,a ,,review ,,of ,,edwards',s  ,,inquiry
  ,,into ,,the  ,,freedom ,,of ,,the    
,,will4   ,,containing  ,i4 ,,statement 
,,of ,,edwards',s ,,system4  ,,ii4 ,,the
 ,,legitimate ,,consequences ,,of ,,this
 ,,system4  ,,iii4 ,,an ,,examination   
,,of ,,the ,,arguments ,,against ,a     
,,self-,,determining ,,will4  ,,by      
,,henry ,,philip ,,tappan4  ,i am afraid
 that ,edwards's book 7however well     
meant17 has done much harm in ,england1 
as it has secured a favourable hearing  
to the same doctrines1 which1 since the 
time of ,clarke1 had been generally     
ranked among the most dangerous errors  
of ,hobbes and his disciples4--,dugald  
,stewart4   ,,new-,,york3  ,,john ,s4   
,,taylor1  ,,theological ,,publisher    
,,and ,,bookseller1 ,,brick ,,church    
,,chapel1  #ahci4     ,entered according
 to the ,act of ,congress1 in the year  
#ahci1 by ,,henry ,,philip ,,tappan1 in 
the ,clerk's ,office of the ,district   
,court of the ,united ,states1 for the  
,southern ,district of ,new-,york4  ,g4 

,f4 ,hopkins1 ,printer1 #b ,ann-street4 
,,introduction4  ,discussions respecting
 the will1 have1 unhappily1 been        
confounded with theological opinions1   
and hence have led to theological       
controversies1 where predilections for a
 particular school or sect1 have        
generally prejudged the conclusions of  
philosophy4 ,as a part of the mental    
constitution1 the will must be subjected
 to the legitimate methods of           
psychological investigation1 and must   
abide the result4 ,if we enter the field
 of human consciousness in the free1    
fearless1 and honest spirit of ,baconian
 observation in order to arrive at the  
laws of the reason or the imagination1  
what should prevent us from pursuing the
 same enlightened course in reference to
 the will8  ,is it because              
responsibility and the duties of        
morality and religion are more          
immediately connected with the will8    
,this1 indeed1 throws solemnity around  
our investigations1 and warns us of     

caution2 but1 at the same time1 so far  
from repressing investigation1 it       
affords the highest reason why we should
 press it to the utmost limit of        
consciousness4 ,nothing surely can serve
 more to fix our impressions of moral   
obligation1 or to open our eye to the   
imperishable truth and excellency of    
religion1 than a clear and ripe         
knowledge of that which makes us the    
subjects of duty4 ,as a believer in     
philosophy1 ,i claim unbounded liberty  
of thought1 and by thinking ,i hope to  
arrive at truth4 ,as a believer in the  
,bible ,i always anticipate that the    
truths to which philosophy leads me1    
will harmonize with its facts and       
doctrines4 ,if in the result there      
should appear to be a collision1 it     
imposes upon me the duty of re-examining
 both my philosophy and my              
interpretation of the text4 ,in this way
 ,i may in the end remove the           
difficulty1 and not only so1 but even   
gain from the temporary and apparent    

collision1 a deeper insight into both   
philosophy and religion4 ,if the        
difficulty cannot be removed1 then it   
remains a vexed point4 ,it does not     
follow1 however1 that ,i must either    
renounce the philosophical conclusion1  
or remove the text4  ,if the whole of   
philosophy or its leading truths were in
 opposition to the whole of revelation  
or its leading truths1 we should then   
evidently be placed on the alternative  
of denying one or the other2 but as the 
denial of philosophy would be the       
destruction of reason1 there would no   
longer remain in our being any principle
 on which a revelation could be         
received4 ,such a collision would       
therefore disprove the claims of any    
system to be from ,heaven4 ,but let us  
suppose1 on the other hand1 that with   
every advance of philosophy the facts of
 the ,bible are borne aloft1 and their  
divine authority and their truth made   
more manifest1 have we not reason to    
bless the researches which have enabled 

us to perceive more clearly the light   
from ,heaven8 ,a system of truth does   
not fear1 it courts philosophical       
scrutiny4 ,its excellency will be most  
resplendent when it has had the most    
fiery trial of thought4 ,nothing would  
so weaken my faith in the ,bible as the 
fact of being compelled to tremble for  
its safety whenever ,i claimed and      
exercised the prerogative of reason4    
,and what ,i say of it as a whole1 ,i   
say of doctrines claiming to be derived 
from it4  ,theologists are liable to    
impose upon themselves when they argue  
from the truths of the ,bible to the    
truths of their philosophy2 either under
 the view that the last are deducible   
from the former1 or that they serve to  
account for and confirm the former4 ,how
 often is their philosophy drawn from   
some other source1 or handed down by old
 authority1 and rendered venerable by   
associations arbitrary and accidental2  
and instead of sustaining the simplicity
 of the ,bible1 the doctrine is perhaps 

cast into the mould of the philosophy4  
,it is a maxim commended by reason and  
confirmed by experience1 that in        
pursuing our investigations in any      
particular science we are to confine    
ourselves rigorously to its subjects and
 methods1 neither seeking nor fearing   
collision with any other science4 ,we   
may feel confident that ultimately      
science will be found to link with      
science1 forming a universal and        
harmonious system of truth2 but this can
 by no means form the principle of our  
particular investigations4 ,the         
application of this maxim is no less    
just and necessary where a philosophy or
 science holds a relation to revelation4
 ,it is a matter of the highest interest
 that in the developements of such      
philosophy or science1 it should be     
found to harmonize with the revelation2 
but nevertheless this cannot be received
 as the principle on which we shall aim 
to develope it4 ,if there is a harmony1 
it must be discovered2 it cannot be     

invented and made4  ,the ,cardinals     
determined upon the authority of        
,scripture1 as they imagined1 what the  
science of astronomy must be1 and       
compelled the old man ,gallileo to give 
the lie to his reason2 and since then1  
the science of geology has been         
attempted1 if not to be settled1 at     
least to be limited in its researches in
 the same way4 ,science1 however1 has   
pursued her steady course resistlessly1 
settling her own bounds and methods1 and
 selecting her own fields1 and giving to
 the world her own discoveries4 ,and is 
the truth of the ,bible unsettled8 ,no4 
,the memory of ,gallileo and of ,cuvier 
is blessed by the same lips which name  
the name of ,christ4  ,now we ask the   
same independence of research in the    
philosophy of the human mind1 and no    
less with respect to the ,will than with
 respect to any other faculty4 ,we wish 
to make this purely a psychological     
question4 ,let us not ask what          
philosophy is demanded by ,calvinism in 

opposition to ,pelagianism and          
,arminianism1 or by the latter in       
opposition to the former2 let us ask    
simply for the laws of our being4 ,in   
the end we may present another instance 
of truth honestly and fearlessly sought 
in the legitimate exercise of our       
natural reason1 harmonizing with truths 
revealed4  ,one thing is certain2 the   
,bible no more professes to be a system 
of formal mental philosophy1 than it    
professes to contain the sciences of    
astronomy and geology4 ,if mental       
philosophy is given there1 it is given  
in facts of history1 individual and     
national1 in poetry1 prophecy1 law1 and 
ethics2 and as thus given1 must be      
collected into a system by observation  
and philosophical criticism4  ,but      
observations upon these external facts  
could not possibly be made independently
 of observations upon internal          
facts--the facts of the consciousness2  
and the principles of philosophical     
criticism can be obtained only in the   

same way4 ,to him who looks not within  
himself1 poetry1 history1 law1 ethics1  
and the distinctions of character and   
conduct1 would necessarily be           
unintelligible4 ,no one therefore can   
search the ,bible for its philosophy1   
who has not already read philosophy in  
his own being4 ,we shall find this amply
 confirmed in the whole history of      
theological opinion4 ,every interpreter 
of the ,bible1 every author of a creed1 
every founder of a sect1 plainly enough 
reveals both the principles of his      
philosophy and their influence upon     
himself4 ,every man who reflects and    
aims to explain1 is necessarily a       
philosopher1 and has his philosophy4    
,instead therefore of professing to     
oppose the ,bible to philosophy1 or     
instead of the pretence of deducing our 
philosophy solely and directly from the 
,bible1 let us openly declare that we do
 not discard philosophy1 but seek it in 
its own native fields2 and that inasmuch
 as it has a being and a use1 and is    

related to all that we know and do1 we  
are therefore determined to pursue it in
 a pure1 truth-loving spirit4  ,i am    
aware1 however1 that the doctrine of the
 will is so intimately associated with  
great and venerable names1 and has so   
long worn a theological complexion1 that
 it is well nigh impossible to          
disintegrate it4 ,the authority of great
 and good men1 and theological          
interests1 even when we are disposed to 
be candid1 impartial1 and independent1  
do often insensibly influence our       
reasonings4  ,it is out of respect to   
these old associations and prejudices1  
and from the wish to avoid all          
unnecessary strangeness of manner in    
handling an old subject1 and more than  
all1 to meet what are regarded by many  
as the weightiest and most conclusive   
reasonings on this subject1 that ,i open
 this discussion with a review of       
,edwards's ,inquiry into the ,freedom of
 the ,will4 ,there is no work of higher 
authority among those who deny the      

self-determining power of the will2 and 
none which on this subject has called   
forth more general admiration for       
acuteness of thought and logical        
subtlety4 ,i believe there is a         
prevailing impression that ,edwards must
 be fairly met in order to make any     
advance in an opposite argument4 ,i     
propose no less than this attempt1      
presumptuous though it may seem1 yet    
honest and made for truth's sake4 ,truth
 is greater and more venerable than the 
names of great and venerable men1 or of 
great and venerable sects3 and ,i cannot
 believe that ,i seek truth with a      
proper love and veneration1 unless ,i   
seek her1 confiding in herself alone1   
neither asking the authority of men in  
her support1 nor fearing a collision    
with them1 however great their authority
 may be4 ,it is my interest to think and
 believe aright1 no less than to act    
aright2 and as right action is          
meritorious not when compelled and      
accidental1 but when free and made under

 the perception and conviction of right 
principles2 so also right thinking and  
believing are meritorious1 either in an 
intellectual or moral point of view1    
when thinking and believing are         
something more than gulping down dogmas 
because ,austin1 or ,calvin1 or         
,arminius1 presents the cup4  ,facts of 
history or of description are           
legitimately received on testimony1 but 
truths of our moral and spiritual being 
can be received only on the evidence of 
consciousness1 unless the testimony be  
from ,god himself2 and even in this case
 we expect that the testimony1 although 
it may transcend consciousness1 shall   
not contradict it4 ,the internal        
evidence of the ,bible under the highest
 point of view1 lies in this3 that      
although there be revelations of that   
which transcends consciousness1 yet     
wherever the truths come within the     
sphere of consciousness1 there is a     
perfect harmony between the decisions of
 developed reason and the revelation4   

,now in the application of these        
principles1 if ,edwards have given us a 
true psychology in relation to the will1
 we have the means of knowing it4 ,in   
the consciousness1 and in the           
consciousness alone1 can a doctrine of  
the will be ultimately and adequately   
tested4 ,nor must we be intimidated from
 making this test by the assumption that
 the theory of ,edwards alone sustains  
moral responsibility and evangelical    
religion4 ,moral responsibility and     
evangelical religion1 if sustained and  
illustrated by philosophy1 must take a  
philosophy which has already on its own 
grounds proved itself a true philosophy4
 ,moral responsibility and evangelical  
religion can derive no support from a   
philosophy which they are taken first to
 prove4  ,but although ,i intend to     
conduct my argument rigidly on          
psychological principles1 ,i shall      
endeavour in the end to show that moral 
responsibility is really sustained by   
this exposition of the will2 and that ,i

 have not1 to say the least1 weakened   
one of the supports of evangelical      
religion1 nor shorn it of one of its    
glories4  ,the plan of my undertaking   
embraces the following particulars3  ,i4
 ,a statement of ,edwards's system4     
,,ii4 ,the legitimate consequences of   
this system4  ,,iii4 ,an examination of 
the arguments against a self-determining
 will4  ,,iv4 ,the doctrine of the will 
determined by an appeal to              
consciousness4  ,v4 ,this doctrine      
viewed in connexion with moral agency   
and responsibility4  ,,vi4 ,this        
doctrine viewed in connexion with the   
truths and precepts of the ,bible4  ,the
 first three complete the review of     
,edwards1 and make up the present       
volume4 ,another volume is in the course
 of preparation4     ,i4  ,a ,,statement
 ,,of ,,edwards',s ,,system4  ,edwards's
 ,system1 or1 in other words1 his       
,philosophy of the ,will1 is contained  
in part ,i4 of his ,inquiry into the    
,freedom of the ,will4 ,this part       

comprises five sections1 which ,i shall 
give with their titles in his own order4
 ,my object is to arrive at truth4 ,i   
shall therefore use my best endeavours  
to make this statement with the utmost  
clearness and fairness4 ,in this part of
 my work1 my chief anxiety is to have   
,edwards perfectly understood4 ,my      
quotations are made from the edition    
published by ,s4 ,converse1 ,new-,york1 
#ahbi4  ,sec4 ,i4--,concerning the      
,nature of the ,will4  ,edwards under   
this title gives his definition of the  
will4 ,the will is1 that by which the   
mind chooses anything4 ,the faculty of  
the will1 is that power1 or principle of
 mind1 by which it is capable of        
choosing3 an act of the will is the same
 as an act of choosing or choice4 7p4   
#ae47  ,he then identifies choosing and 
refusing3 ,in every act of refusal the  
mind chooses the absence of the thing   
refused4 7p4 #af47  ,the will is thus   
the faculty of choice4 ,choice manifests
 itself either in relation to one object

 or several objects4 ,where there is but
 one object1 its possession or          
non-possession--its enjoyment or        
non-enjoyment--its presence or absence1 
is chosen4 ,where there are several     
objects1 and they are so incompatible   
that the possession1 enjoyment1 or      
presence of one1 involves the refusal of
 the others1 then choice manifests      
itself in fixing upon the particular    
object to be retained1 and the objects  
to be set aside4  ,this definition is   
given on the ground that any object     
being regarded as positive1 may be      
contrasted with its negative3 and that  
therefore the refusing a negative is    
equivalent to choosing a positive2 and  
the choosing a negative1 equivalent to  
refusing a positive1 and vice versa4    
,thus if the presence of an object be   
taken as positive1 its absence is       
negative4 ,to refuse the presence is    
therefore to choose the absence2 and to 
choose the presence1 to refuse the      
absence3 so that every act of choosing  

involves refusing1 and every act of     
refusing involves choosing2 in other    
words1 they are equivalents4  ,object of
 ,will4  ,the object in respect to which
 the energy of choice is manifested1    
inducing external action1 or the action 
of any other faculty of the mind1 is    
always an immediate object4 ,although   
other objects may appear desirable1 that
 alone is the object of choice which is 
the occasion of present action--that    
alone is chosen as the subject of       
thought on which ,i actually think--that
 alone is chosen as the object of       
muscular exertion respecting which      
muscular exertion is made4 ,that is1    
every act of choice manifests itself by 
producing some change or effect in some 
other part of our being4 ,the thing next
 chosen or preferred1 when a man wills  
to walk1 is not his being removed to    
such a place where he would be1 but such
 an exertion and motion of his legs and 
feet1 c4 in order to it4 ,the same      
principle applies to any mental         

exertion4  ,will and ,desire4  ,edwards 
never opposes will and desire4 ,the only
 distinction that can possibly be made  
is that of genus and species4 ,they are 
the same in kind4 ,i do not suppose that
 will and desire are words of precisely 
the same signification3 will seems to be
 a word of a more general signification1
 extending to things present and absent4
 ,desire respects something absent4 ,but
 yet ,i cannot think they are so        
entirely distinct that they can ever be 
properly said to run counter4 ,a man    
never1 in any instance1 wills anything  
contrary to his desires1 or desires     
anything contrary to his will4 ,the     
thing which he wills1 the very same he  
desires2 and he does not will a thing   
and desire the contrary in any          
particular4 7p4 #ag47 ,the immediate    
object of will1--that object1 in respect
 of which choice manifests itself by    
producing effects1--is also the object  
of desire2 that is1 of supreme desire1  
at that moment3 so that1 the object     

chosen is the object which appears most 
desirable2 and the object which appears 
most desirable is always the object     
chosen4 ,to produce an act of choice1   
therefore1 we have only to awaken a     
preponderating desire4 ,now it is plain1
 that desire cannot be distinguished    
from passion4 ,that which we love1 we   
desire to be present1 to possess1 to    
enjoy3 that which we hate1 we desire to 
be absent1 or to be affected in some    
way4 ,the loving an object1 and the     
desiring its enjoyment1 are identical3  
the hating it1 and desiring its absence 
or destruction1 or any similar affection
 of it1 are likewise identical4 ,the    
will1 therefore1 is not to be           
distinguished1 at least in kind1 from   
the emotions and passions3 this will    
appear abundantly as we proceed4 ,in    
other works he expressly identifies     
them3 ,i humbly conceive1 that the      
affections of the soul are not properly 
distinguishable from the will2 as though
 they were two faculties of soul4       

7,revival of ,religion in ,new ,england1
 part ,i47  ,god has endued the soul    
with two faculties3 one is that by which
 it is capable of perception and        
speculation1 or by which it discerns1   
and views1 and judges of things2 which  
is called the understanding4 ,the other 
faculty is that by which the soul does  
not merely perceive and view things1 but
 is in some way inclined with respect to
 the things it views or considers2      
either is inclined to them1 or is       
disinclined or averse from them4 ,this  
faculty is called by various names3 it  
is sometimes called inclination2 and as 
it has respect to the actions that are  
determined or governed by it1 is called 
will4 ,the will and the affections of   
the soul are not two faculties3 the     
affections are not essentially distinct 
from the will1 nor do they differ from  
the mere actings of the will and        
inclination of the soul1 but only in the
 liveliness and sensibleness of         
exercise4 7,the ,nature of the          

,affections1 part ,i47 ,that ,edwards   
makes but two faculties of the mind1 the
 understanding and the will1 as well as 
identifies the will and the passions1 is
 fully settled by the above quotation4  
,sec4 ,,ii4--,concerning the            
,determination of ,will4  ,meaning of   
the term4  ,by determining the will1 if 
the phrase be used with any meaning1    
must be intended1 causing that the act  
of the will or choice should be thus and
 not otherwise2 and the will is said to 
be determined1 when in consequence of   
some action or influence1 its choice is 
directed to1 and fixed upon1 some       
particular object4 ,as when we speak of 
the determination of motion1 we mean    
causing the motion of the body to be in 
such a direction1 rather than in        
another4 ,the determination of the will 
supposes an effect1 which must have a   
cause4 ,if the will be determined1 there
 is a determiner4  ,now the causation of
 choice and the determination of the    
will are here intended to be            

distinguished1 no more than the         
causation of motion and the             
determination of the moving body4 ,the  
cause setting a body in motion1 likewise
 gives it a direction2 and where there  
are several causes1 a composition of the
 forces takes place1 and determines both
 the extent and direction of the motion4
 ,so also the cause acting upon the will
 or the faculty of choice1 in producing 
a choice determines its direction2      
indeed1 choice cannot be conceived of1  
without also conceiving of something    
chosen1 and where something is chosen1  
the direction of the choice is          
determined1 that is1 the will is        
determined4 ,and where there are several
 causes acting upon the will1 there is  
here likewise a composition of the      
mental forces1 and the choice or the    
determination of the will takes place   
accordingly4 7,see p4 #bc47 ,choice or  
volition then being an effect must have 
a cause4 ,what is this cause8  ,motive4 
,the cause of volition or choice is     

called motive4 ,a cause setting a body  
in motion is properly called the motive 
of the body2 hence1 analogously1 a cause
 exciting the will to choice is called  
the motive of the will4 ,by long usage  
the proper sense of motive is laid      
aside1 and it has come now to express   
only the cause or reason of volition4   
,by motive ,i mean the whole of that    
which moves1 excites1 or invites the    
mind to volition1 whether that be one   
thing singly1 or many things conjointly4
 ,and when ,i speak of the strongest    
motive1 ,i have respect to the strength 
of the whole that operates to induce a  
particular act of volition1 whether that
 be the strength of one thing alone1 or 
of many together4 ,and that motive      
which1 as it stands in view of the mind1
 is the strongest1 determines the will4 
7p4 #ai47 ,this is general1 and means   
nothing more than--#a4 the cause of     
volition is called motive2 #b4 that     
where there are several causes or       
motives of volition1 the strongest cause

 prevails2 #c4 the cause is often       
complex2 #d4 in estimating the strength 
of the cause1 if it be complex1 all the 
particulars must be considered in their 
co-operation2 and1 #e4 the strength of  
the motive stands in view of the mind1  
that is1 it is something which the mind 
knows or is sensible of4  ,what         
constitutes the strength of ,motive8    
,everything that is properly called a   
motive1 excitement1 or inducement1 to a 
perceiving1 willing agent1 has some sort
 and degree of tendency or advantage to 
move or excite the will1 previous to the
 effect1 or to the act of will excited4 
,this previous tendency of the motive is
 what ,i call the strength of the       
motive4 ,when different objects are     
presented to the mind1 they awaken      
certain emotions1 and appear more or    
less inviting4 7p4 #bj47 ,in the        
impression thus at once produced1 we    
perceive their tendency or advantage to 
move or excite the will4 ,it is a       
preference or choice anticipated1 an    

instantaneous perception of a quality in
 the object which we feel would         
determine our choice1 if we were called 
upon to make a choice4 ,the object is   
felt to be adapted to the state of the  
mind1 and the state of the mind to the  
object4 ,they are felt to be reciprocal4
  ,what is this quality which makes up  
the previous tendency8  ,whatever is    
perceived or apprehended by an          
intelligent and voluntary agent1 which  
has the nature and influence of a motive
 to volition or choice1 is considered or
 viewed as good2 nor has it any tendency
 to engage the election of the soul in  
any further degree than it appears such4
 ,now1 as the will is determined by the 
strongest motive2 and as the strength of
 motive lies in the previous tendency2  
and as the previous tendency is made up 
of the quality of goodness2 and as the  
highest degree of this quality in any   
given case makes the strongest motive2  
therefore1 it follows that the will is  
always as the greatest apparent good is4

 7p4 #bj47  ,the sense in which the term
 good is used4  ,i use the term 'good'  
as of the same import with 'agreeable4' 
,to appear good to the mind1 as ,i use  
the phrase1 is the same as to appear    
agreeable1 or seem pleasing to the mind4
 ,if it tends to draw the inclination   
and move the will1 it must be under the 
notion of that which suits the mind4    
,and therefore that must have the       
greatest tendency to attract and engage 
it1 which1 as it stands in the mind's   
view1 suits it best1 and pleases it     
most2 and in that sense is the greatest 
apparent good4 ,the word good in this   
sense includes the avoiding of evil1 or 
of that which is disagreeable and       
uneasy4 7p4 #bj47  ,it follows then that
 the will is always determined by that  
which seems most pleasing or appears    
most agreeable to the mind4  ,this      
conclusion is in perfect accordance with
 the position with which ,edwards set   
out3 that will is always as the         
preponderating desire2 indeed1 that the 

will is the same in kind with desire1 or
 with the affections2 and an act of will
 or choice1 nothing more than the       
strongest desire in reference to an     
immediate object1 and a desire producing
 an effect in our mental or physical    
being4 ,the determination of will is the
 strongest excitement of passion4 ,that 
which determines will is the cause of   
passion4 ,the strength of the cause lies
 in its perceived tendency to excite the
 passions and afford enjoyment4 ,as     
possessing this tendency1 it is called  
good1 or pleasing1 or agreeable2 that   
is1 suiting the state of the mind or the
 condition of the affections4  ,the good
 which forms the characteristic of a    
cause or motive is an immediate good1 or
 a good in the present view of the mind4
 7p4 #ba47 ,thus a drunkard1 before he  
drinks1 may be supposed to weigh against
 each other the present pleasure of     
drinking and the remote painful         
consequences2 and the painful           
consequences may appear to him to be    

greater than the present pleasure4 ,but 
still the question truly in his mind1   
when he comes to drink1 respects the    
present act of drinking only2 and if    
this seems to him most pleasing1 then he
 drinks4 ,if he wills to drink1 then    
drinking is the proper object of the act
 of his will2 and drinking1 on some     
account or other1 now appears most      
agreeable to him1 and suits him best4   
,if he chooses to refrain1 then         
refraining is the immediate object of   
his will1 and is most pleasing to him4  
,the reasoning is1 that when the        
drunkard drinks1 we are not to conclude 
that he has chosen future misery over   
future good1 but that the act of        
drinking1 in itself1 is the object of   
choice2 so that1 in the view he has     
taken of it1 it is to him the greatest  
apparent good4 ,in general we may say1  
in accordance with this principle1 that 
whenever the act of choice takes place1 
the object of that act comes up before  
the mind in such a way as to seem most  

pleasing to the mind2 it is at the      
moment1 and in the immediate relation1  
the greatest apparent good4 ,the man    
thus never chooses what is disagreeable1
 but always what is agreeable to him4   
,proper use of the term most agreeable1 
in relation to the ,will4  ,i have      
chosen rather to express myself thus1   
that the will always is as the greatest 
apparent good1 or as what appears most  
agreeable1 than to say the will is      
determined by the greatest apparent     
good1 or by what seems most agreeable2  
because an appearing most agreeable to  
the mind1 and the mind's preferring1    
seem scarcely distinct4 ,if strict      
propriety of speech be insisted on1 it  
may more properly be said1 that the     
voluntary action1 which is the immediate
 consequence of the mind's choice1 is   
determined by that which appears most   
agreeable1 than the choice itself4 7p4  
#ba1 #bb47 ,here the perception or sense
 of the most agreeable is identified in 
express terms with volition or choice4  

,the will is as the most                
agreeable1--that is1 the determination  
of will1 which means its actual choice1 
as a fact of the consciousness is       
embraced in the sense of the most       
agreeable2 and as the voluntary action1 
or the action1 or change1 or effect1    
following volition1 in any part of our  
being1--as to walk1 or talk1 or read1 or
 think1--has its cause in the volition1 
or the mind's choice1--so it is entirely
 proper to say1 either that this        
voluntary action is determined by the   
volition or that it is determined by the
 sense of the most agreeable4 ,edwards's
 meaning plainly is1 that the terms are 
convertible3 volition may be called the 
cause of voluntary action1 or the sense 
of the most agreeable may be called the 
cause4 ,this is still a carrying out of 
the position1 that the will is as the   
desire4 ,the greatest apparent good     
being identical with the most agreeable1
 and this again being identical with the
 most desirable1 it must follow1 that   

whenever1 in relation to any object1 the
 mind is affected with the sense of the 
most agreeable1 it presents the         
phenomenon of volition or choice2 and   
still farther1 that which is chosen is  
the most agreeable object2 and is known 
to be such by the simple fact that it is
 chosen2 for its being chosen1 means    
nothing more than that it affects the   
mind with the sense of the most         
agreeable1--and the most agreeable is   
that which is chosen1 and cannot be     
otherwise than chosen2 for its being    
most agreeable1 means nothing more than 
that it is the object of the mind's     
choice or sense of the most agreeable4  
,the object1 and the mind regarded as a 
sensitive or willing power1 are         
correlatives1 and choice is the unition 
of both3 so that if we regard choice as 
characterizing the object1 then the     
object is affirmed to be the most       
agreeable2 and if1 on the other side1 we
 regard choice as characterizing the    
mind1 then the mind is affirmed to be   

affected with the sense of the most     
agreeable4  ,cause of ,choice1 or of the
 sense of the most agreeable4  ,volition
 itself is always determined by that in 
or about the mind's view of the object1 
which causes it to appear most          
agreeable4 ,i say in or about the mind's
 view of the object2 because what has   
influence to render an object in view   
agreeable1 is not only what appears in  
the object viewed1 but also the manner  
of the view1 and the state and          
circumstances of the mind that views4   
7p4 #bb47  ,choice being the unition of 
the mind's sensitivity and the          
object1--that is1 being an affection of 
the sensitivity1 by reason of its       
perfect agreement and correlation with  
the object1 and of course of the perfect
 agreement and correlation of the object
 with the sensitivity1 in determining   
the cause of choice1 we must necessarily
 look both to the mind and the object4  
,edwards accordingly gives several      
particulars in relation to each4  ,i4   

,in relation to the object1 the sense of
 the most agreeable1 or choice1 will    
depend upon1--  #a4 ,the beauty of the  
object1 viewing it as it is in itself1  
independently of circumstances4  #b4    
,the apparent degree of pleasure or     
trouble attending the object1 or the    
consequence of it1 or the object taken  
with its concomitants and consequences4 
#c4 ,the apparent state of the pleasure 
or trouble that appears with respect to 
distance of time4 ,it is a thing in     
itself agreeable to the mind1 to have   
pleasure speedily2 and disagreeable to  
have it delayed4 7p4 #bb47  ,,ii4 ,in   
relation to mind1 the sense of          
agreeableness will depend1 first1 upon  
the manner of the mind's view2 secondly1
 upon the state of mind4 ,edwards1 under
 the first1 speaks of the object as     
connected with future pleasure4 ,here   
the manner of the mind's view will have 
influence in two respects3  #a4 ,the    
certainty or uncertainty which the mind 
judges to attach to the pleasure2  #b4  

,the liveliness of the sense1 or of the 
imagination1 which the mind has of it4  
,now these may be in different degrees1 
compounded with different degrees of    
pleasure1 considered in itself2 and the 
agreeableness of a proposed object of   
choice will be in a degree some way     
compounded of the degree of good        
supposed by the judgement1 the degree of
 apparent probability or certainty of   
that good1 and the degree of liveliness 
of the idea the mind has of that good4  
7p4 #bc47  ,secondly3 ,in reference to  
objects generally1 whether connected    
with present or future pleasure1 the    
sense of agreeableness will depend also 
upon the state of the mind which views a
 proposed object of choice4 7p4 #bd47   
,here we have to consider the particular
 temper which the mind has by nature1 or
 that has been introduced or established
 by education1 example1 custom1 or some 
other means2 or the frame or state that 
the mind is in on a particular occasion4
 7ibid47  ,edwards here suggests1 that  

it may be unnecessary to consider the   
state of the mind as a ground of        
agreeableness distinct from the two     
already mentioned3 viz4--the nature and 
circumstances of the object1 and the    
manner of the view4 ,perhaps1 if we     
strictly consider the matter1 he        
remarks1 the different temper and state 
of the mind makes no alteration as to   
the agreeableness of objects in any     
other way1 than as it makes the objects 
themselves appear differently2 beautiful
 or deformed1 having apparent pleasure  
or pain attending them2 and as it       
occasions the manner of the view to be  
different1 causes the idea of beauty or 
deformity1 pleasure or uneasiness1 to be
 more or less lively4 7ibid47 ,in this  
remark1 ,edwards shows plainly how      
completely he makes mind and object to  
run together in choice1 or how perfect a
 unition of the two1 choice is4 ,the    
state of the mind is manifested only in 
relation to the nature and circumstances
 of the object2 and the sense of        

agreeableness being in the correlation  
of the two1 the sense of the most       
agreeable or choice is such a perfect   
unition of the two1 that1 having        
described the object in its nature and  
circumstances in relation to the most   
agreeable1 we have comprehended in this 
the state of mind4 ,on the other hand1  
the nature and circumstances of the     
object1 in relation to the most         
agreeable1 can be known only by the     
state of mind produced by the presence  
of the object and its circumstances4 ,to
 give an example1--let a rose be the    
object4 ,when ,i describe the beauty and
 agreeableness of this object1 ,i       
describe the state of mind in relation  
to it2 for its beauty and agreeableness 
are identical with the sensations and   
emotions which ,i experience1 hence1 in 
philosophical language1 called the      
secondary qualities of the object3 and  
so1 on the other hand1 if ,i describe my
 sensations and emotions in the presence
 of the rose1 ,i do in fact describe its

 beauty and agreeableness4 ,the mind and
 object are thus united in the sense of 
agreeableness4 ,i could not have this   
sense of agreeableness without an       
object2 but when the object is presented
 to my mind1 they are so made for each  
other1 that they seem to melt together  
in the pleasurable emotion4 ,the sense  
of the most agreeable or choice may be  
illustrated in the same way4 ,the only  
difference between the agreeable simply 
and the most agreeable is this3 the     
agreeable refers merely to an emotion   
awakened on the immediate presentation  
of an object1 without any comparison or 
competition4 ,the most agreeable takes  
place where there is comparison and     
competition4 ,thus1 to prefer or choose 
a rose above a violet is a sense of the 
most agreeable of the two4 ,in some     
cases1 however1 that which is refused is
 positively disagreeable4 ,the choice1  
in strictness of speech1 in these cases1
 is only a sense of the agreeable4 ,as1 
however1 in every instance of choosing1 

there are two terms formed by           
contemplating the act of choosing itself
 in the contrast of positive and        
negative1 the phrase most agreeable or  
greatest apparent good is convenient for
 general use1 and sufficiently precise  
to express every case which comes up4   
,it may be well here to remark1 that in 
the system we are thus endeavouring to  
state and to illustrate1 the word choice
 is properly used to express the action 
of will1 when that action is viewed in  
relation to its immediate effects1--as  
when ,i say1 ,i choose to walk4 ,the    
sense of the most agreeable1 is properly
 used to express the same action1 when  
the action is viewed in relation to its 
own cause4 ,choice and volition are the 
words in common use1 because men at     
large only think of choice and volition 
in reference to effects4 ,but when the  
cause of choice is sought after by a    
philosophic mind1 and is supposed to lie
 in the nature and circumstances of mind
 and object1 then the sense of the most 

agreeable becomes the most appropriate  
form of expression4  ,edwards concludes 
his discussion of the cause of the most 
agreeable1 by remarking3 ,however1 ,i   
think so much is certain1--that         
volition1 in no one instance that can be
 mentioned1 is otherwise than the       
greatest apparent good is1 in the manner
 which has been explained4 ,this is the 
great principle of his system2 and1 a   
few sentences after1 he states it as an 
axiom1 or a generally admitted truth3   
,there is scarcely a plainer and more   
universal dictate of the sense and      
experience of mankind1 than that when   
men act voluntarily and do what they    
please1 then they do what suits them    
best1 or what is most agreeable to them4
 ,indeed1 ,edwards cannot be considered 
as having attempted to prove this2 he   
has only explained it1 and therefore it 
is only the explanation of a supposed   
axiom that we have been following out4  
,this supposed axiom is really announced
 in the first section3 ,will and desire 

do not run counter at all3 the thing    
which he wills1 the very same he        
desires2 that is1 a man wills as he     
desires1 and of course wills what is    
most agreeable to him4 ,it is to be     
noticed1 also1 that the title of part   
,i4 runs as follows3 ,wherein are       
explained and stated various terms and  
things1 c4 ,receiving it1 therefore1 as 
a generally admitted truth1 that choice 
or volition is always as the most       
agreeable1 and is itself only the sense 
of the most agreeable1 what is the      
explanation given8  #a4 ,that will1 or  
the faculty of choice1 is not a faculty 
distinct from the affections or         
passions1 or that part of our being     
which philosophers sometimes call the   
sensitivity4  #b4 ,that volition1 or    
choice1 or preference1 being at any     
given moment and under any given        
circumstances the strongest inclination1
 or the strongest affection and desire  
with regard to an immediate object1     
appears in the constitution of our being

 as the antecedent of effects in the    
mind itself1 or in the body2 which      
effects are called voluntary            
actions1--as acts of attention1 or of   
talking1 or walking4  #c4 ,to say that  
volition is as the desire1 is equivalent
 to saying that volition is as the      
greatest apparent good1 which again     
means only the most agreeable1--so that 
the volition becomes again the sense or 
feeling of the greatest apparent good4  
,there is in all this only a variety of 
expressions for the same affection of   
the sensitivity4  #d4 ,determination of 
will is actual choice1 or the production
 in the mind of volition1 or choice1 or 
the strongest affection1 or the sense of
 the most agreeable1 or of the greatest 
apparent good4 ,it is therefore an      
effect1 and must have a determiner or   
cause4  #e4 ,this determiner or cause is
 called motive4 ,in explaining what     
constitutes the motive1 we must take    
into view both mind and object4 ,the    
object must be perceived by the mind as 

something existent4 ,this perception1   
however1 is only preliminary1 or a mere 
introduction of the object to the mind4 
,now1 in order that the sense of the    
most agreeable1 or choice1 may take     
place1 the mind and object must be      
suited to each other2 they must be      
correlatives4 ,the object must possess  
qualities of beauty and agreeableness to
 the mind4 ,the mind must possess a     
susceptibility agreeable to the         
qualities of the object4 ,but to say    
that the object possesses qualities of  
beauty and agreeableness to the mind1 is
 in fact to affirm that the mind has the
 requisite susceptibility2 for these    
qualities of the object have a being1   
and are what they are only in relation  
to mind4 ,choice1 or the sense of       
agreeableness1 may therefore be called  
the unition of the sensitivity and the  
object4 ,choice is thus1 like any       
emotion or passion1 a fact perpetually  
appearing in the consciousness2 and1    
like emotion or passion2 and1 indeed1   

being a mere form of emotion and        
passion1 must ultimately be accounted   
for by referring it to the constitution 
of our being4 ,but inasmuch as the      
constitution of our being manifests     
itself in relation to objects and       
circumstances1 we do commonly account   
for its manifestations by referring them
 to the objects and circumstances in    
connexion with which they take place1   
and without which they would not take   
place2 and thus1 as we say1 the cause of
 passion is the object of passion3 so we
 say also1 in common parlance1 the cause
 of choice is the object of choice2 and 
assigning the affections of the mind    
springing up in the presence of the     
object1 to the object1 as descriptive of
 its qualities1 we say that choice is   
always as the most beautiful and        
agreeable2 that is1 as the greatest     
apparent good4 ,this greatest apparent  
good1 thus objectively described1 is the
 motive1 or determiner1 or cause of     
volition4  ,in what sense the ,will     

follows the last dictate of the         
,understanding4  ,it appears from these 
things1 that in some sense the will     
always follows the last dictate of the  
understanding4 ,but then the            
understanding must be taken in a large  
sense1 as including the whole faculty of
 perception or apprehension1 and not    
merely what is called reason or         
judgement4 ,if by the dictate of the    
understanding is meant what reason      
declares to be best1 or most for the    
person's happiness1 taking in the whole 
of its duration1 it is not true that the
 will always follows the last dictate of
 the understanding4 ,such a dictate of  
reason is quite a different matter from 
things appearing now most agreeable1 all
 things being put together which relates
 to the mind's present perceptions in   
any respect4 7p4 #be47 ,the large sense 
in which ,edwards takes the             
understanding1 embraces the whole       
intellectual and sensitive being4 ,in   
the production of choice1 or the sense  

of the most agreeable1 the suggestions  
of reason may have their influence1 and 
may work in with other particulars to   
bring about the result2 but then they   
are subject to the same condition with  
the other particulars1--they must       
appear1 at the moment and in the        
immediate circumstances1 the most       
agreeable4 ,it is not enough that they  
come from reason1 and are true and      
right2 they must likewise suit the state
 of the mind1--for as choice is the     
sense of the most agreeable1 that only  
as an object can tend to awaken this    
sense1 which is properly and agreeably  
related to the feelings of the subject4 
,where the suggestions of reason are not
 agreeably related1 the act of the will 
is determined in opposition to it4      
7ibid47  ,sec4 ,,iii4--,concerning the  
meaning of the terms ,necessity1        
,impossibility1 ,inability1 c4 and of   
,contingence4  ,after having settled his
 definition of choice or volition1 and  
explained the cause of the same1        

,edwards takes up the nature of the     
connexion between this cause and effect3
 viz4 motive and volition4 ,is this     
connexion a necessary connexion8  ,in   
order to determine this point1 and to   
explain his view of it1 he proceeds to  
discuss the meaning of the terms        
contained in the above title4 ,this     
section is entirely occupied with this  
preliminary discussion4  ,edwards makes 
two kinds of necessity3 #a4 ,necessity  
as understood in the common or vulgar   
use2 #b4 ,necessity as understood in the
 philosophical or metaphysical use4  #a4
 ,in common use1 necessity is a relative
 term1 and relates to some supposed     
opposition made to the existence of a   
thing1 which opposition is overcome or  
proves insufficient to hinder or alter  
it4 ,the word impossible is manifestly a
 relative term1 and has reference to    
supposed power exerted to bring a thing 
to pass which is insufficient for the   
effect4 ,the word unable is relative1   
and has relation to ability1 or         

endeavour1 which is insufficient4 ,the  
word irresistible is relative1 and has  
reference to resistance which is made1  
or may be made1 to some force or power  
tending to an effect1 and is            
insufficient to withstand the power or  
hinder the effect4 ,the common notion of
 necessity and impossibility implies    
something that frustrates endeavour or  
desire4  ,he then distinguishes this    
necessity into general and particular4  
,things are necessary in general1 which 
are or will be1 notwithstanding any     
supposable opposition1 from whatever    
quarter3 e4 g4 that ,god will judge the 
world4  ,things are necessary to us     
which are or will be1 notwithstanding   
all opposition supposable in the case   
from us4 ,this is particular necessity3 
e4 g4 any event which ,i cannot hinder4 
,in the discussions about liberty and   
moral agency1 the word is used          
especially in a particular sense1       
because we are concerned in these       
discussions as individuals4  ,according 

to this common use of necessity in the  
particular sense1 ,when we speak of any 
thing necessary to us1 it is with       
relation to some supposable opposition  
to our wills2 and a thing is said to be 
necessary in this sense when we cannot  
help it1 do what we will4 ,so also a    
thing is said to be impossible to us    
when we cannot do it1 although we make  
the attempt1--that is1 put forth the    
volition2 and irresistible to us1 which1
 when we put forth a volition to hinder 
it1 overcomes the opposition3 and we are
 unable to do a thing when our          
supposable desires and endeavours are   
insufficient1--are not followed by any  
effect4 ,in the common or vulgar use of 
these terms1 we are not considering     
volition in relation to its own cause2  
but we are considering volition as      
itself a cause in relation to its own   
effects3 e4 g4 suppose a question be    
raised1 whether a certain man can raise 
a certain weight1--if it be affirmed    
that it is impossible for him to raise  

it1 that he has not the ability to raise
 it1 and that the weight will           
necessarily keep its position1--no      
reference whatever is made to the       
production of a volition or choice to   
raise it1 but solely to the connexion   
between the volition and the raising of 
the weight4 ,now ,edwards remarks1 that 
this common use of the term necessity   
and its cognates being habitual1 is     
likely to enter into and confound our   
reasonings on subjects where it is      
inadmissible from the nature of the     
case4 ,we must therefore be careful to  
discriminate4 7p4 #bg47  #b4 ,in        
metaphysical or philosophical use1      
necessity is not a relative1 but an     
absolute term4 ,in this use necessity   
applies in cases wherein no insufficient
 will is supposed1 or can be supposed2  
but the very nature of the supposed case
 itself excludes any opposition1 will1  
or endeavour4 7ibid47 ,thus it is used  
with respect to ,god's existence before 
the creation of the world1 when there   

was no other being4 ,metaphysical or    
philosophical necessity is nothing      
different from certainty1--not the      
certainty of knowledge1 but the         
certainty of things in themselves1 which
 is the foundation of the certainty of  
knowledge1 or that wherein lies the     
ground of the infallibility of the      
proposition which affirms them4         
,philosophical necessity is really      
nothing else than the full and fixed    
connexion between the things signified  
by the subject and predicate of a       
proposition which affirms something to  
be true2 and in this sense ,i use the   
word necessity1 in the following        
discourse1 when ,i endeavour to prove   
that necessity is not inconsistent with 
liberty4 7p4 #bg1 #bh1 #bi47  ,the      
subject and predicate of a proposition  
which affirms the existence of          
something1 may have a full1 fixed1 and  
certain connexion1 in several ways4  #a4
 ,they1 may have a full and perfect     
connexion in and of themselves4 ,so     

,god's infinity and other attributes are
 necessary4 ,so it is necessary1 in its 
own nature1 that two and two should be  
four4  #b4 ,the subject and predicate of
 a proposition1 affirming the existence 
of something which is already come to   
pass1 are fixed and certain4  #c4 ,the  
subject and predicate of a proposition  
may be fixed and certain                
consequentially1--and so the existence  
of the things affirmed may be           
consequentially necessary4 ,things which
 are perfectly connected with the things
 that are necessary1 are necessary      
themselves1 by a necessity of           
consequence4 ,this is logical necessity4
  ,and here it may be observed1 that all
 things which are future1 or which will 
hereafter begin to be1 which can be said
 to be necessary1 are necessary only in 
this last way1--that is1 by a connexion 
with something that is necessary in its 
own nature1 or something that already is
 or has been4 ,this is the necessity    
which especially belongs to             

controversies about acts of the will4   
7p4 #cj47  ,philosophical necessity is  
general and particular4 #a4 ,the        
existence of a thing may be said to be  
necessary with a general necessity1 when
 all things considered there is a       
foundation for the certainty of its     
existence4 ,this is unconditional       
necessity in the strictest sense4  #b4  
,particular necessity refers to things  
that happen to particular persons1 in   
the existence of which1 no will of      
theirs has any concern1 at least at that
 time2 which1 whether they are necessary
 or not with regard to things in        
general1 yet are necessary to them1 and 
with regard to any volition of theirs at
 that time1 as they prevent all acts of 
the will about the affair4 7p4 #ca47    
,this particular necessity is absolute  
to the individual1 because his will has 
nothing to do with it--whether it be    
absolute or not in the general sense1   
does not affect his case4  ,what has    
been said to show the meaning of terms  

necessary and necessity1 may be         
sufficient for the explaining of the    
opposite terms impossible and           
impossibility4 ,for there is no         
difference1 but only the latter are     
negative and the former positive4       
7ibid47  ,inability and ,unable4  ,it   
has been observed that these terms in   
their original and common use1 have     
relation to will and endeavour1 as      
supposable in the case4 ,that is have   
relation to the connexion of volition   
with effects4 ,but as these terms are   
often used by philosophers and divines1 
especially writers on controversies     
about free will1 they are used in a     
quite different and far more extensive  
sense1 and are applied to many cases    
wherein no will or endeavour for the    
bringing of the thing to pass is or can 
be supposed3 e4 g4 ,the connexion       
between volitions and their causes or   
motives4  ,contingent and ,contingency4 
,any thing is said to be contingent1 or 
to come to pass by chance or accident1  

in the original meaning of such words1  
when its connexion with its causes or   
antecedents1 according to the           
established course of things1 is not    
discerned2 and so is what we have no    
means of foreseeing4 ,but the word1     
contingent1 is abundantly used in a very
 different sense2 not for that1 whose   
connexion with the series of things we  
cannot discern so as to foresee the     
event1 but for something which has      
absolutely no previous ground or reason1
 with which its existence has any fixed 
connexion4 7p4 #ca4 #cb47  ,contingency 
and chance ,edwards uses as equivalent  
terms4 ,in common use1 contingency and  
chance are relative to our              
knowledge--implying that we discern no  
cause4 ,in another use1--the use of a   
certain philosophical school1--he       
affirms that contingency is used to     
express absolutely no cause2 or1 that   
some events are represented as existing 
without any cause or ground of their    
existence4 ,this will be examined in its

 proper place4 ,i am now only stating   
,edwards's opinions1 not discussing     
them4  ,sec4 ,,iv4 ,of the ,distinction 
of natural and moral ,necessary and     
,inability4  ,we now return to the      
question3--,is the connexion between    
motive and volition necessary8  ,the    
term necessary1 in its common or vulgar 
use1 does not relate to this question1  
for in that use as we have seen1 it     
refers to the connexion between volition
 considered as a cause1 and its effects4
 ,in this question1 we are considering  
volition as an effect in relation to its
 cause or the motive4 ,if the connexion 
then of motive and volition be          
necessary1 it must be necessary in the  
philosophical or metaphysical sense of  
the term4 ,now this philosophical       
necessity ,edwards does hold to         
characterize the connexion of motive and
 volition4 ,this section opens with the 
following distinction of philosophical  
necessity3 ,that necessity which has    
been explained1 consisting in an        

infallible connexion of the things      
signified by the subject and predicate  
of a proposition1 as intelligent beings 
are the subjects of it1 is distinguished
 into moral and natural necessity4 ,he  
then appropriates moral philosophical   
necessity to express the nature of the  
connexion between motive and volition3  
,and sometimes by moral necessity is    
meant that necessity of connexion and   
consequence which arises from moral     
causes1 as the strength of inclination1 
or motives1 and the connexion which     
there is in many cases between these1   
and such certain volitions and actions4 
,and it is in this sense that ,i use the
 phrase moral necessity in the following
 discourse4 7p4 #cb47 ,natural          
philosophical necessity as distinguished
 from this1 he employs to characterize  
the connexion between natural causes and
 phenomena of our being1 as the         
connexion of external objects with our  
various sensations1 and the connexion   
between truth and our assent or belief4 

7p4 #cc47  ,in employing the term moral1
 however1 he does not intend to intimate
 that it affects at all the absoluteness
 of the necessity which it              
distinguishes2 on the contrary1 he      
affirms that moral necessity may be as  
absolute as natural necessity4 ,that is1
 the effect may be as perfectly         
connected with its moral cause1 as a    
natural necessary effect is with its    
natural cause4 ,it must be allowed that 
there may be such a thing as a sure and 
perfect connexion between moral causes  
and effects2 so this only 7i4 e4 the    
sure and perfect connexion17 is what ,i 
call by the name of moral necessity4 7p4
 #cc47  ,nor does he intend that when a 
moral habit or motive is so strong that 
the act of the will infallibly follows1 
this is not owing to the nature of      
things6 ,but these terms1 moral and     
natural1 are convenient to express a    
difference which really exists2 a       
difference1 however1 which does not lie 
so much in the nature of the connexion  

as in the two terms connected4 ,indeed1 
he soon after admits that choice in many
 cases arises from nature1 as truly as  
other events4 ,his sentiment is plainly 
this choice lies in the great system and
 chain of nature as truly as any other  
phenomenon1 arising from its antecedent 
and having its consequents or effects3  
but we have appropriated nature to      
express the chain of causes and effects1
 which lie without us1 and which are    
most obvious to us2 and choice being1 as
 it were1 a new principle of motion and 
action1 lying within us1 and often      
interrupting or altering the external   
course of nature1 seems to demand a     
peculiar designation4 7p4 #cd47         
,edwards closes his remarks on moral    
necessity by justifying his reduction of
 motive and volition under philosophical
 necessity4 ,it must be observed1 that  
in what has been explained1 as signified
 by the name of moral necessity1 the    
word necessity is not used according to 
the original design and meaning of the  

word2 for1 as was observed before1 such 
terms1 necessary1 impossible1           
irresistible1 c4 in common speech1 and  
their most proper sense1 are always     
relative1 having reference to some      
supposable voluntary opposition or      
endeavour1 that is insufficient4 ,but no
 such opposition1 or contrary will and  
endeavour1 is supposable in the case of 
moral necessity2 which is a certainty of
 the inclination and will itself2 which 
does not admit of the supposition of a  
will to oppose and resist it4 ,for it is
 absurd to suppose the same individual  
will to oppose itself in its present    
act2 or the present choice to be        
opposite to1 and resisting present      
choice3 as absurd as it is to talk of   
two contrary motions in the same moving 
body at the same time4 ,and therefore   
the very case supposed never admits of  
any trial1 whether an opposing or       
resisting will can overcome this        
necessity4 7p4 #ce47  ,this passage is  
clear and full4 ,common necessity1 or   

necessity in the original use of the    
word1 refers to the connexion between   
volition and its effects2 for here an   
opposition to will is supposable4 ,i may
 choose or will to raise a weight2 but  
the gravity opposed to my endeavour     
overcomes it1 and ,i find it impossible 
for me to raise it1 and the weight      
necessarily remains in its place4 ,in   
this common use of these terms1 the     
impossibility and the necessity are     
relative to my volition2 but in the     
production of choice itself1 or         
volition1 or the sense of the most      
agreeable1 there is no reference to     
voluntary endeavour4 ,choice is not the 
cause of itself3 it cannot be conceived 
of as struggling with itself in its own 
production4 ,the cause of volition does 
not lie within the sphere of volition   
itself2 if any opposition1 therefore1   
were made to the production of a        
volition1 it could not be made by a     
volition4 ,the mind1 with given         
susceptibilities and habits1 is supposed

 to be placed within the influence of   
objects and their circumstances1 and the
 choice takes place in the correlation  
of the two1 as the sense of the most    
agreeable4 ,now choice cannot exist     
before its cause1 and so there can be no
 choice in the act of its causation4 ,it
 comes into existence1 therefore1 by no 
necessity relating to voluntary         
endeavour2 it comes into existence by a 
philosophical and absolute necessity of 
cause and effect4 ,it is necessary as   
the falling of a stone which is thrown  
into the air2 as the freezing or boiling
 of water at given temperatures2 as     
sensations of sight1 sound1 smell1      
taste1 and feeling1 when the organs of  
sense and the objects of sense are      
brought together4 ,the application of   
the epithet moral to the necessity of   
volition1 evidently does not alter in   
the least the character of that         
necessity4 ,it is still philosophical   
and absolute necessity1 and as sure and 
perfect as natural necessity4 ,this we  

have seen he expressly admits1 7p4 #cc27
 affirming1 7p4 #cd17 that the          
difference between a moral and natural  
necessity is a mere difference in the   
two terms connected1 and not a          
difference in the nature of the         
connexion4  ,natural and moral          
inability4  ,what has been said of      
natural and moral necessity1 may serve  
to explain what is intended by natural  
and moral inability4 ,we are said to be 
naturally unable to do a thing1 when we 
cannot do it if we will1 because what is
 most commonly called nature does not   
allow of it1 or because of some impeding
 defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to
 the will2 either in the faculty of the 
understanding1 constitution of body1 or 
external objects4 7p4 #ce47 ,we may make
 a voluntary endeavour to know          
something1 and may find ourselves       
unable1 through a defect of the         
understanding4 ,we may make a voluntary 
effort to do something by the           
instrumentality of our hand1 and may    

find ourselves unable through a defect  
of the bodily constitution2 or external 
objects may be regarded as presenting   
such a counter force as to overcome the 
force we exert4 ,this is natural        
inability2 this is all we mean by it4   
,it must be remarked too1 that this is  
inability not metaphysically or         
philosophically considered1 and         
therefore not absolute inability2 but   
only inability in the common and vulgar 
acceptation of the term--a relative     
inability1 relative to volition or      
choice--an inability to do1 although we 
will to do4  ,what is moral inability8  
,moral inability consists not in any of 
these things2 but either in the want of 
inclination1 or the strength of a       
contrary inclination1 or the want of    
sufficient motives in view1 to induce   
and excite the act of will1 or the      
strength of apparent motives to the     
contrary4 ,or both these may be resolved
 into one2 and it may be said1 in one   
word1 that moral inability consists in  

the opposition or want of inclination4  
,for when a person is unable to will or 
choose such a thing1 through a defect of
 motives1 or prevalence of contrary     
motives1 it is the same thing as his    
being unable through the want of an     
inclination1 or the prevalence of a     
contrary inclination1 in such           
circumstances and under the influence of
 such views4 7bid47  ,the inability in  
this case does not relate to the        
connexion between volition and its      
consequents and effects2 but to the     
production of the volition itself4 ,now 
the inability to the production of a    
volition1 cannot be affirmed of the     
volition1 because it is not yet supposed
 to exist1 and as an effect cannot be   
conceived of as producing itself4 ,the  
inability1 therefore1 must belong to the
 causes of volition1 or to the motive4  
,but motive1 as we have seen1 lies in   
the state of the mind1 and in the nature
 and circumstances of the object2 and   
choice or volition exists when1 in the  

correlation of mind and object1 the     
sense of the most agreeable is produced4
 ,now what reason can exist1 in any     
given case1 why the volition or sense of
 the most agreeable is not produced8    
,why simply this1 that there is not such
 a correlation of mind and object as to 
produce this sense or choice4 ,but      
wherein lies the deficiency8 ,we may say
 generally1 that it lies in both mind   
and object--that they are not suited to 
each other4 ,the mind is not in a state 
to be agreeably impressed by the object1
 and the object does not possess        
qualities of beauty and agreeableness to
 the mind4 ,on the part of the mind1    
there is either a want of inclination to
 the object1 or a stronger inclination  
towards another object3 on the part of  
the object1 there is a want of          
interesting and agreeable qualities to  
the particular state of mind in         
question1 or a suitableness to a        
different state of mind3 and this       
constitutes the want of sufficient      

motives in view1 to induce and excite   
the act of will1 or the strength of     
apparent motives to the contrary4 ,and  
both these may clearly be resolved into 
one1 that above mentioned1 viz1 a want  
of inclination on the part of the mind  
to the object1 and a stronger           
inclination towards another object2 or1 
as ,edwards expresses it1 the opposition
 or want of inclination4 ,for a want of 
inclination to one object1 implying a   
stronger inclination to another object1 
expresses that the state of the mind1   
and the nature and circumstances of the 
one object1 are not correlated2 but that
 the state of mind1 and the nature and  
circumstances of the other object1 are  
correlated4 ,the first1 is a want of    
sufficient motives2 the second1 stronger
 motives to the contrary4 ,moral        
inability lies entirely out of the      
sphere of volition2 volition1 therefore1
 cannot produce or relieve it1 for this 
would suppose an effect to modify its   
cause1 and that too before the effect   

itself has any existence4 ,moral        
inability is a metaphysical inability3  
it is the perfect and fixed             
impossibility of certain laws and       
principles of being1 leading to certain 
volitions2 and is contrasted with       
physical inability1 which is the        
established impossibility of a certain  
volition1 producing a certain effect4   
,so we may say1 that moral ability is   
the certain and fixed connexion between 
certain laws and principles of being1   
and volitions2 and is contrasted with   
natural ability1 which is the           
established connexion between certain   
volitions and certain effects4  ,moral  
inability1 although transcending the    
sphere of volition1 is a real inability4
 ,where it exists1 there is the absolute
 impossibility of a given volition1--and
 of course an absolute impossibility of 
certain effects coming to pass by that  
volition4 ,the impossibility of water   
freezing above an established           
temperature1 or of boiling below an     

established temperature1 is no more     
fixed than the impossibility of effects 
coming to pass by a volition1 when there
 is a moral inability of the volition4  
,the difference between the two cases   
does not lie in the nature of the       
connexion1 but in the two terms         
connected4  ,edwards gives several      
instances in illustration of moral      
inability4  ,a woman of great honour and
 chastity may have a moral inability to 
prostitute herself to her slave4 7ibid47
 ,there is no correlation between the   
state of her mind and the act which     
forms the object contemplated1--of      
course the sense of the most agreeable  
or choice cannot take place2 and while  
the state of her mind remains the same1 
and the act and its circumstances remain
 the same1 there is1 on the principle of
 ,edwards1 an utter inability to the    
choice1 and of course to the consequents
 of the choice4  ,a child of great love 
and duty to his parents1 may be thus    
unable to kill his father4 7ibid47 ,this

 case is similar to the preceding4  ,a  
very lascivious man1 in case of certain 
opportunities and temptations1 and in   
the absence of such and such restraints1
 may be unable to forbear gratifying his
 lust4 ,there is here a correlation     
between the state of mind and the       
object1 in its nature and               
circumstances1--and of course the sense 
of the most agreeable or choice takes   
place4 ,there is a moral ability to the 
choice1 and a moral inability to        
forbear1 or to choose the opposite4  ,a 
drunkard1 under such and such           
circumstances1 may be unable to forbear 
taking strong drink4 7ibid47 ,this is   
similar to the last4  ,a very malicious 
man may be unable to exert benevolent   
acts to an enemy1 or to desire his      
prosperity2 yea1 some may be so under   
the power of a vile disposition1 that   
they may be unable to love those who are
 most worthy of their esteem and        
affection4 7ibid47 ,the state of mind is
 such1--that is1 the disposition or     

sensitivity1 as not to be at all        
correlated to the great duty of loving  
one's neighbour as one's self1--or to   
any moral excellency in another3 of     
course the sense of the most agreeable  
is not produced2 and in this state of   
mind it is absolutely impossible that it
 should be produced4 ,a strong habit of 
virtue1 a great esteem of holiness1 may 
cause a moral inability to love         
wickedness in general4 7p4 #cf47 ,on the
 other hand1 a great degree of habitual 
wickedness may lay a man under an       
inability to love and choose holiness1  
and render him utterly unable to love an
 infinitely ,holy ,being1 or to choose  
and cleave to him as the chief good4    
7ibid47 ,the love and choice of holiness
 is necessarily produced by the         
correlation of the mind with holiness2  
and the love and choice of holiness is  
utterly impossible when this correlation
 does not exist4 ,where a moral         
inability to evil exists1 nothing can be
 more sure and fixed than this          

inability4 ,the individual who is the   
subject of it has absolutely no power to
 alter it4 ,if he were to proceed to    
alter it1 he would have to put forth a  
volition to this effect2 but this would 
be an evil volition1 and by supposition 
the individual has no ability to evil   
volitions4  ,where a moral inability to 
good exists1 nothing can be more sure   
and fixed than this inability4 ,the     
individual who is the subject of it1 has
 absolutely no power to alter it4 ,if he
 were to proceed to alter it1 he would  
have to put forth a volition to this    
effect2 but this would be a good        
volition1 and by supposition the        
individual has no ability to good       
volitions4  ,general and habitual1      
particular and occasional ,inability4   
,the first consists in a fixed and      
habitual inclination1 or an habitual and
 stated defect or want of a certain kind
 of inclination4 7p4 #cf47  ,the second 
is an inability of the will or heart to 
a particular act1 through the strength  

or defect of present motives1 or of     
inducements presented to the view of the
 understanding1 on this occasion4       
7ibid47  ,an habitual drunkard1 and a   
man habitually sober1 on some particular
 occasion getting drunk1 are instances  
of general and particular inability4 ,in
 the first instance1 the state of the   
man's mind has become correlated to the 
object2 under all times and             
circumstances it is fixed4 ,in the      
second instance1 the state of the man's 
mind is correlated to the object only   
when presented on certain occasions and 
under certain circumstances4 ,in both   
instances1 however1 the choice is       
necessary1--it not being possible1 in   
any case1 that the will should at       
present go against the motive which has 
now1 all things considered1 the greatest
 advantage to induce it4  ,will and     
endeavour against1 or diverse from      
present acts of the will1 are in no case
 supposable1 whether those acts be      
occasional or habitual2 for that would  

be to suppose the will at present to be 
otherwise than at present it is4 7ibid47
  ,the passage which follows deserves   
particular attention4 ,it may be brought
 up under the following question3       
,although will cannot be exerted against
 present acts of the will1 yet can      
present acts of the will be exerted to  
produce future acts of the will1 opposed
 to present habitual or present         
occasional acts8  ,but yet there may be 
will and endeavour against future acts  
of the will1 or volitions that are      
likely to take place1 as viewed at a    
distance4 ,it is no contradiction1 to   
suppose that the acts of the will at one
 time may be against the act of the will
 at another time2 and there may be      
desires and endeavours to prevent or    
excite future acts of the will2 but such
 desires and endeavours are in many     
cases rendered insufficient and vain    
through fixedness of habit3 when the    
occasion returns1 the strength of habit 
overcomes and baffles all such          

opposition4 7p4 #cg47  ,let us take the 
instance of the drunkard4 ,the choice or
 volition to drink is the fixed         
correlation of his disposition and the  
strong drink4 ,but we may suppose that  
his disposition can be affected by other
 objects likewise3 as the consideration 
of the interest and happiness of his    
wife and children1 and his own          
respectability and final happiness4     
,when his cups are removed1 and he has  
an occasional fit of satiety and        
loathing1 these considerations may      
awaken at the time the sense of the most
 agreeable1 and lead him to avoid the   
occasions of drunkenness1 and to form   
resolutions of amendment2 but when the  
appetite and longing for drink returns1 
and he comes again in the way of        
indulgence1 then these considerations1  
brought fairly into collision with his  
habits1 are overcome1 and drinking1 as  
the most agreeable1 asserts its         
supremacy4  ,but it may be comparatively
 easy to make an alteration with respect

 to such future acts as are only        
occasional and transient2 because the   
occasional or transient cause1 if       
foreseen1 may often easily be prevented 
or avoided4 7ibid47  ,in the case of    
occasional drunkenness1 for instance1   
the habitual correlation is not of mind 
and strong drink1 but of mind and       
considerations of honour1 prudence1 and 
virtue4 ,but strong drink being         
associated on some occasion with objects
 which are correlated to the mind1 as   
hospitality1 friendship1 or festive     
celebrations1--may obtain the mastery2  
and in this case1 the individual being  
under no temptation from strong drink in
 itself considered1 and being really    
affected with the sense of the most     
agreeable in relation to objects which  
are opposed to drunkenness1 may take    
care that strong drink shall not come   
again into circumstances to give it an  
adventitious advantage4 ,the repetition 
of occasional drunkenness would of      
course by and by produce a change in the

 sensitivity1 and establish an habitual 
liking for drink4 ,on this account1 the 
moral inability that attends fixed      
habits1 especially obtains the name of  
inability4 ,and then1 as the will may   
remotely and indirectly resist itself1  
and do it in vain1 in the case of strong
 habits2 so reason may resist present   
acts of the will1 and its resistance be 
insufficient3 and this is more commonly 
the case1 also1 when the acts arise from
 strong habit4 7ibid47  ,in every act of
 the will1 the will at the moment is    
unable to act otherwise2 it is in the   
strictest sense true1 that a man1 at the
 moment of his acting1 must act as he   
does act2 but as we usually characterize
 men by the habitual state of their     
minds1 we more especially speak of moral
 inability in relation to acts which are
 known to have no correlation to this   
habitual state4 ,this habitual state of 
the mind1 if it be opposed to reason1   
overcomes reason2 for nothing1 not even 
reason itself1 can be the strongest     

motive1 unless it produce the sense of  
the most agreeable2 and this it cannot  
do1 where the habitual disposition or   
sensitivity is opposed to it4  ,common  
usage with respect to the phrase want of
 power or inability to act in a certain 
way4  ,but it must be observed          
concerning moral inability1 in each kind
 of it1 that the word inability is used 
in a sense very diverse from its        
original import4 ,the word signifies    
only a natural inability1 in the proper 
use of it2 and is applied to such cases 
only wherein a present will or          
inclination to the thing1 with respect  
to which a person is said to be unable1 
is supposable4 ,it cannot be truly said1
 according to the ordinary use of       
language1 that a malicious man1 let him 
be never so malicious1 cannot hold his  
hand from striking1 or that he is not   
able to show his neighbour a kindness2  
or that a drunkard1 let his appetite be 
never so strong1 cannot keep the cup    
from his mouth4 ,in the strictest       

propriety of speech1 a man has a thing  
in his power if he has it in his choice 
or at his election2 and a man cannot be 
truly said to be unable to do a thing1  
when he can do it if he will4 7ibid47   
,men1 in the common use of language1 and
 in the expression of their common and  
generally received sentiments1 affirm   
that an individual has any thing in his 
power when it can be controlled by      
volition4 ,their connexion of power does
 not arise from the connexion of        
volition with its cause1 but from the   
conception of volition as itself a cause
 with its effects4 ,thus the hand of a  
malicious man when moved to strike1     
having for its antecedent a volition2   
and if withheld from striking1 having   
for its antecedent likewise a volition2 
according to the common usage of        
language1 he1 as the subject of         
volition1 has the power to strike or not
 to strike4 ,now as it is improperly    
said that he cannot perform those       
external voluntary actions which depend 

on the will1 it is in some respects more
 improperly said1 that he is unable to  
exert the acts of the will themselves2  
because it is more evidently false1 with
 respect to these1 that he cannot if he 
will2 for to say so is a downright      
contradiction2 it is to say he cannot   
will if he does will3 and1 in this case1
 not only is it true that it is easy for
 a man to do the thing if he will1 but  
the very willing is the doing4 7ibid47  
,it is improper1 according to this1 to  
say that a man cannot do a thing1 when  
nothing is wanting but an act of        
volition2 for that is within our power1 
as far as it can be within our power1   
which is within the reach of our        
volition4  ,it is still more improper to
 say that a man is unable to exert the  
acts of the will themselves1 or unable  
to produce volitions4 ,to say that a man
 has power to produce volitions1 would  
imply that he has power to will         
volitions2 but this would make one      
volition the cause of another1 which is 

absurd4 ,but1 as it is absurd to        
represent the will as the cause of its  
own volitions1 and of course to say that
 the man has ability to produce his     
volitions1 it must be absurd likewise to
 represent the man as unable1 in any    
particular case1 to produce volitions1  
for this would imply that in other cases
 he is able4 ,nay1 the very language is 
self-contradictory4 ,if a man produce   
volitions1 he must produce them by      
volitions2 and if in any case he is     
affirmed to be unable to produce        
volitions2 then this inability must     
arise from a want of connexion between  
the volition by which the required      
volition is aimed to be produced1 and   
the required volition itself4 ,so that  
to affirm that he is unable to will is  
equivalent to saying1 that he cannot    
will if he will--a proposition which    
grants the very point it assumes to     
deny4 ,the very willing is the doing1   
which is required4  ,edwards adopts what
 he calls the original and proper1      

meaning of power1 and ability1 as       
applied to human agents1 and appearing1 
in the ordinary use of language1 as the 
legitimate and true meaning4 ,in this   
use1 power1 as we have seen1 relates    
only to the connexion of volition with  
its consequents1 and not to its         
connexion with its antecedents or       
motives4 ,hence1 in reference to the    
human agent1 to ascribe a               
non-performance to the want of power or 
ability1 or to the want of motives1 7for
 this is plainly his meaning17 is not   
just1 because the thing wanting1 that   
is1 immediately wanting1 and wanting so 
far as the agent himself can be the     
subject of remark in respect of it1 is  
not a being able1 that is1 a having the 
requisite motives1 or the moral ability1
 but a being willing1 or the act of     
volition1 itself4 ,to the act of        
volition1 or the fact of 'being         
willing1' there is no facility of mind  
or capacity of nature wanting1 but only 
a disposition or state of mind adapted  

to the act2 but with this1 the          
individual can have no concern in       
reference to his action1 because he has 
all the ability which can be predicated 
of him legitimately1 when he can do the 
act1 if he will to do it4 ,it is evident
 that there may be an utter moral       
inability to do a thing--that is the    
motive may be wanting which causes the  
volition1 which is the immediate        
antecedent of the thing to be done2 but 
still if it is true that there is such a
 connexion between the volition and the 
thing to be done1 that the moment the   
volition takes place the thing is done2 
then1 according to ,edwards1 the man may
 be affirmed to be able to do it with   
the only ability that can be affirmed of
 him4  ,we can exert power only by      
exerting will1 that is by putting forth 
volitions by choosing2 of course we     
cannot exert power over those motives   
which are themselves the causes of our  
volitions4 ,we are not unable to do     
anything in the proper and original and 

legitimate use of the word when1 for the
 want of motive1 we are not the subjects
 of the volition required as the        
immediate antecedent of the thing to be 
done2 but we are unable in this use     
when1 although the volition be made2    
still1 through some impediment1 the     
thing is not done4 ,we are conscious of 
power1 or of the want of power only in  
the connexion between our actual        
volitions and their objects4  ,sec4 ,v4 
,concerning the ,notion of ,liberty1 and
 of moral ,agency4  ,what is liberty8   
,the plain and obvious meaning of the   
words freedom and liberty1 in common    
speech1 is power1 opportunity1 or       
advantage that any one has to do as he  
pleases4 ,or1 in other words1 his being 
free from hinderance1 or impediment in  
the way of doing1 or conducting in any  
way as he wills4 ,and the contrary to   
liberty1 whatever name we call it by1 is
 a person's being hindered or unable to 
conduct as he will1 or being1           
necessitated to do otherwise4 7p4 #ch47 

,again1 ,that power and opportunity for 
one to do and conduct as he will1 or    
according to his choice1 is all that is 
meant by it2 without taking into the    
meaning of the word1 anything of the    
cause of that choice1 or at all         
considering how the person came to have 
such a volition2 whether it was caused  
by some external motive1 or internal    
habitual bias2 whether it was determined
 by some internal antecedent volition1  
or whether it happened without a cause2 
whether it was necessarily connected    
with something foregoing1 or not        
connected4 ,let the person come by his  
choice any how1 yet if he is able1 and  
there is nothing in the way to hinder   
his pursuing and executing his will1 the
 man is perfectly free1 according to the
 primary and common notion of freedom4  
7p4 #ci47  ,this is ,edwards's          
definition of liberty1 and he has given 
it with a clearness1 a precision1 and1  
at the same time1 an amplification1     
which renders it impossible to mistake  

his meaning4  ,liberty has nothing to do
 with the connexion between volition and
 its cause or motive4 ,liberty relates  
solely to the connexion between the     
volition and its objects4 ,he is free in
 the only true and proper sense1 who1   
when he wills1 finds no impediment      
between the volition and the object1 who
 wills and it is done4 ,he wills to     
walk1 and his legs obey3 he wills to    
talk1 and his intellect and tongue obey1
 and frame and express sentences4 ,if   
his legs were bound1 he would not be    
free4 ,if his tongue were tied with a   
thong1 or his mouth gagged1 he would not
 be free2 or if his intellect were      
paralysed or disordered1 he would not be
 free4 ,if there should be anything     
preventing the volition from taking     
effect1 he would not be free4  ,of what 
can the attribute of ,liberty be        
affirmed8  ,from the definition thus    
given ,edwards remarks1 ,it will follow1
 that in propriety of speech1 neither   
liberty1 nor its contrary1 can properly 

be ascribed to any being or thing1 but  
that which has such a faculty1 power1 or
 property1 as is called will4 ,for that 
which is possessed of no will1 cannot   
have any power or opportunity of doing  
according to its will1 nor be           
necessitated to act contrary to its     
will1 nor be restrained from acting     
agreeable to it4 ,and therefore to talk 
of liberty1 or the contrary1 as         
belonging to the very will itself1 is   
not to speak good sense2 for the will   
itself1 is not an agent that has a will4
 ,the power of choosing itself1 has not 
a power of choosing4 ,that which has the
 power of volition is the man1 or the   
soul1 and not the power of volition     
itself4 ,and he that has the liberty1 is
 the agent who is possessed of the will2
 and not the will which he is possessed 
of4 7p4 #ch47  ,liberty is the attribute
 of the agent1 because the agent is the 
spiritual essence or being who is the   
subject of the power or capacity of     
choice1 and his liberty consists as we  

have seen in the unimpeded connexion    
between the volitions produced in him   
and the objects of those volitions4     
,hence1 free will is an objectionable   
phrase4 ,free agent is the proper       
phrase1 that is1 an agent having the    
power of choice and whose choice reaches
 effects4  ,moral ,agent4  ,a moral     
agent is a being that is capable of     
those actions that have a moral quality1
 and which can properly be denominated  
good or evil in a moral sense1 virtuous 
or vicious1 commendable or faulty4 7p4  
#ci47  ,in what lies the capability of  
actions having a moral quality8  ,to    
moral agency belongs a moral faculty1 or
 sense of moral good and evil1 or of    
such a thing as desert or worthiness1 of
 praise or blame1 reward or punishment2 
and a capacity which an agent has of    
being influenced in his actions by moral
 inducements or motives1 exhibited to   
the view of the understanding or reason1
 to engage to a conduct agreeable to    
moral faculty4 7p4 #dj47  ,a moral agent

 is a being who can perform moral       
actions1 or actions which are subject to
 praise or blame4 ,now the same action  
may be committed by a man or by a       
brute--and the man alone will be guilty3
 why is the man guilty8 ,because he has 
a moral sense or perception by which he 
distinguishes right and wrong3 the brute
 has no such sense or perception4 ,the  
man having thus the power of perceiving 
the right and wrong of actions--actions 
and their moral qualities may be so     
correlated to him as to produce the     
sense of the most agreeable or choice4  
,or1 we may say generally1 moral agency 
consists in the possession of a reason  
and conscience to distinguish right and 
wrong1 and the capacity of having the   
right and wrong so correlated to the    
mind as to form motives and produce     
volitions4 ,we might define a man of    
taste in the fine arts in a similar way2
 thus1--a man of taste is an agent who  
has the power of distinguishing beauty  
and ugliness1 and whose mind is so      

correlated to beauty that the sense of  
the most agreeable or choice is         
produced4 ,the only difference between  
the two cases is this3 that1 in the     
latter1 the sense of the most agreeable 
is always produced by the beauty        
perceived2 while in the former1 the     
right perceived does not always produce 
this sense2 on the contrary1 the sense  
of the most agreeable is often produced 
by the wrong1 in opposition to the      
decisions of reason and conscience4  ,i 
have now completed the statement of     
,edwards's system1 nearly in his own    
words1 as contained in part ,i4 of his  
work4 ,the remarks and explanations     
which have been thrown in1 ,i hope will 
serve to make him more perfectly        
understood4 ,this end will be still more
 fully attained by presenting on the    
basis of the foregoing investigation and
 statement1 a compend of his            
psychological system1 independently of  
the order there pursued1 and without    
largely introducing quotations1 which   

have already been abundantly made4      
,,compend ,,of ,,edwards',s             
,,psychological ,,system4  ,i4 ,there   
are two cardinal faculties of the mind4 
#a4 ,the intellectual--called reason or 
understanding4 #b4 ,the active and      
feeling--called will or affections4     
,,ii4 ,the relation of these to each    
other4 ,the first precedes the second in
 the order of exercise4 ,the first      
perceives and knows objects in their    
qualities1 circumstances1 and relations4
 ,the second experiences emotions and   
passions1 or desires and choices1 in    
relation to the objects perceived4      
,,iii4 ,perception is necessary4 ,when  
the understanding and its objects are   
brought together1 perception takes place
 according to the constituted laws of   
the intelligence4  ,,iv4 ,the acts of   
will or the affections are necessary4   
,when this faculty of our being and its 
objects are brought together1 volition  
or choice1 emotions1 passions1 or       
desires take place1 according to the    

constituted nature and laws of this     
faculty4  ,the objects and this faculty 
are correlates4 ,in relation to the     
object1 we may call this faculty        
subject4 ,when subject and object are   
suited to each other1 that is1 are      
agreeable1 affections are produced which
 we call pleasant2 when they are not    
suited1 that is1 are disagreeable1      
affections take place which are         
unpleasant or painful4 ,every object in 
relation to subject1 is agreeable or    
disagreeable1 and produces accordingly1 
in general1 affections pleasant or      
painful4  ,in the perfection and harmony
 of our being1 this correspondence is   
universal2 that is1 what is known to be 
agreeable is felt to be pleasant2--what 
is known to be disagreeable is felt to  
be painful4 ,but1 in the corruption of  
our being1 this is reversed in respect  
of moral objects4 ,although what is     
right is known to be agreeable1 that is1
 suited to us1 it is felt to be painful4
 ,but the wrong which is known to be    

unsuited1 is felt to be pleasant4 ,it   
must be remarked here1 that pleasant and
 agreeable1 are used by ,edwards and    
others1 as synonymous terms4 ,the       
distinction ,i have here made is at     
least convenient in describing the same 
objects as presented to the             
understanding and to the will4  ,v4 ,the
 emotions and passions1 volitions or    
choices1 are thus produced in the       
correlation of subject1 that is the     
will1 and the object4 ,in assigning the 
causes of these affections1 we may refer
 to the nature of the will1 which is    
such1 as to receive such and such       
affections when in the presence of such 
and such objects3 or1 we may refer to   
the objects1 and say their nature and   
circumstances are such as to produce    
such and such affections in the will3   
or1 we may refer to both at once1 and   
say that the affections arise from the  
state of the mind1 and from the nature  
and circumstances of the object4  ,,vi4 
,the affections of the will stand       

connected with changes or effects in    
other parts of our being1 as stated     
antecedents4 ,first1 they stand thus    
connected with muscular action1--as     
walking1 talking1 striking1 resisting1  
c4 ,secondly1 they stand thus connected 
with mental operations1--as fixing the  
attention upon any subject of thought   
and investigation1 or upon any          
imagination1 or any idea of the memory4 
,,vii4 ,the affections of the will1 when
 thus connected with effects in other   
parts of our being1 have a peculiar and 
striking characteristic4 ,it is this3   
that the effect contemplated takes place
 at the moment it appears the most      
agreeable1--the greatest apparent good2 
which1 as ,edwards uses these phrases1  
means1 that at the moment the effect    
contemplated produces the most pleasant 
affection1--the most intense sense of   
the agreeable1--it takes place4 ,thus1  
when walking seems most pleasant1 we    
walk2 when talking1 we talk2 when       
thinking on a particular subject1 then  

we think on that subject4 ,such is the  
constitution and law of our being4 ,the 
play of the different parts is          
reciprocal4 ,perception must bring up   
the objects1 and the affections of will 
immediately follow4 ,the most agreeable 
are dwelt upon by the mind1 and         
perception again takes place            
particularly with regard to these2 and  
according as objects affect the will1 do
 all the activities of our being come   
forth4  ,,viii4 ,various terms and      
phrases in common use can be easily     
explained by this system3--,choice is   
the sense or the affection of the most  
pleasant and agreeable4 ,preference is  
its synonyme1 with scarcely a shade of  
difference4 ,they both have respect to  
the act of selection4 ,volition is      
another name for this affection of will1
 and is used more particularly in       
relation to effects or changes following
 the affection4 ,desire is a nascent    
choice4 ,the strongest desire1 at a     
given moment1 is choice4 ,emotion is an 

affection1 pleasant or painful1         
according to the quality of the object1 
but not ripened into desire4 ,it is the 
first sudden affection arising from an  
object presented2 and with respect to   
certain objects1 it expresses all the   
enjoyment possible in relation to       
them1--for example1 the emotion of      
sublimity1 produced by an object which  
can hold no other relation to us4 ,but  
then the sublimity of the object may be 
the motive which causes the choice of   
gazing at it2 that is1 it connects this 
act of contemplation with the sense of  
the most agreeable4  ,passion is emotion
 accompanied by desire in reference to  
other relations with the object4 ,thus  
the emotion of beauty awakened by a     
flower may be accompanied by the desire 
of possessing it2 and if this desire    
becomes the strongest desire at the     
moment1 then the passion has the        
characteristic which makes it choice1   
and some corresponding effects take     
place in order to possess it1--as       

walking towards it1 stretching out the  
hand1 c4  ,the determination of will is 
the production or causation of choice4  
,it is used in reference to the         
immediate and particular choice1 in     
opposition to all other choices4  ,the  
will itself is the capacity of being    
affected by objects with emotion1       
passion1 and desire1--and with that form
 of passion which we call the sense of  
the most agreeable or choice1 and which 
is connected with effects or consequents
 as their stated antecedent4  ,the      
motive is the cause of choice1 and is   
complex4 ,it lies in the nature and     
susceptibilities of the will1 and in the
 nature and circumstances ,of the object
 chosen4  ,,ix4 ,the will and reason may
 be opposed2 that is1 what reason       
commands may seem disagreeable to the   
will1 and of course reason cannot be    
obeyed4 ,reason can be obeyed only when 
her commands produce the sense of the   
most agreeable4  ,x4 ,the terms         
necessity1 and freedom or liberty are   

opposed in reference to will4 ,freedom  
or liberty is the attribute of the      
man--the human soul4 ,the man is free   
when his volitions or choices are       
unimpeded1--when1 upon choosing to walk1
 he walks1 c4 ,the man is not free1 or  
is under necessity1 when his volitions  
or choices are impeded1--when1 upon     
choosing to walk1 he finds his legs     
bound or paralysed1 c4 ,then it is      
impossible for him to walk1--then he has
 no liberty to walk1--then he is under a
 necessity of remaining in one place4   
,necessity in any other use is          
metaphysical or philosophical necessity1
 and is applied out of the sphere of the
 will3 as the necessity of truth1 the   
necessity of being1--the necessary      
connexion of cause and effect4 ,hence1  
,the connexion between volitions or     
choices1 or the sense of the most       
agreeable with the motive or cause1 is  
necessary with a philosophical          
necessity4 ,the necessity of volitions  
in reference to motives is also called  

moral necessity4 ,this term moral is    
given1 not in reference to the nature of
 the connexion1 but in reference to the 
terms connected4 ,volitions belonging to
 responsible and moral beings are thus  
distinguished from those phenomena which
 we commonly call natural4  ,,xi4 ,an   
agent is that which produces effects4 ,a
 natural agent is that which produces   
effects without volition4 ,a moral agent
 is one producing effects by volitions1 
accompanied with an intellectual        
perception of the volitions and their   
effects1 as right or wrong1 and a sense 
of desert1 or of praiseworthiness1 or   
blameworthiness1 on account of the      
volitions and their effects4  ,brutes or
 irresponsible beings are agents that   
have volitions1 but have no reason to   
perceive right and wrong1 and           
consequently have no sense of desert2   
and as they cannot perceive right and   
wrong1 they cannot be made the subjects 
of moral appeals and inducements4       
,,xii4 ,moral responsibility arises     

first1 from the possession of reason2   
secondly1 from the capacity of choice2  
thirdly1 from natural ability4  ,natural
 ability exists when the effect or act  
commanded to be accomplished has an     
established connexion with volition or  
choice4 ,thus we say a man has natural  
ability to walk1 because if he chooses  
to walk1 he walks4 ,natural ability     
differs from freedom only in this3--,the
 first refers to an established         
connexion between volitions and effects4
 ,the second refers to an absence of all
 impediment1 or of all resisting forces 
from between volitions and effects4     
,hence a man is naturally unable to do  
anything when there is no established   
connexion between volition and that     
thing4 ,a man is naturally unable to    
push a mountain from its seat4 ,he has  
no liberty to move his arm when it is   
bound4  ,moral inability is metaphysical
 or philosophical inability4            
,philosophical inability in general     
refers to the impossibility of a certain

 effect for the want of a cause1 or an  
adequate cause4 ,thus there is a        
philosophical inability of transmuting  
metal2 or of restoring the decay of old 
age to the freshness and vigour of      
youth1 because we have no cause by which
 such effects can be produced4 ,there is
 a philosophical inability also1 to pry 
up a rock of a hundred tons weight with 
a pine lath1 and by the hand of a single
 man1 because we have not an adequate   
cause4 ,moral inability relates to the  
connexion between motives and volitions 
in distinction from natural ability1    
which relates to the connexion between  
volitions and actions consequent upon   
them3 but the term moral as we have     
seen1 does not characterize the nature  
of the connexion1--it only expresses the
 quality of terms connected4 ,hence     
moral inability1 as philosophical       
inability1 is the impossibility of a    
certain volition or choice for the want 
of a motive or cause1 or an adequate    
motive4 ,thus there is a moral          

philosophical inability of ,paul denying
 ,jesus ,christ1 for there is plainly no
 motive or cause to produce a volition  
to such an act4 ,there is a moral       
philosophical inability also1 of a man  
selling an estate for fifty dollars     
which is worth fifty thousand1 because  
the motive is not adequate to produce a 
volition to such an act4  ,philosophical
 necessity and inability are absolute in
 respect of us1 because beyond the      
sphere of our volition4  ,,xiii4        
,praiseworthiness or virtue1            
blameworthiness or guilt1 apply only to 
volitions4 ,this indeed is not formally 
brought out in the part of ,edwards's   
work we have been examining4 ,his       
discussion of it will be found in part  
,,iv4 sec4 ,i4 ,but as it is necessary  
to a complete view of his system1 we    
introduce it here4  ,he remarks in this 
part1 ,if the essence of virtuousness or
 commendableness1 and of viciousness or 
fault1 does not lie in the nature of the
 disposition or acts of the mind1 which 

are said to be our virtue or our fault1 
but in their cause1 then it is certain  
it lies no where at all4 ,thus1 for     
instance1 if the vice of a vicious act  
of will lies not in the nature of the   
act1 but in the cause1 so that its being
 of a bad nature will not make it at all
 our fault1 unless it arises from some  
faulty determination of ours as its     
cause1 or something in us that is our   
fault1 c4 7page #aij47 ,disposition of  
mind1 or inclination1 --acts of the     
mind1 acts of will1 here obviously mean 
the same thing2 that is1 they mean      
volition or choice1 and are             
distinguished from their cause or       
motive4 ,the question is not whether the
 cause or motive be pure or impure1 but 
whether our virtuousness or viciousness 
lie in the cause of our volition1 or in 
the volition itself4 ,it plainly results
 from ,edwards's psychology1 and he has 
himself in the above quotation stated   
it1 that virtuousness or viciousness lie
 in the volition itself4 ,the           

characteristic of our personality or    
agency is volition4 ,it is in and by our
 volitions that we are conscious of     
doing or forbearing to do1 and therefore
 it is in respect of our volitions that 
we receive praise for well-doing1 or    
blame for evil-doing4 ,if these         
volitions are in accordance with        
conscience and the law of ,god1 they are
 right2 if not1 they are wrong1 and we  
are judged accordingly4 ,the            
metaphysical questions1 how the volition
 was produced1 and what is the character
 of the cause1 is the cause praiseworthy
 or blameworthy1 are questions which    
transcend the sphere of our volitions1  
our actions1 our personality1 our       
responsibility4 ,we are concerned only  
with this3--,do we do right8 do we do   
wrong8 ,what is the nature of our       
volitions8  ,nor does the necessary     
connexion between the motives and the   
volitions1 destroy the blameworthiness  
and the praiseworthiness of the         
volitions4 ,we are blameworthy or       

praiseworthy according to the character 
of the volitions in themselves1         
considered and judged according to the  
rule of right1 without considering how  
these volitions came to exist4 ,the last
 inquiry is altogether of a             
philosophical or metaphysical kind1 and 
not of a moral kind1 or that kind which 
relates to moral agency1 responsibility1
 and duty4  ,and so also we are         
blameworthy or praiseworthy for doing or
 not doing external actions1 so far only
 as these actions are naturally         
connected with volitions1 as sequents   
with their stated antecedents4 ,if the  
action is one which ought to be done1 we
 are responsible for the doing of it1 if
 we know that upon our willing it1 it   
will be done2 although at this very     
moment there is no such correlation     
between the action and the will1 as to  
form the motive or cause upon which the 
existence of the act of willing depends4
 ,if the action is one which ought not  
to be done1 we are guilty for doing it1 

when we know that if we were not to will
 it1 it would not be done2 although at  
this very moment there is such a        
correlation between the action1 and the 
state of the will1 as to form the cause 
or motive by which the act of willing   
comes necessarily to exist4 ,the        
metaphysical or philosophical inquiry   
respecting the correlation of the state 
of the will and any action1 or          
respecting the want of such a           
correlation1 is foreign to the question 
of duty and responsibility4 ,this       
question relates only to the volition   
and its connexion with its consequents4 
,this does not clash at all with the    
common sentiment that our actions are to
 be judged of by our motives2 for this  
sentiment does not respect volitions in 
relation to their cause1 but external   
actions in relation to the volitions    
which produce them4 ,these external     
actions may be in themselves good1 but  
they may not be what was willed2 some   
other force or power may have come in   

between the volition and its object1 and
 changed the circumstances of the       
object1 so as to bring about an event   
different from the will or intention2   
although being in connexion with the    
agent1 it may still be attributed to his
 will3 or the immediate act which       
appears good1 may1 in the mind of the   
agent be merely part of an extended plan
 or chain of volitions1 whose last      
action or result is evil4 ,it is common1
 therefore1 to say of an external       
action1 we must know what the man       
intends1 before we pronounce upon him2  
which is the same thing as to say we    
must know what his volition really is1  
or what his motive is--that is1 not the 
cause which produces his volition1 but  
the volition which is aiming at effects1
 and is the motive and cause of these   
effects2--which again1 is the same thing
 as to say1 that before we can pronounce
 upon his conduct1 we must know what    
effects he really intends or wills1 or  
desires1 that is1 what it is which is   

really connected in his mind with the   
sense of the most agreeable4  ,edwards  
and ,locke4  ,their systems are one3    
there is no difference in the principle4
 ,edwards represents the will as        
necessarily determined so does ,locke4  
,edwards places liberty in the unimpeded
 connexion of volition with its stated  
sequents--so does ,locke4  ,they differ 
only in the mode of developing the      
necessary determination of will4        
,according to ,locke1 desire is in      
itself a necessary modification of our  
being produced in its correlation with  
objects2 and volition is a necessary    
consequent of desire when excited at any
 given moment to a degree which gives   
the most intense sense of uneasiness at 
that moment4 ,the greatest present      
uneasiness is the spur of action that is
 constantly felt1 and for the most part1
 determines the will in its choice of   
the next action4 7book #b4 ch4 #ba1     
,sec4 #dj47 ,according to ,edwards1     
desire is not distinguishable from will 

as a faculty1 and the strongest desire1 
at any moment1 is the volition of that  
moment4  ,edwards's analysis is more    
nice than ,locke's1 and his whole       
developement more true to the great     
principle of the system--necessary      
determination4 ,locke1 in distinguishing
 the will from the desire1 seems about  
to launch into a different psychology1  
and one destructive of the principle4   
,,ii4  ,,the ,,legitimate ,,consequences
 ,,of ,,edwards',s ,,system4  ,these    
consequences must1 ,i am aware1 be      
deduced with the greatest care and      
clearness4 ,the deduction must be       
influenced by no passion or prejudice4  
,it must be purely and severely         
logical--and such ,i shall endeavour to 
make it4 ,i shall begin with a deduction
 which ,edwards has himself made4  ,i4  
,there is no self-determining power of  
will1 and of course no liberty          
consisting in a self-determining power4 
,a self-determining power of will is a  
supposed power1 which will has to       

determine its own volitions4  ,will is  
the faculty of choice1 or the capacity  
of desire1 emotion1 or passion4         
,volition is the strongest desire1 or   
the sense of the most agreeable at any  
given moment4  ,volition arises from the
 state of the mind1 or of the will1 or  
sensitivity itself1 in correlation with 
the nature and circumstances of the     
object4  ,now1 if the will determined   
itself1 it would determine its own      
state1 in relation to objects4 ,but to  
determine is to act1 and therefore1 for 
the will to determine is for the will to
 act2 and for the will to determine     
itself1 is for the will to determine    
itself by an act4 ,but an act of the    
will is a volition2 therefore for the   
will to determine itself is to create a 
volition by a volition4 ,but then we    
have to account for this antecedent     
volition1 and it can be accounted for   
only in the same way4 ,we shall then    
have an infinite1 or more properly1 an  
indefinite series of volitions1 without 

any first volition2 consequently we     
shall have no self-determiner after all1
 because we can arrive at no first      
determiner1 and thus the idea of        
self-determination becomes              
self-destructive4 ,again1 we shall have 
effects without a cause1 for the series 
in the nature of the case never ends in 
a first1 which is a cause per se4       
,volitions are thus contingent1 using   
this word as a synonyme of chance1 the  
negative of cause4  ,now that this is a 
legitimate deduction1 no one can        
question4 ,if ,edwards's psychology be  
right1 and if self-determination implies
 a will to will1 or choosing a choice1  
then a self-determining power is the    
greatest absurdity possible4  ,,ii4 ,it 
is clearly deducible from this also1    
that ,god can exercise a perfect control
 over his intelligent creatures1 or     
administer perfectly a moral government 
consisting in the influence of motives4 
,to any given state of mind1 he can     
adapt motives in reference to required  

determinations4 ,and when an individual 
is removed from the motives adapted to  
his state of mind1 the ,almighty        
,providence can so order events as to   
bring him into contiguity with the      
motives4  ,if the state of mind should  
be such that no motives can be made     
available in reference to a particular  
determination1 it is dearly supposable  
that he who made the soul of man1 may   
exert a direct influence over this state
 of mind1 and cause it to answer to the 
motives presented4 ,whether there are   
motives adapted to every state of mind1 
in reference to every possible          
determination required by the ,almighty 
,lawgiver1 so as to render it           
unnecessary to exert a direct influence 
over the will1 is a question which ,i am
 not called upon here to answer4 ,but in
 either case1 the divine sovereignty1   
perfect and absolute1 fore-determining  
and bringing to pass every event in the 
moral as well as the physical world2 and
 the election of a certain number to    

eternal life1 and the making of this    
election sure1 are necessary and plain  
consequences of this system4 ,and as    
,god is a being all-wise and good1 we   
may feel assured in connexion with this 
system1 that1 in the working out of his 
great plan1 whatever evil may appear in 
the progress of its developement1 the   
grand consummation will show that all   
things have been working together for   
good4  ,,iii4 ,it is plainly deducible  
from this system that moral beings exert
 an influence over each other by the    
presentation of motives4 ,and thus      
efforts may be made either to the injury
 or benefit of society4  ,,iv4 ,if1 as  
,edwards contends1 the sense of         
responsibility1 the consciousness of    
guilt or of rectitude1 and consequently 
the expectation of punishment or reward1
 connect themselves simply with the     
nature of the mere fact of              
volition4--that is1 if this is a true   
and complete representation of          
consciousness in relation to this       

subject1 then upon the mere fact of     
volition considered only in its own     
nature1 and wholly independently of its 
causes1 can the processes of justice go 
forth4  ,thus we may view the system in 
relation both to ,god and to man4  ,in  
relation to ,god4 ,it makes him supreme 
and absolute--foreseeing and            
fore-determining1 and bringing          
everything to pass according to infinite
 wisdom1 and by the energy of an        
infinite will4  ,in relation to man4 ,it
 shuts him up to the consideration of   
the simple fact of volition1 and its    
connexion as a stated or established    
antecedent with certain effects4 ,he is 
free to accomplish these effects1       
because he can accomplish them if he    
will4 ,he is free to forbear1 because he
 can forbear if he will4 ,it is affirmed
 to be the common judgement of men1 and 
of course universally a fact of         
consciousness1 that an individual is    
fully responsible for the doing of      
anything which ought to be done1 if     

nothing is wanting to the doing of it   
but a volition3 that he is guilty and   
punishable for doing anything wrong1    
because it was done by his volition3    
that he is praiseworthy and to be       
rewarded for doing anything right1      
because it was done by his volition4 ,in
 vain does he attempt to excuse himself 
from right-doing on the plea of moral   
inability2 this is metaphysical         
inability1 and transcends the sphere of 
volition4 ,he can do it if he will--and 
therefore he has all the ability        
required in the case4 ,nothing is       
immediately wanting but a willingness1  
and all his responsibility relates to   
this2 he can do nothing1 can influence  
nothing1 except by will2 and therefore  
that which goes before will is foreign  
to his consideration1 and impossible to 
his effort4  ,in vain does he attempt to
 excuse himself for wrong-doing on the  
ground of moral necessity4 ,this moral  
necessity is metaphysical necessity1 and
 transcends the sphere of volition4 ,he 

could have forborne to do wrong1 if he  
had had the will4 ,whatever else may    
have been wanting1 there was not wanting
 to a successful resistance of evil1    
anything with which the agent has any   
concern1 and for which he is under any  
responsibility1 but the volition4 ,by   
his volitions simply is he to be tried4 
,no court of justice1 human or divine1  
that we can conceive of1 could admit the
 plea--,i did not the good because ,i   
had not the will to do it1 or ,i did the
 evil because ,i had the will to do it4 
,this is your guilt1 would be the reply 
of the judge1 that you had no will to do
 the good--that you had a will to do the
 evil4  ,we must now take up a different
 class of deductions4 ,they are such as 
those abettors of this system who wish  
to sustain the great interests of       
morality and religion do not make1 but  
strenuously contend against4 ,if however
 they are logical deductions1 it is in  
vain to contend against them4 ,i am     
conscious of no wish to force them upon 

the system1 and do most firmly believe  
that they are logical4 ,let the reader  
judge for himself1 but let him judge    
thoughtfully and candidly4  ,i4 ,the    
system of ,edwards leads to an absolute 
and unconditional necessity1 particular 
and general4  #a4 ,a particular         
necessity--a necessity absolute in      
relation to the individual4  ,it is     
granted in the system1 that the         
connexion of motive and volition is     
necessary with an absolute necessity1   
because this precedes and therefore is  
not within the reach of the volition4   
,so also1 the state of mind1 and the    
nature and circumstances of the object  
in relation to this state1 forming a    
correlation1 in which lies the motive1  
is dependent upon a cause1 beyond the   
reach of volition4 ,as the volition     
cannot make its motive1 so neither can  
the volition make the cause of its      
motive1 and so on in the retrogression  
of causes1 back to the first cause4     
,hence1 all the train of causes         

preceding the volition are related by an
 absolute necessity2 and the volition   
itself1 as the effect of motive1 being  
necessary also with an absolute         
necessity1 the only place for freedom   
that remains1 if freedom be possible1 is
 the connexion of volition and effects1 
internal and external4 ,and this is the 
only place of freedom which this system 
claims4 ,but what new characteristic    
appears in this relation8 ,have we here 
anything beyond stated antecedents and  
sequents8 ,i will to walk1 and ,i walk2 
,i will to talk1 and ,i talk2 ,i will to
 sit down1 and ,i sit down4 ,the        
volition is an established antecedent to
 these muscular movements4 ,so also1    
when ,i will to think on a certain      
subject1 ,i think on that subject4 ,the 
volition of selecting a subject1 and the
 volition of attending to it1 are stated
 antecedents to that mental operation   
which we call thought4 ,we have here    
only another instance of cause and      
effect2 the relation being one as       

absolute and necessary as any other     
relation of cause and effect4 ,the      
curious organism by which a choice or a 
sense of the most agreeable produces    
muscular movement1 has not been arranged
 by any choice of the individual man4   
,the connexion is pre-established for   
him1 and has its cause beyond the sphere
 of volition4 ,the constitution of mind 
which connects volition with thinking is
 also pre-established1 and beyond the   
sphere of volition4 ,as the volition    
itself appears by an absolute necessity 
in relation to the individual man1 so   
also do the stated sequents or effects  
of volition appear by an absolute       
necessity in relation to him4  ,it is   
true1 indeed1 that the connexion between
 volition and its objects may be        
interrupted by forces coming between1 or
 overcome by superior forces1 but this  
is common to cause and effect1 and forms
 no peculiar characteristic2 it is a    
lesser force necessarily interrupted or 
overcome by a greater4 ,besides1 the    

interruption or the overcoming of a     
force does not prove its freedom when it
 is unimpeded2 its movement may still be
 necessitated by an antecedent force4   
,and this is precisely the truth in     
respect of volition1 according to this  
system4 ,the volition could have no     
being without a motive1 and when the    
motive is present it must have a being1 
and no sooner does it appear than its   
effects follow1 unless impeded4 ,if     
impeded1 then we have two trains of     
causes coming into collision1 and the   
same necessity which brought them       
together1 gives the ascendency to the   
one or the other4  ,it seems to me      
impossible to resist the conclusion1    
that necessity1 absolute and            
unconditional1 as far at least as the   
man himself is concerned1 reigns in the 
relation of volition and its effect1 if 
the volition itself be a necessary      
existence4 ,all that precedes volition  
is necessary2 volition itself is        
necessary4 ,all that follows volition is

 necessary3 ,humanity is but a link of  
the inevitable chain4  #b4 ,general     
necessity--a necessity absolute1 in     
relation to all being and causality1 and
 applicable to all events4  ,an event   
proved to be necessary in relation to an
 individual--is this event likewise     
necessary in the whole train of its     
relations8 ,let this event be a volition
 of a given individual2 it is necessary 
in relation to that individual4 ,now it 
must be supposed to have a connexion by 
a chain of sequents and antecedents with
 a first cause4 ,let us now take any    
particular antecedent and sequent in the
 chain1 and that antecedent and sequent1
 in its particular place and relations1 
can be proved necessary in the same way 
that the volition is proved necessary in
 its particular place and relations2    
that is1 the antecedent being given     
under the particular circumstances1 the 
sequent must follow4 ,but the antecedent
 is linked by like necessity to another 
antecedent1 of which it is the sequent2 

and the sequent is linked by like       
necessity to another sequent1 of which  
it is the antecedent2 and thus the whole
 chain1 from the given necessary        
volition up to the first cause1 is      
necessary4 ,we come therefore at last to
 consider the connexion between the     
first sequent and the first antecedent1 
or the first cause4 ,is this a necessary
 connexion8 ,if that first antecedent be
 regarded as a volition1 then the       
connexion must be necessary4 ,if ,god   
will the first sequent1 then it was     
absolutely necessary that that sequent  
should appear4 ,but the volition itself 
cannot really be the first antecedent or
 cause1 because volition or choice1 from
 its very nature1 must itself have a    
determiner or antecedent4 ,what is this 
antecedent8 ,the motive3--for           
self-determination1 in the sense of the 
will determining itself1 would involve  
the same absurdities on this system in  
relation to ,god as in relation to man2 
since it is represented as an absurdity 

in its own nature--it is determining a  
volition by a volition1 in endless      
retrogression4 ,as the motive therefore 
determines the divine volition1 what is 
the nature of the connexion between the 
motive and the volition8 ,it cannot but 
be a necessary connexion2 for there is  
nothing to render it otherwise1 save the
 divine will4 ,but the divine will      
cannot be supposed to do this1 for the  
motive is already taken to be the ground
 and cause of the action of the divine  
will4 ,the necessity which applies to   
volition1 in the nature of the case must
 therefore apply to the divine volition4
 ,no motives1 indeed1 can be supposed to
 influence the divine will1 except those
 drawn from his infinite intelligence1  
wisdom1 and goodness2 but then the      
connexion between these motives and the 
divine volitions is a connexion of      
absolute necessity4 ,this ,edwards      
expressly affirms--,if ,god's will is   
steadily and surely determined in       
everything by supreme wisdom1 then it is

 in everything necessarily determined to
 that which is most wise4 7p4 #bcj47    
,that the universe is governed by       
infinite wisdom1 is a glorious and      
satisfactory thought1 and is abundantly 
contended for by this system2 but still 
it is a government of necessity4 ,this  
may be regarded as the most excellent   
government1 and if it be so regarded it 
may fairly be contended for4 ,let us    
not1 however1 wander from the question1 
and in representing it as the government
 of wisdom1 forget that it is a         
government of necessity1 and that       
absolute4 ,the volition1 therefore1 with
 which we started1 is at last traced up 
to a necessary and infinite wisdom as   
its first and final cause2 for here the 
efficient cause and the motive are      
indeed one4  ,what we have thus proved  
in relation to one volition1 must be    
equally true in reference to every other
 volition and every other event1 for the
 reasoning must apply to every possible 
case4 ,every volition1 every event1 must

 be traced up to a first and final      
cause1 and this must be necessary and   
infinite wisdom4  ,,ii4 ,it follows1    
therefore1 from this system1 that every 
volition or event is both necessary1 and
 necessarily the best possible in its   
place and relations4  ,the whole system 
of things had its origin in infinite and
 necessary wisdom4 ,all volitions and   
events have their last and efficient    
cause in infinite and necessary wisdom4 
,all that has been1 all that is1 all    
that can be1 are connected by an        
absolute necessity with the same great  
source4 ,it would be the height of      
absurdity to suppose it possible for any
 thing to be different from what it is1 
or to suppose that any change could make
 any thing better than it is2 for all   
that is1 is by absolute necessity1--and 
all that is1 is just what and where     
infinite wisdom has made it1 and        
disposed of it4  ,,iii4 ,if that which  
we call evil1 in reality be evil1 then  
it must be both necessary evil and evil 

having its origin in infinite wisdom4   
,it is in vain to say that man is the   
agent1 in the common acceptation of the 
word2 that he is the author1 because the
 particular volitions are his4 ,these   
volitions are absolutely necessary1 and 
are necessarily carried back to the one 
great source of all being and events4   
,hence1  ,,iv4 ,the creature man cannot 
be blameable4 ,every volition which     
appears in him1 appears by an absolute  
necessity1--and it cannot be supposed to
 be otherwise than it is4 ,now the      
ground of blameworthiness is not only   
the perception of the difference between
 right and wrong1 and the conviction    
that the right ought to be done1 but the
 possession of a power to do the right  
and refrain from the wrong4 ,but if     
every volition is fixed by an absolute  
necessity1 then neither can the         
individual be supposed to have power to 
do otherwise than he actually does1 nor1
 all things considered1 can it be       
supposed there could have been1 at that 

precise moment and in that precise      
relation1 any other volition4 ,the      
volition is fixed1 and fixed by an      
infinite and necessary wisdom4 ,we      
cannot escape from this difficulty by   
perpetually running the changes of--,he 
can if he will1--,he could if he        
would1--,there is nothing wanting but a 
will1--,he has a natural ability1 c4 c4 
,let us not deceive ourselves1 and      
endeavour to stop thought and           
conclusions by these words1 he can if he
 will6 but he cannot if he don't will4  
,the will is wanting1--and while it is  
wanting1 the required effect cannot     
appear4 ,and how is that new volition or
 antecedent to be obtained8 ,the man    
cannot change one volition for another4 
,by supposition1 he has not the moral or
 metaphysical ability1--and yet this is 
the only ability that can produce the   
new volition4 ,it is passing strange    
that the power upon which volition is   
absolutely dependent1 should be set     
aside by calling it metaphysical1--and  

the man blamed for an act because the   
consequent of his volition1 when the    
volition itself is the necessary        
consequent of this power6 ,the man is   
only in his volition4 ,the volition is  
good or bad in itself4 ,the cause of    
volition is none of his concern1 because
 it transcends volition4 ,he can if he  
will4 ,that is enough for him6 ,but it  
is not enough to make him blameable1    
when whether he will or not depends not 
only upon an antecedent out of his      
reach1 but the antecedent itself is     
fixed by a necessity in the divine      
nature itself4  ,i am not now disputing 
the philosophy4 ,the philosophy may be  
true2 it may be very good3 but then we  
must take its consequences along with   
it2 and this is all that ,i now insist  
upon4  ,v4 ,it is another consequence of
 this system1 that there can be nothing 
evil in itself4 ,if infinite wisdom and 
goodness are the highest form of moral  
perfection1 as indeed their very names  
imply1 then all the necessary           

consequences of these must partake of   
their nature4 ,infinite wisdom and      
goodness1 as principles1 can only       
envelope parts of themselves4 ,it would 
be the destruction of all logic to deny 
this4 ,it would annihilate every        
conclusion that has ever been drawn4 ,if
 it be said that infinite wisdom has    
promulged a law which defines clearly   
what is essentially right1 and that it  
is a fact that volitions do transgress  
this law1 still this cannot affect what 
is said above4 ,the promulgation of the 
law was a necessary developement of     
infinite wisdom2 and the volition which 
transgresses it is a developement of the
 same nature4 ,if this seems            
contradictory1 ,i cannot help it4 ,it is
 drawn from the system1 and the system  
alone is responsible for its            
conclusions4  ,if it should be replied  
here1 that every system must be subject 
to the same difficulty1 because if evil 
had a beginning1 it must have had a holy
 cause1 inasmuch as it could not exist  

before it began to exist1--,i answer1   
this would be true if evil is the       
necessary developement of a holy cause4 
,but more of this hereafter4  ,,vi4 ,the
 system of ,edwards is a system of      
utilitarianism4 ,every volition being   
the sense of the most agreeable1 and    
arising from the correlation of the     
object and the sensitivity2 it follows  
that every motive and every action comes
 under1 and cannot but come under1 the  
one idea of gratification or enjoyment4 
,according to this system1 there can be 
no collision between principle and      
passion1 because principle can have no  
power to determine the will1 except as  
it becomes the most agreeable4          
,universally1 justice1 truth1 and       
benevolence1 obtain sway only by uniting
 with desire1 and thus coming under     
conditions of yielding the highest      
enjoyment4 ,justice1 truth1 and         
benevolence1 when obeyed1 therefore1 are
 not obeyed as such1 but simply as the  
most agreeable2 and so also injustice1  

falsehood1 and malignity1 are not obeyed
 as such1 but simply as the most        
agreeable4 ,in this quality of the most 
agreeable1 as the quality of all motive 
and the universal principle of the      
determinations of the will1 intrinsic   
moral distinctions fade away4 ,we may   
indeed speculate respecting these       
distinctions1--we may say that justice  
evidently is right in itself1 and       
injustice wrong in itself2 but this     
judgement has practical efficiency only 
as one of the terms takes the form of   
the most agreeable4 ,but we have seen   
that the most agreeable depends upon the
 state of the sensitivity in correlation
 with the object1--a state and a        
correlation antecedent to action2 and   
that therefore it is a necessary law of 
our being1 to be determined by the      
greatest apparent good or the most      
agreeable4 ,utility1 therefore1 is not  
only in point of fact1 but also in point
 of necessity1 the law of action4 ,there
 is no other law under which it is      

conceivable that we can act4  ,,vii4 ,it
 follows from this system1 again1 that  
no individual can make an effort to     
change the habitual character of his    
volitions1--and of course cannot resist 
his passions1 or introduce any          
intellectual or moral discipline other  
than that in which he is actually       
placed1 or undertake any enterprise that
 shall be opposite to the one in which  
he is engaged1 or not part or consequent
 of the same4  ,if he effect any change 
directly in the habitual character of   
his volitions1 he must do it by a       
volition2 that is1 he must will         
different from his actual will1--his    
will must oppose itself in its own act3 
but this is absurd1 the system itself   
being judge4 ,as1 therefore1 the will   
cannot oppose itself1 a new volition can
 be obtained only by presenting a new   
motive2 but this is equally impossible4 
,to present a new motive is to call up  
new objects and circumstances in        
relation to the actual state of the     

mind1 touching upon some principles     
which had been slumbering under the     
habitual volitions2 or the state of the 
mind itself must be changed in relation 
to the objects now before it2 or a      
change must take place both of subject  
and object1 for the motive lies in the  
correlation of the two4 ,but the        
volition to call up new objects and     
circumstances in relation to some       
principle of the mind that had been     
slumbering1--for example1 fear1 must    
itself have a motive2 but the motive to 
call up objects of fear must preexist2  
if it exist at all4 ,if it preexist1    
then of necessity the volition to call  
up objects of fear will take place2 and1
 it will not be a change effected by the
 man himself1 out of the actually       
existing state of mind and objects4 ,if 
there be no such motive pre-existing1   
then it would become necessary to       
present a new motive1 to cause the      
choice of objects of fear2 and here     
would be a recurrence of the original   

difficulty1--and so on1 ad infinitum4   
,if the problem be to effect a change in
 the state of the mind in relation to   
existing objects1 in the first place1   
this cannot be effected by a direct act 
of will1 for the act of will is caused  
by the state of mind1 and this would be 
an effect changing or annihilating its  
cause4  ,nor can it be done indirectly4 
,for to do it indirectly1 would be to   
bring influences to bear upon the state 
of mind or the sensitivity2 but the     
choice and volition of these influences 
would require a motive--but the motive  
to change the state of mind must        
pre-exist in the state of mind itself4  
,and thus we have on the one hand1 to   
show the possibility of finding a       
principle in the state of mind on which 
to bring about its change4 ,and then if 
this be shown1 the change is not really 
a change1 but a new developement of the 
long chain of the necessary causes and  
volitions4 ,and on the other1 if this be
 not shown1 we must find a motive to    

change the state of mind in order to a  
change of the state3 but this motive1 if
 it exist1 must pre-exist in the state  
of mind4 ,if it pre-exist1 then no      
change is required2 if it do not2 then  
we must seek still an antecedent motive1
 and so in endless retrogression4 ,if   
the problem be to change both subject   
and object1 the same difficulties exist 
in two-fold abundance4  ,the grand      
difficulty is to find a primum mobile1  
or first mover1 when the very act of    
seeking implies a primum mobile1 which  
the conditions of the act deny4  ,any   
new discipline1 therefore1 intellectual 
or moral1 a discipline opposite to that 
which the present state of the mind     
would naturally and necessarily bring   
about1 is impossible4  ,of course1 it is
 impossible to restrain passion1 to deny
 or mortify one's self4 ,the present    
volition is as the strongest present    
desire--indeed1 is the strongest present
 desire itself4 ,will and desire do not 
run counter at all4 ,a man never in any 

instance1 wills anything contrary to his
 desires1 or desires anything contrary  
to his will4 7p4 #ag47 ,hence to        
restrain a present passion would be to  
will against will--would be to desire   
opposite ways at the same moment4       
,desires may be relatively stronger and 
weaker1 and the stronger will overcome  
the weaker2 but the strongest desire    
must prevail and govern the man2 it is  
utterly impossible for him to oppose any
 resistance1 for his whole power1       
activity1 and volition1 are in the      
desire itself4  ,he can do nothing but  
will2 and the nature and direction of   
his volitions are1 at least in reference
 to any effort of his own1 immutable as 
necessity itself4  ,,viii4 ,all         
exhortations and persuasions which call 
upon the man to bestir himself1 to      
think1 to plan1 to act1 are inconsistent
 and absurd4 ,in all such exhortations  
and persuasions1 the man is urged to    
will or put forth volitions1 as if he   
were the author1 the determiner of the  

volitions4 ,it may be replied1 'that the
 man does will1 that the volitions are  
his volitions4' ,but then he wills only 
passively1 and these volitions are his  
only because they appear in his         
consciousness4 ,you exhort and persuade 
him to arouse himself into activity2 but
 what is his real condition according to
 this system8 ,the exhortations and     
persuasions do themselves contain the   
motive power3 and instead of arousing   
himself to action1 he is absolutely and 
necessarily passive under the motives   
you present4 ,whether he be moved or    
not1 as truly and absolutely depends    
upon the motives you present1 as the    
removing of any material mass depends   
upon the power and lever applied4 ,and  
the material mass1 whether it be wood or
 stone1 may with as much propriety be   
said to arouse itself as the man2 and   
the man's volition is his volition in no
 other sense than the motion of the     
material mass is its motion4 ,in the one
 case1 the man perceives2 and in the    

other case1 the material mass does not  
perceive--but perception is granted by  
all parties to be necessary2 the        
addition of perception1 therefore1 only 
modifies the character of the being     
moved1 without altering the nature of   
his relation to the power which moves   
him4 ,in the material mass1 too1 we have
 an analogous property1 so far as motion
 is considered4 ,for as motive cannot   
determine the will unless there be      
perception1 so neither can the lever and
 power move the mass unless it possess  
resistance1 and cohesion of parts4 ,if  
,i have but the wisdom to discover the  
proper correlation of object and        
sensitivity in the case of individuals  
or of masses of men1 ,i can command them
 in any direction ,i please1 with a     
necessity no less absolute than that    
with which a machine is caused to work  
by the application of a steam or        
water-power4  ,when ,i bring motives    
before the minds of my fellow-beings in 
the proper relation1 the volition is    

necessarily produced2 but let me not    
forget1 that in bringing these motives  
,i put forth volitions1 and that of     
course ,i am myself moved under the     
necessity of some antecedent motive4 ,my
 persuasions and exhortations are       
necessary sequents1 as well as necessary
 antecedents4 ,the water must run       
through the water-course2 the wheel must
 turn under the force of the current2 ,i
 must exhort and persuade when motives  
determine me4 ,the minds ,i address must
 yield when the motives are properly    
selected4  ,,ix4 ,divine commands1      
warnings1 and rebukes1 when obeyed and  
yielded to1 are obeyed and yielded to by
 the necessary force which they possess 
in relation to the state of mind to     
which they are addressed4 ,when not     
obeyed and yielded to1 they fail        
necessarily1 through a moral inability  
on the part of the mind addressed2 or1  
in other words1 through the want of a   
proper correlation between them and the 
state of mind addressed3 that is1 there 

is not in the case a sufficient power to
 produce the required volitions1 and    
their existence of course is an utter   
impossibility4  ,divine commands1       
warnings1 and rebukes1 produce volitions
 of obedience and submission1 only as   
they produce the sense of the most      
agreeable2 and as the will of the       
creature can have no part in producing  
this sense1 since this would be         
producing a volition by a volition1 it  
is produced in a correlation antecedent 
to will1 and of course by a positive    
necessity4 ,this is so clear from all   
that has gone before2 that no           
enlargement here is required4  ,when no 
obedience and submission take place1 it 
is because the divine commands1         
warnings1 and rebukes1 do not produce   
the sense of the most agreeable4 ,and as
 the will of the creature can have no   
part in producing this sense1 since this
 would be producing a volition by a     
volition2 and as it is produced in a    
correlation antecedent to will1 and of  

course by a positive necessity2 so      
likewise the will of the creature can   
have no part in preventing this sense   
from taking place4 ,the volition of     
obedience and the volition of           
disobedience are manifestations of the  
antecedent correlations of certain      
objects with the subject1 and are       
necessarily determined by the nature of 
the correlation4  ,now the ,divine      
,being must know the precise relation   
which his commands will necessarily hold
 to the vast variety of mind to which   
they are addressed1 and consequently    
must know in what cases obedience will  
be produced1 and in what cases          
disobedience4 ,both results are equally 
necessary4 ,the commands have therefore1
 necessarily and fitly1 a two-fold      
office4 ,when they come into connexion  
with certain states of mind1 they       
necessarily and fitly produce what we   
call obedience3 when in connexion with  
other states of mind1 they necessarily  
and fitly produce what we call          

rebellion3 and as all volitions are     
predetermined and fixed by a necessary  
and infinite wisdom1 and are therefore  
in their time and place the best1 it    
must follow that rebellion no less than 
obedience is a wise and desirable       
result4  ,the consequences ,i am here   
deducing seem almost too shocking to    
utter4 ,but show me1 he that can1 that  
they are not logical deductions from    
this system8 ,i press the system to its 
consequences1--not to throw any reproach
 upon those great and good men who      
unfortunately were led away by a false  
philosophy1 but to expose and bring to  
its close this philosophy itself4 ,it   
has too long been consecrated by its    
association with the good4 ,i know ,i   
shall be justified in the honest1 though
 bold work1 of destroying this unnatural
 and portentous alliance4  ,x4 ,the     
sense of guilt and shame and the fear of
 retribution cannot1 according to this  
system1 have a real and necessary       
connexion with any volitions1 but must  

be regarded as prejudices or errors of  
education1 from which philosophy will   
serve to relieve us4  ,edwards labours  
to prove1 7part iv4 sec4 #a17 that      
virtue and vice lie essentially in the  
volitions themselves1 and that of course
 the consciousness of evil volitions is 
the consciousness of guilt4 ,i will1 or 
put forth volitions4 ,the volitions are 
mine1 and therefore ,i am guilty4 ,this 
reasoning is plausible1 but not         
consequential2 for1 according to this   
system1 ,i put forth volitions in entire
 passivity3 the volitions appear        
necessarily and by ,antecedent motives  
in my consciousness1 and really are mine
 only because they are produced in me4  
,connected with this may be the         
perception that those volitions are     
wrong2 but if there is likewise the     
conviction that they are necessary1 and 
that to suppose them different from what
 they are1 is to suppose what could not 
possibly have been1--since a series of  
sequents and antecedents connect these  

volitions which now appear1 by          
absolutely necessary relations1 with a  
first and necessary cause1--then the    
sense of guilt and shame1 and the       
judgement ,i ought to be punished1 can  
have no place in the human mind4 ,it is 
of no avail to tell me that ,i will1    
and1 according to the common judgement  
of mankind1 ,i must be guilty when ,i   
will wrong1--if1 at the same time1      
philosophy teaches me that ,i will under
 the necessary and inevitable governance
 of an antecedent motive4 ,the common   
judgement of mankind is an error1 and   
philosophy must soon dissipate the sense
 of guilt and shame1 and of moral       
desert1 which have hitherto annoyed me  
and made me fearful3 and much more must 
such a result ensue1 when ,i take into  
consideration1 likewise1 that the       
necessity which determines me1 is a     
necessity which takes its rise in       
infinite and necessary wisdom4  ,what is
 true of guilt and retribution is true  
also of well-doing and reward4 ,if ,i do

 well1 the volitions being determined by
 an antecedent necessity1 ,i could not  
possibly have done otherwise4 ,it does  
not answer the conditions of the case at
 all1 to say ,i might have done         
otherwise1 if ,i had willed to do       
otherwise2 because the will to do as ,i 
actually am doing1 is a will that could 
not have been otherwise4 ,give me1 then1
 in any action called good1 great1      
noble1 glorious1 c4 the conviction that 
the choice of this action was a         
necessary choice1 predetermined in a    
long and unbroken chain of necessary    
antecedents1 and the sense of           
praiseworthiness1 and the judgement ,i  
ought to be rewarded1 remain no longer4 
,merit and demerit are connected in our 
minds with our volitions1 under the     
impression that the good we perform1 we 
perform in opposition to temptation1 and
 with the power and possibility of doing
 evil2 and that the evil we perform1 we 
perform in opposition to motives of     
good1 and with the power and possibility

 of doing good4 ,but when we are        
informed that all the power and         
possibility of a conduct opposite to our
 actual conduct is this1--that if we had
 put forth opposite volitions1 there    
would have been opposite external acts1 
but that nevertheless the volitions     
themselves were necessary1 and could not
 have been otherwise1--we cannot but    
experience a revulsion of mind4 ,we     
perhaps are first led to doubt the      
philosophy1--or if1 by acute reasonings1
 or by the authority of great names1 we 
are influenced to yield an implicit     
belief1--the sense of merit and demerit 
must either die away1 or be maintained  
by a hasty retreat from the regions of  
speculation to those of common sense4   
,,xi4 ,it follows from this system1     
also1 that nature and spirit1 as causes 
or agents1 cannot be distinguished in   
their operations4  ,there are three     
classes of natural causes or agents     
generally acknowledged #a4              
,inanimate1--as water1 wind1 steam1     

magnetism1 c42 #b4 ,animate1 but        
insensible1--as the life and affinities 
of plants2 #c4 ,animate and sensitive1  
or brute animal power4  ,these all      
properly come under the denomination of 
natural1 because they are alike         
necessitated4 ,whatever is comprised in 
the chain and mechanism of cause and    
effect1 of course necessitated1 and     
having its necessity in some other thing
 antecedent or concurrent1--this is said
 to be natural2 and the aggregate and   
system of all such things is nature4    
,now spirit1 as a cause or agent1 by    
this system1 comes under the same       
definition3 in all its acts it is       
necessitated4 ,it is in will            
particularly that man is taken as a     
cause or agent1 because it is by will   
that he directly produces phenomena or  
effects2 and by this system it is not   
possible to distinguish1 so far as      
necessary connexion is considered1 a    
chain of antecedents and sequents made  
up of motives1 volitions1 and the       

consequents of volitions1 from a chain  
of sequents and antecedents into which  
the three first mentioned classes of    
natural agents enter4 ,all the several  
classes have peculiar and distinguishing
 characteristics2 but in the relation of
 antecedence and sequence1--their       
relation as causes or agents producing  
effects1--no distinction can be         
perceived4 ,wind1 water1 c4 form one    
kind of cause2 organic life forms       
another2 brute organization and         
sensitivity another2 intelligent        
volition another3 but they are all      
necessary1 absolutely necessary2 and    
therefore they are the co-ordinate parts
 of the one system of nature4 ,the      
difference which exists between them is 
a difference of terms merely4 ,there is 
no difference in the nature of the      
relation between the terms4 ,the nature 
of the relation between the water-wheel 
and the water1--of the relation between 
the organic life of plants and their    
developement1--of the relation between  

passion and volition in brutes1--of the 
relation between their efforts and      
material effects1--and the nature of the
 relation between motive and            
volition1--are one3 it is the relation  
of cause and effect considered as stated
 antecedent and sequent1 and no more and
 no less necessary in one subject than  
in another4  ,,xii4 ,it follows1 again1 
that sensations produced by external    
objects1 and all emotions following     
perception1 and all the acts of the     
intelligence1 whether in intuitive      
knowledge or in ratiocination1 are as   
really our acts1 and acts for which we  
are as really responsible1 if           
responsibility be granted to exist1 as  
acts of volition4 ,sensations1 emotions1
 perceptions1 reasonings1 are all within
 us2 they all lie in our consciousness2 
they are not created by our volitions1  
like the motions of the hands and feet2 
they take place by their own causes1    
just as volitions take place by their   
causes4 ,the relation of the man to all 

is precisely the same4 ,he is in no     
sense the cause of any of these         
affections of his being2 he is simply   
the subject3 the subject of sensation1  
of perception1 of emotion1 of reasoning1
 and of volition2 and he is the subject 
of all by the same necessity4  ,,xiii4  
,the system of punishment is only a     
system accommodated to the opinions of  
society4  ,there is nothing evil in     
itself1 according to this system of     
necessity1 as we have already shown4    
,every thing which takes place is1 in   
its time1 place1 and relations          
generally1 the necessary result of      
necessary and infinite wisdom4 ,but     
still it is a fact that society are     
desirous of preventing certain          
acts1--such as stealing1 adultery1      
murder1 c42 and they are necessarily so 
desirous4 ,now the system of punishment 
is a mere collection of motives in      
relation to the sense of pain and the   
emotion of fear1 which prevent the      
commission of these acts4 ,where these  

acts do take place1 it is best they     
should take place2 but where they are   
prevented by the fear of punishment1 it 
is best they should be prevented4 ,where
 the criminal suffers1 he has no right  
to complain1 because it is best that he 
should suffer2 and yet1 if he does      
complain1 it is best that he should     
complain4 ,the system of punishment is  
good1 as every thing else is good4 ,the 
system of divine punishments must be    
considered in the same light4 ,indeed1  
what are human punishments1 when        
properly considered1 but divine         
punishments8 ,they are comprehended in  
the pre-ordained and necessary chain of 
being and events4  ,,xiv4 ,hence we must
 conclude1 also1 that there cannot      
really be any calamity4 ,the calamities 
which we may at any time experience1 we 
ought to endure and rejoice in1 as      
flowing from the same perfect and       
necessary source4 ,but as calamity does 
nevertheless necessarily produce        
suffering and uneasiness1 and the desire

 of relief1 we may be permitted to hope 
that perfect relief and entire          
blessedness will finally ensue1 and that
 the final blessedness will be enhanced 
just in proportion to the present       
suffering4  ,the necessitarian may be an
 optimist of a high order4 ,it he       
commits what is called crime1 and       
remorse succeeds1 and punishment is     
inflicted under law1 the crime is good1 
the remorse is good1 the punishment is  
good1 all necessary and good1 and       
working out1 as he hopes1 a result of   
pure happiness4 ,nothing can be bad in  
itself3 it may be disagreeable2 but even
 this will probably give way to the     
agreeable4 ,and so also with all        
afflictions3 they must be good in       
themselves1 although disagreeable1 --and
 will probably lead the way to the      
agreeable1 just as hunger and thirst1   
which are disagreeable1 lead the way to 
the enjoyments of eating and drinking4  
,all is of necessity1 and of a necessary
 and perfect wisdom4  ,,xv4 ,but as all 

is of necessity1 and of a necessary and 
perfect wisdom1 there really can no more
 be folly in conduct1 or error in       
reasoning and belief1 than there can be 
crime and calamity1 considered as evils 
in themselves4 ,every act that we call  
folly is a necessary act1 in its time1  
place1 and relations generally1 and is a
 necessary consequence of the infinite  
wisdom2 but a necessary consequence of  
infinite wisdom cannot be opposed to    
infinite wisdom2 so that what we call   
folly1 when philosophically considered1 
ceases to be folly4  ,in any act of pure
 reasoning1 the relations seem          
necessary1 and the assent of the mind is
 necessary4 ,this is granted by all     
parties4 ,but it must be admitted1 that 
when men are said to reason falsely1 and
 to yield their assent to false         
conclusions1 the relations seem         
necessary to them2 and1 according to    
this system1 they necessarily so seem1  
and cannot seem otherwise3 and the      
assent of the mind is also necessary4   

,the reasoning1 to others1 would be     
false reasoning1 because it so          
necessarily seems to them2 but to the   
individual to whom it seems different1  
it must really be different1 and be good
 and valid reasoning4  ,again3 as all   
these different reasonings and beliefs  
proceed necessarily from the same       
source1 they must all be really true    
where they seem true1 and all really    
false where they seem false4 ,it would  
follow1 from this1 that no one can      
really be in a false position except the
 hypocrite and sophist1 pretending to   
believe and to be what he does not      
believe and what he is not1 and         
purposely reasoning falsely1 and stating
 his false conclusions as if they were  
truths4 ,i say this would follow1 were  
we not compelled by this system to allow
 that even the hypocrite and sophist    
cannot hold a false position1 inasmuch  
as his position is a necessary one1     
predetermined in its necessary connexion
 with the first necessary wisdom4       

,,xvi4 ,another consequence of this     
system is fatalism1--or1 perhaps1 more  
properly speaking1 the system is itself 
a system of fatalism4  ,this1 indeed1   
has already been made to appear         
substantially4 ,the word1 however1 has  
not yet been used4 ,i here1 then1 charge
 directly this consequence or feature   
upon the system4  ,fatalism is the      
absolute negation of liberty4 ,this     
system is fatalism1 because it is the   
absolute negation of liberty4  ,no      
liberty is contended for1 in this       
system1 in relation to man1 but physical
 liberty3 viz4 that when he wills1 the  
effect will follow1--that when he wills 
to walk1 he walks1 c4 ,liberty1 as ,i   
have explained it1 is the power1        
opportunity1 or advantage1 that any one 
has to do as he pleases1 or conducting  
himself in any respect according to his 
pleasure1 without considering how his   
pleasure comes to be as it is4 7p4      
#bia47  ,in the first place1 this is no 
higher liberty than what brutes possess4

 ,they have power1 opportunity1 or      
advantage1 to do as they please4        
,effects follow their volitions by as   
certain a law as effects follow the     
volitions of men4  ,in the second place1
 this is no higher liberty than slaves  
possess4 ,slaves uniformly do as they   
please4 ,if the motive be the lash1 or  
the fear of the lash1 still1 in their   
case as well as in that of brutes under 
similar circumstances1 the volition     
which takes place is the most pleasing  
at the moment4 ,the slave and the animal
 do what is most pleasing to them1 or do
 according to their pleasure1 ,when the 
one drags the plough and the other holds
 it4 ,nay1 it is impossible for any     
animal1 rational or irrational1 to act  
without doing what is most pleasing to  
him or it4 ,volition is always as the   
greatest apparent good1 or as the sense 
of the most pleasant or agreeable4  ,if 
any should reply that slaves and animals
 are liable to be fettered1 and this    
distinguishes them from the free1 ,i    

rejoin that every being is liable to    
various restraints2 none of us can do   
many things which in themselves appear  
desirable1 and would be objects of      
volition if there were known to be an   
established connexion between them and  
our wills4 ,we are limited in our       
actions by the powers of nature around  
us2 we cannot overturn mountains1 or    
command the winds4 ,we are limited in   
the nature of our physical being4 ,we   
are limited by our want of wealth1      
knowledge1 and influence4 ,in all these 
respects1 we may1 with as much propriety
 as the slave1 be regarded as deprived  
of liberty4 ,it does not avail to say   
that1 as we never really will what we   
know to be impossible or impracticable1 
so in relation to such objects1 neither 
liberty or a want of liberty is to be   
affirmed2 for the same will apply to the
 fettered slave2 he does not will to    
walk or run when he knows it to be      
impossible4 ,but in relation to him as  
well as to every other being1 according 

to this system it holds true1 that      
whether he act or forbear to act1 his   
volitions are as the most agreeable4    
,all creatures1 therefore1 acting by    
volition1 are to be accounted free1 and 
one really as free as another4  ,in the 
third place1 the liberty here affirmed  
belongs equally to every instance of    
stated antecedence and sequence4  ,the  
liberty which is taken to reside in the 
connexion between volition and effects1 
is a liberty lying in a connexion of    
stated antecedence and sequence1 and is 
perfect according as this connexion is  
necessary and unimpeded4 ,the highest   
form of liberty1 therefore1 is to be    
found in the most absolute form of      
necessity4 ,liberty thus becomes        
identified also with power3 where there 
is power1 there is liberty2 and where   
power is the greatest1 that is1 where it
 overcomes the most obstacles and moves 
on irresistibly to its effects1 there is
 the greatest degree of liberty4 ,god is
 the most free of all beings1 because   

nothing can impede his will4 ,his       
volitions are always the antecedents of 
effects4  ,but obviously we do not alter
 the relation1 when we change the terms4
 ,if liberty lie in the stated          
antecedence of volition to effects1 and 
if liberty is measured by the necessity 
of the relation1 then when the          
antecedent is changed1 the relation     
remaining the same1 liberty must still  
be present4 ,for example3 when a        
volition to move the arm is followed by 
a motion of the arm1 there is liberty2  
now let galvanism be substituted for the
 volition1 and the effect as certainly  
takes place2 and as freedom is doing as 
we please1 or will1 without considering 
how this pleasure 7or will7 comes to be 
as it is2 that is1 without taking its   
motive into the account4 ,so likewise1  
freedom may be affirmed to be doing     
according to the galvanic impulse1      
without considering how that impulse    
comes to be as it is4  ,if we take any  
other instance of stated antecedence and

 sequence1 the reasoning is the same4   
,for example1 a water wheel in relation 
to the mill-stone3 when the wheel turns1
 the mill-stone moves4 ,in this case    
freedom may be defined3 the mill-stone  
moving according to the turn of the     
wheel1 without considering how that turn
 of the wheel comes to be as it is4 ,in 
the case of human freedom1 freedom is   
defined1 doing according to our         
volitions1 without considering how the  
volition comes to be as it is2 doing    
according to choice1 without taking into
 the meaning of the word anything of the
 cause of that choice4 7p4 #ci47  ,if it
 be said that in the case of volition1  
we have the man of whom to affirm       
freedom2 but in the case of the wheel   
and mill-stone1 we have nothing of which
 liberty can properly be affirmed4 ,i   
reply1 that liberty must be affirmed1   
and is properly affirmed1 of that to    
which it really belongs2 and hence as   
volition is supposed to belong to the   
spiritual essence1 man2 and this        

spiritual essence is pronounced free1   
because volition appears in it1 and is  
attended by consequences3--so1 likewise1
 the material essence of the wheel may  
be pronounced free1 because motion      
belongs to it1 and is followed by       
consequences4 ,as every being that has  
volition is free1 so likewise every     
thing that hath motion is free3--in     
every instance of cause and effect1 we  
meet with liberty4  ,but volition cannot
 be the characteristic of liberty1 if   
volition itself be governed by          
necessity3 and yet this system which    
affirms liberty1 wherever there is      
unimpeded volition1 makes volition a    
necessary determination4 ,in the fact of
 unimpeded volition1 it gives liberty to
 all creatures that have volition2 and  
then again1 in the fact of the necessary
 determination of volition it destroys  
the possibility of liberty4 ,but even   
where it affirms liberty to exist1 there
 is no new feature to characterize it as
 liberty4 ,the connexion between        

volition and its stated consequences1 is
 a connexion as necessary and absolute  
as the connexion between the motive and 
the volition1 and between any antecedent
 and sequent whatever4 ,that my arm     
should move when ,i make a volition to  
this effect1 is just as necessary and   
just as incomprehensible too1 as that   
water should freeze at a given          
temperature3 when the volition is       
impeded1 we have only another instance  
of necessity1--a lesser force overcome  
by a greater4  ,the liberty therefore   
which this system affirms in the fact of
 volition and its unimpeded connexion   
with its consequents1 is an             
assumption--a mere name4 ,it is a part  
of the universal necessity arbitrarily  
distinguished and named1 its liberty    
does not reside in human volition1 so   
neither can it reside in the divine     
volition4 ,the necessary dependence of  
volition upon motive1 and the necessary 
sequence of effects upon volition1 can  
no more be separated from the divine    

mind than from ours4 ,it is a doctrine  
which1 if true1 is implied in the       
universal conception of mind4 ,it       
belongs to mind generically considered4 
,the creation of volition by volition is
 absurd in itself--it cannot but be an  
absurdity4 ,the determination of will by
 the strongest motive1 if a truth is a  
truth universally2 on this system1 it   
contains the whole cause and possibility
 of volition4 ,the whole liberty of     
,god1 it is affirmed1 is contained in   
this1 to do as pleases him1 or1 in other
 words1 that what he wills is           
accomplished1 and necessarily           
accomplished3 what pleases him is also  
fixed in the necessity of his own       
nature4 ,his liberty1 therefore1 by its 
own definition1 differs nothing from    
necessity4  ,if the movements of mind   
are necessary1 no argument is required  
to prove that all being and events are  
necessary4 ,we are thus bound up in a   
universal necessity4 ,whatever is1 is1  
and cannot be otherwise1 and could not  

have been otherwise4 ,as therefore there
 is no liberty1 we are reduced to the   
only remaining alternative of fatalism4 
,edwards does not indeed attempt to     
rebut wholly the charge of fatalism4    
7part iv4 ,sec4 vi47 ,in relation to the
 ,stoics1 he remarks3--,it seems they   
differed among themselves2 and probably 
the doctrine of fate as maintained by   
most of them1 was1 in some respects1    
erroneous4 ,but whatever their doctrines
 was1 if any of them held such a fate1  
as is repugnant to any liberty1         
consisting in our doing as we please1 ,i
 utterly deny such a fate4 ,he objects  
to fatalism only when it should deny our
 actions to be connected with our       
pleasure1 or our sense of the most      
agreeable1 that is our volition4 ,but   
this connexion we have fully proved to  
be as necessary as the connexion between
 the volition and its motive4 ,this     
reservation therefore does not save him 
from fatalism4  ,in the following       
section1 7sec4 vii47 he represents the  

liberty and sovereignty of ,god as      
consisting in an ability to do whatever 
pleases him4 ,his idea of the divine    
liberty1 therefore1 is the same as that 
attributed to man4 ,that the divine     
volitions are necessarily determined1 he
 repeatedly affirms1 and indeed         
represents as the great excellence of   
the divine nature1 because this         
necessity of determination is laid in   
the infinite wisdom and perfection of   
his nature4  ,if necessity govern all   
being and events1 it is cheering to know
 that it is necessity under the forms of
 infinite wisdom and benevolence4 ,but  
still it remains true that necessity    
governs4 ,if it is no disadvantage or   
dishonour to a being1 necessarily to act
 in the most excellent and happy manner 
from the necessary perfection of his own
 nature1 still let us remember that     
under this representation he does act   
necessarily4 ,fate must have some       
quality or form2 it must be what we call
 good or evil3 but in determining its   

quality1 we do not destroy its nature4  
,now if we call this fate a nature of   
goodness and wisdom1 eternal and        
infinite1 we present it under forms     
beautiful1 benign1 and glorious1 but it 
is nevertheless fate1--and as such it   
governs the divine volitions2 and       
through the divine volitions1 all the   
consequents and effects of these        
volitions2--the universe of being and   
things is determined by fate2--and all  
volitions of angels or men are          
determined by fate--by this fate so     
beautiful1 benign1 and glorious4 ,now if
 all things thus proceeding from fate   
were beautiful1 benign1 and glorious1   
the theory might not alarm us4 ,but that
 deformity1 crime1 and calamity should  
have place as developements of this     
fate1 excites uneasiness4 ,the abettors 
of this system1 however1 may perhaps    
comfort themselves with the persuasion  
that deformity1 crime1 and calamity1 are
 names not of realities1 but of the     
limited conceptions of mankind4 ,we have

 indeed an instance in point in ,charles
 ,bonnet1 whom ,dugald ,stewart mentions
 as a very learned and pious disciple of
 ,leibnitz4 ,says ,bonnet--,thus the    
same chain embraces the physical and    
moral world1 binds the past to the      
present1 the present to the future1 the 
future to eternity4 ,that wisdom which  
has ordained the existence of this      
chain1 has doubtless willed that of     
every link of which it is composed4 ,a  
,caligula is one of these links2 and    
this link is of iron4 ,a ,marcus        
,aurelius is another link2 and this link
 is of gold4 ,both are necessary parts  
of one whole1 which could not but exist4
 ,shall ,god then be angry at the sight 
of the iron link8 ,what absurdity6 ,god 
esteems this link at its proper value4  
,he sees it in its cause1 and he        
approves this cause1 for it is good4    
,god beholds moral monsters as he       
beholds physical monsters4 ,happy is the
 link of gold6 ,still more happy if he  
know that he is only fortunate4 ,he has 

attained the highest degree of moral    
perfection1 and is nevertheless without 
pride1 knowing that what he is1 is the  
necessary result1 of the place which he 
must occupy in the chain4 ,the gospel is
 the allegorical exposition of this     
system2 the simile of the potter is its 
summary4 ,he might have added1 ,happy is
 the link of iron1 if he know that he is
 not guilty1 but at worst only          
unfortunate2 and really not unfortunate1
 because holding a necessary place in   
the chain which both as a whole and in  
its parts1 is the result of infinite    
wisdom4  ,if anything more is required  
in order to establish this consequence  
of the system we are examining1 ,i would
 call attention to the inquiry1 whether 
after a contingent self-determining will
 there remains any theory of action     
except fatalism8 ,a contingent          
self-determining will is a will which is
 the cause of its own volitions or      
choices--a self-conscious power1        
self-moved and directed1 and at the     

moment of its choice1 or movement       
towards a particular object1 conscious  
of ability of choosing1 or moving       
towards1 an opposite object4 ,now what  
conception have we to oppose to this but
 that of a will not determining         
itself1--not the cause of its own       
volitions1--a power not self-moved and  
directed1--and not conscious of ability 
at the moment of a particular choice1 to
 make a contrary choice8 ,and this last 
conception is a will whose volitions are
 determined by some power antecedent to 
itself1 not contingently1 but           
necessarily4 ,as the will is the only   
power for which contingent              
self-determination is claimed1 if it be 
proved to be no such power1 then no such
 power exists4 ,the whole theory of     
action and causality will then be       
expressed as follows3  #a4 ,absolute and
 necessary connexion of motives and     
volitions4 #b4 ,absolute and necessary  
connexion of volitions and effects4 #c4 
,absolute and necessary connexion of all

 sequents and antecedents in nature4 #d4
 ,absolute and necessary connexion of   
all things existent with a first and    
necessary principle or cause4 #e4 ,the  
necessary determination of this         
principle or cause4  ,denying a         
contingent self-determining will1 this  
theory is all that remains4 ,if liberty 
be affirmed to reside in the #b;d       
particular of this theory1 it becomes a 
mere arbitrary designation1 because the 
nature of the relation is granted to be 
the same2 it is not contingent1 but     
necessary4 ,nor can liberty be affirmed 
to reside in the #eth2 because in the   
first place1 the supposed demonstration 
of the absurdity of a contingent        
self-determining will1 by infinite      
series of volitions1 must apply to this 
great first principle considered as     
,god4 ,and in the second place1 the     
doctrine of the necessary determination 
of motive must apply here likewise1     
since ,god as will and intelligence     
requires motives no less than we do4    

,such determination is represented as   
arising from the very nature of mind or 
spirit4 ,now this theory advanced in    
opposition to a self-determining will1  
is plainly the negation of liberty as   
opposed to necessity4 ,and this is all  
that can be meant by fatalism4 ,liberty 
thus becomes a self-contradictory       
conception1 and fatalism alone is truth 
and reality4  ,,xvii4 ,it appears to me 
also1 that pantheism is a fair deduction
 from this system4  ,according to this  
system1 ,god is the sole and universal  
doer--the only efficient cause4 #a4 ,his
 volition is the creative act1 by which 
all beings and things exist4 ,thus far  
it is generally conceded that ,god is   
all in all4 ,by him we live1 and move1  
and have our being4 #b4 ,the active     
powers of the whole system of nature he 
has constituted and regulated4 ,the     
winds are his messengers4 ,the flaming  
fire his servant4 ,however we may       
conceive of these powers1 whether as    
really powers acting under necessary    

laws1 or as immediate manifestations of 
divine energy1 in either case it is     
proper to attribute all their movements 
to ,god4 ,these movements were ordained 
by his wisdom1 and are executed directly
 or indirectly by his will4 ,every      
effect which we produce in the material 
world1 we produce by instrumentality4   
,our arms1 hands1 c4 are our first      
instruments4 ,all that we do by the     
voluntary use of these1 we attribute to 
ourselves4 ,now if we increase the      
instrumentality by the addition of an   
axe1 spade1 or hammer1 still the effect 
is justly attributed in the same way4   
,it is perfectly clear that to whatever 
extent we multiply the instruments1 the 
principle is the same4 ,whether ,i do   
the deed directly with my hand1 or do it
 by an instrument held in my hand1 or by
 a concatenation of machinery1 reaching 
from the centre to the utmost pole1--if 
,i contemplate the deed1 and designedly 
accomplish it in this way1 the deed is  
mine4 ,and not only is the last deed    

contemplated as the end of all this     
arrangement mine1 all the intermediary  
movements produced as the necessary     
chain of antecedents and sequents by    
which the last is to be attained1 are   
mine likewise4  ,i use powers and       
instruments whose energy and capacity ,i
 have learned by experience1 but in     
whose constitution ,i have had no hand4 
,they are provided for me1 and ,i merely
 use them4 ,but ,god in working by      
these1 works by what his own wisdom and 
power have created2 and therefore a     
fortiori must every effect produced by  
these1 according to his design1 and by  
his volition as at least the first power
 of the series1 be attributed to        
him1--be called his doing4 ,he causeth  
the sun to rise and set4 ,he causeth the
 grass to grow for the cattle1 and herb 
for the service of man4 ,he watereth the
 hills from his chambers4 ,this is not  
merely poetry4 ,it is truth4  ,now the  
system we are considering goes one step 
further2 it makes human volitions as    

much the objects of the eternal design1 
and as really the effects of the divine 
volition1 as the rising of the stars1   
the flight of the lightning1 the tumult 
of the waters1 or the light which       
spreadeth itself like a garment over    
creation4 ,every volition of created    
mind is ,god's act1 as really as any    
effect in nature4 ,we have seen how     
every volition is connected with its    
motive2 how the motive lies in a        
pre-constitution2 how the series of     
antecedents and sequents necessarily    
runs back and connects itself with the  
infinite wisdom4 ,god's volition is his 
own act2 the effect immediately produced
 by that volition is his own deed4 ,let 
that effect be the creation of man3 the 
man in all his powers and               
susceptibilities is ,god's work2 the    
objects around him are ,god's work2 the 
correlation of the objects with the     
sensitivity of man is ,god's work2 the  
volition which necessarily takes place  
as the result of this correlation is    

,god's work4 ,the volition of the man is
 as strictly attributable to ,god1 as1  
according to our common apprehensions1  
the blow which ,i give with an axe is   
attributable to me4 ,what is true of the
 first man1 must be equally true of the 
man removed by a thousand generations1  
for the intermediary links are all      
ordained by ,god under an inevitable    
necessity4 ,god is really1 therefore1   
the sole doer--the only efficient1 the  
only cause4 ,all beings and things1 all 
motion and all volition1 are absolutely 
resolved into divine volition4 ,god is  
the author of all beings1 things1       
motions1 and volitions1 and as much the 
author of any one of these as of any    
other1 and the author of all in the same
 way and in the same sense4 ,set aside  
self-determining will1 and there is no  
stopping-place between a human volition 
and the divine volition4 ,the human     
volition is but the divine1 manifested  
through a lengthened it may be1 but a   
connected and necessary chain of        

antecedents and sequents4 ,i see no way 
of escaping from this1 as a necessary   
and legitimate consequence of the       
necessary determination of will4 ,and   
what is this consequence but pantheism8 
,god is the universal and all-pervading 
intelligence--the universal and only    
power4 ,every movement of nature is     
necessary2 every movement of mind is    
necessary2 because necessarily caused   
and determined by the divine volition4  
,there is no life but his1 no thought   
but his1 no efficiency but his4 ,he is  
the soul of the world4  ,spinosa never  
represented himself as an atheist1 and  
according to the following              
representation appears rather as a      
pantheist4 ,he held that ,god is the    
cause of all things2 but that he acts1  
not from choice1 but from necessity2    
and1 of consequence1 that he is the     
involuntary author of all the good and  
evil1 virtue and vice1 which are        
exhibited in human life4 7,dugald       
,stewart1 vol4 #f4 p4 #bgf1 note47      

,cousin remarks1 too1 that ,spinosa     
deserves rather the reproach of         
pantheism than of atheism4 ,his         
pantheism was fairly deduced from the   
doctrine of necessary determination1    
which he advocated4  ,,xviii4 ,spinosa1 
however1 is generally considered an     
atheist4 ,it will not be disputed1 says 
,stewart1 by those who comprehend the   
drift of his reasonings1 that in point  
of practical tendency atheism and       
,spinosism are one and the same4  ,the  
following is ,cousin's view of his      
system4 ,it apparently differs from the 
preceding in some respects1 but really  
tends to the same conclusions4  ,instead
 of accusing ,spinosa of atheism1 he    
ought to be reproached for an error in  
the other direction4 ,spinosa starts    
from the perfect and infinite being of  
,descartes's system1 and easily         
demonstrates that such a being is alone 
a being in itself2 but that a being1    
finite1 imperfect1 and relative1 only   
participates of being1 without          

possessing it1 in itself3 that a being  
in itself is one necessarily3 that there
 is but one substance2 and that all that
 remains has only a phenomenal          
existence3 that to call phenomena1      
finite substances1 is affirming and     
denying1 at the same time2 whereas1     
there being1 but one substance which    
possesses being in itself1 and the      
finite being that which participates of 
existence without possessing it in      
itself1 a substance finite implies two  
contradictory notions4 ,thus1 in the    
philosophy of ,spinosa1 man and nature  
are pure phenomena2 simple attributes of
 that one and absolute substance1 but   
attributes which are co-eternal with    
their substance3 for as phenomena cannot
 exist without a subject1 the imperfect 
without the perfect1 the finite without 
the infinite1 and man and nature suppose
 ,god2 so likewise1 the substance cannot
 exist without phenomena1 the perfect   
without the imperfect1 the infinite     
without the finite1 and ,god on his part

 supposes man and nature4 ,the error of 
his system lies in the predominance of  
the relation of phenomenon to being1 of 
attribute to substance1 over the        
relation of effect to cause4 ,when man  
has been represented1 not as a cause1   
voluntary and free1 but as necessary and
 uncontrollable desire1 and as an       
imperfect and finite thought2 ,god1 or  
the supreme pattern of humanity1 can be 
only a substance1 and not a cause--a    
being1 perfect1 infinite1 necessary--the
 immutable substance of the universe1   
and not its producing and creating      
cause4 ,in ,cartesianism1 the notion of 
substance figures more conspicuously    
than that of cause2 and this notion of  
substance1 altogether predominating1    
constitutes ,spinosism4 7,hist4 de la   
,phil tom4 #a4 p4 #dff47  ,the          
predominance of the notion of substance 
and attribute1 over that of cause and   
effect1 which ,cousin here pronounces   
the vice of ,spinosa's system1 is indeed
 the vice of every system which contains

 the dogma of the necessary             
determination of will4 ,the first       
consequence is pantheism2 the second1   
atheism4 ,i will endeavour to explain4  
,when self -determination is denied to  
will1 and it is resolved into mere      
desire1 necessitated in all its acts    
from its pre-constituted correlation    
with objects1 then will really ceases to
 be a cause4 ,it becomes an instrument  
of antecedent power1 but is no power in 
itself1 creative or productive4 ,the    
reasoning employed in reference to the  
human will1 applies in all its force to 
the divine will1 as has been already    
abundantly shown4 ,the divine will      
therefore ceases to be a cause1 and     
becomes a mere instrument of antecedent 
power4 ,this antecedent power is the    
infinite and necessary wisdom2 but      
infinite and necessary wisdom is eternal
 and unchangeable2 what it is now1 it   
always was2 what tendencies or energies 
it has now1 it always had2 and          
therefore1 whatever volitions it now    

necessarily produces1 it always         
necessarily produced4 ,if we conceive a 
volition to have been1 in one direction1
 the immediate and necessary antecedent 
of creation2 and1 in another1 the       
immediate and necessary sequent of      
infinite1 and eternal1 and necessary    
wisdom2 then this volition must have    
always existed1 and consequently1       
creation1 as the necessary effect of    
this volition1 must have always existed4
 ,the eternal and infinite wisdom thus  
becomes the substance1 because this is  
existence in itself1 no antecedent being
 conceivable2 and creation1 consisting  
of man and nature1 imperfect and finite1
 participating only of existence1 and   
not being existence in themselves1 are  
not substances1 but phenomena4 ,but what
 is the relation of the phenomena to the
 substance8 ,not that of effect to      
cause2--this relation slides entirely   
out of view1 the moment will ceases to  
be a cause4 ,it is the relation simply  
of phenomena to being1 considered as the

 necessary and inseparable              
manifestations of being2 the relation of
 attributes to substance1 considered as 
the necessary and inseparable properties
 of substance4 ,we cannot conceive of   
substance without attributes or         
phenomena1 nor of attributes or         
phenomena without substance2 they are1  
therefore1 co-eternal in this relation4 
,who then is ,god8 ,substance and its   
attributes2 being and its phenomena4 ,in
 other words1 the universe1 as made up  
of substance and attributes1 is ,god4   
,this is ,spinosism2 this is pantheism2 
and it is the first and legitimate      
consequence of a necessitated will4     
,the second consequence is atheism4 ,in 
the denial of will as a cause per       
se1--in resolving all its volitions into
 the necessary phenomena of the eternal 
substance1--we destroy personality3 we  
have nothing remaining but the universe4
 ,now we may call the universe ,god2 but
 with equal propriety we call ,god the  
universe4 ,this destruction of          

personality1--this merging of ,god into 
necessary substance and attributes1--is 
all that we mean by ,atheism4 ,the      
conception is really the same1 whether  
we name it fate1 pantheism1 or atheism4 
,the following remark of ,dugald        
,stewart1 shows that he arrived at the  
same result3 ,whatever may have been the
 doctrines of some of the ancient       
atheists about man's free agency1 it    
will not be denied that1 in the history 
of modern philosophy1 the schemes of    
atheism and of necessity have been      
hitherto always connected together4 ,not
 that ,i would by any means be          
understood to say1 that every           
necessitarian must ipso facto be an     
atheist1 or even that any presumption is
 afforded1 by a man's attachment to the 
former sect1 of his having the slightest
 bias in favour of the latter2 but only 
that every modern atheist ,i have heard 
of has been a necessitarian4 ,i cannot  
help adding1 that the most consistent   
necessitarian who have yet appeared1    

have been those who followed out their  
principles till they ended in           
,spinosism1--a doctrine which differs   
from atheism more in words than in      
reality4 7,vol4 #f1 p4 #dgj47           
,cudworth1 in his great work entitled   
,the true ,intellectual ,system of the  
,universe1 shows clearly the connexion  
between fatalism and atheism4 ,this work
 seems to have grown out of another     
undertaking1 which contemplated         
specifically the question of liberty and
 necessity1 and its bearing upon        
morality and religion4 ,the passage in  
the preface1 in which he informs us of  
his original plan1 is a very full       
expression of his opinion4 ,first1      
therefore1 ,i acknowledge1 says he1 that
 when ,i engaged the press1 ,i intended 
only a discourse concerning liberty and 
necessity1 or1 to speak out more        
plainly1 against the fatal necessity of 
all actions and events2 which1 upon     
whatsoever grounds or principles        
maintained1 will1 as we conceive1 serve 

the design of atheism1 and undermine    
,christianity1 and all religion1 as     
taking away all guilt and blame1        
punishments and rewards1 and plainly    
rendering a day of judgement ridiculous4
 ,this opinion of the tendency of the   
doctrine of a necessitated will1 is the 
germ of his work4 ,the connexion        
established in his mind between this    
doctrine and atheism1 naturally led him 
to his masterly and elaborate exposition
 and refutation of the latter4  ,the    
arguments of many atheists might be     
referred to1 to illustrate the connexion
 between necessity and atheism4 ,i shall
 here refer1 however1 to only one       
individual1 remarkable both for his     
poetic genius and metaphysical acumen4  
,i mean the late ,piercy ,bysshe        
,shelley4 ,he openly and unblushingly   
professed atheism4 ,in his ,queen ,mab  
we find this line3 ,there is no ,god4   
,in a note upon this line1 he remarks3  
,this negation must be understood solely
 to affect a creative ,deity4 ,the      

hypothesis of a pervading spirit1       
co-eternal with the universe1 remains   
unshaken4 ,this last hypothesis is      
,pantheism4 ,pantheism is really the    
negation of a creative ,deity1--the     
identity or at least necessary and      
eternal co-existence of ,god and the    
universe4 ,shelley has expressed this   
clearly in another passage3     ,spirit 
of nature6 all-sufficing power1         
,necessity6 thou mother of the world6   
,in a note upon this passage1 ,shelley  
has argued the doctrine of the necessary
 determination of will by motive1 with  
an acuteness and power scarcely inferior
 to ,collins or ,edwards4 ,he makes1    
indeed1 a different application of the  
doctrine1 but a perfectly legitimate    
one4 ,collins and ,edwards1 and the     
whole race of necessitarian theologians1
 evidently toil under insurmountable    
difficulties1 while attempting to base  
religion upon this doctrine1 and effect 
their escape only under a fog of        
subtleties4 ,but ,shelley1 in daring to 

be perfectly consistent1 is perfectly   
clear4 ,he fearlessly proceeds from     
necessity to pantheism1 and thence to   
atheism and the destruction of all moral
 distinctions4 ,we are taught1 he       
remarks1 by the doctrine of necessity1  
that there is neither good nor evil in  
the universe1 otherwise than as the     
events to which we apply these epithets 
have relation to our own peculiar mode  
of being4 ,still less than with the     
hypothesis of a ,god1 will the doctrine 
of necessity accord with the belief of a
 future state of punishment4  ,i here   
close my deductions from this system4   
,if these deductions be legitimate1 as  
,i myself cannot doubt they are1 then1  
to the largest class of readers1 the    
doctrine of necessity is overthrown3 it 
is overthrown by its consequences1 and  
my argument has the force of a reductio 
ad absurdum4 ,if a self-determined will 
appear an absurdity1 still it cannot be 
as absurd as the contrary doctrine1 if  
this doctrine involve the consequences  

above given4 ,at least1 practical wisdom
 will claim that doctrine which leaves  
to the world a ,god1 and to man a moral 
and responsible nature4  ,a question    
will here very naturally arise3 ,how can
 we account for the fact that so many   
wise and good men have contended for a  
necessitated will1 as if they were      
contending for the great basis of all   
morality and religion8 ,for example1    
take ,edwards himself as a man of great 
thought and of most fervent piety4 ,in  
the whole of his treatise1 he argues    
with the air and manner of one who is   
opposing great errors as really         
connected with a self-determined will4  
,what can be stronger than the following
 language3 ,i think that the notion of  
liberty1 consisting in a contingent     
self-determination of the will1 as      
necessary to the morality of men's      
dispositions and actions1 is almost     
inconceivably pernicious2 and that the  
contrary truth is one of the most       
important truths of moral philosophy    

that ever was discussed1 and most       
necessary to be known4 ,the question is 
a fair one1 and ,i will endeavour to    
answer it4  #a4 ,the impossibility of a 
self-determining will as being in itself
 a contradictory idea1 and as leading to
 the consequence of affirming the       
existence of effects without causes1    
takes strong hold of the mind in these  
individuals4 ,this ,i believe1 and hope 
to prove in the course of this treatise1
 to be a philosophical error2--but it is
 no new thing for great and good men to 
fall into philosophical errors4  ,as1   
therefore1 the liberty consisting in a  
self-determining will1 or the liberty of
 indifference1 as it has been           
technically called1 is conceived to be  
exploded1 they endeavour to supply a    
liberty of spontaneity1 or a liberty    
lying in the unimpeded connexion between
 volition and sequents4  ,hobbes has    
defined and illustrated this liberty in 
a clearer manner than any of its        
advocates3 ,i conceive1 says he1 liberty

 to be rightly defined1--the absence of 
all impediments to action1 that are not 
contained in the nature and intrinsical 
quality of the agent4 ,as for example1  
the water is said to descend freely1 or 
is said to have liberty to descend by   
the channel of the river1 because there 
is no impediment that way2 but not      
across1 because the banks are           
impediments3 and though water cannot    
ascend1 yet men never say1 it wants the 
liberty to ascend1 but the faculty or   
power1 because the impediment is in the 
nature of the water1 and intrinsical4   
,so also we say1 he that is tied1 wants 
the liberty to go1 because the          
impediment is not in him1 but in his    
hands2 whereas1 we say not so of him who
 is sick or lame1 because the impediment
 is in himself1--that is1 he wants the  
faculty or power of going3--this        
constitutes natural inability4 ,liberty 
is volition acting upon physical        
instrumentalities1 or upon mental       
faculties1 according to a fixed and     

constituted law of antecedents1 and     
meeting with no impediment or overcoming
 antagonistic power4 ,natural ability is
 the fixed and constituted antecedence  
itself4 ,hence there may be natural     
ability without liberty2 but liberty    
cannot be affirmed without natural      
ability4 ,both are necessary to         
constitute responsibility4 ,natural     
ability is volition known as a stated   
antecedent of certain effects4 ,liberty 
is this antecedent existing without     
impediment or frustration4 ,since this  
is the only possible liberty remaining1 
and as they have no wish to be          
considered fatalists1 they enlarge much 
upon this2 not only as the whole of     
liberty actually existing1 but as the   
full and satisfactory notion of liberty4
  ,in basing responsibility and praise  
and blameworthiness upon this liberty1  
an appeal is made to the common ideas1  
feelings1 and practices of men4 ,every  
man regards himself as free when he does
 as he pleases1--when1 if he pleases to 

walk1 he walks1--when1 if he pleases to 
sit down1 he sits down1 c4 if a man1 in 
a court of justice1 were to plead in    
excuse that he committed the crime      
because he pleased or willed to do it1  
the judge would reply--this is your     
guilt1 that you pleased or willed to    
commit it3 nay1 your being pleased or   
willing to commit it was the very doing 
of it4 ,now all this is just4 ,i readily
 admit that we are free when we do as we
 please1 and that we are guilty when1 in
 doing as we please1 we commit a crime4 
,well1 then1 it is asked1 is not this   
liberty sufficient to constitute        
responsibility8 ,and thus the whole     
difficulty seems to be got over4 ,the   
reasoning would be very fair1 as far as 
it goes1 if employed against fatalists1 
but amounts to nothing when employed    
against those who hold to the           
self-determining power of the will4 ,the
 latter receive these common ideas1     
feelings1 and practices of men1 as facts
 indicative of freedom1 because they    

raise no question against human freedom4
 ,the real question at issue is1 how are
 we to account for these facts8 ,the    
advocates of self-determining power     
account for them by referring them to a 
self-determined will4 ,we say a man is  
free when he does as he pleases or      
according to his volitions1 and has the 
sense of freedom in his volitions1      
because he determines his own volitions2
 and that a man is guilty for crime1 if 
committed by his volition1 because he   
determined this volition1 and at the    
very moment of determining it1 was      
conscious of ability to determine an    
opposite volition4 ,and we affirm1 also1
 that a man is free1 not only when he   
does as he pleases1 or1 in other words1 
makes a volition without any impediment 
between it and its object1--he is free1 
if he make the volition without         
producing effects by it3 volition itself
 is the act of freedom4 ,but how do     
those who deny a self-determining power 
account for these facts8 ,they say that 

the volition is caused by a motive      
antecedent to it1 but that nevertheless1
 inasmuch as the man feels that he is   
free and is generally accounted so1 he  
must be free2 for liberty means nothing 
more than power and opportunity to do   
and conduct as he will1 or according to 
his choice1 without taking into the     
meaning of the word any thing of the    
cause of that choice1 or at all         
considering how the person came to have 
such a volition1--that is1 the man is   
free1 and feels himself to be so1 when  
he does as he pleases1 because this is  
all that is meant by freedom4  ,but     
suppose the objection be brought up1    
that the definition of liberty here     
given is assumed1 arbitrary1 and        
unsatisfactory2 and that the sense or   
consciousness of freedom in the act of  
volition1 and the common sentiments and 
practices of men in reference to        
voluntary action1 are not adequately    
accounted for1--then the advocates of   
necessitated volition return to the     

first argument1 of the impossibility of 
any other definition1--and affirm that1 
inasmuch as this sense of freedom does  
exist1 and the sentiments and practices 
of men generally correspond to it1 we   
must believe that we are free when      
volition is unimpeded in its connexion  
with sequents1 and that we are blame or 
praiseworthy1 according to the perceived
 character of our volitions1--although  
it cannot but be true that the volitions
 themselves are necessary4 ,on the one  
hand1 they are compelled by their       
philosophy to deny a self-determining   
will4 ,on the other hand1 they are      
compelled1 by their moral sense and     
religious convictions1 to uphold moral  
distinctions and responsibility4 ,in    
order to do this1 however1 a quasi      
liberty must be preserved3 hence the    
attempt to reconcile liberty and        
necessity1 by referring the first       
exclusively to the connexion between    
volition and its sequents1 and the      
second exclusively to the connexion     

between the volition and its antecedents
 or motives4 ,liberty is physical2      
necessity is metaphysical4 ,the first   
belongs to man2 the second transcends   
the sphere of his activity1 and1 is not 
his concern4 ,in this very difficult    
position1 no better or more ingenious   
solution could be devised2 but that it  
is wholly illogical and ineffectual1 and
 forms no escape from absolute and      
universal necessity1 has already been   
abundantly proved4  #b4 ,the            
philosophers and divines of whom we are 
speaking1 conceive that when volitions  
are supposed to exist out of the        
necessary determination of motives1 they
 exist fortuitously and without a cause4
 ,but to give up the necessary and      
universal dependence of phenomena upon  
causes1 would be to place events beyond 
the divine control3 nay1 more1--it would
 destroy the great a posteriori argument
 for the existence of a ,god4 ,of course
 it would be the destruction of all     
morality and religion4  #c4 ,the        

doctrine of the divine foreknowledge1 in
 particular1 is much insisted upon as   
incompatible with contingent volitions4 
,divine foreknowledge1 it is alleged1   
makes all events certain and necessary4 
,hence volitions are necessary2 and1 to 
carry out the reasoning1 it must be     
added likewise that the connexion       
between volitions and their sequents is 
equally necessary4 ,god foresees the    
sequent of the volition as well as the  
volition4 ,the theory1 however1 is      
careful to preserve the name of liberty1
 because it fears the designation which 
properly belongs to it4  #d4 ,by        
necessary determination1 the sovereignty
 of ,god and the harmony of his         
government are preserved4 ,his volitions
 are determined by his infinite wisdom4 
,the world1 therefore1 must be ruled in 
truth and righteousness4  ,these        
philosophers and divines thus represent 
to themselves the theory of a           
self-determining will as an absurdity in
 itself1 and1 if granted to be true1 as 

involving the most monstrous and        
disastrous consequences1 while the      
theory which they advocate is viewed    
only in its favourable points1 and      
without reaching forth to its legitimate
 consequences4 ,if these consequences   
are urged by another hand1 they are     
sought to be evaded by concentrating    
attention upon the fact of volition and 
the sense of freedom attending it3 for  
example1 if fatalism be urged as a      
consequence1 of this theory1 the ready  
reply is invariably--,no such necessity 
is maintained as goes to destroy the    
liberty which consists in doing as one  
pleases2 or if the destruction of       
responsibility be urged as a            
consequence1 the reply is--,a man is    
always held a just subject of praise or 
blame when he acts voluntarily4 ,the    
argumentation undoubtedly is as sincere 
as it is earnest4 ,the interests at     
stake are momentous4 ,they are supposed 
to perish1 if this philosophy be untrue4
 ,no wonder1 then1 that1 reverencing and

 loving morality and religion1 they     
should by every possible argument aim to
 sustain the philosophy which is        
supposed to lie at their basis1 and look
 away from consequences so destructive1 
persuading themselves that these        
consequences are but the rampant        
sophistries of infidelity4  ,it is a    
wonderful fact in the history of        
philosophy1 that the philosophy of fate1
 pantheism1 and atheism1 should be taken
 as the philosophy of religion4 ,good   
men have misapprehended the philosophy1 
and have succeeded in bringing it into  
fellowship with truth and righteousness4
 ,bad men and erring philosophers have  
embraced it in a clear understanding of 
its principles1 and have both logically 
reasoned out and fearlessly owned its   
consequences4  ,,xix4 ,assuming1 for the
 moment1 that the definition of liberty 
given by the theologians above alluded  
to1 is the only possible definition1 it 
must follow that the most commonly      
received modes of preaching the truths  

and urging the duties of religion are   
inconsistent and contradictory4  ,a     
class of theologians has been found in  
the church1 who1 perhaps without        
intending absolutely to deny human      
freedom1 have denied all ability on the 
part of man to comply with the divine   
precepts4 ,a generic distinction between
 inability and a want of freedom is not 
tenable1 and certainly is of no moment1 
where1 as in this case1 the inability   
contended for is radical and absolute4  
,these theologians clearly perceived1   
that if volition is necessarily         
determined by motive1 and if motive lies
 in the correlation of desire and       
object1 then1 in a being totally        
depraved1 or a being of radically       
corrupt desires1 there can be no ability
 to good deeds3 the deed is as the      
volition1 and the volition is as the    
strongest desire or the sense of the    
most agreeable4  ,hence these           
theologians refer the conversion of man 
exclusively to divine influence4 ,the   

man cannot change his own heart1 nor    
employ any means to that end2 for this  
would imply a volition for which1       
according to the supposition1 he has no 
ability4  ,now1 at the same time1 that  
this class represent men as unable to   
love and obey the truths of religion1   
they engage with great zeal in          
expounding these truths to their minds1 
and in urging upon them the duty of     
obedience4 ,but what is the aim of this 
preaching8 ,perhaps one will reply1 ,i  
know the man cannot determine himself to
 obedience1 but in preaching to him1 ,i 
am presenting motives which may         
influence him4 ,but in denying his      
ability to do good1 you deny the        
possibility of moving him by motives    
drawn from religious truth and          
obligation4 ,his heart1 by supposition1 
is not in correlation with truth and    
duty2 the more1 therefore1 you preach   
truth and duty1 the more intense is the 
sense of the disagreeable which you     
awaken4 ,as when you present objects to 

a man's mind which are correlated to his
 feelings1 the more clearly and         
frequently you present them1 the more   
you advance towards the sense of the    
most agreeable or choice4 ,so when you  
present objects which are not correlated
 to his feelings1 the more clearly and  
frequently you present them1 the more   
you must advance towards the sense of   
the most disagreeable1 or positive      
refusal4  ,if it be affirmed1 in reply  
to this1 that the presentation of truth 
forms the occasion or condition on which
 the divine influence is exerted for the
 regeneration of the heart1 then ,i ask1
 why do you urge the man to repent1 and 
believe1 and love ,god1 and discharge   
religious duty generally1 and rebuke him
 for sin1 when you know that he is      
utterly unable to move1 in the slightest
 degree1 towards any of these affections
 and actions1 and utterly unable to     
leave off sinning1 until the divine     
influence be exerted1 which brings his  
heart into correlation with religion1   

and makes it possible for him to put    
forth the volitions of piety and duty8  
,it can be regarded in no other light   
than playing a solemn farce1 thus to    
rebuke and urge and persuade1 as if the 
man ought to make some exertion when you
 feel convinced that exertion is        
impossible4 ,it certainly can form no   
occasion for divine interposition1      
unless it be in pity of human folly4 ,if
 you say that such a course does succeed
 in the conversion of men1 then we are  
constrained to believe that your        
philosophy is wrong1 and that your      
practice succeeds1 because inconsistent 
with it1 and really belonging to some   
other system which you know not1 or     
understand not and deny4  ,a total      
inability to do good makes man the      
passive subject of influences to be     
employed for his regeneration1 and he   
can no more be considered active in     
effecting it than he is in the process  
of digesting food1 or in the curative   
action of medicines upon any diseased   

part of his system4 ,if you urge him to 
exert himself for his regeneration1 you 
urge him to put forth volitions which1  
according to this philosophy1 are in no 
sense possible until the regeneration   
has been effected1 or at least          
commenced4  ,i will go one step farther 
in this reasoning3--on supposition of   
total inability1 not only is the        
individual a passive subject of         
regenerating influences1 but he is also 
incapable of regeneration1 or any       
disposition or tendency towards         
regeneration1 from any influences which 
lie merely in motives1 produced by      
arraying objects before the mind4       
,motive1 according to the definition1   
exhibited in the statement of ,edwards's
 system1 lies in the nature and         
circumstances of the object standing in 
correlation with the state of mind4 ,now
 the state of mind1 in an unregenerate  
state1 is a state represented by this   
system itself1 as totally adverse to the
 objects of religion4 ,hence1 there is  

no conceivable array of religious truth1
 and no conceivable religious           
exhortation and persuasion that could   
possibly come into such a relation to   
this state of mind as to form the motive
 of a religious choice or volition4 ,it 
is perfectly plain1 that before such a  
result could take place1 the state of   
mind itself would have to be changed4   
,but as the array of religious truth and
 the energy of religious exhortation    
must fail to produce the required       
volitions1 on account of the state of   
mind1 so neither can the state of mind  
be changed by this array of truth or by 
this exhortation4 ,there is a positive  
opposition of mind and object1 and the  
collision becomes more severe upon every
 attempt to bring them together4 ,it    
must follow1 therefore1 that preaching  
truth and duty to the unregenerate1 so  
far from leading to their conversion1   
can only serve to call out more actively
 the necessary determination1 not to    
obey4 ,the very enlightening of the     

intelligence1 as it gives a clearer     
perception of the disagreeable objects1 
only increases the disinclination4  ,nor
 can we pause in this consequence1 at   
human instrumentality4 ,it must be      
equally true1 that if divine            
interposition lies in the presentation  
of truth and persuasions to duty1 only  
that these are given with tenfold light 
and power1 it must fail of accomplishing
 regeneration1 or of producing any      
tendency towards regeneration4 ,the     
heart being in no correlation with      
these1--its sense of the                
disagreeable1--and therefore the energy 
of its refusal will only be the more    
intense and decided4  ,if it should be  
remarked that hope and fear are         
feelings1 which1 even in a state of     
unregeneracy1 can be operated upon1 the 
state of things is equally difficult4   
,no such hope can be operated upon as   
implies desire after religious          
principles and enjoyments2 for this     
cannot belong to the corrupt nature2 nor

 can any fear be aroused which implies a
 reverence of the divine purity1 and an 
abhorrence of sin4 ,the fear could only 
relate to danger and suffering2 and the 
hope1 to deliverance and security1      
independently of moral qualities4 ,the  
mere excitement of these passions might 
awaken attention1 constrain to an       
outward obedience1 and form a very      
prudent conduct1 but could effect no    
purification of the heart4  ,there is   
another class of theologians1 of whom   
,edwards is one1 who endeavour to escape
 the difficulties which attend a total  
inability1 by making the distinction of 
moral and natural inability3--man1 they 
say1 is morally unable to do good1 and  
naturally able to do good1 and therefore
 he can justly be made the subject of   
command1 appeal1 rebuke1 and            
exhortation4 ,the futility of this      
distinction ,i cannot but think has     
already been made apparent4 ,it may be  
well1 however1 inasmuch as so great     
stress is laid upon it1 to call up a    

brief consideration of it in this       
particular connexion4  ,moral inability1
 as we have seen1 is the impossibility  
of a given volition1 because there are  
no motives or causes to produce it4 ,it 
is simply the impossibility of an effect
 for the want of a cause3 when we speak 
of moral cause and effect1 according to 
,edwards1 we speak of nothing different 
from physical cause and effect1 except  
in the quality of the terms--the        
relation of the terms is the same4 ,the 
impossibility of a given volition1      
therefore1 when the appropriate motive  
is wanting1 is equal to the             
impossibility of freezing water in the  
sun of a summer's noon-tide4#a  ,when   
objects of volition are fairly          
presented1 an inability to choose them  
must lie in the state of the mind1      
sensitivity1 desire1 will1 or           
affections1 for all these have the same 
meaning according to this system4 ,there
 is no volition of preference where     
there is no motive to this effect2 and  

there is no motive to this effect where 
the state of the mind is not in         
correlation with the objects presented3 
on the contrary1 the volition which now 
takes place1 is a volition of refusal4  
,natural inability1 as defined by this  
system1 lies in the connexion between   
the volition considered as an           
antecedent1 and the effect required4    
,thus ,i am naturally unable to walk1   
when1 although ,i make the volition1 my 
limbs1 through weakness or disease1 do  
not obey4 ,any defect in the powers or  
instrumentalities dependent for activity
 upon volition1 or any impediment which 
volition cannot surmount1 constitutes   
natural inability4#b ,according to this 
system1 ,i am not held responsible for  
anything which1 through natural         
inability1 cannot be accomplished1      
although the volition is made4 ,but now 
let us suppose that there is no defect  
in the powers or instrumentalities      
dependent for activity upon volition1   
and no impediment which volition cannot 

surmount1 so that there need be only a  
volition in order to have the effect1   
and then the natural ability is         
complete3--,i will to walk1 and ,i walk4
  ,now it is affirmed that a man is     
fairly responsible for the doing of     
anything1 and can be fairly urged to do 
it when all that is necessary for the   
doing of it is a volition although there
 may be a moral inability to the        
volition itself4  ,nothing it seems to  
me can be more absurd than this         
distinction4 ,if liberty be essential to
 responsibility1 liberty1 as we have    
clearly shown1 can no more lie in the   
connexion between volition and its      
effects1 than in the connexion between  
volition and its motives4 ,one is just  
as necessary as the other4 ,if it be    
granted to be absurd with the first     
class of theologians to urge men to do  
right when they are conceived to be     
totally unable to do right1 it is       
equally so when they are conceived to   
have only a natural ability to do right1

 because this natural ability is of no  
avail without a corresponding moral     
ability4 ,if the volition take place1   
there is indeed nothing to prevent the  
action2 nay1 the very willing is the    
doing of it2 but then the volition as an
 effect cannot take place without a     
cause2 and to acknowledge a moral       
inability1 is nothing less than to      
acknowledge that there is no cause to   
produce the required volition4  ,the    
condition of men as represented by the  
second class of theologians1 is not     
really different from their condition as
 represented by the first class4 ,the   
inability under both representations is 
a total inability4 ,in the utter        
impossibility of a right volition on    
these1 is the utter impossibility of any
 good deed4  ,when we have denied       
liberty1 in denying a self-determining  
power1 these definitions in order to    
make out a quasi liberty and ability1   
are nothing but ingenious folly and     
plausible deception4  ,you tell the man1

 indeed1 that he can if he will2 and    
when he replies to you1 that on your own
 principles the required volition is    
impossible1 you refer him to the common 
notions of mankind4 ,according to these1
 you say a man is guilty when he        
forbears to do right1 since nothing is  
wanting to right-doing but a            
volition1--and guilty when he does      
wrong1 because he wills to do wrong4    
,according to these common notions1 too1
 a man may fairly be persuaded to do    
right1 when nothing is wanting but a    
will to do right4 ,but do we find this  
distinction of natural and moral ability
 in the common notions of men8 ,when    
nothing is required to the performance  
of a deed but a volition1 do men        
conceive of any inability whatever8 ,do 
they not feel that the volition has a   
metaphysical possibility as well as that
 the sequent of the volition has a      
physical possibility8 ,have we not at   
least some reason to suspect that the   
philosophy of responsibility1 and the   

basis of rebuke and persuasion lying in 
the common notions of men1 are something
 widely different from the scheme of a  
necessitated volition8  ,this last class
 of theologians1 equally with the first1
 derive all the force of their preaching
 from a philosophy1 upon which they are 
compelled to act1 but which they stoutly
 deny4 ,let them carry out their        
philosophy1 and for preaching no place  
remains4  ,preaching can produce good   
effects only by producing good          
volitions2 and good volitions can be    
produced only by good motives3 but good 
motives can exist under preaching only  
when the subjects of the preaching are  
correlated with the state of mind4 ,but 
by supposition this is not the case1 for
 the heart is totally depraved4  ,to    
urge the unregenerate man to put forth  
volitions in reference to his           
regeneration1 may consist with a        
self-determining power of will1 but is  
altogether irrelevant on this system4   
,it is urging him to do what he cannot  

do2 and indeed what all persuasion must 
fail to do in him as a mere passive     
subject4 ,to assure him that the affair 
is quite easy1 because nothing is       
required of him but to will1 is         
equivalent to assuring him that the     
affair is quite easy1 because it will be
 done when he has done it4 ,the man may 
reply1 the affair would indeed be quite 
easy if there existed in me a motive to 
produce the volition2 but as there does 
not1 the volition is impossible4 ,and as
 ,i cannot put forth the volition       
without the motive1 so neither can ,i   
make the motive which is to produce the 
volition--for then an effect would make 
its cause4 ,what ,i cannot do for       
myself1 ,i fear neither you1 nor indeed 
an angel from heaven will succeed in    
doing for me4 ,you array the truths1 and
 duties1 and prospects of religion      
before my mind1 but they cannot take the
 character of motives to influence my   
will1 because they are not agreeable to 
my heart4  ,you indeed mean well2 but do

 you not perceive that on your own      
principles all your zeal and eloquence  
must necessarily have an opposite effect
 from what you intend8 ,my affections   
not being in correlation with these     
subjects1 the more you urge them1 the   
more intense becomes my sense of the    
most disagreeable1 or my positive       
refusal2 and this1 my good friends1 by a
 necessity which holds us all alike in  
an inevitable and ever-during chain4    
,it is plainly impossible to escape from
 this conclusion1 and yet maintain the  
philosophy4 ,all efforts of this kind1  
made by appealing to the common         
sentiments of mankind1 we have seen are 
self-contradictory4 ,it will not do to  
press forward the philosophy until      
involved in difficulty and perplexity1  
and then to step aside and borrow       
arguments from another system which is  
assumed to be overthrown4 ,there is no  
necessity more absolute and sovereign1  
than a logical necessity4#c  ,,xviii4   
,the cardinal principles of ,edwards's  

system in the sections we have been     
examining1 from which the above         
consequences are deduced1 are the three 
following3  #a4 ,the will is always     
determined by the strongest motive4  #b4
 ,the strongest motive is always the    
most agreeable4  #c4 ,the will is       
necessarily determined4  ,i shall close 
this part of the present treatise with a
 brief examination of the reasoning by  
which he endeavours to establish these  
points4  ,the reasoning by which the    
first point is aimed to be established1 
is the general reasoning respecting     
cause and effect4 ,volition is an       
effect1 and must have a cause4 ,its     
cause is the motive lying in the        
correlation of mind and object4 ,when   
several physical causes conflict with   
each other1 we call that the strongest  
which prevails and produces its         
appropriate effects1 to the exclusion of
 the others4 ,so also where there are   
several moral causes or motives         
conflicting with each other1 we call    

that the strongest which prevails4      
,where a physical cause is not opposed  
by any other force1 it of course        
produces its effect2 and in this case we
 do not say the strongest cause produces
 the effect1 because there is no        
comparison4 ,so also there are cases in 
which there is but one moral cause or   
motive present1 when there being no     
comparison1 we cannot affirm that the   
volition is determined by the strongest 
motive3 the doing of something may be   
entirely agreeable1 and the not doing of
 it may be utterly disagreeable3 in this
 case the motive is only for the doing  
of it4 ,but wherever the case contains a
 comparison of causes or of motives1 it 
must be true that the effect which      
actually takes place1 is produced by the
 strongest cause or motive4 ,this indeed
 is nothing more than a truism1 or a    
mere postulate1 as if we should         
say1--let a cause or motive producing   
effects be called the strongest4 ,it may
 be represented1 also1 as a petitio     

principii1 or reasoning in a            
circle1--since the proof that the will  
is determined by the strongest motive is
 no other than the fact that it is      
determined4 ,it may be stated thus3 ,the
 will is determined by the strongest    
motive4 ,how do you know this8 ,because 
it is determined4 ,how does this prove  
it8 ,because that which determines it   
must be the strongest4#d  ,edwards      
assumes1 also1 that motive is the cause 
of volition4 ,this assumption he        
afterwards endeavours indirectly to     
sustain1 when he argues against a       
self-determining will4 ,if the will do  
not cause its own volitions1 then it    
must follow that motive is the cause4   
,the argument against a self-determining
 will we are about to take up4  #b4 ,the
 strongest motive is always the most    
agreeable4 ,edwards maintains that the  
motive which always prevails to cause   
volition1 has this characteristic1--that
 it is the most agreeable or pleasant at
 the time1 and that volition itself is  

nothing but the sense of the most       
agreeable4 ,if there should be but one  
motive present to the mind1 as in that  
case there would be no comparison1 we   
presume he would only say that the will 
is determined by the agreeable4  ,but   
how are we to know whether the motive of
 every volition has this characteristic 
of agreeableness1 or of most            
agreeableness1 as the case may be8 ,we  
can know it only by consulting our      
consciousness4 ,if1 whenever we will1 we
 find the sense of the most agreeable   
identified with the volition1 and if we 
are conscious of no power of willing1   
save under this condition of willing    
what is most agreeable to us1 then      
certainly there remains no farther      
question on this point4 ,the            
determination of consciousness is final4
 ,whether such be the determination of  
consciousness1 we are hereafter to      
consider4  ,does ,edwards appeal to     
consciousness8  ,he does1--but without  
formally announcing it4 ,the following  

passage is an appeal to consciousness1  
and contains ,edwards's whole thought on
 this subject3 ,there is scarcely a     
plainer and more universal dictate of   
the sense and experience of mankind1    
than that when men act voluntarily1 and 
do what they please1 then they do what  
suits them best1 or what is most        
agreeable to them4 ,to say that they do 
what pleases them1 but yet what is not  
agreeable to them1 is the same thing as 
to say1 they do what they please1 but do
 not act their pleasure2 and that is to 
say1 that they do what they please1 and 
yet do not what they please4 7p4 #be47  
,motives differ widely1 intrinsically   
considered4 ,some are in accordance with
 reason and conscience2 some are opposed
 to reason and conscience4 ,some are    
wise2 some are foolish4 ,some are good2 
some are bad4 ,but whatever may be their
 intrinsic properties1 they all have    
this characteristic of agreeableness    
when they cause volition2 and it is by  
this characteristic that their strength 

is measured4 ,the appeal1 however1 which
 is made to sustain this1 is made in a  
way to beg the very point in question4  
,will not every one admit1 that when men
 act voluntarily and do what they       
please1 they do what suits them best1   
and what is most agreeable to them8     
,yes4 ,is it not a palpable             
contradiction1 to say that men do what  
pleases them1 and yet do what is not    
agreeable to them1 according to the     
ordinary use of these words8 ,certainly4
  ,but the point in question is1 whether
 men1 acting voluntarily1 always do what
 is pleasing to them3 and this point    
,edwards assumes4 ,he assumes it here1  
and he assumes it throughout his        
treatise4 ,we have seen that1 in his    
psychology1 he identifies will and      
desire or the affections3--hence        
volition is the prevailing desire or    
affection1 and the object which moves   
the desire must of course appear        
desirable1 or agreeable1 or pleasant2   
for they have the same meaning4 ,if men 

always will what they most desire1 and  
desire what they will1 then of course   
when they act voluntarily1 they do what 
they please2 and when they do what they 
please1 they do what suits them best and
 is most agreeable to them4  ,edwards   
runs the changes of these words with    
great plausibility1 and we must say     
deceives himself as well as others4 ,the
 great point1--whether will and desire  
are one1--whether the volition is as the
 most agreeable1--he takes up at the    
beginning as an unquestionable fact1 and
 adheres to throughout as such2 but he  
never once attempts an analysis of      
consciousness in relation to it1        
adequate and satisfactory4 ,his         
psychology is an assumption4  #c4 ,the  
will is necessarily determined4  ,how   
does ,edwards prove this8 #a4 ,on the   
general connexion of causes and effects4
 ,causes necessarily produce effects1   
unless resisted and overcome by opposing
 forces2 but where several causes are   
acting in opposition1 the strongest will

 necessarily prevail1 and produce its   
appropriate effects4  ,now1 ,edwards    
affirms that the nature of the connexion
 between motives and volitions is the   
same with that of any other causes and  
effects4 ,the difference is merely in   
the terms3 and when he calls the        
necessity which characterizes the       
connexion of motive and volition a moral
 necessity1 he refers not to the        
connexion itself1 but only to the terms 
connected4 ,in this reasoning he plainly
 assumes that the connexion between     
cause and effect in general1 is a       
necessary connexion2 that is1 all       
causation is necessary4 ,a contingent1  
self-determining cause1 in his system1  
is characterized as an absurdity4 ,hence
 he lays himself open to all the        
consequences of a universal and absolute
 necessity4  #b4 ,he also endeavours to 
prove the necessity of volition by a    
method of approximation4 7p4 #cc47 ,he  
here grants1 for the sake of the        
argument1 that the will may oppose the  

strongest motive in a given case2 but   
then he contends that it is supposable  
that the strength of the motive may be  
increased beyond the strength of the    
will to resist1 and that at this point1 
on the general law of causation1 the    
determination of the will must be       
considered necessary4 ,whatever power1  
he remarks1 men may be supposed to have 
to surmount difficulties1 yet that power
 is not infinite4 ,if the power of the  
man is finite1 that of the motive may be
 supposed to be infinite3 hence the     
resistance of the man must at last be   
necessarily overcome4 ,this reasoning   
seems plausible at first2 but a little  
examination1 ,i think1 will show it to  
be fallacious4 ,edwards does not        
determine the strength of motives by    
inspecting their intrinsic qualities1   
but only by observing their degrees of  
agreeableness4 ,but agreeableness1 by   
his own representation1 is              
relative1--relative to the will or      
sensitivity4 ,a motive of infinite      

strength would be a motive of infinite  
agreeableness1 and could be known to be 
such only by an infinite sense of       
agreeableness in the man4 ,the same of  
course must hold true of any motive less
 than infinite3 and universally1        
whatever be the degree of strength of   
the motive1 there must be in the man an 
affection of corresponding intensity4   
,now1 if there be a power of resistance 
in the will to any motive1 which is     
tending strongly to determine it1 this  
power of resistance1 according to       
,edwards1 must consist of a sense of    
agreeableness opposing the other motive1
 which is likewise a sense of           
agreeableness3 and the question is      
simply1 which shall predominate and     
become a sense of the most agreeable4   
,it is plain that if the first be       
increased1 the second may be supposed to
 be increased likewise2 if the first can
 become infinite1 the second can become 
infinite likewise3 and hence the power  
of resistance may be supposed always to 

meet the motive required to be resisted1
 and a point of necessary determination 
may never be reached4  ,if ,edwards     
should choose to throw us upon the      
strength of motives intrinsically       
considered1 then the answer is ready4   
,there are motives of infinite strength1
 thus considered1 which men are         
continually resisting3 for example1 the 
motive which urges them to obey and love
 ,god1 and seek the salvation of their  
souls4     ,,iii4  ,,an ,,examination   
,,of ,,the ,,arguments ,,against ,a     
,,self-,,determining ,,and ,,contingent 
,,will4  ,edwards's first and great     
argument against a self-determining     
will1 is given in part ,,ii4 sec4 #a1 of
 his work1 and is as follows3  ,the     
will1--or the soul1 or man1 by the      
faculty of willing1 effects every thing 
within its power as a cause1 by acts of 
choice4 ,the will determines which way  
the hands and feet shall move1 by an act
 of choice2 and there is no other way of
 the will's determining1 directing1 or  

commanding any thing at all4 ,hence1 if 
the will determines itself1 it does it  
by an act of choice2 and if it has      
itself under its command1 and determines
 itself in its own actions1 it doubtless
 does it in the same way that it        
determines other things which are under 
its command4 ,but if the will determines
 its choice by its choice1 then of      
course we have an infinite series of    
choices1 or we have a first choice which
 is not determined by a choice1--which  
brings us directly to a contradiction2  
for it supposes an act of the will      
preceding the first act in the whole    
train1 directing and determining the    
rest2 or a free act of the will before  
the first free act of the will3 or else 
we must come at last to an act of the   
will determining the consequent acts1   
wherein the will is not self-determined1
 and so is not a free act1 in this      
notion of freedom4 7p4 #dc47  ,this     
reasoning1 and all that follows in the  
attempt to meet various evasions1 as    

,edwards terms them1 of the advocates of
 a self-determining will1 depend mainly 
upon the assumption1 that if the will   
determines itself1 it must determine    
itself by an act of choice2 that is1    
inasmuch as those acts of the will1 or  
of the soul1 considered in its power of 
willing1 or in its personal activity1 by
 which effects are produced out of the  
activity or will itself1 are produced by
 acts of choice1 for example1 walking   
and talking1 rising up and sitting down3
 therefore1 if the soul1 in the power of
 willing1 cause volitions1 it must cause
 them by volitions4 ,the causative act  
by which the soul causes volitions1 must
 itself be a volition4 ,this assumption 
,edwards does not even attempt to       
sustain1 but takes for granted that it  
is of unquestionable validity4 ,if the  
assumption be of unquestionable         
validity1 then his position is          
impregnable2 for nothing can be more    
palpably absurd than the will           
determining volitions by volitions1 in  

an interminable series4  ,before        
directly meeting the assumption1 ,i     
remark1 that if it be valid1 it is fatal
 to all causality4 ,will is simply      
cause2 volition is effect4 ,i affirm    
that the will is the sole and adequate  
cause of volition4 ,edwards replies3 if 
will is the cause of volition1 then1 to 
cause it1 it must put forth a causative 
act2 but the only act of will is        
volition itself3 hence if it cause its  
own volitions1 it must cause them by    
volitions4  ,now take any other cause3  
there must be some effect which         
according to the general views of men   
stands directly connected with it as its
 effect4 ,the effect is called the      
phenomenon1 or that by which the cause  
manifests itself4 ,but how does the     
cause produce the phenomenon8 ,by a     
causative act3--but this causative act1 
according to ,edwards's reasoning1 must 
itself be an effect or phenomenon4 ,then
 this effect comes between the cause1   
and what was at first considered the    

immediate effect but the effect in      
question must likewise be caused by a   
causative act2 and this causative act1  
again1 being an effect1 must have       
another causative act before it2 and so 
on1 ad infinitum4 ,we have here then an 
infinite series of causative acts--an   
absurdity of the same kind1 with an     
infinite series of volitions4  ,it      
follows from this1 that there can be no 
cause whatever4 ,an infinite series of  
causative acts1 without any first1      
being1 according to this reasoning1 the 
consequence of supposing a cause to     
cause its own acts1 it must therefore   
follow1 that a cause does not cause its 
own acts1 but that they must be caused  
by some cause out of the cause4 ,but the
 cause out of the cause which causes the
 causative acts in question1 must cause 
these causative acts in the other cause 
by a causative act of its own3--but the 
same difficulties occur in relation to  
the second cause as in relation to the  
first2 it cannot cause its own acts1 and

 they must therefore be caused out of   
itself by some other cause2 and so on1  
ad infinitum4 ,we have here again the   
absurdity of an infinite series of      
causative acts2 and also1 the absurdity 
of an infinite series of causes without 
a first cause4 ,otherwise1 we must come 
to a first cause which causes its own   
acts1 without an act of causation2 but  
this is impossible1 according to the    
reasoning of ,edwards4 ,as1 therefore1  
there cannot be a cause causing its own 
acts1 and inasmuch as the denial of this
 leads to the absurdities above         
mentioned1 we are driven to the         
conclusion1 that there is no cause      
whatever4 ,every cause must either cause
 its own acts1 or its acts must be      
caused out of itself4 ,neither of these 
is possible2 therefore1 there is no     
cause4  ,take the will itself as an     
illustration of this last consequence4  
,the will is cause2 the volition1       
effect4 ,but the will does not cause its
 own volition2 the volition is caused by

 the motive4 ,but the motive1 as a      
cause1 must put forth a causative act in
 the production of a volition4 ,if the  
motive determine the will1 then there   
must be an act of the motive to         
determine the will4 ,to determine1 to   
cause1 is to do1 is to act4 ,but what   
determines the act of the motive        
determining the act of the will or      
volition ,if it determine its own act1  
or cause its own act1 then it must do   
this by a previous act1 according to the
 principle of this reasoning2 and this  
again by another previous act2 and so   
on1 ad infinitum4  ,take any other      
cause1 and the reasoning must be the    
same4  ,it may be said in reply to the  
above1 that volition is an effect       
altogether peculiar4 ,it implies        
selection or determination in one       
direction rather than in another1 and   
therefore that in inquiring after its   
cause1 we inquire not merely after the  
energy which makes it existent1 but also
 after the cause of its particular      

determination in one direction rather   
than in another4 ,the question is not so
 much1 how a spirit endowed with        
activity comes to act1 as why it exerts 
such an act1 and not another2 or why it 
acts with a particular determination8   
,if activity of nature be the cause why 
a spirit 7the soul of man1 for instance7
 acts and does not lie still2 yet that  
alone is not the cause why its action is
 thus and thus limited1 directed and    
determined4 7p4 #eh47  ,every phenomenon
 or effect is particular and limited4   
,it must necessarily be one thing and   
not another1 be in one place and not in 
another1 have certain characteristics   
and not others2 and the cause which     
determines the phenomenon1 may be       
supposed to determine likewise all its  
properties4 ,the cause of a particular  
motion1 for example1 must1 in producing 
the motion1 give it likewise a          
particular direction4  ,volition must   
have an object2 something is willed or  
chosen2 particular determination and    

direction are therefore inseparable from
 every volition1 and the cause which    
really gives it a being1 must           
necessarily give it character1 and      
particular direction and determination4 
,selection is the attribute of the      
cause1 and answers to particular        
determination and direction in the      
effect4 ,as a phenomenon or effect      
cannot come to exist without a          
particular determination1 so a cause    
cannot give existence to a phenomenon1  
or effect1 without selection4 ,there    
must necessarily be one object selected 
rather than another4 ,thus1 if fire be  
thrown among various substances1 it     
selects the combustibles1 and produces  
phenomena accordingly4 ,it selects and  
gives particular determination4 ,we     
cannot conceive of cause without        
selection1 nor of effect without a      
particular determination4 ,but in what  
lies the selection8 ,in the nature of   
the cause in correlation with certain   
objects4 ,fire is in correlation with   

certain objects1 and consequently       
exhibits phenomena only with respect to 
them4 ,in chemistry1 under the title of 
affinities1 we have wonderful           
exhibitions of selection and particular 
determination4 ,now motive1 according to
 ,edwards1 lies in the correlation of   
the nature of the will1 or desire1 with 
certain objects2 and volition is the    
effect of this correlation4 ,the        
selection made by will1 arising from its
 nature1 is1 on the principle of        
,edwards1 like the selection made by any
 other cause2 and the particular        
determination or direction of the       
volition1 in consequence of this1 is    
like that which appears in every other  
effect4 ,in the case of will1 whatever  
effect is produced1 is produced of      
necessity1 by a pre-constitution and    
disposition of will and objects1 just as
 in the case of any other cause4  ,from 
this it appears sufficiently evident1   
that on ,edwards's principles there is  
no such difference between volition and 

any other effect1 as to shield his      
reasonings respecting a self-determining
 will1 against the consequences above   
deduced from them4 ,the distinction of  
final and efficient causes does not lie 
in his system4 ,the motive is that which
 produces the sense of the most         
agreeable1 and produces it necessarily1 
and often in opposition to reason and   
conscience2 and this sense of the most  
agreeable is choice or volition4 ,it    
belongs to the opposite system to make  
this distinction in all its clearness   
and force--where the efficient will is  
distinguished1 both from the persuasions
 and allurements of passion and desire1 
and from the laws of reason and         
conscience4  ,thus far my argument      
against ,edwards's assumption1--that1 to
 make the will the cause of its own     
volitions1 is to make it cause its      
volitions by an act of volition1--has   
been indirect4 ,if this indirect        
argument has been fairly and            
legitimately conducted1 few probably    

will be disposed to deny that the       
assumption is overthrown by its         
consequences4 ,in addition to the above1
 however1 on a subject so important1 a  
direct argument will not be deemed      
superfluous4  ,self-determining will    
means simply a will causing its own     
volitions2 and consequently1            
particularly determining and directing  
them4 ,will1 in relation to volition1 is
 just what any cause is in relation to  
its effect4 ,will causing volitions1    
causes them just as any cause causes its
 effects4 ,there is no intervention of  
anything between the cause and effect2  
between will and volition4 ,a cause     
producing its phenomena by phenomena1 is
 a manifest absurdity4 ,in making the   
will a self-determiner1 we do not imply 
this absurdity4 ,edwards assumes that we
 do1 and he assumes it as if it were    
unquestionable4  ,the will1 he first    
remarks1 determines all our external    
actions by volitions1 as the motions of 
the hands and feet4 ,he next affirms1   

generally1 that all which the will      
determines1 it determines in this way2  
and then concludes1 that if it          
determines its own volitions1 they must 
come under the general law1 and be      
determined by volitions4  ,the first    
position is admitted4 ,the second1      
involving the last1 he does not prove1  
and ,i deny that it is unquestionable4  
,in the first place1 it cannot          
legitimately be taken as following from 
the first4 ,the relation of will to the 
sequents of its volitions1 is not       
necessarily the same as its relation to 
its volitions4 ,the sequents of         
volitions are changes or modifications1 
in external nature1 or in parts of the  
being external to the will2 but the     
volitions are modifications of the will 
itself4 ,now if the modification of     
external nature by the will can be      
effected only by that modification of   
itself called volition1 how does it     
appear that this modification of itself1
 if effected by itself1 must be effected

 by a previous modification of itself8  
,we learn from experience1 that         
volitions have sequents in external     
nature1 or in parts of our being1       
external to will2 but this experience   
teaches us nothing respecting the       
production of volitions4 ,the acts of   
the will are volitions1 and all the acts
 of wills are volitions2 but this means 
nothing more than that all the acts of  
the will are acts of the will1 for      
volition means only this--an act of the 
will4 ,but has not the act of the will a
 cause8 ,yes1 you have assigned the     
cause1 in the very language just        
employed4 ,it is the act of the         
will--the will is the cause4 ,but how   
does the will cause its own acts8 ,i do 
not know1 nor do ,i know how any cause  
exerts itself1 in the production of its 
appropriate phenomena2 ,i know merely   
the facts4 ,the connexion between       
volition and its sequents1 is just as   
wonderful and inexplicable1 as the      
connexion between will and its          

volitions4 ,how does volition raise the 
arm or move the foot8 ,how does fire    
burn1 or the sun raise the tides8 ,and  
how does will cause volitions8 ,i know  
not2 but if ,i know that such are the   
facts1 it is enough4  ,volitions must   
have a cause2 but1 says ,edwards1 will  
cannot be the cause1 since this would   
lead to the absurdity of causing        
volitions by volitions4 ,but we cannot  
perceive that it leads to any such      
absurdity4  ,it is not necessary for us 
to explain how a cause acts4 ,if the    
will produce effects in external nature 
by its acts1 it is impossible to connect
 with this as a sequence1 established   
either by experience or logic1 that in  
being received as the cause of its own  
acts1 it becomes such only by willing   
its own acts4 ,it is clearly an         
assumption unsupported1 and incapable of
 being supported4 ,besides1 in denying  
will to be the cause of its own acts1   
and in supplying another cause1 namely1 
the motive1 ,edwards does not escape the

 very difficulty which he creates2 for  
,i have already shown1 that the same    
difficulty appertains to motive1 and to 
every possible cause4 ,every cause      
produces effects by exertion or acting2 
but what is the cause of its acting8 ,to
 suppose it the cause of its own acts1  
involves all the absurdities which      
,edwards attributes to                  
self-determination4 ,but1 ,in the second
 place1--let us look at the connexion of
 cause and phenomena a little more      
particularly4 ,what is cause8 ,it is    
that which is the ground of the         
possible1 and actual existence of       
phenomena4 ,how is cause known8 ,by the 
phenomena4 ,is cause visible8 ,no3      
whatever is seen is phenomenal4 ,we     
observe phenomena1 and by the law of our
 intelligence we assign them to cause4  
,but how do we conceive of cause as     
producing phenomena8 ,by a nisus1 an    
effort1 or energy4 ,is this nisus itself
 a phenomenon8 ,it is when it is        
observed4 ,is it always observed8 ,it is

 not4 ,the nisus of gravitation we do   
not observe2 we observe merely the facts
 of gravitation4 ,the nisus of heat to  
consume we do not observe2 we observe   
merely the facts of combustion4 ,where  
then do we observe this nisus8 ,only in 
will4 ,really1 volition is the nisus or 
effort of that cause which we call will4
 ,i do not wish to anticipate subsequent
 investigations1 but ,i am constrained  
here to ask every one to examine his    
consciousness in relation to this point4
 ,when ,i wish to do anything ,i make an
 effort--a nisus to do it2 ,i make an   
effort to raise my arm1 and ,i raise it4
 ,this effort is simply the volition4 ,i
 make an effort to lift a weight with my
 hand1--this effort is simply the       
volition to lift it1--and immediately   
antecedent to this effort1 ,i recognise 
only my will1 or really only myself4    
,this effort--this nisus--this          
volition--whatever we call it1--is in   
the will itself1 and it becomes a       
phenomenon to us1 because we are causes 

that know ourselves4 ,every nisus1 or   
effort1 or volition1 which we may make1 
is in our consciousness3 causes1 which  
are not self-conscious1 of course do not
 reveal this nisus to themselves1 and   
they cannot reveal it to us because it  
is in the very bosom of the cause       
itself4 ,what we observe in relation to 
all causes--not ourselves1 whether they 
be self-conscious or not1 is not the    
nisus1 but the sequents of the nisus4   
,thus in men we do not observe the      
volition or nisus in their wills1 but   
the phenomena which form the sequents of
 the nisus4 ,and in physical causes1 we 
do not observe the nisus of these       
causes1 but only the phenomena which    
form the sequents of this nisus4 ,but   
when each one comes to himself1 it is   
all different4 ,he penetrates           
himself--knows himself4 ,he is himself  
the cause--he1 himself1 makes the nisus1
 and is conscious of it2 and this nisus 
to him becomes an effect--a phenomenon1 
the first phenomenon by which he reveals

 himself1 but a phenomenon by which he  
reveals himself only to himself4 ,it is 
by the sequents of this nisus1--the     
effects produced in the external visible
 world1 that he reveals himself to      
others4  ,sometimes the nisus or        
volition expends itself in the will1 and
 gives no external phenomena4 ,i may    
make an effort to raise my arm1 but my  
arm may be bound or paralyzed1 and      
consequently the effort is in vain1 and 
is not known without4 ,how energetic are
 the efforts made by the will during a  
fit of the night-mare6 we struggle to   
resist some dreadful force2 we strive to
 run away from danger but all in vain4  
,it is possible for me to make an effort
 to remove a mountain3 ,i may place my  
hand against its side1 and tug1 and     
strive3 the nisus or volition is the    
most energetic that ,i can make1 but1   
save the straining of my muscles1 no    
external expression of the energy of my 
will is given2 ,i am resisted by a      
greater power than myself4  ,the most   

original movement of every cause is1    
then1 this nisus in the bosom of the    
cause itself1 and in man1 as a cause1   
the most original movement is this nisus
 likewise1 which in him we call         
volition4 ,to deny such a nisus would be
 to deny the activity1 efficiency1 and  
energy of cause4 ,this nisus1 by its    
very conception and definition1 admits  
of no antecedent1 phenomenon1 or        
movement3 it is in the substance of the 
cause2 its first going forth to effects4
 ,a first movement or nisus of cause is 
just as necessary a conception as first 
cause itself4 ,there is no conception to
 oppose to this1 but that of every cause
 having its first movement determined by
 some other cause out of itself--a      
conception which runs back in endless   
retrogression without arriving at a     
first cause1 and is1 indeed1 the        
annihilation of all cause4  ,the        
assumption of ,edwards1 therefore1 that 
if will determine its own volitions1 it 
must determine them by an act of        

volition1 is unsupported alike by the   
facts of consciousness and a sound      
logic1--while all the absurdities of an 
infinite series of causation of acts    
really fasten upon his own theory1 and  
destroy it by the very weapons with     
which it assails the opposite system4   
,in the third place1--,edwards virtually
 allows the self-determining power of   
will4  ,will he defines as the desire1  
the affections1 or the sensibility4     
,there is no personal activity out of   
the affections or sensitivity4 ,volition
 is as the most agreeable1 and is itself
 the sense of the most agreeable4 ,but  
what is the cause of volition8 ,he      
affirms that it cannot be will1 assuming
 that to make will the cause of its own 
volitions1 involves the absurdity of    
willing volitions or choosing choices2  
but at the same time he affirms the     
cause to be the state of the affections 
or will1 in correlation with the nature 
and circumstances of objects4 ,but all  
natural causes are in correlation with  

certain objects1--as1 for example1 heat 
is in correlation with combustibles2    
that is1 these natural causes act only  
under the condition of meeting with     
objects so constituted as to be         
susceptible of being acted upon by them4
 ,so1 likewise1 according to ,edwards's 
representation1 we may say that the     
cause of volition is the nature and     
state of the affections or the will1    
acting under the condition of objects   
correlated to it4 ,the sense of the most
 agreeable or choice cannot indeed be   
awakened1 unless there be an object     
presented which shall appear the most   
agreeable2 but then its appearing most  
agreeable1 and its awakening the sense  
of the most agreeable1 depends not only 
upon what appears in the object viewed1 
but also in the manner of the view1 and 
the state and circumstances of the mind 
that views4 7p4 #bb47 ,now the state and
 circumstances of the mind that views1  
and the manner of its view1 is simply   
the mind acting from its inherent nature

 and under its proper conditions1 and is
 a representation which answers to every
 natural cause with which we are        
acquainted3 the state of the mind1      
therefore1 implying of course its       
inherent nature1 may with as much       
propriety be taken as the cause of      
volition1 on ,edwards's own principles1 
as the nature and state of heat may be  
taken as the cause of combustion3 but by
 the state1 of mind1 ,edwards means1    
evidently1 the state of the will or the 
affections4 ,it follows1 therefore1 that
 he makes the state of the will or the  
affections the cause of volition2 but as
 the state of the will or the affections
 means nothing more in reference to will
 than the state of any other cause means
 in reference to that cause1--and as the
 state of a cause1 implying of course   
its inherent nature or constitution1    
means nothing more than its character   
and qualities considered as a           
cause1--therefore he virtually and      
really makes will the cause of its own  

volitions1 as much as any natural cause 
is the cause of its invariable sequents4
  ,edwards1 in contemplating and urging 
the absurdity of determining a volition 
by a volition1 overlooked that1         
according to our most common and        
necessary conceptions of cause1 the     
first movement or action of cause must  
be determined by the cause itself1 and  
that to deny this1 is in fact to deny   
cause4 ,if cause have not within itself 
a nisus to produce phenomena1 then      
wherein is it a cause8 ,he overlooked1  
too1 that in assigning as the cause or  
motive of volition1 the state of the    
will1 he really gave the will a         
self-determining power1 and granted the 
very point he laboured to overthrow4    
,the point in dispute1 therefore1       
between us and ,edwards1 is not1 after  
all1 the self-determining power of the  
will4 ,if will be a cause1 it will be   
self-determining2 for all cause is      
self-determining1 or1 in other words1 is
 in its inherent nature active1 and the 

ground of phenomena4  ,but the real     
point in dispute is this3 ,is the will  
necessarily determined1 or not8  ,the   
inherent nature of cause may be so      
constituted and fixed1 that the nisus by
 which it determines itself to produce  
phenomena1 shall take place according to
 invariable and necessary laws4 ,this we
 believe to be true with respect to all 
physical causes4 ,heat1 electricity1    
galvanism1 magnetism1 gravitation1      
mechanical forces in general1 and the   
powers at work in chemical of           
affinities1 produce their phenomena     
according to fixed1 and1 with respect to
 the powers themselves1 necessary laws4 
,we do not conceive it possible for     
these powers to produce any other       
phenomena1 under given circumstances1   
than those which they actually produce4 
,when a burning coal is thrown into a   
mass of dry gunpowder1 an explosion must
 take place4  ,now1 is it true likewise 
that the cause which we call will1 must1
 under given circumstances1 necessarily 

produce such and such phenomena8 ,must  
its nisus1 its self-determining energy1 
or its volition1 follow a uniform and   
inevitable law8 ,edwards answers yes4   
,will is but the sensitivity1 and the   
inherent nature of the will is fixed1 so
 that its sense of the most agreeable1  
which is its most original nisus or its 
volition1 follows certain necessary     
laws1--necessary in relation to itself4 
,if we know the state of any particular 
will1 and its correlation to every      
variety of object1 we may know1 with the
 utmost certainty1 what its volition    
will be at a given time1 and under given
 circumstances4 ,moral necessity and    
physical necessity differ only in the   
terms1--not in the nature of the        
connexion between the terms4 ,volition  
is as necessary as any physical         
phenomenon4  ,now1 if the will and the  
affections or sensitivity are one1 then1
 as a mere psychological fact1 we must  
grant that volition is necessary2 for   
nothing can be plainer than that the    

desires and affections necessarily      
follow the correlation of the           
sensitivity and its objects4 ,but if we 
can distinguish in the consciousness1   
the will as a personal activity1 from   
the sensitivity1--if we can distinguish 
volition from the strongest desire or   
the sense of the most agreeable1--then  
it will not follow1 because the one is  
necessary1 the other is necessary       
likewise1 unless a necessary connexion  
between the two be also an observed fact
 of consciousness4 ,this will be        
inquired into in another part of our    
undertaking4 ,what we are now mainly    
concerned with1 is ,edwards's argument  
against the conception of a will not    
necessarily determined4 ,this he calls a
 contingent determination of will4 ,we  
adopt the word contingent2 it is        
important in marking a distinction4     
,edwards1 in his argument against a     
contingent determination1 mistakes and  
begs the question under discussion4  #a4
 ,he mistakes the question4 ,contingency

 is treated of throughout as if         
identical with chance or no cause4 ,any 
thing is said to be contingent1 or to   
come to pass by chance or accident1 in  
the original meaning of such words1 when
 its connexion with its causes or       
antecedents1 according to the           
established course of things1 is not    
discerned2 and so is what we have no    
means of foreseeing4 ,and especially is 
any thing said to be contingent or      
accidental1 with regard to us1 when it  
comes to pass without our foreknowledge1
 and beside our design and scope4 ,but  
the word contingent is used abundantly  
in a very different sense2 not for that 
whose connexion with the series of      
things we cannot discern so as to       
foresee the event1 but for something    
which has absolutely no previous ground 
or reason with which its existence has  
any fixed and certain connexion4 7p4    
#ca47  ,thus1 according to ,edwards1 not
 only is contingent used in the same    
sense as chance and accident1 in the    

ordinary and familiar acceptation of    
these words1 but it is also gravely     
employed to represent certain phenomena1
 as without any ground1 or reason1 or   
cause of their existence2 and it is     
under this last point of view that he   
opposes it as applied to the            
determination of the will4 ,in part #b1 
sec4 #c1 he elaborately discusses the   
question--whether any event whatsoever1 
and volition in particular1 can come to 
pass without a cause of its existence2  
and in sec4 #d1--whether volition can   
arise without a cause1 through the      
activity of the nature of the soul4     
,if1 in calling volitions               
contingent1--if1 in representing the    
determination of the will as contingent1
 we intended to represent a class of    
phenomena as existing without any       
previous ground or reason with which    
their existence has a fixed and certain 
connexion1--as existing without any     
cause whatever1 and therefore as        
existing by chance1 or as really        

self-existent1 and therefore not        
demanding any previous ground for their 
existence1--it seems to me that no      
elaborate argument would be required to 
expose the absurdity of our position4   
,that every phenomenon must have a      
cause1 is unquestionably one of those   
primitive truths which neither require  
nor admit of a demonstration1 because   
they precede all demonstration1 and must
 be assumed as the basis of all         
demonstration4  ,by a contingent will1  
,i do not mean a will which is not a    
cause4 ,by contingent volitions1 ,i do  
not mean volitions which exist without a
 cause4 ,by a contingent will1 ,i mean a
 will which is not a necessitated will1 
but what ,i conceive only and truly to  
be a free will4 ,by contingent          
volitions1 ,i mean volitions belonging  
to a contingent or free will4 ,i do not 
oppose contingency to cause1 but to     
necessity4 ,let it be supposed that we  
have a clear idea of necessity1 then    
whatever is not necessary ,i call       

contingent4  ,now an argument against   
contingency of will on the assumption   
that we intend1 under this title1 to    
represent volitions as existing without 
a cause1 is irrelevant1 since we mean no
 such thing4  ,but an argument          
attempting to prove that contingency is 
identical with chance1 or no cause1 is a
 fair argument2 but then it must be     
remembered that such an argument really 
goes to prove that nothing but necessity
 is possible1 for we mean by contingency
 that which is opposed to necessity4    
,the argument must therefore turn upon  
these two points3 ,first1 is contingency
 a possible conception1 or is it in     
itself contradictory and absurd8 ,this  
is the main question2 for if it be      
decided that contingency is a           
contradictory and absurd conception1    
then we are shut up to a universal and  
an absolute necessity1 and no place     
remains for inquiry respecting a        
contingent will4 ,but if it be decided  
to be a possible and rational           

conception1 then the second point will  
be1 to determine whether the will be    
contingent or necessary4  ,the first    
point is the only one which ,i shall    
discuss in this place4 ,the second      
properly belongs to the psychological   
investigations which are to follow4 ,but
 ,i proceed to remark1 #b4 that         
,edwards1 in his argument against a     
contingent will1 really begs the        
question in dispute4 ,in the first      
place1 he represents the will as        
necessarily determined4 ,this is brought
 out in a direct and positive argument  
contained in the first part of his      
treatise4 ,here necessity is made       
universal and absolute4 ,then1 in the   
second place1 when he comes particularly
 to discuss contingency1 he assumes that
 it means no cause1 and that necessity  
is inseparable from the idea of cause4  
,now this is plainly a begging of the   
question1 as well as a mistaking of it2 
for when we are inquiring whether there 
be any thing contingent1 that is1 any   

thing opposed to necessity1 he begins   
his argument by affirming all cause to  
be necessary1 and contingency as        
implying no cause4 ,if all cause be     
necessary1 and contingency imply no     
cause1 there is no occasion for inquiry 
after contingency2 for it is already    
settled that there can be no            
contingency4 ,the very points we are    
after1 as we have seen1 are these two3  
whether contingency be possible2 and    
whether there be any cause1 for example1
 will1 which is contingent4  ,if        
,edwards has both mistaken and begged   
the question respecting a contingent    
will1 as ,i think clearly appears1 then 
of course he has logically determined   
nothing in relation to it4  ,but whether
 this be so or not1 we may proceed now  
to inquire whether contingency be a     
possible and rational conception1 or    
whether it be contradictory and absurd4 
,necessity and contingency are then two 
ideas opposed to each other4 ,they at   
least cannot co-exist in relation to the

 same subject4 ,that which is necessary 
cannot be contingent at the same time1  
and vice versa4 ,whether contingency is 
a possible conception and has place in  
relation to any subject1 remains to be  
determined4  ,let us seek a definition  
of these opposing ideas3 we will begin  
with necessity1 because that this idea  
is rational and admits of actual        
application is not questioned4 ,the only
 point in question respecting it1 is1   
whether it be universal1 embracing all  
beings1 causes1 and events4  ,what is   
necessity8 ,edwards defines necessity   
under two points of view3--  #a4 ,viewed
 in relation to will4  #b4 ,viewed      
irrespective of will4  ,the first1      
supposes that opposition of will is     
possible1 but insufficient2--for        
example3 it is possible for me to place 
myself in opposition to a rushing       
torrent1 but my opposition is           
insufficient1 and the progress of the   
torrent relatively to me is necessary4  
,the second does not take will into     

consideration at all1 and applies to    
subjects where opposition of will is not
 supposable2 for example1 logical       
necessity1 a is b1 and c is a1 therefore
 c is b3 mathematical necessity1 #b x #b
  #d4 ,the centre of a circle is a point
 equally distant from every point in the
 circumference3 metaphysical necessity1 
the existence of a first cause1 of time1
 of space4 ,edwards comprehends this    
second kind of necessity under the      
general designation of metaphysical or  
philosophical4 ,this second kind of     
necessity undoubtedly is absolute4 ,it  
is impossible to conceive of these      
subjects differently from what they are4
 ,we cannot conceive of no space2 no    
time2 or that #b x #b  #e1 and so of the
 rest4  ,necessity under both points of 
view he distinguishes into particular   
and general4  ,relative necessity1 as   
particular1 is a necessity relative to  
individual will2 as general1 relative to
 all will4  ,metaphysical necessity1 as 
particular1 is a necessity irrespective 

of individual will2 as general1         
irrespective of all will4  ,relative    
necessity is relative to the will in the
 connexion between volition and its     
sequents4 ,when a volition of individual
 will takes place1 without the sequent  
aimed at1 because a greater force is    
opposed to it1 then the sequent of this 
greater force is necessary with a       
particular relative necessity4 ,when the
 greater force is greater than all      
supposable will1 then its sequents take 
place by a general relative necessity4  
,it is plain however1 that under all    
supposable will1 the will of ,god cannot
 be included1 as there can be no greater
 force than a divine volition4          
,metaphysical necessity1 when           
particular1 excludes the opposition of  
individual will4 ,under this ,edwards   
brings the connexion of motive and      
volition4 ,the opposition of will1 he   
contends1 is excluded from this         
connexion1 because will can act only by 
volition1 and motive is the cause of    

volition4 ,volition is necessary by a   
particular metaphysical necessity1      
because the will of the individual      
cannot be opposed to it2 but not with a 
general metaphysical necessity1 because 
other wills may be opposed to it4       
,metaphysical necessity1 when general1  
excludes the opposition of all          
will--even of infinite will4 ,that #b x 
#b  #d--that the centre of a circle is a
 point equally distant from every point 
in the circumference--the existence of  
time and space--are all true and real1  
independently of all will4 ,will hath   
not constituted them1 nor can will      
destroy them4 ,it would imply a         
contradiction to suppose them different 
from what they are4 ,according to       
,edwards1 too1 the divine volitions are 
necessary with a general metaphysical   
necessity1 because1 as these volitions  
are caused by motives1 and infinite     
will1 as well as finite will1 must act  
by volitions1 the opposition of infinite
 will itself is excluded in the         

production of infinite volitions4  ,now 
what is the simple idea of necessity    
contained in these two points of view1  
with their two-fold distinction8        
,necessity is that which is and which   
cannot possibly not be1 or be otherwise 
than it is4  #a4 ,an event necessary by 
a relative particular necessity1 is an  
event which is and cannot possibly not  
be or be otherwise by the opposition of 
an individual will4  #b4 ,an event      
necessary by a relative general         
necessity1 is an event which cannot     
possibly not be1 or be otherwise by the 
opposition of all finite will4 ,in these
 cases1 opposition of will of course is 
supposable4  #c4 ,an event is necessary 
by a metaphysical particular necessity1 
when it is1 and admits of no possible   
opposition from the individual will4    
#d4 ,an event is necessary by a         
metaphysical general necessity1 when it 
is1 and cannot possibly admit of        
opposition even from infinite will4     
,all this1 however1 in the last analysis

 on ,edwards's system1 becomes absolute 
necessity4 ,the infinite will is        
necessarily determined by a metaphysical
 general necessity4 ,all events are     
necessarily determined by the infinite  
will4 ,hence1 all events are necessarily
 determined by a metaphysical general   
necessity4 ,particular and relative     
necessity are merely the absolute and   
general necessity viewed in the         
particular individual and relation3--the
 terms characterize only the manner of  
our view4 ,the opposition of the        
particular will being predetermined by  
the infinite will1 which comprehends    
all1 is to the precise limit of its     
force absolutely necessary2 and the     
opposite force which overcomes the      
opposition of the particular will1      
produces its phenomena necessarily not  
only in reference to the particular     
will1 but also in reference to the      
infinite will which necessarily         
pre-determines it4  ,having thus settled
 the definition of necessity1 and that  

too1 on ,edwards's own grounds1 we are  
next to inquire1 what is the opposite   
idea of contingency1 and whether it has 
place as a rational idea8  ,necessity is
 that which is1 and which cannot        
possibly not be1 or be otherwise than it
 is4 ,contingency then1 as the opposite 
idea1 must be that which is1 or may be1 
and which possibly might not be1 or     
might be otherwise than it is4 ,now1    
contingency cannot have place with      
respect to anything which is independent
 of will2--time and space2--mathematical
 and metaphysical truths1 for example1  
that all right angles are equal1 that   
every phenomenon supposes a cause1      
cannot be contingent1 for they are seen 
to be real and true in themselves4 ,they
 do not arise from will1 nor is it      
conceivable that will can alter them1   
for it is not conceivable that they     
admit of change from any source4 ,if the
 idea of contingency have place as a    
rational idea1 it must be with respect  
to causes1 being1 and phenomena1 which  

depend upon will4 ,the whole creation is
 the effect of divine volition4 ,god    
said1 let there be light1 and there was 
light3 thus did the whole creation come 
to be4  ,now every one will grant1 that 
the creation does not seem necessary as 
time and space2 and intuitive truths    
with their logical deductions1 seem     
necessary4 ,we cannot conceive of these 
as having not been1 or as ceasing to be2
 but we can conceive of the creation as 
not having been1 and as ceasing to be4  
,no space is an impossible conception2  
but no body1 or void space1 is a        
possible conception2 and as the         
existence of body may be annihilated in 
thought1 so1 likewise1 the particular   
forms and relations of body may be      
modified in thought1 indefinitely1      
different from their actual form4 ,now1 
if we wish to express in one word this  
difference between space and body1 or in
 general this difference between that   
which exists independently of will1 and 
that which exists purely as the effect  

of will1 we call the first necessary2   
the second1 contingent4 ,the first we   
cannot conceive to be different from    
what it is4 ,the second we can conceive 
to be different from what it is4 ,what  
is true of the creation considered as a 
collection of beings and things1 is true
 likewise of all the events taking place
 in this creation4 ,all these events are
 either directly or mediately the       
effects of will1 divine or human4 ,now  
we can conceive of these as not being at
 all1 or as being modified indefinitely1
 different from what they are2--and     
under this conception we call them      
contingent4  ,no one ,i think will deny 
that we do as just represented1 conceive
 of the possibility of the events and   
creations of will1 either as having no  
being1 or as being different from what  
they are4 ,this conception is common to 
all men4 ,what is the meaning of this   
conception8 ,is it a chimera8 ,it must  
be a chimera1 if the system of ,edwards 
be true2 for according to this1 there   

really is no possibility that any event 
of will might have had no being at all1 
or might have been different from what  
it is4 ,will is determined by motives   
antecedent to itself4 ,and this applies 
to the divine will1 likewise1 which is  
determined by an infinite and necessary 
wisdom4 ,the conception1 therefore1 of  
the possibility of that which is1 being 
different from what it is1 must on this 
system be chimerical4 ,but although the 
system would force us to this           
conclusion1 the conception still reigns 
in our minds1 and does not seem to us   
chimerical2--the deduction from the     
system strangely conflicts with our     
natural and spontaneous judgements4     
,there are few men who would not be     
startled by the dogma that all things   
and all events1 even the constantly     
occuring volitions of their minds1 are  
absolutely necessary1 as necessary as a 
metaphysical axiom or a mathematical    
truth1--necessary with a necessity which
 leaves no possibility of their being   

otherwise than they actually are4 ,there
 are few perhaps of the theological     
abettors of ,edwards's system1 who would
 not also be startled by it4 ,i suppose 
that these would generally attempt to   
evade the broad conclusion1 by          
contending that the universal necessity 
here represented1 being merely a        
metaphysical necessity1 does not affect 
the sequents of volition2 that if a man 
can do as he pleases1 he has a natural  
liberty and ability which relieves him  
from the chain of metaphysical          
necessity4 ,i have already shown how    
utterly futile this attempted           
distinction is--how completely the      
metaphysical necessity embraces the so  
called natural liberty and ability4 ,if 
nothing better than this can be resorted
 to1 then we have no alternative left   
but to exclaim with ,shelley1           
,necessity1 thou mother of the world6   
,but why the reluctance to escape from  
this universal necessity8 ,do the       
abettors of this system admit that there

 is something opposed to necessity8 ,but
 what is this something opposed to      
necessity8 ,do they affirm that choice  
is opposed to necessity8 ,but how       
opposed--is choice contingent8 ,do they 
admit the possibility that any choice   
which is1 might not have been at all1 or
 might have been different from what it 
is8  ,we surely do not distinguish      
choice from necessity by merely calling 
it choice1 or an act of the will4 ,if   
will is not necessitated1 we wish to    
know under what condition it exists4    
,volition is plainly under necessity on 
,edwards's system1 just as every other  
event is under necessity4 ,and the      
connexion between volition and its      
sequents is just as necessary as the    
connexion between volition and its      
motives4 ,explain1--why do you endeavour
 to evade the conclusion of this system 
when you come to volition8 why do you   
claim liberty here8 ,do you likewise    
have a natural and spontaneous judgement
 against a necessitated will8 ,it is    

evident that while ,edwards and his     
followers embrace the doctrine of       
necessity in its cardinal principles1   
they shrink from its application to     
will4 ,they first establish the doctrine
 of necessity universally and           
absolutely1 and then claim for will an  
exception from the general law1--not by 
logically and psychologically pointing  
out the grounds and nature of the       
exception1 but by simply appealing to   
the spontaneous and natural judgements  
of men1 that they are free when they do 
as they please3 but no definition of    
freedom is given which distinguishes it 
from necessity2--nor is the natural and 
spontaneous judgement against necessity 
of volition explained and shown not be a
 mere illusion4  ,there is an idea      
opposed to necessity1 says this         
spontaneous judgement--and the will     
comes under the idea opposed to         
necessity4 ,but what is this idea       
opposed to necessity1 and how does the  
will come under it8 ,edwards and his    

followers have not answered these       
questions--their attempt at a solution  
is self-contradictory and void4  ,is    
there any other idea opposed to         
necessity than that of contingency1     
viz4--that which is or may be1 and      
possibly might not be1 or might be      
otherwise than it is8 ,that #b x #b  #d 
is a truth which cannot possibly not be1
 or be otherwise than it is4 ,but this  
book which ,i hold in my hand1 ,i can   
conceive of as not being at all1 or     
being different from what it is1 without
 implying any contradiction1 according  
to this spontaneous judgement4  ,the    
distinction between right and wrong1 ,i 
cannot conceive of as not existing1 or  
as being altered so as to transpose the 
terms1 making that right which now is   
wrong1 and that wrong which now is      
right4 ,but the volition which ,i now   
put forth to move this pen over the     
paper1 ,i can conceive of as not        
existing1 or as existing under a        
different mode1 as a volition to write  

words different from those which ,i am  
writing4 ,that this idea of contingency 
is not chimerical1 seems settled by     
this1 that all men naturally have it1   
and entertain it as a most rational     
idea4 ,indeed even those who hold the   
doctrine of necessity1 do either adopt  
this idea in relation to will by a      
self-contradiction1 and under a false   
position1 as the abettors of the scheme 
which ,i am opposing for example1 or in 
the ordinary conduct of life1 they act  
upon it4 ,all the institutions of       
society1 all government and law1 all our
 feelings of remorse and compunction1   
all praise and blame1 and all language  
itself1 seem based upon it4 ,the idea of
 contingency as above explained1 is     
somehow connected with will1 and all the
 creations and changes arising from     
will4  ,that the will actually does come
 under this idea of contingency1 must be
 shown psychologically if shown at all4 
,an investigation to this effect must be
 reserved therefore for another         

occasion4 ,in this place1 ,i shall      
simply inquire1 how the will may be     
conceived as coming under the idea of   
contingency8  ,the contingency of any   
phenomenon or event must depend upon the
 nature of its cause4 ,a contingent     
phenomenon or event is one which may be 
conceived of1 as one that might not have
 been at all1 or might have been        
different from what it is2 but wherein  
lies the possibility that it might not  
have been at all1 or might have been    
different from what it is8 ,this        
possibility cannot lie in itself1 for an
 effect can determine nothing in        
relation to its own existence4 ,neither 
can it lie in anything which is not its 
cause1 for this can determine nothing in
 relation to its existence4 ,the cause  
therefore which actually gives it       
existence1 and existence under its      
particular form1 can alone contain the  
possibility of its not having existed at
 all1 or of its having existed under a  
different form4 ,but what is the nature 

of such a cause8 ,it is a cause which in
 determining a particular event1 has at 
the very moment of doing so1 the power  
of determining an opposite event4 ,it is
 a cause not chained to any class of    
effects by its correlation to a certain 
class of objects--as fire1 for example1 
is chained to combustion by its         
correlation to a certain class of       
objects which we thence call            
combustibles4 ,it is a cause which must 
have this peculiarity in opposition to  
all other causes1 that it forbears of   
itself to produce an effect which it may
 produce1 and of any given number of    
effects alike within its power1 it may  
take any one of them in opposition to   
all the others2 and at the very moment  
it takes one effect1 it has the power of
 taking any other4 ,it is a cause       
contingent and not necessitated4 ,the   
contingency of the event1 therefore1    
arises from the contingency of the      
cause4 ,now every cause must be a       
necessary or not necessary cause4 ,a    

necessary cause is one which cannot be  
conceived of as having power to act     
differently from its actual             
developements--fire must                
burn--gravitation must draw bodies      
towards the earth's centre4 ,if there be
 any cause opposed to this1 it can be   
only the contingent cause above defined1
 for there is no third conception4 ,we  
must choose therefore between a         
universal and absolute necessity1 and   
the existence of contingent causes4 ,if 
we take necessity to be universal and   
absolute1 then we must take all the     
consequences1 likewise1 as deduced in   
part ,,ii4 ,there is no possible escape 
from this4 ,as then all causes must be  
either necessary or contingent1 we bring
 will under the idea of contingency1 by 
regarding it as a contingent cause--a   
power to do1 or not to do1#e--or a      
faculty of determining to do1 or not to 
do something which we conceive to be in 
our power4#f  ,we may here inquire      
wherein lies the necessity of a cause   

opposed to a contingent cause8 ,its     
necessity lies in its nature1 also4     
,what is this nature8 ,it is a nature in
 fixed correlation with certain objects1
 so that it is inconceivable that its   
phenomena might be different from those 
which long and established observation  
have assigned to it4 ,it is             
inconceivable that fire might not burn  
when thrown amid combustibles2 it is    
inconceivable that water might not      
freeze at the freezing temperature4 ,but
 is this necessity a necessity per se1  
or a determined necessity8 ,it is a     
determined necessity--determined by the 
creative will4 ,if the creative will be 
under the law of necessity1 then of     
course every cause determined by will   
becomes an absolute necessity4  ,the    
only necessity per se is found in that  
infinite and necessary wisdom in which  
,edwards places the determining motives 
of the divine will4 ,all intuitive      
truths and their logical deductions are 
necessary per se4 ,but the divine will  

is necessary with a determined necessity
 on ,edwards's system1--and so of all   
other wills and all other causes1       
dependent upon will--the divine will    
being the first will determined4 ,we    
must recollect1 however1 that on        
,edwards's theory of causation1 a cause 
is always determined out of itself2 and 
that consequently there can be no cause 
necessary per se2 and yet at the same   
time there is by this theory1 an        
absolute necessity throughout all       
causality4  ,now let us consider the    
result of making will a contingent      
cause4 ,in the first place1 we have the 
divine will as the first and supreme    
contingent cause4 ,then consequently in 
the second place1 all causes ordained by
 the divine will1 considered as effects1
 are contingent4 ,they might not have   
been4 ,they might cease to be4 ,they    
might be different from what they are4  
,but in the third place1 these causes   
considered as causes1 are not all       
contingent4 ,only will is contingent4   

,physical causes are necessary with a   
determined necessity4 ,they are         
necessary as fixed by the divine will4  
,they are necessary with a relative     
necessity--relatively to the divine     
will4 ,they put forth their nisus1 and  
produce phenomena by a fixed and        
invariable law1 established by the      
divine will4 ,but will is of the nature1
 being made after the image of the      
divine will4 ,the divine will is        
infinite power1 and can do everything   
possible to cause4 ,the created will is 
finite power1 and can do only what is   
within its given capacity4 ,its         
volitions or its efforts1 or its nisus  
to do1 are limited only by the extent of
 its intelligence4 ,it may make an      
effort1 or volition1 or nisus1 to do    
anything of which it can conceive--but  
the actual production of phenomena out  
of itself1 must depend upon the         
instrumental and physical connexion     
which the divine will has established   
between it and the world1 external to   

itself4 ,of all the volitions or nisus  
within its capacity1 it is not          
necessitated to any one1 but may make   
any one1 at any time2 and at the time it
 makes any one nisus or volition1 it has
 the power of making any other4  ,it is 
plain1 moreover1 that will is efficient1
 essential1 and first cause4 ,whatever  
other causes exist1 are determined and  
fixed by will1 and are therefore        
properly called secondary or            
instrumental causes4 ,and as we         
ourselves are will1 we must first of    
all1 and most naturally and most truly  
gain our idea of cause from ourselves4  
,we cannot penetrate these second       
causes--we observe only their phenomena2
 but we know ourselves in the very first
 nisus of causation4  ,to reason        
therefore from these secondary causes to
 ourselves1 is indeed reversing the     
natural and true order on this subject4 
,now what is the ground of all this     
clamour against contingency8 ,do you say
 it represents phenomena as existing    

without cause8 ,we deny it4 ,we oppose  
contingency not to cause1 but to        
necessity4 ,do you say it is contrary to
 the phenomena of physical              
causation1--we reply that you have no   
right to reason from physical causes to 
that cause which is yourself4 ,for in   
general you have no right to reason from
 the laws and properties of matter to   
those of mind4 ,do you affirm that      
contingency is an absurd and pernicious 
doctrine--then turn and look at the     
doctrine of an absolute necessity in all
 its bearings and consequences1 and     
where lies the balance of absurdity and 
pernicious consequences8 ,but we deny   
that there is anything absurd and       
pernicious in contingency as above      
explained4 ,that it is not pernicious1  
but that on the contrary1 it is the     
basis of moral and religious            
responsibility1 will clearly appear in  
the course of our inquiries4  ,after    
what has already been said in the       
preceding pages1 it perhaps is          

unnecessary to make any further reply to
 its alleged absurdity4  ,there is one  
form under which this allegation comes  
up1 however1 which is at first sight so 
plausible1 that ,i shall be pardoned for
 prolonging this discussion in order to 
dispose of it4 ,it is as follows3 ,that 
in assigning contingency to will1 we do 
not account for a volition being in one 
direction rather than in another4 ,the  
will1 it is urged1 under the idea of    
contingency1 is indifferent to any      
particular volition4 ,how then can we   
explain the fact that it does pass out  
of this state of indifferency to a      
choice or volition8  ,in answer to this1
 ,i remark3--,it has already been made  
clear1 that selection and particular    
determination belong to every cause4 ,in
 physical causes1 this selection and    
particular determination lies in the    
correlation of the nature of the cause  
with certain objects2 and this selection
 and particular determination are       
necessary by a necessity determined out 

of the cause itself--that is1 they are  
determined by the creative will1 which  
gave origin to the physical and         
secondary causes4 ,now ,edwards affirms 
that the particular selection and       
determination of will take place in the 
same way4 ,the nature of the will is    
correlated to certain objects1 and this 
nature1 being fixed by the creative     
will1 which gave origin to the secondary
 dependent will1 the selection and      
particular determination of will1 is    
necessary with a necessity determined   
out of itself4 ,but to a necessitated   
will1 we have nothing to oppose except a
 will whose volitions are not determined
 by the correlation of its nature with  
certain objects--a will1 indeed1 which  
has not its nature correlated to any    
objects1 but a will indifferent2 for if 
its nature were correlated to objects1  
its particular selection and            
determination would be influenced by    
this1 and consequently its action would 
become necessary1 and that too by a     

necessity out of itself2 and fixed by   
the infinite will4 ,in order to escape  
an absolute and universal necessity1    
therefore1 we must conceive of a will   
forming volitions particular and        
determinate1 or in other words1 making a
 nisus towards particular objects1      
without any correlation of its nature   
with the objects4 ,is this conception a 
possible and rational conception8 ,it is
 not a possible conception if will and  
the sensitivity1 or the affections are  
identical--for the very definition of   
will then becomes that of a power in    
correlation with objects1 and           
necessarily affected by them4  ,but now 
let us conceive of the will as simply   
and purely an activity or cause1 and    
distinct from the sensitivity or        
affections--a cause capable of producing
 changes or phenomena in relation to a  
great variety of objects1 and conscious 
that it is thus capable1 but conscious  
also that it is not drawn by any        
necessary affinity to any one of them4  

,is this a possible and rational        
conception8 ,it is indeed the conception
 of a cause different from all other    
causes2 and on this conception there are
 but two kinds of causes4 ,the physical1
 which are necessarily determined by the
 correlation of their nature with       
certain objects1 and will1 which is a   
pure activity not thus determined1 and  
therefore not necessitated1 but         
contingent4  ,now ,i may take this as a 
rational conception1 unless its palpable
 absurdity can be pointed out1 or it can
 be proved to involve some              
contradiction4  ,does the objector      
allege1 as a palpable absurdity1 that   
there is1 after all1 nothing to account 
for the particular determination8 ,i    
answer that the particular determination
 is accounted for in the very quality or
 attribute of the cause4 ,in the case of
 a physical cause1 the particular       
determination is accounted for in the   
quality of the cause1 which quality is  
to be necessarily correlated to the     

object4 ,in the case of will1 the       
particular determination is accounted   
for in the quality of the cause1 which  
quality is to have the power to make the
 particular determination without being 
necessarily correlated to the object4 ,a
 physical cause is a cause fixed1       
determined1 and necessitated4 ,the will 
is a cause contingent and free4 ,a      
physical cause is a cause instrumental  
of a first cause3--the will is first    
cause itself4 ,the infinite will is the 
first cause inhabiting eternity1 filling
 immensity1 and unlimited in its energy4
 ,the human will is first cause         
appearing in time1 confined to place1   
and finite in its energy2 but it is the 
same in kind1 because made in the       
likeness of the infinite will2 as first 
cause it is self moved1 it makes its    
nisus of itself1 and of itself it       
forbears to make it2 and within the     
sphere of its activity1 and in relation 
to its objects1 it has the power of     
selecting by a mere arbitrary act1 any  

particular object4 ,it is a cause1 all  
whose acts1 as well as any particular   
act1 considered as phenomena demanding a
 cause1 are accounted for in itself     
alone4 ,this does not make the created  
will independent of the uncreated4 ,the 
very fact of its being a created will1  
settles its dependence4 ,the power which
 created it1 has likewise limited it1   
and could annihilate it4 ,the power     
which created it1 has ordained and fixed
 the instrumentalities by which         
volitions become productive of effects4 
,the man may make the volition or nisus1
 to remove a mountain1 but his arm fails
 to carry out the nisus4 ,his volitions 
are produced freely of himself2 they are
 unrestrained within the capacity of    
will given him1 but he meets on every   
side those physical causes which are    
mightier than himself1 and which1       
instrumental of the divine will1 make   
the created will aware of its feebleness
 and dependence4  ,but although the will
 is an activity or cause thus           

contingent1 arbitrary1 free1 and        
indifferent1 it is an activity or cause 
united with sensitivity and reason2 and 
forming the unity of the soul4 ,will1   
reason1 and1 the sensitivity or the     
affections1 constitute mind1 or spirit1 
or soul4 ,although the will is arbitrary
 and contingent1 yet it does not follow 
that it must act without regard to      
reason or feeling4  ,i have yet to make 
my appeal to consciousness2 ,i am now   
only giving a scheme of psychology in   
order to prove the possibility of a     
contingent will1 that we have nothing   
else to oppose to an absolute and       
universal necessity4  ,according to this
 scheme1 we take the will as the        
executive of the soul or the doer4 ,it  
is a doer having life and power in      
itself1 not necessarily determined in   
any of its acts1 but a power to do or   
not to do4 ,reason we take as the       
lawgiver4 ,it is the source and         
substance of pure1 immutable1 eternal1  
and necessary truth4 ,this teaches and  

commands the executive will what ought  
to be done4 ,the sensitivity or the     
affections1 or the desire1 is the seat  
of enjoyment3 it is the capacity of     
pleasure and pain4 ,objects1 in general1
 hold to the sensitivity the relation of
 the agreeable or the disagreeable1 are 
in correlation with it2 and1 according  
to the degree of this correlation1 are  
the emotions and passions awakened4     
,next let the will be taken as the chief
 characteristic of personality1 or more 
strictly1 as the personality itself4 ,by
 the personality1 ,i mean the me1 or    
myself4 ,the personality--the me--the   
will1 a self-moving cause1 directs      
itself by an act of attention to the    
reason1 and receives the laws of its    
action4 ,the perception of these laws is
 attended with the conviction of their  
rectitude and imperative obligation2 at 
the same time1 there is the             
consciousness of power to obey or to    
disobey them4  ,again1 let the will be  
supposed to direct itself in an act of  

attention to the pleasurable emotions   
connected with the presence of certain  
objects2 and the painful emotions       
connected with the presence of other    
objects2 and then the desire of         
pleasure1 and the wish to avoid pain1   
become rules of action4 ,there is here  
again the consciousness of power to     
resist or to comply with the            
solicitations of desire4 ,the will may  
direct itself to those objects which    
yield pleasure1 or may reject them1 and 
direct itself towards those objects     
which yield only pain and disgust4  ,we 
may suppose again two conditions of the 
reason and sensitivity relatively to    
each other2 a condition of agreement1   
and a condition of disagreement4 ,if the
 affections incline to those objects    
which the reason approves1 then we have 
the first condition4 ,if the affections 
are repelled in dislike by those objects
 which reason approves1 then we have the
 second condition4 ,on the first        
condition1 the will1 in obeying reason1 

gratifies the sensitivity1 and vice     
versa4 ,on the second1 in obeying the   
reason1 it resists the sensitivity1 and 
vice versa4  ,now if the will were      
always governed by the highest reason1  
without the possibility of resistance1  
it would be a necessitated will2 and if 
it were always governed by the strongest
 desire1 without the possibility of     
resistance1 it would be a necessitated  
will2 as much so as in the system of    
,edwards1 where the strongest desire is 
identified with volition4  ,the only    
escape from necessity1 therefore1 is in 
the conception of a will as above       
defined--a conscious1 self-moving power1
 which may obey reason in opposition to 
passion1 or passion in opposition to    
reason1 or obey both in their harmonious
 union2 and lastly1 which may act in the
 indifference of all1 that is1 act      
without reference either to reason or   
passion4 ,now when the will obeys the   
laws of the reason1 shall it be asked1  
what is the cause of the act of         

obedience8 ,the will is the cause of its
 own act2 a cause per se1 a cause       
self-conscious and self-moving2 it obeys
 the reason by its own nisus4 ,when the 
will obeys the strongest desire1 shall  
we ask1 what is the cause of the act of 
obedience8 ,here again1 the will is the 
cause of its own act4 ,are we called    
upon to ascend higher8 ,we shall at last
 come to such a self-moving and         
contingent power1 or we must resign all 
to an absolute necessity4 ,suppose1 that
 when the will obeys the reason1 we     
attempt to explain it by saying1 that   
obedience to the reason awakens the     
strongest desire1 or the sense of the   
most agreeable2 we may then ask1 why the
 will obeys the strongest desire8 and   
then we may attempt to explain this     
again by saying1 that to obey the       
strongest desire seems most reasonable4 
,we may evidently1 with as much         
propriety1 account for obedience to     
passion1 by referring to reason2 as     
account for obedience to reason1 by     

referring to passion4 ,if the act of the
 will which goes in the direction of the
 reason1 finds its cause in the         
sensitivity2 then the act of the will   
which goes in the direction of the      
sensitivity1 may find its cause in the  
reason4 ,but this is only moving in a   
circle1 and is no advance whatever4 ,why
 does the will obey the reason8 because 
it is most agreeable3 but why does the  
will obey because it is most agreeable8 
because to obey the most agreeable seems
 most reasonable4  ,acts of the will may
 be conceived of as analogous to        
intuitive or first truths4 ,first truths
 require no demonstration2 they admit of
 none2 they form the basis of all       
demonstration4 ,acts of the will are    
first movements of primary causes1 and  
as such neither require nor admit of    
antecedent causes1 to explain their     
action4 ,will is the source and basis of
 all other cause4 ,it explains all other
 cause1 but in itself admits of no      
explanation4 ,it presents the primary   

and all-comprehending fact of power4 ,in
 ,god1 will is infinite1 primary cause1 
and untreated3 in man1 it is finite1    
primary cause1 constituted by ,god's    
creative act1 but not necessitated1 for 
if necessitated it would not be will1 it
 would not be power after the likeness  
of the divine power2 it would be mere   
physical or secondary cause1 and        
comprehended in the chain of natural    
antecedents and sequents4  ,god's will  
explains creation as an existent fact2  
man's will explains all his volitions4  
,when we proceed to inquire after the   
characteristics of creation1 we bring in
 the idea of infinite wisdom and        
goodness4 ,but when we inquire why      
,god's will obeyed infinite wisdom and  
goodness1 we must either represent his  
will as necessitated by infinite wisdom 
and goodness1 and take with this all the
 consequences of an absolute necessity2 
or we must be content to stop short1    
with will itself as a first cause1 not  
necessary1 but contingent1 which1       

explaining all effects1 neither requires
 nor admits of any explanation itself4  
,when we proceed to inquire after the   
characteristics of human volition1 we   
bring in the idea of right and wrong2 we
 look at the relations of the reason and
 the sensitivity4 ,but when we inquire  
why the will now obeys reason1 and now  
passion2 and why this passion1 or that  
passion2 we must either represent the   
will as necessitated1 and take all the  
consequences of a necessitated will1 or 
we must stop short here likewise1 with  
the will itself as a first cause1 not   
necessary1 but contingent1 which1 in    
explaining its own volitions1 neither   
requires nor admits of any explanation  
itself1 other than as a finite and      
dependent will it requires to be        
referred to the infinite will in order  
to account for the fact of its          
existence4  ,edwards1 while he burdens  
the question of the will's determination
 with monstrous consequences1 relieves  
it of no one difficulty4 ,he lays down1 

indeed1 a uniform law of determination2 
but there is a last inquiry which he    
does not presume to answer4 ,the        
determination of the will1 or the       
volition1 is always as the most         
agreeable1 and is the sense of the most 
agreeable4 ,but while the will is       
granted to be one simple power or       
capacity1 there arise from it an        
indefinite variety of volitions2 and    
volitions at one time directly opposed  
to volitions at another time4 ,the      
question now arises1 how this one simple
 capacity of volition comes to produce  
such various volitions8 ,it is said in  
reply1 that whatever may be the         
volition1 it is at the time the sense of
 the most agreeable3 but that it is     
always the sense of the most agreeable1 
respects only its relation to the will  
itself2 the volition1 intrinsically     
considered1 is at one time right1 at    
another wrong2 at one time rational1 at 
another foolish4 ,the volition really   
varies1 although1 relatively to the     

will1 it always puts on the             
characteristic of the most agreeable4   
,the question therefore returns1 how    
this simple capacity determines such a  
variety of volitions1 always however    
representing them to itself as the most 
agreeable8 ,there are three ways of     
answering this4 ,first1 we may suppose  
the state of the will or sensitivity to 
remain unchanged1 and the different     
volitions to be effected by the         
different arrangements and conditions of
 the objects relatively to it4          
,secondly1 we may suppose the           
arrangements and conditions of the      
objects to remain unchanged1 and the    
different volitions to be effected by   
changes in the state of the sensitivity1
 or will1 relatively to the objects4    
,or1 thirdly1 we may suppose both the   
state of the will1 and the arrangements 
and conditions of the objects to be     
subject to changes1 singly and mutually1
 and thus giving rise to the different  
volitions4 ,but our questionings are not

 yet at an end4 ,on the first           
supposition1 the question comes up1 how 
the different arrangements and          
conditions of the objects are brought   
about8 ,on the second supposition1 how  
the changes in the state of the         
sensitivity are effected8 ,on the third 
supposition1 how the changes in both1   
singly and mutually1 are effected8 ,if  
it could be said1 that the sensitivity  
changes itself relatively to the        
objects1 then we should ask again1 why  
the sensitivity chooses at one time1 as 
most agreeable to itself1 that which is 
right and rational1 and at another time1
 that which is wrong and foolish8 ,or1  
if it could be said1 that the objects   
have the power of changing their own    
arrangements and conditions1 then also  
we must ask1 why at one time the objects
 arrange themselves to make the right   
and rational appear most agreeable1 and 
at another time1 the wrong and foolish4 
,these last questions are the very      
questions which ,edwards does not       

presume to answer4 ,the motive by which 
he accounts for the existence of the    
volition1 is formed of the correlation  
of the state of the will1 and the nature
 and circumstances of the object4 ,but  
when the correlation is such as to give 
the volition in the direction of the    
right and the rational1 in opposition to
 the wrong and the foolish1--we ask why 
does the correlation give the volition  
in this direction4 ,if it be said that  
the volition in this direction appears  
most agreeable1 the answer is a mere    
repetition of the question2 for the     
question amounts simply to this3--why   
the correlation is such as to make the  
one agreeable rather than the other8    
,the volition which is itself only the  
sense of the most agreeable1 cannot be  
explained by affirming that it is always
 as the most agreeable4 ,the point to be
 explained is1 why the mind changes its 
state in relation to the objects2 or why
 the objects change their relations to  
the mind1 so as to produce this sense of

 the most agreeable in one direction    
rather than in another8 ,the difficulty 
is precisely of the same nature which is
 supposed to exist in the case of a     
contingent will4 ,the will now goes in  
the direction of reason1 and now in the 
direction of passion1--but why8 ,we say1
 because as will1 it has the power of   
thus varying its movement4 ,the change  
is accounted for by merely referring to 
the will4  ,according to ,edwards1 the  
correlation of will and its objects1 now
 gives the sense of the most agreeable1 
or volition1 in the direction of the    
reason2 and now in the direction of     
passion--but why8--,why does the reason 
now appear most agreeable1--and now the 
indulgences of impure desire8 ,i choose 
this because it is most agreeable1 says 
,edwards1 which is equivalent to        
saying1--,i have the sense of the most  
agreeable in reference to this1 because 
it is most agreeable2 but how do you    
know it is the most agreeable8 because  
,i choose it1 or have the sense of the  

most agreeable in reference to it4 ,it  
is plain1 therefore1 that on ,edwards's 
system1 as well as on that opposed to   
it1 the particular direction of         
volition1 and the constant changes of   
volition1 must be referred simply to the
 cause of volition1 without giving any  
other explanation of the different      
determinations of this cause1 except    
referring them to the nature of the     
cause itself4 ,it is possible1 indeed1  
to refer the changes in the correlation 
to some cause which governs the         
correlation of the will and its objects2
 but then the question must arise in    
relation to this cause1 why it          
determines the correlation in one       
direction at one time1 and in another   
direction at another time8 ,and this    
could be answered only by referring it  
to itself as having the capacity of     
these various determinations as a power 
to do or not to do1 and a power to      
determine in a given direction1 or in   
the opposite direction2 or by referring 

it to still another antecedent cause4   
,now let us suppose this last antecedent
 to be the infinite will3 then the      
question would be1 why the infinite will
 determines the sensitivity1 or will of 
his creatures at one time to wisdom1 and
 at another to folly8 ,and what answer  
could be given8 ,shall it be said that  
it seems most agreeable to him8 ,but why
 does it seem most agreeable to him8 ,is
 it because the particular determination
 is the most reasonable1 that it seems  
most agreeable8 ,but why does he        
determine always according to the most  
reasonable8 ,is it because to determine 
according to the most reasonable1 seems 
most agreeable8 ,now1 inasmuch as       
according to ,edwards1 the volition and 
the sense of the most agreeable are the 
same2 to say that ,god wills as he does 
will1 because it is most agreeable to   
him1 is to say that he wills because he 
wills2 and to say that he wills as he   
does will1 because it seems most        
reasonable to him1 amounts to the same  

thing1 because he wills according to the
 most reasonable only because it is the 
most agreeable4  ,to represent the      
volitions1 or choices1 either in the    
human or divine will1 as determined by  
motives1 removes therefore no difficulty
 which is supposed to pertain to        
contingent self-determination4  ,let us 
compare the two theories particularly1  
although at the hazard of some          
repetition4  ,contingent                
self-determination represents the will  
as a cause making its nisus or volitions
 of itself1 and determining their       
direction of itself--now obeying reason1
 and now obeying passion4 ,if it be     
asked why it determines in a particular 
direction8--if this particular direction
 in which it determines be that of the  
reason8--then it may be said1 that it   
determines in this direction because it 
is reasonable2--if this particular      
direction be that of passion1 as opposed
 to reason1 then it may be said that it 
determines in this direction1 because it

 is pleasing4 ,but if it be asked why   
the will goes in the direction of       
reason1 rather than in that of passion1 
as opposed to reason8--we cannot say    
that it is most reasonable to obey      
reason and not passion2 because the one 
is all reason1 and the other is all     
passion1 and of course they cannot be   
compared under the reasonable2 and no   
more can they be compared under the     
pleasing1--when1 by the pleasing1 we    
understand1 the gratification of desire1
 as opposed to reason4 ,to obey reason  
because it is reasonable1 is nothing    
more than the statement of the fact that
 the will does obey reason4 ,to obey    
desire because it is desirable1 is      
nothing more than the statement of the  
fact that the will does obey desire4    
,the will goes in one direction rather  
than in another by an act of            
self-determination1 which neither admits
 of1 nor indeed requires any other      
explanation than this1 that the will has
 power to do one or the other1 and in   

the exercise of this power1 it does one 
rather than the other4  ,to this stands 
contrasted the system of ,edwards2 and  
what is this system8 ,that the will is  
determined by the strongest motive2--and
 what is the strongest motive8 ,the     
greatest apparent good1 or the most     
agreeable3--what constitutes the        
greatest apparent good1 or the most     
agreeable8 ,the correlation of will or  
sensitivity and the object4 ,but why    
does the correlation make one object    
appear more agreeable than another2 or  
make the same object at one time appear 
agreeable1 at another time disagreeable8
 ,now this question is equivalent to the
 question1--why does the will go in the 
direction of one object rather than of  
another2 or go in the direction of a    
given object at one time1 and in        
opposition to it at another time8 ,for  
the will to determine itself toward an  
object in one system1 answers to the    
will having the sense of the most       
agreeable towards an object in          

,edwards's system4 ,if ,edwards should  
attempt to give an answer without going 
beyond the motive1 he could only say    
that the sensitivity has the power of   
being affected with the sense of the    
most agreeable or of the most           
disagreeable2 and that in the exercise  
of this power it is affected with the   
one rather than with the other4 ,he     
could not say that to obey reason       
appears more agreeable than to obey     
passion as opposed to reason1 for the   
obedience of the will on his system1 is 
nothing more than a sense of the most   
agreeable4 ,nor could he say it is more 
reasonable to obey reason1 for reason   
cannot be compared with its opposite1   
under the idea of itself2 and if he     
could say this1 it amounts to no more   
than this1 on his system1 that it is    
most agreeable to obey the              
reasonable2--that is1 the reasonable is 
obeyed only as the most agreeable3 but  
obedience of will being nothing more    
than the sense of the most agreeable1 to

 say it is obeyed because most          
agreeable1 is merely to say that it     
awakens the sense of the most agreeable2
 that is1 it is obeyed1 because it is   
obeyed4  ,to refer the motive to the    
divine determination makes volition     
necessary to the man1 and throws the    
difficulty in question1 if it is to be  
considered a difficulty1 only farther   
back4  ,if ,god's will determines in the
 direction of the reasonable because it 
is most agreeable1 then we ask1 why is  
it the most agreeable8 ,if the reply be1
 because it is most reasonable1 then we 
are only moving in a circle2 but if the 
agreeable be taken as an ultimate fact1 
then inasmuch as to will is only to have
 the sense of the most agreeable1 it    
follows that ,god has the sense of the  
most agreeable towards an object only   
because it is most agreeable to him1 or 
awakens this sense in him2 and thus the 
question why ,god wills in one direction
 rather than in another1 or what is the 
cause of his determination1 is not      

answered by ,edwards1 unless he says    
with us that the will in itself as a    
power to do or not to do1 or to do one  
thing1 or its opposite1 is a sufficient 
explanation1 and the only possible      
explanation2--or unless he refers the   
divine will to an antecedent cause1 and 
this again to another antecedent cause1 
in an endless series--and thus introduce
 the two-fold error of an endless       
series1 and an absolute necessity4  ,all
 possible volitions1 according to the   
scheme of psychology ,i have above      
given1 must be either in the direction  
of the reason or of the sensitivity1 or 
in the indifferency of both4 ,if the    
volition be in the direction of the     
reason1 it takes the characteristics of 
rational1 good1 c4 ,if in the direction 
of the sensitivity1 it takes its        
characteristic from the nature of the   
particular desire which it obeys3--it is
 generous1 benevolent1 kind1 c4--or it  
is malicious1 envious1 unkind1 vicious1 
c4 ,what moves the will to go in the    

direction of the reason8 ,nothing moves 
it2 it is a cause per se2 it goes in    
that direction because it has power to  
go in that direction4 ,what moves the   
will to go in the direction of the      
sensitivity8 ,nothing moves it2 it is a 
cause per se2 it goes in that direction 
because it has power to go in that      
direction4  ,there are in the           
intelligence or reason1 as united with  
the will in the constitution of the     
mind1 necessary convictions of the true1
 the just1 the right4 ,there are in the 
sensitivity1 as united in the same      
constitution1 necessary affections of   
the agreeable and the disagreeable in   
reference to various objects4 ,the will 
as the power which by its nisus produces
 changes or phenomena1 is conscious of  
ability to go in either of these        
directions1 or in opposition to both4   
,now when it makes its nisus or volition
 in reference to the true1 the just1 the
 good2 should we attempt to explain this
 nisus by saying that the true1 the     

just1 the good1 affect the sensitivity  
agreeably1 this would only amount to    
saying that the nisus is made towards   
the true1 not as the true1 but only as  
the agreeable2 and then we would        
introduce the law that the nisus is     
always made in the direction of the     
agreeable4 ,but then again we might seek
 to explain why the nisus is always made
 in the direction of the agreeable4 ,is 
it of an antecedent necessity8 ,then we 
have an absolute and universal          
necessity4 ,is it because to go in the  
direction of the agreeable seems most   
rational8 ,then it follows that the     
nisus is made towards the agreeable not 
as the agreeable1 but only as the       
rational2 and then we would introduce   
the law that the nisus is always made in
 the direction of the rational4 ,but    
then again we might seek to explain why 
this nisus is always made in the        
direction of the rational4 ,is it of an 
antecedent necessity8 ,then here        
likewise we have an absolute and        

universal necessity4 ,is it because to  
go in the direction of the rational     
seems most agreeable8 ,then we are      
winding back in a circle to our first   
position4  ,how shall we escape from    
these difficulties8 ,shall we adopt the 
psychology of ,edwards1 and make the    
will and the sensitivity one8 ,then as  
the volition is always the strongest    
affection of the agreeable1 if the      
sensitivity be necessary1 volitions are 
necessary1 and we are plunged headlong  
again into an absolute and universal    
necessity4 ,if the sensitivity be not   
necessary1 then we have shown fully1    
above1 that we have to account for its  
various determinations just as we are   
supposed to be called upon to account   
for the various determinations of the   
will when considered as a power distinct
 from the sensitivity3--we are met with 
the questions1 why does the sensitivity 
represent this object as more agreeable 
than that object8--or the same object as
 agreeable at one time1 and disagreeable

 at another8 ,or if these various       
determinations are resolved into an     
antecedent necessity comprehending them1
 then we go up to the antecedent cause  
in which this necessity resides1 and    
question it in like manner4  ,but one   
thing remains1 and that is to consider  
the will as primary cause1 contingent in
 opposition to being necessitated--a    
cause having in itself the power of     
making these various volitions or nisus1
 and neither asking nor allowing of any 
explanation of its acts1 or their       
particular direction1 save its own      
peculiarity and energy as will4  ,the   
question respecting the indifferency of 
will must now be considered4 ,the term  
indifferency comes up in consequence of 
considering the will as distinct from   
the sensitivity4 ,it is not desire or   
feeling--it is a power indifferent to   
the agreeableness or disagreeableness of
 objects4  ,it is also a power distinct 
from the reason2 it is not conviction or
 belief--it is a power indifferent to   

the true and the right1 to the false and
 the wrong1 in the sense that it is not 
necessarily determined by conviction and
 belief1 by the true and the right1 or  
by the false and the wrong4 ,the        
conception of will in its utmost        
simplicity is the conception of pure    
power1 self-moving1 and                 
self-conscious--containing within itself
 the ground and the possibility of      
creation and of modification4 ,in ,god  
it is infinite1 eternal1 uncreated      
power2 and every nisus in his will is   
really creative or modifying1 according 
to its self-directed aim4 ,in man it is 
constituted1 dependent1 limited1 and    
accountable4  ,now in direct connexion  
with power1 we have the conception of   
law or rule1 or what power ought to do4 
,this law or rule is revealed in the    
reason4 ,in man as pure1 and we conclude
 in ,god likewise1 as the archetype of  
all spirit1 there is given a sensitivity
 or a capacity to be affected agreeably 
by1 and to be drawn towards the objects 

approved and commanded by the reason4   
,if this sensitivity does not move in   
harmony with the reason1 it is          
corrupted4 ,now will is placed in a     
triunity with these two other powers4   
,we can distinguish but not separate it 
from them4 ,a will without reason would 
be a power without eyes1 or light4 ,a   
will without sensitivity would be a     
power stern and isolated2--just as a    
reason and sensitivity without will1    
would be without efficiency1 or capacity
 of giving real manifestations4  ,the   
completeness and perfection of each1    
lies in a union with all2 but then each 
in its proper movements is in some sense
 independent and free of the others4    
,the convictions1 beliefs1 or           
perceptions of reason are not made1 nor 
can they be unmade by the energy of the 
will4 ,nor has the will any direct      
command over the sensitivity4 ,and yet  
the will can excite and direct both the 
reason and the sensitivity1 by calling  
up objects and occasions4 ,the          

sensitivity does not govern the reason1 
and yet it supplies conditions which are
 necessary to its manifestations4  ,the 
reason does not govern the sensitivity1 
and yet the latter would have no        
definite perception1 and of course its  
highest sensibilities would lie dormant 
without the reason4  ,so also the reason
 and the sensitivity do not determine   
the acts of the will4 ,the will has     
efficiency1 or creative and modifying   
power in itself--self-moved1            
self-directed4 ,but then without reason 
and sensitivity1 the will would be      
without objects1 without designs1       
without rules1--a solitary power1       
conscious of ability to do1 but not     
knowing what to do4  ,it addition to the
 above1 the will has this high and      
distinguishing peculiarity4 ,that it    
alone is free--that it alone is opposed 
to necessity4 ,reason must perceive1    
must believe4 ,sensitivity must feel    
when its objects are presented2 but     
will1 when the reason has given its     

light and uttered its commands1 and when
 the sensitivity has awakened all its   
passions and emotions1 is not compelled 
to obey4 ,it is as conscious of power   
not to do1 as of power to do4 ,it may be
 called a power arbitrary and           
contingent2 but this means only that it 
is a power which absolutely puts forth  
its own nisus1 and is free4  ,it follows
 from this1 that the will can act       
irrespective of both reason and         
sensitivity1 if an object of action1    
bearing no relation to reason or        
sensitivity1 be possible4 ,it is plain  
that an object bearing no such relation1
 must be very trifling4 ,if a case in   
illustration could not be called up1 it 
would not argue anything against the    
indifferency of will2--it would only    
prove that all objects of action        
actually existing1 bear some relation to
 reason and sensitivity4 ,there is a    
case1 however1 frequently called up1 and
 much disputed1 which deserves some     
attention1 and which it appears to me1  

offers the illustration required4 ,let  
it be required to select one of the     
squares of the chess-board4 ,in         
selecting one of the squares1 does the  
will act irrespective of reason and     
sensitivity1 or not8 ,those who hold    
that the will is necessarily determined1
 must make out some connexion between   
the act of selection1 and the reason and
 sensitivity4 ,it is affirmed that there
 is a general motive which determines   
the whole process1 viz3 the aim or      
desire to illustrate1 if possible1 the  
question in dispute4 ,the motive is1 to 
prove that the will can act without a   
motive4  ,i reply to this1 that this is 
undoubtedly the motive of bringing the  
chess-board before the eye1 and in      
making all the preparations for a       
selection2--but now the last question   
is1 which square shall ,i select8 ,the  
illustration will have the same force   
whichever square is selected1 and there 
is no motive that can be drawn either   
from the reason or the sensitivity for  

taking one square in preference to the  
other3 under the absence of all such    
motives1 and affording each time the    
same attempt at illustration1 ,i can    
vary the selection sixty-four times3 in 
making this selection1 therefore1 it    
appears to me1 there is an entire       
indifferency as to which particular     
square is selected2--there is no command
 of the reason directing to one square  
rather than another2--there is no       
affection of the sensitivity towards one
 square rather than another1 as most    
agreeable and yet the will does select  
one of the squares4  ,it will be proper1
 in this place1 to consider the         
following argument of ,edwards against  
indifferency of will3 ,choice may be    
immediately after a state of            
indifference1 but cannot co-exist with  
it3 even the very beginning of it is not
 in a state of indifference4 ,and1      
therefore1 if this be liberty1 no act of
 the will1 in any degree1 is ever       
performed in a state of liberty1 or in  

the time of liberty4 ,volition and      
liberty are so far from agreeing        
together1 and being essential one to    
another1 that they are contrary one to  
another1 and one excludes and destroys  
the other1 as much as motion and rest1  
light and darkness1 or life and death4  
7p4 #gc47  ,edwards reasons according to
 his own psychology3 ,if the will and   
the sensitivity are one1 the will cannot
 well be conceived of as in a state of  
indifference1 and if it could be        
conceived of as in a state of           
indifference before it exercises        
volition1 inasmuch as1 according to his 
system again1 volition is the sense of  
the most agreeable1 the moment volition 
begins1 indifference ceases2 and hence1 
if liberty consist in indifference1     
liberty must cease when volition takes  
place1 just as rest ceases with motion4 
,but according to the system of         
psychology1 which we adopt1 and which ,i
 shall verify hereafter1 the will is not
 one with the sensitivity1 but is       

clearly distinguishable from it3--the   
sensitivity is the capacity of feeling2 
the will is the causality of the        
soul3--a movement of the sensitivity1   
under the quality of indifference1 is   
self-contradictory2 and a movement of   
the will being a mere nisus of cause1   
under the quality of any sense and      
feeling whatever1 would be              
self-contradictory likewise2 it would be
 confounding that which we had already  
distinguished4 ,from ,edwards's very    
definition of will it cannot be         
indifferent2 from our very definition of
 will it cannot be otherwise than       
indifferent4 ,when it determines        
exclusively of both reason and          
sensitivity1 it of course must retain1  
in the action1 the indifference which it
 possessed before the action2 but this  
is no less true when it determines in   
the direction either of reason or       
sensitivity4 ,when the determination is 
in the direction of the reason1 there is
 an exercise of reason in connexion with

 the act1 and all the interest of the   
reason is wakened up1 but the will      
considered in its entire simplicity1    
knows only the nisus of power4 ,when the
 determination is in the direction of   
the sensitivity1 there is a play of     
emotions and passions1 but the will     
again knows only the nisus of power     
which carries it in this direction4  ,in
 the unity of the soul these powers are 
generally found acting together4 ,it may
 be difficult to distinguish them1 and  
this1 in connexion with the constantly  
observed fact of the fixed correlation  
between physical causes and the masses  
which they operate upon1 may lead to the
 conclusion that there is a fixed       
correlation likewise between the will   
and its objects1 regarding the will as  
the sensitivity2 or at least1 that there
 is a fixed connexion between the will  
and the sensitivity1 so that the former 
is invariably governed by the latter4   
,we have already shown1 that to identify
 sensitivity and will does not relieve  

us from the difficulties of a           
self-determined and contingent will1    
unless we plunge into absolute          
necessity2 and that to make the         
sensitivity govern the will1 is only    
transferring to the sensitivity the     
difficulties which we suppose1 to       
encompass the will4 ,in our             
psychological investigations it will    
appear how clearly distinguishable those
 powers are1 and also how clearly       
independent and sovereign will is1      
inasmuch as it does actually determine  
at one time1 in opposition to the most  
agreeable2 at another1 in opposition to 
reason2 and at another1 in opposition to
 both conjoined4 ,in the unity of our   
being1 however1 we perceive that will is
 designed to obey the reason1 and as    
subordinated to reason1 to move within  
the delights of the sensitivity2 and we 
know that we are acting unreasonably and
 senselessly when we act otherwise2 but 
yet unreasonably and senselessly do we  
often act4 ,but when we do obey reason1 

although we characterize the act from   
its direction1 will does not lose its   
simplicity and become reason2 and when  
we do obey the sensitivity1 will does   
not become sensitivity--will is still   
simply cause1 and its act the nisus of  
power3 thought1 and conviction1 and     
design1 hold their place in the reason  
alone3 emotion and passion their place  
in the sensitivity alone4  ,,argument   
,,from  ,,the ,,divine ,,prescience4    
,edwards's argument against a           
contingent1 self-determining will1 drawn
 from the divine prescience1 remains to 
be considered4  ,the argument is        
introduced as follows3 ,that the acts of
 the wills of moral agents are not      
contingent events1 in such a sense as to
 be without all necessity1 appears by   
,god's certain foreknowledge of such    
events4 7sec4 xi4 p4 #ih47 ,edwards     
devotes this section to the evidence of 
,god's certain foreknowledge of the     
volitions of moral agents4 ,in the      
following section1 7sec4 xii4 p4 #aad17 

he proceeds formally with his argument4 
,before examining this argument1 let us 
look at the consequences of his         
position4  ,god foresees all volitions2 
that he foresees them makes their       
existence necessary4 ,if their existence
 were not necessary1 he could not       
foresee them2 or1 to express it still   
more generally1 foreknowledge extends to
 all events1 and foreknowledge proves   
the necessary existence of everything to
 which it extends4 ,it follows from     
this1 that all events exist with an     
absolute necessity1 all physical        
phenomena1 all volitions1 and moral1    
phenomena1 whether good or evil1 and all
 the divine volitions1 for ,god cannot  
but foresee his own volitions4 ,in no   
part of his work1 does ,edwards lay down
 more summarily and decidedly1 the      
doctrine of absolute and universal      
necessity4 ,we have already1 in part    
,,ii4 of this treatise1 deduced the     
consequences of this doctrine4 ,if then 
we are placed upon the alternative of   

denying the divine prescience of        
volitions1 or of acknowledging the      
doctrine of necessity1 it would         
practically be most desirable and wisest
 to take the first part of the          
alternative4 ,if it could be            
demonstrated1 remarks ,dugald ,stewart1 
7vol4 #e4 app4 sec4 viii47 which in my  
opinion has not yet been done1 that the 
prescience of the volitions of moral    
agents is incompatible with the free    
agency of man1 the logical inference    
would be1 not in favour of the scheme of
 necessity1 but that there are some     
events1 the foreknowledge of which      
implies an impossibility4 ,shall we     
venture to affirm1 that it exceeds the  
power of ,god to permit such a train of 
contingent events to take place1 as his 
own foreknowledge shall not extend to8  
,does not such a proposition detract    
from the omnipotence of ,god1 in the    
same proportion in which it aims to     
exalt his omniscience8 ,if the divine   
foreknowledge goes to establish the     

doctrine of necessity1 there is nothing 
left that it is worth while to contend  
for2 all moral and theological interests
 vanish away4 ,but let us examine the   
argument of ,edwards4  ,this argument   
consists of three parts2 we shall       
consider them in order4  ,i4 ,edwards   
lays down1 that a past event is         
necessary1 having already made sure of  
existence2 but divine foreknowledge is  
such an event1 and is therefore         
necessary4 ,this is equivalent to the   
axiom1 that whatever is1 is4 ,he next   
affirms1 that whatever is indissolubly  
connected with other things that are    
necessary1 are themselves necessary2 but
 events infallibly foreknown1 have an   
indissoluble connexion with the         
foreknowledge4 ,hence1 the volitions    
infallibly foreknown by ,god1 have an   
indissoluble connexion with his         
foreknowledge1 and are therefore        
necessary4  ,the force of this reasoning
 turns upon the connexion between       
foreknowledge and the events foreknown4 

,this connexion is affirmed to be       
indissoluble2 that is1 the foreknowledge
 is certainly connected with the event4 
,but this only amounts to the certainty 
of divine foreknowledge1 and proves     
nothing as to the nature of the         
existence foreknown4 ,we may certainly  
know a past or present event1 but our   
knowledge of its existence defines      
nothing as to the manner in which it    
came to exist4 ,i look out of my window1
 and ,i see a man walking in a certain  
direction3 ,i have a positive knowledge 
of this event1 and it cannot but be that
 the man is walking2 but then my        
knowledge of his walking has no         
influence upon his walking1 as cause or 
necessary antecedent2 and the question  
whether his walking be contingent or    
necessary is entirely distinct1 and     
relates to the cause of walking4 ,i     
looked out of my window yesterday1 and  
saw a man walking2 and the knowledge of 
that event ,i now retain1 so that it    
cannot but be that the man walked       

yesterday3 but this again leaves the    
question respecting the mode of         
existence untouched3--,did the man walk 
of necessity1 or was it a contingent    
event8 ,now let me suppose myself       
endowed with the faculty of prescience1 
sufficiently to know the events of      
to-morrow2 then by this faculty ,i may  
see a man walking in the time called    
to-morrow1 just as by the faculty of    
memory ,i see a man walking in the time 
called yesterday4 ,the knowledge1       
whether it relate to past1 present1 or  
future1 as a knowledge in relation to   
myself1 is always a present knowledge2  
but the object known may stand in       
various relations of time1 place1 c4    
,now in relation to the future1 no more 
than in relation to the past and        
present1 does the act of knowledge on my
 part1 explain anything in relation to  
the mode of the existence of the object 
of knowledge4 ,edwards remarks1 7p4     
#aba47 ,all certain knowledge1 whether  
it be foreknowledge1 or after-knowledge1

 or concomitant knowledge1 proves the   
thing known now to be necessary1 by some
 means or other2 or proves that it is   
impossible that it should now be        
otherwise than true4  ,edwards does not 
distinguish between the certainty of the
 mere fact of existence1 and the        
necessity by which anything comes to    
exist4 ,foreknowledge1 after-knowledge1 
and concomitant knowledge1--that is1 the
 present knowledge of events1 future1   
past1 or present1--proves of course the 
reality of the events2 that they will   
be1 have been1 or are3 or1 more strictly
 speaking1 the knowledge of an event1 in
 any relation of time1 is the           
affirmation of its existence in that    
relation2 but the knowledge of the event
 neither proves nor affirms the         
necessity of its existence4 ,if the     
knowledge of the event were the cause of
 the event1 or if it generically        
comprehended it in its own existence1   
then1 upon strict logical principles1   
the necessity affirmed of the knowledge 

would be affirmed of the event likewise4
  ,that ,god foreknows all volitions is 
granted2 that as he foreknows them1 they
 will be1 is also granted2 his          
foreknowledge of them is the positive   
affirmation of their reality in time    
future2 but by supposition1 ,god's      
foreknowledge is not their cause1 and   
does not generically comprehend them2   
they are caused by wills acting in the  
future4 ,hence ,god's foreseeing how the
 wills acting in the time future1 will  
put forth or determine their volitions1 
does not take away from these wills the 
contingency and freedom belonging to    
them1 any more than our witnessing how  
wills act in the time present1 takes    
away from them their contingency and    
freedom4 ,god in his prescience1 is the 
spectator of the future1 as really as we
 are the spectators of the present4     
,edwards's reasoning is a sort of       
puzzle1 like that employed sometimes for
 exercising the student of logic in the 
detection of fallacies3 for example1 a  

man in a given place1 must necessarily  
either stay in that place1 or go away   
from that place2 therefore1 whether he  
stays or goes away1 he acts necessarily4
 ,now it is necessary1 in the nature of 
things1 that a man as well as any other 
body should be in some place1 but then  
it does not follow from this1 that his  
determination1 whether to stay or go1 is
 a necessary determination4 ,his        
necessary condition as a body1 is       
entirely distinct from the question     
respecting the necessity or contingency 
of his volitions4 ,and so also in       
respect of the divine foreknowledge3 all
 human volitions as events occurring in 
time1 are subject to the necessary      
condition of being foreknown by that    
,being1 who inhabiteth eternity3 but    
this necessary condition of their       
existence neither proves nor disproves  
the necessity or the contingency of     
their particular causation4  ,,ii4 ,the 
second proposition in ,edwards's        
argument is1 ,no future event can be    

certainly foreknown1 whose existence is 
contingent1 and without all necessity4  
,his reasoning in support of this is as 
follows3 #a4 ,it is impossible for a    
thing to be certainly known to any      
intellect without evidence4 #b4 ,a      
contingent future event is without      
evidence4 #c4 ,therefore1 a contingent  
future event is not a possible object of
 knowledge4 ,i dispute both premises3   
,that which is known by evidence or     
proof is mediate knowledge1--that is1 we
 know it through something which is     
immediate1 standing between the faculty 
of knowledge and the object of knowledge
 in question4 ,that which is known      
intuitively is known without proof1 and 
this is immediate knowledge4 ,in this   
way all axioms or first truths and all  
facts of the senses are known4 ,indeed  
evidence itself implies immediate       
knowledge1 for the evidence by which    
anything is known is itself immediate   
knowledge4 ,to a ,being1 therefore1     
whose knowledge fills duration1 future  

and past events may be as immediately   
known as present events4 ,indeed1 can we
 conceive of ,god otherwise than        
immediately knowing all things8 ,an     
,infinite and ,eternal ,intelligence    
cannot be thought of under relations of 
time and space1 or as arriving at       
knowledge through media of proof or     
demonstration4 ,so much for the first   
premise4 ,the second is equally         
untenable3 ,a contingent future event is
 without evidence4 ,we grant with       
,edwards that it is not self-evident2   
implying by that the evidence arising   
from the necessity of its nature1 as for
 example1 #b x #b  #d4 ,what is         
self-evident1 as we have already shown1 
does not require any evidence or proof1 
but is known immediately2 and a future  
contingent event may be self-evident as 
a fact lying before the divine mind1    
reaching into futurity1 although it     
cannot be self-evident from the         
necessity of its nature4  ,but ,edwards 
affirms1 that neither is there any proof

 or evidence in anything else1 or       
evidence of connexion with something    
else that is evident2 for this is also  
contrary to the supposition4 ,it is     
supposed that there is now nothing      
existent with which the future existence
 of the contingent event is connected4  
,for such a connexion destroys its      
contingency and supposes necessity4 7p4 
#aaf47 ,he illustrates his meaning by   
the following example3 ,suppose that    
five thousand seven hundred and sixty   
years ago1 there was no other being but 
the ,divine ,being1--and then this      
world1 or some particular body or       
spirit1 all at once starts out of       
nothing into being1 and takes on itself 
a particular nature and form--all in    
absolute contingence1--without any      
concern of ,god1 or any other cause in  
the matter1--without any manner of      
ground or reason of its existence1 or   
any dependence upon1 or connexion at all
 with anything foregoing2--,i say that  
if this be supposed1 there was no       

evidence of that event beforehand4      
,there was no evidence of it to be seen 
in the thing itself2 for the thing      
itself as yet was not2 and there was no 
evidence of it to be seen in any thing  
else2 for evidence in something else2 is
 connexion with something else2 but such
 connexion is contrary to the           
supposition4 7p4 #aaf47  ,the amount of 
this reasoning is this3 ,that inasmuch  
as a contingent event exists without any
 concern of ,god1 or any other cause in 
the matter1--without any manner of      
ground or reason of its existence1--or  
any dependence upon or connexion with   
anything foregoing1--there is really    
nothing by which it can be proved       
beforehand4 ,if ,edwards be right in    
this definition of a contingent event1  
viz43 that it is an event without any   
cause or ground of its existence1 and   
that there is nothing now existent with 
which the future existence of the       
contingent event is connected1 then this
 reasoning must be allowed to be        

conclusive4 ,but ,i do not accede to the
 definition3 ,contingence ,i repeat     
again1 is not opposed to cause but to   
necessity4 ,the world may have sprung   
into being by absolute contingence more 
than five thousand years ago1 and yet   
have sprung into being at the command of
 ,god himself1 and its existence have   
been foreseen by him from all eternity4 
,the contingence expresses only the     
freedom of the divine will1 creating the
 world by sovereign choice1 and at the  
moment of creation1 conscious of power  
to withhold the creative                
nibus1--creating in the light of his    
infinite wisdom1 but from no compulsion 
or necessity of motive therein found4   
,under this view to foresee creation was
 nothing different from foreseeing his  
own volitions4  ,the ground on which    
human volitions can be foreseen1 is no  
less plain and reasonable4 ,in the first
 place1 future contingent volitions are 
never without a cause and sufficient    
ground of their existence1 the          

individual will being always taken as   
the cause and sufficient ground of the  
individual volitions4 ,god has therefore
 provided for the possible existence of 
volitions other than his own1 in the    
creation and constitution of finite free
 will4 ,now1 in relation to him1 it is  
not required to conceive of media by    
which all the particular volitions may  
be made known or proved to his mind1    
previous to their actual existence4     
,whatever he knows1 he knows by direct  
and infinite intuition2 he cannot be    
dependent upon any media for his        
knowledge4 ,it is enough1 as ,i have    
already shown1 to assign him prescience1
 in order to bring within his positive  
knowledge all future contingent         
volitions4 ,he knows all the variety and
 the full extent of the possible1 and   
amid the possible he foresees the       
actual2 and he foresees not only that   
class of the actual which1 as decreed   
and determined by himself1 is relatively
 necessary1 but also that class of the  

actual which is to spring up under the  
characteristic of contingency4  ,and    
herein1 ,i would remark1 lies the       
superiority of the divine prescience    
over human forecast1--in that the former
 penetrates the contingent as accurately
 as the necessary4 ,with the latter it  
is far otherwise4 ,human forecast or    
calculation can foresee the motions of  
the planets1 eclipses of the sun and    
moon1 and even the flight of the comets1
 because they are governed by necessary 
laws2 but the volitions of the human    
will form the subject of only probable  
calculations4  ,but if human volitions1 
as contingent1 form the subject of      
probable calculations1 there must be in 
opposition to ,edwards something that is
 evident and now existent1 with which   
the future existence of the contingent  
event is connected4  ,there are three   
kinds of certainty4 ,first1 absolute    
certainty4 ,this is the certainty which 
lies in necessary and eternal principles
 e4 g4 #b x #bd2 the existence of space2

 every body must be in space2 every     
phenomenon must have a cause2 the being 
of ,god4  ,logical certainty1 that is1  
the connexion between premises and      
conclusion1 is likewise absolute4       
,secondly4 ,physical certainty4 ,this is
 the certainty which lies in the        
connexion between physical causes and   
their phenomena3 e4 g4 gravitation1     
heat1 chemical affinities in general1   
mechanical forces4  ,the reason         
conceives of these causes as inherently 
active and uniform2 and hence1 wherever 
a physical cause exists1 we expect its  
proper phenomena4  ,now we do not call  
the operation of these causes absolutely
 certain1 because they depend ultimately
 upon will1--the will of ,god2 and we   
can conceive that the same will which   
ordained them1 can change1 suspend1 or  
even annihilate them3 they have no      
intrinsic necessity1 still1 as causes   
given in time and space1 we conceive of 
them generally as immutable4 ,if in any 
case they be changed1 or suspended1 we  

are compelled to recognise the presence 
of that will which ordained them4 ,such 
change or suspension we call a miracle2 
that is1 a surprise1--a wonder1 because 
it is unlooked for4  ,when1 therefore1  
we affirm any thing to be physically    
certain1 we mean that it is certain in  
the immutability of a cause acting in   
time and space1 and under a necessity   
relatively to the divine will2 but still
 not absolutely certain1 because there  
is a possibility of a miracle4 ,but when
 we affirm any thing to be absolutely   
certain1 we mean that it is certain as  
comprehended in a principle which is    
unalterable in its very nature1 and is  
therefore independent of will4          
,thirdly4 ,moral certainty1 is the      
certainty which lies between the        
connexion of motive and will4 ,by will  
we mean a self-conscious and intelligent
 cause1 or a cause in unity with        
intelligence4 ,it is also1 in the       
fullest sense1 a cause per se2 that is1 
it contains within itself proper        

efficiency1 and determines its own      
direction4 ,by motives we mean the      
reasons according to which the will     
acts4 ,in general1 all activity proceeds
 according to rules1 or laws1 or        
reasons2 for they have the same meaning3
 but in mere material masses1 the rule  
is not contemplated by the acting       
force1--it is contemplated only by the  
intelligence which ordained and         
conditioned the force4 ,in spirit1 on   
the contrary1 the activity which we call
 will is self-conscious1 and is         
connected with a perception of the      
reasons1 or ends1 or motives of action4 
,these motives or ends of action are of 
two kinds4 ,first1 those found in the   
ideas of the practical reason1 which    
decides what is fit and right4 ,these   
are reasons of supreme authority4       
,secondly1 those found in the           
understanding and sensitivity3 e4 g4 the
 immediately useful and expedient1 and  
the gratification of passion4 ,these are
 right only when subordinate to the     

first4  ,now these reasons and motives  
are a light to the will1 and serve to   
direct its activities2 and the human    
conscience1 which is but the reason1 has
 drawn up for the will explicit rules1  
suited to all circumstances and         
relations1 which are called ethics1 or  
the rules4  ,these rules the will is not
 compelled or necessitated to obey4 ,in 
every volition it is conscious of a     
power to do or not to do2 but yet1 as   
the will forms a unity with the         
intelligence1 we take for granted that  
it will obey them1 unless grounds for an
 opposite conclusion are apparent4 ,but 
the only probable ground for a          
disobedience of these rules lies in a   
state of sinfulness1--a corruption of   
the sensitivity1 or a disposition to    
violate the harmony and fitness of the  
spiritual constitution4 ,hence moral    
certainty can exist only where the      
harmony of the spiritual being is       
preserved4 ,for example3 ,god and good  
angels4 ,in ,god moral certainty is     

infinite4 ,his dispositions are         
infinitely pure1 and his will freely    
determines to do right2 it is not       
compelled or necessitated1 for then his 
infinite meritoriousness would cease4   
,moral certainty is not absolute1       
because will being a power to do or not 
to do1 there is always a possibility1   
although there may be no probability1   
nay an infinite improbability1 that the 
will may disobey the laws of the reason4
  ,in the case of angels and good men1  
the moral certainty is such as to be    
attended with no apprehension of a      
dereliction4 ,with respect to such men  
as ,joseph1 ,daniel1 ,paul1 ,howard1 and
 ,washington1 we can calculate with a   
very high and satisfactory moral        
certainty1 of the manner in which they  
will act in any given circumstances     
involving the influence of motives4 ,we 
know they will obey truth1 justice1 and 
mercy1--that is1 the first class of     
motives2 and the second only so far as  
they are authorized by the first4 ,if   

the first class of motives are forsaken1
 then human conduct can be calculated   
only according to the influence of the  
second class4  ,human character1        
however1 is mixed and variously         
compounded4 ,we might make a scale of an
 indefinite number of degrees1 from the 
highest point of moral excellence to the
 lowest point of moral degradation1 and 
then our predictions of human conduct   
would vary with every degree4  ,in any  
particular case where we are called upon
 to reason from the connexion of motives
 with the will1 it is evident we must   
determine the character of the          
individual as accurately as possible1 in
 order to know the probable resultant of
 the opposite moral forces which we are 
likely to find4  ,we have remarked that 
moral certainty exists only where the   
harmony of the moral constitution is    
preserved4 ,here we know the right will 
be obeyed4 ,it may be remarked in       
addition to this1 however1 that moral   
certainty may almost be said to exist in

 the case of the lowest moral           
degradation1 where the right is         
altogether forsaken4 ,here the rule is1 
whatever is most agreeable2 and the     
volition is indeed merged into the sense
 of the most agreeable4 ,but in the     
intermediate state lies the wide field  
of probability4 ,what is commonly called
 the knowledge of human nature1 and     
esteemed of most importance in the      
affairs of life1 is not the knowledge of
 human nature as it ought to be1 but as 
it is in its vast variety of good and   
evil4 ,we gain this knowledge from      
observation and history4 ,what human    
nature ought to be1 we learn from       
reason4  ,on a subject of so much       
importance1 and where it is so desirable
 to have clear and definite ideas1 the  
rhetorical ungracefulness of repetition 
is of little moment1 when this          
repetition serves our great end4 ,i     
shall be pardoned1 therefore1 in calling
 the attention of the reader to a point 
above suggested1 namely1 that the will  

is in a triunity with reason and        
sensitivity1 and1 in the constitution of
 our being1 is designed to derive its   
rules and inducements of action from    
these4 ,acts which are in the direction 
of neither reason nor sensitivity1 must 
be very trifling acts2 and therefore    
acts of this description1 although      
possible1 we may conclude are very rare4
 ,in calculating1 then1 future acts of  
will1 we may1 like the mathematicians1  
drop infinitesimal differences1 and     
assume that all acts of the will are in 
the direction of reason or sensitivity1 
or of both in their harmony4 ,although  
the will is conscious of power to do1   
out of the direction of both reason and 
sensitivity1 still1 in the triunity in  
which it exists1 it submits itself to   
the general interests of the being1 and 
consults the authority of conscience1 or
 the enjoyments of passion4 ,now every  
individual has acquired for himself     
habits and a character more or less     
fixed4 ,he is known to have submitted   

himself from day to day1 and in a great 
variety of transactions1 to the laws of 
the conscience2 and hence we conclude   
that he has formed for himself a fixed  
purpose of doing right4 ,he has         
exhibited1 too1 on many occasions1      
noble1 generous1 and pure feelings2 and 
hence we conclude that his sensitivity  
harmonizes with conscience4 ,or he is   
known to have violated the laws of the  
conscience from day to day1 and in a    
great variety of transactions2 and hence
 we conclude that he has formed for     
himself a fixed purpose of doing wrong4 
,he has exhibited1 too1 on many         
occasions1 low1 selfish1 and impure     
feelings2 and hence we conclude that his
 sensitivity is in collision with       
conscience4  ,in both cases supposed1   
and in like manner in all supposable    
cases1 there is plainly a basis on      
which1 in any given circumstances1 we   
may foresee and predict volitions4      
,there is something that is evident and 
now existent with which the future      

existence of the contingent event is    
connected4 ,on the one hand these       
predictions exert no necessitating      
influence over the events themselves1   
for they are entirely disconnected with 
the causation of the events3 and1 on the
 other hand1 the events need not be     
assumed as necessary in order to become 
the objects of probable calculations4   
,if they were necessary1 the            
calculations would no longer be merely  
probable3--they would1 on the contrary1 
take the precision and certainty of the 
calculation of eclipses and other       
phenomena based upon necessary laws4    
,but these calculations can aim only at 
moral certainty1 because they are made  
according to the generally known and    
received determinations of will in a    
unity with reason and sensitivity2 but  
still a will which is known also to have
 the power to depart at any moment from 
the line of determination which it has  
established for itself4 ,thus the       
calculations which we make respecting   

the conduct of one man in given         
circumstances1 based on his known       
integrity1 and the calculations which we
 make respecting another1 based on his  
known dishonesty1 may alike disappoint  
us1 through the unexpected1 though      
possible dereliction of the first1 and  
the unexpected1 though possible         
reformation of the latter4 ,when we     
reason from moral effects to moral      
causes1 or from moral causes to moral   
effects1 we cannot regard the operation 
of causes as positive and uniform under 
the same law of necessity which         
appertains to physical causes1 because  
in moral causality the free will is the 
efficient and last determiner4 ,it is   
indeed true that we reason here with a  
high degree of probability1 with a      
probability sufficient to regulate      
wisely and harmoniously the affairs of  
society2 but we cannot reason respecting
 human conduct1 as we reason respecting 
the phenomena of the physical world1    
because it is possible for the human    

will to disappoint calculations based   
upon the ordinary influence of motives3 
e4 g4 the motive does not hold the same 
relation to will which fire holds to    
combustible substance2 the fire must    
burn2 the will may or may not determine 
in view of motive4 ,hence the reason    
why1 in common parlance1 probable       
evidence has received the name of moral 
evidence3 moral evidence being generally
 probable1 all probable evidence is     
called moral4  ,the will differs from   
physical causes in being a cause per se1
 but although a cause per se1 it has    
laws to direct its volitions4 ,it may   
indeed violate these laws and become a  
most arbitrary and inconstant law unto  
itself2 but this violation of law and   
this arbitrary determination do not     
arise from it necessarily as a cause per
 se1 but from an abuse of its liberty4  
,as a cause in unity with the laws of   
the reason1 we expect it to be uniform1 
and in its harmonious and perfect       
movements it is uniform4 ,physical      

causes are uniform because ,god has     
determined and fixed them according to  
laws derived from infinite wisdom4  ,the
 human will may likewise be uniform by  
obeying the laws of conscience1 but the 
departures may also be indefinitely     
numerous and various4  ,to sum up these 
observations in general statements1 we  
remark2--  ,first3 ,the connexion on    
which we base predictions of human      
volitions1 is the connexion of will with
 reason and sensitivity in the unity of 
the mind or spirit4  ,secondly3 ,by this
 connexion1 the will is seen to be      
designed to be regulated by truth and   
righteousness1 and by feeling           
subordinated to these4  ,thirdly3 ,in   
the purity of the soul1 the will is thus
 regulated4  ,fourthly3 ,this           
regulation1 however1 does not take place
 by the necessary governance which      
reason and sensitivity have over will1  
but by a self-subjection of will to     
their rules and inducements2--this      
constitutes meritoriousness1--the       

opposite conduct constitutes ill desert4
  ,fifthly3 ,our calculations must      
proceed according to the degree and     
fixedness of this self-subjection to    
reason and right feeling2 or where this 
does not exist1 according to the degree 
and fixedness of the habits of wrong    
doing1 in a self-subjection to certain  
passions in opposition to reason4       
,sixthly3 ,our calculations will be more
 or less certain according to the extent
 and accuracy of our observations upon  
human conduct4  ,seventhly3 ,our        
calculations can never be attended with 
absolute certainty1 because the will    
being contingent1 has the power of      
disappointing calculations made upon the
 longest observed uniformity4           
,eighthly3 ,our expectations respecting 
the determinations of ,deity are        
attended with the highest moral         
certainty4 ,we say moral certainty1     
because it is certainty not arising from
 necessity1 and in that sense absolute2 
but certainty arising from the free     

choice of an infinitely pure being4     
,thus1 when ,god is affirmed to be      
immutable1 and when it is affirmed to be
 impossible for him to lie1 it cannot be
 meant that he has not the power to     
change or to determine contrary to      
truth2 but that there is an infinite    
moral certainty arising from the        
perfection of his nature1 that he never 
will depart from infinite wisdom and    
rectitude4  ,to assign ,god any other   
immutability would be to deprive him of 
freedom4  ,ninthly3 ,the divine         
foresight of human volitions need not be
 supposed to necessitate them1 any more 
than human foresight1 inasmuch as       
foreseeing them1 has no necessary       
connexion in any case with their        
causation4 ,again1 if it does not appear
 essential to the divine foresight of   
volitions that they should be necessary4
 ,we have seen that future contingent   
volitions may be calculated with a high 
degree of certainty even by men2 and now
 supposing that the divine being must   

proceed in the same way to calculate    
them through media1--the reach and      
accuracy of his calculations must be in 
the proportion of his intelligence1 and 
how far short of a certain and perfect  
knowledge of all future contingent      
volitions can infinite intelligence be  
supposed to fall by such calculations8  
,tenthly3 ,but we may not suppose that  
the infinite mind is compelled to resort
 to deduction1 or to employ media for   
arriving at any particular knowledge4   
,in the attribute of prescience1 he is  
really present to all the possible and  
actual of the future4  ,,iii4 ,the third
 and last point of ,edwards's argument  
is as follows3 ,to suppose the future   
volitions of moral agents1 not to be    
necessary events2 or which is the same  
thing1 events which it is not impossible
 but that they may not come to pass2 and
 yet to suppose that ,god certainly     
foreknows them1 and knows all things1 is
 to suppose ,god's knowledge to be      
inconsistent with itself4 ,for to say   

that ,god certainly and without all     
conjecture1 knows that a thing will     
infallibly be1 which at the same time he
 knows to be so contingent1 that it may 
possibly not be1 is to suppose his      
knowledge inconsistent with itself2 or  
that one thing he knows is utterly      
inconsistent with another thing he      
knows4 7page #aag47  ,the substance of  
this reasoning is this4 ,that inasmuch  
as a contingent future event is         
uncertain from its very nature and      
definition1 it cannot be called an      
object of certain knowledge1 to any     
mind1 not even to the divine mind1      
without a manifest contradiction4 ,it is
 the same as to say1 he now knows a     
proposition to be of certain infallible 
truth1 which he knows to be of          
contingent uncertain truth4  ,we have   
here again an error arising from not    
making a proper distinction1 which ,i   
have already pointed out1--the          
distinction between the certainty of a  
future volition as a mere fact existent1

 and the manner in which that fact came 
to exist4  ,the fact of volition comes  
to exist contingently2 that is1 by a    
power which in giving it existence1 is  
under no law of necessity1 and at the   
moment of causation1 is conscious of    
ability to withhold the causative nibus4
 ,now all volitions which have already  
come to exist in this way1 have both a  
certain and contingent existence4 ,it is
 certain that they have come to exist1  
for that is a matter of observation2 but
 their existence is also contingent1    
because they came to exist1 not by      
necessity as a mathematical conclusion1 
but by a cause contingent and free1 and 
which1 although actually giving         
existence to these volitions1 had the   
power to withhold them4  ,certainty and 
contingency are not opposed1 and        
exclusive of each other in reference to 
what has already taken place4 ,are they 
opposed and exclusive of each other in  
reference to the future8 ,in the first  
place1 we may reason on probable        

grounds4 ,contingent causes have already
 produced volitions--hence they may     
produce volitions in the future4 ,they  
have produced volitions in obedience to 
laws of reason and sensitivity--hence   
they may do so in the future4 ,they have
 done this according to a uniformity    
self-imposed1 and long and habitually   
observed--hence this uniformity may be  
continued in the future4  ,a future     
contingent event may therefore have a   
high degree of probability1 and even a  
moral certainty4  ,but to a being       
endowed with prescience1 what prevents a
 positive and infallible knowledge of a 
future contingent event8 ,his mind      
extends to the actual in the future1 as 
easily as to the actual in the past2 but
 the actual of the future is not only   
that which comes to pass by his own     
determination and nibus1 and therefore  
necessarily in its relation to himself  
as cause1 but also that which comes to  
pass by the nibus of constituted wills1 
contingent and free1 as powers to do or 

not to do4 ,there is no opposition1 as  
,edwards supposes1 between the          
infallible divine foreknowledge1 and the
 contingency of the event2--the divine  
foreknowledge is infallible from its own
 inherent perfection2 and of course     
there can be no doubt but that the event
 foreseen will come to pass2 but then it
 is foreseen as an event coming to pass 
contingently1 and not necessarily4  ,the
 error we have just noted1 appears again
 in the corollary which ,edwards        
immediately deduces from his third      
position4 ,from what has been observed1 
he remarks1 it is evident1 that the     
absolute decrees of ,god are no more    
inconsistent with human liberty1 on     
account of the necessity of the event   
which follows such decrees1 than the    
absolute foreknowledge of ,god4 7page   
#aah47 ,the absolute decrees of ,god are
 the determinations of his will1 and    
comprehend the events to which they     
relate1 as the cause comprehends the    
effect4 ,foreknowledge1 on the contrary1

 has no causality in relation to events 
foreknown4 ,it is not a determination of
 divine will1 but a form of the divine  
intelligence4 ,hence the decrees of ,god
 do actually and truly necessitate      
events2 while the foreknowledge of ,god 
extends to events which are not         
necessary but contingent1--as well as to
 those which are pre-determined4        
,edwards always confounds contingency   
with chance or no cause1 and thus makes 
it absurd in its very definition4 ,he   
also always confounds certainty with    
necessity1 and thus compels us to take  
the latter universal and absolute1 or to
 plunge into utter uncertainty1 doubt1  
and disorder4  ,prescience is an        
essential attribute of ,deity4          
,prescience makes the events foreknown1 
certain2 but if certain1 they must be   
necessary4 ,and on the other hand1 if   
the events were not certain1 they could 
not be foreknown1--for that which is    
uncertain cannot be the object of       
positive and infallible knowledge2 but  

if they are certain in order to be      
foreknown1 then they must be necessary4 
,again3 contingence1 as implying no     
cause1 puts all future events supposed  
to come under it1 out of all possible   
connexion with anything preceding and   
now actually existent1 and consequently 
allows of no basis upon which they can  
be calculated and foreseen4             
,contingence1 also1 as opposed to       
necessity1 destroys certainty1 and      
excludes the possibility even of divine 
prescience4 ,this is the course of      
,edwards's reasoning4  ,now if we have  
reconciled contingence with both cause  
and certainty1 and have opposed it only 
to necessity1 thus separating cause and 
certainty from the absolute and         
unvarying dominion of necessity1 then   
this reasoning is truly and legitimately
 set aside4  ,necessity lies only in the
 eternal reason1 and the sensitivity    
connected with it3--contingency lies    
only in will4 ,but the future acts of   
will can be calculated from its known   

union with1 and self-subjection to the  
reason and sensitivity4  ,these         
calculations are more or less probable1 
or are certain according to the known   
character of the person who is the      
subject of these calculations4  ,of ,god
 we do not affirm merely the power of   
calculating future contingent events    
upon known data1 but a positive         
prescience of all events4 ,he sees from 
the beginning how contingent causes or  
wills1 will act4 ,he sees with absolute 
infallibility and certainty--and the    
events to him are infallible and        
certain4 ,but still they are not        
necessary1 because the causes which     
produce them are not determined and     
necessitated by anything preceding4     
,they are causes contingent and free1   
and conscious of power not to do what   
they are actually engaged in doing4  ,i 
am persuaded that inattention to the    
important distinction of the certainty  
implied in the divine foreknowledge1 and
 the necessity implied in the divine    

predetermination or decree1 is the great
 source of fallacious reasonings and    
conclusions respecting the divine       
prescience4 ,when ,god pre-determines or
 decrees1 he fixes the event by a       
necessity relative to himself as an     
infinite and irresistible cause4 ,it    
cannot be otherwise than it is decreed1 
while his decree remains4 ,but when he  
foreknows an event1 he presents us      
merely a form of his infinite           
intelligence1 exerting no causative1 and
 consequently no necessitating influence
 whatever4 ,the volitions which ,i am   
now conscious of exercising1 are just   
what they are1 whether they have been   
foreseen or not--and as they now do     
actually exist1 they have certainty2 and
 yet they are contingent1 because ,i am 
conscious that ,i have power not to     
exercise them4 ,they are1 but they might
 not have been4 ,now let the            
intelligence of ,god be so perfect1 as  
five thousand years ago1 to have        
foreseen the volitions which ,i am now  

exercising2 it is plain that this       
foresight does not destroy the          
contingency of the volitions1 nor does  
the contingency render the foresight    
absurd4 ,the supposition is both        
rational and possible4  ,it is not      
necessary for us to consider the        
remaining corollaries of ,edwards1 as   
the application of the above reasoning  
to them will be obvious4  ,before       
closing this part of the treatise in    
hand1 ,i deem it expedient to lay down  
something like a scale of certainty4 ,in
 doing this1 ,i shall have to repeat    
some things4 ,but it is by repetition1  
and by placing the same things in new   
positions1 that we often best attain    
perspicuity1 and succeed in rendering   
philosophical ideas familiar4  ,first3  
,let us consider minutely the           
distinction between certainty and       
necessity4 ,necessity relates to truths 
and events considered in themselves4    
,certainty relates to our apprehension  
or conviction of them4 ,hence necessity 

is not certainty itself1 but a ground of
 certainty4 ,absolute certainty relates 
only to truths or to being4  ,first or  
intuitive truths1 and logical           
conclusions drawn from them1 are        
necessary with an absolute necessity4   
,they do not admit of negative          
suppositions1 and are irrespective of   
will4 ,the being of ,god1 and time1 and 
space1 are necessary with an absolute   
necessity4  ,relative necessity relates 
to logical conclusions and events or    
phenomena4 ,logical conclusions are     
always necessary relatively to the      
premises1 but cannot be absolutely      
necessary unless the premises from which
 they are derived1 are absolutely       
necessary4  ,all phenomena and events   
are necessary with only a relative      
necessity2 for in depending upon causes1
 they all ultimately depend upon will4  
,considered therefore in themselves1    
they are contingent2 for the will which 
produced them1 either immediately or by 
second or dependent causes1 is not      

necessitated1 but free and              
contingent--and therefore their         
non-existence is supposable4 ,but they  
are necessary relatively to will4 ,the  
divine will1 which gave birth to        
creation1 is infinite2 when therefore   
the nibus of this will was made1        
creation was the necessary result4 ,the 
,deity is under no necessity of willing2
 but when he does will1 the effect is   
said necessarily to follow--meaning by  
this1 that the nibus of the divine will 
is essential power1 and that there is no
 other power that can prevent its taking
 effect4  ,created will is under no     
necessity of willing2 but when it does  
will or make its nibus1 effects         
necessarily follow1 according to the    
connexion established by the will of    
,deity1 between the nibus of created    
will and surrounding objects4 ,where a  
nibus of created will is made1 and      
effects do not follow1 it arises from   
the necessarily greater force of a      
resisting power1 established by ,deity  

likewise2 so that whatever follows the  
nibus of created will1 whether it be a  
phenomenon without1 or the mere         
experience of a greater resisting force1
 it follows by a necessity relative to  
the divine will4  ,when we come to      
consider will in relation to its own    
volitions1 we have no more necessity1   
either absolute er relative2 we have    
contingency and absolute freedom4  ,now 
certainty we have affirmed to relate to 
our knowledge or conviction of truths   
and events4  ,necessity is one ground of
 certainty1 both absolute and relative4 
,we have a certain knowledge or         
conviction of that which we perceive to 
be necessary in its own nature1 or of   
which a negative is not supposable2 and 
this1 as based upon an absolute         
necessity1 may be called an absolute    
certainty4  ,the established connexion  
between causes and effects1 is another  
ground of certainty4 ,causes are of two 
kinds2 first causes1 or causes per se1  
or contingent and free causes1 or will2 

and second or physical causes1 which are
 necessary with a relative necessity4   
,first causes are of two degrees1 the   
infinite and the finite4  ,now we are   
certain1 that whatever ,god wills1 will 
take place4 ,this may likewise be called
 an absolute certainty1 because the     
connexion between divine volitions and  
effects is absolutely necessary4 ,it is 
not supposable that ,god should will in 
vain1 for that would contradict his     
admitted infinity4  ,the connexion      
between the volitions of created will   
and effects1 and the connexion between  
physical causes and effects1 supposing  
each of course to be in its proper      
relations and circumstances1 is a       
connexion of relative necessity2 that   
is1 relative to the divine will4 ,now   
the certainty of our knowledge or       
conviction that an event will take      
place1 depending upon volition or upon a
 physical cause1 is plainly different   
from the certain knowledge of a         
necessary truth1 or the certain         

conviction that an event which infinite 
power wills1 will take place4 ,the will 
which established the connexion1 may at 
any moment suspend or change the        
connexion4 ,i believe that when ,i will 
to move my hand over this paper1 it will
 move1 supposing of course the continued
 healthiness of the limb2 but it is     
possible for ,god so to alter the       
constitution of my being1 that my will  
shall have no more connexion with my    
hands than it now has with the          
circulation of the blood4 ,i believe    
also that if ,i throw this paper into   
the fire1 it will burn2 but it is       
possible for ,god so to alter the       
constitution of this paper or of fire1  
that the paper will not burn2 and yet ,i
 have a certain belief that my hand will
 continue to obey volition1 and that    
paper will burn in the fire4 ,this      
certainly is not an absolute certainty1 
but a conditional certainty3 events will
 thus continue to take place on         
condition the divine will does not      

change the condition of things4 ,this   
conditional certainty is likewise called
 a physical certainty1 because the      
events contemplated include besides the 
phenomena of consciousness1 which are   
not so commonly noticed1 the events or  
phenomena of the physical world1 or     
nature4  ,but we must next look at will 
itself in relation to its volitions3    
,here all is contingency and            
freedom1--here is no necessity4 ,is     
there any ground of certain knowledge   
respecting future volitions8  ,if will  
as a cause per se1 were isolated and in 
no relation whatever1 there could not be
 any ground of any knowledge whatever1  
respecting future volitions4 ,but will  
is not thus isolated4 ,on the contrary1 
it forms a unity with the sensitivity   
and the reason4 ,reason reveals what    
ought to be done1 on the basis of       
necessary and unchangeable truth4 ,the  
sensitivity reveals what is most        
desirable or pleasurable1 on the ground 
of personal experience4 ,now although it

 is granted that will can act without   
deriving a reason or inducement of      
action from the reason and the          
sensitivity1 still the instances in     
which it does so act1 are so rare and   
trifling1 that they may be thrown out of
 the account4 ,we may therefore safely  
assume as a general law1 that the will  
determines according to reasons and     
inducements drawn from the reason and   
the sensitivity4 ,this law is not by its
 very definition1 and by the very nature
 of the subject to which it relates1 a  
necessary law--but a law revealed in our
 consciousness as one to which the will1
 in the exercise of its freedom1 does   
submit itself4 ,in the harmony and      
perfection of our being1 the reason and 
the sensitivity perfectly accord4 ,in   
obeying the one or the other1 the will  
obeys both4 ,with regard to perfect     
beings1 therefore1 we can calculate with
 certainty as to their volitions under  
any given circumstances4 ,whatever is   
commanded by reason1 whatever appears   

attractive to the pure sensitivity1 will
 be obeyed and followed4  ,but what kind
 of certainty is this8 ,it is not       
absolute certainty1 because it is       
supposable that the will which obeys may
 not obey1 for it has power not to obey4
 ,nor is it physical certainty1 for it  
does not relate to a physical cause1 nor
 to the connexion between volition and  
its effects1 but to the connexion       
between will and its volitions4 ,nor    
again can we1 strictly speaking1 call it
 a conditional certainty2 because the   
will1 as a power per se1 is under no    
conditions as to the production of its  
volitions4 ,to say that the volitions   
will be in accordance with the reason   
and pure sensitivity1 if the will       
continue to obey the reason and pure    
sensitivity1 is merely saying that the  
volitions will be right if the willing  
power put forth right volitions4 ,what  
kind of certainty is it1 then8 ,i reply1
 it is a certainty altogether           
peculiar1--a certainty based upon the   

relative state of the reason and the    
sensitivity1 and their unity with the   
will2 and as the commands of reason in  
relation to conduct have received the   
name of moral#g laws1 simply because    
they have this relation1--and as the    
sensitivity1 when harmonizing with the  
reason1 is thence called morally pure1  
because attracting to the same conduct  
which the reason commands1--this        
certainty may fitly be called moral     
certainty4 ,the name1 however1 does not 
mark degree4 ,does this certainty       
possess degrees8 ,it does4 ,with respect
 to the volitions of ,god1 we have the  
highest degree of moral certainty1--an  
infinite moral certainty4 ,he1 indeed1  
in his infinite will1 has the power of  
producing any volitions whatever2 but   
from his infinite excellency1 consisting
 in the harmony of infinite reason with 
the divine affections of infinite       
benevolence1 truth1 and justice1 we are 
certain that his volitions will always  
be right1 good1 and wise4 ,besides1 he  

has assured us of his fixed             
determination to maintain justice1      
truth1 and love2 and he has given us    
this assurance as perfectly knowing     
himself in the whole eternity of his    
being4 ,let no one attempt to confound  
this perfect moral certainty with       
necessity1 for the distinction is plain4
 ,if ,god's will were affirmed to be    
necessarily determined in the direction 
of truth1 righteousness1 and love1 it   
would be an affirmation respecting the  
manner of the determination of the      
divine will3 viz4--that the divine      
determination takes place1 not in       
contingency and freedom1 not with the   
power of making an opposite             
determination1 but in absolute          
necessity4 ,but if it be affirmed that  
,god's will1 will certainly go in the   
direction of truth1 righteousness1 and  
love1 the affirmation respects our      
knowledge and conviction of the         
character of the divine volitions in the
 whole eternity of his being4 ,we may   

indeed proceed to inquire after the     
grounds of this knowledge and           
conviction2 and if the necessity of the 
divine determinations be the ground of  
this knowledge and conviction1 it must  
be allowed that it is a sufficient      
ground4 ,but will any man assume that   
necessity is the only ground of certain 
knowledge and conviction8 ,if necessity 
be universal1 embracing all beings and  
events1 then of course there is no place
 for this question1 inasmuch as any     
other ground of knowledge than necessity
 is not supposable4 ,but if1 at least   
for the sake of the argument1 it be     
granted that there may be other grounds 
of knowledge than necessity1 then ,i    
would ask whether the infinite          
excellence of the divine reason and     
sensitivity1 in their perfect harmony1  
does afford to us a ground for the most 
certain and satisfactory belief that the
 divine will will create and mould all  
being and order all events according to 
infinite wisdom and rectitude4 ,in order

 to have full confidence that ,god will 
forever do right1 must we know that his 
will is absolutely necessitated by his  
reason and his affections8 ,can we not  
enjoy this confidence1 while we allow   
him absolute freedom of choice8 ,can we 
not believe that the ,judge of all the  
,earth will do right1 although in his   
free and omnipotent will he have the    
power to do wrong8 ,and especially may  
we not believe this1 when1 in his       
omniscience and his truth1 he has       
declared that his purposes will forever 
be righteous1 benevolent1 and wise8     
,does not the glory and excellency of   
,god appear in this1--that while he hath
 unlimited power1 he employs that power 
by his free choice1 only to dispense    
justice1 mercy1 and grace8 ,and does not
 the excellency and meritoriousness of a
 creature's faith appear in this1--that 
while ,god is known to be so mighty and 
so absolute1 he is confided in as a     
being who will never violate any moral  
principle or affection8 ,suppose ,god's 

will to be necessitated in its wise and 
good volitions1--the sun dispensing heat
 and light1 and by their agency         
unfolding and revealing the beauty of   
creation1 seems as truly excellent and  
worthy of gratitude1--and the creature1 
exercising gratitude towards ,god and   
confiding in him1 holds no other        
relation to him than the sunflower to   
the sun--by a necessity of its nature1  
ever turning its face upwards to receive
 the influences which minister to its   
life and properties4  ,the moral        
certainty attending the volitions of    
created perfect beings is the same in   
kind with that attending the volitions  
of the ,deity4 ,it is a certainty based 
upon the relative state of the reason   
and the sensitivity1 and their unity    
with the will4 ,wherever the reason and 
the sensitivity are in harmony1 there is
 moral certainty4 ,i mean by this1 that 
in calculating the character of future  
volitions in this case1 we have not to  
calculate the relative energy of        

opposing principles3--all which is now  
existent is1 in the constituted unity of
 the soul1 naturally connected only with
 good volitions4 ,but the degree of the 
moral certainty in created beings1 when 
compared with that attending the        
volitions of ,deity1 is only in the     
proportion of the finite to the         
infinite4 ,the confidence which we      
repose in the integrity of a good being1
 does not arise from the conviction that
 his volitions are necessitated1 but    
from his known habit of obeying truth   
and justice2 and our sense of his       
meritoriousness does not arise from the 
impossibility of his doing wrong1 but   
from his known determination and habit  
of doing right while having the power of
 doing wrong1 and while even under      
temptations of doing wrong4  ,a         
certainty respecting volitions1 if based
 upon the necessity of the volitions1   
would not differ from a physical        
certainty4 ,but a moral certainty has   
this plain distinction1--that it is     

based upon the evidently pure           
dispositions and habits of the          
individual1 without implying1 however1  
any necessity of volitions4  ,moral     
certainty1 then1 is predicable only of  
moral perfection1 and predicable in     
degrees according to the dignity and    
excellency of the being4  ,but now let  
us suppose any disorder to take place in
 the sensitivity2 that is1 let us       
suppose the sensitivity1 to any degree1 
to grow into opposition to the reason1  
so that while the reason commands in one
 direction1 the sensitivity gives the   
sense of the most agreeable in the      
opposite direction1--and then our       
calculations respecting future volitions
 must vary accordingly4 ,here moral     
certainty exists no longer1 because     
volitions are now to be calculated in   
connexion with opposing principles3     
calculations now attain only to the     
probable1 and in different degrees4  ,by
 the probable1 we mean that which has   
not attained to certainty1 but which    

nevertheless has grounds on which it    
claims to be believed4 ,we call it      
probable or proveable1 because it both  
has proof and is still under conditions 
of proof1 that is1 admits of still      
farther proof4 ,that which is certain1  
has all the proof of which the case     
admits4 ,a mathematical proposition is  
certain on the ground of necessity1 and 
admits of no higher proof than that     
which really demonstrates its truth4    
,the divine volitions are certain on the
 ground of the divine perfections1 and  
admit of no higher proof than what is   
found in the divine perfections4  ,the  
volitions of a good created being are   
certain on the ground of the purity of  
such a being1 and admit of no higher    
proof than what is found in this purity4
  ,but when we come to a mixed being1   
that is1 a being of reason1 and of a    
sensitivity corrupted totally or in     
different degrees1 then we have place   
not for certainty1 but for probability4 
,as our knowledge of the future         

volitions of such a being can only be   
gathered from something now existent1   
this knowledge will depend upon our     
knowledge of the present relative state 
of his reason and sensitivity2 but a    
perfect knowledge of this is in no case 
supposable1--so that1 although our      
actual knowledge of this being may be   
such as to afford us proof of what his  
volitions may be1 yet1 inasmuch as our  
knowledge of him may be increased       
indefinitely by close observation and   
study1 so likewise will the proof be    
increased4 ,according to the definition 
of probability above given1 therefore1  
our knowledge of the future volitions of
 an imperfect being can only amount to  
probable knowledge4  ,the direction of  
the probabilities will be determined by 
the preponderance of the good or the bad
 in the mixed being supposed4 ,if the   
sensitivity be totally corrupted1 the   
probabilities will generally go in the  
direction of the corrupted sensitivity1 
because it is one observed general fact 

in relation to a state of corruption1   
that the enjoyments of passion are      
preferred to the duties enjoined by the 
conscience4 ,but the state of the reason
 itself must be considered4 ,if the     
reason be in a highly developed state1  
and the convictions of the right        
consequently clear and strong1 there may
 be probabilities of volitions in       
opposition to passion which cannot exist
 where the reason is undeveloped and    
subject to the errors and prejudices of 
custom and superstition4 ,the difference
 is that which is commonly known under  
the terms enlightened and unenlightened 
conscience4  ,where the sensitivity is  
not totally corrupted1 the direction of 
the probabilities must depend upon the  
degree of corruption and the degree to  
which the reason is developed or        
undeveloped4  ,with a given state of the
 sensitivity and the reason1 the        
direction of the probabilities will     
depend also very much upon the          
correlated1 or upon the opposing objects

 and circumstances3--where the objects  
and circumstances agree with the state  
of the sensitivity and the reason1 or to
 speak generally and collectively1 with 
the state of the mind1 the probabilities
 will clearly be more easily determined 
than where they are opposed to the state
 of the mind4  ,the law which ,edwards  
lays down as the law of volition        
universally1 viz3 that the volition is  
as the greatest apparent good3          
understanding by the term good1 as he   
does1 simply1 that which strikes us     
agreeably1 is indeed a general rule1    
according to which the volitions of     
characters deeply depraved may be       
calculated4 ,this law represents the    
individual as governed wholly by his    
passions1 and this marks the worst form 
of character4 ,it is a law which cannot 
extend to him who is struggling under   
the light of his reason against passion1
 and consequently the probabilities in  
this last case must be calculated in a  
different way4 ,but in relation to the  

former it is a sufficient rule4         
,probability1 as well as certainty1     
respects only the kind and degree of our
 knowledge of any events1 and not the   
causes by which those events are        
produced3 whether these causes be       
necessary or contingent is another      
question4  ,one great error in reasoning
 respecting the character of causes1 in 
connexion with the calculation of       
probabilities1 is the assumption that   
uniformity is the characteristic of     
necessary causes only4 ,the reasoning   
may be stated in the following          
syllogism3  ,in order to calculate      
either with certainty or probability any
 events we must suppose a uniform law of
 causation2 but uniformity can exist    
only where there is a necessity of      
causation2 hence1 our calculations      
suppose a necessity of causation4  ,this
 is another instance of applying to the 
will principles which were first        
obtained from the observation of        
physical causes1 and which really belong

 to physical causes only4 ,with respect 
to physical causes1 it is true that     
uniformity appears to be a              
characteristic of necessary causes1     
simply because physical causes are      
relatively necessary causes3--but with  
respect to the will1 it is not true that
 uniformity appears to be a             
characteristic of necessary cause1      
because the will is not a necessary     
cause4 ,that uniformity therefore1 as in
 the case of physical causes1 seems to  
become a characteristic of necessary    
cause1 does not arise from the nature of
 the idea of cause1 but from the nature 
of the particular subject1 viz41        
physical cause4 ,uniformity in logical  
strictness1 does not belong to cause at 
all1 but to law or rule4 ,cause is      
simply efficiency or power3 law or rule 
defines the direction1 aims1 and modes  
of power3 cause explains the mere       
existence of phenomena3 law explains    
their relations and characteristics3 law
 is the thought and design of the       

reason4 ,now a cause may be so          
conditioned as to be incapable of acting
 except in obedience to law1 and this is
 the case of all physical causes which  
act according to the law or design of   
infinite wisdom1 and thus the uniformity
 which we are accustomed to attribute to
 these causes is not their own1 but     
belongs to the law under which they     
necessarily act4 ,but will is a cause   
which is not so conditioned as to be    
incapable of acting except in obedience 
to law2 it can oppose itself to1 and    
violate law1 but still it is a cause in 
connexion with law1 the law found in the
 reason and sensitivity1 which law of   
course has the characteristic of        
uniformity4 ,the law of the reason and  
pure sensitivity is uniform--it is the  
law of right4 ,the law of a totally     
corrupted sensitivity is likewise a     
uniform law2 it is the law of passion2 a
 law to do whatever is most pleasing to 
the sensitivity2 and every individual1  
whatever may be the degree of his       

corruption1 forms for himself certain   
rules of conduct1 and as the very idea  
of rule embraces uniformity1 we expect  
in every individual more or less        
uniformity of conduct4 ,uniformity of   
physical causation1 is nothing but the  
design of the supreme reason developed  
in phenomena of nature4 ,uniformity of  
volitions is nothing but the design of  
reason and pure sensitivity1 or of      
corrupted passion developed in human    
conduct4 ,the uniformity thus not being 
the characteristic of cause as such1    
cannot be the characteristic of         
necessary cause4 ,the uniformity of     
causation1 therefore1 argues nothing    
respecting the nature of the cause2 it  
may be a necessary cause or it may not4 
,there is no difficulty at all in       
conceiving of uniformity in a free      
contingent will1 because this will is   
related to uniform rules1 which in the  
unity of the being we expect to be      
obeyed but which we also know do not    
necessitate obedience4 ,in physical     

causes we have the uniformity of        
necessitated causes4 ,in will we have   
the uniformity of a free intelligent    
cause4 ,we can conceive of perfect      
freedom and yet of perfect order1       
because the free will can submit itself 
to the light of the reason4 ,indeed1 all
 the order and harmony of creation1     
although springing from the idea of the 
reason1 has been constituted by the     
power of the infinite free will4 ,it is 
an order and harmony not necessitated   
but chosen by a power determining       
itself4 ,it is altogether an assumption 
incapable of being supported that       
freedom is identified with disorder4    
,of the words1 ,foreknowledge and       
,prescience4  ,these words are          
metaphorical3 fore and pre do not       
qualify knowledge and science in        
relation to the mind which has the      
knowledge or science2 but the time in   
which the knowledge takes place in      
relation to the time in which the object
 of knowledge is found4 ,the metaphor   

consists in giving the attribute of the 
time of knowledge1 considered relatively
 to the time of the object of knowledge1
 to the act of knowledge itself4        
,banishing metaphor for the sake of     
attaining greater perspicuity1 let us   
say1  ,first3 ,all acts of knowing are  
present acts of knowing1--there is no   
fore knowledge and no after knowledge4  
,secondly3 ,the objects of knowledge may
 be in no relation to time and space    
whatever1 e4 g4 pure abstract and       
necessary truth1 as #b x #b  #d2 and the
 being of ,god4 ,or the objects of      
knowledge may be in relations of time   
and space1 e4 g4 all physical phenomena4
  ,now these relations of time and space
 are various2--the object of knowledge  
may be in time past1 or time present1 or
 time future2 and it may be in a place  
near1 or in a place distant4 ,and the   
faculty of knowledge may be of a        
capacity to know the object in all these
 relations under certain limitations1 or
 under no limitations4 ,the faculty of  

knowledge as knowing objects in all     
relations of time and space1 under      
certain limitations1 is the faculty as  
given in man4 ,we know objects in time  
present1 and past1 and future2 and we   
know objects both near and distant2 but 
then our knowledge does not extend to   
all events in any of these relations1 or
 in any of these relations to their     
utmost limit4  ,the faculty of knowledge
 as knowing objects in all relations of 
time and space1 under no limitations1 is
 the faculty under its divine and       
infinite form4 ,under this form it      
comprehends the present perfectly1 and  
the past and the future no less than the
 present--and it reaches through all    
space4 ,god's knowledge is an eternal   
now--an omnipresent here2 that is1 all  
that is possible and actual in eternity 
and space1 is now perfectly known to    
him4 ,indeed ,god's knowledge ought not 
to be spoken of in relation to time and 
space2 it is infinite and absolute      
knowledge1 from eternity to eternity the

 same2 it is unchangeable1 because it is
 perfect2 it can neither be increased   
nor diminished4  ,we have shown before  
that the perfection of the knowledge    
does not settle the mode of causation2  
that which comes to pass by necessity1  
and that which comes to pass            
contingently1 are alike known to ,god4  
,,conclusion4  ,i here finish my review 
of ,edwards's ,system1 and his arguments
 against the opposite system4 ,i hope ,i
 have not thought or written in vain4   
,the review ,i have aimed to conduct    
fairly and honourably1 and in supreme   
reverence of truth4 ,as to style1 ,i    
have laboured only for perspicuity1 and 
where a homely expression has best      
answered this end1 ,i have not hesitated
 to adopt it4 ,the nice graces of       
rhetoric1 as popularly understood1      
cannot be attended to in severe         
reasoning4 ,to amble on a flowery       
surface with fancy1 when we are mining  
in the depths of reason1 is manifestly  
impossible4  ,the great man with whose  

work ,i have been engaged1 ,i honour and
 admire for his intellectual might1 and 
love and venerate for a purity and      
elevation of spirit1 which places him   
among the most sainted names of the     
,christian church4 ,but have ,i done    
wrong not to be seduced by his genius1  
nor won and commanded by his piety to   
the belief of his philosophy8 ,i have   
not done wrong if that be a false       
philosophy4 ,when he leads me to the    
cross1 and speaks to me of salvation1 ,i
 hear in mute attention--and one of the 
old preachers of the martyr age seems to
 have re-appeared4 ,but when we take a  
walk in the academian grove1 ,i view him
 in a different character1 and here his 
voice does not sound to me so sweet as  
,plato's4  ,the first part of my        
undertaking is accomplished4 ,when ,i   
again trouble the public with my        
lucubrations1 ,i shall appear not as a  
reviewer1 but in an original work1 which
 in its turn must become the subject of 
philosophical criticism4  ,,the ,,end4  

,footnotes  #a ,it is remarkable that   
the advocates for necessity have adopted
 a distinction made use of for other    
purposes1 and forced it into their      
service2 ,i mean moral and natural      
necessity4 ,they say natural or physical
 necessity takes away liberty1 but moral
 necessity does not3 at the same time   
they explain moral necessity so as to   
make it truly physical or natural4 ,that
 is physical necessity which is the     
invincible effect of the law of nature1 
and it is neither less natural1 nor less
 insurmountable1 if it is from the laws 
of spirit than it would be if it were   
from the laws of                        
matter4--7,witherspoon's ,lectures on   
,divinity1 lect4 xiii47  #b ,natural    
inability1 and a want of liberty1 are   
identified in this usage2 for the want  
of a natural faculty essential to the   
performance of an action1 and the       
existence of an impediment or           
antagonistic force1 which takes from a  
faculty supposed to exist1 the liberty  

of action1 have the same bearing upon   
responsibility4  #c ,it is but justice  
to remark here1 that the distinction of 
moral and natural inability is made by  
many eminent divines1 without intending 
anything so futile as that we have above
 exposed4 ,by moral inability they do   
not appear to mean anything which really
 render the actions required1           
impossible2 but such an impediment as   
lies in corrupt affections1 an          
impediment which may be removed by a    
self-determination to the use of means  
and appliances graciously provided or   
promised4 ,by natural ability they mean 
the possession of all the natural       
faculties necessary to the performance  
of the actions required4 ,in their      
representations of this natural ability1
 they proceed according to a popular    
method1 rather than a philosophical4    
,they affirm this natural ability as a  
fact1 the denial of which involves      
monstrous absurdities1 but they give no 
psychological view of it4 ,this task ,i 

shall impose upon myself in the         
subsequent volume4 ,i shall there       
endeavour to point out the connexion    
between the sensitivity and the will1   
both in a pure and a corrupt state1--and
 explain what these natural faculties   
are1 which1 according to the just       
meaning of these divines1 form the      
ground of rebuke and persuasion1 and    
constitute responsibility4  #d ,the     
great argument that men are determined  
by the strongest motives1 is a mere     
equivocation1 and what logicians call   
petitio principii4 ,it is impossible    
even to produce any medium of proof that
 it is the strongest motive1 except that
 it has prevailed4 ,it is not the       
greatest in itself2 nor does it seem to 
be in all respects the strongest to the 
agent2 but you say it appears strongest 
in the meantime4 ,why8 ,because you are 
determined by it4 ,alas6 you promised to
 prove that ,i was determined by the    
strongest motive1 and you have only     
shown that ,i had a motive when ,i      

acted4 ,but what has determined you     
then8 ,can any effect be without a      
cause8 ,i answer--supposing my          
self-determining power to exist1 it is  
as real a cause of its proper and       
distinguishing effect1 as your moral    
necessity3 so that the matter just comes
 to a stand1 and is but one and the same
 thing on one side and on the other4    
--7,witherspoon's ,lectures1 lect4      
xiii47  #e ,cousin4  #f ,dr4 ,reid4  #g 
,lat4 moralis1 from mos1--i4 e4 custom  
or ordinary conduct4