,,determinism ,,or ,,free-,,will8 ,printed and ,published by ,,the ,,pioneer ,,press 7,g4 ,w4 ,,foote ,,co41 ,,ltd471 #fa ,farringdon ,street1 ,london1 ,e4,c4 #d4 ,determinism ,,or ,free-,will8 ,,by ,,chapman ,,cohen4 ,new ,edition4 ,revised and ,enlarged4 ,,london3 ,,the ,,pioneer ,,press1 #fa ,,farringdon ,,street1 ,e4,c4 #d4 #aiai4 ,,contents4 ,,chapter ,,page ,i4--,,the ,,question ,,stated #i ,,ii4--,,freedom ,,and ,,will #bc ,,iii4--,,consciousness1 ,,deliberation1 ,,and ,,choice #cf ,,iv4--,,some ,,alleged ,,consequences ,,of ,,determinism #ej ,v4--,,professor ,,james ,,on ,,the ,,dilemma ,,of ,,determinism #fc ,,vi4--,,the ,,nature ,,and ,,implications ,,of ,,responsibility #gf ,,vii4--,,determinism ,,and ,,character #ib ,,viii4--,a ,,problem ,,in ,,determinism #aja ,,ix4--,,environment #aag ,,preface ,,to ,,new ,,edition4 ,the demand for a new edition of ,determinism or ,free-,will is gratifying as affording evidence of the existence of a public1 apart from the class catered for by more expensive publications1 interested in philosophic questions#a4 ,it was1 indeed1 in the conviction that such a public existed that the book was written4 ,capacity1 in spite of a popular impression to the contrary1 has no very close relation to cash1 nor is interest in philosophic questions indicated solely by the ability to spend a half-guinea or guinea on a work that might well have been published at three or four shillings4 ,there exists a fairly large public of sufficient capacity and education intelligently to discuss the deeper aspects of life1 but which has neither time nor patience to give to the study of bulky works that so often leave a subject more obscure at the end than it was at the beginning4 #a ,when the ,mss4 of this work was submitted to a well-known firm of publishers1 the reply came in the form of an offer to publish the work provided it could be expanded so as to admit of its publication at #g_/f4 ,it would have been quite easy to have done this2 the difficulty is to compress1 and the less a subject is understood the easier it is to write at length on it4 ,but the offer1 though financially tempting1 would have defeated the purpose for which the work was written1 and so was declined4 ,nor does there appear any adequate reason why it should be otherwise4 ,a sane philosophy must base itself on the common things of life1 and must deal with the common experience of all men4 ,the man who cannot find material for philosophic study by reflecting on those which are near at hand is not likely to achieve success by travelling all over the globe4 ,he will only succeed in presenting to his readers a more elaborately acquired and a more expensively gained confusion4 ,nor is there any reason why philosophy should be discussed only in the jargon of the schools1 except to keep it1 like the religious mysteries1 the property of the initiated few4 ,we all talk philosophy1 as we all talk prose1 and doubtless many are as surprised as was ,m4 ,jourdain1 when the fact is pointed out to them4 ,so whatever merit this little work has is chiefly due to the avoidance1 so far as possible1 of a stereotyped phraseology1 and to the elimination of irrelevant matter that has gathered round the subject4 ,the present writer has long had the conviction that the great need in the discussion of ethical and psychological questions is their restatement in the simplest possible terms4 ,the most difficult thing that faces the newcomer to these questions is to find out what they are really all about4 ,writer follows writer1 each apparently more concerned to discuss what others have said than to deal with a straightforward discussion of the subject itself4 ,imposing as this method may be1 it is fatal to enlightenment4 ,for the longer the discussion continues the farther away from the original question it seems to get4 ,one has heard of ,the ,religion of ,philosophy1 and its acquisition of obscurity in thought and prolixity in language seems to have gone some distance towards earning the title4 ,being neither anxious to parade the extent of my reading1 nor greatly overawed by the large number of eminent men who have written on the subject1 ,i decided that what was needed was a plain statement of the problem itself4 ,my concern1 therefore1 has been to keep out all that has not a direct bearing on the essential question1 and only to deal with other writers so far as a discussion of what they say may help to make plain the point at issue4 ,if the result does not carry conviction it at least makes clear the ground of disagreement4 ,and that is certainly something gained4 ,moreover1 there is a real need for a clearing away of all the verbal lumber that has been allowed to gather round subjects concerning which intelligent men and women will think even though they may be unable to reach reliable or satisfactory conclusions4 ,and ,i have good grounds for believing that so far this little work has achieved the purpose for which it was written4 ,if ,i may say it without being accused of conceit1 it has made the subject clear to many who before found it incomprehensible4 ,and1 really1 philosophy would not be so very obscure1 if it were not for the philosophers4 ,we may not always be able to find answers to our questions1 but we ought always to understand what the questions are about4 ,that it is not always the case is largely due to those who mistake obscurity for profundity1 and in their haste to rise from the ground lose altogether their touch with the earth4 ,c4 ,c4 ,,determinism ,,or ,,free-,,will8 ,i4 ,,the ,,question ,,stated4 ,at the tail end of a lengthy series of writers1 from ,augustine to ,martineau1 and from ,spinoza to ,william ,james1 one might well be excused the assumption that nothing new remains to be said on so well-worn a topic as that of ,free-,will4 ,against this1 however1 lies the feeling that in the case of any subject which continuously absorbs attention some service to the cause of truth is rendered by a re-statement of the problem in contemporary language1 with such modifications in terminology as may be necessary1 and with such illustrations from current positive knowledge as may serve to make the issue clear to a new generation4 ,in the course of time new words are created1 while old ones change their meanings and implications4 ,this results not only in the terminology of a few generations back taking on the character of a dead language to the average contemporary reader1 but may occasion the not unusual spectacle of disputants using words with such widely different meanings that even a clear comprehension of the question at issue becomes impossible4 ,so much may be assumed without directly controverting or endorsing ,professor ,paulsen's opinion that the ,free-,will problem is one which arose under certain conditions and has disappeared with the disappearance of those conditions2 or the opposite opinion of ,professor ,william ,james that there is no other subject on which an inventive genius has a better chance of breaking new ground4 ,if mankind--even educated mankind--were composed of individuals whose brains functioned with the accuracy of the most approved text-books of logic1 ,professor ,paulsen's opinion would be self-evidently true4 ,granting that the conditions which gave rise to the belief in ,free-,will have disappeared1 the belief itself should have disappeared likewise4 ,professor ,paulsen's own case proves that he is either wrong in thinking that these conditions have disappeared1 or in assuming that1 this being the case1 the belief has also died out4 ,the truth is that beliefs do not always1 or even usually1 die with the conditions that gave them birth4 ,society always has on hand a plentiful stock of beliefs that are1 like so many intellectual vagrants1 without visible means of support4 ,human history would not present the clash and conflict of opinion it does were it otherwise4 ,indeed1 if a belief is in possession its ejection is the most difficult of all operations4 ,possession is here not merely nine points of the law1 it is often all the law that is acknowledged4 ,beliefs once established acquire an independent vitality of their own1 and may defy all destructive efforts for generations4 ,one may1 therefore1 agree with the first half of ,professor ,paulsen's statement without endorsing the concluding portion4 ,the problem has not1 so far as the generality of civilized mankind is concerned1 disappeared4 ,the originating conditions have gone1 but the belief remains1 and its real nature and value can only be rightly estimated by a mental reconstruction of the conditions that gave it birth4 ,as ,spencer has reminded us1 the pedigree of a belief is as important as is the pedigree of a horse4 ,we cannot be really certain whether a belief is with us because of its social value1 or because of sheer unreasoning conservatism1 until we know something of its history4 ,in any case we understand better both it and the human nature that gives it hospitality by knowing its ancestry4 ,and of this truth no subject could better offer an illustration than the one under discussion4 ,reserving this point for a moment1 let us ask1 ,what is the essential issue between the believers in ,free-,will and the upholders of the doctrine of ,determinism8 ,one may put the ,deterministic position in a few words4 ,essentially it is a thorough-going application of the principle of causation to human nature4 ,what ,copernicus and ,kepler did for the world of astronomy1 ,determinism aims at doing for the world of psychological phenomena4 ,human nature1 it asserts1 is part and parcel of nature as a whole1 and bears to it the same relation that a part does to the whole4 ,when the ,determinist refers to the ,order of ,nature he includes all1 and asserts that an accurate analysis of human nature will be found to exemplify the same principle of causation that is seen to obtain elsewhere4 ,true1 mental phenomena have laws of their own1 as chemistry and biology have their own peculiar laws1 but these are additional1 not contradictory to other natural laws4 ,any exception to this is apparent1 not real4 ,man's nature1 physical1 biological1 psychological1 and sociological1 is to be studied as we study other natural phenomena1 and the closer our study the clearer the recognition that its manifestations are dependent upon processes with which no one dreams of associating the conception of freedom4 ,determinism asserts that if we knew the quality and inclination of all the forces bearing upon human nature1 in the same way that we know the forces determining the motions of a planet1 then the forecasting of conduct would become a mere problem in moral mathematics4 ,that we cannot do this1 nor may ever be able to do it1 is due to the enormous and ever-changing complexity of the forces that determine conduct4 ,but this ought not to blind us to the general truth of the principle involved4 ,to some extent we do forecast human conduct2 that we cannot always do so1 or cannot do so completely1 only proves weakness or ignorance4 ,the ,determinist claims1 therefore1 that his view of human nature is thoroughly scientific1 and that he is only applying here principles that have borne such excellent fruit elsewhere2 and1 finally1 that unless this view of human nature be accepted the scientific cultivation of character becomes an impossibility4 ,so far the ,determinist4 ,the believer in ,free-,will--for the future it will be briefer and more convenient to use the term ,volitionist or ,indeterminist--does not on his part deny the influence on the human organism of those forces on which the ,determinist lays stress4 ,what he denies is that any of them singly1 or all of them collectively1 can ever furnish an adequate and exhaustive account of human action4 ,he affirms that after analysis has done its utmost there remains an unexplained residuum beyond the reach of the instruments or the methods of positive science4 ,he denies that conduct--even theoretically--admits of explanation and prediction in the same way that explanation and prediction apply to natural phenomena as a whole4 ,it is admitted that circumstances may influence conduct1 but only in the way that a cheque for five pounds enables one to become possessed of a certain quantity of bullion--provided the cheque is honoured by the bank4 ,so the ,will may honour or respond to certain circumstances or it may not4 ,in other words1 the deterministic influence of circumstances is contingent1 not necessary4 ,circumstances determine conduct only when a free volition assents to their operation4 ,so against the proposition that conduct is ultimately the conditioned expression of one aspect of the cosmic order1 there is the counter-proposition that intentional action is the unconditioned expression of absolutely free beings1 and is what it is because of the selective action of an undetermined will4 ,further1 against all deterministic analysis the ,volitionist stubbornly opposes the testimony of consciousness1 and the necessity for the belief in ,free-,will as a moral postulate4 ,thus1 even when the deterministic analysis of an action--from its source in some external stimuli1 to the final neural discharge that secures its performance is complete1 it is still urged that no possible analysis can override man's conviction of freedom4 ,the existence of this conviction is1 of course1 indisputable1 and it forms the bed-rock of all forms of anti-determinism4 ,but the scientific or logical value of a conviction1 as such1 is surely open to question4 ,equally strong convictions were once held concerning the flatness of the earth's surface1 the existence of witches1 and a hundred and one other matters4 ,besides1 a belief or a conviction is not a basal fact in human nature1 it is the last stage of a process1 and can therefore prove nothing save the fact of its own existence4 ,human nature at any stage of its existence is an evolution from past human nature1 and many prevalent beliefs are as reminiscent in their character as our rudimentary tails are reminiscent of a simian ancestry4 ,i hope later to make it clear that the much talked of testimony of consciousness is quite irrelevant to the question at issue2 and also that the assumed necessity for the conception of freedom as a moral postulate is really due to a misconception of both the nature of morality and of voluntary action4 ,ultimately the question1 as already indicated1 resolves itself into one of how far we are justified in applying the principle of causation4 ,the ,determinist denies any limit to its theoretical application4 ,the ,volitionist insists on placing man in a distinct and unique category4 ,but this conception of causation is in itself of the nature of a growth1 and a study of its development may well throw light on the present question4 ,a conception of causation in some form or other could hardly have been altogether absent from the most primitive races of mankind4 ,some experiences are so uniform1 so persistent1 and so universal that they would inevitably be connected in terms of cause and effect4 ,nevertheless1 the primitive mind was so dominated by volitional conception of nature that a sense of necessary connection between events could only have been of a weak character4 ,experience may have shown that certain physical phenomena succeeded each other in a certain order1 but the belief that these phenomena embodied the action of supernormal conscious forces would break in upon that sense of inevitability which is the very essence of scientific causation4 ,modern thought fixes its attention upon a given series of events and declines to go further4 ,with us the order is inevitable4 ,with primitive man the order1 even when perceived1 is conditional upon the non-interference of assumed supernormal intelligences4 ,each phenomenon1 or each group of phenomena1 thus possesses to the primitive mind precisely that quality of freedom which is now claimed for the human will4 ,how difficult is the task of establishing causal connections between physical phenomena the whole history of science bears witness4 ,to establish causal connections between external conditions and subjective states1 where the forces are more numerous and immensely more complex in their combinations1 is a task of infinitely greater difficulty4 ,amongst savages it would never be attempted4 ,feelings arise without any traceable connection with surrounding conditions1 nor does a recurrence of the same external circumstances produce exactly the same result4 ,a circumstance that produces anger one day may give rise to laughter on another occasion4 ,something that produces a striking effect on one person leaves another quite unaffected4 ,numerous feelings arise in consciousness that have all the superficial signs of being self-generated4 ,the phenomena are too diverse in character1 and the connections too complex and obscure1 for uninstructed man to reach a deterministic conclusion4 ,the conclusion is inevitable2 man himself is the absolute cause of his own actions2 he is veritably master of his own fate1 subject only to the malign and magical influence of other extra-human personalities4 ,primitive thinking about man is thus quite in line with primitive thinking about other things4 ,in a way man's earliest philosophy of things is more coherent and more rigorously logical than that of modern times4 ,the same principle is applied all round4 ,all force is conceived as vital force2 souls or wills govern all4 ,the division between animate and inanimate things is of the vaguest possible character2 that between man and animals can hardly be said to exist4 ,only very gradually do the distinctions between animate and inanimate1 voluntary and involuntary actions1 which are taken for granted by the modern mind1 arise4 ,and it is easy to conceive that in the growth of these distinctions1 modes of thinking characteristic of primitive man1 would linger longest in the always obscure field of psychology4 ,broadly1 however1 the growth of knowledge has consisted1 as ,huxley pointed out1 in the substitution of a mechanical for a volitional interpretation of things4 ,in one department after another purposeful action yields to inevitable causation4 ,in physics1 chemistry1 geology1 astronomy1 and kindred sciences this process is now complete4 ,the volitional interpretation still betrays a feeble vitality in biology2 but even here the signs of an early demise are unmistakable4 ,its last stronghold is in psychology1 and this because it is at once the newest of the sciences to be placed upon a positive basis1 and also the most obscure in its ramifications4 ,yet there can be no reasonable doubt that the same principle which has been found to hold good in other directions will sooner or later be shown to obtain here also4 ,science is by its very nature progressive2 and its progress is manifested by the degree to which phenomena hitherto unrelated are brought under constantly enlarging and more comprehensive generalisations4 ,men were once satisfied to explain the wetness of water as due to a spirit of aquosity1 the movement of the blood as due to a certain spirit dwelling in the veins and arteries4 ,these were not statements of knowledge1 but verbose confessions of ignorance4 ,to this same class of belief belongs the ,free-,will of the anti-determinist4 ,it is the living representative of that immense family of souls and spirits with which early animistic thought peopled the universe4 ,the surviving member of a once numerous family1 it carries with it the promise of the same fate that has already overtaken its predecessors4 ,the origin of the belief in free-will once understood1 the reasons for its perpetuation are not difficult to discover4 ,first comes the obscurity of the processes underlying human action4 ,this alone would secure a certain vitality for a belief that has always made the impossibility of explaining the origin1 sequence1 and relation of mental states its principal defence4 ,beyond offering as evidence the questionable affirmation of consciousness volitionists have been unanimous in resting their case upon their adversary's want of knowledge4 ,and it is further characteristic that while holding to a theory on behalf of which not a single shred of positive evidence has ever been produced1 they yet demand the most rigorous and the most complete demonstration of determinism before they will accept it as true2 this despite the presumptive evidence in its favour arising from the fact of its harmony with our knowledge in other directions4 ,secondly1 the human mind does not at any time commence its philosophic speculations de novo4 ,it necessarily builds upon the materials accumulated by previous generations2 and usually retains the form in which previous thinking has been cast1 even when the contents undergo marked modifications4 ,thus the ghost-soul of the savage1 a veritable material copy of the body1 by centuries of philosophizing gets refined into the distinct spiritual substance of the metaphysician4 ,and this1 not because the notion of a soul was derived from current knowledge or thinking1 but because it was one of the inherited forms of thought to which philosophy had to accommodate itself4 ,the result of this pressure of the past upon contemporary thinking is that a large proportion of mental activity is in each generation devoted to reconciling past theories of things with current knowledge4 ,in our own time the number of volumes written to reconcile the theory of evolution with already existing religious views is a striking example of this phenomenon4 ,and beyond the philosophic few there lies the mass of the people with whom an established opinion of any kind takes on something of a sacred character4 ,unfortunately1 too1 many writers work with an eye to the prejudices of this class1 which prejudices are in turn strengthened by the tacit support of men of ability1 or at least by their not openly controverting them4 ,it is1 however1 of the greatest significance that since the opening of the modern scientific period1 wherever qualified thinkers have deliberately based their conclusions upon contemporary knowledge the theory of determinism has been generally upheld4 ,a third cause of the persistence of the belief in ,free-,will is its association with theology4 ,for at least four centuries1 whenever the discussion of the subject has assumed an acute form1 it has been due to theological requirements rather than to ethical or psychological considerations4 ,true1 many other reasons have been advanced1 but these have been little more than cloaks for the theological interest4 ,apart from theology there does not seem any valid reason why the principle of determinism should rouse more opposition in connection with human character than it does in connection with the course of physical nature4 ,or if it be pointed out that the establishment of the principle of universal causation1 as applied to nature at large1 was not established without opposition1 then the reply is that here again it was the religious interest that dictated the opposition4 ,it was felt that the reduction of all physical phenomena to a mechanical sequence was derogatory to the majesty of ,god1 excluded the deity from his own universe1 and generally weakened the force of religious beliefs4 ,and1 as a mere matter of historic fact1 the establishment of the scientific conception of nature did have1 with the bulk of mankind1 precisely the consequences predicted4 ,and when in the course of events theological considerations were banished from one department of science after another1 it was only natural that theologians should fight with the greater tenacity to maintain a footing in the region of human nature4 ,although the subject is in origin pre-,christian1 it was in connection with ,christian theology that it assumed an important place in ,european thinking4 ,the development of monotheism gave the problem a sharper point and a deeper meaning4 ,the issue here was a simple one4 ,given the belief in ,god as sole creator and governor of the world1 and he may conceivably be related to mankind in one of two ways4 ,either he induces man to carry out his will by an appeal to human reason and emotion1 or he has so arranged matters that certain events will inevitably come to pass at a certain time1 human effort being one of the contributory agencies to that end4 ,the first supposition leaves man free--at least in his relation to deity4 ,the second leads straight to the ,christian doctrine of predestination4 ,either supposition has1 from the theological point of view1 its disadvantages4 ,the first leaves man free as against ,god1 but it limits the power of deity by creating an autonomous force that may act contrary to the divine will4 ,the second opens up the question of the divine wisdom and goodness1 and by making ,god responsible for evil conflicts with the demands of the moral sense4 ,evil and goodness are made parts of the divine plan1 and as man must fit in with the general pre-arranged scheme1 personal merit and demerit disappear4 ,these considerations explain why in the course of the ,free-,will controversy official ,christianity has ranged itself now on one side and now on the other4 ,it has championed ,determinism or ,indeterminism as the occasion served its interest4 ,to-day1 owing to easily discoverable reasons1 ,christian writers are1 in the main1 markedly anti-deterministic4 ,the first clear statement of the ,christian position1 if we omit the ,pauline teaching that we are all as clay in the hands of the potter1 appears in the writings of ,augustine4 ,in opposition to the ,pelagians1 ,augustine maintained a doctrine of absolute predestination4 ,no room was allowed for human self-determination to anyone but the first man4 ,adam was created and endowed with free-will1 and chose evil--a curious verification of ,voltaire's definition of ,free-,will as a capacity by means of which man gets himself damned4 ,and as in ,adam there were contained1 potentially1 all future generations1 all are pre-destined to eternal damnation except such as are saved through the free gift of divine grace4 ,this theory of ,augustine's1 carried to the point of asserting the damnation of infants1 was modified in several respects by that great medieval ,christian teacher1 ,thomas ,aquinas1 who held that while the will might be free from external restraint1 it was determined by our reason1 but was reinstated in full force by ,john ,calvin4 ,he denied that the goodness or badness of man had anything whatever to do with the bestowal or withholding of grace4 ,god dooms men either to heaven or hell1 for no other reason than that he chooses to do so4 ,most of the leading ,protestants of the early ,reformation period were strongly opposed to free-will4 ,for instance1 ,zwingli asserted that ,god was the author1 mover1 and impeller to sin4 ,still more emphatic was ,luther4 ,the will of man he compared to a horse1 ,if mounted by ,god it wills and wends whithersoever ,god may will2 if mounted by ,satan it wills and wends whithersoever ,satan may will2 neither hath it any liberty of choice to which of the riders it shall run1 or which it shall choose2 but the riders themselves contend for its acquisition and possession4 ,among the most powerful essays ever written in defence of ,determinism was ,jonathan ,edwards's1 the famous ,protestant divine1 ,inquiry into the ,modern ,prevailing ,notions respecting that ,freedom of ,will which is supposed to be essential to moral agency1 virtue and vice1 reward and punishment1 praise and blame1 and to which ,i shall have occasion to refer later4 ,finally1 the explicit declarations of the ,westminster ,confession of ,faith and the ,articles of the ,church of ,england1 that man's will1--in the absence of grace1--cannot accomplish good works1 throw a curious light on the theological opponents of ,determinism who denounce it as anti-,christian and immoral4 ,,ii4 ,,freedom ,,and ,,will4 ,to ,david ,hume the dispute between the advocates of ,free-,will and the advocates of ,necessity was almost entirely a matter of words4 ,the essence of the question1 he thought1 both sides were agreed on1 and consequently expressed the opinion that a few intelligible definitions would immediately have put an end to the whole controversy4 ,that ,hume was over sanguine is shown by the controversy being still with us4 ,yet his recommendation as to intelligible definitions1 while pertinent to all controversy1 is specially so with regard to such a subject as that of ,free-,will4 ,for much of the anti-,determinist case actually rests upon giving a misleading significance to certain phrases1 while applying others in a direction where they have no legitimate application4 ,consider1 for instance1 the controversial significance of such a phrase as ,liberty versus ,necessity--the older name for ,determinism4 ,we all love liberty1 we all resent compulsion1 and1 as ,mill pointed out1 he who announces himself as a champion of ,liberty has gained the sympathies of his hearers before he has commenced to argue his case4 ,such words play the same part that catchy election cries do in securing votes4 ,such phrases as ,power of ,choice1 ,sense of ,responsibility1 ,testimony of ,consciousness1 ,consciousness of ,freedom1 are all expressions that1 while helpful and legitimate when used with due care and understanding1 as usually employed serve only to confuse the issue and prevent comprehension4 ,not that the dispute between the ,volitionist and the ,determinist is a merely verbal one4 ,the controversy carries with it a significance of the deepest kind4 ,fundamentally the issue expresses the antagonism of two culture stages1 an antagonism which finds expression in many other directions4 ,we are in fact concerned with what ,tylor well calls the deepest of all distinctions in human thought1 the distinction that separates ,animism from ,materialism4 ,much as philosophic ingenuity may do in the way of inventing defences against the application of the principle of causation to human action1 the deeper our analysis of the controversy1 the more clearly is it seen that we are dealing with an attenuated form of that primitive animism which once characterised all human thinking4 ,the persistence of types is a phenomenon that occurs as frequently in the world of mind as it does in the world of biology4 ,or just as when a country is overrun by a superior civilisation1 primitive customs are found lingering in remote districts1 so unscientific modes of thinking linger in relation to the more obscure mental processes in spite of the conquests of science in other directions4 ,it is well to bear these considerations in mind1 even while admitting that a great deal of the dispute does turn upon the fitness of the language employed1 and the accuracy with which it is used4 ,and if intelligible definition may not1 as ,hume hoped1 end the controversy1 it will at least have the merit of making the issue plain4 ,what is it that people have in their minds when they speak of the ,freedom of the ,will8 ,curiously enough1 the advocates of free-will seldom condescend to favour us with anything so commonplace as a definition1 or if they do it tells us little4 ,we are consequently compelled to dig out the meanings of their cardinal terms from the arguments used4 ,now the whole of the argument for free-will makes the word free or freedom the equivalent to an absence of determining conditions2 either this1 or the case for free-will is surrendered4 ,for if a man's decisions are in any way influenced--influenced is here only another word for determined--,determinism is admitted4 ,i need not argue whether decisions are wholly or partly determined1 the real and only question being whether they are determined at all4 ,what is called by some a limited free-will is really only another name for unlimited nonsense4 ,freedom1 as used by the ,volitionist1 being an equivalent for absence of determining conditions1 let us ask next what this means4 ,here ,i am brought to a dead halt4 ,i do not know what it means4 ,i cannot even conceive it as meaning anything at all4 ,at any rate1 ,i am quite certain that it is outside the region of scientific thought and nomenclature4 ,scientifically1 atoms of matter are not free to move in any direction1 the planets are not free to move in any shaped orbit1 the blood is not free to circulate1 the muscles are not free to contract1 the brain is not free to function4 ,in all these cases what takes place is the result of all converging circumstances and conditions4 ,given these and the result follows4 ,scientifically1 the thing that occurs is the only thing possible4 ,if the word free is used in science1 it is as a figure of speech1 as when one speaks of a free gas1 or of the blood not being free to circulate owing to the existence of a constricted artery4 ,but in either case all that is meant is that a change in the nature of the conditions gives rise to a corresponding change of result4 ,the determination of the gas or the blood to behave in a definite way is as great in any case4 ,from the point of view of science1 then1 to speak of an absence of determining conditions is the most complete nonsense4 ,all science is a search for the conditions that determine phenomena4 ,save as a metaphor1 freedom has no place whatever in positive science4 ,are we then to discard the use of such a word as freedom altogether8 ,by no means4 ,properly applied1 the word is intelligible and useful enough4 ,when1 for instance1 we speak of a free man1 a free state1 a free country1 or free trade1 we are using the word free in a legitimate manner1 and can give to it a precise significance4 ,a free state is one in which the people composing it pursue their way uncoerced by other states4 ,a free man is one who is at liberty to exert bodily action or express his opinions4 ,we do not mean that in the first instance the people are not governed by laws1 or that physical conditions are without influence on them2 nor do we mean1 in the second instance1 that the actions and opinions of the free man are not the result of heredity1 bodily structure1 education1 social position1 etc4 ,the obvious meaning of freedom in each of these cases is an absence of external and non-essential coercion4 ,it does not touch the question of why we act as we do1 or of why we please to act in this or that manner4 ,as ,jonathan ,edwards puts it3 ,the plain1 obvious meaning of the words 'freedom' and 'liberty' is power and opportunity1 or advantage that any one has to do as he pleases4 ,or as ,hume put it more elaborately3-- ,what is meant by liberty when applied to voluntary actions8 ,we cannot surely mean that actions have so little connection with motives1 inclinations1 and circumstances that one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the other4 ,for these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact4 ,by liberty1 then1 we can only mean a power of acting or not acting1 according to the determination of the will--that is1 if we choose to remain at rest we may2 and if we choose to move1 we also may4 ,the ultimate significance of liberty or freedom is thus sociological4 ,here it expresses a fact2 in positive science it is a mere metaphor1 and1 as experience shows1 a misleading one4 ,its use in philosophy dates from the time of the ,greeks1 and when they spoke of a free man they were borrowing an illustration from their social life4 ,there were slaves and there were free men1 and in speaking of a free man people were not so likely as they were at a later date to be misled by a metaphor4 ,unfortunately1 its use in philosophy has continued1 while its limitations have been ignored4 ,to ask if a man is free is an intelligible question4 ,to ask whether actions are free from the determining associations of organization and environment admits of but one intelligible reply4 ,personally1 ,i agree with ,professor ,bain that the term is brought in by main force1 into a phenomenon to which it is altogether incommensurable1 and it would be well if it could be excluded altogether from serious discussion#b4 #b ,the subjective sense of freedom1 sometimes alleged against ,determinism1 has no bearing on the question whatever4 ,the view that it has a bearing rests upon the belief that causes compel their effects1 or that nature enforces obedience to its laws as governments do4 ,these are mere anthropomorphic superstitions1 due to assimilation of causes with volitions1 and of natural laws with human edicts4 ,we feel that our will is not compelled1 but that only means that it is not other than we choose it to be4 ,it is one of the demerits of the traditional theory of causality that it has created an artificial opposition between determinism and the freedom of which we are introspectively conscious4 7,bertrand ,russell1 ,mysticism and ,logic1 p4 #bjf47 ,so also ,wundt3 ,freedom and constraint are reciprocal concepts2 they are both necessarily connected with consciousness2 outside of consciousness they are both imaginary concepts1 which only a mythologising imagination could relate to things4 7,human and ,animal ,psychology1 p4 #dbf47 ,now let us take that equally confusing word will4 ,unfortunately1 few of those who champion the freedom of the will think it worth while to trouble their readers with a clear definition of what they mean by it4 ,the orthodox definition of the will as a faculty of the soul tells us nothing4 ,it is explaining something the existence of which is questioned by reference to something else the existence of which is unknown4 ,or the definition is volunteered1 ,will is the power to decide1 a description which only tells us that to will is to will4 ,professor ,james tells us that ,desire1 wish1 will1 are states of mind which every one knows1 and which no definition can make plainer4 ,this may be true of desire and wish2 it certainly is not true of will4 ,there is no question as to will being a state of mind1 but as to every one knowing its character1 and above all possessing the knowledge enabling him to discriminate between will and desire and wish1 this is highly questionable4 ,one may also be permitted the opinion that if advocates of free-will were to seriously set themselves the task of discovering what they do mean by will1 and also in what way it may be differentiated from other mental states1 the number of the champions of that curious doctrine would rapidly diminish4 ,what is it that constitutes an act of volition1 or supplies us with the fact of will8 ,the larger part of our bodily movements do not come under the heading of volition at all4 ,the primary bodily movements are reflex1 instinctive1 emotional1 the action following without any interposition of consciousness4 ,of course1 an action that is performed quite automatically at one time may be voluntarily performed at another time4 ,i may close my eyelid deliberately1 or it may be because of the approach of some foreign object4 ,or an action1 if it be performed frequently1 tends to become automatic4 ,to come within the category of a voluntary action1 it must be performed consciously1 and there is also present some consciousness of an end to be realized4 ,every voluntary action is thus really dependent upon memory4 ,a newly-born child has no volitions1 only reflexes4 ,it is only when experience has supplied us with an idea of what may be done that we will it shall be done4 ,this consideration alone is enough to shatter the case for the supposed freedom of the will4#c #c ,the essential issue is again confused by the language employed4 ,if all volitional action is action performed with the view to an end1 a quite correct and completely adequate word would be intentional6 ,if we were to speak of an intentional action instead of a voluntary one1 the nature of the act would be clear1 the factors of experience1 memory1 consciousness of an end1 would be indicated1 and the misleading associations of willing avoided4 ,it is difficult1 however1 to introduce a new terminology1 and so ,i must beg the reader1 in the interests of clarity1 to bear in mind that whenever voluntary action is referred to1 it is intentional action that is connoted by the phrase4 ,if we analyze any simple act of volition what has just been said will be made quite clear4 ,i am sitting in a room and will to open a window2 it may be to get fresh air1 to look out1 or for some other reason4 ,assume that the first is the correct reason1 the room being close and stuffy4 ,first of all1 then1 ,i become aware of a more or less unpleasant feeling2 my experience tells me this is because the air in the room needs purifying4 ,experience also tells me that by opening a window the desired result will be obtained4 ,finally1 ,i open the window and experience a feeling of relief and satisfaction4 ,now had the room been without a window1 and the door bolted from the outside1 or had the window been too heavy for me to raise1 no volition would have arisen4 ,i should still have had the desire for fresh air1 but not seeing any means by which this could be obtained1 ,i should have had no motive for action1 and should have remained perfectly passive4 ,in order that my desire may operate as a motive there must be not only a consciousness of a need1 but also a mental representation of the means by which that need is to be gratified4 ,i will to do a thing1 when allied to the desire for that thing there is a conception of how it is to be done1 of the means to be employed4 ,without this ,i have no motive1 only a desire2 without a consciousness of the nature of the desire1 there is nothing but pure feeling4 ,willing terminates with the prevalence of the idea4444 ,attention with effort is all that any case of volition implies4 7,prof4 ,w4 ,james1 ,princip4 of ,psychology1 ,,ii4 #efj-a47 ,the stages of the process are1 feeling rising into consciousness as desire1 the perception of the means to realize an end which raises the desire from the statical to the dynamic stage of motive1 and finally a voluntary or intentional action4 ,now at no stage of this process is there room for the intervention of any power or faculty not expressed in a strictly sequential process4 ,of course1 the action ,i have taken as an example is an exceedingly simple one1 but the more complex actions only offer greater difficulties of analysis without leading to any different result4 ,this will be seen more clearly when we come to deal with choice and deliberation4 ,from the moment that a certain stimulus creates a desire in an organism1 to the time that desire expresses itself in action1 there is no gap in the chain through which a ,free-,will may manifest its being4 ,the physiologist points out that at the basis of all our feelings and ideas there lie certain neural processes4 ,the psychologist takes up the story and from the dawn of desire to action finds no break--or at least none that future knowledge may not reasonably hope to make good4 ,want of knowledge may at present prevent our tracing all the details of the process1 but this is surely a very inadequate ground on which to affirm the existence of a power at variance with our knowledge of nature in other directions4#d #d ,whether we work backward or forward the result is the same4 ,strip off from the mind all feelings1 desires1 all consciousness of ends and means to ends1 and what there is left is not a will ready to throw the weight of its preference in this or that direction1 but a complete blank4 ,now in thus tracing the course of a voluntary action are we doing any more than observing the action of desire in consciousness8 ,if1 yes1 the writer is quite unaware of the fact4 ,if ,i remove all feeling1 all desire1 all motive1 the will disappears4 ,excite feeling1 generate desire1 and there is the occasion for a voluntary action4 ,multiply the number of desires and the operation of will becomes evident4 ,thus when a writer like ,professor ,hyslop says1 ,if two motives offer different attractions to the will1 the reply is that the will is not one thing1 and motives other things1 but two aspects of one fact4 ,the will is not something that decides or chooses between motives2 the will is nothing more than the name given to that motive or cluster of motives which is sufficiently strong to overcome resistance and to express itself in action4 ,i emphasize the expression overcome resistance because without competing motives and a sense of resistance we have no clear consciousness of volition4 ,where only one desire is present in consciousness1 or where it is of overwhelming strength1 feeling is succeeded by action without any recognizable hiatus4 ,it is the sense of conflict1 the break1 that is essential to creating a lively sense of volition1 and also1 as shall see later1 to the sense of choice and deliberation4 ,but in speaking of an action as the expression of motives1 or as an expression of will1 both statements are identical so far as the fact is concerned4 ,we have not desires1 motives1 and will1 there is simply a desire or desires that assume the quality of a motive by being strong enough to result in action4 ,as ,spencer has put it1 ,will is no more an existence apart from the predominant feeling than a king is an existence apart from the man occupying the throne4 ,all that is to be found in any act of will is a desire accompanied by the consciousness of an end4 ,to put the same thing in another way1 we have a desire1 the consciousness of an end and the means of realizing it1 and1 finally1 action4 ,to the physiological and psychological processes that culminate in action we give the name of motive4 ,properly speaking a motive that does not issue in action--or inhibition--is not a motive at all1 it is a mere desire4 ,and apart from the presence of desire1 or of desires1 will does not exist4 ,it is a pure abstraction1 valuable enough as an abstraction1 but having no more real existence apart from particular motives1 than tree is a real existence apart from particular trees4 ,physiologically1 says ,dr4 ,maudsley3-- ,we cannot choose but reject the will4444 ,as physiologists we have to deal with volition as a function of the supreme centres1 following reflection1 varying in quantity and quality as its cause varies1 strengthened by education and exercise1 enfeebled by disuse1 decaying with decay of structure4444 ,we have to deal with will not as a single undecomposable faculty unaffected by bodily conditions1 but as a result of organic changes in the supreme centres1 affected as certainly and as seriously by disorders of them as our motor faculties are by disorders of their centres4 ,and1 says ,professor ,sully1 referring to the will3-- ,modern scientific psychology knows nothing of such an entity4 ,as a science of phenomena and their laws1 it confines itself to a consideration of the processes of volition1 and wholly discards the hypothesis of a substantial will as unnecessary and unscientific4 ,neither physiology nor psychology1 neither a sane science nor a sound philosophy1 knows anything of1 or can find use for1 an autonomous will4 ,will as the final term of a discoverable series may be admitted2 will as a self-directing force1 deciding whether particular desires shall or shall not prevail1 answers to nothing conformable to our knowledge of man1 and is plainly but the ghost of the wills and souls of our savage ancestors4 ,if instead of speaking of the freedom of the will1 we spoke of uncaused volitions1 the position of the volitionist would be clear1 and its indefensible character plain to all4 ,but by giving the abstraction will a concrete existence1 and by taking from sociology a word such as freedom and using it in a sphere in which it has no legitimate application1 the issue is confused1 and a scientifically absurd theory given an air of plausibility4 ,the dispute between the ,determinist and the ,indeterminist is certainly not one of words only1 but it is one in which the cardinal terms employed need the most careful examination if we are to clear away from the subject the verbal fog created by theologians and metaphysicians4 ,,iii4 ,,consciousness1 ,,deliberation1 ,,and ,,choice4 ,the one argument used by the ,indeterminist against the ,deterministic position with some degree of universality is that of the testimony of consciousness4 ,it is the one to which practically all have appealed1 and which all have flattered themselves was simple in nature and convincing in character4 ,professor ,sidgwick1 although he admitted that this testimony might be illusory1 yet asserted ,there is but one opposing argument of real force1 namely1 the immediate affirmation of consciousness in the moment of deliberate action4 ,and by the testimony of consciousness must be meant1 not1 of course1 a consciousness of acting1 but that at the moment of acting we could1 under identical conditions1 have selected and acted upon an alternative that has been rejected4 ,i emphasize the phrase under identical conditions1 because otherwise nothing is in dispute1 and because1 as we shall see1 this important consideration has not been always or even frequently borne in mind4 ,the question is1 ,what does consciousness really tell us1 and how far is its testimony valid8 ,in some directions it must be admitted that the testimony of consciousness is absolute4 ,in others it cannot1 without verification1 claim any authority whatever4 ,when ,i say that ,i have a feeling of heat or coldness1 of pleasure or pain1 there is here a direct deliverance of consciousness against which there is no appeal4 ,but consciousness does not and cannot tell me why ,i feel hot or cold1 or what is the cause of a pain ,i am experiencing4 ,in this last case the testimony of consciousness may be distinctly misleading4 ,as it tells us nothing of the existence of a brain1 a nervous system1 viscera1 etc41 its testimony as to the cause of pain is obviously of no value4 ,we are conscious of states of mind1 and that is all4 ,a man seized with sudden paralysis may be conscious of his power to move a limb1 only to discover by experience his impotence4 ,in short1 consciousness cannot1 indeed does not1 tell us the causes of our states of mind4 ,for this information we are thrown back upon observation1 experiment1 and experience4 ,we must1 then1 make quite sure when we interrogate consciousness1 exactly what it is that consciousness says1 and whether what it says is on a subject that comes within its province4 ,what is1 then1 the testimony of consciousness8 ,when it is said that we are conscious of our ability to have selected one alternative at the time that another is chosen1 ,i think this may be fairly met with the retort that consciousness is unable to inform us as to our actual ability to do anything at all4 ,i may be quite conscious of a desire to jump a six foot fence1 or lift a weight of half a ton1 but whether ,i am actually able to do so or not1 only experience can decide4 ,what ,i am really conscious of is a desire to vault a given height or lift a given weight1 and it is surely an inexcusable confusion to speak of a desire to do a particular thing as the equivalent of an ability to do it4 ,if a consciousness of desire equalled the ability to perform failure would be but little known among men4 ,all that consciousness really tells us is of the existence of passing states of mind4 ,it can tell us nothing of their origin1 their value1 or their consequences4 ,in the particular instance under consideration consciousness informs us of the fact of choice1 and this no ,determinist has ever dreamed of denying4 ,he does assert that choice1 as the ,indeterminist persists in using the term1 is a delusion1 but otherwise1 as will be shown later1 he claims that it is only on deterministic lines that choice can have any meaning or ethical significance4 ,in any voluntary action ,i am conscious of the possibility of choice and of having chosen1 and that is really all4 ,what is the nature of that possibility1 and why ,i choose one thing rather than another--on these points consciousness can give us no information whatever4 ,one might as reasonably argue that a consciousness of hunger gives us a knowledge of the process of digestion1 as argue that a consciousness of choice supplies us with a knowledge of the mechanism of the process4 ,we are conscious of the presence of several desires1 we are also conscious that out of these several desires one is strong enough to rank as a motive1 but it tells us absolutely nothing of the causes or conditions that have resulted in the emergence of that motive4 ,instead of telling us that we could have acted in opposition to the strongest motive--which is really the indeterminist position--consciousness simply reveals which desire is the most powerful4 ,we are conscious that other desires were present1 we are also aware of the possibility that another desire than the one that actually prevailed might have been the most powerful2 but when we admit this and say that we could have acted differently1 we have really displaced the actual conditions by imaginary ones4 ,we might have preferred to act differently4 ,this is not denied4 ,it is not questioned that we do choose1 or that the same person chooses1 differently or different occasions4 ,the question really is1 ,why have we chosen thus or thus8 ,and so far as consciousness is concerned we are quite in the dark as to why one choice is made rather than another1 what are the conditions that give rise to our conscious desires1 or why one desire is more powerful than another4 ,consciousness1 then1 can testify only to the reality of its own states2 no more4 ,it can tell us nothing of their causes4 ,it cannot tell us that man has a brain and nervous system1 and can tell us nothing of the connection between mental states and the condition of the bodily organs4 ,the chief factor in conduct 7habit7 lies outside the region of consciousness altogether4 ,in most cases we act as we have been in the habit of acting1 and our present conduct expresses the sum of our previous actions and inclinations4 ,every action we perform assists the formation of a habit1 and with every repetition of a particular action we find its performance easier4 ,indeed1 a very powerful criticism of the trustworthiness of consciousness is found in the fact that the determining causes of conduct lie largely in the region of the unconscious or subconscious1 and of this territory consciousness can tell us no more than a ripple on the surface of a river can tell us of its depths4 ,next to the emphasis upon the testimony of consciousness the ,indeterminist lays special stress upon the facts of choice and deliberation4 ,can we really say1 it is asked1 that man chooses and deliberates1 or even that in any genuine sense he does anything at all1 if all his actions are pre-determined by his constitution and environment8 ,if every act of man is determined and man himself a mere stage in the process unending and unbroken1 is it not idle to speak of man deliberating on alternatives and choosing that which seems to him best8 ,we continue using words that on deterministic lines have lost all meaning4 ,and if ,determinists do not realise this1 it is because the logical implications of their doctrines have never been fully explored4 ,well1 it entirely depends upon the sense in which one uses the cardinal terms in the discussion4 ,if deliberation and choice when applied to mental processes are used in the same sense as when these terms are used as descriptive of the proceedings of a committee1 then we can all agree that deliberation would be as great a sham as it would be if the members of a committee before meeting had determined upon their decision4 ,but1 we may note in passing1 that even here1 when the deliberations are genuine1 the votes of each member are supposed to be decided by the reasons advanced during the discussion--that is the decision of each individual member is determined by the forces evoked during the deliberations4 ,the scientific method1 and it may be added1 the sane and profitable method1 is not to come to the study of a problem with ready-made meanings and compel the facts1 under penalty of disqualification1 to agree with them1 but to let the facts determine what meaning is to be attached to the words used4 ,it is mere childish petulance for the ,indeterminist to say that unless certain words are used with his meaning they shall not be used at all1 but shall be expelled from our vocabulary4 ,when gravity was conceived as a force moving downward through infinite space1 the existence of people on the other side of the earth was denied as being contrary to the law of gravitation4 ,a more correct knowledge of the phenomena did not lead people to discard gravity2 the meaning of the word was revised4 ,and really neither language nor morality is the private property of the ,indeterminist1 and he is1 therefore1 not at liberty to annihilate either for not coming up to his expectations4 ,he must submit to such revision of his ideas1 or his language1 or of both1 as more accurate knowledge may demand4 ,the question is not1 then1 whether ,determinism destroys deliberation and choice and responsibility1 but what meaning ,determinism can legitimately place upon these words1 and is this meaning in harmony with what we know to be true4 ,with responsibility we will deal at length later4 ,for the present let us see what is really involved in the fact of choice4 ,determinism1 we are advised1 must deny the reality of choice1 because choice assumes alternatives1 and there can be no genuine alternatives if events are determined4 ,let us see4 ,if ,i am watching a stone rolling down a hillside1 and am in doubt as to whether it will pass to the right or to the left of a given point1 ,i shall not recognize any resident capacity in the stone for choosing one path rather than the other4 ,the absence of consciousness in the stone precludes such an assumption4 ,but suppose we substitute for the stone a barefooted human being1 and assume that one path is smooth while the other is liberally sprinkled with sharp pointed stones4 ,there would then be an obvious reason for the selection of one path1 and no one would hesitate to say that here was an illustration of the exercise of choice4 ,choice1 then1 is a phenomenon of consciousness1 and it implies a recognition of alternatives4 ,but a recognition of alternatives does not by any means imply that either of two are equally eligible4 ,it is merely a consciousness of the fact that they exist1 and that either might be selected were circumstances favourable to its selection4 ,without labouring the point we may safely say that all that is given in the fact of choice is the consciousness of a choice4 ,there is nothing in it that tells us of the conditions of the selection1 or whether it was possible for the agent to have chosen differently or not4 ,so far there is nothing in ,determinism that is discordant with the fact of choice1 indeed1 it has a perfectly reasonable theory of the process4 ,why is there a choice or selection of things or actions8 ,clearly the reason must be looked for in the nature of the thing selected1 or in the nature of the agent that selects1 or in a combination of both factors4 ,either there is an organic prompting in favour of the thing selected1 as when a baby takes a bottle of milk and rejects a bottle of vinegar1 or there is a recognition that the selection will enable the agent to better realize whatever end he has in view4 ,the alternatives are there1 and they are real in the only sense in which they can be real4 ,but they are not real in the sense of their being equally eligible--which is the sense in which the ,indeterminist uses the word4 ,for that would destroy choice altogether4 ,unless a selection is made because certain things offer greater attractions than other things to the agent1 no intelligible meaning can be attached to such a word as ,choice4 ,we should have a mere blind explosion of energy1 the direction taken no more involving choice than the stone's path down a hillside4 ,and if the ,will chooses between alternatives because one is more desirable than the other1 its freedom 7in the ,indeterminist sense7 is sacrificed1 and the selection is correspondingly determined4 ,there can be no real choice in the absence of a determinative influence exercised by one of the things chosen4 ,but it is urged that this line of reasoning does not explain the feeling of possibility that we have at the moment of action4 ,i think it explains possibility as it explains choice1 provided we allow facts to determine the meaning of words instead of torturing facts to suit certain forms of language4 ,if by possibility we mean that under identical conditions1 other things than those which actually occur are possible1 then this may be confidently met with a flat denial4 ,if1 on the other hand1 it is meant that by varying the conditions other possibilities become actualities1 this is a statement that to a ,determinist is self-evident4 ,as a matter of fact1 there are only two senses in which the word possibility may be rightly used1 and neither sense yields any evidence against ,determinism4 ,one of these meanings is simply an expression of our own ignorance on the matter that happens to be before us4 ,if ,i am asked what kind of weather we are likely to have a month hence1 ,i should reply that it is equally possible the day may be dry or wet1 bright or dull4 ,i do not mean to imply that had ,i adequate knowledge it would not be as easy to predict the kind of weather on that date as it is to predict the position of ,neptune4 ,it is simply an expression of my own ignorance4 ,but1 as ,spinoza pointed out1 possibility narrows as knowledge grows4 ,to complete ignorance anything is possible because the course of events is unknown4 ,as a comprehension of natural causation develops1 people speak less of what may possibly occur1 and more of what will occur4 ,possibility here has no reference to the course of events1 only to our knowledge1 or want of knowledge1 concerning their order4 ,to say that it is possible for a man to do either this or that is1 so far as a spectator is concerned1 only to say that our knowledge concerning the man's whole nature is not extensive enough1 or exact enough for us to predict what he will do4 ,nor is the case altered if instead of an outsider1 it is the agent himself who is incapable of prediction4 ,for all that amounts to is the assertion that the agent is ignorant of the relative strength of desires that may be aroused under a particular conjuncture of circumstances4 ,the second sense of possibility depends upon our ability to imagine conditions not actually present at the moment of action4 ,by a trick of imagination ,i can picture myself acting differently1 or1 on looking back1 ,i can see that ,i might have acted differently4 ,but in either case ,i have altered in thought the conditions that actually existed at the moment of action4 ,generally1 all it means is that with a number of conflicting desires present1 ,i am conscious that a very slight variation in the relative strength of these desires would result in a different course of conduct4 ,and the conditions affecting conduct are so complex and so easily varied that it is small wonder there is lacking in this instance that sense of inevitability present when one is dealing with physical processes4 ,but the essential question is not whether a slight change of conditions would produce a different result1 but whether under identical conditions two opposite courses of action are equally possible8 ,and this is not only untrue in fact1 it is unthinkable1 as a formal proposition4 ,even the old adage1 ,there1 but for the grace of ,god1 go ,i1 while recognizing a different possibility1 also recognized that a variation in the factors--the elimination of the grace of ,god--is essential if the possibility was to become an actuality4 ,that the sense of possibility implies more than this may be safely denied1 let who will make the opposite affirmation4 ,this discussion of the nature and function of choice will help us to realize more clearly than would otherwise be the case the nature of deliberation4 ,this question has always played an important part in the ,free-,will controversy1 because it has stood as the very antithesis of a reflex or obviously mechanical action4 ,deliberation1 it has been argued1 does very clearly point to a determinative power exercised by the human will1 and a power that cannot be explained in the same terms with which we explain other events4 ,one anti-determinist writer remarks that if a volition is the effect of a 'motive1' it should follow immediately upon the occurrence of the motive4 ,but if there is deliberation between motives1 they do not seem to have casual power to initiate a volition until a prior causal power directs them1 and this would be the deliberating subject4 ,now there are numerous cases1 the majority probably1 where action does follow immediately upon the presence of desire4 ,and in such cases we are not aware of any process of deliberation1 although there may be a truly intentional action4 ,and from this single case we have a whole series of examples that will take us to the other extreme where the desires are so numerous and so conflicting that an excess of deliberation may prevent action altogether4 ,let us take an illustration4 ,sitting in my room on a fine day ,i am conscious of a desire for a walk4 ,provided no opposing feeling or desire is present ,i should at once rise and go out4 ,but ,i may be conscious of a number of other feelings based upon various considerations4 ,there is the fact of leaving the task on which ,i am engaged1 and the desire to get it finished4 ,there is the trouble of dressing1 the consideration that once out ,i may wish ,i had stayed in1 or that it may rain1 or that ,i may be needed at home3 all these result in a state of indecision1 and induce deliberation4 ,imagination is excited1 ideal feelings are aroused1 and eventually a choice is made4 ,i decide on the walk4 ,what is it1 now1 that has occurred8 ,my first desire for a walk has been enforced by a representation of all the advantages that may be gained by going out1 and these have proved themselves strong enough to bear down all opposition4 ,had any other desire gained strength1 or had the conviction that it would rain been strong enough1 a different motive would have emerged from this conflict of desires and ideas4 ,no matter how we vary the circumstances1 this is substantially what occurs in every case where deliberation and choice are involved4 ,not only is this what does occur1 but it is impossible to picture clearly any other process4 ,the only evidence we can have of the relative strength of ideas is that one triumphs over others4 ,to say that the weaker desire triumphs is to make a statement the absurdity of which is self-evident4 ,this conclusion cannot be invalidated by the argument that a particular desire becomes the stronger because the will declares in its favour4 ,one need only ask1 by way of reply1 ,why does the will declare in favour of one desire rather than another8 ,there is no dispute that a choice is made4 ,those who say that a man can choose what he likes are not making a statement that conflicts in the slightest degree with ,determinism4 ,the ,determinist says as clearly as anyone that ,i do what ,i choose to do4 ,the real question is why do ,i choose this rather than that8 ,why does the will pronounce in favour of one desire rather than another8 ,no one can believe that all desires are of equal strength or value to the agent4 ,such an assumption would be too absurd for serious argument4 ,but if all desires are not of equal strength and value1 the only conclusion left is that certain ones operate because they are1 in relation to the particular organism1 of greater value than others4 ,and in that case we are simply restating ,determinism4 ,the action of the environment is conditioned by the nature of the organism4 ,the reaction of the organism is conditioned by the character of the environment4 ,the resultant is a compound of the two4 ,it is1 moreover1 an absurdity to speak of the will or the self as though this were something apart from the various phases of consciousness4 ,in the contest of feelings and desires that calls forth deliberation ,i am equally involved in every aspect of the process4 ,as ,professor ,james points out1 both effort and resistance are ours1 and the identification of our self with one of these factors is an illusion and a trick of speech4 ,my self and my mental states are not two distinct things2 they constitute myself1 and if these are eliminated there is no self left to talk about4 ,further1 in the growth of each individual1 conscious and deliberative action can be seen developing out of automatic action--the simplest and earliest type of action4 ,not only does deliberative action develop from reflex action1 but it sinks into reflex action again4 ,one of the commonest of experiences is that actions performed at one time slowly and after deliberation are at another time performed rapidly and automatically4 ,every action contributes to the formation of a habit1 and frequently repetition results in the habit becoming a personal characteristic4 ,deliberation and choice are not even always the mark of a highly developed character2 they may denote a poorly-developed one--one that is ill adapted to social requirements4 ,one man1 on going into a room where there is a purse of money1 may only after long deliberation and from conscious choice refrain from stealing it4 ,another person1 under the same conditions1 may be conscious of no choice1 no effort1 the desire to steal the purse being one that is foreign to his nature4 ,in two such by no means uncommon instances1 we should have no doubt as to which represented the higher type of character4 ,morally1 it is not the feeling1 ,i could have acted dishonestly instead of honestly had ,i so chosen1 that marks the ethically developed character1 but the performance of the right action at the right moment1 without a consciousness of tendency in the opposite direction4 ,but the aim of education is1 in the one direction1 to weaken the sense of choice by the formation of right habits1 moral and intellectual2 and on the other hand by bringing man into a more direct contact with a wider and more complex environment1 deliberation becomes one of the conditions of a co-ordination of ideas and actions that will result in a more perfect adaptation4 ,,iv4 ,,some ,,alleged ,,consequences ,,of ,,determinism4 ,not the least curious aspect of the ,free-,will controversy is that those who oppose ,determinism base a large part of their argumentation upon the supposed evil consequences that will follow its acceptance4 ,in a work from which ,i have already cited1 ,mr4 ,f4 ,c4 ,s4 ,schiller falls foul of ,determinism because1 he says1 while incompatible with morality1 its champions nevertheless imagine they are leaving morality undisturbed4 ,the real difficulty of ,determinism is1 he says1 that in its world1 events being fully determined1 there can be no alternatives4 ,things are what they must be4 ,they must be because they are4 ,no man can help doing what he does4 ,man himself belongs to a sequence unending and unbroken4 ,to imagine therefore that ,determinism1 after annihilating the moral agent1 remains compatible with morality1 simply means that the logical implications of the doctrine have never been fully explored4 ,and he adds3 ,the charge against it is not merely that it fails to do full justice to the ethical fact of responsibility1 but that it utterly annihilates the moral agent4 ,this1 he says1 is the real dilemma1 and ,determinism has never answered it4 ,it is curious that so clever a writer as ,mr4 ,schiller should fail to realize that taking ,determinism in its most drastic form1 and accepting it in the most unequivocal manner1 nothing can suffer1 because everything remains as it must be--including the facts1 feelings1 and consequences of the moral life4 ,observe1 it is part of ,mr4 ,schiller's case against ,determinism that on determinist lines everything1 down to the minutest happenings1 is the necessary result of all antecedent and co-operating conditions4 ,but this being the case1 if ,determinism leaves no room for chance or absolute origination1 how comes it that an acceptance of ,determinism initiates an absolutely new thing--the destruction of morality8 ,surely it is coming very near the absurd to charge ,determinism with breaking an unbreakable sequence4 ,it is surely idle to credit ,determinism with doing what is impossible for it to accomplish4 ,so far as morality is a real thing1 so far as the facts of the moral life are real things1 ,determinism must leave them substantially unaltered4 ,the problem is1 as has been already said1 to find out for what exactly all these things stand4 ,to read wrong meanings into the facts of life1 and then to declare that the facts cease to exist if the meanings are corrected1 is unphilosophical petulance4 ,it is1 indeed1 quite open to the ,determinist to meet these grave fears as to the consequences of ,determinism with a denial that morality is vitally concerned with the question of whether man's will be free or not4 ,the question of ,determinism may enter into the subject of how to develop character along desirable lines2 and1 apart from ,determinism1 it is difficult to see how there can be anything like a scientific cultivation of character4 ,but the fact of morality and the value of morality are not bound up with whether conduct be the expression of theoretically calculable factors1 or whether it is1 on the one side1 determined by a self which originates its own impulses4 ,determinism or no ,determinism1 murder1 to take an extreme illustration1 is never likely to become an every-day occupation in human society4 ,neither can any other action that is obviously injurious to the well-being of society be practised beyond certain well-defined limits4 ,the laws of social health operate to check socially injurious actions1 as the laws of individual health operate to check injurious conduct in dietary or in hygiene4 ,determinists and ,indeterminists1 as may easily be observed1 manifest a fairly uniform measure of conduct1 and whatever variations from the normal standard each displays cannot well be put down to their acceptance or rejection of ,determinism4 ,the real nature of morality is best seen if one asks oneself the question1 ,what is morality8 ,let us imagine the human race reduced to a single individual4 ,what would then be the scope and character of morality8 ,it is without question that a large part of our moral rules would lose all meaning4 ,theft1 murder1 unchastity1 slander1 etc41 would be without meanings1 for the simple reason that there would be none against whom such offences could be committed4 ,would there be any moral laws or moral feelings left8 ,would there even be a man left under such conditions8 ,one might safely query both statements4 ,for if we take away from this solitary individual all that social culture and intercourse have given him--language1 knowledge1 habits both mental and moral1 all1 in short1 that has been developed through the agency of the social medium--man1 as we know him1 disappears1 and a mere animal is left in his place4 ,even the feeling that a man has a duty to himself1 and that to realize his highest possibilities is the most imperative of moral obligations1 is only an illustration of the same truth4 ,for very little analysis serves to show that even this derives its value from the significance of the individual to the social structure4 ,morality1 then1 is wholly a question of relationship4 ,not whether my actions spring from a self-determined will or even whether they are the inevitable consequent of preceding conditions makes them moral or immoral1 but their influence in forwarding or retarding certain ideal social relations4 ,the rightness or wrongness of an action lies in its consequences4 ,whether one is of the ,utilitarian or other school of morals does not substantially affect the truth of this statement4 ,action without consequences--assuming its possibility--would have no moral significance whatever4 ,and consequences remain whether we accept or reject ,determinism4 ,determinism cannot alter or regulate the consequences of actions1 it can only indicate their causes and their results4 ,what a science of morals is really concerned with is1 objectively1 the consequences of actions1 and subjectively the feelings that lead to their performance4 ,when a science of morals has determined what actions best promote desirable relations between human beings1 and what states of mind are most favourable to the performance of such actions1 its task as a science of morals is concluded4 ,the genesis of such states of mind belongs to psychology1 just as to sociology belong the creation and maintenance of such social conditions as will best give them expression and actuality4 ,the question of the moral consequences of ,determinism is not1 therefore1 discussed because we believe there is any relevancy in the issue thus raised1 but solely because it is raised1 and not to deal with it may create a prejudice against ,determinism4 ,many of those who quite admit the scientific character of ,determinism1 yet insist on the necessity for some sort of ,indeterminism in the region of morals4 ,professor ,william ,james1 for instance1 admits that a profitable study of mental phenomena is impossible unless we postulate ,determinism 7,prin4 ,psych4 ii4 #egc74 ,but having admitted this1 and in fact illustrated it through the whole of his two volumes1 his next endeavour is to find a place for free-will as a moral postulate4 ,the region of morals is thus made to play the part of a haven of refuge for illegitimate and unscientific theories1 a kind of workhouse for all mental vagrants found at large without visible means of support4 ,the moral postulate which is to reinstate ,free-,will1 is that ,what ought to be can be1 and that bad acts cannot be fated1 but that good ones must be possible in their place4 ,in a writer usually so clear this somewhat ambiguous deliverance is far more indicative of a desire to befriend an oppressed theory than of the possession of any good evidence in its behalf4 ,the matter really turns upon what is meant by ought and possible4 ,it has already been pointed out that if by possible it is meant that although one thing actually occurs1 another thing--a different thing--might have occurred without any alteration in the accompanying conditions1 the statement is not only untrue in fact1 but it is inconceivable as possibly true4 ,and if it does not mean this1 then ,professor ,james is merely stating what every ,determinist most cheerfully endorses4 ,but in that case the possibility gives no support whatever to the ,indeterminist4 ,further1 ,professor ,james says that ,determinism is a clear and seductive conception so long as one stands by the great scientific postulate that the world must be one unbroken fact1 and that prediction of all things without exception must be ideally1 even if not actually1 possible4 ,on which one may enquire1 how prediction could be at all possible unless1 given the co-operating conditions1 a definite and particular result is inevitable8 ,but if prediction be possible--and the whole power of science lies in its power of prediction--what becomes of the value of possibility to the ,indeterminist8 ,is it any more than an expression of our ignorance of the power of particular factors1 and a consequent ignorance of their resultant8 ,to say that certain things ought to be1 or that one ought to act in this or that particular manner1 are common expressions1 and within limits1 relevant and intelligible expressions4 ,but ought here clearly stands for no more than ideal conception4 ,its reference is to the future1 not to the past4 ,it does not imply a belief that things could have resulted other than those which actually did result1 but a belief that given a suitable alteration in the conditions different results might ensue in the future4 ,when1 for example1 ,i say that men ought to think wisely1 ,i do not affirm either that all men do think wisely1 or that foolish men can do so without some change in their mental make-up4 ,i merely eliminate all those conditions that make for unwise thinking1 leaving wise thinking as the only possible result4 ,that is1 recognizing that from different conditions different consequences will follow1 in imagination1 all forces that are inimical to the ideal end are eliminated4 ,we say that no man ought to commit murder1 and yet if we take as an illustration the congenital homicide1 no one can assert that in his case1 at least1 anything but murder is possible1 given favourable conditions for its perpetration4 ,or if it is said that congenital homicide is a purely pathological case1 it may surely be asserted that the same general considerations apply to cases that are not classified as pathological4 ,the more we know of the criminal's heredity1 environment1 and education1 the more clearly it is seen that his deeds result from the inter-action of these factors1 and that these must be modified if we are reasonably to expect any alteration in his conduct4 ,in fact1 the criminal--or the saint--being what he is as the result of the inter-action of possibly calculable factors is the essential condition towards making the prediction of all things ideally1 if not actually possible4 ,in saying1 then1 that a man ought not to do wrong1 we are only saying that our ideal of a perfect man eliminates the idea of wrong-doing1 and that our imagination is powerful enough to construct a human character to which wrong-doing shall be alien4 ,the fallacy here is due to a confusion of the actual with the desirable4 ,if we are looking to the past we are bound to say that ought is meaningless1 because what has been is the only thing that could have been4 ,thus it is meaningless to say that a piece of string capable of withstanding a strain of half a hundredweight ought to have withstood a strain of half a ton4 ,it is equally absurd to say that a man ought to have withstood the germ of malarial fever1 when his constitution rendered him susceptible to attack4 ,both of these instances will be readily admitted4 ,is it1 then1 any more reasonable to say that a man ought to have withstood a temptation to drunkenness1 or theft1 or cruelty--in the sense that given his nature he could have withstood it--when all the circumstances of character1 heredity1 and environment made for his downfall8 ,we say that certain considerations ought to have restrained ,jones because they were enough to restrain ,smith4 ,are we1 then1 to conclude that ,smith and ,jones are so much alike--are1 in fact1 identical in character--that the same forces will influence each in the same manner and to the same degree8 ,the assumption is obviously absurd4 ,what ought to have happened with ,smith and ,jones1 bearing in mind all the conditions of the problem1 is what did happen4 ,what ought to happen to ,smith and ,jones in the future will be equally dependent upon the extent to which the character of the two becomes modified4 ,in this sense our conception of what ought to be in the future will guide us as to the nature of the influences we bring to bear upon ,smith and ,jones4 ,we believe that good actions may be possible in the future where bad ones occurred in the past1 because we see that a change of conditions may produce the desired result4 ,the moral postulate1 therefore1 does not contain anything1 or imply anything1 in favour of ,indeterminism4 ,it does assert that certain things ought to be1 but it can only realize this by recognizing1 and acting upon the recognition1 that just as certain forces in the past have issued in certain results1 so a modification in the nature or incidence of these forces will produce a corresponding modification of conduct in the future4 ,whatever else there appears to be in the ought is a mere trick of the imagination2 and the surprising thing is that a writer of the calibre of ,professor ,james should not have been perfectly alive to this4 ,a cruder form of the same position1 although introducing other issues1 was upheld by ,dr4 ,martineau in the categorical statement1 either free-will is a fact1 or moral judgment a delusion4 ,his reason for this remarkable statement is3-- ,we could never condemn one turn of act or thought did we not believe the agent to have command of another2 and just in proportion as we perceive1 in his temperament or education or circumstances1 the certain preponderance of particular suggestions1 and the near approach to an inner necessity1 do we criticize him rather as a natural object than as a responsible being1 and deal with his aberrations as maladies instead of sins4#e #e ,types of ,ethical ,theory1 vol4 ii4 p4 #da4 ,well1 human nature might easily have been nearer perfection than it is had moral aberrations been treated as maladies rather than sins1 and one certainly would not have felt greater regret had judges and critics always been capable of rising to this level of judgment4 ,social1 political1 and religious malevolence might not have received the gratification and support it has received had this been the rule of judgment and the guide to methods of treatment1 but our social consciousness would have been of a superior texture than is now the case4 ,and one may ask whether there is any human action conceivable for which an adequate cause cannot be found in temperament or education or circumstances1 or in a combination of the three8 ,it would tax any one's ingenuity to name an action that lies outside the scope of these influences4 ,temperament1 education1 circumstances1 are the great and controlling conditions of human action1 and only in proportion as this is recognized and acted upon do we approach a science of human nature and begin to realize methods of profitable modification4 ,against ,determinism ,dr4 ,martineau argues that the moral life dwells exclusively in the voluntary sphere1 and also that impulses of spontaneous action do not constitute character4 ,the first of these statements is at least very debatable1 although it may turn upon a matter of definition4 ,but the second statement is distinctly inaccurate4 ,one may assert the exact opposite1 and instead of saying that the impulses of spontaneous action do not constitute character1 argue that they are the truest indications of character4 ,of course1 from one point of view1 all that a man does1 whether it be spontaneous or reflective1 must be equally the expression of the whole man4 ,but from another point of view the more permanent and enduring characteristics of a man may be overborne by a passing flood of emotion or by a casual combination of unusual circumstances4 ,by these means an habitually mean man may be roused to acts of generosity1 an habitual thief roused to acts of honesty4 ,long reflection may cause a person to decide this or that1 when his spontaneous impulses are in the contrary direction4 ,and while these reflections and floods of emotion are equally with the spontaneous impulses part of a given personality1 yet it will hardly be disputed that the latter are the more deeply seated1 will express themselves in a more uniform manner1 and are thus a truer and more reliable index to the character of the person with whom we are dealing4 ,how far we are to accept morality as dwelling exclusively in the voluntary1 that is the intentional1 sphere1 is1 as ,i have said1 largely a matter of definition4 ,we may so define morality that it shall cover only intentional acts1 in which case the statement must be accepted1 or we can define morality in a wider sense1 as covering all action by means of which desirable relations between people are maintained1 in which case the statement is not true4 ,for we should then be committed to the curious position that all moral development tends to make man less moral4 ,to have the quality of voluntariness an act must be consciously performed with a particular end in view4 ,but a large part of the more important functions of life do not come under this category1 while a still larger portion are only semi-voluntary4 ,the whole set of instincts that cluster round the family1 the feelings which urge human beings to seek others' society1 and which are the essential conditions of all social phenomena1 do not properly come under the head of volition4 ,our conduct in any of these directions may easily be justified by reason1 but it would be absurd to argue that there is any intentional choice involved4 ,moreover1 the chief aim of education1 of the moralization of character1 is to divest actions of their quality of reflectiveness or intention4 ,our aim here is so to fashion character that it will unquestioningly and instinctively place itself on the right side4 ,this is a force that operates on all individuals more or less1 and from the cradle to the grave4 ,family influences curb and fashion the egotism of the child until there is an unconscious and often unreasoning adherence to the family circle4 ,social influences continue the work and train the individual into an instinctive harmony1 more or less complete with the structure of the society to which he belongs4 ,the mere repetition of a particular action involves the formation of a habit1 and habit is meaningless in the absence of a modified nerve structure which reacts in a special manner4 ,persistence in right action1 therefore1 no matter how consciously it may be performed in its initial stages1 inevitably passes over into unconscious or instinctive action4 ,and let it be noted1 too1 that it is only when this change has been brought about that a person can be said to be a thoroughly moralized character4 ,it is not the man who does right after a long internal struggle that is most moral1 but the one with whom doing right is the most imperative of organic necessities4 ,we praise the man who does right after struggle1 but chiefly because of our admiration at the triumph of right over wrong1 or because his weakness cries for support1 or because he has in him the making of a more perfect character4 ,but to place him as the superior of one whose right doing is the efflorescence of his whole nature is to misunderstand the ethical problem4 ,and equally to confine morality to merely voluntary or intentional action is to truncate the sphere of morals to an extent that would meet with the approval of very few writers on ethics4 ,in brief1 one may not merely say with ,lessing1 ,determinism has nothing to fear from the side of morals1 one may add that it is only on the theory of ,determinism that the moralization of character becomes a rational possibility4 ,v4 ,,professor ,,james ,,on ,,the ,,dilemma ,,of ,,determinism4 ,we have seen in what has gone before how much of the case for ,free-,will is based upon the wrong use of language1 and upon a display of petulance arising from the degree to which it is assumed that the universe ought to fulfil certain a priori expectations4 ,in this last respect the ,volitionist behaves as if he were on a kind of shopping excursion1 with full liberty to purchase or reject the goods brought out for inspection4 ,both of these points are well illustrated in an apology for ,indeterminism offered by ,professor ,william ,james1 and although in examining his argument it may be necessary to repeat in substance some of the arguments already used1 this will not be without its value in enabling the reader to realize the shifts to which the defender of ,free-,will is compelled to resort4 ,in justice to ,professor ,james1 however1 it is only fair to point out that it is not quite clear that he is thoroughly convinced of the position he sees fit to state4 ,much of his argument reads as though he were merely stating a speculation that might prove valuable1 but which might also turn out valueless4 ,still1 whatever conviction he has1 or had1 appears to lean to the side of ,indeterminism1 and ,i shall accordingly deal with his argument as though he were quite convinced of its soundness4 ,in his chief work1 ,the ,principles of ,psychology1 ,professor ,james took up the perfectly sane position that a man would be foolish not to espouse the great scientific postulate that the prediction of all things without exception must be possible1 and drew a proper distinction between what is ideally possible--that is to complete knowledge--and what is actually possible to incomplete knowledge4 ,in a later deliverance he1 for the time at least1 forsakes this position and champions a case which rests for its coherence very largely upon the neglect of those precautions previously insisted on4#f ,to suit the necessities of the argument the ,determinist is made to say things that ,i think few1 if any1 determinists ever dreamed of saying1 while certain leading words are used with a meaning obviously framed to meet the requirements of the case4 #f ,see the lecture on ,the ,dilemma of ,determinism in the volume ,the ,will to ,believe1 and other ,essays4 ,london2 #aijc4 ,at the outset of his essay ,professor ,james remarks that if a certain formula--in this case the ,determinist formula--for expressing the nature of the world violates my moral demands1 ,i shall feel as free to throw it overboard1 or at least to doubt it1 as if it disappointed my demand for uniformity of sequence4 ,and he proceeds to argue that all our scientific laws are ideal constructions1 built up in order to satisfy certain demands of our nature4 ,uniformity in nature is thus as much a formula framed to this end as is ,free-,will4 ,if this be admitted1 he says1 we can debate on even terms4 ,unfortunately for the ,professor's argument the two instances are not analogous--not1 at least1 in the direction required4 ,the sense of causality is not something that is innate in human nature4 ,children at an early age hardly possess it1 and primitive man has it in only a very vague manner4 ,the conviction that all things are bound together in terms of causation is one that belongs1 even to-day1 to the educated1 thoughtful mind4 ,at any rate it is a conviction that has been forced upon the human mind by the sheer pressure of experience4 ,it is a growth consequent upon the mind's intercourse with the objective universe4 ,and its validity is not called into question4 ,on the other hand1 this assumed moral demand for ,free-,will is the very point in dispute4 ,whether there is such a demand1 and if so is it a legitimate one1 are the questions upon which the discussion turns4 ,and it will not do for ,professor ,james to claim ,free-,will in the name of certain moral demands and reserve the right to throw overboard any theory that does not grant them4 ,man's moral nature1 equally with his intellectual nature1 must in the last resort yield to facts4 ,it will not do to exalt into a moral instinct what may be no more than a personal idiosyncrasy4 ,there is certainly no more than this in such expressions as something must be fatally unreasonable1 absurd1 and wrong in the world1 or ,i deliberately refuse to keep on terms of loyalty with the universe1 if certain things turn out to be true4 ,such phrases are completely out of place in a scientific enquiry4 ,the universe will remain what it is whether we call it absurd or rational1 and may even survive the raising of the standard of revolt by so eminent a psychologist as ,professor ,james1 to whom we would commend1 were he still alive1 ,schopenhauer's profound remark that there are no moral phenomena1 only moral interpretations of phenomena4 ,what1 now1 is the insuperable dilemma which ,professor ,james places before upholders of ,determinism8 ,the whole of it turns out to be little more than a play upon the words possible and actual4 ,determinism1 he says1 professes that those parts of the universe already laid down absolutely appoint and decree 7,why 'appoint' and 'decree'8 ,why not the impersonal word 'determine8'7 what the other parts shall be4 ,the future is determined by the past2 and given the past1 only one future is possible4 ,indeterminism says that the parts have a certain amount of loose play on one another1 so that the laying down of one of them does not necessarily determine what the others shall be4 ,thus1 still following ,professor ,james's exposition1 given a special instance1 both sides admit the occurrence of a volition4 ,the ,determinist asserts that no other volition could have occurred4 ,the ,indeterminist asserts that another volition might have occurred1 other things remaining the same4 ,and1 asks the ,professor1 can science tell us which is correct8 ,his reply is1 ,no4 ,how can any amount of assurance that something actually happened give us the least grain of information as to whether another thing might or might not have happened in its place8 ,only facts can be proved by other facts4 ,with things that are possibilities and not facts1 facts have no concern4 ,the position may be made clearer by taking the ,professor's own illustration4 ,when1 he says1 ,i leave this lecture hall ,i may go home via ,divinity ,avenue1 or traverse ,oxford ,street4 ,it is a matter of chance which route is selected4 ,but assume that by some miracle1 after having walked down ,divinity ,avenue1 ten minutes of time are annihilated1 and reaching the ,hall door again ,oxford ,street is the route selected4 ,spectators thus have two alternative universes4 ,one universe with the ,professor walking through ,divinity ,avenue1 the other with him walking through ,oxford ,street4 ,if the spectators are ,determinists they will believe only one universe to have been from eternity possible4 ,but1 asks ,professor ,james1 looking outwardly at these two universes1 can anyone say which is the accidental and which is the necessary one8 ,in other words1 either universe after the fact and once there would1 to our means of observation and understanding1 appear just as rational as the other4 ,there is no means by which we can distinguish chance from a rational necessity4 ,a universe which allows a certain loose play of the parts is as rational as one which submits to the most rigid determinism4 ,before dealing with the above1 it is necessary to take another phrase on which much of the above argument depends4 ,professor ,james says that the stronghold of the ,determinist sentiment is antipathy to the idea of ,chance1 and chance is a notion not to be entertained by any sane mind4 ,and the sting1 he says1 seems to rest on the assumption that chance is something positive1 and if a thing happens by chance it must needs be irrational and preposterous4 ,but ,i am not aware that any scientific ,determinist ever used chance as being a positive term at all4 ,certainly the last thing the present writer would dream of doing would be to predicate chance of any portion of the objective universe whatsoever4 ,the only legitimate use of the word is in reference to the state of our knowledge concerning phenomena4 ,to say that a thing chanced1 or happened by chance1 is only saying that we are not aware of the causes that produced it4 ,we say nothing of the thing itself1 we only express the state of our mind in relation to it4 ,professor ,james says all you mean by chance is that a thing is not guaranteed1 it may fall out otherwise4 ,not guaranteed by our knowledge about the thing1 certainly2 in any other sense1 his definition seems invented for the express purpose of bolstering up his hypothesis4 ,for1 he says1 a chance thing means that the general system of things has no hold on it4 ,it appears in relation to other things1 but it escapes their determining influence1 and appears as a free gift4 ,thus whether he walked down ,divinity ,avenue or ,oxford ,street was a matter of chance2 and the future of the world is full of similar chances--events that may take one of several forms1 either of which is consistent with the whole4 ,we now have the essence of ,professor ,james's case1 and can consider it in detail4 ,first of all we may note the curiously double sense in which ,professor ,james uses the word fact and the agility with which he skips from one meaning to another1 as it suits his argument4 ,in a broad and general sense a mental fact is as much a fact as any other fact4 ,a man riding on horseback is a fact4 ,my vision or conception of a horse with the head of a man is equally a fact1 though nothing like it exists in nature4 ,we should discriminate between the two by saying that one is a mental fact strictly relative to a particular mind1 the other is an objective fact relative to all minds normally constituted4 ,now science does not deny possibilities as mental facts4 ,but it would be a very queer science indeed that allowed all sorts of possibilities of a given group of phenomena under identical conditions4 ,like chance1 the possibilities of the ,universe are strictly relative to our knowledge concerning it4 ,if opposite things appear equally possible1 it is only because we are not sufficiently conversant with the processes to say which thing is certain4 ,a universe with ,professor ,james walking down ,divinity ,avenue appears as orderly and as natural as one with him parading ,oxford ,street4 ,but this is because we cannot unravel the complex conditions that may determine the selection of one route or the other4 ,or if it be said in reply1 that the walker is unaware of any choice in the matter1 the answer is that there is present the desire to get away from the lecture hall and arrive at home1 and this is strong enough to make the choice of means to that end unimportant4 ,if the choice lay between walking down a sunlit street or wading through a mile of water1 five feet deep1 while the latter would still remain a possibility1 since it could be done were the inducement to do it strong enough1 there is not much doubt as to what the choice would actually be4 ,the complete reply therefore to ,professor ,james's illustration is that from the standpoint of mere possibility1 bearing in mind the proper significance of possibility1 opposite alternatives may be equally real4 ,we can1 that is1 conceive conditions under which a certain thing may occur1 and we can conceive another set of conditions under which exactly the opposite may occur4 ,and either alternative presents us with a universe that is equally rational1 because in either case we vary the co-operating conditions in order to produce the imagined consequence4 ,but given a complete knowledge of all the co-operating conditions1 and not only do two views of the universe cease to be equally rational1 but one of them ceases to be even conceivable4 ,for let us note that the resultant of any calculation is no more and no less than a synthesis of the factors that are included in the calculation4 ,if we do not understand the factors included in a given synthesis it will be a matter of chance what the resultant may be4 ,but if we do understand the nature of the factors1 and the consequence of their synthesis1 possibility and actuality become convertible terms4 ,finally1 whether a man on leaving a lecture hall turns to the right or the left appears1 under ordinary conditions1 equally rational and natural only because we are aware that it may be a matter of indifference which direction he takes1 and in that case his action will be governed by the simple desire to get away1 or to get to a particular spot4 ,it is a simple deduction from experience presented by ,professor ,james in a needlessly confusing manner4 ,the next1 and practically the only example cited by ,professor ,james to prove that this world is a world of chances1 is concerned with a question of morals4 ,we constantly1 he says1 have occasion to make judgments of regret4 ,in illustration of this1 he cites the case of a particularly brutal murder1 and adds1 ,we feel that1 although a perfect mechanical fit to the rest of the universe1 it is a bad moral fit1 and that something else would really have been better in its place4 ,but calling a thing bad means1 if it means anything at all1 that the thing ought not to be1 that something else ought to be in its stead4 ,if ,determinism denies this it is defining the universe as a place in which what ought to be is impossible1 and this lands us in pessimism1 or if we are to escape pessimism we can only do so by abandoning the judgment of regret4 ,but if our regrets are necessitated nothing else can be in their place1 and the universe is what it was before--a place in which what ought to be appears impossible4 ,murder and treachery cannot be good without regret being bad1 regret cannot be good without murder and treachery being bad4 ,as both1 however1 are foredoomed1 something must be fatally wrong and absurd in the world4 ,now1 ,i must confess all this seems a deal of bother concerning a fairly simple matter4 ,indeed1 ,professor ,james seems to be engaged in raising a dust and then complaining of the murkiness of the atmosphere4 ,coming from a writer of less standing ,i might1 in view of what has been said elsewhere in this essay1 have left the reply to the careful reader's understanding of the subject4 ,but from so eminent a psychologist as ,william ,james1 silence might well be construed as deterministic inability to reply to the position laid down4 ,in the first place1 ,i may be pardoned for again reminding the reader that1 in this connection1 ought stands upon precisely the same level as possible4 ,whether we say that a man ought to do a certain thing1 or that it is possible for him to do a certain thing1 we are making identical statements1 for no one would dream of saying that a man ought to do that which it is impossible for him to perform4 ,when we say that murder and treachery ought not to be1 we do not imply--if we use language properly--that these are not as much part of the cosmic order1 and as much the expression of co-operating conditions1 as are kindness and loyalty4 ,it is saying no more than that in our judgment human nature may be so trained and conditioned as to practise neither murder nor treachery4 ,we are expressing a judgment as to what our ideal of human nature is1 and our ideal of what human nature should be is based upon what experience has taught us concerning its possibilities4 ,man's judgment of regret is justifiable and admirable1 not because he recognizes that the past could have been different from what it was1 but because it furnishes him with the requisite experience for a better direction of action in the future1 and because the feeling of regret is itself one of the determining conditions that will decide conduct in the future4 ,the question1 says ,professor ,james1 is of things1 not of eulogistic names for them4 ,with this ,i cordially agree2 but in that case what are we to make of the following3-- ,the only consistent way of representing 444 a world whose parts may affect one another through their conduct being either good or bad is the indeterminate way4 ,what interest1 zest1 or excitement can there be in achieving the right way1 unless we are enabled to feel that the wrong way is also a possible and a natural way--nay1 more1 a menacing and an imminent way8 ,and what sense can there be in condemning ourselves for taking the wrong way1 unless we need have done nothing of the sort1 unless the right way was open to us as well8 ,i cannot understand the willingness to act1 no matter how we feel1 without the belief that acts are really good or bad4 ,i cannot understand the belief that an act is bad1 without regret at its happening4 ,i cannot understand regret without the admission of real genuine possibilities in the world4 ,eliminate from this all that is matter of common agreement between ,determinists and ,indeterminists1 and what have we left but sheer verbal confusion8 ,the pleasurable feeling that results from a sense of achievement is real no matter what are the lines on which the universe is constructed4 ,one might as reasonably ask1 ,why feel a greater interest in a first-class orchestral performance1 than in the harmonic outrages of a hurdy-gurdy1 since both are1 from the physical side1 vibratory phenomena8 ,and is it not clear1 to repeat a truth already emphasized1 that a most important factor in our condemning ourselves for doing a wrong action is the fact that we have done so4 ,it is one of the determining conditions of doing better actions in future4 ,of course1 ,professor ,james cannot understand the belief that an act is bad1 without regret at its happening4 ,neither can anyone else1 for the simple reason that one involves the other4 ,the statement is as much a truism as is the one that we can have no willingness to act unless we believe that acts are either good or bad4 ,equally true is it that regret implies real possibilities in the world--not always1 though1 for we may regret death or the radiation into extra terrestrial space of solar energy without believing that the prevention of either is possible4 ,but our possibilities in relation to conduct do not1 as the argument implies1 relate to the past1 but to the future4 ,indeed1 the sense of possibility would be morally worthless were it otherwise4 ,finally1 and this brings me to what is one of the cardinal weaknesses of so much of the writing on psychology1 ,professor ,james's argument is vitiated by non-recognition of the fact that regret and satisfaction1 praise and blame1 with most of the cardinal moral qualities1 are social in their origin and application4 ,they represent the reaction of our social feelings against anti-social conduct1 or their expression of satisfaction at conduct of an opposite character4 ,they are consequently the creations1 not of an indwelling will1 but of an outdwelling social relationship4 ,they are not impressed by the ego upon the world1 they are impressed by the world upon the ego4 ,character is not something that each individual brings ready fashioned to the service of society2 it is something that society itself creates4 ,it has been fashioned by countless generations of social evolution1 and1 in the main1 that evolution has of necessity placed due emphasis upon those intellectual and moral qualities on which social welfare depends4 ,,vi4 ,,the ,,nature ,,and ,,implications ,,of ,,responsibility4 ,if ,hume was not right in asserting that a few intelligible definitions would put an end to the ,free-,will controversy1 his error lay in assuming a greater receptivity of mind than most people possess4 ,for it may safely be asserted that once the legitimate meanings of the terms employed are acknowledged1 and they are properly applied to the matter in dispute1 it may be shown that the opponents of ,determinism have been beating the air4 ,the ,determinism they attack is not the ,determinism that is either professed or defended4 ,the consequences they forecast follow only from a distorted1 and often meaningless1 use of the terms employed4 ,instead of the ,determinist denying the moral and mental value of certain qualities of which the ,indeterminist announces himself the champion1 he admits their value1 gives them a definite meaning1 and proves that it is only by an assumption of the truth of the cardinal principle of ,determinism that they have any reality4 ,this has already been shown to be true in the case of ,freedom1 ,choice1 ,deliberation1 etc42 it remains to pursue the same method with such conceptions as praise and blame or punishment and reward1 and responsibility4 ,the charge is1 again1 that ,determinism robs praise and blame and responsibility of all meaning1 and reduces them to mere verbal expressions which some may mistake for the equivalents of reality1 but which clearer thinkers will estimate at their true worth4 ,what is the use of praising or blaming if each one does what heredity1 constitution1 and environment compels8 ,why punish a man for being what he is8 ,why hold him responsible for the expressions of a character provided for him1 and for the influence of an environment which he had no part in forming8 ,so the string of questions run on4 ,none of them1 it may safely be said1 would ever be asked if all properly realized the precise meaning and application of the terms employed4 ,for as with the previous terms examined1 it is an acceptance of ,indeterminism that would rob these words of all value4 ,rationally conceived they are not only consonant with ,determinism1 but each of them implies it4 ,of the four terms mentioned above--,praise1 ,blame1 ,punishment1 and ,responsibility1 the cardinal and governing one is the last4 ,it will be well1 therefore1 to endeavour to fix this with some degree of clearness4 ,to commence with we may note that in contra-distinction to freedom where the testimony of consciousness is illegitimately invoked1 a consciousness of responsibility is essential to its existence4 ,a person in whom it was manifestly impossible to arouse such a consciousness would be unhesitatingly declared to be irresponsible4 ,there is here1 consequently1 both the fact of responsibility and our consciousness of it that calls for explanation4 ,and both require for an adequate explanation a larger area than is offered by mere individual psychology4 ,indeed1 so long as we restrict ourselves to the individual we cannot understand either the fact or the consciousness of responsibility4 ,by limiting themselves in this manner some ,determinists have been led to deny responsibility altogether4 ,the individual1 they have said1 does not create either his own organism or its environment1 and consequently all reasonable basis for responsibility disappears4 ,to which there is the effective reply that the datum for responsibility is found in the nature of the organism and in the possibility of its being affected by certain social forces1 and not in the absolute origination of its own impulses and actions4 ,it is playing right into the hands of the ,indeterminist to deny so large and so important a social phenomenon as responsibility4 ,and to the ,indeterminist attack1 that if action is the expression of heredity1 organism1 and environment1 there is no room for responsibility1 there is the effective reply that it is precisely because the individual's actions are the expression of all the forces brought to bear upon him that he may be accounted responsible4 ,the ,determinist has often been too ready to take the meanings and implications of words from his opponent1 instead of checking the sense in which they were used4 ,the general sense of responsibility--omitting all secondary meanings--is that of accountability1 to be able to reply to a charge1 or to be able to answer a claim made upon us4 ,this at once gives us the essential characteristic of responsibility1 and also stamps it as a phenomenon of social ethics4 ,a man living on a desert island would not be responsible1 unless we assume his responsibility to deity2 and even here we have the essential social fact--relation to a person--reintroduced4 ,it is our relations to others1 that and the influence of our actions upon others1 combined with the possibility of our natures being affected by the praise or censure of the social body to which we belong1 which sets up the fact of responsibility4 ,conduct creates a social reaction1 good or bad1 agreeable or disagreeable1 and the reacting judgment of society awakens in each of us a consciousness of responsibility1 more or less acute1 and more or less drastic1 to society at large4 ,the individual sees himself in the social mirror4 ,his nature is fashioned by the social medium1 his personal life becomes an expression of the social life4 ,just as the social conscience1 in the shape of a legal tribunal1 judges each for actions that are past1 so the larger social conscience1 as expressed in a thousand and one different forms1 customs1 and associations1 judges us for those desires and dispositions that may result in action in the future4 ,responsibility as a phenomenon of social psychology is obvious1 educative1 inescapable1 and admirable4 ,responsibility as a phenomenon of individual psychology1 whether from the ,determinist or ,indeterminist point of view1 is positively meaningless4 ,taking1 then1 responsibility as a fact of social life1 with its true significance of accountability1 let us see its meaning on deterministic lines4 ,for the sake of clearness we will first take legal responsibility as illustrating the matter4 ,in law a man is accounted guilty provided he knows the law he is breaking1 and also that he is capable of appreciating the consequences of his actions4 ,a further consideration of no mean importance is that the consequences attending the infringement of the law are assumed to be sufficiently serious to counterbalance the inducements to break the regulation4 ,and as all citizens are assumed to know the law1 we may confine our attention to the last two aspects4 ,what1 then1 is meant by ability to appreciate consequences8 ,there can be no other meaning than the capacity to create an ideal presentment of the penalties attaching to certain actions4 ,every promise of reward or threat of punishment assumes this1 and assumes also that provided the ideal presentment is strong enough1 certain general results will follow4 ,it is on this principle alone that punishments are proportioned to offences1 and that certain revisions of penalties take place from time to time4 ,negatively the same thing is shown by the fact that young children1 idiots1 and lunatics are not legally held responsible for their actions4 ,the ground here is that the power to represent ideally the full consequences of actions is absent1 or operates in an abnormal manner4 ,moreover1 the whole line of proof to establish insanity in a court of law is that a person is not amenable to certain desires and impulses in the same manner as are normally constituted people4 ,substantially the same thing is seen if we take the fact of responsibility in non-legal matters4 ,a very young child1 incapable of ideally representing consequences1 is not considered a responsible being4 ,an older child has a limited responsibility in certain simple matters4 ,as it grows older1 and growth brings with it the power of more fully appreciating the consequence of actions1 its responsibility increases in the home1 in the school1 in business1 social1 religious1 and political circles it is held accountable for its conduct1 in proportion as the power of estimating the consequences of actions is assumed4 ,in other words1 we assume not that there is at any stage an autonomous or self-directing will in operation1 but that a particular quality of motive will operate at certain stages of mental development1 and the whole of the educative process1 in the home1 the school1 and in society1 aims at making these motives effective4 ,that is1 the whole fact of responsibility assumes as a datum the very condition that the ,indeterminist regards as destroying responsibility altogether4 ,he argues that if action is the expression of character1 responsibility is a farce4 ,but it is precisely because action is the expression of character that responsibility exists4 ,when the law1 or when society1 calls a man to account for something he has done1 it does not deny that had he possessed a different character he would have acted differently4 ,it does not assert that at the time of action he could have helped doing what he did4 ,both may be admitted4 ,what it does say is that having a character of such and such a kind certain things are bound to follow4 ,but inasmuch as that character may be modified by social opinion or social coercion1 inasmuch as it will respond to certain influences brought to bear upon it1 it is a responsible character1 and so may be held accountable for its actions4 ,there is1 therefore1 nothing incompatible between ,determinism and ,responsibility4 ,the incompatibility lies between ,indeterminism and ,responsibility4 ,what meaning can we attach to it1 on what ground can we call a person to account1 if our calling him to account is not one of the considerations that will affect his conduct8 ,grant that a consciousness of responsibility decides how a person shall act1 and the principle of ,determinism is admitted4 ,deny that a consciousness of responsibility determines action1 and the phrase loses all meaning and value4 ,the difficulty arises1 as has been said1 by ignoring the fact that responsibility is of social origin1 and in looking for an explanation in individual psychology4 ,it would1 of course1 be absurd to make man responsible for being what he is1 but so long as he is amenable to the pressure of normal social forces he is responsible or accountable for what he may be4 ,whatever his character be1 so long as it has the capacity of being affected by social pressure1 it is a responsible character4 ,and this is the sole condition that makes responsibility intelligible4 ,having said this1 it is not difficult to see the place of punishment and reward1 or praise and blame1 in the ,determinist scheme of things4 ,another word than punishment might be selected1 and one that would be without its unpleasant associations1 but on the whole it is advisable perhaps to retain the word in order to see the nature of the problem clearly4 ,of course1 punishment in the sense of the infliction of pain merely because certain actions have been committed1 no ,determinist would countenance4 ,so far as punishment is inflicted in this spirit of sheer retaliation it serves only to gratify feelings of malevolence4 ,a society that punishes merely to gratify resentment is only showing that it can be as brutal collectively as individuals can be singly4 ,and if punishment begins and ends with reference to the past1 then it is certainly revolting to inflict pain upon a person because he has done what education and organization impelled him to do4 ,so far one can agree with ,professor ,sidgwick that when a man's conduct is compared with a code1 to the violation of which punishments are attached1 the question whether he really could obey the rule by which he is judged is obvious and inevitable4 ,but when he goes on to reply ,if he could not1 it seems contrary to our sense of justice to punish him1 the reply is1 ,not if the code is one that normal human nature can obey1 and the individual one who can be modified in a required direction in both his own interest and the interest of others4 ,for if our punishment is prospective instead of retrospective1 or at least retrospective only so far as to enable us to understand the character of the individual with whom we are dealing1 and using punishment as one of the means of securing a desirable modification of character1 then punishment is merged in correction1 and receives a complete justification upon ,deterministic lines4 ,the problem is comparatively simple4 ,actions being decided by motives1 the problem with a socially defective character is how to secure the prevalence of desires that will issue in desirable conduct4 ,a man steals2 the problem then is1 ,how can we so modify the character of which stealing is the expression1 so that we may weaken the desire to steal and strengthen feelings that will secure honesty of action8 ,on the lower plane society resorts to threats of pains and penalties1 so that when the desire to steal arises again1 the knowledge that certain measures will be taken against the offender will arrest this desire4 ,this is one of the principal grounds on which a measure like the ,first ,offenders ,act is based4 ,on a higher plane the approval and respect of society serve to awaken a positive liking for honesty and the formation of desirable mental habits4 ,praise and blame rest upon a precisely similar basis4 ,man being the socialized animal he is1 the approbation and disapprobation of his fellows must always exert considerable influence on his conduct4 ,the memory of censure passed or of praise bestowed acts as one of the many influences that will determine conduct when the critical moment for action arrives4 ,man does not always consciously put the question of what his social circle will think of his actions1 but this feeling rests upon a deeper and more secure basis than that of consciousness4 ,it has been1 so to speak1 worked into his nature by all the generations of social life that have preceded his existence1 and to escape it means to put off all that is distinctly human in his character4 ,every time we praise or blame an action we are helping to mould character1 for both will serve as guides in the future4 ,and it is just because at the moment of action a person could not help doing what he did that there is any reasonable justification for either approval or censure4 ,social approval and disapproval become an important portion of the environment to which the human being must perforce adapt himself4 ,what use could there be in punishing or blaming a man if his actions are determined1 not by realizable motives1 but by a mysterious will that in spite of our endeavours remains uninfluenced8 ,if neither the promise nor the recollection of punishment creates feelings that will determine conduct1 then one might as well whip the wind4 ,its only purpose is to gratify our own feelings of anger or malevolence4 ,it is equally futile to look for the cause of wrong-doing in education1 organization1 or environment4 ,for in proportion as we recognize any or all of these factors as determining conduct we are deserting the ,indeterminist position1 and relinquishing the freedom of the will4 ,if ,indeterminism be true we are forced to believe that although as a consequence of ill-conduct evil feelings may arise with greater frequency1 yet they must be wholly ineffective as influencing action4 ,it cannot even be argued that certain motives offer stronger attraction than others to the will1 for this in itself would be a form of determinism4 ,there is no middle course4 ,either the will remains absolutely uninfluenced by threat of punishment or desire for praise1 serenely indifferent to the conflict of desires1 and proof against the influence of education1 or it forms a part of the causative sequence and the truth of ,determinism is admitted4 ,you cannot at the same time hold that man does not act in accordance with the strongest motive1 and decide that the will maintains its freedom by deciding which motive shall be the strongest--its own determination not being the product of previous training4 ,one need1 indeed1 only state the ,indeterminist position plainly to see its inherent absurdity4 ,if ever in any case the argument ad absurdum was applicable it is surely here4 ,it may safely be said that the larger part of the life of each of us is passed in anticipating the future in the light of experience4 ,but if ,free-,will be a fact1 on what ground can we forecast the future4 ,if motives do not determine conduct1 any prophecy of what certain people may do in a given situation is futile4 ,the will being indetermined1 what they have done in the past is no guide as to what they will do in the future4 ,if motives did not decide then they will not decide now4 ,whether we read backward or forward makes no difference4 ,we have no right to say that the actions of certain statesmen prove them to have been animated by the desire for wealth or power4 ,that would imply ,determinism4 ,we cannot say that because a murder has been committed a certain person who bore the deceased ill-will is rightly suspected4 ,this is assuming that conduct is determined by motives4 ,if we see a person jump into the river1 we have no right to argue that depressed health1 or financial worry1 or impending social disgrace1 has caused him to commit suicide4 ,the mother may as easily murder her child as nurse it4 ,the workman may labour as well for a bare pittance as for a comfortable wage4 ,a man outside a house in the early hours of the morning1 armed with a dark lantern and a jemmy1 may have no desire to commit a burglary4 ,a person with a game bag and a gun furnishes no reliable data for believing that he intends to shoot something4 ,in all of these cases1 and in hundreds of others1 if free-will be a fact we have no right to argue from actions to motives1 or infer motives from actions4 ,motives do not rule1 and we are witnessing the uncaused and unaccountable vagaries of an autonomous will4 ,it is sometimes said that no matter how convinced a ,determinist one may be1 one always acts as though the will were free4 ,this1 so far from being true1 is the reverse of what really happens4 ,in all the affairs of life people of all shades of opinion concerning ,determinism really act as though ,free-,will had no existence4 ,it would1 indeed1 be strange were it otherwise4 ,facts are more insistent than theories1 and in the last resort it is the nature of things which determines the course of our actions4 ,nature1 while permitting considerable latitude in matters of theory or opinion1 allows comparatively little play in matters of conduct4 ,and it may be asserted that a society which failed to acknowledge in its conduct the principle of ,determinism would stand but small chance of survival4 ,as a matter of fact1 when it comes to practical work the theory of ,free-,will is ignored and the theory of ,determinism acted upon4 ,the unfortunate thing is that the maintenance of ,free-,will in the sphere of opinion serves to check the wholesome application of the opposite principle4 ,theory is used to check action instead of serving its proper function as a guide to conduct4 ,still1 it is instructive to note to what extent in the sphere of practice the principle of ,determinism is admitted4 ,in dealing with the drink question1 for instance1 temperance reformers argue that a diminution in the number of public-houses1 and the creation of opportunities for healthy methods of enjoyment1 will diminish temptation and weaken the desire for alcoholic stimulants4 ,in the training of children stress is rightly laid upon the importance of the right kind of associates1 the power of education1 and of healthy physical surroundings4 ,with adults1 the beneficial influences of fresh air1 good food1 well-built houses1 open spaces1 and healthy conditions of labour have become common-places of sociology4 ,in every rational biography attention is paid to the formative influences of parents1 friends1 and general environment4 ,medical men seek the cause of frames of mind in nervous structure1 and predisposition to physical1 mental1 and moral disease in heredity4 ,statisticians point to absolute uniformity of general human action under certain social conditions4 ,moralists point to the power of ideals on people's minds4 ,religious teachers emphasize the power of certain teachings in reducing particular habits4 ,in all these cases no allowance whatever is made for the operation of an undetermined will4 ,the motive theory of action may not be consciously in the minds of all1 but it is everywhere and at all times implied in practice4 ,in strict truth1 we cannot undertake a single affair in life without making the assumption that people will act in accordance with certain motives1 and that these in turn will be the outcome of specific desires4 ,if ,i journey from here to ,paris ,i unconsciously assume that certain forces--the desire to retain a situation1 to earn a living1 to satisfy a sense of duty--will cause all the officials connected with boat and train service to carry out their duties in a given manner4 ,if ,i appeal for the protection of the police ,i am again counting upon certain motives influencing the official mind in a particular manner4 ,all commercial transactions rest upon the same unconscious assumption4 ,a merchant who places an order with a firm in ,russia1 ,america1 or ,japan1 or who sends goods abroad1 counts with absolute confidence upon certain desires and mental states so influencing a number of people with whom he has no direct connection1 that they will co-operate in landing the goods at the point desired4 ,or if the goods are not transmitted as desired1 it is not because the principle upon which he relied is invalid1 but because other desires have operated in a more powerful manner4 ,a general commanding an army acts on precisely the same principle4 ,the ideal of duty1 of the honour of the regiment1 the desire for distinction1 are all counted upon as being powerful enough to serve as motives that will cause men to join in battle1 storm a risky position1 or take part in a forlorn hope4 ,history is read upon the same principle4 ,the statement that ,nero was cruel1 that ,henry the ,eighth was of an amatory nature1 that ,charles ,i4 was tyrannical1 or that ,louis the ,fifteenth was licentious1 could not be made unless we argue that their actions imply the existence of certain motives4 ,that the motive theory of the will is true is admitted in practice by all4 ,the ,indeterminist admits it even in his appeal to ,liberty4 ,he is counting upon the desire for freedom 7sociologically7 as being strong enough to lead people to reject a theory which denies its applicability to morals4 ,human nature becomes a chaos if ,determinism is denied4 ,neither a science of human conduct nor of history is possible in its absence2 for both assume a fundamental identity of human nature beneath all the comparatively superficial distinctions of colour1 creed1 or national divisions4 ,the determination of the influence of climate1 food1 inter-tribal or international relations1 of the power of ideals--moral1 religious1 military1 national1 etc4--are all so many exercises in the philosophy of ,determinism4 ,in none of these directions do we make the least allowance for the operation of an uncaused will4 ,we say with absolute confidence that given a people with a military environment1 and either its discomforts produce an anti-militarist feeling1 or its glamour evokes a strong militarist feeling4 ,so with all other consideration that comes before us4 ,and as ,determinism enables us to read and understand history and life1 so it also provides a basis upon which we can work for reform4 ,in the belief that certain influences will produce1 in the main1 a particular result1 we can lay our plans and work with every prospect of ultimate success4 ,instead of our best endeavours being left at the mercy of an undetermined will1 they take their place as part of the determining influences that are moulding human nature4 ,every action becomes a portion of the environment with which each has to deal4 ,more1 it becomes a portion of the agent's own environment1 a part of that ideal world in which we all more or less live4 ,and the heightened consciousness that every action leaves a certain residuum for either good or ill1 supplies in itself one of the strongest incentives for the exercise of self-control and furnishes an unshakable basis for self-development4 ,,vii4 ,,determinism ,,and ,,character4 ,in spite of what has been said1 it may be that a protest will still be raised by some on behalf of character4 ,a man's character1 it will be argued1 is an alienable personal possession4 ,what he does belongs to him in a sense that is peculiar to his personality4 ,in many important instances his actions bear the stamp of individuality in so plain a manner that while we cannot predict what he will do1 once it is done we recognize by the peculiar nature of the action that it must have been done by him and by none other4 ,in painting1 in music1 in literature1 and in many other walks of life1 we are able to infer authorship by the personality stamped upon the production4 ,moreover1 nothing that we can do or say will ever destroy the conviction that my actions are mine4 ,they proceed from me2 they are the expressions of my character2 it is this feeling that induces me to plead guilty to the charge of responsibility1 and this conviction remains after all argument has been urged4 ,but1 it is further asked1 how can this be aught but an illusion if ,i am not the real and determining cause of my conduct8 ,if ,i and my actions are the products of a converging series of calculable or indetermined forces1 are we not compelled to dismiss this conviction as pure myth8 ,must ,i not conclude that ,i am no more the determining cause of my conduct than a stone determines whether it shall fall to the ground or not8 ,and is not the cultivation of character1 therefore1 an absurd futility8 ,now although the ,determinist will dissent from the conclusions of those who argue in this way1 with a great deal of the argument he would agree2 more than that1 he would enforce the same line of reasoning as a legitimate inference from his own position4 ,and he might also submit that it is only by an acceptance of the deterministic position that such reasoning can receive full justification4 ,what do we mean by character8 ,suppose we reply with ,t4 ,h4 ,green by defining character as the way in which a man seeks self-satisfaction4#g ,we are next faced with the problem of accounting for the different ways in which self-satisfaction is sought4 ,one man is a drunkard and another temperate1 one is benevolent and another grasping1 one is cruel and another kind2 there are endless diversities of human conduct1 and all come within the scope of ,green's definition of character4 ,we have to look farther and deeper4 ,a satisfactory answer clearly cannot be found in the assumption that each person's actions proceed from an unfettered1 autonomous will4 ,the reason for the choice would still have to be discovered4 ,nor will it do to attribute the difference of choice to different environmental influences in which the self is placed4 ,this would indeed be reducing the man to the level of a machine1 or to a lower level still4 ,and the same environmental influences do not produce identical results4 ,this is one of the commonest facts of daily experience4 ,stimulus from the environment is the essential condition of action1 but the precise nature of the action elicited is an affair of the organism4 ,if ,i am courageous by nature ,i shall stay and face a threatened danger4 ,if ,i am cowardly ,i shall run away4 ,thus1 while circumstances are the cause of my acting1 how ,i shall act is in turn caused by my character1 the net result being due to their interaction4 ,this seems so obvious that it may well be accepted as a datum common to both parties in the dispute4 #g ,works1 vol4 ii4 p4 #adb4 ,we may1 then1 freely grant the ,indeterminist--what he foolishly assumes is inconsistent with the ,deterministic position--that environment may be modified by character1 that a man is not the creature of circumstances1 if we restrict that word to external circumstances1 as is so often done4 ,a man1 we will say1 allowing for the influence of external circumstances1 acts according to his character4 ,the question then becomes1 ,what is his character8 ,how does he acquire it8#h ,and whence the varieties of character8 ,to these queries the only intelligible reply is that a man's character represents his psychic heritage1 as his body represents his physical heritage1 both of them being subject to development and modification by post-natal influences4 ,each one thus brings a different psychic force1 or a different character1 to bear upon the world around him4 ,he is thus the author of his acts1 not in the unintelligible sense of absolutely originating the sequence that proceeds from his actions1 but in the rational sense of being that point in the sequence that is represented by his personality4 ,and his actions bear the stamp of his personality because had his antecedents been different his actions would have varied accordingly4 ,each is properly judged in terms of character1 because it is the character which determines the form taken by the reaction of the organism on the environment4 #h ,of course1 the man and his character are not two distinct things4 ,the character is the man4 ,but it would involve needless circumlocution to insist on superfine distinctions1 and it may even help to a comprehension of the argument to keep to familiar forms of speech4 ,we may go even further than this and say that it is only actions which proceed from character that are properly the subject of moral judgment4 ,let us take a concrete illustration of this4 ,a man distributes a large sum of money among the inhabitants of a town1 some of it in the form of personal gifts among its needy inhabitants1 the rest in endowing various institutions connected with its social and municipal life4 ,twelve months later he comes forward as candidate in a parliamentary election4 ,the question of his donations at once comes up for judgment1 and in defence he may plead that he was only invited to contest the seat after the money was given4 ,how shall we determine what his motives were8 ,obviously by an appeal to his character4 ,if he were well known as a wealthy person of recognized benevolent disposition1 it would be argued that while his candidature would inevitably reap benefit from his donations it was highly probable that in giving the money he was only acting as one would expect him to act4 ,if1 on the other hand1 he was well known as a person of a mean and grasping disposition1 it would be concluded that the donation was an attempt to bribe the electorate1 his giving the money so long before being an intelligent anticipation of events4 ,in either case we should be appealing to character1 and judging the man by what of his character was known4 ,numerous instances of a like kind might be given1 but in every case it would be found that we infer from an action a particular kind of motive1 and that our judgment of the motive is determined by the character of the individual4 ,this is so far the case that we are apt to mistrust our own judgment when we find a benevolent person doing what looks like a mean action1 or a brave person committing what looks like an act of cowardice4 ,while action is thus--so far as it is intentional--always the registration of motive1 and motive the expression of a preponderating desire1 the desire1 whether it be licentious or chaste1 noble or ignoble1 is the outcome of character4 ,determinism thus finds a fit and proper place for character in its philosophy of things4 ,it does not say that the fact or the consideration of character is irrelevant2 on the contrary1 it says it is all-important4 ,and in saying this it challenges the position of the ,indeterminist by the implication that it is only on lines of ,determinism that character is important or that it can be profitably cultivated4 ,for consider what is meant by saying that conduct implies and proceeds from character4 ,it clearly implies that a man acts in this or that manner because he has been in the habit of acting in this or that manner4 ,we do not gather grapes from thistles1 and we do not experience noble actions from a depraved character4 ,the actions of each are determined by the character of each1 and character is in turn the outcome of psychic inheritance1 plus the effects of the interaction of organism and environment from the moment of birth onward4 ,personal characteristics1 honesty1 courage1 truthfulness1 loyalty1 thus imply strictly determined qualities4 ,they are qualities determined by the nature of the organism4 ,they could not be expressed unless the surrounding circumstances were favourable to their expression2 but neither could they be manifested unless the character was of a particular order4 ,conduct is1 in fact1 always a product of the two things4 ,let us also note that it is this determination of qualities that is implied when we speak of a good or a bad1 a strong or a weak character4 ,we should not call a man a good character who to-day fed a starving child1 and to-morrow kicked it from his doorstep4 ,we should describe him as1 at best1 a person of an exceedingly variable disposition who satisfied the caprice of the moment irrespective of the feelings and needs of others4 ,we should not call a person strong who withstood a temptation one hour and yielded to it the next4 ,he would be described as weak1 and lacking the compelling force of a stable disposition4 ,it is also true that the moralization of character is the more complete as the determined nature of impulses is the more evident4 ,most people would not only resent the imputation of having committed a mean action1 they would also resent the likelihood of their committing one4 ,and in common speech1 and in fact1 the highest tribute we can pay a man is to say that a certain kind of action is beneath him4 ,we say that we know ,a would not have committed a theft1 but we are quite willing to believe it of ,b4 ,in each case we make no allowance for the operation of an undetermined will2 such doubts as we have being connected with our inability to completely analyze the character in question4 ,but our prognostications are strictly based upon our knowledge of character and upon the conviction that given a certain character and the operation of particular motives1 specific action follows with mathematical certainty4 ,and this1 as has previously been pointed out1 gives the only reliable basis for the cultivation of character4 ,the whole aim of education1 whether it be that received in the home1 in the school1 or the larger and more protracted education of social life1 has the aim and purpose of securing the spontaneous response of a particular action to a particular stimulus1 or on the negative side that certain circumstances shall not arouse desires of a socially unwelcome character4 ,the phrase ,patriotism thus serves to arouse a group of feelings that cluster round the state and social life4 ,home awakens its own groups of domestic and parental feelings4 ,duty1 again1 covers a wider sphere1 but involves the same process4 ,by instruction and by training1 certain conditions1 circumstances1 words1 or associations are made to call up trains of connected feelings which1 culminating in a desire1 imperatively demand conduct along a given line4 ,the more complete the education1 the stronger the desire2 the stronger the desire1 the more certain the action4 ,the more defective the education the less the certainty with which we can count upon specific conduct4 ,the man who acts to-day in one way and to-morrow in another way is not a man of strong desires1 so much as he is a man whose desires are undisciplined4 ,the man who acts with uniform certainty is not a man of weak desire1 but one whose desires run with strength and swiftness in a uniform direction4 ,and it is a curious feature of indeterministic psychology that it should take as clear evidence of the subordination of desire to will the man whose desire is so strong as to preclude hesitation between it and action4 ,the whole of education1 the whole of the discipline of life1 is thus based upon the determination of conduct by circumstances and character4 ,if the principle of cause and effect does not fully apply to conduct1 all our training is so much waste of time4 ,but it is because we cannot really think of the past not influencing the present1 once we bring the two into relation1 that we1 ,determinist and ,indeterminist alike1 proceed with our deterministic methods of training1 and in this instance at least wisdom is justified of her children4 ,finally1 if the above be granted1 can we longer attach meaning to the expression that man forms his own character8 ,well1 if it means that a man has any share in his psychic endowments1 or that they being what they are at any given time he could at that time act differently from the way in which he does act1 the expression is meaningless4 ,it is absolute nonsense4 ,but in another sense it does convey an important truth4 ,we must1 however1 always bear in mind that in speaking of a man's character we are not dealing with two things1 but with one thing4 ,the character is the man1 the man is the character4 ,or to be quite accurate1 body and mind1 physical and psychical qualities together1 form the man1 and any separation of these is for purposes of analysis and study only4 ,if we say1 then1 that a man is master of his own character1 or that a man may mould his own character1 we do not imply the existence of an independent entity moulding or mastering something else4 ,we are saying no more than that every experience carries its resultant into the sum of character4 ,action generates habit1 and habit means a more or less permanent modification of character4 ,what a man is1 is the outcome of what he has been1 and a perception of this truth no more conflicts with the principles of ,determinism as above explained1 than a stone being intercepted in its fall down the side of a hill by lodging against a tree is an infraction of the law of gravitation4 ,in this sense1 using figurative language1 a man may be said to be master of himself4 ,what he does proceeds from himself2 it is the expression of his character1 and his doing cuts deeper the grooves of habit1 and so makes more certain the performance of similar actions in the future4 ,it is the fact of the motive springing from character which determines the act that makes the man its author4 ,and the knowledge of this supplies him with1 not alone the most powerful incentive towards the determination of his own character1 but1 what is equally important1 the only method whereby to fashion the character of others4 ,,viii4 ,a ,,problem ,,in ,,determinism4 ,if human feeling followed logical conviction the discussion of ,determinism might1 so far as the present writer is concerned1 be considered as finished4 ,ultimately this doubtless occurs2 but in the interim one has to reckon with the play of feeling1 fashioned by long-standing conviction1 upon convictions that are of recent origin4 ,thus it happens that many who realise the logical force of arguments similar to those hitherto advanced1 find themselves in a state of fearfulness concerning the ultimate effect on human life of a convinced ,determinism4 ,the conflict between feeling and conviction that exists in their own minds they naturally ascribe to others1 and endow it with a permanency which mature consideration might show to be unwarranted4 ,it would indeed be strange and lamentable if the divorce between feeling and conviction--to adopt a popular classification--was not simply incidental to change1 but was also an inexpugnable part of fundamental aspects of human life4 ,mr4 ,a4 ,j4 ,balfour has indeed gone so far as to suggest1#i as a theory to meet this phenomenon1 that the immediate consciousness of our actions being determined would be so paralyzing to action1 that ,nature has by a process of selective slaughter made a consciousness of this character a practical impossibility4 ,but it would seem that the fact of a consciousness of determination developing at all affords strong presumptions in favour of the belief that no such selective slaughter is really necessary to the maintenance of vital social relations4 ,mr4 ,balfour's argument might have some weight against ,fatalism1 which says that what is to be will be in despite of all that may be done to prevent its occurrence2 but we are on different ground with a theory which makes what ,i do part of the sequence that issues in a particular result4 #i ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 vol4 iv4 pp4 #dba-dbb4 ,the problem is put very plainly in the following two quotations4 ,the first is from a private source1 written by one who fears the consequences of ,determinism on conduct4 ,the writer says3-- ,in a moral crisis1 and with the consciousness of a strong tendency in the direction of what is felt to be wrong1 is there no danger of this desire gaining further strength and becoming the predominant feeling by accepting ,determinism1 causing a weakened sense of responsibility1 besides providing a convenient excuse for giving way to the lower instead of the higher8 ,thus in a question of alternatives is it not conceivable that by dwelling on this thought1 the agent is resisting possibilities which might otherwise have a different effect had ,determinism no advocacy and with a different competitive factor to oppose8 ,this1 it seems to me1 is what the ,indeterminist fears1 and ,i think it must be admitted not without some reason4 ,the second comes from ,mr4 ,f4 ,w4 ,headley's work1 ,life and ,evolution4 ,mr4 ,headley1 after discussing the evolution of mind1 and after admitting the impregnable nature of the determinist position1 says that notwithstanding the evidence to the contrary we cannot help cherishing the belief that we are in some sense free1 and adds3-- ,for practical purposes what is wanted is not free-will but a working belief in it4 ,when the time for decision and for action comes1 a man must feel that he is free to choose or he is lost4 ,and this working belief in free-will1 even though the thing itself be proved to be a phantom and an illusion1 is the inalienable property of every healthy man4 ,both these criticisms might be met by the method of analysing the use made of certain leading words4 ,for example1 the ,determinist would quite agree that for conduct to be fruitful a man must feel that he is free to choose4 ,but unless his freedom consists in liberty to obey the dictates of his real nature1 the term is without significance4 ,the fact of choice1 as has been pointed out1 is common ground for both ,determinist and ,indeterminist4 ,the real question is whether the choice itself is determined or not4 ,what a man needs to feel is that his choice is decisive1 and that it is based upon an impartial review of the alternatives as they appear to him4 ,determinism makes full allowance for this2 it is ,indeterminism which in denying the application of causality to the will substantially asserts that the whole training of a lifetime may be counteracted by the decision of an uncaused will1 and so renders the whole process unintelligible4 ,and as to ,determinism causing a weakened sense of responsibility1 surely one may fairly argue that the consciousness of the cumulative force of practice may well serve to warn us against yielding to a vicious propensity1 and so strengthen the feeling of resistance to it4 ,there could hardly be conceived a stronger incentive to right action1 or to struggle against unwholesome desires1 than this conviction4 ,moreover1 the practical testimony of those who are convinced ,determinists is all in this direction4 ,the fears are expressed by those whose advocacy of ,determinism is at best of but a lukewarm description4 ,but in order that the full weight of the difficulty may be realized let us put the matter in a still more forcible form4 ,determinism1 it is to be remembered1 is an attempt to apply to mind and morals that principle of causation which is of universal application in the physical world1 and where it has proved itself so fruitful and suggestive4 ,on this principle all that is flows from all that has been in such a way that1 given a complete knowledge of the capacities of all the forces in operation at any one time1 the world a century hence could be predicted with mathematical accuracy4 ,so likewise with human nature4 ,human conduct being due to the interaction of organism with environment1 our inability to say what a person will do under given circumstances is no more than an expression of our ignorance of the quantitative and qualitative value of the forces operating4 ,the possibilities of action are co-extensive with the actualities of ignorance4 ,there is no break in the working of causation1 no matter what the sphere of existence with which we happen to be dealing4 ,it is at this point that ,determinism lands one in what is apparently an ethical cul-de-sac4 ,if all that is1 is the necessary result of all that has been1 if nothing different from what does occur could occur1 what is the meaning of the sense of power over circumstances that we possess8 ,and why urge people to make an effort in this or that direction if everything1 including the effort or its absence1 is determined8 ,i may flatter myself with the notion that things are better because of some action of mine4 ,but beyond the mere fact that my action is part of the stream of causation1 all else is a trick of the imagination4 ,my conduct is1 all the time1 the result of the co-operation of past conditions with present circumstances4 ,to say that praise or blame of other people's conduct1 or approval or disapproval of my own conduct1 is itself a determinative force1 hardly meets the point4 ,for these1 too1 are part of the determined order4 ,it might be urged that the knowledge that by exciting certain feelings others are proportionately weakened operates in the direction of improvement4 ,quite so2 and as a mere description of what occurs the statement is correct4 ,but to the ,determinist there is no ,i that determines which feeling or cluster of feelings shall predominate4 ,i am the expression of the succession and co-ordination of mental states2 we are still within a closed circle of causation4 ,whether ,i am good or bad1 wise or unwise1 ,i shall be what ,i must be1 and nothing else2 do as ,i must do1 and no more4 ,this is1 ,i think1 putting the ,indeterminists' case as strongly as it can be put4 ,how is the ,determinist to meet the attack8 ,a common retort is that all this being granted things remain as they were4 ,if the criminal action is determined so is that of the judge1 and so no harm is done4 ,we shall go on praising or blaming1 punishing or rewarding1 doing or not doing1 exactly as before1 simply because we cannot do otherwise4 ,this1 however1 while effective as a mere retort1 is not very satisfactory as an answer4 ,for it neither explains the sense of power people feel they possess1 nor does it meet the criticism raised4 ,on the one hand there is the fact that character does undergo modification1 and the conviction that my effort does play a part in securing that modification4 ,and with this there goes the feeling--with some--that if everything1 mental states and dispositions included1 is part of an unbroken and unbreakable order1 why delude ourselves with the notion of personal power8 ,why not let things drift8 ,and on the other hand there is the conviction that scientific ,determinism holds the field4 ,the state of mind is there1 and it is fairly expressed in the two quotations already given2 particularly in ,mr4 ,headley's statement that we ought to act as though ,free-,will were a fact1 even though we know it to be otherwise4 ,the difficulty is there1 and one must admit that it is not always fairly faced by writers on ,determinism4 ,an appeal is made to man's moral sense1 and this1 while legitimate enough in some connections1 is quite irrelevant in this4 ,or it is said that a knowledge of the causational nature of morals should place people on their guard against encouraging harmful states of mind4 ,this is also good counsel1 but it clearly does not touch the point that1 whether ,i encourage harmful or beneficial states of mind1 it is all part of the determined order of things4 ,as an example of what has been said we may take a passage from ,john ,stuart ,mill4 ,in his criticism of ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 ,mill remarks3-- ,the true doctrine of the causation of human actions maintains 444 that not only our conduct1 but our character1 is1 in part1 amenable to our will2 that we can by employing the proper means1 improve our character2 and that if our character is such that while it remains what it is1 it necessitates us to do wrong1 it will be just to apply motives which will necessitate us to strive for its improvement1 and so emancipate ourselves from the other necessity2 in other words1 we are under a moral obligation to seek the improvement of our moral character4 ,admirable as is this passage it is clearly no reply to the criticism that whether we seek moral improvement or not1 either course is as much necessitated as is the character that needs improving4 ,to give a real relevance to this passage we should have to assume the existence of an ego outside the stream of causation deciding at what precise point it should exert a determining influence4 ,that so clear a thinker as ,mill should have overlooked this gives point to what has been said as to writers on ,determinism having failed to squarely face the issue4 ,a more valid reply to ,mr4 ,headley's position would be that so long as we believe a theory to be sound there is no real gain in acting as though we were convinced otherwise4 ,granting that an illusion may have its uses1 it can only be of service so long as we do not know it to be an illusion4 ,a mirage of cool trees and sparkling pools may inspire tired travellers in a desert to renewed efforts of locomotion4 ,but if they know it to be a mirage it only serves to discourage effort4 ,and once we believe in ,determinism1 our right course1 and our only profitable course1 is to face all the issues as courageously as may be4 ,not that a correct reading of ,determinism leads to our sitting with folded hands lacking the spirit to strive for better things4 ,it may be that certain people so read ,determinism1 but one cannot reasonably hold a theory responsible for every misreading of it that exists4 ,theologians in particular would be in a very uncomfortable position if this rule were adopted4 ,a theory is responsible for such conclusions or consequences as are logically deducible therefrom1 but no more4 ,and what we are now concerned with is1 first1 will ,determinism1 properly understood1 really have the effect feared2 and1 second1 is it possible for ,determinism to account adequately for the belief that it is possible to modify other people's character1 and in so doing modify our own8 ,in ,mill's words1 can we exchange the necessity to do wrong for the necessity to do right8 ,i believe that a satisfactory reply can be given to both questions4 ,in the first place we have to get rid of the overpowering influence of an atomistic psychology4 ,a very little study of works on psychology--particularly of the more orthodox schools--is enough to show that the social medium as a factor determining man's mental nature has been either ignored1 or given a quite subordinate position4 ,because in studying the mental qualities of man we are necessarily dealing with an individual brain1 it has been assumed that mental phenomena may be explained with no more than a casual reference to anything beyond the individual organism4 ,this assumption may be sound so long as we are dealing with mind as the function of definitely localized organs1 or if we are merely describing mental phenomena4 ,it is when we pass to the contents of the mind1 and study the significance of mental states1 or enquire how they came into existence1 that we find the atomistic psychology breaking down1 and we find ourselves compelled to deal with mind as a psycho-sociologic phenomenon1 with its relation to the social medium4 ,then we discover that it is man's social relationships1 the innumerable generations of reaction between individual organisms and the social medium1 which supply the key to problems that are otherwise insoluble4 ,it has already been pointed out that the whole significance of morality is social4 ,if we restrict ourselves to the individual no adequate explanation can be given of such qualities as sympathy1 honesty1 truthfulness1 chastity1 kindness1 etc4 ,separate it in thought from the social medium and morality becomes meaningless4 ,properly studied1 psychology yields much the same result4 ,when we get beyond the apprehension of such fundamental qualities as time and space1 heat and cold1 colour and sound1 the contour of man's mind1 so to speak1 is a social product4 ,his feelings and impulses imply a social medium as surely as does morality4 ,from this point of view the phrase ,social sense is no mere figure of speech2 it is the expression of a pregnant truth1 the statement of something as real as any scientific law with which we are acquainted4 ,for the essence of a scientific law is the expression of a relation4 ,the law of gravitation1 for instance1 formulates the relations existing between particles of matter4 ,if there existed but one particle of matter in the universe gravitation would be a meaningless term4 ,introduce a second particle1 and a relation is established between the two1 and the material for a scientific law created4 ,in the same way a description of individual human qualities is fundamentally a statement of the relations existing between individuals living in groups2 and any attempt to understand human nature without considering these relations is as certainly foredoomed to failure as would be the attempt to study a particle of matter apart from the operation of all known forces4 ,the individual as he exists to-day is not something that exists apart from the social forces2 he is an expression1 an epitome1 of all their past and present operations4 ,the really essential thing in the study of human nature is not so much the discrete individual ,a or ,b1 but the relations existing between ,a and ,b4 ,it is these which make each end of the term what it is--determines the individual's language1 feelings1 thoughts1 and character4 ,it is along these lines that we have to look for an explanation of the feeling that we can initiate a reform in character1 and of a sense of power in determining events4 ,we start with a sense of power over the course of events--which is interpreted as the equivalent of our ability to initiate absolutely a change in our own character or in that of others4 ,but a little reflection convinces us--particularly if we call ourselves ,determinists--that this interpretation is quite erroneous4 ,an absolute beginning is no more conceivable in the mental or moral sphere than it is in the physical world4 ,the sum of all that is is the product of all that has been1 and in this1 desires1 feelings1 dispositions are included no less than physical properties4 ,now1 curiously enough1 the conviction that an absolute change in character can be initiated exists with much greater strength in regard to oneself than it does with regard to others4 ,it is easier to observe others than to analyze one's own mental states1 with the result that most people can more readily realize that what others do is the product of their heredity and their environment than they can realize it in their own case4 ,of course1 reflection shows that the same principle applies in both directions1 but we are here dealing with moods rather than with carefully reasoned out convictions4 ,and1 generally speaking1 while we feel ourselves masters of our own fate1 we only suspect a similar strength in others4 ,but each one realizes1 and with increasing vividness1 the power he possesses in modifying other people's character by a change of circumstances4 ,we see this illustrated by the increased emphasis placed upon the importance of better sanitation1 better housing1 better conditions of labour1 and of an improved education4 ,more from observing others than by studying ourselves we see how modifiable a thing human nature is4 ,we see how character is modified by an alteration of the material environment1 and we also note our own individual function as a determinative influence in effecting this modification4 ,now ,i quite fail to see that there is in this sense of power over circumstances anything more than a recognition of our own efforts as part of the determinative sequence4 ,the added factor to the general causative series is the consciousness of man himself4 ,we are conscious1 more or less clearly1 of our place in the sequence2 we are able to recognize and study our relations to past and present events1 and our probable relation to future ones4 ,we see ourselves as so many efficient causes of those social reactions that go to make up a science of sociology1 and it is this which gives us a sense of power of determining events4 ,i say power because freedom is an altogether different thing4 ,the question of whether we are free to determine events is1 as ,i have shown1 meaningless when applied to scientific matters4 ,but the question of whether or not we have the power of determining events may be answered in the affirmative--an answer not in the least affected by the belief that this power is strictly conditioned by past and present circumstances4 ,the sense of power is real1 and it expresses a fact1 even though the fact be an inevitable one4 ,we are all shapers of each other's character1 moulders of each other's destiny4 ,the recognition of our power to act in this relation is not contrary to ,determinism1 ,determinism implies it4 ,it is this which gives a real meaning to the expression social sense4 ,for the social sense can have no other meaning or value than as a recognition of the action of one individual upon another1 which1 as in the case of a chemical compound1 results in the production of something that is not given by the mere sum of individual qualities4 ,so1 too1 do we get by this method a higher meaning to the word freedom4 ,in an earlier part of this essay it was pointed out that freedom was of social origin and application4 ,its essential meaning is liberty to carry out the impulses of one's nature unrestricted by the coercive action of one's fellows4 ,but there is a higher and a more positive meaning than this4 ,man is a social animal2 his character is a social product4 ,the purely human qualities not only lose their value when divorced from social relationships1 it is these relationships that provide the only medium for their activity4 ,to say that a person is free to express moral qualities in the absence of his fellows is meaningless1 since it is only in their presence that the manifestation of them is possible4 ,it is the intercourse of man with man that gives to each whatever freedom he possesses4 ,the restraints imposed upon each member of a society in the interests of all are not a curtailing of human freedom but the condition of its realization4 ,to chafe against them is1 to use ,kant's famous illustration1 as unreasonable as a bird's revolt against the opposing medium or atmosphere1 in ignorance of the fact that it is this opposition which makes flight possible4 ,the only genuine freedom that man can know and enjoy is that provided by social life4 ,human freedom has its origin in social relationships1 and to these we are ultimately driven to discover its meaning and significance4 ,so far1 then1 the sense of power in controlling events which each possesses presents no insuperable difficulty to a theory of ,determinism4 ,only one other point remains on which to say a word1 and that is whether a conviction of the causative character of human action would lead to a weakening of effort or to moral depression4 ,why should it have this effect8 ,it is curious that those who fear this result seem to have only in mind the tendencies to wrongdoing4 ,but if it operates at all it must operate in all directions1 and this would certainly strengthen good resolutions as well as bad ones4 ,and even though no more were to be said1 this would justify the assertion that merit and demerit would remain unaffected1 and that any harm done in one direction would be compensated by good done in another4 ,but another important consideration is to be added4 ,this is that while a consciousness of the power of habit acts as a retarding influence on wrongdoing1 it has an accelerating influence in the reverse direction--that is1 unless we assume a character acting with the deliberate intention of cultivating an evil disposition4 ,besides1 the really vicious characters are not usually given to reflecting upon the origin and nature of their desires1 and are therefore quite unaffected by any theory of volition2 while those who are given to such reflection are not usually of a vicious disposition4 ,we are really crediting the vicious with a degree of intelligence and reflective power quite unwarranted by the facts of the case4 ,finally1 the criticism with which ,i have been dealing takes a too purely intellectual view of conduct4 ,it does not allow for the operation of sympathy1 or for the power of social reaction4 ,and these are not only real1 they are of vital importance when we are dealing with human nature4 ,for man cannot1 even if he would1 remain purely passive4 ,the power of sympathy1 the desire for social intercourse1 the invincible feeling that in some way he is vitally concerned with the well-being of the society to which he belongs1 these are always in operation1 even though their degree of intensity varies with different individuals4 ,we cannot possibly isolate man in considering conduct1 because his whole nature has been moulded by social intercourse1 and craves continuously for social approval4 ,and it is such feelings that are powerful agents in the immediate determination of conduct4 ,the mental perception of the causes and conditions of conduct are feeble by comparison and can only operate with relative slowness4 ,and in their operation they are all the time checked and modified by the fundamental requirements of the social structure4 ,,ix4 ,,environment4 ,in the course of the foregoing pages we have made frequent reference to environment1 without the word being precisely described or defined4 ,the subject was of too great importance to be dismissed with a bald definition1 and to have dealt with it earlier at suitable length might have diverted attention from the main argument4 ,but so much turns on a correct understanding of the word environment that a discussion of ,determinism would be incomplete that failed to fix its meaning with a fair degree of accuracy4 ,a very casual study of anti-deterministic literature is enough to show that a great deal of the opposition to a scientific interpretation of human conduct has its origin in a quite wrong conception of what the determinist has in mind when he speaks of the part played by the environment in the determination of conduct4 ,even writings ostensibly deterministic in aim have not been free from blame in their use of the word4 ,thus on the one hand we find it said that man is a creature of his environment1 and by environment we are to understand1 by implication1 only the material forces1 which are assumed to somehow drive man hither and thither in much the same way as a tennis ball is driven this way or that by the player4 ,against this there has been a natural and1 let it be said1 a justifiable reaction4 ,expressed in this way it was felt that man was not at the mercy of his surroundings4 ,it was felt that1 whatever be its nature the organism does exert some influence over environmental forces1 and that it is not a merely passive register of their operations4 ,neither of these views expresses the whole truth4 ,it may be that each expresses a truth1 and it is still more probable1 as is the case with some terms already examined1 that the confusion arises from a mis-use of the language employed4 ,to-day we are all familiar with the dictum that the maintenance of life is a question of adaptation to environment--a truth that is equally applicable to ideas and institutions4 ,but the general truth admitted1 there is next required a consideration of its application to the particular subject in hand1 and in connection with our present topic some attention must be paid both to the nature of the organism and of the environment with which we are dealing4 ,we then discover that not alone are we dealing with an organism which is extremely plastic in its nature1 but that the environment may also vary within very wide limits4 ,on the one side1 and in relation to man1 we may be dealing with an environment that is mainly physical in character1 or it may be a combination of physical conditions and biological forces1 or1 yet again1 it may be predominantly psychological in its nature4 ,and1 on the other hand1 the reaction of the organism on the environment may vary from extreme feebleness to an almost overpowering determination4 ,we may1 indeed1 anticipate our argument by saying that one of the chief features of human progress is the gradual subordination of the material environment to the psychologic powers of man4 ,if1 now1 we contrast the environment of an uncivilized with that of a civilized people the difference is striking4 ,the environment of an uncivilized race will consist of the immediate physical surroundings1 the animals that are hunted for sport or killed for food1 and a comparatively meagre stock of customs and traditions4 ,the environment of a modern ,european will add to the physical surroundings an enormously enlarged mass of social traditions and customs1 an extensive literature1 contact with numerous other societies in various stages of culture1 and relations1 more or less obscure1 to a vast literary and social past4 ,the environment thus includes not merely the living1 but also the dead4 ,roman law1 ,greek philosophy1 ,eastern religious ideas1 etc41 all affect the twentieth century ,european4 ,it would require a lengthy essay to enumerate all the influences that dominate the life of a particular people of to-day1 but enough has been said to illustrate the truth that we must use the term environment so as to include all that affects the organism4 ,and when this is done it soon becomes clear that by the very growth of humanity the influence of the physical portion of the environment becomes of relatively less importance with the progress of the race--it is the subordination of the physical environment that is the principal condition of the advance of civilization4 ,but even when our conception of the meaning of environment has been thus enlarged1 we need to be on our guard against misconception from another side4 ,for the environment is only one factor in the problem2 the organism is another1 and the relative importance of the two is a matter of vital significance4 ,we may still make the mistake of treating the environment as active and the organism as passive4 ,this would be a similar mistake to that which is made when morality and religion are treated as being no more than a reflection of economic conditions4 ,the action of the environment is given a place of first importance1 while the reaction of the organism on its environment is treated as a negligible quantity4 ,historically this may be taken as a reaction against the extreme spiritualistic view which1 in upholding1 a theory of ,free-,will made no allowance for the influence of the surroundings4 ,an extreme view in one direction usually sets up an extreme view by way of opposition1 and it must be confessed that in social philosophy the power of the environment has often been made omnipotent4 ,the medium has been presented as active and the organism as passive4 ,different results occur because the susceptibilities of organisms vary4 ,good or bad influences affect individuals differently for much the same reason that soils differ in their capacity for absorbing water4 ,from the scientific and the philosophic side this conception derived a certain adventitious strength4 ,in the first place there was the now generally discarded psychology which taught that the individual mind was as a sheet of blank paper on which experience inscribed its lessons4 ,and in the second place the growth of biological science brought out with great distinctness the influence of the environment on organic life4 ,it was very plain that the quality and quantity of the food supply1 the action of air and light1 and other purely environmental forces exercised an important influence4 ,in the plant world it was seen how much could be effected by a mere change of habitat4 ,in the animal world markings and structure seemed to have an obvious reference to the nature of the environment4 ,it1 therefore1 seemed nothing but a logical inference to extend the same reasoning to man1 and treat not only his structure but his mental capacities as being the outcome of the same kind of correspondence4 ,but a too rigid application of biological principles lands one in error4 ,society is more than a mere biological group1 and no reasoning that proceeds on the assumption that it is no more than that can avoid confusion4 ,and we certainly cannot square the facts with a theory which treats the human organism as passive under the operation of environmental forces4 ,the conviction that man plays a positive part in life is general1 powerful1 and1 ,i think1 justifiable4 ,but if what ,i do is at any time the product of the environmental forces1 physical and other1 there does not seem any room for me as an active participant4 ,and the facts seem to demand that the individual should appear in some capacity other than that of representing the total in an environmental calculation4 ,this would leave man with no other function than that of a billiard ball pushed over a table by rival players4 ,given the force exerted by the player1 added to the size1 weight1 and position of the ball1 and the product of the combination gives us the correct answer4 ,but this kind of calculation will not do in the case of man4 ,here we must allow1 in addition to external influences1 the positive action of man on his surroundings4 ,the conception of the organism as a plexus of forces capable of this reaction is1 indeed1 vital to our conception of a living being4 ,granted that in either case1 that of the billiard ball and that of the man1 the result expresses the exact sum of all the forces aiding at the time1 there still remains an important distinction in the two cases4 ,whether the billiard ball is struck by a professional player or by an amateur1 provided it be struck in a particular way the result is in both cases identical4 ,an identity of result is produced by an identity of external conditions4 ,with the human organism--with1 in fact1 any organism--this rule does not apply4 ,in any two cases the external factors may be identical1 but the results may be entirely different4 ,a temptation that leaves one unaffected may prove overpowering with another4 ,exactly the same conditions of food1 occupation1 residence1 and social position may co-exist with entirely different effects on the organism4 ,these differences will be manifested from the earliest years and are a direct consequence of the positive reaction of the organism on its environment1 a reaction that is more profound in the case of man than in that of any other animal4 ,to put the matter briefly4 ,in the case of the billiard player the ball remains a constant factor in a problem in which external conditions represent a variant4 ,in the case of man and his environment we are dealing with two sets of factors1 neither of which is constant and one of which--the human one--varies enormously4 ,and the reaction of man on his environment becomes so great as to result in its practical transformation4 ,it may1 of course1 be urged that all this is covered and allowed for by heredity4 ,this may be so1 but ,i am arguing against those who while recognizing heredity fail to make adequate allowance for its operations4 ,or it may be said that environment covers all forces1 including heredity4 ,but in that case the distinction between organism and environment is useless--in fact1 it disappears4 ,if1 however1 the distinction between the two is retained1 our theorizing must give full appreciation to both4 ,and in that case we must not fail to allow for the transforming power of man over his surroundings4 ,nor must we overlook another and a very vital fact1 that in a large measure the environment to which civilised mankind must adapt itself is largely a thing of human creation4 ,viewed as merely external circumstances1 the physical environment of man remains constant4 ,at any rate1 such changes as do take place occur with such slowness that for generations we may safely deal with them as unchanged4 ,the dissipation of the heat of the earth may be a fact1 but no one takes this into account in dealing with the probabilities of human life during the next few generations4 ,on the other hand1 the organism represents the cumulative1 and consequently1 ever-changing power of human nature1 and it is this that gives us the central fact of human civilization4 ,whether acquired characters be inherited or not may be still an open question1 but in any case there is no denying that capacity is heritable1 and natural selection will move along the line of favouring the survival of that capacity which is most serviceable4 ,and how does increasing capacity express itself8 ,it can do so only in the direction of giving man a greater ability to control and mould to his own uses the material environment in which he is placed4 ,looking at the course of social evolution1 we see this increased and increasing capacity expressed in art1 industries1 inventions1 etc41 all of which mean in effect a transformation of the material surroundings and their subjugation to the needs of man4 ,these inventions1 etc41 not only involve a transformation of the existing environment2 they also mean the creating of a new environment for succeeding generations4 ,each mechanical invention1 for example1 is dependent upon the inventions and discoveries that have preceded it1 and to that extent it is dependent upon the environment4 ,but each invention places a new power in the hands of man1 and so enables him to still further modify and control his surroundings4 ,human heredity is thus expressed in capacity as represented by a definite organic structure4 ,this is one factor in the phenomenon of social evolution4 ,the other factor is the environment in which the organism is placed and to which it responds4 ,the two factors1 organism and environment1 remain constant throughout the animal world4 ,it is when we come to deal with human society specifically1 that we find a radical change in the nature of the environment to be considered4 ,granted that some influence must always be exerted by the purely material conditions1 the fact remains that they become relatively less powerful with the advance of civilization4 ,the development of agriculture1 the invention of weapons and tools1 the discovery of the nature of natural forces1 all help to give the developing human a greater measure of control over both the physical and organic portion of his environment1 and to manifest a measure of independence concerning them4 ,but the supreme and peculiar feature of human society is the creation of a new medium to which the individual must adapt himself4 ,by means of language and writing the knowledge and experience gained by one generation are transmitted to its successors4 ,the human intellect elaborates definite theories concerning the universe of which it forms a part4 ,these theories and beliefs form and fashion institutions that are transmitted from generation to generation4 ,language stereotypes tradition and slowly creates a literature4 ,in this way a new medium is created which is psychological in character1 and ultimately dominates life4 ,when a dog is about to rest it often tramps round and round the spot on which it is to recline4 ,naturalists explain this as the survival of an instinct which in the wild dog served the useful function of guarding it against the presence of harmful creatures hidden in the grass4 ,the domesticated dog is here exhibiting an instinct that belongs to a past condition of life4 ,but man has few instincts--fewer perhaps than any other animal4 ,in their stead he has a greater plasticity of nature1 and a more educable intelligence4 ,and it is in the exercise of this educable organization that the psychological medium as expressed in art1 literature1 and inventions1 plays its part for good and ill4 ,so soon as he is able to understand1 the individual finds himself surrounded by ideas concerning home1 the ,state1 the monarchy1 the ,church1 and a thousand and one other things4 ,he is brought into relation with a vast literature1 and also with the play of myriads of minds similar to his own4 ,henceforth1 it is this environment with which he has chiefly to reckon in terms of either harmony or conflict4 ,he can no more escape it than he can dispense with the atmosphere4 ,it is part and parcel of himself4 ,without it he ceases to be himself2 for if we cut away from man all that this psychological heredity gives him he ceases to be man as we understand the term4 ,he becomes a mere animated object4 ,finally1 we have to note that this psychological environment is cumulative in character as being is all powerful in its influence4 ,by its own unceasing activity humanity is continually triumphing over the difficulties of its material environment and adding to the complexity and power of its mental one4 ,inevitably the environment thus becomes more psychic in character and more powerful in its operations4 ,we may overcome the difficulties of climate1 poor soil1 geographical position1 etc41 but it is impossible to ignore the great and growing pressure of this past mental life of the race4 ,it defies all attempts at material coercion1 and gradually transforms a material medium into what is substantially a psychological one4 ,man cannot escape the domination of his own mental life4 ,its unfettered exercise supplies the only freedom he is capable of realising1 as it constitutes the source of his influence as a link in the causative process of determining his own destiny and moulding that of his successors4 ---------------------------------------- -------------------------------- ,transcriber's ,note3 ,minor punctuation errors have been corrected without note4 ,inconsistent hyphenation has not been changed4 ,in the plain-text version1 decorative italics have not been represented4 ,the following corrections were made to the text3 p4 #ag3 contantly to constantly 7constantly enlarging and more comprehensive7 p4 #bd3 admiting to admitting 7even while admitting7 p4 #bd3 which which to with which 7with which it is used7 p4 #bh 7,footnote #b73 contraint to constraint 7,freedom and constraint7 p4 #cj 7,footnote #c73 acton to action 7all volitional action7 p4 #cd3 ,maudesley to ,maudsley 7says ,dr4 ,maudsley7 p4 #da3 missing from added 7shall be expelled from our7 p4 #eh3 occured to occurred 7occurred in the past7 p4 #hf3 absurdem to absurdum 7argument ad absurdum7 p4 #ih3 condiitons to conditions 7certain conditions1 circumstances7 p4 #ajg3 ,hamiliton to ,hamilton 7,sir ,william ,hamilton7 ---------------------------------------- --------------------------------