,,examination ,,of ,,edwards ,,on ,,the ,,will4 ,,an ,,examination ,,of ,,president ,,edwards' ,,inquiry ,,into ,,the ,,freedom ,,of ,,the ,,will4 ,,by ,,albert ,,taylor ,,bledsoe4 ,man1 as the minister and interpreter of nature1 does and understands as much as his observations on the order of nature1 either with regard to things or the mind1 permit him1 and neither knows more1 nor is capable of more4--,novum ,organum4 ,,philadelphia3 ,h4 ,,hooker1 #af ,,south ,,seventh ,,street4 #ahde4 ,,entered1 according to act of ,congress1 in the year #ahde1 by ,h4 ,,hooker1 in the clerk's office of the ,district ,court for the ,eastern ,district of ,pennsylvania4 ,king ,baird1 ,printers1 #i ,george ,st4 ,,to ,,the ,,rev4 ,,william ,,sparrow1 ,d4 ,d4 ,,as ,a ,,token ,,of ,,admiration ,,for ,,his ,,genius1 ,,and ,,affectionate ,,regard ,,for ,,his ,,virtues1 ,this little ,volume ,,is ,,respectfully ,,inscribed1 ,,by ,,the ,,author4 ,,contents4 ,,introductory ,,remarks ,,section ,i4 ,,of ,,the ,,point ,,in ,,controversy ,,section ,,ii4 ,,of ,,edwards' ,,use ,,of ,,the ,,term ,,cause ,,section ,,iii4 ,,the ,,inquiry ,,involved ,,in ,a ,,vicious ,,circle ,,section ,,iv4 ,,volition ,,not ,,an ,,effect ,,section ,v4 ,,of ,,the ,,consequences ,,of ,,regarding ,,volition ,,as ,,an ,,effect ,,section ,,vi4 ,,of ,,the ,,maxim ,,that ,,every ,,effect ,,must ,,have ,a ,,cause ,,section ,,vii4 ,,of ,,the ,,application ,,of ,,the ,,maxim ,,that ,,every ,,effect ,,must ,,have ,a ,,cause ,,section ,,viii4 ,,of ,,the ,,relation ,,between ,,the ,,feelings ,,and ,,the ,,will ,,section ,,ix4 ,,of ,,the ,,liberty ,,of ,,indifference ,,section ,x4 ,,of ,,action ,,and ,,passion ,,section ,,xi4 ,,of ,,the ,,argument ,,from ,,the ,,foreknowledge ,,of ,,god ,,section ,,xii4 ,,of ,,edwards' ,,use ,,of ,,the ,,term ,,necessity ,,section ,,xiii4 ,,of ,,natural ,,and ,,moral ,,necessity ,,section ,,xiv4 ,,of ,,edwards' ,,idea ,,of ,,liberty ,,section ,,xv4 ,,of ,,edwards' ,,idea ,,of ,,virtue ,,section ,,xvi4 ,,of ,,the ,,self-,,determining ,,power ,,section ,,xvii4 ,,of ,,the ,,definition ,,of ,a ,,free-,,agent ,,section ,,xviii4 ,,of ,,the ,,testimony ,,of ,,consciousness ,,introductory ,,remarks4 ,i ,,entered upon an examination of the ,inquiry of ,president ,edwards1 not with a view to find any fallacy therein1 but simply with a desire to ascertain the truth for myself4 ,if ,i have come to the conclusion1 that the whole scheme of moral necessity which ,edwards has laboured to establish1 is founded in error and delusion2 this has not been because ,i came to the examination of his work with any preconceived opinion4 ,in coming to this conclusion ,i have disputed every inch of the ground with myself1 as firmly and as resolutely as ,i could have done with an adversary4 ,the result has been1 that the views which ,i now entertain1 in regard to the philosophy of the will1 are widely different from those usually held by the opponents of moral necessity1 as well as from those which are maintained by its advocates4 ,the formation of these views1 whether they be correct or not1 has been no light task4 ,long have ,i struggled under the stupendous difficulties of the subject4 ,long has darkness1 a deep and perplexing darkness1 seemed to rest upon it4 ,faint glimmerings of light have alternately appeared and disappeared4 ,some of these have returned at intervals1 while others have vanished for ever4 ,some have returned1 and become less wavering1 and led on the mind to other regions of mingled obscurity and light4 ,gladly and joyfully have ,i followed4 ,by patient thought1 and sustained attention1 these faint glimmerings have1 in more instances than one1 been made to open out into what has appeared to be the clear and steady light of truth4 ,if these are not mere fond illusions1 the true intellectual system of the world is far different from that which has been constructed by the logic of ,president ,edwards4 ,if his system be false1 why1 it may be asked1 has the ,inquiry so often appeared to be unanswerable8 ,why has it been supposed1 even by some of the advocates of free agency1 that logic is in favour of his system1 while consciousness only is in favour of ours8 ,one reason of this opinion is1 that it has been taken for granted1 that either the scheme of ,president ,edwards or that of his opponents must be true2 and hence1 his system has appeared to stand upon immoveable ground1 in so far logic is concerned1 only because he has1 with such irresistible power and skill1 demolished and trampled into ruins that of his adversaries4 ,reason has been supposed to be on his side1 because he has so clearly shown that it is not on the side of his opponents4 ,but the scheme of the motive-determining power1 does not necessarily arise out of the ruins of the self-determining power2 it is only to the imagination that it appears to do so4 ,because the one system is false1 it does not follow that the other is true4 ,there is another and still more powerful reason for the idea in question4 ,the advocates of free agency have granted too much4 ,the great foundation principles of the scheme of moral necessity have been incautiously admitted by its adversaries4 ,these principles have appeared so obvious at first view1 that their correctness has not been doubted2 and hence they have been assumed by the one side and conceded by the other4 ,yet1 if ,i am not greatly mistaken1 they have been derived1 not from the true oracles of nature1 but from what ,bacon quaintly calls the idols of the tribe4 ,if this be the case1 as ,i think it will hereafter appear to be2 then in order to secure a complete triumph over the scheme of moral necessity1 even on the arena of logic1 we must not only know how to reason1 but also how to doubt4 ,i fully concur with the younger ,edwards1 that ,clarke1 ,johnson1 ,price1 and ,reid have granted too much2 and while ,i try to show this1 ,i shall also endeavour to show that ,president ,edwards has assumed too much1 not for the good of the cause in which he is engaged1 but for the attainment of truth4 ,if his system had not been founded upon certain natural illusions1 by which the true secrets of nature are concealed from our view1 it could never have been the boast of its admirers1 that a reluctant world has been constrained to bow in homage to its truth4 ,if we would try the strength of this system then1 we must bend a searching and scrutinizing eye upon the premises and assumptions upon which it is based2 we must put aside every preconceived notion1 even the most plausible and commonly received opinions1 and lay our minds open to the steady and unbiased contemplation of nature1 just as it has been created by the ,almighty ,architect2 we must view the intellectual system of the world1 not as it is seen through our hasty and careless conceptions1 but as it is revealed to us in the light of consciousness and severe meditation4 ,this will be no light task1 ,i am aware2 but whosoever would seek the truth on such a subject1 must not expect to find it by light and trifling efforts2 he must go after it in all the loving energy of his soul4 ,let this course be pursued1 honestly and perseveringly pursued1 and ,i am persuaded1 that a system of truth will be revealed to the mind1 to which it will not be constrained to render a reluctant homage1 but which1 by harmonizing the deductions of logic with the dictates of nature1 will secure to itself the most pleasing and delightful homage of which the human mind is susceptible4 ,those false conceptions which are common to the human mind1 those idols of the tribe1 of which ,bacon speaks1 have been1 as it is well known1 the sources of some of the most obstinate errors1 both in science and in religion1 that have ever infested the world4 ,and it is evident1 that while the assumptions from which any system1 however false1 legitimately results1 are conceded1 it will stand1 like a wall of adamant1 against the most powerful artillery of logic4 ,it will remain triumphant in spite of all opposition4 ,it may be contrary to our natural convictions1 and consequently liable to our suspicions2 but it cannot be refuted by argument4 ,its advocates may reason correctly1 and its adversaries may appeal to opposite truths2 but neither can ever arrive at the truth1 and the whole truth4 ,this has appeared to me to be the case1 with respect to the long controverted question of liberty and necessity4 ,the above causes1 conspiring with some instances of false logic1 which have been overlooked amid so much that is really conclusive1 and also with a number of unsound1 yet plausible1 devices to reconcile the scheme of moral necessity with the reality of virtue and free-agency1 have1 in the minds of many1 rendered the work of ,president ,edwards both an acceptable and an unanswerable production4 ,such1 at least1 is the conclusion to which ,i have been constrained to come2 but whether this conclusion be correct or not1 it is not for me to determine4 ,time alone can show1 whether the foundation of his system1 like that of truth1 is immutable1 or whether1 like many which have been laid by the master spirits of other ages1 it is destined to pass away1 though not to be forgotten4 ,in the above enumeration of causes ,i have not alluded to those of a theological nature2 because they have been but partial in their operation4 ,and besides1 ,i have not wished to refer to this subject at all1 except in so far as1 is necessary to indicate wherein ,i conceive the errors of the ,inquiry to consist1 and thereby to point out the course which ,i intend to pursue in the following discussion4 ,,section ,i4 ,,of ,,the ,,point ,,in ,,controversy4 ,,it is worse than a waste of time1 it is a grievous offence against the cause of truth1 to undertake to refute an author without having taken pains to understand exactly what he teaches4 ,in every discussion1 the first thing to be settled is the point in dispute2 and if this be omitted1 the controversy must needs degenerate into a mere idle logomachy4 ,it seldom happens that any thing affords so much satisfaction1 or throws so much light on a controversy1 as to have the point at issue clearly made up1 and constantly borne in mind4 ,what then1 is the precise doctrine of the ,inquiry which ,i intend to oppose8 ,the great question is1 says ,edwards1 what determines the will4 ,it is taken for granted1 on all sides1 that the will is determined2 and the only point is1 or rather has been1 as to what determines it4 ,it is determined by the strongest motive1 says one2 it is not determined by the strongest motive1 says another4 ,but although the issue is thus made up in general terms1 it is very far from being settled with any tolerable degree of clearness and precision2 ample room is still left for all that loose and declamatory kind of warfare in which so many controversialists delight to indulge4 ,the question still remains to be settled1 what is meant by determining the will8 ,in regard to this point1 the necessitarian does not seem to have a very clear and definite idea4 ,the object of our ,inquiry1 says ,president ,day1 is not to learn whether the mind acts at all4 ,this no one can doubt4 ,nor is it to determine why we will at all4 ,the very nature of the faculty of the will implies that we put forth volitions4 ,but the real point of inquiry is1 why we will one way rather than another2 why we choose one thing rather than its opposite1 p4 #db4 ,one would suppose from this statement1 that we have nothing to do with the question1 why we put forth volitions1 but exclusively with the question1 why we will one way rather than another4 ,here the author's meaning seems to be plain1 and we may imagine that we know exactly where to find him2 but1 in the very next sentence1 he declares that the object of our inquiry is1 what is it that determines not only that there shall be volitions1 but what they shall be8 p4 #db4 ,in one breath we are told1 that we have nothing to do with the question1 why our volitions are put forth or come into existence2 these are admitted to be implied in the very nature of the faculty of the will2 but1 in the very next1 we are informed that we have to inquire into this point also4 ,one moment1 only one of these points is in dispute1 and the next1 both are put in controversy4 ,surely1 this does not indicate any very clear and definite idea1 on the part of ,president ,day1 as to the point at issue4 ,the notion of ,president ,edwards1 on this subject1 appears to be equally unsteady and vacillating4 ,thus1 says he1 by determining the will1 if the phrase be used with any meaning1 must be intended1 causing that the act of the will should be thus1 and not otherwise3 and the will is said to be determined1 when1 in consequence of some action1 or influence1 its choice is directed to1 and fixed upon a particular object4 ,as when we speak of the determination of motion1 we mean causing the motion of the body to be in such a direction1 rather than another1 p4 #ah4 ,now1 are we to understand from this1 that the determination of the will can only refer to the question1 why it is directed to and fixed upon a particular object1 and not to the question1 how it comes to put forth a volition at all8 ,one would certainly suppose so2 and that1 according to ,edwards1 we have nothing to do with the question1 ,how a spirit comes to act1 but with the question1 why its action has such and such a particular direction and determination4 ,but this supposition would be very far from the truth4 ,for he informs us1 that the question is not so much1 ,how a spirit endowed with activity comes to act1 as why it exerts such an act1 and not another2 or why it acts with such a particular determination8 ,this clearly implies1 that although the question1 ,how a spirit comes to act1 is not chiefly concerned in the present controversy2 yet it is partly concerned in it4 ,this question is concerned in it1 though not so much as the other question1 why the act of the mind is as it is1 rather than otherwise4 ,this is not all4 ,when ,edwards attacks the doctrine of his adversaries1 in regard to the determining of the will1 he never seems to dream of the idea1 which1 according to himself1 if the phrase mean any thing1 must be attached to it4 ,he treats it as a settled point1 that by determining the will must be intended1 not causing volition to be one way rather than another1 but causing it to come into existence4 ,he could take this expression to mean the one thing or the other1 just as it suited his purpose4 ,are these two questions really distinct8 ,can there be one cause of volition1 and another cause of its particular direction8 ,i answer1 there cannot4 ,no such distinction can be shown to exist by a reference to the cause of motion4 ,force is the cause of motion4 ,one force may put a body in motion2 and1 afterwards1 another force may change the direction of its motion4 ,upon a superficial observation1 this may seem to illustrate the distinction in question2 but1 upon more mature reflection1 it will not appear to do so4 ,for the force which sets a body in motion necessarily causes it to move in one particular direction1 and not another2 because it is impossible for a body to move without moving in a particular direction4 ,after one force has put a body in motion1 another force1 it is true1 may change its direction2 but in such a case1 it is not correct to say1 that one force caused its motion and another the direction of that motion4 ,for1 in reality1 both the motion of the body and its direction1 result from the joint action of the two forces2 or1 in other words1 each force contributes to the motion1 and each to its direction4 ,both the motion and its direction are caused by what is technically called1 in mechanical philosophy1 the resultant of the two forces2 and the case is really not different1 so far as the distinction in question is concerned1 from the case of motion produced by the action of a single force4 ,the absurdity of this distinction consists1 in supposing that a body may be put in motion without moving in a particular direction2 and that something else beside the cause of its motion1 is necessary to account for the direction of that motion4 ,the illustration1 therefore1 drawn from the phenomena of motion1 fails to answer the purpose for which ,president ,edwards has produced it4 ,the same absurdity is involved in the supposition1 that one thing may cause volition to exist1 and another may cause it to be directed to and fixed upon a particular object4 ,no man can conceive of a choice as existing1 which has not some particular object4 ,it is of the very nature and essence of a choice to have some particular direction and determination4 ,if a choice exists at all1 it must be a choice of some particular thing4 ,hence1 whatever causes a volition to exist1 must cause it to have a particular direction and determination4 ,let any one show a choice1 which is not the preference of one thing rather than another1 and then we may admit that there is some reason for the distinction in question2 but until then1 we must be permitted to regard it as having no foundation in the nature of things4 ,if it were necessary1 this matter might be fully and unanswerably illustrated2 but a bare statement of it is sufficient to render it perfectly clear4 ,we shall hereafter see1 that the reason why ,president ,edwards supposed that there is some foundation for such a distinction is1 that he did not sufficiently distinguish between the cause of a thing and its condition4 ,although we may suppose that the activity of the soul is the cause of its acting2 yet motive may be the indispensable condition of its acting2 and1 in this sense1 may be the reason why a volition is one way rather than another4 ,but it is denied that there can be two causes in the case2 one to produce volition1 and another to determine its object4 ,we have seen that such a supposition is absurd2 and we shall hereafter see1 that ,edwards was led to make it1 by confounding the condition with the cause of volition4 ,after all1 it may be said1 that ,edwards himself did not really consider these two things as distinct1 but only as different aspects of the same thing4 ,if so1 it will follow1 that when he undertook to establish his own scheme1 he represented motive as the cause of volition2 and yet when he was reminded1 that the activity of the nature of the soul is the cause of its actions1 he replied1 that although this may be very true1 yet this activity of nature is not the cause why its acts are thus and thus limited1 directed and determined4 ,he replied that the question is not so much1 ,how a spirit comes to act1 as why it acts thus1 and not otherwise4 ,that is to say1 it will follow1 that he chose to build up his scheme under one aspect of it1 and to defend it under another aspect thereof2 that as the architect of his system1 he chose to assume and occupy the position1 that motive is the cause of volition itself2 yet as the defender of it1 he sometimes preferred to present this same position under the far milder aspect1 that although the activity of spirit1 may be the cause why it acts1 yet motive is the cause why its acts are thus and thus limited1 c4 ,in other words1 it will follow1 that his doctrine possesses two faces2 and that with the one it looks sternly on the scheme of necessity1 whilst1 with the other1 it seems to smile on its adversaries4 ,the truth is1 the great question which ,president ,edwards discusses throughout the ,inquiry1 as we shall see1 is ,how a spirit comes to act2 and the other question1 why its action is thus and thus limited1 c41 which1 on occasion1 swells out into such immense importance1 as to seem to cover the whole field of vision1 generally shrinks down into comparative insignificance4 ,as a general thing1 he goes along in the even tenor of his way1 to prove that no event can begin to be without a cause of its existence2 and1 in particular1 that no volition can come into existence without being caused to do so by motive2 and it is only when it is urged upon him1 that a spirit endowed with activity may give rise to its own acts1 that he takes a sudden turn and reminds us1 that the question is not so much how a spirit comes to act8 as why its acts are thus and thus limited8 ,from the supposition made by ,edwards1 that if activity of nature be the cause why a spirit acts1 it has been concluded that he regarded the soul of man as the efficient cause of its volitions1 and motive as merely the occasion on which they are put forth or exerted4 ,but surely1 those who have so understood the ,inquiry1 have done so very unadvisedly1 and have but little reason to complain1 as they are prone to do1 that his opponents do not understand him4 ,if ,edwards makes mind the efficient cause of volition1 what becomes of his famous argument against the self-determining power1 by which he reduces it to the absurdity of an infinite series of volitions8 ,if the mind causes its volition1 says he1 it can do so only by a preceding volition2 and so on ad infinitum4 ,is not all this true1 on the supposition that the mind is the efficient cause of volition8 ,and if so1 how can any reader of ,edwards1 who does not wish to make either his author or himself appear ridiculous1 seriously contend that he holds mind to be the efficient1 or producing cause of volition8 ,there be pretended followers and blind admirers of ,president ,edwards1 who1 knowing but little of his work themselves1 are ever ready to defend him1 whensoever attacked1 even by those who have devoted years to the study of the ,inquiry1 by most ignorantly and flippantly declaring that they do not understand him4 ,these pseudo-disciples will not listen to the charge1 that ,edwards makes the strongest motive the producing cause of volition2 but whether this charge be true or not1 we shall see in the following section4 ,,section ,,ii4 ,,of ,,edwards' ,,use ,,of ,,the ,,term ,,cause4 ,,we have already seen that ,edwards must be understood as holding motive to be the cause of volition2 but still we cannot make up the issue with him1 until we have ascertained in what sense he employs the term cause4 ,it has been contended1 by high authority1 that he did not regard motive as the efficient1 or producing cause of volition1 but only as the occasion or condition on which volition is produced4 ,hence1 it becomes necessary to examine this point1 and to settle the meaning of the author1 in order that ,i may not be supposed to misrepresent him1 and to dispute with him only about words4 ,the above notion is based on the following passage3 ,i would explain1 says ,president ,edwards1 how ,i would be understood when ,i use the word cause in this discourse2 since1 for want of a better word1 ,i shall have occasion to use it in a sense which is more extensive1 than that in which it is sometimes used4 ,the word is often used in so restrained a sense as to signify only that which has a positive efficiency or influence to produce a thing1 or bring it to pass4 ,but there are many things which have no such positive productive influence2 which yet are causes in this respect1 that they have truly the nature of a reason why some things are1 rather than others2 or why they are thus rather than otherwise44 4 4 4 ,i sometimes use the word ,cause1 in this ,inquiry1 to signify any antecedent1 either natural or moral1 4 4 4 upon which an event so depends1 that it is the ground or reason1 either in whole or in part1 why it is1 rather than not2 or why it is as it is1 rather than otherwise2 or1 in other words1 any antecedent with which a consequent event is so connected1 that it truly belongs to the reason why the proposition which affirms that event1 is true2 whether it has any positive influence1 or not4 ,and1 agreeably to this1 ,i sometimes use the term effect for the consequence of another thing1 which is perhaps rather an occasion than cause1 most properly speaking4 ,and he tells us1 that ,i am the more careful thus to explain my meaning1 that ,i may cut off occasion1 from any that might seek occasion to cavil and object against some things which ,i may say concerning the dependence of all things which come to pass1 on some cause1 and their connection with their cause1 p4 #ej-a4 ,this is the portion of the ,inquiry on which the younger ,edwards founds his conclusion1 that his father did not regard motive as the efficient cause of volition1 but only as the occasion1 or condition1 or antecedent of volition4 ,he finds this language in the ,essays of ,dr4 ,west2 ,we cannot agree with ,mr4 ,edwards in his assertion1 that motive is the cause of volition2 and he replies1 ,mr4 ,edwards has very particularly informed us in what sense he uses the term cause2 and1 in proof of this1 he proceeds to quote a portion of the above extracts from the ,inquiry4 ,having done this1 he triumphantly demands1 ,now1 does ,dr4 ,west deny1 that motive is an antecedent1 on which volition1 either in whole or in part depends8 or that it is a ground or reason1 either in whole or in part1 either by positive influence or not1 why it is rather than not8 ,surely1 he cannot with consistency deny this1 since he says1 ',by motive we understand the occasion1 end or design1 which an agent has in view when he acts4' ,so that1 however desirous ,dr4 ,west may be to be thought to differ1 in this point1 from ,president ,edwards1 it appears that he most exactly agrees with him1 p4 #fe4 ,now1 if ,edwards really believed that motive is merely the occasion on which the mind acts1 agreeing herein most perfectly with ,dr4 ,west1 why did he not say so8 ,why adhere to the term cause1 which can only obscure such an idea1 instead of adopting the word occasion1 or condition1 or antecedent1 which would have clearly expressed it8 ,surely1 if ,edwards maintained the doctrine ascribed to him1 he has been most unfortunate in his manner of setting it forth2 it is a great pity he did not give it a more conspicuous place in his system4 ,it is to be regretted1 that he has not once told us that such was his doctrine1 in order that we might see for ourselves his agreement with ,dr4 ,west in this respect1 instead of leaving it to the initiated few to enlighten us on this subject4 ,he has1 we are told1 very particularly informed us in what sense he uses the word cause1 p4 #fd4 ,now is this so8 ,has he informed us that by cause he means occasion8 ,he has done no such thing1 and his language admits of no such construction4 ,he merely tells us1 that he sometimes uses the term cause to signify an occasion only2 but when and where he so employs it1 he has not explained at all4 ,he has not once said1 that when he applies it to motive he uses it in the sense of an occasion1 or antecedent2 and1 if he had said so1 it would not have been true4 ,the truth is1 that he has used the word in question with no little vagueness and indistinctness of meaning2 for he sometimes employs it to signify merely an occasion1 which exerts no positive influence1 and sometimes to signify a producing cause4 ,this is the manner in which he uses it1 when he applies it to motive4 ,in his definition of motive1 as the younger ,edwards truly says1 he includes every cause or occasion of volition2 every thing which has a tendency to volition2 c41 p4 #ajd4 ,thus1 according to the younger ,edwards himself1 the elder ,edwards has1 in his definition of motive1 included every conceivable cause of volition2 and yet1 when ,dr4 ,west objects that he makes motive the producing cause of volition1 the very same writer replies that he has done no such thing3 that he has very particularly explained in what sense he uses the word cause when applied to motive1 and that he means by cause1 no other than occasion1 reason1 or previous circumstance necessary for volition2 and that in this ,dr4 ,west entirely agrees with him1 p4 #fe4 ,if we may believe the younger ,edwards1 then1 when the author of the ,inquiry says1 that motive is the cause of volition1 he means that it is no other than the occasion or previous circumstance necessary to volition1 and not that it is the cause thereof in the proper sense of the word2 and yet that it is the cause thereof in every conceivable sense of the word6 ,now1 he agrees with ,dr4 ,west himself2 and again1 he teaches precisely the opposite doctrine6 ,let those who so fondly imagine that they are the only men who understand the ,inquiry1 and that the most elaborate replies to it may be sufficiently refuted by raising the cry of misconstruction2 let them1 ,i say1 take some little pains to understand the work for themselves1 instead of merely giving echo to the blunders of the younger ,edwards4 ,president ,edwards says1 that the term cause is often used in so restrained a sense as to signify that which has a positive efficiency or influence to produce a thing1 or bring it to pass4 ,it is in this restrained sense that ,i use the word1 when ,i say that ,president ,edwards regarded motive as the cause of volition2 and it is in this sense that ,i intend to make the charge good4 ,i intend to show that he regarded motive1 not merely as the occasion or condition of volition1 but as that which produces it4 ,this position1 as we have seen1 has been denied by high authority2 and therefore it becomes necessary to establish it1 in order that ,i may not be charged with disputing only about words2 and that although ,i may be exceedingly desirous of being thought to differ with ,president ,edwards on this subject1 yet ,i do most exactly agree with him4 ,to begin then2--if motive is merely the condition on which the mind acts1 and exerts no influence in the production of volition1 it is certainly improper to say1 that it gives rise to volition4 ,this clearly implies that it is the efficient1 or producing cause of volition4 ,on this point1 let the younger ,edwards himself be the judge4 ,that self-determination gives rise to volition1 is an expression which he quotes from ,dr4 ,chauncey1 and italicizes the words gives rise to1 as showing that the author of them regarded the mind as the efficient cause of volition4 ,now1 ,president ,edwards says1 that the strongest motive excites the mind to volition2 and he adds1 that the notion of exciting1 is exerting influence to cause the effect to arise and come forth into existence1 p4 #if4 ,surely1 if to give rise to a thing1 is efficiently to cause it1 no less can be said of exerting influence to cause it to arise and come forth into existence4 ,and if so1 then1 according to the younger ,edwards himself1 the author of the ,inquiry regarded motive as the efficient cause of volition2 and yet1 on p4 #ff he declares1 that ,president ,edwards did not hold motive to be the efficient cause of volition2 and that if he has dropped any expression which implies such a doctrine1 it must have been an inadvertency4 ,i intend to show1 before ,i have done1 that there are many such inadvertencies in his work2 the younger ,edwards himself being the judge4 ,now1 it will not be denied1 that that which produces a thing1 is its efficient cause4 ,the younger ,edwards himself has spoken of an efficient1 producing cause1 in such a manner as to show that he regarded them as convertible terms1 p4 #df4 ,he being judge1 then1 that which produces a thing1 is its efficient cause4 ,i might easily show1 if it were necessary1 that he himself frequently speaks of motive as the efficient1 or producing cause of volition2 but1 at present1 ,i am only concerned with the doctrine of ,president ,edwards4 ,it is true1 says ,president ,edwards1 ,i find myself possessed of my volitions before ,i can see the effectual power of any cause to produce them1 for the power and efficacy of the cause is not seen but by the effect1 p4 #bgg4 ,here1 from the volition1 from the effect1 he infers the operation of the cause or power which produces it4 ,now this cause is motive1 the strongest motive2 for this is that which operates to induce a choice4 ,motive1 then1 produces volition1 according to the ,inquiry2 it is not merely the condition on which it is produced4 ,the younger ,edwards declares1 that ,president ,edwards did not regard motive as the efficient cause of volition1 p4 #ff1 but only as the occasion or previous circumstances necessary to volition2 in this respect most exactly agreeing with ,dr4 ,west himself2 and yet he tells us1 in another place1 that every cause of volition is included in ,president ,edwards' definition of motive1 p4 #ajd4 ,now1 does not every cause of volition include the efficient cause thereof8 ,does not this expression include that which is the cause of volition in the real1 in the only proper1 sense of the word8 ,to save the consistency of the author1 will it be said1 that every cause does not include the efficient cause in his estimation1 since in his opinion there is no such cause8 ,if this should be said1 it would not be true2 for the younger ,edwards did1 as it is well known1 regard the influence of the ,divine ,being as the efficient cause of volition4 ,he regarded the ,deity as the sole fountain of all efficiency in heaven and in earth4 ,hence1 if the definition of ,president ,edwards included every cause of volition2 it must have included this divine influence1 this efficient cause4 ,indeed1 the younger ,edwards expressly asserts1 that this divine influence is included in ,president ,edwards' explanation of his idea of motive1 p4 #ajd4 ,he tells us1 then1 that ,president ,edwards regards motive as merely the occasion of volition2 and yet that he considered motive as including the efficient cause of volition6 ,at one time1 motive is merely the antecedent1 which exerts no influence2 at another1 it embraces the efficient cause6 ,at one time1 the author of the ,inquiry most exactly agrees with the libertarian in regard to this all-important point2 and1 at another1 he most perfectly disagrees with him6 ,it is to be hoped1 that ,president ,edwards is not quite so glaringly inconsistent with himself1 on this subject1 as he is represented to be by his distinguished son4 ,again4 ,president ,edwards has written a section to prove1 that volitions are necessarily connected with the influence of motives2 which clearly implies that they are brought to pass by the influence of motives4 ,in this section1 he says1 ,motives do nothing1 as motives or inducements1 but by their influence4 ,and so much as is done by their influence is the effect of them4 ,for that is the notion of an effect1 something that is brought to pass by the influence of something else4 ,here motives are said to be the causes of volitions1 and to bring them to pass by their influence4 ,is this to make motive merely the condition on which the mind acts8 ,is this to consider it as merely an antecedent to volition1 which exerts no influence8 ,on the contrary1 does it not strongly remind one of that restrained sense of the word cause1 in which it signifies1 that which has an influence to produce a thing1 or bring it to pass8 ,once more4 ,in relation to the acts of the will1 he adopts the following language to show that they are necessarily dependent on the influence of motives3 ,for an event to have a cause and ground of its existence1 and yet not be connected with its cause1 is an inconsistency4 ,for if the event be not connected with the cause1 it is not dependent on its cause2 its existence is as it were loose from its influence2 and it may attend it1 or it may not2 its being a mere contingency1 whether it follows or attends the influence of the cause1 or not2 and that is the same thing as not to be dependent on it4 ,and to say the event is not dependent on its cause1 is absurd2 it is the same thing as to say1 it is not its cause1 nor the event the effect of it2 for dependence on the influence of a cause is the very notion of an effect4 ,if there be no such relation between one thing and another1 consisting in the connexion and dependence of one thing on the influence of another1 then it is certain there is no such relation between them as is signified by the relation of cause and effect1 p4 #gg-h4 ,now1 here we are told1 that it is the very notion of an effect1 that it owes its existence to the influence of its cause2 and that it is absurd to speak of an effect which is loose from the influence of its cause4 ,it is this influence1 which causes volition to arise and come forth into existence4 ,any other notion of cause and effect is absurd and unmeaning4 ,and yet1 ,president ,edwards informs us1 that he sometimes uses the term cause to signify any antecedent1 though it may exert no influence2 and that he so employs it1 in order to prevent cavilling and objecting4 ,now1 what is all this taken together1 but to inform us1 that he sometimes uses the word in question very absurdly1 in order to keep us from finding fault with him8 ,the truth is1 that whatever apparent concession ,president ,edwards may have made1 he does habitually bring down the term cause to its narrow and restrained sense1 to its strict and proper meaning1 when he says1 that motive is the cause of volition4 ,he loses sight entirely of the idea1 that it is only the occasion on which the mind acts4 ,i might multiply extracts to the same effect almost without end2 but it is not necessary4 ,it must be evident to every impartial reader of the ,inquiry1 that even if the author really meant by the above extracts1 that motive is merely the antecedent to volition2 this was only a momentary concession made to his opponents1 with the vague and ill-defined hope1 perhaps1 that it would render his system less obnoxious to them4 ,it had no abiding place in his mind4 ,it was no sooner uttered than it was repelled and driven away by the whole tenor of his system4 ,we soon hear him1 as if no such thing had ever been dreamed of in his philosophy1 asking the question1 and that too1 in relation to motives1 ,what can be meant by a cause1 but something that is the ground and reason of a thing by its influence1 ,,an ,,influence ,,that ,,is ,,prevalent ,,and ,,effectual1 p4 #ig4 ,will it be pretended1 that this does not come up to his definition of an efficient cause1 as that which brings something to pass by a positive influence8 ,such a pretext would amount to nothing2 for ,edwards has said1 that motives excite volition2 and to excite1 is to be a cause in the most proper sense1 not merely a negative occasion1 but a ground of existence by positive influence1 p4 #if4 ,an efficient cause is properly defined by the ,edwardses themselves4 ,does not the man talk absurdly and inconsistently1 says the younger ,edwards1 who asserts1 that a man is the efficient cause of his own volitions1 yet puts forth no exertion in order to cause it8 ,if any other way of efficiently causing an effect1 be possible or conceivable1 let it be pointed out1 p4#di4 ,president ,edwards evidently entertained the same idea2 for he repeatedly says1 that if the mind be the cause of its own volitions1 it must cause them by a preceding act of the mind4 ,the objection which he urges against the self-determining power1 is founded on this idea of a cause4 ,it is what he means1 when he says1 that the term cause is often used in so restrained a sense as to signify only that which has a positive efficiency or influence to produce a thing1 or bring it to pass4 ,that ,president ,edwards regarded motive as the efficient or producing cause of volition1 according to his own notion of it1 is clear not only from numerous passages of the ,inquiry2 it is also wrought into the very substance and structure of his whole argument4 ,it is involved in his very definition of the strongest motive4 ,the strongest motive1 says he1 is the whole of that which operates to induce a particular choice4 ,now1 to say that one thing operates to induce another1 or bring it into existence1 is1 according to the definition of the younger ,edwards himself1 to say that it is the efficient cause of the thing so produced4 ,if there be any meaning in words1 or any truth in the definition of the ,edwardses1 then to say that one thing operates to produce another1 is to say that it is its efficient cause4 ,president ,edwards1 as we have seen1 holds that motive is the effectual power and efficacy which produces volition4 ,again4 ,edwards frequently says1 that if this great principle of common sense1 that every effect must have a cause1 be given up1 then there will be no such thing as reasoning from effect to cause4 ,we cannot even prove the existence of ,deity4 ,if any thing can begin to be without a cause of its existence1 then we cannot know that there is a ,god4 ,now1 the sense in which this maxim is here used is perfectly obvious2 for nothing can begin to be without an efficient cause1 by which it is brought into existence4 ,when we reason from those things which begin to be up to ,god1 we clearly reason from effects to their efficient causes4 ,hence1 when this maxim is applied by ,edwards to volitions1 he evidently refers to the efficient causes of them4 ,if he does not1 his maxim is misapplied2 for it is established in one sense1 and applied in another4 ,if it proves any thing1 it proves that volition must have an efficient cause2 and when motive is taken to be that cause1 it is taken to be the efficient cause of volition4 ,this is not all4 ,edwards undertakes to point out the difference between natural and moral necessity4 ,in the case of moral necessity1 says he1 the cause with which the effect is connected is of a particular kind3 viz41 that which is of a moral nature2 either some previous habitual disposition1 or some motive presented to the understanding4 ,and the effect is also of a particular kind1 being likewise of a moral nature2 consisting in some inclination or volition of the soul1 or voluntary action4 ,but the difference1 says he1 does not lie so much in the nature of the connection1 as in the two terms connected4 ,now1 let us suppose that any effect1 the creation of the world1 for example1 is produced by the power of ,god4 ,in this case1 the connection between the effect produced1 the creation of the world1 and the act of the divine omnipotence by which it is created1 is certainly the connection between an effect and its efficient cause4 ,the two terms are here connected by a natural necessity4 ,but we are most explicitly informed1 that the connection between motives and volitions1 differs from this in the nature of the two terms connected1 rather than in the nature of the connection4 ,how could language more clearly or precisely convey the meaning of an author8 ,to say that ,president ,edwards does not make motive the efficient cause of volition1 is1 indeed1 not so much to interpret1 as it is to new model1 his philosophy of the will4 ,the connection between the strongest motive1 he declares1 and the corresponding volition1 is absolute1 just as absolute as any connection in the world4 ,if the strongest motive exists1 the volition is sure to follow2 it necessarily follows2 it is absurd to suppose1 that it may attend its cause or not4 ,to say that it may follow the influence of its cause1 or may not1 is to say that it is not dependent on that influence1 that it is not the effect of it4 ,in other words1 it is to say that a volition is the effect of the strongest motive1 and yet that it is not the effect of it2 which is a plain contradiction4 ,such1 as we have seen1 is the clear and unequivocal teaching of the ,inquiry4 ,in conclusion1 if ,edwards really held1 that motive does not produce volition1 but is merely the occasion on which it is put forth1 where shall we find his doctrine8 ,where shall we look for it8 ,we hear him charged with destroying man's free-agency1 by making motive the producing cause of volition2 and we see him labouring to repel this charge4 ,truly1 if he held the doctrine ascribed to him1 we might have expected to find some allusion to it in his attempts to refute such a charge4 ,if such had been his doctrine1 with what ease might he have repelled the charge in question1 and shown its utter futility1 by simply alleging that1 according to his system1 motive is the occasion1 and not the producing cause1 of volition8 ,instead of the many pages through which he has so laboriously struggled1 in order to bring our ideas of free-agency and virtue into harmony with his scheme2 with what infinite ease might a single word have brought his scheme into harmony with the common sentiments of mankind in regard to free-agency and virtue6 ,indeed1 if ,edwards really believed that motive is merely the condition on which the mind acts1 nothing can be more wonderful than his profound silence in regard to it on such an occasion2 except the great pains which1 on all occasions1 he has taken to keep it entirely in the background4 ,if the younger ,edwards is not mistaken as to the true import of his father's doctrine1 then1 instead of setting it forth in a clear light1 so that it may be read of all men1 the author of the ,inquiry has1 indeed1 enveloped it in such a flood of darkness1 that it is no wonder those who have been so fortunate as to find it out1 should be so frequently called upon to complain that his opponents do not understand him4 ,indeed1 if such be the doctrine of the ,inquiry1 ,i do not see how any man can possibly understand it1 unless he has inherited some peculiar power1 unknown to the rest of mankind1 by which its occult meaning may be discerned1 notwithstanding all the outward appearances by which it is contradicted and obscured4 ,the plain truth is1 as we have seen1 that ,president ,edwards holds motive to be the producing cause of volition4 ,according to his scheme1 ,volitions are necessarily connected with the influence of motives2 they are brought to pass by the prevailing and effectual influence of motives4 ,motive is the effectual power and efficacy by which they are produced4 ,they are not merely caused to be thus1 and not otherwise1 by motive2 they are caused to arise and come forth into existence4 ,this is the great doctrine for which ,edwards contends2 and this is precisely the doctrine which ,i deny4 ,i contend against no other kind of necessity but this moral necessity1 just as it is explained by ,edwards himself4 ,here the issue with ,president ,edwards is joined2 and ,i intend to hold him steadily to it4 ,no ambiguity of words shall1 for a moment1 divert my mind from it4 ,if his arguments1 when thoroughly sifted and scrutinized1 establish this doctrine2 then shall ,i lay down my arms and surrender at discretion4 ,but if his assumptions are unsound1 or his deductions false1 ,i shall hold them for naught4 ,if he reconciles his scheme of moral necessity with the reality of virtue1 with the moral agency and accountability of man1 and with the purity of ,god2 then ,i shall lay aside my objections2 but if1 in reality1 he only reconciles it with the semblance of these things1 whilst he denies their substance1 ,i shall not be diverted from an opposition to so monstrous a system1 by the fair appearances it may be made to wear to the outward eye4 ,,section ,,iii4 ,,the ,,inquiry ,,involved ,,in ,a ,,vicious ,,circle4 ,,the great doctrine of the ,inquiry seems to go round in a vicious circle1 to run into an insignificant truism4 ,this is a grave charge1 ,i am aware1 and ,i have ventured to make it only after the most mature reflection3 and the justness of it1 may be shown by a variety of considerations4 ,in the first place1 when we ask1 what determines the will8 the author replies1 it is the strongest motive2 and yet1 according to his definition1 the strongest motive is that which determines the will4 ,thus1 says ,edwards1 when ,i speak of the strongest motive1 ,i have respect to the whole that operates to induce a particular act of volition1 whether that be the strength of one thing alone1 or of many together4 ,if we ask1 then1 what produces any particular act of volition1 we are told1 it is the strongest motive2 and if we inquire what is the strongest motive1 we are informed1 it is the whole of that which operated to produce that particular act of volition4 ,what is this but to inform us1 that an act of volition is produced by that which produces it8 ,it is taken for granted by ,president ,edwards1 that volition is an effect1 and consequently has a cause4 ,the great question1 according to his work1 is1 what is this cause8 ,he says it is the strongest motive2 in the definition of which he includes every thing that in any way contributes to the production of volition2 in other words1 the strongest motive is made to embrace every thing that acts as a cause of volition4 ,this is the way in which he explains himself1 as well as the manner in which he is understood by others4 ,thus1 says the younger ,edwards1 in his explanation of his idea of motive1 he mentions all agreeable objects and views1 all reasons and arguments1 and all internal biases and tempers1 which have a tendency to volition2 i4 e4 every cause or occasion of volition1 p4 #ajd4 ,every reader of ,president ,edwards must be satisfied that this is a correct account of his definition of motive2 and this being the case1 the whole amounts to just this proposition1 that volition is caused by that which causes it6 ,he admits that it would be hard1 if not impossible1 to enumerate all those things and circumstances which aid in the production of volition2 but still he is quite sure1 that the whole of that which operates to produce a volition does actually produce it6 ,though he may have failed to show wherein consists the strength of motives2 yet he contends that the strongest motive1 or the cause of volition1 is really and unquestionably the cause of volition6 ,such is the great doctrine of the ,inquiry4 ,if this is what the ,inquiry means to establish1 surely it rests upon unassailable ground4 ,well may ,president ,day assert1 that to say a weaker motive prevails against a stronger one is to say1 that that which has the least influence has the greatest influence1 p4 #ff4 ,now who would deny this position of the learned president8 ,who would say1 that that which has the greatest influence has not the greatest influence8 ,surely1 this great doctrine is to the full as certain as the newly discovered axiom of professor ,villant1 that a thing is equal to itself6 ,president ,day1 following in the footsteps of ,edwards1 informs us that the will is determined by the strongest motive2 but how shall we know what is the strongest motive8 ,the strength of a motive1 says he1 is not its prevailing1 but the power by which it prevails4 ,yet we may very properly measure this power by the actual result6 ,thus are we gravely informed that the will is determined by that which determines it4 ,again4 ,if we suppose there is a real strength in motives1 that they exert a positive influence in the production of volitions1 then we concede every thing to ,president ,edwards4 ,for1 if motives are so many forces acting upon the will1 to say that the strongest will prevail1 is simply to say that it is the strongest4 ,but if motives exert no positive influence1 then when we say that one is stronger than another1 we must be understood to use this expression in a metaphorical sense2 we must refer to some property of motives which we figuratively call their strength1 and of which we suppose one motive to possess a greater degree than another4 ,if this be so1 what is this common property of motives1 which we call their strength8 ,if they do not possess a real strength1 if they do not exert an efficient influence2 but are merely said1 metaphorically speaking1 to possess such power and to exert such influence2 then what becomes of the self-evidence which ,president ,edwards claims for his fundamental proposition motives exert a real force1 of course the strongest must prevail2 but if they only have something else about them1 which we call their strength1 it is not self-evident that the motive which possesses this something else in the highest degree must necessarily prevail4 ,hence1 the great doctrine of ,president ,edwards is either a proposition whose truth arises out of the very definition of the terms in which it is expressed1 or it is utterly destitute of that axiomatical certainty which he claims for it4 ,in other words1 he has settled his great doctrine of the will by the mere force of a definition2 or he has left its foundations quite unsettled4 ,motives1 as they are called1 are different from each other in nature and in kind2 and hence1 it were absurd to compare them in degree4 ,the strongest motive1 therefore1 is a mode of expression which can have no intelligible meaning1 unless it be used with reference to the influence which motives are supposed to exert over the mind4 ,this is the sense in which it clearly seems to be used by ,edwards4 ,the distinguishing property of a motive1 according to his definition1 is nothing in the nature of the motive itself2 it consists in its adaptedness to move or excite the mind to volition2 nor indeed could he find any other way of measuring or determining what he calls the strength of motives1 since they are so diverse in their own nature from each other4 ,he could not have given any plausible definition of the strength of motives1 if he had looked at them as they are in themselves2 and hence1 he was under the necessity of defining it1 by a reference to the degree of tendency or advantage they have to move or excite the will4 ,thus1 according to the ,inquiry1 the will is determined by the strongest motive2 and yet we can form no intelligible idea of what is meant by the strongest motive1 unless we conceive it to be that which determines the will4 ,the matter will not be mended1 by alleging that the strongest motive is not defined to be that which actually determines the will1 but that which has the greatest degree of previous tendency or advantage1 to excite or move it2 for we cannot know what motive has this greatest degree of previous tendency or advantage1 except by observing what motive actually does determine the will4 ,this leads us to another view of the same subject4 ,the strength of a motive1 as ,president ,edwards properly remarks1 depends upon the state of the mind to which it is addressed4 ,hence1 in a great majority of cases1 we can know nothing about the relative strength of motives1 except from the actual influence which they exert over the mind of the individual upon whom they are brought to bear4 ,this shows that the universal proposition1 that the will is always determined by the strongest motive1 can be known to be true1 only by assuming that the strongest motive is that by which the will is determined4 ,the same thing may be made to appear from another point of view4 ,it has been well said by the philosopher of ,malmsbury1 that experience concludeth nothing universally4 ,from experience we can pronounce1 only in so far as we have observed1 and no farther4 ,but the proposition1 that the will is always determined by the strongest motive1 is a universal proposition2 and hence1 if true at all1 its truth could not have been learnt from observation and experience4 ,it must depend upon the very definition of the terms in which it is expressed4 ,we cannot say that the will is in all cases determined by the strongest motive1 unless we include in the very idea and definition of the strongest motive1 that it is such that it determines the will4 ,president ,edwards not only does1 but he must necessarily1 go around in this circle1 in order to give any degree of clearness and certainty to his doctrine4 ,that ,president ,edwards goes around in this vicious circle1 may be shown in another way4 ,it appears from these things1 says he1 that in some sense1 the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding4 ,but then the understanding must be taken in a large sense1 as including the whole faculty of perception or apprehension1 and not merely what is called reason or judgment4 ,if by the last dictate of the understanding is meant what reason declares to be best1 or most for the person's happiness1 taking in the whole of its duration1 it is not true1 that the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding1 p4 #be4 ,in this place1 ,president ,edwards gives no distinct idea of what he means by the last dictate of the understanding1 which the will is said to follow in all cases4 ,but in the eighth volume of his works1 that dictate of the understanding which the will is said to follow1 is called the practical judgment2 and this is defined to be1 that judgment which men make of things that prevail1 so as to determine their actions and govern their practice4 ,here again are we informed1 that the will always follows the practical judgment1 and that the practical judgment is that which men make of things that prevail1 so as to determine the will4 ,the ,inquiry itself furnishes abundant evidence1 that ,i have done its author no injustice4 ,i have chosen1 says he1 rather to express myself thus1 that the will always is as the greatest apparent good1 or as what appears most agreeable1 than to say the will is determined by the greatest apparent good1 or by what seems most agreeable2 because an appearing most agreeable to the mind1 and the mind's preferring1 seem scarcely distinct4 ,if strict propriety of speech be insisted on1 it may more properly be said1 that the voluntary action1 which is the immediate consequence of the mind's choice1 is determined by that which appears most agreeable1 than the choice itself4 ,after all1 then1 it seems that choice itself1 or volition1 is not determined by that which appears the most agreeable2 because1 in reality1 the sense of the most agreeable and volition are one and the same thing4 ,but surely1 if we cannot distinguish between choice and the sense of the most agreeable1 then to say that the one always is as the other1 is only to say that a thing is always as it is4 ,edwards saw the absurdity of saying that a thing is determined by itself2 but he does not seem to have seen how insignificant is the proposition1 that a thing is always as it is1 and not otherwise2 and hence this is the form in which he has chosen to present the great leading idea of his work on the will4 ,and henceforth we are to understand1 that the preference of the mind is always as that which appears most agreeable to the mind2 or1 in other words1 that the preference or choice of the mind is always as the choice of the mind4 ,this is not all4 ,president ,edwards himself has frequently reduced the fundamental doctrine of the ,inquiry to an identical proposition4 ,it is well known1 that to be determined by the strongest motive1 to follow the greatest apparent good1 to do what is most agreeable1 or what pleases most1 are all different modes of expression employed by him to set forth the same fundamental doctrine4 ,in speaking of this doctrine1 he says3 ,there is scarcely a plainer and more universal dictate of the sense and experience of mankind1 than that1 when men act voluntarily1 and do what they please1 then they do what suits them best1 or what is most agreeable to them4 ,to say1 that they do what pleases them1 but yet not what is agreeable to them1 is the same thing as to say1 they do what they please1 but do not act their pleasure2 and that is to say1 that they do what they please1 and yet do not what they please4 ,most assuredly1 if to deny the leading proposition of the ,inquiry1 is to deny that men do what they please when they do what they please2 then to affirm it1 is only to advance the insignificant truism1 that men do what they please when they do what they please4 ,it seems to me1 that after ,president ,edwards had reduced his fundamental proposition to such a truism1 he might very well have spared himself the three hundred pages that follow4 ,again1 he says3 ,it is manifest that no acts of the will are contingent1 in such sense as to be without all necessity1 or so as not to be necessary with a necessity of consequence and connection2 because every act of the will is some way connected with the understanding1 and is as the greatest apparent good is1 in the manner which has already been explained2 namely1 that the soul always wills or chooses that1 which in the present view of the mind1 considered in the whole of that view1 and all that belongs to it1 appears most agreeable4 ,because1 as we observed before1 nothing is more evident than that1 when men act voluntarily1 and do what they please1 then they do what appears most agreeable to them2 and to say otherwise would be as much as to affirm1 that men do not choose what appears to suit them best1 or what seems most pleasing to them2 or that they do not choose what they prefer1 which brings the matter to a contradiction4 ,thus1 the great fundamental doctrine of the ,inquiry is reduced by ,edwards himself to the barren truism1 that men do actually choose what they choose2 a proposition which the boldest advocate of free-agency would hardly dare to call in question4 ,after labouring through a whole section to establish this position1 the author concludes by saying1 ,these things may serve1 ,i hope1 in some measure to illustrate and confirm the position laid down in the beginning of this section3 viz4 ,that the will is always determined by the strongest motive1 or by the view of the mind which has the greatest previous tendency to excite volition4 ,but whether ,i have been so happy as rightly to explain the thing wherein consists the strength of motives1 or not1 yet my failing in this will not overthrow the position itself2 which carries much of its own evidence along with it1 and is a point of chief importance to the purpose of the ensuing discourse3 and the truth of it ,i hope will appear with great clearness1 before ,i have finished what ,i have to say on the subject of human liberty4 ,truly the position in question1 as it is explained by the author himself1 carries not only much1 but all1 of its own evidence along with it4 ,who can deny that a man always does what he pleases1 when he does what he pleases8 ,this truth appears with just as great clearness at the beginning1 as it does at the conclusion1 of the celebrated ,inquiry of the author4 ,it is invested in a flood of light1 which can neither be increased by argument1 nor obscured by sophistry4 ,from the foregoing remarks1 it appears1 ,i think1 that the fundamental doctrine of the ,inquiry is a barren truism1 or a vicious circle4 ,if ,edwards understood the import of his own doctrine1 when he reduced it to the form that a man does what he pleases when he does what he pleases1 it is certainly a truism2 and if this is all his famous doctrine amounts to1 it can have no bearing whatever upon the question as to the cause of volition2 for whether the mind be the cause of its own volitions1 or whether the strongest motive always causes them1 or whether they have no causes at all1 it is equally and unalterably true1 that every man does what he pleases when he does what he pleases4 ,there is no possible form of the doctrine of free-agency or contingency1 however wild1 which is at all inconsistent with such a truism4 ,edwards is not always consistent with himself4 ,he sometimes represents the greatest apparent good1 or sense of the most agreeable1 as the cause of volition2 and then his doctrine assumes the form1 that the will is determined by the strongest motive1 or the greatest apparent good4 ,and yet he sometimes identifies a sense of the most agreeable with the choice itself2 and then his doctrine assumes the form that the choice of the mind is always as the choice of the mind2 and to deny it is a plain contradiction in terms4 ,from the fact that ,edwards has gone round in a circle1 it has been concluded that he has begged the question2 but how1 or wherein he has begged it1 is a point which has not been sufficiently noticed4 ,the very authors who have uttered this complaint1 have granted him the very thing for which he has begged4 ,if volition is an effect1 if it has a cause1 then most unquestionably the cause of volition is the cause of volition4 ,admit that volition is an effect1 as so many libertarians have done1 and then his definition of motive1 which includes every cause of volition1 places his doctrine upon an immutable foundation4 ,we might as well heave at the everlasting mountains as to try to shake it4 ,admit that volition is an effect1 and what can we say8 ,can we say1 that the strongest motive may exist1 and yet no volition may follow from it8 ,to this the necessitarian would instantly reply1 that it any thing exists1 and no volition follows thereupon1 it is evidently not the cause of volition1 and consequently is not the strongest motive2 for this1 according to the definition1 includes every cause of volition3 it is indeed absurd1 to suppose that an effect should not proceed from its cause3 ,this is the ground taken both by ,president ,edwards and ,president ,day4 ,it is absurd1 says the latter1 to suppose that a weaker motive1 or any thing else1 can prevail over the stronger--and why8 ,because the strongest motive is that which prevails4 ,if it be said1 he continues1 that something else gives the weaker motive a superiority over the stronger2 then this something else is itself a motive1 and the united influence of the two is greater than that of the third1 p4 #ff4 ,thus1 say what we will1 we can never escape this admirable net of words1 that the will is determined by that which determines it4 ,i do not intend1 then1 to engage in the hopeless task1 of admitting volition to be an effect1 and yet striving to extricate it from the mechanism of cause and effect4 ,this ground has long since been occupied by much abler persons than myself2 and if they have failed of success1 falling into innumerable inconsistencies1 it is because1 on such ground1 success is impossible2 and that notwithstanding their transcendant abilities1 they have been fated to contradict themselves4 ,,section ,,iv4 ,,volition ,,not ,,an ,,effect4 ,,the argument of the ,inquiry1 as ,i have shown1 assumes that a volition is an effect in the proper sense of the word2 that it is the correlative of an efficient cause4 ,if it were necessary1 this point might be established by a great variety of additional considerations2 but1 ,i presume that every candid reader of the ,inquiry is fully satisfied in relation to it4 ,if we mean by an effect1 every thing that comes to pass1 of course a volition is an effect2 for no one can deny that it comes to pass4 ,or1 if we include in the definition of the term1 every thing which has a sufficient reason and ground of its existence1 we cannot deny that it embraces the idea of a volition4 ,for1 under certain circumstances1 the free mind will furnish a sufficient reason and ground of the existence of a volition4 ,all that ,i deny is1 that a volition does proceed from the mind1 or from motive1 or from anything else1 in the same manner that an effect1 properly so called1 proceeds from its efficient cause4 ,this is a point on which ,i desire to be distinctly understood4 ,i put forth a volition to move my hand4 ,the motion of the hand follows4 ,now1 here ,i observe the action of the mind1 and also the motion of the hand4 ,the effect exists in the body1 in that which is by nature passive2 the cause in that which is active1 in the mind4 ,the effect produced in the body1 in the hand1 is the passive result of the prior direct action of the mind4 ,it is in this restricted sense1 that ,i use the term in question1 when ,i deny that a volition is an effect4 ,i do not deny that it depends for its production upon certain circumstances1 as the conditions of action1 and upon the powers of the mind1 by which it is capable of acting in view of such circumstances4 ,all that ,i deny is1 that volition results from the prior action of mind1 or of circumstances1 or of any thing else1 in the same manner that the motion of body results from the prior action of mind4 ,or1 in other words1 ,i contend that action is the invariable antecedent of bodily motion1 but not of volition2 that whatever may be its relations to other things1 a volition does not sustain the same relation to any thing in the universe1 that an effect sustains to its efficient cause1 that a passive result sustains to the direct prior action by which it is produced4 ,i hope ,i may be always so understood1 when ,i affirm that a volition is not an effect4 ,it is in this narrow and restricted sense that ,edwards assumes a volition to be an effect4 ,he does not say1 in so many words1 that the mind cannot put forth a volition1 except in the way of producing it by a preceding volition or act of the will2 but he first assumes a volition to be an effect2 and then he asserts1 that the mind can be the cause of no effect1 7italicising the term effect17 except by the prior action of the mind4 ,thus1 having assumed a volition to be an effect1 he takes it for granted that it cannot proceed from the mind in any way1 except that in which any effect in the outer world proceeds from the mind2 that is to say1 except it be produced by the direct prior action of the mind1 by a preceding volition4 ,thus he brings the idea of a volition under the above narrow and restricted notion of an effect2 and thereby confounds the relation which subsists between mind and its volitions1 with the relation which subsists between mind and its external effects in body4 ,in other words1 on the supposition that our volitions proceed from the mind1 he takes it for granted that they must be produced by the preceding action of the mind2 just as an effect1 in the limited sense of the term1 is produced by the prior action of its cause4 ,it is in this assumption1 that ,edwards lays the foundation of the logic1 by which he reduces the self-determining power of the mind to the absurdity of an infinite series of volitions4 ,it is evident that such is the course pursued by ,edwards2 for he not only calls a volition1 an effect1 but he also says1 that the mind can bring no effects to pass1 but what are consequent upon its acting1 p4 #ef4 ,and again he says1 ,the will determines which way the hands and feet shall move1 by an act of choice2 and there is no other way of the will's determining1 directing1 or commanding any thing at all4 ,this is very true1 if a volition is such an effect as requires the prior action of something else to account for its production1 just as the motion of the hands and feet requires the action of the mind to account for its production2 but it is not true1 if a volition is such an effect1 that its existence may be accounted for by the presence of certain circumstances or motives1 as the conditions of action1 in conjunction with a mind capable of acting in view of such motives4 ,in other words1 his assertion is true1 if we allow him to assume1 as he does1 that a volition is an effect1 in the above restricted meaning of the term2 but it is not true1 if we consider a volition as an effect in a larger sense of the word4 ,hence1 the whole strength of ,edwards' position lies in the sense which he arbitrarily attaches to the term effect1 when he says that a volition is an effect4 ,now1 is a volition an effect in such a sense of the word8 ,is it brought into existence1 like the motion of body1 by the prior action of any thing else8 ,we answer1 ,no4 ,but how shall this point be decided8 ,the necessitarian says1 a moment before the volition did not exist1 now it does exist2 and hence1 it necessarily follows1 that there must have been a cause by which it was brought into existence4 ,that is to say1 it must be an effect4 ,true1 it must be an effect1 if you please2 but in what sense of the word8 ,is volition an effect1 in the same sense that the motion of the body is an effect8 ,this is the question4 ,and this question1 ,i contend1 is not to be decided by abstract considerations1 nor yet by the laying of words together1 and drawing conclusions from them4 ,it is a question1 not of logic1 but of psychology4 ,by whatever name you may please to call it1 the true nature of a volition is not to be determined by reference to abstractions1 nor by the power of words2 but by simply looking at it and seeing what it is4 ,if we would really understand its nature1 we must not undertake to reason it out2 we must open our eyes1 and look1 and see4 ,the former course would do very well1 no doubt1 if the object were to construct a world for ourselves2 but if we would behold the glory of that which ,god has constructed for us1 and in us1 we must lay aside the proud syllogistic method of the schools1 and betake ourselves to the humble task of observation--of patient1 severe1 and scrutinizing observation4 ,there is no other condition on which we can enter into the kingdom of man1 which is founded in the sciences4 ,there is no other course marked out for us by the immortal ,bacon3 and if we pursue any other we may wander in the dazzling light of a thousand abstractions1 and behold whatever fleeting images of grandeur and of beauty we may be pleased to conjure up for ourselves2 but the pure light of nature and of truth will be hid from us4 ,what then is a volition just as it is revealed to us in the light of consciousness8 ,does it result from the prior action of mind1 or of motive1 or of any thing else8 ,in other words1 is it an effect1 as the motion of body is an effect6 ,we always conceive of the subject in which such an effect resides1 as being wholly passive4 ,president ,edwards himself has repeatedly said1 that it is the very notion of an effect1 that it results from the action or influence of its cause2 and that nothing is any further an effect1 than as it proceeds from that action or influence4 ,the subject in which it is produced1 is always passive as to its production2 and just in so far as it is itself active1 it is not the subject of an effect1 but the author of an action4 ,such is the idea of an effect in the true and proper sense of the word4 ,now does our idea of a volition correspond with this idea of an effect8 ,is it produced in the mind1 and is the mind passive as to its production8 ,is it1 like the motion of a body1 the passive result of the action of something else8 ,no4 ,it is not the result of action2 it is action itself4 ,the mind is not passive as to its production2 it is in and of itself an action of the mind4 ,it is not determined2 it is a determination4 ,it is not a produced effect1 like the motion of body2 it is itself an original producing cause4 ,it does seem to me1 that if any man will only reflect on this subject1 he must see that there is a clear and manifest difference between an ,,act and an ,,effect4 ,although the scheme of ,edwards identifies these two things1 and his argument assumes them to be one and the same2 yet his language1 it appears to me1 frequently betrays the fact1 that his consciousness did not work in harmony with his theory4 ,while speaking of the acts of the will as effects1 he frequently says1 that it is the very idea of an effect that it results from1 and is necessarily connected with1 the action of its cause1 and that it is absurd to suppose that it is free or loose from the influence of its cause4 ,and yet1 in reference to volitions1 he often uses the expression1 this sort of effects1 as if it did not exactly correspond with the very idea of an effect1 from which it is absurd to depart in our conceptions4 ,when he gives fair play to consciousness1 he speaks of different kinds of effects2 and yet1 when he returns to his theory and his reasoning1 all this seems to vanish2 and there remains but one clear1 fixed1 and definite idea of an effect1 and to speak of any thing else as such is absurd4 ,he now and then pays a passing tribute to the power of consciousness1 by admitting that the soul exerts its own volitions1 that the soul itself acts2 but he no sooner comes to the work of argument and refutation1 than it is motive that causes them to be put forth or exerted1 p4 #if4 ,ever and anon1 he seems to catch a whisper from the voice of consciousness2 and he concedes that he sometimes uses the term cause to designate that which has not a positive or productive influence1 p4 #ej-a4 ,but this is not when he is engaged in the energy of debate4 ,let ,mr4 ,chubb cross his path2 let him hear the voice of opposition giving utterance to the sentiment1 that in motive there is no causality in the production of action2 and that moment the voice of consciousness is hushed in the most profound silence4 ,he rises1 like a giant1 in the defence of his system1 and he declares1 that to excite1 as motives do1 is positively to do something1 and certainly that which does something1 is the cause of the thing done by it4 ,yea1 to excite1 is to cause in the most proper sense1 not merely a negative occasion1 but a ground of existence by positive influence1 p4 #if4 ,these passages1 which are scattered up and down through the ,inquiry1 in which the doctrine of liberty seems to be conceded1 ,i cannot but regard as highly important concessions4 ,they have been used to show that we misconceive the scheme of ,edwards1 when we ascribe to him the doctrine of fate4 ,but when they are thus adduced1 to show that we misrepresent his doctrine1 ,i beg it may be remembered that such evidence can prove only one of two things2 either that we do not understand what he teaches1 or that he is not always consistent with himself4 ,if he really held the doctrine of fatalism1 we ought not to be surprised that he has furnished such evidence against himself4 ,it is not in the nature of the human mind to keep itself always deaf to the voice of consciousness4 ,it is not in the power of any system always to counteract the spontaneous workings of nature4 ,though the mind should be surrounded by those deep-seated1 all-pervading1 and obstinate illusions1 by which the scheme of fatalism is made to wear the appearance of self-evident truth2 yet when it loses sight of that system1 it will1 at times1 speak out in accordance with the dictates of nature4 ,the stern and unrelenting features of fatalism cannot always be so intimately present to the mind1 as entirely to exclude it from the contemplation of a milder and more captivating system of philosophy4 ,notwithstanding the influence of system1 how rigid soever may be its demands1 the human mind will1 in its moments of relaxation1 recognize in its feelings and in its utterance1 those great truths which are inseparable from its very nature4 ,let it be borne in mind1 then1 that there is more than one process in the universe4 ,some things are produced1 it is most true1 by the prior action of other things2 and herein we behold the relation of cause and effect1 properly so called2 but it does not follow1 that all things are embraced by this one relation4 ,this appears to be so only to the mind of the necessitarian2 from which one fixed idea has shut out the light of observation4 ,he no longer sees the rich variety1 the boundless diversity1 there is in the works of ,god3 all things and all modes and all processes of the awe-inspiring universe1 are made to conform to the narrow and contracted methods of his own mind4 ,look where he will1 he sees not the free and flowing outline of nature's true lineaments2 he every where beholds the image of the one fixed idea in his mind1 projected outwardly upon the universe of ,god2 behind which the true secrets and operations of nature are concealed from his vision4 ,even when he contemplates that living source of action1 that bubbling fountain of volitions1 the immortal mind of man itself1 he only beholds a thing1 which is made to act by the action of something else upon it2 just as a body is made to move by the action of force upon it4 ,his philosophy is1 therefore1 an essentially shallow and superficial philosophy4 ,the great name of ,edwards cannot shield it from such condemnation4 ,,section ,v4 ,,of ,,the ,,consequences ,,of ,,regarding ,,volition ,,as ,,an ,,effect4 ,,it has been frequently conceded that a volition is an effect2 but to make this concession1 without explanation or qualification1 is to surrender the whole cause of free agency into the hand of the enemy4 ,for if a volition is an effect1 properly speaking1 the only question is as to its efficient cause3 it is necessarily produced by its cause4 ,to make this matter clear1 let us consider what is precisely meant by the term cause when it is thus used8 ,an effect is necessarily connected1 not with the thing which is sometimes called its cause1 but with the action or positive influence of that thing4 ,thus1 the mind1 or the power of the mind1 is sometimes said to be the cause of motion in the body2 but this is not to speak with philosophical precision4 ,no motion of the body is necessarily connected1 either with the mind itself1 or with the power of the mind4 ,in other words1 if these should lie dormant1 or fail to act1 they would produce no bodily motion4 ,but let the mind act1 or will a particular motion1 and the body will necessarily move in consequence of that action4 ,hence1 it is neither with the mind1 nor with the power of the mind1 that bodily motion1 as an effect1 is necessarily connected2 it is with an act of the mind or volition that this necessary connection subsists4 ,a cause is said to imply its effect3 it is not the mind1 but an act of the mind1 that implies motion in the body4 ,this is evidently the idea of ,edwards1 when he says1 as he frequently does1 that an effect is necessarily connected with the influence or action of its cause4 ,the term cause is ambiguous2 and when he says1 that an effect is necessarily connected with its cause1 he should be understood to mean1 in accordance with his own doctrine1 that the cause referred to is the influence or action by which it is produced1 and not the thing which exerts that influence or action4 ,thus1 although motives are said to be causes of action1 he contends1 they can do nothing except by their influence2 and so much as results from their influence is the effect of that influence1 and is necessarily connected with it4 ,now1 if a volition is an effect1 if it has an efficient cause1 what is that cause8 ,by the action of what is it produced8 ,it cannot be by the act of the mind1 says ,edwards1 because the mind can produce an effect only by another act4 ,thus1 on the supposition in question1 we cannot ascribe a volition to the mind as its cause1 without being compelled to admit that it results from a preceding act of the mind4 ,but that preceding act1 on the same supposition1 will require still another preceding act to account for its production2 and so on ad infinitum4 ,such is the absurdity which ,edwards delighted to urge against the self-determining power of the mind4 ,it is triumphantly based on the concession that a volition is an effect2 that as such the prior action of something else is necessary to account for its existence4 ,and if we suppose1 in accordance with the truth1 that a volition is merely a state of the mind1 which does not sustain the same relation to the mind that an effect does to its efficient cause1 this absurdity will vanish4 ,the doctrine of liberty will no longer be encumbered with it4 ,now1 proceeding on the same supposition1 let us conceive of a volition as resulting from the influence exerted by motive4 ,if an act of the mind is an effect1 surely we may say1 that the act or productive influence of motive1 or of any thing else1 is likewise an effect2 and consequently must have a cause to account for its existence2 and so on ad infinitum4 ,hence1 the very absurdity which ,edwards charges upon our system1 really attaches to his own4 ,will it be said that this ad infinitum absurdity does not result from the supposition in question1 but from the fact that the mind can do nothing except by its action or influence8 ,it is very true1 as ,edwards repeatedly declares1 that the mind can be the cause of no effect1 except by a preceding act of the mind4 ,the truth of this proposition is involved in the very idea which he attaches to the term effect1 and it is based upon this idea alone4 ,and we may say1 with equal propriety1 that motive can be the cause of no effect1 except by its action or productive influence4 ,indeed1 ,edwards himself expressly says1 that motives can do nothing1 except by an exertion of their influence1 or by operating to produce effects4 ,thus1 the two cases are rendered perfectly parallel2 and afford the same foundation on which to erect an infinite series of causes4 ,to evade this1 can it be pretended1 that motive just exerts this influence of itself8 ,may we not with equal1 nay1 with infinitely greater propriety1 contend that mind just exerts its own positive influence of itself8 ,or1 will it be said1 that it is a mistake1 to suppose that ,edwards ascribed any real1 productive1 or causal influence to motives2 that he regarded them as the occasions on which the mind acts1 and not properly as the causes of its action8 ,if so1 then the whole scheme of moral necessity is abandoned1 and the doctrine of liberty is left to stand upon its own foundation1 in the undisputed evidence of consciousness4 ,the truth is1 if we take it for granted1 that a volition is an effect1 properly so called1 and as such must proceed from the prior action of something else1 we cannot escape the ad infinitum1 absurdity of the ,inquiry4 ,if we rise from this platform1 we cannot possibly ascend in any direction1 without entering upon an infinite series of causes4 ,whether we ascend through the self-determining power of the mind1 or through the determining power of motives1 or through the joint action of both1 we can save ourselves from such an absurd consequence only by a glaring act of inconsistency4 ,hence1 we are forced back upon the conclusion that action may1 and actually does arise in the world of mind1 without any efficient or producing cause of its existence1 without resulting from the prior action of any thing whatever4 ,any other hypothesis is involved in absurdity4 ,let it be assumed1 that a volition is1 properly speaking1 an effect1 and every thing is conceded4 ,on this vantage ground1 the scheme of necessity may be erected beyond the possibility of an overthrow4 ,for1 even if we suppose that action is determined by the will and free choice1 this is as much as to say1 that it must be necessary1 being dependent upon1 and determined by something foregoing2 namely1 a foregoing act of choice1 p4 #aii4 ,let the above position be conceded1 and there is no escape from this conclusion4 ,nay1 the conclusion itself is but another mode of stating the position assumed4 ,it is evident1 then1 that action must take its rise somewhere in the world1 without being caused by prior action2 or else there must be an infinite series of acts4 ,i say it takes its rise in the mind1 in that which is essentially active1 and not in matter4 ,edwards does not say1 that it takes its rise in matter2 and hence1 there is no dispute on this point4 ,it is very remarkable1 that this objection to his scheme1 that it runs into an infinite series1 seems never to have occurred to ,president ,edwards4 ,he seems to have endeavoured to anticipate and reply to all possible objections to his system2 and yet this1 which has occurred to so many others1 appears not to have occurred to himself1 for he has not noticed it4 ,the younger ,edwards has attempted to reply to it4 ,let us see his reply4 ,we maintain1 says he1 that action may be the effect of a divine influence2 or that it may be the effect of one or more second causes1 the first of which is immediately produced by the ,deity4 ,here then is not an infinite series of causes1 but a very short series1 which terminates in the ,deity or first cause1 p4 #aba4 ,thus1 according to the younger ,edwards1 the infinite series of causes is cut short1 terminating in the volition of ,deity4 ,what6 does the volition of ,god come into existence without a cause of its existence8 ,what then becomes of that great principle of common sense1 so often applied to volition1 that no event can begin to be without a cause of its existence8 ,is this great principle given up8 ,has it become obsolete8 ,it may be contended1 that although human volition is an effect1 and so must have a cause2 yet the divine volition is not an effect4 ,the elder ,edwards could not have taken this ground2 for he contends1 that the volition of ,deity is just as necessarily connected ,with the strongest motive1 or the greatest apparent good1 as is the volition of man4 ,according to the ,inquiry1 all volitions1 both human and divine1 are necessarily connected with the greatest apparent good1 and in precisely the same manner4 ,the above pretext1 therefore1 could not have been set up by him4 ,this ground1 however1 is taken by the younger ,edwards4 ,it is granted1 says he1 that volition in the ,deity is not an effect1 p4 #abb2 it has no cause1 and here terminates the series4 ,but how is this8 ,can some event1 after all1 begin to be without having a cause of its existence8 without being an effect8 ,by no means4 ,how is it then8 ,why1 says the learned author1 the volitions of the ,deity have existed from all eternity6 ,they have no causes2 because they have never begun to be6 ,i deny1 says he1 that the operations and energies of the ,deity begin in time1 though the effects of those operations do4 ,they no more begin in time than the divine existence does2 but human volitions all begin in time1 p4 #abc4 ,this makes all the difference imaginable2 for as the divine acts have existed from all eternity1 so they cannot be caused4 ,but there is an objection to this view4 ,if it should be said1 he continues1 that on this supposition the effects take place not till long after the acts1 by which they are produced1 ,i answer1 they do so in our view1 but not in the view of ,god4 ,with him there is no time1 no before nor after with respect to time1 p4 #abd4 ,now1 it will not be denied1 that things appear to ,god just as they are in themselves2 and hence1 if his volitions1 which are said to exist long before their effects1 even from all eternity1 appear to him not to exist long before them2 then they do not in reality exist long before them4 ,but if the divine volitions do not really exist long before their effects1 but just before them1 as other causes do before their effects1 why should they not have causes as well as any other volitions8 ,if they really exist just before their effects in time1 and not long before them1 why do they not exist in time just as much as any other volitions8 and why do they not as much require causes to account for their existence8 ,if they only seem to us to exist long before their effects1 even from all eternity1 how can this mere seeming make any real difference in the case8 ,there is a very short series1 we are told1 the volition of ,deity constituting the first link4 ,has not this first link1 this volition of the ,deity1 a cause8 ,no4 ,and why8 ,because it has existed from all eternity2 and so nothing could go before it to produce it4 ,did it not exist long before the effect then1 which it produces in time8 ,no4 ,and why8 ,because in the view of ,god and in reality1 it existed just before its effect1 as all causes do1 and therefore there is no real severance of cause and effect in the case6 ,it really comes just before its effect in time1 and therefore there is no severance of cause and effect2 and yet it really existed before all time1 even from all eternity1 and therefore it cannot have a cause6 ,now is this logic1 or is it legerdemain8 ,there is no time with ,god1 says the author2 then there is no time in reality2 it is all an illusion arising from the succession of our own thoughts4 ,if this be so1 then all things do really come to pass simultaneously2 and if there were a very long series1 even an infinite series of causes and effects1 yet would they all come to pass in the same instant4 ,indeed1 there is very great uncertainty about the speculations of philosophers in regard to time and space2 and we hardly know what to make of them1 except we cannot very well understand them2 but one thing is abundantly certain2 and that is1 that it is not good logic1 to assert that a particular cause cannot be produced1 because it has existed long before its effect1 even from all eternity2 and yet repel objections to this assertion1 by alleging that they only seem to do so1 while in reality there is no such tiling4 ,this is to turn from the illusion to the reality1 and from the reality to the illusion1 just as it suits the exigency of the moment4 ,such are the poor shifts and shallow devices1 to which even gifted minds are reduced1 when they refuse to admit that action1 that volition1 may take its rise in the world1 spontaneously proceeding from mind itself1 without being made to do so by the action of any thing upon it4 ,let us suppose1 that a man should tell us1 that a producing cause existed long before its effect2 that there was nothing to prevent it from bringing its effect to pass2 and yet1 long after it had existed1 its effect sprang up and came into existence2 what should we think8 ,should we not see that it is absurd1 in the highest degree1 to say that an unimpeded causative act existed yesterday1 and even from all eternity1 unchanged and unchangeable2 and yet its effect did not come to pass until to-day8 ,surely1 no man in his right mind can be made to believe this1 unless it be forced upon him by the desperate necessities of a false system2 and if any person were told1 that although such a thing may seem absurd to us1 inasmuch as the cause seems to exist in full operation long before its effect1 yet it is not so in the view of ,god1 with whom there is no time1 should he not be pardoned if he doubted the infallibility of his informant8 ,the truth is1 we must reason about cause and effect as they appear to us2 and whether time be an illusion or not1 we must1 in all our reasonings1 conceive of cause and effect as conjoined in what we call time1 or we cannot reason at all4 ,according to the younger ,edwards1 the act of creation1 not the mere purpose to create1 but the real causative act of creation1 existed in the divine mind from all eternity4 ,why then did the world spring up and come into existence at one point of time rather than another8 ,how happened it1 that so many ages rolled away1 and this mighty causative act produced no effect8 ,in view of such a case1 how could the author have said1 as he frequently does1 that a cause necessarily implies its effect8 ,how can this be1 if a causative act of the ,almighty may exist1 and yet1 for millions of ages1 its omnipotent energy produce no effect8 ,indeed1 such a doctrine destroys all our notions of cause and effect2 it overthrows the great principle of common sense that cause and effect necessarily imply each other2 and involves all our reasoning from cause to effect1 and vice versa1 in the utmost perplexity and confusion4 ,it throws clouds and darkness over the whole field of inquiry4 ,since the time of ,dr4 ,samuel ,clarke1 it has been frequently objected to the scheme of moral necessity1 that it is involved in the great absurdity of an infinite series of causes4 ,president ,edwards urged this objection against the doctrine of the self-determining power2 he did not perceive that it lay against his own scheme of the motive-determining power2 and hence1 he has not even attempted to answer it4 ,this was reserved for the younger ,edwards2 and although he has deservedly ranked high as a logician1 ,i cannot but regard his attempt to answer the objection in question1 as one of the most remarkable abortions in the history of philosophy4 ,,section ,,vi4 ,,of ,,the ,,maxim ,,that ,,every ,,effect ,,must ,,have ,a ,,cause4 ,,in a former section1 ,i referred to some of the false assumptions which have been incautiously conceded to the necessitarian1 and in which he has laid the foundations of his system2 but ,i have not1 as yet1 alluded to the argument or deduction in which he is accustomed to triumph4 ,this argument1 strange as it may seem1 is a deduction1 not from any principle or general fact which has been ascertained by observation or experience1 but from a self-evident and universal truth4 ,that every effect must have a cause1 is the maxim upon which the necessitarian takes his stand1 and from which he delights to draw his favourite conclusion4 ,it may be well1 therefore1 to examine the argument which has been so frequently erected upon the maxim in question4 ,although from various considerations1 it has been very justly concluded1 that there is somewhere a lurking fallacy in the argument1 yet it has not been precisely shown where the fallacy lies4 ,suspicion has been thrown over it3 nay1 abundant reason has been shown why it should be rejected2 but yet the fallacy of it should be dragged from the place of its concealment1 and laid open in a clear light1 so as to render it apparent to every eye4 ,if it is a sophism1 it certainly can be exposed1 and it should be done4 ,in order to do this1 it will be necessary to consider the nature and use of the maxim1 that every effect must have a cause4 ,i am aware1 that no necessitarian of the present day1 would choose to express this maxim as ,i have expressed it2 for in such a form ,mr4 ,hume has shown that it contains no information1 and is indeed a most insignificant proposition4 ,and1 in truth1 what does it amount to8 ,cause and effect are correlative terms2 and when we speak of an effect1 we mean something that is produced by a cause2 and hence1 the famous proposition1 that every effect has a cause1 amounts only to this1 that every effect is an effect6 ,after ,mr4 ,hume had caused the subject to be viewed in this light1 the usual mode of expression was dropped2 and it has now become the common practice to say1 that there is no change in nature without a cause4 ,but ,i do not see how this mends the matter in the least3 it may disguise1 but it does not alter the nature or real import of the maxim in question4 ,for when it is said that every change has a cause1 it is evident that a change is conceived of under the idea of an effect4 ,it is supposed to be produced by a cause1 and therefore it must be considered as an effect2 and if the idea remains precisely the same1 ,i do not see that giving it a new name1 can possibly make any difference in the meaning of the proposition4 ,the maxim1 that every effect must have a cause1 is a self-evident and universal proposition4 ,its truth is involved in the very definition of the terms of which it is composed4 ,in this respect it is like the axioms of geometry4 ,when it is said1 for example1 that the whole is equal to the sum of the parts1 we at once perceive the truth of the axiom2 because the whole is merely another name for the sum of the parts4 ,it is intuitively certain that they are equal1 because they are but different expressions of the same thing4 ,so1 likewise1 when it is affirmed1 that every effect or every change in nature has a cause1 we instantly perceive the truth of the proposition2 inasmuch as an effect is that which is produced by a cause4 ,the very idea of an effect implies its relation to a cause2 and to say1 that it has one1 is only to say1 that an effect is an effect4 ,for if it were not produced by a cause1 it would not be an effect4 ,the maxim under consideration is as unquestionably true as any axiom in ,euclid4 ,it does not depend for the evidence of its truth upon observation1 or experience1 or reasoning2 it carries its own evidence along with it4 ,no sooner are the terms in which it is expressed understood1 than it rivets irresistible conviction on the mind4 ,it is a fundamental law of belief2 and it is impossible for the imagination of man to conceive1 that an effect1 or that which is produced by a cause1 should be without a cause4 ,and it were just as idle an employment of one's time1 to undertake to prove such a proposition1 as it would be to attempt to refute it4 ,now1 one of the fallacies of the argument of the necessitarian is1 that it is an attempt to draw a conclusion from the axiomatical truth above referred to1 as from the major of a syllogism4 ,every such attempt must necessarily be vain and fruitless4 ,axioms1 justly remarks ,mr4 ,locke1 are not the foundations on which any of the sciences are built4 ,and again1 ,it was not the influence of those maxims which are taken for principles in mathematics1 that hath led the masters of that science into the wonderful discoveries they have made4 ,let a man of good parts know all the maxims generally made use of in mathematics never so perfectly1 and contemplate their extent and consequences as much as he pleases1 he will1 by their assistance1 ,i suppose1 scarce ever come to know1 that the square of the hypothenuse in a right-angled triangle1 is equal to the squares of the two other sides4 ,the knowledge1 that the whole is equal to the parts1 and1 if you take equals from equals1 the remainder will be equal1 helped him not1 ,i presume1 to this demonstration4 ,and a man may1 ,i think1 pore long enough on those axioms1 without ever seeing one jot the more of mathematical truths4 ,the same doctrine is still more distinctly stated by ,dugald ,stewart4 ,if by the first principles of a science1 says he1 be meant those fundamental propositions from which its remoter truths are derived1 the axioms cannot1 with any consistency1 be called the first principles of mathematics4 ,they have not1 7it will be admitted17 the most distant analogy to what are called the first principles of natural philosophy3--to those general facts1 for example1 of the gravity and elasticity of the air1 from which may be deduced1 as consequences1 the suspension of the mercury in the ,torricellian tube1 and its fall when carried up to an eminence4 ,according to this meaning of the word1 the first principles of mathematical science are1 not the axioms but the definitions2 which definitions hold1 in mathematics1 precisely the same place that is held in natural philosophy by such general facts as have now been referred to4 ,but the doctrine in question rests upon a firmer basis than that of human authority4 ,let any man examine the demonstrations in geometry1 and attentively consider the principles from which the conclusions of that science are deduced1 and he will find that they are definitions1 and not axioms4 ,he will find2 that the properties of the triangle are derived from the definition of a triangle1 and those of a circle from the definition of a circle4 ,and then let him try his own skill upon the axioms of that science2 let him arrange them and combine them in all possible ways2 let him compare them together as long as he pleases1 and determine for himself1 whether they can be made to yield a single logical inference4 ,if the question is thus brought to the test of an actual experience1 ,i think it is not difficult to foresee1 that the decision must be in favour of the doctrine of ,stewart1 and that it will be seen1 that no such proposition as that whatever is1 is1 can even constitute the postulate1 or first principle1 in any sound argument2 and that it is only from general facts1 such as are ascertained by observation and experience1 that we can derive logical consequences of any kind whatever1 either in relation to matter or to mind4 ,if there is any truth in the foregoing remarks1 or correctness in the position of ,locke and ,stewart1 it is certainly one of the capital errors of ,edwards1 as well as of other necessitarians1 that he has undertaken to deduce his doctrine from a metaphysical axiom1 or identical proposition4 ,supposing this to be the case1 how has it happened1 it may be asked1 that the argument of the necessitarian has appeared so conclusive to himself1 as well as unanswerable to others8 ,the reason is plain4 ,having set out with a proposition1 which is barren of all consequences1 as the basis of his argument1 it became necessary1 in order to arrive at the destined conclusion1 to assume1 somewhere and somehow1 in the course of his reasoning1 the very point which he had undertaken to prove4 ,accordingly1 this has been done2 and the tacit assumption of the point in dispute seems not to have been suspected by him4 ,the justice of this remark may be shown1 by a reference to the argument of the necessitarian4 ,when this is reduced to the form of a syllogism1 it stands thus3 ,every effect has a cause2 a volition is an effect2 and1 therefore1 a volition has a cause4 ,in the middle term1 which assumes that a volition is an effect1 the point in dispute is taken for granted1 the whole question is completely begged4 ,if we take the words in any sense1 yet as they are correlative terms1 the maxim that every effect must have a cause is self-evident2 and hence1 no conclusion can be drawn from it1 unless the conclusion intended to be drawn is assumed in the middle term of the syllogism4 ,it either begs the question1 or it decides nothing to the purpose4 ,it is true1 that every change in nature must have a cause2 that is to say1 it is in some sense of the word an effect1 and consequently must have a corresponding cause2 but in what sense does every act of the mind come under the idea and definition of an effect8 ,this is the question4 ,is it brought to pass by the prior action of motive8 ,is it necessitated8 ,upon this precise question1 the maxim that every change must have a cause can throw no light2 it only seems to refer to this point1 by means of the very convenient ambiguity of the terms in which it is expressed4 ,the necessitarian never fails to avail himself of this ambiguity4 ,he seems both to himself and to the spectator to be carrying on a great demonstration2 and this is one reason1 perhaps1 why the mind is diverted from the sophistical tricks1 the metaphysical jugglery1 by which both are deceived4 ,let us look a little more narrowly at this pretended demonstration4 ,the maxim in question is applied to volition2 every change in nature1 even the voluntary acts of the mind1 must have a cause4 ,now according to ,edwards' explanation of the term1 this is a proposition which1 ,i will venture to say1 no man in his right mind ever ventured to deny4 ,it is true1 that ,president ,edwards tells us of those1 who imagine that a volition has no cause1 or that it produces itself2 and he has very well compared this to the absurdity of supposing1 that ,i gave myself my own being1 or that ,i came into being without a cause1 p4 #bgg4 ,but who ever held such a doctrine8 ,did any man1 in his right mind1 ever contend that a volition could produce itself1 can arise out of nothing1 and bring itself into existence8 ,if so1 they were certainly beyond the reach of logic2 they stood in need of the physician4 ,i have never been so unfortunate as to meet with any advocate of free-agency1 either in actual life or in history1 who supposed that a volition arose out of nothing1 without any cause of its existence1 or that it produced itself4 ,they have all maintained1 with one consent1 that the mind is the cause of volition4 ,is the mind nothing8 ,if a man should say1 as so many have said1 that the mind produces its own volitions1 is that equivalent to saying1 that nothing produces it2 that it comes into being accidentally1 without any cause of its being8 ,such is the broad caricature of their doctrine1 which is repeatedly given by ,president ,edwards4 ,it is freely admitted1 and the advocates of free-agency have always admitted1 that volition has a cause1 as that word is frequently used by ,edwards4 ,he tells us1 that by cause he sometimes means any antecedent1 whether it exerts any positive influence or no4 ,now1 in this sense1 it is conceded by the advocates of free-agency1 that motive itself is the cause of volition4 ,this is the question3 ,is motive the efficient1 or producing cause of volition8 ,this is the question1 ,i say2 but ,edwards frequently loses sight of it in a mist of ambiguities2 and he lays around him in the dark1 with such prodigious strength1 that if his adversaries were not altogether imaginary beings1 and therefore impassible to his ponderous blows1 ,i have no doubt he would have slain more of them than ever ,samson did of the ,philistines4 ,the manner in which the necessitarian speaks of cause in his maxims1 and reasonings1 and pretended demonstrations1 is of very great service to him4 ,it includes1 as we are told1 every condition or cause of volition2 7what a heterogeneous mass67 every thing without which volition could not come to pass4 ,yea1 it is used in this sense1 when it is said that motive is the cause of volition4 ,what shall we do1 then1 with this broad1 this most ambiguous proposition8 ,shall we deny it8 ,if so1 then we deny that volition has any cause of its existence1 and fall into the great absurdity of supposing volition to produce itself4 ,shall we assent to it1 then8 ,if so1 we really admit that motive is the efficient cause of volition2 and thus1 by denying1 we are made to reject our own doctrine1 while1 by affirming1 we are made to receive that of our opponents4 ,this way of proposing the doctrine of necessity very strongly reminds one of a certain trick in legislation1 by which such things are forced into a bill1 that in voting upon it1 you must either reject what you most earnestly desire1 or else sanction and support what you most earnestly detest4 ,we should1 therefore1 neither affirm nor deny the whole proposition as it is set forth by the necessitarian2 we should touch it with the dissecting knife1 and cure it of its manifold infirmities4 ,the ambiguity of the term cause is1 indeed1 one of the most powerful weapons1 both of attack and defence1 in the whole armory of the necessitarian4 ,do you affirm the mind to be the cause of volition8 ,then1 forthwith1 as if the word could have only one meaning1 it is alleged1 that if the mind is the cause of volition1 it can cause it only by a preceding volition2 and so on ad infinitum4 ,hence1 your doctrine must needs be absurd2 because the word is understood1 yea1 and will be understood1 in its most restrained and narrow sense4 ,but do you deny motive to be the cause of volition8 ,then1 how absurd are you again2 you are no longer understood to use the word in the same sense2 you now mean1 not only that motive is not the producing cause of volition1 but that there is absolutely nothing upon which it depends for its existence1 and that it produces itself4 ,does ,edwards affirm that motive is the cause of volition2 that motive causes volition to arise and come forth into existence2 that it is not merely the negative occasion thereof1 but the cause in the most proper sense of the word2 that it is the effectual power which produces volition8 ,what then8 ,dare you assert1 in the face of such teaching1 that motive is not the cause of volition8 ,if so1 then you are a most obstinate and perverse caviller2 and you are silenced by the information that he sometimes uses the word cause to signify any antecedent1 whether it has any positive influence or no4 ,yea1 he gives this information1 he declares1 to cut off occasion from any that might seek occasion to cavil and object against his doctrine1 p4 #ea4 ,these1 and many other things of the same kind1 are to be found in the writings of ,day1 and ,edwards1 and ,collins1 and ,hobbes2 and whosoever may be pleased to follow them1 through all the doublings and windings of their logic1 may do so at his leisure4 ,it is sufficient for my present purpose to remark1 that ,edwards has included a number of different ideas in his definition of cause2 and that he turns from the one to the other of these ideas1 just as it suits the exigencies of his argument4 ,it is in this way1 as we have seen1 that the famous maxim1 that every change in nature must have a cause1 has been made to serve his purpose4 ,he did not look at a volition and an effect1 so as to mark their differences narrowly1 and to proceed in his reasonings according to them2 he set out with the great and universal truth1 that every change in the universe must have a cause2 from which lofty position the differences of things in this nether world were invisible4 ,having secured this position to his entire satisfaction1 being firmly persuaded in his own mind1 that nonentity could not bring forth1 he supposed he had gained a strong foothold2 and from thence he proceeded to reason downward to what actually takes place in this lower world6 ,we are but the humble servants and interpreters of nature1 and we can understand her operations only in so far as we have observed them4 ,the necessitarian takes higher ground than this4 ,he disdains the humble and patient task of observation4 ,he plants his foot upon an eternal and immutable axiom2 and1 turning away from the study of what is1 he magisterially pronounces what must be4 ,it is easy to see how he constructs his system4 ,every change in nature must have a cause1 says he2 this is very true2 there is no truth in the world more certain1 according to the sense in which he frequently understands it4 ,if he means to assert1 that nothing1 whether it be an entity1 or an attribute1 or a mode1 can bring itself into existence1 no one disputes his doctrine4 ,it is most true1 that there can be no choice without a mind that chooses1 or an object in view of which it chooses2 a mind1 an object1 and a desire1 7if you please17 are the indispensable prerequisites1 the invariable antecedents1 to volition2 but there is an immense chasm between this position and the doctrine1 that the mind cannot put forth a volition1 unless it is made to do so by the action of something else upon it4 ,this immense chasm1 the necessitarian can cross only by stepping over from one branch of his ambiguous proposition to another2 he either does this1 or he does not reach the point in controversy at all4 ,,section ,,vii4 ,,of ,,the ,,application ,,of ,,the ,,maxim ,,that ,,every ,,effect ,,must ,,have ,a ,,cause4 ,,in the last section ,i considered the application of the maxim1 that every effect must have a cause1 to the question of necessity4 ,this maxim figures so largely in every scheme of necessity1 and it is relied upon with so much confidence1 that ,i shall present some further views respecting its true nature and application4 ,the necessitarian may see the truth of this maxim clearly1 but he applies it vaguely4 ,he is always saying1 that if we give up this great principle of common sense1 then there is no reasoning from effect to cause2 and we cannot prove the existence of a ,god4 ,now ,i propose to show that we need not give up this great principle of common sense2 that we may continue to reason from effect to cause1 and so reach the conclusion that there is a ,god1 by one of the most incontrovertible of all our mental processes2 and yet we may1 with perfect consistency1 refuse to apply the maxim in question to human actions or volitions4 ,in other words1 that we may freely admit the principle in question1 and yet reject the application which the necessitarian is accustomed to make of it4 ,in order to do this in a perspicuous and satisfactory manner1 let us consider the occasion on which we first became acquainted with the truth of the principle1 that every effect must have a cause4 ,let us consider the circumstances under which it is first suggested to the mind4 ,whence1 then1 do we derive the ideas of cause and effect1 and of the necessary connection between them8 ,locke1 it is well known1 supposed that we might derive the idea of causation by reflecting on the changes which take place in the external world4 ,the fallacy of this supposition has been fully shown by ,hume1 and ,brown1 and ,consin4 ,in the refutation of ,locke's notion1 these celebrated philosophers were undoubtedly right2 but the two first were wrong in the conclusion that we have no idea of power at all4 ,because the ideas of power and causation are not suggested by the changes of the material world1 it does not follow that we have no such ideas in reality2 that the only notion we have of causation is that of an invariable antecedence4 ,the only way in which the mind ever comes to be furnished with the ideas of cause and effect at all is this3 we are conscious that we will a certain motion in the body1 and we discover that the motion follows the volition4 ,it is this act of the mind1 this exertion of the will1 that gives us the idea of a cause2 and the change which it produces in the body1 is that from which we derive the idea of an effect4 ,if we had never experienced a volition1 we should never have formed the idea of causation4 ,the idea of positive efficiency1 or active power1 would never have entered into our minds4 ,the two terms of the sequence1 with which we are thus furnished by an actual experience1 is an act of the mind1 or a volition1 on the one hand1 which we call an efficient cause2 and a modification or change in inert1 passive matter1 on the other1 which we call an effect4 ,it is easy to see how we rise from this single experience to the universal maxim in question4 ,we are so made and constituted1 by the ,author of our nature1 that we cannot help believing in the uniformity of nature's laws1 or sequences4 ,hence1 whenever we see either term of the above sequence1 we are necessarily compelled1 by a fundamental law of belief1 to infer the existence of the other4 ,this fundamental law of belief1 by which we repose the most implicit confidence in the uniformity of nature's sequences1 has been recognized by many distinguished writers in modern times4 ,it is well stated and illustrated by ,dr4 ,chalmers4 ,the doctrine of innate ideas in the mind1 says he1 is wholly different from the doctrine of innate tendencies in the mind--which tendencies may lie undeveloped till the excitement of some occasion have manifested or brought them forth4 ,in a newly-formed mind1 there is no idea of nature1 or of a single object in nature2 yet1 no sooner is an object presented1 or is an event observed to happen1 than there is elicited the tendency of the mind to presume on the constancy of nature4 ,at least as far back as our observation extends1 the law of the mind is in full operation4 ,let an infant1 for the first time in his life1 strike on the table with a spoon2 and1 pleased with the noise1 it will repeat that stroke with every appearance of a confident expectation that the noise will be repeated also4 ,it counts on the invariableness wherewith the same consequent will follow the same antecedent4 ,in the language of ,dr4 ,thomas ,brown1 these two terms make up a sequence1 and there seems to exist in the spirit of man not an underived1 but an aboriginal faith in the uniformity of nature's sequences4--,nat4 ,theo4 p4 #aba4 ,now1 the two terms which we find connected in the case before us1 is an act of the mind1 and a change or modification of the body4 ,the volition is the antecedent1 and the motion of body is the consequent4 ,and these two1 by virtue of the law of belief above stated1 we shall always expect to find conjoined4 ,wherever we discover a change or modification1 for example1 in the corporeal system of any other person1 similar to that which results from our own volitions1 we shall necessarily infer the existence of a prior act by which it was produced4 ,hence1 when we witness a change in the world of matter1 we are authorized to apply the maxim we have derived in the manner above explained4 ,we have really no idea of an efficient cause1 except that which we have derived from the phenomena of action4 ,hence1 if we would not suffer ourselves to be imposed upon by words without meaning1 when we see any change or effect in the material world1 we should conclude that it proceeds from an action of spirit4 ,when we see the same consequent1 we should infer the existence of the same antecedent2 and not suffer our minds to be confused and misled by the manifold ambiguities of language1 as well as by the innumerable illusions of the fancy4 ,wherever we see a change in matter1 we should infer an act by which it is produced2 and thus1 through all the changes and modifications of the material universe1 we shall behold the sublime manifestations of an ever-present and all-pervading agency of spirit4 ,by a similar process1 we are made acquainted with the existence of an intelligent and designing ,first ,cause4 ,we learn the connection between the adaptation of means to an end1 and the operations of a designing mind1 by reflecting on what passes within ourselves when we plan and execute a work of skill and contrivance4 ,and1 as we are so made as to rely with implicit confidence on the uniformity of nature's sequences2 so1 without further experience or induction1 it is impossible for us to conceive of any contrivance whatever1 without conceiving of it as proceeding from the hand of a contriver4 ,thus1 we necessarily rise from the innumerable and wonderful contrivances in nature1 to a belief in the existence of an intelligent and designing mind4 ,in like manner may we establish the other attributes of ,god4 ,but to return to our maxim4 ,we can only infer1 from a change or modification in matter1 the existence of an act by which it is produced4 ,the former is the only idea we have of an effect2 the latter is the only idea we have of an efficient cause4 ,hence1 in reasoning from effect to cause1 we can only reason from a change or modification in matter1 or in that what is passive1 to the act of some active power4 ,this lays a sufficient foundation on which to rest the proof of the existence of ,god1 as well as the existence of other minds4 ,but the case is very different when we turn from the contemplation of a passive result to consider an efficient cause--when we turn from the motion of body to consider the activity of mind4 ,in such a case1 the consequent ceases to be the same2 and hence we have no right to infer that the antecedent is the same4 ,we are conscious of an act2 we perceive that it is followed by a change in the outward world2 and henceforth1 whenever we observe another change in the outward world1 we are compelled to ascribe it1 also1 to a similar cause4 ,this conviction results from the constitution of our minds--from a fundamental law of belief4 ,but when we contemplate1 not a change in the outward world1 in that which is passive1 but an act of the mind itself1 the case is entirely different4 ,we have some experience that certain changes in matter are the results of certain acts2 and hence1 whenever we observe similar phenomena1 we are under a necessity of our nature to refer them to similar causes4 ,we merely rely upon our veritable belief in the uniformity of nature's sequences1 without a reliance upon which there can be no such thing as reasoning1 when we ascend from the changes in the outward world to a belief in the agency of an efficient ,cause4 ,but we have no experience that an act of the mind is produced by a preceding act of the mind1 or by the prior action of any thing else4 ,president ,edwards himself admits that our experience is silent on this subject4 ,and hence1 when we witness an act of the mind1 or when we are conscious of a volition1 our instinctive belief in the uniformity of nature's sequences does not require us to believe that it has an efficient cause2 or1 in other words1 that it is produced by the prior action of something else1 as the motion of body is produced by a prior act of mind4 ,a change in body necessarily implies the prior action of something else by which it is produced2 an act of mind only implies the existence of an agent that is capable of acting4 ,wherever an act exists1 we must believe that there is a soul1 or mind1 or agent1 that is capable of acting4 ,we need not suppose that1 like a change in body1 it is brought to pass by a prior act4 ,in other words1 a change in that which is by nature passive1 necessarily implies an act by which it is produced4 ,but an act of the mind itself1 which is not passive1 does not likewise imply a preceding act by which it is produced4 ,it only implies the existence of an agent that is capable of acting1 and the circumstances necessary to action as conditions1 not as causes4 ,herein1 then1 lies the error of the necessitarian4 ,he discovers from experience the connection between an act and a corresponding motion2 and his instinctive belief in the uniformity of nature's sequences authorizes him to extend this connection to all sequences where the two terms are the same4 ,that is to say1 wherever he discovers a change in body1 he is authorized to infer the existence of a prior act by which it was produced4 ,but he does not confine himself to this sequence alone4 ,he does not rest satisfied with the universal principle1 that every change in body1 or in that which is passive1 must proceed from the prior action of something else4 ,he makes a most unwarrantable extension of this principle4 ,he supposes not only that every change in body1 but also that every act of mind1 must proceed from the prior action of something else4 ,thus he confounds passion and action4 ,he takes it for granted that a volition is an effect--an effect in such a sense that it cannot proceed from the mind1 unless it be produced by the prior act thereof4 ,he asserts that the mind cannot be the cause of such an effect1 of a volition1 except by the preceding action of the mind4 ,thus1 in rising from a single experience to a universal maxim1 by virtue of our belief in the uniformity of nature's laws1 he does not confine himself to the observed sequences2 he does not keep his attention steadily fixed on a change in body as the consequent1 and on an act as the invariable antecedent4 ,on the contrary1 from the exceedingly abstruse and subtle nature of the subject1 as well as from the ambiguity of language1 he treats a volition as a consequent1 which implies the same kind of antecedent as does a change in body4 ,thus1 by this unwarrantable extension or application of his principle1 he confounds the motion of body with the action of spirit2 than which there could hardly be a more unphilosophical confusion of ideas4 ,from the foregoing remarks1 it will be perceived1 as ,i have already said1 that the question is not1 whether every effect must have a cause4 ,this is conceded4 ,we do not give up this great principle of common sense4 ,we insist upon it as firmly as do our adversaries2 and hence1 we have as strong a foundation whereon to rest our belief in the being of a ,god4 ,but the question is1 whether every cause is an effect8 ,or1 in other words1 whether an act of mind can exist without being produced by the prior action of something else2 just as the motion of body is produced by the prior action of mind8 ,we say that it can exist without any such producing cause4 ,if it were otherwise1 if every cause were an effect in the sense in which a volition is assumed to be an effect by the necessitarian1 what would be the consequence8 ,it is evident1 that each and every cause in the universe must itself have a cause--must itself result from the preceding action of something else2 and thus we should be involved in the great absurdity of an infinite series of causes1 as well as in the iron scheme of an all-pervading necessity4 ,but1 happily1 there is nothing in our experience1 nor in any law of our nature1 nor in both together1 which requires us to believe that a volition is an effect in any such sense of the word4 ,call it an effect1 if you please2 but then it must be conceded that it is not1 like the motion of body1 such a consequent as necessarily requires the prior action of something else for its production4 ,every effect must have a cause1 it is true2 but it is purely a gratuitous assumption--a mere petitio principii1 to take it for granted that a volition is an effect in the sense in which the word should always be understood in this celebrated maxim4 ,this maxim is undoubtedly true1 as we have seen1 when applied to the changes of that which cannot act3 it is in reference to such effects1 or consequents1 that the conviction of its truth is first suggested2 and we cannot doubt of the propriety of its application to all such effects1 unless we can doubt of the uniformity of nature's sequences4 ,but when we go over from the region of inert1 passive matter1 into that which is full of spiritual vigour and unceasing activity1 and apply this maxim here in all its rigour1 we do make a most unwarrantable extension of it4 ,we pervert it from its true meaning and import2 we identify volition with local motion2 we involve ourselves in the greatest of all absurdities1 as well as in the most ruinous of all doctrines4 ,as we have already said1 then1 we do not give up the great principle of common sense1 that every effect must have a cause4 ,we recognize this principle when we reason from effect to cause--when we ascend from the creation up to the ,creator4 ,we deny that volition is an effect2 and what then8 ,if volition be not an effect1 are there no effects in the universe8 ,are we sunk in utter darkness8 ,have we no platform left whereon to stand1 and to behold the glory of ,god1 our ,creator and ,preserver8 ,surely we have4 ,every change throughout inanimate nature bespeaks the agency of ,him1 who sits concealed behind his own creation1 but is everywhere manifested by his omnipresent energy4 ,the human body is an effect1 teeming with evidences of the most wonderful skill of its ,great ,cause and ,contriver4 ,the soul itself is an effect1--the soul1 with all its complicated and wonder-working powers1 is an effect2 and clearly proclaims the wisdom1 and the goodness1 and the holiness of its ,maker4 ,the heavens above us1 with all its shining hosts and admirable mechanism1 proclaims the glory of ,god2 and the whole universe of created intelligences shout for joy1 as they respond in their eternal anthems to the music of the spheres4 ,and is not this enough8 ,is the whole psaltery of heaven and earth marred1 and all its sweet harmony turned into harsh discord1 if we only dare to assert that an act is not an effect8 ,no1 no3 this too proclaims the glory of ,god2 for1 however great may be the mystery1 it only shows that the ,almighty has called into existence innumerable creatures1 bearing the impress of his own glorious image1 and that1 in consequence thereof1 they are capable of acting without being compelled to act4 ,it is the position of ,edwards1 and not ours1 that would disprove the existence of a ,god4 ,we believe in action which is uncaused by any prior action2 and hence1 we can reason from effects up to ,cause1 and there find a resting-place4 ,we do not look beyond that which is uncaused4 ,we believe there is action somewhere1 uncaused by preceding action2 and if we did not believe this1 we should be constrained to adopt the doctrine of ,edwards1 that action itself must be caused by the action of something else1 p4 #bjc2 which necessarily lands us in an infinite series of causes2 the very ground occupied by ,atheists in all ages of the world4 ,it is well1 therefore1 to hold on to this great principle of common sense1 that every effect must have a cause1 in order that we may rise from the world and its innumerable wonders to the contemplation of the infinite wisdom and goodness of ,god3 it is also well that we should hold it with a distinction1 and not apply it to action1 in order that we may not be forced beyond the ,great ,first ,cause--the central light of the ,universe1 into the outer darkness of the old atheistic scheme of an infinite series of causes4 ,if we give up this principle1 we cannot prove the existence of a ,god1 it is most true2 but yet1 if we apply this principle as ,edwards applies it1 we are irresistibly launched upon an infinite series of causes1 and compelled to shoot entirely beyond the belief of a ,god4 ,we quarrel not1 therefore1 with his great principle2 but we utterly reject his application of it1 as leading directly to ,atheism4 ,,section ,,viii4 ,,of ,,the ,,relation ,,between ,,the ,,feelings ,,and ,,the ,,will4 ,,it is well known that ,edwards confounds the sensitive part of our nature with the will1 the susceptibility by which the mind feels with the power by which it acts4 ,he expressly declares1 that the affections and the will are not two faculties of the soul2 and it is upon this confusion of things that much of his argument depends for its coherency4 ,but although he thus expressly confounds them2 yet he frequently speaks of them1 in the course of his argument1 as if they were two different faculties of the soul4 ,thus1 he frequently asserts that the will is determined by the strongest appetite1 by the strongest disposition1 by the strongest inclination4 ,now1 in these expressions1 he evidently means to distinguish appetite1 inclination1 and disposition1 from the will2 and if he does not1 then he asserts1 that the will is determined by itself1 a doctrine which he utterly repudiates4 ,the soundness of much of his argument depends1 as ,i have said1 upon the confusion or the identification of these two properties of the mind2 the soundness of much of it also depends upon the fact that they are not identical1 but distinct4 ,from a great number of similar passages1 we may select the following1 as an illustration of the justness of this remark3 ,moral necessity1 says he1 may be as absolute1 as natural necessity4 ,that is1 the effect may be as powerfully connected with its moral cause1 as a natural necessary effect is with its natural cause4 ,whether the will in every case is necessarily determined by the strongest motive1 or whether the will ever makes any resistance to such a motive1 or can ever oppose the strongest present inclination1 or not2 if that matter should be controverted1 yet ,i suppose none will deny1 but that1 in some cases1 a previous bias1 or inclination1 or the motive presented1 may be so ,,powerful1 ,,that ,,the ,,act ,,of ,,the ,,will ,,may ,,be ,,certainly ,,and ,,indissolubly ,,connected ,,therewith4 ,when motives or previous bias are very strong1 all will allow that there is some difficulty in going against them4 ,and if they were yet stronger1 the difficulty would be still greater4 ,and1 therefore1 if more be still added to their strength1 to a certain degree1 it would make the difficulty so great1 that it would be wholly impossible to surmount it2 for1 this plain reason1 because whatever power men may be supposed to have to surmount difficulties1 yet that power is not infinite2 and so goes not beyond certain limits4 ,if a man can surmount ten degrees of difficulty of this kind with twenty degrees of strength1 because the degrees of strength are beyond the degrees of difficulty2 yet if the difficulty be increased to thirty1 or an hundred1 or a thousand degrees1 and his strength not also increased1 his strength will be wholly insufficient to surmount the difficulty4 ,as1 therefore1 it must be allowed1 that there may be such a thing as a sure and perfect connexion between moral causes and effects2 so this only is what ,i call by the name of moral necessity4 ,now he here speaks of inclination and previous bias1 as elsewhere of appetite and disposition1 as distinct from volition4 ,in this he is right2 even the necessitarian will not1 at the present day1 deny that our desires1 affections1 c41 are different from volition4 ,between motive and volition1 says ,president ,day1 there must intervene an apprehension of the object1 and consequent feeling excited in the mind4 ,thus1 according to ,president ,day1 feeling is not volition2 it intervenes between the external object and volition4 ,but although ,edwards is right in this2 there is one thing in which he is wrong4 ,he is wrong in supposing that our feelings possess a real strength1 by which they act upon and control the will4 ,it is obvious that the coherency and force of the above passage depends on the idea1 that there is a real power in the strongest inclination or desire of the mind1 which renders it difficult to be surmounted or overcome4 ,for if we suppose1 that our inclinations or desires are merely the occasions on which we act1 and that they themselves exert no influence or efficiency in the production of our volitions1 it would be absurd to speak of the difficulty of overcoming them1 as well as to speak of this difficulty as increasing with the increasing strength of the inclination1 or desire4 ,take away this idea1 show that there is no real strength in motives1 or desires and inclinations1 and the above extract will lose all its force2 it will fall to pieces of itself4 ,indeed1 the idea or supposition in question1 is one of the strongholds of the necessitarian4 ,external objects are regarded as the efficient causes of desire2 desire as the efficient cause of volition2 and in this way1 the whole question seems to be settled4 ,the same result would follow1 if we should suppose that desire is awakened not exclusively by external objects1 but partly by that which is external1 and partly by that which is internal4 ,on this supposition1 as well as on the former1 the will would seem to be under the dominion of the strongest desire or inclination of the soul4 ,the assumption1 that there is a real efficiency exerted by the desires and inclinations of the soul1 has been1 so far as ,i know1 universally conceded to the necessitarian4 ,he seems to have been left in the undisputed possession of this stronghold2 and yet1 upon mature reflection1 ,i think we may find some reason to call it in question4 ,if ,i am not greatly mistaken1 we may see that the necessitarian has some reason to abate the loftiness of his tone1 when he asserts1 that we know that the feelings do exert an influence in the production of volition4 ,this may appear very evident to his mind2 nay1 at first view1 it may appear very evident to all minds2 and yet1 after all1 it may be only an idol of the tribe4 ,it is a commonly received opinion1 among philosophers1 that the passions1 desires1 c41 do really exert an influence to produce volition4 ,this was evidently the idea of ,burlamaqui4 ,he draws a distinction between voluntary actions and free actions2 and as an instance of a voluntary action which is not free1 he cites the case of a man who1 as he supposes1 is constrained to act from fear4 ,he supposes that such an action1 though voluntary1 is not free1 because it is brought about by the irresistible influence of the passion of fear4 ,it is believed1 also1 by the disciples of ,butler1 that there is a real strength possessed by what are called the active powers of the mind4 ,this distinction1 says ,dr4 ,chalmers1 made by the sagacious ,butler between the power of a principle and its authority1 enables us in the midst of all the actual anomalies and disorders of our state1 to form a precise estimate of the place which conscience naturally and rightly holds in man's constitution4 ,the desire of acting virtuously1 which is a desire consequent on our sense of right and wrong1 may not be of equal strength with the desire of some criminal indulgence1 and so1 practically1 the evil may predominate over the good4 ,and thus it is that the system of the inner man1 from the weakness of that which claims to be the ascendant principle of our nature1 may be thrown into a state of turbulence and disorder4--,nat4 ,the4 p4 #cac4 ,such was the idea of ,butler himself4 ,he frequently speaks of the supremacy of conscience1 in terms such as the following3 ,that principle by which we survey1 and either approve or disapprove1 our heart1 temper1 and actions1 is not only to be considered as what in its turn is to have some influence1 which may be said of every passion1 of the basest appetite2 but likewise as being superior2 as from its very nature manifestly claiming superiority over all others2 insomuch that you cannot form a notion of this faculty conscience1 without taking in judgement1 direction1 and superintendency4 ,this is a constituent part of the idea1 that is of the faculty itself2 and to preside and govern1 from the very economy and constitution of man1 belongs to it4 ,had it might1 as it has right2 had it power1 as it has manifest authority2 it would absolutely govern the world4 ,this language1 it should be observed1 is not used in a metaphorical sense2 it occurs in the statement of a philosophical theory of human nature4 ,similar language is frequently to be found in the writings of the most enlightened advocates of free-agency4 ,thus1 says ,jouffroy1 even while he is contending against the doctrine of necessity3 ,there are two kinds of moving powers acting upon us2 first1 the impulses of instinct1 or passion2 and1 secondly1 the conceptions of reason4 4 4 4 4 ,that these two kinds of moving powers can and do1 act efficiently upon our volitions1 there can be no doubt1 p4 #ajb4 ,if it were necessary1 it might be shown1 by hundreds of extracts from their writings1 that the great advocates of free-agency have held1 that the emotions1 desires1 and passions1 do really act on the will1 and tend to produce volitions4 ,but why dwell upon particular instances8 ,if any advocate of free-agency had really believed1 that the passions1 desires1 affections1 c41 exert no influence over the will1 is it not certain that he would have availed himself of this principle8 ,if the principle that no desire1 or affection1 or passion1 is possessed of any power or causal influence1 had been adopted by the advocates of free-agency1 its bearing in favour of their cause would have been too obvious and too important to have been overlooked4 ,the necessitarian might have supposed1 if he had pleased1 that our desires and affections are produced by the action of external objects2 and yet1 on the supposition that these exerted no positive or causal influence1 the doctrine of liberty might have been most successfully maintained4 ,for1 after all1 the desires and affections thus produced in the mind1 would not1 on the supposition in question1 be the causes of our volitions4 ,they would merely be the occasions on which we act4 ,there would be no necessary connexion between what are called motives and their corresponding actions4 ,our desires or emotions might be under the influence and dominion of external causes1 or of causes that are partly external and partly internal2 but yet our volitions would be perfectly free from all preceding influences whatever4 ,our volitions might depend on certain conditions1 it is true1 such as the possession of certain desires or affections2 but they would not result from the influence or action of them4 ,they would be absolutely free and uncontrolled4 ,the reason why this principle has not been employed by the advocates of free-agency is1 ,i humbly conceive1 because it has not been entertained by them4 ,in short1 if the advocates of free-agency had shaken off the common illusion that there is a real efficiency1 or causal influence1 exerted by the desires of the soul1 they would have made it known in the most explicit and unequivocal terms4 ,instead of resorting to the expedients they have adopted1 in order to surmount the difficulties by which they have been surrounded1 they would1 every where and on all occasions1 have reminded their adversaries that those difficulties arise merely from ascribing a literal signification to language1 which is only true in a metaphorical sense2 and we should have had pages1 not to say volumes1 concerning this use of language1 where we have not had a syllable4 ,if the illusion in question has been as general as ,i have supposed1 it is not difficult to account for its prevalence4 ,the fact that a desire1 or affection is the indispensable condition1 the invariable antecedent1 of an act of the will1 is of itself sufficient to account for the prevalence of such a notion4 ,nothing is more common than for men to mistake an invariable antecedent for an efficient cause4 ,this source of error1 it is well known1 has given rise to some of the most obstinate delusions that have ever infested and enslaved the human mind4 ,and besides1 when such an error or illusion prevails1 its hold upon the mind is confirmed and rendered almost invincible by the circumstance1 that it is interwoven into the structure of all our language4 ,in this case in particular1 we never cease to speak of the active principles1 of the ruling passion1 of ungovernable desire1 of the dominion of lust1 of being enslaved to a vicious propensity2--in a thousand ways1 the idea that there is a real efficiency in the desires and affections of the soul1 is wrought into the structure of our language2 and hence1 there is no wonder that it has gained such an ascendency over our thoughts4 ,it has met us at every turn2 it has presented itself to us in a thousand shapes2 it has become so familiar1 that we have not even stopped to inquire into its true nature4 ,its dominion has become complete and secure1 just because its truth has never been doubted4 ,the illusion in question1 if it be one1 has derived an accession of strength from another source4 ,it is a fact1 that whenever we feel intensely1 we do1 as a general thing1 act with a proportioned degree of energy2 and vice versa4 ,hence1 we naturally derive the impression1 that the determinations of the will are produced by the strength of our feelings4 ,if the passion or desire is languid1 7since we must use a metaphor17 the action is in general feeble2 and if it is intense1 the act is usually powerful and energetic4 ,hence1 we are prone to conclude1 that the mind is moved to act by the influence of passion or desire2 and that the energy of the action corresponds with the strength of the motive1 or moving principle4 ,though the principle in question has been so commonly received1 ,i think we should be led to question it in consequence of the conclusions which have been deduced from it4 ,if our desires1 affections1 c41 operate to influence the will1 how can it be free in putting forth volitions8 ,how does ,mr4 ,locke meet this difficulty8 ,does he tell us1 that it arises solely from our mistaking a metaphorical for a literal mode of expression8 ,far from it4 ,he does not place liberty on the broad ground1 that the desires by which volitions are supposed to be determined1 are in reality nothing more than the conditions or occasions on which the mind acts2 and that they themselves can exert no positive influence or efficiency4 ,the liberty of the soul consists1 according to him1 not in the circumstance that its desires do not operate1 but in its power to arrest the operation of its desires4 ,he admits that they operate1 that they tend to produce volition2 but the mind is nevertheless free1 because it can suspend the operation of desire1 and prevent the tendency thereof from passing into effect4 ,there being1 says he1 in us a great many uneasinesses always soliciting and ready to determine the will1 it is natural1 as ,i have said1 that the greatest or most pressing should determine the will to the next action2 and so it does for the most part1 but not always4 ,for the mind having in most cases1 as is evident in experience1 a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of its desires1 and so all1 one after another1 examine them on all sides1 and weigh them with others4 ,in this lies the liberty man has4 ,thus we are supposed to be free1 because we have a power to resist1 in some cases at least1 the influence of desire4 ,but this is not always the case4 ,our desires may be so strong as entirely to overcome us--and what then8 ,why we cease to be free agents2 and it is only when the storm of passion subsides1 that we are restored to the rank of accountable beings4 ,sometimes a boisterous passion hurries away our thoughts1 says ,locke1 as a hurricane does our bodies1 without leaving us the liberty of thinking on other things1 which we would rather choose4 ,but as soon as the mind regains the power to stop or continue1 begin or forbear1 any of these motives of the body without1 or thoughts within1 according as it thinks fit to prefer either to the other1 we then consider the man as a free-agent again4 ,this language is employed by ,mr4 ,locke1 while attempting to define the idea of liberty or free-agency2 and he evidently supposed1 as appears from the above passage1 as well as from some others1 that we frequently cease to be free-agents1 in consequence of the irresistible power of our desires or passions4 ,dr4 ,reid set out from the same position1 and he arrived at the same conclusion4 ,he frequently speaks of the appetites and passions as so many forces1 whose action is directly upon the will4 ,they draw a man towards a certain object1 without any further view1 by a sort of violence4--,essays1 p4 #ah4 ,when a man is acted upon by motives of this kind1 he finds it easy to yield to the strongest4 ,they are like two forces pushing him in contrary directions4 ,to yield to the strongest1 he need only be passive1 p4 #bcg4 ,in actions that proceed from appetite and passion1 we are passive in part and only in part active4 ,they are therefore in part imputed to the passion2 and if it is supposed to be irresistible1 we do not impute them to the man at all4 ,even an ,american savage judges in this way2 when in a fit of drunkenness he kills his friend2 as soon as he comes to himself1 he is very sorry for what he has done1 but pleads that drink1 and not he1 was the cause1 p4 #ad1 #ae4 ,such is the dreadful consequence1 which ,dr4 ,reid boldly deduces from the principle1 that the appetites and passions do really act upon the will4 ,though he was an advocate of free-agency2 yet1 holding this principle1 he could speak of actions that are partly passive2 and that in so far as they are passive1 he maintained they should not be imputed to the man whose actions they are1 but to the passions by which they are produced1 ,this may appear to be strange doctrine for an advocate of free-agency and accountability2 but it seems to be the natural and inevitable consequence of the commonly received notion with respect to the relation which subsists between the passions and the will4 ,the principle that our appetites1 desires1 c41 do exert a real influence in the production of volition1 was common to ,edwards1 ,locke1 and ,reid3 indeed1 so far as ,i know1 it has been universally received4 ,in the opinion of ,edwards1 this influence becomes so powerful at times as to establish a moral necessity beyond all question2 and in that of ,locke and ,reid1 it is sometimes so great as to destroy free-agency and accountability4 ,is not this inference well drawn8 ,it seems to me that it is2 and this constitutes one reason1 why ,i deny the principle from which it is deduced4 ,is it true1 then1 that any power or efficacy belongs to the sensitive or emotive part of our nature8 ,reflection must show us1 ,i think1 that it is absurd to suppose that any desire1 affection1 or disposition of the mind1 can really and truly exert any positive or productive influence4 ,when we speak of the appetites1 desires1 affections1 c41 as the active principles of our nature1 we must needs understand this as a purely metaphorical mode of expression4 ,edwards himself has shown the impropriety of regarding similar modes of speech as a literal expression of the truth4 ,to talk of liberty1 says he1 or the contrary1 as belonging to the very will itself1 is not to speak good sense2 if we judge of sense1 and nonsense1 by the original and proper signification of words4 ,for the will itself is not an agent that has a will3 the power of choosing1 itself1 has not a power of choosing4 ,that which has the power of volition is the man1 or the soul1 and not the power of volition itself4 ,to be free is the property of an agent1 who is possessed of powers and faculties1 as much as to be cunning1 valiant1 bountiful1 or zealous4 ,but these qualities are the properties of persons1 and not the properties of properties4 ,this remark1 no doubt1 is perfectly just1 as well as highly important4 ,and it may be applied with equal force and propriety1 to the practice of speaking of the strength of motives1 or inclinations1 or desires2 for power is a property of the person1 or the soul2 and not the property of a property4 ,it appeared exceedingly absurd to the author of the ,inquiry1 to speak of the free acts of the will1 as being determined by the will itself2 because the will is not an agent1 and actions are to be ascribed to agents1 and not properly to the powers and properties of agents4 ,but he seemed to perceive no absurdity1 in speaking of the free acts of the will1 as being caused by the strongest motives1 by the dispositions and appetites of the soul4 ,now1 are the strongest motives1 as they are called1 are the strongest dispositions and desires of the soul1 agents1 or are they merely the properties of agents8 ,let the necessitarian answer this question1 and then determine whether his logic is consistent with itself4 ,mr4 ,locke1 also1 has well said1 that it is absurd to inquire whether the will be free or no2 inasmuch as liberty1 which is but a power1 belongs only to agents1 and cannot be an attribute or modification of will1 which is also but a power4 ,though ,mr4 ,locke applied this remark to the usual form of speech1 by which freedom is ascribed to the will1 he failed to do so in regard to the language by which power1 which is a property of the mind itself1 is ascribed to our desires1 or passions1 or affections1 which are likewise properties of the mind4 ,and hence have arisen many of his difficulties in regard to the freedom of human actions4 ,supposing that our desires exerted some positive influence or efficiency in the production of volitions1 his views on the subject of free-agency become vague1 inconsistent1 fluctuating and unsatisfactory4 ,the hypothesis that the desires impel the will to act1 is inconsistent with observed facts4 ,if this hypothesis were true1 the phenomena of volition would be very different from what they are4 ,a man may desire that it should rain1 for example2 he may have the most intense feeling on this subject imaginable1 and there may be no counteracting desire or feeling whatever2 now if desire ever impelled a man to volition1 it would induce him1 in such a case1 to will that it should rain4 ,but no man1 in his senses1 ever puts forth a volition to make it rain--and why8 ,just because he is a rational creature1 and knows that his volition cannot produce any such effect4 ,in the same manner1 a man might wish to fly1 or to do a thousand other things which are beyond his power2 and yet not make the least effort to do so1 not because he has no power to put forth such efforts1 but because he does not choose to make a fool of himself3 ,this shows that desire1 feeling1 c41 is merely one of the conditions necessary to volition1 and not its producing cause4 ,again4 ,it has been frequently observed1 since the time of ,butler1 that our passive impressions often become weaker and weaker1 while our active habits become stronger and stronger4 ,thus1 the feeling of pity1 by being frequently excited1 may become less and less vivid1 while the active habit of benevolence1 by which it is supposed to be induced1 becomes more and more energetic4 ,that is to say1 while the power1 as it is called1 or the causal influence1 is gradually diminishing1 the effect1 which is supposed to flow from it1 is becoming more and more conspicuous4 ,and again1 the feeling of pity is sometimes exceedingly strong2 that is to say1 exceedingly vivid and painful1 while there is no act attending it4 ,the passive impression or susceptibility is entirely dissociated1 in many cases1 from the acts of the will4 ,the feeling often exists in all its power1 and yet there is no act1 and no disposition to act1 on the part of the individual who is the subject of it4 ,the cause operates1 and yet the effect does not follow6 ,all that we can say is1 that when we see the mind deeply agitated1 and1 as it were1 carried away by a storm of passion1 we also observe that it frequently acts with great vehemency4 ,but we do not observe1 and we do not know1 that this increased power of action1 is the result of an increased power of feeling4 ,all that we know is1 that as a matter of fact1 when our feelings are languid1 we are apt to act but feebly2 and that when they are intense1 we are accustomed to act with energy4 ,or1 in other words1 that we do not ordinarily act with so much energy in order to gratify a slight feeling or emotion1 as we do to gratify one of greater intensity and painfulness4 ,but it is wrong to conclude from hence1 that it is the increased intensity of feeling1 which produces the increased energy of the action4 ,no matter how intense the feeling1 it is wrong to conclude1 that it literally causes us to act1 that it ever lays the will under constraint1 and thereby destroys1 even for a moment1 our free-agency4 ,such an assumption is a mere hypothesis1 unsupported by observation1 inconsistent with the dictates of reason1 and irreconcilable with observed facts4 ,i repeat it1 such an assumption is inconsistent with observed facts2 for who that has any energy of will1 has not1 on many a trying occasion1 stood firm amid the fiercest storm of passion2 and1 though the elements of discord raged within1 remained himself unmoved2 giving not the least sign or manifestation of what was passing in his bosom8 ,who has not felt1 on such an occasion1 that although the passions may storm1 yet the will alone is power8 ,it is not uncommon to see this truth indirectly recognized by those who absolutely know that some power is exerted by our passions and desires1 and that the will is always determined by the strongest4 ,thus1 says ,president ,day1 our acts of choice1 are not always controlled by those emotions which appear to be most vivid4 ,we often find a determined and settled purpose1 apparently calm1 but unyielding1 which carries a man steadily forward1 amid all the solicitations of appetite and passion ,the inflexible determination of ,howard1 gave law to his emotions1 and guided his benevolent movements1 p4 #fe4 ,here1 although ,president ,day holds that the will is determined by the strongest desire1 passion1 or emotion1 he unconsciously admits that the will1 the inflexible determination1 is independent of them all4 ,let it be supposed1 that no one means so absurd a thing as to say1 that the affections themselves act upon the will1 but that the mind in the exercise of its affections acts upon it1 and thereby exerts a power over its determinations2 let us suppose1 that this is the manner in which a real force is supposed to bear upon the will2 and what will be the consequence8 ,why1 if the will is not distinguished from the affections1 we shall have the will acting upon itself2 a doctrine to which the necessitarian will not listen for a moment4 ,and if they are distinguished from the will1 we shall have two powers of action1 two forces in the mind1 each contending for the mastery4 ,but what do we mean by a will1 if it is not the faculty by which the mind acts1 by which it exerts a real force8 ,and if this be the idea and definition of a will1 we cannot distinguish the will from the affections1 and say that the latter exerts a real force1 without making two wills4 ,this seems to be the inevitable consequence of the commonly received notion1 that the mind1 in the exercise of its affections1 does really act upon the will with an impelling force4 ,indeed1 there seems to have been no little perplexity and confusion of conception on this subject1 arising from the extreme subtlety of our mental processes1 as well as from the ambiguities of language4 ,the truth is1 that in feeling the mind is passive2 and it is absurd to make a passive impression1 the active cause of any thing4 ,the sensibility does not act1 it merely suffers4 ,the appetites and passions1 which have always been called the active powers1 the moving principles1 and so forth1 should be called the passive susceptibilities4 ,unless this truth be clearly and fully recognized1 and the commonly received notion respecting the relation which the appetites and passions sustain to the will1 to the active power1 be discarded1 it seems to me1 that the great doctrine of the liberty of the will1 must continue to be involved in the sadest perplexity1 the most distressing darkness4 ,,section ,,ix4 ,,of ,,the ,,liberty ,,of ,,indifference4 ,,if1 as ,i have endeavoured to show1 the appetites and passions exert no positive influence in the production of volition1 if they do not sustain the relation of cause to the acts of the will2 then is the doctrine of the liberty of indifference placed in a clear and strong light having admitted that the sensitive part of our nature always tends to produce volition1 and in some cases irresistibly produces it1 the advocates of free agency have not been able to maintain the doctrine of a perfect liberty in regard to all human actions4 ,they have been compelled to retire from the broad and open field of the controverted territory1 and to take their stand in a dark corner1 in order to contend for that perfect liberty1 without which there cannot be a perfect and unclouded accountability4 ,hence1 it has been no uncommon thing1 even for those who have been the most disposed to sympathize with them1 to feel a dissatisfaction in reading what they have written on the subject of a liberty of indifference4 ,this they have placed in a perfect freedom to choose between a few insignificant things1 in regard to which we have no feeling2 while1 in regard to the great objects which relate to our eternal destiny1 we have been supposed to enjoy no such freedom4 ,the true liberty of indifference does not consist1 as ,i have endeavoured to show1 in a power to resist the influence of the appetites and passions struggling to produce volition2 because there is no such influence in existence4 ,this notion is encumbered with insuperable difficulties2 it supposes two powers struggling for the mastery--the desires on the one hand1 and the will on the other2 and that when the desires are so strong as to prevail1 and bear us away in spite of ourselves1 we cease to be free agents4 ,it supposes that at no time we have a perfect liberty1 unless we are perfectly destitute of feeling2 and that at some of the most trying1 and critical1 and awful moments of our existence1 we have no liberty at all2 the whole man being passive to the power and dominion of the passions4 ,what a wound is thus given to the cause of free-agency and accountability6 ,what scope is thus allowed for the sophistry of the passions6 ,every man who can persuade himself that his appetites1 his desires1 or his passions1 have been too strong for him1 may blind his mind to a sense of his guilt1 and lull his conscience into a fatal repose4 ,the necessitarian1 like a skilful general1 is not slow to attack this weak point in the philosophy of free-agency4 ,if our emotions operate to produce volition1 says he1 then the strongest must prevail2 to say otherwise1 is to say that it is not the strongest4 ,this is the ground uniformly occupied by ,president ,day4 ,and it is urged by ,president ,edwards1 that if a great degree of such influence destroys free agency1 as it is supposed to do1 then every smaller degree of it must impair free agency2 and hence1 according to the principles and scheme of its advocates1 it cannot be perfect4 ,is not this inference well drawn8 ,indeed1 it seems to me1 that while the notion that our desires possess a real power and efficacy1 which are exerted over the will1 maintains its hold upon the mind1 the great doctrine of liberty can never be seen in the brightness of its full-orbed glory2 and that it must1 at times1 suffer a total eclipse4 ,the liberty which we really possess1 then1 does not consist in an indifference of the desires and affections1 but in that of the will itself4 ,we are perfectly free1 says the libertarian1 in regard to all those things about which our feelings are in a state of indifference2 such as touching one of two spots1 or choosing one of two objects that are perfectly alike4 ,to this the necessitarian replies1 what does it signify that a man has a perfect liberty in regard to the choice of one of two peppercorns8 ,are not such things perfectly insignificant1 and unworthy the grave attention of the philosopher1 while treating of the great questions of moral good and evil8 ,there is some truth in this reply1 and some injustice4 ,it truly signifies nothing1 that we are at perfect liberty to choose between two pepper-corns1 if we are not so to choose between good and evil1 life and death4 ,but in making this attack upon the position of his opponent1 when viewed as designed to serve the cause of free-agency1 the necessitarian overlooks its bearing upon his own scheme4 ,he contends1 that the mind cannot act unless it is made to act by some extraneous influence3 this is a universal proposition1 extending to all our mental acts2 and hence1 if it can be shown that1 in a single instance1 the mind can and does put forth a volition1 without being made to do so1 his doctrine is subverted from its foundations4 ,if this can be shown1 by a reference to the case of two pepper-corns1 it may be made to serve an important purpose in philosophy1 how much soever it may be despised by the philosopher4 ,if we keep the distinction between the will and the sensibility in mind1 it will throw much light on what has been written in regard to the subject of indifference4 ,if you offer a guinea and a penny to a man's choice1 asks ,president ,day1 which will he choose8 ,will the one exert as great an influence over him as the other8 ,president ,day may assert1 if he pleases1 that the guinea will exert the greater influence over his feelings2 but this does not destroy the equilibrium of the will4 ,the feelings and the will are different4 ,by the one we feel1 by the other we act2 by the one we suffer1 by the other we do4 ,why1 then1 will the man be certain to choose the guinea1 all other things being equal8 ,not because its influence acts upon the will1 either directly or indirectly through the passions1 and compels him to choose it1 but because he has a purpose to accomplish2 and1 as a rational being1 he sees that the guinea will answer his purpose better than the penny4 ,he is not made to act1 therefore1 by a blind impulse2 he acts freely in the light of reason4 ,the philosophy of the necessitarian overlooks the slight circumstance1 that the will of man is not a ball to be set a-going by external impulse2 but that man is a rational being1 made in the image of his ,maker1 and can act as a designing cause4 ,hence1 when we affirm that the will of man acts without being made to do so by the action of any thing upon the will itself1 he imagines that we dethrone the ,almighty1 and place chance upon the throne of the moral universe4 ,day on the ,will1 p4 #aie4 ,but ,i would remind him1 once for all1 that the act of a free designing cause1 no less than that of a necessitated act1 proceeding from an efficient cause1 7if such a thing can be conceived17 is utterly inconsistent with the idea of accident4 ,choice in its very nature is opposed to chance4 ,the doctrine of the indifference of the will has been subjected to another mode of attack4 ,this doctrine implies that we have a power to choose one thing or another2 or1 as it is sometimes called1 a power of choice to the contrary4 ,for1 if the will is not controlled by any extraneous influence1 it is evident that we may choose a thing1 or let it alone--that we may put forth a volition1 or refuse to put it forth4 ,this power1 which results from the idea of indifference as just explained1 is regarded as in the highest degree absurd2 and a torrent of impetuous questions is poured forth to sweep it away4 ,when ,satan1 as a roaring lion1 asks ,president ,day1 goeth about1 seeking whom he may devour1 is he equally inclined to promote the salvation of mankind8 c4 c4 c4 ,now1 ,i freely admit1 that when ,satan is inclined to do evil1 and is actually doing it1 he is not inclined to the contrary4 ,i freely admit that a thing is not different from itself2 and the learned author is welcome to all such triumphant positions4 ,in the same easy way1 ,president ,edwards1 as he imagines1 demolishes the doctrine of indifference4 ,he supposes that1 according to this doctrine1 the will does not choose when it does choose2 and1 having supposed this1 he proceeds to demolish it1 as if he were contending with a thousand adversaries2 and yet1 ,i will venture to affirm1 that no man in his senses ever maintained such a position4 ,the most contemptible advocate of free-agency that ever lived1 has maintained nothing so absurd as that the mind ever chooses without choosing4 ,this is the light in which the doctrine of indifference is frequently represented by ,edwards1 but it is a gross misrepresentation4 ,the question is1 says ,edwards1 whether ever the soul of man puts forth an act of will1 while it yet remains in a state of liberty1 viz3 as implying a state of indifference2 or whether the soul ever exerts an act of preference1 while at the very time the will is in a perfect equilibrium1 not inclining one way more than another1 p4 #gb4 ,if this be the point in dispute1 he may well add1 that the very putting of the question is sufficient to show the absurdity of the affirmative answer2 and he might have added1 the utter futility of the negative reply4 ,how ridiculous1 he continues1 for any body to insist that the soul chooses one thing before another1 when1 at the very same instant1 it is perfectly indifferent with respect to each6 ,this is the same thing as to say1 we shall prefer one thing to another1 at the very same time that it has no preference4 ,choice and preference can no more be in a state of indifference than motion can be in a state of rest1 c4 p4 #gb4 ,and he repeats it over and over again1 that this is to put the soul in a state of choice1 and in a state of equilibrium at the same time2 choosing one way1 while it remains in a state of perfect indifference1 and has no choice of one way more than the other2 p4 #gd4 ,to suppose the will to act at all in a state of indifference1 is to assert that the mind chooses without choosing1 p4 #fd2 and so in various other places4 ,now1 if the doctrine of the indifference of the will1 as commonly understood1 amounts to this1 that the will does not choose when it chooses1 then ,edwards was certainly right in opposing it2 but how could he have expected to correct such incorrigible blockheads as the authors of such a doctrine must have been1 by the force of logic8 ,edwards has not always1 though frequently1 mis-stated the doctrine of his adversaries4 ,the liberty of indifference1 says he1 in one place1 consists in this1 that the will1 in choosing1 is subject to no prevailing influence1 p4 #fd4 ,now this is a fair statement of the doctrine in question4 ,why did not ,edwards1 then1 combat this idea8 ,why transform it into the monstrous absurdity1 that the will chooses without choosing1 or exerts an act of choice at the same time that it exerts no act of choice2 and then proceed to demolish it8 ,was it because he did not wish to march up1 fairly and squarely1 in the face of the enemy1 and contend with them in their strongholds and fastnesses8 ,by no means4 ,there never was a more honest reasoner than ,edwards4 ,but his psychology is false2 and hence1 he has not only misrepresented the doctrine of his opponents1 but also his own4 ,he confounds the sensitive part of our nature with the will1 expressly in his definitions1 though he frequently distinguishes them in his arguments4 ,this is the reason why he sometimes asserts1 that the choice of the mind is always as the sense of the most agreeable2 and1 at others1 throws this fundamental doctrine into the form1 as we have seen in our third section1 that the choice of the mind is always as the choice of the mind2 and holds that to deny it is a plain contradiction4 ,by reason of the same confusion of things1 the doctrine of his opponents1 that the will1 in choosing1 is subject to no prevailing influence1 seemed to him to mean that the will1 in choosing1 does not choose4 ,in both cases1 he confounds the most agreeable impression upon the sensibility with the choice of the mind2 and thus misrepresents both his own doctrine1 and that of his opponents1 by reducing the one to an insignificant truism1 and the other to a glaring absurdity4 ,president ,day should have avoided the error of ,edwards1 in thus misconceiving the doctrine of his opponents2 for he expressly distinguishes the sensibility from the will4 ,but there is this difference between ,edwards and ,day2 the first expressly confounds these two parts of our nature1 and then proceeds to reason1 in many cases1 as if they were distinct2 while the last most explicitly distinguishes them1 and then frequently proceeds to reason as if they were one and the same4 ,it is in this way that he also gravely teaches that the mind chooses when it chooses2 and makes his adversaries assert that the mind chooses without choosing1 or that the will is inclined without being inclined4 ,start from whatever point he will1 the necessitarian never feels so strong1 as when he finds himself securely intrenched in the truism1 that a thing is always as itself2 there manfully contending against those who assert that a thing is different from itself4 ,the doctrine of the liberty of indifference1 as usually held1 is this--that the will is not determined by any prevailing influence4 ,this is not a perfect liberty1 it is true1 wherever the will is partially influenced by an extraneous cause2 but it is not equivalent to the gross absurdity of the position1 that the will chooses without choosing4 ,nor can we possibly reduce it to this form1 unless we forget that the authors of it did not confound that which is supposed to exert the influence over the will1 with the act of the will itself4 ,they contended for a partial indifference of the will only2 and1 consequently1 they could only contend for a partial1 and not a perfect liberty4 ,on the contrary1 ,i think we should contend for a perfect indifference1 not in regard to feeling1 but in regard to the will4 ,standing on this high ground1 we need not retire from the broad and open field1 in order to set up the empire of a perfect liberty in a dark corner1 extending to a few insignificant things only3 we may establish it over the whole range of human activity1 bringing out into a clear and full light1 the great fact of man's perfect accountability1 for all his actions1 under all the circumstances of his life4 ,,section ,x4 ,,of ,,action ,,and ,,passion4 ,,there are no two things in nature which are more perfectly distinct than action and passion2 the one necessarily excludes the other4 ,thus1 if an effect is produced in any thing1 by the action or influence of something else1 then is the thing in which the effect is produced wholly passive in regard to it4 ,the effect itself is called passion or passiveness4 ,it is not an act of that in which it is produced2 it is an effect resulting wholly from that which produces it4 ,to say that a thing acts then1 is to say that it is not passive2 or1 in other words1 that its act is not produced by the action or influence of any thing else4 ,to suppose that an act is so produced1 is to suppose that it is not an act2 the object in which it is said to be caused being wholly passive in regard to it4 ,if this statement be correct1 it follows that an act of the mind cannot be a produced effect2 that the ideas of action and passion1 of cause and effect1 are opposite and contrary the one to the other2 and hence1 it is absurd to assert that the mind may be caused to act1 or that a volition can be produced by any thing acting upon the mind4 ,this is a self-evident truth4 ,the younger ,edwards calls for proof of it2 but the only evidence there is in the case1 is that which arises from the nature of the things themselves1 as they must appear to every mind which will bestow suitable reflection on the subject4 ,but as he held the affirmative1 maintaining that the mind is caused to act1 it would have been well for him to have furnished proof himself1 before he called for it from the opposite party4 ,it may be said1 that if it were self-evident that the mind cannot be caused to act1 it would appear so to all men1 and there could be no doubt on the subject2 that a truth or proposition cannot be said to be self-evident1 unless it carries irresistible conviction to every mind to which it is proposed4 ,but this does not follow4 ,previous to the time of ,galileo1 it was universally believed by mankind1 that if a body were set in motion1 it would run down of itself2 though it should meet with no resistance whatever in its progress4 ,but that great philosopher1 by reflecting on the nature of matter1 very clearly saw1 that if a body were put in motion1 and met with no resistance1 it would continue to move on in a right line forever4 ,as matter is inert1 so he saw that it could not put itself in motion2 and if put in motion by the action of any thing upon it1 he perceived with equal clearness that it could not check itself in its career4 ,he perceived that it is just as impossible for passive1 inert matter1 to change its state from motion to rest1 as it is for it to change its state from rest to motion4 ,thus1 by simply reflecting upon the nature of matter1 as that which cannot act1 the mind of ,galileo recognized it as a self-evident and unquestionable truth1 that if a body be put in motion1 and there is nothing to impede its career1 it will move on in a right line forever4 ,this great law of motion1 first recognized by ,galileo1 and afterwards adopted by all other philosophers1 is called the law of inertia2 because its truth necessarily results from the fact1 that matter is essentially inert1 or cannot act4 ,i am aware it has been contended by ,mr4 ,whewell1 in his ,bridgewater ,treatise1 that the law of motion in question is not a necessary or self-evident truth2 and the reason he assigns is1 that if it were a truth of this nature1 it would have been recognized and believed by all men before the time of ,galileo4 ,but this reason is not good4 ,for if it did not appear self-evident to those philosophers who lived before ,galileo1 it was because they did not bestow sufficient reflection upon the subject1 and not because it was not a self-evident truth4 ,all men had seen bodies moving only in a resisting medium1 amid counteracting influences2 and having always seen them run down in such a medium1 they very naturally concluded that a body put in motion would run down of itself4 ,yielding to an illusion of the senses1 instead of rising above it by a sustained effort of reason and meditation1 they supposed that the motion of a body would spend itself in the course of time1 and so come to an end without any cause of its extinction4 ,this is the reason why they did not see1 what must have appeared to be a self-evident truth1 if they had bestowed sufficient reflection upon the subject1 instead of being swayed by an illusion of the senses4 ,mr4 ,whewell admits the law in question to be a truth2 he only denies that it is a necessary or self-evident truth4 ,now1 if it be not a necessary truth1 ,i should like to know how he has ascertained it to be a truth at all4 ,has any man ever seen a body put in motion1 and continue to move on in a right line forever8 ,has any man ever ascertained the truth of this law by observation and experiment8 ,it is evident1 that if it be true at all1 it must be a necessary truth4 ,who that is capable of rising above the associations of sense1 so as to view things as they are in themselves1 can meditate upon this subject1 without perceiving that the law of inertia is a self-evident truth1 necessarily arising out of the very nature of matter8 ,it does not follow1 then1 that a truth is not self-evident1 because it does not appear so to all men2 for some may be blinded to the truth by an illusion of the senses4 ,this is the case1 with the necessitarian4 ,he has always seen the motion of body produced by the action of something else2 and hence1 confounding the activity of mind with the motion of body1 he concludes that volition is produced by the prior action of something else4 ,all that he needs in order to see the impossibility of such a thing1 is severe and sustained meditation4 ,but how can we expect this from him8 ,is he not a great reasoner1 rather than a great thinker8 ,does he not display his skill in drawing logical conclusions from the illusions of the senses1 and assumptions founded thereon2 rather than in laying his foundations and his premises aright1 in the immutable depths of meditation and consciousness8 ,we may appeal to his reason1 and he will fall to reasoning4 ,we may ask for meditation1 and he will give us logic4 ,indeed1 he wants that severe and scrutinizing observation which pierces through all the illusions and associations of the senses1 rising to a contemplation of things as they are in themselves2 which is one of the best attributes of the great thinker4 ,to show that he does this1 ,i shall begin with ,president ,day4 ,no other necessitarian has made so formal and elaborate an attempt to prove1 that the mind may be caused to act4 ,he undertakes to answer the objection which has been urged against the scheme of moral necessity1 that it confounds action and passion4 ,it is alleged1 that a volition cannot be produced or caused by the action or influence of any thing4 ,to this ,president ,day replies1 these are terms of very convenient ambiguity1 with which it is easy to construct a plausible but fallacious argument4 ,the word passive is sometimes used to signify that which is inactive4 ,with this meaning1 it must1 of course1 be the opposite of every thing which is active4 ,to say that that which is in this sense passive1 is at the same time active1 is to assert that that which is active is not active4 ,but this is not the only signification of the term passive in common use4 ,it is very frequently used to express the relation of an effect to its cause1 p4 #aei4 ,now1 here is the distinction1 but is it not without a difference8 ,if an effect is produced1 is it not passive in relation to its cause8 ,this is not denied4 ,is it active then in relation to any thing8 ,president ,day says it is4 ,but is this so8 ,is not an effect1 which is wholly produced in one thing by the action or influence of another1 wholly passive8 ,is not the thing which1 according to the supposition1 is wholly passive to the influence acting upon it1 wholly passive8 ,in other words2 is it made to act8 ,does it not merely suffer8 ,if it is endued with an active nature1 and really puts forth an act1 is not this act clearly different from the passive impression made upon it8 ,one would certainly suppose so1 but for the logic of the necessitarian4 ,let us examine this logic4 ,the term passive1 says ,president ,day1 is sometimes employed to express the relation of an effect to its cause4 ,in this sense1 it is so far from being inconsistent with activity1 that activity may be the very effect which is produced4 ,a thing may be caused to be active4 ,a cannon shot is said to be passive1 with respect to the charge of powder which impels it4 ,but is there no activity given to the ball8 ,is not the whirlwind active1 when it tears up the forest8 c4 c41 p4 #afj4 ,now1 all these illustrations are brought to show that the mind may be caused to act2--that it may be passive in relation to the cause of its volition1 and active in relation to the effect of its volition4 ,a more striking instance could not be adduced to prove the correctness of the assertion already made1 that the necessitarian confounds the motion of body with the action of mind4 ,a thing may be caused to act1 says ,president ,day4 ,but how does he show this8 ,by showing that a thing may be caused to move6 ,is no activity given to the ball8 ,is not the whirlwind active1 when it tears up the forest8 ,and so he goes on1 leaving the light of reason and of consciousness2 now rushing into the darkness of the whirlwind2 now riding on the mountain wave2 and now plunging into the depths of volcanic lava2--all the time in quest of light respecting the phenomena of mind6 ,we could have wished him to stop awhile1 in the impetuous current of rhetoric1 and inform us1 whether he really considers1 the motion of a ball as the same thing with the volition of the mind4 ,if he does1 then he may suppose that his illustrations are to the purpose1 how great soever may be his mistake2 but if he supposes there is a real difference between them1 how can he ever pretend to show that mind may be caused to act1 by showing that body may be caused to move8 ,i freely admit1 that body may be caused to move4 ,body is perfectly passive in motion2 and hence1 its motion may be caused4 ,but the mind is not passive in volition2 and hence the difference in the two cases4 ,it is an error1 as ,i have already said1 pervading the views of the necessitarian1 that he confounds the action of mind with the motion of body4 ,even ,mr4 ,locke1 who1 in some places1 has recognized the essential difference between them1 has frequently confounded them in his reasonings and illustrations4 ,hence1 it becomes necessary to bear this distinction always in mind1 in the examination of their writings4 ,it should be rendered perfectly clear to our minds by meditation2 and never permitted to grow dim through forgetfulness4 ,this is indispensably necessary to shut out the illusions of the senses1 in order that we may have a clear and unclouded view of the phenomena of nature4 ,is the motion of body1 then1 one and the same thing with the action of mind8 ,they are frequently called by the same name4 ,the motion of mind1 and the action of body1 are very common modes of expression4 ,body is said to act1 when it only moves2 and mind is said to move1 when it really acts4 ,these metaphors and supposed analogies are intimately and inseparably interwoven into the very frame-work of our language2 and hence the necessity of guarding against them in our conceptions4 ,they are almost as subtle as the great adversary of truth2 and therefore we should be constantly on the watch1 lest we should be deceived or misled by them4 ,let us look1 then1 at these things just as they are in themselves4 ,when a body moves1 it simply passes from one place to another2 and when the mind acts or chooses1 it simply prefers one thing to another4 ,here1 there is no real identity or sameness of nature4 ,the body suffers a change2 the mind itself acts4 ,the one is pure passim or passiveness2 the other is pure action--the very opposite of passivity4 ,the one is a suffering1 and the other is a doing4 ,there are no two things in the whole range of nature1 which are more perfectly and essentially distinct2 and he who confounds them in his reasonings1 as philosophers have so often done1 can never arrive at a clear perception of the truth4 ,president ,day1 if he intended any thing to the purpose1 undertook to show that an act may be produced in mind1 in that which is active1 by the action or influence of something else2 and what has he shown8 ,why1 that body may be caused to move6 ,let a case be produced in which the mind1 the active soul of man1 is made to act3 let a case be produced in which a volition is caused to exist in the soul of man1 by the action or influence of any thing whatever1 and it will be something to the purpose3 but what does it signify to tell us1 that a body1 that that which is wholly and essentially passive in its nature1 may be made to move1 or suffer a change of place8 ,a more palpable sophism was never perpetrated2 and that such a mind should have recourse to such an argument1 only betrays the miserable weakness1 and the forlorn hopelessness1 of the cause in which it is enlisted4 ,indeed1 the learned president seems1 after all1 to be at least half conscious that the analogies of matter can throw no light on the phenomena of mind2 and that what he has so eloquently said1 amounts to just nothing at all4 ,for he says1 ,it may be objected1 that these are all examples of inanimate objects2 and that they have no proper application to mental activity1 p4 #afa4 ,yes1 truly1 this is the very objection which we should urge against all the fine illustrations of ,president ,day2 and it is a full and complete answer to them4 ,it is the great principle of the inductive study of mind1 that its phenomena can be understood only in so far as we have observed them in the pure light of consciousness1 and no farther2 they should never be viewed through the darkening and confounding analogies of matter4 ,no one1 that ,i know of1 has ever denied that a body may be caused to move2 the only point on which we desire to be enlightened is1 whether the mind may be caused to act4 ,to this point ,president ,day next directly comes4 ,leaving inanimate objects1 he says1 take the case of deep and earnest thinking4 ,is there no activity in this8 ,and is it without a cause8 ,when reading the orations of ,demosthenes1 or the demonstrations of ,newton1 are our minds wholly inactive2 or if they think intensely1 have our thoughts no dependence on the book before us8 p4 #afa4 ,truly1 there is activity in this1 in our deep and earnest thinking2 but what is the cause of this activity8 ,does the book before us cause us to think8 ,this is the point at which the argument of the author is driving1 and to which it should come1 if it would be to the purpose1 and yet he does not seem to like to speak it out right manfully2 and hence1 instead of saying that the book causes us to think1 he chooses to say that our thoughts have a dependence on the book4 ,it is true1 that no man can read a book1 unless he has it to read2 and1 consequently1 his thoughts in reading the book are absolutely dependent on the possession of it4 ,but still1 the possession of a book is the condition1 and not the cause1 of his reading it4 ,the cause of a thing1 and the indispensable condition of it1 are perfectly distinct from each other2 and the argument of ,day1 in confounding them1 has presented us with another sophism4 ,the ideas of a condition and of a cause1 though so different in themselves1 are always blended together by necessitarians2 and hence the confusion into which they run4 ,edwards has united them1 as we have seen1 under the term cause2 and then employed this term to signify the one or the other at his pleasure4 ,the word dependence1 is the favourite of ,president ,day2 and he uses it with fully as much vagueness and vacillation of meaning1 as ,edwards does the term cause4 ,he has undertaken to show us1 that the mind may be caused to act2 and he has shown us1 that a particular class of thoughts cannot come to existence1 except upon a particular condition6 ,this is not to reason2 but to slip and to slide from one meaning of an ambiguous word to another4 ,when it is said that the mind cannot be caused to act1 ,president ,day must have known in what sense the term cause is used in this proposition4 ,he must have known1 that no one meant to assert1 that there are no conditions or antecedents1 on which the action of the mind depends4 ,there is not an advocate of free-agency in the universe1 who will contend1 that the mind can choose a thing1 unless there is a thing to be chosen2 or1 to take his own illustration1 can read a book1 unless there is a book to be read4 ,the question is not1 whether there are conditions1 without the existence of which the mind cannot act2 this no one denies2 but whether there is1 or can be1 a real and efficient cause of the mind's action4 ,the point in dispute1 relates not to mere fact of dependence1 but to the nature of that dependence4 ,the question is1 can the mind be efficiently caused to act8 ,this being the question1 what does it signify to tell us1 that it cannot read a book1 unless it has a book to read8 ,or what does it signify to tell us1 that a body may be caused to move8 ,these are mere irrelevancies2 they fall short of the point in dispute2 and they only seem to reach it by means of a very convenient ambiguity of words4 ,but still it may be said1 that although a body is passive in motion1 it may act upon other bodies1 and thereby communicate motion to them4 ,this is the ground taken by ,president ,day4 ,the very same thing1 says he1 may be both cause and effect4 ,the mountain wave1 which is the effect of the wind1 may be the cause which buries the ship in the ocean1 p4 #afj4 ,i am aware1 that one body is frequently said to act upon another2 but this word action1 as ,president ,day has well said1 is a term of very convenient ambiguity1 with which it is easy to construct a plausible but fallacious argument1 p4 #aei4 ,the only cause in every case of motion1 is that force1 whatever it may be1 which acts upon the body moved1 and puts it in motion4 ,all the rest is pure passion or passiveness4 ,the motion of the body is not action2 it is the most pure passion of which the mind can form a conception4 ,if a body in action is said to act upon another1 this is but a metaphor2 there is no real action in the case4 ,indeed1 if a body be put in motion1 and meets with no resistance1 it will move on in a right line forever--and why8 just because of its inertia1 of its inherent destitution of a power to act4 ,as a mathematician1 ,president ,day certainly knew all this2 but he seems to have forgotten it all1 in his eagerness to support the cause of moral necessity4 ,he saw that motion is frequently called action2 he saw that one body is sometimes said to act upon another2 and this was sufficient for his purpose4 ,he did not reflect upon the natures of motion and of volition1 as they are in themselves2 he views them through the medium of an ambiguous phraseology4 ,nor did he reflect1 that if motion is communicated from one body to another1 this is not because one body really acts upon another1 but because it is impossible for two bodies to occupy the same place at one and the same time4 ,he did not reflect1 that if motion is communicated from one body to another1 this does not arise from the activity1 but from the impenetrability of matter4 ,in short1 he did not reflect1 that there is no state or phenomena of matter1 whatever may be its name1 that at all resembles the state of mind which we call action or volition2 or else he would have seen1 that all his illustrations drawn from material objects can throw no light on the point in controversy4 ,we find the same confusion of things in the works of the ,edwardses4 ,we do not at all confound action and passion1 ,president ,edwards contends1 by supposing that acts of the soul are effects1 wherein the soul is the object of something acting upon and influencing it1 p4 #bjc4 ,and again1 ,it is no more a contradiction to suppose that action may be the effect of some other cause beside the agent1 or being that acts1 than to suppose that life may be the effect of some other cause beside the being that lives1 p4 #bjc4 ,the younger ,edwards also asserts1 that to say that an agent that is acted upon cannot act1 is as groundless1 as to say1 that a body acted upon cannot move1 p4 #aca4 ,we might adduce many similar passages2 but these are sufficient4 ,what do they prove8 ,if they are any thing to the purpose1 they are only so by confounding motion with volition1 passion with action4 ,no one would pretend to deny1 that the mind may be1 and is1 caused to exist1 or that the agent may be caused to live4 ,in regard to our being and living we are perfectly passive2 and hence we admit that we may be caused to exist and to live4 ,living and being are not acting4 ,we are not passive in regard to volition2 this is an act of the mind itself4 ,the above assertions only overlook the slight circumstance that being and doing are two different things2 that motion is not volition1 that passion is not action4 ,this strange confusion of things is very common in the writings of the ,edwardses1 as well as in those of all other necessitarians4 ,edwards held volition to be a produced effect4 ,this identifies a passive impression made upon the mind1 with an act of the mind itself4 ,in order to escape this difficulty1 ,edwards was bound to show that action and passion are not opposite in their natures4 ,action1 when properly set in opposition to passion or passiveness1 says he1 is no real existence2 it is not the same with an action1 but is a mere relation4 ,and again1 ,action and passion are not two contrary natures2 when placed in opposition they are only contrary relations4 ,the same ground is taken by ,president ,day4 ,are not cause and effect1 says he1 opposite in their natures8 ,they are opposite relations1 but not always opposite things4 ,they contend1 that an object may be passive in relation to one thing1 and active in relation to another2 that a volition may be passive in relation to its producing cause1 and yet active in relation to its produced effect4 ,now1 this is not true4 ,an act is opposite in its nature to a passive impression made upon the mind4 ,this every man may clearly see by suitable reflection1 if he will not blind himself to the truth1 as the necessitarian always does1 by false analogies drawn from the world of matter1 and the phenomena of motion4 ,we have seen how ,president ,day has attempted to show1 that an object may be passive in relation to one thing1 and yet active in relation to another2 and that in all these attempts he has confounded the motion of body with the action or choice of mind4 ,we have seen that all the illustrations adduced to throw light on this subject are fallacious4 ,let this subject be studied in the light of consciousness1 not through the darkening and confounding medium of false analogies1 and we may safely anticipate a verdict in our favour4 ,for who that will closely and steadily reflect upon an action of the mind1 does not perceive that it is different1 in nature and in kind1 from a passive impression made upon the mind from without8 ,i do not say action1 which ,president ,edwards seems to think does not signify any thing positive1 such as an action1 when it is set in opposition to passion2 but ,i say that an action itself is opposite in its nature to passion1 to a produced effect4 ,president ,edwards cannot escape the absurdity of his doctrine by alleging1 that when action and passion are set in opposition1 they do not signify opposite natures1 but only opposite relations4 ,for he has confounded an act of the mind with a passive impression made thereon2 and these things are opposite in their natures1 whether he is pleased to say that action and passion are opposite natures or not4 ,this position may be easily established4 ,i humbly conceive1 says he1 that the affections of the soul are not properly distinguished from the will1 as though they were two faculties in the soul4 4 4 4 4 ,the affections are no other than the more vigorous and sensible exercises of the inclination and will of the soul4 ,these passages are referred to by ,president ,day to prove1 that ,edwards regarded our emotions or affections as acts of the will1 p4 #ci4 ,having confounded the will and the sensibility1 it became exceedingly easy for ,edwards to show that a volition may be produced or caused3 all that he had to do was to show1 that an emotion may be produced1 which is the same thing with an act of the will or a volition4 ,it is upon this confusion of things1 that his whole system rests2 for if the sensibility is different from the will1 as most persons1 at the present day1 will admit it is2 then to excite an emotion1 or to make a passive impression upon the sensibility1 is very different from producing a volition4 ,edwards has taken great pains with the superstructure of his system1 while he has left its foundations without support4 ,he has not shown1 nor can any man show1 that the sensibility and the will are one and the same faculty of the soul4 ,he assumes that an emotion is an act of the will1 and then proceeds to build upon it1 and to argue from it1 as if it were a clear and unquestionable truth4 ,thus1 he repeatedly says1 that whatever pleases us most1 or excites the most agreeable sensation1 is that which operates to induce a volition2 and to say otherwise1 is to assert that that which pleases us most1 does not please us most4 ,such assertions1 7and ,i have already had occasion to adduce many such17 clearly identify a sense of the most agreeable1 or the most pleasing emotion1 with an act of the will4 ,his definition1 as we have already seen1 laid the foundation for this1 and his arguments are based upon it4 ,the passive impression1 or the sensation produced1 is1 according to ,edwards1 a volition6 ,no wonder1 then1 that he could conceive of an action of the mind as being produced4 ,the wonder is1 how he could conceive of it as being an action at all4 ,let us suppose1 now1 that a feeling or an emotion is produced by an object in view of the mind4 ,it will follow1 that the mind is passive in feeling1 or in experiencing emotion4 ,we are conscious of such feeling or emotion2 and hence we infer1 that we are susceptible of feeling or emotion4 ,this susceptibility we call the sensibility1 the heart1 the affections1 c4 ,but there is another phenomenon of our nature1 which is perfectly distinct in nature and in kind from an emotion or a feeling4 ,we are conscious of a volition or choice2 and hence we infer that we have a power of acting1 or putting forth volitions4 ,this power we call the will4 ,now1 the phenomena exhibited by these two faculties of the soul1 the sensibility and the will1 are entirely different from each other2 and there is not the least shadow of evidence going to show that the faculties themselves are one and the same4 ,on the contrary1 we are compelled by a fundamental law of belief1 to regard the susceptibility of our nature1 by which we feel1 as different from that power of the soul1 by which we act or put forth volitions4 ,the only reason we have for saying that matter is different from mind1 is that its manifestations or phenomena are different2 and we have a similar reason for asserting1 that the emotive part of our nature1 or the sensibility1 is distinct from the will4 ,and yet1 in the face of all this1 ,president ,edwards has expressly denied that there is any difference between these two faculties of the soul4 ,it is in this confusion of things1 in this false psychology1 that he has laid the foundation of his system4 ,if ,president ,edwards be right1 it is no wonder that the younger ,edwards should so often assert1 that it is no more absurd to say1 that volition may be caused1 than it is to say1 that feeling or emotion may be caused4 ,for1 if the doctrine in question be true1 a volition is an emotion or feeling2 and to produce the one is to produce the other4 ,how short and easy has the path of the necessitarian been made1 by a convenient definition6 ,if we only bear the distinction between the sensibility and the will in mind1 it will be exceedingly easy to see through the cloudy sophistications of the necessitarian4 ,how does it appear to be a fact1 asks ,president ,day1 that the will cannot act when it is acted upon8 ,i reply that the will is not acted upon at all2 that passive impressions are made upon the sensibility1 and not upon the will4 ,this is a fact which the necessitarian always overlooks4 ,again2 the same object may be both passive and active2 passive with respect to one thing1 and active with respect to another4 ,thus1 says ,president ,day1 ,the axe is passive1 with respect to the hand which moves it2 but active1 with respect to the object which it strikes4 ,the cricket club is passive in receiving motion from the hand of the player2 it is active in communicating motion to the ball4 ,the fallacy of all such illustrations1 in confounding motion and action1 ,i have already noticed1 and ,i intend to say nothing more in relation to this point4 ,but there is another less palpable fallacy in them4 ,how are such illustrations intended to be applied to the phenomena of volition8 ,is it meant1 that volition itself is passive in relation to one thing1 and active in relation to another8 ,if so1 ,i reply it is absurd to affirm1 that volition1 or an act1 is passive in relation to any thing8 ,is it meant1 that not volition itself1 but the will1 is passive to that which acts upon it1 while it is active in relation to its effect8 ,if so1 ,i contend that the will is not acted upon at all2 that the passive impression is made upon the sensibility1 and not upon the will4 ,is it supposed1 that it is neither the volition nor the will1 which is both active and passive at the same time2 but that it is the mind8 ,this may be very true4 ,the mind may be passive1 if you please1 in relation to that which acts upon its sensibility1 while it is active in volition2 but how does this prove the doctrine1 that an act may be produced by something else acting upon the will8 ,how does this show1 that action and passion are not confounded1 in supposing that an act is caused8 ,the passive impression1 the state of the sensibility is produced but this is not a volition4 ,the passive impression exists in the sensibility2 the volition exists in the will4 ,the first is a produced effect2 the last is an act of the mind4 ,and the only way in which this act of the mind itself has been linked with that which acts upon the mind1 as an effect is linked with its cause1 has been by confounding the sensibility with the will2 and the light of this distinction is no sooner held up1 than we see that a very important link is wanting in the chain of the necessitarian's logic4 ,let this light be carried around through all the dark corners of his system1 and through all its dark labyrinths of words2 and many a lurking sophism will be detected and brought out from its unsuspected hiding place4 ,when it is said1 that the same thing may be active and passive1 this remark should be understood with reference to the mind itself4 ,the language of the necessitarian1 ,i am aware1 sometimes points to the volition itself1 and sometimes to the will2 but we should always understand him as referring to the mind4 ,he may not have so understood himself2 but he must be so understood4 ,for it is not the will that acts2 it is the mind4 ,this is conceded by the necessitarian4 ,hence1 when he says1 that the same thing may be both active and passive1 he must be understood as applying this proposition to the mind itself2 and not to the will or to volition4 ,it is the mind that acts2 and hence the mind must be also passive2 or we cannot say that the same thing may be both active and passive4 ,the mind then1 it may be said1 is both active and passive at the same time4 ,but it is passive in regard to its emotions and feelings2 and hence1 if you please1 these may be produced4 ,it is active in regard to its volitions1 or rather in its volitions2 and hence these cannot be produced by the action of any thing upon the mind4 ,to show that they can1 the necessitarian1 as we have seen1 has confounded a passive impression with an active volition4 ,if these be distinct1 as they most clearly are1 the necessitarian can make his point good1 only by showing that the passive impression made upon the mind1 is connected with the volition of the mind1 as a producing cause is connected with its effect4 ,but this he has not shown2 and hence his whole system rests upon gratuitous and unfounded assumptions4 ,i say his whole system2 for if the mind cannot be caused to act1 if it is absurd to speak of a produced action1 it is not true1 that an action or volition does or can result from the necessitating action1 or influence of motives4 ,,section ,,xi4 ,,of ,,the ,,argument ,,from ,,the ,,foreknowledge ,,of ,,god4 ,,the argument from the foreknowledge of ,god1 is one on which the necessitarian relies with great confidence4 ,nor is this at all surprising2 since to so many minds1 even among distinguished philosophers1 the prescience of ,deity and the free-agency of man have appeared to be irreconcilable4 ,thus1 says ,mr4 ,stewart1 ,i have mentioned the attempt of ,clarke and others to show that no valid argument against the scheme of free-will can be deduced from the prescience of ,god1 even supposing that to extend to all the actions of voluntary beings4 ,on this point ,i must decline offering any opinion of my own1 because ,i conceive it as placed far beyond the reach of our faculties4 ,dr4 ,campbell also says1 ,to reconcile the divine prescience with the freedom1 and even contingency1 and consequently with the good or ill desert of human actions1 is what ,i have never yet seen achieved by any1 and indeed despair of seeing4 ,and ,mr4 ,locke declares1 ,i cannot make freedom in man consistent with omnipotence and omniscience in ,god1 though ,i am as fully persuaded of both as of any truth ,i most firmly assent to2 and therefore ,i have long since given off the consideration of that subject1 resolving all into this short conclusion1 that if it is possible for ,god to make a free-agent1 then man is free1 though ,i see not the way of it4 ,sentiments like these1 which are so often met with in the writings of eminent philosophers1 have repeatedly led me to reconsider the conclusion at which ,i have arrived on this subject2 but ,i have been able to discover no reason why it should be abandoned4 ,indeed1 if authority were a sufficient reason why the great difficulty in question should be regarded as incapable of being solved1 ,i should abandon it in despair1 and leave the necessitarian to make the most of his argument2 but it has only induced me to proceed with the greater caution2 and this1 instead of having shaken my convictions1 has settled them with the greater firmness and clearness in my mind4 ,whether ,i am in the right1 or whether ,i labour under a hallucination1 satisfactory only to myself1 and perplexing to all others1 ,i must submit to the candid consideration of the reader4 ,why should it be thought impossible to reconcile the free-agency of man with the foreknowledge of ,god8 ,no one pretends that there is any disagreement between the things themselves1 as they really exist2 if there is any discrepancy in the case1 it must exist only between our ideas of foreknowledge and free-agency4 ,indeed1 we cannot think of the things themselves1 or compare them1 except by means of the ideas we have formed of then2 and if our ideas of them are really irreconcilable1 it is because they have not been correctly formed1 and do not correspond with the things themselves4 ,what shall we do then8 ,shall we set to work to reform our ideas8 ,shall we explain away the free-agency of man1 or deny the foreknowledge of ,god8 ,no4 ,we may retain both4 ,edwards contends1 that volitions are brought to pass by the influence of motives1 and that it is impossible in any case1 that a volition should depart from the influence of the strongest motive4 ,this is the great doctrine of moral necessity1 which it is the object of ,president ,edwards to establish4 ,now1 if his celebrated argument1 or demonstration1 as it is called1 proves this point1 then it is to be held as true and valid2 but if it only proves some other thing which is called by the name of necessity1 it is not to the purpose4 ,and if it can be shown1 that his argument does not prove any thing at all in relation to the causation of choice1 it will appear that it has no relevancy to the point at issue4 ,the foreknowledge of ,god1 ,i admit1 infers the necessity of all human actions1 in one sense of the word2 but not that kind of necessity for which any necessitarian pleads1 or against which any libertarian is at all concerned to contend4 ,the fallacy of the argument in question is1 that it shows all human actions to be necessary in a sense in which it is not opposed to any scheme of liberty whatever1 and assumes them to be necessary in another and quite different sense2 and thus the great doctrine of freewill1 otherwise so clear and unquestionable1 is overshadowed and obscured by an imperfect and ambiguous phraseology1 rather than by the inherent difficulties of the subject4 ,this is the position which ,i shall endeavour to establish4 ,the first argument of ,president ,edwards is as follows4 ,when the existence of a thing is infallibly and indissolubly connected with something else1 which has already had existence1 then its existence is necessary2 but the future volitions of moral agents1 are infallibly and indissolubly connected with the foreknowledge of ,god2 and therefore they are necessary1 p4 #aad-ae4 ,now this argument is perfectly sound2 the conclusion is really contained in the premise1 or definition of necessity1 and it is fairly deduced from it4 ,it is as perfect as any syllogism in ,euclid but what does it prove8 ,it proves that all human actions are necessary--but in what sense8 ,does it prove that they are necessary with a moral necessity8 ,does it prove that they are brought to pass by the influence of moral causes8 ,no such thing is even pretended3 ,i allow what ,dr4 ,whitby says to be true1 says ,edwards1 that mere foreknowledge does not affect the thing known1 to make it more certain or future1 p4 #abb4 ,he admits that foreknowledge exerts no influence on the thing known to make it necessary4 ,he does not even pretend that there is any moral necessity shown to exist by this argument2 and hence his conclusion has no connexion with the great doctrine of the ,inquiry1 or the point in dispute4 ,it aims at the word1 but not at the thing4 ,the infallible connexion it shows to exist1 is admitted to be entirely different from the infallible connexion between moral causes and volitions2 that is to say1 it is admitted that it does not prove any thing to the purpose4 ,but is the indissoluble connexion1 or necessity1 established by this argument1 at all inconsistent with human liberty8 ,if it is not2 and if our scheme of liberty is perfectly consistent and reconcilable with it2 then it infers nothing1 and is nothing1 that is opposed to what we hold4 ,this question admits of an easy solution4 ,the foreknowledge of a future event proves it to be necessary in precisely the same manner that the knowledge of a present event shows it to be necessary4 ,this is conceded by ,edwards4 ,all certain knowledge1 says he1 whether it be foreknowledge1 or after knowledge1 or concomitant knowledge1 proves the thing known now to be necessary1 by some means or other2 or proves that it is impossible it should now be otherwise than true1 p4 #aba4 ,and again1 ,all certain knowledge proves the necessity of the truth known2 whether it be before1 or after1 or at the same time1 p4 #abd2 and so in other places4 ,in what sense then1 let us inquire1 does the knowledge of a present event prove it to be necessary8 ,it is necessary1 says ,edwards1 because it is indissolubly connected with the knowledge of it4 ,in other words1 it could not possibly be known to exist1 unless it did exist2 and hence1 its existence is said to be indissolubly connected with the knowledge of its existence1 or1 in other words1 it is said to be necessary4 ,this is all true2 but is this indissoluble connexion1 or necessity1 at all inconsistent with the contingency of the event known8 ,this is the question2 and let us not lose sight of it in a mist of words4 ,let it be distinctly borne in mind1 and it will be easily settled4 ,for this purpose1 let us suppose1 to adopt the language of ,president ,edwards1 that nonentity is about to bring forth2 and that an event comes into being without any cause of its existence4 ,this event then exists2 it is seen1 and it is known to exist4 ,now1 even on this wild supposition1 there is an infallible and indissoluble connexion between the existence of the event and the knowledge of it2 and hence it is necessary1 in the sense above explained4 ,but what has this necessary connexion to do with the cause of its existence8 ,this indissoluble connexion1 this dire necessity1 is perfectly consistent1 as we have seen1 with the supposition that the event had no cause at all of its existence4 ,how can it conflict1 then1 with any scheme of free-agency that ever was dreamed of by man8 ,if this argument proves any thing in regard to human actions1 it only proves that a volition has an effect1 and not that it has a cause4 ,indeed1 it has been said1 that the knowledge of an event is the effect of its existence2 and the same remark has been extended to the foreknowledge of ,god with respect to the future volitions of human beings4 ,this position is not denied by ,edwards2 he considers1 in fact1 that it strengthens1 rather than weakens1 his argument4 ,because it shows the existence of the event to be so settled and firm1 that it is as if it had already been2 inasmuch as in effect it actually exists already2 and much more to the same purpose1 p4#abb-c4 ,it is as strong arguing1 says he1 from the effect to the cause1 as from the cause to the effect4 ,this is all true2 it is as strong arguing from effect to cause1 as it is from cause to effect4 ,but do the arguments prove the same thing8 ,let us see4 ,i know a thing to exist2 and therefore it does exist4 ,this is to reason from effect to cause4 ,the conclusion is inevitable2 but what does it prove8 ,why1 it proves that the thing does exist--it proves the bare fact of existence4 ,the indissoluble connexion1 or the necessity1 in this case1 exists between the knowledge and the event known2 and it has no relation to the question how the event came to exist4 ,this argument1 then1 in regard to human volitions1 only proves that they are indissolubly connected with their effects1 and are necessarily implied by them2 just as every cause is implied by its effects3 but no libertarian in the world has ever questioned such a position4 ,for all that such an argument proves1 all the volitions of moral agents may come into existence1 without having the least shadow of reason or ground of their existence4 ,we admit that volitions are efficient causes2 and that they have effects1 with which they are indissolubly connected4 ,edwards undertook to show1 that volitions are necessary1 because they are infallibly and indissolubly connected with their causes2 and he has shown that they are necessary1 because they are infallibly and indissolubly connected with their effects6 ,this is one branch of his great argument4 ,there is another sense1 in which the knowledge of an event1 whether it be fore1 or after1 or concomitant1 knowledge1 proves it to be necessary4 ,this sense is not clearly distinguished from the former by ,edwards4 ,he recognizes them both1 however1 although he blends them together1 and frequently turns from the one to the other in the course of his argument4 ,it is highly important1 and affords no little satisfaction1 to keep them clearly distinct in our minds4 ,a thing is said to be necessary1 as we have seen1 because it is connected with the knowledge of it2 and1 if a thing does exist1 or is certainly and infallibly known to exist1 it may be said to be necessary1 on the principle that it is impossible it should exist and not exist at one and the same time4 ,these two things are evidently different2 and1 for the sake of distinctness in our language1 as well as in our thoughts1 ,i shall call the first a logical1 and the last an axiomatical necessity4 ,a thing1 then1 which does exist1 is said to be necessary with an axiomatical necessity2 because it is impossible for it not to exist while it does exist3 and it is said to be necessary1 with a logical necessity1 because it is indissolubly connected with the knowledge of it4 ,the former kind of necessity is frequently presented in this form of expression1 that if a thing does exist1 it is impossible it should be otherwise than true that it does exist4 ,in this form of expression1 it is frequently resorted to by ,edwards4 ,thus1 says he1 ,i observed before1 in explaining the nature of necessity1 that in things which are past1 their past existence is now necessary2 having already made sure of existence1 it is now impossible that it should be otherwise than true1 that the thing has existed1 p4 #aad-ae4 ,just so we may say in relation to things which now exist2 for1 having already made sure of existence1 it is impossible it should be otherwise than true1 that they do now exist2 or1 in other words1 it is impossible they should not exist while they do exist4 ,in like manner1 if the future existence of any thing is foreknown1 it is impossible it should be otherwise than true1 that it should exist1 or come to pass3 that is to say1 if it will exist1 it will be impossible for it not to exist at the time of its existence4 ,foreknowledge1 ,i admit1 infers this kind of necessity2 but is this any thing to the purpose8 ,the conclusion is the same1 whether it be deduced from foreknowledge1 or concomitant knowledge4 ,let us suppose1 then1 for the sake of clearness and convenience1 that a thing is now known to exist4 ,it follows from hence1 by a logical necessity1 that it does exist2 for it could not possibly be known to exist1 unless it did exist4 ,and1 as it does exist1 it is impossible that it should be otherwise than true that it does exist2 or1 in other words1 it is impossible for it not to exist now1 while it does exist4 ,this is all there is in this part of the argument4 ,and what does it amount to8 ,it is a simple declaration of what no body ever denied--that if a thing exists1 or is to exist1 or has existed1 it is impossible to conceive of it as not existing at the time of its existence4 ,all this is perfectly true1 without the least reference to the question1 how it came to exist1 or how it will come to exist8 ,it is wholly irrelevant to the point at issue4 ,it controverts no position1 held by any sane man that now lives1 or that ever has lived4 ,in other words1 if a thing is known to exist1 certainly and infallibly1 then it does exist2 and if it does exist1 then it is impossible it should be otherwise than true that it does exist2 and hence its existence is said to be necessary with an axiomatical necessity4 ,but this does not prove that it is necessarily produced4 ,for1 supposing it to exist1 its existence would be necessary in the above sense1 even if it had no cause of its existence4 ,the necessity here referred to1 is a necessity in the order of our ideas1 and not in the course of events4 ,it arises from the impossibility of a thing's not existing at the time it does exist2 and it has no reference whatever to the causation of any thing3 it is a fundamental law of belief1 and not a causal necessity4 ,these three things1 an axiomatical1 a logical1 and a causal necessity1 are most strangely confounded in the argument of ,president ,edwards4 ,will it be said1 that in this argument1 it was not the object of ,edwards1 to prove that there is a moral necessity in regard to our volitions2 but only that they are not without all necessity8 ,suppose this to be the case1 with whom has he any controversy1 or to what purpose has he argued8 ,no one has ever held that human volitions are without all necessity1 according to ,edwards' use of that term2 and no one can hold it4 ,no one can deny1 that there is an indissoluble connexion between the existence of a thing1 and the certain and infallible knowledge of its existence2 or between the effect of a thing and the thing itself2 or that it is impossible for a thing not to exist while it does exist4 ,in these senses of the word1 all rational creatures are bound to acknowledge that human volitions are necessary4 ,the most strenuous advocate of free-agency has not one word to say against them2 and such being the meaning of ,edwards1 we must all heartily concur with him1 when he says1 that there is no geometrical theorem or proposition whatever more capable of strict demonstration1 than that ,god's certain prescience of the volition of moral agents is inconsistent with such a contingency of these events1 as is without all necessity1 p4 #abe-f4 ,if it can be truly said1 that a thing is foreknown1 it follows that it will come to pass1 or the proposition which affirms the future existence of it1 is necessarily true4 ,in other words1 it is self-contradictory and absurd1 to assert that a thing is foreknown1 and yet that it may not come to pass2 just as it is to assert that a thing is known to exist and yet at the same time does not exist4 ,hence1 it is frequently alleged by ,edwards1 that to deny his conclusions1 drawn from foreknowledge1 is self-contradictory and absurd2 unless we deny foreknowledge itself4 ,to admit this1 says he1 and yet contend that the thing foreknown may possibly not be1 is to fall into a plain contradiction1 and to suppose ,god's foreknowledge to be inconsistent with itself1 p4 #aag4 ,is it not strange1 that it did not occur to ,edwards1 that if to deny his position is to deny that ,god foreknows what he foreknows2 then to affirm it1 is only to affirm that he foreknows what he foreknows8 ,indeed1 all those reasonings in which he represents the denial of his position as self-contradictory and absurd1 should have convinced him that he could prove nothing to the purpose1 by arguing from the foreknowledge of ,god1 or else he must assume the very thing in dispute1 by taking it for granted that it is future2 or1 which is the same thing in effect1 that it is foreknown4 ,for in admitting any premise1 we admit1 no more than is contained in it2 and if we only deny what is not contained in our admission1 we are not involved in a self-contradiction1 or absurdity4 ,in alleging that we have done this1 therefore1 in the present case2--in alleging that we contradict ourselves by admitting the foreknowledge of ,god1 and in denying necessity1 he takes it for granted that the very thing in dispute is included in that foreknowledge4 ,in other words1 if ,edwards does not mean to say1 that the point in dispute is included in the foreknowledge of ,god2 then he cannot say1 that we contradict ourselves by admitting that divine prescience2 and if he does mean to say1 that the thing which we deny is included in the foreknowledge of ,god1 then he begs the question4 ,it is freely conceded1 that whatever ,god foreknows will most certainly and infallibly come to pass4 ,he foresees all human volitions2 and1 therefore1 they will most certainly and infallibly come to pass1 in some manner or other3 the bare fact of their future existence is clearly established by ,god's foreknowledge of them4 ,and if all human volitions will be brought to pass1 by the operation of moral causes2 then this manner of their existence is foreknown to ,god1 and will all come to pass in this way2 but to take this for granted1 is to beg the question4 ,we have just as much right to suppose1 that ,god foreknows that the volitions of moral agents are not necessitated1 as the necessitarian has to suppose that ,he foreknows the contrary2 and then it would follow that our volitions are necessarily free1 or without any producing causes4 ,if ,god foreknows that our actions will come to pass in the way we call freely1 7and we have as much right to this supposition as our opponents have to the contrary17 then1 as foreknowledge infers necessity1 our actions are necessarily free4 ,and surely1 if the necessity which is inferred from foreknowledge1 is predicable of freedom itself1 it cannot be inconsistent with it4 ,in other words1 if the necessity of human volitions1 according to the scheme of ,edwards1 be a fact1 then it was foreknown to ,god that such is the fact2 and1 if we please1 we may infer the fact from his foreknowledge1 after having inferred his foreknowledge from the fact4 ,on the other hand1 if the scheme of necessity be a mere hypothesis1 having no corresponding reality in the universe2 then ,god never foreknew that it is according to such scheme that all human actions are brought to pass2 unless he foreknew things to be necessitated which in reality are not necessitated4 ,hence1 we can prove nothing by reasoning from the foreknowledge of ,god2 except what we first assume to be true1 and consequently foreknown to ,him2 and1 if we choose to resort to this pitiful way of begging the question1 we may prove our hypothesis just as well as any other4 ,the foreknowledge of an event1 as ,i have already said1 proves nothing more nor less than the bare certainty of its future existence2 it decides nothing as to the manner of its coming into existence4 ,the necessitarian may ring the changes upon this subject as long as he pleases1 and all he can possibly make out of it is1 that if ,god foreknows a thing1 it will certainly be1 and to suppose otherwise1 is a contradiction4 ,thus1 says ,edwards1 ,to suppose the future volitions of moral agents not to be necessary events2 or1 which is the same thing1 events which it is not possible but that they may come to pass2 and yet to suppose that ,god certainly foreknows them1 and knows all things1 is to suppose ,god's knowledge to be inconsistent with itself4 ,for to say that ,god certainly1 and without all conjecture1 knows that a thing will infallibly be1 which at the same time he knows to be so contingent that it may possibly not be1 is to suppose his knowledge inconsistent with itself2 or that one thing he knows is utterly inconsistent with another thing he knows4 ,it is the same as to say1 he now knows a proposition to be of certain infallible truth1 which he knows to be of contingent uncertain truth4 ,if a future volition is so without all necessity1 that nothing hinders but it may not be1 then the proposition which asserts its future existence is so uncertain1 that nothing hinders but that the truth of it may entirely fail4 ,and if ,god knows all things1 he knows this proposition to be thus uncertain2 and that is inconsistent with his knowing it to be infallibly true2 and so inconsistent with his knowing that it is true4 p4 #aag4 ,now all this going around and around amounts to just this1 that if ,god certainly and infallibly foreknows a thing1 he certainly and infallibly foreknows it1 or that if it will certainly come to pass1 it will certainly come to pass4 ,we admit that the certainty of all future events is implied in ,god's foreknowledge of them4 ,does the argument in question prove any more than the bare fact of the certainty of the events foreknown8 ,the argument1 so far as we have yet followed it1 clearly does not4 ,it merely proves the bare fact of the certainty of existence4 ,indeed1 ,edwards himself says1 that metaphysical or philosophical necessity1 7and this is the necessity for which he here contends17 is nothing different from their certainty4 p4 #bc4 ,and the younger ,edwards frequently says1 ,if a proposition asserting some future event1 be a real and absolute truth1 there is an absolute certainty of the event2 such absolute certainty is all that is implied in the divine foreknowledge2 and all the moral necessity for which we plead4 p4 #afj4 ,now1 if these writers merely mean that a thing is certain1 when they say it is necessary1 it is to be regretted that they did not use the right word4 ,it would have saved their works from no little confusion4 ,but the truth is1 that the moral necessity for which they contend consists sometimes in the certainty of an event1 and sometimes in the ground of that certainty4 ,volitions are said to be morally necessitory in their definition1 and in their system1 because they are made certain by the influence of moral causes4 ,but in their arguments1 and the defence of their system1 the bare absolute certainty1 without any reference to the ground of it1 is frequently all that is meant by moral necessity4 ,thus1 they build upon one idea of necessity1 while they attack and defend themselves upon another idea thereof4 ,this is our present starting point then1 agreed upon by all sides1 that the foreknowledge of ,god infers the certainty of all future realities4 ,now1 how can we conclude from hence1 that the volitions of moral agents are1 not only certain1 but rendered certain by the influence of moral causes8 ,it may be said1 that it is sufficient that the foreknowledge of ,god proves that human volitions will certainly come to pass in some way or other2 for if they will certainly come to pass in any way1 we know that they must have some cause of their existence2 and it is just as absurd to suppose that a volition can come into being without any cause of its existence1 as it is to suppose that a world can come into being of itself4 ,if this ground should be taken1 7and it certainly will be17 the reply is obvious4 ,it would show that the divine prescience can only prove the certainty of future events while it is left to the old maxim1 that every effect must have a cause1 in order to make out the doctrine of moral necessity1 or the point in dispute6 ,it would show1 that after all the parade made with the divine prescience1 it leaves the whole argument to rest upon ground which has already been occupied by one side1 and fully considered by the other6 ,it would only show1 that a great pretence of demonstration had been made from the foreknowledge of ,god2 whereas1 in fact1 it proves nothing to the purpose1 unless its most impotent and lame conclusion be helped out by something else6 ,another attempt is made to link the conclusion drawn from the foreknowledge of ,god1 with the point to be established by the necessitarian4 ,it is said1 that ,god could not foreknow all future events1 unless he views them as connected with known causes4 ,this ground is taken by many eminent necessitarians4 ,thus1 says ,dr4 ,john ,dick1 ,future events cannot be foreseen1 unless they are certain2 they cannot be certain1 unless ,god have determined to bring them to pass4 ,the same position is assumed by ,president ,edwards1 ,there must be a certainty in things themselves1 says he1 before they are certainly foreknown4 4 4 4 ,there must be a certainty in things to be a ground of certainty of knowledge1 and render things capable of being known to be certain4 p4 #abb4 ,now1 what is this certainty in things themselves1 or in human volitions1 without which they are incapable of being foreknown8 ,the answer is obvious2 for ,edwards every where contends1 that unless volitions are brought to pass by the influence of moral causes--that unless they are necessarily produced by an effectual power and efficacy--they are altogether uncertain and contingent1 and connected with nothing that can render them certain4 ,hence1 he clearly maintains1 that unless human volitions are necessarily brought to pass by the influence of motives1 they are not certain in themselves1 and hence are incapable of being foreknown4 ,and besides1 he has a laboured argument to prove1 that ,god could not foreknow the future volitions of moral agents1 unless he views them as necessarily connected with something else that is evident4 pp4 #aae-aag4 ,this something else is not foreknowledge itself2 for it is the ground of foreknowledge1 it is the necessary influence of motives1 or moral causes4 ,but we need not dwell upon this point1 as this is so evidently his meaning2 and if it is not1 then it is nothing to the purpose4 ,if ,edwards means that a thing cannot be foreknown unless it has a sufficient ground and reason for its existence1 and does not of itself come forth out of nothing1 we are not at all concerned to deny his position4 ,every advocate of free-agency contends1 that volition proceeds from the mind1 acting in view of motives2 and therefore is not destitute of a sufficient ground and reason of its existence4 ,he denies that volition is necessarily brought to pass by the operation of motives4 ,hence1 if ,edwards merely means that ,god could not foreknow a human volition1 unless he foreknew all the circumstances in view of the mind when it is to act1 as well as the nature and all the circumstances of the mind from which the act is to proceed2 no advocate of free-agency is at all concerned to deny his position4 ,it may be true1 or it may be false2 but it establishes nothing which may not be consistently admitted by the advocates of free-agency4 ,if he means any thing to the purpose1 he must mean1 that ,god could not foresee human volitions1 unless they are necessarily connected with causes1 according to his scheme of moral necessity2 that is1 unless they are necessarily produced by the action or influence of motives1 or moral causes4 ,if this is his meaning1 then indeed it is something to the purpose2 but what unbounded presumption is it1 on the part of a poor blind worm of the dust1 thus to set bounds and limits to the modes of knowledge possesssd by an infinite1 all-knowing ,god6 ,it is true1 that no understanding1 created or uncreated1 can see evidence where there is none2 but what kind of evidence that is1 by which all things are rendered perfectly clear to the eye of ,omniscience1 it is surely not for us to determine4 ,that all things are known to ,god1 is freely admitted2 but that they can be known1 only by reason of their resulting from the necessitating influence of known causes1 which are themselves necessitated1 is more than any finite mind should presume to affirm4 ,it were1 indeed1 to make our shallow1 limited1 and feeble intellects1 the measure of all possible modes of knowledge4 ,it were to make ,god like one of ourselves4 ,yet this position the necessitarian has been compelled to assume4 ,after all his pretended demonstrations from the foreknowledge of ,god1 his argument can reach the point in dispute1 only by means of this tremendous flight of presumption4 ,let the necessitarian show1 that ,god cannot foresee future events1 unless he have determined to bring them to pass1 or unless they are brought to pass by a chain of producing causes1 ultimately connected with his own will2 and he will prove something to the purpose4 ,but let him not talk so boastfully about demonstrations1 while there is this exceedingly weak link in the chain of his argument4 ,if ,god were so like one of ourselves1 that he could not foresee future volitions1 unless they are brought to pass by the operation of known causes2 then1 ,i admit1 that his foreknowledge would infer the moral necessity for which ,edwards contends1 provided he really possesses that knowledge2 but if he were so imperfect a being1 ,i should be compelled to believe1 that there are some things which he could not foreknow4 ,this assumption comes with a peculiarly ill grace from the necessitarian4 ,he should be the last man to contend1 that ,god cannot foresee future events unless they are involved in known producing causes2 just as all that we know of the future is ascertained by reasoning from known causes to effects4 ,for he contends that with ,god1 there is no time2 but that to ,his view all things are seen as if they were present4 ,his knowledge is without succession1 and there is no before nor after with him2 all things are intimately present to his mind from all eternity4 ,such is the doctrine of both the ,edwardses2 and ,dr4 ,dick believes1 that ,god sees all things at a glance4 ,now1 present things are not known to exist1 because they are implied by known causes1 but because they are present and seen4 ,and hence1 if ,god sees all things as present1 there is not the shadow of a foundation whereon to rest the proof of moral necessity from his foreknowledge4 ,it is all taken away by their own doctrine1 and their argument is left without the least support from it4 ,indeed1 there is no need of lugging the foreknowledge of ,god into the present controversy1 except it be to deceive the mind4 ,for all future events will certainly and infallibly come to pass1 whether they are foreknown or not2 and foreknowledge cannot make the matter any more certain than it is without it4 ,we may say that ,god foreknows all things1 and we may mix this up with all possible propositions2 but this will never help the conclusion1 that all future things will certainly and infallibly come to pass4 ,if ,god should cease to foreknow all future volitions1 or if he had never foreknown them1 they would1 nevertheless1 just as certainly and infallibly come to pass1 as if he had foreknown them from all eternity4 ,the bare naked fact1 that they are future infers all that is implied in ,god's foreknowledge of them2 and it is just as much a contradiction in terms1 to say that what is future will not come to pass1 as it is to say1 that what ,god foreknows will never take place4 ,hence1 by bringing in the prescience of ,deity1 we do not really strengthen or add to the conclusion in favour of necessity4 ,it only furnishes a very convenient and plausible method of begging the question1 or of seeming to prove something by hiding our sophisms in the blaze of the divine attributes4 ,it only serves as a veil1 behind which is concealed those sophistical tricks1 by which both the performer and the spectator are deceived4 ,this whole argument from the foreknowledge of ,god1 is1 indeed1 a grand specimen of undesigned metaphysical jugglery1 by which the mind is called off in one direction1 whilst it is deceived1 perplexed1 and confounded1 by not seeing what takes place in another4 ,it appears from these things1 that those persons who have endeavoured to clear up this matter1 by supposing that some things are not foreknown to ,god2 have only got rid of one of the divine attributes1 and not of their difficulty4 ,it appears also1 that ,edwards might have made his argument far more simple and direct1 by leaving out the long section in which he proves that ,god really foreknows all future things2 and confining himself to the simple proposition1 that all future events will certainly and infallibly come to pass2 that it is a contradiction in terms to say that a thing is future and yet that it will not come to pass2 or1 in other words1 if a thing is future1 it is impossible it should be otherwise than true1 that it will come to pass4 ,and how unreasonable are those1 who have imagined that we are free-agents1 because ,god has chosen not to foresee our free actions2 as if the supposition that he might have foreseen them1 does not infer necessity just as much as the fact that he does foresee them4 ,indeed1 these reasoners seem to have expected to see one truth1 by shutting their eyes upon another6 ,mr4 ,hobbes has an argument to prove necessity1 precisely like that of ,edwards1 except that its nakedness is not covered up with the foreknowledge of ,god4 ,let the case be put1 says he1 of the weather3 'tis necessary that to-morrow it shall rain or not rain4 ,if1 therefore1 it be not necessary that it shall rain1 it is necessary it shall not rain2 otherwise there is no necessity that the proposition1 it shall rain or not rain1 should be true4 ,this sophism confounds the axiomatical necessity referred to in the premise1 that it must rain or not rain1 with the causal necessity intended to be deduced from it in the conclusion4 ,this poor sophism has been adopted by ,mr4 ,locke1 and seriously employed to prove that human volitions cannot be free4 ,thus1 says he1 ,it is unavoidably necessary to prefer the doing or forbearance of an action in a man's power1 which is once proposed to a man's thoughts4 ,the act of volition or preferring one of the two1 being that1 which he cannot avoid1 a man in respect of that act of willing is under necessity4 ,here we have precisely the same confusion of an axiomatical with a causal necessity1 that occurs in the argument of ,mr4 ,hobbes4 ,and yet1 the younger ,edwards has deemed this argument of ,mr4 ,locke as worthy of his special notice and commendation2 and ,president ,day falls in with the same idea1 alleging that we will because we cannot avoid willing1 because we must either choose or refuse4 ,is it not wonderful1 that these philosophers should have imagined1 that they had any controversy with any one1 in contending so manfully that the mind1 under certain circumstances1 must either choose or refuse8 or that they could infer any thing from this1 in favour of a causal necessity--the only question in dispute8 ,with what clearness6 with what force6 would ,president ,edwards have dashed this poor flimsy sophism into a thousand atoms1 if he had come across it in the atheism of ,hobbes6 ,but1 unfortunately1 he came across it in a different direction2 and hence1 he has rescued it from the loathsome dunghill of atheistical trash1 invested it with dignity1 seeming to clothe it in the solemn sanction of religion1 by covering it up in the ample folds of the divine ,omniscience4 ,this1 then1 is the conclusion of the whole matter4 ,the prescience of ,god does not make our volitions necessary2 it only proves them to be certain4 ,this is conceded by ,edwards4 ,it proves them to be certain1 just as present knowledge proves them to be certain4 ,this also is admitted by ,edwards4 ,but present knowledge proves an act of the mind to be certain1 because it is infallibly connected with that knowledge1 and not because it is necessitated by the influence of a cause4 ,it proves it to be certain1 because it is impossible for a volition1 or any thing else1 not to exist at the time of its existence1 and not because it is impossible for it to come to pass without being necessitated4 ,in short1 it proves an axiomatical and a logical necessity1 but not a causal necessity2 that is to say1 it proves nothing to the point in dispute4 ,the necessitarian can connect his conclusion with the thing he has undertaken to prove1 in only one of two ways3 he may say1 that if an event is certain1 it cannot come into existence without a producing cause2 or he may allege1 that ,god cannot foresee them1 unless he is determined to bring them to pass4 ,if he takes the former position1 he really discards the argument from foreknowledge1 and returns for support to the old argument1 that every effect must have a cause4 ,and if he assumes the latter1 maintaining that ,god cannot foreknow future events unless he reasons from producing causes to effects1 he builds his argument1 not upon foreknowledge alone1 but upon this in connection with a most unwarrantable flight of presumption1 without which the argument from prescience is good for nothing4 ,and besides1 the bringing in of the divine prescience1 only serves to blind1 and not to illuminate4 ,for ,god foreknows only what is future2 and all future things will come to pass just as infallibly1 without being foreknown1 as they will with it4 ,if we assume them to be future1 it is just as much a contradiction to deny that they will come to pass2 as it is to assume that they are foreknown and yet deny it4 ,nothing can be proved in this way1 except what is assumed or taken for granted2 and the foreknowledge of ,god is only a plausible way of begging the question1 or concealing a sophism4 ,in conclusion1 the necessitarian takes the wrong course in his inquiries1 and lays his premises in the dark4 ,to illustrate this point3--,i know that ,i act2 and hence1 ,i conclude that ,god foreknew that ,i would act4 ,and again1 ,i know that my act is not necessitated1 that it does necessarily proceed from the action1 or influence of causes2 and hence1 ,i conclude that ,god foreknew that ,i would thus act freely1 in precisely this manner1 and not otherwise4 ,thus1 ,i reason from what ,i know to what ,i do not know1 from my knowledge of the actual world as it is1 up to ,god's foreknowledge respecting it4 ,the necessitarian pursues the opposite course4 ,he reasons from what he does not know1 that is1 from the particulars of the divine foreknowledge1 about which he absolutely knows nothing a priori1 down to the facts of the actual world4 ,thus1 quitting the light which shines so brightly within us and around us1 he seeks for light in the midst of impenetrable darkness4 ,he endeavours to determine the phenomena of the world1 not by looking at them and seeing what they are2 but by deducing conclusions from ,god's infinite foreknowledge respecting them6 ,in doing this1 a grand illusion is practised1 by his merely supposing that the volitions themselves are foreknown1 without taking into the supposition the whole of the case1 and recollecting that ,god not only foresees all our actions1 but also all about them4 ,for if this were done1 if it were remembered that ,he not only foresees that our volitions will come to pass1 but also how they will come to pass2 the necessitarian would see1 that nothing could be proved in this way except what is first tacitly assumed4 ,the grand illusion would vanish1 and it would be clearly seen1 that if the argument from foreknowledge proves any thing1 it just as well proves the necessity of freedom as any thing else4 ,indeed1 it does seem to me1 that it is one of the most wonderful phenomena in the history of the human mind1 that1 in reasoning about facts in relation to which the most direct and palpable sources of evidence are open before us1 so many of its brightest ornaments should so long have endeavoured to draw conclusions from the dark unknown of ,god's foreknowledge2 without perceiving that this is to reject the true method1 to invert the true order of inquiry1 and to involve the inquirer in all the darkness and confusion inseparable therefrom3 without perceiving that no powers1 however great1 that no genius1 however exalted1 can possibly extort from such a method any thing but the dark1 and confused1 and perplexing exhibitions of an ingenious logomachy4 ,,section ,,xii4 ,,of ,,edwards' ,,use ,,of ,,the ,,term ,,necessity4 ,,in the controversy concerning the will1 nothing is of more importance1 it will readily be admitted1 than to guard against the influence of the ambiguity of words4 ,yet1 it may be shown1 that ,president ,edwards has used the principal terms in this controversy in an exceedingly loose and indeterminate manner4 ,this he has done especially in regard to the term necessity4 ,his very definition prepares the way for such an abuse of language4 ,philosophical necessity1 says he1 is really nothing else than the ,,full ,,and ,,fixed ,,connexion ,,between ,,the ,,things ,,signified ,,by ,,the ,,subject ,,and ,,predicate ,,of ,a ,,proposition1 which affirms something to be true4 ,when there is such a connexion1 then the thing affirmed in the proposition is necessary1 in a philosophical sense1 whether any opposition or contrary effort be supposed or no4 ,when the subject and predicate of the proposition1 which affirms the existence of any thing1 either substance1 quality1 act1 or circumstance1 have a full and ,,certain ,,connexion1 then the existence or being of that thing is said to be necessary in a metaphysical sense4 ,and in this sense ,i use the word ,necessity1 in the following discourse1 when ,i endeavour to prove that ,necessity is not inconsistent with ,liberty4 ,the subject and predicate of a proposition1 which affirms existence of something1 may have a full1 fixed1 and certain connexion several ways4 #a4 ,they may have a full and perfect connexion in and of themselves2 because it may imply a contradiction1 or gross absurdity1 to suppose them not connected4 ,thus many things are necessary in their own nature4 ,so the eternal existence of being1 generally considered1 is necessary in itself2 because it would be in itself the greatest absurdity1 to deny the existence of being in general1 or to say there was absolute and universal nothing2 and as it were the sum of all contradictions2 as might be shown1 if this were the proper place for it4 ,so ,god's infinity1 and other attributes are necessary4 ,so it is necessary in its own nature1 that two and two should be four2 and it is necessary1 that all right lines drawn from the centre to the circumference should be equal4 ,it is necessary1 fit1 and suitable1 that men should do to others1 as they would that they should do to them4 ,so innumerable metaphysical and mathematical truths are necessary in themselves2 the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirms them1 are perfectly connected of themselves4 #b4 ,the connexion of the subject and predicate of a proposition1 which affirms the existence of something1 may be fixed and made certain1 because the existence of that thing is already come to pass2 and either now is1 or has been2 and so has1 as it were1 made sure of existence4 ,and therefore1 the proposition which affirms present or past existence of it1 may by this means1 be made certain1 and necessarily and unalterably true2 the past event has fixed and decided the matter1 as to its existence2 and has made it impossible but that existence should be truly predicated of it4 ,thus the existence of whatever is already come to pass1 is now become necessary2 it is become impossible it should be otherwise than true1 that such a thing has been4 #c4 ,the subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms something to be1 may have a real and certain connexion consequentially2 and so the existence of the thing may be consequentially necessary1 as it may be surely and firmly connected with something else1 that is necessary in one of the former respects4 ,as it is either fully and thoroughly connected with that which is absolutely necessary in its own nature2 or with something which has already made sure of its existence4 ,this necessity lies in1 and may be explained by1 the connexion between two or more propositions1 one with another4 ,things which are perfectly connected with other things that are necessary1 are necessary themselves1 by a necessity of consequence4 ,after having defined what he means by philosophical or metaphysical necessity1 he tells us1 that this is the sense in which he uses the word1 when he endeavours to show that necessity is not inconsistent with liberty4 ,and yet under this sense1 how many totally distinct ideas are embraced6 ,the eternal existence of being in general2 the attributes of ,god2 the proposition that two and two are four2 the equality of the radii of a circle2 the moral duty that we should do as we would be done by2 the existence of a thing which has already come to pass2 the existence of things1 that are connected with that which is absolutely necessary in itself1 or with something that has already made sure of its existence2 the connexion of two or more propositions with each other--all these things are included in his definition of philosophical necessity6 ,and yet he tells us1 that he uses the term in this sense 7in what sense87 when he undertakes to reconcile liberty with necessity6 ,when he says1 that he employs the word in this sense1 one would suppose that1 as a great metaphysician1 he referred to some one of its precise and definite significations2 but no such thing4 ,he merely refers to its philosophical sense1 which1 according to his own explanation1 embraces a multitude of different ideas4 ,hence1 although he may keep close to this philosophical sense of the word1 in the ensuing discourse2 yet he may1 before the discourse is concluded1 shift his position a thousand times from one of these ideas to another4 ,and he may always seem1 to superficial observers1 to speak of the same thing2 because although the things spoken of are really different1 they are all drawn together under one definition1 and called by one name4 ,he not only may have done this2 he actually has done it4 ,and if he had formed the express design to envelope the whole subject in a cloud of sophistry1 he could not have taken a better course to accomplish his object4 ,it was the design of the ,inquiry to establish the doctrine of moral necessity2 and hence it was incumbent on ,president ,edwards to reconcile this kind of necessity1 and not philosophical necessity1 with the free-agency of man4 ,he contends that there is a necessary connexion between the influence of motives and volitions4 ,this he calls moral necessity4 ,it differs from natural necessity1 says he1 it differs from the necessary connexion between cause and effect2 but yet1 he expressly tells us1 that this difference does not lie so much in the nature of the connexion1 as in the terms connected4 ,in both cases1 he maintains1 the connexion is necessary and absolute4 ,the two terms connected are different2 but the kind and nature of the connexion is the same4 ,this is the kind of necessity for which he pleads2 and we can never be satisfied with his scheme1 until the term shall be used in this precise and definite sense1 and the doctrine it expresses shall be shown to be consistent with the true idea and feeling of liberty in the human breast4 ,it will not1 it cannot satisfy the mind1 that any other kind of necessity is reconcilable with liberty2 while it remains to be shown that moral necessity1 as it is defined and explained in the ,inquiry1 is consistent with the free-agency of man4 ,there is one sense of the term in question1 says he1 which especially belongs to the controversy about acts of the will1 p4 #cj4 ,it is what he calls a necessity of consequence4 ,this would be very true1 if he merely meant by a necessity of consequence1 to refer to the necessary connexion between cause and effect4 ,but this is not his meaning2 for he expressly says1 that a necessity of consequence lies in1 and may be explained by1 the connexion of two or more propositions one with another4 ,now what has the connexion between any two or all the propositions in the universe1 to do with the controversy about acts of the will8 ,is it not evident1 that it is the connexion which subsists between effects and their producing causes1 and which is supposed to subsist between motives and actions1 that has to do with the controversy in question2 and that the connexion which subsists between two or more propositions is entirely foreign to the subject8 ,it may be said1 that by a necessity of consequence1 ,edwards referred not only to the connexion between two or more propositions1 but also to the connexion between cause and effect4 ,this is undoubtedly true2 for he speaks of effects as coming to pass by this kind of necessity4 ,but then it is to be lamented that two ideas1 which are so perfectly distinct1 should have been couched under the same mode of expression1 and treated as if they were identically the same4 ,such a confounding of different ideas1 has led to no little confusion and error in the reasoning of ,president ,edwards4 ,the subject of the last section furnishes a striking illustration of the justness of this remark4 ,from the proposition that a volition is certainly and infallibly foreknown1 it follows1 by a necessity of consequence1 that it will come to pass4 ,this is an instance of the necessary connexion between two ideas or propositions2 between the idea or proposition1 that a certain volition is foreknown1 and the idea that it will come to pass2 between the proposition which affirms that1 it is foreknown1 and the idea that it will come to pass in other words1 the proposition which affirms that it is foreknown1 necessarily assumes that it will come to pass2 and to deny this assumption1 at the same time that we make it1 is surely to be guilty of a contradiction in terms4 ,to suppose that a volition will not come to pass1 is inconsistent with the proposition that it is certainly and infallibly foreknown4 ,edwards himself has frequently declared that this is the kind of necessity which is inferred from foreknowledge4 ,in truth1 the necessary connexion which exists between the idea that a thing is foreknown1 and the truth of the proposition which predicates future existence of it1 is perfectly distinct from the necessary connexion between cause and effect4 ,they are as widely different1 as the connexion between any two propositions in ,euclid is from the connexion between the motion of a ball and the force by which it is put in motion4 ,hence1 the kind of necessity which is involved in the idea of foreknowledge1 has nothing to do with the controversy about acts of the will4 ,there is1 in like manner1 a necessary connexion between the idea that a volition is now certainly and infallibly known to exist1 and the truth of the proposition which affirms present existence of it2 and hence1 its present existence is necessary1 by a necessity of consequence1 according to the definition of ,president ,edwards4 ,but all this has no relevancy to the question1 as to how that volition came to pass4 ,its present existence is necessarily connected with the idea that it is certainly known to exist2 but this is a necessity of consequence which lies in1 and may be explained by1 the connexion between two or more propositions4 ,it is not a necessity of consequence that lies in1 or can be explained by1 the connexion between cause and effect4 ,the two things are entirely different1 and it is strange1 that they should always have been confounded by ,president ,edwards4 ,i do most certainly and infallibly know1 for example1 that ,i am now willing to write2 and from this knowledge1 it necessarily follows1 that ,i am now willing to write4 ,but if any one should infer from hence1 that ,i am necessitated to write1 by the operation of some cause1 we should certainly think his inference very badly drawn4 ,yet this is precisely the way in which the necessitarian proceeds1 when he infers the necessity of human actions from the foreknowledge of ,god4 ,he confounds the necessary connexion between two propositions1 with the necessary connexion between cause and effect4 ,this single ambiguity has been a mighty instrument in the building up of that portentous scheme of necessity1 which has seemed to overshadow the glory and beauty of man's nature as a free and accountable being4 ,this is not the only ambiguity of the term in question which has been turned to account by the necessitarian4 ,in opposition to the scheme of moral necessity1 or the necessary connexion between volitions and the influence of motives1 it has been said1 that volitions are produced neither by motives1 nor by preceding acts of choice4 ,this is a direct denial of the doctrine of moral necessity1 of the only thing which we are at all concerned to deny4 ,we may thus attempt to escape from the thing1 but the name still pursues us4 ,for1 to this view of the subject1 ,president ,edwards replies as follows3 ,if any shall see cause to deny this1 and say they hold no such thing as that every action is chosen or determined by a foregoing choice2 but that the very first exertion of will only1 undetermined by any preceding act1 is properly called action2 then ,i say1 such a man's notion of action implies necessity2 for what the mind is the subject of1 without the determination of its own previous choice1 it is the subject of necessarily1 as to any hand that free choice has in the affair2 and without any ability the mind has to prevent it1 by any will or election of its own2 because by the supposition it precludes all previous acts of the will or choice in the case1 which might prevent it4 ,so that it is again1 in this other way1 implied in the notion of an act1 that1 it is both necessary and not necessary1 p4 #aii4 ,it is in this manner1 that ,president ,edwards disposes of this important view of the subject of free-agency4 ,let us examine his logic4 ,in the first place1 the argument is not sound4 ,it proceeds on the supposition1 that unless a volition is produced1 it cannot be prevented1 by a preceding act of volition4 ,this is a false supposition4 ,i choose1 for example1 to go out at one of the doors of my room4 ,this choice is not produced by any preceding act of choice4 ,and yet ,i can certainly prevent it1 by choosing to go out at the other door of the room1 or by choosing to sit still4 ,thus one act of choice may1 from the very nature of things1 necessarily exclude or prevent another act of choice2 although it could not possibly have produced that other act of choice4 ,but suppose the argument to be sound1 what does it prove8 ,it proves our actions to be necessary2 but in what sense8 ,does it show them to be subject to that moral necessity1 for which ,edwards contends1 and against which we protest8 ,this is the question1 let me repeat1 which we have undertaken to discuss2 and if we would not wander in an eternal maze of words1 we must keep to it2 it is the talisman which is to conduct us out of all our difficulties and perplexities4 ,it is the first point1 and the second point1 and the third point in logic1 to keep to the issue1 steadily1 constantly1 and without the least shadow of turning4 ,otherwise we shall lose ourselves in a labyrinth of words1 in darkness and confusion interminable4 ,in what sense1 then1 does the above argument1 supposing it to be sound1 prove our actions to be necessary8 ,does it prove them to be necessary with a moral necessity8 ,it does not4 ,according to the argument in question1 volitions are necessary1 as to any hand free choice has in the affair2 because by the supposition it precludes all previous acts of the will or choice in the case1 which might prevent them4 ,that is to say1 volitions are necessary as to previous acts of choice2 because by the supposition previous acts of choice do not produce them1 and consequently cannot prevent them4 ,this is the argument4 ,now1 it is very true1 that this is not an unheard of use of the term in question4 ,we say a thing is necessary1 when it is dependent upon no cause for its existence4 ,thus the existence of the ,supreme ,being is said to be necessary1 because he is the uncaused ,cause of all things4 ,as he owes his existence to nothing1 so there is nothing capable of destroying it4 ,he is independent of all causes2 and hence1 his existence is said to be necessary4 ,in like manner1 a thing may be said to be necessary as to any other particular thing1 upon which it does not depend for its existence4 ,as the ,supreme ,being is said to be necessary as to all things1 because his existence depends upon nothing2 so any created object may be said to be necessary1 as to the influence of any other object1 to which it does not owe its existence1 and upon which its existence does not depend4 ,it is in this sense that our volitions are shown to be necessary by the above argument of ,president ,edwards4 ,a volition is necessary as to any hand free choice has in the affair2 because by the supposition it preclude all previous acts of the will or choice in the case1 which might prevent it4 ,that is to say1 it is necessary as to preceding acts of choice2 because1 by the supposition1 it is wholly independent of preceding acts of choice for its existence4 ,now1 in so far as the doctrine of moral necessity is concerned1 this argument amounts to just exactly nothing4 ,for although a volition may be necessary as to one particular cause1 in consequence of its being wholly independent of that cause2 it does not follow that it is necessarily produced by another cause4 ,because it does not result from any preceding act of volition1 and consequently is necessary as to any hand that preceding act of volition had in the affair1 it does not follow1 that the strongest motive produces it4 ,supposing a volition to be independent of all causes1 as well as of preceding acts of choice2 and then it would be necessary1 in the same sense1 as to all causes1 as well as to preceding acts of choice4 ,but how infinitely absurd would it be to conclude1 that because a volition is independent of the influence of all causes1 it is therefore necessarily connected with the influence of a particular cause6 ,we only deny that volitions are necessarily connected with the power1 or influence1 or action1 of motives or moral causes4 ,this is the only kind of necessity against which1 as the advocates of free-agency1 we are at all concerned to contend4 ,and it is worse than idle for the necessitarian to endeavour to establish any other kind of necessity beside this4 ,let him come directly to the point1 and keep to it1 if he would hope to accomplish any thing4 ,this shifting backwards and forwards from one meaning of an ambiguous term to another2 this showing a volition to be necessary in one sense1 and then tacitly assuming it to be necessary in another sense2 is not the way to silence and refute the adversaries of the doctrine of moral necessity4 ,it may show1 7supposing the argument to be sound17 that a volition is necessary as to a particular cause1 on the supposition that it is not produced by that cause2 and in the same manner1 it might be shown1 that a volition is necessary as to all causes1 on the supposition that it is produced by no cause4 ,but the necessity which results from such a supposition1 would be directly arrayed against the necessity for which ,president ,edwards contends4 ,in the same sense1 volitions are necessary as to any hand motives have in the affair1 on the supposition that they do not result from the influence of motives2 but instead of building on this kind of necessity1 one would have supposed that ,president ,edwards was somewhat concerned in its destruction4 ,in short1 the case stands thus3 a thing is said to be necessary1 on the supposition that it has no cause of its existence2 or necessary as to another thing1 on the supposition that it does not depend on that other thing for its existence4 ,again1 a thing is said to be necessary1 on the supposition that it proceeds from the operation of a cause4 ,these ideas are perfectly distinct4 ,the difference between them is as clear as noonday4 ,it is true1 they have the same name2 but to reason from the one to the other1 is about as wild an abuse of language as could be made4 ,president ,edwards is required to show that a volition is necessary1 in the sense of its having a moral cause2 he has shown that it is necessary in the sense of its not having a cause4 ,this is his argument4 ,let us view this subject in another light4 ,if we say that a volition proceeds from a prior act of choice1 we certainly hold the doctrine of necessity4 ,president ,edwards speaks out from the ,inquiry and convicts us of this doctrine4 ,their notion of1 action1 says he1 implies necessity1 and supposes that it is necessary1 and cannot be contingent4 ,for they suppose1 that whatever is properly called action1 must be determined by the will and free choice2 and this is as much as to say1 that it must be necessary1 being dependent upon1 and determined by something foregoing2 namely1 a foregoing act of choice1 p4 #aii4 ,thus1 if we say that a volition is produced by a preceding act of volition1 we are clearly convicted of the doctrine of necessity4 ,now let us endeavour to escape from this accusation4 ,for this purpose1 let us assume the directly opposite position3 let us deny that our volitions are produced by preceding acts of choice--and what then8 ,are we out of danger8 ,far from it4 ,we are still convicted of the dreaded doctrine of necessity4 ,on the very supposition we have made1 diametrically opposite as it is to the former1 we are still convicted of the same doctrine of necessity4 ,we cannot escape from it4 ,it pursues us1 like a ghost1 through the dark and ill-defined shadows of an ambiguous phraseology1 and lays its cold hand upon us4 ,turn wheresoever we may1 it is sure to meet us in some shape or other4 ,this is not all4 ,we are also convicted of a contradiction in terms4 ,it is shown1 that we hold an act to be both necessary and not necessary4 ,this may appear to be an exceedingly grave charge2 and yet ,i think we may venture to put in the plea of guilty4 ,we do hold an act to be necessary1 as to the strongest motive1 as well as to any preceding act of choice1 by which we contend it is not produced1 and by which it cannot be prevented4 ,we likewise most freely admit1 that many volitions are necessary in other senses of the word1 as explained by ,president ,edwards4 ,we cannot deny this1 so long as we retain our senses2 for a thing is said to be necessary1 according to him1 when it has already come to pass1 and so made sure of its existence2 and it is likewise said to be necessary1 when its present existence1 is certainly and infallibly known1 as well as when its future existence is certainly and infallibly foreknown4 ,but yet we deny1 that an act of volition is necessary1 in the sense that it is produced by the operation of the strongest motive1 as it is called4 ,that is to say1 we admit an act of choice to be necessary1 in some senses of the word2 and1 in another sense of it1 we deny it to be necessary4 ,is there any thing very contradictory in all this8 ,any thing to shock the common sense and reason of mankind8 ,it may be said1 that ,edwards does not always endeavour to establish the doctrine of moral necessity2 that he frequently aims merely to show1 that our actions are not without all necessity4 ,this is unquestionably true4 ,he frequently arrives at this conclusion2 and he seems to think that he has done something1 whenever he has shown our actions to be necessary in any sense of the word as defined by himself4 ,but it is difficult to conceive with whom he could have had any controversy4 ,for certainly no one in his right mind1 could pretend to deny that human actions are necessary in any sense1 as the word is explained and used in the ,inquiry4 ,when it is said1 for example1 that the truth of the proposition which affirms the future existence of an event1 is necessarily connected with the idea that that event is certainly and infallibly foreknown2 no one1 in his right mind1 can deny the position4 ,such a denial1 as ,edwards says1 involves a contradiction in terms4 ,hence1 this notion of necessity only requires to be stated and understood1 in order to rivet irresistible conviction on the mind of every rational being4 ,no light has been thrown upon it1 by the pages which ,president ,edwards has devoted to the subject2 nor could a thousand volumes render it one whit clearer than it is in itself4 ,hence1 the author of the ,inquiry should have seen1 that if there was any controversy with him on this point1 it was not because there was any diversity of opinion2 but because there was a misconception of his proposition4 ,and no doubt he would have seen this1 if the meaning of his own language had been clearly defined in his own mind3 if he had marked out and circumscribed1 as with a sunbeam1 the precise limitation within which his own propositions are true1 and beyond which they are false4 ,if he had done this1 he would have seen that there was1 and that there could have been1 but one real point of difference between himself and his adversaries4 ,he would have seen1 that1 aside from the ambiguities of language1 there was but one real point in dispute4 ,he would have seen1 that it was affirmed1 on the one side1 that the strongest motive operates to produce a choice2 and that this was denied on the other4 ,and hence1 he would have put forth his whole strength to establish this single point1 to fortify this single doctrine of moral necessity4 ,he would not have crowded so many different ideas into the definition of the term necessity2 and then imagined that he was overwhelming and confounding his adversaries1 when he was only showing that human actions are not without all necessity4 ,and when they said1 that a necessary action is a contradiction1 he would have seen how they used the term necessary2 and he would not have concluded1 as he has done1 that this notion of action implies contingence1 and excludes all necessity1 p4 #aii4 ,he would have seen1 that the idea of an action1 in our view1 is inconsistent with necessity1 in one sense of the word2 and yet not inconsistent with every thing that has been called necessity4 ,in the definition of ,president ,edwards1 there is an inherent and radical defect1 which ,i have not as yet noticed2 and which is1 indeed1 the source of all his vacillating on this subject4 ,it proceeds from a very common error1 which has been well explained and illustrated by ,mr4 ,stewart in his ,essay on the ,beautiful4 ,the various theories1 which ingenious men have framed in relation to the beautiful1 says ,mr4 ,stewart1 have originated in a prejudice1 which has descended to modern times from the scholastic ages2 that when a word admits of a variety of significations1 these different significations must all be species of the same genus2 and must consequently include some essential idea common to every individual to which the generic term can be applied4 ,the question of ,aristippas1 how can beauty differ from beauty1 says ,mr4 ,stewart1 plainly proceeded on a total misconception of the nature of the circumstances2 which1 in the history of language1 attach different meanings to the same word2 and which by slow and insensible gradations1 remove them to such a distance from their primitive or radical sense1 that no ingenuity can trace the successive steps of their progress4 ,the variety of these circumstances is1 in fact1 so great1 that it is impossible to attempt a complete enumeration of them2 and ,i shall1 therefore1 select a few of the cases1 in which the principle now in question appears most obviously and indisputably to fail4 ,i shall begin with supposing1 that the letters ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 ,d1 ,e1 denote a series of objects2 that ,a possesses some quality in common with ,b2 ,b a quality in common with ,c2 ,c a quality in common with ,d2 ,d a quality in common with ,e2--while at the same time1 no quality can be found which belongs in common to any three objects in the series4 ,is it not conceivable1 that the affinity between ,a and ,b may produce a transference of the name of the first to the second2 and that1 in consequence of the other affinities which connect the remaining objects together1 the same name may pass in succession from ,b to ,c2 from ,c to ,d2 and from ,d to ,e8 ,this idea1 and the reasoning which ,mr4 ,stewart has founded upon it1 are at once obvious1 original and profound4 ,it shows that the most gifted philosophers1 have not been able to frame a satisfactory theory of the beautiful1 because they have proceeded on the false supposition1 that all those objects which are called beautiful have some common property1 merely because they have a common appellation1 by which they are distinguished from other objects2 and that in endeavouring to point out and define this common property1 they have engaged in an impracticable attempt2 and hence they have succeeded to their own satisfaction1 only by doing violence to the nature of things4 ,this is a fruitful idea4 ,it admits of many illustrations4 ,i shall select only a few4 ,philosophers and jurists have frequently attempted to define executive power2 but they have proceeded on the supposition1 that all those powers called executive1 have a common and distinguishing property1 because they have a common name4 ,hence1 they have necessarily failed2 because the supposition on which they have proceeded is false4 ,executive power1 properly so called1 is that which sees to the execution of the laws2 and other powers are called executive1 not because they partake of the nature of such powers1 but simply because they have been conferred upon the chief executive magistrate4 ,the same remark1 may be made1 in relation to the attempts of ingenious men1 to define the nature of law in general4 ,if we analyze all those things which have been called laws1 we shall find that they have no element or property in common3 the only thing they have in common is the name4 ,hence1 when we undertake to define law in general1 or to point out the common property by which laws are distinguished from other things1 we must necessarily fail4 ,we may frame a definition in words1 as others have done2 but1 however carefully this may be constructed1 it can be applied to different kinds of laws1 only by giving totally different meanings to the words of which it is composed4 ,thus1 for example1 a law is said to be a rule of conduct1 given by a superior to an inferior1 and which the inferior is bound to obey4 ,now1 who does not see1 that the words conduct and obedience1 must have totally distinct meanings1 when they are applied to inanimate objects and when they are applied to the actions of moral and accountable beings8 ,and who does not see1 that human beings are bound to do their duty1 in an entirely different sense1 from that in which matter can be said to be under an obligation8 ,the same remark may be extended to all the definitions which have been given of law in general4 ,and whoever understands the philosophy of definitions1 will easily perceive that every attempt to draw things1 so wholly unlike each other1 under one and the same mode of expression1 is not really to define1 but to hide1 the true nature of things under the ambiguities of language4 ,of this common fault1 ,president ,edwards has been guilty4 ,instead of defining the various senses of the term necessity1 and always using it with precision and without confusion2 he has undertaken to show wherein those things called necessary really agree in some common property4 ,he looked for a common nature1 where there is only a common name4 ,as ,aristippas could not conceive1 how beauty could differ from beauty2 so1 if we may judge from his argument1 it was a great difficulty with him1 to conceive how necessity can differ from necessity4 ,hence1 when he proves an action to be necessary in any one of the various senses which are included under his definition of philosophical necessity1 he imagines that his work is done2 and when his adversary denies that an action is necessary in any one of those senses1 he concludes that he denies all necessity6 ,in all this1 we see the question as plainly as if it had been expressly written down1 how can philosophical necessity differ from philosophical necessity8 ,to which ,i would simply reply1 that a thing cannot differ from itself1 it is true2 but the same word may have very different meanings2 and that it is a prejudice which has descended to modern times from the scholastic ages1 to suppose that things have a common nature1 merely because they have a common name4 ,no better illustration of the fallacy of this prejudice could be furnished1 than that which ,edwards has given in his definition of philosophical or metaphysical necessity4 ,under this definition1 as we have seen1 he has included the being of a ,god1 which is said to be necessary1 because he has existed from all eternity1 unmade and uncaused2 and also the existence of an effect1 which is said to be necessary1 because it necessarily results from the operation of a cause4 ,now1 these two ideas stand in direct opposition to each other2 and the only thing they have in common is the name4 ,and yet ,president ,edwards reasons from the one to the other6 ,if he can1 in any way1 reach the name1 this seems to satisfy him4 ,the thing in dispute is entirely overlooked4 ,if we say that choice is produced by choice1 then he contends it is an effect1 and consequently necessary4 ,if we deny that choice is produced by choice1 then it is necessary any how2 not because it is produced by a cause1 but because it is independent of a cause1 being neither produced nor prevented by it4 ,it makes no difference with this great champion of necessity1 whether choice is said to be produced by choice or not2 for1 on either of these opposite suppositions1 he can show that our volitions are necessary4 ,the absence of the very circumstance which makes it necessary in the one case1 is that which makes it necessary in the other4 ,is choice produced by choice8 ,then this dependence of choice upon choice1 shows it to be necessary4 ,is choice not produced by choice8 ,then this independence of choice upon choice is the very thing which shows it to be necessary6 ,thus this great champion of necessity1 just passes from one meaning of the term to another1 without the least regard to the point in dispute1 or to the logical coherency of his argument4 ,surely1 if a reluctant world has bowed in homage to his logic1 it must have been because the world has been too indolent to pry into the sophisms with which it swarms4 ,it is only in his onsets upon error1 that the might of his resistless logic is felt2 in the defence of his own system1 he does not reason at all1 he merely rambles4 ,indeed1 with all his gigantic power1 he was compelled to reel and stagger under the burden of such a cause4 ,,section ,,xiii4 ,,of ,,natural ,,and ,,moral ,,necessity4 ,i ,,have already said many things bearing upon the famous distinction between natural and moral necessity2 but this distinction is regarded as so important by its advocates1 that it deserves a separate notice4 ,this ,i shall proceed to give it4 ,the distinction in question is treated with no great reverence by the advocates of free-agency4 ,it is denounced by them as a distinction without a difference2 and1 though this may be true in the main1 yet this is not the way to settle any thing4 ,there is1 indeed1 a real difference between natural and moral necessity1 as they are held and described by necessitarians2 and if we pay no attention to it1 our declarations about its futility will be apt to produce more heat than light4 ,i fully recognize the justness of the demand made by ,dr4 ,edwards1 that those who insist that natural and moral necessity are the same1 should tell us in what respects they are so4 ,we have informed them1 says he1 in what respects we hold them to be different4 ,we wish them to be equally explicit and candid1 p4 #ai4 ,i intend to be equally explicit and candid4 ,i admit1 then1 that there is a real difference between natural and moral necessity2 they differ1 as the ,edwardses say1 in the nature of the terms connected4 ,in the one case1 there is a natural cause and its effect1 such as force and the motion produced by it1 connected together2 and in the other1 there is a motive and a volition4 ,in this respect1 ,i believe that there is a greater difference between them than does the necessitarian himself2 for he considers volition to be of the same nature with an effect1 whereas ,i regard it as essentially different in nature and in kind from an effect4 ,there is another difference between natural and moral necessity4 ,natural necessity admits of an opposition of the will2 whereas it is absurd to suppose any such opposition in the case of moral necessity4 ,a man may be so bound that his utmost efforts to move may prove unavailing3 in such a case1 he is said to labour under a natural necessity4 ,this always implies and presupposes an opposition of will4 ,but not so in regard to moral necessity4 ,it is absurd to suppose1 that our wills can ever be in opposition to moral necessity2 for this would be to suppose that we are made willing by the influence of motives1 and yet are not willing4 ,now1 ,i fully recognize these differences between natural and moral necessity1 as they are viewed by the necessitarian4 ,whether they are not inconsistent with their ideas of moral necessity1 is another question4 ,but as ,i am not concerned with that question at present1 ,i am willing to take these differences without the least abatement4 ,admitting1 then1 that these distinctions are well-founded1 and that they are perfectly consistent with the idea of moral necessity1 let us see in what respects there is an agreement between the things under consideration4 ,the difference does not lie1 says ,edwards1 so much in the nature of the connexion1 as in the two terms connected4 ,moral necessity is a sure and perfect connexion between moral causes and effects4 ,it is as absolute as natural necessity4 ,the influence of motives is not a condition of volition1 which the will may or may not follow2 it is the cause thereof2 and it is absurd to suppose that the effect1 the volition1 can be loose from the influence of its cause1 p4 #gg-h4 ,yes1 volition is just as absolutely and unconditionally controlled by motive1 as the inanimate objects of nature are controlled by the power of the ,almighty4 ,the connexion1 the necessary connexion1 which subsists between motion and the force by which it is produced1 is the same in nature and in kind as that which subsists between the action or influence of motive and volition4 ,herein1 then1 is the agreement1 that in moral necessity1 as well as in natural1 the effect is produced by the influence of its cause4 ,the nature of the connexion is the same in both2 and in both it is equally absolute4 ,now we have seen the differences1 and we have also seen the points of agreement2 and the question is1 not whether this famous distinction be well-founded1 but whether it will serve the purpose for which it is employed4 ,in the full light1 and in the perfect recognition of this distinction1 we deny that it will serve the purpose of the necessitarian4 ,it is supposed1 that natural necessity alone interferes with the free-agency of man1 while moral necessity is perfectly consistent with it4 ,but1 in reality1 moral necessity is more utterly subversive of all free-agency and accountability than natural necessity itself4 ,think not that this is a mere hasty and idle assertion4 ,let us look at it1 and see if it is not true4 ,we have already seen1 that a caused volition is no volition at all2--that a necessary agent is a contradiction in terms4 ,in other words1 a power to act must itself act1 and not be made to act by the action of any other power1 or else it does not act at all4 ,and if it must be caused to act1 before it can act1 then1 as we have already seen1 there must be an infinite series of acts4 ,these things have been fully illustrated1 and defended against the false analogies1 by which they have been assailed2 and they are here mentioned only for the sake of greater clearness and distinctness4 ,if the scheme of moral necessity be true1 then1 according to which our volitions are absolutely caused by the action or influence of motive1 it is idle to talk about free acts of the will2 for there are no acts of the will at all4 ,if our wills are caused to put forth volitions1 and are turned to one side or the other1 by the controlling influence of motives1 it is idle to talk about a free-will2 for we have no will at all4 ,i know full well1 that ,president ,edwards admits that we have a will2 and that the will does really act2 but this admission is contradicted by bringing the will and all its exercises under the domination and absolute control of motives4 ,he obliterates the distinction between cause and effect1 between action and passion1 between mental activity and bodily motion2 and thereby draws the phenomena of will1 the volitions of all intelligent creatures1 under the iron scheme of necessity4 ,we are eternally reminded that ,edwards believes in the existence of a will1 and in the reality of its acts4 ,we know it2 but let us not be accused of misrepresenting him1 unless it can be shown that one part of his system does not contradict another1--unless it can be shown1 not by false analogies and an abuse of words1 but by valid evidence1 that an act of the mind may be necessarily caused4 ,this never has been shown2 and the attempts of the necessitarian to show it1 as we have seen1 are among the most signal failures in the whole range of human philosophy4 ,until this be shown1 we must contend that there is nothing in the universe so diametrically opposed to all free-agency--to all liberty of the will1 as the scheme of moral necessity2 which so clearly overthrows and1 demolishes the very idea of a will and all its volitions4 ,indeed1 what is called natural necessity does not properly interfere with the liberty of the will at all2 it merely restrains the freedom of motion4 ,it is moral necessity that reaches the seat of the mind1 and takes away all the freedom thereof2 even denying to us the possession of a will itself4 ,when my hand is bound1 ,i may strive to move it in vain2 in this case1 my will is free1 because ,i may strive1 or ,i may not2 but the hand is not free1 because it cannot move4 ,but if motives cause the mind to follow their influence1 so that it may not possibly depart or be loose from that influence2 then we have no will at all2 and it is idle and a mockery to talk about freedom of the will4 ,and yet1 although ,edwards would have us to believe that no system is consistent with free-agency but his own2 he occupies the position1 that it is absurd to suppose1 that a volition may possibly be loose from the influence of motive2 that this is to suppose that it is the effect of motive1 and at the same time that it is not the effect of motive6 ,all agree1 says ,day1 that a necessity which is opposed to our choice1 is inconsistent with liberty1 p4 #ia4 ,that is to say1 a necessity which cuts off or prevents the external consequence of our choice1 is inconsistent with liberty of the will2 but that which takes away one choice1 and sets up another1 is perfectly consistent with it6 ,if the arm is held1 so that the free choice cannot move it1 then is the liberty of the will interfered with2 but1 though the will may be absolutely swayed and controlled1 by the influence of motives1 or by the sovereign power of ,god himself1 yet is it perfectly free6 ,if such be the liberty of the will1 what is it worth8 ,there are many things1 which it is beyond the power of the human mind to accomplish4 ,even in such cases1 the natural necessity under which we are said to labour1 does not interfere with the liberty of the will4 ,if we cannot do such things1 it is not because our will is not free in regard to them1 but because its power is limited4 ,we might very well attempt them1 and put forth volitions in order to accomplish them1 as in our ignorance we often do2 and if we abstain from so doing in other cases1 wherein we might wish to act1 it is because we know they are beyond our power1 and1 as rational creatures1 do not choose to make fools of ourselves4 ,to say that we are under a natural necessity1 then1 is only to say that our power is limited1 and not that it is not free4 ,it is reserved for moral necessity--shall ,i say to enslave8--no1 but to annihilate the will4 ,it is true1 if we will to do a thing1 and are restrained from doing it by a superior force1 we are not to blame for not doing it2 or if we refuse to do it1 and are constrained to do it1 we are equally blameless4 ,in such cases1 natural necessity1 although it does not reach the will1 is an excuse for external conduct4 ,if the question were1 is a man accountable for his external actions8 for the movements of his body8 then we might talk about natural necessity4 ,but as the question1 in the present controversy1 is1 whether a man is accountable for his internal acts1 for the volitions of his mind8 to talk about natural necessity is wholly irrelevant4 ,it has nothing to do with such a controversy2 and hence1 ,edwards is entirely mistaken when he supposes that it is natural necessity1 and that alone1 which is opposed to the freedom of the will4 ,it is in fact opposed to nothing but the freedom of the body2 and by lugging it into the present controversy1 it can only serve to make confusion the worse confounded4 ,it is the general sentiment of mankind1 that moral necessity is inconsistent with free-agency and accountability4 ,edwards has taken great pains to explain this fact4 ,his great reason for it is1 that men are in the habit of excusing themselves for their outward conduct1 on the ground of natural necessity4 ,in this way1 by early and constant association1 the idea of blamelessness becomes firmly attached to the term necessity1 as well as those terms1 such as must1 cannot1 c41 in which the same thing is implied4 ,hence1 we naturally suppose that we are excusable for those things which are necessary with a moral necessity4 ,thus1 the fact that men generally regard moral necessity and free-agency as incompatible with each other1 is supposed by ,edwards to arise from the ambiguity of language2 and that if we will only shake off this influence1 we shall see a perfect agreement and harmony between them4 ,but is this so8 ,let any man fix his mind upon the very idea of moral necessity itself1 and then answer this question4 ,let him lay aside the term necessity1 and all kindred words2 let him simply and abstractedly consider a volition as being produced by the action or influence of motives2 and then ask himself1 if the subject in which this effect is produced is accountable for it8 ,if it can be his virtue or his vice8 ,let him conceive of a volition1 or anything else1 as being produced in the human mind1 by an extraneous cause2 and then ask himself if the mind in which it is thus produced can be to praise or to blame for it8 ,let any man do this1 and ,i think he will see a better reason for the common sentiment of mankind than any which ,edwards has assigned for it2 he will see that men have generally regarded moral necessity as incompatible with free-agency and accountability1 just because it is utterly irreconcilable with them4 ,indeed1 however liable the common people1 and philosophers too1 may be to be deceived and misled by the ambiguities of language1 there is no such deception in the present case4 ,the common people1 as they are called1 do not always say1 my actions are necessary1 ,i cannot help them1 and therefore ,i am not accountable for them4 ,they as frequently say1 that if my actions1 if my volitions1 are brought to pass by the strength and influence of motives1 ,i am not responsible for them4 ,this common sentiment and conviction of mankind1 therefore1 does not blindly aim merely at the name1 while it misses the thing2 it does indeed bear with all its force directly upon the scheme of moral necessity itself4 ,and its power is sought to be evaded1 as we have seen1 and as we shall still further see1 not by explaining the ambiguities of language1 so as to enlighten mankind1 but by confounding the most opposite natures1 such as action and passion1 volition and local motion1 through the ambiguities of language4 ,it is the necessitarian1 who is always talking about the ambiguities of language1 that is continually building upon them4 ,indeed1 it is hard to conceive why he has so often been supposed to use language with such wonderful precision1 if it be not because he is eternally complaining of the want of it in others4 ,just let the common people1 or those of them who may desire an opiate for their consciences1 see the scheme of moral necessity as it is in itself1 stripped of all the disguises of an ambiguous phraseology1 and it will satisfy them4 ,it will be the one thing needful to their craving and hungering appetites4 ,let them be made to believe that all our volitions are produced by the action and influence of motives1 so that they may not be otherwise than they are2 and a sense of moral obligation and responsibility will be extinguished in their breasts1 unless nature should prove too strong for sophistry4 ,indeed1 if we may believe the most authentic accounts1 this doctrine has done its strange and fearful work among the common people1 both in this country and in ,europe4 ,it is a philosophy which is within the reach of the most ordinary minds1 as well as the most agreeable to the most abandoned hearts2 and hence its awfully desolating power4 ,and if its ravages and devastations have not extended wider and deeper than they have1 it is because they have been checked by the combined powers of nature and of religion1 rather than by logic2 by the happy inconsistency1 rather than by the superior metaphysical acumen1 of its advocates and admirers4 ,,section ,,xiv4 ,,of ,,edwards' ,,idea ,,of ,,liberty4 ,,it was not the design of ,edwards1 as it is well known1 to interfere with the moral agency of man4 ,he honestly believed that the scheme of necessity1 as held by himself1 was perfectly consistent with the doctrine of liberty2 and he retorted upon his adversaries that it was their system1 and not his1 which struck at the foundation of moral agency and accountability4 ,but however upright may have been his intentions1 he has merely left us the name of liberty1 while he has in reality denied to us its nature and its essence4 ,according to his view of the subject1 ,the plain and obvious meaning of the words freedom and liberty1 in common speech1 is the power1 opportunity1 or advantage that any one has to do as he pleases4 ,or1 in other words1 his being free from hindrance or impediment in the way of doing1 or conducting in any respect as he wills4 ,and the contrary to liberty1 whatever name we call that by1 is a person's being hindered1 or unable to conduct as he will1 or being necessitated to do otherwise4 ,this is the kind of liberty for which he contends4 ,and he says1 ,there are two things contrary to what is called liberty in common speech4 ,one is constraint1 otherwise called force1 compulsion1 and co-action1 which is a person's being necessitated to do a thing contrary to his will4 ,the other is restraint2 which is his being hindered1 and not having power to do according to his will4 ,but that which has no will cannot be the subject of these things4 ,this notion of liberty1 as ,edwards says1 presupposes the existence of a will4 ,in fact1 it presupposes more than this2 it presupposes the existence of a determination of the will4 ,for1 unless one is determined not to do a thing1 he cannot be constrained to do it1 contrary to his will2 and1 unless he is determined to do a thing1 he cannot be restrained from doing it according to his will4 ,this kind of liberty1 then1 as it presupposes the existence of a determination of the will1 has nothing to do with the manner in which that determination is brought to pass4 ,if the determination of the mind or will were brought to pass1 so to speak1 by an absolutely irresistible force2 just as any other effect is brought to pass by its efficient cause2 yet this kind of liberty might exist in its utmost perfection4 ,for it only requires that after the will is determined in this manner1 or in any other1 that it should be left free from constraint or restraint1 to flow on just as it has been determined to do4 ,it is no other liberty than that which is possessed by a current of water1 when it is said to flow freely1 because it is not opposed in its course by any material obstruction4 ,that the liberty for which ,edwards contends1 has nothing to do with the manner in which our actions or volitions come to pass2 or1 more properly speaking1 with the kind of relation between motives and actions1 we have his own express acknowledgment4 ,what is vulgarly called liberty1 says he1 namely1 that power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will1 or according to his choice1 is all that is meant by it2 without taking into the meaning of the word any thing of the cause of that choice2 or at all considering how the person came to have such a volition2 whether it was caused by some external motive1 or internal habitual bias2 whether it was determined by some internal antecedent volition1 or whether it happened without a cause2 whether it was necessarily connected with something foregoing1 or not connected4 ,let the person come by his choice ,,any ,,how1 yet if he is able1 and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will1 the man is perfectly free1 according to the primary and common notion of freedom4 ,this notion of liberty1 it is easy to see1 is consistent with the most absolute scheme of fatality of which it is possible to conceive4 ,for1 according to this idea of it1 if we should come by our choice any how1 even by the most irresistible influence of external circumstances1 yet we might be perfectly free4 ,hence it is no wonder that we find the same definition of liberty in the writings of the most absolute fatalists4 ,it is remarkable that ,edwards has taken great pains to define his idea of philosophical necessity1 and to distinguish it from the common sense of the word2 and yet he supposes that the notion of liberty1 about which the same dispute is conversant1 is that which is referred to in common speech1 or that which is vulgarly called liberty4 ,he contends for a philosophical necessity1 and especially for a necessary connexion between the influence of motives and volitions2 but the philosophical liberty which stands opposed to his scheme1 which denies any such necessary connexion1 he has not deemed it worth his while to notice6 ,liberty1 according to ,edwards' sense of the term1 has nothing to do with the controversy respecting free-agency and necessity4 ,it is as consistent with fatalism as could be desired by the most extravagant supporters of that odious system4 ,hence1 when the doctrine of necessity is denied1 and that of liberty or moral agency is asserted1 something more than this is intended4 ,the idea of liberty1 as it stands connected with the controversy in question1 has reference to the manner in which our volitions come to pass1 to the relation which subsists between motives and their corresponding actions4 ,when we say that the will is free1 we mean that it is not necessarily determined by the influence of motives2 we mean to deny the doctrine of moral necessity1 or that the relation which subsists between a motive and its corresponding act1 is not that which subsists between an efficient cause and its effect4 ,we mean to contend for a philosophical liberty1 as ,president ,edwards contends for a philosophical necessity1 and not for that which is vulgarly called liberty4 ,there is an inconsistency1 ,i am aware1 in supposing a choice to be induced by the force of external circumstances1 or by the force of motives1 whether external or internal2 but this inconsistency belongs to the scheme of necessity2 and if ,i have indulged in the supposition for a moment1 it was only to meet the necessitarian1 and argue with him on his own ground4 ,as ,i have already said1 a will that is determined1 instead of determining1 is no will at all4 ,and the liberty of the will for which we contend1 is implied by the power of the mind to ,,act4 ,it does not depend upon the presence or the absence of any external obstruction4 ,it is no such occasional1 or accidental thing2 it is an inherent and essential attribute and power of the mind4 ,no power in the universe1 but that of creation1 can produce it1 and no chains on earth can bind it4 ,the idea of liberty1 as contended for by ,president ,edwards1 is no other than that entertained by ,mr4 ,locke4 ,thus1 says the latter1 there may be thought1 there may be will1 there may be volition1 where there is no liberty4 ,in illustration of this position he says1 ,a man falling into water1 7a bridge breaking under him17 has not herein liberty1 is not a free-agent4 ,for though he has volition1 though he prefers his not falling to falling1 yet the forbearance of that motion not being in his power1 the stop or cessation of that motion follows not upon his volition2 and therefore therein he is not free4 ,it is true1 he is not therein free1 in one of the most common senses of the term2 but it is wrong to conclude from hence1 that there is in such a case1 no liberty4 ,for if the volition1 of which he is said to be possessed1 did not result from the action of any thing1 if it was simply an act of the mind1 which was not necessarily produced by another act1 then he possessed freedom in the philosophical sense of the term4 ,he was free in the act of willing1 in the possession of his volition1 although the consequence of that volition was cut off and prevented by an over-ruling necessity1 which had no conceivable relation to the manner in which he came by his volition4 ,wherever there is a volition1 there is this kind of liberty2 for a volition is not1 and cannot be1 produced by any coercive force4 ,the foregoing illustration might have been very consistently offered by ,president ,edwards1 who considered a volition and a preference of the mind as identically the same2 but it comes not with so good a grace from ,mr4 ,locke4 ,he considered an act of the will as different from a preference4 ,according to his doctrine1 a man might prefer not to fall1 in such a case as that put by himself1 and yet not will not to fall4 ,and he illustrates the difference by saying1 a man would prefer flying to walking1 yet who can say he ever wills it8 ,now1 if a man cannot will to fly1 it is very difficult to see how he can will not to fall1 in case he were dropped from the air4 ,the illustration of ,mr4 ,locke is fallacious4 ,it does not show1 and ,i humbly conceive it cannot be shown1 that there can be a volition anywhere in the universe where there is not freedom4 ,the very idea of a volition1 or an act of the mind1 necessarily implies that kind of philosophical liberty for which we contend4 ,the above notion of liberty1 which ,mr4 ,locke borrowed from ,hobbes1 and ,edwards from ,locke1 evidently confounds the motion of the body1 7which they frequently call action17 with volition or action of the mind4 ,thus1 no matter how a volition comes to pass1 or is caused to exist1 if there is nothing to prevent the motion of the body from following its influence1 we are said to be perfectly free4 ,this kind of liberty1 therefore1 refers to the motion of the body1 and not to the action of the mind4 ,it has no reference whatever to the question1 ,is the mind free in the act of willing8 ,this is the question in dispute2 and hence1 if the necessitarian would say any thing to the purpose1 he must show that his scheme is reconcilable with the freedom of the mind in willing4 ,this ,edwards has not attempted to do4 ,he has1 in fact1 as we have seen1 only given us the name1 while he has taken from us the substance of liberty4 ,the idea of liberty1 for which ,edwards contends1 may be illustrated by an unobstructed fall of water4 ,indeed1 this is the very thing by which ,mr4 ,hobbes has chosen to illustrate and explain it4 ,i conceive liberty to be rightly defined in this manner1 says he2 liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action1 7motion87 that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent1 as for example1 the water is said to descend freely1 or to have liberty to descend by the channel of the river1 because there is no impediment that way1 but not across1 because the banks are impediments1 and though the water cannot ascend1 yet men never say it wants the liberty to ascend1 but the faculty or power1 because the impediment is in the nature of the water1 and intrinsical4 ,mr4 ,hobbes encountered no more difficulty in reconciling this notion of liberty with the scheme of fatality for which he contended1 than ,president ,edwards found in reconciling it with the same scheme in disguise4 ,according to the ,inquiry1 then1 we have no other liberty than that which may be ascribed to the winds and the waves of the sea1 as they are carried onward in their courses by the power of the ,almighty4 ,edwards looks for liberty1 and he finds it1 not in the will1 but in the motions of the body1 which is universally admitted to be passive to the action of the will4 ,he looks for liberty1 and he finds it1 where1 by universal consent1 an absolute necessity reigns2 thus seeking and finding the living among the dead4 ,it is no wonder1 that he could reconcile such a liberty with the scheme of necessity4 ,even ,president ,day is not satisfied with this account of liberty4 ,on the subject of liberty or freedom1 says he1 which occupies a portion of the fifth section of ,edwards' first book1 he has been less particular than was to be expected1 considering that this is the great object of inquiry in his work4 ,how could ,edwards have been more particular8 ,he has repeatedly and most explicitly informed us1 that liberty consists in a power1 or opportunity1 to do as we choose2 without considering how we come by our choice4 ,if we can only do as we choose1 though our choice should be produced by the most absolute and irresistible power in the universe1 yet are we perfectly free in the highest conceivable sense of the word4 ,if any imagine they desire1 and that they conceive of a higher liberty than this1 says he1 they are deceived1 and delude themselves with confused ambiguous words instead of ideas4 ,president ,day complains that all this is not sufficiently particular2 but although he may not have been aware of it1 ,i apprehend that he has been dissatisfied with the dreadful particularity and precision with which the doctrine of the ,inquiry has been exhibited4 ,it is precisely the doctrine of liberty which has been held by the most absolute and unqualified fatalists the world has ever seen2 and it is set forth1 too1 with a bold precision and clearness1 which would have done honour to the stern consistency of ,hobbes himself4 ,it is no wonder1 that ,president ,day should have felt a desire to see such a doctrine softened down by the author of the ,inquiry4 ,the professed object of his book1 says ,president ,day1 according to the title-page1 is an inquiry concerning the freedom of the will2--not the freedom of external conduct4 ,we naturally look for his meaning of this internal liberty4 ,what he has said1 in this section1 respecting freedom of the will1 has rather the appearance of evading such a definition of it as might be considered his own4 ,yes1 it is in this section that we naturally look for his idea of the liberty of the will2 but we do not find it4 ,we must turn to the title-page1 if we wish to see any thing about the liberty of the will4 ,what he has said1 in this section1 respecting freedom of the will1 does not1 7,president ,day himself being judge17 relate to the freedom of the will at all2 it only relates to the freedom of the body1 which has no freedom at all2 but which is wholly passive to the action of the will4 ,president ,day is not satisfied with all this2 and hence1 he proceeds to tell us1 what ,edwards would have said in this section1 if he had not thus evaded his own definition of internal liberty4 ,let us see1 then1 what he would have said4 ,from a letter to a minister of the ,church of ,scotland1 ,president ,day finds that in the phrase conducting as a man pleases1 the author of the ,inquiry means to include the idea of choosing as he pleases4 ,now1 this is all true2 and this is the internal liberty1 which ,president ,day has extracted from the aforesaid letter4 ,then1 according to ,edwards1 we have two kinds of liberty3 the one is a liberty to move the body as we please1 or as we choose2 and the other is1 to choose as we please1 or as we choose4 ,in the vocabulary1 and according to the psychology of ,president ,edwards1 as we have frequently seen1 and as we here see1 our pleasing and our choosing are one and the same thing4 ,hence1 to move our bodies according to our pleasure1 is to move it according to our choice2 and to choose as we please1 is to choose as we choose4 ,president ,day need not have gone to the letter in question1 in order to find this doctrine2 for it is repeatedly set forth in the inquiry4 ,president ,edwards1 as we have seen1 frequently contends in the ,inquiry1 that we always choose as we choose2 and as frequently makes his adversaries assert1 that we can choose without choosing2 which is just as absurd1 he truly declares1 as to say that a body can move while it is in a state of rest4 ,now1 to place liberty in this choosing as we choose1 without regard to the cause or origin of our choice1 is just about as rational as it would be to place it in the axioms of geometry4 ,suppose a man is made to choose1 by an absolute and uncontrollable power2 it is nevertheless true1 that he chooses as he does choose4 ,this cannot be otherwise than true2 it is a self-evident and necessary truth2 for nothing can be different from itself1 can be what it is1 and yet not what it is1 at one and the same time4 ,to speak of a power of choosing as we choose1 as ,edwards and ,day both do1 is just about as reasonable as it were to speak of a power to make two and two equal to four4 ,supposing the ,almighty should cause us to choose1 it is not in his power to prevent us from choosing as we do choose2 for he cannot work contradictions4 ,whether ,president ,edwards speaks of our moving as we please1 or of our choosing as we please2 whether he speaks of an external liberty1 or of this internal liberty2 he is always careful to remind us1 that it has no reference to the question1 how we come by our pleasure or choice4 ,in the letter referred to1 wherein he admits that a man's liberty of conducting as he pleases or chooses1 includes a liberty of choosing as he pleases1 he instantly adds1 but without determining how he came by that pleasure4 ,yes1 no matter how we come by our choice1 though it be wrought into us by the most uncontrollable power in the universe1 yet are we free in the highest conceivable sense of the word1 if we can only conduct according to our choice4 ,this1 instead of being the greatest liberty1 is indeed the greatest mockery1 of which it is possible for the imagination of man to conceive4 ,the liberty of fate itself1 is1 in all respects1 to the full as desirable as such a liberty as this4 ,is it not wonderful1 to behold the great and good author of the ,inquiry1 thus planting himself upon the very ground of atheistical fatalism2 and from thence1 in sober1 serious earnestness1 holding out to us1 as a great and glorious reality1 the mere name and shadow and fiction of liberty8 the very phantom which atheists1 in mockery and derision1 have been pleased to confer upon mankind1 as upon poor blind fools1 who merely dream of liberty1 and fondly dote upon the empty name thereof1 whilst they are ignorant of the chains which bind them fast in fate4 ,,section ,,xv4 ,,of ,,edwards' ,,idea ,,of ,,virtue4 ,,in order to reconcile his scheme of necessity with the existence and reality of virtue1 it appears that ,edwards has adopted a false notion of virtue4 ,this is the course he has taken1 as ,i have already shown1 in regard to the doctrine of liberty or free-agency1 in order to reconcile it with necessity2 and if ,i mistake not1 it may be shown1 that he has been able to reconcile necessity and virtue only by transforming the nature of virtue to make it suit his system4 ,i do not intend1 at present1 to enter into a full discussion of the author's views in relation to the nature of virtue4 ,i shall content myself with a brief consideration of his notion of virtue1 as it stands more immediately and directly connected with the subject of the ,inquiry4 ,it is a fundamental principle with him1 that the essence of the virtue and viciousness of dispositions of the heart1 and acts of the will1 lies not in their cause1 but their nature4 ,in what precise sense the author would have us to understand this proposition1 ,i shall not now stop to inquire4 ,it is sufficient for my present purpose1 that he attaches such a sense to it1 as to make the idea of virtue it is intended to define1 to agree not only with his doctrine of necessity1 but also with any other kind of necessity or fatality whatever4 ,for he maintains1 that as the essence of virtue does not consist in its cause1 but in its nature1 so a man by the mere act of creation may1 in the proper sense of the word1 be endowed with virtuous and holy dispositions4 ,it is true1 the man himself has had no share in the production of his dispositions1 they are exclusively the work of his ,creator2 but yet they are virtuous1 they are the objects of moral approbation1 because the virtuousness of dispositions has nothing at all to do with their cause or origin4 ,it depends wholly on their nature1 and having this nature1 7as he supposes they may have by creation alone17 he concludes that they are properly and truly virtuous1 although the person in whom they exist has in no manner whatever contributed to their production2 neither in whole nor in part1 neither exclusively nor concurrently with his ,maker4 ,now1 it is evident1 ,i think1 that if virtue may be made to exist in this way1 by a power wholly extraneous to the being in whom it exists1 and wholly independent of all his own thoughts and reflections and doings1 then it may be easily reconciled with the most absolute scheme of fatality that has ever been advocated4 ,for it may exist without any agency or concurrence or consent on the part of the person in whom it exists2 and hence1 there would be no difficulty in reconciling it with any scheme of necessity that any fatalist may be pleased to advance4 ,to show that ,i have not misrepresented the author1 ,i shall select from many passages of similar import1 the following from his work on ,original ,sin3--,human nature must be created with some dispositions2 a disposition to relish some things as good and amiable1 and to be averse to other things as odious and disagreeable3 otherwise it must be without any such thing as inclination or will1 perfectly indifferent1 without preference1 without choice or aversion towards any thing as agreeable or disagreeable4 ,but if it had any concreated dispositions at all1 they must be either right or wrong1 either agreeable or disagreeable to the nature of things4 ,if man had at first the highest relish of things excellent and beautiful1 a disposition to have the quickest and highest delight in those things which are most worthy of it1 then his dispositions were morally right and amiable1 and never can be excellent in a higher sense4 ,but if he had a disposition to love most those things that were inferior and less worthy1 then his dispositions were vicious4 ,and it is evident there can be no medium between these4 ,now1 this principle1 that a man may be to praise or to blame1 that he may be esteemed virtuous or vicious1 on account of what he has wholly and exclusively received from another1 appears to me to be utterly irreconcilable with one of the clearest and most unequivocal dictates of reason and conscience4 ,according to the above passage1 there can be no medium between virtuous and vicious dispositions4 ,this sentiment is still more explicitly declared in the following words2 ,in a moral agent1 subject to moral obligations1 it is the same thing to be perfectly innocent1 as to be perfectly righteous4 ,it must be the same1 because there can no more be any medium between sin and righteousness1 or between being right and being wrong1 in a moral sense1 than there can be between being straight and crooked1 in a natural sense4 ,now1 all this is very true1 in regard to a moral being who has been called upon to act2 for he must either live up to the rule of duty1 or he must fall short of it4 ,if he does the former1 he becomes righteous in the true and proper sense of the term2 and if he does the latter1 he loses his original innocence1 and becomes a transgressor4 ,but before he has any opportunity of acting1 at the instant of his creation1 ,i humbly conceive that no moral agent is either to be praised or blamed for any disposition with which he may have been endowed by his ,maker4 ,he is neither virtuous nor vicious1 neither righteous nor sinful4 ,this was the condition of ,adam1 as it very clearly appears to me1 at the instant of his creation4 ,he was in a state of perfect innocency2 having neither transgressed the law of ,god1 nor attained to true holiness4 ,and if this be the case1 then in regard to such a moral agent1 before he has an opportunity to act1 or to think1 or to feel1 it is not the same thing to be perfectly innocent1 as to be1 perfectly righteous2 nor the same thing to be destitute of true righteousness1 as to be sinful4 ,it strikes my mind with the force of a self-evident truth1 that nothing can be our virtue1 unless we are in some sense the author of it2 and to affirm that a man may be justly praised or blamed1 that he may be esteemed virtuous or vicious1 on account of what he has wholly and exclusively received from another1 appears to me to contradict one of the clearest and most unequivocal dictates of reason1 one of the most universal and irreversible laws of human belief4 ,though the ,almighty endowed ,adam with all that is lovely in human nature1 the recipient of such noble qualities certainly deserved no credit for them1 as he had no agency in their production4 ,all the praise and glory belonged to ,god4 ,such dispositions are no doubt the objects of our admiration and love1 but they are no more the objects of our moral approbation than is the beauty of a flower4 ,both are the work of the same creative energy which hath diffused so much of loveliness and beauty over every part of the creation4 ,hence1 ,i deny that ,adam was created or brought into existence righteous4 ,i am willing to admit1 that he was brought into existence capable of acting immediately as a moral agent2 and1 therefore1 he was immediately under a rule of right action4 ,he was obliged as soon as he existed1 to act right4 ,but ,i deny that until he did begin to act1 he could possess the character of true holiness or virtue4 ,that ,president ,edwards thought otherwise1 is evident1 not only from the passage already quoted1 but also from many others1 as well as from the fact1 that he argues if ,adam had not possessed virtuous dispositions before he began to act1--if he had not derived them directly from his ,creator1 then the existence of virtue would have been impossible4 ,on this subject1 his argument is ingenious and plausible4 ,it is as follows3 ,it is agreeable to the sense of men1 in all nations and ages1 not only that the fruit or effect of a good choice is virtuous1 but that the good choice itself from whence that effect proceeds1 is so2 yea1 also the antecedent good disposition1 temper1 or affection of mind1 from whence proceeds that good choice1 is virtuous4 ,this is the general notion--not that principles derive their goodness from actions1 but--that actions derive their goodness from the principles whence they proceed2 so that the act of choosing what is good1 is no further virtuous1 than it proceeds from a good principle1 or virtuous disposition of mind4 ,which supposes that a virtuous disposition of mind1 may be before a virtuous act of choice2 and that1 therefore1 it is not necessary there should first be thought1 reflection1 and choice1 before there can be any virtuous disposition4 ,if the choice be first1 before the existence of a good disposition of heart1 what is the character of that choice8 ,there can1 according to our natural notions1 be no virtue in a choice which proceeds from no virtuous principle1 but from mere self-love1 ambition1 or some animal appetite3 therefore1 a virtuous temper of mind may be before a good act of choice1 as a tree may be before the fruit1 and the fountain before the stream which proceeds from it1 p4 #djg4 ,it is true1 that actions derive their good or evil quality1 as the case may be1 from the principles whence they proceed4 ,this accords1 as the author truly says1 with the universal sentiment of mankind4 ,but this proposition1 plain and simple as it appears to be at first sight1 may be misunderstood4 ,the term principle is ambiguous2 and1 according to the idea attached to it1 the above proposition may be true or false4 ,when it is said1 for example1 that a vicious or sinful action derives its evil quality from the principle or motive whence it proceeds1 ,i apprehend that no one pretends to fix the brand of condemnation on the implanted principle1 or the natural spring of action1 from which it is supposed to proceed4 ,to take the very case in question2 our first parents1 in eating the forbidden fruit1 acted partly from a desire of food and partly from a desire of knowledge4 ,now1 this was a sinful action1 because forbidden1 and consequently1 according to the sense of men in all ages and nations1 it must have proceeded from a sinful inclination or principle4 ,but yet no one1 ,i presume1 will contend that either the desire of food or the desire of knowledge1 from which it is supposed to have proceeded1 is in itself sinful4 ,they were implanted in our nature by the finger of ,god1 for wise and beneficent purposes2 and to assert that they are sinful1 is to make ,god the author of sin4 ,our first parents were not to blame because they were endowed with these principles4 ,hence1 when it is said1 that a sinful action must proceed from a sinful principle1 we are not to understand the proposition as meaning that the inherent constitutional principle of action from which it is supposed to proceed is sinful4 ,our first parents sinned1 not in possessing an appetite for food1 or a desire for knowledge1 but in indulging these contrary to the will of ,god4 ,it was their intention and design to do that which ,god had commanded them not to do1 and which they knew it was wrong for them to do4 ,it was this intention and design1 which was certainly not an implanted principle1 or any part of the work of the ,creator1 which constituted their sin2 and it is this intention and design that is pointed at1 when it is said1 that the principle or motive from which their transgression proceeded1 was a sinful principle or motive4 ,and hence1 we very clearly perceive1 that a sinful action may result from those principles of our constitution1 which are in themselves neither virtuous nor vicious1 which are wholly destitute of any moral character whatever4 ,so1 in like manner1 a virtuous action may result from a principle of our nature1 implanted in the human breast by the ,author of our being1 although such principle may not1 properly speaking1 be called a virtuous principle1 or an object of moral approbation4 ,the fallacy of the author's argument1 ,i conceive1 has arisen from the ambiguity of the term principle4 ,as it is truly said1 that a holy action can proceed only from a holy principle or disposition1 he concluded1 that if man had not been created with a principle of virtue or holiness in his heart1 then no such thing as virtue or holiness could ever have found its way into the world4 ,supposing1 all the time1 that it is universally considered that a virtuous act could proceed only from an implanted principle of virtue1 of which ,god alone is the author2 whereas1 in fact1 the virtuous principle from which the virtuous act is supposed to derive its character1 is not an implanted principle at all1 but the design1 or intention1 or motive with which the act is done2 and of which the created agent is himself the author4 ,there is one thing well worthy of remark in this connexion4 ,president ,edwards contends1 as we have seen1 that ,adam must have been created with a principle of virtue1 of which his ,maker was the sole author1 or else the existence of virtue would have been impossible1 ,and yet1 he contends that ,adam was created perfectly free from sin2--that as he came from the hand of his ,maker1 he was perfectly pure and holy1 without the least stain or blemish of any wrong or vicious principle upon his nature4 ,is it not wonderful1 that it did not occur to so acute a reasoner as the author of the ,inquiry1 that if his own argument was sound1 it would1 according to his own principle1 prove the introduction of sin into the world to be utterly impossible8 ,that he did not see1 if it is impossible to account for the existence of holiness1 except on the supposition that man was created or brought into the world with a principle of holiness implanted in his heart2 so1 for the same reason1 it is equally impossible to account for the existence of sin1 except on the supposition that a sinful principle was implanted in the breast of man by the hand of his ,maker8 ,the above extract1 by which ,edwards endeavours to prove that ,adam could not have performed a virtuous act1 unless a virtuous principle had been planted in his nature by the ,creator1 would be just as correct and conclusive1 if we were to read vicious instead of virtuous4 ,by the very same argument1 we might prove that he could not have sinned1 and so sin would have been impossible1 unless ,god had planted a sinful principle or disposition in his nature4 ,it is sufficiently evident1 that ,president ,edwards' idea of the essence of virtue1 was not altogether correct1 and that he was led to adopt it by the necessities of a false system4 ,for if we admit that the essence of virtue or of sin consists in its nature1 and not in its cause or origin1 it must be conceded1 on the other hand1 that the nature of those principles1 or dispositions1 or volitions1 or habits1 7call them what we may17 which are termed virtuous or vicious1 depend in a very important sense upon their cause or origin4 ,it must be conceded1 that no disposition or principle whatever which has derived its origin wholly from any cause or power extraneous to the moral agent in which it exists1 can be properly denominated virtuous or vicious4 ,it cannot partake of the nature of virtue or of vice1 unless it owes its origin to the agent whose virtue or whose vice it is supposed to be4 ,if it proceeds wholly from the power1 influence1 or action1 of motives1 or from the hand of the ,creator1 it is not the act of the agent in whom it exists1 and consequently he is not accountable for it4 ,or1 in other words1 the nature of virtue and vice is such1 that they cannot possibly be produced by any cause1 or power1 or influence1 which is wholly extraneous to the mind in which they exist4 ,virtue and vice1 in the strict and proper sense of the words1 must have the concurrence and consent of the mind in which they exist1 or they cannot possibly exist at all4 ,to speak of virtue1--of that which deserves our moral approbation1 as being wholly derived from another--as being exclusively the work of ,god in the soul1 is to be guilty of a contradiction1 as plain and palpable as the light of heaven4 ,it is to be regretted1 it is to be deeply lamented1 that ,edwards did not try to bring his doctrine of the will into harmony with the common sentiments of mankind with respect to the nature of virtue and free-agency1 instead of exerting his matchless powers to make virtue and free-agency agree with his scheme of necessity1 by explaining away and transforming their natures4 ,it is to be lamented2 because in attempting to uphold and support the distinctive peculiarities of his own system of theology1 he has unintentionally struck a deadly blow at the vital and fundamental principles of all religion1 both natural and revealed4 ,the infidel and the atheist are much indebted to him for such an exertion of his immortal powers4 ,,section ,,xvi4 ,,of ,,the ,,self-,,determining ,,power4 ,,the advocates of free-agency have contended that the will is determined by itself1 and not by the strongest motive4 ,this is the ground which1 so far as ,i know1 has always been taken against the doctrine of necessity2 but it may be questioned whether it is tenable1 and whether the friends of moral agency might not have made far greater headway against their adversaries if they had not assumed such a position4 ,it appears to be involved in several inevitable contradictions2 in the exposure of which the necessitarian has been accustomed to triumph4 ,the leading argument of ,edwards against the self-determining power may be substantially stated in a few words4 ,the will can be the cause of no effect1 says he1 except by acting1 or putting forth a volition to cause it2 and hence1 if we assert that the will causes its own volitions1 we must suppose it causes them by preceding volitions4 ,it can cause a volition only by a prior volition1 which1 in its turn1 can be caused only by another volition prior to it2 and so on ad infinitum4 ,thus1 according to ,edwards1 the self-determining power of the will necessarily runs out into the absurdity of an infinite series of volitions4 ,if this reasoning is just1 the doctrine in question must be abandoned2 for no sound doctrine can lead to such a conclusion4 ,but is it just8 ,does such an absurdity really flow from the self-determining power of the will8 ,it has been objected to the argument of ,edwards1 that it is based on a false assumption4 ,the position of ,edwards1 that if the will determines itself1 it must determine itself by an act of choice1 is1 it has been contended1 clearly an assumption unsupported1 and incapable of being supported4 ,the reason assigned for this objection is1 that we do not know how any cause exerts itself in the production of phenomena2 and consequently we have no right to assume that the will can cause its volitions only by volitions4 ,in other words1 as we do not know how any cause produces its effects1 so it is wholly a gratuitous assumption to say1 that if the will causes its volitions1 it must cause them in this particular manner1 that is1 by preceding acts of volition4 ,this objection does not seem to be well taken4 ,when we say1 that the will is the cause of any thing1 we do not really mean that the will itself is the cause of it2 for the will itself does not act3 it is not an agent1 it is merely the power of an agent4 ,it is that power by which the mind acts4 ,hence1 when the will is said to cause a thing1 the language must either have no intelligible meaning1 or it must be understood to mean1 that the mind causes it by an exercise of its power of willing4 ,but to say that the mind causes a thing by an exercise of its power of willing1 is to say that it causes it by an act of the will or a volition2 which brings us to the assumption of ,edwards4 ,hence1 if the language that the will causes its own volitions means any thing1 it must mean what ,edwards supposes it does4 ,that is1 if the will causes its volition1 or rather1 if the mind in the act of willing causes them1 then they must be caused by volitions or acts of the will4 ,it is said1 that we do not know how any cause acts4 ,this is very true1 when properly understood2 but in the true sense of this maxim1 ,edwards has not undertaken to explain how a cause acts2 nor has he made any assumption as to how it acts4 ,the term cause has a variety of meanings2 and it is frequently applied with extreme vagueness and want of precision4 ,what is the cause of an effect8--of the motion of the hand1 for example8 ,it is the mind1 says one2 it is the will1 says another2 it is a volition1 replies a third4 ,now here are three distinct things1--the mind1 the will1 and the volition2 and yet each is said to be the cause of the same identical effect4 ,this diversity of expression may do very well in popular discourse1 but it must be laid aside whenever philosophical precision is required4 ,what is then1 really and properly speaking1 the cause of the motion in question8 ,it is neither the mind1 nor the will2 for these might both exist1 and yet no such effect result from them4 ,a mind1 or a will1 that lies still and does not act1 is the cause of no effect4 ,if we would speak with philosophical precision1 then1 we should say that the act of the mind is the cause of the effect in question4 ,the idea of a cause1 in the strict and proper sense of the term1 is that from which the effect immediately and necessarily flows4 ,now the motion of the hand is not necessarily connected with the mind itself2 for if the mind were to lie still and not act1 no such effect would follow4 ,it is with the act of the mind that the effect in question is connected as with its efficient cause4 ,it is the act of the mind which implies the motion of the hand1 and that is implied by it2 and hence1 it is the act of the mind1 or the volition1 that is properly said to be the cause of such motion4 ,for cause and effect1 are said to imply each other4 ,now ,edwards has not pretended to say how a volition acts upon the external part of our being2 if he had done so1 he would have been justly obnoxious to the charge of presuming to know how a cause acts1 in the proper sense of the word2 but he has done no such thing4 ,the connexion between cause and effect1 in the proper sense of the terms1 he has left enveloped in profound mystery4 ,he has not presumed to say how an act1 or cause1 properly so called1 produces its corresponding effect4 ,he does not assume to know how a cause acts2 but how what is sometimes called a cause really becomes such4 ,the will may be called a cause1 if you please2 but1 in reality1 unless it acts1 it is the cause of no effect2 and even then1 properly speaking1 the act is the cause4 ,he clearly saw that a will which lies still and does nothing1 is the cause of no effect2 and hence he stated the simple fact1 that it must act in order to become a cause1 or1 which is the same thing1 in order to produce an effect4 ,and is not this perfectly self-evident8 ,we do not know how the will acts1 nor how its act produces a change in the external part of our being2 but yet do we not certainly know1 that a dormant will can do nothing1 and that it must act in order to produce an effect4 ,if this be to explain how a cause acts1 ,i humbly conceive that we may do so with perfect propriety4 ,indeed1 all that is assumed by ,edwards1 has been conceded to him by most of his adversaries4 ,thus says ,dr4 ,west1 as quoted by ,edwards the younger1 ,no being can become a cause1 i4 e4 an efficient1 or that which produces an effect1 but by first operating1 acting1 or energizing4 ,here we are told1 not how a cause acts1 but how the mind becomes a cause1 or the author of effects4 ,this is all that ,edwards takes for granted2 and1 for aught that ,i can see1 he has done so with perfect propriety4 ,the same thing is conceded by ,dr4 ,reid4 ,the change1 says he1 whether it be of thought1 of will1 or of motion1 is the effect4 ,active power1 therefore1 is a quality in the cause1 which enables it to produce the effect4 ,and the exertion of that active power in producing the effect1 is called action1 agency1 efficiency4 ,in order to the production of any effect1 there must be in the cause1 not only power1 but the exertion of that power4--,essays on the ,active ,powers1 p4 #bei4 ,here it is declared by ,dr4 ,reid1 that active power or the will must act1 in order to produce an effect1 whether the effect be in the mind itself1 or out of the mind1 whether it be of thought1 of will1 or of motion4 ,this is all that ,edwards assumes as the basis of his argument4 ,but the question is not so much what has been conceded1 as what is true4 ,is it true1 then1 that if the will causes its own volitions1 it can cause them only by preceding volitions8 ,it is1 as we have already seen1 according to the common acceptation of the terms2 for a dormant cause can produce no effect2 it must act in order to produce effects4 ,edwards has truly said1 that if the will be determined1 there is a determiner4 ,this must be supposed to be intended even by those that say the will determines itself4 ,if it be so1 the will is both determiner and determined2 it is a cause that acts and produces effects upon itself1 and is the object of its own influence and action4 p4 #ai4 ,now1 whatever may be the meaning of those who choose to affirm that the will determines itself1 admitting that it is both determined and determiner2 the conclusion of ,edwards seems to be fairly drawn from the language in which their doctrine is expressed4 ,to say the least1 he fairly reduces the obvious meaning of their language to the absurdity of an infinite series of volitions4 ,if the phrase1 that the will is determined by itself1 has any meaning1 it must mean1 either that the will is made to act by a preceding act of the will1 or that the will simply acts4 ,if the meaning be1 that the act or choice of the will is produced by a preceding act of the will1 then is the inference of ,edwards well drawn1 and the self-determining power is involved in the aforesaid ad infinitum absurdity4 ,but if the meaning be1 that the will simply acts1 why not present the idea in this its true and unambiguous form8 ,it is evident1 that while the will remains inactive1 it can produce no effect2 it must act1 in order to become the author of effects4 ,the effect caused1 and the causative act1 are clearly distinct2 the one produces the other4 ,if the causative act is a volition1 then we have an infinite series of volitions4 ,and if it be not a volition1 but some other effort of the mind1 the same difficulty arises2 for if it be necessary to suppose a preceding effort of the mind in order to account for a volition1 it will be equally necessary to suppose the existence of another effort to account for that2 and so on ad infinitum4 ,and an infinite series of efforts is just as great an absurdity as an infinite series of volitions4 ,now let us suppose that1 in order to escape these difficulties1 an advocate of the self-determining power should deny that there is any causative act of volition2 but that volition is itself an act uncaused by any preceding act4 ,according to this view1 what does the self-determining power amount to8 ,it amounts to just this1 that the will itself acts1--a position which is as freely recognized by ,edwards as it could possibly be by the warmest advocate of the self-determining power4 ,if this be all that is meant by self-determination1 why not state the simple fact that the will itself acts1 in plain ,english1 instead of going about to envelope it in a mist of words8 ,if this be all that is meant1 why not state the thing so that it may be acquiesced in by the necessitarian1 instead of keeping up such a war of words8 ,indeed1 it appears plain to me1 that the assertion that the will is determined by itself1 is either false doctrine1 or else the language in which it is couched is not a clear and distinct expression of its own meaning4 ,on either supposition1 this mode of expression should be abandoned4 ,i have long been impressed with the conviction1 that the self-determining power1 as it is generally understood1 is full of inconsistencies4 ,while we hold this doctrine1 we cannot with a good grace contend that the motive-determining power is involved in the absurdity of an infinite series of causes2 for we ourselves are involved in it4 ,nor can we very well maintain that a necessary agent is no agent at all2 for the necessitarian will reply1 as he always does1 that according to our own scheme1 our actions are caused2 and hence1 if it be absurd to speak of a caused action1 this is equally true1 whether the cause be intrinsic or extrinsic4 ,moreover1 if we should complain that1 according to the necessitarian1 the phenomena of the will are involved in the mechanism of cause and effect1 he will be sure to reply1 that the same thing is true according to our own scheme1 inasmuch as we admit volition to be an effect1 and place it under the dominion of an internal cause4 ,these difficulties1 as well as some others1 have always encumbered the cause of free and accountable agency2 just because it has been supposed to consist in the self-determining power of the will4 ,we should1 therefore1 abandon this doctrine4 ,if ,clarke1 and ,price1 and ,reid1 and ,west1 have not been able to maintain it without running into such inconsistencies1 it is high time it should be laid aside forever4 ,it has always been taken for granted that the will is determined4 ,the use of this word clearly implies that the will is acted upon1 either by the will itself1 or by something else4 ,it has been conceded1 on all sides1 that it is determined2 and the only controversy has been1 as to what is the determiner4 ,it is determined by the strongest motive1 says one2 it is determined by itself1 says another2 and upon these two positions the combatants have arranged themselves4 ,but behind all this controversy1 there is a question which has not been agitated2 and that is1 whether the will is determined at all8 ,for my part1 ,i am firmly and fully persuaded that it is not1 but that it simply determines4 ,it is the determiner1 but not the determined4 ,it is never the object of its own determination4 ,it acts1 but there is no causative act1 by which it is made to act4 ,this position1 ,i trust1 has been made good in the preceding pages4 ,if we say that the will is determined by itself1 this implies that it is determined in the passive voice1 at the same time that it determines in the active voice2 whereas1 in reality1 it is simply active1 and not passive to the action of any thing1 in its determinations4 ,we should not say1 then1 that the mind is self-determined1 but simply that it is self-active4 ,on this ground we may securely rest in our opposition to the scheme of necessity4 ,it can never be shown that it is involved in the absurdity of an endless series of causes2 it will remain for the necessitarian alone to extricate himself from that absurdity4 ,that the mind is self-active1 ,i have already shown1 by showing that it is absurd to suppose that an act of the mind is produced by the action of any thing upon it4 ,it is right here1 then1 upon the self-activity of the human mind1 that we take our stand1 in order to plant the lever which shall heave the scheme of moral necessity from its foundations4 ,it is right here that we find our stronghold2 that we erect the bulwark and the fortifications of man's free-agency1 against which1 as against a wall of adamant1 all the shafts of the necessitarian will fall blunted to the earth1 or else recoil with destructive force upon himself4 ,but why fight against the doctrine of those who have laboured in the same great cause with myself8 ,truly1 most truly1 not because it is a grateful task1 but because it is a deep and earnest conviction1 wrought into my mind by the meditation of years1 that the great and glorious cause of free-agency has been retarded by some of the errors of its friends1 more than by all the truths of its enemies4 ,this has appeared to be the case especially in regard to the self-determining power of the will4 ,it seems to have retained its hold upon the mind of its friends1 not so much by its intrinsic merits1 as by its denial of moral necessity1 and the idea that it is the only mode of such denial4 ,as the scheme of moral necessity has triumphed in the weakness of the self-determining power1 so has the self-determining power resisted the siege of centuries1 in the unconquerable energy of its opposition to the determining and controlling power of motives4 ,and if both have stood together1 each deriving strength from the weakness of the other1 is it not possible that both may fall together1 and that a more complete and satisfactory scheme of moral agency may arise out of the common ruins8 ,,section ,,xvii4 ,,of ,,the ,,definition ,,of ,a ,,free ,,agent4 ,,having shown1 as ,i trust1 that there is no influence whatever operating upon the mind to produce volition1 ,i am now prepared to declare the true idea of a free-agent4 ,a free-agent1 then1 is one who acts without being caused to act4 ,here the question arises1 ,is such a thing possible8 ,can any being act1 without being caused to act8 ,the answer to this question1 depends upon the meaning which is attached to the very ambiguous term cause4 ,if it means an efficient cause1 or that which produces a thing by prior action or influence1 it is possible for a spirit to act without being caused to do so2 and1 as we have already seen1 if there can be no action without such a cause of its existence1 then there must be an infinite series of actions or causes4 ,but if the question be1 ,can an act arise and come into being1 without a sufficient ground and reason of its existence8 ,i answer1 ,no4 ,it is very necessary to separate the different questions included in the general one1 ,is not a volition caused8 or has it not a cause8 and to pass upon them separately4 ,there is1 ,i admit1 a sufficient ground and reason for our actions2 but not an efficient cause of them4 ,this is the all-important distinction which has been overlooked in the present controversy4 ,edwards frequently asks1 if a volition is without a cause8 ,now we call for a division of this question4 ,has volition an efficient cause8 ,i answer1 ,no4 ,has it a sufficient ground and reason of its existence8 ,i answer1 ,yes4 ,no one ever imagined that there are no indispensable antecedents to choice1 without which it could not take place2 but ,edwards has framed this question in such a manner1 that we cannot give a categorical answer to it1 without either denying our own doctrine1 or else subscribing to his4 ,unless there were a mind1 there could be no act of the mind2 and unless the mind possessed a power of acting1 it could not put forth volitions4 ,the mind1 then1 and the power of the mind called will1 constitute the ground of action or volition4 ,but a power to act1 it will be said1 is not a sufficient reason to account for the existence of action4 ,this is true4 ,the reason is to come4 ,the sufficient reason1 however1 is not an efficient cause2 for there is some difference between a blind impulse or force1 and rationality4 ,the mind is endowed with various appetites1 passions1 and desires1--with noble affections1 and1 above all1 with a feeling of moral approbation and disapprobation4 ,these are not the active principles1 or the motive powers1 as they have been called2 they are the ends of our acting3 we simply act in order to gratify them4 ,they exert no influence over the will1 much less is the will controlled by them2 and hence1 we are perfectly free1 to gratify the one or the other of them2--to act in obedience to the dictates of conscience1 or in order to gratify the lowest appetites of our nature4 ,we see that certain means must be used1 in order to gratify the passion1 desire1 affection1 or feeling1 which we intend to gratify2 and we act accordingly4 ,in all this1 we form our designs or intentions free from all influence whatever3 nothing acts upon the will3 we fix upon the end1 and we choose the means to accomplish it4 ,we adapt the means to our end2 because there is a fitness in them to accomplish that end or design2 and because1 as rational creatures1 we perceive that fitness4 ,thus1 we act according to reason1 but not from the influence of reason4 ,we act with a view to our desires1 but not from the influence of our desires2 and our volition is virtuous or vicious according to the intention with which it is put forth1--according to the design with which it is directed4 ,passion is not the gale1 it is the card4 ,reason is not the force1 it is the law4 ,all the power resides in the free1 untrammelled will4 ,he who overlooks this1 and blindly seeks for something to move the mind to volition1 loses sight of the grand and distinctive peculiarity of man's nature1 and brings it down to the dust1 subjecting it to the laws of matter and to bondage4 ,we do not allow ,mr4 ,hobbes to declare our idea of a free-agent1 as one that1 when all the circumstances necessary to produce action are present1 can nevertheless not act2 nor do we accept of the amendment1 of another1 that a free-agent is one who1 when all the circumstances necessary to produce action are present1 can act4 ,for if all the circumstances necessary to produce action are present1 then they would produce it2 and nothing would be left for the will to do1 except to receive the producing influence4 ,in other words1 if volition is produced by circumstances1 then it is a passive impression made upon the will1 and not an act at all4 ,it is contended by ,edwards1 that it is just as absurd to say1 that a volition can come into existence without a cause1 as it is that a world should do so4 ,it is true1 that a world cannot arise out of nothing1 and come into existence of itself2 and this is also equally true of a volition4 ,but is the mind nothing8 ,is the will nothing8 ,is a free1 intelligent1 designing cause nothing8 ,the mind is something2 and it is capable of acting in order to fulfil its own designs1 though it be not impelled to act4 ,is this idea absurd8 ,is it self-contradictory8 ,is it any thing like the assertion1 that an effect has no cause8 ,it is not4 ,it implies no contradiction2--it is a possible idea4 ,how does it act1 then8 ,i do not know4 ,this is a mystery4 ,indeed1 every ultimate fact in man's nature1 and every simple exercise of his intellectual powers1 is a mystery4 ,an exercise of the power of conception1 by which the past is called up1 and made to pass in review before us2 an exercise of the imagination1 by which the world is made to teem with wonders of our own creation2 and an exercise of the will1 by which we produce changes in1 the external world2 are all mysteries8 ,now1 shall we fly from these mysteries8 ,shall we strive to make the matter plain1 in a single instance1 by assigning an efficient cause to an act of the will8 ,if so1 whether we escape the mystery or not1 we shall certainly plunge into absurdity4 ,we shall embrace a doctrine1 which denies the nature of action1 and which is necessarily involved in the great absurdity of an infinite series of causes4 ,for my part1 ,i prefer a simple statement of the fact of volition1 with its attendant circumstances1 how much soever of mystery it may seem to leave around the subject1 to any explanation which involves it in absurdity4 ,the philosophers of all ages have sought for the efficient cause of volition2 but who has found it8 ,is it in the will8 ,the necessitarian has shown the absurdities of this hypothesis4 ,is it in the power of motive8 ,this hypothesis is fraught with the very same absurdities4 ,is it in the uncaused volition of ,deity8 ,the younger ,edwards could do nothing with this hypothesis4 ,in truth1 the efficient cause of volition is nowhere4 ,it has never been found1 because it does not exist2 and it never will be found1 so long as an action of mind continues to be what it is4 ,this1 then1 is the true idea of a free-agent3 it is one who1 in view of circumstances1 both external and internal1 can act1 without being efficiently caused to do so4 ,this is the idea of a free-agent which ,god has realized by the creation of the soul of man4 ,it may be a mystery2 but it is not a contradiction4 ,it may be a mystery2 but then it solves a thousand difficulties which we have unnecessarily created to ourselves4 ,it may be a mystery2 but then it is the only safe retreat from self-contradiction1 absurdity1 and atheism4 ,it is no reason for disbelieving a thing1 that we cannot conceive how it is4 ,this will be readily admitted2 but this principle1 like every other1 may be misapplied and abused4 ,if any thing is possible in itself considered1 that is1 if it implies no contradiction1 we should not refuse to believe it1 because we cannot conceive how it is4 ,when confined within these limits1 the principle or maxim in question is one of immense importance2 and to disregard it betrays one of the greatest weaknesses to which the human mind is exposed4 ,if we do not adhere to it1 there is no resting-place for us this side of the most unqualified atheism3 we shall be compelled to renounce1 not only the stupendous facts and mysteries of revelation1 but also all the great truths of natural religion4 ,the very being and attributes of ,god can find no place in our minds1 if we expunge this principle from them2 and insist upon seeing how every thing is1 before we consent to receive it as an object of belief4 ,we should find no difficulty1 therefore1 in believing that the mind of man acts1 without being efficiently caused to act4 ,this implies no contradiction2 and hence the creative power of ,god can produce such a being--a being that acts freely1 without labouring under any necessity1 either natural or moral1 in its accountable and moral agency4 ,a being1 the end of whose action is found in the sensibility2 the intention1 the design1 and the plan of whose action is formed in the intelligence2 and the power by which this intention is executed1 and this plan accomplished1 is in the will alone4 ,it is in this triunity of the sensibility1 the intelligence1 and the will1 that the glory of man's nature1 as a free and accountable being1 consists4 ,the relation between them is most intimate1--is inconceivably intimate2 but the relation is not the same in nature and kind as that which subsists between an effect and its efficient1 or producing cause4 ,the only relation of this kind1 which is to be found in the case1 is that which subsists between the action of the will1 or the volition1 and the corresponding change which it produces in the external part of our being4 ,i say1 we can very easily believe all this1 as it implies no contradiction2 and yet not feel ourselves bound1 by a regard for consistency1 to believe that a world may rise up out of nothing1 and come into being of itself1 without any cause of its existence4 ,these things are blended together1 in the philosophy of the necessitarian1 by a most convenient use of an ambiguous phraseology2 but they are1 indeed1 as widely different from each other as mystery is from absurdity1--as light is from darkness4 ,but the above maxim1 as ,i have already said1 may be grievously misapplied2 and thus the garb of intellectual humility may be thrown over the greatest absurdities4 ,we may be told1 for example1 that the same body may be wholly in one place1 and wholly in a far distant place1 at one and the same time2 and1 if we object to this doctrine1 the murmurings of reason are sought to be silenced1 by reminding us1 that it is exceedingly weak and presumptuous for poor blind creatures like ourselves1 to reject a truth because we cannot conceive how it is4 ,in like manner1 we are informed that a volition1 or an act of the will1 may be produced in the mind1 may be necessitated1 by the action of an extraneous cause2 or1 if you please1 of an intrinsic cause2 and if we ask how this can be1 without interfering with our free-agency1 it is frequently replied1 that we cannot tell2 but that it is exceedingly absurd and presumptuous to disbelieve a thing because we cannot conceive how it is4 ,that ,god operates upon the mind1 not to rectify and elevate its powers1 but to produce a volition in it2 not to cleanse and purify the whole stream and current of our natures1 but merely to throw up a bubble upon the surface thereof1 for which effect he holds us accountable3 that he does this1 we are told1 is a great mystery1 which we should not presume to call in question4 ,for my part1 ,i had rather believe the doctrine of transubstantiation itself1 than such a mystery as this4 ,there is some difference1 ,i have supposed1 between disbelieving a thing because we cannot see how it is1 and disbelieving it1 because we very clearly see that it cannot possibly be any how at all4 ,it is upon this distinction that ,i stand1 when ,i receive the great mysteries of the ,godhead1 and reject the absurdities of transubstantiation4 ,and it is upon the same ground1 that ,i most freely and fully recognize and embrace the great mysteries of our being1 whilst ,i reject the absurdities of an efficiently caused and accountable agency4 ,is not this distinction properly applied8 ,if the action or influence of any thing produces an effect upon the mind1 is not that effect merely a passive impression8 ,is it not absurd to suppose1 that it is a passive impression1 produced by the action of something else1 and yet that it is an action of the mind itself8 ,if so2 and so ,i think it has been made to appear1 then we not only should1 but must1 reject it4 ,we must reject it1 unless we suffer ourselves to be blinded by false analogies1 and verbal ambiguities4 ,this is not to deny the divine influence1 as has been so often imagined4 ,the regeneration1 the new creation1 of the soul1 by the power of ,god1 is no more inconsistent with free and accountable agency1 than was the original creation of it with all its powers2 but this cannot be said of the production of our acts or volitions by a divine influence4 ,those must take an exceedingly narrow and superficial view of the great work of regeneration2 who suppose that it is altogether denied1 unless we admit that the ,spirit produces our volitions2 who suppose that the divine agency can in no way cleanse and purify our powers1 unless it can superinduce a volition1 or an act1 upon our depraved natures4 ,how many persons have laboured in vain1 to reconcile the free-agency of man with the reality of a divine influence2 just because they have laboured under the superficial notion1 the grand illusion1 that the ,spirit of ,god cannot act upon the mind at all1 unless it acts to produce a volition6 ,it is no wonder that they have laboured in vain1 and abandoned the task in despair2 because what they have taken for a seeming difficulty1 is1 when narrowly inspected1 seen to be a real absurdity4 ,lay this aside1 and there will be a mystery in the case1 it is true2 but there will not be even a seeming contradiction4 ,but ,i do not intend to enter upon the subject of theology4 ,this is entirely beside the purpose of the present work2 and if ,i have touched upon it for a moment1 it was only to show1 by a passing glance1 how very easy it were for any one1 if he were so disposed1 to draw false conclusions with respect to theology1 from the views which have been advanced in regard to the philosophy of the will4 ,true1 philosophy and religion will always perfectly harmonize2 but then he is very apt to be a poor philosopher1 who derives his philosophy from his religion2 and he a miserable theologian1 who derives his religion from his philosophy4 ,it was in that way1 that ,edwards became a necessitarian2 it is in this1 that many a necessitarian has become an infidel or an atheist4 ,,section ,,xviii4 ,,of ,,the ,,testimony ,,of ,,consciousness4 ,,whether our volitions come to pass in the manner we call freely1 or are brought to pass by the operation of necessary causes1 is a question of fact1 which should be referred to the tribunal of consciousness4 ,if we ever hope to settle this question1 we must occasionally turn from the arena of dialectics1 and unite our efforts in the cultivation of the much-neglected field of observation4 ,we must turn from the dust and smoke of mere logical contention1 and consult the living oracle within2 we must behold the pure light that ever burns behind the darkened veil of disputation4 ,this appeal is not declined by the necessitarian4 ,he consents to the appeal2 and the dispute is1 as to the true interpretation of the decision of the tribunal in question4 ,we contend that the testimony of consciousness is clearly and unequivocally in favour of the doctrine of liberty1 while our opponents allege the same evidence in their own favour4 ,now1 what is the real import of this testimony8 ,it is to be regretted that ,president ,edwards has said so little on this subject4 ,he has disposed of it in one brief note2 as if the nature of our mental operations were to be determined by abstract and universal propositions1 or truisms1 and observation consulted only to confirm our preconceived opinions4 ,what little he has said on this subject1 however1 is sufficient to show with what faint hope of success the necessitarian can venture to submit his cause to the tribunal of consciousness4 ,the testimony of consciousness1 ,i have no doubt1 might have been made much stronger in our favour1 if the wrong question had not been submitted to it4 ,all the advocates of free-agency1 so far as ,i remember1 have said that we are conscious of freedom2 that we are conscious of a power of contrary choice4 ,or1 in other words1 that when we put forth a volition1 we are conscious that we might forbear to do so4 ,but this does not seem to be the case4 ,we are not conscious of what does not take place in our minds2 and hence1 we are only conscious of the volition which we put forth4 ,we are not even conscious of our power to act2 this is necessarily inferred from the acts of which we are conscious4 ,as we do not then1 according to the supposition1 put forth the contrary choice1 we cannot be conscious of it1 nor of the power to put it forth4 ,by referring this1 therefore1 to the tribunal of consciousness1 it seems to me that most advocates of free-agency have rendered a disservice to the cause which they have so ably supported in other respects4 ,for the necessitarian sees1 that the doctrine of liberty1 or the power of choice to the contrary1 cannot be established by the direct testimony of consciousness alone2 and hence he strengthens himself in his own convictions1 by picking flaws in our evidence4 ,he sees that we are not borne out by the testimony of consciousness1 in regard to the point which we submit to it2 and hence1 he readily concludes that we are wrong in the whole matter4 ,it is well1 it is exceedingly important1 to observe what are the strong points of our cause1 upon which we can rest with unshaken confidence1 and to take our stand upon them2 giving up all untenable positions4 ,by consciousness1 then1 we discover the existence of an act4 ,we see no cause by which it is produced4 ,if it were produced by the act or operation of any thing else1 it would be a passive impression1 and not an act of the mind itself4 ,the mind would be wholly passive in relation to it1 and it would not be an act at all4 ,whether it is produced by a preceding act of the mind1 or by the action of any thing else1 the mind would be passive as to the effect produced4 ,but we see1 in the clear and unquestionable light of consciousness1 that instead of being passive1 the mind is active in its volitions4--,hence1 it follows by an inference as clear as noonday1 and as irresistible as fate1 that the action of the mind is not a produced effect4 ,it is not a passive impression2 and hence it does not1 it cannot1 result from the action of any thing else4 ,to say that it is produced by the action of something else upon the mind1 is to say that it is a passive impression1 and to deny that it is an act4 ,we are simply conscious of an act then1 and the irresistible inference which results from this fact1 stands out in direct and eternal opposition to the doctrine of necessity4 ,when we reflect upon the operation of the will1 or of the mind in the act of willing1 we simply find ourselves in possession of a volition4 ,we do not see how we come by this volition2 how we come to exist in this state of activity4 ,on this point1 ,i am happy to find that the consciousness of ,president ,edwards agreed with my own4 ,it is true1 says he1 ,i find myself possessed of my volitions before ,i can see the effectual power of any cause to produce them1 for the power and efficacy of the cause is seen but by the effect1 and this1 for aught ,i know1 may make some imagine that volition has no cause1 or that it produces itself4 ,our consciousness is precisely the same2 but just observe how he interprets it4 ,he finds himself possessed of a volition2 but does he look at this volition to see what it is8 ,does he ask himself whether it is the same in nature and in kind with a produced effect8 ,he does not4 ,it is most unquestionably a produced effect2 this is beyond all doubt1 and it is taken for granted4 ,he sees no effectual power by which this volition is produced2 but he knows it is a produced effect1 and therefore he knows it must have a producing cause4 ,the oracle is not consulted on this point at all4 ,it would be an insult to reason to consult the great oracle of nature on so plain a point as this4 ,this has been decided long ago1 and the ear is deaf to any response that might possibly contravene so clear a decision4 ,thus it is that the necessitarian goes to the true oracle within1 and delivers oracles himself4 ,he reasons not from the observed1 but from the assumed1 nature of a volition4 ,it must be an effect1 says he1 and though ,i do not see the effectual power by which it is produced2 yet there must be such a power4 ,yes1 it is just as absurd to suppose that it can exist1 without being produced by the effectual power of something operating upon the mind1 as it is to suppose that a world can create itself6 ,but as we appeal to consciousness1 let us pay some little attention to its teaching4 ,we find ourselves1 then1 possessed of a volition2 we find our minds in a state of acting4 ,this is all we discover by the light of consciousness4 ,we see not the effectual power of any cause operating to produce it4 ,what shall we conclude then8 ,shall we conclude that there must be some cause to produce it8 ,this were not to study nature1 as the humble servants and interpreters thereof2 but to approach it in the attitude of dictators4 ,if we draw such an inference at all1 it must be from the fact1 it seems1 that volition is a produced effect4 ,but is it such an effect8 ,what says consciousness upon this point8 ,we have already repeatedly seen1 what every man may see1 that a volition is not the passive result of any prior action2 it is action itself4 ,it is not a produced effect2 it is a producing cause4 ,it is not determined at all2 it is simply a determination4 ,as it stands out in the light of consciousness1 it is as perfectly distinct from the idea of an effect1 as any one thing can possibly be from another2 and if it has not so appeared to every reflecting mind1 it is because it has not been simply looked at1 and beheld as it is in itself1 but has been viewed through the medium of a certain fixed notion1 a certain preconceived form of thought1 a certain grand illusion1 by which the witchery of the senses has blinded the eye of consciousness4 ,every change in the external world requires a producing cause2 who then can possibly conceive of a volition as existing upon any other terms or conditions6 ,it is this fallacy1 this begging of the question1 this perpetual declaration that it is self-evident1 that has1 through a natural illusion of the senses1 spread the scheme of necessity far and wide over the minds of men4 ,it is this grand illusion of the senses1 or1 if you please1 of the mind1 that has brought the dictates of reason1 as they have been called1 into conflict with the testimony of consciousness4 ,the doctrine of liberty is as inevitably connected with the observed nature of a volition1 as that of necessity is connected with its assumed nature4 ,i would not say that we are conscious of liberty2 for that would not be correct2 but ,i will say1 that we are conscious of that which necessarily leads to the conviction that we are free1 that we have a power of contrary choice4 ,i would not say with ,dr4 ,clarke1 that liberty consists in a power to act2 but ,i will say1 that it necessarily results from it4 ,i would not say1 that we are conscious of the existence of no producing cause of our volitions2 for we cannot be conscious of that which does not exist4 ,but ,i will say1 that as we are conscious of the existence of an act1 so we see and do know that this is not a passive impression1 or a produced effect4 ,and as we are not compelled to act1 so we know that we may act or may not act1 so we know that our actions are not necessitated1 but may be put forth or withheld4 ,this is liberty1 this is a power of contrary choice4 ,this idea of liberty1 ,i say1 follows from the fact of consciousness that we do act1 by an inference as clear as noonday2 by an inference so natural1 so direct1 and so inconceivably rapid1 that it has often been supposed to be included in the testimony of consciousness itself4 ,no man could help the conclusion1 if he would only allow his reason to speak for itself4 ,is this doctrine any the less certain1 because it is a matter of inference8 ,it will be conceded that it is not4 ,the most unquestionable facts in the universe are made known by the same kind of evidence4 ,it is sometimes said1 that we are conscious of our own existence2 but this is not to use language with philosophical precision4 ,we are merely conscious of the existence of thought1 of feeling1 of volition2 and we are so made1 that we are compelled to believe that there is something which thinks1 and feels1 and wills4 ,it is thus1 by what has been called a fundamental law of belief1 that we arrive at the knowledge of the existence of our minds4 ,in like manner1 from the fact of consciousness that we do act1 or put forth volitions1 we are forced1 by a fundamental law of belief1 to yield to the conviction that we are free4 ,this inference as necessarily results from the observed phenomena of the mind1 as the existence of the mind itself results from the same phenomena4 ,and if the doctrine of the necessitarian were true1 that volition is a produced effect1 we should never infer from it that we have a power of acting at all2 we should simply infer that we are susceptible of passive impressions4 ,i have said1 that we are not conscious that there is no producing cause of volition4 ,no man can be conscious of that which does not exist4 ,hence1 it is highly absurd to require us to furnish the evidence of consciousness that there is no such cause of volition4 ,it cannot testify to any such universal negative2 and one might as well require a mathematical demonstration of the point in dispute1 as to demand such evidence from us4 ,and yet1 ,president ,edwards declares1 that by experience he knows nothing like the doctrine1 that any volition arises in his mind contingently2 that is to say1 he was not conscious that a volition has no producing cause of its existence4 ,did he expect that we should prove the non-existence of a thing by the direct evidence of consciousness8 ,all that he could reasonably expect in such a case is1 that we should not be conscious of any such influence2 and this ,president ,edwards himself admits4 ,he admits1 that we do not see the effectual power of any cause1 or feel its influence1 operating to produce a volition3 he merely infers this from the assumption that volition is a produced effect4 ,he also says1 ,i find that the acts of my will are my own2 i4 e4 that they are acts of my will--the volitions of my own mind2 or1 in other words1 that what ,i will1 ,i will2 which1 ,i suppose1 is the sum of what others experience in this affair4 ,surely1 no one was ever so silly as to deny that what a man wills1 he wills2 and if this is all that consciousness teaches on the subject1 its information can throw no light upon this or upon any other controversy4 ,this proposition1 that a man wills what he wills1 is independent of all experience and all consciousness4 ,it is an identical proposition1 which experience can neither shake nor confirm4 ,we may see1 nay1 we must see1 that each and every thing in the universe is what it is1 without any reference to consciousness or experience4 ,indeed1 it is as absurd to appeal to experience or consciousness for the truth of such a universal and self-evident axiom1 as it is to appeal to universal and self-evident axioms1 to ascertain and determine the nature of our mental phenomena1--of the states and processes of the mind4 ,edwards has done both3 he has deduced the truth of the proposition1 that a man wills what he wills1 from the evidence of consciousness or experience1 as the sum of all its teaching2 and he has established the fact1 that a volition is produced by the operation of an effectual power1 by an appeal to a universal axiom4 ,he has submitted a truism1 which declines every test of its truth1 to the tribunal of consciousness2 and he has determined the nature of a volition1 as well as the manner of its production1 by the application of a similar truism1 which contains no conceivable information respecting the nature of any thing in the universe4 ,edwards says1 ,i find myself possessed of my volitions4 ,he was conscious of his own acts4 ,this is a sufficient foundation for the doctrine of liberty2 for such a consciousness is utterly irreconcilable with the supposition that those acts are produced by the operation of efficient causes4 ,to say that they are my acts1 and yet to say that they are produced by the action of something else1 is1 as we have repeatedly seen1 to say that they are my acts1 and at the same time to say that they are not my acts1 but effects produced upon my mind4 ,this very admission1 therefore1 lays the foundation of the doctrine of liberty4 ,and hence1 it has been supposed that ,edwards himself was an advocate of this doctrine2 because he has spoken of the soul as exerting its own volitions4 ,from such an admission1 it has been concluded by some of his admirers1 that he really regarded the mind as the efficient cause of its own acts1 and motives as merely the occasions on which it acts4 ,but such an admission only proves1 that his consciousness cannot be reconciled with his theory4 ,his consciousness lays the foundation of liberty2 but he does not build thereon4 ,on the contrary1 he lays the foundation of his system in universal abstractions1 and not in observed facts2 and hence1 as it is not derived from an observation of nature1 so it can never be brought into harmony with the dictates and operations of nature4 ,it is altogether a thing of definitions and words2 and as such it must pass away1 when men shall cease to construct for themselves1 and come forward as the humble servants and interpreters of nature1 to study the world of mind upon the true principles of the inductive method4 ,edwards did not observe the intellectual world just as it has been constructed by the ,almighty1 and narrowly watch it in its workings2 he only reasoned about it and about it2 and hence1 he was necessarily devoted to blindness4 ,with all his gigantic power1 he was necessarily compelled to go around1 eternally1 upon the treadmill of a merely dialectical philosophy1 which of itself can yield no fruit1 instead of going forth to the harvest upon the rich and boundless field of discovery4 ,why should the failure of other times1 resulting from such a course1 inspire us with despair8 ,we hope for better results1 not from better minds1 but from better methods4 ,socrates dissuaded the men of his time from the study of nature1 alleging that the wonderful art wherewith the heavens had been constructed1 was concealed from their eyes2 and that it was displeasing to the gods1 that men should so vainly strive to pry into mysteries which are so far above their reach4 ,faint-hearted sage6 ,though ,bacon had beheld the genius and labour of two thousand years after ,socrates had been laid in the dust1 wasted upon the same great problem1 yet did not the unconquerable ardour of his hope droop for a moment4 ,rising aloft1 even from the wild waste which men had made of their powers in all times past1 he poured down the floods of his indignation upon those who are thus ready and willing to devote mankind to darkness and despair4 ,inspired by his philosophy1 and pursuing his method1 the more than immortal ,newton did not fear1 cautiously yet boldly1 humbly yet hopefully1 to pry into the wonderful art wherewith the ,almighty has constructed the heavens2 and the great problem which ,socrates had so timidly1 yet so rashly1 pronounced to lie beyond the reach of man1 did this humble student of nature most triumphantly solve2 showing1 to the admiration of the world and the glory of ,god1 that that wonderful art is infinitely more wonderful than any thing which had ever been dreamed of in the philosophy of antiquity4 ,how great soever1 then1 the failure of times past may have been1 we should not despair4 ,nor should we listen1 for a moment1 to those who are ever ready to declare1 that the great problem of the intellectual system of the universe is not within the reach of the human faculties4 ,note4--,the edition of ,edwards' works quoted in this volume1 is that by ,g4 ,c4 ,h4 ,carvill1 ,new ,york1 #ahcj4