,libraries7 ,,lectures ,,on ,,the ,,true1 ,,the ,,beautiful ,,and ,,the ,,good4 ,,by ,m4 ,v4 ,,cousin4 ,,increased ,,by ,an ,appendix on ,french ,art4 ,,translated1 ,,with ,,the ,,approbation ,,of ,m4 ,,cousin1 ,,by ,o4 ,w4 ,,wight1 ,,translator ,,of ,,cousin',s ,,course ,,of ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,modern ,,philosophy1 ,,american ,,editor ,,of ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,sir ,,william ,,hamilton1 ,,bart41 ,,author ,,of ,,the ,,romance ,,of ,,abelard ,,and ,,heloise1 ,,etc41 ,,etc4 ,god is the life of the soul1 as the soul is the life of the body4 ,,the ,,platonists ,,and ,,the ,,fathers4 ,,new ,,york3 ,d4 ,,appleton ,,and ,,company1 #edi #eea ,,broadway4 #ahgb4 ,entered1 according to ,act of ,congress1 in the year #ahed1 ,,by ,d4 ,,appleton ,,co41 ,in the ,clerk's ,office of the ,district ,court of the ,united ,states for the ,southern ,district of ,new ,york4 ,,to ,,sir ,,william ,,hamilton1 ,,bart41 ,professor of ,logic and ,metaphysics in the ,university of ,edinburgh3 ,,who ,,has ,,clearly ,,elucidated1 ,,and1 ,,with ,,great ,,erudition1 ,,sketched ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,common ,,sense2 ,,who1 ,,following ,,in ,,the ,,footsteps ,,of ,,his ,,illustrious ,,countryman1 ,,reid ,,has ,,established ,,the ,,doctrine ,,of ,,the ,,immediateness ,,of ,,perception1 ,,thereby ,,fortifying ,,philosophy ,,against ,,the ,,assaults ,,of ,,skepticism2 ,,who1 ,,taking ,a ,,step ,,in ,,advance ,,of ,,all ,,others1 ,,has ,,given ,,to ,,the ,,world ,a ,,doctrine ,,of ,,the ,,conditioned1 ,,the ,,originality ,,and ,,importance ,,of ,,which ,,are ,,acknowledged ,,by ,,the ,,few ,,qualified ,,to ,,judge ,,in ,,such ,,matters2 ,,whose ,,new ,,analytic ,,of ,,logical ,,forms ,,completes ,,the ,,hitherto ,,unfinished ,,works ,,of ,,aristotle2 ,,this ,,translation ,,of ,m4 ,,cousin',s ,lectures on the ,true1 the ,beautiful1 and the ,good1 ,,is ,,respectfully ,,dedicated1 ,,in ,,admiration ,,of ,a ,,profound ,,and ,,independent ,,thinker1 ,,of ,,an ,,incomparable ,,master ,,of ,,philosophic ,,criticism2 ,,as ,a ,,token ,,of ,,esteem ,,for ,a ,,man ,,in ,,whom ,,genius ,,and ,,almost ,,unequalled ,,learning ,,have ,,been ,,adorned ,,by ,,truth1 ,,beauty1 ,,and ,,goodness ,,of ,,life4 ,,author',s ,,preface4 ,for some time past we have been asked1 on various sides1 to collect in a body of doctrine the theories scattered in our different works1 and to sum up1 in just proportions1 what men are pleased to call our philosophy4 ,this resume was wholly made4 ,we had only to take again the lectures already quite old1 but little known1 because they belonged to a time when the courses of the ,faculte des ,lettres had scarcely any influence beyond the ,quartier ,latin1 and1 also1 because they could be found only in a considerable collection1 comprising all our first instruction1 from #ahae to #ahba4a ,these lectures were there1 as it were1 lost in the crowd4 ,we have drawn them hence1 and give them apart1 severely corrected1 in the hope that they will thus be accessible to a greater number of readers1 and that their true character will the better appear4 ,the eighteen lectures that compose this volume have in fact the particular trait that1 if the history of philosophy furnishes their frame-work1 philosophy itself occupies in them the first place1 and that1 instead of researches of erudition and criticism1 they present a regular exposition of the doctrine which was at first fixed in our mind1 which has not ceased to preside over our labors4 ,this book1 then1 contains the abridged but exact expression of our convictions on the fundamental points of philosophic science4 ,in it will be openly seen the method that is the soul of our enterprise1 our principles1 our processes1 our results4 ,under these three heads1 the ,true1 the ,beautiful1 the ,good1 we embrace psychology1 placed by us at the head of all philosophy1 aesthetics1 ethics1 natural right1 even public right to a certain extent1 finally theodicea1 that perilous rendez-vous of all systems1 where different principles are condemned or justified by their consequences4 ,it is the affair of our book to plead its own cause4 ,we only desire that it may be appreciated and judged according to what it really is1 and not according to an opinion too much accredited4 ,eclecticism is persistently represented as the doctrine to which men deign to attach our name4 ,we declare that eclecticism is very dear to us1 for it is in our eyes the light of the history of philosophy2 but the source of that light is elsewhere4 ,eclecticism is one of the most important and most useful applications of the philosophy which we teach1 but it is not its principle4 ,our true doctrine1 our true flag is spiritualism1 that philosophy as solid as generous1 which began with ,socrates and ,plato1 which the ,gospel has spread abroad in the world1 which ,descartes put under the severe forms of modern genius1 which in the seventeenth century was one of the glories and forces of our country1 which perished with the national grandeur in the eighteenth century1 which at the commencement of the present century ,m4 ,royer-,collard came to re-establish in public instruction1 whilst ,m4 de ,chateaubriand1 ,madame de ,stael1 and ,m4 ,quatremere de ,quincy transferred it into literature and the arts4 ,to it is rightly given the name of spiritualism1 because its character in fact is that of subordinating the senses to the spirit1 and tending1 by all the means that reason acknowledges1 to elevate and ennoble man4 ,it teaches the spirituality of the soul1 the liberty and responsibility of human actions1 moral obligation1 disinterested virtue1 the dignity of justice1 the beauty of charity2 and beyond the limits of this world it shows a ,god1 author and type of humanity1 who1 after having evidently made man for an excellent end1 will not abandon him in the mysterious development of his destiny4 ,this philosophy is the natural ally of all good causes4 ,it sustains religious sentiment2 it seconds true art1 poesy worthy of the name1 and a great literature2 it is the support of right2 it equally repels the craft of the demagogue and tyranny2 it teaches all men to respect and value themselves1 and1 little by little1 it conducts human societies to the true republic1 that dream of all generous souls which in our times can be realized in ,europe only by constitutional monarchy4 ,to aid1 with all our power1 in setting up1 defending1 and propagating this noble philosophy1 such is the object that early inspired us1 that has sustained during a career already lengthy1 in which difficulties have not been wanting4 ,thank ,god1 time has rather strengthened than weakened our convictions1 and we end as we began3 this new edition of one of our first works is a last effort in favor of the holy cause for which we have combated nearly forty years4 ,may our voice be heard by new generations as it was by the serious youth of the ,restoration6 ,yes1 it is particularly to you that we address this work1 young men whom we no longer know1 but whom we bear in our heart1 because you are the seed and the hope of the future4 ,we have shown you the principle of our evils and their remedy4 ,if you love liberty and your country1 shun what has destroyed them4 ,far from you be that sad philosophy which preaches to you materialism and atheism as new doctrines destined to regenerate the world3 they kill1 it is true1 but they do not regenerate4 ,do not listen to those superficial spirits who give themselves out as profound thinkers1 because after ,voltaire they have discovered difficulties in ,christianity3 measure your progress in philosophy by your progress in tender veneration for the religion of the ,gospel4 ,be well persuaded that1 in ,france1 democracy will always traverse liberty1 that it brings all right into disorder1 and through disorder into dictatorship4 ,ask1 then1 only a moderated liberty1 and attach yourself to that with all the powers of your soul4 ,do not bend the knee to fortune1 but accustom yourselves to bow to law4 ,entertain the noble sentiment of respect4 ,know how to admire1--possess the worship of great men and great things4 ,reject that enervating literature1 by turns gross and refined1 which delights in painting the miseries of human nature1 which caresses all our weaknesses1 which pays court to the senses and the imagination1 instead of speaking to the soul and awakening thought4 ,guard yourselves against the malady of our century1 that fatal taste of an accommodating life1 incompatible with all generous ambition4 ,whatever career you embrace1 propose to yourselves an elevated aim1 and put in its service an unalterable constancy4 ,sursum corda1 value highly your heart1 wherein is seen all philosophy1 that which we have retained from all our studies1 which we have taught to your predecessors1 which we leave to you as our last word1 our final lecture4 ,v4 ,,cousin4 ,june #ae1 #ahec4 99 99 99 99 99 ,a too indulgent public having promptly rendered necessary a new edition of this book1 we are forced to render it less unworthy of the suffrages which it has obtained1 by reviewing it with severe attention1 by introducing a mass of corrections in detail1 and a considerable number of additions1 among which the only ones that need be indicated here are some pages on ,christianity at the end of ,lecture ,,xvi41 and the notes placed as an ,appendix#b at the end of the volume1 on various works of ,french masters which we have quite recently seen in ,england1 which have confirmed and increased our old admiration for our national art of the seventeenth century4 ,november #a1 #ahec4 ,,footnotes3 #a #ast ,series of our work1 ,cours de l',histoire de la ,philosophie ,moderne1 five volumes4 #b ,the ,appendix has been translated by ,mr4 ,n4 ,e4 ,s4 ,a4 ,hamilton of the ,british ,museum1 who is alone entitled to credit and alone responsible4--,,tr4 ,,translator',s ,,preface4 ,the nature of this publication is sufficiently explained in the preface of ,m4 ,cousin4 ,we have attempted to render his book1 without comment1 faithfully into ,english4 ,not only have we endeavored to give his thought without increase or diminution1 but have also tried to preserve the main characteristics of his style4 ,on the one hand1 we have carefully shunned idioms peculiar to the ,french2 on the other1 when permitted by the laws of structure common to both languages1 we have followed the general order of sentences1 even the succession of words4 ,it has been our aim to make this work wholly ,cousin's in substance1 and in form as nearly his as possible1 with a total change of dress4 ,that1 however1 we may have nowhere missed a shade of meaning1 nowhere introduced a gallicism1 is too much to be hoped for1 too much to be demanded4 ,m4 ,cousin1 in his ,philosophical ,discussions1 defines the terms that he uses4 ,in the translation of these we have maintained uniformity1 so that in this regard no farther explanation is necessary4 ,this is1 perhaps1 in a philosophical point of view1 the most important of all ,m4 ,cousin's works1 for it contains a complete summary and lucid exposition of the various parts of his system4 ,it is now the last word of ,european philosophy1 and merits serious and thoughtful attention4 ,this and many more like it1 are needed in these times1 when noisy and pretentious demagogues are speaking of metaphysics with idiotic laughter1 when utilitarian statesmen are sneering at philosophy1 when undisciplined sectarians of every kind are decrying it2 when1 too1 earnest men1 in state and church1 men on whose shoulders the social world really rests1 are invoking philosophy1 not only as the best instrument of the highest culture and the severest mental discipline1 but also as the best human means of guiding politics towards the eternally true and the eternally just1 of preserving theology from the aberrations of a zeal without knowledge1 and from the perversion of the interested and the cunning2 when many an artist1 who feels the nobility of his calling1 who would address the mind of man rather than his senses1 is asking a generous philosophy to explain to him that ravishing and torturing ,ideal which is ever eluding his grasp1 which often discourages unless understood2 when1 above all1 devout and tender souls are learning to prize philosophy1 since1 in harmony with ,revelation1 it strengthens their belief in ,god1 freedom1 immortality4 ,grateful to an indulgent public1 on both sides of the ocean1 for a kindly and very favorable reception of our version of ,m4 ,cousin's ,course of the ,history of ,modern ,philosophy1 we add this translation of his ,lectures on the ,true1 the ,beautiful1 and the ,good1 hoping that his explanation of human nature will aid some in solving the grave problem of life1--for there are always those1 and the most gifted1 too1 who feel the need of understanding themselves1--believing that his eloquence1 his elevated sentiment1 and elevated thought1 will afford gratification to a refined taste1 a chaste imagination1 and a disciplined mind4 ,o4 ,w4 ,,wight4 ,,london1 ,dec4 #ba1 #ahec ,,advertisement4 ,the ,publishers have to express their thanks to ,m4 ,,cousin for his cordial concurrence1 and especially for his kindness in transmitting the sheets of the ,french original as printed1 so that this translation appears almost simultaneously with it4 ,,edinburgh1 #ch ,,george-,,street1 ,dec4 #bf1 #ahec4 ,,the ,,stem4 ,,contents4 ,,author',s ,,preface ,page #g ,,translator',s ,,preface #ae ,,discourse ,,pronounced ,,at ,,the ,,opening ,,of ,,the ,,course4--,,philosophy ,,of ,,the ,,nineteenth ,,century #be ,spirit and general principles of the ,course4--,object of the ,lectures of this year3--application of the principles of which an exposition is given1 to the three ,problems of the ,true1 the ,beautiful1 and the ,good4 ,,part ,,first4--,,the ,,true4 ,,lecture ,i4--,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,universal ,,and ,,necessary ,,principles #ci ,two great wants1 that of absolute truths1 and that of absolute truths that may not be chimeras4 ,to satisfy these two wants is the problem of the philosophy of our time4--,universal and necessary principles4--,examples of different kinds of such principles4--,distinction between universal and necessary principles and general principles4--,experience alone is incapable of explaining universal and necessary principles1 and also incapable of dispensing with them in order to arrive at the knowledge of the sensible world4--,reason as being that faculty of ours which discovers to us these principles4--,the study of universal and necessary principles introduces us to the highest parts of philosophy4 ,,lecture ,,ii4--,,origin ,,of ,,universal ,,and ,,necessary ,,principles #ea ,resume of the preceding ,lecture4 ,a new question1 that of the origin of universal and necessary principles4--,danger of this question1 and its necessity4--,different forms under which truth presents itself to us1 and the successive order of these forms3 theory of spontaneity and reflection4--,the primitive form of principles2 abstraction that disengages them from that form1 and gives them their actual form4--,examination and refutation of the theory that attempts to explain the origin of principles by an induction founded on particular notions4 ,,lecture ,,iii4--,,on ,,the ,,value ,,of ,,universal ,,and ,,necessary ,,principles #fe ,examination and refutation of ,kant's skepticism4--,recurrence to the theory of spontaneity and reflection4 ,,lecture ,,iv4--,,god ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,principles #ge ,object of the lecture3 ,what is the ultimate basis of absolute truth8--,four hypotheses3 ,absolute truth may reside either in us1 in particular beings and the world1 in itself1 or in ,god4 #a4 ,we perceive absolute truth1 we do not constitute it4 #b4 ,particular beings participate in absolute truth1 but do not explain it2 refutation of ,aristotle4 #c4 ,truth does not exist in itself2 defence of ,plato4 #d4 ,truth resides in ,god4--,plato2 ,st4 ,augustine2 ,descartes2 ,malebranche2 ,fenelon2 ,bossuet2 ,leibnitz4--,truth the mediator between ,god and man4--,essential distinctions4 ,,lecture ,v4--,,on ,,mysticism #ajb ,distinction between the philosophy that we profess and mysticism4 ,mysticism consists in pretending to know ,god without an intermediary4--,two sorts of mysticism4--,mysticism of sentiment4 ,theory of sensibility4 ,two sensibilities--the one external1 the other internal1 and corresponding to the soul as external sensibility corresponds to nature4--,legitimate part of sentiment4--,its aberrations4--,philosophical mysticism4 ,plotinus3 ,god1 or absolute unity1 perceived without an intermediary by pure thought4--,ecstasy4--,mixture of superstition and abstraction in mysticism4--,conclusion of the first part of the course4 ,,part ,,second4--,,the ,,beautiful4 ,,lecture ,,vi4--,,the ,,beautiful ,,in ,,the ,,mind ,,of ,,man #abc ,the method that must govern researches on the beautiful and art is1 as in the investigation of the true1 to commence by psychology4--,faculties of the soul that unite in the perception of the beautiful4--,the senses give only the agreeable2 reason alone gives the idea of the beautiful4--,refutation of empiricism1 that confounds the agreeable and the beautiful4--,pre-eminence of reason4--,sentiment of the beautiful2 different from sensation and desire4--,distinction between the sentiment of the beautiful and that of the sublime4--,imagination4--,influence of sentiment on imagination4--,influence of imagination on sentiment4--,theory of taste4 ,,lecture ,,vii4--,,the ,,beautiful ,,in ,,objects #adj ,refutation of different theories on the nature of the beautiful3 the beautiful cannot be reduced to what is useful4--,nor to convenience4--,nor to proportion4--,essential characters of the beautiful4--,different kinds of beauties4 ,the beautiful and the sublime4 ,physical beauty4 ,intellectual beauty4 ,moral beauty4--,ideal beauty3 it is especially moral beauty4--,god1 the first principle of the beautiful4--,theory of ,plato4 ,,lecture ,,viii4--,,on ,,art #aed ,genius3--its attribute is creative power4--,refutation of the opinion that art is the imitation of nature--,m4 ,emeric ,david1 and ,m4 ,quatremere de ,quincy4--,refutation of the theory of illusion4 ,that dramatic art has not solely for its end to excite the passions of terror and pity4--,nor even directly the moral and religious sentiment4--,the proper and direct object of art is to produce the idea and the sentiment of the beautiful2 this idea and this sentiment purify and elevate the soul by the affinity between the beautiful and the good1 and by the relation of ideal beauty to its principle1 which is ,god4--,true mission of art4 ,,lecture ,,ix4--,,the ,,different ,,arts #afe ,expression is the general law of art4--,division of arts4--,distinction between liberal arts and trades4--,eloquence itself1 philosophy1 and history do not make a part of the fine arts4--,that the arts gain nothing by encroaching upon each other1 and usurping each other's means and processes4--,classification of the arts3--its true principle is expression4--,comparison of arts with each other4--,poetry the first of arts4 ,,lecture ,x4--,,french ,,art ,,in ,,the ,,seventeenth ,,century #agh ,expression not only serves to appreciate the different arts1 but the different schools of art4 ,example3--,french art in the seventeenth century4 ,french poetry3--,corneille4 ,racine4 ,moliere4 ,la ,fontaine4 ,boileau4--,painting3--,lesueur4 ,poussin4 ,le ,lorrain4 ,champagne4--,engraving4--,sculpture3--, sarrazin4 ,the ,anguiers4 ,girardon4 ,pujet4--,le ,notre4--,architecture4 ,,part ,,third4--,,the ,,good4 ,,lecture ,,xi4--,,primary ,,notions ,,of ,,common ,,sense #bae ,extent of the question of the good4--,position of the question according to the psychological method3 ,what is1 in regard to the good1 the natural belief of mankind8--,the natural beliefs of humanity must not be sought in a pretended state of nature4-- ,study of the sentiments and ideas of men in languages1 in life1 in consciousness4--,disinterestedness and devotedness4--,liberty4-- ,esteem and contempt4--,respect4--,admiration and indignation4-- ,dignity4--,empire of opinion4--,ridicule4--,regret and repentance4-- ,natural and necessary foundations of all justice4--,distinction between fact and right4--,common sense1 true and false philosophy4 ,,lecture ,,xii4--,,the ,,ethics ,,of ,,interest #bbi ,exposition of the doctrine of interest4--,what there is of truth in this doctrine4--,its defects4 #ast4 ,it confounds liberty and desire1 and thereby abolishes liberty4 #b;d4 ,it cannot explain the fundamental distinction between good and evil4 #c;d4 ,it cannot explain obligation and duty4 #dth4 ,nor right4 #eth4 ,nor the principle of merit and demerit4--,consequences of the ethics of interest3 that they cannot admit a providence1 and lead to despotism4 ,,lecture ,,xiii4--,,other ,,defective ,,principles #bee ,the ethics of sentiment4--,the ethics founded on the principle of the interest of the greatest number4--,the ethics founded on the will of ,god alone4--,the ethics founded on the punishments and rewards of another life4 ,,lecture ,,xiv4--,,true ,,principles ,,of ,,ethics #bgd ,description of the different facts that compose the moral phenomena4--,analysis of each of these facts3--#ast1 ,judgment and idea of the good4 ,that this judgment is absolute4 ,relation between the true and the good4--#b;d1 ,obligation4 ,refutation of the doctrine of ,kant that draws the idea of the good from obligation instead of founding obligation on the idea of the good4--#c;d1 ,liberty1 and the moral notions attached to the notion of liberty4--#dth1 ,principle of merit and demerit4 ,punishments and rewards4--#eth1 ,moral sentiments4--,harmony of all these facts in nature and science4 ,,lecture ,,xv4--,,private ,,and ,,public ,,ethics #cja ,application of the preceding principles4--,general formula of interest1--to obey reason4--,rule for judging whether an action is or is not conformed to reason1--to elevate the motive of this action into a maxim of universal legislation4--,individual ethics4 ,it is not towards the individual1 but towards the moral person that one is obligated4 ,principle of all individual duties1--to respect and develop the moral person4--,social ethics1--duties of justice and duties of charity4--,civil society4 ,government4 ,law4 ,the right to punish4 ,,lecture ,,xvi4--,,god ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,the ,,good #cbe ,principle on which true theodicea rests4 ,god the last foundation of moral truth1 of the good1 and of the moral person4--,liberty of ,god4--,the divine justice and charity4--,god the sanction of the moral law4 ,immortality of the soul2 argument from merit and demerit2 argument from the simplicity of the soul2 argument from final causes4--,religious sentiment4--,adoration4--,worship4--,mor al beauty of ,christianity4 ,,lecture ,,xvii4--,,resume ,,of ,,doctrine #cdf ,review of the doctrine contained in these lectures1 and the three orders of facts on which this doctrine rests1 with the relation of each one of them to the modern school that has recognized and developed it1 but almost always exaggerated it4--,experience and empiricism4--,reason and idealism4--,sentiment and mysticism4--,theodicea4 ,defects of different known systems4--,the process that conducts to true theodicea1 and the character of certainty and reality that this process gives to it4 ,,appendix #cga ,,lectures ,,on ,,the ,,true1 ,,the ,,beautiful1 ,,and ,,the ,,good4 ,,discourse ,,pronounced ,,at ,,the ,,opening ,,of ,,the ,,course1 ,,december #d1 #ahag4 ,,philosophy ,,in ,,the ,,nineteenth ,,century4 ,spirit and general principles of the ,course4--,object of the ,lectures of this year3--application of the principles of which an exposition is given1 to the three ,problems of the ,true1 the ,beautiful1 and the ,good4 ,it seems natural that a century1 in its beginning1 should borrow its philosophy from the century that preceded it4 ,but1 as free and intelligent beings1 we are not born merely to continue our predecessors1 but to increase their work1 and also to do our own4 ,we cannot accept from them an inheritance except under the condition of improving it4 ,our first duty is1 then1 to render to ourselves an account of the philosophy of the eighteenth century2 to recognize its character and its principles1 the problems which it agitated1 and the solutions which it gave of them2 to discern1 in fine1 what it transmits to us of the true and the productive1 and what it also leaves of the sterile and the false1 in order that1 with reflective choice1 we may embrace the former and reject the latter4#c ,placed at the entrance of the new times1 let us know1 first of all1 with what views we would occupy ourselves4 ,moreover1--why should ,i not say it8--after two years of instruction1 in which the professor1 in some sort1 has been investigating himself1 one has a right to demand of him what he is2 what are his most general principles on all the essential parts of philosophic science2 what flag1 in fine1 in the midst of parties which contend with each other so violently1 he proposes for you1 young men1 who frequent this auditory1 and who are called upon to participate in a destiny still so uncertain and so obscure in the nineteenth century1 to follow4 99 99 99 99 99 ,it is not patriotism1 it is a profound sentiment of truth and justice1 which makes us place the whole philosophy now expanded in the world under the invocation of the name of ,descartes4 ,yes1 the whole of modern philosophy is the work of this great man1 for it owes to him the spirit that animates it1 and the method that constitutes its power4 ,after the downfall of scholasticism and the mournful disruptures of the sixteenth century1 the first object which the bold good sense of ,descartes proposed to itself was to make philosophy a human science1 like astronomy1 physiology1 medicine1 subject to the same uncertainties and to the same aberrations1 but capable also of the same progress4 ,descartes encountered the skepticism spread on every side in the train of so many revolutions1 ambitious hypotheses1 born out of the first use of an ill-regulated liberty1 and the old formulas surviving the ruins of scholasticism4 ,in his courageous passion for truth1 he resolved to reject1 provisorily at least1 all the ideas that hitherto he had received without controlling them1 firmly decided not to admit any but those which1 after a serious examination1 might appear to him evident4 ,but he perceived that there was one thing which he could not reject1 even provisorily1 in his universal doubt1--that thing was the existence itself of his doubt1 that is to say1 of his thought2 for although all the rest might be only an illusion1 this fact1 that he thought1 could not be an illusion4 ,descartes1 therefore1 stopped at this fact1 of an irresistible evidence1 as at the first truth which he could accept without fear4 ,recognizing at the same time that thought is the necessary instrument of all the investigations which he might propose to himself1 as well as the instrument of the human race in the acquisition of its natural knowledges1#d he devoted himself to a regular study of it1 to the analysis of thought as the condition of all legitimate philosophy1 and upon this solid foundation he reared a doctrine of a character at once certain and living1 capable of resisting skepticism1 exempt from hypotheses1 and affranchised from the formulas of the schools4 ,thus the analysis of thought1 and of the mind which is the subject of it1 that is to say1 psychology1 has become the point of departure1 the most general principle1 the important method of modern philosophy4#e ,nevertheless1 it must indeed be owned1 philosophy has not entirely lost1 and sometimes still retains1 since ,descartes and in ,descartes himself1 its old habits4 ,it rarely belongs to the same man to open and run a career1 and usually the inventor succumbs under the weight of his own invention4 ,so ,descartes1 after having so well placed the point of departure for all philosophical investigation1 more than once forgets analysis1 and returns1 at least in form1 to the ancient philosophy4#f ,the true method1 again1 is more than once effaced in the hands of his first successors1 under the always increasing influence of the mathematical method4 ,two periods may be distinguished in the ,cartesian era1--one in which the method1 in its newness1 is often misconceived2 the other1 in which one is forced1 at least1 to re-enter the salutary way opened by ,descartes4 ,to the first belong ,malebranche1 ,spinoza1 ,leibnitz himself2 to the second1 the philosophers of the eighteenth century4 ,without doubt ,malebranche1 upon some points1 descended very far into interior investigation2 but most of the time he gave himself up to wander in an imaginary world1 and lost sight of the real world4 ,it is not a method that is wanting to ,spinoza1 but a good method2 his error consists in having applied to philosophy the geometrical method1 which proceeds by axioms1 definitions1 theorems1 corollaries2 no one has made less use of the psychological method2 that is the principle and the condemnation of his system4 ,the ,nouveaux ,essais sur l',entendement ,humain exhibit ,leibnitz opposing observation to observation1 analysis to analysis2 but his genius usually hovers over science1 instead of advancing in it step by step2 hence the results at which he arrives are often only brilliant hypotheses1 for example1 the pre-established harmony1 now relegated among the analogous hypotheses of occasional causes and a plastic mediator4 ,in general1 the philosophy of the seventeenth century1 by not employing with sufficient rigor and firmness the method with which ,descartes had armed it1 produced little else than systems1 ingenious without doubt1 bold and profound1 but often also rash1--systems that have failed to keep their place in science4#g ,in fact1 nothing is durable except that which is founded upon a sound method2 time destroys all the rest2 time1 which re-collects1 fecundates1 aggrandizes the least germs of truth deposited in the humblest analyses1 strikes without pity1 engulfs hypotheses1 even those of genius4 ,time takes a step1 and arbitrary systems are overturned2 the statues of their authors alone remain standing over their ruins4 ,the task of the friend of truth is to search for the useful remains of them1 that survive and can serve for new and more solid constructions4 ,the philosophy of the eighteenth century opens the second period of the ,cartesian era2 it proposed to itself to apply the method already discovered and too much neglected1--it applied itself to the analysis of thought4 ,disabused of ambitious and sterile attempts1 and1 like ,descartes1 disdainful of the past1 the eighteenth century dared to think that every thing in philosophy was to be done over again1 and that1 in order not to wander anew1 it was necessary to set out with the modest study of man4 ,instead1 therefore1 of building up all at once systems risked upon the universality of things1 it undertook to examine what man knows1 what he can know2 it brought back entire philosophy to the study of our faculties1 as physics had just been brought back to the study of the properties of bodies1--which was giving to philosophy1 if not its end1 at least its true beginning4 ,the great schools which divide the eighteenth century are the ,english and ,french school1 the ,scotch school1 and the ,german school1 that is to say1 the school of ,locke and ,condillac1 that of ,reid1 that of ,kant4 ,it is impossible to misconceive the common principle which animates them1 the unity of their method4 ,when one examines with impartiality the method of ,locke1 he sees that it consists in the analysis of thought2 and it is thereby that ,locke is a disciple1 not of ,bacon and ,hobbes1 but of our great countryman1 ,descartes4#h ,to study the human understanding as it is in each one of us1 to recognize its powers1 and also its limits1 is the problem which the ,english philosopher proposed to himself1 and which he attempted to solve4 ,i do not wish to judge here of the solution which he gave of this problem2 ,i limit myself to indicating clearly what was for him the fundamental problem4 ,condillac1 the ,french disciple of ,locke1 made himself everywhere the apostle of analysis2 and analysis was also in him1 or at least should have been1 the study of thought4 ,no philosopher1 not even ,spinoza1 has wandered farther than ,condillac#i from the true experimental method1 and has strayed farther on the route of abstractions1 even verbal abstractions2 but1 strange enough1 no one is severer than he against hypotheses1 save that of the statue-man4 ,the author of the ,traite des ,sensations has very unfaithfully practised analysis2 but he speaks of it without cessation4 ,the ,scotch school combats ,locke and ,condillac2 it combats them1 but with their own arms1 with the same method which it pretends to apply better4#aj ,in ,germany1 ,kant wishes to replace in light and honor the superior element of human consciousness1 left in the shade1 and decried by the philosophy of his times2 and for that end1 what does he do8 ,he undertakes a profound examination of the faculty of knowing2 the title of his principal work is1 ,critique of ,pure ,reason2#aa it is a critique1 that is to say again1 an analysis2 the method of ,kant is then no other than that of ,locke and ,reid4 ,follow it until it reaches the hands of ,fichte1#ab the successor of ,kant1 who died but a few years since2 there1 again1 the analysis of thought is given as the foundation of philosophy4 ,kant was so firmly established in the subject of knowledge1 that he could scarcely go out of it--that1 in fact1 he never did legitimately go out of it4 ,fichte plunged into the subject of knowledge so deeply that he buried himself in it1 and absorbed in the human me all existences1 as well as all sciences--sad shipwreck of analysis1 which signalizes at once its greatest effort and its rock6 ,the same spirit1 therefore1 governs all the schools of the eighteenth century2 this century disdains arbitrary formulas2 it has a horror for hypotheses1 and attaches itself1 or pretends to attach itself1 to the observation of facts1 and particularly to the analysis of thought4 ,let us acknowledge with freedom and with grief1 that the eighteenth century applied analysis to all things without pity and without measure4 ,it cited before its tribunal all doctrines1 all sciences2 neither the metaphysics of the preceding age1 with their imposing systems1 nor the arts with their prestige1 nor the governments with their ancient authority1 nor the religions with their majesty1--nothing found favor before it4 ,although it spied abysses at the bottom of what it called philosophy1 it threw itself into them with a courage which is not without grandeur2 for the grandeur of man is to prefer what he believes to be truth to himself4 ,the eighteenth century let loose tempests4 ,humanity no more progressed1 except over ruins4 ,the world was again agitated in that state of disorder in which it had already been once seen1 at the decline of the ancient beliefs1 and before the triumphs of ,christianity1 when men wandered through all contraries1 without power to rest anywhere1 given up to every disquietude of spirit1 to every misery of heart1 fanatical and atheistical1 mystical and incredulous1 voluptuous and sanguinary4#ac ,but if the philosophy of the eighteenth century has left us a vacuity for an inheritance1 it has also left us an energetic and fecund love of truth4 ,the eighteenth century was the age of criticism and destructions2 the nineteenth should be that of intelligent rehabilitations4 ,it belongs to it to find in a profounder analysis of thought the principles of the future1 and with so many remains to raise1 in fine1 an edifice that reason may be able to acknowledge4 ,a feeble but zealous workman1 ,i come to bring my stone2 ,i come to do my work2 ,i come to extract from the midst of the ruins what has not perished1 what cannot perish4 ,this course is at once a return to the past1 an effort towards the future4 ,i propose neither to attack nor to defend any of the three great schools that divide the eighteenth century4 ,i will not attempt to perpetuate and envenom the warfare which divides them1 complacently designating the differences which separate them1 without taking an account of the community of method which unites them4 ,i come1 on the contrary1 a devoted soldier of philosophy1 a common friend of all the schools which it has produced1 to offer to all the words of peace4 ,the unity of modern philosophy1 as we have said1 resides in its method1 that is to say1 in the analysis of thought--a method superior to its own results1 for it contains in itself the means of repairing the errors that escape it1 of indefinitely adding new riches to riches already acquired4 ,the physical sciences themselves have no other unity4 ,the great physicians who have appeared within two centuries1 although united amongst themselves by the same point of departure and by the same end1 generally accepted1 have nevertheless proceeded with independence and in ways often opposite4 ,time has re-collected in their different theories the part of truth that produced them and sustained them2 it has neglected their errors from which they were unable to extricate themselves1 and uniting all the discoveries worthy of the name1 it has little by little formed of them a vast and harmonious whole4 ,modern philosophy has also been enriched during the two centuries with a multitude of exact observations1 of solid and profound theories1 for which it is indebted to the common method4 ,what has hindered her from progressing at an equal pace with the physical sciences whose sister she is8 ,she has been hindered by not understanding better her own interests1 by not tolerating diversities that are inevitable1 that are even useful1 and by not profiting by the truths which all the particular doctrines contain1 in order to deduce from them a general doctrine1 which is successively and perpetually purified and aggrandized4 ,not1 indeed1 that ,i would recommend that blind syncretism which destroyed the school of ,alexandria1 which attempted to bring contrary systems together by force2 what ,i recommend is an enlightened eclecticism1 which1 judging with equity1 and even with benevolence1 all schools1 borrows from them what they possess of the true1 and neglects what in them is false4 ,since the spirit of party has hitherto succeeded so ill with us1 let us try the spirit of conciliation4 ,human thought is immense4 ,each school has looked at it only from its own point of view4 ,this point of view is not false1 but it is incomplete1 and moreover1 it is exclusive4 ,it expresses but one side of truth1 and rejects all the others4 ,the question is not to decry and recommence the work of our predecessors1 but to perfect it in reuniting1 and in fortifying by that reunion1 all the truths scattered in the different systems which the eighteenth century has transmitted to us4 ,such is the principle to which we have been conducted by two years of study upon modern philosophy1 from ,descartes to our times4 ,this principle1 badly disengaged at first1 we applied for the first time within the narrowest limits1 and only to theories relative to the question of personal existence4#ad ,we then extended it to a greater number of questions and theories2 we touched the principal points of the intellectual and moral order1#ae and at the same time that we were continuing the investigations of our illustrious predecessor1 ,m4 ,royer-,collard1 upon the schools of ,france1 ,england1 and ,scotland1 we commenced the study new among us1 the difficult but interesting and fecund study1 of the philosophy of ,koenigsberg4 ,we can at the present time1 therefore1 embrace all the schools of the eighteenth century1 and all the problems which they agitated4 ,philosophy1 in all times1 turns upon the fundamental ideas of the true1 the beautiful1 and the good4 ,the idea of the true1 philosophically developed1 is psychology1 logic1 metaphysic2 the idea of the good is private and public morals2 the idea of the beautiful is that science which1 in ,germany1 is called aesthetics1 the details of which pertain to the criticism of literature1 the criticism of arts1 but whose general principles have always occupied a more or less considerable place in the researches1 and even in the teaching of philosophers1 from ,plato and ,aristotle to ,hutcheson and ,kant4 ,upon these essential points which constitute the entire domain of philosophy1 we will successively interrogate the principal schools of the eighteenth century4 ,when we examine them all with attention1 we can easily reduce them to two1--one of which1 in the analysis of thought1 the common subject of all their works1 gives to sensation an excessive part2 the other of which1 in this same analysis1 going to the opposite extreme1 deduces consciousness almost wholly from a faculty different from that of sensation--reason4 ,the first of these schools is the empirical school1 of which the father1 or rather the wisest representative1 is ,locke1 and ,condillac the extreme representative2 the second is the spiritualistic or rationalistic school1 as it is called1 which reckons among its illustrious interpreters ,reid1 who is the most irreproachable1 and ,kant1 who is the most systematic4 ,surely there is truth in these two schools1 and truth is a good which must be taken wherever one finds it4 ,we willingly admit1 with the empirical school1 that the senses have not been given us in vain2 that this admirable organization which elevates us above all other animate beings1 is a rich and varied instrument1 which it would be folly to neglect4 ,we are convinced that the spectacle of the world is a permanent source of sound and sublime instruction4 ,upon this point neither ,aristotle1 nor ,bacon1 nor ,locke1 has in us an adversary1 but a disciple4 ,we acknowledge1 or rather we proclaim1 that in the analysis of human knowledge1 it is necessary to assign to the senses an important part4 ,but when the empirical school pretends that all that passes beyond the reach of the senses is a chimera1 then we abandon it1 and go over to the opposite school4 ,we profess to believe1 for example1 that1 without an agreeable impression1 never should we have conceived the beautiful1 and that1 notwithstanding1 the beautiful is not merely the agreeable2 that1 thank heaven1 happiness is usually added to virtue1 but that the idea itself of virtue is essentially different from that of happiness4 ,on this point we are openly of the opinion of ,reid and ,kant4 ,we have also established1 and will again establish1 that the reason of man is in possession of principles which sensation precedes but does not explain1 and which are directly suggested to us by the power of reason alone4 ,we will follow ,kant thus far1 but not farther4 ,far from following him1 we will combat him1 when1 after having victoriously defended the great principles of every kind against empiricism1 he strikes them with sterility1 in pretending that they have no value beyond the inclosure of the reason which possesses them1 condemning also to impotence that same reason which he has just elevated so high1 and opening the way to a refined and learned skepticism which1 after all1 ends at the same abyss with ordinary skepticism4 ,you perceive that we shall be by turns with ,locke1 with ,reid1 and with ,kant1 in that just and strong measure which is called eclecticism4 ,eclecticism is in our eyes the true historical method1 and it has for us all the importance of the history of philosophy2 but there is something which we place above the history of philosophy1 and1 consequently1 above eclecticism1--philosophy itself4 ,the history of philosophy does not carry its own light with it1 it is not its own end4 ,how could eclecticism1 which has no other field than history1 be our only1 our primary1 object8 ,it is1 doubtless1 just1 it is of the highest utility1 to discriminate in each system what there is true in it from what there is false in it2 first1 in order to appreciate this system rightly2 then1 in order to render the false of no account1 to disengage and re-collect the true1 and thus to enrich and aggrandize philosophy by history4 ,but you conceive that we must already know what truth is1 in order to recognize it1 and to distinguish it from the error with which it is mixed2 so that the criticism of systems almost demands a system1 so that the history of philosophy is constrained to first borrow from philosophy the light which it must one day return to it with usury4 ,in fine1 the history of philosophy is only a branch1 or rather an instrument1 of philosophical science4 ,surely it is the interest which we feel for philosophy that alone attaches us to its history2 it is the love of truth which makes us everywhere pursue its vestiges1 and interrogate with a passionate curiosity those who before us have also loved and sought truth4 ,thus philosophy is at once the supreme object and the torch of the history of philosophy4 ,by this double title it has a right to preside over our instruction4 ,in regard to this1 one word of explanation1 ,i beg you4 ,he who is speaking before you to-day is1 it is true1 officially charged only with the course of the history of philosophy2 in that is our task1 and in that1 once more1 our guide shall be eclecticism4#af ,but1 we confess1 if philosophy has not the right to present itself here in some sort on the first plan2 if it should appear only behind its history1 it in reality holds dominion2 and to it all our wishes1 as well as all our efforts1 are related4 ,we hold1 doubtless1 in great esteem1 both ,brucker and ,tennemann1#ag so wise1 so judicious2 nevertheless our models1 our veritable masters1 always present to our thought1 are1 in antiquity1 ,plato and ,socrates1 among the moderns1 ,descartes1 and1 why should ,i hesitate to say it1 among us1 and in our times1 the illustrious man who has been pleased to call us to this chair4 ,m4 ,royer-,collard was also only a professor of the history of philosophy2 but he rightly pretended to have an opinion in philosophy2 he served a cause which he has transmitted to us1 and we will serve it in our turn4 ,this great cause is known to you2 it is that of a sound and generous philosophy1 worthy of our century by the severity of its methods1 and answering to the immortal wants of humanity1 setting out modestly from psychology1 from the humble study of the human mind1 in order to elevate itself to the highest regions1 and to traverse metaphysics1 aesthetics1 theodicea1 morals1 and politics4 ,our enterprise is not then simply to renew the history of philosophy by eclecticism2 we also wish1 we especially wish1 and history well understood1 thanks to eclecticism1 will therein powerfully assist us1 to deduce from the study of systems1 their strifes1 and even their ruins1 a system which may be proof against criticism1 and which can be accepted by your reason1 and also by your heart1 noble youth of the nineteenth century6 ,in order to fulfil this great object1 which is our veritable mission to you1 we shall dare this year1 for the first and for the last time1 to go beyond the narrow limits which are imposed upon us4 ,in the history of the philosophy of the eighteenth century1 we have resolved to leave a little in the shade the history of philosophy1 in order to make philosophy itself appear1 and while exhibiting to you the distinctive traits of the principal doctrines of the last century1 to expose to you the doctrine which seems to us adapted to the wants and to the spirit of our times1 and still1 to explain it to you briefly1 but in its full extent1 instead of dwelling upon some one of its parts1 as hitherto we have done4 ,with years we will correct1 we will task ourselves to aggrandize and elevate our work4 ,to-day we present it you very imperfect still1 but established upon foundations which we believe solid1 and already stamped with a character that will not change4 ,you will here see1 then1 brought together in a short space1 our principles1 our processes1 our results4 ,we ardently desire to recommend them to you1 young men1 who are the hope of science as well as of your country4 ,may we at least be able1 in the vast career which we have to run1 to meet in you the same kindness which hitherto has sustained us4 ,,footnotes3 #c ,we have so much felt the necessity of understanding well the philosophy of the century that ours succeeds1 that three times we have undertaken the history of philosophy in the eighteenth century1 here first1 in #ahah1 then in #ahai and #ahbj1 and that is the subject of the last three volumes of the #ast ,series of our works2 finally1 we resumed it in #ahbi1 vol4 ii4 and iii4 of the #b;d ,series4 #d ,this word was used by the old ,english writers1 and there is no reason why it should not be retained4 #e ,on the method of ,descartes1 see #ast ,series1 vol4 iv41 lecture #bj2 #b;d ,series1 vol4 i41 lecture #b2 vol4 ii41 lecture #aa2 #c;d ,series1 vol4 iii41 ,philosophie ,moderne1 as well as ,fragments de ,philosophie ,cartesienne2 #eth ,series1 ,instruction ,publique1 vol4 ii41 ,defense de l',universite et de la ,philosophie1 p4 #aab1 etc4 #f ,on this return to the scholastic form in ,descartes1 see #ast ,series1 vol iv41 lecture #ab1 especially three articles of the ,journal des ,savants1 ,august1 ,september1 and ,october1 #ahej1 in which we have examined anew the principles of ,cartesianism1 a propos the ,leibnitii ,animadversiones ad ,cartesii ,principia ,philosophiae4 #g ,see on ,malebranche1 ,spinoza1 and ,leibnitz1 #b;d ,series1 vol4 ii41 lectures #aa and #ab2 #c;d ,series1 vol4 iv41 ,introduction aux ,oeuvres ,philosophiques de ,m4 de ,biran1 p4 #bhh2 and the ,fragments de ,philosophie ,cartesienne1 passim4 #h ,on ,locke1 see #ast ,series1 vol4 iii41 lecture #a1 especially #b;d ,series1 vol4 iii41 ,examen du ,systeme de ,locke4 #i #ast ,series1 vol4 iii41 lectures #b and #c4 #aj #ast ,series1 vol4 iv41 lectures on the ,scotch ,school4 #aa ,see on ,kant and the ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 vol4 v4 of the #ast ,series1 where that great work is examined with as much extent as that of ,reid in vol4 iv41 and the ,essay of ,locke in vol4 iii4 of the #b;d ,series4 #ab ,on ,fichte1 #b;d ,series1 vol4 i41 lecture #ab2 #c;d ,series1 vol4 iv41 ,introduction aux ,oeuvres de ,m4 de ,biran1 p4 #cbd4 #ac ,we expressed ourselves thus in ,december1 #ahag1 when1 following the great wars of the ,revolution1 and after the downfall of the empire1 the constitutional monarchy1 still poorly established1 left the future of ,france and of the world obscure4 ,it is sad to be obliged to hold the same language in #ahce1 over the ruins accumulated around us4 #ad #ast ,series1 vol4 i41 ,course of #ahaf4 #ae ,ibid41 ,course of #ahag4 #af ,on the legitimate employment and the imperative conditions of eclecticism1 see #c;d ,series1 ,fragments ,philosophiques1 vol4 iv41 preface of the first edition1 p4 #da1 c41 especially the article entitled ,de la ,philosophie en ,belgique1 pp4 #bbh and #bbi4 #ag ,we have translated his excellent ,manual of the ,history of ,philosophy4 ,see the second edition1 vol4 ii41 #hvo41 #ahci4 ,,part ,,first4 ,,the ,,true4 ,,lecture ,i4 ,,the ,,existence ,,of ,,universal ,,and ,,necessary ,,principles4 ,two great wants1 that of absolute truths1 and that of absolute truths that may not be chimeras4 ,to satisfy these two wants is the problem of the philosophy of our time4--,universal and necessary principles4--,examples of different kinds of such principles4--,distinction between universal and necessary principles and general principles4--,experience alone is incapable of explaining universal and necessary principles1 and also incapable of dispensing with them in order to arrive at the knowledge of the sensible world4--,reason as being that faculty of ours which discovers to us these principles4--,the study of universal and necessary principles introduces us to the highest parts of philosophy4 ,to-day1 as in all time1 two great wants are felt by man4 ,the first1 the most imperious1 is that of fixed1 immutable principles1 which depend upon neither times nor places nor circumstances1 and on which the mind reposes with an unbounded confidence4 ,in all investigations1 as long as we have seized only isolated1 disconnected facts1 as long as we have not referred them to a general law1 we possess the materials of science1 but there is yet no science4 ,even physics commence only when universal truths appear1 to which all the facts of the same order that observation discovers to us in nature may be referred4 ,plato has said1 that there is no science of the transitory4 ,this is our first need4 ,but there is another1 not less legitimate1 the need of not being the dupe of chimerical principles1 of barren abstractions1 of combinations more or less ingenious1 but artificial1 the need of resting upon reality and life1 the need of experience4 ,the physical and natural sciences1 whose regular and rapid conquests strike and dazzle the most ignorant1 owe their progress to the experimental method4 ,hence the immense popularity of this method1 which is carried to such an extent that one would not now condescend to lend the least attention to a science over which this method should not seem to preside4 ,to unite observation and reason1 not to lose sight of the ideal of science to which man aspires1 and to search for it and find it by the route of experience1--such is the problem of philosophy4 ,now we address ourselves to your recollections of the last two years3--have we not established1 by the severest experimental method1 by reflection applied to the study of the human mind1 with the deliberation and the rigor which such demonstrations exact1--have we not established that there are in all men1 without distinction1 in the wise and the ignorant1 ideas1 notions1 beliefs1 principles which the most determined skeptic cannot in the slightest degree deny1 by which he is unconsciously1 and in spite of himself1 governed both in his words and actions1 and which1 by a striking contrast with our other knowledges1 are marked with the at once marvellous and incontestable character1 that they are encountered in the most common experience1 and that1 at the same time1 instead of being circumscribed within the limits of this experience1 they surpass and govern it1 universal in the midst of particular phenomena to which they are applied2 necessary1 although mingled with things contingent2 to our eyes infinite and absolute1 even while appearing within us in that relative and finite being which we are8 ,it is not an unpremeditated paradox that we present to you2 we are only expressing here the result of numerous lectures4#ah ,it was not difficult for us to show that there are universal and necessary principles at the head of all sciences4 ,it is very evident that there are no mathematics without axioms and definitions1 that is to say1 without absolute principles4 ,what would logic become1 those mathematics of thought1 if you should take away from it a certain number of principles1 which are a little barbarous1 perhaps1 in their scholastic form1 but must be universal and necessary in order to preside over all reasoning and every demonstration8 ,are physics possible1 if every phenomenon which begins to appear does not suppose a cause and a law8 ,without the principle of final causes1 could physiology proceed a single step1 render to itself an account of a single organ1 or determine a single function8 ,is not the principle on which the whole of morals rests1 the principle which obligates man to good and lays the foundation of virtue1 of the same nature8 ,does it not extend to all moral beings1 without distinction of time and place8 ,can you conceive of a moral being who does not recognize in the depth of his conscience that reason ought to govern passion1 that it is necessary to preserve sworn faith1 and1 against the most pressing interest1 to restore the treasure that has been confided to us8 ,and these are not mere metaphysical prejudices and formulas of the schools3 ,i appeal to the most vulgar common sense4 ,if ,i should say to you that a murder has just been committed1 could you not ask me when1 where1 by whom1 wherefore8 ,that is to say1 your mind is directed by the universal and necessary principles of time1 of space1 of cause1 and even of final cause4 ,if ,i should say to you that love or ambition caused the murder1 would you not at the same instant conceive a lover1 an ambitious person8 ,this means1 again1 that there is for you no act without an agent1 no quality and phenomenon without a substance1 without a real subject4 ,if ,i should say to you that the accused pretends that he is not the same person who conceived1 willed1 and executed this murder1 and that1 at intervals1 his personality has more than once been changed1 would you not say he is a fool if he is sincere1 and that1 although the acts and the incidents have varied1 the person and the being have remained the same8 ,suppose that the accused should defend himself on this ground1 that the murder must serve his interest2 that1 moreover1 the person killed was so unhappy that life was a burden to him2 that the state loses nothing1 since in place of two worthless citizens it acquires one who becomes useful to it2 that1 in fine1 mankind will not perish by the loss of an individual1 c42 to all these reasonings would you not oppose the very simple response1 that this murder1 useful perhaps to its author1 is not the less unjust1 and that1 therefore1 under no pretext was it permitted8 ,the same good sense which admits universal and necessary truths1 easily distinguishes them from those that are not universal and necessary1 and are only general1 that is to say1 are applied only to a greater or less number of cases4 ,for example1 the following is a very general truth3 the day succeeds the night2 but is it a universal and necessary truth8 ,does it extend to all lands8 ,yes1 to all known lands4 ,but does it extend to all possible lands8 ,no2 for it is possible to conceive of lands plunged in eternal night1 another system of the world being given4 ,the laws of the material world are what they are2 they are not necessary4 ,their ,author might have chosen others4 ,with another system of the world one conceives other physics1 but we cannot conceive other mathematics and other morals4 ,thus it is possible to conceive that day and night may not be in the same relation to each as that in which we see them2 therefore the truth that day succeeds night is a very general truth1 perhaps even a universal truth1 but by no means a necessary truth4 ,montesquieu has said that liberty is not a fruit of warm climates4 ,i acknowledge1 if it is desired1 that heat enervates the spirit1 and that warm countries maintain free governments with difficulty2 but it does not follow that there may be no possible exception to this principle3 moreover1 there have been exceptions2 hence it is not an absolutely universal principle1 much less is it a necessary principle4 ,could you say as much of the principle of cause8 ,could you in any way conceive1 in any time and in any place1 a phenomenon which begins to appear without a cause1 physical or moral8 ,and were it possible to reduce universal and necessary principles to general principles1 in order to employ and apply these principles thus abased1 and to found upon them any reasoning whatever1 it would be necessary to admit what is called in logic the principle of contradiction1 viz41 that a thing cannot at the same time be and not be1 in order to maintain the integrity of each part of the reasoning2 as well as the principle of sufficient reason1 which alone establishes their connection and the legitimacy of the conclusion4 ,now1 these two principles1 without which there is no reasoning1 are themselves universal and necessary principles2 so that the circle is manifest4 ,even were we to destroy in thought all existences1 save that of a single mind1 we should be compelled to place in that mind1 in order that it might exercise itself at all--and the mind is such only on the condition that it thinks--several necessary principles2 it would be beyond the power of thought to conceive it deprived of the principle of contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason4 ,how many times have we demonstrated the vanity of the efforts of the empirical school to disturb the existence or weaken the bearing of universal and necessary principles6 ,listen to this school3 it will say to you that the principle of cause1 given by us as universal and necessary1 is1 after all1 only a habit of the mind1 which1 seeing in nature a fact succeeding another fact1 puts between these that connection which we have called the relation of effect to cause4 ,this explanation is nothing but the destruction1 not only of the principle of causality1 but even of the notion of cause4 ,the senses show me two balls1 one of which begins to move1 the other of which moves after it4 ,suppose that this succession is renewed and continues2 it will be constancy added to succession2 it will by no means be the connection of a causative power with its effect2 for example1 that which consciousness attests to us is the least effort of volition4 ,thus a consequent empiricist1 like ,hume1#ai easily proves that no sensible experience legitimately gives the idea of cause4 ,what we say of the notion of cause we might say of all notions of the same kind4 ,let us at least instance those of substance and unity4 ,the senses perceive only qualities1 phenomena4 ,i touch the extension1 ,i see the color1 ,i am sensible of the odor2 but do our senses attain the substance that is extended1 colored1 or odorous8 ,on this point ,hume#bj indulges in pleasantries4 ,he asks which one of our senses takes cognizance of substance4 ,what1 then1 according to him and in the system of empiricism1 is the notion of substance8 ,an illusion like the notion of cause4 ,neither do the senses give us unity2 for unity is identity1 is simplicity1 and the senses show us every thing in succession and composition4 ,the works of art possess unity only because ,art1 that is to say1 the mind of man puts it there4 ,if we perceive unity in the works of nature1 it is not the senses that discover it to us4 ,the arrangement of the different parts of an object may contain unity1 but it is a unity of organization1 an ideal and moral unity which the mind alone conceives1 and which escapes the senses4 ,if the senses are not able to explain simple notions1 much less still are they able to explain the principles in which these notions are met1 which are universal and necessary4 ,in fact1 the senses clearly perceive such and such facts1 but it is impossible for them to embrace what is universal2 experience attests what is1 it does not reach what cannot but be4 ,we go farther4 ,not only is empiricism unable to explain universal and necessary principles2 but we maintain that1 without these principles1 empiricism cannot even account for the knowledge of the sensible world4 ,take away the principle of causality1 and the human mind is condemned never to go out of itself and its own modifications4 ,all the sensations of hearing1 of smell1 of taste1 of touch1 of feeling even1 cannot inform you what their cause is1 nor whether they have a cause4 ,but give to the human mind the principle of causality1 admit that every sensation1 as well as every phenomenon1 every change1 every event1 has a cause1 as evidently we are not the cause of certain sensations1 and that especially these sensations must have a cause1 and we are naturally led to recognize for those sensations causes different from ourselves1 and that is the first notion of an exterior world4 ,the universal and necessary principle of causality alone gives it and justifies it4 ,other principles of the same order increase and develop it4 ,as soon as you know that there are external objects1 ,i ask you whether you do not conceive them in a place that contains them4 ,in order to deny it1 it would be necessary to deny that every body is in a place1 that is to say1 to reject a truth of physics1 which is at the same time a principle of metaphysics1 as well as an axiom of common sense4 ,but the place that contains a body is often itself a body1 which is only more capacious than the first4 ,this new body is in its turn in a place4 ,is this new place also a body8 ,then it is contained in another place more extended1 and so on2 so that it is impossible for you to conceive a body which is not in a place2 and you arrive at the conception of a boundless and infinite place1 that contains all limited places and all possible bodies3 that boundless and infinite place is space4 ,and ,i tell you in this nothing that is not very simple4 ,look4 ,do you deny that this water is in a vase8 ,do you deny that this vase is in this hall8 ,do you deny that this hall is in a larger place1 which is in its turn in another larger still8 ,i can thus carry you on to infinite space4 ,if you deny a single one of these propositions1 you deny all1 the first as well as the last2 and if you admit the first1 you are forced to admit the last4 ,it cannot be supposed that sensibility1 which is not able to give us even the idea of body1 alone elevates us to the idea of space4 ,the intervention of a superior principle is1 therefore1 here necessary4 ,as we believe that every body is contained in a place1 so we believe that every event happens in time4 ,can you conceive an event happening1 except in some point of duration8 ,this duration is extended and successively increased to your mind's eye1 and you end by conceiving it unlimited like space4 ,deny duration1 and you deny all the sciences that measure it1 you destroy all the natural beliefs upon which human life reposes4 ,it is hardly necessary to add that sensibility alone no more explains the notion of time than that of space1 both of which are nevertheless inherent in the knowledge of the external world4 ,empiricism is1 therefore1 convicted of being unable to dispense with universal and necessary principles1 and of being unable to explain them4 ,let us pause3 either all our preceding works have terminated in nothing but chimeras1 or they permit us to consider as a point definitely acquired for science1 that there are in the human mind1 for whomsoever interrogates it sincerely1 principles really stamped with the character of universality and necessity4 ,after having established and defended the existence of universal and necessary principles1 we might investigate and pursue this kind of principles in all the departments of human knowledge1 and attempt an exact and rigorous classification2 but illustrious examples have taught us to fear to compromise truths of the greatest price by mixing with them conjectures which1 in giving brilliancy1 perhaps1 to the spirit of philosophy1 diminish its authority in the eyes of the wise4 ,we1 also1 following the example of ,kant1 attempted before you1 last year1#ba a classification1 even a reduction of universal and necessary principles1 and of all the notions that are connected with them4 ,this work has not lost for us its importance1 but we will not reproduce it4 ,in the interest of the great cause which we serve1 and taking thought here only to establish upon solid foundations the doctrine which is adapted to the ,french genius in the nineteenth century1 we will carefully shun every thing that might seem personal and hazardous2 and1 instead of examining1 criticising1#bb and reconstituting the classification which the philosophy of ,koenigsberg has given of universal and necessary principles1 we prefer1 we find it much more useful1 to enable you to penetrate deeper into the nature of these principles1 by showing you what faculty of ours it is that discovers them to us1 and to which they are related and correspond4 ,the peculiarity of these principles is1 that each one of us in reflection recognizes that he possesses them1 but that he is not their author4 ,we conceive them and apply them1 we do not constitute them4 ,let us interrogate our consciousness4 ,do we refer to ourselves1 for example1 the definitions of geometry1 as we do certain movements of which we feel ourselves to be the cause8 ,if it is ,i who make these definitions1 they are therefore mine1 ,i can unmake them1 modify them1 change them1 even annihilate them4 ,it is certain that ,i cannot do it4 ,i am not1 then1 the author of them4 ,it has also been demonstrated that the principles of which we have spoken cannot be derived from sensation1 which is variable1 limited1 incapable of producing and authorizing any thing universal and necessary4 ,i arrive1 then1 at the following consequence1 also necessary3--truth is in me and not by me4 ,as sensibility puts me in relation with the physical world1 so another faculty puts me in communication with the truths that depend upon neither the world nor me1 and that faculty is reason4 ,there are in men three general faculties which are always mingled together1 and are rarely exercised except simultaneously1 but which analysis divides in order to study them better1 without misconceiving their reciprocal play1 their intimate connection1 their indivisible unity4 ,the first of these faculties is activity1 voluntary and free activity1 in which human personality especially appears1 and without which the other faculties would be as if they were not1 since we should not exist for ourselves4 ,let us examine ourselves at the moment when a sensation is produced in us2 we shall recognize that there is perception only so far as there is some degree of attention1 and that perception ends at the moment when our activity ends4 ,one does not recollect what he did in perfect sleep or in a swoon2 because then he had lost voluntary activity1 consequently consciousness2 consequently1 again1 memory4 ,passion often1 in depriving us of liberty1 deprives us1 at the same time1 of the consciousness of our actions and of ourselves2 then1 to use a just and common expression1 one knows not what he does4 ,it is by liberty that man is truly man1 that he possesses himself and governs himself2 without it1 he falls again under the yoke of nature2 he is1 without it1 only a more admirable and more beautiful part of nature4 ,but while ,i am endowed with activity and liberty1 ,i am also passive in other respects2 ,i am subject to the laws of the external world2 ,i suffer and ,i enjoy without being myself the author of my joys and my sufferings2 ,i feel rising within me needs1 desires1 passions1 which ,i have not made1 which by turns fill my life with happiness and misery4 ,finally1 besides volition and sensibility1 man has the faculty of knowing1 has understanding1 intelligence1 reason1 the name matters little1 by means of which he is elevated to truths of different orders1 and among others1 to universal and necessary truths1 which suppose in reason1 attached to its exercise1 principles entirely distinct from the impressions of the senses and the resolutions of the will4#bc ,voluntary activity1 sensibility1 reason1 are all equally certain4 ,consciousness verifies the existence of necessary principles1 which direct the reason quite as well as that of sensations and volitions4 ,i call every thing real that falls under observation4 ,i suffer2 my suffering is real1 inasmuch as ,i am conscious of it3 it is the same with liberty3 it is the same with reason and the principles that govern it4 ,we can affirm1 then1 that the existence of universal and necessary principles rests upon the testimony of observation1 and even of the most immediate and surest observation1 that of consciousness4 ,but consciousness is only a witness1--it makes what is appear2 it creates nothing4 ,it is not because consciousness announces it to you1 that you have produced such or such a movement1 that you have experienced such or such an impression4 ,neither is it because consciousness says to us that reason is constrained to admit such or such a truth1 that this truth exists2 it is because it exists that it is impossible for reason not to admit it4 ,the truths that reason attains by the aid of universal and necessary principles with which it is provided1 are absolute truths2 reason does not create them1 it discovers them4 ,reason is not the judge of its own principles1 and cannot account for them1 for it only judges by them1 and they are to it its own laws4 ,much less does consciousness make these principles1 or the truths which they reveal to us2 for consciousness has no other office1 no other power than in some sort to serve as a mirror for reason4 ,absolute truths are1 therefore1 independent of experience and consciousness1 and at the same time1 they are attested by experience and consciousness4 ,on the one hand1 these truths declare themselves in experience2 on the other1 no experience explains them4 ,behold how experience and reason differ and agree1 and how1 by means of experience1 we come to find something which surpasses it4 ,so the philosophy which we teach rests neither upon hypothetical principles1 nor upon empirical principles4 ,it is observation itself1 but observation applied to the higher portion of our knowledge1 which furnishes us with the principles that we seek1 with a point of departure at once solid and elevated4#bd ,this point of departure we have found1 and we do not abandon it4 ,we remain immovably attached to it4 ,the study of universal and necessary principles1 considered under their different aspects1 and in the great problems which they solve1 is almost the whole of philosophy2 it fills it1 measures it1 divides it4 ,if psychology is the regular study of the human mind and its laws1 it is evident that that of universal and necessary principles which preside over the exercise of reason1 is the especial domain of psychology1 which in ,germany is called rational psychology1 and is very different from empirical psychology4 ,since logic is the examination of the value and the legitimacy of our different means of knowing1 its most important employment must be to estimate the value and the legitimacy of the principles which are the foundations of our most important cognitions4 ,in fine1 the meditation of these same principles conducts us to theodicea1 and opens to us the sanctuary of philosophy1 if we would ascend to their true source1 to that sovereign reason which is the first and last explanation of our own4 ,,footnotes3 #ah #ast ,series of our ,course1 vol4 i4 #ai #ast ,series1 vol4 i4 #bj ,ibid4 #ba #ast ,series1 vol4 i41 ,fragments of the ,course of #ahag4 #bb ,see that criticism1 #ast ,series1 vol4 v41 ,kant1 lecture #h4 #bc ,this classification of the human faculties1 save some differences more nominal than real1 is now generally adopted1 and makes the foundation of the psychology of our times4 ,see our writings1 among others1 #ast ,series1 ,course of #ahaf1 lectures #bc and #bd3 ,histoire du moi2 ibid41 ,des faits de ,conscience2 vol4 iii41 lecture #c1 ,examen de la ,theorie des ,facultes dans ,condillac2 vol4 iv41 lecture #ba1 des ,facultes selon ,reid2 vol4 v41 lecture #h1 ,examen de la ,theorie de ,kant2 #c;d ,series1 vol iv41 ,preface de la ,premiere ,edition1 ,examen des ,lecons de ,m4 ,laromiguiere1 ,introduction aux ,oeuvres de ,m4 de ,biran1 etc4 #bd ,this lecture on the existence of universal and necessary principles1 which was easily comprehended1 in #ahah1 by an auditory to which long discussions had already been presented during the two previous years1 appearing here without the support of these preliminaries1 will not perhaps be entirely satisfactory to the reader4 ,we beseech him to consult carefully the first volume of the #ast ,series of our ,course1 which contains an abridgment1 at least1 of the numerous lectures of #ahaf and #ahag1 of which this is a resume2 especially to read in the third1 fourth1 and fifth volumes of the #ast ,series1 the developed analyses1 in which1 under different forms1 universal and necessary principles are demonstrated as far as may be1 and in the third volume of the #b;d ,series the lectures devoted to establish against ,locke the same principles4 ,,lecture ,,ii4 ,,origin ,,of ,,universal ,,and ,,necessary ,,principles4 ,resume of the preceding ,lecture4 ,a new question1 that of the origin of universal and necessary principles4--,danger of this question1 and its necessity4--,different forms under which truth presents itself to us1 and the successive order of these forms3 theory of spontaneity and reflection4--,the primitive form of principles2 abstraction that disengages them from that form1 and gives them their actual form4--,examination and refutation of the theory that attempts to explain the origin of principles by an induction founded on particular notions4 ,we may regard as a certain conquest of the experimental method and of true psychological analysis1 the establishment of principles which at the same time that they are given to us by the surest of all experiences1 that of consciousness1 have a bearing superior to experience1 and open to us regions inaccessible to empiricism4 ,we have recognized such principles at the head of nearly all the sciences2 then1 searching among our different faculties for that which may have given them to us1 we have ascertained that it is impossible to refer them to any other faculty than to that general faculty of knowing which we call reason1 very different from reasoning1 to which it furnishes its laws4 ,that is the point at which we have arrived4 ,but is it possible to stop there8 ,in human intelligence1 as it is now developed1 universal and necessary principles are offered to us under forms in some sort consecrated4 ,the principle of causality1 for example1 is thus enounced to us3--,every thing that begins to appear necessarily has a cause4 ,other principles have this same axiomatic form4 ,but have they always had it1 and did they spring from the human mind with this logical and scholastic apparel1 as ,minerva sprang all armed from the head of ,jupiter8 ,with what characters did they show themselves at first1 before taking those in which they are now clothed1 and which can scarcely be their primitive characters8 ,in a word1 is it possible to find the origin of universal and necessary principles1 and the route which they must have followed in order to arrive at what they are to-day8 ,a new problem1 the importance of which it is easy to feel2 for1 if it can be resolved1 what light will be shed upon these principles6 ,on the other hand1 what difficulties must be encountered6 ,how can we penetrate to the sources of human knowledge1 which are concealed1 like those of the ,nile8 ,is it not to be feared that1 in plunging into the obscure past1 instead of truth1 one may encounter an hypothesis2 that1 attaching himself1 then1 to this hypothesis1 he may transport it from the past to the present1 and that1 being deceived in regard to the origin of principles1 he may be led to misconceive their actual and certain characters1 or1 at least1 to mutilate and enfeeble those which the adopted origin would not easily explain8 ,this danger is so great1 this rock is so celebrated in shipwrecks1 that before braving it one should know how to take many precautions against the seductions of the spirit of the system4 ,it is even conceived that great philosophers1 who were timid in no place1 have suppressed the perilous problem4 ,in fact1 by undertaking to grapple with this problem at first1 ,locke and ,condillac went far astray1#be and it must be said1 corrupted all philosophy at its source4 ,the empirical school1 which lauds the experimental method so much1 turns its back upon it1 thus to speak1 when1 instead of commencing by the study of the actual characters of our cognitions1 as they are attested to us by consciousness and reflection1 it plunges1 without light and without guidance1 into the pursuit of their origin4 ,reid#bf and ,kant#bg showed themselves much more observing by confining themselves within the limits of the present1 through fear of losing themselves in the darkness of the past4 ,both freely treat of universal and necessary principles in the form which they now have1 without asking what was their primitive form4 ,we much prefer this wise circumspection to the adventurous spirit of the empirical school4 ,nevertheless1 when a problem is given out1 so long as it is not solved1 it troubles and besets the human mind4 ,philosophy ought not to shun it then1 but its duty is to approach it only with extreme prudence and a severe method4 ,we cannot recollect too well1 for the sake of others and ourselves1 that the primitive state of human cognitions is remote from us2 we can scarcely bring it within the reach of our vision and submit it to observation2 the actual state1 on the contrary1 is always at our disposal3 it is sufficient for us to enter into ourselves1 to fathom consciousness by reflection1 and make it give up what it contains4 ,setting out from certain facts1 we shall not be liable to wander subsequently into hypotheses1 or if1 in ascending to the primitive state1 we fall into any error1 we shall be able to perceive it and repair it by the aid of the truth which an impartial observation shall have given us2 every origin which shall not legitimately end at the point where we are1 is by that alone convicted of being false1 and will deserve to be discarded4#bh ,you know that a large portion of the last year was spent upon this question4 ,we took1 one by one1 universal and necessary questions submitted to our examination1 in order to determine the origin of each one of them1 its primitive form1 and the different forms which have successively clothed it2 only after having operated thus upon a sufficiently large number of principles1 did we come slowly to a general conclusion1 and that conclusion we believe ourselves entitled to express here briefly as the solid result of a most circumspect analysis1 and1 at least1 a most methodical labor4 ,we must either renew before you this labor1 this analysis1 and thereby run the risk of not being able to complete the long course that we have marked out for ourselves1 or we must limit ourselves to reminding you of the essential traits of the theory at which we arrived4 ,this theory1 moreover1 is in itself so simple1 that1 without the dress of regular demonstrations upon which it is founded1 its own evidence will sufficiently establish it4 ,it wholly rests upon the distinction between the different forms under which truth is presented to us4 ,it is1 in its somewhat arid generality1 as follows3 #ast4 ,one can perceive truth in two different ways4 ,sometimes one perceives it in such or such a particular circumstance4 ,for example1 in presence of two apples or two stones1 and of two other similar objects placed by the side of the first1 ,i perceive this truth with absolute certainty1 viz41 that these two stones and these two other stones make four stones1--which is in some sort a concrete apperception of the truth1 because the truth is given to us in regard to real and determinate objects4 ,sometimes ,i also affirm in a general manner that two and two equal four1 abstracting every determinate object1--which is the abstract conception of truth4 ,now1 of these two ways of knowing truth1 which precedes in the chronological order of human knowledge8 ,is it not certain1 may it not be avowed by every one1 that the particular precedes the general1 that the concrete precedes the abstract1 that we begin by perceiving such or such a determinate truth1 in such or such a case1 at such or such a moment1 in such or such a place1 before conceiving a general truth1 independently of every application and different circumstances of place and time8 #b;d4 ,we can perceive the same truth without asking ourselves this question3 ,have we the ability not to admit this truth8 ,we perceive it1 then1 by virtue alone of the intelligence which has been given us1 and which enters spontaneously into exercise2 or rather1 we try to doubt the truth which we perceive1 we attempt to deny it2 we are not able to do it1 and then it is presented to reflection as superior to all possible negation2 it appears to us no longer only as a truth1 but as a necessary truth4 ,is it not also evident1 that we do not begin by reflection1 that reflection supposes an anterior operation1 and that this operation1 in order not to be one of reflection1 and not to suppose another before it1 must be entirely spontaneous2 that thus the spontaneous and instinctive intuition of truth precedes its reflection and necessary conception8 ,reflection is a progress more or less tardy in the individual and in the race4 ,it is1 par excellence1 the philosophic faculty2 it sometimes engenders doubt and skepticism1 sometimes convictions that1 for being rational1 are only the more profound4 ,it constructs systems1 it creates artificial logic1 and all those formulas which we now use by the force of habit as if they were natural to us4 ,but spontaneous intuition is the true logic of nature4 ,it presides over the acquisition of nearly all our cognitions4 ,children1 the people1 three-fourths of the human race never pass beyond it1 and rest there with boundless security4 ,the question of the origin of human cognitions is thus resolved for us in the simplest manner3 it is enough for us to determine that operation of the mind which precedes all others1 without which no other would take place1 and which is the first exercise1 and the first form of our faculty of knowing4#bi ,since every thing that bears the character of reflection cannot be primitive1 and supposes an anterior state1 it follows1 that the principles which are the subject of our study could not have possessed at first the reflective and abstract character with which they are now marked1 that they must have shown themselves at their origin in some particular circumstance1 under a concrete and determinate form1 and that in time they were disengaged from this form1 in order to be invested with their actual1 abstract1 and universal form4 ,these are the two ends of the chain2 it remains for us to seek how the human mind has been from one to the other1 from the primitive state to the actual state1 from the concrete state to the abstract state4 ,how can we go from the concrete to the abstract8 ,evidently by that well-known operation which is called abstraction4 ,thus far1 nothing is more simple4 ,but it is necessary to discriminate between two sorts of abstractions4 ,in presence of several particular objects1 you omit the characters which distinguish them1 and separately consider a character which is common to them all--you abstract this character4 ,examine the nature and conditions of this abstraction2 it proceeds by means of comparison1 and it is founded on a certain number of particular and different cases4 ,take an example3 examine how we form the abstract and general idea of color4 ,place before my eyes for the first time a white object4 ,can ,i here at the first step immediately arrive at a general idea of color8 ,can ,i at first place on one side the whiteness1 and on the other side the color8 ,analyze what passes within you4 ,you experience a sensation of whiteness4 ,omit the individuality of this sensation1 and you wholly destroy it2 you cannot neglect the whiteness1 and preserve or abstract the color2 for1 a single color being given1 which is a white color1 if you take away that1 there remains to you absolutely nothing in regard to color4 ,let a blue object succeed this white object1 then a red object1 etc42 having sensations differing from each other1 you can neglect their differences1 and only consider what they have in common1 that they are sensations of sight1 that is to say1 colors1 and you thus obtain the abstract and general idea of color4 ,take another example3 if you had never smelled but a single flower1 the violet1 for instance1 would you have had the idea of odor in general8 ,no4 ,the odor of the violet would be for you the only odor1 beyond which you would not seek1 you could not even imagine another4 ,but if to the odor of the violet is added that of the rose1 and other different odors1 in a greater or less number1 provided there be several1 and a comparison be possible1 and consequently1 knowledge of their differences and their resemblances1 then you will be able to form the general idea of odor4 ,what is there in common between the odor of one flower and that of another flower1 except that they have been smelled by aid of the same organ1 and by the same person8 ,what here renders generalization possible1 is the unity of the sentient subject which remembers having been modified1 while remaining the same1 by different sensations2 now1 this subject can feel itself identical under different modifications1 and it can conceive in the qualities of the object felt some resemblance and some dissimilarity1 only on the condition of a certain number of sensations experienced1 of odors smelled4 ,in that case1 but in that case alone1 there can be comparison1 abstraction1 and generalization1 because there are different and similar elements4 ,in order to arrive at the abstract form of universal and necessary principles1 we have no need of all this labor4 ,let us take again1 for example1 the principle of cause4 ,if you suppose six particular cases from which you have abstracted this principle1 it will contain neither more nor less ideas than if you had deduced it from a single one4 ,to be able to say that the event which ,i see must have a cause1 it is not indispensable to have seen several events succeed each other4 ,the principle which compels me to pronounce this judgment1 is already complete in the first as in the last event2 it can change in respect to its object1 it cannot change in itself2 it neither increases nor decreases with the greater or less number of its applications4 ,the only difference that it is subject to in regard to us1 is1 that we apply it whether we remark it or not1 whether we disengage it or not from its particular application4 ,the question is not to eliminate the particularity of the phenomenon1 wherein it appears to us1 whether it be the fall of a leaf or the murder of a man1 in order immediately to conceive1 in a general and abstract manner1 the necessity of a cause for every thing that begins to exist4 ,here1 it is not because ,i have been the same1 or have been affected in the same manner in several different cases1 that ,i have come to this general and abstract conception4 ,a leaf falls3 at the same instant ,i think1 ,i believe1 ,i declare that this falling of the leaf must have a cause4 ,a man has been killed3 at the same instant ,i believe1 ,i proclaim that this death must have a cause4 ,each one of these facts contains particular and variable circumstances1 and something universal and necessary1 to wit1 both of them cannot but have a cause4 ,now1 ,i am perfectly able to disengage the universal from the particular1 in regard to the first fact as well as in regard to the second fact1 for the universal is in the first quite as well as in the second4 ,in fact1 if the principle of causality is not universal in the first fact1 neither will it be in the second1 nor in the third1 nor in a thousandth2 for a thousand are not nearer than one to the infinite1 to absolute universality4 ,it is the same1 and still more evidently1 with necessity4 ,pay particular attention to this point3 if necessity is not in the first fact1 it cannot be in any2 for necessity cannot be formed little by little1 and by successive increment4 ,if1 at the first murder that ,i see1 ,i do not exclaim that this murder necessarily has a cause1 at the thousandth murder1 although it shall have been proved that all the others have had causes1 ,i shall have the right to think that this new murder has1 very probably1 also its cause2 but ,i shall never have the right to declare that it necessarily has a cause4 ,but when necessity and universality are already in a single case1 that case alone is sufficient to entitle us to deduce them from it4#cj ,we have established the existence of universal and necessary principles3 we have marked their origin2 we have shown that they appear to us at first from a particular fact1 and we have shown by what process1 by what sort of abstraction the mind disengages them from the determinate and concrete form which envelops them1 but does not constitute them4 ,our task1 then1 seems accomplished4 ,but it is not1--we must defend the solution which we have just presented to you of the problem of the origin of principles against the theory of an eminent metaphysician1 whose just authority might seduce you4 ,m4 ,maine de ,biran#ca is1 like us1 the declared adversary of the philosophy of sensation1--he admits universal and necessary principles2 but the origin which he assigns to them1 puts them1 according to us1 in peril1 and would lead back by a detour to the empirical school4 ,universal and necessary principles1 if expressed in propositions1 embrace several terms4 ,for example1 in the principle that every phenomenon supposes a cause2 and in this1 that every quality supposes a substance1 by the side of the ideas of quality and phenomenon are met the ideas of cause and substance1 which seem the foundation of these two principles4 ,m4 de ,biran pretends that the two ideas are anterior to the two principles which contain them1 and that we at first find these ideas in ourselves in the consciousness that we are cause and substance1 and that1 these ideas once being thus acquired1 induction transports them out of ourselves1 makes us conceive causes and substances wherever there are phenomena and qualities1 and that the principles of cause and substance are thus explained4 ,i beg pardon of my illustrious friend2 but it is impossible to admit in the least degree this explanation4 ,the possession of the origin of the idea of cause is by no means sufficient for the possession of the origin of the principle of causality2 for the idea and the principle are things essentially different4 ,you have established1 ,i would say to ,m4 de ,biran1 that the idea of cause is found in that of productive volition3--you will to produce certain effects1 and you produce them2 hence the idea of a cause1 of a particular cause1 which is yourself2 but between this fact and the axiom that all phenomena which appear necessarily have a cause1 there is a gulf4 ,you believe that you can bridge it over by induction4 ,the idea of cause once found in ourselves1 induction applies it1 you say1 wherever a new phenomenon appears4 ,but let us not be deceived by words1 and let us account for this extraordinary induction4 ,the following dilemma ,i submit with confidence to the loyal dialectics of ,m4 de ,biran3 ,is the induction of which you speak universal and necessary8 ,then it is a different name for the same thing4 ,an induction which forces us universally and necessarily to associate the idea of cause with that of every phenomenon that begins to appear is precisely what is called the principle of causality4 ,on the contrary1 is this induction neither universal nor necessary8 ,it cannot supply the place of the principle of cause1 and the explanation destroys the thing to be explained4 ,it follows from this that the only true result of these various psychological investigations is1 that the idea of personal and free cause precedes all exercise of the principle of causality1 but without explaining it4 ,the theory which we combat is much more powerless in regard to other principles which1 far from being exercised before the ideas from which it is pretended to deduce them1 precede them1 and even give birth to them4 ,how have we acquired the idea of time and that of space1 except by aid of the principle that the bodies and events1 which we see are in time and in space8 ,we have seen#cb that1 without this principle1 and confined to the data of the senses and consciousness1 neither time nor space would exist for us4 ,whence have we deduced the idea of the infinite1 except from the principle that the finite supposes the infinite1 that all finite and defective things1 which we perceive by our senses and feel within us1 are not sufficient for themselves1 and suppose something infinite and perfect8 ,omit the principle1 and the idea of the infinite is destroyed4 ,evidently this idea is derived from the application of the principle1 and it is not the principle which is derived from the idea4 ,let us dwell a little longer on the principle of substances4 ,the question is to know whether the idea of subject1 of substance1 precedes or follows the exercise of the principle4 ,upon what ground could the idea of substance be anterior to the principle that every quality supposes a substance8 ,upon the ground alone that substance be the object of self-observation1 as cause is said to be4 ,when ,i produce a certain effect1 ,i may perceive myself in action and as cause2 in that case1 there would be no need of the intervention of any principle2 but it is not1 it cannot be1 the same1 when the question is concerning the substance which is the basis of the phenomena of consciousness1 of our qualities1 our acts1 our faculties even2 for this substance is not directly observable2 it does not perceive itself1 it conceives itself4 ,consciousness perceives sensation1 volition1 thought1 it does not perceive their subject4 ,who has ever perceived the soul8 ,has it not been necessary1 in order to attain this invisible essence1 to set out from a principle which has the power to bind the visible to the invisible1 phenomenon to being1 to wit1 the principle of substances8#cc ,the idea of substance is necessarily posterior to the application of the principle1 and1 consequently1 it cannot explain its formation4 ,let us be well understood4 ,we do not mean to say that we have in the mind the principle of substances before perceiving a phenomenon1 quite ready to apply the principle to the phenomenon1 when it shall present itself2 we only say that it is impossible for us to perceive a phenomenon without conceiving at the same instant a substance1 that is to say1 to the power of perceiving a phenomenon1 either by the senses or by consciousness1 is joined that of conceiving the substance in which it inheres4 ,the facts thus take place3--the perception of phenomena and the conception of the substance which is their basis are not successive1 they are simultaneous4 ,before this impartial analysis fall at once two equal and opposite errors--one1 that experience1 exterior or interior1 can beget principles2 the other1 that principles precede experience4#cd ,to sum up1 the pretension of explaining principles by the ideas which they contain1 is a chimerical one4 ,in supposing that all the ideas which enter into principles are anterior to them1 it is necessary to show how principles are deduced from these ideas1--which is the first and radical difficulty4 ,moreover1 it is not true that in all cases ideas precede principles1 for often principles precede ideas1--a second difficulty equally insurmountable4 ,but whether ideas are anterior or posterior to principles1 principles are always independent of them2 they surpass them by all the superiority of universal and necessary principles over simple ideas4#ce ,we should1 perhaps1 beg your pardon for the austerity of this lecture4 ,but philosophical questions must be treated philosophically3 it does not belong to us to change their character4 ,on other subjects1 another language4 ,psychology has its own language1 the entire merit of which is a severe precision1 as the highest law of psychology itself is the shunning of every hypothesis1 and an inviolable respect for facts4 ,this law we have religiously followed4 ,while investigating the origin of universal and necessary principles1 we have especially endeavored not to destroy the thing to be explained by a systematic explanation4 ,universal and necessary principles have come forth in their integrity from our analysis4 ,we have given the history of the different forms which they successively assume1 and we have shown1 that in all these changes they remain the same1 and of the same authority1 whether they enter spontaneously and involuntarily into exercise1 and apply themselves to particular and determinate objects1 or reflection turns them back upon themselves in order to interrogate them in regard to their nature1 or abstraction makes them appear under the form in which their universality and their necessity are manifest4 ,their certainty is the same under all their forms1 in all their applications2 it has neither generation nor origin2 it is not born such or such a day1 and it does not increase with time1 for it knows no degrees4 ,we have not commenced by believing a little in the principle of causality1 of substances1 of time1 of space1 of the infinite1 etc41 then believing a little more1 then believing wholly4 ,these principles have been1 from the beginning1 what they will be in the end1 all-powerful1 necessary1 irresistible4 ,the conviction which they give is always absolute1 only it is not always accompanied by a clear consciousness4 ,leibnitz himself has no more confidence in the principle of causality1 and even in his favorite principle of sufficient reason1 than the most ignorant of men2 but the latter applies these principles without reflecting on their power1 by which he is unconsciously governed1 whilst ,leibnitz is astonished at their power1 studies it1 and for all explanation1 refers it to the human mind1 and to the nature of things1 that is to say1 he elevates1 to borrow the fine expression of ,m4 ,royer-,collard1#cf the ignorance of the mass of men to its highest source4 ,such is1 thank heaven1 the only difference that separates the peasant from the philosopher1 in regard to those great principles of every kind which1 in one way or another1 discover to men the same truths indispensable to their physical1 intellectual1 and moral existence1 and1 in their ephemeral life1 on the circumscribed point of space and time where fortune has thrown them1 reveal to them something of the universal1 the necessary1 and the infinite4 ,,footnotes3 #be ,first ,series1 vol4 iv41 lectures #a1 #b1 and #c4 #bf ,ibid41 vol4 iv41 etc4 #bg ,ibid41 vol4 v41 lecture #h4 #bh ,we have everywhere called to mind1 maintained1 and confirmed by the errors of those who have dared to break it1 this rule of true psychological analysis1 that1 before passing to the question of the origin of an idea1 a notion1 a belief1 any principle whatever1 the actual characters of this idea1 this notion1 this belief1 this principle1 must have been a long time studied and well established1 with the firm resolution of not altering them under any pretext whatever in wishing to explain them4 ,we believe that we have1 as ,leibnitz says1 settled this point4 ,see #ast ,series1 vol4 i41 ,programme of the ,course of #ahag1 and the ,opening ,discourse2 vol4 iii41 lecture #a1 ,locke2 lecture #b1 ,condillac2 lecture #c1 almost entire1 and lecture #h1 p4 #bfj2 #b;d ,series1 vol4 iii41 ,examen du ,systeme de ,locke1 lecture #af1 p4 #gg-hg2 #c;d ,series1 vol4 iv41 ,examination of the ,lectures of ,m4 ,loremquiere1 p4 #bfh4 #bi ,this theory of spontaneity and of reflection1 which in our view is the key to so many difficulties1 continually recurs in our works4 ,one may see1 vol4 i4 of the #ast ,series1 in a programme of the ,course of #ahag1 and in a fragment entitled ,de la ,spontaneite et de la ,reflexion2 vol4 iv4 of the same ,series1 ,examination of ,reid's ,philosophy1 passim2 vol4 v41 ,examination of ,kant's ,system1 lecture #h2 #b;d ,series1 vol4 i41 passim2 vol4 iii41 ,lectures on ,judgment2 #c;d ,series1 ,fragments ,philosophiques1 vol4 iv41 preface of the first edition1 p4 #cg1 etc42 it will be found in different lectures of this volume1 among others1 in the third1 ,on the value of ,universal and ,necessary ,principles2 in the fifth1 ,on ,mysticism2 and in the eleventh1 ,primary ,data of ,common ,sense4 #cj ,on immediate abstraction and comparative abstraction1 see #ast ,series1 vol4 i41 ,programme of the ,course of #ahag1 and everywhere in our other ,courses4 #ca ,on ,m4 de ,biran1 on his merits and defects1 see our ,introduction at the head of his ,works4 #cb ,see lecture #a4 #cc ,see vol4 i4 of the #ast ,series1 course of #ahaf1 and #b;d ,series1 vol4 iii41 lecture #ah1 p4 #adj-adf4 #cd ,we have developed this analysis1 and elucidated these results in the #agth lecture of vol4 ii4 of the #b;d ,series4 #ce ,we have already twice recurred1 and more in detail1 to the impossibility of legitimately explaining universal and necessary principles by any association or induction whatever1 founded upon any particular idea1 #b;d ,series1 vol4 iii41 ,examen du ,systeme de ,locke1 lecture #ai1 p4 #aff2 and #c;d ,series1 vol4 iv41 ,introduction aux ,oeuvres de ,m4 de ,biran1 p4 #cai4 ,we have also made known the opinion of ,reid1 #ast ,series1 vol4 iv41 lecture #bb1 p4 #dhi4 ,finally1 the profoundest of ,reid's disciples1 the most enlightened judge that we know of things philosophical1 ,sir ,w4 ,hamilton1 professor of logic in the ,university of ,edinburgh1 has not hesitated to adopt the conclusions of our discussion1 to which he is pleased to refer his readers3--,discussions on ,philosophy and ,literature1 etc41 by ,sir ,william ,hamilton1 ,london1 #aheb4 ,appendix ,i1 p4 #ehh4 #cf ,oeuvres de ,reid1 vol4 iv41 p4 #dce4 ,when we revolt against primitive facts1 we equally misconceive the constitution of our intelligence and the end of philosophy4 ,is explaining a fact any thing else than deriving it from another fact1 and if this kind of explanation is to terminate at all1 does it not suppose facts inexplicable8 ,the science of the human mind will have been carried to the highest degree of perfection it can attain1 it will be complete1 when it shall know how to derive ignorance from the most elevated source4 ,,lecture ,,iii4 ,,on ,,the ,,value ,,of ,,universal ,,and ,,necessary ,,principles4 ,examination and refutation of ,kant's skepticism4--,recurrence to the theory of spontaneity and reflection4 ,after having recognized the existence of universal and necessary principles1 their actual characters1 and their primitive characters1 we have to examine their value1 and the legitimacy of the conclusions which may be drawn from them1--we pass from psychology to logic4 ,we have defended against ,locke and his school the necessity and universality of certain principles4 ,we now come to ,kant1 who recognizes with us these principles1 but confines their power within the limits of the subject that conceives them1 and1 so far as subjective1 declares them to be without legitimate application to any object1 that is to say1 without objectivity1 to use the language of the philosopher of ,koenigsberg1 which1 right or wrong1 begins to pass into the philosophic language of ,europe4 ,let us comprehend well the import of this new discussion4 ,the principles that govern our judgments1 that preside over most sciences1 that rule our actions1--have they in themselves an absolute truth1 or are they only regulating laws of our thought8 ,the question is1 to know whether it is true in itself1 that every phenomenon has a cause1 and every quality a subject1 whether every thing extended is really in space1 and every succession in time1 etc4 ,if it is not absolutely true that every quality has its subject of inherence1 it is not1 then1 certain1 that we have a soul1 a real substance of all the qualities which consciousness attests4 ,if the principle of causality is only a law of our mind1 the external world1 which this principle discovers to us1 loses its reality1 it is only a succession of phenomena1 without any effective action over each other1 as ,hume would have it1 and even the impressions of our senses are destitute of causes4 ,matter exists no more than the soul4 ,nothing exists2 every thing is reduced to mobile appearances1 given up to a perpetual becoming1 which again is accomplished we know not where1 since in reality there is neither time nor space4 ,since the principle of sufficient reason only serves to put in motion human curiosity1 once in possession of the fatal secret that it can attain nothing real1 this curiosity would be very good to weary itself in searching for reasons which inevitably escape it1 and in discovering relations which correspond only to the wants of our mind1 and do not in the least correspond to the nature of things4 ,in fine1 if the principle of causality1 of substances1 of final causes1 of sufficient reason1 are only our modes of conception1 ,god1 whom all these principles reveal to us1 will no more be any thing but the last of chimeras1 which vanishes with all the others in the breath of the ,critique4 ,kant has established1 as well as ,reid and ourself1 the existence of universal and necessary principles2 but an involuntary disciple of his century1 an unconscious servant of the empirical school1 to which he places himself in the attitude of an adversary1 he makes to it the immense concession that these principles are applied only to the impressions of sensibility1 that their part is to put these impressions in a certain order1 but that beyond these impressions1 beyond experience1 their power expires4 ,this concession has ruined the whole enterprise of the ,german philosopher4 ,this enterprise was at once honest and great4 ,kant1 grieved at the skepticism of his times1 proposed to arrest it by fairly meeting it4 ,he thought to disarm ,hume by conceding to him that our highest conceptions do not extend themselves beyond the inclosure of the human mind2 and at the same time1 he supposed that he had sufficiently vindicated the human mind by restoring to it the universal and necessary principles which direct it4 ,but1 according to the strong expression of ,m4 ,royer-,collard1 one does not encounter skepticism1--as soon as he has penetrated into the human understanding he has completely taken it by storm4 ,a severe circumspection is one thing1 skepticism is another4 ,doubt is not only permitted1 it is commanded by reason itself in the employment and legitimate applications of our different faculties2 but when it is applied to the legitimacy itself of our faculties1 it no longer elucidates reason1 it overwhelms it4 ,in fact1 with what would you have reason defend herself1 when she has called herself in question8 ,kant himself1 then1 overturned the dogmatism which he proposed at once to restrain and save1 at least in morals1 and he put ,german philosophy upon a route1 at the end of which was an abyss4 ,in vain has this great man--for his intentions and his character1 without speaking of his genius1 merit for him this name--undertaken with ,hume an ingenious and learned controversy2 he has been vanquished in this controversy1 and ,hume remains master of the field of battle4 ,what matters it1 in fact1 whether there may or may not be in the human mind universal and necessary principles1 if these principles only serve to classify our sensations1 and to make us ascend1 step by step1 to ideas that are most sublime1 but have for ourselves no reality8 ,the human mind is1 then1 as ,kant himself well expressed it1 like a banker who should take bills ranged in order on his desk for real values2--he possesses nothing but papers4 ,we have thus returned1 then1 to that conceptualism of the middle age1 which1 concentrating truth within the human intelligence1 makes the nature of things a phantom of intelligence projecting itself everywhere out of itself1 at once triumphant and impotent1 since it produces every thing1 and produces only chimeras4#cg ,the reproach which a sound philosophy will content itself with making to ,kant1 is1 that his system is not in accordance with facts4 ,philosophy can and must separate itself from the crowd for the explanation of facts2 but1 it cannot be too often repeated1 it must not in the explanation destroy what it pretends to explain2 otherwise it does not explain1 it imagines4 ,here1 the important fact which it is the question to explain is the belief of the human mind1 and the system of ,kant annihilates it4 ,in fact1 when we are speaking of the truth of universal and necessary principles1 we do not believe they are true only for us3--we believe them to be true in themselves1 and still true1 were there no minds of ours to conceive them4 ,we regard them as independent of us2 they seem to us to impose themselves upon our intelligence by the force of the truth that is in them4 ,so1 in order to express faithfully what passes within us1 it would be necessary to reverse the proposition of ,kant1 and instead of saying with him1 that these principles are the necessary laws of our mind1 therefore they have no absolute value out of mind2 we should much rather say1 that these principles have an absolute value in themselves1 therefore we cannot but believe them4 ,and even this necessity of belief with which the new skepticism arms itself1 is not the indispensable condition of the application of principles4 ,we have established#ch that the necessity of believing supposes reflection1 examination1 an effort to deny and the want of power to do it2 but before all reflection1 intelligence spontaneously seizes the truth1 and1 in the spontaneous apperception1 is not the sentiment of necessity1 nor consequently that character of subjectivity of which the ,german school speaks so much4 ,let us1 then1 here recur to that spontaneous intuition of truth1 which ,kant knew not1 in the circle where his profoundly reflective and somewhat scholastic habits held him captive4 ,is it true that there is no judgment1 even affirmative in form1 which is not mixed with negation8 ,it seems indeed that every affirmative judgment is at the same time negative2 in fact1 to affirm that a thing exists1 is to deny its non-existence2 as every negative judgment is at the same time affirmative2 for to deny the existence of a thing1 is to affirm its non-existence4 ,if it is so1 then every judgment1 whatever may be its form1 affirmative or negative1 since these two forms come back to each other1 supposes a pre-established doubt in regard to the existence of the thing in question1 supposes some exercise of reflection1 in the course of which the mind feels itself constrained to bear such or such a judgment1 so that at this point of view the foundation of the judgment seems to be in its necessity2 and then recurs the celebrated objection3--if you judge thus only because it is impossible for you not to do it1 you have for a guaranty of the truth nothing but yourself and your own ways of conceiving2 it is the human mind that transports its laws out of itself2 it is the subject that makes the object out of its own image1 without ever going beyond the inclosure of subjectivity4 ,we respond1 going directly to the root of the difficulty3--it is not true that all our judgments are negative4 ,we admit that in the reflective state every affirmative judgment supposes a negative judgment1 and reciprocally4 ,but is reason exercised only on the condition of reflection8 ,is there not a primitive affirmation which implies no negation8 ,as we often act without deliberating on our action1 without premeditating it1 and as we manifest in this case an activity that is free still1 but free with a liberty that is not reflective2 so reason often perceives the truth without traversing doubt or error4 ,reflection is a return to consciousness1 or to an operation wholly different from it4 ,we do not find1 then1 in any primitive fact1 that every judgment which contains it presupposes another in which it is not4 ,we thus arrive at a judgment free from all reflection1 to an affirmation without any mixture of negation1 to an immediate intuition1 the legitimate child of the natural energy of thought1 like the inspiration of the poet1 the instinct of the hero1 the enthusiasm of the prophet4 ,such is the first act of the faculty of knowing4 ,if one contradicts this primitive affirmation1 the faculty of knowing falls back up upon itself1 examines itself1 attempts to call in doubt the truth it has perceived2 it cannot2 it affirms anew what it had affirmed at first2 it adheres to the truth already recognized1 but with a new sentiment1 the sentiment that it is not in its power to divest itself of the evidence of this same truth2 then1 but only then1 appears that character of necessity and subjectivity that some would turn against the truth1 as though truth could lose its own value1 while penetrating deeper into the mind and there triumphing over doubt2 as though reflective evidence of it were the less evidence2 as though1 moreover1 the necessary conception of it were the only form1 the primary form of the perception of truth4 ,the skepticism of ,kant1 to which good sense so easily does justice1 is driven to the extreme and forced within its intrenchment by the distinction between spontaneous reason and reflective reason4 ,reflection is the theatre of the combats which reason engages in with itself1 with doubt1 sophism1 and error4 ,but above reflection is a sphere of light and peace1 where reason perceives truth without returning on itself1 for the sole reason that truth is truth1 and because ,god has made the reason to perceive it1 as he has made the eye to see and the ear to hear4 ,analyze1 in fact1 with impartiality1 the fact of spontaneous apperception1 and you will be sure that it has nothing subjective in it except what it is impossible it should not have1 to wit1 the me which is mingled with the fact without constituting it4 ,the me inevitably enters into all knowledge1 since it is the subject of it4 ,reason directly perceives truth2 but it is in some sort augmented1 in consciousness1 and then we have knowledge4 ,consciousness is there its witness1 and not its judge2 its only judge is reason1 a faculty subjective and objective together1 according to the language of ,germany1 which immediately attains absolute truth1 almost without personal intervention on our part1 although it might not enter into exercise if personality did not precede or were not added to it4#ci ,spontaneous apperception constitutes natural logic4 ,reflective conception is the foundation of logic properly so called4 ,one is based upon itself1 verum index sui2 the other is based upon the impossibility of the reason1 in spite of all its efforts1 not betaking itself to truth and believing in it4 ,the form of the first is an affirmation accompanied with an absolute security1 and without the least suspicion of a possible negation2 the form of the second is reflective affirmation1 that is to say1 the impossibility of denying and the necessity of affirming4 ,the idea of negation governs ordinary logic1 whose affirmations are only the laborious product of two negations4 ,natural logic proceeds by affirmations stamped with a simple faith1 which instinct alone produces and sustains4 ,now1 will ,kant reply that this reason1 which is much purer than that which he has known and described1 which is wholly pure1 which is conceived as something disengaged from reflection1 from volition1 from every thing that constitutes personality1 is nevertheless personal1 since we have a consciousness of it1 and since it is thus marked with subjectivity8 ,to this argument we have nothing to respond1 except that it is destroyed in the excess of its pretension4 ,in fact1 if1 that reason may not be subjective1 we must in no way participate in it1 and must not have even a consciousness of its exercise1 then there is no means of ever escaping this reproach of subjectivity1 and the ideal of objectivity which ,kant pursued is a chimerical1 extravagant ideal1 above1 or rather beneath1 all true intelligence1 all reason worthy the name2 for it is demanding that this intelligence and this reason should cease to have consciousness of themselves1 whilst this is precisely what characterizes intelligence and reason4#dj ,does ,kant mean1 then1 that reason1 in order to possess a really objective power1 cannot make its appearance in a particular subject1 that it must be1 for example1 wholly outside of the subject which ,i am8 ,then it is nothing for me2 a reason that is not mine1 that1 under the pretext of being universal1 infinite1 and absolute in its essence1 does not fall under the perception of my consciousness1 is for me as if it were not4 ,to wish that reason should wholly cease to be subjective1 is to demand something impossible to ,god himself4 ,no1 ,god himself can understand nothing except in knowing it1 with his intelligence and with the consciousness of this intelligence4 ,there is subjectivity1 then1 in divine knowledge itself2 if this subjectivity involves skepticism1 ,god is also condemned to skepticism1 and he can no more escape from it than men2 or indeed1 if this is too ridiculous1 if the knowledge which ,god has of the exercise of his own intelligence does not involve skepticism for him1 neither do the knowledge which we have of the exercise of our intelligence1 and the subjectivity attached to this knowledge1 involve it for us4 ,in truth1 when we see the father of ,german philosophy thus losing himself in the labyrinth of the problem of the subjectivity and the objectivity of first principles1 we are tempted to pardon ,reid for having disdained this problem1 for limiting himself to repeating that the absolute truth of universal and necessary principles rests upon the veracity of our faculties1 and that upon the veracity of our faculties we are compelled to accept their testimony4 ,to explain1 says he1 why we are convinced by our senses1 by consciousness1 by our faculties1 is an impossible thing2 we say--this is so1 it cannot be otherwise1 and we can go no farther4 ,is not this the expression of an irresistible belief1 of a belief which is the voice of nature1 and against which we contend in vain8 ,do we wish to penetrate farther1 to demand of our faculties1 one by one1 what are their titles to our confidence1 and to refuse them confidence until they have produced their claims8 ,then1 ,i fear that this extreme wisdom would conduct us to folly1 and that1 not having been willing to submit to the common lot of humanity1 we should be deprived of the light of common sense4#da ,let us support ourselves also by the following admirable passage of him who is1 for so many reasons1 the venerated master of the ,french philosophy of the nineteenth century4 ,intellectual life1 says ,m4 ,royer-,collard1 is an uninterrupted succession1 not only of ideas1 but of explicit or implicit beliefs4 ,the beliefs of the mind are the powers of the soul and the motives of the will4 ,that which determines us to belief we call evidence4 ,reason renders no account of evidence2 to condemn reason to account for evidence1 is to annihilate it1 for it needs itself an evidence which is fitted for it4 ,these are fundamental laws of belief which constitute intelligence1 and as they flow from the same source they have the same authority2 they judge by the same right2 there is no appeal from the tribunal of one to that of another4 ,he who revolts against a single one revolts against all1 and abdicates his whole nature4#db ,let us deduce the consequences of the facts of which we have just given an exposition4 #ast4 ,the argument of ,kant1 which is based upon the character of necessity in principles in order to weaken their objective authority1 applies only to the form imposed by reflection on these principles1 and does not reach their spontaneous application1 wherein the character of necessity no longer appears4 #b;d4 ,after all1 to conclude with the human race from the necessity of believing in the truth of what we believe1 is not to conclude badly2 for it is reasoning from effect to cause1 from the sign to the thing signified4 #c;d4 ,moreover1 the value of principles is above all demonstration4 ,psychological analysis seizes1 takes1 as it were1 by surprise1 in the fact of intuition1 an affirmation that is absolute1 that is inaccessible to doubt2 it establishes it2 and this is equivalent to demonstration4 ,to demand any other demonstration than this1 is to demand of reason an impossibility1 since absolute principles1 being necessary to all demonstration1 could only be demonstrated by themselves4#dc ,,footnotes3 #cg ,on conceptualism1 as well as on nominalism and realism1 see the ,introduction to the inedited works of ,abelard1 and also #ast ,series1 vol4 iv41 lecture #ba1 p4 #deg2 #b;d ,series1 vol4 iii41 lecture #bj1 p4 #bae1 and the work already cited on the ,metaphysics of ,aristotle1 p4 #di3 ,nothing exists in this world which has not its law more general than itself4 ,there is no individual that is not related to a species2 there are no phenomena bound together that are not united to a plan4 ,and it is necessary there should really be in nature species and a plan1 if every thing has been made with weight and measure1 cum pondere et mensura1 without which our very ideas of species and a plan would only be chimeras1 and human science a systematic illusion4 ,if it is pretended that there are individuals and no species1 things in juxtaposition and no plan2 for example1 human individuals more or less different1 and no human type1 and a thousand other things of the same sort1 well and good2 but in that case there is nothing general in the world1 except in the human understanding1 that is to say1 in other terms1 the world and nature are destitute of order and reason except in the head of man4 #ch ,see preceding lecture4 #ci ,on the just limits of the personality and the impersonality of reason1 see the following lecture1 near the close4 #dj ,we have everywhere maintained1 that consciousness is the condition1 or rather the necessary form of intelligence4 ,not to go beyond this volume1 see farther on1 lecture #e4 #da #ast ,series1 vol4 iv41 lecture #bb1 p4 #did4 #db ,oeuvres de ,reid1 vol4 iii41 p4 #dej4 #dc ,we have not thought it best to make this lecture lengthy by an exposition and detailed refutation of the ,critique of ,pure ,reason and its sad conclusion2 the little that we say of it is sufficient for our purpose1 which is much less historical than dogmatical4 ,we refer the reader to a volume that we have devoted to the father of ,german philosophy1 #ast ,series1 vol4 v41 in which we have again taken up and developed some of the arguments that are here used1 in which we believe that we have irresistibly exposed the capital defect of the transcendental logic of ,kant1 and of the whole ,german school1 that it leads to skepticism1 inasmuch as it raises superhuman1 chimerical1 extravagant problems1 and1 when well understood1 cannot solve them4 ,see especially lectures #f and #h4 ,,lecture ,,iv4 ,,god ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,principles4 ,object of the lecture3 ,what is the ultimate basis of absolute truth8--,four hypotheses3 ,absolute truth may reside either in us1 in particular beings and the world1 in itself1 or in ,god4 #a4 ,we perceive absolute truth1 we do not constitute it4 #b4 ,particular beings participate in absolute truth1 but do not explain it2 refutation of ,aristotle4 #c4 ,truth does not exist in itself2 defence of ,plato4 #d4 ,truth resides in ,god4--,plato2 ,st4 ,augustine2 ,descartes2 ,malebranche2 ,fenelon2 ,bossuet2 ,leibnitz4--,truth the mediator between ,god and man4--,essential distinctions4 ,we have justified the principles that govern our intelligence2 we have become confident that there is truth outside of us1 that there are verities worthy of that name1 which we can perceive1 which we do not make1 which are not solely conceptions of our mind1 which would still exist although our mind should not perceive them4 ,now this other problem naturally presents itself3 ,what1 then1 in themselves1 are these universal and necessary truths8 where do they reside8 whence do they come8 ,we do not raise this problem1 and the problems that it embraces2 the human mind itself proposes them1 and it is fully satisfied only when it has resolved them1 and when it has reached the extreme limit of knowledge that it is within its power to attain4 ,it is certain that the principles which1 in all the orders of knowledge1 discover to us absolute and necessary truths1 constitute part of our reason1 which surely makes its dwelling in us1 and is intimately connected with personality in the depths of intellectual life4 ,it follows that the truth1 which reason reveals to us1 falls thereby into close relation with the subject that perceives it1 and seems only a conception of our mind4 ,nevertheless1 as we have proved1 we perceive truth1 we are not the authors of it4 ,if the person that ,i am1 if the individual me does not1 perhaps1 explain the whole of reason1 how could it explain truth1 and absolute truth8 ,man1 limited and passing away1 perceives necessary1 eternal1 infinite truth2 that is for him a privilege sufficiently high2 but he is neither the principle that sustains truth1 nor the principle that gives it being4 ,man may say1 ,my reason2 but give him credit for never having dared to say1 ,my truth4 ,if absolute truths are beyond man who perceives them1 once more1 where are they1 then8 ,a peripatetic would respond--,in nature4 ,is it1 in fact1 necessary to seek for them any other subject than the beings themselves which they govern8 ,what are the laws of nature1 except certain properties which our mind disengages from the beings and phenomena in which they are met1 in order to consider them apart8 ,mathematical principles are nothing more4 ,for example1 the axiom thus expressed--,the whole is greater than any of its parts1 is true of any whole and part whatever4 ,the principle of contradiction1 considered in its logical title1 as the condition of all our judgments1 of all our reasonings1 constitutes a part of the essence of all being1 and no being can exist without containing it4 ,the universal exists1 says ,aristotle1 but it does not exist apart from particular beings4#dd ,this theory which considers universals as having their basis in things1 is a progress towards the pure conceptualism which we have in the beginning indicated and shunned4 ,aristotle is much more of a realist than ,abelard and ,kant4 ,he is quite right in maintaining that universals are in particular things1 for particular things could not be without universals2 universals give to them their fixity1 even for a day1 and their unity4 ,but from the fact that universals are in particular beings1 is it necessary to conclude that they1 wholly and exclusively1 reside there1 and that they have no other reality than that of the objects to which they are applied8 ,it is the same with principles of which universals are the constitutive elements4 ,it is1 it is true1 in the particular fact1 of a particular cause producing a particular event1 that is given us the universal principle of causality2 but this principle is much more extensive than the facts1 for it is applied1 not only to this fact1 but to a thousand others4 ,the particular fact contains the principle1 but it does not wholly contain it1 and1 far from giving the basis of the principle1 it is based upon it4 ,as much may be said of other principles4 ,perhaps it will be replied that1 if a principle is certainly more extensive than such a fact1 or such a being1 it is not more extensive than all facts and all beings1 and that nature1 considered as a whole1 can explain that which each particular being does not explain4 ,but nature1 in its totality1 is still only a finite and contingent thing1 whilst the principles to be explained have a necessary and infinite bearing4 ,the idea of the infinite can come neither from any particular being1 nor from the whole of beings4 ,entire nature will not furnish us the idea of perfection1 for all the beings of nature are imperfect4 ,absolute principles govern1 then1 all facts and all beings1 they do not spring from them4 ,will it be necessary to come to the opinion1 then1 that absolute truths1 being explicable neither by humanity nor by nature1 subsist by themselves1 and are to themselves their own foundation and their own subject8 ,but this opinion contains still more absurdities than the preceding2 for1 ,i ask1 what are truths1 absolute or contingent1 that exist by themselves1 out of things in which they are found1 and out of the intelligence that conceives them8 ,truth is1 then1 only a realized abstraction4 ,there are no quintessential metaphysics which can prevail against good sense2 and if such is the ,platonic theory of ideas1 ,aristotle is right in his opposition to it4 ,but such a theory is only a chimera that ,aristotle created for the pleasure of combating it4 ,let us hasten to remove absolute truths from this ambiguous and equivocal state4 ,and how8 ,by applying to them a principle which should now be familiar to you4 ,yes1 truth necessarily appeals to something beyond itself4 ,as every phenomenon has its subject of inherence1 as our faculties1 our thoughts1 our volitions1 our sensations1 exist only in a being which is ourselves1 so truth supposes a being in which it resides1 and absolute truths suppose a being absolute as themselves1 wherein they have their final foundation4 ,we come thus to something absolute1 which is no longer suspended in the vagueness of abstraction1 but is a being substantially existing4 ,this being1 absolute and necessary1 since it is the subject of necessary and absolute truths1 this being which is at the foundation of truth as its very essence1 in a single word1 is called ,god4#de ,this theory1 which conducts from absolute truth to absolute being1 is not new in the history of philosophy3 it goes back to ,plato4 ,plato1#df in searching for the principles of knowledge clearly saw1 with ,socrates his master1 that the least definition1 without which there can be no precise knowledge1 supposes something universal and one1 which does not come within the reach of the senses1 which reason alone can discover2 this something universal and one he called ,idea4 ,ideas1 which possess universality and unity1 do not come from material1 changing1 and mobile things1 to which they are applied1 and which render them intelligible4 ,on the other hand1 it is not the human mind that constitutes ideas2 for man is not the measure of truth4 ,plato calls ,ideas veritable beings1 ,greek3 ta ontos onta1 since they alone communicate to sensible things and to human cognitions their truth and their unity4 ,but does it follow that ,plato gives to ,ideas a substantial existence1 that he makes of them beings properly so called8 ,it is important that no cloud should be left on this fundamental point of the ,platonic theory4 ,at first1 if any one should pretend that in ,plato ,ideas are beings subsisting by themselves1 without interconnection and without relation to a common centre1 numerous passages of the ,timaeus might be objected to him1#dg in which ,plato speaks of ,ideas as forming in their whole an ideal unity1 which is the reason of the unity of the visible world4#dh ,will it be said that this ideal world forms a distinct unity1 a unity separate from ,god8 ,but1 in order to sustain this assertion1 it is necessary to forget so many passages of the ,republic1 in which the relations of truth and science with the ,good1 that is to say1 with ,god1 are marked in brilliant characters4 ,let not that magnificent comparison be forgotten1 in which1 after having said that the sun produces in the physical world light and life1 ,socrates adds3 ,so thou art able to say1 intelligible beings not only hold from the ,good that which renders them intelligible1 but also their being and their essence4#di ,so1 intelligible beings1 that is to say1 ,ideas1 are not beings that exist by themselves4 ,men go on repeating with assurance that the ,good1 in ,plato1 is only the idea of the good1 and that an idea is not ,god4 ,i reply1 that the ,good is in fact an idea1 according to ,plato1 but that the idea here is not a pure conception of the mind1 an object of thought1 as the peripatetic school understood it2 ,i add1 that the ,idea of the ,good is in ,plato the first of ,ideas1 and that1 for this reason1 while remaining for us an object of thought1 it is confounded as to existence with ,god4 ,if the ,idea of the ,good is not ,god himself1 how will the following passage1 also taken from the ,republic1 be explained8 ,at the extreme limits of the intellectual world is the ,idea of the ,good1 which is perceived with difficulty1 but1 in fine1 cannot be perceived without concluding that it is the source of all that is beautiful and good2 that in the visible world it produces light1 and the star whence the light directly comes1 that in the invisible world it directly produces truth and intelligence4#ej ,who can produce1 on the one hand1 the sun and light1 on the other1 truth and intelligence1 except a real being8 ,but all doubt disappears before the following passages from the ,phaedrus1 neglected1 as it would seem designedly1 by the detractors of ,plato3 ,in this transition1 7the soul7 contemplates justice1 contemplates wisdom1 contemplates science1 not that wherein enters change1 nor that which shows itself different in the different objects which we are pleased to call beings1 but science as it exists in that which is called being1 par excellence4444#ea--;,it belongs to the soul to conceive the universal1 that is to say1 that which1 in the diversity of sensations1 can be comprehended under a rational unity4 ,this is the remembrance of what the soul has seen during its journey in the train of ,deity1 when1 disdaining what we improperly call beings1 it looked upwards to the only true being4 ,so it is just that the thought of the philosopher should alone have wings2 for its remembrance is always as much as possible with the things which make ,god a true ,god1 inasmuch as he is with them4#eb ,so the objects of the philosopher's contemplation1 that is to say1 ,ideas1 are in ,god1 and it is by these1 by his essential union with these1 that ,god is the true ,god1 the ,god who1 as ,plato admirably says in the ,sophist1 participates in august and holy intelligence4#ec ,it is therefore certain1 that1 in the true ,platonic theory1 ,ideas are not beings in the vulgar sense of the word1 beings which would be neither in the mind of man1 nor in nature1 nor in ,god1 and would subsist only by themselves4 ,no1 ,plato considers ,ideas as being at once the principles of sensible things1 of which they are the laws1 and the principles also of human knowledge1 which owes to them its light1 its rule1 and its end1 and the essential attributes of ,god1 that is to say1 ,god himself4 ,plato is truly the father of the doctrine which we have explained1 and the great philosophers who have attached themselves to his school have always professed this same doctrine4 ,the founder of ,christian metaphysics1 ,st4 ,augustine1 is a declared disciple of ,plato3 everywhere he speaks1 like ,plato1 of the relation of human reason to the divine reason1 and of truth to ,god4 ,in the ,city of ,god1 book x41 chap4 ii41 and in chap4 ix4 of book vii4 of the ,confessions1 he goes to the extent of comparing the ,platonic doctrine with that of ,st4 ,john4 ,he adopts1 without reserve1 the theory of ,ideas4 ,book of ,eighty-three ,questions1 question #df3 ,ideas are the primordial forms1 and1 as it were1 the immutable reasons of things2 they are not created1 they are eternal1 and always the same3 they are contained in the divine intelligence2 and without being subject to birth and death1 they are the types according to which is formed every thing that is born and dies4#ed ,what man1 pious1 and penetrated with true religion1 would dare to deny that all things that exist1 that is to say1 all things that1 each of its kind1 possess a determinate nature1 have been created by ,god8 ,this point being once conceded1 can it be said that ,god has created things without reason8 ,if it is impossible to say or think this1 it follows that all things have been created with reason4 ,but the reason of the existence of a man cannot be the same as the reason of the existence of a horse2 that is absurd2 each thing has therefore been created by virtue of a reason that is peculiar to it4 ,now1 where can these reasons be1 except in the mind of the ,creator8 ,for he saw nothing out of himself1 which he could use as a model for creating what he created3 such an opinion would be sacrilege4#ee ,if the reasons of things to be created and things created are contained in the divine intelligence1 and if there is nothing in the divine intelligence but the eternal and immutable1 the reasons of things which ,plato calls ,ideas1 are the eternal and immutable truths1 by the participation in which every thing that is is such as it is4#ef ,st4 ,thomas himself1 who scarcely knew ,plato1 and who was often enough held by ,aristotle in a kind of empiricism1 carried away by ,christianity and ,st4 ,augustine1 let the sentiment escape him1 that our natural reason is a sort of participation in the divine reason1 that to this we owe our knowledge and our judgments1 that this is the reason why it is said1 that we see every thing in ,god4#eg ,there are in ,st4 ,thomas many other similar passages1 of perhaps an expressive ,platonism1 which is not the ,platonism of ,plato1 but of the ,alexandrians4 ,the ,cartesian philosophy1 in spite of its profound originality1 and its wholly ,french character1 is full of the ,platonic spirit4 ,descartes has no thought of ,plato1 whom apparently he has never read2 in nothing does he imitate or resemble him3 nevertheless1 from the first1 he is met in the same regions with ,plato1 whither he goes by a different route4 ,the notion of the infinite and the perfect is for ,descartes what the universal1 the ,idea1 is for ,plato4 ,no sooner has ,descartes found by consciousness that he thinks1 than he concludes from this that he exists1 then1 in course1 by consciousness still1 he recognizes himself as imperfect1 full of defects1 limitations1 miseries1 and1 at the same time1 conceives something infinite and perfect4 ,he possesses the idea of the infinite and the perfect2 but this idea is not his own work1 for he is imperfect2 it must then have been put into him by another being endowed with perfection1 whom he conceives1 whom he does not possess3--that being is ,god4 ,such is the process by which ,descartes1 setting out from his own thought1 and his own being1 elevated himself to ,god4 ,this process1 so simple1 which he so simply exposes in the ,discours de la ,methode1 he will put successively1 in the ,meditations1 in the ,responses aux ,objections1 in the ,principes1 under the most diverse forms1 he will accommodate it1 if it is necessary1 to the language of the schools1 in order that it may penetrate into them4 ,after all1 this process is compelled to conclude1 from the idea of the infinite and the perfect1 in the existence of a cause of this idea1 adequate1 at least1 to the idea itself1 that is to say1 infinite and perfect4 ,one sees that the first difference between ,plato and ,descartes is1 that the ideas which in ,plato are at once conceptions of our mind1 and the principles of things1 are for ,descartes1 as well as for all modern philosophy1 only our conceptions1 amongst which that of the infinite and perfect occupies the first place2 the second difference is1 that ,plato goes from ideas to ,god by the principle of substances1 if we may be allowed to use this technical language of modern philosophy2 whilst ,descartes employs rather the principle of causality1 and concludes--well understood without syllogism--from the idea of the infinite and the perfect in a cause also perfect and infinite4#eh ,but under these differences1 and in spite of many more1 is a common basis1 a genius the same1 which at first elevates us above the senses1 and1 by the intermediary of marvellous ideas that are incontestably in us1 bears us towards him who alone can be their substance1 who is the infinite and perfect author of our idea of infinity and perfection4 ,for this reason1 ,descartes belongs to the family of ,plato and ,socrates4 ,the idea of the perfect and the finite being once introduced into the philosophy of the seventeenth century1 it becomes there for the successors of ,descartes what the theory of ideas became for the successors of ,plato4 ,among the ,french writers1 ,malebranche1 perhaps1 reminds us with the least disadvantage1 although very imperfectly still1 of the manner of ,plato3 he sometimes expresses its elevation and grace2 but he is far from possessing the ,socratic good sense1 and1 it must be confessed1 no one has clouded more the theory of ideas by exaggerations of every kind which he has mingled with them4#ei ,instead of establishing that there is in the human reason1 wholly personal as it is by its intimate relation with our other faculties1 something also which is not personal1 something universal which permits it to elevate itself to universal truths1 ,malebranche does not hesitate to absolutely confound the reason that is in us with the divine reason itself4 ,moreover1 according to ,malebranche1 we do not directly know particular things1 sensible objects2 we know them only by ideas2 it is the intelligible extension and not the material extension that we immediately perceive2 in vision the proper object of the mind is the universal1 the idea2 and as the idea is in ,god1 it is in ,god that we see all things4 ,we can understand how well-formed minds must have been shocked by such a theory2 but it is not just to confound ,plato with his brilliant and unfaithful disciple4 ,in ,plato1 sensibility directly attains sensible things2 it makes them known to us as they are1 that is to say1 as very imperfect and undergoing perpetual change1 which renders the knowledge that we have of them almost unworthy of the name of knowledge4 ,it is reason1 different in us from sensibility1 which1 above sensible objects1 discovers to us the universal1 the idea1 and gives a knowledge solid and durable4 ,having once attained ideas1 we have reached ,god himself1 in whom they have their foundation1 who finishes and consummates true knowledge4 ,but we have no need of ,god1 nor of ideas1 in order to perceive sensible objects1 which are defective and changing2 for this our senses are sufficient4 ,reason is distinct from the senses2 it transcends the imperfect knowledge of what they are capable2 it attains the universal1 because it possesses something universal itself2 it participates in the divine reason1 but it is not the divine reason2 it is enlightened by it1 it comes from it1--it is not it4 ,fenelon is inspired at once by ,malebranche and ,descartes in the treatise1 de l',existence de ,dieu4 ,the second part is entirely ,cartesian in method1 in the order and sequence of the proofs4 ,nevertheless1 ,malebranche also appears there1 especially in the fourth chapter1 on the nature of ideas1 and he predominates in all the metaphysical portions of the first part4 ,after the explanations which we have given1 it will not be difficult for you to discern what is true and what is at times excessive in the passages which follow3#fj ,part i41 chap4 lii4 ,oh6 how great is the mind of man6 ,it bears in itself what astonishes itself and infinitely surpasses itself4 ,its ideas are universal1 eternal1 and immutable4444 ,the idea of the infinite is in me as well as that of lines1 numbers1 and circles4444--,chap4 liv4 ,besides this idea of the infinite1 ,i have also universal and immutable notions1 which are the rule of all my judgments4 ,i can judge of nothing except by consulting them1 and it is not in my power to judge against what they represent to me4 ,my thoughts1 far from being able to correct this rule1 are themselves corrected in spite of me by this superior rule1 and they are irresistibly adjusted to its decision4 ,whatever effort of mind ,i may make1 ,i can never succeed in doubting that two and two are four2 that the whole is not greater than any of its parts2 that the centre of a perfect circle is not equidistant from all points of the circumference4 ,i am not at liberty to deny these propositions2 and if ,i deny these truths1 or others similar to them1 ,i have in me something that is above me1 that forces me to the conclusion4 ,this fixed and immutable rule is so internal and so intimate that ,i am inclined to take it for myself2 but it is above me since it corrects me1 redresses me1 and puts me in defiance against myself1 and reminds me of my impotence4 ,it is something that suddenly inspires me1 provided ,i listen to it1 and ,i am never deceived except in not listening to it4444 ,this internal rule is what ,i call my reason4444--,chap4 lv4 ,in truth my reason is in me2 for ,i must continually enter into myself in order to find it4 ,but the higher reason which corrects me when necessary1 which ,i consult1 exists not by me1 and makes no part of me4 ,this rule is perfect and immutable2 ,i am changing and imperfect4 ,when ,i am deceived1 it does not lose its integrity4 ,when ,i am undeceived1 it is not this that returns to its end3 it is this which1 without ever having deviated1 has the authority over me to remind me of my error1 and to make me return4 ,it is a master within1 which makes me keep silent1 which makes me speak1 which makes me believe1 which makes me doubt1 which makes me acknowledge my errors or confirm my judgments4 ,listening to it1 ,i am instructed2 listening to myself1 ,i err4 ,this master is everywhere1 and its voice makes itself heard1 from end to end of the universe1 in all men as well as in me4444--,chap4 lvi4444 ,that which appears the most in us and seems to be the foundation of ourselves1 ,i mean our reason1 is that which is least of all our own1 which we are constrained to believe to be especially borrowed4 ,we receive without cessation1 and at all moments1 a reason superior to us1 as we breathe without cessation the air1 which is a foreign body4444--,chap4 lvii4 ,the internal and universal master always and everywhere speaks the same truths4 ,we are not this master4 ,it is true that we often speak without it1 and more loftily than it4 ,but we are then deceived1 we are stammering1 we do not understand ourselves4 ,we even fear to see that we are deceived1 and we close the ear through fear of being humiliated by its corrections4 ,without doubt1 man1 who fears being corrected by this incorruptible reason1 who always wanders in not following it1 is not that perfect1 universal1 immutable reason which corrects him in spite of himself4 ,in all things we find1 as it were1 two principles within us4 ,one gives1 the other receives2 one wants1 the other supplies2 one is deceived1 the other corrects2 one goes wrong by its own inclination1 the other rectifies it4444 ,each one feels within himself a limited and subaltern reason1 which wanders when it escapes a complete subordination1 which is corrected only by returning to the yoke of another superior1 universal1 and immutable power4 ,so every thing in us bears the mark of a subaltern1 limited1 partial1 borrowed reason1 which needs another to correct it at every moment4 ,all men are rational1 because they possess the same reason which is communicated to them in different degrees4 ,there is a certain number of wise men2 but the wisdom which they receive1 as it were1 from the fountain-head1 which makes them what they are1 is one and the same4444--,chap4 lviii4 ,where is this wisdom8 ,where is this reason1 which is both common and superior to all the limited and imperfect reasons of the human race8 ,where1 then1 is this oracle which is never silent1 against which the vain prejudices of peoples are always impotent8 ,where is this reason which we ever need to consult1 which comes to us to inspire us with the desire of listening to its voice8 ,where is this light that lighteneth every man that cometh into the world4444 ,the substance of the human eye is not light2 on the contrary1 the eye borrows at each moment the light of the sun's rays4 ,so my mind is not the primitive reason1 the universal and immutable truth1 it is only the medium that conducts this original light1 that is illuminated by it4444--,chap4 lx4 ,i find two reasons in myself1--one is myself1 the other is above me4 ,that which is in me is very imperfect1 faulty1 uncertain1 preoccupied1 precipitate1 subject to aberration1 changing1 conceited1 ignorant1 and limited2 in fine1 it possesses nothing but what it borrows4 ,the other is common to all men1 and is superior to all2 it is perfect1 eternal1 immutable1 always ready to communicate itself in all places1 and to rectify all minds that are deceived1 in fine1 incapable of ever being exhausted or divided1 although it gives itself to those who desire it4 ,where is this perfect reason1 that is so near me and so different from me8 ,where is it8 ,it must be something real4444 ,where is this supreme reason8 ,is it not ,god that ,i am seeking8 ,part ii41 chap4 i41 sect4 #bh4fa ,i have in me the idea of the infinite and of infinite perfection4444 ,give me a finite thing as great as you please--let it quite transcend the reach of my senses1 so that it becomes1 as it were1 infinite to my imagination2 it always remains finite in my mind2 ,i conceive a limit to it1 even when ,i cannot imagine it4 ,i am not able to mark the limit2 but ,i know that it exists2 and far from confounding it with the infinite1 ,i conceive it as infinitely distant from the idea that ,i have of the veritable infinite4 ,if one speaks to me of the indefinite as a mean between the two extremes of the infinite and the limited1 ,i reply1 that it signifies nothing1 that1 at least1 it only signifies something truly finite1 whose boundaries escape the imagination without escaping the mind4444 ,sect4 #bi4 ,where have ,i obtained this idea1 which is so much above me1 which infinitely surpasses me1 which astonishes me1 which makes me disappear in my own eyes1 which renders the infinite present to me8 ,whence does it come8 ,where have ,i obtained it8444 ,once more1 whence comes this marvellous representation of the infinite1 which pertains to the infinite itself1 which resembles nothing finite8 ,it is in me1 it is more than myself2 it seems to me every thing1 and myself nothing4 ,i can neither efface1 obscure1 diminish1 nor contradict it4 ,it is in me2 ,i have not put it there1 ,i have found it there2 and ,i have found it there only because it was already there before ,i sought it4 ,it remains there invariable1 even when ,i do not think of it1 when ,i think of something else4 ,i find it whenever ,i seek it1 and it often presents itself when ,i am not seeking it4 ,it does not depend upon me2 ,i depend upon it4444 ,moreover1 who has made this infinite representation of the infinite1 so as to give it to me8 ,has it made itself8 ,has the infinite image#fb of the infinite had no original1 according to which it has been made1 no real cause that has produced it8 ,where are we in relation to it8 ,and what a mass of extravagances6 ,it is1 therefore1 absolutely necessary to conclude that it is the infinitely perfect being that renders himself immediately present to me1 when ,i conceive him1 and that he himself is the idea which ,i have of him4444 ,chap4 iv41 sect4 #di4 444 ,my ideas are myself2 for they are my reason4444 ,my ideas1 and the basis of myself1 or of my mind1 appear but the same thing4 ,on the other hand1 my mind is changing1 uncertain1 ignorant1 subject to error1 precipitate in its judgments1 accustomed to believe what it does not clearly understand1 and to judge without having sufficiently consulted its ideas1 which are by themselves certain and immutable4 ,my ideas1 then1 are not myself1 and ,i am not my ideas4 ,what shall ,i believe1 then1 they can be8444 ,what then6 are my ideas ,god8 ,they are superior to my mind1 since they rectify and correct it2 they have the character of the ,divinity1 for they are universal and immutable like ,god2 they really subsist1 according to a principle that we have already established3 nothing exists so really as that which is universal and immutable4 ,if that which is changing1 transitory1 and derived1 truly exists1 much more does that which cannot change1 and is necessary4 ,it is then necessary to find in nature something existing and real1 that is1 my ideas1 something that is within me1 and is not myself1 that is superior to me1 that is in me even when ,i am not thinking of it1 with which ,i believe myself to be alone1 as though ,i were only with myself1 in fine1 that is more present to me1 and more intimate than my own foundation4 ,i know not what this something1 so admirable1 so familiar1 so unknown1 can be1 except ,god4 ,let us now hear the most solid1 the most authoritative of the ,christian doctors of the seventeenth century--let us hear ,bossuet in his ,logic1 and in the ,treatise on the ,knowledge of ,god and ,self4#fc ,bossuet may be said to have had three masters in philosophy--,st4 ,augustine1 ,st4 ,thomas1 and ,descartes4 ,he had been taught at the college of ,navarre the doctrine of ,st4 ,thomas1 that is to say1 a modified peripateticism2 at the same time he was nourished by the reading of ,st4 ,augustine1 and out of the schools he found spread abroad the philosophy of ,descartes4 ,he adopted it1 and had no difficulty in reconciling it with that of ,st4 ,augustine1 while1 upon more than one point1 it corroborated the doctrine of ,st4 ,thomas4 ,bossuet invented nothing in philosophy2 he received every thing1 but every thing united and purified1 thanks to that supreme good sense which in him is a quality predominating over force1 grandeur1 and eloquence4#fd ,in the passages which ,i am about to exhibit to you1 which ,i hope you will impress upon your memories1 you will not find the grace of ,malebranche1 the exhaustless abundance of ,fenelon2 you will find what is better than either1 to wit1 clearness and precision--all the rest in him is in some sort an addition to these4 ,fenelon disengages badly enough the process which conducts from ideas1 from universal and necessary truths1 to ,god4 ,bossuet renders to himself a strict account of this process1 and marks it with force2 it is the principle that we have invoked1 that which concludes from attributes in a subject1 from qualities in a being1 from laws in a legislator1 from eternal verities in an eternal mind that comprehends them and eternally possesses them4 ,bossuet cites ,st4 ,augustine1 cites ,plato himself1 interprets him and defends him in advance against those who would make ,platonic ideas beings subsisting by themselves1 whilst they really exist only in the mind of ,god4 ,logic1 book i41 chap4 xxxvi4 ,when ,i consider a rectilineal triangle as a figure bounded by three straight lines1 and having three angles equal to two right angles1 neither more nor less2 and when ,i pass from this to an equilateral triangle with its three sides and its three angles equal1 whence it follows1 that ,i consider each angle of this triangle as less than a right angle2 and when ,i come again to consider a right-angled triangle1 and what ,i clearly see in this idea1 in connection with the preceding ideas1 that the two angles of this triangle are necessarily acute1 and that these two acute angles are exactly equal to one right angle1 neither more nor less--,i see nothing contingent and mutable1 and consequently1 the ideas that represent to me these truths are eternal4 ,were there not in nature a single equilateral or right-angled triangle1 or any triangle whatever1 every thing that ,i have just considered would remain always true and indubitable4 ,in fact1 ,i am not sure of having ever seen an equilateral or rectilineal triangle4 ,neither the rule nor the dividers could assure me that any human hand1 however skilful1 could ever make a line exactly straight1 or sides and angles perfectly equal to each other4 ,in strictness1 we should only need a microscope1 in order1 not to understand1 but to see at a glance1 that the lines which we trace deviate from straightness1 and differ in length4 ,we have never seen1 then1 any but imperfect images of equilateral1 rectilineal1 or isosceles triangles1 since they neither exist in nature1 nor can be constructed by art4 ,nevertheless1 what we see of the nature and the properties of a triangle1 independently of every existing triangle1 is certain and indubitable4 ,place an understanding in any given time1 or at any point in eternity1 thus to speak1 and it will see these truths equally manifest2 they are1 therefore1 eternal4 ,since the understanding does not give being to truth1 but is only employed in perceiving truth1 it follows1 that were every created understanding destroyed1 these truths would immutably subsist4444 ,chap4 xxxvii4 ,since there is nothing eternal1 immutable1 independent1 but ,god alone1 we must conclude that these truths do not subsist in themselves1 but in ,god alone1 and in his eternal ideas1 which are nothing else than himself4 ,there are those who1 in order to verify these eternal truths which we have proposed1 and others of the same nature1 have figured to themselves eternal essences aside from deity--a pure illusion1 which comes from not understanding that in ,god1 as in the source of being1 and in his understanding1 where resides the art of making and ordering all things1 are found primitive ideas1 or as ,st4 ,augustine says1 the eternally subsisting reasons of things4 ,thus1 in the thought of the architect is the primitive idea of a house which he perceives in himself2 this intellectual house would not be destroyed by any ruin of houses built according to this interior model2 and if the architect were eternal1 the idea and the reason of the house would also be eternal4 ,but1 without recurring to the mortal architect1 there is an immortal architect1 or rather a primitive eternally subsisting art in the immutable thought of ,god1 where all order1 all measure1 all rule1 all proportion1 all reason1 in a word1 all truth are found in their origin4 ,these eternal verities which our ideas represent1 are the true object of science2 and this is the reason why ,plato1 in order to render us truly wise1 continually reminds us of these ideas1 wherein is seen1 not what is formed1 but what is1 not what is begotten and is corrupt1 what appears and vanishes1 what is made and defective1 but what eternally subsists4 ,it is this intellectual world which that divine philosopher has put in the mind of ,god before the world was constructed1 which is the immutable model of that great work4 ,these are the simple1 eternal1 immutable1 unbegotten1 incorruptible ideas to which he refers us1 in order to understand truth4 ,this is what has made him say that our ideas1 images of the divine ideas1 were also immediately derived from the divine ideas1 and did not come by the senses1 which serve very well1 said he1 to awaken them1 but not to form them in our mind4 ,for if1 without having ever seen any thing eternal1 we have so clear an idea of eternity1 that is to say1 of being that is always the same2 if1 without having perceived a perfect triangle1 we understand it distinctly1 and demonstrate so many incontestable truths concerning it1 it is a mark that these ideas do not come from our senses4 ,treatise on the ,knowledge of ,god and ,self4#fe ,chap4 iv41 sect4 #e4 ,intelligence has for its object eternal truths1 which are nothing else than ,god himself1 in whom they are always subsisting and perfectly understood4 444 ,we have already remarked that the understanding has eternal verities for its object4 ,the standards by which we measure all things are eternal and invariable4 ,we know clearly that every thing in the universe is made according to proportion1 from the greatest to the least1 from the strongest to the weakest1 and we know it well enough to understand that these proportions are related to the principles of eternal truth4 ,all that is demonstrated in mathematics1 and in any other science whatever1 is eternal and immutable1 since the effect of the demonstration is to show that the thing cannot be otherwise than as it is demonstrated to be4 ,so1 in order to understand the nature and the properties of things which ,i know1 for example1 a triangle1 a square1 a circle1 or the relations of these figures1 and all other figures1 to each other1 it is not necessary that ,i should find such in nature1 and ,i may be sure that ,i have never traced1 never seen1 any that are perfect4 ,neither is it necessary that ,i should think that there is motion in the world in order to understand the nature of motion itself1 or that of the lines which every motion describes1 and the hidden proportions according to which it is developed4 ,when the idea of these things is once awakened in my mind1 ,i know that1 whether they have an actual existence or not1 so they must be1 that it is impossible for them to be of another nature1 or to be made in a different way4 ,to come to something that concerns us more nearly1 ,i mean by these principles of eternal truth1 that they do not depend on human existence1 that1 so far as he is capable of reasoning1 it is the essential duty of man to live according to reason1 and to search for his maker1 through fear of lacking the recognition of his maker1 if in fault of searching for him1 he should be ignorant of him4 ,all these truths1 and all those which ,i deduce from them by sure reasoning1 subsist independently of all time4 ,in whatever time ,i place a human understanding1 it will know them1 but in knowing them it will find them truths1 it will not make them such1 for our cognitions do not make their objects1 but suppose them4 ,so these truths subsist before all time1 before the existence of a human understanding3 and were every thing that is made according to the laws of proportion1 that is to say1 every thing that ,i see in nature1 destroyed except myself1 these laws would be preserved in my thought1 and ,i should clearly see that they would always be good and always true1 were ,i also destroyed with the rest4 ,if ,i seek how1 where1 and in what subject they subsist eternal and immutable1 as they are1 ,i am obliged to avow the existence of a being in whom truth is eternally subsisting1 in whom it is always understood2 and this being must be truth itself1 and must be all truth1 and from him it is that truth is derived in every thing that exists and has understanding out of him4 ,it is1 then1 in him1 in a certain manner1 who is incomprehensible#ff to me1 it is in him1 ,i say1 that ,i see these eternal truths2 and to see them is to turn to him who is immutably all truth1 and to receive his light4 ,this eternal object is ,god eternally subsisting1 eternally true1 eternally truth itself4444 ,it is in this eternal that these eternal truths subsist4 ,it is also by this that ,i see them4 ,all other men see them as well as myself1 and we see them always the same1 and as having existed before us4 ,for we know that we have commenced1 and we know that these truths have always been4 ,thus we see them in a light superior to ourselves1 and it is in this superior light that we see whether we act well or ill1 that is to say1 whether we act according to these constitutive principles of our being or not4 ,in that1 then1 we see1 with all other truths1 the invariable rules of our conduct1 and we see that there are things in regard to which duty is indispensable1 and that in things which are naturally indifferent1 the true duty is to accommodate ourselves to the greatest good of society4 ,a well-disposed man conforms to the civil laws1 as he conforms to custom4 ,but he listens to an inviolable law in himself1 which says to him that he must do wrong to no one1 that it is better to be injured than to injure4444 ,the man who sees these truths1 by these truths judges himself1 and condemns himself when he errs4 ,or1 rather1 these truths judge him1 since they do not accommodate themselves to human judgments1 but human judgments are accommodated to them4 ,and the man judges rightly when1 feeling these judgments to be variable in their nature1 he gives them for a rule these eternal verities4 ,these eternal verities which every understanding always perceives the same1 by which every understanding is governed1 are something of ,god1 or rather1 are ,god himself4444 ,truth must somewhere be very perfectly understood1 and man is to himself an indubitable proof of this4 ,for1 whether he considers himself or extends his vision to the beings that surround him1 he sees every thing subjected to certain laws1 and to immutable rules of truth4 ,he sees that he understands these laws1 at least in part1--he who has neither made himself1 nor any part of the universe1 however small1 and he sees that nothing could have been made had not these laws been elsewhere perfectly understood2 and he sees that it is necessary to recognize an eternal wisdom wherein all law1 all order1 all proportion1 have their primitive reason4 ,for it is absurd to suppose that there is so much sequence in truths1 so much proportion in things1 so much economy in their arrangement1 that is to say1 in the world1 and that this sequence1 this proportion1 this economy1 should nowhere be understood3--and man1 who has made nothing1 veritably knowing these things1 although not fully knowing them1 must judge that there is some one who knows them in their perfection1 and that this is he who has made all things4444 ,sect4 #f is wholly ,cartesian4 ,bossuet there demonstrates that the soul knows by the imperfection of its own intelligence that there is elsewhere a perfect intelligence4 ,in sect4 #i1 ,bossuet elucidates anew the relation of truth to ,god4 ,whence comes to my intelligence this impression1 so pure1 of truth8 ,whence come to it those immutable rules that govern reasoning1 that form manners1 by which it discovers the secret proportions of figures and of movements8 ,whence come to it1 in a word1 those eternal truths which ,i have considered so much8 ,do the triangles1 the squares1 the circles1 that ,i rudely trace on paper1 impress upon my mind their proportions and their relations8 ,or are there others whose perfect trueness produces this effect8 ,where have ,i seen these circles and these triangles so true1--,i who am not sure of ever having seen a perfectly regular figure1 and1 nevertheless1 understand this regularity so perfectly8 ,are there somewhere1 either in the world or out of the world1 triangles or circles existing with this perfect regularity1 whereby it could be impressed upon my mind8 ,and do these rules of reasoning and conduct also exist in some place1 whence they communicate to me their immutable truth8 ,or1 indeed1 is it not rather he who has everywhere extended measure1 proportion1 truth itself1 that impresses on my mind the certain idea of them8444 ,it is1 then1 necessary to understand that the soul1 made in the image of ,god1 capable of understanding truth1 which is ,god himself1 actually turns towards its original1 that is to say1 towards ,god1 where the truth appears to it as soon as ,god wills to make the truth appear to it4444 ,it is an astonishing thing that man understands so many truths1 without understanding at the same time that all truth comes from ,god1 that it is in ,god1 that it is ,god himself4444 ,it is certain that ,god is the primitive reason of all that exists and has understanding in the universe2 that he is the true original1 and that every thing is true by relation to his eternal idea1 that seeking truth is seeking him1 and that finding truth is finding him4444 ,chap4 v41 sect4 #ad4 ,the senses do not convey to the soul knowledge of truth4 ,they excite it1 awaken it1 and apprize it of certain effects3 it is solicited to search for causes1 but it discovers them1 it sees their connections1 the principles which put them in motion1 only in a superior light that comes from ,god1 or is ,god himself4 ,god is1 then1 truth1 which is always the same to all minds1 and the true source of intelligence4 ,for this reason intelligence beholds the light1 breathes1 and lives4 ,at the close of the seventeenth century1 ,leibnitz comes to crown these great testimonies1 and to complete their unanimity4 ,here is a passage from an important treatise entitled1 ,meditationes de ,cognitione1 ,veritate et ,idaeis1 in which ,leibnitz declares that primary notions are the attributes of ,god4 ,i know not1 he says1 whether man can perfectly account to himself for his ideas1 except by ascending to primary ideas for which he can no more account1 that is to say1 to the absolute attributes of ,god4#fg ,the same doctrine is in the ,principia ,philosophiae seu ,theses in ,gratiam ,principis ,eugenii4 ,the intelligence of ,god is the region of eternal truths1 and the ideas that depend upon them4#fh ,theodicea1 part ii41 sect4 #ahi4fi ,it must not be said with the ,scotists that eternal truths would subsist if there were no understanding1 not even that of ,god4 ,for1 in my opinion1 it is the divine understanding that makes the reality of eternal truths4 ,nouveaux ,essais sur l',entendement ,humain1 book ii41 chap4 xvii4 ,the idea of the absolute is in us internally like that of being4 ,these absolutes are nothing else than the attributes of ,god1 and it may be said they are just as much the source of ideas as ,god is in himself the principle of beings4 ,ibid41 book iv41 chap4 xi4 ,but it will be demanded where those ideas would be if no mind existed1 and what would then become of the real foundation of this certainty of eternal truths8 ,that brings us in fine to the last foundation of truths1 to wit1 to that supreme and universal mind which cannot be destitute of existence1 whose understanding1 to speak truly1 is the region of eternal truths1 as ,st4 ,augustine saw and clearly enough expressed it4 ,and that it may not be thought necessary to recur to it1 we must consider that these necessary truths contain the determinating reason and the regulative principle of existences themselves1 and1 in a word1 the laws of the universe4 ,so these unnecessary truths1 being anterior to the existences of contingent beings1 must have their foundation in the existence of a necessary substance4 ,it is there that ,i find the original of truths which are stamped upon our souls1 not in the form of propositions1 but as sources1 the application and occasions of which will produce actual enunciations4 ,so1 from ,plato to ,leibnitz1 the greatest metaphysicians have thought that absolute truth is an attribute of absolute being4 ,truth is incomprehensible without ,god1 as ,god is incomprehensible without truth4 ,truth is placed between human intelligence and the supreme intelligence1 as a kind of mediator4 ,in the lowest degree1 as well as at the height of being1 ,god is everywhere met1 for truth is everywhere4 ,study nature1 elevate yourselves to the laws that govern it and make of it as it were a living truth3--the more profoundly you understand its laws1 the nearer you approach to ,god4 ,study1 above all1 humanity2 humanity is much greater than nature1 for it comes from ,god as well as nature1 and knows him1 while nature is ignorant of him4 ,especially seek and love truth1 and refer it to the immortal being who is its source4 ,the more you know of the truth1 the more you know of ,god4 ,the sciences1 so far from turning us away from religion1 conduct us to it4 ,physics1 with their laws1 mathematics1 with their sublime ideas1 especially philosophy1 which cannot take a single step without encountering universal and necessary principles1 are so many stages on the way to ,deity1 and1 thus to speak1 so many temples in which homage is perpetually paid to him4 ,but in the midst of these high considerations1 let us carefully guard ourselves against two opposite errors1 from which men of fine genius have not always known how to preserve themselves1--against the error of making the reason of man purely individual1 and against the error of confounding it with truth and the divine reason4#gj ,if the reason of man is purely individual because it is in the individual1 it can comprehend nothing that is not individual1 nothing that transcends the limits wherein it is confined4 ,not only is it unable to elevate itself to any universal and necessary truth1 not only is it unable to have any idea of it1 even any suspicion of it1 as one blind from his birth can have no suspicion that a sun exists2 but there is no power1 not even that of ,god1 that by any means could make penetrate the reason of man any truth of that order absolutely repugnant to its nature2 since1 for this end1 it would not be sufficient for ,god to lighten our mind2 it would be necessary to change it1 to add to it another faculty4 ,neither1 on the other hand1 must we1 with ,malebranche1 make the reason of man to such a degree impersonal that it takes the place of truth which is its object1 and of ,god who is its principle4 ,it is truth that to us is absolutely impersonal1 and not reason4 ,reason is in man1 yet it comes from ,god4 ,hence it is individual and finite1 whilst its root is in the infinite2 it is personal by its relation to the person in which it resides1 and must also possess ,i know not what character of universality1 of necessity even1 in order to be capable of conceiving universal and necessary truths2 hence it seems1 by turns1 according to the point of view from which it is regarded1 pitiable and sublime4 ,truth is in some sort lent to human reason1 but it belongs to a totally different reason1 to wit1 that supreme1 eternal1 uncreated reason1 which is ,god himself4 ,the truth in us is nothing else than our object2 in ,god1 it is one of his attributes1 as well as justice1 holiness1 mercy1 as we shall subsequently see4 ,god exists2 and so far as he exists1 he thinks1 and his thoughts are truths1 eternal as himself1 which are reflected in the laws of the universe1 which the reason of man has received the power to attain4 ,truth is the offspring1 the utterance1 ,i was about to say1 the eternal word of ,god1 if it is permitted philosophy to borrow this divine language from that holy religion which teaches us to worship ,god in spirit and in truth4 ,of old1 the theory of ,ideas1 which manifest ,god to men1 and remind them of him1 had given to ,plato the surname of the precursor2 on account of that theory of ,ideas he was dear to ,st4 ,augustine1 and is invoked by ,bossuet4 ,it is by this same theory1 wisely interpreted1 and purified by the light of our age1 that the new philosophy is attached to the tradition of great philosophies1 and to that of ,christianity4 ,the last problem that the science of the true presented is resolved3--we are in possession of the basis of absolute truths4 ,god is substance1 reason1 supreme cause1 and the unity of all these truths2 ,god1 and ,god alone1 is to us the boundary beyond which we have nothing more to seek4 ,,footnotes3 #dd ,see our work entitled1 ,metaphysics of ,aristotle1 #b;d edition1 passim4 ,in ,aristotle himself1 see especially ,metaphysics1 book vii41 chap4 xii41 and book xiii41 chap4 ix4 #de ,there are doubtless many other ways of arriving at ,god1 as we shall successively see2 but this is the way of metaphysics4 ,we do not exclude any of the known and accredited proofs of the existence of ,god2 but we begin with that which gives all the others4 ,see further on1 part ii41 ,god1 the ,principle of ,beauty1 and part iii41 ,god1 the ,principle of the ,good1 and the last lecture1 which sums up the whole course4 #df ,we have said a word on the ,platonic theory of ideas1 #ast ,series1 vol4 iv41 p4 #dfa and #ebb4 ,see also1 vol4 ii4 of the #b;d ,series1 lecture #g1 on ,plato and ,aristotle1 especially #c;d ,series1 vol4 i41 a few words on the ,language of the ,theory of ,ideas1 p4 #aba2 our work on the ,metaphysics of ,aristotle1 p4 #dh and #adi1 and our translation of ,plato1 passim4 #dg ,aristotle first stated this2 modern peripatetics have repeated it2 and after them1 all who have wished to decry the ancient philosophy1 and philosophy in general1 by giving the appearance of absurdity to its most illustrious representative4 #dh ,see particularly p4 #aba of the ,timaeus1 vol4 xii4 of our translation4 #di ,republic1 book vi41 vol4 x4 of our translation1 p4 #eg4 #ej ,republic1 book vii41 p4 #bj4 #ea ,phaedrus1 vol4 vi41 p4 #ea4 #eb ,phaedrus1 vol4 vi41 p4 #ee4 #ec ,vol4 xi41 p4 #bfa4 #ed ,edit4 ,bened41 vol4 vi41 p4 #ag3 ,idex sunt formae quaedam principales et rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles1 quae ipsae formatae non sunt ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo sese habentes1 quae in divina intelligentia continentur4444 #ee ,edit4 ,bened41 vol4 vi41 p4 #ah4 ,singula igitur propriis creata sunt rationibus4 ,has autem rationes ubi arbitrandum est esse nisi in mente ,creatoris8 non enim extra se quidquam intuebatur1 ut secundum id constitueret quod constituebat3 nam hoc opinari sacrilegum est4 #ef ,ibid4 ,see also1 book of the ,confessions1 book ii4 of the ,free ,will1 book xii4 of the ,trinity1 book vii4 of the ,city of ,god1 c4 #eg ,summa totius theologiae4 ,primae partis quaest4 xii4 art4 #aa4 ,ad tertium dicendum1 quod omnia dicimus in ,deo videre1 et secundum ipsum de omnibus judicare1 in quantum per participationem sui luminis omnia cognoscimus et dijudicamus4 ,nam et ipsum lumen naturale rationis participatio quaedam est divini luminis4 #eh ,on the doctrine of ,descartes1 and on the proof of the existence of ,god and the true process that he employs1 see #ast ,series1 vol4 iv41 lecture #ab1 p4 #fd1 lecture #bb1 p4 #eji-eah2 vol4 v41 lecture #f1 p4 #bje2 #b;d ,series1 vol4 xi41 lecture #aa2 especially the three articles1 already cited1 of the ,journal des ,savants for the year #ahej4 #ei ,see on ,malebranche1 #b;d ,series1 lecture #b1 and #c;d ,series1 vol4 iii41 ,modern ,philosophy1 as well as the ,fragments of ,cartesian ,philosophy2 preface of the #ast edition of our ,pascal3--,on this basis1 so pure1 ,malebranche is not steady2 is excessive and rash1 ,i know2 narrow and extreme1 ,i do not fear to say2 but always sublime1 expressing only one side of ,plato1 but expressing it in a wholly ,christian spirit and in angelic language4 ,malebranche is a ,descartes who strays1 having found divine wings1 and lost all connection with the earth4 #fj ,we use the only good edition of the treatise on the ,existence of ,god1 that which the ,abbe ,gosselin has given in the collection of the ,works of ,fenelon4 ,versailles1 #ahbj4 ,see vol4 i41 p4 #hj4 #fa ,edit4 de ,versailles1 p4 #ade4 #fb ,it is not necessary to remark how incorrect are the expressions1 representation of the infinite1 image of the infinite1 especially infinite image of the infinite4 ,we cannot represent to ourselves1 we cannot imagine to ourselves the infinite4 ,we conceive the infinite2 the infinite is not an object of the imagination1 but of the understanding1 of reason4 ,see #ast ,series1 vol4 v41 lecture #f1 p4 #bbc1 #bbd4 #fc ,by a trifling anachronism1 for which we shall be pardoned1 we have here joined to the ,traite de la ,connaissance de ,dieu et de ,soi-meme1 so long known1 the ,logique1 which was only published in #ahbh4 #fd #dth ,series1 vol4 i41 preface of the #ast edition of ,pascal3 ,bossuet1 with more moderation1 and supported by a good sense which nothing can shake1 is1 in his way1 a disciple of the same doctrine1 only the extremes of which according to his custom1 he shunned4 ,this great mind1 which may have superiors in invention1 but has no equal for force in common sense1 was very careful not to place revelation and philosophy in opposition to each other3 he found it the safer and truer way to give to each its due1 to borrow from philosophy whatever natural light it can give1 in order to increase it in turn with the supernatural light1 of which the ,church has been made the depository4 ,it is in this sovereign good sense1 capable of comprehending every thing1 and uniting every thing1 that resides the supreme originality of ,bossuet4 ,he shunned particular opinions as small minds seek them for the triumph of self-love4 ,he did not think of himself2 he only searched for truth1 and wherever he found it he listened to it1 well assured that if the connection between truths of different orders sometimes escapes us1 it is no reason for closing the eyes to any truth4 ,if we wished to give a scholastic name to ,bossuet1 according to the custom of the ,middle ,age1 we would have to call him the infallible doctor4 ,he is not only one of the highest1 he is also one of the best and solidest intelligences that ever existed2 and this great conciliator has easily reconciled religion and philosophy1 ,st4 ,augustine and ,descartes1 tradition and reason4 #fe ,the best1 or1 rather1 only good edition is that which was published from an authentic copy1 in #ahdf1 by ,lecoffre4 #ff ,these words1 d'une certaine maniere qui m'est incomprehensible1 c'est en lui1 dis-je1 are not in the first edition of #agbb4 #fg ,leibnitzii ,opera1 edit4 ,deutens1 vol4 ii41 p4 #ag4 #fh ,ibid41 p4 #bd4 #fi #ast edition1 ,amsterdam1 #agaj1 p4 #ced1 edit4 of ,m4 de ,jaucourt1 ,amsterdam1 #agdg1 vol4 ii41 p4 #ic4 #gj ,we have many times designated these two rocks1 for example1 #b;d ,series1 vol4 i41 lecture #e1 p4 #ib3--,one cannot help smiling when1 in our times1 he hears individual reason spoken against4 ,in truth it is a great waste of declamation1 for the reason is not individual2 if it were1 we should govern it as we govern our resolutions and our volitions1 we could at any moment change its acts1 that is to say1 our conceptions4 ,if these conceptions were merely individual1 we should not think of imposing them upon another individual1 for to impose our own individual and personal conceptions on another individual1 on another person1 would be the most extravagant despotism4444 ,we call those mad who do not admit the relations of numbers1 the difference between the beautiful and the ugly1 the just and the unjust4 ,why8 ,because we know that it is not the individual that constitutes these conceptions1 or1 in other terms1 we know that the reason has something universal and absolute1 that upon this ground it obligates all individuals2 and an individual1 at the same time that he knows that he himself is obligated by it1 knows that all others are obligated by it on the same ground4--,ibid41 p4 #ic3 ,truth misconceived is thereby neither altered nor destroyed2 it subsists independently of the reason that perceives it or perceives it ill4 ,truth in itself is independent of our reason4 ,its true subject is the universal and absolute reason4 ,,lecture ,v4 ,,on ,,mysticism4 ,distinction between the philosophy that we profess and mysticism4 ,mysticism consists in pretending to know ,god without an intermediary4--,two sorts of mysticism4--,mysticism of sentiment4 ,theory of sensibility4 ,two sensibilities--the one external1 the other internal1 and corresponding to the soul as external sensibility corresponds to nature4--,legitimate part of sentiment4--,its aberrations4--,philosophical mysticism4 ,plotinus3 ,god1 or absolute unity1 perceived without an intermediary by pure thought4--,ecstasy4--,mixture of superstition and abstraction in mysticism4--,conclusion of the first part of the course4 ,whether we turn our attention to the forces and the laws that animate and govern matter without belonging to it1 or as the order of our labors calls us to do1 reflect upon the universal and necessary truths which our mind discovers but does not constitute1 the least systematic use of reason makes us naturally conclude from the forces and laws of the universe that there is a first intelligent mover1 and from necessary truths that there is a necessary being who alone is their substance4 ,we do not perceive ,god1 but we conceive him1 upon the faith of this admirable world exposed to our view1 and upon that of this other world1 more admirable still1 which we bear in ourselves4 ,by this double road we succeed in going to ,god4 ,this natural course is that of all men3 it must be sufficient for a sound philosophy4 ,but there are feeble and presumptuous minds that do not know how to go thus far1 or do not know how to stop there4 ,confined to experience1 they do not dare to conclude from what they see in what they do not see1 as if at all times1 at the sight of the first phenomenon that appears to their eyes1 they did not admit that this phenomenon has a cause1 even when this cause does not come within the reach of their senses4 ,they do not perceive it1 yet they believe in it1 for the simple reason that they necessarily conceive it4 ,man and the universe are also facts that cannot but have a cause1 although this cause may neither be seen by our eyes nor touched by our hands4 ,reason has been given us for the very purpose of going1 and without any circuit of reasoning1 from the visible to the invisible1 from the finite to the infinite1 from the imperfect to the perfect1 and also1 from necessary and universal truths1 which surround us on every side1 to their eternal and necessary principle4 ,such is the natural and legitimate bearing of reason4 ,it possesses an evidence of which it renders no account1 and is not thereby less irresistible to whomsoever does not undertake to contest with ,god the veracity of the faculties which he has received4 ,but one does not revolt against reason with impunity4 ,it punishes our false wisdom by giving us up to extravagance4 ,when one has confined himself to the narrow limits of what he directly perceives1 he is smothered by these limits1 wishes to go out of them at any price1 and invokes some other means of knowing2 he did not dare to admit the existence of an invisible ,god1 and now behold him aspiring to enter into immediate communication with him1 as with sensible objects1 and the objects of consciousness4 ,it is an extreme feebleness for a rational being thus to doubt reason1 and it is an incredible rashness1 in this despair of intelligence1 to dream of direct communication with ,god4 ,this desperate and ambitious dream is mysticism4 ,it behooves us to separate with care this chimera1 that is not without danger1 from the cause that we defend4 ,it behooves us so much the more to openly break with mysticism1 as it seems to touch us more nearly1 as it pretends to be the last word of philosophy1 and as by an appearance of greatness it is able to seduce many a noble soul1 especially at one of those epochs of lassitude1 when1 after the cruel disappointment of excessive hopes1 human reason1 having lost faith in its own power without having lost the need of ,god1 in order to satisfy this immortal need1 addresses itself to every thing except itself1 and in fault of knowing how to go to ,god by the way that is open to it1 throws itself out of common sense1 and tries the new1 the chimerical1 even the absurd1 in order to attain the impossible4 ,mysticism contains a pusillanimous skepticism in the place of reason1 and1 at the same time1 a faith blind and carried even to the oblivion of all the conditions imposed upon human nature4 ,to conceive ,god under the transparent veil of the universe and above the highest truths1 is at once too much and too little for mysticism4 ,it does not believe that it knows ,god1 if it knows him only in his manifestations and by the signs of his existence3 it wishes to perceive him directly1 it wishes to be united to him1 sometimes by sentiment1 sometimes by some other extraordinary process4 ,sentiment plays so important a part in mysticism1 that our first care must be to investigate the nature and proper function of this interesting and hitherto ill-studied part of human nature4 ,it is necessary to distinguish sentiment well from sensation4 ,there are1 in some sort1 two sensibilities3 one is directed to the external world1 and is charged with transmitting to the soul the impressions that it sees2 the other is wholly interior1 and is related to the soul as the other is to nature1--its function is to receive the impression1 and1 as it were1 the rebound of what passes in the soul4 ,have we discovered any truth8 there is something in us which feels joy on account of it4 ,have we performed a good action8 we receive our reward in a feeling of satisfaction less vivid1 but more delicate and more durable than all the agreeable sensations that come from the body4 ,it seems as if intelligence also had its intimate organ1 which suffers or enjoys1 according to the state of the intelligence4 ,we bear in ourselves a profound source of emotion1 at once physical and moral1 which expresses the union of our two natures4 ,the animal does not go beyond sensation1 and pure thought belongs only to the angelic nature4 ,the sentiment that partakes of sensation and thought is the portion of humanity4 ,sentiment is1 it is true1 only an echo of reason2 but this echo is sometimes better understood than reason itself1 because it resounds in the most intimate1 the most delicate portions of the soul1 and moves the entire man4 ,it is a singular1 but incontestable fact1 that as soon as reason has conceived truth1 the soul attaches itself to it1 and loves it4 ,yes1 the soul loves truth4 ,it is a wonderful thing that a being strayed into one corner of the universe1 alone charged with sustaining himself against so many obstacles1 who1 it would seem1 has enough to do to think of himself1 to preserve and somewhat embellish his life1 is capable of loving what is not related to him1 and exists only in an invisible world6 ,this disinterested love of truth gives evidence of the greatness of him who feels it4 ,reason takes one step more3--it is not contented with truth1 even absolute truth1 when convinced that it possesses it ill1 that it does not possess it as it really is2 as long as it has not placed it upon its eternal basis2 having arrived there1 it stops as before its impassable barrier1 having nothing more to seek1 nothing more to find4 ,sentiment follows reason1 to which it is attached2 it stops1 it rests1 only in the love of the infinite being4 ,in fact1 it is the infinite that we love1 while we believe that we are loving finite things1 even while loving truth1 beauty1 virtue4 ,and so surely is it the infinite itself that attracts and charms us1 that its highest manifestations do not satisfy us until we have referred them to their immortal source4 ,the heart is insatiable1 because it aspires after the infinite4 ,this sentiment1 this need of the infinite1 is at the foundation of the greatest passions1 and the most trifling desires4 ,a sigh of the soul in the presence of the starry heavens1 the melancholy attached to the passion of glory1 to ambition1 to all the great emotions of the soul1 express it better without doubt1 but they do not express it more than the caprice and mobility of those vulgar loves1 wandering from object to object in a perpetual circle of ardent desires1 of poignant disquietudes1 and mournful disenchantments4 ,let us designate another relation between reason and sentiment4 ,the mind at first precipitates itself towards its object without rendering to itself an account of what it does1 of what it perceives1 of what it feels4 ,but1 with the faculty of thinking1 of feeling1 it has also that of willing2 it possesses the liberty of returning to itself1 of reflecting on its own thought and sentiment1 of consenting to this1 or of resisting it1 of abstaining from it1 or of reproducing its thought and sentiment1 while stamping them with a new character4 ,spontaneity1 reflection1--these are the two great forms of intelligence4#ga ,one is not the other2 but1 after all1 the latter does little more than develop the former2 they contain at bottom the same things3--the point of view alone is different4 ,every thing that is spontaneous is obscure and confused2 reflection carries with it a clear and distinct view4 ,reason does not begin by reflection2 it does not at first perceive the truth as universal and necessary2 consequently1 when it passes from idea to being1 when it refers truth to the real being that is its subject1 it has not sounded1 it even has no suspicion of the depth of the chasm it passes2 it passes it by means of the power which is in it1 but it is not astonished at what it has done4 ,it is subsequently astonished1 and undertakes by the aid of the liberty with which it is endowed1 to do the opposite of what it has done1 to deny what it has affirmed4 ,here commences the strife between sophism and common sense1 between false science and natural truth1 between good and bad philosophy1 both of which come from free reflection4 ,the sad and sublime privilege of reflection is error2 but reflection is the remedy for the evil it produces4 ,if it can deny natural truth1 usually it confirms it1 returns to common sense by a longer or shorter circuit2 it opposes in vain all the tendencies of human nature1 by which it is almost always overcome1 and brought back submissive to the first inspirations of reason1 fortified by this trial4 ,but there is nothing more in the end than there was at the beginning2 only in primitive inspiration there was a power which was ignorant of itself1 and in the legitimate results of reflection there is a power which knows itself3--one is the triumph of instinct1 the other1 that of true science4 ,sentiment which accompanies intelligence in all its proceedings presents the same phenomena4 ,the heart1 like reason1 pursues the infinite1 and the only difference there is in these pursuits is1 that sometimes the heart seeks the infinite without knowing that it seeks it1 and sometimes it renders to itself an account of the final end of the need of loving what disturbs it4 ,when reflection is added to love1 if it finds that the object loved is in fact worthy of being loved1 far from enfeebling love1 it strengthens it2 far from clipping its divine wings1 it develops them1 and nourishes them1 as ,plato#gb says4 ,but if the object of love is only a symbol of the true beauty1 only capable of exciting the desire of the soul without satisfying it1 reflection breaks the charm which held the heart1 dissipates the chimera that enchained it4 ,it must be very sure in regard to its attachments1 in order to dare to put them to the proof of reflection4 ,o ,psyche6 ,psyche6 preserve thy good fortune2 do not sound the mystery too deeply4 ,take care not to bring the fearful light near the invisible lover with whom thy soul is enamored4 ,at the first ray of the fatal lamp love is awakened1 and flies away4 ,charming image of what takes place in the soul1 when to the serene and unsuspecting confidence of sentiment succeeds reflection with its bitter train4 ,this is perhaps also the meaning of the biblical account of the tree of knowledge4#gc ,before science and reflection are innocence and faith4 ,science and reflection at first engender doubt1 disquietude1 distaste for what one possesses1 the disturbed pursuit of what one knows not1 troubles of mind and soul1 sore travail of thought1 and1 in life1 many faults1 until innocence1 forever lost1 is replaced by virtue1 simple faith by true science1 until love1 through so many vanishing illusions1 finally succeeds in reaching its true object4 ,spontaneous love has the native grace of ignorance and happiness4 ,reflective love is very different2 it is serious1 it is great1 even in its faults1 with the greatness of liberty4 ,let us not be in haste to condemn reflection3 if it often produces egotism1 it also produces devotion4 ,what1 in fact1 is self-devotion8 ,it is giving ourselves freely1 with full knowledge of what we are doing4 ,therein consists the sublimity of love1 love worthy of a noble and generous creature1 not an ignorant and blind love4 ,when affection has conquered selfishness1 instead of loving its object for its own sake1 the soul gives itself to its object1 and miracle of love1 the more it gives the more it possesses1 nourishing itself by its own sacrifices1 and finding its strength and its joy in its entire self-abandonment4 ,but there is only one being who is worthy of being thus loved1 and who can be thus loved without illusions1 and without mistakes1 at once without limits1 and without regret1 to wit1 the perfect being who alone does not fear reflection1 who alone can fill the entire capacity of our heart4 ,mysticism corrupts sentiment by exaggerating its power4 ,mysticism begins by suppressing in man reason1 or1 at least1 it subordinates and sacrifices reason to sentiment4 ,listen to mysticism3 it says that by the heart alone is man in relation with ,god4 ,all that is great1 beautiful1 infinite1 eternal1 love alone reveals to us4 ,reason is only a lying faculty4 ,because it may err1 and does err1 it is said that it always errs4 ,reason is confounded with every thing that it is not4 ,the errors of the senses1 and of reasoning1 the illusions of the imagination1 even the extravagances of passion1 which sometimes give rise to those of mind1 every thing is laid to the charge of reason4 ,its imperfections are triumphed over1 its miseries are complacently exhibited2 the most audacious dogmatical system--since it aspires to put man and ,god in immediate communication--borrows against reason all the arms of skepticism4 ,mysticism goes farther3 it attacks liberty itself2 it orders liberty to renounce itself1 in order to identify itself by love with him from whom the infinite separates us4 ,the ideal of virtue is no longer the courageous perseverance of the good man1 who1 in struggling against temptation and suffering1 makes life holy2 it is no longer the free and enlightened devotion of a loving soul2 it is the entire and blind abandonment of ourselves1 of our will1 of our being1 in a barren contemplation of thought1 in a prayer without utterance1 and almost without consciousness4 ,the source of mysticism is in that incomplete view of human nature1 which knows not how to discern in it what therein is most profound1 which betakes itself to what is therein most striking1 most seizing1 and1 consequently1 also most seizable4 ,we have already said that reason is not noisy1 and often is not heard1 whilst its echo of sentiment loudly resounds4 ,in this compound phenomenon1 it is natural that the most apparent element should cover and dim the most obscure4 ,moreover1 what relations1 what deceptive resemblances between these two faculties6 ,without doubt1 in their development1 they manifestly differ2 when reason becomes reasoning1 one easily distinguishes its heavy movement from the flight of sentiment2 but spontaneous reason is almost confounded with sentiment1--there is the same rapidity1 the same obscurity4 ,add that they pursue the same object1 and almost always go together4 ,it is not1 then1 astonishing that they should be confounded4 ,a wise philosophy distinguishes#gd them without separating them4 ,analysis demonstrates that reason precedes1 and that sentiment follows4 ,how can we love what we are ignorant of8 ,in order to enjoy the truth1 is it not necessary to know it more or less8 ,in order to be moved by certain ideas1 is it not necessary to have possessed them in some degree8 ,to absorb reason in sentiment is to stifle the cause in the effect4 ,when one speaks of the light of the heart1 he designates1 without knowing it1 that light of the spontaneous reason which discovers to us truth by a pure and immediate intuition entirely opposite to the slow and laborious processes of the reflective reason and reasoning4 ,sentiment by itself is a source of emotion1 not of knowledge4 ,the sole faculty of knowledge is reason4 ,at bottom1 if sentiment is different from sensation1 it nevertheless pertains on all sides to general sensibility1 and it is1 like it1 variable2 it has1 like it1 its interruptions1 its vivacity1 and its lassitude1 its exaltation and its short-comings4 ,the inspirations of sentiment1 then1 which are essentially mobile and individual1 cannot be raised to a universal and absolute rule4 ,it is not so with reason2 it is constantly the same in each one of us1 the same in all men4 ,the laws that govern its exercise constitute the common legislation of all intelligent beings4 ,there is no intelligence that does not conceive some universal and necessary truth1 and1 consequently1 the infinite being who is its principle4 ,these grand objects being once known excite in the souls of all men the emotions that we have endeavored to describe4 ,these emotions partake of the dignity of reason and the mobility of imagination and sensibility4 ,sentiment is the harmonious and living relation between reason and sensibility4 ,suppress one of the two terms1 and what becomes of the relation8 ,mysticism pretends to elevate man directly to ,god1 and does not see that in depriving reason of its power1 it really deprives him of that which makes him know ,god1 and puts him in a just communication with ,god by the intermediary of eternal and infinite truth4 ,the fundamental error of mysticism is1 that it discards this intermediary1 as if it were a barrier and not a tie3 it makes the infinite being the direct object of love4 ,but such a love can be sustained only by superhuman efforts that end in folly4 ,love tends to unite itself with its object3 mysticism absorbs love in its object4 ,hence the extravagances of that mysticism so severely and so justly condemned by ,bossuet and the ,church in quietism4#ge ,quietism lulls to sleep the activity of man1 extinguishes his intelligence1 substitutes indolent and irregular contemplation for the seeking of truth and the fulfilment of duty4 ,the true union of the soul with ,god is made by truth and virtue4 ,every other union is a chimera1 a peril1 sometimes a crime4 ,it is not permitted man to reject1 under any pretext1 that which makes him man1 that which renders him capable of comprehending ,god1 and expressing in himself an imperfect image of ,god1 that is to say1 reason1 liberty1 conscience4 ,without doubt1 virtue has its prudence1 and if we must never yield to passion1 there are diverse ways of combating it in order to conquer it4 ,one can let it subside1 and resignation and silence may have their legitimate employment4 ,there is a portion of truth1 of utility even1 in the ,spiritual ,letters1 even in the ,maxims of the ,saints4 ,but1 in general1 it is unsafe to anticipate in this world the prerogatives of death1 and to dream of sanctity when virtue alone is required of us1 when virtue is so difficult to attain1 even imperfectly4 ,the best quietism can1 at most1 be only a halt in the course1 a truce in the strife1 or rather another manner of combating4 ,it is not by flight that battles are gained2 in order to gain them it is necessary to come to an engagement1 so much the more as duty consists in combating still more than in conquering4 ,of the two opposite extremes--stoicism and quietism--the first1 taken all in all1 is preferable to the second2 for if it does not always elevate man to ,god1 it maintains1 at least1 human personality1 liberty1 conscience1 whilst quietism1 in abolishing these1 abolishes the entire man4 ,oblivion of life and its duties1 inertness1 sloth1 death of soul1--such are the fruits of that love of ,god1 which is lost in the sterile contemplation of its object1 provided it does not cause still sadder aberrations6 ,there comes a moment when the soul that believes itself united with ,god1 puffed up with this imaginary possession1 despises both the body and human personality to such an extent that all its actions become indifferent to it1 and good and evil are in its eyes the same4 ,thus it is that fanatical sects have been seen mingling crime and devotion1 finding in one the excuse1 often even the motive1 of the other1 and prefacing infamous irregularities or abominable cruelties with mystic transports1--deplorable consequences of the chimera of pure love1 of the pretension of sentiment to rule over reason1 to serve alone as a guide to the human soul1 and to put itself in direct communication with ,god1 without the intermediary of the visible world1 and without the still surer intermediary of intelligence and truth4 ,but it is time to pass to another kind of mysticism1 more singular1 more learned1 more refined1 and quite as unreasonable1 although it presents itself in the very name of reason4 ,we have seen#gf that reason1 if one of the principles which govern it be destroyed1 cannot lay hold of truth1 not even absolute truths of the intellectual and moral order2 it refers all universal1 necessary1 absolute truths1 to the being that alone can explain them1 because in him alone are necessary and absolute existence1 immutability1 and infinity4 ,god is the substance of uncreated truths1 as he is the cause of created existences4 ,necessary truths find in ,god their natural subject4 ,if ,god has not arbitrarily made them1--which is not in accordance with their essence and his1--he constitutes them1 inasmuch as they are himself4 ,his intelligence possesses them as the manifestations of itself4 ,as long as our intelligence has not referred them to the divine intelligence1 they are to it an effect without cause1 a phenomenon without substance4 ,it refers them1 then1 to their cause and their substance4 ,and in that it obeys an imperative need1 a fixed principle of reason4 ,mysticism breaks in some sort the ladder that elevates us to infinite substance3 it regards this substance alone1 independently#gg of the truth that manifests it1 and it imagines itself to possess also the pure absolute1 pure unity1 being in itself4 ,the advantage which mysticism here seeks1 is to give to thought an object wherein there is no mixture1 no division1 no multiplicity1 wherein every sensible and human element has entirely disappeared4 ,but in order to obtain this advantage1 it must pay the cost of it4 ,it is a very simple means of freeing theodicea from every shade of anthropomorphism2 it is reducing ,god to an abstraction1 to the abstraction of being in itself4 ,being in itself1 it is true1 is free from all division1 but upon the condition that it have no attribute1 no quality1 and even that it be deprived of knowledge and intelligence2 for intelligence1 if elevated as it might be1 always supposes the distinction between the intelligent subject and the intelligible object4 ,a ,god from whom absolute unity excludes intelligence1 is the ,god of the mystic philosophy4 ,how could the school of ,alexandria1 how could ,plotinus1 its founder1#gh in the midst of the lights of the ,greek and ,latin civilization1 have arrived at such a strange notion of the ,divinity8 ,by the abuse of ,platonism1 by the corruption of the best and severest method1 that of ,socrates and ,plato4 ,the ,platonic method1 the dialectic process1 as its author calls it1 searches in particular1 variable1 contingent things1 for what they also have general1 durable1 one1 that is to say1 their ,idea1 and is thus elevated to ,ideas1 as to the only true objects of intelligence1 in order to be elevated still from these ,ideas1 which are arranged in an admirable hierarchy1 to the first of all1 beyond which intelligence has nothing more to conceive1 nothing more to seek4 ,by rejecting in finite things their limit1 their individuality1 we attain genera1 ,ideas1 and1 by them1 their sovereign principle4 ,but this principle is not the last of genera1 nor the last of abstractions2 it is a real and substantial principle4#gi ,the ,god of ,plato is not called merely unity1 he is called the ,good2 he is not the lifeless substance of the ,eleatics2#hj he is endowed with life and movement2#ha strong expressions that show how much the ,god of the ,platonic metaphysics differs from that of mysticism4 ,this ,god is the father of the world4#hb ,he is also the father of truth1 that light of spirits4#hc ,he dwells in the midst of ,ideas which make him a true ,god inasmuch as he is with them4#hd ,he possesses august and holy intelligence4#he ,he has made the world without any external necessity1 and for the sole reason that he is good4#hf ,in fine1 he is beauty without mixture1 unalterable1 immortal1 that makes him who has caught a glimpse of it disdain all earthly beauties4#hg ,the beautiful1 the absolute good1 is too dazzling to be looked on directly by the eye of mortal2 it must at first be contemplated in the images that reveal it to us1 in truth1 in beauty1 in justice1 as they are met here below1 and among men1 as the eye of one who has been a chained captive from infancy1 must be gradually habituated to the light of the sun4#hh ,our reason1 enlightened by true science1 can perceive this light of spirits2 reason rightly led can go to ,god1 and there is no need1 in order to reach him1 of a particular and mysterious faculty4 ,plotinus erred by pushing to excess the ,platonic dialectics1 and by extending them beyond the boundary where they should stop4 ,in ,plato they terminate at ideas1 at the idea of the good1 and produce an intelligent and good ,god2 ,plotinus applies them without limit1 and they lead him into an abyss of mysticism4 ,if all truth is in the general1 and if all individuality is imperfection1 it follows1 that as long as we are able to generalize1 as long as it is possible for us to overlook any difference1 to exclude any determination1 we shall not be at the limit of dialectics4 ,its last object1 then1 will be a principle without any determination4 ,it will not spare in ,god being itself4 ,in fact1 if we say that ,god is a being1 by the side of and above being1 we place unity1 of which being partakes1 and which it cannot disengage1 in order to consider it alone4 ,being is not here simple1 since it is at once being and unity2 unity alone is simple1 for one cannot go beyond that4 ,and still when we say unity1 we determine it4 ,true absolute unity must1 then1 be something absolutely indeterminate1 which is not1 which1 properly speaking1 cannot be named1 the unnamable1 as ,plotinus says4 ,this principle1 which exists not1 for a still stronger reason1 cannot think1 for all thought is still a determination1 a manner of being4 ,so being and thought are excluded from absolute unity4 ,if ,alexandrianism admits them1 it is only as a forfeiture1 a degradation of unity4 ,considered in thought1 and in being1 the supreme principle is inferior to itself2 only in the pure simplicity of its indefinable essence is it the last object of science1 and the last term of perfection4 ,in order to enter into communication with such a ,god1 the ordinary faculties are not sufficient1 and the theodicea of the school of ,alexandria imposes upon it a quite peculiar psychology4 ,in the truth of things1 reason conceives absolute unity as an attribute of absolute being1 but not as something in itself1 or1 if it considers it apart1 it knows that it considers only an abstraction4 ,does one wish to make absolute unity something else than an attribute of an absolute being1 or an abstraction1 a conception of human intelligence8 ,reason could accept nothing more on any condition4 ,will this barren unity be the object of love8 ,but love1 much more than reason1 aspires after a real object4 ,one does not love substance in general1 but a substance that possesses such or such a character4 ,in human friendships1 suppress all the qualities of a person1 or modify them1 and you modify or suppress the love4 ,this does not prove that you do not love this person2 it only proves that the person is not for you without his qualities4 ,so neither reason nor love can attain the absolute unity of mysticism4 ,in order to correspond to such an object1 there must be in us something analogous to it1 there must be a mode of knowing that implies the abolition of consciousness4 ,in fact1 consciousness is the sign of the me1 that is to say1 of that which is most determinate3 the being who says1 me1 distinguishes himself essentially from every other2 that is for us the type itself of individuality4 ,consciousness should degrade the ideal of dialectic knowledge1 or every division1 every determination must be wanting1 in order to respond to the absolute unity of its object4 ,this mode of pure and direct communication with ,god1 which is not reason1 which is not love1 which excludes consciousness1 is ecstasy 7,greek3 ekstasis74 ,this word1 which ,plotinus first applied to this singular state of the soul1 expresses this separation from ourselves which mysticism exacts1 and of which it believes man capable4 ,man1 in order to communicate with absolute being1 must go out of himself4 ,it is necessary that thought should reject all determinate thought1 and1 in falling back within its own depths1 should arrive at such an oblivion of itself1 that consciousness should vanish or seem to vanish4 ,but that is only an image of ecstasy2 what it is in itself1 no one knows2 as it escapes all consciousness1 it escapes memory1 escapes reflection1 and consequently all expression1 all human speech4 ,this philosophical mysticism rests upon a radically false notion of absolute being4 ,by dint of wishing to free ,god from all the conditions of finite existence1 one comes to deprive him of all the conditions of existence itself2 one has such a fear that the infinite may have something in common with the finite1 that he does not dare to recognize that being is common to both1 save difference of degree1 as if all that is not were not nothingness itself6 ,absolute being possesses absolute unity without any doubt1 as it possesses absolute intelligence2 but1 once more1 absolute unity without a real subject of inherence is destitute of all reality4 ,real and determinate are synonyms4 ,what constitutes a being is its special nature1 its essence4 ,a being is itself only on the condition of not being another2 it cannot but have characteristic traits4 ,all that is1 is such or such4 ,difference is an element as essential to being as unity itself4 ,if1 then1 reality is in determination1 it follows that ,god is the most determinate of beings4 ,aristotle is much more ,platonic than ,plotinus1 when he says that ,god is the thought of thought1#hi that he is not a simple power1 but a power effectively acting1 meaning thereby that ,god to be perfect1 ought to have nothing in himself that is not completed4 ,to finite nature it belongs to be1 in a certain sense1 indeterminate1 since being finite1 it has always in itself powers that are not realized2 this indetermination diminishes as these powers are realized4 ,so true divine unity is not abstract unity1 it is the precise unity of perfect being in which every thing is accomplished4 ,at the summit of existence1 still more than at its low degree1 every thing is determinate1 every thing is developed1 every thing is distinct1 every thing is one4 ,the richness of determinations is a certain sign of the plenitude of being4 ,reflection distinguishes these determinations from each other1 but it is not necessary that it should in these distinctions see the limits4 ,in us1 for example1 does the diversity of our faculties and their richest development divide the me and alter the identity and the unity of the person8 ,does each one of us believe himself less than himself1 because he possesses sensibility1 reason1 and will8 ,no1 surely4 ,it is the same with ,god4 ,not having employed a sufficient psychology1 ,alexandrian mysticism imagined that diversity of attributes is incompatible with simplicity of essence1 and through fear of corrupting simple and pure essence1 it made of it an abstraction4 ,by a senseless scruple1 it feared that ,god would not be sufficiently perfect1 if it left him all his perfections2 it regards them as imperfections1 being as a degradation1 creation as a fall2 and1 in order to explain man and the universe1 it is forced to put in ,god what it calls failings1 not having seen that these pretended failings are the very signs of his infinite perfection4 ,the theory of ecstasy is at once the necessary condition and the condemnation of the theory of absolute unity4 ,without absolute unity as the direct object of knowledge1 of what use is ecstasy in the subject of knowledge8 ,ecstasy1 far from elevating man to ,god1 abases him below man2 for it effaces in him thought1 by taking away its condition1 which is consciousness4 ,to suppress consciousness1 is to render all knowledge impossible2 it is not to comprehend the perfection of this mode of knowing1 wherein the limitation of subject and object gives at once the simplest1 most immediate1 and most determinate knowledge4#ij ,the ,alexandrian mysticism is the most learned and the profoundest of all known mysticisms4 ,in the heights of abstraction where it loses itself1 it seems very far from popular superstitions2 and yet the school of ,alexandria unites ecstatic contemplation and theurgy4 ,these are two things1 in appearance1 incompatible1 but they pertain to the same principle1 to the pretension of directly perceiving what inevitably escapes all our efforts4 ,on the one hand1 a refined mysticism aspires to ,god by ecstasy2 on the other1 a gross mysticism thinks to seize him by the senses4 ,the processes1 the faculties employed1 differ1 but the foundation is the same1 and from this common foundation necessarily spring the most opposite extravagances4 ,apollonius of ,tyanus is a popular ,alexandrianist1 and ,jamblicus is ,plotinus become a priest1 mystagogue1 and hierophant4 ,a new worship shone forth by miracles2 the ancient worship would have its own miracles1 and philosophers boasted that they could make the divinity appear before other men4 ,they had demons for themselves1 and1 in some sort1 for their own orders2 the gods were not only invoked1 but evoked4 ,ecstasy for the initiates1 theurgy for the crowd4 ,at all times and in all places1 these two mysticisms have given each other the hand4 ,in ,india and in ,china1 the schools where the most subtile idealism is taught1 are not far from pagodas of the most abject idolatry4 ,one day the ,bhagavad-,gita or ,lao-tseu#ia is read1 an indefinable ,god is taught1 without essential and determinate attributes2 the next day there is shown to the people such or such a form1 such or such a manifestation of this ,god1 who1 not having a form that belongs to him1 can receive all forms1 and being only substance in itself1 is necessarily the substance of every thing1 of a stone and a drop of water1 of a dog1 a hero1 and a sage4 ,so1 in the ancient world under ,julien1 for example1 the same man was at once professor in the school of ,athens and guardian of the temple of ,minerva or ,cybele1 by turns obscuring the ,timaeus and the ,republic by subtile commentaries1 and exhibiting to the eyes of the multitude sometimes the sacred vale1#ib sometimes the shrine of the good goddess1#ic and in either function1 as priest or philosopher1 imposing on others and himself1 under taking to ascend above the human mind and falling miserably below it1 paying in some sort the penalty of an unintelligible metaphysics1 in lending himself to the most shameless superstitions4 ,when the ,christian religion triumphed1 it brought humanity under a discipline that puts a rein upon this deplorable mysticism4 ,but how many times has it brought back1 under the reign of spiritual religion1 all the extravagances of the religions of nature6 ,it was to appear especially at the renaissance of the schools and of the genius of ,paganism in the sixteenth century1 when the human mind had broken with the philosophy of the ,middle ,age1 without yet having arrived at modern philosophy4#id ,the ,paracelsuses and the ,von ,helmonts renewed the ,apolloniuses and the ,jamblicuses1 abusing some chemical and medical knowledge1 as the former had abused the ,socratic and ,platonic method1 altered in its character1 and turned from its true object4 ,and so1 in the midst of the eighteenth century1 has not ,swedenborg united in his own person an exalted mysticism and a sort of magic1 opening thus the way to those senseless#ie persons who contest with me in the morning the solidest and best-established proofs of the existence of the soul and ,god1 and propose to me in the evening to make me see otherwise than with my eyes1 and to make me hear otherwise than with my ears1 to make me use all my faculties otherwise than by their natural organs1 promising me a superhuman science1 on the condition of first losing consciousness1 thought1 liberty1 memory1 all that constitutes me an intelligent and moral being4 ,i should know all1 then1 but at the cost of knowing nothing that ,i should know4 ,i should elevate myself to a marvellous world1 which1 awakened and in a natural state1 ,i am not even able to suspect1 of which no remembrance will remain to me3--a mysticism at once gross and chimerical1 which perverts both psychology and physiology2 an imbecile ecstasy1 renewed without genius from the ,alexandrine ecstasy2 an extravagance which has not even the merit of a little novelty1 and which history has seen reappearing at all epochs of ambition and impotence4 ,this is what we come to when we wish to go beyond the conditions imposed upon human nature4 ,charron first said1 and after him ,pascal repeated it1 that whoever would become an angel becomes a beast4 ,the remedy for all these follies is a severe theory of reason1 of what it can and what it cannot do2 of reason enveloped first in the exercise of the senses1 than elevating itself to universal and necessary ideas1 referring them to their principle1 to a being infinite and at the same time real and substantial1 whose existence it conceives1 but whose nature it is always interdicted to penetrate and comprehend4 ,sentiment accompanies and vivifies the sublime intuitions of reason1 but we must not confound these two orders of facts1 much less smother reason in sentiment4 ,between a finite being like man and ,god1 absolute and infinite substance1 there is the double intermediary of that magnificent universe open to our gaze1 and of those marvellous truths which reason conceives1 but has not made more than the eye makes the beauties it perceives4 ,the only means that is given us of elevating ourselves to the ,being of beings1 without being dazzled and bewildered1 is to approach him by the aid of a divine intermediary2 that is to say1 to consecrate ourselves to the study and the love of truth1 and1 as we shall soon see1 to the contemplation and reproduction of the beautiful1 especially to the practice of the good4 ,,footnotes3 #ga ,see the preceding lectures4 #gb ,see the ,phaedrus and the ,banquet1 vol4 vii4 of our translation4 #gc ,we shall not be accused of perverting the holy ,scriptures by these analogies1 for we give them only as analogies1 and ,st4 ,augustine and ,bossuet are full of such4 #gd ,see part ii41 ,the ,beautiful1 lecture #f1 and part iii41 lecture #ac1 on the ,morals of ,sentiment4 ,see also our ,pascal1 preface of the last edition1 p4 #h1 etc41 vol4 i4 of the #dth ,series4 #ge ,see the admirable work of ,bossuet1 ,instruction sur les etats d',oraison4 #gf ,lecture #d4 #gg ,see especially in our writings the regular and detailed refutation of the double extravagance of considering substance apart from its determinations and its qualities1 or of considering its qualities and its facilities apart from the being that possesses them4 #ast ,series1 vol4 iii41 lecture #c1 ,on ,condillac1 and vol4 v41 lectures #e and #f1 ,on ,kant4 ,we say1 the same ,series1 vol4 iv41 p4 #ef3 ,there are philosophers beyond the ,rhine1 who1 to appear very profound1 are not contented with qualities and phenomena1 and aspire to pure substance1 to being in itself4 ,the problem stated as follows1 is quite insoluble3 the knowledge of such a substance is impossible1 for this very simple reason1 that such a substance does not exist4 ,being in itself1 das ,ding in sich1 which ,kant seeks1 escapes him1 and this does not humiliate ,kant and philosophy2 for there is no being in itself4 ,the human mind may form to itself an abstract and general idea of being1 but this idea has no real object in nature4 ,all being is determinate1 if it is real2 and to be determinate is to possess certain modes of being1 transitory and accidental1 or constant and essential4 ,knowledge of being in itself is then not merely interdicted to the human mind2 it is contrary to the nature of things4 ,at the other extreme of metaphysics is a powerless psychology1 which1 by fear of a hollow ontology1 is condemned to voluntary ignorance4 ,we are not able1 say these philosophers1 ,mr4 ,dugald ,stewart1 for example1 to attain being in itself2 it is permitted us to know only phenomena and qualities3 so that1 in order not to wander in search of the substance of the soul1 they do not dare affirm its spirituality1 and devote themselves to the study of its different faculties4 ,equal error1 equal chimera6 ,there are no more qualities without being1 than being without qualities4 ,no being is without its determinations1 and reciprocally its determinations are not without it4 ,to consider the determinations of being independently of the being which possesses them1 is no longer to observe2 it is to abstract1 to make an abstraction quite as extravagant as that of being considered independently of its qualities4 #gh ,on the school of ,alexandria1 see #b;d ,series1 vol4 ii41 ,sketch of a ,general ,history of ,philosophy1 lecture #h1 p4 #baa1 and #c;d ,series1 vol4 i41 passim4 #gi ,see the previous lecture4 #hj #c;d ,series1 vol4 i41 ,ancient ,philosophy1 article ,xenophanes1 and article ,zeno4 #ha ,the ,sophist1 vol4 xi4 of our translation1 p4 #bfa4 #hb ,timaeus1 vol4 xii41 p4 #aag4 #hc ,republic1 book vii41 p4 #gj of vol4 x4 #hd ,phaedrus1 vol4 vi41 p4 #ee4 #he ,the ,sophist1 p4 #bfa1 #bfb4 ,the following little-known and decisive passage1 which we have translated for the first time1 must be cited3--,stranger4 ,but what1 by ,zeus6 shall we be so easily persuaded that in reality1 motion1 life1 soul1 intelligence1 do not belong to absolute being8 that this being neither lives nor thinks1 that this being remains immobile1 immutable1 without having part in august and holy intelligence8--,theatetus4 ,that would be consenting1 dear ,eleatus1 to a very strange assertion4--,stranger4 ,or1 indeed1 shall we accord to this being intelligence while we refuse him life8--,theatetus4 ,that cannot be4--,stranger4 ,or1 again1 shall we say that there is in him intelligence and life1 but that it is not in a soul that he possesses them8--,theatetus4 ,and how could he possess them otherwise8--,stranger4 ,in fine1 that1 endowed with intelligence1 soul1 and life1 all animated as he is1 he remains incomplete immobility4--,theatetus4 ,all that seems to me unreasonable4 #hf ,timaeus1 p4 #aai3 ,let us say that the cause which led the supreme ordainer to produce and compose this universe was1 that he was good4 #hg ,bouquet1 discourse of ,diotimus1 vol4 vi41 and the #b;d part of this vol41 ,the ,beautiful1 lecture #g4 #hh ,republic4 ,ibid4 #hi ,book xii4 of the ,metaphysics4 ,de la ,metaphysique d',aristotle1 #b;d edition1 p4 #bjj1 etc4 #ij ,on this fundamental point1 see lecture #c1 in this vol4--#b;d ,series1 vol4 i41 lecture #e1 p4 #ig4 ,the peculiarity of intelligence is not the power of knowing1 but knowing in fact4 ,on what condition is there intelligence for us8 ,it is not enough that there should be in us a principle of intelligence2 this principle must be developed and exercised1 and take itself as the object of its intelligence4 ,the necessary condition of intelligence is consciousness--that is to say1 difference4 ,there can be consciousness only where there are several terms1 one of which perceives the other1 and at the same time perceives itself4 ,that is knowing1 and knowing self2 that is intelligence4 ,intelligence without consciousness is the abstract possibility of intelligence1 it is not real intelligence4 ,transfer this from human intelligence to divine intelligence1 that is to say1 refer ideas1 ,i mean ideas in the sense of ,plato1 of ,st4 ,augustine1 of ,bossuet1 of ,leibnitz1 to the only intelligence to which they can belong1 and you will have1 if ,i may thus express myself1 the life of the divine intelligence 4441 etc4 #ia ,vol4 ii4 of the #b;d ,series1 ,sketch of a ,general ,history of ,philosophy1 lectures #e and #f1 ,on the ,indian ,philosophy4 #ib ,see the ,euthyphron1 vol4 i4 of our translation4 #ic ,lucien1 ,apuleius1 ,lucius of ,patras4 #id #b;d ,series1 vol4 ii41 ,sketch of a ,general ,history of ,philosophy1 lecture #aj1 ,on the ,philosophy of the ,renaissance4 #ie ,one was then ardently occupied with magnetism1 and more than a magnetizer1 half a materialist1 half a visionary1 pretended to convert us to a system of perfect clairvoyance of soul1 obtained by means of artificial sleep4 ,alas6 the same follies are now renewed4 ,conjunctions are the fashion4 ,spirits are interrogated1 and they respond6 ,only let there be consciousness that one does not interrogate1 and superstition alone counterpoises skepticism4 ,,part ,,second ,,the ,,beautiful4 ,,lecture ,,vi4 ,,the ,,beautiful ,,in ,,the ,,mind ,,of ,,man4 ,the method that must govern researches on the beautiful and art is1 as in the investigation of the true1 to commence by psychology4--,faculties of the soul that unite in the perception of the beautiful4--,the senses give only the agreeable2 reason alone gives the idea of the beautiful4--,refutation of empiricism1 that confounds the agreeable and the beautiful4--,pre-eminence of reason4--,sentiment of the beautiful2 different from sensation and desire4--,distinction between the sentiment of the beautiful and that of the sublime4--,imagination4--,influence of sentiment on imagination4--,influence of imagination on sentiment4--,theory of taste4 ,let us recall in a few words the results at which we have arrived4 ,two exclusive schools are opposed to each other in the eighteenth century2 we have combated both1 and each by the other4 ,to empiricism we have opposed the insufficiency of sensation1 and its own inevitable necessity to idealism4 ,we have admitted1 with ,locke and ,condillac1 in regard to the origin of knowledge1 particular and contingent ideas1 which we owe to the senses and consciousness2 and above the senses and consciousness1 the direct sources of all particular ideas1 we have recognized1 with ,reid and ,kant1 a special faculty1 different from sensation and consciousness1 but developed with them1--reason1 the lofty source of universal and necessary truths4 ,we have established1 against ,kant1 the absolute authority of reason1 and the truths which it discovers4 ,then1 the truths that reason revealed to us have themselves revealed to us their eternal principle1--,god4 ,finally1 this rational spiritualism1 which is both the faith of the human race and the doctrine of the greatest minds of antiquity and modern times1 we have carefully distinguished from a chimerical and dangerous mysticism4 ,thus the necessity of experience and the necessity of reason1 the necessity of a real and infinite being which is the first and last foundation of truth1 a severe distinction between spiritualism and mysticism1 are the great principles which we have been able to gather from the first part of this course4 ,the second part1 the study of the beautiful1 will give us the same results elucidated and aggrandized by a new application4 ,it was the eighteenth century that introduced1 or rather brought back into philosophy1 investigations on the beautiful and art1 so familiar to ,plato and ,aristotle1 but which scholasticism had not entertained1 to which our great philosophy of the seventeenth century had remained almost a stranger4#if ,one comprehends that it did not belong to the empirical school to revive this noble part of philosophic science4 ,locke and ,condillac did not leave a chapter1 not even a single page1 on the beautiful4 ,their followers treated beauty with the same disdain2 not knowing very well how to explain it in their system1 they found it more convenient not to perceive it at all4 ,diderot1 it is true1 had an enthusiasm for beauty and art1 but enthusiasm was never so ill placed4 ,diderot had genius2 but1 as ,voltaire said of him1 his was a head in which every thing fermented without coming to maturity4 ,he scattered here and there a mass of ingenious and often contradictory perceptions2 he has no principles2 he abandons himself to the impression of the moment2 he knows not what the ideal is2 he delights in a kind of nature1 at once common and mannered1 such as one might expect from the author of the ,interpretation de la ,nature1 the ,pere de ,famille1 the ,neveu de ,rameau1 and ,jacques le ,fataliste4 ,diderot is a fatalist in art as well as in philosophy2 he belongs to his times and his school1 with a grain of poetry1 sensibility1 and imagination4#ig ,it was worthy of the ,scotch#ih school and ,kant#ii to give a place to the beautiful in their doctrine4 ,they considered it in the soul and in nature2 but they did not even touch the difficult question of the reproduction of the beautiful by the genius of man4 ,we will try to embrace this great subject in its whole extent1 and we are about to offer at least a sketch of a regular and complete theory of beauty and art4 ,let us begin by establishing well the method that must preside over these investigations4 ,one can study the beautiful in two ways3--either out of us1 in itself and in the objects1 whatever they may be1 that bear its impress2 or in the mind of man1 in the faculties that attain it1 in the ideas or sentiments that it excites in us4 ,now1 the true method1 which must now be familiar to you1 makes setting out from man to arrive at things a law for us4 ,therefore psychological analysis will here again be our point of departure1 and the study of the state of the soul in presence of the beautiful will prepare us for that of the beautiful considered in itself and its objects4 ,let us interrogate the soul in the presence of beauty4 ,is it not an incontestable fact that before certain objects1 under very different circumstances1 we pronounce the following judgment3--,this object is beautiful8 ,this affirmation is not always explicit4 ,sometimes it manifests itself only by a cry of admiration2 sometimes it silently rises in the mind that scarcely has a consciousness of it4 ,the forms of this phenomenon vary1 but the phenomenon is attested by the most common and most certain observation1 and all languages bear witness of it4 ,although sensible objects1 with most men1 oftenest provoke the judgment of the beautiful1 they do not alone possess this advantage2 the domain of beauty is more extensive than the domain of the physical world exposed to our view2 it has no bounds but those of entire nature1 and of the soul and genius of man4 ,before an heroic action1 by the remembrance of a great sacrifice2 even by the thought of the most abstract truths firmly united with each other in a system admirable at once for its simplicity and its productiveness2 finally1 before objects of another order1 before the works of art1 this same phenomenon is produced in us4 ,we recognize in all these objects1 however different1 a common quality in regard to which our judgment is pronounced1 and this quality we call beauty4 ,the philosophy of sensation1 in faithfulness to itself1 should have attempted to reduce the beautiful to the agreeable4 ,without doubt1 beauty is almost always agreeable to the senses1 or at least it must not wound them4 ,most of our ideas of the beautiful come to us by sight and hearing1 and all the arts1 without exception1 are addressed to the soul through the body4 ,an object which makes us suffer1 were it the most beautiful in the world1 very rarely appears to us such4 ,beauty has little influence over a soul occupied with grief4 ,but if an agreeable sensation often accompanies the idea of the beautiful1 we must not conclude that one is the other4 ,experience testifies that all agreeable things do not appear beautiful1 and that1 among agreeable things1 those which are most so are not the most beautiful1--a sure sign that the agreeable is not the beautiful2 for if one is identical with the other1 they should never be separated1 but should always be commensurate with each other4 ,far from this1 whilst all our senses give us agreeable sensations1 only two have the privilege of awakening in us the idea of beauty4 ,does one ever say3 ,this is a beautiful taste1 this is a beautiful smell8 ,nevertheless1 one should say it1 if the beautiful is the agreeable4 ,on the other hand1 there are certain pleasures of odor and taste that move sensibility more than the greatest beauties of nature and art2 and even among the perceptions of hearing and sight1 those are not always the most vivid that most excite in us the idea of beauty4 ,do not pictures1 ordinary in coloring1 often move us more deeply than many dazzling productions1 more seductive to the eye1 less touching to the soul8 ,i say farther2 sensation not only does not produce the idea of the beautiful1 but sometimes stifles it4 ,let an artist occupy himself with the reproduction of voluptuous forms2 while pleasing the senses1 he disturbs1 he repels in us the chaste and pure idea of beauty4 ,the agreeable is not1 then1 the measure of the beautiful1 since in certain cases it effaces it and makes us forget it2 it is not1 then1 the beautiful1 since it is found1 and in the highest degree1 where the beautiful is not4 ,this conducts us to the essential foundation of the distinction between the idea of the beautiful and the sensation of the agreeable1 to wit1 the difference already explained between sensibility and reason4 ,when an object makes you experience an agreeable sensation1 if one asks you why this object is agreeable to you1 you can answer nothing1 except that such is your impression2 and if one informs you that this same object produces upon others a different impression and displeases them1 you are not much astonished1 because you know that sensibility is diverse1 and that sensations must not be disputed4 ,is it the same when an object is not only agreeable to you1 but when you judge that it is beautiful8 ,you pronounce1 for example1 that this figure is noble and beautiful1 that this sunrise or sunset is beautiful1 that disinterestedness and devotion are beautiful1 that virtue is beautiful2 if one contests with you the truth of these judgments1 then you are not as accommodating as you were just now2 you do not accept the dissent as an inevitable effect of different sensibilities1 you no longer appeal to your sensibility which naturally terminates in you1 you appeal to an authority which is made for others as well as you1 that of reason2 you believe that you have the right of accusing him with error who contradicts your judgment1 for here your judgment rests no longer on something variable and individual1 like an agreeable or painful sensation4 ,the agreeable is confined for us within the inclosure of our own organization1 where it changes every moment1 according to the perpetual revolutions of this organization1 according to health and sickness1 the state of the atmosphere1 that of our nerves1 etc4 ,but it is not so with beauty2 beauty1 like truth1 belongs to none of us2 no one has the right to dispose of it arbitrarily1 and when we say3 this is true1 this is beautiful1 it is no longer the particular and variable impression of our sensibility that we express1 it is the absolute judgment that reason imposes on all men4 ,confound reason and sensibility1 reduce the idea of the beautiful to the sensation of the agreeable1 and taste no longer has a law4 ,if a person says to me1 in the presence of the ,apollo ,belvidere1 that he feels nothing more agreeable than in presence of any other statue1 that it does not please him at all1 that he does not feel its beauty1 ,i cannot dispute his impression2 but if this person thence concludes that the ,apollo is not beautiful1 ,i proudly contradict him1 and declare that he is deceived4 ,good taste is distinguished from bad taste2 but what does this distinction signify1 if the judgment of the beautiful is resolved into a sensation8 ,you say to me that ,i have no taste4 ,what does that mean8 ,have ,i not senses like you8 ,does not the object which you admire act upon me as well as upon you8 ,is not the impression which ,i feel as real as that which you feel8 ,whence comes it1 then1 that you are right1--you who only give expression to the impression which you feel1 and that ,i am wrong1--,i who do precisely the same thing8 ,is it because those who feel like you are more numerous than those who feel like me8 ,but here the number of voices means nothing8 ,the beautiful being defined as that which produces on the senses an agreeable impression1 a thing that pleases a single man1 though it were frightfully ugly in the eyes of all the rest of the human race1 must1 nevertheless1 and very legitimately1 be called beautiful by him who receives from it an agreeable impression1 for1 so far as he is concerned1 it satisfies the definition4 ,there is1 then1 no true beauty2 there are only relative and changing beauties1 beauties of circumstance1 custom1 fashion1 and all these beauties1 however different1 will have a right to the same respect1 provided they meet sensibilities to which they are agreeable4 ,and as there is nothing in this world1 in the infinite diversity of our dispositions1 which may not please some one1 there will be nothing that is not beautiful2 or1 to speak more truly1 there will be nothing either beautiful or ugly1 and the ,hottentot ,venus will equal the ,venus de ,medici4 ,the absurdity of the consequences demonstrates the absurdity of the principle4 ,but there is only one means of escaping these consequences1 which is to repudiate the principle1 and recognize the judgment of the beautiful as an absolute judgment1 and1 as such1 entirely different from sensation4 ,finally1 and this is the last rock of empiricism1 is there in us only the idea of an imperfect and finite beauty1 and while we are admiring the real beauties that nature furnishes1 are we not elevating ourselves to the idea of a superior beauty1 which ,plato1 with great excellence of expression1 calls the ,idea of the beautiful1 which1 after him1 all men of delicate taste1 all true artists call the ,ideal8 ,if we establish decrees in the beauty of things1 is it not because we compare them1 often without noticing it1 with this ideal1 which is to us the measure and rule of all our judgments in regard to particular beauties8 ,how could this idea of absolute beauty enveloped in all our judgments on the beautiful1--how could this ideal beauty1 which it is impossible for us not to conceive1 be revealed to us by sensation1 by a faculty variable and relative like the objects that it perceives8 ,the philosophy which deduces all our ideas from the senses falls to the ground1 then1 before the idea of the beautiful4 ,it remains to see whether this idea can be better explained by means of sentiment1 which is different from sensation1 which so nearly resembles reason that good judges have often taken it for reason1 and have made it the principle of the idea of the beautiful as well as that of the good4 ,it is already a progress1 without doubt1 to go from sensation to sentiment1 and ,hutcheson and ,smith#ajj are in our eyes very different philosophers from ,condillac and ,helvetius2#aja but we believe that we have sufficiently established#ajb that1 in confounding sentiment with reason1 we deprive it of its foundation and rule1 that sentiment1 particular and variable in its nature1 different to different men1 and in each man continually changing1 cannot be sufficient for itself4 ,nevertheless1 if sentiment is not a principle1 it is a true and important fact1 and1 after having distinguished it well from reason1 we ourselves proceed to elevate it far above sensation1 and elucidate the important part it plays in the perception of beauty4 ,place yourself before an object of nature1 wherein men recognize beauty1 and observe what takes place within you at the sight of this object4 ,is it not certain that1 at the same time that you judge that it is beautiful1 you also feel its beauty1 that is to say1 that you experience at the sight of it a delightful emotion1 and that you are attracted towards this object by a sentiment of sympathy and love8 ,in other cases you judge otherwise1 and feel an opposite sentiment4 ,aversion accompanies the judgment of the ugly1 as love accompanies the judgment of the beautiful4 ,and this sentiment is awakened not only in presence of the objects of nature3 all objects1 whatever they may be1 that we judge to be ugly or beautiful1 have the power to excite in us this sentiment4 ,vary the circumstances as much as you please1 place me before an admirable edifice or before a beautiful landscape2 represent to my mind the great discoveries of ,descartes and ,newton1 the exploits of the great ,conde1 the virtue of ,st4 ,vincent de ,paul2 elevate me still higher2 awaken in me the obscure and too much forgotten idea of the infinite being2 whatever you do1 as often as you give birth within me to the idea of the beautiful1 you give me an internal and exquisite joy1 always followed by a sentiment of love for the object that caused it4 ,the more beautiful the object is1 the more lively is the joy which it gives the soul1 and the more profound is the love without being passionate4 ,in admiration judgment rules1 but animated by sentiment4 ,is admiration increased to the degree of impressing upon the soul an emotion1 an ardor that seems to exceed the limits of human nature8 this state of the soul is called enthusiasm3 ,est ,deus in nobis1 agitante calescimus illo4 ,the philosophy of sensation explains sentiment1 as well as the idea of the beautiful1 only by changing its nature4 ,it confounds it with agreeable sensation1 and1 consequently1 for it the love of beauty can be nothing but desire4 ,there is no theory more contradicted by facts4 ,what is desire8 ,it is an emotion of the soul which has1 for its avowed or secret end1 possession4 ,admiration is in its nature respectful1 whilst desire tends to profane its object4 ,desire is the offspring of need4 ,it supposes1 then1 in him who experiences it1 a want1 a defect1 and1 to a certain point1 suffering4 ,the sentiment of the beautiful is to itself its own satisfaction4 ,desire is burning1 impetuous1 sad4 ,the sentiment of the beautiful1 free from all desire1 and always without fear1 elevates and warms the soul1 and may transport it even to enthusiasm1 without making it know the troubles of passion4 ,the artist sees only the beautiful where the sensual man sees only the alluring and the frightful4 ,on a vessel tossed by a tempest1 while the passengers tremble at the sight of the threatening waves1 and at the sound of the thunder that breaks over their heads1 the artist remains absorbed in the contemplation of the sublime spectacle4 ,vernet has himself lashed to the mast in order to contemplate for a longer time the storm in its majestic and terrible beauty4 ,when he knows fear1 when he participates in the common feeling1 the artist vanishes1 there no more remains any thing but the man4 ,the sentiment of the beautiful is so far from being desire1 that each excludes the other4 ,let me take a common example4 ,before a table loaded with meats and delicious wines1 the desire of enjoyment is awakened1 but not the sentiment of the beautiful4 ,suppose that if1 instead of thinking of the pleasures which all these things spread before my eyes promise me1 ,i only take notice of the manner in which they are arranged and set upon the table1 and the order of the feast1 the sentiment of the beautiful might in some degree be produced2 but surely this will be neither the need nor the desire of appropriating this symmetry1 this order4 ,it is the property of beauty not to irritate and inflame desire1 but to purify and ennoble it4 ,the more beautiful a woman is1--,i do not mean that common and gross beauty which ,reubens in vain animates with his brilliant coloring1 but that ideal beauty which antiquity and ,raphael understood so well1--the more1 at the sight of this noble creature is desire tempered by an exquisite and delicate sentiment1 and is sometimes even replaced by a disinterested worship4 ,if the ,venus of the ,capitol1 or the ,saint ,cecilia1 excites in you sensual desires1 you are not made to feel the beautiful4 ,so the true artist addresses himself less to the senses than to the soul2 in painting beauty he only seeks to awaken in us sentiment2 and when he has carried this sentiment as far as enthusiasm1 he has obtained the last triumph of art4 ,the sentiment of the beautiful is1 therefore1 a special sentiment1 as the idea of the beautiful is a simple idea4 ,but is this sentiment1 one in itself1 manifested only in a single way1 and applied only to a single kind of beauty8 ,here again--here1 as always--let us interrogate experience4 ,when we have before our eyes an object whose forms are perfectly determined1 and the whole easy to embrace1--a beautiful flower1 a beautiful statue1 an antique temple of moderate size1--each of our faculties attaches itself to this object1 and rests upon it with an unalloyed satisfaction4 ,our senses easily perceive its details2 our reason seizes the happy harmony of all its parts4 ,should this object disappear1 we can distinctly represent it to ourselves1 so precise and fixed are its forms4 ,the soul in this contemplation feels again a sweet and tranquil joy1 a sort of efflorescence4 ,let us consider1 on the other hand1 an object with vague and indefinite forms1 which may nevertheless be very beautiful3 the impression which we experience is without doubt a pleasure still1 but it is a pleasure of a different order4 ,this object does not call forth all our powers like the first4 ,reason conceives it1 but the senses do not perceive the whole of it1 and imagination does not distinctly represent it to itself4 ,the senses and the imagination try in vain to attain its last limits2 our faculties are enlarged1 are inflated1 thus to speak1 in order to embrace it1 but it escapes and surpasses them4 ,the pleasure that we feel comes from the very magnitude of the object2 but1 at the same time1 this magnitude produces in us ,i know not what melancholy sentiment1 because it is disproportionate to us4 ,at the sight of the starry heavens1 of the vast sea1 of gigantic mountains1 admiration is mingled with sadness4 ,these objects1 in reality finite1 like the world itself1 seem to us infinite1 in our want of power to comprehend their immensity1 and1 resembling what is truly without bounds1 they awaken in us the idea of the infinite1 that idea which at once elevates and confounds our intelligence4 ,the corresponding sentiment which the soul experiences is an austere pleasure4 ,in order to render the difference which we wish to mark more perceptible1 examples may be multiplied4 ,are you affected in the same way at the sight of a meadow1 variegated in its rather limited dimensions1 whose extent the eye can easily take in1 and at the aspect of an inaccessible mountain1 at the foot of which the ocean breaks8 ,do the sweet light of day and a melodious voice produce upon you the same effect as darkness and silence8 ,in the intellectual and moral order1 are you moved in the same way when a rich and good man opens his purse to the indigent1 and when a magnanimous man gives hospitality to his enemy1 and saves him at the peril of his own life8 ,take some light poetry in which measure1 spirit1 and grace1 everywhere predominate2 take an ode1 and especially an epistle of ,horace1 or some small verses of ,voltaire1 and compare them with the ,iliad1 or those immense ,indian poems that are filled with marvellous events1 wherein the highest metaphysics are united to recitals by turns graceful or pathetic1 those poems that have more than two hundred thousand verses1 whose personages are gods or symbolic beings2 and see whether the impressions that you experience will be the same4 ,as a last example1 suppose1 on the one hand1 a writer who1 with two or three strokes of the pen1 sketches an analysis of intelligence1 agreeable and simple1 but without depth1 and1 on the other1 a philosopher who engages in a long labor in order to arrive at the most rigorous decomposition of the faculty of knowing1 and unfolds to you a long chain of principles and consequences1--read the ,traite des ,sensations and the ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 and1 even leaving out of the account the truth and the falsehood they may contain1 with reference solely to the beautiful1 compare your impressions4 ,these are1 then1 two very different sentiments2 different names have also been given them3 one has been more particularly called the sentiment of the beautiful1 the other that of the sublime4 ,in order to complete the study of the different faculties that enter into the perception of beauty1 after reason and sentiment1 it remains to us to speak of a faculty not less necessary1 which animates them and vivifies them1--imagination4 ,when sensation1 judgment1 and sentiment have been produced by the occasion of an external object1 they are reproduced even in the absence of this object2 this is memory4 ,memory is double3--not only do ,i remember that ,i have been in the presence of a certain object1 but ,i represent to myself this absent object as it was1 as ,i have seen1 felt1 and judged it3--the remembrance is then an image4 ,in this last case1 memory has been called by some philosophers imaginative memory4 ,such is the foundation of imagination2 but imagination is something more still4 ,the mind1 applying itself to the images furnished by memory1 decomposes them1 chooses between their different traits1 and forms of them new images4 ,without this new power1 imagination would be captive in the circle of memory4 ,the gift of being strongly affected by objects and reproducing their absent or vanished images1 and the power of modifying these images so as to compose of them new ones1--do they fully constitute what men call imagination8 ,no1 or at least1 if these are indeed the proper elements of imagination1 there must be something else added1 to wit1 the sentiment of the beautiful in all its degrees4 ,by this means is a great imagination preserved and kindled4 ,did the careful reading of ,titus ,livius enable the author of the ,horaces to vividly represent to himself some of the scenes described1 to seize their principal traits and combine them happily8 ,from the outset1 sentiment1 love of the beautiful1 especially of the morally beautiful1 were requisite2 there was required that great heart whence sprang the word of the ancient ,horace4 ,let us be well understood4 ,we do not say that sentiment is imagination1 we say that it is the source whence imagination derives its inspirations and becomes productive4 ,if men are so different in regard to imagination1 it is because some are cold in presence of objects1 cold in the representations which they preserve of them1 cold also in the combinations which they form of them1 whilst others1 endowed with a particular sensibility1 are vividly moved by the first impressions of objects1 preserve strong recollections of them1 and carry into the exercise of all their faculties this same force of emotion4 ,take away sentiment and all else is inanimate2 let it manifest itself1 and every thing receives warmth1 color1 and life4 ,it is then impossible to limit imagination1 as the word seems to demand1 to images properly so called1 and to ideas that are related to physical objects4 ,to remember sounds1 to choose between them1 to combine them in order to draw from them new effects1--does not this belong to imagination1 although sound is not an image8 ,the true musician does not possess less imagination than the painter4 ,imagination is conceded to the poet when he retraces the images of nature2 will this same faculty be refused him when he retraces sentiments8 ,but1 besides images and sentiments1 does not the poet employ the high thoughts of justice1 liberty1 virtue1 in a word1 moral ideas8 ,will it be said that in moral paintings1 in pictures of the intimate life of the soul1 either graceful or energetic1 there is no imagination8 ,you see what is the extent of imagination3 it has no limits1 it is applied to all things4 ,its distinctive character is that of deeply moving the soul in the presence of a beautiful object1 or by its remembrance alone1 or even by the idea alone of an imaginary object4 ,it is recognized by the sign that it produces1 by the aid of its representations1 the same impression as1 and even an impression more vivid than1 nature by the aid of real objects4 ,if beauty1 absent and dreamed of1 does not affect you as much as1 and more than1 present beauty1 you may have a thousand other gifts1--that of imagination has been refused you4 ,in the eyes of imagination1 the real world languishes in comparison with its own fictions4 ,one may feel that imagination is his master by the ennui that real and present things give him4 ,the phantoms of imagination have a vagueness1 an indefiniteness of form1 which moves a thousand times more than the clearness and distinctness of actual perceptions4 ,and then1 unless we are wholly mad1--and passion does not always render this service1--it is very difficult to see reality otherwise than as it is not1 that is to say1 very imperfectly4 ,on the other hand1 one makes of an image what he wishes1 unconsciously metamorphoses it1 embellishes it to his own liking4 ,there is at the bottom of the human soul an infinite power of feeling and loving to which the entire world does not answer1 still less a single one of its creatures1 however charming4 ,all mortal beauty1 viewed near by1 does not suffice for this insatiable power which it excites and cannot satisfy4 ,but from afar1 its effects disappear or are diminished1 shades are mingled and confounded in the clear-obscure of memory and dream1 and the objects please more because they are less determinate4 ,the peculiarity of men of imagination is1 that they represent men and things otherwise than as they are1 and that they have a passion for such fantastic images4 ,those that are called positive men1 are men without imagination1 who perceive only what they see1 and deal with reality as it is instead of transforming it4 ,they have1 in general1 more reason than sentiment2 they may be seriously1 profoundly honest2 they will never be either poets or artists4 ,what makes the poet or artist is1 with a foundation of good sense and reason--without which all the rest is useless--a sensitive1 even a passionate heart2 above all1 a vivid1 a powerful imagination4 ,if sentiment acts upon imagination1 we see that imagination returns with usury to sentiment what it gives4 ,this pure and ardent passion1 this worship of beauty that makes the great artist1 can be found only in a man of imagination4 ,in fact1 the sentiment of the beautiful may be awakened in each one of us before any beautiful object2 but1 when this object has disappeared1 if its image does not subsist vivaciously retraced1 the sentiment which it for a moment excited is little by little effaced2 it may be revived at the sight of another object1 but only to be extinguished again1--always dying to be born again at hazard2 not being nourished1 increased1 exalted by the vivacious and continuous reproduction of its object in the imagination1 it wants that inspiring power1 without which there is no artist1 no poet4 ,a word more on another faculty1 which is not a simple faculty1 but a happy combination of those which have just been mentioned1--taste1 so ill treated1 so arbitrarily limited in all theories4 ,if1 after having heard a beautiful poetical or musical work1 admired a statue or a picture1 you are able to recall what your senses have perceived1 to see again the absent picture1 to hear again the sounds that no longer exist2 in a word1 if you have imagination1 you possess one of the conditions without which there is no true taste4 ,in fact1 in order to relish the works of imagination1 is it not necessary to have taste8 ,do we not need1 in order to feel an author1 not to equal him1 without doubt1 but to resemble him in some degree8 ,will not a man of sensible1 but dry and austere mind1 like ,le ,batteux or ,condillac1 be insensible to the happy darings of genius1 and will he not carry into criticism a narrow severity1 a reason very little reasonable--since he does not comprehend all the parts of human nature1--an intolerance that mutilates and blemishes art while thinking to purify it8 ,on the other hand1 imagination does not suffice for the appreciation of beauty4 ,moreover1 that vivacity of imagination so precious to taste1 when it is somewhat restrained1 produces1 when it rules1 only a very imperfect taste1 which1 not having reason for a basis1 carelessly judges1 runs the risk of misunderstanding the greatest beauty1--beauty that is regulated4 ,unity in composition1 harmony of all the parts1 just proportion of details1 skilful combination of effects1 discrimination1 sobriety1 measure1 are so many merits it will little feel1 and will not put in their place4 ,imagination has doubtless much to do with works of art2 but1 in fine1 it is not every thing4 ,is it only imagination that makes the ,polyeucte and the ,misanthrope1 two incomparable marvels8 ,is there not1 also1 in the profound simplicity of plan1 in the measured development of action1 in the sustained truth of characters1 a superior reason1 different from imagination which furnishes the superior colors1 and from sensibility that gives the passion8 ,besides imagination and reason1 the man of taste ought to possess an enlightened but ardent love of beauty2 he must take delight in meeting it1 must search for it1 must summon it4 ,to comprehend and demonstrate that a thing is not beautiful1 is an ordinary pleasure1 an ungrateful task2 but to discern a beautiful thing1 to be penetrated with its beauty1 to make it evident1 and make others participate in our sentiment1 is an exquisite joy1 a generous task4 ,admiration is1 for him who feels it1 at once a happiness and an honor4 ,it is a happiness to feel deeply what is beautiful2 it is an honor to know how to recognize it4 ,admiration is the sign of an elevated reason served by a noble heart4 ,it is above a small criticism1 that is skeptical and powerless2 but it is the soul of a large criticism1 a criticism that is productive3 it is1 thus to speak1 the divine part of taste4 ,after having spoken of taste which appreciates beauty1 shall we say nothing of genius which makes it live again8 ,genius is nothing else than taste in action1 that is to say1 the three powers of taste carried to their culmination1 and armed with a new and mysterious power1 the power of execution4 ,but we are already entering upon the domain of art4 ,let us wait1 we shall soon find art again and the genius that accompanies it4 ,,footnotes3 #if ,except the estimable ,essay on the ,beautiful1 by ,p4 ,andre1 a disciple of ,malebranche1 whose life was considerably prolonged into the eighteenth century4 ,on ,p4 ,andre1 see #c;d ,series1 vol4 iii41 ,modern ,philosophy1 p4 #bjg1 #eaf4 #ig ,see in the works of ,diderot1 ,pensees sur la ,sculpture1 les ,salons1 etc4 #ih ,see #ast ,series1 vol4 iv41 explained and estimated1 the theories of ,hutcheson and ,reid4 #ii ,the theory of ,kant is found in the ,critique of ,judgment1 and in the ,observations on the ,sentiment of the ,beautiful and the ,sublime4 ,see the excellent translation made by ,m4 ,barny1 #b vols41 #ahdf4 #ajj ,on ,hutcheson and ,smith1 their merits and defects1 the part of truth and the part of error1 which their philosophy contains1 see the detailed lectures which we have devoted to them1 #ast ,series1 vol4 iv4 #aja ,see the exposition and refutation of the doctrine of ,condillac and ,helvetius1 ,ibid41 vol4 iii4 #ajb ,see lecture #e1 in this vol4 ,,lecture ,,vii4 ,,the ,,beautiful ,,in ,,objects4 ,refutation of different theories on the nature of the beautiful3 the beautiful cannot be reduced to what is useful4--,nor to convenience4--,nor to proportion4--,essential characters of the beautiful4--,different kinds of beauties4 ,the beautiful and the sublime4 ,physical beauty4 ,intellectual beauty4 ,moral beauty4--,ideal beauty3 it is especially moral beauty4--,god1 the first principle of the beautiful4--,theory of ,plato4 ,we have made known the beautiful in ourselves1 in the faculties that perceive it and appreciate it1 in reason1 sentiment1 imagination1 taste2 we come1 according to the order determined by the method1 to other questions3 ,what is the beautiful in objects8 ,what is the beautiful taken in itself8 ,what are its characters and different species8 ,what1 in fine1 is its first and last principle8 ,all these questions must be treated1 and1 if possible1 solved4 ,philosophy has its point of departure in psychology2 but1 in order to attain also its legitimate termination1 it must set out from man1 and reach things themselves4 ,the history of philosophy offers many theories on the nature of the beautiful3 we do not wish to enumerate nor discuss them all2 we will designate the most important4#ajc ,there is one very gross1 which defines the beautiful as that which pleases the senses1 that which procures an agreeable impression4 ,we will not stop at this opinion4 ,we have sufficiently refuted it in showing that it is impossible to reduce the beautiful to the agreeable4 ,a sensualism a little more wise puts the useful in the place of the agreeable1 that is to say1 changes the form of the same principle4 ,neither is the beautiful the object which procures for us in the present moment an agreeable but fugitive sensation1 it is the object which can often procure for us this same sensation or others similar4 ,no great effort of observation or reasoning is necessary to convince us that utility has nothing to do with beauty4 ,what is useful is not always beautiful4 ,what is beautiful is not always useful1 and what is at once useful and beautiful is beautiful for some other reason than its utility4 ,observe a lever or a pulley3 surely nothing is more useful4 ,nevertheless1 you are not tempted to say that this is beautiful4 ,have you discovered an antique vase admirably worked8 ,you exclaim that this vase is beautiful1 without thinking to seek of what use it may be to you4 ,finally1 symmetry and order are beautiful things1 and at the same time1 are useful things1 because they economize space1 because objects symmetrically disposed are easier to find when one wants them2 but that is not what makes for us the beauty of symmetry1 for we immediately seize this kind of beauty1 and it is often late enough before we recognize the utility that is found in it4 ,it even sometimes happens1 that after having admired the beauty of an object1 we are not able to divine its use1 although it may have one4 ,the useful is1 then1 entirely different from the beautiful1 far from being its foundation4 ,a celebrated and very ancient#ajd theory makes the beautiful consist in the perfect suitableness of means to their end4 ,here the beautiful is no longer the useful1 it is the suitable2 these two ideas must be distinguished4 ,a machine produces excellent effects1 economy of time1 work1 etc42 it is therefore useful4 ,if1 moreover1 examining its construction1 ,i find that each piece is in its place1 and that all are skilfully disposed for the result which they should produce2 even without regarding the utility of this result1 as the means are well adapted to their end1 ,i judge that there is suitableness in it4 ,we are already approaching the idea of the beautiful2 for we are no longer considering what is useful1 but what is proper4 ,now1 we have not yet attained the true character of beauty2 there are1 in fact1 objects very well adapted to their end1 which we do not call beautiful4 ,a bench without ornament and without elegance1 provided it be solid1 provided all the parts are firmly connected1 provided one may sit down on it with safety1 provided it may be for this purpose suitable1 agreeable even1 may give an example of the most perfect adaptation of means to an end2 it will not1 therefore1 be said that this bench is beautiful4 ,there is here always this difference between suitableness and utility1 that an object to be beautiful has no need of being useful1 but that it is not beautiful if it does not possess suitableness1 if there is in it a disagreement between the end and the means4 ,some have thought to find the beautiful in proportion1 and this is1 in fact1 one of the conditions of beauty1 but it is not the only one4 ,it is very certain1 that an object ill-proportioned cannot be beautiful4 ,there is in all beautiful objects1 however far they may be from geometric form1 a sort of living geometry4 ,but1 ,i ask1 is it proportion that is dominant in this slender tree1 with flexible and graceful branches1 with rich and shady foliage8 ,what makes the terrible beauty of a storm1 what makes that of a great picture1 of an isolated verse1 or a sublime ode8 ,it is not1 ,i know1 wanting in law and rule1 neither is it law and rule3 often1 even what at first strikes us is an apparent irregularity4 ,it is absurd to pretend that what makes us admire all these things and many more1 is the same quality that makes us admire a geometric figure1 that is to say1 the exact correspondence of parts4 ,what we say of proportion may be said of order1 which is something less mathematical than proportion1 but scarcely explains better what is free1 varied1 and negligent in certain beauties4 ,all these theories which refer beauty to order1 harmony1 and proportion1 are at foundation only one and the same theory which in the beautiful sees unity before all4 ,and surely unity is beautiful2 it is an important part of beauty1 but it is not the whole of beauty4 ,the most probable theory of the beautiful is that which composes it of two contrary and equally necessary elements1 unity and variety4 ,behold a beautiful flower4 ,without doubt1 unity1 order1 proportion1 symmetry even1 are in it2 for1 without these qualities1 reason would be absent from it1 and all things are made with a marvellous reason4 ,but1 at the same time1 what a diversity6 ,how many shades in the color1 what richness in the least details6 ,even in mathematics1 what is beautiful is not an abstract principle1 it is a principle carrying with itself a long chain of consequences4 ,there is no beauty without life1 and life is movement1 is diversity4 ,unity and variety are applied to all orders of beauty4 ,let us rapidly run over these different orders4 ,in the first place1 there are beautiful objects1 to speak properly1 and sublime objects4 ,a beautiful object1 we have seen1 is something completed1 circumscribed1 limited1 which all our faculties easily embrace1 because the different parts are on a somewhat narrow scale4 ,a sublime object is that which1 by forms not in themselves disproportionate1 but less definite and more difficult to seize1 awakens in us the sentiment of the infinite4 ,there are two very distinct species of beauty4 ,but reality is inexhaustible1 and in all the degrees of reality there is beauty4 ,among sensible objects1 colors1 sounds1 figures1 movements1 are capable of producing the idea and the sentiment of the beautiful4 ,all these beauties are arranged under that species of beauty which1 right or wrong1 is called physical beauty4 ,if from the world of sense we elevate ourselves to that of mind1 truth1 and science1 we shall find there beauties more severe1 but not less real4 ,the universal laws that govern bodies1 those that govern intelligences1 the great principles that contain and produce long deductions1 the genius that creates1 in the artist1 poet1 or philosopher1--all these are beautiful1 as well as nature herself3 this is what is called intellectual beauty4 ,finally1 if we consider the moral world and its laws1 the idea of liberty1 virtue1 and devotedness1 here the austere justice of an ,aristides1 there the heroism of a ,leonidas1 the prodigies of charity or patriotism1 we shall certainly find a third order of beauty that still surpasses the other two1 to wit1 moral beauty4 ,neither let us forget to apply to all these beauties the distinction between the beautiful and the sublime4 ,there are1 then1 the beautiful and the sublime at once in nature1 in ideas1 in sentiments1 in actions4 ,what an almost infinite variety in beauty6 ,after having enumerated all these differences1 could we not reduce them8 ,they are incontestable2 but1 in this diversity is there not unity8 ,is there not a single beauty of which all particular beauties are only reflections1 shades1 degrees1 or degradations8 ,plotinus1 in his treatise ,on the ,beautiful1#aje proposed to himself this question4 ,he asks--,what is the beautiful in itself8 ,i see clearly that such or such a form is beautiful1 that such or such an action is also beautiful2 but why and how are these two objects1 so dissimilar1 beautiful8 ,what is the common quality which1 being found in these two objects1 ranges them under the general idea of the beautiful8 ,it is necessary to answer this question1 or the theory of beauty is a maze without issue2 one applies the same name to the most diverse things1 without understanding the real unity that authorizes this unity of name4 ,either the diversities which we have designated in beauty are such that it is impossible to discover their relation1 or these diversities are especially apparent1 and have their harmony1 their concealed unity4 ,is it pretended that this unity is a chimera8 ,then physical beauty1 moral beauty1 and intellectual beauty1 are strangers to each other4 ,what1 then1 will the artist do8 ,he is surrounded by different beauties1 and he must make a work2 for such is the recognized law of art4 ,but if this unity that is imposed upon him is a factitious unity1 if there are in nature only essentially dissimilar beauties1 art deceives and lies to us4 ,let it be explained1 then1 how falsehood is the law of art4 ,that cannot be2 the unity that art expresses1 it must have somewhere caught a glimpse of1 in order to transport it into its works4 ,we neither retract the distinction between the beautiful and the sublime1 nor the other distinctions just now indicated2 but it is necessary to re-unite after having distinguished them4 ,these distinctions and these re-unions are not contradictory3 the great law of beauty1 like that of truth1 is unity as well as variety4 ,all is one1 and all is diverse4 ,we have divided beauty into three great classes--physical beauty1 intellectual beauty1 and moral beauty4 ,we must now seek the unity of these three sorts of beauty4 ,now1 we think that they resolve themselves into one and the same beauty1 moral beauty1 meaning by that1 with moral beauty properly so called1 all spiritual beauty4 ,let us put this opinion to the proof of facts4 ,place yourself before that statue of ,apollo which is called ,apollo ,belvidere1 and observe attentively what strikes you in that master-piece4 ,winkelmann1 who was not a metaphysician1 but a learned antiquarian1 a man of taste without system1 made a celebrated analysis of the ,apollo4#ajf ,it is curious to study it4 ,what ,winkelmann extols before all1 is the character of divinity stamped upon the immortal youth that invests that beautiful body1 upon the height1 a little above that of man1 upon the majestic altitude1 upon the imperious movement1 upon the ensemble1 and all the details of the person4 ,the forehead is indeed that of a god1--an unalterable placidity dwells upon it4 ,lower down1 humanity reappears somewhat2 and that is very necessary1 in order to interest humanity in the works of art4 ,in that satisfied look1 in the distension of the nostrils1 in the elevation of the under lip1 are at once felt anger mingled with disdain1 pride of victory1 and the little fatigue which it has cost4 ,weigh well each word of ,winkelmann3 you will find there a moral impression4 ,the tone of the learned antiquary is elevated1 little by little1 to enthusiasm1 and his analysis becomes a hymn to spiritual beauty4 ,instead of a statue1 observe a real and living man4 ,regard that man who1 solicited by the strongest motives to sacrifice duty to fortune1 triumphs over interest1 after an heroic struggle1 and sacrifices fortune to virtue4 ,regard him at the moment when he is about to take this magnanimous resolution2 his face will appear to you beautiful1 because it expresses the beauty of his soul4 ,perhaps1 under all other circumstances1 the face of the man is common1 even trivial2 here1 illuminated by the soul which it manifests1 it is ennobled1 and takes an imposing character of beauty4 ,so1 the natural face of ,socrates#ajg contrasts strongly with the type of ,grecian beauty2 but look at him on his death-bed1 at the moment of drinking the hemlock1 convening with his disciples on the immortality of the soul1 and his face will appear to you sublime4#ajh ,at the highest point of moral grandeur1 ,socrates expires3--you have before your eyes no longer any thing but his dead body2 the dead face preserves its beauty1 as long as it preserves traces of the mind that animated it2 but little by little the expression is extinguished or disappears2 the face then becomes vulgar and ugly4 ,the expression of death is hideous or sublime1--hideous at the aspect of the decomposition of the matter that no longer retains the spirit1--sublime when it awakens in us the idea of eternity4 ,consider the figure of man in repose3 it is more beautiful than that of an animal1 the figure of an animal is more beautiful than the form of any inanimate object4 ,it is because the human figure1 even in the absence of virtue and genius1 always reflects an intelligent and moral nature1 it is because the figure of an animal reflects sentiment at least1 and something of soul1 if not the soul entire4 ,if from man and the animal we descend to purely physical nature1 we shall still find beauty there1 as long as we find there some shade of intelligence1 ,i know not what1 that awakens in us some thought1 some sentiment4 ,do we arrive at some piece of matter that expresses nothing1 that signifies nothing1 neither is the idea of beauty applied to it4 ,but every thing that exists is animated4 ,matter is shaped and penetrated by forces that are not material1 and it obeys laws that attest an intelligence everywhere present4 ,the most subtile chemical analysis does not reach a dead and inert nature1 but a nature that is organized in its own way1 that is neither deprived of forces nor laws4 ,in the depths of the earth1 as in the heights of the heavens1 in a grain of sand as in a gigantic mountain1 an immortal spirit shines through the thickest coverings4 ,let us contemplate nature with the eye of the soul as well as with the eye of the body3--everywhere a moral expression will strike us1 and the forms of things will impress us as symbols of thought4 ,we have said that with man1 and with the animal even1 the figure is beautiful on account of the expression4 ,but1 when you are on the summit of the ,alps1 or before the immense ,ocean1 when you behold the rising or setting of the sun1 at the beginning or the close of the day1 do not these imposing pictures produce on you a moral effect8 ,do all these grand spectacles appear only for the sake of appearing8 ,do we not regard them as manifestations of an admirable power1 intelligence1 and wisdom8 ,and1 thus to speak1 is not the face of nature expressive like that of man8 ,form cannot be simply a form1 it must be the form of something4 ,physical beauty is1 then1 the sign of an internal beauty1 which is spiritual and moral beauty2 and this is the foundation1 the principle1 the unity of the beautiful4#aji ,all the beauties that we have just enumerated and reduced compose what is called the really beautiful4 ,but1 above real beauty1 is a beauty of another order--ideal beauty4 ,the ideal resides neither in an individual1 nor in a collection of individuals4 ,nature or experience furnishes us the occasion of conceiving it1 but it is essentially distinct4 ,let it once be conceived1 and all natural figures1 though never so beautiful1 are only images of a superior beauty which they do not realize4 ,give me a beautiful action1 and ,i will imagine one still more beautiful4 ,the ,apollo itself is open to criticism in more than one respect4 ,the ideal continually recedes as we approach it4 ,its last termination is in the infinite1 that is to say1 in ,god2 or1 to speak more correctly1 the true and absolute ideal is nothing else than ,god himself4 ,god1 being the principle of all things1 must for this reason be that of perfect beauty1 and1 consequently1 of all natural beauties that express it more or less imperfectly2 he is the principle of beauty1 both as author of the physical world and as father of the intellectual and moral world4 ,is it not necessary to be a slave of the senses and of appearances in order to stop at movements1 at forms1 at sounds1 at colors1 whose harmonious combinations produce the beauty of this visible world1 and not to conceive behind this scene so magnificent and well regulated1 the orderer1 the geometer1 the supreme artist8 ,physical beauty serves as an envelope to intellectual and moral beauty4 ,what can be the principle of intellectual beauty1 that splendor of the true1 except the principle of all truth8 ,moral beauty comprises1 as we shall subsequently see1#aaj two distinct elements1 equally but diversely beautiful1 justice and charity1 respect and love of men4 ,he who expresses in his conduct justice and charity1 accomplishes the most beautiful of all works2 the good man is1 in his way1 the greatest of all artists4 ,but what shall we say of him who is the very substance of justice and the exhaustless source of love8 ,if our moral nature is beautiful1 what must be the beauty of its author6 ,his justice and goodness are everywhere1 both in us and out of us4 ,his justice is the moral order that no human law makes1 that all human laws are forced to express1 that is preserved and perpetuated in the world by its own force4 ,let us descend into ourselves1 and consciousness will attest the divine justice in the peace and contentment that accompany virtue1 in the troubles and tortures that are the invariable punishments of vice and crime4 ,how many times1 and with what eloquence1 have men celebrated the indefatigable solicitude of ,providence1 its benefits everywhere manifest in the smallest as well as in the greatest phenomena of nature1 which we forget so easily because they have become so familiar to us1 but which1 on reflection1 call forth our mingled admiration and gratitude1 and proclaim a good ,god1 full of love for his creatures6 ,thus1 ,god is the principle of the three orders of beauty that we have distinguished1 physical beauty1 intellectual beauty1 moral beauty4 ,in him also are reunited the two great forms of the beautiful distributed in each of these three orders1 to wit1 the beautiful and the sublime4 ,god is1 par excellence1 the beautiful--for what object satisfies more all our faculties1 our reason1 our imagination1 our heart6 ,he offers to reason the highest idea1 beyond which it has nothing more to seek2 to imagination the most ravishing contemplation2 to the heart a sovereign object of love4 ,he is1 then1 perfectly beautiful2 but is he not sublime also in other ways8 ,if he extends the horizon of thought1 it is to confound it in the abyss of his greatness4 ,if the soul blooms at the spectacle of his goodness1 has it not also reason to be affrighted at the idea of his justice1 which is not less present to it8 ,god is at once mild and terrible4 ,at the same time that he is the life1 the light1 the movement1 the ineffable grace of visible and finite nature1 he is also called the ,eternal1 the ,invisible1 the ,infinite1 the ,absolute ,unity1 and the ,being of beings4 ,do not these awful attributes1 as certain as the first1 produce in the highest degree in the imagination and the soul that melancholy emotion excited by the sublime8 ,yes1 ,god is for us the type and source of the two great forms of beauty1 because he is to us at once an impenetrable enigma and still the clearest word that we are able to find for all enigmas4 ,limited beings as we are1 we comprehend nothing in comparison with that which is without limits1 and we are able to explain nothing without that same thing which is without limits4 ,by the being that we possess1 we have some idea of the infinite being of ,god2 by the nothingness that is in us1 we lose ourselves in the being of ,god2 and thus always forced to recur to him in order to explain any thing1 and always thrown back within ourselves under the weight of his infinitude1 we experience by turns1 or rather at the same time1 for this ,god who raises and casts us down1 a sentiment of irresistible attraction and astonishment1 not to say insurmountable terror1 which he alone can cause and allay1 because he alone is the unity of the sublime and the beautiful4 ,thus absolute being1 which is both absolute unity and infinite variety1--,god1 is necessarily the last reason1 the ultimate foundation1 the completed ideal of all beauty4 ,this is the marvellous beauty that ,diotimus had caught a glimpse of1 and thus paints to ,socrates in the ,banquet3 ,eternal beauty1 unbegotten and imperishable1 exempt from decay as well as increase1 which is not beautiful in such a part and ugly in such another1 beautiful only1 at such a time1 in such a place1 in such a relation1 beautiful for some1 ugly for others1 beauty that has no sensible form1 no visage1 no hands1 nothing corporeal1 which is not such a thought or such a particular science1 which resides not in any being different from itself1 as an animal1 the earth1 or the heavens1 or any other thing1 which is absolutely identical and invariable by itself1 in which all other beauties participate1 in such a way1 nevertheless1 that their birth or their destruction neither diminishes nor increases1 nor in the least changes it6444 ,in order to arrive at this perfect beauty1 it is necessary to commence with the beauties of this lower world1 and1 the eyes being fixed upon the supreme beauty1 to elevate ourselves unceasingly towards it1 by passing1 thus to speak1 through all the degrees of the scale1 from a single beautiful body to two1 from two to all others1 from beautiful bodies to beautiful sentiments1 from beautiful sentiments to beautiful thoughts1 until from thought to thought we arrive at the highest thought1 which has no other object than the beautiful itself1 until we end by knowing it as it is in itself4 ,o my dear ,socrates1 continued the stranger of ,mantinea1 that which can give value to this life is the spectacle of the eternal beauty4444 ,what would be the destiny of a mortal to whom it should be granted to contemplate the beautiful without alloy1 in its purity and simplicity1 no longer clothed with the flesh and hues of humanity1 and with all those vain charms that are condemned to perish1 to whom it should be given to see face to face1 under its sole form1 the divine beauty6#aaa ,,footnotes3 #ajc ,if one would make himself acquainted with a simple and piquant refutation1 written two thousand years ago1 of false theories of beauty1 he may read the ,hippias of ,plato1 vol4 iv4 of our translation4 ,the ,phaedrus1 vol4 vi41 contains the veiled exposition of ,plato's own theory2 but it is in the ,banquet 7,ibid471 and particularly in the discourse of ,diotimus1 that we must look for the thought of ,plato carried to its highest degree of development1 and clothed with all the beauty of human language4 #ajd ,see the ,hippias4 #aje ,first ,ennead1 book vi41 in the work of ,m4 ,b4 ,saint-,hillaire1 on the ,school of ,alexandria1 the translation of this morsel of ,plotinus1 p4 #aig4 #ajf ,winkelmann has twice described the ,apollo1 ,history of ,art among the ,ancients1 ,paris1 #ahjb1 #c vols41 in #dto4 ,vol4 i41 book iv41 chap4 iii41 ,art among the ,greeks3--,the ,apollo of the ,vatican offers us that ,god in a movement of indignation against the serpent ,python1 which he has just killed with arrow-shots1 and in a sentiment of contempt for a victory so little worthy of a divinity4 ,the wise artist1 who proposed to represent the most beautiful of the gods1 placed the anger in the nose1 which1 according to the ancients1 was its seat2 and the disdain on the lips4 ,he expressed the anger by the inflation of the nostrils1 and the disdain by the elevation of the under lip1 which causes the same movement in the chin4--,ibid41 vol4 ii41 book iv41 chap4 vi41 ,art under the ,emperors3--,of all the antique statues that have escaped the fury of barbarians and the destructive hand of time1 the statue of ,apollo is1 without contradiction1 the most sublime4 ,one would say that the artist composed a figure purely ideal1 and employed matter only because it was necessary for him to execute and represent his idea4 ,as much as ,homer's description of ,apollo surpasses the descriptions which other poets have undertaken after him1 so much this statue excels all the figures of this god4 ,its height is above that of man1 and its attitude proclaims the divine grandeur with which it is filled4 ,a perennial spring-time1 like that which reigns in the happy fields of ,elysium1 clothes with lovable youth the beautiful body1 and shines with sweetness over the noble structure of the limbs4 ,in order to feel the merit of this chef-d'oeuvre of art1 we must be penetrated with intellectual beauty1 and become1 if possible1 the creatures of a celestial nature2 for there is nothing mortal in it1 nothing subject to the wants of humanity4 ,that body1 whose forms are not interrupted by a vein1 which is not agitated by a nerve1 seems animated with a celestial spirit1 which circulates like a sweet vapor in all the parts of that admirable figure4 ,the god has just been pursuing ,python1 against which he has bent1 for the first time1 his formidable bow2 in his rapid course1 he has overtaken him1 and given him a mortal wound4 ,penetrated with the conviction of his power1 and lost in a concentrated joy1 his august look penetrates far into the infinite1 and is extended far beyond his victory4 ,disdain sits upon his lips2 the indignation that he breathes distends his nostrils1 and ascends to his eyebrows2 but an unchangeable serenity is painted on his brow1 and his eye is full of sweetness1 as though the ,muses were caressing him4 ,among all the figures that remain to us of ,jupiter1 there is none in which the father of the gods approaches the grandeur with which he manifested himself to the intelligence of ,homer2 but in the traits of the ,apollo ,belvidere1 we find the individual beauties of all the other divinities united1 as in that of ,pandora4 ,the forehead is the forehead of ,jupiter1 inclosing the goddess of wisdom2 the eyebrows1 by their movement1 announce his supreme will2 the large eyes are those of the queen of the gods1 orbed with dignity1 and the mouth is an image of that of ,bacchus1 where breathed voluptuousness4 ,like the tender branches of the vine1 his beautiful locks flow around his head1 as if they were lightly agitated by the zephyr's breath4 ,they seem perfumed with the essence of the gods1 and are charmingly arranged over his head by the hand of the ,graces4 ,at the sight of this marvel of art1 ,i forget every thing else1 and my mind takes a supernatural disposition1 fitted to judge of it with dignity2 from admiration ,i pass to ecstasy2 ,i feel my breast dilating and rising1 like those who are filled with the spirit of prophecy2 ,i am transported to ,delos1 and the sacred groves of ,syria1--places which ,apollo honored with his presence3--the statue seems to be animated as it were with the beauty that sprung of old from the hands of ,pygmalion4 ,how can ,i describe thee1 ,o inimitable master-piece8 ,for this it would be necessary that art itself should deign to inspire my pen4 ,the traits that ,i have just sketched1 ,i lay before thee1 as those who came to crown the gods1 put their crowns at their feet1 not being able to reach their heads4 #ajg ,see the last part of the ,banquet1 the discourse of ,alcibiades1 p4 #cbf of vol4 vi4 of our translation4 #ajh ,we here have in mind1 and we avow it1 the ,socrates of ,david1 which appears to us1 the theatrical character being admitted1 above its reputation4 ,besides ,socrates1 it is impossible not to admire ,plato listening to his master1 as it were from the bottom of his soul1 without looking at him1 with his back turned upon the scene that is passing1 and lost in the contemplation of the intelligible world4 #aji ,we are fortunate in finding this theory1 which is so dear to us1 confirmed by the authority of one of the severest and most circumspect minds3--it may be seen in ,reid1 #ast ,series1 vol4 iv41 lecture #bc4 ,the ,scotch philosopher terminates his ,essay on ,taste with these words1 which happily remind us of the thought and manner of ,plato himself3--,whether the reasons that ,i have given to prove that sensible beauty is only the image of moral beauty appear sufficient or not1 ,i hope that my doctrine1 in attempting to unite the terrestrial ,venus more closely to the celestial ,venus1 will not seem to have for its object to abase the first1 and render her less worthy of the homage that mankind has always paid her4 #aaj ,part iii41 lecture #ae4 #aaa ,vol4 vi4 of our translation1 p4 #haf-hah ,,lecture ,,viii ,,on ,,art4 ,genius3--its attribute is creative power4--,refutation of the opinion that art is the imitation of nature4--,m4 ,emeric ,david1 and ,m4 ,quatremere de ,quincy4--,refutation of the theory of illusion4 ,that dramatic art has not solely for its end to excite the passions of terror and pity4--,nor even directly the moral and religious sentiment4--,the proper and direct object of art is to produce the idea and the sentiment of the beautiful2 this idea and this sentiment purify and elevate the soul by the affinity between the beautiful and the good1 and by the relation of ideal beauty to its principle1 which is ,god4--,true mission of art4 ,man is not made only to know and love the beautiful in the works of nature1 he is endowed with the power of reproducing it4 ,at the sight of a natural beauty1 whatever it may be1 physical or moral1 his first need is to feel and admire4 ,he is penetrated1 ravished1 as it were overwhelmed with the sentiment of beauty4 ,but when the sentiment is energetic1 he is not a long time sterile4 ,we wish to see again1 we wish to feel again what caused us so vivid a pleasure1 and for that end we attempt to revive the beauty that charmed us1 not as it was1 but as our imagination represents it to us4 ,hence a work original and peculiar to man1 a work of art4 ,art is the free reproduction of beauty1 and the power in us capable of reproducing it is called genius4 ,what faculties are used in this free reproduction of the beautiful8 ,the same that serve to recognize and feel it4 ,taste carried to the highest degree1 if you always join to it an additional element1 is genius4 ,what is this element8 ,three faculties enter into that complex faculty that is called taste1--imagination1 sentiment1 reason4 ,these three faculties are certainly necessary for genius1 but they are not sufficient for it4 ,what essentially distinguishes genius from taste is the attribute of creative power4 ,taste feels1 judges1 discusses1 analyzes1 but does not invent4 ,genius is1 before all1 inventive and creative4 ,the man of genius is not the master of the power that is in him2 it is by the ardent1 irresistible need of expressing what he feels1 that he is a man of genius4 ,he suffers by withholding the sentiments1 or images1 or thoughts1 that agitate his breast4 ,it has been said that there is no superior man without some grain of folly2 but this folly1 like that of the cross1 is the divine part of reason4 ,this mysterious power ,socrates called his demon4 ,voltaire called it the devil in the body2 he demanded it even in a comedian in order to be a comedian of genius4 ,give to it what name you please1 it is certain that there is a ,i-know-not-what that inspires genius1 that also torments it until it has delivered itself of what consumes it2 until1 by expressing them1 it has solaced its pains and its joys1 its emotions1 its ideas2 until its reveries have become living works4 ,thus two things characterize genius2 at first1 the vivacity of the need it has of producing1 then the power of producing2 for the need without the power is only a malady that resembles genius1 but is not it4 ,genius is above all1 is essentially1 the power of doing1 of inventing1 of creating4 ,taste is contented with observing1 with admiring4 ,false genius1 ardent and impotent imagination1 consumes itself in sterile dreams and produces nothing1 at least nothing great4 ,genius alone has the power to convert conceptions into creations4 ,if genius creates it does not imitate4 ,but genius1 it is said1 is then superior to nature1 since it does not imitate it4 ,nature is the work of ,god2 man is then the rival of ,god4 ,the answer is very simple4 ,no1 genius is not the rival of ,god2 but it is the interpreter of him4 ,nature expresses him in its way1 human genius expresses him in its own way4 ,let us stop a moment at that question so much discussed1--whether art is any thing else than the imitation of nature4 ,doubtless1 in one sense1 art is an imitation2 for absolute creation belongs only to ,god4 ,where can genius find the elements upon which it works1 except in nature1 of which it forms a part8 ,but does it limit itself to the reproduction of them as nature furnishes them to it1 without adding any thing to them which belongs to itself8 ,is it only a copier of reality8 ,its sole merit1 then1 is that of the fidelity of the copy4 ,and what labor is more sterile than that of copying works essentially inimitable on account of the life with which they are endowed1 in order to obtain an indifferent image of them8 ,if art is a servile pupil1 it is condemned never to be any thing but an impotent pupil4 ,the true artist feels and profoundly admires nature2 but every thing in nature is not equally admirable4 ,as we have just said1 it has something by which it infinitely surpasses art--its life4 ,besides that1 art can1 in its turn1 surpass nature1 on the condition of not wishing to imitate it too closely4 ,every natural object1 however beautiful1 is defective on some side4 ,every thing that is real is imperfect4 ,here1 the horrible and the hideous are united to the sublime2 there1 elegance and grace are separated from grandeur and force4 ,the traits of beauty are scattered and diverse4 ,to reunite them arbitrarily1 to borrow from such a face a mouth1 eyes from such another1 without any rule that governs this choice and directs these borrowings1 is to compose monsters2 to admit a rule1 is already to admit an ideal different from all individuals4 ,it is this ideal that the true artist forms to himself in studying nature4 ,without nature1 he never would have conceived this ideal2 but with this ideal1 he judges nature herself1 rectifies her1 and dares undertake to measure himself with her4 ,the ideal is the artist's object of passionate contemplation4 ,assiduously and silently meditated1 unceasingly purified by reflection and vivified by sentiment1 it warms genius and inspires it with the irresistible need of seeing it realized and living4 ,for this end1 genius takes in nature all the materials that can serve it1 and applying to them its powerful hand1 as ,michael ,angelo impressed his chisel upon the docile marble1 makes of them works that have no model in nature1 that imitate nothing else than the ideal dreamed of or conceived1 that are in some sort a second creation inferior to the first in individuality and life1 but much superior to it1 we do not fear to say1 on account of the intellectual and moral beauty with which it is impressed4 ,moral beauty is the foundation of all true beauty4 ,this foundation is somewhat covered and veiled in nature4 ,art disengages it1 and gives to it forms more transparent4 ,on this account1 art1 when it knows well its power and its resources1 institutes with nature a contest in which it may have the advantage4 ,let us establish well the end of art3 it is precisely where its power lies4 ,the end of art is the expression of moral beauty1 by the aid of physical beauty4 ,the latter is only a symbol of the former4 ,in nature1 this symbol is often obscure3 art in bringing it to light attains effects that nature does not always produce4 ,nature may please more1 for1 once more1 it possesses in an incomparable degree what makes the great charm of imagination and sight--life2 art touches more1 because in expressing1 above all1 moral beauty1 it addresses itself more directly to the source of profound emotions4 ,art can be more pathetic than nature1 and the pathetic is the sign and measure of great beauty4 ,two extremes are equally dangerous--a lifeless ideal1 or the absence of the ideal4 ,either we copy the model1 and are wanting in true beauty1 or we work de tete1 and fall into an ideality without character4 ,genius is a ready and sure perception of the right proportion in which the ideal and the natural1 form and thought1 ought to be united4 ,this union is the perfection of art3 chefs-d'oeuvre are produced by observing it4 ,it is important1 in my opinion1 to follow this rule in teaching art4 ,it is asked whether pupils should begin with the study of the ideal or the real4 ,i do not hesitate to answer1--by both4 ,nature herself never offers the general without the individual1 nor the individual without the general4 ,every figure is composed of individual traits which distinguish it from all others1 and make its own looks1 and1 at the same time1 it has general traits which constitute what is called the human figure4 ,these general traits are the constitutive lineaments1 and this figure is the type1 that are given to the pupil that is beginning in the art of design to trace4 ,it would also be good1 ,i believe1 in order to preserve him from the dry and abstract1 to exercise him early in copying some natural object1 especially a living figure4 ,this would be putting pupils to the true school of nature4 ,they would thus become accustomed never to sacrifice either of the two essential elements of the beautiful1 either of the two imperative conditions of art4 ,but1 in uniting these two elements1 these two conditions1 it is necessary to distinguish them1 and to know how to put them in their place4 ,there is no true ideal without determinate form1 there is no unity without variety1 no genus without individuals1 but1 in fine1 the foundation of the beautiful is the idea2 what makes art is before all1 the realization of the idea1 and not the imitation of such or such a particular form4 ,at the commencement of our century1 the ,institute of ,france offered a prize for the best answer to the following question3 ,what were the causes of the perfection of the antique sculpture1 and what would be the best means of attaining it8 ,the successful competitor1 ,m4 ,emeric ,david1#aab maintained the opinion then dominant1 that the assiduous study of natural beauty had alone conducted the antique art to perfection1 and that thus the imitation of nature was the only route to reach the same perfection4 ,a man whom ,i do not fear to compare with ,winkelmann1 the future author of the ,olympic ,jupiter1#aac ,m4 ,quatremere de ,quincy1 in some ingenious and profound disquisitions1#aad combated the doctrine of the laureate1 and defended the cause of ideal beauty4 ,it is impossible to demonstrate more decidedly1 by the entire history of ,greek sculpture1 and by authentic texts from the greatest critiques of antiquity1 that the process of art among the ,greeks was not the imitation of nature1 either by a particular model1 or by several1 the most beautiful model being always very imperfect1 and several models not being able to compose a single beauty4 ,the true process of the ,greek art was the representation of an ideal beauty which nature scarcely possessed more in ,greece than among us1 which it could not then offer to the artist4 ,we regret that the honorable laureate1 since become a member of the ,institute1 pretended that this expression of ideal beauty1 if it had been known by the ,greeks1 would have meant visible beauty1 because ideal comes from ,greek3 eidos1 which signifies only1 according to ,m4 ,emeric ,david1 a form seen by the eye4 ,plato would have been much surprised at this exclusive interpretation of the word ,greek3 eidos4 ,m4 ,quatremere de ,quincy confounds his unequal adversary by two admirable texts1 one from the ,timaeus1 where ,plato marks with precision in what the true artist is superior to the ordinary artist1 the other at the commencement of the ,orator1 where ,cicero explains the manner in which great artists work1 in referring to the manner of ,phidias1 that is to say1 the most perfect master of the most perfect epoch of art4 ,the artist1#aae who1 with eye fixed upon the immutable being1 and using such a model1 reproduces its idea and its excellence1 cannot fail to produce a whole whose beauty is complete1 whilst he who fixes his eye upon what is transitory1 with this perishable model will make nothing beautiful4 ,phidias1#aaf that great artist1 when he made the form of ,jupiter or ,minerva1 did not contemplate a model a resemblance of which he would express2 but in the depth of his soul resided a perfect type of beauty1 upon which he fixed his look1 which guided his hand and his art4 ,is not this process of ,phidias precisely that which ,raphael describes in the famous letter to ,castiglione1 which he declares that he followed himself for the ,galatea8#aag ,as1 he says1 ,i am destitute of beautiful models1 ,i use a certain ideal which ,i form for myself4 ,there is another theory which comes back1 by a circuit1 to imitation3 it is that which makes illusion the end of art4 ,if this theory be true1 the ideal beauty of painting is a tromp-l'oeil1#aah and its master-piece is the grapes of ,zeuxis that the birds came and pecked at4 ,the height of art in a theatrical piece would be to persuade you that you are in the presence of reality4 ,what is true in this opinion is1 that a work of art is beautiful only on the condition of being life-like1 and1 for example1 the law of dramatic art is not to put on the stage pale phantoms of the past1 but personages borrowed from imagination or history1 as you like1 but animated1 endowed with passion1 speaking and acting like men and not like shades4 ,it is human nature that is to be represented to itself under a magic light that does not disfigure it1 but ennobles it4 ,this magic is the very genius of art4 ,it lifts us above the miseries that besiege us1 and transports us to regions where we still find ourselves1 for we never wish to lose sight of ourselves1 but where we find ourselves transformed to our advantage1 where all the imperfections of reality have given place to a certain perfection1 where the language that we speak is more equal and elevated1 where persons are more beautiful1 where the ugly is not admitted1 and all this while duly respecting history1 especially without ever going beyond the imperative conditions of human nature4 ,has art forgotten human nature8 it has passed beyond its end1 it has not attained it2 it has brought forth nothing but chimeras without interest for our soul4 ,has it been too human1 too real1 too nude8 it has fallen short of its end2 it has then attained it no better4 ,illusion is so little the end of art1 that it may be complete and have no charm4 ,thus1 in the interest of illusion1 theatrical men have taken great pains in these latter times to secure historical accuracy of costume4 ,this is all very well2 but it is not the most important thing4 ,had you found1 and lent to the actor who plays the part of ,brutus1 the very costume that of old the ,roman hero wore1 it would touch true connoisseurs very little4 ,this is not all2 when the illusion goes too far1 the sentiment of art disappears in order to give place to a sentiment purely natural1 sometimes insupportable4 ,if ,i believed that ,iphegenia were in fact on the point of being immolated by her father at a distance of twenty paces from me1 ,i should leave the theatre trembling with horror4 ,if the ,ariadne that ,i see and hear1 were the true ,ariadne who is about to be betrayed by her sister1 in that pathetic scene where the poor woman1 who already feels herself less loved1 asks who then robs her of the heart1 once so tender1 of ,theseus1 ,i would do as the young ,englishman did1 who cried out1 sobbing and trying to spring upon the stage1 ,it is ,phedre1 it is ,phedre6 as if he would warn and save ,ariadne4 ,but1 it is said1 is it not the aim of the poet to excite pity and terror8 ,yes2 but at first in a certain measure2 then he must mix with them some other sentiment that tempers them1 or makes them serve another end4 ,if the aim of dramatic art were only to excite in the highest degree pity and terror1 art would be the powerless rival of nature4 ,all the misfortunes represented on the stage are very feeble in comparison with those sad spectacles which we may see every day4 ,the first hospital is fuller of pity and terror than all the theatres in the world4 ,what should the poet do in the theory that we combat8 ,he should transfer to the stage the greatest possible reality1 and move us powerfully by shocking our senses with the sight of frightful pains4 ,the great resort of the pathetic would then be the representation of death1 especially that of the greatest torture4 ,quite on the contrary1 there is an end of art when sensibility is too much excited4 ,to take1 again1 an example that we have already employed1 what constitutes the beauty of a tempest1 of a shipwreck8 ,what attracts us to those great scenes of nature8 ,it is certainly not pity and terror1--these poignant and lacerating sentiments would much sooner keep us away4 ,an emotion very different from these is necessary1 which triumphs over us1 in order to retain us by the shore2 this emotion is the pure sentiment of the beautiful and the sublime1 excited and kept alive by the grandeur of the spectacle1 by the vast extent of the sea1 the rolling of the foaming waves1 and the imposing sound of the thunder4 ,but do we think for a single instant that there are in the midst of the sea the unfortunate who are suffering1 and are1 perhaps1 about to perish8 ,from that moment the spectacle becomes to us insupportable4 ,it is so in art4 ,whatever sentiment it proposes to excite in us1 must always be tempered and governed by that of the beautiful4 ,if it only produces pity or terror beyond a certain limit1 especially physical pity or terror1 it revolts1 and no longer charms2 it loses the effect that belongs to it in exchange for a foreign and vulgar effect4 ,for this same reason1 ,i cannot accept another theory1 which1 confounding the sentiment of the beautiful with the moral and religious sentiment1 puts art in the service of religion and morals1 and gives it for its end to make us better and elevate us to ,god4 ,there is here an essential distinction to be made4 ,if all beauty covers a moral beauty1 if the ideal mounts unceasingly towards the infinite1 art1 which expresses ideal beauty1 purifies the soul in elevating it towards the infinite1 that is to say1 towards ,god4 ,art1 then1 produces the perfection of the soul1 but it produces it indirectly4 ,the philosopher who investigates effects and causes1 knows what is the ultimate principle of the beautiful and its certain1 although remote1 effects4 ,but the artist is before all things an artist2 what animates him is the sentiment of the beautiful2 what he wishes to make pass into the soul of the spectator is the same sentiment that fills his own4 ,he confides himself to the virtue of beauty2 he fortifies it with all the power1 all the charm of the ideal2 it must then do its own work2 the artist has done his when he has procured for some noble souls the exquisite sentiment of beauty4 ,this pure and disinterested sentiment is a noble ally of the moral and religious sentiments2 it awakens1 preserves1 and develops them1 but it is a distinct and special sentiment4 ,so art1 which is founded on this sentiment1 which is inspired by it1 which expands it1 is in its turn an independent power4 ,it is naturally associated with all that ennobles the soul1 with morals and religion2 but it springs only from itself4 ,let us confine our thought strictly within its proper limits4 ,in vindicating the independence1 the proper dignity1 and the particular end of art1 we do not intend to separate it from religion1 from morals1 from country4 ,art draws its inspirations from these profound sources1 as well as from the ever open source of nature4 ,but it is not less true that art1 the state1 religion1 are powers which have each their world apart and their own effects2 they mutually help each other2 they should not serve each other4 ,as soon as one of them wanders from its end1 it errs1 and is degraded4 ,does art blindly give itself up to the orders of religion and the state8 ,in losing its liberty1 it loses its charm and its empire4 ,ancient ,greece and modern ,italy are continually cited as triumphant examples of what the alliance of art1 religion1 and the state can do4 ,nothing is more true1 if the question is concerning their union2 nothing is more false1 if the question is concerning the servitude of art4 ,art in ,greece was so little the slave of religion1 that it little by little modified the symbols1 and1 to a certain extent1 the spirit itself1 by its free representations4 ,there is a long distance between the divinities that ,greece received from ,egypt and those of which it has left immortal exemplars4 ,are those primitive artists and poets1 as ,homer and ,dedalus are called1 strangers to this change8 ,and in the most beautiful epoch of art1 did not ,a,eschylus and ,phidias carry a great liberty into the religious scenes which they exposed to the gaze of the people1 in the theatre1 or in front of the temples8 ,in ,italy as in ,greece1 as everywhere1 art is at first in the hands of priesthoods and governments2 but1 as it increases its importance and is developed1 it more and more conquers its liberty4 ,men speak of the faith that animated the artists and vivified their works2 that is true of the time of ,giotto and ,ciambue2 but after ,angelico de ,fiesole1 at the end of the fifteenth century1 in ,italy1 ,i perceive especially the faith of art in itself and the worship of beauty4 ,raphael was about to become a cardinal2#aai yes1 but always painting ,galatea1 and without quitting ,fornarine4 ,once more1 let us exaggerate nothing2 let us distinguish1 not separate2 let us unite art1 religion1 and country1 but let not their union injure the liberty of each4 ,let us be thoroughly penetrated with the thought1 that art is also to itself a kind of religion4 ,god manifests himself to us by the idea of the true1 by the idea of the good1 by the idea of the beautiful4 ,each one of them leads to ,god1 because it comes from him4 ,true beauty is ideal beauty1 and ideal beauty is a reflection of the infinite4 ,so1 independently of all official alliance with religion and morals1 art is by itself essentially religious and moral2 for1 far from wanting its own law1 its own genius1 it everywhere expresses in its works eternal beauty4 ,bound on all sides to matter by inflexible laws1 working upon inanimate stone1 upon uncertain and fugitive sounds1 upon words of limited and finite signification1 art communicates to them1 with the precise form that is addressed to such or such a sense1 a mysterious character that is addressed to the imagination and the soul1 takes them away from reality1 and bears them sweetly or violently into unknown regions4 ,every work of art1 whatever may be its form1 small or great1 figured1 sung1 or uttered1--every work of art1 truly beautiful or sublime1 throws the soul into a gentle or severe reverie that elevates it towards the infinite4 ,the infinite is the common limit after which the soul aspires upon the wings of imagination as well as reason1 by the route of the sublime and the beautiful1 as well as by that of the true and the good4 ,the emotion that the beautiful produces turns the soul from this world2 it is the beneficent emotion that art produces for humanity4 ,,footnotes3 #aab ,recherches sur l',art ,statuaire4 ,paris1 #ahje4 #aac ,paris1 #ahae1 in folio1 an eminent work that will subsist even when time shall have destroyed some of its details4 #aad ,since reprinted under the title of ,essais sur l',ideal dans ses ,applications ,pratiques4 ,paris1 #ahcg4 #aae ,translation of ,plato1 vol4 xii41 ,timaeus1 p4 #aaf4 #aaf ,orator3 ,neque enim ille artifex 7,phidias7 cum faceret ,jovis formam aut ,minervae1 contemplabatur aliquem a quo similitudinem duceret2 sed ipsius in mente insidebat species pulchritudinis eximia quaedam1 quam intuens1 in eaque defixus1 ad illius similitudinem artem et manum dirigebat4 #aag ,raccolta di lett4 ,sulla pitt41 i41 p4 #hc4 ,essendo carestia e de' buoni giudici e di belle donne1 io mi servo di certa idea che mi viene alla mente4 #aah ,a picture representing a broken glass over several subjects painted on the canvas1 by which the eye is deceived4 #aai ,vassari1 ,vie de ,raphael4 ,,lecture ,,ix4 ,,the ,,different ,,arts4 ,expression is the general law of art4--,division of arts4--,distinction between liberal arts and trades4--,eloquence itself1 philosophy1 and history do not make a part of the fine arts4--,that the arts gain nothing by encroaching upon each other1 and usurping each other's means and processes4--,classification of the arts3--its true principle is expression4--,comparison of arts with each other4--,poetry the first of arts4 ,a resume of the last lecture would be a definition of art1 of its end and law4 ,art is the free reproduction of the beautiful1 not of a single natural beauty1 but of ideal beauty1 as the human imagination conceives it by the aid of data which nature furnishes it4 ,the ideal beauty envelops the infinite3--the end of art is1 then1 to produce works that1 like those of nature1 or even in a still higher degree1 may have the charm of the infinite4 ,but how and by what illusion can we draw the infinite from the finite8 ,this is the difficulty of art1 and its glory also4 ,what bears us towards the infinite in natural beauty8 ,the ideal side of this beauty4 ,the ideal is the mysterious ladder that enables the soul to ascend from the finite to the infinite4 ,the artist1 then1 must devote himself to the representation of the ideal4 ,every thing has its ideal4 ,the first care of the artist will be1 then1 whatever he does1 to penetrate at first to the concealed ideal of his subject1 for his subject has an ideal1--in order to render it1 in the next place1 more or less striking to the senses and the soul1 according to the conditions which the very materials that he employs--the stone1 the color1 the sound1 the language--impose on him4 ,so1 to express the ideal of the infinite in one way or another1 is the law of art2 and all the arts are such only by their relation to the sentiment of the beautiful and the infinite which they awaken in the soul1 by the aid of that high quality of every work of art that is called expression4 ,expression is essentially ideal3 what expression tries to make felt1 is not what the eye can see and the hand touch1 evidently it is something invisible and impalpable4 ,the problem of art is to reach the soul through the body4 ,art offers to the senses forms1 colors1 sounds1 words1 so arranged that they excite in the soul1 concealed behind the senses1 the inexpressible emotion of beauty4 ,expression is addressed to the soul as form is addressed to the senses4 ,form is the obstacle of expression1 and1 at the same time1 is its imperative1 necessary1 only means4 ,by working upon form1 by bending it to its service1 by dint of care1 patience1 and genius1 art succeeds in converting an obstacle into a means4 ,by their object1 all arts are equal2 all are arts only because they express the invisible4 ,it cannot be too often repeated1 that expression is the supreme law of art4 ,the thing to express is always the same1--it is the idea1 the spirit1 the soul1 the invisible1 the infinite4 ,but1 as the question is concerning the expression of this one and the same thing1 by addressing ourselves to the senses which are diverse1 the difference of the senses divides art into different arts4 ,we have seen1 that1 of the five senses which have been given to man1#abj three--taste1 smell1 and touch--are incapable of producing in us the sentiment of beauty4 ,joined to the other two1 they may contribute to the understanding of this sentiment2 but alone and by themselves they cannot produce it4 ,taste judges of the agreeable1 not of the beautiful4 ,no sense is less allied to the soul and more in the service of the body2 it flatters1 it serves the grossest of all masters1 the stomach4 ,if smell sometimes seems to participate in the sentiment of the beautiful1 it is because the odor is exhaled from an object that is already beautiful1 that is beautiful for some other reason4 ,thus the rose is beautiful for its graceful form1 for the varied splendor of its colors2 its odor is agreeable1 it is not beautiful4 ,finally1 it is not touch alone that judges of the regularity of forms1 but touch enlightened by sight4 ,there remain two senses to which all the world concedes the privilege of exciting in us the idea and the sentiment of the beautiful4 ,they seem to be more particularly in the service of the soul4 ,the sensations which they give have something purer1 more intellectual4 ,they are less indispensable for the material preservation of the individual4 ,they contribute to the embellishment rather than to the sustaining of life4 ,they procure us pleasures in which our personality seems less interested and more self-forgetful4 ,to these two senses1 then1 art should be addressed1 is addressed1 in fact1 in order to reach the soul4 ,hence the division of arts into two great classes1--arts addressed to hearing1 arts addressed to sight2 on the one hand1 music and poetry2 on the other1 painting1 with engraving1 sculpture1 architecture1 gardening4 ,it will1 perhaps1 seem strange that we rank among the arts neither eloquence1 nor history1 nor philosophy4 ,the arts are called the fine arts1 because their sole object is to produce the disinterested emotion of beauty1 without regard to the utility either of the spectator or the artist4 ,they are also called the liberal arts1 because they are the arts of free men and not of slaves1 which affranchise the soul1 charm and ennoble existence2 hence the sense and origin of those expressions of antiquity1 artes liberales1 artes ingenuae4 ,there are arts without nobility1 whose end is practical and material utility2 they are called trades1 such as that of the stove-maker and the mason4 ,true art may be joined to them1 may even shine in them1 but only in the accessories and the details4 ,eloquence1 history1 philosophy1 are certainly high employments of intelligence2 they have their dignity1 their eminence1 which nothing surpasses1 but rigorously speaking1 they are not arts4 ,eloquence does not propose to itself to produce in the soul of the auditors the disinterested sentiment of beauty4 ,it may also produce this effect1 but without having sought it4 ,its direct end1 which it can subordinate to no other1 is to convince1 to persuade4 ,eloquence has a client which before all it must save or make triumph4 ,it matters little1 whether this client be a man1 a people1 or an idea4 ,fortunate is the orator if he elicits the expression3 ,that is beautiful6 for it is a noble homage rendered to his talent2 unfortunate is he if he does not elicit this1 for he has missed his end4 ,the two great types of political and religious eloquence1 ,demosthenes in antiquity1 ,bossuet among the moderns1 think only of the interest of the cause confided to their genius1 the sacred cause of country and that of religion2 whilst at bottom ,phidias and ,raphael work to make beautiful things4 ,let us hasten to say1 what the names of ,demosthenes and ,bossuet command us to say1 that true eloquence1 very different from that of rhetoric1 disdains certain means of success2 it asks no more than to please1 but without any sacrifice unworthy of it2 every foreign ornament degrades it4 ,its proper character is simplicity1 earnestness--,i do not mean affected earnestness1 a designed and artful gravity1 the worst of all deceptions--,i mean true earnestness1 that springs from sincere and profound conviction4 ,this is what ,socrates understood by true eloquence4#aba ,as much must be said of history and philosophy4 ,the philosopher speaks and writes4 ,can he1 then1 like the orator1 find accents which make truth enter the soul1 colors and forms that make it shine forth evident and manifest to the eyes of intelligence8 ,it would be betraying his cause to neglect the means that can serve it2 but the profoundest art is here only a means1 the aim of philosophy is elsewhere2 whence it follows that philosophy is not an art4 ,without doubt1 ,plato is a great artist2 he is the peer of ,sophocles and ,phidias1 as ,pascal is sometimes the rival of ,demosthenes and ,bossuet2#abb but both would have blushed if they had discovered at the bottom of their soul another design1 another aim than the service of truth and virtue4 ,history does not relate for the sake of relating2 it does not paint for the sake of painting2 it relates and paints the past that it may be the living lesson of the future4 ,it proposes to instruct new generations by the experience of those who have gone before them1 by exhibiting to them a faithful picture of great and important events1 with their causes and their effects1 with general designs and particular passions1 with the faults1 virtues1 and crimes that are found mingled together in human things4 ,it teaches the excellence of prudence1 courage1 and great thoughts profoundly meditated1 constantly pursued1 and executed with moderation and force4 ,it shows the vanity of immoderate pretensions1 the power of wisdom and virtue1 the impotence of folly and crime4 ,thucydides1 ,polybius1 and ,tacitus undertake any thing else than procuring new emotions for an idle curiosity or a worn-out imagination2 they doubtless desire to interest and attract1 but more to instruct2 they are the avowed masters of statesmen and the preceptors of mankind4 ,the sole object of art is the beautiful4 ,art abandons itself as soon as it shuns this4 ,it is often constrained to make concessions to circumstances1 to external conditions that are imposed upon it2 but it must always retain a just liberty4 ,architecture and the art of gardening are the least free of arts2 they are subjected to unavoidable obstacles2 it belongs to the genius of the artist to govern these obstacles1 and even to draw from them happy effects1 as the poet turns the slavery of metre and rhyme into a source of unexpected beauties4 ,extreme liberty may carry art to a caprice which degrades it1 as chains too heavy crush it4 ,it is the death of architecture to subject it to convenience1 to comfort4 ,is the architect obliged to subordinate general effect and the proportions of the edifice to such or such a particular end that is prescribed to him8 ,he takes refuge in details1 in pediments1 in friezes1 in all the parts that have not utility for a special object1 and in them he becomes a true artist4 ,sculpture and painting1 especially music and poetry1 are freer than architecture and the art of gardening4 ,one can also shackle them1 but they disengage themselves more easily4 ,similar by their common end1 all the arts differ by the particular effects which they produce1 and by the processes which they employ4 ,they gain nothing by exchanging their means and confounding the limits that separate them4 ,i bow before the authority of antiquity2 but1 perhaps1 through habit and a remnant of prejudice1 ,i have some difficulty in representing to myself with pleasure statues composed of several metals1 especially painted statues4#abc ,without pretending that sculpture has not to a certain point its color1 that of perfectly pure matter1 that especially which the hand of time impresses upon it1 in spite of all the seductions of a contemporaneous#abd artist of great talent1 ,i have little taste1 ,i confess1 for that artifice that is forced to give to marble the morbidezza of painting4 ,sculpture is an austere muse2 it has its graces1 but they are those of no other art4 ,flesh-color must remain a stranger to it3 there would nothing more remain to communicate to it but the movement of poetry and the indefiniteness of music6 ,and what will music gain by aiming at the picturesque1 when its proper domain is the pathetic8 ,give to the most learned symphonist a storm to render4 ,nothing is easier to imitate than the whistling of the winds and the noise of thunder4 ,but by what combinations of harmony will he exhibit to the eyes the glare of the lightning rending all of a sudden the veil of the night1 and what is most fearful in the tempest1 the movement of the waves that now ascend like a mountain1 now descend and seem to precipitate themselves into bottomless abysses8 ,if the auditor is not informed of the subject1 he will never suspect it1 and ,i defy him to distinguish a tempest from a battle4 ,in spite of science and genius1 sounds cannot paint forms4 ,music1 when well guided1 will guard itself from contending against the impossible2 it will not undertake to express the tumult and strife of the waves and other similar phenomena2 it will do more3 with sounds it will fill the soul with the sentiments that succeed each other in us during the different scenes of the tempest4 ,haydn will thus become#abe the rival1 even the vanquisher of the painter1 because it has been given to music to move and agitate the soul more profoundly than painting4 ,since the ,laocoon of ,lessing1 it is no longer permitted to repeat1 without great reserve1 the famous axiom1--,ut pictura poesis2 or1 at least1 it is very certain that painting cannot do every thing that poetry can do4 ,everybody admires the picture of ,rumor1 drawn by ,virgil2 but let a painter try to realize this symbolic figure2 let him represent to us a huge monster with a hundred eyes1 a hundred mouths1 and a hundred ears1 whose feet touch the earth1 whose head is lost in the clouds1 and such a figure will become very ridiculous4 ,so the arts have a common end1 and entirely different means4 ,hence the general rules common to all1 and particular rules for each4 ,i have neither time nor space to enter into details on this point4 ,i limit myself to repeating1 that the great law which governs all others1 is expression4 ,every work of art that does not express an idea signifies nothing2 in addressing itself to such or such a sense1 it must penetrate to the mind1 to the soul1 and bear thither a thought1 a sentiment capable of touching or elevating it4 ,from this fundamental rule all the others are derived2 for example1 that which is continually and justly recommended1--composition4 ,to this is particularly applied the precept of unity and variety4 ,but1 in saying this1 we have said nothing so long as we have not determined the nature of the unity of which we would speak4 ,true unity1 is unity of expression1 and variety is made only to spread over the entire work the idea or the single sentiment that it should express4 ,it is useless to remark1 that between composition thus defined1 and what is often called composition1 as the symmetry and arrangement of parts according to artificial rules1 there is an abyss4 ,true composition is nothing else than the most powerful means of expression4 ,expression not only furnishes the general rules of art1 it also gives the principle that allows of their classification4 ,in fact1 every classification1 supposes a principle that serves as a common measure4 ,such a principle has been sought in pleasure1 and the first of arts has seemed that which gives the most vivid joys4 ,but we have proved that the object of art is not pleasure3--the more or less of pleasure that an art procures cannot1 then1 be the true measure of its value4 ,this measure is nothing else than expression4 ,expression being the supreme end1 the art that most nearly approaches it is the first of all4 ,all true arts are expressive1 but they are diversely so4 ,take music2 it is without contradiction the most penetrating1 the profoundest1 the most intimate art4 ,there is physically and morally between a sound and the soul a marvellous relation4 ,it seems as though the soul were an echo in which the sound takes a new power4 ,extraordinary things are recounted of the ancient music4 ,and it must not be believed that the greatness of effect supposes here very complicated means4 ,no1 the less noise music makes1 the more it touches4 ,give some notes to ,pergolese1 give him especially some pure and sweet voices1 and he returns a celestial charm1 bears you away into infinite spaces1 plunges you into ineffable reveries4 ,the peculiar power of music is to open to the imagination a limitless career1 to lend itself with astonishing facility to all the moods of each one1 to arouse or calm1 with the sounds of the simplest melody1 our accustomed sentiments1 our favorite affections4 ,in this respect music is an art without a rival3--however1 it is not the first of arts4 ,music pays for the immense power that has been given it2 it awakens more than any other art the sentiment of the infinite1 because it is vague1 obscure1 indeterminate in its effects4 ,it is just the opposite art to sculpture1 which bears less towards the infinite1 because every thing in it is fixed with the last degree of precision4 ,such is the force and at the same time the feebleness of music1 that it expresses every thing and expresses nothing in particular4 ,sculpture1 on the contrary1 scarcely gives rise to any reverie1 for it clearly represents such a thing and not such another4 ,music does not paint1 it touches2 it puts in motion imagination1 not the imagination that reproduces images1 but that which makes the heart beat1 for it is absurd to limit imagination to the domain of images4#abf ,the heart1 once touched1 moves all the rest of our being2 thus music1 indirectly1 and to a certain point1 can recall images and ideas2 but its direct and natural power is neither on the representative imagination nor intelligence1 it is on the heart1 and that is an advantage sufficiently beautiful4 ,the domain of music is sentiment1 but even there its power is more profound than extensive1 and if it expresses certain sentiments with an incomparable force1 it expresses but a very small number of them4 ,by way of association1 it can awaken them all1 but directly it produces very few of them1 and the simplest and the most elementary1 too1--sadness and joy with their thousand shades4 ,ask music to express magnanimity1 virtuous resolution1 and other sentiments of this kind1 and it will be just as incapable of doing it1 as of painting a lake or a mountain4 ,it goes about it as it can2 it employs the slow1 the rapid1 the loud1 the soft1 etc41 but imagination has to do the rest1 and imagination does only what it pleases4 ,the same measure reminds one of a mountain1 another of the ocean2 the warrior finds in it heroic inspirations1 the recluse religious inspirations4 ,doubtless1 words determine musical expression1 but the merit then is in the word1 not in the music2 and sometimes the word stamps the music with a precision that destroys it1 and deprives it of its proper effects--vagueness1 obscurity1 monotony1 but also fulness and profundity1 ,i was about to say infinitude4 ,i do not in the least admit that famous definition of song3--a noted declamation4 ,a simple declamation rightly accented is certainly preferable to stunning accompaniments2 but to music must be left its character1 and its defects and advantages must not be taken away from it4 ,especially it must not be turned aside from its object1 and there must not be demanded from it what it could not give4 ,it is not made to express complicated and factitious sentiment1 nor terrestrial and vulgar sentiments4 ,its peculiar charm is to elevate the soul towards the infinite4 ,it is therefore naturally allied to religion1 especially to that religion of the infinite1 which is at the same time the religion of the heart2 it excels in transporting to the feet of eternal mercy the soul trembling on the wings of repentance1 hope1 and love4 ,happy are those1 who1 at ,rome1 in the ,vatican1#abg during the solemnities of the ,catholic worship1 have heard the melodies of ,leo1 ,durante1 and ,pergolese1 on the old consecrated text6 ,they have entered heaven for a moment1 and their souls have been able to ascend thither without distinction of rank1 country1 even belief1 by those invisible and mysterious steps1 composed1 thus to speak1 of all the simple1 natural1 universal sentiments1 that everywhere on earth draw from the bosom of the human creature a sigh towards another world6 ,between sculpture and music1 those two opposite extremes1 is painting1 nearly as precise as the one1 nearly as touching as the other4 ,like sculpture1 it marks the visible forms of objects1 but adds to them life2 like music1 it expresses the profoundest sentiments of the soul1 and expresses them all4 ,tell me what sentiment does not come within the province of the painter8 ,he has entire nature at his disposal1 the physical world1 and the moral world1 a churchyard1 a landscape1 a sunset1 the ocean1 the great scenes of civil and religious life1 all the beings of creation1 above all1 the figure of man1 and its expression1 that living mirror of what passes in the soul4 ,more pathetic than sculpture1 clearer than music1 painting is elevated1 in my opinion1 above both1 because it expresses beauty more under all its forms1 and the human soul in all the richness and variety of its sentiments4 ,but the art par excellence1 that which surpasses all others1 because it is incomparably the most expressive1 is poetry4 ,speech is the instrument of poetry2 poetry fashions it to its use1 and idealizes it1 in order to make it express ideal beauty4 ,poetry gives to it the charm and power of measure2 it makes of it something intermediary between the ordinary voice and music1 something at once material and immaterial1 finite1 clear1 and precise1 like contours and forms the most definite1 living and animated like color1 pathetic and infinite like sound4 ,a word in itself1 especially a word chosen and transfigured by poetry1 is the most energetic and universal symbol4 ,armed with this talisman1 poetry reflects all the images of the sensible world1 like sculpture and painting2 it reflects sentiment like painting and music1 with all its varieties1 which music does not attain1 and in their rapid succession that painting cannot follow1 as precise and immobile as sculpture2 and it not only expresses all that1 it expresses what is inaccessible to every other art1 ,i mean thought1 entirely distinct from the senses and even from sentiment1--thought that has no forms1--thought that has no color1 that lets no sound escape1 that does not manifest itself in any way1--thought in its highest flight1 in its most refined abstraction4 ,think of it4 ,what a world of images1 of sentiments1 of thoughts at once distinct and confused1 are excited within us by this one word--country6 and by this other word1 brief and immense1--,god6 ,what is more clear and altogether more profound and vast6 ,tell the architect1 the sculptor1 the painter1 even the musician1 to call forth also by a single stroke all the powers of nature and the soul6 ,they cannot1 and by that they acknowledge the superiority of speech and poetry4 ,they proclaim it themselves1 for they take poetry for their own measure2 they esteem their own works1 and demand that they should be esteemed1 in proportion as they approach the poetic ideal4 ,and the human race does as artists do3 a beautiful picture1 a noble melody1 a living and expressive statue1 gives rise to the exclamation--,how poetical6 ,this is not an arbitrary comparison2 it is a natural judgment which makes poetry the type of the perfection of all the arts1--the art par excellence1 which comprises all others1 to which they aspire1 which none can reach4 ,when the other arts would imitate the works of poetry1 they usually err1 losing their own genius1 without robbing poetry of its genius4 ,but poetry constructs according to its own taste palaces and temples1 like architecture2 it makes them simple or magnificent2 all orders1 as well as all systems1 obey it2 the different ages of art are the same to it2 it reproduces1 if it pleases1 the classic or the ,gothic1 the beautiful or the sublime1 the measured or the infinite4 ,lessing has been able1 with the exactest justice1 to compare ,homer to the most perfect sculptor2 with such precision are the forms which that marvellous chisel gives to all beings determined6 ,and what a painter1 too1 is ,homer6 and1 of a different kind1 ,dante6 ,music alone has something more penetrating than poetry1 but it is vague1 limited1 and fugitive4 ,besides its clearness1 its variety1 its durability1 poetry has also the most pathetic accents4 ,call to mind the words that ,priam utters at the feet of ,achilles while asking him for the dead body of his son1 more than one verse of ,virgil1 entire scenes of the ,cid and the ,polyeucte1 the prayer of ,esther kneeling before the ,lord1 the choruses of ,esther and ,athalie4 ,in the celebrated song of ,pergolese1 ,stabat ,mater ,dolorosa1 we may ask which moves most1 the music or the words4 ,the ,dies irae1 ,dies illa1 recited only1 produces the most terrible effect4 ,in those fearful words1 every blow tells1 so to speak2 each word contains a distinct sentiment1 an idea at once profound and determinate4 ,the intellect advances at each step1 and the heart rushes on in its turn4 ,human speech idealized by poetry has the depth and brilliancy of musical notes2 it is luminous as well as pathetic2 it speaks to the mind as well as to the heart2 it is in that inimitable1 unique1 and embraces all extremes and all contraries in a harmony that redoubles their reciprocal effect1 in which1 by turns1 appear and are developed1 all images1 all sentiments1 all ideas1 all the human faculties1 all the inmost recesses of the soul1 all the forms of things1 all real and all intelligible worlds6 ,,footnotes3 #abj ,lecture #f4 #aba ,see the ,gorgias1 with the ,argument1 vol4 iii4 of our translation of ,plato4 #abb ,there is a ,provincial that for vehemence can be compared only to the ,philipics1 and its fragment on the infinite has the grandeur and magnificence of ,bossuet4 ,see our work on the ,thoughts of ,pascal1 #dth ,series1 ,literature1 vol4 i4 #abc ,see the ,jupiter ,olympien of ,m4 ,quatremere de ,quincy4 #abd ,allusion to the ,magdeleine of ,canova1 which was then to be seen in the gallery of ,m4 de ,sommariva4 #abe ,see the ,tempest of ,haydn1 among the pianoforte works of this master4 #abf ,see lecture #f4 #abg ,i have not myself had the good fortune to hear the religious music of the ,vatican4 ,therefore1 ,i shall let a competent judge1 ,m4 ,quatremere de ,quincy1 speak1 ,considerations ,morales sur les ,destination des ,ouvrages de l',art1 ,paris1 #ahae1 p4 #ih3 ,let one call to mind those chants so simple and so touching1 that terminate at ,rome the funeral solemnities of those three days which the ,church particularly devotes to the expression of its grief1 in the last week of ,lent4 ,in that nave where the genius of ,michael ,angelo has embraced the duration of ages1 from the wonders of creation to the last judgment that must destroy its works1 are celebrated1 in the presence of the ,roman pontiff1 those nocturnal ceremonies whose rites1 symbols1 and plaintive liturgies seem to be so many figures of the mystery of grief to which they are consecrated4 ,the light decreasing by degrees1 at the termination of each psalm1 you would say that a funeral veil is extended little by little over those religious vaults4 ,soon the doubtful light of the last lamp allows you to perceive nothing but ,christ in the distance1 in the midst of clouds1 pronouncing his judgments1 and some angel executors of his behests4 ,then1 at the bottom of a tribune interdicted to the regard of the profane1 is heard the psalm of the penitent king1 to which three of the greatest masters of the art have added the modulations of a simple and pathetic chant4 ,no instrument is mingled with those accents4 ,simple harmonies of voice execute that music2 but these voices seem to be those of angels1 and their effect penetrates the depths of the soul4 ,we have cited this beautiful passage--and we could have cited many others1 even superior to it--of a man now forgotten1 and almost always misunderstood1 but whom posterity will put in his place4 ,let us indicate1 at least1 the last pages of the same production1 on the necessity of leaving the works of art in the place for which they were made1 for example1 the portrait of ,mlle4 de ,valliere in the ,madeleine aux ,carmelites1 instead of transferring it to1 and exposing it in the apartments of ,versailles1 the only place in the world1 eloquently says ,m4 ,quatremere1 which never should have seen it4 ,,lecture ,x4 ,,french ,,art ,,in ,,the ,,seventeenth ,,century4 ,expression not only serves to appreciate the different arts1 but the different schools of art4 ,example3--,french art in the seventeenth century4 ,french poetry3--,corneille4 ,racine4 ,moliere4 ,la ,fontaine4 ,boileau4--,painting3--,lesueur4 ,poussin4 ,le ,lorrain4 ,champagne4--,engraving4--,sculpture3--, sarrazin4 ,the ,anguiers4 ,girardon4 ,pujet4--,le ,notre4--,architecture4 ,we believe that we have firmly established that all kinds of beauty1 although most dissimilar in appearance1 may1 when subjected to a serious examination1 be reduced to spiritual and moral beauty2 that expression1 therefore1 is at once the true object and the first law of art2 that all arts are such only so far as they express the idea concealed under the form1 and are addressed to the soul through the senses2 finally1 that in expression the different arts find the true measure of their relative value1 and the most expressive art must be placed in the first rank4 ,if expression judges the different arts1 does it not naturally follow1 that by the same title it can also judge the different schools which1 in each art1 dispute with each other the empire of taste8 ,there is not one of these schools that does not represent in its own way some side of the beautiful1 and we are disposed to embrace all in an impartial and kindly study4 ,we are eclectics in the arts as well as in metaphysics4 ,but1 as in metaphysics1 the knowledge of all systems1 and the portion of truth that is in each1 enlightens without enfeebling our convictions2 so1 in the history of arts1 while holding the opinion that no school must be disdained1 that even in ,china some shade of beauty can be found1 our eclecticism does not make us waver in regard to the sentiment of true beauty and the supreme rule of art4 ,what we demand of the different schools1 without distinction of time or place1 what we see in the south as well as in the north1 at ,florence1 ,rome1 ,venice1 and ,seville1 as well as at ,antwerp1 ,amsterdam1 and ,paris1--wherever there are men1 is something human1 is the expression of a sentiment or an idea4 ,a criticism that should be founded on the principle of expression1 would somewhat derange1 it must be confessed1 received judgments1 and would carry some disorder into the hierarchy of the renowned4 ,we do not undertake such a revolution2 we only propose to confirm1 or at least elucidate our principle by an example1 and by an example that is at our hand4 ,there is in the world a school formerly illustrious1 now very lightly treated3--this school is the ,french school of the seventeenth century4 ,we would replace it in honor1 by recalling attention to the qualities that make its glory4 ,we have worked with constancy to reinstate among us the philosophy of ,descartes1 unworthily sacrificed to the philosophy of ,locke1 because with its defects it possesses in our view the incomparable merit of subordinating the senses to the mind1 of elevating and ennobling man4 ,so we profess a serious and reflective admiration for our national art of the seventeenth century1 because1 without disguising what is wanting to it1 we find in it what we prefer to every thing else1 grandeur united to good sense and reason1 simplicity and force1 genius of composition1 especially that of expression4 ,france1 careless of her glory1 does not appear to have the least notion that she reckons in her annals perhaps the greatest century of humanity1 that which embraces the greatest number of extraordinary men of every kind4 ,when1 ,i pray you1 have politicians like ,henry ,,iv41 ,richelieu1 ,mazarin1 ,colbert1 ,louis ,,xiv4 been seen giving each other the hand8 ,i do not pretend that each of them has no rival1 even superiors4 ,alexander1 ,caesar1 ,charlemagne1 perhaps excel them4 ,but ,alexander has but a single contemporary that can be compared with him1 his father ,philip2 ,caesar cannot even have suspected that ,octavius would one day be worthy of him2 ,charlemagne is a colossus in a desert2 whilst among us these five men succeed each other without an interval1 press upon each other1 and have1 thus to speak1 a single soul4 ,and by what officers were they served6 ,is ,conde really inferior to ,alexander1 ,hannibal1 and ,caesar2 for among his predecessors we must not look for other rivals8 ,who among them surpasses him in the extent and justness of his conceptions1 in quickness of sight1 in rapidity of manoeuvres1 in the union of impetuosity and firmness1 in the double glory of taker of cities and gainer of battles8 ,add that he dealt with generals like ,merci and ,william1 that he had under him ,turenne and ,luxemburg1 without speaking of so many other soldiers who were reared in that admirable school1 and at the hour of reverse still sufficed to save ,france4 ,what other time1 at least among the moderns1 has seen flourishing together so many poets of the first order8 ,we have1 it is true1 neither ,homer1 nor ,dante1 nor ,milton1 nor even ,tasso4 ,the epic1 with its primitive simplicity1 is interdicted us4 ,but in the drama we scarcely have equals4 ,it is because dramatic poetry is the poetry that is adapted to us1 moral poetry par excellence1 which represents man with his different passions armed against each other1 the violent contentions between virtue and crime1 the freaks of fortune1 the lessons of providence1 and in a narrow compass1 too1 in which the events press upon each other without confusion1 in which the action rapidly progresses towards the crisis that must reveal what is most intimate to the heart of the personages4 ,let us dare to say what we think1 that1 in our opinion1 ,a,eschylus1 ,sophocles1 and ,euripides1 together1 do not equal ,corneille2 for none of them has known and expressed like him what is of all things most truly touching1 a great soul at war with itself1 between a generous passion and duty4 ,corneille is the creator of a new pathetic unknown to antiquity and to all the moderns before him4 ,he disdains to address common and subaltern passions2 he does not seek to rouse terror and pity1 as demands ,aristotle1 who limits himself to erecting into maxims the practice of the ,greeks4 ,corneille seems to have read ,plato1 and followed his precepts3--he addresses a most elevated part of human nature1 the noblest passion1 the one nearest virtue1--admiration2 and from admiration carried to its culmination he draws the most powerful effects4 ,shakspeare1 we admit1 is superior to ,corneille in extent and richness of dramatic genius4 ,entire human nature seems at his disposal1 and he reproduces the different scenes of life in their beauty and deformity1 in their grandeur and baseness4 ,he excels in painting the terrible or the gentle passions4 ,othello is jealousy1 ,lady ,macbeth is ambition1 as ,juliet and ,desdemona are the immortal names of youthful and unfortunate love4 ,but if ,corneille has less imagination1 he has more soul4 ,less varied1 he is more profound4 ,if he does not put upon the stage so many different characters1 those that he does put on it are the greatest that can be offered to humanity4 ,the scenes that he gives are less heart-rending1 but at once more delicate and more sublime4 ,what is the melancholy of ,hamlet1 the grief of ,king ,lear1 even the disdainful intrepidity of ,caesar1 in comparison with the magnanimity of ,augustus striving to be master of himself as well as the universe1 in comparison with ,chimene sacrificing love to honor1 especially in comparison with ,pauline1 not suffering even at the bottom of her heart an involuntary sigh for the one that she must not love8 ,corneille always confines himself to the highest regions4 ,he is by turns ,roman and ,christian4 ,he is the interpreter of heroes1 the chanter of virtue1 the poet of warriors and politicians4#abh ,and it must not be forgotten that ,shakspeare is almost alone in his times1 whilst after ,corneille comes ,racine1 who would suffice for the poetical glory of a nation4 ,racine assuredly cannot be compared with ,corneille for dramatic genius2 he is more the man of letters2 he has not the tragic soul2 he neither loves nor understands politics and war4 ,when he imitates ,corneille1 for example1 in ,alexander1 and even in ,mithridates1 he imitates him badly enough4 ,the scene1 so vaunted1 of ,mithridates exposing his plan of campaign to his sons is a morsel of the finest rhetoric1 which cannot be compared with the political and military scenes of ,cinna and ,sertorius1 especially with that first scene of the ,death of ,pompey1 in which you witness a counsel as true1 as grand1 as profound as ever could have been one of the counsels of ,richelieu or ,mazarin4 ,racine was not born to paint heroes1 but he paints admirably man with his natural passions1 and the most natural as well as the most touching of all1 love4 ,so he particularly excels in feminine characters4 ,for men he has need of being sustained by ,tacitus or holy ,scripture4#abi ,with woman he is at his ease1 and he makes them think and speak with perfect truth1 set off by exquisite art4 ,demand of him neither ,emilie1 ,cornelie1 nor ,pauline2 but listen to ,andromaque1 ,monime1 ,berenice1 and ,phedre6 ,there1 even in imitating1 he is original1 and leaves the ancients very far behind him4 ,who has taught him that charming delivery1 those graceful troubles1 that purity even in feebleness1 that melancholy1 sometimes even that depth1 with that marvellous language which seems the natural accent of woman's heart8 ,it is continually repeated that ,racine wrote better than ,corneille3--say only that the two wrote very differently1 and like men in very different epochs4 ,one has two sovereign qualities1 which belong to his own nature and his times1 a naivete and grandeur1 the other is not naive1 but he has too much taste not to be always simple1 and he supplies the place of grandeur1 forever lost1 with consummate elegance4 ,corneille speaks the language of statesmen1 soldiers1 theologians1 philosophers1 and clever women2 of ,richelieu1 ,rohan1 ,saint-,cyran1 ,descartes1 and ,pascal2 of mother ,angelique ,arnaud and mother ,madeleine de ,saint-,joseph2 the language which ,moliere still spoke1 which ,bossuet preserved to his last breath4 ,racine speaks that of ,louis ,,xiv4 and the women who were the ornament of his court4 ,i suppose that thus spoke ,madame1 the amiable1 sprightly1 and unfortunate ,henriette2 thus wrote the author of the ,princesse de ,cleves and the author of ,telemaque4 ,or1 rather1 this language is that of ,racine himself1 of that feeble and tender soul1 which passed quickly from love to devotion1 which uttered its complaints in lyric poetry1 which was wholly poured out in the choruses of ,esther and ,athalie1 and in the ,cantiques ,spirituels2 that soul1 so easy to be moved1 that a religious ceremony or a representation of ,esther at ,saint-,cyr touched to tears1 that pitied the misfortunes of the people1 that found in its pity and its charity the courage to speak one day the truth to ,louis ,,xiv41 and was extinguished by the first breath of disgrace4 ,moliere is1 in comparison with ,aristophanes1 what ,corneille is1 in comparison with ,shakspeare4 ,the author of ,plutus1 the ,wasps1 and the ,clouds1 has doubtless an imagination1 an explosive buffoonery1 a creative power1 above all comparison4 ,moliere has not as great poetical conceptions3 he has more1 perhaps2 he has characters4 ,his coloring is less brilliant1 his graver is more penetrating4 ,he has engraved in the memory of men a certain number of irregularities and vices which will ever be called l',avare 7the ,miser71 le ,malade ,imaginaire 7the ,hypochondriac71 les ,femmes ,savantes 7the ,learned ,women71 le ,tartufe 7the ,hypocrite71 and ,don ,juan1 not to speak of the ,misanthrope1 a piece apart1 touching as pleasant1 which is not addressed to the crowd1 and cannot be popular1 because it expresses a ridicule rare enough1 excess in the passion of truth and honor4 ,of all fabulists1 ancient and modern1 does any one1 even the ingenious1 the pure1 the elegant ,phaedrus1 approach our ,la ,fontaine8 ,he composes his personages1 and puts them in action with the skill of ,moliere2 he knows how to take on occasion the tone of ,horace1 and mingle an ode with a fable2 he is at once the most naive1 and the most refined of writers1 and his art disappears in its very perfection4 ,we do not speak of the tales1 first1 because we condemn the kind1 then1 because ,la ,fontaine displays in them qualities more ,italian than ,french1 a narrative full of nature1 malice1 and grace1 but without any of those profound1 tender1 melancholy traits1 that place among the greatest poets of all time the author of the ,two ,pigeons 7,deux ,pigeons71 the ,old ,man 7,vieillard71 and the ,three ,young ,persons 7,gens74 ,we do not hesitate to put ,boileau among these great men4 ,he comes after them1 it is true1 but he belongs to their company3 he comprehends them1 loves them1 sustains them4 ,it was he1 who1 in #affc1 after the ,school of ,women 7l',ecole des ,femmes7 and long before the ,hypocrite 7le ,tartufe71 and the ,misanthrope1 proclaimed ,moliere the master in the art of verse4 ,it was he who1 in #afgg1 after the failure of ,phedre1 defended the vanquisher of ,euripides against the successes of ,pradon4 ,it was he who1 in advance of posterity1 first put in light what is new and entirely original in the plays of ,corneille4#acj ,he saved the pension of the old tragedian by offering the sacrifice of his own4 ,louis ,,xiv4 asking him what writer most honored his reign1 ,boileau answered1 that it was ,moliere2 and when the great king in his decline persecuted ,port-,royal1 and wished to lay hands on ,arnaud1 he encountered a man of letters1 who said to the face of the imperious monarch1--,your ,majesty in vain seeks ,m4 ,arnaud1 you are too fortunate to find him4 ,boileau is somewhat wanting in imagination and invention2 but he is great in the energetic sentiment of truth and justice2 he carries to the extent of passion taste for the beautiful and the honest2 he is a poet by force of soul and good sense4 ,more than once his heart dictated to him the most pathetic verses3 ,in vain against the ,cid a minister is leagued1#aca ,all ,paris for ,chimene the eyes of ,rodrique1 etc4 99 99 99 99 99 ,after a little spot of earth1 obtained by prayer1 ,forever in the tomb had inclosed ,moliere1 etc4 ,and this epitaph of ,arnaud1 so simple and so grand3#acb ,at the feet of this altar of structure gross1 ,lies without pomp1 inclosed in a coffin vile1 ,the most learned mortal that ever wrote2 ,arnaud1 who in grace instructed by ,jesus ,christ1 ,combating for the ,church1 has1 in the ,church itself1 ,suffered more than one outrage and more than one anathema1 etc4 99 99 99 99 99 ,wandering1 poor1 banished1 proscribed1 persecuted2 ,and even by his death their ill-extinguished rage ,had never left his ashes in repose1 ,if ,god himself here by his holy flock ,from these devouring wolves had not concealed his bones4#acc ,these are1 ,i think1 poets sufficiently great1 and we have more of them still3 ,i mean those charming or sublime minds who have elevated prose to poetry4 ,greece alone1 in her most beautiful days1 offers1 perhaps1 such a variety of admirable prose writers4 ,who can enumerate them8 ,at first1 ,rabelais and ,montaigne2 later1 ,descartes1 ,pascal1 and ,malebranche2 ,la ,rochefoucauld and ,la ,bruyere2 ,retz and ,saint-,simon2 ,bourdaloue1 ,flechier1 ,fenelon1 and ,bossuet2 add to these so many eminent women1 at their head ,madame de ,sevigne2 while ,montesquieu1 ,voltaire1 ,rousseau1 and ,buffon are still to come4#acd ,by what strange diversity could a country1 in which the mental arts were carried to such perfection1 remain ordinary in the other arts8 ,was the sentiment of the beautiful wanting1 then1 to that society so polished1 to that magnificent court1 to those great lords and those great ladies passionately loving luxury and elegance1 to that public of the elite1 enamored of every kind of glory1 whose enthusiasm defended the ,cid against ,richelieu8 ,no2 ,france in the seventeenth century was a whole1 and produced artists that she can place by the side of her poets1 her philosophers1 her orators4 ,but1 in order to admire our artists1 it is necessary to comprehend them4 ,we do not believe that imagination has been less freely imparted to ,france than to any other nation of ,europe4 ,it has even had its reign among us4 ,it is fancy that rules in the sixteenth century1 and inspires the literature and the arts of the ,renaissance4 ,but a great revolution intervened at the commencement of the seventeenth century4 ,france at that moment seems to pass from youth to virility4 ,instead of abandoning imagination to itself1 we apply ourselves from that moment to restrain it without destroying it1 to moderate it1 as the ,greeks did by the aid of taste2 as in the progress of life and society we learn to repress or conceal what is too individual in character4 ,an end is made of the literature of the preceding age4 ,a new poetry1 a new prose1 begin to appear1 which1 during an entire century1 bear fruits sufficiently beautiful4 ,art follows the general movement2 after having been elegant and graceful1 it becomes in its turn serious2 it no longer aims at originality and extraordinary effects2 it neither flashes nor dazzles2 it speaks1 above all1 to the mind and the soul4 ,hence its good qualities and also its defects4 ,in general1 it is somewhat wanting in brilliancy and coloring1 but it is in the highest degree expressive4 ,some time since we have changed all that4 ,we have discovered1 somewhat late1 that we have not sufficient imagination2 we are in training to acquire it1 it is true1 at the expense of reason1 alas6 also at the expense of soul1 which is forgotten1 repudiated1 proscribed4 ,at this moment1 color and form are the order of the day1 in poetry1 in painting1 in every thing4 ,we are beginning to run mad with ,spanish painting4 ,the ,flemish and ,venetian schools are gaining ground on the schools of ,florence and ,rome4 ,rossini equals ,mozart1 and ,gluck will soon seem to us insipid4 ,young artists1 who1 rightly disgusted with the dry and inanimate manner of ,david1 undertake to renovate ,french painting1 who would rob the sun of its heat and splendor1 remember that of all beings in the world1 the greatest is still man1 and that what is greatest in man is his intelligence1 and above all1 his heart2 that it is this heart1 then1 which you must put and develop on your canvas4 ,this is the most elevated object of art4 ,in order to reach it1 do not make yourselves disciples of ,flemings1 ,venetians1 and ,spaniards2 return1 return to the masters of our great national school of the seventeenth century4 ,we bow with respectful admiration before the schools of ,rome and ,florence1 at once ideal and living2 but1 those excepted1 we maintain that the ,french school equals or surpasses all others4 ,we prefer neither ,murillo1 ,rubens1 ,corregio1 nor ,titian himself to ,lesueur and ,poussin1 because1 if the former have an incomparable hand and color1 our two countrymen are much greater in thought and expression4 ,what a destiny was that of ,eustache ,lesueur6#ace ,he was born at ,paris about #afag1 and he never went out of it4 ,poor and humble1 he passed his life in the churches and convents where he worked4 ,the only sweetness of his sad days1 his only consolation was his wife3 he loses her1 and goes to die1 at thirty-eight1 in that cloister of ,chartreux1 which his pencil has immortalized4 ,what resemblance at once1 and what difference between his life and that of ,raphael1 who also died young1 but in the midst of pleasures1 in honors1 and already almost in purple6 ,our ,raphael was not the lover of ,fornarina and the favorite of a pope3 he was ,christian2 he is ,christianity in art4 ,lesueur is a genius wholly ,french4 ,scarcely having escaped from the hands of ,simon ,vouet1 he formed himself according to the model which he had in the soul4 ,he never saw the sky of ,italy4 ,he knew some fragments of the antique1 some pictures of ,raphael1 and the designs that ,poussin sent him4 ,with these feeble resources1 and guided by a happy instinct1 in less than ten years he mounted by a continual progress to the perfection of his talent1 and expired at the moment when1 finally sure of himself1 he was about to produce new and more admirable master-pieces4 ,follow him from the ,st4 ,bruno completed in #afdh1 through the ,st4 ,paul of #afdi1 to the ,vision of ,st4 ,benedict in #afea1 and to the ,muses1 scarcely finished before his death4 ,lesueur went on adding to his essential qualities which he owed to his own genius1 and to the national genius1 ,i mean composition and expression1 qualities which he had dreamed of1 or had caught glimpses of4 ,his design from day to day became more pure1 without ever being that of the ,florentine school1 and the same is true of his coloring4 ,in ,lesueur every thing is directed towards expression1 every thing is in the service of the mind1 every thing is idea and sentiment4 ,there is no affectation1 no mannerism2 there is a perfect naivete2 his figures sometimes would seem even a little common1 so natural are they1 if a ,divine breath did not animate them4 ,it must not be forgotten that his favorite subjects do not exact a brilliant coloring3 he oftenest retraces scenes mournful or austere4 ,but as in ,christianity by the side of suffering and resignation is faith with hope1 so ,lesueur joins to the pathetic sweetness and grace2 and this man charms me at the same time that he moves me4 ,the works of ,lesueur are almost always great wholes that demanded profound meditation1 and the most flexible talent1 in order to preserve in them unity of subject1 and to give them variety and harmony4 ,the ,history of ,st4 ,bruno1 the founder of the order des ,chartreux1 is a vast melancholy poem1 in which are represented the different scenes of monastic life4 ,the ,history of ,st4 ,martin and ,st4 ,benedict has not come down to us entire2 but the two fragments of it that we possess1 the ,mass of ,st4 ,martin1 and the ,vision of ,st4 ,benedict1 allow us to compare that great work with every better thing of the kind that has been done in ,italy1 as1 to speak sincerely1 the ,muses and the ,history of ,love1 appear to us to equal at least the ,farnesina4 ,in the ,history of ,st4 ,bruno1 it is particularly necessary to remark ,st4 ,bruno1 prostrated before a crucifix1 the saint reading a letter of the pope1 his death1 his apotheosis4 ,is it possible to carry meditation1 humiliation1 rapture farther8 ,st4 ,paul preaching at ,ephesus reminds one of the ,school of ,athens1 by the extent of the scene1 the employment of architecture1 and the skilful distribution of groups4 ,in spite of the number of personages1 and the diversity of episodes1 the picture wholly centres in ,st4 ,paul4 ,he preaches1 and upon his words hang those who are listening1 of every sex1 of every age1 in the most varied attitudes4 ,in that we behold the grand lines of the ,roman school1 its design full of nobleness and truth at the same time4 ,what charming and grave heads6 ,what graceful1 bold1 and always natural movements6 ,here1 that child with ringlets1 full of naive enthusiasm2 there1 that old man with bended knees1 and hands joined4 ,are not all those beautiful heads1 and those draperies1 too1 worthy of ,raphael8 ,but the marvel of the picture is the figure of ,st4 ,paul1#acf--;it is that of the ,olympic ,jupiter1 animated by a new spirit4 ,the ,mass of ,st4 ,martin carries into the soul an impression of peace and silence4 ,the ,vision of ,st4 ,benedict has the character of simplicity full of grandeur4 ,a desert1 the saint on his knees1 contemplating his sister1 ,st4 ,scholastique1 who is ascending to heaven1 borne up by angels1 accompanied by two young girls1 crowned with flowers1 and bearing the palm1 the symbol of virginity4 ,st4 ,peter and ,st4 ,paul show ,st4 ,benedict the abode whither his sister is going to enjoy eternal peace4 ,a slight ray of the sun pierces the cloud4 ,st4 ,benedict is as it were lifted up from the earth by this ecstatic vision4 ,one scarcely desires a more lively color1 and the expression is divine4 ,those two virgins1 a little too tall1 perhaps1 how beautiful and pure they are6 ,how sweet are those forms6 ,how grave and gentle are those faces6 ,the person of the holy monk1 with all the material accessories1 is perfectly natural1 for it remains on the earth2 whilst his face1 where his soul shines forth1 is wholly ideal1 and already in heaven4 ,but the chef-d'oeuvre of ,lesueur is1 in our opinion1 the ,descent from the ,cross1 or rather the enshrouding of ,jesus ,christ1 already descended from the cross1 whom ,joseph of ,arimathea1 ,nicodemus1 and ,st4 ,john are placing in the shroud4 ,on the left1 ,magdalen1 in tears1 kisses the feet of ,jesus2 on the right1 are the holy women and the ,virgin4 ,it is impossible to carry the pathetic farther and preserve beauty4 ,the holy women1 placed in front1 have each their particular grief4 ,while one of them abandons herself to despair1 an immense but internal and thoughtful sadness is upon the face of the mother of the crucified4 ,she has comprehended the divine benefit of the redemption of the human race1 and her grief1 sustained by this thought1 is calm and resigned4 ,and then what dignity in that head6 ,it1 in some sort1 sums up the whole picture1 and gives to it its character1 that of a profound and subdued emotion4 ,i have seen many ,descents from the ,cross2 ,i have seen that of ,rubens at ,antwerp1 in which the sanctity of the subject has1 as it were1 constrained the great ,flemish painter to join sensibility and sentiment to color2 none of those pictures have touched me like that of ,lesueur4 ,all the parts of art are there in the service of expression4 ,the drawing is severe and strong2 even the color1 without being brilliant1 surpasses that of the ,st4 ,bruno1 the ,mass of ,st4 ,martin1 the ,st4 ,paul1 and even that of the ,vision of ,st4 ,benedict2 as if ,lesueur had wished to bring together in it all the powers of his soul1 all the resources of his talent6#acg ,now1 regard the ,muses1--other scenes1 other beauties1 the same genius4 ,those are ,pagan pictures1 but ,christianity is in them also1 by reason of the adorable chastity with which ,lesueur has clothed them4 ,all critics have emulously shown the mythological errors into which poor ,lesueur fell1 and they have not wanted occasion to deplore that he had not made the journey to ,italy and studied antiquity more4 ,but who can have the strange idea of searching in ,lesueur for an archeology8 ,i seek and find in him the very genius of painting4 ,is not that ,terpsichore1 well or ill named1 with a harp a little too strong1 it is said1 as if the ,muse had no particular gift1 in her modest attitude the symbol of becoming grace8 ,in that group of three ,muses1 to which one may give what name he pleases1 is not the one that holds upon her knees a book of music1 who sings or is about to sing1 the most ravishing creature1 a ,st4 ,cecilia that preludes just before abandoning herself to the intoxication of inspiration8 ,and in those pictures there is brilliancy and coloring2 the landscape is beautifully lighted1 as if ,poussin had guided the hand of his friend4 ,poussin6 ,what a name ,i pronounce4 ,if ,lesueur is the painter of sentiment1 ,poussin is the painter of thought4 ,he is in some sort the philosopher of painting4 ,his pictures are religious or moral lectures that testify a great mind as well as a great heart4 ,it is sufficient to recall the ,seven ,sacraments1 the ,deluge1 the ,arcadia1 the ,truth that ,time frees from the ,taints of ,envy1 the ,will of ,eudamidas1 and the ,dance of ,human ,life4 ,and the style is equal to the conception4 ,poussin draws like a ,florentine1 composes like a ,frenchman1 and often equals ,lesueur in expression2 coloring alone is sometimes wanting to him4 ,as well as ,racine1 he is smitten with the antique beauty1 and imitates it2 but1 like ,racine1 he always remains original4 ,in place of the naivete and unique charm of ,lesueur1 he has a severe simplicity1 with a correctness that never abandons him4 ,remember1 too1 that he cultivated every kind of painting4 ,he is at once a great historical painter and a great landscape painter1--he treats religious subjects as well as profane subjects1 and by turns is inspired by antiquity and the ,bible4 ,he lived much at ,rome1 it is true1 and died there2 but he also worked in ,france1 and almost always for ,france4 ,scarcely had he become known1 when ,richelieu attracted him to ,paris and retained him there1 loading him with honors1 and giving him the commission of first painter in ordinary to the king1 with the general direction of all the works of painting1 and all the ornaments of the royal houses4 ,during that sojourn of two years in ,paris1 he made the ,last ,supper 7,cene71 the ,st4 ,francois ,xavier1 the ,truth that ,time frees from the ,taints of ,envy4 ,it was also to ,france1 to his friend ,m4 de ,chantelou1 that from ,rome he addressed the ,inspiration of ,st4 ,paul1 as well as the second series of the ,seven ,sacraments1 an immense composition that1 for grandeur of thought1 can vie with the ,stanze of ,raphael4 ,i speak of it from the engravings2 for the ,seven ,sacraments are no longer in ,france4 ,eternal shame of the eighteenth century6 ,it was at least necessary to wrest from the ,greeks the pediments of the ,parthenon1--we1 we delivered up to strangers1 we sold all those monuments of ,french genius which ,richelieu and ,mazarin1 with religious care1 had collected4 ,public indignation did not avert the act6 ,and there has not since been found in ,france a king1 a statesman1 to interdict letting the master-pieces of art that honor the nation depart without authorization from the national territory6#ach ,there has not been found a government which has undertaken at least to repurchase those that we have lost1 to get back again the great works of ,poussin1 ,lesueur1 and so many others1 scattered in ,europe1 instead of squandering millions to acquire the baboons of ,holland1 as ,louis ,,xiv4 said1 or ,spanish canvasses1 in truth of an admirable color1 but without nobleness and moral expression4#aci ,i know and ,i love the ,dutch pastorals and the cows of ,potter2 ,i am not insensible to the sombre and ardent coloring of ,zurbaran1 to the brilliant ,italian imitations of ,murillo and ,velasquez2 but in fine1 what is all that in comparison with serious and powerful compositions like the ,seven ,sacraments1 for example1 that profound representation of ,christian rites1 a work of the highest faculties of the intellect and the soul1 in which the intellect and the soul will ever find an exhaustless subject of study and meditation6 ,thank ,god1 the graver of ,pesne has saved them from our ingratitude and barbarity4 ,whilst the originals decorate the gallery of a great ,english lord1#adj the love and the talent of a ,pesne1 of a ,stella1 have preserved for us faithful copies in those expressive engravings that one never grows tired of contemplating1 that every time we examine them1 reveal to us some new side of the genius of our great countryman4 ,regard especially the ,extreme ,unction6 ,what a sublime and at the same time almost graceful scene6 ,one would call it an antique bas-relief1 so many groups are properly distributed in it1 with natural and varied attitudes4 ,the draperies are as admirable as those of a fragment of the ,panathenaea1 which is in the ,louvre4 ,the figures are all beautiful4 ,beauty of figures belongs to sculpture1 one is about to say3--yes1 but it also belongs to painting1 if you have yourself the eye of the painter1 if you have been struck with the expression of those postures1 those heads1 those gestures1 and almost those looks2 for every thing lives1 every thing breathes1 even in those engravings1 and if it were the place1 we would endeavor to make the reader penetrate with us into those secrets of ,christian sentiment which are also the secrets of art4 ,we endeavor to console ourselves for having lost the ,seven ,sacraments1 and for not having known how to keep from ,england and ,germany so many productions of ,poussin1 now buried in foreign collections1#ada by going to see at the ,louvre what remains to us of the great ,french artist1--thirty pictures produced at different epochs of his life1 which1 for the most part1 worthily sustain his renown1--the portrait of ,poussin1 one of the ,bacchanals made for ,richelieu1 ,mars and ,venus1 the ,death of ,adonis1 the ,rape of the ,sabines1#adb ,eliezer and ,rebecca1 ,moses saved from the ,waters1 the ,infant ,jesus on the ,knees of the ,virgin and ,st4 ,joseph standing by1#adc especially the ,manna in the ,desert1 the ,judgment of ,solomon1 the ,blind ,men of ,jericho1 the ,woman taken in ,adultery1 the ,inspiration of ,st4 ,paul1 the ,diogenes1 the ,deluge1 the ,arcadia4 ,time has turned the color1 which was never very brilliant2 but it has not been able to disturb what will make them live forever1--the design1 the composition1 and the expression4 ,the ,deluge has remained1 and in fact will always be1 the most striking4 ,after so many masters who have treated the same subject1 ,poussin has found the secret of being original1 and more pathetic than his predecessors1 in representing the solemn moment when the race is about to disappear4 ,there are few details2 some dead bodies are floating upon the abyss2 a sinister-looking moon has scarcely risen2 a few moments and mankind will be no more2 the last mother uselessly extends her last child to the last father1 who cannot take it1 and the serpent that has destroyed mankind darts forth triumphant4 ,we try in vain to find in the ,deluge some signs of a trembling hand3 the soul that sustained and conducted that hand makes itself felt by our soul1 and profoundly moves it4 ,stop at that scene of mourning1 and almost by its side let your eyes rest upon that fresh landscape and upon those shepherds that surround a tomb4 ,the most aged1 with a knee on the ground1 reads these words graven upon the stone3 ,et in ,arcadia ego1 and ,i also lived in ,arcadia4 ,at the left a shepherd listens with serious attention4 ,at the right is a charming group1 composed of a shepherd in the spring-time of life1 and a young girl of ravishing beauty4 ,an artless admiration is painted on the face of the young peasant1 who looks with happiness on his beautiful companion4 ,as for her1 her adorable face is not even veiled with the slightest shade2 she smiles1 her hand resting carelessly upon the shoulder of the young man1 and she has no appearance of comprehending that lecture given to beauty1 youth1 and love4 ,i confess that1 for this picture alone1 of so touching a philosophy1 ,i would give many master-pieces of coloring1 all the pastorals of ,potter1 all the badinages of ,ostade1 all the buffooneries of ,teniers4 ,lesueur and ,poussin1 by very different but nearly equal titles1 are at the head of our great painting of the seventeenth century4 ,after them1 what artists again are ,claude ,lorrain and ,philippe de ,champagne8 ,do you know in ,italy or ,holland a greater landscape painter than ,claude8 ,and seize well his true character4 ,look at those vast and beautiful solitudes1 lighted by the first or last rays of the sun1 and tell me whether those solitudes1 those trees1 those waters1 those mountains1 that light1 that silence1--whether all that nature has a soul1 and whether those luminous and pure horizons do not lift you involuntarily1 in ineffable reveries1 to the invisible source of beauty and grace6 ,lorrain is1 above all1 the painter of light1 and his works might be called the history of light and all its combinations1 in small and great1 when it is poured out over large plains or breaks in the most varied accidents1 on land1 on waters1 in the heavens1 in its eternal source4 ,the human scenes thrown into one corner have no other object than to relieve and make appear to advantage the scenes of nature by harmony or contrast4 ,in the ,village ,fete1 life1 noise1 movement are in front1--peace and grandeur are at the foundation of the landscape1 and that is truly the picture4 ,the same effect is in the ,cattle ,crossing a ,river4 ,the landscape placed immediately under your eyes has nothing in it very rare1 we can find such a one anywhere2 but follow the perspective1--it leads you across flowering fields1 a beautiful river1 ruins1 mountains that overlook these ruins1 and you lose yourself in infinite distances4 ,that ,landscape crossed by a river1 where a peasant waters his herd1 means nothing great at first sight4 ,contemplate it some time1 and peace1 a sort of meditativeness in nature1 a well-graduated perspective1 will1 little by little1 gain your heart1 and give you in that small picture a penetrating charm4 ,the picture called a ,landscape represents a vast champagne filled with trees1 and lighted by the rising sun1--in it there is freshness and--already--warmth1 mystery1 and splendor1 with skies of the sweetest harmony4 ,a ,dance at ,sunset expresses the close of a beautiful day4 ,one sees in it1 one feels in it the decline of the heat of the day2 in the foreground are some shepherds and shepherdesses dancing by the side of their flocks4#add ,is it not strange1 that ,champagne has been put in the ,flemish school8#ade ,he was born at ,brussels1 it is true1 but he came very early to ,paris1 and his true master was ,poussin1 who counselled him4 ,he devoted his talent to ,france1 lived there1 died there1 and what is decisive1 his manner is wholly ,french4 ,will it be said that he owes to ,flanders his color8 ,we respond that this quality is balanced by a grave defect that he also owes to ,flanders1 the want of ideality in the figures2 and it was from ,france that he learned how to repair this defect by beauty of moral expression4 ,champagne is inferior to ,lesueur and ,poussin1 but he is of their family4 ,he was1 also1 of those artists contemporaneous with ,corneille1 simple1 poor1 virtuous1 ,christian4#adf ,champagne worked both for the convent of the ,carmelites in the ,rue ,st4 ,jacques1 that venerable abode of ardent and sublime piety1 and ,port-,royal1 that place of all others that contained in the smallest space the most virtue and genius1 so many admirable men and women worthy of them4 ,what has become of that famous crucifix that he painted for the ,church of the ,carmelites1 a master-piece of perspective that upon a horizontal plane appeared perpendicular8 ,it perished with the holy house4 ,the ,last ,supper 7,cene7 is a living picture1 on account of the truth of all the figures1 movements1 and postures1 but to my eyes it is blemished by the absence of the ideal4 ,i am obliged to say as much of the ,repast with ,simon the ,pharisee4 ,the chef-d'oeuvre of ,champagne is the ,apparition of ,st4 ,gervais and ,st4 ,protais to ,st4 ,ambrose in a ,basilica of ,milan4 ,all the qualities of ,french art are seen in it1--simplicity and grandeur in composition1 with a profound expression4 ,on that canvas are only four personages1 the two martyrs and ,st4 ,paul1 who presents them to ,st4 ,ambrose4 ,those four figures fill the temple1 lighted above all in the obscurity of the night1 by the luminous apparition4 ,the two martyrs are full of majesty4 ,st4 ,ambrose1 kneeling and in prayer1 is1 as it were1 seized with terror4#adg ,i certainly admire ,champagne as an historical painter1 and even as a landscape painter2 but he is perhaps greatest as a portrait painter4 ,in portraits truth and nature are particularly in their place1 relieved by coloring1 and idealized in proper measure by expression4 ,the portraits of ,champagne are so many monuments in which his most illustrious contemporaries will live forever4 ,every thing about them is strikingly real1 grave1 and severe1 with a penetrating sweetness4 ,should the records of ,port-,royal be lost1 all ,port-,royal might be found in ,champagne4 ,among those portraits we see the inflexible ,saint-,cyran1#adh as well as his persecutor1 the imperious ,richelieu4#adi ,we see1 too1 the learned1 the intrepid ,antoine ,arnaud1 to whom the contemporaries of ,bossuet decreed the name of ,great2#aej and ,mme4 ,angelique ,arnaud1 with her naive and strong figure4#aea ,among them is mother ,agnes and the humble daughter of ,champagne himself1 sister ,st4 ,suzanne4#aeb ,she has just been miraculously cured1 and her whole prostrated person bears still the impress of a relic of suffering4 ,mother ,agnes1 kneeling before her1 regards her with a look of grateful joy4 ,the place of the scene is a poor cell2 a wooden cross hanging on the wall1 and some straw chairs1 are all the ornaments4 ,on the picture is the inscription1--,christo uni medico animarum et corporum1 etc4 ,there is possessed the ,christian stoicism of ,port-,royal in its imposing austerity4 ,add to all these portraits that of ,champagne2#aec for the painter may be put by the side of his personages4 ,had ,france produced in the seventeenth century only these four great artists1 it would be necessary to give an important place to the ,french school2 but she counts many other painters of the greatest merit4 ,among these we may distinguish ,p4 ,mignard1 so much admired in his times1 so little known now1 and so worthy of being known4 ,how have we been able to let fall into oblivion the author of the immense fresco of ,val-de-grace1 so celebrated by ,moliere1 which is perhaps the greatest page of painting in the world6#aed ,what strikes at first1 in this gigantic work1 is the order and harmony4 ,then come a thousand charming details and innumerable episodes which form themselves important compositions4 ,remark also the brilliant and sweet coloring which should at least obtain favor for so many other beauties of the first order4 ,again1 it is to the pencil of ,mignard that we owe that ravishing ceiling of a small apartment of the ,king at ,versailles1 a master-piece now destroyed1 but of which there remains to us a magnificent translation in the beautiful engraving of ,gerard ,audran4 ,what profound expression in the ,plague of ,a,eacus1#aee and in the ,st4 ,charles giving the ,communion to the ,plague-infected of ,milan6 ,mignard is recognized as one of our best portrait painters3 grace1 sometimes a little too refined1 is joined in him to sentiment4 ,the ,french school can also present with pride ,valentin1 who died young and was so full of promise2 ,stella1 the worthy friend of ,poussin1 the uncle of ,claudine1 ,antoinette1 and ,francoise ,stella2 ,lahyre1 who has so much spirit and taste2#aef ,sebastien ,bourdon1 so animated and elevated2#aeg the ,lenains1 who sometimes have the naivete of ,lesueur and the color of ,champagne2 ,bourguignon1 full of fire and enthusiasm2 ,jouvenet1 whose composition is so good2#aeh finally1 besides so many others1 ,lebrun1 whom it is now the fashion to treat cavalierly1 who received from nature1 with perhaps an immoderate passion for fame1 passion for the beautiful of every kind1 and a talent of admirable flexibility1--the true painter of a great king by the richness and dignity of his manner1 who1 like ,louis ,,xiv41 worthily closes the seventeenth century4#aei ,since we have spoken somewhat extensively of painting1 would it not be unjust to pass in silence over engraving1 its daughter1 or its sister8 ,certainly it is not an art of ordinary importance2 we have excelled in it2 we have above all carried it to its perfection in portraits4 ,let us be equitable to ourselves4 ,what school--and we are not unmindful of those of ,marc' ,antonio1 ,albert ,durer1 and ,rembrandt--can present such a succession of artists of this kind8 ,thomas de ,leu and ,leonard ,gautier make in some sort the passage from the sixteenth to the seventeenth century4 ,then come a crowd of men of the most diverse talents1--,mellan1 ,michel ,lasne1 ,morin1 ,daret1 ,huret1 ,masson1 ,nanteuil1 ,drevet1 ,van ,schupen1 the ,poillys1 the ,edelincks1 and the ,audrans4 ,gerard ,edelinck and ,nanteuil alone have a popular renown1 and they merit it by the delicacy1 splendor1 and charm of their graver4 ,but the connoisseurs of elevated taste find at least their rivals in engravers now less admired1 because they do not flatter the eye so much1 but have1 perhaps1 more truth and vigor4 ,it must also be said1 that the portraits of these two masters have not the historic importance of those of their predecessors4 ,the ,conde of ,nanteuil is justly admired2 but if we wish to know the great ,conde1 the conqueror of ,rocroy and ,lens1 we must not demand him from ,nanteuil1 but from ,huret1 ,michel ,lasne1 and ,daret1#afj who designed and engraved him in all his force and heroic beauty4 ,edelinck and ,nanteuil himself scarcely knew and retraced the seventeenth century1 except at the approach of its decline4#afa ,morin and ,mellan were able to see it1 and transmit it in its glorious youth4 ,morin is the ,champagne of engraving3 he does not engrave1 he paints4 ,it is he who represents and transmits to posterity the illustrious men of the first half of the great century--,henry ,,iv41 ,louis ,,xiii41 the de ,thous1 ,berulle1 ,jansenius1 ,saint-,cyran1 ,marillac1 ,bentivoglio1 ,richelieu1 ,mazarin1 still young1 and ,retz1 when he was only a coadjutor4#afb ,mellan had the same advantage4 ,he is the first in date of all the engravers of the seventeenth century1 and perhaps is also the most expressive4 ,with a single line1 it seems that from his hands only shades can spring2 he does not strike at first sight2 but the more we regard him1 the more he seizes1 penetrates1 and touches1 like ,lesueur4#afc ,christianity1 that is to say1 the reign of the spirit1 is favorable to painting1 is particularly expressive4 ,sculpture seems to be a pagan art2 for1 if it must also contain moral expression1 it is always under the imperative condition of beauty of form4 ,this is the reason why sculpture is as it were natural to antiquity1 and appeared there with an incomparable splendor1 before which painting somewhat paled1#afd whilst among the moderns it has been eclipsed by painting1 and has remained very inferior to it1 by reason of the extreme difficulty of bringing stone and marble to express ,christian sentiment1 without which1 material beauty suffers2 so that our sculpture is too insignificant to be beautiful1 too mannered to be expressive4 ,since antiquity1 there have scarcely been two schools of sculpture3#afe--one at ,florence1 before ,michael ,angelo1 and especially with ,michael ,angelo2 the other in ,france1 at the ,renaissance1 with ,jean ,cousin1 ,goujon1 ,germain ,pilon4 ,we may say that these three artists have1 as it were1 shared among themselves grandeur and grace3 to the first belong nobility and force1 with profound knowledge2#aff to the other two1 an elegance full of charm4 ,sculpture changes its character in the seventeenth century as well as every thing else3 it no longer has the same attraction1 but it finds moral and religious inspiration1 which the skilful masters of the ,renaissance too much lacked4 ,jean ,cousin excepted1 is there one of them that is superior to ,jacques ,sarazin8 ,that great artist1 now almost forgotten1 is at once a disciple of the ,french school and the ,italian school1 and to the qualities that he borrows from his predecessors1 he adds a moral expression1 touching and elevated1 which he owes to the spirit of the new school4 ,he is1 in sculpture1 the worthy contemporary of ,lesueur and ,poussin1 of ,corneille1 ,descartes1 and ,pascal4 ,he belongs entirely to the reign of ,louis ,,xiii41 ,richelieu1 and ,mazarin2 he did not even see that of ,louis ,,xiv4#afg ,called into ,france by ,richelieu1 who had also called there ,poussin and ,champagne1 ,jacques ,sarazin in a few years produced a multitude of works of rare elegance and great character4 ,what has become of them8 ,the eighteenth century passed over them without regarding them4 ,the barbarians that destroyed or scattered them1 were arrested before the paintings of ,lesueur and ,poussin1 protected by a remnant of admiration3 while breaking the master-pieces of the ,french chisel1 they had no suspicion of the sacrilege they were committing against art as well as their country4 ,i was at least able to see1 some years ago1 at the ,museum of ,french ,monuments1 collected by the piety of a friend of the arts1 beautiful parts of a superb mausoleum erected to the memory of ,henri de ,bourbon1 second of the name1 ,prince of ,conde1 father of the great ,conde1 the worthy support1 the skilful fellow-laborer of ,richelieu and ,mazarin4 ,this monument was supported by four figures of natural grandeur1--,faith1 ,prudence1 ,justice1 ,charity4 ,there were four bas-reliefs in bronze1 representing the ,triumphs of ,renown1 ,time1 ,death1 and ,eternity4 ,in the ,triumph of ,death1 the artist had represented a certain number of illustrious moderns1 among whom he had placed himself by the side of ,michael ,angelo4#afh ,we can still contemplate in the court of the ,louvre1 in the pavilion of the ,horloge1 those caryatides of ,sarazin at once so majestic and so graceful1 which are detached with admirable relief and lightness4 ,have ,jean ,goujon and ,germain ,pilon done any thing more elegant and lifelike8 ,those females breathe1 and are about to move4 ,take the pains to go a short distance#afi to visit the humble chapel that now occupies the place of that magnificent church of the ,carmelites1 once filled with the paintings of ,champagne1 ,stella1 ,lahire1 and ,lebrun2 where the voice of ,bossuet was heard1 where ,mlle4 de ,lavalliere and ,mme4 de ,longueville were so often seen prostrated1 their long hair shorn1 and their faces bathed in tears4 ,among the relics that are preserved of the past splendor of the holy monastery1 consider the noble statue of the kneeling ,cardinal de ,berulle4 ,on those meditative and penetrating features1 in those eyes raised to heaven1 breathes the soul of that great servant of ,god1 who died at the altar like a warrior on the field of honor4 ,he prays ,god for his dear ,carmelites4 ,that head is perfectly natural1 as ,champagne might have painted it1 and has a severe grace that reminds one of ,lesueur and ,poussin4#agj ,below ,sarazin1 the ,anguiers are still artists that ,italy would admire1 and to whom there is wanting1 since the great century1 nothing but judges worthy of them4 ,these two brothers covered ,paris and ,france with the most precious monuments4 ,look at the tomb of ,jacques-,auguste de ,thou1 by ,francois ,anguier3 the face of the great historian is reflective and melancholy1 like that of a man weary of the spectacle of human things2 and nothing is more amiable than the statues of his two wives1 ,marie ,barbancon de ,cany1 and ,gasparde de la ,chatre4#aga ,the mausoleum of ,henri de ,montmorency1 beheaded at ,toulouse in #afcb1 which is still seen at ,moulins1 in the church of the ancient convent of the daughters of ,sainte-,marie1 is an important work of the same artist1 in which force is manifest1 with a little heaviness4#agb ,to ,michel ,anguier are attributed the statues of the duke and duchess of ,tresmes1 and that of their illustrious son1 ,potier1 ,marquis of ,gevres4#agc ,behold in him the intrepid companion of ,conde1 arrested in his course at thirty-two years of age before ,thionville1 after the battle of ,rocroy1 already lieutenant-general1 and when ,conde was demanding for him the baton of a marshal of ,france1 deposited on his tomb2 behold him young1 beautiful1 brave1 like his comrades cut down also in the flower of life1 ,laval1 ,chatillon1 ,la ,moussaye4 ,one of the best works of ,michel ,anguier is the monument of ,henri de ,chabot1 that other companion1 that faithful friend of ,conde1 who by the splendor of his valor1 especially by the graces of his person1 knew how to gain the heart1 the fortune1 and the name of the beautiful ,marguerite1 the daughter of the great ,duke of ,rohan4 ,the new duke died1 still young1 in #afee1 at thirty-nine years of age4 ,he is represented lying down1 the head inclined and supported by an angel2 another angel is at his feet4 ,the whole is striking1 and the details are exquisite4 ,the face of ,chabot has every beauty1 as if to answer to its reputation1 but the beauty is that of one dying4 ,the body has already the languor of death1 longuescit moriens1 with ,i know not what antique grace4 ,this morsel1 if the drawing were more severe1 would rival the ,dying ,gladiator1 of which it reminds one1 which it perhaps even imitates4#agd ,in truth1 ,i wonder that men now dare speak so lightly of ,puget and ,girardon4 ,to ,puget qualities of the first order cannot be refused4 ,he has the fire1 the enthusiasm1 the fecundity of genius4 ,the caryatides of the ,hotel de ,ville of ,toulon1 which have been brought to the ,museum of ,paris1 attest a powerful chisel4 ,the ,milon reminds one of the manner of ,michael ,angelo2 it is a little overstrained1 but it cannot be denied that the effect is striking4 ,do you want a talent more natural1 and still having force and elevation8 ,take the trouble to search in the ,tuileries1 in the gardens of ,versailles1 in several churches of ,paris1 for the scattered works of ,girardon1 here for the mausoleum of the ,gondis1#age there for that of the ,castellans1#agf that of ,louvois1#agg etc42 especially go to see in the church of the ,sorbonne the mausoleum of ,richelieu4 ,the formidable minister is there represented in his last moments1 sustained by religion and wept by his country4 ,the whole person is of a perfect nobility1 and the figure has the fineness1 the severity1 the superior distinction given to it by the pencil of ,champagne1 and the gravers of ,morin1 ,michel ,lasne1 and ,mellan4 ,finally1 ,i do not regard as a vulgar sculptor ,coysevox1 who1 under the influence of ,lebrun1 unfortunately begins the theatrical style1 who still has the facility1 movement1 and elegance of ,lebrun himself4 ,he reared worthy monuments to ,mazarin1 ,colbert1 and ,lebrun1#agh and thus to speak1 sowed busts of the illustrious men of his time4 ,for1 remark it well1 artists then took scarcely any arbitrary and fanciful subjects4 ,they worked upon contemporaneous subjects1 which1 while giving them proper liberty1 inspired and guided them1 and communicated a public interest to their works4 ,the ,french sculpture of the seventeenth century1 like that of antiquity1 is profoundly natural4 ,the churches and the monasteries were filled with the statues of those who loved them during life1 and wished to rest in them after death4 ,each church of ,paris was a popular museum4 ,the sumptuous residences of the aristocracy--for at that period1 there was one in ,france1 like that of ,england at the present time--possessed their secular tombs1 statues1 busts1 and portraits of eminent men whose glory belonged to the country as well as their own family4 ,on its side1 the state did not encourage the arts in detail1 and1 thus to speak1 in a small way2 it gave them a powerful impulse by demanding of them important works1 by confiding to them vast enterprises4 ,all great things were thus mingled together1 reciprocally inspired and sustained each other4 ,one man alone in ,europe has left a name in the beautiful art that surrounds a chateau or a palace with graceful gardens or magnificent parks1--that man is a ,frenchman of the seventeenth century1 is ,le ,notre4 ,le ,notre may be reproached with a regularity that is perhaps excessive1 and a little mannerism in details2 but he has two qualities that compensate for many defects1 grandeur and sentiment4 ,he who designed the park of ,versailles1 who to the proper arrangement of parterres1 to the movement of fountains1 to the harmonious sound of waterfalls1 to the mysterious shades of groves1 has known how to add the magic of infinite perspective by means of that spacious walk where the view is extended over an immense sheet of water to be lost in the limitless distances1--he is a landscape-painter worthy of having a place by the side of ,poussin and ,lorrain4 ,we had in the middle age our ,gothic architecture1 like all the nations of northern ,europe4 ,in the sixteenth century what architects were ,pierre ,lescot1 ,jean ,bullant1 and ,philibert ,delorme6 ,what charming palaces1 what graceful edifices1 the ,tuileries1 the ,hotel de ,ville of ,paris1 ,chambord1 and ,ecouen6 ,the seventeenth century also had its original architecture1 different from that of the middle age and that of the ,renaissance1 simple1 austere1 noble1 like the poetry of ,corneille and the prose of ,descartes4 ,study without scholastic prejudice the ,luxembourg of de ,brosses1#agi the portal of ,saint-,gervais1 and the great hall of the ,palais de ,justice1 by the same architect2 the ,palais ,cardinal and the ,sorbonne of ,lemercier2#ahj the cupola of ,val-de-,grace by ,lemuet2#aha the triumphal arch of the ,porte ,saint-,denis by ,francois ,blondel2 ,versailles1 and especially the ,invalides1 of ,mansart4#ahb ,consider with attention the last edifice1 let it make its impression on your mind and soul1 and you will easily succeed in recognizing in it a particular beauty4 ,it is not a ,gothic monument1 neither is it an almost ,pagan monument of the sixteenth century1--it is modern1 and also ,christian2 it is vast with measure1 elegant with gravity4 ,contemplate at sunset that cupola reflecting the last rays of day1 elevating itself gently towards the heavens in a slight and graceful curve2 cross that imposing esplanade1 enter that court admirably lighted in spite of its covered galleries1 bow beneath the dome of that church where ,vauban and ,turenne sleep1--you will not be able to guard yourself from an emotion at once religious and military2 you will say to yourself that this is indeed the asylum of warriors who have reached the evening of life and are prepared for eternity6 ,since then1 what has ,french architecture become8 ,once having left tradition and national character1 it wanders from imitation to imitation1 and without comprehending the genius of antiquity1 it unskilfully reproduces its forms4 ,this bastard architecture1 at once heavy and mannered1 is1 little by little1 substituted for the beautiful architecture of the preceding century1 and everywhere effaces the vestiges of the ,french spirit4 ,do you wish a striking example of it8 ,in ,paris1 near the ,luxembourg1 the ,condes had their hotel1#ahc magnificent and severe1 with a military aspect1 as it was fitting for the dwelling-place of a family of warriors1 and within of almost royal splendor4 ,beneath those lofty ceilings had been some time suspended the ,spanish flags taken at ,rocroy4 ,in those vast saloons had been assembled the elite of the grandest society that ever existed4 ,in those beautiful gardens had been seen promenading ,corneille and ,madame de ,sevigne1 ,moliere1 ,bossuet1 ,boileau1 ,racine1 in the company of the great ,conde4 ,the oratory had been painted by the hand of ,lesueur4#ahd ,it had been easy to repair and preserve the noble habitation4 ,at the end of the eighteenth century1 a descendant of the ,condes sold it to a dismal company to build that palace without character and taste which is called the ,palais-,bourbon4 ,almost at the same epoch there was a movement made to construct a church to the patroness of ,paris1 to that ,genevieve1 whose legend is so touching and so popular4 ,was there ever a better chance for a national and ,christian monument8 ,it was possible to return to the ,gothic style and even to the ,byzantine style4 ,instead of that there was made for us an immense ,roman basilica of the ,decline4 ,what a dwelling for the modest and holy virgin1 so dear to the fields that bordered upon ,lutece1 whose name is still venerated by the poor people who inhabit these quarters6 ,behold the church which has been placed by the side of that of ,saint-,etienne du ,mont1 as if to make felt all the differences between ,christianity and ,paganism6 ,for here1 in spite of a mixture of the most different styles1 it is evident that the ,pagan style predominates4 ,christian worship cannot be naturalized in this profane edifice1 which has so many times changed its destination4 ,it is in vain to call it anew ,saint-,genevieve1--the revolutionary name of ,pantheon will stick to it4#ahe ,the eighteenth century treated the ,madeleine no better than ,saint-,genevieve4 ,in vain the beautiful sinner wished to renounce the joys of the world and attach herself to the poverty of ,jesus ,christ4 ,she has been brought back to the pomp and luxury that she repudiated2 she has been put in a rich palace1 all shining with gold1 which might very well be a temple of ,venus1 for certainly it has not the severe grace of the ,pantheon1 of which it is the most vulgar copy4 ,how far we are from the ,invalides1 from ,val-de-,grace1 and the ,sorbonne1 so admirably appropriated to their object1 wherein appears so well the hand of the century and the country which reared them6 ,while architecture thus strays1 it is natural that painting should seek above every thing color and brilliancy1 that sculpture should apply itself to become ,pagan again1 that poetry itself1 receding for two centuries1 should abjure the worship of thought for that of fancy1 that it should everywhere go borrowing images from ,spain1 ,italy1 and ,germany1 that it should run after subaltern and foreign qualities which it will not attain1 and abandon the grand qualities of the ,french genius4 ,it will be said that the ,christian sentiment which animated ,lesueur and the artists of the seventeenth century is wanting to those of ours2 it is extinguished1 and cannot be rekindled4 ,in the first place1 is that very certain8 ,native faith is dead1 but cannot reflective faith take its place8 ,christianity is exhaustless2 it has infinite resources1 and admirable flexibility2 there are a thousand ways of arriving at it and returning to it1 because it has itself a thousand phases that answer to the most different dispositions1 to all the wants1 to all the mobility of the heart4 ,what it loses on one side1 it gains on another2 and as it has produced our civilization1 it is called to follow it in all its vicissitudes4 ,either every religion will perish in this world1 or ,christianity will endure1 for it is not in the power of thought to conceive a more perfect religion4 ,artists of the nineteenth century1 do not despair of ,god and yourselves4 ,a superficial philosophy has thrown you far from ,christianity considered in a strict sense2 another philosophy can bring you near it again by making you see it with another eye4 ,and then1 if the religious sentiment is weakened1 are there not other sentiments that can make the heart of man beat1 and fecundate genius8 ,plato has said1 that beauty is always old and always new4 ,it is superior to all its forms1 it belongs to all countries and all times2 it belongs to all beliefs1 provided these beliefs be serious and profound1 and the need be felt of expressing and spreading them4 ,if1 then1 we have not arrived at the boundary assigned to the grandeur of ,france1 if we are not beginning to descend into the shade of death1 if we still truly live1 if there remain to us convictions1 of whatever kind they may be1 thereby even remains to us1 or at least may remain to us1 what made the glory of our fathers1 what they did not carry with them to the tomb1 what had already survived all revolutions1 ,greece1 ,rome1 the ,middle ,age1 what does not belong to any temporary or ephemeral accident1 what subsists and is continually found in the focus of consciousness--,i mean moral inspiration1 immortal as the soul4 ,let us terminate here1 and sum up this defence of the national art4 ,there are in arts1 as well as in letters and philosophy1 two contrary schools4 ,one tends to the ideal in all things1--it seeks1 it tries to make appear the spirit concealed under the form1 at once manifested and veiled by nature2 it does not so much wish to please the senses and flatter the imagination as to enlarge the intellect and move the soul4 ,the other1 enamored of nature1 stops there and devotes itself to imitation1--its principal object is to reproduce reality1 movement1 life1 which are for it the supreme beauty4 ,the ,france of the seventeenth century1 the ,france of ,descartes1 ,corneille1 and ,bossuet1 highly spiritual in philosophy1 poetry1 and eloquence1 was also highly spiritual in the arts4 ,the artists of that great epoch participate in its general character1 and represent it in their way4 ,it is not true that they lacked imagination1 more than ,pascal and ,bossuet lacked it4 ,but inasmuch as they do not suffer imagination to usurp the dominion that does not belong to it1 inasmuch as they subject its order1 even its impetuosity1 to the reign of reason and the inspirations of the heart1 it seems that it is not so strong when it is only disciplined and regulated4 ,as we have said1 they excel in composition1 especially in expression4 ,they always have a thought1 and a moral and elevated thought4 ,for this reason they are dear to us1 their cause interests us1 is in some sort our own cause1 and so this homage rendered to their misunderstood glory naturally crowns these lectures devoted to true beauty1 that is to say1 moral beauty4 ,may these lectures be able to make it known1 and1 above all1 loved6 ,may they be able also to inspire some one of you with the idea of devoting himself to studies so beautiful1 of devoting to them his life1 and attaching to them his name6 ,the sweetest recompense of a professor who is not too unworthy of that title1 is to see rapidly following in his footsteps young and noble spirits who easily pass him and leave him far behind them4#ahf ,,footnotes3 #abh ,one is reminded of the expression of the great ,conde3 ,where then has ,corneille learned politics and war8 #abi ,it would be a curious and useful study1 to compare with the original all the passages of ,britannicus imitated from ,tacitus2 in them ,racine would almost always be found below his model4 ,i will give a single example4 ,in the account of the death of ,britannicus1 ,racine thus expresses the different effects of the crime on the spectators3 ,juez combien ce coup frappe tous les esprits2 ,la moitie s'epouvante et sort avec des cris2 ,mais ceux qui de la cour ont un plus long usage ,sur les yeux de ,cesar composent leur visage4 ,certainly the style is excellent2 but it pales and seems nothing more than a very feeble sketch in comparison with the rapid and sombre pencil-strokes of the great ,roman painter3 ,trepidatur a circumsedentibus1 diffugiunt imprudentes2 at1 quibus altior intellectus1 resistunt defixi et ,neronem intuentes4 #acj ,see the letter to ,perrault4 #aca ,en vain contre le ,cid ministre se ligue1 ,tout ,paris pour ,chimene a les yeux de ,rodrique1 etc4 99 99 99 99 99 ,apres qu'un peu de terre1 obtenu par priere1 ,pour jamais dans la tombe eut enferme ,moliere1 etc4 99 99 99 99 99 #acb ,aux pieds de cet autel de structure grossiere1 ,git sans pompe1 enferme dans une vile biere1 ,le plus savant mortel qui jamais ait ecrit2 ,arnaud1 qui sur la grace instruit par ,jesus-,christ1 ,combattant pour l',eglise1 a1 dans l',eglise meme1 ,souffert plus d'un outrage et plus d'un anatheme1 etc4 99 99 99 99 99 ,errant1 pauvre1 banni1 proscrit1 persecute2 ,et meme par sa mort leur fureur mal eteinte ,n'aurait jamais laisse ses cendres en repos1 ,si ,dieu lui-meme ici de son ouaille sainte ,a ces loups devorants n'avait cache les os4 #acc ,these verses did not appear till after the death of ,boileau1 and they are not well known4 ,jean-,baptiste ,rousseau1 in a letter to ,brossette1 rightly said that these are the most beautiful verses that ,m4 ,despreaux ever made4 #acd #dth ,series of our works1 ,,literature1 book i41 ,preface1 p4 #c3 ,it is in prose1 perhaps1 that our literary glory is most certain4444 ,what modern nation reckons prose writers that approach those of our nation8 ,the country of ,shakspeare and ,milton does not possess1 since ,bacon1 a single prose writer of the first order 82 that of ,dante1 ,petrarch1 ,ariosto1 and ,tasso1 is in vain proud of ,machiavel1 whose sound and manly diction1 like the thought that it expresses1 is destitute of grandeur4 ,spain1 it is true1 has produced ,cervantes1 an admirable writer1 but he is alone4444 ,france can easily show a list of more than twenty prose writers of genius3 ,froissard1 ,rabelais1 ,montaigne1 ,descartes1 ,pascal1 ,la ,rochefoucauld1 ,moliere1 ,retz1 ,la ,bruyere1 ,malebranche1 ,bossuet1 ,fenelon1 ,flechier1 ,bourdaloue1 ,massillon1 ,mme4 de ,sevigne1 ,saint-,simon1 ,montesquieu1 ,voltaire1 ,buffon1 ,j4 ,j4 ,rousseau2 without speaking of so many more that would be in the first rank everywhere else1--,amiot1 ,calvin1 ,pasquier1 ,d',aubigne1 ,charron1 ,balzac1 ,vaugelas1 ,pelisson1 ,nicole1 ,fleury1 ,bussi1 ,saint-,evremont1 ,mme4 de ,lafayette1 ,mme4 de ,maintenon1 ,fontenelle1 ,vauvenargues1 ,hamilton1 ,le ,sage1 ,prevost1 ,beaumarchais1 etc4 ,it may be said with the exactest truth1 that ,french prose is without a rival in modern ,europe2 and1 even in antiquity1 superior to the ,latin prose1 at least in the quantity and variety of models1 it has no equal but the ,greek prose1 in its palmiest days1 in the days of ,herodotus and ,demosthenes4 ,i do not prefer ,demosthenes to ,pascal1 and it would be difficult for me to put ,plato himself above ,bossuet4 ,plato and ,bossuet1 in my opinion1 are the two greatest masters of human language1 with manifest differences1 as well as more than one trait of resemblance2 both ordinarily speak like the people1 with the last degree of simplicity1 and at moments ascending without effort to a poetry as magnificent as that of ,homer1 ingenious and polished to the most charming delicacy1 and by instinct majestic and sublime4 ,plato1 without doubt1 has incomparable graces1 the supreme serenity1 and1 as it were1 the demi-smile of the divine sage4 ,bossuet1 on his side1 has the pathetic1 in which he has no rival but the great ,corneille4 ,when such writers are possessed1 is it not a religion to render them the honor that is their due1 that of a regular and profound study8 #ace ,see the ,,appendix1 at the end of the volume4 #acf ,see the ,,appendix4 #acg ,this picture had been made for a chapel of the church of ,st4 ,gervais4 ,it formed the altar-piece1 and in the foreground there was the admirable ,bearing of the ,cross1 which is still seen in the ,museum4 #ach ,such a law was the first act of the first assembly of affranchised ,greece1 and all the friends of art have applauded it from end to end of civilized ,europe4 #aci ,see the ,,appendix4 #adj ,the ,seven ,sacraments of ,poussin are now in the ,bridgewater ,gallery4 ,see the ,,appendix4 #ada ,see the ,,appendix4 #adb ,in the midst of this scene of brutal violence1 everybody has remarked this delicate trait--a ,roman quite young1 almost juvenile1 while possessing himself by force of a young girl taking refuge in the arms of her mother1 asks her from her mother with an air at once passionate and restrained4 ,in order to appreciate this picture1 compare it with that of ,david in the ensemble and in the details4 #adc ,in fact1 the ,st4 ,joseph is here the important personage4 ,he governs the whole scene2 he prays1 he is as it were in ecstasy4 #add ,the pictures of ,claude ,lorrain1 of which we have just spoken1 are in the ,museum of ,paris4 ,in all there are thirteen1 whilst the ,museum of ,madrid alone possesses almost as many1 while there are in ,england more than fifty1 and those the most admirable4 ,see the ,,appendix4 #ade ,the last ,notice of the ,pictures exhibited in the ,gallery of the ,national ,museum of the ,louvre1 #aheb1 although its author1 ,m4 ,villot1 is surely a man of incontestable knowledge and taste1 persists in placing ,champagne in the ,flemish school4 ,en revanche1 a learned foreigner1 ,m4 ,waagen1 claims him for the ,french school4 ,kunstwerke and ,kuenstler in ,paris1 ,berlin1 #ahci1 p4 #fea4 #adf ,well appreciated by ,richelieu1 he preferred his esteem to his benefits4 ,one day when an envoy of ,richelieu said to him that he had only to ask freely what he wished for the advancement of his fortune1 ,champagne responded that if ,m4 the ,cardinal could make him a more skilful painter than he was1 it was the only thing that he asked of his ,eminence2 but that being impossible1 he only desired the honor of his good graces4 ,felibien1 ,entretiens1 #ast edition1 #dto41 part v41 p4 #aga2 and de ,piles1 ,abrege de la ,vie des ,peintres1 #b;d edition1 p4 #ejj4--;,as he had much love for justice and truth1 provided he satisfied what they both demanded1 he easily passed over all the rest4--,necrologe de ,port-,royal1 p4 #ccf4 #adg ,see the ,,appendix4 #adh ,the original is in the ,museum of ,grenoble2 but see the engraving of ,morin2 see also that of ,daret1 after the beautiful design of ,demonstier4 #adi ,in the ,museum of the ,louvre2 see also the engraving of ,morin4 #aej ,the original is now in the ,chateau of ,sable1 belonging to the ,marquis of ,rouge2 see the engraving of ,simonneau in ,perrault4 ,the beautiful engraving of ,edelinck was made after a different original1 attributed to a nephew of ,champagne4 #aea ,the original is also in the possession of the ,marquis of ,rouge2 the admirable engraving of ,van ,schupen may take its place4 #aeb ,in the ,museum4 #aec ,in the ,museum1 and engraved by ,gerard ,edelinck4 #aed ,la ,gloire du ,val-de-,grace1 in #dto1 #affi1 with a frontispiece and vignettes4 ,moliere there enters into infinite details on all the parts of the art of painting and the genius of ,mignard4 ,he pushes eulogy perhaps to the extent of hyperbole2 afterwards1 hyperbole gave place to the most shameful indifference4 ,the fresco of the dome of ,val-de-grace is composed of four rows of figures1 which rise in a circle from the base to the vertex of the arch4 ,in the upper part is the ,trinity1 above which is raised a resplendent sky4 ,below the ,trinity are the celestial powers4 ,descending a degree1 we see the ,virgin and the holy personages of the ,old and ,new ,testament4 ,finally1 at the lower extremity is ,anne of ,austria1 introduced into paradise by ,st4 ,anne and ,st4 ,louis1 and these three figures are accompanied by a multitude of personages pertaining to the history of ,france1 among whom are distinguished ,joan of ,arc1 ,charlemagne1 etc4 #aee ,engraved by ,gerard ,audran under the name of the ,plague of ,david 7la ,peste de ,david74 ,what has become of the original8 #aef ,see his ,landscape at ,sunset1 and the ,bathers 7les ,baigneuses71 an agreeable scene somewhat blemished by careless drawing4 #aeg ,it would be necessary to cite all his compositions4 ,in his ,holy ,family the figure of the ,virgin1 without being celestial1 admirably expresses meditation and reflection4 ,we lost some time ago the most important work of ,s4 ,bourdon1 the ,sept ,oeuvres de ,misericorde4 ,see the ,,appendix4 #aeh ,see especially his ,extreme ,unction4 #aei ,the picture that is called le ,silence1 which represents the sleep of the infant ,jesus1 is not unworthy of ,poussin4 ,the head of the infant is of superhuman power4 ,the ,battles of ,alexander1 with their defects1 are pages of history of the highest order2 and in the ,alexander visiting with ,ephestion the ,mother and the ,wife of ,darius1 one knows not which to admire most1 the noble ordering of the whole or the just expression of the figures4 #afj ,it seems that ,lesueur sometimes furnished ,daret with designs4 ,it is indeed to ,lesueur that ,daret owes the idea and the design of his chef-d'oeuvre1 the portrait of ,armand de ,bourbon1 prince de ,conti1 represented in his earliest youth1 and in an abbe1 sustained and surrounded by angels of different size1 forming a charming composition4 ,the drawing is completely pure1 except some imperfect fore-shortenings4 ,the little angels that sport with the emblems of the future cardinal are full of spirit1 and1 at the same time1 sweetness4 #afa ,edelinck saw only the reign of ,louis ,,xiv4 ,nanteuil was able to engrave very few of the great men of the time of ,louis ,,xiii41 and the regency1 and in the latter part of their life2 ,mazarin1 in his last five or six years2 ,conde1 growing old2 ,turenne1 old2 ,fouquet and ,matthieu ,mole1 some years before the fall of the one and the death of the other2 and he was too often obliged to waste his talent upon a crowd of parliamentarians1 ecclesiastics1 and obscure financiers4 #afb ,if ,i wished to make any one acquainted with the greatest and most neglected portion of the seventeenth century1 that which ,voltaire almost wholly omitted1 ,i would set him to collecting the works of ,morin4 #afc ,mellan not only made portraits after the celebrated painters of his time1 he is himself the author of great and charming compositions1 many of which serve as frontispieces to books4 ,i willingly call attention to that one which is at the head of a folio edition of the ,introduction a la ,vie ,devote1 and to the beautiful frontispieces of the writings of ,richelieu1 from the press of the ,louvre4 #afd ,this was the opinion of ,winkelmann at the end of the eighteenth century2 it is our opinion now1 even after all the discoveries that have been made during fifty years1 that may be seen in great part retraced and described in the ,musio real ,barbonico4 #afe ,there was doubtless sculpture in the middle age3 the innumerable figures at the portals of our cathedrals1 and the statues that are discovered every day sufficiently testify it4 ,the imagers of that time certainly had much spirit and imagination2 but1 at least in everything that we have seen1 beauty is absent1 and taste wanting4 #aff ,go and see at the ,museum of ,versailles the statue of ,francis ,i41 and say whether any ,italian1 except the author of the ,laurent de ,medicis1 has made any thing like it4 ,see also in the ,museum of the ,louvre1 the statue of ,admiral ,chabot4 #afg ,sarazin died in #affj1 ,lesueur in #afee1 ,poussin in #affe1 ,descartes in #afej1 ,pascal in #affb1 and the genius of ,corneille did not extend beyond that epoch4 #afh ,lenoir1 ,musee des ,monuments ,francais1 vol4 v41 p4 #hg-ia1 and the ,musee ,royale des ,monuments ,francais of #ahae1 p4 #ih1 #ii1 #ajh1 #abb1 and #adj4 ,this wonderful monument1 erected to ,henri de ,bourbon1 at the expense of his old intendant ,perrault1 president of the ,chambre des ,comptes1 was placed in the ,church of the ,jesuits1 and was wholly in bronze4 ,it must not be confounded with the other monument that the ,condes erected to the same prince in their family burial-ground at ,vallery1 near ,montereau1 in ,yonne4 ,this monument is in marble1 and by the hand of ,michel ,anguier2 see the description in ,lenoir1 vol4 v41 p4 #bc-be1 and especially in the ,annuaire de l',yonne pour #ahdb1 p4 #agc1 etc4 #afi ,rue d',enfer1 ,no4 #fg4 #agj ,the ,museum of the ,louvre possesses only a very small number of ,sarazin's works1 and those of very little importance3--a bust of ,pierre ,seguier1 strikingly true1 two statuettes full of grace1 and the small funeral monument of ,hennequin1 ,abbe of ,bernay1 member of ,parliament1 who died in #afea1 which is a chef-d'oeuvre of elegance4 #aga ,these three statues were united in the ,museum des ,petits-,augustins1 ,lenoir1 ,musee-royal1 etc41 p4 #id2 we know not why they have been separated2 ,jacques-,auguste de ,thou has been placed in the ,louvre1 and his two wives at ,versailles4 #agb ,francois ,anguier had made a marble tomb of ,cardinal de ,berulle1 which was in the oratory of ,rue ,st4 ,honore4 ,it would have been interesting to compare this statue with that of ,sarazin1 which is still at the ,carmelites4 ,francois is also the author of the monument of the ,longuevilles1 which1 before the ,revolution1 was at the ,celestins1 and was seen in #ahae at the museum des ,petits-,augustins1 ,lenoir1 ibid41 p4 #ajc2 it is now in the ,louvre4 ,it is an obelisk1 the four sides of which are covered with allegorical bas-reliefs4 ,the pedestal1 also ornamented with bas-reliefs1 has four female figures in marble1 representing the cardinal virtues4 #agc ,now at ,versailles4 ,lenoir1 p4 #ig and #ajj4 ,see his portrait1 painted by ,champagne1 and engraved by ,morin4 #agd ,group in white marble which was at the ,celestins1 a church near the hotel of ,rohan-,chabot in the ,place ,royale2 re-collected in the ,museum des ,petits-,augustins1 ,lenoir1 ibid41 p4 #ig2 it is now at ,versailles4 ,we must not pass over that beautiful production1 the mausoleum of ,jacques de ,souvre1 ,grand ,prior of ,france1 the brother of the beautiful ,marchioness de ,sable2 a mausoleum that came from ,saint-,jean de ,latran1 passed through the ,museum des ,petits-,augustins1 and is now found in the ,louvre4 ,the sculptures of the porte ,saint-,denis are also owed to ,michel ,anguier1 as well as the admirable bust of ,colbert1 which is in the museum4 #age ,at first at ,notre-,dame1 the natural place for the tombs of the ,gondis1 then at the ,augustins1 now at ,versailles4 #agf ,in the ,church ,st4 ,germain des ,pres4 #agg ,at the ,capuchins1 then at the ,augustins1 then at ,versailles4 #agh ,see1 on these monuments1 ,lenoir1 p4 #ih1 #aja1 #ajb4 ,that of ,mazarin is now at the ,louvre2 that of ,colbert has been restored to the ,church of ,st4 ,eustache1 and that of ,lebrun to the ,church ,st4 ,nicholas du ,chardonnet1 as well as the mausoleum1 so expressive but a little overstrained1 of the mother of ,lebrun1 by ,tuby1 and the mausoleum of ,jerome ,bignon1 the celebrated ,councillor of ,state1 who died in #afef4 #agi ,quatremere de ,quincy1 ,histoire de la ,vie et des ,ouvrages de plus ,celebres ,architectes1 vol4 ii41 p4 #ade3--,there could scarcely be found in any country an ensemble so grand1 which offers with so much unity and regularity an aspect at once more varied and picturesque1 especially in the facade of the entrance4 ,unfortunately this unity has disappeared1 thanks to the constructions that have since been added to the primitive work4 #ahj ,in order to appreciate the beauty of the ,sorbonne1 one must stand in the lower part of the great court1 and from that point consider the effect of the successive elevation1 at first of the other part of the court1 then of the different stories of the portico1 then of the portico itself1 of the church1 and1 finally1 of the dome4 #aha ,quatremere de ,quincy1 ,ibid41 p4 #beg3--,the cupola of this edifice is one of the finest in ,europe4 #ahb ,we do not speak of the colonnade of the ,louvre by ,perrault1 because in spite of its grand qualities1 it begins the decline and marks the passage from the serious to the academic style1 from originality to imitation1 from the seventeenth century to the eighteenth4 #ahc ,see the engraving of ,perelle4 ,sauval1 vol4 ii41 p4 #ff and p4 #aca1 says that the hotel of ,conde was magnificently built1 that it was the most magnificent of the time4 #ahd ,notice of ,guillet de ,st4 ,georges1 recently published 7see the ,,appendix73--,nearly at the same time the ,princess-dowager de ,conde1 ,charlotte-,marguerite de ,montmorency1 mother of the late prince1 had an oratory painted by ,lesueur in the hotel of ,conde4 ,the altar-piece represents a ,nativity1 that of the ceiling a ,celestial ,glory4 ,the wainscot is enriched with several figures and with a quantity of ornaments worked with great care4 #ahe ,the ,pantheon is an imitation of the ,st4 ,paul's of ,london1 which is itself a very sad imitation of ,st4 ,peter's of ,rome4 ,the only merit of the ,pantheon is its situation on the summit of the hill of ,st4 ,genevieve1 from which it overlooks that part of the town1 and is seen on different sides to a considerable distance4 ,put in its place the ,val-de-,grace of ,lemercier with the dome of ,lemuet1 and judge what would be the effect of such an edifice6 #ahf ,in the first rank of the intelligent auditors of this course was ,m4 ,jouffroy1 who already under our auspices1 had presented to the faculte des lettres1 in order to obtain the degree of doctor1 a thesis on the beautiful4 ,m4 ,jouffroy had cultivated1 with care and particular taste1 the seeds that our teaching might have planted in his mind4 ,but of all those who at that epoch or later frequented our lectures1 no one was better fitted to embrace the entire domain of beauty or art than the author of the beautiful articles on ,eustache ,lesueur1 the ,cathedral of ,noyon1 and the ,louvre4 ,m4 ,vitet possesses all the knowledge1 and1 what is more1 all the qualities requisite for a judge of every kind of beauty1 for a worthy historian of art4 ,i yield to the necessity of addressing to him the public petition that he may not be wanting to a vocation so marked and so elevated4 ,,part ,,third ,,the ,,good4 ,,lecture ,,xi4 ,,primary ,,notions ,,of ,,common ,,sense4 ,extent of the question of the good4--,position of the question according to the psychological method3 ,what is1 in regard to the good1 the natural belief of mankind8--,the natural beliefs of humanity must not be sought in a pretended state of nature4--,study of the sentiments and ideas of men in languages1 in life1 in consciousness4--,disinterestedness and devotedness4--,liberty4--,esteem and contempt4--,respect4--,admiration and indignation4--,dignity4--,empire of opinion4--,ridicule4--,regret and repentance4--,natural and necessary foundations of all justice4--,distinction between fact and right4--,common sense1 true and false philosophy4 ,the idea of the true in its developments1 comprises psychology1 logic1 and metaphysics4 ,the idea of the beautiful begets what is called aesthetics4 ,the idea of the good is the whole of ethics4 ,it would be forming a false and narrow idea of ethics to confine them within the inclosure of individual consciousness4 ,there are public ethics1 as well as private ethics1 and public ethics embrace1 with the relations of men among themselves1 so far as men1 their relations as citizens and as members of a state4 ,ethics extend wherever is found in any decree the idea of the good4 ,now1 where does this idea manifest itself more1 and where do justice and injustice1 virtue and crime1 heroism and weakness appear more openly1 than on the theatre of civil life8 ,moreover1 is there any thing that has a more decisive influence over manners1 even of individuals1 than the institutions of peoples and the constitutions of states8 ,if the idea of the good goes thus far1 it must be followed thither1 as recently the idea of the beautiful has introduced us into the domain of art4 ,philosophy usurps no foreign power2 but it is not disposed to relinquish its right of examination over all the great manifestations of human nature4 ,all philosophy that does not terminate in ethics1 is hardly worthy of the name1 and all ethics that do not terminate at least in general views on society and government1 are powerless ethics1 that have neither counsels nor rules to give humanity in its most difficult trials4 ,it seems that at the point where we have arrived1 the metaphysics and aesthetics that we have taught evidently involve such a doctrine of morality and not such another1 that1 accordingly1 the question of the good1 that question so fertile and so vast1 is for us wholly solved1 and that we can deduce1 by way of reasoning1 the moral theory that is derived from our theory of the beautiful and our theory of the true4 ,we might do this1 perhaps1 but we will not4 ,this would be abandoning the method that we have hitherto followed1 that method that proceeds by observation1 and not by deduction1 and makes consulting experience a law to itself4 ,we do not grow weary of experience4 ,let us attach ourselves faithfully to the psychological method2 it has its delays2 it condemns us to more than one repetition1 but it places us in the beginning1 and a long time retains us at the source of all reality1 and all light4 ,the first maxim of the psychological method is this3 ,true philosophy invents nothing1 it establishes and describes what is4 ,now here1 what is1 is the natural and permanent belief of the being that we are studying1 to wit1 man4 ,what is1 then1 in relation to the good1 the natural and permanent belief of the human race8 ,such is1 in our eyes1 the first question4 ,with us1 in fact1 the human race does not take one side1 and philosophy the other4 ,philosophy is the interpreter of the human race4 ,what the human race thinks and believes1 often unconsciously1 philosophy re-collects1 explains1 establishes4 ,it is the faithful and complete expression of human nature1 and human nature is entire in each of us philosophers1 and in every other man4 ,among us1 it is attained by consciousness2 among other men1 it manifests itself in their words and actions4 ,let us1 then1 interrogate the latter and the former2 let us especially interrogate our own consciousness2 let us clearly recognize what the human race thinks2 we shall then see what should be the office of philosophy4 ,is there a human language known to us that has not different expressions for good and evil1 for just and unjust8 ,is there any language1 in which1 by the side of the words pleasure1 interest1 utility1 happiness1 are not also found the words sacrifice1 disinterestedness1 devotedness1 virtue8 ,do not all languages1 as well as all nations1 speak of liberty1 duty1 and right8 ,here1 perhaps1 some disciple of ,condillac and ,helvetius will ask us whether1 in this regard1 we possess authentic dictionaries of the language of savage tribes found by voyagers in the isles of the ocean8 ,no2 but we have not made our philosophic religion out of the superstitions and prejudices of a certain school4 ,we absolutely deny that it is necessary to study human nature in the famous savage of ,aveyron1 or in the like of him of the isles of the ocean1 or the ,american continent4 ,the savage state offers us humanity in swaddling-clothes1 thus to speak1 the germ of humanity1 but not humanity entire4 ,the true man is the perfect man of his kind2 true human nature is human nature arrived at its development1 as true society is also perfected society4 ,we do not think it worth the while to ask a savage his opinion on the ,apollo ,belvidere1 neither will we ask him for the principles that constitute the moral nature of man1 because in him this moral nature is only sketched and not completed4 ,our great philosophy of the seventeenth century was sometimes a little too much pleased with hypotheses in which ,god plays the principal part1 and crushes human liberty4#ahg ,the philosophy of the eighteenth century threw itself into the opposite extreme2 it had recourse to hypotheses of a totally different character1 among others1 to a pretended natural state1 whence it undertook1 with infinite pains1 to draw society and man as we now see them4 ,rousseau plunged into the forests1 in order to find there the model of liberty and equality4 ,that is the commencement of his politics4 ,but wait a little1 and soon you will see the apostle of the natural state1 driven1 by a necessary inconsequence1 from one excess to an opposite excess1 instead of the sweets of savage liberty1 proposing to us the ,contrat ,social and ,lacedemone4 ,condillac#ahh studies the human mind in a statue whose senses enter into exercise under the magic wand of a systematic analysis1 and are developed in the measure and progress that are convenient to him4 ,the statue successively acquires our five senses1 but there is one thing that it does not acquire1 that is1 a mind like the human mind1 and a soul like ours4 ,and this was what was then called the experimental method6 ,let us leave there all those hypotheses4 ,in order to understand reality1 let us study it1 and not imagine it4 ,let us take humanity as it is incontestably shown to us in its actual characters1 and not as it may have been in a primitive1 purely hypothetical state1 in those unformed lineaments or that degradation which is called the savage state4 ,in that1 without doubt1 may be found signs or souvenirs of humanity1 and1 if this were the plea1 we might1 in our turn1 examine the recitals of voyages1 and find1 even in that darkness of infancy or decrepitude1 admirable flashes of light1 noble instincts1 which already appear1 or still subsist1 presaging or recalling humanity4 ,but1 for the sake of exactness of method and true analysis1 we turn our eyes from infancy and the savage state1 in order to direct them towards the being who is the sole object of our studies1 the actual man1 the real and completed man4 ,do you know a language1 a people1 which does not possess the word disinterested virtue8 ,who is especially called an honest man8 ,is it the skilful calculator1 devoting himself to making his own affairs the best possible1 or he who1 under all circumstances1 is disposed to observe justice against his apparent or real interest8 ,take away the idea that an honest man is capable1 to a certain degree1 of resisting the attractions of personal interest1 and of making some sacrifices for opinion1 for propriety1 for that which is or appears honest1 and you take away the foundation of that title of honest man1 even in the most ordinary sense4 ,that disposition to prefer what is good to our pleasure1 to our personal utility1 in a word1 to interest--that disposition more or less strong1 more or less constant1 more or less tested1 measures the different degrees of virtue4 ,a man who carries disinterestedness as far as devotion1 is called a hero1 let him be concealed in the humblest condition1 or placed on a public stage4 ,there is devotedness in obscure as well as in exalted stations4 ,there are heroes of probity1 of honor1 of loyalty1 in the relations of ordinary life1 as well as heroes of courage and patriotism in the counsels of peoples and at the head of armies4 ,all these names1 with their meaning well recognized1 are in all languages1 and constitute a certain and universal fact4 ,we may explain this fact1 but on one imperative condition1 that in explaining we do not destroy it4 ,now1 is the idea and the word disinterestedness explained to us by reducing disinterestedness to interest8 ,this is what common sense invincibly repels4 ,poets have no system1--they address themselves to men as they really are1 in order to produce in them certain effects4 ,is it skilful selfishness or disinterested virtue that poets celebrate8 ,do they demand our applause for the success of fortunate address1 or for the voluntary sacrifices of virtue8 ,the poet knows that there is at the foundation of the human soul ,i know not what marvellous power of disinterestedness and devotedness4 ,in addressing himself to this instinct of the heart1 he is sure of awakening a sublime echo1 of opening every source of the pathetic4 ,consult the annals of the human race1 and you will find in them man everywhere1 and more and more1 claiming his liberty4 ,this word liberty is as old as man himself4 ,what then6 ,men wish to be free1 and man himself should not be free6 ,the word nevertheless exists with the most determined signification4 ,it signifies that man believes himself a free being1 not only animated and sensible1 but endowed with will1 a will that belongs to him1 that consequently cannot admit over itself the tyranny of another will which would make1 in regard to him1 the office of fatality1 even were it that of the most beneficent fatality4 ,do you suppose that the word liberty could ever have been formed1 if the thing itself did not exist8 ,none but a free being could possess the idea of liberty4 ,will it be said that the liberty of man is only an illusion8 ,the wishes of the human race are then the most inexplicable extravagance4 ,in denying the essential distinction between liberty and fatality1 we contradict all languages and all received notions2 we have1 it is true1 the advantage of absolving tyrants1 but we degrade heroes4 ,they have1 then1 fought and died for a chimera6 ,all languages contain the words esteem and contempt4 ,to esteem1 to despise1--these are universal expressions1 certain phenomena1 from which an impartial analysis can draw the highest notions4 ,can we despise a being who1 in his acts1 should not be free1 a being who should not know the good1 and should not feel himself obligated to fulfil it8 ,suppose that the good is not essentially different from the evil1 suppose that there is in the world only interest more or less well understood1 that there is no real duty1 and that man is not essentially a free being1--it is impossible to explain rationally the word contempt4 ,it is the same with the word esteem4 ,esteem is a fact which1 faithfully expressed1 contains a complete philosophy as solid as generous4 ,esteem has two certain characters3 #ast1 ,it is a disinterested sentiment in the soul of him who feels it2 #b;d1 ,it is applied only to disinterested acts4 ,we do not esteem at will1 and because it is our interest to esteem4 ,neither do we esteem an action or a person because they have been successful4 ,success1 fortunate calculation1 may make us envied2 it does not bring esteem1 which has another price4 ,esteem in a certain degree1 and under certain circumstances1 is respect1--respect1 a holy and sacred word which the most subtile or the loosest analysis will never degrade to expressing a sentiment that is related to ourselves1 and is applied to actions crowned by fortune4 ,take again these two words1 these two facts analogous to the first two1 admiration and indignation4 ,esteem and contempt are rather judgments2 indignation and admiration are sentiments1 but sentiments that pertain to intelligence and envelop a judgment4#ahi ,admiration is an essentially disinterested sentiment4 ,see whether there is any interest in the world that has the power to give you admiration for any thing or any person4 ,if you were interested1 you might feign admiration1 but you would not feel it4 ,a tyrant with death in his hand1 may constrain you to appear to admire1 but not to admire in reality4 ,even affection does not determine admiration2 whilst a heroic trait1 even in an enemy1 compels you to admire4 ,the phenomenon opposed to admiration is indignation4 ,indignation is no more anger than admiration is desire4 ,anger is wholly personal4 ,indignation is never directly related to us2 it may have birth in the midst of circumstances wherein we are engaged1 but the foundation and the dominant character of the phenomenon in itself is to be disinterested4 ,indignation is in its nature generous4 ,if ,i am a victim of an injustice1 ,i may feel at once anger and indignation1 anger against him that injures me1 indignation towards him who is unjust to one of his fellow-men4 ,we may be indignant towards ourselves2 we are indignant towards every thing that wounds the sentiment of justice4 ,indignation covers a judgment1 the judgment that he who commits such or such an action1 whether against us1 or even for us1 does an action unworthy1 contrary to our dignity1 to his own dignity1 to human dignity4 ,the injury sustained is not the measure of indignation1 as the advantage received is not that of admiration4 ,we felicitate ourselves on possessing or having acquired a useful thing2 but we never admire1 on that account1 either ourselves or the thing that we have just acquired4 ,so we repel the stone that wounds us1 we do not feel indignant towards it4 ,admiration elevates and ennobles the soul4 ,the generous parts of human nature are disengaged and exalted in presence of1 and as it were in contact with1 the image of the good4 ,this is the reason why admiration is already by itself so beneficent1 even should it be deceived in its object4 ,indignation is the result of these same generous parts of the soul1 which1 wounded by injustice1 are highly roused and protest in the name of offended human dignity4 ,look at men in action1 and you will see them imposing upon themselves great sacrifices in order to conquer the suffrages of their fellows4 ,the empire of opinion is immense1--vanity alone does not explain it2 it doubtless also pertains to vanity1 but it has deeper and better roots4 ,we judge that other men are1 like us1 sensible to good and evil1 that they distinguish between virtue and vice1 that they are capable of being indignant and admiring1 of esteeming and respecting1 as well as despising4 ,this power is in us1 we have consciousness of it1 we know that other men possess it as well as we1 and it is this power that frightens us4 ,opinion is our own consciousness transferred to the public1 and there disengaged from all complaisance and armed with an inflexible severity4 ,to the remorse in our own hearts1 responds the shame in that second soul which we have made ourselves1 and is called public opinion4 ,we must not be astonished at the sweets of popularity4 ,we are more sure of having done well1 when to the testimony of our consciousness we are able to join that of the consciousness of our fellow-men4 ,there is only one thing that can sustain us against opinion1 and even place us above it3 it is the firm and sure testimony of our consciousness1 because1 in fine1 the public and the whole human race are compelled to judge us according to appearance1 whilst we judge ourselves infallibly and by the most certain of all knowledge4 ,ridicule is the fear of opinion in small things4 ,the force of ridicule is wholly in the supposition that there is a common taste1 a common type of what is proper1 that directs men in their judgments1 and even in their pleasantries1 which in their way are also judgments4 ,without this supposition1 ridicule falls of itself1 and pleasantry loses its sting4 ,but it is immortal1 as well as the distinction between good and evil1 between the beautiful and the ugly1 between what is proper and what is improper4 ,when we have not succeeded in any measure undertaken for our interest and prosperity1 we experience a sentiment of pain that is called regret4 ,but we do not confound regret with that other sentiment that rises in the soul when we are conscious of having done something morally bad4 ,this sentiment is also a pain1 but of quite a different nature1--it is remorse1 repentance4 ,that we have lost in play1 for example1 is disagreeable to us2 but if1 in gaining1 we have the consciousness of having deceived our adversary1 we experience a very different sentiment4 ,we might prolong and vary these examples4 ,we have said enough to be entitled to conclude that human language and the sentiments that it expresses are inexplicable1 if we do not admit the essential distinction between good and evil1 between virtue and crime1 crime founded on interest1 virtue founded on disinterestedness4 ,disturb this distinction1 and you disturb human life and entire society4 ,permit me to take an extreme1 tragic1 and terrible example4 ,here is a man that has just been judged4 ,he has been condemned to death1 and is about to be executed--to be deprived of life4 ,and why8 ,place yourself in the system that does not admit the essential distinction between good and evil1 and ponder on what is stupidly atrocious in this act of human justice4 ,what has the condemned done8 ,evidently a thing indifferent in itself4 ,for if there is no other outward distinction than that of pleasure and pain1 ,i defy any one to qualify any human action1 whatever it may be1 as criminal1 without the most absurd inconsequence4 ,but this thing1 indifferent in itself1 a certain number of men1 called legislators1 have declared to be a crime4 ,this purely arbitrary declaration has found no echo in the heart of this man4 ,he has not been able to feel the justice of it1 since there is nothing in itself just4 ,he has therefore done1 without remorse1 what this declaration arbitrarily interdicted4 ,the court proceeds to prove to him that he has not succeeded1 but not that he has done contrary to justice1 for there is no justice4 ,i maintain that every condemnation1 be it to death1 or to any punishment whatever1 imperatively supposes1 in order to be any thing else than a repression of violence by violence1 the four following points3--#ast1 ,that there is an essential distinction between good and evil1 justice and injustice1 and that to this distinction is attached1 for every intelligent and free being1 the obligation of conforming to good and justice2 #b;d1 ,that man is an intelligent and free being1 capable of comprehending this distinction1 and the obligation that accompanies it1 and of adhering to it naturally1 independently of all convention1 and every positive law2 capable also of resisting the temptations that bear him towards evil and injustice1 and of fulfilling the sacred law of natural justice2 #c;d1 ,that every act contrary to justice deserves to be repressed by force1 and even punished in reparation of the fault committed1 and independently too of all law and all convention2 #dth1 ,that man naturally recognizes the distinction between the merit and demerit of actions1 as he recognizes the distinction between the just and the unjust1 and knows that every penalty applied to an unjust act is itself most strictly just4 ,such are the foundations of that power of judging and punishing which is entire society4 ,society has not made those principles for its own use2 they are much anterior to it1 they are contemporaneous with thought and the soul1 and upon these rests society1 with its laws and its institutions4 ,laws are legitimate by their relation to these eternal laws4 ,the surest power of institutions resides in the respect that these principles bear with them and extend to every thing that participates in them4 ,education develops them1 it does not create them4 ,they direct the legislator who makes the law1 and the judge who applies it4 ,they are present to the accused brought before the tribunal1 they inspire every just sentence1 they give it authority in the soul of the condemned1 and in that of the spectator1 and they consecrate the employment of force necessary for his execution4 ,take away a single one of these principles1 and all human justice is overthrown1 no longer is there any thing but a mass of arbitrary conventions which no one in conscience is bound to respect1 which may be violated without remorse1 which are sustained only by the display of extreme punishments4 ,the decisions of such a justice are not true judgments1 but acts of force1 and civil society is only an arena where men contend with each other without duties and rights1 without any other object than that of procuring for themselves the greatest possible amount of enjoyment1 of procuring it by conquest and preserving it by force or cunning1 save throwing over all that the cloak of hypocritical laws4 ,it is true1 such is the aspect under which skepticism makes us consider society and human justice1 driving us through despair to revolt and disorder1 and bringing us back through despair again to quite another yoke than that of reason and virtue1 to that regulated disorder which is called despotism4 ,the spectacle of human things1 viewed coolly1 and without the spirit of system1 is1 thank ,god1 less sombre4 ,without doubt1 society and human justice have still many imperfections which time discovers and corrects2 but it may be said1 that in general they rest on truth and natural equity4 ,the proof of it is1 that society everywhere subsists1 and is even developed4 ,moreover1 facts1 were they such as the melancholy pen of a ,pascal or a ,rousseau represent them to be1 facts are not all1--before facts is right2 and this idea of right alone1 if it is real1 suffices to overturn an abasing system1 and save human dignity4 ,now1 is the idea of right a chimera8 ,i again appeal to languages1 to individual consciousness1 to the human race1--is it not true that fact is everywhere distinguished from right1 fact which too often1 perhaps1 but not always1 as it is said1 is opposed to right2 and right that subdues and rules fact1 or protests against it8 ,what word is it that restrains most in human societies8 ,is it not that of right8 ,look for a language that does not contain it4 ,on all sides1 society is bristling with rights4 ,there is even a distinction made between natural right and positive right1 between what is legal and what is equitable4 ,it is proclaimed that force should be in the service of right1 and not right at the mercy of force4 ,the triumphs of force1 wherever we perceive them1 either under our eyes1 or by the aid of history in bygone centuries1 or by favor of universal publicity beyond the ocean1 and in foreign continents1 rouse indignation in the disinterested spectator or reader4 ,on the contrary1 he who inscribes on his banner the name of right1 by that alone interests us2 the cause of right1 or what we suppose to be the cause of right1 is for us the cause of humanity4 ,it is also a fact1 and an incontestable fact1 that in the eyes of man fact is not every thing1 and that the idea of right is a universal idea1 graven in shining and ineffaceable characters1 if not in the visible world1 at least in that of thought and the soul2 concerning that is the question2 it is also that which in the long run reforms and governs the other4 ,individual consciousness1 conceived and transferred to the entire species1 is called common sense4 ,it is common sense that has made1 that sustains1 that develops languages1 natural and permanent beliefs1 society and its fundamental institutions4 ,grammarians have not invented languages1 nor legislators societies1 nor philosophers general beliefs4 ,all these things have not been personally done1 but by the whole world1--by the genius of humanity4 ,common sense is deposited in its works4 ,all languages1 and all human institutions contain the ideas and the sentiments that we have just called to mind and described1 and especially the distinction between good and evil1 between justice and injustice1 between free will and desire1 between duty and interest1 between virtue and happiness1 with the profoundly rooted belief that happiness is a recompense due to virtue1 and that crime in itself deserves to be punished1 and calls for the reparation of a just suffering4 ,these things are attested by the words and actions of men4 ,such are the sincere and impartial1 but somewhat confused1 somewhat gross notions of common sense4 ,here begins the part of philosophy4 ,it has before it two different routes2 it can do one of two things3 either accept the notions of common sense1 elucidate them1 thereby develop and increase them1 and1 by faithfully expressing them1 fortify the natural beliefs of humanity2 or1 preoccupied with such or such a principle1 impose it upon the natural data of common sense1 admit those that agree with this principle1 artificially bend the others to these1 or openly deny them2 this is what is called making a system4 ,philosophic systems are not philosophy2 they try to realize the idea of it1 as civil institutions try to realize that of justice1 as the arts express in their way infinite beauty1 as the sciences pursue universal science4 ,philosophic systems are necessarily very imperfect1 otherwise there never would have been two systems in the world4 ,fortunate are those that go on doing good1 that expand in the minds and souls of men1 with some innocent errors1 the sacred love of the true1 the beautiful1 and the good6 ,but philosophic systems follow their times much more than they direct them2 they receive their spirit from the hands of their age4 ,transferred to ,france towards the close of the regency and under the reign of ,louis ,,xv41 the philosophy of ,locke gave birth there to a celebrated school1 which for a long time governed and still subsists among us1 protected by ancient habits1 but in radical opposition to our new institutions and our new wants4 ,sprung from the bosom of tempests1 nourished in the cradle of a revolution1 brought up under the bad discipline of the genius of war1 the nineteenth century cannot recognize its image and find its instincts in a philosophy born under the influence of the voluptuous refinements of ,versailles1 admirably fitted for the decrepitude of an arbitrary monarchy1 but not for the laborious life of a young liberty surrounded with perils4 ,as for us1 after having combated the philosophy of sensation in the metaphysics which it substituted for ,cartesianism1 and in the deplorable aesthetics1 now too accredited1 under which succumbed our great national art of the seventeenth century1 we do not hesitate to combat it again in the ethics that were its necessary product1 the ethics of interest4 ,the exposition and refutation of these pretended ethics will be the subject of the next lecture4 ,,footnotes3 #ahg ,see #b;d ,series1 vol4 ii41 lect4 #aa and #ab2 #dth ,series1 vol4 ii41 last pages of ,jacqueline ,pascal1 and the ,fragments of the ,cartesian ,philosophy1 p4 #dfi4 #ahh #ast ,series1 vol4 iii41 lectures #b and #c1 ,condillac4 #ahi ,see the ,theory of ,sentiment1 part i41 lecture #e4 ,,lecture ,,xii4 ,,the ,,ethics ,,of ,,interest4#aij ,exposition of the doctrine of interest4--,what there is of truth in this doctrine4--,its defects4 #ast4 ,it confounds liberty and desire1 and thereby abolishes liberty4 #b;d4 ,it cannot explain the fundamental distinction between good and evil4 #c;d4 ,it cannot explain obligation and duty4 #dth4 ,nor right4 #eth4 ,nor the principle of merit and demerit4--,consequences of the ethics of interest3 that they cannot admit a providence1 and lead to despotism4 ,the philosophy of sensation1 setting out from a single fact1 agreeable or painful sensation1 necessarily arrives in ethics at a single principle1--interest4 ,the whole of the system may be explained as follows3 ,man is sensible to pleasure and pain3 he shuns the one and seeks the other4 ,that is his first instinct1 and this instinct will never abandon him4 ,pleasure may change so far as its object is concerned1 and be diversified in a thousand ways3 but whatever form it takes1--physical pleasure1 intellectual pleasure1 moral pleasure1 it is always pleasure that man pursues4 ,the agreeable generalized is the useful2 and the greatest possible sum of pleasure1 whatever it may be1 no longer concentrated within such or such an instant1 but distributed over a certain extent of duration1 is happiness4#aia ,happiness1 like pleasure1 is relative to him who experiences it2 it is essentially personal4 ,ourselves1 and ourselves alone we love1 in loving pleasure and happiness4 ,interest is that which prompts us to seek in every thing our pleasure and our happiness4 ,if happiness is the sole end of life1 interest is the sole motive of all our actions4 ,man is only sensible to his interest1 but he understands it well or ill4 ,much art is necessary in order to be happy4 ,we are not ready to give ourselves up to all the pleasures that are offered on the highway of life1 without examining whether these pleasures do not conceal many a pain4 ,present pleasure is not every thing1--it is necessary to take thought for the future2 it is necessary to know how to renounce joys that may bring regret1 and sacrifice pleasure to happiness1 that is to say1 to pleasure still1 but pleasure more enduring and less intoxicating4 ,the pleasures of the body are not the only ones1--there are other pleasures1 those of mind1 even those of opinion3 the sage tempers them by each other4 ,the ethics of interest are nothing else than the ethics of perfected pleasure1 substituting happiness for pleasure1 the useful for the agreeable1 prudence for passion4 ,it admits1 like the human race1 the words good and evil1 virtue and vice1 merit and demerit1 punishment and reward1 but it explains them in its own way4 ,the good is that which in the eyes of reason is conformed to our true interest2 evil is that which is contrary to our true interest4 ,virtue is that wisdom which knows how to resist the enticement of passions1 discerns what is truly useful1 and surely proceeds to happiness4 ,vice is that aberration of mind and character that sacrifices happiness to pleasures without duration or full of dangers4 ,merit and demerit1 punishment and reward1 are the consequences of virtue and vice3--for not knowing how to seek happiness by the road of wisdom1 we are punished by not attaining it4 ,the ethics of interest do not pretend to destroy any of the duties consecrated by public opinion2 it establishes that all are conformed to our personal interest1 and it is thereby that they are duties4 ,to do good to men is the surest means of making them do good to us2 and it is also the means of acquiring their esteem1 their good will1 and their sympathy1--always agreeable1 and often useful4 ,disinterestedness itself has its explanation4 ,doubtless there is no disinterestedness in the vulgar sense of the word1 that is to say1 a real sacrifice of self1 which is absurd1 but there is the sacrifice of present interest to future interest1 of gross and sensual passion to a nobler and more delicate pleasure4 ,sometimes one renders to himself a bad account of the pleasure that he pursues1 and in fault of seeing clearly into his own heart1 invents that chimera of disinterestedness of which human nature is incapable1 which it cannot even comprehend4 ,it will be conceded that this explanation of the ethics of interest is not overcharged1 that it is faithful4 ,we go further1--we acknowledge that these ethics are an extreme1 but1 up to a certain point1 a legitimate reaction against the excessive rigor of stoical ethics1 especially ascetic ethics that smother sensibility instead of regulating it1 and1 in order to save the soul from passions1 demands of it a sacrifice of all the passions of nature that resembles a suicide4 ,man was not made to be a sublime slave1 like ,epictetus1 employed in supporting bad fortune well without trying to surmount it1 nor1 like the author of the ,imitation1 the angelic inhabitant of a cloister1 calling for death as a fortunate deliverance1 and anticipating it1 as far as in him lies1 by continual penitence and in mute adoration4 ,the love of pleasure1 even the passions1 have a place among the needs of humanity4 ,suppress the passions1 and it is true there is no more excess2 neither is there any mainspring of action1--without winds the vessel no longer proceeds1 and soon sinks in the deep4 ,suppose a being that lacks love of self1 the instinct of preservation1 the horror of suffering1 especially the horror of death1 who has neither the love of pleasure nor the love of happiness1 in a word1 destitute of all personal interest1--such a being will not long resist the innumerable causes of destruction that surround and besiege him2 he will not remain a day4 ,never can a single family1 nor the least society be formed or maintained4 ,he who has made man has not confided the care of his work to virtue alone1 to devotedness and sublime charity1--he has willed that the duration and development of the race and human society should be placed upon simpler and surer foundations2 and this is the reason why he has given to man the love of self1 the instinct of preservation1 the taste of pleasure and happiness1 the passions that animate life1 hope and fear1 love1 ambition1 personal interest1 in fine1 a powerful1 permanent1 universal motive that urges us on to continually ameliorate our condition upon the earth4 ,so we do not contest with the ethics of interest the reality of their principle1--we are convinced that this principle exists1 that it has a right to be4 ,the only question that we raise is the following3--,the principle of interest is true in itself1 but are there not other principles quite as true1 quite as real8 ,man seeks pleasure and happiness1 but are there not in him other needs1 other sentiments as powerful1 as vital8 ,the first and universal principle of human life is the need of the individual to preserve himself2 but would this principle suffice to support human life and society entire and as we behold it8 ,just as the existence of the body does not hinder that of the soul1 and reciprocally1 so in the ample bosom of humanity and the profound designs of divine ,providence1 the principles that differ most do not exclude each other4 ,the philosophy of sensation continually appeals to experience4 ,we also invoke experience2 and it is experience that has given us certain facts mentioned in the preceding lecture1 which constitute the primary notions of common sense4 ,we admit the facts that serve as a foundation for the system of interest1 and reject the system4 ,the facts are true in their proper bearing1--the system is false in attributing to them an excessive1 limitless bearing2 and it is false again in denying other facts quite as incontestable4 ,a sound philosophy holds for its primary law to collect all real facts and respect the real differences that also distinguish them4 ,what it pursues before all1 is not unity1 but truth4#aib ,now the ethics of interest mutilate truth1--they choose among facts those that agree with them1 and reject all the others1 which are precisely the very facts of morality4 ,exclusive and intolerant1 they deny what they do not explain1--they form a whole well united1 which1 as an artificial work1 may have its merit1 but is broken to pieces as soon as it comes to encounter human nature with its grand parts4 ,we are about to show that the ethics of interest1 an offspring of the philosophy of sensation1 are in contradiction with a certain number of phenomena1 which human nature presents to whomsoever interrogates it without the spirit of system4 #ast4 ,we have established1 not in the name of a system1 but in the name of the most common experience1 that entire humanity believes in the existence1 in each of its members1 of a certain force1 a certain power that is called liberty4 ,because it believes in liberty in the individual1 it desires that this liberty should be respected and protected in society4 ,liberty is a fact that the consciousness of each of us attests to him1 which1 moreover1 is enveloped in all the moral phenomena that we have signalized1 in moral approbation and disapprobation1 in esteem and contempt1 in admiration and indignation1 in merit and demerit1 in punishment and reward4 ,we ask the philosophy of sensation and the ethics of interest what they do with this universal phenomena which all the beliefs of humanity suppose1 on which entire life1 private and public1 turns4 ,every system of ethics1 whatever it may be1 which contains1 ,i do not say a rule1 but a simple advice1 implicitly admits liberty4 ,when the ethics of interest advise a man to sacrifice the agreeable to the useful1 it apparently admits that man is free to follow or not to follow this advice4 ,but in philosophy it does not suffice to admit a fact1 there must be the right to admit it4 ,now1 most moralists of interest deny the liberty of man1 and no one has the right to admit it in a system that derives the entire human soul1 all its faculties as well as all its ideas1 from sensation alone and its developments4 ,when an agreeable sensation1 after having charmed our soul1 quits it and vanishes1 the soul experiences a sort of suffering1 a want1 a need1--it is agitated1 disquieted4 ,this disquietude1 at first vague and indecisive1 is soon determined2 it is borne towards the object that has pleased us1 whose absence makes us suffer4 ,this movement of the soul1 more or less vivid1 is desire4 ,is there in desire any of the characters of liberty8 ,what is it called to be free8 ,each one knows that he is free1 when he knows that he is master of his action1 that he can begin it1 arrest it1 or continue it as he pleases4 ,we are free1 when before acting we have taken the resolution to act1 knowing well that we are able to take the opposite resolution4 ,a free act is that of which1 by the infallible testimony of my consciousness1 ,i know that ,i am the cause1 for which1 therefore1 ,i regard myself as responsible4 ,god1 the world1 the body1 can produce in me a thousand movements2 these movements may seem to the eyes of an external observer to be voluntary acts2 but any error is impossible to consciousness1--it distinguishes every movement not voluntary1 whatever it may be1 from a voluntary act4 ,true activity is voluntary and free activity4 ,desire is just the opposite4 ,desire1 carried to its culmination1 is passion2 but language1 as well as consciousness1 says that man is passive in passion2 and the more vivid passion is1 the more imperative are its movements1 the farther is it from the type of true activity in which the soul possesses and governs itself4 ,i am no more free in desire than in the sensation that precedes and determines it4 ,if an agreeable object is presented to me1 am ,i able not to be agreeably moved8 ,if it is a painful object1 am ,i able not to be painfully moved8 ,and so1 when this agreeable sensation has disappeared1 if memory and imagination remind me of it1 is it in my power not to suffer from no longer experiencing it1 is it in my power not to feel the need of experiencing it again1 and to desire more or less ardently the object that alone can appease the disquietude and suffering of my soul8 ,observe well what takes place within you in desire2 you recognize in it a blind emotion1 that1 without any deliberation on your part1 and without the intervention of your will1 rises or falls1 increases or diminishes4 ,one does not desire1 and cease to desire1 according to his will4 ,will often combats desire1 as it often also yields to it2 it is not1 therefore1 desire4 ,we do not reproach the sensations that objects produce1 nor even the desires that these sensations engender2 we do reproach ourselves for the consent of the will to these desires1 and the acts that follow1 for these acts are in our power4 ,desire is so little will1 that it often abolishes it1 and leads man into acts that he does not impute to himself1 for they are not voluntary4 ,it is even the refuge of many of the accused2 they lay their faults to the violence of desire and passion1 which have not left them masters of themselves4 ,if desire were the basis of will1 the stronger the desire the freer we should be4 ,evidently the contrary is true4 ,as the violence of desire increases1 the dominion of man over himself decreases2 and as desire is weakened and passion extinguished1 man repossesses himself4 ,i do not say that we have no influence over our desires4 ,that two facts differ1 it does not follow that they must be without relation to each other4 ,by removing certain objects1 or even by merely diverting our thoughts away from the pleasure that they can give us1 we are able1 to a certain extent1 to turn aside and elude the sensible effects of these objects1 and escape the desire which they might excite in us4 ,one may also1 by surrounding himself with certain objects1 in some sort manage himself1 and produce in himself sensations and desires which for that are not more voluntary than would be the impression made upon us by a stone with which we should strike ourselves4 ,by yielding to these desires1 we lend them a new force1 and we moderate them by a skilful resistance4 ,one even has some power over the organs of the body1 and1 by applying to them an appropriate regimen1 he goes so far as to modify their functions4 ,all this proves that there is in us a power different from the senses and desire1 which1 without disposing of them1 sometimes exercises over them an indirect authority4 ,will also directs intelligence1 although it is not intelligence4 ,to will and to know are two things essentially different4 ,we do not judge as we will1 but according to the necessary laws of the judgment and the understanding4 ,the knowledge of truth is not a resolution of the will4 ,it is not the will that declares1 for example1 that body is extended1 that it is in space1 that every phenomenon has a cause1 etc4 ,yet the will has much power over intelligence4 ,it is freely and voluntarily that we work1 that we give attention1 for a longer or a shorter time1 more or less intense1 to certain things2 consequently1 it is the will that develops and increases intelligence1 as it might let it languish and become extinguished4 ,it must1 then1 be avowed that there is in us a supreme power that presides over all our faculties1 over intelligence as well as sensibility1 which is distinguished from them1 and is mingled with them1 governs them1 or leaves them to their natural development1 making appear1 even in its absence1 the character that belongs to it1 since the man that is deprived of it avows that he is no longer master of himself1 that he is not himself1 so true is it that human personality resides particularly in that prominent power that is called the will4#aic ,singular destiny of that power1 so often misconceived1 and yet so manifest6 ,strange confounding of will and desire1 wherein the most opposite schools meet each other1 ,spinoza1 ,malebranche1 and ,condillac1 the philosophy of the seventeenth century1 and that of the eighteenth6 ,one1 a despiser of humanity1 by an extreme and ill-understood piety1 strips man of his own activity1 in order to concentrate it in ,god2 the other transfers it to nature4 ,in both man is a mere instrument1 nothing else than a mode of ,god or a product of nature4 ,when desire is once taken as the type of human activity1 there is an end of all liberty and personality4 ,a philosophy1 less systematic1 by conforming itself to facts1 carries through common sense to better results4 ,by distinguishing between the passive phenomenon of desire and the power of freely determining self1 it restores the true activity that characterizes human personality4 ,the will is the infallible sign and the peculiar power of a real and effective being2 for how could he who should be only a mode of another being find in his own borrowed being a power capable of willing and producing acts of which he should feel himself the cause1 and the responsible cause8 ,if the philosophy of sensation1 by setting out from passive phenomena1 cannot explain true activity1 voluntary and free activity1 we might regard it as demonstrated that this same philosophy cannot give a true doctrine of morality1 for all ethics suppose liberty4 ,in order to impose rules of action on a being1 it is necessary that this being should be capable of fulfilling or violating them4 ,what makes the good and evil of an action is not the action itself1 but the intention that has determined it4 ,before every equitable tribunal1 the crime is in the intention1 and to the intention the punishment is attached4 ,where1 then1 liberty is wanting1 where there is nothing but desire and passion1 not even a shade of morality subsists4 ,but we do not wish to reject1 by the previous question1 the ethics of sensation4 ,we proceed to examine in itself the principle that they lay down1 and to show that from this principle can be deduced neither the idea of good and evil1 nor any of the moral ideas that are attached to it4 #b;d4 ,according to the philosophy of sensation1 the good is nothing else than the useful4 ,by substituting the useful for the agreeable1 without changing the principle1 there has been contrived a convenient refuge against many difficulties2 for it will always be possible to distinguish interest well understood from apparent and vulgar interest4 ,but even under this somewhat refined form1 the doctrine that we are examining none the less destroys the distinction between good and evil4 ,if utility is the sole measure of the goodness of actions1 ,i must consider only one thing when an action is proposed to me to do1--what advantages can result from it to me8 ,so ,i make the supposition that a friend1 whose innocence is known to me1 falls into disfavor with a king1 or opinion--a mistress more jealous and imperious than all kings1--and that there is danger in remaining faithful to him and advantage in separating myself from him2 if1 on one side1 the danger is certain1 and on the other the advantage is infallible1 it is clear that ,i must either abandon my unfortunate friend1 or renounce the principle of interest--of interest well understood4 ,but it will be said to me3--think on the uncertainty of human things2 remember that misfortune may also overtake you1 and do not abandon your friend1 through fear that you may one day be abandoned4 ,i respond that1 at first1 it is the future that is uncertain1 but the present is certain2 if ,i can reap great and unmistakable advantages from an action1 it would be absurd to sacrifice them to the chance of a possible misfortune4 ,besides1 according to my supposition1 all the chances of the future are in my favor1--this is the hypothesis that we have made4 ,do not speak to me of public opinion4 ,if personal interest is the only rational principle1 the public reason must be with me4 ,if it were against me1 it would be an objection against the truth of the principle4 ,for how could a true principle1 rationally applied1 be revolting to the public conscience8 ,neither oppose to me remorse4 ,what remorse can ,i feel for having followed the truth1 if the principle of interest is in fact moral truth8 ,on the contrary1 ,i should feel satisfaction on account of it4 ,the rewards and punishments of another life remain4 ,but how are we to believe in another life1 in a system that confines human consciousness within the limits of transformed sensation8 ,i have1 then1 no motive to preserve fidelity to a friend4 ,and mankind nevertheless imposes on me this fidelity2 and1 if ,i am wanting in it1 ,i am dishonored4 ,if happiness is the highest aim1 good and evil are not in the act itself1 but in its happy or unhappy results4 ,fontenelle seeing a man led to punishment1 said1 ,there is a man who has calculated badly4 ,whence it follows that1 if this man1 in doing what he did1 could have escaped punishment1 he would have calculated well1 and his conduct would have been laudable4 ,the action then becomes good or ill according to the issue4 ,every act is of itself indifferent1 and it is lot that qualifies it4 ,if the honest is only the useful1 the genius of calculation is the highest wisdom2 it is even virtue6 ,but this genius is not within the reach of everybody4 ,it supposes1 with long experience of life1 a sure insight1 capable of discerning all the consequences of actions1 a head strong and large enough to embrace and weigh their different chances4 ,the young man1 the ignorant1 the poor in mind1 are not able to distinguish between the good and the evil1 the honest and the dishonest4 ,and even in supposing the most consummate prudence1 what place remains1 in the profound obscurity of human things1 for chance and the unforeseen6 ,in truth1 in the system of interest well understood1 there must be great knowledge in order to be an honest man4 ,much less is requisite for ordinary virtue1 whose motto has always been3 ,do what you ought1 let come what may4#aid ,but this principle is precisely the opposite of the principle of interest4 ,it is necessary to choose between them4 ,if interest is the only principle avowed by reason1 disinterestedness is a lie and madness1 and literally an incomprehensible monster in well-ordered human nature4 ,nevertheless humanity speaks of disinterestedness1 and thereby it does not simply mean that wise selfishness that deprives itself of a pleasure for a surer1 more delicate1 or more durable pleasure4 ,no one has ever believed that it was the nature or the degree of the pleasure sought that constituted disinterestedness4 ,this name is awarded only to the sacrifice of an interest1 whatever it may be1 to a motive free from all interest4 ,and the human race1 not only thus understands disinterestedness1 but it believes that such a disinterestedness exists2 it believes the human soul capable of it4 ,it admires the devotedness of ,regulus1 because it does not see what interest could have impelled that great man to go far from his country to seek1 among cruel enemies1 a frightful death1 when he might have lived tranquil and even honored in the midst of his family and his fellow-citizens4 ,but glory1 it will be said1 the passion of glory inspired ,regulus2 it is1 then1 interest still that explains the apparent heroism of the old ,roman4 ,admit1 then1 that this manner of understanding his interest is even ridiculously absurd1 and that heroes are very unskilful and inconsistent egoists4 ,instead of erecting statues1 with the deceived human race1 to ,regulus1 d',assas1 and ,st4 ,vincent de ,paul1 true philosophy must send them to the ,petites-,maisons1 that a good regime may cure them of generosity1 charity1 and greatness of soul1 and restore them to the sane state1 the normal state1 the state in which man only thinks of himself1 and knows no other law1 no other principle of action than his interest4 #c;d4 ,if there is no liberty1 if there is no essential distinction between good and evil1 if there is only interest well or ill understood1 there can be no obligation4 ,it is at first very evident that obligation supposes a being capable of fulfilling it1 that duty is applied only to a free being4 ,then the nature of obligation is such1 that if we are delinquent in fulfilling it1 we feel ourselves culpable1 whilst if1 instead of understanding our interest well1 we have understood it ill1 there follows only a single thing1 that we are unfortunate4 ,are1 then1 being culpable and being unfortunate the same thing8 ,these are two ideas radically different4 ,you may advise me to understand my interest well1 under penalty of falling into misfortune2 you cannot command me to see clearly in regard to my interest under penalty of crime4 ,imprudence has never been considered a crime4 ,when it is morally accused1 it is much less as being wrong than as attesting vices of the soul1 lightness1 presumption1 feebleness4 ,as we have said1 our true interest is often most difficult of discernment4 ,obligation is always immediate and manifest4 ,in vain passion and desire combat it2 in vain the reasoning that passion trains for its attendance1 like a docile slave1 tries to smother it under a mass of sophisms3 the instinct of conscience1 a cry of the soul1 an intuition of reason1 different from reasoning1 is sufficient to repel all sophisms1 and make obligation appear4 ,however pressing may be the solicitations of interest1 we may always enter into contest and arrangement with it4 ,there are a thousand ways of being happy4 ,you assure me that1 by conducting myself in such a manner1 ,i shall arrive at fortune4 ,yes1 but ,i love repose more than fortune1 and with happiness alone in view1 activity is not better than sloth4 ,nothing is more difficult than to advise any one in regard to his interest1 nothing is easier than to advise him in regard to honor4 ,after all1 in practice1 the useful is resolved into the agreeable1 that is to say1 into pleasure4 ,now1 in regard to pleasure1 every thing depends on humor and temperament4 ,when there is neither good nor evil in itself1 there are no pleasures more or less noble1 more or less elevated2 there are only pleasures that are more or less agreeable to us4 ,every thing depends on the nature of each one4 ,this is the reason why interest is so capricious4 ,each one understands it as it pleases him1 because each one is the judge of what pleases him4 ,one is more moved by pleasures of the senses2 another by pleasures of mind and heart4 ,to the latter1 the passion of glory takes the place of pleasures of the senses2 to the former1 the pleasure of dominion appears much superior to that of glory4 ,each man has his own passions1 each man1 then1 has his own way of understanding his interest2 and even my interest of to-day is not my interest of to-morrow4 ,the revolutions of health1 age1 and events greatly modify our tastes1 our humors4 ,we are ourselves perpetually changing1 and with us change our desires and our interests4 ,it is not so with obligation4 ,it exists not1 or it is absolute4 ,the idea of obligation implies that of something inflexible4 ,that alone is a duty from which one cannot be loosed under any pretext1 and is1 by the same title1 a duty for all4 ,there is one thing before which all the caprices of my mind1 of my imagination1 of my sensibility must disappear1--the idea of the good with the obligation which it involves4 ,to this supreme command ,i can oppose neither my humor1 nor circumstances1 nor even difficulties4 ,this law admits of no delay1 no accommodation1 no excuse4 ,when it speaks1 be it to you or me1 in whatever place1 under whatever circumstance1 in whatever disposition we may be1 it only remains for us to obey4 ,we are able not to obey1 for we are free2 but every disobedience to the law appears to ourselves a fault more or less grave1 a bad use of our liberty4 ,and the violated law has its immediate penal sanction in the remorse that it inflicts upon us4 ,the only penalty that is brought upon us by the counsels of prudence1 comprehended more or less well1 followed more or less well1 is1 in the final account1 more or less happiness or unhappiness4 ,now ,i pray you1 am ,i obligated to be happy8 ,can obligation depend upon happiness1 that is to say1 on a thing that it is equally impossible for me to always seek and obtain at will8 ,if ,i am obligated1 it must be in my power to fulfil the obligation imposed4 ,but my liberty has but little power over my happiness1 which depends upon a thousand circumstances independent of me1 whilst it is all in all in regard to virtue1 for virtue is only an employment of liberty4 ,moreover1 happiness is in itself1 morally1 neither better nor worse than unhappiness4 ,if ,i understand my interest badly1 ,i am punished for it by regret1 not by remorse4 ,unhappiness can overwhelm me2 it does not disgrace me1 if it is not the consequence of some vice of the soul4 ,not that ,i would renew stoicism and say to suffering1 ,thou art no evil4 ,no1 ,i earnestly advise man to escape suffering as much as he can1 to understand well his interest1 to shun unhappiness and seek happiness4 ,i only wish to establish that happiness is one thing and virtue another1 that man necessarily aspires after happiness1 but that he is only obligated to virtue1 and that consequently1 by the side of and above interest well understood is a moral law1 that is to say1 as consciousness attests1 and the whole human race avows1 an imperative prescription of which one cannot voluntarily divest himself without crime and shame4 #dth4 ,if interest does not account for the idea of duty1 by a necessary consequence1 it does not more account for that of right2 for duty and right reciprocally suppose each other4 ,might and right must not be confounded4 ,a being might have immense power1 that of the whirlwind1 of the thunderbolt1 that of one of the forces of nature2 if liberty is not joined to it1 it is only a fearful and terrible thing1 it is not a person1--it may inspire1 in the highest degree1 fear and hope1--it has no right to respect2 one has no duties towards it4 ,duty and right are brothers4 ,their common mother is liberty4 ,they are born at the same time1 are developed and perish together4 ,it might even be said that duty and right make one1 and are the same being1 having a face on two different sides4 ,what1 in fact1 is my right to your respect1 except the duty you have to respect me1 because ,i am a free being8 ,but you are yourself a free being1 and the foundation of my right and your duty becomes for you the foundation of an equal right1 and in me of an equal duty4#aie ,i say equal with the exactest equality1 for liberty1 and liberty alone1 is equal to itself4 ,all the rest is diverse2 by all the rest men differ2 for resemblance implies difference4 ,as there are no two leaves that are the same1 there are no two men absolutely the same in body1 senses1 mind1 heart4 ,but it is impossible to conceive of difference between the free will of one man and the free will of another4 ,i am free or ,i am not free4 ,if ,i am free1 ,i am free as much as you1 and you are as much as ,i4 ,there is not in this more or less4 ,one is a moral person as much as1 and by the same title as another moral person4 ,volition1 which is the seat of liberty1 is the same in all men4 ,it may have in its service different instruments1 powers different1 and consequently unequal1 whether material or spiritual4 ,but the powers of which will disposes are not it1#aif for it does not dispose of them in an absolute manner4 ,the only free power is that of will1 but that is essentially so4 ,if will recognizes laws1 these laws are not motives1 springs that move it1--they are ideal laws1 that of justice1 for example2 will recognizes this law1 and at the same time it has the consciousness of the ability to fulfil it or to break it1 doing the one only with the consciousness of the ability to do the other1 and reciprocally4 ,therein is the type of liberty1 and at the same time of true equality2 every thing else is false4 ,it is not true that men have the right to be equally rich1 beautiful1 robust1 to enjoy equally1 in a word1 to be equally fortunate2 for they originally and necessarily differ in all those points of their nature that correspond to pleasure1 to riches1 to good fortune4 ,god has made us with powers unequal in regard to all these things4 ,here equality is against nature and eternal order2 for diversity and difference1 as well as harmony1 are the law of creation4 ,to dream of such an equality is a strange mistake1 a deplorable error4 ,false equality is the idol of ill-formed minds and hearts1 of disquiet and ambitious egoism4 ,true equality accepts without shame all the exterior inequalities that ,god has made1 and that it is not in the power of man not only to efface1 but even to modify4 ,noble liberty has nothing to settle with the furies of pride and envy4 ,as it does not aspire to domination1 so1 and by virtue of the same principle1 it does not more aspire to a chimerical equality of mind1 of beauty1 of fortune1 of enjoyments4 ,moreover1 such an equality1 were it possible1 would be of little value in its own eyes2 it asks something much greater than pleasure1 fortune1 rank1 to wit1 respect4 ,respect1 an equal respect of the sacred right of being free in every thing that constitutes the person1 that person which is truly man2 this is what liberty and with it true equality claim1 or rather imperatively demand4 ,respect must not be confounded with homage4 ,i render homage to genius and beauty4 ,i respect humanity alone1 and by that ,i mean all free natures1 for every thing that is not free in man is foreign to him4 ,man is therefore the equal of man precisely in every thing that makes him man1 and the reign of true equality exacts on the part of all only the same respect for what each one possesses equally in himself1 both young and old1 both ugly and beautiful1 both rich and poor1 both the man of genius and the mediocre man1 both woman and man1 whatever has consciousness of being a person and not a thing4 ,the equal respect of common liberty is the principle at once of duty and right2 it is the virtue of each and the security of all2 by an admirable agreement1 it is dignity among men1 and accordingly peace on earth4 ,such is the great and holy image of liberty and equality1 which has made the hearts of our fathers beat1 and the hearts of all virtuous and enlightened men1 of all true friends of humanity4 ,such is the ideal that true philosophy pursues across the ages1 from the generous dreams of ,plato to the solid conceptions of ,montesquieu1 from the first free legislation of the smallest city of ,greece to our declaration of rights1 and the immortal works of the constituent ,assembly4 ,the philosophy of sensation starts with a principle that condemns it to consequences as disastrous as those of the principle of liberty are beneficent4 ,by confounding will with desire1 it justifies passion1 which is desire in all its force--passion1 which is precisely the opposite of liberty4 ,it accordingly unchains all the desires and all the passions1 it gives full rein to imagination and the heart2 it renders each man much less happy on account of what he possesses1 than miserable on account of what he lacks2 it makes him regard his neighbors with an eye of envy and contempt1 and continually pushes society towards anarchy or tyranny4 ,whither1 in fact1 would you have interest lead in the train of desire8 ,my desire is certainly to be the most fortunate possible4 ,my interest is to seek to be so by all means1 whatever they may be1 under the single reserve that they be not contrary to their end4 ,if ,i am born the first of men1 the richest1 the most beautiful1 the most powerful1 etc41 ,i shall do every thing to preserve the advantages ,i have received4 ,if fate has given me birth in a rank little elevated1 with a moderate fortune1 limited talents1 and immense desires--for it cannot too often be repeated1 desire of every kind aspires after the infinite--,i shall do every thing to rise above the crowd1 in order to increase my power1 my fortune1 my joys4 ,unfortunate on account of my position in this world1 in order to change it1 ,i dream of1 and call for revolutions1 it is true1 without enthusiasm and political fanaticism1 for interest alone does not produce these noble follies1 but under the sharp goad of vanity and ambition4 ,thereby1 then1 ,i arrive at fortune and power2 interest1 then1 claims security1 as before it invoked agitation4 ,the need of security brings me back from anarchy to the need of order1 provided order be to my profit2 and ,i become a tyrant1 if ,i can1 or the gilt servant of a tyrant4 ,against anarchy and tyranny1 those two scourges of liberty1 the only rampart is the universal sentiment of right1 founded on the firm distinction between good and evil1 the just and the useful1 the honest and the agreeable1 virtue and interest1 will and desire1 sensation and conscience4 #e4 ,let us again signalize one of the necessary consequences of the doctrine of interest4 ,a free being1 in possession of the sacred rule of justice1 cannot violate it1 knowing that he should and may follow it1 without immediately recognizing that he merits punishment4 ,the idea of punishment is not an artificial idea1 borrowed from the profound calculations of legislators2 legislations rest upon the natural idea of punishment4 ,this idea1 corresponding to that of liberty and justice1 is necessarily wanting where the former two do not exist4 ,does he who obeys1 and fatally obeys his desires1 by the attraction of pleasure and happiness1 supposing that1 without any other motive than that of interest1 he does an act conformed1 externally at least1 to the rule of justice1 merit any thing by doing such an action8 ,not the least in the world4 ,conscience attributes to him no merit1 and no one owes him thanks or recompense1 for he only thinks of himself4 ,on the other hand1 if he injures others in wishing to serve himself1 he does not feel culpable1 and no one can say to him that he has merited punishment4 ,a free being who wills what he does1 who has a law1 and can conform to it1 or break it1 is alone responsible for his acts4 ,but what responsibility can there be in the absence of liberty and a recognized and accepted rule of justice8 ,the man of sensation and desire tends to his own good under the law of interest1 as the stone is drawn towards the centre of the earth under the law of gravitation1 as the needle points to the pole4 ,man may err in the pursuit of his interest4 ,in this case1 what is to be done6 ,as it seems1 to put him again in the right way4 ,instead of that1 he is punished4 ,and for what1 ,i pray you8 ,for being deceived4 ,but error merits advice1 not punishment4 ,punishment has1 in the system of interest1 no more the sanction of moral sense than recompense4 ,punishment is only an act of personal defence on the part of society2 it is an example which it gives1 in order to inspire a salutary terror4 ,these motives are excellent1 if it be added that this punishment is just in itself1 that it is merited1 and that it is legitimately applied to the action committed4 ,omit that1 and the other motives lose their authority1 and there remains only an exercise of force1 destitute of all morality4 ,then the culprit is not punished2 he is smitten1 or even put to death1 as the animal that injures instead of serving is put to death without scruple4 ,the condemned does not bow his head to the wholesome reparation due to justice1 but to the weight of irons or the stroke of the axe4 ,the chastisement is not a legitimate satisfaction1 an expiation which1 comprehended by the culprit1 reconciles him in his own eyes with the order that he has violated4 ,it is a storm that he could not escape2 it is the thunder-bolt that falls upon him2 it is a force more powerful than his own1 which compasses and overthrows him4 ,the appearance of public chastisements acts1 without doubt1 upon the imagination of peoples2 but it does not enlighten their reason and speak to their conscience2 it intimidates them1 perhaps2 it does not soften them4 ,so recompense is only an additional attraction1 added to all the others4 ,as1 properly speaking1 there is no merit1 recompense is simply an advantage that one desires1 that is striven for and obtained without attaching to it any moral idea4 ,thus is degraded and effaced the great institution1 natural and divine1 of the recompense of virtue by happiness1 and of reparation for a fault by proportionate suffering4#aig ,we may then draw the conclusion1 without fear of its being contradicted either by analysis or dialectics1 that the doctrine of interest is incompatible with the most certain facts1 with the strongest convictions of humanity4 ,let us add1 that this doctrine is not less incompatible with the hope of another world1 where the principle of justice will be better realized than in this4 ,i will not seek whether the sensualistic metaphysics can arrive at an infinite being1 author of the universe and man4 ,i am well persuaded that it cannot4 ,for every proof of the existence of ,god supposes in the human mind principles of which sensation renders no account1--for example1 the universal and necessary principle of causality1 without which ,i should have no need of seeking1 no power of finding the cause of whatever exists4#aih ,all that ,i wish to establish here is1 that in the system of interest1 man1 not possessing any truly moral attribute1 has no right to put in ,god that of which he finds no trace either in the world or in himself4 ,the ,god of the ethics of interest must be analogous to the man of these same ethics4 ,how could they attribute to him the justice and the love--,i mean disinterested love--of which they cannot have the least idea8 ,the ,god that they can admit loves himself1 and loves only himself4 ,and reciprocally1 not considering him as the supreme principle of charity and justice1 we can neither love nor honor him1 and the only worship that we can render him1 is that of the fear with which his omnipotence inspires us4 ,what holy hope could we then found upon such a ,god8 ,and we who have some time grovelled upon this earth1 thinking only of ourselves1 seeking only pleasure and a pitiable happiness1 what sufferings nobly borne for justice1 what generous efforts to maintain and develop the dignity of our soul1 what virtuous affections for other souls1 can we offer to the ,father of humanity as titles to his merciful justice8 ,the principle that most persuades the human race of the immortality of the soul is still the necessary principle of merit and demerit1 which1 not finding here below its exact satisfaction1 and yet under the necessity of finding it1 inspires us to call upon ,god for its satisfaction1 who has not put in our hearts the law of justice to violate it himself in regard to us4#aii ,now1 we have just seen that the ethics of interest destroy the principle of merit and demerit1 both in this world1 and above all1 in the world to come4 ,accordingly1 there is no regard beyond this world1--no recourse to an all-powerful judge1 wholly just and wholly good1 against the sports of fortune and the imperfections of human justice4 ,every thing is completed for man between birth and death1 in spite of the instincts and presentiments of his heart1 and even the principles of his reason4 ,the disciples of ,helvetius will1 perhaps1 claim the glory of having freed humanity from the fears and hopes that turn it aside from its true interests4 ,it is a service which mankind will appreciate4 ,but since they confine our whole destiny to this world1 let us demand of them what lot so worthy of envy they have in reserve for us here1 what social order they charge with our good fortune1 what politics1 in fine1 are derived from their ethics4#bjj ,you already know4 ,we have demonstrated that the philosophy of sensation knows neither true liberty nor true right4 ,what1 in fact1 is will for this philosophy8 ,it is desire4 ,what1 then1 is right8 ,the power of satisfying desires4 ,on this score1 man is not free1 and right is might4 ,once more1 nothing pertains less to man than desire4 ,desire comes of need which man does not make1 which he submits to4 ,he submits in the same way to desire4 ,to reduce will to desire is to annihilate liberty2 it is worse still1 it is to put it where it is not2 it is to create a mendacious liberty that becomes an instrument of crime and misery4 ,to call man to such a liberty is to open his soul to infinite desires1 which it is impossible for him to satisfy4 ,desire is in its nature without limits1 and our power is very limited4 ,if we were alone in this world1 we should even then be much troubled to satisfy our desires4 ,but we press against each other with immense desires1 and limited1 diverse1 and unequal powers4 ,when right is the force that is in each of us1 equality of rights is a chimera1--all rights are unequal1 since all forces are unequal and can never cease to be so4 ,it is1 therefore1 necessary to renounce equality as well as liberty2 or if one invents a false equality as well as a false liberty1 he puts humanity in pursuit of a phantom4 ,such are the social elements that the ethics of interest give to politics4 ,from such elements ,i defy all the politics of the school of sensation and interest to produce a single day of liberty and happiness for the human race4 ,when right is might1 the natural state of men among themselves1 is war4 ,all desiring the same things1 they are all necessarily enemies2 and in this war1 woe to the feeble1 to the feeble in body and the feeble in mind6 ,the stronger are the masters by perfect right4 ,since right is might1 the feeble may complain of nature that has not made them strong1 and not complain of the strong man who uses his right in oppressing them4 ,the feeble then call deception to their aid2 and it is in this strife between cunning and force that humanity combats with itself4 ,yes1 if there are only needs1 desires1 passions1 interests1 with different forces pitted against each other1 war1 a war sometimes declared and bloody1 sometimes silent and full of meannesses1 is in the nature of things4 ,no social art can change this nature1--it may be more or less covered2 it always reappears1 overcomes and rends the veil with which a mendacious legislation envelops it4 ,dream1 then1 of liberty for beings that are not free1 of equality between beings that are essentially different1 of respect for rights where there is no right1 and of the establishment of justice on an indestructible foundation of inimical passions6 ,from such a foundation can spring only endless troubles or oppression1 or rather all these evils together in a necessary circle4 ,this fatal circle can be broken only by the aid of principles which all the metamorphoses of sensation do not engender1 and for which interest cannot account1 which none the less subsist to the honor and for the safety of humanity4 ,these principles are those that time has little by little drawn from ,christianity in order to give them for the guidance of modern societies4 ,you will find them written in the glorious declaration of rights that forever broke the monarchy of ,louis ,,xv41 and prepared the constitutional monarchy4 ,they are in the charter that governs us1 in our laws1 in our institutions1 in our manners1 in the air that we breathe4 ,they serve at once as foundations for our society and the new philosophy necessary to a new order4#bja ,perhaps you will ask me how1 in the eighteenth century1 so many distinguished1 so many honest souls could let themselves be seduced by a system that must have been revolting to all their sentiments4 ,i will answer by reminding you that the eighteenth century was an immoderate reaction against the faults into which had sadly fallen the old age of a great century and a great king1 that is to say1 the revocation of the edict of ,nantes1 the persecution of all free and elevated philosophy1 a narrow and suspicious devotion1 and intolerance1 with its usual companion1 hypocrisy4 ,these excesses must have produced opposite excesses4 ,mme4 de ,maintenon opened the route to ,mme4 de ,pompadour4 ,after the mode of devotion comes that of license2 it takes every thing by storm4 ,it descends from the court to the nobility1 to the clergy even1 and accordingly to the people4 ,it carried away the best spirits1 even genius itself4 ,it put a foreign philosophy in the place of the national philosophy1 culpable1 persecuted as it had been1 for not being irreconcilable with ,christianity4 ,a disciple of ,locke1 whom ,locke had discarded1 ,condillac1 took the place of ,descartes1 as the author of ,candide and la ,pucelle had taken the place of ,corneille and ,bossuet1 as ,boucher and ,vanloo had taken the place of ,lesueur and ,poussin4 ,the ethics of pleasure and interest were the necessary ethics of that epoch4 ,it must not be supposed from this that all souls were corrupt4 ,men1 says ,m4 ,royer-,collard1 are neither as good nor as bad as their principles#bjb4 ,no stoic has been as austere as stoicism1 no epicurean as enervated as epicureanism4 ,human weakness practically baffles virtuous theories2 in return1 thank ,god1 the instinct of the heart condemns to inconsistency the honest man who errs in bad theories4 ,accordingly1 in the eighteenth century1 the most generous and most disinterested sentiments often shone forth under the reign of the philosophy of sensation and the ethics of interest4 ,but it is none the less true1 that the philosophy of sensation is false1 and the ethics of interest destructive of all morality4 ,i should perhaps make an apology for so long a lecture2 but it was necessary to combat seriously a doctrine of morality radically incompatible with that which ,i would make penetrate your minds and your souls4 ,it was especially necessary for me to strip the ethics of interest of that false appearance of liberty which they usurp in vain4 ,i maintain1 on the contrary1 that they are the ethics of slaves1 and send them back to the time when they ruled4 ,now1 the principle of interest being destroyed1 ,i propose to examine other principles also1 less false without doubt1 but still defective1 exclusive1 and incomplete1 upon which celebrated systems have pretended to found ethics4 ,i will successively combat these principles taken in themselves1 and will then bring them together1 reduced to their just value1 in a theory large enough to contain all the true elements of morality1 in order to express faithfully common sense and entire human consciousness4 ,,footnotes3 #aij ,on the ethics of interest1 to this lecture may be joined those of vol4 iii4 of the #ast ,series1 on the doctrine of ,helvetius and ,st4 ,lambert4 #aia ,the word bonheur1 which has no exact ,english equivalent1 which ,m4 ,cousin uses in his ethical discussions in the precise sense of the definition given above1 we have sometimes translated happiness1 sometimes good fortune1 sometimes prosperity1 sometimes fortune4 ,when one has in mind the thing1 he will not be troubled by the more or less exact word that indicates it3--all language1 at best1 is only symbolic2 it bears the same relation to thought as the forms of nature do to the laws that produce and govern them4 ,the true reader never mistakes the symbol for the thing symbolized1 the shadow for the reality4 #aib ,on the danger of seeking unity before all1 see in the #c;d ,series1 ,fragments ,philosophiques1 vol4 iv41 our ,examination of the ,lectures of ,m4 ,laromeguiere4 #aic ,on the difference between desire1 intelligence1 and will1 see the ,examination1 already cited1 of the ,lectures of ,m4 ,laromeguiere4 #aid #ast ,series1 vol4 iii41 p4 #aic3 ,in the doctrine of interest1 every man seeks the useful1 but he is not sure of attaining it4 ,he may1 by dint of prudence and profound combinations1 increase in his favor the chances of success2 it is impossible that there should not remain some chances against him2 he never pursues1 then1 any thing but a probable result4 ,on the contrary1 in the doctrine of duty1 ,i am always sure of obtaining the last end that ,i propose to myself1 moral good4 ,i risk my life to save my fellow2 if1 through mischance1 ,i miss this end1 there is another which does not1 which cannot1 escape me1--,i have aimed at the good1 ,i have been successful4 ,moral good1 being especially in the virtuous intention1 is always in my power and within my reach2 as to the material good that can result from the action itself1 ,providence alone disposes of it4 ,let us felicitate ourselves that ,providence has placed our moral destiny in our own hands1 by making it depend upon the good and not upon the useful4 ,the will1 in order to act in the sad trials of life1 has need of being sustained by certainty4 ,who would be disposed to give his blood for an uncertain end8 ,success is a complicated problem1 that1 in order to be solved1 exacts all the power of the calculus of probabilities4 ,what labor and what uncertainties does such a calculus involve6 ,doubt is a very sad preparation for action4 ,but when one proposes before all to do his duty1 he acts without any perplexity4 ,do what you ought1 let come what may1 is a motto that does not deceive4 ,with such an end1 we are sure of never pursuing it in vain4 #aie ,see the development of the idea of right1 lectures #ad and #ae4 #aif ,see lecture #ad1 ,theory of liberty4 #aig ,see the preceding lecture1 and lectures #ad and #ae4 #aih #ast part1 lecture #a4 #aii ,see lecture #af4 #bjj ,on the politics that are derived from the philosophy of sensation1 see the four lectures that we devoted to the exposition and refutation of the doctrine of ,hobbes1 vol4 iii4 of the #ast ,series4 #bja ,these words sufficiently mark the generous epoch in which we pronounce them1 without wounding the authority and the applauses of a noble youth1 when ,m4 de ,chateaubriand covered the ,restoration with his own glory1 when ,m4 ,royer-,collard presided over public instruction1 ,m4 ,pasquier1 ,m4 ,laine1 ,m4 de ,serre over justice and the interior1 ,marshal ,st4 ,cyr over war1 and the ,duke de ,richelieu over foreign affairs1 when the ,duke de ,broglie prepared the true legislation of the press1 and ,m4 ,decazes1 the author of the wise and courageous ordinance of ,september #e1 #ahaf1 was at the head of the councils of the crown2 when finally1 ,louis ,,xviii4 separated himself1 like ,henry ,,iv41 from his oldest servants in order to be the king of the whole nation4 #bjb ,oeuvres de ,reid1 vol4 iv41 p4 #big3 ,men are neither as good nor as bad as their principles2 and1 as there is no skeptic in the street1 so ,i am sure there is no disinterested spectator of human actions who is not compelled to discern them as just and unjust4 ,skepticism has no light that does not pale before the splendor of that vivid internal light that lightens the objects of moral perception1 as the light of day lightens the objects of sensible perception4 ,,lecture ,,xiii4 ,,other ,,defective ,,principles4 ,the ethics of sentiment4--,the ethics founded on the principle of the interest of the greatest number4--,the ethics founded on the will of ,god alone4--,the ethics founded on the punishments and rewards of another life4 ,against the ethics of interest1 all generous souls take refuge in the ethics of sentiment4 ,the following are some of the facts on which these ethics are supported1 and by which they seem to be authorized4 ,when we have done a good action1 is it not certain that we experience a pleasure of a certain nature1 which is to us the reward of this action8 ,this pleasure does not come from the senses--it has neither its principle nor its measure in an impression made upon our organs4 ,neither is it confounded with the joy of satisfied personal interest1--we are not moved in the same manner1 in thinking that we have succeeded1 and in thinking that we have been honest4 ,the pleasure attached to the testimony of a good conscience is pure2 other pleasures are much alloyed4 ,it is durable1 whilst the others quickly pass away4 ,finally1 it is always within our reach4 ,even in the midst of misfortune1 man bears in himself a permanent source of exquisite joys1 for he always has the power of doing right1 whilst success1 dependent upon a thousand circumstances of which we are not the masters1 can give only an occasional and precarious pleasure4 ,as virtue has its joys1 so crime has its pains4 ,the suffering that follows a fault is the just recompense for the pleasure that we have found in it1 and is often born with it4 ,it poisons culpable joys and the successes that are not legitimate4 ,it wounds1 rends1 bites1 thus to speak1 and thereby receives its name4#bjc ,to be man1 is sufficient to understand this suffering1--it is remorse4 ,here are other facts equally incontestable3 ,i perceive a man whose face bears the marks of distress and misery4 ,there is nothing in this that reaches and injures me2 nevertheless1 without reflection or calculation1 the sight alone of this suffering man makes me suffer4 ,this sentiment is pity1 compassion1 whose general principle is sympathy4 ,the sadness of one of my fellow-men inspires me with sadness1 and a glad face disposes me to joy3 ,ut ridentibus arrident1 ita flentibus adflent ,humani vultus4 ,the joy of others has an echo in our souls1 and their sufferings1 even their physical sufferings1 communicate themselves to us almost physically4 ,not as exaggerated as it has been supposed was that expression of ,mme4 de ,sevigne to her sick daughter3 ,i have a pain in your breast4 ,our soul feels the need of putting itself in unison1 and1 as it were1 in equilibrium with that of others4 ,hence those electric movements1 thus to speak1 that run through large assemblies4 ,one receives the counter-stroke of the sentiments of his neighbors1--admiration and enthusiasm are contagious1 as well as pleasantry and ridicule4 ,hence again the sentiment with which the author of a virtuous action inspires us4 ,we feel a pleasure analogous to that which he feels himself4 ,but are we witnesses of a bad action8 our souls refuse to participate in the sentiments that animate the culpable man1--they have for him a true aversion1 what is called antipathy4 ,we do not forget a third order of facts that pertain to the preceding1 but differ from them4 ,we not only sympathize with the author of a virtuous action1 we wish him well1 we voluntarily do good to him1 in a certain degree we love him4 ,this love goes as far as enthusiasm when it has for its object a sublime act and a hero4 ,this is the principle of the homages1 of the honors that humanity renders to great men4 ,and this sentiment does not pertain solely to others1--we apply it to ourselves by a sort of return that is not egoism4 ,yes1 it may be said that we love ourselves when we have done well4 ,the sentiment that others owe us1 if they are just1 we accord to ourselves1--that sentiment is benevolence4 ,on the contrary1 do we witness a bad action8 ,we experience for the author of this action antipathy2 moreover we wish him evil1--we desire that he should suffer for the fault that he has committed1 and in proportion to the gravity of the fault4 ,for this reason great culprits are odious to us1 if they do not compensate for their crimes by deep remorse1 or by great virtues mingled with their crimes4 ,this sentiment is not malevolence4 ,malevolence is a personal and interested sentiment1 which makes us wish evil to others1 because they are an obstacle to us4 ,hatred does not ask whether such a man is virtuous or vicious1 but whether he obstructs us1 surpasses us1 or injures us4 ,the sentiment of which we are speaking is a sort of hatred1 but a generous hatred that neither springs from interest nor envy1 but from a shocked conscience4 ,it is turned against us when we do evil1 as well as against others4 ,moral satisfaction is not sympathy1 neither is sympathy1 to speak rigorously1 benevolence4 ,but these three phenomena have the common character of all being sentiments4 ,they give birth to three different and analogous systems of ethics4 ,according to certain philosophers1 a good action is that which is followed by moral satisfaction1 a bad action is that which is followed by remorse4 ,the good or bad character of an action is at first attested to us by the sentiment that accompanies it4 ,then1 this sentiment1 with its moral signification1 we attribute to other men2 for we judge that they do as we do1 that in presence of the same actions they feel the same sentiments4 ,other philosophers have assigned the same part to sympathy or benevolence4 ,for these the sign and measure of the good is in the sentiments of affection and benevolence which we feel for a moral agent4 ,does a man excite in us by such or such an action a more or less vivid disposition to wish him well1 a desire to see and even make him happy8 we may say that this action is good4 ,if1 by a series of actions of the same kind1 he makes this disposition and this desire permanent in us1 we judge that he is a virtuous man4 ,does he excite an opposite desire1 an opposite disposition8 he appears to us a dishonest man4 ,for the former1 the good is that with which we naturally sympathize4 ,has a man devoted himself to death through love for his country8 this heroic action awakens in us1 in a certain degree1 the same sentiments that inspired him4 ,bad passions are not thus echoed in our hearts1 unless they find us already very corrupt1 and have interest for their accomplice2 but even then there is something in us that revolts against these passions1 and in the most depraved soul subsists a concealed sentiment of sympathy for the good1 and antipathy for the evil4 ,these different systems may be reduced to a single one1 which is called the ethics of sentiment4 ,it is not difficult to show the difference which separates these ethics from those of egoism4 ,egoism is the exclusive love of self1 is the thoughtful and permanent search for our own pleasure and our own well-being4 ,what is there more opposed to interest than benevolence8 ,in benevolence1 far from wishing others well by reason of our interest1 we will voluntarily risk something1 we will make some sacrifice in order to serve an honest man who has coined our heart4 ,if even in this sacrifice the soul feels a pleasure1 this pleasure is only the involuntary accompaniment of sentiment1 it is not the end proposed1--we feel it without having sought it4 ,it is1 indeed1 permitted the soul to taste this pleasure1 for it is nature herself that attaches it to benevolence4 ,sympathy1 like benevolence1 is related to another than ourselves1--our interest is not its starting-point4 ,the soul is so constituted that it is capable of suffering on account of the sufferings of an enemy4 ,that a man does a noble action1 although it opposes our interests1 awakens in us a certain sympathy for that action and its author4 ,the attempt has been made to explain the compassion with which the suffering of one of our fellow-men inspires us by the fear that we have of feeling it in our turn4 ,but the unhappiness for which we feel compassion1 is often so far from us and threatens us so little1 that it would be absurd to fear it4 ,doubtless1 that sympathy may have existence it is necessary to experience suffering1--non ignara mali4 ,for how do you suppose that ,i can be sensible to evils of which ,i form to myself no idea8 ,but that is only the condition of sympathy4 ,it is not at all necessary to conclude that it is only a remembrance of our own ills or the fear of ills to come4 ,no recurrence to ourselves can account for sympathy4 ,in the first place1 it is involuntary1 like antipathy4 ,then it cannot be supposed that we sympathize with any one in order to win his benevolence2 for he who is its object often knows not what we feel4 ,what benevolence are we seeking1 when we sympathize with men that we have never seen1 that we never shall see1 with men that are no more8 ,egoism admits all pleasures2 it repels none2 it may1 if it is enlightened1 if it has become delicate and refined1 recommend1 as more durable and less alloyed1 the pleasures of sentiment4 ,the ethics of sentiment would then be confounded with those of egoism1 if they should prescribe obedience to sentiment for the pleasure that we find in it4 ,there would1 then1 be no disinterestedness in it1--the individual would be the centre and sole end of all his actions4 ,but such is not the case4 ,the charm of the pleasures of conscience comes from the very fact that we are forgetful of self in the action that has produced them4 ,so if nature has joined to sympathy and benevolence a true enjoyment1 it is on condition that these sentiments remain as they are1 pure and disinterested2 you must only think of the object of your sympathy and benevolence in order that benevolence and sympathy may receive their recompense in the pleasure which they give4 ,otherwise1 this pleasure no longer has its reason for existence1 and it is wanting as soon as it sought for itself4 ,no metamorphose of interest can produce a pleasure attached to disinterestedness alone4 ,the ethics of egoism are only a perpetual falsehood1--they preserve the names consecrated by ethics1 but they abolish ethics themselves2 they deceive humanity by speaking to humanity its own language1 concealing under this borrowed language a radical opposition to all the instincts1 to all the ideas that form the treasure of mankind4 ,on the contrary1 if sentiment is not the good itself1 it is its faithful companion and useful auxiliary4 ,it is as it were the sign of the presence of the good1 and renders the accomplishment of it more easy4 ,we always have sophisms at our disposal1 in order to persuade ourselves that our true interest is to satisfy present passion2 but sophism has less influence over the mind when the mind is in some sort defended by the heart4 ,nothing is1 therefore1 more salutary than to excite and preserve in the soul those noble sentiments that lift us above the slavery of personal interest4 ,the habit of participating in the sentiments of virtuous men disposes us to act like them4 ,to cultivate in ourselves benevolence and sympathy is to fertilize the source of charity and love1 is to nourish and develop the germ of generosity and devotion4 ,it is seen that we render sincere homage to the ethics of sentiment4 ,these ethics are true1--only they are not sufficient for themselves2 they need a principle which authorizes them4 ,i act well1 and ,i feel on account of it an internal satisfaction3 ,i do evil1 and feel remorse on account of it4 ,these two sentiments do not qualify the act that ,i have just done1 since they follow it4 ,would it be possible for us to feel any internal satisfaction for having acted well if we did not judge that we had acted well8--any remorse for having done evil1 if we did not judge that we had done evil8 ,at the same time that we do such or such an act1 a natural and instinctive judgment characterizes it1 and it is in consequence of this judgment that our sensibility is moved4 ,sentiment is not this primitive and immediate judgment2 far from forming the basis of the idea of the good1 it supposes it4 ,it is manifestly a vicious circle to derive the knowledge of the good from that which would not exist without this knowledge4#bjd ,so is it not because we find a good action that we sympathize with it8 ,is it not because the dispositions of a man appear to us conformed to the idea of justice1 that we are inclined to participate in them with him8 ,moreover1 if sympathy were the true criterion of the good1 every thing for which we feel sympathy would be good4 ,but sympathy is not only related to things in their nature moral1 we also sympathize with the grief and the joy that have nothing to do with virtue and crime4 ,we even sympathize with physical sufferings4 ,moral sympathy is only a case of general sympathy4 ,it must even be acknowledged that sympathy is not always in accordance with right4 ,we sometimes sympathize with certain sentiments that we condemn1 because1 without being in themselves bad--which would prevent all sympathy--they give an inclination to the greatest faults2 for example1 love1 which comes so near to irregularity1 and emulation1 that so quickly leads to ambition4 ,benevolence also is not always determined by the good alone4 ,and1 again1 when it is applied to a virtuous man1 it supposes a judgment by which we pronounce that this man is virtuous4 ,it is not because we wish the author of an action well that we judge that this action is good2 it is because we judge that this action is good that we wish its author well4 ,this is not all4 ,in the sentiment of benevolence is enveloped a new judgment which is not in sympathy4 ,this judgment is the following3 the author of a good action deserves to be happy1 as the author of a bad action deserves to suffer in order to expiate it4 ,this is the reason why we desire happiness for the one and reparatory suffering for the other4 ,benevolence is little else than the sensible form of this judgment4 ,all these sentiments1 therefore1 suppose an anterior and superior judgment4 ,everywhere and always the same vicious circle4 ,from the fact that the sentiments which we have just described have a moral character1 it is concluded that they constitute the idea of the good1 whilst it is the idea of the good that communicates to them the character that we perceive in them4 ,another difficulty is1 that sentiments pertain to sensibility1 and borrow from it something of its relative and changing nature4 ,it is1 then1 very necessary that all men should be made to enjoy with the same delicacy the pleasures of the heart4 ,there are gross natures and natures refined4 ,if your desires are impetuous and violent1 will not the idea of the pleasures of virtue be in you much more easily overcome by the force of passion than if nature had given you a tranquil temperament8 ,the state of the atmosphere1 health1 sickness1 calm or rouse our moral sensibility4 ,solitude1 by delivering man up to himself1 leaves to remorse all its energy1 the presence of death redoubles it2 but the world1 noise1 force of example1 habit1 without power to smother it1 in some sort stun it4 ,the spirit has a little season of rest4 ,we are not always in the vein of enthusiasm4 ,courage itself has its intermissions4 ,we know the celebrated expression3 ,he was one day brave4 ,humor has its vicissitudes that influence our most intimate sentiments4 ,the purest1 the most ideal sentiment still pertains on some side to organization4 ,the inspiration of the poet1 the passion of the lover1 the enthusiasm of the martyr1 have their languors and shortcomings that often depend on very pitiable material causes4 ,on those perpetual fluctuations of sentiment1 is it possible to ground a legislation equal for all8 ,sympathy and benevolence do not escape the conditions of all the phenomena of sensibility4 ,we do not all possess in the same degree the power of feeling what others experience4 ,those who have suffered most best comprehend suffering1 and consequently feel for it the most lively compassion4 ,with mere imagination one also represents to himself better and feels more what passes in the souls of his fellow-man4 ,one feels more sympathy for physical pleasures and pains1 another for pleasures and pains of soul2 and each of these sympathies has in each of us its degrees and variations4 ,they not only differ1 they often oppose each other4 ,sympathy for talent weakens the indignation that outraged virtue produces4 ,we overlook many things in ,voltaire1 in ,rousseau1 in ,mirabeau1 and we excuse them on account of the corruption of their century4 ,the sympathy caused by the pain of a condemned person renders less lively the just antipathy excited by his crime4 ,thus turns and wavers at each step that sympathy which some would set up as the supreme arbiter of the good4 ,benevolence does not vary less4 ,we have souls naturally more or less affectionate1 more or less animated4 ,and1 then1 like sympathy1 benevolence receives the counter-stroke of different passions that are mingled with it4 ,friendship1 for example1 often renders us1 in spite of ourselves1 more benevolent than justice would wish4 ,is it not a rule of prudence not to listen to1 without always disdaining them1 the inspirations--often capricious--of the heart8 ,governed by reason1 sentiment becomes to it an admirable support4 ,but1 delivered up to itself1 in a little while it degenerates into passion1 and passion is fantastic1 excessive1 unjust2 it gives to the soul spring and energy1 but generally troubles and perverts it4 ,it is even not very far from egoism1 and it usually terminates in that1 wholly generous as it is or seems to be in the beginning4 ,unless we always keep in sight the good and the inflexible obligation that is attached to it1 unless we always keep in sight this fixed and immutable point1 the soul knows not where to betake itself on that moving ground that is called sensibility2 it floats from sentiment to passion1 from generosity to selfishness1 ascending one day to the pitch of enthusiasm1 and the next day descending to all the miseries of personality4 ,thus the ethics of sentiment1 although superior to those of interest1 are not less insufficient3 #ast4 ,they give as the foundation of the idea of the good what is founded on this same idea2 #b;d4 ,the rule that they propose is too mobile to be universally obligatory4#bje ,there is another system of which ,i will also say1 as of the preceding1 that it is not false1 but incomplete and insufficient4 ,the partisans of the ethics of utility and happiness have tried to save their principle by generalizing it4 ,according to them1 the good can be nothing but happiness2 but egoism is wrong in understanding by that the happiness of the individual2 we must understand by it the general happiness4 ,let us establish1 in the first place1 that the new principle is entirely opposed to that of personal interest1 for1 according to circumstances1 it may demand1 not only a passing sacrifice1 but an irreparable sacrifice1 that of life4 ,now1 the wisest calculations of personal interest cannot go thus far4 ,and1 notwithstanding1 this principle is far from containing true ethics and the whole of ethics4 ,the principle of general interest leans towards disinterestedness1 and this is certainly much2 but disinterestedness is the condition of virtue1 not virtue itself4 ,we may commit an injustice with the most entire disinterestedness4 ,from the fact that an action does not profit him who does it1 it does not follow that it may not be in itself very unjust1 in seeking general interest before all1 we escape1 it is true1 that vice of soul which is called selfishness1 but we may fall into a thousand iniquities4 ,or1 indeed1 it must be felt1 that general interest is always conformed to justice4 ,but these two ideas are not adequate to each other4 ,if they very often go together1 they are sometimes also separated4 ,themistocles proposed to the ,athenians to burn the fleet of the allies that was in the port of ,athens1 and thus to secure to themselves the supremacy4 ,the project is useful1 says ,aristides1 but it is unjust1 and on account of this simple speech1 the ,athenians renounce an advantage that must be purchased by an injustice4 ,observe that ,themistocles had no particular interest in that2 he thought only of the interest of his country4 ,but1 had he hazarded or given his life in order to engage the ,athenians in such an act1 he would only have been consecrating--what has often been seen--an admirable devotion to a course in itself immoral4 ,to this it is replied1 that if1 in the example cited1 justice and interest exclude each other1 it is because the interest was not sufficiently general2 and the celebrated maxim is arrived at1 that one must sacrifice himself to his family1 his family to the city1 the city to country1 country to humanity1 that1 in fine1 the good is the interest of the greatest number4#bjf ,when you have gone thus far1 you have not yet attained even the idea of justice4 ,the interest of humanity1 like that of the individual1 may accord in fact with justice1 for in that there is certainly no incompatibility1 but the two things are none the more identical1 so that we cannot say with exactness that the interest of humanity is the foundation of justice4 ,a single case1 even a single hypothesis1 in which the interest of humanity should not accord with the good1 is sufficient to enable us to conclude that one is not essentially the other4 ,we go farther3 if it is the interest of humanity that constitutes and measures justice1 that only is unjust which this interest declares to be so4 ,but you are not able to affirm absolutely1 that1 in any circumstance1 the interest of humanity will not demand such or such an action2 and if it demands it1 by virtue of your principle1 it will be necessary to do it1 whatever it may be1 and to do it inasmuch as it is just4 ,you order me to sacrifice particular interest to general interest4 ,but in the name of what do you order me to do this8 ,is it in the name of interest8 ,if interest1 as such1 must touch me1 evidently my interest must also touch me1 and ,i do not see why ,i should sacrifice it to that of others4 ,the supreme end of human life1 you say1 is happiness4 ,i hence conclude very reasonably1 that the supreme end of my life is my happiness4 ,in order to ask of me the sacrifice of my happiness1 it must be called for by some other principle than happiness itself4 ,consider to what perplexity this famous principle of the greatest good of the greatest number condemns me4 ,i have already much difficulty in discerning my true interest in the obscurity of the future2 by substituting for the infallible voice of justice the uncertain calculations of personal interest1 you have not rendered action easy for me2#bjg but it becomes impossible1 if it is necessary to seek1 before acting1 what is the interest not only of myself1 but of my family1 not only of my family1 but of my country1 not only of my country1 but of humanity4 ,what6 must ,i embrace the entire world in my foresight8 ,what6 is such the price of virtue8 ,you impose upon me a knowledge that ,god alone possesses4 ,am ,i in his counsels so as to adjust my actions according to his decrees8 ,the philosophy of history and the wisest diplomacy are not1 then1 sufficient for conducting ourselves well4 ,imagine1 therefore1 that there is no mathematical science of human life4 ,chance and liberty confound the profoundest calculations1 overturn the best-established fortunes1 relieve the most desperate miseries1 mingle good fortune and bad1 confound all foresight4 ,and would you establish ethics on a foundation so mobile8 ,how much place you leave for sophism in that complaisant and enigmatical law of general interest6#bjh ,it will not be very difficult always to find some remote reason of general interest1 which will excuse us from being faithful in the present moment to our friends1 when they shall be in misfortune4 ,a man in adversity addresses himself to my generosity4 ,but could ,i not employ my money in a way more useful to humanity8 ,will not the country have need of it to-morrow8 ,let us virtuously keep it for the country then4 ,moreover1 even where the interest of all seems evident1 there still remains some chance of error2 it is1 therefore1 better to withhold4 ,it will always be wisdom to withhold4 ,yes1 when it is necessary1 in order to do well1 to be sure of serving the greatest interest of the greatest number1 none but the rash and senseless will dare to act4 ,the principle of general interest will produce1 ,i admit1 great devotedness1 but it will also produce great crimes4 ,is it not in the name of this principle that fanatics of every kind1 fanatics in religion1 fanatics in liberty1 fanatics in philosophy1 taking it upon themselves to understand the eternal interest of humanity1 have engaged in abominable acts1 mingled often with a sublime disinterestedness8 ,another error of this system is that it confounds the good itself with one of its applications4 ,if the good is the greatest interest of the greatest number1 the consequence is clear1 that there are only public and social ethics1 and no private ethics2 there is only a single class of duties1 duties towards others1 and there are no duties towards ourselves4 ,but this is retrenching precisely those of our duties that most surely guarantee the exercise of all the rest4#bji ,the most constant relations that ,i sustain are with that being which is myself4 ,i am my own most habitual society4 ,i bear in myself1 as ,plato#baj has well said1 a whole world of ideas1 sentiments1 desires1 passions1 emotions1 which claim a legislation4 ,this necessary legislation is suppressed4 ,let us also say a word on a system that1 under sublime appearances1 conceals a vicious principle4 ,there are persons who believe that they are magnifying ,god1 by placing in his will alone the foundation of the moral law1 and the sovereign motive of humanity in the punishments and rewards that it has pleased him to attach to the respect and violation of his will4 ,let us understand what we are about in a matter of such delicacy4 ,it is certain1 and we shall establish it for the good1#baa as we have done for the true and the beautiful1#bab it is certain that1 from explanations to explanations1 we come to be convinced that ,god is definitively the supreme principle of ethics1 so that it may be very truly said1 that the good is the expression of his will1 since his will is itself the expression of the eternal and absolute justice that resides in him4 ,god wills1 without doubt1 that we should act according to the law of justice that he has put in our understanding and our heart2 but it is not at all necessary to conclude that he has arbitrarily instituted this law4 ,far from that1 justice is in the will of ,god only because it has its roots in his intelligence and wisdom1 that is to say1 in his most intimate nature and essence4 ,while making1 then1 every reservation in regard to what is true in the system that founds ethics on the will of ,god1 we must show what there is in this system1 as it is presented to us1 false1 arbitrary1 and incompatible with ethics themselves4#bac ,in the first place1 it does not pertain to the will1 whatever it may be1 to institute the good1 any more than it belongs to it to institute the true and the beautiful4 ,i have no idea of the will of ,god except by my own1 to be sure with the differences that separate what is finite from what is infinite4 ,now1 ,i cannot by my will found the least truth4 ,is it because my will is limited8 ,no2 were it armed with infinite power1 it would1 in this respect1 be equally impotent4 ,such is the nature of my will that1 in doing a thing1 it is conscious of the power to do the opposite2 and that is not an accidental character of the will1 it is its fundamental character2 if1 then1 it is supposed that truth1 or that first part of it which is called justice1 has been established as it is by an act of volition1 human or ,divine1 it must be acknowledged that another act might have established it otherwise1 and made what is now just unjust1 and what is unjust just4 ,but such mobility is contrary to the nature of justice and truth4 ,in fact1 moral truths are as absolute as metaphysical truths4 ,god cannot make effects exist without a cause1 phenomena without a substance2 neither can he make it evil to respect his word1 to love truth1 to repress one's passions4 ,the principles of ethics are immutable axioms like those of geometry4 ,of moral laws especially must be said what ,montesquieu said of all laws in general1--they are necessary relations that are derived from the nature of things4 ,let us suppose that the good and the just are derived from the divine will2 on the divine will obligation will also rest4 ,but can any will whatever be the foundation of obligation8 ,the divine will is the will of an omnipotent being1 and ,i am a feeble being4 ,this relation of a feeble being to an omnipotent being1 does not contain in itself any moral idea4 ,one may be forced to obey the stronger1 but he is not obligated to do it4 ,the sovereign orders of the will of ,god1 if his will could for a moment be separated from his other attributes1 would not contain the least ray of justice2 and1 consequently1 there would not descend into my soul the least shade of obligation4 ,one will exclaim1--,it is not the arbitrary will of ,god that makes the foundation of obligation and justice2 it is his just will4 ,very well4 ,every thing changes then4 ,it is not the pure will of ,god that obligates us1 it is the motive itself that determines his will1 that is to say1 the justice passed into his will4 ,the distinction between the just and the unjust is not then the work of his will4 ,one of two things4 ,either we found ethics on the will of ,god alone1 and then the distinction between good and evil1 just and unjust1 is gratuitous1 and moral obligation does not exist2 or you give authority to the will of ,god by justice1 which1 in your hypothesis1 must have received from the will of ,god its authority1 which is a petitio principii4 ,another petitio principii still more evident4 ,in the first place1 you are compelled1 in order legitimately to draw justice from the will of ,god1 to suppose that this will is just1 or ,i defy any one to show that this will alone can ever form the basis of justice4 ,moreover1 evidently you cannot comprehend what a just will of ,god is1 if you do not already possess the idea of justice4 ,this idea1 then1 does not come from that of the will of ,god4 ,on the one hand1 you may have1 and you do have1 the idea of justice1 without understanding the will of ,god2 on the other1 you cannot conceive the justice of the divine will1 without having conceived justice elsewhere4 ,are not these reasons sufficient1 ,i pray you1 to conclude that the sole will of ,god is not for us the principle of the idea of the good8 ,and now1 behold the natural consummation of the ethical system that we are examining3--the just and the unjust are what it has pleased ,god to declare such1 by attaching to them the rewards and punishments of another life4 ,the divine will manifests itself here only by an arbitrary order2 it adds to this order promises and threats4 ,but to what human faculty are addressed the promise and threat of the chastisements and the rewards of another life8 ,to the same one that in this life fears pain and seeks pleasure1 shuns unhappiness and desires happiness1 that is to say1 to sensibility animated by imagination1 that is to say1 again1 to what is most changing in each of us and most different in the human species4 ,the joys and sufferings of another life excite in us the two most vivid but most mobile passions1 hope and fear4 ,every thing influences our fears and hopes1--aye1 health1 the passing cloud1 a ray of the sun1 a cup of coffee1 a thousand causes of this kind4 ,i have known men1 even philosophers1 who on certain days hoped more1 and other days less4 ,and such a basis some would give to ethics6 ,then it is doing nothing else than proposing for human conduct an interested motive4 ,the calculation which ,i obey is purer1 if you will2 the happiness that one makes me hope for is greater2 but ,i see in that no justice that obligates me1 no virtue and no vice in me1 who know or do not know how to make this calculation1 not having a head as strong as that of ,pascal1#bad who yield to or resist those fears and hopes according to the deposition of my sensibility and my imagination1 over which ,i have no power4 ,finally1 the pains and pleasures of the future life are instituted on the ground of punishments and rewards4 ,now1 none but actions in themselves good or bad can be rewarded and punished4 ,if already there is in itself no good1 no law that in conscience we are obligated to follow1 there is neither merit nor demerit2 recompense is not then recompense1 nor penalty penalty1 since they are such only on the condition of being the complement and the sanction of the idea of the good4 ,where this idea does not pre-exist1 there remain1 instead of recompense and penalty1 only the attraction of pleasure and the fear of suffering1 added to a prescription deprived in itself of morality4 ,in that we come back to the punishments of earth invented for the purpose of frightening popular imagination1 and supported solely on the decrees of legislators1 on an abstraction of good and evil1 of justice and injustice1 of merit and demerit4 ,it is the worst human justice that is found thus transported into heaven4 ,we shall see that the human soul has foundation somewhat solider4#bae ,these different systems1 false or incomplete1 having been rejected1 we arrive at the doctrine that is to our eyes perfect truth1 because it admits only certain facts1 neglects none1 and maintains for all of them their character and rank4 ,,footnotes3 #bjc ,mordre--to bite1 is the main root of remords--remorse4 #bjd ,see #ast part1 lecture #e1 ,on ,mysticism1 and #b;d part1 lecture #f1 ,on the ,sentiment of the ,beautiful4 ,see1 also1 #ast ,series1 vol4 iv41 detailed refutation of the ,theories of ,hutcheson and ,smith4 #bje ,we do not grow weary of citing ,m4 ,royer-,collard4 ,he has marked the defects of the ethics of sentiment in a lively and powerful passage1 from which we borrow some traits4 ,oeuvres de ,reid1 vol4 iii41 p4 #daj1 #daa3 ,the perception of the moral qualities of human actions is accompanied by an emotion of the soul that is called sentiment4 ,sentiment is a support of nature that invites us to good by the attraction of the noblest joys of which man is capable1 and turns us from evil by the contempt1 the aversion1 the horror with which it inspires us4 ,it is a fact that by the contemplation of a beautiful action or a noble character1 at the same time that we perceive these qualities of the action and the character 7perception1 which is a judgment71 we feel for the person a love mingled with respect1 and sometimes an admiration that is full of tenderness4 ,a bad action1 a loose and perfidious character1 excite a contrary perception and sentiment4 ,the internal approbation of conscience and remorse are sentiments attached to the perception of the moral qualities of our own actions4444 ,i do not weaken the part of sentiment2 yet it is not true that ethics are wholly in sentiment2 if we maintain this1 we annihilate moral distinctions4444 ,let ethics be wholly in sentiment1 and nothing is in itself good1 nothing is in itself evil2 good and evil are relative2 the qualities of human actions are precisely such as each one feels them to be4 ,change sentiment1 and you change every thing2 the same action is at once good1 indifferent1 and bad1 according to the affection of the spectator4 ,silence sentiment1 and actions are only physical phenomena2 obligation is resolved into inclinations1 virtue into pleasure1 honesty into utility4 ,such are the ethics of ,epicurus3 ,dii meliora piis6 #bjf ,in this formula is recognized the system of ,bentham1 who1 for some time1 had numerous partisans in ,england1 and even in ,france4 #bjg ,see lecture #ab4 #bjh #ast ,series1 vol4 iv41 p4 #agd3 ,if the good is that alone which must be the most useful to the greatest number1 where can the good be found1 and who can discern it8 ,in order to know whether such an action1 which ,i propose to myself to do1 is good or bad1 ,i must be sure1 in spite of its visible and direct utility in the present moment1 that it will not become injurious in a future that ,i do not yet know4 ,i must seek whether1 useful to mine and those that surround me1 it will not have counter-strokes disastrous to the human race1 of which ,i must think before all4 ,it is important that ,i should know whether the money that ,i am tempted to give this unfortunate who needs it1 could not be otherwise more usefully employed1 in fact1 the rule is here the greatest good of the greatest number4 ,in order to follow it1 what calculations are imposed on me8 ,in the obscurity of the future1 in the uncertainty of the somewhat remote consequences of every action1 the surest way is to do nothing that is not related to myself1 and the last result of a prudence so refined is indifference and egoism4 ,supposing you have received a deposit from an opulent neighbor1 who is old and sick1 a sum of which he has no need1 and without which your numerous family runs the risk of dying with famine4 ,he calls on you for this sum1--what will you do8 ,the greatest number is on your side1 and the greatest utility also2 for this sum is insignificant for your rich neighbor1 whilst it will save your family from misery1 and perhaps from death4 ,father of a family1 ,i should like much to know in the name of what principle you would hesitate to retain the sum which is necessary to you8 ,intrepid reasoner1 placed in the alternative of killing this sick old man1 or of letting your wife and children die of hunger1 in all honesty of conscience you ought to kill him4 ,you have the right1 it is even your duty to sacrifice the less advantage of a single person to much the greater advantage of a greater number2 and since this principle is the expression of true justice1 you are only its minister in doing what you do4 ,a vanquishing enemy or a furious people threaten destruction to a whole city1 if there be not delivered up to them the head of such a man1 who is1 nevertheless1 innocent4 ,in the name of the greatest good of the greatest number1 this man will be immolated without scruple4 ,it might even be maintained that innocent to the last1 he has ceased to be so1 since he is an obstacle to the public good4 ,it having once been declared that justice is the interest of the greatest number1 the only question is to know where this interest is4 ,now1 here1 doubt is impossible1 therefore1 it is perfectly just to offer innocence as a holocaust to public safety4 ,this consequence must be accepted1 or the principle rejected4 #bji ,see lecture #ae1 ,private and ,public ,ethics4 #baj ,plato1 ,republic1 vol4 ix4 and x4 of our translation4 #baa ,lecture #af4 #bab ,lectures #d and #g4 #bac ,this polemic is not new4 ,the school of ,st4 ,thomas engaged in it early against the theory of ,occam1 which was quite similar to that which we combat4 ,see our ,sketch of a ,general ,history of ,philosophy1 #b;d ,series1 vol4 ii41 lect4 #i1 ,on ,scholasticism4 ,here are two decisive passages from ,st4 ,thomas1 #ast book of the ,summation against the ,gentiles1 chap4 lxxxvii3 ,per praedicta autem excluditur error dicentiam omnia procedere a ,deo secundum simplicem voluntatem1 ut de nullo oporteat rationem reddere1 nisi quia ,deus vult4 ,quod etiam divinae ,scripturae contrariatur1 quae ,deum perhibet secundum ordinem sapientiae suae omnia fecisse1 secundum illud ,psalm ciii43 omnia in sapientia fecisti4 ,ibid41 book ii41 chap4 xxiv43 ,per hoc autem excluditur quorundam error qui dicebant omnia ex simplica divina voluntate dependere aliqua ratione4 #bad ,see the famous calculus applied to the immortality of the soul1 ,des ,pensees de ,pascal1 vol4 i4 of the #dth ,series1 p4 #bbi-bce and p4 #bhi-bif4 #bae ,lecture #af4 ,,lecture ,,xiv4 ,,true ,,principles ,,of ,,ethics4 ,description of the different facts that compose the moral phenomena4--,analysis of each of these facts3--#ast1 ,judgment and idea of the good4 ,that this judgment is absolute4 ,relation between the true and the good4--#b;d1 ,obligation4 ,refutation of the doctrine of ,kant that draws the idea of the good from obligation instead of founding obligation on the idea of the good4--#c;d1 ,liberty1 and the moral notions attached to the notion of liberty4--#dth1 ,principle of merit and demerit4 ,punishments and rewards4--#eth1 ,moral sentiments4--,harmony of all these facts in nature and science4 ,philosophic criticism is not confined to discerning the errors of systems2 it especially consists in recognizing and disengaging the truths mixed with these errors4 ,the truths scattered in different systems compose the whole truth which each of these almost always expresses on a single side4 ,so1 the systems that we have just run over and refuted deliver up to us1 in some sort1 divided and opposed to each other1 all the essential elements of human morality4 ,the only question is to collect them1 in order to restore the entire moral phenomenon4 ,the history of philosophy1 thus understood1 prepares the way for or confirms psychological analysis1 as psychological analysis receives from the history of philosophy its light4 ,let us1 then1 interrogate ourselves in presence of human actions1 and faithfully collect1 without altering them by any preconceived system1 the ideas and the sentiments of every kind that the spectacle of these actions produce in us4 ,there are actions that are agreeable or disagreeable to us1 that procure us advantages or injure us1 in a word1 that are1 in one way or another1 directly or indirectly1 addressed to our interest4 ,we are rejoiced with actions that are useful to us1 and shun those that may injure us4 ,we seek earnestly and with the greatest effort what seems to us our interest4 ,this is an incontestable fact4 ,here is another fact that is not less incontestable4 ,there are actions that have no relation to us1 that1 consequently1 we cannot estimate and judge on the ground of our interest1 that we nevertheless qualify as good or bad4 ,suppose that before your eyes a man1 strong and armed1 falls upon another man1 feeble and disarmed1 whom he maltreats and kills1 in order to take away his purse4 ,such an action does not reach you in any way1 and1 notwithstanding1 it fills you with indignation4#baf ,you do every thing in your power that this murderer may be arrested and delivered up to justice2 you demand that he shall be punished1 and if he is punished in one way or another1 you think that it is just2 your indignation is appeased only after a chastisement proportioned to the crime committed has been inflicted on the culprit4 ,i repeat that in this you neither hope nor fear any thing for yourself4 ,were you placed in an inaccessible fortress1 from the top of which you might witness this scene of murder1 you would feel these sentiments none the less4 ,this is only a rude picture of what takes place in you at the sight of a crime4 ,apply now a little reflection and analysis to the different traits of which this picture is composed1 without destroying their nature1 and you will have a complete philosophic theory4 ,what is it that first strikes you in what you have experienced8 ,it is doubtless the indignation1 the instinctive horror that you have felt4 ,there is1 then1 in the soul a power of raising indignation that is foreign to all personal interests6 ,there are1 then1 in us sentiments of which we are not the end6 ,there is an antipathy1 an aversion1 a horror1 that are not related to what injures us1 but to acts whose remotest influence cannot reach us1 that we detest for the sole reason that we judge them to be bad6 ,yes1 we judge them to be bad4 ,a judgment is enveloped under the sentiments that we have just mentioned4 ,in fact1 in the midst of the indignation that transports you1 let one tell you that all this generous anger pertains to your particular organization1 and that1 after all1 the action that takes place is indifferent1--you revolt against such an explanation1 you exclaim that the action is bad in itself2 you not only express a sentiment1 you pronounce a judgment4 ,the next day after the action1 when the feelings that agitated your soul have been quieted1 you none the less still judge that the action was bad2 you judge thus six months after1 you judge thus always and everywhere2 and it is because you judge that this action is in itself bad1 that you bear this other judgment1 that it should not have been done4 ,this double judgment is at the foundation of sentiment2 otherwise sentiment would be without reason4 ,if the action is not bad in itself1 if he who has done it was not obligated not to do it1 the indignation that we experience is only a physical emotion1 an excitement of the senses1 of the imagination1 of the heart1--a phenomenon destitute of every moral character1 like the trouble that visits us before some frightful scene of nature4 ,you cannot rationally feel indignation for the author of an indifferent action4 ,every sentiment of disinterested anger against the author of an action supposes in him who feels it1 this double conviction3--#ast1 ,that the action is in itself bad2 #b;d1 ,that it should not have been done4 ,this sentiment also supposes that the author of this action has himself a consciousness of the evil that he has done1 and of the obligation that he has violated2 for without this he would have acted like a brutal and blind force1 not like an intelligent and moral force1 and we should have felt towards him no more indignation than towards a rock that falls on our head1 towards a torrent that sweeps us away into an abyss4 ,indignation equally supposes in him who is the object of it an other character still1 to wit1 that he is free1--that he could do or not do what he has done4 ,it is evident that the agent must be free in order to be responsible4 ,you desire that the murderer may be arrested and delivered up to justice1 you desire that he may be punished2 when he has been arrested1 delivered up to justice1 and punished1 you are satisfied4 ,what does that mean8 ,is it a capricious movement of the imagination and heart8 ,no4 ,calm or indignant1 at the moment of the crime or a long time after1 without any spirit of personal vengeance1 since you are not the least interested in this affair1 you none the less declare that the murderer ought to be punished4 ,if1 instead of receiving a punishment1 the culpable man makes his crime a stepping-stone to fortune1 you still declare that1 far from deserving prosperity1 he deserves to suffer in reparation of his fault2 you protest against lot1 and appeal to a superior justice4 ,this judgment philosophers have called the judgment of merit and demerit4 ,i suppose1 in the mind of man1 the idea of a supreme law that attaches happiness to virtue1 unhappiness to crime4 ,omit the idea of this law1 and the judgment of merit and demerit is without foundation4 ,omit this judgment1 and indignation against prosperous crime and the neglect of virtue is an unintelligible1 even an impossible sentiment1 and never1 at the sight of crime1 would you think of demanding the chastisement of a criminal4 ,all the parts of the moral phenomenon are connected together2 all are equally certain parts1--destroy one1 and you completely overturn the whole phenomenon4 ,the most common observation bears witness to all these facts1 and the least subtle logic easily discovers their connection4 ,it is necessary to renounce even sentiment1 or it must be avowed that sentiment covers a judgment1 the judgment of the essential distinction between good and evil1 that this distinction involves an obligation1 that this obligation is applied to an intelligent and free agent2 in fine1 it must be observed that the distinction between merit and demerit1 that corresponds to the distinction between good and evil1 contains the principle of the natural harmony between virtue and happiness4 ,what have we done thus far8 ,we have done as the physicist or chemist does1 who submits a composite body to analysis and reduces it to its simple elements4 ,the only difference here is that the phenomenon to which our analysis is applied is in us1 instead of being out of us4 ,besides1 the processes employed are exactly the same2 there is in them neither system nor hypothesis2 there are only experience and the most immediate induction4 ,in order to render experience more certain1 we may vary it4 ,instead of examining what takes place in us when we are spectators of bad or good actions in another1 let us interrogate our own consciousness when we are doing well or ill4 ,in this case1 the different elements of the moral phenomenon are still more striking1 and their order appears more distinctly4 ,suppose that a dying friend has confided to me a more or less important deposit1 charging me to remit it after his death to a person whom he has designated to me alone1 and who himself knows not what has been done in his favor4 ,he who confided to me the deposit dies1 and carries with him his secret2 he for whom the deposit has been made to me has no knowledge of it2 if1 then1 ,i wish to appropriate this deposit to myself1 no one will ever be able to suspect me4 ,in this case what should ,i do8 ,it is difficult to imagine circumstances more favorable for crime4 ,if ,i consult only interest1 ,i ought not to hesitate to return the deposit4 ,if ,i hesitate1 in the system of interest1 ,i am senseless1 and ,i revolt against the law of my nature4 ,doubt alone1 in the impunity that is assured me1 would betray in me a principle different from interest4 ,but naturally ,i do not doubt1 ,i believe with the most entire certainty1 that the deposit confided to me does not belong to me1 that it has been confided to me to be remitted to another1 and that to this other it belongs4 ,take away interest1 and ,i should not even think of returning this deposit1--it is interest alone that tempts me4 ,it tempts me1 it does not bear me away without resistance4 ,hence the struggle between interest and duty1--a struggle filled with troubles1 opposite resolutions1 by turns taken and abandoned2 it energetically attests the presence of a principle of action different from interest and quite as powerful4 ,duty succumbs1 interest triumphs over it4 ,i retain the deposit that has been confided to me1 and apply it to my own wants1 and to the wants of my family2 it makes me rich1 and in appearance happy2 but ,i internally suffer with that bitter and secret suffering that is called remorse4#bag ,the fact is certain2 it has been a thousand times described2 all languages contain the word1 and there is no one who1 in some degree1 has not experienced the thing1 that sharp gnawing at the heart which is caused by every fault1 great or small1 as long as it has not been expiated4 ,this painful recollection follows me in the midst of pleasures and prosperity4 ,the applauses of the crowd are not able to silence this inexorable witness4 ,only a long habit of sin and crime1 an accumulation of oft-repeated faults1 can compass this sentiment1 at once avenging and expiatory4 ,when it is stifled1 every resource is lost1 and an end is made of the soul's life2 as long as it endures1 the sacred fire is not wholly extinguished4 ,remorse is a suffering of a particular character4 ,in remorse ,i do not suffer on account of such an impression made upon my senses1 nor on account of the thwarting of my natural passions1 nor on account of the injury done or threatened to my interest1 nor by the disquietude of my hopes and the agony of my fears3 no1 ,i suffer without any external cause1 yet ,i suffer in the most cruel manner4 ,i suffer for the sole reason that ,i have a consciousness of having committed a bad action which ,i knew ,i was obligated not to commit1 which ,i was able not to commit1 which leaves behind it a chastisement that ,i know to be deserved4 ,no exact analysis can take away from remorse1 without destroying it1 a single one of these elements4 ,remorse contains the idea of good and evil1 of an obligatory law1 of liberty1 of merit and demerit4 ,all these ideas were already in the struggle between good and evil2 they reappear in remorse4 ,in vain interest counselled me to appropriate the deposit that had been confided to me2 something said to me1 and still says to me1 that to appropriate it is to do evil1 is to commit an injustice2 ,i judged1 and judge1 thus1 not such a day1 but always1 not under such a circumstance1 but under all circumstances4 ,in vain ,i say to myself that the person to whom ,i ought to remit this deposit has no need of it1 and that it is necessary to me2 ,i judge that a deposit must be respected without regard to persons1 and the obligation that is imposed on me appears inviolable and absolute4 ,having taken upon myself this obligation1 ,i believe by this fact alone that ,i have the power to fulfil it3 this is not all2 ,i am directly conscious of this power1 ,i know with the most certain knowledge that ,i am able to keep this deposit or to remit it to the lawful owner2 and it is precisely because ,i am conscious of this power that ,i judge that ,i have deserved punishment for not having made the use of it for which it was given me4 ,it is1 in fine1 because ,i have a lively consciousness of all that1 that ,i experience this sentiment of indignation against myself1 this suffering of remorse which expresses in itself the moral phenomenon entire4 ,according to the rules of the experimental method1 let us take an opposite course2 let us suppose that1 in spite of the suggestions of interest1 in spite of the pressing goad of misery1 in order to be faithful to pledged faith1 ,i send the deposit to the person that had been designated to me2 instead of the painful scene that just now passed in consciousness1 there passes another quite as real1 but very different4 ,i know that ,i have done well2 ,i know that ,i have not obeyed a chimera1 an artificial and mendacious law1 but a law true1 universal1 obligatory upon all intelligent and free beings4 ,i know that ,i have made a good use of my liberty2 ,i have of this liberty1 by the very use that ,i have made of it1 a sentiment more distinct1 more energetic1 and1 in some sort1 triumphant4 ,every opinion would accuse me in vain1 ,i appeal from it to a better justice1 and this justice is already declared in me by sentiments that press upon each other in my soul4 ,i respect myself1 esteem myself1 and believe that ,i have a right to the esteem of others2 ,i have the sentiment of my dignity2 ,i feel for myself only sentiments of affection opposed to that species of horror for myself with which ,i was just now inspired4 ,instead of remorse1 ,i feel an incomparable joy that no one can deprive me of1 that1 were every thing else wanting to me1 would console and support me4 ,this sentiment of pleasure is as penetrating1 as profound as was the remorse4 ,it expresses the satisfaction of all the generous principles of human nature1 as remorse represented their revolt4 ,it testifies by the internal happiness that it gives me to the sublime accord between happiness and virtue1 whilst remorse is the first link in that fatal chain1 that chain of iron and adamant1 which1 according to ,plato1#bah binds pain to transgression1 trouble to passion1 misery to faithlessness1 vice1 and crime4 ,moral sentiment is the echo of all the moral judgments and entire moral life4 ,it is so striking that it has been regarded by a somewhat superficial philosophy as sufficient to found entire ethics2 and1 nevertheless1 we have just seen that this admirable sentiment would not exist without the different judgments that we have just enumerated2 it is their consequence1 but not their principle2 it supplies1 but does not constitute them2 it does not take their place1 but sums them up4 ,now that we are in possession of all the elements of human morality1 we proceed to take these elements one by one1 and submit them to a detailed analysis4 ,that which is most apparent in the complex phenomenon that we are studying is sentiment2 but its foundation is judgment4 ,the judgment of good and evil is the principle of all that follows it2 but this judgment rests only on the constitution itself of human nature1 like the judgment of the true and the judgment of the beautiful4 ,as well as these two judgments1#bai that of the good is a simple1 primitive1 indecomposable judgment4 ,like them1 again1 it is not arbitrary4 ,we cannot but fear this judgment in presence of certain acts2 and1 in fearing it1 we know that it does not make good or evil1 but declares it4 ,the reality of moral distinctions is revealed by this judgment1 but it is independent of it1 as beauty is independent of the eye that perceives it1 as universal and necessary truths are independent of the reason that discovers them4#bbj ,good and evil are real characters of human actions1 although these characters might not be seen with our eyes nor touched with our hands4 ,the moral qualities of an action are none the less real for not being confounded with the material qualities of this action4 ,this is the reason why actions materially identical may be morally very different4 ,a homicide is always a homicide2 nevertheless1 it is often a crime1 it is also often a legitimate action1 for example1 when it is not done for the sake of vengeance1 nor for the sake of interest1 in a strict case of self-defence4 ,it is not the spilling of blood that makes the crime1 it is the spilling of innocent blood4 ,innocence and crime1 good and evil1 do not reside in such or such an external circumstance determined one for all4 ,reason recognizes them with certainty under the most different appearances1 in circumstances sometimes the same and sometimes dissimilar4 ,good and evil almost always appear to us connected with particular actions2 but it is not on account of what is particular in them that these actions are good or bad4 ,so when ,i declare that the death of ,socrates is unjust1 and that the devotion of ,leonidas is admirable1 it is the unjust death of a wise man that ,i condemn1 and the devotion of a hero that ,i admire4 ,it is not important whether this hero be called ,leonidas or d',assas1 whether the immolated sage be called ,socrates or ,bailly4 ,the judgment of the good is at first applied to particular actions1 and it gives birth to general principles which in course serve us as rules for judging all actions of the same kind4 ,as after having judged that such a particular phenomenon has such a particular cause1 we elevate ourselves to the general principle that every phenomenon has its cause2#bba so we erect into a general rule the moral judgment that we have borne in regard to a particular fact4 ,thus1 at first we admire the death of ,leonidas1 thence we elevate ourselves to the principle that it is good to die for one's country4 ,we already possess the principle in its first application to ,leonidas2 otherwise1 this particular application would not have been legitimate1 it would not have been even possible2 but we possess it implicitly2 as soon as it is disengaged1 it appears to us under its universal and pure form1 and we apply it to all analogous cases4 ,ethics have their axioms like other sciences2 and these axioms are rightly called in all languages moral truths4 ,it is good not to violate one's oath1 and in this is also involved a truth4 ,in fact1 an oath is founded in the truth of things1--its good is only derived4 ,moral truths considered in themselves have no less certainty than mathematical truths4 ,the idea of a deposit being given1 ,i ask whether the idea of faithfully keeping it is not necessarily attached to it1 as to the idea of a triangle is attached the idea that its three angles are equal to two right angles4 ,you may withhold a deposit2 but1 in withholding it1 do not believe that you change the nature of things1 nor that you make it possible for a deposit ever to become property4 ,these two ideas exclude each other4 ,you have only a false semblance of property2 and all the efforts of passion1 all the sophisms of interest will not reverse the essential differences4 ,this is the reason why moral truth is so troublesome1--it is because1 like all truth1 it is what it is1 and does not bend to any caprice4 ,always the same and always present1 in spite of all our efforts1 it inexorably condemns1 with a voice always heard1 but not always listened to1 the sensible and the culpable will which thinks to hinder it from being by denying it1 or rather by pretending to deny it4 ,moral truths are distinguished from other truths by the singular character that1 as soon as we perceive them1 they appear to us as the rule of our conduct4 ,if it is true that a deposit is made to be remitted to its legitimate possessor1 it is necessary to remit it to him4 ,to the necessity of believing is here added the necessity of practising4 ,the necessity of practising is obligation4 ,moral truths1 in the eyes of reason necessary1 are to the will obligatory4 ,moral obligation1 like the moral truth that is its foundation1 is absolute4 ,as necessary truths are not more or less necessary1#bbb so obligation is not more or less obligatory4 ,there are degrees of importance between different obligations2 but there are no degrees in the same obligation4 ,we are not somewhat obligated1 almost obligated2 we are either wholly obligated1 or not at all4 ,if obligation is absolute1 it is immutable and universal4 ,for1 if the obligation of to-day were not the obligation of to-morrow1 if what is obligatory for me were not so for you1 obligation would differ from itself1 would be relative and contingent4 ,this fact of absolute1 immutable1 universal obligation is so certain and so manifest1 in spite of all the efforts of the doctrine of interest to obscure it1 that one of the profoundest moralists of modern philosophy1 particularly struck with this fact1 has regarded it as the principle of the whole of ethics4 ,by separating duty from interest which ruins it1 and from sentiment which enervates it1 ,kant restored to ethics their true character4 ,he elevated himself very high in the century of ,helvetius1 in elevating himself to the holy law of duty2 but he still did not ascend high enough1 he did not reach the reason itself of duty4 ,the good for ,kant is what is obligatory4 ,but logically1 whence comes the obligation of performing an action1 if not from the intrinsic goodness of this act8 ,is it not because that1 in the order of reason1 it is absolutely impossible to regard a deposit as a property1 that we cannot appropriate it to ourselves without a crime8 ,if one action must be performed1 and another action must not1 it is because there is apparently an essential difference between these two acts4 ,to found the good on obligation1 instead of founding obligation on the good1 is1 therefore1 to take the effect for the cause1 is to draw the principle from the consequence4 ,if ,i ask an honest man who1 in spite of the suggestions of misery1 has respected the deposit that was intrusted to him1 why he respected it1 he will answer me1--because it was my duty4 ,if ,i persist1 and ask why it was his duty1 he will very rightly answer1--because it was just1 because it was good4 ,that point having been reached1 all answers are stopped2 but questions also are stopped4 ,no one allows a duty to be imposed upon him without rendering to himself a reason for it2 but as soon as it is recognized that this duty is imposed upon us because it is just1 the mind is satisfied2 for it reaches a principle beyond which it has nothing more to seek1 justice being its own principle4 ,first truths carry with them their reason for being4 ,now1 justice1 the essential distinction between good and evil in the relations of men among themselves1 is the primary truth of ethics4 ,justice is not a consequence1 since we cannot ascend to another more elevated principle2 and duty is not1 rigorously speaking1 a principle1 since it supposes a principle above it1 that explains and authorizes it1 to wit1 justice4 ,moral truth no more becomes relative and subjective1 to take for a moment the language of ,kant1 in appearing to us obligatory1 than truth becomes relative and subjective in appearing to us necessary2 for in the very nature of truth and the good must be sought the reason of necessity and obligation4 ,but if we stop at obligation and necessity1 as ,kant did1 in ethics as well as in metaphysics1 without knowing it1 and even against our intention1 we destroy1 or at least weaken truth and the good4#bbc ,obligation has its foundation in the necessary distinction between good and evil2 and is itself the foundation of liberty4 ,if man has duties1 he must possess the faculty of fulfilling them1 of resisting desire1 passion1 and interest1 in order to obey law4 ,he ought to be free1 therefore he is free1 or human nature is in contradiction with itself4 ,the direct certainty of obligation implies the corresponding certainty of liberty4 ,this proof of liberty is doubtless good2 but ,kant is deceived in supposing it the only legitimate proof4 ,it is very strange that he should have preferred the authority of reasoning to that of consciousness1 as if the former had no need of being confirmed by the latter2 as if1 after all1 my liberty ought not to be a fact for me4#bbd ,empiricism must be greatly feared to distrust the testimony of consciousness2 and1 after such a distrust1 one must be very credulous to have a boundless faith in reasoning4 ,we do not believe in our liberty as we believe in the movement of the earth4 ,the profoundest persuasion that we have of it comes from the continual experience that we carry with ourselves4 ,is it true that in presence of an act to be done ,i am able to will or not to will to do it8 ,in that lies the whole question of liberty4 ,let us clearly distinguish between the power of doing and the power of willing4 ,the will has1 without doubt1 in its service and under its empire1 the most of our faculties2 but that empire1 which is real1 is very limited4 ,i will to move my arm1 and ,i am often able to do it1--in that resides1 as it were1 the physical power of will2 but ,i am not always able to move my arm1 if the muscles are paralyzed1 if the obstacle to be overcome is too strong1 c42 the execution does not always depend on me2 but what always depends on me is the resolution itself4 ,the external effects may be hindered1 my resolution itself can never be hindered4 ,in its own domain1 will is sovereign4 ,and ,i am conscious of this sovereign power of the will4 ,i feel in myself1 before its determination1 the force that can determine itself in such a manner or in such another4 ,at the same time that ,i will this or that1 ,i am equally conscious of the power to will the opposite2 ,i am conscious of being master of my resolution1 of the ability to arrest it1 continue it1 repress it4 ,when the voluntary act ceases1 the consciousness of the power does not cease1--it remains with the power itself1 which is superior to all its manifestations4 ,liberty is therefore the essential and always-subsisting attribute of will4#bbe ,the will1 we have seen1#bbf is neither desire nor passion1--it is exactly the opposite4 ,liberty of will is not1 then1 the license of desires and passions4 ,man is a slave in desire and passion1 he is free only in will4 ,that they may not elsewhere be confounded1 liberty and anarchy must not be confounded in psychology4 ,passions abandoning themselves to their caprices1 is anarchy4 ,passions concentrated upon a dominant passion1 is tyranny4 ,liberty consists in the struggle of will against this tyranny and this anarchy4 ,but this combat must have an aim1 and this aim is the duty of obeying reason1 which is our true sovereign1 and justice1 which reason reveals to us and prescribes for us4 ,the duty of obeying reason is the law of will1 and will is never more itself than when it submits to its law4 ,we do not possess ourselves1 as long as to the domination of desire1 of passion1 of interest1 reason does not oppose the counterpoise of justice4 ,reason and justice free us from the yoke of passions1 without imposing upon us another yoke4 ,for1 once more1 to obey them1 is not to abdicate liberty1 but to save it1 to apply it to its legitimate use4 ,it is in liberty1 and in the agreement of liberty with reason and justice1 that man belongs to himself1 to speak properly4 ,he is a person only because he is a free being enlightened by reason4 ,what distinguishes a person from a simple thing1 is especially the difference between liberty and its opposite4 ,a thing is that which is not free1 consequently that which does not belong to itself1 that which has no self1 which has only a numerical individuality1 a perfect effigy of true individuality1 which is that of person4 ,a thing1 not belonging to itself1 belongs to the first person that takes possession of it and puts his mark on it4 ,a thing is not responsible for the movements which it has not willed1 of which it is even ignorant4 ,person alone is responsible1 for it is intelligent and free2 and it is responsible for the use of its intelligence and freedom4 ,a thing has no dignity2 dignity is only attached to person4 ,a thing has no value by itself2 it has only that which person confers on it4 ,it is purely an instrument whose whole value consists in the use that the person using it derives from it4#bbg ,obligation implies liberty2 where liberty is not1 duty is wanting1 and with duty right is wanting also4 ,it is because there is in me a being worthy of respect1 that ,i have the duty of respecting it1 and the right to make it respected by you4 ,my duty is the exact measure of my right4 ,the one is in direct ratio with the other4 ,if ,i had no sacred duty to respect what makes my person1 that is to say1 my intelligence and my liberty1 ,i should not have the right to defend it against your injuries4 ,but as my person is inviolable and sacred in itself1 it follows that1 considered in relation to me1 it imposes on me a duty1 and1 considered in relation to you1 it confers on me a right4 ,i am not myself permitted to degrade the person that ,i am by abandoning myself to passion1 to vice and crime1 and ,i am not permitted to let it be degraded by you4 ,the person is inviolable2 and it alone is inviolable4 ,it is inviolable not only in the intimate sanctuary of consciousness1 but in all its legitimate manifestations1 in its acts1 in the product of its acts1 even in the instruments that it makes its own by using them4 ,therein is the foundation of the sanctity of property4 ,the first property is the person4 ,all other properties are derived from that4 ,think of it well4 ,it is not property in itself that has rights1 it is the proprietor1 it is the person that stamps upon it1 with its own character1 its right and its title4 ,the person cannot cease to belong to itself1 without degrading itself1--it is to itself inalienable4 ,the person has no right over itself2 it cannot treat itself as a thing1 cannot sell itself1 cannot destroy itself1 cannot in any way abolish its free will and its liberty1 which are its constituent elements4 ,why has the child already some rights8 ,because it will be a free being4 ,why have the old man1 returned to infancy1 and the insane man still some rights8 ,because they have been free beings4 ,we even respect liberty in its first glimmerings or its last vestiges4 ,why1 on the other hand1 have the insane man and the imbecile old man no longer all their rights8 ,because they have lost liberty4 ,why do we enchain the furious madman8 ,because he has lost knowledge and liberty4 ,why is slavery an abominable institution8 ,because it is an outrage upon what constitutes humanity4 ,this is the reason why1 in fine1 certain extreme devotions are sometimes sublime faults1 and no one is permitted to offer them1 much less to demand them4 ,there is no legitimate devotion against the very essence of right1 against liberty1 against justice1 against the dignity of the human person4 ,we have not been able to speak of liberty1 without indicating a certain number of moral notions of the highest importance which it contains and explains2 but we could not pursue this development without encroaching upon the domain of private and public ethics and anticipating the following lecture4 ,we arrive1 then1 at the last element of the moral phenomenon1 the judgment of merit and demerit4 ,at the same time that we judge that a man has done a good or bad action1 we bear this other judgment quite as necessary as the former1 to wit1 that if this man has acted well he has merited a reward1 and if he has acted ill1 he has merited a punishment4 ,it is exactly the same with this judgment as with that of the good4 ,it may be outwardly expressed in a more or less lively manner1 according as it is mingled with more or less energetic feelings4 ,sometimes it will be only a benevolent disposition towards the virtuous agent1 and an unfavorable disposition towards the culpable agent2 sometimes it will be enthusiasm or indignation4 ,in some cases one will make himself the executor of the judgment that he bears1 he will crown the hero and load the criminal with chains4 ,but when all your feelings are calmed1 when enthusiasm has cooled as well as indignation1 when time and separation have rendered an action almost indifferent to you1 you none the less persist in judging that the author of this action merits a reward or a punishment1 according to the quality of the action4 ,you decide that you were right in the sentiments that you felt1 and1 although they are extinguished1 you declare them legitimate4 ,the judgment of merit and demerit is essentially tied to the judgment of good and evil4 ,in fact1 he who does an action without knowing whether it is good or bad1 has neither merit nor demerit in doing it4 ,it is with him the same as with those physical agents that accomplish the most beneficent or the most destructive works1 to which we never think of attributing knowledge and will1 consequently accountability4 ,why are there no penalties attached to involuntary crimes8 ,because for that very reason they are not regarded as crimes4 ,hence it comes that the question of premeditation is so grave in all criminal processes4 ,why is the child1 up to a certain age1 subject to none but light punishments8 ,because where the idea of the good and liberty are wanting1 merit and demerit are also wanting1 which alone authorize reward and punishment4 ,the author of an injurious but involuntary action is condemned to an indemnity corresponding to the damage done2 he is not condemned to a punishment properly so called4 ,such are the conditions of merit and demerit4 ,when these conditions are fulfilled1 merit and demerit manifest themselves1 and involve reward and punishment4 ,merit is the natural right we have to be rewarded2 demerit the natural right that others have to punish us1 and1 if we may thus speak1 the right that we have to be punished4 ,this expression may seem paradoxical1 nevertheless it is true4 ,a culpable man1 who1 opening his eyes to the light of the good1 should comprehend the necessity of expiation1 not only by internal repentance1 without which all the rest is in vain1 but also by a real and effective suffering1 such a culpable man would have the right to claim the punishment that alone can reconcile him with order4 ,and such reclamations are not so rare4 ,do we not every day see criminals denouncing themselves and offering themselves up to avenge the public8 ,others prefer to satisfy justice1 and do not have recourse to the pardon that law places in the hands of the monarch in order to represent in the state charity and mercy1 as tribunals represent in it justice4 ,this is a manifest proof of the natural and profound roots of the idea of punishment and reward4 ,merit and demerit imperatively claim1 like a lawful debt1 punishment and reward2 but reward must not be confounded with merit1 nor punishment with demerit2 this would be confounding cause and effect1 principle and consequence4 ,even were reward and punishment not to take place1 merit and demerit would subsist4 ,punishment and reward satisfy merit and demerit1 but do not constitute them4 ,suppress all reward and all punishment and you do not thereby suppress merit and demerit2 on the contrary1 suppress merit and demerit1 and there are no longer true punishments and true rewards4 ,unmerited goods and honors are only material advantages2 reward is essentially moral1 and its value is independent of its form4 ,one of those crowns of oak that the early ,romans decreed to heroism is worth more than all the riches in the world1 when it is the sign of the recognition and the admiration of a people4 ,to reward is to give in return4 ,he who is rewarded must have first given something in order to deserve to be rewarded4 ,reward accorded to merit is a debt2 reward without merit is a charity or a theft4 ,it is the same with punishment4 ,it is the relation of pain to a fault1--in this relation1 and not in the pain alone1 is the truth as well as the shame of chastisement4 ',tis crime and not the scaffold makes the shame4#bbh ,there are two things that must be unceasingly repeated1 because they are equally true1--the first is1 that the good is good in itself1 and ought to be pursued whatever may be the consequences2 the second is1 that the consequences of the good cannot fail to be fortunate4 ,happiness1 separated from the good1 is only a fact to which is attached no moral idea2 but1 as an effect of the good1 it enters into the moral order and completes it4 ,virtue without happiness1 and crime without unhappiness1 are a contradiction1 a disorder4 ,if virtue supposes sacrifice1 that is to say1 suffering1 it is of eternal justice that the sacrifice1 generously accepted and courageously borne1 have for a reward the very happiness that has been sacrificed4 ,so1 it is of eternal justice that crime be punished by the unhappiness of the culpable happiness which it has tried to obtain by stealth4 ,now1 when and how is the law fulfilled that attaches pleasure and pain to good and evil8 ,most of the time even here below4 ,for order rules in this world1 since the world endures4 ,if order is sometimes disturbed1 and happiness and unhappiness are not always distributed in right proportion to crime and virtue1 still the absolute judgment of the good1 the absolute judgment of obligation1 the absolute judgment of merit and demerit1 subsist inviolable and imprescriptible1--we remain convinced that he who has put in us the sentiment and the idea of order cannot in that fail himself1 and that sooner or later he will re-establish the sacred harmony between virtue and happiness by the means that to him belong4 ,but the time has not come to sound these mysterious prospects4#bbi ,it is sufficient for us1 but it was necessary to mark them1 in order to show the nature and the end of moral truth4 ,we terminate this analysis of the different parts of the complex phenomenon of morality by recalling that one which is the most apparent of all1 which1 however1 is only the accompaniment1 and1 thus to speak1 the echo of all the others--sentiment4 ,sentiment has for its object to render sensible to the soul the tie between virtue and happiness4 ,it is the direct and vital application of the law of merit and demerit4 ,it precedes and authorizes the punishments and rewards that society institutes4 ,it is the internal model according to which the imagination1 guided by faith1 represents to itself the punishments and rewards of the divine city4 ,the world that we place beyond this is1 in great part1 our own heart transported into heaven4 ,since it comes thence1 it is just that it should return thither4 ,we will not dwell upon the different phenomena of sentiment2 we have sufficiently explained them in the last lecture4 ,a few words will replace them under your eyes4 ,we cannot witness a good action1 whoever may be its author1 another or ourselves1 without experiencing a particular pleasure1 analogous to that which is attached to the perception of the beautiful2 and we cannot witness a bad action without feeling a contrary sentiment1 also analogous to that which the sight of an ugly and deformed object excites in us4 ,this sentiment is profoundly different from agreeable or disagreeable sensation4 ,are we the authors of the good action8 ,we feel a satisfaction that we do not confound with any other4 ,it is not the triumph of interest nor that of pride1--it is the pleasure of modest honesty or dignified virtue that renders justice to itself4 ,are we the authors of the bad action8 ,we feel offended conscience groaning within us4 ,sometimes it is only an importunate reclamation1 sometimes it is a bitter agony4 ,remorse is a suffering the more poignant on account of our feeling that it is deserved4 ,the spectacle of a good action done by another also has something delicious to the soul4 ,sympathy is an echo in us that responds to whatever is noble and good in others4 ,when interest does not lead us astray1 we naturally put ourselves in the place of him who has done well4 ,we feel in a certain measure the sentiments that animate him4 ,we elevate ourselves to the mood of his spirit4 ,is it not already for the good man an exquisite reward to make the noble sentiments that animate him thus pass into the hearts of his fellow-men8 ,the spectacle of a bad action1 instead of sympathy1 excites an involuntary antipathy1 a painful and sad sentiment4 ,without doubt1 this sentiment is never acute like remorse4 ,there is in innocence something serene and placid that tempers even the sentiment of injustice1 even when this injustice falls on us4 ,we then experience a sort of shame for humanity1 we mourn over human weakness1 and1 by a melancholy return upon ourselves1 we are less moved to anger than to pity4 ,sometimes also pity is overcome by a generous anger1 by a disinterested indignation4 ,if1 as we have said1 it is a sweet reward to excite a noble sympathy1 an enthusiasm almost always fertile in good actions1 it is a cruel punishment to stir up around us pity1 indignation1 aversion1 and contempt4 ,sympathy for a good action is accompanied by benevolence for its author4 ,he inspires us with an affectionate disposition4 ,even without knowing it1 we would love to do good to him2 we desire that he may be happy1 because we judge that he deserves to be4 ,antipathy also passes from the action to the person1 and engenders against him a sort of bad will1 for which we do not blame ourselves1 because we feel it to be disinterested and find it legitimate4 ,moral satisfaction and remorse1 sympathy1 benevolence1 and their opposites are sentiments and not judgments2 but they are sentiments that accompany judgments1 the judgment of the good1 especially that of merit and demerit4 ,these sentiments have been given us by the sovereign ,author of our moral constitution to aid us in doing good4 ,in their diversity and mobility1 they cannot be the foundations of absolute obligation which must be equal for all1 but they are to it happy auxiliaries1 sure and beneficent witnesses of the harmony between virtue and happiness4 ,these are the facts as presented by a faithful description1 as brought to light by a detailed analysis4 ,without facts all is chimera2 without a severe distinction of facts1 all is confusion2 but1 also1 without the knowledge of their relations1 instead of a single vast doctrine1 like the total phenomenon that we have undertaken to embrace1 there can be only different systems like the different parts of this phenomenon1 consequently imperfect systems1 systems always at war with each other4 ,we set out from common sense2 for the object of true science is not to contradict common sense1 but to explain it1 and for this end we must commence by recognizing it4 ,we have at first painted in its simplicity1 even in the gross1 the phenomenon of morality4 ,then we have separated its elements1 and carefully marked the characteristic traits of each of them4 ,it only remains for us to re-collect them all1 to seize their relations1 and thus to find again1 but more precise and more clear1 the primitive unity that served us as a point of departure4 ,beneath all facts analysis has shown us a primitive fact1 which vests only on itself1--the judgment of the good4 ,we do not sacrifice other facts to that1 but we must establish that it is the first both in date and in importance4 ,by its close resemblance to the judgment of the true and the beautiful1 the judgment of the good has shown us the affinities of ethics1 metaphysics1 and aesthetics4 ,the good1 so essentially united to the true1 is distinguished from it in that it is practical truth4 ,the good is obligatory4 ,these two ideas are inseparable1 but not identical4 ,for obligation rests on the good1--in this intimate alliance1 from the good obligation borrows its universal and absolute character4 ,the obligatory good is the moral law4 ,therein is for us the foundation of all ethics4 ,thereby it is that we separate ourselves from the ethics of interest and the ethics of sentiment4 ,we admit all the facts1 but we do not admit them in the same rank4 ,to the moral law in the reason of man corresponds liberty in action4 ,liberty is deduced from obligation1 and moreover it is a fact of an irresistible evidence4 ,man as a being free and subject to obligation1 is a moral person4 ,the idea of person contains several moral notions1 among others that of right4 ,person alone can have rights4 ,to all these ideas is added that of merit and demerit1 which serves as their sanction4 ,merit and demerit suppose the distinction between good and evil1 obligation and liberty1 and give birth to the idea of reward and punishment4 ,it is on the condition that the good may be an object of reason1 that ethics can have an immovable basis4 ,we have therefore insisted on the rational character of the idea of the good1 but without misconceiving the part of sentiment4 ,we have distinguished that particular sensibility1 which is stirred in us in the train of reason itself1 from physical sensibility1 which needs an impression made upon the organs in order to enter into exercise4 ,all our moral judgments are accompanied by sentiments that respond to them4 ,the sight of an action which we judge to be good gives us pleasure1--the consciousness of having performed an obligatory act1 and of having performed it freely1 is also a pleasure2 the judgment of merit and demerit makes our hearts beat by taking the form of sympathy and benevolence4 ,it must be avowed that the law of duty1 although it ought to be fulfilled for its own sake1 would be an ideal almost inaccessible to human weakness1 if to its austere prescriptions were not added some inspiration of the heart4 ,sentiment is in some sort a natural grace that has been given us1 either to supply the light of reason that is sometimes uncertain1 or to succor the will wavering in the presence of an obscure or painful duty4 ,in order to resist the violence of culpable passions1 the aid of generous passions is needed2 and when the moral law exacts the sacrifice of natural sentiments1 of the sweetest and most lively instincts1 it is fortunate that it can support itself on other sentiments1 or other instincts which also have their charm and their force4 ,truth enlightens the mind2 sentiment warms the soul and leads to action4 ,it is not cold reason that determines a ,codrus to devote himself for his countrymen1 a d',assas to utter1 beneath the steel of the enemy1 the generous cry that brings him death and saves the army4 ,let us guard ourselves1 then1 from weakening the authority of sentiment2 let us honor and sustain enthusiasm2 it is the source whence spring great and heroic actions4 ,and shall interest be entirely banished from our system8 ,no2 we recognize in the human soul a desire for happiness which is the work of ,god himself4 ,this desire is a fact1--it must then have its place in a system founded upon experience4 ,happiness is one of the ends of human nature2 only it is neither its sole end nor its principal end4 ,admirable economy of the moral constitution of man6 ,its supreme end is the good1 its law is virtue1 which often imposes on it suffering1 and thereby it is the most excellent of all things that we know4 ,but this law is very hard and in contradiction with the instinct of happiness4 ,fear nothing1--the beneficent author of our being has placed in our souls1 by the side of the severe law of duty1 the sweet and amiable force of sentiment1--he has1 in general1 attached happiness to virtue2 and1 for the exceptions1 for there are exceptions1 at the end of the course he has placed hope4#bcj ,our doctrine is now known4 ,its only pretension is to express faithfully each fact1 to express them all1 and to make appear at once their differences and their harmony4 ,beyond that there is nothing new to attempt in ethics4 ,to admit only a single fact and to sacrifice to that all the rest1--such is the beaten way4 ,of all the facts that we have just analyzed1 there is not one that has not in its turn played the part of sole principle4 ,all the great schools of moral philosophy have each seen only one side of truth1--fortunate when they have not chosen among the different phases of the moral phenomenon1 in order to found upon them their entire system1 precisely those that are least adapted to that end6 ,who could now return to ,epicurus1 and1 against the most manifest facts1 against common sense1 against the very idea of all ethics1 found duty1 virtue1 the good1 on the desire of happiness alone8 ,it would be proof of great blindness and great barrenness4 ,on the other hand1 shall we immolate the need of happiness1 the hope of all reward1 human or divine1 to the abstract idea of the good8 ,the ,stoics have done it1--we know with what apparent grandeur1 with what real impotence4 ,shall we confine with ,kant the whole of ethics to obligation8 ,that is straitening still more a system that is already very narrow4 ,moreover1 one may hope to surpass ,kant in extent of views1 by a completer knowledge and more faithful representation of facts2 one cannot hope to be more profound in the point of view that he has chosen4 ,or1 in another order of ideas1 shall we refer to the will of ,god alone the obligation of virtue1 and found ethics on religion1 instead of giving religion to ethics as their necessary perfection8 ,we still invent nothing new1 we only renew the ethics of the theologians of the ,middle ,age1 or rather of a particular school which has had for its adversaries the most illustrious doctors4 ,finally1 shall we reduce all morality to sentiment1 to sympathy1 to benevolence8 ,it only remains to follow the footsteps of ,hutcheson and ,smith1 abandoned by ,reid himself1 or the footsteps of a celebrated adversary of ,kant1 ,jacobi4#bca ,the time of exclusive theories has gone by2 to renew them is to perpetuate war in philosophy4 ,each of them1 being founded upon a real fact1 rightly refuses the sacrifice of this fact2 and it meets in hostile theories an equal right and an equal resistance4 ,hence the perpetual return of the same systems1 always at war with each other1 and by turns vanquished and victorious4 ,this strife can cease only by means of a doctrine that conciliates all systems by comprising all the facts that give them authority4 ,it is not the preconceived design of conciliating systems in history that suggests to us the idea of conciliating facts in reality4 ,it is1 on the contrary1 the full possession of all the facts1 analogous and different1 that forces us to absolve and condemn all systems on account of the truth that is in each of them1 and on account of the errors that are mixed with the truth4 ,it is important to repeat continually1 that nothing is so easy as to arrange a system1 by suppressing or altering the facts that embarrass it4 ,but is it1 then1 the object of philosophy to produce at any cost a system1 instead of seeking to understand the truth and express it as it is8 ,it is objected that such a doctrine has not sufficient character4 ,but is it not sporting with philosophy to demand of it any other character than that of truth8 ,do men complain that modern chemistry has not sufficient character1 because it limits itself to studying facts in their relations1 and also in their differences1 and because it does not end at a single substance8 ,the only true philosophy that is proper for a century returned from all exaggerations1 is a picture of human nature whose first merit is fidelity1 which must offer all the traits of the original in their right proportion and real harmony4 ,the unity of the doctrine that we profess is in that of the human soul1 whence we have drawn it4 ,is it not one and the same being that perceives the good1 that knows that he is obligated to fulfil it1 that knows that he is free in fulfilling it1 that loves the good1 and judges that the fulfilment or violation of the good justly brings after it reward or punishment1 happiness or misery8 ,we draw1 then1 a true unity from the intimate relation between all the facts that1 as we have seen1 imply and sustain each other4 ,but by what right is the unity of a doctrine placed in allowing in it only a single principle8 ,such a unity is possible only in those regions of mathematical abstraction1 where one is not disturbed by what is1 where one retrenches at will from the object that he is studying1 in order to simplify it continually1 where every thing is reduced to pure notions4 ,in the reality all is determined1 and consequently1 all is complex4 ,a science of facts is not a series of equations4 ,in it must be found again the life that is in things1 life with its harmony doubtless1 but also with its richness and diversity4#bcb ,,footnotes3 #baf ,on indignation1 see lecture #aa4 #bag ,on remorse1 see lecture #aa4 #bah ,see the ,gorgias1 with the ,argument1 vol4 iii4 of our translation4 #bai ,lectures #a and #f4 #bbj ,lectures #b1 #c1 and #f4 #bba #ast part1 lecture #b4 #bbb ,lecture #b4 #bbc #ast part1 lecture #c4 ,see also vol4 v4 of the #ast ,series1 lecture #h4 #bbd #ast ,series1 vol4 v41 lecture #g4 #bbe ,see1 for the entire development of the theory of liberty1 #ast ,series1 vol4 iii41 lecture #a1 ,locke1 p4 #ga2 lecture #c1 ,condillac1 p4 #aaf1 #adi1 etc42 vol4 iv41 lecture #bc1 ,reid1 p4 #eda-egd2 #b;d ,series1 vol4 iii41 ,examination of the ,system of ,locke1 lecture #be4 #bbf ,lecture #ab4 #bbg ,see #ast ,series1 vol4 iv41 ,lecture on ,smith and on the true principle of political economy1 p4 #bgh-cjb4 #bbh ,le crime fait la honte et non pas l'echafaud4 #bbi ,see lecture #af1 ,god1 the ,principle of the ,idea of the ,good4 #bcj ,see lecture #af4 #bca ,on ,jacobi1 see ,tennemann's ,manual of the ,history of ,philosophy1 vol4 iii41 p4 #cah1 etc4 #bcb ,on this important question of method1 see lecture #ab4 ,,lecture ,,xv4 ,,private ,,and ,,public ,,ethics4 ,application of the preceding principles4--,general formula of interest1--to obey reason4--,rule for judging whether an action is or is not conformed to reason1--to elevate the motive of this action into a maxim of universal legislation4--,individual ethics4 ,it is not towards the individual1 but towards the moral person that one is obligated4 ,principle of all individual duties1--to respect and develop the moral person4--,social ethics1--duties of justice and duties of charity4--,civil society4 ,government4 ,law4 ,the right to punish4 ,we know that there is moral good and that there is moral evil3 we know that this distinction between good and evil engenders an obligation1 a law1 duty2 but we do not yet know what our duties are4 ,the general principle of ethics is laid down2 it must be followed at least into its most important applications4 ,if duty is only truth become obligatory1 and if truth is known only by reason1 to obey the law of duty1 is to obey reason4 ,but to obey reason is a precept very vague and very abstract3--how can we be sure that our action is conformed or is not conformed to reason8 ,the character of reason being1 as we have said1 its universality1 action1 in order to be conformed to reason1 must possess something universal2 and as it is the motive itself of the action that gives it its morality1 it is also the motive that must1 if the action is good1 reflect the character of reason4 ,by what sign1 then1 do you recognize that an action is conformed to reason1 that it is good8 ,by the sign that the motive of this action being generalized1 appears to you a maxim of universal legislation1 which reason imposes upon all intelligent and free beings4 ,if you are not able thus to generalize the motive of an action1 and if it is the opposite motive that appears to you a universal maxim1 your action1 being opposed to this maxim1 is thereby proved to be contrary to reason and duty1--it is bad4 ,if neither the motive of your action nor the motive of the opposite action can be erected into a universal law1 the action is neither good nor bad1 it is indifferent4 ,such is the ingenious measure that ,kant has applied to the morality of actions4 ,it makes known with the last degree of clearness where duty is and where it is not1 as the severe and naked form of syllogism1 being applied to reasoning1 brings out in the precisest manner its error or its truth4 ,to obey reason1--such is duty in itself1 the duty superior to all other duties1 giving to all others their foundation1 and being itself founded only on the essential relation between liberty and reason4 ,it may be said that there is only a single duty1 that of obeying reason4 ,but man having different relations1 this single and general duty is determined by these different relations1 and divided into a corresponding number of particular duties4 ,of all the beings that we know1 there is not one with whom we are more constantly in relation than with ourselves4 ,the actions of which man is at once the author and the object1 have rules as well as other actions4 ,hence that first class of duties which are called the duties of man towards himself4 ,at first sight1 it is strange that man should have duties towards himself4 ,man1 being free1 belongs to himself4 ,what is most to me is myself3--this is the first property and the foundation of all other properties4 ,now1 is it not the essence of property to be at the free disposition of the proprietor1 and consequently1 am ,i not able to do with myself what ,i please8 ,no2 from the fact that man is free1 from the fact that he belongs only to himself1 it must not be concluded that he has over himself all power4 ,on the contrary1 indeed1 from the fact alone that he is endowed with liberty1 as well as intelligence1 ,i conclude that he can no more degrade his liberty than his intelligence1 without transgressing4 ,it is a culpable use of liberty to abdicate it4 ,we have said that liberty is not only sacred to others1 but is so to itself4 ,to subject it to the yoke of passion1 instead of increasing it under the liberal discipline of duty1 is to abase in us what deserves our respect as much as the respect of others4 ,man is not a thing2 it has not1 then1 been permitted him to treat himself as a thing4 ,if ,i have duties towards myself1 it is not towards myself as an individual1 it is towards the liberty and intelligence that make me a free moral person4 ,it is necessary to distinguish closely in us what is peculiar to us from what pertains to humanity4 ,each one of us contains in himself human nature with all its essential elements2 and1 in addition1 all these elements are in him in a certain manner that is not the same in two different men4 ,these particularities make the individual1 but not the person2 and the person alone in us is to be respected and held as sacred1 because it alone represents humanity4 ,every thing that does not concern the moral person is indifferent4 ,in these limits ,i may consult my tastes1 even my fancies to a certain extent1 because in them there is nothing absolute1 because in them good and evil are in no way involved4 ,but as soon as an act touches the moral person1 my liberty is subjected to its law1 to reason1 which does not allow liberty to be turned against itself4 ,for example1 if through caprice1 or melancholy1 or any other motive1 ,i condemn myself to an abstinence too prolonged1 if ,i impose on myself vigils protracted and beyond my strength2 if ,i absolutely renounce all pleasure1 and1 by these excessive privations1 endanger my health1 my life1 my reason1 these are no longer indifferent actions4 ,sickness1 death1 madness1 may become crimes1 if we voluntarily bring them upon ourselves4 ,i have not established this obligation of self-respect imposed on the moral person1 therefore ,i cannot destroy it4 ,is self-respect founded on one of those arbitrary conventions that cease to exist when the two contracting parties freely renounce them8 ,are the two contracting parties here me and myself8 ,by no means2 one of the contracting parties is not me1 to wit1 humanity1 the moral person4 ,and there is here neither convention nor contract4 ,by the fact alone that the moral person is in us1 we are obligated towards it1 without convention of any sort1 without contract that can be cancelled1 and by the very nature of things4 ,hence it comes that obligation is absolute4 ,respect of the moral person in us is the general principle whence are derived all individual duties4 ,we will cite some of them4 ,the most important1 that which governs all others1 is the duty of remaining master of one's self4 ,one may lose possession of himself in two ways1 either by allowing himself to be carried away1 or by allowing himself to be overcome1 by yielding to enervating passions or to overwhelming passions1 to anger or to melancholy4 ,on either hand there is equal weakness4 ,and ,i do not speak of the consequences of those vices for society and ourselves1--certainly they are very injurious2 but they are much worse than that1 they are already bad in themselves1 because in themselves they give a blow to moral dignity1 because they diminish liberty and disturb intelligence4 ,prudence is an eminent virtue4 ,i speak of that noble prudence that is the moderation in all things1 the foresight1 the fitness1 that preserve at once from negligence and that rashness which adorns itself with the name of heroism1 as cowardice and selfishness sometimes usurp the name of prudence4 ,heroism1 without being premeditated1 ought always to be rational4 ,one may be a hero at intervals2 but1 in every-day life1 it is sufficient to be a wise man4 ,we must ourselves hold the reins of our life1 and not prepare difficulties for ourselves by carelessness or bravado1 nor create for ourselves useless perils4 ,doubtless we must know how to dare1 but still prudence is1 if not the principle1 at least the rule of courage2 for true courage is not a blind transport1 it is before all coolness and self possession in danger4 ,prudence also teaches temperance2 it keeps the soul in that state of moderation without which man is incapable of recognizing and practising justice4 ,this is the reason why the ancients said that prudence is the mother and guardian of all the virtues4 ,prudence is the government of liberty by reason1 as imprudence is liberty escaped from reason3--on the one side1 order1 the legitimate subordination of our faculties to each other2 on the other1 anarchy and revolt4#bcc ,veracity is also a great virtue4 ,falsehood1 by breaking the natural alliance between man and truth1 deprives him of that which makes his dignity4 ,this is the reason why there is no graver insult than giving the lie1 and why the most honored virtues are sincerity and frankness4 ,one may degrade the moral person by wounding it in its instruments4 ,for this reason the body is to man the object of imperative duties4 ,the body may become an obstacle or a means4 ,if you refuse it what sustains and strengthens it1 or if you demand too much from it by exciting it beyond measure1 you exhaust it1 and by abusing it1 deprive yourself of it4 ,it is worse still if you pamper it1 if you grant every thing to its unbridled desires1 if you make yourself its slave4 ,it is being unfaithful to the soul to enfeeble its servant2 it is being much more unfaithful to it still1 to enslave it to its servant4 ,but it is not enough to respect the moral person1 it is necessary to perfect it2 it is necessary to labor to return the soul to ,god better than we received it2 and it can become so only by a constant and courageous exercise4 ,everywhere in nature1 all things are spontaneously developed1 without willing it1 and without knowing it4 ,with man1 if the will slumbers1 the other faculties degenerate into languor and inertion2 or1 carried away by the blind impulse of passion1 they are precipitated and go astray4 ,it is by the government and education of himself that man is great4 ,man must1 before every thing else1 occupy himself with his intelligence4 ,it is in fact our intelligence that alone can give us a clear sight of the true and the good1 that guides liberty by showing it the legitimate object of its efforts4 ,no one can give himself another mind than the one that he has received1 but he may train and strengthen it as well as the body1 by putting it to a task of some kind1 by rousing it when it is drowsy1 by restraining it when it is carried away1 by continually proposing to it new objects1--for it is only by continually enriching it that it does not grow poor4 ,sloth benumbs and enervates the mind2 regular work excites and strengthens it1 and work is always in our power4 ,there is an education of liberty as well as our other faculties4 ,it is sometimes in subduing the body1 sometimes in governing our intelligence1 especially in resisting our passions1 that we learn to be free4 ,we encounter opposition at each step1--the only question is not to shun it4 ,in this constant struggle liberty is formed and augmented1 until it becomes a habit4 ,finally1 there is a culture of sensibility itself4 ,fortunate are those who have received from nature the sacred fire of enthusiasm6 ,they ought religiously to preserve it4 ,but there is no soul that does not conceal some fortunate vein of it4 ,it is necessary to watch it and pursue1 to avoid what restrains it1 to seek what favors it1 and1 by an assiduous culture1 draw from it1 little by little1 some treasures4 ,if we cannot give ourselves sensibility1 we can at least develop what we have4 ,we can do this by giving ourselves up to it1 by seizing all the occasions of giving ourselves up to it1 by calling to its aid intelligence itself2 for1 the more we know of the beautiful and the good1 the more we love it4 ,sentiment thereby only borrows from intelligence what it returns with usury4 ,intelligence in its turn finds1 in the heart1 a rampart against sophism4 ,noble1 sentiments1 nourished and developed1 preserve from those sad systems that please certain spirits so much only because their hearts are so small4 ,man would still have duties1 should he cease to be in relation with other men4#bcd ,as long as he preserves any intelligence and any liberty1 the idea of the good dwells in him1 and with it duty4 ,were we cast upon a desert island1 duty would follow us thither4 ,it would be beyond belief strange that it should be in the power of certain external circumstances to affranchise an intelligent and free being from all obligation towards his liberty and his intelligence4 ,in the deepest solitude he is always and consciously under the empire of a law attached to the person itself1 which1 by obligating him to keep continual watch over himself1 makes at once his torment and his grandeur4 ,if the moral person is sacred to me1 it is not because it is in me1 it is because it is the moral person2 it is in itself respectable2 it will be so1 then1 wherever we meet it4 ,it is in you as in me1 and for the same reason4 ,in relation to me it imposes on me a duty2 in you it becomes the foundation of a right1 and thereby imposes on me a new duty in relation to you4 ,i owe to you truth as ,i owe it to myself2 for truth is the law of your reason as of mine4 ,without doubt there ought to be measure in the communication of truth1--all are not capable of it at the same moment and in the same degree2 it is necessary to portion it out to them in order that they may be able to receive it2 but1 in fine1 the truth is the proper good of the intelligence2 and it is for me a strict duty to respect the development of your mind1 not to arrest1 and even to favor its progress towards truth4 ,i ought also to respect your liberty4 ,i have not even always the right to hinder you from committing a fault4 ,liberty is so sacred that1 even when it goes astray1 it still deserves1 up to a certain point1 to be managed4 ,we are often wrong in wishing to prevent too much the evil that ,god himself permits4 ,souls may be corrupted by an attempt to purify them4 ,i ought to respect you in your affections1 which make part of yourself2 and of all the affections there are none more holy than those of the family4 ,there is in us a need of expanding ourselves beyond ourselves1 yet without dispelling ourselves1 of establishing ourselves in some souls by a regular and consecrated affection1--to this need the family responds4 ,the love of men is something of the general good4 ,the family is still almost the individual1 and not merely the individual1--it only requires us to love as much as ourselves what is almost ourselves4 ,it attaches one to the other1 by the sweetest and strongest of all ties--father1 mother1 child2 it gives to this sure succor in the love of its parents--to these hope1 joy1 new life1 in their child4 ,to violate the conjugal or paternal right1 is to violate the person in what is perhaps its most sacred possession4 ,i ought to respect your body1 inasmuch as it belongs to you1 inasmuch as it is the necessary instrument of your person4 ,i have neither the right to kill you1 nor to wound you1 unless ,i am attacked and threatened2 then my violated liberty is armed with a new right1 the right of defence and even constraint4 ,i owe respect to your goods1 for they are the product of your labor2 ,i owe respect to your labor1 which is your liberty itself in exercise2 and1 if your goods come from an inheritance1 ,i still owe respect to the free will that has transmitted them to you4#bce ,respect for the rights of others is called justice2 every violation of a right is an injustice4 ,every injustice is an encroachment upon our person1--to retrench the least of our rights1 is to diminish our moral person1 is1 at least1 so far as that retrenchment goes1 to abase us to the condition of a thing4 ,the greatest of all injustices1 because it comprises all others1 is slavery4 ,slavery is the subjecting of all the faculties of one man to the profit of another man4 ,the slave develops his intelligence a little only in the interest of another1--it is not for the purpose of enlightening him1 but to render him more useful1 that some exercise of mind is allowed him4 ,the slave has not the liberty of his movements2 he is attached to the soil1 is sold with it1 or he is chained to the person of a master4 ,the slave should have no affection1 he has no family1 no wife1 no children1--he has a female and little ones4 ,his activity does not belong to him1 for the product of his labor is another's4 ,but1 that nothing may be wanting to slavery1 it is necessary to go farther1--in the slave must be destroyed the inborn sentiment of liberty1 in him must be extinguished all idea of right2 for1 as long as this idea subsists1 slavery is uncertain1 and to an odious power may respond the terrible right of insurrection1 that last resort of the oppressed against the abuse of force4#bcf ,justice1 respect for the person in every thing that constitutes the person1 is the first duty of man towards his fellow-man4 ,is this duty the only one8 ,when we have respected the person of others1 when we have neither restrained their liberty1 nor smothered their intelligence1 nor maltreated their body1 nor outraged their family1 nor injured their goods1 are we able to say that we have fulfilled the whole law in regard to them8 ,one who is unfortunate is suffering before us4 ,is our conscience satisfied1 if we are able to bear witness to ourselves that we have not contributed to his sufferings8 ,no2 something tells that it is still good to give him bread1 succor1 consolation4 ,there is here an important distinction to be made4 ,if you have remained hard and insensible at the sight of another's misery1 conscience cries out against you2 and yet this man who is suffering1 who1 perhaps1 is ready to die1 has not the least right over the least part of your fortune1 were it immense2 and1 if he used violence for the purpose of wresting from you a single penny1 he would commit a crime4 ,we here meet a new order of duties that do not correspond to rights4 ,man may resort to force in order to make his rights respected2 he cannot impose on another any sacrifice whatever4 ,justice respects or restores2 charity gives1 and gives freely4 ,charity takes from us something in order to give it to our fellow-men4 ,if it goes so far as to inspire us to renounce our dearest interests1 it is called devotedness4 ,it certainly cannot be said that to be charitable is not obligatory4 ,but this obligation must not be regarded as precise1 as inflexible as the obligation to be just4 ,charity is a sacrifice2 and who can find the rule of sacrifice1 the formula of self-renunciation8 ,for justice1 the formula is clear1--to respect the rights of another4 ,but charity knows neither rule nor limit4 ,it transcends all obligation4 ,its beauty is precisely in its liberty4 ,but it must be acknowledged that charity also has its dangers4 ,it tends to substitute its own action for the action of him whom it wishes to help2 it somewhat effaces his personality1 and makes itself in some sort his providence1--a formidable part for a mortal6 ,in order to be useful to others1 one imposes himself on them1 and runs the risk of violating their natural rights4 ,love1 in giving itself1 enslaves4 ,doubtless it is not interdicted us to act upon another4 ,we can always do it through petition and exhortation4 ,we can also do it by threatening1 when we see one of our fellows engaged in a criminal or senseless action4 ,we have even the right to employ force when passion carries away liberty and makes the person disappear4 ,so we may1 we even ought to prevent by force the suicide of one of our fellow-men4 ,the legitimate power of charity is measured by the more or less liberty and reason possessed by him to whom it is applied4 ,what delicacy1 then1 is necessary in the exercise of this perilous virtue6 ,how can we estimate with sufficient certainty the degree of liberty still possessed by one of our fellow-men to know how far we may substitute ourselves for him in the guiding of his destiny8 ,and when1 in order to assist a feeble soul1 we take possession of it1 who is sufficiently sure of himself not to go farther1 not to pass from the person governed to the love of domination itself8 ,charity is often the commencement and the excuse1 and always the pretext of usurpation4 ,in order to have the right of abandoning one's self to the emotions of charity1 it is necessary to be fortified against one's self by a long exercise of justice4 ,to respect the rights of others and do good to men1 to be at once just and charitable1--such are social ethics in the two elements that constitute them4 ,we speak of social ethics1 and we do not yet know what society is4 ,let us look around us3--everywhere society exists1 and where it is not1 man is not man4 ,society is a universal fact which must have universal foundations4 ,let us avoid at first the question of the origin of society4#bcg ,the philosophy of the last century delighted in such questions too much4 ,how can we demand light from the regions of darkness1 and the explanation of reality from an hypothesis8 ,why go back to a pretended primitive state in order to account for a present state which may be studied in itself in its unquestionable characters8 ,why seek what may have been in the germ that which may be perceived1 that which it is the question to understand1 completed and perfect8 ,moreover1 there is great peril in starting with the question of the origin of society4 ,has such or such an origin been found8 ,actual society is arranged according to the type of the primitive society that has been dreamed of1 and political society is delivered up to the mercy of historical romances4 ,this one imagines that the primitive state is violence1 and he sets out from that in order to authorize the right of the strongest1 and to consecrate despotism4 ,that one thinks that he has found in the family the first form of society1 and he compares government to the father of a family1 and subjects to children2 society in his eyes is a minor that must be held in tutelage in the hands of the paternal power1 which in the origin is absolute1 and consequently1 must remain so4 ,or has one thrown himself to the extreme of the opposite opinion1 and into the hypothesis of an agreement1 of a contract that expresses the will of all or of the greatest number8 ,he delivers up to the mobile will of the crowd the eternal laws of justice and the inalienable rights of the person4 ,finally1 are powerful religious institutions found in the cradle of society8 ,it is hence concluded1 that power belongs of right to priesthoods1 which have the secret of the designs of ,god1 and represent his sovereign authority4 ,thus a vicious method in philosophy leads to a deplorable political system1--the commencement is made in hypothesis1 and the termination is in anarchy or tyranny4 ,true politics do not depend on more or less well directed historical researches into the profound night of a past forever vanished1 and of which no vestige subsists3 they rest on the knowledge of human nature4 ,wherever society is1 wherever it was1 it has for its foundations3--#ast1 ,the need that we have of our fellow-creatures1 and the social instincts that man bears in himself2 #b;d1 ,the permanent and indestructible idea and sentiment of justice and right4 ,man1 feeble and powerless when he is alone1 profoundly feels the need that he has of the succor of his fellow-creatures in order to develop his faculties1 to embellish his life1 and even to preserve it4#bch ,without reflection1 without convention1 he claims the hand1 the experience1 the love of those whom he sees made like himself4 ,the instinct of society is in the first cry of the child that calls for the mother's help without knowing that it has a mother1 and in the eagerness of the mother to respond to the cries of the child4 ,it is in the feelings for others that nature has put in us--pity1 sympathy1 benevolence4 ,it is in the attraction of the sexes1 in their union1 in the love of parents for their children1 and in the ties of every kind that these first ties engender4 ,if ,providence has attached so much sadness to solitude1 so much charm to society1 it is because society is indispensable for the preservation of man and for his happiness1 for his intellect and moral development4 ,but if need and instinct begin society1 it is justice that completes it4 ,in the presence of another man1 without any external law1 without any compact1#bci it is sufficient that ,i know that he is a man1 that is to say1 that he is intelligent and free1 in order to know that he has rights1 and to know that ,i ought to respect his rights as he ought to respect mine4 ,as he is no freer than ,i am1 nor ,i than he1 we recognize towards each other equal rights and equal duties4 ,if he abuses his force to violate the equality of our rights1 ,i know that ,i have the right to defend myself and make myself respected2 and if a third party is found between us1 without any personal interest in the quarrel1 he knows that it is his right and his duty to use force in order to protect the feeble1 and even to make the oppressor expiate his injustice by a chastisement4 ,therein is already seen entire society with its essential principles1--justice1 liberty1 equality1 government1 and punishment4 ,justice is the guaranty of liberty4 ,true liberty does not consist in doing what we will1 but in doing what we have a right to do4 ,liberty of passion and caprice would have for its consequence the enslavement of the weakest to the strongest1 and the enslavement of the strongest themselves to their unbridled desires4 ,man is truly free in the interior of his consciousness only in resisting passion and obeying justice2 therein also is the type of true social liberty4 ,nothing is falser than the opinion that society diminishes our mutual liberty2 far from that1 it secures it1 develops it3 what it suppresses is not liberty2 it is its opposite1 passion4 ,society no more injures liberty than justice1 for society is nothing else than the very idea of justice realized4 ,in securing liberty1 justice secures equality also4 ,if men are unequal in physical force and intelligence1 they are equal in so far as they are free beings1 and consequently equally worthy of respect4 ,all men1 when they bear the sacred character of the moral person1 are to be respected1 by the same title1 and in the same degree4#bdj ,the limit of liberty is in liberty itself2 the limit of right is in duty4 ,liberty is to be respected1 but provided it injure not the liberty of an other4 ,i ought to let you do what you please1 but on the condition that nothing which you do will injure my liberty4 ,for then1 in virtue of my right of liberty1 ,i should regard myself as obligated to repress the aberrations of your will1 in order to protect my own and that of others4 ,society guaranties the liberty of each one1 and if one citizen attacks that of another1 he is arrested in the name of liberty4 ,for example1 religious liberty is sacred2 you may1 in the secret of consciousness1 invent for yourself the most extravagant superstition2 but if you wish publicly to inculcate an immoral worship1 you threaten the liberty and reason of your citizens3 such preaching is interdicted4 ,from the necessity of repressing springs the necessity of a constituted repressive force4 ,rigorously1 this force is in us2 for if ,i am unjustly attacked1 ,i have the right to defend myself4 ,but1 in the first place1 ,i may not be the strongest2 in the second place1 no one is an impartial judge in his own cause1 and what ,i regard or give out as an act of legitimate defence may be an act of violence and oppression4 ,so the protection of the rights of each one demands an impartial and disinterested force1 that may be superior to all particular forces4 ,this disinterested party1 armed with the power necessary to secure and defend the liberty of all1 is called government4 ,the right of government expresses the rights of all and each4 ,it is the right of personal defence transferred to a public force1 to the profit of common liberty4 ,government is not1 then1 a power distinct from and independent of society2 it draws from society its whole force4 ,it is not what it has seemed to two opposite schools of publicists1--to those who sacrifice society to government1--to those who consider government as the enemy of society4 ,if government did not represent society1 it would be only a material1 illegitimate1 and soon powerless force2 and without government1 society would be a war of all against all4 ,society makes the moral power of government1 as government makes the security of society4 ,pascal is wrong#bda when he says1 that not being able to make what is just powerful1 men have made what is powerful just4 ,government1 in principle at least1 is precisely what ,pascal desired1--justice armed with force4 ,it is a sad and false political system that places society and government1 authority and liberty1 in opposition to each other1 by making them come from two different sources1 by presenting them as two contrary principles4 ,i often hear the principle of authority spoken of as a principle apart1 independent1 deriving from itself its force and legitimacy1 and consequently made to rule4 ,no error is deeper and more dangerous4 ,thereby it is thought to confirm the principle of authority2 far from that1 from it is taken away its solidest foundation4 ,authority--that is to say1 legitimate and moral authority--is nothing else than justice1 and justice is nothing else than the respect of liberty2 so that there is not therein two different and contrary opinions1 but one and the same principle1 of equal certainty and equal grandeur1 under all its forms and in all its applications4 ,authority1 it is said1 comes from ,god3 doubtless2 but whence comes liberty1 whence comes humanity8 ,to ,god must be referred every thing that is excellent on the earth2 and nothing is more excellent than liberty4 ,reason1 which in man commands liberty1 commands it according to its nature2 and the first law that reason imposes on liberty is that of self-respect4 ,authority is so much the stronger as its true title is better understood2 and obedience is the easiest when1 instead of degrading1 it honors2 when1 instead of resembling servitude1 it is at once the condition and guaranty of liberty4 ,the mission1 the end of government1 is to make justice1 the protector of the common liberty1 reign4 ,whence it follows1 that as long as the liberty of one citizen does not injure the liberty of another1 it escapes all repression4 ,so government cannot be severe against falsehood1 intemperance1 imprudence1 levity1 avarice1 egoism1 except when these vices become prejudicial to others4 ,moreover1 it is not necessary to confine government within too narrow limits4 ,government1 which represents society1 is also a moral person2 it has a heart like the individual2 it has generosity1 goodness1 charity4 ,there are legitimate1 and even universally admired facts1 that are not explained1 if the function of government is reduced to the protection of rights alone4#bdb ,government owes to the citizens1 in a certain measure1 to guard their well-being1 to develop their intelligence1 to fortify their morality1 for the interest of society1 and even for the interest of humanity4 ,hence sometimes for government the formidable right of using force in order to do good to men4 ,but we are here touching upon that delicate point where charity inclines to despotism4 ,too much intelligence and wisdom1 therefore1 cannot be demanded in the employment of a power perhaps necessary1 but dangerous4 ,now1 on what condition is government exercised8 ,is an act of its own will sufficient for it in order to employ to its own liking under all circumstances1 as it shall understand them1 the power that has been confided to it8 ,government must have been thus exercised in early society1 and in the infancy of the art of governing4 ,but the power1 exercised by men1 may go astray in different ways1 either through weakness or through excess of force4 ,it must1 then1 have a rule superior to itself1 a public and known rule1 that may be a lesson for the citizens1 and for the government a rein and support3 that rule is called law4 ,universal and absolute law is natural justice1 which cannot be written1 but speaks to the reason and heart of all4 ,written laws are the formulas wherein it is sought to express1 with the least possible imperfection1 what natural justice requires in such or such determined circumstances4 ,if laws propose to express in each thing natural justice1 which is universal and absolute justice1 one of the necessary conditions of a good law is the universality of its character4 ,it is necessary to examine in an abstract and general manner what is required by justice in such or such a case1 to the end that this case being presented may be judged according to the rule laid down1 without regard to circumstances1 place1 time1 or person4 ,the collection of those rules or laws that govern the social relations of individuals is called positive right4 ,positive right rests wholly on natural right1 which at once serves as its foundation1 measure1 and limit4 ,the supreme law of every positive law is that it be not opposed to natural law3 no law can impose on us a false duty1 nor deprive us of a true right4 ,the sanction of law is punishment4 ,we have already seen that the right to punish springs from the idea of demerit4#bdc ,in the universal order1 to ,god alone it belongs to apply a punishment to all faults1 whatever they may be4 ,in the social order1 government is invested with the right to punish only for the purpose of protecting liberty by imposing a just reparation on those who violate it4 ,every fault that is not contrary to justice1 and does not strike at liberty1 escapes1 then1 social retribution4 ,neither is the right to punish the right of avenging one's self4 ,to render evil for evil1 to demand an eye for an eye1 a tooth for a tooth1 is the barbarous form of a justice without light2 for the evil that ,i do you will not take away the evil that you have done me4 ,it is not the pain felt by the victim that demands a corresponding pain2 it is violated justice that imposes on the culpable man the expiation of suffering4 ,such is the morality of penalty4 ,the principle of penalty is not the reparation of damage caused4 ,if ,i have caused you damage without intending it1 ,i pay you an indemnity2 that is not a penalty1 for ,i am not culpable2 whilst if ,i have committed a crime1 in spite of the material indemnity for the evil that ,i have done1 ,i owe a reparation to justice by a proper suffering1 and in that truly consists the penalty4 ,what is the exact proportion of chastisements and crimes8 ,this question cannot receive an absolute solution4 ,what is here immutable1 is that the act opposed to justice merits a punishment1 and that the more unjust the act is1 the severer ought to be the punishment4 ,but by the side of the right to punish is the duty of correcting4 ,to the culprit must be left the possibility of repairing his crime4 ,the culpable man is still a man2 he is not a thing of which we ought to rid ourselves as soon as it becomes injurious1 a stone that falls on our heads1 that we throw into a gulf that it may wound no more4 ,man is a rational being1 capable of comprehending good and evil1 of repenting1 and of being one day reconciled with order4 ,these truths have given birth to works that honor the close of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth4 ,the conception of houses of correction reminds one of those early times of ,christianity when punishment consisted in an expiation that permitted the culprit to return through repentance to the ranks of the just4 ,here intervenes1 as we have just indicated1 the principle of charity1 which is very different from the principle of justice4 ,to punish is just1 to ameliorate is charitable4 ,in what measure ought those two principles to be united8 ,nothing is more delicate1 more difficult to determine4 ,it is certain that justice ought to govern4 ,in undertaking the amendment of the culprit1 government usurps1 with a very generous usurpation1 the rights of religion2 but it ought not to go so far as to forget its proper function and its rigorous duty4 ,let us pause on the threshold of politics1 properly so called4 ,nothing in them but these principles is fixed and invariable2 all else is relative4 ,the constitutions of states have something absolute by their relation to the inviolable rights which they ought to guarantee2 but they also have a relative side by the variable forms with which they are clothed1 according to times1 places1 manners1 history4 ,the supreme rule of which philosophy reminds politics1 is that politics ought1 in consulting all circumstances1 to seek always those social forms and institutions that best realize those eternal principles4 ,yes1 they are eternal2 because they are drawn from no arbitrary hypothesis1 because they rest on the immutable nature of man1 on the all-powerful instincts of the heart1 on the indestructible notion of justice1 and the sublime idea of charity1 on the consciousness of person1 liberty1 and equality1 on duty and right1 on merit and demerit4 ,such are the foundations of all true society1 worthy of the beautiful name of human society1 that is to say1 formed of free and rational beings2 and such are the maxims that ought to direct every government worthy of its mission1 which knows that it is not dealing with beasts but with men1 which respects them and loves them4 ,thank ,god1 ,french society has always marched by the light of this immortal idea1 and the dynasty that has been at its head for some centuries has always guided it in these generous ways4 ,it was ,louis le ,gros1 who1 in the ,middle ,age1 emancipated the communes2 it was ,philippe le ,bel who instituted parliaments--an independent and gratuitous justice2 it was ,henri ,,iv4 who began religious liberty2 it was ,louis ,,xiii4 and ,louis ,,xiv4 who1 while they undertook to give to ,france her natural frontiers1 and almost succeeded in it1 labored to unite more and more all parts of the nation1 to put a regular administration in the place of feudal anarchy1 and to reduce the great vassals to a simple aristocracy1 from day to day deprived of every privilege but that of serving the common country in the first rank4 ,it was a king of ,france who1 comprehending the new wants1 and associating himself with the progress of the times1 attempted to substitute for that very real1 but confused and formless representative government1 that was called the assemblies of the nobility1 the clergy1 and the tiers etat1 the true representative government that is proper for great civilized nations1--a glorious and unfortunate attempt that1 if royalty had then been served by a ,richelieu1 a ,mazarin1 or a ,colbert1 might have terminated in a necessary reform1 that1 through the fault of every one1 ended in a revolution full of excess1 violence1 and crime1 redeemed and covered by an incomparable courage1 a sincere patriotism1 and the most brilliant triumphs4 ,finally1 it was the brother of ,louis ,,xvi4 who1 enlightened and not discouraged by the misfortunes of his family1 spontaneously gave to ,france that liberal and wise constitution of which our fathers had dreamed1 about which ,montesquieu had written1 which1 loyally adhered to1 and necessarily developed1 is admirably fitted for the present time1 and sufficient for a long future4 ,we are fortunate in finding in the ,charter the principles that we have just explained1 that contain our views and our hopes for ,france and humanity4#bdd ,,footnotes3 #bcc ,see the ,republic1 book iv41 vol4 ix41 of our translation4 #bcd ,on our principal duties towards ourselves1 and on that error1 too much accredited in the eighteenth century1 of reducing ethics to our duties towards others1 see #ast ,series1 vol4 iii41 lectures on the ethics of ,helvetius and ,saint-,lambert1 lecture vi41 p4 #bce3 ,to define virtue an habitual disposition to contribute to the happiness of others1 is to concentrate virtue into a single one of its applications1 is to suppress its general and essential character4 ,therein is the fundamental vice of the ethics of the eighteenth century4 ,those ethics are an exaggerated reaction against the somewhat mystical ethics of the preceding age1 which1 rightly occupied with perfecting the internal man1 often fell into asceticism1 which is not only useless to others1 but is contrary to well-ordered human life4 ,through fear of asceticism1 the philosophy of the eighteenth century forgot the care of internal perfection1 and only considered the virtues useful to society4 ,that was retrenching many virtues1 and the best ones4 ,i take1 for example1 dominion over self4 ,how make a virtue of it1 when virtue is defined a disposition to contribute to the happiness of others8 ,will it be said that dominion over self is useful to others8 ,but that is not always true2 often this dominion is exercised in the solitude of the soul over internal and wholly personal movements2 and there it is most painful and most sublime4 ,were we in a desert1 it would still be for us a duty to resist our passions1 to command ourselves1 and to govern our life as it becomes a rational and free being4 ,beneficence is an adorable virtue1 but it is neither the whole of virtue1 nor its most difficult employment4 ,what auxiliaries we have when the question is to do good to our fellow-creatures1--pity1 sympathy1 natural benevolence6 ,but to resist pride and envy1 to combat in the depths of the soul a natural desire legitimate in itself1 often culpable in its excesses1 to suffer and struggle in silence1 is the hardest task of a virtuous man4 ,i add that the virtues useful to others have their surest guaranty in those personal virtues that the eighteenth century misconceived4 ,what are goodness1 generosity1 and beneficence without dominion over self1 without the form of soul attached to the religious observance of duty8 ,they are1 perhaps1 only the emotions of a beautiful nature placed in fortunate circumstances4 ,take away these circumstances1 and1 perhaps1 the effects will disappear or be diminished4 ,but when a man1 who knows himself to be a rational and free being1 comprehends that it is his duty to remain faithful to liberty and reason1 when he applies himself to govern himself1 and pursue1 without cessation1 the perfection of his nature through all circumstances1 you may rely upon that man2 he will know how1 in case of need1 to be useful to others1 because there is no true perfection for him without justice and charity4 ,from the care of internal perfection you may draw all the useful virtues1 but the reciprocal is not always true4 ,one may be beneficent without being virtuous2 one is not virtuous without being beneficent4 #bce ,on the true foundation of property see the preceding lecture4 #bcf ,voluntary servitude is little better than servitude imposed by force4 ,see #ast ,series1 vol4 iii41 lecture #d1 p4 #bdj3 ,had another the desire to serve us as a slave1 without conditions and without limits1 to be for us a thing for our use1 a pure instrument1 a staff1 a vase1 and had we also the desire to make use of him in this manner1 and to let him serve us in the same way1 this reciprocity of desires would authorize for neither of us this absolute sacrifice1 because desire can never be the title of a right1 because there is something in us that is above all desires1 participated or not participated1 to wit1 duty and right1--justice4 ,to justice it belongs to be the rule of our desires1 and not to our desires to be the rule of justice4 ,should entire humanity forget its dignity1 should it consent to its own degradation1 should it extend the hand to slavery1 tyranny would be none the more legitimate2 eternal justice would protest against a contract1 which1 were it supported by desires1 reciprocal desires most authentically expressed and converted into solemn laws1 is none the less void of all right1 because1 as ,bossuet very truly said1 there is no right against right1 no contracts1 no conventions1 no human laws against the law of laws1 against natural law4 #bcg ,on the danger of seeking at first the origin of human knowledge1 see #ast ,series1 vol4 iii41 lecture on ,hobbes1 p4 #bfa3 ,hobbes is not the only one who took the question of the origin of societies as the starting-point of political science4 ,nearly all the publicists of the eighteenth century1 ,montesquieu excepted1 proceed in the same manner4 ,rousseau imagines at first a primitive state in which man being no longer savage without being yet civilized1 lived happy and free under the dominion of the laws of nature4 ,this golden age of humanity disappearing carries with it all the rights of the individual1 who enters naked and disarmed into what we call the social state4 ,but order cannot reign in a state without laws1 and since natural laws perished in the shipwreck of primitive manners1 new ones must be created4 ,society is formed by aid of a contract whose principle is the abandonment by each and all of their individual force and rights to the profit of the community1 of the state1 the instrument of all forces1 the depository of all rights4 ,the state1 for ,hobbes1 will be a man1 a monarch1 a king2 for ,rousseau1 the state is the collection itself of citizens1 who by turns are considered as subjects and governors1 so that instead of the despotism of one over all1 we have the despotism of all over each4 ,law is not the more or less happy1 more or less faithful expression of natural justice2 it is the expression of the general will4 ,this general will is alone free2 particular wills are not free4 ,the general will has all rights1 and particular wills have only the rights that it confers on them1 or rather lends them4 ,force1 in ,the ,citizen is the foundation of society1 of order1 of laws1 of the rights and duties which laws alone institute4 ,in the ,contrat ,social1 the general will plays the same part1 fulfils the same function4 ,moreover1 the general will scarcely differs in itself from force4 ,in fact1 the general will is number1 that is to say1 force still4 ,thus1 on both sides1 tyranny under different forms4 ,one may here observe the power of method4 ,if ,hobbes1 if ,rousseau especially had at first studied the idea of right in itself1 with the certain characters without which we are not able to conceive it1 they would have infallibly recognized that if there are rights derived from positive laws1 and particularly from conventions and contracts1 there are rights derived from no contract1 since contracts take them for principles and rules2 from no convention1 since they serve as the foundation to all conventions in order that these conventions may be reputed just2--rights that society consecrates and develops1 but does not make1--rights not subject to the caprices of general or particular will1 belonging essentially to human nature1 and like it1 inviolable and sacred4 #bch #ast ,series1 vol4 iii41 p4 #bfe3 ,what6 somewhere says ,montesquieu1 man is everywhere in society1 and it is asked whether man was born for society6 ,what is this fact that is reproduced in all the vicissitudes of the life of humanity1 except a law of humanity8 ,the universal and permanent fact of society attests the principle of sociability4 ,this principle shines forth in all our inclinations1 in our sentiments1 in our beliefs4 ,it is true that we love society for the advantages that it brings2 but it is none the less true1 that we also love it for its own sake1 that we seek it independently of all calculation4 ,solitude saddens us2 it is not less deadly to the life of the moral being1 than a perfect vacuum is to the life of the physical being4 ,without society what would become of sympathy1 which is one of the most powerful principles of our soul1 which establishes between men a community of sentiments1 by which each lives in all and all live in each8 ,who would be blind enough not to see in that an energetic call of human nature for society8 ,and the attraction of the sexes1 their union1 the love of parents for children1--do they not found a sort of natural society1 that is increased and developed by the power of the same causes which produced it8 ,divided by interest1 united by sentiment1 men respect each other in the name of justice4 ,let us add that they love each other in virtue of natural charity4 ,in the sight of justice1 equal in right1 charity inspires us to consider ourselves as brethren1 and to give each other succor and consolation4 ,wonderful thing6 ,god has not left to our wisdom1 nor even to experience1 the care of forming and preserving society1--he has willed that sociability should be a law of our nature1 and a law so imperative that no tendency to isolation1 no egoism1 no distaste even1 can prevail against it4 ,all the power of the spirit of system was necessary in order to make ,hobbes say that society is an accident1 as an incredible degree of melancholy to wring from ,rousseau the extravagant expression that society is an evil4 #bci #ast ,series1 vol4 iii41 p4 #bhc3 ,we do not hold from a compact our quality as man1 and the dignity and rights attached to it2 or1 rather1 there is an immortal compact which is nowhere written1 which makes itself felt by every uncorrupted conscience1 that compact which binds together all beings intelligent1 free1 and subject to misfortune1 by the sacred ties of a common respect and a common charity4444 ,laws promulgate duties1 but do not give birth to them2 they could not violate duties without being unjust1 and ceasing to merit the beautiful name of laws--that is to say1 decisions of the public authority worthy of appearing obligatory to the conscience of all4 ,nevertheless1 although laws have no other virtue than that of declaring what exists before them1 we often found on them right and justice1 to the great detriment of justice itself1 and the sentiment of right4 ,time and habit despoil reason of its natural rights in order to transfer it to law4 ,what then happens8 ,we either obey it1 even when it is unjust1 which is not a very great evil1 but we do not think of reforming it little by little1 having no superior principle that enables us to judge it1--or we continually change it1 in an invincible impotence of founding any thing1 by not knowing the immutable basis on which written law must rest4 ,in either case1 all progress is impossible1 because the laws are not related to their true principle1 which is reason1 conscience1 sovereign and absolute justice4 #bdj ,lecture #ab4 #bda ,see #dth ,series1 vol4 i41 p4 #dj4 #bdb ,see our pamphlet entitled ,justice and ,charity1 composed in #ahdh1 in the midst of the excesses of socialism1 in order to remind of the dignity of liberty1 the character1 bearing1 and the impassable limits of true charity1 private and civil4 #bdc ,see on the theory of penalty1 the ,gorgias1 vol4 iii4 of the translation of ,plato1 and our argument1 p4 #cfg3 ,the first law of order is to be faithful to virtue1 and to that part of virtue which is related to society1 to wit1 justice2 but if one is wanting in that1 the second law of order is to expiate one's fault1 and it is expiated by punishment4 ,publicists are still seeking the foundation of penalty4 ,some1 who think themselves great politicians1 find it in the utility of the punishment for those who witness it1 and are turned aside from crime by fear of its menace1 by its preventive virtue4 ,and that it is true1 is one of the effects of penalty1 but it is not its foundation2 for punishment falling upon the innocent1 would produce as much1 and still more terror1 and would be quite as preventive4 ,others1 in their pretensions to humanity1 do not wish to see the legitimacy of punishment except in its utility for him who undergoes it1 in its corrective virtue1--and that1 too1 is one of the possible effects of punishment1 but not its foundation2 for that punishment may be corrective1 it must be accepted as just4 ,it is1 then1 always necessary to recur to justice4 ,justice is the true foundation of punishment1--personal and social utility are only consequences4 ,it is an incontestable fact1 that after every unjust act1 man thinks1 and cannot but think that he has incurred demerit1 that is to say1 has merited a punishment4 ,in intelligence1 to the idea of injustice corresponds that of penalty2 and when injustice has taken place in the social sphere1 merited punishment ought to be inflicted by society4 ,society can inflict it only because it ought4 ,right here has no other source than duty1 the strictest1 most evident1 and most sacred duty1 without which this pretended right would be only that of force1 that is to say1 an atrocious injustice1 should it even result in the moral profit of him who undergoes it1 and in a salutary spectacle for the people1--what it would not then be2 for then the punishment would find no sympathy1 no echo1 either in the public conscience or in that of the condemned4 ,the punishment is not just1 because it is preventively or correctively useful2 but it is in both ways useful1 because it is just4 ,this theory of penalty1 in demonstrating the falsity1 the incomplete and exclusive character of two theories that divide publicists1 completes and explains them1 and gives them both a legitimate centre and base4 ,it is doubtless only indicated in ,plato1 but is met in several passages1 briefly but positively expressed1 and on it rests the sublime theory of expiation4 #bdd ,as it is perceived1 we have confined ourselves to the most general principles4 ,the following year1 in #ahai1 in our lectures on ,hobbes1 #ast ,series1 vol4 iii41 we gave a more extended theory of rights1 and the civil and political guaranties which they demand2 we even touched the question of the different forms of government1 and established the truth and beauty of the constitutional monarchy4 ,in #ahbh1 #b;d ,series1 vol4 i41 lecture #ac1 we explained and defended the ,charter in its fundamental parts4 ,under the government of ,july1 the part of defender of both liberty and royalty was easy4 ,we continued it in #ahdh2 and when1 at the unexpected inundation of democracy1 soon followed by a passionate reaction in favor of an absolute authority1 many minds1 and the best1 asked themselves whether the young ,american republic was not called to serve as a model for old ,europe1 we did not hesitate to maintain the principle of the monarchy in the interest of liberty2 we believe that we demonstrated that the development of the principles of #aghi1 and in particular the progress of the lower classes1 so necessary1 can be obtained only by the aid of the constitutional monarchy1--#fth ,series1 ,,political ,,discourses1 with an introduction on the principles of the ,french ,revolution and representative government4 ,,lecture ,,xvi4 ,,god ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,the ,,good4 ,principle on which true theodicea rests4 ,god the last foundation of moral truth1 of the good1 and of the moral person4--,liberty of ,god4--,the divine justice and charity4--,god the sanction of the moral law4 ,immortality of the soul2 argument from merit and demerit2 argument from the simplicity of the soul2 argument from final causes4--,religious sentiment4--,adoration4--,worship4--,mor al beauty of ,christianity4 ,the moral order has been confirmed1--we are in possession of moral truth1 of the idea of the good1 and the obligation that is attached to it4 ,now1 the same principle that has not permitted us to stop at absolute truth1#bde and has forced us to seek its supreme reason in a real and substantial being1 forces us here again to refer the idea of the good to the being who is its first and last foundation4 ,moral truth1 like every other universal and necessary truth1 cannot remain in a state of abstraction4 ,in us it is only conceived4 ,there must somewhere be a being who not only conceives it1 but constituted it4 ,as all beautiful things and all true things are related--these to a unity that is absolute truth1 and those to another unity that is absolute beauty1 so all moral principles participate in the same principle1 which is the good4 ,we thus elevate ourselves to the conception of the good in itself1 of absolute good1 superior to all particular duties1 and determined in these duties4 ,now1 can the absolute good be any thing else than an attribute of him who1 properly speaking1 is alone absolute being8 ,would it be possible that there might be several absolute beings1 and that the being in whom are realized absolute truth and absolute beauty might not also be the one who is the principle of absolute good8 ,the very idea of the absolute implies absolute unity4 ,the true1 the beautiful1 and the good1 are not three distinct essences2 they are one and the same essence considered in its fundamental attributes4 ,our mind distinguishes them1 because it can comprehend them only by division2 but1 in the being in whom they reside1 they are indivisibly united2 and this being at once triple and one1 who sums up in himself perfect beauty1 perfect truth1 and the supreme good1 is nothing else than ,god4 ,so ,god is necessarily the principle of moral truth and the good4 ,he is also the type of the moral person that we carry in us4 ,man is a moral person1 that is to say1 he is endowed with reason and liberty4 ,he is capable of virtue1 and virtue has in him two principal forms1 respect of others1 and love of others1 justice and charity4 ,can there be among the attributes possessed by the creature something essential not possessed by the ,creator8 ,whence does the effect draw its reality and its being1 except from its cause8 ,what it possesses1 it borrows and receives4 ,the cause at least contains all that is essential in the effect4 ,what particularly belongs to the effect1 is inferiority1 is a lack1 is imperfection3 from the fact alone that it is dependent and derived1 it bears in itself the signs and the conditions of dependence4 ,if1 then1 we cannot legitimately conclude from the imperfection of the effect in that of the cause1 we can and must conclude from the excellence of the effect in the perfection of the cause1 otherwise there would be something prominent in the effect which would be without cause4 ,such is the principle of our theodicea4 ,it is neither new nor subtle2 but it has not yet been thoroughly disengaged and elucidated1 and it is1 to our eyes1 firm against every test4 ,it is by the aid of this principle that we can1 up to a certain point1 penetrate into the true nature of ,god4 ,god is not a being of logic1 whose nature can be explained by way of deduction1 and by means of algebraic equations4 ,when1 setting out from a first attribute1 we have deduced the attributes of ,god from each other1 after the manner of geometricians and the schoolmen1 what do we possess1#bdf ,i pray you1 but abstractions8 ,it is necessary to leave these vain dialectics in order to arrive at a real and living ,god4 ,the first notion that we have of ,god1 to wit1 the notion of an infinite being1 is itself given to us independently of all experience4 ,it is the consciousness of ourselves1 as being at once1 and as being limited1 that elevates us directly to the conception of a being who is the principle of our being1 and is himself without bounds4 ,this solid and single argument1 which is at bottom that of ,descartes1#bdg opens to us a way that must be followed1 in which ,descartes too quickly stopped4 ,if the being that we possess forces us to recur to a cause which possesses being in an infinite degree1 all that we have of being1 that is to say1 of substantial attributes1 equally requires an infinite cause4 ,then1 ,god will no longer be merely the infinite1 abstract1 or at least indeterminate being in which reason and the heart know not where to betake themselves1#bdh he will be a real and determined being1 a moral person like ours and psychology conducts us without hypothesis to a theodicea at once sublime and related to us4#bdi ,before all1 if man is free1 can it be that ,god is not free8 ,no one contends that he who is cause of all causes1 who has no cause but himself1 can be dependent on any thing whatever4 ,but in freeing ,god from all external constraint1 ,spinoza subjects him to an internal and mathematical necessity1 wherein he finds the perfection of being4 ,yes1 of being which is not a person2 but the essential character of personal being is precisely liberty4 ,if1 then1 ,god were not free1 ,god would be beneath man4 ,would it not be strange that the creature should have the marvellous power of disposing of himself1 and of freely willing1 and that the being who has made him should be subjected to a necessary development1 whose cause is only in himself1 without doubt1 but1 in fine1 is a sort of abstract power1 mechanical or metaphysical1 but very inferior to the personal and voluntary cause that we are1 and of which we have the clearest consciousness8 ,god is therefore free1 since we are free4 ,but he is not free as we are free2 for ,god is at once all that we are1 and nothing that we are4 ,he possesses the same attributes that we possess1 but elevated to infinity4 ,he possesses an infinite liberty1 joined to an infinite intelligence2 and1 as his intelligence is infallible1 excepted from the uncertainties of deliberation1 and perceiving at a glance where the good is1 so his liberty spontaneously1 and without effort1 fulfils it4#bej ,in the same manner as we transfer to ,god the liberty that is the foundation of our being1 we also transfer to him justice and charity4 ,in man1 justice and charity are virtues2 in ,god1 they are attributes4 ,what is in us the laborious conquest of liberty1 is in him his very nature4 ,if respect of rights is in us the very essence of justice and the sign of the dignity of our being1 it is impossible that the perfect being should not know and respect the rights of the lowest beings1 since it is he1 moreover1 who has imparted to them those rights4 ,in ,god resides a sovereign justice1 which renders to each one his due1 not according to deceptive appearances1 but according to the truth of things4 ,finally1 if man1 that limited being1 has the power of going out of himself1 of forgetting his person1 of loving another than himself1 of devoting himself to another's happiness1 or1 what is better1 to the perfecting of another1 should not the perfect being have1 in an infinite degree1 this disinterested tenderness1 this charity1 the supreme virtue of the human person8 ,yes1 there is in ,god an infinite tenderness for his creatures3 he at first manifested it in giving us the being that he might have withheld1 and at all times it appears in the innumerable signs of his divine providence4 ,plato knew this love of ,god well1 and expressed it in those great words1 ,let us say that the cause which led the supreme ordainer to produce and compose this universe is1 that he was good2 and he who is good has no species of envy4 ,exempt from envy1 he willed that all things should be1 as much as possible1 like himself4#bea ,christianity went farther3 according to the divine doctrine1 ,god so loved men that he gave them his only ,son4 ,god is inexhaustible in his charity1 as he is inexhaustible in his essence4 ,it is impossible to give more to the creature2 he gives him every thing that he can receive without ceasing to be a creature2 he gives him every thing1 even himself1 so far as the creature is in him and he in the creature4 ,at the same time nothing can be lost2 for being absolute being1 he eternally expands and gives himself without being diminished4 ,infinite in power1 infinite in charity1 he bestows his love in exhaustless abundance upon the world1 to teach us that the more we give the more we possess4 ,it is egoism1 whose root is at the bottom of every heart1 even by the side of the sincerest charity1 that inculcates in us the error that we lose by self-devotion3 it is egoism that makes us call devotion a sacrifice4 ,if ,god is wholly just and wholly good1 he can will nothing but what is good and just2 and1 as he is all-powerful1 every thing that he wills he can do1 and consequently does do4 ,the world is the work of ,god2 it is therefore perfectly made1 perfectly adapted to its end4 ,and nevertheless1 there is in the world a disorder that seems to accuse the justice and goodness of ,god4 ,a principle that is attached to the very idea of the good1 says to us that every moral agent deserves a reward when he does good1 and a punishment when he does evil4 ,this principle is universal and necessary3 it is absolute4 ,if this principle has not its application in this world1 it must either be a lie1 or this world is ordered ill4 ,now1 it is a fact that the good is not always followed by happiness1 nor evil always by unhappiness4 ,let us1 in the first place1 remark that if the fact exists1 it is rare enough1 and seems to present the character of an exception4 ,virtue is a struggle against passion2 this struggle1 full of dignity1 is also full of pain2 but1 on one side1 crime is condemned to much harder pains2 on the other1 those of virtue are of short duration2 they are a necessary and almost always beneficent trial4 ,virtue has its pains1 but the greatest happiness is still with it1 as the greatest unhappiness is with crime2 and such is the case in small and great1 in the secret of the soul1 and on the theatre of life1 in the obscurest conditions and in the most conspicuous situations4 ,good and bad health are1 after all1 the greatest part of happiness or unhappiness4 ,in this regard1 compare temperance and its opposite1 order and disorder1 virtue and vice2 ,i mean a temperance truly temperate1 and not an atrabilarious asceticism1 a rational virtue1 and not a fierce virtue4 ,the great physician ,hufeland#beb remarks that the benevolent sentiments are favorable to health1 and that the malevolent sentiments are opposed to it4 ,violent and sinful passions irritate1 inflame1 and carry trouble into the organization as well as the soul2 the benevolent affections preserve the measured and harmonious play of all the functions4 ,hufeland again remarks that the greatest longevities pertain to wise and well-regulated lives4 ,thus1 for health1 strength1 and life1 virtue is better than vice3 it is already much1 it seems to me4 ,i surely mean to speak of conscience only after health2 but1 in fine1 with the body1 our most constant host is conscience4 ,peace or trouble of conscience decides internal happiness or unhappiness4 ,at this point of view1 compare again order and disorder1 virtue and vice4 ,and without us1 in society1 to whom come esteem and contempt1 consideration and infamy8 ,certainly opinion has its mistakes1 but they are not long4 ,in general1 if charlatans1 intriguers1 impostors of every kind1 for some time surreptitiously get suffrages1 it must be that a sustained honesty is the surest and the almost infallible means of reaching a good renown4 ,i regret that upon this point time does not allow of any development4 ,it would have afforded me delight1 after having distinguished virtue from happiness1 to show them to you almost always united by the admirable law of merit and demerit4 ,i should have been pleased to show you this beneficent law already governing human destiny1 and called to preside over it more exactly from day to day by the ever-increasing progress of lights in governments and peoples1 by the perfecting of civil and judicial institutions4 ,it would have been my wish to make pass into your minds and hearts the consoling conviction that1 after all1 justice is already in this world1 and that the surest road to happiness is still that of virtue4 ,this was the opinion of ,socrates and ,plato2 and it is also that of ,franklin1 and ,i gather it from my personal experience and an attentive examination of human life4 ,but ,i admit that there are exceptions2 and were there but one exception1 it would be necessary to explain it4 ,suppose a man1 young1 beautiful1 rich1 amiable1 and loved1 who1 placed between the scaffold and the betrayal of a sacred cause1 voluntarily mounts the scaffold at twenty years of age4 ,what do you make of this noble victim8 ,the law of merit and demerit seems here suspended4 ,do you dare blame virtue1 or how in this world do you accord to it the recompense that it has not sought1 but is its due8 ,by careful search you will find more than one case analogous to that4 ,the laws of this world are general2 they turn aside to suit no one3 they pursue their course without regard to the merit or demerit of any4 ,if a man is born with a bad temperament1 it is in virtue of certain obscure but undeviating physical laws1 to which he is subject1 like the animal and the plant1 and he suffers during his whole life1 although personally innocent4 ,he is brought up in the midst of flames1 epidemics1 calamities that strike at hazard the good as well as the bad4 ,human justice condemns many that are innocent1 it is true1 but it absolves1 in fault of proof1 more than one who is culpable4 ,besides1 it knows only certain derelictions4 ,what faults1 what basenesses occur in the dark1 which do not receive merited chastisement6 ,in like manner1 what obscure devotions of which ,god is the sole witness and judge6 ,without doubt nothing escapes the eye of conscience1 and the culpable soul cannot escape remorse4 ,but remorse is not always in exact relation with the fault committed2 its vivacity may depend on a nature more or less delicate1 on education and habit4 ,in a word1 if it is in general very true that the law of merit and demerit is fulfilled in this world1 it is not fulfilled with mathematical rigor4 ,what must we conclude from this8 ,that the world is ill-made8 ,no4 ,that cannot be1 and is not4 ,that cannot be1 for incontestably the world has a just and good author2 that is not1 for1 in fact1 we see order reigning in the world2 and it would be absurd to misconceive the manifest order that almost everywhere shines forth on account of a few phenomena that we cannot refer to order4 ,the universe endures1 therefore it is well made4 ,the pessimism of ,voltaire is still more opposed to the aggregate of facts than an absolute optimism4 ,between these two systematic extremes which facts deny1 the human race places the hope of another life4 ,it has found it very irrational to reject a necessary law on account of some infractions2 it has1 therefore1 maintained the law2 and from infractions it has only concluded that they ought to be referred to the law1 that there will be a reparation4 ,either this conclusion must be admitted1 or the two great principles previously admitted1 that ,god is just1 and that the law of merit and demerit is an absolute law1 must be rejected4 ,now1 to reject these two principles is to totally overthrow all human belief4 ,to maintain them1 is implicitly to admit that actual life must be1 elsewhere terminated or continued4 ,but is this continuation of the person possible8 ,after the dissolution of the body1 can any thing of us remain8 ,in truth1 the moral person1 which acts well or ill1 which awaits the reward or punishment of its good or bad actions1 is united to a body1--it lives with the body1 makes use of it1 and1 in a certain measure1 depends on it1 but is not it4#bec ,the body is composed of parts1 may decrease or increase2 is divisible1 essentially divisible1 and even infinitely divisible4 ,but that something that has consciousness of itself1 that says1 ,i1 me1 that feels itself to be free and responsible1 does it not also feel that there is in it no division1 even no possible division1 that it is a being one and simple8 ,is the me more or less me8 ,is there a half of me1 a quarter of me8 ,i cannot divide my person4 ,it remains identical to itself under the diversity of the phenomena that manifest it4 ,this identity1 this indivisibility of the person1 is its spirituality4 ,spirituality is1 therefore1 the very essence of the person4 ,belief in the spirituality of the soul is involved in the belief of this identity of the me1 which no rational being has ever called in question4 ,accordingly1 there is not the least hypothesis for affirming that the soul does not essentially differ from the body4 ,add that when we say the soul1 we mean to say1 and do say the person1 which is not separated from the consciousness of the attributes that constitute it1 thought and will4 ,the being without consciousness is not a person4 ,it is the person that is identical1 one1 simple4 ,its attributes1 in developing it1 do not divide it4 ,indivisible1 it is indissoluble1 and may be immortal4 ,if1 then1 divine justice1 in order to be exercised in regard to us1 demands an immortal soul1 it does not demand an impossible thing4 ,the spirituality of the soul is the necessary foundation of immortality4 ,the law of merit and demerit is the direct demonstration of this4 ,the first proof is called the metaphysical proof1 the second1 the moral proof1 which is the most celebrated1 most popular1 at once the most convincing and the most persuasive4 ,what powerful motives are added to these two proofs to fortify them in the heart6 ,the following1 for example1 is a presumption of great value for any one that believes in the virtue of sentiment and instinct4 ,every thing has its end4 ,this principle is as absolute as that which refers every event to a cause4#bed ,man has1 therefore1 an end4 ,this end is revealed in all his thoughts1 in all his ways1 in all his sentiments1 in all his life4 ,whatever he does1 whatever he feels1 whatever he thinks1 he thinks upon the infinite1 loves the infinite1 tends to the infinite4#bee ,this need of the infinite is the mainspring of scientific curiosity1 the principle of all discoveries4 ,love also stops and rests only there4 ,on the route it may experience lively joys2 but a secret bitterness that is mingled with them soon makes it feel their insufficiency and emptiness4 ,often1 while ignorant of its true object1 it asks whence comes that fatal disenchantment by which all its successes1 all its pleasures are successively extinguished4 ,if it knew how to read itself1 it would recognize that if nothing here below satisfies it1 it is because its object is more elevated1 because the true bourne after which it aspires is infinite perfection4 ,finally1 like thought and love1 human activity is without limits4 ,who can say where it shall stop8 ,behold this earth almost known4 ,soon another world will be necessary for us4 ,man is journeying towards the infinite1 which is always receding before him1 which he always pursues4 ,he conceives it1 he feels it1 he bears it1 thus to speak1 in himself1--how should his end be elsewhere8 ,hence that unconquerable instinct of immortality1 that universal hope of another life to which all worships1 all poesies1 all traditions bear witness4 ,we tend to the infinite with all our powers2 death comes to interrupt the destiny that seeks its goal1 and overtakes it unfinished4 ,it is1 therefore1 likely that there is something after death1 since at death nothing in us is terminated4 ,look at the flower that to-morrow will not be4 ,to-day1 at least1 it is entirely developed3 we can conceive nothing more beautiful of its kind2 it has attained its perfection4 ,my perfection1 my moral perfection1 that of which ,i have the clearest idea and the most invincible need1 for which ,i feel that ,i am born1--in vain ,i call for it1 in vain ,i labor for it2 it escapes me1 and leaves me only hope4 ,shall this hope be deceived8 ,all beings attain their end2 should man alone not attain his8 ,should the greatest of creatures be the most ill-treated8 ,but a being that should remain incomplete and unfinished1 that should not attain the end which all his instincts proclaim for him1 would be a monster in the eternal order1--a problem much more difficult to solve than the difficulties that have been raised against the immortality of the soul4 ,in our opinion1 this tendency of all the desires and all the powers of the soul towards the infinite1 elucidated by the principle of final causes1 is a serious and important confirmation of the moral proof and the metaphysical proof of another life4 ,when we have collected all the arguments that authorize belief in another life1 and when we have thus arrived at a satisfying demonstration1 there remains an obstacle to be overcome4 ,imagination cannot contemplate without fright that unknown which is called death4 ,the greatest philosopher in the world1 says ,pascal1 on a plank wider than it is necessary in order to go without danger from one side of an abyss to the other1 cannot think without trembling on the abyss that is beneath him4 ,it is not reason1 it is imagination that frightens him2 it is also imagination that in great part causes that remnant of doubt1 that trouble1 that secret anxiety which the firmest faith cannot always succeed in overcoming in the presence of death4 ,the religious man experiences this terror1 but he knows whence it comes1 and he surmounts it by attaching himself to the solid hopes furnished him by reason and the heart4 ,imagination is a child that must be educated1 by putting it under the discipline and government of better faculties2 it must be accustomed to go to intelligence for aid instead of troubling intelligence with its phantoms4 ,let us acknowledge that there is a terrible step to be taken when we meet death4 ,nature trembles when face to face with the unknown eternity4 ,it is wise to present ourselves there with all our forces united1--reason and the heart lending each other mutual support1 the imagination being subdued or charmed4 ,let us continually repeat that1 in death as in life1 the soul is sure to find ,god1 and that with ,god all is just1 all is good4#bef ,we now know what ,god truly is4 ,we have already seen two of his adorable attributes1--truth and beauty4 ,the most august attribute is revealed to us1--holiness4 ,god is the holy of holies1 as the author of the moral law and the good1 as the principle of liberty1 justice1 and charity1 as the dispenser of penalty and reward4 ,such a ,god is not an abstract ,god1 but an intelligent and free person1 who has made us in his own image1 from whom we hold the law itself that presides over our destiny1 whose judgments we await4 ,it is his love that inspires us in our acts of charity2 it is his justice that governs our justice1 that of our societies and our laws4 ,if we do not continually remind ourselves that he is infinite1 we degrade his nature2 but he would be for us as if he were not1 if his infinite essence had no forms that pertain to us1 the proper forms of our reason and our soul4 ,by thinking upon such a being1 man feels a sentiment that is par excellence the religious sentiment4 ,all the beings with whom we are in relation awaken in us different sentiments1 according to the qualities that we perceive in them2 and should he who possesses all perfections excite in us no particular sentiment8 ,when we think upon the infinite essence of ,god1 when we are penetrated with his omnipotence1 when we are reminded that the moral law expresses his will1 that he attaches to the fulfilment and the violation of this law recompenses and penalties which he dispenses with an inflexible justice1 we cannot guard ourselves against an emotion of respect and fear at the idea of such a grandeur4 ,then1 if we come to consider that this all-powerful being has indeed wished to create us1 us of whom he has no need1 that in creating us he has loaded us with benefits1 that he has given us this admirable universe for enjoying its ever-new beauties1 society for ennobling our life in that of our fellow-men1 reason for thinking1 the heart for loving1 liberty for acting2 without disappearing1 respect and fear are tinged with a sweeter sentiment1 that of love4 ,love1 when it is applied to feeble and limited beings1 inspires us with a desire to do good to them2 but in itself it proposes to itself no advantage from the person loved2 we love a beautiful or good object1 because it is beautiful or good1 without at first regarding whether this love may be useful to its object and ourselves4 ,for a still stronger reason1 love1 when it ascends to ,god1 is a pure homage rendered to his perfections2 it is the natural overflow of the soul towards a being infinitely lovable4 ,respect and love compose adoration4 ,true adoration does not exist without possessing both of these sentiments4 ,if you consider only the all-powerful ,god1 master of heaven and earth1 author and avenger of justice1 you crush man beneath the weight of the grandeur of ,god and his own feebleness1 you condemn him to a continual trembling in the uncertainty of ,god's judgments1 you make him hate the world1 life1 and himself1 for every thing is full of misery4 ,towards this extreme1 ,port-,royal inclines4 ,read the ,pensees de ,pascal4#beg ,in his great humility1 ,pascal forgets two things1--the dignity of man and the love of ,god4 ,on the other hand1 if you see only the good ,god and the indulgent father1 you incline to a chimerical mysticism4 ,by substituting love for fear1 little by little with fear1 we run the risk of losing respect4 ,god is no more a master1 he is no more even a father2 for the idea of a father still to a certain point involves that of a respectful fear2 he is no more any thing but a friend1 sometimes even a lover4 ,true adoration does not separate love and respect2 it is respect animated by love4 ,adoration is a universal sentiment4 ,it differs in degrees according to different natures2 it takes the most different forms2 it is often even ignorant of itself2 sometimes it is revealed by an exclamation springing from the heart1 in the midst of the great scenes of nature and life1 sometimes it silently rises in the mute and penetrated soul2 it may err in its expressions1 even in its object2 but at bottom it is always the same4 ,it is a spontaneous1 irresistible emotion of the soul2 and when reason is applied to it1 it is declared just and legitimate4 ,what1 in fact1 is more just than to fear the judgments of him who is holiness itself1 who knows our actions and our intentions1 and will judge them according to the highest justice8 ,what1 too1 is more just than to love perfect goodness and the source of all love8 ,adoration is at first a natural sentiment2 reason makes it a duty4 ,adoration confined to the sanctuary of the soul is what is called internal worship--the necessary principle of all public worships4 ,public worship is no more an arbitrary institution than society and government1 language and arts4 ,all these things have their roots in human nature4 ,adoration abandoned to itself1 would easily degenerate into dreams and ecstasy1 or would be dissipated in the rush of affairs and the necessities of every day4 ,the more energetic it is1 the more it tends to express itself outwardly in acts that realize it1 to take a sensible1 precise1 and regular form1 which1 by a proper reaction on the sentiment that produced it1 awakens it when it slumbers1 sustains it when it languishes1 and also protects it against extravagances of every kind to which it might give birth in so many feeble or unbridled imaginations4 ,philosophy1 then1 lays the natural foundation of public worship in the internal worship of adoration4 ,having arrived at that point1 it stops1 equally careful not to betray its rights and not to go beyond them1 to run over1 in its whole extent and to its farthest limit1 the domain of natural reason1 as well as not to usurp a foreign domain4 ,but philosophy does not think of trespassing on the ground of theology2 it wishes to remain faithful to itself1 and also to follow its true mission1 which is to love and favor every thing that tends to elevate man1 since it heartily applauds the awakening of religious and ,christian sentiment in all noble souls1 after the ravages that have been made on every hand1 for more than a century1 by a false and sad philosophy4 ,what1 in fact1 would not have been the joy of a ,socrates and a ,plato if they had found the human race in the arms of ,christianity6 ,how happy would ,plato--who was so evidently embarrassed between his beautiful doctrines and the religion of his times1 who managed so carefully with that religion even when he avoided it1 who was forced to take from it the best possible part1 in order to aid a favorable interpretation of his doctrine--have been1 if he had had to do with a religion which presents to man1 as at once its author and its model1 the sublime and mild ,crucified1 of whom he had an extraordinary presentiment1 whom he almost described in the person of a just man dying on the cross2#beh a religion which came to announce1 or at least to consecrate and expand the idea of the unity of ,god and that of the unity of the human race2 which proclaims the equality of all souls before the divine law1 which thereby has prepared and maintains civil equality2 which prescribes charity still more than justice1 which teaches man that he does not live by bread alone1 that he is not wholly contained in his senses and his body1 that he has a soul1 a free soul1 whose value is infinite1 above the value of all worlds1 that life is a trial1 that its true object is not pleasure1 fortune1 rank1 none of those things that do not pertain to our real destiny1 and are often more dangerous than useful1 but is that alone which is always in our power1 in all situations and all conditions1 from end to end of the earth1 to wit1 the improvement of the soul by itself1 in the holy hope of becoming from day to day less unworthy of the regard of the ,father of men1 of the examples given by him1 and of his promises4 ,if the greatest moralist that ever lived could have seen these admirable teachings1 which in germ were already at the foundation of his spirit1 of which more than one trait can be found in his works1 if he had seen them consecrated1 maintained1 continually recalled to the heart and imagination of man by sublime and touching institutions1 what would have been his tender and grateful sympathy for such a religion6 ,if he had come in our own times1 in that age given up to revolutions1 in which the best souls were early infected by the breath of skepticism1 in default of the faith of an ,augustine1 of an ,anselm1 of a ,thomas1 of a ,bossuet1 he would have had1 we doubt not1 the sentiments at least of a ,montesquieu1#bei of a ,turgot1#bfj of a ,franklin1#bfa and very far from putting the ,christian religion and a good philosophy at war with each other1 he would have been forced to unite them1 to elucidate and fortify them by each other4 ,that great mind and that great heart1 which dictated to him the ,phedon1 the ,gorgias1 the ,republic1 would also have taught him that such books are made for a few sages1 that there is needed for the human race a philosophy at once similar and different1 that this philosophy is a religion1 and that this desirable and necessary religion is the ,gospel4 ,we do not hesitate to say that1 without religion1 philosophy1 reduced to what it can laboriously draw from perfected natural reason1 addresses itself to a very small number1 and runs the risk of remaining without much influence on manners and life2 and that1 without philosophy1 the purest religion is no security against many superstitions1 which little by little bring all the rest1 and for that reason it may see the best minds escaping its influence1 as was the case in the eighteenth century4 ,the alliance between true religion and true philosophy is1 then1 at once natural and necessary2 natural by the common basis of the truths which they acknowledge2 necessary for the better service of humanity4 ,philosophy and religion differ only in the forms that distinguish1 without separating them4 ,another auditory1 other forms1 and another language4 ,when ,st4 ,augustine speaks to all the faithful in the church of ,hippone1 do not seek in him the subtile and profound metaphysician who combated the ,academicians with their own arms1 who supports himself on the ,platonic theory of ideas1 in order to explain the creation4 ,bossuet1 in the treatise ,de la ,connaissance de ,dieu et ,soi-meme1 is no longer1 and at the same time he is always1 the author of the ,sermons1 of the ,elevations1 and the incomparable ,catechisme de ,meaux4 ,to separate religion and philosophy has always been1 on one side or the other1 the pretension of small1 exclusive1 and fanatical minds2 the duty1 more imperative now than ever1 of whomsoever has for either a serious and enlightened love1 is to bring together and unite1 instead of dividing and wasting the powers of the mind and the soul1 in the interest of the common cause and the great object which the ,christian religion and philosophy pursue1 each in its own way1--,i mean the moral grandeur of humanity4#bfb ,,footnotes3 #bde ,lectures #d and #g4 #bdf ,such is the common vice of nearly all theodiceas1 without excepting the best--that of ,leibnitz1 that of ,clarke2 even the most popular of all1 the ,profession de ,foi du ,vicaire ,savoyard4 ,see our small work entitled ,philosophie ,populaire1 #c;d edition1 p4 #hb4 #bdg ,on the ,cartesian argument1 see above1 part #ast1 lecture #d2 see also #ast ,series1 vol4 iv41 lecture #ab1 and especially vol4 v41 lecture #f4 #bdh ,fragments de ,philosophie ,cartesienne1 p4 #bd3 ,the infinite being1 inasmuch as infinite1 is not a mover1 a cause2 neither is he1 inasmuch as infinite1 an intelligence2 neither is he a will2 neither is he a principle of justice1 nor much less a principle of love4 ,we have no right to impute to him all these attributes in virtue of the single argument that every contingent being supposes a being that is not so1 that every finite supposes an infinite4 ,the ,god given by this argument is the ,god of ,spinoza1 is rigorously so2 but he is almost as though he were not1 at least for us who with difficulty perceive him in the inaccessible heights of an eternity and existence that are absolute1 void of thought1 of liberty1 of love1 similar to nonentity itself1 and a thousand times inferior1 in his infinity and eternity1 to an hour of our finite and perishable existence1 if during this fleeting hour we know what we are1 if we think1 if we love something else than ourselves1 if we feel capable of freely sacrificing to an idea the few minutes that have been accorded to us4 #bdi ,this theodicea is here in resume1 and in the #dth and #eth lectures of part first1 as well as in the lecture that follows4 ,the most important of our different writings1 on this point1 will be found collected and elucidated by each other1 in the ,appendix to the #eth lecture of the first volume of the #ast ,series4--,see our translation of this entire ,series of ,m4 ,cousin's works1 under the title of the ,history of ,modern ,philosophy4 #bej #c;d ,series1 vol4 iv41 advertisement to the #c;d edition3 ,without vain subtilty1 there is a real distinction between free will and spontaneous liberty4 ,arbitrary freedom is volition with the appearance of deliberation between different objects1 and under this supreme condition1 that when1 as a consequence of deliberation1 we resolve to do this or that1 we have the immediate consciousness of having been able1 and of being able still1 to will the contrary4 ,it is in volition1 and in the retinue of phenomena which surround it1 that liberty more energetically appears1 but it is not thereby exhausted4 ,it is at rare and sublime moments in which liberty is as much greater as it appears less to the eyes of a superficial observation4 ,i have often cited the example of d',assas4 ,d',assas did not deliberate2 and for all that1 was d',assas less free1 did he not act with entire liberty8 ,has the saint who1 after a long and painful exercise of virtue1 has come to practise1 as it were by nature1 the acts of self-renunciation which are repugnant to human weakness2 has the saint1 in order to have gone out from the contradictions and the anguish of this form of liberty which we called volition1 fallen below it instead of being elevated above it2 and is he nothing more than a blind and passive instrument of grace1 as ,luther and ,calvin have inappropriately wished to call it1 by an excessive interpretation of the ,augustinian doctrine8 ,no1 freedom still remains2 and far from being annihilated1 its liberty1 in being purified1 is elevated and ennobled2 from the human form of volition it has passed to the almost divine form of spontaneity4 ,spontaneity is essentially free1 although it may be accompanied with no deliberation1 and although often1 in the rapid motion of its inspired action1 it escapes its own observation1 and leaves scarcely a trace in the depths of consciousness4 ,let us transfer this exact psychology to theodicea1 and we may recognize without hypothesis1 that spontaneity is also especially the form of ,god's liberty4 ,yes1 certainly1 ,god is free2 for1 among other proofs1 it would be absurd that there should be less freedom in the first cause than in one of its effects1 humanity2 ,god is free1 but not with that liberty which is related to our double nature1 and made to contend against passion and error1 and painfully to engender virtue and our imperfect knowledge2 he is free1 with a liberty that is related to his own divine nature1 that is a liberty unlimited1 infinite1 recognizing no obstacle4 ,between justice and injustice1 between good and evil1 between reason and its contrary1 ,god cannot deliberate1 and1 consequently1 cannot will after our manner4 ,can one conceive1 in fact1 that he could take what we call the bad part8 ,this very supposition is impious4 ,it is necessary to admit that when he has taken the contrary part1 he has acted freely without doubt1 but not arbitrarily1 and with the consciousness of having been able to choose the other part4 ,his nature1 all-powerful1 all-just1 all-wise1 is developed with that spontaneity which contains entire liberty1 and excludes at once the efforts and the miseries of volition1 and the mechanical operation of necessity4 ,such is the principle and the true character of the divine action4 #bea ,timaeus1 p4 #aai1 vol4 xii4 of our translation4 #beb ,de l',art de prolonger sa ,vie1 etc4 #bec ,on the spirituality of the soul1 see all our writings4 ,we will limit ourselves to two citations4 #b;d ,series1 vol4 iii41 lecture #be1 p4 #hei3 ,it is impossible to know any phenomenon of consciousness1 the phenomena of sensation1 or volition1 or of intelligence1 without instantly referring them to a subject one and identical1 which is the me2 so we cannot know the external phenomena of resistance1 of solidity1 of impenetrability1 of figure1 of color1 of smell1 of taste1 etc41 without judging that these are not phenomena in appearance1 but phenomena which belong to something real1 which is solid1 impenetrable1 figured1 colored1 odorous1 savory1 etc4 ,on the other hand1 if you did not know any of the phenomena of consciousness1 you would never have the least idea of the subject of these phenomena2 if you did not know any of the external phenomena of resistance1 of solidity1 of impenetrability1 of figure1 of color1 etc41 you would not have any idea of the subject of these phenomena3 therefore the characters1 whether of the phenomena of consciousness1 or of exterior phenomena1 are for you the only signs of the nature of the subjects of these phenomena4 ,in examining the phenomena which fall under the senses1 we find between them grave differences upon which it is useless here to insist1 and which establish the distinction of primary qualities and of secondary qualities4 ,in the first rank among the primary qualities is solidity1 which is given to you in the sensation of resistance1 and inevitably accompanied by form1 etc4 ,on the contrary1 when you examine the phenomena of consciousness1 you do not therein find this character of resistance1 of solidity1 of form1 etc42 you do not find that the phenomena of your consciousness have a figure1 solidity1 impenetrability1 resistance2 without speaking of secondary qualities which are equally foreign to them1 color1 savor1 sound1 smell1 etc4 ,now1 as the subject is for us only the collection of the phenomena which reveal it to us1 together with its own existence in so far as the subject of the inherence of these phenomena1 it follows that1 under phenomena marked with dissimilar characters and entirely foreign to each other1 the human mind conceives dissimilar and foreign subjects4 ,thus as solidity and figure have nothing in common with sensation1 will1 and thought1 as every solid is extended for us1 and as we place it necessarily in space1 while our thoughts1 our volitions1 our sensations1 are for us unextended1 and while we cannot conceive them and place them in space1 but only in time1 the human mind concludes with perfect strictness that the subject of the exterior phenomena has the character of the latter1 and that the subject of the phenomena of consciousness has the character of the former2 that the one is solid and extended1 and that the other is neither solid nor extended4 ,finally1 as that which is solid and extended is divisible1 and as that which is neither solid nor extended is indivisible1 hence divisibility is attributed to the solid and extended subject1 and indivisibility attributed to the subject which is neither extended nor solid4 ,who of us1 in fact1 does not believe himself an indivisible being1 one and identical1 the same yesterday1 to-day1 and to-morrow8 ,well1 the word body1 the word matter1 signifies nothing else than the subject of external phenomena1 the most eminent of which are form1 impenetrability1 solidity1 extension1 divisibility4 ,the word mind1 the word soul1 signifies nothing else than the subject of the phenomena of consciousness1 thought1 will1 sensation1 phenomena simple1 unextended1 not solid1 etc4 ,behold the whole idea of spirit1 and the whole idea of matter6 ,see1 therefore1 all that must be done in order to bring back matter to spirit1 and spirit to matter3 it is necessary to pretend that sensation1 volition1 thought1 are reducible in the last analysis to solidity1 extension1 figure1 divisibility1 etc41 or that solidity1 extension1 figure1 etc41 are reducible to thought1 volition1 sensation4 #ast ,series1 vol4 iii41 lecture ,i1 ,locke4 ,locke pretends that we cannot be certain by the contemplation of our own ideas1 that matter cannot think2 on the contrary1 it is in the contemplation itself of our ideas that we clearly perceive that matter and thought are incompatible4 ,what is thinking8 ,is it not uniting a certain number of ideas under a certain unity8 ,the simplest judgment supposes several terms united in a subject1 one and identical1 which is me4 ,this identical me is implied in every real act of knowledge4 ,it has been demonstrated to satiety that comparison exacts an indivisible centre that comprises the different terms of the comparison4 ,do you take memory8 ,there is no memory possible without the continuation of the same subject that refers to self the different modifications by which it has been successively affected4 ,finally1 consciousness1 that indispensable condition of intelligence1--is it not the sentiment of a single being8 ,this is the reason why each man cannot think without saying me1 without affirming that he is himself the identical and one subject of his thoughts4 ,i am me and always me1 as you are always yourself in the most different acts of your life4 ,you are not more yourself to-day than you were yesterday1 and you are not less yourself to-day than you were yesterday4 ,this identity and this indivisible unity of the me inseparable from the least thought1 is what is called its spirituality1 in opposition to the evident and necessary characters of matter4 ,by what1 in fact1 do you know matter8 ,it is especially by form1 by extension1 by something solid that stops you1 that resists you in different points of space4 ,but is not a solid essentially divisible8 ,take the most subtile fluids1--can you help conceiving them as more or less susceptible of division8 ,all thought has its different elements like matter1 but in addition it has its unity in the thinking subject1 and the subject being taken away1 which is one1 the total phenomenon no longer exists4 ,far from that1 the unknown subject to which we attach material phenomena is divisible1 and divisible ad infinitum2 it cannot cease to be divisible without ceasing to exist4 ,such are the ideas that we have1 on the one side1 of mind1 on the other1 of matter4 ,thought supposes a subject essentially one2 matter is infinitely divisible4 ,what is the need of going farther8 ,if any conclusion is legitimate1 it is that which distinguishes thought from matter4 ,god can indeed make them exist together1 and their co-existence is a certain fact1 but he cannot confound them4 ,god can unite thought and matter1 he cannot make matter thought1 nor what is extended simple4 #bed ,see #ast part1 lecture #a4 #bee ,see lecture #e1 ,mysticism4 #bef #dth ,series1 vol4 iii41 ,santa-,rosa3 ,after all1 the existence of a divine ,providence is1 to my eyes1 a truth clearer than all lights1 more certain than all mathematics4 ,yes1 there is a ,god1 a ,god who is a true intelligence1 who consequently has a consciousness of himself1 who has made and ordered every thing with weight and measure1 whose works are excellent1 whose ends are adorable1 even when they are veiled from our feeble eyes4 ,this world has a perfect author1 perfectly wise and good4 ,man is not an orphan2 he has a father in heaven4 ,what will this father do with his child when he returns to him8 ,nothing but what is good4 ,whatever happens1 all will be well4 ,every thing that he has done has been done well2 every thing that he shall do1 ,i accept beforehand1 and bless4 ,yes1 such is my unalterable faith1 and this faith is my support1 my refuge1 my consolation1 my solace in this fearful moment4 #beg ,see our discussion on the ,pensees de ,pascal1 vol4 i4 of the #dth ,series4 #beh ,see the end of the first book of the ,republic1 vol4 ix4 of our translation4 #bei ,esprit des ,lois1 passim4 #bfj ,works of ,turgot1 vol4 ii41 ,discours en ,sorbonne sur les ,avantages que l'etablissement du ,christianism a procures au ,genre ,humain1 etc4 #bfa ,in the ,correspondence1 the letter to ,dr4 ,stiles1 ,march #i1 #agij1 written by ,franklin a few months before his death3 ,i am convinced that the moral and religious system which ,jesus ,christ has transmitted to us is the best that the world has seen or can see4--,we here re-translate1 not having the works of ,franklin immediately at hand4 #bfb ,we have not ceased to claim1 to earnestly call for1 the alliance between ,christianity and philosophy1 as well as the alliance between the monarchy and liberty4 ,see particularly #c;d ,series1 vol4 iv41 ,philosophie ,contemporaine1 preface of the second edition2 #dth ,series1 vol4 i41 ,pascal1 #ast and #b;d preface1 passim2 #eth ,series1 vol4 ii41 ,discours a la ,chambre des ,paris pour le ,defence de l',universite et de la ,philosophie4 ,we everywhere profess the most tender veneration for ,christianity1--we have only repelled the servitude of philosophy1 with ,descartes1 and the most illustrious doctors of ancient and modern times1 from ,st4 ,augustine and ,st4 ,thomas1 to the ,cardinal de la ,lucerne and the ,bishop of ,hermopolis4 ,moreover1 we love to think that those quarrels1 originating in other times from the deplorable strife between the clergy and the ,university1 have not survived it1 and that now all sincere friends of religion and philosophy will give each other the hand1 and will work in concert to encourage desponding souls and lift up burdened characters4 ,,lecture ,,xvii4 ,,resume ,,of ,,doctrine4 ,review of the doctrine contained in these lectures1 and the three orders of facts on which this doctrine rests1 with the relation of each one of them to the modern school that has recognized and developed it1 but almost always exaggerated it4--,experience and empiricism4--,reason and idealism4--,sentiment and mysticism4--,theodicea4 ,defects of different known systems4--,the process that conducts to true theodicea1 and the character of certainty and reality that this process gives to it4 ,having arrived at the limit of this course1 we have a final task to perform1--it is necessary to recall its general spirit and most important results4 ,from the first lecture1 ,i have signalized to you the spirit that should animate this instruction1--a spirit of free inquiry1 recognizing with joy the truth wherever found1 profiting by all the systems that the eighteenth century has bequeathed to our times1 but confining itself to none of them4 ,the eighteenth century has left to us as an inheritance three great schools which still endure--the ,english and ,french school1 whose chief is ,locke1 among whose most accredited representatives are ,condillac1 ,helvetius1 and ,saint-,lambert2 the ,scotch school1 with so many celebrated names1 ,hutcheson1 ,smith1 ,reid1 ,beattie1 ,ferguson1 and ,dugald ,stewart2#bfc the ,german school1 or rather school of ,kant1 for1 of all the philosophers beyond the ,rhine1 the philosopher of ,koenigsberg is almost the only one who belongs to history4 ,kant died at the beginning of the nineteenth century2#bfd the ashes of his most illustrious disciple1 ,fichte1#bfe are scarcely cold4 ,the other renowned philosophers of ,germany still live1#bff and escape our valuation4 ,but this is only an ethnographical enumeration of the schools of the eighteenth century4 ,it is above all necessary to consider them in their characters1 analogous or opposite4 ,the ,anglo-,french school particularly represents empiricism and sensualism1 that is to say1 an almost exclusive importance attributed in all parts of human knowledge to experience in general1 and especially to sensible experience4 ,the ,scotch school and the ,german school represent a more or less developed spiritualism4 ,finally1 there are philosophers1 for example1 ,hutcheson1 ,smith1 and others1 who1 mistrusting the senses and reason1 give the supremacy to sentiment4 ,such are the philosophic schools in the presence of which the nineteenth century is placed4 ,we are compelled to avow1 that none of these1 to our eyes1 contains the entire truth4 ,it has been demonstrated that a considerable part of knowledge escapes sensation1 and we think that sentiment is a basis neither sufficiently firm1 nor sufficiently broad1 to support all human science4 ,we are1 therefore1 rather the adversary than the partisan of the school of ,locke and ,condillac1 and of that of ,hutcheson and ,smith4 ,are we on that account the disciple of ,reid and ,kant8 ,yes1 certainly1 we declare our preference for the direction impressed upon philosophy by these two great men4 ,we regard ,reid as common sense itself1 and we believe that we thus eulogize him in a manner that would touch him most4 ,common sense is to us the only legitimate point of departure1 and the constant and inviolable rule of science4 ,reid never errs2 his method is true1 his general principles are incontestable1 but we will willingly say to this irreproachable genius1--,sapere aude4 ,kant is far from being as sure a guide as ,reid4 ,both excel in analysis2 but ,reid stops there1 and ,kant builds upon analysis a system irreconcilable with it4 ,he elevates reason above sensation and sentiment2 he shows with great skill how reason produces by itself1 and by the laws attached to its exercise1 nearly all human knowledge2 there is only one misfortune1 which is that all this fine edifice is destitute of reality4 ,dogmatical in analysis1 ,kant is skeptical in his conclusions4 ,his skepticism is the most learned1 most moral1 that ever existed2 but1 in fine1 it is always skepticism4 ,this is saying plainly enough that we are far from belonging to the school of the philosopher of ,koenigsberg4 ,in general1 in the history of philosophy1 we are in favor of systems that are themselves in favor of reason4 ,accordingly1 in antiquity1 we side with ,plato against his adversaries2 among the moderns1 with ,descartes against ,locke1 with ,reid against ,hume1 with ,kant against both ,condillac and ,smith4 ,but while we acknowledge reason as a power superior to sensation and sentiment1 as being1 par excellence1 the faculty of every kind of knowledge1 the faculty of the true1 the faculty of the beautiful1 the faculty of the good1 we are persuaded that reason cannot be developed without conditions that are foreign to it1 cannot suffice for the government of man without the aid of another power3 that power which is not reason1 which reason cannot do without1 is sentiment2 those conditions1 without which reason cannot be developed1 are the senses4 ,it is seen what for us is the importance of sensation and sentiment3 how1 consequently1 it is impossible for us absolutely to condemn either the philosophy of sensation1 or1 much more1 that of sentiment4 ,such are the very simple foundations of our eclecticism4 ,it is not in us the fruit of a desire for innovation1 and for making ourself a place apart among the historians of philosophy2 no1 it is philosophy itself that imposes on us our historical views4 ,it is not our fault if ,god has made the human soul larger than all systems1 and we also aver that we are also much rejoiced that all systems are not absurd4 ,without giving the lie to the most certain facts signalized and established by ourself1 it was indeed necessary1 on finding them scattered in the history of philosophy1 to recognize and respect them1 and if the history of philosophy1 thus considered1 no longer appeared a mass of senseless systems1 a chaos1 without light1 and without issue2 if1 on the contrary1 it became1 in some sort1 a living philosophy1 that was1 it should seem1 a progress on which one might felicitate himself1 one of the most fortunate conquests of the nineteenth century1 the very triumphing of the philosophic spirit4 ,we have1 therefore1 no doubt in regard to the excellence of the enterprise2 the whole question for us is in the execution4 ,let us see1 let us compare what we have done with what we have wished to do4 ,let us ask1 in the first place1 whether we have been just towards that great philosophy represented in antiquity by ,aristotle1 whose best model among the moderns is the wise author of the ,essay on the ,human ,understanding4 ,there is in the philosophy of sensation what is true and what is false4 ,the false is the pretension of explaining all human knowledge by the acquisitions of the senses2 this pretension is the system itself2 we reject it1 and the system with it4 ,the true is that sensibility1 considered in its external and visible organs1 and in its internal organs1 the invisible seats of the vital functions1 is the indispensable condition of the development of all our faculties1 not only of the faculties that evidently pertain to sensibility1 but of those that seem to be most remote from it4 ,this true side of sensualism we have everywhere recognized and elucidated in metaphysics1 aesthetics1 ethics1 and theodicea4 ,for us1 theodicea1 ethics1 aesthetics1 metaphysics1 rest on psychology1 and the first principle of our psychology is that the condition of all exercise of mind and soul is an impression made on our organs1 and a movement of the vital functions4 ,man is not a pure spirit2 he has a body which is for the spirit sometimes an obstacle1 sometimes a means1 always an inseparable companion4 ,the senses are not1 as ,plato and ,malebranche have too often said1 a prison for the soul1 but much rather windows looking out upon nature1 through which the soul communicates with the universe4 ,there is an entire part of ,locke's polemic against the theories of innate ideas that is to our eyes perfectly true4 ,we are the first to invoke experience in philosophy4 ,experience saves philosophy from hypothesis1 from abstraction1 from the exclusively deductive method1 that is to say1 from the geometrical method4 ,it is on account of having abandoned the solid ground of experience1 that ,spinoza1 attaching himself to certain sides of ,cartesianism1#bfg and closing his eyes to all the others1 forgetting its method1 its essential character1 and its most certain principles1 reared a hypothetical system1 or made from an arbitrary definition spring with the last degree of rigor a whole series of deductions1 which have nothing to do with reality4 ,it is also on account of having exchanged experience for a systematic analysis1 that ,condillac1 an unfaithful disciple of ,locke1 undertook to draw from a single fact1 and from an ill-observed fact1 all knowledge1 by the aid of a series of verbal transformations1 whose last result is a nominalism1 like that of the later scholastics4 ,experience does not contain all science1 but it furnishes the conditions of all science4 ,space is nothing for us without visible and tangible bodies that occupy it1 time is nothing without the succession of events1 cause without its effects1 substance without its modes1 law without the phenomena that it rules4#bfh ,reason would reveal to us no universal and necessary truth1 if consciousness and the senses did not suggest to us particular and contingent notions4 ,in aesthetics1 while severely distinguishing between the beautiful and the agreeable1 we have shown that the agreeable is the constant accompaniment of the beautiful1#bfi and that if art has for its supreme law the expression of the ideal1 it must express it under an animated and living form which puts it in relation with our senses1 with our imagination1 above all1 with our heart4 ,in ethics1 if we have placed ,kant and stoicism far above epicureanism and ,helvetius1 we have guarded ourselves against an insensibility and an asceticism which are contrary to human nature4 ,we have given to reason neither the duty nor the right to smother the natural passions1 but to rule them2 we have not wished to wrest from the soul the instinct of happiness1 without which life would not be supportable for a day1 nor society for an hour2 we have proposed to enlighten this instinct1 to show it the concealed but real harmony which it sustains with virtue1 and to open to it infinite prospects4#bgj ,with these empirical elements1 idealism is guarded from that mystical infatuation which1 little by little1 gains and seizes it when it is wholly alone1 and brings it into discredit with sound and severe minds4 ,in our works--and why should we not say it8--we have often presented the thought of ,locke1 whom we regard as one of the best and most sensible men that ever lived4 ,he is among those secret and illustrious advisers with whom we support our weakness4 ,more than one happy thought we owe to him2 and we often ask ourself whether investigations directed with the circumspect method which we try to carry into ours1 would not have been accepted by his sincerity and wisdom4 ,locke is for us the true representative1 the most original1 and altogether the most temperate of the empirical school4 ,tied to a system1 he still preserves a rare spirit of liberty1--under the name of reflection he admits another source of knowledge than sensation2 and this concession to common sense is very important4 ,condillac1 by rejecting this concession1 carried to extremes and spoiled the doctrine of ,locke1 and made of it a narrow1 exclusive1 entirely false system1--sensualism1 to speak properly4 ,condillac works upon chimeras reduced to signs1 with which he sports at his ease4 ,we seek in vain in his writings1 especially in the last1 some trace of human nature4 ,one truly believes himself to be in the realm of shades1 per inania regna4#bga ,the ,essay on the ,human ,understanding produces the opposite impression4 ,locke is a disciple of ,descartes1 whom the excesses of ,malebranche have thrown to an opposite excess3 he is one of the founders of psychology1 he is one of the finest and most profound connoisseurs of human nature1 and his doctrine1 somewhat unsteady but always moderate1 is worthy of having a place in a true eclecticism4#bgb ,by the side of the philosophy of ,locke1 there is one much greater1 which it is important to preserve from all exaggeration1 in order to maintain it in all its height4 ,founded in antiquity by ,socrates1 constituted by ,plato1 renewed by ,descartes1 idealism embraces1 among the moderns1 men of the highest renown4 ,it speaks to man in the name of what is noblest in man4 ,it demands the rights of reason2 it establishes in science1 in art1 and in ethics fixed and invariable principles1 and from this imperfect existence it elevates us towards another world1 the world of the eternal1 of the infinite1 of the absolute4 ,this great philosophy has all our preferences1 and we shall not be accused of having given it too little place in these lectures4 ,in the eighteenth century it was especially represented in different degrees by ,reid and ,kant4 ,we wholly accept ,reid1 with the exception of his historical views1 which are too insufficient1 and often mixed with error4#bgc ,there are two parts in ,kant1--the analytical part1 and the dialectical part1 as he calls them4#bgd ,we admit the one and reject the other4 ,in this whole course we have borrowed much from the ,critique of ,speculative ,reason1 the ,critique of ,judgment1 and the ,critique of ,practical ,reason4 ,these three works are1 in our eyes1 admirable monuments of philosophic genius1--they are filled with treasures of observation and analysis4#bge ,with ,reid and ,kant1 we recognize reason as the faculty of the true1 the beautiful1 and the good4 ,it is to its proper virtue that we directly refer knowledge in its humblest and in its most elevated part4 ,all the systematic pretensions of sensualism are broken against the manifest reality of universal and necessary truths which are incontestably in our mind4 ,at each instant1 whether we know it or not1 we bear universal and necessary judgments4 ,in the simplest propositions is enveloped the principle of substance and being4 ,we cannot take a step in life without concluding from an event in the existence of its cause4 ,these principles are absolutely true1 they are true everywhere and always4 ,now1 experience apprises us of what happens here and there1 to-day or yesterday2 but of what happens everywhere and always1 especially of what cannot but happen1 how can it apprise us1 since it is itself always limited to time and space8 ,there are1 then1 in man principles superior to experience4 ,such principles can alone give a firm basis to science4 ,phenomena are the objects of science only so far as they reveal something superior to themselves1 that is to say1 laws4 ,natural history does not study such or such an individual1 but the generic type that every individual bears in itself1 that alone remains unchangeable1 when the individuals pass away and vanish4 ,if there is in us no other faculty of knowing than sensation1 we never know aught but what is passing in things1 and that1 too1 we know only with the most uncertain knowledge1 since sensibility will be its only measure1 which is so variable in itself and so different in different individuals4 ,each of us will have his own science1 a science contradictory and fragile1 which one moment produces and another destroys1 false as well as true1 since what is true for me is false for you1 and will even be false for me in a little while4 ,such are science and truth in the doctrine of sensation4 ,on the contrary1 necessary and immutable principles found a science necessary and immutable as themselves1--the truth which they gave as is neither mine nor yours1 neither the truth of to-day1 nor that of to-morrow1 but truth in itself4 ,the same spirit transferred to aesthetics has enabled us to seize the beautiful by the side of the agreeable1 and1 above different and imperfect beauties which nature offers to us1 to seize an ideal beauty1 one and perfect1 without a model in nature1 and the only model worthy of genius4 ,in ethics we have shown that there is an essential distinction between good and evil2 that the idea of the good is an idea just as absolute as the idea of the beautiful and that of the true2 that the good is a universal and necessary truth1 marked with the particular character that it ought to be practised4 ,by the side of interest1 which is the law of sensibility1 reason has made us recognize the law of duty1 which a free being can alone fulfil4 ,from these ethics has sprung a generous political doctrine1 giving to right a sure foundation in the respect due to the person1 establishing true liberty1 and true equality1 and calling for institutions1 protective of both1 which do not rest on the mobile and arbitrary will of the legislator1 whether people or monarch1 but on the nature of things1 on truth and justice4 ,from empiricism we have retained the maxim which gives empiricism its whole force--that the conditions of science1 of art1 of ethics1 are in experience1 and often in sensible experience4 ,but we profess at the same time this other maxim1 that the foundation of science is absolute truth1 that the direct foundation of art is absolute beauty1 that the direct foundation of ethics and politics is the good1 is duty1 is right1 and that what reveals to us these absolute ideas of the true1 the beautiful1 and the good1 is reason4 ,the foundation of our doctrine is1 therefore1 idealism rightly tempered by empiricism4 ,but what would be the use of having restored to reason the power of elevating itself to absolute principles1 placed above experience1 although experience furnishes their external conditions1 if1 to adopt the language of ,kant1#bgf these principles have no objective value8 ,what good could result from having determined with a precision until then unknown the respective domains of experience and reason1 if1 wholly superior as it is to the senses and experience1 reason is captive in their inclosure1 and we know nothing beyond with certainty8 ,thereby1 then1 we return by a detour to skepticism to which sensualism conducts us directly1 and at less expense4 ,to say that there is no principle of causality1 or to say that this principle has no force out of the subject that possesses it1--is it not saying the same thing8 ,kant avows that man has no right to affirm that there are out of him real causes1 time1 or space1 or that he himself has a spiritual and free soul4 ,this acknowledgment would perfectly satisfy ,hume2 it would be of very little importance to him that the reason of man1 according to ,kant1 might conceive1 and even could not but conceive1 the ideas of cause1 time1 space1 liberty1 spirit1 provided these ideas are applied to nothing real4 ,i see therein1 at most1 only a torment for human reason1 at once so poor and so rich1 so full and so void4 ,a third doctrine1 finding sensation insufficient1 and also discontented with reason1 which it confounds with reasoning1 thinks to approach common sense by making science1 art1 and ethics rest on sentiment4 ,it would have us confide ourselves to the instinct of the heart1 to that instinct1 nobler than sensation1 and more subtle than reasoning4 ,is it not the heart1 in fact1 that feels the beautiful and the good8 ,is it not the heart that1 in all the great circumstances of life1 when passion and sophism obscure to our eyes the holy idea of duty and virtue1 makes it shine forth with an irresistible light1 and1 at the same time1 warms us1 animates us1 and gives us the courage to practise it8 ,we also have recognized that admirable phenomenon which is called sentiment2 we even believe that here will be found a more precise and more complete analysis of it than in the writings where sentiment reigns alone4 ,yes1 there is an exquisite pleasure attached to the contemplation of the truth1 to the reproduction of the beautiful1 to the practice of the good2 there is in us an innate love for all these things2 and when great rigor is not aimed at1 it may very well be said that it is the heart which discerns truth1 that the heart is and ought to be the light and guide of our life4 ,to the eyes of an unpractised analysis1 reason in its natural and spontaneous exercise is confounded with sentiment by a multitude of resemblances4#bgg ,sentiment is intimately attached to reason2 it is its sensible form4 ,at the foundation of sentiment is reason1 which communicates to it its authority1 whilst sentiment lends to reason its charm and power4 ,is not the widest spread and the most touching proof of the existence of ,god that spontaneous impulse of the heart which1 in the consciousness of our miseries1 and at the sight of the imperfections of our race which press upon our attention1 irresistibly suggests to us the confused idea of an infinite and perfect being1 fills us1 at this idea1 with an inexpressible emotion1 moistens our eyes with tears1 or even prostrates us on our knees before him whom the heart reveals to us1 even when the reason refuses to believe in him8 ,but look more closely1 and you will see that this incredulous reason is reasoning supported by principles whose bearing is insufficient2 you will see that what reveals the infinite and perfect being is precisely reason itself2#bgh and that1 in turn1 it is this revelation of the infinite by reason1 which1 passing into sentiment1 produces the emotion and the inspiration that we have mentioned4 ,may heaven grant that we shall never reject the aid of sentiment6 ,on the contrary1 we invoke it both for others and ourself4 ,here we are with the people1 or rather we are the people4 ,it is to the light of the heart1 which is borrowed from that of reason1 but reflects it more vividly in the depths of the soul1 that we confide ourselves1 in order to preserve all great truths in the soul of the ignorant1 and even to save them in the mind of the philosopher from the aberrations or refinements of an ambitious philosophy4 ,we think1 with ,quintilian and ,vauvenargues1 that the nobility of sentiment makes the nobility of thought4 ,enthusiasm is the principle of great works as well as of great actions4 ,without the love of the beautiful1 the artist will produce only works that are perhaps regular but frigid1 that will possibly please the geometrician1 but not the man of taste4 ,in order to communicate life to the canvas1 to the marble1 to speech1 it must be born in one's self4 ,it is the heart mingled with logic that makes true eloquence2 it is the heart mingled with imagination that makes great poetry4 ,think of ,homer1 of ,corneille1 of ,bossuet1--their most characteristic trait is pathos1 and pathos is a cry of the soul4 ,but it is especially in ethics that sentiment shines forth4 ,sentiment1 as we have already said1 is as it were a divine grace that aids us in the fulfilment of the serious and austere law of duty4 ,how often does it happen that in delicate1 complicated1 difficult situations1 we know not how to ascertain wherein is the true1 wherein is the good6 ,sentiment comes to the aid of reasoning which wavers2 it speaks1 and all uncertainties are dissipated4 ,in listening to its inspirations1 we may act imprudently1 but we rarely act ill3 the voice of the heart is the voice of ,god4 ,we1 therefore1 give a prominent place to this noble element of human nature4 ,we believe that man is quite as great by heart as by reason4 ,we have a high regard for the generous writers who1 in the looseness of principles and manners in the eighteenth century1 opposed the baseness of calculation and interest with the beauty of sentiment4 ,we are with ,hutcheson against ,hobbes1 with ,rousseau against ,helvetius1 with the author of ,woldemar#bgi against the ethics of egoism or those of the schools4 ,we borrow from them what truth they have1 we leave their useless or dangerous exaggerations4 ,sentiment must be joined to reason2 but reason must not be replaced by sentiment4 ,in the first place1 it is contrary to facts to take reason for reasoning1 and to envelop them in the same criticism4 ,and then1 after all1 reasoning is the legitimate instrument of reason2 its value is determined by that of the principles on which it rests4 ,in the next place1 reason1 and especially spontaneous reason1 is1 like sentiment1 immediate and direct2 it goes straight to its object1 without passing through analysis1 abstraction1 and deduction1 excellent operations without doubt1 but they suppose a primary operation1 the pure and simple apperception of the truth4#bhj ,it is wrong to attribute this apperception to sentiment4 ,sentiment is an emotion1 not a judgment2 it enjoys or suffers1 it loves or hates1 it does not know4 ,it is not universal like reason2 and as it still pertains on some side to organization1 it even borrows from the organization something of its inconstancy4 ,in fine1 sentiment follows reason1 and does not precede it4 ,therefore1 in suppressing reason1 we suppress the sentiment which emanates from it1 and science1 art1 and ethics lack firm and solid bases4 ,psychology1 aesthetics1 and ethics1 have conducted us to an order of investigations more difficult and more elevated1 which are mingled with all the others1 and crown them--theodicea4 ,we know that theodicea is the rock of philosophy4 ,we might shun it1 and stop in the regions--already very high--of the universal and necessary principles of the true1 the beautiful1 and the good1 without going farther1 without ascending to the principles of these principles1 to the reason of reason1 to the source of truth4 ,but such a prudence is1 at bottom1 only a disguised skepticism4 ,either philosophy is not1 or it is the last explanation of all things4 ,is it1 then1 true that ,god is to us an inexplicable enigma1--he without whom the most certain of all things that thus far we have discovered would be for us an insupportable enigma8 ,if philosophy is incapable of arriving at the knowledge of ,god1 it is powerless2 for if it does not possess ,god1 it possesses nothing4 ,but we are convinced that the need of knowing has not been given us in vain1 and that the desire of knowing the principle of our being bears witness to the right and power of knowing which we have4 ,accordingly1 after having discoursed to you about the true1 the beautiful1 and the good1 we have not feared to speak to you of ,god4 ,more than one road may lead us to ,god4 ,we do not pretend to close any of them2 but it was necessary for us to follow the one that was open to us1 that which the nature and subject of our instruction opened to us4 ,universal and necessary truths are not general ideas which our mind draws by way of reasoning from particular things2 for particular things are relative and contingent1 and cannot contain the universal and necessary4 ,on the other hand1 these truths do not subsist by themselves2 they would thus be only pure abstractions1 suspended in vacuity and without relation to any thing4 ,truth1 beauty1 and goodness are attributes and not entities4 ,now there are no attributes without a subject4 ,and as here the question is concerning absolute truth1 beauty and goodness1 their substance can be nothing else than absolute being4 ,it is thus that we arrive at ,god4 ,once more1 there are many other means of arriving at him2 but we hold fast to this legitimate and sure way4 ,for us1 as for ,plato1 whom we have defended against a too narrow interpretation1#bha absolute truth is in ,god1--it is ,god himself under one of his phases4 ,since ,plato1 the greatest minds1 ,saint ,augustine1 ,descartes1 ,bossuet1 ,leibnitz1 agree in putting in ,god1 as in their source1 the principles of knowledge as well as existence4 ,from him things derive at once their intelligibility and their being4 ,it is by the participation of the divine reason that our reason possesses something absolute4 ,every judgment of reason envelops a necessary truth1 and every necessary truth supposes necessary being4 ,if all perfection belongs to the perfect being1 ,god will possess beauty in its plenitude4 ,the father of the world1 of its laws1 of its ravishing harmonies1 the author of forms1 colors1 and sounds1 he is the principle of beauty in nature4 ,it is he whom we adore1 without knowing it1 under the name of the ideal1 when our imagination1 borne on from beauties to beauties1 calls for a final beauty in which it may find repose4 ,it is to him that the artist1 discontented with the imperfect beauties of nature and those that he creates himself1 comes to ask for higher inspirations4 ,it is in him that are summed up the main forms of every kind of beauty1 the beautiful and the sublime1 since he satisfies all our faculties by his perfections1 and overwhelms them with his infinitude4 ,god is the principle of moral truths1 as well as of all other truths4 ,all our duties are comprised in justice and charity4 ,these two great precepts have not been made by us2 they have been imposed on us2 from whom1 then1 can they come1 except from a legislator essentially just and good8 ,therein1 in our opinion1 is an invincible demonstration of the divine justice and charity3--this demonstration elucidates and sustains all others4 ,in this immense universe1 of which we catch a glimpse of a comparatively insignificant portion1 every thing1 in spite of more than one obscurity1 seems ordered in view of general good1 and this plan attests a ,providence4 ,to the physical order which one in good faith can scarcely deny1 add the certainty1 the evidence of the moral order that we bear in ourselves4 ,this order supposes the harmony of virtue and goodness2 it therefore requires it4 ,without doubt this harmony already appears in the visible world1 in the natural consequences of good and bad actions1 in society which punishes and rewards1 in public esteem and contempt1 especially in the troubles and joys of conscience4 ,although this necessary law of order is not always exactly fulfilled1 it nevertheless ought to be1 or the moral order is not satisfied1 and the intimate nature of things1 their moral nature1 remains violated1 troubled1 perverted4 ,there must1 then1 be a being who takes it upon himself to fulfil1 in a time that he has reserved to himself1 and in a manner that will be proper1 the order of which he has put in us the inviolable need2 and this being is again1 ,god4 ,thus1 on all sides1 on that of metaphysics1 on that of aesthetics1 especially on that of ethics1 we elevate ourselves to the same principle1 the common centre1 the last foundation1 of all truth1 all beauty1 all goodness4 ,the true1 the beautiful1 and the good1 are only different revelations of the same being4 ,human intelligence1 interrogated in regard to all these ideas which are incontestably in it1 always makes us the same response2 it sends us back to the same explanation1--at the foundation of all1 above all1 ,god1 always ,god4 ,we have arrived1 then1 from degree to degree1 at religion4 ,we are in fellowship with the great philosophies which all proclaim a ,god1 and1 at the same time1 with the religions that cover the earth1 with the ,christian religion1 incomparably the most perfect and the most holy4 ,as long as philosophy has not reached natural religion1--and by this we mean1 not the religion at which man arrives in that hypothetical state that is called the state of nature1 but the religion which is revealed to us by the natural light accorded to all men1--it remains beneath all worship1 even the most imperfect1 which at least gives to man a father1 a witness1 a consoler1 a judge4 ,a true theodicea borrows in some sort from all religious beliefs their common principle1 and returns it to them surrounded with light1 elevated above all uncertainty1 guarded against all attack4 ,philosophy may present itself in its turn to mankind2 it also has a right to man's confidence1 for it speaks to him of ,god in the name of all his needs and all his faculties1 in the name of reason and sentiment4 ,observe that we have arrived at these high conclusions without any hypothesis1 by the aid of processes at once very simple and perfectly rigorous4 ,truths of different orders being given1 truths which have not been made by us1 and are not sufficient for themselves1 we have ascended from these truths to their author1 as one goes from the effect to the cause1 from the sign to the thing signified1 from phenomenon to being1 from quality to subject4 ,these two principles--that every effect supposes a cause1 and every quality a subject--are universal and necessary principles4 ,they have been put by us in their full light1 and demonstrated in the manner in which principles undemonstrable1 because they are primitive1 can be demonstrated4 ,moreover1 to what are these necessary principles applied8 ,to metaphysical and moral truths1 which are also necessary4 ,it was therefore necessary to conclude in the existence of a cause and a necessary being1 or1 indeed1 it was necessary to deny either the necessity of the principle of cause and the principle of substance1 or the necessity of the truths to which we applied them1 that is to say1 to renounce all notions of common sense2 for these very principles and these truths1 with their character of universality and necessity1 compose common sense4 ,not only is it certain that every effect supposes a cause1 and every quality a being1 but it is equally certain that an effect of such a nature supposes a cause of the same nature1 and that a quality or an attribute marked with such or such essential characters supposes a being in which these same characters are again found in an eminent degree4 ,whence it follows1 that we have very legitimately concluded from truth in an intelligent cause and substance1 from beauty in a being supremely beautiful1 and from a moral law composed at once of justice and charity in a legislator supremely just and supremely good4 ,and we have not made a geometrical and algebraical theodicea1 after the example of many philosophers1 and the most illustrious4 ,we have not deduced the attributes of ,god from each other1 as the different terms of an equation are converted1 or as from one property of a triangle the other properties are deduced1 thus ending at a ,god wholly abstract1 good perhaps for the schools1 but not sufficient for the human race4 ,we have given to theodicea a surer foundation--psychology4 ,our ,god is doubtless also the author of the world1 but he is especially the father of humanity2 his intelligence is ours1 with the necessity of essence and infinite power added4 ,so our justice and our charity1 related to their immortal exemplar1 give us an idea of the divine justice and charity4 ,therein we see a real ,god1 with whom we can sustain a relation also real1 whom we can comprehend and feel1 and who in his turn can comprehend and feel our efforts1 our sufferings1 our virtues1 our miseries4 ,made in his image1 conducted to him by a ray of his own being1 there is between him and us a living and sacred tie4 ,our theodicea is therefore free at once from hypothesis and abstraction4 ,by preserving ourselves from the one1 we have preserved ourselves from the other4 ,consenting to recognize ,god only in his signs visible to the eyes and intelligible to the mind1 it is on infallible evidence that we have elevated ourselves to ,god4 ,by a necessary consequence1 setting out from real effects and real attributes1 we have arrived at a real cause and a real substance1 at a cause having in power all its essential effects1 at a substance rich in attributes4 ,i wonder at the folly of those who1 in order to know ,god better1 consider him1 they say1 in his pure and absolute essence1 disengaged from all limitative determination4 ,i believe that ,i have forever removed the root of such an extravagance4#bhb ,no2 it is not true that the diversity of determinations1 and1 consequently1 of qualities and attributes1 destroys the absolute unity of a being2 the infallible proof of it is that my unity is not the least in the world altered by the diversity of my faculties4 ,it is not true that unity excludes multiplicity1 and multiplicity unity2 for unity and multiplicity are united in me4 ,why then should they not be in ,god8 ,moreover1 far from altering unity in me1 multiplicity develops it and makes its productiveness appear4 ,so the richness of the determinations and the attributes of ,god is exactly the sign of the plenitude of his being4 ,to neglect his attributes1 is therefore to impoverish him2 we do not say enough1 it is to annihilate him1--for a being without attributes exists not2 and the abstraction of being1 human or divine1 finite or infinite1 relative or absolute1 is nonentity4 ,theodicea has two rocks1--one1 which we have just signalized to you1 is abstraction1 the abuse of dialectics2 it is the vice of the schools and metaphysics4 ,if we are forced to shun this rock1 we run the risk of being dashed against the opposite rock1 ,i mean that fear of reasoning that extends to reason1 that excessive predominance of sentiment1 which developing in us the loving and affectionate faculties at the expense of all the others1 throws us into anthropomorphism without criticism1 and makes us institute with ,god an intimate and familiar intercourse in which we are somewhat too forgetful of the august and fearful majesty of the divine being4 ,the tender and contemplative soul can neither love nor contemplate in ,god the necessity1 the eternity1 the infinity1 that do not come within the sphere of imagination and the heart1 that are only conceived4 ,it therefore neglects them4 ,neither does it study ,god in truth of every kind1 in physics1 metaphysics1 and ethics1 which manifest him2 it considers in him particularly the characters to which affection is attached4 ,in adoration1 ,fenelon retrenches all fear that nothing but love may subsist1 and ,mme4 ,guyon ends by loving ,god as a lover4 ,we escape these opposite excesses of a refined sentimentality and a chimerical abstraction1 by always keeping in mind both the nature of ,god1 by which he escapes all relation with us1--necessity1 eternity1 infinity1 and at the same time those of his attributes which are our own attributes transferred to him1 for the very simple reason that they came from him4 ,i am able to conceive ,god only in his manifestations and by the signs which he gives of his existence1 as ,i am able to conceive any being only by the attributes of that being1 a cause only by its effects1 as ,i am able to conceive myself only by the exercise of my faculties4 ,take away my faculties and the consciousness that attests them to me1 and ,i am not for myself4 ,it is the same with ,god1--take away nature and the soul1 and every sign of ,god disappears4 ,it is therefore in nature and the soul that he must be sought and found4 ,the universe1 which comprises nature and man1 manifests ,god4 ,is this saying that it exhausts ,god8 ,by no means4 ,let us always consult psychology4 ,i know myself only by my acts2 that is certain2 and what is not less certain is1 that all my acts do not exhaust1 do not equal my power and my substance2 for my power1 at least that of my will1 can always add an act to all those which it has already produced1 and it has the consciousness1 at the same time that it is exercised1 of containing in itself something to be exercised still4 ,of ,god and the world must be said two things in appearance contrary1--we know ,god only by the world1 and ,god is essentially distinct and different from the world4 ,the first cause1 like all secondary causes1 manifests itself only by its effects2 it can even be conceived only by them1 and it surpasses them by all of the difference between the ,creator and the created1 the perfect and the imperfect4 ,the world is indefinite2 it is not infinite2 for1 whatever may be its quantity1 thought can always add to it4 ,to the myriads of worlds that compose the totality of the world1 may be added new worlds4 ,but ,god is infinite1 absolutely infinite in his essence1 and an indefinite series cannot equal the infinite2 for the indefinite is nothing else than the finite more or less multiplied and capable of continuous multiplication4 ,the world is a whole which has its harmony2 for a ,god could make only a complete and harmonious work4 ,the harmony of the world corresponds to the unity of ,god1 as indefinite quantity is a defective sign of the infinity of ,god4 ,to say that the world is ,god1 is to admit only the world and deny ,god4 ,give to this whatever name you please1 it is at bottom atheism4 ,on the one hand1 to suppose that the world is void of ,god1 and that ,god is separate from the world1 is an insupportable and almost impossible abstraction4 ,to distinguish is not to separate4 ,i distinguish myself1 but do not separate myself from my qualities and my acts4 ,so ,god is not the world1 although he is in it everywhere present in spirit and in truth4#bhc ,such is our theodicea3 it rejects the excesses of all systems1 and contains1 we believe at least1 all that is good in them4 ,from sentiment it borrows a personal ,god as we ourselves are a person1 and from reason a necessary1 eternal1 infinite ,god4 ,in the presence of two opposite systems1--one of which1 in order to see and feel ,god in the world1 absorbs him in it2 the other of which1 in order not to confound ,god with the world1 separates him from it and relegates him to an inaccessible solitude1--it gives to both just satisfaction by offering to them a ,god who is in fact in the world1 since the world is his work1 but without his essence being exhausted in it1 a ,god who is both absolute unity and unity multiplied1 infinite and living1 immutable and the principle of movement1 supreme intelligence and supreme truth1 sovereign justice and sovereign goodness1 before whom the world and man are like nonentity1 who1 nevertheless1 is pleased with the world and man1 substance eternal1 and cause inexhaustible1 impenetrable1 and everywhere perceptible1 who must by turns be sought in truth1 admired in beauty1 imitated1 even at an infinite distance1 in goodness and justice1 venerated and loved1 continually studied with an indefatigable zeal1 and in silence adored4 ,let us sum up this resume4 ,setting out from the observation of ourselves in order to preserve ourselves from hypothesis1 we have found in consciousness three orders of facts4 ,we have left to each of them its character1 its rank1 its bearing1 and its limits4 ,sensation has appeared to us the indispensable condition1 but not the foundation of knowledge4 ,reason is the faculty itself of knowing2 it has furnished us with absolute principles1 and these absolute principles have conducted us to absolute truths4 ,sentiment1 which pertains at once to sensation and reason1 has found a place between both4 ,setting out from consciousness1 but always guided by it1 we have penetrated into the region of being2 we have gone quite naturally from knowledge to its objects by the road that the human race pursues1 that ,kant sought in vain1 or rather misconceived at pleasure1 to wit1 that reason which must be admitted entire or rejected entire1 which reveals to us existences as well as truths4 ,therefore1 after having recalled all the great metaphysical1 aesthetical1 and moral truths1 we have referred them to their principle2 with the human race we have pronounced the name of ,god1 who explains all things1 because he has made all things1 whom all our faculties require1--reason1 the heart1 the senses1 since he is the author of all our faculties4 ,this doctrine is so simple1 is to such an extent in all our powers1 is so conformed to all our instincts1 that it scarcely appears a philosophic doctrine1 and1 at the same time1 if you examine it more closely1 if you compare it with all celebrated doctrines1 you will find that it is related to them and differs from them1 that it is none of them and embraces them all1 that it expresses precisely the side of them that has made them live and sustains them in history4 ,but that is only the scientific character of the doctrine which we present to you2 it has still another character which distinguishes it and recommends it to you much more4 ,the spirit that animates it is that which of old inspired ,socrates1 ,plato1 and ,marcus ,aurelius1 which makes your hearts beat when you are reading ,corneille and ,bossuet1 which dictated to ,vauvenargues the few pages that have immortalized his name1 which you feel especially in ,reid1 sustained by an admirable good sense1 and even in ,kant1 in the midst of1 and superior to the embarrassments of his metaphysics1 to wit1 the taste of the beautiful and the good in all things1 the passionate love of honesty1 the ardent desire of the moral grandeur of humanity4 ,yes1 we do not fear to repeat that we tend thither by all our views2 it is the end to which are related all the parts of our instruction2 it is the thought which serves as their connection1 and is1 thus to speak1 their soul4 ,may this thought be always present to you1 and accompany you as a faithful and generous friend1 wherever fortune shall lead you1 under the tent of the soldier1 in the office of the lawyer1 of the physician1 of the savant1 in the study of the literary man1 as well as in the studio of the artist6 ,finally1 may it sometimes remind you of him who has been to you its very sincere but too feeble interpreter6 ,,footnotes3 #bfc ,still living in #ahah1 died in #ahbh4 #bfd ,in #ahjd4 #bfe ,died1 #ahad4 #bff ,this was said in #ahah4 ,since then1 ,jacobi1 ,hegel1 and ,schleiermacher1 with so many others1 have disappeared4 ,schelling alone survives the ruins of the ,german philosophy4 #bfg ,,fragments ,,de ,,philosophie ,,cartesienne1 p4 #dbi3 ,des ,rapports du ,cartesienisme et du ,spinozisme4 #bfh ,part #ast1 lectures #a and #b4 #bfi ,part #b;d4 #bgj ,part #c;d4 #bga ,on ,condillac1 #ast ,series1 vol4 i41 passim1 and particularly vol4 iii41 lectures #b and #c4 #bgb ,we have never spoken of ,locke except with sincere respect1 even while combating him4 ,see #ast ,series1 vol4 i41 course of #ahag1 ,discours d',ouverture1 vol4 ii41 lecture #a1 and especially #b;d ,series1 vol4 iii41 passim4 #bgc ,see #ast ,series1 vol4 iv41 lectures on ,reid4 #bgd ,ibid41 vol4 v4 #bge ,for more than twenty years we have thought of translating and publishing the three ,critiques1 joining to them a selection from the smaller productions of ,kant4 ,time has been wanting to us for the completion of our design2 but a young and skilful professor of philosophy1 a graduate of the ,normal ,school1 has been willing to supply our place1 and to undertake to give to the ,french public a faithful and intelligent version of the greatest thinker of the eighteenth century4 ,m4 ,barni has worthily commenced the useful and difficult enterprise which we have remitted to his zeal1 and pursues it with courage and talent4 #bgf ,part #ast1 ,lecture #c4 #bgg ,lecture #e1 ,mysticism4 #bgh ,this pretended proof of sentiment is in fact1 the ,cartesian proof itself4 ,see lectures #d and #af4 #bgi ,m4 ,jacobi4 ,see the ,manual of the ,history of ,philosophy1 by ,tennemann1 vol4 ii41 p4 #cah4 #bhj ,on spontaneous reason and reflective reason1 see #ast part1 lect4 #b and #c4 #bha ,lectures #d and #e4 #bhb ,see particularly lecture #e4 #bhc ,we place here this analogous passage on the true measure in which it may be said that ,god is at once comprehensible and incomprehensible1 #ast ,series1 vol4 iv41 lecture #ab1 p4 #ab3 ,we say in the first place that ,god is not absolutely incomprehensible1 for this manifest reason1 that1 being the cause of this universe1 he passes into it1 and is reflected in it1 as the cause in the effect2 therefore we recognize him4 ',the heavens declare his glory4' and 'the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen1 being understood by the things that are made2' his power1 in the thousands of worlds sown in the boundless regions of space2 his intelligence in their harmonious laws2 finally1 that which there is in him most august1 in the sentiments of virtue1 of holiness1 and of love1 which the heart of man contains4 ,it must be that ,god is not incomprehensible to us1 for all nations have petitioned him1 since the first day of the intellectual life of humanity4 ,god1 then1 as the cause of the universe1 reveals himself to us2 but ,god is not only the cause of the universe1 he is also the perfect and infinite cause1 possessing in himself1 not a relative perfection1 which is only a degree of imperfection1 but an absolute perfection1 an infinity which is not only the finite multiplied by itself in those proportions which the human mind is able always to enumerate1 but a true infinity1 that is1 the absolute negation of all limits1 in all the powers of his being4 ,moreover1 it is not true that an indefinite effect adequately expresses an infinite cause2 hence it is not true that we are able absolutely to comprehend ,god by the world and by man1 for all of ,god is not in them4 ,in order absolutely to comprehend the infinite1 it is necessary to have an infinite power of comprehension1 and that is not granted to us4 ,god1 in manifesting himself1 retains something in himself which nothing finite can absolutely manifest2 consequently1 it is not permitted us to comprehend absolutely4 ,there remains1 then1 in ,god1 beyond the universe and man1 something unknown1 impenetrable1 incomprehensible4 ,hence in the immeasurable spaces of the universe1 and beneath all the profundities of the human soul1 ,god escapes us in that inexhaustible infinitude1 whence he is able to draw without limit new worlds1 new beings1 new manifestations4 ,god is to us1 therefore1 incomprehensible2 but even of this incomprehensibility we have a clear and precise idea2 for we have the most precise idea of infinity4 ,and this idea is not in us a metaphysical refinement1 it is a simple and primitive conception which enlightens us from our entrance into this world1 both luminous and obscure1 explaining everything1 and being explained by nothing1 because it carries us at first1 to the summit and the limit of all explanation4 ,there is something inexplicable for thought1--behold then whither thought tends2 there is infinite being1--behold then the necessary principle of all relative and finite beings4 ,reason explains not the inexplicable1 it conceives it4 ,it is not able to comprehend infinity in an absolute manner1 but it comprehends it in some degree in its indefinite manifestations1 which reveal it1 and which veil it2 and1 further1 as it has been said1 it comprehend it so far as incomprehensible4 ,it is1 therefore1 an equal error to call ,god absolutely comprehensible1 and absolutely incomprehensible4 ,he is both invisible and present1 revealed and withdrawn in himself1 in the world and out of the world1 so familiar and intimate with his creatures1 that we see him by opening our eyes1 that we feel him in feeling our hearts beat1 and at the same time inaccessible in his impenetrable majesty1 mingled with every thing1 and separated from every thing1 manifesting himself in universal life1 and causing scarcely an ephemeral shadow of his eternal essence to appear there1 communicating himself without cessation1 and remaining incommunicable1 at once the living ,god1 and the ,god concealed1 ',deus vivus et ,deus absconditus4' ,,appendix4 ,page #ahh3 ,what a destiny was that of ,eustache ,lesueur6 ,it is perceived that we have followed1 as regards his death1 the tradition1 or rather the prejudices current at the present day1 and which have misled the best judges before us4 ,but there have appeared in a recent and interesting publication1 called ,archives de l',art francais1 vol4 iii41 certain incontrovertible documents1 never before published1 on the life and works of the painter of ,st4 ,bruno1 which compel us to withdraw certain assertions agreeable to general opinion1 but contrary to truth4 ,the notice of ,lesueur's death1 extracted for the first time from the ,register of ,deaths of the parish church of ,saint-,louis in the isle of ,notre-,dame1 preserved amongst the archives of the ,hotel de ,ville at ,paris1 clearly prove that he did not die at the ,chartreux1 but in the isle of ,notre-,dame1 where he dwelt1 in the parish of ,st4 ,louis1 and that he was buried in the church of ,saint-,etienne du ,mont1 the resting-place of ,pascal and ,racine4 ,it appears also that ,lesueur died before his wife1 ,genevieve ,gousse1 since the ,register of ,births of the parish of ,saint-,louis1 contains under the date #ahth ,february1 #afee1 a notice of the baptism of a fourth child of ,lesueur4 ,now1 ,genevieve ,gousse must have deceased almost immediately after her confinement1 supposing her to have died before her husband's decease1 which occurred on the #ast of the following ,may4 ,if this were the case1 we should have found a notice of her death in the ,register of ,deaths for the year #afee1 as we do that of her husband4 ,such a notice1 however1 which could alone disprove the probability1 and authenticate the vulgar opinion1 is nowhere to be found amongst the archives of the ,hotel de ,ville1 at least the author of the ,nouvelles ,recherches has nowhere been able to meet with it4 ,in the other particulars our rapid sketch of ,lesueur's history remains untouched4 ,he never was in ,italy2 and according to the account of ,guillet de ,saint-,georges1 which has so long remained in manuscript1 he never desired to go there4 ,he was poor1 discreet1 and pious1 tenderly loved his wife1 and lived in the closest union with his three brothers and brother-in-law1 who were all pupils and fellow-laborers of his4 ,it appears to be a refinement of criticism which denies the current belief of an acquaintance between ,lesueur and ,poussin4 ,if no document authenticates it1 at all events it is not contradicted by any1 and appears to us to be highly probable4 ,every one admits that ,lesueur studied and admired ,poussin4 ,it would certainly be strange if he did not seek his acquaintance1 which he could have obtained without difficulty1 since ,poussin was staying at ,paris from #afdj to #afdb4 ,it would be difficult for them not to have met4 ,after ,vouet's death in #afda1 ,lesueur acquired more and more a peculiar style2 and in #afdb1 at the age of twenty-five1 entirely unshackled1 and with a taste ripe for the antique and ,raphael1 he must frequently have been at the ,louvre1 where ,poussin resided4 ,thus it is natural to suppose that they frequently saw each other and became acquainted1 and with their sympathies of character and talent1 acquaintance must have resulted in esteem and love4 ,if ,poussin's letters do not mention ,lesueur1 we would remark that neither do they mention ,champagne1 whose connection with ,poussin is not disputed4 ,the argument built on the silence of ,guillet de ,saint-,georges' account is far from convincing2 inasmuch as being intended to be read before a ,sitting of the ,academy1 it could only contain a notice of the great artist's career1 without those biographical details in which his friendships would be mentioned4 ,lastly1 it is impossible to deny ,poussin's influence upon ,lesueur1 which it seems to us at least probable was as much due to his counsels as to his example4 ,page #aij3 ,but the marvel of the picture is the figure of ,st4 ,paul4 ,we have recently seen1 at ,hampton ,court1 the seven cartoons of ,raphael1 which should not be looked at1 still less criticised1 but on bended knee4 ,behold ,raphael arrived at the summit of his art1 and in the last years of life6 ,and these were but drawings for tapestry6 ,these drawings alone would reward the journey to ,england1 even were the figures from the friezes of the ,parthenon not at the ,british ,museum4 ,one never tires of contemplating these grand performances even in the obscurity of that ill-lighted room4 ,nothing could be more noble1 more magnificent1 more imposing1 more majestic4 ,what draperies1 what attitudes1 what forms6 ,notwithstanding the absence of color1 the effect is immense2 the mind is struck1 at once charmed and transported2 but the soul1 we can speak for ourselves1 remains well-nigh insensible4 ,we request any one to compare carefully the sixth cartoon1 clearly one of the finest1 representing the ,preaching of ,st4 ,paul at ,ephesus1 with the painting we have described of ,lesueur's4 ,one1 immediately and at the first sight1 transports you into the regions of the ideal2 the other is less striking at first1 but stay1 consider it well1 study it in detail1 then take in the whole3 by degrees you are overcome by an ever-increasing emotion4 ,above all1 examine in both the principal character1 ,st4 ,paul4 ,here1 you behold the fine long folds of a superb robe which at once envelops and sets off his height1 whilst the figure is in shade1 and the little you see of it has nothing striking4 ,there he confronts you1 inspired1 terrible1 majestic4 ,now say which side lays claim to moral effect4 ,page #aic3 ,the great works of ,lesueur1 ,poussin1 and so many others scattered over ,europe4 ,of all the paintings of ,lesueur which are in ,england1 that which we regret most not having seen is ,alexander and his ,physician1 painted for ,m4 de ,nouveau1 director-general of the ,postes1 which passed from the ,hotel ,nouveau to the ,place ,royale in the ,orleans ,gallery1 from thence into ,england1 where it was bought by ,lady ,lucas at the great ,london sale in #ahjj4 ,the sale catalogue1 with the prices and names of the purchasers1 will be found at the end of vol4 i4 of ,m4 ,waagen's excellent work1 ,oeuvres d',art et ,artistes en ,angleterre1 #b vols41 ,berlin1 #ahcg and #ahch4 ,we were both consoled and agreeably surprised on our return1 to meet1 in the valuable gallery of ,m4 le ,comte d',houdetot1 an ancient peer of ,france1 and free member of the ,academy of ,fine ,arts1 with another ,alexander and his physician ,philip1 in which the hand of ,lesueur cannot be mistaken4 ,the composition of the entire piece is perfect4 ,the drawing is exquisite4 ,the amplitude and nobleness of the draperies recall those of ,raphael4 ,the form of ,alexander fine and languid2 the person of ,philip the physician grave and imposing4 ,the coloring1 though not powerful1 is finely blended in tone4 ,now1 where is the true original1 is it with ,m4 ,houdetot or in ,england8 ,the painting sold in ,london in #ahjj certainly came from the ,orleans' gallery1 which would seem most likely to have possessed the original4 ,on the other hand1 it is impossible ,m4 ,houdetot's picture is a copy4 ,they must1 therefore1 both be equally the work of ,lesueur1 who has in this instance treated the same subject twice over1 as he has likewise done the ,preaching of ,st4 ,paul2 of which there is another1 smaller than that at the ,louvre1 but equally admirable1 at the ,place ,royale1 belonging to ,m4 ,girou de ,buzariengues1 corresponding member of the ,academy of ,sciences4#bhd ,we borrow ,m4 ,waagen's description of the works of ,lesueur1 found by that eminent critic in the ,english collections3 ,the ,queen of ,sheba before ,solomon1 the property of the ,duke of ,devonshire1 vol4 i41 p4 #bde4 ,christ at the foot of the ,cross supported by his ,family1 belonging to the ,earl of ,shrewsbury1 vol4 ii41 p4 #dfc1 the sentiment deep and truthful1 remarks ,m4 ,waagen4 ,the ,magdalen pouring the ointment on the feet of ,jesus1 the property of ,lord ,exeter1 vol4 ii41 p4 #dhe1 a picture full of the purest sentiment2 lastly1 in the possession of ,m4 ,miles1 a ,death of ,germanicus1 a rich and noble composition1 completely in ,poussin's style1 remarks ,m4 ,waagen1 vol4 ii41 p4 #cef4 ,let us add that this last work is not met with in any catalogue1 ancient or modern4 ,we ask ourselves whether this may not be a copy of the ,germanicus of ,poussin attributed to ,lesueur4 ,the author of ,musees d',allemagne et du ,russie 7,paris1 #ahdd7 mentions at ,berlin a ,saint ,bruno adoring the ,cross in his ,cell1 opening upon a landscape1 and pretends that this picture is as pathetic as the best ,saint ,brunos in the ,museum at ,paris4 ,it is probably a sketch1 like the one we have1 or one of the wanting panels2 for as for the pictures themselves1 there were never more than twenty-two at the ,chartreux1 and these are at the ,louvre4 ,perhaps1 however1 it may be the picture which ,lesueur made for ,m4 ,bernard de ,roze1 see ,florent ,lecomte1 vol4 iii41 p4 #ih1 which represented a ,carthusian in a cell4 ,at ,st4 ,petersburg1 the catalogue of the ,hermitage mentions seven pictures of ,lesueur1 one of which1 ,the infant ,moses exposed on the ,nile1 is admitted by the author cited to be authentic4 ,can this be one of two ,moses which were painted by ,lesueur for ,m4 de ,nouveau1 as we learn from ,guillet de ,saint-,georges8 ,unless ,m4 ,viardot is deceived1 and mistakes a copy for an original1 we must regret that a real ,lesueur should ,lave been suffered to stray to ,st4 ,petersburg1 with many of ,poussin's most beautiful ,claudes 7see p4 #dgd71 ,mignards1 ,sebastian ,bourdons1 ,gaspars1 ,stellas1 and ,valentins4 ,some years ago1 at the sale of ,cardinal ,fesch's gallery1 we might have acquired one of ,lesueur's finest pieces1 executed for the church of ,saint-,germain-l',auxerrois1 which had got1 by some chance1 into the possession of ,chancellor ,pontchartrain1 afterwards into that of the ,emperor's uncle4 ,this celebrated picture1 ,christ with ,martha and ,mary1 formed at ,saint-,germain-l',auxerrois1 a pendent to the ,martyrdom of ,st4 ,lawrence4 ,will it be believed that the ,french ,government lost the opportunity1 and permitted this little chef-d'oeuvre to pass into the hands of the ,king of ,bavaria8 ,a good copy at ,marseilles was thought1 doubtless1 sufficient1 and the original was left to find its way to the gallery at ,munich1 and meet again the ,st4 ,louis on his knees at ,mass1 which the catalogue of that gallery attributes to ,lesueur1 on what ground we are not aware4 ,in conclusion1 we may mention that there is in the ,museum at ,brussels1 a charming little ,lesueur1 ,the ,saviour giving his ,blessing1 and in the ,museums of ,grenoble and ,montpelier several fragments of the ,history of ,tobias1 painted for ,m4 de ,fieubet4 ,page #aic3 ,those master-pieces of art that honor the nation depart without authorization from the national territory6 ,there has not been found a government which has undertaken at least to repurchase those that we have lost1 to get back again the great works of ,poussin1 ,lesueur1 and so many others1 scattered in ,europe1 instead of squandering millions to acquire the baboons of ,holland1 as ,louis ,,xiv4 said1 or ,spanish canvases1 in truth of an admirable color1 but without nobleness and moral expression4 ,shall we give a recent instance of the small value we appear to set on ,poussin8 ,we blush to think that in #ahdh we should have permitted the noble collection of ,m4 de ,montcalm to pass into ,england4 ,one picture escaped3 it was put up to sale in ,paris on the #eth of ,march1 #ahej4 ,it was a charming ,poussin1 undoubtedly authentic1 from the ,orleans gallery1 and described at length in the catalogue of ,dubois de ,saint-,gelais4 ,it represented the ,birth of ,bacchus1 and by its variety of scenes and multitude of ideas1 showed it belonged to ,poussin's best period4 ,we must do ,normandy1 rather the city of ,rouen1 the justice to say1 that it made an effort to acquire it1 but it was unsupported by ,government2 and this composition1 wholly ,french1 was sold at ,paris for the sum of #ag1jjj francs1 to a foreigner1 ,mr4 ,hope4 ,miserable contrast6 while five or six hundred thousand francs have been given for a ,virgin by ,murillo1 which is now turning the heads of all who behold it4 ,i confess that mine has entirely resisted4 ,i admire the freshness1 the sweetness1 the harmony of color2 but every other superior quality which one looks to find in such a subject is wanting1 or at least escaped me4 ,ecstasy never transfigured that face1 which is neither noble nor great4 ,the lovely infant before me does not seem sensible of the profound mystery accomplished in her4 ,what1 then1 can there be in this vaunted ,virgin which so catches the multitude8 ,she is supported by beautiful angels1 in a fine dress1 of a charming color1 the effect of all which is doubtless highly pleasant4 ,page #aie3 ,we endeavor to console ourselves for having lost the ,seven ,sacraments1 and for not having known how to keep from ,england and ,germany so many productions of ,poussin1 now buried in foreign collections1 etc4 ,after having expressed our regret that we were unacquainted with the ,seven ,sacraments save from the engravings of ,pesne1 we made a journey to ,london1 to see with our own eyes1 and judge for ourselves these famous pictures1 with many others of our great countryman1 now fallen into the possession of ,england1 through our culpable indifference1 and which have been brought under our notice by ,m ,waagen4 ,in the few days we were able to dedicate to this little journey1 we had to examine four galleries3 the ,national ,gallery1 answering to our ,museum1 those of ,lord ,ellesmere and the ,marquis of ,westminster1 and1 at some miles from ,london1 the collection at ,dulwich ,college1 celebrated in ,england1 though but little known on the continent4 ,we likewise visited another collection1 resulting from an institution which might easily be introduced into ,france1 to the decided advantage of art and taste4 ,a society has been formed in ,england1 called the ,british ,institution for promoting the ,fine ,arts in the ,united ,kingdom4 ,every year it has1 in ,london1 an exhibition of ancient paintings1 to which individual galleries send their choice pieces1 so that in a certain number of years all the most remarkable pictures in ,england pass under the public eye4 ,but for this exhibition1 what riches would remain buried in the mansions of the aristocracy or unknown cabinets of provincial amateurs6 ,the society1 having at its head the greatest names of ,england1 enjoys a certain authority1 and all ranks respond eagerly to its appeal4 ,we ourselves saw the list of persons who this year contributed to the exhibition2 there were her ,majesty the ,queen1 the ,dukes of ,bedford1 ,devonshire1 ,newcastle1 ,northumberland1 ,sutherland1 the ,earls of ,derby and ,suffolk1 and numerous other great men1 besides bankers1 merchants1 savants1 and artists4 ,the exhibition is public1 but not free1 as you must pay both for admission and the printed catalogue4 ,the money thus acquired is appropriated to defray the expenses of the exhibition2 whatever remains is employed in the purchase of pictures1 which are then presented to the ,national ,gallery4 ,at this year's exhibition we saw three of ,claude ,lorrain's1 which well sustained the name of that master4 ,apollo watching the herds of ,admetus2 a ,sea-port1 both belonging to the ,earl of ,leicester1 and ,psyche and ,amor1 the property of ,mr4 ,perkins2 a pretended ,lesueur1 the ,death of the ,virgin1 from the ,earl of ,suffolk2 seven ,sebastian ,bourdons1 the ,seven ,works of ,mercy1#bhe lent by the ,earl of ,yarborough2 a landscape by ,gaspar ,poussin1 but not one morceau of his illustrious brother-in-law's4 ,we were more fortunate in the ,national ,gallery4 ,there1 to begin1 what admirable ,claudes6 ,we counted as many as ten1 some of them of the highest value4 ,we will confine ourselves to the recapitulation of three1 the ,embarkation of ,st4 ,ursula1 a large landscape1 and the ,embarkation of the ,queen of ,sheba4 #ast4 ,the ,embarkation of ,st4 ,ursula1 which was painted for the ,barberini1 and adorned their palace at ,rome until the year #agfj1 when an ,english amateur purchased it from the ,princess ,barberini1 with other works of the first class4 ,this picture is #c feet #h inches high1 #d feet #aa inches wide4 #b;d4 ,the large landscape is #d feet #aa inches high1 #f feet #g inches wide4 ,rebecca is seen1 with her relatives and servants1 waiting the arrival of ,isaac1 who comes from afar to celebrate their marriage4 #c;d4 ,the ,embarkation of the ,queen of ,sheba1 going to visit ,solomon1 formed a pendent to the preceding figure1 which it resembles in its dimensions4 ,it is both a sea and landscape drawing1 ,m4 ,waagen declares it to be the most beautiful morceau of the kind he is acquainted with1 and asserts that ,lorrain has here attained perfection1 vol4 i41 p4 #baa4 ,this masterpiece was executed by ,claude for his protector1 the ,duke de ,bouillon4 ,it is signed ,claude ,,ge4 ,i4 ,v41 faict pour son ,altesse le ,duc de ,bouillon1 anno #afdh4 ,doubtless the great ,duke de ,bouillon1 eldest brother of ,turenne4 ,this ,french work1 destined1 too1 for ,france1 she has now forever lost1 as well as the famous ,book of ,truth1 ,libro di ,verita1 in which ,claude collected the drawings of all his paintings1 drawings which may be themselves regarded as finished pictures4 ,this invaluable treasure was1 like the ,embarkation of the ,queen of ,sheba1 for a long time in the hands of a ,french broker1 who would willingly have relinquished it to the ,government1 but failing to find purchasers in ,paris in the last century1 ultimately sold it for a mere nothing into ,holland1 whence it has passed into ,england4#bhf ,the author of the ,musees d',allemagne et de ,russie1 mentions that in the gallery of the ,hermitage at ,st4 ,petersburg1 amongst a large number of ,claudes1 whose authenticity he appears to admit1 there are four morceaux1 which he does not hesitate to declare equal to the most celebrated chefs-d'oeuvre of that master1 in ,paris or ,london1 called the ,morning1 the ,noon1 the ,evening1 and the ,night4 ,they are from ,malmaison4 ,thus the sale of the gallery of an empress has in our own time enriched ,russia1 as1 twenty-five years before1 the sale of the ,orleans gallery enriched ,england4 ,in the ,national ,gallery1 along with the serene and quiet landscapes of ,lorrain1 are five of ,caspar's1 depicting nature under an opposite aspect--rugged and wild localities1 and tempests4 ,one of the most remarkable represents ,eneas and ,dido seeking shelter in a grotto from the violence of a storm4 ,the figures are from the pencil of ,albano1 and for a length of time remained in the palace ,falconieri4 ,two other landscapes are from the palace ,corsini1 and two from the palace ,colonna4 ,but to return to our real subject1 which is ,poussin4 ,there are eight paintings by his hand in the ,national ,gallery1 all worthy of mention4 ,m4 ,waagen has merely spoken of them in general terms1 but we shall proceed to give a description in detail4 ,of these eight paintings1 only one1 representing the plague of ,ashdod1 is taken from sacred history4 ,this is described in the printed catalogue as ,no4 #aje4 ,the ,israelites having been vanquished by the ,philistines1 the ark was taken by the victors and placed in the temple of ,dagon at ,ashdod4 ,the idol falls before the ark1 and the ,philistines are smitten with the pestilence4 ,this canvas is #d feet #c inches high1 and #f feet #h inches1 wide4 ,a sketch or copy of the ,plague of the ,philistines is in the ,museum of the ,louvre1 and has been engraved by ,picard4 ,poussin was1 in fact1 fond of repeating a subject2 there are two sets of the ,seven ,sacraments1 two ,arcadias1#bhg two or three ,moses striking the ,rock1 c4 ,the science of painting is here employed to portray the scene in all its terrors1 and display every horror of the pestilence1 and it would seem that ,poussin had here endeavored to contend with ,michael ,angelo1 even at the expense of beauty4 ,it is said the commission for this work was given by ,cardinal ,barberini4 ,it comes from the palace of ,colonna4 ,the subjects of the remaining seven pictures in the ,national ,gallery are mythological1 and may be nearly all referred to the early epoch of ,poussin's career1 when he paid tribute to the genius of the #afth century1 and yielded to the influence of ,marini4 ,no4 #ci4 ,the ,education of ,bacchus1 a subject chosen by ,poussin more than once4 ,on a small canvas #b feet #c inches high1 and #c feet #a inch wide4 ,no4 #dj4 ,another small picture #a foot #f inches high1 and #c feet #d inches broad3 ,phocion washing his ,feet at a ,public ,fountain1 a touching emblem of the purity and simplicity of his life4 ,to heighten this rustic scene1 and impart its meaning1 the painter shows us the trophies of the noble warrior hung on the trunk of a tree at a little distance4 ,the whole composition is striking and full of animation4 ,we believe that it has never been engraved4 ,it forms a happy addition to the two other compositions consecrated by ,poussin to ,phocion1 and which have been so admirably engraved by ,baudet1 ,phocion carried out of the ,city of ,athens1 and the ,tomb of ,phocion4 ,no4 #db4 ,here is one of the three bacchanals painted by ,poussin for the ,duke de ,montmorency4 ,the two others are said to be in the collection of ,lord ,ashburnham4 ,this bacchanal is #d feet #h inches high1 and #c feet #a inch wide4 ,in a warm landscape ,bacchus is sleeping surrounded by nymphs1 satyrs1 and centaurs1 whilst ,silenus appears under an arbor attended by sylvan figures4 ,no4 #fb4 ,another bacchanal1 which may be considered one of ,poussin's masterpieces4 ,according to ,m4 ,waagen1 it belonged to the ,colonna collection1 but the catalogue1 published by authority1 states that it was originally the property of the ,comte de ,vaudreueili1 that it afterwards came into the hands of ,m4 de ,calonne1 whence it passed into ,england1 and ultimately found its way into the hands of ,mr4 ,hamlet1 from whom it was purchased by ,parliament1 and placed in the ,national ,gallery4 ,it is #c feet #h inches high1 and #d feet #h inches wide4 ,its subject is a dance of fauns and bacchantes1 which is interrupted by a satyr1 who attempts to take liberties with a nymph4 ,besides the main subject1 there are numerous spirited and graceful episodes1 particularly two infants endeavoring to catch in a cup the juice of a bunch of grapes supported in air1 and pressed by a bacchante of slim and fine form4 ,the composition is full of fire1 energy1 and spirit4 ,there is not a single group1 not a figure1 which will not repay an attentive study4 ,m4 ,waagen does not hesitate to pronounce it one of ,poussin's finest4 ,he admires the truth and variety of heads1 the freshness of color1 and the transparent tone 7die ,faerbung von seltenster ,frische1 ,helle und ,klarheit in allen ,theilen74 ,it has been engraved by ,huart1 and accurately copied by ,landon1 under the title of ,danse de ,fauns et de ,bacchantes4 ,no4 #fe4 ,cephalus and ,aurora4 ,aurora1 captivated by the beauty of ,cephalus1 endeavors to separate him from his wife ,procris4 ,being unsuccessful1 in a fit of jealousy she gives to ,cephalus the dart which causes the death of his adored spouse4 #c feet #b inches high1 #d feet #b inches wide4 ,no4 #hc4 ,a large painting1 #e feet #f inches high1 and #h feet wide1 representing ,phineas and his ,companions changed into ,stones by looking on the ,gorgon4 ,perseus1 having rescued ,andromeda from the sea monster1 obtains her hand from her father ,cepheus1 who celebrates their nuptials with a magnificent feast4 ,phineas1 to whom ,andromeda had been betrothed1 rushes in upon the festivity at the head of a troop of armed men4 ,a combat ensues1 in which ,perseus1 being nearly overcome1 opposes to his enemies the head of ,medusa1 by which they are instantly changed to stone4 ,this composition is full of vigor1 with brilliant coloring1 although somewhat crude4 ,it is nowhere mentioned1 and we are not aware of its having been engraved4 ,no4 #ia4 ,a charming little drawing1 #b feet #b inches high1 #a foot #h inches wide3 ,a sleeping ,nymph1 surprised by ,lore and ,satyrs1 engraved by ,daulle1 also in ,landon's work4 ,passing from the ,national ,gallery to that of ,bridgewater1 we come upon another phase of ,poussin's genius1 and encounter not the disciple of ,mariai but the disciple of the gospel1 the graces of mythology giving way to the austerity and sublimity of ,christianity4 ,such is the account of what we came to see2 we looked for much1 and found more than we expected4 ,the ,bridgewater ,gallery is so named after its founder1 the ,duke of ,bridgewater1 by whom it was formed about the middle of the eighteenth century4 ,he bequeathed it to his brother1 the ,marquis of ,stafford1 on the condition of his leaving it to his second son1 ,lord ,francis ,egerton1 now ,lord ,ellesmere4 ,the best part of this collection was engraved during the life of the ,marquis of ,stafford1 by ,ottley1 under the title of the ,stafford ,gallery1 in #d vols4 folio4 ,it occupies the first place in ,england amongst private collections1 on account of the number of masterpieces of the ,italian1 and ,dutch1 and ,french schools4 ,a large number of paintings were added to it from the ,orleans ,gallery1 and we could not repress a feeling of regret to meet at ,cleveland ,square with so many masterpieces formerly belonging to ,france1 and which have been engraved in the two celebrated works3 #a4 ,la ,galerie du duc d',orleans au ,palais-,royal1 #b volumes in folio2 #b4 ,recueil d'estampes d'apres les plus beaux tableaux et dessins qui sont en ,france dans le cabinet du roi et celui de ,monseigneur le duc d',orleans1 #agbi1 #b volumes in folio2 a most valuable collection known also under the name of the ,cabinet of ,crozat4 ,this admirable collection is deposited in a building worthy of it1 in a veritable palace1 and consists of nearly #cjj paintings4 ,the ,french school is here well represented4 ,the ,musical ,party1 from the ,orleans ,gallery1 and engraved in the ,galerie du ,palais-,royal1 three ,bourguignons1 four ,gaspars1 four fine ,claudes1 described by ,m4 ,waagen1 vol4 i41 p4 #cca1 the two former described in the catalogue as ,nos4 #aa and #da were painted in #affd for ,m4 de ,bourlemont1 a gentleman of ,lorraine2 the former1 ,demosthenes by the ,sea-side1 offers a fine contrast between majestic ruins and nature eternally young and fresh2 the second1 ,moses at the ,burning ,bush1 a third1 ,no4 #ajc1 of the year #afeg1 was likewise painted for a ,frenchman1 ,m4 de ,lagarde1 and represents the ,metamorphosis of ,apuleius into a ,shepherd2 lastly1 there is a fourth1 ,no4 #ig1 the freshest idyll that ever was1 a ,view of the ,cascatelles of ,tivoli4 ,the memory of these charming compositions1 however1 soon fades before the view of the eight grand pictures of ,poussin1 marked in the catalogue ,nos4 #fb-fi1 the ,seven ,sacraments1 and ,moses striking the ,rock with his ,rod4 ,it would be difficult to describe the religious sensations which took possession of us whilst contemplating the ,seven ,sacraments4 ,whatever ,m4 ,waagen may please to assert1 there is certainly nothing theatrical about them4 ,the beauty of ancient statuary is here animated and enlivened by the spirit of ,christianity1 and the genius of the painter4 ,the moral expression is of the most exalted character1 and is left to be noticed less in the details than in the general composition4 ,in fact1 it is in composition that ,poussin excels1 and1 in this respect1 we do not think he has any superior1 not even of the ,florentine and ,roman school4 ,as each ,sacrament is a vast scene in which the smallest details go to enhance the effect of the whole1 so the ,seven ,sacraments form a harmonious entirety1 a single work1 representing the development of the ,christian life by means of its most august ceremonies1 in the same way as the twenty-two ,st4 ,brunos of ,lesueur express the whole monastic life1 the intention of the variety being to give a truer conception of its unity4 ,can any one1 in sincerity1 say as much as this for the ,stanze of the ,vatican8 ,have they a common sentiment8 ,is the sentiment profound1 and1 indeed1 ,christian8 ,no doubt ,raphael elevates the soul1 whatever is beautiful cannot fail to do that2 but he touches only the surface1 circum praecordia ludit2 he penetrates not deep2 moves not the inner fibres of our being3 for why8 he himself was not so moved4 ,he snatches us from earth1 and transports us into the serene atmosphere of eternal beauty2 but the mournful side of life1 the sublime emotions of the heart1 magnanimity1 heroism1 in a word1 moral grandeur1 this he does not express2 and why was this8 because he did not possess it in himself1 because it was not to be met with around him in the ,italy of the #afth century1 in a society semi-pagan1 superstitious1 and impious1 given up to every vice and disorder1 which ,luther could not even catch a glimpse of without raging with horror1 and meditating a revolution4 ,from this corrupt basis1 thinly hidden by a fictitious politeness1 two great figures1 ,michael ,angelo and ,vittoria ,colonna1 show themselves4 ,but the noble widow of the ,marquis of ,pescaria was not of the company of the ,fornarina2 and what common ground could the chaste lover of the second ,beatrice1 the ,dante of painting and of sculpture1 the intrepid engineer who defended ,florence1 the melancholy author of the ,last ,judgment and of ,lorenzo di ,medici1 have with such men as ,perugino boldly professing atheism1 at the same time that he painted1 at the highest price possible1 the most delicate ,madonnas2 and his worthy friend ,aretino1 atheist1 and moreover hypocrite1 writing with the same hand his infamous sonnets and the life of the ,holy ,virgin2 and ,giulio ,romano1 who lent his pencil to the wildest debaucheries1 and ,marc' ,antonio1 who engraved them8 ,such is the world in which ,raphael lived1 and which early taught him to worship material beauty1 the purest taste in design1 if not the strongest1 fine drawing1 sweet contours1 of light1 of color1 but which always hides from him the highest beauty1 that is1 moral beauty4 ,poussin belongs to a very different world4 ,thanks to ,god1 he had learned to know in ,france others besides artists without faith or morals1 elegant amateurs1 rich prelates1 and compliant beauties4 ,he had seen with his eyes heroes1 saints1 and statesmen4 ,he must have met1 at the court of ,louis ,,xiii41 between #afdj and #afdb1 the young ,conde and the voting ,turenne1 ,st4 ,vincent de ,paul1 ,mademoiselle de ,vigean1 and ,mademoiselle de ,lafayette2 had shaken hands with ,richelieu1 with ,lesueur1 with ,champagne1 and no doubt also with ,corneille4 ,like the last1 he is grave and masculine2 he has the sentiment of the great1 and strives to reach it4 ,if1 above every thing1 he is an artist1 if his long career is an assiduous and indefatigable study of beauty1 it is pre-eminently moral beauty that strikes him3 and when he represents historic or ,christian scenes1 one feels he is there1 like the author of the ,cid1 of ,cinna1 and of ,polyeuete1 in his natural element4 ,he shows1 assuredly1 much spirit and grace in his mythologies1 and like ,corneille in several of his elegies and in the ,declaration of ,love to ,psyche3 but also like him1 it is in the thoughtful and noble style that ,poussin excels3 it is on the moral ground that he has a place exalted and apart in the history of art4 ,it is not our intention to describe the ,seven ,sacraments1 which has been done by others more competent to the task than ourselves4 ,we will only inquire whether ,bossuet himself1 in speaking of the sacrament of the ,ordination1 could have employed more gravity and majesty than ,poussin has done in the noble painting1 so well preserved1 in the gallery of ,lord ,ellesmere4 ,it is worthy of remark1 in this as in the other paintings of ,poussin's best period1 how admirably the landscape accords with the historic portion4 ,whilst the foreground is occupied with the great scene in which ,christ transmits his power to ,st4 ,peter before the assembled apostles1#bhh in the distance1 and above the heights1 are descried edifices rising and in decay4 ,doubtless1 the ,extreme ,unction is the most pathetic2 affects and attracts us most by its various qualities1 particularly by a certain austere grace shed around the images of death2#bhi but1 unhappily1 this striking composition has almost totally disappeared under the black tint1 which has little by little gained on the other colors1 and obscured the whole painting1 so that we are well-nigh reduced to the engraving of ,pesne1 and the beautiful drawing preserved in the museum of the ,louvre4#bij ,most unhappily a technical error1 into which even the most inconsiderable painter would not now fall1 has deprived posterity of one half of ,poussin's labors4 ,he was in the habit of covering his canvas with a preparation of red1 which has been changed by the effect of time into black1 and thus absorbed the other colors1 destroying the effect of the etherial perspective4 ,as every one knows1 this does not occur with a white preparation1 which1 instead of destroying the colors1 preserves them for a length of time in their original state4 ,this last process ,poussin appears to have adopted in the ,moses striking the ,rock with his ,staff1 incomparably the finest of all the ,strikings of the ,rock which proceeded from his pencil4 ,this masterpiece is well known1 from the engraving by ,baudet1 and has passed1 with the ,seven ,sacraments1 from the ,orleans gallery into the collection at ,bridgewater4 ,what unity is in this vast composition1 and yet what variety in the action1 the pose1 the features of the figures6 ,it consists of twenty different pictures1 and yet is but one2 and not even one of the episodes could be taken away without considerable injury to the ensemble of the piece4 ,at the same time1 what fine coloring6 ,the impastation is both solid and light1 and the colors are combined in the happiest manner4 ,no doubt they might possess greater brilliancy2 but the severity of the subject agrees well with a moderate tone4 ,it is important to remember this4 ,in the first place1 every subject demands its proper color3 in the second1 grave subjects require a certain amount of coloring1 which1 however1 must not be exceeded4 ,although the highest art does not consist in coloring1 it would nevertheless be folly to regard it as of small importance3 for1 in that case1 drawing would be every thing1 and color might be altogether dispensed with4 ,in attempting too far to please the eye1 the risk is incurred of not going beyond and penetrating to the soul4 ,on the other hand1 want of color1 or what is perhaps still worse1 a disagreeable1 crude1 and improper coloring1 while it offends the eye1 likewise impairs the moral effect1 and deprives even beauty of its charm4 ,color is to painting what harmony is to poetry and prose4 ,there is equal defect whether in the case of too much or too little harmony1 while one same harmony continued must be looked upon as a serious fault4 ,is ,corneille happily inspired8 ,his harmony1 like his words1 are true1 beautiful1 admirable in their variety4 ,the tones differ with his different characters1 but are always consistent with the conditions of harmony imposed by poesy4 ,is he negligent8 his style then becomes rude1 unpolished1 at times intolerable4 ,the harmony of ,racine is slightly monotonous1 his men talk like women1 and his lyre was but one tone1 that of a natural and refined elegance4 ,there is but one man amongst us who speaks in every tone and in all languages1 who has colors and accents for every subject1 naive and sublime1 vividly correct yet unaffectedly simple4 ,sweet as ,racine in his lament of ,madame1 masculine and vigorous as ,corneille or ,tacitus when he comes to describe ,retz or ,cromwell1 clear as the battle trumpet when his strain is ,roeroy or ,conde1 suggestive of the equal and varied flow of a mighty river in the majestic harmony of his ,discourse on ,universal ,history1 a ,history which1 in the grandeur and extent of its composition1 in its vanquished difficulties1 its depth of art1 where art even ceases to appear as such1 in its perfect unity1 and1 at the same time1 almost infinite variety of tone and style1 is perhaps the most finished work which has ever come from the hand of man4 ,to return to ,poussin4 ,at ,hampton ,court1 where1 by the side of the seven cartoons of ,raphael1 the nine magnificent ,montegnas representing the triumph of ,caesar1 and the fine portraits of ,albert ,durer and ,holbein1 ,french art makes so small a figure1 there is a ,poussin#bia of particularly fine color1 ,satyrs finding a ,nymph4 ,the transparent and lustrous body of the nymph forms the entire picture4 ,it is a study of design and color1 evidently of the period when ,poussin1 to perfect himself in every branch of his art1 made copies from ,titian4 ,time fails us to give the least idea of the rich gallery of the ,marquess of ,westminster1 in ,grosvenor-street4 ,we refer for this to what ,m4 ,waagen has said1 vol4 ii41 p4 #aac-acj4 ,the ,flemish and ,dutch schools preponderate in this gallery4 ,one sees there in all their glory the three great masters of that school1 ,rubens1 ,van ,dyck1 and ,rembrandt1 accompanied by a numerous suite of inferior masters1 at present much in vogue1 ,hobbema1 ,cuyp1 ,both1 ,potter1 and others1 who1 to our idea1 fade completely before some half-dozen by ,claude of all sizes1 of every variety of subject1 and nearly all of the best time of the great landscape-painter1 between #afea and #affa4 ,of these paintings1 the greatest and most important is perhaps the ,sermon on the ,mount4 ,poussin appears worthily by the side of ,lorrain in the gallery at ,grosvenor-street4 ,m4 ,waagen admires particularly ,calisto changed into a ,bear1 and placed by ,jupiter among the ,constellations1 and still more a ,virgin with the infant ,jesus surrounded by ,angels4 ,he extols in this morceau the surpassing clearness of coloring1 the noble and melancholy sentiment of nature1 together with a warm and powerful tone4 ,m4 ,waagen places this painting amongst the masterpieces of the ,french painter 7gehoert zu dem vortrefflichsten was ich von ihm kenne74 ,whilst fully concurring in this judgment1 we beg leave to point out in the same gallery two other canvases of ,poussin1 two delicious pieces from the easel1 first a touching episode in ,moses striking the ,rock1 in the gallery of ,lord ,ellesmere1 of a mother who1 heedless of herself1 hastens to give her children drink1 whilst their father bends in thanksgiving to ,god2 the other1 ,children at play4 ,never did a more delightful scene come from the pencil of ,albano4 ,two children look1 laughing1 at each other2 another to the right holds a butterfly on his finger2 a fourth endeavors to catch a butterfly which is flying from him2 a fifth1 stooping1 takes fruit from a basket4 ,but we must quit the ,london galleries to betake ourselves to that which forms the ornament of the college situated in the charming village of ,dulwich4 ,stanislas1 king of ,poland1 charged a ,london amateur1 ,m4 ,noel ,desenfans1 to form him a collection of pictures4 ,the misfortunes of ,stanislas1 and the dismemberment of ,poland left on ,m4 ,desenfans' hands all he had collected2 these he made a present of to a friend of his1 ,m4 ,bourgeois1 a painter1 who still further enriched this fine collection1 and bequeathed it1 at his death1 to ,dulwich ,college1 where it now is in a very commodious and well-lighted building4 ,it consists of nearly #cej paintings4 ,m4 ,waagen1 who visited it1 pronounces judgment with some severity4 ,the catalogue is ill-compiled1 it is true1 but in this it does not differ from numerous other catalogues4 ,mediocrity is frequently placed side by side with excellence1 and copies given as originals2 this is the case with more than one gallery4 ,this one1 however1 has to us the merit of containing a considerable number of ,french paintings1 to some of which even ,m4 ,waagen cannot refuse his admiration4 ,we will1 first of all1 mention without describing them1 a ,lenain1 two ,bourguignons1 three portraits by ,rigaud1 or after ,rigaud1 a ,louis ,,xiv41 a ,boileau1 and another personage unknown to us1 two ,lebruns1 the ,massacre of the ,innocents1 and ,horatius ,cocles defending the ,bridge1 in which ,m4 ,waagen discovers happy imitations of ,poussin1 three or four ,gaspars and seven ,claude ,lorrains1 the beauty of most of which is a sufficient guarantee of their authenticity2 together with a very fine ,fete champetre by ,watteau1 and a ,view near ,rome1 by ,joseph ,vernet4 ,of ,poussin1 the catalogue points out eighteen1 of which the following is a list3 ,no4 #aae4 ,the ,education of ,bacchus2 #adb1 a ,landscape2 #bdi1 a ,holy ,family2 #bec1 the ,apparition of the ,angels to ,abraham2 #bfj1 a ,landscape2 #bfi1 the ,destruction of ,niobe2 #bgi1 a ,landscape2 #bia1 the ,adoration of the ,magi2 #bib1 a ,landscape2 #bie1 the ,inspiration of the ,poet2 #cjj1 the ,education of ,jupiter2 #cje1 the ,triumph of ,david2 #caj1 the ,flight into ,egypt2 #cae1 ,renald and ,armida2 #caf1 ,venus and ,mercury2 #cbe1 ,jupiter and ,antiope2 #ccf1 the ,assumption of the ,virgin2 #ceb1 ,children4 ,of these eighteen pictures1 ,m4 ,waagen singles out five1 which he thus characterizes3 ,the ,assumption of the ,virgin1 ,no4 #ccf4 ,in a landscape of powerful poesy1 the ,virgin is carried off to heaven in clouds of gold3 a small picture1 of which the sentiment is noble and pure1 the coloring strong and transparent 7in der ,farbe kraftiges und klaares ,bild74 ,children1 ,no4 #ceb4 ,replete with loveliness and charm4 ,the ,triumph of ,david1 ,no4 #cje4 ,a rich picture1 but theatrical4 ,jupiter suckled by the goat ,amalthea1 ,no4 #cjj4 ,a charming composition1 transparent tone4 ,a ,landscape1 ,no4 #bfj4 ,a well-drawn landscape1 breathing a profound sentiment of nature2 but which has become rather blackened4 ,we are unable to recognize in the ,triumph of ,david the theatrical character which shocked ,m4 ,waagen4 ,on the contrary1 we perceive a bold and almost wild expression1 a great deal of passion finely subdued4 ,a triumph must always contain some formality2 here1 however1 there is the least possible1 and that with which we are struck is its vigor and truth to nature4 ,the giant's head stuck on the pike has the grandest effect3 and we believe that the able ,german critic has1 in this instance1 likewise yielded to the prejudices of his country1 which1 in its passion for what it styles reality1 fancies it perceives the theatrical in whatever is noble4 ,we admit that at the close of the seventeenth century1 under ,louis ,,xiv4 and ,lebrun1 the noble was merged in the theatrical and academic2 but under ,louis ,,xiii4 and the ,regency1 in the time of ,corneille and ,poussin1 the academic and theatrical style was wholly unknown4 ,we entreat the sagacious critic not to forget this distinction between the divisions of the seventeenth century1 nor to confound the master with his disciples1 who1 although they were still great1 had slightly degenerated1 and who were oppressed by the taste of the age of ,louis ,,xiv4 ,but our gravest reproach against ,m4 ,waagen is1 that he did not notice at ,dulwich numerous morceaux of ,poussin1 which well merited his attention2 amongst others1 the ,adoration of the ,magi1 far superior1 for its coloring1 to that in the ,museum at ,paris2 and1 above all1 a picture which seems to us a masterpiece in the difficult art of conveying a philosophic idea under the living form of a myth and an allegory4 ,in this art1 ,poussin excelled3 he is pre-eminently a philosophical artist1 a thinker assisted by all the resources of the science of design4 ,he has ever an idea which guides his hand1 and which is his main object4 ,let us not tire to reiterate this3 it is moral beauty which he everywhere seeks1 both in nature and humanity4 ,as we have stated in relation to the sacrament of ,ordination1 the landscapes of ,poussin are almost always designed to set off and heighten human life1 whilst ,claude is essentially a landscape painter1 with whom both history and humanity are made subservient to nature4 ,subjects derived from ,christianity were exactly suited to ,poussin1 inasmuch as they afforded the sublimest types of that moral grandeur in which he delighted1 although we do not see in him the exquisite piety of ,lesueur and ,champagne2 and if ,christian greatness speaks to his soul1 it appears to do so with no authority beyond that of ,phocion1 of ,scipio1 or of ,germanicus4 ,sometimes neither sacred nor profane history suffices him3 he invents1 he imagines1 he has recourse to moral and philosophic allegory4 ,it is here1 perhaps1 that he is most original1 and that his imagination displays itself in its greatest freedom and elevation4 ,arcadia is a lesson of high philosophy under the form of an idyll4 ,the ,testament of ,eudamidas portrays the sublime confidence of friendship4 ,time ,rescuing ,truth from the assaults of ,envy and ,discord1 the ,ballet of ,human ,life1 are celebrated models of this style4 ,we have had the good fortune to meet at ,dulwich with a work of ,poussin's almost unknown1 and of whose existence we had not even an idea1 sparkling at the same time with the style we have been describing1 and with the most eminent qualities of the chief of the ,french school4 ,this work1 entirely new to us1 is a picture of very small size1 marked ,no4 #bie1 and described in the catalogue as ,the ,inspiration of the ,poet1 a delightful subject1 and treated in the most delightful manner4 ,fancy the freshest landscape1 in the foreground a harmonious group of three personages4 ,the poet1 on bended knee1 carries to his lips the sacred cup which ,apollo1 the god of poesy1 has presented to him4 ,whilst he quaffs1 inspiration seizes him1 his face is transfigured1 and the sacred intoxication becomes apparent in the motion of his hands and his whole body4 ,beside ,apollo1 the ,muse prepares to collect the songs of the poet4 ,above this group1 a genius1 frolicking in air1 weaves a chaplet1 whilst other genii scatter flowers4 ,in the background1 the clearest horizon4 ,grace1 spirit1 depth--this enchanting composition unites the whole4 ,added to this1 the color is well-grounded and of great brilliancy4 ,it is very singular that neither ,bellori nor ,felibien1 who both lived on terms of intimacy with ,poussin1 and are still his best historians1 say not a word of this work4 ,it is not referred to in the catalogues of ,florent ,lecomte1 of ,gault de ,st4 ,germain1 or of ,castellan2 nor does ,m4 ,waagen himself1 who1 having been at ,dulwich1 must have seen it there1 make the least mention of it4 ,we are1 therefore1 ignorant in what year1 on what occasion1 and for whom this delicious little painting was executed3 but the hand of ,poussin is seen throughout1 in the drawing1 in the composition1 in the expression4 ,nothing theatrical or vulgar3 truth combined with beauty4 ,the whole scene conveys unmixed delight1 and its impression is at once serene and profound4 ,in our idea1 ,the ,inspiration of the ,poet may be ranked as almost equal with ,the ,arcadia4 ,notwithstanding this1 ,the ,inspiration has never been engraved1 at least we have not met with it in any of the rich collections of engravings from ,poussin we have been enabled to consult1 those of ,m4 de ,baudicour1 of ,m4 ,gatteaux1 member of the ,academy of ,fine ,arts1 and lastly1 the cabinet of prints in the ,bibliotheque ,nationale4 ,we hope that these few words may suggest to some ,french engraver the idea of undertaking the very easy pilgrimage to ,dulwich1 and making known to the lovers of national art an ingenious and touching production of ,poussin1 strayed and lost1 as it1 were1 in a foreign collection4 ,,finis4 ,,footnotes3 #bhd ,this is the sketch which ,felibien so justly praises1 part v41 p4 #cg1 of the #ast edition1 in #dto4 #bhe ,this great work has been long in ,england1 as remarked by ,mariette1 see the ,abecedario1 just published1 article ,s4 ,bourdon1 vol4 i41 p4 #aga4 ,it appears to have been a favorite work of ,bourdon1 he having himself engraved it1 see de ,piles1 ,abrege de la ,vie des ,peintres1 #b;d edition1 p4 #did1 and the ,peintre graveur francais1 of ,m4 ,robert ,dumesnil1 vol4 i41 p4 #aca1 etc4 ,the copperplates of the ,seven ,works of ,mercy are at the ,louvre4 #bhf ,the ,libro di ,verita is now the property of the ,duke of ,devonshire4 ,m4 ,leon de ,laborde has given a detailed account of it in the ,archives de l',art francais1 tom4 i41 p4 #dce1 et seq4 #bhg ,the first composition of ,arcadia1 truly precious could it have been placed in the ,louvre beside the second and better production1 is in ,england1 the property of the ,duke of ,devonshire4 #bhh ,in the first set of the ,seven ,sacraments1 executed for the ,chevalier del ,pozzo1 now in ,england1 the property of the ,duke of ,rutland1 and with which we are acquainted only through engravings1 ,christ is placed on the left hand2 it is less masterly and imposing1 and the centre has a vacant appearance4 ,in the second set1 painted five or six years after the former for ,m4 de ,chanteloup1 ,christ is placed in the centre3 this new disposition changes the entire effect of the piece4 ,poussin never repeated himself in treating the same subject a second time1 but improved on it1 aiming ever at perfection4 ,and the memorable answer which he once made to one who inquired of him by what means he had attained to so great perfection1 ,i never neglected any thing1 should be always present to the mind of every artist1 painter1 sculptor1 poet1 or composer4 #bhi ,poussin writes to ,m4 de ,chanteloup1 ,april #be1 #afdd 7,lettres de ,poussin1 ,paris1 #ahbd71 ,i am working briskly at the ,extreme ,unction1 which is indeed a subject worthy of ,apelles1 who was very fond of representing the dying4 ,he adds1 with a vivacity which seems to indicate that he took a particular fancy to this painting1 ,i do not intend to quit it whilst ,i feel thus well-disposed1 until ,i have put it in fair train for a sketch4 ,it is to contain seventeen figures of men1 women1 and children1 young and old1 one part of whom are drowned in tears1 whilst the others pray for the dying4 ,i will not describe it to you more in detail4 ,in this1 my clumsy pen is quite unfit1 it requires a gilded and well-set pencil4 ,the principal figures are two feet high2 the painting will be about the size of your ,manne1 but of better proportion4 ,felibien1 a friend and confidant of ,poussin1 likewise remarks 7,entretiens1 etc41 part iv41 p4 #bic71 that the ,extreme ,unction was one of the paintings which pleased him most4 ,we learn at length1 from ,poussin's letters1 that he finished it and sent it into ,france in this same year1 #afdd4 ,fenoien informs us that in #afdf he completed the ,confirmation1 in #afdg the ,baptism1 the ,penance1 the ,ordination and the ,eucharist1 and that he sent the last sacrament1 that of ,marriage1 at the commencement of the year #afdh4 ,bellori 7le ,vite de ,pittori1 etc41 ,rome1 #afgb7 gives a full and detailed description of the ,extreme ,unction2 and1 as he lived with ,poussin1 it seems credible that his explanations are for the most part those he had himself received from the great artist4 #bij ,the drawing of the ,extreme ,unction is at the ,louvre2 the drawings of the five other sacraments are in the rich cabinet of ,m4 de la ,salle1 that of the seventh is the property of the well-known print seller1 ,m4 ,deter4 #bia ,there is here likewise a charming ,francis ,,ii41 wholly from the hand of ,clouet1 and the portrait of ,fenelon by ,rigaud1 which may be the original or at all events is not inferior to the painting in the gallery at ,versailles4 99 99 99 99 99 ,d4 ,,appleton ,,co4',s ,,publications4 ,a ,history of ,philosophy3 ,an ,epitome4 ,by ,dr4 ,,albert ,,schwegler4 ,translated from the original ,german1 by ,,julius ,h4 ,,seelye4 #abmo1 #cfe pages4 ,this translation is designed to supply a want long felt by both teachers and students in our ,american colleges4 ,we have valuable histories of ,philosophy in ,english1 but no manual on this subject so clear1 concise1 and comprehensive as the one now presented4 ,schwegler's work bears the marks of great learning1 and is evidently written by one who has not only studied the original sources for such a history1 but has thought out for himself the systems of which he treats4 ,he has thus seized upon the real germ of each system1 and traced its process of development with great clearness and accuracy4 ,the whole history of speculation1 from ,thales to the present time1 is presented in its consecutive order4 ,this rich and important field of study1 hitherto so greatly neglected1 will1 it is hoped1 receive a new impulse among ,american students through ,mr4 ,seelye's translation4 ,it is a book1 moreover1 invaluable for reference1 and should be in the possession of every public and private library4 ,from ,l4 ,p4 ,,hickok1 ,vice-,president of ,union ,college4 ,i have had opportunity to hear a large part of ,mr4 ,seelye's translation of ,schwegler's ,history of ,philosophy read from manuscript1 and ,i do not hesitate to say that it is a faithful1 clear1 and remarkably precise ,english rendering of this invaluable ,epitome of the ,history of ,philosophy4 ,it is exceedingly desirable that it should be given to ,american students of philosophy in the ,english language1 and ,i have no expectation of its more favorable and successful accomplishment than in this present attempt4 ,i should immediately introduce it as a text-book in the graduate's department under my own instruction1 if it be favorably published1 and cannot doubt that other teachers will rejoice to avail themselves of the like assistance from it4 ,from ,,henry ,b4 ,,smith1 ,professor of ,christian ,theology1 ,union ,theological ,seminary1 ,n4 ,y4 ,it will well reward diligent study1 and is one of the best works for a text-book in our colleges upon this neglected branch of scientific investigation4 ,from ,n4 ,,porter1 ,professor of ,intellectual ,philosophy in ,yale ,college4 ,it is the only book translated from the ,german which professes to give an account of the recent ,german systems which seems adapted to give any intelligible information on the subject to a novice4 ,from ,,geo4 ,p4 ,,fisher1 ,professor of ,divinity in ,yale ,college4 ,it is really the best ,epitome of the ,history of ,philosophy now accessible to the ,english student4 ,from ,,joseph ,,haven1 ,professor of ,mental ,philosophy in ,amherst ,college4 ,as a manual and brief summary of the whole range of speculative inquiry1 ,i know of no work which strikes me more favorably4 ,,annual ,,cyclopaedia ,,for #ahgj4 ,in addition to its usual information on all the ,civil1 ,political1 ,industrial ,affairs of each ,state1 and of the whole country1 it contains very complete details of the ,,united ,,states ,,census4 ,a complete account of the origin and progress of the ,,german-,,french ,,war1 and a very full exhibition of the present state of ,europe1 ,population1 ,nationalities1 ,wealth1 ,debts1 ,military ,force of the different ,countries and an ,,explanation ,,of ,,all ,,the ,,existing ,,european ,,questions1 are presented4 ,the ,discoveries1 ,events1 and ,developments of the year are fully brought up1 together with the ,history and ,progress of all ,countries of the ,world during the year2 and the volume is ,illustrated with ,maps1 and fine ,steel ,portraits of ,general ,,robert ,e4 ,,lee1 ,general ,,von ,,moltke1 and ,king ,,victor ,,emmanuel4 ,this work is the ,tenth of a ,series commenced in #ahfa1 and published1 one volume annually since1 in the same style as the ,new ,american ,cyclopaedia1 and is1 in fact1 an addendum to that invaluable work4 ,each volume1 however1 is complete in itself1 and is confined to the results of its year4 ,,this ,,volume ,,also ,,contains ,a ,,complete ,,index ,,to ,,all ,,the ,,annuals ,,heretofore ,,published4 ,,comments ,,of ,,the ,,press4 ,the ,new ,york ,world1 speaking of this work1 says3 ,the past volumes of the annual series have all been good2 but that which has been recently added is excellent1 in fact1 it might be said to have approached perfection4 ,no final ,word is needed to express the genuine admiration which this work1 in its conception1 execution1 and publication1 deserves4 ,no private library in the country should be without it or its predecessors4 ,its value is not easily estimated4--,london ,saturday ,review4 ,each succeeding year will add to its value4--,london ,daily ,news4 ,no individual or family of ordinary intelligence should be without it4--,n4 ,y4 ,times4 ,supplies a great public want4--,detroit ,tribune4 ,ought to be in every library4--,albany ,atlas and ,argus4 ,we can confidently and conscientiously recommend it4--,evening ,traveller4 ,thorough and reliable1 and just such a work as is greatly needed4--,cleveland ,daily ,plain ,dealer4 ,cannot be too highly commended4--,ohio ,state ,journal4 ,,prices ,,and ,,styles ,,of ,,binding4 ,in ,extra ,cloth1 per vol41 #e4jj ,in ,library ,leather1 per vol41 #f4jj ,in ,half ,turkey ,morocco1 per vol41 #f4ej ,in ,half ,russia1 extra gilt1 per vol41 #g4ej ,in ,full ,morocco1 antique1 gilt edges1 per vol41 #i4jj ,in ,full ,russia1 #i4jj ,,sold ,,by ,,subscription ,,only4 ,d4 ,,appleton ,,co41 ,publishers1 #edi #eea ,,broadway1 ,,new ,,york4 ,a ,,text-,,book ,,of ,,practical ,,medicine1 with ,particular ,reference to ,physiology and ,pathological ,anatomy4 ,by ,dr4 ,,felix ,,von ,,niemeyer4 ,translated from the eighth ,german edition1 by special permission of the ,author1 by ,,george ,h4 ,,humphreys1 ,m4 ,d41 and ,,charles ,e4 ,,hackley1 ,m4 ,d4 #b vols41 #hvo1 #a1ebh pages4 ,cloth4 ,price1 #i4jj4 ,the translators are pleased to find that the medical public sustain their own opinion of the practical value of ,professor ,niemeyer's ,text-,book1 and take pleasure in presenting the present edition1 which is altered to correspond with the eighth and last ,german edition4 ,the translators also take great pleasure in noticing the favorable reception of this work in ,england1 showing the interest felt there as well as herein the ideas of the modern ,german ,school of ,medicine4 ,,vera2 ,,or ,,the ,,english ,,earl ,,and ,,the ,,russian ,,princess4 ,by the ,author of ,the ,hotel du ,petit ,st4 ,jean4 #a vol41 #hvo1 forming ,no4 #be of ,library of ,choice ,novels4 ,price1 #dj cents4 ,vera has been praised by the ,english press in the highest terms4 ,there is a freshness of style1 of method and material1 and the world of ,english novel-readers have found in them a new sensation4 ,the ,london ,saturday ,review1 speaking of ,vera1 says that it heartily recommends to the public a book which cannot fail to please every one who reads it4 ,,light ,,science ,,for ,,leisure ,,hours4 ,a ,series of ,familiar ,essays on ,scientific ,subjects1 ,natural ,phenomena1 etc4 ,by ,r4 ,a4 ,,proctor1 ,b4 ,a41 ,f4 ,r4 ,a4 ,s41 author of ,saturn and its ,system1 ,other ,worlds than ,ours1 ,the ,sun1 etc4 #a vol4 ,cloth4 #abmo4 ,price1 #b4jj4 ,,contents4--,strange ,discoveries respecting the ,aurora2 ,the ,earth's ,magnetism2 ,our ,chief ,timepiece losing ,time2 ,encke1 the ,astronomer2 ,venus on the ,sun's ,face2 ,recent ,solar ,researches2 ,government ,aid to ,science2 ,american ,alms for ,british ,science2 ,the ,secret of the ,north ,pole2 ,is the ,gulf ,stream a ,myth8 ,floods in ,switzerland2 ,a ,great ,tidal ,wave2 ,deep-,sea ,dredgings2 ,the ,tunnel through ,mont ,cenis2 ,tornadoes2 ,vesuvius2 ,the ,earthquake in ,peru2 ,the ,greatest ,sea ,wave ever known2 ,the ,usefulness of ,earthquakes2 ,the ,forcing ,power of ,rain2 ,a ,shower of ,snow ,crystals2 ,long ,shots2 ,influence of ,marriage on the ,death-,rate2 ,the ,topographical ,survey of ,india2 ,a ,ship attacked by a ,swordfish2 ,the ,safety-,lamp2 ,the ,dust we have to ,breathe2 ,photographic ,ghosts2 ,the ,oxford and ,cambridge ,rowing ,styles2 ,betting on ,horse-,races1 or the ,state of the ,odds2 ,squaring the ,circle2 ,a ,new ,theory of ,achilles's ,shield4 ,,hereditary ,,genius2 an ,inquiry into its ,laws and ,consequences4 ,by ,,francis ,,galton1 ,f4 ,r4 ,s4 #a vol41 #hvo4 ,cloth4 #cij pages4 ,price1 #b4jj4 ,the author of this book endeavors to show that man's natural abilities are derived from inheritance1 under exactly the same limitations as are the form and physical features of the whole organic world4 ,consequently1 as it is easy1 notwithstanding the limitations1 to obtain by careful selection a permanent breed of dogs or horses1 gifted with peculiar powers of reasoning1 or of doing any thing else1 so it would be quite practicable to produce a highly-gifted race of men by judicious marriages during several consecutive generations4 ,,appletons' ,,european ,,guide-,,book1 ,illustrated1 including ,england1 ,scotland1 and ,ireland1 ,france1 ,belgium1 ,holland1 ,northern and ,southern ,germany1 ,switzerland1 ,italy1 ,spain and ,portugal1 ,russia1 ,denmark1 ,norway1 and ,sweden2 containing a ,map of ,europe1 and ,nine other ,maps1 with ,plans of ,twenty of the ,principal ,cities1 and #abj ,engravings4 #a vol41 #abmo4 ,second ,edition1 brought down to ,may1 #ahga4 #gbj pages4 ,red ,french morocco1 with a tuck4 ,price1 #f4jj4 ,in the preparation of this ,guide-book1 the author has sought to give1 within the limits of a single volume1 all the information necessary to enable the tourist to find his way1 without difficulty1 from place to place1 and to see the objects best worth seeing1 throughout such parts of ,europe as are generally visited by ,american and ,english travellers4--,extract from ,preface4 ,,the ,,art ,,of ,,beautifying ,,suburban ,,home ,,grounds ,,of ,,small ,,extent1 and the best ,modes of ,laying out1 ,planting1 and ,keeping ,decorated ,grounds4 ,illustrated by upward of ,two ,hundred ,plates and ,engravings of ,plans for ,residences and their ,grounds1 of ,trees1 and ,shrubs1 and ,garden ,embellishments4 ,with ,descriptions of the ,beautiful and ,hardy ,trees and ,shrubs grown in the ,united ,states4 ,by ,,frank ,j4 ,,scott4 ,complete in one ,elegant ,quarto ,volume of #fah pages4 ,is printed on tinted paper1 bound in green morocco cloth1 bevelled boards1 with uncut edges1 gilt top4 ,price1 #h4jj4 ,this elegant work is the only book published on the especial subject indicated by the title4 ,its aim and object are to aid persons of moderate incomes1 who are not fully posted on the arts of decorative gardening1 to beautify their homes1 to suggest and illustrate the simple means with which beautiful home-surroundings may be realized on small ground1 and with little cost2 also to assist in giving an intelligent direction to the desires and a satisfactory result for the labors of those who are engaged in embellishing houses1 as well as those whose imaginations are warm with the hopes of homes that are yet to be4 ,,life ,,of ,,major ,,john ,,andre4 ,by ,,winthorp ,,sargent4 ,a new and revised edition4 #a vol41 #abmo1 with ,portraits of the ,author and ,editor4 ,price1 #b4ej4 ,this work is an important contribution to our historical literature--a volume1 says ,robert ,c4 ,winthrop1 full of attractive and valuable matter1 and displaying the fruit of rich culture and rare accomplishments4 ,the ,life of ,andre has been fortunate in receiving the commendation1 at home and abroad1 of careful critics and distinguished historians4 ,,the ,,two ,,guardians2 ,,or ,,home ,,in ,,this ,,world4 ,by the author of ,the ,heir of ,redclyffe4 #a vol41 #abmo4 ,cloth4 ,price1 #a4jj4 ,forming one of the volumes of the new illustrated edition of ,miss ,yonge's popular novels4 ,volumes already published3 ,the ,heir of ,redclyffe1 #b vols42 ,heartsease1 #b vols42 ,daisy ,chain1 #b vols42 ,beechcroft1 #a vol4 ,,the ,,recovery ,,of ,,jerusalem4 ,an ,account of the ,recent ,excavations and ,discoveries in the ,holy ,city4 ,by ,,captain ,,wilson1 ,r4 ,e41 and ,,captain ,,warren1 ,r4 ,e4 ,with an ,introductory ,chapter by ,dean ,stanley4 ,cloth1 #hvo4 ,with fifty ,illustrations4 ,price1 #c4ej4 ,that this volume may bring home to the ,english public a more definite knowledge of what the ,palestine ,exploration ,fund has been doing1 and hopes to do1 than can be gathered from partial and isolated reports1 or from popular lectures1 must be the desire of every one who judges the ,bible to be the most precious1 as it is the most profound1 book in the world1 and who deems nothing small or unimportant that shall tend to throw light upon its meaning1 and to remove the obscurities which time and distance have caused to rest upon some of its pages4--,globe4 ,,the ,,physical ,,cause ,,of ,,the ,,death ,,of ,,christ1 and its ,relations to the ,principles and ,practice of ,christianity4 ,by ,,wm4 ,,stroud1 ,m4 ,d4 ,with a ,letter on the ,subject by ,,sir ,,james ,y4 ,,simpson1 ,bart41 ,m4 ,d4 #a vol41 #abmo4 ,cloth4 ,price1 #b4jj4 ,dr4 ,william ,stroud's treatise on ,the ,physical ,cause of the ,death of ,christ1 and its ,relation to the ,principles and ,practice of ,christianity1 although now first reprinted in this country1 has maintained1 for the last quarter of a century1 a great reputation in ,england4 ,it is1 in its own place1 a masterpiece4 ,it could have been composed1 says ,dr4 ,stroud's biographer1 only by a man characterized by a combination of superior endowments4 ,it required1 on the one hand1 a profound acquaintance with medical subjects and medical literature4 ,it required1 on the other1 an equally profound acquaintance with the ,bible1 and with theology in general4 ,the object of the treatise is to demonstrate an important physical fact connected with the death of ,christ--namely1 that it was caused by rupture of the heart--and to point out its relation to the principles and practice of ,christianity4 ,,westward ,,by ,,rail3 ,,the ,,new ,,route ,,to ,,the ,,east4 ,by ,w4 ,f4 ,,rae4 #a vol41 #abmo4 ,cloth4 #cij pages4 ,price1 #b4jj4 ,the author of this work1 one of the editors of the ,london ,daily ,news1 was a stanch defender of the ,union1 and his work is one of the most just and appreciative books on ,america yet published by an ,englishman4 ,there is a quiet and subtle charm1 as well as a deep and true romantic interest1 in the story of the railway journey4--,westminster ,review4 ,he has given us a very pleasant and instructive book1 which we heartily commend to the attention of all thoughtful and inquiring readers4--,glasgow ,mail4 ,he has written a most readable1 interesting1 and attractive account of a journey which is long enough to be worth the complete description he has given it4--,observer4 ,,the ,,revelation ,,of ,,john1 with ,notes1 ,critical1 ,explanatory1 and ,practical4 ,designed for both ,pastors and ,people4 ,by ,rev4 ,,henry ,,cowles1 ,d4 ,d4 #a vol41 #abmo1 cloth4 ,price1 #a4ej4 ,d4 ,appleton ,co4 also publish by the same ,author3 ,minor ,prophets4 #abmo1 cloth4 ,price1 #b4jj2 ,ezekiel and ,daniel4 #abmo1 cloth4 #b4be2 ,isaiah4 ,with ,notes1 #b4be2 ,jeremiah4 #a vol41 #abmo4 #b4jj2 ,proverbs1 ,ecclesiastes1 and ,songs of ,solomon4 #b4jj4 ,a ,,treatise ,,on ,,diseases ,,of ,,the ,,nervous ,,system4 ,by ,,william ,a4 ,,hammond1 ,m4 ,d41 ,professor of ,diseases of the ,mind and ,nervous ,system1 and of ,clinical ,medicine1 in the ,bellevue ,hospital ,medical ,college2 ,physician-in-chief to the ,new-,york ,state ,hospital for ,diseases of the ,nervous ,system1 etc4 ,with ,forty-five ,illustrations4 #a vol41 #hvo1 #gej pages4 ,price1 #e4jj4 ,in the following work ,i have endeavored to present a ',treatise on ,diseases of the ,nervous ,system' which1 without being superficial1 would be concise and explicit1 and which1 while making no claim to being exhaustive1 would nevertheless be sufficiently complete for the instruction and guidance of those who might be disposed to seek information from its pages4 ,how far ,i have been successful will soon be determined by the judgment of those more competent than myself to form an unbiased opinion4 ,one feature ,i may1 however1 with justice claim for this work1 and that is1 that it rests1 to a great extent1 on my own observation and experience1 and is1 therefore1 no mere compilation4 ,the reader will readily perceive that ,i have views of my own on every disease considered1 and that ,i have not hesitated to express them4--,extract from the ,preface4 ,over fifty diseases of the nervous system1 including insanity1 are considered in this treatise4 ,,on ,,the ,,physiological ,,effects ,,of ,,severe ,,and ,,protracted ,,muscular ,,exercise1 with ,special ,reference to its ,influence upon the ,excretion of ,nitrogen4 ,by ,,austin ,,flint1 ,jr41 ,m4 ,d41 ,professor of ,physiology in the ,bellevue ,hospital ,medical ,college1 ,new ,york4 #a vol41 #hvo4 ,cloth4 ,price1 #a4be4 ,,appletons' ,,hand-,,book ,,of ,,american ,,travel4 ,northern and ,eastern ,tour4 ,new edition1 revised for the ,summer of #ahga4 ,including ,new ,york1 ,new ,jersey1 ,pennsylvania1 ,connecticut1 ,rhode ,island1 ,massachusetts1 ,maine1 ,new ,hampshire1 ,vermont1 and the ,british ,dominion1 being a ,guide to ,niagara1 the ,white ,mountains1 the ,alleghanies1 the ,catskills1 the ,adirondacks1 the ,berkshire ,hills1 the ,st4 ,lawrence1 ,lake ,champlain1 ,lake ,george1 ,lake ,memphremagog1 ,saratoga1 ,newport1 ,cape ,may1 the ,hudson1 and other ,famous ,localities2 with full ,descriptive ,sketches of the ,cities1 ,towns1 ,rivers1 ,lakes1 ,waterfalls1 ,mountains1 ,hunting and ,fishing ,grounds1 ,watering-places1 ,sea-side ,resorts1 and all scenes and objects of importance and interest within the district named4 ,with ,maps and various ,skeleton ,tours1 arranged as suggestions and guides to the ,traveller4 ,one vol41 #abmo4 ,flexible cloth4 ,price1 #b4jj4 ,,james ,,gordon',s ,,wife4 ,a ,novel4 #hvo4 ,paper4 ,price1 #ej cents4 ,an interesting novel1 pleasantly written1 refined in tone1 and easy in style4--,london ,globe4 ,this novel is conceived and executed in the purest spirit4 ,the illustrations of society in its various phases are cleverly and spiritedly done4--,london ,post4 ,,the ,,principles ,,of ,,psychology4 ,by ,,herbert ,,spencer4 #a vol41 #hvo4 ,cloth4 ,price1 #b4ej4 ,this work is thought by many able judges to be the most original and valuable contribution to the science of mind that has appeared in the present century4 ,john ,stuart ,mill says it is one of the finest examples we possess of the psychological method in its full power4 ,dr4 ,mc,cosh says his bold generalizations are always suggestive1 and some may in the end be established in the profoundest laws of the knowable universe4 ,george ,ripley says ,spencer is as keen an analyst as is known in the history of ,philosophy4 ,i do not except either ,aristotle or ,kant1 whom he greatly resembles4 ,,nigel ,,bartram',s ,,ideal4 ,a ,novel4 ,by ,,florence ,,wilford4 #a vol41 #hvo4 ,paper covers4 ,price1 #ej cents4 ,this is a novel of marked originality and high literary merit4 ,the heroine is one of the loveliest and purest characters of recent fiction1 and the detail of her adventures in the arduous task of overcoming her husband's prejudices and jealousies forms an exceedingly interesting plot4 ,the book is high in tone and excellent in style4 ,,good ,,for ,,nothing4 ,a ,novel4 ,by ,,whyte ,,melville4 ,author of ,digby ,grand1 ,the ,interpreter1 etc4 #a vol41 #hvo1 #baj pages4 ,price1 #fj cents4 ,the interest of the reader in the story1 which for the most part is laid in ,england1 is enthralling from the beginning to the end4 ,the moral tone is altogether unexceptionable4--,the ,chronicle4 ,a ,,hand-,,book ,,of ,,law1 for ,business ,men2 containing an ,epitome of the ,law of ,contracts1 ,bills and ,notes1 interest1 ,guaranty and ,suretyship1 ,assignments for ,creditors1 ,agents1 ,factors1 and ,brokers1 ,sales1 ,mortgages1 and ,liens1 ,patents and ,copyrights1 ,trade-,marks1 the ,good-,will of a ,business1 ,carriers1 ,insurance1 ,shipping1 ,arbitrations1 ,statutes of ,limitation1 ,partnership1 with an ,appendix1 containing ,forms of ,instruments used in the ,transaction of ,business4 ,by ,,william ,,tracy1 ,,ll4 ,d4 #a vol41 #hvo1 #fgi pages4 ,half basil1 #e4ej2 library leather1 #f4ej4 ,this work is an epitome of those branches of law which affect the ordinary transactions of ,,business ,,men4 ,it is not proposed by it to make every man a lawyer1 but to give a man of business a convenient and reliable book of reference1 to assist him in the solution of questions relating to his rights and duties1 which are constantly arising1 and to guide him in conducting his negotiations4 ,in preparing it1 the aim has been to set forth1 ,,in ,,plain ,,language1 the rules which constitute the doctrines of law which are examined1 and to illustrate the same by decisions of the ,courts in which they are recognized1 ,,with ,,marginal ,,references ,,to ,,the ,,volumes ,,where ,,the ,,cases ,,may ,,be ,,found4 ,,new ,,york ,,illustrated2 with ,fifty-nine ,illustrations4 ,a ,descriptive ,text and a ,map of the ,city4 ,an entirely new edition1 brought down to date1 with new ,illustrations4 ,price1 #ej cents4 ,there has never been published so beautiful a guide-book to ,new ,york as this is4 ,a suitable letter-press accompanies the woodcuts1 the whole forming a picture of ,new ,york such as no other book affords4--,new ,york ,world4 ,,the ,,novels ,,and ,,novelists ,,of ,,the ,,eighteenth ,,century4 ,in ,illustration of the ,manners and ,morals of the ,age4 ,by ,,william ,,forsyth1 ,m4 ,a41 ,q4 ,c4 #a vol41 #abmo4 ,cloth4 ,price1 #a4ej4 ,mr4 ,forsyth1 in his instructive and entertaining volume1 has succeeded in showing that much real information concerning the morals as well as the manners of our ancestors may be gathered from the novelists of the last century4 ,with judicial impartiality he examines and cross-examines the witnesses1 laying all the evidence before the reader4 ,essayists as well as novelists are called up4 ,the ,spectator1 ,the ,tatler1 ,the ,world1 ,the ,connoisseur1 add confirmation strong to the testimony of ,parson ,adams1 ,trulliber1 ,trunnion1 ,squire ,western1 the ,fool of ,quality1 ,betsey ,thoughtless1 and the like4 ,a chapter on dress is suggestive of comparison4 ,costume is a subject on which novelists1 like careful artists1 are studiously precise4 ,,reminiscences ,,of ,,fifty ,,years4 ,by ,,mark ,,boyd4 #a vol41 #abmo1 #cij pp4 ,price1 #a4ge4 ,mr4 ,boyd has seen much of life at home and abroad4 ,he has enjoyed the acquaintance or friendship of many illustrious men1 and he has the additional advantage of remembering a number of anecdotes told by his father1 who possessed a retentive memory and a wide circle of distinguished friends4 ,the book1 as the writer acknowledges1 is a perfect olla podrida4 ,there is considerable variety in the anecdotes4 ,some relate to great generals1 like the ,duke of ,wellington and ,lord ,clyde2 some to artists and men of letters1 and these include the names of ,campbell1 ,rogers1 ,thackeray1 and ,david ,roberts2 some to statesmen1 and among others1 to ,pitt1 who was a friend of ,mr4 ,boyd's father1 to ,lords ,palmerston1 ,brougham1 and ,derby2 some to discoverers1 like ,sir ,john ,franklin and ,sir ,john ,ross3 and others--among which may be reckoned1 perhaps1 the most amusing in the volume--to persons wholly unknown to fame1 or to manners and customs now happily obsolete4 ,,fragments ,,of ,,science ,,for ,,unscientific ,,people4 ,a ,series of ,detached ,essays1 ,lectures1 and ,reviews4 ,by ,,john ,,tyndall1 ,,ll4 ,d41 ,f4 ,r4 ,s4 #a vol41 #abmo4 ,cloth4 #dbb pages4 ,price1 #b4jj4 ,,prof4 ,,tyndall ,,is ,,the ,,poet ,,of ,,modern ,,science4 ,this is a book of genius--one of those rare productions that come but once in a generation4 ,prof4 ,tyndall is not only a bold1 broad1 and original thinker1 but one of the most eloquent and attractive of writers4 ,in this volume he goes over a large range of scientific questions1 giving us the latest views in the most lucid and graphic language1 so that the subtlest order of invisible changes stand out with all the vividness of stereoscopic perspective4 ,though a disciplined scientific thinker1 ,prof4 ,tyndall is also a poet1 alive to all beauty1 and kindles into a glow of enthusiasm at the harmonies and wonder of ,nature which he sees on every side4 ,to him science is no mere dry inventory of prosaic facts1 but a disclosure of the ,divine order of the world1 and fitted to stir the highest feelings of our nature4 ,,gabrielle ,,andre4 ,an ,historical ,novel4 ,by ,s4 ,,baring-,,gould1 author of ,myths of the ,middle ,ages4 #a vol41 #hvo4 ,paper covers4 ,price1 #fj cents4 ,those who take an interest in comparing the effects of the present ,french ,revolution on the ,church with that of #aghi will find in this work a great deal of information illustrating the feeling in the ,state and ,church of ,france at that period4 ,the ,literary ,churchman says3 ,the book is a remarkably able one1 full of vigorous and often exceedingly beautiful writing and description4 ,,musings ,,over ,,the ,,christian ,,year ,,and ,,lyra ,,innocentium4 ,by ,,charlotte ,,mary ,,yonge1 together with a few ,gleanings of ,recollection1 gathered by ,several ,friends4 #a vol4 ,thick #abmo1 #dca pages4 ,price1 #b4jj4 ,miss ,yonge has here produced a volume which will possess great interest in the eyes of ,churchmen1 who have for so many years enjoyed the privilege of reading the exquisite poetry of the ,christian ,year by ,rev4 ,john ,keble4 ,miss ,yonge gives her own experience of the uninterrupted intercourse of thirty years3 then there are the ,recollections1 by ,francis ,m4 ,wilbraham3 a few words of ,personal ,description1 by ,rev4 ,t4 ,simpson ,evans2 then follow the ,musings1 one each of the poems illustrative of the ,christian ,year and ,lyra ,innocentium4 ,,the ,,heir ,,of ,,redclyffe4 ,by ,,charlotte ,m4 ,,yonge4 ,a ,new ,illustrated ,edition4 #b vols41 #abmo4 ,cloth4 ,price1 #b4jj4 ,to be followed by ,,heartsease4 ,the first of her writings which made a sensation here was the ',heir1' and what a sensation it was6 ,referring to the remains of the tear-washed covers of the copy aforesaid1 we find it belonged to the 'eighth thousand4' ,how many thousands have been issued since by the publishers1 to supply the demand for new1 and the places of drowned1 dissolved1 or swept away old copies1 we do not attempt to conjecture4 ,not individuals merely1 but households--consisting in great part of tender-hearted young damsels--were plunged into mourning4 ,with a tolerable acquaintance with fictitious heroes 7not to speak of real ones71 from ,sir ,charles ,grandison down to the nursery idol1 ,carlton1 we have little hesitation in pronouncing ,sir ,guy ,morville1 or ,redclyffe1 ,baronet1 the most admirable one we ever met with1 in story or out4 ,the glorious1 joyous boy1 the brilliant1 ardent child of genius and of fortune1 crowned with the beauty of his early holiness1 and overshadowed with the darkness of his hereditary gloom1 and the soft and touching sadness of his early death--what a caution is there6 ,what a vision6--,extract from a review of ,the ,heir of ,redclyffe1 and ,heartsease1 in the ,north ,american ,review for ,april4 ,a ,,comprehensive ,,dictionary ,,of ,,the ,,bible2 mainly abridged from ,dr4 ,william ,smith's ,dictionary of the ,bible1 but comprising important ,additions and ,improvements from the ,works of ,robinson1 ,gesenius1 ,furst1 ,pape1 ,pott1 ,winer1 ,keil1 ,lange1 ,kitto1 ,fairbairn1 ,alexander1 ,barnes1 ,bush1 ,thomson1 ,stanley1 ,porter1 ,tristram1 ,king1 ,ayre1 and many other eminent scholars1 commentators1 travellers1 and authors in various departments4 ,designed to be a ,complete ,guide in regard to the ,pronunciation and ,signification of ,scriptural ,names2 the ,solution of ,difficulties respecting the ,interpretation1 ,authority1 and ,harmony of the ,old and ,new ,testaments2 the ,history and ,description of ,biblical ,customs1 ,events1 ,places1 ,persons1 ,animals1 ,plants1 ,minerals1 and other things concerning which information is needed for an intelligent and thorough study of the ,holy ,scriptures1 and of the ,books of the ,apocrypha4 ,illustrated with ,five ,hundred ,maps and ,engravings4 ,edited by ,rev4 ,,samuel ,w4 ,,barnum4 ,complete in one large royal octavo volume of #a1bcd pages4 ,price1 in cloth binding1 #e4jj2 in library sheep1 #f4jj2 in half morocco1 #g4ej4 ,,light ,,and ,,electricity4 ,notes of ,two ,courses of ,lectures before the ,royal ,institution of ,great ,britain4 ,by ,,john ,,tyndall1 ,,ll4 ,d41 ,f4 ,r4 ,s4 #a vol41 #abmo4 ,cloth4 ,price1 #a4be4 ,for the benefit of those who attended his ,lectures on ,light and ,electricity at the ,royal ,institution4 ,prof4 ,tyndall prepared with much care a series of notes1 summing up briefly and clearly the leading facts and principles of these sciences4 ,the notes proved so serviceable to those for whom they were designed that they were widely sought by students and teachers1 and ,prof4 ,tyndall had them reprinted in two small books4 ,under the conviction that they will be equally appreciated by instructors and learners in this country1 they are here combined and republished in a single volume4--,extract from ,preface4 ,,the ,,descent ,,of ,,man ,,and ,,selection ,,in ,,relation ,,to ,,sex4 ,by ,,charles ,,darwin1 ,m4 ,a4 ,with ,illustrations4 #b vols41 #abmo4 ,cloth4 ,price1 #d4jj4 ,we can find no fault with ,mr4 ,darwin's facts1 or the application of them4--,utica ,herald4 ,the theory is now indorsed by many eminent scientists1 who at first combated it1 including ,sir ,charles ,lyell1 probably the most learned of living geologists4--,evening ,bulletin4 ,,on ,,the ,,genesis ,,of ,,species4 ,by ,,st4 ,,george ,,mivart1 ,f4 ,r4 ,s4 #a vol41 #abmo4 ,cloth1 with ,illustrations4 ,price1 #a4ge4 ,mr4 ,mivart has succeeded in producing a work which will clear the ideas of biologists and theologians1 and which treats the most delicate questions in a manner which throws light upon most of them1 and tears away the barriers of intolerance on each side4--,british ,medical ,journal4 ,,marquis ,,and ,,merchant4 ,a ,novel4 ,by ,,mortimer ,,collins4 #a vol41 #hvo4 ,paper covers4 ,price1 #ej cents4 ,we will not compare ,mr4 ,collins1 as a novelist1 with ,mr4 ,disraeli1 but1 nevertheless1 the qualities which have made ,mr4 ,disraeli's fictions so widely popular are to be found in no small degree in the pages of the author of ',marquis and ,merchant4'--,times4 ,,heartsease4 ,a ,novel4 ,by the author of the ,heir of ,redclyffe4 ,an ,illustrated ,edition4 #b vols41 #abmo4 ,price1 #b4jj4 ,this is the second of the series of ,miss ,yonge's novels1 now being issued in a new and beautiful style with illustrations4 ,since this novel was first published a new generation of readers have appeared4 ,nothing in the ,english language can equal the delineation of character which she so beautifully portrays4 ,,what ,,to ,,read1 ,,and ,,how ,,to ,,read1 being ,classified ,lists of ,choice ,reading1 with appropriate hints and remarks1 adapted to the general reader1 to subscribers1 to libraries1 and to persons intending to form collections of books4 ,brought down to ,september1 #ahgj4 ,by ,,charles ,h4 ,,moore1 ,m4 ,d4 #a vol41 #abmo4 ,paper ,covers1 #ej cents4 ,cloth4 ,price1 #ge cents4 99 99 99 99 99 ,transcriber's ,note4 ,the following errors in the original text have been corrected in this version3 ,page #bj3 ,mind on ,man changed to ,mind of ,man ,page #ba3 ,le ,notre changed to ,le ,notre ,page #dd3 empirist changed to empiricist ,page #ge3 ,fenelon2 changed to ,fenelon2 ,page #ii3 metaphysicans changed to metaphysicians ,page #aag3 ,greek3 ektasis changed to ,greek3 ekstasis ,page #acf3 added missing comma after receives warmth ,page #afe3 resume changed to resume ,page #ahb3 exquiste changed to exquisite ,page #ahd3 monarh changed to monarch ,page #bde3 missing semi-colon added after duty and right ,page #bfh3 destrnction changed to destruction ,page #bgj3 depeudere changed to dependere ,page #cba3 missing quotation mark added after because it is just4 ,page #cbg3 inaccesible changed to inaccessible ,page #cef3 iufinite changed to infinite ,page #cfj3 sinee changed to since ,page #cfc3 extravagauce changed to extravagance ,page #cff3 obsconditus changed to absconditus ,page #cgd3 ,nonveau changed to ,nouveau ,allemange changed to ,allemagne ,page #cii3 analysist changed to analyst