,a ,,logic ,,of ,,facts3  or  ,every-day
 ,reasoning  ,by ,g4 ,j4 ,holyoake      
,call him wise whose thoughts and words 
are a clear       because to a clear    
why4--,lavater4  ,,fourth ,,thousand4   
,,london3 ,f4 ,,farrah1 #bhb1 ,,strand1 
,w4,c4  #ahff4     ,,introduction ,,of  
#ahdh4  ,the ,logic of the ,schools1    
however indispensable in its place1     
fails to meet half the common want in   
daily life4 ,the ,logic of the ,schools 
begins with the management of the       
premises of an argument2 there is1      
however1 a more practical lesson to be  
learned in beginning with the premises  
themselves4 ,a thousand errors arise    
through the assumption of premises for  
one arising in the misplacement of      
terms4 ,the ,logic of the ,schools is an
 elaborate attack upon the lesser evil4 
,sir ,james ,mackintosh has remarked    
that ',popular reason can alone correct 
popular sophistry'--and it is in vain   
that we expect amendment in the         
reasoning of the multitude1 unless we   

make reasoning intelligible to the      
multitude4 ,as to my object1 could ,i1  
like ,gridiron-,cobbett1 adopt a symbol 
of it1 ,i would have engraved ,a,esop's 
',old ,man and his ,ass1' who1 in a vain
 attempt to please everybody1 failed    
7like his disciples--for even he has    
disciples7 to please anybody4 ,the folly
 of that superfluously philanthropic old
 gentleman should teach us proportion of
 purpose4 ,to be of real service2 to    
some is in the compass of individual    
capacity1 and consequently1 the true way
 of serving1 if not of pleasing all4    
,the republic of literature1 like       
society1 has its aristocratic1 its      
middle1 and its lower classes4 ,no one  
has combined1 in one performance1 the   
refinement applauded in the             
universities1 with the practical        
purpose1 popular among those who toil to
 live1 and live to toil4 ,the populace  
are my choice--of them ,i am one1 and1  
like a recent premier1 ,earl ,grey1 am  
disposed 'to stand by my order4' ,i     

write for this class both from affection
 and taste4 ,if ,i can benefit any1 ,i  
can them4 ,i know their difficulties1   
for ,i have encountered them--their     
wants1 for they have been mine4 ,this   
will account for the liberties taken    
with the subjects upon which ,i treat4  
,there is more than one kind of hunger  
that will break through barriers1 and ,i
 have taken with an unlicensed hand1    
wherever it was to be found1 what ,i    
wanted for myself1 and what ,i know to  
be wanted by those who stand at the     
anvil and the loom1 and who never had   
the benefits of scholastic education1   
and who never will4  ,many of the arts  
and sciences1 which formerly resided    
exclusively in the colleges1 and        
ministered only to the sons of opulence 
and leisure1 have escaped from their    
retreat1 and have become the hand-maids 
of the populace4 ,but as respects logic1
 there still remains between the learned
 and the illiterate an impassable gulf4 
,the uninformed look on the recondite   

structure of logic1 and they are        
repelled by the difficulty of           
comprehending it1 and wrap themselves up
 in absolute and obstinate ignorance1   
which they believe to be their destiny4 
,the populace1 in our manufactories1    
have to choose between subsistence and  
intelligence4 ,for study1 after         
protracted toil1 they have not the      
strength--and to abridge their labour is
 to abridge their subsistence1 and this 
they cannot afford4 ,but because they   
are precluded by the destiny of         
civilisation from knowing much1 they    
need not remain utterly unskilled in    
reasoning4 ,their natural good sense may
 be systematized1 their natural logic   
may be reduced to some rule and         
order--though it may not be refined it  
may be practical1 it may give power1 and
 develop capacity now dormant4  ,the    
hints1 general rules1 and elementary    
remarks dispersed throughout this work1 
will probably be of service to the      
uninitiated1 perhaps put them on the    

road to higher acquirements1 give them a
 confidence in their own powers1 perhaps
 inspire them with a love of these      
essential studies1 and impart a taste   
for the refinements which lie beyond4   
,my hope is that many will be induced to
 consult scholastic treatises1 and      
acquire that accurate knowledge which   
makes the society of educated people so 
interesting4 ,impulse has been given to 
knowledge1 and the populace have begun  
to think1 and both to speak and write   
their thinkings--and why should they not
 be enabled to do it free from obvious  
mistakes1 and with a broad propriety    
commensurate with the native capacity   
they possess8 ,why should they1 like a  
certain learned politician on a public  
occasion1 propose1 as a sentiment1 ',the
 three ,r's1 ,reading1 ',riting1 and    
',rithmetic8'99 ,why1 in writing1 should
 they not express themselves with strong
 grammatical coherence1 and a certain   
bold perspicuity1 if not able to reach  
refinement and elegance8 ,why1 in       

pronunciation1 should they not speak    
with a certain manly openness of vowel  
sound and a distinct articulation1 if   
not with all elocutionary modulation8   
,why should not their discourse be      
expressed in brief1 clear sentences8 ,if
 their punctuation went no farther than 
placing capital letters at the          
commencement of sentences and of proper 
names1 and periods at the conclusion of 
sentences1 it would render their        
writings more intelligible than are half
 the communications they now send to the
 press4 ,if they mastered only brevity  
and abrupt directness1 and learned to   
omit tedious prolixity1 they would      
command a hearing in many cases where   
now they are denied one4 ,if in logic   
they made a shrewd mastery of plain     
facts--being as sure as they could1 when
 once set on surety1 eschewing          
conjecture and pernicious               
supposition--if they followed the       
methods of nature and good sense1 where 
the elaborate methods of art are hidden 

from them1 who will not admit that they 
would be more intelligible than now1    
exercise a power they never yet         
possessed1 and extort the attention and 
esteem of the public where now they     
excite only its pity1 or contempt1 or   
outrage what just taste it has8 ,the    
people would be enabled to do these     
things1 but that so many who prepare    
treatises for their guidance alarm them 
by the display of abstruse dissertation 
above their powers1 their means1 their  
time1 and their wants4 ,that a little   
learning is a dangerous thing is not a  
maxim alone believed in by the race of  
country squires steeped in port and     
prejudice1 but by schoolmen who cannot  
bring themselves to give a little       
proportion of sound knowledge1 but must 
give all1 the reconite as well4 ,the    
statesman decries the ignorance and want
 of wisdom displayed by embryo          
politicians who will accept no          
instalment of liberty1 but insist on the
 concession of all their claims--but the

 scholar does the same thing when he    
will impart none but the completest     
information to the people4       99     
,this case is cited by ,s4 ,g4          
,goodrich1 the original ,peter          
,parley1 in his preface to ',fireside   
,education4' ,sir ,william      ,curtis1
 to whom1 probably1 ,mr4 ,goodrich      
refers1 gave also      'the three       
,k's--,king1 ,church1 and               
,constitution4'  ,in quoting1 ,i have   
been a borrower1 but not a plagiarist4  
,in no case am ,i conscious of having   
taken from others without at the same   
time making the fairest acknowledgment  
in my power4  ,if the references to the 
highest authorities are sometimes       
through others1 it is because the       
highest authorities have not always been
 accessible4 ,those who have had        
ordinary experience estimate highly the 
value of minute integrity in this       
respect4 ,fruitless hours are spent in  
tracing false and careless references1  
and to one whose time is his means1 no  

little injury is done when it is thus   
wasted4  ,unbounded gratitude is due to 
those authors1 old and new1 who1 with   
learning and grace1 with care and       
patience1 have put the world in         
possession of thoughts which are real   
additions to its knowledge--and         
corresponding should be the contempt of 
those whose high-sounding and pretending
 books seduce readers to wade through   
them only to find in them the millioneth
 echo of some commonplace idea4  ,the   
',spectator' was pleased to say that ,i 
wrote ',practical ,grammar' in the      
spirit of an 'ultra-radical1 setting the
 world to rights4' ,yet ,i have always  
declared1 with ,butler--                
,reforming schemes are none of mine1    
,to mend the world's a vast design2     
,like those who toil in little boat     
,to drag to them the ship afloat4       
,utopianism is not my idiosyncracy4 ,but
 ,i have confidence in endeavour4       
,continuity of ameliorative effort is   
the sole enthusiasm that can serve the  

cause of improvement4 ,it is useful to  
do what seems to be useful1 whether     
little or much--a moderate rule1 but one
 that will take those who carry it out1 
a long way4  ,my illustrations1 ,i need 
scarcely say1 are neutral in politics   
and theology4 ,in the grammar of ,j4 ,a4
 ,d4 ,d',orsey1 published in ',chambers'
 ,educational ,course1' there are       
disputations1 ,biblicisms1 and bits of  
intense theology4 ,professor ,john      
,radford ,young1 in his treatise on     
,algebra1 has introduced a reply to     
,hume's controverted theory of          
miracles--and ,dr4 ,whately makes his   
',logic' an avowedly theological        
auxiliary1 showing that much passes for 
good taste in this country which is only
 an irrelevant propitiation of powerful 
opinion4 ,i have not1 however1 been     
seduced by this species of example4     
,there are distinct provinces in        
intellect as well as in industry--and   
what political economy justifies in one 
case1 good sense dictates in the other4 

,no man has a right to intrude theology 
into every question1 and agitate points 
of faith when he pretends to instruct   
the understanding4  ,there is less      
occasion to speak of the utility of     
logic1 than to show it to be easy of    
acquisition4 ,mr4 ,stuart ,mill1 in     
confirmation of this view1 observes3 ,we
 need not seek far for a solution of the
 question so often agitated1 respecting 
the utility of ,logic4 ,if a science of 
logic exists1 or is capable of existing1
 it must be useful4 ,if there be rules  
to which every mind conforms1 in every  
instance in which it judges rightly1    
there seems little necessity for        
discussing whether a person is more     
likely to observe those rules when he   
knows the rules1 than when he is        
unacquainted with them499 ,certainly    
people are not so much prejudiced       
against logic on account of its supposed
 uselessness as on account of its       
supposed difficulties4 ,deserved or not1
 logic has always had a good reputation4

 ,well or ill founded1 the popular      
impression has uniformly been in its    
favour4 ,it has been valued like the    
diamond--but considered1 like that      
precious stone1 of very uncertain       
access4       99',system of ,logic1' p4 
#ab4   ,second ,edition4  ,the high     
popularity of common sense--'the        
exercise of the judgment unaided by     
rule'--has been interpreted into a      
virtual rejection of logic by the       
multitude4 ,but it ought not to be      
overlooked1 that the credit in which    
mere common sense is held1 is a matter  
of necessity as well as choice4 ,it     
being the best sense the untutored have1
 they wisely use it1 and no wonder that 
they are inclined to laud what they are 
constrained to employ4 ,doubtless they  
always perceived that common sense would
 be the better for being made orderly1  
as a spirited horse is the fitter for   
use after being 'broken4' ,logical      
sense1 among the masses1 is secretly    
supposed to be disciplined sense1 and to

 have all the advantage of the trained  
soldier over the raw recruit4  ,it is   
quite true1 as ,abram ,tucker puts it1  
that ',the science of abstruse learning1
 when completely attained1 is like      
,achilles' spear1 that healed the wounds
 it had made before2 so this knowledge  
serves to repair the damage itself had  
occasioned1 it casts no additional light
 upon the paths of life4' ,but few      
persons sensible of the value of exact  
knowledge will complain of the necessary
 elaboration to which it sometimes      
leads4 ,nor will those who have felt the
 thrill of pleasure which complete      
analysis imparts1 regret the patience   
which put them in possession of a secret
 of science1 or made them master of a   
new field of knowledge4  ,common sense  
is the substratum of all logic4 ,common 
sense is the natural sense of mankind4  
,it is founded on common observation and
 experience4 ,it is modest and plain and
 unsophisticated4 ,it sees with         
everybody's eyes and hears with         

everybody's ears4 ,it has no capricious 
distinctions1 no partialities1 and no   
mysteries4 ,it never equivocates and    
never trifles4 ,its language is always  
the same1 and is always intelligible4   
,it is known by its perspicuity of      
speech and singleness of purpose4 ,the  
most prudent of all the children of     
fact1 it never forsakes nature or       
reason4 ,some outline laws for its      
employment1 if they can be indicated1   
must be better than its popular aimless 
and desultory use4     ,,preface ,,of   
#ahff4  ,one has no right to make a     
literary subject political--that is1 to 
make it partisan2 but to give a         
political motive which concerns all     
equally1 for promoting a literary study1
 is allowable1 and does not partake of  
the nature of party politics4 ,one may1 
like ,cobbett1 look on literature with  
political eyes1 without1 like him1      
making it a vehicle of party attacks4   
,in this country1 where the political   
genius of the people lies in            

self-government--where the public growth
 of the people and their internal       
liberty depend upon their capacity to   
manage their own affairs--the art of    
public speaking has political importance
 to every aide in politics4  ,to be able
 to take a subject well in hand1 like a 
stage-coach driver does his horses--to  
hold the reins of your arguments        
firmly--to direct and drive well home   
the burden of your meaning1 is a power  
which every man ought to study to       
attain1 who rises to address a council1 
or stands up on a platform to convince a
 meeting4      ,a ,,logic ,,of ,,facts4 
,,chapter ,i4 ,,the ,,logic ,,of ,,the  
,,schools  ,it is a humiliating         
reflection that mankind never reasoned  
so ill as when they most professed to   
cultivate the art of reasoning4--,life  
of ,galileo1 p4 #a4 society for the     
,diffusion of ,useful ,knowledge4       
,common sense--the foundation of        
logic--first received 7to a limited     
extent7 the regularity of an art and the

 certainty of a science1 from the master
 hand of ,aristotle4 ,impartial         
scholars1 familiar with his writings on 
logic1 allow them to have not only      
ingenuity but real merit2 and his       
admirers contend that he has been       
misunderstood by some and abused by     
others4 ,this is highly probable1 as we 
are certain that when his works were    
interpreted by the schools1 and his     
logic proclaimed the great text-book of 
knowledge and the only weapon of truth1 
'men's minds1 instead of studying       
nature1 were in an endless ferment about
 occult qualities and imaginary         
essences2 little was talked of but      
intention and remission1 proportion and 
degree1 infinity1 formality1 quiddity   
and individuality4'99 ,logic then was   
jargon1 controversy chicane1 and truth a
 shuttlecock1 with which the disputants 
respectively played1 or the object which
 they mutually disguised4 ,logic was a  
labyrinth in which the subtlest lost    
their ,way--a bourne from which the     

traveller after truth seldom returned4  
99 ,account of ,lord ,bacon's ,novum    
,organon ,scientiarum1 ,lib4 of         
,useful ,knowledge1 p4 #d4  ,a striking 
illustration of this has been furnished 
by a candid and distinguished           
writer--,dr4 ,reid4 ',of the analytics  
and of the topics of ,aristotle1        
ingenuousness requires me to confess1   
that though ,i have often purposed to   
read the whole with care1 and to        
understand what is intelligible1 yet my 
courage and patience always failed me   
before ,i had done4 ,why should ,i throw
 away so much time and painful attention
 upon a thing of so little real use8 ,if
 ,i had lived in those ages when the    
knowledge of ,aristotle's ,organon      
entitled a man to the highest rank in   
philosophy1 ambition might have ,induced
 me to employ upon it some years of     
painful study2 and1 less1 ,i conceive1  
would not be sufficient4 ,such          
reflections as these always got the     
better of my resolution4'99  ,dr4       

,whately1 who has for many years        
occupied the throne of ,logic and whose 
work maybe taken1 from its currency in  
our colleges and academies1 as the      
representative of the logic of the      
schools1 seems to obviate all objections
 to the abstruseness of this subject by 
a counter charge1 to the effect that    
logic is now underrated only because it 
has been overrated4 ,but it is not the  
complexity found in it1 but the         
laudations bestowed upon it which have  
brought it into neglect4 ,dr4 ,whately  
contends that certain writers1 'by      
representing logic as furnishing the    
sole instrument for the discovery of    
truth in all subjects1 and as teaching  
the use of the intellectual faculties in
 general1 raised expectations which     
could not be realised1 and which        
naturally led to a reaction--to logic   
being regarded as utterly futile and    
empty4'9999 ,deeply deploring this kind 
of injury1 from which many important    
arts have suffered1 ,i am neither       

disposed to defend such a course1 nor to
 imitate it4 ,but ,i demur to the truth 
of this representation with regard to   
logic4 ,if logic be not the 'sole       
instrument for the discovery of truth in
 all subjects1' it is certainly the     
principal one4 ,instead of charging     
scholastic logicians with having unduly 
'raised1' it would be nearer the truth1 
in my opinion1 to say that they have    
confused 'expectations' by intricate    
machinery and extreme elaborations4     
99 ,lord ,kamet's ,sketches vol4 #h1    
chap4 ,s4   ,aristotle's      ,logic4   
9999 ,dr4 ,whately3 ,elements of ,logic1
 preface1 p4 vii4   ,second             
edition4  ,intricacy and minuteness of  
detail might be a trifling              
disqualification did they lead to       
something immediately practical4 ,but   
,dr4 ,whately contends that logic1 in   
the most extensive sense which the name 
can1 with propriety1 be made to bear1 is
 that of the science1 and also the art  
of reasonings ',inasmuch as logic       

institutes an analysis of the process of
 the mind in reasoning1 it is strictly a
 science1 while considered in reference 
to the practical rules it furnishes it  
is an art4'99 ,he confines the province 
of logic1 as an art1 to 'employing      
language properly for the purpose of    
reasoning1' and restricts the logician  
to the use of the syllogism as the sole 
test of argument4 ,mr4 ,augustus de     
,morgan thus exhibits the spirit of     
,whately's restriction3--  ,logic has   
nothing to do with the truth of the     
facts1 opinions1 or presumptions1 from  
which an inference is derived2 but      
simply takes care that the inference    
shall certainly be true if the premises 
be true4'  ,it has been1 and is to be1  
objected1 that logic1 thus confined1    
'leaves untouched the greatest          
difficulties1 and those which are the   
sources of the greatest errors in       
reasoning4' ,to this powerful objection 
,dr4 ,whately thinks it sufficient to   
reply1 that 'no art is to be censured   

for not teaching more than falls within 
its province1 and1 indeed1 more than can
 be taught by any conceivable art4 ,such
 a system of universal knowledge as     
should instruct us in the full meaning  
or meanings of every term1 and the truth
 or falsity1 certainty or uncertainty of
 every proposition1 thus superseding all
 other studies1 it is most              
unphilosophical to expect1 or even to   
imagine4 ,and to find fault with logic  
for not performing this1 is as if one   
should object to optics for not giving  
sight to the blind--or complain of a    
reading glass for being of no service to
 a person who had never learnt to       
read4'999999 ,this would be a most      
conclusive answer if confident assertion
 could be accepted in lieu of proof4    
,the objection still remains to be      
removed4 ,we may still demand1 does it  
not fall within the legitimate province 
of logic to provide means of            
encountering the 'greatest difficulties'
 with which it is confessed logic is    

beset8 ,true1 there is no art can teach 
everything1 but is that a reason why    
logic should teach nothing1 or next to  
nothing1 compared with what seems       
essentially necessary8       99 ,intro41
 p4 #a4       9999 ,klein4 of ,logic1   
,synthetical ,compendium1 chap4  #b1    
part      #a1 sec4 #i4       999999     
,elem4 of ,logic1 ,intro41 pp4 #ab1 #ac4
  ,dr4 ,whately contends that the       
'difficulties' and 'errors' in the      
objection adduced1 are in the subject   
matter about which logic is employed1   
and not in the process of               
reasoning--which alone is the           
appropriate province of logic4 ,but it  
seems to me that ,dr4 ,whately has found
 it impossible to keep within the bounds
 of the restriction he thus endeavours  
to establish4  ,in treating upon        
'apprehension1' he introduces1 as indeed
 he was obliged to do1 from the         
department of metaphysics1 several      
speculations on 'generalisation' and    
'abstractions1' and from ontology 7the  

science which explains the most general 
conceptions respecting the phenomena of 
nature7 he borrows the leading          
principles of definition4 ,because he   
thus goes so far1 it is not to be       
contended that therefore he should have 
gone further2 but when he found he must 
depart from his rule and borrow from    
other branches of knowledge 7no matter  
for what end71 why did he not depart    
from it to some purpose1 and borrow from
 natural philosophy such rules as would 
have guarded the logician from the      
'chief errors' into which he may fall8  
,dr4 ,whately informs us1 indeed1 that  
logic furnishes certain syllogistic     
forms to which all sound arguments may  
be reduced1 and thus establishes        
universal tests for the detection of    
fallacy--but it is to be observed that  
it is only such fallacy as may creep in 
between the premises and the conclusion 
of an argument4 ,it is to this narrow   
and ,aristotelian object that logic is  
restricted4 ',the process of reasoning  

itself is alone the appropriate province
 of logic4 ,this process will have been 
correctly conducted if it have conformed
 to the logical rules1 which preclude   
the possibility of any error creeping in
 between the principles from which we   
are arguing1 and the conclusions we     
deduce from them4'99 ,we learn from our 
authority1 that as arithmetic does not  
profess to introduce any notice of the  
things1 whether coins1 persons1 or      
dimensions1 respecting which            
calculations are made2 neither does     
logic undertake 'the ascertainment of   
facts1 or the degree of evidence of     
doubtful propositions4' ,and just as an 
arithmetical result will be useless if  
the data of the calculation be          
incorrect1 so a logical conclusion is   
liable to be false if the premises are  
so4 ,neither does the logic1 now under  
consideration1 concern itself with the  
'discovery of truth1' excepting so far  
as that may be said to be implied by the
 detection of error in a false          

inference49999 ,logic thus1 confined to 
the actual process of reasoning1 however
 important its functions there1         
evidently leaves us in the dark as to   
the value of what we reason about4 ,for 
the information thus missing1 this logic
 refers us to knowledge in general--to  
grammar and composition for the art of  
expressing1 with correctness and        
perspicuity1 the terms of               
propositions--to natural1 moral1        
political1 or other philosophy1 for the 
facts which alone can establish the     
truth of the premises reasoned from4    
99 ,intro41 p4 #ac4       9999 ,for the 
grounds of these representations1 see   
,dissertation on the ,province of       
,reasoning1 chap4 #b1 sec4 #d      ,dr4 
,whately's ,logic4  ,the exclusion from 
logic of all consideration of the facts 
on which propositions are founded1 is   
thus endeavoured to be justified by the 
,archbishop of ,dublin3--',no           
arithmetical skill will secure a correct
 result1 unless the data are correct    

from which we calculate3 nor does any   
one on that account undervalue          
arithmetic2 and yet the objection       
against logic rests on no better        
foundation4' ,this is true1 but is it   
true that arithmetic is on this account 
to be imitated8 ,if the arithmetician   
must take his data for granted1 it is   
what the searcher after truth must never
 do--he must use his eyes and examine   
for himself1 in all cases1 as far as    
possible1 unless he intends to be       
deceived4 ,and for want of such         
precaution as this1 the arithmetician is
 at sea the moment he steps out of the  
narrow path of mechanical routine4 ,who 
is not aware of the failures of         
calculation when applied to the general 
business of life--to statistics1 moral  
and political8 ,every day1 facts have to
 be called in to correct the egregious  
blunders of figures499 ,the calculations
 are conducted in most approved form1   
but are of no use4 ,does not this       
demonstrate that when arithmetic1 like  

logic1 is applied to the business of    
life1 general rules for securing the    
accuracy of data would be of essential  
service8 ,supposing1 however1 that      
arithmetic could do very well without   
them1 does it follow that logic should1 
when it would be safer and more         
efficient with them8       99 ',in ,art1
 in ,practice1 innumerable critics will 
demonstrate      that most things are   
impossible4 ,it was proved by fluxionary
      calculus1 that steam-ships could  
never get across from the      farthest 
point of ,ireland to the nearest of     
,newfoundland2      impelling force1    
resisting force1 maximum here1 minimum  
there2 by law of ,nature1 and geometric 
demonstration--what      could be done8 
,the ,great ,western could weigh anchor 
from      ,bristol ,port2 that could be 
done4 ,the ,great ,western1             
bounding safe through the gullets of the
 ,hudson1 threw her      cable out on   
the capstan of ,new ,york1 and left our 
still      moist paper-demonstration to 

dry itself at leisure4'--      ,thomas  
,carlyle1 ,chartism1 pp4 #if-g4  ,since 
our author's canons are held absolute in
 the schools1 it may be useful to       
consider this last cited argument in    
another light4 ,a stronger objection may
 be urged1 one which particularly       
addresses itself to those who mistake   
mere pertinence for general relevance1  
and suppose that a single analogy       
decides a case4  ,his ,grace reasons1   
that1 because arithmetic does not       
concern itself about its data1 logic    
should follow the same example4 ,but why
 overlooks he pure mathematics--a much  
higher science than arithmetic8 ,surely 
geometry1 which through all time has    
been the model of the sciences1 was     
better worthy than arithmetic to be the 
model of logic6 ,was it classical in the
 principal of ,st4 ,alban's ,college to 
abandon ,euclid and cleave unto ,cocker 
or ,walkingame8  ,arithmetic is         
mechanical--geometry is reasoning2      
surely it was more befitting to compare 

reason with reason1 when endeavouring to
 discover the true way of perfecting    
reason4 ,geometry is1 of all sciences1  
reputed the most conclusive in its      
arguments--and we know it is            
distinguished above all sciences for    
carefulness in its data4 ,it begins with
 axioms1 the most indubitable of all    
data1 and its subsequent conclusions are
 founded only on established facts--and 
to be sure that they are established    
facts1 the geometer1 before he employs  
them1 establishes them himself4 ,if an  
analogy is to decide the province of    
logic1 here is an analogy whose         
pretensions over those of arithmetic are
 eminent4  ,so conclusive did ,dr4      
,whately deem the argument just         
examined1 that he many times1 in various
 forms1 reproduced it4 ,one of the last 
instances is under the head of          
',fallacies4' ',it has been made a      
subject of bitter complaint against     
logic1 that it presupposes the most     
difficult point to be already           

accomplished2 viz41 the sense of the    
terms to be ascertained4 ,a similar     
objection might be urged against every  
other art in existence e4g41 against    
agriculture1 that all the precepts for  
the cultivation of land presuppose the  
possession of a farm4'99       99       
,logic1 chap4 #c4  ,fallacies1 sec4 #b4 
,already has been pointed out what may  
reasonably induce a suspicion of the    
soundness of these analogies2 viz41 that
 their author found it necessary to     
disregard them and introduce1 from other
 branches of knowledge1 certain         
disquisitions on the 'sense of terms4'  
,with regard to this particular         
instance1 it may be observed1 that      
though treatises on agriculture do      
presuppose the possession of a farm1    
they do not presuppose the knowledge    
requisite for cultivating it1 but inform
 fully of soil1 and seed1 and crops4 ,so
 logic may be allowed to presuppose the 
existence of the universe1 whence truth 
is drawn1 or the existence of language1 

'whereby it is expressed2 but it is     
surely not to pre-suppose the knowledge 
of facts and terms1 the great           
instruments for the cultivation of      
truth4 ,agricultural treatises hardly   
warrant this inference4 ,there are the  
representations that induced the        
confession that ',logic is not so much  
an instrument of acquirement as of      
defence4 ,it is a good armour to buckle 
on when compelled to battle for our     
heritage1 but a poor implement for its  
cultivation4'99  ,all practical arts    
include a knowledge of materials as well
 as implements4 ,platers1 ignorant of   
the nature of metals1 cabinetmakers1 of 
the different species of wood1 make but 
sorry artizans2 and in like manner1     
reasoners1 unacquainted1 at least in a  
general way1 with the accuracy of what  
is reasoned about1 make but sorry       
logicians49999  ,it will readily be     
expected that in the modern progress of 
knowledge1 the ,aristotelian province of
 logic would be enlarged4 ,the          

far-seeing intellect of ,lord ,verulam  
heralded the innovation--',our glorious 
,bacon led philosophy forth from the    
jargon of schools and the fopperies of  
sects4 ,he made her to be--the handmaid 
of nature1 friendly to her creatures1   
and faithful to her laws4'999999        
99  ,w4 ,j4 ,fox1 ,mon4 ,rep41 p4 #de3  
#ahce4       9999 ,the reader will find 
that logician is need in the sense      
of skilfulness in eliciting and         
exhibiting reality4 ,by that      which 
,i call logical is meant that which is  
truthful4 ,i      presume that is the   
sense to which this high word should be 
confined4 ,it is the lax application of 
this term to mere      dexterity in     
evading the truth according to rule1    
that has      so increased the          
unsatisfactory race of professed        
sceptics4      --,see ,scepticism1 chap4
 ,,xii4       999999 ,langhornea'       
,preface to the ,lives of ,plutarch4    
,the general object of ,lord ,bacon's   
philosophy1 writes ,bruce1 an ,edinburgh

 professor of logic of the last century1
 is to connect the reasoning powers of  
man with experiments for the improvement
 of natural knowledge4  ,to create a    
just taste for philosophical            
investigation1 required--  #a4 ,a       
display of the true1 that they may be   
distinguished from the false subjects of
 inquiry4  #b4 ,scientific rules to     
direct the discovery of the laws of     
nature4  ,but to 'display the true1' is 
to display the facts on which the truth 
rests4 ,the 'discovery of the laws of   
nature' implies observation of the      
operations of nature4 ,the philosophy of
 ,bacon1 says ,macaulay1 began in       
observation and ended in arts4  ,it is  
most obvious1 as the reader will gather 
from what has been advanced1 that for   
guarding1 to the greatest possible      
extent1 against error in conclusions1 it
 is necessary to take into consideration
 the character of the data from which we
 reason--and to do this1 we must draw   
from the general sources of knowledge to

 which the ,logic of the ,schools refers
 us4 ,if we happen not to possess an    
accurate acquaintance with these        
branches1 we must draw upon the best    
notions we have of them1 or apply such  
natural sagacity as we happen to        
possess4 ,but whether the information we
 happen to possess be complete or       
partial1 it is not well that we are left
 to apply it at random1 without any     
definite mode of procedure2 and if logic
 refuses to assist us1 and gives only a 
vague reference elsewhere1 we must      
endeavour to assist ourselves4 ,the     
datum of all arguments is a proposition1
 an assertion1 or denial2 and to        
ascertain its truth 7upon which the     
value of the whole reasoning depends7 we
 have to do with the facts upon which it
 rests1 and the terms in which it is    
expressed4 ,for it may be here observed1
 that the truth or falsity of every     
proposition depends upon facts4 ,to     
ascertain the general accuracy of facts1
 we have to appeal to received standards

 of certainty2 and to fix the meaning of
 terms1 we have recourse to a plain     
principle of definition4 ,in the task of
 recognising truth1 so necessary in     
examining the premises of an argument1  
one is wonderfully assisted by being    
familiarised with the sources of truth1 
and the mode of its discovery4 ,in these
 operations the tutored and untutored   
may alike be assisted by simple general 
rules4 ,if these rules prove not        
infallible in every case1 they will     
prove successful in the majority of     
cases4  ,since general rules are the    
only1 rules that the vast field of facts
 admits of1 they are not to be rejected 
on light grounds4 ,they enable us to set
 forth intelligibly the reasons of our  
own conviction1 and to detect and expose
 the fundamental fallacies of apparent  
arguments4 ,since they direct us where  
the ,logic of the ,schools leaves us    
without a guide1 their value is         
apparent4  ,the logical management of   
the syllogism involves much abstruseness

 respecting 'genus' and 'species1' the  
'quantity' and 'quality' of             
'propositions'1 'contraries1'           
'sub-contraries1' 'contradictions1' and 
'subalterns4' ,stepping by 'illative    
conversion1' 'six rules to be observed  
with respect to categorical syllogism'  
next demand attention1 followed hard by 
eleven moods which can be used in a     
legitimate syllogism1 ,viz4---- ,a1 ,a1 
,a1 ,a1 ,a1 ,i1 ,a41 ,e1 ,e1 ,a1 ,e1 ,o1
 ,a1 ,i1 ,i1 ,a1 ,o1 ,o1 ,e1 ,a1 ,e1 ,e1
 ,a1 ,o1 ,e1 ,i1 ,o1 ,i1 ,a1 ,i1 ,o1 ,a1
 ,o4' ,in the middle of this abstract   
train march the 'undistributed middle'  
and the 'illicit process1' attended by  
four figures represented by the         
following mnemonic lines1 which must be 
carefully committed to memory3'--  ,fig4
 #a4 b,arb,ar,a1 c,el,ar,ent1 d,ar,i,i1 
f,er,i,oque prioris4  ,fig4 #b4         
c,es,ar,e1 d,am,estr,es1 f,est,in,o1    
b,ar,ok,o199 secundae4  ,fig4 #c4       
tertia1 d,ar,apt,i1 d,is,am,is1         
d,at,is,i1 f,el,apt,on1 b,ok,ard,o19999 

f,erls,o1 habet2 quarta insuper addit4  
,fig4 #d4 br,am,ant,ip1 c,am,en,es1     
d,im,ar,is1 f,es,apo1 fr,es,is,on4  ,a  
motley group1 too numerous to be        
particularised1 bring up the complex    
rear of ',modals1' ',hypotheticals1'    
',conditionals1' and ',disjunctives4'   
,this is certainly not the portal       
through which the populace can at       
present pass to logic1 even if such     
logic helped them to all truth1 and     
saved them from all fallacy4  ,but this 
species of logic is not without         
interest4 ,symbolic letters and mnemonic
 lines are not without attractions to   
those who understand them4 ,there is    
poetry in an algebraic sign1 when it is 
the emblem of a difficulty solved1 and a
 wonderful result simply arrived at4 ,to
 try the whole power of words1 and      
discover every form of language in which
 a legitimate deduction can be          
expressed1 is no ignoble task4 ,it is a 
high discipline1 but it belongs rather  
to the age of leisure than this of      

'copperasfames1 cotton-fuz1 gin-riot1   
wrath1 and toil'--to the luxuries rather
 than the utilities of learning4  ,there
 is the inefficiency of the syllogism1  
and also the vitiation produced by its  
employment4  #a4 ,it corrupts the taste 
for philosophical invention by placing  
philosophy in abstractions1 and         
withdrawing it from the observation of  
nature4  #b4 ,it creates a reliance on  
principles1 which originate in the      
hypotheses of philosophers1 not in the  
laws of nature4  #c4 ,it makes truth the
 result of the forms of argument1 not of
 scientific evidence4999999       99    
,or1 ,fakoro1 as indeed all the         
particulars in this place      recited4 
9999 ,or1 ,dokamo4  but a brief summary 
of the subjects      comprised in his   
logic in reference to the syllogism4    
999999,bruce4 ,these references to      
,fakoro and ,dokamo are ,whately's4     
,lord ,kames cites from the father of   
logic the following syllogism1 which    
will bear repetition as an extraordinary

 instance of that assumption for which  
the ,logic of the ,schools provides no  
remedy3--    ,heavy bodies naturally    
tend to the centre of the universe4     
,we know1 by experience1 that heavy     
bodies tend to the centre of the earth4 
,therefore the centre of the earth is   
the centre of the universe4  ,but by    
what experience did ,aristotle discover 
the centre of the universe1 so as to    
become aware that heavy bodies naturally
 tend there8 ,on what facts rest the    
measurement of the radii from our earth 
to the boundless circumference of space8
 ,how did he ascertain the limits of    
that which has no limits8 ,yet1 strange 
to say1 the ,logic of the ,schools      
prides itself in leaving us where the   
,stagyrite left us4  ',when mankind     
began to reason on the phenomena of     
nature1 they were solicitous to         
abstract1 and they formed general       
propositions from a limited observation4
 ,though these propositions were        
assumed1 they were admitted as true4    

,they were not examined by appeals to   
nature1 but by comparison with other    
propositions4'99  ,in this syllogism    
from ,aristotle1 there is the usual     
compliance with accredited rules1 and   
the same defiance of common sense4 ,such
 examples are deemed perfect reasoning  
and legitimate argument2 but is it not a
 mockery to encourage the belief that we
 can have reason and argument1 without  
the truth8 ,only this shallow           
consolation remains to us4 ,if the      
logician of the schoole does not        
enlighten the understanding1 he is at   
least reputed not to offend the taste1  
and he wins the equivocal praise of     
,butler3--       ',he'll run in debt by 
disputation1      ,and pay with         
ratiocination2      ,all this by        
syllogism1 true      ,in mood and       
figure1 he will do4'  ,syllogisms are to
 truth what rhyme is to poetry4 ',it is 
a well known fact that verse1 faultless 
in form1 may be utterly destitute of    
poetic fire or feeling4'9999       99   

,bruce4       9999 ,a4 ,j4 ,d4          
,d',orsey1 ,eng4 ,gram41 part #b1       
article ,prosody4  ,according to the    
,logic of the ,schools1 'the question   
respecting the validity of an argument  
is not whether the conclusion be true1  
but whether it follows from the premises
 adduced4' ,it was the bitter experience
 of ,bordon of the delusiveness of such 
partial logic that induced him to       
exclaim1 'one fact is worth fifty       
arguments4'  ,with such authorities1 'a 
valid argument is that which it so      
stated that its conclusiveness is       
evident from the mere form of the       
expression4' ,but since it is admitted  
that if the data reasoned upon be       
incorrect1 no logical skill can secure a
 correct result2 it is evident that     
however faultless the form1 the inquirer
 after truth is in no way nearer his    
object1 unless he be instructed how to  
lay a foundation of faultless facts4 ,he
 then1 who is in love with truth rather 
than logomachy1 will admit1 in spite of 

the most ingenious analogies1 that there
 is some room for a logic of facts1 as  
well as a logic of words4    ,,chapter  
,,ii4 ,,locke-,,logic4  ,logic is a     
general guide to the discovery of truth1
 and teaches us its systematic          
communication to others4 ,this          
definition is intended to combine logic 
and rhetoric into one system4 ,according
 to a quotation in ,pinnock's ,guide to 
,knowledge1 ,locke defined logic as     
'that art by which we rightly use our   
mental faculties in the discovery and   
communication of truth1' a definition1  
called by the writer1 the definition of 
nature echoed by genius4 ,there exists a
 natural connection between logic and   
rhetoric4 ,the discovery of truth could 
avail us little if we were without the  
means of communicating it2 and it is    
easy to see that it would be in vain to 
possess the means of communicating      
truth1 unless we had the truth to       
communicate4 ,therefore1 ingenuity is   
but ill employed in separating these    

mutual departments of learning which    
nature has connected together4 ,besides1
 the skill of the logician is as        
serviceable in the statement of a case1 
as in arguing it4 ,arrangement is as    
much a matter of logic as ratiocination2
 and to impress this neglected truth    
upon the young inquirer1 is one reason  
for proposing a combined definition4    
,the mutual connection of logic and     
rhetoric is illustrated by the fact1    
that the ,logic of the ,schools is      
purely a branch of rhetoric4 ,it        
consists in putting an argument into    
'the most perspicuous form in which it  
can be exhibited1'99--i4 e41 in         
communicating it in the most efficient  
way to others4       99 ,dr4 ,whatetly3 
,anal4 ,ont41 chap4 #a1 aec4 #f1 p4 #de4
  ,indeed1 ,dr4 ,whately 7who makes     
logic to consist in reasoning7 defines  
reasoning as discourse1 and discourse is
 rhetoric4 ',grammar1' says ,doherty1'  
represents the mechanism of letters in  
forming words--,rhemar1 the mechanism of

 words in forming sentences4 ,we have   
,grammar for letters1 ,rhemar for words1
 ,logic for arguments1 and ,rhetoric for
 discourse4' ,locke-logic1 therefore--i4
 e41 logic in the sense in which ,locke 
treated it--seems to come nearer the    
truth1 as well as nearer the common     
requirement1 than the restricted        
definition of it by others insisted on4 
,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,logical ,,truth  ,all
 men know something of truth4 ,happily  
it is the first impulse of childhood1   
and nature teaches us its pleasure      
before reason instructs us in its truth4
 ,in infancy we own its beauty1 in      
manhood its power4 ,there is nothing1   
says ,cicero1 sweeter to man than the   
light of truth4 ,truth1 observes        
,godwin1 is the native element of an    
intellectual nature4 ,it has been wisely
 remarked1 said ,lord ,kames1 that truth
 is to the understanding what beauty is 
to the eye1 or music to the ear4        
,philosophy sanctions what              
unsophisticated feelings suggested4 ,he 

that has made but a little progress     
beyond ignorance and privilege1 cannot  
be edified by anything but truth49999   
,truth1 like a mathematical point1 has  
had various descriptions2 and it may be 
useful to select those which graduate to
 its logical definition4 ,bulwer tells  
us1 that 'the agitation of thought is   
the beginning of truth4' ,locke1 ,lord  
,kames1 ,mill1 and others1 agree that   
truth1 or falsehood1 is an affair of    
language4 ,an assertion which represents
 things as they really are1 is a        
truth--an assertion that represents     
things what in reality they are not1 is 
a falsehood4       9999 ,mr4 ,hobhouse3 
,note #ae4 to #dth ,canto of ,childe    
,harold4  ,truth1 in sculpture1 means an
 exact similitude of some living form1  
chiselled in stone or marble4 ,truth1 in
 painting1 is a natural representation  
on canvass of some person1 or object4   
,in the same manner1 moral 'truth is an 
exact image of things set forth in      
speech1 or writing4' ,the logical       

definition of truth is given in these   
words3--',truth is that which admits of 
proof1'99 that is1 an assertion or      
denial which can be substantiated by    
facts4       99 ,chambers' ,information4
  ,a fact is commonly called a truth1   
but this practice leads to great        
confusion in reasoning4 ,a fact is only 
an element in truth1 ,a logical truth is
 a proposition supported by facts4      
,facts compose the premises of an       
argument--a truth is the inference from 
the facts4 ,unless this distinction is  
observed1 recourse must be had to the   
expedient of calling a fact a particular
 truth1 and an induction from facts a   
general truth4 ,or we must adopt this   
distinction1 that a moral truth1 that   
is1 the truth of parlance1 is the       
coincidence of language with reality2   
and a logical truth1 a proposition which
 admits of demonstration4  ,a lady1 who 
has given intellectual laws to many whom
 ,i address1 has said--',a truth ,i     
consider to be an ascertained fact1     

which truth would be changed into an    
error the moment the fact on which it   
rested was disproved4' ,but that which  
can be disproved cannot be an           
'ascertained fact4' ,allowing1 however1 
the relevancy of this definition of a   
truth1 it would1 in a treatise on logic1
 be considered as a definition only of a
 particular truth4 ,many such truths are
 required to make a logical truth4      
,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,discovery ,,of ,,truth
       ,the great treasure-house of     
nature is open to all1 and the      only
 fee demanded for inspection is         
attention4--,detrosibr4                 
,observation9999 of nature is the only  
source of truth4 ,discursive observation
 is the art of noticing circumstances   
evident to the senses4 ,men who do this 
intentionally and carefully1 with a view
 of acquiring a knowledge of phenomena  
and their causes1 are distinguished for 
their varied knowledge and often for    
their great discoveries4 ,shakspere must
 have owed the varied facts interwoven  

into his delineations of human character
 to this source4 ,the clever            
personations of ,garrick were suggested 
by his curious observations of men and  
manners4 ,sir ,walter ,scott is known to
 have been a careful observer4 ,it is   
said1 'no expression escaped him if it  
bore on the illustration of character4' 
9999 ,the term observation is used here 
in the sense in which      it is        
commonly understood1 signifying         
cognisance in general4      ,it includes
 whatever information we acquire by the 
meant of      consciousness1 or         
experience1 or through the agency of the
      senses4  ,claude ,lorraine1 with a
 passionate sympathy for the beautiful1 
sate in the fields from sun-rise to dewy
 eve1 watching1 catching1 and saturating
 his very soul1 as it were1 with all the
 evanescent beauties of a summer's day1 
as they chased each other over the face 
of the fair scene2 fixing on canvass1   
taking captive and imprisoning in our   
cabinets1 the wanton daughters of       

nature1 that before his time never were 
caught1 but flitted before the          
fascinated eye only long enough to make 
the heart afterwards feel more achingly 
the void of their vanishing4 ,and the   
artist who has done all this1 do we not 
justly call him an imaginative painter1 
to distinguish him from those meaner    
geniuses who were1 in painting1 very    
like ,crabbe in poetry1 merely faithful 
delineators of the vulgarer objects of  
social life1 bunches of carrots1 drunken
 boors1 chamber maids and chimney       
corners4  ',has the reader ever seen    
,mr4 ,macready in the character of      
,macbeth8 ,if he have1 he can never     
forget the stupefied murderer           
withdrawing from the chamber in which he
 has just done the dread act1 with      
fascinated gaze retreatingly regarding  
his royal victim1 and awaking with a    
guilty start as he runs unconsciously   
against his hard-souled partner in      
guilt1 who in vain tries to infuse into 
the weaker spirit of her paralysed      

husband her own metaphysical            
superiority4 ,in this scene we know that
 ,mr4 ,macready's acting was perfect1   
for the pressure at our heart1 the      
suspension of our breathing1 and the    
creeping of our hair1 made us feel that 
it was so4 ,we see him now1 as          
stealthily he places his foot over the  
threshold of the chamber of death to    
re-appear on the stage2 the intensely   
staring eye1 that cannot remove from    
what 'tis horror to look upon2 the      
awfully natural absorption of his soul  
by that sorry sight1 which one little   
minute has brought about2 his starting  
and awaking from his entranced state1 as
 he runs against his wife in his        
retreat1 and his full passionate burst  
of blended remorse1 terror1 and         
superstition1 as refusing counsel1      
regardless of remonstrance1 heedless of 
probable detection1 he pours forth his  
brain-sickly convictions1 of having in  
one little moment cut the cable that had
 held him to the rest of the great human

 family4 ,all this we can see in our    
mind's eye1 for the actor gave us a     
picture of passion that time can never  
obliterate4 ,but how would it have been 
with a cloddish unimaginative fellow1   
whom nature never intended should       
understand ,shakspere8 ,would he not1   
conscious that he was among shoals and  
quicksands of feelings1 too nice for his
 appreciation1 seek to tear over all by 
a tempest of rant1 which would be a more
 ruthless murder on ,shakspere than     
,macbeth's on the king8 ,and why should 
we be delighted with ,mr4 ,macready's   
delineation1 and disgusted with the     
ranter8 ,simply because the former has  
observed1 treasured up1 and felt every  
genuine exhibition of human feeling that
 came in his way1 and applied it        
appropriately to all the situations to  
which it was related in nature4 ,a      
single instance will make this clear4   
,mr4 ,kean one night1 in the concluding 
part of the combat scene of ,richard    
,,iii41 when supposed to be wounded to  

the death1 before falling1 steadily     
regarded his foe1 and painfully raising 
his right arm in act to strike1 the     
relaxed and dying limb1 unable to second
 the spirit1 fell heavily and harmlessly
 to his side1 indicating merely the     
fierce bravery of the usurper living in 
all its strength1 when the body which it
 would move1 was all but a senseless    
clod4 ,pit1 gallery1 and boxes arose    
with an enthusiasm beyond description1  
and by their repeated plaudits bore     
testimony the intense naturalness of the
 struggle4 ,the actor being afterwards  
complimented upon the hit1 said1 that he
 had taken the action from ,jack        
,painter1 the prize-fighter1 when the   
latter was beaten in some one of his    
contests1 and it immediately struck the 
tragedian that the very same thing would
 come in beautifully in the dying scene 
of ,richard ,,iii4 ,what was this1 if   
not imagination8 ,kean saw ,painter's   
action to be the natural effects of     
undying valour in vain endeavouring to  

contend against overwhelming power4     
,remembering and associating it with his
 previous conception of the character of
 ,richard ,,iii41 the actor saw it could
 be most strikingly incorporated with   
that picture of passion the usurper's   
death should present to our view4       
,seeing this1 he combined it with his   
previous delineation1 and thereby did   
precisely the same thing as the poet in 
using a fine simile1 or the painter in  
introducing sun-light over a part of his
 picture4 ,it was a portion of nature   
carried away by the actor to be         
reproduced on a future and fitting      
occasion4'99  ,the beginning of all     
knowledge is observation4 ,it has been  
shown by ,mr4 ,mill that 'axioms1' which
 lie at the foundation of all reasoning 
and all science1 'are experimental      
truths--generalisations from            
observation4 ,the proposition that ,two 
straight lines cannot inclose a         
space--or1 in other words1 ,two straight
 lines which have once met do not meet  

again1 but continue to diverge--is an   
induction from the evidence of our      
senses4'9999 ',axioms are but a class of
 inductions from experience3 the        
simplest and easiest cases of           
generalisation1' from the facts         
furnished to1 us by our senses or by our
 internal consciousness4'999999         
,autobiography1 or the metaphysical     
revelation of a man to himself1 is a    
source of valuable psychological and    
moral truths4 ,from this centre         
frequently radiate new lights upon human
 nature4 ,but this is resolvable into a 
species of mental observation4 ,it is   
self-inspection4  ,we have lately been  
told that ',poetry is called upon to    
work in the discovery of truth4 ,the    
imagination has always been the great   
discovering power4 ,discoveries are the 
poetry of science4 ,the case is rare    
indeed in which1 by merely advancing    
step by step in the exercise of the     
logical faculty1 any new truth has been 
arrived at4 ,logic comes afterwards1 to 

verify that which imagination sees with 
its far-darting glance4'99999999        
99 ,phrenology ,tested1 by ,a4 ,m41 of  
the ,middle ,temple1 pp4      #adc-e4   
9999 ,logic1 vol #a1 p4 #cje4           
999999 ,idem1 pp4 #cbh-i4       99999999
 ,w4 ,j4 ,fox's ,lectures to the        
,working ,classes3 ,genius and          
,poetry of ,campbell1 p42#e4  ,this     
seems to call upon us to recognise the  
imagination as fresh source of truth4   
,but the definition of imagination1 as  
given by ,emerson1 reveals to us its    
origin in observation2--',the           
imagination may be defined to be the use
 which reason makes of the material     
world4 ,shakspere's imperial muse tosses
 the creation like a bauble from hand to
 hand1 to embody any capricious shade of
 thought that is uppermost in his mind4'
 ,hence1 though we agree with ,gilfillan
 that imagination is thought on fire1 we
 must confess that the ignition is      
material4  ,we will1 however1 hear a    
poet's defence of his                   

fraternity3--',poets are vulgarly       
considered deficient in the reasoning   
faculty2 whereas no man was ever a great
 poet without having it in excess1 and  
after a century or two1 men become      
convinced of it4 ,they jump the middle  
terms of their syllogisms1 it is true1  
and assume premises to which the world  
has not yet arrived2 but time stamps    
their deductions as invincible4'99      
,imagination is based on observation1   
and bears the same relation to the      
'material world' that the magician bears
 to the appliances of his art4          
,imagination is the dexterous and       
astonishing use of realities4 ,it is a  
species of mental experiment1 whereby1  
without permission of the line-and-rule 
men1 we join strange things together1   
and to the surprise of every body1 the  
junction is a happy one4 ',angelo's     
greatness lay in searching for untried  
existence4'9999 ,but observation        
primarily suggests the combination4 ,if1
 as in the case of ,angelo1 imagination 

essays the highest flights of genius1   
and goes in search of untried existence1
 it is not existence out of nature1 but 
founded upon nature--its success is a   
revelation of some hidden reality4      
99 ,lowell's ,conversations on the ,old 
,poets4       9999 ,j4 ,t4 ,seymour2    
,oracle of ,reason4  ,some of the most  
praised conceptions of ,shakspere have  
been traced by critics to the tritest   
observation4 ,instance ,hamlet's        
remark3--       ,there's a divinity doth
 shape our ends1      ,bough-hew them as
 we will4  ,critics tell us1 that       
,shakspere here fell into the           
conventional cant of a mechanic making  
skewers4 ,but it is no detraction to    
cull the best phrases from the most     
common sources4 ,knight                 
remarks3--',philosophy1 as profound as  
it is beautiful6 says the uninitiated   
reader of ,shakspere4 ,but he that is   
endued with the wisdom of the           
commentators1 will learn how easy it is 
to mistake for philosophy and poetry    

what really only proceeded from the very
 vulgar recollection of an ignorant     
mind4 ,dr4 ,farmer informs me1 says     
,steevens1 that these words are merely  
technical4 ,a woodman1 butcher1 and     
dealer in skewers1 lately observed to   
him1 that his nephew 7an idle lad71     
could only assist in making them2 he    
could rough-hew them1 but ,i was obliged
 to shape their ends4 ,to shape the ends
 of wood skewers1 i4 e41 to point them1 
requires a degree of skill3 any one can 
rough-hew them4 ,whoever recollects the 
profession of ,shakspere's father1 will 
admit that his son might be no stranger 
to such terms4 ,i have frequently seen  
packages of wool pinned up with         
skewers4'99 ,to admit the likelihood of 
all this1 notwithstanding ,mr4 ,knight's
 jeer at the 'wisdom of the             
commentators1' is rather to exalt than  
degrade the genius of ,shakspere1 who   
could derive exalted figures from humble
 sources4 ,the ',athenaeum1' far more   
wisely than ,mr4 ,knight1 in this       

instance1 observes3--',this is the test 
of a truly great man2 that his thoughts 
should be things1 and become things in  
instantaneous act1 and not for a moment 
mere speculations and abstractions4'    
,as the theories of the schoolmen       
subside1 and men no longer ignore       
nature1 it will become recognised as the
 source rather than the tool of         
intellect4 ,we shall have less occasion 
to contend that all lofty and sublime   
ideas derive their value and beauty from
 their coherence with the instincts of  
sensation1 ',poetry1 we grant1 creates a
 world of its own2 but it creates it out
 of existing materials4' ',imagination' 
may be but 'thought on fire1' but the   
spark1 which ignites it1 is material4   
,is there any other distinction between 
the nights of the rhapsodist and those  
of genius1 than that genius illumines   
reality and rhapsody obscures it8 ',we  
know of no great generalisation that has
 ever been made by a man unacquainted   
with the details on which it rests4'    

,experiment is invented observation4 ,it
 is putting into operation certain      
supposed causes in order to observe     
their effects4 ,an experiment may be    
defined as an observation1 which we are 
at some trouble to make4 ,experiment is 
usually set down as being a process of  
discovering truth different from        
observation4 ,it is evidently included  
under observation1 and there is no      
practical advantage in separating it4   
,discursive1 general1 ordinary1 or      
common observation is the observation of
 the phenomena we find4 ,experiment is  
observation of the phenomena we bring   
together4 ,experimental observation has 
been the great agent of modern          
discovery4 ,newton ranked it as the most
 valuable knowledge4 ,whatever is not   
founded on phenomena is hypothesis1 and 
has no place in experimental philosophy4
 ,it is the principal source of accurate
 facts4 ,when ,jenner first communicated
 to ,john ,hunter1 what he thought      
respecting the prevention of small      

pox--',don't think1 but try2 be patient1
 be accurate1' was ,hunter's            
characteristic reply4 ,locke            
remarks--',while the philosophy of      
,aristotle prevailed in the schools1    
which dealt often in words without      
meaning1 the knowledge of nature was at 
a stand2 men argued concerning things of
 which they had no idea2 in this        
enlightened age1 we keep to trial and   
experiment1 as the only certain         
foundation of philosophy4'       99     
,philosophy and ,religion of ,shakspere1
 pp4 #agc-d       9999  ,no #idf4 p4    
#aajc4       999999 ,athenaeum1 ,no4    
#idf1 p4 #aaia4  ,hypothesis may be     
noticed here as being a species of      
embryo experiment4 ,hypothesis is       
guessing at the truth4 ,it is a         
conjecture or supposition relating to   
the cause of an effect4 ,it imagines    
that where certain conditions exist1 the
 desired result will ensue4 ,but all    
these conjectures must be founded on    
observation4 ,for1 in the wildest       

conjecture1 unless made by a madman1    
there is some reason4 ,hypothesis is    
incipient truth founded on a few facts  
which make it probable1 but not on      
sufficient to make it certain4          
,hypothesis does not directly discover  
truth1 but it is a guide to experiment1 
which does4 ,the hypotheses of ,columbus
 respecting an unknown continent1 did   
not of itself discover ,america--but it 
directed the experiment of his voyage   
there1 which did4 ,to hypothesise alone 
is the error of the visionary and the   
dreamer4 ,practical wisdom1 as far as   
possible1 tests hypothesis by           
experiment4 ,sir ,c4 ,bell conjectured  
that the nervous fluid of the human body
 was analogous to galvanic fluid1 and   
then1 by experiments on various animals1
 he endeavoured to test his hypothesis4 
,however1 great thinkers arise who are  
best employed in contriving plans for   
others to execute--in telling others    
what they are to do4 ,great poets belong
 to this class4 ,they are often         

incapable of the concentrated labour of 
furnishing proofs of their hypothesis4  
,gladly should we recognise the mission 
of such men4 ,they work for humanity by 
thinking for humanity4 ',all who think1'
 says ,lytton1 'are co-operative with   
all who work4' ,labour supplies our     
wants1 thought teaches us dominion over 
nature4 ,labour is but the means of     
subsistence1 it is thought that makes it
 the source of wealth by multiplying its
 powers4  ,to the value of hypothesis   
,mr4 ,mill bears this testimony1 that by
 suggesting observations and            
experiments1 it puts us upon the road   
to1 independent evidence1 if it be      
really attainable1 and till it be       
attained1 the hypothesis ought not to   
count for more than a suspicion4 ,the   
function of hypothesis is one which must
 be reckoned absolutely indispensable in
 science4 ,without such assumption1     
science would not have attained its     
present state4 ,nearly everything which 
is now theory was once hypothesis499    

99 ,logic1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #ah4          
,induction is systematic observation of 
a given class of phenomena4 ,it consists
 in bringing together a variety of facts
 and instances1 carefully and patiently 
viewing them in all possible lights to  
discover from a comparison of the whole 
what1 if any1 new principle is          
elicitable4 ,induction is an experiment 
with a number of facts1 to see if any   
general result can be arrived at4 ,thus 
observation is of three                 
kinds--discursive1 experimental1 and    
inductive4 ,for brevity of speech1 we   
use respectively the terms observation1 
experiment1 and induction1 as the names 
of the three recognised modes of        
investigation4 ,but it facilitates a    
clear view of this subject1 to note that
 experiment and induction are but phases
 of observation--and that observation is
 the great source of the discovery of   
truth4  ,discursive observation and     
experiment are the sources of facts or  
particular truths4 ,nature1 poetically  

says ,dr4 ,reid1 is put to the question 
by a thousand observations and          
experiments1 and forced to confess her  
secrets4 ,out of these secrets induction
 gathers its general truths1 which      
become the premises of argument4 ,facts1
 like stones1 are of little service     
while scattered--it is in the edifice   
raised by them that their value is      
apparent4 ,they have been compared to   
blocks1 upon one of which1 if a person  
stand1 he has but a partially increased 
view2 but when many are piled up1 a     
person from their summit commands the   
prospect round4 ,particular truth seldom
 proves anything but itself4 ,argument  
is proving something else1 and we have  
seen that that which is proved must be  
contained in something which proves it4 
,in other words1 an argument is an      
assertion or denial of something        
substantiated by other things--by facts4
  ,gall observed the peculiar formation 
of a certain head1 but the one fact     
proved nothing1 except that the head had

 a certain form4 ,it was a barren       
observation1 except that it suggested to
 his imagination the hypothesis that the
 peculiar form of the head might be     
caused by peculiarity of mind4 ,this set
 him upon the experiment of observing   
the habits and dispositions of the      
individual in order to test his         
hypothesis4 ,but the one fact of finding
 a peculiarity proved nothing new of any
 value4 ,the two facts1 though incident1
 were hardly convincing4 ,they proved   
only that a peculiar head was           
accompanied in one case by peculiar     
habits--but whether one was the cause of
 the other1 or whether the phenomena    
were in any way connected1 still        
remained unknown4 ,when1 however1 ,gall1
 ,spurzheim1 and others1 had travelled  
through ,europe1 making observations and
 experiments1 and at last putting all   
the facts and instances together1 and   
carefully and patiently viewing them in 
all possible lights1 and finding that   
they shadowed forth that the brain was  

the organ1 the map and measure of       
intelligence1 they inducted a general   
truth1 which enters the lists of        
argument and takes its place as an      
addition to our metaphysical and moral  
treasures4  ,mr4 ,macaulay1 who1        
perhaps1 might be accused of underrating
 both ,bacon and ,induction1 with a view
 of exalting ,aristotle1 remarks that   
',the vulgar notion about ,bacon we take
 to be this1 that he invented a new     
method of arriving at truth1 which      
method is called induction1 and that he 
detected some fallacy in the syllogistic
 reasoning which had been in vogue      
before his time4 ,this notion is about  
as well founded as that of the people   
who1 in the middle ages1 imagined that  
,virgil was a great conjurer4 ,many who 
are far too well informed to talk such  
extravagant nonsense1 entertain what we 
think incorrect notions as to what      
,bacon really effected in this matter4  
,the inductive method has been practised
 ever since the beginning of the world  

by every human being4 ,it is constantly 
practised by the most ignorant clown1 by
 the most thoughtless schoolboy1 by the 
very child at the breast4 ,that method  
leads the clown to the conclusion1 that 
if he sows barley he shall not reap     
wheat4 ,by that method1 the schoolboy   
learns that a cloudy day is the best for
 catching trout4 ,the very infant we    
imagine is led by induction to expect   
milk from his mother or nurse1 and none 
from his father4 ,not only is it not    
true that ,bacon invented the inductive 
method1 but it is not true that he was  
the first person who correctly analysed 
that method and explained its uses4     
,aristotle had long before pointed out  
the absurdity of supposing that         
syllogistic reasoning could ever conduct
 men to the discovery of any new        
principle1 had shown that such          
discoveries must be made by induction   
and by induction alone1 and had given   
the history of the inductive process    
concisely1 indeed1 but with great       

perspicuity and precision4 ,we are not  
inclined to ascribe much practical value
 to that analysis of the ,inductive     
method which ,bacon has given in the    
second book of the ,novum ,organon4 ,it 
is1 indeed1 an elaborate and correct    
analysis4 ,but it is an analysis of that
 which we are all doing from morning to 
night1 and which we continue to do even 
in our dream4'99       99 ,macaulay's   
,hist ,essays1 vol4 #c1 p4 #djg4  ,it is
 not 'some fallacy in the syllogistic   
reasoning' which ,bacon is supposed to  
have detected1 it is rather the partial 
protection against error afforded by    
syllogisms1 which he exposed and        
provided against1 for which he is       
estimated4 ,certainly ,aristotle must   
have had a very different opinion of the
 value of inductive philosophy from that
 entertained by ,bacon1 or he would have
 indoctrinated his disciples with it4   
,few will doubt that had ,bacon's ,novum
 ,organon appeared in the place of      
,aristotle's logic1 and ,aristotle's    

work in the place of ,bacon's1 that the 
advancement of learning in the world    
would now be in a very different state4 
,could ,bacon have arrested the         
attention of the ancient sages with his 
methods of discovering new principles1  
ancient philosophy1 instead of being a  
treadmill1 would have been a path1 and  
we should not have had a contempt for   
all learning which was useful4 ,when    
,posidonius said that we owed to        
philosophy the principles of the arch   
and the introduction of metals4 ,we     
should not have had ,seneca repudiating 
such insulting compliments1 nor         
,archimedes considering that geometry   
was degraded by being employed in       
anything useful4  ,but these            
observations of ,macaulay have the merit
 of showing us that induction has its   
foundation in nature1 and afford a      
further confirmation of our views1 that 
observation is the source of our        
knowledge1 and that it is the province  
of logic to teach us to systematise our 

thoughts4 ,observation1 experiment1     
hypothesis and induction1 are but       
different names for the                 
operation--varying in degree1 in method1
 in expedient1 and elaboration--whereby 
we discover truth4 ,nature is the       
treasure-house of truth1 and the sole   
fee of appropriation is attention4      
,much discussion has taken place upon   
the nature of necessary truths4 ,mr4    
,mill1 however1 after an elaborate      
analysis of ,dr4 ,whewell's theory1     
pronounces that 'nothing is necessary   
except the connection between a         
conclusion and the premises4' ,a        
necessary truth is commonly defined as a
 proposition1 the negation of which is  
not only false1 but inconceivable4 ,mr4 
,mill contests this doctrine in words   
embodying suggestions of great value4   
',now ,i cannot but wonder that so much 
stress should be laid upon the          
circumstance of inconceivableness1 when 
there is such ample experience to show  
that our capacity or incapacity of      

conceiving a thing has very little to do
 with a possibility of the thing in     
itself2 but is in truth very much an    
affair of accident1 and depends upon the
 past history and habits of our own     
minds4 ,there is no more generally      
acknowledged fact in human nature1 than 
the extreme difficulty at first felt in 
conceiving anything as possible1 which  
is in contradiction to long established 
and familiar experience2 or even to old 
and familiar habits of thought4 ,and    
this difficulty is a necessary result of
 the fundamental laws of the human mind4
 ,when we have often seen and thought of
 two things together1 and have never in 
any one instance either seen or thought 
of them separately1 there is by the     
primary law of association an increasing
 difficulty1 which in the end becomes   
insuperable1 of conceiving the two      
things apart4 ,this is most of all      
conspicuous in uneducated persons1 who  
are in general utterly unable to        
separate any two ideas which have once  

become firmly associated in their minds2
 and if persons of cultivated intellect 
have any advantage on the point1 it is  
only because1 having seen and heard and 
read more1 and been more accustomed to  
exercise their imagination1 they have   
experienced their sensations and        
thoughts in more varied combinations1   
and have been prevented from forming    
these inseparable associations4 ,but    
this advantage has necessarily its      
limits4 ,the man of the most practised  
intellect is not exempt from the        
universal laws of our conceptive        
faculty4 ,if daily habit presents to him
 for a long period two facts in         
combination1 and if he is not led during
 that period either by accident or      
intention to think of them apart1 he    
will in time become incapable of doing  
so even by the strongest effort2 and the
 supposition that the two facts can be  
separated in nature1 will at last       
present itself to his mind with all the 
characters of an inconceivable          

phenomenon4 ,there are remarkable       
instances of this in the history of     
science3 instances1 in which the wisest 
men rejected as impossible1 because     
inconceivable1 things which their       
posterity1 by earlier practice and      
longer perseverance in the attempt1     
found it quite easy to conceive1 and    
which everybody knows to be true4 ',if1 
then1 it be so natural to the human     
mind1 even in its highest state of      
culture1 to be incapable of conceiving1 
and on that ground to believe           
impossible1 what is afterwards not only 
found to be conceivable but proved to be
 true2 what wonder if in cases where the
 association is still older1 more       
confirmed1 and more familiar1 and in    
which nothing ever occurs to shake our  
conviction1 or even suggest to us any   
conception at variance with the         
association1 the acquired incapacity    
should continue1 and be mistaken for a  
natural incapacity8 ,it is true our     
experience of the varieties in nature   

enables us1 within certain limits1 to   
conceive other varieties analogous to   
them4 ,we can conceive the sun or moon  
falling2 for although we never saw them 
fall1 nor ever perhaps1 imagined them   
falling1 we have seen so many other     
things fall1 that we have innumerable   
familiar analogies to assist the        
conception2 which after all1 we should  
probably have some difficulty in        
framing1 were we not well accustomed to 
see the sun and moon move1 7or appear to
 move17 so that we are only called upon 
to conceive a slight change in the      
direction of motion1 a circumstance     
familiar to our experience4 ,but when   
experience affords no model on which to 
shape the new conception1 how is it     
possible for us to form it8 ,how1 for   
example1 can we imagine an end to space 
or time8 ,we never saw any object       
without something beyond it1 nor        
experienced any feeling without         
something following it4 ,when1          
therefore1 we attempt to conceive the   

last point of space1 we have the idea   
irresistibly raised of other points     
beyond it4 ,when we try to imagine the  
last instant of time1 we cannot help    
conceiving another instant after it ,nor
 is there any necessity to assume1 as is
 done by a modern school of             
metaphysicians1 a peculiar fundamental  
law of the mind to account for the      
feeling of infinity inherent in our     
conceptions of space and time2 that     
apparent infinity is sufficiently       
accounted for by simpler and universally
 acknowledged laws4'99       99 ,mill's 
,logic1 vol4 #a1 pp4 #cac-ag4  ,thus we 
stand on the verge of boundless         
possibility4 ,what truths may yet be    
discovered in that great and untrodden  
field1 which lies without our           
experience1 no man can tell4 ,all we    
have yet brought between assertion and  
proof1 is all we have yet conquered1 is 
all that we as yet know1 is all that we 
can yet rely upon4 ,the search after the
 untried is the highest and apparently  

the inherent aspiration of roan4 ,the   
revelation of new worlds continually    
rewards his noble ambition4 ,at once    
arrested and allured by the magnificence
 of nature--we wonder1 we work1 we wait4
    ,,chapter ,v4 ,,facts       ,we must
 never forget that accurate and         
multiplied      quantitative facts form 
the only substantial basis of           
science4--,parker4  ,as clear fountains 
send forth pellucid streams1 so do clear
 truths give accurate sciences4 ,the    
more definite the facts1 the more       
perfect the science2 it is therefore of 
importance that all facts should be     
capable of being tested by the standard 
of physical certainty4 ,dr4 ,reid says1 
that 'the inquirer after truth must take
 only facts for his guide4' ,it is then 
of moment that he takes true and not    
false guides4 ,a writer in the ',monthly
 ,repository' observes1 that 'the basis 
of all knowledge is such an extensive   
induction from particular facts1 as     
leads to general conclusions and        

fundamental axioms'--and if the facts   
are erroneous1 evidently the conclusions
 will be also erroneous4 ,he also       
remarks1 that 'in reasoning1 all        
sciences are the same1 being founded on 
an examination of facts--comparison of  
ideas4' ,but ,if the examination is     
incomplete1 or the facts admitted       
incorrect1 the comparison will be alike 
defective and the reasoning vitiated4   
,if suppositions or conjectures are     
mixed up with facts1 the inductions from
 them will be suppositions1 and the     
conclusions but conjectures4  ,there are
 three words--consciousness1 conscience1
 and conscientiousness--very much alike 
to the ear but very different in        
signification4 ,consciousness1 is       
feeling--conscience1 the sense of right 
and wrong---conscientiousness1 the      
practice of what is believed to be      
right4 ,conscience and conscientiousness
 are often confounded4 ,we say1 lawyers 
have no conscience1 we mean no          
conscientiousness4 ,they know right from

 wrong as men1 but not professionally4  
,it is with consciousness that the      
logician has to deal4 ,consciousness is 
the primary source of knowledge4        
,consciousness and the ',evidences of   
the ,senses' are synonymous terms4      
,facts referable to consciousness are   
said to be physically certain4 ,the     
evidence of the senses is the highest   
standard of certainty4  ,the intuitive  
principles of belief are--    #ast4 ,a  
conviction of our own existence4   #bnd4
 ,a confidence in the evidences of our  
senses4   #crd4 ,in our mental          
operations4   #dth4 ,in our mental      
identity4   #eth4 ,in the conformity of 
the operations of nature4  ,these truths
 of intuition or consciousness are the  
foundation of all knowledge4 ,truths    
which we know1 by way of inference1 are 
occurrences which took place while we   
were absent--the events of history and  
the theorems of mathematics4 ,but the   
truths known by intuition are the       
original premises from which all others 

axe inferred4 ,our assent to the        
conclusion being grounded upon the truth
 of the premises1 we could never arrive 
at any knowledge by reasoning1 unless   
something could be known antecedently to
 all reasoning4  ',whatever is known to 
us by consciousness1 is known beyond    
possibility of question4 ,what one sees1
 or feels1 whether bodily or mentally1  
one cannot but be sure that one sees or 
feels4 ,no science is required for the  
purpose of establishing such truths2 no 
rules of art can render our knowledge of
 them more certain than it is in itself4
 ,there is no logic for this portion of 
our know ledge4'99  ,all discussions    
pertaining to the nature and limits of  
intuition or consciousness are referred 
to the higher or transcendental         
metaphysics1 but all the facts that     
compose evidence and become the grounds 
of inference are1 according to the view 
taken here1 necessarily subjects of     
examination4  ',cogito ergo sum--,i     
think1 therefore ,i am1 argued ,des     

,cartes4 ,we learn by this that         
consciousness of the operations of the  
mind is the strongest evidence of our   
existence4 ,it cannot be proved so      
forcibly by any other means2 and        
although ,des ,cartes' language may     
appear to involve a logical fallacy1 yet
 the proof of our personal existence    
which we have from thinking1 is the     
fullest and best we are acquainted      
with4'9999       99 ,j4 #h4 ,mil3       
,logic1 vol4 l1 p4 #g4       9999 ,rev4 
,robert ,amalie4  ,there is a numerous  
class of facts from which all men draw  
conclusions1 which facts are not        
referable to the evidence of the senses4
 ,there are the facts of testimony4     
,testimony is founded on laws almost as 
fixed and certain as those of nature4   
,all our knowledge1 scientific1         
literary1 historical--all except what   
arises from our experience and          
consciousness--depends on it4 ,in the   
administration of justice it is the sole
 guardian of property and life4 ,if a   

man of known integrity and veracity     
state a fact1 without any possible      
motive of self-interest1 and evidently  
subject to no delusion2 and if others of
 like character1 who could have no      
understanding or collusion with him1    
state the same1 men are nearly as       
certain of it as of any truth in        
mathematics4 ,i believe in the existence
 of ,rome and the facts of astronomy on 
this evidence1 although ,i never saw the
 city or examined the stars through a   
telescope4  ,the conclusiveness of      
testimony is designated moral certainty4
 ,the value of testimony depends on     
three things4 #a4 ,on the nature of the 
subject4 ,some subjects are capable of  
more accurate observation than others4  
#b4 ,on the powers and character of the 
observer--his ability to understand or  
note that of which he testifies--and his
 honesty in common matters4 #c4 ,on the 
number of our informers4 ,several       
persons are less likely to be imposed   
upon than one4  ,testimony or moral     

certainty is inferior to physical       
certainty4 ,a physical certainty bears  
uniformly the name of certainty1 while a
 moral certainty is characterised as a  
probability4 ,great1 very great may be  
the probability1 still it is less in    
reliableness than a physical certainty4 
,the evidence of ,cato or ,aristides    
would be very conclusive--yet somewhat  
less certain than that which our own    
senses have proved4  ,the conclusions   
from moral certainties are obtained like
 other conclusions1 by induction4 ,the  
induction from moral facts is like the  
induction from physical facts1 with this
 difference--that the conclusions from  
moral facts are probabilities1 like the 
facts on which they are founded4        
,whatever has physical certainty in its 
favour is considered demonstrable1 and  
when sufficient probable evidence is    
adduced in favour of a proposition1 it  
is considered to be fairly proved4 ,some
 persons1 biased by the strictness of   
mathematical proof1 insist upon the same

 accuracy in moral investigations4 ,i   
have elsewhere pointed out the          
juvenility and infatuation of this      
error4 ,insist upon demonstration where 
the nature of the questions admits it4  
,less should not1 in such case1 suffice4
 ,accept probability where probability  
is the sole evidence attainable4 ,never 
ask more than reason can grant4 ,we must
 admit gradations of validity4 ,what we 
are conscious of1 we know4 ,all we      
receive on testimony1 we believe4       
,physical certainty is knowledge3 moral 
certainty1 belief4 ,hume remarks1 in his
 ',essay on ,probabilities1' that ',mr4 
,locke divides all arguments into       
demonstrative and probable4 ,in this    
view1 we must say1 that it is only      
probable all men must die1 or that the  
sun will rise to-morrow4 ,but to conform
 our language more to common us1 we     
ought to divide arguments into          
demonstrations1 proofs1 and             
probabilities4 ,by proofs1 meaning such 
arguments from experience as leave no   

room for doubt or opposition4'99        
99 ,hume's ,essays1 vol4 #b1 p4#ei4     
,conjecture is probable truth4 ,some    
subjects only furnish a sufficient      
number of facts to make them probable in
 the lowest degree--not to decide them  
as positively true4 ,the propositions   
expressing results pertaining to such   
subjects are called conjectures4  ,a    
conjecture founded on no fact or upon   
too few to make it likely1 is called a  
vagary4  ,it will be seen that          
probability is a thing of degree4 ,a    
probability may vary in weight from a   
moral certainty1 where it ranks next to 
a physical certainty1 down to a         
conjecture1 and descend lower in        
likelihood till it is lost in           
conjecture4  ,lord ,kames remarks1 in   
his preface to his ',sketches'--',most  
of the subjects handled in the following
 sheets1 admit but of probable          
reasoning3 and1 with respect to such    
reasoning1 it is often difficult to say1
 what degree of conviction they ought to

 produce4 ,it is easy to form plausible 
arguments2 but to form such as can stand
 the test of time1 is not always easy4  
,i could amuse the reader with numerous 
examples of conjectural arguments1      
which1 fair at a distant view1 vanish   
like a cloud on a near approach'4 ,did  
all authors so judiciously apprise their
 readers of the probable logical value  
of their speculations1 fewer would be   
misled than now4  ,to numerous questions
 of undoubted interest1 which have been 
agitated in all ages1 only a moderate   
degree of certainty attaches--these are 
termed speculative4 ,such subjects may  
afford but few facts and instances1 and 
the chances of conclusiveness may seem  
remote--yet ultimate results are not to 
be despaired of3 the new comparison of  
conjectures and the arrangement of facts
 daily throws new light on age-contested
 points4 ,systems of conduct should not 
be founded on conjectures in opposition 
to evident moral utility2 but if        
speculation is kept 'within the sphere  

of speculation1 it may be prosecuted    
with safety and prospect of success4    
,there are problems in metaphysics as   
there are in mathematics1 which may be  
demonstrated to be insolvable4 ,to      
describe the limit of human power with  
respect to contested questions will yet 
result from speculative controversy4    
,the capacities of our understanding    
will be one day well considered1 the    
extent of our knowledge discovered1 and 
the horizon found which sets bounds     
between the enlightened and the dark    
part of things--between what is and what
 is not comprehensible by us4 ,but this 
will only be when the untried has been  
universally attempted in all directions4
 ,bailey1 ,i think1 has defined truth as
 being that which is universally        
accepted after having been universally  
examined4 ,little of this truth is yet  
extant4 ,when every man shall be a      
thinker1 when the autobiography of      
intellect shall be more freely furnished
 than it ever yet has been1 unanimity of

 opinion not yet dreamed of will        
prevail4 ,harmony of opinion is the sign
 of intellectual conquest--the          
standard-bearer of truth no advocacy is 
victorious while dissent occupies the   
field4  ,what we know to be true1 is    
knowledge2 what we have only reason to  
believe true1 is opinion4 ,all human    
information is made up of knowledge and 
opinion4 ,the primary importance of     
knowledge is evident from the fact that 
knowledge is the umpire of all opinion4 
,we believe in the existence of the     
ruins of ,palmyra and ,thebes1 and in   
certain discoveries of algebraists and  
astronomers4 ,it is our opinion that    
these things are true1 although we may  
never have visited ,palmyra or ,thebes1 
nor made the calculations of the        
algebraist1 nor the observations of the 
astronomer4 ,in these cases our belief  
is founded on our experience and        
knowledge of mankind4 ,it is quite true 
that travellers exaggerate1 and         
scientific men are sometimes mistaken2  

but we know that there is always some   
truth at the bottom of what is          
communicated by well-meaning writers4   
,more or less1 every man's experience   
assures him of this2 and it is the cause
 of our reliance on the records of      
history1 and the reports of science4    
,therefore1 since all information is    
made up of knowledge and opinion1       
plainly knowledge is the one thing which
 comprises all intelligence4            
',questions of fact1' observes ,pascal1 
in his celebrated ',provincial          
,letters1' 'are only to be determined by
 the senses4 ,if what you assert be     
true1 prove it to be so2 if it be not1  
you labour in vain to induce belief4    
,all the authority in the world cannot  
enforce or alter belief as to facts2    
nothing can possibly have power to cause
 that not to be which actually is4'99   
,a remarkable instance of the           
verification of what was assumed to be  
is related of ,pascal by ,goodrich4     
',pascal was a philosopher even in      

childhood4 ,at a very early age he was  
taught the ten commandments4 ,for       
several days after1 he was observed to  
be measuring the growth of a blade of   
grass4 ,when asked the meaning of this1 
he replied1 ,the fourth commandment     
says1 ',six days shalt thou labour1 but 
the seventh is the ,sabbath in which    
thou shalt do no work4' ,now ,i wished  
to ascertain if nature obeyed this great
 law1 and therefore measured the grass1 
to see if it grew as much on ,sunday as 
on other days4 '9999  ',we are          
informed1' says ,beattie1 'by ,father   
,malebranche1 that the senses were at   
first as honest faculties as one could  
desire to be endued with1 till after    
they were debauched by original sin2 an 
adventure from which they contracted    
such an invincible propensity to        
cheating1 that they are now continually 
lying in wait to deceive us4 ,but there 
is in man1 it seems1 a certain          
clear-sighted1 stout1 old faculty1      
called reason1 which1 without being     

deceived by appearances1 keeps an eye   
upon the rogues1 and often proves too   
cunning for them4'999999       99       
,letter xviii4       9999 ,fireside     
,education1 p4 #hi4       999999 ,essay 
on ,truth1 p4 #aje4  ,though it is so   
abundantly obvious that the evidences of
 our senses1 internal and external1 are1
 in effect1 the sources of all          
certainty1 yet we are not warranted in  
rejecting1 as mere hypothesis1 every    
theory which we cannot at once          
corroborate4 ,when ,euler remarked of   
his new law of arches1 ',this will be   
found true1 though contrary to all      
experience'--when ,gall exclaimed of his
 new philosophy of the sensorium1 ',this
 is true1 though opposed to the         
philosophy of ages'--they expressed     
demonstrable truths hidden from the     
multitude4 ,they announced new          
generalisations to man4 ,new truths are 
commonly found to be old unnoted        
experiences1 for the first time         
subjected to classification1 and        

presented in a scientific form4  ,to me 
it seems almost in vain to urge men to  
notice facts who have never noticed     
themselves4 ,the truest standards of    
certainty arise from individuality of   
retrospection4 ,an intelligent man is1  
himself to himself1 the measure of all  
things in the universe4  ,in appealing  
to the young on the aspiration after    
improvement1 one cannot say ',consult   
your aptitudes--follow your bias4' ,this
 ,is the sole appeal-injunctive to which
 all natures can respond4 ,but in this  
half-natured1 half-trained1             
doubtfully-conditioned state of society1
 though the generous would be incited to
 noble deeds1 the sordid would lay their
 vulture claws on the world1 and the    
unprincipled victimise their fellows4   
,you have1 therefore1 to say1 ',man1 do 
what thou listest1 provided it be       
compatible with the welfare of thy      
fellow men4' ,men are not well-natured1 
and we have thus to guard individuality1
 and qualify the appeal1 and so we miss 

the soil of great enterprise4 ,great is 
the disadvantage4 ,for the fulcrum which
 is to raise men is without their       
natures--remote in the wide world4  ,man
 should begin with himself4 ,he loves   
,truth--it is the first impulse of his  
nature4 ,he loves ,justice--the bandit  
on the throne1 as well as the bandit in 
the forest1 respects justice in some    
form or other4 ,man loves               
,cheerfulness--it is the attribute of   
innocence and courage4 ,he loves        
,fraternity--it knits society together  
in brotherhood4 ,these are standards4   
,his codes of life and judgment arise   
from these aspirations4 ,that which     
accords with these principles is        
reasonable4 ,whatever develops these    
principles in conduct is moral4 ,these  
sentiments are to be confirmed by his   
own observations4 ,his experience in    
connection with these rules is the right
 with which he may examine religions1   
creeds1 books1 systems1 opinions4  ,the 
right understanding of physical and     

moral facts greatly depends upon        
intellectual character--and there enters
 largely into the recondite and ultimate
 inquiries of intelligent men another   
class of facts1 called mental facts4    
,there is no chance of identifying these
 without the power of self-analysis1    
which is one reason why metaphysic      
ability belongs to so few1 and why      
questions involving metaphysical        
considerations are such profound enigmas
 to the majority of the people4 ,the    
illiterate in these things are easily   
led or misled by words4 ,they who will  
not bow before a throne fall prostrate  
before a sound4  ,the first principles  
of things are few4 ,the axioms from     
which men date their reasoning are      
chiefly personal4 ,they are expressed in
 an infinite variety of ways1 occasioned
 by the various conceptions of those who
 conceive them1 and by the different    
capacities to which they are adapted    
when offered for the instruction and    
guidance of others4 ,but this must not  

mislead us as to the number1 and        
overwhelm us with a sense of complexity1
 where in fact simplicity reigns4 ,those
 who have the power of self-analysis    
make for themselves rules of conduct1   
and the best are originated in this     
way--for when a man recasts his         
acquirements of sense and education1 in 
order to see on what all rests1 and what
 are essential standards of action and  
judgment1 he resolves all into few1 and 
those the clear and strong4 ,rob ,roy's 
self-examination paper is presented to  
us in those lines which ,sir ,walter    
,scott1 with grace and justice1         
characterised as the 'high-toned poetry 
of his gifted friend ,wordsworth4'      
,say1 then1 that he was wise as brave1  
,as wise in thought as bold in deed2    
,for in the principles of things        
,he sought his morai creed4       ,said 
generous ,rob1 ',what need of ,books8   
,burn all the statutes and their        
shelves6      ,they stir us up against  
our kind1      ,and worse1 against      

ourselves4       ,we have a passion1    
make a law1      ,too false to guide us 
or control2      ,and for the law itself
 we fight      ,in bitterness of soul4  
,and puzzled1 blinded1 then we lose     
,distinctions that are plain and few2   
,these find ,i graven on my heart1      
,that tells me what to do4  ,sir ,walter
 ,scott himself has enforced the same   
views3--',how much do ,i need such a    
monitor1' said ,waverley to ,flora4 ',a 
better one by far ,mr4 ,waverley will   
always find in his own bosom1 when he   
will give its still small voice leisure 
to be heard4       ,all that hath been  
majestical      ,in life or death1 since
 time began1      ,is native in the     
simple heart of all1--      ,the angel  
heart of man4--,lowell4  ,to awaken the 
senses and instruct them and direct them
 aright in the art of observation1 is a 
great and essential undertaking4 ,all   
scattered aids need collecting together4
 ,de la ,beche in ',geology1' and ,miss 
,martineau have written books1 entitled 

',how to ,observe4' ,this quality is the
 distinction between the natural and    
artificial man--the natural man observes
 what is in nature--the artificial notes
 what he finds in books--the one depends
 on himself--the other on an            
encyclopaedia4 ,we want contrast1 in    
order to know as well as to explain4    
,foreigners observe us better than we   
observe ourselves4 ,the common escapes  
our attention4 ,to know a fact fully we 
seek its opposite to compare it with4   
,were men reared with the powers of men 
without the genius of the child being   
impaired1 the ability to observe would  
be more general and perfect among us4   
,children stop at everything to question
 its nature1 at every word to ask its   
import4 ,it was the aim of ,pestalozzi  
to cultivate by his system of tuition   
this incessant questioning4 ,but parents
 among the poor know not the value of   
the habit1 or knowing it have not time  
to gratify it1 and thus this happiest   
aptitude of childhood is repressed4     

,with regard to the analysis of groups  
of facts1 ,mr4 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill            
remarks--',the observer is not he who   
merely sees the thing before his eyes1  
but he who sees what parts that thing is
 composed of4 ,to do this well is a rare
 talent4 ,one person from inattention1  
or attending only in the wrong place1   
overlooks half of what he sees2 another 
sets down much more than he sees1       
confounding it with what he imagines1 or
 with what he infers  another takes note
 of the kind of all the circumstances1  
but being inexpert in estimating their  
degree1 leaves the quantity of each     
vague and uncertain2 another sees indeed
 the whole1 but makes such an awkward   
division of it into parts1 throwing     
things into one mass which require to be
 separated1 and separating others which 
might more conveniently be considered as
 one1 that the result is much the same1 
sometimes even worse1 than if no        
analysis had been attempted at all4'99  
99 ,logic1 vol4 #a1 p4 #dch4  ,in the   

case of the ,leigh ,peerage there was a 
number of witnesses examined in the     
,house of ,lords1 as to the existence of
 a certain monument in ,stonely         
,church--',the first witness described  
the monument as being black2 the second 
spoke of it as a kind of dove-colour2   
the third said it was black and white2  
the fourth said it was originally white1
 but dirty1 when he saw it2 the fifth   
differing from the others1 said it was  
blue2 the next witness described it as a
 light marble1 but said it had a dark   
appearance as if it had been bronzed1   
and the last witness spoke of it as     
feeing of a light grey colour4 ,then1 as
 to the form of the monument1 the first 
witness said it was oblong2 the next    
said it was square at the top1 and came 
down narrower to the bottom1 and there  
rested on a single truss2 the third     
witness described it as being square at 
the bottom1 testing upon two trusses2   
and went up narrower and narrower to a  
point at the top2 the fourth witness    

said it was angular at the top2 the next
 said it was square at the bottom1 was  
brought to a point in the middle1 and   
was then curved into a sort of festoon2 
the sixth witness stated that it was    
square at the top and bottom1 and had a 
curve2 and the last said it was square  
at the top and bottom4 ,as to the       
language of the inscriptions1 the first 
witness stated that the names of ,thomas
 and ,christopher ,leigh were in        
,english2 the next said the inscription 
was not in ,english2 the third said     
there was a great deal in ,english2 the 
fourth witness said the whole1 7with the
 exception of the name ,christopher     
,lee71 was in a language1 which he did  
not understand2 the next witness stated 
that the inscription was all in         
,english1 except the words ,anno        
,domini2 and the last witness said it   
was not in ,english4'99       99 ,times1
 ,may #aj1 #ahbh4  ,all these witnesses 
agree as to the fact in dispute1 but    
their variances in testimony illustrate 

the common inattention of               
observation--and this case farther      
admonishes us that if such differences  
may exist as to a question of fact1     
where the senses are the same1 little   
wonder that differences exist as to     
matters of opinion1 where intellectual  
capacity and information are so various4
  ,we know from experience that the     
sportsman sees a point which is hidden  
from the unpractised aimer--the painter 
sees traits of character of light and   
shade in an object which the untaught   
limner never observes2 the musician     
distinguishes harmonies and discords    
that fall unnoted on the uneducated ear4
  ,thus we learn that by cultivation we 
can increase natural susceptibility to  
observe4  ,the extent is surprising to  
which the unanalytic are in ignorance of
 the real nature of phenomena4 ',there  
is nothing which we appear to ourselves 
more directly conscious of1 than the    
distance of an object from us4 ,yet it  
has long been ascertained1 that what is 

perceived by the eye1 is at most nothing
 more than a variously coloured surface2
 that when we fancy we see distance1 all
 we really see is certain variation of  
apparent size1 and more or less         
faintness of colour4'99  ,in preparing  
to support an argument on any question1 
we must first determine the sources     
whence the facts are to be collected4   
,instance3 ,the objects of municipal    
laws are rights and crimes4  ,the       
evidence of rights are3--  #a4 ,public  
consent4   #b4 ,testimony4   #c4        
,records4  ,the evidence of crimes      
are3--  #a4 ,confession4   #b4 ,previous
 malice4   #c4 ,testimony4  ,this       
outline of the investigation prosecuted1
 the inquirer next consults the authors 
who treat of the rules which are applied
 for determining the facts of public    
consent1 testimony1 records1            
confessions3 he is then able to support 
his own argument in a valid manner1 or  
prepared to examine the facts offered by
 an opponent in support of an opposite  

view4  ,the opinion may be hazarded that
 it is not so much from want of capacity
 to observe that error arises1 as from  
the want of conviction that we should   
observe well before we attempt to infer4
 ,nature is inventive1 and desire1 once 
awakened1 will1 without formal rules1   
find out a thousand modes of            
gratification4 ,the foundation for a    
soldier logic than now prevails will be 
laid when the people are impressed with 
the great importance of looking well to 
facts as the data of all inferential    
truth4  ,there is a noted aphorism of   
,cendillac1 to the effect that the one  
sufficient rule for discovering the     
nature and properties of objects is to  
name them properly1 as if1 observes ,mr4
 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 'the reverse was not the
 truth1 that it is impossible to name   
them properly except in proportion as we
 are already acquainted with their      
nature and properties4' ,need it be     
added that this knowledge is only to be 
had by patient observation8       99    

,mill ,logic vol4 l1 p4#g4  ,to assist  
this habit1 ,dr4 ,watts recommends the  
thinker to ascertain if a given idea is 
clear and distinct1 obscure and         
confused1 learned or vulgar1 perfect or 
imperfect1 adequate or inadequate--true 
or false4 ',view a subject1 says he1 as 
through a telescope1 so as to command a 
clear view of it2 examine its whole     
bearings as you look over a globe2      
consider it in its several              
properties--anatomise it as with a      
scalpel4 ,take cognizance of its various
 aspects as though inspecting it through
 a prismatic glass4 ,whenever we        
contemplate a single object in nature is
 obvious it must have duration1 size1   
weight1 form1 colour1 such qualities    
being essentially present in all        
adequate conceptions of physical        
phenomena4'  ,it was objected to the    
',cricket' of ,mr4 ,dickens1 that his   
delineation of ,bertha was wanting in   
truthfulness4 ,the teachers of the blind
 who knew their nature could detect the 

departure from the reality of their     
habits in the sketch of ,bertha4 ,the   
study of the blind was necessary to     
insure success4 ,we may not be able in  
any one book to give rules for the study
 of all subjects1 but we may indicate   
that we ought not to speak of what we do
 not know1 and that if we mean to       
introduce certain facts into our speech 
or writing1 we should consult the       
records and experienee of those persons 
who are known to have written upon the  
subject1 and follow the best directions 
they give1 and we shall generally attain
 accuracy4  ,mr4 ,combe observes1 in his
 introduction to his notes on the       
,united ,states of ,north ,america1 p4  
xi4--',i was told that a certain person 
boasts of having given ,miss ,martineau 
erroneous information for the purpose of
 leading her into mistakes2 and another 
in ,philadelphia assures his friends    
that he crammed ,capt4 ,marryatt with   
old ,joe ,millers1 which the ,capt4     
embodied into his books as facts        

illustrative of ,american manners4 ,this
 seems to be a case in which some       
uncertainty must ever exist as to the   
value of the facts collected by         
travellers4 ,they cannot observe all1 or
 test half that they do observe4 ,they  
must rely on testimony4 ,but they might 
do this--,they might tell us precisely  
the kind of authority they followed1 and
 then the reader could form some opinion
 of the value of what was communicated4 
,had ,miss ,martineau and ,captain      
,marryatt given the name and addresses  
of their informants1 the latter would   
now be punished by being infamously     
known throughout ,europe2 and all future
 travellers warned from them--and all   
future informants warned by their       
example4 ,where informants cannot be    
mentioned by name and address1 the      
chances are1 they cannot be trusted4    
,when first connected with public       
proceedings1 ,i found myself made the   
depository of innumerable bits of       
scandal1 and ominous reports of public  

characters4 ,to all who told me         
anything1 if ,i attached importance to  
it1 ,i made it a rule to ask--',may ,i  
mention it to the party with your name8'
 ',o1 no1 ,i would rather not1' was the 
common reply4 ,to all written           
communications answer--',please add your
 name and address--and may ,i publish   
them if occasion requires8' ',o1 no1    
don't1' would be the general injunction4
 ,thus ,i found that huge reports1      
inflated as balloons1 shrunk like them  
when pricked by the pin of a            
question--',will you answer for it8'    
,thus ,i saved myself from being imposed
 upon by1 or being the retailer of1     
reports for which the originator or     
relator would not or could not vouch4   
',upwards of twenty years ago1' says    
,george ,combe1 ',i accompanied a member
 of the bar of ,paris1 a philosopher and
 a man of letters1 on a visit to the    
,highlands of ,scotland4 ,at ,callendar 
a boy of twelve or thirteen years of age
 attended as a guide to some interesting

 spot1 and in external appearance he    
seemed to be in every respect one of the
 common lads of the village4 ,my        
,parisian friend entered into           
conversation with him2 asked him if he  
had been at school1 and soon discovered 
that to a tolerable acquaintance with   
the ,greek and ,latin languages1 he     
added a pretty extensive-knowledge of   
arithmetic and geography1 and was then  
engaged in the study of mathematics4 ,my
 friend conceived that the boy was an   
average specimen of the peasantry of the
 country2 and greatly admired the       
educational attainments of the ,scotch  
people1 which he had previously heard   
highly extolled4 ,but1' adds ,mr4       
,combe1 'the boy was the natural son of 
an ,english officer1 who had resided in 
the neighbourhood1 and who1 while he    
ordered him to be reared in the hardy   
habits of the ,scottish ,highlanders1   
had provided ample funds for his mental 
education4'99       99 ,intro1 to notes 
on ,united ,states of ,north ,america1  

p4 #aj41      vol4 #a  ,it is difficult 
to believe in this ,frenchman being a   
'philosopher1 making1 as he did1 a      
national induction from a single        
instance4 ,had he previously inquired1  
as he ought to have done1 the           
particulars of that lad's life and      
rearing1 before coming to so large a    
conclusion1 he would at once have       
discovered the error he was falling     
into4  ,in the ,registrar ,general's    
,report of #ahdj1 the mean of married   
persons unable to write is presented4   
,the conclusion is based upon the       
statistics of nine counties4 ,but when  
it was found that only three per cent1  
of the persons marriageable1 did marry1 
the datum was found insufficient to     
afford sure results4 ,this fact2 is     
given by ,mr4 ,combe in the same book4  
,then how many boys ought our           
'philosopher' to have questioned before 
making his vast inference8  ,another    
instance of the value of a question ,i  
extract from the same work4 ,mr4 ,combe 

says3--',a few years ago1 when          
travelling in ,somersetshire1 ,i saw    
four horses1 attended by two men1       
drawing a light plough in a light soil4 
,what a waste of labour is here1 said ,i
 to an intelligent farmer2 in ,scotland1
 two horses and one man will accomplish 
this work4 ,we rear and train young     
horses for the ,london market1 said he2 
two of the four which you see are       
serving an apprenticeship to labour4'   
,had ,mr4 ,combe asked a few questions  
as to the correctness of his assumed    
inference1 he would have been saved from
 his erroneous conclusion4 ,we should be
 wary of unquestioned data4  ,when      
,murray's ,grammar was first placed in  
my hands1 ,i found in it certain        
references to the ,canons of ,language  
in the larger edition4 ,i questioned my 
teacher as to what it meant4 ',it is a  
trick of the printer1' he answered1 'to 
induce you to buy the larger volume4' ,i
 do not believe this now4 ,i believe    
that it was a necessary reference4 ,an  

author who has written upon a given     
subject1 naturally finds his own ideas  
coincident illustrations of his views1  
and honestly refers to them4 ,in this   
book ,i have made a few references to   
previous works of mine1 and it has      
struck me that nine ont of ten of the   
readers will set this down to artifice  
or egotism4 ,yet it is neither4 ,i have 
referred only to avoid the full         
quotation of some necessary illustration
 of the argument4 ,yet few will         
penetrate to the fact1 and most will be 
apt to infer a trick from appearances4  
,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,science               
,whatever we know must be in the number 
of the primitive      data1 or of the   
conclusions which can be drawn          
therefrom4--      ,j4,s4 ,mill  ,to have
 reached1 in the study of observed      
phenomena1 the point of perception      
indicated in this motto1 and to feel the
 full force of the remark1 is to have   
imbibed the spirit of science---whose   
traits are dear distinctions1 accurate  

classification1 and strict reference to 
primitive data4 ,the bases of all       
science are methodical facts4 ,the first
 step to the perfection and enlargement 
of a science is the resolution of its   
propositions into axioms1 and into      
propositions which are to be proved4    
,dr4 ,reid observes--',this has been    
done in mathematics from the beginning1 
and has tended greatly to the emolument 
of that science4 ,it has lately been    
done in natural philosophy1 and by this 
means that science has advanced more in 
#afj years than it had done before in   
#b1jjj4 ,every science is in an unformed
 state until its first principles are   
ascertained2 after this it advances     
regularly1 and secures the ground it has
 gained4'  ,classification is one of the
 first steps to ,science4 ,the maxim in 
government1 divide and conquer1 retains1
 when applied to science1 all its wisdom
 without its machiavelialism4 ,the young
 grammarian reduces the mass of words1  
that so threaten to confound his powers1

 to a few natural classes1 and he       
conquers them separately with ease4     
',the single power by which we discover 
resemblance or relation in general1 is a
 sufficient aid to us in the perplexity 
and confusion of our first attempts at  
arrangement4 ,it begins by converting   
thousands1 and more than thousands1 into
 one2 and1 reducing in the same manner  
the numbers tiros formed1 it arrives at 
last at the few distinctive characters  
of those great comprehensive tribes1 on 
which it ceases to operate1 'because    
there is nothing left to oppress the    
memory or the understanding4'99       99
 ,brown's ,moral ,philosophy1 ,lect1    
xvi4  ,merell has spoken more           
comprehensively on this subject--',that 
human knowledge dees not consist in the 
bare collection and enumeration of      
facts2 this alone would be of little    
service were we net to attempt the      
classification of them1 and to educe    
from such classification general laws   
and principles4 ,the knowledge1 which   

consists in individual truths1 could    
never be either extensive ear           
definite--for the multiplicity of       
objects which then must crowd in upon   
the mind only tends to confound and     
perplex it1 while the memory1           
overburdened with particulars1 is not   
able to retain a hundredth part of the  
materials which are collected4 ,to      
prevent this1 the power el              
generalisation comes to our aid1 by     
which the individual facts are so       
classified under their proper           
conceptions1 that they may at the same  
time be more easily retained1 and their 
several relations to all other branches 
of knowledge accurately defined4 ,the   
colligation and classification of facts1
 then1 we may regard as the two first   
steps1 which are to be taken in the     
attainment of truth4'99  ,aristotle1    
says ,morell1 classified the matter1    
,kant the forms4 ,aristotle was the     
first man who undertook the gigantic    
task of reducing the multiplicity of all

 the objects of human knowledge to a few
 general heads---#a4 ,substance4 #b4    
,quality4 #c4 ,quantity4 #d4 ,relation4 
,action4 #f4 ,passion4 #g4 ,place4 #h4  
,time4 #i4 ,posture4 #aj4 ,habit4       
,aristotle's philosophy was objective1  
,kant's subjective4 ,kant's categories  
were twelve4 #a4 ,unity4 #b4 ,plurality4
 #c4 ,totality4 #d4 ,affirmation4       
,negation4 #f4 limitation4 #g4          
,substance4 #h4 ,casualty4 #i4          
,reciprocity4 #aj4 ,possibility4 #aa4   
,actuality4 #ab4 ,necessity4  ',it is a 
fundamental principle in logic1 that the
 power of framing classes is unlimited  
as long as there is any 7even the       
smallest7 difference to found a         
distinction upon49999  ,what ,geoffroy  
,saint ,hilaire has said of natural     
history is applicable to all            
science3--',the first problem to be     
solved by him who wishes to penetrate   
deeply into this2 study1 consists       
evidently in the formation of clear and 
precise distinctions between the various

 brings4 ,this is the most elementary   
problem1 in so-far as it precedes all   
the others2 but it is in reality1 in    
most cases1 complicated and full of     
difficulties4 ,its accurate solution    
requires--first1 ,observation1 which    
makes known the facts2 next1            
,description1 which fixes them          
permanently2 then ,characterisation1    
which selects and displays prominently  
the most important of them--and lastly1 
,classification1 which arranges them in 
systematic order4'999999  ,of the value 
of classification1 ,lamartine has given 
a fine illustration3----',montesquieu   
had sounded the institutions and        
analysed the laws of all people4 ,by    
classing governments he had compared    
them1 by comparing them he passed       
judgment on them2 and this judgment     
brought out1 in its bold relief and     
contrast1 on every page1 right and      
force1 privilege and equality1 tyranny  
and liberty4'99999999       99 ,morell's
 ,hist4 of ,speculative ,phil41 p4 #cd1 

vol4 #a4       9999 ,mill1 p4 #afe1 vol4
 #a4       999999 ,t4 ,w4 ,thornton3    
,reasoner ,no4 #gb1 p4 #ffd4            
99999999 ,lamartine's ,hist4            
,girondists1 pp4 #ad-ae1 vol4 #a4       
,familiarity with the characteristics of
 science imparts considerable power for 
the detection of fallacy4 ,a logician is
 imperfect without scientific tastes and
 habits4 ,the man of science has all his
 knowledge systematised and arranged4   
,what other people have in confusion1 he
 has in order4 ,the elements of         
knowledge are1 more or less1 as has been
 observed1 known to all men--but in     
their perfect1 communicable1 and usable 
state1 they are-known only to the       
educated and scientific man4 ,what      
training is to the soldier1 science is  
to the thinker4 ,it enables him to      
control all his resources and employ his
 natural powers to the best advantage4  
,it is this which constitutes the       
superiority of the educated over the    
ignorant4 ,astronomy1 navigation1       

architecture1 geometry1 political       
economy1 morals1 all rest1 or should    
rest1 and do rest1 if they have-attained
 to the perfection of science1 on       
primary facts and first principles4     
,every step can be measured by an       
axiom--every result can be traced to a  
first principle499 ,to detect error1    
then1 in any province of investigation1 
or any domain of argument1 the logician 
first looks to the primary principles on
 which it is based1 and thus tests the  
legitimacy of its conclusions4  ,as     
respects those who deal in things       
professedly above reason1 ,it was well  
said by an anonymous writer of the old  
school of sturdy thinkers1--',of such   
men as these ,i usually demand1 whether 
their own assent to things they would   
have us believe1 be grounded upon some  
rational argument4 ,if they say 'tis    
not1 they are fools to believe it       
themselves2 and ,i should add to the    
number of fools1 if1 after this         
acknowledgment1 ,i should believe them3 

but if they say it is1 ,i desire them to
 produce their argument2 for since 'tis 
framed by a human understanding1 the    
force of it may also be comprehended and
 judged of by a human understanding3 and
 tis to no purpose to say that the      
subject surpasses human reason3 for if  
it do so indeed1 it will surpass theirs 
as well as mine1 and so leave us both   
upon even terms4 ,and let the thing     
assented to be what it will1 the assent 
itself must be founded upon a sufficient
 reason1 and consequently upon one that 
is intelligible to the human intellect  
that is wrought on by it4'9999       99 
,see ,beauties and ,uses of ,euclid1    
chap4 vi41 ,logic of      ,euclid4      
9999  ,a ,discourse on ,things above    
,reason1 #afha4  ,what is it8-- ',tis   
impossible the same thing should be1 and
 not be at the same time1 are maxims of 
such universal usefulness1 that without 
them we could neither judge1 discourse1 
nor act4 ,these principles may not      
always make their appearance in formal  

propositions1 but still they guide all  
our thoughts in the same manner as when 
a musician plays a careless voluntary   
upon a harpsichord--he is guided by     
rules of music he long since became     
familiar with1 though now scarcely      
sensible of them4  ',a butcher loses his
 knife1 and looks all about for it1 and 
remarks as the motive of his search1 ,i 
am sure it must be somewhere or other4  
,by which rude saying it is evident he  
is guided by the axiom last mentioned4  
,had he not the knowledge of this axiom 
beforehand1 did he think it possible    
that his knife could be no where or in  
no place he would never take pains to   
look for it4 ,we may observe many such  
axioms as this guiding the actions of   
the vulgar1 and it is no unworthy       
speculation to observe their behaviour  
and words1 which proceed from           
uncorrupted nature1 and retrieve the    
axioms from which their conduct         
proceeds4'99       99  ,solid           
,philosophy1 asserted against the       

,fancies of the      ,idealists4        
7,locke's ,understanding is the work    
controverted47      ,by ,j4 ,s44        
,london1 #afgi4  ,the outlines of the   
science of morality are thus            
comprehensively sketched by ,sir ,james 
,mackintosh3 the origin1 value1 and     
application of first principles are     
indicated with his usual felicity4 ',the
 usages and laws of nations1 the events 
of history1 the opinions of             
philosophers1 the sentiments of orators 
and poets1 as well as the observations  
of common life1 are in truth1 the       
materials out of which the science of   
morality to formed2 and those who       
neglect them are justly chargeable with 
a vain attempt to philosophise without  
regard to fact and experienee--the sole 
foundation of all true philosophy4  ,the
 natural order undoubtedly dictates that
 we should first search for the original
 principles of the science in human     
nature2 then apply them to the          
regulation of the conduct of            

individuals1 and lastly employ them for 
the decision of those difficult and     
complicated questions that arise with   
respect to the intercourse of nations4' 
,to search for ultimate principles is to
 discover at a glance the whole bearings
 of a great question4 ,through what     
clouds of politics had the historian of 
,rome penetrated when he announced that 
the principles of a free constitution   
are irrecoverably lost when the         
legislative power is nominated by the   
executive4  ,this habit--it cannot be   
too often insisted on aids not only the 
acquisition of knowledge1 but also its  
retention4 ,around these first          
principles1 as around a standard1 the   
thoughts naturally associate4 ,touch but
 a remote chord of any question1 and it 
will vibrate to the central principle to
 which it has once been well attached4  
,every relative impression owns a       
kindred connection1 and the moment one  
is attacked1 it1 like a faithful        
sentinel1 arouses a whole troop1 which1 

marshalled and disciplined1 bear down   
and challenge the enemy4'99       99    
,beauties and ,uses of ,euclid1 pp4     
#dg-i4  ,what ,rogers has so exquisitely
 sung of the associations of childhood1 
is true of the associations of science4 
,childhood's loved group revisit6 every 
scene1--      ,the tangled wood-walk and
 the tufted green4      ,the school's   
lone porch1 with reverend mosses grey1  
,just tells the pensive pilgrim where it
 lay4       ,mute is the bell which rang
 at peep of dawn1      ,quick'ning my   
truant steps across the lawn3           
,unheard the shout that rent the        
noontide air1      ,when the slow dial  
gave a pause to care4       ,up springs 
at every step1 to claim a tear1         
,some little friendship formed and      
cherished here8      ,and not the       
lightest leaf but trembling teems       
,with golden visions and romantic       
dreams4    ,,chapter ,,vii4             
,,propositions       ,all truth and all 
error lie in ,propositions4--,j4 ,s4    

,mill4  ,in accordance with that        
experience which directs to the         
profoundest books for the simplest      
statements1 we turn to ,mill's ,logic   
for the philosophy of propositions4 ,the
 answer to every question which it is   
possible to frame is contained in a     
proposition or assertion4 ,whatever can 
be an object of belief or even of       
disbelief1 must1 when put into words1   
assume the form of a proposition 99 99  
,what we call a truth is simply a true  
proposition2 and errors are false       
propositions4 ,to know the import of all
 possible propositions would be to know 
all questions which can be raised1 all  
matters which are susceptible of being  
either believed or disbelieved4 99 99   
,since then the objects of all belief   
and all inquiry express themselves in   
propositions1 a sufficient scrutiny of  
propositions and of their varieties will
 apprise us what questions mankind have 
asked themselves1 and what it the nature
 of the answers to those questions they 

have actually thought they had grounds  
to believe4  ',now the first glance at a
 proposition shows that it is formed by 
putting together two names4 ,a          
proposition1 according to the common    
simple definition1 which is sufficient  
for our purpose1 is1 discourse in which 
something is affirmed or denied of      
something4 ,thus1 in the proposition1   
gold is yellow1 the quality yellow is   
affirmed of the substance gold4 ,in the 
proposition1 ,franklin was not born in  
,england1 the fact expressed by the     
words born in ,england is denied of the 
man ,franklin4  ',every proposition     
consists of three parts3 the subject1   
the predicate1 and the copula4 ,the     
predicate is the name denoting that     
which is affirmed or denied4 ,the       
subject is the name denoting the person 
or thing which something is affirmed or 
denied of4 ,the copula is the sign      
denoting that there is an affirmation or
 denial2 and thereby enabling the hearer
 or reader to distinguish a proposition 

from any other kind of discourse4 ,thus1
 in the proposition1 the earth is round1
 the predicate is the word round1 which 
denotes the quality affirmed1 or 7as the
 phrase is7 predicated3 the earth words 
denoting the object which that quality  
is affirmed of1 compose the subject2 the
 word it1 which serves as the connecting
 mark between the subject and predicate1
 to show that one of them is affirmed of
 the other1 is called the copula4'      
,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,definitions         
,no difficulty is unsurmountable1 if    
words be allowed to pass      without   
meaning4--,lord ,kames4  ,as every      
proposition consists of two names1 and  
as every proposition affirms or denies  
one of these names of the other1 the    
value of definition1 which fixes the    
import of names1 is apparent4  ',a name 
is a word taken at pleasure to serve for
 a mark1 which may raise in our mind a  
thought like to some thought we had     
before1 and which being pronounced to   
others1 may be to them a sign of what   

thought the speaker had before in his   
mind ,hobbes4 ,this simple definition of
 a name1 as a word 7or set of words7    
serving the double purpose of a mark to 
recall to ourselves the likeness of a   
former thought1 and a sign to make it   
known to others1 appears                
unexceptionable4'99  ,definition        
originates in accurate and comprehensive
 observation4 ',there cannot be1' says  
,mill1 'agreement about the definition  
of a thing1 until there is agreement    
about the thing itself4 ,to define a    
thing is to select from among the whole 
of its properties those which shall be  
understood to be designated and declared
 by its name2 and the properties must be
 very well known to us before we can be 
competent to determine which of them are
 fittest to be chosen for this          
purpose4'9999  ',the simplest and most  
correct notion of a definition is1 a    
proposition declaratory of the meaning  
of a word2 namely1 either the meaning   
which it bears in common acceptation1 or

 that which the speaker or writer1 for  
the particular purposes of his          
discourse1 intends to annex to          
it4'999999       99 ,j4 ,stuart ,mill3  
,system of ,logic1 #bnd ed41 chap4 #aa1 
sec4      ,i4  p4 #bg4       9999       
,introduction to ,logic1 p4 #a4         
999999 ,mill's ,logic1 p4 #ahc1 vol4 #a4
  ,but with most persons the object of a
 definition is merely to guide them to  
the correct use of a term as a          
protection against applying it in a     
manner inconsistent with custom and     
convention4 ,anything1 therefore1 is to 
them a sufficient definition of a term  
which will serve as a correct index to  
what the term denotes2 although not     
embracing the whole1 and sometimes      
perhaps not even any part of what it    
connotes4  ,definitions are sometimes   
explained as being of two kinds--of     
things and words4  ,the definition of   
words is the explanation of the sense in
 which they are used4  ,the definition  
of things is an explanation of the      

specific properties by which they differ
 from all other things4  ,to define a   
thing1 says ,dr4 ,watts1 we must        
ascertain with what it agrees1 then note
 the most remarkable attribute of       
difference1 and join the two together4  
,probity--the disposition to acknowledge
 the rights of mankind4  ,justice--the  
disposition to maintain the rights of   
mankind4  ,benevolence--the disposition 
to improve the rights of mankind4       
,deceit--the concealed violation of the 
rights of mankind4  ,injustice--the open
 violation of the rights of mankind4    
,malevolence--hatred of the rights of   
mankind4  ,in defining a word we seek   
some class to which to refer it1 that we
 may identify it1 and fix attention upon
 that peculiarity by which we can       
distinguish it from all other things4   
',probity and 'justice' are referred to 
'disposition1' with reference to the    
'rights of mankind' as their sphere of  
existence3 and acknowledgment1 and      
maintenance1 are mentioned as the       

distinguishing features4  ,distinctions 
must not be made without differences4   
,the definition should be plainer than  
the thing defined4 ,aristotle's         
definition of motion is considered      
defective in this respect3--',motion--an
 act of a being in power1 so far forth  
as it is in power4' ,tautological       
definitions cause more to be supposed   
than is true--the too terse explanation 
leaves some necessary thing unmentioned4
 ,a perfect definition requires the     
union of the concise1 the clear1 and the
 adequate4 ,some persons are so         
unskilful in the analysis of terms as to
 occasion the advice ,nil               
explicare--never explain yourself if you
 wish to be understood4  ,double        
meanings should be avoided4 ,the writer 
may himself alternate in their use1 and 
the reader may take the word in the     
unintended meaning4 ,all men have not   
the strong sense of ,johnson4 ,when     
,caleb ,whiteford inquired seriously of 
the ,doctor1 whether he really          

considered that a man ought to be       
transported1 like ,barrington1 the      
pickpocket1 for being guilty of a double
 meaning4 ',sir1' said ,johnson1 'if a  
man means well1 the more he means the   
better'--which1 whether real or         
fictitious1 is one of the happiest      
answers that ever crushed a quibble499  
99 ,hood's ,own4  ,i have frequently put
 the question--,what is consciousness8  
to persons who have been conscious for  
twenty or thirty years1 but who were yet
 unable to reply4 ,had any one deprived 
these persons of consciousness1 a judge 
would have hanged him for the offence2  
yet1 could they themselves have been    
interrogated as to what harm they had   
suffered1 they could not have told what 
they had lost4 ,and upon the principle1 
that he not knowing what he has lost1 is
 no loser1 these persons1 though        
murdered1 had suffered no harm4  ,the   
various definitions of the same subject 
which prevail1 originate in the caprice1
 or partial1 or profound knowledge the  

definer may have of his subject4 ,it    
seems to be admitted by logicians1 that 
an author has a right to give whatever  
provisional definition he pleases of his
 terms4 ,but having once given them1    
perspicuity requires that he should     
adhere to them4 ,any new sense in which 
a term is employed should be specially  
defined4 ,in discoursing on an ordinary 
subject1 as the right of public         
assembly1--such words as perception1    
conception1 apprehension1 might be used 
reciprocally1 but in a dissertation on  
metaphysics each requires restriction in
 use and precision in purport4  ,often  
genius strikes out new relations of     
words4 ,in recent political debates1    
,mr4 ,cobden resorted with new force and
 point to a charge of rashness against  
ministers3 he showed that rashness      
consisted more frequently in inaction   
than action4 ,he is rash who stands     
surrounded by the elements of danger    
without taking2 any precaution against  
the contingencies of peril2 he is rash  

who does not take advantage of the calm1
 to repair his shattered rigging2 he is 
rash who looks not out for a proper     
supply of water until the conflagration 
is raging around him2 and more rash than
 all is he who exercises no provident   
care for supplying a nation with food1  
but waits for the pressure of famine and
 the perils of starvation4  ,at the last
 soiree of the ,leeds ,mechanics'       
,institution1 ,mr4 ,dickens referred to 
ignorance1 commonly considered as a     
passive negation1 and placed it in the  
light of a power4 ',look where we will1 
do we not find ignorance powerful for   
every kind of wrong and evil8 ,powerful 
to take its enemies to its heart and    
strike its best friends down--powerful  
to fill the prisons1 the hospitals1 and 
the graves--powerful for blind violence1
 prejudice1 and error in all their      
destructive shapes4'  ,the variations   
which not only common but technical     
terms undergo1 is a considerable source 
of perplexity in reasoning4 ,mr4 ,mill  

cites the instance of the term felony4  
,no lawyer will undertake to tell what a
 felony is otherwise than by enumerating
 the various kinds of offences which are
 so called4 ,originally1 felony denoted 
all offences1 the penalty of which      
included forfeiture of goods2 but1      
subsequent ,acts of ,parliament have    
declared various offences to be felonies
 without enjoining that penalty1 and    
have taken away the penalty from others 
which continue still to be called       
felonies1 insomuch that the acts so     
called have now no property whatever in 
common1 save that of being unlawful and 
punishable4 ,this inattention to        
precision in terms has arisen not among 
the vulgar1 but among educated ,english 
lawyers4  ',language1' says ,mr4 ,mill1 
borrowing a political simile from ,sir  
,james ,mackintosh1 'is not made1 but   
grows4 ,a name not unfrequently passes  
by successive links of resemblance from 
one object to another1 until it becomes 
applied to things having nothing in     

common with the first things to which   
the name was given2 which1 however1 do  
not1 for that reason1 drop the name2 so 
that it at last denotes a confused      
huddle of objects1 having nothing       
whatever in common2 and connotes        
nothing1 not even a vague and general   
resemblance4 ,when a name has fallen    
into this state1 in which by predicating
 it of any object we assert literally   
nothing about the object1 it has become 
unfit for the purposes either of thought
 or of the communication of thought2 and
 can only be made serviceable by        
stripping it of some part of its        
multifarious denotation1 and confining  
it to objects possessed of some         
attributes in common1 which it may be   
made to connote4 ,such are the          
inconveniences of a language which is   
not made1 but grows4 like a road which  
is not made1 but has made itself1 it    
requires continual mending in order to  
be passable4'99       99 ,logic1 p4     
#bjg4  ,it is well observed1 that the   

spontaneous growth of language is of the
 utmost importance to the thinker4      
,there seems to be so palpable a        
substratum of right sense1 in the rude  
classifications of the multitude1 that  
the logician has little else to do1 in  
many cases1 than to retouch them and    
give them precision4 ,guizot observes1  
there is frequently more truth in common
 acceptations of general terms than in  
the more precise definitions of science4
 ,common sense gives to words their     
ordinary signification4 ,the leading    
terms of philosophy are clothed in      
innumerable shades of meaning acquired  
in their transitional use1 and immense  
is the knowledge of thing3 requisite to 
enable a man to affirm that any given   
argument turns wholly on words4 ,the    
study of terms1 for which logicians have
 provided multiplied means1 is one of   
the most interesting and profitable upon
 which men can enter4 ,if it be worth   
while to speak at all1 it is worth while
 to know certainly what we speak about4 

,philanthropic genius has pointed out a 
perversion of power1 arising through    
definitional incapacity1 which makes it 
a moral duty to study analysis of terms1
 and exactitude of expression4  ',all   
battle1' says ,carlyle1 'is             
misunderstanding--did the parties know  
one another1 the battle would cease4 ,no
 man at bottom means injustice2 he      
contends for some distorted image of    
right4 ,clear1 undeniable right--clear1 
undeniable might--either of these1 once 
ascertained1 puts an end to battle4     
,battle is a confused experiment to     
ascertain these4'  ,of the power of     
names to impose on the multitude1       
history furnishes too many examples4    
,strength to forefend us against they   
delusion ability to see that the meaning
 governs the term1 and not the term the 
meaning--are species of intellectual    
self-defence4  ',augustus1' says        
,gibbon1 'was sensible that mankind is  
governed by names2 nor was he deceived  
in his expectation that the senate and  

people would submit to slavery provided 
that they were respectably assured that 
they still enjoyed their ancient        
freedom4'  ',never1' adjures ,w4 ,j4    
,fox1 'be deceived by words4 ,always try
 to penetrate to realities4 ,have your  
wits sharpened1 your senses exercised to
 discern good and evil4 ,be not imposed 
upon by pompous manners4 ,many a        
solemnly-uttered sentence is often a    
sheer inanity1 which will not bear the  
scrutiny of an observant intellect4 ,be 
not frightened by denunciations2 by     
being told that you are not a good      
subject or a good ,christian1 if you do 
not believe1 or say that you believe    
this or that4 ,be not led astray by     
iteration--mistake not the familiar for 
the intelligible4 ,ascertain what words 
are meant to convey1 and what they      
actually do convey4 ,go to the substance
 and soul of whatever is propounded4 ,be
 on your guard against bold assumptions1
 nor let them bear you away against the 
dictates of your own understanding4     

,look at phrases as counters1 or paper  
money1 that may pass for much or little 
according to circumstances4 ,endeavour  
to arrive at truth1 and make that your  
treasure4 ,be ever wide awake to see    
through any veil of sophistry and cant2 
nor by the agency of words be made the  
dupe of critic or lawyer1 of priest of  
politician4'99       99 ,lectures to the
 ,working ,classes1 p4 #gj1 vol4 #b4    
,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,syllogisms            
,propositions being assertions--as soon 
as sufficient reasons are adduced to    
make the proposition credible1 it       
becomes a truth probable or certain1 as 
the case may be4  ,reasoning is a simple
 business4 ,to reason is to state facts 
in support of a proposition4 ,a         
conclusive fact so advanced is called a 
reason4 ,all the reasons offered in     
proof of a proposition are called       
premises4 ,the ,pythagorean1 who lays   
down the proposition that fruits and    
grain are the proper food of man1 and   
cites facts to prove his                

assertion--reasons4 ,a proposition and  
its reasons are called an argument4     
,reason is the faculty of perceiving    
coherences4 ,effective reasoning is     
stating them so that others cannot but  
see them too4 ',reasoning on the        
abstrusest questions is nothing more    
than arriving at a remote truth by      
discovering its coherence with the      
preceding facts in the same chain4'99   
99 ,uses and ,beauties of ,euclid1 p4   
#eb4  ,a syllogism is a peculiar form of
 expression1 in which every argument may
 be stated4 ,it consists of three       
propositions4  #a4 ,whoever have their  
heads cut off ought to be allowed to ask
 the reason why4  #b4 ,women have their 
heads cut off4  #c4 ,therefore women    
ought to be allowed to ask 7politically7
 the reason why4  ,this is an argument  
of ,mad4 de ,stael1 in allusion to the  
beheading of women in ,france1 without  
allowing them any voice in making the   
laws which determine the offences for   
which they suffered4  ,a syllogism is   

constructed upon the principle 7known as
 the ,dictum of ,aristotle7 that        
whatever is affirmed or denied          
universally of a whole class of things1 
may be affirmed or denied of anything   
comprehended in that class4 ,thus the   
first proposition introduces the class  
of persons who have their heads cut off4
 ,of this class it is affirmed that they
 ought to be allowed to ask the reason  
why4 ,but women are included in the     
class of persons who have their heads   
cut off1 and consequently that may be   
affirmed of them which is affirmed of   
the whole class--that they should be    
allowed to ask the reason why4  ',to    
prove an affirmative1' says ,mr4 ,mill1 
'the argument must admit of being stated
 in this form3--  ,all animals are      
mortal2    ,all men           ,some men 
are animals2   ,socrates                
therefore    ,all men           ,some   
men           are mortal4   ,socrates   
',to prove a negative1 the argument must
 be capable of being expressed in this  

form3--  ',no one who is capable of     
self-control is necessarily vicious2    
,all negroes           ,some negroes    
are capable of self-control2   ,mr4     
,a4's negro         therefore    ,no    
negroes are              ,some negroes  
are not        necessarily vicious4     
,mr4 ,a4's negro is not      ',although 
all ratiocination admits of being thrown
 into one or the other of these forms1  
and sometimes gains considerably by the 
transformation1 both in clearness and in
 the obviousness of its consequence2    
there are1 no doubt1 cases in which the 
argument falls more naturally into one  
of the other three figures1 and in which
 its conclusiveness is more apparent at 
the first glance in those figures1 than 
when reduced into the first4 ,thus1 if  
the proposition were that pagans may be 
virtuous1 and the evidence to prove it  
were the example of ,aristides2 a       
syllogism in the third figure1          
,aristides was virtuous1   ,aristides   
was a pagan1  therefore    ,some pagan  

was virtuous1  ,would be a more natural 
mode of stating the argument1 and would 
carry conviction more instantly home1   
than the same ratiocination strained    
into the first figure1 thus--           
,aristides was virtuous1  ,some pagan   
was ,aristides1  therefore    ,some     
pagan was virtuous4'  ,the best thing   
that can be said in favour of the       
syllogism1 as an instrument of          
reasoning1 is that it is a regular form 
to which every valid argument can be    
reduced2 and may be accompanied by a    
rule1 showing the validity of every     
argument in that form1 and consequently 
the unsoundness of any apparent argument
 which cannot be reduced to it4 ,this   
would be high praise if every 'valid    
argument' was a trusty one4 ,but        
unfortunately 'the question respecting  
the validity of an argument is not      
whether the conclusion be true1 but     
whether it follows from the premises    
adduced4'99 ,even this small advantage  
is purchased at a greater expense of    

tedium and trouble than the bulk of     
mankind are willing to pay1 or able to  
pay if they were willing4       99      
,logic1 vol4 #a1 pp4 #bcb-c4  ,there is 
some reason to believe that the         
syllogistic form1 as a test of valid    
arguments1 may be entirely dispensed    
with1 if we can secure accuracy of data1
 and intelligibility in terms4  ,it is  
not contended now that we discover new  
truths by the syllogism4 ,the syllogism 
is allowed to be only a form of stating 
a truth4 ,example3--    ,no predacious  
animals are ruminant1   ,the lion is    
predacious1  therefore    ,the lion is  
not ruminant4       99 ,whately's       
,logic1 ,anal4 ,out4 chap4 #a1 sec4 #c4 
,of course1 if we know that no animal   
that lives by prey chews the cud1 and   
know1 also1 that the lion lives by prey1
 we know that the lion does not chew the
 cud4 ,this conclusion1 as ,lord ,kames 
contends1 and ,dr4 ,whately admits1 is  
not a truth inferred from the           
fundamental premises1 but included in   

it4 ,smart1 whom ,mr4 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill     
calls acute and often profound1         
remarks--',every one1 as to the mere act
 of reasoning1 reasons rightly3 we may  
reason from wrong premises1 or mistake  
right ones2 we may be unable to infer   
from proper ones2 but from such premises
 as we do reason from1 we reason        
correctly3 for all premises contain     
their conclusion2 and in knowing the    
premises1 we therefore know the         
conclusion4 ,the art wanted is one that 
will enable us to use language          
perspicuously in expressing our         
premises3' and he might have            
added--direct us in selecting proper    
materials of which to make premises4    
,the strength and weakness of the       
syllogism as an instrument of reasoning 
will now be understood4 ,whately        
remarks1 that 'since all reasoning may  
be resolved into syllogisms1 and since  
in a syllogism the premises do virtually
 assert the conclusion1 it follows at   
once that no new truth can be elicited  

by any process of reasoning4'99 ,we     
therefore no longer look to the         
syllogism to discover truth1 its value  
is in stating it4 ,in this sense it is  
worthy of all attention4 ,it is the form
 of nature4       99 ,logic1 p4 #bbc4   
,of such a syllogism as the one quoted--
    ,no predacious animals are ruminant1
   ,the lion is predacious1  therefore  
,the lion is not ruminant4  ,it has been
 insisted by some logicians that the    
genius required for its construction was
 invention4 ,having made a general      
proposition like the first1 we then have
 to invent or find out a middle term as 
the second--but if we bear in mind that 
the general affirmation of the first    
proposition relates to a class of       
7predacious animals in this case7       
objects which include the middle term1  
the necessity of invention is           
consequently dispensed with4 ,we need   
only look well to what we have there4   
,simplicity will be promoted by         
returning to our previous remark1       

viz4--that reasoning is asserting a     
proposition1 and then showing why it is 
true--in other words1 adducing the fact 
or facts1 on which the assertion rests4 
,in the ,logic given in ',chambers'     
,information1' it is said--' ,in        
choosing your middle terms1 or arguments
 to prove any question1 always take such
 topics as are purest and least         
fallible1 and which carry the greatest  
evidence and strength with them1' ,but  
it rather appears that we have not to   
invent a middle term1 but only to look  
to the major premises1 and find it      
included there4  ,by methodical         
questioning any argument may be tested4 
,thus1 on any assertion being made1     
ask--,why is the assertion true8 ,in    
this manner1 if an argument has truth in
 it1 it may be elicited4 ,in this manner
 you dig through assertions down to     
premises1 and discover whether any ore  
of truth lies there4  ,the value of the 
argument depends upon the final answer  
which reveals the premises or data of   

facts1 upon which the conclusion rests4 
,forms of speech1 classification of     
propositions1 figures of syllogisms1 are
 of minor importance when you have once 
elicited the rough truth4 ,the best test
 of an argument is the soundness of its 
data1 and the simplest formula for      
drawing out and exhibiting such data1 is
 of the greatest service in enabling us 
to judge of the validity thereof4       
,tyranny1 says ,cobbett1 has no enemy so
 formidable as the pen1 ,why8 ',because 
the pen pursues tyranny both in life and
 beyond the grave4' ,how is this proved 
to be the most formidable enemy of      
tyranny8 ',from the fact that tyranny   
has no enemy so formidable as that which
 assails not only its existence1 but its
 reputation1 which pursues it in life   
and beyond the grave4' ,such            
interrogatories and replies generate the
 expository syllogism4  #a4 ,tyranny has
 no enemy so formidable as that which   
assails not only its existence1 but its 
reputation1 which pursues it in life and

 beyond the grave4  #b4 ,the pen pursues
 tyranny in life and beyond the grave4  
#c4 ,therefore1 tyranny has no enemy so 
formidable as the pen4 ,a syllogism is  
made up of collective and single facts4 
,it is the process of reasoning1 whereby
 we show that a single truth is proved  
by a collective one which contains it1  
or a less quantity is proved by a       
greater1 or that an assertion is proved 
by an induction from a class of facts4  
,from the class of the enemies of       
tyranny the pen is selected1 and is     
proved1 by passing in inductive review  
the whole class1 to be the most         
formidable4  ,the usual manner in which 
an argument is presented is called the  
entihymeme4 ,thus3--    ,he is an       
industrious man1  therefore    ,he will 
acquire wealth4  ,the first or major    
proposition is in this form suppressed4 
,the syllogistic form would be this3--  
,every industrious man acquires wealth1 
,he is an industrious man1  therefore   
,he will acquire wealth4  ,but if we ask

 for the proof that every industrious   
man acquires wealth1 we find the facts  
wanting--for the idle are often rich1   
and the diligent poor4 ,the industrious 
may acquire wealth1 the chances are in  
their favour4  ,again4    ,we must      
cherish self-respect1   ,because        
self-respect is the stay of virtue4     
,the suppressed proposition is--',we    
must cherish whatever is the stay of    
virtue4'  ,the whole syllogism then     
stands thus3--    ,we must cherish      
whatever is the stay of virtue1         
,self-respect is the stay of virtue1    
therefore    ,we must cherish           
self-respect4  ,dilemma is derived from 
a ,greek word1 and signifies twice an   
argument4 ,it is an argument divided    
into several members1 and infers of each
 part what is to be inferred of the     
whole4 ,thus3 ,either we shall live or  
die4 ,if we live1 we can only live      
happily by being virtuous2 and if we    
die1 we can only die happy by being     
virtuous2 therefore1 we ought always to 

be virtuous4 ,in the dilemma1 question  
one argument at a time1 as in preceding 
cases4  ,the ,sorites uses several      
middle terms by which the predicate of  
the last proposition is connected with  
the first subject4 ,of this argument the
 well-known speech of ,themistocles is a
 specimen4 ',my son1' said that eminent 
person1 'governs his mother1 his mother 
governs me1 ,i govern the ,athenians1   
the ,athenians govern ,greece1 ,greece  
governs ,europe1 and ,europe governs the
 world2 therefore1 my son governs the   
world4' ,in these instances1 question   
each assertion1 as there are as many    
acts of reasoning as intermediate       
propositions4  ,the ,onus ,probandi1 or 
,burden of ,proof1 is said to rest with 
him who would dispute any point in      
favour of a presumptive1 or generally   
allowed truth4 ,but manly logic holds no
 quibbling about who shall prove4       
,whatever he asserts1 the honest        
reasoner should be prompt to prove4     
,chalmers1 it is said1 made ,morell     

known--but ,morell has written a        
synopsis of metaphysical philosophy that
 only needed to be known to be          
appreciated4 ,if ,chalmers gave ,morell 
distinction1 ,morell had previously     
earned it4 ,from his work ,i extract the
 following passage1 which passes in     
review the steps taken1 marks the       
analytic point reached1 and outlines the
 ground before us3--',different as were 
the minds of those two great men ,bacon 
and ,descartes in themselves1 different 
as were their respective labours1 and   
opposite as were1 in many respects1 the 
results at which they arrived1 yet the  
writings of both were marked by one and 
the same great characteristic1 namely1  
by the spirit of method4 ,the most      
important works of ,bacon1 it will be   
remembered1 were the ,instanratio       
,magna1 and the ,novum ,organum2 those  
of ,descartes were his ,dissertatio de  
,methodo1 and his ,meditationes de      
,prima ,philosophia1 ,the fruitlessness 
of the ancient logic1 as an instrument  

of discovery1 had been abundantly proved
 by past experience1 and the watchword  
which these two great thinkers of their 
age both uttered1 and which has been    
ever since the guiding principle of all 
philosophy1 was--analysis4 ,bacon1 who  
gave his attention chiefly to the       
direction and improvement of physical   
science1 taught to analyse nature1 while
 ,descartes1 who aimed rather at        
grounding all human knowledge upon its  
ultimate principles1 instructed how to  
analyse thought4 ,all modern philosophy1
 therefore1 whether it arise from the   
,baconian or the ,cartesian point of    
view1 bears upon it the broad outline of
 the analytic method4 ,it matters not   
whether it be the outer or the inner    
world to which its investigations apply1
 in each case it teaches us to observe  
and analyse facts to induce instances1  
and upon such observation and induction 
to ground our knowledge of laws and     
principles4 ,in this alone consists the 
,unity of modern science1 and from this 

arises its broad distinction from that  
of the ancient world4 ,every natural    
philosopher since ,bacon has grounded   
his success upon an induction of the    
facts of the outward world1 and every   
metaphysician1 since ,descartes1 has    
progressed onwards in his department of 
knowledge by analysing the facts of our 
inward consciousness4'99       99       
,morell3 ,modern ,philosophy1 pp4 #gf-h4
    ,,chapter ,x4 ,,induction           
,induction is an inference from many    
facts4 ,induction is verification4 ,just
 as in a syllogism we show that a part  
is contained in the whole1 so in        
induction we show that a part is        
illustrated by the whole4 ,it seems that
 every single fact contains many truths1
 but induction establishes their        
universality4 ,a single brain contains  
all the truths of phrenology1 a single  
stone includes the phenomena of         
gravitation1 the temperance of a single 
individual exhibits the whole law of    
moderation1 but we learn the            

universality of these truths by         
induction4  ,every legal statute1 says  
,dr4 ,johnson1 is founded on induction4 
',law is the science in which the       
greatest powers of understanding are    
applied to the greatest number of       
facts4' ,the basis of all science is    
such an extensive induction of          
particulars as leads to general         
definitions and fundamental axioms1 and 
furnishes the premises from which       
inferences may be deduced4  ,inductive  
observation is the great instrument of  
discovering important truths4 ',what are
 called the principles of human nature  
are learned from individual instances4  
,it is the only possible way of learning
 them4 99 99 ,when we reason from a     
general law or principle1 we are in     
truth reasoning from a number of        
instances represented by ,it4'99        
99 ,rationale of ,political             
,representation1 p4 #cd4  ,a general    
election is an induction of the         
intelligence of the country represented 

by the members of ,parliament4 ,the     
difference between democracy and        
monarchy is in one sense an affair of   
logic4 ,where electors are limited in   
franchise1 and candidates restricted by 
property qualification1 the induction is
 partial1 but where all can vote and    
many can be chosen from1 the premises   
are more capacious and the inference    
sounder4  ,dr4 ,whately says1 that 'in  
,natural ,philosophy a single instance  
is often accounted a sufficient         
induction2 e4g41 having once ascertained
 that an individual magnet will attract 
iron1 we are authorised to conclude that
 this property is universal4'  ',the    
,edinburgh ,reviewer of ,whewell's      
,history of the ,inductive ,sciences1   
observes that1 by the accidental placing
 of a rhomb of calcareous spar1 upon a  
book or line1 ,bartholinus discovered   
the property of the double refraction of
 light4 ,by accidentally combining two  
rhombs in different positions1 ,huygens 
discovered the polarisation of light4   

,by accidentally looking through a prism
 of the same substance1 and turning it  
round1 ,mains discovered the            
polarisation of light by reflection2 and
 by placing thin chrystalline films     
between two similar prisms or rhombs1   
,m4 ,arago discovered the phenomena of  
polarised tints4  ',to this ,mr4        
,whewell1 in his ,philosophy of the     
,inductive ,sciences1 makes the         
following reply3--,but ,bartholinus     
could have seen no such consequence in  
the accident1 if he had not previously  
had a clear conception of single        
refraction4 ,a lady1 in describing an   
optical experiment which had been shown 
her1 said of her teacher1 'he told me to
 increase and diminish the angle of     
refraction3 and1 at last1 ,i found that 
he only meant me to move my head up and 
down4' ,at any rate1 till the lady had  
acquired a knowledge of the meaning     
which the technical terms convey1 she   
could not have made ,bartholinus's      
discovery by means of this accident4    

,suppose that ,huygens made the         
experiment alluded to1 without design1  
what he really observed was that the    
images appeared and disappeared         
alternately as he turned the rhomb      
round4 ,his success depended on his     
clearness of thought1 which enabled him 
to perform the intellectual analysis    
which would never have occurred to most 
men1 however often they had combined two
 rhombs in different positions4 ,malus  
saw that in some positions the light    
reflected from the windows of the       
,louvre became dim4 ,another person     
would have attributed this to accident2 
he1 however1 considered the position of 
the prism1 and the window2 repeated the 
experiment often2 and by virtue of the  
eminently distinct conceptions of space 
which he possessed1 resolved the        
phenomenon into its geometrical         
conditions499 ,if it were true1 that the
 fall of an apple was the occasion of   
,newton's pursuing that train of thought
 which led to the doctrine of universal 

gravitation1 the habits and constitution
 of ,newton's intellect were the real   
source of this great event in the       
progress of knowledge49999 ,in whatever 
manner facts may be presented to the    
notice of a discoverer1 they can never  
become the materials of exact knowledge1
 except they find his mind already      
provided with precise and suitable      
conceptions1 by which they may be       
analysed and connected4'999999       99 
,whewell3  ,phil4 ,induct4 ,sciences1   
vol4 #b4 pp4 #aii-a4       9999 ,ibid1  
vol4 #b1 p4 #ahi4       999999 ,see ,j4 
,n4 ,bailey's ,essays pp4 #hg-h-i4      
,these admissions seem to me to prove   
that whenever a casual fact proves to us
 a new truth1 it does so by its         
coincidence with previously known facts1
 and that the novelty of the occasion   
attracts all credit to itself1 and we   
lose sight of the generalisation        
below--the fruitful soil of experience  
on which the new fact1 like a seed1     
falls4 ,we only recognise difference by 

comparison1 and the comparison is an    
induction1 however slender4  ,monsieur  
de ,montmorine was recaptured and       
brought to the scaffold1 through the    
trifling circumstance of some chicken   
bones being found near the door of his  
landlady--a woman too poor to indulge in
 such dainties499 ,the discovery of de  
,montmorine was not1 as at first sight  
appears1 an inference from a single     
fact1 but from an adjacent induction4   
,it was a general truth1 7known to the  
party who observed the bones7 a truth   
inducted from a number of facts that    
poor people could not afford to         
luxuriate on chickens4 ,it was1         
therefore1 from this induction1 inferred
 that some one of superior fortune must 
be living in that particular place4     
99 ,chambers' ,miscellany of ,useful and
 ,entertaining ,tracts1      ,no4 #fa3  
the ,story of ,lavaiette1 p4 #bg  ,the  
judicious care which the great fathers  
of science have exhibited in making     
their inferences1 incontestably         

establishes their conviction of the     
danger of any other reasoning than that 
from inductions4 ,lord ,brougham informs
 us1 that what ,newton's ,principia is  
to science1 ,locke's essay to           
metaphysics1 ,demosthenes in oratory1   
and ,homer in poetry1 ,cuvier's         
researches to our fossil osteology4 ,but
 ,cuvier never attempted to draw any    
inferences until he had examined the    
whole osteology of the living species4  
,lord ,brougham remarks1 that 'from     
examining a single fragment of bone we  
infer that1 in the wilds where we found 
it1 there lived and ranged1 some        
thousands of years ago1 an animal of a  
peculiar kind4' ,this is a case in which
 the inference spoken of is arrived at  
in a way different from that apparently 
stated4 ,we recognise in the 'fragment  
of bone' a link in a chain of facts     
constituting the basis of a well-known  
induction1 which comparative anatomy has
 many times verified4 ,it is important  
to distinguish well the grounds from    

which accurate inferences1 such as these
 in the cases before us1 have really    
been adduced1 in order to ascertain the 
grounds from which we should reason     
generally4 ,it will be found that solid 
reasoning can only proceed from general 
rules--i4e41 inductions from facts4 ,it 
will be found that the prime source of  
fallacy lies in reasoning from isolated 
facts4 ,it is not to be denied that such
 reasoning is sometimes right1 but it is
 to be remembered that it is right by   
accident1 not by design4 ,there is no   
science or certainty in it4 ,it is      
hazard1 not logic4  ,this habit however1
 is very common4 ,mr4 ,mill says1 that  
',not only may we reason from           
particulars to particulars1 without     
passing through generals1 but we        
perpetually do so reason4 ,all our      
earliest inferences are of this nature4 
,from the first dawn of intelligence we 
draw inferences1 but years elapse before
 we learn the use of general language4  
,the child1 who1 having burnt his       

fingers1 avoids to thrust them again    
into the fire1 has reasoned or inferred1
 though he has never thought of the     
general maxim--fire burns4 ,he knows    
from memory that he has been burnt1 and 
on this evidence believes1 when he sees 
a candle1 that if he puts his fingers   
into the flame of it1 he will be burnt  
again4 ,he believes this in every case  
which happens to arise2 but without     
looking1 in each instance1 beyond the   
present case4 ,he is not generalising2  
he is inferring a particular from       
particulars4 ,in the same way1 also1    
brutes reason4 ,there is little or no   
ground1 for attributing to any of the   
lower animals the use of conventional   
signs1 without which general            
propositions are impossible4 ,but those 
animals profit by experience1 and avoid 
what they have found to cause them pain1
 in the same manner1 though not always  
with the same skill1 as a human         
creature4 ,not only the burnt child1 but
 the burnt dog1 dreads the fire4  ',i   

believe that1 in point of fact1 when    
drawing inferences from our personal    
experience1 and not from maxims handed  
down to us by books or tradition1 we    
much oftener conclude from particulars  
to particulars directly1 than through   
the intermediate agency of any general  
proposition4 ,we are constantly         
reasoning from ourselves to other       
people1 or from one person to another1  
without giving ourselves the trouble to 
erect our observations into general     
maxims of human or external nature4     
,when we conclude that some person will1
 on some given occasion1 feel or act so 
and so1 we sometimes judge from an      
enlarged consideration of the manner in 
which men in general1 or men of some    
particular character1 are accustomed to 
feel and act2 but much oftener from     
having known the feelings and conduct of
 the same man in some previous instance1
 or from considering how we should feel 
or act ourselves4 ,it is not only the   
village matron who1 when called to a    

consultation upon the case of a         
neighbour's child1 pronounces on the    
evil and its remedy simply on the       
recollection and authority of what she  
accounts the similar case of her ,lucy4 
,we all1 where we have no definite      
maxims to steer by1 guide ourselves in  
the same way2 and if we have an         
extensive experience1 and retain its    
impressions strongly1 we may acquire1 in
 this manner1 a very considerable power 
of accurate judgment1 which we may be   
utterly incapable of justifying or of   
communicating to others4 ,among the     
higher order of practical intellects1   
there have been many of whom it was     
remarked how admirably they suited their
 means to their ends1 without being able
 to give any sufficient reasons for what
 they did and applied1 or seemed to     
apply1 recondite principles which they  
were wholly unable to state4 ,this is a 
natural consequence of having a mind    
stored with appropriate particulars1 and
 having been long accustomed to reason  

at once from these to fresh particulars1
 without practising the habit of stating
 to oneself or to others the            
corresponding general propositions4 ,an 
old warrior1 on a rapid glance at the   
outlines of the ground1 is able at once 
to give the necessary orders for a      
skilful arrangement of his troops2      
though if he has received little        
theoretical instruction1 and has seldom 
been called upon to answer to other     
people for his conduct1 he may never    
have had in his mind a single general   
theorem respecting the relation between 
ground and array4 ,but his experience of
 encampments1 under circumstances more  
or less similar1 has left a number of   
vivid1 unexpressed1 ungeneralised       
analogies in his mind1 the most         
appropriate of which1 instantly         
suggesting itself1 determines him to a  
judicious arrangement4  ',the skill of  
an uneducated person in the use of      
weapons1 or of tools1 is of a precisely 
similar nature4 ,the savage who executes

 unerringly the exact throw which brings
 down his game1 or his enemy1 in the    
manner most suited to his purpose1 under
 the operation of all the conditions    
necessarily involved1 the weight and    
form of the weapon1 the direction and   
distance of the object1 the action of   
the wind1 c41 owes this power to a long 
series of previous experiments1 the     
results of which he certainly never     
framed into any verbal theorems or      
rules4 ,it is the same in all           
extraordinary manual dexterity4 ,not    
long ago a ,scotch manufacturer procured
 from ,england1 at a high rate of wages1
 a working dyer1 famous for producing   
very fine colours1 with a view of       
teaching to his other workmen the same  
skill4 ,the workman came2 but his mode  
of proportioning the ingredients1 in    
which lay the secret of the effects he  
produced1 was by taking them up in      
handfuls while the common method was to 
weigh them4 ,the manufacturer sought to 
make him turn his handling system into  

an equivalent weighing system1 that the 
general principle of his peculiar mode  
of proceeding might be ascertained4     
,this1 however1 the man found himself   
quite unable to do1 and therefore could 
impart his skill to nobody4 ,he had1    
from the individual cases of his own    
experience1 established a connection in 
his mind between fine effects of colour1
 and tactual perceptions in handling his
 dyeing materials2 and from these       
perceptions he could1 in any particular 
cases1 infer the means to be employed1  
and the effect which would be produced1 
but could not put others in possession  
of the grounds on which he proceeded1   
from having never generalised them in   
his own mind1 or expressed them in      
language4  ',almost every one knows     
,lord ,mansfield's advice to a man of   
practical good sense1 who1 being        
appointed governor of a colony1 had to  
preside in its court of justice1 without
 previous judicial practice or legal    
education4 ,the advice was to give his  

decision boldly1 for it would probably  
be right2 but never to venture on       
assigning reasons1 for they would almost
 infallibly be wrong4 ,in cases like    
this1 which are of no uncommon          
occurrence1 it would be absurd to       
suppose that the bad reason was the     
source of the good decision4 ,lord      
,mansfield knew that if any reason were 
assigned it would be necessarily an     
afterthought1 the judge being in fact   
guided by impressions from past         
experience1 without the circuitous      
process of framing general principles   
from them1 and that if he attempted to  
frame any such he would assuredly fail4 
,lord ,mansfield1 however1 would not    
have doubted that a man of equal        
experience1 who had also a mind stored  
with general propositions derived by    
legitimate induction from that          
experience1 would have been greatly     
preferable as a judge1 to one1 however  
sagacious1 who could not be trusted with
 the explanation and justification of   

his own judgments4 ,the cases of able   
men performing wonderful things they    
know not how1 are examples of the less  
civilised and most spontaneous form of  
the operations of superior minds ,it is 
a defect in them1 and often a source of 
errors1 not to have generalised as they 
went on2 but generalisation is a help1  
the most important indeed of all helps1 
yet not an essential4'99       99       
,mill's ,logic1 pp4 #bea-e4  ,in        
illustration of generalising from single
 instances1 ,miss ,martineau gives this 
example3--',a raw ,chinese traveller in 
,england was landed by a ,thames        
waterman who had a wooden leg4 ,the     
stranger saw that the wooden leg was    
used to stand in the water with1 while  
the other was high and dry4 ,the        
apparent economy of the fact struck the 
,chinese2 he saw in it strong evidence  
of design1 and wrote home that in       
,england one-legged men are kept for    
watermen1 to the saving of all injury to
 health1 shoe1 and stocking1 from       

standing in the river4'99  ,reasoning on
 insufficient data--       ,falls like  
an inverted cone1      ,wanting its     
proper base to stand upon4  ,samuel     
,bailey has furnished1 in one passage1  
both a clear illustration of the        
process1 and the validity of an         
induction3--',whoever had witnessed the 
acts of a landlord to his tenants1 of a 
schoolmaster to his pupils1 of artizans 
towards their apprentices1 of husbands  
towards their wives1 on points where the
 power of the superior could not be     
contested1 and where his personal       
gratification was incompatible with just
 conduct to the subordinate1 would      
necessarily have formed in his own mind 
a species of general rule2 and from this
 rule he might safely draw an inference 
as to what would be the conduct of a    
despot1 seated on a throne1 in the      
possession of unchecked authority2      
assisted too1 as the inquirer would be1 
by that indispensable and inestimable   
guide to the knowledge of mankind1 an   

appeal to his own feelings1 in a variety
 of analogous instances4  ',we conclude1
 that a ruler with uncontrolled power   
will act the tyrant1 not merely from the
 fact that ,caligula1 or ,nero1 or      
,bonaparte did1 but from a thousand     
facts attesting that men1 in1 every     
situation1 use uncontrolled power in    
this way--just as we infer that all     
bodies tend to the centre of the earth1 
not merely from the circumstance of an  
apple dropping from a tree1 but from    
seeing the tendency in stones1 water1   
animals1 and all things within our      
observation4 ,the use of uncontrolled   
power1 for the gratification of the     
possessor1 without an equitable respect 
to others1 is no more peculiar to       
monarchs1 than a tendency to the earth  
is peculiar to apples4 ,it may be useful
 to know that monarchs act in this way1 
as it may be useful to know that apples 
drop to the ground2 but it is much more 
useful to know that men act in this     
manner4 ,an inference is safer when     

gathered from the widest induction4'    
99  ,how to ,observe1 p4 #f4       9999 
,rationale of ,political                
,representation4 ,introduction1 pp4     
#he-f4 ,the last sentence of this       
extract is abridged--but1 as      the   
reader will find upon reference1 the    
sense of the author      is faithfully  
rendered4  ,it may be useful to observe 
that1 though a few instances are        
insufficient to establish a theory1 one 
may be sufficient to overturn a theory1 
fancifully or hypothetically supported1 
,gibbon overturns the entertaining      
theory of ,rudbeck1 an antiquarian of   
,upsal1 of profound learning and easy   
faith1 who1 by the dim light of legends 
and traditions1 of conjectures and      
etymologies1 sought to establish the    
antiquity of ,sweden over half the      
earth4 ,gibbon annihilated this well    
laboured system of ,german antiquities1 
by a single fact too well attested to   
admit of any doubt1 and of too decisive 
a nature to leave room for any          

reply--the fact that the ,germans1 of   
the age of ,tacitus1 were unacquainted  
with the use of letters4 ,a circumstance
 fatal to their literary claims1 urged  
by ,olaus ,rudbeck4  ,in the chapter on 
',facts' ,i have cautioned the reader   
against unquestioned data4 ,this seems  
the place to remark that the unsuspected
 sources of error and unfriendliness    
have their rise in the criminal         
implicitness with which we listen to    
reports1 and infer from rumours as from 
facts4 ,these are the very little       
handles which move men and women to     
strange performances4'99 ,all the plots 
of dramas and romances are founded on   
misunderstandings1 which a little       
sagacity of action 7such as a wise      
resolution not to be imposed upon would 
lead to7 would commonly suffice to      
arrest the error at its birth4 ,with    
regard to character we constantly infer 
from data1 partial1 limited1 and        
doubtful4 ,if most quarrelers were      
called into a court of ,inquiry to      

confess the real grounds from which they
 have arrived at certain conclusions    
with regard to their neighbours1 and    
often with regard to their friends1 they
 would be at once overwhelmed with a    
conviction of the weakness of which they
 have been guilty4 ,upon analysing the  
miserable sources of opinions of which  
scandal and calumny are born1 ,i have   
found it impossible to restrain         
astonishment at the imbecility of       
logical power men will sometimes be     
content to exhibit1 where meanness      
prevails1 malice incites1 and passion   
governs4 ,well might ,bacon             
exclaim--',doth any man doubt1 that if  
there were taken out of men's minds1    
vain opinions1 flattering hopes1 false  
valuations1 imaginations1 and the like1 
but it would leave the minds of a number
 of men poor shrunken things8'9999 ,the 
wise rule is1 never judge from          
appearances when facts can be had--never
 receive a report without challenging   
its foundation1 nor adopt it without    

permission to give the authority4       
99 ,cricket on the ,hearth4       9999  
,essay on ,truth4  ,in all cases1 in    
which you must judge from appearances   
and reason from conjectures1 adopt the  
fairest interpretation possible4 ,on    
this principle1 credit will sometimes be
 given where none is due--but in nine   
cases out of ten1 justice will be done1 
for ,i am satisfied that there is more  
worth among men than wisdom1 and that we
 do well much oftener than we reason    
well4 ,we seldom need judge charitably1 
did we always endeavour to judge justly4
 ,but we make a virtue of our own       
errors1 and we often affect to          
condescend to pronounce an opinion1     
which it would be criminal to withhold4 
,if ever ,i go to the ,herald's1 office1
 the motto ,i will have emblazoned shall
 be this--,justice is sufficient4 ,could
 we only get justice in the world1 we   
could afford to excuse it all its       
'charity' of judgment1 and its          
benevolence even of act4  ,where should 

a man's reputation be safe from         
suspicion if not in the hands of his    
friend8 ,it ought to be a principle of  
action with all men1 never to judge a   
friend except out of his own mouth4     
',there was a generous friend of mine   
once1 who never would have judged me or 
any other man unheard4'99 ,with the     
sublime intensity of one who felt the   
infinite value of private justice1 has  
,schiller delineated this spirit in the 
interview between ,octavio and his son  
,max ,piccolomini4 ,after a violent and 
visible struggle with his               
feelings--wrought upon by his father's  
endeavours to sow suspicions in his     
mind1 and detach him from the service of
 his friend1 ,wallenstein--,max         
exclaims3--       99 ,edward to ,mr4    
,peerybing4  ,i will procure me light a 
shorter way4 ,farewell4  ,octavio4      
,where now8  ,max4 7,to the ,duke47     
,if thou hast believed that ,i shall act
   ,a part in this thy play----   ,thou 
hast miscalculated on me grievously4    

,my way must be straight on4   ,true    
with the tongue1   ,false with the      
heart--,i may not1 cannot be3   ,nor can
 ,i suffer that a man should trust me-- 
,as his friend trust me--and then lull  
my conscience   ,with such low pleas as 
these3--,i ask him not--   ,he did it   
all at his own hazard--and   ,my mouth  
has never lied to him4--,no1 no   ,what 
a friend takes me for1 that ,i must be4 
--,i'll to the ,duke2 ere yet this day  
is ended   ,will ,i demand of him that  
he do save   ,his good name from the    
world1 and with one stride   ,break     
through and rend this fine-spun web of  
yours4   ,he can1 he will6--,i still am 
his believer4   ,yet ,i'll not pledge   
myself1 but that those letters   ,may   
furnish you1 perchance1 with proofs     
against him4   ,how far may not this    
,tertsky have proceeded--   ,what may   
not he himself too have permitted       
,himself to do1 to snare the enemy1     
,the laws of war excusing8   ,nothing1  
save   ,his own mouth shall convict     

him--nothing less6   ,and face to face  
will ,i go question him4   ,ay--this    
state-policy8   ,o how ,i curse it6     
,you will some time1 with your          
state-policy1   ,compel him to the      
measure2 it may happen   ,because ye are
 determined that he is guilty1   ,guilty
 ye'll make him4   ,all retreat cut off1
   ,you close up every outlet1 hem him  
in   ,narrower and narrower1 till at    
length ye force him--   ,yes1 ye1--ye   
force him in his desperation1   ,to set 
fire to his prison4   ,father6 father6  
,that never can end well--it            
cannot--will not6   ,deem of it what    
thou wilt2 but pardon me1   ,that ,i    
must bear me on in my own way4   ,all   
must remain pure betwixt him and me2    
,and1 ere the day-light dawns1 it must  
be known   ,which ,i must lose--my      
father1 or my friend499       99        
,shiller's ,piccolomini1 act #c1  scene 
#i4  ,had ,othello been thus honourable 
to ,desdemona1 he would never have      
murdered her4 ,incalculable is the evil 

we bring on ourselves and society1 by   
supposing and surmising facts we ought  
resolutely to question4 ,the motto of   
the garter--    ,evil be to him who evil
 thinks1  ought to be1    ,evil is to   
him who evil thinks4  ,every man will be
 his own ,lawyer and his own ,doctor1   
and such is the perversity of human     
nature1 he will also be his own ,iago1  
and feed himself with suspicions4       
,nearly all tragedies hinge on this     
error4  ,to avoid being the cause of    
misunderstanding to others1 it is a good
 rule never to speak critically of      
others1 except in their presence1 or in 
print4 ,when ,i am obliged to do this in
 conversation1 with persons of unknown  
or doubtful exactitude1 ,i take care to 
keep much below the truth in matters of 
censure1 as anything of that kind may   
gain ten or twenty per cent1 in         
carriage4 ,when with men of just habits 
of interpretation1 ,i pay them the      
highest compliment of friendship1 and   
speak to them of others1 without        

reserve4  ,notorious are the contumelies
 put upon the cases of grievance        
presented from the people in the ,house 
of ,commons4 ,nor is it altogether      
causeless4 ,so prone are the ignorant to
 mistake their prejudices for facts1 and
 ascribe to others as crimes what exists
 only in their own surmises1 that most  
popular cases may be stripped of half   
their pretensions without injuring their
 truth4 ,exaggeration is the vice of    
ignorance4 ,half the speeches addressed 
to ',king ,mob' are hyperbolic4 ,the    
sentiments of public meetings minister  
too often to the prevalent inflation4   
,the people will be powerful when they  
learn to be exact--and not till then4   
,the only mode of correcting this evil  
is to instil into the people the wise   
rule of ,burlamiqui4 ,to reason1 7that  
is1 inductively7 says this writer1 is to
 calculate1 and as it were draw up an   
account1 after balancing all arguments1 
in order to see on which side the       
advantage lies4 ,burlamiqui had law     

chiefly in view in his remark1 but the  
rule is of immense application4 ,a      
logician is a secretary or banker's     
clerk1 who keeps an account between     
truth and error4 ,when a lady once      
consulted ,dr4 ,johnson on the degree of
 turpitude to be attached to her son's  
robbing an orchard--',madam1' said      
,johnson1 'it all depends upon the      
weight of the boy4 ,i remember my       
schoolfellow1 ,davy ,garrick1 who was   
always a little fellow1 robbing a dozen 
orchards with impunity1 but the very    
first time ,i climbed up an apple tree1 
for ,i was always a heavy boy1 the bough
 broke with me1 and it was called a     
judgment4 ,i suppose that is why        
,justice is represented with a pair of  
scales4' ,this may not be the precise   
reason why ,justice has a pair of       
scales1 but the point goes to the root  
of the matter4 ,without weighing there  
can be neither justice nor fair         
induction4  ,in illustration of these   
views ,mr4 ,mill has some able          

remarks3--',in proportion to any        
person's deficiency of knowledge and    
mental cultivation1 is generally his    
inability to discriminate between his   
inferences and the perceptions on which 
they were grounded4  ,many a marvellous 
tale many a scandalous anecdote1 owes   
its origin to this incapacity4 ,the     
narrater relates1 not what he saw or    
heard1 but the impression which he      
derived from what he saw or heard1 and  
of which perhaps the greater part       
consisted of inference1 though the whole
 is related not as inference but as     
matter-of-fact4 ,the difficulty of      
inducing witnesses to restrain1 within  
any moderate limits1 the intermixture of
 their inferences with the narrative of 
their perceptions1 is well known to     
experienced cross-examiners2 and still  
more is this the case when ignorant     
persons attempt to describe any natural 
phenomenon4 ,the simplest narrative1    
says ,dugald ,stewart1 of the most      
illiterate observer involves more or    

less of hypothesis nay1 in general1 it  
will be found that1 in proportion to his
 ignorance1 the greater is the number of
 conjectural principle involved in his  
statements4 ,a village apothecary 7and1 
if possible1 in a still greater degree1 
an experienced nurse7 is seldom able to 
describe2 the plainest case1 without    
employing a phraseology of which every  
word is a theory2 whereas a simple and  
genuine specification of the phenomena  
which mark a particular disease--a      
specification unsophisticated by fancy1 
or by preconceived opinions1 may be     
regarded as unequivocal evidence of a   
mind trained by long and successful     
study to the most difficult of all arts1
 that of the faithful interpretation of 
nature4'99       99 ,logic1 pp4 #djh-i1 
vol4 #b4  ,it is in judgments formed1 in
 reprehensible indifference to the      
actual facts of the case1 that party    
rancour and the proverbial injustice of 
popular political opinion take their    
rise4 ,a useful caution on this head is 

pronounced by ,lord ,brougham in his    
sketch of the life of ,lord             
,wellesley3--',how often do we see1'    
observes his lordship1 'vehement3 and   
unceasing2 attacks made upon a minister 
or a statesman1 perhaps not in the      
public service1 for something which he  
does not choose to defend or explain1   
resting his claims to the confidence of 
his countrymen upon his past exertions  
and his known character4 ,yet these     
assaults are unremittingly made upon    
him1 and the people believe that so much
 noise could not be stirred up without  
something to authorise it4 ,sometimes   
the objects of the calumny are silent   
from disdain2 sometimes from knowing    
that the base propagators of it will    
only return to their slander the more   
eagerly alter their conviction of       
falsehood2 but sometimes1 also1 the     
silencer may be owing to official       
reserve1 of which we see a most         
remarkable instance in the ease of ,lord
 ,wellesly4'  ,not only are enemies of  

the people afforded a justification for 
their opposition by wrongful judgment   
pronounced upon them1 but the friends of
 the people often pass over to the other
 side through the same cause4 ,when a   
leader of the people first comes in     
personal contact with the opposite      
party1 and becomes acquainted with      
merits of feeling and judgment which he 
had as it were pledged himself to deny1 
and indeed achieved himself a position  
by disbelieving in1 he becomes ashamed  
of the injustice exacted from him by his
 inexorable adherents1 and forsakes his 
party when he should only forsake its   
errors4 ,the case of ,barnave1 in the   
first ,french ,revolution1 is a         
memorable instance of this4 ,on lesser  
theatres ,i have seen many instances of 
this kind of conversion2 ,such changes  
have always been ascribed to venality1  
yet they are men of generous instincts  
who are thus overcome--but they want    
logical strength1 and cannot correct    
themselves without falling4  ,it is a   

wise rule in conversation1 never to     
guess at meanings4 ,when1 an observation
 is made1 capable of affording two      
inferences1 at once put the question    
which shall elicit the meaning intended4
 ,conversation is held to no purpose    
unless explicitness comes out of it4    
,innumerable are the errors that arise  
through letting remarks pass1 of which  
we only suppose we know the purport4    
,this is a fruitful source of           
misunderstanding4 ,when in ,scotland ,i 
was much instructed by the intellectual 
characteristics of the people4 ,the     
,scotch are essentially a reflective    
people4 ,the ,english conceive doubts1  
but the ,scotch put them into queries4  
,before ,i had been in the country many 
hours ,i was struck by the inductive    
habits of the people4 ,a very old and   
illiterate woman1 to whom ,i put an     
indefinite question1 eyed me            
deliberately from head to foot before   
she gave me an answer4 ,not in rudeness 
did she gaze1 so much as in inquiry as  

to what could be my object4 ,i spent    
more than a week in inquiring at places1
 where apartments were to be let1 by    
which ,i acquired profitable            
acquaintance with the people4 ,upon     
asking the terms of apartments1 ,i was  
met1 in all cases1 by several           
preliminary questions1 as for whom were 
they8 what number of persons8 what      
station1 habits1 and probable stay8     
,then ,i received the precise answer    
required4 ,it did not seem to me that   
they were answering one question by     
asking another1 as is sometimes said of 
the ,scotch--but by a happy and wise    
presence of mind they asked1 as all     
should do1 at many questions as were    
required to complete the data of the    
specific answer they were called upon to
 give4  ,a wise practice is followed in 
courts of law4 ,no judge pronounces an  
opinion on a hypothetical case4 ,what he
 would do8 or what would be the judgment
 of the law1 suppose a certain case     
should arise8--are questions he never   

condescends to answer4 ',bring the      
plaintiff into court1 let the evidence  
be taken1 and then we will decide4 ,we  
sit here to judge actual1 not           
suppositious cases4' ,such would be the 
reply4 ,people out of court might profit
 by the example4  ,i remember one       
striking instance of the pernicious     
effects of surmise4 ,some years ago ,i  
took part in a ,fraternal ,demonstration
 at ,highbury ,barn4 ,the assembly was  
numerous1 and composed of persons of all
 nations and all parties4 ,the          
celebration was avowedly one of         
fraternity4 ,the tone of the meeting    
reflected its object4 ,pacific words    
were on every tongue1 and harmony       
reigned up till eleven o'clock4 ,at that
 hour ,monsieur ,chillman asked me if   
some steps could not be taken to        
annualize the meeting1 and he requested 
me to prepare and propose a resolution  
to that effect4 ,monsieur ,chillman1    
thinking the resolution ought to come   
from an ,englishman1 strongly urged me  

to move it4 ,i1 thinking it too         
important to emanate from a young man1  
looked about for a person of experience 
and known discretion to introduce it4   
,after several had declined1 ,mr4       
,hetherington undertook it4 ,the        
,english politicians were composed of   
two parties1 the friends of ,mr4        
,o',connor1 and the members of the      
,national ,hall4 ,at that time they were
 pleased to be the antipodes of each    
other4 ,no sooner had ,mr4 ,hetherington
 spoken1 he being the friend of ,mr4    
,lovett1 than his motion was supposed to
 come from ,mr4 ,lovett's party1 though 
they were utterly ignorant of its       
origination4 ,clamour's hundred tongues 
were loosened4 ,slumbering differences  
were awakened4 ,suspicion spread like an
 infection4 ,fraternity perished of the 
contagion4 ,twenty amendments were      
proposed1 and it was not till midnight1 
and then in a storm indescribably       
contradictory of the meeting's whole    
purport1 that a common understanding was

 come to4 ,had the least inquiry been   
made by the objecting party1 previously 
to dissenting1 they would have found    
that the suspicious proposition         
originated with one of themselves4 ,but 
assuming premises1 they inferred from   
conjecture instead of fact1 and raised  
disastrous doubts as to the ability of  
that assembly for domestic or           
international fraternisation4  ,the use 
and abuse of authority ,is a subject    
worthy of the young logician's serious  
attention4 ,many great writers like     
,bacon1 through policy--,burke through  
position1 or ,shakspere through         
versatility of genius1 have written on  
both sides of important questions4 ,such
 men1 taken piece-meal1 may be quoted by
 the most opposite parties in favour of 
the most opposite opinions4 ,unless     
there is time to make a broad induction 
from their writings1 showing1 by        
weighty1 quantitive evidence1 the side  
to which they leaned1 better not quote  
them as authorities at all1 but give    

what expresses your own views on your   
own responsibility--indeed1 in all      
cases1 the quoter ought to stand        
prepared1 if possible1 to justify all he
 cites from another in argument4 ',there
 is perhaps something weak and servile  
in our wishing to rely on1 or draw      
assistance from1 ancient opinions4      
,reason ought not1 like vanity1 to adorn
 herself with old parchments1 and the   
display of a genealogical tree2 more    
dignified in her proceedings1 she ought 
to derive everything from herself2 she  
should disregard past times1 and be1 if 
,i may use the phrase1 the contemporary 
of all ages4'99 ,quote others as        
,grotius did3 not as judges from whose  
decision there is no appeal1 but as     
witnesses whose conspiring testimony    
confirms the view taken4       99       
,necker4  ,analogy has frequently been  
confounded with induction4 ,analogy     
signifies reasoning from resemblances   
subsisting between phenomena--induction1
 reasoning from the sameness of         

phenomena4  ,the phenomena affording an 
induction of a law of nature must be    
obvious1 uniform1 and universal4  ,the  
rules to be observed in deducing general
 principles are1 that the case be true  
and the facts universal4  ,on this      
subject1 as exhibiting the clearest     
results arrived at1 ,i transcribe a     
passage from ,mill3 ',there is no word  
which is used more loosely1 or in a     
greater variety of senses1 than analogy4
 ,it sometimes stands for arguments     
which may be examples of the most rigid 
induction4 ,archbishop ,whately1 for    
instance1 following ,ferguson and other 
writers1 defines analogy conformably to 
its primitive acceptation1 that which   
was given to it by mathematicians1      
resemblance of relations4 ,in this      
sense1 when a country which has sent out
 colonies is termed the mother country1 
the expression is analogical1 signifying
 that the colonies of a country stand in
 the same relation to her in which      
children stand to their parents4 ,and if

 any inference be drawn from this       
resemblance of relations1 as1 for       
instance1 that the same obedience or    
affection is due from colonies to the   
mother country which is due from        
children to a parent1 this is called    
reasoning by analogy4 ,or if it be      
argued that a nation is most            
beneficially governed by an assembly    
elected by the people1 from the admitted
 fact that other associations for a     
common purpose1 such as joint stock     
companies1 are best managed by a        
committee chosen by the parties         
interested2 this1 too1 is an argument   
from analogy in the preceding sense1    
because its foundation is1 not that a   
nation is like a joint stock company1 or
 ,parliament like a board of directors1 
but that ,parliament stands in the same 
relation to the nation in which a board 
of directors stands to a joint stock    
company4 ,now1 in an argument of this   
nature1 there is no inherent inferiority
 of conclusiveness like other arguments 

from resemblance1 it may amount to      
nothing1 or it may be a perfect and     
conclusive induction4 ,the circumstance 
in which the two cases resemble1 may be 
capable of3 being shown to be the       
matereal circumstance2 to be that on    
which all the consequences1 necessary to
 be taken into account in the particular
 discussion1 depend4 ,in the case in    
question1 the resemblance is one of     
relation2 the fundamentum relationis    
being the management1 by a few persons1 
of affairs in which a much greater      
number are interested along with them4  
,now1 some may contend that this        
circumstance which is common to the two 
cases1 and the various consequences     
which follow from it1 have the chief    
share in determining all those effects  
which make up what we term good or bad  
administration4 ,if they can establish  
this1 their argument has the force of a 
rigid induction3 if they cannot1 they   
are said to have failed in proving the  
analogy between the two cases1 a mode of

 speech which implies that when the     
analogy can be proved1 the argument     
founded upon it cannot be resisted4'99  
99 ,logic1 pp4 #ig-h1 vol4 #b4  ',many  
of the most splendid and important      
discoveries in this science were the    
result of analogical reasonings4 ,it was
 from this source that ,dr4 ,priestley  
proved the compound nature of           
atmospheric air2 and it is related that 
it was in consequence of hints which he 
had given1 when on a visit to ,paris1 to
 ,lavoisier1 founded entirely upon      
analogical conjectures1 that the latter 
philosopher was induced to commence     
experiments1 with the view of proving   
the compound nature of water1 and of    
reducing it to its constituent elements4
 ,indeed the whole history of this very 
important and useful department of human
 knowledge exhibits very striking and   
incontestable proofs how much of the art
 owed its existence to mere hints and   
conjectures1 founded1 in many cases1    
upon very slight resemblances or        

analogies4994 ,the chief province of    
analogy is confined to that of          
suggestion4 ,analogies are the great    
hinters of experiments4 ,they illustrate
 an argument1 but do not establish it4  
,they are probabilities1 not proofs4    
,hence ,lord ,brougham in one place     
exclaims3--',i have a dread1 at least a 
suspicion1 of all analogies1 and never  
more than when on the slippery heights  
of an obscure subject2 when we are1 as  
it were1 inter apices of a metaphysical 
argument1 and feeling1 perhaps groping1 
our way in the dark1 or among the       
clouds4 ,i then regard analogy as a     
dangerous light1 a treacherous ignii    
fatuus4'9999  ,a striking instance of   
the fallacy of analogy is afforded in   
the experiments of ,professor           
,matteuoci1 which seem to prove that    
though the analogies between electricity
 and nervous substance are nearly       
perfect1 yet they are two distinct      
agencies4999999       99 ,blakey's      
,logic1 pp4 #ig-g4       9999 ,pal4     

,illus4  vol4 #b4       999999  ,see    
,zoist ,no4 #bj1 p4 #cfc4    ,,chapter  
,,xi4 ,,detection ,,of ,,fallacies  ,,we
 hope to be able to save students from  
the fate of ,diodorus1 7a great         
logician1 who died in his school through
 shame at being1 unable to resolve a    
quibble propounded by ,stilno7--not by  
hardening1 but by enlightening them4    
,though we bring neither mood nor figure
 wherewith to test the presence of      
error1 we are not without the hope of   
qualifying the student for its          
discovery4  ,it has been confessed from 
the throne of logic that1 ',after all1  
in the practical detection of each      
individual fallacy1 much must depend on 
natural and acquired acuteness3 nor can 
any rules be given1 the mere learning of
 which will enable us to apply them with
 mechanical certainty and readiness4'   
,bulwer1 in remarking that error is a   
view of some facts instead of a survey  
of all1 indicated the key to logical    
fallacy4 ,error lies principally in     

defective premises4 ,sophistry in       
science is referable to incomplete      
analysis of nature1 of systems--to      
artificial arrangements--to supposing   
qualities1 to assuming principles1 to   
false inductions from imperfect         
demonstration4  ,dickens1 in ',nicholas 
,nickleby1' gives the case of a certain 
lady1 who1 because she knew one young   
milliner1 who retained red cheeks and   
did not die of consumption1 was         
immovably of opinion that all           
representations of the injurious effect 
of such sedentary occupation were false4
 ,it is ever so with the vulgar4 ,some  
one case has come under their notice1   
and it is in vain that you appeal to a  
chain of facts4 ,they know nothing of   
induction--they know one case to the    
contrary1 and that is enough4 ,this     
error is the source of vulgar prejudice4
 ,once teach men that truth does not lie
 in a single instance1 but in a         
calculation in a balance of             
probabilities1 and you rationalise them4

 ',the chapter of accidents or single   
instances is the ,bible of the fool--it 
supplies him with a text against        
everything great1 or good1 or wise4'99  
99 ,times4       ,where others toil with
 philosophic force1      ,their nimble  
nonsense takes a shorter course1        
,flings at your head convictions in the 
lump1      ,and gains' remote           
conclusions with a jump4--,cowper1  ,the
 first source of error is defective     
induction4 ,we easily arrive at this    
point of examination by the questions we
 have proposed for use in the test of   
syllogism4 ,formerly1 one syllogism was 
required to be defeated by another--we  
now attack a fallacy by induction4 ,no  
false syllogism1 says ,biennan1 can     
resist the inductive process of sifting 
particulars4       ,i do not like thee4 
,dr4 ,fell1      ,the reason why1 ,i    
cannot tell--      ,but this ,i know1   
and know full well1      ,i do not like 
thee1 ,dr4 ,fell4  ,this kind of thing  
will not do4 ,induction pursues the     

reasoner with an eternal why4 ,a clear  
because to a clear why1 is a demand that
 is never remitted in sound logic4      
,lord ,melbourne1 in giving his reason  
for his religion in the ,house of       
,lords1 said it was the religion of his 
forefathers and that of his country1    
therefore1 he would support the church4 
7,cheers from the opposition benches47  
,the ,brahmin and ,mussulman give the   
same reason for theirs4 ,a logician in  
facts would have said1 ,i hold and      
support my religion because it is true4 
,what the standard of physical certainty
 is to facts1 what axioms are to        
science1 such is induction to           
syllogisms--it is the test of their     
correctness4  ,dr4 ,whately exhibits the
 following instance of a regularly      
expressed syllogism3--    ,every        
dispensation of ,providence is          
beneficial3   ,afflictions are          
dispensations of ,providence1           
,therefore1 they are beneficial4  ,every
 applicable rule of ,dr4 ,whately's     

logic is1 of course1 applied here--it is
 true in mood and figure1 and yet the   
argument is fallacious4 ,a fallacy is   
defined as 'an ingenious mixture of     
truth and falsehood1 so entangled as to 
be intimately blended--that the         
falsehood is1 in chemical phrase1 held  
in solution3 one drop of sound logic is 
that test which immediately disunites   
them1 makes the foreign substance       
visible1 and precipitates it to the     
bottom4'99 ,but whence is to come 'this 
drop of sound logic8' ,not from the     
,doctor's ,elements1 they have sent     
forth the fallacy4 ,but touch it with   
the talisman of facts and2 the error    
will appear4       99 ,whately's ,logic1
 ,anal4 ,out41 chap4 #a1 stc4 #d4  ,what
 facts support the assertion that       
,afflictions are dispensations of       
,providence8' ,the simple question is   
fatal to the argument4 ,can such a      
proposition have facts for its support8 
,ignorance1 congregating in narrow      
courts1 and laziness1 accumulating      

filth1 generate sickness and affliction4
 ,are these the dispensations of        
,providence1 or the dispensations of    
folly and crime8 ,to ascribe them to    
,providence is virtually to allow       
ignorance and laziness to step into the 
throne of ,god1 and call upon men to    
believe in their beneficent             
dispensations4 ,dr4 ,watts1 another     
writer on logic1 set the ,christian     
congregations of ,england to sing the   
same species of fallacy3---             
,diseases are the servants1 ,lord1      
,they come at thy command2      ,i'll   
not attempt a murm'ring word1           
,against thy chast'ning hand4           
,according to this lyrical logician1    
whenever wise precautions arrest the    
progress of pestilence1 or the          
physician's skill subdues disease1      
,jehovah is robbed of a servant4 ,by    
such an argument1 humanity is made to be
 in rebellion against heaven1 and our   
medical colleges are in antagonism with 
,deity1 and the recent appointment1 by  

the ,russell government1 of a ,sanatory 
,commission1 was high blasphemy4 ,it is 
the degradation of language to employ it
 to such a purpose1 and logic needs     
revising to save us from publishing such
 puerility in the name of learning and  
of reason4 ,it must have been logic of  
this kind that induced a                
strong-thoughted woman to hazard the    
bold but tenable conjecture1 that ',if  
an argument has truth in it1 less than a
 philosopher will see it--and if it has 
not1 less than a logician will refute   
it4'99       99 ,a ,few ,days in        
,athens1 by ,frances ,wright4  ,r4 ,g4  
,latham1 ,m4,d41 in his ',first         
,outlines of ,logic applied to ,grammar 
and ,etymology1' has introduced the     
particular instance of the syllogism on 
,providence here cited from ,whately4   
,it would be no difficult task to       
present other instances of the same     
species of polemical fallacy from ,dr4  
,whately and other writers on logic1 did
 it comport with the rule ,i have chosen

 for observance4 ,i give these cases    
chiefly to show how extensively and     
obtrusively they are introduced4  ',we  
have1' says ,mr4 ,mill1 'five           
distinguishable classes of fallacy1     
which may to expressed in the following 
synoptic table3--  ,illustration3       
,mill's ,fallacy ,table  ,it was the    
boast of ,archimedes1 that if any one   
would find him a fulcrum1 on which to   
rest a prop1 he would raise the world1  
,but this was mere assertion unsupported
 by facts1 for if the fulcrum had been  
found him1 ,archimedes could not have   
performed his promise4 ,this has been   
proved by ,ferguson1 who has            
demonstrated that if ,archimedes could  
have moved with the swiftness of a      
cannon ball--#dhj miles every hour--it  
would have taken him just               
#dd1ifc1edj1jjj1jjj of years to         
have-raised the world one inch4 ,bulwer 
remarks1 ',critics have said1 what a    
fine idea of ,archimedes6 ,but how much 
finer is the fact that refutes it4 ,one 

of the sublimest things in the world is 
plain truth4'    ,all motion generates  
warmth1   ,shaking 7with cold7 is       
motion1   ,ergo1 shaking with cold      
generates warmth4  ,we look1 in this    
case1 to the facts on which the first   
proposition rests1 and find the         
assertion too general4  ,to one who said
 that none were happy who were not above
 opinion1 a ,spartan replied1 ',then    
none are happy but knaves and robbers4' 
,mr4 ,goodrich1 the original ,peter     
,farley gives1 ,in his ',fireside       
,education1' an instance to this effect 
of two boys arguing on the division of  
their beds4 ,william exclaims1 ',you    
take more than your share of the bed1   
,james4' ,james answers1 ',i only take  
half the bed4' ,william replies1 ',true1
 but you take your half out of the      
middle1 and ,i am obliged to lie on both
 sides to get my half4'  ,innumerable   
sophisms are suffered to pass in        
consequence of ,some brilliancy of      
position which1 dazzles us and prevents 

our seeing that they are wide of the'   
mark of reason4 ,an instance occurs in  
,bulwer--who says1 ',helvetius erred    
upon education--but his dogma has been  
beneficial4' ,probably so--but not so   
beneficial as the truth would have been4
 ,many persons have argued from such an 
instance1 that error is useful4         
,dickens1 in those incidental           
observations of striking good sense     
strewed up and down his writings1 says1 
in the ',cricket on the                 
,hearth3'--',these remarks 7of ,mrs4    
,fielding7 were quite unanswerable3     
which is the happy property of all      
remarks that are sufficiently wide of   
the purpose4' ,of the refutation of such
 remarks he has presented an able       
instance in ',martin ,chuzzlewit'3      
',bless my soul1 ,westlock1' says       
,pinch1 is it nothing to see ,pecksniff 
moved to that extent and know one's self
 to be the cause8 ,and did you not hear 
him say that he could have shed his     
blood for me8  ',do you want any blood  

shed for you8' returned ,westlock with  
considerable irritation4 ',does he shed 
anything for you that you do want8 ,does
 he shed employment for you1 instruction
 for you pocket money for you8 ,does he 
even shed legs of mutton for you in any 
decent proportion to potatoes and garden
 stuff8'    ,,chapter ,,xii4            
,,scepticism  ,man has been called the  
plaything of chance1 but there is no    
logic more close and inflexible than    
that of human life3 all is entwined     
together2 and for him who is able to    
disentangle the premises and patiently  
await the conclusion it is the most     
correct of syllogisms4--,jules ,sandau3 
,people's ,journal1 ,no4 #hg4  ',to     
quote authors1' says ,harris1 in his    
preface to his ,hermes1' 'who have lived
 in various ages1 and in distant        
countries2 some in the full maturity of 
,grecian and ,roman literature2 some in 
its declension2 and others in periods   
still more barbarous and depraved2 may  
afford1 perhaps1 no unpleasing          

speculation1 to see how the same reason 
has at all times prevailed2 how there is
 one truth like one sun1 that has       
enlightened human intelligence through  
every age1 and saved it from the        
darkness both of sophistry and error4'  
,this is the assurance which right      
reason will ever impart4 ,underneath all
 the change after which we pant1 amid   
all the variety which surrounds us1 and 
seem the very aliment of our nature1    
lies the instinct after the permanent4  
,it is the province of sound logic to   
guarantee this in conclusion4  ,the     
novelty1 change1 fluctuation1 which     
scientific discovery has brought1 and   
will yet bring1 into the formerly       
settled worlds of opinion and social    
condition1 will unsettle men's minds1   
and pave the way to an age of           
scepticism4 ,sound logic is necessary to
 provide that this doubt is transitional
 and not ultimate4  ,scepticism is of   
two kinds1 that of ,pyrrho1 and that of 
examination4 ,the followers of ,pyrrho1 

it is said1 made doubting a profession1 
until at last they doubted whether they 
did doubt4 ,this is the scepticism of   
the scorner and trifler4  ,he did not   
know that he did not know it1 and if he 
did know it it was more than he knew4   
,this is as far as the philosopher1 of  
this school can go4 ,dickens has drawn  
the portrait of these1 logicians in ,mr4
 ,tigg3--  ',when a man like ,slyme1'   
said ,mr4 ,tigg1 'is detained for such a
 thing as a bill' ,i reject the         
superstition of ages1 and believe       
nothing4 ,i don't even believe that ,i  
don't believe1 curse me if ,i do4'      
,hood is ironical on the professors of  
uncertainty4 ',on a certain day of a    
certain year1 certain officers went1 on 
certain information1 to a certain court1
 in a certain city1 to take up a certain
 ,italian for a certain crime4 ,what    
gross fools are they who say there is   
nothing certain in this world4'  ,but   
scepticism is not capable of disturbing 
the well-grounded repose of the wise2   

for when the sceptic thinks he has      
involved everything in doubt1 everything
 is still left in as much certainty as  
his scepticism4  ,in the great maze of  
conflicting opinion1 it matters little  
that we are cautioned that reason is not
 all-sufficient--it is the best         
sufficiency we have4 ,if reason will not
 serve us well1 will anything serve us  
better8 ,bishop ,berkeley may           
demonstrate that we are not sure of     
matter's existence--but are we more sure
 of any thing else8 ,we are not thus to 
be cajoled4 ,but it is right to say that
 ,mr4 ,j4 ,s4 ,mill contends that       
,berkeley has been misunderstood--but if
 he did argue1 as popularly believed1 to
 such argument1 the answer of ,byron is 
sufficient--       ,when ,berkeley said 
there  was no matter1      ,it was no   
matter what he said4  ,if all is        
delusion1 the delusion is very          
orderly--it observes regular laws1 and  
we proceed in logical method to inform  
each other1 how the delusion of things  

appears to our understandings or affects
 our fortunes4       ,where nothing is1 
and all things seem1      ,and we the   
shadows of a dream1  ,we discuss the    
seemings with the same gravity as       
realities4' ,if a man seems to do wrong1
 and ,i seem to prevent him1 and the    
wrong1 therefore1 seems not to be done1 
,i am satisfied4  ,the 'wise considerate
 scepticism' of inquiry has been well   
expressed by ,emerson1 in his recent    
lecture on ,montaigne4--',who shall     
forbid a wise scepticism1 seeing that   
there is no practical question on which 
anything more than a proximate solution 
is to be had8 ,marriage itself is an    
open question3 those out wish to be in3 
those in to be out4  ,the state4 ,with  
all its obvious advantages1 nobody loves
 it4 ,is it2 otherwise with the ,church8
 ,shall the young man enter trade or a  
profession without being vitiated8      
,shall he stay on shore or put out to   
sea8 ,there is much to be said on both  
sides4 ,then there is competition and   

the attractions of the co-operative     
system4 ,the labourer has a poor hut1 is
 without knowledge1 virtue1             
civilisation4 ,if3 we say1 ,let us have 
culture1 the expression awakens a new   
indisposition2 for culture destroys     
spontaneous and hearty unencumbered     
action4 ,let us have a robust manly     
life2 let us have to do with realities1 
not with shadowy ghosts4 ,now this      
precisely is the right ground of the    
sceptic2 not of unbelief1 denying or    
doubting--least of all of scoffing and  
profligate jeering at what is stable and
 good4 ,he is the considerer4 ,he has1  
too many enemies around him to wish to  
be his own4 ,the position of the sceptic
 is one taken up for defence2 as we     
build a house not too high or too low2  
under the wind1 but out of the dust4    
,for him the ,spartan vigour is         
too-austere4 ,st4 ,john too thin and    
aerial4 ,the wise sceptic avoids to be  
fooled by any extreme2 he wishes to1 see
 the game4 ,he wishes to see all things1

 but mainly men4 ,really our life in    
this world not of so easy interpretation
 as preachers and school-books are      
accustomed to describe it4' ,these have 
not so efficiently solved the problem1  
that the sceptic should yield himself   
contentedly to their interpretation4    
,true1 he does not wish to speak harshly
 of what is best in us1--to turn himself
 into a devil's attorney4 ,but he points
 out the room there is for doubt2--the  
power of moods2--the power of           
complexion1 and so forth4 ,shall we1    
then1 because good-nature inclines us to
 virtue's side1 smoothly cry3 ,there are
 no doubts6--and lie for the right8 ,we 
ask whether life is to be led in a brave
 or a cowardly way3 whether the         
satisfaction of our doubts be not       
essential to all manliness3 whether the 
name of virtue is to be a barrier to    
that which is virtue8 ,the sceptic wants
 truth1 wants to have things made plain 
to him1 and has a right to be convinced 
in his own way4 ,in such scepticism     

there is no malignity2 it is honest1 and
 does not hinder his being convinced2   
and this hard-headed man1 once convinced
 will prove a giant in defence of his   
faith4 ,the true and final answer in    
which all scepticism is lost is the     
moral sentiment3 that never forfeits the
 supremacy4 ,it is the drop that        
balances the universe4'  ,science and   
logic have so far advanced as to abridge
 the field of doubtful questions4 ,when 
syllogism answered syllogism1           
uncertainty reigned absolute--but now   
that the appeal is to facts1 we can1    
wherever facts can be had1 weigh or     
number them1 and decide on one side or  
the other4  ,when ,ali ,pacha was at    
,janina1 the case of a poor woman1 who  
accused a man of the theft of all her   
property1 was brought before him2 but   
the plaintiff having no witnesses1 the  
case was discharged1 as the other       
asserted his innocence1 and insisted as 
a proof1 that he had not a farthing in  
the world4 ,on their leaving his        

presence1 ,ali ordered both to be       
weighed1 and then released them without 
further notice4 ,a fortnight afterwards1
 he commanded both into his presence1   
and again weighed them2 the accuser had 
lost as much as the defendant had gained
 in weight4 ,the thing spoke for itself1
 and ,ali decided that the accusation   
was just4 ,ali ,pacha was the           
,burlamiqui of justice4 ,induction1 too1
 has its scales1 and seldom leaves us in
 doubt when it gets truth and falsehood 
in them4 ,scepticism is now happily     
restricted to those questions resting on
 conjectures1 and which do not pertain  
to the practical affairs of this life4  
,on matter-of-fact questions1 only the  
weak are perplexed4 ,after men have been
 in deliberation till the time of action
 approach1 if it be not then manifest   
what is best to be done1 it is a sign   
the difference of motives the one way   
and the other is not great2 therefore1  
not to resolve then is to lose the      
occasion by weighing of trifles1 which  

is pusillanimity4  ,quaint old ,bunyan  
tells us1 that when he had completed his
 ',pilgrim's ,progress' he took the     
opinions of various friends on the      
propriety of publishing it4 ,some said  
',john1 do2' others ',john1 don't4' ,but
 solid old ,john was not to be thus     
confounded4 ',then ,i will print it1'   
said he1 'and thus the case decide4' ,to
 this good sense the public owe that    
immortal dream4  ,in the great field of 
physical investigation1 science has     
conquered doubt4 ',contingency and      
versimilitude are the offspring of human
 ignorance1 and1 with an intellect of   
the highest order1 cannot be supposed to
 have any existence4'99                 
99,edinburgh ,review1 ,september #ahad1 
article ,probabilities  ',probability1' 
says ,laplace1' has reference partly to 
our ignorance1 and partly to our        
knowledge4'  ',chance1' observes ,mr4   
,mill1 'is usually spoken of in direct  
antithesis to law2 whatever 7it is      
supposed7 cannot be ascribed to law1 ,if

 attributed to chance4 ,it is1 however1 
certain1 that whatever happens is the   
result of some law2 is an effect of     
causes1 and could have been predicted   
from a knowledge of the existence of    
those causes1 and from their laws4 ,if  
,i turn up a particular card1 that is a 
consequence of its place in the pack4   
,its place in the pack was a consequence
 of the manner in which the cards were  
shuffled1 or of the order in which they 
were played in the last game2 which1    
again1 were the effects of prior causes4
 ,at every stage1 if we had possessed an
 accurate knowledge of the causes in    
existence1 it would have been           
abstractedly possible to foretell the   
effect4'99  ',in the domain of morals1  
too1 a certainty1 not dreamed of in past
 times1 now prevails4 ,however much man1
 as an individual1 may be an enigma1 in 
the aggregate he is a mathematical      
problem4'9999  ,in the great world of   
opinion it is the duty of honest        
reasoners to endeavour to find out the  

truth1 and take sides1 undeterred by the
 philosophical frivolity now growing    
fashionable4 ,if men are silent         
concerning objects and principles1 it is
 said they have none1 and it is         
impatiently asked 'where is their bond  
of union8' ,and no sooner is it         
explained than they are told 'it is very
 unphilosophical to think of setting up 
a creed4' ,where the alternatives are   
thus put against them they should take  
their own course4 ,creeds are the       
necessary exponents of conviction4 ,the 
creedless philosopher is out on the sea 
of opinion1 without compass or chart4   
,to bind yourself for the future to     
present opinions is doubtless unwise1   
but he who has inquired to any purpose  
has come to some conclusion1            
affirmative1 negative1 or neutral2 and  
it is the province of a creed to avow   
the actual result1 and the consequent2  
conduct intended to be followed4 ,it is 
the vice of free thinking that it       
spreads universal uncertainty1 and      

assumes right and wrong to be so protean
 that no man can tell one hour what     
opinion he shall hold the next4 ,logic  
should correct this unsatisfactory      
extreme1 and extirpate the tiresome race
 whom ,shelley described in ,peter      
,bell3--       ,to ,peter's view1 all   
seems one hue2      ,he is no ,whig1 he 
is no ,tory2      ,no ,deist and no     
,christian he--      ,but is so subtle1 
that to be      ,nothing is all his     
glory9999            99 ,logic1 pp4     
#eg-h1 vol4 #b            9999          
,vestiges4    ,,chapter ,,xiii4         
,,intellectual ,,daring  ,freedom has   
been hunted through the world1 and is   
ever exposed to ,insult and injury4 ,it 
is crushed by conquest2 frowned from    
courts2 expelled from colleges2 scorned 
out of society2 flogged in schools2 and 
anathematised in churches4 ,mind is her 
last asylum2 and if freedom quail there1
 what becomes of the hope of the world1 
or the worth of human nature8--,w4 ,j4  
,fox's ,lectures to the ,working        

,classes1 part #ab1 p4 #fe4  ,we should 
be prepared to dare all things for      
truth4 ,if the 'very hopes of man1 the  
thoughts of his heart1 the religion of  
nations1 the manners and morals of      
mankind1 are all at the mercy of a new  
generalisation1' we should be prepared  
to risk them4 ,if we must choose between
 truth and repose1 we ought not to      
hesitate4 ,there is danger in having the
 truth--philosophers are obliged to     
conceal it4 ,mankind vaunt their love of
 truth1 but they are not to be trusted4 
,from interest or ignorance they always 
persecute1 and often kill1 the          
discoverer4 ,still the pursuit of truth 
is a duty1 and we must find consolation 
in the heroic reflection of ,burke1 that
 in all exertions of duty there it      
something to be hazarded4 ,but          
intellectual daring will never be common
 while it is so generally believed to be
 criminal4 ,we will1 therefore1 quote   
some considerations touching the        
rightfulness of inquiry4  ,without      

inquiry it is impossible for us to know 
whether our opinions are true or false1 
and various are the pretences employed  
for declining investigation3 frequently 
they are masked under vague and         
metaphorical phrases3 inquiry implies   
the weighing of evidence1 and might lead
 to doubt and perplexity--to search into
 a subject might shake the settled      
convictions of the understanding--to    
examine opposite arguments1 and         
contradictory opinions1 might           
contaminate the mind with false views4  
',every one who alleges pretexts like   
these for declining inquiry1 must       
obviously begin by assuming that his own
 opinions are unerringly in the right4  
,nothing could justify a man for        
declining the investigation of a subject
 involving important opinions1 but the  
possession of an understanding free from
 liability of error4 ,not gifted with   
infallibility1 in what way1 except by   
diligent inquiry1 can he obtain any     
assurance that he is not pursuing a     

course of injurious action8 ,if he holds
 any opinion1 he must have acquired it  
either by examination1 by instillation1 
rote1 or some other process4 ,on the    
supposition that he has acquired it by  
proper examination1 the duty on which ,i
 am now insisting has been discharged1  
and the matter is at an end--but if he  
has acquired it in any other manner1 the
 mere plea1 that his mind might become  
unsettled1 can be no argument against   
the duty of investigation4 ,for anything
 he can allege to the contrary1 his     
present opinions are wrong--and1 in that
 case1 the disturbance of his blind     
convictions1 instead of being an evil1  
is an essential step towards arriving at
 the truth4  ',it may possibly be       
assigned1 as a further reason for his   
declining inquiry1 that he may come to  
some fallacy which he cannot surmount1  
although convinced of its character4 ,if
 he is convinced of its character1 he   
must either have grounds for that       
conviction or not4 ,if he has grounds1  

let him examine them1 draw them out1 try
 if they are valid1 and then the fallacy
 will stand exposed4 ,if he has no      
grounds for suspecting a fallacy1 what  
an irrational conclusion he confesses   
himself to have arrived at6 ,but perhaps
 he will reply--he may be unable to     
solve the difficulty2 his mind may      
become perplexed1 and the issue may     
prove1 after all1 that it would have    
been much better had he remained in his 
former strong1 though unenlightened1    
conviction4 ,why better8 ,if he is in   
perplexity let him read1 think1 consult 
the learned and the wise1 and in the end
 he will probably reach a definite      
opinion on one side or the other4 ,but  
if he should still remain in doubt1     
where is the harm8 or rather1 why is it 
not to be considered a good8 ,the       
subject is evidently one which admits   
strong probabilities on opposite sides4 
,doubt is therefore the proper sentiment
 for the occasion--it is the result of  
the best exercise of the faculties--and 

either positively to believe1 or        
positively to disbelieve1 would imply an
 erroneous appreciation of evidence4    
,in the minds of some people a strong   
prejudice appears to exist against that 
state of the understanding which is     
termed doubt4 ,a little reflection1     
however1 will convince any one that on  
certain subjects doubt is as appropriate
 a state of the reasoning faculties as  
belief or disbelief on others4 ,there   
are doctrines1 propositions1 facts1     
supported and opposed by every degree of
 evidence1 and amongst them by that     
degree of evidence of which the proper  
effect is to leave the understanding in 
an equipoise between two conclusions4   
,in these cages doubt is the appropriate
 result1 which there can be no reason to
 shrink from or lament4 ,but it may be  
further urged1 that inquiry might       
contaminate the understanding with false
 views--and1 therefore1 ,it is wise and 
laudable to abstain from it4  ',we can  
comprehend what is meant by             

contaminating a man's habits or         
disposition1 or even imagination4 ,but  
there is no analogy on these points in  
reference to the understanding4 ,there  
is contamination1 there is evil1 in     
preposterous and obscene images crowding
 before the intellectual vision1        
notwithstanding a full and distinct     
perception of their character--but there
 is no contamination1 no evil1 in a     
thousand false arguments coming before  
the understanding1 if their quality is  
clearly discerned4 ,the only possible   
evil in this case is mistaking false for
 true--but the man who shrinks from     
investigation lest he should mistake    
false for true1 can have no reason for  
supposing himself free from that        
delusion in his actual opinions4        
,besides these objections to inquiry1   
there are other prejudices of a similar 
character1 forming serious impediments  
to the attainment of truth4  ',one of   
these is a fear that we may search too  
far1 and become chargeable with         

presumption in prying into things we    
ought not to know4 ,a few words will    
suffice to prove that nothing can be    
more irrational and absurd4 ,we have    
already shown that true opinions are    
conducive to the welfare of mankind--and
 the prosecution of inquiry is therefore
 a process from which we have everything
 to hope and nothing to fear1 and to    
which there are no limits but such as   
the nature of our own faculties pre     
scribes4  ',a second prejudice--that we 
may contract guilt1 if1 in the course of
 our researches1 we miss the right      
conclusion1 and had therefore better let
 inquiry alone--is still more           
influential in preventing those         
investigations which it is our duty to  
make4 ,as our opinions on any subject   
are not voluntary acts1 but involuntary 
effects1 in whatever conclusions our    
researches terminate they can involve us
 in no culpability4 ,all that we have to
 take care of is1 to bestow on every    
subject an adequate and impartial       

attention4 ,having done this1 we have   
discharged our duty2 and it would be    
irrational and unmanly to entertain any 
apprehension for the result4  ',in fact1
 there is the grossest inconsistency in 
the prejudice now under consideration4  
,if we may contract guilt by searching  
after truth1 wo may equally do so by    
remaining in our present state ,the     
reason alleged in the prejudice itself1 
and the only reason which can be        
assigned with any plausibility1 why we  
may commit an offence by embarking in   
any inquiry1 is that we may1 by so      
doing1 miss the right conclusion1 or1 in
 other words1 fall into error--for no   
one would seriously contend that we     
incur any moral culpability by an       
investigation which conducts us to the  
truth4 ,but it is obvious that we may   
equally miss the right conclusion by    
remaining in our actual opinions4 ,it   
is1 then1 incumbent on us to ascertain  
whether we are committing an offence by 
remaining in them--in other words1 it is

 necessary to examine whether those     
opinions are true4 ,thus the reasons    
assigned for not inquiring1 lead to the 
conclusion that it is necessary to      
inquire4  ',the third prejudice is that 
acquiescence in received opinions1 or   
forbearing to think for ourselves1 shows
 a degree of humility highly proper and 
commendable--if closely examined will be
 found usually to evince nothing but a  
great degree of indolent presumption1 or
 intellectual cowardice4 ,there is      
often1 in truth1 as great a measure of  
presumption in this species of          
acquiescence as in the boldest          
hypothesis which human invention can    
start4 ,that received and established   
opinions are true1 is one of those      
sweeping conclusions which would require
 very strong reasons1 and often         
elaborate research1 to justify4 ,on what
 grounds are they considered to be true 
by one who declines investigation8      
,because 7on the most favourable        
supposition7 they have been handed down 

to us by our predecessors1 and have been
 held with unhesitating faith by a      
multitude of illustrious men4 ,but what 
comprehensive reasons are these8 ,what  
investigation would it require to shew  
that they were valid8 ,as the whole     
history of mankind teems with instances 
of the transmission of the grossest     
errors from one generation to another1  
and of their having been countenanced by
 the concurrence of the most eminent of 
our race--how1 without examination1 can 
we show that this particular instance is
 an exception from the general lot8     
',from the necessity of using our own   
judgment1 or1 in other words1 of        
arriving at a conclusion for ourselves1 
we cannot be absolved4 ,far from being a
 virtue1 blind acquiescence in the      
opinions of others is1 in most cases1 a 
positive vice1 tending to stop all      
advancement in knowledge1 and all       
improvement in practice4  ,from the     
preceding it is evident that the        
inquirer may enter on his task with full

 confidence that he is embarking in no  
criminal1 or forbidden1 or presumptuous 
enterprise1 but is1 on the contrary1    
engaging in the discharge of a duty4    
,let him be as circumspect as he pleases
 in collecting his facts and deducing   
his conclusions1 cautious in the        
process1 but fearless in the result4    
,let him be fully aware of his liability
 to error1 of the thousand sources of   
illusions1 of the limited powers of the 
individual1 of the paramount importance 
of truth--but let him dismiss all       
apprehensions of the issue of an        
investigation conducted with due        
application of mind and rectitude of    
purpose4'99       99 ,extracts of       
,summary1 by ,aliquis4 of arguments on  
the ,duty      of ,inquiry1 from the    
',pursuit of ,truth1 and other ,essays1 
by      ,s4 ,bailey1 in ,reasoner ,no4  
#ab4  ,marcus ,antoninus1 indeed1 said  
',i seek after truth1 by which no man   
yet was ever injured4' ,but there is a  
great practical mistake here4 ,there is 

danger in truth---and the admission     
should be plainly made4 ,men1 where     
forewarned1 make the choice more        
manfully4 ,we have been wisely told by  
,emerson1 that the cherished thoughts   
and institutions of mankind are at the  
mercy of a new generalisation--rest1    
commodity1 reputation4 ,inconvenience1  
and suspense1 are the consequences of   
the partizanship of truth4 ,certain     
political truths annihilate the         
interests of whole classes4 ,certain    
social truths war with life-cherished   
prejudices4 ,certain sanitary truths    
reduce the value of all city property4  
,certain scientific truths ruin the     
working classes by thousands4 ,in a     
wiser state of society this could be    
prevented1 but our present business is  
with what is4 ,it is therefore idle to  
conceal the truth--that there is danger 
in truth4 ,pope's dictum1 that party is 
the madness of many for the gain of a   
few1 is inversely true of truth4 ,truth 
is the ultimate benefit of many1 but the

 immediate ruin of the few4 ,here1      
however1 comes to our aid the wise and  
far-seeing aphorism of ,burke--',in all 
exertions of duty there is something to 
be hazarded'--and the brave man and wise
 friend of mankind will risk the fate   
which surely awaits him--the fate of    
,galileo1 ,newton1 ,salomon de ,caus1   
,volta1 ,fulton1 ,winser1 ,arkwright1   
,gall1 and all who present themselves1  
with truth in their hands1 at the door  
of this great bedlam called the         
world--the fate of being received with  
stones and hisses4    ,,chapter ,,xiv4  
,,idols  ,the term ,idol is employed by 
,bacon to designate those prejudices    
which men prefer to truth4 ,a prejudice 
is a bias without a reason for it1 an   
opinion without a foundation1 a judgment
 formed of persons and things without   
sufficient examination1 an assent given 
to a proposition without sufficient     
evidence4 ,the bias may be honourable1  
the opinion correct1 the assent in the  
right direction1 but still of the nature

 of prejudice1 because1 if right1 it is 
right by accident rather than design4   
,ignorance hides from us facts1 and we  
decide partially rather than confess our
 deficiency4 ,ill-directed education    
gives us pre-possessions1 which are     
obstacles in the way of truth1 and we   
continue to cherish what1 having become 
a part of our nature1 it pains us to    
discard4 ,the senses will occasionally  
mislead us and although we are conscious
 that appearances are not to be wholly  
trusted1 we reluctantly doubt our own   
infallibility4 ,from early1 and         
therefore unquestioned1 associations1 we
 have acquired certain habits1 and from 
fashion certain sentiments1 and we      
continue old customs1 and fall into the 
current opinion unconsciously4 ,of these
 sources of prejudice1 logic warns us to
 beware4 ,of so much importance did     
,bacon regard these hindrances to truth1
 that he considered the pursuit of new  
truth hopeless while they were          
cherished4 ,in a mixed vein of poetry   

and philosophy1 he divided prejudices   
into four classes1 which he called      
,idols of the ,tribe1 the ,den1 the     
,market and the ,theatre4 ,idols of the 
,tribe are prejudices men imbibe from   
early training1 and love of hypothesis4 
,they are so called because common to   
the whole race or tribe of mankind4     
,idols of the ,den are those which      
relate to a man's particular character1 
,idols of the ,market are those which   
are accommodated to common notions4     
,idols of the ,theatre denote such as   
pertain to hypothetical systems of      
philosophy4  ,remembering the           
declarations of ,euler and ,gall1 and   
the daily discoveries of science1 we    
should stand1 as it were1 on the verge  
of the old world of experience1 and look
 out on the new world of troth4 ,a young
 thinker should make for himself a chart
 of proposed reforms1 systems1 and      
changes1 agitated in his day--place  ,in
 relative positions in the scale of     
importance such as he deems of value1 if

 true--and then analyse his experience  
to see what is soundly opposed thereto4 
,such a practice would go far to rid men
 of idol-prejudices1 which retard       
private improvement and public progress4
    ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,illustrative      
,,exercises  #a4 ,all men possessed of  
an uncontrolled discretionary power1    
leading to the aggrandisement and profit
 of their own body1 have always abused  
it4'--,burke's ,thoughts on the ,present
 ,discontents4  ,the student will find  
the proof of this proposition exhibited 
in the example of ,induction1 quoted    
from ,mr4 ,bailey1 p4 #fc4  #b4         
,prosperity could never be reached and  
maintained in this country1 without some
 provision for the regular employment of
 the poor4--,mr4 ,beckett's ,speech in  
the ,house of ,commons1 ,feb4 #c1ahdb4  
,the demonstration1 to universal        
conviction1 of this proposition1 would  
lead to an entire and beneficial change 
of the social condition of this country4
  #c4 ,the pen is the tongue of the     

world4--,paine4 ,put this in the        
syllogistic form4  #d4 ,a good instance 
of a metaphorical argument drawn out is 
given by ,mr4 ,mill3--',for instance1   
when ,mr4 ,carlyle1 rebuking the        
,byronic vein1 says that strength does  
not manifest itself in spasms1 but in   
stout bearing of burdens2 the metaphor  
proves nothing1 it is no argument1 only 
an allusion to an argument2 in no other 
way however could so much of argument be
 so completely suggested in so few      
words4 ,the expression suggests a whole 
train of reasoning1 which it would take 
many sentences to write out at length4  
,as thus3 ,motions which are violent but
 brief1 which lead to no end1 and are   
not under the control of the will1 are1 
in the physical body1 more incident to a
 weak than to a strong constitution4 ,if
 this be owing to a cause which equally 
operates in what relates to the mind1   
the same conclusion will told there     
likewise4 ,but such is really the fact4 
,for the body's liability to these      

sudden and uncontrollable motions arises
 from irritability1 that is1 unusual    
susceptibility of being moved out of its
 ordinary course by transient           
influences3 which may equally be said of
 the mind4 ,and this susceptibility1    
whether of mind or body1 must arise from
 a weakness of the forces which maintain
 and carry on the ordinary action of the
 system4 ,all this is conveyed in one   
short sentence4 ,and since the causes   
are alike in the body and in the mind1  
the analogy is a just one1 and the maxim
 holds of the one as much as of the     
other4'99       99 ,logic1 pp4 #dcc-d1  
vol4 #b4  #e4 ,a youth1 named ,evathlus1
 engaged with ,protagoras to learn      
dialectics1 and promised his tutor a    
large sum of money1 in case he gained   
the first cause he pleaded1 ,evathlus1  
when fully instructed1 refused to pay   
his instructor4 ,protagoras brought his 
action thus--',you must pay the money   
however the cause go1 for if ,i gain you
 must pay in consequence of the         

sentence1 as being cast in the cause2   
and if you gain it1 you must pay in     
pursuance of our covenant4' ',nay1'     
,evathlus retorts1 'which way soever the
 cause be decided1 you will have        
nothing1 for if ,i prevail1 the sentence
 gives it that nothing is due3 and if ,i
 lose1 then there is nothing due by the 
covenant4' ,what should be the decision 
in this case8  #f4 ,the first case1 says
 ,cervantes1 requiring ,sancho's        
attention was a question put by a       
stranger1 in presence of the stewards   
and rest of the attendants4 ',my ,lord1'
 said he1 'a certain manor is divided by
 a large river4 ,i beg your honour will 
be attentive1 for the case is of great  
consequence and of some difficulty4 ,i  
say then1 upon this river is a bridge1  
and at one end of it the gibbet1        
together with a sort of court hall1 in  
which four judges usually sit to execute
 the law enacted by the lord of the     
river1 bridge1 and manor1 which runs to 
this effect3 ,whoever shall pass this   

bridge1 must first swear whence he comes
 and whither he goes2 if he swear the   
truth he shall be allowed to pass1 but  
if he forswear himself he shall die upon
 the gallows without mercy or respite4  
,this law1 together with the rigorous   
penalty1 being known1 numbers passed1   
and as it appeared they swore nothing   
but the truth1 the judges permitted them
 to pass freely and without control4 ,it
 happened1 however1 that one man's oath 
being taken1 he affirmed and swore by   
his deposition that he was going to be  
hanged on that gibbet1 and had no other 
errand or intention4 ,the judges1 having
 considered this oath1 observed3 if we  
allow this man to pass freely1 he swore 
to a lie1 and1 therefore1 ought to be   
hanged according to law2 and if we      
ordered him to be hanged after he hath  
sworn he was going to be suspended on   
that gibbet1 he will have sworn the     
truth1 and by the same law he ought to  
be acquitted1 ,i beg1 therefore1 to     
know1 my lord governor and student1 what

 the judges must do with this man8'     
,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,,technical ,,terms4   
,abstract names--the names of           
attributes4--,j4 ,s4 ,mill4             
,abstraction--fixing thought on the     
point of resemblance in one             
body4--drawing off and contemplating    
separately any part of an an object4    
,action--a volition followed by an      
effect4--,j4 ,s4 ,mill4                 
,analogy--resemblance of                
relation4--,whately4  ,analysis--the    
resolution of a complex whole into its  
component elements4 --,j4 ,s4 ,mill4    
,argument--an expression in which1 from 
something laid down as granted1         
something else is deduced--,whately4    
,argumentum ad hominem--appealing to an 
opponent's professed views4  ,a         
priori--reasoning from cause to effect4 
,a posteriori--arguing from effects to  
cause4  ,body--the unknown cause of our 
sensations--,j4 ,s4 ,mill4  ,cause--the 
invariable antecedent1 or thing going   
before4--the stimulus of an effect4     

,conclusion--a proposition proved by    
argument4  ,connotative terms--denote a 
subject1 and imply an attribute4---4    
,j4,s4 ,mill4  ,consciousness--sensation
 of existences4  ,definition--the       
separation of a thing1 as by a boundary1
 from everything else4                  
,discovery--finding out something       
already existing4  ,effect--the         
immediate1 invariable consequent1 or the
 change produced by power4              
,,enthymeme-,an argument with one       
premiss suppressed being understood4    
,experience--events which have taken    
place within a person's own             
knowledge4--,whately4  ,fallacy--an     
apparent argument4  ,general            
,terms--express the notion of partial   
similarity4  ,generalisation--tracing   
certain points of resemblance4--naming  
one respect in which many things agree4 
,induction--universalisation of truth by
 inference from uniform facts4          
,intuition--imaginary                   
looking4--,whewell1  ,logic--a          

scientific use of facts4  ,logical      
,truth--that which admits of            
proof4--,chambers4  ,mind--the unknown  
percipient of sensation4--,j4 ,s4 ,mill4
  ,necessary ,truths--are those in which
 we not only learn that the proposition 
is true1 but see that it must be true2  
in which the negative of the truth is   
not only false1 but impossible2 in which
 we cannot1 even by an effort of the    
imagination1 or in a supposition1       
conceive the reverse of that which is   
asserted4--,dr4 ,whewell3 ,phil4        
,inductive ,sciences1 pp4 #ed-e1 vol4   
#a499  99 ,as 'necessary truths' are    
much talked of ,i have introduced here1 
from ,whewell1 the completest definition
 with which ,i am acquainted4 ,for      
myself1 ,i coincide on this question    
with ,j4 ,s4 ,mill1 as quoted pp4 #bb-c4
  ,non-connotative ,terms--denote a     
subject only and an attribute only4--,j4
 ,s4 ,mill4  ,philosophy--the science of
 realities in opposition to that of mere
 appearances--the attempt to comprehend 

things as they are1 rather than as they 
seem4--,morell4  ,point at issue--the   
real question to be decided4  ,power in 
logic1 is the relation of circumstances 
to each other in time4  ,premises the   
propositions which precede a            
conclusion4--the name of the            
propositions from which a conclusion is 
deduced4  ,principle--an invariable     
rule4  ,proof--sufficient evidence2 the 
balance of probability in favour of a   
proposition4  ,proposition--a sentence  
which affirms or denies                 
something4--,whately4--,an expression in
 words of a judgment4--,j4 ,s4 ,mill1   
,reason--the recognition of facts4--the 
classification of facts4--following in  
the pathway of facts4--the power of     
discerning coherences4--a premiss placed
 after its conclusion4--the minor       
premiss--in the sense of ,reason for    
asserting something4                    
,reasoning--argumentation4--process1 the
 same always4 ,subject--first term of a 
proposition4  ,syllogism--#a4 ,a general

 rule4 #b4 ,a fact contained under that 
rule4 #c4 ,a conclusion that the fact is
 so contained4--an argument stated      
regularly and at full length4--a valid  
argument so stated that its             
conclusiveness is evident from the mere 
form of the expression4  ,technical     
,terms--the tools of art4--,whately4    
,technical ,language--regularly formed1 
defined1 and agreed on set of           
expressions4  ,testimony--second-hand   
experience4 ,direct evidence is that    
which is professedly given4 ,incidental1
 is corroboration casually introduced on
 one subject in the course of an        
evidence delivered on another4          
,theory--is a system of rules intended  
to explain a class of facts4 ,the rules 
should be precise1 and rest on a        
rigorous induction of facts or          
probabilities4  ,tradition--the relation
 of a circumstance1 not committed to    
writing by any person who observed it1  
but communicated orally from one to     
another for a long period of time4