,,social ,,rights ,,and ,,duties ,the ,volumes of the ,series already ,published are3-- ,civilisation of ,christendom1 and other ,studies4 ,by ,,bernard ,,bosanquet1 ,m4,a4 7,oxon471 ,hon4 ,,ll4,d4 7,glasgow74 #ds4 #f;d4 ,short ,studies in ,character4 ,by ,,sophie ,,bryant1 ,d4,sc4 7,lond474 #ds4 #f;d4 ,social ,rights and ,duties4 ,by ,,leslie ,,stephen4 #b vols41 #is4 ,other ,volumes to follow by-- ,professor ,a4 ,,sidgwick1 ,professor ,d4 ,g4 ,,ritchie1 and ,j4 ,h4 ,,muirhead1 ,esq4 7the ,editor74 ,the ,ethical ,library ,,social ,,rights ,,and ,,duties ,,addresses ,,to ,,ethical ,,societies ,,leslie ,,stephen ,,in ,,two ,,volumes ,,vol4 ,,ii4 ,illustration3 ,logo ,,london ,,swan ,,sonnenschein ,,co41 ,,limited ,,new ,,york3 ,,macmillan ,,co4 #ahif ,,aberdeen ,,university ,,press4 ,,note4 ,the following chapters are chiefly a republication of addresses delivered to the ,ethical ,societies of ,london4 ,some have previously appeared in the ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 the ,national ,review1 and the ,contemporary ,review4 ,the author has to thank the proprietors of these periodicals for their consent to the republication4 ,l4 ,s4 ,,contents4 ,,page ,,heredity1 #a ,,punishment1 #ee ,,luxury1 #ie ,,the ,,duties ,,of ,,authors1 #acg ,,the ,,vanity ,,of ,,philosophising1 #ahc ,,forgotten ,,benefactors1 #bbe ,,heredity4 ,i found1 the other day1 that an address upon ,heredity had been announced1 of which ,i was to be the deliverer4 ,i admit that ,i was fully responsible for the statement1 although1 for reasons with which ,i need not trouble you1 ,i was not quite prepared for it in this form4 ,i mention this fact in order simply to say that the title may possibly give rise to false expectations4 ,i am quite incompetent to express any opinion of the slightest scientific value upon certain problems suggested by that rather ugly word heredity4 ,the question as to the precise relationship between any organism and its parents or remoter ancestors1 is one of the highest interest4 ,the solution1 for example1 of the problem1 whether is it possible for a living being to transmit to its descendants qualities which have only been acquired during its own lifetime1 has an important bearing upon the general theory of evolution4 ,but ,i have nothing whatever to suggest in regard to that problem4 ,i simply take it for granted that there is some relation between parents and children3 and a relation1 speaking in the most general way1 such that the qualities with which we start in life1 resemble more or less closely those of our ancestors4 ,i may also assume that1 in some form or other1 the doctrine of evolution must be accepted3 and that all living things now in the world are the descendants1 more or less modified1 of the population which preceded them4 ,i proceed to ask whether1 as some people appear to believe1 the acceptance of this doctrine in the most unqualified form1 would introduce any difficulty into our primary ethical conceptions4 ,i will also at once give my answer4 ,i do not believe that it introduces any difficulty whatever4 ,i do believe that the general theory of evolution tends in very important ways to give additional distinctness to certain ethical doctrines2 although1 to go at all fully into the how and the why would take me beyond my present purpose4 ,all that ,i have to argue to-day is1 that a belief in heredity need not be a stumbling-block to any reasonable person4 ,i cannot doubt that the popular mind is vaguely alarmed by the doctrine4 ,i read1 the other day1 a novel by a well-known author1 of which1 so far as ,i can remember1 the main substance was as follows3 ,a virtuous doctor 7his virtue had some limitations7 studied the problem of heredity1 and had read ,darwin1 and ,herbert ,spencer1 and ,weissmann1 and all the proper authorities4 ,his own researches are carefully described1 with the apparent assumption that they were both profound and of tremendous significance4 ,he had1 it appears1 accumulated a vast amount of material2 and his method was to cut out slips from newspapers1 whenever they recorded any events in his own family history1 and to preserve them in a mysterious cabinet4 ,these investigations proved that there was a decided family likeness running through the descendants of a common ancestor4 ,as a general rule1 they had all belonged to the class blackguard4 ,from this result he inferred that there was no ,god and no soul4 ,his relations were dreadfully scandalised3 one was converted to his views2 but the others contrived diabolical plots for setting fire to these marvellous collections and so stopping the contagion of these dreadful doctrines at their source4 ,it struck me1 ,i confess1 that instead of burning the collections1 they would have done better to ask him what was the connection between his premisses and his conclusions4 ,what was this terrible1 heart-paralysing truth which the poor man had discovered8 ,has any human being ever doubted1 since mothers were invented1 that children are apt to resemble their parents8 ,i do not personally remember the fact1 but ,i should be prepared to bet1 if the point could be settled1 that1 before ,i was a month old1--and in those days neither ,darwin nor ,weissmann had published a line1--my nurse and my mother had affirmed that the baby was like his papa4 ,that1 at any rate1 is a remark1 the omission of which would show more originality than the assertion4 ,if ,i desired1 again1 to produce classical authority for the importance of race1 ,i should not have to extend my researches beyond the ,latin ,grammar4 ,if1 once more1 we look into the writings of famous theologians1 we meet it everywhere4 ,i take the first that comes to hand4 ,good men1 says ,calvin1 and beyond all others1 ,augustine1 have laboured to demonstrate1 that we are not corrupted by any adventitious means but that we derive an innate depravity from our very birth4 ,the denial of this was an instance of consummate impudence--reserved1 as ,calvin shows1 for such wicked heretics as ,pelagius4 ,the doctrine of heredity1 in short1 in a theological version1 is essentially involved in the dogmatic foundations of the orthodox creed4 ,i have no doubt that an investigation of the reasonings of ,augustine and others would exhibit much affinity to modern controversy1 though in a very different terminology4 ,whatever we may think of its merits1 the doctrine of original sin implies that a depraved nature may have been transmitted to the whole human race2 and1 if the commonly alleged cause of the original depravity strikes us as insufficient1 it is1 at least1 a very familiar argument of divines1 that the doctrine corresponds to undeniable facts4 ,why should it startle us in a scientific dress8 ,if we can transmit depravity1 why not genius and bodily health8 ,in one respect1 modern theories tend rather to limit than to extend the applicability of the principle4 ,no one ever doubted1 nor could doubt1 that the child of a monkey is always a monkey2 and that the child of a negro1 or even of a ,mongol1 has certain characteristics which distinguish it from the child of a ,european4 ,but the difference is that1 whereas it used to be held that there was an impassable barrier between the monkey and the man1 it is now widely believed that both may be descendants from a common ancestor4 ,should this belief establish itself1 we shall have to admit that1 in spite of heredity1 organic forms are capable of much wider variation than was believed by our fathers to be even conceivable4 ,let us try1 then1 to discover some more plausible explanation of the fear excited by the doctrine4 ,now1 ,i wish to give as wide a berth as possible to that freewill controversy which perplexes so many minds1 and is apt to intrude at this point4 ,i will try to assume1--though it is not my own position1--the doctrine of the freedom of the will in the widest sense that any reasonable person can devise4 ,no such person will deny that there is a close connection--the terms of which have not yet been defined--between the physical constitution and the moral or intellectual character4 ,the man plainly grows out of the baby4 ,if the baby's skull has a certain conformation it can only be an idiot2 with another skull and brain it may be developed into a ,shakespeare or a ,dante4 ,the possibilities ranging between those limits are immovably fixed at birth4 ,and what determines the constitution with which the child is born8 ,surely it can be nothing but the constitution and circumstances of its parents4 ,whether ,i can be a great man1 or cannot be more than a commonplace man1 or a fool1--nay1 whether ,i shall be man or monkey or an oak1--is settled before ,i have had any power of volition at all4 ,now1 it is curious how1 even at this early period1 we are led to use delusive language4 ,the difficulty is quaintly indicated in a remark by ,jonathan ,swift4 ,the dean hath often been heard to say 7says a fragment of autobiography7 that he felt the consequences of his parents' marriage1 not only through the whole course of his education1 but during the greater part of his life4 ,if they had not married1 he apparently implies1 he would have been born of other parents1 and certainly would have felt it for life4 ,what the word he means in that connection1 is a puzzle for logicians4 ,i fell into the difficulty myself1 the other day1 when ,i had occasion to say that a man's character had been influenced1 both by his inheritance of certain qualities and by the later circumstances of his education4 ,having said this1 which1 ,i think1 aimed at a real meaning1 it occurred to me that the phrase was grossly illogical1 and ,i shall be still obliged if any one will put it straight for me4 ,the difficulty was1 that ,i had used the same form of words to indicate the influence of a separable accident1 and to describe one aspect of the essential character4 ,to say that a man is influenced by his education is to say that he would have been different had he gone1 for example1 to another school4 ,that is intelligible4 ,but to say that he would have been different if he had been born of other parents is absurd1 for he would not have been he4 ,he would not have existed at all4 ,he means the man who has grown out of the baby with all its innate qualities2 and not some1 but all those qualities1 the very essence of the man himself1 is1 of course1 the product of his progenitors4 ,such phrases1 in short1 suggest the fancy that a man had a pre-existence somewhere1 and went about like ,er the ,pamphylian in ,plato's myth1 selecting the conditions of his next stay upon earth4 ,in that case1 no doubt1 there might be some meaning in the doctrine4 ,the character of the future incarnation would depend upon the soul's choice of position4 ,but as we know nothing about any pre-existent soul1 we must agree that each of us starts as the little lump of humanity1 every characteristic of which is determined by the characteristics of the parents1 however much its later career may be affected by the independent powers of thought and volition which it develops4 ,so much1 it seems to me1 must be granted on all hands1 and is perhaps implicitly denied by no one4 ,but granting this very obvious remark1 what harm does heredity do us8 ,it is the most familiar of all remarks that you and ,i and all of us depend upon our brains in some sense4 ,if they are pierced1 we die2 if they are inflamed1 we go mad2 and their constitution determines the whole of our career4 ,a grain of sand in the wrong place1 as the old epigrams have told us1--in ,caesar's eye1 for example1--may change the course of history4 ,that unlucky fly1 which1 as ,fuller remarks1 could find no other place to creep into in the whole patrimony of ,st4 ,peter except the ,pope's throat1 choked the unlucky man1 and1 for the time at least1 altered the ecclesiastical order of ,christendom4 ,in other words1 we are dependent at every instant upon elements in the outside world1--bacteria1 for instance1--and the working of our own physical organism4 ,but1 that being so1 what conceivable difference does it make whether the brain1 which we certainly did not ourselves make1 has a fixed resemblance to that of our parents1 or be1 if it be possible1 the product of some other series of processes8 ,it is important1 no doubt1 to recognise the fact2 it would be of the highest importance if we could define the exact nature of the fact2 but the influence upon any general ethical doctrine of the recognition of the bare fact itself seems to be precisely nothing at all4 ,it is part of the necessary data of all psychological speculation1 and has been recognised with more or less precision from the very first attempts to speculate4 ,trying1 once more1 to discover what it is that alarms1 or is said to alarm1 some people1 we are reminded of certain facts1 which again are of profound interest in some respects4 ,i take a special instance1--not1 unfortunately1 a rare or at all a strange instance1--to illustrate the point4 ,many years ago ,i knew a clergyman1 a man of most amiable character and refined tastes4 ,one morning he shocked his friends by performing the ,church service in a state of intoxication1 and within a few months had drunk himself to death4 ,the case was explained1--that is1 a proper name for it was found1--when we learnt that more than one of his nearest relations had developed similar propensities1 and died in much the same way4 ,then we called it an instance of hereditary dipsomania1 and were more or less consoled by the classification4 ,we were not1 ,i think1 unreasonable4 ,the discovery proved apparently that the man whom we had respected and admired was not a vulgar debauchee1 who had been hypocritically concealing his vices2 but that he had really possessed the excellent qualities attributed to him1 only combined with an unfortunate constitutional tendency1 which was as much a part of his original nature as a tendency to gout or consumption4 ,now this1 as ,i think1 suggests the problem which puzzles us at times4 ,a man develops some vicious propensity1 for which we were quite unprepared4 ,in some cases1 perhaps1 he may show homicidal mania or kleptomania1 or some of the other manias which physicians have discovered in late years4 ,they say1 though the lawyers are rather recalcitrant1 that a man suffering from such a mania is not responsible2 and if asked1 why not8 they reply1 because he was the victim of a disease which made him unable to resist the morbid impulse4 ,but then1 we say1 are not all our actions dependent upon our physical constitution8 ,if a man develops homicidal mania1 may not a murderer of the average type excuse himself upon the same ground8 ,you have committed an action1 we say1 which shows you to be a man of abnormal wickedness4 ,you are a bloodthirsty1 ferocious1 inhuman villain4 ,certainly1 he may reply2 but if you could examine my brain you would see that ,i could not be anything else4 ,there is something wrong about its molecular construction1 or about the shape of the skull into which it was fitted1 which makes bloodthirstiness quite as inevitable in me as a tendency to drink is in others1 or perhaps as the most ardent philanthropy may be in some4 ,in short1 ,i am a murderer2 but wickedness is so natural to me that you must in all fairness excuse me4 ,this is1 of course1 a kind of excuse which would not free a man from the gallows4 ,it would simply suggest that punishment should not be considered from the moral1 but1 if ,i may say so1 from the sanitary point of view4 ,we should hang the murderer--not to satisfy our sense of justice1 but to get rid of a nuisance4 ,i will not now inquire what may be said upon that undoubtedly difficult problem2 but ,i must touch upon the previous question which is raised by the argument4 ,would our supposed murderer make out a good case for himself8 ,is there no difference between him and the maniac2 or1 rather1 what is the nature of the difference which we clearly recognise in practice8 ,in the extreme case which our ancestors took as the typical case1 the madman kills because he is under some complete illusion3 he supposes that he is only breaking a glass when he is really taking a life1 and so forth4 ,he is therefore not wicked1 but accidentally mischievous4 ,we have now come to recognise the existence of many states of mind intervening between this and complete sanity4 ,among them1 for example1 is the state of mind of the homicidal monomaniac1 whose propensity is considered to be the cause of his actions1 and which may be consistent with his being in many other respects capable of acting upon the ordinary motives and judging reasonably in most of the affairs of life4 ,what1 then1 is the meaning of the statement that he is a madman1 and therefore excusable8 ,the contention must1 of course1 be1 in the first place1 that his character is in some way abnormal4 ,he is not governable by the ordinary motives which determine human action4 ,but1 beyond this1 it is evident that the abnormality is taken to mean something more than the mere deviation from the average4 ,a man may be abominably wicked1 and yet not in the least abnormal in the sense here required4 ,he may be deficient in the higher motives1 and the more brutal passions may be unusually developed2 and yet we do not hold that he therefore deviates from the type4 ,so1 in a different sphere1 we may have one man possessing enormous strength and another exceedingly feeble1 one very active and another very clumsy2 and yet they may all be perfectly normal1 they are free from physical disease1 and all their physical functions may be performed according to the normal system4 ,entire freedom from disease1 in short1 is perfectly compatible with exceedingly wide deviations from the average1 with capacity for walking a thousand miles in a thousand hours1 or with inability to walk a single mile2 and yet such deviations do not imply a departure from a certain common type4 ,to say precisely what symptoms indicate mere differences within the normal type1 and what imply an actual deviation from the type1 is exceedingly difficult1 if not impossible2 and yet that such a distinction exists has to be constantly recognised4 ,so-and-so is delicate1 but not diseased2 feeble1 but not deformed1 has a definite meaning1 though we may be unable to define the precise meaning of our words1 or to decide which statement is true in particular cases4 ,the great difficulty in the case of insanity corresponds to this4 ,the physician tells us that the madman's mind works abnormally1 but not abnormally in the sense merely of having some faculties weaker and others stronger than is common2 but in such a way as to indicate disease1 and1 moreover1 a particular kind of disease1 or one1 perhaps1 of several particular kinds of diseases4 ,the vagueness of this statement provokes lawyers1 who have a natural love of definite external tests to govern their decisions2 and it has led to a number of delicate discussions1 upon which ,i need not enter4 ,the legal problem seems essentially to be1 what tests should guide us in determining whether a man should be regarded as a normal human being1 or as a being so far differing from the normal type that he should be treated exceptionally1 and especially put under the guidance of other persons1 and excused from legal responsibility1 that is1 liability to punishment4 ,i have to do with the moral problem alone4 ,it is a still more difficult problem2 but it has this advantage1 that we do not require so definite an answer4 ,we have not1 happily1 to decide whether our fellows shall go to heaven or to hell1 though we have to decide whether they shall be hanged or locked up2 and we must be content as a rule with very vague estimates as to their moral character4 ,what we practically have to take1 more or less roughly1 into account is simply this3 that our inference from conduct to character has often to be modified by the existence of these abnormal cases4 ,a man is drunk on an important occasion2 ,i infer1 as a rule1 that he has all the qualities which go with low sensuality2 but in some cases the inference is wrong2 the man may be really a person of most admirable feelings2 but one of his instincts has suddenly taken an abnormal development1 owing to a set of causes entirely different from the usual causes4 ,another man suddenly and causelessly kills a friend4 ,the natural inference that he must be a bloodthirsty brute is erroneous1 if it turns out that he has acted from impulses not generated by any habitual want of benevolence1 but from some special defect in the constitution of his brain4 ,in other words1 our moral judgment must vary in the two cases1 and may vary so much that the same action may rightly suggest only pity in one case and abhorrence in the other2 although1 in many cases1 where it may be very difficult to say what is the precise implication as to character1 the judgment must1 if we are properly diffident1 remain obscure4 ,the moral problem always depends ultimately upon this3 ,what is the character implied by this conduct8 ,if the moral conduct shows malignity within the normal type1 it justifies condemnation2 if it shows only a blind instinctive impulse1 due to a deflection from the type1 it may justify no other feelings than those which we have for the poor maniac who fancies himself a king1 and takes his limbs to be made of glass4 ,if we hold that such responsibility implies free will we shall argue that the madman is deprived of free will1 or that his freedom of will is more or less restricted1 and that he is therefore irresponsible4 ,in my own opinion1 that proposition would be by no means an easy one to establish4 ,i fancy that a man may be insane and yet capable1 within very wide limits1 of being good or bad1 and that therefore we must at any rate hold that he has still some power of free will4 ,the bearing of this upon the question of moral responsibility brings us within sight of some delicate problems4 ,but1 however this may be1 the criterion by which we shall have to judge whether we are believers in free will or determinists will be the same4 ,the problem is essentially1 is this man accessible to the motives by which normal men regulate their conduct8 or does he so far deflect from the typical constitution1 however that constitution may be precisely defined1 that his conscience or his affections or his intellectual powers are unable to act according to the general laws of human nature8 ,having said so much1 ,i think that ,i may proceed to this conclusion1 that the theory of heredity can make no real difference whatever to our problem4 ,there is a difficulty for the metaphysician--the difficulty which is involved in discussions between materialists and idealists1 determinists and believers in free will4 ,i do not deny the existence of that difficulty4 ,i only say that the question of heredity is altogether irrelevant to the difficulty4 ,the desire to treat ethical problems by the methods of science may predispose a thinker to materialism1 and may at the same time lead him to attach particular importance to the doctrine of heredity4 ,but that doctrine only takes note of facts which every theory has to state in its own phraseology1 and do not alter the ultimate problem4 ,let us1 in fact1 go back to our murderer4 ,i am not responsible1 he says1 because ,i am determined by the processes in my brain4 ,i am a mere machine1 grinding out one set of actions or another as external accidents set my wheels and pulleys in motion4 ,if that argument be fatal to moral responsibility1 or to the belief that any truly moral action exists 7a point which ,i do not argue71 it will no doubt remove the moral element from the treatment both of murderers and madmen4 ,they might still require different measures1 just as we treat a machine differently when we consider that it is not of the normal construction1 or that its various parts have somehow got out of gear1 so that we can no longer1 for example1 expect that the mainspring will transmit its motion to the wheels4 ,but1 in any case1 if the dependence upon the body be a fatal objection to morality in the highest sense1 the circumstance that the body is made upon the plan of previously existing bodies makes no additional difficulty4 ,if we could suppose every brain to be started afresh by a fortuitous concourse of atoms1 the difficulty would be neither increased nor diminished4 ,the problem1 are we automatic8 and the validity of the inference1 is morality meaningless8 are questions altogether independent of the question1 what particular kind of automata are we8 and do we or do we not resemble a previous generation of automata8 ,if1 however1 we reply to the criminal that he is not a machine or an automaton1 but a responsible1 reasoning1 and thinking being1 we do not get away from the facts4 ,we then assert that he is responsible because he possesses a certain moral constitution4 ,but whatever words we may use to express the facts correctly1 we must still allow that there is such a correlation between soul and body 7if those old-fashioned words be admissible7 that the health of his moral constitution depends at every instant upon the health of his nervous system and his brain4 ,it may be shattered or destroyed by an injury2 and1 if this be so1 what does it matter whether the injury--say the defective shape of the skull1 which causes pressure on the brain--is due to some accident or to a connate malformation due to his parents8 ,the difficulty1 if it be difficulty1 is that the want of responsibility is due to some cause1 accidental relatively to him2 and it matters not whether that cause be in his parents' constitution or in some other combination of circumstances4 ,in any case1 we have to suppose1 whatever the relation of mind and body1 we must at least assume that a man is born with some character4 ,like everything that exists1 he has certain definite qualities which he did not make for himself1 and upon which his subsequent development depends4 ,and1 if that be once admitted1 the whole difficulty still occurs1 and the question as to whether the origin of these innate qualities be derived from his parents or from a something else is a mere matter of detail4 ,in fact1 the confusion seems to me to arise from the vague phraseology which induces us to accept1 virtually at least1 the mental attitude of ,dean ,swift in ,er the ,pamphylian4 ,we speak as if the man were an independent entity1 lying somehow outside the chain of cause and effect1 and arbitrarily plunged into it2 nay1 as if even his inner constitution were something superinduced upon his nature4 ,it is really an absurd abstraction to distinguish between the man and his character1 as though he meant a something existing without a character1 and afterwards run into a mould by fate4 ,the character is the man in certain relations1 and he can never exist without it1 any more than a piece of matter can be outside of all particular times and places4 ,if the doctrine of free will and moral responsibility be so interpreted as to imply our acceptance of such fallacies1 ,i can only say that it appears to me to be irreconcilable with the most undeniable facts4 ,but ,i am very far from supposing that any intelligent supporter of the doctrine would state it in such a form4 ,he would admit as fully as ,i do the facts1 and1 if they can be admitted and reconciled to the doctrine of moral responsibility1 certainly the doctrine of heredity can be so reconciled4 ,the only peculiarity of the doctrine is1 that it has called attention to an order of facts which must in any case be recognised by every philosopher2 and that it helps1 therefore1 to disperse a fallacy which only requires articulate statement to show its radical want of logic or even conceivability4 ,we are1 beyond all doubt1 affected somehow1 and affected profoundly1 by our environment2 and this particular form of relation to other beings has no more bearing upon the problem than the other forces which have been recognised ever since speculation began4 ,there is1 however1 another side from which ,i must briefly consider the question of heredity2 and it is a side which1 ,i think1 is really more important1 because it involves issues of facts1 and has suggested some more reasonable prejudices4 ,it is1 undoubtedly1 very common that when a theory has obtained a certain currency it should be applied rashly beyond its proper limits4 ,when the speculations of ,darwin encouraged us to believe that the natural selection might be analogous to artificial selection1 that different species of animals have been produced as varieties of dogs and pigeons have been produced by breeders1 it was1 at least1 tempting to apply the same formula directly to other cases4 ,some men of science have endeavoured to show that genius or criminality is hereditary2 and that1 if one man writes a great poem and another picks a pocket1 it is always in virtue of their hereditary endowment4 ,within certain limits1 this statement is not surprising1 and ,i shall be very glad when men of science can tell us what those limits may be4 ,without being a man of science1 ,i fully believe that our congenital characteristics form1 as ,i have said1 certain impassable limits to our development4 ,one baby is a potential ,shakespeare1 and1 probably1 only one in a million4 ,the qualities with which he starts1 again1 are1 no doubt1 derived from his parents1 though we do not1 as yet1 understand in what way2 whether1 for example1 we should infer that ,shakespeare's parents had more than usual capacity1 or were especially healthy1 or had some peculiar form of one-sided development which generated the disease called poetical genius2 or whether he may have inherited qualities from a remote ancestor1 which had remained latent for several generations4 ,in any case1 he was at birth only a potential ,shakespeare4 ,he might have died of the measles1 or been made stupid by a sunstroke1 or have taken to drink in bad company1 or have run away to sea1 or been sent to the ,university and become a mere bishop or professor of casuistry2 in short1 though he could not easily have done very much better work than he did1 he might have done inconceivably less4 ,that is to say1 his congenital qualities implied certain powers2 but what he would do with them remained to be partly determined by an indefinite variety of external circumstances acting upon him in various ways4 ,hence1 we have always the complex problem1 what1 given certain raw material in the shape of new-born babies1 will be the characteristics of the finished product in the shape of a grown-up population8 ,if the social state is determined from the inherited qualities directly1 we should be able1 for example1 to infer from a given proportion of criminals1 that a certain number of children were born with a corresponding physical constitution1 with foreheads villainous low1 and prognathous jaws1 and with the other peculiar signs which mark the felon from his birth4 ,in that case1 again1 we should infer1 ,i suppose1 that the only possible means of improving the social state would be by somehow improving the breed2 perhaps1 by appointing some of the inspectors who play so great a part in modern society1 to examine infants1 and get rid of those who were thus distinguished1 by the means now adopted in the case of superfluous puppies4 ,one objection to this system is1 of course1 that men of science have not yet shown that they are qualified for exercising such a supervision2 and there are other difficulties upon which ,i need not dwell4 ,this much1 indeed1 we may grant without any scientific prepossessions whatever4 ,it is clearly very desirable that every generation should raise up for its successors as many children with sturdy bodies and vigorous brains as possible2 and it is to be hoped that the objection to transmitting disease and imbecility may be more generally recognised1 and1 in some shape or other1 have an influence even upon the strongest passions4 ,but ,i am only concerned with the general theory1 which1 if ,i understand it rightly1 would appear to imply that the characteristics of a society are irrevocably fixed by the characteristics of the children born into it2 and1 whether this theory be true or false1 we must admit that it has a considerable bearing upon morality4 ,if1 in fact1 we hold it to be rigidly true1 we should have to suppose that no serious improvement can be produced in society at large1 except by breeding a superior race of men4 ,this1 again1 is a discouraging prospect4 ,let me quote what has been said by an authority who expresses1 ,i believe1 the accepted scientific view4 ,there can be no doubt1 says ,professor ,huxley1 that vast changes have taken place in ,english civilisation since the days of the ,tudors4 ,but ,i am not aware that there is a single particle of evidence in favour of the conclusion that this evolutionary process has been accompanied by any modification of the physical or the mental characters of the men who have been the subjects of it4 ,i have not met with any grounds for suspecting that the average ,englishmen of to-day are sensibly different from those that ,shakespeare knew and drew4 ,the statement1 ,i imagine1 might be very much extended4 ,i do not suppose that the average cockney of to-day is a superior animal1 physically or morally1 to the average ,athenian of the days of ,pericles1 or even1 it may be1 to the pre-historic savages who made flint implements for the amusement of our antiquaries4 ,briefly1 whatever change has taken place1 within historical period1 has been a social change1 not a change in the structure of the individual4 ,this is surely conceivable4 ,we need only consider1 for example1 how vast a change has been made in all the conditions of life by the modern applications of practical science4 ,whether1 in other respects1 we are better or worse than our forefathers1 we have an enormously greater aggregate of wealth now than we had1 say1 two centuries ago2 we can support four times the population1 though the condition of the lowest stratum may not be better4 ,and this amazing advance of wealth is not due to the fact that ,englishmen of to-day have better brains for mathematics than the ,englishmen of ,newton's time2 but to the accumulation of capital1 the improvement of the natural conditions of the soil1 the turning to account of vast masses of material1 previously neglected2 to the invention of machinery1 and so forth2 all of which imply1 not necessarily the very slightest improvement of natural capacity1 but simply the growth of knowledge1 and the fact that each generation has preserved more than it has consumed4 ,what we call progress or civilisation1 which means1 whatever else it may or may not mean1 a gigantic increase in the power of man over nature1 is due1 therefore1 to the one fact that man can accumulate4 ,he can modify the earth in such a way as to facilitate the labours of the coming generations2 he can make tools which last beyond his own time1 and which themselves become1 as it were1 the ancestors of incomparably superior tools2 he can1 moreover1 accumulate and transmit knowledge1 not merely the knowledge of facts1 but the knowledge of scientific laws and of useful inventions1 and of the right methods of investigating facts4 ,when ,newton made a discovery1 he made it for all the following generations2 and1 though it may well be that no superior or even equal intellect has since arisen to carry on his work1 the dwarf now stands on the shoulders of the giant4 ,it is not simply that we know more facts4 ,the modes of mathematical inquiry differ as much from those which ,newton could employ1 as the latest steam engine from the crude fire machine before the time of ,watt2 and an average undergraduate can solve with ease problems which once puzzled the greatest intellects that ever appeared among men4 ,man1 then1 can accumulate2 and that simple fact enables every generation enormously to surpass its predecessors4 ,accumulation1 again1 is1 of course1 a form of inheritance4 ,we are born heirs to the intellectual as well as to the material fortunes of our ancestors4 ,but1 it is obvious1 this is something very different from heredity4 ,it supposes an alteration1 not in the man1 but in his surroundings or his education in the widest sense2 not in his intellectual capacity1 but in the knowledge which it can attain and the rules which it has worked out4 ,in order that a man may be capable either of bequeathing or inheriting1 he must have certain faculties2 he must be an observing1 remembering1 reasoning animal2 but he may become indefinitely richer1 not from any improvement in his powers of observing and remembering and using1 but simply from the change in his position4 ,people's memories1 it is sometimes suggested1 have been weakened by the invention of printing4 ,but1 weakened or not1 we have an incomparably greater knowledge of the past than was formerly possible1 because we can now keep our memories upon our bookshelves1 in the form of histories and encyclopaedias1 and know every fact that we want to know when we want it1 without troubling ourselves to fill our minds with all the knowledge that may ever be possibly useful4 ,a library is an external and materialised memory4 ,but without illustrating so plain a point any further1 ,i simply take note of what it implies3 that is1 that1 as ,professor ,huxley has pointed out1 all that distinguishes the present state of things from the state of things in the time of ,elizabeth1 or1 perhaps1 at the time of remote ,egyptian dynasties1 may be due1 not to any change in the individual1 but to what is called the social factor4 ,the inference from the individual to the society1 or from the society to the individual1 is1 therefore1 rigidly impossible1 because1 given the man1 the position in which he is placed and the stage of development of the society to which he belongs1 are relevant facts which exercise an incalculably great influence4 ,if this be true1 what follows8 ,we remark1 in the first place1 that the evolution of which we speak in regard to natural history1 the process by which the present population of the globe has gradually grown out of the population of remote geological epochs1 is slow4 ,the changes which it may produce are not sensible within a generation--for1 indeed1 the very nature of the case implies that they must take many generations--not perhaps even within such a period as is covered by all authentic history4 ,it is not1 of course1 on that account to be overlooked for scientific purposes4 ,monkeys must have grown into men before they could begin to accumulate capital1 either material or spiritual4 ,the faculty of accumulating must itself have been developed4 ,only when once it was developed1 another process would begin1 the process of social evolution1 which1 however it may resemble the other1 or possibly be in some sense its continuation1 proceeds1 at least1 at a totally different rate4 ,the difference is comparable1 one may say roughly1 to the difference between the speed of an express train and the speed of a four-wheeled waggon4 ,beneath the surface1 it may be1 the slower process is still continuing2 men1 for anything ,i can say to the contrary1 may be acquiring larger brains and more sensitive bodies2 and it is further possible1 or rather obvious1 that if we can do anything to facilitate this proceeding1 to behave so as to give nature a better chance of turning out better work1 we ought to do so4 ,only nature is pretty sure to take her time about it4 ,how far1 again1 one process is to be considered as a continuation of the other1 or as a modification1 or even as in opposition to it1 is a point which ,i cannot now touch4 ,what ,i have to say is simply this3 that if we take any two periods of society1 the present1 for example1 and that of a thousand or five thousand years ago1 we shall find enormous or incalculably great differences in the social structure1 in the amount of knowledge1 in the character of the ethical1 religious1 and philosophical beliefs1 and in the relations between the individuals of which the society is constructed2 but between the individuals at the two periods we may find hardly any definable difference whatever4 ,for anything we can say1 we should be able1 if we could move people about in time as well as in space1 to exchange a thousand infants of the nineteenth century ,a4,d41 for a thousand of the nineteenth century ,b4,c41 and nobody would be able to detect the difference which would result4 ,hence it follows1 in my opinion1 that the evolutionary process with which moralists and political philosophers have practically to deal1 is what ,i have called the social1 and not the individual process4 ,we inherit thoughts as we inherit wealth2 we inherit customs and laws and forms of worship1 and indeed our whole mental furniture2 we can add enormously to our inheritance1 and can transmit the augmented fund to our descendants4 ,but the other process of inheritance1 to which the word heredity is taken to apply1 is not1 immediately at least1 cumulative4 ,we inherit the old faculties1 bodily and mental1 unaltered1 or with infinitesimal alterations1 though we live in a different environment1 and are ourselves as much altered as our environment4 ,the modern social organism is built up1 if ,i may say so1 of cells almost identical in their properties with those of the old organism1 although the mode of combination gives entirely new properties to the whole1 and brings out new actions and reactions among the constituent cells themselves4 ,i have been touching the edge of certain problems of great interest but enormous complexity1 and ,i shall venture to indicate the difference between these views and some which have recently attracted much attention4 ,mr4 ,kidd's work upon ,social ,evolution has made the phrase popular2 but1 instead of using it in my sense1 he speaks as though social evolution involved what ,i have called individual evolution4 ,in order to keep within limits1 ,i will confine myself to one case upon which he lays great stress4 ,it will show sufficiently why ,i hold his mode of reasoning to be inconclusive4 ,mr4 ,kidd has achieved success by very excellent qualities1 by remarkable literary ability1 and by his uniformly high tone of moral feeling4 ,i should1 therefore1 be very sorry to speak of him otherwise than respectfully4 ,mr4 ,kidd1 however1 chooses to maintain a thesis in which he has certainly no personal interest1--the thesis1 namely1 that a little stupidity may be a very good thing4 ,this view is1 perhaps1 intelligible when we observe that he also maintains that the progress of the race depends upon its holding ultra-rational1 which ,i think he would find it hard to distinguish from irrational1 beliefs4 ,in support of this view he writes a chapter to prove that progress is not primarily intellectual4 ,the argument of which ,i have spoken is part of this proof4 ,the ,greeks1 he tells us1 were a race intellectually superior to ourselves4 ,they were1 so ,mr4 ,galton informs him1 two degrees above modern ,englishmen in the scale of intelligence1 and as superior to us as we are to the negro4 ,and yet1 says ,mr4 ,kidd1 this marvellous race died out1 and no trace of its blood is now to be found in the present population of the world4 ,let us look shortly into the logic of this argument1 and consider how far it is entitled to be regarded as scientific reasoning4 ,first of all1 ,i should ask1 what precisely is meant by the ,greeks8 ,the argument is founded partly on the number of great thinkers1 poets1 and artists1 in proportion to the population4 ,now1 it is obviously essential to a scientific statement that we should know what is the population indicated4 ,if we compare the number of great men at ,athens in its best period with the number of free ,athenians1 we shall get one ratio2 if we admit the ,athenian slaves1 or add ,boeotia and other ,greek ,states to our population1 we get quite a different ratio4 ,and the difference is of immense importance4 ,the smaller the population1 the higher the excellence indicated by a given number of great men2 but1 also1 the smaller the population1 the less is the wonder that it should have died out or been swallowed up in the whirlpools of political1 religious1 and social convulsions4 ,a similar remark applies in regard to the period during which this race flourished4 ,when did they begin and when did they cease to be superior to other people8 ,till the statement is more precise we do not even know what are the phenomena to be explained2 and the case is susceptible of any number of explanations4 ,did the superior race cease to be prolific2 or was it prolific1 but of inferior descendants2 and1 if so1 was it because it was mixed with races of an inferior stamp2 or was it because its position exposed it to the attacks of more numerous enemies2 or because its energy led it to attempt impossible feats8 ,has it died out1 or has it been swamped by other races8 ,to answer such questions is absolutely necessary before we can say positively that the higher organisation was the cause of the decay1 or that it did not cause the decay by some indirect process due to the special combination of circumstances4 ,but to answer such questions1 if they be answerable at all1 would require the investigations of a lifetime1 and a mastery of a whole series of studies1 historical1 statistical1 ethnological1 and so forth1 in which ,i am an absolute ignoramus4 ,but ,i cannot perceive that ,mr4 ,kidd claims more than second-hand information4 ,but1 secondly1 there is another obvious question to which an answer is necessary4 ,mr4 ,kidd and ,mr4 ,galton deduce their view about ,greek intellect1 first1 from the proportion of great men4 ,does1 then1 the occurrence of a group of great men at a certain period prove a superior organisation in the race8 ,that leads to a very familiar problem3 ,what were the causes of what we may call the flowering times of arts and sciences8 ,we are all familiar with the phenomenon2 with the sudden display of astonishing excellence at ,athens1 at ,florence1 or in the ,england of ,elizabeth4 ,it seems to be the rule that processes which may have been going on quietly for centuries suddenly culminate2 that artistic1 poetic1 or philosophic excellence becomes unprecedentedly common for a generation or two1 and that the impulse then dies away as rapidly4 ,it is the kind of problem which is satisfactorily solved by the authors of university prize essays1 which somehow fail to convince the world or to be republished by their writers4 ,are we1 then1 entitled to argue from the great works an organic superiority in the race8 ,must we suppose1 for example1 that ,englishmen at the time of ,shakespeare and ,bacon and ,spenser and ,raleigh were an abler race than their descendants1 because1 when there was a very much smaller number of educated men1 they produced more first-rate authors than have been produced by generations much more numerous and more generally cultivated8 ,this seems to me at least to be a very rash hypothesis2 and some of the obvious remarks made in our university essays seem to me to indicate considerations which1 though not conclusive1 cannot be neglected4 ,it is clear1 for example1 that particular stages of intellectual progress are abnormally stimulating2 that1 as the last step to a pass in the mountains suddenly reveals vast prospects1 while a hundred equally difficult steps before made no appreciable change1 so there are mental advances which1 as at the time of ,bacon1 seemed suddenly to disclose boundless prospects of knowledge4 ,it is the ,pisgah sight of the promised land which causes a burst of energy4 ,or1 again1 a certain social condition is obviously required2 philosophers and poets may exist potentially among barbarous tribes1 but they cannot get a chance to speak1 and they have no opportunity of communication with other thinkers4 ,the intellect may be impelled in various directions1 some of which leave no trace of a tangible kind4 ,the amount of intellectual power implied in building up the ,roman ,empire may have been as great as that implied in developing ,greek art2 and in ,america1 as we are often told1 intellect turns to dollar-making1 instead of book-writing4 ,so1 conversely1 the outburst of power may indicate1 not greater faculties1 but special opportunities1 or special stimulus1 applied to already existing faculties4 ,everybody who has written an aesthetic treatise has pointed to all manner of conditions which were in this sense favourable to the ,greeks4 ,how far such conditions were sufficient ,i cannot even guess2 but at least an allowance must be made for them before we can argue from the achievements to the intrinsic power of the race which achieved4 ,i do not see that it is even proved that the average ,athenian was in the least superior in this sense to the average ,englishman4 ,it would require a lifetime of study to pronounce any opinion worth having4 ,i fully confess that1 so far as a vague impression is worth anything1 it is the most obvious impression1 after looking at the ,elgin marbles1 that the ,greeks were possessed of a finer organisation than ourselves4 ,still1 ,i cannot accept as certain the quasi-mathematical formula that the ,greek is to the ,englishman as the ,englishman to the negro4 ,this1 however1 suggests another and very difficult series of problems4 ,mr4 ,kidd is arguing against intellectual superiority4 ,he1 of course1 does not argue that the general superiority of a race leads to its disappearance2 but that a one-sided superiority--an improvement of one set of faculties at the expense of others--may have that result4 ,this at once suggests a whole series of psychological problems4 ,the intellect and the emotional nature are not two separate organs1 each capable of independent development4 ,every mental process involves both1 and neither faculty can be developed without reference to the other4 ,mr4 ,kidd accepts the conclusion that certain primitive races were as clever as ourselves1 because their brains were as large4 ,if the argument be sound1 it proves equally that their emotional nature was as well developed as ours2 for no one can doubt that the brain is the physical condition of feeling as well as of thought4 ,even the most abstract thought1 as he elsewhere notices1 implies certain moral qualities4 ,newton remarked that he was superior to other men1 not because his intellect was clearer1 but because he attended more persistently to his problems4 ,the statement1 ,i think1 involves a fallacy4 ,newton himself1 no doubt1 did better the longer he kept a problem before him4 ,he inferred1 unjustifiably1 that of two different men1 the one who could keep up his attention longest would be the best4 ,that does not follow4 ,the difference may indeed be moral as well as intellectual2 and it is quite true that a power of sustained attention is of the highest importance in mathematics1 and that that power supposes a moral quality2 but1 conversely1 the power of attention probably implies also the power of clear intellectual vision4 ,a muddle-headed man would find attention useless4 ,this is1 of course1 still clearer in the case where the mind is exercised upon questions of human interest4 ,the statesman and the dramatist both depend upon their power of sympathy and the strength of their emotions1 as much as upon their logical capacity4 ,to feel for others ,i must imagine their position3 if ,i imagine it1 ,i can hardly avoid feeling for them4 ,altruism is the product1 in other words1 of a process both intellectual and moral4 ,now1 remembering this1 we see the difficulty of pronouncing upon the nature of the ,greek organisation4 ,perhaps the commonest of all remarks upon ,greek work is the symmetry and harmony1 the all-roundness1 if ,i may say so1 of the development implied4 ,poetry and philosophy1 art and science seem to be so blended in their work that we cannot tell which faculty is predominant4 ,what1 then1 is the inequality of development which is essential to ,mr4 ,kidd's argument8 ,they were wanting1 he seems to answer1 in altruism4 ,what does this mean8 ,the astonishing power of the ,greeks was certainly as conspicuous in poetry and art as in anything else2 and that power surely implies development of the emotional as well as of the intellectual nature4 ,by a defect of altruism1 ,i take him to mean that these emotions did not flow along the channel of general philanthropy4 ,they were wanting then1 as ,i should put it1 rather in cosmopolitanism than in altruism4 ,if altruism means care for something outside yourself1 where could we find better examples of altruism than at ,thermopylae or ,marathon8 ,was it not due to ,greek altruism in this form 7some historians would say7 that ,mr4 ,kidd is not now living under the rule of a ,persian ,satrap8 ,the altruism1 no doubt1 meant an intense and patriotic devotion to a small ,state1 or an interest in ,greek as against barbarian1 and was compatible with much brutality to individuals and acquiescence in slavery4 ,but this does not indicate an absence of the emotions themselves1 but simply their confinement within narrow limits1 by the conditions under which they were placed4 ,slavery1 for example1 is abominable2 but ,i see no reason for supposing that the slave-holders in ,america were worse men by innate constitution than their opponents4 ,they were corrupted by their position4 ,this1 in any case1 leads to another problem4 ,were the ,greeks more or less altruistic than other races8 ,if you could show that altruistic races had survived while the ,greeks perished1 there might be a presumption that the want of altruism was the cause of their decay4 ,but this again does not seem to be the case4 ,hardly one of the ancient races1 indeed1 has survived unvaried4 ,the ,romans were at least as brutal as the ,greeks1 and1 one would say1 as far from altruistic4 ,yet they overpowered the ,greeks4 ,how1 then1 can it be inferred that the ,greeks perished because of defective altruism8 ,the struggle for existence was between races equally defective to all appearance in that quality2 and it must be a sophistry to signalise its absence in one as the cause of its disappearance4 ,there is1 indeed1 one race to which every one would turn as the most prominent example of survival1 namely1 the ,jews4 ,the ,jews have enormous merits and great intellectual endowments2 but can anybody say that they were altruistic in the sense of being cosmopolitan8 ,are they not conspicuous1 beyond any race1 for the narrower forms of altruism1 rejection of a cosmopolitan creed1 even when it arose among them1 and exclusive devotion to the welfare of their own people8 ,i think that it would be perfectly easy to argue that the ,greeks died out just because of their cosmopolitan and therefore dispersive tendencies1 and that the ,jews have held out from a judicious adherence to narrower views of self-preservation4 ,but personally ,i regard all such arguments as really belonging to the extra-scientific regions of rhetorical illustration4 ,this suggests one other point which requires consideration4 ,mr4 ,kidd regards it as proved that progress has been due to the ,christian religion1 which revealed the new moral doctrine4 ,the ,christian religion introduced1 it seems1 that belief in the supernatural which is essential to altruism4 ,it seems to me to be inconsistent with his own principles1 that he should attribute progress to what is essentially1 on his own showing1 an intellectual change3 that is1 to a change in belief and even to a change which1 in comparison with the old polytheism1 was distinctly sceptical and rationalistic4 ,but one point is clear4 ,the introduction of ,christianity may be interpreted more consistently in a totally different way4 ,the ,greek who became a ,christian was not provided with a new set of emotions1 but his emotions were directed into new channels4 ,he ceased to care for ,athens1 because ,athens had ceased to be an independent ,state2 he began to be cosmopolitan when he was forced to be part of a cosmopolitan empire4 ,the important distinction was no longer the distinction between ,athenian and ,spartan1 but between the different classes in the world-wide system4 ,that is to say1 the altruism which came in with ,christianity was not the product of a new dogma suddenly dropped from heaven2 but of the new social condition1 which made it inevitable that the forces which previously stimulated a local patriotism should now exert themselves nearer a cosmopolitan organisation4 ,this is1 of course1 a commonplace2 but1 for that reason1 it should not be simply ignored4 ,it suggests one other consequence of ,mr4 ,kidd's theory4 ,it is proved1 he says1 that the progress of the ,western world is due to ,christianity4 ,his proof1 as ,i suppose1 is that the ,states which have sprung out of the old ,empire of the ,west have been ,christian and have progressed4 ,how1 then1 about the ,empire of the ,east8 ,if the great ,kingdoms of the ,west are the unique example of progress1 what is the unique example of decay8 ,surely1 the regions where ,christian dogmatic theology was defended by ,athanasius and ,chrysostom4 ,if you wish to point out a region where the race has actually gone backwards1 you would refer to the ,turkish ,empire4 ,why1 if ,christianity was the sole cause of progress in one quarter1 was it comparable with complete decay in the other8 ,does the ,eastern theory about the filioque explain it8 ,or were the ,mohammedans more altruistic than the ,christians8 ,or is it that it is absurd1 especially upon ,mr4 ,kidd's own doctrine1 to assign the dogmatic creed of a race as the sole cause of its character and its success in the struggle for existence8 ,i do not lay any stress upon the argument1 except in a negative sense4 ,i do not see1 that is1 how ,mr4 ,kidd can make his theory fit the facts4 ,but ,i infer one other remark4 ,it is impossible to divine the causes of the rise and fall of empires1 the success or decay of a race1 from any of these sweeping generalisations about ill-defined qualities4 ,if we ask why the ,greeks died out1 we should have to take into account another and a totally different set of considerations3 what ,i may call the accidents of their position4 ,we should have to consider all the arguments by which historians have tried to explain the events2 the facts of physical geography1 for example1 which account for the division into small separate ,states2 the relations of the ,greeks to the ,eastern races on the one side1 and to the ,romans on the other2 and1 briefly1 to all the material conditions1 those different from the intrinsic character of the race1 by which the whole course of political development and of the conflict between different peoples1 is moulded and directed into particular courses4 ,i do not say1 for ,i cannot guess1 what would be the result of such an inquiry2 but ,i think it just as possible that it would lead us to wonder at the persistence of the ,greek ,states for so long a period1 as that it would lead us to wonder at their disappearance4 ,our conclusion might be1 that nothing but the astonishing intellectual powers of the ,greeks enabled them to play so great a part in the world's history1 not that their intellectual superiority was the cause of their decay4 ,i consider1 therefore1 that the alleged fact is stated so vaguely that we have no distinct problem set before us2 that we don't know what is the process to be explained2 that the suggested intellectual superiority is doubtful1 at least in degree3 that the excess of intellectual above other development1 which the superiority is supposed to have created1 is not proved1 and1 still less1 that such excess was more conspicuous among the ,greeks than among their rivals2 that1 even if it existed1 it is not proved that it would have produced the effect ascribed to it2 and1 finally1 that the other causes which undoubtedly operated1 are simply overlooked4 ,i confess1 therefore1 that the whole argument seems to me to illustrate the danger of rashly applying certain scientific formulae1--themselves1 perhaps1 still doubtful1--to new and exceedingly complex questions4 ,if ,darwin had reasoned in this light-hearted way1 no one would have been moved by his conclusions4 ,but ,i must still add1 what brings me back to my point1 that even if the proposition were proved1 it would not establish the conclusion4 ,it may be1 that races of abnormal intellectual development are at a disadvantage in the struggle for existence4 ,that does not prove that progress is not primarily intellectual4 ,buckle1 who argued that progress was due to intellectual causes exclusively1 always assumed that human nature was constant1 or that the faculties did not change4 ,though ,i do not accept his view1 any more than ,mr4 ,kidd's1 ,i do not see that he was inconsistent4 ,i take the most obvious case to illustrate the point4 ,no one can doubt that one of the most important influences in modern social evolution was the set of mechanical contrivances devised by ,arkwright and ,watt and their contemporaries4 ,without them1 the enormous development of great cities1 of a population of artisans1 and of the bringing together of all quarters of the globe1 would have been impossible4 ,the inventions1 again1 were due to no moral purpose in the inventors4 ,they wanted to make money1 and represented what is called 7,i do not say justly7 the most egoistic impulse of modern times4 ,one condition1 then1 of the great social change was essentially intellectual4 ,this does not mean that ,watt was a cleverer man than ,archimedes4 ,i don't know whether he was or not2 but it does mean that the mechanical sciences had improved2 and1 consequently1 that ,watt1 though not possessed of intrinsically greater powers1 was1 in this direction1 a more intellectual person4 ,he had inherited the truths discovered by ,archimedes and many generations of successors4 ,that science should be efficient1 it is not required that men should be greater geniuses than their predecessors2 but simply that they should know more of the facts and laws of nature1 and have1 so to speak1 better intellectual tools4 ,mr4 ,kidd thinks that the inability of a savage to count three does not prove him to be stupid1 only to be without certain rules discovered by the higher races4 ,yet1 he will not deny that by the help of arithmetic we can work out sums inconceivable to the savage2 and that our power affects our whole social position4 ,does not the existence of a currency affect mankind2 and if we could not count1 could we make use of it8 ,i therefore hold that in many cases the causes of progress are primarily intellectual4 ,the mechanical discoveries of which ,i have spoken have revolutionised the whole world4 ,i agree1 indeed1 fully1 that the causes are not exclusively intellectual4 ,a certain social condition--the existence1 to say nothing more1 of peace and order over wide regions--was as necessary as the intellectual condition to the development of commerce and manufactures4 ,this1 of course1 implies the growth of corresponding sentiments1 including1 no doubt1 what ,mr4 ,kidd means by altruism4 ,but the change may1 and1 ,i fancy1 generally does1 originate in intellectual movements4 ,the new ideas shake the world4 ,reason1 says ,mr4 ,kidd1 is the great disintegrating and egoistic force4 ,i should say that reasoning is essentially altruistic3 my discoveries are mentally discoveries for you2 ,i cannot keep a truth for my private consumption1 as ,i can keep a material product4 ,but it is true1 to use eulogistic instead of dyslogistic language1 that reason is the great force of movement1 and breaks up the old social conditions1 not only by getting rid of the ultra-rational1 but by spreading the power of the rational2 and therefore it inevitably brings about a state of things in which the old moral impulses have to run in new channels2 a narrow patriotism1 to widen into a regard for the interests of other races2 and the class distinctions which repose upon no reasonable ground1 to disappear in favour of a wider humanity4 ,when we are arguing about an organism1 it is surely a mistake to fix our minds upon one aspect of the problem3 to deny with ,buckle the moral evolution1 and with ,mr4 ,kidd to disparage the intellectual evolution4 ,mr4 ,kidd's doctrine appears to me1 though1 of course1 not to him1 to be eminently discouraging4 ,if he worked it out logically1 his argument1 ,i think1 would come to this3 that the progress of mankind has resulted from the accidental1 that is1 inexplicable1 appearance of a quality called altruism1 which gave to those who possessed it an advantage in the struggle for existence4 ,it would be far more consistent to say that the religious dogma was determined by this new element1 than that it was the cause4 ,altruism1 again1 was only produced in effect on this hypothesis by the slow results of a process necessarily lasting through many generations2 and our only hope must be in a slow organic change of the primary characteristics of mankind4 ,now1 it is1 of course1 true that those characteristics1 whatever they may be1 impose definite limits upon our progress4 ,the raw material limits the product2 and the new-born baby is the raw material of society1 as wool is of cloth3 you cannot convert it into tissue of gold4 ,so much is undeniable4 ,we1 it is said1 have been developed out of an arboreal animal1 and ,i have sometimes regretted that we were not developed out of a flying animal4 ,the course of civilisation would have been very different if we had not been forced to come into contact by crawling and swimming1 instead of the much freer methods of aerial travelling4 ,however1 as things were1 the choice was apparently between wings and hands2 and if we could not have both1 perhaps hands were preferable1 and may in time lead to flying machines4 ,the speculation1 it may be1 borders upon the fanciful4 ,i mention it only by way of illustrating the unevitable conditions imposed upon us by heredity4 ,we have to be content with walking instead of flying2 and similarly we have to be content with having only the five senses of our forefathers1 and the various old-fashioned apparatuses for eating1 drinking1 digesting1 and so forth1 which they unconsciously elaborated4 ,no material change can possibly be made in this system within any period to which we can look forward4 ,to regret these limitations is just as idle as to regret that we cannot fly1 or that we cannot extend our voyages to the moon4 ,they are part of the primary data of the problem with which we have to deal2 and to regret that that problem was not differently contrived is to propose to set about reconstructing the universe4 ,but when we go on to ask how far this limits any possibilities of achieving really desirable1 because distinctly conceivable results1 ,i say that we have ample room for hopes large enough to animate our loftiest desires4 ,we inherit1 it is true1 certain faculties which scarcely alter1 or do not perceptibly alter1 for the better4 ,we do not see or smell or hear better than the savage1 and in some of these faculties we are surpassed by the dog4 ,we inherit also certain intellectual powers1 and1 if they improve1 the improvement is so slow as to be perceptible only after many generations4 ,but then this intellect carries with it another power1--the power of inheriting thoughts1 beliefs1 methods of reasoning and rules of conduct4 ,and1 therefore1 to the organic evolution is added the social evolution1 which enables us to accumulate our vast spiritual inheritance4 ,the inheritance is everything1 or almost everything1 that makes the distinctions between the civilised races of to-day and the wandering savages who roamed the fens and the forests which were supplanted by fields and towns4 ,and this1 ,i think1 makes room enough for all reasonable aspirations1 though it certainly does not open any prospect that we shall ever become gods or angels4 ,thus1 for example1 we look with sorrow1 sometimes with something like despair1 upon the masses of the criminal or degraded population which grovels at the base of modern society4 ,if we were bound to say1 the crime and the stupidity are the necessary expression of the shape of the skull and the organisation of the brain2 if we had therefore to infer that the only possible remedy is by so modifying the struggle for existence that the inferior forms may be killed off and a better breed of humanity take the place of the present2 we should certainly feel that we were confined within very narrow limits4 ,i do not for a moment say1 that such considerations may not point to important practical conclusions4 ,i should be very glad to hear of any practical suggestions for so applying these doctrines as to increase the probability that the next generation may be stronger1 healthier1 and more intelligent than the present4 ,but ,i also assert that the most obvious facts also show that there are enormous possibilities of progress without supposing any such organic transformation4 ,if all that makes the difference between the ,england of to-day and the ,england of two or three centuries back is the presence of the social factor1 not of the organic change1 it shows in the most striking way the vast educability of mankind1 even without any ultimate change of human nature4 ,we must all1 ,i think1 have been impressed lately by one of the most singular phenomena which have ever taken place in history4 ,we have ourselves seen the transformation of the ,japanese--whom we so recently regarded as semi-barbarians--acquire almost at a bound all the arts of ,western civilisation1 and able not only to use with singular effect that most complex and delicate piece of machinery which forms a modern warship1 but to adopt systems of military organisation and the strategy of a ,moltke4 ,that is not because the ,japanese have changed any one of their physical characteristics1 for they are the very same men who the other day were chiefly known to us as performing the happy despatch4 ,they have changed simply because they were able to assimilate ,european results4 ,now1 if that be a perfectly possible result1 consistently with all the so-called laws of heredity1 the same laws cannot be inconsistent with changes of a similar character within ourselves4 ,you take a thorough ruffian1--a drinking1 rowdy1 fighting brute1 who has stamped his wife or his friend into a jelly4 ,you say that he is an illustration of slavism1 or the reproduction of an ancient type which once had its place among his ancestors4 ,the fact may be quite true2 that he is1 for example1 acting-still in the spirit of those ancient ,vikings who have been idealised by our romantic writers2 but who1 when they landed in an old ,british village1 behaved pretty much as the modern roughs or some of those noble blackguards who are described in ,mr4 ,rudyard ,kipling's novels4 ,but if you mean that he is divided from civilised beings by an impassable gulf1 and is doomed to be a scoundrel by the shape of his skull1 ,i venture to dispute the assumption4 ,the ,viking in a generation or two became the ,norman knight1 capable of the highest cultivation of his time2 and even the rough1 according to ,mr4 ,rudyard ,kipling1 is capable1 under judicious discipline1 of developing some very fine qualities1 chiefly1 it is true1 in the shape of devotion to his colours4 ,to wean him from some of his weaknesses it is probably necessary to catch him rather younger4 ,all1 however1 that ,i desire to say1 for the present1 is this--as it seems to me--very undeniable fact3 that the difference between a civilised man and a barbarian1 between the highest types of modern life and the apparently irreclaimable brutes who are exhibited in our police-courts1 is not dependent upon the mark of the beast irreclaimably fixed upon them at their birth2 but to certain later influences1 which may or may not be brought to bear upon them effectually4 ,there is nothing1 for example1 in the doctrine of heredity inconsistent with the belief that if such influences could be properly directed1 the standard1 say1 of sobriety and prudence among the lowest classes might be improved1 as much as the standard of the same virtues has been improved in classes above them4 ,the consequences of such a change would1 ,i suspect1 be incomparably greater than the consequences of whole systems of laws regulating the hours of labour and whole armies of official inspectors4 ,but into this ,i need not go2 and ,i have only one thing to say in conclusion4 ,i have spoken of the enormous results of what we call progress and civilisation4 ,that they are in one sense enormous is1 ,i suppose1 undeniable4 ,that the power which we generally describe as the command of man over nature has been immensely increased is too palpable a fact to be denied2 that there has been a corresponding change in many political and social respects is a fact which ,i only mention without seeking to say how far it has been in all respects a change for the better4 ,further1 ,i urge that this change1 whatever it is1 has not been due to a change in the individual constitution1 but to a change in the social factor4 ,and1 this being so1 ,i simply suggest that1 considering how vast is the total change thus effected1 we may reasonably hope1 or1 at the very least1 we may reasonably endeavour to justify the hope1 that a change of great magnitude may be brought about in those directions where we all have to regret the survival or even the development of so much that is melancholy3 of regeneration going on alongside of amelioration4 ,i think that the doctrine of heredity is sometimes interpreted in such a way as to suggest the hopelessness or at least the extreme difficulty of introducing any sensible improvement within any limited time2 and what ,i have tried to urge is that1 if properly understood1 it does not in the least degree tend to justify such forebodings1 or to imply that we are to abandon ourselves to a demoralising fatalism4 ,,punishment4 ,i invite you to consider a rather dry problem4 ,i ventured to select this topic because it has lately been my duty to occupy myself with certain legal writings1 which1 perhaps1 took me a little beyond my depth4 ,they touched1 however1 problems which are common to the lawyer and to the moralist4 ,although not a lawyer1 ,i am interested in some moral problems which have also a legal aspect3 ,what ,i propose to do this evening is1 to consider certain questions which lie in the region common to both provinces of inquiry1 and especially this question3 ,what is the true ethical theory of punishments inflicted by the criminal law8 ,how1 and in what sense1 are they to be regarded as just8 ,there is1 obviously1 a relation between the two codes--moral and legal4 ,murder is both a sin and a crime3 a breach of the moral law1 and of the laws of every civilised country4 ,yet1 there is one broad and deep distinction between the two systems of law4 ,the moral law is essentially concerned with a man's motives4 ,to say that a man's conduct is wicked1 is necessarily also to say that it is the action of a bad man1 or due to evil passions4 ,murder is wicked1 as it is the manifestation of the murderer's hatred of his neighbour4 ,the criminal law1 on the other hand1 has to deal1 in the first instance1 with the external facts4 ,it contemplates1 primarily1 what a man does1 not what he is4 ,it does not attempt to punish every man who hates his neighbour1 but every man who has1 in fact1 killed1 whether the action springs from hatred or some other motive4 ,every one who deliberately kills1 unless the act falls under certain definite exceptions1 is guilty of murder4 ,this1 of course1 does not imply that the moral aspect is of no account4 ,the exceptions are so arranged that the legal classification corresponds roughly to the moral classification4 ,under certain exceptions1 killing is regarded as justifiable homicide1 and under others1 it is only manslaughter1 and1 therefore1 receives none1 or a slighter penalty4 ,the coincidence between the codes may thus be very close4 ,in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the action condemned by the criminal law will be condemned by the moralist4 ,the man who is legally guilty of murder is also1 almost invariably1 guilty of a great moral offence4 ,although1 again1 the moral law applies to large classes of conduct1 which are not within the cognisance of the criminal law1 it is1 at least1 plainly desirable that the criminal law should condemn nothing which is not also morally wrong4 ,the sway of the moral law is universal2 it applies to all conduct1 and1 of course1 to the conduct of legislators and judges3 they and the law which they define and apply should be consistent with the general law of right and wrong4 ,they and all of us are bound not to make virtue more difficult nor vice easier4 ,but1 further1 the questions as to the relations between the two codes arise in various directions4 ,it is obvious that the criminal law has to employ very rough and ready methods4 ,it cannot estimate1 with any accuracy1 the degree of immorality implied by any given action4 ,it cannot1 and it does not attempt to1 look closely into the secrets of a man's heart4 ,it cannot inquire1 as a rule1 how far a man's crime is the result of bad education or bad surroundings2 how far it implies thorough corruption or only superficial faults of temper1 or a misunderstanding of some fact or doctrine4 ,it cannot take into account a number of metaphysical or psychological considerations which are connected with the theory of moral responsibility4 ,to settle such points you would have to empanel a jury of philosophers1 and the only thing of which you could be certain would be1 that such a jury would never agree upon a verdict4 ,again1 there are whole classes of virtues and vices with which the criminal law is not concerned4 ,ingratitude1 to take the common example1 is a grave vice1 but one which it would be absurd to punish legally4 ,not only would such an attempt involve impossible inquiries1 but the attempt would be self-defeating4 ,if the duty of gratitude to a benefactor were turned into a legal obligation1 gratitude proper would cease to exist4 ,to confer a benefit would be the same thing as to acquire a right to repayment4 ,a man who allows his best friend to starve1 or to go to the workhouse1 may be1 morally1 far worse than a thief2 but you could not punish him legally1 without adopting a principle which1 even if practicable1 would1 so far as it operated1 be destructive of all disinterested friendship4 ,the law1 again1 can deal only with criminals who are found out4 ,what proportion they may bear to the whole class of moral offenders is not discoverable2 but it is1 at least1 safe to say that1 for every man whom you convict of a crime1 you must leave unpunished1 because undetected1 another sinner who is equally deserving of punishment4 ,and1 finally1 it is apparently impossible to say1 upon any intelligible grounds1 what should be the proportion between crime and punishment4 ,how many years' imprisonment does a man deserve for putting out his neighbour's eye8 ,i do not see how such a rule of three can be stated4 ,the good old theory of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth1 seems to suggest a possible criterion4 ,but it was difficult to carry out4 ,deloraine1 in the ,lay of the ,last ,minstrel1 has1 as he points out1 killed ,musgrove's brother2 but1 on the other hand1 ,musgrove has killed ,deloraine's nephew1 and1 besides1 got a thousand marks ransom out of ,deloraine himself4 ,is the account to be regarded as accurately balanced8 ,is one brother just equal to a nephew plus a thousand marks8 ,the theory1 of course1 is an application of an inappropriate analogy4 ,if we regard crime simply as a case of private injury1 we may say that it is fair that the wrong-doer should restore the thing that he has taken1 and so put matters where they were before4 ,but this is obviously to take a view which is quite inapplicable in most cases1 and in all cases becomes inadequate when we take the moral view1 and regard crime as an offence against society--not simply as a wrong to another individual4 ,for such reasons1 it is apparently impossible to say that a legal punishment can be just1 in the full sense in which the moralist would use the words4 ,no doubt we may say1--and we wish that we could always say1--that a man deserves what he has got2 and that implies that we recognise as desirable some satisfaction to our sense of justice4 ,and1 of course1 too1 we demand that justice should be done in another sense of the word2 that the case1 for example1 should be impartially investigated2 that a man should not be punished severely because he is poor1 or because he is unpopular1 or let off easily because he is a private friend of the judge4 ,such demands mean that justice should not be perverted by applying irrelevant considerations2 but they leave our previous questions untouched4 ,the criminal law1 from its nature1 cannot impose equal penalties upon all men who are equally wicked2 but only upon those who have made themselves liable3 and that always involves elements of accident2 it cannot take into account at all some of the elements upon which the depth of moral depravity essentially depends2 and it is1 at least1 very difficult to say what specific meaning can be given to the proportion between crime and the suffering imposed upon the criminal4 ,if1 then1 the legislative action must1 of necessity1 be very imperfect from the moral point of view1 we may try what will be the effect of dismissing the moral question altogether1 or1 at least1 reducing it to a secondary place4 ,we may1 that is1 consider crime not in so far as immoral1 but in so far as mischievous4 ,here we have the doctrine worked out very consistently by ,bentham and his followers4 ,pain1 they said1 is an evil1 the only evil2 pleasure1 a good1 and the only good4 ,to inflict needless pain--pain which does not cause a balance of pleasure--upon any one1 be he a good man or be he a bad man1 is1 so far1 wrong4 ,for the same reason1 it is justifiable1 and1 indeed1 right1 to inflict pain1 so far as it prevents some greater evil4 ,hence1 you should punish criminals just so far as the pain which you inflict is less than the pain which you prevent4 ,it is wrong to give a single useless pang even to the worst of men4 ,if 7according to a sentiment attributed to ,bentham7 a fine of five shillings would prevent a man from committing murder1 it would be wrong to fine him seven shillings and sixpence4 ,this gives a justification of punishment1 in so far as deterrent4 ,it is obviously connected with another doctrine4 ,a man is the best judge of his own pleasures and pains4 ,therefore1 in so far as a man's actions affect himself alone1 they are not to be forbidden by the law4 ,we may think them bad or degrading2 but so long as they do not affect others1 the fact that a man chooses them is a proof that they give him pleasure2 and we shall1 therefore1 only diminish the sum of happiness by interfering4 ,now1 it is plain that this distinction does not draw the line between what is morally bad or good4 ,every habit which affects a man's own character1 affects1 also1 his capacity to fulfil his duties to others4 ,but this theory overlooks immorality1 except so far as it happens to involve certain extraneous consequences4 ,we are1 upon this showing1 to punish a criminal precisely in the same spirit as we are to abate a nuisance4 ,the thief is to be suppressed1 as we are to extirpate a mischievous weed1 and to be suppressed by just as much severity as is required for the purpose4 ,the drunkard1 so long as he confines himself to making a beast of himself in his own room1 does his neighbours no direct injury1 and must be left to enjoy the pleasure which is shown1 because he chooses it1 to be a pleasure to him4 ,of this theory1 it may1 ,i think1 be said that1 however imperfect1 it is tolerably consistent1 and1 moreover1 that it undoubtedly does express one legitimate end of punishment4 ,there can be no doubt1 that is1 that the punishment of murderers may be rightly defended1 among other grounds1 at any rate1 on the ground that it discourages the practice2 though we may not fully agree with the famous saying of the judge1 ,you are not hanged for stealing sheep1 but hanged in order that sheep may not be stolen4 ,and1 further1 though there are various difficulties about the distinction between self-regarding and extra-regarding conduct1 we must also1 ,i think1 allow1 in general terms1 that the fact that a man's conduct has a direct and assignable influence upon his neighbour's happiness1 must always be one reason1 and1 frequently1 the only sufficient reason1 for suppressing it by legal penalties4 ,this doctrine of simple deterrence1 however1 seems1 to most critics1 to be insufficient4 ,it omits the moral element too completely4 ,when a man is punished for some revolting offence1 we are not simply providing him and his like with reasons for abstaining in future4 ,we are1 as a fact1 exposing him to infamy1 sometimes more painful to bear than the immediate penalty1 and are thus1 in fact1 invoking the sanction of the moral sentiment4 ,therefore1 it is urged1 we must still1 whether we like it or not1 be moralists4 ,the purely utilitarian argument has omitted one element of the calculation4 ,the punishment not only deters offenders1 but gratifies the feeling of resentment to moral indignation1 which has been approved by many moralists4 ,hence1 it is urged1 besides the deterrent theory1 we must make room for the vindictive theory4 ,it is legitimate and right to hate crime1 and1 therefore1 to hate criminals2 and legal punishments are defensible1 not merely as adding to the motives for refraining from crime1 but as gratifying the desire for revenge1 which1 in early ages1 was assumed in the rude modes of putting down violence1 and which1 even now1 should be not eradicated but confined within legal channels and directed towards the desirable ends4 ,postponing1 for the present1 a consideration of this proposed emendation1 let us consider1 a little more closely1 the objection made to the theory of deterrence4 ,in what way does it come into direct conflict with a moral theory of punishment8 ,it looks upon immorality as mischievous1 or as diminishing happiness2 and upon the utilitarian view immorality means the diminution of happiness4 ,now1 without discussing ultimate moral questions1 ,i may assume that1 for practical purposes1 this seems to be a sufficiently tenable position4 ,after all1 we admit1 to whatever school we belong1 that crime is mischievous1 and1 whatever deeper meaning may be assigned to it1 may be considered in that light by the legislator4 ,he cannot--certainly he ought not to--forbid actions which do no harm to anybody1 or which nobody1 at the time and place1 feels to be injurious to happiness4 ,even1 therefore1 if utilitarianism be unsatisfactory as an ultimate theory1 it may represent adequately the point of view of the practical legislator4 ,he tries to suppress violence and fraud because1 as a fact1 they cause what their victims unanimously agree to be painful consequences2 and he need not look any further for a reason4 ,people1 it is said1 have very different standards of pleasure4 ,still1 we all dislike having our throats cut or our pockets picked2 and that fact supplies a sufficient ground upon which to base the whole criminal law4 ,when we go a little further1 a point of divergence may be noticed1 a short consideration of which may help to clear the case4 ,let us assume the legitimate end of all punishment to be deterrence4 ,it will follow1 that we must annex as a consequence to crimes an adequate counterpoise1 and a counterpoise not more than adequate to the criminal's motives4 ,the fine to be paid must be just sufficient to prevent the transgression4 ,now1 it has been urged1 this necessarily implies a conflict with morality4 ,the degree of moral guilt implied in a given crime varies inversely as the temptation4 ,the greater the inducement to the offence1 the less the wickedness shown in committing the offence4 ,a man may have enough virtue to refrain from a gratuitous injustice1 although he has not virtue enough to resist a large bribe1 or the threats of a man in power4 ,but1 if the legislator is to provide simply a counterpoise1 he will have to follow the opposite rule4 ,the greater the temptation1 the greater must be the force of the motive which must be added to counterbalance the temptation4 ,if there be a crime by which a man might make a million of money1 you must1 if you would prevent it1 hold out the prospect of such pains as would1 in his estimation1 be cheaply avoided at the sacrifice of a million2 or1 making allowance for the uncertainty of detection1 by the sacrifice of more than a million4 ,but if1 by the same crime1 he only got a five-pound note1 the prospect of paying a hundred pounds in case of detection might be a sufficient preservative of his honesty4 ,yet1 the man who is tempted by the million gives less proof of dishonesty than the man who commits the same crime for a paltry five pounds4 ,therefore the punishment must be increased1 as the wickedness is less4 ,i must first set aside one ambiguity which perplexes this argument4 ,when we speak of a temptation as varying1 we may mean one of two very different things4 ,to say that ,i am more tempted than you to commit a given crime1 may mean that the gain expected by me is itself greater2 or1 it may mean that ,i am more predisposed to the crime4 ,i may be more tempted1 let us say1 to poison my uncle than you are to poison yours4 ,that may mean that my uncle is a rich old sinner and ,i am his heir1 whereas your uncle is a poor saint and you will get nothing by his death4 ,or it may mean that ,i am more tempted because1 our uncles being alike1 ,i am spiteful1 and you affectionate1 by nature4 ,in the first case1 to say that ,i am under the stronger temptation would1 perhaps1 tend to alleviate the gravity of my crime2 in the second1 it would simply be another way of saying that ,i was the greater brute4 ,in both cases1 of course1 it is true that the greater temptation would require the greater counterpoise4 ,in one case1 this only means that the worse the man1 the stronger the restraints which he requires2 and1 if you could make different laws for bad men and good1 it would follow that the bad would require the heaviest penalties4 ,but this does not conflict with the moral view4 ,it is no excuse for a murderer to say1 ,i am so bloodthirsty that ,i really could not help murdering4 ,no contradiction to morality arises from punishing his crime more severely4 ,in the other case alone1--the case in which we made distinctions founded upon the difference of surrounding circumstances1--it is true that we should1 from the point of view of simple deterrence1 require heavier penalties where the temptations were greater1 and1 therefore1 the intrinsic malevolence proved to exist less4 ,for most purposes1 this argument seems to have very little practical application4 ,the law is made for people in general2 we cannot have one law for bad men and another for good2 partly because good and bad people do not carry about tangible marks of their quality written upon their faces4 ,no doubt1 indeed1 the atrocity of a crime is recognised1 if not by the general law1 by the nature of the sentence4 ,an assault may show unnatural ferocity or merely a rather excessive warmth of temper2 and1 though the offence may be forbidden under the same clause of the criminal law1 the judge may be empowered to give sentences of varying severity1 varying more or less according to the moral depravity implied4 ,so far1 the worst offences 7in a moral sense7 get the heaviest punishment2 and the deterring influence is rightly exerted by proportioning the penalty to the temptation1 that is1 to the predisposition to crime4 ,the other case1 again1 requires some qualification4 ,it is not true1 as an absolute proposition1 that the criminality is always1 or generally1 diminished1 in proportion to the greatness of the temptation2 for we must remember that both the temptation and the crime will generally be greater in proportion to the amount of mischief inflicted4 ,it is more tempting1 no doubt1 to appropriate a thousand pounds than a shilling2 but we cannot infer that the man who takes the larger sum is1 therefore1 less wicked2 that he has a conscience which would have kept him honest under the smaller temptation1 and has only yielded to the greater4 ,compare1 for example1 the case of the petty pilferer who appropriates my watch1 with the case of the man of business who appropriates securities worth many thousand pounds and ruins widows and orphans by the dozen4 ,we should all agree1 ,i imagine1 that the perpetrator of the more gigantic fraud would require the stronger deterring motive to be kept straight4 ,he is playing for heavy stakes1 and we cannot hold out too strong a threat of infamy and suffering1 if our aim is simply to prevent the crime4 ,but neither1 if we consider him from the purely moral point of view1 would it be fair to argue that he was a better man than the pickpocket1 because the plunder which tempted him was greater4 ,the opposite1 ,i fancy1 would be true4 ,he shows a callousness to human suffering1 and an amount of deliberate hypocrisy and treachery which proves him to be not only the more dangerous1 but the more thoroughly corrupt of the two4 ,the two ends of providing a sufficient counterpoise and of punishing the worst men most severely1 would1 therefore1 coincide in this case also2 and the argument that the greater temptation implies less wickedness is plainly inapplicable4 ,without going further into this1 which may briefly indicate some of the perplexities involved1 ,i may mention certain cases in which there seems to be a real divergence of the two principles4 ,there are cases in which the temptation may be fairly held to lessen guilt1 and in which punishment has1 notwithstanding1 been made severer in consequence4 ,the criminal law of the last century1 for example1 imposed a penalty of death upon persons who stole certain kinds of property left in specially exposed positions4 ,the ease of taking it would very possibly tempt to theft men who would elsewhere be honest2 and it was sought to compensate for the strength of the temptation by more savage punishment of those who yielded to it4 ,or1 again1 there are certain problems of a similar kind connected with political offences4 ,a man who gets up a rebellion from sincere political motives is generally far better morally than the man who gets up a rebellion for the sake1 say1 of simple plunder4 ,ought the motive to be allowed as an extenuation of the offence8 ,it ought1 it may be said1 from a moral point of view2 but1 from the point of view of simple deterrence1 we might rather consider that the patriotic rebel is the more dangerous person of the two1 and1 therefore1 requires the prospect of at least as heavy a punishment to keep him quiet4 ,so1 again1 it has been asked1 whether it should be admitted as an excuse for a rioter1 that he has joined in violent courses under threats from the riotous mob4 ,this is1 of course1 an excuse from the moralist's point of view2 the man is only attacking the police in order to save his own house from being burnt1 not from a disorderly or disaffected spirit4 ,but it is replied1 from the deterring point of view1 that1 if such an excuse be allowed1 you are ceasing to threaten at the precise moment when the threats are most required4 ,if the law is not to press from one side1 all the pressure will come from the other1 and every argument will be in favour of joining the side of disorder4 ,hence1 it is argued1 we ought to proportion the punishment1 not to the offence1 but to the temptation4 ,now1 ,i may say1 very briefly1 that such a divergence of the two principles appears to me to be possible2 and1 further1 that cases may be put in which it might be necessary to deter1 at all hazards1 even to the neglect of moral considerations4 ,a general who is defending a town must sometimes burn the houses of innocent people1 without stopping to consider whether they can ever be compensated2 and ,i think that there may be analogous cases even in regard to law1 where the consideration of the absolute necessity of putting down mischievous conduct may override the normal moral considerations4 ,but the general answer is1 ,i think1 different1 and may help to clear the principle4 ,the law to which ,i have referred1 for the protection of exposed property1 obviously suggests one remark4 ,the true remedy for the evil would have been not to increase the penalty1 but to increase the protection4 ,you ought to have provided more watchmen1 or to have forbidden owners to put temptation in the way of their neighbours1 and not to have tried to make the hangman do the work of the policeman4 ,so our ancestors erred when they protected their fields1 not by putting up fences1 but by setting mantraps to mutilate occasional trespassers4 ,in that1 as in other cases1 the mistake is to confuse between the deterring influence of punishment and the preventive influence of protective measures4 ,arguments1 questionable when used on behalf of punishment considered as deterring1 are perfectly applicable to the preventive measures4 ,it is obviously right that such measures should be proportioned to the temptation4 ,when a starving man steals a loaf1 he is not so bad as a man who steals when he is not starving4 ,we should1 therefore1 think it morally wrong to punish him as severely4 ,but1 if we thought that he ought not to have the loaf1 we should take stronger precautions in proportion to the probable temptation4 ,if1 for example1 we were sending supplies to relieve a starving district1 it would be clearly right to send such a force with them as might prevent their appropriation by the strongest1 or the first comers4 ,but1 at the same time1 we should also think it right to save the men from temptation1 by providing as much as possible against the danger of starvation4 ,so1 again1 it would be monstrous to punish a poor man more severely than a duke1 for stealing a watch2 but1 as a matter of prudence1 ,i should take more precautions if ,i were dining in a poor public-house1 than if ,i were dining in a ducal palace4 ,this suggests the true application of another doctrine1 about the responsibility of society4 ,society1 it is sometimes said1 has no right to punish1 because it ought to have suppressed the causes of crime4 ,this doctrine is often stated very illogically1 and would sanction a great deal of false sentimentalism4 ,if society includes many corrupt and dangerous elements1 that is no reason at all for not suppressing them by all available means4 ,but1 no doubt1 it is a very good and sufficient reason for trying1 as far as possible1 to remove the cause as well as the effects2 for getting rid of the temptations to crime1 and training people so as to make them less disposed to crime1 instead of simply punishing more severely those who have yielded to temptation and given play to instincts which have not been properly disciplined4 ,this applies conspicuously to the case of the political criminal4 ,it is generally essential to the welfare of a nation1 that order should be preserved by a settled government4 ,it is the duty of every government1 not only to crush resistance1 but to take such precautions as will make resistance hopeless4 ,but a correlative duty is suggested when a rebellion actually occurs1 and especially a rebellion which excites the sympathy of otherwise moral people4 ,such a case1 that is1 affords the strongest presumption that there are real grievances to be redressed1 and that the rebel should not be confounded with the vulgar criminal4 ,it may be1 and often is1 quite necessary to shoot him down1 so long as he is actively attacking authority2 but1 when he is disarmed1 he cannot be regarded simply as a thief or murderer1 but as a man who has given a useful1 though a disagreeable1 hint that the times are out of joint4 ,i have gone so far into these questions--which might lead to a great many other problems of legal casuistry--with the desire of bringing out one essential part of the question4 ,the difficulties which have arisen point1 ,i think1 to the impossibility of treating the problem exclusively1 from a simple consideration of the deterring influence of punishment4 ,that1 however1 remains an essential element4 ,if the sole reason for punishing a sheep-stealer be not the prevention of sheep-stealing1 that is1 at least1 a very excellent reason as far as it goes4 ,but it seems to me an insufficient reason from the moral point of view1 and1 in particular1 to fail in assigning a sufficiently distinct ground for determining the desirable degree of punishment4 ,the principle was advocated as limiting the severity of the old laws2 but it is not quite easy to define the limit suggested4 ,there is a necessary clumsiness about the method4 ,a punishment only becomes operative in the cases in which the threat has failed to deter4 ,the fact that a man has committed a crime demonstrates the inadequacy of the system in his case2 we have not given him a sufficient motive for abstaining4 ,when ,bentham says1 that if a fine of five shillings would prevent a murder1 you ought not to fine the murderer seven and sixpence1 he says what is1 in a sense1 obviously true4 ,if ,i could prevent a murder1 or1 indeed1 achieve any other desirable object1 for a given sum1 why should ,i throw away another penny8 ,but the fine is not inflicted till somebody has committed a murder1 and1 in that case1 the threat of fining has obviously failed4 ,the question arises1 therefore1 how far am ,i to go8 ,am ,i to go on raising the tariff till murder becomes altogether obsolete8 ,but we have already got as far as capital punishment1 without achieving that result4 ,and1 if we consider the case upon this method1 we begin to find a difficulty in the method of calculation4 ,we are to compare the pain inflicted upon the criminal with the pain saved to the victim4 ,but the greater the pain inflicted1 the smaller1 according to the assumption made1 will be the number of criminals1 and the greater the number of victims saved4 ,if we could adopt the ,draconic system1 and be sure of punishing every crime with death1 crime ought to disappear2 for hardly anybody would break the law if he were quite certain of the gallows4 ,but1 in that case1 the pain1 both of the criminal and the victim1 would disappear1 for there would be no one in either class4 ,the result1 therefore1 would be a pure gain3 no crime and no punishment4 ,against this practical conclusion1 indeed1 ,bentham was one of the first to protest2 and he uses one very sound argument4 ,punish all crime equally1 he says1 and you put a premium on the worst crimes4 ,if both robber and murderer are to be hanged1 the robber will have a good reason for destroying evidence1 by adding the murder to the plunder of his victims4 ,but1 though the argument is very much to the purpose1 it seems to make our calculations rather difficult4 ,we cannot look simply to the deterring influence of a given punishment1 but have to consider its place in the general tariff1 and its influence in inducing people to prefer one variety of crime to another4 ,and if we try to find our way out of this difficulty1 we shall have1 ,i think1 to find that the mode of reasoning requires some modification4 ,the theory on which the calculation goes may1 perhaps1 be represented thus3 ,it is supposed that by hanging a murderer1 you prevent1 say1 ten murders which would otherwise happen4 ,the suffering saved to the ten victims is greater than the actual suffering of the single criminal4 ,therefore1 the infliction of the penalty gives a balance on the side of happiness4 ,the argument seems to me to be sound as far as it goes1 and1 in some cases1 it would1 ,i think1 be sufficient4 ,if1 for example1 it were proved that the use of a certain remedy1 such as inoculation1 caused a certain number of deaths1 while1 on the other hand1 it prevented ten times as many1 we should consider that a good case had been made out for its adoption4 ,and1 similarly1 if we attended simply to the number of executions and to the number of crimes1 and could make the necessary arithmetical comparison1 we should be able to estimate the balance of good or evil in terms of pain and pleasure4 ,but this mode of considering the case is obviously inadequate2 and1 indeed1 ,bentham 7though ,i cannot now go into his teaching7 feels and makes allowance for its inadequacy4 ,for1 to say nothing else1 the mere deterrence of a certain number of crimes is an entirely insufficient measure of the effect of the law4 ,the one obvious remark is that1 by suppressing violence1 you not only save a certain number of lives1 but you secure an essential condition of all civilised life4 ,i came here to-night without a revolver in my pocket2 and ,i am not aware that ,i showed any particular courage by doing so4 ,but it would have been foolhardy to have shown the same negligence1 a few years ago1 in some of the ,western ,states of ,america4 ,if ,i had lived in such conditions1 ,i should not only have taken a revolver1 but have1 very possibly1 thought it a duty to join a vigilance committee1 with a view to the suppression of crimes of violence4 ,there are still regions where the fact that a man lives in a neighbouring village is a sufficient justification for shooting him down as soon as he comes in sight1 for the simple reason that1 otherwise1 he would shoot you4 ,so1 when private war was still part of the regular custom1 there was an obstacle which had to be crushed before any progress could be made in industrial development1 which presupposes peaceful intercourse and mutual confidence4 ,the formation of all that is meant by social order1 the bringing about of a state of things in which men can meet habitually without fear or precaution1 counting with complete confidence upon the absence of any hostile intention1 is1 obviously1 an essential condition of everything that makes life worth living in a civilised country4 ,the fact is too obvious to require much illustration2 but it requires notice1 for it is very imperfectly recognised when you regard murder1 for example1 simply as a kind of sporadic disease1 which breaks out here and there1 and can be kept within limits by killing some murderers1 and so frightening other would-be murderers4 ,the criminal law1 no doubt1 includes that consideration2 but it includes infinitely more4 ,it is a necessary corollary of that state of social relations which alone gives a secure base for every conceivable kind of satisfactory social relation4 ,it might1 perhaps1 serve as a sufficient defence of the old system1 when1 in the absence of any settled order1 the system of private vengeance1 of blood-feuds1 and so forth1 served to restrain the prevalence of actual violence4 ,but it is a totally insufficient measure of the real advantage gained by enforcing order4 ,we have to compare1 not only the number of murders and the number of victims which would exist in a given social order1 supposing the penalty to be inflicted or not inflicted2 but to compare two radically different social states1 and to ask1 whether it is better to live in a society where peace is the almost invariable rule1 and violence the rare exception1 or in one in which there is a chaos of little societies1 each of them being in constant fear of all its neighbours4 ,the construction of a central authority which will keep the peace is a necessary part of the process of civilisation1 and the criminal law is involved in the process4 ,for1 of course1 it follows that1 so long as anti-social elements exist within the borders of society1 and some people resort to the old methods of the knife or the bludgeon1 they must be put down2 and the hangman and the jailer1 clumsy as the action may be1 represent the only kind of machinery which has hitherto been invented for the purpose4 ,it follows that we must understand deterrence in a wider sense than we have hitherto given to it4 ,when we speak of punishment as deterring from crime1 we must consider1 not merely the effect upon the individual of the prospect of punishment following detection1 but the total effect of a systematic adherence to the law upon the preservation of a peaceful state of society at large4 ,we do not simply wish to provide a sufficient motive to decide the individual who is asking himself1 shall ,i steal or not steal8 but to maintain an organisation under which property shall be normally respected1 and stealing become as exceptional as we can make it4 ,this1 in turn1 involves much more than a simple execution of the criminal law2 it involves the support of agencies for prevention1 education1 and reformation2 though it does1 also1 involve an inflexible adherence to the criminal law4 ,the law has to use rough means1 and cannot possibly affect to adhere precisely to the moral deserts of individual cases4 ,but it is justified by the simple ground that the only alternative is a chaos of barbarism4 ,if you ask1 therefore1 in what sense is a criminal law just8 we must confess that1 in certain respects1 it is impossible that it should be strictly just2 it must deal with the found-out exclusively and with those who are found out in certain definite cases of criminality1 and it must1 therefore1 impose penalties which do not precisely correspond to the degree of criminality implied4 ,but the relation to morality is1 nevertheless1 intimate4 ,for the growth of the social order depends upon the growth of the corresponding social instincts2 or rather1 the two processes are correlative4 ,if ,i love my neighbour ,i shall not wish to cut his throat2 and1 in order that ,i may love him1 ,i must be pretty sure that he does not mean to cut mine4 ,the external framework provides a protection under which the primary moral instincts can expand2 and the expansion of the instincts supposes a correlative modification of the external framework4 ,the moral requirement in regard to the criminal law is1 therefore1 essentially1 that it should be such a law as is favourable1 when considered in connection with the whole order1 to the strength and development of the existing morality4 ,if the criminal asks1 ,how do you justify yourself for punishing me8 the reply must be1 ,because the inflexible administration of the law is an essential precondition of the whole system1 under which alone progress is possible4 ,a society in which peace and order are preserved is superior1 in morals as in other respects1 to a society in which peace and order are made impossible by violence2 and the suppression by punishment of offenders is involved in the system4 ,the advantage of belonging to such a society is not to be measured by counting up the working of individual cases2 but by the whole characteristics of the social state1 taken as a whole1 and including1 as one essential part1 the administration of criminal law in such a way as to be in conformity with the conditions of healthy social development4 ,the difficulty1 ,i think1 though ,i can only indicate the argument briefly1 results from a common illusion1 which is illustrated by the once famous social contract theory4 ,you suppose a number of independent individuals1 agreeing to join and expecting to receive a precise equivalent for every sacrifice that they make in consequence4 ,the reply is1 that the individual is the product of the society1 and it is a mere fiction to consider him as possessing any antecedent rights whatever4 ,his rights are to be deduced from1 not to supply the premisses for deducing1 the social order4 ,the only considerations which are relevant are those which affect the welfare of the social organism1 taken as a whole2 and we must regard them as determined1 before we come to the distribution of benefits and burdens among its constituent facts4 ,otherwise1 we should be falling into the same fallacy as if we argued about the health of separate bodily organs1 legs1 and arms1 and stomachs1 as though they were independent things1 fastened together to make a single machine4 ,since the leg implies the stomach1 any consideration of the leg's separate rights would be absurd4 ,so the individual member of a political society cannot be regarded as though he had existed outside society somewhere1 and was entitled to a precise equivalent for the sacrifice of his independence4 ,the doctrine involves impossible considerations4 ,i have to contribute to certain sanitary regulations1 though ,i may be stronger or weaker than my neighbours1 and therefore less or more in need of them4 ,or1 ,i have to pay a school-rate1 whether ,i have a dozen children or none at all4 ,do those facts give me a right to complain if ,i am taxed equally with my neighbours8 ,if so1 every benefit which ,i receive from society must be set down as a separate item in an account to be balanced by itself4 ,obviously1 the advantage which ,i receive in such cases is the whole advantage received from living in a healthy place or among educated people2 and it is essentially impossible to cut that up into a number of different bits of happiness conferred in return for separate payments on account4 ,if ,i use the contract formula1 ,i must interpret it to mean that amenability to various regulations1 including the criminal law1 is part of the whole bargain1 which would have been made1 if it had ever been real1 when ,i decided1 if ,i ever had decided1 to join the society4 ,the instinct for punishing criminals guilty of violence is one of the fundamental instincts of civilisation1 and we must accept it just as we accept any other fundamental instinct4 ,the question of justice1 however1 is not a whit the less essential because it presupposes this social characteristic instead of supplying the primary axioms from which it is to be deduced4 ,it is undoubtedly of the highest importance that every difference in our method of treating different classes should have its sufficient reason1 to be assigned as clearly as possible4 ,the preservation of the peace is essential2 but that does not settle the methods by which it is to be preserved4 ,on what ground1 then1 are we to deal with the problem of justice as regards different classes of crime8 ,if the calculation of pain and pleasure1 as already stated1 seems to be unsatisfactory1 what is the right principle of proportioning punishment to offence8 ,i have noticed one argument which ,bentham applied1 and1 as ,i think1 with very good reason4 ,to punish crimes equally1 he said1 is virtually to put a premium upon the worst4 ,the in for a penny in for a pound maxim becomes at once applicable4 ,moreover1 as every one now admits1 the old brutal system is condemned by experience4 ,to punish a great number of offences with death led to a mixture of excessive brutality with excessive uncertainty4 ,the cruel punishment of some criminals was balanced by the complete escape of others4 ,but this practical failure clearly resulted1 in great measure1 from an obscure sense of justice4 ,it was grossly unjust1 it seemed1 to hang a man for stealing a loaf1 when you could only hang another for the brutal murder of his wife4 ,the penalty in the first case1 was1 it was felt1 altogether out of proportion to the offence4 ,this instinctive sentiment was1 as ,i think we all feel1 substantially right4 ,in any case1 it would have to be taken into account by the legislator1 for the obvious reason that punishments which outrun public opinion1 tend to make martyrs of criminals4 ,they are either not inflicted1 or they set the sympathy of the people on the side of the offender4 ,but to say this1 is not to prove the sentiment to be just1 only to take account of its existence4 ,and the question1 therefore1 remains1 how it is to be logically justified1 for it may seem to imply the theory to which ,i have objected--the hypothesis of a sort of debtor and creditor account--of the old eye for an eye doctrine1 which1 as ,i have argued1 involves a misconception of the true doctrine4 ,my reply would be1 in general terms1 that the doctrine requires restatement1 and1 if properly stated1 will not lose but acquire new forces4 ,let us consider the consequences of my previous statements4 ,the essential condition of social development is enforcement1 where necessary1 of peace and order by adequate means4 ,the criminal law corresponds to one part of this process4 ,the whole social system includes machinery for prevention1 for reformation and for education1 as well as for punishment2 and it is only when taken in its relation to other parts of the system1 that we can give the full justification4 ,its methods are1 as ,i have said1 obviously full of imperfections1 from the purely moral point of view4 ,if we consider it as an isolated fact1 comparably to the interference of a quasi-supernatural power1 which clutches an offender here and there1 and punishes him simply to frighten others1 the arbitrary and unequal nature of the proceeding assumes an air of injustice4 ,in fact1 if you take the extreme individualist view1 according to which each man is an independent unit1 while society represents a force impinging upon him from without1 it always becomes difficult to introduce the conception of justice without ending in the approval of anarchy4 ,when1 however1 we consider the social organisation as including all the means of civilising society1 of strengthening the general spirit of order1 as well as acting upon the fears of the disorderly1 we have to take wider considerations into account4 ,we become sensible1 in the first place1 of the importance of the principle that punishment should never be substituted for prevention4 ,wherever it is possible to remove temptations1 or take precautions which make crime impossible1 we can have no excuse for adopting the blundering and unsatisfactory system of punishing those who have committed it4 ,we admit1 that is1 that the criminal law1 though absolutely necessary1 is an essentially clumsy contrivance1 to be used only when other methods fail4 ,when certain punishments have been condemned as brutalising1 it has been replied that the persons punished were already so brutal that it is impossible to make them worse4 ,but the brutalising influence is even more objectionable as it applies to the legislator than as it applies to the criminal4 ,to make up for neglect of appropriate precautions by severity against the offender1 is to adopt the necessarily arbitrary method in which chance must always play a part in place of more effective and civilising methods4 ,frugality in applying punishment is desirable as a guarantee that we are acting in the proper spirit4 ,an ,indian official was asked why the native police were disposed to use torture for the detection of crime4 ,the cause was1 he said1 mainly from laziness3 it was so much easier to sit in the shade1 rubbing red pepper in a poor devil's eyes1 than to go about in a hot sun collecting evidence4 ,so1 it would be very much easier to inflict cruel punishment than to try to remove the causes of crime2 and a resolution never to use the more brutal methods is not1 as ,i think1 to be regarded as a proof of weak sentimentalism1 but as a judicious self-denying ordinance1 imposed upon society by itself1 as binding it always to adopt1 as far as it possibly can1 what is at once the more humane and the more scientific method4 ,the same principle involves the careful graduation of punishment4 ,there are1 indeed1 as ,i believe1 though ,i cannot give reasons1 cases in which crimes ought to be punished with death4 ,there are persons of whom we may say that it would have been better1 especially for their neighbours1 if they had never been born4 ,i am worth inconceivably more for hanging than for any other purpose1 said the heroic ,john ,brown2 and the words may be applied1 in a very different sense1 to some of the wretches who occasionally make their appearance in the courts4 ,to hang such a man is to act upon the assumption that murderers represent elements which are entirely and radically anti-social4 ,the only remedy for them is extirpation4 ,but1 if this be admitted1 it suggests a sufficient reason for not applying it to the cases of less gravity1 in which such radical incompatibility has not been demonstrated4 ,punishment by death1 even if necessary1 is certainly a confession of impotence4 ,we are admitting that we can do nothing better with the man than convert him into a scarecrow for the benefit of his like4 ,what more1 it may be asked1 can we do with a criminal8 ,the obvious reply would be1 reform him4 ,although no one can doubt that reformation would be an extremely good thing1 wherever practicable1 it may be urged that the enterprise is exceedingly difficult2 that1 in many cases1 it is hopeless2 and that we might spend our money and our efforts to better purpose upon more hopeful materials4 ,and yet1 ,i think that the answer is the true one1 if properly understood1 and will suggest the right meaning to be given to the word deterrence4 ,so long as we consider the individual case alone1 and merely mean that we are giving motives to bad men for refraining from particular lines of conduct1 the results1 however desirable1 are of limited value4 ,but if we consider deterrence as including or coinciding with reformation1 as indicating a part of the general system of moral pressure by which the classes exposed to temptation may be gradually raised in the scale of civilisation1 we recognise an acceptable meaning4 ,in fact1 if we ask what is the deterring influence of punishment1 we must observe that at one extreme it will always fail1 or only induce a bad man to take precautions against detection2 and that1 at the other end of the scale1 there are a great many cases in which it does not come into active operation at all4 ,you and ,i1 ,i hope1 are not in the least disposed to assault each other1 even though no policeman is present4 ,the bare thought of resorting to violence1 pelting me1 say1 with rotten eggs1 has not even suggested itself to you1 even though ,i may be making a very provoking use of my tongue4 ,but there is also an intermediate class of people upon whom the possibility of having to appear in a police court1 and the strong sense of shame attached to such appearances1 is an active restraining force1 tending to limit1 and1 in cases where the proper conditions exist1 gradually to narrow1 the sphere of violence4 ,we1 the peaceable and law-abiding citizens1 have gained a right to those epithets1 because we have lived in a sphere where the law has been habitually enforced4 ,we have ceased to carry deadly weapons about us1 and have established a general condition of good order4 ,the deterring influence of the criminal law acts1 or ought to act1 by gradually spreading that state of mind through a steadily widening circle4 ,the classes which are still in need of such a support to their moral instincts are clearly capable of reformation1 whatever may be the case of some of the individuals who break the law4 ,a fighting tribe1 which has been in the habit of resenting every injury by the use of the knife1 may learn1 in a very short time1 that a court of law settles disputes more agreeably than a free fight2 and may become a most admirable and efficient part of the society to which it belongs4 ,and the same may be said of large classes in our own society1 which are perfectly capable of being converted into good citizens1 though they may retain certain propensities developed under a rougher and more brutal system4 ,to employ excessive and brutalising punishments in order to suppress small offences1 is1 therefore1 to abandon the aim of civilising1 to declare internecine war against the class1 and to regard them simply as a nuisance to be abated4 ,the effect might be1 if the law could be carried out1 to prevent a certain number of crimes2 but it must also be to generate a more dangerous spirit in the class which you regard simply as dangerous1 instead of regarding it as the possible raw materials of a more civilised and orderly society4 ,without attempting to dwell upon a familiar argument1 ,i merely say that this view of the case implies that the governing power should be regarded1 not simply as a machinery for catching and killing noxious criminals1 but as a great civilising influence1 suppressing all temptations to crime1 where possible2 preferring prevention1 in every practicable case1 to punishment1 and making use of the clumsy1 though necessary1 weapons in the last resort2 and acting by a steady and regulated pressure upon all anti-social elements4 ,it is only possible to give a satisfactory theory of the jail and the gallows1 when you take them as a subordinate part of the system which includes reformatories and schools1 and due precautions for the regular preservation of order4 ,the ultimate criterion of justice is not to be found in any attempt to form a debtor and creditor account between the government and the individual2 but in the civilising influence of the system1 taken as a whole4 ,and1 finally1 ,i come back to the other theory which ,i have noticed4 ,to supply the defects of the simply deterrent theory1 it has been found necessary1 as ,i said1 to invoke the vindictive theory4 ,we should go1 it was suggested1 upon the theory that a criminal is hateful1 and1 therefore1 that it should be a pleasure to punish him4 ,the feelings of resentment and moral indignation are parts of our nature1 to which the punishment of the offender affords them a legitimate gratification4 ,now1 to this1 ,i should reply that1 in the first place1 ,i do not admit that the desire for revenge1 as usually understood1 can ever be legitimate4 ,revenge1 as ,i understand the word1 implies a personal feeling4 ,it is taking pleasure in giving pain to a man because he has given pain to me4 ,according to my view of morals1 any pleasure in causing pain is1 so far1 wrong2 and the public punishment should be free from all personal motive4 ,i quite agree with ,bentham that we ought not to take a positive pleasure in the sufferings1 even of the worst criminal2 and to admit the legitimacy of such pleasure is to admit an element of pure sentiment to which it is difficult to assign any precise limits4 ,if you allow yourself to hate a man so as to take pleasure in his sufferings1 you might justify the infliction of superfluous torture and the old methods of hanging1 drawing1 and quartering4 ,to do so is precisely to approve the ferocious old treatment1 to which1 as ,i conceive1 the theory of simple deterrence was an excellent corrective1 in so far as it at least implied a definite limit to the indulgence of fiercer passions4 ,there is1 however1 ,i think1 an element of truth in the doctrine4 ,i admit1 that is1 that the punishment of a criminal should carry a moral approval1 and not be regarded purely as a measure of convenience4 ,successful crime should be regarded with abhorrence4 ,if a man convicted of a grave offence should be allowed to go without punishment1 we should be rightly aggrieved4 ,it is not1 however1 that we should take pleasure in his suffering1 but that we should be pained by an example of the practical impunity of anti-social conduct4 ,the escape of a murderer would1 as we should feel1 be a blow to the security of all innocent people4 ,in that sense1 we may take pleasure in his punishment1 not in the sense of positive enjoyment1 but1 certainly1 in the sense of relief from positive sense of evil4 ,it is1 and should be1 painful to see the rogues flourish and honest men droop1 and to observe captive good attending captain ill4 ,but the pleasure of seeing the necessary equilibrium restored is different from the pleasure of dwelling upon the sufferings of the disturber4 ,the practical difference is that1 while we regard the infliction of suffering as necessary1 we admit it to be a necessary evil1 and are keenly alive to the inability of keeping it within the limits fixed by the general necessities of the law4 ,,luxury4 ,professor ,sidgwick has been discussing the ethics of luxury1 and1 according to his wont1 has been giving fresh interest to a well-worn topic4 ,i do not wish to dispute anything that he has said1 nor do ,i hope to clear up problems which he professedly left unsolved4 ,in one sense1 they obviously cannot be solved precisely4 ,luxury is a relative term1 which cannot be defined in absolute terms4 ,a luxury1 in the first place1 is distinguished from a necessary4 ,but1 then1 one man's necessary may be another man's luxury4 ,my very existence depends upon conditions with which another man can dispense4 ,if1 again1 we admit that there are many things which1 though not absolutely necessary1 may rightly be used1 if they can be used without injuring others1 we see that we must also take into account the varying social conditions4 ,if we use luxury1 in what ,bentham called the dyslogistic sense1 we must distinguish between necessaries and superfluities1 and then divide superfluities into comforts which may be rightfully enjoyed1 and luxuries which cannot be enjoyed without incurring some degree of moral censure4 ,but the dividing lines are always shifting4 ,scott tells somewhere of a ,highlander sleeping on the open moor in a winter night4 ,when he tried to roll the snow into a pillow his companion kicked it away1 as a proof of disgraceful effeminacy4 ,most of us would come to a speedy end if we lived in a social state where such a standard of hardiness was rigidly enforced4 ,we admit that some kind of pillow may be permitted1 if not as absolutely necessary1 as1 at least1 a pardonable comfort4 ,we shall probably agree1 also1 that nobody is to be blamed for using clean sheets and securing a certain amount of warmth and softness--as much1 at least1 as is desirable for sanitary reasons4 ,but if we endeavour to prescribe precisely how much may be allowed in excess of the necessary1 how often we are to send our sheets to the wash1 whether it is right to have lace upon our pillows1 and so forth1 we get into problems where any attempt at precision is obviously illusory4 ,we are the more perplexed by the question1 whether the provision of a bed for ourselves causes other people to go without a bed1 and1 perhaps1 without supper1 or how far we are bound to take such consequences into account4 ,without aiming1 therefore1 at an impossible precision1 ,i shall try to consider--not what objects should be called luxuries1 or comforts1 or necessaries1 but what are the really relevant considerations by which we should endeavour to guide our judgments4 ,luxury is1 as ,i have said1 a well-worn topic4 ,saints and philosophers in all ages1 have denounced the excessive love of material enjoyments1 and set examples of a more or less thorough-going asceticism4 ,it was--to go no further back--one of the favourite topics of our ancestors1 in such papers as the ,spectator and the ,rambler4 ,addison1 in his ,cato1 described the simple ,numidian1 whose standard appears to have resembled that of ,scott's ,highlander4 ,the ,numidian1 he says1 rests his head upon a rock at night1 and1 if next day he chances to find a new repast or an untasted spring1 blesses his stars and calls it luxury4 ,general ,oglethorpe quoted this passage1 in an argument about luxury1 to ,johnson1 and added1 let us have that kind of luxury1 sir1 if you will4 ,johnson himself put down all this declamation as part of the cant from which we ought to clear our minds4 ,no nation1 he said to ,goldsmith1 was ever hurt by luxury4 ,let us take a walk from ,charing ,cross to ,whitechapel1 through the greatest series of shops in the world3 what is there in any of these shops 7if you except gin-shops7 that can do any human being any harm8 ,i accept your challenge1 said ,goldsmith4 ,the next shop to ,northumberland ,house is a pickle-shop4 ,to which the excellent ,johnson replied1 first1 that five pickle-shops could serve the whole kingdom2 secondly1 that no harm was done to anybody either by making pickles or by eating pickles4 ,i will not go into the ethics of pickles4 ,i only quote this to remind you that this was one of the stock questions of the period2 and not without reason4 ,the denunciation of luxury was1 in fact1 the mark of a very significant tendency4 ,goldsmith had expressed the prevalent sentiment in the ,deserted ,village1 as in the familiar passage beginning3-- ,ill fares the land1 to hastening ills a prey1 ,where wealth accumulates and men decay4 ,and ,goldsmith1 like many contemporaries1 was only versifying the sentiments uttered most powerfully by ,rousseau in his famous exaltation of the ideal man of nature above the man of a corrupt civilisation4 ,the theory has some affinity to the ancient doctrine already expounded by classical writers1 according to which each form of government includes a principle of decay as well as of life4 ,one stage in the process of corruption of ,plato's ideal republic is marked by the appearance of the drones1 people who take a surfeit of unnecessary pleasures1 and1 to obtain satisfaction1 associate themselves with the fierce and rapacious4 ,in ,rousseau's time1 this view became connected with the growing belief in progress and perfectibility4 ,it was a symptom of warning to the drones of his day4 ,it showed that the thoughtful classes were becoming dimly sensible that something was wrong in the social organisation2 and that a selfish and indolent aristocracy should be called upon to put its house in order4 ,the denunciation of luxury meant1 in short1 that the rich and powerful were accused of indulgence in pleasures which they had not earned by services1 but by the rigid enforcement of class privileges4 ,considered from this point of view1 as the muttering of a coming storm1 as the expression of a vague foreboding that the world was somehow out of joint1 we may see more meaning than appears at first sight1 in the old-fashioned commonplaces of our great-grandfathers4 ,the language has changed its form2 but the discontent at the misuse of wealth in various forms has certainly not diminished since that time4 ,obviously1 then1 the question of luxury is connected with very wide and deep problems as to what is the proper use of wealth1 and might lead us into ultimate questions as to the justification of the right to private property at all4 ,i shall try1 however1 to keep as closely as may be to the particular aspect of such problems1 which is immediately relevant to this particular question4 ,and for this purpose1 ,i think it will be convenient to take two points separately4 ,the objections to luxury may be stated either with reference to the individual or with reference to the society4 ,that is to say1 that if we consider a man by himself1 we may ask with ,johnson1 whether expenditure upon pickles is injurious to the constitution1 or at what point it becomes injurious4 ,and1 in the next place1 we may ask whether1 if we see our way to decide that pickles are wholesome as well as agreeable1 some of us may not be getting more than our fair share of pickles1 and so diminishing the total sum of pleasure1 by inordinate consumption4 ,first1 then1 ,i discard1 for the moment1 all social considerations4 ,i take for granted1 for the sake of argument1 that my indulgence does no harm to any one else2 that ,i am not depriving others of a means of enjoyment1 but simply adding to my own2 or1 at any rate1 that ,i am not1 for the moment1 to take into account that set of consequences4 ,how far1 on this hypothesis1 or1 say1 setting aside all question of duty to my neighbour1 should ,i be prudent in accumulating wealth8 ,i sometimes amuse myself with the problem1 ,how rich should ,i like to be1 supposing that ,i were perfectly wise in that sense in which wisdom is compatible with thorough-going egoism1 or with what is called enlightened self-interest8 ,the obvious answer is that1 in that case1 there would be no limits to my desires4 ,an imaginative ,american1 we are told1 defined competence as a million a minute and all your expenses paid4 ,the suggestion is fascinating1 but not1 to my mind1 quite satisfactory4 ,it recalls a doctrine which used to be put forward by the old political economists4 ,they had to meet the theory--a preposterous theory enough--of the danger of a universal glut2 the danger1 that is1 that a nation might produce so much that nothing would have any value1 and1 therefore1 that we should all be ruined by all becoming enormously rich4 ,to meet this1 it was often urged--along with more satisfactory arguments--that human desires were illimitable2 and1 therefore1 that however rich a man might become he would always wish to become a little richer4 ,according to this doctrine1 the desire for wealth cannot be satiated4 ,the millionaire would still choose an extra half-crown rather than refuse it1 although the half-crown brings him incomparably less additional pleasure than it brought him when his pockets were empty4 ,but it is also true that long before we were millionaires1 the pleasure obtainable by additional wealth may be infinitesimal1 or absolutely non-existent4 ,the simple desires may be easily saturated4 ,pope asks1 ,what riches give us1 let us then inquire4 ,and he replies1 ,meat1 fire1 and clothes--what more8 ,meat1 clothes1 and fire4 ,this is1 in fact1 a pithy summary of our most elementary and necessary wants4 ,now1 our demand for meat is obviously strictly limited4 ,as soon as we have eaten1 say1 a pound of beefsteak1 we do not want more2 by the time we have eaten1 say1 three pounds we do not only not want more1 we loathe the very thought of eating4 ,so1 when we are clothed sufficiently for comfort and decency1 more clothing is simply a burden2 and we wish only for so much fire as will keep our thermometer within certain limits2 a heat above or below would mean death either by burning or by freezing4 ,our ultimate aim1 therefore1 in regard to desires of this class1 is not to increase the stimulus indefinitely1 but to preserve a certain balance or equilibrium4 ,if we want more food after our appetites are satisfied1 it must either be with a view to our future consumption1 which is still strictly finite1 or else with a view to exchanging the food for something else1 in which case it is desired1 not as food1 but as the means of satisfying some other desire4 ,if1 then1 ,pope's doctrine were really sound1 which actually amounts to saying1 if our desires were really limited to the physical conditions necessary to life1 we should very soon reach the state in which they would be completely glutted or saturated4 ,it may be worth while to note the circumstance which rather obscures our recognition of this fact4 ,we may distinguish between the wealth which a man actually uses and that which remains1 as ,i may say1 only potential4 ,a man may desire an indefinite quantity of wealth1 because he may wish to have rights which he may yet never turn to actual account4 ,there is a certain satisfaction1 no doubt1 in knowing that ,i have a vast balance at my banker's1 though ,i have no desire to use it4 ,i may want it some time or other2 and1 even if ,i never want it1 ,i may enjoy the sense of having a disproportionate barrier of money-bags piled up between me and the yawning gulf of actual poverty4 ,therefore1 though a very limited amount may be enough to satiate all our existing desires1 we may like to know that there is more at our disposal4 ,if possession carried with it the necessity of using our property1 if we could not have potential as distinguished from actual wealth1 we should be so far from desiring an indefinite increase of wealth that we should regard the increase beyond a certain limit as only one of two intolerable alternatives4 ,the question1 therefore1 ,how rich should ,i wish to be8 requires an answer to the previous question1 ,how rich can ,i be8 ,a man1 even if on the intellectual level of a savage1 can be indefinitely rich in potential wealth3 he may1 that is1 have a right to millions of pounds or be the owner of thousands of acres2 but in order to use them he must have certain capacities and sensibilities4 ,it is a curious question1 for example1 how much of the wealth of a country would cease to be wealth at all if the intelligence of the possessors were lowered certain degrees in the scale8 ,a large part of the wealth of ,england consists1 ,i suppose1 of machinery4 ,if nobody knew more of machines than ,i do--and my whole notion of a machine is that it is something that goes round somehow if you happen to turn the right handle--all this wealth would become as useless as an electric telegraph in the possession of a hairy ,ainu4 ,and if nobody had any better artistic perception than mine1 and we were therefore unable to see the difference between a ,raphael and the daub in an advertising placard1 the pictures in the ,national ,gallery would have an average value1 say1 of eighteen-pence4 ,a man1 therefore1 who is at the lower levels of intelligence is simply unable to be actually rich1 beyond a narrow limit4 ,the fact is occasionally forced upon us by striking examples4 ,i heard the other day a story--,i am afraid we all hear such stories too often--of a man who had become enormously rich by a freak of fortune4 ,his only idea of enjoyment happened to be gin4 ,he could1 therefore1 only use his wealth by drinking himself to death2 a proceeding which he accordingly felt to be only a proper tribute to his improved social position4 ,a similar result happens whenever a sudden rise of wages to an insufficiently civilised class leads to the enrichment of publicans1 instead of increased indulgence in refined and innocent pleasures4 ,the man1 in short1 whose idea of pleasure is simply the gratification of the physical appetites in their coarser forms is incapable of becoming actually rich1 because a small amount of wealth will enable him to saturate his desires by providing a superfluity of the material means of gratification4 ,it is1 perhaps1 here that we may take into account the remark so often made by moralists1 by ,adam ,smith among others1 as ,professor ,sidgwick reminds us1 that happiness is more evenly distributed among different classes than we suppose4 ,the king1 according to ,shakespeare1 cannot-- ,with all the tide of pomp ,that beats upon the high shore of this world 444 ,sleep so soundly as the wretched slave ,who with a body filled and vacant mind ,gets him to rest1 cramm'd with distressful bread4 ,the body filled and the vacant mind make up for the distressful bread4 ,it is as well1 that is1 to have no wants except the want of mere physical comfort1 as to have higher wants and the means of gratifying them1 and yet to be saddled with the anxieties and responsibilities which the higher position involves4 ,the doctrine1 ,i am not really better off than you1 is1 indeed1 not a very graceful one from those who are actually better off4 ,there was some excuse for the fox who said the grapes were sour when he could not get them2 it argued a judicious desire to make the best of things3 but if he made the remark while he was comfortably chewing them1 by way of pacifying the grapeless foxes1 we should have thought him a more objectionable hypocrite4 ,the pauper may fairly reply1 ,if you really mean that your wealth brings no happiness1 why don't you change places with me8 ,i will1 therefore1 not defend the statement1 considered as an exhortation to content2 but ,i accept it as a recognition of the obvious fact1 that if happiness means a satisfaction of all our desires1 a man of small means may be as happy as the man of the greatest means1 if his desires are limited in proportion4 ,but is it for our happiness to increase them8 ,does our principle hold when we suppose a man to have the necessary sensibilities for the actual enjoyment of wealth8 ,if he acquires the tastes which imply greater intellectual cultivation1 a power1 therefore1 of taking into account sources of pleasure more complex and more distant in time and space1 does it then become true that his power of using wealth will be indefinite8 ,i should reply1 in the first place1 that we must still admit the same psychological truth4 ,any desire whatever1 that is1 is capable of yielding only a strictly finite amount of enjoyment2 the pleasure which we can derive from it must be limited both by the necessity of gratifying other desires and by the fact that no desire whatever is capable of an indefinite increase by increased stimulation4 ,after a certain point of excitement is reached1 we cannot get more pleasure by any accumulation of internal conditions4 ,we assume for the present that our aim is simply to extract the greatest possible amount of gratification out of life4 ,we must then take for our data our actual constitution1 capacities1 sensibilities1 and so forth1 and calculate how much wealth could be actually applied in order to keep us moving always along the line of maximum enjoyment4 ,this would be to study the art of life on purely hedonistic principles4 ,we should ask1 what career will on the whole be fullest of enjoyment8 and then1 what material conditions can enable us to follow that career8 ,i imagine that the amount requisite would vary indefinitely according to our characters4 ,suppose1 for example1 that a man has strong intellectual tastes1 a love of art or science or literature4 ,he will require1 of course1 enough wealth to enable him to devote himself without anxiety to his favourite pursuits1 and enough1 moreover1 to train himself in all requisite knowledge4 ,but granting this1 the material conditions of happiness will be sufficiently fulfilled4 ,i think it was ,agassiz who observed when he was devoting himself to science that he had not time to get rich4 ,wealth to him would have been rather an impediment than an advantage4 ,a man like ,faraday1 who placed his whole happiness in the extension of scientific knowledge1 and who was not less honoured because he lived upon a modest income1 would not have had a greater amount of that kind of happiness had he possessed the wealth of a ,rothschild4 ,a man whose pleasure is in reading books1 or contemplating works of art1 or listening to music1 can obtain the highest enjoyment at a very moderate price1 and could get very little more if he had the most unbounded wealth at his disposal4 ,if we inquired what men possessing such tastes had derived from them the greatest happiness1 we should1 ,i fancy1 find ourselves mentioning men comparatively poor1 whose enjoyments were even comparatively keen1 because they had to devote a certain amount of care and contrivance to obtaining full play for their capacities4 ,charles ,lamb1 plotting and contriving to get an old volume from a bookstall1 possibly got more pleasure from his taste than if he had been the possessor of a gigantic library4 ,the sociable man1 again1 the man whose pleasure in society is the genuine delight in a real interchange of thought and sympathy1 who does not desire magnificent entertainment1 but the stimulus of intimate association with congenial friends1 would probably find the highest pleasure in comparatively simple social strata1 where the display of wealth was no object1 and men met1 as ,johnson met his friends at the club1 to put mind fairly to mind1 and to stimulate intellectual activity1 instead of consuming the maximum of luxury4 ,milton's sonnet to ,lawrence gives perhaps a rather severe but a very fascinating ideal of refined luxury3-- ,what neat repast shall feast us1 light and choice1 ,of ,attic taste with wine1 whence we may rise ,to hear the lute well touched1 or artful voice ,warble immortal notes and ,tuscan air8 ,he who of these delights can judge1 and spare ,to interpose them oft1 is not unwise4 ,nor need we be accused of inordinate boasting if we should say that we would rather have made a third at such a feast than have joined a dozen rowdy courtiers at the table of ,charles ,,ii4 ,there are1 however1 pleasures which undoubtedly suppose an indefinite capacity for using wealth4 ,there is1 for example1 such a thing as the pure love of splendour1 which is represented so curiously in some of ,disraeli's novels4 ,one of his heroes1 if ,i remember rightly1 proposed to follow the precedent actually set by ,beckford1 who built at ,fonthill a tower #cjj feet high--not because it was wanted for any other purpose1 but simply for the sake of building a tower4 ,of course1 if one has a taste for towers #cjj feet high1 there is no particular limit to the quantity of wealth which may be found convenient4 ,one of the gentlest and most delicate satirists of modern society1 ,mr4 ,du ,maurier1 has given us admirable illustrations of a more vulgar form of the same tendency in his portraits of ,sir ,gorgius ,midas4 ,when that worthy denounces his servants because there are only three footmen sitting up till two o'clock to save him the trouble of using a latch-key1 we may admit that his pleasures1 such as they were1 were capable of finding gratification in any quantity of expenditure4 ,it might be a question1 indeed1 if we had time to ask it1 whether the pleasure derived from such expenses by the millionaire be really so great as the pleasure which he had when he first turned the proverbial half-crown1 with which he must have come to ,london1 into his first five shillings2 and it is certainly also a question whether his expenditure was ethically right4 ,but at present we are only considering facts1 and we may admit that there would be no filling such a gulf of desire by any dribble of bullion2 and1 further1 that there are pleasures--not1 on the face of them1 immoral--in procuring which any quantity of money may be spent4 ,if a man is simply desirous of obtaining influence1 or1 in some cases1 political power2 or if he decides to muddle away his money upon charity1 there are no limits to the sums he may spend1 especially if he has no objection to corrupting his neighbours4 ,before saying anything upon this1 however1 ,i must pause to deduce a conclusion4 ,keeping still to the purely hedonistic point of view1 ,i ask1 ,at what point does expenditure become luxurious in a culpable sense8 meaning by culpable not morally culpable1 but simply injudicious from the point of view of enlightened self-interest4 ,to this ,i think that one answer is already suggested1 that is to say1 that since1 on the one hand1 a certain finite quantity of wealth will enable us to keep to the happiest or most philosophic career2 and since1 on the other hand1 a man may possess a quantity of superfluous wealth which he can only use on penalty of deviating from that career1 he becomes foolish1 if not immoral--upon which ,i say nothing--when he tries to use more4 ,that people frequently commit this folly is undeniable4 ,wealth ought to be 7,i mean would be by a judiciously selfish person7 regarded as a means of enjoyment4 ,therefore the superfluous wealth should be left in the potential stage--as a balance at his banker's or accumulating in the funds4 ,but though the possession does not imply a necessity of using1 it does generally imply a sort of tacit feeling of responsibility--responsibility1 that is1 to a man's self4 ,i have got so much money2 surely it is a duty to myself to use it for my pleasure4 ,so far as a man yields to such an argument1 he becomes the slave instead of the master of his wealth4 ,what ought to be machinery for furthering an end1 becomes an end in itself3 and1 at that point of conduct1 ,i think that we are disposed to call a man's life luxurious in a distinctly bad sense4 ,the error1 as ,i have suggested1 is perhaps at bottom much the same as that which leads a poor man to spend an increase of wages at a gin-shop4 ,but we do not call the gin-drinker luxurious1 but simply vicious4 ,for luxury seems to apply less to conduct which we can distinctly call bad in itself1 than to conduct which only becomes bad or foolish as implying a disproportion between the end attained and the expense of attaining it4 ,it applies when a man has1 as we say1 so much money that he does not know what to do with it4 ,we speak of luxuries in the case of ,sir ,gorgius1 where the prominent fact is that the man has been gorged with excessive wealth1 and is yet too dull to use it in any manner which would increase the happiness of a reasonable or refined being4 ,so it is generally regarded as characteristic rather of the upstart or newly-made millionaire than of the man born to higher position1 whose life is perhaps as selfish and hardly superior morally4 ,but the nobleman by birth has inherited a certain art of life2 he has acquired traditional modes of arranging his pleasures1 which give him the appearance1 at least1 of possessing more judicious and refined tastes2 and we are less shocked than by the man who has obviously wealth which he knows not how to use1 and which he1 therefore1 deliberately devotes to coarse and vulgar ostentation4 ,the upstart may not be more selfish at bottom2 but he dashes in your face the evidence of his selfishness1 and appeals for admiration on the simple ground that he has a larger income than his neighbours4 ,luxury means1 on this showing1 all such expenditure as is objectionable1 not because the pleasure obtained is intrinsically bad1 but because we are spending for the sake of spending1 and could get more real enjoyment at a lower sum4 ,i need not dwell upon the fact that men of moderate means may fall into the same error4 ,the fault of exaggerating the importance of machinery is not confined to those whom we call rich4 ,thackeray's discourses upon ,snobs are full expositions of the same weakness in the middle classes4 ,when we read1 for example1 of ,colonel ,ponto being miserable because he tries to make an income of a thousand a year support the pomp accessible to persons with ten thousand1 we see that he has as false a view as ,sir ,gorgius of the true ends of life4 ,and ,i refer to the same great satirist for abundant illustrations of the weaknesses which too often make society a machinery for wasting money on display1 and entirely oblivious that it should be a machinery for the promotion of intellectual and refined pleasures4 ,now1 if ,i have given a fair account of luxury as considered simply from the point of view of an enlightened selfishness1 ,i may proceed to the ethical question4 ,so far1 ,i have only asked1 in substance1 at what point our expenditure upon pickles becomes foolish4 ,but1 of course1 the more important question arises1 at what point it becomes selfish4 ,a man may be silly for spending money upon erecting towers2 but if he does no harm to his neighbours we hardly call him wicked4 ,we cannot say that it is unconditionally wrong to build a tower4 ,we must inquire1 therefore1 how far luxury necessarily involves a wrong to others4 ,here we must begin by listening to all the philosophers and divines of whom ,i spoke at starting4 ,any number of wise and good men will tell us1 in various dialects1 that pleasure is in itself bad1 or1 at least1 that all the pleasures obtainable by wealth are bad1 or1 at any rate1 beneath the notice of the higher spirits4 ,there are the thorough-going ascetics1 who strive1 not to regulate1 but to suppress all except the absolutely necessary physical instincts1 and think that even those desires savour of evil2 who consider the best man to be the man who lives upon bread and water1 and1 if possible1 upon mouldy bread and ditch-water4 ,there are1 again1 spiritually-minded people1 who consider all happiness to be worthless1 except such happiness as results from aspirations to another world2 who regard all riches as chains binding the soul to earth2 who take the words ,blessed are the poor in the most literal sense1 as defining the true aim of life4 ,we should seek1 they say1 for happiness elsewhere than in this transitory stage of existence1 remember that the world is a mere screen hiding the awful realities of heaven and hell2 and despise even such pleasures as are generally called intellectual pleasures1 the pleasures1 for example1 of art or science1 for they1 too1 belong really to the sphere of illusion1 and are simply more subtle temptations than those of the flesh4 ,and1 besides these1 we have the philosophers1 who would have us live in the world of pure intellect1 and tell us that the true moral of life is to make ourselves independent of external circumstances by suppressing all the corresponding desires4 ,renunciation1 therefore1 is the first lesson to be learned by the wise man2 and the practical rule1 as has been said1 is that we should endeavour not to increase our numerator but to lessen our denominator4 ,i cannot now discuss such doctrines4 ,i am content to say that ,i regard them not as simply false1 but as distorted views of truth4 ,for my part1 ,i am content to say that1 even as a moralist1 ,i wish to see people as happy as possible2 that being1 after all1 a poor utilitarian after my own fashion1 ,i desire--however erroneously--the greatest happiness of the greatest number2 and1 in particular1 that ,i should like to see1 not a feebler1 but a much keener appreciation of all the pleasures derivable from art1 or science1 or literature1 or rational society1 even1 if ,i may say so1 from good cookery and athletic sports4 ,briefly1 the ideal society seems to me to be one in which even our lower instincts should not be suppressed1 but regulated2 and the typical man of the future to be one whose whole faculties and their corresponding sensibilities should be cultivated to the utmost possible degree4 ,what is the application of this to our special question8 ,i do not know that ,i can do better than refer to the writings of ,bernard ,mandeville1 who in his ,fable of the ,bees--one of the cleverest books in the language--succeeded by the help of much paradox1 and under a cloak of cynicism1 in stating the problem with singular vivacity4 ,private vices1 that was his way of putting it1 are public benefits4 ,his meaning1 put less paradoxically1 was this3 accept1 on the one hand1 the ascetic doctrine that pursuit of pleasure is intrinsically vicious1 and you condemn all the impulses by which the structure of society1 especially the industrial structure1 has been built up4 ,accept1 on the other hand1 the doctrine that civilisation is1 on the whole1 a good thing1 and you admit that the instincts1 which1 upon this hypothesis1 correspond to private vices1 are the only means of producing a public benefit4 ,in other words1 if we took the language of theologians in its natural sense1 and really regarded the world as worthless1 we should have no industry1 no trade or commerce1 and be still living in swamps and forests1 digging up roots with our nails1 living upon acorns and shell-fish1 and scarcely even painting ourselves blue1 for to the savage blue paint was a luxury4 ,now1 apart from any question as to the fairness of this version of theological doctrine1 we may ask1 ,what is the real underlying difficulty--or that aspect of it which is still worth considering8 ,we may grant1 in the first place1 to ,mandeville1 that1 in point of fact1 the construction of a civilised society presupposes the development of numerous desires1 many of which are more or less condemned by severe moralists4 ,if the savage comes to value blue paint1 he may take to planting something to exchange for it1 instead of simply lying on his back to digest his last handful of acorns2 and1 in so doing1 he makes the first step towards the development of an industrial system4 ,the desire for wealth is1 of course1 implied in all stages of progress if men are to create wealth2 and we can partly answer ,mandeville's paradox by throwing over the ascetic and declaring that a desire for good meat1 and fire1 and clothes1 even for pictures1 and books1 and music1 or for such comforts as most of us enjoy1 is not in itself immoral2 and that1 on the contrary1 the more there is of such enjoyment the better for men's bodies and minds1 and therefore1 on the whole1 the better for their morality4 ,but the moral difficulty returns in a new shape4 ,the desire for wealth1 let us say1 is not in itself bad2 it is simply natural--it is a desire for one essential condition of a tolerably happy life4 ,but is it not bad1 in so far as it is selfish8 ,do not the desires which have been the mainspring of all modern development imply a desire of each man to get rich at the expense of others8 ,have they not been the source of all that division between rich and poor which makes one side luxurious and the other miserable8 ,has not ,dives become rich and bloated by force of the very same process which has made ,lazarus a mass of sores and misery8 ,suppress the desire for wealth1 and we should still be savages running wild in woods4 ,but was not even the noble savage better than the pauper who now hangs on to the fringes of society8 and is his existence compensated by the existence of other classes who have more wealth than they can use8 ,and so the old problem comes back2 and we have1 as of old1 the most contradictory answers to the problem4 ,i am1 ,i confess it1 one of those old-fashioned people who believe in progress1 and hold that their own century is distinctly better than any which preceded it2 who would on no account go back1 if they could1 to the days of the noble savages or even to the brutalities and superstitions of the ages of faith4 ,but ,i do not think that ,i need argue that question for our present purpose4 ,we have got to this century somehow1 and we can only get out of it by living till the twentieth4 ,meanwhile1 we should make the best of the interval4 ,i will1 therefore1 only permit myself one remark4 ,if we suppose1 with ,mandeville1 that the instincts which have developed modern society have been1 to a great extent1 selfish desires1 that is1 for the personal comfort of the agent1 irrespectively of consequences to others1 it does not follow that the corresponding development has been mischievous4 ,good commonplace moralists have been much in the habit of condemning the selfish passions of kings and conquerors4 ,what can be an easier mark for denunciation than such a man1 for example1 as ,louis ,,xi4 of ,france1 and the wily and cruel rulers of past ages1 whose only aim was to enlarge their own powers and wealth8 ,and yet1 if we consider the matter historically1 we must admit that such men have rendered enormous services to mankind4 ,a ruler1 let us say1 had for his only object the extension and concentration of his own authority4 ,still1 it was by the conflicts of rulers that the great nations have been formed out of a chaos of struggling clans2 that peace and order1 therefore1 have been substituted for violence1 throughout broad territories2 that law has taken the place of private war2 moreover1 that the privileges of selfish orders have been suppressed through the development of a larger and more civilised national organisation2 and that1 although the immediate victory was won by the selfish ruler1 the ultimate benefit has accrued to the people upon whom he was forced to rely for support against the oppressive subordinate powers4 ,the ruler1 perhaps1 did not look beyond his own interests2 but his own interest forced him to find allies among the mass of the population1 and so gradually led to the formation of central organs1 representing not the personal interest of the king1 but the interest of the whole nation in which they had arisen4 ,we may make a similar remark upon industrial development4 ,the great merchant and capitalist and inventor of new methods and machinery has not looked1 it may be1 beyond his own interest2 but1 intentionally or not1 he was helping to construct a vast organisation1 which1 whether it has1 on the whole1 improved the world or not1 has1 at least1 made it enormously richer4 ,perhaps ,watt1 when he was improving the steam-engine1 thought only of the profits to be derived from his invention4 ,but the profit which he gained after a laborious life was but an infinitesimal fraction of the enormous increase of efficiency which resulted to the national industry4 ,we cannot doubt that the whole gigantic system which at least maintains a population several times multiplied1 which maintains part of it in wealth and a large proportion in reasonable comfort1 has been due to the labours of many men1 each working for his own interest and animated chiefly by the desire of wealth4 ,so much remains true of the economist's doctrine of the natural harmony between individual and public interest4 ,in this case1 as in the case of governments1 we may1 perhaps1 say that men acted from motives which must be called selfish1 in this sense at least1 that they thought of little but their own interests2 but that1 at the same time1 their own interests compelled them to work in a direction which promoted1 more or less1 the interests of others4 ,i add1 briefly1 that these are only instances of what we may call the general rule3 namely1 that morality begins from an external or unrecognised conformity of interests1 and ends by recognising and adopting1 as motives1 the consequences which1 in the earlier stage1 seemed to be internal or accidental consequences4 ,i begin by helping a man because circumstances make it useful to myself1 and ,i end--and only become truly moral when ,i end--by doing what is useful to him1 because it is useful to him4 ,when1 indeed1 ,i have reached that point1 my end itself is profoundly modified2 it becomes much wider1 and yet only regulates and directs to new channels a great deal of the corresponding conduct4 ,the consideration of this modification--of the change which should take place when a man not only pursues such conduct as is beneficial on the whole to a country1 but pursues it with a view to the beneficial consequences--brings us back to the question of luxury4 ,the bare pursuit of wealth as the end of existence implies1 of course1 indifference to the means by which it is produced2 an equal readiness1 for example1 to grow rich by cheating my neighbour1 or by actually producing a greater quantity of useful produce4 ,it is consistent with a simple desire to enlarge my business without reference to the effect upon the persons ,i employ1 as when manufacturers enriched themselves by cruel exploitation of the labour of infants4 ,but if we hope for a state of things in which an employer should consider himself as essentially part of the national organism1 as increasing his own wealth only by such means as would be also advantageous to the comfort of the nation generally1 the pursuit of wealth would become moralised4 ,here1 in fact1 we must once more consider ,mandeville's paradox4 ,desire for wealth1 he substantially says1 must be good because it stimulates industry4 ,when your lazy barbarian1 who has no pleasure but gorging himself with food1 comes also to desire fine clothes1 he is not only a degree more refined in his tastes1 but his increased industry leads him to produce enough food to support his tailor1 and provision is made for two men instead of one4 ,but desire for wealth1 it is replied1 is bad1 because it leads our barbarian not only to consume the product of his own labour1 but to consume that of somebody else4 ,mandeville gained piquancy for his argument by confusing the two cases4 ,since the desire is good1 all its manifestations must be good4 ,extravagance1 for example1 is good1 and1 as he put it1 the fire of ,london was a benefit to industry because it set up a greater demand for the services of carpenters and bricklayers4 ,i need not say how frequently an argument substantially the same has been adopted by good writers1 and simple extravagance been praised because it was supposed to be good for trade4 ,political economists have been forced to labour the point that extravagant consumption does not increase wealth2 but the only curious thing is that such a point should ever have required demonstration4 ,the conclusion1 which is sufficient for our purpose1 is simply that an absolute denunciation or an absolute exaltation of the desire for wealth is equally impossible2 for the desire may have contrary effects4 ,in one shape it may stimulate to enjoyments which actually diminish wealth in general1 or1 at any rate1 to those which lead to the actual exploitation of the many for the benefit of the few2 and1 on the other hand1 to denounce it1 simply would be to denounce all the springs of action which raise men above the barbarous state of society4 ,when we look at the contrasts between the rich and the poor1 we must rightfully desire a greater equality of distribution2 but we may be tempted to approve too easily any means which may lead to such equality4 ,it is1 indeed1 obvious that if all the national resources which are now applied to producing superfluities could be turned to the production of necessaries1 we could support the same population in a greater comfort1 or support a much greater population at a point just above starvation level4 ,but it does not at all follow that a society in which every man's labour was devoted entirely to the task of providing necessaries would in fact be either more comfortable or more numerous4 ,historically speaking1 the fact is the very reverse4 ,the only societies in which there is such an equality are societies in which the level is one of uniform misery1 and whose total industrial efficiency is incomparably smaller than that of the more civilised races4 ,it has been only in so far as a nation has been able to support classes with sufficient means to devote themselves to science and art1 and the cultivation of the higher faculties generally1 that it has acquired the vast powers of production which enable some to be disproportionately rich1 but which also enable numerous masses to support themselves in tolerable comfort where there were once a few wandering barbarians4 ,that the more cultivated classes have sought only their own advantage instead of the general benefit1 may be too true2 but the conclusion is1 not that they should cease to have the desires which entitle a man to be called a civilised being1 but that these desires should be so regulated and moralised as to subserve directly and necessarily the ends which they have only promoted indirectly and accidentally4 ,a society which has grown rich by mechanical discoveries and industrious organisation has acquired the power of greatly raising the average level of comfort4 ,if1 in point of fact1 its power has been greatly misused1 if a great development of poverty has taken place side by side with a great development of industrial efficiency1 the proper inference is not that we should denounce the desires from which the efficiency is derived1 but that we should direct them into such channels as may lead to the more universal distribution of the advantages which they create4 ,it is1 ,i think1 from this point of view that we can best judge of the moral objection to luxury4 ,for1 as ,i previously suggested1 luxury begins when a man becomes the slave instead of the master of his wealth2 when that which ought to be a mere machinery becomes an end in itself2 and when1 therefore1 there is a tendency to cultivate and stimulate to excess those lower passions which1 though necessary within limits1 may beyond those limits distort and lower the whole character1 and make the pursuit of worthy objects impossible4 ,we know that the king who had the reputation of being the wisest of mankind1 after building a splendid temple and a gorgeous palace1 and filling them with vessels of gold1 and importing ivory and apes and peacocks1 could find nothing better to do with the rest than to take #gjj wives and #cjj concubines--a measure which hardly increased his domestic felicity1 but no doubt got rid of a good deal of money4 ,although few men have ,solomon's opportunities of affording a typical instance of luxury1 many of us show ourselves capable of weakness similar at least in kind4 ,i need not multiply examples4 ,the great mystery of fashion is perhaps a trifling but a significant example4 ,when people1 instead of considering dress as a means of displaying the beauty of the human frame1 consider their bodies as mere pegs upon which to display clothes1 and are ready to distort their own forms to fill arbitrary shapes1 changed at short intervals to increase the cost1 they are clearly exemplifying the confusion between means and ends4 ,when a young gentleman spends a fortune upon the turf1 or upon gambling1 he shows that he has no more conception than the poor boy who plays pitch-and-toss with halfpence of the ways in which wealth might be made conducive to undertakings worthy of absorbing human energy4 ,when1 on pretence of cultivating society1 we invent a whole cumbrous social apparatus which makes all rational conversation impossible1 we know that the display of wealth has become an end to which we are ready to sacrifice our ostensible purpose4 ,now1 ,i suggest that such luxury1 such exaltation of the machinery above the ultimate good1 corresponds pretty nearly to the distinction between the desires which lead to the rightful use and those which lead to the shameful misuse of wealth in a social sense4 ,human nature1 indeed1 is singularly complex1 and it is impossible to deny that the hope of acquiring such luxuries may incidentally lead to that increase of industry and development of national resources which1 as we have seen1 is the ground upon which it is defended4 ,the industrious apprentice may have been stimulated to become ,lord ,mayor by the odours from his master's turtle-soup2 ,arkwright1 perhaps1 was induced to invent the machinery which revolutionised the cotton manufactures by the hope of becoming ,sir ,richard1 and rivalling the coarse luxury of some stupid ,squire ,western4 ,but we cannot doubt that upon a large scale the love of the grosser indulgences is bad1 even from its purely economical point of view4 ,if1 incidentally1 it encourages industry1 it far more directly and necessarily encourages wasteful expenditure4 ,if a rich man can only spend his thousands at a gambling-table1 the poorer man cannot be blamed for gambling with a thimble-rigger4 ,when ,solomon set up his domestic establishment1 every shopkeeper in ,jerusalem might be encouraged to marry an extra wife4 ,if a rich man1 who has enough to saturate a healthy appetite1 tries how much money he can spend1 like the old classical epicures1 upon new dishes of nightingales' tongues1 you can hardly expect the poorer man to refrain from an extra glass of gin4 ,briefly1 so far as the resources of a nation are spent upon the mere ostentation--which we call vulgar1 to imply that it is spending for the sake of expense1 foolishly trying to get more pleasure for an appetite already gorged to excess1 by simply increasing the stimulus--it is encouraging all the forces which make rather for waste than increased productiveness1 and justifying the natural jealousy of the poorer4 ,so far1 that is1 as a desire for wealth means a desire to consume as much as possible on supersaturating the lower appetites1 the commonest argument against private property in general is not only plausible but justified4 ,i should say1 then1 that luxury in a bad sense begins wherever in expenditure it indicates an insufficient sense of the responsibility which attaches to all wealth4 ,this does not condemn an expenditure which may seem1 from some points of view1 luxurious2 though1 as ,i have said1 ,i cannot profess to draw any distinct line in what is essentially a question of degree and of actual possibilities1 ,i can only suggest in general that a man is prima facie justified in all such expenditure as tends to the highest possible cultivation of his faculties and of the faculties of those dependent upon him4 ,i hold it to be a matter of the highest importance that there should be a thoroughly civilised class--a class capable of all intellectual pleasures2 loving the beauties of art and nature2 studying every possible department of knowledge1 scientific and historical2 maintaining all such modes of recreation and social enjoyment as are naturally appropriate to such a class4 ,and ,i do not call any man luxurious for maintaining his position in such a sphere1 or for enabling his children to follow in his steps4 ,i believe that1 as things are1 the existence of such a class is a necessary condition of national welfare and of the preservation and extension of the whole body of cultivation which we have received from our ancestors4 ,what is requisite is1 that the class should be not only capable of refined enjoyment1 but of discharging its functions relatively to the nation at large1 and spreading a higher standard of enjoyment through the whole community4 ,so far as the richer class maintains certain traditions1 moral and intellectual--traditions of personal honour and public spirit1 of artistic and literary cultivation--it may be discharging an invaluable function1 and its existence may be a necessary means of diffusing a higher civilisation through the masses who have not the same advantage4 ,whatever employments of wealth contribute to make a man more efficient as an individual member of society1 to strengthen his understanding and his perceptions1 to widen his intellectual horizon and interest his sympathies1 and the enjoyments which correspond to them1 are not to be condemned as luxurious4 ,they are1 at present1 only within the reach of the richer classes1 ardently as we may hope that the power of partaking them may be extended as rapidly and widely as possible4 ,but the growth of luxury1 in the bad sense1 is the indication that the class which should act as the brain of the social organism is ceasing to discharge its functions1 and becoming what we call a survival4 ,it is a kind of moral gout--an aristocratic disease1 showing that the secretions are becoming disordered for want of a proper application of the energies4 ,it was in that sense1 as ,i said before1 that our grandfathers denounced the luxury which proved that the ruling classes1 especially in ,france1 had retained their privileges while abandoning the corresponding duties4 ,if in ,england we escaped so violent a catastrophe1 it was because1 with all their luxuries and levities and shortsightedness1 the aristocratic classes were still playing an active part1 and1 if not governing well1 doing whatever was done in the way of governing4 ,but every class1 and every member of a class1 should always remember that he may be asked whether1 on the whole1 he and his like can give any sufficient reason for his or their existence1 and that he ought to be prepared with a satisfactory answer4 ,when he has to admit that his indulgences are in the main what may be called luxuries in the bad sense1 he may consider that he is receiving notice to quit4 ,this may suggest the last remark that ,i need make4 ,it is impossible1 ,i have said1 to say definitely this is1 and that is not1 a luxury3 and1 in general1 that is not the way in which the question presents itself4 ,we have rather to decide upon our general standard of life1 and to adopt a certain scale of living more or less fixed for us by our social surroundings4 ,we can all do something towards rationalising the habitual modes of expenditure1 and adapting the machinery to such ends as are worthy of intelligent and cultivated beings4 ,so far as inclination is in the direction of vulgarity1 of ostentatious habits1 of multiplying idle ceremonies and cumbrous pomposities1 we can protest by our own conduct1 at least1 in favour of plain living and high thinking4 ,but so far as social life is really adapted to the advancement of intellect1 the humanising and refinement of our sympathies1 it promotes an improvement which cannot but spread beyond the immediate circle4 ,even such pursuits1 it is true1 may incidentally become provocative of an objectionable luxury4 ,a man who is a lover of art1 for example1 occasionally shuts himself out all the more from the average sympathies1 and indulges in pleasures1 less gross but1 perhaps1 even more enervating than some which we should call distinctly sensual4 ,the art1 whether literary or plastic1 which is only appreciable by the connoisseur1 is an art which is luxurious because it is on the way to corruption4 ,nothing is clearer in the vague set of guesses which pass for aesthetic theory1 than this3 that to be healthy and vigorous1 art must spread beyond cliques and studios1 and express the strongest instincts and emotions of the society in which it is developed4 ,this1 ,i think1 is significant of a general principle4 ,luxury is characteristic of a class with narrow outlook1 and devoted to such enjoyments as are1 by their nature1 incapable of communication4 ,whenever the enjoyments are such as have an intrinsic tendency to raise the general standard1 as well as to heighten the pleasure of a few1 they cannot be simply stigmatised as luxurious4 ,the old view of the responsibilities of wealth was chiefly confined to the doctrine that the rich man should give away as many of his superfluities as possible1 to be scrambled for by the poor1 in order to appease the ,fates4 ,we have come to see that charity1 though at present a necessary1 should be regarded as a degrading necessity2 and1 therefore1 not in the long run a possible alternative to luxury4 ,too often it is itself a kind of luxury as mischievous as selfish disregard to the natural consequences of our expenditure4 ,the true direction of our wishes should rather be to direct social energies into such channels as have a natural affinity to public spirit4 ,a man who really loves art because he has a keen sense of beauty1 not because he wishes to have the reputation of a skilful collector1 would surely try to beautify the world in which we all live1 to get rid of the hideous deformities which meet us at every turn1 and not simply to make a little corner into which he may retire for simple self-indulgence4 ,a lover of truth should not be content1 as some philosophers were forced to be content1 with discussion in an esoteric circle1 but should endeavour1 now that thought is free1 to stimulate the intellectual activity of all men1 confident that the greater the number of investigators1 the more rapid will be the advance of truth4 ,i do not venture to suggest what special direction should be taken by those who have the privileges and responsibilities of great wealth4 ,i have never had to consider that problem in any practical reference4 ,still1 considering how vast a part they actually play in social development1 how great is their influence1 and how many people and enterprises seem to be in want of a little money1 ,i cannot help fancying that a rich man may find modes of expenditure other than reckless charity or elaborate pampering of his personal wants1 which would be not only more useful to the world1 but more interesting to himself than many of the ordinary forms of indulgence4 ,but ,i am only speaking of general tendencies1 and have disavowed any capacity for laying down precise regulations4 ,if ,i have stated rightly what is the evil properly attacked when we speak of luxury as vicious1 it will1 ,i think1 come mainly to this3 that the direction in which we should look for improvement is not so much in directly prescribing any ,spartan or ascetic system of life1 as in cultivating in every one who possesses superfluities1 the sense of his implicit responsibility to his fellows1 which should go with every increase of wealth1 and the conviction1 not that he should regard pleasure as in itself bad1 but that he should train himself to find pleasures in such conduct as makes him a more efficient member of the body corporate of ,society4 ,if1 indeed1 there should be any man who feels that he has no right to superfluities at all1 while so many are wanting necessaries1 and should resolve to devote himself to the improvement of their elevation1 ,i should say1 in the first place1 ,i fully and heartily recognise him to be one of the very large class which ,i regard as my superiors in morality2 although1 in the next place1 ,i should insinuate that he is one of those heroes who1 while they deserve all honour1 cannot be taken as models for universal imitation1 inasmuch as ,i cannot help thinking that the ultimate end is not the renunciation but the multiplication of all innocent happiness4 ,,the ,,duties ,,of ,,authors4 ,i propose to speak to you to-day upon a subject which1 though ,i may perhaps be tempted to exaggerate its importance1 possesses some real importance4 ,i have undertaken to speak upon the duties of the class to which ,i belong4 ,i make1 however1 no claims to the position of censor4 ,i have no such claim1 except1 indeed1 the claim of possessing some experience4 ,there are two ways1 ,i may observe1 in which a man may acquire a sense of the importance of any moral law4 ,one is by keeping the law1 and the other is by breaking it4 ,in some ways1 perhaps1 the systematic offender has acquired the most valuable experience4 ,no one can speak more feelingly about the evils of intemperance than the reformed drunkard1 unless it be the drunkard who has not reformed4 ,the sober gentleman who has never exceeded can realise neither the force of the temptation nor the severity of the penalty4 ,on the other hand1 ,i must admit that some writers upon ethical questions have been men of fair moral character4 ,i only make the statement by way of explaining that1 in speaking of the duties of authors1 ,i do not assert1 even by the most indirect implication1 that ,i personally have either observed or disregarded the principles which ,i shall discuss4 ,whether ,i am a model for imitation or an example of the evils to be avoided1 matters nothing to this discourse2 though the question to which of these classes ,i belong has a certain interest for myself4 ,there is one other matter which ,i can deal with very briefly4 ,i have said that the subject has a certain importance4 ,upon that it is needless to dilate2 for1 in the first place1 authors have been engaged for generations1 and never more industriously than in this generation1 in preaching the vast importance of authors to mankind4 ,i could not hope to add anything to their eloquence upon a topic with which they are so familiar4 ,we may1 however1 assume that the enormous mass of literature which is daily produced1 whether its abundance be a matter of regret or exultation1 is at least a proof that a vast number of people read something1 and are1 we may suppose1 more or less affected by what they read4 ,it cannot be indifferent to inquire what are the duties of those who undertake to provide for this ever-growing demand4 ,one matter has been lately discussed which may serve as a starting-point for what ,i have to say4 ,a ,french author who came the other day to observe our manners and customs1 was impressed by the fact that so much of our writing is anonymous4 ,the public1 that is1 reads without knowing who are its instructors1 and the instructors write without incurring any definite personal responsibility4 ,the problem is naturally suggested1 whether such a system be not morally objectionable4 ,ought not a man who undertakes to speak as an authority let us know who he is1 and therefore with what authority he speaks8 ,the question could hardly be answered satisfactorily without some study of the facts2 and especially of the way in which the system has grown up4 ,i can only notice one or two obvious reflections4 ,a century ago we boasted--and we had reason to boast--that the ,english ,press was the freest in ,europe4 ,it was already a very important factor in political life4 ,but at that period the profession of letters was still regarded as more or less disreputable4 ,the great author--the poet1 divine1 or historian--was indeed fully as much respected as he is now2 but to write for money or to write in periodicals was held to be not quite worthy of a gentleman4 ,byron1 for example1 refused to take money for his poetry1 and taunted others for taking money1 until so much money was offered to him that he swallowed his scruples4 ,burns1 though as much in need of money1 had shortly before refused to write for money2 and ,wordsworth held that his high calling imposed upon him the duty of rather repelling than seeking the popularity by which money is to be won4 ,we have changed all this1 and the greatest modern authors are less apt to disavow a desire for pay1 than to complain that their pay is insufficient4 ,the employment--it can hardly be called the profession--of periodical writing1 again--the only kind of writing which could make literature a source of a regular income--was long regarded as a kind of poor relation of the respectable or so-called learned professions1 clerical1 legal1 and medical4 ,jeffrey1 whose fame now rests upon his position as the editor of ,the ,edinburgh ,review1 was for a long time anxious to conceal his employment as not exactly creditable4 ,in the year #ahji the benchers of ,lincoln's ,inn passed a resolution that no one should be called to the ,bar who had written for money in a newspaper4 ,writers in newspapers since that time have frequently risen to the ,bench1 and have been not the least honoured of ,cabinet ,ministers4 ,yet the sentiment which involved a certain stigma has only disappeared in this generation4 ,and the historical cause seems to be obvious4 ,the newspaper ,press had gradually grown up in spite of authority4 ,it had first been persecuted1 and writers had escaped persecution by consenting to be spies or dependants upon great men4 ,half the hack-authors aspired to subsidies from the secret-service money1 and the other half were looking for a reward when their patrons should have a turn in the distribution of good things4 ,the ,press was freer than elsewhere1 for the ,english system of government gave importance to public discussion4 ,both ,ministers and ,opposition wished to influence voters through the papers4 ,but the authors were in the position of dependent auxiliaries1 prosecuted for libel if they went too far1 and recompensed by pensions for the risks they had to run2 they were despised1 even by those who used them1 as a set of mercenary guerillas1 employed to do dirty work and insinuate charges which could not be made by responsible people1 and ready1 as was supposed1 to serve on whichever side would pay them best4 ,according to a well-known anecdote1 two writers of the eighteenth century decided by the toss of a halfpenny which should write for ,walpole and which should write for his adversary ,pulteney2 but the choice was generally decided by less reputable motives4 ,now1 so long as the ,press meant such a class it was of course natural that the trade should be regarded as discreditable1 and should be carried on by men who had less care for their character than for their pockets4 ,in ,england1 where our development has been continuous and traditions linger long1 the sentiment long survived2 and the practice which corresponded to it--the practice1 that is1 of anonymity--has itself survived the sentiment which gave it birth4 ,i do not1 indeed1 mean to insinuate that the practice may not have better reasons than that which led to its first adoption4 ,the mask was formerly worn by men who were ashamed of their employment1 and who had the same reasons for anonymity as a thief or an anarchist may have for a disguise4 ,it may now be worn even by men who are proud of their profession1 because the mask has a different significance4 ,when a journalist calls himself we instead of ,i1 the word really represents a fact3 the fact that he speaks not simply as an individual1 but as the mouthpiece of a corporation1 which itself claims to be the organ of a party4 ,the plural covers whatever additional weight may be due to this representative character4 ,to consider the value of this justification would take me too far4 ,i have spoken of this historical fact because ,i think that it illustrates a more general problem4 ,for1 in the first place1 ,i think that there were some elements in the older sentiment which deserved respect4 ,when an author was as anxious to disavow the charge of writing for money as an author at the present day is to claim his reward1 ,i cannot1 for my part1 simply set him down as silly4 ,my songs1 said ,burns1 are either above price or below price1 and1 therefore1 ,i will accept nothing4 ,i respect his feelings4 ,he may not have been quite logical2 but he was surely right in the belief that the poet whose inspiration should come from his breeches-pocket would never write true songs or embody the very spirit of a nation4 ,i do not doubt that authors ought to be paid2 but ,i certainly agree that a money reward never ought to be the chief aim of their writing4 ,and ,i confess that some utterances about copyrights in these days have jarred upon me1 because they seem to imply that the doctrine is not disavowed so unequivocally as it should be by our leaders4 ,i am1 indeed1 happy to believe1 as ,i fully believe1 that there has never been a time at which more good work has been done for pure love of the work1 independently1 and even in defiance1 of pecuniary considerations4 ,but ,i cannot help thinking that in their desire to establish a right to the profits of their work1 authors have condescended at moments to speak as if that reward constituted their sole motive to work1 instead of being desired--as it may most properly be desired--simply as the means of enabling them to work4 ,the old contempt was aristocratic1 and in these days we have come to use aristocratic as a term of abuse4 ,my own impression is that we ought to be just even to aristocrats2 and in that contempt for all such work1 ,i think that there was a genuine element of self-respect4 ,the noble despised the poor scribe who had to get his living by his pen4 ,we1 my lords1 as ,chesterfield put it1 may thank ,providence that we do not depend upon our brains4 ,it is wrong1 no doubt1 to despise anybody2 and especially mean to despise a man for poverty4 ,but the sentiment also included the belief--surely not so wrong--that the adventurer who joined the ranks of a party for the sake of the pay was so far contemptible1 and likely to join the party which paid best4 ,the misfortune1 no doubt1 was that the political state involved such dependence2 and the desirable solution that every one should become independent4 ,till that solution was more or less reached1 the corresponding sentiment was inevitable1 and not without meaning4 ,well1 the literary class has had its declaration of independence4 ,an author has long ceased to need a patron1 and he is in little danger of the law of libel4 ,the question occurs3 ,what are the qualities by which we should justify our independence8 ,have we not still a certain stoop of the shoulders1 a kind of traditional shamefacedness1 an awkwardness of manner1 and a tendency to blush and stammer1 which shows that we are not quite at ease in our new position8 ,or have we not--it is a more serious question--exchanged dependence upon the great for dependence upon the public1 rather than learnt to stand upon our own feet8 ,have we made ourselves1 and1 if we have not1 how can we make ourselves1 worthy of our position as free men8 ,we boast that the ,press does part of what used to be done by the priesthood1 that we enlighten and encourage and purify public opinion4 ,there is a whole class which depends upon us for intellectual culture2 which reads nothing that is not in newspapers and magazines4 ,do we give them a wholesome training1 provide them with sound knowledge1 and stimulate them to real thought8 ,are we such a priesthood as is really raising the standard of human life2 or such a priesthood as is clinging to power by echoing the superstitions of its congregations8 ,nature is ruled by obeying her2 and what is called ruling public opinion is too often servilely following its dictates4 ,there is an old story which tells how a certain newspaper used to send out an emissary to discover what was the common remark that every one was making in omnibuses and club smoking-rooms1 and to fashion it into next morning's article for the instruction of mankind4 ,the echo affected to set the tune which it really repeated4 ,now1 there is nothing more flattering than an echo4 ,this must be an inspired teacher1 for he says exactly what ,i thought myself1 is a very common and effective argument4 ,to reproduce the opinions of the average reader2 to dress them so skilfully that he will be pleased to see what keen intelligence is implied in holding such opinions2 to say just what everybody wishes to have said a little more neatly than everybody could say it1 or1 at the outside1 to say to-day what every one will be saying to-morrow1 is one path to success in journalism4 ,there is1 ,i am afraid1 much so-called education which tends to nothing better than a development of this art4 ,i was consulted the other day by a young gentleman who was proposing to put himself under a professor of journalism4 ,so far as ,i could gather from his account1 the professor did not suggest that the pupil should study any branch of serious knowledge3 that he should become1 for example1 a good political economist1 or read ancient or modern history1 or make himself familiar with continental affairs or bimetallism1 or other thorny and complex subjects4 ,the aim was precisely to enable him to dispense with all study1 and to spin words out of absolute mental vacuity4 ,if such an art can really be acquired1 it is scarcely an art to be recommended to ingenuous youth4 ,and yet1 as ,i understand1 it is an art which is more or less countenanced even at our universities4 ,a distinguished classman learns much1 but the last thing he learns is the depth of his own ignorance4 ,he is too often practised in the power of beating out his gold or his tinsel to cover the largest possible surface2 he becomes an adept in adopting the very last new fashion of thought2 he can pronounce dogmatically upon all previous thinkers after reading not their own works1 but the summary given in the last text-book4 ,success in the art of passing examinations requires the same qualities which enable a man to write off-hand a brilliant leading article upon any side of any subject4 ,i have often heard remarks upon the modern diffusion of literary skill4 ,ten people1 it is said1 can write well now for one who could write well fifty years ago4 ,no doubt the demand for facile writing has enormously increased the supply4 ,but ,i do not think that first-rate writing--the writing which speaks of a full mind and strong convictions1 which is clear because it is thorough1 not because it is shallow--has increased in the same proportion1 if1 indeed1 we can be sure that it has increased at all4 ,perhaps there are ten times as many people who can put other men's thoughts into fluent phrases2 but are there ten times as many1 are there even as many1 who think for themselves and speak at first hand8 ,the practice of anonymous writing affords1 of course1 obvious conveniences to a superficial omniscience4 ,the young gentleman who dogmatises so early might blush if he had to sign his name to his audacious utterances4 ,his tone of infallibility would be absurd if we knew who was the pope that was promulgating dogmas4 ,the man in a mask professes to detect at a glance the absurd sophistries which impose upon the keenest contemporary intellects2 but if he doffed the mask and appeared as young ,mr4 ,smith1 or ,jones1 who took his degree last year1 we might doubt whether he had a right to assume so calmly that the sophistry is all on the other side4 ,i am1 however1 quite aware that this is only one side of the question of anonymity4 ,were the practice abolished1 the journalist who was forced to appear in his own character might abandon not his superficiality1 but whatever power of blushing he retains4 ,the more fluent phrase-monger might take himself even more seriously than he now does1 and might persuade other people to take him seriously too4 ,the charlatan1 in short1 might have a better chance1 and use his notoriety as a stepping-stone to more mischievous ambition4 ,i refrain from discussing this question3 the rather because it is obvious that such changes must work themselves out gradually1 and that we may assume1 for the present1 that the position will not be materially changed4 ,i am1 therefore1 content to infer that the journalist should at least bear in mind one obvious criterion4 ,he should never say anything anonymously to which he would be ashamed to sign his name4 ,i do not mean merely that he should not be libellous or spiteful--,i hope and believe that the underhand assassin of reputations1 who at one period was common enough1 has almost ceased to exist1--but rather that he should refrain from that pompous assumption of omniscience which would he ludicrous in a simple individual4 ,he should say nothing when he speaks in the plural which would make him look silly if he used the first person singular4 ,now1 this modest requirement involves1 ,i think1 a good deal4 ,i will try to say what it involves by an example1 of which ,i frequently think4 ,i remember a young gentleman1 who1 in my hearing1 confessed1 in answer to a question from ,carlyle1 that he did a certain amount of journalistic work4 ,the great man thereupon said1 with his usual candour1 and1 ,i must add1 without any personal discourtesy1 that1 in his opinion1 the journalism of the period was just so much ditch-water4 ,what should be a well of ,english undefiled poured forth streams little better than a public sewer4 ,the phrase1 like some other prophetic utterances1 sounded a trifle harsh1 but was all the more calculated to set me thinking4 ,my thinking naturally led me to reflect upon ,carlyle's own example4 ,i was invited some time afterwards to sign a little testimonial presented to him upon his eightieth birthday1 in imitation of the gift which he had himself forwarded to ,goethe4 ,in this it was said1 and said1 ,i think1 most truly1 that ,carlyle was himself an example of the heroic life in literature4 ,and why8 ,a good many epigrams have been levelled at ,carlyle1 and he has more than once been ridiculed as the philosopher who preached the virtues of silence in thirty volumes4 ,now1 ,carlyle's utterances about silence may not have been unimpeachable2 but ,i think that1 stated in a commonplace way1 they substantially come to this3 that idle talk1 a mere spinning of phrases1 is a very demoralising habit1 and one great mischief of the present day2 but that the serious and careful utterance of real thought and genuine knowledge must be considered rather as a mode of action than of talk1 and deserves the cordial welcome of all men4 ,a ,goethe affects action as much as a ,napoleon4 ,carlyle did not really mean to draw the line between an active and a literary life2 for he knew as well as any man that literature may at once require the most strenuous activity1 and be the source of life and vigour in active men2 but between frivolity and earnestness1 between the mere waste and dissipation of energy and its concentration upon some worthy purpose4 ,judged by such a standard1 ,carlyle's words were also deeds4 ,he wrote a good deal1 for he lived a long time1 and had for many years to live by his pen4 ,i could1 ,i think1 mention several professional authors who habitually provide as much copy in a month as ,carlyle ever achieved in a year4 ,but1 luckily for them1 their works are not collected4 ,carlyle appears to be voluminous because he never wrote anything which was not worth preservation1 and that because he never wrote an essay without making it as good as his abilities permitted4 ,he did so1 although he was till middle life hard pressed for money1 and helping to support his family out of his narrow earnings4 ,he stuck indomitably to his own ideal of what was best1 though he had slowly to form a public which could appreciate him4 ,and through long years of struggle and hardship he never condescended to make easy gains at the price of inferior workmanship1 or to lower his standard of excellence in order to meet the immediate demands of editors4 ,in that sense1 if in no other1 ,i call ,carlyle a worthy hero of literature1 and ,i reverence his example a great deal more1 ,i fear1 than ,i have imitated it4 ,perhaps1 indeed1 a man must have an unusually1 even unreasonably1 strong conviction of the truth and importance of his mission before he can make such sacrifices in order to discharge it worthily4 ,to most of us the question occurs whether it can possibly be worth while to do so4 ,perhaps1 if ,i devoted myself exclusively to delivering my message to mankind as forcibly as ,i could1 and to making all necessary preparations1 it might be rather more effective than the second-hand twaddle which ,i actually produce4 ,but would the game be worth the candle8 ,i have1 it may be1 a family to support4 ,should ,i not1 as an honest man1 think first of my butcher and my baker and of paying the collector of rates1 before ,i undertake to become an immortal author8 ,probably1 at the best1 my immortality would be a very short one1 for there is not one author in a thousand who can make his voice audible at the distance of a generation4 ,is it not better and wiser to earn an honest living by innocent small talk1 than to aim at a great success and let my children go barefoot and lose their schooling8 ,that low man1 says ,browning's ,grammarian-- ,that low man goes on adding one to one1 ,his hundred's soon hit3 ,this high man1 aiming at a million1 ,misses an unit4 ,is it not better to hit your hundred than to aim at your million and miss it8 ,that is a problem which ,i do not think it possible to answer by a general rule4 ,we rightly honour the ,carlyle or the ,wordsworth who has forced the public to admire him in spite of critical gibes and long obscurity2 but we must not forget that even success does not necessarily justify the audacity which has won it1 and that a good many people who fancied themselves to be capable of enlightening the world have been empty-headed impostors who would have done better to take the critic's advice3 drop their pens and mind their gallipots4 ,devotion to an ideal1 like other high qualities1 may be misplaced or counterfeited by mere personal vanity4 ,but leaving each man to decide by the concrete circumstances of his own case1 ,i still hold that at least we should try in this respect to act in ,carlyle's spirit4 ,i cannot blame the author who1 under certain conditions1 feels that his first duty is to pay his weekly bills1 so long1 of course1 as he does not earn the money by pandering to the bad passions of his readers2 for there are modes of making a livelihood by the pen to which starvation or the workhouse would be preferred by any high-minded man4 ,but we will not judge harshly of the author who lives by supplying innocent1 if rather insipid1 food for public amusement4 ,he might be capable of better things2 but1 then1 he might certainly be doing much worse4 ,yet in any case1 ,i say that1 to have a tolerably comfortable conscience1 an author should try to look a little farther than this4 ,the great mass of mankind has to devote most of its energies to employments which require nothing more than honest work2 and yet even the humblest can do something to maintain and elevate the moral standard of his surroundings4 ,the author1 so far as he is simply a journeyman1 a reporter of ordinary events and speeches1 for example1 does his duty so far as he reports them honestly2 and we have no more to say to him4 ,but the author who takes part in political and social or religious discussions has a responsibility which involves something more4 ,probably he feels--,i am sure enough that ,i feel--that his performance makes remarkably little difference to mankind in general2 and that he is playing only an infinitesimal part in the great processes by which the huge world blunders along1 struggling into some approximation to a more tolerable order4 ,he may compare himself to one of the myriads of insects building up one square yard on the coral reef which stretches for hundreds of leagues4 ,yet even the coral reef depends on the units1 and if the insect's powers are small it concerns him to make the best of them4 ,now1 to make the best of them implies some genuine interest in his work2 something that makes the reader perceive that he is being addressed by a human being1 not a mere machine for vamping up old materials4 ,i have been struck in reading newspaper articles1 even my own1 by the curious loss of individuality which a man seems to suffer as a writer4 ,unconsciously the author takes the colour of his organ2 he adopts not only its sentiment but its style1 and seems to become a mere transmitter of messages1 with whose substance he has no more to do than the wires of the electric telegraph which carries them4 ,but now and then we suddenly come across something fresh and original2 we know by instinct that we are being addressed by another man1 and are in a living relation to a separate human being1 not to a mere drilled characterless unit of a disciplined army2 we find actually thoughts1 convictions1 arguments1 which1 though all arguments are old1 have evidently struck the writer's mind1 and not merely been transmitted into his pen2 and then we may know that we are in the presence of a real force1 and meeting with a man who is doing his duty4 ,i refrain from mentioning1 though ,i easily could mention1 living modern instances4 ,but on looking to the history of the past1 it is curious to notice how rare the phenomenon is1 and how important it is when it occurs4 ,think for a moment1 for example1 of old ,cobbett1 agricultural labourer and soldier1 with nothing to help him but his shrewd mother-wit and his burly ,english strength4 ,he wrote much that was poor and clumsy enough2 much1 too1 that was pure claptrap1 and much that was dictated by personal motives and desire for notoriety4 ,but in spite of this the untaught peasant became one of the great political forces1 more effective than the ninety and nine elegant ,edinburgh and ,quarterly reviewers1 who had all the advantages which he lacked4 ,why8 ,partly1 no doubt1 because he was a really strong man2 but also because he had at least one genuine and deeply-rooted conviction1 springing out of his profound desire for the welfare of the class which was both the largest and the most helpless of the ,england of his day4 ,he is1 therefore1 one example1 and there are many others1 of the singular power which is exercised in journalism by a man1 under whatever disadvantages1 who possesses1 or rather who is possessed by1 some master-thought1 and utters it in season and out of season with perhaps disproportionate intensity1 but with perfect sincerity4 ,now1 though ,cobbett would be in some respects a bad model1 ,i only refer to him in this sense4 ,when my young friends consult me as to the conditions of successful journalism1 my first bit of advice comes to this3 know something really2 at any rate1 try to know something2 be the slaves of some genuine idea1 or you will be the slaves of a newspaper--a bit of mechanism instead of a man4 ,you can carry on the business with self-respect--whatever your success--if it is also something more than a business2 if1 for example1 you can honestly feel that you are helping on the propaganda of sound principle1 denouncing real grievances1 and speaking from genuine belief4 ,no man has a right to lay down the law to statesmen as though he were in possession of absolute knowledge1 or as though he were a man of science talking to a class of ignorant schoolboys4 ,but every man ought to believe that truth is attainable1 and to endeavour with all his power to attain it4 ,he should study the great problems of the day historically3 for he must know how they have arisen2 what previous attempts have been made to solve them2 how far recent suggestions are mere reproductions of exploded fallacies2 and so qualify himself to see things in their true relations as facts of a great process of evolution4 ,he should endeavour to be philosophical in spirit1 so far1 at least1 as to seek to base his opinions upon general principles1 and to look at the events of the day from a higher point of view than that of personal or party expediency4 ,and he must1 though upon this it is hardly necessary to insist1 be familiar with the affairs of the day3 for no one can apply principles to politics effectively without a genuine first-hand knowledge of the actual currents of political life4 ,unless a man can take up his calling in some such spirit1 he can be but a mere retailer of popular commonplaces1 and must live from hand to mouth or upon the chance utterances of people as thoughtless as himself1 increasing the volume of mere noise which threatens to drown sense4 ,but if he seriously cultivates his powers1 and enriches his mind1 he may feel sure that even in journalism he may be discharging one of the most important functions which a man can undertake4 ,he may be right or wrong in the particular doctrines which he supports4 ,indeed1 the first and most obvious result of any attempt to take wider views of politics is the admission that wisdom 7and as certainly1 nonsense7 is not the exclusive possession of any party in politics1 literature1 or philosophy4 ,but something is done whenever a man of trained intellect and genuine conviction lifts popular discussion to a higher plane4 ,at such times it rises above the region of personal invective or pure platitude1 and involves a conscious reference to great principles and to the remote conditions of the little bit of history which we are actually transacting4 ,when ,john ,stuart ,mill became a member of the ,house of ,commons1 and was accepted as a philosopher coming among practical men1 he said much that displeased his hearers2 but it was observed by competent judges at the time1 that the tone of parliamentary debates was perceptibly raised4 ,members of ,parliament were forced to reflect for the moment1 not only how their speeches would tell in next day's reports1 and what traps they were setting for opponents1 but also for a brief instant1 how their arguments would stand the test of impartial logic4 ,mill tells a significant story in his autobiography1 which1 perhaps1 indicates one source of his influence4 ,when he appeared upon the hustings he was asked whether he had not said that the ,english working-classes were generally liars4 ,he replied simply1 ,i did1 and the reply was1 he says1 received with vehement applause4 ,the incident1 he adds1 convinced him that the working-classes valued nothing more than thorough straightforwardness1 and honoured a man for daring to tell them of their faults4 ,i hope that it is so3 ,i believe1 in point of fact1 that no quality is more heartily honoured than unflinching political honesty4 ,and ,i confess that ,i have often wondered why it is that where the reward is so clear1 so few people take the plain road which leads to it4 ,it seems equally clear that moral courage pays better than any other quality in politics1 and that it is the rarest of all qualities even to be simulated4 ,we are all anxious to show how profound is our affection for the masses2 but how many candidates for their favour dare to give ,mr4 ,mill's proof of genuine respect8 ,no doubt you must make it clear that you possess some other qualities before you can hope to conciliate the respect of a class by accusing it openly of habitual lying4 ,indeed1 this might be taken as a test of genuine independence4 ,till you can tell men of their faults without being suspected of spite or bad temper--till you can praise them without being suspected of unworthy flattery--you are not really in a position worthy to be called independent4 ,how many journalists--,i say nothing of statesmen--stand firmly enough on their own legs to speak out without giving offence8 ,we are often told of a great revolution of opinion1 and especially of the abandonment of the old prejudice against government interference4 ,that a great change has taken place in the opinions which men profess is undeniable2 though how far that change has been due to unbiassed scientific reflection1 and how far to a change in the conditions of popularity1 is a very different question4 ,i see1 for example1 a statement by an honourable gentleman that he approves of the ,eight ,hours ,bill because the principle of non-interference with adult labour is obsolete4 ,it is too late to avow it4 ,if the honourable gentleman means to say that experience has proved the principle to be erroneous1 he is1 of course1 justified in abandoning it4 ,but1 if his meaning be simply that the principle has gone out of fashion1 what is this but to admit that you will abandon any doctrine as soon as it ceases to be popular8 ,do we really mean to assert that a fallacious doctrine can never get the upper hand2 that the beliefs of to-day are always better than the beliefs of yesterday2 that every man who has dared to stick to an opinion condemned by a majority must necessarily be a fool for his pains8 ,that really seems to be a common opinion4 ,we hear a great deal at the present day about mandates1 and a mandate seems to be regarded not simply as a declaration of the will of a majority which must1 in point of fact1 be obeyed1 but as the official utterance of an infallible church which cannot in point of logic be erroneous4 ,now1 ,i confess that ,i have always had a weakness for the faithful ,abdiel4 ,i believe that a man is often doing invaluable services who resists the dominant current of opinion1 who denounces fallacies when they are growing and flourishing1 and points out that a revolution in belief1 even though it be inevitable for the time1 and even though it contain an element of right reason1 may yet contain errors and hasty judgments and deviations from the true line of progress1 which require exposure the more unsparing in proportion to their temporary popularity4 ,is not the ordinary journalist's frame of mind singularly unfavourable to his discharge of this function8 and is it not inevitable that it should be so as long as the journalist's only aim is to gain a hearing somehow8 ,it matters not which side he takes4 ,he denounces some new doctrine1 but only in the name of the current prejudices which it happens to shock4 ,he advocates it1 but only because it is the last new fashion of the day4 ,in either case he falls into the ordinary party vice of imagining that his opponents must be fools or knaves1 that their opinions are directly inspired by the devil or a judicial blindness inflicted by ,providence1 simply because he will not take the trouble to understand them4 ,the man who would try to raise himself above the position of the mere pander to passing antipathies must widen his intellectual horizon4 ,he must qualify himself to take broad views2 he must learn that his little list of commonplaces does not represent real thought1 but is often the embodiment of mere prejudice1 or perhaps the deposit of words left by thinkers of past generations2 he must learn to do more than merely dish them up with a new sauce2 he must concentrate his abilities upon definite problems1 consider how they have arisen1 and what is their relation to the past and the future4 ,to do so requires some disinterestedness3 some love of truth for its own sake2 and a capacity for answering your opponent by explaining him1 instead of a mere quickness for taunting him personally4 ,it requires1 no doubt1 serious and prolonged application4 ,even such a training will not enable a man to unlock all the puzzles of the day2 but it may help towards the desirable consummation in which a solution is at least sought in connection with established principles1 and with a constant reference to the organised experience which also can be a safe guide to more reasonable conclusions4 ,even the attempt to do so may strengthen a man against the temptation to take short cuts to notoriety1 and seek a momentary sensation at the sacrifice of permanent effect4 ,we owe gratitude to all who have acted upon such principles and won the influence which comes at last1 though it comes slowly1 to honest work1 bestowed even upon such shifting materials as political and moral philosophy4 ,i have dwelt so far chiefly upon political journalism1 because it is so characteristic a part of modern literature1 and illustrates so clearly some obvious tendencies of the time4 ,i must say something1 however1 of another department of literature1 which is sometimes said to have nothing at all to do with morality4 ,the poet or the novelist1 it is suggested1 has no duties except that duty which ,scheherazade discharged at the risk of her neck1--the duty of keeping her master amused4 ,if1 instead of telling him stories about genii1 she had read him every morning an orthodox sermon or an ethical discourse1 the one thousand and one nights would have been diminished by one thousand4 ,am ,i to tell our modern ,scheherazades to forget the ,arabian ,nights1 and adopt for our use passages from the homilies of ,tillotson8 ,some religious persons have taken that horn of the dilemma1 and perhaps with some plausibility4 ,when the world is heaving with the throes of a social earthquake1 what right have you or ,i to be lounging on sofas1 telling silly stories about young ladies' and gentlemen's billings and cooings8 ,perhaps the condemnation should be extended to recreations less obviously frivolous4 ,your philosopher who tries to distinguish or to identify is and is not1 and to draw the true line between object and subject1 has a very fascinating plaything1 but is perhaps as far from influencing the world4 ,judging from the history of past philosophical cobwebs1 he might as well be framing conundrums1 or learning how to throw grain through the eye of a needle4 ,i only refer to this to say that ,i am not in favour of suppressing either art or philosophy4 ,i have a kind of hankering after them in some forms myself4 ,i assume1 without further argument1 that ,shakespeare1 and ,milton1 and ,wordsworth1 and ,fielding1 and ,scott1 and ,dickens1 did well in devoting themselves to literature1 and probably did more to make the world happier and better than if they had composed sermons or systems of philosophy4 ,i must1 as ,i said1 refrain from pronouncing any set eulogy upon the services rendered by authors4 ,this only ,i take for granted4 ,no one1 ,i think1 of any intellectual capacity can remember the early days when his faculties were ripening1 when he wandered1 for the pure delight of wandering1 in the enchanted world of the great imaginative writers1 saw through their eyes1 and unconsciously caught the contagion of their sympathies1 without feeling a deep gratitude to the men who not only gave him so much innocent pleasure1 but who incidentally refined his taste and roused his enthusiasm1 and quickened his perception of whatever is beautiful1 or heroic1 or pathetic1 in the moral or the natural world4 ,the highest literature embodies the instincts by which a cultivated people differs from the barbarous1 and the classes are in a true sense civilised1 which enjoy and appreciate the ennobling as distinguished from the coarser pleasures1 and rise above the merely brutal life4 ,one who aspires to be a leader1 or to follow the steps of the leaders1 in this band of crusaders against barbarism1 must surely have some corresponding duties4 ,i am here upon the edge of certain troublesome controversies which ,i shall refrain from discussing at length4 ,this only ,i need say4 ,some great authors explicitly accept the function of preaching4 ,milton1 and1 in later days1 ,wordsworth1 identified the offices of the prophet and the poet1 and set themselves deliberately to expound an ideal of life1 and justify the ways of ,god to man4 ,and ,milton gave the principle in his famous saying1 that he who would write well hereafter of laudable things must be himself a true poem4 ,yet men equally great have impressed readers by their apparent indifference to such considerations4 ,they accept the new commandment which1 as ,emerson tells us1 the ,muse gave to her darling son1 ,thou shalt not preach4 ,shakespeare and ,scott did not consciously and deliberately write to set forth any ideal2 they even wrote1 more or less1 to make money2 they were magnificent opulent geniuses1 who poured out their imaginative wealth liberally and spontaneously1 without a thought of any particular moral1 simply because their minds were full to overflowing of great thoughts and vivid images1 which they diffused as liberally as the rose gives its scent4 ,are we to say that they were wrong or morally inferior1 even if artistically superior1 to those who wrote1 like ,milton or ,dante1 with a more definite aim8 ,must ,i condemn ,scott because he did not write1 like the excellent ,miss ,edgeworth1 or even like ,dickens in some of his stories1 to preach consciously that honesty is the best policy1 or that selfishness is a vice2 and1 if so1 must ,i not condemn a man from whom ,i have not only received an incalculable amount of innocent enjoyment1 but imbibed--it is my own fault if ,i have not imbibed--many thoughts that have strengthened and stimulated the best elements of my nature8 ,if ,i insist upon the moral influences1 am ,i not confounding the poet and the preacher1 and falling under the lash of ,i know not how many critical connoisseurs8 ,if ,i renounce the preachers1 ,i am renouncing some of the greatest artists1 and indirectly sanctioning even such art as is worthy only of ,holywell ,street1 and panders to the worst passions4 ,i will say what ,i think4 ,great writers1 it seems to me1 may be great in two ways2 and the greatest is he who combines them most thoroughly4 ,the first-rate writer1 in the first place1 must--to use a frequently misapplied word--be a thorough realist4 ,he is great in proportion to the width and depth of the truths which he grasps1 and to which he gives the most perfect expression4 ,when we read ,shakespeare at his best1 what strikes us is that he has expressed once for all some home-truth about human nature and the world1 round which all inferior writers seem to have been blundering without ever achieving a complete utterance4 ,more generally1 every great period of our literature has been marked in one shape or other by a fresh realism1 or what is called the desire to return to ,nature3 to get rid of the phrases which have become conventional and unreal1 and express the real living ultimate truth4 ,shakespeare and the great men of his time were inspired by such a passion2 they were animated by the desire to hold the mirror up to ,nature and to portray real vivid human passion1 for they had burst through the old mediaeval chains of theological dogma1 and were aroused to a sudden fresh perception of the beauties which had been unrecognised and misconceived by ascetic monks4 ,the men of ,pope's time1 again1 believed in what they1 too1 called the religion of ,nature1 and tried to hasten the day when enlightened reason should finally crush what ,berkeley called the pedantry of courts and schools4 ,wordsworth and his followers inaugurated a new era by proposing a return to ,nature1 because the language1 which with ,pope expressed a real meaning1 had again become the conventional language of a narrow class of critics and the town4 ,it is in all ages one great function of the imaginative writers to get rid of mere survivals2 to forego the spectacles used by their ancestors as helps1 which have now become encumbrances2 to destroy the formulas employed only to save the trouble of thinking1 and make us see facts directly1 instead of being befooled by words4 ,in that sense it is their great service that they break up the old frost of dreary commonplace1 and give life and power1 in place of an acceptance of mere ossified or fossilised remnants of what once was thought4 ,briefly1 they teach us to see what is before us4 ,so far the function of the poet resembles that of the scientific and philosophic observer4 ,he differs radically in method1 because he proceeds by intuition instead of analysis2 shows us the type1 instead of cataloguing the attributes of a class2 and gives us a real living man--a ,falstaff or a ,hamlet--instead of propounding a psychological theory as to the relations of the will1 the intellect1 and the emotions4 ,i take it1 therefore1 that realism in this sense is one essential characteristic of great imaginative power4 ,i hold it to be more than ever necessary2 more necessary because scientific methods of thought are more developed4 ,it is less possible for a serious writer to make use of the merely fanciful symbols which were perfectly legitimate as long as they represented real beliefs1 but are now fitter for only the lighter moods4 ,the greatest writers have to dispense with fairies and fighting gods and goddesses1 and the muses1 and to show us a direct portraiture of the forces by which society is actually moved4 ,but the functions of the great writer1 though they involve a perception of truth1 are not adequately defined by the simple condition of truthfulness4 ,he has to be--may ,i say it8--a preacher2 he cannot help it2 and1 so far as he cannot help it1 his preaching will be elevating in proportion as it is truthful4 ,he does not preach in the sense in which a moralist preaches1 by arguing in favour of this or that doctrine1 or expounding the consequences of opinions4 ,it is not his business to prove1 but to see1 and to make you see4 ,but1 in another sense1 he cannot help preaching1 because his power over you is founded upon sympathy1 upon his personal charms1 upon the clearness with which he sees and the vividness with which he portrays the real nature of the instincts which make men lovable or hateful4 ,what are really the most fascinating books in the language8 ,i was impressed the other day by discovering that perhaps the most popular of all ,english books1 judging by the number of editions1 is ,goldsmith's ,vicar of ,wakefield4 ,to what does it owe its popularity8 ,obviously to the exquisite keenness of ,goldsmith's perception of the moral beauty of a simple character1 which is always saved from the charge of being unctuous or sentimental by the constant play of gentle and yet penetrative humour4 ,do we not love ,charles ,lamb for a similar reason8 ,why1 again1 do we love ,scott1 as all men ought to love him8 ,is it not because his ,jeanie ,deans and his ,dandie ,dinmont1 and a hundred more characters1 show the geniality1 the manliness as well as the shrewd common-sense of their creator1 and his vivid perception of the elements which ennoble the national character which he loved so well8 ,why does the ,british public love ,dickens so well8 ,for his incomparable fun1 no doubt2 but also because the fun is always associated with a keen perception of certain moral qualities which they regard with1 it may be1 excessive admiration4 ,but to give no more examples1 ,i am content to say that the enduring power of every great writer depends not merely on his intellectual forces1 but upon the charm of his character--the clear recognition of what it really is that makes life beautiful and desirable1 and of what are the baser elements that fight against the elevating forces4 ,we are under intellectual obligations to the man of science who will tell us1 for example1 how mountain chains have been raised and carved into their present shape4 ,but we are grateful to the great poets and prose writers1 to ,wordsworth and ,mr4 ,ruskin1 for interpreting and stimulating the emotions which make the vision of the great peaks a source of pure delight4 ,we may1 in the same way1 thank the psychologist who can make more intelligible the principle of association of ideas1 or trace the development of the moral sense or the social affections4 ,but we love the man who1 like ,goldsmith1 and ,lamb1 and ,scott1 and ,wordsworth1 has revealed to us by actual portraits of typical characters1 the sweetness and tenderness and truthfulness which may be embodied in humble characters4 ,love1 says ,wordsworth1 of his shepherd lord-- ,love had he found in huts where poor men lie1 ,his daily teachers had been woods and rills2 ,the silence that is in the starry sky1 ,the sleep that is among the comely hills4 ,the power of discovering and of making us discover such thoughts in the huts of poor men and in natural scenery is the true prerogative of the poet1 and it is to that power that he owes his enduring place in our hearts4 ,i have said this much because ,i think that it is in a perversion of these principles that we shall find some of the temptations to which the author is in these days most liable4 ,i can only glance at them briefly4 ,one perversion1 for example1 is indicated by the common use of the phrase realism4 ,this word has various meanings2 but the commonest1 perhaps1 would not be misrepresented by saying that it involves a confusion between the functions of the man of science and the poet4 ,in a scientific sense1 it is a sufficient reason for setting forth any theory that you believe it to be true4 ,the facts which you describe may be hideous and revolting3 it is not the less desirable that they should be accurately known4 ,the poet and novelist may be equally justified in taking hideous and revolting facts into account4 ,that1 for example1 is the duty of a satirist2 and ,i am not at all concerned to say that satire is illegitimate--,i think it perfectly legitimate4 ,i should be the last to assert that a writer should confine himself to such facts as can be discussed with decency in presence of a young ladies' school4 ,on the contrary1 ,i think that1 if not the most enviable privilege1 it is sometimes a duty of the novelist to set forth vice and crime1 and even1 it may be1 to set them forth in impressive and startling shapes4 ,it is his duty to represent them truly and to make them intelligible2 to show how they may be natural1 and not to misrepresent even a villain4 ,all ,i say is1 that he should also recognise the fact that they are hideous and revolting4 ,and1 therefore1 this is no excuse for the man who really dwells upon such facts1 not because they are facts1 but because he knows that such descriptions are the easiest way of attracting morbid tastes2 and that he can get a readier market by being irreverent and indecent than by other expedients4 ,to defend such work on the excuse of realism is simply to indulge in a bit of contemptible humbug1 too transparent to need exposure4 ,the purpose of an artist1 you say1 is to give pleasure1 not to preach4 ,that is perfectly true2 but to give pleasure to whom8 ,if it is to give pleasure to the prurient1 to the cynical1 to the debauchee1 to give the kind of pleasure which1 to a pure-minded man1 is pain1 and of which even the blackguard is ashamed1 then ,i will not quarrel over words1 and ask whether it can be truly artistic1 but ,i will simply reply that ,i should have a greater respect for a man who lived by picking pockets4 ,but1 you reply1 it requires a great deal of skill4 ,so does picking pockets1 and so do some other kinds of human energy which ,i need not particularise4 ,if the ethical judgment be really irrelevant aesthetically1 the aesthetic judgment must be irrelevant ethically4 ,if that doctrine be true1 we are1 therefore1 quite at liberty to say that a thing may be beautiful and at the same time blackguardly and beastly4 ,i will1 however1 express my own conviction1 that what is disgusting to a right-minded man cannot be really beautiful1 and that the sentiments which it offends cannot be put out of court simply because they are called moral4 ,they have as good a right to be considered as any others4 ,there is a temptation of the opposite kind3 the temptation to what ,i may briefly call sentimentalism4 ,the virtue of idealism is as necessary as the virtue of realism2 and every great writer shows his greatness by combining the two4 ,the contradictory of the real is not properly the ideal1 but the unreal--which is a very different thing4 ,for idealism means properly1 as ,i take it1 that quality in virtue of which a poem or a fiction does not represent merely the scientific or photographic reproduction of matters of fact1 but incarnates an idea and expresses a sentiment4 ,a great work imparts to us the impression made upon a mind of unusual power1 reflectiveness1 and emotional sensibility by some aspect of the world in which we all live1 but which he can see more vividly than others4 ,to be really impressive1 therefore1 it must correspond to facts and be the genuine product of experience4 ,the erroneous idealism is that which perverts the truth in order to gain apparent emphasis2 which deals in the impossible1 the absurd1 and the exaggerated2 and supposes a world which cannot even be better than the actual1 because it cannot exist2 which1 therefore1 has the defect of being arbitrary and inconceivable4 ,so political ,utopias are interesting in proportion as they suggest a legitimate construction1 based upon actual facts and observed laws of human nature4 ,as soon as we see that they presuppose a world of monstrosities1 of impossible combinations of incompatible qualities1 they become mere playthings4 ,and the same is true of every work of imagination2 as soon as it ceases to have a foundation in truth--to be other than realistic--it loses its real hold upon our sympathies4 ,you solve no problem when you call in a god to cut the knot4 ,this is the tendency of the sentimentalist1 who refuses to be bound by the actual conditions4 ,his creations are ephemeral because only plausible1 even to the imagination1 so long as the illusions to which they are congenial survive4 ,and he probably falls into the further error that the emotion which he utters becomes as factitious as the laws which he invents4 ,the man who weeps because he is melted at the sight of misery1 touches us2 but when he weeps because he finds it pleasant1 or because he wishes to make a public exhibition of his tenderness of heart1 we find him out by degrees and call him a humbug and a sentimentalist4 ,sham feelings and moral facts are the staple of the sentimentalist and the cause of his inevitable decay4 ,these remarks may serve to suggest the temptations which most beset the author in our days1 though peculiar to our day only in the degree in which authorship has become more professional4 ,for the ideal author is the man who1 having discovered truth1 desires to reveal it to his fellows1 or1 being full of perceptions of beauty1 cannot resist the impulse to embody them in words or outward symbols4 ,but when he desires also to live by his powers1 he is at once in a position of which all authors know the peril4 ,he becomes self-conscious2 for he has a perpetual poultice of public favour or enmity applied to soften his fibres1 and to make him feel1 even in his study1 that an eye is upon him and that he must so act as always to preserve attention4 ,he is tempted to produce sensation at any cost--to shock and startle by horrors if he cannot move the sympathies by gentle arts3 for a man who cannot command the pathetic1 can1 at least1 always be disgusting4 ,he can turn our stomachs if he cannot move our hearts4 ,he is tempted1 at least1 to caricature--to show how keen is his perception by crude and glaring colours1 and to indulge in the grotesque as an easy substitute for the really graphic2 he can affect a facile cynicism to show how profound is his penetration1 and display that marvellous knowledge of the world and the human heart1 and that power of discovering the emptiness of all apparent virtues which is so common an endowment of young gentlemen upon their first initiation into real experience of life4 ,there is nothing which the author affects so easily at his first start as the world weariness which comes from long experience and years of disappointed hope4 ,and when a man has once gained applause for his sentiment1 he finds himself his own covert rival1 and is forced to substitute for the first sprightly runnings a fanciful pumping up of the last dregs of his old feelings4 ,nothing1 unfortunately1 is more common1 or could be more easily illustrated by examples of good writers1 than the spectacle of the veteran trying to reproduce in cold blood the effects which he struck out spontaneously and unconsciously in youth4 ,and1 then1 at every instant the poor author feels that he must keep up with the fashion2 he lives in fear of that verdict which will come some day1 that he is an old fogey1 and that he is transgressing those eternal principles which were discovered by some ingenuous youth a fortnight ago4 ,some such danger is1 indeed1 shared by others than the author4 ,it is the misfortune of his calling that success with him is intrinsically associated with notoriety4 ,a man may do good work in many departments of life1 of which no one will ever hear beyond a narrow circle4 ,i hold1 for my part1 that the greatest part of the good work which is done in the world is actually of that kind1 and that the best is done for the pure love of work4 ,the world knows nothing of its greatest men1 and as little1 perhaps1 of its best4 ,but what would be the good of writing even a ,hamlet or a ,divine ,comedy if nobody was to read it8 ,some great writers1 ,i know1 have prided themselves on finding fit audience and few2 and ,i fully agree that a man who could really influence a few seminal minds might be well content with such a result of his labours4 ,but1 after all1 the genuine aim of a great author must be1 directly or indirectly1 to affect the world in which he lives1 whether by changing its beliefs or stimulating its emotions4 ,and1 as a rule1 he cannot do so without becoming known1 and even known to vast numbers of readers4 ,some religious writers1 the author1 for example1 of the ,imitation of ,christ1 have influenced many generations1 while absolutely concealing their identity4 ,even they must1 at least1 have desired that their works should be known2 and the case is a rare one4 ,for the author generally1 success of the worthiest kind1 success in enlightening1 encouraging1 and stimulating his fellow-men1 is inextricably connected with success of a lower kind1 the success measured by fame and popularity4 ,that1 of course1 is equally the case with statesmanship3 a statesman has to appeal to crowds1 and is too apt to be fascinated by thunders of applause2 public oratory1 even in the pulpit1 is a terrible stimulant to unworthy vanity4 ,the author only differs in this1 that his very function presupposes a temperament of more than average sensibility2 that he does not get that case-hardening which is administered to the statesman by the opposition orator2 and that publicity has a specially intoxicating effect upon the man whose proper home is in his study1 and who1 perhaps1 leaves it only to mix with a circle of reverent admirers4 ,i have tried to indicate some of the obvious temptations of authors1 especially so far as they are strengthened by the practice of authorship as a profession4 ,they may be summed up by saying that they tend to degrade the profession into a trade1 and a trade which has as many tricks as the least elevating kind of business4 ,it would be1 perhaps1 desirable to end by deducing some definite moral4 ,but1 in the first place1 ,i think that any such moral as ,i could give is sufficiently indicated by the statement of the dangers4 ,and1 in the second place1 ,i do not think that there is any moral that can be regarded as peculiar to authors4 ,for an author1 after all1 is a man1 and1 as all men ought to be1 a workman4 ,his power comes to this1 that he is a man with a special capacity for exciting sympathy4 ,that he should be a good workman1 therefore1 goes without saying2 and it follows that he should have a sense of responsibility in whatever department he undertakes2 that he should not bestow his advice upon us without qualifying himself to be a competent adviser2 nor write philosophical speculation without serious study of philosophy2 nor1 if possible1 produce poetry or even fiction without filling his mind by observation or training it by sympathy with the great movements of thought which are shaping the world in which we live4 ,it is a sort of paradox which cannot be avoided1 that we must warn a man that one condition of all good work is that it should be spontaneous1 and yet tell him that it should be directed to make men better and happier4 ,it seems to be saying that the conscious pursuit of a given end would be inconsistent with the attainment of the end4 ,yet ,i believe that this is a paradox which can be achieved in practice on the simple condition of a reasonable modesty4 ,the author1 that is1 should not listen to those who would exaggerate the importance of his work4 ,the world can get on very well without it2 and even the greatest men are far more the product than the producers of the intellectual surroundings4 ,the acceptance of that truth--,i hold it to be a truth--will help to keep in check the exaggerated estimate of the importance of making a noise in the world1 which is our besetting sin1 and help to make a regulating principle of what is a theoretical belief1 that a man who is doing honestly good work in any department1 whether under the eyes of a multitude or of a few1 will be happiest if he can learn to take pleasure in doing it thoroughly rather than in advertising it widely4 ,and1 finally1 with that conviction we shall be less liable to the common error of an author who grumbles at his want of success1 and becomes morbid and irritable and inclined to lower his standard1 when in reality he ought to remember that he is as unreasonable as a marksman who should complain of the target for keeping out of the line of fire4 ,it is my own fault is often a bitter reflection1 but a bitter may be a very wholesome tonic4 ,,the ,,vanity ,,of ,,philosophising4 ,when the ,preacher exclaimed1 ,vanity of vanities1 all is vanity1 he did not exclude his own wisdom4 ,i communed with my own heart1 saying1 ,lo1 ,i am come to great estate1 and have gotten more wisdom than all that have gone before me in ,jerusalem3 yea1 my heart hath great experience of wisdom and knowledge4 ,and ,i gave my heart to know wisdom and to know madness and folly3 ,i perceived that this also is vexation of spirit4 ,for in much wisdom is much grief3 and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow4 ,the ,preacher1 whoever he may have been1 has uttered thoughts upon which many eloquent followers have expatiated4 ,more than two thousand years have passed since the words were written2 philosophies have risen and spread and decayed2 and yet1 in this year #ahie1 can we say that they have brought more than a multiplication of doubt8 ,has the increase of knowledge as yet diminished sorrow1 or established any firm standing ground from which we may look upon the universe and say that the eternal riddle is1 ,i will not say solved1 but brought a step nearer to solution8 ,a great poet--,i can't tell whether he lived in the twelfth or the nineteenth century1 for the phrase is equally characteristic of either ,omar ,khayyam or ,edward ,fitzgerald--gives the same thought3-- ,myself1 when young1 did eagerly frequent ,doctor and saint1 and heard great argument ,about it and about3 but evermore ,came out by the same door as in ,i went4 ,what1 indeed1 are eight or twenty centuries in the life even of this planet8 ,there are moments at which we all have suddenly felt by flashes the sensation of being suspended in vast abysses of space and time3 when we see1 for example1 a chart of the heavens which has been recently revealed to us by astronomers1 and find that spaces between the stars shown to us by ordinary eyesight are filled in every direction with world beyond world1 vast systems of worlds1 worlds in every stage of evolution1 growing out of nebulous vapour or sinking into eternal coldness3 while the imagination is staggered and bewildered by the inconceivable vastness of the spaces indicated1 and its own infinitesimal pettiness4 ,if we stroll into a museum and look at the petrified bones of some grotesque monster1 and after rejoicing1 perhaps1 that there is an end of him1 we are struck by the thought of the vast lapse of ages during which he was being slowly hammered out of some mere primitive form1 and then slowly decayed1 and was gradually elbowed out of existence by monsters a degree less preposterous than himself1 and gain a new measure of the portentous lapse of time4 ,the greatest of poets has summed up the impression in the phrase which ,carlyle was fond of quoting3 we are such stuff as dreams are made of3 and our little speck of existence a vanishing quantity in comparison of the infinite above and below and around us1 which we dimly infer though we cannot distinctly realise it4 ,if in such a mood1 common at times to all who can think or feel1 we take up some philosophical work1 and find the writer complacently setting forth a cosmogony or a theory of the ,universe2 explaining how things came into being2 what is the reason why they are not better or worse2 what is the end of the whole drama3 are we not justified in exclaiming with ,carlyle3-- ,the builder of this ,universe was wise1 ,he planned all souls1 all systems1 planets1 particles3 ,the plan he shaped all worlds and aeons by ,was--,heavens6--was thy small nine-and-thirty articles6 ,carlyle has been1 to some of us1 the most stimulating of writers1 just because he succeeded in expressing1 with unsurpassed power1 the emotion which ,i must be content with indicating--the emotion which is roused by sudden revelations of the infinitudes1 the silences and eternities that surround us4 ,we cannot keep it permanently before us2 the present absorbs us1 and its little interests seem to be all that is important4 ,it is only at moments when1 for example1 we reflect that our action of a minute ago is already a part of the mysterious past1 sinking downwards1 and rapidly becoming invisible in the depths of the infinite ocean1 that we are startled by a momentary pang1 and feel as though to live with a constant sense of our insignificance would be to risk the paralysis of all our powers of thought and action4 ,that way1 we are inclined to say1 lies madness4 ,we shall lose our heads if we gaze too long into such tremendous depths4 ,possibly we may restore our equilibrium by meditating upon the infinitesimal1 though possibly too we may rather feel that such meditations only reveal another infinite4 ,i intended to make a few reflections suggested by such thoughts1 when ,i found a guide1 and1 to a great extent1 an ally1 in a writer who has lately taken up the ancient parable4 ,mr4 ,balfour1 in a book rather quaintly entitled ,foundations of ,belief has dwelt upon the vanity of all known philosophy1 and has shown1 or appears to some of his readers to have endeavoured to show1 that it is hopeless to lay any sound foundations on the little film of knowledge beneath which lie the great unknown abysses4 ,he tries to indicate some other basis1 though1 so far as ,i can understand him1 the foundations of his edifice are ingeniously supported by the superstructure2 and that is a kind of architecture which1 to my mind1 lacks stability4 ,through a large part of his argument1 however1 ,i find myself in the pleasanter position of an ally4 ,he asserts1 and ,i doubt whether any competent thinker would materially differ from him1 that there does not1 as a matter of fact1 exist any established system of philosophic truth--any system upon which we can rely1 as we do1 in fact1 rightly or wrongly rely1 upon certain scientific doctrines4 ,we no more doubt the truth of the ,newtonian system of astronomy than we doubt that fire burns or that bread nourishes4 ,but the briefest glance at the old systems of philosophy shows us1 as ,mr4 ,balfour says1 nothing but imperishable ruins--imperishable aesthetically--but1 logically1 mere crumbling fragments4 ,we can still read ,plato with delight2 but the delight is due to the beauty of style and exposition1 not1 certainly1 to the conviction produced by his reasoning4 ,aristotle's philosophy is a marvel--for his time3 but his theory of the ,universe is no more tenable than his ,natural ,science4 ,the luxuriant growths of later ,greek philosophy are interesting only to the curious investigators of the pathology of the human intellect4 ,the vast development of scholastic philosophy in the middle ages showed only how far unlimited ingenuity and subtlety may lead in the wrong direction1 if it starts with mistaken principles4 ,it ended by upsetting the doctrines which it attempted to prove1 and had finally to commit suicide1 or fall before the insurrection of living thought4 ,the great men who revolted against its tyranny in its later stages constructed new systems1 which1 to them1 seemed demonstrable1 but which1 to us1 are already untenable4 ,we cannot accept ,descartes1 or ,spinoza1 or ,leibnitz1 or ,bacon1 or ,hobbes1 or ,locke1 as giving satisfactory or even coherent systems1 or as having done more than lead to the thorough scepticism of ,hume4 ,if ,kant presented one solution of the difficulties in which philosophy was landed1 we have still to ask what precisely ,kant meant2 whether his criticism was simply all-destructive1 or really left anything standing1 and1 if so1 what it left standing2 and who represents the proper line of development4 ,shall we1 with ,schopenhauer1 pronounce ,hegel to be a thorough impostor8 and1 if so1 can we seriously accept ,schopenhauer's own system8 ,if1 here and there1 some people accept his theories for literary purposes1 nobody will maintain that they rest upon any permanently settled foundation4 ,if1 again1 we believe in ,hegel1 we have to make out what we mean by believing in ,hegel1 and to which school of his followers we are to attach ourselves4 ,i need not consider the polemic which ,mr4 ,balfour has directed against the writers who have given a version of ,hegelian principles in ,england4 ,personally1 ,i agree with his criticisms in a general way2 but ,i fancy that even the adherents of those principles would defend themselves mainly by declaring that they do not make such pretensions as he ascribes to them4 ,they try1 at most1 to indicate a way of approaching1 not of solving the problems4 ,but1 at least1 they would claim to have done one thing3 namely1 to have proved the inadequacy of the rival system of empirical philosophy1 accepted by the ,english followers of ,locke1 and now mainly represented for us by ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer4 ,i only add to this1 that it is not a question of the convictions of any individual thinker1 however eminent4 ,philosophies of every different variety have been not merely accepted by those who first devised them1 but have been taken up in good faith by whole schools of disciples2 they have been tested1 on a large scale1 by systematic application to all relevant questions1 and one after the other has become bankrupt2 has lost its hold on the world1 and confessed that it leaves the riddle as dark as it was before4 ,all that can be claimed for the greatest philosophers is1 that they have1 at least1 proved that certain paths which seemed to lead through the labyrinth1 end in a deadlock2 that they have exposed certain fallacies by the process of provisionally believing in them2 and that they have buoyed certain shoals1 and demonstrated that no channel leads in what seemed to be a promising direction4 ,is there any channel open8 ,once more1 ,i might follow--,i might even1 if ,i had time1 expand ,mr4 ,balfour's argument in another direction4 ,he has pointed out--not for the first time certainly--how men's beliefs are due not to reasoning1 but to countless causes which prevent them from reasoning4 ,the argument is too familiar1 indeed1 to require much emphasis4 ,some one1 arguing in the days of the old orthodoxy upon the necessity of the true faith to salvation1 put the case of a couple of infants deserted by their parents4 ,one of them is carried off by a ,mohammedan and the other by a ,christian4 ,each will1 of course1 adopt the faith of the party into whose hands it has fallen2 and the problem was1 whether the infant seized by the ,mohammedan would be eternally damned1 and the one taken by the ,christian go straight to heaven2 and whether1 on the whole1 that would satisfy our sense of justice4 ,the argument implies the inevitableness of error4 ,men not only do1 but ought to hold1 contradictory opinions4 ,take a ,scottish ,davie ,deans1 brought up in the shadow of ,john ,knox's pulpit2 a ,tyrolese peasant1 educated in the ,catholic ,church2 and a ,mohammedan1 living at ,mecca2 and1 of course1 it is plain1 not only that each will accept the creed which pervades what is for him the whole world known to him1 but that as a reasoning being each is probably in the right4 ,that is to say1 the accessible evidence is in each case overwhelmingly in favour of the doctrine1 inasmuch as the supposed reasoner is entirely unaware of the evidence which might be produced on the other side4 ,but what is true of the peasant is true of the philosopher4 ,measured on a sufficient scale1 the difference vanishes4 ,this intellectual horizon is just as much limited1 though not so narrowly limited4 ,no one but a bigot would deny that a mediaeval philosopher might accept on perfectly reasonable grounds the dogmas of the ,catholic ,church4 ,the historical difficulties had not even been presented to his mind4 ,he had no reason for doubting innumerable assumptions as to fact which have since turned out to be erroneous2 and if the method of his reasoning was itself fundamentally vicious1 the fact only came to light gradually in the process of working out the results4 ,we--including in the we the philosophers--have to approach truth by the help of assumptions1 and by trying how in point of fact they will work2 it is so hard to remember that they are only assumptions that we generally call them self-evident truths4 ,considering how many assumptions are involved even in the very structure of language itself2 how we are led into all kinds of difficulties by the essential instrument of thought1 which has been fashioned by the unconscious logic of our ancestors2 it is not strange that the best that can be said of philosophies is1 that they represent convenient working hypotheses4 ,that1 at least1 seems to be a liberal view of their logical value4 ,in another sense they are really to be considered as poetry1 rather than as logic4 ,they are modes of presenting certain conceptions of the world by apparently logical formulae1 instead of by concrete imagery2 but1 substantially1 they represent the emotions with which men regard their dwelling place1 and are radically imperfect if we insist upon considering them as providing us with correct plans and drawings of its various arrangements4 ,let us look for a moment at another set of reflections upon which ,mr4 ,balfour touches4 ,what has been the influence of these systems upon men's lives8 ,have these provisional constructions1 these fluctuating1 conflicting1 unstable combinations of pretentious formulae1 really decided or directed the course of human history8 ,it would seem so1 if you read certain histories of philosophy4 ,they seem to suggest that the hinge upon which all the course of human affairs ultimately turns is the growth of certain metaphysical conceptions4 ,there is a preliminary difficulty in seeing how such pretensions can be established4 ,the philosopher in his study or his lecture room discusses problems in which the enormously preponderating majority of the race has so little interest1 that it is not even aware that there are any such problems to be discussed4 ,he lays down dogmas so vague and unsatisfactory that half his hearers give up the attempt to understand1 or understand them in a sense which the more intelligent half would utterly repudiate2 and that intelligent half is itself divided into different schools1 interpreting the dogmas in radically contradictory ways4 ,is it not hard to believe that speculation leads to vast results1 when for ninety-nine men out of a hundred it is practically non-existent1 and with the small minority it amounts to providing new weapons for endless controversy8 ,we must1 of course1 admit that men's conduct is in some sense determined by their thoughts4 ,change the radical beliefs1 and you will certainly change the whole constitution of society4 ,and1 again1 it is obvious that in one sphere of thought the progress of inquiry is of vast importance4 ,nobody can deny that scientific and mechanical discoveries have1 for good or evil1 materially affected our lives4 ,the great inventions of modern times1 from gunpowder and printing to the steam-engine and electricity1 have changed things as much as if they had altered the physical constitution of the world4 ,they have indeed altered it for us1 for they have given us the means of applying forces previously dormant1 and therefore for practical purposes non-existent4 ,such beliefs have an immediate bearing upon the practices of ordinary human beings4 ,but if we are to set down all philosophies as at once untenable and as absolutely unknown to the enormous majority of mankind1 it becomes difficult to understand by what process they come to influence1 or apparently to influence1 the position of the race4 ,a philosopher frames his scheme of the universe to his own satisfaction2 but you and ,i hear nothing about it1 and do not trouble ourselves to understand it1 and go on working with our good old common-sense conceptions of things1 leaving it to the philosopher to construct or destroy the fanciful system which he somehow supposes to lie beneath them4 ,one answer is of course obvious4 ,religious and ethical systems1 it is said1 presuppose a philosophy3 no one denies that men are profoundly affected by the gods whom they worship and the rules of conduct which they adopt2 and therefore the sceptic who is burrowing at the base may be ruining the whole superstructure1 although his operations are no more obvious upon the surface than those of some minute parasite4 ,accordingly1 we are often told that revolutions are ultimately produced by speculation2 and that old systems fall with a crash because some shrewd witness has been boring into the foundations upon which they really repose4 ,the ,french ,revolution1 according to one familiar statement1 was due to the freethinkers who had set about prying into the ultimate grounds of the old faith1 and had succeeded in shaking the convictions necessary to social welfare4 ,that this argument expresses a truth is what ,i am so far from denying that ,i should be most anxious to give it emphasis4 ,but what is precisely the truth expressed8 ,destroy the belief in a church as a social system1 and the organisation will crumble4 ,but what is the real cause of the loss of belief8 ,is it the logical argument that is effective8 ,does the philosophical revolution underlie the political or religious revolution1 or is that to invert cause and effect8 ,let me take an example to illustrate my meaning4 ,the doctrine of the rights of man1 proclaimed by the whole revolutionary school1 was1 it is said1 the cause of the revolution4 ,the destruction of the old order was caused by the sudden conviction which spread through ,europe of the truth of this theory1 and the consequent decay of the old authority4 ,now we may proceed1 if we please1 to trace the origin of this doctrine back through certain speculations to the days of the ,roman jurists1 themselves influenced by the ,stoical philosophy4 ,the view suggested is that the doctrine was a kind of germ1 a something which preserved its vitality through centuries1 like the bacteria of modern physiologists1 and which1 somehow1 developed a baleful or a beneficial activity about a century ago1 and changed all the conditions of social equilibrium4 ,but1 if this be true1 we naturally remark that the potency of the doctrine must have been due1 not to the doctrine itself1 which lay dormant so long1 but to the conditions which suddenly made it effective4 ,the doctrine1 indeed1 is so obvious1 in a sense1 that it is not to be doubted that anybody who once began to philosophise about laws and political constitutions1 after they had reached a certain stage1 would hit upon it in one shape or another4 ,it is not comparable to those scientific discoveries which require patient thought and a dexterous combination of arguments3 but one of the primary axioms which present themselves on the very threshold of inquiry4 ,the mediaeval peasant who put the question3-- ,when ,adam delved1 and ,eve span1 ,who was then the gentleman8 was1 probably1 no great philosopher2 but he was giving the essential pith of the doctrine of liberty1 fraternity1 and equality4 ,it may be regarded as an obvious logical canon1 converted by an illegitimate process into a statement of fact4 ,if ,i make any general statement whatever about men or beasts or stones1 ,i1 of course1 assume that there is a corresponding class of things in respect of each of which the proposition is equally true4 ,as soon as ,i say anything1 therefore1 about morality or politics1 which is intended to be true of men in general1 ,i assume1 in this sense1 that men are so far equal that something may be predicated1 indifferently1 of every member of the class man4 ,it is very natural and easy to convert this into the proposition that the concrete men of whom ,i am speaking are1 in some sense1 actually equal4 ,in doing so1 however1 ,i am either making a false statement1 or begging the question4 ,as a matter of fact1 men are1 in many respects1 as far as possible from being equal4 ,the real question1 therefore1 is whether the inequalities which undoubtedly exist are or are not relevant to the political inequalities which ,i have to consider4 ,as a matter of fact1 the inequalities which were challenged by the revolutionary writers were1 as ,i think1 and as most of us think1 entirely unjustifiable4 ,at any rate1 they had1 as a matter of fact1 produced widespread discontent and bitter antipathies between classes4 ,it was the existence of these antipathies to which the outbreak was due4 ,the peasant1 for example1 felt that he was forced to give up the fruit of his labour to the noble1 and that the noble was discharging no duty to justify his demands4 ,the peasant1 probably1 could not read2 he was unaware that ,rousseau or ,voltaire was laying down principles which would cover his case2 he had never even heard of philosopher or philosophy2 only1 when the time was ripe1 when the upper orders had become useless1 and the lower classes had accumulated a sufficient quantity of passion1 of indignant or vindictive feeling1 an outraged sense of justice1 the crash came1 and any formula which would cover the particular case was acceptable4 ,the doctrine then made its fortune2 not because it was true1 or because it was demonstrable1 but because it gave the shortest and simplest expression to the prevailing sentiment4 ,the philosophical dogma1 which had been lying idle for generations1 doing no particular harm or good1 was1 suddenly1 converted into a war-cry1 the more effective because the real vagueness and uncertainty of its application enabled those who used it to save themselves the trouble of thinking or arguing4 ,instead of substituting particular grievances1 and showing that this or that inequality in general was useless and objectionable1 they could1 in half a dozen words1 denounce all inequality1 and be perfectly satisfied with a formula which was imposing for its generality1 though true only in its particular application4 ,i take this familiar case1 not only as familiar1 but because it seems to me to be typical4 ,similar general remarks might1 ,i fancy1 be made about any of the great religious movements which have1 undoubtedly1 most profoundly affected human society4 ,they are not due to the philosophers2 to the abstract meditations of refined thinkers upon ultimate principles2 but to great underlying social changes4 ,our ,christian apologists of the last century held the quaint belief that a new creed was caused by the occurrence of certain miraculous facts1 susceptible of legal proof4 ,it is sufficiently obvious to us that this is to invert the process4 ,given the faith1 and there is never any difficulty in supplying the miracles4 ,no quantity of assertions as to miraculous events would have the slightest effect1 unless there were a predisposition to accept them4 ,the same answer applies to the theory that a new religion owes its success to the discovery of new moral truths4 ,in the first place1 there are1 properly speaking1 no sudden discoveries in morality2 and in the next place1 the mere statement of a moral doctrine1 and even the presentation of a lofty moral type1 can have little importance unless the soil is already prepared1 and the doctrine is but the overt utterance of the sentiments which are seeking for expression4 ,the only explanation that we can give of such events is the social explanation4 ,there are periods1 that is in history1 when the old order is out of joint2 when society has outgrown the institutions which were adequate at a previous stage1 and when1 therefore1 the beliefs associated with them become oppressive1 and can no longer pass without challenge2 when different races and nations have been brought into collision or combination1 and crushed together into new forms by conquest and commerce2 when1 therefore1 the several creeds are no longer supported by the patriotism which has ceased to have a meaning2 when a vast amalgam of different faiths and modes of life has been formed out of many heterogeneous elements2 and thus a need is created for some wider and more comprehensive system of belief corresponding to the general needs of society4 ,in that case the influence of the philosopher may be of some importance1 because he can do something towards suggesting the most workable compromise1 and of exposing superstitions which have lost their old support1 and the instinctive loyalty of their adherents4 ,even then his voice will not be predominant4 ,the creed will survive which is most suited to the state of the average intellect2 it will include a large element of the ancient modes of thought1 which still insist upon finding some satisfaction1 and which1 indeed1 have a strange vitality beneath the surface1 even when explicitly disavowed by the official interpreters of the faith4 ,now1 if this be accepted as a rough sketch of the actual course of the development of belief1 what is the conclusion as to the philosopher's function8 ,does it go to suggest that philosophy is but a vanity and vexation of spirit1 and does it reduce the philosopher to a humbler position than is sometimes claimed for him8 ,my answer would be1 in the first place1 that the case against philosophy would have to be frankly admitted if the criterion sometimes tacitly suggested be the true one4 ,nothing could be more hopeless than the claim of any philosophy whatever to have laid down a definitively satisfactory plan of things in general4 ,when ,mr4 ,balfour observes that an ,aristotle or ,aquinas or ,descartes has not laid down a tenable theory of the universe1 ,i can only add that the very phrase--theory of the universe--conveys a sufficient refutation4 ,it is idle1 or worse than idle1 to imagine that we can lay down1 or even hope to lay down1 anything of the kind4 ,it needs only one of those glances into the surrounding infinities which ,i have suggested1 or the briefest survey of the history of philosophy1 to reveal the sheer impossibility of the attempt4 ,no one1 perhaps1 ever quite imagined that his speculation could really lay bare the ultimate ground plan of things in general4 ,but1 certainly1 philosophers have1 at times1 thought1 or spoken as if they thought1 that they could construct a body of first principles which should be to knowledge in general what a science is to some particular application1--the general theory of physics1 for example1 to astronomy4 ,philosophy would then be a system of such ultimate principles4 ,the day for such systems has1 ,i think1 passed4 ,we have learnt that it is for ever impossible to spin real knowledge out of pure logic4 ,what the universe1 or the little bit of it that we know1 actually is1 can only be learnt by experience2 and if experience presupposes categories or forms of intuition1 still1 without experience1 they remain empty2 as incapable of producing truth as a mill of grinding flour without corn4 ,philosophers must admit that on such terms we get only brain cobwebs2 ingenious feats of intellectual legerdemain1 where the operator shows his skill by dexterously hiding away his assumptions1 and bringing them out at the end as triumphantly demonstrated conclusions4 ,the more modest ideal1 which is now presented to us1 is what is called the unification of knowledge4 ,that means1 no doubt1 that we have to bring our theories into harmony and consistency2 to get rid of the hypothetical and conjectural elements which have intruded themselves from earlier and cruder speculation2 and so to analyse the primary factors of thought and the most general conceptions1 that we may not have to assume in one relation what we dispute in another4 ,even this process is1 no doubt1 exceedingly difficult2 it is difficult partly because the human mind has1 generally speaking1 to begin at the wrong end2 to proceed upon postulates which break down here and there and leave inconvenient fragments remaining elsewhere2 partly because some philosophers are still open to the charge that they raise a dust and then complain that they cannot see2 and1 briefly1 because1 in one way or other1 what with the dulness of the ordinary mind and what with the over-subtlety of the acute1 our thoughts and beliefs have got into intricate tangles1 which will require enormous patience and judgment to wind off and weave into a satisfactory tissue4 ,genuine philosophers1 doubtless1 will learn in time how to set about the work4 ,it will probably strike them that instead of evolving pretentious systems of theology1 and ethics1 and politics1 and art1 each purporting to give an exhaustive theory of the subject1 and each destined to melt away1 leaving some infinitesimal residuum of real suggestion1 they will have to follow a slower method of gradual and tentative investigation4 ,if so1 we must undoubtedly assign to philosophy a more modest position than has sometimes been claimed for it4 ,it must resign its claim to a vision of transcendental realities1 to a knowledge of things in themselves1 and of the ultimate groundwork of the universe4 ,it has not1 ,i hold1 a subject-matter peculiar to itself2 it reveals no principles belonging to a separate sphere of thought2 it corresponds simply to the attempt to correct and harmonise the cruder thoughts of the average human being1 and to state explicitly in their purity the principles which have been all along implicitly involved in his ordinary observations4 ,it is1 therefore1 not a substantive1 but an adjective2 philosophy is not a distinct department of thought1 and cannot be defined by itself4 ,all we can say is1 that we think philosophically in so far as we think rightly4 ,when our mode of conceiving the world includes no heterogeneous or conflicting element1 we shall be philosophers2 but we shall not1 in that capacity1 have a separate dominion of our own4 ,now1 it will probably do no harm to philosophers more than to other men1 to be impressed with a sense of modesty and a right appreciation of the necessary limitations of their enterprise4 ,you have been trying to soar beyond the atmosphere1 and you will make the better use of your wings when you learn that they won't support you in a vacuum4 ,your failure is not due to the want of aquiline powers of flight1 but to the melancholy truth that even an eagle can't do much in an air-pump4 ,is not that a rather consoling reflection8 ,but here the philosopher begins to be recalcitrant4 ,you are not lowering my pretensions1 he says1 but attacking the power of man to attain truth upon any terms4 ,all that is given to us in experience is the effect of underlying causes2 if the causes vary the effects would vary2 and1 unless1 therefore1 you can get back to the cause1 your knowledge must remain empirical and radically uncertain4 ,destroy all transcendental truths1 and the phenomenal world itself becomes a mere shifting phantasmagoria1 on which we can trace only coincidences and sequences1 but are entirely unable to say that they will ever recur again4 ,the argument1 of course1 raises the recollection of library upon library of controversy4 ,i can only touch one point4 ,practically1 we do not trouble ourselves about this difficulty4 ,we are quite convinced that we know a great many things3 we are sure that the sun will rise and set to-morrow2 we have no doubt as to the properties of the ordinary objects1 of trees and stones and steam-engines2 every action of our lives implies a certain confidence in what is called the uniformity of nature2 and it is plain enough that even if our knowledge be1 in some sense1 only a knowledge of probabilities1 yet1 from its effect upon conduct1 it may be exactly the same as a knowledge of certainties4 ,there may be an indefinite distance between the necessary truth that two and two make four and the empirical truth that a stone will fall2 but if all the evidence attainable goes to prove that the stone will fall1 ,i should be as foolish not to act upon that hypothesis as not to assume the truth of the arithmetical formula4 ,now1 it is1 of course1 the growth within recent generations of vast systems of such truths which has alarmed the philosopher4 ,he contrasts his own fluctuating and conflicting dogmas with the steady growth and assured results and mutual confirmation of the established physical sciences4 ,he fears that they will obtain a prestige which will enable them to crush him and sweep his pretended knowledge into the limbo of alchemy and astrology and scholastic logomachy4 ,here comes in the argument which is really the keystone of ,mr4 ,balfour's whole theory2 and1 as ,i cannot accept it1 ,i must dwell upon its true nature4 ,it looks1 at first sight1 like a retort upon the men of science4 ,your knowledge1 he seems to say1 is as vain as your antagonist's4 ,your physics1 and astronomy1 and chemistry1 and physiology are mere empty shows1 like the metaphysical theories that have gone to their long home in histories of philosophy4 ,but to say this would be to accept complete scepticism1 and a kind of scepticism which ,mr4 ,balfour would1 ,i am sure1 disavow4 ,he believes1 of course1 just as strongly as any one of us believes1 in the astronomical theories of ,newton and ,laplace2 or in the mathematical theories of the great physical sciences4 ,that in which he disbelieves is a kind of bastard science called naturalism1 which1 as he tells us1 leads to contradictory or incoherent results4 ,the naturalist1 it appears1 proposes to confine himself to the evidence of the senses1 and ends by accepting a view of the world entirely inconsistent with the sensible perceptions4 ,i see a green field3 an object which has visual and other properties recognised by my organs of sense4 ,no1 says this misguided naturalist1 you do not see what you suppose2 what really happens is1 that there is a vast whirlpool of atoms impinging upon each other and setting up vibrations1 the last set of which is communicated to another set of atoms1 called my optic nerve4 ,these atoms1 by their very nature imperceptible to the senses1 are the only realities4 ,we thus start from the senses and we get a world beyond the senses1 a world which is a mere dance of infinite multitudes of bits of matter performing all manner of extraordinary gyrations and evolutions4 ,the sensible impressions of colour1 sound1 and so forth1 are mere illusions1 somehow arising in a figment called the mind4 ,this mind is a mere phantom--an unreal spectator of things and events1 among which it has no place1 and upon which it exercises no influence4 ,now1 let me say first that ,i agree with ,mr4 ,balfour that the doctrine thus imputed to the naturalist is absurd4 ,i do not believe1 for ,i cannot believe1 that ,i am only a dance of atoms4 ,i cannot believe1 ,i say1 for the words are to me meaningless4 ,my sensations and emotions are to me the typical realities4 ,i cannot doubt the real existence of pain and pleasure1 grief and joy1 whatever else ,i may doubt4 ,i believe1 for example1 that my toothache is a reality2 and nobody will ever persuade me that it is merely a set of molecular changes in my tooth4 ,that it1 in some way1 is dependent upon such changes ,i fully believe2 but that is quite a different statement4 ,and1 secondly1 ,i agree with ,mr4 ,balfour 7or with what ,i take to be ,mr4 ,balfour's belief7 that the scientific doctrines which are reached by help of these atoms are established truths4 ,i believe those doctrines1 not because ,i am convinced by the arguments1 which ,i may not have examined or be capable of examining2 nor simply because ,i trust1 though ,i do trust1 in the ability and the candour of the scientific reasoners2 but because the doctrines can be and have been independently verified4 ,i believe1 that is1 in modern astronomy because it has enabled modern astronomers to predict eclipses1 and enabled ,adams and ,leverrier to discover ,neptune4 ,that is the conclusive proof2 for it is impossible to suppose that the power of prediction should be a result of erroneous belief1 and such proofs are verifiable by anybody who can observe the phenomena4 ,here1 then1 we have the difficulty1 the difficulty upon which the whole of ,mr4 ,balfour's argument depends4 ,solve it1 and the whole sceptical argument crumbles4 ,the naturalistic theory1 we both say1 is incredible4 ,the scientific doctrines based upon it are1 as we both admit1 unassailable4 ,how is this8 ,i reply1 first1 because the atoms represent nothing more than a logical scaffolding which enables us to infer one set of sensible phenomena from another4 ,we start from phenomena and we end with phenomena4 ,when we have discovered the so-called law--the connecting formula--we can remove the hypothesis as the engineer can remove the provisional supports when he has once got the keystone into his arch4 ,that this is so appears1 ,i think1 from the whole scientific procedure4 ,how is the atomic theory obtained8 ,not by any direct observation of atoms themselves4 ,they are1 as ,mr4 ,balfour says1 not only not objects of observation1 but incapable by their nature of ever being directly observed4 ,the man of science begins by saying1 if the phenomena of light correspond in some way to a vibration of atoms1 the atoms must vibrate in such and such ways4 ,he finds1 again1 that the laws so discovered will give the law of other phenomena of light2 and he argues quite correctly that his hypothesis is for his purpose verified4 ,that is1 it has enabled him to discover a verifiable and verified formula4 ,in order to do this he has assumed from the very first the theory which of course appears in his conclusions4 ,all physical science consists ultimately in giving definite formulae in terms of space and time4 ,it is therefore assumed that the atoms are to have no qualities except those which are definable in terms of space4 ,we exclude any other quality because our whole purpose is to obtain purely geometrical measurements4 ,we have asked how those atoms1 infinitesimal bits1 so to speak1 of solid space1 arranged in certain positions1 must move in order to correspond to the law given by observation1 and we have therefore1 of course1 predetermined that our answer must come out in terms of atoms4 ,but1 now1 what is the error of the naturalist8 ,simply that he has converted the scientific doctrine into an ontological doctrine4 ,he really knows nothing1 and cannot possibly know anything1 about his atoms1 except just this1 that they give the law of the phenomena4 ,he has nothing whatever to say to them in any other relation4 ,if he proceeds1 as ,mr4 ,balfour says that he proceeds1 to declare that nothing exists except atoms1 that they are the ultimate realities1 that they are things in themselves1 or objects independent of any subject1 he is going beyond his tether1 passing from science to transcendental metaphysics1 and getting into hopeless confusion4 ,in fact1 after he has done his worst we may still follow ,berkeley and deny the existence of matter1 or declare with ,clifford that atoms are only bits of mindstuff1 or adopt any other metaphysical theory we please4 ,the atoms at most are things which we judge from the analogy of the senses2 and it is a pure illusion to suppose that they can ever take us into an extra-sensible world4 ,they represent not only a convenient but an indispensable contrivance for enabling us to formulate scientific laws1 such as those of light and heat2 but they take us no further4 ,in a remarkable passage1 ,mr4 ,balfour sketches an analogy1 which gives the application of this to philosophical or theological questions2 and ,i will venture to give my own interpretation of the argument because it seems to lead to the real point4 ,we believe1 he says1 in a scientific theory of heat1 although our view of the realities has changed4 ,people once thought that heat was a substance4 ,they now hold it to be a mode of motion4 ,yet our scientific faith 7our faith1 ,i suppose1 that things are hot1 and that their heat varies according to certain assigned laws7 remains unaffected4 ,on the other hand1 he says1 if we cease to believe in the ,christian doctrine of the atonement1 we cease also to have that sense of reconciliation between ,god and man which the doctrine was intended to explain4 ,this he seems to regard as a kind of melancholy paradox4 ,why is the scepticism harmless in science and fatal in theology8 ,first1 what are the admitted facts8 ,a man of science propounds a theory of heat4 ,if his theory does not give us the observed laws1 we reject it and adopt a more successful theory4 ,in any case1 we1 of course1 continue to believe in heat4 ,we may know facts without knowing their causes2 as1 for example1 the fact of gravitation1 which is not the less certain because it is at present an ultimate fact4 ,otherwise our knowledge would be limited indeed2 for even if the cause 7in the scientific sense7 were given1 we should still have to ask1 what is the cause of that cause8 ,if heat is due to certain systems of atoms1 we might still inquire how the atoms came to occupy their places1 and possess the properties which they actually have4 ,an effect depends upon a cause1 as we naturally say2 but it does not follow that the knowledge of the effect depends upon the knowledge of the cause4 ,now1 what are the facts which correspond to the facts of heat in the theory of the atonement8 ,if we believe in a certain being1 an anthropomorphic deity1 who will punish us or reward us1 it is1 of course1 obvious that if we cease to believe in him we shall cease to desire to be reconciled to him4 ,so if ,i believed that the warmth of my house depended upon a fire next door1 and then discovered that no such fire existed1 ,i should of course cease to care about lighting it4 ,in this there is nothing which wants explanation4 ,i suppose1 therefore1 that what ,mr4 ,balfour means is1 that if men have certain emotions1--remorse1 for example1 or what is called a conviction of sin1--and then learn to reject the theory by which these emotions were explained1 they cease also to feel the emotions4 ,in fact1 he emphatically accepts the view that1 if we cease to accept theology1 we shall cease to be moral4 ,the perversity of a few wretched naturalists in continuing to be moral is explained as a case of survival2 the moral naturalist is the parasite who draws his sustenance from the organism which he infests4 ,let us consider the scientific analogy4 ,i believe in heat1 and ,i accept a scientific theory just as far as it gives me verified laws of heat4 ,i believe1 too1 in the existence of conscience2 that is1 ,i believe that people have real emotions1 such as remorse and shame1 which correspond to the name4 ,i hold that to be a fact of experience4 ,it would have to be explained1 again1 so far as explanation is possible1 by psychology in the first instance1 as heat must be explained by scientific theories4 ,remorse is a fact1 as heat is a fact2 and an explanation would consist in giving accurately its place in the moral organism and the laws of its operation4 ,the explanation furnished by any given psychology1 by association1 for example1 must be accepted or rejected in so far as it explains or fails to explain the facts4 ,if some theory about spiritual monads enabled us to show what the conscience is1 and how it is1 in fact1 stimulated or suppressed1 we should accept it in the same way as we accept the physical theory of heat4 ,as yet1 ,i need hardly say1 no such result has been achieved2 and psychology is still far too vague to offer any definite laws of the emotional nature4 ,but in any case1 how can a theory about facts make the facts themselves vanish8 ,would not grief be real just as pain would be real if we could clearly explain how and why it occurred8 ,why should the sense of reconciliation vanish because we show the conditions of its existence8 ,the reason of ,mr4 ,balfour's difficulty1 ,i think1 appears from what ,i have said4 ,in the physical theory we can draw the line clearly between the scientific and the philosophical spheres4 ,mr4 ,balfour can accept the scientific truth1 though he does not accept the doctrine which results from translating it into ontology4 ,but the boundary between psychology and philosophy is far less distinct4 ,we constantly confound questions about the constitution of man1 as known to us by experience1 with questions about supposed intuitions of ultimate truth4 ,the fact that sin causes remorse is interpreted as meaning that remorse actually is a knowledge of an avenging deity2 and when the emotion is thus identified with the belief1 it becomes easy to suppose that to destroy the belief is also to destroy the emotion4 ,i think1 indeed1 that fallacies of that kind are among the commonest in philosophical writings4 ,now1 of course1 psychology has something to say in this matter4 ,it may help1 and ,i think that it has helped us to explain how men come to believe in anthropomorphic deities1 and to invest them with the attributes of human rulers4 ,but in that way it tends to show not that the conscience is caused by the belief1 but to show how1 under certain conditions1 it has given rise to a belief by other than logical grounds4 ,it suggests no probability that the conscience will disappear with the fallacy1 but only that it will act differently when enlightened by a different logic4 ,conscience disappears no more than heat disappears1 when both are explained2 though the conduct which the emotions or the sensations determine will1 of course1 be affected4 ,and now1 ,i can say what ,i take to be the difficulty1 and the escape4 ,mr4 ,balfour draws a kind of parallel between the scientific creed1 which is1 as he would put it1 based upon a metaphysical doctrine1 and the theological creed1 which has a similar foundation4 ,if the metaphysical foundation is so uncertain in both cases1 must not the scientific be as uncertain as the theological8 ,if we know nothing about atoms1 or1 on the other hand1 about souls1 we must be either sceptical in both cases1 or credulous in both4 ,there are the same underlying difficulties1 and if we manage to overlook them in the case of science1 why not overlook them in the case of theology8 ,conversely1 if we elect to be sceptics in theology1 how can we escape from scepticism in science8 ,and1 as a thorough-going scepticism is1 doubtless1 an impossible state of mind in practice1 the conclusion of many people will be to accept belief in spite of certain gaps in our logical foundations4 ,this1 no doubt1 is eminently convenient for the constructive process adumbrated by ,mr4 ,balfour1 which ,i certainly regard as extra-logical4 ,but is any such dilemma really offered to us8 ,the obvious answer is1 that scientific truth1 as ,mr4 ,balfour admits1 is not based upon metaphysical theory4 ,the astronomical doctrine of a ,newton remains equally valid1 whatever is the ultimate nature of space or laws or atoms2 whether we are materialists or empiricists or idealists4 ,the philosophical basis is not really a set of truths which we must know before we can know the astronomical theory2 but simply a set of hypotheses which have to conform to the truths given by experience4 ,the unassailable truths are just the facts which we observe1 and which science enables us to describe accurately and state systematically4 ,if a metaphysical doctrine has any bearing upon these facts1 which seems to be doubtful1 it must conform to the facts1 and not the facts to it4 ,so long as no such theory is proved1 we can afford to remain metaphysically sceptical without losing our hold upon the scientific truth4 ,now1 ,i should say1 what is true of the physical sciences is true of all our knowledge4 ,we may study the moral sciences as we can study the physical sciences4 ,we can observe and colligate the facts of emotion and volition1 as we can observe the position of the stars and the laws of heat4 ,therefore1 in so far as theology is an attempt to give a theory of the universe in general1 we must accept or deny the doctrines just in so far as they serve to explain or fail to explain the facts4 ,but1 in any case1 the facts will remain unaltered1 and will not vanish because we may be unable to understand them4 ,but theology corresponds1 also1 not to the scientific method1 but to the ontological inquiries which are represented by ,mr4 ,balfour's naturalism4 ,both doctrines1 as ,i should say1 lead to incoherence1 to contradictions covered by ambiguous language1 and to hopeless difficulties1 which1 in theology1 are described as inscrutable mysteries4 ,i am1 therefore1 quite ready1 with ,mr4 ,balfour1 to reject naturalism1 but1 on the same grounds1 ,i also reject the transcendental theology4 ,attainable truth is equally independent of all such theories2 and were it otherwise1 we should be doomed to hopeless scepticism4 ,mr4 ,balfour's analogy1 therefore1 apparently upsets his conclusion4 ,i believe in heat1 and ,i believe in the conscience4 ,i reject the atoms1 and ,i reject the doctrine of atonement4 ,i reject it1 if it be meant for science1 because1 so far from explaining the facts1 the facts explain how the false doctrine was generated4 ,i reject it1 if it is meant for philosophy1 because1 like other transcendental theories1 it leads to hopeless controversies1 and appears to me to be incredible as soon as any such theology as is tenable by a philosopher is substituted for the crude theology of a savage4 ,we are driven to scepticism1 then1 if we first declare that scientific knowledge depends upon metaphysical theory2 and then that all metaphysical theory is moonshine4 ,i do not accept the first principle2 and ,i hold that the danger to morals from metaphysical difficulties is pretty much the same as the danger that the stars will leave their courses if we adopt a wrong theory of an astronomy4 ,we fancy that when we are explaining facts1 we are1 somehow1 creating them2 as the meteorologist in ,rasselas observed the clouds till he came to think that he caused the rain4 ,the facts upon which morality depends are the facts that men have certain emotions2 that mothers love their children2 that there are such things as pity1 and sympathy1 and public spirit2 and that there are social instincts upon the growth of which depends the vitality of the race4 ,we may1 of course1 ask how more precisely these emotions act1 and what functions they discharge4 ,we may make historical and psychological and metaphysical inquiries2 and we may end1 if ever we reach such a consummation1 by establishing what we may call a science of ethics4 ,but the facts do not depend upon the explanation4 ,the illusion of their dependence is easily produced4 ,you make your theory of morality1 and then you define morality as a belief in the object required by your theory4 ,it follows1 of course1 that morality will disappear with the belief--or else that your theory is wrong4 ,morality1 said some people1 is a belief in future rewards and punishments4 ,if that belief disappears1 morality--that is1 their morality--must disappear too4 ,but that morality--taken as the actual sentiment which they have erroneously defined--should disappear also1 no more follows than it follows that heat will disappear when we discover that there is no such thing as the old imaginary substance of heat4 ,the doctrine is now more generally urged in a different form4 ,theology1 it is said1 is essential to morality4 ,such bold assertions may be best met by a dogmatic assertion of the inverse case4 ,theology1 as ,i hold1 is not the source of the moral instincts1 but1 under certain conditions1 derives its real power from them4 ,theology1 in the first place1 is a word including not only heterogeneous but contradictory meanings1--,baal and ,jehovah1 the ,mumbo-jumbo of the negro and ,spinoza's ens absolute infinitum4 ,to the enormous majority of the human race1 the more metaphysical conception is hopelessly unintelligible4 ,when a savage expresses his crude sense of duties to the tribe under the form of belief in an ancestral ghost1 is the morality made by the belief1 or the belief generated by the incipient moral emotion8 ,does he believe in ,god or really in a man like himself1 and respected precisely because he is like himself8 ,is not the truth tacitly acknowledged by the more philosophical religions8 ,their adherents admit that the ,god of philosophy is too abstract a ,being to excite any emotion2 he fades into ,nature or the ,unknowable1 and it is impossible to love one whom1 by his very definition1 you can neither benefit nor injure and whose omnipotence makes even justice a mockery4 ,therefore1 they make a ,god out of a man1 and by boldly combining in words two contradictory sets of attributes1 make what in theology is called a mystery1 and in common sense called by a different name4 ,does not that amount to confessing that the true source of morality is in the human affections of like for like1 and not in that sentiment towards a transcendental object of which you have chosen to make your definition8 ,and1 finally1 if we ask what is the relation of theology to morality1 from a historical point of view1 we see the same result4 ,undoubtedly1 theology has been a bulwark of morality in one way4 ,it has expressed the veneration of mankind for the most deeply-seated customs of the race4 ,it has been the form through which1 though not the cause owing to which1 men have expressed the importance of adhering to certain established institutions of the highest importance to mankind4 ,briefly1 therefore1 it represents the conservative instincts4 ,but1 for that reason1 it has naturally lagged behind an advancing morality4 ,the newer religions have been precisely protests against the objectionable conduct of the old-fashioned deities who retained the manners and customs of a more barbarous period2 and have1 therefore1 been regarded by the older faith1 sometimes with justice1 as atheistic4 ,without referring to the familiar cases1 ,i am content to appeal to the present day4 ,what are the relative positions of the theologian and his opponent during the modern phase of evolution8 ,the theologian has1 in the main1 maintained the sanctity of old institutions and customs2 and ,i do not doubt that he has rendered a useful service4 ,but the demand for justice1 for the abolition of slavery1 of the hardships of the poor and oppressed1 the desire to construct society upon a wholesomer ideal1 has been generated1 not by theological speculation1 but by the new relations into which men have been brought and the new sentiments developed4 ,it has been accepted most fully by men hostile to all theology1 by the free-thinker1 the atheist1 and the materialist1 whom the orthodox denounces as criminal4 ,doubtless the denouncer has excuses3 the reformer may err in the direction of excessive demolition2 but the very survival of the older creeds depends1 as we all see1 upon their capacity for assimilating and finding utterance for the moral convictions which have arisen outside of their limits1 and1 generally1 in defiance of their authority4 ,to say1 therefore1 that the morality depends upon the survival of the metaphysical theory1 seems to me to be inverting the true relation4 ,i end by suggesting what is to my mind the true moral of these speculations4 ,the vanity of philosophising means the vanity of certain philosophical pretensions2 of the chimerical belief that the philosopher lays down the first principles of belief in ethics or in other departments of life1 in such a sense that the destinies of the race or of knowledge depend upon accepting and applying his principles4 ,his function is a humbler one1 though one of vast importance4 ,the great philosophical systems have vanished1 though they have cleared the air4 ,they were primitive attempts at construction2 results of the fact that we have to act before we can think2 and to assume postulates which can only be verified or falsified by the slow experience of ages4 ,but the process by which truth is advanced is not confined to the philosopher2 or perhaps we should rather say that some sort of crude philosophy is embedded even in the feeblest and earliest speculations of mankind4 ,our thoughts are guided by an implicit logic long before we have even a conception of logic in the abstract1 or have the least thought of codifying and tabulating its formulae4 ,so every savage who begins to make a tool is exemplifying some mechanical principle which will not be put into accurate and abstract language till countless generations have passed4 ,every one at the present day who is using his wits is philosophising after a fashion1 and is contributing towards the advancement of philosophy4 ,he is increasing the mass of still more or less chaotic knowledge1 the whole of which is to that philosopher what the particular set of facts is to the student of physical science4 ,the philosopher has not to evolve first principles out of himself1 so much as to discover what are the principles which have been unconsciously applied2 to eliminate the obsolete elements2 to bring the new into harmony2 to verify them1 or describe how they may be verified2 and so to work towards the unification and systematisation of knowledge in general4 ,probably he will make a great many blunders in his task2 but it may be some comfort to reflect that even blunders are often useful1 and that he is not in the terribly responsible position of really framing laws for the universe or for man1 but only of clearing up or codifying the laws which are already in operation4 ,,forgotten ,,benefactors4 ,i was reading not long ago some remarks,a which impressed me at the time1 and upon which1 as it came to pass1 ,i have had reason to reflect more seriously4 ,the writer dwelt upon the vast services which have been rendered to the race by men of whom all memory has long since faded away4 ,compare1 he said1 the ,england of ,alfred with the ,england of ,victoria2 think of the enormous differences which have been brought about in thirty generations2 and then try to estimate how large a share of all that has been done in the interval should be put to the credit of thousands who have long sunk into oblivion1 and whose achievements1 by the very necessity of the case1 can never be properly estimated4 ,a few great names mark every period2 the great statesmen1 the great churchmen and warriors1 are commemorated in our official histories2 they are placed upon exalted pedestals2 and to them is attributed everything that was done in their time1 though1 but for the co-operation of innumerable nameless fellow-labourers1 they would not have been provided even with the foundations upon which their work was necessarily based4 ,this remark recalls the familiar discussion about the importance of the individual4 ,is the hero whom we are invited to worship everything1 or is he next to nothing8 ,is it true1 as some writers put it1 that had ,cleopatra broken her nose1 or had a cannon ball gone a hair's breadth further to the right or left when ,napoleon was directing the siege of ,toulon1 the whole course of history would have been changed8 ,or is it rather true that1 as some philosophers would say1 no man is indispensable1 nor even any man very important3 that1 if any even of the greatest of men had died of the measles in his infancy1 we should have carved a different set of letters upon the pedestals of our statues1 but the course of affairs would have run in much the same channel8 ,i will not seek to discuss that old theme1 to which it is evident that no very precise answer can be given4 ,it is clearly a question of degree4 ,nobody can deny that a great man has an influence in the spheres of action and of thought2 but to attempt to say how great an influence he has1 how far he depends upon others or could be replaced by others1 involves considerations lying in the unprofitable region of vague conjecture4 ,this only ,i wish to note4 ,it seems often to be suggested that there is something degrading or ungenerous in taking a side against the importance of the hero4 ,it raises a suspicion that you are a valet1 capable of supposing that men are distinguished by the quantity of lace on their coats1 and not by the intensity of the fire in their souls4 ,and1 moreover1 the view is fatalistic3 it supposes that the destinies of the race are determined by what are denounced as blind laws1 and not by the passions and aspirations which guide their energies4 ,to me it seems that it would be easy enough to retort these imputations4 ,i cannot feel that a man of generous sympathies should be therefore inclined to a doctrine which would tend to make the future of the race a matter of chance4 ,the more you believe in the importance of the great men1 the more you have to admit that our progress depends upon the innumerable accidents which may stifle the greatest as easily as the smallest career4 ,if some great social change was so absolutely dependent upon the leader who first put into words the demand upon which it is based1 or who led the first forlorn hope which made victory possible1 that his loss would have been the loss of his cause1 it follows that the cause might have been lost if a crust of bread had gone the wrong way4 ,it ought surely to be pleasanter if we are entitled to hold that we have a stronger ground of confidence2 that the great victories of thought and action prove the diffusion of enthusiasm and courage through a wide circle2 and that the fall of the chief is sure to make room for a worthy successor4 ,the wider and deeper the causes of progress1 the more confidently we can derive hope from the past1 and accept with comparative equanimity even the most painful catastrophes4 ,nor can ,i agree that such a view implies any want of susceptibility to the claims of the hero4 ,i do not think that we can pay homage too cheerfully to the great men who form landmarks in history4 ,i admit1 most gladly1 that the admiration which we feel for such men2 the thrill which stirs us in reading of the great patriots and martyrs of the past2 the reverence which we are now and then able to pay to a contemporary--to a ,lincoln1 proving that political action may represent real faiths1 not party formulae2 to a ,gordon1 impersonating the sense of duty2 or a ,father ,damien1 sacrificing his life for the lepers--is one of the invaluable elements of moral cultivation4 ,but ,i do not see the connection between this and the desire to exalt the glory of the great man by ignoring the unknown who followed in his steps1 and often made them possible4 ,i have not so far attained to the cosmopolitan point of view that my blood is not stirred by the very name of ,nelson4 ,nay1 however cosmopolitan ,i might become1 ,i hope that my sympathies would never blind me to the greatness of the qualities implied in his patriotic devotion4 ,my cosmopolitanism would rather1 ,i hope1 lead me to appreciate more generously the similar qualities in his antagonists1 and1 also1 the similar qualities in the band of brothers whom he was proud to lead4 ,i should be sorry so to admire ,nelson as to forget the sturdy old race of sea dogs who did their duty1 and helped him to do his in a memorable way1 some ninety years ago4 ,i would rather believe than not that1 had ,nelson been killed at the ,nile1 there were many among his followers who1 had the chance come to them1 would have led the ,victory at ,trafalgar1 and have made ,england impregnable4 ,i trust we have within this realm five hundred good as he is surely the more heroic tone4 ,but1 to drop the old-fashioned appeal to patriotic spirit1 is it not true that1 in every department of life1 it is more congenial to our generous feelings to remember the existence and the importance of those who have never won a general reputation8 ,this has come to be a commonplace in the sphere of scientific discovery4 ,we find1 over and over again1 that the great discoverer has been all but anticipated by his rivals2 that his fame1 if not his real greatness1 depends upon the circumstance that he has just anticipated by a year1 or1 perhaps1 in extreme cases1 by a generation1 results to which a comparatively second-rate thinker would have been competent a few years later4 ,the winner of the race is apt to monopolise the glory1 though he wins only by a hair's breadth4 ,the familiar instance of ,darwin and ,mr4 ,wallace is remarkable1 not because the relation of the two thinkers was unique1 but because1 unfortunately1 the generosity with which each acknowledged the merit of the other was exceptional4 ,a great discovery is made when the fertile thought is already going through the process of incubation in a whole circle of intelligent minds2 and that in which it first comes to the birth1 claims1 or1 at least1 receives1 the whole merit1 by a right of intellectual primogeniture not much more justifiable than the legal right4 ,admitting1 again1 in the fullest sense1 the value and the difficulty of that last step which has to be made in order to reach the crowning triumph1 it would surely be ungenerous to forget the long series of previous explorations by which alone it was made possible4 ,there must have been countless forgotten ,newtons and ,descartes'1 who1 in their day1 had to exert equal powers in order to discover what are now the most familiar truths2 to invent the simplest systems of arithmetical notation1 or solve the earliest geometrical problems1 without which neither a ,newton nor a ,descartes would have been possible4 ,and what is true in science is1 surely1 equally true of activities which touch most of us more nearly4 ,of all undeniable claims to greatness ,i suppose the most undeniable to be the claim of the founders of religions4 ,their disciples are so much impressed by their greatness that they regard them as supernatural beings1 or1 in other words1 as beings who are the sole and indispensable causes of all the consequences attributed to the prevalence of their doctrines4 ,we are told1 constantly1 and often as though it were too obvious to need proof1 that every moral improvement which has taken place in the world since the origin of ,christianity1 is due to ,christianity1 and that ,christianity itself is entirely due to its founder4 ,human nature was utterly corrupt until the ,deity became incarnate in the form of a ,jewish peasant2 and every social or moral step which has since been made in advance--and not one of the unfortunate backslidings by which the advance has since been trammelled--is a direct consequence of that stupendous event4 ,this is the theory of the importance of the individual1 raised1 so to speak1 to its very highest potence4 ,we not only attribute the most important and far-reaching of all changes to a single agent1 but declare that that agent cannot have been human1 and indeed cannot have been less than the first cause of all changes4 ,i shall not1 of course1 discuss the plausibility of a doctrine which1 if accepted1 breaks the whole chain of cause and effect1 and makes the later history of the world not an evolution of previously operative process1 but the result of an abrupt1 mysterious interference from without1 incommensurable with any other set of spiritual forces4 ,i am content to say that to my mind the doctrine becomes daily more impossible to any one who thinks seriously and tries to picture to himself distinctly the true nature of the great world processes4 ,what is to my purpose is1 that it seems to me to be not only infinitely more credible1 but also more satisfactory and more generous--if there be properly a question of generosity--to do justice to the disciples as well as to the master--to believe that the creed was fermenting in the hearts and minds of millions of human beings2 and that1 although the imperfect and superstitious elements by which it was alloyed were due to the medium in which it was propagated1 yet1 on the other hand1 it succeeded so far as it corresponded to the better instincts of great masses of men1 struggling blindly and through many errors to discover rules of conduct and modes of conceiving the universe more congenial than the old to their better nature1 and prepared to form a society by crystallising round the nucleus which best corresponded to their aspirations4 ,when so regarded1 it seems to me1 and only when so regarded1 we can see in the phenomenon something which may give us solid ground for hopes of humanity1 and enable us to do justice to countless obscure benefactors4 ,the corruption of human nature1 as theologians sometimes tell us1 expresses a simple fact4 ,undoubtedly1 it expresses a fact which nobody1 so far as ,i know1 ever thought of denying--the fact that there are bad instincts in human nature2 that many men are cruel1 sensual1 and false2 and that every man is more or less liable to succumb to temptation4 ,but the essential meaning of the old theological dogma was1 ,i take it1 something different4 ,it meant that man was so corrupt that he could only be made good by a miracle2 that even his apparent virtues are splendid sins unless they come from divine grace2 and1 in short1 that men cannot be really elevated without supernatural interference4 ,if all that is good in men comes from their religions1 and if religions are only explicable as inspirations from without1 that1 no doubt1 logically follows4 ,i prefer1 myself1 to believe that1 though all men are weak1 and a good many utter scoundrels2 yet human nature does contain good principles2 that those principles tend1 however slow and imperfect may be the process1 gradually to obtain the mastery2 and that the great religions of the races1 while indicating the intellectual and moral shortcomings of mankind1 indicate also the gradual advance of ethical ideals1 worked out by the natural and essential tendencies of the race4 ,and thus1 as it seems to me1 this conception of the mode of growth of religions and of morality1 which gathers strength as we come to take a more reasonable view of the world's history1 is closely connected with the doctrine that1 instead of ascribing all good achievement to the hero who drops from heaven1 or springs spontaneously from the earth1 we should steadily remember that he is only possible1 and his work can only be successfully secured1 by the tacit co-operation of the innumerable unknown persons in whose hearts his words find an echo because they are already feeling after the same ideal which is in him more completely embodied4 ,in our judgment of such cases there is1 then1 an injustice so far as we make a false estimate of the right distribution of praise and gratitude4 ,it would be an injustice1 in a stricter sense1 to the persons ignored1 if we regarded such gratitude as the appropriate and main reward of a noble life4 ,i need not repeat the commonplaces of moralists as to the real value of posthumous fame1 nor inquire whether it implies an illusion1 nor how far the desire for such fame is1 in point of fact1 a strong motive with many people4 ,this only ,i will note--that obscurity is a condition1 and by no means an altogether unpleasant condition1 of much of the very best work that is done4 ,the general or the statesman is conspicuous in connection with successful enterprise in which his subordinates necessarily do a great part of the labour4 ,it is impossible for the outside world to form a correct judgment in such cases2 and1 therefore1 there is no hardship to the particular persons concerned1 if they are simply ignored where they would1 certainly1 be misjudged2 and if they1 therefore1 work in obscurity1 content with the approval of the very few who can estimate their merits4 ,there is a compensation1 as we see1 when we reflect upon the moral disadvantages of conspicuous station4 ,literary people1 for example1 must be very unobservant if they do not notice how demoralising is the influence of public applause1 and the constant inducement to court notoriety4 ,it is unwholesome to live in an atmosphere which constantly stimulates and incites the weaknesses to which we are most liable4 ,and many of our first writers must1 ,i should fancy1 feel pangs of self-humiliation when they contrast the credit which they have got for popular work with the very scanty recognition which comes to many who have applied equal talents to the discharge of duties often far more beneficial to mankind1 but1 from their nature1 performed in the shade4 ,i1 such a man1 ,i fancy1 must sometimes say to himself1 am quoted in every newspaper2 ,i am puffed1 and praised1 and denounced2 not to know me is to write yourself down a dunce2 and1 yet1 have ,i done as much for the good of my kind as this or that humble friend1 who would be astonished were his name ever to be uttered in public8 ,some such thought1 for example1 is inspired by ,johnson's most pathetic verses1 when the great lexicographer1 the acknowledged dictator of ,english literature1 thought of the poor dependant1 the little humble quack doctor1 ,levett1 who was content1 literally1 to be fed with the crumbs from his tables4 ,but the obscure dependant1 as the patron felt1 had done all that he could to alleviate the sum of human misery4 ,his virtues walked their narrow round1 ,nor made a pause1 nor left a void2 ,and1 sure1 the ,eternal ,master found ,the single talent well employed4 ,have ,i not1 ,johnson seems to have felt1 really done less to soothe misery by my ,dictionary and my ,ramblers than this obscure labourer in the back lanes of ,london1 of whom1 but for my verses1 no one would have heard even the name8 ,a full answer to questions suggested by these thoughts would1 perhaps1 require an estimate of the relative value of different aims and different functions in life2 and1 for such an estimate1 there are no adequate grounds4 ,in one of ,browning's noblest poems1 ,rabbi ,ben ,ezra--of whom ,i must say that he strikes me as being a little too self-complacent--puts a relevant question4 ,who1 he asks1 shall arbitrate8 ,ten men love what ,i hate2 ,shun what ,i follow1 slight what ,i receive2 ,ten who1 in ears and eyes1 ,match me2 we all surmise1 ,they this thing and ,i that3 whom shall my soul believe8 ,and he answers or suggests one condition of a satisfactory answer1 by saying that we are not to take the coarse judgment of the world1 which goes by the work achieved4 ,we must remember-- ,all instincts immature1 ,all purposes unsure1 ,that1 weighed not as his work1 yet swelled the man's account2 ,thoughts hardly to be packed ,into a narrow act2 ,fancies that broke through language and escaped2 ,all ,i would never be1 ,all men ignored in me1 ,that ,i was worth to ,god1 whose wheel the pitcher shaped4 ,if it were proper to treat a poetical utterance of this kind like a deliberate philosophical theory1 ,i might wish to argue the point a little with the rabbi4 ,but1 at any rate1 he points to considerations which show how little any one can judge of merit by any tangible and generally accessible test4 ,i am content to say that this sentiment gives one--and a very impressive--answer to a problem which presses upon us the more as we grow older4 ,it is natural for a man who feels that he has done most of his work1 that the night is coming1 and1 as it seems1 coming with accelerated speed2 who feels1 too1 that whatever he has done or may do1 he can no longer have the approval of those whose approval was dear to him as his breath2--it is natural for such a man to look back1 to take stock more or less of his own performances perhaps1 and at any rate to endeavour to estimate at their true worth the services which he has received from others4 ,what1 he may ask1 has he done with his talents8 what little fragment has he achieved of what might once have been in his power8 ,the answer is pretty sure to have a very melancholy side to it2 and it will lead to the question1 what part of that fragment was really worth doing8 ,what were the few really solid services which he may set off as some satisfaction to his self-esteem1 against his countless errors and his wanderings in wrong directions1 and his attempts to achieve the impossible1 and the waste of energy upon the trifling and the worthless in which he is pretty sure to have spent a very large proportion of his time8 ,when we try to return a verdict upon such issues1 we feel painfully to how many illusions we are subject4 ,when we are young we naturally accept the commonplaces1 and do not question the ideals amid which we happen to have grown up2 we are not conscious of the movement which we share4 ,as long as we are floating with the current1 we are not even aware that any current exists4 ,we take our own little world to be the fixed base1 quite unconscious that it is all the time whirling and spinning along a most complex course4 ,and so it is difficult1 even if the thought of making the attempt ever occurs to us1 to try to occupy the position of a bystander looking on at life from outside1 and endeavouring to pronounce some general opinion as to its merits or defects--its happiness or misery as a whole4 ,what a queer place this is6 ,i remember a man once saying to me abruptly2 and ,i thought that he was referring to the steamboat on which we were fellow-passengers4 ,i found that he had been suddenly struck by the oddity of the universe in general2 and it seemed to me that there was a great deal to be said for a remark which seldom occurs to those people who take things for granted4 ,we are roused sometimes by a philosopher who professes pessimism or optimism1 to ask and to try to answer such questions4 ,the answers1 we know1 are apt to be painfully discordant4 ,is the world on the whole a scene of misery1 of restless desires1 proving that we are miserable now1 and doomed never to obtain satisfaction8 is it our only wisdom to give up the will to live2 to hope that all this visible and tangible scenery is so much illusion1 and to aspire to sink into ,nirvana8 ,shall we try to conquer all earthly appetites by a thorough-going asceticism1 and cultivate those spiritual emotions which can only find full satisfaction in another and a better world8 ,or shall we agree that1 after all1 the love of the true and the beautiful1 or1 it may be1 the physically pleasurable1 gives a real solid comfort for the time1 which it would be idle to drop for a shadow8 ,is the world a scene of probation1 in which we are to be fitted for higher spheres beyond human ken by the hearty and strenuous exertion of every faculty that we possess8 or shall we say that such action is a good in itself1 which requires to be supplemented by no vision of any ulterior end8 ,shall we say that this is the best of all possible worlds because the fittest always tends to prevail1 or that it is the worst because even the greatest wretchedness which is compatible with bare existence can still survive8 ,philosophers1 no doubt1 contradict each other1 because even philosophers are not exempt from the universal weakness4 ,the explanation that pessimism means a disordered liver1 and the counter remark that optimism means a cold heart and a good digestion1 are too familiar to need exposition4 ,each man's macrocosm is apt to be related to his microcosm1 as the convex to the concave of a curve4 ,to say the world is disagreeable1 means that ,i find it disagreeable2 and that may be either my own fault or the world's4 ,nor is it easy to correct the personal error by observation1 for the observer carries himself and his illusions with him4 ,has such-and-such a life been a happy one8 ,how are we to decide8 ,we are often subject to what may be called the dramatic illusion4 ,we judge by the catastrophe1 by the success or failure of the assumed end4 ,we see a noble young man struck down by some accident1 and we think of his career sadly1 because the promise has not been fulfilled4 ,is it not equally reasonable to say that the promise was itself a blessing8 that the man we regret had his twenty or thirty years of hopefulness1 confidence1 and happiness1 and that that was a clear gain even if we lose the result which we might have anticipated8 ,or we are impressed by the more exciting incidents of a life1 the blows which crushed a man at intervals2 and we forget all the monotonous years of tranquil happiness which1 if we apply an arithmetical test1 may have occupied by far the greater part of his existence4 ,southey1 for example1 argues that although we remember ,cowper chiefly for his terrible mental suffering1 we shall find1 if we add up the moments of happiness and misery1 that he probably had1 on the balance1 a life of much more enjoyment than torture4 ,so1 when we speak of the misery of a nation at the time of some great trouble--the ,french ,revolution1 for example--it is difficult to remember how small was the proportion of actual sufferers2 how many thousands or millions of children were enjoying their little sports1 utterly ignorant of the distant storm2 how many mothers were absorbed in watching their children2 and how many quiet commonplace people were going about their daily peaceful labour1 pretty much as usual1 and with only a vague--and possibly pleasurable--excitement at the news1 which occasionally drifted to them1 of the catastrophes in a different sphere4 ,carlyle1 in one of his most vivid and famous passages1 has incidentally drawn the contrast4 ,or1 if we try to form an estimate of the balance of happiness and misery through any portion of the race1 and appeal to experience for an answer1 we must certainly remember how limited is the field of observation1 even of the best informed1 and the most impartial2 how rigidly they are confined for their direct knowledge to one little section of one part of the race2 and how the vast majority--the thousand millions or so who are altogether beyond their ken--are known to them only by statistical tables or the casual reports of superficial observers4 ,as there are so many difficulties in forming an estimate1 as we are not agreed as to the true ends of human life1 nor as to the degrees in which those ends are actually attained1 nor as to the efficacy of the various causes which determine the success or failure of the means employed1 it becomes any one to put forward his own opinion upon the topics to which such considerations apply1 with all modesty4 ,and1 yet1 ,i think that ,i may dwell upon some truths which may be admitted by those who differ upon these difficult problems1 and1 as ,i fancy1 deserve more weight than they generally receive1 even though they have become commonplaces4 ,the main condition of human happiness1 say some people1 is physical health4 ,a man whose organs are all working satisfactorily cannot fail to be happy under any but very abnormal conditions2 as1 conversely1 a grain of sand in the wrong place will make any life a burden4 ,no one will dispute the truth contained in such dicta2 and1 perhaps1 as we realise more distinctly the importance of sound health to our neighbours and to our descendants1 as well as to ourselves1 we shall lay greater stress upon the conduct which is conducive to its preservation4 ,we shall see that what is1 apparently1 a mere dictate of personal prudence1 has1 also1 its ethical aspect4 ,but1 without dwelling upon this view1 we may apply the analogy to society4 ,whatever morality precisely means1 and whatever happiness means1 it clearly indicates what we call--and ,i think that it is no mere metaphor--a healthy state of society4 ,this1 again1 implies1 first of all1 the health of those domestic relations which are as the ultimate molecular forces which bind together the social tissue4 ,the society1 we may say without hesitation1 in which the reciprocal duties of husbands and wives1 parents and children1 are instinctively recognised and habitually observed1 has1 so far1 secured the most deeply-seated and essential condition of happiness and virtue2 the society in which the union of married people normally produces harmony1 and the absolute identity of interests and affections1 in which children are brought up in a pure home atmosphere1 with an embodiment of the beauty of domestic love always before their eyes1 imbibing unconsciously the tradition of a high moral standard1 and so prepared to repay1 in due time1 to others the services lavishly and ungrudgingly bestowed upon them by their elders1--so far represents perfectly sound health4 ,the degree in which any ethical theory recognises and reveals the essential importance of the family relation is1 ,i think1 the best test of its approximation to the truth4 ,an unworthy view of domestic happiness may lead to the ascetic view which sets up a sham and ,quixotic ideal2 or to the cynical view which regards it as a mere case of selfish indulgence4 ,i do not deny that the relation1 like all other human relations1 may require modification as circumstances change4 ,difficulties arise1 as when we notice the great social changes which have broken up ancient ties1 and have tended to weaken the family bond by facilitating desertion1 and increasing the floating population4 ,and many socialist schemes appear at first sight to be1 and sometimes are1 consciously designed to weaken the sense of responsibility of parents4 ,i1 of course1 cannot now discuss a point which is1 undoubtedly1 of the highest importance2 but ,i am certainly convinced that the merits of any change must be tested by its tendency to preserve1 and1 if possible1 intensify the strength of this underlying bond upon which the welfare of society depends far more intimately than upon any other human relation4 ,if this be true1 it follows also that to those activities which knit families together1 which help to enlarge the highest ideal of domestic life1 we owe a greater debt than to any other kind of conduct4 ,and to this ,i add that1 as ,i believe1 the highest services of this kind are rendered by persons condemned1 or perhaps ,i should say privileged1 to live in obscurity2 whose very names will soon be forgotten1 and who are entirely eclipsed by people whose services1 though not equally valuable1 are by their nature more public4 ,to prove such an assertion is1 of course1 impossible4 ,i give it only as my personal impression--for what it is worth1 after any deductions you may please to make upon the score of the great fallibility of such impressions2 and only because1 correct or otherwise1 it may serve to bring out aspects of the truth which we are apt to neglect4 ,i have lived long enough to have had opportunities of seeing many eminent men and women4 ,i have insensibly formed some kind of estimate of the services which they have rendered to me and my like2 and ,i record1 as far as ,i can1 the result upon my own convictions4 ,i will put aside for the moment the half-dozen men of really first-rate eminence1--the men whose names are written upon all the great intellectual and social movements of the century4 ,i will think for the present only of those who may be placed in the second rank2 of those who do not profess to have originated1 but only to have diffused1 important thoughts2 who have acted as lieutenants to the great leaders1 and become known to their contemporaries1 with little prospect of filling any important place in the memory of their successors4 ,yet even such men bulk far more largely in our eyes than multitudes of men and women whose names will never be known outside their own little parish1 or even their family circles4 ,and then ,i ask myself1 how far the estimate thus formed corresponds to the real value of the services performed4 ,i think that ,i can speak most easily by deserting the line of abstract argument1 and endeavouring to draw a portrait or two1 which you need not assume to correspond too closely to particular facts4 ,i mean to suggest reflections which will really apply in many representative cases1 and to refer to typical instances of general truths4 ,i will first mention one such case which happened to strike me forcibly at the time1 and which no one here1 ,i am quite certain1 will be able to identify4 ,long years ago ,i knew a young man at college2 he was so far from being intellectually eminent that he had great difficulty in passing his examinations2 he died from the effects of an accident within a very short time after leaving the university1 and hardly any one would now remember his name4 ,he had not the smallest impression that there was anything remarkable about himself1 and looked up to his teachers and his more brilliant companions with a loyal admiration which would have made him wonder that they should ever take notice of him4 ,and yet ,i often thought then1 and ,i believe1 in looking back1 that ,i thought rightly1 that he was of more real use to his contemporaries than any one of the persons to whose influence they would most naturally refer as having affected their development4 ,the secret was a very simple one4 ,without any special intellectual capacity1 he somehow represented with singular completeness a beautiful moral type4 ,he possessed the simple faith miscalled simplicity1 and was so absolutely unselfish1 so conspicuously pure in his whole life and conduct1 so unsuspicious of evil in others1 so sweet and loyal in his nature1 that to know him was to have before one's eyes an embodiment of some of the most lovable and really admirable qualities that a human being can possess4 ,he was a living exemplification of the truth which some great humorists have embodied in their writings1 the truth that simplicity at which fools laugh may be venerable to wise observers4 ,young men were not always immaculate in those days3 ,i don't know that they are now2 some of them probably were vicious in conduct1 and might be cynical in the views which they openly expressed4 ,but whatever might be their failings1 they were at the age when all but the depraved--that is1 ,i hope and fully believe1 all but a very small minority--were capable of being deeply impressed by this concrete example4 ,they might affect to ridicule1 but it was impossible that even the ridicule should not be of the kindly sort2 blended and tempered with something that was more like awe--profound respect1 at least1 for the beauty of soul that underlay the humble exterior4 ,the direct moral addresses which took the form of eloquent sermons or of good advice naturally gained an incomparably higher reputation for those who uttered them4 ,but1 considering the facility with which the impressions so made evaporate from the minds of the hearers1 ,i often thought that this obscure influence1 the more impressive when one felt it because of its entire unconsciousness1 probably did far more to stimulate good feelings and higher aspirations among his companions than all the official exhortations to which they ever listened4 ,he would have been unfeignedly surprised to hear1 what ,i most sincerely believe to be the truth1 that his tutor owed incomparably more to his living exemplification of what is meant by a character of unblemished purity and simplicity1 than he owed to the tutor whose respectable platitudes he received with unaffected humility4 ,the case--for various reasons--impressed me deeply2 and ,i have often thought of it and of the principle which it illustrates in later years4 ,i once knew1 for example1 a woman whose whole life was devoted to domestic duties1 and who confessed to me that she had sometimes felt a touch of humiliation when she thought how narrow was her own sphere of action1 while her husband was daily deciding upon great questions of high political importance4 ,some women would have drawn the conclusion1 that the exclusion of women from political activity was a grievance to be abated2 and such people might receive with scorn the suggestion that the discharge of the domestic duty might possibly be as important as the discharge of the more conspicuous function4 ,the argument about the proper sphere of women is now generally treated with contempt2 and ,i am perfectly ready to admit that it begs the question1 and is often a mere utterance of blind prejudice4 ,no one1 ,i hope1 could assert more willingly than ,i1 that the faculties of women should be cultivated as fully as possible1 and that every sphere in which their faculties can be effectively applied should be thrown open to them4 ,but the doctrine sometimes tacitly confounded with this1 that the sphere generally assigned to women is necessarily lower or less important than others1 is not to be admitted1 because the contradictory may be misapplied4 ,the domestic influence is1 no doubt1 confined within narrower limits2 but then1 within those limits it is incomparably stronger and more certain of effect4 ,the man or woman can really mould the character of a little circle1 and determine the whole life of one little section of the next generation2 when it may be very difficult to say whether the influence which they can bring to bear upon a class or a nation is really perceptible at all1 or does not even operate in the direction opposite to that intended4 ,and ,i could not help thinking that a woman who was bringing up sons and daughters ready to quit themselves like brave men and women in the great struggle of life1 might be doing something more really important than her conspicuous husband1 who was1 after all1 only part of a vast and complicated machinery1 nominally directed by him1 but1 in reality1 controlling all his energy1 and1 not impossibly1 working out the very results which he most disapproved4 ,it is1 therefore1 with no reference to any of the political theories of women's rights1 and so forth1 that ,i venture to insist upon this topic4 ,i think that we habitually under-estimate the enormous value of the services1 whether of man or woman1 done in the shade1 and confined within a very limited area4 ,let me attempt1 again1 to draw a portrait1 not all imaginary1 which may explain1 at least1 what ,i often feel--the contrast between the real worth of such lives and the recognition which they can ever receive4 ,wordsworth1 in one of those poems which show best how true and tender were his moral instincts1 has described one who was-- ,a perfect woman1 nobly planned ,to warn1 to comfort1 and command2 ,and yet a spirit too1 and bright ,with something of an angel light4 ,the words have often come to me of late1 till ,i fancy that ,i could supply a commentary4 ,the woman of whom ,wordsworth speaks was1 when he first saw her1 a phantom of delight1 an embodiment of feminine beauty1 and1 as such1 possessing a characteristic perhaps superfluous from a moral point of view4 ,i have known and know women1 not exactly beautiful1 before whom ,i would gladly bow as deeply as ,i would if they were beautiful as ,helen of ,troy4 ,but a poet must be allowed to take pleasure in beauty1 and we may grant to it a certain place that it deserves among higher qualities4 ,for it does so when the possessor is absolutely--not unaware of the fact1 for that is hardly possible1 nor1 perhaps1 desirable--but absolutely untouched by any vanity or self-consciousness4 ,the beauty1 one may say1 gives1 at least1 an opportunity for displaying a quality which otherwise would not have so good an occasion of manifestation4 ,and1 moreover1 there is a beauty of the rarest and most exquisite1 which1 if not the product1 is1 or at least seems to be1 the spontaneous accompaniment of nobility of mind and character4 ,some persons1 by a singular felicity1 possess beauty as one of their essential attributes2 it seems to be not an accident or an addition1 but a part of their essence1 which must mould every detail1 which shines through body as well as soul1 and is but the outward and visible sign of all that is sweet and elevated4 ,wordsworth's ideal woman is-- ,not too bright or good ,for human nature's daily food1 ,for transient sorrows1 simple wiles1 ,praise1 blame1 love1 kisses1 tears and smiles3 and yet displays equally-- ,the reason firm1 the temperate will1 ,endurance1 foresight1 strength1 and skill4 ,we cannot1 even in our thoughts1 separate the artistic homage which we pay to the external appearance1 and that which we pay to the inner qualities1 of which they are apparently the inevitable and predestined symbol4 ,we have before us the ideal--the type which reconciles all the conditions of human life1 physical and moral--the perfect woman1 who is also the fitting vehicle of the angel light4 ,but it is1 of course1 upon the qualities symbolised and not upon the outward symbols that we must insist4 ,i will1 therefore1 say1 that the inward beauty1 whether fully represented or not by the outward form1 implies1 in the first place1 the absence of all those qualities which tend to lower and vulgarise life4 ,what we call the worldly view1 for example1 of love and marriage1 is simply unintelligible to such a nature4 ,love means1 to it1 an absolute self-surrender1 and the complete fusion of its own life with the life of the beloved object4 ,it can only be granted in return for a reciprocal surrender2 and becomes the mutual passion by which fear and distrust are utterly cast out2 and the intensity proves not liability to weak illusions1 but the sure insight of the lofty instincts which cannot fail to recognise corresponding instincts in others4 ,to the lower mind1 such a character appears to be too highly strung1 too impassioned1 romantic1 and careless of the solid advantages which secure at least comfort4 ,to those of more or less congenial sentiment1 it will rather appear to imply a spirit which1 because it breathes a higher element than that at which men habitually live1 perceives also more distinctly what are the truest and deepest sources of all that deserves to be called real happiness4 ,to live in an atmosphere of the strongest and most unqualified affection1 to have the very substance of life woven out of the unreserved love of a worthy object1 is its ideal2 and that ideal represents1 ,i am convinced1 the highest and purest happiness that can be enjoyed in this world4 ,suppose1 now1 that one so endowed is struck by one of those terrible blows which shiver the very foundations of life2 which make the outside world a mere discordant nightmare1 and seem to leave for the only reality a perpetual and gnawing pain1 which lulls for an instant only to be revived by every contact with facts4 ,sorrow becomes the element in which one lives and moves4 ,consolation1 according to the familiar phrase1 is idle2 for the vulgar notion of consoling is that which ,sir ,walter ,scott attributes to one of his characters3 it is to try to prove that the very thing for which we offer consolation has not happened--in other words1 to undertake an enterprise which is obviously hopeless and illusory4 ,yet the greatest test of true nobility of character is its power of turning even the bitterest grief to account4 ,the lofty and simple nature sorrows2 it does not attempt to shut its eyes to the full extent of the calamity1 nor seek to distract itself by a forgetfulness which might obscure its most sacred visions of the past2 nor1 on the other hand1 to make a parade of its sensibility1 or try to foster or stimulate enervating emotions4 ,it knows instinctively that grief1 terrible as it is1 is yet1 in another sense1 an invaluable possession4 ,the sufferer who has eaten his bread with herbs learns1 as the poet puts it1 to know the heavenly powers4 ,for he or she acquires a deeper and keener sympathy with all who are desolate and afflicted2 and the natural affections become blended1 if with a certain melancholy1 yet with that quick and delicate perception of the suffering of others which gives the only consolation worthy of the name--the sense of something soothing and softening and inspiring in the midst of the bitterest agony4 ,grief1 so taken1 may be stunning and deadening for the time2 it may make life a heavy burden1 from which hope and eager interest have disappeared3 weary1 stale1 flat1 and unprofitable2 but by slow degrees it undergoes a transmutation into more steady and profound love of whatsoever may still be left4 ,the broken and mangled fibres imperceptibly find new attachments2 and the only solution of the terrible dilemma is reached when time1 which heals the actual laceration1 enables the sufferer to feel that the new ties do not imply infidelity to the objects still beloved1 but are a continuous development of the indelible emotions1 and that the later activities are but a carrying on of the old duties1 made more sacred and solemn by the old grief and its associations4 ,a lofty nature which has profited by passing through the furnace acquires claims not only upon our love but upon our reverence4 ,it becomes perhaps within the little circle with which it is familiar the obvious and immediate resort whenever some blow of sorrow or sickness has fallen upon one of its fellows4 ,the figure which ,i attempt truly to describe is happily not unfamiliar4 ,we have all1 ,i hope1 known some one who is instinctively called to mind whenever there is need of the loving kindness which seems so obvious and spontaneous that it does not even occur to the bestower to connect the conduct with self-sacrifice4 ,such persons appear to be formed by nature for ministering angels1 and move among us unconscious of their claims to our devotion1 and bringing light into darkness by their simple presence with as little thought that they deserve our gratitude as that they ought to emerge from obscurity4 ,happiness1 peaceful and contented at least1 if not the old bright and confident happiness1 may come in time2 and new spheres be bound together by the attractive force of a character which1 if it is not more intrinsically lovable1 has gained a more pathetic charm from its experience4 ,the desire to relieve suffering has become a settled instinct2 and1 even when there is no special appeal to it1 is incessantly overflowing in those little1 nameless1 unremembered acts of kindness and of love which1 according to ,wordsworth again1 are the best portion of a good man's life4 ,whether that be quite true ,i know not2 but in so far as such acts seem to testify most unequivocally to the constant flow of a current of sympathetic tenderness1 always ready to seize upon every occasion of giving happiness1 on a child's birthday as on the parent's deathbed1 they perhaps speak to us most convincingly of an all-pervading sweetness of character4 ,an assiduous and watchful desire to show kindness1 which makes a perpetual succession of such little attentions a part of the practical religion of the doer1 may generate a corresponding love even more forcibly than the sacrifices made in obedience to a more conspicuous appeal for help4 ,the value of such a life as ,i have tried imperfectly to indicate is not to be estimated by the number of good actions performed1 or by any definite list of the particular consequences achieved4 ,it may be hard to say how many pangs have been soothed1 how much happiness has been added in special cases1 by one who goes through life absorbed in such activities4 ,but above and beyond all the separate instances1 such a person1--the object only to a few1 perhaps1 of love and reverence1 but to those few the object of those feelings in the most unreserved and unequivocal form1--is something far more than a source of any number of particular benefits4 ,to reckon up and estimate the value of such benefits is a conceivable undertaking2 but we cannot attempt to calculate the value of a spiritual force which has moulded our lives1 which has helped by a simple consciousness of its existence to make us gentler1 nobler1 and purer in our thoughts of the world2 which has constantly set before us a loftier ideal than we could frame for ourselves2 which has bestowed upon us an ever-present criterion of the goodness or badness of our own motives by our perception of the light in which they appear to a simple and elevated character2 which has made every cowardly and worldly thought shrink away abashed in the presence of noble instincts2 which has given us a sympathy so close and constant that1 as with the light of the sun1 we are apt to be unconscious of its essential importance to us until some accident makes us realise the effect of its eclipse2 and which1 therefore1 has in some sense become a part of ourselves1 a restraining and elevating and softening impulse1 to which we cling as to the worthiest and most indispensable of our possessions4 ,i am not speaking from imagination4 ,i am trying to utter convictions springing from my personal experience1 and which ,i feel--most painfully--that ,i cannot adequately express4 ,i could not say more1 even if by saying more ,i could express myself adequately1 without a sense of a kind of profanity for uttering what should be kept for a few4 ,but though ,i speak for myself1 ,i hope and ,i entirely believe that ,i am therefore speaking for many others also4 ,there are few who have the eyes to see who have not recognised some such light shining upon their lives1 and as one main source of what they have done or said if least unworthy4 ,i fancy that the thought which naturally occurs to us when we reflect upon such an influence will be3 was ,i1 could ,i1 be worthy of it8 what am ,i that such goodness should have come to me8 or1 what1 if anything1 have ,i done to transmit to others the blessings conferred upon me8 ,such questions have various aspects1 and ,i do not quite see how they could be reduced to a form admitting of a bare logical answer4 ,it now seems to me almost unbecoming to dwell upon the comparison which ,i contemplated at starting4 ,i imagined a man who has made some such impression upon the world as is recognised by public reputation1 to compare his own achievement with such achievements as these1 which are absolutely private1 and neither seek nor desire any public reward4 ,in truth1 the two things are1 perhaps1 strictly incommensurable4 ,they must be measured by different standards1 and are of importance in different spheres4 ,and yet ,i must try to say this much4 ,the achievements to which ,i have referred as in their nature public and recognisable1 should certainly be considered with gratitude4 ,yet1 when we attempt to estimate their worth we are sensible of terrible drawbacks4 ,i have passed1 let us say1 a measure admirably useful1 or written a book which has made a mark4 ,certainly ,i have done a good action4 ,but what if ,i had not done it8 ,were there not hundreds of people who would have been only too glad to take my place8 ,i have been successful because ,i happen to have been in the front rank1 which was impelled by thousands of eager supporters4 ,i have said just a little better than my rivals what they were all striving to say2 and my highest reward will be that my name will be attached in my own generation1 and possibly even in the next1 to some particular opinion which yet would have come to the birth without me4 ,i have made a certain commotion on the surface for a moment or two1 but the ripple will die away in a few years2 and1 important as ,i may seem to myself1 ,i have only to look back for a generation to recognise the plain fact that there have not been at any period more than one or two conspicuous workers the products of whose activity can be distinctly recognised at the present day4 ,even in regard to them1 it is often doubtful whether they did more harm or good2 whether they did not direct human energy along the wrong paths1 and do as much in giving currency to fallacies as in extending permanent truths4 ,now1 after making such deductions1 which to me1 at least1 seem to be essentially necessary1 we can1 ,i think1 do justice to the truth which is contained in ,browning's poem4 ,you are not1 he seems to say1 to measure the worth of life by the amount of work done in it1 by the tangible and obvious results which can be tested by the world's coarse finger and thumb4 ,rather1 he suggests1 the value depends upon the excellence of the soul which is fashioned into heaven's consummate cup by the stress of the potter's wheel2 by the joys and sorrows1 the trials and triumphs1 which have affected it in its passage through life4 ,i should prefer to say that the kind of dilemma so suggested is not really to the purpose4 ,the rabbi may seem to speak1 as ,i said1 with a little too much complacency1 if he be interpreted as sharing the feeling which is often1 however unjustly1 attributed to ,goethe--that his supreme end was the cultivation of his own nature1 and that he regarded himself as a work of art1 to be elaborated for its own sake1 and enriched by experience even at the cost of others4 ,but in a better interpretation this does not apply3 for the very process by which the noble nature is developed and cultivated1 implies the closest and most active sympathy with suffering1 and an invariable reference to the highest aims of life4 ,it becomes perfect1 that is1 by constantly rendering invaluable services to others2 and there is1 therefore1 no meaning in drawing a distinction between the services and the influence upon the soul itself4 ,they are parts of the same indivisible process4 ,what is true and noble1 as ,i think1 in the rabbi's doctrine1 is that which ,i have already tried to indicate3 namely1 that the worth of such a life is not exhausted by a catalogue of the good deeds done1 but that1 beyond and above all them1 remains the inestimable value within its own circle of the very existence of a natural symbol of the good and holy--by the holy ,i understand that which is not only moral1 but beautiful by reason of its morality--and the incalculable benefits to it of the pure fountain of all good influences which descend upon all within its reach4 ,the stimulus which is given to the beholders of such a life--by the clear perception that morality does not mean a string of judicious commonplaces1 but can be embodied as the spring of a harmonious life1 and reveal itself as a concrete flesh-and-blood human being--is something which transcends in value all the particular results which we can tabulate and reckon up4 ,we must think of it1 not as the cause of so many external benefits1 but as the manifestation of a spiritual force which modifies and raises the characters of all its surroundings4 ,if the sphere within which it distinctly operates is far narrower than that of political or literary achievement1 it is also incomparably purer1 and works without a single drawback4 ,every religion has its saints1 and honours them in various ways1 not always altogether edifying4 ,but that man is unfortunate who has not a saint of his own--some one in whose presence1 or in the very thought of whom1 he does not recognise a superior1 before whom it becomes him to bow with reverence and gratitude1 and who has purified the atmosphere and strengthened the affections in a little circle from which the influence may be transmitted to others4 ,the saint will be forgotten all too soon--long before less valuable1 but accidentally more conspicuous1 services have passed out of mind--but the moral elevation1 even of a small circle1 is a benefit which may be propagated indefinitely4 ,if we cannot hope to preserve the name1 we can try to carry on the good work2 to maintain the ties which have been formed and propagate the goodwill through widening circles4 ,that1 ,i think1 is what every one feels under the stress of the most terrible trials of life4 ,we are shocked by the sense of the inevitable oblivion that will hide all that we loved so well4 ,there is1 according to my experience1 only one thought which is inspiring1 and--if not in the vulgar sense consoling1 for it admits the existence of an unspeakable calamity--points1 at least1 to the direction in which we may gradually achieve something like peace and hopefulness without the slightest disloyalty to the objects of our love4 ,it is the thought which ,i can only express by saying that we may learn to feel as if those who had left us had yet become part of ourselves2 that we have become so permeated by their influence1 that we can still think of their approval and sympathy as a stimulating and elevating power1 and be conscious that we are more or less carrying on their work1 in their spirit4 ,we find1 as ,lowell says in his noble ode-- ,we find in our dull road their shining track2 ,in every nobler mood ,we feel the orient of their spirit glow1 ,part of our life's unalterable good1 ,of all our saintlier aspiration2 ,they come transfigured back1 ,secure from change in their high-hearted ways1 ,beautiful evermore1 and with the rays ,of morn on their white shields of expectation4 ,alas1 he adds1 even the best deeds will be hidden before long by the thoughtless drift of the deciduous years4 ,yes2 they will be forgotten before long1 as we too shall be forgotten--the incalculable majority within a generation or two4 ,the thought may be painful1 but the reasonable conclusion is1 ,i think1 not that we should fret over the inevitable2 rather that we should purify our minds from this as from other illusions1 and feel ashamed of the selfish desire that our own names should be preserved when we know that so many who were far better and nobler than ourselves will inevitably be forgotten1 and were better and nobler without the stimulus of any such paltry desire4 ,gratitude to the obscure is1 in this sense1 ,i take it1 a duty1 which we cannot practise without a proportional moral benefit4 ,it enables us to rise above the constant temptation to seek for notoriety at any price1 and to make our ultimate aim the achievement of good work1 not the chorus of popular applause which may be aroused4 ,thoroughly to conquer that temptation is1 ,i take it1 one of the objects which every man should set before himself4 ,and nothing1 ,i think1 helps one more than a vivid and enduring consciousness of the enormous debt which we owe to men and women who lived in obscurity1 who never had a thought of emerging out of obscurity1 and whose ennobling influence has yet become a part of every higher principle of action in ourselves4 ,i may or ,i may not have formed too low an estimate of the services of the few heroes who stand conspicuously above the ordinary level2 but ,i am certain that nothing that ,i can say would exaggerate the importance of many who have no claims to such a position4 ,to cherish and preserve that influence by every faculty we possess seems to me to be our plainest duty2 and we may comfort ourselves1 if comfort be needed1 by the reflection that1 though the memory may be transitory1 the good done by a noble life and character may last far beyond any horizon which can be realised by our imaginations4 ,,the ,,end4 ,,footnote3 ,a ,see the ,wealth of ,nature1 in ,essays by a ,barrister ,sir ,james ,fitzjames ,stephen4 ,,aberdeen ,,university ,,press4