,,elements ,,of ,,morals3 ,,with ,,special ,,application ,,of ,,the ,,moral ,,law ,,to ,,the ,,duties ,,of ,,the ,,individual ,,and ,,of ,,society ,,and ,,the ,,state4 ,,by ,,paul ,,janet1 ,,member ,,of ,,the ,,institute1 ,,of ,,the ,,academy ,,of ,,moral ,,and ,,political ,,sciences1 ,,author ,,of ,,theory ,,of ,,morals1 ,,history ,,of ,,moral ,,and ,,political ,,philosophy1 ,,final ,,causes1 ,,etc41 ,,etc4 ,,translated ,,by ,,mrs4 ,c4 ,r4 ,,corson4 ,a4 ,s4 ,,barnes ,,co41 ,,new ,,york ,,and ,,chicago ,copyright1 #ahhd1 by ,a4 ,s4 ,barnes ,co4 ,,preface4 ,the ,elements de ,morale1 by ,m4 ,paul ,janet1 which we here present to the educational world1 translated from the latest edition1 is1 of all the works of that distinguished moralist1 the one best adapted to college and school purposes4 ,its scholarly and methodical arrangement1 its clear and direct reasonings1 its felicitous examples and illustrations1 drawn with rare impartiality from the best ancient and modern writers1 make of this study of ,ethics1 generally so unattractive to young students1 one singularly inviting4 ,it is a system of morals1 practical rather than theoretical1 setting forth man's duties and the application thereto of the moral law4 ,starting with ,preliminary ,notions1 ,m4 ,janet follows these up with a general division of duties1 establishes the general principles of social and individual morality1 and chapter by chapter moves from duties to duties1 developing each in all its ramifications with unerring clearness1 decision1 and completeness4 ,never before1 perhaps1 was this difficult subject brought to the comprehension of the student with more convincing certainty1 and1 at the same time1 with more vivid and impressive illustrations4 ,the position of ,m4 ,paul ,janet is that of the religious moralist4 ,he supplies1 says a writer in the ,british ,quarterly ,review1#a in a notice of his ,theory of ,morals1 the very element to which ,mr4 ,sully gives so little place4 ,he cannot conceive morals without religion4 ,stated shortly1 his position is1 that moral good is founded upon a natural and essential good1 and that the domains of good and of duty are absolutely equivalent4 ,so far he would seem to follow ,kant2 but he differs from ,kant in denying that there are indefinite duties3 every duty1 he holds1 is definite as to its form2 but it is either definite or indefinite as to its application4 ,as religion is simply belief in the ,divine goodness1 morality must by necessity lead to religion1 and is like a flowerless plant if it fail to do so4 ,he holds with ,kant that practical faith in the existence of ,god is the postulate of the moral law4 ,the two things exist or fall together4 ,this1 as to ,m4 ,janet's position as a moralist2 as to his manner of treating his subject1 the writer adds3 444 it is beyond our power to set forth1 with approach to success1 the admirable series of reasonings and illustrations by which his positions are established and maintained4 ,m4 ,janet's signal merit is the clearness and decision which he gives to the main points of his subject1 keeping them ever distinctly in view1 and strengthening and supplementing them by substantial and conclusive facts1 drawn from the best sources1 framing1 so to say1 his idea in time-honored and irrefutable truths4 ,the law of duty thus made clear to the comprehension of the student1 cannot fail to fix his attention2 and between fixing the attention and striking root1 the difference is not very great4 ,c4 ,r4 ,c4 ,,table ,,of ,,contents4 ,,chapter ,,page ,i4--,preliminary ,notions #a ,,ii4--,division of ,duties4--,general ,principles of ,social ,morality #cc ,,iii4--,duties of ,justice4--,duties toward ,human ,life #ej ,,iv4--,duties ,concerning the ,property of ,others #fc ,v4--,duties toward the ,liberty and toward the ,honor of ,others4--,justice1 ,distributive and ,remunerative4-- ,equity #ic ,,vi4--,duties of ,charity and ,self-,sacrifice #aaa ,,vii4--,duties toward the ,state #aci ,,viii4--,professional ,duties #aeg ,,ix4--,duties of ,nations among themselves4--,international ,law #ahb ,x4--,family ,duties #aij ,,xi4--,duties toward ,one's ,self4--,duties relative to the ,body #bbc ,,xii4--,duties relative to ,external ,goods #bdd ,,xiii4--,duties relative to the ,intellect #bfj ,,xiv4--,duties relative to the ,will #bha ,,xv4--,religious ,morality4--,religious ,rights and ,duties #bii ,,xvi4--,moral ,medicine and ,gymnastics #cae ,appendix to ,chapter ,,viii #cda ,,elements ,,of ,,morals4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,preliminary ,,notions4 ,,summary4 ,starting point of morals4--,notions of common sense4 ,object and divisions of morals4--,practical morality and theoretical morality4 ,utility of morals4--,morals are useful3 #a1 in protecting us against the sophisms which combat them2 #b1 in fixing principles in the mind2 #c1 in teaching us to reflect upon the motives of our actions2 #d1 in preparing us for the difficulties which may arise in practice4 ,short resume of theoretical morality4--,pleasure and the good4--,the useful and the honest4--,duty4--,moral conscience and moral sentiment4--,liberty4--,merit and demerit4--,moral responsibility4--,moral sanction4 ,all sciences have for their starting-point certain elementary notions which are furnished them by the common experience of mankind4 ,there would be no arithmetic if men had not1 as their wants increased1 begun by counting and calculating1 and if they had not already had some ideas of numbers1 unity1 fractions1 etc42 neither would there be any geometry if they had not also had ideas of the round1 the square1 the straight line4 ,the same is true of morals4 ,they presuppose a certain number of notions existing among all men1 at least to some degree4 ,good and evil1 duty and obligation1 conscience1 liberty and responsibility1 virtue and vice1 merit and demerit1 sanction1 punishment and reward1 are notions which the philosopher has not invented1 but which he has borrowed from common sense1 to return them again cleared and deepened4 ,let us begin1 then1 by rapidly enumerating the elementary and common notions1 the analysis and elucidation of which is the object of moral science1 and explain the terms employed to express them4 #a4 ,starting point of morals3 common notions4--,all men distinguish the good and the bad1 good actions and bad actions4 ,for instance1 to love one's parents1 respect other people's property1 to keep one's word1 etc41 is right2 to harm those who have done us no harm1 to deceive and lie1 to be ungrateful towards our benefactors1 and unfaithful to our friends1 etc41 is wrong4 ,to do right is obligatory on every one--that is1 it should be done2 wrong1 on the contrary1 should be avoided4 ,duty is that law by which we are held to do the right and avoid the wrong4 ,it is also called the moral law4 ,this law1 like all laws1 commands1 forbids1 and permits4 ,he who acts and is capable of doing the right and the wrong1 and who consequently is held to obey the moral law1 is called a moral agent4 ,in order that an agent may be held to obey a law1 he must know it and understand it4 ,in morals1 as in legislation1 no one is supposed to be ignorant of the law4 ,there is1 then1 in every man a certain knowledge of the law1 that is to say1 a natural discernment of the right and the wrong4 ,this discernment is what is called conscience1 or sometimes the moral sense4 ,conscience is an act of the mind1 a judgment4 ,but it is not only the mind that is made aware of the right and the wrong3 it is the heart4 ,good and evil1 done either by others or by ourselves1 awaken in us emotions1 affections of diverse nature4 ,these emotions or affections are what collectively constitute the moral sentiment4 ,it does not suffice that a man know and distinguish the good and the evil1 and experience for the one and for the other different sentiments2 it is also necessary1 in order to be a moral agent1 that he be capable of choosing between them2 he cannot be commanded to do what he cannot do1 nor can he be forbidden to do what he cannot help doing4 ,this power of choosing is called liberty1 or free will4 ,a free agent--one1 namely1 who can discern between the right and the wrong--is said to be responsible for his actions2 that is to say1 he can answer for them1 give an account of them1 suffer their consequences2 he is then their real cause4 ,his actions may consequently be attributed to him1 put to his account2 in other words imputed to him4 ,the agent is responsible1 the actions are imputable4 ,human actions1 we have said1 are sometimes good1 sometimes bad4 ,these two qualifications have degrees in proportion to the importance or the difficulty of the action4 ,it is thus we call an action suitable1 estimable1 beautiful1 admirable1 sublime1 etc4 ,on the other hand1 a bad action is sometimes but a simple mistake1 and sometimes a crime4 ,it is culpable1 base1 abominable1 execrable1 etc4 ,if we observe in an agent the habit of good actions1 a constant tendency to conform to the law of duty1 this habit or constant tendency is called virtue1 and the contrary tendency is called vice4 ,whilst man feels himself bound by his conscience to seek the right1 he is impelled by his nature to seek pleasure4 ,when he enjoys pleasure without any admixture of pain1 he is happy2 and the highest degree of possible pleasure with the least degree of possible pain is happiness4 ,now1 experience shows that happiness is not always in harmony with virtue1 and that pleasure does not necessarily accompany right doing4 ,and yet we find such a separation unjust2 and we believe in a natural and legitimate connection between pleasure and right1 pain and wrong4 ,pleasure1 considered as the consequence of well-doing1 is called recompense2 and pain1 considered as the legitimate consequence of evil1 is called punishment4 ,when a man has done well he thinks1 and all other men think1 that he has a right to a recompense4 ,when he has done ill they think the contrary1 and he himself thinks also that he must atone for his wrong-doing by a chastisement4 ,this principle1 by virtue of which we declare a moral agent deserving of happiness or unhappiness according to his good or bad actions1 is called the principle of merit and demerit4 ,the sum total of the rewards and punishments attached to the execution or violation of a law is called sanction2 the sanction of the moral law will then be called moral sanction4 ,all law presupposes a legislator4 ,the moral law will presuppose1 then1 a moral legislator1 and morality consequently raises us to ,god4 ,all human or earthly sanction being shown by observation to be insufficient1 the moral law calls for a religious sanction4 ,it is thus that morality conducts us to the immortality of the soul4 ,if we go back upon the whole of the ideas we have just briefly expressed1 we shall see that at each of the steps we have taken there are always two contraries opposed the one to the other3 good and evil1 command and prohibition1 virtue and vice1 merit and demerit1 pleasure and pain1 reward and punishment4 ,human life presents itself1 then1 under two aspects4 ,man can choose between the two4 ,this power is liberty4 ,this choice is difficult and laborious2 it exacts from us incessant efforts4 ,it is for this reason that life is said to be a trial1 and is often represented as a combat4 ,it should therefore not be represented as a play1 but rather as a manly and valiant effort4 ,struggle is its condition1 peace its prize4 ,such are the fundamental ideas morality has for its object1 and of which it seeks1 at the same time1 both the principles and the applications4 #b4 ,what is morality8 the object of morality4--,morality may be considered as a science or as an art4 ,by science we understand a totality of truths connected with each other concerning one and the same object4 ,science has for its object proper1 knowledge4 ,by art we understand a totality of rules or precepts for directing activity towards a definite end2 art has for its object proper1 action4 ,science is theoretical or speculative2 art is practical4 ,morality is a science inasmuch as it seeks to know and demonstrate the principles and conditions of morality2 it is an art inasmuch as it shows and prescribes to us its applications4 ,as science1 morality may be defined3 science of good or science of duty4 ,as art1 morality may be defined3 the art of right living or the art of right acting4 #c4 ,division of morality4--,morality is divided into two parts3 in one it studies principles1 in the other1 applications2 in the one1 duty2 in the other1 duties4 ,hence a theoretical morality and a practical morality4 ,the first may also be called general morality1 and the second particular morality1 because the first has for its object the study of the common and general character of all our duties1 and the other especially that of the particular duties1 which vary according to objects and circumstances4 ,it is in the first that morality has especially the character of science1 and in the second1 the character of art4 #d4 ,utility of morality4--,the utility of moral science has been disputed4 ,the ancients questioned whether virtue could be taught4 ,it may also be asked whether it should be taught4 ,morality1 it is said1 depends much more upon the heart than upon the reasoning faculties4 ,it is rather by education1 example1 habit1 religion1 sentiment1 than through theories1 that men become habituated to virtue4 ,if this were so1 moral science would be of no use4 ,however1 though it may be true that for happiness nothing can take the place of practice1 it does not follow that reflection and study may not very efficaciously contribute toward it1 and for the following reasons3 #a4 ,it often happens that evil has its origin in the sophisms of the mind1 sophisms ever at the service of the passions4 ,it is therefore necessary to ward off or prevent these sophisms by a thorough discussion of principles4 #b4 ,a careful study of the principles of morality causes them to penetrate deeper into the soul and gives them there greater fixity4 #c4 ,morality consists not only in the actions themselves1 but especially in the motives of our actions4 ,an outward morality1 wholly of habit and imitation1 is not yet the true morality4 ,morality must needs be accompanied by conscience and reflection4 ,so viewed1 moral science is a necessary element of a sound education1 and the higher its principles the more the conscience is raised and refined4 #d4 ,life often presents moral problems for our solution4 ,if the mind is not prepared for them it will lack certainty of decision2 what above all is to be feared is that it will mostly prefer the easier and the more convenient solution4 ,it should be fortified in advance against its own weakness by acquiring the habit of judging of general questions before events put it to the proof4 ,such is the utility of morality4 ,it is of the same service to man as geometry is to the workman2 it does not take the place of tact and common sense1 but it guides and perfects them4 ,it is well understood1 moreover1 that such a study in nowise excludes1 it even exacts1 the co-operation of all the practical means we have indicated above1 which constitute what is called education4 ,doctrinal teaching is but the complement and confirmation of teaching by practice and by example4 #e4 ,short resume of theoretical morality4--,theoretical morality should1 in fact1 precede practical morality1 and that is what usually takes place2 but as it presents more difficulties and less immediate applications than practical morality1 we shall defer the developments it may give rise to1 to a subsequent year4#b ,the present will be a short resume1 purely elementary1 containing only preliminary and strictly necessary notions4 ,it will be an exposition of the common notions we have just enumerated above4 #f4 ,pleasure and the good4--,morality being1 as we have said1 the science of the good1 the first question that presents itself is3 ,what is good8 ,if we are to believe the first impulses of nature1 which instinctively urge us towards the agreeable and cause us to repel all that is painful1 the answer to the preceding question would not be difficult2 we should have but to reply3 ,good is what makes us happy2 good is pleasure4 ,one can1 without doubt1 affirm that morality teaches us to be happy1 and puts us on the way to true happiness4 ,but it is not1 as one might believe1 in obeying that blind law of nature which inclines us towards pleasure1 that we shall be truly happy4 ,the road morality points out is less easy1 but surer4 ,some very simple reflections will suffice to show us that it cannot be said absolutely that pleasure is the good and pain the bad4 ,experience and reasoning easily demonstrate the falsity of this opinion4 #a4 ,pleasure is not always a good1 and in certain circumstances it may even become a real evil2 and1 vice versa1 pain is not always an evil1 and it may even become a great good4 ,thus we see1 on the one hand1 that the pleasures of intemperance bring with them sickness1 the loss of health and reason1 shortening of life4 ,the pleasures of idleness bring poverty1 uselessness1 the contempt of men4 ,the pleasures of vengeance and of crime carry with them chastisement1 remorse1 etc4 ,conversely1 again1 we see the most painful troubles and trials bringing with them evident good4 ,the amputation of a limb saves our life2 energetic and painstaking work brings comfort1 etc4 ,in these different cases1 if we consider their results1 it is pleasure that is an evil and pain a good4 #b4 ,it must be added that among the pleasures there are some that are low1 degrading1 vulgar2 for example1 the pleasures of drunkenness2 others1 again1 that are noble and generous1 as the heroism of the soldier4 ,among the pleasures of man there are some he has in common with the beasts1 and others that are peculiar to him alone4 ,shall we put the one kind and the other on the same level8 ,assuredly not4 #c4 ,there are pleasures very keen1 which1 however1 are fleeting1 and soon pass away1 as the pleasures of the passions2 others which are durable and continuous1 as those of health1 security1 domestic comfort1 and the respect of mankind4 ,shall we sacrifice life-long pleasures to pleasures that last but an hour8 #d4 ,other pleasures are very great1 but equally uncertain1 and dependent on chance2 as1 for instance1 the pleasures of ambition or the pleasures of the gaming-table2 others1 again1 calmer and less intoxicating1 but surer1 as the pleasures of the family circle4 ,pleasures may then be compared in regard to certainty1 purity1 durability1 intensity1 etc4 ,experience teaches that we should not seek pleasures without distinction and choice2 that we should use our reason and compare them2 that we should sacrifice an uncertain and fleeting present to a durable future2 prefer the simple and peaceful pleasures1 free from regrets1 to the tumultuous and dangerous pleasures of the passions1 etc42 in a word1 sacrifice the agreeable to the useful4 #g4 ,utility and honesty4--,one should prefer1 we have just seen1 the useful to the agreeable2 but the useful itself should not be confounded with the real good--that is1 with the honest4 ,let us explain the differences between these two ideas4 #a4 ,there is no honesty or moral goodness without disinterestedness2 and he who never seeks anything but his own personal interest is branded by all as a selfish man4 #b4 ,interest gives only advice2 morality gives commands4 ,a man is not obliged to be skillful1 but he is obliged to be honest4 #c4 ,personal interest cannot be the foundation of any universal and general law as applicable to others as to ourselves1 for the happiness of each depends on his own way of viewing things4 ,every man takes his pleasure where he finds it1 and understands his interest as he pleases2 but honesty or justice is the same for all men4 #d4 ,the honest is clear and self-evident2 the useful is uncertain4 ,conscience tells every one what is right or wrong2 but it requires a long trained experience to calculate all the possible consequences of our actions1 and it would often be absolutely impossible for us to foresee them4 ,we cannot1 therefore1 always know what is useful to us2 but we can always know what is right4 #e4 ,it is never impossible to do right2 but one cannot always carry out his own wishes in order to be happy4 ,the prisoner may always bravely bear his prison1 but he cannot always get out of it4 #f4 ,we judge ourselves according to the principles of action we recognize4 ,the man who loses in gambling may be troubled and regret his imprudence2 but he who is conscious of having cheated in gambling 7though he won thereby7 must despise himself if he judges himself from the standpoint of moral law4 ,this law must therefore be something else than the principle of personal happiness4 ,for1 to be able to say to one's self1 ,i am a villain1 though ,i have filled my purse1 requires another principle than that by which one congratulates himself1 saying1 ,i am a prudent man1 for ,i have filled my cash-box4 #g4 ,the idea of punishment or chastisement could not be understood1 moreover1 if the good only were the useful4 ,a man is not punished for having been awkward2 he is punished for being culpable4 #h4 ,the good or the honest4--,we have just seen that neither pleasure nor usefulness is the legitimate and supreme object of human life4 ,we are certainly permitted to seek pleasure1 since nature invites us to it2 but we should not make it the aim of life4 ,we are also permitted1 and even sometimes commanded1 to seek what is useful1 since reason demands we see to our self-preservation4 ,but1 above pleasure and utility1 there is another aim1 a higher aim1 the real object of human life4 ,this higher and final aim is what we call1 according to circumstances1 the good1 the honest1 and the just4 ,now1 what is honesty8 ,we distinguish in man a double nature1 body and soul2 and in the soul itself two parts1 one superior1 one inferior2 one more particularly deserving of the name of soul1 the other more carnal1 more material1 if one may say so1 which comes nearer the body4 ,in one class we have intelligence1 sentiments1 will2 in the other1 senses1 appetites1 passions4 ,now1 that which distinguishes man from the lower animal is the power to rise above the senses1 appetites1 and passions1 and to be capable of thinking1 loving1 and willing4 ,thus1 moral good consists in preferring what there is best in us to what there is least good2 the goods of the soul to the goods of the body2 the dignity of human nature to the servitude of animal passions2 the noble affections of the heart to the inclinations of a vile selfishness4 ,in one word1 moral good consists in man becoming truly man--that is to say1 ,a free will1 guided by the heart and enlightened by reason4 ,moral good takes different names1 according to the relations under which we consider it4 ,for instance1 when we consider it as having for its special object the individual man in relation with himself1 good becomes what is properly called the honest1 and has for its prime object personal dignity4 ,in its relation with other men1 good takes the name of the just1 and has for its special object the happiness of others4 ,it consists either in not doing to others what we should not wish they should do to us1 or in doing to others as we should ourselves wish to be done by4 ,finally1 in its relation to ,god1 the good is called piety or saintliness1 and consists in rendering to the ,father of men and of the universe what is his due4 #i4 ,duty4--,thus1 the honest1 the just1 and the pious are the different names which moral good takes in its relations to ourselves1 to other men1 or to ,god4 ,moral good1 under these different forms1 presents itself always in the same character1 namely1 imposing on us the obligation to do it as soon as we recognize it1 and that1 too1 without regard to consequences and whatever be our inclinations to the contrary4 ,thus1 we should tell the truth even though it injures us2 we should respect the property of others1 though it be necessary to our existence2 finally1 we should even sacrifice1 if necessary1 our life for the family and the country4 ,this law1 which prescribes to us the doing right for its own sake1 is what is called moral law or the law of duty4 ,it is a sort of constraint1 but a moral constraint1 and is distinguished from physical constraint by the fact that the latter is dictated by fate and is irresistible1 whilst the constraint of duty imposes itself upon our reason without violating our liberty4 ,this kind of necessity1 which commands reason alone without constraining the will1 is moral obligation4 ,to say that the right is obligatory is to say1 then1 that we consider ourselves held to do it1 without being forced to do it4 ,on the contrary1 if we were to do it by force it would cease to be the right4 ,it must therefore be done freely1 and duty may thus be defined an obligation consented to4 ,duty presents itself in a two-fold character3 it is absolute and universal4 #a4 ,it is absolute3 that is to say1 it imposes its commands unconditionally1 without taking account of our desires1 our passions1 our interests4 ,it is by this that the commands of duty may be distinguished1 as we have already said1 from the counsels of an interested prudence4 ,the rules or calculations of prudence are nothing but means to reach a certain end1 which is the useful4 ,the law of duty1 on the contrary1 is in itself its own aim4 ,here the law should be obeyed for its own sake1 and not for any other reason4 ,prudence says3 ,the end justifies the means4 ,duty says3 ,do as thou shouldst do1 let come what will4 #b4 ,from this first character a second is deduced3 duty being absolute1 is universal2 that is to say1 it can be applied to all men in the same manner and under the same circumstances2 whence it follows that each must acknowledge that this law is imposed not only on himself1 but on all other men also4 ,to which correspond those two beautiful maxims of the ,gospel3 ,do to others as thou wishest to be done by4 ,do not do to others what thou dost not wish they should do to thee4 ,the law of duty is not only obligatory in itself1 it is so also because it is derived from ,god1 who in his justice and goodness wishes we should submit to it4 ,god being himself the absolutely perfect being1 and having created us in his image1 wishes1 for this very reason1 that we should make every effort to imitate him as much as possible1 and has thus imposed on us the obligation of being virtuous4 ,it is ,god we obey in obeying the law of honesty and duty4 #aj4 ,moral conscience4--,a law cannot be imposed on a free agent without its being known to him2 without its being present to his mind--that is to say1 without his accepting it as true1 and recognizing the necessity of its application in every particular case4 ,this faculty of recognizing the moral law1 and applying it in all the circumstances that may present themselves1 is what is called conscience4 ,conscience is then that act of the mind by which we apply to a particular case1 to an action to be performed or already performed1 the general rules prescribed by moral law4 ,it is both the power that commands and the inward judge that condemns or absolves4 ,on the one hand it dictates what should be done or avoided2 on the other it judges what has been done4 ,hence it is the condition of the performance of all our duties4 ,conscience being the practical judgment which in each particular case decides the right and the wrong1 one can ask of man only one thing3 namely1 to act according to his conscience4 ,at the moment of action there is no other rule4 ,but one must take great care lest by subtle doubts1 he obscures either within himself or in others the clear and distinct decisions of conscience4 ,in fact1 men often1 to divert themselves from the right when they wish to do certain bad actions1 fight their own conscience with sophisms4 ,under the influence of these sophisms1 conscience becomes erroneous2 that is to say1 it ends by taking good for evil and evil for good1 and this is even one of the punishments of those who follow the path of vice3 they become at last incapable of discerning between right and wrong4 ,when it is said of a man that he has no conscience1 it is not meant that he is really deprived of it 7else he were not a man72 but that he has fallen into the habit of not consulting it or of holding its decisions in contempt4 ,by ignorant conscience we mean that conscience which does wrong because it has not yet learned to know what is right4 ,thus1 a child tormenting animals does not always do so out of bad motives3 he does not know or does not think that he hurts them4 ,in fact1 it is with good as it is with evil2 the child is already good or bad before it is able to discern between the one or the other4 ,this is what is called the state of innocence1 which in some respects is conscience asleep4 ,but this state cannot last2 the child's conscience1 and in general the conscience of all men1 must be enlightened4 ,this is the progress of human reason which every day teaches us better to know the difference between good and evil4 ,it sometimes happens that one is in some respects in doubt between two indications of conscience2 not1 of course1 between duty and passion1 which is the highest moral combat1 but between two or more duties4 ,this is what is called a doubting or perplexed conscience4 ,in such a case the simplest rule to follow1 when it is practicable1 is the one expressed by that celebrated maxim3 ,when in doubt1 abstain4 ,in cases where it is impossible to absolutely abstain1 and where it becomes necessary not only to act but to choose1 the rule should always be to choose that part which favors least our interests1 for we may always suppose that that which causes our conscience to doubt1 is an interested1 unobserved motive4 ,if there is no private interest in the matter either on the one side or the other1 there remains nothing better to do than to decide according to circumstances4 ,but it is very rare that conscience ever finds itself in such an absolute state of doubt1 and there are almost always more reasons on the one side than on the other4 ,the simplest and most general rule in such a case is to chose what seems most probable4 #aa4 ,moral ,sentiment4--,at the same time1 as the mind distinguishes between good and evil by a judgment called conscience1 the heart experiences emotions or divers affections1 which are embraced under the common term moral sentiment4 ,these are the pleasures or pains which arise in our soul at the sight of good or evil1 either in ourselves or in others4 ,in respect to our own actions this sentiment is modified according as the action is to be performed1 or is already performed4 ,in the first instance we experience1 on the one hand1 a certain attraction for the right 7that is when passion is not strong enough to stifle it71 and on the other1 a repugnance or aversion for the wrong 7more or less attenuated1 according to circumstances1 by habit or the violence of the design74 ,usage has not given any particular names to these two sentiments4 ,when1 on the contrary1 the action is performed1 the pleasure which results from it1 if we have acted rightly1 is called moral satisfaction2 and if we have acted wrong1 remorse1 or repentance4 ,remorse is a burning pain2 and1 as the word indicates1 the bite that tortures the heart after a culpable action4 ,this pain may be found among the very ones who have no regret for having done wrong1 and who would do it over again if they could4 ,it has therefore no moral character whatsoever1 and must be considered as a sort of punishment attached to crime by nature herself4 ,malice1 said ,montaigne1 poisons itself with its own venom4 ,vice leaves1 like an ulcer in the flesh1 a repentance in the soul1 which1 ever scratching itself1 draws ever fresh blood4 ,repentance is also1 like remorse1 a pain which comes from a bad action2 but there is coupled with it the regret of having done it1 and the wish1 if not the firm resolution1 never to do it again4 ,repentance is a sadness of the soul2 remorse is a torture and an anguish4 ,repentance is almost a virtue2 remorse is a punishment2 but the one leads to the other1 and he who feels no remorse can feel no repentance4 ,moral satisfaction1 on the contrary1 is a peace1 a joy1 a keen and delicious emotion born from the feeling of having accomplished one's duty4 ,it is the only remuneration that never fails us4 ,among the sentiments called forth by our own actions1 there are two which are the natural auxiliaries of the moral sentiment3 they are the sentiment of honor and the sentiment of shame4 ,honor is a principle which incites us to perform actions which raise us in our own eyes1 and to avoid such as would lower us4 ,shame is the opposite of honor2 it is what we feel when we have done something that lowers us not only in the eyes of others1 but in our own4 ,all remorse is more or less accompanied by shame2 yet the shame is greater for actions which indicate a certain baseness of soul4 ,for instance1 one will feel more ashamed of having told a falsehood than for having struck a person2 for having cheated in gambling than for having fought a duel4 ,honor and shame are therefore not always an exact measure of the moral value of actions2 for be they but brilliant1 man will soon rid himself of all shame2 this happens1 for instance1 in cases of prodigality1 licentiousness1 ambition4 ,one does wrong1 not without remorse1 but with a certain ostentation which stifles the feelings of shame4 ,let us pass now to the sentiments which the actions of others excite in us4 ,sympathy1 antipathy1 kindness1 esteem1 contempt1 respect1 enthusiasm1 indignation1 these are the various terms by which we express the diverse sentiments of the soul touching virtue and vice4 ,sympathy is a disposition to share the same impressions with other men2 to sympathize with their joy is to share that joy2 to sympathize with their grief is to share that grief4 ,it may happen that one sympathizes with the defects of others when they are the same as our own2 but1 as a general thing1 people sympathize above all with the good qualities1 and experience only antipathy for the bad4 ,at the theatre1 all the spectators1 good and bad1 wish to see virtue rewarded and crime punished4 ,the contrary of sympathy is antipathy4 ,kindness is the disposition to wish others well4 ,esteem is a sort of kindness mingled with judgment and reflection1 which we feel for those who have acted well1 especially in cases of ordinary virtues2 for before the higher and more difficult virtues1 esteem becomes respect2 if it be heroism1 respect turns into admiration and enthusiasm2 admiration being the feeling of surprise which great actions excite in us1 and enthusiasm that same feeling pushed to an extreme2 carrying us away from ourselves1 as if a god were in us4#c ,contempt is the feeling of aversion we entertain towards him who does wrong2 it implies particularly a case of base and shameful actions4 ,when these actions are only condemnable without being odious1 the sentiment is one of blame1 which1 like esteem1 is nearer being a judgment than a sentiment4 ,when1 finally1 it is a case of criminal and revolting actions1 the feeling is one of horror or execration4 #ab4 ,liberty4--,we have already said that man or the moral agent is free1 when he is in a condition to choose between right and wrong1 and able to do either at his will4 ,liberty always supposes one to be in possession of himself4 ,man is free when he is awake1 in a state of reason1 and an adult4 ,he is not free1 or very little so1 when he is asleep1 or delirious1 or in his first childhood4 ,liberty is certified to man4 #a4 ,by the inward sentiment which accompanies each of his acts2 for instance1 at the moment of acting1 ,i feel that ,i can will or not will to do such or such an action2 if ,i enter on it1 ,i feel that ,i can discontinue it as long as it is not fully executed2 when it is completed1 ,i am convinced that ,i might have acted otherwise4 #b4 ,by the very fact of moral law or duty2 ,i ought1 therefore ,i can4 ,no one is held to do the impossible4 ,if1 then1 there is in me a law that commands me to do good and avoid evil1 it is because ,i can do either as ,i wish4 #c4 ,by the moral satisfaction which accompanies a good action2 by the remorse or repentance which follows a bad one4 ,one does not rejoice over a thing done against his will1 and no one reproaches himself for an act committed under compulsion4 ,the first word of all those reproached for a bad action is1 that it was not done on purpose1 intentionally4 ,they acknowledge thereby that we can only be reproached for an action done wilfully2 namely1 freely4 #d4 ,by the rewards and punishments1 and in general by the moral responsibility which is attached to all our actions when they have been committed knowingly4 ,we do not punish actions which are the result of constraint or ignorance4 #e4 ,by the exhortations or counsels we give to others4 ,we do not exhort a man to be warm or cold1 not to suffer hunger or thirst1 because it is well known that this is not a thing dependent on his will4 ,but we exhort him to be honest1 because we believe that he can be so if he wishes4 #f4 ,by promises3 no one promises not to die1 not to be sick1 etc41 but one promises to be present at a certain meeting1 to pay a certain sum of money1 on such a day1 to such a man1 because one feels he can do so unless circumstances over which he has no control prevent4 ,prejudices against ,liberty4--,although men1 as we have seen1 may have the sense of liberty very strong1 and may show it by their acts1 by their approbation or blame1 etc41 yet1 on the other hand1 they often yield to the force of certain prejudices which seem to contradict the universal belief we have just spoken of4 #a4 ,character4--,the principal one of these prejudices is the often expressed opinion that every man is impelled by his own character to perform the actions which accord with this character1 and that there is no help against this irresistible necessity of nature2 this is often expressed by the common axiom3 ,one cannot make himself over again4 ,the same has also been expressed by the poet ,destouches in that celebrated line3 ,chassez le naturel1 il revient au galop4#d ,nothing is less exact as a fact and more dangerous as a principle1 than this pretended immutability of human character1 which1 if true1 would render evil irremediable and incorrigible4 ,experience teaches the contrary4 ,no man is wholly deprived of good and bad inclinations2 he may develop the one or the other1 as he chooses between them4 #b4 ,habits4--,habits in the long run become1 it is true1 irresistible4 ,it is a fact which has been often observed2 but if1 on the one hand1 an inveterate habit is irresistible1 it is not so in the beginning1 and man is thus free to prevent the encroachments of bad habits4 ,it is for this reason that moralists warn us above all against the beginnings of habits4 ,beware especially of beginnings1 says the ,imitation4 #c4 ,passions4--,passions have especially enjoyed the privilege of passing for uncontrollable and irresistible4 ,all great sinners find their excuse in the fatal allurements of passions4 ,the spirit is willing1 but the flesh is weak1 says the ,gospel4 ,the remarks we have just made touching the habits1 may be equally applied to the passions4 ,it is rare that passions manifest themselves all of a sudden1 and with that excess of violence which1 breaking upon one unexpectedly and like a delirium1 assume1 indeed1 all the appearances of a fatality4 ,but1 as a general thing1 passions grow little by little4 ,some smaller crimes always precede the greater crimes4 ,it is especially when the first attacks of a passion begin to show themselves that it should be energetically fought down4 #d4 ,education and circumstances4--,the education one has received1 the circumstances one finds himself in1 may put a limit to his liberty2 and man is not wholly responsible for the impulses which he may owe to example and the bad principles in which he may have been brought up4 ,these may1 perhaps1 be called attenuating circumstances2 but they do not go so far as wholly to suppress liberty and responsibility4 ,in the appreciation of other people's acts1 we may allow the attenuating circumstances as large a margin as possible1 but in the case of self-government1 one should make it as strict and narrow as possible4 ,no one having1 in fact1 a measure by which he may determine his moral strength in an absolute manner1 it is better to aim too high than too low4 ,one should be guided by the principle that nothing is impossible to him who has a strong will2 for we can do a thing when we think we can4 ,in conclusion1 liberty means nothing else but moral strength4 ,experience certifies that man can become the master of the physical nature which he can subject to his designs2 he can gain the mastery over his own body1 his passions1 his habits1 his own disposition2 in a word1 he can be master of himself4 ,in thus ascending1 step by step1 from exterior nature to the body1 from the body to the passions1 from the passions to the habits and the character1 we arrive at the first motor of action which moves everything without being moved3 namely1 liberty4 #ac4 ,merit and demerit4--,we call in general merit the quality by virtue of which a moral agent renders himself worthy of a reward2 and demerit that by which he renders himself1 so to say1 worthy of punishment4 ,the merit of an action may be determined3 #a1 by the difficulty of the action2 #b1 by the importance of the duty4 #a4 ,why1 for instance1 is there in general very little merit in respecting other people's property and abstaining from theft8 ,because education in this respect has so fashioned us1 that few men have any temptation to the contrary2 and1 even were there such a temptation1 we should be ashamed to publicly claim any merit for having resisted it4 ,why1 on the other hand1 is there great merit in sacrificing one's life to the happiness of others8 ,because we are strongly attached to life1 and comparatively very little attached to men in general2 to sacrifice what we love most1 to what we love but little1 from a sense of duty1 is evidently very difficult2 for this reason1 we find in this action a very great merit4 ,suppose a man1 who had enjoyed in all security of conscience and during a long life1 a large fortune which he believes his1 and of which he has made the noblest use1 should learn all at once1 and at the brink of old age1 that this fortune belongs to another4 ,suppose1 to render the action still more difficult to perform1 that he alone knows the fact1 and could consequently in all security keep the fortune if he wishes2 aggravate the situation still more by supposing that this fortune belongs to heirs in great poverty1 and that in renouncing it the possessor would himself be reduced to utter misery4 ,imagine1 finally1 all the circumstances which may render a duty both the strictest and most difficult1 and you will have an action the merit of which will be very great4 #b4 ,it is not only the difficulty of an action that constitutes its merit1 but also the importance of the duty4 ,thus the merit of a difficulty surmounted1 has no more value in morality than it has in poetry1 when it stands alone4 ,one may of course impose upon himself a sort of moral gymnastics1 and consequently very difficult tasks1 though very useless in the end2 but these will be considered only in the light of discipline and exercise1 and not in that of duty2 and this discipline would have to be more or less connected with the life one may be called to lead4 ,for instance1 suppose a missionary1 called to brave during all his life all kinds of climates and dangers1 should exercise himself beforehand in undertakings brave and bold1 such undertakings would be both reasonable and meritorious4 ,but he who out of bravado1 ostentation1 and without any worthy aim1 should undertake the climbing to inaccessible mountain-tops1 the swimming across an arm of the sea1 the fighting openly ferocious animals1 etc41 he would accomplish actions which1 it is true1 would not be without merit1 since they are brave2 but their merit would not be equivalent to that we should attribute to other actions less difficult1 but more wise4 ,as to demerit1 it is in proportion to the gravity of duties1 and the facility of accomplishing them4 ,the more important a matter1 and the easier to fulfil1 the more is one culpable in failing to fulfil it4 ,according to these principles1 one may determine as follows the estimation of moral actions3 ,human actions1 we have said1 are divided into two classes3 the good and the bad4 ,it is a question among the moralists to determine whether there are any that are to be called indifferent4 ,among the good actions1 some are beautiful1 heroic1 sublime2 others1 proper1 right1 and honest2 among the bad1 some are simply censurable1 others shameful1 criminal1 hideous2 finally1 among the indifferent ones1 some are agreeable and allowable1 others necessary and unavoidable4 ,let us give some examples by which the different characters of human actions may be well understood4 ,a judge who administers justice without partiality1 a merchant who sells his merchandise for no more than it is worth1 a debtor who regularly pays his creditor1 a soldier punctual at drill1 obedient to discipline1 and faithful at his post in times of peace or war1 a schoolboy doing regularly the task assigned to him1 all these persons perform actions good and laudable1 but they cannot be called extraordinary4 ,they are approved of1 but not admired4 ,to manage one's fortune economically1 not to yield too much to the pleasure of the senses1 to tell no lies1 to neither strike nor wound others1 are so many good1 right1 proper1 and estimable actions2 but they cannot be called admirable actions4 ,actions are beautiful in proportion to the difficulty of their performance2 when they are extremely difficult and perilous1 then we call them heroic and sublime2 that is1 provided they are good actions1 for heroism is unfortunately sometimes allied with wrong4 ,he who1 like ,president de ,harlay1 can say to a very powerful usurper3 ,it is a sad thing when the servant is allowed to dismiss the master2 he who can say1 like ,viscount d',orthez1 who made opposition to ,charles ,,ix4 after ,st4 ,bartholomew1 saying3 ,my soldiers are no executioners2 he who1 like ,boissy d',anglas1 can firmly and resolutely uphold the rights of an assembly in the face of a sanguinary1 violent1 and rebellious populace2 he who1 like ,morus or ,dubourg1 would rather die than sacrifice his trust2 he who1 like ,columbus1 can venture upon an unknown ocean1 and brave the revolt of a rude and superstitious crew1 to obey a generous conviction2 he who1 like ,alexander1 confides in friendship enough to receive from the hands of his physician a drink reputed poisoned2 any man1 in short1 who devotes himself for his fellow beings1 who1 in fire1 in water1 in the depths of the earth1 braves death to save life2 who1 in order to spread the truth1 to remain true and honest1 to work in the interests of religion1 science1 or humanity1 will suffer hunger and thirst1 poverty1 slavery1 torture1 or death1 is a hero4 ,epictetus was a slave4 ,his master1 for some negligence or other1 caused him to be beaten4 ,you will break my leg1 said the sufferer2 and the leg broke1 indeed1 under the blows4 ,i told you you would break it1 he remarked quietly4 ,this is a hero4 ,joan of ,arc1 defeated by the ,english and made a prisoner1 threatened with the stake1 said to her executioners3 ,i knew quite well that the ,english would put me to death2 but were there a hundred thousand of them1 they should not have this kingdom4 ,this is a heroine4 ,bad actions have their degrees likewise4 ,but here we should call attention to the fact that the worst are those that stand in opposition to the simply good actions2 on the contrary1 an action which is not heroic is not necessarily bad2 and when it is bad it is not to be classed among the most criminal4 ,some examples will again be necessary to understand these various shades of meaning1 which every one feels and recognizes in practice1 but which are very difficult to analyze theoretically4 ,to be respectful towards one's parents is a good and proper action1 but not a heroic one4 ,on the contrary1 to strike them1 insult them1 kill them1 are abominable actions1 and to be classed among the basest and most hideous that can be committed4 ,to love one's friends1 to be as serviceable to them as possible1 shows a straightforward and well-endowed soul2 but there is nothing sublime in it4 ,on the other hand1 to betray friendship2 to slander those that love us2 to lie in order to win their favor2 to inquire into their secrets for the purpose of using them against them1 are black1 base1 and shameful actions4 ,there is scarcely any merit in not taking what does not belong to us2 theft1 on the contrary1 is the most contemptible of things4 ,now1 not to be able to bear with adversity1 to fear death1 to shrink from braving the ice of the ,north ,pole1 to stay at home when fire or flood threatens our neighbor1 may be mean or weak1 but not criminal4 ,let us add1 however1 that there are cases where heroism becomes obligatory1 and where it is criminal not to be heroic4 ,a sea-captain1 who has endangered his ship1 and who1 instead of saving it1 leaves his post2 a general who1 when the moment calls for it1 refuses to die at the head of his army1 lack courage2 the chief of a ,state who1 in times of revolt1 or when the country is in peril1 fears death2 the president of a convention who takes to flight before a rebellion2 the physician who runs away before an epidemic2 the magistrate who is afraid to be just2 all these are truly culpable4 ,every condition of life has its peculiar heroism1 which at certain moments becomes a duty4 ,yet will it always be true that the more easy an action is1 the less excusable is its neglect1 and consequently the more odious is it to try to escape from it4 ,besides the good or bad actions1 there are others which appear to partake of neither the one nor the other of these two characters1 which are neither good nor bad1 and which for this reason are called indifferent4 ,for instance1 to go and take a walk is an action which1 considered by itself1 is neither good nor bad1 although it may become the one or the other according to circumstances4 ,to be asleep1 to be awake1 to eat1 to take exercise1 to talk with one's friends1 to read an agreeable book1 to play on some instrument1 are actions which certainly have nothing bad in themselves1 but which1 nevertheless1 could not be cited as examples of good actions4 ,one would not say1 for instance1 such a one is an honest man because he plays the violin well2 such a one is a scholar because he has a good appetite2 still less when actions absolutely necessary come into question1 as the act of breathing and sleeping4 ,actions1 then1 which are inseparable from the necessities of our existence1 have no moral character2 they are the same with us as with the animals and plants2 they are purely natural actions4 ,there are others1 again1 that are not necessary1 but simply agreeable1 which we perform because they suit our tastes and fancies4 ,it is sufficient that they are not contrary to the right1 that one cannot call them bad2 but it does not follow from this that they are good1 and such are what are called indifferent actions4 ,such1 at least1 is the appearance of things2 for1 in a more elevated sense1 the moralists were right in saying that there is no action absolutely indifferent1 and that all actions are in some respect good or bad1 according to motive4 #ad4 ,moral responsibility4--,man being free1 is for this reason responsible for his actions3 they can be imputed to him4 ,these two expressions have about the same meaning1 only the term responsibility applies to the agent1 and imputability to the actions4 ,the two fundamental conditions of moral responsibility are3 #a1 the knowledge of good and evil2 #b1 the liberty of action4 ,in proportion as these two conditions vary1 the responsibility will vary4 ,it follows from this1 that idiocy1 insanity1 delirium in cases of illness--destroying nearly always both conditions of responsibility--namely1 discernment and free agency1 deprive thereby of all moral character the actions committed in these different states4 ,they are not of a nature to be imputed to a moral agent4 ,yet are there certain lunatics not wholly insane who may preserve in their lucid state a certain portion of responsibility4 #b4 ,drunkenness4 ,may that be considered a cause of irresponsibility8 ,no1 certainly not2 for1 on the one hand1 one is responsible for the very act of drunkenness2 and1 on the other1 one knows that in putting himself in such a condition he exposes himself to all its consequences1 and accepts them implicitly4 ,for example1 he who puts himself in a state of drunkenness1 consents beforehand to all the low1 vulgar actions inseparable from that state4 ,as to the violent and dangerous actions which may accidentally result from it1 as blows and murders springing from quarrels1 one cannot1 of course1 impute them to the drunken man with the same severity as to the sober man1 for he certainly did not explicitly chose them when he put himself into a state of drunkenness2 but neither is he wholly innocent of them1 for he knew that they were some of the possible consequences of that condition4 ,as to him who puts himself voluntarily into a state of drunkenness1 with the express intention of committing a crime and giving himself courage for the act1 it is evident that1 so far from diminishing thereby his share of responsibility in the action1 he1 on the contrary1 increases it1 since he makes violent efforts to keep off all the scruples or hesitations which might keep him from committing it4 #c4 ,no one is held to do impossible things4 ,according to this theory1 it is evident that one is not responsible for an action he has been absolutely unable to accomplish2 thus we cannot blame a paralytic1 or a child1 or an invalid1 for not taking up arms in defence of his country4 ,yet we must not have voluntarily created the impossibility of acting1 as it often happened in ,rome1 where some1 in order not to go to war1 cut off their thumbs4 ,the same with a debtor who1 by circumstances independent of his will 7fire1 shipwreck1 epidemics71 is unable to acquit himself3 he is excusable2 but if he placed himself in circumstances which he knew would disable him1 his inability is no longer an excuse4 #d4 ,natural qualities or defects of mind and body cannot be imputed to any one1 either for good or for bad4 ,who would reproach a man for being born blind1 or because he became so in consequence of sickness or a blow8 ,the same with the defects of the mind3 no one is responsible for having no memory1 or for not being bright4 ,yet as these defects may be corrected by exercise1 we are more or less responsible for making no efforts to remedy them4 ,as to the defects or deformities which result from our own fault1 as1 for example1 the consequences of our passions1 it is evident that they can justly be imputed to us4 ,natural qualities cannot be credited to any one4 ,thus we should not honor people for their physical strength1 health1 beauty1 or even wit2 and no one should boast of such advantages1 or pride himself on them4 ,however1 he who by a wise and laborious life has succeeded in preserving or developing his physical strength1 or who1 by the effort of his will1 has cultivated and perfected his mind1 deserves praise2 and it is thus that physical and moral advantages may become indirectly legitimate matter for moral approbation4 #e4 ,the effects of extraneous causes and events1 whatever they may be1 whether good or bad1 can only be imputed to a man1 as he could or should have produced1 prevented1 or directed them1 and has been careful or negligent in doing so4 ,thus a farmer1 according as he works the land entrusted to him well or badly1 is made responsible for a good or bad harvest4 #f4 ,a final question is that of the responsibility of a man for other people's actions4 ,theoretically1 no man certainly is responsible for any but his own actions4 ,but human actions are so interlinked with each other that it is very rare that we have not some share1 direct or indirect1 in the conduct of others4 ,for instance1 one is responsible in a certain measure for the conduct of those under him2 a father for his children1 a master for his servants1 and1 up to a certain point1 an employer for his workmen2 #b1 one is responsible in a measure for actions which he might have prevented1 when1 either through negligence or laziness1 he did not do so2 if you see a man about to kill himself1 and make no effort to prevent it1 you are not innocent of his death1 unless1 of course1 you did not suspect what he was going to do2 #c1 you are responsible for other people's actions when1 either by your instigations1 or even by a simple approbation1 you have co-operated towards them4 #ae4 ,moral sanction4--,we call the sanction of a law the body of recompenses and punishments attached to the execution or violation of the law4 ,civil laws1 in general1 make more use of punishments than rewards2 for punishments may appear means sufficient to have the law executed4 ,in education1 on the contrary1 the commands or laws laid down by a superior1 have as much need of rewards as punishments4 ,but what is to be understood by the terms recompense and punishment8 ,the recompense of a good and virtuous action is the pleasure we derive from it1 and for the very reason that it is good and virtuous4 ,there are to be distinguished1 however1 two other kinds of rewards1 which1 though they resemble recompense1 are nevertheless very different from it namely1 favor and remuneration4 ,favor is a pleasure or an advantage bestowed on us1 without our having deserved or earned it2 a pure expression of the good-will of others towards us4 ,it is thus that a king grants favors to his courtiers1 that those in power distribute favors4 ,it is thus we speak of the favors of fortune4 ,although theoretically there is no reason why we should understand the word favor in a bad sense1 yet has it by usage come to signify not only an advantage undeserved1 but unworthy2 not only a legitimate preference which has its reason in sympathy1 but an arbitrary choice more or less contrary to justice4 ,however1 although no such ugly signification need be attached to it1 a favor1 as a gratuitous gift1 must always be distinguished from reward1 which1 on the contrary1 implies a remuneration2 that is to say1 a gift in return for something4 ,yet not all remuneration is necessarily a reward2 and here we must establish another distinction between reward and remuneration4 ,by remuneration we mean the price we pay for a service rendered us1 no matter what motive may determine a person to render us this service2 it is for its utility we pay1 and for nothing else4 ,the reward1 on the contrary1 implies the idea of a certain effort to do good4 ,he who renders us a service from affection and devotion1 would refuse being paid for it1 and1 vice versa1 he who sells us his work does not ask us for a recompense1 but for an equivalent of what he would have earned for himself if he had applied his work to his own wants4 ,on the contrary1 we call every pain or suffering inflicted on an agent for committing a bad action1 for no other reason than that it is bad1 chastisement or punishment4 ,punishment stands against damage or wrong2 that is to say1 against undeserved harm4 ,the blows of fortune or of men are not always punishments4 ,one may be struck without being punished4 ,although we say in a general way that the ills that befall men are often the chastisements of their faults1 yet this should not be taken too strictly1 otherwise we should too easily transform the merely unfortunate into criminals4 ,although recompenses and punishments may be only secondary means by which men may be led to do good and avoid evil1 this should not be their essential office nor their real idea4 ,it is not that the law should be fulfilled that there are rewards and punishments in morality2 it is because it has been fulfilled or violated4 ,such is the true principle of reward4 ,it comes from justice1 not utility4 ,for the same reason1 chastisement1 in its true sense1 should not only be a menace insuring the execution of the law1 but a reparation or expiation for its violation4 ,the order of things disturbed by a rebellious will is again re-established by the suffering which is the consequence of the fault committed4 ,in one sense it may be said that punishment is the remedy for the fault4 ,in fact1 injustice and vice being1 as it were1 the diseases of the soul1 it is certain that suffering is their remedy2 but only on condition that this suffering be accepted by way of chastisement4 ,it is thus that grief has a purifying virtue1 and that instead of being considered an evil1 it may be called a good4 ,another confusion of ideas which should be equally avoided1 and which is very common among men1 is that which consists in taking the reward itself for a good1 and the punishment for an evil4 ,it is thus that men are often more proud of the titles and honors they have obtained1 than of the real merit through which they have won them4 ,it is thus also that they fear the prison more than the crime1 and shame more than vice4 ,it is for this reason that the greatest courage is needed to bear undeserved punishment4 ,we distinguish generally four species of sanction3 #a4 ,natural sanction2 #b1 legal sanction2 #c1 the sanction of public opinion2 #d1 inward sanction4 #a4 ,natural sanction is that which rests on the natural consequences of our actions4 ,it is natural for sobriety to keep up and establish health1 for intemperance to be a cause of disease4 ,it is natural for work to bring with it ease of circumstances1 for idleness to be a source of misery and poverty4 ,it is natural that probity should insure security1 confidence1 and credit2 that courage should put off the chances of death2 that patience should render life more bearable2 that good-will should call forth good-will2 that wickedness should drive men from us2 that perjury should cause them to distrust us1 etc4 ,these facts have ever been verified by experience4 ,the honest is not always the useful2 but it is often what is most useful4 #b4 ,legal sanction is above all a penal sanction4 ,it is composed of the chastisements which the law has established for the guilty4 ,there are1 in general1 few rewards established by the law1 and they may be classed among what is called the esteem of men4 #c4 ,another kind of sanction consists in the opinion other men entertain in regard to our actions and character4 ,we have seen that it is in the nature of good actions to inspire esteem1 in the nature of the bad to inspire blame and contempt4 ,the honest man generally enjoys public honor and consideration4 ,the dishonest man1 even though the law does not reach him1 is branded with discredit1 aversion1 contempt1 etc4 #d4 ,finally1 a more exact and certain sanction is that which results from the very conscience and moral sentiment mentioned above4 #af4 ,the superior sanction3 the future life4--,these various sanctions being insufficient to satisfy our want of justice1 there is required still another1 namely1 the superior religious sanction4 ,it is a well-known fact that virtue is not a sufficient shield to protect us against the blows of adversity1 and that immorality does not necessarily condemn one to misery and grief4 ,it is evident that a man corrupt and wicked may be born with all the advantages of genius1 fortune1 health2 and that an honest man may have inherited none of these4 ,there is in this neither injustice nor blind chance2 but it proves that the harmony between moral good and happiness is not of this world4 ,in regard to the pleasures and pains of conscience1 it is also evident that they are not sufficient4 ,in fact1 the pleasures of the senses may divert and deaden the pangs of remorse2 and it must also be said1 though it be still more sad1 that it sometimes happens that a merciless continuance of misfortune deadens in an honest soul the delight in virtue2 and the painful efforts which virtue costs may finally obliterate in a man1 tired of life1 the calm and sweet enjoyment which it naturally brings with it4 ,if such is the disproportion and disagreement between the inner pleasures and pains1 and the moral merit of him who experiences them1 what shall we say of that wholly outward sanction which consists in the rewards and punishments distributed by the unequal justice of man8 ,i do not speak of legal pains alone2 it is well known that they often fall upon the innocent1 and are spared to the guilty2 that they are almost always disproportioned3 the law punishing the crime1 without taking note of the exact moral value of the action2 but ,i speak also of the pains and rewards of public opinion1 esteem1 and contempt4 ,are these always in an exact proportion to merit8 ,from all these observations it results that the law of harmony between good and happiness is not of this world2 that there is always disagreement1 or at least disproportion1 between moral merit and the pleasures of the senses4 ,hence the necessity of a superior sanction1 the means and time of which are in the hand of ,god4 ,the more ,i go within myself1 says a philosopher1#e the more ,i consult myself1 the more ,i read these words written in my soul3 be just and thou shalt be happy4 ,and yet it is not so1 looking at the actual state of things3 the wicked prosper1 and the just are oppressed4 ,see1 also1 what indignation arises in us when this expectation is frustrated6 ,the conscience murmurs and rebels against its author2 it cries to him1 groaning3 ,thou hast deceived me6 ,i have deceived thee1 oh thou rash one8 ,who has told thee so8 ,is thy soul annihilated8 ,hast thou ceased to exist8 ,oh1 ,brutus6 oh1 my son1 do not stain thy noble life by putting an end to it2 do not leave thy hopes and glory with thy body on the fields of ,philippi4 ,why sayest thou3 ,virtue is nothing when thou art now about entering into the enjoyment of thine8 ,thou shalt die1 thinkest thou2 no1 thou shalt live1 and it is then ,i shall keep what ,i have promised6 ,one would say1 hearing the murmurings of impatient mortals1 that ,god owes them a reward before they have shown any merit1 and that he is obliged to pay their virtue in advance4 ,oh6 let us first be good2 we shall be happy afterwards4 ,do not let us claim the prize before the victory1 nor the salary before the work4 ',it is not in the lists1' says ,plutarch1 'that the victors in our sacred games are crowned2 it is after they have run the course4' ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,division ,,of ,,duties--,,general ,,principles ,,of ,,social ,,morality4 ,,summary4 ,division of duties4--,in theory there is but one duty1 which is to do right2 but this duty is subdivided according to the various relations of man4 ,hence three classes of duties3 duties towards ourselves1 towards others1 towards ,god3 individual1 social1 religious morality4 ,we will begin with social morality1 which requires the most expounding4 ,general principles of social duties3 to do good2 not to do evil4 ,different degrees of this double obligation3 #a1 not to return evil for good 7ingratitude72 #b1 not to do evil to those who have not done us any 7injustice and cruelty72 #c1 not to return evil for evil 7revenge72 #d1 to return good for good 7gratitude72 #e1 to do good to those who have not done us any 7charity72 #f1 to return good for evil 7clemency1 generosity74 ,distinction between the various kinds of social duties3 #a1 towards the lives of other men2 #b1 towards their property2 #c1 towards their family2 #d1 towards their honor2 #e1 towards their liberty4 ,distinction between the duties of justice and the duties of charity4--,justice is absolute1 without restriction1 without exception4 ,charity1 although as obligatory as justice1 is more independent in its application4 ,it chooses its time and place2 its objects and means2 its beauty is in its liberty4 ,we have seen that practical morality or private morality has for its object to acquaint us with the application of theoretical morality4 ,it bears not so much on duty as on duties4 ,the first question1 then1 that presents itself to us is that of the division of duties4 #ag4 ,division of duties4--,it has been reasonably asserted that there is in reality but one duty1 which is to do good under all circumstances1 the same as it has also been said that there is but one virtue3 wisdom1 or obedience to the laws of reason4 ,but as these two general divisions teach us in reality nothing touching our various actions1 which are very numerous1 it is useful and necessary to classify the principal circumstances in which we have to act1 in order to specify in a more particular manner wherein the general principle which commands us to do good may be applied in each case4 ,human actions may then be divided1 either in regard to the different beings they have for their object1 or in regard to the various faculties to which they relate4 ,the ancients divided morality particularly in reference to the divers human faculties1 and in private morality they considered above all the virtues4 ,the moderns1 on the other hand1 have divided morality particularly in its relations to the different objects of our actions2 and1 in private morality1 they have considered1 above all1 the duties4 ,the ancients reduced all virtues to four principal ones3 prudence1 temperance1 courage1 and justice4 ,this division was transmitted to us1 and it is these four virtues which the catechism teaches under the name of cardinal virtues4 ,the moderns reduced duties to three classes3 the duties towards ourselves1 towards others1 and towards ,god4 ,some add a fourth class1 namely1 duties towards animals4 ,that portion of morality which treats of the duties towards ourselves1 is called individual morality2 that which treats of the duties towards ,god1 is called religious morality2 that which treats of the duties towards other men1 social morality4 ,as to the duties towards animals1 they are of so secondary an order1 that it is not worth while to classify them apart2 we shall include them in social morality4 ,social morality is by far the most extended in precepts and applications1 the various relations of men with each other being extremely numerous4 ,it may be subdivided into three parts3 #a1 general duties of social life1 or morality properly called social2 #b1 duties towards the ,state1 or civil morality2 #c1 duties towards the family1 or domestic morality4 ,we will begin with the study of social morality1 social duties towards men in general1 and we will first establish their principles and different varieties4 ,let us in a few pages rapidly take a summary review of the general principles of social morality4 #ah4 ,general principles of social duties3 to do good1 not to do evil4--,all human actions1 in regard to others1 may be reduced to these two precepts3 #a1 to do good to men2 #b1 not to do them harm4 ,to this all the virtues of social morality may be reduced4 ,but before exhibiting these virtues and vices more in detail1 let us explain what is understood by the expressions to do good and to do evil4 ,in the most general and apparent sense to do any one good would seem to be to give him pleasure2 to do him harm1 would seem to be to give him pain4 ,yet1 is it always doing good to a person to procure him pleasure8 and is it always doing him harm1 to cause him pain8 ,for example1 ,kant#f says1 ,shall we allow the idler soft cushions2 the drunkard wines in abundance2 the rogue an agreeable face and manners1 to deceive more easily2 the violent man audacity and a good fist8 ,would it really be doing good to these men to grant them the object of their desires1 what may satisfy their passions8 ,on the other hand1 the surgeon who amputates a mortified limb1 the dentist who pulls out a bad tooth1 the teacher who obliges you to learn1 the father who corrects your faults or restrains your passions1 do they really do you harm because they give you pain8 ,no1 certainly not4 ,there are1 then1 cases where to do some one good is to cause him pain1 and to do him harm is to procure him pleasure4 ,one may reasonably reduce all principles of social morality to these two maxims of the gospel3 ,do not do to others what you do not wish them do to you2--,do to others as you wish to be done by4 ,these two maxims are admirable1 certainly2 but they must be interpreted rightly4 ,if1 for instance1 we have done wrong1 do we generally wish to be corrected and punished8 ,when we are yielding to a passion1 do we wish to be repressed in it1 have it repelled8 ,on the contrary1 do we not rather wish to be allowed to enjoy it1 and have the free range of our vices8 ,is not this generally what we all wish1 when the voice of duty is mute and does not silence our passionate feelings8 ,if this is so1 should we wish to do to others as we wish in similar circumstances1 namely1 in the gratification of passions1 to be done by8 ,should we not rather do to them what we should not like them do to us1 that is1 punish and correct them8 ,it is evidently not in that sense we are to understand the two evangelical maxims2 for they would be then no other than maxims of remissness and improper kindness2 whilst they1 on the contrary1 express most admirably a moral truth2 only when they speak of what we wish1 they mean a true and good wish1 not the desires of passion2 the same when we recommend men to do good1 we mean real good and not apparent good2 as also in recommending to do no harm1 we mean real harm1 not the illusory harm of the senses1 imagination and passions4 ,thus1 to well understand the duties we have to fulfil towards other men1 we must understand the distinction between true good and false good4 ,false good is that which consists exclusively in pleasure1 all abstraction being made of usefulness or moral value2 as1 for example1 the pleasures of passions4 ,true good is that which independently of pleasure recommends itself either through usefulness or through moral value2 as1 for instance1 health or education4 ,the real evils1 of course1 are those which injure either the interests of others or their moral dignity1 such as misery or corruption4 ,apparent evils are those which cause us to suffer but a moment and redeem themselves by subsequent advantages3 as1 for instance1 remedies or chastisements4 ,when we speak of good in regard to others1 we should not fear to understand by that their interest1 as well as their moral welfare2 for1 though we should not make our own interest the aim of our actions1 it is not so in our relation with others4 ,the seeking of our own happiness has no moral value2 but the seeking of other people's happiness may have one1 provided1 we repeat1 that we do not deceive ourselves touching the real sense of the word happiness1 and that we do not understand by it a deceitful and short-lived delight4 ,to do to others as we wish to be done by2 not to do to them what we do not wish they should do us1 should1 therefore1 be understood in the sense of an enlightened will1 which wills for itself nothing but what is truly conformable either to a proper interest or to virtue4 ,thus understood 7and it is their true sense#g71 these two maxims comprehend perfectly the whole of social morality4 #ai4 ,different degrees of this double obligation4--,the sense of these two expressions1 to do good and to do harm1 being now well-defined1 let us examine the various cases which may present themselves1 in rising1 so to say1 from the lowest to the highest round of duty4 ,let us first suppose a certain good or a certain evil1 which will not vary in any of the following cases3 this is the scale one may observe starting from the least virtue1 to which corresponds evidently the greatest vice 7by virtue of the principle set forth above#h71 to rise to the highest virtue1 to which the least vice corresponds4 #a4 ,not to return evil for good4--,this is1 one may say 7all things being equal71 the feeblest of the virtues1 as to return evil for good constitutes the greatest of wrongs4 ,say1 for example1 homicide3 is it not evident that the murder of a benefactor is the most abominable of all8 that to rob a benefactor is the most horrible of robberies8 that the slander of a benefactor is the most criminal of slanders8 ,on the other hand again1 not to kill1 not to steal1 not to slander1 not to deceive a benefactor1 is the minimum of moral virtue4 ,to abstain from doing harm to him who has done you good1 is a wholly negative virtue1 which is simply the absence of a crime4 ,we cannot call that gratitude1 for gratitude is a positive virtue1 not a negative one2 it is all in action1 and not in omission2 but1 before being grateful1 the first condition at least1 is to be not ungrateful4 ,we shall then say that the greatest of crimes is ingratitude4 ,it is by reason of this principle that the crimes towards parents are the most odious of all2 for we have no greater benefactors than our parents1 and without mentioning the crimes nature finds repugnant enough1 it is evident that the same kind of harm 7wounds1 blows1 insults1 negligence1 etc47 will always be more blamable when done to parents than to any other benefactors1 and to benefactors in general1 than to any other men4 #b4 ,not to do harm to those who have not done us any4--,the violation of this maxim is the second degree of crime and of sin1 somewhat less serious than the preceding one1 but still odious enough that to abstain from it is1 in many cases1 a rather feeble virtue4 ,not to kill1 not to steal1 not to deceive1 not to expose one's self to the punishments of the law1 are1 indeed1 of a very feeble moral value2 whilst their contraries constitute the basest and most odious of actions4 ,the kind of vice which injures others without provocation is what is called injustice1 and when the pleasure of doing wrong is joined thereto1 it is called cruelty4 ,cruelty is an injustice which rejoices in the harm done to others2 injustice contents itself with taking advantage of it4 ,there is1 therefore1 a higher degree of evil in cruelty than in injustice pure and simple4 ,the virtue opposed to injustice is justice1 which has two degrees and two forms3 the one negative1 which consists simply in abstaining from doing injury to any one2 the second positive1 which consists in rendering to each his due4 ,this second form of justice is more difficult than the first1 for it is active4 ,it is more difficult to restore to others what we hold as our own1 or to pay one's debts1 than to abstain from stealing2 it is more difficult to speak well of one's rivals1 than to abstain from slandering them2 it is more difficult to give up one's position to another who deserves it1 than to abstain from taking his2 and yet there are cases where justice requires one should act instead of simply abstaining4 #c4 ,not to return evil for good4--,here we rise1 in some respect1 a degree in the moral scale4 ,the two inferior degrees1 namely1 ingratitude and cruelty1 have always and everywhere been considered as crimes4 ,nowhere has it ever been considered allowable to do harm to those who have done us good4 ,but in nearly all societies1 at a certain degree of civilization1 has it been considered allowable1 and even praiseworthy1 to return evil for evil4 ,to do good to our friends1 and harm to our enemies1 is one of the maxims the poets and sages of ,greece oftenest repeat4 ,among the ,indians of ,america1 glory consists in ornamenting one's dwelling with the greatest possible number of scalps taken from conquered enemies4 ,we know about the ,corsican vendetta4 ,in one word1 the passion of revenge 7which consists precisely in returning evil for evil7 is one of the most natural and the most profound in the human heart1 and it demands a very advanced moral education to comprehend that revenge is contrary to the laws of morality4 ,now1 as the beauty of virtue is in proportion to the difficulty of the passions to be overcome1 it is evident that the virtues contrary to revenge1 namely3 gentleness1 clemency1 pardon of injuries1 are amongst the most beautiful and most sublime4 ,already among the ancients had morality reached this maxim1 that one should not do any harm1 namely1 even to those who had done us some1 as may be seen from the dialogue of ,plato1 entitled the ,crito4 ,socrates3 ,one should then commit no injustice whatsoever8 ,crito3 ,no1 certainly not4 ,socrates3 ,then should one not be unjust even towards those who are unjust towards us4 #d4 ,thus far we have only spoken of the virtues which express themselves negatively1 and which consist especially in doing no harm4 ,let us now consider those which express themselves affirmatively1 and which consist in doing good4 ,the first degree is to return good for good3 which is gratitude1 the contrary of which1 as we have seen1 is ingratitude2 but there are two sorts of ingratitude1 as there are two sorts of gratitude4 ,there is a negative ingratitude1 as there is a positive ingratitude4 ,the positive ingratitude1 which is1 as we have seen1 the most odious of all crimes1 consists in returning evil for good2 negative ingratitude consists simply in not returning good for good1 namely1 in forgetting a kindness4 ,it is not so reprehensible as the former1 but it has still a certain character of baseness4 ,gratitude is also twofold in its degrees and forms3 it is negative1 inasmuch as it abstains from injuring a benefactor2#i it is positive1 inasmuch as it returns good for good4 ,in one sense1 gratitude is a part of justice1 for it consists in returning to a benefactor what is due him2 but it is also a notable part1 and one which deserves being pointed out1 for it seems that there is nothing easier than to return good for good2 and experience1 on the contrary1 teaches us that there is nothing more rare4 ,this is certainly too strongly put4 #e4 ,to do good to those who have done us neither good nor harm4 ,this is what is called charity1 which is a degree above the preceding1 for in the preceding case we scarcely do more than give back what we have received2 in this case we put in something of our own4 ,but to characterize this new degree of virtue1 it is necessary to well explain that the question relates to a good that is not due4 ,for justice1 we have seen1 does not always mean to abstain from evil2 it even does good sometimes4 ,to restore a trust to one not expecting it2 to do good to him who deserves it2 to elect to a position one worthy of it2 or1 what is still more heroic1 to give one's own position up to him1 this evidently is doing good to others1 and to those who have not done us any2 but these are goods due1 which already belong in some respects to those upon whom we confer them4 ,it is not so with the goods which charity distributes4 ,the gifts ,i make to the poor1 the consolations ,i give to the afflicted1 the care ,i bestow upon the sick1 all of which take from my time1 my interests1 and my life which ,i endanger to save a fellow-being1 are also goods which are my own and not his4 ,i do not return to him what he would otherwise legitimately possess1 whether he knows it or not4 ,i give him something of my own2 it is a pure gift4 ,this gift is suggested to me by love1 not by justice4 ,the contrary of charity or devotion to others is selfishness4 ,finally1 there is a last degree above all other preceding degrees1 namely1 to return good for evil4 ,this kind of virtue1 the highest of all1 has no particular name in the language4 ,charity1 in fact1 consists in doing good generally1 and comprises the two degrees3 to do good to the unfortunate1 and return good for evil4 ,clemency may consist in simply pardoning2 it does not necessarily go so far as to return good for evil4 ,corneille might as well have called his tragedy of ,cinna1 the ,clemency of ,augustus1 even if ,augustus had merely pardoned ,cinna1 and not added3 ,let us be friends6 ,thus has this great and magnificent virtue no name1 and as science is powerless in creating words suitable for every-day language1 it must rest satisfied with periphrases4 ,nevertheless1 this sublime virtue finds nowhere a grander expression than in those maxims of the ,gospel3 ,you have been told that it was said3 ,thou shalt love thy neighbor and hate thy enemy3 ,but ,i say to you3 ,love your enemies2 do good to those that hate you1 and pray for those that despitefully use you and persecute you4 #bj4 ,different kinds of social duties4--,after the preceding division1 which answers to the different degrees of obligation which may exist among men1 there is another classification which rests on the various species or kinds of duties which we may have to perform towards our fellow-beings4 ,let us first briefly state what will be developed at greater length in the following chapters4 #a4 ,duties relating to the life of others4--,according to the two maxims cited above1 these duties are of two kinds3 #a1 not to attempt the life of others2 #b1 to make efforts to save the life of others4 ,all attempt at the life of others is called homicide4 ,when accompanied by perfidy or treason1 it is assassination4 ,the murder of parents by children is called parricide2 of children by parents 7especially at the tenderest age71 infanticide2 of brothers by brothers1 fratricide4 ,all these crimes are most odious1 and most repugnant to the human heart4 ,murder is never permitted1 even when the highest interest and the greatest good is at stake4 ,thus did the ancients err in believing that the murder of a tyrant1 or tyrannicide1 was not only legitimate1 but also honorable and beautiful4 ,however1 there is to be excepted the case of legitimate self-defense2 for we cannot be forbidden to defend ourselves against him who wishes to deprive us of life4 ,but the duel should not be considered an act of legitimate self-defense3 that is evident in the case of the aggressor2 and1 on the other side1 there is only the defense that there has been the consent to be put in peril4 ,as to the question whether an attack on honor is not equivalent to an attack on life1 it cannot be said that it is false in all cases2 but the abuse of the thing is here so near the principle1 that it is wiser to condemn altogether a barbarous practice1 of which so deplorable an abuse has been made4 ,finally1 homicide in war1 within the conditions authorized by international law1 is considered a case of legitimate self-defense4#aj ,if murder is the most criminal of actions1 and the most revolting to our sensibilities1 the action1 on the contrary1 which consists in saving the life of others is the most beautiful of all4 ,the good shepherd gives his life for the sheep4 ,with the fundamental duty not to attempt the life of other men1 is connected1 as corollary1 the duty not to injure them bodily by blows or wounds1 or by dangerous violence done to their health1 and1 conversely1 to assist them in illness4 #b4 ,duties relating to property4--,it is evident#aa that man cannot preserve his life and render it happy and comfortable without a certain number of material objects which are his4 ,the legitimate possession of these goods is what is called property4#ab ,the right of property rests in one respect on social utility1 and in the other on human labor4 ,on the one hand1 society cannot subsist without a certain order that settles for each what is his own2 on the other1 it is but right that each should be the proprietor of what he has earned by his work2 the right of possession carries with it the right of economizing1 and1 consequently1 the right of forming a capital1 and1 moreover1 the right of using this capital in making it bear interest4 ,again1 the right of preserving implies also the right of transmission2 hence the legitimacy of inheritance4 ,property once founded upon law1 it becomes our duty not to transgress the law4 ,the act of taking what belongs to another is called theft4 ,theft is absolutely forbidden by the moral law1 whatever name it may assume1 or under whatever prestige it may present itself4 ,thou shalt not steal4 ,theft does not consist merely in putting one's hand into a neighbor's pocket2 it includes all possible ways whereby the property of others may be appropriated4 ,for example1 to defraud in regard to the quality of the thing sold2 to practice illegal stock-jobbing2 to convert to one's own use a deposit entrusted to one's care2 to borrow without knowing whether one can pay1 and after having borrowed1 to disown the debt1 or refuse to pay it2 there are as many forms of theft as there are ways of appropriating the property of others4 ,regarding the property of others1 the negative duty then consists in not taking what belongs to others4 ,the positive duty consists in assisting others with one's own property1 in relieving their misery4 ,this is called benevolence1 which benevolence may be exercised in various ways1 either by gift1 or by loan4 ,it may also be exercised in kind1 that is in giving to others the objects necessary to their maintenance or support1 or in money1 that is1 in furnishing them the means of procuring them2 or in work1 which is the best of all gifts2 for in thus relieving others we procure them the means of helping themselves4 ,with the duty relating to the property of others1 are connected as corollaries1 the duties relating to the observance of agreements or contracts2 the transmission of property in society being not always done from hand to hand1 but by means of promises and writings4 ,to fail in keeping one's promise1 to pervert the sense of solemn contracts1 is1 on the one side1 to appropriate other people's property1 and on the other1 to lie and deceive1 and thus to fail in a double duty4 #c4 ,duties relating to the families of others4--,we have seen above what are the duties of man in his family2 there remains to be said a few words touching the duties towards the families of others4 ,one may fail in these duties either by violating the conjugal bond1 which is adultery2 or by carrying off other people's children1 which is abduction1 or by depraving them through bad advice or bad examples1 which is corruption4 #d4 ,duties relating to the honor of others4--,one may fail in these duties1 either by saying to a man 7who does not deserve it71 wounding and rude things to his face1 which are insults1 or in speaking ill of others2 and here we distinguish two degrees3 if what is said is true1 it is backbiting2 if what is said is false and an invention1 it is slander4 ,in general one must not too easily ascribe evil to other men2 this kind of defect is what is called rash judgments4 ,the positive duty respecting other people's reputation is to be just towards every one1 even towards one's enemies2 to speak well of them if they deserve it1 and even of those who speak ill of us4 ,it is a duty to entertain a kindly disposition towards men in general1 provided this does not go so far as to wink at wrong4 ,in our relations with our neighbors1 usage of the world has1 in order to avoid quarrels and insults1 introduced what is called politeness1 which1 for being a worldly virtue1 is not the less a necessary virtue in the order of society4 #e4 ,duties towards the liberty of others4--,these are rather the duties of the ,state than of the individual4 ,they consist in respecting in others the liberty of conscience1 the liberty of labor1 individual liberty1 personal responsibility1 all of which are the natural rights of man4 ,however1 private individuals may themselves also fail in this kind of duties4 ,the violation of the liberty of conscience is called intolerance2 it consists either in employing force to constrain the consciences1 or in imputing bad morals or bad motives to those who do not think as we do4 ,the virtue opposed to intolerance is tolerance1 a disposition of the soul which consists1 not in approving what we think false1 but in respecting in others what we wish they should respect in us1 namely1 conscience4 ,one may also violate individual liberty1 the liberty of labor1 in keeping one's fellow-beings in slavery2 but slavery is rather a social institution than an individual act4 ,however1 there may be cases where one may seek to injure other people's work1 in restraining others by threats from work2 which1 for example1 takes sometimes place in workmen's strikes4 ,there is also a certain way of domineering over the freedom of others without restraining it materially1 which constitutes real tyranny2 it is the dominion which a strong will exercises over a feeble will1 and of which it too often is tempted to take advantage4 ,on the contrary1 it is a duty1 not only to respect the liberty of others1 but also to encourage it1 to develop it1 to enlighten it through education4 #f4 ,duties relating to friendship4--,all the preceding duties are the same towards all men4 ,there are others which concern more particularly certain men1 those1 for example1 to whom we are attached either by congeniality of disposition or uniformity of occupation1 or a common education1 etc41 those1 namely1 whom we call friends4 ,the duties relating to friendship are3 #a1 to choose well one's friends2 to choose the honest1 and enlightened1 in order to find in their society encouragement to right-doing4 ,nothing more dangerous than pleasure-friends or interested friends1 united by vices and passions1 instead of being united by wisdom and virtue2 #b1 the friends once chosen1 the reciprocal duty is fidelity4 ,they should treat each other with perfect equality and with confidence4 ,they owe each other secrecy when they mutually entrust their dearest interests2 they owe each other self-devotion when they need each other's help4 ,finally1 they owe to each other in a more strict and rigorous a sense1 all they generally owe to other men1 for the faults or crimes against humanity in general assume a still more odious character when against friends4 #ba4 ,professional duties and civic duties4--,such are the general duties of men in relation to each other1 when simply viewed as men4 ,but these duties become diversified and specialized according as we view man either in the light of the private functions he fills in society1 which are his professional duties1 or in the light of the particular society of which he is a member1 and which is called the ,state or the country1 and these are the civic duties4 7,see chapters xii4 and xiii47 #bb4 ,distinction between the duties of justice and the duties of charity4--,we have said above that all the social duties could be reduced to these two maxims3 ,do not do unto others what you do not wish they should do to you4 ,do to others as you wish to be done by4 ,these two maxims correspond with what is called3 #a1 the duties of justice2 #b1 the duties of charity4 ,the first consists in not doing wrong1 or at least in repairing the wrong already done4 ,charity consists in doing good1 or at least in giving to others what is not really their due4 ,a celebrated writer#ac has made a very subtle and forcible distinction between these two virtues3 ,the respect for the rights of others is called justice4 ,all violation of any right whatsoever is an injustice4 ,the greatest of injustices1 since it comprises all1 is slavery4 ,slavery is the subjugation of all the faculties of a man for the benefit of another4 ,moral personality should be respected in you as well as in me1 and for the same reason4 ,in regard to myself it has imposed a duty on me2 in you it becomes the foundation of a right1 and imposes thereby1 relatively to you1 a new duty on me4 ,i owe you the truth as ,i owe it to myself1 and it is my strict duty to respect the development of your intelligence and not arrest its progress towards the truth4 ,i must also respect your liberty2 perhaps even ,i owe it to you more than ,i do to myself1 for ,i have not always the right to prevent you from making a mistake4 ,i must respect you in your affections1 which are a part of yourself2 and of all the affections none are more holy than those of the family4 ,to violate the conjugal and paternal right is to violate what a person holds most sacred4 ,i owe respect to your body1 inasmuch as belonging to you1 it is the instrument of your personality4 ,i have neither the right to kill you nor to wound you1 unless in self-defense4 ,i owe respect to your property1 for it is the product of your labor2 ,i owe respect to your labor1 which is your very liberty in action2 and if your property comes from inheritance1 ,i owe respect to the free will which has transmitted it to you4 ,justice1 that is1 the respect for the person in all that constitutes his personality1 is the first duty of man towards his fellow-man4 ,is this duty the only one8 ,when we have respected the person of others1 when we have neither put a restraint upon their liberty1 nor smothered their intelligence1 nor maltreated their body1 nor interfered with their family rights nor their property1 can we say that we have fulfilled towards them all moral duties8 ,a wretch is here suffering before us4 ,is our conscience satisfied if we can assure ourselves that we have not contributed to his sufferings8 ,no2 something tells us that it would be well if we should give him bread1 help1 consolation2 and yet this man in pain1 who1 perhaps1 is going to die1 has not the least right to the least part of our fortune1 were this fortune ever so great2 and if he were to use violence to take a farthing from us1 he would commit a crime4 ,we shall meet here a new order of duties which do not correspond to rights4 ,man1 we have seen1 may resort to force to have his rights respected1 but he cannot impose on another a sacrifice1 whatever that may be4 ,justice respects or restores3 charity gives4 ,one cannot say that to be charitable is not obligatory2 but this obligation is by no means as precise and as inflexible as justice4 ,charity implies sacrifice4 ,now1 who will furnish the rule for sacrifice1 the formula for self-renunciation8 ,for justice1 the formula is clear3 to respect the rights of others4 ,but charity knows neither rule nor limits4 ,it is above all obligation4 ,its beauty is precisely in its liberty4 ,it follows from these considerations that justice is absolute1 without restriction1 without exception4 ,charity1 whilst it is as obligatory as justice1 is more independent in its applications2 it chooses its place and its time1 considers its objects and means4 ,in a word1 as ,victor ,cousin says1 its beauty is in its liberty4 ,let us not hesitate to borrow from the ,apostle ,st4 ,paul his admirable exaltation of charity3 ,though ,i speak with the tongues of men and of angels1 and have not charity1 ,i am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal4 ,and though ,i have the gift of prophecy1 and understand all mysteries1 and all knowledge1 and though ,i have all faith1 so that ,i could remove mountains1 and have not charity1 ,i am nothing4#ad ,and though ,i bestowed all my goods to feed the poor1 and though ,i give my body to be burned1 and have not charity1 it profiteth me nothing4 ,charity suffereth long1 and is kind2 charity envieth not2 charity vaunteth not itself2 is not puffed up4 ,doth not behave itself unseemely2 seeketh not her own2 is not easily provoked2 thinketh no evil4 ,beareth all things2 believeth all things2 endureth all things4#ae ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,duties ,,of ,,justice--,,duties ,,towards ,,human ,,life4 ,,summary4 ,division of the duties of justice4--,four kinds of duties3 #a1 towards the life of others2 #b1 towards the liberty of others2 #c1 towards the honor of others2 #d1 towards the property of others4 ,duties towards human life4--,avoid homicide1 acts of violence1 and mutilation4 ,pascal and the ,provinciales4 ,the right of self-defense4--,right to oppose force to force4 ,limits of this right4 ,problems4--,four very grave problems are bound up in the question of self-defense3 #a1 the penalty of death2 #b1 political assassination2 #c1 the duel2 #d1 war4 ,the penalty of death4--,the penalty of death is the right of self-defense exercised by society3 it is just so far as it is efficacious4 ,political assassination4--,murder is always a crime1 under whatever pretext it may conceal itself4 ,the duel4--,the duel is at the same time a homicide and a suicide2 it is falsely considered justice1 since it appeals to chance and skill4 ,war4--,war is the only mode of self-defense existing among nations2 it is desirable for the sake of humanity that it may some day disappear2 but humanity cannot now exact this sacrifice of the country4 #bc4 ,division of social duties4--,according to the foregoing distinctions1 we will first divide duties into duties of justice and duties of charity4 ,let us begin by expounding the duties of justice4 ,these duties may be summed up in a general manner in the respect for the person of others1 and for all that is necessary for the preservation and development of that person4 ,hence four kinds of duties3 #a4 ,towards the life of other men4 #b4 ,towards their liberty4 #c4 ,towards their honor4 #d4 ,towards their property4 ,besides these duties1 purely negative1 which consist only in doing others no harm1 there are also the duties of justice1 which may be called positive2 and which consist not only in not injuring others1 but also in granting each what he has a right to4 ,this is called distributive or remunerative justice1 and is the duty of all those who have others under them1 and who are commissioned to distribute rewards1 titles1 or functions4 #bd4 ,duties towards the life of men4--,we have seen above that self-preservation is the duty of every one1 and that one should not attempt one's own life1 nor mutilate one's self1 nor injure one's health4 ,now1 all these obligations which we have towards ourselves1 we have equally towards others2 for that which each owes to himself1 he owes it to his quality1 as man1 to his quality as a free and reasonable being1 a moral person4 ,it is1 as ,kant says1 humanity itself that each one must respect in his own person2 and it is also humanity which each must respect in others4 ,we should not do to others what we do not wish that they should do to us1 or what we should not wish to do to ourselves4 ,now1 no one wishes others to attempt his life2 no one should wish to attempt it himself4 ,for the same reason he should not wish to attempt the life of others4 ,these are such self-evident considerations that it is useless to insist on them4 ,let us add that this duty rests1 besides1 on one of the most powerful instincts of humanity1 the instinct of sympathy for other men1 the horror of their sufferings1 the horror of spilt blood4 ,those who are wanting in this sentiment are like monsters in the midst of humanity4 ,one of the corollaries of this principle is to avoid the blows and wounds which might1 through imprudence and unexpectedly1 cause death1 and which1 besides1 are in themselves to be condemned1 inasmuch as they contribute1 if not towards destroying1 at least towards mutilating1 the person and rendering it unfitted to fulfil its duties and functions4 ,in a word1 to avoid scuffles1 bodily quarrels1 which are unworthy1 moreover1 from their very brutality1 of a reasonable being2 all this is comprised in the duty of avoiding homicide4 ,all may be summed up in these words of the ,decalogue3 ,thou shalt not kill4 ,pascal1 in his letter on homicide 7xiv4 ,provinciale71 expressed most eloquently the duty concerning the respect for human life3 ,everybody knows1 my fathers1 that individuals are never permitted to seek the death of any person1 and that1 even if a man should have ruined us1 maimed us1 burnt our houses1 killed our parents1 and was preparing to murder us1 to rob us of our honor1 that our seeking his death would not be listened to in a court of justice4 ,so that it was necessary to establish public functionaries who seek it in the name of the king1 or rather in the name of ,god4 ,suppose1 then1 these public functionaries should seek the death of him who has committed all these crimes1 how would they proceed8 ,would they plunge the dagger in his breast at once8 ,no2 the life of man is too important2 they would proceed with more consideration2 the law has not left it subject to the decision of all sorts of people2 but only to that of the judges1 whose integrity and sufficiency have been ascertained4 ,and think you that one alone is enough to condemn a man to death8 ,no2 there are at least seven required2 and among these seven there must not be any one whom the criminal has in any way offended1 for fear that his judgment be affected1 or corrupted by anger4 ,in short1 they can judge him only upon the testimony of witnesses1 and according to the other forms prescribed to them2 in consequence of which they can conscientiously pronounce upon him only according to law1 or judge worthy of death only those whom the law condemns4 ,after having thus expounded the innumerable precautions which society has taken1 out of respect for human life1 touching the persons of criminals1 ,pascal continues as follows3 ,behold in what way1 in the order of justice1 the life of man is disposed of2 let us see now how you dispose of it4#af ,in your new laws there is but one judge1 and this judge is the offended party4 ,he is at the same time judge1 accuser1 and executioner4 ,he seeks himself the death of his enemy2 he commands it1 he executes him on the spot2 and1 without respect for either the body or soul of his brother1 he kills and damns him for whom ,christ died2 and all this to avenge an affront1 or slander1 or an insulting word1 or other similar offences for which a judge1 although clothed with legal authority1 would be considered a criminal if he should condemn to death those who had committed them1 because the laws themselves are very far from condemning them4 ,finally1 gathering into one word all the evils which homicide comprises1 ,pascal ends by saying homicide is the only crime which at the same time destroys the ,state1 the ,church1 nature1 and piety4 #be4 ,the right of self-defense4--,none of the foregoing principles would present the shadow of a difficulty to any except those who are nearer the brute than man1 if it were not for an apparent exception to the rule1 which is the case of legitimate self-defense4 ,to understand properly the solution of this question1 it is necessary to examine carefully the nature of the relations which bind men to each other4 ,every man is a moral person2 that is to say1 a free being1 and for that very reason inviolable in his dignity and in his rights4 ,he is1 as ,kant says1 an end to himself1 and should not be treated as a means4 ,the things of nature are to us but means to satisfy our wants2 we may therefore mutilate and destroy them1 not as our whims may dictate1 but as our wants require4 ,thus can we cut the finest trees of a forest to make fire of1 or for furniture4 ,we even claim a similar right over animals1 although it may1 perhaps1 not be so evident4 ,but we have no such right over man4 ,we can neither mutilate nor destroy him for our use4 ,and1 in fact1 to destroy or mutilate through sheer force a member of humanity1 is to apply to him the law of compulsion1 which is the law of physical nature1 and which without reserve governs all physical phenomena3 it is to make of man a thing of nature1 to see in him the body only1 and ignore the soul4 ,the consequence of such conduct is evident3 it is that whosoever employs against another the law of compulsion means thereby that he does not recognize between himself and other men any other law but that4 ,treating them as if they were purely physical agents1 he gives us thereby to understand that he recognizes himself1 and expects to be treated1 as such2 he means to take advantage of his strength as long as he is the strongest1 but gives us to understand thereby that he is satisfied to submit to strength if he is the weaker4 ,it is here that the right of self-defense comes in4 ,he who is violently attacked1 has the right to oppose to violence just as much strength as there is employed against him4 ,otherwise1 in allowing himself to be knocked down by strength1 he would consent to the abasement1 to the suppression of his own personality2 he would in some respect be the accomplice of the violence he is made to suffer4 ,some ,christian sects1 straining this point1 go so far as to condemn absolutely the right of self-defense2 they do not see that this would infallibly bring with it the triumph of brute force1 and the suppression of all justice4 ,such sects may1 to a certain extent1 manage to exist in civilized societies2 but the principle is self-destructive1 since not to resist violence is in some respect to be its accomplice4 ,yet1 whilst admitting the right of self-defense1 it is necessary to recognize its limits4 ,this agent1 says ,m4 ,renouvier1 whom the right of self-defense treats as a brute1 this being is a man1 nevertheless1 or has been one1 or may become such4 ,hence the doctrine of conscience is to admit this right only when necessary1 and not beyond what is necessary4 7,moral ,science1 ,ch4 ,,lvi47 ,this is1 to begin with1 a natural consequence of the duties towards one's self1 since it is already a surrender of one's dignity to be obliged to act in the capacity of a physical agent1 and renounce one's character of a moral person2 it is also a duty towards humanity in general1 which is represented by every man1 even the most violent and the most uncultivated4 #bf4 ,problems4--,the right of legitimate self-defense gives rise to a certain number of problems relative to the law of homicide4 ,m4 ,jules ,simon#ag reduces them to five3 homicide in case of self-defense1 penalty of death1 political assassination1 duel1 and war4 ,in the first case it is implied in what precedes1 that legitimate self-defense may go so far as to deprive another man of life2 but only in case of absolute necessity4 ,there remain the four other cases1 which are not all of the same order4 #bg4 ,the penalty of death4--,the penalty of death in these days has been very much contested1 and several ,states have tried to abolish it4#ah ,the following arguments are brought to bear against it3 #a4 ,the inviolability of human life4--,the ,state1 it is said1 should not give the example of what it proscribes and punishes4 ,now1 it punishes homicide2 then it should not itself commit homicide4 #b4 ,the possible mistakes1 which in all other cases can be corrected1 but which in this case alone are irreparable4 #c4 ,experience1 which1 it is said1 tells against it in certain countries by proving that the number of crimes has not been increased by the suppression of the penalty of death4 #d4 ,finally1 the refinement of manners1 which can no longer bear the idea of capital punishment4 ,no one of these arguments is wholly decisive4 #a4 ,the inviolability of human life is not an absolute thing1 at least not for those who admit the right of legitimate self-defense4 ,we shall examine this presently4 #b4 ,judiciary mistakes are very rare1 and will become more and more so1 as justice becomes more respectful towards the rights of the accused1 and through greater publicity1 by the intervention of a jury1 etc4 #c4 ,experience is not so much of a test as it is said to be1 and is often made on too small a scale4 ,the attempts at abolition have not been very numerous4 ,in ,tuscany murders have always been very rare on account of the gentleness of manners4 ,in ,switzerland1 on the contrary1 crime is on the increase1 and certain cantons have asked for a return to the death penalty4 ,besides1 it is a very difficult experiment to make4 ,how could a society as complicated as ours dare to trust its security to so hazardous an experiment8 #d4 ,the refinement of manners may gradually bring about1 thanks to the institution of the jury1 the diminution1 perhaps some day the suppression1 of the penalty of death1 without its being necessary for the ,state to lay aside this powerful means of defense and intimidation4 ,the penalty of death1 in fact1 can be considered legitimate only in the light of the right of self-defense4 ,if society needs this penalty to protect the life of its members1 it may be said that it is authorized to use it1 on the same ground as each individual to whom we have conceded the right to repel force by force1 and to deprive of his own life one who should threaten to take his life4 ,but1 it will be objected1 the right of self-defense1 when ending in homicide1 is justifiable only at the moment of the attack1 and to ward off a sudden aggression itself threatening murder2 but the deed once committed and the criminal in the hands of the law1 there is no reason to fear a new aggression from him1 and his chances of escape from justice through evasion are too few to justify the violation of a duty so absolute as the respect for human life4 ,it may be answered that society1 by the death penalty1 not only defends itself against the criminal himself1 but against all those who might be inclined to imitate him4 ,the penalty of death is above all a precautionary means of defense1 that is to say1 a means of intimidation4 ,the future criminal is warned beforehand of the risks he runs2 he accepts voluntarily the punishment he will incur4 ,if society should catch him in the act--flagrante delicto--it would certainly1 in order to prevent the crime1 since it is the representative of all individuals1 have the same rights as the individual of defending himself4 ,but the difficulty of seizing upon the criminal at the moment of commission1 can it be considered a circumstance in favor of the criminal1 and does society lose its right1 because1 through the skill and precautions of assassins1 it can but very rarely1 and scarcely ever1 catch them in the act8 ,the right of society to defend itself by the death penalty does not seem to us1 then1 to admit any doubt4 ,the whole question is to know whether such a means of defense is really necessary and efficacious4 ,it is1 as we have said1 a question of experience which it is very difficult to settle1 for the reason that we dare not make the experiment4 ,all that can be said is that1 as a principle1 every man fears death2 it is the greatest of fears4 ,there is1 therefore1 reason to believe that it is the most powerful of the means of intimidation4 ,besides1 it is known that professional criminals estimate with great accuracy offenses and crimes proportionably to their penalties4 ,thus1 those who steal know that they expose themselves to such or such punishment1 but they go no farther in order not to incur a more severe punishment2 for these the penalty of death is certainly a great item in their plans1 and it would be dangerous to relieve them of this menace4 ,we do not mean to say that in future society may not reach a state of organization strong and enlightened enough to be able to do without such means2 but in the present state of things we should consider the attempt to abolish them dangerous for society4 #bh4 ,of political assassination4--,concerning this pretended right1 so shockingly promulgated in these days by savage factions1 we cannot do better than quote the words of ,m4 ,jules ,simon in his book on ,duty3 ,political assassination1 he says1 is essentially worthy of condemnation from whichever side one looks at it4 ,it has the same origin as the penalty of death1 with this double difference that1 in the application of the penalty of death1 it is the ,state that pronounces the sentence conformably to the law1 whilst in political assassination it is the same man who makes the law1 pronounces the sentence1 and executes it4 ,now1 society1 though badly constituted1 and the law1 though bad1 are nevertheless a guaranty1 whilst there is none at all against the caprice1 passion or false judgment of a single individual4 ,besides1 the legitimacy of the penalty of death is connected with the legitimacy of the power that pronounces it1 and the uniformity of the law4 ,let some tyrannical authority cause a man to be shot at the corner of a street1 without form of legal process1 that cannot be called penalty of death2 it is called murder2 and even when the victim should have deserved his death1 the government would not be the less criminal for having executed him without trial4 ,if these principles are just1 how can we admit the theory of political assassination1 which allows the destiny of all to depend upon the conscience of a single individual4 ,we reflect so little upon the rights of men that there are those who will condemn the death penalty and yet approve of political assassination4 ,we judge so badly1 that under the ,restoration a monument was erected to ,georges ,cadoudal1 and we hear every day the eulogy of ,charlotte ,corday4 ,the guiltiness of the victim does not legitimate the act of the murderer4 ,it is both unwise and criminal to furnish hatred with such excuses4 #bi4 ,the duel4--,does the duel come under the head of legitimate self-defense8 ,no2 whatever custom and prejudice may say in its favor4 #a4 ,we must first lay aside without discussion all duels bearing on frivolous causes1 and they are the largest in number4 #b4 ,in many other cases reparation may be obtained through the law1 and prejudice alone can prevent having recourse to it4 ,if ,i am willing to have recourse to law in a case of robbery1 why should ,i not appeal to this same law when my honor is attacked8 #c4 ,the duel is an absurd form of justice1 because it puts the offender and the one offended on the same level4 ,it is not the guilty one that is punished2 it is the awkward one4 #d4 ,social justice has degrees of penalty in proportion to the gravity of the offense1 and is applied only after a very severe examination4 ,the aim of the duel is to apply to very unequal offenses one and the same penalty1 death 7,jules ,simon1 ,le ,devoir1 ,,iv471 or if there are any degrees1 since it does not always result in death1 these degrees are the effect of chance4 ,finally1 if in a duel the parties agree to use skill enough to hurt each other as little as possible1 is it not as if they confessed to the injustice and insanity of the proceeding8 #e4 ,the duel had its origin in superstition3 in the ,combat of ,god1 in the belief1 namely1 that ,god himself would arbitrate by means of the combat1 and give the victory to the innocent and strike the guilty4 #f4 ,the duel is a homicide or a suicide4 ,it is1 therefore1 contrary to the duty towards others and the duty towards ourselves4 ,finally1 the duel is contrary to the duty towards society1 which forbids each to be his own judge4 ,j4 ,j4 ,rousseau1 in the ,nouvelle ,heloise1 has written on the duel and suicide 7see further on1 ,chapter xi47 a letter often quoted1 of which we will briefly give the principal passages4 #a4 ,one must distinguish between real honor and apparent honor3 ,what is there in common between the glory of killing a man and the testimony of a righteous soul8 ,what hold can the vain opinion of others have upon true honor1 the roots of which are in the depths of the heart8 ,what6 the lies of a slanderer can destroy real virtues8 ,do the insults of a drunkard prove that one deserves them8 ,and can the honor of a sensible man be at the mercy of the first ruffian he meets8 #b4 ,the use of force cannot be a title to virtue3 ,will you tell me that one must show courage1 and that courage suffices to efface the shame and reproach of all other vices8 ,in this case a rogue would have but to fight a duel to cease to be a rogue2 the words of a liar would become true if maintained at the point of a sword2 and if you were charged with having killed a man1 you would go and kill a second one to prove that the charge is not true4 ,thus1 virtue1 vice1 honor1 infamy1 truth1 falsehood1 all derive their being from the event of a fight2 a fencing-hall becomes the seat of all justice2 might makes right4 #c4 ,antiquity1 so rich in heroes and great characters1 knew nothing of the duel4 ,there may then exist societies civilized and refined where a man may defend his honor without having to resort to the duel4 ,this is a remarkably striking argument3#ai ,did ever the valiant men of antiquity think of avenging their personal insults by single combats8 ,did ,caesar send a challenge to ,cato1 or ,pompey to ,caesar8 ,other times1 other manners1 you'll say1 ,i know1 but true honor does not vary2 it does not depend on times or places or prejudices2 it can neither pass away nor be born again2 it has its eternal source in the heart of the just man and in the unalterable rule of his duties4 ,if the most enlightened1 the bravest1 the most virtuous nations of the earth knew nothing of the duel1 ,i say that it is not an institution of honor1 but rather a frightful and barbarous fashion worthy of its savage origin4 #d4 ,it is not true that a man of honor incurs contempt by refusing a duel3 ,the righteous man whose whole life is pure1 who never gave any sign of cowardice1 will refuse to stain his hand by a homicide1 and will be only the more honored for it4 ,always ready to serve his country1 to protect the feeble1 to fulfil the most dangerous duties1 and defend in all just and honest encounters1 and at the price of his blood1 what he holds dear1 he will reveal in all his transactions that resolute firmness which always accompanies true courage4 ,in the security of his conscience he walks with head erect2 he neither flies from nor seeks his enemy2 one can easily see that he fears less to die than to do wrong1 and that it is not danger he shuns1 but crime4 #cj4 ,war4--,war is the most serious and the most solemn exception to the law which forbids homicide4 ,not only does it permit homicide1 but it commands it4 ,the means thereto are prepared in public2 the art of practicing them is a branch of education1 and it is glorious to destroy as many enemies as possible4 ,one cannot fail to see the sad side of war1 and how contrary it is to the ideal tendencies of modern society4 ,it is still to be hoped that there will come a time when nations will find a more rational and more humane means of conciliating their differences4 ,but there is no indication of this good time as yet1 nor even that it is near1 and it is necessary to guard against a false philanthropy1 which would imperil the sacred rights of patriotism4 ,the problem of war in itself belongs rather to the law of nations than to morality properly so called4 ,it will be in studying later the relations of the nations between each other that we shall have to establish as a rule that the right of self-defense exists for them as well as for the individual4 ,the only question in a moral point of view is to know whether the individual1 by the sole fact of the order of society1 is released from the duty imposed on him not to shed blood4 ,some religious sects in the early times of ,christianity1 others in modern times in ,england and in ,america 7the ,quakers71 believe that the interdiction of homicide is an absolute thing2 they claim the right to be exempt from military duty4 ,the ,state1 of course1 never recognized the legitimacy of such a scruple1 which would prevent all social subordination and deprive the defense of the country of all its strength4 ,but neither does morality recognize such a right4 ,as a part of a society which is commissioned to defend us1 and which can do so only by using force1 it is evident that each one should share in the acts by which it undertakes to defend us4 ,for how can malefactors be prosecuted without employing force8 ,the same may be asked as to enemies from without4 ,now1 as society defends every one equally1 it cannot make any exception in favor of such or such scruple4 ,it can grant exemptions1 but cannot admit that each should exempt himself by the scruples of his conscience4 ,certainly it ought not to be maintained that any order given by society releases the individual conscience from all consideration4 ,but obedience to the law is the foundation of social order1 and co-operation in the public defense is a duty of absolute necessity4 ,of course one assumes in this view implicitly the legitimacy of war2 but this question will be treated later on by itself1 and in accordance with the reasons belonging to it4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,duties ,,concerning ,,the ,,property ,,of ,,others4 ,,summary4 ,of property4--,its fundamental principle2 work sanctioned by law4 ,communistic ,utopia4--,inequality of wealth3 it is founded on nature1 but should not be aggravated by the law4--,different forms of the rights of property3 loans1 trusts1 things lost1 sales1 property properly so called4 ,loan4--,is it a duty to loan8--,the interest of money4--,the question of usury4--,duties of creditor and debtor4--,failures and bankruptcies4--,the commodate or things loaned for use4 ,trust4--,duties of the depositary and the deponent4 ,of the possession in good faith4--,the thing lost4 ,sales4--,obligations of seller and buyer4 ,of property in general4--,violation of property or theft4--,the elements which constitute theft4--,simple thefts and qualified thefts4--,abuse of confidence1 swindling4--,restitution4 ,promises and contracts4--,differences between these two facts4--,strict obligation to keep one's promises3 rare exceptions 7practical impossibility1 illicit promises1 etc47--,different kinds of contracts4--,conditions of the contract3 consent1 capacity of contracting parties1 a real object1 a licit cause4--,rules for the formation of contracts4--,rules for the interpretation of contracts4 ,the immediate consequence of the right of self-preservation which each has1 etc41 implies the right of property4 #ca4 ,property4--,what is property8 ,what is its origin and principle8 ,what objections has it raised8 ,what moral and social reasons justify it1 rendering its maintenance both sacred and necessary8 ,property1 says the civil code1 is the right to enjoy and dispose of things in the most absolute manner1 provided no use is made of them prohibited by the laws or the rules4 7,art4 #edd47 ,the right of property1 says the ,constitution of '#ic1 is that which belongs to every citizen3 to enjoy1 and dispose at will of his property1 his income1 of the fruit of his labor and industry4 7,art4 #h47 ,these are the judicial and political definitions of property4 ,philosophically1 it may be said1 that it is the right each man has to make something his own1 that is to say1 to attribute to himself the exclusive right to enjoy something outside of himself4 ,we must distinguish between possession and property4 ,possession is nothing else than actual custody3 ,i may have in my hands an object that is not mine1 which has either been loaned to me1 or which ,i may have found2 this does not make me its proprietor4 ,property is the right ,i have to exclude all others from the use of a thing1 even if ,i should not be in actual possession of it4 #cb4 ,origin and fundamental principle of property4--,the first property is that of my own body1 but thus far it is nothing else than what may be called corporeal liberty4 ,how do we go beyond that8 ,how do we extend this primitive right over things which are outside of ourselves8 ,let us first remark that this right of appropriating external things rests on necessity and on the laws of organized beings4 ,it is evident1 in fact1 that life cannot be preserved otherwise than by a perpetual exchange between the parts of the living body and the particles of the surrounding bodies4 ,nutrition is assimilation1 and1 consequently1 appropriation4 ,it is1 then1 necessary that certain things of the external world should become mine1 otherwise life is impossible4 ,property is then necessary2 let us now see by what means it becomes legitimate4 ,property has been given several origins3 occupation1 law1 work4 ,according to some1 property has for its fundamental principle the right of the first occupant4 ,it is said that man has the right of appropriating a thing not in possession of some one else2 the same as at the theatre1 the spectator who comes first has the right to take the best place4 7,cicero47 ,so be it2 but at the theatre ,i occupy only the place occupied by my own body2 ,i have not the right to appropriate the whole theatre1 or even the pit4 ,it is the same with the right of the first occupant4 ,i have certainly a right to the place my own body would occupy1 but no further3 for where would my right then stop8 ,will the setting one's foot1 says ,j4 ,j4 ,rousseau1 on a piece of common ground be sufficient to declare one's self at once the master of it8 ,when ,nunez ,balboa took on landing possession of the ,southern ,sea1 and of the whole of ,southern ,america in the name of the ,crown of ,castile1 was that enough to exclude from it all the princes of the world8 ,at that rate the ,catholic king had but to take all at once possession in his study of the whole universe1 relying upon subsequently striking off from his empire what before was in possession of the other princes4 7,contrat social1 liv4 #a;er1 ,ch4 ix47 ,the law4--,if occupation of itself alone is insufficient in founding the right of property1 will it not become legitimate by adding to it convention--that is to say1 the law8 ,property1 we have seen1 is necessary2 but if every one is free to appropriate to himself what he needs1 it becomes anarchy2 it is1 as ,hobbes said1 the war of all against all4 ,it is necessary that the law should fix the property of each in the interest of all4 ,property1 under this new hypothesis1 would then mean the part which public authority has fixed or recognized1 whether we admit a primitive division made by a magistrate1 or a primitive occupation more or less due to chance1 but consecrated by law4 ,certainly1 the reason of social utility plays a great part in the establishment and consecration of property2 and it would be absurd not to take this consideration into account4 ,certainly1 even if property were but a fact consecrated by time1 by necessity1 and by law1 it would already by that alone have a very great authority2 but we believe that that is not saying enough4 ,property is not only a consecrated fact1 it is also a right4 ,it finds in the law its guaranty1 but not its foundation4 ,the true principle of property is work2 and property becomes blended with liberty itself3 liberty and property1 say the ,english4 ,work4--,if all the things man has need of were in unlimited number1 and if they could be acquired without effort1 there would be no property4 ,this1 for example1 takes place in the case of the atmosphere1 of which we all have need1 but which belongs to no one4 ,but if the question is of things that cannot be acquired except by a certain effort 7as in the case of animals running wild71 or even that can be produced only by human effort 7as a harvest in a barren ground71 these things belong by right to him who conquers them or brings them about4 ,i take wild wheat into my hand1 ,i sow it in soil ,i have dug1 and ,i wait for the earth1 aided by rain and sunshine1 to do its work4 ,is the growing crop my property8 ,where would it be without me8 ,i created it4 ,who can deny it8444 ,this earth was worth nothing and produced nothing3 ,i dug the soil2 ,i brought from a distance friable and fertilizing earth2 ,i enriched it with manure2 it is now fertile for many years to come4 ,this fertility is my work4444 ,the earth belonged to no one2 in fertilizing it1 ,i made it mine4 ,according to ,locke1 nine tenths at least of the produce of the soil should be attributed to human labor4#bj ,it has been said that work is not a sufficient foundation to establish the right of property2 that occupation must be added thereto1 for otherwise work alone would make us the proprietors of what is already occupied by others2 the farmer would become the proprietor of the fields he cultivates from the fact alone that he cultivates them4 ,occupation is therefore a necessary element of property4 ,certainly2 but occupation itself has no value except as it already represents labor1 and inasmuch as it is labor4 ,the fact of culling a fruit1 of seizing an animal1 and even of setting foot upon a desert land1 is an exercise of my activity which is more or less easy or difficult to accomplish1 but which in reality is not the less the result of an effort4 ,it is1 then1 work itself which lays the foundation of occupation and consecrates it4 ,but when the thing once occupied has become the property of a man by a first work1 it can no longer without contradiction become the property of another by a subsequent work4 ,this work applied to the property of others is not the less itself the foundation of property1 namely3 the price received in exchange of work1 which is called salary1 and which again by exchange can obtain for us the possession of things not ours4 #cc4 ,accumulation and transmission4--,the right of appropriation1 founded as we have just seen on work1 carries with it as its consequence1 the right of accumulation and that of transmission4 ,in fact1 if ,i have acquired a thing1 ,i can either enjoy it actually1 or reserve it to enjoy it later2 and if ,i have more than my actual wants require1 ,i can lay aside what to-day is useless to me1 but which will be useful to me later4 ,this is what is called saving2 and the successive additions to savings is called accumulation4 ,this right cannot be denied to man2 for that would be ignoring in him one of his noblest faculties1 namely1 the faculty of providing for the future4 ,in suppressing this right1 the very source of all production1 namely1 work1 would dry up2 for it is his thought of the future which1 above all1 induces man to work to insure his security4 ,the right of transmission is another consequence of property2 for if ,i have enjoyment myself1 ,i ought to be able to transmit it to others2 finally1 ,i can give up my property to obtain in its place the property of others which might be more agreeable or more useful to me2 hence the right of exchange1 which gives rise to what is called purchase and sale4 ,of all transmissions1 the most natural is that which takes place between a father and his children3 this is what is called inheritance4 ,if we were to deprive the head of a family of the right of thinking of his children in the accumulation of the fruits of his labors1 we should destroy thereby the most energetic instigation to work there is in the human heart4 #cd4 ,individual property and the community4--,the adversaries of property have often said that they did not attack property in itself1 but only individual property4 ,the soil which1 if not the principle1 is at least the source of all riches1 belongs1 they say1 not to the individual1 but to society2 to the ,state1 that is to say1 to all1 as common and undivided property3 each individual is but a consumer1 and receives his share from the ,state1 which alone is the true proprietor4 ,this is what is called the community system1 or communism1 which takes two forms1 according as it admits the division to be made in a manner absolutely equal among the co-members of the society1 which is the equality system 7systeme egalitaire72 or by reason of capacity and works4 ,it is this form of communism which the school of ,saint-,simon maintains at this day4 ,we need not point out the practical impossibility of realizing such a system4 ,let us confine ourselves to showing its essential vice4 ,if communism means absolute equality 7and true communism does71 it destroys the main inducement to work3 for man assured of his living by the ,state1 has nothing left to stimulate him to personal effort4 ,work1 deprived of the hope of a legitimate remuneration1 would be reduced to a strict minimum1 and civilization1 which lives by work1 would rapidly go backward3 general wretchedness would be the necessary consequence of this state of things2 all would be equally poor and miserable2 humanity would go back to its primitive state1 to get from which it struggled so hard1 and from which it emerged by means of work and property alone4 ,moreover1 as it is absolutely impossible to dispense with work1 the ,state would be obliged to enforce it upon those whom their interest did not spontaneously incline to it2 from being free1 work would become servile1 and the pensioners of the ,state would in reality be but its slaves4 ,as to the inequality-communism 7communisme inegalitaire7 which recommends a remuneration from the ,state1 proportioned to merit and products1 that is to say1 to capacity and works1 it certainly does not so very seriously impair the principle of property and liberty2 but1 on the one hand1 it does not satisfy the instincts of equality1#ba which have at all times inspired the communistic utopias2 on the other1 it attacks the family instincts by suppressing inheritance2 now1 if man is interested in his own fate1 he interests himself still more1 as he grows old1 in the fate of his children2 in depriving him of the responsibility for their destinies1 you deprive him of the most energetic stimulus to work2 and the tendency would be1 though in a lesser degree1 to produce the same evil of general impoverishment1 as would communism properly so called4 ,but the principal vice of all communism1 whether of equality or inequality1 is to substitute the ,state for the individual1 to make of all men functionaries1 to commit to the ,state the destinies of all individuals2 in one word1 to make of the ,state a providence4#bb #ce4 ,inequality of riches4--,yet there will always arise in the mind a grave problem3 ,why are goods created for all1 distributed in so unequal and capricious a manner8 ,why the rich and the poor8 and if inequality must exist1 why is it not in proportion to inequality of merit and individual work8 ,why are the idle and prodigal sometimes rich8 ,why are the poor overwhelmed by both work and poverty8 ,there are two questions here3 #a4 ,why is there any inequality at all8 #b4 ,why1 supposing this inequality must exist1 has it no connection with merit or the work of the individual8 ,regarding the first point1 we cannot deny1 unless we should wish to suppress all human responsibility1 all free and personal activity--in a word1 all liberty--we cannot deny1 ,i say1 that the inequality of merit and of work does not authorize and justify a certain inequality in the distribution of property4 ,but1 it is said1 this inequality is not always in proportion to the work4 ,it may be answered that as civic laws become more perfect 7by the abolition of monopoly1 privileges1 abuse of rights1 such as the feudal rights1 etc417 the distribution of riches will tend to become more and more in proportion to individual merit and efforts4 ,there remain but two sources of inequality which do not proceed from personal work3 #a1 accidents2 #b1 hereditary transmission4 ,but in regard to accidents1 there is no way of absolutely suppressing the part chance plays in man's destiny2 it can only be corrected and diminished1 and thereto tend the institutions of life-assurances1 savings-banks1 banks of assistance1 etc41 which are means of equalization growing along with the general progress4 ,as to the inequality produced by inheritance1 one of two things is to be considered3 either the heir keeps and increases by his own work what he has acquired1 and thus succeeds in deserving it2 or1 on the contrary1 he ceases to work and consumes without producing1 and in this case he destroys his privilege himself without the ,state's meddling with it4 ,besides1 the question is less concerning the relative well-being of men than their absolute well-being4 ,what use would it be to men to be all equal if they were all miserable8 ,there is certainly more equality in a republic of savages than in our ,european societies2 but how many of our poor ,europeans are there who would exchange their condition for an existence among savages8 ,in reality1 social progress1 in continually increasing general wealth1 increases at the same time the well-being of each1 without increasing the sum of individual efforts4 ,this superaddition of well-being is in reality gratuitous1 as ,bastiat has demonstrated4 ,hence1 as he says1 with a community increasing in well-being1#bc as by property ever better guaranteed1 we leave behind us the community of misery from which we came4 ,property1 says ,bastiat1 tends to transform onerous into gratuitous utility4 ,it is that spur which obliges human intelligence to draw from the inertia of matter its latent natural forces4 ,it struggles1 certainly for its own benefit1 against the obstacles which make utility onerous2 and when the obstacle is overthrown1 it is found that its disappearance benefits all4 ,then the indefatigable proprietor attacks new obstacles1 and continually raising the human level1 he more and more realizes community1 and with it equality in the midst of the great human family4 #cf4 ,duties concerning the property of others4--,after having established the right of general property1 we have to expound the duties relative to the property of others4 ,the property of others may be injured in various ways1 and in different cases4 ,these cases are3 #a1 loans2 #b1 trusts2 #c1 things lost2 #d1 sales2 #e1 property strictly so-called4 #cg4 ,loans4--,debts4--,the inequality of riches is the cause that among men some have need of what others possess1 and yet cannot procure by purchase1 for want of means4 ,in this case1 the first turn to the second to obtain the temporary enjoyment of the thing they stand in need of2 this is called borrowing2 the reciprocal act1 which consists in conceding for a time the desired object1 is called loaning4 ,he who borrows1 and who by this very act engages himself to return the thing again1 is called debtor 7who owes71 and he who loans is called creditor2 he has a credit on his debtor4 ,several questions spring from this1 some very simple1 others very delicate1 and often debated4 #ch4 ,rights and duties of the creditor4--,money interest4--,usury4--,and first1 is it a duty to loan to any that ask you8 ,it is evident that if it is a duty it can be only a duty of charity1 or friendliness1 but not of strict justice4 ,one is no more obliged to loan to all than to give to all4 ,the duty of loaning1 like the duty of giving without discrimination1 would be tantamount to the negation of property2 for he who would open his money-chest to all unconditionally1 however rich he might be1 would in a few days be absolutely despoiled4 ,besides1 the same duty weighing equally on those who have received1 they in their turn would be obliged to pass their goods over to others1 and no one would ever be proprietor4 ,in this case1 it would even be better to hand all property over to the ,state1 that it might establish a certain order and fixity in the repartition of it4 ,it is this doctrine which a ,father of the ,church1 ,clement of ,alexandria1 has expressed in these terms in his treatise3 ,can any rich man be saved8 ,what division of property could there be among men if no one had anything8 ,if we cannot fulfil the duties of charity without any money1 and if at the same time we were commanded to reject riches1 would there not be contradiction8 ,would it not be to say at the same time give and not give1 feed and not feed1 share and not share8 ,it is therefore not a strict duty to loan to all2 it is a form of benevolence1 and we must put off to another chapter 7ch4 vi47 the conditions and the degrees of this duty4 ,but a question which necessarily presents itself here1 is to know if1 when one loans1 it is a duty to deprive one's self of all remuneration2 or if it is1 on the contrary1 permitted to exact a price over and beyond the sum loaned4 ,this is what is called money interest2 and when this interest is or appears excessive1 it is called usury4 ,this question1 discussed during the whole middle ages1 was1 before its true principles were established1 first resolved by practice and necessity4 ,it is to-day evident to all sensible minds1 that capital1 like work1 has a right to remuneration4 ,why8 ,because without the expectation of this remuneration1 the possessor of the capital would forthwith consume it himself or allow it to waste away without use4 ,this will be better understood in considering the two principal forms of remuneration for capital3 interest and rent4 ,interest and rent are both the product of a capital loaned1 but with this difference1 that rent is the product of a fixed capital 7house1 field1 workshop72 while interest is the product of a circulating capital 7money or paper74 ,the interest of capital represents two things3 #a1 the deprivation of him who loans1 and who might consume his capital2 #b1 the risk he incurs1 for capital is never loaned except to be invested1 and consequently it may be lost4 ,these are the two fundamental reasons which establish the legitimacy of interest1 despite the prejudices which have long condemned it as usury1 and the utopias which would establish the gratuity of credit4#bd ,the principal reason against the legitimacy of interest is deduced from the sterility of money4 ,interest1 says ,aristotle1 is money bred from money2 and nothing is more contrary to nature4 ,but1 as ,bentham remarks 7,defense of ,usury1 letter #aj71 if it be true that a sum of money is of itself incapable to breed1 it is not the less true that with this same borrowed sum1 a man can buy a ram and a sheep1 which1 at the end of a year1 will have produced two or three lambs4 ,in other terms1 as ,calvin says1 it is not from the money itself that the benefit comes1 it is from the use that is made of it4 ,it has been said that he who loans does not deprive himself of his money1 since he can do without it4 7,proudhon1 ,letters to ,bastiat1 #c;d letter47 ,but he does deprive himself of it1 since he might have consumed it himself4 ,the proof that a loan is a privation1 is the pain men have in economizing and in investing their money4 ,how many men are there who1 in possession of a sum of one hundred francs1 would not rather spend it than place it on interest8 ,as to what is called gratuitous credit1 it could be possible only by being reciprocal4 ,in fact1 if ,i loan you my house1 and you loan me in return your land1 supposing they are of equal value1 it is evident that1 the one being worth as much as the other1 and the two services equivalent1 we need not pay each other anything2 for it would be only an exchange of money4 ,but nothing can be inferred from this1 touching the most usual case3 namely1 where the capital is loaned by the possessor to him who does not possess2 for then there is no reciprocity1 consequently no gratuity4 ,as to the rate of interest it varies like all values according to the law of supply and demand in the money market4 7,see the ,cours d',economie ,politique47 ,the greater the supply of capital the less dear it is4 ,it is1 then1 the increase of capital that is to diminish interest and bring about a sort of relative gratuity4 ,every enterprise against capital will produce a contrary result4 ,as to the rent of capital1 it has generally raised fewer objections than interest2 for it is easier to understand that if ,i give myself the trouble to build a house1 it is that it will bring me in something2 but it is1 on the whole1 the same thing1 with this difference1 that circulating capital1 running more risks than fixed capital1 seems to have a still better right to remuneration4 ,the lender has then the right to exact a certain amount over and above the sum loaned4 ,certainly1 he cannot exact it1 as it often occurs among friends1 and for very small sums4 ,but as a principle1 one is no more obliged to lend gratuitously1 than to give to others gratuitously what they need4 ,in admitting that the interest of money is a legitimate thing1 is one obliged also to admit that the money-lender has a right to fix the rate of interest as high as he wishes8 ,beyond a certain limit1 will not the interest become what we call usury8 ,to which may be replied3 #a4 ,if the one borrowing consents to pay the price1 it is that this service done him does not appear to him too dear4 ,one may borrow at #bj and even #cj per cent41 if one foresees a gain of #dj4 #b4 ,why not look at the thing from the lender's standpoint8 ,if the return of the funds appears more or less doubtful1 why should he not have the right to protect himself8 7,dictionary of ,politics1 by ,maurice ,block47 ,these arguments prove1 in fact1 that it is impossible to determine beforehand and absolutely the rate at which it may be permitted to lend1 and there are many cases where a very high interest may be legitimate3 for instance1 in what is called bottomry-loan1 which consists in advances made to shipping merchants on their ships2 the law here sanctions very high interest1 because of the exceptional risks this kind of enterprise runs4 ,does it1 however1 follow1 as some economists seem to think1 that there is no occasion to speak of usury1 properly so called1 that the term usurer is an insult1 invented by ignorance1 which has no real basis8 ,this we cannot admit4 ,political economy and morality are two different things4 ,even if one should admit that there is no reason for legally fixing the rate of interest1 because money is a merchandise like all others which should be left to free circulation1 to the free appreciation of the parties1 it would not follow that there could be no abuse made of the required interest4 ,experience proves the contrary4 ,it is not so much the rate of the interest which constitutes the injustice thereof1 as the reasons and circumstances of the loan4 ,if1 taking advantage of the passions of youth1 one loans to a prodigal1 knowing him unable to refuse the conditions1 because he only listens to pleasure2 or if1 seducing the ignorant1 one dazzles him with magnificent bargains2 or1 lastly1 if profiting by the common desire among peasants to enlarge their grounds1 we advance them money1 knowing they cannot return it1 and secure thereby the property they think they are buying1 in all such cases1 or similar ones1 there is always usury1 and morality must condemn such hateful practices4 ,the hatefulness of usury is brought into strong relief in ,moliere's celebrated scene in ,the ,miser 7,act ii41 ,sc4 i473 ,,la ,,fleche3 ,suppose that the lender sees all the securities1 and that the borrower be of age and of a family of large property1 substantial1 secure1 clear and free from any incumbrances1 there will then be drawn up a regular bond before a notary1 as honest a man as may be found1 who to this effect shall be chosen by the lender1 to whom it is of particular importance that the bond be properly drawn up4 ,,cleante3 ,that's all right4 ,,la ,,fleche3 ,the lender not to burden his conscience with any scruples1 means to give his money at the low rate of denier eighteen#be 7#e1 #i per cent47 only4 ,,cleante3 ,denier eighteen8 ,jolly6 ,that's honest indeed6 ,no fault to find there6 ,,la ,,fleche3 ,no4 ,but as the said lender has not with him the sum in question1 and1 to oblige the borrower1 he will himself be obliged to borrow from another at the rate of denier five 7#bj per cent471 it will be but just that the abovesaid first borrower should pay that interest without prejudice to the other1 for it is only to oblige him that the said lender resorts to this loan4 ,,cleante3 ,the devil6 ,what a ,jew6 ,what an ,arab is that6 ,that would be at a greater rate than denier four 7#be per cent474 ,,la ,,fleche3 ,that's so3 it is just what ,i said4 ,,cleante3 ,is there anything more8 ,,la ,,fleche3 ,but just a small item4 ,of the fifteen thousand francs that are asked1 the lender can give in cash only twelve thousand1 and for the thousand crowns remaining1 it will be necessary that the borrower take the clothes1 stock1 jewelry1 etc41 of which here is the list4 ,,cleante3 ,the plague on him6 ,the next scene shows with remarkable energy the spendthrift and the usurer in conflict with each other4#bf #ci4 ,duties of the debtor4--,after the duties of the lender and the creditor1 let us point out those of the borrower or the debtor4 ,the only duty for him here is to return what he has borrowed3 it is the duty of paying one's debts4 ,for a long time1 the duty of paying one's debts appeared to be one of those vulgar and commonplace duties intended for the generality of men1 but from which the great lords freed themselves easily4 ,the poor creditors have been the laughing stock in comedies4#bg ,but it is not doubted nowadays that to refuse to pay what one owes1 is really taking from the property of others1 and appropriating what does not belong to us4 ,this duty1 besides1 is so simple and stringent that it is necessary only to mention it without further development4 ,the same principles apply to the various ways in which one may make use of property1 and particularly to the three kinds indicated in the ,civil ,code--the usufruct1 the usage1 and the right of action4 ,the common obligation in these three cases1 mentioned by the ,code1 is to use the thing belonging to others as a prudent father would1 which is to say1 to use it as the proprietor himself would use it1 without injuring the object1 and even improving it as much as possible4 ,it is especially in commerce that the act of paying one's debts1 is not only more obligatory morally1 but socially more necessary than anywhere else4 ,the reason of it is that commerce is impossible without credit4 ,by exacting of every merchant the payment of cash1 the springs of exchange would dry up2 besides1 most of the time it would be useless2 for in commerce merchandise is constantly bought against merchandise4 ,it would be loss of time1 loss of writing1 limitation of the market4 ,in commerce one cannot say of him who owes that he is a borrower2 for the next day1 according to the fluctuations of demand and supply1 he may be the lender4 ,but it is just because credit is indispensable in commerce1 that the obligations of the debtors are in some respect more stringent2 for the greater the confidence1 the more stringent the duty4 ,so that commercial honor is like military honor--it does not admit of breaking promises4 #dj4 ,failures and bankruptcies4--,however strict one should be in commerce in regard to keeping promises1 there is nevertheless in the ,code cause for distinguishing two different cases of promise-breaking--failure and bankruptcy2 and in this second case1 there is simple bankruptcy and fraudulent bankruptcy4 ,failure is purely and simply the suspension of payments resulting from circumstances independent of the will of him who fails4 ,bankruptcy1 on the contrary1 is suspension of payments resulting either from imprudence or from mistakes of the bankrupt4 ,simple bankruptcy occurs in the following cases3 #a4 ,if the personal expenses of the merchant or the expenses of his house are judged excessive2 #b4 ,if he has spent large sums of money in operations of pure chance either in fictitious operations or extravagant purchases2 #c4 ,if with the intention of putting off his failure1 he has made purchases to sell again below par2 #d4 ,if after cessation of payment1 he has paid a creditor to the prejudice of all others4 7,code of ,commerce47 ,bankruptcy is called fraudulent1 when the bankrupt has abstracted his books1 misrepresented a portion of his assets1 or declared himself debtor for sums he does not owe4 ,it is useless to say that this third case is but another case of theft and deserves the severest denunciation4 ,simple bankruptcy is already very culpable2 and failure itself should be regarded by all merchants as a very great misfortune1 which they must avoid at any cost4 #da4 ,the commodate or gratuitous loan4--,the gratuitous loan or commodate is a contract by which one of the parties gives to the other a thing to be made use of1 on the condition that it be returned after having served its purpose4 7,code ,civ41 ,art4 #ahge47 ,as a fundamental principle1 the receiver must return to the lender the very thing he has loaned him4 ,but in case of loss or deterioration of the thing loaned1 resulting from the use made of it1 on whom is to fall the loss8 ,it cannot be presumed1 says ,kant 7,doctrine of the ,law1 ,french translation1 p4 #adf71 that the lender should take upon himself all the chances of loss or deterioration of the thing loaned2 for it stands to reason that the proprietor1 besides granting to the borrower the use of the thing he loans him1 would not agree to insure him also against all risks4 ,if1 for instance1 during a shower1 ,i enter a house1 where ,i borrow a cloak1 and this cloak gets to be forever spoiled from coloring matters thrown upon me by mischance1 from a window1 or if it be stolen from me in a house where ,i laid it down1 it would be considered generally absurd1 to say that ,i had nothing else to do than to send back the cloak1 such as it is1 or report the theft that has taken place4 ,the case would be very different if1 after having asked permission to use a thing1 ,i should insure myself against the loss in case it should suffer any damage at my hands1 by begging not to be held responsible for it4 ,no one would think this precaution superfluous and ridiculous1 except perhaps the lender1 supposing he was a rich and generous man2 for it would then be almost an offense not to expect from his generosity the remission of my debt4 #db4 ,the trust4--,trust1 in general1 is an act by which one receives the thing of another on condition to keep it and restore it in kind4 7,code ,civ41 ,art4 #aiae47 ,he who deposits is called deponent 7or bailor in ,england72 he who receives the trust is called depositary 7in ,england bailee74 ,the obligations of the depositary are morally the same as those found in positive law4 ,we have then nothing better to do here than to reproduce the precepts of the ,code on this matter4 #a4 ,the depositary1 in keeping the thing deposited with him1 must exercise the same care as with the things belonging to himself 7,art4 #aibg74 #b4 ,this obligation becomes still more stringent in the following cases3 7a71 when the depositary offers himself to receive the thing in trust2 7b71 when he stipulates for a compensation for the keeping of the thing deposited2 7c71 when the trust is to the interest of the depositary2 7d71 when it has been expressly agreed upon that the depositary be answerable for all kinds of mistakes 7,art4 #aibh74 #c4 ,the depositary cannot make use of the trust without the express or presumed consent of the deponent 7,art #aibi74--;,for example1 if a library has been left in my trust1 it may be presumed that the deponent would not object to my using it2 but if the trust consists in valuable jewelry1 it can be only by the express wish of the deponent that ,i could wear it4 ,the difference is simple and easily understood4 #d4 ,the depositary should not seek to know what the things deposited with him are1 if they have been left with him in a closed trunk or a sealed envelope 7,art4 #aica74 #e4 ,the depositary must return the identical thing he has received4 ,thus the trust consisting in specie1 must be returned in the same specie4 ,the obligation to restore the thing deposited in kind1 and such as it was when delivered1 is evident1 and constitutes the very essence of the trust4 ,however1 we should take into account the following circumstances3 #a4 ,the depositary is not held responsible in cases of insuperable accidents 7,art4 #aibi74 #b4 ,the depositary is only held to return the things deposited with him1 in the state wherein they are at the moment of restitution4 ,deteriorations1 through no fault of his1 are at the expense of the deponent 7,art4 #aice74 ,such are the obligations of the depositary2 as to those of the deponent1 they resolve themselves into the following rule3 ,the deponent is held to reimburse the depositary for any expense he may have incurred in the keeping of the trust1 and to indemnify him for any loss the trust may have occasioned him 7,art4 #aidg74 #dc4 ,possession in good faith4--,possession in good faith is analogous to trust4 ,in fact1 he who possesses in good faith a thing that is not his1 is in reality but a depositary1 but he is so without knowing it4 ,hence analogies and differences between these two cases1 which it is well to point out4 ,the following are some rules proposed on this subject by ,grotius 7,de la paix et de la guerre1 ,b4 #aa1 ch4 xii41 ,sec4 #c72 and ,puffendorf 7,droit de la ,nature et des ,gens1 ,b4 iv41 ch4 xiii41 ,sec4 #ab74 ,but as these rules appeared excessive to other jurisconsults1 we give them here rather as problems than solutions3 #a4 ,a possessor in good faith is not obliged to restore a thing which1 against his wish1 has come to be destroyed or lost1 for his good faith stood to him in lieu of property4 #b4 ,a possessor in good faith is held to return not only the thing itself1 but also its fruits still existing in kind4 #c4 ,a possessor in good faith is held to return the thing itself1 and the value of the fruit thereof which he has consumed1 if there is reason to believe that he would have otherwise consumed as many similar ones4 #d4 ,a possessor in good faith is not held to return in kind the value of the fruit he has neglected to gather or to grow4 #e4 ,if a possessor in good faith1 having received the thing as a present1 should afterwards give it to another1 he is not obliged to return it1 unless he would otherwise have given one of the same value4 #f4 ,if a possessor in good faith1 having acquired a thing by an onerous title1 should afterwards dispose of it in some way or other1 he need return but the gain it procured him4 ,it is necessary to remark here that in this matter morality should be more severe than the strict law2 for if morality demands that a possessor be above all mindful of the rights of others1 the law should also consider the rights of him who in good faith and ignorance enjoys what belongs to others4 ,hence1 an essential difference between this case and that of the trust4 #dd4 ,things lost4--,the question of things lost is related to that of possession in good faith4 ,if the thing lost should fall into my hands by a regular acquisition1 by purchase1 contract1 etc4 7as1 for instance1 buying a horse in the market71 it is evident that this case comes under possession in good faith1 and that it is the business of the law to decide between proprietor and possessor4 ,but if ,i appropriate to myself the thing lost1 knowing it to be lost1 and consequently not mine1 there is fraud and converting to my own use the property of others4 ,public opinion was for a long time indulgent towards this kind of appropriation4 ,it seemed that luck gave a certain title to property4 ,the difficulty1 moreover1 of finding the true owner1 seemed to give to him who had found the object a certain right to it4 ,but to-day society plays the part of intermediary1 and assumes the duty of restoring the thing lost to its owner4 ,it is1 therefore1 to the authorities the object must be returned4#bh ,for a long time a misjudgment of the same kind allowed wreckers a pretended right to the objects thrown on the strand by the tempest following a wreck4 #de4 ,sale4--,sale is a contract by which one of the parties engages to deliver a thing1 and the other to pay for it 7,civ4 ,code1 ,art4 #aihb74 ,there are1 then1 two contracting parties--the seller and the buyer4 ,they are subject to different obligations4 ,obligations of the seller4--,the seller is held clearly to explain what he engages to do4 ,an obscure and ambiguous agreement is interpreted against the seller 7,civ4 ,code1 ,art4 #afjb74 ,such is the general and fundamental obligation of a sale4 ,it implies1 moreover1 two others1 more particular3 #a1 that of delivering2 #b1 that of guaranteeing the thing sold4 ,the first is very simple1 and raises only questions of fact1 as in regard to delays1 expenses of removal1 etc42 it is the business of the law to regulate these details4 ,the guaranty1 in a moral point of view1 is of greater importance4 ,the two essential principles in this matter are expressed by the ,code in the following terms3 #a4 ,the seller is held to his guaranty in proportion to the concealed defects of the thing sold1 rendering it improper for the use for which it was destined1 or so diminishing this use1 that the buyer would not have bought it1 or would not have given so much for it1 had he known of these defects4 #b4 ,the seller is not held to the obvious defects which the buyer may have been able to see himself4 ,it is to this question of guaranteeing the thing sold1 that the conscience-case mentioned by ,cicero1 in his treatise on ,duties1 is applicable3 ,an honest man puts up for sale a house1 for defects only known to him2 this house is unhealthy and passes for healthy2 it is not known that there is not a room in it where there are no serpents2 the timber is bad and threatens ruin2 but the master alone knows it4 ,i ask if the seller who should not say anything about it to the buyers1 and should get for it much more than he has a right to expect1 would do a just or unjust thing4 ,certainly he would do wrong1 says ,antipater2 is it not1 in fact1 leading a man into error knowingly8 ,diogenes1 on the contrary1 replies3 ,were you obliged to buy8 ,you were not even invited to do so4 ,this man put up for sale a house that no longer suited him1 and you bought it because it suited you4 ,if any one should advertise3 ,fine country-house well built1 he is not charged with deceit1 even though it was neither the one nor the other4 ,and whilst one is not responsible for what he says1 you would make one responsible for what he does not say6 ,what would be more ridiculous than a seller who would make known the defects of the thing he puts up for sale8 ,what more absurd than a public crier who1 by order of his master1 should cry3 ,unhealthy house for sale6 ,despite ,diogenes' railleries1 ,cicero decides in favor of ,antipater and the more rigorous solution4 ,the truly honest man1 he says1 is he who conceals nothing4 ,if it is a fault not to reveal the defects of the thing sold1 it is a still graver one1 and one which becomes a fraud1 to ascribe to it qualities or advantages it has not4 ,cicero cites on this subject a charming and well-known anecdote4 ,the ,roman patrician1 ,c4 ,canius1 a man lacking neither in personal attractions nor learning1 having gone to ,syracuse1 not on business1 but to do nothing1#bi as he expressed it1 said everywhere that he wished to buy a pleasure-house1 to which he might invite his friends1 and amuse himself with them away from intruders4 ,upon this report1 a certain ,pythius1 a ,syracuse banker1 came to tell him that he had a pleasure-house which was not for sale1 but which he offered him and begged him to use as his own1 inviting him at the same time to supper for the next day4 ,canius having accepted1 ,pythius1 who in his quality of banker had much influence among people of all professions1 assembled some fishermen1 requesting them to go fishing the next day in front of his pleasure-house1 giving them his orders4 ,canius did not fail to present himself at the supper hour4 ,he found prepared a splendid banquet1 and a multitude of boats before the grounds of his host4 ,each of the fishermen brought the fish he had caught1 and threw them at ,pythius' feet4 ,canius wondered3 ,what means this1 ,pythius8 ,how6 so many fish here1 and so many boats6 ,nothing to wonder at1 says ,pythius2 all the fish of ,syracuse come up here4 ,it is here the fishermen come for water4 ,they could not do without this house4 ,canius then becomes excited2 he presses1 solicits ,pythius to sell him the house4 ,pythius first holds back1 but at last gives in4 ,the ,roman patrician gives him all he asks for it1 and buys it all furnished4 ,the contract is drawn up1 and the bargain concluded4 ,the next day1 ,canius invites his friends1 and comes himself early in the morning2 but not a boat is in sight4 ,he inquires of the first neighbor if it was a holiday with the fishermen1 that he did not see any about4 ,not that ,i know of1 replied the neighbor2 but they never come this way1 and ,i did not know1 seeing them yesterday1 what it all meant4 ,canius was no less indignant than surprised4 ,but what remedy8 ,aquillius1 my colleague and friend1 had not yet established his formulas on fraudulent acts4#cj #df4 ,the price in selling4--,if we adhere to the principles of political economy1 the price in selling is entirely free3 it depends exclusively upon the agreement between the vender and the buyer1 and as it is said1 on the relation between the supply and demand4 ,nothing more unjust than the intervention of the law in commercial relations4 ,if the buyer buys at such or such a price1 however high1 it is that he still finds it to his interest to buy even at that rate4 ,if the vender sells at such or such a price1 however low1 it is that he cannot get more1 and that it suits him rather to sell at that price than keep the thing4 ,it is then certain that the value of things being wholly relative1 it is impossible to determine in an absolute manner what may be called the just price2 for that depends on the frequency and rarity of the thing1 on the market1 on the wishes of the buyer1 and the thousand continually varying circumstances4 ,in short1 the sale taking place when one wishing to sell and one wishing to buy1 meet each other1 it seems that their accord is a proof that the two interested parties have come to an understanding4 ,there would1 according to that1 never be any unjust sale or purchase4 ,we must consequently consider the definition of commerce given by the socialist1 ,ch4 ,fourier3 ,commerce is the art of buying for three cents what is worth six1 and selling for six what is worth three1 not only as satirical and hyperbolical1 but also as unjust and anti-scientific2 for we cannot say whether a thing is in itself absolutely worth six cents or three cents4 ,does it follow1 however1 that there can never be any injustice in sale or purchase8 ,if there is no absolute price1 there is a medium price resulting from the state of the market4 ,now1 the buyer may not know this medium price2 and it is an injustice on the part of the seller to take advantage of this ignorance to sell above that4 ,the same in the case of the vender's not knowing the price of the thing he has for sale1 which the buyer appropriates1 paying for it below its real value4 ,besides1 whilst admitting that the prices are free1 and that the law cannot intervene between vender and buyer1 it is1 however1 necessary to admit that there is a certain moderation beyond which injustice begins1 if not in a legal1 at least in a moral point of view4 ,but it is for particular circumstances to determine this limit2 and there is no general rule for it4 ,it is a case where not strict justice1 but equity is just4 #dg4 ,violation of the property of others4--,theft4--,in general1 every kind of violation of property under one form or another1 is called theft1 and this action is condemned by morality4 ,it is expressed by that ancient commandment3 ,thou shalt not steal4 ,the following are the various definitions of theft given by the jurists3 ,by theft is meant every illegal usurpation of the property of others4#ca--;,by theft is meant every fraudulent carrying off for gain a thing belonging to others4#cb ,finally our ,code declares that1 whosoever has fraudulently carried off anything that does not belong to him1 is guilty of theft4 7,penal ,code1 ,art4 #cgi47 ,it takes1 then1 three elements to constitute theft3 #a1 carrying off2 #b1 fraud2 #c1 the thing of another4 ,two kinds of theft are distinguished3 the simple thefts and the qualified thefts4 ,the first are those in which are met the three preceding elements1 but without any further aggravating circumstance4 ,the second 7qualified thefts7 are those which to the three preceding elements add some aggravating circumstances4 ,these circumstances are3 #a1 the quality of the agents 7servants1 inn-keepers1 drivers or boatmen74 ,it is clear that this is an aggravating circumstance by reason of the facility given by the more intimate relations in which they stand with the injured persons1 and the greater confidence these are obliged to grant them4 #b4 ,times and places4--,for example1 thefts committed by night are more grave than those committed by day1 because it is more difficult to anticipate them1 to catch their perpetrators1 and because they place the injured person in greater danger4 ,the places that aggravate theft are3 #a1 the fields2 #b1 inhabited houses2 #c1 edifices consecrated to divine worship2 #d1 highways1 etc4 ,it is easy to understand why these different places aggravate the crime by rendering it more easy4 #c4 ,circumstances of execution1 as for example3 #a1 theft committed by several persons2 #b1 theft by breaking open2 #c1 theft with an armed hand1 etc4 ,in a word1 theft becomes greater in proportion to the difficulty of forestalling it1 and its menacing character4 ,one particular form of theft is swindling4 ,swindling is a sort of theft1 since it is a fraudulent appropriation of the thing of another4 ,but it is characterized by the fact that it does not take place through violence1 but through cunning1 and in deceiving the victim by fraudulent maneuvers2 for instance1 in making him believe in the existence of false enterprises1 in an imaginary power or credit1 in calling forth the hope and fear of a chimerical event1 etc4 ,embezzlement is a sort of swindling1 with this difference1 that if the criminal has betrayed the confidence which has been placed in him1 he has not solicited this confidence by criminal maneuvers4 ,among these may be classed3 #a1 taking improper advantage of the wants of a minor2 #b1 misuse of letters of confidence2 #c1 embezzlement of trusts2 #d1 the abstraction of documents produced in court4 ,we have to point out still several other kinds of theft3 for example1 theft at gambling or cheating2 theft of public moneys or peculation1 etc4 ,in one word1 under whatever form it may be concealed1 misappropriation of another's goods is always a theft4 ,in popular opinion it often seems1 as if theft really takes place only when the criminal takes violent possession of another's property4 ,very often a few false appearances suffice to conceal to the eyes of easy consciences the hatefulness and shamefulness of fraudulent spoliations4 ,one who would scruple to take a piece of money from the purse of another1 may have no scruple in deceiving stockholders with fictitious advertisements1 and appropriate capital by fraudulent maneuvers4 ,theft thus committed on a large scale is still more culpable1 perhaps1 than the act of him who1 through want1 ignorance1 hereditary vices1 never knew of any other means of living than by theft4 #dh4 ,restitution4--,he who has taken possession of anything that belongs to another1 or retains it for any cause1 is held to restitution as a reparation of his fault4 ,this restitution must be made as soon as possible2 otherwise it is necessary to obtain an extension of time from the injured person4 ,if the thing has been lost1 restitution should no less be made under some form of compensation4 ,restitution is independent of the penalty attached to the damage and fault4 #di4 ,promises and contracts4--,we have seen above that it is an absolute obligation for man to use language only so as to express the truth4 ,hence every word given becomes essentially obligatory4 ,but it is as yet only a duty of the man towards himself4 ,we have to see wherein and how the word given may become a duty towards others4 ,this is the case with promises and contracts4 ,promises4--,a promise is the act whereby one gives his word to another either to give him something or do something for him4 ,according to jurists1 a promise is obligatory only when accepted by him to whom it is made4 ,pollicitation 7promise7 says ,pothier1#cc produces no obligation properly so called1 and he who has made such a promise may1 as long as that promise has not been accepted by him to whom it was made1 revoke it2 for there can be no obligation without a right acquired by the person to whom it has been made and against the one under obligation4 ,now1 as ,i cannot of my own free will1 transfer to any one a right over my property1 if his own will does not concur with mine in accepting it2 so ,i cannot1 by my promise1 grant any one a right over my person1 until that one's will concurs with mine in acquiring it by the acceptance of my promise4 ,it may be true that in strict law1 and from the standpoint of positive law1 the promise may be obligatory only and capable of enforcement when it has been accepted1 and accepted in an obvious and open way2 but in natural law and in morality1 the promise is obligatory in itself4 ,of course1 it is understood that the promise bears on something advantageous to him to whom we make it2 for if ,i promise some one a thrashing1 it cannot be maintained that ,i am obliged to give it to him2 and if he to whom ,i make the promise will not receive what ,i offer1 ,i am by that very fact relieved from my promise2 for one cannot give anything to another against his will2 ,i am under no obligation to him who will not receive anything from me4 ,but if the promise bears on something advantageous to any one1 ,i am obliged to keep it without asking myself whether he to whom ,i made it1 is disposed to accept it2 presuming still that he will accept it4 ,it is therefore not the explicit acceptance of a thing that renders the promise obligatory2 it is the explicit refusal which relieves one of the promise2 and together with that it would be necessary that the refusal be absolute and not contingent2 for even then the promise may remain obligatory1 at least in its general principles1 while undergoing some modification in the execution4 ,is one obliged to keep his promise when the fulfillment of it is injurious to those to whom it was made8 ,no1 says ,cicero2 for example3 ,sol had promised ,phaethon1 his son1 to fulfil all his wishes4 ,phaethon wished to get on the chariot of his father2 he got his wish1 but at the same instant he was struck with lightning4 ,it would have been better for him had his father not kept his promise4 ,may we not say the same of the one ,theseus claimed of ,neptune8 ,this god having made him the promise to grant him three wishes1 ,theseus wished for the death of his son ,hippolytus1 whom he suspected of criminal love4#cd ,how bitter the tears he shed when his wish was accomplished6 ,what shall we say of ,agamemnon8 ,he had made a vow to immolate the most beautiful object in his kingdom2 this was ,iphigenia2 and he immolated her2 this cruel action was worse than perjury4 ,the truth of this doctrine cannot be contested4 ,however1 it is necessary to understand this exception in the strictest sense1 and not to seek in the pretended interest of the person one obliges1 a pretext to change one's mind4 ,for example1 if you have promised any one a post which he accepts and desires1 you cannot be allowed to relieve yourself of it1 by supposing that the post will in reality be a disadvantage to him1 and that you will give him a better one another time4 ,some other exceptions are pointed out by the moralists and jurists2 for example3 #a4 ,necessity relieves of all promise4 ,if1 for example1 ,i have promised to go to a meeting and am kept in bed by a serious illness1 it is impossible for me to go1 and hence ,i am relieved of my promise4 #b4 ,one is not obliged to perform illicit acts3 for1 says ,puffendorf1 it would be a contradiction1 to be held by civil or moral law1 to perform things which the civil or moral law interdicts4 ,it is already doing wrong to promise illicit things1 and it is doing wrong twice to perform them4#ce #c4 ,one cannot promise what belongs to another3 for ,i cannot promise what ,i cannot dispose of4 #ej4 ,contracts4--,a contract is an agreement by which one or several persons engage to do or not to do a certain thing for one or several others4 7,code ,civ41 ,art4 #aaja47 ,conditions of the contract 7,art4 #aajh74--;,four conditions are necessary to constitute a valid and legitimate agreement3 #a4 ,the consent of the parties4 #b4 ,the capacity of the contractors4 #c4 ,a sure object as a basis for the contract4 #d4 ,a licit cause in the obligation4 7#a47 ,the consent4--,the consent is the voluntary acceptance of the charges implied in the contract4 ,it is express or implied3 express1 when it is made manifest by words1 writing1 or any other kind of expressive signs4 ,it is implied1 when1 without being expressed by outward signs1 it may be deduced1 as a manifest consequence of the very nature of the thing1 and other circumstances4 ,all consent presupposes1 #a1 the use of reason3 the insane cannot contract any obligation2 children neither2#cf #b1 necessary knowledge4 ,therefore all real consent excludes error1 at least when it falls on the very substance of the thing which is its object4#cg ,it is1 besides1 for the jurists to define with precision what is to be understood by error in matter of contract2 #c1 the liberty of the contracting parties3 whence it follows that consent extorted by constraint and violence is not valid4 7#b47 ,the capacity to make a contract is deduced from the foregoing principles4 ,all those who are not supposed to be able to give an intelligent and free consent1 are incapable and cannot make contracts3 for instance1 persons under age1 persons interdicted1 insane or idiots1 etc4 7#c47 ,the matter of a contract4--,all contract has for its object something that a certain party engages to give1 or do or not do4 ,it is evident that a contract without subject-matter and bearing on nothing1 is void1 and does not exist4 7#d47 ,the cause of the contract must be real and legal4 ,contracts are subject here to the same rules as are promises4 ,the preceding distinctions are all borrowed from the civil law2 but they express no less principles of justice and equity which may be resolved into the following rules3 #a4 ,no one should take by surprise or extort a consent through artifice or violence4 #b4 ,no one should make a contract with one whom he knows to be incapable of understanding the value of the engagement he is called upon to make3 for example1 with one under age1 incapable before the law1 but of whom it is known that the parents will pay the debts2 or with one feeble-minded1 though not yet an interdicted person1 etc4 #c4 ,no one should contract a fictitious engagement bearing on matters non-existing1 or such as have only an imaginary or illegal cause4 ,interpretation of contracts4--,jurists give the following rules regarding the interpretation of obscure clauses in contracts4 ,the rules which are to guide the judge in regard to the law are the same as those which are to enlighten the consciences of the interested parties3 #a4 ,one should1 in agreements1 find out the mutual intention of the contracting parties1 rather than stop at the literal sense of the words4 7,art4 #aaef47 #b4 ,when a clause is susceptible of a double meaning1 one should understand it in the sense in which it may have some effect1 rather than in the one in which it would not have any4 7,art4 #aaeg47 #d4 ,that which is ambiguous is to be interpreted by what is customary in the country where the contract is made4 7,art4 #aaei47 #e4 ,one should supply in a contract its customary clauses1 though they be not therein expressed4 7,art4 #aafj47 #f4 ,all the clauses of agreements are to be interpreted by one another1 giving each the sense which results from the entire document4 7,art4 #aafa47 #g4 ,if doubtful1 the agreement is to be interpreted against the stipulator1 and in favor of him who contracted the obligation4 7,art4 #aafb47 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,duties ,,towards ,,the ,,liberty ,,and ,,towards ,,the ,,honor ,,of ,,others4--,,justice1 ,,distributive ,,and ,,remunerative2 ,,equity4 ,,summary4 ,liberty in general4--,natural rights4 ,slavery4--,arguments of ,j4 ,j4 ,rousseau against slavery1 servitude2 oppression of work under divers forms4 ,the honor of others4--,backbiting and slander4 ,rash judgments4--,analysis of a treatise of ,nicole4--,envy2 rancor2 delation4 ,justice1 distributive and remunerative4--,to each according to his merits and his works4 ,equity4 ,after self-preservation1 the most sacred prerogative of man is liberty--that is to say1 the right of using his faculties1 both physical and moral1 without injury to others1 at his own risks and perils1 and on his own responsibility4 #ea4 ,liberty--,natural rights4--,the word liberty sums up all that is understood by the natural rights of man1 namely1 the right to go and come1 or individual liberty2 the right to use his physical faculties to supply his wants1 or liberty of work2 the right to exercise his intelligence and reason1 or liberty of thought2 the right to honor ,god according to his lights1 or liberty of conscience2 the right to have a family1 a wife and children1 or the family right1 and finally the right to keep what he has acquired1 or the right of property4 #eb4 ,slavery4--,the privation of all these rights1 of all these liberties in an individual1 is called slavery4 ,slavery is the suppression of the human personality4 ,it consists in transforming man into a thing4 ,it takes away from him the right of property and makes of himself a property4 ,the slave is bought and sold as a thing4 ,the fruits of his labor do not belong to him2 he cannot come and go at will2 he can neither think nor believe freely2 in some countries he is interdicted the right of instructing himself2 he has no family1 or has one temporarily only1 since his wife or children may be separately sold2 and since the women belong to their masters as their property1 there is no bridle against the license of passions4 ,although slavery is at the present day well-nigh abolished in the world1 still as it is not yet wholly so1 and as this abolition is quite recent1 and tends constantly to be renewed under one form or another1 it is important to sum up the principal reasons that show the immorality and iniquity of this institution4 #ec4 ,refutation of slavery--,opinion of ,j4 ,j4 ,rousseau4--,j4 ,j4 ,rousseau1 in his ,contrat ,social 7,i41 iv471 combated slavery with as much profundity as eloquence4 ,let us sum up his arguments with a few citations3 #a4 ,slavery cannot arise from a contract between the master and the slave2 for to consent to slavery is to renounce one's manhood1 of which no one can dispose at his will4 ,to renounce one's liberty is to renounce one's manhood1 and the rights of humanity1 even one's duties4 ,there is no reparation possible for him that renounces everything4 ,such a renunciation is incompatible with the nature of man1 and is depriving his actions of all morality1 and his will of all liberty4 #b4 ,such a contract is contradictory1 for the slave giving himself wholly and without reserve1 can receive nothing in return4 ,it is a vain and contradictory agreement to stipulate an absolute authority on one side1 and on the other unlimited obedience4 ,is it not clear that one can be under no obligation towards him of whom one has a right to demand everything8 and does not this single condition1 without equivalent1 without exchange1 carry with it the nullity of the act8 ,for what right could my slave have against me1 since all he has belongs to me1 and that his right being my own1 this my right against myself is a word without any sense4 #c4 ,even if one had the right to sell one's self1 one has not the right to sell one's children4 ,slavery at least should not be hereditary4 ,admitting that one could alienate himself1 he could not alienate his children2 they are born men and free2 their liberty is their own2 no one has a right to dispose of it but themselves4 ,before they have reached the age of reason1 their father may1 in their name1 stipulate conditions for their welfare1 but not give them irrevocably and unconditionally over to another2 for such a gift is contrary to the ends of nature1 and passes the rights of paternity4 #d4 ,slavery1 furthermore1 comes not from the right of killing in war2 for this right does not exist4 ,the conqueror1 according to ,grotius1 having the right to kill the conquered enemy1 the latter may ransom his life at the expense of his liberty3 an agreement all the more legitimate1 as it turns to the profit of both4 ,but it is clear that this pretended right to kill the conquered adversary does not result in any way from the state of war4444 ,one has a right to kill the defenders of the enemy's ,state as long as they hold to their arms2 but when they lay these down and surrender1 and cease to be enemies1 they become simply men again1 and one has no longer a right on their life4 ,if war does not give the conqueror the right of massacring the conquered1 it does not give him the right of reducing them to slavery4444 ,the right of making of the enemy a slave1 does not then follow the right of killing him2 it is then an iniquitous exchange to make him buy his life at the price of his liberty1 over which one has no right whatsoever4 ,montesquieu has also combated slavery2 but he has done it under a form of irony1 which gives still greater force to his eloquence4 ,if ,i had to defend the right we have had to make slaves of the negroes1 this is what ,i should say3 ,the peoples of ,europe having exterminated those of ,america1 they were obliged to reduce to slavery those of ,africa in order to use them to clear the lands4 ,sugar would be too dear if the plant that produces it were not cultivated by slaves4 ,the people in question are black from head to foot1 and they have so flat a nose that it is almost impossible to pity them4 ,one cannot conceive that ,god1 who is a being most wise1 could have put a soul1 and above all a good soul1 in so black a body4 ,it is impossible for us to suppose that these people are men2 because if we supposed them to be men1 one might begin to think we are not ,christians ourselves4 ,narrow minds exaggerate too much the injustice done to ,africans4 ,for if it were as they say1 would it not have come to the minds of the princes of ,europe1 who make so many useless contracts among each other1 to make a general one in favor of mercy and of pity8#ch #ed4 ,servitude--,restrictions of the liberty to work--,oppression of children under age1 etc4--,absolute slavery existed in antiquity1 and has particularly reappeared since the discovery of ,america1 owing to the difference of the races3 the black race being1 seemingly1 particularly adapted to the cultivation of the torrid zones1 and endowed with great physical vitality1 became the serving-race par excellence3 it has even been hunted down for purposes of procreation2 hence that infamous traffic1 called slave trade1 and which is to-day interdicted by all civilized countries4 ,but there existed in the ,middle ,ages1 and has subsisted even to these days1 in ,russia1 for example1 a relative slavery1 less rigorous and odious1 but which1 though circumscribed within certain limits1 was not the less a grave outrage to liberty4 ,the serf was allowed a family1 and even a certain amount of money2 but the ground which he cultivated could never belong to him2 and above all he could not leave this ground1 nor make of his work and services the use he wished4 ,it was certainly less of an injustice than slavery2 but it was still an injustice4 ,however1 this injustice exists to-day no longer than as an historical memory4 ,morality has no longer anything to do with it4 ,it is the same with the restrictions formerly imposed on the freedom of work under the old administration 7ancien regime71 the organization of maitrises and jurandes1#ci namely1 and that of corporations2 the work was under regulations3 each trade had its corporation1 which no one could enter or leave without permission4 ,no one was allowed to encroach upon his neighbor's trade2 the barbers defended themselves against the wig-makers2 the bakers against the pastry-cooks2 hence much that was wrong1 and which those who regret this administration have forgotten4 ,but here again1 it is the object of history to inquire into the good or the evil of these institutions2 and these questions belong rather to political economy than to morals4 ,it is not the same regarding the abuse made of the work of children and minors1 or the work of women4 ,severe laws have forbidden such2 but it is always to be feared that manners get the better of the laws4 ,the work of children and women being naturally cheaper than the work of men and adults1 one is tempted to make use of it2 but the work of children is improper because it is taking advantage of and using up beforehand a constitution not yet established1 and also because it is thus depriving children of the means of being educated4 ,as to girls and women1 in abusing their strength1 one compromises their health1 and contributes thereby to the impoverishment of the race4 ,among the violations the liberty of work may suffer1 we must not forget the threats and violences exercised by the workers themselves and inflicted upon each other4 ,it is not rare1 in fact1 in times of strikes1 to see the workmen who do not work try to impose1 by main force1 their will on those that are at work4 ,such violences1 which have their source in false ideas of brotherhood 7a mistaken esprit de corps71 and in a false sense of honor1 constitute1 nevertheless1 even when free from the coarse enmity of laziness and vice1 waging war with work and honesty--a grave violation of liberty2 and it may be considered a sort of slavery and servitude to suffer them4 ,it is the same with the attempts by which men try to forbid to women factory work1 under pretext that it brings the wages down4 ,this reason1 in the first place1 is a bad one1 because the woman's earnings come in the end all back to the family1 increasing by that much more the share of each4 ,but by what right should work be prohibited to woman more than to man8 ,certainly it would be desirable if the woman could stay at home1 and busy herself exclusively with the cares of the household2 but in the present state of things such an ideal is not possible4 ,it is then necessary that woman1 who has1 like man1 her rights as a moral personality1 should be allowed by her every-day work to make a living1 under the protection of the laws1 and at her own risks and perils4 #ee4 ,moral oppression--,inward liberty and responsibility4--,the question is not only one of corporal liberty1 the liberty to work2 the laws in a certain measure provide for that1 and one can appeal to their authority for self-protection4 ,but there may exist a sort of moral bondage1 which consists in the subordination of one will to another4 ,it is here that the respect we owe to others calls for a more delicate and a more strict sense of justice3 for this sort of slavery is not so obvious1 and the love we bear to others may be the very thing to lead us into error4 #ef4 ,violation of the honor of others--,backbiting and slander4--,among the first rights of a man1 there is one sometimes forgotten1 although it is one of the most essential1 and this is his right to honor4 ,in our ignorance of most men's actions1 and in all cases of the real motives of these actions1 it is a duty for us to respect in others what we wish they should respect in us3 namely1 our honor and our respectability4 ,in fact1 it is very difficult for men to form true judgments regarding each other4 ,for fear of committing an injustice1 it is better not to judge at all than to judge wrongly4 ,there are two ways of violating other people's honor3 backbiting and slander4 ,backbiting consists in saying evil of others1 either deservedly or undeservedly2 but when undeservedly1 and especially when one knows it to be so1 backbiting becomes slander4 ,backbiting may arise from ill-will or thoughtlessness1 and slander is the work of baseness and perfidy4 ,backbiting which consists in saying evil of others deservedly1 is not in itself an injustice3 there is to be recognized the right and jurisdiction of public opinion4 ,the honest man should be held in greater esteem than the rogue1 even though the latter cannot be reached by the law4 ,nevertheless1 backbiting becomes an injustice through the abuse that is made of it4 ,it is not a question of severe judgments touching actions deserving blame and contempt4 ,it is a question of thoughtless and unkind judgments1 and which we are all too easily and readily inclined to pronounce upon others1 forgetting that we deserve ourselves as many and severer ones4 ,how shall we conciliate1 however1 the just severity which vice deserves1 with the spirit of kindness which charity and brotherly love demand of us8 ,on the one hand1 an excess of kindness seems to weaken the horror of evil1 to put on the same level the honest man and the rogue2 on the other1 the habit of speaking evil weakens the bonds of human society1 sets men against each other1 and is always1 in a certain measure1 a shortcoming of sincerity2 for one hardly ever tells to people's faces the evil one says of them in their absence4 ,it is not easy to find the just medium between these two extremes4 ,it may be laid down as a principle that1 except the case where notorious vices1 contrary to honor1 comes into question1 it is better absolutely to abstain from speaking evil of others4 ,for1 either the question is of persons one does not know1 or knows imperfectly1 and then one is never sure not to be mistaken2 and most of the time one judges people on the testimony of others only1 or one speaks of persons whom one knows1 and with whom one stands in more or less friendly relations2 and then backbiting becomes a sort of treason4 ,even deserved blame should not be a favorite subject of conversation3 it is an unwholesome and ungenerous pleasure to lay any stress upon the weakness of others4 ,if1 at least1 one accepted with it the right of others to judge us with the same severity1 such reciprocal liberty might prove of some utility2 but the backbiter nowise admits that he may be himself the subject of backbiting2 and at the very moment when he criticises others1 he would himself be very much offended if he learned that the same persons had1 on their side1 been doing the same in regard to him4 ,as to slander1 it is not necessary to say much on the subject to show to what degree it is cowardly and criminal4 ,what makes it1 above all1 cowardly is that it is always very difficult to combat and refute slander4 ,often1 and for a long time1 it is not known3 at the moment when one hears of it1 it has taken roots which nothing can destroy4 ,one does not know who spread it1 nor whom to answer4 ,it is1 besides1 often impossible to prove a negative thing3 namely1 that one has done no harm1 that one has not committed such and such an action1 and said such or such a word4 ,one always confronts the well-accredited saying3 ,there is no smoke without fire4 ,the wrong done by slander will be better understood by the description ,beaumarchais has given of it3 ,slander1 sir--you hardly know how great a thing you hold in contempt3 ,i have seen the best of people crushed by it4 ,believe me1 there is no flat malice1 no hateful story1 no absurd tale which a skillful mischief-maker cannot make the idlers of a large town believe4444 ,at first1 a slight report1 just grazing the ground as a swallow does before the storm3 murmuring pianissimo1 and spinning away1 it launches in its course the poisoned arrow4 ,a certain ear is open to take it in1 and it is deftly whispered piano1 piano1 to the next4 ,the harm is done2 it sprouts1 crawls1 makes its way2 and rinforzando from mouth to mouth1 goes like wildfire2 then all at once1 you scarcely know how1 you see the slander rise before you1 whistling1 blowing1 growing while you look at it4 ,it starts1 takes its flight1 whirls about1 envelops1 pulls1 carries everything along with it1 bursts and thunders1 and becomes a general cry1 a public crescendo1 a universal chorus of hatred and proscription4#dj #eg4 ,rash judgments4--,we call rash judgments ill-natured remarks made about others without sufficient knowledge of facts4 ,it is through rash judgments one becomes often the accomplice of slander1 without knowing it and without wishing it4 ,nicole1 in his ,essais de ,morale1 has thoroughly treated the question of rash judgments4 ,we have but to give here a short resume of his ,treatise on this subject4 #a4 ,rash judgments are a usurpation of ,god's judgment4 ,rash judgments being always accompanied by ignorance and want of knowledge1 are a manifest injustice and a presumptuous usurpation of ,god's authority4 #b4 ,this sin has degrees according to the quality of its object1 the causes from which it springs1 and the effects it produces4 ,the quality of the object increases it or diminishes it1 because the more things are important the more is one obliged to be circumspect and reserved in the judgments one pronounces4#da ,the causes may be very different3 ,one falls into it sometimes simply from over-hastiness4 ,sometimes we are led into it through the presumptuous attachment we have for our sentiments4 ,but the most ordinary source of this ignorance is the maliciousness which causes us to see stains and defects in persons which a single eye would never discover in them4444 ,it causes us to feel strongly the least conjectures1 and enlarges in our eyes the slightest appearances4 ,we believe them guilty because we should be very glad if they were4 ,the consequences of rash judgments are sometimes terrible and fatal4 ,the divisions and hatreds which disturb human society and extinguish charity come generally only from a few indiscreet words that escape us4 ,moreover1 we do not always confine ourselves to simple judgments4 ,we pass from the thoughts of the mind to the promptings of the heart4 ,we conceive aversion and contempt for those we have thoughtlessly condemned1 and we inspire the same sentiments in others4 ,rash judgments are the source of what we call prejudices2 or1 rather1 prejudices are but rash judgments fixed and permanent4444 ,we portray human beings to ourselves from the inconsiderate remarks made about them before us1 and we then adjust all their other actions to the ideas we have formed of them4 ,it serves us as a key whereby to explain the conduct of these persons1 and as a rule for our conduct towards them4 #c4 ,we are apt to delude ourselves as to the motives of the judgments we pronounce4 ,the manner in which we conceal from ourselves this defect is very delicate and very difficult to avoid4 ,for it comes from the bad use we make of a maxim very true in itself when viewed generally1 but which in private we imperceptibly pervert4 ,this maxim is1 that whilst it is forbidden to judge1 it is not forbidden to see--that is to say1 to give one's self up to convincing evidence4 ,thus1 in making our judgments pass for views or evidences1 we shield them from all that can be said against the rashness of our judgments4 ,to enable us to distrust this pretended evidence1 it would only be necessary to call our attention upon those whom we think guilty of rash judgments in regard to us4 ,they think as we do1 that the rashest of their judgments are from observation evidently true4 ,who1 then1 will assure us that it is different with us1 and that we are the only ones free from this illusion8 #d4 ,it is maintained that one cannot help seeing the faults of others3 so be it2 but one need not make it voluntarily an object4 ,it may be said that we cannot help but see4 ,but that is not true4 ,it is rare that our mind is so violently struck that it cannot help deciding4 ,it is generally obliged to make an effort to look at things1 and it is this voluntary looking at the faults of others which ,christian prudence should correct in the persons whose function it is not to correct them4 #e4 ,besides1 even if we knew the evil for certain1 it is not for us to make it known to others4 ,whatever evidence we may think we have of the faults of our neighbor1 ,christian prudence forbids us to make these known to others when it is not incumbent on us or useful so to do4444 ,this exercise does not only serve in regulating our speech and forestalling the consequences of rash judgments1 but it is also of infinite service in regulating the mind and correcting the rashness of judgment at its very source2 for one hardly ever allows one's mind to judge the faults of others1 except to speak about them1 and if one did not speak of them1 one would insensibly stop trying to judge them4 #f4 ,but as it is not always possible to avoid judging1 it becomes necessary to employ other remedies against the abuse of rash judgments4 7a47 ,the remedy for malignity is to fill one's heart with charity2 to think often about the virtues and good qualities of others4 7b47 ,the remedy against haste is to accustom one's self to judge slowly and to take more time in looking at things4 7c47 ,the remedy against the too strong attachment to our own sentiments is to continually remember the weakness of our minds and the frequent mistakes we1 as well as others1 make4 ,nicole goes so far in proscribing rash judgments1 that he even forbids them regarding the dead 7xxxv471 regarding ourselves 7xxxvi471 even when they have good rather than evil for their object 7xxxvii471 even regarding abstract maxims of morality 7xli472 and he concludes by saying that the only reasonable method is silence6 ,we recognize here the rigorism of the ,jansenists4#db ,it suffices to say that1 as a general principle1 one should neither judge nor pronounce without investigation2 but one must allow a little more latitude and liberty than does ,nicole2 for if all men agreed to keep silent1 human society would be nothing but a semblance1 a word void of sense4 ,how could men get to love each other if they did not know each other8 ,and how could they know each other if they did not talk to each other8 ,we must1 therefore1 adhere to certain general principles without pretending to bring all words and thoughts under regulations4 #eh4 ,of envy and delation4--,among the vices which may lead to the greatest injustices1 and which already in themselves are odious as sentiments1 the most blameworthy and the vilest is the passion of envy4 ,we call envious him who suffers from the happiness of others1 him who hates others because of the advantages they possess and the superiority they enjoy4 ,in the first place1 this sentiment is an injustice2 for the happiness of one is not the cause of another's misfortune2 the health of one does not make the other sick2 ,voltaire's wit is not the cause of the mediocrity of our own talents2 beautiful women are not answerable for the ugliness of other women4 ,let the ill-favored one accuse nature or ,providence1 and there will be some reason in it1 though it is a bad feeling2 for it is a want of resignation to a wisdom the motives of which we cannot always divine2 but to accuse the favored of fortune1 is a shocking baseness of the heart4 ,it is the hateful feature of a celebrated sect of these present days2 they desire not the happiness of all1 but the misfortune of all4 ,unable to procure the same advantages to all men1 their ideal is general destruction4 ,their utopia is just the reverse of all other utopias4 ,these believed they could secure to all the advantages reserved to a few4 ,this new utopia1 persuaded of the impossibility of the thing1 have overthrown the problem and propose to reduce the more fortunate to the wretchedness of the less happy2 and as among the number of heads they hit there are still some which retain a few advantages over the others1 the work of destruction will go on till they shall have reached the level of universal degradation4 ,but1 without speaking of the social envy1 which has had so large a share in the revolutions of our time1 what we ought above all to fight against is the individual envy which each of us has so much trouble in defending himself against in presence of the success of his neighbor4 ,it is above all dangerous when disputed goods are in question--things all cannot have at the same time--and which he who is in the enjoyment of them seems thereby to rob the others of3 as1 for instance1 a situation one obtains at the expense of another1 be it that he is more deserving of it1 or more favored by fortune4 ,in the first case1 one should be just enough to recognize the rights of others to these things1 and in the second1 generous enough to forgive them the favors of chance4 ,it is wanting in personal dignity to begrudge men their chances and good fortune2 and even were these chances undeserved1 it is still lowering one's self to do them the honor of envying them4 ,envy comes close to another sentiment1 less odious perhaps1 and less unjust1 but which is1 nevertheless1 unworthy of a right-feeling man2 this is resentment1 rancor1 a vindictive spirit4 ,if we are commanded to return good for good1 we are1 on the other hand1 forbidden to return evil for evil4 ,for centuries it has been said3 ,eye for eye and tooth for tooth4 ,this is called retaliation 7lex talionis74 ,christian morality has reformed this law of barbarous times4 ,it is written3 eye for eye1 tooth for tooth2 but ,i say unto you3 ,love those who hate you2 pray for those who persecute you and speak evil of you4 ,without insisting here on the love for enemies 7which is a duty of charity and not of justice71 we will simply say that the spirit of vengeance is even contrary to justice4 ,nature1 when we have been offended1 calls forth in our hearts a spontaneous emotion1 which inspires in us an aversion for the cause of the offense4 ,this is a mere revolt of nature1 innocent in itself1 since it is the principle of the right of self-defense4 ,but we should not yield to this thoughtless impulse2 we should combat the desire to return evil for evil2 for otherwise we place ourselves on a level with him whom we hate4 ,and here again we should distinguish between anger and rancor4 ,anger is the immediate impression we receive from the wrong committed1 and which may induce us to return evil for evil on the spot2 but rancor is hatred coldly kept up2 it is the slow and calculated preparation for a revenge2 it is the remembrance of wrong carefully nursed3 and it is this which is contrary to human dignity4 ,man should remember good1 not evil3 he who is capable of hatred is worthy of hatred1 and would seem to have beforehand deserved the wrong he has been made to suffer4 ,we do not go so far as to say that wrong must be pardoned as wrong1 for that would be siding with injustice2 but it should be pardoned to human nature1 because it is weak1 and we are no less liable to sin than others4 ,from these feelings of hatred1 envy1 rancor1 covetousness1 springs sometimes a vice which lowers the soul and corrupts it3 this is delation4 ,to report to one the wrong done by another2 to superiors the wrongs done by our colleagues2 to friends the evil said of them in their absence2 to inform the authorities of the presence and lodgings of an outlaw1 such are the faults designated by the term delation1 and the essential characteristics of which are1 that they are committed without the knowledge of the interested parties4 ,it is evident1 besides1 that this term can nowise be applied to functionaries commissioned to watch and discover faults1 or to those who complain of injustice done them1 and finally where great crimes committed against society are in question1 to those who1 knowing the criminals1 report them to the authorities4 #ei4 ,distributive and remunerating justice--,equity4--,all the acts we have thus far enumerated1 and which consist in doing no wrong to others1 relate to what may be called negative justice4#dc ,there is another kind of justice1 more positive1 which consists1 like charity1 in doing good to others1 not in the sense of liberality and a gift1 but as a debt2 only the question then is not a material debt1 which obliges to return a thing loaned1 or intrusted1 or the venal value of that thing2 but it is a moral debt in proportion to the merit and services it relates to4 ,this kind of justice1 which distributes goods1 advantages1 praises in proportion to certain efforts1 capacities1 virtues1 is what is called distributive justice1 and1 inasmuch as it rewards services1 remunerating4 ,distributive justice goes into effect every time when there is occasion to classify men1 to distribute among them offices1 ranks1 honors1 degrees1 etc4 ,it is that which especially administrators who distribute places1 have to exercise2 also1 examiners who give diplomas1 learned societies who grant prizes1 or take in new members2 finally1 critical judges who appreciate the merit of books1 works of art1 dramatic productions4 ,the administrators who have to fill posts1 must above all consider the interests of the situation which is to be filled4 ,favoritism should be strictly excluded3 the misuse of testimonials has been often pointed out2 it is the plague of our administrations4 ,they have not always all the influence attributed to them2 but it is enough that it is thought they have any1 to give rise to bad habits and a very serious laxity of morals4 ,they make you believe that success does not wholly depend on conscientious work1 and that it requires1 above all1 the favor of the great 7protections74 ,it is1 therefore1 the duty of administrators to consider the merit of functionaries only1 and not their patrons4 ,but even this rule is far from being sufficient3 for personal merit is not everything2 is not the only element to be considered2 age1 length of service1 have also their value2 for1 in order that the ,state be well served1 it is necessary that those who work for it1 should have faith in the future2 should know that their past services will be taken account of1 that as they grow older and their burdens heavier1 the ,state will come to their assistance in raising their functions4 ,thus must length of service be combined with merit and be itself a part of the merit4 ,in many administrations1 the division between these two elements is made by granting vacant posts half to length of service1 half to choice4 ,but the choice itself depends on various elements2 for personal merit is itself composed of many elements3 for example1 which should be considered the higher1 talent or work8 ,a lively mind will accomplish more work in less time2 but it may be negligent1 forgetful1 disorderly3 a substantial mind1 always ready1 industrious1 conscientious1 offers better guarantees and more security2 yet in difficult transactions1 talent offers more resources4 ,this shows how many practical difficulties have to be met in the choice of men4 ,it is for experience and conscience to decide in each particular case4 ,morality can give no general rules1 except negative rules3 to avoid nepotism1 simony1#dd guard against the arbitrary1 against favor1 testimonials1 etc4 ,in examinations there are the same dangers to avoid3 for here1 also1 it is unfortunately too much a general belief that favoritism is the rule1 and that testimonials go for everything4 ,the first duty is to set aside all personal interest1 worldly influence1 pressure from without4 ,but all does not end here2 for there remains to be seen what rule is to be followed in the choice of candidates4 ,if the number of those who are to be elected is fixed beforehand1 as in contests1 there is then already a great difficulty obviated3 for there is but to be determined the order of merit of the candidates4 ,but in many examinations the number is not fixed4 ,it becomes then necessary to find a just medium between excess of severity and excess of indulgence4 ,this medium is generally determined through the co-operation of different minds1 of which some are inclined to severity and others to indulgence4 ,but one must not trust to this co-operation of others to arrive at a strict justice4 ,it is clear that each1 for his own part1 must fix upon a mean1 and endeavor to adhere to it as strictly as possible4 ,in cases where there is occasion for classification1 one must1 above all1 consider the more substantial qualities1 and not allow one's self to be too easily led away by mere appearances and surface-talent4 ,thus1 facility of speech1 which in itself is a merit1 should not have any advantage over sound learning1 especially in regard to functions where speech-making plays no part4 ,presence of mind1 ready wit1 are also brilliant and precious qualities1 but the absence of which does not always denote ignorance and incapacity4 ,in learned or political societies1 which are recruited among themselves1 the same principles of independence and impartiality should always predominate1 except in cases of difference in circumstances4 ,talent is here the principal thing to go by1 and which should prevail2 length of service counts for nothing except where the merit is equal4 ,the interest of science in learned societies1 the interest of the ,state in political societies1 should be the prime considerations4 ,literary or artistic criticism comes under the same rules1 only it has not for its object persons1 but works4 ,here the danger to be feared is not exactly favor1 but good fellowship3 one upholds the other1 the praise is mutual1 and all severity is reserved for those who do not belong to the society4 ,but1 whether good fellowship or favor1 all privilege-preference substituted for the esteem the thing should be held in for its own sake1 is contrary to justice4 ,criticism may1 of course1 be more or less severe--more or less laudatory2 there is as much impropriety in constant blame as in constant praise2 one must strike as near as possible a just mean between the two1 and this mean may not be the same with the different critics2 here comes in the part which individual temperament plays in the matter4 ,but whatever rule each may adopt for himself1 they must all apply it to the same end3 there must be no undue respect for the person1 and the interest of art must be alone considered4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,duties ,,of ,,charity ,,and ,,self-,,sacrifice4 ,,summary4 ,a retrospect of what distinguishes justice and charity4 ,duties of kindness4--,the lowest degree of charity is kindness3 to wish others well leads to doing them good4 ,civility4--,personal civility2 civility of the mind2 civility of the heart4 ,modesty4--,modesty is as much a duty to others as to ourselves4 ,peace among men4--,analysis of ,nicole's dissertation on the means of preserving peace among men4--,citations from ,kant on society virtues4 ,duties of friendship4--,citations from ,aristotle and ,kant4 ,duties of benevolence4--,duties minima3 services which cost nothing4--,hospitality with the ancients4 ,good deeds4--,analysis of ,seneca4 ,duties of benefactors4--#a1 ,the benefaction consists rather in the sentiment than in the thing given2 #b1 one should not trouble one's self if the benefaction results in ingratitude2 #c1 degrees in benefactions3 the necessary1 the useful1 the agreeable2 #d1 the manner of giving is often better than the gift itself2 #e1 one should not reproach benefactions2 #f1 benefaction consists sometimes in refusing2 #g1 benefaction should be disinterested4 ,duties of the person under obligation3--#a1 ,not to be too greedy2 #b1 a kindness should be accepted cheerfully2 #c1 one should remember a kindness4 ,kant's rules regarding benevolence and gratitude4 ,precautions required by benevolence3 ,cicero's rules4 ,self-sacrifice4--,different forms of self-sacrifice3 ,the life1 the property1 the morality of others1 etc42 clemency2 forgiveness of injuries2 love of enemies4 ,we have said that charity consists1 above all1 in doing good to men1 whilst justice consists in doing them no wrong4 ,it is true1 there is a positive justice1 as there is a negative justice2 and this positive justice consists also in doing good to men1 but it is a good which is due them1 which belongs to them by right1 and which is itself an acknowledgment of that due and that right4 ,the good done to others in the exercise of the duties of charity is1 on the contrary1 something we take from our own2 it is a gift2 whilst the good done in the name of justice1 is always a debt4 ,the lowest degree of the duty of charity consists in what are called duties of kindliness4 #fj4 ,duties of kindliness4--,the first step to arrive at doing good to men1 is to wish them well4 ,kindliness is the road to benevolence4 ,kindliness is that disposition which induces us to give others pleasure2 to rejoice over their good fortune1 to make them happy themselves1 if not by our own kindnesses1 if that is not in our power1 at least by outward demonstrations of sympathy and affection4 #fa4 ,civility4--,the lowest degree of this virtue1 consists in using gentle and amiable manners in our intercourse with others1 in not repelling them by a gruff and unsociable disposition2 in wounding no one's feelings by the affectation of contempt and raillery1 etc4 ,this kind of surface-virtue1 which is confined to the outward1 is what is called civility4 ,civility is the ensemble of the forms usage has established to regulate the habitual and daily relations of men with each other4 ,it corresponds in society to the ceremonial of diplomatic life4 ,to avoid the clashes which the rivalries of courts and powers would necessarily carry with them1 a code of agreements was established which fix with precision the relations of the diplomatic agents4 ,the same in social life4 ,civility is composed not of absolute and wholly material rules1 but of forms fixed in a general way1 yet more or less free in their application1 and all the more pleasing as they are the more free4 ,these forms1 often laughed at when regarded superficially1 have a serious value when we consider that they express the general duty whereby peace is established and maintained among men4 7,see ,nicole1 ,essais de morale1#de #afga47 ,there is1 then1 in civility a principle which is essential and a form which is arbitrary4 ,usage has everywhere established the form of bowing1 for instance2 everywhere there are conventional expressions wherewith to greet people according to their age1 their sex2 but these outward manifestations vary according to times and countries4 ,a distinction has been made between personal civility and the civility of the mind and heart4 ,civility properly so called is that of the outward manners2 but it is worth very little if it is not sustained by the delicacy which says nothing wounding and the true kindliness which seeks to give pleasure3 this is what is called civility of the mind and heart4 ,the most amiable natural gifts1 and the talents made most supple by education1 change into defects and vices if they are not inspired by a feeling of kindness4 ,suppleness1 then1 is nothing else than perfidy2 delicacy nothing else but cunning2 this civility lavished upon everybody is nothing else than duplicity4444 ,it is not enough to be a man of the world2 one must also be a man of heart4444 ,true civility is that which has its source in justice1 in the respect for humanity2 it is a form of charity2 it is the luxury of virtue4#df #fb4 ,modesty4--,one of the most essential parts of kindness is modesty4 ,modesty is certainly a duty we owe to ourselves2 but it is also a duty we owe to others4 ,nothing more fatiguing than people who bring everything back to themselves1 and can speak of nothing but themselves4 ,it is not by appearing satisfied with your own accomplishments1 but in having others satisfied with them1 that you will please2 and they will never find you more charming than when1 completely forgetting yourself1 you will be only occupied with them4 ,to succeed in making them satisfied with themselves1 is the true means of having them satisfied with you4 ,among remarkable instances of modesty often cited1 are those of ,turenne and ,catinat4 ,the latter having sent in a report of the battle of ,marsaglia1 had so totally forgotten to mention himself that some one ingenuously asked3 ,was the marshal present8 #fb 7bis74 ,peace among men4--,you have but a day to spend on earth1 says ,lamennais2 try to spend it in peace4#dg ,nicole has written an excellent treatise on the means of preserving peace among men 7,essais de morale1 #afga74 ,let us give a resume of it4 ,two causes1 according to ,nicole1 produce disunion among men3 either in wounding their feelings we cause them to withdraw from us1 or1 in being wounded ourselves1 we withdraw from them4 ,consequently1 the only means of avoiding such divisions is not to wound the feelings of others1 and not to feel one's self wounded by them4 #a4 ,if we look into the causes which generally give offense1 we shall see that they may be reduced to two1 which are3 to contradict people in their opinions1 and to oppose their passions4 #a4 ,opinions4--,men are naturally attached to their opinions1 because they desire to rule over others3 now we rule through the trust that is placed in us2 it is a sort of empire to have one's opinions received by others4 ,for this reason1 when one seeks to combat the opinions of a man1 one does him in some sort injury4 ,it cannot be done without giving him to understand that he is mistaken2 and he does not take pleasure in being mistaken4 ,he who contradicts another on some point1 pretends to more knowledge than has he whom he wishes to persuade2 he thus presents to him two disagreeable ideas at the same time3 one1 that he is deficient in knowledge1 and the other that he who corrects him surpasses him in intelligence4 ,one should1 therefore1 spare people in their opinions2 but among these opinions there are some which must be treated with more regard than others3 ,they are those advanced by no one particular person of the place where one may live1 but which are established by universal approbation3 in running against such opinions1 one appears wishing to rise above all the rest4 ,not that one should always scruple in conversation to show that one does not approve some opinions3 that would be destroying society1 instead of preserving it4444 ,but it is a thing worth pointing out how one may express his sentiments so gently and agreeably that they give no offense4444 ,for very often it is not so much our sentiments that shock others1 as the proud1 presumptuous1 passionate1 disdainful1 insulting manner in which we express them4 ,there are1 then1 several mistakes to be avoided3 7a7 ,the first is assumed superiority1 that is to say an imperious manner in the expression of one's sentiments1 and which most persons resent1 as much because it shows a proud and haughty soul1 as because it indicates a domineering spirit tyrannizing over minds4 7b7 ,the second is the decided and dogmatic manner in which an opinion is given2 as if it could not be reasonably contradicted4 7c7 ,vehemence does not belong to the mistakes we have just spoken of4 ,it consists in conveying the impression that one is not only attached to one's sentiments from conviction1 but also passionately1 which furnishes many people a reason for suspecting the truth of those sentiments1 thus inspiring in them a wholly contrary feeling4 7d7 ,the contempt and insults which enter into disputes1 are so obviously shocking1 that it is not necessary to warn against them2 but it may be well to remark that there are certain rudenesses and incivilities nearly akin to contempt1 although they spring from another source4 ,change of opinion is in itself such a hard thing1 and so contrary to nature1 that we must not add to it other difficulties4 7e7 ,finally1 hardness1 which does not so much consist in the hardness of the terms employed as in the absence of certain softening words1 also often shocks those thus addressed1 because it implies a sort of indifference and contempt4 #b4 ,passions4--,it is not enough to avoid contradicting people's opinions1 or to do so cautiously only2 one must also spare their inclinations and their passions1 because otherwise1 it is impossible to avoid complaints1 murmurs1 and quarrels4 ,these inclinations are of three kinds3 which may be called just1 indifferent1 and unjust4 7a7 ,one should never really satisfy the unjust ones2 but it is not always necessary to oppose them2 for it is wounding others to make one's self conspicuous without particular reason4444 ,one must always make amends for good and evil 444 especially when there are others who could do it with better results than we4 ,besides1 this same rule obliges us to choose the least offensive1 the gentlest1 the least irritating means4 7b7 ,i call indifferent passions those the objects of which are not bad in themselves1 although they may be sought after with a vicious adhesion4 ,now1 in this sort of things we are at greater liberty to yield to the inclinations of others3 #a1 because we are not their judges2 #b1 because we do not know whether these affections are not necessary to them 7leading them away from still more dangerous objects72 #c1 because these sorts of affections must be destroyed with prudence and circumspection2 #d1 because there is reason to fear we might do them more harm in indirectly opposing their innocent passions1 than we should do them good in warning them against them4 7c7 ,i call just passions1 those in which we are obliged to follow others by reason of some duty1 although they might perhaps not be justified in requiring of us such deference4 ,the peace of society resting thus on reciprocal esteem and love1 it is just that men should wish to be esteemed and loved1 and should demand outward signs of esteem and love4 ,upon this rest the rules of civility established among men1 and of which we have spoken above4 ,,ii4 ,it is not enough to avoid wounding men's feelings1 one should1 moreover1 not allow one's self to feel wounded by them1 when they themselves fail to treat us as we ought to treat them4 ,for it is impossible to practice inward peace1 if we are so sensitive to all that may be done and said contrary to our inclinations and sentiments2 and it is even difficult to prevent the inner dissatisfaction from showing itself outwardly1 and inducing us to treat those who have shocked us in a manner calculated to shock them in their turn4 ,it is1 then1 necessary to avoid complaining of others1 when one has been offended by them4 ,in fact3 444 ,let us complain of others as much as we please1 we shall generally only embitter them the more1 without correcting them4 ,we shall be accounted sensitive1 proud1 haughty 444 and if those we complain of have any sort of skill1 they will give such an aspect to things that the blame will fall back upon us4 ,we must then endeavor to establish our peace and quiet on our own reformation and on the moderation of our passions4 ,we cannot dispose of the minds or the tongues of others 444 we are enjoined to work on ourselves and to correct our own faults4 ,there is nothing more useful than to suppress one's complaining and resentment4 ,it is the surest way to appease differences at their birth and prevent their increase2 it is a charity we practice towards ourselves by procuring to ourselves the good of patience 444 it is a charity we do to others in bearing with their foibles1 in sparing them the little shame they have deserved1 and the new faults they might commit in justifying themselves4 ,but it is not possible for us to observe outwardly such discretion1 if we allow our resentment to work inwardly in all its force and violence4 ,the outward complaints come from the inward1 and it is very difficult to hold them back1 if one's mind is full of them2 they always escape and break through some opening or other4444 ,we must1 therefore1 also quench the complaints which the soul engenders4 ,among the subjects of complaint which other men give us1 and which should be treated with contempt1 ,nicole points out particularly3 ,false judgments1 slander1 rudeness1 negligence1 reserve1 or want of confidence1 ingratitude1 disagreeable tempers1 etc4 ,let us merely repeat what he says of the unfavorable judgments of others regarding us3 ,there is a ridiculous oddity in this spite which we feel when we hear of the unfavorable judgments and remarks made about us2 for one must have very little knowledge of the world to suppose it generally possible that they would not be made4 ,princes are talked against in their ante-chambers2 their servants mimic them4 ,there is nothing so common as to speak of the defects of one's friends and pride one's self in pointing them frankly out to others4 ,there are even occasions when this may be done innocently4444 ,it is1 therefore1 ridiculous to expect being spared 444 for there is no time when we may not be generally sure either that people talk or have talked about us otherwise than we should wish4444 ,we show annoyance at these judgments when they are expressly reported to us 444 yet the report itself adds next to nothing to the matter1 for before it was made we ought to have been almost sure that we and our faults were unpleasantly commented on4444 ,if this resentment were just1 one would then have to be always angry1 or never so1 because it is unjust4 ,but to keep very quiet1 as we do1 though we should know that there are people laughing at us1 and to be disturbed and upset when we are told what we already knew1 is a ridiculous foible4 #fc4 ,social virtues--,kant's advice4--,kant has also treated the duties of kindness towards men1 under the title of ,social ,virtues4#dh ,it is a duty to one's self as well as to others to carry the commerce of life to the highest degree of moral perfection2 not to isolate one's self2 not only to have the happiness of the world in view ideally1 but to cultivate the means which indirectly lead to it2 urbanity in social relations1 gentleness1 reciprocal love and respect1 affability and propriety1 thus adding the graces to virtue1 for this also is a duty of virtue4 ,these1 it is true1 are but external and accessory works1 presenting a fine appearance of virtue1 which1 however1 deceives no one1 because every one knows how much to think of it4 ,it is but a sort of small coin2 but the effort we are obliged to make to bring this appearance as near to the truth as possible1 helps the sentiment of virtue greatly along4 ,an easy access1 an amiable mode of speech1 politeness1 hospitality1 that gentleness in controversy which keeps off all quarrel--all these forms of sociability are external obligations which put also the others under obligation1 and which favor the sentiment of virtue in rendering it at least amiable4 ,here arises the question to know whether one can keep up friendly relations with the vicious4#di ,one cannot avoid meeting them2 for one would have to quit the world1 and we are not ourselves competent judges in respect to them4 ,but when vice becomes a scandal--that is to say1 a public example of contempt of the strict laws of duty1 thus carrying with it opprobrium--then one should stop all relations one may have had heretofore with the guilty person2 for the continuation of this relation would deprive virtue of honor1 and make of it a merchandise for the use of whoever were rich enough to corrupt parasites through the pleasures of good living4 #fd4 ,duties of friendship4--,besides the general duties of every kind which link us with all men1 for the only reason that they are men1 there are particular duties imposed on us toward those of our fellow-beings1 to whom we are united by the bonds of friendship4 ,the duties of friendship have been admirably known and described by the ancients4 ,we could not1 therefore1 treat this subject better here than by briefly recalling some few passages from ,aristotle or ,cicero4 ,according to ,aristotle1 there are three kinds of friendship3 the friendship of pleasure1 the friendship of interest1 and the friendship of virtue4 ,the latter is the only true one4 ,there are three kinds of friendship4444 ,the people who love each other from interested motives1 for the use they are to each other1 love each other1 not for their own sakes1 but only inasmuch as they get any good or profit from their mutual relations4 ,it is the same with those who only love each other for pleasure's sake4 ,when one loves from motives of pleasure only1 one really seeks nothing else but this same pleasure4 ,such friendships are only indirect and accidental4 ,they are very easily broken1 because these pretended friends do not long remain the same4 ,utility1 interest1 have nothing fixed2 they vary from one moment to another4 ,the motive which originated the friendship disappearing1 the friendship disappears as rapidly with it4 ,the perfect friendship is that of virtuous people1 and who resemble each other in their virtue2 for these wish each other well1 inasmuch as they are good2 and ,i add that they are good in themselves4 ,those who wish their friends well from such a noble motive are the friends par excellence4 ,hence it is that the friendship of such generous hearts lasts as long as they remain good and virtuous themselves2 now virtue is a substantial and durable thing4 ,each of the two friends is in the first place good in himself1 and he is1 moreover1 good to all his friends1 for good people are useful to each other1 and also mutually agreeable to each other4 ,such a friendship unites1 then1 all the conditions4 ,there is nothing more lovely4 ,it is quite natural1 however1 that such friendships are very rare1 because there are very few people of such a disposition4 ,it requires1 moreover1 time and habit4 ,the proverb is true which says that people can hardly know each other well1 'before having eaten together bushels of salt4' ,in the same way persons cannot be friends before having shown themselves worthy of affection1 before reciprocal confidence is established4 7,nicomachean ,ethics1 liv4 viii41 ch4 vii47 ,friendship1 according to ,aristotle1 consists in loving rather than in being loved4 ,friendship1 besides1 consists much rather in loving than in being loved4 ,the proof of it is the pleasure mothers experience in lavishing their love4444 ,to love is1 then1 the great virtue of friends2 it is thus that the most unequal of people may be friends2 their mutual esteem renders them equals4 7,ch4 viii47 ,friendship gives rise to a number of delicate problems3 they may be found discussed in great detail in ,cicero's ,treatise on ,friendship4 #fe4 ,kant's precepts touching friendship4--,among the moderns1 ,kant is the only moral philosopher who has given friendship a place in practical morality4 ,he has found new and delicate traits to add to the rules of the ancients4 ,he insists above all on what he calls the difficulties of friendship1 and above all on the difficulty of conciliating love and respect4 ,to look at the moral aspect of the thing1 he says1 it is certainly a duty to call a friend's attention to the mistakes he may commit2 for it is done for his good1 and is consequently a duty of love4 ,but the friend1 thus admonished1 sees in the thing but a lack of esteem he had not expected1 and thinks he has lost something in your mind2 or1 seeing himself thus observed and criticised1 may at least be in constant fear of losing your esteem4 ,besides1 the fact alone of being observed and censured1 will already appear to him an offensive thing in itself4 ,how much in adversity do we not wish for a friend1 especially an effective friend1 one finding in his own resources abundant means for helping us8 ,yet is it a very heavy burden to feel one's self responsible for the fortunes of another1 and called to provide for his necessities4444 ,then if the one receives a kindness from the other1 perhaps there may be yet reason to hope for perfect equality in love2 but he could no longer expect perfect equality in respect2 for being under obligation to one he cannot oblige in his turn1 he feels himself manifestly one degree his inferior4444 ,friendship is something so tender that if one does not subject this reciprocal abandonment and interchange of thoughts to principles1 to fixed rules1 which prevent too great a familiarity and limit reciprocal love by the requirements of respect1 it will see itself every instant threatened by some interruption4444 ,in any case affection in friendship should not be a passion2 for passion is blind in its choice1 and evaporates with time4#ej #ff4 ,duties of benevolence4--,duties minima4--,from kindness we pass to benevolence4 ,the one resides in sentiment1 the other in acts3 the first consists in wishing well1 the second in doing good4 ,the least degree of benevolence consists in rendering to others those smaller services which cost us nothing1 and which are helpful to them4 ,it is what ,puffendorf calls the duties minima of benevolence4#ea ,cicero1 in his ,treatise on duties 7,i41 xvi471 gives several examples of this kind3 ,to show the way to him who asks for it2 to forbid no one the use of running water2 to give fire to him who has need of it2 to give advice in good faith to him who is in doubt4 ,plutarch1 in the same sense1 says that the ,romans never extinguished their lamps after their meals1 and always left something on the table to accustom the servants of the house to the duties of humanity4 ,by the law of ,moses1 the owner of a field was obliged always to leave some corner uncut and not glean the ears that had escaped the reapers4 ,finally1 a ,greek poet1 ,phocylides1 expressed in the following lines this minimum of benevolence which every one can exercise3 ,give shelter to those who have none2 lead the blind2 be merciful to those who have suffered shipwreck2 extend a helping hand to the fallen2 assist those that have no one to help them out of danger4 ,among these primitive duties1 which cost him that fulfills them but little1 the ancients put in the first rank hospitality4 ,it is in fact a virtue of primitive times which exists especially among barbarous and savage peoples4 ,in the poems of ,homer we see to what degree the guest was held sacred2 it is still so among the ,arabs and the ,indians of ,america4 ,this virtue1 on the contrary1 seems to have disappeared with civilization4 ,the reason of it is that among barbarous populations1 where security is feeble1 it was the point of honor which guaranteed the security of strangers4 ,but as civilization becomes more complicated1 as traveling increases1 and security becomes greater1 mercenary hospitality takes the place of free and private hospitality4 ,nevertheless1 there can always remain some occasion for this primitive virtue in places isolated and separated from the great centres3 this1 for example1 can still be seen in our days in the great wastes of ,america and ,australia4 #fg4 ,benefactions--,duties of the benefactor4--,the foregoing actions1 however praiseworthy they may be1 are too simple and too easy to be presented as real acts of benevolence4 ,this term is reserved for the more difficult actions1 which may cost us some real sacrifices more or less great1 and which1 moreover1 are important services4 ,these are what are called benefactions4 ,seneca1 in his ,treatise on benefactions1 has fixed the principles of benevolence3 #a4 ,benefaction consists especially in the feeling which accompanies it1 rather than in the thing given4 ,what is a benefaction8 he asks2 it is an act of benevolence which procures joy to him who is the object of it and to him who exercises it3 it is a voluntary and spontaneous act4 ,it is then not at the thing done and given that we must look1 but at the intention1 because the benefaction does not consist in the gift or in the action1 but in the disposition of him who gives4 ,the proof of this difference is that the benefaction is always a good1 whilst the thing done or given is neither a good nor an evil4 ,the benefaction is then not the money that is counted out to you1 the present that is made you2 no more than the worship of the gods consists in its fattest victims1 but in the uprightness and piety of their worshipers4 ,one prefers a hand that opens easily to one that gives largely4 ,he has done little for me1 but he could not do any more4 ,that other has given much1 but he hesitated1 he delayed1 he groaned in giving1 he gave with ostentation2 he proclaimed his good deed2 he did not care to please him whom he obliged3 it is not to me he gave1 it is to his vanity4 7,i41 vi47 #b4 ,one should do good without caring about ingrates4 ,what is after all the wrong the ingrate does you8 ,you have lost your good deed4 ,but there remains to you the most precious part of it3 the merit of having done it4 ,there are services one should learn how to render without hope of returns1 to people one may presume will be ungrateful1 and whom one even knows to have been so4 ,if1 for example1 ,i can save from a great peril the children of one who has been ungrateful to me1 ,i shall not hesitate to do so4 7,i41 x47 #c4 ,there must be degrees in benefactions1 and1 having to choose1 one must first give the necessary1 then the useful1 then the agreeable4 ,the necessary1 says ,seneca1 is divided into three classes3 the first comprises the things without which one cannot live 7for example1 to rescue a man from the sword of the enemy1 from the rage of tyrants1 from proscription1 etc472 the second1 those without which one should not live 7such as liberty1 honor1 virtue72 finally 7#c;d class71 our children1 our wives1 our household gods are objects dearer to us than life4--,after the necessary comes the useful2 it may be subdivided into a great number of species2 it comprises money1 honors1 and above all the progress in the science of virtue4--,finally come the agreeable things which are innumerable4444 ,let us seek things which please because they are to the purpose2 that are not common2 that recall the donor2 let us above all beware of useless presents4 7,i41 xi47 #d4 ,the manner of granting a benefit is more important than the benefit itself4 ,the simplest rule to follow is to give as we should ourselves wish to be given to4 ,one must above all give heartily1 without hesitation 444 after a refusal nothing so hard as irresolution4444 ,the most agreeable kindnesses are those one does not expect1 which flow naturally2 which anticipate their need4 ,it is better to anticipate the request4 ,to forestall this trouble is doubling the good deed4 ,there are people who spoil their greatest kindnesses by their silence1 their slowness to speak which comes from constraint and moodiness2 they promise with the same air with which they would refuse4444 ,their knit brows1 their harangues1 their disdain make one regret having obtained the promised thing4 ,nothing more disagreeable than to be a long time in suspense4 ,there are persons who prefer giving up hope to languishing in expectation4444 ,promptness then enhances the good deed1 and tardiness diminishes it4 7,,ii41 ii-vi47 #e4 ,one must not reproach good deeds4 ,one of the first and most indispensable laws1 is not to reproach or even recall to the mind of recipients one's kindnesses4 ,the tacit agreement between the giver and the receiver is1 that the one should immediately forget what he has given1 and that the other should never forget what he has received4 ,the frequent mention of kindnesses is a crushing weight to the soul4 #f4 ,benevolence consists sometimes in refusing4 ,if the thing asked for is prejudicial to him who asks for it1 then benevolence consists no longer in giving1 but in refusing4 ,we should have more regard to the interests of the petitioner than to his wishes4 ,as we refuse patients cold water1 arms to angry persons1 so should we also refuse a kindness to the most pressing requests1 if that kindness is injurious to the interested person4444 ,one should no less consider the end than the principle of kindnesses4 #g4 ,benevolence must be disinterested4 ,it is shameful to do good for any other motive than doing good4 ,if one gave only in the hope of restitution1 one would choose the richest in preference to the most worthy4444 ,the least benevolent men would be those who had the best means for being benevolent3 the rich1 the great1 the king1 etc4 444 ,as an insult is a thing one should for itself avoid1 so benevolence is desirable for its own sake 7xv474444 ,there is no benevolence where there is expectation of profit4 ,i shall give so much2 ,i shall receive so much3 this is called a bargain4 7xiv47 ,we will put aside the other questions1 more curious than useful1 raised by ,seneca 7as1 for example1 whether one should give to the wicked2 whether one may be his own benefactor2 whether one may allow himself to be outdone by good deeds1 etc471 and consider now the duties of the one under obligation4 #fh4 ,duties of the person under obligation4--,gratitude4--,after having expounded the duties of the benefactor1 we have to ask ourselves what are those of the person under obligation4 ,the principle of all is gratitude2 that only comes after the kindness2 but there are duties which precede the good deed or accompany it4 ,we shall again cite here ,seneca as authority4 ,after having set forth the principles which should actuate the giver1 he also sets forth those the receiver should be guided by4 #a4 ,the first principle is that we should not be too greedy and receive from any one1 but only from those to whom we should like to give ourselves3 ,it is a painful thing to be under obligations to people against one's will4 ,nothing sweeter1 on the contrary1 than to receive a kindness from a person one loves4444 ,i must then choose the person of whom ,i consent to receive anything1 and ,i should even be more particular in regard to kindness-creditors than to money-creditors2 to the latter one need only return what he has received from them2 this reimbursement done we have acquitted ourselves toward them2 in the matter of kindnesses1 on the contrary1 one should pay more than what he has received4 #b4 ,a second rule is that from the moment one accepts a kindness1 he must accept it cheerfully4 ,when we have concluded to accept a kindness1 let us do it cheerfully4444 ,to accept a kindness with pleasure1 is making the first payment of the interest 7,,ii41 xxii474--,there are people who only consent to receive in secret2 they wish neither witnesses to1 nor confidants of1 the obligations they are contracting4 ,if the benefactor is bound to proclaim his kindness only inasmuch as its publicity will give pleasure to the person he obliges1 the one receiving should1 on the contrary1 call together the crowd4 ,one is at liberty not to accept what he blushes to receive 7xxxiii474444 ,one of the lesser paradoxes of the stoics is1 that in receiving a kindness cheerfully1 one has already acquitted himself4 #c4 ,one must awaken the remembrance of a good deed3 to remember is already to acquit one's self 7xxiv474 ,which1 according to you1 is the most culpable1 he who feels no gratitude for a kindness1 or he who does not even keep it in mind8444 ,it would seem that one thought very little about restitution when he has got so far as to forget the kindness4444 ,to acquit one's self of a kindness1 one needs means1 some fortune2 but the recollection of it is a gratitude which costs nothing4 ,to withhold a payment which requires neither trouble nor riches1 is inexcusable4444 ,the objects memory is busy with never escape it2 it only loses those it does not often revert to4 #fi4 ,kant's rules touching benevolence and gratitude4--,to the maxims of the ancients which we have just summed up1 let us add a few principles borrowed of a modern moralist1 the philosopher ,kant3 ,benevolence4--,benevolence1 when one is rich1 and finds in his superfluity the means of making others happy1 should never be considered by the benefactor even a meritorious duty4 ,the satisfaction he procures to himself thereby1 and which does not cost him any sacrifice1 is a means of filling himself with moral sentiments4 ,therefore must he carefully avoid looking as if he thought he was obliging others2 for otherwise his kindness would no longer be one2 since he would seem wishing to put under obligation the person to whom he grants it4 ,he should1 on the contrary1 show himself under obligation1 or as honored by the acceptance of his kindness1 and consequently fulfill this duty as he would pay a debt he had contracted2 or1 what is still better1 practice benevolence wholly in secret4 ,this virtue is still greater when the means for being benevolent are restricted3 it is then he deserves to be considered as very rich morally4 7,kant1 ,doctrine de la ,vertu1 trad4 ,fr41 p4 #abh47 ,gratitude4--,gratitude should be considered a holy duty4 ,we call1 in fact1 holy any moral object regarding which no act could entirely acquit one of the contracted obligation4 ,now there is no way of acquitting one's self of a benefit received1 because he who receives it cannot refuse to him who grants it the merit and advantage of having been the first in showing his kindness4 ,the least degree of gratitude is to render to the benefactor equivalent services4 ,it is1 also1 never to look upon a kindness received as upon a burden one would be glad to be rid of 7under pretext that it places the one under obligation in a position inferior to that of his benefactor1 which is wounding to his pride74 ,one must1 on the contrary1 accept it as a moral kindness1 that is to say1 as furnishing us an opportunity to practice a virtue4 7,ibid41 p4 #acj1 #acb47 #gj4 ,precautions which benevolence requires4--,benevolence should not be exercised without reserve and precaution4 ,in abandoning one's self to it imprudently1 one may do more harm than good4 ,cicero on this subject recommends three principal precautions3 ,one must take care1 he says3 #a4 ,lest1 in wishing to do a person good1 one does harm1 either to him or to others2 #b4 ,in the second place1 let not our benevolence exceed our means2 #c4 ,finally1 let every one be treated according to his deserts4 #a4 ,those1 in fact1 whose benevolence injures him who is the object thereof1 should be looked upon as flatterers1 rather than generous men4 ,those who injure some1 to be generous towards others 7as1 for example1 to omit paying one's debts1 in order to exercise charity71 commit the same injustice as if they appropriated what belongs to others4 ,thus1 when ,sylla and ,caesar transferred to strangers the property of lawful owners1 they were not generous2 liberality may exist then where justice is absent4 #b4 ,the second precaution is to exercise our benevolence according to our means4 ,those who wish to be more benevolent than they can afford1 are in the first place unjust to their family2 since the property1 to the inheritance of which it has a right1 goes thus over to strangers4 ,such generosity often leads1 moreover1 to the enriching of one's self at the expense of others1 in order to provide for liberalities4 ,one sees1 thus1 many people1 more vain than generous1 pass for being benevolent4 ,it becomes then a borrowed virtue1 which has more of vanity than liberality4 #c4 ,the third rule is1 whilst dispensing our liberalities1 to proportion them to merit2 to consider the morals of him who is their object1 the attachment he shows us1 the different relations he may have with us2 lastly1 the services he may have rendered us4 ,it were desirable he had all these titles to our benevolence2 but if he has them not all1 the greatest and largest in numbers should weigh most in the scales4 #ga4 ,self-devotion--,self-abnegation--,sacri fice4--,when charity reaches the highest degree2 when it requires we should give to others what we hold most dear--as1 for instance1 life1 fortune1 etc4--it takes another name and is called devotion1 self-abnegation1 sacrifice4 ,these three words1 with various shadings1 express the idea of a precious gift of which one deprives himself to benefit others4 ,one may devote one's self to others in various ways1 in choosing for one's object either the life1 or welfare1 or liberty1 or the morality and intelligence of others4 ,let us examine these various forms of devotion4 #gb4 ,the nature of the benefit4--,diverse forms of self-devotion4--,the life1 the welfare1 the morality of others1 etc4--,sacrificing one's life for others4--,justice requires we should not attack the life of others2 charity requires more3 it demands that we make every effort to save the life of our fellow-beings1 even sometimes at the cost of our own4 ,this duty1 which is a duty of charity for men in general1 is a duty of justice for the physician and all those who have care of the sick4 ,the physician owes his devotion to the patient1 as the soldier owes his to his country4 ,in both these cases medical duty1 military duty1 devotion is a strict duty4 ,it is at the same time a duty towards men and a duty towards the profession4 ,it is in both cases what may be called the honor of the flag4 ,thus do we every year see a certain number of young hospital physicians die1 like soldiers on the field of honor4 ,the duty of attending the sick and being thereby exposed to contagion1 falls alike on all who have chosen this profession3 sisters of charity1 the nurses1 the male and female attendants in infirmaries4 ,it is also a duty in the family2 the parents owe themselves to their children2 the servants themselves should assume in a certain measure the same responsibility1 although it is the duty of the masters to spare them as much as possible4 ,moreover1 it is known how common this devotion is1 especially with mothers1 and how many of them die of the illness they have contracted at the bedside of their children4 ,in all these circumstances1 it is of course not forbidden to be cautious1 and wisdom requires one should not go beyond the strictly necessary2 but the necessary is obligatory2 and on whom should it fall more naturally than on the parents8 ,besides the illnesses which threaten the lives of men1 there are dangers more sudden1 more violent1 more terrible1 which arise from the invasion of the forces of nature3 fire and water are the most terrible2 conflagrations1 inundations1 shipwrecks1 catastrophes of all kinds imperil the lives of men4 ,here the question is no longer one of slow and leisurely attentions4 ,to save a life which a minute later will be extinguished1 there is wanted a sudden resolution1 a well-tested courage1 and the will to risk one's life for that of another4 ,in these terrible circumstances there are some men who seem to be more naturally called than others to sacrifice themselves2 for example1 firemen and sailors4 ,it is certain that it is those who are the more familiar with the element it is necessary to combat1 that are most called to do so1 and for whom self-devotion becomes a greater duty4 ,but it is not always possible to have them immediately at hand2 in a sudden catastrophe1 all must take their share of the peril2 all must be ready to give their life for others if they can do so with some utility4 ,devotion towards the wretched4--,next to health and life1 what men most esteem are material goods and that which is called fortune4 ,certainly1 we should not encourage this estimation men have for material goods2 one should as much as possible teach them to do without them2 and the saying that happiness resides rather in a small competence than in riches1 is most true4 ,but it is not less true that the material things are absolutely necessary to life1 and that the absence of these things is in every respect prejudicial to man1 since health1 life1 and even the interests of the soul and mind1 depend on these material goods4 ,how can we educate ourselves without eating8 ,how can we improve the heart and soul when want impels us to all sorts of temptations8 ,finally1 suffering itself1 though morality commands us to bear it with courage1 is a legitimate object of sympathy4 ,from all these considerations arises1 for those who possess anything1 the obligation to come to the assistance of those who have nothing3 this is what is called gift4 ,this obligation can be satisfied in many ways1 but the mode should certainly consist with the dignity and responsibility of those who are the object of the gift4 ,experience has shown that an ill-understood charity encourages idleness and often rewards and perpetuates vice4 ,it is therefore work which should above all be furnished to the poor3 the loan should generally be preferred to the gift2 but finally1 whatever precautions one may take1 and whatever be the causes of the misery1 there comes always a moment when1 in presence of hunger1 illness1 supreme want1 one must give2 must deprive himself for others4 ,as to the particular rules which govern benevolence1 we have given them above in speaking of benefactions4 ,consolations1 exhortations1 instructions4 ,after the duties toward the body come the duties toward the soul3 and this distinction has place for others as for ourselves4 ,it is not enough to insure and save the lives of men1 and give them the daily bread2 one must also nourish their souls1 their intelligences1 their moral weaknesses1 which also need sustenance4 ,thence three different obligations3 to console the afflicted2 to exhort the weak2 to instruct the ignorant4 ,the consoling of the afflicted is a virtue1 which needs no rule1 and does not admit of any4 ,one does not console by order1 by processes1 by principles4 ,here the heart is better than strict laws4 ,listen to your heart2 it will teach you how to be merciful without being indiscreet2 how to touch without wounding2 how to say enough without saying too much4 ,in respect to poor people1 one often consoles them by relieving their misery1 and the duty here blends with benevolence4 ,after the consolation come the exhortations4 ,the duty here becomes more and more delicate4 ,it is no easy thing to advise men2 we have not even always a right to do so2 for it is attributing to ourselves a certain superiority over them4 ,this duty of exhortation is therefore an affectation of pride rather than an inspiration of fraternity4 ,it is especially with children1 with young people1 that good exhortations properly made can be useful4 ,in a few words1 moderate and just1 one may often recall to them their duties of respect towards themselves1 and of economy1 sobriety1 devotion towards their relatives4 ,finally comes the duty of instruction4 ,here it is not the office of all1 but only of those who are charged with this function4 ,yet may we contribute our share towards the instruction of children either by money-contributions1 or by visiting the schools1 or by encouragement-societies2 in a word1 by all sorts of auxiliary means4 ,such are the principal duties in regard to souls4 #gc4 ,clemency4--,pardon of injuries4--,love of enemies4--,the foregoing duties consist not only in returning good for evil1 but also in doing good to those who have not done us any4 ,a superior degree of charity1 which is called generosity1 consists in returning good for evil1 in forgiving the wicked1--not the wrong they have done to others1 but the wrong they have done to ourselves4 ,this1 in the case of sovereigns1 is called clemency4 ,the saying of ,louis ,,xii4 is well known1 having pardoned the enemies he had had before taking the crown3 ,the king1 said he1 should forget the injuries done to the duke of ,orleans4 ,the great ,conde was moved to tears over ,corneille's celebrated lines in ,cinna3 ,let us be friends1 ,cinna2 it is ,i who invite thee3 ,i gave thee thy life as to my enemy1 ,and despite the fury of thy cowardly designs1 ,i still give it thee1 as to my murderer4 ,the duty of returning good for evil goes even further than clemency and the pardon of injuries3 for this is nothing more than to abstain from wronging one's enemies4 ,but we should do more3 we must be capable of doing good to our enemies when they deserve it1 or need it2 and further still1 we should try to carry the virtue even so far as to interdict ourselves any feeling of pride1 which would naturally arise in a heart great enough to avenge itself by benefits4 ,the philosopher ,spinoza has admirably expressed this doctrine3 ,hatred must be overcome not by hatred1 but by love and generosity4 #gd4 ,duties of kindness towards animals4--,among the moralists1 there are some who do not admit that we have any duties towards beings inferior to man1 namely1 animals2 others1 on the contrary1 do not admit any duties towards any above man1 consequently towards ,god2 others1 in fine1 deny that man has any towards himself4 ,there are scarcely any duties1 except those towards our fellow-beings1 that have not been questioned by one or the other of the moralists3 some connecting the latter with the duties towards ourselves1 or the duties towards ,god4 ,according to us1 there are four classes of duties1 and these four classes are not reducible the one to the other4#eb ,no one can deny from a practical point of view that there are duties towards animals2 for we know very well that it is not permitted to maltreat them or cause them unnecessary pain2 and every enlightened conscience condemns cruelty to animals4 ,therefore can there be here question only of a speculative scruple4 ,it can be very well seen that there is a duty here2 but it is1 they say1 a duty towards ourselves2 for it is our duty not to be cruel1 and cruelty toward animals accustoms us too easily to cruelty toward men4 ,but this is a very useless subtlety1 and too roundabout a way to express a very simple thing4 ,we prefer simply saying that kindness toward an animal is a duty toward that animal4 ,besides1 the reasons given against the duties toward animals1 appear to us more specious than substantial4 ,it is said that animals1 having neither will nor intelligence1 are not persons1 but things2 that1 consequently1 they have no rights1 and that we can have no duties toward what has no rights4 ,these are inadmissible subtleties4 ,one can1 in law terms1 divide all objects of nature into persons and things2 and animals1 not being persons1 are things1 in the sense that they can be appropriated4 ,but1 strictly speaking1 can a being endowed with sensibility be called a thing8 ,is it true1 moreover1 that an animal has no intelligence1 no will--that consequently it has not any vestige of personality8 ,is it true again that an animal has no kind of rights8 ,this1 in the first place1 is to suppose what is in question4 ,and1 moreover1 does not conscience say to us that an animal which has served us long years with affection has thereby acquired a certain right to our gratitude8 ,and1 finally1 is it really true that we have only duties towards those that have duties towards us8 ,that were a very perilous maxim in social morality4 ,we are told not to be cruel to animals in order not to become cruel towards men4 ,but if one were sure not to become cruel towards men1 would it follow therefrom that it is permitted to be so towards animals8 ,no1 it will be said2 but it is because cruelty1 though its object be only animals1 is in itself a vice1 base and unworthy of man4 ,one should not conclude from that1 that cruelty is a direct crime against them4 ,but for the same reason it might be maintained that we have no duties toward others1 and only toward ourselves2 injustice1 cruelty1 are odious vices in themselves2 goodness and justice1 noble qualities2 we should shun the one and avoid the other out of respect for ourselves1 and regardless of the object of these vices and virtues4 ,if1 despite these considerations1 it is then thought better to make1 nevertheless1 a distinction between the duties toward others and those toward ourselves1 there should for the same reason be made a distinct class of the duties toward animals4 ,finally1 if we owe nothing to animals1 it is not very clear why acts hypothetically indifferent should be treated as cruelties2 nor why such acts should be considered as lowering and dishonoring the character4 ,on the whole1 and to avoid all theoretical difficulties1 it may be said that we have duties1 if not toward animals1 at least in regard to animals4 ,our duties in regard to animals1 are they1 however1 of a kind to make us doubt our right to destroy or reduce them to servitude8 ,the destruction of animals may have two causes2 it may be for our defense1 it may be for our subsistence4 ,as to the first there is no difficulty2 the right of legitimate self-defense authorizes us to destroy what would otherwise destroy us4 ,between us and beasts injurious to man there is evidently a state of natural war1 and in that state the law is that might makes right4 ,this same law is the one which regulates the relations of the animals between themselves3 it is also their law in regard to us4 ,the lion1 for instance1 might not always be as tenderly inclined as the lion of ,androcles or the lion of ,florence3 it would not be well to trust it4 ,we need not1 therefore1 even theoretically1 entertain any scruples concerning the destruction of injurious animals4 ,is it the same with the destruction of animals intended for our nourishment8 ,is this destruction innocent1 or must we1 as did the ,pythagoreans or ,brahmins of old 7for superstitious reasons1 however71 interdict all animal food8#ec ,this question has been so well solved by general usage that it is scarcely necessary to raise it4 ,it is not likely men will ever think of giving up animal food1 and no one regrets having eaten of a good roast4 ,yet for those who like to find out the reason of things1 it is a problem to know whether we have the right to do what we do without remorse and scruples2 and whether a universal and apparently indestructible practice is also a legitimate and innocent practice4 ,man1 according to us1 in living on flesh1 is justified by nature herself1 who made him a carnivorous creature4 ,every being is authorized to perform the acts which result from its organization4#ed ,the human organization1 as the nature of the teeth and the whole digestive system indicate1 is prepared to nourish itself with flesh4 ,in many countries even all other nourishment is impossible2 there are peoples whose very situation makes them necessarily hunters1 fishermen1 or shepherds2 it is only in some countries highly favored1 and1 thanks to scientific cultivation1 the result of civilization1 that vegetable food could be made abundant enough to suffice1 and hardly that for large masses of population2 for we know quite well what disasters follow upon a scarcity of crops4 ,what would be the result if the human race were deprived of half its means of subsistence8 ,add to this that1 whatever may have been said against it1 animal food mixed in a certain measure with vegetable food1 is indispensable to the health and vigor of the human race4 ,as to the servitude of animals and the labor we impose on them1 its justification lies first in the principle of legitimate self-defense1 to which we have just now alluded4 ,many of our domestic races would1 in a savage state1 become veritable wild beasts4 ,the wild hog is1 they say1 the wild boar2 the wild dog1 the jackal2 the wild cat belongs to the leopard and tiger family4 ,in reducing these sorts of animals to servitude1 and in making of them companions and help-mates in our work1 we thereby deliver ourselves from dangerous enemies4 ,domestication is better than destruction4 ,add to this1 that if we except the first animals which have passed from the savage state to the domestic state 7which1 as to our domestic races1 is lost in the night of time and escapes all responsibility71 the present animals1 born in servitude1 know no other state1 do not suffer from a want of liberty1 and find even1 thanks to our cares1 a more certain subsistence than if they were free4 ,they are1 it is true1 sacrificed by us to our wants1 but they would be so by other animals in the savage state4 ,whether a sheep be eaten by men or wolves1 it is not to be more pitied for that1 one way or the other4 ,the right of man over animals being set aside1 there remains an essential duty respecting them1 namely3 not to make them suffer without necessity4 ,fontenelle relates that1 having gone one day to see ,malebranche1#ee at the fathers of the ,oratoire1 a dog of the house1 big with young1 entered the room and rolled about at the feet of the father4 ,after having tried in vain to drive it away1 ,malebranche gave the dog a kick which caused it to utter a cry of pain and ,fontenelle a cry of compassion3 ,oh1 pshaw6 said father ,malebranche1 coolly1 do you not know that these things do not feel8 ,how could this philosopher be sure that these things did not feel8 ,is not the animal organized in the same manner as man8 ,has he not the same senses1 the same nervous system8 ,does he not give the same signs of impressions received8 ,why should not the cry of the animal express pain as does the cry of a child8 ,when man is not perverted by custom1 cruelty1 or the spirit of system1 he cannot see the sufferings of animals without suffering himself1 a manifest proof that there is something in common between them and us1 for sympathy is by reason of similitude4 ,animals1 then1 suffer2 this is undeniable2 they have1 like ourselves1 a physical sensibility2 but they have also a certain moral sensibility2 they are capable of attachment1 of gratitude1 of fidelity2 of love for their little ones1 of reciprocal affection4 ,from this physical and moral analogy between men and animals1 there obviously results the obligation of inflicting upon them no useless suffering4 ,madame ,necker de ,saussure#ef relates the story of a child who1 finding himself in a garden where a tamed quail was freely running about beside the cage of a bird of prey1 yielded to the temptation of seizing the poor quail and giving it to the bird to devour4 ,the hero of this adventure relates himself the punishment inflicted on him3 ,at dinner--there was a great deal of company that day--the master of the house began to relate the scene1 coolly and without any remarks1 simply naming me4 ,when he was through1 there was a moment of general silence1 where every one looked at me with a kind of horror4 ,i heard some words exchanged among the guests1 and without any one's directly speaking to me1 ,i could understand that everybody thought me a monster4 ,connected with the cruelty toward animals are certain barbarous games where animals are made to fight with each other for our pleasure4 ,such are the bull-fights in ,spain2 the cock-fights in ,england2 we do not go so far as to rank the chase among inhuman games1 because1 on the one hand1 it has for its object to destroy the animals injurious to our forests and crops1 and to furnish us useful food2 and on the other1 it is an exercise favorable to health1 and exercises certain faculties of the soul2 but the chase must at least not be a massacre1 and must have for its end utility4 ,brutality toward the animals which render us the greatest services1 and which we see every day loaded beyond their strength1 and beaten to bear up under the load1 is also an odious act1 and doubly wrong1 as it is both contrary to humanity and contrary to our interests1 since these animals1 overloaded and beaten1 will not be long in succumbing to the violence of their persecutors4 ,nor can we consider as absolutely indifferent the act of killing or selling 7except in cases of extreme necessity7 a domestic animal that has served us a long time1 and whose attachment we have experienced4 ,among the conquerors at the ,olympic ,games1 the ancients tell us1 many share the distinctions which they receive with the horses which have helped to procure them2 they provide for them a happy old age2 they accord them an honorable burial1 and sometimes even raise a monument over their graves4 ,it is not reasonable1 says ,plutarch1 to use things which have life and feeling1 as we would use a shoe or any other instrument1 throwing it away when worn out and ruined by dint of service done2 if it were for no other cause than to induce and stimulate us to constant compassion1 we should accustom ourselves to gentleness and charitableness1 even to performing the humblest offices of kindness2 as for me1 ,i should never have the heart to sell an ox who for a long time had ploughed my land1 because1 by reason of old age1 he can no longer work4 ,a very serious question has been raised these latter times1 namely1 the question of vivisection1 and how far1 in a scientific point of view1 we have a right to practice on living animals4 ,the point is not to interdict to science what is the indispensable condition of its progress and propagation2 but we should limit ourself to the strictly necessary1 and not with revolting prodigality multiply sacrifices that are not absolutely useful4 ,one of the principal reasons for condemning cruelty toward animals1 is that through the instinct of imitation and sympathy men may get into the habit of doing to others what they have seen practiced on animals4 ,there is a story of a child who caused his brother to suffer the same death he had just seen inflicted on an animal4#eg ,the men who are brutal toward animals are likewise so toward each other1 and treat with the same cruelty their wives and children4 ,it is by reason of these considerations of social utility and humanity that the law in ,france decided to interfere to prevent and punish the bad treatment inflicted upon animals2#eh and the consequences of this measure have been most happy4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,duties ,,toward ,,the ,,state4 ,,summary4 ,three groups of societies among men3 ,humanity1 the family1 the country1 or the ,state4 ,analysis of patriotism4 ,foundation of the ,state4--,law and rights4 ,public authority3 distinction between society and the ,state4 ,the three powers4 ,sovereignty4 ,the right of punishment4 ,duties toward the ,state3 #a4 ,obedience to the laws4--,the ,crito of ,plato4 ,pretended exceptions to this principle4 ,criticising the laws is not disobedience4 #b4 ,respect to magistrates4--,the magistrates being the representatives of the laws1 to respect them is to respect the law itself2 to insult them is to insult the law4 #c4 ,the ballot4--,obligation to vote4 ,the character of the ballot3 #a1 disinterested2 #b1 free2 #c1 enlightened4 #d4 ,taxes4--,immorality of frauds against the ,state4 #e4 ,military service4--,legal and moral obligation4 ,attempts to escape it3 #a1 by mutilations2 #b1 by simulated infirmities2 #c1 by desertion2 want of discipline4 #f4 ,educational obligation4 ,civil courage4--,noted example3 ,boissy d',anglas4 #ge4 ,three groups of societies4--,cicero and ,fenelon remark that there are three sorts of societies among men3 the first comprises the whole of humanity2 the last1 which is the most circumscribed1 is what is called the family4 ,but between the family and the human race in general1 there is an intermediate society1 larger than the one and more circumscribed than the other1 and this is what is called the country4 #gf4 ,patriotism4--,the sentiment which binds us to the country1 and which1 articulated1 becomes a duty1 is what is called patriotism4 ,we have already given elsewhere1#ei an analysis of patriotism4 ,let us repeat what we have said3 ,patriotism is one of our most complex sentiments3 it is in fact composed of many distinct elements3 it is1 in the first place1 the love of the soil where we were born2 and this soil is at first the narrow territory where our youth passed1 and which we embraced entire with the eyes and recollections3 it is the native village1 the native city4 ,but if this is the first sense of country1 it falls far short of embracing the whole country4 ,the love for the native church steeple is not patriotism3 it is even its opposite often4 ,the soil must extend1 widen1 and from the natal house1 must gradually embrace1 by successive additions1 the village1 the town1 the county1 the province1 the whole country4 ,but what is to determine the extent of this territory8 ,who is to decide that it shall go so far and no farther8 ,there enter into it many elements3 first1 the inhabitants1 the fellow-citizens1 fellow-countrymen2 a soil deserted would not be a country2 to the love of the territory there must be added the love of those who inhabit it with us1 or of our fellow-countrymen2 to the nomadic people the country is only their tribe4 ,conversely1 the citizens without the soil are not the country either1 for exile in common is not the less exile4 ,finally1 the union of soil and fellow-citizens may still not be the country1 at least not all the country2 a conquered nation may preserve its soil and its inhabitants1 and have lost the country3 as ,poland1 for instance4 ,what1 then1 are the ties to determine the existence of a country8 ,there are a large number of them1 such as the unity of language1 the unity of laws1 the unity of the flag1 historic tradition1 and1 finally1 above all1 the unity of government and of an accepted government4 ,a country exists only where there is an independent political state4 ,this political unity does not suffice when the other ties are wanting2 when it is a constraint1 when peoples united under the same government have different manners1 customs1 traditions2 conversely1 unity of language and community of habits1 will neither be sufficient when the political unity or a certain form of political unity is wanting4 ,but what1 before everything else1 constitutes the country1 is a common spirit1 a common soul1 in short1 a common name1 which fuses into one all these separate facts of which no single one is absolutely necessary1 but of which each forms an additional element to the strength of the country4 ,finally1 as a last condition1 the association which is to become a country must not1 as was the case with the ,roman empire1 extend over too much territory2 for beyond certain limits1 patriotism relaxes4 ,nature has endowed us with this sentiment of patriotism4 ,there is no one that does not love his country better than other countries1 that is not flattered by national glory1 that does not suffer from the humiliations and miseries of his native country4 ,but this sentiment is more or less strong1 according to temperaments4 ,often it is nothing more than a sentiment1 and does not express itself in actions4 ,it is the reflective faculties which make of patriotism a duty1 which duty demands that sentiment pass into action2 demands of all the citizens the same acts1 whatever be the personal inclinations of each4 ,the duties imposed on each man in regard to the particular society of which he is a member1 are called civil duties4 ,he1 himself1 in regard to this society1 is what is called a citizen2 finally1 the society itself1 considered as one and the same person1 of which the citizens are the members1 is what is called the ,state or the city4 ,on the whole1 there is no difference between country and ,state4 ,country is at the same time ,society and soil4 ,it is called by that name 7,state7 when looked upon in the light of a family of which the citizens are the children1 and also when considered in its relations with other nations and other societies4 ,the ,state is that same society considered interiorly and in itself1 not as to its soil and territory1 but as to the members that compose it1 and in as far as these members form one and the same body and are governed by laws4 ,the country is a more concrete and more vivid expression1 which appeals more to the feelings2 the ,state is a more abstract expression1 which addresses itself to reason4 ,besides1 we shall understand better what is meant by the ,state1 when we shall have explained the nature of public authority and the laws4 #gg4 ,foundation of the ,state--,rights4--,to understand the nature of the ,state and what is called authority1 sovereignty1 magistracy1 law1 one must begin with the notion of rights and of the different kinds of rights4 ,duty is the law which imposes on us obligations either toward ourselves or toward others2 it is a moral necessity 7p4 #aa74 ,rights is the power we have to exercise and develop our faculties conformably to our destiny1 provided we allow other men the same power3 it is a moral power 7,leibnitz74 ,each man1 by reason of his enjoying liberty and intelligence1 is a person1 and should not be treated as a thing4 ,man is a thing sacred to man1 said the ancients4 ,he is inviolable in his personality and in all that constitutes the development of his personality4 ,thence follows an immediate consequence3 it is1 that every man being man by the same title1 no one can claim for himself a right which he is not willing to recognize at the same time in another2 hence the equality of rights4 ,besides1 the liberty of one cannot1 without contradiction1 suppress the liberty of another1 whence this other definition3 ,right is the accord of liberties4 #gh4 ,the rights of man4--,what are the principal rights of man8 ,they are3 the right of self-preservation2 the right of going and coming1 or individual liberty2 the liberty of work2 the right of property2 the liberty of thought2 the liberty of conscience2 the right of family1 etc4 ,we have also seen that man 7p4 #eb7 has a final right which is the guaranty and the sanction of all others2 it is the right of preventing by force every attempt at his rights2 to constrain others to respect his rights1 and lastly1 to punish every violation of his rights4 ,this is what is called the right of self-defense4 #gi4 ,public authority4--,man having1 as we have just seen1 the right of self-defense by opposing force to any attack1 possesses1 when alone1 and far from all human help1 this right in all its plenitude4 ,but it is easy to see the dangers and inexpediency of such a right in a society4 ,each man1 in fact1 when he meets with opposition to his will and desires1 always thinks himself injured in his rights4 ,if every one were free to defend himself in all circumstances1 the right of self-defense would keep men constantly under arms2 and society1 without a regulating power to check their doings1 would soon1 as the philosopher ,hobbes expressed it1 be the war of all against all4 ,hence the necessity of the ,state--that is to say1 of a disinterested power--taking in hand the defense of all1 and insuring the proper exercise of the right of self-defense by suppressing its abuses4 ,this is what is called public authority4 #hj4 ,society and the ,state4--,we must distinguish between society and the ,state1 or natural society and civil society4 ,society is the union which exists between men1 without distinction of frontiers--without exterior restraint--and for the sole reason that they are men4 ,an ,englishman and an ,indian1 as ,locke says1 meeting in the waste forests of ,america 7,robinson and ,friday71 are1 from the fact alone of their common nature1 in a state of society4 ,the civil society or ,state is an assemblage of men subject to a common authority1 to common laws--that is to say1 a society whose members may be constrained by public force to respect their reciprocal rights4 #ha4 ,the three powers4--,there results from that1 that two necessary elements enter into the idea of the ,state3 laws and force4 ,the laws are the general rules which establish beforehand and fix after deliberation1 and abstractly1 the rights of each2 force is the physical restraint the public power is armed with to have the laws executed4 ,hence two powers in the ,state1 the legislative power and the executive power--one that makes the law2 the other that executes it1 and to which may generally be added a third1 namely1 judiciary power1 which1 on its part1 is empowered to apply and interpret the law4#fj #hb4 ,sovereignty4--,these three powers emanate from a common source which is called sovereign4 ,in all ,states1 the sovereign is the authority which is in possession of the three preceding powers and delegates them4 ,in an absolute monarchy1 the sovereign is the monarch1 who of himself exercises the legislative and executive power1 sometimes even the judicial power4 ,in a democracy1 the sovereign is the universality of the citizens1 or the people1 which delegates the three powers1 and even in some cases exercises them4 ,as to the basis of sovereignty1 two systems face each other3 the divine right and the sovereignty of the people4 ,in the first1 the authority emanates from ,god1 who transmits it to chosen families2 in the second1 societies1 like individuals1 are free arbiters1 and belong to themselves2 they are answerable for their destinies2 and this can only be true of the entire society2 for why should certain classes rather than others have the privilege to decide about the fate of each8 ,the sovereignty of the people is then nothing else than the right of each to participate in public power1 either of himself or through his representatives4 ,this principle tends more and more to predominate in civilized ,states4 #hc4 ,political liberty4--,political liberty means all the guaranties which insure to every citizen the legitimate exercise of his natural rights2 political liberty is1 then1 the sanction of civil liberty4 ,the principal of these guaranties are3 #a1 the right of suffrage1 which insures to every one his share of sovereignty2 #b1 the separation of powers1 which puts into different hands the executive1 legislative1 and judicial powers2 #c1 the liberty of the press1 which insures the right of minorities1 and allows them to employ argument to change or modify the ideas and opinions of the majority4 #hd4 ,the right of punishment4--,the right of punishment in a ,state is nothing else than the right of restraint1 which1 as we have already seen1 is inherent in the very idea of the ,state2 for the ,state only exists to insure to each the exercise of his rights1 and it can only do so by restraint and the use of force4 ,how far can this right of force go8 ,can it1 for example1 go so far as the taking of life even8 ,this is a mooted question between publicists1 and upon which we have1 moreover1 already expressed ourselves 7p4 #ee et seq474 ,after having in these summary views resolved the principle upon which the ,state rests1#fa and the essential elements which enter into the idea1 we are better prepared to approach what constitutes the object proper of civil morality1 namely1 the duties of citizens toward the country or the ,state4 #he4 ,civil duties4--,these duties are the following3 ,obedience to the laws2 respect of magistrates2 the ballot2 military service2 educational obligations4 #hf4 ,obedience to the laws4--,the first of the civil duties1 is obedience to the laws4 ,the reason is evident4 ,the ,state rests on the law4 ,it is the law which substitutes1 for the will of individuals1 always more or less carried away by passion or governed by self-interest1 a general1 impartial1 and disinterested rule4 ,the law is the guaranty of all3 it opposes itself to force1 or rather puts force in the service of justice1 instead of making of justice the slave of force4 ,pascal says3 ,not being able to make that which is just1 strong1 men have wished that what is strong should be just4 ,this is the jest of a misanthrope4 ,certainly the laws are not always as just as they might be1 despite the efforts made to render them so3 the reason of it is1 the extreme complexity of interests between which it is difficult to find a true balance and just equilibrium2 but such as they are1 they are infinitely more just than the right of the strongest1 which would alone reign if there were no laws4 ,the empire of the laws is then that which secures order in a society1 and consequently procures for each of its members security and peace1 and through these1 the means of devoting himself to his work1 whether intellectual or material1 and of reaping the fruits thereof4 ,at the same time that the law guarantees order within1 it also insures the independence of the nation from without4 ,for a nation without laws1 or which no longer obeys its laws1 falls into anarchy and becomes the prey of the first conqueror who presents himself1 as is shown by the history of ,poland4 ,it is especially in democratic or republican states1 that obedience to the laws is necessary1 as it is there the most difficult4 ,montesquieu has shown with great sagacity the difficulty and thereby the necessity of obedience to the laws in a democracy2 in fact1 what in other governments is obtained by constraint1 in a democracy depends only upon the will of the citizens4 ,it is clear1 says ,montesquieu1 that in a monarchy1 where he who causes the laws to be executed is above the laws1 there is less virtue requisite than in a popular government1 where he who causes the laws to be executed1 feels that he is himself subject to them1 and will have to bear the consequence of their violation4 ,it is further clear that a monarch who1 through bad advice or negligence1 ceases to have the laws executed1 may easily repair the evil2 he has but to change counselors or correct himself of his negligence4 ,but when in a popular government1 the laws have ceased to be executed1 as this can only happen through the corruption of the republic1 the ,state is already lost4 ,montesquieu then describes1 in the strongest and liveliest colors1 a republican state where the laws have ceased to be enforced4 ,they were free with the laws2 they wish to be free without them4 ,each citizen is as a slave escaped from the house of his master4 ,what before was called maxim1 is now called severity2 what was rule is now annoying restraint2 what was attention1 is now fear4 ,the republic has become booty1 and its strength is no longer anything more than the power of a few and the license of all4 ,in the republics of ,athens and ,rome1 as long as they were prosperous and great1 the empire of the laws was admirable4 ,socrates1 in his prison1 gave of this a sublime example4 ,he was unjustly condemned by his fellow-citizens to drink the hemlock1 namely1 to die by poison4 ,meanwhile1 his friends pressed him to resort to flight2 and everything leads to the belief that this would have been quite easy1 as the judges themselves almost wished to be relieved of the responsibility of his death4 ,yet ,socrates resisted1 and refused to employ this means of safety4 ,the principal reason given by him was1 that1 having been condemned by the laws of his country1 he could save himself only by violating these laws4 ,this is what ,plato has expressed in the dialogue entitled ,crito4 ,the laws of the country are represented as addressing a speech to ,socrates2 it is called the ,prosopopoeia#fb of ,crito3 ,socrates1 they will say to me1 was that our agreement1 or was it not rather that thou shouldst submit to the judgments rendered by the republic8444 ,what cause of complaint hast thou against us that thou shouldst try to destroy us8 ,dost thou not1 in the first place1 owe us thy life8 ,was it not under our auspices that thy father took to himself the companion that gave thee birth8 ,if thou owest us thy birth and education1 canst thou deny that thou art our child and servant8 ,and if this be so1 thinkest thou thy rights equal to ours2 and that thou art permitted to make us suffer for what we make thee suffer8 ,what6 in the case of a father or a master1 if thou hadst one1 thou wouldst not have the right to do to him what he would do to thee2 to speak to him insultingly if he insulted thee2 to strike him1 if he struck thee1 nor anything like it2 and thou shouldst hold such a right toward thy country6 and if we had sentenced thee to death1 thinking the sentence just1 thou shouldst undertake to destroy us6444 ,does not thy wisdom teach thee that the country has a greater right to thy respect and homage1 that it is more august and more wise before the gods and the sages1 than father1 mother1 and all ancestors2 that the country in its anger must be respected1 that one must convince it of its error through persuasion1 or obey its commands1 suffer without murmuring whatever it orders to be suffered1 even to be beaten and loaded with chains8444 ,what else then dost thou do8 they would proceed to say1 than violate the treaty that binds thee to us1 and trample under foot thy agreement8444 ,in suffering thy sentence1 thou diest an honorable victim of the iniquity1 not of the laws1 but of men2 but if thou takest to flight1 thou repellest unworthily injustice by injustice1 evil by evil1 and thou violatest the treaty whereby thou wert under obligation to us3 thou imperilest those it was thy duty to protect1 thou imperilest thyself1 thy friends1 thy country1 and us4 ,we shall be thy enemies all thy life2 and when thou shalt descend to the dead1 our sisters1 the laws of ,hades1 knowing that thou hast tried thy best to destroy us here1 will not receive thee very favorably4 ,pretended ,exceptions4--,the duty of obedience to the laws must then be admitted as a principle2 but is this duty absolute8 is it not susceptible of some exceptions8 ,a learned theologian of the ,,xvi4 century1 a ,jesuit1 ,suarez 7,traite des lois1 ,,iii41 iv471 admits three exceptions to the obedience due to the law3 #a1 if a law is unjust--for an unjust law is no law--not only is one not obliged to accept1 but even1 when accepted1 one is not obliged to obey it2 #b1 if it is too hard2 for then one may reasonably presume that the law was not made by the prince with the absolute intention that it should be obeyed1 but rather as an experiment2 now1 under this supposition one can always begin by not observing it2--#c1 if1 in fact1 the majority of the people have ceased to observe it1 even though the first who had commenced should have sinned2 the minority is not obliged to observe what the majority has abandoned3 for one cannot suppose the prince to intend obliging such or such individuals to observe it1 when the community at large have ceased observing it4 ,these exceptions1 proposed by ,suarez1 are inadmissible1 at least the two first4 ,to authorize disobedience to unjust laws is introducing into society an inward principle of destruction4 ,all law is supposed to be just1 otherwise it is arbitrariness and not law4 ,every man finds always the law that punishes him unjust4 ,if there are unjust laws1 which is possible1 we must ask their abrogation2 and1 in these our days1 the liberty of the press is ready to give satisfaction to the need of criticism2 but1 in the meantime1 we must obey4 ,the second exception is not tenable either4 ,to say that it is permitted to disobey a law when it is too hard1 in supposing that the prince only made it for an experiment1 is to permit the eluding of all the laws3 for every law is hard for somebody2 and there is1 besides1 no determining the hardness of laws4 ,such an appreciation is1 moreover1 fictitious2 a prince who makes a law is supposed a priori to wish it executed3 to say that he only meant to try us therewith is a wholly gratuitous invention4 ,certainly one may by such conduct succeed in wearing a law out when the prince is feeble2 but it is not the less unjust1 and no ,state could resist such a cause of dissolution4 ,as to the third exception1 it can be admitted that there are laws fallen into disuse1 and which are no longer applied by any one because they stand in contradiction to the manners1 and are no longer of any use2 but1 except in such case1 it is nowise permitted to say that it is sufficient for the majority to disobey to entitle the minority to do the same4 ,for instance1 if it pleased the majority to engage in smuggling1 or to make false declarations in the matter of taxes1 it would nowise acquit the good citizens from continuing to fulfill their duty4 ,now1 if it is an absolute duty to obey a law1 we must1 at the same time1 admit as a corrective1 the right of criticising the law4 ,this right is the right of the minority1 and it is recognized to-day in all civilized countries4 ,a law may1 in fact1 be unjust or erroneous3 it may have been introduced by passion1 by party-spirit2 even without having been originally unjust1 it may have become so in time through change in manners2 it may also be the work of ignorance1 prejudice1 etc42 and thereby hurtful4 ,hence the necessity of what is called the liberty of the press1 the inviolable guaranty of the minorities4 ,but the right of criticising the law is not the right of insulting it4 ,discussion is not insult4 ,every law is entitled to respect because it is a law2 it is the expression of the public reason1 the public will1 of sovereignty4 ,one may try to persuade the sovereign by reasoning1 and induce him to change the law2 one should not inspire contempt which leads unavoidably to disobedience4 #hg4 ,respect for magistrates4--,another duty1 which is the corollary to obedience to the laws1 is the respect for the magistrate4 ,the magistrate--that is1 the functionary1 whoever he be1 in charge of the execution of the laws--should be obeyed1 not only because he represents force1 but also because he is the expression of the law4 ,for this reason1 he should be for all an object of respect4 ,the person is nothing2 it is the authority itself that is entitled to respect1 and not such or such an individual4 ,many ignorant persons are always disposed to regard the functionary as a tyrant1 and every act of authority1 an act of oppression4 ,this is a puerile and lamentable prejudice4 ,the greatest oppression is always that of individual passions1 and the most dangerous of despotisms is anarchy3 for then it is the right of the strongest which alone predominates4 ,authority1 whatever it be1 makes the maintenance of order its special interest1 and order is the guaranty of every one4 ,the magistrate is1 moreover1 entitled to respect1 as he represents the country2 if the country be a family1 the authority of the magistrate should be regarded the same as that of the head of the family1 an authority entitled to respect even in its errors4 #hh4 ,the ballot4--,of all the special obligations which we have enumerated1 the most important to point out is that of the ballot1 because it is free and left entirely at the will of the citizens4 ,in regard to the other obligations1 constraint may1 up to a certain point1 supply the good will2 he who does not pay his taxes from a sense of duty1 is obliged to pay them from necessity2 but the ballot is free2 one may vote or not vote2 one may vote for whom he pleases3 there is no other restraint than the sense of duty2 for this reason1 it is necessary to insist on this kind of obligation4 #a4 ,it is a duty to vote4 ,what in fact the law demands1 in granting to the citizens the right of suffrage1 is that the will of the citizens be made manifest1 and that the decisions about to be taken1 be those of the majority4 ,this principle of the right of the majorities has often been questioned3 for1 it is said1 why might not the majority be mistaken8 ,certainly1 but why might not the minority be also mistaken8 ,the majority is a rule which puts an end to disputes and forestalls the appeal to force4 ,the minorities certainly may have cause for complaint1 for no rule is absolutely perfect2 but they have the chance of becoming majorities in their turn4 ,this is seen in all free ,states1 where the majority is constantly being modified with the time4 ,if such is the principle of elective governments 7whatever be the measure or extension of the electoral right71 it can be seen of what importance it is that the true majority show itself2 and this can only take place through the greatest possible number of voters4 ,if1 for example1 half of the citizens abstain1 and that of the half that vote1 one-half alone1 plus one1 constitute the majority1 it follows that it is a fourth of the citizens that make the law2 which would seem to be reversing the principle of majorities4 ,this is certainly not absolutely unjust1 for it may be said that those who do not vote admit implicitly the result obtained2 but this negative compliance has not the same value as a positive compliance4 ,to abstain from voting may have two causes3 either indifference1 or ignorance of the questions propounded1 and consequently the impossibility of deciding one way or another4 ,in the first case1 especially is the abstaining culpable4 ,no citizen has the right to be indifferent to public affairs4 ,skepticism in this matter is want of patriotism4 ,in the second case1 the question is a more delicate one4 ,how can ,i vote8 it may be said4 ,i understand nothing about the question2 ,i have no opinion2 ,i have no preference as to candidates4 ,to combat this evil1 it is1 of course1 necessary that education gain a larger development1 and that liberty enter into customs and manners4 ,there will be seen then a greater and greater number of citizens understandingly interested in public affairs4 ,but even in the present state of things1 a man may still fulfill his duty in consulting enlightened men1 in choosing some one in whom he may have confidence2 in short1 in making every effort to gain information4 #b4 ,the vote should be disinterested4 ,the question here is not only one concerning the venality of the vote1 which is a shameful act1 punishable1 moreover1 by the laws2 but it embraces disinterestedness in a wider sense4 ,one should in voting consider the interests of the country alone1 and in nowise1 or at least1 only secondarily1 the interests of localities1 unless the question be precisely as to those latter interests1 when voting for municipal officers4 #c4 ,the vote should be free4 ,the electors or representatives of an assembly should obey their conscience alone3 they should repel all pressure1 as well that from committees arrogating omnipotence1 as from the power itself4 #d4 ,in fine1 the vote should be enlightened4 ,each voter should gather information touching the matter in hand1 the candidates1 their morality1 their general fitness for their duty1 their opinions4 ,in order to vote with knowledge of the facts1 one must have some education4 ,that1 of course1 depends on our parents2 but what depends on us1 is to develop the education already obtained2 we must read the papers1 but not one only1 or we may become the slaves of a watch word and of bigoted minds2 we must also gather information from men more enlightened1 etc4 #hi4 ,taxes4--,it is a duty to pay the taxes2 for1 without the contributions of each citizen1 the ,state would have no budget1 and could not set the offices it is commissioned with1 to work4 ,how could justice be rendered1 instruction be given1 the territory be defended1 the roads kept up1 without money8 ,this money1 besides1 is voted by the representatives of the country1 elected for that purpose4 ,but if the ,state is not to tax the citizens without their consent and supervision1 they in their turn should not refuse it their money4 ,certainly1 this evil is not much to be feared1 for in the absence of good will1 there is still the constraint which can be brought to bear upon refractory citizens4 ,yet there are still means of defrauding the law4 ,the common people believe too readily that to deceive the ,state is not deceiving2 they do not scruple to make false declarations where declarations are required1 to pass prohibited goods over the frontier1 etc42 which are so many ways of refusing to pay the taxes4 #ij4 ,military service1 as are the taxes1 is obligatory by law1 and consequently does not depend on individual choice4 ,but it is not enough to do our duty because we are obliged to do it2 we must also do it conscientiously and heartily4 ,it is not enough to pay out of one's purse1 says a moralist2#fc one must also pay with one's person4 ,certainly1 it is not for any one's pleasure that he leaves his parents and friends1 his work and habits1 to go to do military service in barracks1 and1 if needs be1 to fight on the frontiers4 ,but who will defend the country in case of attack if it be not its young and robust men8 ,and must they not learn the use of arms in order to be efficient on the day when the country shall need them8 ,this is why there are armies4 ,certainly1 it would be a thousand times better if there were no need of this1 if all nations were just enough never to make war with each other4 ,but whilst this ideal is being realized1 the least any one can do is to hold himself in readiness to defend his liberty1 his honor4444 ,thanks to a good army1 one not only can remain quiet at home1 but the humblest citizen is respected wherever he goes1 wherever his interests take him4 ,in looking carefully at the matter it can be seen that even in respect to simple interests1 the time spent in the service of the flag1 is nothing in comparison with the advantages derived from it4 ,is it not because others have been there before us that we have been enabled to grow up peacefully and happy to the age of manhood8 ,is it not just that we should take their place and in our turn watch over the country8 ,and when we return1 others will take our place1 and we1 in our turn1 shall be enabled to raise a family1 attend to our business1 and lead a quiet and contented life4 ,let us add to these judicious remarks that military service is a school of discipline1 order1 obedience1 courage1 patience1 and as such1 contributes to strengthening the mind and body1 to developing personality1 to forming good citizens4 ,the principal infractions of the duty of military service are3 #a1 mutilations by which some render themselves improper for service2 #b1 simulated infirmities by which one tries to escape from the obligation2 #c1 desertion in times of war1 and what is more criminal still1 passing over to the enemy2 #d1 insubordination or disobedience to superiors4 ,this latter vice is the most important to point out1 the others being more or less rare2 but insubordination is an evil most frequent in our armies1 and a most dangerous evil4 ,military operations have become so complicated and difficult in these days1 that nothing is possible without the strictest obedience on the part of soldiers4 ,in times when individual valor was almost everything1 insubordination might have presented fewer inconveniences2 but in these days1 all is done through masses1 and if the men do not obey1 the armies are necessarily beaten because they cannot oppose an equal force to the enemy4 ,suppose the enemy to be #ej1jjj men strong in a certain place1 that you yourself belong to a body of #ej1jjj1 and that you all together reach the same place at the same time as the enemy3 you are equal in numbers1 one against one1 and you have at least as many chances as they2 and if1 besides1 you have other qualities which they have not1 you will have more chances4 ,but if in the corps you belong to1 there is no discipline1 if every one disobeys--if1 for example1 when the order for marching is given1 each starts when he pleases1 and marches but as he pleases1 you will arrive too late1 and the enemy will have taken the best positions2 there is then one chance lost4 ,if1 moreover1 through the disorder in your ranks1 you do not all arrive together1 if there are but #be1jjj men in a line1 the others remaining behind1 these #be1jjj will be overwhelmed4 ,as for those who do not reach the spot1 think you they will escape the consequences of the battle8 ,by no means2 the disorder will not save them2 it will deliver them defenseless into the hands of the pursuing enemy4 ,now1 all disorder is followed by similar consequences4 ,on the other hand1 the obedience of the soldier being sure1 the army is as one man who lends himself to all the plans1 all the combinations2 who takes advantage of all the happy chances1 who runs less dangers because the business proceeds more rapidly1 and that with less means one obtains more results4 ,such are the reasons for the punctilious discipline required of soldiers4 ,we are treated as machines1 you will say4 ,yes2 if you resist3 for then constraint becomes indispensable2 but if you understand the necessity of the discipline1 if you submit to it on your own accord1 then are you no longer machines3 you are men4 ,the only way of not being a machine is then precisely to obey freely4 ,it has often been asked1 in these days1 whether the soldier is always obliged to obey1 even such orders as his conscience disapproves of4 ,these are dangerous questions to raise1 and they tend to imperil discipline without much profit to morality4 ,no doubt if a soldier were ordered to commit a crime--as1 for example1 to go and kill a defenseless man--he would have the right to refuse doing it4 ,at the time of the massacre of ,st4 ,bartholomew1 an order was sent to all the provinces to follow the example of ,paris4 ,one of the governors1 the ,viscount ,orthez1 replied that his soldiers did not do executioner's service2 and this answer was admired by all the world4 ,but these are very rare cases2 and it is dangerous for such uncertain eventualities to inspire mistrust against order and discipline1 which are the certain guaranties of the defense and independence of a country4 #ia4 ,educational obligation4--,the duty to instruct children results from the natural relations between parents and children4 ,the obligation to raise children implies1 in fact1 the obligation to instruct them4 ,there is no more education without instruction than instruction without education4 ,to-day educational obligation is inserted in the law1 and has its sanction therein4 ,but parents owe it to themselves to obey the law without constraint4 #ib4 ,civil courage4--,we have already spoken above of civil courage as opposed to military courage4 ,but here is the place to return to this subject4 ,let us recall a fine page by ,j4 ,barni in his book on ,morality in ,democracy3 ,the stoics defined courage admirably3 ,virtue combating for equity4 ,civil courage might be defined3 virtue defending the liberty and rights of citizens against tyranny1 whether this tyranny be that of the masses or a despot's4 ,as much courage1 and perhaps more1 is demanded in the first case as in the second2 it is less easy to resist a crowd than a single man1 were there nothing more to be feared than unpopularity1 one of the disadvantages hardest to brave4 ,how much more difficult when it comes to risking a popularity already acquired8 ,yet must one1 if necessary1 be able to make the sacrifice4 ,true civil courage shows itself the same in all cases4 ,thus1 ,socrates1 this type of civil virtue1 as he was of all other virtues1 refused1 at the peril of his life1 to obey the iniquitous orders of the tyrant ,critias2 and he resisted with no less courage the people1 who1 contrary to justice and law1 asked for the death of the generals who conquered at ,arginusae4 ,another name presents itself to the memory1 namely1 that of ,boissy d',anglas1 immortalized for the heroism he showed as president of the ,national ,convention1 the #ast ,prairial1 year ,,ii4 7#bj ,may1 #agie74 ,assailed by the clamors of the crowd which had invaded the ,assembly1 threatened by the guns which were pointed at him1 he remains impassible2 and without even appearing to be aware of the danger he is running1 he reminds the crowd of the respect due to national representatives4 ,they cry3 ,we do not want thy ,assembly2 the people is here2 thou art the president of the people2 sign1 says one1 the decree shall be good1 or ,i kill thee6 ,he quietly replied3 ,life to me is a trifle2 you speak of committing a great crime2 ,i am a representative of the people2 ,i am president of the convention2 and he refused to sign4 ,the head of a representative of the people who had just been massacred by the populace for having attempted to prevent the invasion of the ,convention1 is presented to him on the end of a pike2 he salutes it and remains firm at his post4 ,this is a great example of civil courage4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,professional ,,duties4 ,,summary4 ,professional duties3 founded on the division of social work4 ,the absence of a profession--,leisure4--,is it a duty to have a profession8 ,rules for the choice of a profession4 ,division of social professions4--,plato's theory2 the ,saint ,simonian theory2 ,fichte's theory4 ,resume and synthesis of these theories4 ,mechanic and industrial professions4--,employers and employees4--,workmen and farmers4 ,military duties4 ,public functions4--,elective functions2 the magistracy and the bar4 ,science4--,teaching4--,medicine4--,the arts and letters4 #ic4 ,division of social work4--,independently of the general duties to which man is held1 as man or member of a particular group 7family1 country71 there are still others relating to the situation he holds in society1 to the part he plays therein1 to his particular line of work4 ,society is1 in fact1 a sort of great enterprise where all pursue a common end1 namely1 the greatest happiness or the greatest morality of the human species2 but as this end is very complex1 it is necessary that the parts to be played toward reaching it be divided2 and1 as in industrial pursuits1 unity of purpose1 rapidity of execution1 perfection of work1 cannot be obtained except by division of labor1 so is there also in society a sort of social division of labor1 which allots to each his share of the common work4 ,the special work each is appointed to accomplish in society is what is called a profession1 and the peculiar duties of each profession are the professional duties4 #id4 ,the absence of a profession--,leisure4--,the first question to be considered is1 whether a man should have a profession1 or if1 having received from his family a sufficient fortune to live without doing anything1 he has a right to dispense with all profession and give himself up to what is called leisure4 ,some schools have condemned leisure absolutely1 have denounced what they call idlers as the enemies of society4 ,this is a rather delicate question1 and concerning which one must guard against arriving at a too absolute conclusion4 ,and1 in the first place1 there cannot be question here of approving or permitting that sort of foolish and shameful leisure to which some young prodigals1 without sense of dignity and morality1 are given1 who dissipate in disorder hereditary fortunes1 or the wealth obtained by the indefatigable labor of their fathers4 ,it is sometimes said that this does more good than harm1 because fortunes pass thus from hand to hand1 and each profits by it in his turn4 ,but who does not know that to make a good use of a fortune is more profitable to society than dissipation8 ,however that may be1 nothing is more unworthy of youth than this nameless idleness1 where all the strength of the body and soul1 the energy of character1 the life of the intelligence1 all the gifts of nature are squandered4 ,there have been sometimes seen superior souls who rose from such disorders victorious over themselves1 and stronger for the combat of life4 ,but how rare such examples6 ,how often does it not1 on the contrary1 happen that the idleness of his youth determines the whole course of the man's life8 ,sometimes1 it is true1 one may choose a life of leisure designedly1 not with an idea of dissipation1 but1 on the contrary1 with that of being free to do great things4 ,certain independent minds believe that a profession deprives a person of his liberty1 narrows him1 fastens him down to mean and monotonous occupations1 subjects him to conventional and narrow modes of thinking--in short1 that a positive kind of work weakens and lowers the mind4 ,there is some truth in these remarks4 ,everybody has observed how men of different professions differ in their mode of thinking4 ,what more different than a physician1 a man of letters1 a soldier1 a merchant8 ,all these men thought about the same in their youth2 they see each other twenty years later2 each has undergone a peculiar bent2 each has his particular physiognomy1 costume1 etc4 ,not only has the profession absorbed the man1 but it has also deadened his individuality4 ,one may conceive1 then1 how some ambitious minds may expect to escape the yoke and preserve their liberty in renouncing all professions4 ,to be subject to no fixed and prescribed occupation1 to depend upon no master1 to nobly cultivate the mind in every direction1 to make vast experiments1 to be a stranger to nothing1 bound to nothing1 is not that1 seemingly1 the height of human happiness8 ,some men of genius have followed this system1 and found no bad results from it4 ,descartes relates to us in his ,discours sur la ,methode 7,part ,i471 that1 during nine years of his life1 he did nothing but roll about the world1 hither and thither1 trying to be a spectator1 rather than an actor1 in the comedies played therein4 ,he tells us further1 that he employed his youth in traveling1 in visiting courts and armies1 in associating with people of various humors and conditions1 in gathering divers experiences1 in testing himself in the encounters chance favored him with1 etc4 ,that this may be an admirable school1 a marvelously instructive arena for well-endowed minds1 no one will doubt2 but what is possible and useful to a ,descartes or a ,pascal1 will it suit the majority of men8 ,is it not to be feared that this wandering in every direction1 this habit of having nowhere a foot-hold1 may make the mind superficial and weaken its energy8 ,he who renounces being an actor1 to be only a spectator1 as did ,descartes1 takes too easy a part2 he frees himself from all responsibility3 this may sharpen the mind1 but there will always remain some radical deficiency4 ,force of character1 however1 and personal superiority may set at naught all these conclusions--sound as they in general are in theory4#fd ,it may1 therefore1 be doubtful whether a life of leisure1 with some exceptions1 be good for him who gives himself up to it2 but what is not legitimate1 is the kind of jealousy and envy which those who work often entertain against those who have nothing to do4 ,there is a legitimate leisure and nobly employed4 ,for example1 a legitimate leisure is that which1 obtained through hereditary fortune1 is engaged in gratuitously serving the country1 in study1 in the management of property1 the cultivation of land1 in travels devoted to observation and the amelioration of human things1 in a noble intercourse with society4 ,it is a grievous error to wish to blot out of societies all existence that has not gain for its end1 and is not connected with daily wants4 ,property and riches are true social functions1 and among the most difficult of functions4 ,those who know how to use them with profit1 fill one of the most useful parts in society1 and cannot be said to be without a profession4 #ie4 ,of the choice of a profession4--,if it is necessary in society to have a profession1 it is important that it be well chosen4 ,he who is not in his right place1 is wanting in some essential quality to fill the one he occupies3 ,if the abbe de ,carignan had yielded to the wishes of ,madame de ,soissons1 his mother1 what glory would not the house of ,savoy have been deprived of6 ,the empire would have been deprived of one of its greatest captains1 one of the bulwarks of ,christianity4 ,prince ,eugene was a very great man in the profession they wished to interdict him2 what would he have been in the profession they wished him to embrace8 ,m4 de ,retz insisted absolutely that his youngest son should be an ecclesiastic1 despite the repugnance he manifested for this profession1 despite the scandalous conduct he indulged in to escape from it4 ,this duke ,m4 de ,retz gives to the church a sacrilegious priest1 to ,paris a sanguinary archbishop1 to the kingdom a great rebel1 and deprives his house of the last prop that could have sustained it4#fe ,one should1 therefore1 study his vocation1 not decide too quickly1 get information on the nature and duties of different professions2 then consult his taste1 but without allowing himself to be carried away by illusory1 proud1 inconsistent fancies2 consult wise and enlightened persons2 finally1 if necessary1 make certain experiments1 taking care1 however1 to stop in time4 #if4 ,division of social professions4--,it would be impossible to make a survey of all the professions society is composed of3 it were an infinite labor4 ,we must1 therefore1 bring the professions down to a certain number of types or classes1 which allow the reducing of the rules of professional morality to a small number4 ,several philosophers have busied themselves in dividing and classifying social occupations4 ,we shall recall only the principal ones of these divisions4 ,plato has reduced the different social functions to four classes1 namely3 #a1 magistrates2 #b1 warriors2 #c1 farmers2 #d1 artisans4 ,the two first classes are the governing classes2 the two others are the classes governed4 ,the two first apply themselves to moral things3 education1 science1 the defense of the country2 the others to material life4 ,this classification of ,plato is somewhat too general for our modern societies1 which comprise more varied and numerous elements3 these divisions1 nevertheless1 are important1 and should be taken account of in morals4 ,since ,plato1 there is scarcely any but the socialist ,saint-,simon who attempted to classify the social careers4 ,he reduces them to three groups3 industrials1 artists1 and scientists 7savants74 ,the meaning of this classification is this3 the object of human labor1 according to ,saint-,simon1 is the cultivation of the globe--that is to say1 the greatest possible production2 but this is the object of productive labor2 it is what is called industry4 ,now1 the cultivation of nature requires a knowledge of nature's laws1 namely1 science4 ,science and invention are1 then1 the two great branches of social activity4 ,according to ,saint-,simon1 work--that is to say1 industry--must take the place of war2 science1 that of the laws4 ,hence no warriors1 no magistrates2 or1 rather1 the scientists 7savants7 should be the true magistrates4 ,science and industry1 however1 having only relation to material nature1 ,saint-,simon thought there was a part to be given to the moral order1 to the beautiful or the good2 hence a third class1 which he now calls artists1 now moralists and philosophers1 and to whom a sort of religious role is assigned4 ,it will be seen that this theory is absolutely artificial and utopian1 that it has relation to an imaginary system1 and not to the order of things as it is3 it is an ingenious conception1 but quite impracticable4 ,one of the greatest of modern moralists1 the ,german philosopher ,fichte1 assigned1 in his ,practical ,morality1 a part to the doctrine of professional duties2 and he began by giving a theory of the professions more complete and satisfactory than any of the preceding ones4 ,fichte makes of the special professions two great divisions3 #a1 those which have for their object the keeping up of material life2 #b1 those which have for their object the keeping up of intellectual and moral life4 ,on the one side1 mechanical labor2 on the other1 intellectual and moral labor4 ,the object of mechanical labor is production1 manufacture1 and exchange of produce2 hence three functions3 those of producers1 manufacturers1 and merchants4 ,the moral and spiritual labor has also three objects3 #a1 the administration of justice in the ,state2 #b1 the theoretic culture of intelligence2 #c1 the moral culture of the will4 ,hence three classes3 #a1 public functions2 #b1 science and instruction2 #c1 the ,church and the clergy4 ,lastly1 there is in human nature a faculty which serves as a link between the theoretical and the practical faculties3 it is the esthetic sense2 the sense of the beautiful2 hence a last class1 that of artists4 ,this theory is more scientific than that of the ,saint-,simonians1 but it is still somewhat defective2 it is not clear1 for example1 in a moral point of view1 that there is a great difference of duties between the producers1 manufacturers1 and merchants3 they are economical rather than moral distinctions4 ,plato's division is better1 when he puts the farmers in opposition to the artisans4 ,it is certain that there are1 especially in these days1 interesting moral questions1 which differ according as the workmen live in the city or in the country4 ,we therefore prefer on this point ,plato's division2 and we will treat1 on the one side1 industry and commerce1 and on the other agriculture2 and in each of these divisions we will distinguish those who direct or remunerate the work1 namely1 contractors1 masters1 proprietors1 capitalists in some degree1 and those who work with their hands and receive wages4 ,in characterizing the second class of careers1 those which have moral interests for their object1 we will again borrow of ,plato one of the names of his division1 namely1 the defense of the ,state4 ,as to the administration of justice in the ,state1 it is divided1 as we have already said1 into three powers3 the executive1 legislative1 and judicial powers4 ,hence three orders of functions3 administration1 deputation1 and the magistracy1 with which latter is connected the bar4 ,as to science1 it is either speculative or practical4 ,in the first case1 it only concerns the individual2 we have spoken of it under individual duties 7ch4 iv474 ,in the second case1 it has for its object application1 and bears either on things or on men4 ,applied to things1 science is associated with the industry we have already spoken of4 ,applied to men1 it is medicine1 in respect to bodies2 morality or religion1 in respect to hearts and souls4 ,lastly1 along with the sciences which seek the true1 there are the letters and the arts which treat of and produce the beautiful4 ,hence a last class1 namely1 poets1 writers1 artists4 ,such is about the outline of what a system of social professions might be4 ,a treatise of professional morality which would be in harmony with this outline1 would be all one science1 the elements of which scarcely exist1 being dispersed in a multitude of works1 or rather in the practice and interior life of each profession4 ,we will content ourselves with a few general indications4 #ig4 ,i4 ,mechanical and industrial professions4--#a4 ,employers and employees4--,the professions which have for their object the material cultivation of the globe1 and particularly industry and commerce1 are divided into two great classes3 #a1 on one side1 those who1 having capital1 undertake and direct the works2 #b1 those who execute them with their arms and receive wages4 ,the first are the employers2 the second the employees4 ,what are the respective duties of these two classes8 #ih4 ,duties of employers4--,the duties of all those who1 by virtue of their capital legitimately acquired1 or by virtue of their intelligence1 command1 direct and pay for the work done by men1 are the following3 #a4 ,they should raise the wages of the workmen as high as the state of the market permits2 and they should not wait to be compelled to it by strikes or threats of strikes4 ,conversely1 they should not1 from weakness or want of foresight1 yield to every threat of the kind2 for in raising the wages unreasonably high1 one may disable himself from entering into foreign competition1 or may cause the ruin of the humbler manufacturers who have not sufficient capital4 #b4 ,capitalists1 employers and masters should obey strictly the laws established for the protection of childhood4 ,they should employ the work of minors within proper limits1 and according to the conditions fixed by the law4 #c4 ,their task is not done when they have secured to the workmen and their children the share of work and wages which is their due1 even when they are content to claim nothing beyond justice4 ,they have yet to fulfill toward their subordinates the duties of protection and benevolence2 they must assist them1 relieve them1 be it in accidents happening to them in the work they are engaged in1 or in illness4 ,they must spare them suspensions of work as much as possible2 in short1 they must1 through all sorts of establishments--schools1 mutual-help societies1 workmen-cities 7cites ouvrieres71 etc4--encourage education1 economy1 property1 yet without forcing upon them anything that would diminish their own responsibility or impair their personal dignity4 #ii4 ,duties of workingmen4--,the duties of workingmen should correspond to those of the employers4 #a4 ,the workingmen owe it to themselves not to cherish in their hearts feelings of hatred1 envy1 covetousness1 and revolt against the employers4 ,division of work requires that in industrial matters some should direct and others be directed4 ,material exploitation requires capital2 and those who bring this capital1 the fruit of former work1 are as necessary to the workingmen to utilize their work as these are to the first in utilizing their capital4 #b4 ,the workingmen owe their work to the establishment which pays them2 it is as much their interest as their duty4 ,the result of laziness and intemperance is misery4 ,we cannot enough deplore the use of what is called the ,mondays--a day of rest over and beyond the legitimate and necessary ,sunday4 ,it is certain that one day of rest in a week is absolutely a necessity4 ,no man can nor ought 7except in circumstances unavoidable7 work without interruption the whole year through4 ,but the week's day of rest once secure1 all that is over and above that1 is taken from what belongs to the family and the provisions against old age4 #c4 ,supposing that1 in consequence of the progress of industry1 the number of hours of rest could be increased--that1 for example1 the hours of the day's work could be reduced--these hours of rest should then be devoted to the family1 to the cultivation of the mind1 and not to the fatal pleasures of intoxication4 ,the workingmen have certainly a right to ask1 as far as they are worthy of it1 equality of consideration and influence in society2 and all our modern laws are so constituted as to insure them this equality4 ,it rests with them1 therefore1 to render themselves worthy of this new equality by their morals and their education4 ,to have their children educated2 to educate themselves2 to occupy their leisure with family interests1 in reading1 in innocent and elevating recreations 7music1 the theatre1 gardening1 if possible71 it is by all such pursuits that the workingmen will reduce or entirely remove the inequality of manners and education which may still exist between them and their superiors4 #d4 ,workingmen cannot be blamed for seeking to defend their interests and increase their comforts2 in so doing they only do what all men should do4 ,they have also the right1 in order to get satisfaction1 to attach to their work such conditions as they may reasonably desire3 it is the law of demand and supply1 common to all industries4 ,in short1 as an individual refusal to work is a means absolutely inefficacious to bring about an increase of wages1 it must be admitted that the workingmen have a right to act in concert and collectively to refuse to work1 and1 collectively1 to make their conditions2 hence the right of strikes recognized to-day by the law4 ,but this right1 granted to the principle of the liberty of work1 must not be turned against this principle4 ,the workingmen who freely refuse to work should not stand in the way of those who1 finding their demands ill-founded1 persist in continuing to work under the existing conditions4 ,all violence1 all threats to force into the strike him who is opposed thereto1 is an injustice and a tyranny4 ,this violence is condemned by law2 but as it is easily disguised1 it cannot always be reached2 it is1 therefore1 through the morals one must act upon it--through persuasion and education4 ,the workmen must gradually adopt the morals of liberty1 must respect each other4 ,for the same reason they should respect women's work2 should not interdict to their wives and daughters the right of improving their condition by work4 ,unquestionably it is much to be desired that woman should become more and more centred in domestic duties1 the care of her household and family4 ,this is her principal part in the social work4 ,but as long as the imperfect condition of the laboring classes does not permit this state of things1 it may be said that the workmen work against themselves in trying to close the field of industry to women4 ,the tendency toward the equality of wages1 as the ideal of the remuneration of work1 is also to be condemned4 ,nothing is more contrary to the spirit of the times1 which demands that every one be treated according to his work4 ,capacity1 painstaking1 personal efforts1 are elements that demand to be proportionately remunerated4 ,let us add1 that it is the duty of head masters1 in the case of a good will1 succumbing to physical inability1 to conciliate benevolence and equity with justice2 this1 however1 is only an exceptional case4 ,but1 as a principle1 each one should be rewarded only for what he has done4 ,otherwise there would be an inducement to indifference and idleness4 #ajj4 ,workmen and farmers4--,having considered workmen in their relations with their masters1 let us consider them now on a line with farmers2 for1 according as one lives in the city or in the country1 there is a great difference in manners1 and consequently in duties4 ,the workmen who live in the city are for that very reason more apt to acquire new ideas and general information2 they have many more means of educating themselves2 the very pleasures of the city afford them opportunities to cultivate their mind4 ,besides1 living nearer to each other1 they are more disposed to consider their common interests and turn them to account4 ,hence advantages and disadvantages4 ,the advantages are1 the superiority of intellectual culture1 the greater aptitude in conceiving general ideas1 a stronger interest in public affairs2 in all these respects1 city-life presents advantages over country-life4 ,but hence also arise great dangers4 ,the workingmen1 quite ready to admit general ideas1 but without sufficient information and political experience to control them1 abandon themselves readily to utopian preachings and instigations to revolt4 ,further1 very much preoccupied with their common interests1 they are too much disposed to think only of their own class1 and to form1 as it were1 a class apart in society and in the nation4 ,hence for the workmen a double duty3 #a1 to obtain enough information not to blindly follow all demagogues2 #b1 to learn to consider their interests as connected with all those of the other classes and professions4 ,farmers are indebted to the country-life for certain advantages1 which carry with them1 at the same time1 certain disadvantages4 ,the farmer is generally more attached to social stability than the more or less shifting inhabitants of the towns2 he thinks much of property2 he does not like to change in his manners and ideas4 ,he is thereby a powerful support to conservatism and the spirit of tradition1 without which society could not live and last4 ,he has1 moreover1 had till now the great merit of not singling himself out1 of not separating his interests from those of the country in general4 ,thus1 on these two points--opposition to utopias1 preservation of social unity--the countryman serves as a counterpoise to all the opposite tendencies in the workmen4 ,but these very qualities are1 perhaps1 the result of certain defects3 namely1 the absence of information and enlightenment4 ,the countryman sees not very much beyond his church-steeple2 material life occupies and absorbs him wholly2 individual and personal interests are absolutely predominant in him4 ,he is but little disposed to give his children any education2 and he is disposed to look upon them as so many instruments of work less expensive than others4 ,the idea of a general country1 general interests surpassing private interests1 is more or less wanting in him4 ,what it is necessary to persuade the countryman of1 is the usefulness of education4 ,he should be inspired with a taste for liberty1 which is a security to him and his family1 as well as to all the other classes of society4 ,the workman in becoming better informed1 the farmer more informed1 they will gradually blend with the middle classes1 and there will then be no longer those oppositions of classes and interests so dangerous at the present day4 7,see ,appendix47 #aja4 ,,ii4 ,military duties4--,we have already considered military duties1 as the duty of citizens toward the ,state2 we have now to consider here military duties in themselves1 as special duties1 peculiar to a certain class of citizens1 to a certain social profession4 #a4 ,it is useless to say that the peculiar virtue and special duty of the military class is courage4 ,we have but to refer the reader to what will be said further on 7ch4 xiv47 touching the virtue of courage1 in regard to the duties of man toward himself4 #b4 ,patriotism is a duty of all classes and all professions2 but it is particularly one with those who are commissioned to defend the country3 it is1 therefore1 the military virtue par excellence4 #c4 ,fidelity to the flag4--,this duty is implied in the two preceding ones4 ,the duty of courage1 in fact1 implies that one should not flee before the enemy3 it is the crime of desertion2 that one should not pass over to the enemy3 it is the crime of defection or treason4 ,this latter crime has become very rare1 and has even wholly disappeared in modern ,france4 ,formerly there was seen a ,conde1 the great ,conde fighting against the ,french at the head of ,spanish troops2 and so great a fault scarcely injured his reputation2 in our days1 a simple suspicion1 and that an unjust one1 blackened the whole life of a ,marshal of ,france4#ff #d4 ,obedience and discipline4 7,see above1 ,duties toward the ,state1 preceding chapter47 #ajb4 ,,iii4 ,public functions--,administration--,deputation- -,magistracy--,the ,bar4--,the public functions are the divers acts which compose the government of a ,state4 ,we even include the elective functions 7deputation1 general councils1 town councils1 etc471 because1 whilst they have their origin in election1 they are1 nevertheless1 functions1 the purpose of which is the common weal1 public interests4 ,for the same reason1 though the bar is a free profession1 it is so connected with magistracy1 it is so necessary a dependency of the judicial power1 that it is thereby itself a sort of public power4 #ajc4 ,functionaries4--,we call functionaries1 more particularly1 those who take part in the administration of the country and the execution of its laws4 ,this admitted1 the principal duties of functionaries are3 #a4 ,the ,knowledge of the laws they are commissioned to execute4 ,power is only legitimate as far as it is guaranteed by competency4 ,ignorance in public functions has for its results injustice1 since arbitrariness takes then the place of the law2 administrative disorder1 since the law has precisely for its object to establish rules and maintain traditions2 negligence1 since ignorant of the principles by which affairs ought to be settled1 conclusions are kept off as much as possible4 ,but one must not defer obtaining administrative information till called to take a share in the administration4 ,a general information should be acquired beforehand2 for1 once engaged in administrative affairs1 there is then no longer time to acquire it4 ,to go to work is1 therefore1 the first duty of those who would be prepared for public functions2 and this duty of work continues with the functions2 for after general information has been obtained1 comes the special and technical information1 where there is always something new to learn4 #b4 ,the second duty of functionaries of any degree1 is exactitude and assiduity4 ,the most brilliant qualities1 and the largest and amplest mind for public affairs1 will render but inefficient service--at any rate1 a service very inferior to what could be expected of them1 if these qualities are counterbalanced and paralyzed by negligence1 laziness1 disorder1 inexactness4 ,one must not forget that all negligence in public affairs is a denial of justice to some one4 ,an administrative decision1 whatever it be1 has always for its result to satisfy the just1 or to deny the unjust1 claims of some one4 ,to retard a case through negligence1 may therefore deprive some one of what he has a right to4 ,there are1 of course1 necessary delays which arise from the complication of affairs1 and order itself requires that everything come in time2 but delays occasioned by our own fault are a wrong toward others4 #c4 ,integrity and discretion are also among the most important duties of functionaries4 ,the first bears especially upon what concerns finances2 but there are everywhere more or less opportunities to fail in probity4 ,for example1 there is nothing more shameful than to sell one's influence2 this is what is called extortion4 ,an administrator given to extortion is the shame and ruin of the ,state4 ,as to discretion1 it is again a duty which depends on the nature of things4 ,it is especially obligatory when persons are in question1 and still more so in certain careers--as1 for example1 in diplomacy4 #d4 ,justice4--,the strict duty of every administrator or functionary1 is to have no other rule than the law2 to avoid arbitrariness and favor1 to have no regard to persons4 ,this duty1 it must be said1 whilst it is the most necessary1 is also the most difficult to exercise1 and one which requires most courage and will4 ,public opinion1 unfortunately1 encourages in this respect1 the weaknesses of officials2 it is convinced1 and spreads everywhere this conviction1 that all is due to favoritism1 that it is not the most deserving that succeed1 but the best recommended4 ,everybody complains of it1 and everybody helps toward it4 ,there is unquestionably much exaggeration in these complaints4 ,favor is not everything in this world4 ,it is too much the interest of administrators that they should have industrious and intelligent assistants1 and that they should employ every means to choose them well2 and in public affairs1 the interests of the common weal always predominate in the end4 ,it is1 nevertheless1 an evil that so unfavorable a prejudice should exist2 and it is absolutely a duty with functionaries to uproot it1 in showing it to be false4 #ajd4 ,elective functions--,deputation--,elective councils4--,there is a whole class of functionaries1 if it be permitted to say so1 who owe their origin to election1 and who are the mandataries of the people1 either in municipal councils1 or in general councils1 or in the great elective bodies of the ,state1 the ,senate and ,house of ,representatives4 7,see ,civil instruction47 ,the principle of the sovereignty of the people requires that for all its interests1 communal1 departmental or national1 the country have a deliberative voice by means of its representatives4 ,the duties of these mandataries are generally the same in any degree of rank4 #a4 ,fidelity to the mandate4--,the representative is the interpreter of certain opinions1 of certain tendencies1 and although the majority which have elected him comprise very diverse elements1 there exists an average of opinions1 and it is this average which the deputy represents1 or should represent4 ,he would1 therefore1 fail in his duty if1 once elected1 he passed over to his opponents1 or1 if wishing to do so1 he did not tender his resignation4 ,however1 this fidelity to the mandate should not be carried so far as to accept what is called the imperative mandate1 which is the negation of all liberty in the representative1 and makes of him a simple voting machine4 ,the representative is a representative precisely because he is empowered1 on his own responsibility1 to find the best means to carry out the wishes of his constituents4 #b4 ,independence4--,the deputy1 senator1 municipal1 or departmental officer should be independent both in regard to the authorities and in regard to the electors4 ,from the authorities he should receive no favors2 he should not sell his vote in any interest whatsoever2 from the electors he has to receive advice only1 but no orders4 ,outside their office as electors1 the electors are nothing but simple individuals4 ,as such they may try to influence representatives1 but they have otherwise no other title before the representatives of the electoral corps4 ,the representative should1 above all1 avoid making himself the servant of the electors1 for the satisfaction of their private interests and passions4 ,it is often thought that independence only consists in resisting courts and princes2 there is no less independence1 and sometimes even is there more merit and courage required to resist the tyranny of the masses1 and especially that of popular leaders4 ,the deputy should1 we have said1 be faithful to his trust--that is to say1 to the general line of politics adopted by the political party to which he belongs2 but within these general limits it is for him to assume the responsibility1 for it is for this very reason that he is elected a representative4 ,let us1 moreover1 add that fidelity to opinions should not degenerate into party spirit1 and that there is an interest which should supersede all others1 namely1 the interest of the country4 #c4 ,the spirit of conciliation and the spirit of discipline4--,political liberty1 more than any other political principle1 requires the spirit of concession4 ,if each1 indeed1 fortifies himself in his own opinions1 without ever making a concession1 all having the right to do the same1 it is evident that no common conclusion can be arrived at4 ,the consequence of the liberum veto1#fg pushed to excess1 is paralysis of power or anarchy4 ,nothing is done2 and in politics1 when nothing is done1 all becomes disorganized1 dissolved4 ,it is1 therefore1 necessary that whilst preserving their independence1 the representatives sent forth by the electors should endeavor to render government possible2 they should not overstep the limits of their trust by confounding legislative power with executive power2 they should try to harmonize with the other bodies of the ,state--in short1 they ought each to sacrifice the necessary amount of their individual opinion to bring about a common opinion4 ,in a free government it is no more a duty to belong to the majority than to the opposition1 since the opposition may1 in its turn1 become majority2 but whether belonging to the one or to the other1 the representative should subordinate his particular views to the common interest2 otherwise the parties scatter1 which1 in the long run1 can only be profitable to despotism4 #aje4 ,judicial power4--,the magistracy and the bar4--,the judicial power is exercised by magistrates called judges3 it is they who decide about quarrels between individuals3 this is what is called civil justice2 they also decide about the punishments inflicted on criminals who have made attempts upon a life or property2 and this is penal justice4 ,the duties of the magistrate are easily deduced from these obligations4 #a4 ,impartiality and neutrality4--,the judge must necessarily remain neutral among all parties2 he should have no regard to persons1 should render equal justice to the rich and to the poor1 to the high and to the low4 ,equality before the law1 which is one of the principles of our modern institutions1 should not only be a principle in the abstract2 it should also be a practical principle1 and be brought before the eyes of the judges as one among the first of their obligations4 #b4 ,integrity and disinterestedness4--,no less strict a duty for the judges1 and which it is scarcely necessary to point out1 is integrity4 ,the magistrate should be free from all suspicion of venality4 ,under the old regime1 as may be seen in ,racine's comedy of ,the ,pleaders1 the judges were not always free from such suspicion4 ,of course1 it is but a comedy2 but such a comedy could no longer be written nowadays2 it would no longer be understood2 our morals are too much improved for that4 ,the obligation should1 nevertheless1 be pointed out4 #c4 ,impartiality and integrity concern above all civil justice4 ,the duty which more especially concerns criminal justice1 is equity2 namely1 a moderate justice1 intermediary between a dangerous lenity and an excessive severity4 ,in truth1 in most cases1 at least in the graver cases1 the judge has scarcely anything more to do than to apply the law4 ,it is for the jury1 a sort of free and irresponsible magistracy1 to decide upon the culpability or innocence of the prisoners4 ,it is for the jury to find a just medium between harshness and lenity4 ,but the juryman who1 above all1 judges as a man1 and often recoils from responsibility1 should fear the excess of lenity3 the judge1 on the contrary1 accustomed to repression1 and above all preoccupied with the interests of society1 should rather defend himself against excess of rigor and severity4 #d4 ,knowledge4--,what is for most men but a luxury1 becomes in such or such a profession a strict duty4 ,the knowledge of the laws1 for example1 is1 for the magistrate1 as the knowledge of the human body for the physician1 a strict obligation4 ,he who wishes to enter the magistracy1 should therefore carry the study of the law as far as his youth permits it2 but he should not stop his studies the moment he has entered upon his career4 ,he has always something to learn2 he should keep himself informed of the progress jurisprudence is making4 ,it is useless to say that1 independently of this general work1 the special and thorough study of each case brought before him is for the judge a duty still more strict4 ,alongside of the magistracy1 and co-operating with it1 is placed the bar1 which is charged with the defense of private interests from a civil or criminal point of view4 ,from a civil point of view1 the trial is between two citizens1 each claiming his right in the case2 they are what is called pleaders1 and the trial itself is called a law-suit4 ,the pleaders1 not knowing the laws1 need an intermediary to explain and defend their cause1 bring it clearly to the comprehension of the magistrates and enforce its reasons4 ,this is the part of the lawyers4 ,from a criminal point of view1 the trial is not between two individuals2 but between society and the criminal4 ,society1 to defend itself1 employs what is called a public prosecutor2 the criminal needs a counsel4 ,the part of a counsel belongs again to the lawyers4 ,the duties of lawyers are varied according as the cases are civil or criminal cases4 ,in civil law-suits1 the absolute duty is the following3 not to take up bad cases4 ,only it is necessary to understand well this principle4 ,it is generally believed that a bad case is the losing one1 and a good case the winning one4 ,thus would there in every law-suit be a lawyer who failed in his duty3 the one1 namely1 who lost the case4 ,this is a false idea1 which very unjustly throws in many minds discredit upon the profession of the law4 ,certainly there are cases where the law is so clear1 jurisprudence so established1 the morality so evident and imperious1 that a suit having the three against itself1 may be called a bad case2 and the lawyer who can allow his client to believe the suit defensible1 and who employs his skill and eloquence in defending it1 fails in his professional duty4 ,but this is not generally the case4 ,in most cases1 it is very difficult to tell beforehand who is right1 who wrong1 and precisely because it is difficult1 are there judges whose proper function it is to decide4 ,now1 in order that the judge may decide1 he must be acquainted with all the details of the case2 all possible reasons from both sides must be laid before him4 ,everybody knows that one can never of one's own account find in favor of a solution or conclusion1 all the reasons which the interested party can2 now1 it is just that these reasons be set forth3 this is the business of the lawyers4 ,one must not forget that in every law-suit there is a pro and a con4 ,it is for this very reason there is a suit4 ,the lawyers are specially here to plead for the pro and con1 each from his own standpoint4 ,one could very well understand1 for example1 that the court should have at its disposal functionaries commissioned to prepare the cases and plead for the contending parties3 one would take up ,peter's cause1 the other1 ,paul's2 this is just the part of the lawyers1 with this difference1 that the choice of the lawyer is left to the client1 because it is but just that a deputy be chosen by him he is supposed to represent4 ,in criminal cases there are equally very delicate questions4 ,how can a lawyer defend as innocent one who is guilty8 ,were it not an actual lie8 ,and yet society does not allow that any accused1 whoever he be1 be left without counsel2 and when none present themselves1 it provides one1 charging him to save the life of the accused if he can4 ,it is the interest of society that no innocent person be condemned1 and that even the guilty should not be punished beyond what he deserves2 in short1 it takes care that all the reasons that can be brought forth to attenuate the gravity of an offense be well weighed1 and even set forth in a manner to arouse pity and sympathy4 ,such is the business of the lawyers4 ,it is evident that these considerations1 which show the lawyer's profession to be one so legitimate and exalted1 should not be improperly understood4 ,these general rules must be interpreted with delicacy of feeling and conscience4 #ajf4 ,,iv4 ,science--,teaching--,medicine--,the letters and arts4--,beside the social powers which make1 execute and apply the laws1 there is science1 which instructs men1 enlightens them1 directs their work1 and which even1 setting utility aside1 is yet in itself an object of disinterested research4 ,side by side with the sciences are the letters and arts1 which pursue and express the beautiful1 as science pursues the true4 ,finally1 to science and art are added morality and religion1 whose object is the good4 ,the moralists1 it is true1 do not constitute a particular profession in society1 or at least their part is blended with teaching in general2 religion has its interpreters1 who find in their dogmas and traditions the rules of their duties4 ,it is not the business of lay morality to teach these4 ,let us1 therefore1 content ourselves with a few principles concerning the sciences and letters4 #ajg4 ,science--,duties of ,scientists4--,science may be cultivated in two different ways and from two different standpoints3 #a1 for itself2 #b1 for its social advantages--for the services it renders to men4 ,there is but a small number of men who have a natural taste for pure science1 and the leisure to give themselves up to the love of it2 but those who choose such a life contract thereby certain duties4 ,the first of all is the love of truth4 ,the only object for the scientist to pursue is truth4 ,he must1 therefore1 lay aside all interests and passions antagonistic to truth2 and1 above all1 personal interest which inclines one to prefer one theme to another1 because of the advantages it may bring2 this is1 however1 so gross a motive1 that it would not be supposed to exist with a true scholar2 yet are there other causes of error no less dangerous--for example1 the interest of a cause--of a conviction which is dear to us2 the interest of our self-love1 which makes us persist in error known to be such2 the spirit of system1 by which one shows his peculiar forte1 etc4 ,all these passions should give way before the pure love of truth4 #ajh4 ,the communication of science--,teaching4--,the principal duty of those who are possessed of science is to communicate it to other men4 ,certainly1 all men are not called to be scholars2 but all should in some degree have their intelligence cultivated by instruction4 ,hence the duty of teaching imposed upon scholars2 but this duty brings with it many others4 #a4 ,the masters who teach others should themselves first be educated4 ,hence the duty of intellectual work1 not merely to acquire knowledge1 without which one cannot be a teacher1 but to preserve and increase it4 ,the teacher should1 therefore1 set an example to his pupil of assiduous and continuous intellectual work4 #b4 ,the teacher should love his pupils--children1 if he is called upon to teach children2 young men1 if he is to address young men4 ,the teacher should not only think of the science he teaches1 but of the fruits his pupils are to reap from it2 one can only be interested in what he loves4 ,a teacher indifferent toward the young1 will never make the necessary effort to lead and educate them4 #c4 ,the teacher1 in teaching1 should unite in a just measure discipline and liberty4 ,instruction naturally presupposes one that knows and one that does not know2 and it is necessary that the one should direct the other2 hence the necessity of discipline4 ,but the purpose of instruction is to teach to do without the master--to be one's own master in thought and conduct2 hence the necessity of liberty4 ,this liberty should grow along with the instruction1 and1 of course1 proportionately to age2 but1 at any age1 one should take advantage of the faculties of a child1 and make it as much as possible find out by itself what is within its reach4 #d4 ,the teacher should not separate instruction from education4 ,he should not only communicate knowledge--he should above all form men1 characters1 wills4 ,instruction is1 besides1 already in itself an education4 ,can one instruct without accustoming young minds to work1 to obedience1 to correct habits of thought2 without putting into their hands good books2 without giving them good examples8 ,it is most true that one does not form men with pure and abstract science alone1--it is necessary to add the letters1 history1 morality1 religion4 ,the teacher1 besides1 should study the character of his pupils1 should1 through work and moral and physical exercises1 put down presumption1 correct unmanliness1 combat selfishness1 anticipate or restrain the passions4 #aji4 ,applied science--,industry--,medicine4--,science may find its application in two ways1 either to things1 or to men4 ,applied to things1 it is called industry2 applied to men1 medicine4 ,there are no special duties concerning industrial pursuits4 ,engineers1 private or in the service of the ,state1 employed in civil or military works1 have no other duties then the general duties of functionaries1 military-men1 employees1 etc4 ,it is not the same with medicine4 ,there are here obligations of a special and graver nature4 #aaj4 ,duties of the physician--,his knowledge4--,knowledge is an obligation in every profession2 everywhere it is indispensable to know the thing one is engaged in2 but1 in medicine1 ignorance is of a much more serious character3 for it may end in manslaughter4 ,how can any one attend the sick if he knows nothing of the human body2 if he is ignorant of the symptoms of a disease8 ,he has1 it is true1 the resource of doing nothing2 but might not this also be manslaughter8 ,does he not then take the place of him who knows and might save the patient8 #b4 ,secrecy4--,the physician is above all held to secrecy4 ,he must not make known the diseases which have been revealed to him4 ,this is what is called medical secrecy4 ,this obligation may in certain cases give rise to the most serious troubles of conscience2 but1 as a principle1 it may be said that secrecy is as absolute a duty for the physician as it is for the father-confessor4 #c4 ,courage4--,the physician1 we have seen1 has his point d'honneur1 like the military-man2 he often runs equally great dangers3 he must1 if necessary1 devote himself and risk his life4 ,he requires also a great moral courage1 when he is brought before a serious illness where1 at the moment of a dangerous operation1 when his hand must be as firm as his mind1 he needs all the self-possession he can command4 #d4 ,duties toward the sick3 ,kindness and severity4--,the physician should be firm in the treatment of his patients2 he should insist that his prescriptions be unconditionally followed1 for his responsibility rests on this3 he should rather give up the case than consent to a dangerous disobedience4 ,at the same time he must encourage the patient1 raise his strength by inspiring him with confidence1 which is half the cure4 ,he must also1 without deceiving it1 uphold the courage of the family4 ,in some cases it may be necessary to tell the patient the danger he is in4 #aaa4 ,writers and artists4--,the morality of writers and artists is1 as in all the preceding cases1 determined by the object these persons devote their lives to4 ,the object of the writer and artist is the realization of the beautiful1 either in speech or writing 7literature71 or through color and lines 7painting1 sculpture71 or through sound 7music74 ,in all these arts1 the leading thought should be the interests of the art one is cultivating4 ,one should as much as possible beware turning it into a trade--that is to say1 into a mercenary art1 having gain only for its object4 ,certainly one must live1 and it is rare that writers1 poets1 artists1 have at their command resources enough to do without the pecuniary fruit of pen or hand2 but the attainment of the beautiful should be preferred to that of the useful3 study1 the imitation of the great masters1 contempt for fashion1 striving after all that is delicate1 noble1 pure1 the avoiding of all that is low1 frivolous1 factitious3 such are the principles which should regulate the morality of artist and writer4 ,it is useless to add that they should seek their success in what elevates the soul1 and not in what corrupts and degrades it4 ,coarseness1 brutality1 license1 should be absolutely condemned4 ,better to devote one's self to a useful and humble profession than employ one's talent in depraving morals1 and degrading souls4 ,the duties of the poet have been eloquently expressed by ,boileau in his ,art poetique4 #a4 ,it is a duty to devote one's self to poetry and the fine arts only when one has a decided vocation for them4 ,be rather a mason1 if that be your talent4 #b4 ,the poet should listen to good advice4 ,make choice of a solid and wholesome censor4 #c4 ,the poet and artist should1 in their verses and works1 be the interpreters of virtue4 ,let your soul and your morals1 depicted in your works1 ,never present of you but noble images4 ,love1 then1 virtue2 nourish your soul therewith4 ,the verse always savors of the baseness of the heart4 #d4 ,they must avoid jealousies and rivalries4 ,flee1 above all1 flee base jealousies4 #e4 ,they must prefer glory to gain4 ,work for glory and let no sordid gain ,ever be the object of a noble writer4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,duties ,,of ,,nations ,,among ,,themselves--,,international ,,law4 ,,summary4 ,general principles of international law4--,they are the principles of the natural law applied to the relations nations sustain to each other4 ,of war4--,war founded on the right of self-defense4 ,the reasons for a just war4 ,defensive and offensive wars4--,this division does not necessarily correspond to that of just or unjust wars4--,precautions and preparations4--,duties in times of war3 to reconcile as much as possible the rights of humanity with those of patriotism4--,rights of war concerning the enemy's property4--,conquest4--,neutrality4 ,international treaties3 their character2 their forms2 their different species4--,essential conditions for public treaties3 they are the same as for private contracts4 ,observance of treaties4--,obligatory character of treaties3 testimony of ,cardinal ,richelieu4 ,the human race being divided into divers particular societies called ,states or nations1 those different bodies stand toward each other as individuals2 they are subject to the primitive laws existing naturally among all men1 and they are obliged to practice certain duties toward each other4 #aab4 ,international law4--,general principles4--,it is this body of laws which is called international law1 and which is nothing more than the natural law itself1 or the moral law applied to nations4 ,it is by virtue of this natural law that the nations ought to consider each other equals1 and independent of each other2 that they should not injure each other1 and should make each other1 on the contrary1 reparation for injury done4 ,hence the right of self-defense in case of attack1 of repelling and restraining by force whatever violence may threaten or oppress them4 ,when nations practice toward each other the prescriptions of the natural law1 they are in a state of peace with each other2 when they are obliged to resort to force to repel injustice1 they are in a state of war4 #aac4 ,war4--,it is evident that in all nations the ruler1 whoever he be 7the people1 nobles1 or king71 ought to have the right to carry on war2 for it is nothing else than the right of self-defense1 and this right is the same for the nation as for individuals4 ,war is1 then1 legitimate in principle2 but in fact1 it may be just or unjust according as it takes place for good or bad reasons1 and sometimes for no reason at all4 #aad4 ,reasons of a just war4--,it is not easy to say in advance and in a general manner1 what may be the reasons of a just war2 for they vary according to circumstances2 they may be all reduced to one fundamental principle1 namely1 the defense of the national territory when threatened4 ,moreover1 a war may be undertaken not only in self-defense1 but to protect allies when they are unjustly attacked4 ,as for the following reasons1 more or less frequently alleged as pretexts for war1 good morality cannot justify them3 #a4 ,thus1 the fear of the powerful neighbor1 giving1 for example1 as a pretext that he erects new citadels on his lands1 organizes an army1 increases his troops1 etc41 is not a sufficiently just reason for war4 #b4 ,utility does not give the same right as necessity3 for example1 arms could not legitimately be resorted to in order to gain possession of a place which might suit our convenience1 and be proper to protect our frontiers4 #c4 ,the same may be said of the desire to change dwelling-place1 to leave marshes1 deserts1 in order to settle in a more fertile country4 #d4 ,it is no less unjust to make attempt upon the rights and liberties of a people under pretext that they are less intelligent or less civilized than we are4 ,the cause of civilization is1 then1 not a cause for just war so long as we have not ourselves been attacked by barbarians4 #e4 ,nor is it just to conquer a people under pretext that our conquest may be to its advantage1 bring it riches1 or liberty1 or morality1 etc4 #aae4 ,defensive and offensive wars4--,we distinguish two kinds of war1 defensive and offensive4 ,the first consists in defending the national territory1 the second1 in attacking the enemy's territory4 ,it would be a mistake to confound defensive and offensive wars with just and unjust wars1 and to believe that only the defensive wars are just1 and all offensive ones unjust4 ,this distinction has nothing to do with the causes of the war1 but concerns the manner of engaging in it2 sometimes one's interest lies in allowing one's self to be attacked1 sometimes in attacking4 ,he who has done us injustice may very well wait for us to come to him1 instead of carrying arms to us2 this does not prove him to be in the right4 ,he who1 on the contrary1 takes up arms to obtain reparation for an injustice or an insult1 does not prove thereby that he is in the wrong4 #aaf4 ,precautions and preparations4--,even in the case of just causes1 there are certain precautions and preparations necessary in order that the war be called a just one4 #a4 ,the subject must be of great consequence4 ,it is criminal1 for a frivolous cause1 to expose men to all the evils that accompany a war1 even the most fortunate4 #b4 ,there must be some probability of success3 for it would be criminally rash to expose one's self foolhardily to certain destruction and1 to avoid a lesser evil1 throw one's self into a greater4 #c4 ,if we had no gentler means at our disposal4 ,there are two ways of settling a dispute between nations1 without recourse to arms3 #a1 an amicable conference between the parties2 #b1 the intervention of a disinterested third party1 or arbitrament4 ,a third means1 much rarer and now abandoned1 is that of casting lots4 ,when all the means of settling the difficulty amicably have been exhausted1 there remains1 before taking up arms1 a final obligation1 namely1 to declare to the enemy the resolution of employing the last means3 this is what is called a declaration of war4 #aag4 ,duties in times of war4--,war having become a sad and unavoidable necessity between nations1 and the use of force determined on1 it behooves as much as possible to restrict it in its effects1 and to reconcile the rights of humanity with those of justice4 ,hence1 certain rules established by jurisconsults who have treated these matters1 and notably ,grotius1 the founder of international law4 ,the fundamental principle of the right of war is the following3 ,all that has a morally necessary connection with the purpose of the war is allowed1 but nothing more4 ,in fact1 it would be wholly useless to have the right to do a thing1 if1 to accomplish it1 one could not employ the necessary means thereto2 but1 on the other hand1 it would not be just if1 under the pretext of only defending one's rights1 one should believe that everything is permitted1 and should resort to the last extremities4 ,from this general principle are deduced the following consequences1 which are only its applications3 #a4 ,it is certain that it is lawful to kill the enemy's soldiers1 and1 in fact1 the purpose of the war being to constrain the enemy to recognize the justice of our cause1 it would be vain to take up arms if one could not use them4 ,it is then one of the cases where manslaughter may be considered innocent1 and justified by the right of personal self-defense4 7,see above1 ,ch4 iii41 p4 #ej47 #b4 ,however1 the right of death upon the enemy has its limits4 ,as a principle1 it only extends to those who carry arms1 and not to private individuals who do not defend themselves1 arms in hand4 ,such can only accidentally become the victims of the war3 for instance1 it is impossible in a battle to protect the inhabitants of a disputed village against the balls of either party2 but we should not knowingly strike dead those who do not defend themselves4 #c4 ,strangers should be allowed to quit a country exposed to war2 and if obliged to stay1 they should be no further exposed than to share its inevitable perils with the other citizens4 #d4 ,prisoners of war should be neither killed nor reduced to slavery1 but simply prevented from doing mischief4 ,as to the means employed to deprive an enemy of his life1 humanity1 with just reason1 interdicts the use of certain cowardly and perfidious means2 as1 for instance1 poisoned bullets1 or too cruel means of destruction1 or lastly1 assassination4 ,thus1 it would be odious to send traitors secretly charged to kill the hostile general4 ,there is1 besides1 no example of such attempts in modern wars1 and the human conscience would unanimously reprove them4 ,thus much concerning the rights war gives over the lives of enemies4 ,let us consider now the duties regarding property4 #a4 ,war gives the right to destroy the property of the enemy2 it is what is called the right of ravage4 ,but ravage should not be pursued for its own sake1 but only to weaken the enemy4 ,thus we should as much as possible spare public monuments1 works of art1 etc4 #b4 ,it is a right of war to acquire and appropriate things belonging to the enemy until agreement as to the moneys due1 including the expenses of the war4 #c4 ,it is by virtue of these principles that1 in case of naval encounters1 it is justifiable to take possession of the enemy's vessels1 and not only of men-of-war1 but of merchant-men and the goods they carry4 #d4 ,this right upon the enemy's property is only the sovereign's2 he alone has a right to appropriate1 in the name of the ,state1 the property of the invaded territory1 by way of restitution or guaranty2 but war does not confer upon single individuals the right of taking possession of people's property and appropriating it3 this is simply pillage4 #aah4 ,conquest4--,we call right of conquest the right which belongs to a ,state to bring under its sovereignty the whole or part of another ,state1 by virtue of the right of war4 ,conquest1 it will be seen1 is but the right of the strongest4 ,it is contrary to the principle of modern political societies1 which requires that the ,state rest on the free contract of citizens1 and that a people should only be subject to laws consented to4 ,it is not easy to have an official authentication of this consent2 but it is certain that there are annexations that are voluntary1 and others that are not4 ,the latter1 it must be hoped1 will become less and less frequent as the idea of justice among nations develops4 #aai4 ,neutrality4--,we call neutrality the situation of ,states which1 in a case of war1 side with neither the one nor the other of the belligerents1 but remain at peace with the two parties4 ,they are1 therefore1 obliged to practice toward them the laws of natural right impartially3 if1 for example1 they render to one a service of humanity1 they must not refuse the same service to the other4 ,they must not furnish means of hostility to either the one or the other1 or they must furnish them to both4 ,they must lend their good offices for a settlement if they have any chance of being listened to4 ,these rules are very simple2 but1 practically1 the situation of neutrals is a very delicate one1 and gives rise to numerous difficulties1 for the solution of which1 resort must be had to the special treatises on the law of nations4 #abj4 ,international treaties3 their characters3 their forms4--,we have seen that nations have among each other1 the same as individuals1 obligations and rights which they derive from the natural law4 ,but there are other obligations and other rights which are no longer based on nature1 but on special contracts or usages4 ,the international law which bears on usages is called customary right2 that which comes from compacts1 is called conventional right4 ,the compacts between ,states are called treaties4 ,treaties are equal or unequal1 according as they promise equal or unequal things2 personal or real1 according as they relate only to certain persons1 and during their lives1 or as they are independent of persons and last as long as the ,state itself2 pure and simple or conditional2 in the first case the stipulations are absolute2 in the second they depend on certain conditions4 ,there are different species of treaties according to their different objects3 treaties of alliance2 treaties of boundaries2 treaties of cession2 treaties of navigation and commerce2 treaties of neutrality2 treaties of peace4 #aba4 ,essential conditions of public treaties4--,as a principle1 the rules which govern international compacts are 7with the exception of a few differences7 the same as those which govern private compacts4 ,there are three fundamental conditions3 #a1 the consent2 #b1 a licit cause2 #c1 the capacity of the contracting parties4 7,see above1 #ib47 ,the consent should be3 #a1 declared2 #b1 free2 #c1 mutual4 ,the licit causes are those which are physically possible or morally legitimate2 the illicit causes are those which are contrary to morality1 as1 for example1 would be the establishment of slavery4 ,the capacity of making a compact belongs to the sovereign of the ,state alone2 but it is necessary that this sovereign be really invested with the power4 ,a sovereign stripped of his sovereignty has no power to make compacts1 although he might have all the most legitimate rights2 and1 on the other hand1 a usurping power can legitimately make compacts4 ,the reason of this is1 that foreign nations are not capable to decide what with another people constitutes the legitimacy or non-legitimacy of power3 there is for them1 therefore1 only the power de facto4 ,yet this is but the general rule4 ,there may be cases where a foreign government may refuse to recognize a usurper's power4 #abb4 ,observance of treaties4--,the obligation to observe treaties is based on the natural law4 ,whether compacts take place between ,states or individuals1 it matters little4 ,the ,states1 in respect to each other1 are like private individuals4 ,certain publicists1 particularly ,machiavelli1 have maintained that the obligation to observe treaties only lasts as long as these accord with our interests4 ,as much as to say that one should not make any compacts4 ,besides1 ,machiavelli's opinion is in such disrepute that it is almost useless to discuss it4 ,we will content ourselves with setting against it the following beautiful thought of a great politician3 ,kings should be very careful in making treaties1 but when once made1 they must observe them religiously4 ,i know very well that many politicians teach the contrary2 but without stopping to consider what ,christianity has to say regarding these maxims1 ,i maintain that1 since the loss of honor is greater than that of life1 a great prince should rather risk his person1 and even the loss of his ,state1 than break his word1 which he cannot break without losing his reputation1 consequently1 his greatest strength as a sovereign4 7,cardinal de ,richelieu1 ,testament politique1 #b;e partie1 ch4 vi47 ,,chapter ,x4 ,,family ,,duties4 ,,summary4 ,the family4--,origin and history of the family4--,the family originating in the necessity of the perpetuation of the species1 has gradually gained in morality until it has reached the present state1 namely1 monogamy1 or marriage between one man and one woman3 a progress so far as the dignity of woman and the equality of the sexes are concerned4 ,duties of marriage4--,the duties of marriage begin before marriage3 to be prudent in the choice of a partner2 to prefer the moral interests to the material interests4 ,mutual duties of the married couple3 fidelity founded3 #a1 on a free promise2 #b1 on the very idea of marriage4 ,duties peculiar to the husband3 protection of the family1 work1 etc4 ,celibacy and its duties4 ,duties of parents toward children4--,of the rights of parents4--,basis and limits of the paternal authority4--,instituted in the interest of the children1 it is limited by that very interest4 ,parents have not1 therefore1 #a1 the right of life and death2 #b1 the right to strike and maltreat2 #c1 the right to sell2 #d1 the right to corrupt4 ,duties of parents4--,general duty of affection without privileges or preferences4--,duty of maintenance and education4--,decrease of parental responsibility in proportion to the age of the children4--,three periods in paternal authority4 ,duties of children respecting their parents and respecting each other4--,filial duty4--,fraternal duty4 ,duties of masters towards their servants4 #abc4 ,the family4--,it is a law among all living beings to perpetuate their species4 ,this law is among animals subject to no moral law4 ,yet are there certain species where between the male and female a kind of society is established2 and with nearly all animals the attachment of the mother to her young1 shows itself by most striking and touching proofs4 ,but this maternal interest does not usually last beyond the time necessary to bring up the little ones and enable them to provide for themselves4 ,beyond this time1 the offspring separate and disperse4 ,they live their own life2 the mother knows them no longer4 ,as to the father1 he has scarcely ever known them4 ,such are the domestic ties among animals3 and1 rude as they may be1 one cannot help already recognizing and admiring in them the anticipated image of the family4 ,the family in the human species has the same origin and the same end as in the animal species1 namely1 the perpetuation of the species2 but in the former it is exalted and ennobled by additional sentiments3 it is consecrated and sanctioned by laws of duty and right to which animals are absolutely incapable of rising4 ,if we consider the history of the human race1 we see the family rise progressively from a certain primitive state1 which is not very far from the animal promiscuity1 to the condition in which we see it to-day in most civilized countries4 ,among savage nations1 marriages have little stability and duration3 they are as easily broken as formed4 ,female dignity and modesty are scarcely known among them3 woman is more a slave than a companion1 and the freedom of morals has scarcely any limits4 ,yet is there no society where marriages are not subject to some sacred or civil formalities1 which shows that savages1 ignorant as we may suppose them to be1 have a presentiment of duties which1 under favorable circumstances1 tend to purify and elevate the relations of the sexes4 ,later1 in other societies1 marriages take a more regular form and a more fixed character2 yet1 admitting polygamy1 more or less1 as among the ancients4 ,in short1 many circumstances have presided over the legal relations of the two sexes1 before1 through the natural progress of morals and ,christian influence1 monogamy became the almost universal law of the family in civilized countries4 ,it has been seen1 then1 that as the moral sentiment became more refined1 the family1 as it exists to-day1 became more closely related to the ,state2 and it will always be safer1 in order to establish the legitimacy of such an institution and secure for it due respect1 to depend more on sentiment than on reasoning4 ,besides1 the family is a natural result of the necessary relations which exist between mother1 father1 and child4 ,it is the birth of the children which is the end and raison d'etre of the family4 ,this fact1 let it be well noted1 already determines between mother and child a relation of some duration4 ,the child is altogether unable to live and develop alone4 ,the mother owes it its nourishment2 and nature1 having herself prepared for the child in the breast of the mother the sources of its subsistence truly indicated thereby that they should be bound to each other by a positive and inevitable tie4 ,it is true the same tie exists also among the families of the animals and their young 7at least with mammalia72 and we have seen that there exist among them some germs of family4 ,but let us not forget that it takes only a little time for the young of the animal species to reach that degree of strength which enables it to leave its mother without danger4 ,with the human species1 on the contrary1 it takes a considerable time4 ,before the first or second year the child is unable to walk2 when it walks1 it is still unable to walk alone1 to find its food1 to develop in any way4 ,imagine a child two1 three1 five years old1 abandoned to himself in a desert island3 he would die of hunger4 ,besides1 instinct is much less strong in man than in animals1 and much less certain2 when an adult1 man follows his own reason2 in childhood he needs the reason of others4 ,what shall ,i say of his moral education and intellectual development8 ,the child needs a teacher as well as a nurse4 ,we see that the relations between mother and child must naturally be prolonged far beyond those between animals4 ,the first natural and necessary relations will finally create between these two beings habits of such a character that they will never more separate1 even when they can do without each other4 ,at least1 this separation will not take place before man is completely man2 and although son and daughter may separate from the family to become in their turn heads of families1 there will always exist between parents and children certain ties1 certain relations1 all the closer1 as they each follow the laws of nature4 ,in short1 children can never be seen1 as is the case in the animal species1 becoming complete strangers to their father and mother4 ,i have first considered the tie between the mother and the child1 because it is the most evident and the most necessary4 ,but this relation is not the only one4 ,the child1 we have said1 needs protection for a long time3 does the mother's protection suffice8 ,to judge from the way woman is constituted1 one can see that she needs protection herself4 ,her weakness and her sex expose her to attacks2 she is then but an insufficient protection to the feeble creature she is united to by so many ties4 ,therefore must the family have a protector2 and who should be the natural protector of the child1 if not the father8 of the wife1 if not the husband8 ,the necessity of protection renders1 then1 man indispensable to the family4 ,we may add to this1 the necessity of subsistence4 ,undoubtedly the mother gives the child its first nourishment2 but later on1 the common means of subsistence must come from work4 ,now1 without denying that woman is called to work the same as man1 and whilst admitting that in the simple and natural state she is very much stronger than in the civilized state1 it must1 nevertheless1 be admitted that woman1 in general1 is less fitted for work than man2 that with more trouble1 she produces less1 and that a large portion of her life is necessarily taken up with her peculiar cares4 ,without the work of the head of the family1 the common subsistence would1 therefore1 be imperiled4 ,if we now consider the education of the children1 it is beyond doubt that the maternal education is insufficient4 ,the mother represents in the family1 love1 solicitude1 serviceableness4 ,in a solid education1 authority should be added to these4 ,it may be noticed that in children brought up by one of the parents only1 there is in general something incomplete4 ,those who have had the father only1 lack something in tenderness and delicacy of feeling which the graces of maternity insensibly communicate to the child2 those who have had the mother only1 are lacking in discipline and solidity of character3 they are capricious and of a more passionate willfulness4 ,nature1 then1 appeals to the joint efforts of both father and mother in the education of the child4 ,let us add now that this close tie1 which on one side attaches the child to the mother and on the other to the father1 should also attach parents to each other1 far beyond the first and transitory tie which first joined them4 ,united in a common undertaking1 namely1 to support and educate the being they have brought into the world--it is impossible that they should not continue to be more and more closely united4 #abd4 ,family duties4--,this is the natural history of the family4 ,it was probably in a similar manner1 with many vicissitudes1 that it gradually formed and then became transformed4 ,let us now see how out of this association1 founded by instincts1 interests1 and circumstances1 the principle of duty makes a sacred and indissoluble institution4 ,there can be distinguished in the family four kinds of relations1 whence spring four classes of duties3 #a4 ,the relations between the husband and wife4 #b4 ,the relations of parents to children4 #c4 ,the relations of children to parents4 #d4 ,the relations of children to each other4 ,whence conjugal duty1 paternal or maternal duty1 filial duty1 and fraternal duty4 ,to these four relations1 there may be added a fifth3 that of the head of a family to his servants4 #abe4 ,duties of marriage4--,the duties of marriage begin before marriage3 they begin with the mutual choice of the man and the woman4 ,for the woman1 it usually happens1 at least in our society in ,france1 that the choice is determined by the parents4 ,the responsibility1 then1 falls upon them4 ,now1 this choice should not be made lightly and foolishly4 ,it should be determined by a serious and noble conception of the duties and end of marriage4 ,marriage1 our ,code admirably says1 is an association between man and woman1 to share the pleasures and bear in common the trials of life4#fh ,marriage is1 therefore1 a compact entirely moral3 it is not only a union of bodies or fortunes1 it is a union of souls4 ,life in common and indissoluble1 with all its possible accidents1 is too heavy a burden to be left to chance4 ,a man should think not only of his own happiness1 but also of that of the woman whom he associates with his destiny2 if he does not consider himself strong enough to fulfill toward her all the duties which such a connection imposes on him1 he should not unite her to himself by indissoluble vows2 if he does not think that he can love and respect her all through life1 let him spare himself and her a life-long misery4 ,we may see by this how important in conjugal union are a harmony of character1 a just and mutual esteem1 and an enlightened affection4 ,to marry rashly and too hastily1 and thus to risk future happiness1 is already failing in a first duty4 ,one should1 therefore1 not rely too implicitly upon indifferent or interested go-betweens4 ,it is said1 indeed1 that there is no way of knowing with certainty the character and sincerity of men4 ,many a one who in society appears amiable and estimable1 is perhaps1 in private life1 selfish and tyrannical2 women1 it is said1 moreover1 are particularly skilled1 even when young1 in assuming qualities which they do not possess1 and in disguising their faults2 that if one were constantly scrutinizing and distrusting1 marriage would be impossible2 for the most sagacious are deceived in them1 etc41 etc4 ,all this1 to a certain extent1 is true2 and there could be nothing done without some sort of confidence2 but this confidence1 when it is the result of precaution and prudence1 is much less often deceived than satirists would have it4 ,besides1 if there be room for deception1 even after a reasonably long intimacy1 the chances are at least better than they would be if the parties were to rush headlong into a future absolutely unknown to them4 ,another grave error is that of seeing in marriage nothing but a union of fortunes and names4 ,it is bringing what in reality is the noblest and most delicate of contracts1 down to a simple commercial act4 ,certainly one should not propose to the inexperience of young people the union of two poverties1 as an ideal3 it is well known that poverty is much harder to bear when one has to share it with a wife and children1 than alone4 ,but whilst in certain classes of society marriage could scarcely be possible otherwise 7workingmen having no capital to back their marriage contracts71 the classes that have some competency should not make property the first consideration2 character1 mind1 and merit should by far outweigh it4 ,we distinguish generally two kinds of marriages3 the reason-marriages 7mariages de raison7 and the inclination marriages2 and much has been said for and against both4 ,these are questions which will never be solved1 because experience shows that they are mostly dependent on circumstances4 ,it may be said that1 as a principle1 the true marriage is the marriage based on inclination enlightened by reason4 ,what experience and wisdom condemn1 are the foolish inclinations--those1 for example1 that take no account of age1 education1 social surroundings1 necessities of life4 ,these sorts of passion scarcely ever stand the test of time and circumstances1 and are generally followed by a painful reaction4 ,there is1 says ,la ,bruyere1 hardly any other reason for loving no longer1 than to have loved too much4 ,but inclination is not always unreasonable2 and when it can be reconciled with the counsels of wisdom1 which is no rare thing1 it is better than cold reason1 and answers better to the purpose of marriage3 it is a surer guaranty of its dignity and happiness4 ,a wise moralist1 ,mr4 ,adolphe ,garnier1 makes a very reasonable reply to those who pretend that inclination disappears very fast in marriage3 ,we reply1 he says1 that inclination will at least have formed a true marriage whilst it lasted4 ,it will leave for all the rest of life a remembrance of the first years1 which shall have been purified1 ennobled1 sanctified by this heart-affection4 ,this remembrance will sweeten more than one bitter moment1 will prevent more than one anguish4 ,duty will be sustained by a remembrance of past happiness4#fi ,the marriage once made1 we have to consider1 one after the other1 the duties of the husband and those of the wife4 ,there are some they have in common1 and others which belong to the particular part each plays in the household4 ,the duty which the husband and wife have in common1 is fidelity4 ,this duty is based on the very nature of marriage1 as also upon a mutual promise4 ,let us begin by this latter consideration4 ,marriage1 such as it is instituted in civilized or ,christian countries1 is monogamy1 or marriage of one man with one woman 7except in cases of decease74 ,such is the state one binds one's self to in entering the marriage relation3 one accepts thereby the obligation of an inviolable fidelity4 ,if then a promise is sacred in respect to material goods1 how much more sacred is the promise between hearts1 and this mutual gift of soul to soul1 which constitutes the dignity of marriage6 ,conjugal fidelity is1 then1 a duty of honor1 a veritable debt4 ,but fidelity is not only the obligatory result of a promise1 of a given word2 it is also the result of the very idea of marriage1 and marriage in its turn results from the nature of things4 ,marriage was instituted to save the dignity of woman4 ,experience1 in fact1 teaches us that wherever polygamy exists1 woman is not far from being man's slave4 ,man1 dividing his affections between several women1 cannot love each one with that refinement and constancy which render her his equal4 ,how could there exist between a master and several slaves vying for his looks and caprices1 that intimacy1 that mutual sharing of good and evil wherein the moral beauty of marriage consists8 ,it is quite evident that equality between man and woman cannot exist where the latter is obliged to share with others the common good of conjugal affection4 ,hence the institution of marriage which was established in the interest of the woman1 and which is the protection of the weaker party4 ,it evidently follows that1 on her side1 she is held to the same fidelity which she has a right to demand4 ,conjugal infidelity1 on whichever side it occurs1 is then a disguised polygamy1 and1 moreover1 an irregular and capricious polygamy1 very inferior to the legal2 for this recognizes at least certain rules1 and establishes with precision the condition of the several wives4 ,but adultery destroys all regular and fixed relations between the married couple2 it introduces into marriage the open or clandestine usurpation of sworn rights2 it tends to re-establish the primitive and savage state1 where the coming together of the sexes depended on chance and caprice4 ,fidelity is for the married couple a common and reciprocal duty4 ,each1 besides1 has peculiar duties4 ,we shall lay particular stress on those of the husband4 ,the first of all1 which carries with it all others1 is protection4 ,man1 being the head of the family1 is its natural protector4 ,he holds his authority from the laws and from usage4 ,moreover1 it results from the very nature of things3 for between two persons1 even perfectly united1 it is difficult1 it is impossible1 to meet with a constant uniformity of views1 sentiments1 and wishes4 ,there must be1 then1 a determining voice2 one of the two persons sharing in common domestic authority1 must have the privilege of superior authority4 ,now1 what are the titles to this superior authority8 ,these titles are strength and reason4 ,evidently1 power in the family belongs by right to him who is strong enough to defend it and reasonable enough to exercise it4 ,but this authority would only be an insupportable privilege if man pretended to exercise it without doing any thing1 without returning to the family in the form of security what it pays him in respect and obedience4 ,work is the first duty of man as head of the family4 ,this is true of all classes of society1 as well of those who live upon their income1 as of those who live by their work4 ,for the first have to make themselves worthy of the fortune they have received by noble occupations1 or1 at least1 by preserving it and making it bear fruit through a wise management3 and the second have1 ,i do not say1 a fortune to acquire1 which is an aim rarely attained1 but they have a far more pressing object before them1 namely1 the livelihood of those who live under their protection4#gj ,no one has better depicted1 and in a more delicate and sensible manner1 the common duties of husbands and wives than ,xenophon1 who in this particular is a worthy pupil of ,socrates1 the one of all the ancient sages who best understood the duties of the family4 ,socrates relates in the following terms the conversation of ,ischomachus and his wife1--a young married pair1--in which the husband instructs his wife in domestic duties4 ,when she had become more familiar with me1 and a closer connection had emboldened her to speak freely1 ,i put to her something like the following questions3 ',tell me1 my wife1 dost thou begin to understand why ,i have chosen thee1 and why thy parents have given thee to me8444 ,if the gods give us children1 we must consult with each other and do our best in bringing them up3 for it will be a happiness for both of us to find in them the protectors and support of our old age4 ,but from this day on1 all that is in this house is ours in common2 what is mine is thine1 and thou hast thyself already put in common all that thou hast brought4 ,we have but to count which has brought most2 but we must well remember one thing1 and that is1 that it will be the one of us two who will best manage the common property that shall have brought the most valuable share of capital4' ,to this1 my wife replied3 ',in what can ,i assist thee8 ,what am ,i able to do8 ,all depends on thee4 ,my mother told me that my task was to conduct myself well4'--',yes1 by ,jupiter6' ,i replied1 'and my father also told me the same thing2 but it is the duty of a well-behaving couple so to behave that they may be as prosperous as possible1 that by honest and just means they may add new goods to those they have4 ,the gods1 forsooth1 did well when they coupled man with woman for the greatest utility of mankind4 ,the interest of the family and house demands work without and within4 ,now the gods1 from the first1 adapted the nature of woman for the cares and the works of the interior1 and that of man for the cares and the works of the exterior4 ,cold1 heat1 travels1 war1 man is so constituted as to be able to bear all2 on the other hand1 the gods have given to woman the inclination and mission to nurse her offspring2 it is also she who is in charge of the provisions1 whilst man's care is to ward off all that could injure the household4 ',as neither is by nature perfect in all points1 they necessarily need each other2 and their union is all the more useful1 as what the one lacks may be supplied by the other4 ,therefore1 ,o wife1 it behooves us1 when instructed regarding the functions the gods have assigned to each of us1 to endeavor to acquit ourselves the best we can of those that are incumbent on both4 ',there is1 however1' ,i said1 'one function of thine which will please thee least1 and that is1 that if any one of thy slaves should sicken1 thou1 by the cares due to all1 shouldst watch over his or her recovery4' ',by ,jupiter1' said my wife1 'nothing will please me more1 since1 recovering by my care1 they will be grateful to me and show me still more affection than in the past4' ,this answer delighted me1 continued ,ischomachus1 and ,i said to her3 ',thou shalt have other cares more agreeable1 namely1 when of an unskilled slave thou shalt make a good spinner2 when of an ignorant steward or stewardess1 thou shalt make a capable1 devoted1 intelligent servant4 ,but the sweetest charm shall be1 when1 more perfect than ,i1 thou shalt have made me thy servant2 when1 instead of fearing old age1 lest it deprive thee of thy influence in thy household1 thou shalt have gained the assurance that in growing old thou becomest for me a still better companion1 for thy children a still better housekeeper1 for thy household a still more honored mistress4 ,for beauty and goodness do not depend on youth3 they increase through life in the eyes of men1 by means of virtues4'#ga ,we shall say a few words1 without laying greater stress than necessary1 about a question often debated1 namely1 that of the dissolution of marriage or divorce4 ,we may observe1 on this subject1 with an excellent moralist1#gb whom we have already cited1 that as marriage becomes purer1 its dissolution will become more and more difficult4 ,in former days1 the first aspect of the conjugal relation showed the husband to be the master of the woman2 he bought her and sent her again away as he would a slave--he had the right of repudiation4 ,later on1 he could no longer send her away from him without asking the law to pronounce a divorce2 but he was at first alone in claiming this right4 ,next1 woman obtained the same right in her turn4 ,at last divorce was suppressed1 at least in some ,states1 and particularly in our country2#gc and we think1 with the moralist quoted above1 that this is the true road to progress4 ,an ,english moralist#gd has justly said3 ,if love is a passion which a trifle may start and a trifle kill1 friendship is a calm affection cemented by reason and habit4 ,it becomes stronger by rule1 and it is never so strong as when two persons unite in the pursuit of a common interest4 ,how many slight annoyances will they not endeavor to overlook1 out of prudence1 if they are obliged to live with each other1 and which1 with the prospect of an easy separation1 would be allowed to fester even to aversion6 ,it is a duty for the individual conscience1 even though divorce should be legally permitted1 to consider marriage absolutely indissoluble1 or at least make it a last resort2 it is1 above all1 a strict duty1 in contracting a marriage1 not to look to divorce as a hope and end4 ,some moralists have asked whether marriage was a duty4 ,we do not hesitate to answer in the negative2#ge that it is not a duty in the case of women is evident1 since it is their lot not to choose themselves1 but to be chosen2 now it does not always depend on them to find some one to choose them2 and if it is not an obligation for one of the two sexes1 it would be strange if it were one for the other4 ,besides1 the right of celibacy cannot be denied to one who gives up family life to devote himself to works of charity1 as in the religious orders1 and if this be a sufficient reason1 there are many more of the same kind which might sanction the same conduct3 as1 for example1 devotion to science or the country4 ,if it be objected that every one owes himself to the preservation of the race1 and that if no one married the race would perish1 we can reply that there will always be men ready enough to marry1 so that no such consequences need be feared4 ,but the liberty of celibacy can be granted by the moral law on two conditions only3 the first1 that it be based on serious reasons and not on selfishness2 namely1 that there be good reasons to believe that one could render more service in that state than in an imprudently contracted marriage4 ,the second condition1 that celibacy does not interfere with purity of morals--the relations between the sexes being1 in fact1 only proper and legitimate in marriage4 ,the relations between the sexes outside of marriage can only be adultery1 seduction1 or licentiousness4 ,in the first case1 the woman is induced to violate her duties1 her vows1 to give up all that alone can guarantee her dignity4 ,in the second1 the honor and dignity of a whole life is sacrificed to passion2 in the third1 you make yourself an accomplice to a public and deliberate shame--a shame which would not exist except for just such accomplices4 ,at any rate1 the dignity of the woman--that is to say1 of the weaker sex--is sacrificed to the passion of the stronger4 #abf4 ,duties of parents toward their children4--,an ,english philosopher said3 ,such a one is the father of such a one2 hence he is his master1 and he claims that paternal authority was thus based on the authority of mastership4 ,this is a profound error4 ,in the first place1 no man can be absolutely the master of another man1 unless that other be a slave3 there can only exist relations of obedience or allegiance1 required by social necessity1 but which do not permit any man to be in absolute dependence upon another4 ,the relation between father and child is1 it is true1 of a particular kind2 but it is not any more than the other the authority of a master over his slave1 or of a proprietor over his property4 ,let us look into its origin1 and we shall find1 at the same time1 the extent and the limits of paternal authority4 ,to begin with1 we will observe that1 although usage has consecrated the term paternal authority as meaning the authority exercised by parents over children1 this authority includes the rights of both2 of the mother as well as of the father3 #a1 in default of the father1 in case of absence or death1 the mother has over the child exactly the same authority as the father2 #b1 it is an absolute duty with parents to see that there be not1 in regard to their children1 two separate authorities in the house1 two kinds of contradictory orders2 in the eyes of the child there should be but one and the same authority1 exercised by two persons1 but essentially indivisible2 #c1 in cases of conflict1 the will of the father should prevail1 unless the law interfere2 but the father should use such a privilege only as a last resort1 and where it can be made evident that it is in the interest of the child4 ,even then he should see that the obedience to one of the parents be no disobedience to the other1 for that would be destroying at its root the very authority he makes use of4 ,paternal authority is1 then1 the common authority of both parents over their children2 and it is only an exception to the rule when the authority of one parent becomes detrimental to that of the other4 ,what is now the principle of this authority8 ,a purely physical reason is given for it2 that the child1 namely1 is in some respect a part of the parents4 ,but this reason is not sufficient2 for it would presuppose paternal authority to last all through life under the same conditions and same degree of force2 whereas it continues ever diminishing as the child becomes able to govern himself4 ,the true reason for paternal or maternal authority lies in the feebleness of the child1 in its physical1 intellectual1 and moral incapacity4 ,the child in coming into the world is utterly incapable of doing for itself4 ,supposing even that it could satisfy its physical wants1 experience shows that it could not give itself an education1 without which it cannot be truly a man4 ,this state of feebleness requires1 then1 indispensable assistance1 and an assistance of long duration4 ,it needs a hand to support and feed it1 a heart to love it1 an intelligence to enlighten it4 ,to whom belongs this role of educator1 protector1 sustainer8 ,there have been some who have wished to take the child from the family to give it to the ,state2 this is a great error2 for the child should evidently belong to those without whom he would have no existence4 ,in the first place1 it were burdening society with a thing it is not responsible for2 moreover1 it has no right upon the child1 no particular tie existing between them2 finally1 it offers no sufficient guaranty1 and there can be at best expected of it but a vague and general solicitude1 if1 indeed1 the same is not a partial one1 and in favor of those from whom it may derive most advantages2 whilst parents should unquestionably have charge of the child1 since it is through them it exists2 and having charge of it1 gives them a right to it3 and how could they be responsible for this being they have given life to1 if they could not in some measure dispose of it8 ,there are three ties between the parents and the child3 a physical bond1 a heart-bond1 a reason-bond3 no other authority rests on more natural principles2 none is more necessary1 none is protected by greater guarantees4#gf ,not only would the ,state1 in taking possession of the child1 encumber itself with functions for the performance of which it is unfitted1 but it would also violate the natural rights of the human heart4 ,parents are1 then1 invested by nature herself1 with the duty of supporting and educating their children4 ,but this duty calls for authority4 ,how could a father and mother direct the child in the path of right and justice2 how could they impart to it their wisdom and experience2 how could they prepare the way for its becoming in its turn a moral agent--one1 namely1 that acts and governs himself of his own accord--if they are not at the same time invested with the authority that commands obedience8 ,paternal authority1 as we see by this1 has no other origin than the actual interest of the child3 the mission of the parents is to represent it2 they have in some respect the government of its life4 ,the whole authority of the father upon the child is1 then1 limited by the interests and the rights of the child itself4 ,beyond what may be useful to its physical and moral existence1 the father can do nothing4 ,such are the extent and limits of his authority4 ,from these principles we deduce3 #a4 ,that parents have now no right of life and death upon their children as they have had under certain legislations4 #b4 ,that they have neither the right to strike them1 maltreat them1 wound them--in short1 treat them as they would animals or things2 and although usage appears to allow certain corporeal punishments1 it will always be a bad example and a bad habit to use blows as a means of education4 #c4 ,parents have no right to traffic with the liberty of their sons1 to sell them as slaves as in ancient times1 or to turn them into instruments of gain1 as in many families even to this day4 ,certainly one could not wholly forbid a father to make a child work toward the support of the family1 but it must be done without losing sight of the child's strength1 and without sacrificing its intellectual and moral education4 #d4 ,parents have no right to corrupt their children1 by making them accomplices in their own profligacy4 ,grotius justly distinguishes three periods in paternal authority3#gg the first1 when the children have as yet no discernment1 and are not capable of acting with full knowledge2 the second1 when their judgment1 being already ripe1 they are still members of the family and have no business of their own2 the last1 when they have left their father's house1 either to become heads of families themselves1 or to enter into another4 ,in the first of these conditions1 the will of the parents is entirely substituted for that of the children1 and their authority1 within the limits above stated1 is consequently absolute4 ,in the third case1 the son1 having reached his majority or maturity1 has conquered for himself an independent will2 paternal authority must consequently change into moral influence1 which a grateful son will respect1 but which is no longer1 properly so called1 an authority4 ,finally1 in the intermediate state1 which is the most difficult of all1 the paternal will1 whilst remaining preponderant1 yields more and more to the will of the children1 thereby preparing it toward becoming sufficient to itself4 ,let us examine the duties of the parents at these different periods of paternal authority4 ,there is1 to begin with1 a general duty1 which overrules the whole life of the parents as well as of the children1 and which is independent of the latter's age3 it is the duty of love4 ,parents must love their children2 it is the foundation of all the rest4 ,it may perhaps be objected that love is a natural feeling and cannot be a duty2 that the heart is not subject to the will2 that one may love or not love1 according as one is by nature so constituted2 that duty therefore has nothing to do with it4 ,it is also said that paternal or maternal love is so natural a sentiment that it is useless to make a duty of it4 ,these arguments do not appear to us decisive2 and we have already answered them4 ,we cannot1 of course1 create within ourselves sentiments which do not already exist4 ,but we can cultivate or allow to die out sentiments which do exist within us naturally4 ,the degree of sensibility in each individual depends1 ,i admit1 on his or her peculiar constitution of mind and heart2 but it depends on us to reach the highest degree of sensibility we are capable of4 ,for example1 he who leaves his children or removes them from him 7unless it be for their good#gh7 may be certain that the love he bears them will insensibly die out4 ,he1 on the contrary1 who takes the trouble to busy himself with his children1 to win their love by intelligent and constant attentions1 will necessarily feel his heart grow softer by this intercourse1 and his natural feelings will gain more and more strength4 ,but if it is a duty to love one's children1 it is also in consequence of this duty that one should love them for themselves1 and not for one's self4 ,it is not our happiness we should seek in our children1 but theirs2 and for this reason does it sometimes become necessary to govern one's own sensibility1 and deny children pleasures detrimental to their best interests4 ,the excess of tenderness is often1 as has been said1 but a want of tenderness2 it is a sort of delicate selfishness1 shrinking from the pain the seeming suffering of the children might inflict1 and not knowing how to refuse them any thing for fear of displeasing them1 prepares for them in this manner cruel deceptions against the time when they will have to face the sad realities of life4 ,a corollary of what precedes1 is that the father should love all his children equally1 and guard against showing a preference4 ,he should have no favorites among them1 still less victims4 ,he should not1 from feelings of family pride1 prefer the boys to the girls1 or the oldest to the youngest4 ,he should not even yield to the natural predilection which inclines us to give our preference to the most amiable1 the most intelligent1 the most attractively endowed4 ,it has often been observed that mothers have a particular tenderness for the feeblest of their children1 or those that have given most trouble4 ,if preference is at all justifiable it is in this case4 ,after having established the general principle of the duties of the head of a family1 namely1 love1 and an equal love1 for all his children1 let us consider the particular duties this general duty comprises4 ,they bear upon two principal points3 the preservation and the education of the children4 ,we have seen that the fact of giving life to children1 carries with it as an inevitable consequence the duty of preserving it to them4 ,the child not being able to provide its own food1 the parents must furnish it3 this results from the very nature of things4 ,whence it follows1 that a father must work to provide for his children3 this is so evident and necessary a duty that there is hardly any need of dwelling on it4 ,but it is not only for the present that the head of the family ought to provide2 he should provide for the future also4 ,he should1 on the one hand1 foresee the case when1 by some possible misfortune1 he may be taken from his children before they are grown2 and on the other1 prepare the way to their providing for themselves4 ,the first case shows us how economy and prudence become thus a sacred duty for the head of a family4 ,this also explains how it may be a duty in contracting a marriage not to lose sight of the question of property3 not that this consideration should not give way before others more important2 but other things being equal1 the best marriage is that which1 keeping in view the future interests of the children1 provides against the case when by some misfortune they may be left orphans at an early age4 ,in supposing the most favorable cases1 the father and mother may hope that they will live long enough to see their children becoming in their turn independent persons1 able to provide for themselves4 ,it is in view of this1 that parents should plan a profession or a career for their children2 in most cases1 it is a necessity1 it is expedient in all4 ,but the preparation for a career presupposes education2 and here the material interests and security of the children blend with their intellectual and moral interests4 ,everybody recognizes in the education of children two distinct things3 instruction and education properly so called3 the first has for its object the mind2 and the second the character4 ,these two things must not be separated3 for1 without instruction1 all education is powerless2 and without a moral education1 instruction may be dangerous4 ,parents should then--and it is a strict duty--give to their children the instruction their resources and condition allow2 but they are not permitted to leave them in ignorance if they have the means to educate them4 ,some narrow minds still believe that instruction is of no use to the people1 and is even a dangerous thing4 ,this has been sufficiently refuted4 ,the greatest number of crimes and offenses are committed by the most ignorant classes3 the more they learn1 the better will they understand the duties of their condition and the dignity of human nature4 ,it has been justly said that little knowledge may be more dangerous than ignorance3 for this reason should men be raised above the dangerous point1 and be put in possession of as much knowledge as their condition warrants4 ,instruction has two useful effects3 first1 it increases the resources of a man1 renders him better qualified for a greater variety of things2 it is then1 as political economy styles it1 a capital4 ,parents1 in having their children taught1 give them thereby a far more substantial and productive capital than what they could transmit to them by gift or legacy4 ,in the second place1 instruction elevates man and ennobles his nature4 ,if it is reason that distinguishes man from the brute1 knowledge enlarges and heightens reason4 ,instruction thus works together with moral education and forms one of its essential parts4 ,the head of a family who then1 from personal interest1 negligence1 ill-will1 or1 in fine1 from ignorance1 deprives his children of the instruction which is their due1 fails thereby in an essential duty4#gi ,it must1 moreover1 be admitted1 that instruction alone does not suffice2 science alone does not form character2 persuasion1 authority1 example1 the moral action of every instant is necessary thereto4 ,it is a great problem to know how much of fear and gentleness1 restraint and liberty should enter in paternal education4 ,all agree that a child should not be brought up through fear alone1 as the animals are4 ,as ,fenelon admirably puts it1 ,joy and confidence should be the natural state of mind of children2 otherwise their intelligence becomes obscured1 their courage droops2 if they are lively1 fear will irritate them2 if soft1 it will make them stupid2 fear is like the violent remedies employed in extreme illnesses3 they purge2 but they injure the constitution and wear out its organs2 a soul led by fear is always the feebler for it4 ,on the other hand1 everybody admits also that an excessive indulgence is as dangerous as a despotic authority4 ,rousseau ingenuously remarks3 ,the best means of making your child miserable is to accustom it to obtaining all it wants2 for its desires will incessantly grow with the facility with which it can satisfy them2 sooner or later the inability to content it1 will1 despite yourself1 oblige you to refuse1 and this unexpected denial will give it more pain than the deprivation of the thing itself4 ,first it will want the cane you have in your hand2 then your watch2 then the bird in the air2 the bright star in the sky2 in short1 all that it sees3 and unless you were a god1 how could you satisfy it8 ,this remark of ,rousseau refers to the earliest childhood1 but it can be applied to all ages4 ,it is evident that all the duties we have here mentioned relate principally to the first of the three periods distinguished by ,grotius4 ,as the children grow up1 their own personal responsibility gradually takes the place of the paternal responsibility1 and there comes the time of the third state above mentioned1 when both father and mother no longer owe their children any thing more than love or advice4 ,instead of being answerable for their existence1 it is rather the reverse4 ,it is the children's turn to become responsible for the happiness and safety of their parents4 ,but1 as we have said1 the really difficult moment is that when the young man1 awakening to himself1 becomes conscious of a will1 and1 without experience and sense of proportion1 wishes to exercise this will without restraint4 ,it is here especially that the paternal will must show itself firm without despotism1 and persuasive without flattery and weakness1 and where it becomes necessary that the paternal authority be firmly rooted in the first age and upon solid foundations1 so that the young man1 even in his fits of self-will1 may submit to this authority with confidence and respect4 ,there is no particular formula which could set forth a rule of conduct obligatory under all circumstances4 ,tact in this case is better than rules4 #abg4 ,duties of children4--,the ,german philosopher ,fichte1 in his book on ,ethics1 has said some very good things touching the duties of children2 we will cite from it some of the pages devoted to this subject4#hj ,the right of parents to set limits to the liberty of their children cannot be questioned4 ,i should respect the liberty of another man1 because ,i regard him as a being morally educated1 whose liberty is the necessary means whereby he may reach the end reason points out to him4 ,i cannot be his judge1 for he is my equal4 ,but it is not the same in the case of my child4 ,i regard my child not as a moral creature already formed1 but to be formed2 and it is precisely for this reason that it is my duty to educate it4 ,the same reason which commands me to respect the liberty of my equals1 commands me to limit that of my child4 ,but ,i am to limit this liberty only in so far as the use the child may make of it might be injurious to the very end of its education4 ,any other repression is contrary to duty1 for it is contrary to the end in view4 ,it is the very liberty of the child which must be instructed2 and that this instruction be possible1 the child must be free4 ,parents should not1 therefore1 through mere caprice1 forbid children1 with a view1 as is said1 to break their will3 it is only where the will would run counter to the direct aims of their education that it should be broken4 ,here1 however1 parents must be the sole judges2 and are answerable to their conscience alone4 ,the only duty of the child1 says ,fichte again1 is obedience3 this should be developed before any other moral sentiment2 for it is the root of all morality4 ,later on1 when in the sphere left free by the parents1 morality has become possible1 the duty of obedience is still the greatest of all duties1 the child should not wish to be free beyond the limits fixed by the parents themselves4 ,fichte explains next very ingeniously1 how obedience is the only way by which the child can imitate the morality it cannot yet know3 ,the same relation which binds the full-grown man to the moral law1 and to its author1 ,god1 binds the child to its parents4 ,we should do all that duty commands us to do1 absolutely and without troubling ourselves about consequences2 but to be able to do this1 we must suppose these consequences to be in the hands of ,god1 and intended for our good3 the same with the child in regard to parental commands4 ,christianity represents ,god in the image of a father1 and justly so4 ,but we should not simply be satisfied always and incessantly to speak of his goodness2 we should also think of our obligations toward him2 of our obedience1 and that childlike trust free from all anxiety and uneasiness which we ought to cultivate in regard to his will4 ,to create a similar obedience is the only means by which parents may implant the sentiment of morality in the hearts of their children3 it is1 therefore1 a real duty for parents to exercise their children in a similar obedience4 ,it is a very false notion1 which1 like many others1 we owe to the ruling eudemonism#ha of the day1 that wrong inclinations of the child can be thwarted by reasoning with it4 ,there is implied in this notion the absurdity of supposing the child to be possessed of a greater share of reasoning power than ourselves3 for even adults are most of the time prompted in their acts by inclination1 and not by reason4#hb ,another question presents itself now3 ,how far1 in its relation to its parents1 should the child's absolute obedience go8 ,this question may have two sides3 the one as to the extent of this obedience1 and the other as to its limits2 how far it should go2 or in regard to length of time1 how long it shall last1 and1 if it is to cease at all1 at what particular time it is to stop8 ,in the first case1 the question may be raised either from the child's or from the parents' standpoint4 ,on the part of the child it should never be raised4 ,the answer is this3 ,the child should obey1 and its obedience consists in its not wishing to have any more liberty than its parents permit it to have4 ,of the necessary limits of this obedience1 the parents can alone judge2 the child cannot4 ,the doctrine that the child should obey in all reasonable cases1 as we often hear it said1 is a contradictory one4 ,he who only obeys in reasonable cases does not obey1 for he becomes himself then the judge of what is reasonable and what is not4 ,if he does any thing suitable because he judges it to be so1 he acts according to his own conviction1 and not from obedience4 ,whether this obedience which they exact be reasonable or not1 it is for the parents to answer for it before their own consciences2 but they should not allow their children to sit in judgment over them4 ,but1 it may be asked1 suppose the parents command their children to do an immoral thing8 ,i answer3 ,either the immorality of it is only discovered after a laborious investigation1 or it is obvious4 ,in the first case1 there can be no difficulty2 for the obedient child does not suspect his parents capable of commanding him to do any wrong4 ,in the second1 the very basis of obedience--namely1 the belief in the superior morality of the parents--is destroyed2 and then a prolonged obedience would be contrary to duty4 ,the same when the immorality or the shame of the parents is self-evident in the children's eyes4 ,obedience then ceases because education through the parents becomes impossible4 ,the second question is3 ,how long does the duty of obedience last8 ,the answer to this is3 ,obedience1 in the first place1 is only exacted in view of education2 and education is a means to an end2 that end being the utilization of the child's powers for some reasonable purpose1 under whatever circumstances or through whatever mode4 ,when that end has been attained1 the child cannot judge3 it is for the parents to decide4 ,now two cases are possible here3 ,one is where the father himself declares the end attained and leaves his children free to act according to their own will and judgment4 ,the other is where a certain result is sufficient to declare the end attained4 ,the ,state is in this instance a competent outside judge4 ,for example1 if the ,state entrusts an office to a son1 it declares the latter's education completed2 the judgment of the ,state is the parents' judicial bond3 they must submit to it without appeal3 it binds them also morally1 and they must submit to it from a sense of duty4 ,there is finally a third case3 this is where parental education is no longer possible1 as1 for example1 on the marriage of the children4 ,the daughter then gives herself to her husband and becomes subject to his will3 she can therefore no longer depend upon her parents' will4 ,the son assumes the care of his wife1 conformably to her wishes2 he can therefore no longer be guided by others' wishes1 not even by those of his parents4 ,these three cases do not yet exhaust the question2 for we may suppose a fourth3 the one where the children are not called to a function1 by the ,state2 when they do not marry1 and when the parents are nevertheless unwilling to relax their authority1 seemingly wishing to uphold the obedience of early childhood4 ,in this case1 the parents evidently overstep their rights2 for it is obvious that at a given time man must belong to himself4 ,this time has been fixed by the ,state2 which determines when one attains to his majority4 ,in granting to a son the free disposal of his property1 the liberty to make contracts1 to traffic1 the right of suffrage1 the right to marry1 etc41 the ,state puts an end to paternal authority as an authority armed with restraint1 yet certainly not as a moral authority1 for in this respect it is indelible4 ,the son having become a person1 and being in his turn invested with moral responsibility1 may lay obedience aside1 but he does not with this lay aside the respect1 gratitude1 and affection he owes his parents4 ,even after the emancipation of the children1 there still exists between them and their parents a moral tie4 ,parents1 especially if they have been1 as we suppose1 the educators of their children1 know their inner being1 their disposition3 they have seen it develop under their eyes2 they have formed it4 ,they therefore know it better than the children themselves can know it4 ,they consequently continue to be their best advisers4 ,there is then left to parents a special duty1 namely1 that of advising their children1 and on the part of the children a correlative duty1 that of listening attentively to the advice of their parents1 and of considering it carefully4 ,thus do parents retain their care and solicitude for their children1 and the children the duty of respect4 ,these duties of respect and gratitude toward parents have been admirably expressed by the ancient writers4 ,plato1 after speaking of the honor which should be given to the gods1 says3 ,next comes the honor of living parents1 to whom1 as is meet1 we have to pay the first and greatest and oldest of all debts1 considering that all which a man has belongs to those who gave him birth and brought him up1 and that he must do all that he can to minister to them3 first1 in his property2 secondly1 in his person2 and thirdly1 in his soul2 paying the debts due to them for the care and travail which they bestowed upon him of old1 in the days of his infancy1 and which he is now to pay back to them when they are old and in the extremity of their need4 ,and all his life long he ought never to utter1 or to have uttered1 an unbecoming word to them2 for all light and winged words he will have to give an account2 ,nemesis1 the messenger of justice1 is appointed to watch over them4 ,and we ought to yield to our parents when they are angry1 and let them satisfy their feelings in word or deed1 considering that1 when a father thinks that he has been wronged by his son1 he may be expected to be very angry4#hc ,xenophon1 likewise1 relates to us an admirable exhortation of ,socrates to his oldest son ,lamprocles1 on filial piety4 ,it is well known that the wife of ,socrates1 ,xantippe1 was noted for her crabbed disposition1 which often sorely tried ,socrates' patience4 ,no doubt this was the case with the sons also2 but1 less patient than their father1 they yielded sometimes to their anger4 ,socrates recalls ,lamprocles to his duty as a son1 enumerating to him all that mothers have to endure for their children3 ,the woman receives and bears the burden1 oppressing and endangering her life1 and imparting a portion of the nutriment with which she is herself supported2 and at length1 after bearing it the full time1 and bringing it forth with great pain1 she suckles and cherishes it1 though she has received no previous benefit from it1 nor does the infant know by whom it is tended1 nor is it able to signify what it wants1 but she1 conjecturing what will nourish and please it1 tries to satisfy its calls1 and feeds it for a long time1 both night and day1 submitting to the trouble1 and not knowing what return she will receive for it4 ,nor does it satisfy the parents merely to feed their offspring1 but as soon as the children appear capable of learning any thing1 they teach them whatever they know that may be of use for their conduct in life2 and whenever they consider another more capable of communicating than themselves1 they send their sons to him at their own expense1 and take care to adopt every course that their children may be as much improved as possible4 ,upon this the young man said3 ,but1 even if she has done all this1 no one1 assuredly1 could endure her ill-humor4 ,and do you reflect1 returned ,socrates1 how much grievous trouble you have given her by your peevishness1 by voice and by action1 in the day and in the night1 and how much anxiety you have caused her when you were ill8444 ,or do you suppose your mother meditates evil toward you8 ,no1 indeed1 said ,lamprocles1 that ,i do not suppose4 ,do you then say that this mother1 rejoined ,socrates1 who is so benevolent to you1 who1 when you are ill1 takes care of you1 to the utmost of her power1 that you may recover your health1 and who1 besides1 entreats the gods for many blessings on your head1 is a harsh mother8 ,oh1 my son1 if you are wise1 you will entreat the gods to pardon you if you have been wanting in respect toward your mother1 lest1 regarding you as an ungrateful person1 they should be disinclined to do you good2 and you will have regard1 also1 to the opinion of men1 lest1 observing you to be neglectful of your parents1 they should all contemn you1 and you should then be found destitute of friends2 for if men surmise that you are ungrateful toward your parents1 no one will believe that if he does you a kindness he will meet with gratitude in return4#hd ,although children1 when of age1 belong legally to themselves1 there are yet two serious circumstances1 where they should exhaust all the forms of respect and submission before they make a harsh use of the rights which the law grants them3 these are marriage1 and the choice of a profession4 ,in the first case1 both the law and morality require the consent of the parents2 and it is only as a last extremity1 and after three respectful appeals to them1 that proceedings may go on4 ,here again1 although the law permits it1 it may be said that1 except in extreme and exceptional cases1 it is always better not to proceed1 but wait till some change of circumstances brings about a change in the mind of the parents4 ,in fact1 the parents' resistance in these cases is generally in the interest of the children2 they wish to protect them against the impulses of their passions4 ,they have1 besides1 a sort of right to interdict the admission into the family and the taking of its name to any one that might be unworthy of these favors4 ,the obligation not to marry without the consent of the parents 7except in extreme cases7 does not carry with it the obligation of marrying against one's will in order to obey them4 ,this would be the violation of a duty toward others2 you have no right to jeopardize the happiness of a third party1 that you might on your side practice the duty of obedience4 ,to marry with repugnance is contrary to duty1 for it is entering into the bonds of an unhappy union4 ,as to the choice of a profession1 the obligation to conform to the desires and the will of the parents is less strict than in marriage2 and it is obvious that the first1 the stricter duty here1 is to choose the profession one is best fitted for4 ,but as there is here also1 on the side of the children1 much inexperience 7as among the various professions there are some very difficult1 even dangerous ones1 where success is often very rare1 and which for this reason are all the more tempting71 it is clear that in such a case it is the children's duty1 except where there is an irresistible proclivity1 to allow themselves to be guided by a more enlightened and more prudent experience4 ,at any rate1 the strict duty is to confer with the parents1 consult their superior wisdom1 and delay as much as possible a final resolve4 ,these principles once set down1 it is certain that1 on the other hand1 one should not1 to obey one's parents1 follow a profession one felt no capacity for whatsoever4 ,there the duties toward society and toward one's self take precedence of the family duties4 #abh4 ,fraternal duties4--,socrates1 who has spoken so well of the duties of husbands and wives and the duties of children1 shall here again be our guide as to the duties of brothers and sisters4 ,two brothers1 ,chaesephon and ,chaesecrates1 did not live well together4 ,socrates tried to reconcile them with each other by an exhortation1 of which the following gives the principal points3#he #a4 ,brothers are better than riches2 for they are things endowed with reason1 whilst wealth is but a senseless thing2 brothers are a protection2 riches1 on the contrary1 need protection4 #b4 ,one had rather live with fellow-citizens than live alone2 how much more would one not rather live with brothers4 #c4 ,is not the being born of the same parents1 the having been brought up together1 very strong reasons to love one another8 ,even among brutes a certain affection springs up between those that are raised together4 #d4 ,even though our brothers be of dispositions difficult to live with1 we should make advances to bring them nearer to us4 #e4 ,it is for the youngest to make advances to the oldest4 ,a modern moralist1 ,silvio ,pellico1#hf expresses most delicately the duties of brothers and sisters in their intercourse with each other3 ,to practice properly1 in one's relations with men1 the divine science of charity1 one must have learned it at home4 ,what ineffable sweetness is there in the thought3 ',we are the children of the same mother6444' ,if you wish to be a good brother1 beware of selfishness4 ,let each of your brothers1 each of your sisters1 see that their interests are as dear to you as your own4 ,if one of them commits a fault1 be indulgent to it4 ,rejoice over their virtues2 imitate them4 ,the familiarity of the fireside should never make you forget to be courteous toward your brothers4 ,be still more courteous toward your sisters4 ,their sex is endowed with a powerful attraction2 it is a divine gift which they use to make the house pleasant and cheerful4 ,you will find in your sisters the delicious charm of womanly virtues2 and since nature has made them more feeble and sensitive than you1 be attentive to them in their troubles1 console them1 and do not cause them any unnecessary pain4 ,those who contract the habit of being ill-natured and rude toward their brothers and sisters1 are rude and ill-natured toward everybody else4 ,if the home-intercourse is tender and true1 man will experience in his other social relations the same need of esteem and noble affections4 #abi4 ,duties of masters toward their servants4--,one of the most important functions of home administration1 is the management of domestics4 ,it comprises two things3 choice and direction4 ,it is well known how important in a household the choice of servants is2 as it is they who attend to the marketing and pay the bills1 so that the finances of the house are1 to some extent1 in their hands4#hg ,but this is but one of the lesser features of the influence of servants in a household2 the most serious one is their familiar intercourse with the children2 and it is there especially that it becomes necessary to make sure of their fidelity and honesty4 ,yet to make a careful and successful choice is of no use1 if one is ignorant of the art of directing and governing1 which consists in a just medium between too much lenity and too much severity4 ,the master of the house should1 of course1 always have his eyes open1 but he should also know that no human being learns to do things well1 if he is not allowed to act with some sort of freedom4 ,surveillance and confidence are the two principles of a wise domestic government4 ,without the first1 one is apt to be cheated2 without the second1 one cheats one's self in depriving the servant of the most energetic elements of human will1 responsibility and honor4#hh ,the master1 again1 should avoid being violent and brutal toward his servants4 ,he should require of them all that is just1 yet without pushing his requirements to the point of persecution4 ,many persons deprive themselves of good servants1 because they cannot patiently bear with the inevitable defects inherent in human nature4 ,on the other hand1 the servant owes his master3 #a1 an absolute honesty4 ,as it is the servants who do the marketing and pay the bills1 they have the funds of the family in their hands4 ,the more one is obliged to trust them the more are they bound to restrain themselves from the slightest act of dishonesty4 #b4 ,they owe obedience and exactness in the duties pertaining to their service4 #c4 ,they should1 as much as possible1 attach themselves to the persons whose service they have entered2 the longer they stay with them1 the more will they be considered as part of the family1 and the greater will be their right to the regard and affection due to age and fidelity4 #acj4 ,duties of children toward servants4--,it is not only the master and mistress of the house that have duties to fulfill toward servants1 but the children also4 ,the latter are1 in general1 too much disposed to treat servants as instruments of their wishes and the playthings of their caprices4 ,although slavery is no longer allowed1 some children1 if let alone1 would very soon re-establish it for their own benefit4 ,to command1 insult1 beat1 are the not uncommon modes of procedure with children that are left entirely free in their relations with inferiors4 ,the latter1 on the other hand1 do not hesitate to employ force1 in the absence of the masters1 and pass readily from slavery to tyranny4 ,all such conduct is reprehensible4 ,the servant should never be allowed to strike2 but he should himself not be struck or insulted4 ,in childhood1 it is for the parents to oversee the relations between their servants and children4 ,later it is for the children themselves1 when they have reached the age of reason1 to know that they must not treat servants like brutes4 ,the same observations may be applied to workmen1 in circumstances where workmen are in some respect in the service of the family4 ,although servants are no longer slaves1 nor even serfs1 one may still1 modifying its meaning1 quote ,seneca's admirable protestation against slavery3 ,they are slaves6 rather say they are men6 ,they are slaves6 ,not any more than thou6 ,he whom thou callest a slave1 was born of the same seed as thyself2 he enjoys the same sky1 breathes the same air1 lives and dies the same as thou4 ,seneca closes this eloquent apostrophe with a maxim recalling the ,gospel3 ,live with thy inferiors1 as thou wouldst thy superior should live with thee4 ,as to the duties of servants to their masters1 they belong to the class of professional duties which we shall take up further on 7,chap4 ,,xiii474 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,duties ,,toward ,,one',s ,,self--,,duties ,,relative ,,to ,,the ,,body4 ,,summary4 ,have we duties toward ourselves8--,the person of a man should not only be sacred to others1 it also should be so to himself4 ,even though man ceased to be in any relation with other men 7as1 for example1 in a desert island71 he would still have duties to perform4 ,the duty of self-preservation4--,suicide4--,argument s of ,rousseau for and against suicide4 ,the different standpoints from which one may condemn suicide3 #a1 either as contrary to the duties toward men2 #b1 or to the duties toward ,god2 #c1 or1 lastly1 to the duties toward ourselves4 ,kant's fundamental argument against suicide3 ,man cannot abdicate his personality as long as he has duties to perform1 which is the same as to say1 as long as he lives4 ,case of conscience4--,not to confound suicide with self-sacrifice4 ,of voluntary mutilations and of the duty to avoid injuring one's health4 ,that this duty should be understood in a wide sense1 and not as an encouragement to constant preoccupation about the condition of one's body4 ,of cleanliness4 ,other duties concerning the body4--,temperance4--,temperance recommended for two reasons3 #a1 as necessary to health1 and consequently as a corollary to the duty of self-preservation2 #b1 as necessary to human dignity1 which1 through intemperance1 falls below the brute4 ,of the moderate use of sensual pleasures4 ,that we should elevate them by attaching to them ideas and sentiments4 ,other virtues3 ,decency1 modesty1 propriety1 etc4 #aca4 ,have we duties toward ourselves8--,this has been disputed1 and it seems rather strange that it should have been4 ,no one1 say the jurists1 binds himself to himself2 no one does himself injustice1 they say again4 ,in short1 man belongs to himself3 is not that the first of ownerships1 and the basis of all the others8 ,no1 replies ,victor ,cousin1 from man's being free and belonging to himself1 it is not to be concluded that he has all power over himself4 ,from the fact alone that he is endowed with both liberty and intelligence1 ,i1 on the contrary1 conclude that he cannot1 without failing in his duty1 degrade his liberty any more than he can degrade his intelligence4 ,liberty is not only sacred to others2 it is so in itself4 ,this obligation imposed on the moral personality to respect itself1 it is not ,i who established it2 ,i cannot1 therefore1 destroy it4 ,is the respect ,i have for myself founded on one of those arbitrary agreements which cease to be when the two parties freely renounce it8 ,are the two contracting parties here ,i and myself8 ,no2 there is one of the parties that is not ,i1 namely1 humanity itself1 the moral personality1 the human essence which does not belong to me1 which is not my property1 which ,i can no more degrade or wound in myself than ,i can in others4 ,there is not even any agreement here or contract4 ,finally1 man would still have duties1 even though he ceased to be in any relation with other men4 ,as long as he has any intelligence and liberty left1 the idea of right remains in him1 and with that idea1 duty4 ,if he were all at once thrown upon a desert island1 duty would still follow him there4#hi ,kant has likewise defended the existence of the duties of man toward himself4 ,supposing1 he says1 that there were no duties of this kind1 there would not be any duties then of any kind2 for ,i can only think myself under obligations to others1 so far as ,i am under obligations to myself4444 ,thus do people say1 when the question is to save a man or his life3 ,i owe this to myself2 ,i owe it to myself to cultivate such dispositions of mind as make of me a fit member of society 7,doctrine de la vertu1 trad4 franc4 de ,barni1 p4 #gj74 #acb4 ,duties concerning the body4--,duty of self-preservation4--,the duties toward one's self are generally divided into two classes3 duties toward the body1 duties toward the soul4 ,kant justly criticised this distinction1 and asks how can there be any obligations toward the body--that is to say1 toward a mass of matter--which1 apart from the soul1 is nothing better than any of the rough bodies which surround us4 ,kant proposes to substitute for this distinction the following3 duties of man toward himself as an animal 7that is1 united to animality by the corporeal functions71 and the duties of man toward himself as a moral being4 ,considered as an animal1 man is united to a body1 and this union of soul and body is what is called life4 ,hence a first duty which may be considered a fundamental duty1 and the basis of all the others1 namely1 the duty of self-preservation4 ,it is1 in fact1 obvious that the fulfillment of all our other duties rests on this prior one4 ,before being a duty1 self-preservation is for man an instinct1 and even so energetic and so universal an instinct that there would seem to be very little need to transform it into duty3 so much so is it an instinct that man has rather to combat in himself the cowardly tendency which attaches him to life1 than that which induces him to seek death4 ,yet does it happen1 and unfortunately too often1 that men1 crazed by despair1 come to believe that they have a right to free themselves of life3 this is what is called suicide4 ,it is1 therefore1 very important in morals to combat this fatal idea1 and to teach men that1 even though life ceases to be a pleasure1 there is still a moral obligation which they cannot escape4 #acc4 ,suicide4--,j4 ,j4 ,rousseau and ,kant4--,the question of suicide was treated with great ability by ,j4 ,j4 ,rousseau in one of his most celebrated works4 ,he put into the mouth of two personages1 on the one side1 the apology for1 and on the other1 the condemnation of suicide4 ,we will not cite here these two pieces1 the eloquence of which is somewhat declamatory1 but we will give an abstract of the principal arguments presented on each side in favor of its own position4 ,arguments in favor of suicide4--#a4 ,it is said that life is not our own because it was given us4--,not so1 for1 just because it was given us1 is it our own4 ,god has given us arms1 and yet we allow them to be cut off when necessary4 #b4 ,man1 it is said1 is a soldier on sentry on earth3 he should not leave his post without orders4--,so be it2 but misfortune is precisely that order which informs me that ,i have nothing more to do here below4 #c4 ,suicide1 it is said again1 is rebellion against ,providence4--,but how8 it is not to escape its laws one puts an end to one's life2 it is to execute them the better3 in whatever place the soul may be1 it will always be under ,god's government4 #d4 ,if thy slave attempted to kill himself1 says ,socrates to ,cebes in the ,phaedo1 wouldst thou not punish him for trying unjustly to deprive thee of thy property8--,good ,socrates1 what sayest thou8 ,does one no longer belong to ,god when dead8 ,thou art quite wrong2 thou shouldst have said3 ,if thou puttest on thy slave a garment which is in his way in the service he owes thee1 wouldst thou punish him for laying this garment aside in order the better to serve thee8 #e4 ,it is said that life is never an evil4--,yet has nature implanted in us so great a horror of death that life to certain beings must surely be an evil1 since they resolve to renounce it4 #f4 ,it is said that suicide is a cowardice4--,how many cowards1 then1 among the ancients6 ,arria1 ,eponina1 ,lucretia1 ,brutus1 ,cato6 ,certainly there is courage in suffering the evils one cannot avoid2 but it were insanity to suffer voluntarily those from which one can free himself4 #g4 ,there are unquestionably duties that should attach us to life4--,but he who is a burden to every one1 and of no use to himself1 why should he not have a right to quit a place where his complaints are importunate and his sufferings useless8 #h4 ,why should it be allowable to get cured of the gout and not of life8 ,if we consider the will of ,god1 what evil is there for us to combat1 that he has not himself sent us8 ,are we not permitted1 then1 to change the nature of any thing because all that is1 is as he wished it8 #i4 ,thou shall not kill1 says the ,decalogue4--,but if this commandment is to be taken literally1 one should kill neither criminals nor enemies4 ,next comes the answer of my lord ,edward1 namely1 ,j4 ,j4 ,rousseau3 ,arguments against suicide4--#a4 ,if life has no moral end1 one can unquestionably free one's self from it when it is too painful3 if it has one1 it is not permitted to set it arbitrary limits4 #b4 ,the wish to die does not constitute a right to die2 otherwise1 a similar wish might justify all crimes4 #c4 ,thou sayest3 ,life is an evil2 but if thou hast the courage to bear it1 thou wilt some day say3 ,life is a good4 #d4 ,physical pain may in extreme cases deprive one of the use of reason and will2 but moral pain should be borne bravely4 #e4 ,no man is wholly useless2 he has always some duties to fulfill4 ,it has been justly observed1 we think1 that this second letter is feebler than the first1 and that ,rousseau displayed more talent in justifying suicide than in combating it2 at any rate1 the following peroration will always be considered an admirable passage to quote3 ,listen to me1 thou foolish youth3 thou art dear to me1 ,i pity thy errors4 ,if thou hast at the bottom of thy heart the least feeling of virtue left1 come to me1 let me teach thee to love life4 ,every time thou shalt be tempted to put an end to it1 say to thyself3 ',let me do one more good deed before ,i die6' ,then go and seek some poverty to relieve1 some misfortune to console1 some oppressed wretch to protect4 ,if this contemplation does not stop thee to-day1 it will stop thee to-morrow1 or the day after1 or perhaps for the rest of thy life4 ,if it does not stop thee1 go then and die2 for thou art not worthy to live4 ,suicide may be considered from three different standpoints1 which are all three involved and blended in the preceding discussion3 #a4 ,suicide is a transgression of our duty toward other men 7inasmuch as1 however miserable1 one can always render some service to others74 #b4 ,suicide is contrary to our duties toward ,god 7inasmuch as man abandons thereby1 without being relieved of it1 the post intrusted to him in this world74 #c4 ,finally--and this is for us here the essential point--suicide is a violation of the duty of man toward himself2 as1 all other considerations set aside1 he is bound to self-preservation as a moral personality1 and has no right whatsoever upon himself4 ,kant's discussion4--,kant is1 of all philosophers1 the one who most insisted on this latter view of the matter1 and developed it with the greatest force4 ,it seems absurd1 he says1 that man could do himself injury4 7,volenti non fit injuria4#ij7 ,thus did the stoic regard it as a prerogative of the sage1 to be able1 quietly and of his own free will1 to step out of this life as he would out of a room full of smoke4 ,but this very courage1 this strength of soul which enables us to brave death1 revealing to us a something man prizes more than life1 should have been to him the stoic all the greater incentive not to destroy in himself a being endowed with a faculty so great1 so superior to all the most powerful of sensuous motives1 and consequently not to deprive himself of life4 ,man cannot abdicate his personality as long as there are duties for him1 consequently as long as he lives2 and there is contradiction in granting him the right of freeing himself from all obligation--that is to say1 acting as freely as if he had no need of any kind of permission4 ,to annihilate in one's own person the subject of morality1 is to extirpate from the world as much as possible the existence of morality itself2 it is disposing of one's self as of an instrument1 for a simply arbitrary end2 it is lowering humanity in one's own person4 #acd4 ,resume of the discussion on suicide4--,from the above point of view the sophisms of ,saint-,preux in ,j4 ,j4 ,rousseau are easily controverted4 ,i can cut my arm off1 you say2 why can ,i not destroy my body8--,but in destroying a withered or mortified arm1 ,i nowise injure the human personality1 which remains within me entire2 and1 on the contrary1 ,i deliver the moral personality within me of a physical trouble which deprives it of its liberty4 ,i can1 you say1 avoid pain3 no one is obliged to bear a toothache1 if he can free himself from it4--,yes1 unquestionably2 but in finding a remedy for physical pain1 instead of wronging the moral personality of man1 ,i free it1 on the contrary1 of the evils which1 in crushing it1 tend to debase it4 ,besides1 there are1 moreover1 pains from which it is not right to free one's self4 ,for example1 it is not right to leave the sickbed of one dear to us because his pains are unbearable4 ,but life is full of misery1 and1 in certain cases1 the evil is without any compensation4--,the question is not whether life is agreeable or painful3 it might be a question1 if pleasure were the end of life2 but if this end is duty1 there are no circumstances1 however painful1 which do not leave room for the possibility of fulfilling a duty4 ,it is a sophism1 they say1 to call suicide a cowardice2 for it requires a great deal of courage to take one's life4--,no one denies that there is a certain amount of physical courage coupled with taking one's life2 but there is a still greater courage1 a moral courage1 in braving pain1 poverty1 slavery4 ,suicide is therefore a relative cowardice4 ,it matters not1 moreover1 whether suicide be a brave or a cowardly act2 what is certain is1 that man cannot destroy within himself the agent subject to the law of duty without implicitly denying this law and all there is within contained4 ,finally1 it will be said that the moral personality is distinct from the body1 and that in destroying the body1 one does not injure the personality4 ,but we shall answer1 that the only personality of which we can dispose1 and of which we have the care1 is that which is actually united to our physical body4 ,it is that very personality that has duties to perform2 it is that which we cannot sacrifice to a state of things absolutely unknown to us4 ,as to our duties toward others1 there is no one that has absolutely no service to render to his fellow-men2 and each of us is always able to render them the greatest of services1 namely1 to give them the example of virtue1 courage1 gentleness1 and patience4 ,finally1 in respect to ,god1 if we look upon life as a trial1 man has no right to free himself of this trial before it is ended2 if we look upon it as a punishment1 we have no right to cut short its duration as long as nature has not pronounced on it4 ,can we not1 then1 it is asked1 change any thing in the order of things1 since all is disposed by ,god8--,certainly we can2 we can1 as we see fit1 modify things1 but not persons4 ,god1 it is said again1 has given us life3 we can1 then1 do with it what we like4--,but life is not purely a gift1 an absolute gift3 it is bound up in the moral personality which is not in our power1 and which is not to be considered a thing to traffic with1 give away1 or destroy4 ,to admit the legitimacy of suicide1 is to admit that man belongs to himself as a thing belongs to its master2 it is implicitly to admit the right to traffic with one's own personality and1 according to ,kant's energetic expression1 to treat one's self as a means and not as an end4 #ace4 ,suicide from a sense of honor4--,all suicide1 having for its motive the escape from pain 7exception being made1 of course1 of suicides caused by insanity71 should be condemned without qualification4 ,but is it the same with suicides instigated by a feeling of honor1 either to avoid an outrage one is threatened with1 or to escape the shame of an outrage one has suffered8 ,we should certainly not blame too severely acts that have their source in purity and greatness of soul1 and in such matters it is yet better to forgive the excess1 than accustom one's mind1 by too cold reasoning1 to look upon dishonor with patience or complacency4 ,after all1 the love of life speaks enough for itself without its being necessary to give it too much encouragement4 ,nevertheless1 to consider the matter closely1 it is certain that no one is responsible for acts he has not consented to2 that1 consequently1 an act imposed on us by force1 cannot inflict real dishonor2 that ill-natured interpretations should have no weight with a strong mind1 and that conscience is the only judge4 ,we should1 says ,st4 ,augustin1 speaking of ,lucretia's suicide1 resist the temptation of suicide when we have no crime to atone for4444 ,why should a man who has done no harm to another1 do some to himself8 ,is he justified in killing an innocent man in his own person1 to prevent the real criminal from perpetrating his design1 and would he criminally cut short his own life for fear it be cut short by another8#ia ,with still greater reason will suicide be condemned in cases where shame1 if there is any1 can make reparation4 ,let us1 for example1 suppose the case of a merchant obliged to suspend payments4 ,this suspension may be caused by overwhelming circumstances1 as1 for example1 unforeseen physical catastrophes1 or negligence1 imprudence1 or even dishonesty on the part of the merchant4 ,in the first case1 the merchant is obviously innocent1#ib and1 as we have already remarked1 it is an outward and not a real shame4 ,instead of giving way before a misfortune1 he should1 on the contrary1 strive against it and find in himself the means to repair the damage4 ,if1 on the contrary1 it is through his own fault1 through dissipation1 laziness1 etc41 that the trouble was brought about1 he is all the more obliged to make honorable amends1 and by his courage and energy rehabilitate himself4 ,if1 finally1 the evil is still graver1 if he failed through lack of honor1 he owes it to himself to expiate his fault1 for in trying by suicide to escape a merited shame1 he only eschews a well-deserved punishment4 ,modern conscience refuses even to admire without reserve1 the noblest and most generous of suicides1 those1 namely1 occasioned by the grief over a great cause lost3 ,i mean ,cato's suicide4 ,the capital error of this kind of suicides 7laying aside the reasons already pointed out71 is to think that a cause can be lost4 ,on the one hand1 there is never any reason strong enough to persuade any one that what is lost to-day1 is definitively lost2 and if each of those who belong to that cause should kill himself1 he would only contribute his share toward the loss of that cause4 ,besides1 even supposing a cause to be definitively and absolutely lost1 the honor of humanity requires none the less that the cause be faithfully and inviolably represented to the end by its adherents3 for if they do not serve thereby their own cause1 they serve at least that of loyalty1 fidelity1 and honor1 which is the highest of all4 ,certainly an act as impressive as was ,cato's1 shows how far man can carry the devotion to a creed1 and such heroism elevates the soul3 thus may we admire it as an individual act1 but not as an example to be followed4 ,for1 although it presents itself to us under a heroic form1 it is1 after all1 nothing but an escape from responsibility4 #acf4 ,suicide and sacrifice4--,one should not confound with suicide1 the voluntary death--that is to say1 the death dared and even sought after for the sake of humanity1 the family1 country1 truth4 ,for instance1 ,eustache de ,saint ,pierre and his companions1 ,curtius1 d',assas1 voluntarily sought or accepted death when they could have avoided it4 ,are these suicides8 ,if we carried the matter as far as that1 all devotion would have to be suppressed altogether4 ,for the height of devotion is to brave death2 and one would have to condemn even the man who exposes himself to a simple peril1 since he has no assurance that this peril may not lead him to death4 ,but it is evident that the suicide deserving condemnation is that which has for its source either selfishness1 or fear1 or a false sense of honor4 ,to carry the subject further would be sacrificing other more important duties1 and giving to selfishness itself the appearance and prestige of virtue4 #acg4 ,mutilations and mortifications4--,care of one's health4--,one of the obvious consequences of the duty of self-preservation1 is to avoid voluntary mutilations4 ,for example1 those who mutilate themselves to escape military service1 fail first in their duty to their country1 and next in their duty to themselves4 ,for1 the body being the instrument of the soul1 it is forbidden to destroy any part of it without necessity4 ,this is partial suicide4 ,must we count among the number of voluntary mutilations1 the religious mortifications or macerations by which the devout manifest their piety8 ,if it can be proved that such practices are injurious to health1 it is certain that they should be condemned from a moral point of view4 ,but if they are nothing more than self-imposed privations of pleasure1 no one can disapprove of them4 ,for man is always permitted to give up this or that pleasure4 ,thus abstention from animal-flesh which the school of ,pythagoras taught its adepts1 can not be considered contrary to the duty of self-preservation1 as long as it cannot be demonstrated that this diet is unfavorable to health4 ,besides1 this duty not to injure one's health1 must itself be understood in a large and general sense4 ,otherwise1 taken too strictly1 it would become a narrow and selfish preoccupation1 unworthy of man4 ,one should select and regularly observe such diet as1 from general or personal experience1 would seem most suitable to the preservation of health2 but1 this principle once established1 precautions too minute and circumspect lower man in the estimation of others1 and1 if nothing more1 give him a tinge of the ridiculous1 which he ought to avoid4 ,one should therefore not take as a model the ,italian ,cornaro1 who had a pair of scales at his meals to weigh his food and drink1 although this method1 it is said1 prolonged his life to a hundred years4 ,the learned ,kant himself1 although he was very high-minded1 carried the rules he had laid down for his health to extravagant minuteness4 ,for example1 in order to spare his chest1 he had made it a rule1 never to breathe through his mouth when in the street1 and1 to faithfully observe this rule1 he always walked alone1 so as not to be obliged to speak4 ,care carried to such minute details falls into a sort of littleness very unbecoming a being destined for higher thoughts than mere physical self-preservation4 ,one may say of such exaggerated prudence what ,rousseau1 though most inappropriately1 said of medicine3 ,it prevents illness less than it inspires us with the fear of it2 it does not so much ward off death as it gives us beforehand a taste of it2 it wears life out instead of prolonging it2 and even if it did prolong it1 it would still be to the prejudice of the race1 since it takes us away from society by the cares it lays upon us1 and from our duties by the fear it inspires us with4#ic ,but1 if too minute attention to health is not to be recommended1 one cannot be too observant1 within a reasonable measure1 of course1 of the obligation to follow a sensible and moderate diet1 which is as favorable to the mind as it is to the body4 ,hygiene1 in this respect1 forms no inconsiderable part of morals4 ,to avoid sitting up late2 to avoid too long or too rich repasts2 to make an even distribution of one's time2 to get up early2 to dress moderately warm3 are measures recommended by prudence2 this1 however1 does not exclude the liberty of doing away with these rules when more important ones are necessary4 ,the principle consists in not granting the body too much1 which is the best means of strengthening it4 ,the ancients attached a vast importance to the strength and beauty of the body2 and for this reason they encouraged gymnastics2 these were an essential part of their education4 ,this taste for physical exercise seems to be reviving at the present day2 it enters more and more into our public education1 and its good results are already felt4 ,men should1 as much as possible1 reserve some time and leisure for such exercises2 for they not only impart strength1 health1 and skill to the body1 but they accustom the soul to courage1 preparing it by degrees to encounter more serious perils2 the same may be said of military exercises4 #ach4 ,cleanliness4--,among the virtues belonging to the duty of self-preservation1 there is one which a philosopher of the ,,xviii4 century considered the first and the mother of all the others1 namely1 cleanliness4 ,this is saying much2 and it may be thought that ,volney1 in his moral catechism1 exaggerated somewhat this virtue4 ,it is1 however1 one of very great importance1 for its opposite is especially repugnant4 ,cleanliness1 moreover1 in addition to the part it plays1 as we know1 in the preservation of health1 is often indicative of other virtues of a higher order4 ,cleanliness presupposes order1 a certain delicacy of habits1 a certain dignity2 it is really the first condition of civilization2 wherever we meet with it1 it announces that higher wants than those of mere animality have been or are soon to be felt2 wherever it is wanting1 we may be certain that civilization is only apparent1 and that it has yet many deficiencies to supply4 #aci4 ,other duties in regard to the body4--,temperance4--,we have just seen that man has no right to destroy his body1 or mutilate it1 or1 in short1 uselessly to reduce or enfeeble its power2 in a word1 he must not voluntarily injure his physical functions3 for1 in impairing himself as a physical being1 he thereby injures his personality1 which is the principle of all morality4 ,but there are two things to be distinguished in the functions of the human body3 on one side1 their utility1 and on the other1 the pleasure which attends their healthful exercise4 ,the same function may be exercised with more or less pleasure on the side of the senses4 ,hence a moral problem3 ,what is to be granted to the pleasures of the senses8--,certainly for the proper exercise of their functions a certain sensuous agreeableness is necessary2 a good appetite1 for instance1 is a pleasant seasoning which excites and facilitates digestion4 ,nevertheless1 we all know that there is not an exact and continued proportion between the pleasure of the senses and physiological necessity2 we know that enjoyment may by far exceed necessity1 and that health even often requires a certain limitation in enjoyment4 ,we know1 for example1 that the pleasures of the palate may be far more sought after and prolonged than is necessary for the gratification of the appetite4 ,man needs very little to live on2 but he can continue to tickle his palate long after his hunger is satisfied4 ,thirst1 in particular1 has given rise to a multitude of refinements invented by human industry1 and which are but very distantly related to the principle which has given them birth4 ,wine and alcoholic drinks1 which1 used in moderation1 may be useful tonics1 are stimulants demanding a constant renewal3 the more they are indulged in1 the more they provoke and captivate the imagination4 ,from this disproportion and incongruity which exist between the pleasures of the senses and the real wants of the body1 arise vices1 certain habits1 namely1 which sacrifice want to pleasure1 and the consequence of which is the depravation and ruin of the natural functions4 ,pleasure1 in fact1 is1 in a certain measure1 the auxiliary1 and in some sort1 the interpreter of nature2 but beyond a certain limit1 it can only satiate itself at the expense of the legitimate function1 and by solidarity1 at the expense of all the others4 ,thus too much eating destroys the digestive functions2 stimulating drinks burn the stomach and seriously injure the nervous system4 ,the same1 and with still graver consequences1 attends upon the pleasures attached to the function of reproduction4 ,who would1 says ,bossuet1 dare think of other excesses which reveal themselves in a still more dangerous manner8 ,who1 ,i say1 would dare speak of them1 or dare think of them1 since they cannot be spoken of without shame nor thought of without peril1 though it be but to condemn them8 ,o ,god1 once more1 who would dare speak of this deep and shameful plague of nature1 this concupiscence which binds the soul to the body with bonds so tender and so violent--bonds man can scarcely defend himself against1 and which cause such frightful disorders among the human race6 ,woe to the earth6 woe to the earth1 from whose secret passions rise continually vapors so thick and black1 concealing from us both sky and light1 but of which we are reminded through the lightnings and thunder-bolts they send forth against the corruption of the human race6#id ,the abuse of the pleasures of the senses is in general called intemperance1 and the proper use of these pleasures1 temperance4 ,gormandizing is the abuse of the pleasures of eating2 intoxication or drunkenness1 the abuse of the pleasures of drinking2 immodesty or lust1 the abuse of the pleasures attached to the reproduction of the species4 ,the opposites of these three vices are1 to the first two1 sobriety1 to the last1 chastity4 ,the duty of temperance is enforced by two considerations3 #a1 intemperance being1 as experience shows1 the ruination of health1 is thereby contrary to the duty of self-preservation2 #b1 intemperance destroying the intellectual faculties1 and making us unfit for any energetic and manly action1 is contrary to the duty imposed on us to respect our moral faculties and protect against all injury within us the free personality which constitutes the essence of humanity4 ,kant does not admit that the first of these considerations--that1 namely1 which is deduced from the interest of our health--has any validity in morals3 ,vice1 he says1 should not be judged from the damage it does to man1 for to resist it would then be resisting it for reasons of comfort and commodity1 which could never be a principle to found a duty on1 but only a measure of prudence4 ,this is true2 but if we have in the foregoing pages established that self-preservation is one of man's duties1 that he should not destroy his health or abridge his life1 an evident corollary of this principle is to avoid intemperance1 because intemperance abridges life4 ,this consideration is then as legitimate from the standpoint of morality as from that of interest4 ,the ancients have spoken admirably about temperance4 ,socrates in particular1 in ,xenophon's ,memorabilia1 showed clearly that temperance makes of man a free man1 and intemperance1 a brute and a slave4 ,tell me1 ,eutydemus1 thinkest thou not that liberty is a precious and honorable thing for an individual and for a ,state8--,it is the most precious of all4--,thinkest thou him then who allows himself to be overruled by the pleasures of the body1 and thereby disabled from doing good1 a free man8--,not the least4--,perhaps callest thou liberty the power to do good1 and servitude the being prevented from it by obstacles4--,precisely4--,the intemperate then appear to thee as slaves8--,yes1 by ,jupiter1 and rightly so4--,what thinkest thou of masters who hinder the doing good1 and oblige one to do wrong4--,it is1 by ,jupiter1 the worst possible kind4--,and which is the worst of servitudes8--,to my mind that which subjects us to the worst masters4--,then is intemperance the worst of servitudes8--,so ,i think4 ,plato1 on his side1 in a charming picture brings out with force the insatiableness of sensual passions3 ,see1 says ,socrates1 if the temperate man and the disorderly man are not like two men having each a large number of casks3 the casks of the one are in good condition and full1 one with wine1 another with honey1 a third with milk1 and others with other liquors2 these liquors1 moreover1 are rare and hard to get2 they cost infinite trouble to obtain2 their owner having once filled his barrels1 pours henceforth nothing more into them2 he has no longer any anxiety concerning them1 and is perfectly at ease4 ,the other can1 it is true1 procure the same liquors1 but only with difficulty2 his casks1 moreover1 being leaky and rotten1 he is obliged to fill them constantly1 day and night1 lest he be devoured by burning pains4 ,this picture being an image of both lives1 canst thou say that that of the libertine is happier than that of the temperate man8 ,a second consideration which may be added to the preceding one is1 that the intemperate man1 seeking pleasure1 does not find it2 pleasure passionately pursued changes even into pain3 ,intemperance1 says ,montaigne1 is the pest of voluptuousness1 whilst temperance is its seasoning4 ,this view of the matter is especially that in which the epicurean moralists delight2 they always1 in morals1 compare one pleasure with another2 but it also holds good for those who place duty above pleasure1 for it is likewise a duty to prefer a pure1 simple1 delicate pleasure1 to a violent1 disorderly1 or vulgar pleasure4 ,from this standpoint1 we may say with ,plato1 in his ,philebus1 that the purest pleasures are not the strongest1 and even that the stronger and more ardent a pleasure may be1 the nearer it approaches a change into pain4 ,now1 all other duty set aside1 one should principally seek the pleasures which are not mixed with pain1 because they are the most natural and the most legitimate of all3 thus is it that the pleasure we derive from a satisfied appetite is a proper pleasure1 however humble it be1 whilst the pleasure which carries with it satiety and disgust1 indicates by that very fact1 that it is against nature1 or at least goes beyond nature4 ,virtue requires1 then1 that we prefer the first to the second4 #adj4 ,the pleasures of the senses4--,but provided one is content with moderate pleasures1 is it allowed to enjoy the pleasures of the senses1 or must we rather turn our mind1 will1 and soul1 from them1 and rest content with the satisfied want8 ,montaigne1 that naive child of nature1 supports the first proposition2 ,saint ,augustine1 the apostle of free grace1 advocates the second4 ,nature1 says ,montaigne1 has maternally provided that the actions she enjoins upon us for the satisfaction of our wants be also pleasurable1 and she invites us thereto not only through reason1 but also by the appetite3 it is not right to corrupt her rules4 ,not only did ,montaigne authorize the pleasure of the senses1 but he also favored one's delighting in it3 ,it should be fitly studied1 enjoyed1 dwelt upon1 to show ourselves worthily thankful to him who dispenses it4444 ,to that degree1 did ,i myself follow this precept that in order that the pleasure of sleeping should not stupidly escape me1 ,i found it well in former days1 to have myself disturbed in my sleep1 that ,i might catch the feeling of it4444 ,is there any gratification of the senses8 ,i do not allow them to have it all to themselves2 ,i associate my soul with it1 not to lose itself in it1 but to find itself in it4444 ,it estimates1 thereby1 how much it owes ,god for putting the body at its own disposal1 allowing it to enjoy in order and completeness the soft and agreeable functions whereby it pleased him to compensate us by his mercy for the pains his justice inflicts on us in its turn4 ,st4 ,augustine looks at the thing from an entirely different standpoint3 ,thou hast taught me1 ,o my ,god1 he says1 to look upon food as upon a remedy4 ,but when ,i pass from the suffering of hunger to the repose of satiety1 even in this passage from the one to the other does concupiscence lay its snares for me2 for this passage is a pleasure1 and there is no other means to reach the end which by necessity we must reach4 ,and although real hunger and thirst--eating and drinking be but a matter of health1 yet does pleasure join itself thereto as a dangerous companion1 and sometimes it even takes the lead and induces me to do from a sense of pleasure1 what ,i only wish to do for my health4 ,what is enough for health1 is not enough for pleasure1 and it is often difficult to decide whether it is the wants of the body that require to be met1 or the deceiving voluptuousness of concupiscence which subjugates us4 ,in this incertitude our miserable soul rejoices because she finds therein a defense and an excuse1 and1 not knowing what is sufficient for the maintenance of health1 she places the interests of voluptuousness under the shadow of this pretext4 ,every day ,i endeavor to resist its temptations and invoke thy hand to save me1 and ,i lay at thy feet my incertitudes1 because1 alas6 my resolution is not yet strong enough4 ,it will be seen that the two moralists use both the same principle 7namely1 the will of ,providence7 to arrive at entirely different conclusions4 ,according to one1 pleasure was instituted by ,god only as a means to arrive at the satisfaction of bodily wants4 ,it is1 then1 this satisfaction alone we should have in view4 ,according to the other1 ,god allowing necessity to be accompanied by pleasure1 invites us thereby to enjoy pleasure4 ,it seems to us that the two moralists fall here into an excess3 for1 according to us1 we should not too much distrust pleasure nor delight in it too much3 pleasure1 not being an evil in itself1 there is no reason why we should reproach ourselves for enjoying it3 for it is as essential to the nature of our being as life itself4 ,we may even say that pleasure is already a superior degree of existence1 and it is for this reason that the animal is found to be superior to the plant4 ,the scruples of ,st4 ,augustine in regard to pleasure are1 therefore1 exaggerated4 ,on the other hand1 ,i do not approve of ,montaigne's refinement either2 it is not proper to bring the reflective faculties to bear upon sensual pleasures in order to enhance them3 to have one's self waked up in order to take cognizance of the sweetness of sleep is an unjustifiable refinement of sensuality unless one admits pleasure to be the end of life4 ,in one word1 it is necessary here to avoid at the same time exaggerated scruples and self-gratification1 as occupying the mind more than is necessary with what has but a very inferior value4#ie ,providence1 besides1 has furnished us means to enhance the pleasures of the senses by mingling with them the pleasures of the mind or heart4 ,banquets1 says ,kant1 have1 besides the physical pleasure they procure us1 something that tends to a moral end1 namely1 to bring together a certain number of people1 and to maintain among them an extended interchange of kindly feelings4 ,and this austere moralist does not hesitate to lay down certain rules which should preside over refined festivities4 ,we shall be pardoned if we reproduce here some of his witty remarks on that subject4 ,the good cheer1 he says1 which best accords with humanity1 is a good repast in good company2 a company which ,chesterfield says should not fall below the number of the ,graces1 nor exceed that of the ,muses4444 ,on the contrary1 large assemblages and festivities are altogether in bad taste4444 ,to eat alone is unwholesome for a philosophic scholar3 it is no restoration1 it is rather exhaustion2 it is a labor1 and not a play revivifying thought4 ,the man who eats alone loses gradually his cheerfulness2 he recovers it1 on the contrary1 when the intermittent jests of a guest give him a new subject of animation which1 alone1 he would not have been able to discover4 ,kant further requires1 that the repast should end with laughter1 which1 if it is loud and hearty1 is a sort of compliment to nature4 ,then1 after having given rules for table-talk1 he concludes by saying3 ,however insignificant these laws of polite society may appear1 especially when compared to morality properly so called1 they are1 nevertheless1 a garment which becomes virtue1 and which may be recommended in all seriousness4 ,in fact1 thanks to these laws1 sensual pleasures are ennobled and increased by mixing with them intellectual pleasures4 ,it is the same with those other pleasures related to the purest and noblest sentiments of the heart1 and which1 thanks to this alliance1 may be reconciled with perfect chastity4 #ada4 ,the exterior bearing4--,propriety4--,decorum4--,tempe rance should not be confined to the inner man2 it should manifest itself outwardly through acts1 words1 through proper bearing and attitudes3 this is what is called decency2 the principal part of which is modesty4 ,we must not1 says ,cicero1 mind the cynics and certain stoics who turn us into ridicule and reproach us for being ashamed to speak of things that have nothing shameful in themselves4 ,as for us1 let us follow nature1 and abstain from all that might wound the eyes or ears4 ,let our bearing1 gait1 our looks1 gestures1 be always true to decency4444 ,there are two things to be avoided3 soft and effeminate airs1 and a boorish and uncouth appearance4#if ,the ancients justly attached great importance to the outward appearance and countenance2 they regarded it as the sign of the freeman4 ,there are1 says ,cicero1 two kinds of beauty3 the one1 grace2 the other1 dignity4 ,grace belongs to woman1 dignity to man4 ,we should1 therefore1 interdict ourselves all that could belie that dignity1 either in dress1 bearing1 or gesture4 ,there are movements among our wrestlers which are sometimes displeasing1 and certain gestures of our comedians which are somewhat ridiculous2 they would both recommend themselves to the public better by simplicity and decency4 ,one should be neither uncouth nor over-refined2 in regard to dress1 the most modest is the best4 ,avoid1 likewise1 in your gait1 either that excessive slowness 7reminding one of the imposing gravity of sacred pomps71 or too much haste1 which is a sure sign of light-headedness and thoughtlessness4#ig ,these counsels will not appear minute to those who know that the soul is always ready to fall in with the body1 and that the inner man sets himself naturally to the outer man4 ,disorder in manners1 dress1 words1 bring insensibly with them disorder in thought1 and the outward dignity is but the reflection of the dignity of the soul4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,duties ,,relating ,,to ,,external ,,goods4 ,,summary4 ,the necessity of external goods4--,two sorts of duties4--#a4 ,those relative to use2 #b4 ,those relative to acquisition4 ,use of external goods4--,they are means and not ends3 avarice1 cupidity1 prodigality4 ,it is not the degree of riches1 it is the spirit in which we seek or possess them1 which is the object of a moral rule4 ,economy1 a mean between prodigality and avarice4 ,economy and saving are not only duties of self-preservation1 but of dignity4 ,maxims of ,franklin4--,the prodigal and the miser1 according to ,aristotle4 ,acquisition of external things4--,universal law of work4--,servile and free work4--,nobility of work4 ,work is a pleasure1 a necessity1 a duty4 #adb4 ,necessity of external goods4--,external goods are as necessary to man as is his body3 for it is in the first place a fundamental law of beings physically organized1 that they only subsist by means of a continual exchange of their component parts1 with foreign substances4 ,life is a circulation1 a vortex3 we lose and acquire2 we return to nature what it gave us1 and we take from it back again in exchange what we need to repair our losses4 ,there follows from this that certain external things1 especially food1 are indispensable to our existence1 and that it is absolutely necessary that we be in sure possession of them in order to be ourselves sure of life4 ,food is not the only need of man4 ,shelter and clothing1 without being as rigorously indispensable 7especially in warm countries71 are nevertheless of great utility to maintain a certain equilibrium between the temperature of our bodies and the external temperature2 for it is well known that the derangement of this equilibrium is one of the most ordinary causes of illness4 ,nature not having clothed man as she has the other animals1 he is obliged to provide himself with clothes by his industry4 ,as for habitations1 several animals know as well as man how to construct them3 for example1 beavers and rabbits2 and despite the indisputable superiority of his art1 this is yet1 as we see for man1 but the development of an instinct which he shares with other creatures4 ,these various wants1 then1 which to be satisfied demand a certain number of material objects1 such as food1 houses1 clothing1 etc41 carry with them others in their train3 for example1 the need of locomotion to procure what is wanted3 hence1 carriages1 boats1 etc42--the need of protecting one's self against those who would take from us what we possess3 hence1 arms of every kind2--the need of repose and order in the house3 hence1 furniture of every sort2--in a higher degree again the need of pleasing the imagination3 hence1 works of art1 pictures1 statuary2--the need of information3 hence1 books1 etc4 ,finally1 and independently of all these different things1 there are yet two which deserve to be specially noticed1 because of their particular and distinctive character4 ,these are1 first1 land1 which is the common and inexhaustible source of all riches1 the only thing that does not perish1 and which is always found again in the same quantity after as well as before the enjoyment of it2 land1 which is as the substance1 the very basis of riches2#ih and the second1 money 7gold or silver1 with their representative1 paper71 which is of a nature to be exchanged against all kind of merchandise1 even land1 and which1 consequently1 represents them all4 ,these two kinds of things1 land and money1 the one an essential1 the other a condensed image1 of all wealth1 are the two most natural objects of man's desires1 because1 with the one or the other1 he can procure all the rest4 ,we have not to examine here how man succeeds in securing to himself the exclusive enjoyment of these several goods3 we shall treat the subject of property further on1 and shall explain in what1 and why1 it is inviolable4 ,let it suffice to say here that these goods being bound up with the very preservation of our existence1 the desire and instinct which lead us to appropriate them1 have nothing blameworthy in themselves4 ,external goods being necessary to life1 we have to consider how we should use them when we possess them1 and how acquire them when we do not possess them4 #adc4 ,duties relating to the use of external goods4--,cupidity4--,avarice4--,from the very fact that man is a part of nature1 it manifestly follows that he is allowed to make his profit of the goods of nature and to turn them to his use4 ,the only question is then to know to what degree and in what spirit1 he should love material goods1 and what use he is to make of them1 not in regard to others1 but in regard to himself4 ,a first consideration is that material things or riches have no value in themselves2 they are only worth anything as they suit our wants4 ,gold and silver1 in particular1 are only a value because they can be exchanged against useful things1 and these things1 again1 are only good because they are useful4 ,they are1 to employ ,kant's favorite formula1 means1 not ends4 ,now we precisely overthrow this order when we take material things as ends and not as means--that is to say1 when we attribute to them an absolute instead of a relative value4 ,this happens when1 for example1 we seek gain for gain's sake2 when we accumulate riches for the sole pleasure of accumulating them--a vice we call cupidity4 ,it is1 again1 what happens when we enjoy wealth for itself1 without wishing to turn it to use1 and depriving ourselves of everything to enjoy the thing itself1 which has no other value except that of buying other things2 a vice we call avarice4 ,the character of these two vices 7a character which is not only contrary to prudence1 but also to virtue7 is to transform material things into absolute ends4 ,avarice1 says ,kant1 very justly1 is not only economy misunderstood1 but a servile subjection to the goods of fortune2 an incapacity of exercising mastery over them4444 ,it is not only opposed to generosity1 but to liberality of sentiments in general--that is to say1 to the principle of independence which recognizes nothing but the law1 and becomes thus a fraud which man commits against himself4 ,cupidity does not1 at first glance1 appear to be of so shameful1 and especially so ridiculous a character as avarice2 for avarice is a contradiction to one's self 7to die rather than lose that which can only serve to prevent us from dying71 and viewed in that light it becomes a comical oddity4 ,but the love of gain for gain's sake is1 no less than avarice1 a servile subjection to the goods of fortune4 ,to earn money is a necessity to which we must submit 7and of which we need not be ashamed1 since it is nature herself that requires it71 but it is not1 and should not be1 an end to the soul4 ,the end of wealth 7without failing in the duties we owe to ourselves7 should be to make sure of the means of self-preservation1 self-cultivation1 education--yea1 even recreation2 for recreation is a thing much more refined and noble than accumulation of wealth4 ,in one word1 according to an old saying1 one must possess riches and not be possessed by them4 ,such is the spirit in which man should seek or possess riches2 and it is for him a strict duty2 but as to the degree and limits of possession1 as to the extent or quantity of riches1 morality gives us neither rules nor principles4 ,there is no particular limit known beyond which a man in making money would become immoral4 ,there is no restriction to his becoming a millionaire if he can4 ,a morality that should teach to look upon the rich as culpable1 would be a very false one4 ,the contempt for riches1 such as the ancient philosophers professed1 is a very beautiful thing in itself2 but to make good use of wealth is also very praiseworthy4 ,wealth1 which in itself has no value1 may have a very great one from the use made of it4 ,there is1 therefore1 no other rule to be observed here than the one we have already pointed out1 namely1 that we should not love money for itself1 but acquire it or receive it as a means to be useful to ourselves and to others4 ,let us add1 however1 that even with this motive1 we should not entertain too great a desire for gain2#ii for to take too much pleasure in accumulating a fortune1 even to make a good use of it1 is again another way to become its slave4 #add4 ,poverty4--,the duty of not allowing one's self to become morally a slave to external goods1 carries with it1 as its corollary1 the duty of bearing poverty patiently if circumstances impose it on us4 ,i do not mean here the strength of soul with which we should bear adversity of any kind 7we shall speak of that further on71 but the resignation with which we should look upon the deprivation of certain things1 which have no value in themselves4 ,the poor man should1 of course1 endeavor to improve his condition by his work1 and we are far from recommending to him a stupid insensibility which would dry up the sources of all industry2 but what we should especially guard against is this uneasy discontent and powerless desire which are also a kind of slavery4 ,we should try to be satisfied with our lot1 as ancient wisdom has it1 and if it requires a certain amount of heroism to bear extreme misery1 a limited share of wisdom will be sufficient to enable one to accept patiently poverty and mediocrity4 #ade4 ,prodigality4--,maintaining1 as we have done1 that riches have no value in themselves1 except as means to satisfy our wants1 do we mean thereby that they are to be spent injudiciously8--and would not that appear to be condemning saving and economy1 virtues which not only morality1 but wisdom also1 recommends8 ,shall we1 in order to avoid cupidity and avarice1 run into dissipation and prodigality8 ,let us first observe that prodigality1 which is the opposite of avarice1 is not always the opposite of cupidity4 ,the need of spending engenders necessarily the need of obtaining and gaining as much money as possible2 and the prodigal1 if he is not so in the beginning1 very soon becomes covetous1 through the exhaustion of his resources4 ,most prodigals1 says ,aristotle1 become greedy and grasping1 because they always wish to spend at their will4 ,their own resources being soon exhausted1 they must needs procure others2 and as they scarcely take thought about dignity and honor1 they appropriate without scruple1 and as they can4 ,we should1 therefore1 not view prodigality as a noble independence in respect to riches4 ,it is so in the beginning1 in fact1 with young rich people2 but they soon find out the limits of their great fortunes1 and then begins their slavery in respect to those very goods they made at first so light of4 ,prudence and our own interest teach us1 of course1 sufficiently that prodigality is a stupid vice1 and that it is absurd to sacrifice the wants of to-morrow to the pleasures of to-day4 ,simple common-sense advises economy and saving4 ,but for this very reason may we ask1 with ,kant3 whether they deserve the name of virtues2 and whether prodigality even1 inasmuch as it tends to an unexpected indigence1 should not be called an imprudence rather than a vice8 ,we shall say in reply that self-interest well understood becomes itself a duty when in opposition to passion4 ,for instance1 if1 on the one side1 passion lures me on to procure to myself a certain pleasure1 and that1 on the other1 self-interest shows that this pleasure imperils my health1 it is certain that duty in this circumstance commands me to prefer my health to a momentary pleasure4#ajj ,prudence1 then1 is but the exercise of a more general duty1 which1 if not the basis1 is at least the condition of all the others3 the duty of self-preservation4 ,economy and saving are not only a duty of self-preservation1 but also a duty of dignity3 for experience teaches us that poverty and misery bring us into the dependency of others and that want leads to beggary4 ,he who knows how to husband his means of existence1 secures for himself in the future not only his livelihood1 but also independence2 in depriving himself of fleeting and commonplace pleasures1 he buys what is far better1 namely1 dignity4 ,be economical1 says ,franklin1 and independence shall be thy shield and buckler1 thy helmet and crown2 then shall thy soul walk upright1 nor stoop to the silken wretch because he hath riches2 nor pocket an abuse because the hand which offers it wears a ring set with diamonds4 ,it is from this point of view that the charming and witty1 though sometimes vulgar1 precepts of poor ,richard may be regarded as moral maxims1 and should have access to all minds3 ,if you would be wealthy1 think of saving as well as of getting4 ,a fat kitchen makes a lean will4 ,what maintains one vice would bring up two children4 ,many littles make a mickle4 ,fools make feasts and wise men eat them4 ,it is foolish to lay out money in a purchase of repentance4 ,silks and satins1 scarlet and velvets put out the kitchen fire4 ,when the well is dry1 they know the worth of water4 ,pride breakfasted with ,plenty1 dined with ,poverty1 and supped with ,infamy4#aja ,what ,franklin has depicted with greatest force and eloquence1 is the humiliation attached to debts1 a sad consequence of the want of economy4 ,there is a kind of pride which is not that of ,rome and ,sparta1 nor of the courts and the great1 but which has not the less its price4 ,he that goes a borrowing1 goes a sorrowing4 ,alas6 think well what you do when you run in debt2 you give to another power over your liberty4 ,if you cannot pay at the time1 you will be ashamed to see your creditor2 you will be in fear when you speak to him2 you will make poor1 pitiful1 sneaking excuses1 and by degrees come to lose your veracity1 and sink into base1 downright lying4 ,for lying rides upon ,debt's back4 ,a free-born man ought not to be afraid to see or speak to any man living4 ,but poverty often deprives a man of all spirit and virtue4 ,it is hard for an empty bag to stand upright4 ,we should then avoid so to subject ourselves to material things as not to dare make use of them1 which is avarice2 or to spend them foolishly and thus render ourselves dependent upon men1 which is prodigality4 ,economy lies between the two1 and it is one of the virtues upon which ,aristotle has most successfully established his theory of the golden mean4 ,kant1 however1 does not agree with him on this point4 ,for1 says he1 if economy is a just medium between two extremes1 then should we1 in going from one vice to the opposite vice1 have to pass through virtue3 the latter then would be nothing more than a lesser vice4 ,according to ,kant1 it is not the measure but the principle which may serve to distinguish a vice from a virtue3 the one is distinguished from the other not quantitatively1 but specifically4 ,the two vices1 extremes themselves1 prodigality and avarice1 namely1 are opposed to each other1 not only in degree1 but in kind4 ,what is prodigality8 ,it is1 says ,kant1 to procure means of livelihood with a view to the enjoyment only4 ,what is avarice8 ,to acquire and preserve these means in view of possession only1 interdicting one's self the enjoyment thereof4 ,these two qualities1 it is seen1 do not only differ from each other in the more or the less1 but in their very nature4 ,there would remain next to ask1 what is the quality of economy1 and that is just what ,kant does not tell us4 ,in default of it1 it might be formulated thus3 to acquire and preserve the means of livelihood1 not for the sake of possession or enjoyment1 but for present or future need4 ,only there remains still the difficulty of distinguishing need from enjoyment4 ,where does legitimate need end8 ,where does barren enjoyment begin8 ,it is here that ,aristotle's formula asserts itself1 and that we must finally come to recognize that the virtue of economy consists in a certain medium between prodigality and avarice4 ,yet whatever it be1 we cannot better close this subject than by citing ,aristotle's admirable description of the prodigal and the miser3 ,la ,bruyere shows no greater acuteness and force4 ,the prodigal is he who ruins himself on his own accord4 ,the senseless squandering of his property is a sort of self-destruction1 since one can only live on what one has4 ,prodigality is the excess of giving1 and the want of receiving2 but these two conditions cannot very long keep together2 for it is not easy to give to every one1 when one receives from no one4 ,this vice1 however1 should not appear as blameworthy as that of avarice4 ,age1 distress even1 may easily enough correct the prodigal and bring him back to a just medium4 ,thus is the nature of the prodigal on the whole not a bad one2 there is nothing vicious or low in this excessive tendency to give much and take nothing in return2 it is only folly4 ,it is true that prodigals become greedy and grasping4 ,this is also why their gifts are not truly liberal 444 why they enrich some people who should be left in poverty1 and refuse doing anything for others far more deserving4 ,they give with open hands to flatterers or people who procure them pleasures as unworthy as those of flattery4 ,avarice is incurable4444 ,avarice is more natural to man than prodigality2 for most of us prefer keeping what we have than giving it away4444 ,it consists of two principal elements3 defect of giving1 excess of receiving4444 ,some show more excess of receiving1 some more defect of giving4 ,thus do all those branded by the name shabby1 stingy1 mean1 sin through a defect of giving2 yet do they not covet1 nor would they take what belongs to others4444 ,other misers1 on the contrary1 may be known by their grasping propensities1 taking all they can get3 for example1 all those who engage in ignoble speculations 444 usurers and all those who lend small sums at large interest4 ,all these people take where they should not take1 and more than they ought to take4 ,lust for the most shameful lucre seems to be the common vice of all degraded hearts3 there is no infamy they are not willing to endure1 if they can make it a profit4#ajb #adf4 ,duties relating to the acquisition of external things4--,work4--,the necessity of procuring the things needful to life imposes on us a fundamental obligation1 which continues even when the want is met3 it is the obligation of work4 ,work springs from want2 this is its first origin2 but it survives want2 and its beauty and dignity consist in that1 being at first born of a natural necessity1 it becomes the honor of man and the salvation of society4 ,in its most general sense1 work means activity1 and in that sense it may be said that everything works in nature2 everything is in motion2 everywhere we see effort1 energy1 unfolding of forces4 ,take but the animals3 the bird works to build its nest2 the spider to weave its web2 the bee to make her honey2 the beaver to construct its lodges2 the dog to catch the game2 the cat to catch mice4 ,we find among animals workmen of all sorts3 masons1 architects1 tailors1 hunters1 travelers2 even politicians and artists1 as if they had been destined to set us examples in all kinds of work and activity4 ,in the morning1 says ,marcus ,aurelius1 when thou hast trouble in getting up1 say to thyself3 ,i awake to do the work of a man3 why1 then1 should ,i grieve for having to do things for which ,i am born1 for which ,i was sent into the world8 ,was ,i born to remain warmly in bed under my cover8--,but it is so pleasant4--,wert thou born for pleasure1 then8 ,was it not for action1 for work8 ,seest thou not the plants1 the sparrows1 the ants1 the spiders1 the bees1 filling each their functions1 and contributing according to their capacity to the harmony of the world8 ,and shouldst thou refuse to attend thy functions as man8 ,shouldst thou not follow the biddings of nature8#ajc ,the ancients distinguished two kinds of work3 noble and independent work1 namely1 the arts1 the sciences1 war and politics2 and servile or mercenary work imposed by necessity4 ,the latter they deemed below the dignity of man2 manual labor1 properly so called1 useful work1 distinct from gymnastics and military exercises1 they considered as belonging exclusively to slaves4 ,it is to this ,aristotle referred when he said3 ,there are men who have but just the necessary amount of reason to understand the reason of others3 it is they whose only work is useful manual labor4 ,it is obvious that such men cannot belong to themselves2 they belong necessarily to others2 they are slaves by nature4 ,aristotle believed1 moreover1 that nature herself had made the distinction between the freeman and the slave3 ,nature1 he said1 made the bodies of the freemen different from those of the slaves2 she gave to the latter the necessary vigor for the heavy work of society1 and made the former unable to bend their erect natures to such rude labors4#ajd ,it is not necessary to have lived to this present time to find these errors refuted4 ,before ,aristotle1 ,socrates had already understood the dignity of labor1 even of the productive labor insuring a livelihood2 he had seen that work in itself was not servile1 as the following charming account related by ,xenophon1 well proves3 ,socrates1 observing1 on one occasion1 ,aristarchus looking gloomily1 ',you seem1' said he1 ',aristarchus1 to be taking something to heart2 but you ought to impart the cause of your uneasiness to your friends2 for1 perhaps1 we may by some means lighten it4' ',i am indeed1 ,socrates1' replied ,aristarchus1 'in great perplexity2 for since the city has been disturbed1 and many of our people have fled to the ,piraeus1 my surviving sisters and nieces and cousins have gathered about me in such numbers1 that there are now in my house fourteen free-born persons4 ,at the same time1 we receive no profit from our lands1 for the enemy are in possession of them2 nor any rent from our houses1 for but few inhabitants are left in the city2 no one will buy our furniture1 nor is it possible to borrow money from any quarter2 a person1 indeed1 as it seems to me1 would sooner find money by seeking it on the road1 than get it by borrowing4 ,it is a grievous thing to me1 therefore1 to leave my relations to perish2 and it is impossible for me to support such a number under such circumstances4' ,socrates1 on hearing this1 replied3 ',are you not aware that ,cyrebus1 by making bread1 maintains his whole household and lives luxuriously2 that ,demea supports himself by making cloaks1 ,menon by making woolen cloaks1 and that most of the ,megarians live by making mantles8' ',certainly they do1' said ,aristarchus2 'for they purchase barbarian slaves and keep them1 in order to force them to do what they please2 but ,i have with me free-born persons and relatives4' ',then1' added ,socrates1 'because they are free and related to you1 do you think that they ought to do nothing else but eat and sleep8 ,do you find that idleness and carelessness are serviceable to mankind1 either for learning what it becomes them to know1 or for remembering what they have learned1 or for maintaining the health and strength of their bodies1 and that industry and diligence are of no service at all8 ,and as to the arts which you say they know1 did they learn them as being useless to maintain life1 and with the intention of never practicing any of them1 or1 on the contrary1 with a view to occupy themselves about them1 and to reap profit from them8 ,in which condition will men be more temperate1 living in idleness or attending to useful employments8 ,in which condition will they be more honest1 if they work1 or if they sit in idleness meditating how to procure necessaries8' ',by the gods1' exclaimed ,aristarchus1 'you seem to me to give such excellent advice1 ,socrates1 that though hitherto ,i did not like to borrow money1 knowing that1 when ,i had spent what ,i got1 ,i should have no means of repaying it1 ,i now think that ,i can endure to do so1 in order to gain the necessary means for commencing work4' ,the necessary means were accordingly provided2 wool was bought2 and the women took their dinners as they continued at work1 and supped when they had finished their tasks2 they became cheerful instead of gloomy in countenance1 and1 instead of regarding each other with dislike1 met the looks of one another with pleasure2 they loved ,aristarchus as their protector1 and he loved them as being of use to him4 ,at last he came to ,socrates1 and told him with delight of the state of things in the house2 adding that1 'the women complained of him as being the only person in the house that ate the bread of idleness4' ',and do you not tell them1' said ,socrates1 'the fable of the dog8 ,for they say that when beasts had the faculty of speech1 the sheep said to her master3 ,you act strangely1 in granting nothing to us who supply you with wool1 and lambs1 and cheese1 except what we get from the ground2 while to the dog1 who brings you no such profits1 you give a share of the food which you take yourself4 ,the dog hearing these remarks1 said1 ',and not indeed without reason3 for ,i am he that protects even yourselves1 so that you are neither stolen by men1 nor carried off by wolves2 while1 if ,i were not to guard you1 you would be unable even to feed1 for fear lest you should be destroyed4' ,in consequence it is said that the sheep agreed that the dog should have superior honor4 ,you1 accordingly1 tell your relations that you are1 in the place of the dog1 their guardian and protector1 and that1 by your means1 they work and live in security and pleasure1 without suffering injury from any one4'#aje ,if it is unjust to regard manual and productive work as servile1 it is equally unjust to regard them as alone entitled to the name of work4 ,there are1 says a ,chinese sage1 two kinds of work3 some people work with their minds2 some with their hands4 ,those who work with their minds govern men2 those who work with their hands are governed by men4 ,those who are governed by men feed men2 those who govern men are fed by men4#ajf ,the same author shows further how divers functions are necessarily divided in society4 ,the holy man said to his brother3 ,go and comfort men2 call them to thee2 bring them back to virtue2 correct them1 help them2 make them prosper4 ,in thus busying themselves with the welfare of the people1 could these holy men find leisure to engage in agriculture8 ,we must1 therefore1 admit that all activity usefully employed is work1 and that all work1 whether manual or intellectual1 mercenary#ajg or gratuitous1 is noble and legitimate4 ,work being taken in its most general sense1 may be set down as being a pleasure1 a necessity1 a duty4 ,kant1 who1 as we have seen1 refuses to admit in morals any other principle but that of duty1 would probably disagree with us when we say that work is a pleasure and a necessity4 ,but if it be true1 why should we not say so8 ,is it necessary1 in order that the duty of work be truly accomplished1 that it be both painful and useless8 ,wisdom nowise requires this4 ,providence having attached to work1 whilst making it the necessary condition of our self-preservation1 a certain pleasure1 lightening thereby our efforts1 morality nowise forbids us to enjoy this pleasure and accept this necessity4 ,it will be easily granted that work is a necessity2 but it is more difficult to obtain from men the admission that it is a pleasure4 ,man1 if he will not die of hunger1 must work1 unquestionably1 they will say2 but that it is a pleasure is quite another thing4 ,if the pleasure of work is put to question1 no one at least will maintain that it is a pleasure not to work4 ,for when does rest1 leisure1 recreation give us most pleasure8 ,everybody knows1 it is when we have worked4 ,recall to mind any unusually heavy work1 any hurried and necessary task1 or even our daily or weekly duty scrupulously fulfilled3 what joy is it not when the task is done to give ourselves a holiday6 ,idleness brings with it satiety1 weariness1 disgust1 disorder1 the ruin of the family1 the destruction of health1 and other evils still more baleful4 ,work1 on the contrary1 makes repose enjoyable4 ,without the fatigue of the day's work1 no pleasure in sleep1 and even no sleep at all4 ,a manifest proof that ,providence did not intend us for repose1 but for action1 for effort1 for struggle1 for energetic and constant work4 ,we should even go so far as to say that work is not only a stimulant1 but that it is in itself a pleasure and a joy4 ,there is1 in the first place1 the joy of self-love4 ,we all experience joy when we have accomplished something2 when we have succeeded in a difficult work1 and the more difficult it was1 the prouder we are of it4 ,besides1 the exercise which accompanies activity is in itself a great good4 ,the unfolding of strength1 physical or moral1 is the source of the truest pleasures4 ,activity is life itself3 to live1 is to act4 ,work1 again1 gives us the pleasure which accompanies any kind of struggle3 in working we struggle against the forces of nature1 we subdue them1 discipline them1 we teach them to obey us4 ,unquestionably the first efforts are painful3 but when once the first difficulties are overcome1 work is so little a fatigue that it becomes a pleasant necessity4 ,one is even obliged to make an effort to take rest4 ,yes1 after having in childhood had trouble to get accustomed to work1 what in the long run becomes the most difficult1 is not to work4 ,one is almost obliged to fight against himself1 to force himself to recreation and rest4 ,leisure in its turn becomes a duty to which we almost submit against our will1 and only because reason bids us to submit to it2 for we know that we must not abuse the strength ,providence has entrusted to us4 ,it is not necessary to dwell long on this point to fix in our memory that work alone insures security and comfort4 ,certainly it does not always secure them2 this is unfortunately too true2 but if we are not quite sure that by working we can provide for wife and children1 and secure a legitimate rest for our old age1 we may1 on the other hand1 be quite sure that without work we shall bring upon ourselves and our family certain misery4 ,there have not yet been found any means whereby wealth may be struck out of the earth without work4 ,this wealth which dazzles our eyes2 these palaces1 carriages1 splendid dresses1 this furniture1 luxury1 all these riches and others more substantial3 machinery1 iron-works1 land produce1 all this is accumulated work4 ,between the condition of savages that wander about famished in the forests of ,america1 and the condition of our civilized societies1 there is no other difference but work4 ,suppose 7a thing impossible7 that in a society like this our own1 all work should all at once be stopped3 distress and hunger would be the immediate and inevitable consequence4 ,spain1 on discovering the gold mines of ,america1 thought herself enriched forever2 she ceased work2 it was her ruin2 for from being ,europe's sovereign mistress1 as she then was1 she fell to the rank we see her occupy to-day4 ,laziness brings with it misery2 misery beggary1 and beggary is not always satisfied with asking merely--it steals4 ,work is not only a pleasure or a necessity1 it is also a duty2 though painful and joyless1 work is1 nevertheless1 an obligation for man2 it were still an obligation for him if he could live without it4 ,work does not only insure security3 it secures dignity4 ,man was created to exercise the faculties of his mind and body4 ,he was created to act4 ,i do not speak here of what he owes to others1 but of what he owes to himself4 ,the happy man1 says ,aristotle1 is not the man asleep1 but the man awake1 and to be awake is to work and act4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,duties ,,relating ,,to ,,the ,,intellect4 ,,summary4 ,duties relative to the investigation of truth4--,of intellectual virtues3 that there are such4 ,of the three forms of the intellect3 speculative1 critical1 practical4 ,hence1 three principal qualities3 knowledge1 judgment or good sense1 prudence4 ,of knowledge4--,refutation of the objections to knowledge3 ,nicole1 ,malebranche and ,rousseau4 ,general duty to cultivate one's intellect3 the impossibility of determining the full range of this duty4 ,good sense or judgment4--,errors committed in ordinary life3 sophisms of self-love1 interest1 and passion4--,other sophisms founded on false appearances4--,logical rules4 ,of prudence or practical wisdom4--,can it be called a virtue8 ,particular rules4 ,duties relative to telling the truth4--,lying4--,two kinds of lies3 inward and outward lying4 ,inward lying4--,can one lie to himself8 ,examples4 ,of the lie properly so-called4--,how and why it lowers the mind4 ,of silence4--,to distinguish between dissimulation and discretion4 ,duty of silence3 in what cases8 ,of the oath and of perjury4--,perjury is a double lie4 ,the different duties of man toward himself1 considered as a moral being1 are naturally deduced from the divers faculties of which this moral being is composed4 ,plato is the first1 to our knowledge1 who has employed this mode of deduction4#ajh ,it is after having distinguished three parts or three faculties in the soul1 that he attributes to each of them a virtue proper1 virtue being1 he says1 the quality by means of which one does a thing well4 ,it is thus that the virtue of wisdom corresponds to the faculty of the understanding2 the virtue of courage to the irascible or courageous faculty1 or to the heart2 temperance1 to that of desire or appetite4 ,to these three virtues1 ,plato adds another which is but the harmony1 the accord1 the equilibrium between these1 namely1 justice4 ,cicero afterwards took up this deduction from another standpoint4#aji ,in applying this ancient method to the present divisions of psychology1 we shall admit1 with ,plato and ,cicero1 an order of virtues relative to the mind1 and which we will call wisdom2 and another class of virtues relating to the will1 and which would correspond with courage or strength of mind 7virtus1 magnitudo animi74 ,as to sensibility1 if we take into consideration the appetites and physical desires1 the virtue relating to them is temperance1 of which we have already spoken4 ,there remain the emotions1 the affections of the heart which relate more particularly to the duties toward others4 ,yet they may1 in a certain respect1 be also considered as duties toward one's self1 although language does not designate this kind of virtue by a particular name4#aaj #adg4 ,duties relative to the investigation of truth4--,intellectual virtues4--,there are two classes of virtues which have been often distinguished3 the strict duties and the broad duties3 the strict duties to consist in not injuring one's faculties2 the broad1 to develop and perfect them2 it is not easy to apply this distinction here2 and1 concerning intelligence1 to separate self-preservation from self-improvement4 ,in such a case1 not to gain is inevitably to lose2 he who does not cultivate his intellect1 impairs it by that very fact4 ,one could not then1 without pedantic investigation and subtlety1 try to distinguish here1 in one and the same duty1 two distinct duties3 the one prohibitive1 the other imperative4 ,they are both bound up in the general duty to cultivate one's intellect4 ,it is not so with the relations existing between one's own intellect and the intellect of others2 the expression of a thought gives rise to a strict duty3 not to lie2 which is the immediate consequence of the duty of the intellect toward itself1 and which consequently should1 by way of corollary1 also belong to the present chapter4 ,the first question which presents itself to us is to know whether we should admit1 with ,aristotle1 intellectual virtues1 properly so called1 distinct from the moral virtues1 the first having regard to the intellect1 the second to the passions4 ,it would seem that the various faculties pointed out by ,aristotle under the name of intellectual virtues1 are rather qualities of the mind than virtues3 art1 science1 prudence1 wisdom1 intelligence#aaa 7not to mention the difficulty of determining the various shades of meaning of these terms71 are natural or acquired aptitudes1 but which do not appear to have any moral merit3 a scholar1 an artist1 a clever man1 a man of good sense and good counsel are naturally distinguished from virtuous men4 ,it would seem then that the intellectual virtues are opposed to the moral virtues1 as the mind is to the heart3 now1 for every one1 it is the heart rather than the mind that is the seat of virtue4 ,these difficulties are only apparent1 and ,aristotle himself gives us the means of solving them3 ,in order to be truly virtuous1 he says1 one should always act in a certain moral spirit3 ,i mean that the choice of an action should be a free one1 determined only by the nature of the acts one accomplishes4 ,now it is virtue that renders this choice laudable and good4#aab ,it is not the natural faculties of the mind then1 no more than those of the heart and body1 that deserve the name of virtues4 ,it is those same faculties1 developed and cultivated by the will3 on this condition alone do they deserve esteem and respect4 ,the intellect is in itself of a higher order than the senses1 the appetites1 the passions3 it is therefore incumbent upon us to give it the largest share in our personal development4 ,it is to that we are allied1 says ,pascal1 not to space and time4 ,let our efforts then tend to think well2 this is the principle of morality4 ,the intellect presents two particular forms3 it is either contemplative or active1 theoretical or practical4 ,the virtue of the contemplative intellect is knowledge2 that of the practical intellect prudence4 ,finally a third virtue might be admitted3 judgment or common sense1 which is a critical1#aac not a practical faculty1 and which partakes at the same time of both sides of the understanding4 ,these subtle distinctions of ,aristotle have not lost their correctness and application with time4 ,one can1 in fact1 employ his mind in three ways3 either contemplate absolute truth by the means of science2--or judge of events and men and foresee future things without contributing toward their occurrence2--or again deliberate as to what is to be done or not to be done to bring about actions useful to one's self and to others4 ,hence three kinds of men3 the wise1 the intelligent1 the prudent4 ,knowledge4--,taking up again1 one after the other1 these three qualities1 we ought to ask ourselves whether knowledge is a duty for man2 if he is held to develop his mind in a theoretical manner and without any practical end4 ,but before we examine whether it is a duty1 let us first find out whether it is lawful4 ,the scientific and speculative culture of the mind on the part of man1 has often been regarded as a proud or conceited refinement4 ,this opinion was expressed by some writers of the seventeenth century--for instance1 by ,nicole1 in the preface to the ,logique de ,port ,royal3 ,these sciences1 he says1 have not only back-corners and secret recesses of very little use1 but they are all useless when viewed in themselves and for themselves4 ,men were not born to spend their time measuring lines1 examining the relations of angles1 studying the divers movements of matter3 their mind is too vast1 their life too short1 their time too precious1 to occupy themselves with such small matters4 ,malebranche expresses himself in about the same terms3 ,men were not born to become astronomers or chemists1 to spend their whole life hanging on a telescope or fastened to a furnace1 for no better purpose than to draw afterwards from their laborious observations useless consequences4 ,granting some astronomer was the first in discovering lands1 seas1 and mountains in the moon2 that he was the first to perceive spots moving upon the sun1 and that he has calculated their movements exactly4 ,granting some chemists to have finally discovered the secret of fixing mercury or to make that alkahest by means of which ,van ,helmont boasted he could dissolve all matter3 were they the wiser and happier for it8 ,in expressing themselves so disdainfully concerning the sciences1 ,nicole and ,malebranche meant1 in fact1 only that one should not prefer speculative knowledge to the science of man or to the science of ,god2 and it is most true that if we view the sciences from a standpoint of dignity1 we must admit that the moral sciences have greater excellence than the physical sciences4 ,but that which is equally true is1 that we must not measure the merit of the sciences by their material or even moral or logical utility4 ,science is in itself1 and without regard to any other end but itself1 worthy to be loved and studied4 ,intelligence1 in fact1 was given to man that he might know the truth of things2 investigation is its natural food4 ,man1 in raising himself to science1 increases thereby the excellence of his nature2 he becomes a creature of a higher order2 for in the order of divine creatures1 the most perfect are at the same time those who know the most1 and the highest degree of happiness promised to religious faith1 is to know truth face to face4 ,it is therefore no frivolous amusement to increase here below the sum of knowledge we are capable of1 though this knowledge be only that of the things of this world1 and not yet the higher and direct knowledge of ,god4 ,without admitting that science is of itself a legitimate object of research1 it will be recognized that it is lawful to study it1 either in our own interest or for the love of others1 or for the love of ,god4 ,but this is not enough3 to see in science nothing but a means to be useful to ourselves 7as1 for example1 to make a living71#aad is a servile and mercenary view1 which does not deserve to be discussed4 ,to maintain that science should only be cultivated because of its utility to others1 is the same as to say that man has no duties toward himself1 and that he is not obliged1 letting alone the interest of others1 to respect or perfect his own self3 a thing we have already refuted4 ,finally1 to say that science should be cultivated as a gift from ,god1 and for the love of ,god1 may be true2 but this is not any more applicable to that occupation than to any other2 and the same may be said of any other kind of duty without exception4 ,certainly1 science should not make one proud2 but pride is only an adventitious and not a necessary consequence1 which1 in speaking of cultivating science1 should not be confounded with the fact itself4 ,besides1 when ,malebranche says that the scientist is not any happier or wiser for his science1 he is mistaken3 for the greatest happiness is sometimes derived from science alone2 and as to the wisdom of it1 a taste for elevated thought is already a guarantee against the allurements of the passions2 finally1 whilst we cultivate science1 we are safe from other less innocent inclinations4 ,to the opinions of ,nicole and ,malebranche1 let us oppose the testimony of two men who possessed in the highest degree the respect and love of science3 ,it is unworthy of man1 says ,aristotle1 not to possess himself of all the science he can4 ,if the poets are right1 when they say that the ,divinity is capable of jealousy1 this jealousy would especially manifest itself in regard to philosophy1 and then1 all those who indulged in elevated thought would be unhappy4 ,but it is not possible for the ,divinity to be jealous1 and the poets1 as the proverb says1 do not always tell the truth4 ,let us now hear ,descartes3 ,although in judging myself ,i find that ,i am more disposed to incline toward the side of distrust than presumption1 and that regarding with a philosopher's eye the diverse actions and enterprises of men1 there be scarcely any that do not seem to me vain and useless1 yet does the progress which ,i think ,i have already made in the search for truth give me extreme satisfaction1 and inspire me with such hopes for the future that if1 among the more material occupations of men1 there are any substantially good and important1 ,i dare believe that it is the one ,i have chosen4#aae ,if1 from a standpoint of somewhat mystical piety1 some minds of the seventeenth century regarded the sciences as useless1 a paradoxical stoicism accused them in the eighteenth to be a cause of corruption and decay in society4 ,such is ,j4 ,j4 ,rousseau's celebrated thesis in his first speech at the ,academy of ,dijon4 ,this celebrated paradox1 which has created so much excitement in the past century1 and which is even an historical event 7for it was the first attack against the society of the time71 has since been so decried that it is useless to dwell on it4 ,let us make a brief resume of ,j4 ,j4 ,rousseau's arguments3 #a4 ,progress in letters and sciences serves for nothing else but to conceal the vices and put hypocrisy in the place of an ill-bred rusticity4 #b4 ,all great nations ceased to be invincible as soon as the sciences penetrated among them4 ,egypt1 after the conquest of ,cambyses2 ,greece1 after ,pericles2 ,rome1 after ,augustus4 ,if1 on the contrary1 we look for examples of healthy1 honest1 vigorous nations1 we find them among the ancient ,persians1 ,scythians1 ,spartans1 the first ,romans1 the ,swiss4 #c4 ,the sciences and arts are born of and nourish idleness4 ,their least mischief is uselessness4#aaf #d4 ,the letters and arts engender luxury1 and luxury is one of the powerful instruments of corruption in morals3 it destroys courage1 lowers the character1 and1 by another consequence1 depraves and corrupts the taste even4 #e4 ,another consequence3 the culture of the mind engenders sophisms1 false systems1 and dangerous doubts about religion and morality4 ,these various arguments1 taking them up one after the other1 may be answered as follows3 #a4 ,it is nowise proved that in the age of ignorance vices were less numerous and less deeply rooted than in the more enlightened age4 ,decency is a good in itself1 and is not always hypocrisy4 ,delicacy of mind robs at least vice of its grossest features2 it diminishes and allays violence1 which is a great source of crimes4 #b4 ,it is not true that military virtues 7which1 besides1 are not the only admirable virtues7 are destroyed by the culture of the mind3 modern examples prove this sufficiently4 #c4 ,to say that the letters and sciences are born of and nourish idleness is an abuse of words4 ,wherein is the man who works mentally more idle than he who works with his hands8 #d4 ,the sciences and letters do not develop a taste for luxury3 luxury would develop without them1 and would be all the more frivolous and corrupting3 they are concomitant1 but not mutually related facts4 ,luxury1 besides1 is not absolutely bad in itself3 the taste for elegance is a legitimate one4 ,is not nature herself adorned8 #e4 ,science develops wrong opinions1 false systems3 so be it2 but it also corrects them1 and we should look at both sides of a thing and see its good parts as well as its bad4 ,otherwise it would be easy to prove that everything is wrong4 ,rousseau's paradox1 however1 is not altogether false1 and there are1 unquestionably1 many evils mixed up with the culture of the mind1 but these evils do not come from the mind's being cultivated1 but from its being badly cultivated2 they do not come from people's seeking the true and the beautiful1 but1 on the contrary1 from their not seeking them enough4 ,the vanity derived from false science should not be imputed to true science1 but to ignorance4 ,the moral enfeeblement1 which is the result of an over-refined culture of the mind1 comes from our not sufficiently cultivating the mind in every direction2 for example1 from our neglecting the moral sciences for the industrial sciences1 or the nobler arts for the voluptuous arts4 ,the remedy for the evils pointed out by ,rousseau is1 therefore1 not ignorance1 but1 on the contrary1 a greater abundance of light1 and higher lights4 ,it is then for each of us a duty to instruct himself1 but it is evident that this duty must be regarded as a broad duty--that is to say1 that its application cannot be determined by precise formulas4 ,no man is obliged by the moral law to be what is called a scholar2 no one is obliged to learn astronomy or transcendental mathematics1 still less metaphysics4 ,but it can be said that it is a duty for each of us3 #a4 ,to learn as well as possible the principles of the art he will have to cultivate3 for instance1 the magistrate the principles of jurisprudence2 the physician the principles of medicine2 the artisan the principles of mechanics4 ,in this respect young students1 we must confess1 have far too easy a conscience4 ,they do not realize the responsibility they incur by their negligence and laziness4 #b4 ,it is a duty for all men1 according to the means they can dispose of1 to instruct themselves concerning their duties4 #c4 ,it is also a duty for each to go1 as far as he can1 beyond the strictly necessary in matters of education1 and in proportion to the means he has at his disposal4 ,it is then a duty to neglect no occasion of improving one's self4 #adi4 ,good sense4--,between science and prudence1 between theoretical intelligence and practical intelligence1 ,aristotle places the critical faculty--in other terms1 judgment1 good sense1 discernment4 ,this faculty is distinguished from science in that it is only applied to things where doubt and deliberation come in2 it treats then of the same objects as prudence2 but it is distinguished from the latter in that prudence is practical and prescribes what should be done or not be done2 good sense1 on the contrary1 is purely critical3 it is limited to mere judging4 ,it is1 then1 in some respects disinterested and does not induce to action2 it is the art of appreciating things1 men1 and events4 ,good judgment may be found among men lacking practical prudence3 one sees often very well the faults of others without seeing one's own2 or1 again1 one may be aware of one's own faults and not be able to correct them4 ,however1 it is not to be denied that good sense or good judgment is a useful auxiliary to prudence2 it is already in itself an estimable quality1 and is far from being as well distributed among men as ,descartes claims4#aag ,on the contrary1 according to ,nicole3 ,common sense is not so common a quality as one thinks4444 ,nothing is more rare than this exactness of judgment4 ,everywhere we meet false minds who have scarcely any discernment of what is true2 who take everything the wrong way2 who accept the worst kind of reasonings1 and wish to make others accept them also2 who allow themselves to be carried away by the least appearances of things2 who are always excessive in their views and run into extremes2 minds who either have no grasp to hold on to the truths they have acquired1 because they have become attached to them through chance rather than solid knowledge2 or who1 on the contrary1 persist in their ideas with such stubbornness that they listen to nothing that could undeceive them2 who judge boldly of things neither they nor any one else1 perhaps1 ever understood2 who make no difference between talking to the purpose and talking nonsense1 and are guided in their judgment by mere trifles4444 ,so that there are no absurdities1 however incredible1 that do not find approving adherents4 ,whoever intends duping people is sure to find people glad to be duped1 and the most ridiculous nonsense is sure to find minds suited for it4 ,here1 the rules of morality are confounded with those of logic4 ,it is the latter that teaches us how to avoid error1 if not in science 7which is the object of speculative logic71 at least in life4 ,the development of these rules will be found in the ,recherche de la verite of ,malebranche4 ,the ,logique de ,port ,royal will furnish us a resume of them which will suffice here3 #aej4 ,illusions coming from ourselves4--#a4 ,a first cause of illusion in the judgments we pass upon things1 is to take our interest for a motive of belief3 ,i am of such or such a country1 ergo1 ,i must believe that such or such a saint has preached the ,gospel there2 ,i belong to such or such a class1 ergo1 ,i believe that such or such a privilege is a just one4 #b4 ,our affections are another cause of illusion3 ,i love him1 ergo1 he is the cleverest man in the world2 ,i hate him1 ergo1 he is nobody4 ,this is what may be called the sophistry of the heart4 #c4 ,illusions of self-love4 ,there are some who decide about everything by the general and very convenient principle1 that they must be in the right4 ,they listen but little to the reasons of others2 they wish to carry everything before them by main authority1 and treat all those who are not of their opinion as indifferent thinkers4 ,some even1 without suspecting it1 go so far as to say to themselves3 ,if it were so1 ,i should not be the clever man ,i am3 or1 ,i am a clever man2 ergo1 it is not so4 #d4 ,reciprocal reproaches which people may make to each other with the same right3 for example1 you are a caviler1 you are selfish1 blind1 dishonest1 etc4 ,whence this equitable and judicious rule of ,saint ,augustine3 ,let us avoid in discussions mutual reproaching2 reproaches which1 though they may not be true at that moment1 may justly be made by both parties4 #e4 ,a spirit of contradiction and dispute1 so admirably depicted by ,montaigne3 ,we only learn to dispute that we may contradict1 and every one contradicting and being contradicted1 it falls out that the fruit of disputation is to lose and nullify the truth4444 ,one flies to the east1 the other to the west2 they lose the principal1 and wander in the crowd of incidents2 after an hour of tempest1 they know not what they seek2 one is low1 the other high1 and a third wide2 one catches at a word and a simile2 another is no longer sensible of what is said in opposition to him1 being entirely absorbed in his own notions1 engaged in following his own course1 and not thinking of answering you2 another1 finding himself weak1 fears all1 refuses all1 and1 at the very beginning1 confounds the subjects1 or1 in the very height of the dispute1 stops short1 and grows silent2 by a peevish ignorance affecting a proud contempt1 or an unseasonable modest desire to shun debate4444 #f4 ,the contrary defect1 namely1 a sycophantic amiability1 which approves of everything and admires everything3 example1 the ,philinte of ,moliere4 ,besides these different illusions which are due to ourselves and our own weaknesses1 there are others engendered from without1 or at least from the divers aspects under which things present themselves to us3 #aea4 ,illusions arising from objects4--#a4 ,the mixture of the true and the false1 of good and evil which we see in things1 is cause that we often confound them4 ,thus do the good qualities of the persons we esteem cause us to approve their defects1 and vice versa4 ,now1 it is precisely in this judicious separation of good from evil that a correct mind shows itself4 #b4 ,illusions arising from eloquence and flowery rhetoric4 #c4 ,ill-natured interpretations of people's peculiar views founded on mere appearances or hearsay2 as1 for example3 such a one goes with doubtful characters1 ergo1 he is a bad character himself2 such another associates with free-thinkers1 ergo1 he is a free-thinker likewise2 a third criticises the government1 ergo1 he is a rebel2 he approves its acts1 ergo1 he is a courtier1 etc41 etc4 #d4 ,false deductions drawn from a few accidental occurrences2 as for instance3 medicine does not cure all diseases1 hence it cures none2 there are frivolous women1 hence all women are frivolous2 there are hypocrites1 hence piety is nothing but hypocrisy4 #e4 ,error of judging of bad or good advice from subsequent events4 ,as for example3 ,such or such an event followed upon such and such advice1 hence it was good--it was bad4 #f4 ,sophistry of authority4 ,it consists in accepting men's opinions on the strength of certain qualities they may possess1 although these qualities may have nothing to do with the matter in hand4 ,for instance1 by reason of their age1 or piety1 or1 what is worse1 of wealth and influence4 ,certainly we do not exactly say in so many words3 such a one has a hundred pounds income1 and must therefore be right2 but there is nevertheless something similar going on in our minds1 which runs away with our judgment without our being conscious of it4 ,in pointing out these various dangers upon which good judgment and upright reasoning are often wrecked1 we indicate sufficiently the rules which ought to serve in the education of the mind3 for it is enough to be warned against such errors1 and be endowed with a certain amount of correct judgment1 to recognize and avoid them4 #aeb4 ,prudence4--,from the faculty of judging and having an opinion about things1 let us pass on to the third quality of the mind1 namely3 prudence1 which consists1 as ,aristotle informs us1 in deliberating well before doing anything1 and which is the art of well discerning our interest in the things concerning us1 and the interest of others in the things concerning them4 ,there are then two sorts of prudence3 personal prudence1 which is nothing more than self-interest well understood1 and civil or disinterested prudence1 which applies to the interests of others2 thus1 a prudent general1 a prudent notary1 a prudent minister1 are not only prudent in their own interests1 but for that of others4 ,prudence from this point of view is then but a duty toward others4 ,as to personal prudence1 it may be asked how far it is a question of morals1 and whether it is not excluded from them by the very principle of morals1 which is duty4 ,but we have already solved that difficulty4 ,because prudence is not all virtue1 it does not follow that it is not a virtue4 ,certainly1 we are too naturally inclined to seek our own interest1 to make it necessary to set it down as a duty4 ,but in case of struggle between self-interest and passion1#aah self-interest takes sometimes the character of duty4 ,this is clear enough4 ,interest1 if properly understood1 represents general interest2 and passion1 private interest4 ,to yield to passion1 is to satisfy at a given moment1 and for a very short time1 one of our desires only4 ,prudence1 on the contrary1 pleads the cause of the general interest of the entire man1 and for all his life4 ,man may be represented 7as ,plato has represented him7 figuratively as a city1 a republic1 a world2 it has been said that he is a microcosm 7little world74 ,this little world represents in miniature the harmony of the great world4 ,the individual to whom the government of this little world is intrusted1 and who stands in regard to himself as ,providence stands in regard to the universe1 should not favor a part of it at the expense of the rest4 ,prudence is then the virtue by means of which man governs the affairs of the little ,state of which he is the king4 ,prudence1 moreover1 is nothing more than foresight--that is to say1 the faculty of foreseeing what is coming1 of drawing from the past1 consequences for the future1 and acting conformably to the lessons of experience4 ,now1 it is especially by this that man is distinguished from the animal3 it is by this that he is capable of progress4 ,he owes it then to himself to act according to the principles of reason1 and not according to brute instincts4 ,another difficulty of greater import1 is that prudence does not represent a special virtue1 but is nothing more than a common name given to several particular virtues4 ,thus1 prudence being defined the discernment between the useful and the hurtful1 it may be said that discernment1 in point of sensual pleasures1 will be called moderation or temperance2 in point of riches1 economy2 that true courage holding the mean between temerity and cowardice1 is necessarily accompanied by prudence2 we have seen that science itself must learn how to keep within bounds1 and this also is a sort of prudence4 ,we shall find therefore that prudence has not1 like other virtues1 a property of its own4 ,it is in reality nothing more than a mode common to all personal virtues1 each presenting two standpoints to be considered from3 #a1 from the standpoint of personal dignity1 which is the highest principle2 #b1 from the standpoint of a proper self-interest1 which1 subordinate to the first1 is a secondary and relative standpoint4 ,however1 applied in individual cases1 we will give here a few of the rules concerning prudence in general3 #a4 ,it is not enough to attend to what good or evil the present moment may present2 we should also examine what the natural consequences of this good or evil will be1 so that1 comparing the present with the future and balancing the one with the other1 we may see the result beforehand4 #b4 ,it is unreasonable to seek a good which will inevitably be followed by a greater evil4 #c4 ,nothing is more reasonable than to suffer an evil which is certain to be followed by a greater good4 #d4 ,one should prefer a greater good to a lesser1 and conversely so in the case of evils4 #e4 ,it is not necessary to be fully certain in regard to great goods or evils1 and probability is sufficient to induce a reasonable person to deprive himself of some lesser goods1 or to suffer some slight evils1 in view of acquiring much greater goods1 or avoiding worse evils4#aai #aed4 ,duties relative to telling the truth4--,veracity and falsehood4--,it is in the nature of man to express his thoughts by signs of various kinds1 and oftenest by words4 ,what is the law which is to regulate the relations between words and thoughts8 ,are we to regard words as arbitrary means serving indifferently to express any kind of thought1 or as having no other end than to express our own particular thought1 the same1 namely1 which comes to us at the moment of speaking8 ,common sense solves this question by esteeming in the highest degree those who use speech only to express their thought1 and despising those who use it to deceive4 ,this sort of virtue is called veracity1 and its opposite is falsehood4 ,falsehood is generally regarded among men as only a violation of the duty toward others4 ,it is not from this standpoint we are going to consider it here4 ,unquestionably1 one should injure no one in any way1 no more by a falsehood than otherwise4 ,but for a falsehood to be harmless1 does it follow that it is not bad8 ,the scholastics distinguished two kinds of falsehoods3 the malicious falsehood1 with intent to deceive1 and the verbal falsehood1 which consists in mere words1 and does not spring from any wish to do harm 7as1 for example1 the falsehood of the physician who deceives his patient74 ,but such distinctions should not be admitted4 ,falsehood need not be malicious to be bad3 it is bad of itself1 whatever be its consequences4 ,there remains then to know what is to be done in cases of conflict between our duties1 and if moral law does not in certain cases relent8 ,even though it did1 it would not suffice to authorize the distinction between two kinds of falsehoods4 ,what precisely constitutes a falsehood is to be verbal--that is to say1 to employ speech to express the contrary of truth4 ,whether malice enters into it or not1 this is an accident which has nothing to do with the essence of falsehood2 it may aggravate or attenuate it1 certainly1 but it does not constitute it4 ,to well understand the moral evil which resides in falsehood one must take it at its source--that is to say1 distinguish with ,kant between inner and outward falsehood3 the first whereby one lies to himself1 namely1 in lacking in sincerity in regard to himself2 the second whereby one lies to others4 ,the human mind is naturally constituted for knowing the truth3 truth is its object and its end4 ,a mind that has not truth for its object is no mind4 ,whosoever uses his mind to satisfy his inclinations undoubtedly debases his mind1 but he does not pervert it2 but he who uses his mind to make himself or others believe the contrary to the truth1 perverts and ruins his mind4 ,he then perverts and destroys one of the most excellent gifts of his nature1 and fails thereby in one of the strictest and most clearly defined duties4 ,it may be asked whether it is possible for man to really lie to himself1 and if it is not rather a contradiction in terms4 ,one can1 in fact1 understand how a man may be mistaken1 but then he does not know that he is mistaken2 it is an error1 but no lie2 if1 on the contrary1 he knows that he is mistaken1 then for that very reason is he no longer mistaken2 so that it would seem that there can be no lying to one's self4 ,and yet popular psychology1 the subtlest of all1 because it is formed in the presence of real facts1 and under the true teachings of experience 7whilst scientific psychology is always more or less artificial71 this natural psychology1 which sums up the experience of the whole of humanity1 has always affirmed that man could voluntarily deceive himself1 consequently lie to himself4 ,the most ordinary case of inward falsehood is when man employs sophisms--that is to say1 seeks reasons wherewith to smother the cry of his conscience2 or when he tries to persuade himself that he has no other motive in view than moral good1 whilst1 in fact1 he only acts from fear of punishment1 or from any other interested motive4 ,to take1 through love of self1 an intention for a fact1 because it has for its object a good end in itself1 is again1 says ,kant1 a defect of another kind4 ,it is a weakness similar to that of the lover who1 desirous to see nothing but good qualities in the woman he loves1#abj shuts his eyes to the most obvious defects4 ,the inward lie is then an unpardonable weakness1 if not a real baseness1 and we must conclude from this that it is the same with the outward lie--the lie1 namely1 which expresses itself in words4 ,here it may be objected that speech is not an integrant part of the mind1 that it is only an accident1 that whatever use we may make of speech we do not destroy thereby the principle of intelligence1 for ,i may use my mind to discover and possess myself of truth1 even though ,i should not make known the same to others1 or make them believe otherwise than ,i think4 ,from this standpoint falsehood would still remain a sin as a violation of the duty toward others1 though not as a shortcoming in regard to one's self4 ,but this would be a very false analysis of the psychological fact called communication of thought4 ,speech is never wholly independent of thought4 ,the very fact that ,i speak1 implies that ,i think my speech3 there is an inner affirmation required4 ,i cannot make sophisms to deceive men without having first inwardly combined these sophisms through the faculty of thinking which is in me4 ,i think then of one thing and another at the same time2 ,i think at the same time of both the true and the false1 and ,i am conscious of this contradiction4 ,i employ then knowingly my mind in destroying itself1 and ,i fall1 consequently1 into the vice pointed out above4 ,kant gives another deduction than ours to prove that falsehood is a violation of duty toward one's self4 ,but his deduction is1 perhaps1 not sufficiently severe3 ,a man who does not himself believe what he tells another1 is of less worth than is a simple thing2 for one may put the usefulness of a simple thing to some account1 whilst the liar is not so much a real man as a deceiving appearance of a man4444 ,once the major principle of veracity shaken1 dissimulation soon runs into all our relations with others4 ,this deduction is very ingenious2 but it lacks strictness1 inasmuch as it is based on the use a man may be made of1 which principle is contrary to the general principle of ,kant's morals1 and also because it rests on the standpoint of social interest1 which lies outside the point in question4 #aee4 ,discretion4--,it is evident that the duty not to lie1 does not carry with it1 as its consequence1 the duty of telling all4 ,silence must not be confounded with dissimulation1 and no one is obliged to tell all he has in his mind2 far from it2 we are here before another duty toward ourselves1 which stands in some respect in opposition to the preceding one1 namely1 discretion4 ,the babbler who speaks at all times and under all circumstances1 and he who tells what he should not1 must not be confounded with the loyal and sincere man1 who only tells what he thinks1 but does not necessarily tell all he thinks4 ,silence is obviously a strict duty toward others1 when the matter in question has been confided to us under the seal of secrecy4 ,but it may also be said that it is a duty toward ourselves1 and for the following reasons3 #a4 ,to use one's mind1 as does the babbler1 in giving utterance to barren and frivolous thoughts1 is degrading3 not all that accidentally crosses one's mind is worthy of being expressed2 and it is simply heedlessness to fix one's mind on fleeting things1 and give them a certain fixity and value through words2 #b1 there are1 on the other hand1 other thoughts1 too precious1 too personal1 too elevated1 to be indiscreetly exposed to the curiosity of fools or indifferent persons4 ,thus will it be heroic1 unquestionably1 to confess one's faith before the executioner1 if there is need2 but it is not necessary to proclaim it all round when there is no occasion for it3 ,i believe such and such a thing2 ,i belong to such or such a church2 ,i hold such and such a doctrine2 ,i belong to such or such a party1 unless1 of course1 there is an interest in spreading one's belief2 and even then it will be necessary to choose the right place and the right moment4 ,as to using discretion in regard to our sentiments1 our moral qualities1 or our defects1 it is in one instance a duty of modesty and in another one of personal dignity4 #aef4 ,perjury4--,if falsehood is in general an abasement of human dignity1 it is a still greater abasement when it is of the kind called perjury1 and a transgression which might be defined as a double falsehood4 ,perjury is of two sorts3 it either means swearing falsely or violating a former oath4 ,in order to understand the meaning of perjury1 one must know what constitutes an oath4 ,the oath is an affirmation where ,god is taken as a witness of the truth one is supposed to utter4 ,the oath consists1 then1 in some respect1 in invoking ,god in our favor1 in making him speak in our name4 ,we1 so to say1 attest that ,god himself1 who reads the heart1 would1 if he were called in testimony1 speak as we speak ourselves4 ,the oath indicates that one accepts in advance the chastisements ,god does not fail to inflict upon those who invoke his name in vain4 ,it will be seen by this how perjury1 namely1 false swearing1 may be called a double lie4 ,for perjury is a lie1 first in affirming a thing that is false1 and second1 in affirming that ,god would bear testimony if he were present4 ,let us add that there is here a sort of sacrilege which consists in our making ,god1 in some respects1 the accomplice of our lie4 ,it is true that men1 in taking an oath1 forget often its sacred and religious character1 and1 consequently1 there is not always a sacrilegious intention in their false swearing4 ,but it may still be said that perjury is a double lie2 for in every oath taken1 even though stripped of all religious character1 there is always a double attestation3 first we affirm a thing1 and next we affirm that our affirmation is true4 ,it is thus that in that form of speech long since worn out1 which is called word of honor1 we give our word and engage our honor to attest that such or such affirmation is true4 ,to break this word is1 then1 to lie twice1 for it is affirming a false affirmation4 ,it is for this reason that falsehood1 which is always culpable1 must1 in this case1 be regarded as particularly dishonorable4 ,as to perjury1 considered as a violation of a former oath1 it belongs to the class of promise or word-breaking1 which is especially contrary to the duty toward others4 ,yet1 even in this kind of falsehood1 there is also a violation of personal duty2 for he who breaks a promise 7with or without oath7 would seem to indicate by it that he did not intend keeping his promise1 which is destructive to the very idea of a promise2 it is then1 once more1 using speech1 not as a necessary symbol of thought1 but simply as a means of obtaining what we want1 reserving to ourselves the liberty to change our minds when the moment comes for fulfilling our promise4 ,this is abasing our intelligence1 and making it serve as a means to satisfy our wants1 whilst it belongs to an order far superior to these very wants4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,duties ,,relative ,,to ,,the ,,will4 ,,summary4 ,duties relative to the will4--,strength of soul4--,all duty in general is relative to the will3 for there is not any which does not require the control of the will over the inclinations4 ,virtue1 especially when considered from the latter standpoint1--the control of the will over the inclinations1--is strength of soul1 or courage4 ,of courage and its different forms3 military courage2 civic courage2 patience1 moderation in prosperity2 equanimity1 etc4 ,of anger and its different kinds4--,generous anger4 ,duty of personal dignity4--,respect for one's self4 ,true pride and false pride4--,of a just esteem of one's self4--,of modesty4 ,duties relative to sentiment4--,have we any duties in regard to our sensibilities8--,kant's objection3 no one can love at will4 ,reply4--,to distinguish sensibility from sentimentality4 #aeg4 ,duties relative to the will4--,strength of soul4--,one may justly ask whether there are any duties relating particularly to the will3 for it would seem that all duties are generally duties of the will4 ,there is no one that does not require the control of the will over the inclinations2 and if we say that it is a duty to cultivate and exercise this control1 is it not as if we said that it is a duty to learn to do our duty8 ,but why could we not also suppose a third duty1 commanding us to observe the former1 and so ad infinitum8 ,we may then say that the duty to exercise one's will and triumph over the passions1 is nothing more than duty per se1 the duty par excellence1 of which all the other duties are but parts4 ,this virtue1 by which the soul commands its passions and does not allow itself to be subjugated by any of them1 may be called courage or strength of soul4 ,courage thus understood is not only a virtue2 it is virtue itself4#aba ,in fact1 what is temperance1 if it is not a certain kind of courage before the pleasures of the senses8 what economy1 if not courage before the temptations of fortune8 what veracity1 if not the courage to tell the truth under all circumstances8 what justice and benevolence1 if not the courage to sacrifice self-interest to the interest of others8 ,we have already 7page #hg7 made a similar observation in regard to prudence and wisdom1 namely1 that virtue in general is both wisdom and courage3 for it presupposes at the same time strength and light4 ,as strength1 it is courage1 energy1 greatness of soul2 as light1 it is prudence and wisdom4 ,all special virtues would1 then1 strictly speaking1 be only factors1 or component parts1 of those two4 #aeh4 ,courage4--,yet if courage1 in its most general sense1 is virtue itself1 usage has given it a special meaning which defines it in a more particular manner1 and makes of it a certain distinct virtue1 on the same conditions as all the others4 ,as of all the assaults which besiege us in life1 death appears to be the most terrible and generally the most dreaded1 it is not to be wondered then that this kind of energy which consists in braving death and1 consequently1 all that may lead to it1 namely1 peril1 has been designated by a particular name4 ,courage1 therefore1 is the sort of virtue which braves peril and even death4 ,then1 by extension1 the same word was applied to every manifestation of strength of soul before misfortune1 misery1 grief4 ,a man can be brave in poverty1 in slavery1 under humiliation even--that is1 a humiliation which is due to outward circumstances1 and which he has not deserved4 ,this courageous virtue seems to have been the particular feature of the ancients1 and by dint of its excellence1 still retains its hold on us1 dazzling our imagination1 as a privileged prestige4 ,yet is it only an illusion1 and modern times are as rich in heroes as were ancient times3 only we pay less attention to it perhaps2 but1 whether it be real superiority in this kind of virtue1 or literary reminiscences and habits of education1 nothing will ever erase that lively picture of ancient heroism so celebrated under the name of ,plutarch's heroes1 and which has always captivated all great imaginations4 ,stoicism1 that original philosophy of the ,greek and ,roman world1 is above all the philosophy of courage4 ,its character proper is the strength to resist one's self1 to hold pain1 death1 all the accidents of humanity1 in contempt4 ,its model is ,hercules1 the god of strength2 all the great men of antiquity1 whether consciously or not1 were stoics3 such were especially the ancient ,roman citizens2 they were austere1 inexorable2 slaves to duty and discipline1 faithful to their oath1 to their country2--,brutus1 ,regulus1 ,scaevola1 ,decius1 and thousands more like them4 ,when stoicism came in contact with the last great ,romans1 it found material all ready for its doctrines2 it then became the philosophy of the last republicans1 the last heroes of a world which was fast disappearing4 ,the courage which most impresses men is military courage4 ,the most honorable deaths occur in war1 says ,aristotle1 for in war the danger is the greatest and most honorable4 ,the public honors that are awarded in states and by monarchs attest this4 ,properly1 then1 he who in the case of an honorable death1 and under circumstances close at hand which cause death1 is fearless1 may be called courageous2 and the dangers of war are1 more than any others1 of this description4#abb ,in looking at it from this somewhat exclusive standpoint1 ,aristotle refuses to call courageous those who brave sickness and poverty2 for it is possible1 he says1 for cowards1 in the perils of war1 to bear with much firmness the losses of fortune2 nor does he allow to be called courageous him who firmly meets the strokes of the whip he is threatened with4 ,this is but a question of name and degree4 ,wherever there are any evils to brave1 the firmness which meets and bears these evils can be called courage2 on the other hand1 the sense of the word can1 if preferred1 be restricted to military perils2 but what ,aristotle has most justly defined1 and of which he makes a very subtle analysis1 is the difference between apparent and true courage4 ,thus the courage of constraint and necessity--as1 for instance1 that of soldiers who would be mercilessly killed1 if they retreated before the enemy--is not true courage1 for one cannot be brave through fear4 ,nor should anger be confounded with courage3 this were but the courage of wild beasts obeying a blind impulse under the sting of pain4 ,at that rate1 the donkeys even1 when hungry1 would be brave4 ,that which determines true courage is the sentiment of honor1 not passion4 ,we should neither call brave him who is so only because he feels himself the strongest1 like the drunkard full of confidence in the beginning1 but who runs away when he does not succeed4 ,for this reason is there truer courage in preserving one's intrepidity and calm in sudden dangers1 than in dangers long anticipated4#abc ,finally1 ignorance cannot be called courage either3 to brave a danger one is ignorant of1 is only to be apparently brave4 ,aristotle finds also in courage an excellent opportunity to apply his celebrated theory of the golden mean4 ,courage is for him a medium between temerity and cowardice4 ,but it is not the too much or too little in danger which determines what we ought to call courage4 ,there are cases where one may be obliged to brave the greatest possible danger without being for that rash2 other cases where1 on the contrary1 one has the right to avoid the least possible peril without being for that a coward4 ,the true principle is that one should brave necessary perils1 be they ever so great2 and likewise avoid useless perils1 be they ever so slight4 ,yet1 the question of degree should not be wholly overlooked4 ,there are some perils which1 without being necessary1 it is useful to brave 7were it but to train one's self for greater ones74 ,such are1 for example1 the dangers connected with bodily exercises4 ,peril and utility must1 of course1 be compared with each other2 for example1 he who from considerations of utility would wish to avoid all kinds of perils1 will be wanting in courage2 and he who1 on the contrary1 would lightly brave an extreme peril1 will naturally deserve to be called rash4 ,thus must we first consider the nature of the peril1 and1 secondly1 the degree4 #aei4 ,civic courage4--,although military courage is the most brilliant and popular form of courage1 it may be asked whether there is not a higher and nobler form still1 namely1 civic courage4 ,cicero1 who1 to say the truth1 was not sufficiently disinterested in the matter1 persists in showing that civic virtues are equal to military virtues1 and demand an equal amount of courage and energy4#abd ,a firm and high-souled man1 he says1 has no trouble in difficult circumstances1 to preserve his presence of mind and the free use of his reason1 to provide in advance against events1 and to be always ready for action when necessary4 ,this is a sort of courage more difficult perhaps than the one required in a hand-to-hand struggle with the enemy4 ,civic life1 besides1 has itself trials which often imperil one's existence4 ,antiquity has left us innumerable and admirable examples of civic courage against tyranny4 ,helvidius ,priscus was thought to look with disapproval upon ,vespasian's administration4 ,the latter sent him word to keep away from the ,senate3 ,it is in thy power1 replied ,helvidius1 to forbid my belonging to the ,senate1 but as long as ,i belong to it1 ,i shall attend it4--,go1 then1 said the emperor1 but hold thy tongue4--,if thou ask me no questions ,i will make thee no answers4--,but ,i must ask thee questions4--,and ,i must answer thee what ,i think just4--,if thou dost1 ,i shall have thee put to death4--,when have ,i said to thee that ,i was immortal8 ,but nothing ever surpassed the intrepidity of ,socrates1 either before the ,thirty ,tyrants who wished to interdict him free speech1#abe or before the people's tribunals which condemned him to death3 ,plato in his ,apology makes him say3 ,if you were to tell me now1 ',socrates1 we will not listen to ,anytus3 we send thee back absolved on condition that thou ceasest philosophizing and givest up thy accustomed researches1' ,i should answer you without hesitation1 ',o ,athenians1 ,i honor and love you1 but ,i shall obey ,god before ,i obey you4' ,then1 after having been condemned to death1 he closes with these admirable words3 ,i bear my accusers1 and those who have condemned me1 no resentment1 although they did not seek my good1 but rather to injure me4 ,but ,i shall ask of them one favor3 ,i beg you1 when my children shall be grown up1 to persecute them as ,i have myself persecuted you1 if you see that they prefer riches to virtue4444 ,if you grant us this favor1 ,i and my children shall have but to praise your justice4 ,but it is time we go each our way3 ,i to die1 you to live4 ,which of us has the better part1 you or ,i8 ,this is known to none but ,god4 #afj4 ,patience4--,one of the most difficult forms of courage is that which consists not only in braving or repelling a threatening danger 7which presupposes some effort and activity71 but in bearing without anger1 without any sign of vain revolt1 the ills and pains of life3 this is patience4 ,there is a kind of patience which is but a part of our duty in regard to others3 one must learn to bear a great deal from others1 they having often a great deal to bear from us4 ,but we speak here of that inner patience which is our strength in grief2 the patience of the invalid in his daily sufferings2 that of the poor man in his poverty2 the patience1 in short1 which all must exercise amidst the innumerable and inevitable accidents of life4 ,it is1 above all1 that sort of virtue which the ,stoics meant when they said with ,epictetus3 ,you should not wish things to happen as you want them2 but you should wish them as they do happen4 ,a maxim which ,descartes translated substantially1 saying3 ,my maxim is rather to try to overcome myself than fortune1 and rather to change my own wishes than to change the order of the world4 ,which he explained by saying3 ,if we regard the goods which lie outside of us as unattainable as those we are deprived of from our birth1 we shall no more grieve at not possessing them1 than we should in not possessing the empires of ,china or ,mexico2 and1 making1 as it is said1 a virtue of necessity1 we shall not any more desire to be healthy when ill1 or to be free when in prison1 than we desire now to have bodies of as incorruptible a stuff as diamonds1 or to have wings to fly with like birds4#abf ,it is this kind of courage which at every moment of life is most in requisition1 and which is the rarest2 for there will be found plenty of men capable of braving death when the occasion presents itself2 but to bear with resignation the inevitable and constantly renewed ills of human life1 is a virtue all the more rare as one is scarcely ever ashamed of its opposite vice4 ,one would blush to fear peril1 one does not blush for rebelling against destiny2 one is willing to die if necessary1 but not to be thwarted4 ,yet will it be admitted that to succumb under the weight of destiny1 is a kind of cowardice4 ,it is for this reason that it would be justly said that suicide is also a cowardly act2 for whilst it is true that it demands a certain physical courage1 it is also true that the moral courage which bears the ills of life is of a still higher order4 ,you take a journey to ,olympia1 says ,epictetus1 to behold the work of ,phidias1 and each of you thinks it a misfortune to die without a knowledge of such things2 and will you have no inclination to see and understand those works1 for which there is no need to take a journey2 but which are ready and at hand1 even to those who bestow no pains6 ,will you never perceive what you are1 or for what you were born1 or for what purpose you are admitted to behold this spectacle8 ,but there are in life some things unpleasant and difficult4 ,and are there none at ,olympia8 ,are you not heated8 ,are you not crowded8 ,are you not without good conveniences for bathing8 ,are you not wet through1 when it happens to rain8 ,do you not have uproar and noise1 and other disagreeable circumstances8 ,but1 ,i suppose1 by comparing all these with the merit of the spectacle1 you support and endure them4 ,well1 and have you not received faculties by which you may support every event8 ,have you not received greatness of soul8 ,have you not received a manly spirit8 ,have you not received patience8 ,what signifies to me anything that happens1 while my soul is above it8 ,what shall disconcert or trouble or appear grievous to me8 ,shall ,i not use my powers to that purpose for which ,i received them2 but lament and groan at every casualty8#abg ,but we should not confound true strength1 true courage1 true patience1 with false strength and ridiculous obstinacy4 ,an acquaintance of mine1 says again ,epictetus1 had1 for no reason1 determined to starve himself to death4 ,i went the third day1 and inquired what was the matter4 ,he answered3 ',i am determined4'--',well2 but what is your motive8 ,for1 if your determination be right1 we will stay1 and assist your departure2 but if unreasonable1 change it4'--',we ought to keep our determinations4'--',what do you mean1 sir8 ,not all of them2 but such as are right4 ,else1 if you should fancy that it is night1 if this be your principle1 do not change1 but persist and say1 ,we ought to keep to our determinations4 ',what do you mean1 sir8 ,not to all of them4 ,why do you not begin by first laying the foundation1 inquiring whether your determination be a sound one1 or not2 and then build your firmness and constancy upon it4 ,for1 if you lay a rotten and crazy foundation1 you must not build2 since the greater and more weighty the superstructure1 the sooner will it fall4 ,without any reason you are withdrawing from us1 out of life1 a friend1 a companion1 a fellow-citizen both of the greater and the lesser city2 and while you are committing murder1 and destroying an innocent person1 you say1 ,we must keep to our determinations4 ,suppose1 by any means1 it should ever come into your head to kill me2 must you keep to such a determination8' ,with difficulty this person was1 however1 at last convinced2 but there are some at present1 whom there is no convincing 444 a fool will neither bend nor break4#abh #afa4 ,moderation4--,the ancients always associated with patience in adversity another kind of courage1 no less rare and difficult1 namely1 moderation in prosperity4 ,it was for them1 in some respects1 one and the same virtue1 exercised in two opposite conditions1 and this is what they call equanimity4 ,now1 during our prosperity1 says ,cicero1 and while things flow agreeably to our desire1 we ought1 with great care1 to avoid pride and arrogance2 for1 as it discovers weakness not to bear adversity with equanimity1 so also with prosperity4 ,that equanimity1 in every condition of life1 is a noble attribute1 and that uniform expression of countenance which we find recorded of ,socrates1 and also of ,caius ,laelius4 ,panaetius tells us1 his scholar and friend1 ,africanus1 used to say that as horses1 grown unruly by being in frequent engagements1 are delivered over to be tamed by horse-breakers1 thus men1 who grow riotous and self-sufficient by prosperity1 ought1 as it were1 to be exercised in the traverse#abi of reason and philosophy1 that they may learn the inconstancy of human affairs and the uncertainty of fortune4#acj ,nothing occurs more frequently among the ancient poets and moralists than this idea of the vicissitude of human things4 ,the metaphor of ,fortune's wheel1 which sometimes lowers to the greatest depth those it raised highest1 is well known4 ,we need scarcely dwell upon this commonplace saying which has never1 for an instant1 ceased to be true2 although the more regular conditions of modern society have introduced more security and uniformity in life1 at least for those who live wisely and with moderation4 ,yet is no one secure against the changes of fortune2 there are unexpected elevations as there are sudden falls2 and firmness in either bad or good fortune will always be necessary4 #afb4 ,equality of temper2 anger4--,to equality of temper or possession of one's self1 there is still another obligation attached3 that of avoiding anger1 a passion which the ancients with reason considered the principle of courage1#aca but which of itself is without any rules1 and is more proper to beasts than men4 ,aristotle has described the irascible disposition with great accuracy4 ,he justly distinguishes two kinds of anger2 one where a man is easily carried away1 and as easily appeased again1 and the other where resentment is nursed and kept up for a long time4 ,the first is the irascible disposition2 the second1 the splenetic or vindictive disposition4 ,irascible men1 says ,aristotle1 are easily angered1 with improper objects1 on improper occasions1 and too much2 but their anger quickly ceases1 and this is the best point in their character4 ,and this is the case with them1 because they do not restrain their anger1 but retaliate openly and visibly1 because of their impetuosity1 and then they become calm4--,but the bitter are difficult to be appeased1 and retain their anger a long time1 for they repress their rage2 but there comes a cessation1 when they have retaliated2 for revenge makes their anger cease1 because it produces pleasure instead of the previous pain4 ,but if they do not get revenge1 they feel a weight of disappointment3 for1 owing to its not showing itself1 no one reasons with them2 and there is need of time for a man to digest his anger within him4 ,persons of this character are very troublesome to themselves1 and to their best friends4#acb ,seneca1 in his treatise on ,anger1 has conclusively shown all the evils this passion carries with it1 and of which ,horace justly said3 ,anger is a short madness4 ,yet1 if anger is an evil1 apathy1 absolute indifference1 is far from being a good4 ,whilst there is a brutal and beastly anger1 there is also a noble1 a generous anger1 namely1 that which is at the service of noble sentiments4 ,plato describes it in the following terms3 ,when we are convinced that injustice has been done us1 does it not plead the cause of what appears to it to be just8 ,instead of allowing itself to be overcome by hunger1 by cold1 by all sorts of ill-treatments1 does it not overcome them8 ,it never ceases a moment to make generous efforts toward obtaining satisfaction1 and nothing but death depriving it of its power1 or reason persuading or silencing it1 as the shepherd silences his dog1 can stop it4#acc ,aristotle also approves of this generous anger1 and blames those with souls too cold3 ,one can only call stupid those who cannot be aroused to anger about things where real anger ought to be felt4444 ,he who does not then get angry appears insensible and ignorant of what just indignation means4 ,one might even believe him1 since he has no feeling of courage1 unable to defend himself when necessary4 ,but it is the cowardice of the slave's to accept an insult and to allow his kin to be attacked with impunity4#acd ,but that which is not easy1 as ,aristotle remarks1 is to find an exact and proper medium between apathy and violence3 ,it is difficult to determine with accuracy the manner1 the persons1 the occasions1 and the length of time for which one ought to be angry1 and at what point one ceases to act rightly or wrongly4 ,for he who transgresses the limit a little is not blamed1 whether it be on the side of excess or deficiency3 and we sometimes praise those who fall short1 and call them meek2 and we call the irascible manly1 as being able to govern 444 the decision must be left to particular cases1 and to the moral sense4#ace #afc4 ,personal dignity4--,a generous anger1 as has been seen1 has its principle in the sentiment of personal dignity1 with which the duty of self-respect is connected4 ,man's free will is what essentially constitutes the dignity of human nature1 the moral personality4 ,man's duty toward himself as a moral personality is then dependent upon his will4 ,this duty of self-respect1 of the moral personality1 has been admirably expressed by ,kant1 and we can do no better than transcribe here the passage3 ,man1 considered as an animal1 is a being of but mediocre importance1 and is not worth any more than other animals4 ,his utility and worth is that of any marketable thing4--,but1 considered as a personality1 he is priceless2 he is possessed of a dignity which can claim the respect of all other reasonable creatures1 and which allows him to measure himself with each of them1 and consider himself their equal4 ,but this respect1 which he has a right to exact of every other man1 he should not despoil himself of4 ,he can1 and should1 therefore1 estimate himself both in ratio to his greatness and littleness1 according as he considers himself a sensuous being 7in his animal nature71 or an intelligent being 7in his moral nature74 ,but as he should not only consider himself as a person in general1 but also as an individual man1 his lesser worth as animal-man should not impair the consciousness he has of his dignity as reasonable man1 and he must hold on to the moral estimate he makes of himself as such4 ,in other words1 he should not pursue his aims in a lowly and servile manner1 as if he solicited favors3 this would be abdicating his dignity2 he should always uphold within himself the consciousness of the nobility of his moral faculties1 for it is this estimate of one's self which constitutes the duty of man toward himself4 ,the consciousness and conviction of our little moral worth1 compared with what the law requires of us1 is moral humility4 ,the contrary consciousness and conviction1 namely1 the persuading ourselves1 for want of this comparison1 that we are of very great worth1 may be called the pride of virtue4--,to reject all claim to any moral worth whatsoever1 in the hope of acquiring thereby a hidden worth1 is a false moral humility and an abasement of the mind4 ,to undervalue one's own moral worth for the purpose of obtaining thereby the favor of another 7through hypocrisy or flattery1 namely71 is also a false humility1 and1 moreover1 an abasement of one's personality4 ,true humility should of necessity be the result of an exact and sincere comparison of one's self with the moral law 7with its sanctity and severity74 ,this duty relative to the human dignity in our personality may be more or less clearly stated in the following precepts3 ,be no man's slave2 let not your rights be trampled under foot2 contract no debts for which you cannot give full security2 accept no gifts which you can do without2 be neither a parasite1 nor a flatterer1 nor a beggar2 complaints and lamentations1 even a single cry wrung from us by bodily pain1 are things unworthy of us 7still more unworthy if the pain is deserved74 ,therefore is a criminal's death ennobled by the firmness with which he meets it4 ,can he who makes himself a worm complain if he be crushed8#acf #afd4 ,true and false pride4--,we should1 however1 not confound a true and noble pride1 without which man is but a thing and a slave1 with a passion which looks like it1 but which is but its phantom2 ,i mean false pride4 ,true pride is the just feeling man has of his moral dignity1 and which interdicts him to humble the human personality in others1 or to allow it to be humbled in himself4 ,false pride is the exaggerated feeling we entertain in regard to our own advantages and superiority over other men4 ,true pride is related to what there is sacred and divine in us2 false pride1 on the contrary1 feeds and grows fat on the trifling and petty concerns of our mere individuality4 ,there is in man1 the stoics said1 an inner god3 the human essence1 namely1 of which the individual is but the depository1 and which he ought to keep sacred and holy as a divine host4 ,this respect for the human personality1 religious morality calls holiness2 worldly morality calls it honor2 it is one and the same principle under different forms2 it is the idea of something sacred in us which we must neither stain nor debase4 ,true pride rests then on what there is common among all men1 on what makes them equals4 ,false pride1 on the contrary1 regards chiefly our peculiarities1 and what we call more especially our own4 ,true pride asks for nothing more than to be free from oppression2 false pride wants to oppress others4 ,true pride is noble2 false pride1 brutal and insolent4 ,of course it has its degrees according to the nature of the advantages of which it boasts4 ,the pride1 for example1 which boasts of material advantages1 is the grossest of all2 pride of birth and ancestry is more pardonable1 but if he who is proud of them shows it too much he becomes disgusting1 and true pride will have a right to protect itself against that kind of false pride4 ,he1 again1 who is proud of his intellectual advantages is less blameworthy than the former1 for these advantages belong1 at least1 to his personality2 but as they are not due to the man1 and as1 however great they may be1 they have still their weak sides1 this also is an inexcusable pride4 ,the pride which might appear to be the most pardonable is the pride of virtue1 if there were not in some respects a sort of contradiction of terms in drawing advantage and honor from a good the essentiality of which consists in self-forgetfulness and the pure and simple observance of the law4 ,the diminutive of false pride is vanity4 ,false pride looks to great things1 at least to such as appear great to men2 vanity boasts of the smallest4 ,false pride is insulting2 vanity wounding4 ,the one is odious1 the other ridiculous4 ,the lowest order of vanity is foppishness1 or the vanity of external advantages--the person1 the toilet1 superficial accomplishments4 ,this diminutive of false pride is one of the most pitiable of passions1 and should be combated by manly efforts4 #afe4 ,modesty4--,the virtue opposed to false pride1 and which1 besides1 is nowise irreconcilable with true pride1 is modesty1 a correct feeling1 namely1 of one's just worth4 ,morality does not forbid us a proper estimate of our merits2 these merits1 besides1 having but a relative value1 and representing but faintly the high ideal we should always keep before our eyes4 ,to fail to appreciate the advantages we owe to nature1 is often indicative only of laziness and apathy4 ,he who depreciates himself is not disposed to turn what there is in him to account4 ,this self-depreciation1 in order to avoid the responsibility of using his faculties1 is often but a subterfuge and the sophistry of indolence4 ,there is nothing contrary to duty in the acknowledgment of our worth1 so long as we do not boast of it1 but thank ,providence for it1 and put to use the gifts it has conferred on us4 ,if1 on the contrary1 the question is of virtues we have acquired by our own efforts1 the satisfaction we experience from it is but the just recompense of these efforts2 and such a feeling could not be condemned2 for such condemnation would be a virtual protest against the moral conscience1 which consists as much in the satisfaction we derive from good actions as in the regrets which accompany the bad4 ,unquestionably1 the left hand should not know what the right hand doeth2 which means that we should not everywhere proclaim aloud our good actions1 and that we should as much as possible forget them4 ,but this forgetting should not go so far as indifference2 for our morality depends upon our consciousness4 ,but if it is lawful for man to rejoice over his natural or acquired gifts1 it is on the condition that he do not exaggerate their import3 this is easy enough if we compare ourselves to those who are still better gifted than we are1 or think of what we should and could do with greater efforts1 more courage1 better will2 or in recognizing the narrow scope1 limits1 and defects of these gifts1 or in keeping1 above all1 our eyes more open to our faults than our good qualities4 ,beware of the beam of the ,gospel4 ,modesty should not only be external1 but internal also2 externally1 it is above all a duty we owe others1 whom we should not humble by our superior advantages2 internally1 it is a duty to ourselves1 for we should not deceive ourselves about our own worth4 ,one is sometimes modest externally without being so internally1 and conversely4 ,i may pretend before men to have no great opinion of myself1 whilst internally ,i am full of conceit3 this is sheer hypocrisy4 ,i may1 on the other hand1 externally attribute to myself advantages which my conscience altogether denies3 this is bragging4 ,one should be modest both inwardly and outwardly1 in words and actions4 ,but how1 in what manner1 and to what degree must we be modest8 ,it is impossible in matters so delicate to establish definite rules1 and the decision must be left to our own judgment4 ,there is another virtue to be distinguished from modesty1 namely1 humility4 ,humility should not be an abasement2 for it is never a virtue in man to lower himself4 ,but1 even as dignity and true pride are virtues which spring from a proper sense of human greatness1 so humility is a virtue which springs from a proper sense of human weakness4 ,remember that thou art a man and do not degrade thyself3 this is self-respect4 ,remember that thou art but a man and do not allow thyself to indulge in vain pride2 this is humility4 ,modesty relates to the individual2 humility to human nature in general4 ,as to that false humility which consists in lowering one's self before men unnecessarily1 and without any occasion for it 7like ,tartufe1 for example3 ,yes1 brother1 ,i am a sinner and a wretch6#acg71 it is but the falsehood of virtue1 and should be rejected by all manly and generous morality4 #aff4 ,duties relative to sentiment4--,a last point which should not be neglected is this3 has man1 as far as he is endowed with moral sensibility--that is to say1 as far as he is a susceptible being--capable of love1 enthusiasm1 affection1 any duties toward himself8 ,kant maintains that love cannot be an object of duty2 that no one is obliged to love3 that sentiment is phenomenal and belongs to the order of nature1 and can neither be produced nor prevented2 that1 consequently1 it has nothing to do with morals4 ,the only love admitted by ,kant in morals is what he calls practical love3 namely1 the love which consists in actions and does others good1 or any kind of sentiment accompanying benevolence1 provided it be a disinterested sentiment4 ,all other love1 he says in his odd and energetic language1 is pathological1 that is1 sickly4 ,kant1 no doubt1 is right if he means that false sentimentality or feeble softness1#ach which the poet ,gilbert has so well described1 and which the enervating literature of the latter part of the eighteenth century made so ridiculous4 ,we should take care not to fall into an effeminate tenderness or a silly philanthropy which sacrifices justice to a mawkish sensibility4 ,but all danger and defects set aside1 there still remains the question whether we owe anything to our own heart1 and whether the only thing directly commanded us1 be action4 ,it is quite true that it is not an effect of our will if our heart is more or less tender1 more or less sympathetic4 ,nature has made some souls gentle and amiable1 others austere and cold1 others again heroic and hard1 etc42 the moralists should not forget these differences1 and the degree of sensibility obligatory on all cannot be absolutely determined4 ,but there are two facts which certainly oblige us to put some restrictions upon ,kant's too harsh doctrine4 ,the first is that moral emotion 7affection1 enthusiasm for the beautiful1 for our country7 is never wholly absent in any human soul2 the second is that sensibility does not altogether lie outside our will4 ,we can smother our good feelings as we can smother our evil passions2 we can also cultivate them1 develop them1 encourage them2 give them a greater or less share in our lives1 by placing ourselves in circumstances which favor them4 ,for example1 say such or such a person is but slightly endowed with sensibility or sympathy for the sufferings of the wretched2 yet is it impossible that he be entirely deprived of them3 let him overcome his repugnance and indifference2 let him visit the poor1 put himself at the service of human misery2 the dormant sympathy will inevitably awaken in his heart4 ,by this fact alone will he be enabled to do good with more ease1 and raise his soul to a higher degree of perfection and beauty4 ,not only should sentiment not be excluded from virtue1 as ,kant in his excessive austerity demands1 but it should be considered its ornament and bloom4 ,the virtuous man1 says ,aristotle1 is he who takes pleasure in doing virtuous acts4 ,one should therefore endeavor to awaken in one's self1 if one has not yet experienced it1 or develop1 if one has already experienced it1 the noble pleasure which accompanies great sentiments4 ,on the other hand1 and for the same reason that it is a duty for man to develop within him1 in the limits of the possible1 the share of sensibility he may have received from nature1 it is also his duty not to encourage this same disposition too much if he should be inclined this way4 ,for sensibility should only be an auxiliary and a stimulant to virtue2 it should never take its place3 otherwise it will lead us astray4 ,an exaggerated sensibility often smothers the voice of justice1 enervates us1 and deprives us of the robust courage we need in life4 ,there is a reasonable limit which tact and experience alone can teach us4 ,morality can only give advice and directions4 ,more precise rules are impossible1 and would be ridiculous4 ,there is no moral thermometer to indicate the degree of heart-heat each of us is allowed and is obliged to have4 ,let us only say1 that in so delicate a matter1 it is better to have too much sensibility than too little4 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,religious ,,morality4--,,religious ,,rights ,,and ,,duties4 ,,summary4 ,are there duties toward ,god8 ,duties toward ,god4--,analysis of the religious sentiment4--,two elements3 #a1 the sentiment of the infinite2 #b1 the need of hope and consolation4 ,can sentiment become a duty8 ,indirect duties toward ,god4--,piety united with all the acts of life3 #a1 obedience2 #b1 resignation2 #c1 love of ,god united to that of man4 ,the idea of ,god in morals4--,god the surety of the moral law4 ,religious society4--,fenelon and ,epictetus4 ,religious rights4--,liberty of conscience3 liberty of opinion1 liberty of worship1 liberty of propagandism4 ,it is not our purpose to speak here of the different forms of religious thought among men3 this is the special domain of conscience2 but among all these forms1 is there no common ground which may be said to belong to the human soul1 and which is found to be the same with the sages of pagan antiquity and the modern philosophers1 although they may not have adopted any special form of worship8 ,yes4 ,this common ground of all religion is the idea of ,god4 #afg4 ,are there any duties toward ,god8--,if1 as we have seen in our first book 7,vol4 ,i41 last chapter71 there is a ,god1 that is to say1 an author of the physical and moral universe1 and its preserver and protector and father1 it follows that man1 as a part of this universe1 and distinguished from its other creatures by the fact that he knows himself to be a child of ,god1 is held to entertain toward this supreme father1 sentiments of gratitude and respect1 and toward this supreme judge sentiments of fear and hope1 all of which gives rise to a whole class of duties4 ,some doubts have been raised on this point by certain philosophers1 and the question has been asked whether man1 so out of all proportion when compared to ,god1 could have any duties toward ,him8 ,it has been said1 moreover1 that there could be no duty toward a being to whom we can do neither good nor harm4 ,god1 the essence of all perfection and supreme happiness1 can have nothing added to nor taken from these by us4 ,we are therefore under no obligation to him whatsoever4 #a4 ,as for the absolute disproportion we imagine to exist between ,god and man1 this disproportion does not prevent my having an idea of ,god3 why should it prevent my loving him and putting myself in relation with him8 ,fenelon justly said3 ,nothing is so wonderful as the idea of ,god which ,i carry within myself2 it is the infinite contained within the finite4 ,that which is within me is infinitely beyond me4 ,i do not understand how it comes to be in my mind1 and yet it is there1 nevertheless4 ,this indelible and incomprehensible idea of the ,divine ,being is what1 despite my imperfection and weakness1 makes me resemble him4 ,as he infinitely knows and loves himself1 so do ,i1 according to my power1 know and love him4 ,i can love the infinite by no other means than by my finite knowledge1 and love it by no other than a love as finite as myself4444 ,i wish my love were as limitless as the perfection it loves4 ,it is true1 again1 that this knowledge and this love are not equally as perfect as their object1 but the man who knows and loves ,god according to his measure of knowledge and love is incomparably more worthy of this perfect being than the man without ,god in the world1 caring neither to know nor to love him4#aci ,hence it can be concluded that the duties of man toward ,god are implied in the knowledge he has of him4 #b4 ,as to the second difficulty1 it consists in saying that ,god being susceptible of neither benefits nor injuries1 it is not quite clear what acts we could perform in his behalf4 ,but the question is precisely to know whether we only owe duties to beings susceptible of benefits and injuries4 ,we have1 for example1 to perform duties of justice1 love1 respect toward the dead1 although we can do them neither good nor harm1 since they are dead2 and although we have reason to think that the dead still exist under another form1 the duties we still owe them1 are independent of this consideration1 and notwithstanding the doubt of the immortality of souls1 or their relations with the living1 these duties still subsist3 those souls might be so happy1 and in conditions so different from those of our earthly life1 that they might have become wholly indifferent to such1 at least to harm4 ,a historian1 for instance1 would not be justified in slandering his heroes under the pretext that1 not believing in the immortality of the soul1 he knew he could do them no harm4 ,man1 even in this life1 can1 through patience and gentleness1 so rise above all insults as to become wholly insensible to them3 which fact1 however1 does not imply that the insults done him are innocent4 ,the same man might be so modest as to feel no need of any homage1 which would make it no less a duty of justice on the part of others to render him all the homage that is due him4 ,wholly inward feelings1 not evidenced by any outward act whatsoever1 cannot in reality do their object any good or harm2 yet no one will question their being duties4 ,it may then be seen that duty is not regulated by the good or evil which may outwardly be done1 but by the order of things which requires that every being be loved and respected according to his merit4 ,now1 from this standpoint1 there can be no doubt that ,god1 who is supreme perfection and the principle of all order and justice1 is the legitimate object of the highest respect and the profoundest love4 ,it may be said1 perhaps1 that these sentiments toward the ,creator are rather duties we owe ourselves than ,god1 for it is for our own sakes that we are bound to give to our sensibility and affection the highest object they can have4 ,since the perfection and the dignity of the soul are enhanced by religion1 it is our duty to be religious4 ,fenelon is quite right when he says that the man who knows and loves ,god is more worthy of him than he who lives without him4 ,is it not the same as to say that religion rendering man more like ,god1 and bringing him nearer to him1 man owes it to himself to rise above himself through piety and the love of ,god8 ,but it matters very little how we explain the nature of the duties toward ,god1 provided we recognize them4 ,whether they be considered a distinct class1 or whether we only see in them the highest degree of man's duties toward himself2 all this is but a useless speculation4 ,we could say conversely1 and with equal justice1 that our duties toward ourselves are but a part of our duties toward ,god3 for duty itself1 in its highest conception1 being to reach after the highest possible perfection1 we can say1 with ,plato1 that virtue is the imitation of ,god2 that1 consequently1 man owes it to himself to resemble ,god as much as possible1 and that1 conversely1 he owes ,god1 as the type of supreme perfection1 to draw ever nearer to him through self-improvement4 ,but how could he seek to draw nearer to ,god's supreme perfection if he did not entertain for him the feelings of love and respect1 which constitute what we1 in general1 call religious sentiment8 #afh4 ,duties toward ,god4--,analysis of the religious sentiment4--,what is called duties toward ,god is nothing else than the different acts by which we endeavor to bring about1 cultivate1 develop in us1 or in others1 religious sentiment4 ,when these acts are external1 and take a certain definite form1 they constitute what is called outward worship1 and are consequent upon positive religions4 ,when they are concentrated in the soul1 and confined to sentiments1 they constitute what is called inner worship4 ,the virtue which corresponds to these inner acts and sentiments is called piety4 ,the duties toward ,god being thus blended with religious sentiment we must1 in order to set them forth1 first analyze this sentiment4 ,religious sentiment is composed of two elements3 one which may be called metaphysical2#adj the other1 moral4 #a4 ,metaphysically1 the love of ,god is the sentiment of the infinite1 the need of attaching ourselves to the absolute1 the eternal1 the immutable1 the true in itself--in one word1 to ,being4 ,the thinking man1 and even the thoughtless man1 looking at himself1 finds himself small1 feeble1 miserable4 ,oh6 exclaims ,bossuet1 how much we are nothing6 ,man becomes vile to himself1 says ,st4 ,bernard4 ,man feels that he is frail1 that his life hangs but on a thread1 that he is constantly passing away4 ,the goods of the world are perishable4 ,the fashion of this world passeth away4 ,we neither know who we are1 whence we come1 whither we are going1 nor what sustains us during the short period of our lives4 ,we are suspended between heaven and earth3 between two infinities2 we stand as on quicksands4 ,all these strong expressions of mystics and religious writers admirably express the need we stand in of the absolute1 the immutable1 the perfect1--a need felt more particularly by devout minds1 but which all men1 without exception1 experience in some degree or other1 and which they endeavor to satisfy the best they can4 ,all our efforts to reach the absolute in science1 in art1 in politics even1 are but the forms in which this need of the absolute manifests itself4 ,the insatiable pursuit of the gratification of the passions even is1 also1 under a vain appearance1 the same need4 ,it is this feeling of the eternal and the infinite1 which the greatest metaphysicians all regarded as the ultimate foundation of morality4 ,plato1 ,plotinus1 ,malebranche1 ,spinoza1 all enjoin upon us to seek eternal1 in preference to perishable1 goods4 ,this sentiment1 conscious of ever striving after the substance of good and not its shadow1 is the profoundest1 nearest1 and dearest element of religious sentiment4 #b4 ,thus much in regard to the metaphysical element of religion3 next comes the moral element4 ,god does not only appear to the human soul as a being infinite1 inexhaustible1 eternal4 ,the soul wants him nearer1 and in her respectful boldness she calls him ,father4 ,man is not only feeble and imperfect2 he is also a sinner and a sufferer2 evil is his condition4 ,the frailty of our being and its narrow limits are already an evil2 but these are the least of evils2 humanity suffers1 furthermore1 from a double evil far more real and poignant3 pain and sin4 ,against physical pain1 suffering1 it has but the feeble resource of prudence2 against moral evil it has but one means of defense1 very weak also--free-will4 ,it would seem that we are the masters of the universe2 but experience shows1 on the contrary1 that we are the feeblest among its creatures2 often does the will succumb2 and ,kant himself1 despite his stoicism1 asks whether indeed a single act of virtue has ever been accomplished in the world4 ,life1 on the whole1 notwithstanding its grand aspects and its few exquisite and sublime joys1 life is bad2 all ends badly1 and death1 which puts an end to all evils1 is yet the greatest of evils4 ,the human soul1 says ,plato1 like a bird1 raises its eyes to heaven1 and calls for a remedy1 a help1 a deliverance4 ,deliver us from evil1 is the cry of every religion4 ,god is the liberator and comforter4 ,we love what is good and we do what is evil2 we impatiently desire happiness1 and meet with nothing but wretchedness4 ,such is the contradiction ,pascal points out with such incisive eloquence4 ,this contradiction must be removed4 ,hope and trust in a supreme and benevolent ,being must ransom us from pain and sin4 ,many persons place the essence of religion in the belief in a future life1 or immortality of the soul4 ,who1 without the hope of gaining paradise1 would think of ,god8 ,but this is a contradiction in terms4 ,paradise1 for the true believer1 is nothing2 ,god1 everything4 ,if a future life is a necessary consequence of the divine justice and bounty1 we need not doubt its existence2 if not1 we have nothing to ask2 it does not concern us4 ,what especially concerns us is to know what we ought to do here below1 and to have the strength to do it with4 ,life is a meditation1 not of death1 but of life1 said ,spinoza4 ,but in order to live1 and live well1 one must believe in life1 must believe in its healthy and holy significance1 believe that it is not mere play1 a mere mystification1 but that it was given us by the principle of good for the success of good4 ,the essence of religion1 then1 is a belief in the goodness of ,god4 ,a ,german critic1 ,feuerbach1 said with great effect1 that religion consisted in divinizing human attributes4 ,thus3 ,god is good1 means according to him3 goodness is divine4 ,god is just1 signifies3 justice is divine4 ,the boldness of ,christianity1 its profound1 pathetic beauty1 its great moral efficacy lie in the fact that it has divinized our miseries2 and that1 instead of saying1 pain is divine1 death is divine1 it has said3 ,god has suffered1 ,god has died4 ,in a word1 according to the same author1 ,god is the human heart divinized4 ,nothing could be more true and beautiful1 only in another sense than that in which the author takes it4 ,if ,god himself was not supreme goodness1 the heart of man would then contain something divine1 and ,god would not himself be divine6 ,the heart feels that it exceeds all things1 but1 in order to believe in itself1 it must know itself coming from a higher and purer source than it is itself4 ,in thinking of such a being 7,god71 man experiences a sentiment which is above all a religious sentiment4 ,every man1 as we come into contact with him1 awakens in us a feeling of some kind1 according to the qualities we perceive in him1 and should not ,he who possesses all perfections excite in us the strongest of feelings8 ,if we think of the infinite essence of ,god1 if we are thoroughly impressed by his omnipotence1 if we remember that the moral law expresses his will1 and that he has attached to the fulfillment and violation of this law1 rewards and punishments which he distributes with inflexible justice1 we must of necessity experience before such greatness emotions of respect and fear4 ,if next we come to consider that this omnipotent being was pleased to create us1 we1 whom he had no need of1 and that in creating us he heaped upon us benefits of all kinds1 that he has given us this universe to enjoy its ever renewed beauties1 that he has given us society that our life may become enlarged in that of our fellow-beings1 that he has given us reason to think1 a heart to love1 liberty to act1 that same respect and fear will receive additional strength from a still gentler sentiment1 namely1 that of love4 ,love1 when directed toward feeble and circumscribed beings1 inspires us with the desire to do them good3 but1 in itself1 love does not especially consider the advantage of the person beloved3 we love a thing1 good or beautiful1 simply because it is good or beautiful1 and without thought of benefiting it2 or benefiting ourselves4 ,how much more so when this love is turned to ,god1 as a pure homage to his perfections2 when it is the natural outpouring of the soul toward a being infinitely adorable4 ,adoration consists in respect and love4 ,if man1 however1 sees in ,god the omnipotent master of heaven and earth only1 the source of all justice and the avenger of all wrong1 he will1 in his weakness1 be crushed by the overwhelming weight of ,god's greatness3 he will be living a life of perpetual fear1 from the uncertainty of the judgment of ,god2 he will conceive for this world and life1 always so full of misery1 nothing but hatred4 ,read ,pascal's ,thoughts4 ,pascal1 in his superb humility1 forgets two things3 the dignity of man and the goodness of ,god4 ,if1 on the other hand1 man only sees in ,god a kind and indulgent ,father1 he will run into a chimerical mysticism4 ,in substituting love for fear1 there is danger of losing the awe which we should have for him4 ,god is then no longer a master1 scarcely a father even2 for the idea of father carries with it1 in a certain degree1 that of a respectful fear3 he is nothing more than a friend4 ,true adoration does not sever love from respect3 it is respect animated by love4 ,adoration is a universal sentiment2 it differs in degrees according to the differences in human nature2 it takes the greatest variety of forms2 it often does not even know itself2 sometimes it betrays itself by a sudden exclamation1 a cry from the heart over the grand scenes of nature and life2 sometimes it rises silently in the deeply-moved and dumb-stricken soul2 it may in its expression mistake its aim2 but fundamentally it is always the same4 ,it is a spontaneous and irresistible yearning of the soul1 which reason must declare just and legitimate4 ,what more just1 in fact1 than to fear the judgments of ,him who is holiness itself1 who knows our actions and our intentions1 and who will judge them as it becomes supreme justice8 ,what more just1 also1 than to love perfect goodness and the source of all love8 ,adoration is first a natural sentiment3 reason makes of it a duty4#ada ,these two sentiments1 love and respect1 may1 inasmuch as they relate to ,god--that is to say1 to an infinite being--be resolved into one1 which we call veneration4 ,veneration is the respect mixed with love which we feel for our aged parents1 for some exalted virtue1 for devotion to a suffering country2 but it is only through extension we so understand it3 its true object1 its proper domain1 is the divinity2#adb and if there are other objects to be revered and venerated1 it is because we detect in them something august and sacred4 ,it will1 perhaps1 be said that sentiments cannot be erected into duties3 for how can ,i force myself to feel what ,i do not feel8 ,acts can be commanded1 but not sentiments4 ,this is true2 but the acts1 in the first place1 are nothing without the sentiments1 and if piety is not already in the heart1 the most pious works will have no virtue4 ,moreover1 if it be true that it is impossible to generate1 either in one's self or in others1 sentiments1 the germs of which do not exist in human nature1 it is not true that sentiments in conformity with this nature1 and which1 whilst we believe them completely absent1 may only be dormant1 could not be excited1 awakened1 cultivated1 and developed4 ,now1 it is enough to think of divine greatness1 to experience a feeling of fear and respect2 it is enough to think of divine perfection1 to love this perfection1 and seek to come nearer to it4 ,duty here consists1 then1 in thinking of ,god1 in giving this great thought a part of our life1 in uniting it with all the acts of that life3 these sentiments will1 then1 be generated and will expand of themselves4 #afi4 ,piety united with all the acts of life3 indirect duties toward ,god4--,we have just said that the idea of ,god can be united with all the acts of life4 ,every action being the fulfillment of the will of ,providence1 can be both moral and religious4 ,he who works1 prays1 says the proverb2 a life which strives to preserve itself pure and virtuous1 is a continuous prayer4 ,in this sense1 all our duties are indirect duties toward ,god4 #a4 ,obedience to ,god1 manifested by obedience to moral law4 ,i can obey the moral law in two ways3 on the one hand1 because it is a duty1 whatever besides may be the reason of this duty1 and next because this duty is in unison with universal order1 which is the work of divine wisdom4 ,to fulfill one's duty is1 then1 to co-operate in some respect with ,god in the achievement of this order4 ,it is thus that in ancient religions1 agriculture was regarded a religious act1 because man took therein the part of the creator4 #b4 ,resignation to the will of ,providence4--,patience is unquestionably a duty in itself4 ,there is a lack of dignity in rebelling against evils which cannot be prevented2 but this is as yet a wholly negative virtue4 ,it becomes a religious virtue if we regard the ills of life in the light of trials1 and as the condition of a higher good1 and expect to voluntarily submit to them as being in the plan of ,providence4 ,it is thus the ,pythagoreans forbade suicide1 saying that it was leaving the post in which ,god had placed us4 ,it would1 moreover1 be interpreting this duty of resignation very falsely to think that it commands us to bear trouble and make no effort to escape it4 ,this were confounding ,providence with fatalism4 ,on the contrary1 ,god1 having given us free will1 not only permits us thereby1 but even positively enjoins upon us1 to use it in bettering our condition4 #c4 ,love of ,god conjoined with the love of man4--,there is no real love of ,god without love of neighbor2 it is a false piety which thinks itself obliged to sacrifice the love of men to the love of ,god3 thence come fanaticism1 intolerance1 persecution4 ,to believe these to be religious virtues is impious4 ,we cannot please ,god by acts of hatred and cruelty4 ,thus is the love of ,god nothing without the love of men4 ,but it can also be said that the love of men is incomplete if it does not get its sustenance from a higher source1 which is the love of ,god4 ,we can1 in fact1 love men in two ways3 first1 because they are men1 because they are like us1 because there is between them and us a natural bond of sympathy4 ,but we can also love them because they are1 like ourselves1 members of the universe of which ,god is the sovereign ruler1 members of a family of which ,god is the father1 because1 like ourselves1 they reflect some of the attributes of supreme perfection1 because they ought1 like us1 to strive after all perfection4 ,we can then love men religiously1 love them in ,god in some respect4 ,thus conversely to love men will be loving ,god4 #agj4 ,the idea of ,god in morals4--,we have1 in a former course of lectures1 seen how the moral law is related to ,god3 this law is certainly not dependent on his will alone1 but on his holiness and supreme perfection2 and it is still further related to him as to a supreme sanction4 ,we have to consider here only the practical efficacy of the idea of ,god--that is to say1 the additional strength moral belief receives by a belief in absolute justice and holiness4 ,it is on this condition and from this standpoint that ,kant has called the existence of ,god the postulate#adc of the moral law4 ,the moral law1 in fact1 supposes the world able to conform to this law2 but how are we to believe in such a possibility if this world were the effect of a blind and indifferent necessity8 ,since it is our duty1 says ,kant1 to work toward the realization of the supreme good1 it is not only a right1 but a necessity flowing from this duty1 to suppose the possibility of this supreme good1 which good is only possible on the condition of ,god's existence#add4444--,suppose1 for example1 he says elsewhere1 an honest man like ,spinoza1 firmly convinced that there is no ,god and no future life4 ,he will1 without doubt1 fulfill disinterestedly the duty that holy law imposes on his activity2 but his efforts will be limited4 ,if here and there he finds in nature accidental co-operation1 he can never expect of this co-operation to be in perfect and constant accordance with the end he feels himself obliged to pursue4 ,though honest1 peaceful1 benevolent himself1 he will always be surrounded by fraud1 violence1 envy2 in vain do the good people he meets deserve to be happy2 nature has no regard for their goodness1 and exposes them1 like all the rest of earth's animals1 to disease and misery1 to a premature death1 until one vast tomb--the gulf of blind matter from which they issued--swallows them all up again4 ,thus would this righteous man be obliged to give up as absolutely impossible the end which the law imposed on him2 or1 if he wished to remain true to the inner voice of his moral destiny1 he will1 from a practical point of view1 be obliged to recognize the existence of a moral cause in the world1 namely1 ,god4 ,thus1 according to ,kant1 is religion1 namely1 the belief in the existence of ,god1 required1 not as a theoretical basis for morality1 but as a practical basis4 ,the righteous man can say3 ,i will that there be a ,god4#ade ,it may be objected that moral law can dispense with outward success2 that it does not appear to be essential to the idea of that law2 that the wise1 as far as their own happiness is concerned1 need not consider it1 can ignore it4 ,but what they are obliged to consider1 and are not allowed to ignore1 is the happiness of others1 and what is generally understood by progress--the possible improvement of the race4 ,if1 as some pessimistic and misanthropic philosophers seem to think1 men will never be anything more than monkeys or tigers given to the lowest and most ferocious instincts1 do you believe that any man1 be he ever so well endowed morally1 ever so deeply convinced of the obligation of the law of duty1 could1 if he believed such a thing1 be able to continue doing his duty1 a duty followed by no appreciable or perceptible results8 ,the first condition for becoming or remaining virtuous1 is to believe in virtue4 ,but to believe in virtue means to believe that virtue is a fact1 that it exists in the world1 that it can do it good2 in other words1 it is to believe that the human race was created for good2 that nature is capable of being transformed according to the law of good2 it is1 in short1 to believe that the universe obeys a principle of good1 and not a principle of evil--an ,oromazes1 not an ,ahrimanes4 ,as to believing in an indifferent being1 one that were neither good nor evil1 we should not be any better off2 it would leave us just as uncertain in regard to the possible success of our efforts1 and just as doubtful about the worth of our moral beliefs4 ,in one word1 and to conclude1 if ,god were an illusion1 why could not virtue be an illusion also8 ,in order that ,i may believe in the dignity and excellence of my soul and that of other men1 ,i must believe in a supreme principle of dignity and excellence4 ,nothing comes from nothing4 ,if there is no being to love me and my fellow-men1 why should ,i be held to love them8 ,if the world is not good1 if it was not created for good1 if good is not its origin and end1 what have ,i to do here in this world1 and what care ,i for that swarm of ants of which ,i am a part8 ,let them get along as well as they can6 ,why should ,i take so much trouble to so little purpose8 ,take any intelligent man1 a friend of civil and political liberty1 and ready to suffer anything to procure these to his country1 as long as he believes the thing possible1 both wisdom and virtue will command him to devote himself wholly to it4 ,but let experience prove to him that it is a chimera1 that his fellow-citizens are either too great cowards or too vicious to be worthy and capable of the good he wishes to secure to them2 suppose he sees all around him nothing but cupidity1 servility1 unbridled and abominable passions2 suppose1 finally1 that he becomes convinced that liberty among men1 or at least among the people he lives with1 is an illusion1 do you think he could1 do you even think he should1 continue wasting his faculties in an impossible enterprise8 ,once more1 ,i can forget myself1 and ,i ought2 and ,i should leave to internal justice or divine goodness the care to watch over my destinies2 but that which ,i cannot forget1 that which cannot leave me indifferent1 is the reign of justice on earth4 ,i must be able to say3 ,let ,thy kingdom come6 ,how can ,i co-operate with the ,divine ,idea if there is no ,god1 who1 in creating us for the furthering of his kingdom1 made it1 at the same time1 possible for us8 ,and how any ,i to believe that out of that great void whereto atheism reduces us1 there can come a reign of wills holy and just1 bound to each other by the laws of respect and love8 ,kant1 the great stoic1 without borrowing from theology1 has more strongly than any other1 described the necessity of this reign of law2 but he fully understood that this abstract and ideal order of things would remain but a pure conception1 if there were not conjoined with it what he justly calls the practical1 the moral faith in the existence of ,god4 #aga4 ,religious rights4--,religious duties imply religious rights3 for if it is a duty to honor the ,creator1 it is also a right4 ,even those who do not admit obligations toward ,god1 ought to respect in those who do admit them1 their liberty to do so4 ,the right of having a religion1 and practicing it1 is what is called liberty of conscience4 ,the first right ,i claim1 says an eloquent writer1 is the right of adopting a free belief touching the nature of ,god1 my duties1 my future2 it is a wholly interior right1 which governs the relations of my will or conscience alone4 ,it is the liberty of conscience in its essence1 its first act1 its indispensable basis4 ,it is the liberty to believe1 or faith4 ,free in the innermost of my thought1 shall ,i be confined to a silent worship8 ,shall ,i not be allowed to express what ,i think8 ,faith is communicative1 and will make itself felt by others4 ,i cannot control its expressing itself without doing it violence1 without offending ,god1 without rendering myself guilty of ingratitude4 ,i cannot1 moreover1 worship a ,god that is not my ,god4 ,the freedom of belief1 without the freedom of prayer--that is to say1 without free worship--is only a delusion4 ,now1 is prayer sufficient8 ,does this solitary expression of my faith1 my love1 my ignorance1 suffice the wants of my heart and my duties toward ,god8 ,yes1 if man were made to live alone2 but not if he has brethren4 ,i am a social being2 ,i have duties toward society as well as toward ,god2 my creed commands me to teach as well as to pray4 ,my voice must be heard1 and ,i must1 following my destiny1 and according to the measure of my powers1 carry along with me all those who are inclined to follow me4 ,this is the liberty of promulgating one's creed1 or1 in other words1 the liberty of propagandism4 ,worship1 then1 means to believe1 to pray1 to teach4 ,but1 can ,i consider myself a free believer1 if praying in public be denied me2 if by praying1 and teaching1 and confessing my doctrine1 ,i risk the loss of my rights as man and citizen8 ,there are other means for checking public worship and apostleship than burning at the stake4 ,it is obvious that1 in order no injustice be done to my particular creed1 ,i should risk nothing by it2 that ,i be not deprived of any of my civil or political rights4 ,all this is included in the term liberty of conscience3 it is at the same time the right to believe1 the right to pray1 and the right to exercise this triple liberty without having to suffer any diminution in one's dignity as man and citizen4#adf #agb4 ,religious society4--,religious duties and rights give rise to what may be called religious society4 ,fenelon has magnificently described the ideal religious society where all would form but one family united by the love of ,god and men4 ,do we not see1 he says1 that the external worship follows necessarily the internal worship of love8 ,give me a society of men who1 while on earth1 would look upon each other as members of one and the same family1 whose ,father is in heaven2 give me men whose life was sunk in this love for their heavenly ,father1 men who loved their fellow-men and themselves only through love for ,him2 who were but one heart1 one soul3 will not in so godly a society the mouth always speak from the abundance of the heart8 ,they will sing the praises of the ,most ,high1 the ,most ,good spontaneously2 they will bless ,him for all ,his bounties4 ,they will not be content to love ,him merely1 they will proclaim this love to all the nations of the world2 they will wish to correct and admonish their brethren when they see them tempted through pride and low passions to forsake the ,well-,beloved4 ,they will lament the least cooling of that love4 ,they will cross the seas1 go to the uttermost parts of the earth1 to teach the benighted nations who have forgotten ,his greatness the knowledge and love of their common ,father4 ,what do you call external worship if this be not it8 ,god then would be all in all2 ,he would be the universal king1 father1 friend2 ,he would be the living law of all hearts4 ,truly1 if a mortal king or head of a family wins by his wisdom the esteem and confidence of his children1 if we see them at all times pay him the honors due him1 need we ask wherein consists his service1 or whether any is due him8 ,all that is done in his honor1 in obedience to him1 in recognition of his bounties1 is a continuous worship1 obvious to all eyes4 ,what would it be then if men were possessed with the love of ,god6 ,their society would be in a state of continuous worship1 like that described to us of the blessed in heaven4#adg ,the great ancient moralist1 ,epictetus1 has as superbly as ,fenelon expressed the same sentiments3 ,if we had any understanding1 he says1 ought we not1 both in public and in private1 incessantly to sing and praise the ,deity1 and rehearse ,his benefits8 ,ought we not1 whether we dig1 or plough1 or eat1 to sing this hymn to ,god8 ,great is ,god1 who has supplied us with these instruments to till the ground2 great is ,god1 who has given us hands and organs of digestion2 who has given us to grow insensibly1 to breathe in sleep4 ,these things we ought forever to celebrate1 and to make it the theme of the greatest and divinest hymn that ,he has given us the power to appreciate these gifts1 and to use them well4 ,but because the most of you are blind and insensible there must be some one to fill this station1 and lead in behalf of all men the hymn to ,god2 for what else can ,i do1 a lame old man1 but sing hymns to ,god8 ,were ,i a nightingale1 ,i would act the part of a nightingale2 were ,i a swan1 the part of a swan4 ,but since ,i am a reasonable creature it is my duty to praise ,god4 ,this is my business4 ,i do it4 ,nor will ,i ever desert this post1 so long as it is permitted me2 and ,i call on you to join in the same song4#adh ,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,moral ,,medicine ,,and ,,gymnastics4 ,,summary4 ,means and end4--,moral science should not only point out the end2 it should also indicate the means of attaining that end4 ,there is1 as of the body1 a culture of the soul3 as1 in medicine1 we distinguish between temperaments1 diseases and their treatments1 so do we distinguish in morals1 characters1 passions1 and remedies4 ,of character4--,character as compared with temperament3 four principal types4 ,character at different ages3 childhood1 youth1 manhood1 and old age4 ,passions4--,passions may in one respect be considered as natural affections2 but in a moral point of view they should be considered as diseases4 ,the law of passions considered from this last standpoint4 ,enumeration and analysis of these various passions4 ,culture of the soul1 or moral treatment4--,on the government of passions4--,bossuet's advice3 not directly to combat the passions1 but to turn them off into other channels4 ,of the formation of character4--,rules of ,malebranche3 #a1 acts produce habits1 and habits produce acts2 #b1 one can always act against a ruling habit4 ,how is one habit to be substituted for another8--,aristotle's rule3 ,to go from one extreme to the other4--,bacon's rules3 #a1 to proceed by degrees2 #b1 to choose for a new virtue two kinds of opportunities3 the first when one is best disposed1 the second when one is least so2 #c1 not to trust too much to one's conversion and distrust opportunities4 ,benjamin ,franklin's ,almanac4--,other practices4--,kant's moral catechism4 ,we have done with practical morals1 the morals1 namely1 which have for their object the setting forth of man's duties and the principal applications of the moral law4 ,the second part of this course of study shall be devoted to the theory of morals1 which has for its object the elucidation of principles4 ,but to pass from the one to the other1 it seemed to us proper1 by way of conclusion1 to introduce here an order of researches which belongs to both practical and theoretical morals1 the study1 namely1 of the means man has at his disposal in his moral self-perfection1 either by curing himself of vice1 or in advancing in virtue3 this is what we call moral medicine and gymnastics4 ,bacon justly remarks that most moralists are like writing-masters who lay fine copies before their pupils1 but tell them nothing of the manner of using the pen and tracing characters4 ,thus do the philosophers set before us very fine and magnificent models1 very faithful and noble pictures of goodness and virtue1 of duties1 of happiness2 but they teach us nothing about the means of attaining to such perfection4 ,they make us acquainted with the end1 and not with the road that leads to it4#adi ,then1 presenting us himself a sketch of that portion of morality which does not confine itself to precepts only1 but to instructions also1 and which he calls the ,georgics of the soul 7science of the culture and the soul71 he tells us that it should be like medicine which considers first the constitution of the patient1 then the disease1 then the treatment4 ,the same in regard to the soul3 there are moral temperaments as there are physical temperaments3 these are the characters2 moral diseases as there are physical diseases2 these are the passions2 and finally there is a moral treatment as there is a physical treatment1 and it is the treatment of morality to indicate this treatment4 ,now1 one cannot treat a disease without knowing it and without being acquainted with the temperament and constitution of the patient4 ,a coat cannot be fitted on a body without the tailor's taking first the measure of him for whom he makes it4 ,hence1 it follows that before deciding on a remedy1 one must acquaint himself with the characters and passions4 #agc4 ,of character4--,the study of character is hardly susceptible of a methodical classification4 ,passions1 manners1 habits are so complicated and so intermixed in individuals that they afford scarcely a chance to faithfully describe them1 and this subject1 though very fertile1 is more of the province of literature than of science4 ,theophrastus among the ancients1 and ,la ,bruyere among the moderns1 have excelled in this kind of description2 but it would be very difficult to analyze their works1 as they have nothing didactic3 they are better suited for reading4 ,theophrastus describes dissemblers1 flatterers1 intruders1 rustics1 parasites1 babblers1 the superstitious1 misers1 the proud1 slanderers1 etc4 ,all these are unquestionably principal types of human character1 but they cannot be strictly brought down to a few elementary types4 ,la ,bruyere is still further removed2 he does not only treat character1 but manners also2 he describes individuals rather than men in general1 or it is always in the individual that he sees the man4 ,hence the charm and piquancy of his pictures2 but moral science finds scarcely anything to borrow from him4 ,kant tried to give a theory of character1 and he started with the same idea as ,bacon1 namely1 the analogy between characters and temperaments2 thus did he confine himself to taking up again the old physiological theory of temperaments and apply it to the moral man4 ,he distinguishes two kinds of temperaments3 temperaments of sentiment1 and temperaments of activity2 and in each of these two kinds1 two degrees or two different shades3 exaltation or abatement4 ,hence1 four different kinds of temperaments3 the sanguine and the melancholy 7temperament of sentiment71 the choleric and phlegmatic 7temperament of activity74 ,kant describes these four temperaments or characters as follows3#aej ,the sanguine disposition may be recognized by the following indications3 ,the sanguine man is free from care and of good hope2 he gives to things at one moment undue importance2 at another1 he can no longer think of them4 ,he is splendid in his promises1 but does not keep them1 because he has not sufficiently reflected whether he will be able to keep them or not4 ,he is well enough disposed to help others1 but is a poor debtor and always asks for delays4 ,he is good company1 cheerful1 lively1 takes things easily1 and is everybody's friend4 ,he is not usually a bad person1 but a confirmed sinner1 hard to convert1 and who1 though he will repent1 will never allow this repentance to turn into grief3 it is soon again forgotten4 ,he is easily tired by work2 yet is he constantly occupied1 and that1 for the reason that his work being but play1 it proves a change which suits him1 as perseverance is not in his nature4 ,the melancholy man gives to everything concerning him a vast importance2 the least trifles give him anxiety1 and his whole attention is fixed upon the difficulties of things4 ,contrary to the sanguine1 always hopeful of success1 but a superficial thinker1 the melancholy is a profound thinker4 ,he is not hasty in his promises because he intends keeping them1 and he considers carefully whether he will be able to do so4 ,he distrusts and takes thought of things which the sanguine passes carelessly by2 he is no philanthropist1 for the reason that he who denies himself pleasure is rarely inclined to wish it to others4 ,the choleric man is easily excited and as easily appeased2 he flares up like a straw fire2 but submission soon softens him down2 he is then irritable without hatred1 and loves him who readily gives up to him1 all the more ardently4 ,he is prompt in his actions1 but his activity does not last long2 he is never idle1 yet not industrious4 ,his ruling passion is honors2 he likes to meddle with public affairs1 to hear himself praised2 he is for show and ceremonial4 ,he is fond of playing the part of a protector and to appear generous2 but not from a feeling of affection1 but of pride1 for he loves himself much more than he loves others4 ,he is passionately given to money making2 in society he is a ceremonious courtier1 stiff1 and ill at ease1 and ready to accept any flatterer to serve him as a shield2 in a word1 the choleric temperament is the least happy of all because it is the one that meets with most opposition4 ,the phlegmatic temper4 ,phlegm means absence of emotion4 ,the phlegmatic man to whom nature has given a certain quantum of reason1 resembles the man who acts on principle1 although he owes this disposition to instinct only4 ,his happy temperament stands to him in lieu of wisdom1 and often in ordinary life he is called a philosopher4 ,sometimes even he is thought cunning1 because all abuse launched at him bounces back again1 as a ball from a sack of wool4 ,he makes a pretty good husband1 and1 whilst pretending to do every one's will1 he governs both wife and servants as he likes1 for he knows how to bring their wishes in agreement with his own indomitable but thoughtful will4 ,there are then1 according to ,kant1 four essentially distinct characters3 the sanguine1 playful1 kindly1 superficial2 the melancholy1 profound1 sad1 egotistical2 the choleric1 ardent1 passionate1 ambitious1 covetous2 the phlegmatic1 cold1 moderate1 inflexible4 ,kant denies that these four kinds of temperaments can combine with each other2 there are but four in all1 he says1 and each of them is complete in itself4 ,it seems to us1 on the contrary1 that experience shows that no one of these characters exists separately in an absolute manner2 there is always to some degree a mixture1 and different men are generally distinguished by the leading feature in their character4 ,we must1 however1 make a distinction between disposition and character4 ,to be of such or such a disposition is not always being a man of character4 ,the first of these two expressions signifies the various aptitudes1 inclinations1 or habits which distinguish a man from others2 the second signifies that strength of will1 that empire over himself which enables a man to follow faithfully the line of conduct he has chosen1 and to bravely resist temptations4 ,character is not always virtue 7for it may be controlled by false and vicious principles71 but it is its condition4 ,that tendency of the will which acts according to fixed principles 7and does not move from this to that1 like a fly7 is something truly estimable1 and which deserves all the more admiration as it is extremely rare4 ,the question here is not of what nature makes of man1 but of what man makes of himself4 ,talent has a venal value which allows making use of the man therewith endowed2 temperament has an affection-value which makes of him an agreeable companion and pleasant talker2 but character has a value which places him above all these things4#aea #agd4 ,age4--,to this classification of characters according to temperaments1 may be added that founded on age4 ,in fact1 different ages have1 as it is well known1 very different characteristics4 ,aristotle#aeb was the first to describe the differences in men's morals according to their ages1 and he has since been very often imitated4 ,i4 ,the young4--,the young are in their dispositions prone to desire1 and of a character to effect what they desire4 ,and they desire with earnestness1 but speedily cease to desire2 for their wishes are keen1 without being durable2 just like the hunger and thirst of the sick4 ,and they are passionate and irritable1 and of a temperament to follow the impulse4 ,and they cannot overcome their anger2 for by reason of their ambition1 they do not endure a slight1 but become indignant1 and fancy themselves injured2 and they are ambitious indeed of honor1 but more so of victory2 for youth is desirous of superiority1 and victory is a sort of superiority4 ,and they are credulous1 from their never having yet been much imposed on4 ,and they are sanguine in their expectations2 for1 like those who are affected by wine1 so the young are warmed by their nature2 and at the same time from their having never yet met with many repulses4 ,their life too1 for the most part1 is one of hope2 for hope is of that which is yet to be1 while memory is of that which is passed3 but to the young1 that which is yet to be is long2 but that which has passed is short4 ,and they are brave rather to an excess2 for they are irritable and sanguine1 qualities1 the one whereof cancels fear1 and the other inspires courage2 for while no one who is affected by anger ever is afraid1 the being in hope of some good is a thing to give courage4 ,and they are bashful2 for they do not as yet conceive the honorable to be anything distinct2 and they are high-minded2 for they have not as yet been humbled by the course of life1 but are inexperienced in peremptory circumstances2 again1 high-mindedness is the deeming one's self worthy of much2 and this belongs to persons of sanguine expectations4 ,and they prefer succeeding in an honorable sense rather than in points of expediency2 for they live more in conformity to moral feeling than to mere calculations2 and calculation is of the expedient1 moral excellence1 however1 of that which is honorable4 ,again1 they are fond of friends and companions1 by reason of their delighting in social intercourse4 ,and all their errors are on the side of excess2 for their friendships are in excess1 their hatreds are in excess1 and they do everything else with the same degree of earnestness2 they think also that they know everything1 and firmly asseverate that they do2 for this is the cause of their pushing everything to an excess4 ,they are likewise prone to pity2 and they are also fond of mirth1 on which account they are also of a facetious turn4 ,,ii4 ,the old4--,those who are advanced in life are of dispositions in most points the very opposite of those of the young4 ,since by reason of their having lived many years1 and having been deceived in the greater number of instances1 and having come to the conclusion1 too1 that the majority of human affairs are but worthless1 they do not positively asseverate anything1 and err in everything more on the side of defect than they ought4 ,and they always 'suppose' but never 'know' certainly2 and questioning everything1 they always subjoin a 'perhaps1' or a 'possibly4' ,moreover1 they are apt to be suspicious from distrust1 and they are distrustful from their experience4 ,and they are pusillanimous from their having been humbled by the course of life2 for they raise their desires to nothing great or vast1 but to things only which conduce to support of life4 ,and they are timid and apprehensive of everything2 for their disposition is the reverse of that of the young2 for they have been chilled by years2 and yet they are attached to life1 and particularly at its closing day4 ,they are apt to despond4 ,and they live more in memory than in hope2 for the remnant of life is brief1 and what has passed is considerable4 ,and their desires have1 some1 abandoned them1 the others are faint4 ,they are neither facetious nor fond of mirth4 ,,iii4 ,mature age4--,those who are in their prime will1 it is evident1 be in a mean in point of disposition between the young and the old1 subtracting the excesses of each3 being neither rash in too great a degree1 nor too much given to fear1 but keeping themselves right in respect to both4 ,and they are of a tempering coolness joined with spirit1 and are spirited not without temperate coolness4 ,and thus1 in a word1 whatever advantages youth and age have divided between them1 the middle age possesses both4 ,we must admit that ,aristotle1 who has so admirably depicted young and old men1 is weak on the subject of manhood4 ,boileau1 translating ,horace1 makes of it a far more clear and exact picture3 ,manhood1 more ripe1 puts on a wiser look1 succeeds with those in power1 intrigues1 and spares itself1 thinks of holding its own against the blows of fate1 and far on in the now looks forth to the to be4 #age4 ,passions4--,character1 considered from a strictly philosophical standpoint1 is nothing more than the various combinations which the passions1 whether natural or acquired1 which exist in man1 form in each individual1 so that there is1 in some respect1 double reason for treating these two subjects separately4 ,but1 in the first place1 the divers movements of the soul take1 by usage1 the name of passions1 only when they reach a certain degree of acuteness1 and1 as ,bacon puts it1 of disease4 ,in the second1 passions are the elements which in divers quantities and proportions compose what is termed character2 it is from this double point of view that we must speak of them separately4 ,if we consider the passions from a psychological#aec standpoint1 we shall find that they are nothing more than the natural inclinations of the human heart4 ,we have to consider them here especially from a pathological point of view 7if it may be permitted to say so71 that is1 as diseases of the human heart4 ,the character of passions regarded as diseases1 is the following3 #a4 ,they are exclusive4 ,a man who has become enslaved by a passion1 will know nothing else1 will listen to nothing else2 he will sacrifice to that passion not only his reason and his duty1 but his other inclinations1 and even his other passions also4 ,the passion of gambling or of drinking will stifle all the rest1 ambition1 love1 even the instinct of self-preservation4 #b4 ,passion1 as a disease1 is in a violent condition2 it is impetuous1 disordered1 very like insanity4 #c4 ,although there may be fits of passion1 sudden and fleeting1 which rise and fall again in the same instant1 we generally give the name of passions only to movements which have become habitual4 ,passions then are habits2 applied to things base1 they become vices4 #d4 ,there is a diagnosis#aed of passions as there is of diseases4 ,they betray themselves outwardly by external signs which are their symptoms 7acts1 gestures1 physiognomy71 and inwardly1 by first indications or what was formerly called prodromes1 which are their forerunners 7disturbance1 agitation1 etc474 #e4 ,passion1 like disease1 has its history3 it has its regular course1 its crisis1 and termination4 ,the ,imitation of ,jesus ,christ gives in a few words the history of a passion3 ,in the beginning a simple thought presents itself to the mind2 this is followed by a vivid fancy2 then comes delectation1 a bad impulse1 and finally the consent4 ,thus does the evil one gradually enter the soul4#aee #f4 ,it is rare that a passion arises and develops without obstacles and resistance4 ,hence that state we have called fluctuation 7,vol4 ,i41 p4 #afg71 and which has so often been compared to the ebb and flow of the sea4 ,these general features of the passions being stated1 let us make a brief sketch of the principal passions4 ,it may be said that our passions pass through three distinct states2 they are at first natural and unavoidable affections of the mind3 inclinations1 tendencies2 they become next violent and unruly movements3 these are the passions properly so-called2 they become habits and embodied in the character1 and take the name of qualities and defects1 virtues and vices4 ,but it is to be noted that whilst we can always distinguish these three states theoretically1 language is1 for the most part1 inadequate to express them2 for men have designated these moral states only according to the necessities of practice1 and not according to the rules of theory4 ,the three states which we have just pointed out1 can be very clearly distinguished in the first of the affections of human nature1 namely1 the instinct of self-preservation4 ,this instinct is at first a natural1 legitimate1 necessary affection of the human heart2 but by the force of circumstances1 the influence of age1 disease1 temperament1 it develops out of proportion into a state of passion1 and becomes what we call fear2 or else it turns into a habit and becomes the vice we call cowardice4 ,physical self-preservation is inseparable from two appetites called hunger and thirst4 ,these two appetites1 too much indulged in1 become passions1 which themselves may become vices4 ,but language fails here to express their various shades3 there is only one word to express the passion or vice related to eating and drinking3 it is on the one hand gluttony1 and on the other drunkenness2#aef both these vices1 and in general all undue surrender to sensual pleasures1 is called intemperance4 ,the source of all our personal inclinations is the love for ourselves or self-love1 a legitimate instinct when kept within bounds2 but when carried to excess1 when exclusive and predominant1 it becomes the vice we call selfishness4 ,self-esteem1 developed into a passion1 becomes1 when it turns upon great things1 false pride2 when upon small1 vanity4 ,the love of liberty degenerates into a spirit of revolt2 the legitimate love of power1 into ambition2 the instinct of property becomes greed1 cupidity1 passion for gain1 and tends to run into the passion for gambling or the desire to gain by means of chance4 ,the desire for gain engenders the fear of loss1 and this latter passion developing into a vice and mania1 becomes avarice4 ,human inclinations are divided into benevolent and malevolent inclinations4 ,the first may develop into a passion1 but not into a vice2 the second alone become vices4 ,there is not a single benevolent inclination which1 carried too far and beyond reason1 may not become a more or less blameworthy passion4 ,but1 in the first place1 we have no terms in our language to express the exaggerations of these kinds of passions1#aeg and in the second1 though they be exaggerations1 we shall never call the tenderer affections of the human heart1 however foolish they may be1 vices1 if they are sincere4 ,yet1 may some of these affections become vices when they unite with personal passion4 ,for example1 good nature or the desire to please may lead to obsequious servility1 the desire to praise1 to flattery1 and esteem1 to hypocrisy4 ,but these vices partake more of the nature of self-love than of benevolent inclinations4 ,malevolent passions4--,malevolent inclinations give rise to the most terrible passions4 ,but are there1 indeed1 in man naturally malevolent inclinations8 ,reid1 the philosopher1 disputes it and justly thinks1 as we do1 that malevolent passions are but the abuse of certain personal inclinations intended to serve as auxiliaries in the development of our activity4 ,there are two principal malevolent passions1 emulation and anger4 ,emulation is but a special desire for success and superiority4 ,this desire1 induced by the thought that other men around us have attained to such or such degree of public esteem or power1 is not in itself a malevolent inclination4 ,we may wish to equal and surpass others without1 at the same time1 wishing them any harm4 ,we can experience pleasure in excelling them1 without exactly rejoicing in their defeat2 we can bear being excelled by them without begrudging them their success4 ,emulation then is a personal but not a malevolent sentiment2 it becomes malevolent and vicious when our feelings toward others become inverted3 when1 for example1 we regret1 not the check we have been made to suffer1 but the advantage our rivals have gained over us1 and when we are unable to bear the idea of the good fortune of others2 or again when1 conversely1 we experience more pleasure at their defeat than joy at our own victory4 ,this sentiment1 thus perverted1 becomes what is called envy3 and envy is generally the pain we feel at the good fortune of others2 it is then a sentiment implying the wish to see others unhappy2 and is therefore an actual vice1 as low as it is odious4 ,envy which has some analogy with jealousy must be distinguished from the latter4 ,jealousy is a kind of envy which bears especially upon affections it is not allowed to share2 envy1 upon material goods1 or goods in the abstract 7fortune1 honors1 power74 ,the envious man wants goods he does not possess2 the jealous man refuses to share those which he has4 ,jealousy is then a sort of selfishness1 not as base as envy1 since higher goods are in question1 but which for its consequences is nevertheless one of the most terrible of passions4 ,anger is a natural passion1 which seems to have been bestowed on us to furnish us an arm against peril2 it is an effort the soul makes to resist an evil it stands in danger of4 ,but this inclination is one of those which cause us the quickest to lose our self-possession1 and throws us into a sort of momentary insanity4 ,yet1 although it is a passion of which the consequences may be fatal1 it is not necessarily accompanied by hatred 7as may be seen by the soldier who will fight furiously and who1 immediately after the battle or during a truce1 will shake hands with his enemy74 ,anger then is an effort of nature in the act of self-defense2 it is a fever1 and as such it is a fatal and culpable passion1 but it is not a vice4 ,anger becomes hatred when1 thinking of the harm we have done or could do to our enemy1 we rejoice over the thought of this harm2 it is called resentment or rancor when it is the spiteful recollection of an injury received2 finally1 it becomes the passion of vengeance 7the most criminal of all7 when it is the desire and hope to return evil for evil4 ,pleasure at the misfortune of others1 when it reaches a certain refinement1 even though free from hatred1 becomes cruelty4 ,hatred changes into contempt when there is joined to it the idea of the baseness and inferiority of the person who is hated4 ,contempt is a legitimate sentiment when it has for its object base and culpable actions2 it is a bad and blameworthy passion when it bears upon a pretended inferiority1 either of birth1 or fortune1 or talent1 and then belongs to false pride4 ,false pride1 however1 is not always accompanied by contempt4 ,we see men full of self-satisfaction1 who yet know how to be polite and courteous toward those they regard their inferiors2 others1 on the contrary1 who look down upon their inferiors and treat them like brutes4 ,contempt1 with such1 is added to false pride4 ,a gentler form of contempt is disdain1 a sort of delicate and covered contempt4 ,contempt when it applies itself to set off1 not the vices1 but the peculiarities of men1 trying to make them appear ridiculous1 becomes raillery or irony4 ,such are the principal affections of the soul viewed as diseases1 that is to say1 inasmuch as they have need of remedies4 ,let us now1 to continue ,bacon's comparison1 pass to their treatment4 #agf4 ,culture of the soul4--,after having studied characters and passions1 we have to ask ourselves by what means passions may be governed and characters modified or corrected4 #agg4 ,bossuet's rule4--,as to the first point1 namely1 the government of the passions1 ,bossuet gives us in his ,connaissance de ,dieu et de soi-meme1#aeh excellent practical advice3 it is obviously based on his study of consciences4 ,he justly observes that we cannot directly control our passions3 ,we cannot1 he says1 start or appease our anger as we can move an aim or keep it still4 ,but1 on the other hand1 the power we exercise over our external members gives us also a very great one over our passions4 ,it is1 of course1 but an indirect power1 but it is no less efficacious3 ,thus can ,i put away from me a disagreeable and irritating object1 and when my anger is excited1 ,i can refuse it the arm it needs to satisfy itself4 ,to do this it is necessary to will it2 but there is nothing so difficult as to will when the soul is possessed by a passion4 ,the question is then to know how one may escape a ruling passion4 ,to succeed in it one should not attack it in front1 but as much as possible turn the mind upon other objects3 it is with passion as with a river which is more easily turned off from its course than stopped short4 ,a passion is often conquered by means of another passion1 as in a ,state1 says ,bacon1 where a prince restrains one faction by means of another4 ,bossuet says even that it may be well1 in order to avoid criminal passions1 to abandon one's self to innocent ones4#aei ,one should also be careful in the choice of the persons he associates with3 for nothing more arouses the passions than the talk and actions of passionate men2 whilst a quiet mind1 provided its repose be not feelingless and insipid1 seems1 on the contrary1 to communicate to us its own peace4 ,we need something lively that may accord with our own feelings4 ,in a word1 to conclude with ,bossuet1 we should try to calm excited minds by diverting them from the main object of their excitement2 approach them obliquely rather than directly in front2 that is to say1 that when a passion is already excited1 there is no time then to attack it by reasoning1 for one drives it all the stronger in4 ,where wise reflections are of greatest effect is in the forestalling of passions4 ,one should therefore fill his mind with sensible thoughts1 and accustom it early to proper inclinations1 so that there be no room for the objects of passions4 #agh4 ,improvement of character4--,bossuet has just informed us how we are to conduct ourselves in regard to the passions1 as diseases of the soul4 ,let us now see how character1 namely1 temperament1 may be modified4 ,the character is a collection of habits1 a great part of which belong1 unquestionably1 to our natural inclinations1 but which1 nevertheless1 are also largely formed under the influence of education1 circumstances1 indulgence of passions1 etc4 ,it is thus character1 this second nature1 as it has often been called1 gradually develops4 ,character being1 as we have seen above1 a habit1 and virtue1 on the other hand1 being also a habit1 the problem which presents itself to him who wishes to improve his character and exchange his vices for virtues1 is to know how one habit may be substituted for another1 and how even a painful habit may be substituted for an agreeable habit1 sometimes for a habit which has lost its charm1 but not yet its empire over one4 ,this problem may be found analyzed and most pathetically described in the ,confessions of ,st4 ,augustine3 ,i was1 he tells us1 like those who wish to get awake1 but who1 overcome by sleep1 fall back into slumber4 ,there is certainly no one who would wish to sleep always1 and who would not rather1 if he is healthy of mind1 prefer the waking to the sleeping state2 and yet there is nothing more difficult than to shake off the languor which weighs our limbs down2 and often1 though the hour for waking has come1 we are against our will made captives by the sweetness of sleep4444 ,i was held back by the frivolous pleasures and foolish vanities which ,i had found in the company of my former friends3 they hung on the vestures of my flesh1 whispering1 ',art thou going to abandon us8'444 ,if1 on the one hand1 virtue attracted and persuaded me1 pleasure on the other captivated and enslaved me4444 ,i had no other answer for the former1 than3 ',presently1 presently1 wait a little4' ,but this 'presently' had no end and this 'wait a little' was indefinitely prolonged1 ,wretch that ,i am6 who will deliver me from the body of this death8#afj ,at so painful a juncture1 the ,christian religion offers its children an all-powerful and efficacious remedy3 this is what it calls grace4 ,but of this means moral philosophy cannot dispose2 all it can do is to find in the study of human nature the exclusively natural means ,god has endowed it with1 to elevate man to virtue4 ,now1 these means1 limited though they be1 should not be considered inefficient1 since for many centuries they sufficed the greatest men and sages of antiquity4#afa #agi4 ,rules of ,malebranche and ,aristotle4--,we may take for a starting point this maxim of ,malebranche1 which he borrowed from ,aristotle3 ,acts produce habits1 and habits produce acts4#afb ,a habit1 in fact1 is induced by a certain number of often repeated actions2 and once generated1 it produces in its turn acts1 so to say1 spontaneous and without any effort of the will4 ,thence spring vices and virtues2 and the problem is to know how the first may be corrected1 and the second retained3 for the question is not only to pass from evil to good1 but we should also take care not to slide from good into evil4 ,if the first maxim of ,malebranche were absolute1 it would follow that the soul could not change its habits1 nor the bad man improve1 nor the good become corrupt2 it would follow that hope would be interdicted to the one1 and that the other would have nothing more to fear2 consequences which experience shows to be entirely false4 ,some fanatical sects may have believed that virtue or holiness once attained could never again be lost1#afc and this belief served as a shield to the most shameful disorders4 ,facts1 on the contrary1 teach us that there is no virtue so infallible as to be secure against a fall1 and no vice ever so deeply rooted that may not be lessened or destroyed4 ,in fact1 and this is ,malebranche's second maxim3 ,one can always act against a ruling habit4 ,if one can act contrary to a positive habit1 such acts often repeated may1 according to the first maxim1 produce1 by the effort of the will1 a new habit which will take the place of the preceding one4 ,one can thus either corrupt or correct one's self4 ,only1 as the virtuous habits are the more painful to acquire1 and the vicious habits the more agreeable1 it will always be more easy to pass from good to evil than from evil to good4 ,how shall we proceed to substitute a good habit for a bad one8 ,aristotle says that when we have a defect to get rid of1 we should throw ourselves into the opposite extreme1 so that after having removed ourselves with all our might from the dreaded fault we may in some respects1 and through natural elasticity1 return to the just medium indicated by reason1 just as a bent wand straightens itself again when let go4 ,this maxim may do in certain cases and with certain characters1 but it would have to be applied cautiously4 ,one may1 under the influence of enthusiasm1 throw himself into a violent extreme1 and remain there for some time2 but at the moment of reaction it is not impossible that1 instead of stopping at the desired medium1 he may fall back into the first extreme again4 #ahj4 ,rules of ,bacon and ,leibnitz4--,bacon1#afd who did not find ,aristotle's maxim sufficient1 tries to complete it by a few additional ones3 #a4 ,one should beware of beginning with too difficult tasks1 and should proportion them to his strength--in a word1 proceed by degrees4 ,for example1 he who wishes to correct himself of his laziness1 should not at once impose too great a work upon himself1 but he should every day work a little longer than the day before1 until the habit is formed4 ,in order to render these exercises less painful1 it is permitted to employ some auxiliary means1 like some one learning to swim will use bladders or willow supports4 ,after a little while the difficulties will be purposely increased1 like dancers who1 to acquire agility1 practice at first with very heavy shoes4 ,there is to be observed1 adds ,bacon1 that there are certain vices 7and drunkenness is one of them7 where it is dangerous to proceed by degrees only1 and where it is better to cut short at once and in an absolute manner4 #b4 ,the second maxim1 where the question is of acquiring a new virtue1 is to choose for it two different opportunities3 the first when one feels best disposed toward the kind of actions he may have in view2 the second1 when as ill disposed as possible1 so as to take advantage of the first opportunity to make considerable headway1 and of the second1 to exercise the energy of the will4 ,this second rule is an excellent one1 and truly efficacious4 #c4 ,a third rule is1 when one has conquered1 or thinks he has conquered1 his temperament1 not to trust it too much4 ,it were well to remember here the old maxim3 ,drive away temperament1 etc41 and remember ,a,esop's cat1 which1 metamorphosed into a woman1 behaved very well at table until it espied a mouse4 ,leibnitz also gives us some good advice as to practical prudence1 to teach us to triumph over ourselves1 and expounds in his own way the same ideas as ,bossuet and ,bacon3 ,when a man is in a good state of mind he should lay down for himself laws and rules for the future1 and strictly adhere to them2 he should1 according to the nature of the thing1 either suddenly or gradually turn his back upon all occasions liable to degrade him4 ,a journey undertaken on purpose by a lover will cure him of his love2 a sudden retreat will relieve us of bad company4 ,francis ,borgia1 general of the ,jesuits1 who was finally canonized1 being accustomed to drink freely whilst yet a man of the world1 when he began to withdraw from it gradually reduced his allowance to the smallest amount by dropping every day a piece of wax into the bowl he was in the habit of emptying4 ,to dangerous likings one must oppose more innocent likings1 such as agriculture1 gardening1 etc42 one must shun idleness2 make collections of natural history or art objects2 engage in scientific experiments and investigations2 one must make himself some indispensable occupation1 or1 in default of such1 engage in useful or agreeable conversation or reading4 ,in a word1 one should take advantage of all good impulses toward forming strong resolutions1 as if they were the voice of ,god calling us4#afe #aha4 ,franklin's ,almanac4--,to these maxims concerning the formation and perfecting of character1 may fittingly be added the moral method which ,benjamin ,franklin adopted for his own improvement in virtue4 ,he had made a list of the qualities which he wished to acquire and develop within himself1 and had reduced them to thirteen principal ones4 ,this classification1 which has no scientific value1 appeared to him entirely sufficient for the end he had in view4 ,these thirteen virtues are the following3 temperance1 silence1 order1 resolution1 frugality1 industry1 sincerity1 justice1 moderation1 cleanliness1 tranquillity1 chastity1 humility4 ,this catalogue1 once drawn up1 ,franklin1 reflecting that it would be difficult to fight at the same time thirteen defects and keep his mind on thirteen virtues1 had an idea similar to that of ,horatius in his combat with the ,curiatii3 he resolved to fight his enemies one by one2 he applied to morality the well-known principle of politicians3 ,divide if thou wilt rule4 ,i made a little book1 he says1 in which ,i allotted a page for each of the virtues4 ,i ruled each page with red ink1 so as to have seven columns1 one for each day of the week1 marking each column with a letter for the day4 ,i crossed these columns with thirteen red lines1 marking the beginning of each line with the first letter of one of the virtues2 on which line1 and in its proper column1 ,i might mark1 by a little black spot1 every fault ,i found upon examination to have been committed respecting that virtue upon that day4 ,i determined to give a week's strict attention to each of the virtues successively4 ,thus1 in the first week1 my great guard was to avoid even the least offense against temperance2 leaving the other virtues to their ordinary chance1 only marking every evening the faults of the day4 ,thus1 if in the first week ,i could keep my first line1 marked ,t1 clear of spots1 ,i supposed the habit of that virtue so much strengthened1 and its opposite weakened1 that ,i might venture extending my attention to include the next1 and for the following week keep both lines clear of spots4 ,proceeding thus to the last1 ,i could get through a course complete in thirteen weeks1 and four courses in a year4 ,and1 like him1 who1 having a garden to weed1 does not attempt to eradicate all the bad herbs at once1 which would exceed his reach and his strength1 but works on one of the beds at a time1 and1 having accomplished the first1 proceeds to a second2 so ,i should have1 ,i hoped1 the encouraging pleasure of seeing on my pages the progress made in virtue1 by clearing successively my lines of their spots2 till1 in the end1 by a number of courses1 ,i should be happy in viewing a clean book1 after a thirteen weeks' daily examination4 #ahb4 ,maxim of ,epictetus4--,the wise ,epictetus gives us the same advice as ,franklin3 ,if you would not be of an angry temper1 he says1 then do not feed the habit4 ,be quiet at first1 then count the days where you have not been angry4 ,you will say3 ',i used to be angry every day2 now every other day2 then every third or fourth day1 and if you miss it so long as thirty days1 offer a sacrifice to ,god4#aff ,he said1 moreover3 ,if you will practice self-control1 take1 when it is warm and you are thirsty1 a mouthful of fresh water1 and spit it out again1 and tell no one4 #ahc4 ,individual character--,cicero's maxims4--,the philosophers whom we have just cited give us rules to combat and correct our temperament when it is vicious4 ,cicero1 on the contrary1 gives us others to maintain our individual character and remain true to it2 and these rules are no less useful than the others4 ,he justly observes that every man has his own inclinations which constitute his individual and original character4 ,some1 he says1 are more agile in the foot-race2 others stronger at wrestling2 these are more noble1 those more graceful2 ,scaurus and ,drusus were singularly grave2 ,laelius1 very merry2 ,socrates was playful and amusing in conversation4 ,some are simple-minded and frank1 others1 like ,hannibal and ,fabius1 more crafty4 ,in short1 there is an infinite variety of manners and differences of character without their being for that blamable4#afg ,now1 this is a very sensible principle of ,cicero1 that we ought not to go against the inclinations of our nature when they are not vicious3 ,in constraining our talents ,we do nothing gracefully1 said the fabulist4 ,let each of us then know his own disposition1 and be to himself a severe judge concerning his own defects and qualities4 ,let us do as the players who do not always choose the finest parts1 but those best suited to their talent4 ,a,esopus#afh did not often play the part of ,ajax4 ,cicero in this precept1 that every one should remain true to his individual character1 goes so far as to justify ,cato's suicide1 for the reason that it accorded with his character4 ,others1 he says1 might be guilty in committing suicide2 but in the case of ,cato1 he was right2 it was a duty2 ,cato ought to have died4#afi ,this is carrying the rights and duties of the individual character somewhat far2 but it is certain that1 aside from the great general duties of humanity1 which are the same for all men1 each individual man has a role to play on earth1 and this role is in part determined by our natural dispositions2 now1 we should yield to these dispositions1 when they are not vicious1 and should develop them4 #ahd4 ,self-examination4--,finally1 what is especially important1 considered from a practical standpoint and in the light of moral discipline1 is1 that each one should render himself an exact account of his own disposition1 his defects1 oddities1 vices1 so that he be able to correct them4 ,such was the practical sense of that celebrated maxim formerly inscribed over the temple at ,delphi3 ,know thyself4 ,this is ,socrates' own interpretation of it in his conversations with his disciples3 ,tell me1 ,euthydemus1 have you ever gone to ,delphi8--,yes1 twice4--,and did you observe what is written somewhere on the temple-wall3 ,know ,thyself8--,i did4--,think you that to know one's self it is enough to know one's own name8 ,is there nothing more needed8 ,and as those who buy horses do not think they know the animal they wish to buy till they have examined it and discovered whether it is obedient or restive1 vigorous or weak1 swift or slow1 etc41 must we not likewise know ourselves to judge what we are really worth8--,certainly4--,it is then obvious that this knowledge of himself is to man a source of much good1 whilst being in error about himself exposes him to a thousand evils4 ,those who know themselves well1 know what is useful to them1 discern what they can or cannot do2 now1 in doing what they are capable of doing1 they procure the necessaries of life and are happy4 ,those who1 on the contrary1 do not know themselves1 fail in all their enterprises1 and fall into contempt and dishonor4#agj #ahe4 ,examination of the conscience4--,to know one's self well1 it is necessary to examine one's self4 ,hence a practice often recommended by moralists1 and particularly ,christian moralists1 known also by the ancients1 namely1 the examination of the conscience4 ,there is a fine picture of it in ,seneca's writings3 ,we should1 says the philosopher1 call1 every day1 our conscience to account4 ,thus did ,sextius2 when his daily work was done1 he questioned his soul3 ,of what defect hast thou cured thyself to-day8 ,what passion hast thou combated8 ,in what hast thou become better8 ,what more beautiful than this habit of going thus over the whole day6444 ,i do the same1 and being my own judge1 ,i call myself before my own tribunal4 ,when the light has been carried away from my room1 ,i begin an inquest of the whole day2 ,i examine all my actions and words4 ,i conceal nothing1 allow myself nothing4 ,and why should ,i hesitate to look at any of my faults when ,i can say to myself3 ,take care not to do so again3 for to-day ,i forgive thee8#aga ,to designate all the practices which experience of life has suggested to the moralists1 to induce men to better1 correct1 perfect themselves in right doing1 would be an endless task4 ,no better method in this respect than to read the ,christian moralists3 ,bossuet1 ,fenelon1 ,nicole1 ,bourdaloue4 ,the advice they give concerning the proper use of time1 opportunities1 temptations1 false shame1 loose conversations1 perseverance1 can be applied to morals as well as to religion4 ,reading1 meditation1 proper company1 good advice1 selection of some great model to follow1 etc41 are the principal means we should employ to perfect ourselves in the right3 ,if we extirpated and uprooted1 every year1 a single vice only1 we should soon become perfect men4#agb #ahf4 ,kant's ,catechism4--,an excellent practice in moral education is what ,kant calls a moral catechism1 in which the master1 under the form of questions and answers1 sums up the principles of morality4 ,the pupil learns thereby to account for ideas of which he is but vaguely conscious1 and which he often confounds with principles of another order1 with the instinct of happiness1 for example1 or the consideration of self-interest4 ,the following are some extracts from ,kant's ,moral ,catechism4#agc ,teacher4--,what is thy greatest and even thy only wish on earth8 ,the pupil remains silent4#agd ,teacher4--,is it not always to succeed in everything according to thy wishes and will8 ,how do we call such a state8 ,the pupil remains silent4 ,teacher4--,we call it happiness 7namely1 constant prosperity1 a life all satisfaction1 and to be absolutely content with one's condition74 ,now1 if thou hadst in thy hands all possible earthly happiness1 wouldst thou keep it wholly to thyself1 or share it with thy fellow-beings8 ,pupil4--,i should share it with them2 ,i should make others happy and contented also4 ,teacher4--,this already shows that thou hast a good heart4 ,let us see now if thou hast also a good judgment4 ,wouldst thou give to the idler soft cushions2 to the drunkard wine in abundance1 and all else that will produce drunkenness2 to the rogue agreeable manners and a fine presence1 that he might the more easily deceive2 to the violent man1 audacity and a strong fist8 ,pupil4--,certainly not4 ,teacher4--,thou seest then that if thou heldst all happiness in thy hands1 thou wouldst not1 without reflection1 distribute it to each as he desires2 but thou wouldst ask thyself how far he is worthy of it4 ,would it not also occur to thee to ask thyself whether thou art thyself worthy of happiness8 ,pupil4--,undoubtedly4 ,teacher4--,well1 then1 that which in thee inclines to happiness1 is called inclination2 that which judges that the first condition to enjoy happiness is to be worthy of it1 is the reason2 and the faculty thou hast to overcome thy inclination by thy reason1 is liberty4 ,for example1 if thou couldst without injuring any one procure to thyself or to one of thy friends a great advantage by means of an adroit falsehood1 what says thy reason8 ,pupil4--,that ,i must not lie1 whatever great advantage may result from it to me or to my friend4 ,falsehood is degrading1 and renders man unworthy of being happy4 ,there is in this case absolute necessity imposed on me by a command or prohibition of my reason1 and which should silence all my inclinations4 ,teacher4--,what do we call this necessity of acting conformably to the law of reason8 ,pupil4--,we call it duty4 ,teacher4--,thus is the observance of our duty the general condition on which we can alone be worthy of happiness4 ,to be worthy of happiness and to do one's duty is one and the same thing4 ,,appendix#age ,,to ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,the ,,union ,,of ,,classes4 ,a subject which has attracted much attention1 and which is often referred to in conversation1 in books1 in political assemblies1 is the various classes of society2 there are upper and lower classes1 and between these two1 a middle class4 ,we speak of laboring classes1 poor classes1 rich classes4 ,these are expressions which it were desirable should disappear4 ,they relate to ancient customs1 ancient facts1 and in the present state of society correspond no longer to situations now all clearly defined4 ,they are vestiges which last long after the facts to which they corresponded have disappeared1 and which retained are often followed by grave consequences4 ,they give rise to misunderstanding1 false ideas1 sentiments more or less blameworthy4 ,i should like to show that in the present state of society1 there are no longer any classes1 that there are only men1 individuals4 ,the word classes1 in a strict sense1 can be applied only to a state of society where social and natural advantages are conferred by the law to certain men at the expense of others2 where some can procure these advantages whilst others never can2 where the public burden weighs on a certain class1 on a certain number of men1 whilst the others are entirely free from it1 and this1 ,i repeat1 by the sanction of law1 and by social organization4 ,this state of things has existed1 with more or less differences and notably great changes1 in all past centuries4 ,its lowest degree is1 for example1 that where it is impossible for certain men to procure to themselves the goods desired by all1 where they can never own any kind of property1 however small1 where they are themselves considered property2 where1 instead of being allowed to sell and buy1 they are themselves sold and bought1 themselves reduced to an object of commerce4 ,this state is that called slavery4 ,slavery1 in its strict sense1 is the state where man is the property of other men1 is a thing2 where he is bought and sold1 and where his work does not belong to him1 but to his master4 ,this state of things existed through all antiquity4 ,society1 with the ancients1 was divided into two great classes 7the term is here perfectly in its place71 classes very unequal in numbers1 where the more numerous were the property of the least numerous4 ,the citizens1 as they were called1 or freemen1 who constituted a part of the ,state1 the ,republic1 had no need of working to make a living1 because they owned living instruments of work--men4 ,this state of things1 you well know1 did not only exist in antiquity2 it was perpetuated till our days1 and it is not very long since it still existed in some of the greatest societies of the world4 ,we may consider it at present as wholly done away with4 ,a notch higher1 we find the state called serfdom1 where man is not wholly interdicted to own property1 and where he is allowed a family1 which fact constitutes the superiority of serfdom over slavery4 ,it is obvious that in a state of slavery1 there can be no family3 a man1 the property of another1 liable to be bought and sold1 can have no family4 ,serfdom1 which in the ,middle ,ages existed in all ,european societies1 and but recently was abolished in ,russia1 allowed the individual a family1 and in a certain measure even the right of property2 but he was a part of the land on which he was born1 and1 like that land1 belonged to a master1 a lord4 ,the serf then was1 as it is commonly called1 attached to the glebe1 to the land1 unable to leave it1 unable to buy or sell except under extremely restricted conditions1 and thus a part of the soil on which he was born1 he belonged with that soil to his lord4 ,this state of things was gradually bettered4 ,the serfs1 little by little1 acquired by their work a small capital2 they succeeded in buying their liberty from their lords4 ,it is this which gave rise to that ancient society1 called ancien regime1 which preceded the ,french ,revolution4 ,but all men were not serfs2 things had not reached that point2 serfdom had already been abolished by means of certain contracts1 certain sums of money which the workingmen paid as a sign of their former thraldom4 ,yet was there still in force much that was iniquitous1 forming what is called an aristocratic society1 where1 for example1 some men had the exclusive right of holding and transmitting to their children territorial property1 which they were not allowed to put in trade1 the exclusive right of holding public functions1 of having grades in the army1 the right of hunting and fishing1 etc4 ,and conversely1 on the other hand1 whilst the minority enjoyed so exclusively all these privileges1 the costs of society rested on the greater number1 and these costs the serfs were obliged to pay4 ,hence a society in which there were classes1 since the law conferred social advantages on some in preference to others1 and heavy burdens resting on some without resting on others4 ,as it is not my purpose to write here the history of modern society1 ,i need not enter into all the details of these facts1 which are1 besides1 quite well known4 ,you all know that these great social injustices and iniquitous practices disappeared at the time of the ,revolution1 and that the principal object of the ,french ,revolution of #aghi was precisely to suppress all these privileges conceded to some1 and these burdens unequally imposed on others4 ,from that moment1 there was equality in law1 that is to say1 that all men belonging to our present society are allowed to accumulate property1 exercise public functions1 rise to higher grades--in a word1 are considered fit to obtain all the advantages which society has to offer1 and which nature allows them to desire and acquire4 ,since #aghi1 society1 as a matter of course1 has continued to move in the same grooves1 and1 thanks to work and competition1 all that which still existed by way of social inequalities has gradually disappeared2 if1 by chance1 there still remain in our laws such vestiges of former inequality1 they will in time1 and with the help of all enlightened men1 disappear2 for it is now a truth fully recognized that the good of humanity demands that at least all legal inequalities should be done away with1 and that all men1 without distinction1 should be allowed to acquire any advantages which their special faculties1 and the conditions wherein they are placed1 enable them to acquire4 ,i say1 then1 that this being the case1 there is no reason why1 in the present state of society1 men should any longer be designated by classes4 ,they are men1 and men alone1 and as such they should be allowed to enjoy common advantages1 to live by their work--namely1 to constitute themselves into families1 to cultivate their intelligence1 to worship ,god according to their conscience--in a word1 to enjoy all the rights we call the rights of a man and citizen4 ,but when in a society all legal inequalities have been suppressed1 does it necessarily follow that an absolute equality will be the final result8 ,no4 ,society can only do away with inequalities of its own making2 inequalities which1 from causes we have not time here to set forth1 were added to the already existing natural inequalities4 ,for there are natural inequalities2 inequalities which may be called individual inequalities1 there being no two persons in the world exactly the same4 ,from this fact alone--men being in a thousand ways different from each other--it necessarily follows that each man's condition is different from that of his fellow-men4 ,hence an infinite multitude of inequalities which have always existed and always will exist1 because they result from the nature of things2 and such inequalities must be clearly distinguished from those dependent on the law4 ,what now are the principal causes of these inequalities1 which ,i call individual inequalities8 ,they are of two kinds3 the inherent faculties of the individual1 and the circumstances wherein he is placed4 ,the faculties of the individual are the work of nature3 they spring from his moral and physical organization2 and1 as ,i have said above1 there being no two men exactly alike1 either physically or morally1 it naturally follows that there are differences1 and these differences bring with them inequalities4 ,let us1 for instance1 take the most important of all these differences1 namely1 physical strength1 health4 ,man is a living being1 an organized being1 and his organization is subject to the most delicate1 most numerous1 most complicated conditions4 ,hence many differences4 ,some are born strong1 robust1 able to brave all kinds of temperatures1 all sorts of trials--trials of work1 of outside events1 sometimes the trials of their own excesses even4 ,others1 on the contrary1 are born with a feeble constitution2 they are weak1 delicate1 they cannot bear trials the same as the others4 ,this is a first difference1 and this difference1 you well know1 may be subdivided into a multitude of others2 for there are no two individuals equally healthy1 equally strong4 ,what will be the natural result8 ,this1 for example3 that where strength is required 7and every one needs more or less physical strength to accomplish certain heavy works71 the strongest will have the advantage over the others2 and1 after a certain time1 of two men who started at the same time1 under the same conditions1 with equal moral advantages1 one1 owing to his physical strength1 shall have accomplished a great deal1 and the other less2 one shall have earned much1 the other little3 their career is unequal4 ,but it is not always the greater physical strength and health which determine in man his capacity for work2 and it is a notable fact1 and a matter upon which it is well to insist1 namely1 that all differences are compensated for1 balance themselves1 so to say2 that such a one1 for example1 who1 in some respect and from a certain point of view1 may be inferior to another1 may from another standpoint be superior to him2 which1 again1 is as much as to say that there are no classes in society2 for if the one who in one respect is inferior to his fellow-man1 is in another superior to him1 they are equals4 ,in the class called the laboring class1 for example1 we see every day that it is not always the strongest and the healthiest that produce the largest amount of work2 and love of work is a notable factor in this scale of physical strength1 making the balance pretty even4 ,for some delicate men are industrious1 whilst others who are stronger are not2 some have a natural liking for their work1 whilst others again have not4 ,hence a difference in the character of their work1 and1 consequently1 in the remuneration of it4 ,a third difference is that of the intelligence4 ,all men have received from nature a special gift which distinguishes them from the animals1 and which we call intelligence2 but they have not received it all to the same degree4 ,not all men have the same intellectual faculties1 and every one knows how great an element of success intelligence is in all functions1 in all departments of human activity1 even in those requiring above all physical strength and the use of the hands4 ,it is well known that even the latter find in intelligence their best auxiliary2 that it procures them an invaluable advantage1 even over those whose physical strength1 facility1 ardor1 tenacity in work1 would seem to forestall all rivalry4 ,there is finally a fourth element which is also inherent in the individual man1 and which distinguishes one man from the other1 and this is morality4 ,we all know that morality1 independently of its own merit1 its incomparable1 intrinsic merit1 a merit which cannot be estimated by its fruits1 is of itself alone one of the greatest factors in bringing about important results in practical life4 ,we all know that even setting aside the intrinsic worth of morality--honesty1 virtue--the work resulting from our physical efforts is greatly enhanced by this precious element4 ,we all know that economy1 sobriety1 a spirit of peace and concord1 devotion to the family--in short1 all moral elements--give to him who exercises them a vast superiority over his fellows who do not1 despite his intellectual and physical disadvantages4 ,when ,i say that morality is an element of inequality1 ,i wish to be understood rightly4 ,there are1 it is true1 moral inequalities among men2 and from these moral inequalities spring others2 but morality is not in itself a principle of inequality1 for what precisely constitutes morality1 is that all men can equally attain to it2 that it wholly depends on the individual man to attain to it or not4 ,so that if1 on this point1 a man finds himself inferior to another1 he can blame no one for it but himself4 ,here1 then1 is a point where the law is of no avail2 where it is evident that man is the master of his actions1 and gains for himself what morality he wishes2 if1 then1 there results from this a certain inequality among men1 this inequality is to be attributed to the free-will of the individual man1 who did not profit by the admirable gift ,providence has endowed him with--namely1 moral liberty--and by means of which he can choose between the right and the wrong4 ,you see1 then1 that there are many causes differentiating men from each other1 and in such a manner that it is impossible to define them strictly4 ,we cannot say3 there are on the one hand the strong1 and on the other the weak2 on the one the intelligent1 on the other the feeble-minded1 because all these elements so combine as to compensate for one another4 ,once more1 he who is least favored in one direction1 may be better favored in another2 he who has an inferior share of intelligence and physical strength1 may be the first in will-power4 ,we can thus always fill out natural inequalities1 and correct and overcome them by an effort of the will4 ,still1 however that may be1 and despite all effort of individual will-power and moral energy1 there unquestionably result from these individual differences a multitude of different conditions among men4 ,besides1 and independently of these purely inward causes due to both the physical and moral constitution of the individual man1 there are yet outward causes of inequality4 ,these are the circumstances1 the conditions wherein we are born and live4 ,we are all more or less dependent on the physical and social conditions which surround us4 ,it is quite certain that birth1 for example1 is a circumstance wholly independent of the will of man4 ,some are born in the most favorable1 some in the least favorable social conditions--some rich1 some poor2 facts which depend neither on their constitution nor on their will4 ,there are1 moreover1 still other outward circumstances4 ,one may be born in a rich1 a civilized1 an enlightened1 a progressive country1 or in a poor1 barbarous1 benighted country4 ,one may live in a place where there is every means of education1 of making a living1 of improving one's self1 where there may be a thousand favorable openings for a man1 and again1 on the contrary1 in a place far away from all civilization1 without opportunities for work1 without enlightenment1 without means of communication with other men4 ,all such circumstances are independent of the will of the individual man1 and can only be corrected in time and through the progress of civilization1 which gradually equalizes all countries4 ,there are yet1 besides all this1 what is generally called the happy and unhappy chances of life4 ,everybody knows that human events do not always run as one would wish them1 that things turn out more or less fortunately1 as circumstances1 and not men1 order them4 ,one may1 for instance1 get sick1 when he has most need of health2 a wife loses her husband1 the support of her family1 when she has most need of him2 one may engage in an enterprise apparently founded on the best conditions of success3 this enterprise fails on account of unexpected events1 and without its being any one's fault4 ,in commerce1 for instance1 we see every day the most unfortunate consequences of outward circumstances1 against which one is utterly helpless1 because1 in commerce especially1 there is a large share to be left to chance1 to the unknown1 which no one can calculate beforehand4 ,now1 all such unexpected events1 as they are realized1 overthrow all our plans1 and are cause that some attain to wealth1 and others fall into poverty4 ,farmers particularly know but too well how dependent they are on outward circumstances4 ,cold1 heat1 rain1 are for them elements of fortune or misery1 and they are elements over which they have no control whatsoever4 ,now these elements1 working blindly1 as it would seem1 are the chief cause of the great diversity of human conditions4 ,some1 it is said1 are lucky2 others are not2 some meet with favorable circumstances1 others with contrary and fatal circumstances4 ,everything seems to co-operate toward crushing some1 whilst everything again favors the success of others4 ,these causes are innumerable1 and could be multiplied ad infinitum2 they explain the infinite variety of human conditions1 how there are none exactly similar1 and how there are consequently no two men exactly alike4 ,they are equals as men1 in the sense that they have the same rights to justice1 to truth2 the same rights of conscience2 but they are not equals as to their circumstances1 which circumstances1 as we have seen1 vary in every respect4 ,but1 it may be asked1 why all these inequalities8 ,why are some happy and others unhappy8 ,why some rich1 fortunate1 powerful1 intelligent1 virtuous even8 7for it would almost seem that up to a certain point1 virtue also depends on social position1 since those who are born in a more elevated condition have greater facilities to exercise virtue72 why are others1 on the contrary1 unfortunate1 obliged to work so hard to arrive at such poor results2 to be scarcely able to make a living for themselves or their family8 ,certainly these are indeed most grave and serious questions4 ,but1 what ,i contend for is1 that it is not to society we should put these questions1 but to ,providence1 who has made life what it is4 ,society can do but one thing1 namely1 not to add to natural inequalities1 social ones4 ,it can also1 to a certain degree1 lessen the natural inequalities2 but it is not wholly responsible for man's moral and physical constitution2 it is not wholly responsible for the course of events in the world2 so that if we would know why things are thus fashioned1 we must rise higher2 we must not make our fellow-men or society in general answerable for them4 ,i only add that1 as legal inequalities disappear1 so will the natural inequalities also vanish1 and this is the essential point4 ,natural inequalities cannot be wholly corrected1 for the reasons above stated2 but as society1 in doing away with legal inequalities1 strives to lessen the share of responsibility it has heretofore had in these inequalities1 the natural inequalities must necessarily grow less1 and for the simple reason that avenues being opened to man to enjoy the fruit of his labor1 and acquire the rights society holds now out to him1 he will be able to fill out these natural inequalities4 ,the inequality of intelligence was largely due to want of culture4 ,as soon as men shall be educated1 enlightened1 shall themselves endeavor to learn1 the differences in human intelligence will gradually disappear2 for it has been observed that as civilization progresses1 the number of great men diminishes1 and what was formerly called genius1 is lost in the larger development of society4 ,this may be only an illusion1 for genius never changes2 only as the existing differences among men become lessened1 the inequalities which separated the great men from the rest are less obvious4 ,thus1 the more you shall put into the hands of men1 and if possible of all men1 means for educating themselves1 the more you will find these differences vanish2 the more will they grow like each other1 the more will human intelligence become equalized4 ,on the other hand1 as social and legal inequalities disappear1 public prosperity1 public wealth1 public comforts1 will increase at the same rate4 ,as the physical strength of men develops1 so will the means of combating infirmities1 diseases1 all that weakened1 enervated1 depraved the populations1 develop also4 ,as the moral differences diminish 7not indeed in the sense that every one will reach the same degree of virtue--that is impossible71 the rudeness1 the brutality1 certain odious vices due to ignorance1 to barbarous manners1 to the insufficient means of communication with each other1 will gradually disappear2 and thus1 in respect to civilization also1 will men grow more like each other4 ,you see1 then1 that by culture1 by the progress of civilization1 all these inequalities due to outward circumstances1 may be combated4 ,society at the present time1 being more ingenious1 more enlightened1 more clever than in past days1 has at its command a multitude of means wherewith1 if not to destroy1 at least to reduce the ill effects of outward chances4 ,that1 for example1 which we call life-insurance1 is very effective indeed in combating misfortune4 ,by means of a small sacrifice1 every man may in some respect protect himself against chances which formerly reduced a large part of the population to misery4 ,it is the same with other similar societies of mutual assistance and benefit2 they will increase in proportion to general progress1 and will largely counteract the unhappy results of such inequalities as may be combated by human industry4 ,i go still further2 ,i maintain that the inequalities above noted not only should not be imputed to society1 but not even to ,providence4 ,they are legitimate and useful2 they are the necessary stimulant to work4 ,it is because of that very great variety of conditions that men make the proper efforts to better them1 and that by these efforts1 by this common labor1 society progresses4 ,why does every one work8 ,is it not that each sees above him a position he covets1 and which he seeks to secure8 ,it is not the first of positions1 nor the highest1 for man does not think of those too far above him1 nor should he2 but the next best1 such as others like him occupy1 he can attain4 ,if he earns a little money only1 he tries to earn more2 if he is only a workman1 he may become a foreman2 if only a foreman1 a master2 if only a master1 a capitalist4 ,he who is but a third clerk will want to be second clerk2 he who is second will want to be first2 and thus through the whole series of degrees4 ,now1 it is just the possibility of securing a better situation than the one we are in that stimulates us to work and make the necessary efforts4 ,suppose 7a thing1 of course1 impossible7 that all men could be assured of a sufficient quantity of daily bread equally distributed among them1 human activity would at once come to a stop1 human work would cease2 society would consequently become impoverished1 and1 becoming impoverished1 even the small portion each one is satisfied with could no longer be possible1 and they would have to fall back upon work again4 ,work requires a stimulant1 and it is the inequality of human conditions which furnishes this stimulant4 ,societies are like individuals4 ,every society has always before its eyes a condition better than the one it is in1 a state of greater material prosperity1 of greater intellectual development2 and it is because we long to reach that superior state that society strives after improvement4 ,there are1 indeed1 societies that are indifferent to this2 that do not experience such a want2 but such peoples remain stagnant in their barbarous ignorance2 they never advance4 ,it is the civilized nations who are not satisfied with their condition1 and where every one endeavors to better his own4 ,we should1 therefore1 look upon the inequalities which favor individual development1 which assist the progress of the race1 which excite every man to make an effort to better his condition1 as truly desirable4 ,i have demonstrated how the great legal inequalities which1 before the ,french ,revolution1 authorized the division of society into classes1 have now disappeared1 and that what remains1 and must of necessity remain1 are the natural inequalities resting1 on the one hand1 on individual faculties1 and on the other1 on the diversity and the inequality of the conditions wherein we are placed4 ,let us now see whether in these conditions there is something requiring society to be divided into parts3--some people above1 some below1 some in the middle1 and whether each of these parts should be called a class4 ,i look in vain for anything whereon such distinctions could be based4 ,let us take the most natural fact which could serve as a basis for such distinctions--namely1 fortune1 wealth4 ,it is said3 there are the rich and the poor4 ,but what more vague than such terms8 ,where does poverty stop8 ,undoubtedly1 there are wretched people in all societies4 ,there is no society wholly free of poor unfortunates1 so unfortunate as to require the assistance of others4 ,it is what we call beggary1 and it exists in all societies4 ,but this is not an element which may be said to constitute a class4 ,it is not any more correct to say the class of beggars than the class of invalids4 ,there are invalids in all societies1 and we are all subject to becoming invalids1 but we cannot say that there is a class of invalids4 ,those who are ill are to be pitied1 but they do not1 ,i repeat1 constitute a class1 which would allow us to divide society into two parts3 a class of people that are well and people that are sick4 ,the same with beggary2 it is an anomaly1 an unfortunate exception to the rule1 and very sad for those who are its victims1 but it does not constitute a class4 ,yet it is not this we generally understand by the poor and the rich classes4 ,we understand by rich those who have a certain appearance of well-being2 and by poor those who work more or less with their hands4 ,now1 there is nothing more false than such a distinction1 for1 among those called rich1 there are many that are poor1 and wealth and poverty are not generally absolutely different4 ,it depends on the relations between the wants and the means of satisfying them4 ,how many among physicians1 lawyers1 artists1 for example--among men who belong to what we call the middle class--are1 ,i ask1 not only poor1 but wretched8 ,how are we to know them8 ,what is it marks in society the rich and the poor8 ,here we have1 for instance1 country people1 good folks1 who have never opened a book1 who do not know ,a from ,b1 and who are rich2 and again others of the middle class who are poor4 ,the conditions in society so intertwine that it is impossible to cut it in two and say3 these are the rich classes1 these the poor4 ,there is an infinite variety of degrees1 each having some sort of property1 the one more1 the other less4 ,in such a number of degrees it is impossible to distinguish precisely the beginning or the end4 ,we admit these individual inequalities1 and as many different conditions as there are individuals2 but there are no classes1 and no one could tell their beginnings and ends4 ,how could you determine the amount of property requisite to belong to either of these categories--the rich or the poor8 ,shall you say that the rich man is he who has any capital1 and the poor1 he who has not any8 ,there are many people with capital that are poor1 and many without who are very well off4 ,these are but arbitrary distinctions4 ,upon what1 then1 shall we base class differences8 ,on the professions8 ,on those who exercise public functions and those who do not8 ,but this would1 in the first place1 be a very unequal division2 for the number of public functionaries is very small in comparison with the immense mass of people who have no public profession4 ,and again1 wherein is the public functionary superior to this or that merchant1 this or that big farmer1 this or that great builder or contractor8 ,it is impossible to say2 for in the hierarchy of functionaries there is also a top1 a middle1 a bottom1 with an infinite variety of degrees in each4 ,take the nobility4 ,but who in these days troubles himself about aristocratic names8 ,they are1 unquestionably1 valuable souvenirs for those who can boast of them--of great historical names1 for instance2 names which have played a part in history2 they are grand recollections to cherish and respect1 but they give him who possesses them but very feeble advantages4 ,it is not very long since there might have been found some legitimate ground for the class distinctions we are examining1 namely1 in political rights1 at a time when some few enjoyed political rights and a great many had none2 but this time has gone by1 this inequality is also wiped out2 there are no more political classes than there are social classes4 ,shall we take material work--work of hand1 as a class distinction among men8 ,we hear often the term laboring classes--men1 namely1 who live by work of hand2 but are not those who work with their brains1 workers also8 ,there are a thousand kinds of work1 and it is not absolutely necessary one should work with his hands to be a worker4 ,besides1 there are many people working with their hands1 who do not belong to what is usually understood by the laboring class3 the painters1 sculptors1 chemists1 surgeons2 all these people work with their hands4 ,you see1 then1 that1 look at it as you will1 it will be very difficult to find distinctive signs whereby society could be divided into classes4 ,there are groups of workers2 groups formed by the variety of work which has to be done4 ,everybody cannot do the same thing in society4 ,political economy teaches a very true and necessary law1 called division of labor4 ,in order that a certain piece of work be well done1 its different parts must be distributed among those who are capable of executing them2 and the more each one will exclusively attend to the portion allotted to him1 the better will the work be done4 ,it is the same with society4 ,society is a great work-shop1 a vast factory1 where there are a great many different kinds of work to be done4 ,each must do his share4 ,hence various groups of workers4 ,some cultivate the land1 because men must be fed2 some engage in industrial pursuits1 for men must be clothed1 must be housed against the inclemencies of the weather2 then there is justice to be rendered2 there are some needed to protect the laborers2 men must also be educated and need educators4 ,there are roads to be made1 railroads to be laid1 laws to be enforced1 and all this gives rise to a multitude of functions1 a large number of groups of workers1 each working in the line which has been determined1 more or less1 by birth1 circumstances1 or natural ability4 ,shall we still say that each of these groups forms a class8 ,shall it be the military class1 because it is composed of soldiers2 the class of ecclesiastics1 because composed of priests2 the teaching class1 because composed of teachers8 ,in no wise4 ,then should we neither speak of the laboring classes--of the middle classes4 ,there is1 ,i repeat1 but one society1 and that society composed of an infinite number of individuals2 all differing from each other by reason of their various natural endowments and the outward conditions in which they are placed4 ,they are subdivided into groups which more or less blend with each other1 are more or less dependent on each other4 ,there is1 however1 a sign whereby men may be distinguished from each other1 and that is education3 difference in instruction and culture2 and this is in these days the only kind of difference that can still exist among them4 ,how is this to be remedied8 ,in two ways3 in observing the duties of society and the duties of individuals4 ,society at this present moment is doing all in its power to bring education within the reach of all1 and according to the particular need of each4 ,of course all are not obliged to learn the same things4 ,even among the most enlightened1 there are some who1 relatively to others1 are quite ignorant4 ,so that there are degrees here also4 ,but still there is a certain common ground of customary1 useful1 necessary knowledge1 which brings all together3--the education common to all1 and which is as a bond between them4 ,society is doing its best in extending this education1 propagating it1 developing it2 and men should do their best toward it4 ,it depends1 therefore1 on the individual man to do away with this last inequality4 ,it behooves us1 then1 to disseminate education and instruction1 as far as it lies in our power2 and it behooves those who have not yet enjoyed it to make every effort to improve themselves4 ,finally1 connected with education1 there is a feature which also establishes a certain difference between men3 good manners2 good habits2 good morals2 all of which are distinguishing1 differentiating1 traits4 ,on whom is it incumbent to do away with such inequalities8 ,on us all4 ,each of us1 in his own individual sphere of life1 must break down the barrier that separates him from the one above him2 he must rise up to him1 not so much through morality1 for morality is the same below as above1 but through his manners1 his habits1 his dignity1 sobriety1 politeness1 he must win his esteem4 ,this is accomplished rather through education than instruction1 for it is education that makes men good-natured1 so that it will be through education that the last inequality between men will be effaced4 ,i say1 then1 that we should as much as possible work toward this end1 and above all avoid using expressions which tend to separate men from each other4 ,these expressions belong to a past age2 they were perpetuated by usage1 and still uphold certain imaginary rights1 and modes of thinking--certain prejudices and sentiments which divide society into two parts1 and cause it to believe that it is so divided from necessity4 ,in indulging in such prejudices1 what in fact is but an imaginary division becomes a real one4 ,it is1 therefore1 this imaginary division of classes which must be done away with2 for it is from the imagination that all these feelings of distrust1 and jealousy1 and ill-will generally spring2 and they should be combated resolutely1 for they carry with them very lamentable consequences4 ,the remedy is where the evil is4 ,these old prejudices residing in the imagination1 it is the imagination we should correct4 ,we must accustom ourselves to think differently2 we must look upon ourselves not as belonging to a particular class1 but to one and the same society1 a society of men1 men all equals and in different social conditions1 all entitled to the same rights4 ,it is1 therefore1 in reciprocal good feeling1 in the heart of men rather than in any legal reform1 that the true safety of society resides4 ,we must give up those old notions which cause some to imagine that they are oppressed1 or threatened1 or prevented to rise in the social scale1 and others1 that they run the danger of being dispossessed of their privileges4 ,there is in such antagonism far greater danger than in the actual evils both sides complain of4 ,to do away with it only requires reciprocal good-will1 kindness1 readiness to understand each other4 ,the reform which has taken place in our laws1 must take place in our minds also4 ,class feeling must be suppressed1 and there will then appear a truly human society1 all being united by brotherly love4 ,,footnotes3 #a ,no4 ,,clix4--,july #a1 #ahhd1 pp4 #bdf1 #bdg4 #b ,the fifth collegiate year will be devoted to theoretical morality4 #c ,the word enthusiasm comes from a ,greek word signifying1 to be filled with a god4 #d ,drive away nature1 and it gallops back again4 ,lafontaine has said the same thing3 ,shut the door against its nose1 and it will return by the window4 #e ,j4 ,j4 ,rousseau1 ,emile4 #f ,kant1 ,doctrine de la vertu4 ,french translation of ,j4 ,barni1 p4 #aga4 #g ,kant is wrong in rejecting these two maxims1 interpreting them in the sense we have just refuted4 #h ,chapter ,i41 page #bb4 #i ,it would seem here that negative gratitude becomes confounded with negative ingratitude2 the one doing no harm1 the other doing no good2 it would seem as one and the same condition1 wherein neither harm nor good is done2 but the distinction exists nevertheless2 for the question1 on the one hand1 is to do no harm when tempted to do some1 and on the other1 not to do any good when there is an occasion for it4 ,for example1 he who despoils others1 but abstains before his benefactor1 experiences a certain degree of gratitude1 and he who does good to his friends and flatterers around him1 and does not do any to his benefactor1 is already ungrateful4 #aj ,these questions will be examined more in detail in the next chapter4 #aa ,see chapter ,,iv4 #ab ,lawyers make a distinction between possession and property4 ,the first consists simply in having the object in use2 the second1 in enjoying its exclusive use1 even if the object were not naturally in one's hands4 #ac ,victor ,cousin1 ,the ,true1 the ,beautiful1 and the ,good 7lectures xxi4 and xxii474 #ad ,which is to say that the acts are nothing if the heart is absent4 #ae ,st4 ,paul1 #a ,cor41 xiii41 #a-g4 #af ,in the ,provinciales this apostrophe is addressed to the ,jesuits1 whom ,pascal accuses of loose maxims on the subject4 #ag ,le ,devoir4 ,part iv41 ,ch4 iii4 #ah ,in ,tuscany the penalty of death was abolished in the eighteenth century by the ,grand ,duke ,leopold4 ,it was again established with the ,grand ,duchy's annexation to the ,kingdom of ,italy4 ,in ,switzerland1 after being abolished by the ,confederation1 the penalty of death was finally left to be determined by each particular canton4 #ai ,it answers the frequent assertion that the courtesy and regards which men owe each other reciprocally1 would soon disappear if they were not protected by the resource of the duel4 #bj ,jules ,simon1 ,la ,liberte1 ii4 part1 ch4 iii4 #ba ,thus we see ,saint ,simonian ideas completely disappear from the modern socialistic sects which all tend to blend with the equality-communism pure and simple4 #bb ,on the question of property1 see ,thiers1 ,la ,propriete 7#ahdh7 and the ,harmonies economiques de ,bastiat1 ch4 viii4 #bc ,see in the ,harmonies economiques viii41 that ingenious and substantial theory which shows the growing progress of the community by reason of property4 #bd ,see especially about the question of interest1 the controversy between ,proudhon and ,bastiat4 7,works of ,bastiat1 vol4 v41 ,gratuity of ,credit47 #be ,mode of reckoning in the time of ,louis ,,xiv4 #bf ,the scene between father and son in ,the ,miser 7,sc4 ii41 ,act iii474 #bg ,see1 in ,moliere's ,don ,juan1 the charming scene between ,don ,juan and ,mr4 ,dimanche4 #bh ,things lost cannot give rise to an action for theft1 when the finder1 after having looked for their proprietor in vain1 and only retained them when his researches proved fruitless1 has ascertained that the proprietor will not present himself4 ,but if the thing has been taken with the intention of appropriating it1 if it has an owner1 although unknown1 there is no doubt about the delinquency4 7,faustin-,helie1 ,droit penal1 iv4 edit41 ,lecon v41 p4 #ff47 #bi ,the play in ,latin is on the words otiandi and negotiandi4--,translator4 #cj ,de ,officiis1 ,book ,,iii41 ch4 xiv4 #ca ,definition of the canon law4 #cb ,digest1 ,,ii41 ,sec4 #c1 ,de ,furtis4 #cc ,traite des obligations1 ,part ,i41 ch4 i41 ,sec4 #b4 #cd ,see ,racine's tragedy of ,phedre4 #ce ,puffendorf1 ,of the ,duties of ,man and the ,citizen1 ii41 c4 ix41 ,sec4 #ah4 #cf ,in the ,united ,states children can1 in the case of neglect by their parents1 make contracts which are obligatory for whatever is necessary for them4 #cg ,our ,code does not admit that a mistake touching the person1 vitiates the consent of the contractors1 unless this consideration be the principal cause of the agreement4 #ch ,esprit des ,lois1 ,,xv41 iv4 ,the stipulations which ,montesquieu demanded have been made1 and have led to the suppression1 or at least to a great diminution1 of the slave-trade4 #ci ,by maitrise was understood the rank or degree of master2 and jurandes was the name of an annual office by means of which the affairs of the corporation were administered3 it also meant the assembly of workmen1 who had lent the customary oath4 #dj ,beaumarchais1 ,barbier de ,seville4 #da ,nicole does not give any examples2 but it is evident1 for instance1 that it is a graver fault to rashly incriminate the integrity of a functionary than his incapacity1 the chastity of a woman than her economy4 #db ,nicole belonged to the sect of the ,jansenists1 celebrated for the harshness and rigidity of their morality4 #dc ,it is also called commutative justice1 somewhat improperly1 in taking for its type the act of exchange1 where one gives the equivalent of what he receives2 but this expression is only truly correct when it touches upon property1 and particularly upon sale1 trust1 loan4 ,but the term commutative has no longer much meaning when applied to the respect due to the life1 the liberty1 or the honor of others4 ,nevertheless1 it is necessary to be familiar with the expression1 as it is usually opposed to distributive justice4 #dd ,nepotism is the custom of advancing to desirable posts the members of one's family2 simony 7which has especially to do with the ,church7 consisted in the purchase of the ecclesiastical functions3 the term may also1 by extension1 be applied to lay functions4 #de ,we give on the next page an analysis of this ,essay4 #df ,jouffret1 ,de la politesse 7,a ,lecture at the distribution of prizes at the ,tournon ,lyceum1 ,tournon4 #ahhj74 #dg ,lamennais1 ,paroles d'un ,croyant1 xv4 #dh ,kant1 ,doctrine de la vertu1 trad4 ,barni1 p4 #afj4 #di ,it is the question debated between ,alceste and ,philinte in the first scene of the ,misanthrope4 #ej ,kant1 ,doc4 de la vertu1 trad4 de ,barni1 p4 #aee4 #ea ,see ,puffendorf1 ,droits de la nature et des gens1 ,,iii41 ch4 iii4 #eb ,see our ,morale1 liv4 ,,ii41 ch4 v4 #ec ,abstinence from the flesh of animals was based by ,pythagoras1 as it was with the ,brahmins1 upon the doctrine of metempsychosis4 #ed ,the question is as to the acts themselves1 and not their abuse4 #ee ,a philosopher of the school of ,descartes1 who1 like his master1 taught that animals are machines4 #ef ,education progressive1 ,,vi41 iv4 #eg ,bulletin de la ,societe ,protectrice des ,animaux4 ,june1 #ahfh4 #eh ,law of the #b;d ,july1 #ahej1 called ,grammont ,law3 ,shall be punishable by a fine of from five to fifteen francs1 or from one to five days' imprisonment1 any one who shall publicly and abusively have maltreated domestic animals4 ,in case of repetition of the offence1 imprisonment4 ,a society--,societe ,protectrice des ,animaux--has been formed to come in aid to the law4 ,the principal articles of its statutes are3 ,the aim of the society is to ameliorate1 by all the means in its power1 and conformably to the law of the #b;d of ,july1 #ahej1 the condition of animals4 ,the society awards recompenses to any propagating its work and inventing proper means to the relief of animals2 to the agents of the police1 pointed out by their chiefs as having enforced the laws and regulations for the prevention of cruelty and ill-treatment towards animals2--to the agents of agriculture1 shepherds1 farm-help1 farmers1 leaders of cattle2--to coachmen1 butcher-boys1 smiths--in short1 to any person who1 in some high degree1 shall have given proof of good treatment1 intelligent and continued care and compassion toward animals4 ,see in its ,bulletins1 the useful results obtained by this interesting society4 #ei ,traite elementaire de philosophie1 p4 #bfb4 #fj ,concerning these three powers1 see ,montesquieu1 ,esprit des lois1 ,i41 xi4 #fa ,see on this subject the ,notions d'instruction civique4 #fb ,prosopopoeia in rhetoric is the form of expression which consists in animating physical or abstract things1 in lending them a soul1 a mind1 a visage 7,boileau71 in making them speak or being spoken to as if they were present and living4 ,in ,crito1 the laws are personified1 and it is they that speak4 #fc ,droits et devoirs de l'homme1 ,henri ,marion1 ,paris1 #ahhj1 p4 #fg4 #fd ,the preceding quotation is from our ,philosophie du bonheur4 #fe ,philosophie sociale1 ,essai sur les devoirs de l'homme et du citoyen1 par l'abbe ,durosoi 7,paris1 #aghc74 #ff ,marshal ,marmont was accused of treason for having accepted the capitulation of ,essonne1 which was perhaps imposed upon him by necessity4 #fg ,the liberum veto in ,poland was the right of each representative to oppose the veto of the laws which were voted unanimously4 #fh ,montaigne thus expressed himself in regard to marriage3 ,a good marriage is a sweet society for life1 full of constancy1 troubles1 and an infinite number of useful and substantial services and mutual obligations4 #fi ,ad4 ,garnier1 ,morale sociale ,i41 ii41 p4 #ajd4 #gj ,see our book1 ,la ,famille1 #c;d lecture4 ,we take the liberty to refer the reader to this book for the development of the subject4 #ga ,xenophon4 #gb ,a4 ,garnier1 ,morale sociale4 #gc ,the law of divorce has since been passed again in ,france4--,transl4 #gd ,david ,hume1 ,essays4 #ge ,a great ,german moralist1 ,fichte1 denies1 however1 people having a right to voluntarily and systematically renounce marriage3 ,an unmarried person1 he says1 is but half a person4 ,a fixed resolution not to marry is absolutely contrary to duty4 ,not to marry is1 without its being one's fault1 a great misfortune2 but not to marry through one's fault is a great fault 7,durch seine ,schuld1 eine grosse ,schuld74 ,it is not permitted to sacrifice this end to other ends1 even where the service of the ,church1 or family or ,state duties1 or1 in fine1 the repose of a contemplative life1 are concerned2 for there is no higher end for man than to be a complete man4 ,there is much truth in these words of ,fichte1 yet may we be permitted to think that his doctrine in this respect is pushed to excess1 as well as that which forbids second marriages4 #gf ,la ,famille4 #dth ,lecture4 #gg ,du droit de la guerre et de la paix1 ,i41 ,,ii4 ch4 v4 ,sec4 #b4 #gh ,and that may be questioned4 #gi ,this duty to-day is imposed by law3 ,primary instruction is obligatory for children of both sexes from six to thirteen years4 7,law of the #bhth ,march1 #ahhb1 art4 #d47 #hj ,fichte1 ,system der ,sittenlehre1 ,pt4 ,,iii41 ch4 iii41 ,sec4 #bi4 #ha ,doctrine of happiness4 #hb ,fichte is right here when he speaks of the exaggeration of this principle4 ,but the principle itself is a true one1 namely1 that one should accustom children to act according to their own reason3 it is the only means of teaching them liberty4 #hc ,the ,dialogues of ,plato4 ,laws4 ,b4 ,jowett's ,translation1 ,b4 ,,iv41 #bch4 #hd ,xenophon's ,memorabilia of ,socrates1 translation by ,j4 ,s4 ,watson1 ,b4 ,,ii41 ,chap4 #b4 #he ,xenophon's ,memorabilia4 ,translation ,j4 ,s4 ,watson4 #hf ,des ,devoirs de l'homme1 ch4 xii4 #hg ,a ,european custom4--,transl4 #hh ,see our work on ,la ,famille 7#c;d lecture74 #hi ,le ,vrai1 le ,beau et le ,bien4 ,lect4 xxi41 ch4 xxii4 #ij ,there is no injustice done to him who consents to it4 #ia ,st4 ,augustin1 ,cite de ,dieu1 ,i41 xvii41 trad4 d',em4 ,saisset4 #ib ,one will say1 perhaps1 that the merchant is never innocent1 for he should have foreseen the risks which threatened him1 and provided against them4 ,but there is no commerce without risks4 ,there is1 then1 a certain amount of risks which it is allowed and even necessary to run1 or else suppress commerce altogether4 ,for example1 a merchant in times of peace certainly knows that there may suddenly arise a cause of war1 and he must make provision against the eventuality2 but if all his transactions were influenced by that idea1 commerce in times of peace would not differ from commerce in times of war1 and would consequently be null4 #ic ,rousseau's ,emile1 ,i41 i4 #id ,bossuet1 ,traite de la concupiscence1 ,ch4 iv4 #ie ,we may apply here what ,la ,bruyere said of clothes3 ,there is as much weakness in avoiding fashion as affecting it4 ,a philosopher allows his tailor to dress him4 ,in the same sense is there as much weakness in rebelling against pleasure as in seeking it too artfully4 ,the honest man simply enjoys it without thinking of it4 ,between the rigorist and the sensualist1 the sensible man has his place4 #if ,ciceron1 ,traite des devoirs1 ,i41 xxxiv4 #ig ,cicero1 ,traite des devoirs1 ch4 xxxvi4 #ih ,we nowise mean to uphold here the doctrine of the physiocrats for whom land was the only riches2 we shall merely say that it is the basis of all wealth4 #ii ,there is here1 again1 a broad duty1 for how can we interdict to a merchant the desire for gain without suppressing one of the incitements to his activity and work8 ,all that we can recommend to him is moderation1 and not to sacrifice to this incitement sentiments of a higher order4 #ajj ,kant himself recognizes that self-interest may become a duty when combated by passion4 ,to secure one's own happiness1 he says1 is at least an indirect duty2 for he who is dissatisfied with his condition may easily1 in the midst of the cares and wants which besiege him1 yield to the temptation of transgressing his duties4444 ,therefore1 even though this tendency in man to seek his happiness did not determine his will1 even though health were not1 for him at least1 a thing to be taken account of in his calculations1 there would still remain in this case1 as in all others1 a law1 the one1 namely1 which commands him to work for his happiness1 not from inclination1 but from a sense of duty1 and it is only by this that his conduct may have a real moral value4 #aja ,franklin1 ,poor ,richard's ,almanac4 #ajb ,aristotle1 ,nichomachean ,ethics1 iv41 i4 #ajc ,meditations of ,marcus ,aurelius ,antoninus1 v41 i4 #ajd ,aristotle1 ,politics1 i41 ii4 #aje ,xenophon's ,memorabilia of ,socrates1 ,bohn's translation1 by ,rev4 ,j4 ,s4 ,watson1 ,m4,a41 ,,ii41 vii4 #ajf ,confucius and ,mencius1 ,pauthier's translation1 p4 #cjc4 #ajg ,the word mercenary has always had an unfavorable meaning attached to it1 a relic of ancient prejudice4 ,in the proper sense1 mercenary means remunerative1 and should have no condemnatory signification4 ,yet already in antiquity the word mercenary had a higher sense than the word servile2 for ,cicero1 wishing to say that one should treat one's slaves well1 said that they should be treated as mercenaries--that is to say1 as men remunerated but free4 #ajh ,plato1 ,republic1 i41 ii4 #aji ,see his ,de ,officiis1 i41 iv4 #aaj ,it might be called sensibility1 in the sense this word had in the ,,xviii4 century4 ,it is not enough to be human toward others1 one owes some feeling to one's self also4 #aaa ,nicomachean ,ethics1 ,,vi41 ii4 #aab ,ibid41 ,,vi41 xii4 #aac ,nicomachean ,ethics1 ,,vi41 ii4 #aad ,we do not mean by this that science cannot be a means of livelihood3 nothing more legitimate1 on the contrary4 ,we only mean that it is not that alone4 #aae ,see also the admirable passage of ,augustin ,thierry in the preface to ,dix ans d'etude4 #aaf ,answer me1 ye illustrious philosophers1 ye through whom we know what are the causes which attract bodies to a vacuum2 what are in the revolutions of the planets1 the relations of the spaces they travel over at equal periods 444 how man sees everything in ,god2 how the soul and the body correspond to each other without inter-communication1 like two clocks4444 ,even though you had not taught us any of these things1 should we be less numerous1 less flourishing1 more depraved8 ,this passage recalls vividly that of ,malebranche quoted above4 ,what1 however1 is most curious about it is that ,rousseau in his criticism appropriates ,malebranche's hypothesis4 #aag ,good sense is the best distributed thing in the world1 says ,descartes at the beginning of his ,discours de la ,methode4 #aah ,unless1 of course1 passion itself implies a duty superior to self-interest3 which is not the case here4 #aai ,see ,burlamaqui1 ,droit naturel1 part ,i41 ch4 vi4 #abj ,see the celebrated lines in the ,misanthrope1 act ii41 sc4 v4 #aba ,virtus in ,latin has both meanings4 #abb ,aristotle1 ,nicomachean ,ethics4 ,translated by ,r4 ,w4 ,browne1 ,,iii41 vi4 #abc ,this idea of ,aristotle may be questioned2 for1 in a sudden peril1 one may be sustained by a natural impulse1 and the feeling of self-defense1 whilst anticipated peril allows all the impressions of fear to grow3 it requires1 therefore1 a greater effort to overcome them4 #abd ,de ,officiis1 ,i41 xxiii4 #abe ,see ,xenophon's ,memorabilia of ,socrates1 ,i41 i4 #abf ,discours de la ,methode1 part ,,iii4 #abg ,the ,works of ,epictetus4 ,t4 ,w4 ,higginson's translation1 ch4 vi41 p4 #ba4 #abh ,the ,works of ,epictetus4 ,t4 ,w4 ,higginson's translation1 ch4 xv41 page #aci4 #abi ,latin1 gyrus1 the ring in which colts are driven round by horse-breakers4 #acj ,cicero1 ,de ,officiis1 ,i41 xxvi4 #aca ,plato's ,republic1 ,i41 iv43 ,a man deserves to be called courageous when that part of his soul in which anger resides obeys the commands of reason4 #acb ,aristotle1 ,nicomachean ,ethics1 ,r4 ,w4 ,browne's transl41 ,,iv41 v4 #acc ,plato's ,republic1 ,i41 iv4 #acd ,anger is still nobler when provoked by injustice done to others4 #ace ,aristotle1 ,nicomachean ,ethics1 ,,iv41 v4 #acf ,kant1 ,doctrine de la ,vertu1 trad4 franc41 p4 #if4 #acg ,moliere's ,tartufe4 #ach ,and shall ,i speak of ,iris1 loved and praised by all8 ,ah6 what heart6 ah6 what heart6 humanity itself6 ,a wounded butterfly calls forth the truest tears6 ,ah1 yes2 but when to death poor ,lally is condemned1 ,and to the block is dragged1 a spectacle to all1 ,iris will be the first to go to the dread feast1 ,and buy herself the joy to see his dear head fall4 ,,gilbert1 le ,dix-,huitieme ,siecle4 #aci ,lettre sur la metaphysique1 lettre ,,ii41 chap4 ix4 #adj ,metaphysics is the science which treats of what is beyond and above nature4 ,we call metaphysical such attributes of ,god by which he surpasses nature2 as1 for instance1 infinitude1 immensity2 the moral attributes1 on the contrary1 are those which have their analogies in the human soul1 such as kindness1 wisdom1 etc4 #ada ,v4 ,cousin1 ,le ,vrai1 le ,beau et le ,bien1 xvie lecon4 #adb ,see ,dictionnaire de l',academie francaise 7#g;e edition1 #ahgh73 ,veneration1 respect for holy things4 ,it is also said of the respectful esteem in which certain persons are held4 #adc ,a postulate is a truth which1 although it cannot be rigorously demonstrated should1 nevertheless1 by reason of the necessity of its consequences1 be practically admitted4 #add ,kant1 ,critique de la raison pratique1 ,,ii41 ii4 ,trad4 de ,j4 ,barni1 p4 #ccd4 #ade ,critique de la raison pratique2 trad4 fr41 p4 #cfc4 #adf ,jules ,simon1 ,la ,liberte de ,conscience1 #d;e lecon 7,paris1 #aheg74--,we have borrowed some few passages of another book of the same author1 ,la ,liberte 7,vol4 ii41 #d;e1 part #a1 ch4 #a74 #adg ,fenelon4 ,lettres sur la metaphysique et la religion4 ,letter ,,ii41 ch4 i4 #adh ,the works of ,epictetus4 ,t4 ,w4 ,higginson's transl41 ,i41 xvi4 #adi ,de ,augmentis ,scientiarum1 ,,iii41 i4 and iii4 #aej ,kant1 ,anthropologie4 ,trad4 franc4 de ,tissot1 p4 #bg4 #aea ,kant gives ingenious examples of these three degrees of action4 ,see his ,anthropologische charakteristik4 #aeb ,aristotle's ,rhetoric1 book ,,ii41 ch4 xii41 xiii41 xiv41 ,bohn's translation4 #aec ,psychology is the science which treats of the faculties and operations of the soul4 #aed ,diagnosis in medicine is the art of determining a disease by means of the symptoms or signs it presents4 #aee ,imitation of ,jesus ,christ1 ,i41 xii4 #aef ,we should1 however1 make a distinction between the passion for wine and drunkenness4 ,one can have this passion without giving up to it4 ,drunkenness is the habit of yielding to it4 #aeg ,sentimentality is false sensibility1 and not exaggerated sensibility4 ,softness is a vague expression4 ,patriotism may by exaggeration become fanaticism2 but this is equally true of other sentiments--of the religious sentiment1 for example4 #aeh ,chap4 ,,iii41 #ai4 #aei ,plato in the ,phaedo 7trad4 de ,saisset1 p4 #ca7 seems to condemn the idea of combating passion by passion3 ,to exchange one sensual pleasure for another1 he says1 one grief for another1 one fear for another1 and to do like those who get small change for a piece of money1 is not the path which leads to virtue4 ,wisdom is the only true coin against which all the others should be exchanged4444 ,without wisdom all other virtues are but shadows of virtues1 a virtue the slave of vice1 wherein there is nothing wholesome nor true4 ,true virtue is free from all passion4 ,nothing more true and more noble2 but there is in this doctrine nothing contrary to that of ,bossuet4 ,the question is not to exchange one passion for another1 for such an act is devoid of all moral character1 but to exchange passion against wisdom and virtue2 and all we want to know is the means4 ,now experience confirms what ,bossuet has said1 namely1 that one cannot immediately triumph over a passion1 especially when at its zenith1 and that it is necessary to turn one's thoughts upon other objects and appeal to more innocent passions or to passions1 if not less ardent1 at least more noble1 such as patriotism or the religious sentiment4 #afj ,confessions1 ,,viii41 v4 #afa ,the virtues of the pagans have been often depreciated1 and ,st4 ,augustine himself1 great an admirer as he was of antiquity1 called them1 nevertheless1 splendid vices 7vitia splendida74 ,they are often regarded as induced by pride rather than by a sincere love of virtue4 ,we should beware of such interpretations1 for once on the road of moral pessimism1 there is no reason for stopping at anything4 ,we may as well maintain that there are a thousand forms of pride1 and that self-love often sets its glory in pretending to overcome itself4 ,we must therefore not wonder to find it coupled with the greatest austerity1 and1 in order to destroy itself1 make us bravely a companion of it1 for whilst it ruins itself in one place1 it starts up again in another4 ,it may be seen by this passage of ,la ,rochefoucauld1 that it is of no use to interpret the pagan virtues in a bad sense1 for the argument can be retorted4 ,it is better to regard virtue as sincere and true wherever we meet with it1 so long as there are no proofs to the contrary4 #afb ,traite de morale1 ,,iii41 #b4 #afc ,the theory of inadmissible sanctity consisted in maintaining that man1 having reached a state of sanctity1 could never again1 whatever he might do1 fall from it4 #afd ,the ,dignity of ,sciences1 ,,vii41 iii4 #afe ,essays on the ,human ,understanding1 ,,ii41 xxi4 #aff ,epictetus1 ,,ii41 xxiii4 7,t4 ,w4 ,higginson's transl474 #afg ,de ,officiis1 ,i41 xxx4 #afh ,the greatest tragic actor at ,rome1 and a contemporary of ,roscius1 the greatest comic actor4--,,translator4 #afi ,de ,officiis1 ,i41 xxxi4 #agj ,memorabilia of ,socrates1 ,,iv41 iv4 #aga ,seneca1 on ,anger1 ,,iii41 #ch4 ,to tell the truth1 ,seneca forgave himself sometimes too easily perhaps1 as1 for example1 on the day when he defended the murder of ,agrippina2 we are often too much disposed to imitate him4 #agb ,imitation of ,jesus ,christ1 ,i41 xi4 #agc ,doctrine de la ,vertu1 trad4 fr4 p4 #agj4 ,we give here this catechism as an example of what might be done in a course of morals4 ,the teacher can modify its form and developments as he thinks best4 #agd ,we can see by this that ,kant understood youth4 ,in a ,socratic interrogation of this kind1 the pupil1 distrusting his powers1 will always begin by being silent4 ,it is only when he perceives that he knows what was asked him1 that he ventures to answer1 and answers well4 #age ,we give this as a useful supplement to ,chapter ,,viii4 ,it is a lecture formerly delivered on the ,union of ,classes 7#ahfg1 ,revue des cours litteraires1 v41 p4 #db74444 ,we beg to be pardoned for what negligences of style may have crept into the improvisation4 ,transcriber's ,notes3 ,passages in italics are indicated by italics4 ,passages in bold are indicated by bold4 ,superscripted characters are indicated by superscript4