,,transcriber',s ,,note3 ,minor inconsistencies in hyphenated words have been adjusted to correspond with the author's most frequent usage4 ,on page #fj a printer error from the original text was corrected3 the word drawings has been changed to drawing in the phrase1 444 drawing has been taught4444 ,,how ,,we ,,think ,,by ,,john ,,dewey ,,professor ,,of ,,philosophy ,,in ,,columbia ,,university ,d4 ,c4 ,,heath ,,co41 ,,publishers ,,boston ,,new ,,york ,,chicago ,,copyright1 #aiaj1 ,,by ,d4 ,c4 ,,heath ,,co4 #b ,f #h ,printed in ,u4 ,s4 ,a4 ,,preface ,our schools are troubled with a multiplication of studies1 each in turn having its own multiplication of materials and principles4 ,our teachers find their tasks made heavier in that they have come to deal with pupils individually and not merely in mass4 ,unless these steps in advance are to end in distraction1 some clew of unity1 some principle that makes for simplification1 must be found4 ,this book represents the conviction that the needed steadying and centralizing factor is found in adopting as the end of endeavor that attitude of mind1 that habit of thought1 which we call scientific4 ,this scientific attitude of mind might1 conceivably1 be quite irrelevant to teaching children and youth4 ,but this book also represents the conviction that such is not the case2 that the native and unspoiled attitude of childhood1 marked by ardent curiosity1 fertile imagination1 and love of experimental inquiry1 is near1 very near1 to the attitude of the scientific mind4 ,if these pages assist any to appreciate this kinship and to consider seriously how its recognition in educational practice would make for individual happiness and the reduction of social waste1 the book will amply have served its purpose4 ,it is hardly necessary to enumerate the authors to whom ,i am indebted4 ,my fundamental indebtedness is to my wife1 by whom the ideas of this book were inspired1 and through whose work in connection with the ,laboratory ,school1 existing in ,chicago between #ahif and #aijc1 the ideas attained such concreteness as comes from embodiment and testing in practice4 ,it is a pleasure1 also1 to acknowledge indebtedness to the intelligence and sympathy of those who cooeperated as teachers and supervisors in the conduct of that school1 and especially to ,mrs4 ,ella ,flagg ,young1 then a colleague in the ,university1 and now ,superintendent of the ,schools of ,chicago4 ,,new ,,york ,,city1 ,december1 #aiji4 ,,contents ,,part ,i ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,training ,,thought ,,chapter ,,page ,i4 ,,what ,,is ,,thought8 #a ,,ii4 ,,the ,,need ,,for ,,training ,,thought #ad ,,iii4 ,,natural ,,resources ,,in ,,the ,,training ,,of ,,thought #bi ,,iv4 ,,school ,,conditions ,,and ,,the ,,training ,,of ,,thought #de ,v4 ,,the ,,means ,,and ,,end ,,of ,,mental ,,training3 ,,the ,,psychological ,,and ,,the ,,logical #ef ,,part ,,ii ,,logical ,,considerations ,,vi4 ,,the ,,analysis ,,of ,a ,,complete ,,act ,,of ,,thought #fh ,,vii4 ,,systematic ,,inference3 ,,induction ,,and ,,deduction #gi ,,viii4 ,,judgment3 ,,the ,,interpretation ,,of ,,facts #aja ,,ix4 ,,meaning3 ,,or ,,conceptions ,,and ,,understanding #aaf ,x4 ,,concrete ,,and ,,abstract ,,thinking #ace ,,xi4 ,,empirical ,,and ,,scientific ,,thinking #ade ,,part ,,iii ,,the ,,training ,,of ,,thought ,,xii4 ,,activity ,,and ,,the ,,training ,,of ,,thought #aeg ,,xiii4 ,,language ,,and ,,the ,,training ,,of ,,thought #agj ,,xiv4 ,,observation ,,and ,,information ,,in ,,the ,,training ,,of ,,mind #ahh ,,xv4 ,,the ,,recitation ,,and ,,the ,,training ,,of ,,thought #bja ,,xvi4 ,,some ,,general ,,conclusions #bad ,,how ,,we ,,think ,,part ,,one3 ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,training ,,thought ,,chapter ,,one ,,what ,,is ,,thought8 ,sec4 #a4 ,varied ,senses of the ,term ,sidenote3 ,four senses of thought1 from the wider to the limited ,no words are oftener on our lips than thinking and thought4 ,so profuse and varied1 indeed1 is our use of these words that it is not easy to define just what we mean by them4 ,the aim of this chapter is to find a single consistent meaning4 ,assistance may be had by considering some typical ways in which the terms are employed4 ,in the first place thought is used broadly1 not to say loosely4 ,everything that comes to mind1 that goes through our heads1 is called a thought4 ,to think of a thing is just to be conscious of it in any way whatsoever4 ,second1 the term is restricted by excluding whatever is directly presented2 we think 7or think of7 only such things as we do not directly see1 hear1 smell1 or taste4 ,then1 third1 the meaning is further limited to beliefs that rest upon some kind of evidence or testimony4 ,of this third type1 two kinds--or1 rather1 two degrees--must be discriminated4 ,in some cases1 a belief is accepted with slight or almost no attempt to state the grounds that support it4 ,in other cases1 the ground or basis for a belief is deliberately sought and its adequacy to support the belief examined4 ,this process is called reflective thought2 it alone is truly educative in value1 and it forms1 accordingly1 the principal subject of this volume4 ,we shall now briefly describe each of the four senses4 ,sidenote3 ,chance and idle thinking ,i4 ,in its loosest sense1 thinking signifies everything that1 as we say1 is in our heads or that goes through our minds4 ,he who offers a penny for your thoughts does not expect to drive any great bargain4 ,in calling the objects of his demand thoughts1 he does not intend to ascribe to them dignity1 consecutiveness1 or truth4 ,any idle fancy1 trivial recollection1 or flitting impression will satisfy his demand4 ,daydreaming1 building of castles in the air1 that loose flux of casual and disconnected material that floats through our minds in relaxed moments are1 in this random sense1 thinking4 ,more of our waking life than we should care to admit1 even to ourselves1 is likely to be whiled away in this inconsequential trifling with idle fancy and unsubstantial hope4 ,sidenote3 ,reflective thought is consecutive1 not merely a sequence ,in this sense1 silly folk and dullards think4 ,the story is told of a man in slight repute for intelligence1 who1 desiring to be chosen selectman in his ,new ,england town1 addressed a knot of neighbors in this wise3 ,i hear you don't believe ,i know enough to hold office4 ,i wish you to understand that ,i am thinking about something or other most of the time4 ,now reflective thought is like this random coursing of things through the mind in that it consists of a succession of things thought of2 but it is unlike1 in that the mere chance occurrence of any chance something or other in an irregular sequence does not suffice4 ,reflection involves not simply a sequence of ideas1 but a consequence--a consecutive ordering in such a way that each determines the next as its proper outcome1 while each in turn leans back on its predecessors4 ,the successive portions of the reflective thought grow out of one another and support one another2 they do not come and go in a medley4 ,each phase is a step from something to something--technically speaking1 it is a term of thought4 ,each term leaves a deposit which is utilized in the next term4 ,the stream or flow becomes a train1 chain1 or thread4 ,sidenote3 ,the restriction of thinking to what goes beyond direct observation ,sidenote3 ,reflective thought aims1 however1 at belief ,,ii4 ,even when thinking is used in a broad sense1 it is usually restricted to matters not directly perceived3 to what we do not see1 smell1 hear1 or touch4 ,we ask the man telling a story if he saw a certain incident happen1 and his reply may be1 ,no1 ,i only thought of it4 ,a note of invention1 as distinct from faithful record of observation1 is present4 ,most important in this class are successions of imaginative incidents and episodes which1 having a certain coherence1 hanging together on a continuous thread1 lie between kaleidoscopic flights of fancy and considerations deliberately employed to establish a conclusion4 ,the imaginative stories poured forth by children possess all degrees of internal congruity2 some are disjointed1 some are articulated4 ,when connected1 they simulate reflective thought2 indeed1 they usually occur in minds of logical capacity4 ,these imaginative enterprises often precede thinking of the close-knit type and prepare the way for it4 ,but they do not aim at knowledge1 at belief about facts or in truths2 and thereby they are marked off from reflective thought even when they most resemble it4 ,those who express such thoughts do not expect credence1 but rather credit for a well-constructed plot or a well-arranged climax4 ,they produce good stories1 not--unless by chance--knowledge4 ,such thoughts are an efflorescence of feeling2 the enhancement of a mood or sentiment is their aim2 congruity of emotion1 their binding tie4 ,sidenote3 ,thought induces belief in two ways ,,iii4 ,in its next sense1 thought denotes belief resting upon some basis1 that is1 real or supposed knowledge going beyond what is directly present4 ,it is marked by acceptance or rejection of something as reasonably probable or improbable4 ,this phase of thought1 however1 includes two such distinct types of belief that1 even though their difference is strictly one of degree1 not of kind1 it becomes practically important to consider them separately4 ,some beliefs are accepted when their grounds have not themselves been considered1 others are accepted because their grounds have been examined4 ,when we say1 ,men used to think the world was flat1 or1 ,i thought you went by the house1 we express belief3 something is accepted1 held to1 acquiesced in1 or affirmed4 ,but such thoughts may mean a supposition accepted without reference to its real grounds4 ,these may be adequate1 they may not2 but their value with reference to the support they afford the belief has not been considered4 ,such thoughts grow up unconsciously and without reference to the attainment of correct belief4 ,they are picked up--we know not how4 ,from obscure sources and by unnoticed channels they insinuate themselves into acceptance and become unconsciously a part of our mental furniture4 ,tradition1 instruction1 imitation--all of which depend upon authority in some form1 or appeal to our own advantage1 or fall in with a strong passion--are responsible for them4 ,such thoughts are prejudices1 that is1 prejudgments1 not judgments proper that rest upon a survey of evidence4#a #a ,this mode of thinking in its contrast with thoughtful inquiry receives special notice in the next chapter4 ,sidenote3 ,thinking in its best sense is that which considers the basis and consequences of beliefs ,,iv4 ,thoughts that result in belief have an importance attached to them which leads to reflective thought1 to conscious inquiry into the nature1 conditions1 and bearings of the belief4 ,to think of whales and camels in the clouds is to entertain ourselves with fancies1 terminable at our pleasure1 which do not lead to any belief in particular4 ,but to think of the world as flat is to ascribe a quality to a real thing as its real property4 ,this conclusion denotes a connection among things and hence is not1 like imaginative thought1 plastic to our mood4 ,belief in the world's flatness commits him who holds it to thinking in certain specific ways of other objects1 such as the heavenly bodies1 antipodes1 the possibility of navigation4 ,it prescribes to him actions in accordance with his conception of these objects4 ,the consequences of a belief upon other beliefs and upon behavior may be so important1 then1 that men are forced to consider the grounds or reasons of their belief and its logical consequences4 ,this means reflective thought--thought in its eulogistic and emphatic sense4 ,sidenote3 ,reflective thought defined ,men thought the world was flat until ,columbus thought it to be round4 ,the earlier thought was a belief held because men had not the energy or the courage to question what those about them accepted and taught1 especially as it was suggested and seemingly confirmed by obvious sensible facts4 ,the thought of ,columbus was a reasoned conclusion4 ,it marked the close of study into facts1 of scrutiny and revision of evidence1 of working out the implications of various hypotheses1 and of comparing these theoretical results with one another and with known facts4 ,because ,columbus did not accept unhesitatingly the current traditional theory1 because he doubted and inquired1 he arrived at his thought4 ,skeptical of what1 from long habit1 seemed most certain1 and credulous of what seemed impossible1 he went on thinking until he could produce evidence for both his confidence and his disbelief4 ,even if his conclusion had finally turned out wrong1 it would have been a different sort of belief from those it antagonized1 because it was reached by a different method4 ,active1 persistent1 and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it1 and the further conclusions to which it tends1 constitutes reflective thought4 ,any one of the first three kinds of thought may elicit this type2 but once begun1 it is a conscious and voluntary effort to establish belief upon a firm basis of reasons4 ,sec4 #b4 ,the ,central ,factor in ,thinking ,sidenote3 ,there is a common element in all types of thought3 ,there are1 however1 no sharp lines of demarcation between the various operations just outlined4 ,the problem of attaining correct habits of reflection would be much easier than it is1 did not the different modes of thinking blend insensibly into one another4 ,so far1 we have considered rather extreme instances of each kind in order to get the field clearly before us4 ,let us now reverse this operation2 let us consider a rudimentary case of thinking1 lying between careful examination of evidence and a mere irresponsible stream of fancies4 ,a man is walking on a warm day4 ,the sky was clear the last time he observed it2 but presently he notes1 while occupied primarily with other things1 that the air is cooler4 ,it occurs to him that it is probably going to rain2 looking up1 he sees a dark cloud between him and the sun1 and he then quickens his steps4 ,what1 if anything1 in such a situation can be called thought8 ,neither the act of walking nor the noting of the cold is a thought4 ,walking is one direction of activity2 looking and noting are other modes of activity4 ,the likelihood that it will rain is1 however1 something suggested4 ,the pedestrian feels the cold2 he thinks of clouds and a coming shower4 ,sidenote3 viz4 suggestion of something not observed ,sidenote3 ,but reflection involves also the relation of signifying ,so far there is the same sort of situation as when one looking at a cloud is reminded of a human figure and face4 ,thinking in both of these cases 7the cases of belief and of fancy7 involves a noted or perceived fact1 followed by something else which is not observed but which is brought to mind1 suggested by the thing seen4 ,one reminds us1 as we say1 of the other4 ,side by side1 however1 with this factor of agreement in the two cases of suggestion is a factor of marked disagreement4 ,we do not believe in the face suggested by the cloud2 we do not consider at all the probability of its being a fact4 ,there is no reflective thought4 ,the danger of rain1 on the contrary1 presents itself to us as a genuine possibility--as a possible fact of the same nature as the observed coolness4 ,put differently1 we do not regard the cloud as meaning or indicating a face1 but merely as suggesting it1 while we do consider that the coolness may mean rain4 ,in the first case1 seeing an object1 we just happen1 as we say1 to think of something else2 in the second1 we consider the possibility and nature of the connection between the object seen and the object suggested4 ,the seen thing is regarded as in some way the ground or basis of belief in the suggested thing2 it possesses the quality of evidence4 ,sidenote3 ,various synonymous expressions for the function of signifying ,this function by which one thing signifies or indicates another1 and thereby leads us to consider how far one may be regarded as warrant for belief in the other1 is1 then1 the central factor in all reflective or distinctively intellectual thinking4 ,by calling up various situations to which such terms as signifies and indicates apply1 the student will best realize for himself the actual facts denoted by the words reflective thought4 ,synonyms for these terms are3 points to1 tells of1 betokens1 prognosticates1 represents1 stands for1 implies4#b ,we also say one thing portends another2 is ominous of another1 or a symptom of it1 or a key to it1 or 7if the connection is quite obscure7 that it gives a hint1 clue1 or intimation4 #b ,implies is more often used when a principle or general truth brings about belief in some other truth2 the other phrases are more frequently used to denote the cases in which one fact or event leads us to believe in something else4 ,sidenote3 ,reflection and belief on evidence ,reflection thus implies that something is believed in 7or disbelieved in71 not on its own direct account1 but through something else which stands as witness1 evidence1 proof1 voucher1 warrant2 that is1 as ground of belief4 ,at one time1 rain is actually felt or directly experienced2 at another time1 we infer that it has rained from the looks of the grass and trees1 or that it is going to rain because of the condition of the air or the state of the barometer4 ,at one time1 we see a man 7or suppose we do7 without any intermediary fact2 at another time1 we are not quite sure what we see1 and hunt for accompanying facts that will serve as signs1 indications1 tokens of what is to be believed4 ,thinking1 for the purposes of this inquiry1 is defined accordingly as that operation in which present facts suggest other facts 7or truths7 in such a way as to induce belief in the latter upon the ground or warrant of the former4 ,we do not put beliefs that rest simply on inference on the surest level of assurance4 ,to say ,i think so implies that ,i do not as yet know so4 ,the inferential belief may later be confirmed and come to stand as sure1 but in itself it always has a certain element of supposition4 ,sec4 #c4 ,elements in ,reflective ,thinking ,so much for the description of the more external and obvious aspects of the fact called thinking4 ,further consideration at once reveals certain subprocesses which are involved in every reflective operation4 ,these are3 7a7 a state of perplexity1 hesitation1 doubt2 and 7b7 an act of search or investigation directed toward bringing to light further facts which serve to corroborate or to nullify the suggested belief4 ,sidenote3 ,the importance of uncertainty 7a7 ,in our illustration1 the shock of coolness generated confusion and suspended belief1 at least momentarily4 ,because it was unexpected1 it was a shock or an interruption needing to be accounted for1 identified1 or placed4 ,to say that the abrupt occurrence of the change of temperature constitutes a problem may sound forced and artificial2 but if we are willing to extend the meaning of the word problem to whatever--no matter how slight and commonplace in character--perplexes and challenges the mind so that it makes belief at all uncertain1 there is a genuine problem or question involved in this experience of sudden change4 ,sidenote3 and of inquiry in order to test 7b7 ,the turning of the head1 the lifting of the eyes1 the scanning of the heavens1 are activities adapted to bring to recognition facts that will answer the question presented by the sudden coolness4 ,the facts as they first presented themselves were perplexing2 they suggested1 however1 clouds4 ,the act of looking was an act to discover if this suggested explanation held good4 ,it may again seem forced to speak of this looking1 almost automatic1 as an act of research or inquiry4 ,but once more1 if we are willing to generalize our conceptions of our mental operations to include the trivial and ordinary as well as the technical and recondite1 there is no good reason for refusing to give such a title to the act of looking4 ,the purport of this act of inquiry is to confirm or to refute the suggested belief4 ,new facts are brought to perception1 which either corroborate the idea that a change of weather is imminent1 or negate it4 ,sidenote3 ,finding one's way an illustration of reflection ,another instance1 commonplace also1 yet not quite so trivial1 may enforce this lesson4 ,a man traveling in an unfamiliar region comes to a branching of the roads4 ,having no sure knowledge to fall back upon1 he is brought to a standstill of hesitation and suspense4 ,which road is right8 ,and how shall perplexity be resolved8 ,there are but two alternatives3 he must either blindly and arbitrarily take his course1 trusting to luck for the outcome1 or he must discover grounds for the conclusion that a given road is right4 ,any attempt to decide the matter by thinking will involve inquiry into other facts1 whether brought out by memory or by further observation1 or by both4 ,the perplexed wayfarer must carefully scrutinize what is before him and he must cudgel his memory4 ,he looks for evidence that will support belief in favor of either of the roads--for evidence that will weight down one suggestion4 ,he may climb a tree2 he may go first in this direction1 then in that1 looking1 in either case1 for signs1 clues1 indications4 ,he wants something in the nature of a signboard or a map1 and his reflection is aimed at the discovery of facts that will serve this purpose4 ,sidenote3 ,possible1 yet incompatible1 suggestions ,the above illustration may be generalized4 ,thinking begins in what may fairly enough be called a forked-road situation1 a situation which is ambiguous1 which presents a dilemma1 which proposes alternatives4 ,as long as our activity glides smoothly along from one thing to another1 or as long as we permit our imagination to entertain fancies at pleasure1 there is no call for reflection4 ,difficulty or obstruction in the way of reaching a belief brings us1 however1 to a pause4 ,in the suspense of uncertainty1 we metaphorically climb a tree2 we try to find some standpoint from which we may survey additional facts and1 getting a more commanding view of the situation1 may decide how the facts stand related to one another4 ,sidenote3 ,regulation of thinking by its purpose ,demand for the solution of a perplexity is the steadying and guiding factor in the entire process of reflection4 ,where there is no question of a problem to be solved or a difficulty to be surmounted1 the course of suggestions flows on at random2 we have the first type of thought described4 ,if the stream of suggestions is controlled simply by their emotional congruity1 their fitting agreeably into a single picture or story1 we have the second type4 ,but a question to be answered1 an ambiguity to be resolved1 sets up an end and holds the current of ideas to a definite channel4 ,every suggested conclusion is tested by its reference to this regulating end1 by its pertinence to the problem in hand4 ,this need of straightening out a perplexity also controls the kind of inquiry undertaken4 ,a traveler whose end is the most beautiful path will look for other considerations and will test suggestions occurring to him on another principle than if he wishes to discover the way to a given city4 ,the problem fixes the end of thought and the end controls the process of thinking4 ,sec4 #d4 ,summary ,sidenote3 ,origin and stimulus ,we may recapitulate by saying that the origin of thinking is some perplexity1 confusion1 or doubt4 ,thinking is not a case of spontaneous combustion2 it does not occur just on general principles4 ,there is something specific which occasions and evokes it4 ,general appeals to a child 7or to a grown-up7 to think1 irrespective of the existence in his own experience of some difficulty that troubles him and disturbs his equilibrium1 are as futile as advice to lift himself by his boot-straps4 ,sidenote3 ,suggestions and past experience ,given a difficulty1 the next step is suggestion of some way out--the formation of some tentative plan or project1 the entertaining of some theory which will account for the peculiarities in question1 the consideration of some solution for the problem4 ,the data at hand cannot supply the solution2 they can only suggest it4 ,what1 then1 are the sources of the suggestion8 ,clearly past experience and prior knowledge4 ,if the person has had some acquaintance with similar situations1 if he has dealt with material of the same sort before1 suggestions more or less apt and helpful are likely to arise4 ,but unless there has been experience in some degree analogous1 which may now be represented in imagination1 confusion remains mere confusion4 ,there is nothing upon which to draw in order to clarify it4 ,even when a child 7or a grown-up7 has a problem1 to urge him to think when he has no prior experiences involving some of the same conditions1 is wholly futile4 ,sidenote3 ,exploration and testing ,if the suggestion that occurs is at once accepted1 we have uncritical thinking1 the minimum of reflection4 ,to turn the thing over in mind1 to reflect1 means to hunt for additional evidence1 for new data1 that will develop the suggestion1 and will either1 as we say1 bear it out or else make obvious its absurdity and irrelevance4 ,given a genuine difficulty and a reasonable amount of analogous experience to draw upon1 the difference1 par excellence1 between good and bad thinking is found at this point4 ,the easiest way is to accept any suggestion that seems plausible and thereby bring to an end the condition of mental uneasiness4 ,reflective thinking is always more or less troublesome because it involves overcoming the inertia that inclines one to accept suggestions at their face value2 it involves willingness to endure a condition of mental unrest and disturbance4 ,reflective thinking1 in short1 means judgment suspended during further inquiry2 and suspense is likely to be somewhat painful4 ,as we shall see later1 the most important factor in the training of good mental habits consists in acquiring the attitude of suspended conclusion1 and in mastering the various methods of searching for new materials to corroborate or to refute the first suggestions that occur4 ,to maintain the state of doubt and to carry on systematic and protracted inquiry--these are the essentials of thinking4 ,,chapter ,,two ,,the ,,need ,,for ,,training ,,thought ,sidenote3 ,man the animal that thinks ,to expatiate upon the importance of thought would be absurd4 ,the traditional definition of man as the thinking animal fixes thought as the essential difference between man and the brutes1--surely an important matter4 ,more relevant to our purpose is the question how thought is important1 for an answer to this question will throw light upon the kind of training thought requires if it is to subserve its end4 ,sec4 #a4 ,the ,values of ,thought ,sidenote3 ,the possibility of deliberate and intentional activity ,i4 ,thought affords the sole method of escape from purely impulsive or purely routine action4 ,a being without capacity for thought is moved only by instincts and appetites1 as these are called forth by outward conditions and by the inner state of the organism4 ,a being thus moved is1 as it were1 pushed from behind4 ,this is what we mean by the blind nature of brute actions4 ,the agent does not see or foresee the end for which he is acting1 nor the results produced by his behaving in one way rather than in another4 ,he does not know what he is about4 ,where there is thought1 things present act as signs or tokens of things not yet experienced4 ,a thinking being can1 accordingly1 act on the basis of the absent and the future4 ,instead of being pushed into a mode of action by the sheer urgency of forces1 whether instincts or habits1 of which he is not aware1 a reflective agent is drawn 7to some extent at least7 to action by some remoter object of which he is indirectly aware4 ,sidenote3 ,natural events come to be a language ,an animal without thought may go into its hole when rain threatens1 because of some immediate stimulus to its organism4 ,a thinking agent will perceive that certain given facts are probable signs of a future rain1 and will take steps in the light of this anticipated future4 ,to plant seeds1 to cultivate the soil1 to harvest grain1 are intentional acts1 possible only to a being who has learned to subordinate the immediately felt elements of an experience to those values which these hint at and prophesy4 ,philosophers have made much of the phrases book of nature1 language of nature4 ,well1 it is in virtue of the capacity of thought that given things are significant of absent things1 and that nature speaks a language which may be interpreted4 ,to a being who thinks1 things are records of their past1 as fossils tell of the prior history of the earth1 and are prophetic of their future1 as from the present positions of heavenly bodies remote eclipses are foretold4 ,shakespeare's tongues in trees1 books in the running brooks1 expresses literally enough the power superadded to existences when they appeal to a thinking being4 ,upon the function of signification depend all foresight1 all intelligent planning1 deliberation1 and calculation4 ,sidenote3 ,the possibility of systematized foresight ,,ii4 ,by thought man also develops and arranges artificial signs to remind him in advance of consequences1 and of ways of securing and avoiding them4 ,as the trait just mentioned makes the difference between savage man and brute1 so this trait makes the difference between civilized man and savage4 ,a savage who has been shipwrecked in a river may note certain things which serve him as signs of danger in the future4 ,but civilized man deliberately makes such signs2 he sets up in advance of wreckage warning buoys1 and builds lighthouses where he sees signs that such events may occur4 ,a savage reads weather signs with great expertness2 civilized man institutes a weather service by which signs are artificially secured and information is distributed in advance of the appearance of any signs that could be detected without special methods4 ,a savage finds his way skillfully through a wilderness by reading certain obscure indications2 civilized man builds a highway which shows the road to all4 ,the savage learns to detect the signs of fire and thereby to invent methods of producing flame2 civilized man invents permanent conditions for producing light and heat whenever they are needed4 ,the very essence of civilized culture is that we deliberately erect monuments and memorials1 lest we forget2 and deliberately institute1 in advance of the happening of various contingencies and emergencies of life1 devices for detecting their approach and registering their nature1 for warding off what is unfavorable1 or at least for protecting ourselves from its full impact and for making more secure and extensive what is favorable4 ,all forms of artificial apparatus are intentionally designed modifications of natural things in order that they may serve better than in their natural estate to indicate the hidden1 the absent1 and the remote4 ,sidenote3 ,the possibility of objects rich in quality ,,iii4 ,finally1 thought confers upon physical events and objects a very different status and value from that which they possess to a being that does not reflect4 ,these words are mere scratches1 curious variations of light and shade1 to one to whom they are not linguistic signs4 ,to him for whom they are signs of other things1 each has a definite individuality of its own1 according to the meaning that it is used to convey4 ,exactly the same holds of natural objects4 ,a chair is a different object to a being to whom it consciously suggests an opportunity for sitting down1 repose1 or sociable converse1 from what it is to one to whom it presents itself merely as a thing to be smelled1 or gnawed1 or jumped over2 a stone is different to one who knows something of its past history and its future use from what it is to one who only feels it directly through his senses4 ,it is only by courtesy1 indeed1 that we can say that an unthinking animal experiences an object at all--so largely is anything that presents itself to us as an object made up by the qualities it possesses as a sign of other things4 ,sidenote3 ,the nature of the objects an animal perceives ,an ,english logician 7,mr4 ,venn7 has remarked that it may be questioned whether a dog sees a rainbow any more than he apprehends the political constitution of the country in which he lives4 ,the same principle applies to the kennel in which he sleeps and the meat that he eats4 ,when he is sleepy1 he goes to the kennel2 when he is hungry1 he is excited by the smell and color of meat2 beyond this1 in what sense does he see an object8 ,certainly he does not see a house--i4e4 a thing with all the properties and relations of a permanent residence1 unless he is capable of making what is present a uniform sign of what is absent--unless he is capable of thought4 ,nor does he see what he eats as meat unless it suggests the absent properties by virtue of which it is a certain joint of some animal1 and is known to afford nourishment4 ,just what is left of an object stripped of all such qualities of meaning1 we cannot well say2 but we can be sure that the object is then a very different sort of thing from the objects that we perceive4 ,there is moreover no particular limit to the possibilities of growth in the fusion of a thing as it is to sense and as it is to thought1 or as a sign of other things4 ,the child today soon regards as constituent parts of objects qualities that once it required the intelligence of a ,copernicus or a ,newton to apprehend4 ,sidenote3 ,mill on the business of life and the occupation of mind ,these various values of the power of thought may be summed up in the following quotation from ,john ,stuart ,mill4 ,to draw inferences1 he says1 has been said to be the great business of life4 ,every one has daily1 hourly1 and momentary need of ascertaining facts which he has not directly observed3 not from any general purpose of adding to his stock of knowledge1 but because the facts themselves are of importance to his interests or to his occupations4 ,the business of the magistrate1 of the military commander1 of the navigator1 of the physician1 of the agriculturist1 is merely to judge of evidence and to act accordingly4444 ,as they do this well or ill1 so they discharge well or ill the duties of their several callings4 ,it is the only occupation in which the mind never ceases to be engaged4#c #c ,mill1 ,system of ,logic1 ,introduction1 ,sec4 #e4 ,sec4 #b4 ,importance of ,direction in order to ,realize these ,values ,sidenote3 ,thinking goes astray ,what a person has not only daily and hourly1 but momentary need of performing1 is not a technical and abstruse matter2 nor1 on the other hand1 is it trivial and negligible4 ,such a function must be congenial to the mind1 and must be performed1 in an unspoiled mind1 upon every fitting occasion4 ,just because1 however1 it is an operation of drawing inferences1 of basing conclusions upon evidence1 of reaching belief indirectly1 it is an operation that may go wrong as well as right1 and hence is one that needs safeguarding and training4 ,the greater its importance the greater are the evils when it is ill-exercised4 ,sidenote3 ,ideas are our rulers--for better or for worse ,an earlier writer than ,mill1 ,john ,locke 7#afcb-agjd71 brings out the importance of thought for life and the need of training so that its best and not its worst possibilities will be realized1 in the following words3 ,no man ever sets himself about anything but upon some view or other1 which serves him for a reason for what he does2 and whatsoever faculties he employs1 the understanding with such light as it has1 well or ill informed1 constantly leads2 and by that light1 true or false1 all his operative powers are directed4444 ,temples have their sacred images1 and we see what influence they have always had over a great part of mankind4 ,but in truth the ideas and images in men's minds are the invisible powers that constantly govern them1 and to these they all1 universally1 pay a ready submission4 ,it is therefore of the highest concernment that great care should be taken of the understanding1 to conduct it aright in the search of knowledge and in the judgments it makes4#d ,if upon thought hang all deliberate activities and the uses we make of all our other powers1 ,locke's assertion that it is of the highest concernment that care should be taken of its conduct is a moderate statement4 ,while the power of thought frees us from servile subjection to instinct1 appetite1 and routine1 it also brings with it the occasion and possibility of error and mistake4 ,in elevating us above the brute1 it opens to us the possibility of failures to which the animal1 limited to instinct1 cannot sink4 #d ,locke1 ,of the ,conduct of the ,understanding1 first paragraph4 ,sec4 #c4 ,tendencies ,needing ,constant ,regulation ,sidenote3 ,physical and social sanctions of correct thinking ,up to a certain point1 the ordinary conditions of life1 natural and social1 provide the conditions requisite for regulating the operations of inference4 ,the necessities of life enforce a fundamental and persistent discipline for which the most cunningly devised artifices would be ineffective substitutes4 ,the burnt child dreads the fire2 the painful consequence emphasizes the need of correct inference much more than would learned discourse on the properties of heat4 ,social conditions also put a premium on correct inferring in matters where action based on valid thought is socially important4 ,these sanctions of proper thinking may affect life itself1 or at least a life reasonably free from perpetual discomfort4 ,the signs of enemies1 of shelter1 of food1 of the main social conditions1 have to be correctly apprehended4 ,sidenote3 ,the serious limitations of such sanctions ,but this disciplinary training1 efficacious as it is within certain limits1 does not carry us beyond a restricted boundary4 ,logical attainment in one direction is no bar to extravagant conclusions in another4 ,a savage expert in judging signs of the movements and location of animals that he hunts1 will accept and gravely narrate the most preposterous yarns concerning the origin of their habits and structures4 ,when there is no directly appreciable reaction of the inference upon the security and prosperity of life1 there are no natural checks to the acceptance of wrong beliefs4 ,conclusions may be generated by a modicum of fact merely because the suggestions are vivid and interesting2 a large accumulation of data may fail to suggest a proper conclusion because existing customs are averse to entertaining it4 ,independent of training1 there is a primitive credulity which tends to make no distinction between what a trained mind calls fancy and that which it calls a reasonable conclusion4 ,the face in the clouds is believed in as some sort of fact1 merely because it is forcibly suggested4 ,natural intelligence is no barrier to the propagation of error1 nor large but untrained experience to the accumulation of fixed false beliefs4 ,errors may support one another mutually and weave an ever larger and firmer fabric of misconception4 ,dreams1 the positions of stars1 the lines of the hand1 may be regarded as valuable signs1 and the fall of cards as an inevitable omen1 while natural events of the most crucial significance go disregarded4 ,beliefs in portents of various kinds1 now mere nook and cranny superstitions1 were once universal4 ,a long discipline in exact science was required for their conquest4 ,sidenote3 ,superstition as natural a result as science ,in the mere function of suggestion1 there is no difference between the power of a column of mercury to portend rain1 and that of the entrails of an animal or the flight of birds to foretell the fortunes of war4 ,for all anybody can tell in advance1 the spilling of salt is as likely to import bad luck as the bite of a mosquito to import malaria4 ,only systematic regulation of the conditions under which observations are made and severe discipline of the habits of entertaining suggestions can secure a decision that one type of belief is vicious and the other sound4 ,the substitution of scientific for superstitious habits of inference has not been brought about by any improvement in the acuteness of the senses or in the natural workings of the function of suggestion4 ,it is the result of regulation of the conditions under which observation and inference take place4 ,sidenote3 ,general causes of bad thinking3 ,bacon's idols ,it is instructive to note some of the attempts that have been made to classify the main sources of error in reaching beliefs4 ,francis ,bacon1 for example1 at the beginnings of modern scientific inquiry1 enumerated four such classes1 under the somewhat fantastic title of idols 7,gr4 ,greek3 eidola1 images71 spectral forms that allure the mind into false paths4 ,these he called the idols1 or phantoms1 of the 7a7 tribe1 7b7 the marketplace1 7c7 the cave or den1 and 7d7 the theater2 or1 less metaphorically1 7a7 standing erroneous methods 7or at least temptations to error7 that have their roots in human nature generally2 7b7 those that come from intercourse and language2 7c7 those that are due to causes peculiar to a specific individual2 and finally1 7d7 those that have their sources in the fashion or general current of a period4 ,classifying these causes of fallacious belief somewhat differently1 we may say that two are intrinsic and two are extrinsic4 ,of the intrinsic1 one is common to all men alike 7such as the universal tendency to notice instances that corroborate a favorite belief more readily than those that contradict it71 while the other resides in the specific temperament and habits of the given individual4 ,of the extrinsic1 one proceeds from generic social conditions--like the tendency to suppose that there is a fact wherever there is a word1 and no fact where there is no linguistic term--while the other proceeds from local and temporary social currents4 ,sidenote3 ,locke on the influence of ,locke's method of dealing with typical forms of wrong belief is less formal and may be more enlightening4 ,we can hardly do better than quote his forcible and quaint language1 when1 enumerating different classes of men1 he shows different ways in which thought goes wrong3 ,sidenote3 7a7 dependence on others1 #a4 ,the first is of those who seldom reason at all1 but do and think according to the example of others1 whether parents1 neighbors1 ministers1 or who else they are pleased to make choice of to have an implicit faith in1 for the saving of themselves the pains and troubles of thinking and examining for themselves4 ,sidenote3 7b7 self-interest1 #b4 ,this kind is of those who put passion in the place of reason1 and being resolved that shall govern their actions and arguments1 neither use their own1 nor hearken to other people's reason1 any farther than it suits their humor1 interest1 or party4#e #e ,in another place he says3 ,men's prejudices and inclinations impose often upon themselves4444 ,inclination suggests and slides into discourse favorable terms1 which introduce favorable ideas2 till at last by this means that is concluded clear and evident1 thus dressed up1 which1 taken in its native state1 by making use of none but precise determined ideas1 would find no admittance at all4 ,sidenote3 7c7 circumscribed experience #c4 ,the third sort is of those who readily and sincerely follow reason1 but for want of having that which one may call large1 sound1 roundabout sense1 have not a full view of all that relates to the question4444 ,they converse but with one sort of men1 they read but one sort of books1 they will not come in the hearing but of one sort of notions4444 ,they have a pretty traffic with known correspondents in some little creek 444 but will not venture out into the great ocean of knowledge4 ,men of originally equal natural parts may finally arrive at very different stores of knowledge and truth1 when all the odds between them has been the different scope that has been given to their understandings to range in1 for the gathering up of information and furnishing their heads with ideas and notions and observations1 whereon to employ their mind4#f #f ,the ,conduct of the ,understanding1 ,sec4 #c4 ,in another portion of his writings1#g ,locke states the same ideas in slightly different form4 #g ,essay ,concerning ,human ,understanding1 bk4 ,,iv1 ch4 ,,xx1 ,of ,wrong ,assent or ,error4 ,sidenote3 ,effect of dogmatic principles1 #a4 ,that which is inconsistent with our principles is so far from passing for probable with us that it will not be allowed possible4 ,the reverence borne to these principles is so great1 and their authority so paramount to all other1 that the testimony1 not only of other men1 but the evidence of our own senses are often rejected1 when they offer to vouch anything contrary to these established rules4444 ,there is nothing more ordinary than children's receiving into their minds propositions 444 from their parents1 nurses1 or those about them2 which being insinuated in their unwary as well as unbiased understandings1 and fastened by degrees1 are at last 7and this whether true or false7 riveted there by long custom and education1 beyond all possibility of being pulled out again4 ,for men1 when they are grown up1 reflecting upon their opinions and finding those of this sort to be as ancient in their minds as their very memories1 not having observed their early insinuation1 nor by what means they got them1 they are apt to reverence them as sacred things1 and not to suffer them to be profaned1 touched1 or questioned4 ,they take them as standards to be the great and unerring deciders of truth and falsehood1 and the judges to which they are to appeal in all manner of controversies4 ,sidenote3 of closed minds1 #b4 ,secondly1 next to these are men whose understandings are cast into a mold1 and fashioned just to the size of a received hypothesis4 ,such men1 ,locke goes on to say1 while not denying the existence of facts and evidence1 cannot be convinced by the evidence that would decide them if their minds were not so closed by adherence to fixed belief4 ,sidenote3 of strong passion1 #c4 ,predominant ,passions4 ,thirdly1 probabilities which cross men's appetites and prevailing passions run the same fate4 ,let ever so much probability hang on one side of a covetous man's reasoning1 and money on the other1 it is easy to foresee which will outweigh4 ,earthly minds1 like mud walls1 resist the strongest batteries4 ,sidenote3 of dependence upon authority of others #d4 ,authority4 ,the fourth and last wrong measure of probability ,i shall take notice of1 and which keeps in ignorance or error more people than all the others together1 is the giving up our assent to the common received opinions1 either of our friends or party1 neighborhood or country4 ,sidenote3 ,causes of bad mental habits are social as well as inborn ,both ,bacon and ,locke make it evident that over and above the sources of misbelief that reside in the natural tendencies of the individual 7like those toward hasty and too far-reaching conclusions71 social conditions tend to instigate and confirm wrong habits of thinking by authority1 by conscious instruction1 and by the even more insidious half-conscious influences of language1 imitation1 sympathy1 and suggestion4 ,education has accordingly not only to safeguard an individual against the besetting erroneous tendencies of his own mind--its rashness1 presumption1 and preference of what chimes with self-interest to objective evidence--but also to undermine and destroy the accumulated and self-perpetuating prejudices of long ages4 ,when social life in general has become more reasonable1 more imbued with rational conviction1 and less moved by stiff authority and blind passion1 educational agencies may be more positive and constructive than at present1 for they will work in harmony with the educative influence exercised willy-nilly by other social surroundings upon an individual's habits of thought and belief4 ,at present1 the work of teaching must not only transform natural tendencies into trained habits of thought1 but must also fortify the mind against irrational tendencies current in the social environment1 and help displace erroneous habits already produced4 ,sec4 #d4 ,regulation ,transforms ,inference into ,proof ,sidenote3 ,a leap is involved in all thinking ,thinking is important because1 as we have seen1 it is that function in which given or ascertained facts stand for or indicate others which are not directly ascertained4 ,but the process of reaching the absent from the present is peculiarly exposed to error2 it is liable to be influenced by almost any number of unseen and unconsidered causes1--past experience1 received dogmas1 the stirring of self-interest1 the arousing of passion1 sheer mental laziness1 a social environment steeped in biased traditions or animated by false expectations1 and so on4 ,the exercise of thought is1 in the literal sense of that word1 inference2 by it one thing carries us over to the idea of1 and belief in1 another thing4 ,it involves a jump1 a leap1 a going beyond what is surely known to something else accepted on its warrant4 ,unless one is an idiot1 one simply cannot help having all things and events suggest other things not actually present1 nor can one help a tendency to believe in the latter on the basis of the former4 ,the very inevitableness of the jump1 the leap1 to something unknown1 only emphasizes the necessity of attention to the conditions under which it occurs so that the danger of a false step may be lessened and the probability of a right landing increased4 ,sidenote3 ,hence1 the need of regulation which1 when adequate1 makes proof ,such attention consists in regulation 7#a7 of the conditions under which the function of suggestion takes place1 and 7#b7 of the conditions under which credence is yielded to the suggestions that occur4 ,inference controlled in these two ways 7the study of which in detail constitutes one of the chief objects of this book7 forms proof4 ,to prove a thing means primarily to try1 to test it4 ,the guest bidden to the wedding feast excused himself because he had to prove his oxen4 ,exceptions are said to prove a rule2 i4e4 they furnish instances so extreme that they try in the severest fashion its applicability2 if the rule will stand such a test1 there is no good reason for further doubting it4 ,not until a thing has been tried--tried out1 in colloquial language--do we know its true worth4 ,till then it may be pretense1 a bluff4 ,but the thing that has come out victorious in a test or trial of strength carries its credentials with it2 it is approved1 because it has been proved4 ,its value is clearly evinced1 shown1 i4e4 demonstrated4 ,so it is with inferences4 ,the mere fact that inference in general is an invaluable function does not guarantee1 nor does it even help out the correctness of any particular inference4 ,any inference may go astray2 and as we have seen1 there are standing influences ever ready to assist its going wrong4 ,what is important1 is that every inference shall be a tested inference2 or 7since often this is not possible7 that we shall discriminate between beliefs that rest upon tested evidence and those that do not1 and shall be accordingly on our guard as to the kind and degree of assent yielded4 ,sidenote3 ,the office of education in forming skilled ,sidenote3 powers of thinking ,while it is not the business of education to prove every statement made1 any more than to teach every possible item of information1 it is its business to cultivate deep-seated and effective habits of discriminating tested beliefs from mere assertions1 guesses1 and opinions2 to develop a lively1 sincere1 and open-minded preference for conclusions that are properly grounded1 and to ingrain into the individual's working habits methods of inquiry and reasoning appropriate to the various problems that present themselves4 ,no matter how much an individual knows as a matter of hearsay and information1 if he has not attitudes and habits of this sort1 he is not intellectually educated4 ,he lacks the rudiments of mental discipline4 ,and since these habits are not a gift of nature 7no matter how strong the aptitude for acquiring them72 since1 moreover1 the casual circumstances of the natural and social environment are not enough to compel their acquisition1 the main office of education is to supply conditions that make for their cultivation4 ,the formation of these habits is the ,training of ,mind4 ,,chapter ,,three ,,natural ,,resources ,,in ,,the ,,training ,,of ,,thought ,sidenote3 ,only native powers can be trained4 ,in the last chapter we considered the need of transforming1 through training1 the natural capacities of inference into habits of critical examination and inquiry4 ,the very importance of thought for life makes necessary its control by education because of its natural tendency to go astray1 and because social influences exist that tend to form habits of thought leading to inadequate and erroneous beliefs4 ,training must1 however1 be itself based upon the natural tendencies1--that is1 it must find its point of departure in them4 ,a being who could not think without training could never be trained to think2 one may have to learn to think well1 but not to think4 ,training1 in short1 must fall back upon the prior and independent existence of natural powers2 it is concerned with their proper direction1 not with creating them4 ,sidenote3 ,hence1 the one taught must take the initiative ,teaching and learning are correlative or corresponding processes1 as much so as selling and buying4 ,one might as well say he has sold when no one has bought1 as to say that he has taught when no one has learned4 ,and in the educational transaction1 the initiative lies with the learner even more than in commerce it lies with the buyer4 ,if an individual can learn to think only in the sense of learning to employ more economically and effectively powers he already possesses1 even more truly one can teach others to think only in the sense of appealing to and fostering powers already active in them4 ,effective appeal of this kind is impossible unless the teacher has an insight into existing habits and tendencies1 the natural resources with which he has to ally himself4 ,sidenote3 ,three important natural resources ,any inventory of the items of this natural capital is somewhat arbitrary because it must pass over many of the complex details4 ,but a statement of the factors essential to thought will put before us in outline the main elements4 ,thinking involves 7as we have seen7 the suggestion of a conclusion for acceptance1 and also search or inquiry to test the value of the suggestion before finally accepting it4 ,this implies 7a7 a certain fund or store of experiences and facts from which suggestions proceed2 7b7 promptness1 flexibility1 and fertility of suggestions2 and 7c7 orderliness1 consecutiveness1 appropriateness in what is suggested4 ,clearly1 a person may be hampered in any of these three regards3 ,his thinking may be irrelevant1 narrow1 or crude because he has not enough actual material upon which to base conclusions2 or because concrete facts and raw material1 even if extensive and bulky1 fail to evoke suggestions easily and richly2 or finally1 because1 even when these two conditions are fulfilled1 the ideas suggested are incoherent and fantastic1 rather than pertinent and consistent4 ,sec4 #a4 ,curiosity ,sidenote3 ,desire for fullness of experience3 ,the most vital and significant factor in supplying the primary material whence suggestion may issue is1 without doubt1 curiosity4 ,the wisest of the ,greeks used to say that wonder is the mother of all science4 ,an inert mind waits1 as it were1 for experiences to be imperiously forced upon it4 ,the pregnant saying of ,wordsworth3 ,the eye--it cannot choose but see2 ,we cannot bid the ear be still2 ,our bodies feel1 where'er they be1 ,against or with our will-- holds good in the degree in which one is naturally possessed by curiosity4 ,the curious mind is constantly alert and exploring1 seeking material for thought1 as a vigorous and healthy body is on the qui vive for nutriment4 ,eagerness for experience1 for new and varied contacts1 is found where wonder is found4 ,such curiosity is the only sure guarantee of the acquisition of the primary facts upon which inference must base itself4 ,sidenote3 7a7 physical 7a7 ,in its first manifestations1 curiosity is a vital overflow1 an expression of an abundant organic energy4 ,a physiological uneasiness leads a child to be into everything1--to be reaching1 poking1 pounding1 prying4 ,observers of animals have noted what one author calls their inveterate tendency to fool4 ,rats run about1 smell1 dig1 or gnaw1 without real reference to the business in hand4 ,in the same way ,jack a dog scrabbles and jumps1 the kitten wanders and picks1 the otter slips about everywhere like ground lightning1 the elephant fumbles ceaselessly1 the monkey pulls things about4#h ,the most casual notice of the activities of a young child reveals a ceaseless display of exploring and testing activity4 ,objects are sucked1 fingered1 and thumped2 drawn and pushed1 handled and thrown2 in short1 experimented with1 till they cease to yield new qualities4 ,such activities are hardly intellectual1 and yet without them intellectual activity would be feeble and intermittent through lack of stuff for its operations4 #h ,hobhouse1 ,mind in ,evolution1 p4 #aie4 ,sidenote3 7b7 social 7b7 ,a higher stage of curiosity develops under the influence of social stimuli4 ,when the child learns that he can appeal to others to eke out his store of experiences1 so that1 if objects fail to respond interestingly to his experiments1 he may call upon persons to provide interesting material1 a new epoch sets in4 ,what is that8 ,why8 become the unfailing signs of a child's presence4 ,at first this questioning is hardly more than a projection into social relations of the physical overflow which earlier kept the child pushing and pulling1 opening and shutting4 ,he asks in succession what holds up the house1 what holds up the soil that holds the house1 what holds up the earth that holds the soil2 but his questions are not evidence of any genuine consciousness of rational connections4 ,his why is not a demand for scientific explanation2 the motive behind it is simply eagerness for a larger acquaintance with the mysterious world in which he is placed4 ,the search is not for a law or principle1 but only for a bigger fact4 ,yet there is more than a desire to accumulate just information or heap up disconnected items1 although sometimes the interrogating habit threatens to degenerate into a mere disease of language4 ,in the feeling1 however dim1 that the facts which directly meet the senses are not the whole story1 that there is more behind them and more to come from them1 lies the germ of intellectual curiosity4 ,sidenote3 7c7 intellectual 7c7 ,curiosity rises above the organic and the social planes and becomes intellectual in the degree in which it is transformed into interest in problems provoked by the observation of things and the accumulation of material4 ,when the question is not discharged by being asked of another1 when the child continues to entertain it in his own mind and to be alert for whatever will help answer it1 curiosity has become a positive intellectual force4 ,to the open mind1 nature and social experience are full of varied and subtle challenges to look further4 ,if germinating powers are not used and cultivated at the right moment1 they tend to be transitory1 to die out1 or to wane in intensity4 ,this general law is peculiarly true of sensitiveness to what is uncertain and questionable2 in a few people1 intellectual curiosity is so insatiable that nothing will discourage it1 but in most its edge is easily dulled and blunted4 ,bacon's saying that we must become as little children in order to enter the kingdom of science is at once a reminder of the open-minded and flexible wonder of childhood and of the ease with which this endowment is lost4 ,some lose it in indifference or carelessness2 others in a frivolous flippancy2 many escape these evils only to become incased in a hard dogmatism which is equally fatal to the spirit of wonder4 ,some are so taken up with routine as to be inaccessible to new facts and problems4 ,others retain curiosity only with reference to what concerns their personal advantage in their chosen career4 ,with many1 curiosity is arrested on the plane of interest in local gossip and in the fortunes of their neighbors2 indeed1 so usual is this result that very often the first association with the word curiosity is a prying inquisitiveness into other people's business4 ,with respect then to curiosity1 the teacher has usually more to learn than to teach4 ,rarely can he aspire to the office of kindling or even increasing it4 ,his task is rather to keep alive the sacred spark of wonder and to fan the flame that already glows4 ,his problem is to protect the spirit of inquiry1 to keep it from becoming blase from overexcitement1 wooden from routine1 fossilized through dogmatic instruction1 or dissipated by random exercise upon trivial things4 ,sec4 #b4 ,suggestion ,out of the subject-matter1 whether rich or scanty1 important or trivial1 of present experience issue suggestions1 ideas1 beliefs as to what is not yet given4 ,the function of suggestion is not one that can be produced by teaching2 while it may be modified for better or worse by conditions1 it cannot be destroyed4 ,many a child has tried his best to see if he could not stop thinking1 but the flow of suggestions goes on in spite of our will1 quite as surely as our bodies feel1 where'er they be1 against or with our will4 ,primarily1 naturally1 it is not we who think1 in any actively responsible sense2 thinking is rather something that happens in us4 ,only so far as one has acquired control of the method in which the function of suggestion occurs and has accepted responsibility for its consequences1 can one truthfully say1 ,i think so and so4 ,sidenote3 ,the dimensions of suggestion3 ,sidenote3 7a7 ease ,the function of suggestion has a variety of aspects 7or dimensions as we may term them71 varying in different persons1 both in themselves and in their mode of combination4 ,these dimensions are ease or promptness1 extent or variety1 and depth or persistence4 7a7 ,the common classification of persons into the dull and the bright is made primarily on the basis of the readiness or facility with which suggestions follow upon the presentation of objects and upon the happening of events4 ,as the metaphor of dull and bright implies1 some minds are impervious1 or else they absorb passively4 ,everything presented is lost in a drab monotony that gives nothing back4 ,but others reflect1 or give back in varied lights1 all that strikes upon them4 ,the dull make no response2 the bright flash back the fact with a changed quality4 ,an inert or stupid mind requires a heavy jolt or an intense shock to move it to suggestion2 the bright mind is quick1 is alert to react with interpretation and suggestion of consequences to follow4 ,yet the teacher is not entitled to assume stupidity or even dullness merely because of irresponsiveness to school subjects or to a lesson as presented by text-book or teacher4 ,the pupil labeled hopeless may react in quick and lively fashion when the thing-in-hand seems to him worth while1 as some out-of-school sport or social affair4 ,indeed1 the school subject might move him1 were it set in a different context and treated by a different method4 ,a boy dull in geometry may prove quick enough when he takes up the subject in connection with manual training2 the girl who seems inaccessible to historical facts may respond promptly when it is a question of judging the character and deeds of people of her acquaintance or of fiction4 ,barring physical defect or disease1 slowness and dullness in all directions are comparatively rare4 ,sidenote3 7b7 range 7b7 ,irrespective of the difference in persons as to the ease and promptness with which ideas respond to facts1 there is a difference in the number or range of the suggestions that occur4 ,we speak truly1 in some cases1 of the flood of suggestions2 in others1 there is but a slender trickle4 ,occasionally1 slowness of outward response is due to a great variety of suggestions which check one another and lead to hesitation and suspense2 while a lively and prompt suggestion may take such possession of the mind as to preclude the development of others4 ,too few suggestions indicate a dry and meager mental habit2 when this is joined to great learning1 there results a pedant or a ,gradgrind4 ,such a person's mind rings hard2 he is likely to bore others with mere bulk of information4 ,he contrasts with the person whom we call ripe1 juicy1 and mellow4 ,a conclusion reached after consideration of a few alternatives may be formally correct1 but it will not possess the fullness and richness of meaning of one arrived at after comparison of a greater variety of alternative suggestions4 ,on the other hand1 suggestions may be too numerous and too varied for the best interests of mental habit4 ,so many suggestions may rise that the person is at a loss to select among them4 ,he finds it difficult to reach any definite conclusion and wanders more or less helplessly among them4 ,so much suggests itself pro and con1 one thing leads on to another so naturally1 that he finds it difficult to decide in practical affairs or to conclude in matters of theory4 ,there is such a thing as too much thinking1 as when action is paralyzed by the multiplicity of views suggested by a situation4 ,or again1 the very number of suggestions may be hostile to tracing logical sequences among them1 for it may tempt the mind away from the necessary but trying task of search for real connections1 into the more congenial occupation of embroidering upon the given facts a tissue of agreeable fancies4 ,the best mental habit involves a balance between paucity and redundancy of suggestions4 ,sidenote3 7c7 profundity 7c7 ,depth4 ,we distinguish between people not only upon the basis of their quickness and fertility of intellectual response1 but also with respect to the plane upon which it occurs--the intrinsic quality of the response4 ,one man's thought is profound while another's is superficial2 one goes to the roots of the matter1 and another touches lightly its most external aspects4 ,this phase of thinking is perhaps the most untaught of all1 and the least amenable to external influence whether for improvement or harm4 ,nevertheless1 the conditions of the pupil's contact with subject-matter may be such that he is compelled to come to quarters with its more significant features1 or such that he is encouraged to deal with it upon the basis of what is trivial4 ,the common assumptions that1 if the pupil only thinks1 one thought is just as good for his mental discipline as another1 and that the end of study is the amassing of information1 both tend to foster superficial1 at the expense of significant1 thought4 ,pupils who in matters of ordinary practical experience have a ready and acute perception of the difference between the significant and the meaningless1 often reach in school subjects a point where all things seem equally important or equally unimportant2 where one thing is just as likely to be true as another1 and where intellectual effort is expended not in discriminating between things1 but in trying to make verbal connections among words4 ,sidenote3 ,balance of mind ,sometimes slowness and depth of response are intimately connected4 ,time is required in order to digest impressions1 and translate them into substantial ideas4 ,brightness may be but a flash in the pan4 ,the slow but sure person1 whether man or child1 is one in whom impressions sink and accumulate1 so that thinking is done at a deeper level of value than with a slighter load4 ,many a child is rebuked for slowness1 for not answering promptly1 when his forces are taking time to gather themselves together to deal effectively with the problem at hand4 ,in such cases1 failure to afford time and leisure conduce to habits of speedy1 but snapshot and superficial1 judgment4 ,the depth to which a sense of the problem1 of the difficulty1 sinks1 determines the quality of the thinking that follows2 and any habit of teaching which encourages the pupil for the sake of a successful recitation or of a display of memorized information to glide over the thin ice of genuine problems reverses the true method of mind training4 ,sidenote3 ,individual differences ,it is profitable to study the lives of men and women who achieve in adult life fine things in their respective callings1 but who were called dull in their school days4 ,sometimes the early wrong judgment was due mainly to the fact that the direction in which the child showed his ability was not one recognized by the good old standards in use1 as in the case of ,darwin's interest in beetles1 snakes1 and frogs4 ,sometimes it was due to the fact that the child dwelling habitually on a deeper plane of reflection than other pupils--or than his teachers--did not show to advantage when prompt answers of the usual sort were expected4 ,sometimes it was due to the fact that the pupil's natural mode of approach clashed habitually with that of the text or teacher1 and the method of the latter was assumed as an absolute basis of estimate4 ,sidenote3 ,any subject may be intellectual ,in any event1 it is desirable that the teacher should rid himself of the notion that thinking is a single1 unalterable faculty2 that he should recognize that it is a term denoting the various ways in which things acquire significance4 ,it is desirable to expel also the kindred notion that some subjects are inherently intellectual1 and hence possessed of an almost magical power to train the faculty of thought4 ,thinking is specific1 not a machine-like1 ready-made apparatus to be turned indifferently and at will upon all subjects1 as a lantern may throw its light as it happens upon horses1 streets1 gardens1 trees1 or river4 ,thinking is specific1 in that different things suggest their own appropriate meanings1 tell their own unique stories1 and in that they do this in very different ways with different persons4 ,as the growth of the body is through the assimilation of food1 so the growth of mind is through the logical organization of subject-matter4 ,thinking is not like a sausage machine which reduces all materials indifferently to one marketable commodity1 but is a power of following up and linking together the specific suggestions that specific things arouse4 ,accordingly1 any subject1 from ,greek to cooking1 and from drawing to mathematics1 is intellectual1 if intellectual at all1 not in its fixed inner structure1 but in its function--in its power to start and direct significant inquiry and reflection4 ,what geometry does for one1 the manipulation of laboratory apparatus1 the mastery of a musical composition1 or the conduct of a business affair1 may do for another4 ,sec4 #c4 ,orderliness3 ,its ,nature ,sidenote3 ,continuity ,facts1 whether narrow or extensive1 and conclusions suggested by them1 whether many or few1 do not constitute1 even when combined1 reflective thought4 ,the suggestions must be organized2 they must be arranged with reference to one another and with reference to the facts on which they depend for proof4 ,when the factors of facility1 of fertility1 and of depth are properly balanced or proportioned1 we get as the outcome continuity of thought4 ,we desire neither the slow mind nor yet the hasty4 ,we wish neither random diffuseness nor fixed rigidity4 ,consecutiveness means flexibility and variety of materials1 conjoined with singleness and definiteness of direction4 ,it is opposed both to a mechanical routine uniformity and to a grasshopper-like movement4 ,of bright children1 it is not infrequently said that they might do anything1 if only they settled down1 so quick and apt are they in any particular response4 ,but1 alas1 they rarely settle4 ,on the other hand1 it is not enough not to be diverted4 ,a deadly and fanatic consistency is not our goal4 ,concentration does not mean fixity1 nor a cramped arrest or paralysis of the flow of suggestion4 ,it means variety and change of ideas combined into a single steady trend moving toward a unified conclusion4 ,thoughts are concentrated not by being kept still and quiescent1 but by being kept moving toward an object1 as a general concentrates his troops for attack or defense4 ,holding the mind to a subject is like holding a ship to its course2 it implies constant change of place combined with unity of direction4 ,consistent and orderly thinking is precisely such a change of subject-matter4 ,consistency is no more the mere absence of contradiction than concentration is the mere absence of diversion--which exists in dull routine or in a person fast asleep4 ,all kinds of varied and incompatible suggestions may sprout and be followed in their growth1 and yet thinking be consistent and orderly1 provided each one of the suggestions is viewed in relation to the main topic4 ,sidenote3 ,practical demands enforce some degree of continuity ,in the main1 for most persons1 the primary resource in the development of orderly habits of thought is indirect1 not direct4 ,intellectual organization originates and for a time grows as an accompaniment of the organization of the acts required to realize an end1 not as the result of a direct appeal to thinking power4 ,the need of thinking to accomplish something beyond thinking is more potent than thinking for its own sake4 ,all people at the outset1 and the majority of people probably all their lives1 attain ordering of thought through ordering of action4 ,adults normally carry on some occupation1 profession1 pursuit2 and this furnishes the continuous axis about which their knowledge1 their beliefs1 and their habits of reaching and testing conclusions are organized4 ,observations that have to do with the efficient performance of their calling are extended and rendered precise4 ,information related to it is not merely amassed and then left in a heap2 it is classified and subdivided so as to be available as it is needed4 ,inferences are made by most men not from purely speculative motives1 but because they are involved in the efficient performance of the duties involved in their several callings4 ,thus their inferences are constantly tested by results achieved2 futile and scattering methods tend to be discounted2 orderly arrangements have a premium put upon them4 ,the event1 the issue1 stands as a constant check on the thinking that has led up to it2 and this discipline by efficiency in action is the chief sanction1 in practically all who are not scientific specialists1 of orderliness of thought4 ,such a resource--the main prop of disciplined thinking in adult life--is not to be despised in training the young in right intellectual habits4 ,there are1 however1 profound differences between the immature and the adult in the matter of organized activity--differences which must be taken seriously into account in any educational use of activities3 7i7 ,the external achievement resulting from activity is a more urgent necessity with the adult1 and hence is with him a more effective means of discipline of mind than with the child2 7ii7 ,the ends of adult activity are more specialized than those of child activity4 ,sidenote3 ,peculiar difficulty with children 7i7 ,the selection and arrangement of appropriate lines of action is a much more difficult problem as respects youth than it is in the case of adults4 ,with the latter1 the main lines are more or less settled by circumstances4 ,the social status of the adult1 the fact that he is a citizen1 a householder1 a parent1 one occupied in some regular industrial or professional calling1 prescribes the chief features of the acts to be performed1 and secures1 somewhat automatically1 as it were1 appropriate and related modes of thinking4 ,but with the child there is no such fixity of status and pursuit2 there is almost nothing to dictate that such and such a consecutive line of action1 rather than another1 should be followed1 while the will of others1 his own caprice1 and circumstances about him tend to produce an isolated momentary act4 ,the absence of continued motivation cooeperates with the inner plasticity of the immature to increase the importance of educational training and the difficulties in the way of finding consecutive modes of activities which may do for child and youth what serious vocations and functions do for the adult4 ,in the case of children1 the choice is so peculiarly exposed to arbitrary factors1 to mere school traditions1 to waves of pedagogical fad and fancy1 to fluctuating social cross currents1 that sometimes1 in sheer disgust at the inadequacy of results1 a reaction occurs to the total neglect of overt activity as an educational factor1 and a recourse to purely theoretical subjects and methods4 ,sidenote3 ,peculiar opportunity with children 7ii7 ,this very difficulty1 however1 points to the fact that the opportunity for selecting truly educative activities is indefinitely greater in child life than in adult4 ,the factor of external pressure is so strong with most adults that the educative value of the pursuit--its reflex influence upon intelligence and character--however genuine1 is incidental1 and frequently almost accidental4 ,the problem and the opportunity with the young is selection of orderly and continuous modes of occupation1 which1 while they lead up to and prepare for the indispensable activities of adult life1 have their own sufficient justification in their present reflex influence upon the formation of habits of thought4 ,sidenote3 ,action and reaction between extremes ,educational practice shows a continual tendency to oscillate between two extremes with respect to overt and exertive activities4 ,one extreme is to neglect them almost entirely1 on the ground that they are chaotic and fluctuating1 mere diversions appealing to the transitory unformed taste and caprice of immature minds2 or if they avoid this evil1 are objectionable copies of the highly specialized1 and more or less commercial1 activities of adult life4 ,if activities are admitted at all into the school1 the admission is a grudging concession to the necessity of having occasional relief from the strain of constant intellectual work1 or to the clamor of outside utilitarian demands upon the school4 ,the other extreme is an enthusiastic belief in the almost magical educative efficacy of any kind of activity1 granted it is an activity and not a passive absorption of academic and theoretic material4 ,the conceptions of play1 of self-expression1 of natural growth1 are appealed to almost as if they meant that opportunity for any kind of spontaneous activity inevitably secures the due training of mental power2 or a mythological brain physiology is appealed to as proof that any exercise of the muscles trains power of thought4 ,sidenote3 ,locating the problem of education ,while we vibrate from one of these extremes to the other1 the most serious of all problems is ignored3 the problem1 namely1 of discovering and arranging the forms of activity 7a7 which are most congenial1 best adapted1 to the immature stage of development2 7b7 which have the most ulterior promise as preparation for the social responsibilities of adult life2 and 7c7 which1 at the same time1 have the maximum of influence in forming habits of acute observation and of consecutive inference4 ,as curiosity is related to the acquisition of material of thought1 as suggestion is related to flexibility and force of thought1 so the ordering of activities1 not themselves primarily intellectual1 is related to the forming of intellectual powers of consecutiveness4 ,,chapter ,,four ,,school ,,conditions ,,and ,,the ,,training ,,of ,,thought ,sec4 #a4 ,introductory3 ,methods and ,conditions ,sidenote3 ,formal discipline ,the so-called faculty-psychology went hand in hand with the vogue of the formal-discipline idea in education4 ,if thought is a distinct piece of mental machinery1 separate from observation1 memory1 imagination1 and common-sense judgments of persons and things1 then thought should be trained by special exercises designed for the purpose1 as one might devise special exercises for developing the biceps muscles4 ,certain subjects are then to be regarded as intellectual or logical subjects par excellence1 possessed of a predestined fitness to exercise the thought-faculty1 just as certain machines are better than others for developing arm power4 ,with these three notions goes the fourth1 that method consists of a set of operations by which the machinery of thought is set going and kept at work upon any subject-matter4 ,sidenote3 versus real thinking ,we have tried to make it clear in the previous chapters that there is no single and uniform power of thought1 but a multitude of different ways in which specific things--things observed1 remembered1 heard of1 read about--evoke suggestions or ideas that are pertinent to the occasion and fruitful in the sequel4 ,training is such development of curiosity1 suggestion1 and habits of exploring and testing1 as increases their scope and efficiency4 ,a subject--any subject--is intellectual in the degree in which with any given person it succeeds in effecting this growth4 ,on this view the fourth factor1 method1 is concerned with providing conditions so adapted to individual needs and powers as to make for the permanent improvement of observation1 suggestion1 and investigation4 ,sidenote3 ,true and false meaning of method ,the teacher's problem is thus twofold4 ,on the one side1 he needs 7as we saw in the last chapter7 to be a student of individual traits and habits2 on the other side1 he needs to be a student of the conditions that modify for better or worse the directions in which individual powers habitually express themselves4 ,he needs to recognize that method covers not only what he intentionally devises and employs for the purpose of mental training1 but also what he does without any conscious reference to it1--anything in the atmosphere and conduct of the school which reacts in any way upon the curiosity1 the responsiveness1 and the orderly activity of children4 ,the teacher who is an intelligent student both of individual mental operations and of the effects of school conditions upon those operations1 can largely be trusted to develop for himself methods of instruction in their narrower and more technical sense--those best adapted to achieve results in particular subjects1 such as reading1 geography1 or algebra4 ,in the hands of one who is not intelligently aware of individual capacities and of the influence unconsciously exerted upon them by the entire environment1 even the best of technical methods are likely to get an immediate result only at the expense of deep-seated and persistent habits4 ,we may group the conditioning influences of the school environment under three heads3 7#a7 the mental attitudes and habits of the persons with whom the child is in contact2 7#b7 the subjects studied2 7#c7 current educational aims and ideals4 ,sec4 #b4 ,influence of the ,habits of ,others ,bare reference to the imitativeness of human nature is enough to suggest how profoundly the mental habits of others affect the attitude of the one being trained4 ,example is more potent than precept2 and a teacher's best conscious efforts may be more than counteracted by the influence of personal traits which he is unaware of or regards as unimportant4 ,methods of instruction and discipline that are technically faulty may be rendered practically innocuous by the inspiration of the personal method that lies back of them4 ,sidenote3 ,response to environment fundamental in method ,to confine1 however1 the conditioning influence of the educator1 whether parent or teacher1 to imitation is to get a very superficial view of the intellectual influence of others4 ,imitation is but one case of a deeper principle--that of stimulus and response4 ,everything the teacher does1 as well as the manner in which he does it1 incites the child to respond in some way or other1 and each response tends to set the child's attitude in some way or other4 ,even the inattention of the child to the adult is often a mode of response which is the result of unconscious training4#i ,the teacher is rarely 7and even then never entirely7 a transparent medium of access by another mind to a subject4 ,with the young1 the influence of the teacher's personality is intimately fused with that of the subject2 the child does not separate nor even distinguish the two4 ,and as the child's response is toward or away from anything presented1 he keeps up a running commentary1 of which he himself is hardly distinctly aware1 of like and dislike1 of sympathy and aversion1 not merely to the acts of the teacher1 but also to the subject with which the teacher is occupied4 #i ,a child of four or five who had been repeatedly called to the house by his mother with no apparent response on his own part1 was asked if he did not hear her4 ,he replied quite judicially1 ,oh1 yes1 but she doesn't call very mad yet4 ,sidenote3 ,influence of teacher's own habits ,sidenote3 ,judging others by ourselves ,the extent and power of this influence upon morals and manners1 upon character1 upon habits of speech and social bearing1 are almost universally recognized4 ,but the tendency to conceive of thought as an isolated faculty has often blinded teachers to the fact that this influence is just as real and pervasive in intellectual concerns4 ,teachers1 as well as children1 stick more or less to the main points1 have more or less wooden and rigid methods of response1 and display more or less intellectual curiosity about matters that come up4 ,and every trait of this kind is an inevitable part of the teacher's method of teaching4 ,merely to accept without notice slipshod habits of speech1 slovenly inferences1 unimaginative and literal response1 is to indorse these tendencies1 and to ratify them into habits--and so it goes throughout the whole range of contact between teacher and student4 ,in this complex and intricate field1 two or three points may well be singled out for special notice4 7a7 ,most persons are quite unaware of the distinguishing peculiarities of their own mental habit4 ,they take their own mental operations for granted1 and unconsciously make them the standard for judging the mental processes of others4#aj ,hence there is a tendency to encourage everything in the pupil which agrees with this attitude1 and to neglect or fail to understand whatever is incongruous with it4 ,the prevalent overestimation of the value1 for mind-training1 of theoretic subjects as compared with practical pursuits1 is doubtless due partly to the fact that the teacher's calling tends to select those in whom the theoretic interest is specially strong and to repel those in whom executive abilities are marked4 ,teachers sifted out on this basis judge pupils and subjects by a like standard1 encouraging an intellectual one-sidedness in those to whom it is naturally congenial1 and repelling from study those in whom practical instincts are more urgent4 #aj ,people who have number-forms--i4e4 project number series into space and see them arranged in certain shapes--when asked why they have not mentioned the fact before1 often reply that it never occurred to them2 they supposed that everybody had the same power4 ,sidenote3 ,exaggeration of direct personal influence 7b7 ,teachers--and this holds especially of the stronger and better teachers--tend to rely upon their personal strong points to hold a child to his work1 and thereby to substitute their personal influence for that of subject-matter as a motive for study4 ,the teacher finds by experience that his own personality is often effective where the power of the subject to command attention is almost nil2 then he utilizes the former more and more1 until the pupil's relation to the teacher almost takes the place of his relation to the subject4 ,in this way the teacher's personality may become a source of personal dependence and weakness1 an influence that renders the pupil indifferent to the value of the subject for its own sake4 ,sidenote3 ,independent thinking versus getting the answer 7c7 ,the operation of the teacher's own mental habit tends1 unless carefully watched and guided1 to make the child a student of the teacher's peculiarities rather than of the subjects that he is supposed to study4 ,his chief concern is to accommodate himself to what the teacher expects of him1 rather than to devote himself energetically to the problems of subject-matter4 ,is this right8 comes to mean ,will this answer or this process satisfy the teacher8--instead of meaning1 ,does it satisfy the inherent conditions of the problem8 ,it would be folly to deny the legitimacy or the value of the study of human nature that children carry on in school2 but it is obviously undesirable that their chief intellectual problem should be that of producing an answer approved by the teacher1 and their standard of success be successful adaptation to the requirements of another4 ,sec4 #c4 ,influence of the ,nature of ,studies ,sidenote3 ,types of studies ,studies are conventionally and conveniently grouped under these heads3 7#a7 ,those especially involving the acquisition of skill in performance--the school arts1 such as reading1 writing1 figuring1 and music4 7#b7 ,those mainly concerned with acquiring knowledge--informational studies1 such as geography and history4 7#c7 ,those in which skill in doing and bulk of information are relatively less important1 and appeal to abstract thinking1 to reasoning1 is most marked--disciplinary studies1 such as arithmetic and formal grammar4#aa ,each of these groups of subjects has its own special pitfalls4 #aa ,of course1 any one subject has all three aspects3 e4g4 in arithmetic1 counting1 writing1 and reading numbers1 rapid adding1 etc41 are cases of skill in doing2 the tables of weights and measures are a matter of information1 etc4 ,sidenote3 ,the abstract as the isolated 7a7 ,in the case of the so-called disciplinary or pre-eminently logical studies1 there is danger of the isolation of intellectual activity from the ordinary affairs of life4 ,teacher and student alike tend to set up a chasm between logical thought as something abstract and remote1 and the specific and concrete demands of everyday events4 ,the abstract tends to become so aloof1 so far away from application1 as to be cut loose from practical and moral bearing4 ,the gullibility of specialized scholars when out of their own lines1 their extravagant habits of inference and speech1 their ineptness in reaching conclusions in practical matters1 their egotistical engrossment in their own subjects1 are extreme examples of the bad effects of severing studies completely from their ordinary connections in life4 ,sidenote3 ,overdoing the mechanical and automatic ,sidenote3 ,drill 7b7 ,the danger in those studies where the main emphasis is upon acquisition of skill is just the reverse4 ,the tendency is to take the shortest cuts possible to gain the required end4 ,this makes the subjects mechanical1 and thus restrictive of intellectual power4 ,in the mastery of reading1 writing1 drawing1 laboratory technique1 etc41 the need of economy of time and material1 of neatness and accuracy1 of promptness and uniformity1 is so great that these things tend to become ends in themselves1 irrespective of their influence upon general mental attitude4 ,sheer imitation1 dictation of steps to be taken1 mechanical drill1 may give results most quickly and yet strengthen traits likely to be fatal to reflective power4 ,the pupil is enjoined to do this and that specific thing1 with no knowledge of any reason except that by so doing he gets his result most speedily2 his mistakes are pointed out and corrected for him2 he is kept at pure repetition of certain acts till they become automatic4 ,later1 teachers wonder why the pupil reads with so little expression1 and figures with so little intelligent consideration of the terms of his problem4 ,in some educational dogmas and practices1 the very idea of training mind seems to be hopelessly confused with that of a drill which hardly touches mind at all--or touches it for the worse--since it is wholly taken up with training skill in external execution4 ,this method reduces the training of human beings to the level of animal training4 ,practical skill1 modes of effective technique1 can be intelligently1 non-mechanically used1 only when intelligence has played a part in their acquisition4 ,sidenote3 ,wisdom versus information 7c7 ,much the same sort of thing is to be said regarding studies where emphasis traditionally falls upon bulk and accuracy of information4 ,the distinction between information and wisdom is old1 and yet requires constantly to be redrawn4 ,information is knowledge which is merely acquired and stored up2 wisdom is knowledge operating in the direction of powers to the better living of life4 ,information1 merely as information1 implies no special training of intellectual capacity2 wisdom is the finest fruit of that training4 ,in school1 amassing information always tends to escape from the ideal of wisdom or good judgment4 ,the aim often seems to be--especially in such a subject as geography--to make the pupil what has been called a cyclopedia of useless information4 ,covering the ground is the primary necessity2 the nurture of mind a bad second4 ,thinking cannot1 of course1 go on in a vacuum2 suggestions and inferences can occur only upon a basis of information as to matters of fact4 ,but there is all the difference in the world whether the acquisition of information is treated as an end in itself1 or is made an integral portion of the training of thought4 ,the assumption that information which has been accumulated apart from use in the recognition and solution of a problem may later on be freely employed at will by thought is quite false4 ,the skill at the ready command of intelligence is the skill acquired with the aid of intelligence2 the only information which1 otherwise than by accident1 can be put to logical use is that acquired in the course of thinking4 ,because their knowledge has been achieved in connection with the needs of specific situations1 men of little book-learning are often able to put to effective use every ounce of knowledge they possess2 while men of vast erudition are often swamped by the mere bulk of their learning1 because memory1 rather than thinking1 has been operative in obtaining it4 ,sec4#d4 ,the ,influence of ,current ,aims and ,ideals ,it is1 of course1 impossible to separate this somewhat intangible condition from the points just dealt with2 for automatic skill and quantity of information are educational ideals which pervade the whole school4 ,we may distinguish1 however1 certain tendencies1 such as that to judge education from the standpoint of external results1 instead of from that of the development of personal attitudes and habits4 ,the ideal of the product1 as against that of the mental process by which the product is attained1 shows itself in both instruction and moral discipline4 ,sidenote3 ,external results versus processes 7a7 ,in instruction1 the external standard manifests itself in the importance attached to the correct answer4 ,no one other thing1 probably1 works so fatally against focussing the attention of teachers upon the training of mind as the domination of their minds by the idea that the chief thing is to get pupils to recite their lessons correctly4 ,as long as this end is uppermost 7whether consciously or unconsciously71 training of mind remains an incidental and secondary consideration4 ,there is no great difficulty in understanding why this ideal has such vogue4 ,the large number of pupils to be dealt with1 and the tendency of parents and school authorities to demand speedy and tangible evidence of progress1 conspire to give it currency4 ,knowledge of subject-matter--not of children--is alone exacted of teachers by this aim2 and1 moreover1 knowledge of subject-matter only in portions definitely prescribed and laid out1 and hence mastered with comparative ease4 ,education that takes as its standard the improvement of the intellectual attitude and method of students demands more serious preparatory training1 for it exacts sympathetic and intelligent insight into the workings of individual minds1 and a very wide and flexible command of subject-matter--so as to be able to select and apply just what is needed when it is needed4 ,finally1 the securing of external results is an aim that lends itself naturally to the mechanics of school administration--to examinations1 marks1 gradings1 promotions1 and so on4 ,sidenote3 ,reliance upon others 7b7 ,with reference to behavior also1 the external ideal has a great influence4 ,conformity of acts to precepts and rules is the easiest1 because most mechanical1 standard to employ4 ,it is no part of our present task to tell just how far dogmatic instruction1 or strict adherence to custom1 convention1 and the commands of a social superior1 should extend in moral training2 but since problems of conduct are the deepest and most common of all the problems of life1 the ways in which they are met have an influence that radiates into every other mental attitude1 even those far remote from any direct or conscious moral consideration4 ,indeed1 the deepest plane of the mental attitude of every one is fixed by the way in which problems of behavior are treated4 ,if the function of thought1 of serious inquiry and reflection1 is reduced to a minimum in dealing with them1 it is not reasonable to expect habits of thought to exercise great influence in less important matters4 ,on the other hand1 habits of active inquiry and careful deliberation in the significant and vital problems of conduct afford the best guarantee that the general structure of mind will be reasonable4 ,,chapter ,,five ,,the ,,means ,,and ,,end ,,of ,,mental ,,training3 ,,the ,,psychological ,,and ,,the ,,logical ,sec4 #a4 ,introductory3 ,the ,meaning of ,logical ,sidenote3 ,special topic of this chapter ,in the preceding chapters we have considered 7i7 what thinking is2 7ii7 the importance of its special training2 7iii7 the natural tendencies that lend themselves to its training2 and 7iv7 some of the special obstacles in the way of its training under school conditions4 ,we come now to the relation of logic to the purpose of mental training4 ,sidenote3 ,three senses of term logical ,sidenote3 ,the practical is the important meaning of logical ,in its broadest sense1 any thinking that ends in a conclusion is logical--whether the conclusion reached be justified or fallacious2 that is1 the term logical covers both the logically good and the illogical or the logically bad4 ,in its narrowest sense1 the term logical refers only to what is demonstrated to follow necessarily from premises that are definite in meaning and that are either self-evidently true1 or that have been previously proved to be true4 ,stringency of proof is here the equivalent of the logical4 ,in this sense mathematics and formal logic 7perhaps as a branch of mathematics7 alone are strictly logical4 ,logical1 however1 is used in a third sense1 which is at once more vital and more practical2 to denote1 namely1 the systematic care1 negative and positive1 taken to safeguard reflection so that it may yield the best results under the given conditions4 ,if only the word artificial were associated with the idea of art1 or expert skill gained through voluntary apprenticeship 7instead of suggesting the factitious and unreal71 we might say that logical refers to artificial thought4 ,sidenote3 ,care1 thoroughness1 and exactness the marks of the logical ,in this sense1 the word logical is synonymous with wide-awake1 thorough1 and careful reflection--thought in its best sense 7ante1 p4 #e74 ,reflection is turning a topic over in various aspects and in various lights so that nothing significant about it shall be overlooked--almost as one might turn a stone over to see what its hidden side is like or what is covered by it4 ,thoughtfulness means1 practically1 the same thing as careful attention2 to give our mind to a subject is to give heed to it1 to take pains with it4 ,in speaking of reflection1 we naturally use the words weigh1 ponder1 deliberate--terms implying a certain delicate and scrupulous balancing of things against one another4 ,closely related names are scrutiny1 examination1 consideration1 inspection--terms which imply close and careful vision4 ,again1 to think is to relate things to one another definitely1 to put two and two together as we say4 ,analogy with the accuracy and definiteness of mathematical combinations gives us such expressions as calculate1 reckon1 account for2 and even reason itself--ratio4 ,caution1 carefulness1 thoroughness1 definiteness1 exactness1 orderliness1 methodic arrangement1 are1 then1 the traits by which we mark off the logical from what is random and casual on one side1 and from what is academic and formal on the other4 ,sidenote3 ,whole object of intellectual education is formation of logical disposition ,sidenote3 ,false opposition of the logical and psychological ,no argument is needed to point out that the educator is concerned with the logical in its practical and vital sense4 ,argument is perhaps needed to show that the intellectual 7as distinct from the moral7 end of education is entirely and only the logical in this sense2 namely1 the formation of careful1 alert1 and thorough habits of thinking4 ,the chief difficulty in the way of recognition of this principle is a false conception of the relation between the psychological tendencies of an individual and his logical achievements4 ,if it be assumed--as it is so frequently--that these have1 intrinsically1 nothing to do with each other1 then logical training is inevitably regarded as something foreign and extraneous1 something to be ingrafted upon the individual from without1 so that it is absurd to identify the object of education with the development of logical power4 ,sidenote3 ,opposing the natural to the logical ,the conception that the psychology of individuals has no intrinsic connections with logical methods and results is held1 curiously enough1 by two opposing schools of educational theory4 ,to one school1 the natural#ab is primary and fundamental2 and its tendency is to make little of distinctly intellectual nurture4 ,its mottoes are freedom1 self-expression1 individuality1 spontaneity1 play1 interest1 natural unfolding1 and so on4 ,in its emphasis upon individual attitude and activity1 it sets slight store upon organized subject-matter1 or the material of study1 and conceives method to consist of various devices for stimulating and evoking1 in their natural order of growth1 the native potentialities of individuals4 #ab ,denoting whatever has to do with the natural constitution and functions of an individual4 ,sidenote3 ,neglect of the innate logical resources ,sidenote3 ,identification of logical with subject-matter1 exclusively ,the other school estimates highly the value of the logical1 but conceives the natural tendency of individuals to be averse1 or at least indifferent1 to logical achievement4 ,it relies upon subject-matter--upon matter already defined and classified4 ,method1 then1 has to do with the devices by which these characteristics may be imported into a mind naturally reluctant and rebellious4 ,hence its mottoes are discipline1 instruction1 restraint1 voluntary or conscious effort1 the necessity of tasks1 and so on4 ,from this point of view studies1 rather than attitudes and habits1 embody the logical factor in education4 ,the mind becomes logical only by learning to conform to an external subject-matter4 ,to produce this conformity1 the study should first be analyzed 7by text-book or teacher7 into its logical elements2 then each of these elements should be defined2 finally1 all of the elements should be arranged in series or classes according to logical formulae or general principles4 ,then the pupil learns the definitions one by one2 and progressively adding one to another builds up the logical system1 and thereby is himself gradually imbued1 from without1 with logical quality4 ,sidenote3 ,illustration from geography1 ,this description will gain meaning through an illustration4 ,suppose the subject is geography4 ,the first thing is to give its definition1 marking it off from every other subject4 ,then the various abstract terms upon which depends the scientific development of the science are stated and defined one by one--pole1 equator1 ecliptic1 zone1--from the simpler units to the more complex which are formed out of them2 then the more concrete elements are taken in similar series3 continent1 island1 coast1 promontory1 cape1 isthmus1 peninsula1 ocean1 lake1 coast1 gulf1 bay1 and so on4 ,in acquiring this material1 the mind is supposed not only to gain important information1 but1 by accommodating itself to ready-made logical definitions1 generalizations1 and classifications1 gradually to acquire logical habits4 ,sidenote3 from drawing ,this type of method has been applied to every subject taught in the schools--reading1 writing1 music1 physics1 grammar1 arithmetic4 ,drawings for example1 has been taught on the theory that since all pictorial representation is a matter of combining straight and curved lines1 the simplest procedure is to have the pupil acquire the ability first to draw straight lines in various positions 7horizontal1 perpendicular1 diagonals at various angles71 then typical curves2 and finally1 to combine straight and curved lines in various permutations to construct actual pictures4 ,this seemed to give the ideal logical method1 beginning with analysis into elements1 and then proceeding in regular order to more and more complex syntheses1 each element being defined when used1 and thereby clearly understood4 ,sidenote3 ,formal method ,even when this method in its extreme form is not followed1 few schools 7especially of the middle or upper elementary grades7 are free from an exaggerated attention to forms supposedly employed by the pupil if he gets his result logically4 ,it is thought that there are certain steps arranged in a certain order1 which express preeminently an understanding of the subject1 and the pupil is made to analyze his procedure into these steps1 i4e4 to learn a certain routine formula of statement4 ,while this method is usually at its height in grammar and arithmetic1 it invades also history and even literature1 which are then reduced1 under plea of intellectual training1 to outlines1 diagrams1 and schemes of division and subdivision4 ,in memorizing this simulated cut and dried copy of the logic of an adult1 the child generally is induced to stultify his own subtle and vital logical movement4 ,the adoption by teachers of this misconception of logical method has probably done more than anything else to bring pedagogy into disrepute2 for to many persons pedagogy means precisely a set of mechanical1 self-conscious devices for replacing by some cast-iron external scheme the personal mental movement of the individual4 ,sidenote3 ,reaction toward lack of form and method ,a reaction inevitably occurs from the poor results that accrue from these professedly logical methods4 ,lack of interest in study1 habits of inattention and procrastination1 positive aversion to intellectual application1 dependence upon sheer memorizing and mechanical routine with only a modicum of understanding by the pupil of what he is about1 show that the theory of logical definition1 division1 gradation1 and system does not work out practically as it is theoretically supposed to work4 ,the consequent disposition--as in every reaction--is to go to the opposite extreme4 ,the logical is thought to be wholly artificial and extraneous2 teacher and pupil alike are to turn their backs upon it1 and to work toward the expression of existing aptitudes and tastes4 ,emphasis upon natural tendencies and powers as the only possible starting-point of development is indeed wholesome4 ,but the reaction is false1 and hence misleading1 in what it ignores and denies3 the presence of genuinely intellectual factors in existing powers and interests4 ,sidenote3 ,logic of subject-matter is logic of adult or trained mind ,what is conventionally termed logical 7namely1 the logical from the standpoint of subject-matter7 represents in truth the logic of the trained adult mind4 ,ability to divide a subject1 to define its elements1 and to group them into classes according to general principles represents logical capacity at its best point reached after thorough training4 ,the mind that habitually exhibits skill in divisions1 definitions1 generalizations1 and systematic recapitulations no longer needs training in logical methods4 ,but it is absurd to suppose that a mind which needs training because it cannot perform these operations can begin where the expert mind stops4 ,the logical from the standpoint of subject-matter represents the goal1 the last term of training1 not the point of departure4 ,sidenote3 ,the immature mind has its own logic ,sidenote3 ,hence1 the psychological and the logical represent the two ends of the same movement ,in truth1 the mind at every stage of development has its own logic4 ,the error of the notion that by appeal to spontaneous tendencies and by multiplication of materials we may completely dismiss logical considerations1 lies in overlooking how large a part curiosity1 inference1 experimenting1 and testing already play in the pupil's life4 ,therefore it underestimates the intellectual factor in the more spontaneous play and work of individuals--the factor that alone is truly educative4 ,any teacher who is alive to the modes of thought naturally operative in the experience of the normal child will have no difficulty in avoiding the identification of the logical with a ready-made organization of subject-matter1 as well as the notion that the only way to escape this error is to pay no attention to logical considerations4 ,such a teacher will have no difficulty in seeing that the real problem of intellectual education is the transformation of natural powers into expert1 tested powers3 the transformation of more or less casual curiosity and sporadic suggestion into attitudes of alert1 cautious1 and thorough inquiry4 ,he will see that the psychological and the logical1 instead of being opposed to each other 7or even independent of each other71 are connected as the earlier and the later stages in one continuous process of normal growth4 ,the natural or psychological activities1 even when not consciously controlled by logical considerations1 have their own intellectual function and integrity2 conscious and deliberate skill in thinking1 when it is achieved1 makes habitual or second nature4 ,the first is already logical in spirit2 the last1 in presenting an ingrained disposition and attitude1 is then as psychological 7as personal7 as any caprice or chance impulse could be4 ,sec4 #b4 ,discipline and ,freedom ,sidenote3 ,true and false notions of discipline ,discipline of mind is thus1 in truth1 a result rather than a cause4 ,any mind is disciplined in a subject in which independent intellectual initiative and control have been achieved4 ,discipline represents original native endowment turned1 through gradual exercise1 into effective power4 ,so far as a mind is disciplined1 control of method in a given subject has been attained so that the mind is able to manage itself independently without external tutelage4 ,the aim of education is precisely to develop intelligence of this independent and effective type--a disciplined mind4 ,discipline is positive and constructive4 ,sidenote3 ,discipline as drill ,discipline1 however1 is frequently regarded as something negative--as a painfully disagreeable forcing of mind away from channels congenial to it into channels of constraint1 a process grievous at the time but necessary as preparation for a more or less remote future4 ,discipline is then generally identified with drill2 and drill is conceived after the mechanical analogy of driving1 by unremitting blows1 a foreign substance into a resistant material2 or is imaged after the analogy of the mechanical routine by which raw recruits are trained to a soldierly bearing and habits that are naturally wholly foreign to their possessors4 ,training of this latter sort1 whether it be called discipline or not1 is not mental discipline4 ,its aim and result are not habits of thinking1 but uniform external modes of action4 ,by failing to ask what he means by discipline1 many a teacher is misled into supposing that he is developing mental force and efficiency by methods which in fact restrict and deaden intellectual activity1 and which tend to create mechanical routine1 or mental passivity and servility4 ,sidenote3 ,as independent power or freedom ,sidenote3 ,freedom and external spontaneity ,when discipline is conceived in intellectual terms 7as the habitual power of effective mental attack71 it is identified with freedom in its true sense4 ,for freedom of mind means mental power capable of independent exercise1 emancipated from the leading strings of others1 not mere unhindered external operation4 ,when spontaneity or naturalness is identified with more or less casual discharge of transitory impulses1 the tendency of the educator is to supply a multitude of stimuli in order that spontaneous activity may be kept up4 ,all sorts of interesting materials1 equipments1 tools1 modes of activity1 are provided in order that there may be no flagging of free self-expression4 ,this method overlooks some of the essential conditions of the attainment of genuine freedom4 ,sidenote3 ,some obstacle necessary for thought 7a7 ,direct immediate discharge or expression of an impulsive tendency is fatal to thinking4 ,only when the impulse is to some extent checked and thrown back upon itself does reflection ensue4 ,it is1 indeed1 a stupid error to suppose that arbitrary tasks must be imposed from without in order to furnish the factor of perplexity and difficulty which is the necessary cue to thought4 ,every vital activity of any depth and range inevitably meets obstacles in the course of its effort to realize itself--a fact that renders the search for artificial or external problems quite superfluous4 ,the difficulties that present themselves within the development of an experience are1 however1 to be cherished by the educator1 not minimized1 for they are the natural stimuli to reflective inquiry4 ,freedom does not consist in keeping up uninterrupted and unimpeded external activity1 but is something achieved through conquering1 by personal reflection1 a way out of the difficulties that prevent an immediate overflow and a spontaneous success4 ,sidenote3 ,intellectual factors are natural 7b7 ,the method that emphasizes the psychological and natural1 but yet fails to see what an important part of the natural tendencies is constituted at every period of growth by curiosity1 inference1 and the desire to test1 cannot secure a natural development4 ,in natural growth each successive stage of activity prepares unconsciously1 but thoroughly1 the conditions for the manifestation of the next stage--as in the cycle of a plant's growth4 ,there is no ground for assuming that thinking is a special1 isolated natural tendency that will bloom inevitably in due season simply because various sense and motor activities have been freely manifested before2 or because observation1 memory1 imagination1 and manual skill have been previously exercised without thought4 ,only when thinking is constantly employed in using the senses and muscles for the guidance and application of observations and movements1 is the way prepared for subsequent higher types of thinking4 ,sidenote3 ,genesis of thought contemporaneous with genesis of any human mental activity ,at present1 the notion is current that childhood is almost entirely unreflective--a period of mere sensory1 motor1 and memory development1 while adolescence suddenly brings the manifestation of thought and reason4 ,adolescence is not1 however1 a synonym for magic4 ,doubtless youth should bring with it an enlargement of the horizon of childhood1 a susceptibility to larger concerns and issues1 a more generous and a more general standpoint toward nature and social life4 ,this development affords an opportunity for thinking of a more comprehensive and abstract type than has previously obtained4 ,but thinking itself remains just what it has been all the time3 a matter of following up and testing the conclusions suggested by the facts and events of life4 ,thinking begins as soon as the baby who has lost the ball that he is playing with begins to foresee the possibility of something not yet existing--its recovery2 and begins to forecast steps toward the realization of this possibility1 and1 by experimentation1 to guide his acts by his ideas and thereby also test the ideas4 ,only by making the most of the thought-factor1 already active in the experiences of childhood1 is there any promise or warrant for the emergence of superior reflective power at adolescence1 or at any later period4 ,sidenote3 ,fixation of bad mental habits 7c7 ,in any case positive habits are being formed3 if not habits of careful looking into things1 then habits of hasty1 heedless1 impatient glancing over the surface2 if not habits of consecutively following up the suggestions that occur1 then habits of haphazard1 grasshopper-like guessing2 if not habits of suspending judgment till inferences have been tested by the examination of evidence1 then habits of credulity alternating with flippant incredulity1 belief or unbelief being based1 in either case1 upon whim1 emotion1 or accidental circumstances4 ,the only way to achieve traits of carefulness1 thoroughness1 and continuity 7traits that are1 as we have seen1 the elements of the logical7 is by exercising these traits from the beginning1 and by seeing to it that conditions call for their exercise4 ,sidenote3 ,genuine freedom is intellectual1 not external ,genuine freedom1 in short1 is intellectual2 it rests in the trained power of thought1 in ability to turn things over1 to look at matters deliberately1 to judge whether the amount and kind of evidence requisite for decision is at hand1 and if not1 to tell where and how to seek such evidence4 ,if a man's actions are not guided by thoughtful conclusions1 then they are guided by inconsiderate impulse1 unbalanced appetite1 caprice1 or the circumstances of the moment4 ,to cultivate unhindered1 unreflective external activity is to foster enslavement1 for it leaves the person at the mercy of appetite1 sense1 and circumstance4 ,,part ,,two3 ,,logical ,,considerations ,,chapter ,,six ,,the ,,analysis ,,of ,a ,,complete ,,act ,,of ,,thought ,sidenote3 ,object of ,part ,two ,after a brief consideration in the first chapter of the nature of reflective thinking1 we turned1 in the second1 to the need for its training4 ,then we took up the resources1 the difficulties1 and the aim of its training4 ,the purpose of this discussion was to set before the student the general problem of the training of mind4 ,the purport of the second part1 upon which we are now entering1 is giving a fuller statement of the nature and normal growth of thinking1 preparatory to considering in the concluding part the special problems that arise in connection with its education4 ,in this chapter we shall make an analysis of the process of thinking into its steps or elementary constituents1 basing the analysis upon descriptions of a number of extremely simple1 but genuine1 cases of reflective experience4#ac #ac ,these are taken1 almost verbatim1 from the class papers of students4 ,sidenote3 ,a simple case of practical deliberation #a4 ,the other day when ,i was down town on #afth ,street a clock caught my eye4 ,i saw that the hands pointed to #ab4bj4 ,this suggested that ,i had an engagement at #abdth ,street1 at one o'clock4 ,i reasoned that as it had taken me an hour to come down on a surface car1 ,i should probably be twenty minutes late if ,i returned the same way4 ,i might save twenty minutes by a subway express4 ,but was there a station near8 ,if not1 ,i might lose more than twenty minutes in looking for one4 ,then ,i thought of the elevated1 and ,i saw there was such a line within two blocks4 ,but where was the station8 ,if it were several blocks above or below the street ,i was on1 ,i should lose time instead of gaining it4 ,my mind went back to the subway express as quicker than the elevated2 furthermore1 ,i remembered that it went nearer than the elevated to the part of #abdth ,street ,i wished to reach1 so that time would be saved at the end of the journey4 ,i concluded in favor of the subway1 and reached my destination by one o'clock4 ,sidenote3 ,a simple case of reflection upon an observation #b4 ,projecting nearly horizontally from the upper deck of the ferryboat on which ,i daily cross the river1 is a long white pole1 bearing a gilded ball at its tip4 ,it suggested a flagpole when ,i first saw it2 its color1 shape1 and gilded ball agreed with this idea1 and these reasons seemed to justify me in this belief4 ,but soon difficulties presented themselves4 ,the pole was nearly horizontal1 an unusual position for a flagpole2 in the next place1 there was no pulley1 ring1 or cord by which to attach a flag2 finally1 there were elsewhere two vertical staffs from which flags were occasionally flown4 ,it seemed probable that the pole was not there for flag-flying4 ,i then tried to imagine all possible purposes of such a pole1 and to consider for which of these it was best suited3 7a7 ,possibly it was an ornament4 ,but as all the ferryboats and even the tugboats carried like poles1 this hypothesis was rejected4 7b7 ,possibly it was the terminal of a wireless telegraph4 ,but the same considerations made this improbable4 ,besides1 the more natural place for such a terminal would be the highest part of the boat1 on top of the pilot house4 7c7 ,its purpose might be to point out the direction in which the boat is moving4 ,in support of this conclusion1 ,i discovered that the pole was lower than the pilot house1 so that the steersman could easily see it4 ,moreover1 the tip was enough higher than the base1 so that1 from the pilot's position1 it must appear to project far out in front of the boat4 ,moreover1 the pilot being near the front of the boat1 he would need some such guide as to its direction4 ,tugboats would also need poles for such a purpose4 ,this hypothesis was so much more probable than the others that ,i accepted it4 ,i formed the conclusion that the pole was set up for the purpose of showing the pilot the direction in which the boat pointed1 to enable him to steer correctly4 ,sidenote3 ,a simple case of reflection involving experiment #c4 ,in washing tumblers in hot soapsuds and placing them mouth downward on a plate1 bubbles appeared on the outside of the mouth of the tumblers and then went inside4 ,why8 ,the presence of bubbles suggests air1 which ,i note must come from inside the tumbler4 ,i see that the soapy water on the plate prevents escape of the air save as it may be caught in bubbles4 ,but why should air leave the tumbler8 ,there was no substance entering to force it out4 ,it must have expanded4 ,it expands by increase of heat or by decrease of pressure1 or by both4 ,could the air have become heated after the tumbler was taken from the hot suds8 ,clearly not the air that was already entangled in the water4 ,if heated air was the cause1 cold air must have entered in transferring the tumblers from the suds to the plate4 ,i test to see if this supposition is true by taking several more tumblers out4 ,some ,i shake so as to make sure of entrapping cold air in them4 ,some ,i take out holding mouth downward in order to prevent cold air from entering4 ,bubbles appear on the outside of every one of the former and on none of the latter4 ,i must be right in my inference4 ,air from the outside must have been expanded by the heat of the tumbler1 which explains the appearance of the bubbles on the outside4 ,but why do they then go inside8 ,cold contracts4 ,the tumbler cooled and also the air inside it4 ,tension was removed1 and hence bubbles appeared inside4 ,to be sure of this1 ,i test by placing a cup of ice on the tumbler while the bubbles are still forming outside4 ,they soon reverse4 ,sidenote3 ,the three cases form a series ,these three cases have been purposely selected so as to form a series from the more rudimentary to more complicated cases of reflection4 ,the first illustrates the kind of thinking done by every one during the day's business1 in which neither the data1 nor the ways of dealing with them1 take one outside the limits of everyday experience4 ,the last furnishes a case in which neither problem nor mode of solution would have been likely to occur except to one with some prior scientific training4 ,the second case forms a natural transition2 its materials lie well within the bounds of everyday1 unspecialized experience2 but the problem1 instead of being directly involved in the person's business1 arises indirectly out of his activity1 and accordingly appeals to a somewhat theoretic and impartial interest4 ,we shall deal1 in a later chapter1 with the evolution of abstract thinking out of that which is relatively practical and direct2 here we are concerned only with the common elements found in all the types4 ,sidenote3 ,five distinct steps in reflection ,upon examination1 each instance reveals1 more or less clearly1 five logically distinct steps3 7i7 a felt difficulty2 7ii7 its location and definition2 7iii7 suggestion of possible solution2 7iv7 development by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestion2 7v7 further observation and experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection2 that is1 the conclusion of belief or disbelief4 ,sidenote3 #a4 ,the occurrence of a difficulty ,sidenote3 7a7 in the lack of adaptation of means to end #a4 ,the first and second steps frequently fuse into one4 ,the difficulty may be felt with sufficient definiteness as to set the mind at once speculating upon its probable solution1 or an undefined uneasiness and shock may come first1 leading only later to definite attempt to find out what is the matter4 ,whether the two steps are distinct or blended1 there is the factor emphasized in our original account of reflection--viz4 the perplexity or problem4 ,in the first of the three cases cited1 the difficulty resides in the conflict between conditions at hand and a desired and intended result1 between an end and the means for reaching it4 ,the purpose of keeping an engagement at a certain time1 and the existing hour taken in connection with the location1 are not congruous4 ,the object of thinking is to introduce congruity between the two4 ,the given conditions cannot themselves be altered2 time will not go backward nor will the distance between #afth ,street and #abdth ,street shorten itself4 ,the problem is the discovery of intervening terms which when inserted between the remoter end and the given means will harmonize them with each other4 ,sidenote3 7b7 in identifying the character of an object ,in the second case1 the difficulty experienced is the incompatibility of a suggested and 7temporarily7 accepted belief that the pole is a flagpole1 with certain other facts4 ,suppose we symbolize the qualities that suggest flagpole by the letters a1 b1 c2 those that oppose this suggestion by the letters p1 q1 r4 ,there is1 of course1 nothing inconsistent in the qualities themselves2 but in pulling the mind to different and incongruous conclusions they conflict--hence the problem4 ,here the object is the discovery of some object 7,o71 of which a1 b1 c1 and p1 q1 r1 may all be appropriate traits--just as1 in our first case1 it is to discover a course of action which will combine existing conditions and a remoter result in a single whole4 ,the method of solution is also the same3 discovery of intermediate qualities 7the position of the pilot house1 of the pole1 the need of an index to the boat's direction7 symbolized by d1 g1 l1 o1 which bind together otherwise incompatible traits4 ,sidenote3 7c7 in explaining an unexpected event ,in the third case1 an observer trained to the idea of natural laws or uniformities finds something odd or exceptional in the behavior of the bubbles4 ,the problem is to reduce the apparent anomalies to instances of well-established laws4 ,here the method of solution is also to seek for intermediary terms which will connect1 by regular linkage1 the seemingly extraordinary movements of the bubbles with the conditions known to follow from processes supposed to be operative4 ,sidenote3 #b4 ,definition of the difficulty #b4 ,as already noted1 the first two steps1 the feeling of a discrepancy1 or difficulty1 and the acts of observation that serve to define the character of the difficulty may1 in a given instance1 telescope together4 ,in cases of striking novelty or unusual perplexity1 the difficulty1 however1 is likely to present itself at first as a shock1 as emotional disturbance1 as a more or less vague feeling of the unexpected1 of something queer1 strange1 funny1 or disconcerting4 ,in such instances1 there are necessary observations deliberately calculated to bring to light just what is the trouble1 or to make clear the specific character of the problem4 ,in large measure1 the existence or non-existence of this step makes the difference between reflection proper1 or safeguarded critical inference and uncontrolled thinking4 ,where sufficient pains to locate the difficulty are not taken1 suggestions for its resolution must be more or less random4 ,imagine a doctor called in to prescribe for a patient4 ,the patient tells him some things that are wrong2 his experienced eye1 at a glance1 takes in other signs of a certain disease4 ,but if he permits the suggestion of this special disease to take possession prematurely of his mind1 to become an accepted conclusion1 his scientific thinking is by that much cut short4 ,a large part of his technique1 as a skilled practitioner1 is to prevent the acceptance of the first suggestions that arise2 even1 indeed1 to postpone the occurrence of any very definite suggestion till the trouble--the nature of the problem--has been thoroughly explored4 ,in the case of a physician this proceeding is known as diagnosis1 but a similar inspection is required in every novel and complicated situation to prevent rushing to a conclusion4 ,the essence of critical thinking is suspended judgment2 and the essence of this suspense is inquiry to determine the nature of the problem before proceeding to attempts at its solution4 ,this1 more than any other thing1 transforms mere inference into tested inference1 suggested conclusions into proof4 ,sidenote3 #c4 ,occurrence of a suggested explanation or possible solution #c4 ,the third factor is suggestion4 ,the situation in which the perplexity occurs calls up something not present to the senses3 the present location1 the thought of subway or elevated train2 the stick before the eyes1 the idea of a flagpole1 an ornament1 an apparatus for wireless telegraphy2 the soap bubbles1 the law of expansion of bodies through heat and of their contraction through cold4 7a7 ,suggestion is the very heart of inference2 it involves going from what is present to something absent4 ,hence1 it is more or less speculative1 adventurous4 ,since inference goes beyond what is actually present1 it involves a leap1 a jump1 the propriety of which cannot be absolutely warranted in advance1 no matter what precautions be taken4 ,its control is indirect1 on the one hand1 involving the formation of habits of mind which are at once enterprising and cautious2 and on the other hand1 involving the selection and arrangement of the particular facts upon perception of which suggestion issues4 7b7 ,the suggested conclusion so far as it is not accepted but only tentatively entertained constitutes an idea4 ,synonyms for this are supposition1 conjecture1 guess1 hypothesis1 and 7in elaborate cases7 theory4 ,since suspended belief1 or the postponement of a final conclusion pending further evidence1 depends partly upon the presence of rival conjectures as to the best course to pursue or the probable explanation to favor1 cultivation of a variety of alternative suggestions is an important factor in good thinking4 ,sidenote3 #d4 ,the rational elaboration of an idea #d4 ,the process of developing the bearings--or1 as they are more technically termed1 the implications--of any idea with respect to any problem1 is termed reasoning4#ad ,as an idea is inferred from given facts1 so reasoning sets out from an idea4 ,the idea of elevated road is developed into the idea of difficulty of locating station1 length of time occupied on the journey1 distance of station at the other end from place to be reached4 ,in the second case1 the implication of a flagpole is seen to be a vertical position2 of a wireless apparatus1 location on a high part of the ship and1 moreover1 absence from every casual tugboat2 while the idea of index to direction in which the boat moves1 when developed1 is found to cover all the details of the case4 #ad ,this term is sometimes extended to denote the entire reflective process--just as inference 7which in the sense of test is best reserved for the third step7 is sometimes used in the same broad sense4 ,but reasoning 7or ratiocination7 seems to be peculiarly adapted to express what the older writers called the notional or dialectic process of developing the meaning of a given idea4 ,reasoning has the same effect upon a suggested solution as more intimate and extensive observation has upon the original problem4 ,acceptance of the suggestion in its first form is prevented by looking into it more thoroughly4 ,conjectures that seem plausible at first sight are often found unfit or even absurd when their full consequences are traced out4 ,even when reasoning out the bearings of a supposition does not lead to rejection1 it develops the idea into a form in which it is more apposite to the problem4 ,only when1 for example1 the conjecture that a pole was an index-pole had been thought out into its bearings could its particular applicability to the case in hand be judged4 ,suggestions at first seemingly remote and wild are frequently so transformed by being elaborated into what follows from them as to become apt and fruitful4 ,the development of an idea through reasoning helps at least to supply the intervening or intermediate terms that link together into a consistent whole apparently discrepant extremes 7ante1 p4 #gb74 ,sidenote3 #e4 ,corroboration of an idea and formation of a concluding belief #e4 ,the concluding and conclusive step is some kind of experimental corroboration1 or verification1 of the conjectural idea4 ,reasoning shows that if the idea be adopted1 certain consequences follow4 ,so far the conclusion is hypothetical or conditional4 ,if we look and find present all the conditions demanded by the theory1 and if we find the characteristic traits called for by rival alternatives to be lacking1 the tendency to believe1 to accept1 is almost irresistible4 ,sometimes direct observation furnishes corroboration1 as in the case of the pole on the boat4 ,in other cases1 as in that of the bubbles1 experiment is required2 that is1 conditions are deliberately arranged in accord with the requirements of an idea or hypothesis to see if the results theoretically indicated by the idea actually occur4 ,if it is found that the experimental results agree with the theoretical1 or rationally deduced1 results1 and if there is reason to believe that only the conditions in question would yield such results1 the confirmation is so strong as to induce a conclusion--at least until contrary facts shall indicate the advisability of its revision4 ,sidenote3 ,thinking comes between observations at the beginning and at the end ,observation exists at the beginning and again at the end of the process3 at the beginning1 to determine more definitely and precisely the nature of the difficulty to be dealt with2 at the end1 to test the value of some hypothetically entertained conclusion4 ,between those two termini of observation1 we find the more distinctively mental aspects of the entire thought-cycle3 7i7 inference1 the suggestion of an explanation or solution2 and 7ii7 reasoning1 the development of the bearings and implications of the suggestion4 ,reasoning requires some experimental observation to confirm it1 while experiment can be economically and fruitfully conducted only on the basis of an idea that has been tentatively developed by reasoning4 ,sidenote3 ,the trained mind one that judges the extent of each step advisable in a given situation ,the disciplined1 or logically trained1 mind--the aim of the educative process--is the mind able to judge how far each of these steps needs to be carried in any particular situation4 ,no cast-iron rules can be laid down4 ,each case has to be dealt with as it arises1 on the basis of its importance and of the context in which it occurs4 ,to take too much pains in one case is as foolish--as illogical--as to take too little in another4 ,at one extreme1 almost any conclusion that insures prompt and unified action may be better than any long delayed conclusion2 while at the other1 decision may have to be postponed for a long period--perhaps for a lifetime4 ,the trained mind is the one that best grasps the degree of observation1 forming of ideas1 reasoning1 and experimental testing required in any special case1 and that profits the most1 in future thinking1 by mistakes made in the past4 ,what is important is that the mind should be sensitive to problems and skilled in methods of attack and solution4 ,,chapter ,,seven ,,systematic ,,inference3 ,,induction ,,and ,,deduction ,sec4 #a4 ,the ,double ,movement of ,reflection ,sidenote3 ,back and forth between facts and meanings ,the characteristic outcome of thinking we saw to be the organization of facts and conditions which1 just as they stand1 are isolated1 fragmentary1 and discrepant1 the organization being effected through the introduction of connecting links1 or middle terms4 ,the facts as they stand are the data1 the raw material of reflection2 their lack of coherence perplexes and stimulates to reflection4 ,there follows the suggestion of some meaning which1 if it can be substantiated1 will give a whole in which various fragmentary and seemingly incompatible data find their proper place4 ,the meaning suggested supplies a mental platform1 an intellectual point of view1 from which to note and define the data more carefully1 to seek for additional observations1 and to institute1 experimentally1 changed conditions4 ,sidenote3 ,inductive and deductive ,there is thus a double movement in all reflection3 a movement from the given partial and confused data to a suggested comprehensive 7or inclusive7 entire situation2 and back from this suggested whole--which as suggested is a meaning1 an idea--to the particular facts1 so as to connect these with one another and with additional facts to which the suggestion has directed attention4 ,roughly speaking1 the first of these movements is inductive2 the second deductive4 ,a complete act of thought involves both--it involves1 that is1 a fruitful interaction of observed 7or recollected7 particular considerations and of inclusive and far-reaching 7general7 meanings4 ,sidenote3 ,hurry versus caution ,this double movement to and from a meaning may occur1 however1 in a casual1 uncritical way1 or in a cautious and regulated manner4 ,to think means1 in any case1 to bridge a gap in experience1 to bind together facts or deeds otherwise isolated4 ,but we may make only a hurried jump from one consideration to another1 allowing our aversion to mental disquietude to override the gaps2 or1 we may insist upon noting the road traveled in making connections4 ,we may1 in short1 accept readily any suggestion that seems plausible2 or we may hunt out additional factors1 new difficulties1 to see whether the suggested conclusion really ends the matter4 ,the latter method involves definite formulation of the connecting links2 the statement of a principle1 or1 in logical phrase1 the use of a universal4 ,if we thus formulate the whole situation1 the original data are transformed into premises of reasoning2 the final belief is a logical or rational conclusion1 not a mere de facto termination4 ,sidenote3 ,continuity of relationship the mark of the latter ,the importance of connections binding isolated items into a coherent single whole is embodied in all the phrases that denote the relation of premises and conclusions to each other4 7#a7 ,the premises are called grounds1 foundations1 bases1 and are said to underlie1 uphold1 support the conclusion4 7#b7 ,we descend from the premises to the conclusion1 and ascend or mount in the opposite direction--as a river may be continuously traced from source to sea or vice versa4 ,so the conclusion springs1 flows1 or is drawn from its premises4 7#c7 ,the conclusion--as the word itself implies--closes1 shuts in1 locks up together the various factors stated in the premises4 ,we say that the premises contain the conclusion1 and that the conclusion contains the premises1 thereby marking our sense of the inclusive and comprehensive unity in which the elements of reasoning are bound tightly together4#ae ,systematic inference1 in short1 means the recognition of definite relations of interdependence between considerations previously unorganized and disconnected1 this recognition being brought about by the discovery and insertion of new facts and properties4 #ae ,see ,vailati1 ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology1 and ,scientific ,methods1 ,vol4 ,v1 ,no4 #ab4 ,sidenote3 ,scientific induction and deduction ,this more systematic thinking is1 however1 like the cruder forms in its double movement1 the movement toward the suggestion or hypothesis and the movement back to facts4 ,the difference is in the greater conscious care with which each phase of the process is performed4 ,the conditions under which suggestions are allowed to spring up and develop are regulated4 ,hasty acceptance of any idea that is plausible1 that seems to solve the difficulty1 is changed into a conditional acceptance pending further inquiry4 ,the idea is accepted as a working hypothesis1 as something to guide investigation and bring to light new facts1 not as a final conclusion4 ,when pains are taken to make each aspect of the movement as accurate as possible1 the movement toward building up the idea is known as inductive discovery 7induction1 for short72 the movement toward developing1 applying1 and testing1 as deductive proof 7deduction1 for short74 ,sidenote3 ,particular and universal ,while induction moves from fragmentary details 7or particulars7 to a connected view of a situation 7universal71 deduction begins with the latter and works back again to particulars1 connecting them and binding them together4 ,the inductive movement is toward discovery of a binding principle2 the deductive toward its testing--confirming1 refuting1 modifying it on the basis of its capacity to interpret isolated details into a unified experience4 ,so far as we conduct each of these processes in the light of the other1 we get valid discovery or verified critical thinking4 ,sidenote3 ,illustration from everyday experience ,a commonplace illustration may enforce the points of this formula4 ,a man who has left his rooms in order finds them upon his return in a state of confusion1 articles being scattered at random4 ,automatically1 the notion comes to his mind that burglary would account for the disorder4 ,he has not seen the burglars2 their presence is not a fact of observation1 but is a thought1 an idea4 ,moreover1 the man has no special burglars in mind2 it is the relation1 the meaning of burglary--something general--that comes to mind4 ,the state of his room is perceived and is particular1 definite1--exactly as it is2 burglars are inferred1 and have a general status4 ,the state of the room is a fact1 certain and speaking for itself2 the presence of burglars is a possible meaning which may explain the facts4 ,sidenote3 of induction1 ,so far there is an inductive tendency1 suggested by particular and present facts4 ,in the same inductive way1 it occurs to him that his children are mischievous1 and that they may have thrown the things about4 ,this rival hypothesis 7or conditional principle of explanation7 prevents him from dogmatically accepting the first suggestion4 ,judgment is held in suspense and a positive conclusion postponed4 ,sidenote3 of deduction ,then deductive movement begins4 ,further observations1 recollections1 reasonings are conducted on the basis of a development of the ideas suggested3 if burglars were responsible1 such and such things would have happened2 articles of value would be missing4 ,here the man is going from a general principle or relation to special features that accompany it1 to particulars1--not back1 however1 merely to the original particulars 7which would be fruitless or take him in a circle71 but to new details1 the actual discovery or nondiscovery of which will test the principle4 ,the man turns to a box of valuables2 some things are gone2 some1 however1 are still there4 ,perhaps he has himself removed the missing articles1 but has forgotten it4 ,his experiment is not a decisive test4 ,he thinks of the silver in the sideboard--the children would not have taken that nor would he absent-mindedly have changed its place4 ,he looks2 all the solid ware is gone4 ,the conception of burglars is confirmed2 examination of windows and doors shows that they have been tampered with4 ,belief culminates2 the original isolated facts have been woven into a coherent fabric4 ,the idea first suggested 7inductively7 has been employed to reason out hypothetically certain additional particulars not yet experienced1 that ought to be there1 if the suggestion is correct4 ,then new acts of observation have shown that the particulars theoretically called for are present1 and by this process the hypothesis is strengthened1 corroborated4 ,this moving back and forth between the observed facts and the conditional idea is kept up till a coherent experience of an object is substituted for the experience of conflicting details--or else the whole matter is given up as a bad job4 ,sidenote3 ,science is the same operations carefully performed ,sciences exemplify similar attitudes and operations1 but with a higher degree of elaboration of the instruments of caution1 exactness and thoroughness4 ,this greater elaboration brings about specialization1 an accurate marking off of various types of problems from one another1 and a corresponding segregation and classification of the materials of experience associated with each type of problem4 ,we shall devote the remainder of this chapter to a consideration of the devices by which the discovery1 the development1 and the testing of meanings are scientifically carried on4 ,sec4 #b4 ,guidance of the ,inductive ,movement ,sidenote3 ,guidance is indirect ,control of the formation of suggestion is necessarily indirect1 not direct2 imperfect1 not perfect4 ,just because all discovery1 all apprehension involving thought of the new1 goes from the known1 the present1 to the unknown and absent1 no rules can be stated that will guarantee correct inference4 ,just what is suggested to a person in a given situation depends upon his native constitution 7his originality1 his genius71 temperament1 the prevalent direction of his interests1 his early environment1 the general tenor of his past experiences1 his special training1 the things that have recently occupied him continuously or vividly1 and so on2 to some extent even upon an accidental conjunction of present circumstances4 ,these matters1 so far as they lie in the past or in external conditions1 clearly escape regulation4 ,a suggestion simply does or does not occur2 this or that suggestion just happens1 occurs1 springs up4 ,if1 however1 prior experience and training have developed an attitude of patience in a condition of doubt1 a capacity for suspended judgment1 and a liking for inquiry1 indirect control of the course of suggestions is possible4 ,the individual may return upon1 revise1 restate1 enlarge1 and analyze the facts out of which suggestion springs4 ,inductive methods1 in the technical sense1 all have to do with regulating the conditions under which observation1 memory1 and the acceptance of the testimony of others 7the operations supplying the raw data7 proceed4 ,sidenote3 ,method of indirect regulation ,given the facts ,a ,b ,c ,d on one side and certain individual habits on the other1 suggestion occurs automatically4 ,but if the facts ,a ,b ,c ,d are carefully looked into and thereby resolved into the facts ,a' ,b'' ,r ,s1 a suggestion will automatically present itself different from that called up by the facts in their first form4 ,to inventory the facts1 to describe exactly and minutely their respective traits1 to magnify artificially those that are obscure and feeble1 to reduce artificially those that are so conspicuous and glaring as to be distracting1--these are ways of modifying the facts that exercise suggestive force1 and thereby indirectly guiding the formation of suggested inferences4 ,sidenote3 ,illustration from diagnosis ,consider1 for example1 how a physician makes his diagnosis--his inductive interpretation4 ,if he is scientifically trained1 he suspends--postpones--reaching a conclusion in order that he may not be led by superficial occurrences into a snap judgment4 ,certain conspicuous phenomena may forcibly suggest typhoid1 but he avoids a conclusion1 or even any strong preference for this or that conclusion until he has greatly 7i7 enlarged the scope of his data1 and 7ii7 rendered them more minute4 ,he not only questions the patient as to his feelings and as to his acts prior to the disease1 but by various manipulations with his hands 7and with instruments made for the purpose7 brings to light a large number of facts of which the patient is quite unaware4 ,the state of temperature1 respiration1 and heart-action is accurately noted1 and their fluctuations from time to time are exactly recorded4 ,until this examination has worked out toward a wider collection and in toward a minuter scrutiny of details1 inference is deferred4 ,sidenote3 ,summary3 definition of scientific induction ,scientific induction means1 in short1 all the processes by which the observing and amassing of data are regulated with a view to facilitating the formation of explanatory conceptions and theories4 ,these devices are all directed toward selecting the precise facts to which weight and significance shall attach in forming suggestions or ideas4 ,specifically1 this selective determination involves devices of 7#a7 elimination by analysis of what is likely to be misleading and irrelevant1 7#b7 emphasis of the important by collection and comparison of cases1 7#c7 deliberate construction of data by experimental variation4 ,sidenote3 ,elimination of irrelevant meanings 7#a7 ,it is a common saying that one must learn to discriminate between observed facts and judgments based upon them4 ,taken literally1 such advice cannot be carried out2 in every observed thing there is--if the thing have any meaning at all--some consolidation of meaning with what is sensibly and physically present1 such that1 if this were entirely excluded1 what is left would have no sense4 ,a says3 ,i saw my brother4 ,the term brother1 however1 involves a relation that cannot be sensibly or physically observed2 it is inferential in status4 ,if ,a contents himself with saying1 ,i saw a man1 the factor of classification1 of intellectual reference1 is less complex1 but still exists4 ,if1 as a last resort1 ,a were to say1 ,anyway1 ,i saw a colored object1 some relationship1 though more rudimentary and undefined1 still subsists4 ,theoretically1 it is possible that no object was there1 only an unusual mode of nerve stimulation4 ,none the less1 the advice to discriminate what is observed from what is inferred is sound practical advice4 ,its working import is that one should eliminate or exclude those inferences as to which experience has shown that there is greatest liability to error4 ,this1 of course1 is a relative matter4 ,under ordinary circumstances no reasonable doubt would attach to the observation1 ,i see my brother2 it would be pedantic and silly to resolve this recognition back into a more elementary form4 ,under other circumstances it might be a perfectly genuine question as to whether ,a saw even a colored thing1 or whether the color was due to a stimulation of the sensory optical apparatus 7like seeing stars upon a blow7 or to a disordered circulation4 ,in general1 the scientific man is one who knows that he is likely to be hurried to a conclusion1 and that part of this precipitancy is due to certain habits which tend to make him read certain meanings into the situation that confronts him1 so that he must be on the lookout against errors arising from his interests1 habits1 and current preconceptions4 ,sidenote3 ,the technique of conclusion ,the technique of scientific inquiry thus consists in various processes that tend to exclude over-hasty reading in of meanings2 devices that aim to give a purely objective unbiased rendering of the data to be interpreted4 ,flushed cheeks usually mean heightened temperature2 paleness means lowered temperature4 ,the clinical thermometer records automatically the actual temperature and hence checks up the habitual associations that might lead to error in a given case4 ,all the instrumentalities of observation--the various -meters and -graphs and -scopes--fill a part of their scientific role in helping to eliminate meanings supplied because of habit1 prejudice1 the strong momentary preoccupation of excitement and anticipation1 and by the vogue of existing theories4 ,photographs1 phonographs1 kymographs1 actinographs1 seismographs1 plethysmographs1 and the like1 moreover1 give records that are permanent1 so that they can be employed by different persons1 and by the same person in different states of mind1 i4e4 under the influence of varying expectations and dominant beliefs4 ,thus purely personal prepossessions 7due to habit1 to desire1 to after-effects of recent experience7 may be largely eliminated4 ,in ordinary language1 the facts are objectively1 rather than subjectively1 determined4 ,in this way tendencies to premature interpretation are held in check4 ,sidenote3 ,collection of instances 7#b7 ,another important method of control consists in the multiplication of cases or instances4 ,if ,i doubt whether a certain handful gives a fair sample1 or representative1 for purposes of judging value1 of a whole carload of grain1 ,i take a number of handfuls from various parts of the car and compare them4 ,if they agree in quality1 well and good2 if they disagree1 we try to get enough samples so that when they are thoroughly mixed the result will be a fair basis for an evaluation4 ,this illustration represents roughly the value of that aspect of scientific control in induction which insists upon multiplying observations instead of basing the conclusion upon one or a few cases4 ,sidenote3 ,this method not the whole of induction ,so prominent1 indeed1 is this aspect of inductive method that it is frequently treated as the whole of induction4 ,it is supposed that all inductive inference is based upon collecting and comparing a number of like cases4 ,but in fact such comparison and collection is a secondary development within the process of securing a correct conclusion in some single case4 ,if a man infers from a single sample of grain as to the grade of wheat of the car as a whole1 it is induction and1 under certain circumstances1 a sound induction2 other cases are resorted to simply for the sake of rendering that induction more guarded1 and more probably correct4 ,in like fashion1 the reasoning that led up to the burglary idea in the instance already cited 7p4 #hc7 was inductive1 though there was but one single case examined4 ,the particulars upon which the general meaning 7or relation7 of burglary was grounded were simply the sum total of the unlike items and qualities that made up the one case examined4 ,had this case presented very great obscurities and difficulties1 recourse might then have been had to examination of a number of similar cases4 ,but this comparison would not make inductive a process which was not previously of that character2 it would only render induction more wary and adequate4 ,the object of bringing into consideration a multitude of cases is to facilitate the selection of the evidential or significant features upon which to base inference in some single case4 ,sidenote3 ,contrast as important as likeness ,accordingly1 points of unlikeness are as important as points of likeness among the cases examined4 ,comparison1 without contrast1 does not amount to anything logically4 ,in the degree in which other cases observed or remembered merely duplicate the case in question1 we are no better off for purposes of inference than if we had permitted our single original fact to dictate a conclusion4 ,in the case of the various samples of grain1 it is the fact that the samples are unlike1 at least in the part of the carload from which they are taken1 that is important4 ,were it not for this unlikeness1 their likeness in quality would be of no avail in assisting inference4#af ,if we are endeavoring to get a child to regulate his conclusions about the germination of a seed by taking into account a number of instances1 very little is gained if the conditions in all these instances closely approximate one another4 ,but if one seed is placed in pure sand1 another in loam1 and another on blotting-paper1 and if in each case there are two conditions1 one with and another without moisture1 the unlike factors tend to throw into relief the factors that are significant 7or essential7 for reaching a conclusion4 ,unless1 in short1 the observer takes care to have the differences in the observed cases as extreme as conditions allow1 and unless he notes unlikenesses as carefully as likenesses1 he has no way of determining the evidential force of the data that confront him4 #af ,in terms of the phrases used in logical treatises1 the so-called methods of agreement 7comparison7 and difference 7contrast7 must accompany each other or constitute a joint method in order to be of logical use4 ,sidenote3 ,importance of exceptions and contrary cases ,another way of bringing out this importance of unlikeness is the emphasis put by the scientist upon negative cases--upon instances which it would seem ought to fall into line but which as matter of fact do not4 ,anomalies1 exceptions1 things which agree in most respects but disagree in some crucial point1 are so important that many of the devices of scientific technique are designed purely to detect1 record1 and impress upon memory contrasting cases4 ,darwin remarked that so easy is it to pass over cases that oppose a favorite generalization1 that he had made it a habit not merely to hunt for contrary instances1 but also to write down any exception he noted or thought of--as otherwise it was almost sure to be forgotten4 ,sec4 #c4 ,experimental ,variation of ,conditions ,sidenote3 ,experiment the typical method of introducing contrast factors ,we have already trenched upon this factor of inductive method1 the one that is the most important of all wherever it is feasible4 ,theoretically1 one sample case of the right kind will be as good a basis for an inference as a thousand cases2 but cases of the right kind rarely turn up spontaneously4 ,we have to search for them1 and we may have to make them4 ,if we take cases just as we find them--whether one case or many cases--they contain much that is irrelevant to the problem in hand1 while much that is relevant is obscure1 hidden4 ,the object of experimentation is the construction1 by regular steps taken on the basis of a plan thought out in advance1 of a typical1 crucial case1 a case formed with express reference to throwing light on the difficulty in question4 ,all inductive methods rest 7as already stated1 p4 #he7 upon regulation of the conditions of observation and memory2 experiment is simply the most adequate regulation possible of these conditions4 ,we try to make the observation such that every factor entering into it1 together with the mode and the amount of its operation1 may be open to recognition4 ,such making of observations constitutes experiment4 ,sidenote3 ,three advantages of experiment ,such observations have many and obvious advantages over observations--no matter how extensive--with respect to which we simply wait for an event to happen or an object to present itself4 ,experiment overcomes the defects due to 7a7 the rarity1 7b7 the subtlety and minuteness 7or the violence71 and 7c7 the rigid fixity of facts as we ordinarily experience them4 ,the following quotations from ,jevons's ,elementary ,lessons in ,logic bring out all these points3 7i7 ,we might have to wait years or centuries to meet accidentally with facts which we can readily produce at any moment in a laboratory2 and it is probable that most of the chemical substances now known1 and many excessively useful products would never have been discovered at all by waiting till nature presented them spontaneously to our observation4 ,this quotation refers to the infrequency or rarity of certain facts of nature1 even very important ones4 ,the passage then goes on to speak of the minuteness of many phenomena which makes them escape ordinary experience3 7ii7 ,electricity doubtless operates in every particle of matter1 perhaps at every moment of time2 and even the ancients could not but notice its action in the loadstone1 in lightning1 in the ,aurora ,borealis1 or in a piece of rubbed amber4 ,but in lightning electricity was too intense and dangerous2 in the other cases it was too feeble to be properly understood4 ,the science of electricity and magnetism could only advance by getting regular supplies of electricity from the common electric machine or the galvanic battery and by making powerful electromagnets4 ,most1 if not all1 the effects which electricity produces must go on in nature1 but altogether too obscurely for observation4 ,jevons then deals with the fact that1 under ordinary conditions of experience1 phenomena which can be understood only by seeing them under varying conditions are presented in a fixed and uniform way4 7iii7 ,thus carbonic acid is only met in the form of a gas1 proceeding from the combustion of carbon2 but when exposed to extreme pressure and cold1 it is condensed into a liquid1 and may even be converted into a snowlike solid substance4 ,many other gases have in like manner been liquefied or solidified1 and there is reason to believe that every substance is capable of taking all three forms of solid1 liquid1 and gas1 if only the conditions of temperature and pressure can be sufficiently varied4 ,mere observation of nature would have led us1 on the contrary1 to suppose that nearly all substances were fixed in one condition only1 and could not be converted from solid into liquid and from liquid into gas4 ,many volumes would be required to describe in detail all the methods that investigators have developed in various subjects for analyzing and restating the facts of ordinary experience so that we may escape from capricious and routine suggestions1 and may get the facts in such a form and in such a light 7or context7 that exact and far-reaching explanations may be suggested in place of vague and limited ones4 ,but these various devices of inductive inquiry all have one goal in view3 the indirect regulation of the function of suggestion1 or formation of ideas2 and1 in the main1 they will be found to reduce to some combination of the three types of selecting and arranging subject-matter just described4 ,sec4 #d4 ,guidance of the ,deductive ,movement ,sidenote3 ,value of deduction for guiding induction ,before dealing directly with this topic1 we must note that systematic regulation of induction depends upon the possession of a body of general principles that may be applied deductively to the examination or construction of particular cases as they come up4 ,if the physician does not know the general laws of the physiology of the human body1 he has little way of telling what is either peculiarly significant or peculiarly exceptional in any particular case that he is called upon to treat4 ,if he knows the laws of circulation1 digestion1 and respiration1 he can deduce the conditions that should normally be found in a given case4 ,these considerations give a base line from which the deviations and abnormalities of a particular case may be measured4 ,in this way1 the nature of the problem at hand is located and defined4 ,attention is not wasted upon features which though conspicuous have nothing to do with the case2 it is concentrated upon just those traits which are out of the way and hence require explanation4 ,a question well put is half answered2 i4e4 a difficulty clearly apprehended is likely to suggest its own solution1--while a vague and miscellaneous perception of the problem leads to groping and fumbling4 ,deductive systems are necessary in order to put the question in a fruitful form4 ,sidenote3 ,reasoning a thing out ,the control of the origin and development of hypotheses by deduction does not cease1 however1 with locating the problem4 ,ideas as they first present themselves are inchoate and incomplete4 ,deduction is their elaboration into fullness and completeness of meaning 7see p4 #gf74 ,the phenomena which the physician isolates from the total mass of facts that exist in front of him suggest1 we will say1 typhoid fever4 ,now this conception of typhoid fever is one that is capable of development4 ,if there is typhoid1 wherever there is typhoid1 there are certain results1 certain characteristic symptoms4 ,by going over mentally the full bearing of the concept of typhoid1 the scientist is instructed as to further phenomena to be found4 ,its development gives him an instrument of inquiry1 of observation and experimentation4 ,he can go to work deliberately to see whether the case presents those features that it should have if the supposition is valid4 ,the deduced results form a basis for comparison with observed results4 ,except where there is a system of principles capable of being elaborated by theoretical reasoning1 the process of testing 7or proof7 of a hypothesis is incomplete and haphazard4 ,sidenote3 ,such reasoning implies systematized knowledge1 ,these considerations indicate the method by which the deductive movement is guided4 ,deduction requires a system of allied ideas which may be translated into one another by regular or graded steps4 ,the question is whether the facts that confront us can be identified as typhoid fever4 ,to all appearances1 there is a great gap between them and typhoid4 ,but if we can1 by some method of substitutions1 go through a series of intermediary terms 7see p4 #gb71 the gap may1 after all1 be easily bridged4 ,typhoid may mean p which in turn means o1 which means n which means m1 which is very similar to the data selected as the key to the problem4 ,sidenote3 or definition and classification ,one of the chief objects of science is to provide for every typical branch of subject-matter a set of meanings and principles so closely interknit that any one implies some other according to definite conditions1 which under certain other conditions implies another1 and so on4 ,in this way1 various substitutions of equivalents are possible1 and reasoning can trace out1 without having recourse to specific observations1 very remote consequences of any suggested principle4 ,definition1 general formulae1 and classification are the devices by which the fixation and elaboration of a meaning into its detailed ramifications are carried on4 ,they are not ends in themselves--as they are frequently regarded even in elementary education--but instrumentalities for facilitating the development of a conception into the form where its applicability to given facts may best be tested4#ag #ag ,these processes are further discussed in ,chapter ,,ix4 ,sidenote3 ,the final control of deduction ,the final test of deduction lies in experimental observation4 ,elaboration by reasoning may make a suggested idea very rich and very plausible1 but it will not settle the validity of that idea4 ,only if facts can be observed 7by methods either of collection or of experimentation71 that agree in detail and without exception with the deduced results1 are we justified in accepting the deduction as giving a valid conclusion4 ,thinking1 in short1 must end as well as begin in the domain of concrete observations1 if it is to be complete thinking4 ,and the ultimate educative value of all deductive processes is measured by the degree to which they become working tools in the creation and development of new experiences4 ,sec4 #e4 ,some ,educational ,bearings of the ,discussion ,sidenote3 ,educational counterparts of false logical theories ,sidenote3 ,isolation of facts ,some of the points of the foregoing logical analysis may be clinched by a consideration of their educational implications1 especially with reference to certain practices that grow out of a false separation by which each is thought to be independent of the other and complete in itself4 7i7 ,in some school subjects1 or at all events in some topics or in some lessons1 the pupils are immersed in details2 their minds are loaded with disconnected items 7whether gleaned by observation and memory1 or accepted on hearsay and authority74 ,induction is treated as beginning and ending with the amassing of facts1 of particular isolated pieces of information4 ,that these items are educative only as suggesting a view of some larger situation in which the particulars are included and thereby accounted for1 is ignored4 ,in object lessons in elementary education and in laboratory instruction in higher education1 the subject is often so treated that the student fails to see the forest on account of the trees4 ,things and their qualities are retailed and detailed1 without reference to a more general character which they stand for and mean4 ,or1 in the laboratory1 the student becomes engrossed in the processes of manipulation1--irrespective of the reason for their performance1 without recognizing a typical problem for the solution of which they afford the appropriate method4 ,only deduction brings out and emphasizes consecutive relationships1 and only when relationships are held in view does learning become more than a miscellaneous scrap-bag4 ,sidenote3 ,failure to follow up by reasoning 7ii7 ,again1 the mind is allowed to hurry on to a vague notion of the whole of which the fragmentary facts are portions1 without any attempt to become conscious of how they are bound together as parts of this whole4 ,the student feels that in a general way1 as we say1 the facts of the history or geography lesson are related thus and so2 but in a general way here stands only for in a vague way1 somehow or other1 with no clear recognition of just how4 ,the pupil is encouraged to form1 on the basis of the particular facts1 a general notion1 a conception of how they stand related2 but no pains are taken to make the student follow up the notion1 to elaborate it and see just what its bearings are upon the case in hand and upon similar cases4 ,the inductive inference1 the guess1 is formed by the student2 if it happens to be correct1 it is at once accepted by the teacher2 or if it is false1 it is rejected4 ,if any amplification of the idea occurs1 it is quite likely carried through by the teacher1 who thereby assumes the responsibility for its intellectual development4 ,but a complete1 an integral1 act of thought requires that the person making the suggestion 7the guess7 be responsible also for reasoning out its bearings upon the problem in hand2 that he develop the suggestion at least enough to indicate the ways in which it applies to and accounts for the specific data of the case4 ,too often when a recitation does not consist in simply testing the ability of the student to display some form of technical skill1 or to repeat facts and principles accepted on the authority of text-book or lecturer1 the teacher goes to the opposite extreme2 and after calling out the spontaneous reflections of the pupils1 their guesses or ideas about the matter1 merely accepts or rejects them1 assuming himself the responsibility for their elaboration4 ,in this way1 the function of suggestion and of interpretation is excited1 but it is not directed and trained4 ,induction is stimulated but is not carried over into the reasoning phase necessary to complete it4 ,in other subjects and topics1 the deductive phase is isolated1 and is treated as if it were complete in itself4 ,this false isolation may show itself in either 7and both7 of two points2 namely1 at the beginning or at the end of the resort to general intellectual procedure4 ,sidenote3 ,isolation of deduction by commencing with it 7iii7 ,beginning with definitions1 rules1 general principles1 classifications1 and the like1 is a common form of the first error4 ,this method has been such a uniform object of attack on the part of all educational reformers that it is not necessary to dwell upon it further than to note that the mistake is1 logically1 due to the attempt to introduce deductive considerations without first making acquaintance with the particular facts that create a need for the generalizing rational devices4 ,unfortunately1 the reformer sometimes carries his objection too far1 or rather locates it in the wrong place4 ,he is led into a tirade against all definition1 all systematization1 all use of general principles1 instead of confining himself to pointing out their futility and their deadness when not properly motivated by familiarity with concrete experiences4 ,sidenote3 ,isolation of deduction from direction of new observations 7iv7 ,the isolation of deduction is seen1 at the other end1 wherever there is failure to clinch and test the results of the general reasoning processes by application to new concrete cases4 ,the final point of the deductive devices lies in their use in assimilating and comprehending individual cases4 ,no one understands a general principle fully--no matter how adequately he can demonstrate it1 to say nothing of repeating it--till he can employ it in the mastery of new situations1 which1 if they are new1 differ in manifestation from the cases used in reaching the generalization4 ,too often the text-book or teacher is contented with a series of somewhat perfunctory examples and illustrations1 and the student is not forced to carry the principle that he has formulated over into further cases of his own experience4 ,in so far1 the principle is inert and dead4 ,sidenote3 ,lack of provision for experimentation 7v7 ,it is only a variation upon this same theme to say that every complete act of reflective inquiry makes provision for experimentation--for testing suggested and accepted principles by employing them for the active construction of new cases1 in which new qualities emerge4 ,only slowly do our schools accommodate themselves to the general advance of scientific method4 ,from the scientific side1 it is demonstrated that effective and integral thinking is possible only where the experimental method in some form is used4 ,some recognition of this principle is evinced in higher institutions of learning1 colleges and high schools4 ,but in elementary education1 it is still assumed1 for the most part1 that the pupil's natural range of observations1 supplemented by what he accepts on hearsay1 is adequate for intellectual growth4 ,of course it is not necessary that laboratories shall be introduced under that name1 much less that elaborate apparatus be secured2 but the entire scientific history of humanity demonstrates that the conditions for complete mental activity will not be obtained till adequate provision is made for the carrying on of activities that actually modify physical conditions1 and that books1 pictures1 and even objects that are passively observed but not manipulated do not furnish the provision required4 ,,chapter ,,eight ,,judgment3 ,,the ,,interpretation ,,of ,,facts ,sec4 #a4 ,the ,three ,factors of ,judging ,sidenote3 ,good judgment ,a man of good judgment in a given set of affairs is a man in so far educated1 trained1 whatever may be his literacy4 ,and if our schools turn out their pupils in that attitude of mind which is conducive to good judgment in any department of affairs in which the pupils are placed1 they have done more than if they sent out their pupils merely possessed of vast stores of information1 or high degrees of skill in specialized branches4 ,to know what is good judgment we need first to know what judgment is4 ,sidenote3 ,judgment and inference ,that there is an intimate connection between judgment and inference is obvious enough4 ,the aim of inference is to terminate itself in an adequate judgment of a situation1 and the course of inference goes on through a series of partial and tentative judgments4 ,what are these units1 these terms of inference when we examine them on their own account8 ,their significant traits may be readily gathered from a consideration of the operations to which the word judgment was originally applied3 namely1 the authoritative decision of matters in legal controversy--the procedure of the judge on the bench4 ,there are three such features3 7#a7 a controversy1 consisting of opposite claims regarding the same objective situation2 7#b7 a process of defining and elaborating these claims and of sifting the facts adduced to support them2 7#c7 a final decision1 or sentence1 closing the particular matter in dispute and also serving as a rule or principle for deciding future cases4 ,sidenote3 ,uncertainty the antecedent of judgment #a4 ,unless there is something doubtful1 the situation is read off at a glance2 it is taken in on sight1 i4e4 there is merely apprehension1 perception1 recognition1 not judgment4 ,if the matter is wholly doubtful1 if it is dark and obscure throughout1 there is a blind mystery and again no judgment occurs4 ,but if it suggests1 however vaguely1 different meanings1 rival possible interpretations1 there is some point at issue1 some matter at stake4 ,doubt takes the form of dispute1 controversy2 different sides compete for a conclusion in their favor4 ,cases brought to trial before a judge illustrate neatly and unambiguously this strife of alternative interpretations2 but any case of trying to clear up intellectually a doubtful situation exemplifies the same traits4 ,a moving blur catches our eye in the distance2 we ask ourselves3 ,what is it8 ,is it a cloud of whirling dust8 a tree waving its branches8 a man signaling to us8 ,something in the total situation suggests each of these possible meanings4 ,only one of them can possibly be sound2 perhaps none of them is appropriate2 yet some meaning the thing in question surely has4 ,which of the alternative suggested meanings has the rightful claim8 ,what does the perception really mean8 ,how is it to be interpreted1 estimated1 appraised1 placed8 ,every judgment proceeds from some such situation4 ,sidenote3 ,judgment defines the issue1 #b4 ,the hearing of the controversy1 the trial1 i4e4 the weighing of alternative claims1 divides into two branches1 either of which1 in a given case1 may be more conspicuous than the other4 ,in the consideration of a legal dispute1 these two branches are sifting the evidence and selecting the rules that are applicable2 they are the facts and the law of the case4 ,in judgment they are 7a7 the determination of the data that are important in the given case 7compare the inductive movement72 and 7b7 the elaboration of the conceptions or meanings suggested by the crude data 7compare the deductive movement74 7a7 ,what portions or aspects of the situation are significant in controlling the formation of the interpretation8 7b7 ,just what is the full meaning and bearing of the conception that is used as a method of interpretation8 ,these questions are strictly correlative2 the answer to each depends upon the answer to the other4 ,we may1 however1 for convenience1 consider them separately4 ,sidenote3 7a7 by selecting what facts are evidence 7a7 ,in every actual occurrence1 there are many details which are part of the total occurrence1 but which nevertheless are not significant in relation to the point at issue4 ,all parts of an experience are equally present1 but they are very far from being of equal value as signs or as evidences4 ,nor is there any tag or label on any trait saying3 ,this is important1 or ,this is trivial4 ,nor is intensity1 or vividness or conspicuousness1 a safe measure of indicative and proving value4 ,the glaring thing may be totally insignificant in this particular situation1 and the key to the understanding of the whole matter may be modest or hidden 7compare p4 #gd74 ,features that are not significant are distracting2 they proffer their claims to be regarded as clues and cues to interpretation1 while traits that are significant do not appear on the surface at all4 ,hence1 judgment is required even in reference to the situation or event that is present to the senses2 elimination or rejection1 selection1 discovery1 or bringing to light must take place4 ,till we have reached a final conclusion1 rejection and selection must be tentative or conditional4 ,we select the things that we hope or trust are cues to meaning4 ,but if they do not suggest a situation that accepts and includes them 7see p4 #ha71 we reconstitute our data1 the facts of the case2 for we mean1 intellectually1 by the facts of the case those traits that are used as evidence in reaching a conclusion or forming a decision4 ,sidenote3 ,expertness in selecting evidence ,no hard and fast rules for this operation of selecting and rejecting1 or fixing upon the facts1 can be given4 ,it all comes back1 as we say1 to the good judgment1 the good sense1 of the one judging4 ,to be a good judge is to have a sense of the relative indicative or signifying values of the various features of the perplexing situation2 to know what to let go as of no account2 what to eliminate as irrelevant2 what to retain as conducive to outcome2 what to emphasize as a clue to the difficulty4#ah ,this power in ordinary matters we call knack1 tact1 cleverness2 in more important affairs1 insight1 discernment4 ,in part it is instinctive or inborn2 but it also represents the funded outcome of long familiarity with like operations in the past4 ,possession of this ability to seize what is evidential or significant and to let the rest go is the mark of the expert1 the connoisseur1 the judge1 in any matter4 #ah ,compare what was said about analysis4 ,sidenote3 ,intuitive judgments ,mill cites the following case1 which is worth noting as an instance of the extreme delicacy and accuracy to which may be developed this power of sizing up the significant factors of a situation4 ,a ,scotch manufacturer procured from ,england1 at a high rate of wages1 a working dyer1 famous for producing very fine colors1 with the view of teaching to his other workmen the same skill4 ,the workman came2 but his method of proportioning the ingredients1 in which lay the secret of the effects he produced1 was by taking them up in handfuls1 while the common method was to weigh them4 ,the manufacturer sought to make him turn his handling system into an equivalent weighing system1 that the general principles of his peculiar mode of proceeding might be ascertained4 ,this1 however1 the man found himself quite unable to do1 and could therefore impart his own skill to nobody4 ,he had1 from individual cases of his own experience1 established a connection in his mind between fine effects of color and tactual perceptions in handling his dyeing materials2 and from these perceptions he could1 in any particular case1 infer the means to be employed and the effects which would be produced4 ,long brooding over conditions1 intimate contact associated with keen interest1 thorough absorption in a multiplicity of allied experiences1 tend to bring about those judgments which we then call intuitive2 but they are true judgments because they are based on intelligent selection and estimation1 with the solution of a problem as the controlling standard4 ,possession of this capacity makes the difference between the artist and the intellectual bungler4 ,such is judging ability1 in its completest form1 as to the data of the decision to be reached4 ,but in any case there is a certain feeling along for the way to be followed2 a constant tentative picking out of certain qualities to see what emphasis upon them would lead to2 a willingness to hold final selection in suspense2 and to reject the factors entirely or relegate them to a different position in the evidential scheme if other features yield more solvent suggestions4 ,alertness1 flexibility1 curiosity are the essentials2 dogmatism1 rigidity1 prejudice1 caprice1 arising from routine1 passion1 and flippancy are fatal4 ,sidenote3 7b7 ,to decide an issue1 the appropriate principles must also be selected 7b7 ,this selection of data is1 of course1 for the sake of controlling the development and elaboration of the suggested meaning in the light of which they are to be interpreted 7compare p4 #gf74 ,an evolution of conceptions thus goes on simultaneously with the determination of the facts2 one possible meaning after another is held before the mind1 considered in relation to the data to which it is applied1 is developed into its more detailed bearings upon the data1 is dropped or tentatively accepted and used4 ,we do not approach any problem with a wholly naive or virgin mind2 we approach it with certain acquired habitual modes of understanding1 with a certain store of previously evolved meanings1 or at least of experiences from which meanings may be educed4 ,if the circumstances are such that a habitual response is called directly into play1 there is an immediate grasp of meaning4 ,if the habit is checked1 and inhibited from easy application1 a possible meaning for the facts in question presents itself4 ,no hard and fast rules decide whether a meaning suggested is the right and proper meaning to follow up4 ,the individual's own good 7or bad7 judgment is the guide4 ,there is no label on any given idea or principle which says automatically1 ,use me in this situation--as the magic cakes of ,alice in ,wonderland were inscribed ,eat me4 ,the thinker has to decide1 to choose2 and there is always a risk1 so that the prudent thinker selects warily1 subject1 that is1 to confirmation or frustration by later events4 ,if one is not able to estimate wisely what is relevant to the interpretation of a given perplexing or doubtful issue1 it avails little that arduous learning has built up a large stock of concepts4 ,for learning is not wisdom2 information does not guarantee good judgment4 ,memory may provide an antiseptic refrigerator in which to store a stock of meanings for future use1 but judgment selects and adopts the one used in a given emergency--and without an emergency 7some crisis1 slight or great7 there is no call for judgment4 ,no conception1 even if it is carefully and firmly established in the abstract1 can at first safely be more than a candidate for the office of interpreter4 ,only greater success than that of its rivals in clarifying dark spots1 untying hard knots1 reconciling discrepancies1 can elect it or prove it a valid idea for the given situation4 ,sidenote3 ,judging terminates in a decision or statement #c4 ,the judgment when formed is a decision2 it closes 7or concludes7 the question at issue4 ,this determination not only settles that particular case1 but it helps fix a rule or method for deciding similar matters in the future2 as the sentence of the judge on the bench both terminates that dispute and also forms a precedent for future decisions4 ,if the interpretation settled upon is not controverted by subsequent events1 a presumption is built up in favor of similar interpretation in other cases where the features are not so obviously unlike as to make it inappropriate4 ,in this way1 principles of judging are gradually built up2 a certain manner of interpretation gets weight1 authority4 ,in short1 meanings get standardized1 they become logical concepts 7see below1 p4 #aah74 ,sec4 #b4 ,the ,origin and ,nature of ,ideas ,sidenote3 ,ideas are conjectures employed in judging ,this brings us to the question of ideas in relation to judgments4#ai ,something in an obscure situation suggests something else as its meaning4 ,if this meaning is at once accepted1 there is no reflective thinking1 no genuine judging4 ,thought is cut short uncritically2 dogmatic belief1 with all its attending risks1 takes place4 ,but if the meaning suggested is held in suspense1 pending examination and inquiry1 there is true judgment4 ,we stop and think1 we de-fer conclusion in order to in-fer more thoroughly4 ,in this process of being only conditionally accepted1 accepted only for examination1 meanings become ideas4 ,that is to say1 an idea is a meaning that is tentatively entertained1 formed1 and used with reference to its fitness to decide a perplexing situation1--a meaning used as a tool of judgment4 #ai ,the term idea is also used popularly to denote 7a7 a mere fancy1 7b7 an accepted belief1 and also 7c7 judgment itself4 ,but logically it denotes a certain factor in judgment1 as explained in the text4 ,sidenote3 ,or tools of interpretation ,let us recur to our instance of a blur in motion appearing at a distance4 ,we wonder what the thing is1 i4e4 what the blur means4 ,a man waving his arms1 a friend beckoning to us1 are suggested as possibilities4 ,to accept at once either alternative is to arrest judgment4 ,but if we treat what is suggested as only a suggestion1 a supposition1 a possibility1 it becomes an idea1 having the following traits3 7a7 ,as merely a suggestion1 it is a conjecture1 a guess1 which in cases of greater dignity we call a hypothesis or a theory4 ,that is to say1 it is a possible but as yet doubtful mode of interpretation4 7b7 ,even though doubtful1 it has an office to perform2 namely1 that of directing inquiry and examination4 ,if this blur means a friend beckoning1 then careful observation should show certain other traits4 ,if it is a man driving unruly cattle1 certain other traits should be found4 ,let us look and see if these traits are found4 ,taken merely as a doubt1 an idea would paralyze inquiry4 ,taken merely as a certainty1 it would arrest inquiry4 ,taken as a doubtful possibility1 it affords a standpoint1 a platform1 a method of inquiry4 ,sidenote3 ,pseudo-ideas ,ideas are not then genuine ideas unless they are tools in a reflective examination which tends to solve a problem4 ,suppose it is a question of having the pupil grasp the idea of the sphericity of the earth4 ,this is different from teaching him its sphericity as a fact4 ,he may be shown 7or reminded of7 a ball or a globe1 and be told that the earth is round like those things2 he may then be made to repeat that statement day after day till the shape of the earth and the shape of the ball are welded together in his mind4 ,but he has not thereby acquired any idea of the earth's sphericity2 at most1 he has had a certain image of a sphere and has finally managed to image the earth after the analogy of his ball image4 ,to grasp sphericity as an idea1 the pupil must first have realized certain perplexities or confusing features in observed facts and have had the idea of spherical shape suggested to him as a possible way of accounting for the phenomena in question4 ,only by use as a method of interpreting data so as to give them fuller meaning does sphericity become a genuine idea4 ,there may be a vivid image and no idea2 or there may be a fleeting1 obscure image and yet an idea1 if that image performs the function of instigating and directing the observation and relation of facts4 ,sidenote3 ,ideas furnish the only alternative to hit or miss methods ,logical ideas are like keys which are shaping with reference to opening a lock4 ,pike1 separated by a glass partition from the fish upon which they ordinarily prey1 will--so it is said--butt their heads against the glass until it is literally beaten into them that they cannot get at their food4 ,animals learn 7when they learn at all7 by a cut and try method2 by doing at random first one thing and another thing and then preserving the things that happen to succeed4 ,action directed consciously by ideas--by suggested meanings accepted for the sake of experimenting with them--is the sole alternative both to bull-headed stupidity and to learning bought from that dear teacher--chance experience4 ,sidenote3 ,they are methods of indirect attack ,it is significant that many words for intelligence suggest the idea of circuitous1 evasive activity--often with a sort of intimation of even moral obliquity4 ,the bluff1 hearty man goes straight 7and stupidly1 it is implied7 at some work4 ,the intelligent man is cunning1 shrewd 7crooked71 wily1 subtle1 crafty1 artful1 designing--the idea of indirection is involved4#bj ,an idea is a method of evading1 circumventing1 or surmounting through reflection obstacles that otherwise would have to be attacked by brute force4 ,but ideas may lose their intellectual quality as they are habitually used4 ,when a child was first learning to recognize1 in some hesitating suspense1 cats1 dogs1 houses1 marbles1 trees1 shoes1 and other objects1 ideas--conscious and tentative meanings--intervened as methods of identification4 ,now1 as a rule1 the thing and the meaning are so completely fused that there is no judgment and no idea proper1 but only automatic recognition4 ,on the other hand1 things that are1 as a rule1 directly apprehended and familiar become subjects of judgment when they present themselves in unusual contexts3 as forms1 distances1 sizes1 positions when we attempt to draw them2 triangles1 squares1 and circles when they turn up1 not in connection with familiar toys1 implements1 and utensils1 but as problems in geometry4 #bj ,see ,ward1 ,psychic ,factors of ,civilization1 p4 #aec4 ,sec4 #c4 ,analysis and ,synthesis ,sidenote3 ,judging clears up things3 analysis ,through judging confused data are cleared up1 and seemingly incoherent and disconnected facts brought together4 ,things may have a peculiar feeling for us1 they may make a certain indescribable impression upon us2 the thing may feel round 7that is1 present a quality which we afterwards define as round71 an act may seem rude 7or what we afterwards classify as rude71 and yet this quality may be lost1 absorbed1 blended in the total value of the situation4 ,only as we need to use just that aspect of the original situation as a tool of grasping something perplexing or obscure in another situation1 do we abstract or detach the quality so that it becomes individualized4 ,only because we need to characterize the shape of some new object or the moral quality of some new act1 does the element of roundness or rudeness in the old experience detach itself1 and stand out as a distinctive feature4 ,if the element thus selected clears up what is otherwise obscure in the new experience1 if it settles what is uncertain1 it thereby itself gains in positiveness and definiteness of meaning4 ,this point will meet us again in the following chapter2 here we shall speak of the matter only as it bears upon the questions of analysis and synthesis4 ,sidenote3 ,mental analysis is not like physical division ,sidenote3 ,misapprehension of analysis in education ,even when it is definitely stated that intellectual and physical analyses are different sorts of operations1 intellectual analysis is often treated after the analogy of physical2 as if it were the breaking up of a whole into all its constituent parts in the mind instead of in space4 ,as nobody can possibly tell what breaking a whole into its parts in the mind means1 this conception leads to the further notion that logical analysis is a mere enumeration and listing of all conceivable qualities and relations4 ,the influence upon education of this conception has been very great4#ba ,every subject in the curriculum has passed through--or still remains in--what may be called the phase of anatomical or morphological method3 the stage in which understanding the subject is thought to consist of multiplying distinctions of quality1 form1 relation1 and so on1 and attaching some name to each distinguished element4 ,in normal growth1 specific properties are emphasized and so individualized only when they serve to clear up a present difficulty4 ,only as they are involved in judging some specific situation is there any motive or use for analyses1 i4e4 for emphasis upon some element or relation as peculiarly significant4 #ba ,thus arise all those falsely analytic methods in geography1 reading1 writing1 drawing1 botany1 arithmetic1 which we have already considered in another connection4 7,see p4 #ei47 ,sidenote3 ,effects of premature formulation ,the same putting the cart before the horse1 the product before the process1 is found in that overconscious formulation of methods of procedure so current in elementary instruction4 7,see p4 #fj47 ,the method that is employed in discovery1 in reflective inquiry1 cannot possibly be identified with the method that emerges after the discovery is made4 ,in the genuine operation of inference1 the mind is in the attitude of search1 of hunting1 of projection1 of trying this and that2 when the conclusion is reached1 the search is at an end4 ,the ,greeks used to discuss3 ,how is learning 7or inquiry7 possible8 ,for either we know already what we are after1 and then we do not learn or inquire2 or we do not know1 and then we cannot inquire1 for we do not know what to look for4 ,the dilemma is at least suggestive1 for it points to the true alternative3 the use in inquiry of doubt1 of tentative suggestion1 of experimentation4 ,after we have reached the conclusion1 a reconsideration of the steps of the process to see what is helpful1 what is harmful1 what is merely useless1 will assist in dealing more promptly and efficaciously with analogous problems in the future4 ,in this way1 more or less explicit method is gradually built up4 7,compare the earlier discussion on p4 #fb of the psychological and the logical47 ,sidenote3 ,method comes before its formulation ,it is1 however1 a common assumption that unless the pupil from the outset consciously recognizes and explicitly states the method logically implied in the result he is to reach1 he will have no method1 and his mind will work confusedly or anarchically2 while if he accompanies his performance with conscious statement of some form of procedure 7outline1 topical analysis1 list of headings and subheadings1 uniform formula7 his mind is safeguarded and strengthened4 ,as a matter of fact1 the development of an unconscious logical attitude and habit must come first4 ,a conscious setting forth of the method logically adapted for reaching an end is possible only after the result has first been reached by more unconscious and tentative methods1 while it is valuable only when a review of the method that achieved success in a given case will throw light upon a new1 similar case4 ,the ability to fasten upon and single out 7abstract1 analyze7 those features of one experience which are logically best is hindered by premature insistence upon their explicit formulation4 ,it is repeated use that gives a method definiteness2 and given this definiteness1 precipitation into formulated statement should follow naturally4 ,but because teachers find that the things which they themselves best understand are marked off and defined in clear-cut ways1 our schoolrooms are pervaded with the superstition that children are to begin with already crystallized formulae of method4 ,sidenote3 ,judgment reveals the bearing or significance of facts3 synthesis ,as analysis is conceived to be a sort of picking to pieces1 so synthesis is thought to be a sort of physical piecing together2 and so imagined1 it also becomes a mystery4 ,in fact1 synthesis takes place wherever we grasp the bearing of facts on a conclusion1 or of a principle on facts4 ,as analysis is emphasis1 so synthesis is placing2 the one causes the emphasized fact or property to stand out as significant2 the other gives what is selected its context1 or its connection with what is signified4 ,every judgment is analytic in so far as it involves discernment1 discrimination1 marking off the trivial from the important1 the irrelevant from what points to a conclusion2 and it is synthetic in so far as it leaves the mind with an inclusive situation within which the selected facts are placed4 ,sidenote3 ,analysis and synthesis are correlative ,educational methods that pride themselves on being exclusively analytic or exclusively synthetic are therefore 7so far as they carry out their boasts7 incompatible with normal operations of judgment4 ,discussions have taken place1 for example1 as to whether the teaching of geography should be analytic or synthetic4 ,the synthetic method is supposed to begin with the partial1 limited portion of the earth's surface already familiar to the pupil1 and then gradually piece on adjacent regions 7the county1 the country1 the continent1 and so on7 till an idea of the entire globe is reached1 or of the solar system that includes the globe4 ,the analytic method is supposed to begin with the physical whole1 the solar system or globe1 and to work down through its constituent portions till the immediate environment is reached4 ,the underlying conceptions are of physical wholes and physical parts4 ,as matter of fact1 we cannot assume that the portion of the earth already familiar to the child is such a definite object1 mentally1 that he can at once begin with it2 his knowledge of it is misty and vague as well as incomplete4 ,accordingly1 mental progress will involve analysis of it--emphasis of the features that are significant1 so that they will stand out clearly4 ,moreover1 his own locality is not sharply marked off1 neatly bounded1 and measured4 ,his experience of it is already an experience that involves sun1 moon1 and stars as parts of the scene he surveys2 it involves a changing horizon line as he moves about2 that is1 even his more limited and local experience involves far-reaching factors that take his imagination clear beyond his own street and village4 ,connection1 relationship with a larger whole1 is already involved4 ,but his recognition of these relations is inadequate1 vague1 incorrect4 ,he needs to utilize the features of the local environment which are understood to help clarify and enlarge his conceptions of the larger geographical scene to which they belong4 ,at the same time1 not till he has grasped the larger scene will many of even the commonest features of his environment become intelligible4 ,analysis leads to synthesis2 while synthesis perfects analysis4 ,as the pupil grows in comprehension of the vast complicated earth in its setting in space1 he also sees more definitely the meaning of the familiar local details4 ,this intimate interaction between selective emphasis and interpretation of what is selected is found wherever reflection proceeds normally4 ,hence the folly of trying to set analysis and synthesis over against each other4 ,,chapter ,,nine ,,meaning3 ,,or ,,conceptions ,,and ,,understanding ,sec4 #a4 ,the ,place of ,meanings in ,mental ,life ,sidenote3 ,meaning is central ,as in our discussion of judgment we were making more explicit what is involved in inference1 so in the discussion of meaning we are only recurring to the central function of all reflection4 ,for one thing to mean1 signify1 betoken1 indicate1 or point to1 another we saw at the outset to be the essential mark of thinking 7see p4 #h74 ,to find out what facts1 just as they stand1 mean1 is the object of all discovery2 to find out what facts will carry out1 substantiate1 support a given meaning1 is the object of all testing4 ,when an inference reaches a satisfactory conclusion1 we attain a goal of meaning4 ,the act of judging involves both the growth and the application of meanings4 ,in short1 in this chapter we are not introducing a new topic2 we are only coming to closer quarters with what hitherto has been constantly assumed4 ,in the first section1 we shall consider the equivalence of meaning and understanding1 and the two types of understanding1 direct and indirect4 ,i4 ,,meaning ,,and ,,understanding ,sidenote3 ,to understand is to grasp meaning ,if a person comes suddenly into your room and calls out ,paper1 various alternatives are possible4 ,if you do not understand the ,english language1 there is simply a noise which may or may not act as a physical stimulus and irritant4 ,but the noise is not an intellectual object2 it does not have intellectual value4 7,compare above1 p4 #ae47 ,to say that you do not understand it and that it has no meaning are equivalents4 ,if the cry is the usual accompaniment of the delivery of the morning paper1 the sound will have meaning1 intellectual content2 you will understand it4 ,or if you are eagerly awaiting the receipt of some important document1 you may assume that the cry means an announcement of its arrival4 ,if 7in the third place7 you understand the ,english language1 but no context suggests itself from your habits and expectations1 the word has meaning1 but not the whole event4 ,you are then perplexed and incited to think out1 to hunt for1 some explanation of the apparently meaningless occurrence4 ,if you find something that accounts for the performance1 it gets meaning2 you come to understand it4 ,as intelligent beings1 we presume the existence of meaning1 and its absence is an anomaly4 ,hence1 if it should turn out that the person merely meant to inform you that there was a scrap of paper on the sidewalk1 or that paper existed somewhere in the universe1 you would think him crazy or yourself the victim of a poor joke4 ,to grasp a meaning1 to understand1 to identify a thing in a situation in which it is important1 are thus equivalent terms2 they express the nerves of our intellectual life4 ,without them there is 7a7 lack of intellectual content1 or 7b7 intellectual confusion and perplexity1 or else 7c7 intellectual perversion--nonsense1 insanity4 ,sidenote3 ,knowledge and meaning ,all knowledge1 all science1 thus aims to grasp the meaning of objects and events1 and this process always consists in taking them out of their apparent brute isolation as events1 and finding them to be parts of some larger whole suggested by them1 which1 in turn1 accounts for1 explains1 interprets them2 i4e4 renders them significant4 7,compare above1 p4 #ge47 ,suppose that a stone with peculiar markings has been found4 ,what do these scratches mean8 ,so far as the object forces the raising of this question1 it is not understood2 while so far as the color and form that we see mean to us a stone1 the object is understood4 ,it is such peculiar combinations of the understood and the nonunderstood that provoke thought4 ,if at the end of the inquiry1 the markings are decided to mean glacial scratches1 obscure and perplexing traits have been translated into meanings already understood3 namely1 the moving and grinding power of large bodies of ice and the friction thus induced of one rock upon another4 ,something already understood in one situation has been transferred and applied to what is strange and perplexing in another1 and thereby the latter has become plain and familiar1 i4e4 understood4 ,this summary illustration discloses that our power to think effectively depends upon possession of a capital fund of meanings which may be applied when desired4 7,compare what was said about deduction1 p4 #id47 ,,ii4 ,,direct ,,and ,,indirect ,,understanding ,sidenote3 ,direct and circuitous understanding ,in the above illustrations two types of grasping of meaning are exemplified4 ,when the ,english language is understood1 the person grasps at once the meaning of paper4 ,he may not1 however1 see any meaning or sense in the performance as a whole4 ,similarly1 the person identifies the object on sight as a stone2 there is no secret1 no mystery1 no perplexity about that4 ,but he does not understand the markings on it4 ,they have some meaning1 but what is it8 ,in one case1 owing to familiar acquaintance1 the thing and its meaning1 up to a certain point1 are one4 ,in the other1 the thing and its meaning are1 temporarily at least1 sundered1 and meaning has to be sought in order to understand the thing4 ,in one case understanding is direct1 prompt1 immediate2 in the other1 it is roundabout and delayed4 ,sidenote3 ,interaction of the two types ,most languages have two sets of words to express these two modes of understanding2 one for the direct taking in or grasp of meaning1 the other for its circuitous apprehension1 thus3 ,greek3 gnonai and ,greek3 eidenai in ,greek2 noscere and scire in ,latin2 kennen and wissen in ,german2 connaitre and savoir in ,french2 while in ,english to be acquainted with and to know of or about have been suggested as equivalents4#bb ,now our intellectual life consists of a peculiar interaction between these two types of understanding4 ,all judgment1 all reflective inference1 presupposes some lack of understanding1 a partial absence of meaning4 ,we reflect in order that we may get hold of the full and adequate significance of what happens4 ,nevertheless1 something must be already understood1 the mind must be in possession of some meaning which it has mastered1 or else thinking is impossible4 ,we think in order to grasp meaning1 but none the less every extension of knowledge makes us aware of blind and opaque spots1 where with less knowledge all had seemed obvious and natural4 ,a scientist brought into a new district will find many things that he does not understand1 where the native savage or rustic will be wholly oblivious to any meanings beyond those directly apparent4 ,some ,indians brought to a large city remained stolid at the sight of mechanical wonders of bridge1 trolley1 and telephone1 but were held spellbound by the sight of workmen climbing poles to repair wires4 ,increase of the store of meanings makes us conscious of new problems1 while only through translation of the new perplexities into what is already familiar and plain do we understand or solve these problems4 ,this is the constant spiral movement of knowledge4 #bb ,james1 ,principles of ,psychology1 vol4 ,i1 p4 #bba4 ,to know and to know that are perhaps more precise equivalents2 compare ,i know him and ,i know that he has gone home4 ,the former expresses a fact simply2 for the latter1 evidence might be demanded and supplied4 ,sidenote3 ,intellectual progress a rhythm ,our progress in genuine knowledge always consists in part in the discovery of something not understood in what had previously been taken for granted as plain1 obvious1 matter-of-course1 and in part in the use of meanings that are directly grasped without question1 as instruments for getting hold of obscure1 doubtful1 and perplexing meanings4 ,no object is so familiar1 so obvious1 so commonplace that it may not unexpectedly present1 in a novel situation1 some problem1 and thus arouse reflection in order to understand it4 ,no object or principle is so strange1 peculiar1 or remote that it may not be dwelt upon till its meaning becomes familiar--taken in on sight without reflection4 ,we may come to see1 perceive1 recognize1 grasp1 seize1 lay hold of principles1 laws1 abstract truths--i4e4 to understand their meaning in very immediate fashion4 ,our intellectual progress consists1 as has been said1 in a rhythm of direct understanding--technically called apprehension--with indirect1 mediated understanding--technically called comprehension4 ,sec4 #b4 ,the ,process of ,acquiring ,meanings ,sidenote3 ,familiarity ,the first problem that comes up in connection with direct understanding is how a store of directly apprehensible meanings is built up4 ,how do we learn to view things on sight as significant members of a situation1 or as having1 as a matter of course1 specific meanings8 ,our chief difficulty in answering this question lies in the thoroughness with which the lesson of familiar things has been learnt4 ,thought can more easily traverse an unexplored region than it can undo what has been so thoroughly done as to be ingrained in unconscious habit4 ,we apprehend chairs1 tables1 books1 trees1 horses1 clouds1 stars1 rain1 so promptly and directly that it is hard to realize that as meanings they had once to be acquired1--the meanings are now so much parts of the things themselves4 ,sidenote3 ,confusion is prior to familiarity ,in an often quoted passage1 ,mr4 ,james has said3 ,the baby1 assailed by eyes1 ears1 nose1 skin1 and entrails at once1 feels it all as one great blooming1 buzzing confusion4#bc ,mr4 ,james is speaking of a baby's world taken as a whole2 the description1 however1 is equally applicable to the way any new thing strikes an adult1 so far as the thing is really new and strange4 ,to the traditional cat in a strange garret1 everything is blurred and confused2 the wonted marks that label things so as to separate them from one another are lacking4 ,foreign languages that we do not understand always seem jabberings1 babblings1 in which it is impossible to fix a definite1 clear-cut1 individualized group of sounds4 ,the countryman in the crowded city street1 the landlubber at sea1 the ignoramus in sport at a contest between experts in a complicated game1 are further instances4 ,put an unexperienced man in a factory1 and at first the work seems to him a meaningless medley4 ,all strangers of another race proverbially look alike to the visiting foreigner4 ,only gross differences of size or color are perceived by an outsider in a flock of sheep1 each of which is perfectly individualized to the shepherd4 ,a diffusive blur and an indiscriminately shifting suction characterize what we do not understand4 ,the problem of the acquisition of meaning by things1 or 7stated in another way7 of forming habits of simple apprehension1 is thus the problem of introducing 7i7 definiteness and distinction and 7ii7 consistency or stability of meaning into what is otherwise vague and wavering4 #bc ,principles of ,psychology1 vol4 ,i1 p4 #dhh4 ,sidenote3 ,practical responses clarify confusion ,the acquisition of definiteness and of coherency 7or constancy7 of meanings is derived primarily from practical activities4 ,by rolling an object1 the child makes its roundness appreciable2 by bouncing it1 he singles out its elasticity2 by throwing it1 he makes weight its conspicuous distinctive factor4 ,not through the senses1 but by means of the reaction1 the responsive adjustment1 is the impression made distinctive1 and given a character marked off from other qualities that call out unlike reactions4 ,children1 for example1 are usually quite slow in apprehending differences of color4 ,differences from the standpoint of the adult so glaring that it is impossible not to note them are recognized and recalled with great difficulty4 ,doubtless they do not all feel alike1 but there is no intellectual recognition of what makes the difference4 ,the redness or greenness or blueness of the object does not tend to call out a reaction that is sufficiently peculiar to give prominence or distinction to the color trait4 ,gradually1 however1 certain characteristic habitual responses associate themselves with certain things2 the white becomes the sign1 say1 of milk and sugar1 to which the child reacts favorably2 blue becomes the sign of a dress that the child likes to wear1 and so on3 and the distinctive reactions tend to single out color qualities from other things in which they had been submerged4 ,sidenote3 ,we identify by use or function ,take another example4 ,we have little difficulty in distinguishing from one another rakes1 hoes1 plows and harrows1 shovels and spades4 ,each has its own associated characteristic use and function4 ,we may have1 however1 great difficulty in recalling the difference between serrate and dentate1 ovoid and obovoid1 in the shapes and edges of leaves1 or between acids in ic and in ous4 ,there is some difference2 but just what8 ,or1 we know what the difference is2 but which is which8 ,variations in form1 size1 color1 and arrangement of parts have much less to do1 and the uses1 purposes1 and functions of things and of their parts much more to do1 with distinctness of character and meaning than we should be likely to think4 ,what misleads us is the fact that the qualities of form1 size1 color1 and so on1 are now so distinct that we fail to see that the problem is precisely to account for the way in which they originally obtained their definiteness and conspicuousness4 ,so far as we sit passive before objects1 they are not distinguished out of a vague blur which swallows them all4 ,differences in the pitch and intensity of sounds leave behind a different feeling1 but until we assume different attitudes toward them1 or do something special in reference to them1 their vague difference cannot be intellectually gripped and retained4 ,sidenote3 ,children's drawings illustrate domination by value ,children's drawings afford a further exemplification of the same principle4 ,perspective does not exist1 for the child's interest is not in pictorial representation1 but in the things represented2 and while perspective is essential to the former1 it is no part of the characteristic uses and values of the things themselves4 ,the house is drawn with transparent walls1 because the rooms1 chairs1 beds1 people inside1 are the important things in the house-meaning2 smoke always comes out of the chimney--otherwise1 why have a chimney at all8 ,at ,christmas time1 the stockings may be drawn almost as large as the house or even so large that they have to be put outside of it3--in any case1 it is the scale of values in use that furnishes the scale for their qualities1 the pictures being diagrammatic reminders of these values1 not impartial records of physical and sensory qualities4 ,one of the chief difficulties felt by most persons in learning the art of pictorial representation is that habitual uses and results of use have become so intimately read into the character of things that it is practically impossible to shut them out at will4 ,sidenote3 ,as do sounds used as language signs ,the acquiring of meaning by sounds1 in virtue of which they become words1 is perhaps the most striking illustration that can be found of the way in which mere sensory stimuli acquire definiteness and constancy of meaning and are thereby themselves defined and interconnected for purposes of recognition4 ,language is a specially good example because there are hundreds or even thousands of words in which meaning is now so thoroughly consolidated with physical qualities as to be directly apprehended1 while in the case of words it is easier to recognize that this connection has been gradually and laboriously acquired than in the case of physical objects such as chairs1 tables1 buttons1 trees1 stones1 hills1 flowers1 and so on1 where it seems as if the union of intellectual character and meaning with the physical fact were aboriginal1 and thrust upon us passively rather than acquired through active explorations4 ,and in the case of the meaning of words1 we see readily that it is by making sounds and noting the results which follow1 by listening to the sounds of others and watching the activities which accompany them1 that a given sound finally becomes the stable bearer of a meaning4 ,sidenote3 ,summary ,familiar acquaintance with meanings thus signifies that we have acquired in the presence of objects definite attitudes of response which lead us1 without reflection1 to anticipate certain possible consequences4 ,the definiteness of the expectation defines the meaning or takes it out of the vague and pulpy2 its habitual1 recurrent character gives the meaning constancy1 stability1 consistency1 or takes it out of the fluctuating and wavering4 ,sec4 #c4 ,conceptions and ,meaning ,sidenote3 ,a conception is a definite meaning ,the word meaning is a familiar everyday term2 the words conception1 notion1 are both popular and technical terms4 ,strictly speaking1 they involve1 however1 nothing new2 any meaning sufficiently individualized to be directly grasped and readily used1 and thus fixed by a word1 is a conception or notion4 ,linguistically1 every common noun is the carrier of a meaning1 while proper nouns and common nouns with the word this or that prefixed1 refer to the things in which the meanings are exemplified4 ,that thinking both employs and expands notions1 conceptions1 is then simply saying that in inference and judgment we use meanings1 and that this use also corrects and widens them4 ,sidenote3 which is standardized ,various persons talk about an object not physically present1 and yet all get the same material of belief4 ,the same person in different moments often refers to the same object or kind of objects4 ,the sense experience1 the physical conditions1 the psychological conditions1 vary1 but the same meaning is conserved4 ,if pounds arbitrarily changed their weight1 and foot rules their length1 while we were using them1 obviously we could not weigh nor measure4 ,this would be our intellectual position if meanings could not be maintained with a certain stability and constancy through a variety of physical and personal changes4 ,sidenote3 ,by it we identify the unknown ,sidenote3 and supplement the sensibly present ,sidenote3 and also systematize things ,to insist upon the fundamental importance of conceptions would1 accordingly1 only repeat what has been said4 ,we shall merely summarize1 saying that conceptions1 or standard meanings1 are instruments 7i7 of identification1 7ii7 of supplementation1 and 7iii7 of placing in a system4 ,suppose a little speck of light hitherto unseen is detected in the heavens4 ,unless there is a store of meanings to fall back upon as tools of inquiry and reasoning1 that speck of light will remain just what it is to the senses--a mere speck of light4 ,for all that it leads to1 it might as well be a mere irritation of the optic nerve4 ,given the stock of meanings acquired in prior experience1 this speck of light is mentally attacked by means of appropriate concepts4 ,does it indicate asteroid1 or comet1 or a new-forming sun1 or a nebula resulting from some cosmic collision or disintegration8 ,each of these conceptions has its own specific and differentiating characters1 which are then sought for by minute and persistent inquiry4 ,as a result1 then1 the speck is identified1 we will say1 as a comet4 ,through a standard meaning1 it gets identity and stability of character4 ,supplementation then takes place4 ,all the known qualities of comets are read into this particular thing1 even though they have not been as yet observed4 ,all that the astronomers of the past have learned about the paths and structure of comets becomes available capital with which to interpret the speck of light4 ,finally1 this comet-meaning is itself not isolated2 it is a related portion of the whole system of astronomic knowledge4 ,suns1 planets1 satellites1 nebulae1 comets1 meteors1 star dust--all these conceptions have a certain mutuality of reference and interaction1 and when the speck of light is identified as meaning a comet1 it is at once adopted as a full member in this vast kingdom of beliefs4 ,sidenote3 ,importance of system to knowledge ,darwin1 in an autobiographical sketch1 says that when a youth he told the geologist1 ,sidgwick1 of finding a tropical shell in a certain gravel pit4 ,thereupon ,sidgwick said it must have been thrown there by some person1 adding3 ,but if it were really embedded there1 it would be the greatest misfortune to geology1 because it would overthrow all that we know about the superficial deposits of the ,midland ,counties--since they were glacial4 ,and then ,darwin adds3 ,i was then utterly astonished at ,sidgwick not being delighted at so wonderful a fact as a tropical shell being found near the surface in the middle of ,england4 ,nothing before had made me thoroughly realize that science consists in grouping facts so that general laws or conclusions may be drawn from them4 ,this instance 7which might1 of course1 be duplicated from any branch of science7 indicates how scientific notions make explicit the systematizing tendency involved in all use of concepts4 ,sec4 #d4 ,what ,conceptions are ,not ,the idea that a conception is a meaning that supplies a standard rule for the identification and placing of particulars may be contrasted with some current misapprehensions of its nature4 ,sidenote3 ,a concept is not a bare residue #a4 ,conceptions are not derived from a multitude of different definite objects by leaving out the qualities in which they differ and retaining those in which they agree4 ,the origin of concepts is sometimes described to be as if a child began with a lot of different particular things1 say particular dogs2 his own ,fido1 his neighbor's ,carlo1 his cousin's ,tray4 ,having all these different objects before him1 he analyzes them into a lot of different qualities1 say 7a7 color1 7b7 size1 7c7 shape1 7d7 number of legs1 7e7 quantity and quality of hair1 7f7 digestive organs1 and so on2 and then strikes out all the unlike qualities 7such as color1 size1 shape1 hair71 retaining traits such as quadruped and domesticated1 which they all have in general4 ,sidenote3 but an active attitude ,as a matter of fact1 the child begins with whatever significance he has got out of the one dog he has seen1 heard1 and handled4 ,he has found that he can carry over from one experience of this object to subsequent experience certain expectations of certain characteristic modes of behavior--may expect these even before they show themselves4 ,he tends to assume this attitude of anticipation whenever any clue or stimulus presents itself2 whenever the object gives him any excuse for it4 ,thus he might call cats little dogs1 or horses big dogs4 ,but finding that other expected traits and modes of behavior are not fulfilled1 he is forced to throw out certain traits from the dog-meaning1 while by contrast 7see p4 #ij7 certain other traits are selected and emphasized4 ,as he further applies the meaning to other dogs1 the dog-meaning gets still further defined and refined4 ,he does not begin with a lot of ready-made objects from which he extracts a common meaning2 he tries to apply to every new experience whatever from his old experience will help him understand it1 and as this process of constant assumption and experimentation is fulfilled and refuted by results1 his conceptions get body and clearness4 ,sidenote3 ,it is general because of its application #b4 ,similarly1 conceptions are general because of their use and application1 not because of their ingredients4 ,the view of the origin of conception in an impossible sort of analysis has as its counterpart the idea that the conception is made up out of all the like elements that remain after dissection of a number of individuals4 ,not so2 the moment a meaning is gained1 it is a working tool of further apprehensions1 an instrument of understanding other things4 ,thereby the meaning is extended to cover them4 ,generality resides in application to the comprehension of new cases1 not in constituent parts4 ,a collection of traits left as the common residuum1 the caput mortuum1 of a million objects1 would be merely a collection1 an inventory or aggregate1 not a general idea2 a striking trait emphasized in any one experience which then served to help understand some one other experience1 would become1 in virtue of that service of application1 in so far general4 ,synthesis is not a matter of mechanical addition1 but of application of something discovered in one case to bring other cases into line4 ,sec4 #e4 ,definition and ,organization of ,meanings ,sidenote3 ,definiteness versus vagueness ,sidenote3 ,in the abstract meaning is intension ,sidenote3 ,in its application it is extension ,a being that cannot understand at all is at least protected from mis-understandings4 ,but beings that get knowledge by means of inferring and interpreting1 by judging what things signify in relation to one another1 are constantly exposed to the danger of mis-apprehension1 mis-understanding1 mis-taking--taking a thing amiss4 ,a constant source of misunderstanding and mistake is indefiniteness of meaning4 ,through vagueness of meaning we misunderstand other people1 things1 and ourselves2 through its ambiguity we distort and pervert4 ,conscious distortion of meaning may be enjoyed as nonsense2 erroneous meanings1 if clear-cut1 may be followed up and got rid of4 ,but vague meanings are too gelatinous to offer matter for analysis1 and too pulpy to afford support to other beliefs4 ,they evade testing and responsibility4 ,vagueness disguises the unconscious mixing together of different meanings1 and facilitates the substitution of one meaning for another1 and covers up the failure to have any precise meaning at all4 ,it is the aboriginal logical sin--the source from which flow most bad intellectual consequences4 ,totally to eliminate indefiniteness is impossible2 to reduce it in extent and in force requires sincerity and vigor4 ,to be clear or perspicuous a meaning must be detached1 single1 self-contained1 homogeneous as it were1 throughout4 ,the technical name for any meaning which is thus individualized is intension4 ,the process of arriving at such units of meaning 7and of stating them when reached7 is definition4 ,the intension of the terms man1 river1 seed1 honesty1 capital1 supreme court1 is the meaning that exclusively and characteristically attaches to those terms4 ,this meaning is set forth in the definitions of those words4 ,the test of the distinctness of a meaning is that it shall successfully mark off a group of things that exemplify the meaning from other groups1 especially of those objects that convey nearly allied meanings4 ,the river-meaning 7or character7 must serve to designate the ,rhone1 the ,rhine1 the ,mississippi1 the ,hudson1 the ,wabash1 in spite of their varieties of place1 length1 quality of water2 and must be such as not to suggest ocean currents1 ponds1 or brooks4 ,this use of a meaning to mark off and group together a variety of distinct existences constitutes its extension4 ,sidenote3 ,definition and division ,as definition sets forth intension1 so division 7or the reverse process1 classification7 expounds extension4 ,intension and extension1 definition and division1 are clearly correlative2 in language previously used1 intension is meaning as a principle of identifying particulars2 extension is the group of particulars identified and distinguished4 ,meaning1 as extension1 would be wholly in the air or unreal1 did it not point to some object or group of objects2 while objects would be as isolated and independent intellectually as they seem to be spatially1 were they not bound into groups or classes on the basis of characteristic meanings which they constantly suggest and exemplify4 ,taken together1 definition and division put us in possession of individualized or definite meanings and indicate to what group of objects meanings refer4 ,they typify the fixation and the organization of meanings4 ,in the degree in which the meanings of any set of experiences are so cleared up as to serve as principles for grouping those experiences in relation to one another1 that set of particulars becomes a science2 i4e4 definition and classification are the marks of a science1 as distinct from both unrelated heaps of miscellaneous information and from the habits that introduce coherence into our experience without our being aware of their operation4 ,definitions are of three types1 denotative1 expository1 scientific4 ,of these1 the first and third are logically important1 while the expository type is socially and pedagogically important as an intervening step4 ,sidenote3 ,we define by picking out ,i4 ,denotative4 ,a blind man can never have an adequate understanding of the meaning of color and red2 a seeing person can acquire the knowledge only by having certain things designated in such a way as to fix attention upon some of their qualities4 ,this method of delimiting a meaning by calling out a certain attitude toward objects may be called denotative or indicative4 ,it is required for all sense qualities--sounds1 tastes1 colors--and equally for all emotional and moral qualities4 ,the meanings of honesty1 sympathy1 hatred1 fear1 must be grasped by having them presented in an individual's first-hand experience4 ,the reaction of educational reformers against linguistic and bookish training has always taken the form of demanding recourse to personal experience4 ,however advanced the person is in knowledge and in scientific training1 understanding of a new subject1 or a new aspect of an old subject1 must always be through these acts of experiencing directly the existence or quality in question4 ,sidenote3 and also by combining what is already more definite1 #b4 ,expository4 ,given a certain store of meanings which have been directly or denotatively marked out1 language becomes a resource by which imaginative combinations and variations may be built up4 ,a color may be defined to one who has not experienced it as lying between green and blue2 a tiger may be defined 7i4e4 the idea of it made more definite7 by selecting some qualities from known members of the cat tribe and combining them with qualities of size and weight derived from other objects4 ,illustrations are of the nature of expository definitions2 so are the accounts of meanings given in a dictionary4 ,by taking better-known meanings and associating them1--the attained store of meanings of the community in which one resides is put at one's disposal4 ,but in themselves these definitions are secondhand and conventional2 there is danger that instead of inciting one to effort after personal experiences that will exemplify and verify them1 they will be accepted on authority as substitutes4 ,sidenote3 and by discovering method of production #c4 ,scientific4 ,even popular definitions serve as rules for identifying and classifying individuals1 but the purpose of such identifications and classifications is mainly practical and social1 not intellectual4 ,to conceive the whale as a fish does not interfere with the success of whalers1 nor does it prevent recognition of a whale when seen1 while to conceive it not as fish but as mammal serves the practical end equally well1 and also furnishes a much more valuable principle for scientific identification and classification4 ,popular definitions select certain fairly obvious traits as keys to classification4 ,scientific definitions select conditions of causation1 production1 and generation as their characteristic material4 ,the traits used by the popular definition do not help us to understand why an object has its common meanings and qualities2 they simply state the fact that it does have them4 ,causal and genetic definitions fix upon the way an object is constructed as the key to its being a certain kind of object1 and thereby explain why it has its class or common traits4 ,sidenote3 ,contrast of causal and descriptive definitions ,sidenote3 ,science is the most perfect type of knowledge because it uses causal definitions ,if1 for example1 a layman of considerable practical experience were asked what he meant or understood by metal1 he would probably reply in terms of the qualities useful 7i7 in recognizing any given metal and 7ii7 in the arts4 ,smoothness1 hardness1 glossiness1 and brilliancy1 heavy weight for its size1 would probably be included in his definition1 because such traits enable us to identify specific things when we see and touch them2 the serviceable properties of capacity for being hammered and pulled without breaking1 of being softened by heat and hardened by cold1 of retaining the shape and form given1 of resistance to pressure and decay1 would probably be included--whether or not such terms as malleable or fusible were used4 ,now a scientific conception1 instead of using1 even with additions1 traits of this kind1 determines meaning on a different basis4 ,the present definition of metal is about like this3 ,metal means any chemical element that enters into combination with oxygen so as to form a base1 i4e4 a compound that combines with an acid to form a salt4 ,this scientific definition is founded1 not on directly perceived qualities nor on directly useful properties1 but on the way in which certain things are causally related to other things2 i4e4 it denotes a relation4 ,as chemical concepts become more and more those of relationships of interaction in constituting other substances1 so physical concepts express more and more relations of operation3 mathematical1 as expressing functions of dependence and order of grouping2 biological1 relations of differentiation of descent1 effected through adjustment of various environments2 and so on through the sphere of the sciences4 ,in short1 our conceptions attain a maximum of definite individuality and of generality 7or applicability7 in the degree to which they show how things depend upon one another or influence one another1 instead of expressing the qualities that objects possess statically4 ,the ideal of a system of scientific conceptions is to attain continuity1 freedom1 and flexibility of transition in passing from any fact and meaning to any other2 this demand is met in the degree in which we lay hold of the dynamic ties that hold things together in a continuously changing process--a principle that states insight into mode of production or growth4 ,,chapter ,,ten ,,concrete ,,and ,,abstract ,,thinking ,sidenote3 ,false notions of concrete and abstract ,the maxim enjoined upon teachers1 to proceed from the concrete to the abstract1 is perhaps familiar rather than comprehended4 ,few who read and hear it gain a clear conception of the starting-point1 the concrete2 of the nature of the goal1 the abstract2 and of the exact nature of the path to be traversed in going from one to the other4 ,at times the injunction is positively misunderstood1 being taken to mean that education should advance from things to thought--as if any dealing with things in which thinking is not involved could possibly be educative4 ,so understood1 the maxim encourages mechanical routine or sensuous excitation at one end of the educational scale--the lower--and academic and unapplied learning at the upper end4 ,actually1 all dealing with things1 even the child's1 is immersed in inferences2 things are clothed by the suggestions they arouse1 and are significant as challenges to interpretation or as evidences to substantiate a belief4 ,nothing could be more unnatural than instruction in things without thought2 in sense-perceptions without judgments based upon them4 ,and if the abstract to which we are to proceed denotes thought apart from things1 the goal recommended is formal and empty1 for effective thought always refers1 more or less directly1 to things4 ,sidenote3 ,direct and indirect understanding again ,yet the maxim has a meaning which1 understood and supplemented1 states the line of development of logical capacity4 ,what is this signification8 ,concrete denotes a meaning definitely marked off from other meanings so that it is readily apprehended by itself4 ,when we hear the words1 table1 chair1 stove1 coat1 we do not have to reflect in order to grasp what is meant4 ,the terms convey meaning so directly that no effort at translating is needed4 ,the meanings of some terms and things1 however1 are grasped only by first calling to mind more familiar things and then tracing out connections between them and what we do not understand4 ,roughly speaking1 the former kind of meanings is concrete2 the latter abstract4 ,sidenote3 ,what is familiar is mentally concrete ,to one who is thoroughly at home in physics and chemistry1 the notions of atom and molecule are fairly concrete4 ,they are constantly used without involving any labor of thought in apprehending what they mean4 ,but the layman and the beginner in science have first to remind themselves of things with which they already are well acquainted1 and go through a process of slow translation2 the terms atom and molecule losing1 moreover1 their hard-won meaning only too easily if familiar things1 and the line of transition from them to the strange1 drop out of mind4 ,the same difference is illustrated by any technical terms3 coefficient and exponent in algebra1 triangle and square in their geometric as distinct from their popular meanings2 capital and value as used in political economy1 and so on4 ,sidenote3 ,practical things are familiar ,the difference as noted is purely relative to the intellectual progress of an individual2 what is abstract at one period of growth is concrete at another2 or even the contrary1 as one finds that things supposed to be thoroughly familiar involve strange factors and unsolved problems4 ,there is1 nevertheless1 a general line of cleavage which1 deciding upon the whole what things fall within the limits of familiar acquaintance and what without1 marks off the concrete and the abstract in a more permanent way4 ,these limits are fixed mainly by the demands of practical life4 ,things such as sticks and stones1 meat and potatoes1 houses and trees1 are such constant features of the environment of which we have to take account in order to live1 that their important meanings are soon learnt1 and indissolubly associated with objects4 ,we are acquainted with a thing 7or it is familiar to us7 when we have so much to do with it that its strange and unexpected corners are rubbed off4 ,the necessities of social intercourse convey to adults a like concreteness upon such terms as taxes1 elections1 wages1 the law1 and so on4 ,things the meaning of which ,i personally do not take in directly1 appliances of cook1 carpenter1 or weaver1 for example1 are nevertheless unhesitatingly classed as concrete1 since they are so directly connected with our common social life4 ,sidenote3 ,the theoretical1 or strictly intellectual1 is abstract ,by contrast1 the abstract is the theoretical1 or that not intimately associated with practical concerns4 ,the abstract thinker 7the man of pure science as he is sometimes called7 deliberately abstracts from application in life2 that is1 he leaves practical uses out of account4 ,this1 however1 is a merely negative statement4 ,what remains when connections with use and application are excluded8 ,evidently only what has to do with knowing considered as an end in itself4 ,many notions of science are abstract1 not only because they cannot be understood without a long apprenticeship in the science 7which is equally true of technical matters in the arts71 but also because the whole content of their meaning has been framed for the sole purpose of facilitating further knowledge1 inquiry1 and speculation4 ,when thinking is used as a means to some end1 good1 or value beyond itself1 it is concrete2 when it is employed simply as a means to more thinking1 it is abstract4 ,to a theorist an idea is adequate and self-contained just because it engages and rewards thought2 to a medical practitioner1 an engineer1 an artist1 a merchant1 a politician1 it is complete only when employed in the furthering of some interest in life--health1 wealth1 beauty1 goodness1 success1 or what you will4 ,sidenote3 ,contempt for theory ,for the great majority of men under ordinary circumstances1 the practical exigencies of life are almost1 if not quite1 coercive4 ,their main business is the proper conduct of their affairs4 ,whatever is of significance only as affording scope for thinking is pallid and remote--almost artificial4 ,hence the contempt felt by the practical and successful executive for the mere theorist2 hence his conviction that certain things may be all very well in theory1 but that they will not do in practice2 in general1 the depreciatory way in which he uses the terms abstract1 theoretical1 and intellectual--as distinct from intelligent4 ,sidenote3 ,but theory is highly practical ,this attitude is justified1 of course1 under certain conditions4 ,but depreciation of theory does not contain the whole truth1 as common or practical sense recognizes4 ,there is such a thing1 even from the common-sense standpoint1 as being too practical1 as being so intent upon the immediately practical as not to see beyond the end of one's nose or as to cut off the limb upon which one is sitting4 ,the question is one of limits1 of degrees and adjustments1 rather than one of absolute separation4 ,truly practical men give their minds free play about a subject without asking too closely at every point for the advantage to be gained2 exclusive preoccupation with matters of use and application so narrows the horizon as in the long run to defeat itself4 ,it does not pay to tether one's thoughts to the post of use with too short a rope4 ,power in action requires some largeness and imaginativeness of vision4 ,men must at least have enough interest in thinking for the sake of thinking to escape the limits of routine and custom4 ,interest in knowledge for the sake of knowledge1 in thinking for the sake of the free play of thought1 is necessary then to the emancipation of practical life--to make it rich and progressive4 ,we may now recur to the pedagogic maxim of going from the concrete to the abstract4 ,sidenote3 ,begin with the concrete means begin with practical manipulations #a4 ,since the concrete denotes thinking applied to activities for the sake of dealing effectively with the difficulties that present themselves practically1 beginning with the concrete signifies that we should at the outset make much of doing2 especially1 make much in occupations that are not of a routine and mechanical kind and hence require intelligent selection and adaptation of means and materials4 ,we do not follow the order of nature when we multiply mere sensations or accumulate physical objects4 ,instruction in number is not concrete merely because splints or beans or dots are employed1 while whenever the use and bearing of number relations are clearly perceived1 the number idea is concrete even if figures alone are used4 ,just what sort of symbol it is best to use at a given time--whether blocks1 or lines1 or figures--is entirely a matter of adjustment to the given case4 ,if physical things used in teaching number or geography or anything else do not leave the mind illuminated with recognition of a meaning beyond themselves1 the instruction that uses them is as abstract as that which doles out ready-made definitions and rules2 for it distracts attention from ideas to mere physical excitations4 ,sidenote3 ,confusion of the concrete with the sensibly isolated ,the conception that we have only to put before the senses particular physical objects in order to impress certain ideas upon the mind amounts almost to a superstition4 ,the introduction of object lessons and sense-training scored a distinct advance over the prior method of linguistic symbols1 and this advance tended to blind educators to the fact that only a halfway step had been taken4 ,things and sensations develop the child1 indeed1 but only because he uses them in mastering his body and in the scheme of his activities4 ,appropriate continuous occupations or activities involve the use of natural materials1 tools1 modes of energy1 and do it in a way that compels thinking as to what they mean1 how they are related to one another and to the realization of ends2 while the mere isolated presentation of things remains barren and dead4 ,a few generations ago the great obstacle in the way of reform of primary education was belief in the almost magical efficacy of the symbols of language 7including number7 to produce mental training2 at present1 belief in the efficacy of objects just as objects1 blocks the way4 ,as frequently happens1 the better is an enemy of the best4 ,sidenote3 ,transfer of interest to intellectual matters #b4 ,the interest in results1 in the successful carrying on of an activity1 should be gradually transferred to study of objects--their properties1 consequences1 structures1 causes1 and effects4 ,the adult when at work in his life calling is rarely free to devote time or energy--beyond the necessities of his immediate action--to the study of what he deals with4 7,ante1 p4 #dc47 ,the educative activities of childhood should be so arranged that direct interest in the activity and its outcome create a demand for attention to matters that have a more and more indirect and remote connection with the original activity4 ,the direct interest in carpentering or shop work should yield organically and gradually an interest in geometric and mechanical problems4 ,the interest in cooking should grow into an interest in chemical experimentation and in the physiology and hygiene of bodily growth4 ,the making of pictures should pass to an interest in the technique of representation and the aesthetics of appreciation1 and so on4 ,this development is what the term go signifies in the maxim go from the concrete to the abstract2 it represents the dynamic and truly educative factor of the process4 ,sidenote3 ,development of delight in the activity of thinking #c4 ,the outcome1 the abstract to which education is to proceed1 is an interest in intellectual matters for their own sake1 a delight in thinking for the sake of thinking4 ,it is an old story that acts and processes which at the outset are incidental to something else develop and maintain an absorbing value of their own4 ,so it is with thinking and with knowledge2 at first incidental to results and adjustments beyond themselves1 they attract more and more attention to themselves till they become ends1 not means4 ,children engage1 unconstrainedly and continually1 in reflective inspection and testing for the sake of what they are interested in doing successfully4 ,habits of thinking thus generated may increase in volume and extent till they become of importance on their own account4 ,sidenote3 ,examples of the transition ,the three instances cited in ,chapter ,six represented an ascending cycle from the practical to the theoretical4 ,taking thought to keep a personal engagement is obviously of the concrete kind4 ,endeavoring to work out the meaning of a certain part of a boat is an instance of an intermediate kind4 ,the reason for the existence and position of the pole is a practical reason1 so that to the architect the problem was purely concrete--the maintenance of a certain system of action4 ,but for the passenger on the boat1 the problem was theoretical1 more or less speculative4 ,it made no difference to his reaching his destination whether he worked out the meaning of the pole4 ,the third case1 that of the appearance and movement of the bubbles1 illustrates a strictly theoretical or abstract case4 ,no overcoming of physical obstacles1 no adjustment of external means to ends1 is at stake4 ,curiosity1 intellectual curiosity1 is challenged by a seemingly anomalous occurrence2 and thinking tries simply to account for an apparent exception in terms of recognized principles4 ,sidenote3 ,theoretical knowledge never the whole end 7i7 ,abstract thinking1 it should be noted1 represents an end1 not the end4 ,the power of sustained thinking on matters remote from direct use is an outgrowth of practical and immediate modes of thought1 but not a substitute for them4 ,the educational end is not the destruction of power to think so as to surmount obstacles and adjust means and ends2 it is not its replacement by abstract reflection4 ,nor is theoretical thinking a higher type of thinking than practical4 ,a person who has at command both types of thinking is of a higher order than he who possesses only one4 ,methods that in developing abstract intellectual abilities weaken habits of practical or concrete thinking1 fall as much short of the educational ideal as do the methods that in cultivating ability to plan1 to invent1 to arrange1 to forecast1 fail to secure some delight in thinking irrespective of practical consequences4 ,sidenote3 ,nor that most congenial to the majority of pupils 7ii7 ,educators should also note the very great individual differences that exist2 they should not try to force one pattern and model upon all4 ,in many 7probably the majority7 the executive tendency1 the habit of mind that thinks for purposes of conduct and achievement1 not for the sake of knowing1 remains dominant to the end4 ,engineers1 lawyers1 doctors1 merchants1 are much more numerous in adult life than scholars1 scientists1 and philosophers4 ,while education should strive to make men who1 however prominent their professional interests and aims1 partake of the spirit of the scholar1 philosopher1 and scientist1 no good reason appears why education should esteem the one mental habit inherently superior to the other1 and deliberately try to transform the type from practical to theoretical4 ,have not our schools 7as already suggested1 p4 #di7 been one-sidedly devoted to the more abstract type of thinking1 thus doing injustice to the majority of pupils8 ,has not the idea of a liberal and humane education tended too often in practice to the production of technical1 because overspecialized1 thinkers8 ,sidenote3 ,aim of education is a working balance ,the aim of education should be to secure a balanced interaction of the two types of mental attitude1 having sufficient regard to the disposition of the individual not to hamper and cripple whatever powers are naturally strong in him4 ,the narrowness of individuals of strong concrete bent needs to be liberalized4 ,every opportunity that occurs within their practical activities for developing curiosity and susceptibility to intellectual problems should be seized4 ,violence is not done to natural disposition1 but the latter is broadened4 ,as regards the smaller number of those who have a taste for abstract1 purely intellectual topics1 pains should be taken to multiply opportunities and demands for the application of ideas2 for translating symbolic truths into terms of social life and its ends4 ,every human being has both capabilities1 and every individual will be more effective and happier if both powers are developed in easy and close interaction with each other4 ,,chapter ,,eleven ,,empirical ,,and ,,scientific ,,thinking ,sec4 #a4 ,empirical ,thinking ,sidenote3 ,empirical thinking depends on past habits ,apart from the development of scientific method1 inferences depend upon habits that have been built up under the influence of a number of particular experiences not themselves arranged for logical purposes4 ,a says1 ,it will probably rain to-morrow4 ,b asks1 ,why do you think so8 and ,a replies1 ,because the sky was lowering at sunset4 ,when ,b asks1 ,what has that to do with it8 ,a responds1 ,i do not know1 but it generally does rain after such a sunset4 ,he does not perceive any connection between the appearance of the sky and coming rain2 he is not aware of any continuity in the facts themselves--any law or principle1 as we usually say4 ,he simply1 from frequently recurring conjunctions of the events1 has associated them so that when he sees one he thinks of the other4 ,one suggests the other1 or is associated with it4 ,a man may believe it will rain to-morrow because he has consulted the barometer2 but if he has no conception how the height of the mercury column 7or the position of an index moved by its rise and fall7 is connected with variations of atmospheric pressure1 and how these in turn are connected with the amount of moisture in the air1 his belief in the likelihood of rain is purely empirical4 ,when men lived in the open and got their living by hunting1 fishing1 or pasturing flocks1 the detection of the signs and indications of weather changes was a matter of great importance4 ,a body of proverbs and maxims1 forming an extensive section of traditionary folklore1 was developed4 ,but as long as there was no understanding why or how certain events were signs1 as long as foresight and weather shrewdness rested simply upon repeated conjunction among facts1 beliefs about the weather were thoroughly empirical4 ,sidenote3 ,it is fairly adequate in some matters1 ,in similar fashion learned men in the ,orient learned to predict1 with considerable accuracy1 the recurrent positions of the planets1 the sun and the moon1 and to foretell the time of eclipses1 without understanding in any degree the laws of the movements of heavenly bodies--that is1 without having a notion of the continuities existing among the facts themselves4 ,they had learned from repeated observations that things happened in about such and such a fashion4 ,till a comparatively recent time1 the truths of medicine were mainly in the same condition4 ,experience had shown that upon the whole1 as a rule1 generally or usually speaking1 certain results followed certain remedies1 when symptoms were given4 ,our beliefs about human nature in individuals 7psychology7 and in masses 7sociology7 are still very largely of a purely empirical sort4 ,even the science of geometry1 now frequently reckoned a typical rational science1 began1 among the ,egyptians1 as an accumulation of recorded observations about methods of approximate mensuration of land surfaces2 and only gradually assumed1 among the ,greeks1 scientific form4 ,the disadvantages of purely empirical thinking are obvious4 ,sidenote3 but is very apt to lead to false beliefs1 #a4 ,while many empirical conclusions are1 roughly speaking1 correct2 while they are exact enough to be of great help in practical life2 while the presages of a weatherwise sailor or hunter may be more accurate1 within a certain restricted range1 than those of a scientist who relies wholly upon scientific observations and tests2 while1 indeed1 empirical observations and records furnish the raw or crude material of scientific knowledge1 yet the empirical method affords no way of discriminating between right and wrong conclusions4 ,hence it is responsible for a multitude of false beliefs4 ,the technical designation for one of the commonest fallacies is post hoc1 ergo propter hoc2 the belief that because one thing comes after another1 it comes because of the other4 ,now this fallacy of method is the animating principle of empirical conclusions1 even when correct--the correctness being almost as much a matter of good luck as of method4 ,that potatoes should be planted only during the crescent moon1 that near the sea people are born at high tide and die at low tide1 that a comet is an omen of danger1 that bad luck follows the cracking of a mirror1 that a patent medicine cures a disease--these and a thousand like notions are asseverated on the basis of empirical coincidence and conjunction4 ,moreover1 habits of expectation and belief are formed otherwise than by a number of repeated similar cases4 ,sidenote3 and does not enable us to cope with the novel1 #b4 ,the more numerous the experienced instances and the closer the watch kept upon them1 the greater is the trustworthiness of constant conjunction as evidence of connection among the things themselves4 ,many of our most important beliefs still have only this sort of warrant4 ,no one can yet tell1 with certainty1 the necessary cause of old age or of death--which are empirically the most certain of all expectations4 ,but even the most reliable beliefs of this type fail when they confront the novel4 ,since they rest upon past uniformities1 they are useless when further experience departs in any considerable measure from ancient incident and wonted precedent4 ,empirical inference follows the grooves and ruts that custom wears1 and has no track to follow when the groove disappears4 ,so important is this aspect of the matter that ,clifford found the difference between ordinary skill and scientific thought right here4 ,skill enables a man to deal with the same circumstances that he has met before1 scientific thought enables him to deal with different circumstances that he has never met before4 ,and he goes so far as to define scientific thinking as the application of old experience to new circumstances4 ,sidenote3 and leads to laziness and presumption1 #c4 ,we have not yet made the acquaintance of the most harmful feature of the empirical method4 ,mental inertia1 laziness1 unjustifiable conservatism1 are its probable accompaniments4 ,its general effect upon mental attitude is more serious than even the specific wrong conclusions in which it has landed4 ,wherever the chief dependence in forming inferences is upon the conjunctions observed in past experience1 failures to agree with the usual order are slurred over1 cases of successful confirmation are exaggerated4 ,since the mind naturally demands some principle of continuity1 some connecting link between separate facts and causes1 forces are arbitrarily invented for that purpose4 ,fantastic and mythological explanations are resorted to in order to supply missing links4 ,the pump brings water because nature abhors a vacuum2 opium makes men sleep because it has a dormitive potency2 we recollect a past event because we have a faculty of memory4 ,in the history of the progress of human knowledge1 out and out myths accompany the first stage of empiricism2 while hidden essences and occult forces mark its second stage4 ,by their very nature1 these causes escape observation1 so that their explanatory value can be neither confirmed nor refuted by further observation or experience4 ,hence belief in them becomes purely traditionary4 ,they give rise to doctrines which1 inculcated and handed down1 become dogmas2 subsequent inquiry and reflection are actually stifled4 7,ante1 p4 #bc47 ,sidenote3 and to dogmatism ,certain men or classes of men come to be the accepted guardians and transmitters--instructors--of established doctrines4 ,to question the beliefs is to question their authority2 to accept the beliefs is evidence of loyalty to the powers that be1 a proof of good citizenship4 ,passivity1 docility1 acquiescence1 come to be primal intellectual virtues4 ,facts and events presenting novelty and variety are slighted1 or are sheared down till they fit into the ,procrustean bed of habitual belief4 ,inquiry and doubt are silenced by citation of ancient laws or a multitude of miscellaneous and unsifted cases4 ,this attitude of mind generates dislike of change1 and the resulting aversion to novelty is fatal to progress4 ,what will not fit into the established canons is outlawed2 men who make new discoveries are objects of suspicion and even of persecution4 ,beliefs that perhaps originally were the products of fairly extensive and careful observation are stereotyped into fixed traditions and semi-sacred dogmas accepted simply upon authority1 and are mixed with fantastic conceptions that happen to have won the acceptance of authorities4 ,sec4 #b4 ,scientific ,method ,sidenote3 ,scientific thinking analyzes the present case ,in contrast with the empirical method stands the scientific4 ,scientific method replaces the repeated conjunction or coincidence of separate facts by discovery of a single comprehensive fact1 effecting this replacement by breaking up the coarse or gross facts of observation into a number of minuter processes not directly accessible to perception4 ,sidenote3 ,illustration from suction of empirical method1 ,if a layman were asked why water rises from the cistern when an ordinary pump is worked1 he would doubtless answer1 ,by suction4 ,suction is regarded as a force like heat or pressure4 ,if such a person is confronted by the fact that water rises with a suction pump only about thirty-three feet1 he easily disposes of the difficulty on the ground that all forces vary in their intensities and finally reach a limit at which they cease to operate4 ,the variation with elevation above the sea level of the height to which water can be pumped is either unnoticed1 or1 if noted1 is dismissed as one of the curious anomalies in which nature abounds4 ,sidenote3 of scientific method ,sidenote3 ,relies on differences1 ,now the scientist advances by assuming that what seems to observation to be a single total fact is in truth complex4 ,he attempts1 therefore1 to break up the single fact of water-rising-in-the-pipe into a number of lesser facts4 ,his method of proceeding is by varying conditions one by one so far as possible1 and noting just what happens when a given condition is eliminated4 ,there are two methods for varying conditions4#bd ,the first is an extension of the empirical method of observation4 ,it consists in comparing very carefully the results of a great number of observations which have occurred under accidentally different conditions4 ,the difference in the rise of the water at different heights above the sea level1 and its total cessation when the distance to be lifted is1 even at sea level1 more than thirty-three feet1 are emphasized1 instead of being slurred over4 ,the purpose is to find out what special conditions are present when the effect occurs and absent when it fails to occur4 ,these special conditions are then substituted for the gross fact1 or regarded as its principle--the key to understanding it4 #bd ,the next two paragraphs repeat1 for purposes of the present discussion1 what we have already noted in a different context4 ,see p4 #hh and p4 #ii4 ,sidenote3 and creates differences ,the method of analysis by comparing cases is1 however1 badly handicapped2 it can do nothing until it is presented with a certain number of diversified cases4 ,and even when different cases are at hand1 it will be questionable whether they vary in just these respects in which it is important that they should vary in order to throw light upon the question at issue4 ,the method is passive and dependent upon external accidents4 ,hence the superiority of the active or experimental method4 ,even a small number of observations may suggest an explanation--a hypothesis or theory4 ,working upon this suggestion1 the scientist may then intentionally vary conditions and note what happens4 ,if the empirical observations have suggested to him the possibility of a connection between air pressure on the water and the rising of the water in the tube where air pressure is absent1 he deliberately empties the air out of the vessel in which the water is contained and notes that suction no longer works2 or he intentionally increases atmospheric pressure on the water and notes the result4 ,he institutes experiments to calculate the weight of air at the sea level and at various levels above1 and compares the results of reasoning based upon the pressure of air of these various weights upon a certain volume of water with the results actually obtained by observation4 ,observations formed by variation of conditions on the basis of some idea or theory constitute experiment4 ,experiment is the chief resource in scientific reasoning because it facilitates the picking out of significant elements in a gross1 vague whole4 ,sidenote3 ,analysis and synthesis again ,experimental thinking1 or scientific reasoning1 is thus a conjoint process of analysis and synthesis1 or1 in less technical language1 of discrimination and assimilation or identification4 ,the gross fact of water rising when the suction valve is worked is resolved or discriminated into a number of independent variables1 some of which had never before been observed or even thought of in connection with the fact4 ,one of these facts1 the weight of the atmosphere1 is then selectively seized upon as the key to the entire phenomenon4 ,this disentangling constitutes analysis4 ,but atmosphere and its pressure or weight is a fact not confined to this single instance4 ,it is a fact familiar or at least discoverable as operative in a great number of other events4 ,in fixing upon this imperceptible and minute fact as the essence or key to the elevation of water by the pump1 the pump-fact has thus been assimilated to a whole group of ordinary facts from which it was previously isolated4 ,this assimilation constitutes synthesis4 ,moreover1 the fact of atmospheric pressure is itself a case of one of the commonest of all facts--weight or gravitational force4 ,conclusions that apply to the common fact of weight are thus transferable to the consideration and interpretation of the relatively rare and exceptional case of the suction of water4 ,the suction pump is seen to be a case of the same kind or sort as the siphon1 the barometer1 the rising of the balloon1 and a multitude of other things with which at first sight it has no connection at all4 ,this is another instance of the synthetic or assimilative phase of scientific thinking4 ,if we revert to the advantages of scientific over empirical thinking1 we find that we now have the clue to them4 ,sidenote3 ,lessened liability to error 7a7 ,the increased security1 the added factor of certainty or proof1 is due to the substitution of the detailed and specific fact of atmospheric pressure for the gross and total and relatively miscellaneous fact of suction4 ,the latter is complex1 and its complexity is due to many unknown and unspecified factors2 hence1 any statement about it is more or less random1 and likely to be defeated by any unforeseen variation of circumstances4 ,comparatively1 at least1 the minute and detailed fact of air pressure is a measurable and definite fact--one that can be picked out and managed with assurance4 ,sidenote3 ,ability to manage the new 7b7 ,as analysis accounts for the added certainty1 so synthesis accounts for ability to cope with the novel and variable4 ,weight is a much commoner fact than atmospheric weight1 and this in turn is a much commoner fact than the workings of the suction pump4 ,to be able to substitute the common and frequent fact for that which is relatively rare and peculiar is to reduce the seemingly novel and exceptional to cases of a general and familiar principle1 and thus to bring them under control for interpretation and prediction4 ,as ,professor ,james says3 ,think of heat as motion and whatever is true of motion will be true of heat2 but we have a hundred experiences of motion for every one of heat4 ,think of rays passing through this lens as cases of bending toward the perpendicular1 and you substitute for the comparatively unfamiliar lens the very familiar notion of a particular change in direction of a line1 of which notion every day brings us countless examples4#be #be ,psychology1 vol4 ,,ii4 p4 #cdb4 ,sidenote3 ,interest in the future or in progress 7c7 ,the change of attitude from conservative reliance upon the past1 upon routine and custom1 to faith in progress through the intelligent regulation of existing conditions1 is1 of course1 the reflex of the scientific method of experimentation4 ,the empirical method inevitably magnifies the influences of the past2 the experimental method throws into relief the possibilities of the future4 ,the empirical method says1 ,wait till there is a sufficient number of cases2 the experimental method says1 ,produce the cases4 ,the former depends upon nature's accidentally happening to present us with certain conjunctions of circumstances2 the latter deliberately and intentionally endeavors to bring about the conjunction4 ,by this method the notion of progress secures scientific warrant4 ,sidenote3 ,physical versus logical force ,ordinary experience is controlled largely by the direct strength and intensity of various occurrences4 ,what is bright1 sudden1 loud1 secures notice and is given a conspicuous rating4 ,what is dim1 feeble1 and continuous gets ignored1 or is regarded as of slight importance4 ,customary experience tends to the control of thinking by considerations of direct and immediate strength rather than by those of importance in the long run4 ,animals without the power of forecast and planning must1 upon the whole1 respond to the stimuli that are most urgent at the moment1 or cease to exist4 ,these stimuli lose nothing of their direct urgency and clamorous insistency when the thinking power develops2 and yet thinking demands the subordination of the immediate stimulus to the remote and distant4 ,the feeble and the minute may be of much greater importance than the glaring and the big4 ,the latter may be signs of a force that is already exhausting itself2 the former may indicate the beginnings of a process in which the whole fortune of the individual is involved4 ,the prime necessity for scientific thought is that the thinker be freed from the tyranny of sense stimuli and habit1 and this emancipation is also the necessary condition of progress4 ,sidenote3 ,illustration from moving water ,consider the following quotation3 ,when it first occurred to a reflecting mind that moving water had a property identical with human or brute force1 namely1 the property of setting other masses in motion1 overcoming inertia and resistance1--when the sight of the stream suggested through this point of likeness the power of the animal1--a new addition was made to the class of prime movers1 and when circumstances permitted1 this power could become a substitute for the others4 ,it may seem to the modern understanding1 familiar with water wheels and drifting rafts1 that the similarity here was an extremely obvious one4 ,but if we put ourselves back into an early state of mind1 when running water affected the mind by its brilliancy1 its roar and irregular devastation1 we may easily suppose that to identify this with animal muscular energy was by no means an obvious effort4#bf #bf ,bain1 ,the ,senses and ,intellect1 third ,american ed41 #ahgi1 p4 #dib 7italics not in original74 ,sidenote3 ,value of abstraction ,if we add to these obvious sensory features the various social customs and expectations which fix the attitude of the individual1 the evil of the subjection of free and fertile suggestion to empirical considerations becomes clear4 ,a certain power of abstraction1 of deliberate turning away from the habitual responses to a situation1 was required before men could be emancipated to follow up suggestions that in the end are fruitful4 ,sidenote3 ,experience as inclusive of thought ,in short1 the term experience may be interpreted either with reference to the empirical or the experimental attitude of mind4 ,experience is not a rigid and closed thing2 it is vital1 and hence growing4 ,when dominated by the past1 by custom and routine1 it is often opposed to the reasonable1 the thoughtful4 ,but experience also includes the reflection that sets us free from the limiting influence of sense1 appetite1 and tradition4 ,experience may welcome and assimilate all that the most exact and penetrating thought discovers4 ,indeed1 the business of education might be defined as just such an emancipation and enlargement of experience4 ,education takes the individual while he is relatively plastic1 before he has become so indurated by isolated experiences as to be rendered hopelessly empirical in his habit of mind4 ,the attitude of childhood is naive1 wondering1 experimental2 the world of man and nature is new4 ,right methods of education preserve and perfect this attitude1 and thereby short-circuit for the individual the slow progress of the race1 eliminating the waste that comes from inert routine4 ,,part ,,three3 ,,the ,,training ,,of ,,thought ,,chapter ,,twelve ,,activity ,,and ,,the ,,training ,,of ,,thought ,in this chapter we shall gather together and amplify considerations that have already been advanced1 in various passages of the preceding pages1 concerning the relation of action to thought4 ,we shall follow1 though not with exactness1 the order of development in the unfolding human being4 ,sec4 #a4 ,the ,early ,stage of ,activity ,sidenote3 #a4 ,the baby's problem determines his thinking ,the sight of a baby often calls out the question3 ,what do you suppose he is thinking about8 ,by the nature of the case1 the question is unanswerable in detail2 but1 also by the nature of the case1 we may be sure about a baby's chief interest4 ,his primary problem is mastery of his body as a tool of securing comfortable and effective adjustments to his surroundings1 physical and social4 ,the child has to learn to do almost everything3 to see1 to hear1 to reach1 to handle1 to balance the body1 to creep1 to walk1 and so on4 ,even if it be true that human beings have even more instinctive reactions than lower animals1 it is also true that instinctive tendencies are much less perfect in men1 and that most of them are of little use till they are intelligently combined and directed4 ,a little chick just out of the shell will after a few trials peck at and grasp grains of food with its beak as well as at any later time4 ,this involves a complicated cooerdination of the eye and the head4 ,an infant does not even begin to reach definitely for things that the eye sees till he is several months old1 and even then several weeks' practice is required before he learns the adjustment so as neither to overreach nor to underreach4 ,it may not be literally true that the child will grasp for the moon1 but it is true that he needs much practice before he can tell whether an object is within reach or not4 ,the arm is thrust out instinctively in response to a stimulus from the eye1 and this tendency is the origin of the ability to reach and grasp exactly and quickly2 but nevertheless final mastery requires observing and selecting the successful movements1 and arranging them in view of an end4 ,these operations of conscious selection and arrangement constitute thinking1 though of a rudimentary type4 ,sidenote3 ,mastery of the body is an intellectual problem ,since mastery of the bodily organs is necessary for all later developments1 such problems are both interesting and important1 and solving them supplies a very genuine training of thinking power4 ,the joy the child shows in learning to use his limbs1 to translate what he sees into what he handles1 to connect sounds with sights1 sights with taste and touch1 and the rapidity with which intelligence grows in the first year and a half of life 7the time during which the more fundamental problems of the use of the organism are mastered71 are sufficient evidence that the development of physical control is not a physical but an intellectual achievement4 ,sidenote3 #b4 ,the problem of social adjustment and intercourse ,although in the early months the child is mainly occupied in learning to use his body to accommodate himself to physical conditions in a comfortable way and to use things skillfully and effectively1 yet social adjustments are very important4 ,in connection with parents1 nurse1 brother1 and sister1 the child learns the signs of satisfaction of hunger1 of removal of discomfort1 of the approach of agreeable light1 color1 sound1 and so on4 ,his contact with physical things is regulated by persons1 and he soon distinguishes persons as the most important and interesting of all the objects with which he has to do4 ,speech1 the accurate adaptation of sounds heard to the movements of tongue and lips1 is1 however1 the great instrument of social adaptation2 and with the development of speech 7usually in the second year7 adaptation of the baby's activities to and with those of other persons gives the keynote of mental life4 ,his range of possible activities is indefinitely widened as he watches what other persons do1 and as he tries to understand and to do what they encourage him to attempt4 ,the outline pattern of mental life is thus set in the first four or five years4 ,years1 centuries1 generations of invention and planning1 may have gone to the development of the performances and occupations of the adults surrounding the child4 ,yet for him their activities are direct stimuli2 they are part of his natural environment2 they are carried on in physical terms that appeal to his eye1 ear1 and touch4 ,he cannot1 of course1 appropriate their meaning directly through his senses2 but they furnish stimuli to which he responds1 so that his attention is focussed upon a higher order of materials and of problems4 ,were it not for this process by which the achievements of one generation form the stimuli that direct the activities of the next1 the story of civilization would be writ in water1 and each generation would have laboriously to make for itself1 if it could1 its way out of savagery4 ,sidenote3 ,social adjustment results in imitation but is not caused by it ,imitation is one 7though only one1 see p4 #dg7 of the means by which the activities of adults supply stimuli which are so interesting1 so varied1 so complex1 and so novel1 as to occasion a rapid progress of thought4 ,mere imitation1 however1 would not give rise to thinking2 if we could learn like parrots by simply copying the outward acts of others1 we should never have to think2 nor should we know1 after we had mastered the copied act1 what was the meaning of the thing we had done4 ,educators 7and psychologists7 have often assumed that acts which reproduce the behavior of others are acquired merely by imitation4 ,but a child rarely learns by conscious imitation2 and to say that his imitation is unconscious is to say that it is not from his standpoint imitation at all4 ,the word1 the gesture1 the act1 the occupation of another1 falls in line with some impulse already active and suggests some satisfactory mode of expression1 some end in which it may find fulfillment4 ,having this end of his own1 the child then notes other persons1 as he notes natural events1 to get further suggestions as to means of its realization4 ,he selects some of the means he observes1 tries them on1 finds them successful or unsuccessful1 is confirmed or weakened in his belief in their value1 and so continues selecting1 arranging1 adapting1 testing1 till he can accomplish what he wishes4 ,the onlooker may then observe the resemblance of this act to some act of an adult1 and conclude that it was acquired by imitation1 while as a matter of fact it was acquired by attention1 observation1 selection1 experimentation1 and confirmation by results4 ,only because this method is employed is there intellectual discipline and an educative result4 ,the presence of adult activities plays an enormous role in the intellectual growth of the child because they add to the natural stimuli of the world new stimuli which are more exactly adapted to the needs of a human being1 which are richer1 better organized1 more complex in range1 permitting more flexible adaptations1 and calling out novel reactions4 ,but in utilizing these stimuli the child follows the same methods that he uses when he is forced to think in order to master his body4 ,sec4 #b4 ,play1 ,work1 and ,allied ,forms of ,activity ,sidenote3 ,play indicates the domination of activity by meanings or ideas ,sidenote3 ,organization of ideas involved in play ,when things become signs1 when they gain a representative capacity as standing for other things1 play is transformed from mere physical exuberance into an activity involving a mental factor4 ,a little girl who had broken her doll was seen to perform with the leg of the doll all the operations of washing1 putting to bed1 and fondling1 that she had been accustomed to perform with the entire doll4 ,the part stood for the whole2 she reacted not to the stimulus sensibly present1 but to the meaning suggested by the sense object4 ,so children use a stone for a table1 leaves for plates1 acorns for cups4 ,so they use their dolls1 their trains1 their blocks1 their other toys4 ,in manipulating them1 they are living not with the physical things1 but in the large world of meanings1 natural and social1 evoked by these things4 ,so when children play horse1 play store1 play house or making calls1 they are subordinating the physically present to the ideally signified4 ,in this way1 a world of meanings1 a store of concepts 7so fundamental to all intellectual achievement71 is defined and built up4 ,moreover1 not only do meanings thus become familiar acquaintances1 but they are organized1 arranged in groups1 made to cohere in connected ways4 ,a play and a story blend insensibly into each other4 ,the most fanciful plays of children rarely lose all touch with the mutual fitness and pertinency of various meanings to one another2 the freest plays observe some principles of coherence and unification4 ,they have a beginning1 middle1 and end4 ,in games1 rules of order run through various minor acts and bind them into a connected whole4 ,the rhythm1 the competition1 and cooeperation involved in most plays and games also introduce organization4 ,there is1 then1 nothing mysterious or mystical in the discovery made by ,plato and remade by ,froebel that play is the chief1 almost the only1 mode of education for the child in the years of later infancy4 ,sidenote3 ,the playful attitude ,playfulness is a more important consideration than play4 ,the former is an attitude of mind2 the latter is a passing outward manifestation of this attitude4 ,when things are treated simply as vehicles of suggestion1 what is suggested overrides the thing4 ,hence the playful attitude is one of freedom4 ,the person is not bound to the physical traits of things1 nor does he care whether a thing really means 7as we say7 what he takes it to represent4 ,when the child plays horse with a broom and cars with chairs1 the fact that the broom does not really represent a horse1 or a chair a locomotive1 is of no account4 ,in order1 then1 that playfulness may not terminate in arbitrary fancifulness and in building up an imaginary world alongside the world of actual things1 it is necessary that the play attitude should gradually pass into a work attitude4 ,sidenote3 ,the work attitude is interested in means and ends ,what is work--work not as mere external performance1 but as attitude of mind8 ,it signifies that the person is not content longer to accept and to act upon the meanings that things suggest1 but demands congruity of meaning with the things themselves4 ,in the natural course of growth1 children come to find irresponsible make-believe plays inadequate4 ,a fiction is too easy a way out to afford content4 ,there is not enough stimulus to call forth satisfactory mental response4 ,when this point is reached1 the ideas that things suggest must be applied to the things with some regard to fitness4 ,a small cart1 resembling a real cart1 with real wheels1 tongue1 and body1 meets the mental demand better than merely making believe that anything which comes to hand is a cart4 ,occasionally to take part in setting a real table with real dishes brings more reward than forever to make believe a flat stone is a table and that leaves are dishes4 ,the interest may still center in the meanings1 the things may be of importance only as amplifying a certain meaning4 ,so far the attitude is one of play4 ,but the meaning is now of such a character that it must find appropriate embodiment in actual things4 ,the dictionary does not permit us to call such activities work4 ,nevertheless1 they represent a genuine passage of play into work4 ,for work 7as a mental attitude1 not as mere external performance7 means interest in the adequate embodiment of a meaning 7a suggestion1 purpose1 aim7 in objective form through the use of appropriate materials and appliances4 ,such an attitude takes advantage of the meanings aroused and built up in free play1 but controls their development by seeing to it that they are applied to things in ways consistent with the observable structure of the things themselves4 ,sidenote3 and in processes on account of their results ,the point of this distinction between play and work may be cleared up by comparing it with a more usual way of stating the difference4 ,in play activity1 it is said1 the interest is in the activity for its own sake2 in work1 it is in the product or result in which the activity terminates4 ,hence the former is purely free1 while the latter is tied down by the end to be achieved4 ,when the difference is stated in this sharp fashion1 there is almost always introduced a false1 unnatural separation between process and product1 between activity and its achieved outcome4 ,the true distinction is not between an interest in activity for its own sake and interest in the external result of that activity1 but between an interest in an activity just as it flows on from moment to moment1 and an interest in an activity as tending to a culmination1 to an outcome1 and therefore possessing a thread of continuity binding together its successive stages4 ,both may equally exemplify interest in an activity for its own sake2 but in one case the activity in which the interest resides is more or less casual1 following the accident of circumstance and whim1 or of dictation2 in the other1 the activity is enriched by the sense that it leads somewhere1 that it amounts to something4 ,sidenote3 ,consequences of the sharp separation of play and work ,were it not that the false theory of the relation of the play and the work attitudes has been connected with unfortunate modes of school practice1 insistence upon a truer view might seem an unnecessary refinement4 ,but the sharp break that unfortunately prevails between the kindergarten and the grades is evidence that the theoretical distinction has practical implications4 ,under the title of play1 the former is rendered unduly symbolic1 fanciful1 sentimental1 and arbitrary2 while under the antithetical caption of work the latter contains many tasks externally assigned4 ,the former has no end and the latter an end so remote that only the educator1 not the child1 is aware that it is an end4 ,there comes a time when children must extend and make more exact their acquaintance with existing things2 must conceive ends and consequences with sufficient definiteness to guide their actions by them1 and must acquire some technical skill in selecting and arranging means to realize these ends4 ,unless these factors are gradually introduced in the earlier play period1 they must be introduced later abruptly and arbitrarily1 to the manifest disadvantage of both the earlier and the later stages4 ,sidenote3 ,false notions of imagination and utility ,the sharp opposition of play and work is usually associated with false notions of utility and imagination4 ,activity that is directed upon matters of home and neighborhood interest is depreciated as merely utilitarian4 ,to let the child wash dishes1 set the table1 engage in cooking1 cut and sew dolls' clothes1 make boxes that will hold real things1 and construct his own playthings by using hammer and nails1 excludes1 so it is said1 the aesthetic and appreciative factor1 eliminates imagination1 and subjects the child's development to material and practical concerns2 while 7so it is said7 to reproduce symbolically the domestic relationships of birds and other animals1 of human father and mother and child1 of workman and tradesman1 of knight1 soldier1 and magistrate1 secures a liberal exercise of mind1 of great moral as well as intellectual value4 ,it has been even stated that it is over-physical and utilitarian if a child plants seeds and takes care of growing plants in the kindergarten2 while reproducing dramatically operations of planting1 cultivating1 reaping1 and so on1 either with no physical materials or with symbolic representatives1 is highly educative to the imagination and to spiritual appreciation4 ,toy dolls1 trains of cars1 boats1 and engines are rigidly excluded1 and the employ of cubes1 balls1 and other symbols for representing these social activities is recommended on the same ground4 ,the more unfitted the physical object for its imagined purpose1 such as a cube for a boat1 the greater is the supposed appeal to the imagination4 ,sidenote3 ,imagination a medium of realizing the absent and significant ,there are several fallacies in this way of thinking4 7a7 ,the healthy imagination deals not with the unreal1 but with the mental realization of what is suggested4 ,its exercise is not a flight into the purely fanciful and ideal1 but a method of expanding and filling in what is real4 ,to the child the homely activities going on about him are not utilitarian devices for accomplishing physical ends2 they exemplify a wonderful world the depths of which he has not sounded1 a world full of the mystery and promise that attend all the doings of the grown-ups whom he admires4 ,however prosaic this world may be to the adults who find its duties routine affairs1 to the child it is fraught with social meaning4 ,to engage in it is to exercise the imagination in constructing an experience of wider value than any the child has yet mastered4 ,sidenote3 ,only the already experienced can be symbolized 7b7 ,educators sometimes think children are reacting to a great moral or spiritual truth when the children's reactions are largely physical and sensational4 ,children have great powers of dramatic simulation1 and their physical bearing may seem 7to adults prepossessed with a philosophic theory7 to indicate they have been impressed with some lesson of chivalry1 devotion1 or nobility1 when the children themselves are occupied only with transitory physical excitations4 ,to symbolize great truths far beyond the child's range of actual experience is an impossibility1 and to attempt it is to invite love of momentary stimulation4 ,sidenote3 ,useful work is not necessarily labor 7c7 ,just as the opponents of play in education always conceive of play as mere amusement1 so the opponents of direct and useful activities confuse occupation with labor4 ,the adult is acquainted with responsible labor upon which serious financial results depend4 ,consequently he seeks relief1 relaxation1 amusement4 ,unless children have prematurely worked for hire1 unless they have come under the blight of child labor1 no such division exists for them4 ,whatever appeals to them at all1 appeals directly on its own account4 ,there is no contrast between doing things for utility and for fun4 ,their life is more united and more wholesome4 ,to suppose that activities customarily performed by adults only under the pressure of utility may not be done perfectly freely and joyously by children indicates a lack of imagination4 ,not the thing done but the quality of mind that goes into the doing settles what is utilitarian and what is unconstrained and educative4 ,sec4 #c4 ,constructive ,occupations ,sidenote3 ,the historic growth of sciences out of occupations ,the history of culture shows that mankind's scientific knowledge and technical abilities have developed1 especially in all their earlier stages1 out of the fundamental problems of life4 ,anatomy and physiology grew out of the practical needs of keeping healthy and active2 geometry and mechanics out of demands for measuring land1 for building1 and for making labor-saving machines2 astronomy has been closely connected with navigation1 keeping record of the passage of time2 botany grew out of the requirements of medicine and of agronomy2 chemistry has been associated with dyeing1 metallurgy1 and other industrial pursuits4 ,in turn1 modern industry is almost wholly a matter of applied science2 year by year the domain of routine and crude empiricism is narrowed by the translation of scientific discovery into industrial invention4 ,the trolley1 the telephone1 the electric light1 the steam engine1 with all their revolutionary consequences for social intercourse and control1 are the fruits of science4 ,sidenote3 ,the intellectual possibilities of school occupations ,these facts are full of educational significance4 ,most children are preeminently active in their tendencies4 ,the schools have also taken on--largely from utilitarian1 rather than from strictly educative reasons--a large number of active pursuits commonly grouped under the head of manual training1 including also school gardens1 excursions1 and various graphic arts4 ,perhaps the most pressing problem of education at the present moment is to organize and relate these subjects so that they will become instruments for forming alert1 persistent1 and fruitful intellectual habits4 ,that they take hold of the more primary and native equipment of children 7appealing to their desire to do7 is generally recognized2 that they afford great opportunity for training in self-reliant and efficient social service is gaining acknowledgment4 ,but they may also be used for presenting typical problems to be solved by personal reflection and experimentation1 and by acquiring definite bodies of knowledge leading later to more specialized scientific knowledge4 ,there is indeed no magic by which mere physical activity or deft manipulation will secure intellectual results4 7,see p4 #dc47 ,manual subjects may be taught by routine1 by dictation1 or by convention as readily as bookish subjects4 ,but intelligent consecutive work in gardening1 cooking1 or weaving1 or in elementary wood and iron1 may be planned which will inevitably result in students not only amassing information of practical and scientific importance in botany1 zooelogy1 chemistry1 physics1 and other sciences1 but 7what is more significant7 in their becoming versed in methods of experimental inquiry and proof4 ,sidenote3 ,reorganization of the course of study ,that the elementary curriculum is overloaded is a common complaint4 ,the only alternative to a reactionary return to the educational traditions of the past lies in working out the intellectual possibilities resident in the various arts1 crafts1 and occupations1 and reorganizing the curriculum accordingly4 ,here1 more than elsewhere1 are found the means by which the blind and routine experience of the race may be transformed into illuminated and emancipated experiment4 ,,chapter ,,thirteen ,,language ,,and ,,the ,,training ,,of ,,thought ,sec4 #a4 ,language as the ,tool of ,thinking ,sidenote3 ,ambiguous position of language ,speech has such a peculiarly intimate connection with thought as to require special discussion4 ,although the very word logic comes from logos 7,greek3 logos71 meaning indifferently both word or speech1 and thought or reason1 yet words1 words1 words denote intellectual barrenness1 a sham of thought4 ,although schooling has language as its chief instrument 7and often as its chief matter7 of study1 educational reformers have for centuries brought their severest indictments against the current use of language in the schools4 ,the conviction that language is necessary to thinking 7is even identical with it7 is met by the contention that language perverts and conceals thought4 ,sidenote3 ,language a necessary tool of thinking1 ,sidenote3 for it alone fixes meanings ,three typical views have been maintained regarding the relation of thought and language3 first1 that they are identical2 second1 that words are the garb or clothing of thought1 necessary not for thought but only for conveying it2 and third 7the view we shall here maintain7 that while language is not thought it is necessary for thinking as well as for its communication4 ,when it is said1 however1 that thinking is impossible without language1 we must recall that language includes much more than oral and written speech4 ,gestures1 pictures1 monuments1 visual images1 finger movements--anything consciously employed as a sign is1 logically1 language4 ,to say that language is necessary for thinking is to say that signs are necessary4 ,thought deals not with bare things1 but with their meanings1 their suggestions2 and meanings1 in order to be apprehended1 must be embodied in sensible and particular existences4 ,without meaning1 things are nothing but blind stimuli or chance sources of pleasure and pain2 and since meanings are not themselves tangible things1 they must be anchored by attachment to some physical existence4 ,existences that are especially set aside to fixate and convey meanings are signs or symbols4 ,if a man moves toward another to throw him out of the room1 his movement is not a sign4 ,if1 however1 the man points to the door with his hand1 or utters the sound go1 his movement is reduced to a vehicle of meaning3 it is a sign or symbol4 ,in the case of signs we care nothing for what they are in themselves1 but everything for what they signify and represent4 ,canis1 hund1 chien1 dog--it makes no difference what the outward thing is1 so long as the meaning is presented4 ,sidenote3 ,limitations of natural symbols ,natural objects are signs of other things and events4 ,clouds stand for rain2 a footprint represents game or an enemy2 a projecting rock serves to indicate minerals below the surface4 ,the limitations of natural signs are1 however1 great4 7i7 ,the physical or direct sense excitation tends to distract attention from what is meant or indicated4#bg ,almost every one will recall pointing out to a kitten or puppy some object of food1 only to have the animal devote himself to the hand pointing1 not to the thing pointed at4 7ii7 ,where natural signs alone exist1 we are mainly at the mercy of external happenings2 we have to wait until the natural event presents itself in order to be warned or advised of the possibility of some other event4 7iii7 ,natural signs1 not being originally intended to be signs1 are cumbrous1 bulky1 inconvenient1 unmanageable4 #bg ,compare the quotation from ,bain on p4 #aee4 ,sidenote3 ,artificial signs overcome these restrictions4 ,it is therefore indispensable for any high development of thought that there should be also intentional signs4 ,speech supplies the requirement4 ,gestures1 sounds1 written or printed forms1 are strictly physical existences1 but their native value is intentionally subordinated to the value they acquire as representative of meanings4 7i7 ,the direct and sensible value of faint sounds and minute written or printed marks is very slight4 ,accordingly1 attention is not distracted from their representative function4 7ii7 ,their production is under our direct control so that they may be produced when needed4 ,when we can make the word rain1 we do not have to wait for some physical forerunner of rain to call our thoughts in that direction4 ,we cannot make the cloud2 we can make the sound1 and as a token of meaning the sound serves the purpose as well as the cloud4 7iii7 ,arbitrary linguistic signs are convenient and easy to manage4 ,they are compact1 portable1 and delicate4 ,as long as we live we breathe2 and modifications by the muscles of throat and mouth of the volume and quality of the air are simple1 easy1 and indefinitely controllable4 ,bodily postures and gestures of the hand and arm are also employed as signs1 but they are coarse and unmanageable compared with modifications of breath to produce sounds4 ,no wonder that oral speech has been selected as the main stuff of intentional intellectual signs4 ,sounds1 while subtle1 refined1 and easily modifiable1 are transitory4 ,this defect is met by the system of written and printed words1 appealing to the eye4 ,litera scripta manet4 ,bearing in mind the intimate connection of meanings and signs 7or language71 we may note in more detail what language does 7#a7 for specific meanings1 and 7#b7 for the organization of meanings4 ,i4 ,individual ,meanings4 ,a verbal sign 7a7 selects1 detaches1 a meaning from what is otherwise a vague flux and blur 7see p4 #aba72 7b7 it retains1 registers1 stores that meaning2 and 7c7 applies it1 when needed1 to the comprehension of other things4 ,combining these various functions in a mixture of metaphors1 we may say that a linguistic sign is a fence1 a label1 and a vehicle--all in one4 ,sidenote3 ,a sign makes a meaning distinct 7a7 ,every one has experienced how learning an appropriate name for what was dim and vague cleared up and crystallized the whole matter4 ,some meaning seems almost within reach1 but is elusive2 it refuses to condense into definite form2 the attaching of a word somehow 7just how1 it is almost impossible to say7 puts limits around the meaning1 draws it out from the void1 makes it stand out as an entity on its own account4 ,when ,emerson said that he would almost rather know the true name1 the poet's name1 for a thing1 than to know the thing itself1 he presumably had this irradiating and illuminating function of language in mind4 ,the delight that children take in demanding and learning the names of everything about them indicates that meanings are becoming concrete individuals to them1 so that their commerce with things is passing from the physical to the intellectual plane4 ,it is hardly surprising that savages attach a magic efficacy to words4 ,to name anything is to give it a title2 to dignify and honor it by raising it from a mere physical occurrence to a meaning that is distinct and permanent4 ,to know the names of people and things and to be able to manipulate these names is1 in savage lore1 to be in possession of their dignity and worth1 to master them4 ,sidenote3 ,a sign preserves a meaning 7b7 ,things come and go2 or we come and go1 and either way things escape our notice4 ,our direct sensible relation to things is very limited4 ,the suggestion of meanings by natural signs is limited to occasions of direct contact or vision4 ,but a meaning fixed by a linguistic sign is conserved for future use4 ,even if the thing is not there to represent the meaning1 the word may be produced so as to evoke the meaning4 ,since intellectual life depends on possession of a store of meanings1 the importance of language as a tool of preserving meanings cannot be overstated4 ,to be sure1 the method of storage is not wholly aseptic2 words often corrupt and modify the meanings they are supposed to keep intact1 but liability to infection is a price paid by every living thing for the privilege of living4 ,sidenote3 ,a sign transfers a meaning 7c7 ,when a meaning is detached and fixed by a sign1 it is possible to use that meaning in a new context and situation4 ,this transfer and reapplication is the key to all judgment and inference4 ,it would little profit a man to recognize that a given particular cloud was the premonitor of a given particular rainstorm if his recognition ended there1 for he would then have to learn over and over again1 since the next cloud and the next rain are different events4 ,no cumulative growth of intelligence would occur2 experience might form habits of physical adaptation but it would not teach anything1 for we should not be able to use a prior experience consciously to anticipate and regulate a further experience4 ,to be able to use the past to judge and infer the new and unknown implies that1 although the past thing has gone1 its meaning abides in such a way as to be applicable in determining the character of the new4 ,speech forms are our great carriers3 the easy-running vehicles by which meanings are transported from experiences that no longer concern us to those that are as yet dark and dubious4 ,sidenote3 ,logical organization depends upon signs ,,ii4 ,organization of ,meanings4 ,in emphasizing the importance of signs in relation to specific meanings1 we have overlooked another aspect1 equally valuable4 ,signs not only mark off specific or individual meanings1 but they are also instruments of grouping meanings in relation to one another4 ,words are not only names or titles of single meanings2 they also form sentences in which meanings are organized in relation to one another4 ,when we say ,that book is a dictionary1 or ,that blur of light in the heavens is ,halley's comet1 we express a logical connection--an act of classifying and defining that goes beyond the physical thing into the logical region of genera and species1 things and attributes4 ,propositions1 sentences1 bear the same relation to judgments that distinct words1 built up mainly by analyzing propositions in their various types1 bear to meanings or conceptions2 and just as words imply a sentence1 so a sentence implies a larger whole of consecutive discourse into which it fits4 ,as is often said1 grammar expresses the unconscious logic of the popular mind4 ,the chief intellectual classifications that constitute the working capital of thought have been built up for us by our mother tongue4 ,our very lack of explicit consciousness in using language that we are employing the intellectual systematizations of the race shows how thoroughly accustomed we have become to its logical distinctions and groupings4 ,sec4 #b4 ,the ,abuse of ,linguistic ,methods in ,education ,sidenote3 ,teaching merely things1 not educative ,taken literally1 the maxim1 ,teach things1 not words1 or ,teach things before words1 would be the negation of education2 it would reduce mental life to mere physical and sensible adjustments4 ,learning1 in the proper sense1 is not learning things1 but the meanings of things1 and this process involves the use of signs1 or language in its generic sense4 ,in like fashion1 the warfare of some educational reformers against symbols1 if pushed to extremes1 involves the destruction of the intellectual life1 since this lives1 moves1 and has its being in those processes of definition1 abstraction1 generalization1 and classification that are made possible by symbols alone4 ,nevertheless1 these contentions of educational reformers have been needed4 ,the liability of a thing to abuse is in proportion to the value of its right use4 ,sidenote3 ,but words separated from things are not true signs ,symbols are themselves1 as pointed out above1 particular1 physical1 sensible existences1 like any other things4 ,they are symbols only by virtue of what they suggest and represent1 i4e4 meanings4 7i7 ,they stand for these meanings to any individual only when he has had experience of some situation to which these meanings are actually relevant4 ,words can detach and preserve a meaning only when the meaning has been first involved in our own direct intercourse with things4 ,to attempt to give a meaning through a word alone without any dealings with a thing is to deprive the word of intelligible signification2 against this attempt1 a tendency only too prevalent in education1 reformers have protested4 ,moreover1 there is a tendency to assume that whenever there is a definite word or form of speech there is also a definite idea2 while1 as a matter of fact1 adults and children alike are capable of using even precise verbal formulae with only the vaguest and most confused sense of what they mean4 ,genuine ignorance is more profitable because likely to be accompanied by humility1 curiosity1 and open-mindedness2 while ability to repeat catch-phrases1 cant terms1 familiar propositions1 gives the conceit of learning and coats the mind with a varnish waterproof to new ideas4 ,sidenote3 ,language tends to arrest personal inquiry and reflection 7ii7 ,again1 although new combinations of words without the intervention of physical things may supply new ideas1 there are limits to this possibility4 ,lazy inertness causes individuals to accept ideas that have currency about them without personal inquiry and testing4 ,a man uses thought1 perhaps1 to find out what others believe1 and then stops4 ,the ideas of others as embodied in language become substitutes for one's own ideas4 ,the use of linguistic studies and methods to halt the human mind on the level of the attainments of the past1 to prevent new inquiry and discovery1 to put the authority of tradition in place of the authority of natural facts and laws1 to reduce the individual to a parasite living on the secondhand experience of others--these things have been the source of the reformers' protest against the preeminence assigned to language in schools4 ,sidenote3 ,words as mere stimuli ,finally1 words that originally stood for ideas come1 with repeated use1 to be mere counters2 they become physical things to be manipulated according to certain rules1 or reacted to by certain operations without consciousness of their meaning4 ,mr4 ,stout 7who has called such terms substitute signs7remarks that algebraical and arithmetical signs are to a great extent used as mere substitute signs4444 ,it is possible to use signs of this kind whenever fixed and definite rules of operation can be derived from the nature of the things symbolized1 so as to be applied in manipulating the signs1 without further reference to their signification4 ,a word is an instrument for thinking about the meaning which it expresses2 a substitute sign is a means of not thinking about the meaning which it symbolizes4 ,the principle applies1 however1 to ordinary words1 as well as to algebraic signs2 they also enable us to use meanings so as to get results without thinking4 ,in many respects1 signs that are means of not thinking are of great advantage2 standing for the familiar1 they release attention for meanings that1 being novel1 require conscious interpretation4 ,nevertheless1 the premium put in the schoolroom upon attainment of technical facility1 upon skill in producing external results 7ante1 p4 #ea71 often changes this advantage into a positive detriment4 ,in manipulating symbols so as to recite well1 to get and give correct answers1 to follow prescribed formulae of analysis1 the pupil's attitude becomes mechanical1 rather than thoughtful2 verbal memorizing is substituted for inquiry into the meaning of things4 ,this danger is perhaps the one uppermost in mind when verbal methods of education are attacked4 ,sec4 #c4 ,the ,use of ,language in its ,educational ,bearings ,language stands in a twofold relation to the work of education4 ,on the one hand1 it is continually used in all studies as well as in all the social discipline of the school2 on the other1 it is a distinct object of study4 ,we shall consider only the ordinary use of language1 since its effects upon habits of thought are much deeper than those of conscious study4 ,sidenote3 ,language not primarily intellectual in purpose ,the common statement that language is the expression of thought conveys only a half-truth1 and a half-truth that is likely to result in positive error4 ,language does express thought1 but not primarily1 nor1 at first1 even consciously4 ,the primary motive for language is to influence 7through the expression of desire1 emotion1 and thought7 the activity of others2 its secondary use is to enter into more intimate sociable relations with them2 its employment as a conscious vehicle of thought and knowledge is a tertiary1 and relatively late1 formation4 ,the contrast is well brought out by the statement of ,john ,locke that words have a double use1--civil and philosophical4 ,by their civil use1 ,i mean such a communication of thoughts and ideas by words as may serve for the upholding of common conversation and commerce about the ordinary affairs and conveniences of civil life4444 ,by the philosophical use of words1 ,i mean such a use of them as may serve to convey the precise notions of things1 and to express in general propositions certain and undoubted truths4 ,sidenote3 ,hence education has to transform it into an intellectual tool ,this distinction of the practical and social from the intellectual use of language throws much light on the problem of the school in respect to speech4 ,that problem is to direct pupils' oral and written speech1 used primarily for practical and social ends1 so that gradually it shall become a conscious tool of conveying knowledge and assisting thought4 ,how without checking the spontaneous1 natural motives--motives to which language owes its vitality1 force1 vividness1 and variety--are we to modify speech habits so as to render them accurate and flexible intellectual instruments8 ,it is comparatively easy to encourage the original spontaneous flow and not make language over into a servant of reflective thought2 it is comparatively easy to check and almost destroy 7so far as the schoolroom is concerned7 native aim and interest1 and to set up artificial and formal modes of expression in some isolated and technical matters4 ,the difficulty lies in making over habits that have to do with ordinary affairs and conveniences into habits concerned with precise notions4 ,the successful accomplishing of the transformation requires 7i7 enlargement of the pupil's vocabulary2 7ii7 rendering its terms more precise and accurate1 and 7iii7 formation of habits of consecutive discourse4 ,sidenote3 ,to enlarge vocabulary1 the fund of concepts should be enlarged 7i7 ,enlargement of vocabulary4 ,this takes place1 of course1 by wider intelligent contact with things and persons1 and also vicariously1 by gathering the meanings of words from the context in which they are heard or read4 ,to grasp by either method a word in its meaning is to exercise intelligence1 to perform an act of intelligent selection or analysis1 and it is also to widen the fund of meanings or concepts readily available in further intellectual enterprises 7ante1 p4 #abf74 ,it is usual to distinguish between one's active and one's passive vocabulary1 the latter being composed of the words that are understood when they are heard or seen1 the former of words that are used intelligently4 ,the fact that the passive vocabulary is ordinarily much larger than the active indicates a certain amount of inert energy1 of power not freely controlled by an individual4 ,failure to use meanings that are nevertheless understood reveals dependence upon external stimulus1 and lack of intellectual initiative4 ,this mental laziness is to some extent an artificial product of education4 ,small children usually attempt to put to use every new word they get hold of1 but when they learn to read they are introduced to a large variety of terms that there is no ordinary opportunity to use4 ,the result is a kind of mental suppression1 if not smothering4 ,moreover1 the meaning of words not actively used in building up and conveying ideas is never quite clear-cut or complete4 ,sidenote3 ,looseness of thinking accompanies a limited vocabulary ,while a limited vocabulary may be due to a limited range of experience1 to a sphere of contact with persons and things so narrow as not to suggest or require a full store of words1 it is also due to carelessness and vagueness4 ,a happy-go-lucky frame of mind makes the individual averse to clear discriminations1 either in perception or in his own speech4 ,words are used loosely in an indeterminate kind of reference to things1 and the mind approaches a condition where practically everything is just a thing-um-bob or a what-do-you-call-it4 ,paucity of vocabulary on the part of those with whom the child associates1 triviality and meagerness in the child's reading matter 7as frequently even in his school readers and text-books71 tend to shut down the area of mental vision4 ,sidenote3 ,command of language involves command of things ,we must note also the great difference between flow of words and command of language4 ,volubility is not necessarily a sign of a large vocabulary2 much talking or even ready speech is quite compatible with moving round and round in a circle of moderate radius4 ,most schoolrooms suffer from a lack of materials and appliances save perhaps books--and even these are written down to the supposed capacity1 or incapacity1 of children4 ,occasion and demand for an enriched vocabulary are accordingly restricted4 ,the vocabulary of things studied in the schoolroom is very largely isolated2 it does not link itself organically to the range of the ideas and words that are in vogue outside the school4 ,hence the enlargement that takes place is often nominal1 adding to the inert1 rather than to the active1 fund of meanings and terms4 7ii7 ,accuracy of vocabulary4 ,one way in which the fund of words and concepts is increased is by discovering and naming shades of meaning--that is to say1 by making the vocabulary more precise4 ,increase in definiteness is as important relatively as is the enlargement of the capital stock absolutely4 ,sidenote3 ,the general as the vague and as the distinctly generic ,the first meanings of terms1 since they are due to superficial acquaintance with things1 are general in the sense of being vague4 ,the little child calls all men papa2 acquainted with a dog1 he may call the first horse he sees a big dog4 ,differences of quantity and intensity are noted1 but the fundamental meaning is so vague that it covers things that are far apart4 ,to many persons trees are just trees1 being discriminated only into deciduous trees and evergreens1 with perhaps recognition of one or two kinds of each4 ,such vagueness tends to persist and to become a barrier to the advance of thinking4 ,terms that are miscellaneous in scope are clumsy tools at best2 in addition they are frequently treacherous1 for their ambiguous reference causes us to confuse things that should be distinguished4 ,sidenote3 ,twofold growth of words in sense or signification ,the growth of precise terms out of original vagueness takes place normally in two directions3 toward words that stand for relationships and words that stand for highly individualized traits 7compare what was said about the development of meanings1 p4 #abb72 the first being associated with abstract1 the second with concrete1 thinking4 ,some ,australian tribes are said to have no words for animal or for plant1 while they have specific names for every variety of plant and animal in their neighborhoods4 ,this minuteness of vocabulary represents progress toward definiteness1 but in a one-sided way4 ,specific properties are distinguished1 but not relationships4#bh ,on the other hand1 students of philosophy and of the general aspects of natural and social science are apt to acquire a store of terms that signify relations without balancing them up with terms that designate specific individuals and traits4 ,the ordinary use of such terms as causation1 law1 society1 individual1 capital1 illustrates this tendency4 #bh ,the term general is itself an ambiguous term1 meaning 7in its best logical sense7 the related and also 7in its natural usage7 the indefinite1 the vague4 ,general1 in the first sense1 denotes the discrimination of a principle or generic relation2 in the second sense1 it denotes the absence of discrimination of specific or individual properties4 ,sidenote3 ,words alter their meanings so as to change their logical functions ,in the history of language we find both aspects of the growth of vocabulary illustrated by changes in the sense of words3 some words originally wide in their application are narrowed to denote shades of meaning2 others originally specific are widened to express relationships4 ,the term vernacular1 now meaning mother speech1 has been generalized from the word verna1 meaning a slave born in the master's household4 ,publication has evolved its meaning of communication by means of print1 through restricting an earlier meaning of any kind of communication--although the wider meaning is retained in legal procedure1 as publishing a libel4 ,the sense of the word average has been generalized from a use connected with dividing loss by shipwreck proportionately among various sharers in an enterprise4#bi #bi ,a large amount of material illustrating the twofold change in the sense of words will be found in ,jevons1 ,lessons in ,logic4 ,sidenote3 ,similar changes occur in the vocabulary of every student ,these historical changes assist the educator to appreciate the changes that occur with individuals together with advance in intellectual resources4 ,in studying geometry1 a pupil must learn both to narrow and to extend the meanings of such familiar words as line1 surface1 angle1 square1 circle2 to narrow them to the precise meanings involved in demonstrations2 to extend them to cover generic relations not expressed in ordinary usage4 ,qualities of color and size must be excluded2 relations of direction1 of variation in direction1 of limit1 must be definitely seized4 ,a like transformation occurs1 of course1 in every subject of study4 ,just at this point lies the danger1 alluded to above1 of simply overlaying common meanings with new and isolated meanings instead of effecting a genuine working-over of popular and practical meanings into adequate logical tools4 ,sidenote3 ,the value of technical terms ,terms used with intentional exactness so as to express a meaning1 the whole meaning1 and only the meaning1 are called technical4 ,for educational purposes1 a technical term indicates something relative1 not absolute2 for a term is technical not because of its verbal form or its unusualness1 but because it is employed to fix a meaning precisely4 ,ordinary words get a technical quality when used intentionally for this end4 ,whenever thought becomes more accurate1 a 7relatively7 technical vocabulary grows up4 ,teachers are apt to oscillate between extremes in regard to technical terms4 ,on the one hand1 these are multiplied in every direction1 seemingly on the assumption that learning a new piece of terminology1 accompanied by verbal description or definition1 is equivalent to grasping a new idea4 ,when it is seen how largely the net outcome is the accumulation of an isolated set of words1 a jargon or scholastic cant1 and to what extent the natural power of judgment is clogged by this accumulation1 there is a reaction to the opposite extreme4 ,technical terms are banished3 name words exist but not nouns2 action words but not verbs2 pupils may take away1 but not subtract2 they may tell what four fives are1 but not what four times five are1 and so on4 ,a sound instinct underlies this reaction--aversion to words that give the pretense1 but not the reality1 of meaning4 ,yet the fundamental difficulty is not with the word1 but with the idea4 ,if the idea is not grasped1 nothing is gained by using a more familiar word2 if the idea is perceived1 the use of the term that exactly names it may assist in fixing the idea4 ,terms denoting highly exact meanings should be introduced only sparingly1 that is1 a few at a time2 they should be led up to gradually1 and great pains should be taken to secure the circumstances that render precision of meaning significant4 ,sidenote3 ,importance of consecutive discourse 7iii7 ,consecutive discourse4 ,as we saw1 language connects and organizes meanings as well as selects and fixes them4 ,as every meaning is set in the context of some situation1 so every word in concrete use belongs to some sentence 7it may itself represent a condensed sentence71 and the sentence1 in turn1 belongs to some larger story1 description1 or reasoning process4 ,it is unnecessary to repeat what has been said about the importance of continuity and ordering of meanings4 ,we may1 however1 note some ways in which school practices tend to interrupt consecutiveness of language and thereby interfere harmfully with systematic reflection4 7a7 ,teachers have a habit of monopolizing continued discourse4 ,many1 if not most1 instructors would be surprised if informed at the end of the day of the amount of time they have talked as compared with any pupil4 ,children's conversation is often confined to answering questions in brief phrases1 or in single disconnected sentences4 ,expatiation and explanation are reserved for the teacher1 who often admits any hint at an answer on the part of the pupil1 and then amplifies what he supposes the child must have meant4 ,the habits of sporadic and fragmentary discourse thus promoted have inevitably a disintegrating intellectual influence4 ,sidenote3 ,too minute questioning 7b7 ,assignment of too short lessons when accompanied 7as it usually is in order to pass the time of the recitation period7 by minute analytic questioning has the same effect4 ,this evil is usually at its height in such subjects as history and literature1 where not infrequently the material is so minutely subdivided as to break up the unity of meaning belonging to a given portion of the matter1 to destroy perspective1 and in effect to reduce the whole topic to an accumulation of disconnected details all upon the same level4 ,more often than the teacher is aware1 his mind carries and supplies the background of unity of meaning against which pupils project isolated scraps4 ,sidenote3 ,making avoidance of error the aim 7c7 ,insistence upon avoiding error instead of attaining power tends also to interruption of continuous discourse and thought4 ,children who begin with something to say and with intellectual eagerness to say it are sometimes made so conscious of minor errors in substance and form that the energy that should go into constructive thinking is diverted into anxiety not to make mistakes1 and even1 in extreme cases1 into passive quiescence as the best method of minimizing error4 ,this tendency is especially marked in connection with the writing of compositions1 essays1 and themes4 ,it has even been gravely recommended that little children should always write on trivial subjects and in short sentences because in that way they are less likely to make mistakes1 while the teaching of writing to high school and college students occasionally reduces itself to a technique for detecting and designating mistakes4 ,the resulting self-consciousness and constraint are only part of the evil that comes from a negative ideal4 ,,chapter ,,fourteen ,,observation ,,and ,,information ,,in ,,the ,,training ,,of ,,mind ,sidenote3 ,no thinking without acquaintance with facts ,thinking is an ordering of subject-matter with reference to discovering what it signifies or indicates4 ,thinking no more exists apart from this arranging of subject-matter than digestion occurs apart from the assimilating of food4 ,the way in which the subject-matter is furnished marks1 therefore1 a fundamental point4 ,if the subject-matter is provided in too scanty or too profuse fashion1 if it comes in disordered array or in isolated scraps1 the effect upon habits of thought is detrimental4 ,if personal observation and communication of information by others 7whether in books or speech7 are rightly conducted1 half the logical battle is won1 for they are the channels of obtaining subject-matter4 ,sec4 #a4 ,the ,nature and ,value of ,observation ,sidenote3 ,fallacy of making facts an end in themselves ,the protest1 mentioned in the last chapter1 of educational reformers against the exaggerated and false use of language1 insisted upon personal and direct observation as the proper alternative course4 ,the reformers felt that the current emphasis upon the linguistic factor eliminated all opportunity for first-hand acquaintance with real things2 hence they appealed to sense-perception to fill the gap4 ,it is not surprising that this enthusiastic zeal failed frequently to ask how and why observation is educative1 and hence fell into the error of making observation an end in itself and was satisfied with any kind of material under any kind of conditions4 ,such isolation of observation is still manifested in the statement that this faculty develops first1 then that of memory and imagination1 and finally the faculty of thought4 ,from this point of view1 observation is regarded as furnishing crude masses of raw material1 to which1 later on1 reflective processes may be applied4 ,our previous pages should have made obvious the fallacy of this point of view by bringing out the fact that simple concrete thinking attends all our intercourse with things which is not on a purely physical level4 ,sidenote3 ,the sympathetic motive in extending acquaintance ,i4 ,all persons have a natural desire--akin to curiosity--for a widening of their range of acquaintance with persons and things4 ,the sign in art galleries that forbids the carrying of canes and umbrellas is obvious testimony to the fact that simply to see is not enough for many people2 there is a feeling of lack of acquaintance until some direct contact is made4 ,this demand for fuller and closer knowledge is quite different from any conscious interest in observation for its own sake4 ,desire for expansion1 for self-realization1 is its motive4 ,the interest is sympathetic1 socially and aesthetically sympathetic1 rather than cognitive4 ,while the interest is especially keen in children 7because their actual experience is so small and their possible experience so large71 it still characterizes adults when routine has not blunted its edge4 ,this sympathetic interest provides the medium for carrying and binding together what would otherwise be a multitude of items1 diverse1 disconnected1 and of no intellectual use4 ,these systems are indeed social and aesthetic rather than consciously intellectual2 but they provide the natural medium for more conscious intellectual explorations4 ,some educators have recommended that nature study in the elementary schools be conducted with a love of nature and a cultivation of aesthetic appreciation in view rather than in a purely analytic spirit4 ,others have urged making much of the care of animals and plants4 ,both of these important recommendations have grown out of experience1 not out of theory1 but they afford excellent exemplifications of the theoretic point just made4 ,sidenote3 ,analytic inspection for the sake of doing ,sidenote3 ,direct and indirect sense training ,,ii4 ,in normal development1 specific analytic observations are originally connected almost exclusively with the imperative need for noting means and ends in carrying on activities4 ,when one is doing something1 one is compelled1 if the work is to succeed 7unless it is purely routine71 to use eyes1 ears1 and sense of touch as guides to action4 ,without a constant and alert exercise of the senses1 not even plays and games can go on2 in any form of work1 materials1 obstacles1 appliances1 failures1 and successes1 must be intently watched4 ,sense-perception does not occur for its own sake or for purposes of training1 but because it is an indispensable factor of success in doing what one is interested in doing4 ,although not designed for sense-training1 this method effects sense-training in the most economical and thoroughgoing way4 ,various schemes have been designed by teachers for cultivating sharp and prompt observation of forms1 as by writing words1--even in an unknown language1--making arrangements of figures and geometrical forms1 and having pupils reproduce them after a momentary glance4 ,children often attain great skill in quick seeing and full reproducing of even complicated meaningless combinations4 ,but such methods of training--however valuable as occasional games and diversions--compare very unfavorably with the training of eye and hand that comes as an incident of work with tools in wood or metals1 or of gardening1 cooking1 or the care of animals4 ,training by isolated exercises leaves no deposit1 leads nowhere2 and even the technical skill acquired has little radiating power1 or transferable value4 ,criticisms made upon the training of observation on the ground that many persons cannot correctly reproduce the forms and arrangement of the figures on the face of their watches misses the point because persons do not look at a watch to find out whether four o'clock is indicated by ,,iiii or by ,,iv1 but to find out what time it is1 and1 if observation decides this matter1 noting other details is irrelevant and a waste of time4 ,in the training of observation the question of end and motive is all-important4 ,sidenote3 ,scientific observations are linked to problems ,sidenote3 ,object-lessons rarely supply problems ,,iii4 ,the further1 more intellectual or scientific1 development of observation follows the line of the growth of practical into theoretical reflection already traced 7ante1 ,chapter ,ten74 ,as problems emerge and are dwelt upon1 observation is directed less to the facts that bear upon a practical aim and more upon what bears upon a problem as such4 ,what makes observations in schools often intellectually ineffective is 7more than anything else7 that they are carried on independently of a sense of a problem that they serve to define or help to solve4 ,the evil of this isolation is seen through the entire educational system1 from the kindergarten1 through the elementary and high schools1 to the college4 ,almost everywhere may be found1 at some time1 recourse to observations as if they were of complete and final value in themselves1 instead of the means of getting material that bears upon some difficulty and its solution4 ,in the kindergarten are heaped up observations regarding geometrical forms1 lines1 surfaces1 cubes1 colors1 and so on4 ,in the elementary school1 under the name of object-lessons1 the form and properties of objects1--apple1 orange1 chalk1--selected almost at random1 are minutely noted1 while under the name of nature study similar observations are directed upon leaves1 stones1 insects1 selected in almost equally arbitrary fashion4 ,in high school and college1 laboratory and microscopic observations are carried on as if the accumulation of observed facts and the acquisition of skill in manipulation were educational ends in themselves4 ,compare with these methods of isolated observations the statement of ,jevons that observation as conducted by scientific men is effective only when excited and guided by hope of verifying a theory2 and again1 the number of things which can be observed and experimented upon are infinite1 and if we merely set to work to record facts without any distinct purpose1 our records will have no value4 ,strictly speaking1 the first statement of ,jevons is too narrow4 ,scientific men institute observations not merely to test an idea 7or suggested explanatory meaning71 but also to locate the nature of a problem and thereby guide the formation of a hypothesis4 ,but the principle of his remark1 namely1 that scientific men never make the accumulation of observations an end in itself1 but always a means to a general intellectual conclusion1 is absolutely sound4 ,until the force of this principle is adequately recognized in education1 observation will be largely a matter of uninteresting dead work or of acquiring forms of technical skill that are not available as intellectual resources4 ,sec4 #b4 ,methods and ,materials of ,observation in the ,schools ,the best methods in use in our schools furnish many suggestions for giving observation its right place in mental training4 ,sidenote3 ,observation should involve discovery ,i4 ,they rest upon the sound assumption that observation is an active process4 ,observation is exploration1 inquiry for the sake of discovering something previously hidden and unknown1 this something being needed in order to reach some end1 practical or theoretical4 ,observation is to be discriminated from recognition1 or perception of what is familiar4 ,the identification of something already understood is1 indeed1 an indispensable function of further investigation 7ante1 p4 #aai72 but it is relatively automatic and passive1 while observation proper is searching and deliberate4 ,recognition refers to the already mastered2 observation is concerned with mastering the unknown4 ,the common notions that perception is like writing on a blank piece of paper1 or like impressing an image on the mind as a seal is imprinted on wax or as a picture is formed on a photographic plate 7notions that have played a disastrous role in educational methods71 arise from a failure to distinguish between automatic recognition and the searching attitude of genuine observation4 ,sidenote3 and suspense during an unfolding change ,,ii4 ,much assistance in the selection of appropriate material for observation may be derived from considering the eagerness and closeness of observation that attend the following of a story or drama4 ,alertness of observation is at its height wherever there is plot interest4 ,why8 ,because of the balanced combination of the old and the new1 of the familiar and the unexpected4 ,we hang on the lips of the story-teller because of the element of mental suspense4 ,alternatives are suggested1 but are left ambiguous1 so that our whole being questions3 ,what befell next8 ,which way did things turn out8 ,contrast the ease and fullness with which a child notes all the salient traits of a story1 with the labor and inadequacy of his observation of some dead and static thing where nothing raises a question or suggests alternative outcomes4 ,sidenote3 ,this plot interest manifested in activity1 ,when an individual is engaged in doing or making something 7the activity not being of such a mechanical and habitual character that its outcome is assured71 there is an analogous situation4 ,something is going to come of what is present to the sense1 but just what is doubtful4 ,the plot is unfolding toward success or failure1 but just when or how is uncertain4 ,hence the keen and tense observation of conditions and results that attends constructive manual operations4 ,where the subject-matter is of a more impersonal sort1 the same principle of movement toward a denouement may apply4 ,it is a commonplace that what is moving attracts notice when that which is at rest escapes it4 ,yet too often it would almost seem as if pains had been taken to deprive the material of school observations of all life and dramatic quality1 to reduce it to a dead and inert form4 ,mere change is not enough1 however4 ,vicissitude1 alteration1 motion1 excite observation2 but if they merely excite it1 there is no thought4 ,the changes must 7like the incidents of a well-arranged story or plot7 take place in a certain cumulative order2 each successive change must at once remind us of its predecessor and arouse interest in its successor if observations of change are to be logically fruitful4 ,sidenote3 and in cycles of growth ,living beings1 plants1 and animals1 fulfill the twofold requirement to an extraordinary degree4 ,where there is growth1 there is motion1 change1 process2 and there is also arrangement of the changes in a cycle4 ,the first arouses1 the second organizes1 observation4 ,much of the extraordinary interest that children take in planting seeds and watching the stages of their growth is due to the fact that a drama is enacting before their eyes2 there is something doing1 each step of which is important in the destiny of the plant4 ,the great practical improvements that have occurred of late years in the teaching of botany and zooelogy will be found1 upon inspection1 to involve treating plants and animals as beings that act1 that do something1 instead of as mere inert specimens having static properties to be inventoried1 named1 and registered4 ,treated in the latter fashion1 observation is inevitably reduced to the falsely analytic 7ante1 p4 #aab71--to mere dissection and enumeration4 ,sidenote3 ,observation of structure grows out of noting function ,there is1 of course1 a place1 and an important place1 for observation of the mere static qualities of objects4 ,when1 however1 the primary interest is in function1 in what the object does1 there is a motive for more minute analytic study1 for the observation of structure4 ,interest in noting an activity passes insensibly into noting how the activity is carried on2 the interest in what is accomplished passes over into an interest in the organs of its accomplishing4 ,but when the beginning is made with the morphological1 the anatomical1 the noting of peculiarities of form1 size1 color1 and distribution of parts1 the material is so cut off from significance as to be dead and dull4 ,it is as natural for children to look intently for the stomata of a plant after they have become interested in its function of breathing1 as it is repulsive to attend minutely to them when they are considered as isolated peculiarities of structure4 ,sidenote3 ,scientific observation ,,iii4 ,as the center of interest of observations becomes less personal1 less a matter of means for effecting one's own ends1 and less aesthetic1 less a matter of contribution of parts to a total emotional effect1 observation becomes more consciously intellectual in quality4 ,pupils learn to observe for the sake 7i7 of finding out what sort of perplexity confronts them2 7ii7 of inferring hypothetical explanations for the puzzling features that observation reveals2 and 7iii7 of testing the ideas thus suggested4 ,sidenote3 should be extensive ,sidenote3 and intensive ,in short1 observation becomes scientific in nature4 ,of such observations it may be said that they should follow a rhythm between the extensive and the intensive4 ,problems become definite1 and suggested explanations significant by a certain alternation between a wide and somewhat loose soaking in of relevant facts and a minutely accurate study of a few selected facts4 ,the wider1 less exact observation is necessary to give the student a feeling for the reality of the field of inquiry1 a sense of its bearings and possibilities1 and to store his mind with materials that imagination may transform into suggestions4 ,the intensive study is necessary for limiting the problem1 and for securing the conditions of experimental testing4 ,as the latter by itself is too specialized and technical to arouse intellectual growth1 the former by itself is too superficial and scattering for control of intellectual development4 ,in the sciences of life1 field study1 excursions1 acquaintance with living things in their natural habitats1 may alternate with microscopic and laboratory observation4 ,in the physical sciences1 phenomena of light1 of heat1 of electricity1 of moisture1 of gravity1 in their broad setting in nature--their physiographic setting--should prepare for an exact study of selected facts under conditions of laboratory control4 ,in this way1 the student gets the benefit of technical scientific methods of discovery and testing1 while he retains his sense of the identity of the laboratory modes of energy with large out-of-door realities1 thereby avoiding the impression 7that so often accrues7 that the facts studied are peculiar to the laboratory4 ,sec4 #c4 ,communication of ,information ,sidenote3 ,importance of hearsay acquaintance ,when all is said and done the field of fact open to any one observer by himself is narrow4 ,into every one of our beliefs1 even those that we have worked out under the conditions of utmost personal1 first-hand acquaintance1 much has insensibly entered from what we have heard or read of the observations and conclusions of others4 ,in spite of the great extension of direct observation in our schools1 the vast bulk of educational subject-matter is derived from other sources--from text-book1 lecture1 and viva-voce interchange4 ,no educational question is of greater import than how to get the most logical good out of learning through transmission from others4 ,sidenote3 ,logically1 this ranks only as evidence or testimony ,doubtless the chief meaning associated with the word instruction is this conveying and instilling of the results of the observations and inferences of others4 ,doubtless the undue prominence in education of the ideal of amassing information 7ante1 p4 #eb7 has its source in the prominence of the learning of other persons4 ,the problem then is how to convert it into an intellectual asset4 ,in logical terms1 the material supplied from the experience of others is testimony3 that is to say1 evidence submitted by others to be employed by one's own judgment in reaching a conclusion4 ,how shall we treat the subject-matter supplied by text-book and teacher so that it shall rank as material for reflective inquiry1 not as ready-made intellectual pabulum to be accepted and swallowed just as supplied by the store8 ,sidenote3 ,communication by others should not encroach on observation1 ,in reply to this question1 we may say 7i7 that the communication of material should be needed4 ,that is to say1 it should be such as cannot readily be attained by personal observation4 ,for teacher or book to cram pupils with facts which1 with little more trouble1 they could discover by direct inquiry is to violate their intellectual integrity by cultivating mental servility4 ,this does not mean that the material supplied through communication of others should be meager or scanty4 ,with the utmost range of the senses1 the world of nature and history stretches out almost infinitely beyond4 ,but the fields within which direct observation is feasible should be carefully chosen and sacredly protected4 ,sidenote3 should not be dogmatic in tone1 7ii7 ,material should be supplied by way of stimulus1 not with dogmatic finality and rigidity4 ,when pupils get the notion that any field of study has been definitely surveyed1 that knowledge about it is exhaustive and final1 they may continue docile pupils1 but they cease to be students4 ,all thinking whatsoever--so be it is thinking--contains a phase of originality4 ,this originality does not imply that the student's conclusion varies from the conclusions of others1 much less that it is a radically novel conclusion4 ,his originality is not incompatible with large use of materials and suggestions contributed by others4 ,originality means personal interest in the question1 personal initiative in turning over the suggestions furnished by others1 and sincerity in following them out to a tested conclusion4 ,literally1 the phrase ,think for yourself is tautological2 any thinking is thinking for one's self4 ,sidenote3 should have relation to a personal problem1 7iii7 ,the material furnished by way of information should be relevant to a question that is vital in the student's own experience4 ,what has been said about the evil of observations that begin and end in themselves may be transferred without change to communicated learning4 ,instruction in subject-matter that does not fit into any problem already stirring in the student's own experience1 or that is not presented in such a way as to arouse a problem1 is worse than useless for intellectual purposes4 ,in that it fails to enter into any process of reflection1 it is useless2 in that it remains in the mind as so much lumber and debris1 it is a barrier1 an obstruction in the way of effective thinking when a problem arises4 ,sidenote3 and to prior systems of experience ,another way of stating the same principle is that material furnished by communication must be such as to enter into some existing system or organization of experience4 ,all students of psychology are familiar with the principle of apperception--that we assimilate new material with what we have digested and retained from prior experiences4 ,now the apperceptive basis of material furnished by teacher and text-book should be found1 as far as possible1 in what the learner has derived from more direct forms of his own experience4 ,there is a tendency to connect material of the schoolroom simply with the material of prior school lessons1 instead of linking it to what the pupil has acquired in his out-of-school experience4 ,the teacher says1 ,do you not remember what we learned from the book last week8--instead of saying1 ,do you not recall such and such a thing that you have seen or heard8 ,as a result1 there are built up detached and independent systems of school knowledge that inertly overlay the ordinary systems of experience instead of reacting to enlarge and refine them4 ,pupils are taught to live in two separate worlds1 one the world of out-of-school experience1 the other the world of books and lessons4 ,,chapter ,,fifteen ,,the ,,recitation ,,and ,,the ,,training ,,of ,,thought ,sidenote3 ,importance of the recitation ,in the recitation the teacher comes into his closest contact with the pupil4 ,in the recitation focus the possibilities of guiding children's activities1 influencing their language habits1 and directing their observations4 ,in discussing the significance of the recitation as an instrumentality of education1 we are accordingly bringing to a head the points considered in the last three chapters1 rather than introducing a new topic4 ,the method in which the recitation is carried on is a crucial test of a teacher's skill in diagnosing the intellectual state of his pupils and in supplying the conditions that will arouse serviceable mental responses3 in short1 of his art as a teacher4 ,sidenote3 ,re-citing versus reflecting ,the use of the word recitation to designate the period of most intimate intellectual contact of teacher with pupil and pupil with pupil is a fateful fact4 ,to re-cite is to cite again1 to repeat1 to tell over and over4 ,if we were to call this period reiteration1 the designation would hardly bring out more clearly than does the word recitation1 the complete domination of instruction by rehearsing of secondhand information1 by memorizing for the sake of producing correct replies at the proper time4 ,everything that is said in this chapter is insignificant in comparison with the primary truth that the recitation is a place and time for stimulating and directing reflection1 and that reproducing memorized matter is only an incident--even though an indispensable incident--in the process of cultivating a thoughtful attitude4 ,sec4 #a4 ,the ,formal ,steps of ,instruction ,sidenote3 ,herbart's analysis of method of teaching ,but few attempts have been made to formulate a method1 resting on general principles1 of conducting a recitation4 ,one of these is of great importance and has probably had more and better influence upon the hearing of lessons than all others put together2 namely1 the analysis by ,herbart of a recitation into five successive steps4 ,the steps are commonly known as the formal steps of instruction4 ,the underlying notion is that no matter how subjects vary in scope and detail there is one and only one best way of mastering them1 since there is a single general method uniformly followed by the mind in effective attack upon any subject4 ,whether it be a first-grade child mastering the rudiments of number1 a grammar-school pupil studying history1 or a college student dealing with philology1 in each case the first step is preparation1 the second presentation1 followed in turn by comparison and generalization1 ending in the application of the generalizations to specific and new instances4 ,sidenote3 ,illustration of method ,by preparation is meant asking questions to remind pupils of familiar experiences of their own that will be useful in acquiring the new topic4 ,what one already knows supplies the means with which one apprehends the unknown4 ,hence the process of learning the new will be made easier if related ideas in the pupil's mind are aroused to activity--are brought to the foreground of consciousness4 ,when pupils take up the study of rivers1 they are first questioned about streams or brooks with which they are already acquainted2 if they have never seen any1 they may be asked about water running in gutters4 ,somehow apperceptive masses are stirred that will assist in getting hold of the new subject4 ,the step of preparation ends with statement of the aim of the lesson4 ,old knowledge having been made active1 new material is then presented to the pupils4 ,pictures and relief models of rivers are shown2 vivid oral descriptions are given2 if possible1 the children are taken to see an actual river4 ,these two steps terminate the acquisition of particular facts4 ,the next two steps are directed toward getting a general principle or conception4 ,the local river is compared with1 perhaps1 the ,amazon1 the ,st4 ,lawrence1 the ,rhine2 by this comparison accidental and unessential features are eliminated and the river concept is formed3 the elements involved in the river-meaning are gathered together and formulated4 ,this done1 the resulting principle is fixed in mind and is clarified by being applied to other streams1 say to the ,thames1 the ,po1 the ,connecticut4 ,sidenote3 ,comparison with our prior analysis of reflection ,if we compare this account of the methods of instruction with our own analysis of a complete operation of thinking1 we are struck by obvious resemblances4 ,in our statement 7compare ,chapter ,six7 the steps are the occurrence of a problem or a puzzling phenomenon2 then observation1 inspection of facts1 to locate and clear up the problem2 then the formation of a hypothesis or the suggestion of a possible solution together with its elaboration by reasoning2 then the testing of the elaborated idea by using it as a guide to new observations and experimentations4 ,in each account1 there is the sequence of 7i7 specific facts and events1 7ii7 ideas and reasonings1 and 7iii7 application of their result to specific facts4 ,in each case1 the movement is inductive-deductive4 ,we are struck also by one difference3 the ,herbartian method makes no reference to a difficulty1 a discrepancy requiring explanation1 as the origin and stimulus of the whole process4 ,as a consequence1 it often seems as if the ,herbartian method deals with thought simply as an incident in the process of acquiring information1 instead of treating the latter as an incident in the process of developing thought4 ,sidenote3 ,the formal steps concern the teacher's preparation rather than the recitation itself ,before following up this comparison in more detail1 we may raise the question whether the recitation should1 in any case1 follow a uniform prescribed series of steps--even if it be admitted that this series expresses the normal logical order4 ,in reply1 it may be said that just because the order is logical1 it represents the survey of subject-matter made by one who already understands it1 not the path of progress followed by a mind that is learning4 ,the former may describe a uniform straight-way course1 the latter must be a series of tacks1 of zigzag movements back and forth4 ,in short1 the formal steps indicate the points that should be covered by the teacher in preparing to conduct a recitation1 but should not prescribe the actual course of teaching4 ,sidenote3 ,the teacher's problem ,lack of any preparation on the part of a teacher leads1 of course1 to a random1 haphazard recitation1 its success depending on the inspiration of the moment1 which may or may not come4 ,preparation in simply the subject-matter conduces to a rigid order1 the teacher examining pupils on their exact knowledge of their text4 ,but the teacher's problem--as a teacher--does not reside in mastering a subject-matter1 but in adjusting a subject-matter to the nurture of thought4 ,now the formal steps indicate excellently well the questions a teacher should ask in working out the problem of teaching a topic4 ,what preparation have my pupils for attacking this subject8 ,what familiar experiences of theirs are available8 ,what have they already learned that will come to their assistance8 ,how shall ,i present the matter so as to fit economically and effectively into their present equipment8 ,what pictures shall ,i show8 ,to what objects shall ,i call their attention8 ,what incidents shall ,i relate8 ,what comparisons shall ,i lead them to draw1 what similarities to recognize8 ,what is the general principle toward which the whole discussion should point as its conclusion8 ,by what applications shall ,i try to fix1 to clear up1 and to make real their grasp of this general principle8 ,what activities of their own may bring it home to them as a genuinely significant principle8 ,sidenote3 ,only flexibility of procedure gives a recitation vitality ,sidenote3 ,any step may come first ,no teacher can fail to teach better if he has considered such questions somewhat systematically4 ,but the more the teacher has reflected upon pupils' probable intellectual response to a topic from the various stand-points indicated by the five formal steps1 the more he will be prepared to conduct the recitation in a flexible and free way1 and yet not let the subject go to pieces and the pupils' attention drift in all directions2 the less necessary will he find it1 in order to preserve a semblance of intellectual order1 to follow some one uniform scheme4 ,he will be ready to take advantage of any sign of vital response that shows itself from any direction4 ,one pupil may already have some inkling--probably erroneous--of a general principle4 ,application may then come at the very beginning in order to show that the principle will not work1 and thereby induce search for new facts and a new generalization4 ,or the abrupt presentation of some fact or object may so stimulate the minds of pupils as to render quite superfluous any preliminary preparation4 ,if pupils' minds are at work at all1 it is quite impossible that they should wait until the teacher has conscientiously taken them through the steps of preparation1 presentation1 and comparison before they form at least a working hypothesis or generalization4 ,moreover1 unless comparison of the familiar and the unfamiliar is introduced at the beginning1 both preparation and presentation will be aimless and without logical motive1 isolated1 and in so far meaningless4 ,the student's mind cannot be prepared at large1 but only for something in particular1 and presentation is usually the best way of evoking associations4 ,the emphasis may fall now on the familiar concept that will help grasp the new1 now on the new facts that frame the problem2 but in either case it is comparison and contrast with the other term of the pair which gives either its force4 ,in short1 to transfer the logical steps from the points that the teacher needs to consider to uniform successive steps in the conduct of a recitation1 is to impose the logical review of a mind that already understands the subject1 upon the mind that is struggling to comprehend it1 and thereby to obstruct the logic of the student's own mind4 ,sec4 #b4 ,the ,factors in the ,recitation ,bearing in mind that the formal steps represent intertwined factors of a student's progress and not mileposts on a beaten highway1 we may consider each by itself4 ,in so doing1 it will be convenient to follow the example of many of the ,herbartians and reduce the steps to three3 first1 the apprehension of specific or particular facts2 second1 rational generalization2 third1 application and verification4 ,sidenote3 ,preparation is getting the sense of a problem ,i4 ,the processes having to do with particular facts are preparation and presentation4 ,the best1 indeed the only preparation is arousal to a perception of something that needs explanation1 something unexpected1 puzzling1 peculiar4 ,when the feeling of a genuine perplexity lays hold of any mind 7no matter how the feeling arises71 that mind is alert and inquiring1 because stimulated from within4 ,the shock1 the bite1 of a question will force the mind to go wherever it is capable of going1 better than will the most ingenious pedagogical devices unaccompanied by this mental ardor4 ,it is the sense of a problem that forces the mind to a survey and recall of the past to discover what the question means and how it may be dealt with4 ,sidenote3 ,pitfalls in preparation ,the teacher in his more deliberate attempts to call into play the familiar elements in a student's experience1 must guard against certain dangers4 7i7 ,the step of preparation must not be too long continued or too exhaustive1 or it defeats its own end4 ,the pupil loses interest and is bored1 when a plunge in medias res might have braced him to his work4 ,the preparation part of the recitation period of some conscientious teachers reminds one of the boy who takes so long a run in order to gain headway for a jump that when he reaches the line1 he is too tired to jump far4 7ii7 ,the organs by which we apprehend new material are our habits4 ,to insist too minutely upon turning over habitual dispositions into conscious ideas is to interfere with their best workings4 ,some factors of familiar experience must indeed be brought to conscious recognition1 just as transplanting is necessary for the best growth of some plants4 ,but it is fatal to be forever digging up either experiences or plants to see how they are getting along4 ,constraint1 self-consciousness1 embarrassment1 are the consequence of too much conscious refurbishing of familiar experiences4 ,sidenote3 ,statement of aim of lesson ,strict ,herbartians generally lay it down that statement--by the teacher--of the aim of a lesson is an indispensable part of preparation4 ,this preliminary statement of the aim of the lesson hardly seems more intellectual in character1 however1 than tapping a bell or giving any other signal for attention and transfer of thoughts from diverting subjects4 ,to the teacher the statement of an end is significant1 because he has already been at the end2 from a pupil's standpoint the statement of what he is going to learn is something of an ,irish bull4 ,if the statement of the aim is taken too seriously by the instructor1 as meaning more than a signal to attention1 its probable result is forestalling the pupil's own reaction1 relieving him of the responsibility of developing a problem and thus arresting his mental initiative4 ,sidenote3 ,how much the teacher should tell or show ,it is unnecessary to discuss at length presentation as a factor in the recitation1 because our last chapter covered the topic under the captions of observation and communication4 ,the function of presentation is to supply materials that force home the nature of a problem and furnish suggestions for dealing with it4 ,the practical problem of the teacher is to preserve a balance between so little showing and telling as to fail to stimulate reflection and so much as to choke thought4 ,provided the student is genuinely engaged upon a topic1 and provided the teacher is willing to give the student a good deal of leeway as to what he assimilates and retains 7not requiring rigidly that everything be grasped or reproduced71 there is comparatively little danger that one who is himself enthusiastic will communicate too much concerning a topic4 ,sidenote3 ,the pupil's responsibility for making out a reasonable case ,,ii4 ,the distinctively rational phase of reflective inquiry consists1 as we have already seen1 in the elaboration of an idea1 or working hypothesis1 through conjoint comparison and contrast1 terminating in definition or formulation4 7i7 ,so far as the recitation is concerned1 the primary requirement is that the student be held responsible for working out mentally every suggested principle so as to show what he means by it1 how it bears upon the facts at hand1 and how the facts bear upon it4 ,unless the pupil is made responsible for developing on his own account the reasonableness of the guess he puts forth1 the recitation counts for practically nothing in the training of reasoning power4 ,a clever teacher easily acquires great skill in dropping out the inept and senseless contributions of pupils1 and in selecting and emphasizing those in line with the result he wishes to reach4 ,but this method 7sometimes called suggestive questioning7 relieves the pupils of intellectual responsibility1 save for acrobatic agility in following the teacher's lead4 ,sidenote3 ,the necessity for mental leisure 7ii7 ,the working over of a vague and more or less casual idea into coherent and definite form is impossible without a pause1 without freedom from distraction4 ,we say ,stop and think2 well1 all reflection involves1 at some point1 stopping external observations and reactions so that an idea may mature4 ,meditation1 withdrawal or abstraction from clamorous assailants of the senses and from demands for overt action1 is as necessary at the reasoning stage1 as are observation and experiment at other periods4 ,the metaphors of digestion and assimilation1 that so readily occur to mind in connection with rational elaboration1 are highly instructive4 ,a silent1 uninterrupted working-over of considerations by comparing and weighing alternative suggestions1 is indispensable for the development of coherent and compact conclusions4 ,reasoning is no more akin to disputing or arguing1 or to the abrupt seizing and dropping of suggestions1 than digestion is to a noisy champing of the jaws4 ,the teacher must secure opportunity for leisurely mental digestion4 ,sidenote3 ,a typical central object necessary 7iii7 ,in the process of comparison1 the teacher must avert the distraction that ensues from putting before the mind a number of facts on the same level of importance4 ,since attention is selective1 some one object normally claims thought and furnishes the center of departure and reference4 ,this fact is fatal to the success of the pedagogical methods that endeavor to conduct comparison on the basis of putting before the mind a row of objects of equal importance4 ,in comparing1 the mind does not naturally begin with objects a1 b1 c1 d1 and try to find the respect in which they agree4 ,it begins with a single object or situation more or less vague and inchoate in meaning1 and makes excursions to other objects in order to render understanding of the central object consistent and clear4 ,the mere multiplication of objects of comparison is adverse to successful reasoning4 ,each fact brought within the field of comparison should clear up some obscure feature or extend some fragmentary trait of the primary object4 ,sidenote3 ,importance of types ,in short1 pains should be taken to see that the object on which thought centers is typical3 material being typical when1 although individual or specific1 it is such as readily and fruitfully suggests the principles of an entire class of facts4 ,no sane person begins to think about rivers wholesale or at large4 ,he begins with the one river that has presented some puzzling trait4 ,then he studies other rivers to get light upon the baffling features of this one1 and at the same time he employs the characteristic traits of his original object to reduce to order the multifarious details that appear in connection with other rivers4 ,this working back and forth preserves unity of meaning1 while protecting it from monotony and narrowness4 ,contrast1 unlikeness1 throws significant features into relief1 and these become instruments for binding together into an organized or coherent meaning dissimilar characters4 ,the mind is defended against the deadening influence of many isolated particulars and also against the barrenness of a merely formal principle4 ,particular cases and properties supply emphasis and concreteness2 general principles convert the particulars into a single system4 ,sidenote3 ,all insight into meaning effects generalization 7iv7 ,hence generalization is not a separate and single act2 it is rather a constant tendency and function of the entire discussion or recitation4 ,every step forward toward an idea that comprehends1 that explains1 that unites what was isolated and therefore puzzling1 generalizes4 ,the little child generalizes as truly as the adolescent or adult1 even though he does not arrive at the same generalities4 ,if he is studying a river basin1 his knowledge is generalized in so far as the various details that he apprehends are found to be the effects of a single force1 as that of water pushing downward from gravity1 or are seen to be successive stages of a single history of formation4 ,even if there were acquaintance with only one river1 knowledge of it under such conditions would be generalized knowledge4 ,sidenote3 ,insight into meaning requires formulation ,the factor of formulation1 of conscious stating1 involved in generalization1 should also be a constant function1 not a single formal act4 ,definition means essentially the growth of a meaning out of vagueness into definiteness4 ,such final verbal definition as takes place should be only the culmination of a steady growth in distinctness4 ,in the reaction against ready-made verbal definitions and rules1 the pendulum should never swing to the opposite extreme1 that of neglecting to summarize the net meaning that emerges from dealing with particular facts4 ,only as general summaries are made from time to time does the mind reach a conclusion or a resting place2 and only as conclusions are reached is there an intellectual deposit available in future understanding4 ,sidenote3 ,generalization means capacity for application to the new ,,iii4 ,as the last words indicate1 application and generalization lie close together4 ,mechanical skill for further use may be achieved without any explicit recognition of a principle2 nay1 in routine and narrow technical matters1 conscious formulation may be a hindrance4 ,but without recognition of a principle1 without generalization1 the power gained cannot be transferred to new and dissimilar matters4 ,the inherent significance of generalization is that it frees a meaning from local restrictions2 rather1 generalization is meaning so freed2 it is meaning emancipated from accidental features so as to be available in new cases4 ,the surest test for detecting a spurious generalization 7a statement general in verbal form but not accompanied by discernment of meaning71 is the failure of the so-called principle spontaneously to extend itself4 ,the essence of the general is application4 7,ante1 p4 #bi47 ,sidenote3 ,fossilized versus flexible principles ,the true purpose of exercises that apply rules and principles is1 then1 not so much to drive or drill them in as to give adequate insight into an idea or principle4 ,to treat application as a separate final step is disastrous4 ,in every judgment some meaning is employed as a basis for estimating and interpreting some fact2 by this application the meaning is itself enlarged and tested4 ,when the general meaning is regarded as complete in itself1 application is treated as an external1 non-intellectual use to which1 for practical purposes alone1 it is advisable to put the meaning4 ,the principle is one self-contained thing2 its use is another and independent thing4 ,when this divorce occurs1 principles become fossilized and rigid2 they lose their inherent vitality1 their self-impelling power4 ,sidenote3 ,self-application a mark of genuine principles ,a true conception is a moving idea1 and it seeks outlet1 or application to the interpretation of particulars and the guidance of action1 as naturally as water runs downhill4 ,in fine1 just as reflective thought requires particular facts of observation and events of action for its origination1 so it also requires particular facts and deeds for its own consummation4 ,glittering generalities are inert because they are spurious4 ,application is as much an intrinsic part of genuine reflective inquiry as is alert observation or reasoning itself4 ,truly general principles tend to apply themselves4 ,the teacher needs1 indeed1 to supply conditions favorable to use and exercise2 but something is wrong when artificial tasks have arbitrarily to be invented in order to secure application for principles4 ,,chapter ,,sixteen ,,some ,,general ,,conclusions ,we shall conclude our survey of how we think and how we should think by presenting some factors of thinking which should balance each other1 but which constantly tend to become so isolated that they work against each other instead of cooperating to make reflective inquiry efficient4 ,sec4 #a4 ,the ,unconscious and the ,conscious ,sidenote3 ,the understood as the unconsciously assumed ,it is significant that one meaning of the term understood is something so thoroughly mastered1 so completely agreed upon1 as to be assumed2 that is to say1 taken as a matter of course without explicit statement4 ,the familiar goes without saying means it is understood4 ,if two persons can converse intelligently with each other1 it is because a common experience supplies a background of mutual understanding upon which their respective remarks are projected4 ,to dig up and to formulate this common background would be imbecile2 it is understood2 that is1 it is silently supplied and implied as the taken-for-granted medium of intelligent exchange of ideas4 ,sidenote3 ,inquiry as conscious formulation ,if1 however1 the two persons find themselves at cross-purposes1 it is necessary to dig up and compare the presuppositions1 the implied context1 on the basis of which each is speaking4 ,the implicit is made explicit2 what was unconsciously assumed is exposed to the light of conscious day4 ,in this way1 the root of the misunderstanding is removed4 ,some such rhythm of the unconscious and the conscious is involved in all fruitful thinking4 ,a person in pursuing a consecutive train of thoughts takes some system of ideas for granted 7which accordingly he leaves unexpressed1 unconscious7 as surely as he does in conversing with others4 ,some context1 some situation1 some controlling purpose dominates his explicit ideas so thoroughly that it does not need to be consciously formulated and expounded4 ,explicit thinking goes on within the limits of what is implied or understood4 ,yet the fact that reflection originates in a problem makes it necessary at some points consciously to inspect and examine this familiar background4 ,we have to turn upon some unconscious assumption and make it explicit4 ,sidenote3 ,rules cannot be given for attaining a balance ,no rules can be laid down for attaining the due balance and rhythm of these two phases of mental life4 ,no ordinance can prescribe at just what point the spontaneous working of some unconscious attitude and habit is to be checked till we have made explicit what is implied in it4 ,no one can tell in detail just how far the analytic inspection and formulation are to be carried4 ,we can say that they must be carried far enough so that the individual will know what he is about and be able to guide his thinking2 but in a given case just how far is that8 ,we can say that they must be carried far enough to detect and guard against the source of some false perception or reasoning1 and to get a leverage on the investigation2 but such statements only restate the original difficulty4 ,since our reliance must be upon the disposition and tact of the individual in the particular case1 there is no test of the success of an education more important than the extent to which it nurtures a type of mind competent to maintain an economical balance of the unconscious and the conscious4 ,sidenote3 ,the over-analytic to be avoided ,the ways of teaching criticised in the foregoing pages as false analytic methods of instruction 7ante1 p4 #aab71 all reduce themselves to the mistake of directing explicit attention and formulation to what would work better if left an unconscious attitude and working assumption4 ,to pry into the familiar1 the usual1 the automatic1 simply for the sake of making it conscious1 simply for the sake of formulating it1 is both an impertinent interference1 and a source of boredom4 ,to be forced to dwell consciously upon the accustomed is the essence of ennui2 to pursue methods of instruction that have that tendency is deliberately to cultivate lack of interest4 ,sidenote3 ,the detection of error1 the clinching of truth1 demand conscious statement ,on the other hand1 what has been said in criticism of merely routine forms of skill1 what has been said about the importance of having a genuine problem1 of introducing the novel1 and of reaching a deposit of general meaning weighs on the other side of the scales4 ,it is as fatal to good thinking to fail to make conscious the standing source of some error or failure as it is to pry needlessly into what works smoothly4 ,to over-simplify1 to exclude the novel for the sake of prompt skill1 to avoid obstacles for the sake of averting errors1 is as detrimental as to try to get pupils to formulate everything they know and to state every step of the process employed in getting a result4 ,where the shoe pinches1 analytic examination is indicated4 ,when a topic is to be clinched so that knowledge of it will carry over into an effective resource in further topics1 conscious condensation and summarizing are imperative4 ,in the early stage of acquaintance with a subject1 a good deal of unconstrained unconscious mental play about it may be permitted1 even at the risk of some random experimenting2 in the later stages1 conscious formulation and review may be encouraged4 ,projection and reflection1 going directly ahead and turning back in scrutiny1 should alternate4 ,unconsciousness gives spontaneity and freshness2 consciousness1 conviction and control4 ,sec4 #b4 ,process and ,product ,sidenote3 ,play and work again ,a like balance in mental life characterizes process and product4 ,we met one important phase of this adjustment in considering play and work4 ,in play1 interest centers in activity1 without much reference to its outcome4 ,the sequence of deeds1 images1 emotions1 suffices on its own account4 ,in work1 the end holds attention and controls the notice given to means4 ,since the difference is one of direction of interest1 the contrast is one of emphasis1 not of cleavage4 ,when comparative prominence in consciousness of activity or outcome is transformed into isolation of one from the other1 play degenerates into fooling1 and work into drudgery4 ,sidenote3 ,play should not be fooling1 ,by fooling we understand a series of disconnected temporary overflows of energy dependent upon whim and accident4 ,when all reference to outcome is eliminated from the sequence of ideas and acts that make play1 each member of the sequence is cut loose from every other and becomes fantastic1 arbitrary1 aimless2 mere fooling follows4 ,there is some inveterate tendency to fool in children as well as in animals2 nor is the tendency wholly evil1 for at least it militates against falling into ruts4 ,but when it is excessive in amount1 dissipation and disintegration follow2 and the only way of preventing this consequence is to make regard for results enter into even the freest play activity4 ,sidenote3 nor work1 drudgery ,exclusive interest in the result alters work to drudgery4 ,for by drudgery is meant those activities in which the interest in the outcome does not suffuse the means of getting the result4 ,whenever a piece of work becomes drudgery1 the process of doing loses all value for the doer2 he cares solely for what is to be had at the end of it4 ,the work itself1 the putting forth of energy1 is hateful2 it is just a necessary evil1 since without it some important end would be missed4 ,now it is a commonplace that in the work of the world many things have to be done the doing of which is not intrinsically very interesting4 ,however1 the argument that children should be kept doing drudgery-tasks because thereby they acquire power to be faithful to distasteful duties1 is wholly fallacious4 ,repulsion1 shirking1 and evasion are the consequences of having the repulsive imposed--not loyal love of duty4 ,willingness to work for ends by means of acts not naturally attractive is best attained by securing such an appreciation of the value of the end that a sense of its value is transferred to its means of accomplishment4 ,not interesting in themselves1 they borrow interest from the result with which they are associated4 ,sidenote3 ,balance of playfulness and seriousness the intellectual ideal ,sidenote3 ,free play of mind ,sidenote3 is normal in childhood ,the intellectual harm accruing from divorce of work and play1 product and process1 is evidenced in the proverb1 ,all work and no play makes ,jack a dull boy4 ,that the obverse is true is perhaps sufficiently signalized in the fact that fooling is so near to foolishness4 ,to be playful and serious at the same time is possible1 and it defines the ideal mental condition4 ,absence of dogmatism and prejudice1 presence of intellectual curiosity and flexibility1 are manifest in the free play of the mind upon a topic4 ,to give the mind this free play is not to encourage toying with a subject1 but is to be interested in the unfolding of the subject on its own account1 apart from its subservience to a preconceived belief or habitual aim4 ,mental play is open-mindedness1 faith in the power of thought to preserve its own integrity without external supports and arbitrary restrictions4 ,hence free mental play involves seriousness1 the earnest following of the development of subject-matter4 ,it is incompatible with carelessness or flippancy1 for it exacts accurate noting of every result reached in order that every conclusion may be put to further use4 ,what is termed the interest in truth for its own sake is certainly a serious matter1 yet this pure interest in truth coincides with love of the free play of thought4 ,in spite of many appearances to the contrary--usually due to social conditions of either undue superfluity that induces idle fooling or undue economic pressure that compels drudgery--childhood normally realizes the ideal of conjoint free mental play and thoughtfulness4 ,successful portrayals of children have always made their wistful intentness at least as obvious as their lack of worry for the morrow4 ,to live in the present is compatible with condensation of far-reaching meanings in the present4 ,such enrichment of the present for its own sake is the just heritage of childhood and the best insurer of future growth4 ,the child forced into premature concern with economic remote results may develop a surprising sharpening of wits in a particular direction1 but this precocious specialization is always paid for by later apathy and dullness4 ,sidenote3 ,the attitude of the artist ,that art originated in play is a common saying4 ,whether or not the saying is historically correct1 it suggests that harmony of mental playfulness and seriousness describes the artistic ideal4 ,when the artist is preoccupied overmuch with means and materials1 he may achieve wonderful technique1 but not the artistic spirit par excellence4 ,when the animating idea is in excess of the command of method1 aesthetic feeling may be indicated1 but the art of presentation is too defective to express the feeling thoroughly4 ,when the thought of the end becomes so adequate that it compels translation into the means that embody it1 or when attention to means is inspired by recognition of the end they serve1 we have the attitude typical of the artist1 an attitude that may be displayed in all activities1 even though not conventionally designated arts4 ,sidenote3 ,the art of the teacher culminates in nurturing this attitude ,that teaching is an art and the true teacher an artist is a familiar saying4 ,now the teacher's own claim to rank as an artist is measured by his ability to foster the attitude of the artist in those who study with him1 whether they be youth or little children4 ,some succeed in arousing enthusiasm1 in communicating large ideas1 in evoking energy4 ,so far1 well2 but the final test is whether the stimulus thus given to wider aims succeeds in transforming itself into power1 that is to say1 into the attention to detail that ensures mastery over means of execution4 ,if not1 the zeal flags1 the interest dies out1 the ideal becomes a clouded memory4 ,other teachers succeed in training facility1 skill1 mastery of the technique of subjects4 ,again it is well--so far4 ,but unless enlargement of mental vision1 power of increased discrimination of final values1 a sense for ideas--for principles--accompanies this training1 forms of skill ready to be put indifferently to any end may be the result4 ,such modes of technical skill may display themselves1 according to circumstances1 as cleverness in serving self-interest1 as docility in carrying out the purposes of others1 or as unimaginative plodding in ruts4 ,to nurture inspiring aim and executive means into harmony with each other is at once the difficulty and the reward of the teacher4 ,sec4 #c4 ,the ,far and the ,near ,sidenote3 ,familiarity breeds contempt1 ,teachers who have heard that they should avoid matters foreign to pupils' experience1 are frequently surprised to find pupils wake up when something beyond their ken is introduced1 while they remain apathetic in considering the familiar4 ,in geography1 the child upon the plains seems perversely irresponsive to the intellectual charms of his local environment1 and fascinated by whatever concerns mountains or the sea4 ,teachers who have struggled with little avail to extract from pupils essays describing the details of things with which they are well acquainted1 sometimes find them eager to write on lofty or imaginary themes4 ,a woman of education1 who has recorded her experience as a factory worker1 tried retelling ,little ,women to some factory girls during their working hours4 ,they cared little for it1 saying1 ,those girls had no more interesting experience than we have1 and demanded stories of millionaires and society leaders4 ,a man interested in the mental condition of those engaged in routine labor asked a ,scotch girl in a cotton factory what she thought about all day4 ,she replied that as soon as her mind was free from starting the machinery1 she married a duke1 and their fortunes occupied her for the remainder of the day4 ,sidenote3 since only the novel demands attention1 ,naturally1 these incidents are not told in order to encourage methods of teaching that appeal to the sensational1 the extraordinary1 or the incomprehensible4 ,they are told1 however1 to enforce the point that the familiar and the near do not excite or repay thought on their own account1 but only as they are adjusted to mastering the strange and remote4 ,it is a commonplace of psychology that we do not attend to the old1 nor consciously mind that to which we are thoroughly accustomed4 ,for this1 there is good reason3 to devote attention to the old1 when new circumstances are constantly arising to which we should adjust ourselves1 would be wasteful and dangerous4 ,thought must be reserved for the new1 the precarious1 the problematic4 ,hence the mental constraint1 the sense of being lost1 that comes to pupils when they are invited to turn their thoughts upon that with which they are already familiar4 ,the old1 the near1 the accustomed1 is not that to which but that with which we attend2 it does not furnish the material of a problem1 but of its solution4 ,sidenote3 which1 in turn1 can be given only through the old ,the last sentence has brought us to the balancing of new and old1 of the far and that close by1 involved in reflection4 ,the more remote supplies the stimulus and the motive2 the nearer at hand furnishes the point of approach and the available resources4 ,this principle may also be stated in this form3 the best thinking occurs when the easy and the difficult are duly proportioned to each other4 ,the easy and the familiar are equivalents1 as are the strange and the difficult4 ,too much that is easy gives no ground for inquiry2 too much of the hard renders inquiry hopeless4 ,sidenote3 ,the given and the suggested ,the necessity of the interaction of the near and the far follows directly from the nature of thinking4 ,where there is thought1 something present suggests and indicates something absent4 ,accordingly unless the familiar is presented under conditions that are in some respect unusual1 it gives no jog to thinking1 it makes no demand upon what is not present in order to be understood4 ,and if the subject presented is totally strange1 there is no basis upon which it may suggest anything serviceable for its comprehension4 ,when a person first has to do with fractions1 for example1 they will be wholly baffling so far as they do not signify to him some relation that he has already mastered in dealing with whole numbers4 ,when fractions have become thoroughly familiar1 his perception of them acts simply as a signal to do certain things2 they are a substitute sign1 to which he can react without thinking4 7,ante1 p4 #agh47 ,if1 nevertheless1 the situation as a whole presents something novel and hence uncertain1 the entire response is not mechanical1 because this mechanical operation is put to use in solving a problem4 ,there is no end to this spiral process3 foreign subject-matter transformed through thinking into a familiar possession becomes a resource for judging and assimilating additional foreign subject-matter4 ,sidenote3 ,observation supplies the near1 imagination the remote ,the need for both imagination and observation in every mental enterprise illustrates another aspect of the same principle4 ,teachers who have tried object-lessons of the conventional type have usually found that when the lessons were new1 pupils were attracted to them as a diversion1 but as soon as they became matters of course they were as dull and wearisome as was ever the most mechanical study of mere symbols4 ,imagination could not play about the objects so as to enrich them4 ,the feeling that instruction in facts1 facts produces a narrow ,gradgrind is justified not because facts in themselves are limiting1 but because facts are dealt out as such hard and fast ready-made articles as to leave no room to imagination4 ,let the facts be presented so as to stimulate imagination1 and culture ensues naturally enough4 ,the converse is equally true4 ,the imaginative is not necessarily the imaginary2 that is1 the unreal4 ,the proper function of imagination is vision of realities that cannot be exhibited under existing conditions of sense-perception4 ,clear insight into the remote1 the absent1 the obscure is its aim4 ,history1 literature1 and geography1 the principles of science1 nay1 even geometry and arithmetic1 are full of matters that must be imaginatively realized if they are realized at all4 ,imagination supplements and deepens observation2 only when it turns into the fanciful does it become a substitute for observation and lose logical force4 ,sidenote3 ,experience through communication of others' experience ,a final exemplification of the required balance between near and far is found in the relation that obtains between the narrower field of experience realized in an individual's own contact with persons and things1 and the wider experience of the race that may become his through communication4 ,instruction always runs the risk of swamping the pupil's own vital1 though narrow1 experience under masses of communicated material4 ,the instructor ceases and the teacher begins at the point where communicated matter stimulates into fuller and more significant life that which has entered by the strait and narrow gate of sense-perception and motor activity4 ,genuine communication involves contagion2 its name should not be taken in vain by terming communication that which produces no community of thought and purpose between the child and the race of which he is the heir4 ,,index ,abstract1 #ace-add ,abstraction1 #aee f4 ,action1 activity1 activities1 #df1 #adj f41 #aeg-afi1 #aij f4 ,active attitude and the concept1 #abh ,analysis1 #aaa-aae1 #aeb f42 in education1 #aab ,apperception1 #aii2 apperceptive masses1 #bjc ,application1 #abi f41 #bab f4 ,apprehension1 #aai f42 see ,understanding4 ,artist1 attitude of1 #bai f4 ,articulation1 #c ,authority1 #d1 #be ,bacon1 #bb1 #be1 #cc ,bain1 #aee ,balance1 #ch ,behavior1 #e1 #db-d1 #ed f42 see ,action1 ,occupations ,belief1 #a1 #c-g2 reached indirectly1 #ah ,central factor in thinking1 #g ,children1 #db f4 ,clifford1 #adh ,coherence1 #c1 #hj ,comparison1 #hi f41 #bjb ,comprehension1 #abj2 see ,understanding4 ,concentration1 #dj ,concept1 conception1 #ajg1 #abe-i1 #bac2 see ,meaning4 ,conclusion1 #c1 #e f41 #dj1 #gg1 #hj f42 technique of1 #hg f4 ,concrete1 #ace-dd ,congruity1 #c1 #gb ,connection1 #g2 see ,relation4 ,consecutive1 #b1 #dj1 #db ,consequence1 consequential1 #b2 consequences1 #e ,consistency1 #dj ,continuity1 #c1 #dj1 #hj ,control1 #ah-bh2 of deduction1 #ic-ajj2 of induction1 #hd-ic2 of suggestion1 #hd f41 #ic2 see ,regulation4 ,corroborate1 corroboration1 #i1 #gg ,curiosity1 #ca ff41 #aje ,darwin1 #ch1 #ij1 #abg ,data1 #gi f41 #ie1 #ajc f41 #ajf ,decision1 #ajg ,deduction1 #gi1 #ic-ajj1 #ajc2 control of1 #ic-ajj ,definition1 #acj f42 definitions1 #aca-d1 #bab ,development1 of ideas1 #hc2 see ,elaboration1 ,ratiocination1 ,reasoning4 ,discipline1 #fc1 #gh2 formal1 #de1 #ej ,discourse1 consecutive1 #ahe f4 ,discovery1 inductive1 #ha1 #aaf ,division1 #aca ,dogmatism1 #adi1 #aih ,doing1 #aci1 #aij ,doubt1 #f1 #i1 #ac1 #ajb2 see ,perplexity1 ,uncertainty4 ,drill1 #eb1 #fc ,drudgery1 #bah ,education1 intellectual1 #eg1 #fb2 aim of1 #adc f41 #aef ,elaboration1 of ideas1 #ge f41 #hd1 #id f41 #ajc1 #ajf1 #bji2 see ,development1 ,ratiocination1 ,reasoning4 ,emerson1 #agc ,emotion1 #d1 #aa1 #gd ,emphasis1 #aab1 #aad f4 ,empirical thinking1 #ade-i ,end1 #aa f4 ,evidence1 #e1 #g f41 #bg1 #ajc f42 see ,grounds4 ,experience1 #acb1 #aef1 #aii f41 #bbd ,experiment1 experimental1 #gj f41 #gg1 #ia f41 #ii f41 #aea f41 #aed ,extension1 #acj f4 ,fact vs idea1 #aji2 facts1 #c1 #e ,faculty psychology1 #de ,familiar1 familiarity1 #abj-be1 #acf f41 #bjf1 #bad f41 #bba f4 ,fooling1 #bag ,formalism2 see ,discipline4 ,formal steps of instruction1 #bjb1 #bjf ,formulation1 #aab f41 #bji1 #bab1 #bad-ag ,freedom1 #fd f42 intellectual1 #ff ,function1 #abc2 function of signifying1 #g1 #ae ,general #hj1 #hb1 #ii1 #ahb f42 see ,principles1 ,universal4 ,generality1 #abi1 #acd ,generalization1 #baa f4 ,grounds1 #a1 #d-h1 #hj2 see ,evidence4 ,guiding factor in reflection1 #aa ,habits2 see ,action4 ,herbart1 #bjb ,herbartian method1 #bjb-f ,hobhouse1 #ca ,hypothesis1 #e1 #ge1 #gg1 #ha f41 #id f41 #ajh1 #bji ,idea1 #ge1 #gg1 #gi1 #ajg-aj2 see ,meaning4 ,idle thinking1 #b ,image1 #aji ,imagination1 #afe f41 #bbc f4 ,imitation1 #dg1 #ea1 #afj ,implication1 #e1 #ge1 #gg ,impulse1 #fd ,induction1 #gi-ic1 #ajc2 control of1 #hd-ic2 scientific1 #hf ,inference1 #bf f41 #ge1 #gg1 #aja2 critical1 #gd1 #hb2 systematic1 #ha ,information1 #eb f41 #aig-bjj ,inquiry1 #e1 #i f4 ,intellect1 intellectual activity1 #dd1 #ej1 #fb ,intension1 #acj f4 ,internal congruity1 #c ,isolation1 #if-ajj1 #aag1 #aia ,james1 #aai1 #aba1 #aec f4 ,jevons1 #ia f41 #ahc1 #aib ,judgment1 #e2 factors of1 #aja2 good judgment1 #aja1 #ajc1 #ajf f42 and inference1 #aja ff42 intuitive1 #ajd f42 principles of1 #ajf f42 suspended1 #gd1 #hb1 #aje1 #ajh2 tentative1 #aja ,knowledge1 #c f41 #f1 #ie2 spiral movement of1 #abj1 #bbc ,language1 #agj-hg2 and education1 #agf-hg2 and meaning1 #aga2 technical1 #ahd f42 as a tool of thought1 #agj ff41 #agi ,leap1 in inference1 #bf1 #ge ,leisure1 #bji f4 ,locke1 #ai n41 #bb-e ,logical1 #ef f42 vs4 psychological1 #fb f4 ,meaning1 meanings1 #g1 #ag1 #gi f41 #hb1 #id1 #aaf-cd2 capital fund of1 store of1 #aah1 #abj1 #abf1 #afa1 #agd1 #ahj2 individual1 #agc f42 organization of1 #age1 #ahe2 as tools1 keys1 instruments1 #ajh f41 #abj1 #abe f41 #abi2 ,see 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