,ontology ,or the ,theory of ,being ,by ,peter ,coffey1 ,ph4,d4 7,louvain7 ,professor of ,logic and ,metaphysics1 ,waynooth ,college1 ,ireland ,longmans1 ,green and ,co4 ,london1 ,new ,york1 ,bombay1 ,calcutta1 and ,madras #aiah ,,contents ,preface4 ,general ,introduction4 ,chapter ,i4 ,being ,and ,its ,primary ,determinations4 ,chapter ,,ii4 ,becoming ,and ,its ,implications4 ,chapter ,,iii4 ,existence ,and ,essence4 ,chapter ,,iv4 ,reality ,as ,one ,and ,manifold4 ,chapter ,v4 ,reality ,and ,the ,true4 ,chapter ,,vi4 ,reality ,and ,the ,good4 ,chapter ,,vii4 ,reality ,and ,the ,beautiful4 ,chapter ,,viii4 ,the ,categories ,of ,being4 ,substance ,and ,accident4 ,chapter ,,ix4 ,nature ,and ,person4 ,chapter ,x4 ,some ,accident-,modes ,of ,being3 ,quality4 ,chapter ,,xi4 ,quantity1 ,space ,and ,time4 ,chapter ,,xii4 ,relation2 ,the ,relative ,and ,the ,absolute4 ,chapter ,,xiii4 ,causality2 ,classification ,of ,causes4 ,chapter ,,xiv4 ,efficient ,causality2 ,phenomenism ,and ,occasionalism4 ,chapter ,,xv4 ,final ,causes2 ,universal ,order4 ,index4 ,footnotes ,to ,the ,students ,past ,and ,present ,of ,maynooth ,college ,,preface4 ,it is hoped that the present volume will supply a want that is really felt by students of philosophy in our universities--the want of an ,english text-book on ,general ,metaphysics from the ,scholastic standpoint4 ,it is the author's intention to supplement his ,science of ,logic7#a7 and the present treatise on ,ontology1 by a volume on the ,theory of ,knowledge4 ,hence no disquisitions on the latter subject will be found in these pages3 the ,moderate ,realism of ,aristotle and the ,schoolmen is assumed throughout4 ,in the domain of ,ontology there are many scholastic theories and discussions which are commonly regarded by non-scholastic writers as possessing nowadays for the student of philosophy an interest that is merely historical4 ,this mistaken notion is probably due to the fact that few if any serious attempts have yet been made to transpose these questions from their medieval setting into the language and context of contemporary philosophy4 ,perhaps not a single one of these problems is really and in substance alien to present-day speculations4 ,the author has endeavoured1 by his treatment of such characteristically 8medieval0 discussions as those on ,potentia and ,actus1 ,essence and ,existence1 ,individuation1 the ,theory of ,distinctions1 ,substance and ,accident1 ,nature and ,person1 ,logical and ,real ,relations1 ,efficient and ,final ,causes1 to show that the issues involved are in every instance as fully and keenly debated--in an altered setting and a new terminology--by recent and living philosophers of every school of thought as they were by ,st4 ,thomas and his contemporaries in the golden age of medieval scholasticism4 ,and1 as the purposes of a text-book demanded1 attention has been devoted to stating the problems clearly1 to showing the significance and bearings of discussions and solutions1 rather than to detailed analyses of arguments4 ,at the same time it is hoped that the treatment is sufficiently full to be helpful even to advanced students and to all who are interested in the 8,metaphysics of the ,schools04 ,for the convenience of the reader the more advanced portions are printed in smaller type4 ,the teaching of ,st4 ,thomas and the other great ,schoolmen of the ,middle ,ages forms the groundwork of the book4 ,this corpus of doctrine is scarcely yet accessible outside its ,latin sources4 ,as typical of the fuller scholastic text-books the excellent treatise of the ,spanish author1 ,urraburu17#b7 has been most frequently consulted4 ,much assistance has also been derived from ,kleutgen's ,philosophie der ,vorzeit17#c7 a monumental work which ought to have been long since translated into ,english4 ,and finally1 the excellent treatise in the ,louvain ,cours de ,philosophie1 by the present ,cardinal ,archbishop of ,mechlin17#d7 has been consulted with profit and largely followed in many places4 ,the writer freely and gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness to these and other authors quoted and referred to in the course of the present volume4 ,,general ,,introduction4 ,i4 ,,reason ,,of ,,introductory ,,chapter4--,it is desirable that at some stage in the course of his investigations the student of philosophy should be invited to take a brief general survey of the work in which he is engaged4 ,this purpose will be served by a chapter on the general aim and scope of philosophy1 its distinctive characteristics as compared with other lines of human thought1 and its relations to these latter4 ,such considerations will at the same time help to define ,ontology1 thus introducing the reader to the subject-matter of the present volume4 ,,ii4 ,,philosophy3 ,,the ,,name ,,and ,,the ,,thing4--,in the fifth book of ,cicero's ,tusculan ,disputations we read that the terms philosophus and philosophia were first employed by ,pythagoras who flourished in the sixth century before ,christ1 that this ancient sage was modest enough to call himself not a 8wise man0 but a 8lover of wisdom0 71 71 and his calling not a profession of wisdom but a search for wisdom4 ,however1 despite the disclaimer1 the term philosophy soon came to signify wisdom simply1 meaning by this the highest and most precious kind of knowledge4 ,now human knowledge has for its object everything that falls in any way within human experience4 ,it has extensively a great variety in its subject-matter1 and intensively a great variety in its degrees of depth and clearness and perfection4 ,individual facts of the past1 communicated by human testimony1 form the raw materials of historical knowledge4 ,then there are all the individual things and events that fall within one's own personal experience4 ,moreover1 by the study of human language 7or languages71 of works of the human mind and products of human genius and skill1 we gain a knowledge of literature1 and of the arts--the fine arts and the mechanical arts4 ,but not merely do we use our senses and memory thus to accumulate an unassorted stock of informations about isolated facts3 a miscellaneous mass of mental furniture which constitutes the bulk of human knowledge in its least developed form--cognitio vulgaris1 the knowledge of the comparatively uneducated and unreflecting classes of mankind4 ,we also use our reasoning faculty to reflect1 compare1 classify these informations1 to interpret them1 to reason about them1 to infer from them general truths that embrace individual things and events beyond our personal experience2 we try to explain them by seeking out their reasons and causes4 ,this mental activity gradually converts our knowledge into scientific knowledge1 and thus gives rise to those great groups of systematized truths called the sciences3 as1 for example1 the physical and mathematical sciences1 the elements of which usually form part of our early education4 ,these sciences teach us a great deal about ourselves and the universe in which we live4 ,there is no need to dwell on the precious services conferred upon mankind by discoveries due to the progress of the various special sciences3 mathematics as applied to engineering of all sorts2 astronomy2 the physical sciences of light1 heat1 sound1 electricity1 magnetism1 etc42 chemistry in all its branches2 physiology and anatomy as applied in medicine and surgery4 ,all these undoubtedly contribute much to man's bodily well-being4 ,but man has a mind as well as a body1 and he is moreover a social being3 there are1 therefore1 other special sciences--8human0 as distinct from 8physical0 sciences--in which man himself is studied in his mental activities and social relations with his fellow-men3 the sciences of social and political economy1 constitutional and civil law1 government1 statesmanship1 etc4 ,furthermore1 man is a moral being1 recognizing distinctions of good and bad1 right and wrong1 pleasure and happiness1 duty and responsibility1 in his own conduct2 and finally he is a religious being1 face to face with the fact that men universally entertain views1 beliefs1 convictions of some sort or other1 regarding man's subjection to1 and dependence on1 some higher power or powers dwelling somehow or somewhere within or above the whole universe of his direct and immediate experience3 there are therefore also sciences which deal with these domains1 morality and religion4 ,here1 however1 the domains are so extensive1 and the problems raised by their phenomena are of such far-reaching importance1 that the sciences which deal with them can hardly be called special sciences1 but rather constituent portions of the one wider and deeper general science which is what men commonly understand nowadays by philosophy4 ,the distinction between the special sciences on the one hand and philosophy1 the general science1 on the other1 will help us to realize more clearly the nature and scope of the latter4 ,the special sciences are concerned with discovering the proximate reasons and causes of this1 that1 and the other definite department in the whole universe of our experience4 ,the subject-matter of some of them is totally different from that of others3 physiology studies the functions of living organisms2 geology studies the formation of the earth's crust4 ,or if two or more of them investigate the same subject-matter they do so from different standpoints1 as when the zoologist and the physiologist study the same type or specimen in the animal kingdom4 ,but the common feature of all is this1 that each seeks only the reasons1 causes1 and laws which give a proximate and partial explanation of the facts which it investigates1 leaving untouched and unsolved a number of deeper and wider questions which may be raised about the whence and whither and why1 not only of the facts themselves1 but of the reasons1 causes and laws assigned by the particular science in explanation of these facts4 ,now it is those deeper and wider questions1 which can be answered only by the discovery of the more remote and ultimate reasons and causes of things1 that philosophy undertakes to investigate1 and--as far as lies within man's power--to answer4 ,no one has ever disputed the supreme importance of such inquiries into the ultimate reasons and causes of things--into such questions as these1 for instance3 ,what is the nature of man himself8 ,has he in him a principle of life which is spiritual and immortal8 ,what was his first origin on the earth8 ,whence did he come8 ,has his existence any purpose1 and if so1 what8 ,whither does he tend8 ,what is his destiny8 ,why does he distinguish between a right and a wrong in human conduct8 ,what is the ultimate reason or ground of this distinction8 ,why have men generally some form or other of religion8 ,why do men generally believe in ,god8 ,is there really a ,god8 ,what is the origin of the whole universe of man's experience8 ,of life in all its manifestations8 ,has the universe any intelligible or intelligent purpose1 and if so1 what8 ,can the human mind give a certain answer to any of these or similar questions8 ,what about the nature and value of human knowledge itself8 ,what is its scope and what are its limitations8 ,and since vast multitudes of men believe that the human race has been specially enlightened by ,god ,himself1 by ,divine ,revelation1 to know for certain what man's destiny is1 and is specially aided by ,god ,himself1 by ,divine ,grace1 to work out this destiny--the question immediately arises3 ,what are the real relations between reason alone on the one hand and reason enlightened by such ,revelation on the other1 in other words between natural knowledge and supernatural faith8 ,now it will be admitted that the special sciences take us some distance along the road towards an answer to such questions1 inasmuch as the truths established by these sciences1 and even the wider hypotheses conceived though not strictly verified in them1 furnish us with most valuable data in our investigation of those questions4 ,similarly the alleged fact of a ,divine ,revelation cannot be ignored by any man desirous of using all the data available as helps towards their solution4 ,the ,revelation embodied in ,christianity claims not merely to enlighten us in regard to many ultimate questions which mankind would be able to answer without its assistance1 but also to tell us about our destiny some truths of supreme import1 which of ourselves we should never have been able to discover4 ,it is obvious1 then1 that whether a man has been brought up from his infancy to believe in the ,christian ,revelation or not1 his whole outlook on life will be determined very largely by his belief or disbelief in its authenticity and its contents4 ,similarly1 if he be a ,confucian1 or a ,buddhist1 or a ,mohammedan1 his outlook will be in part determined by what he believes of their teachings4 ,man's conduct in life has undoubtedly many determining influences1 but it will hardly be denied that among them the predominant influence is exerted by the views that he holds1 the things he believes to be true1 concerning his own origin1 nature and destiny1 as well as the origin1 nature and destiny of the universe in which he finds himself4 ,the ,germans have an expressive term for that which1 in the absence of a more appropriate term1 we may translate as a man's world-outlook2 they call it his ,weltanschauung4 ,now this world-outlook is formed by each individual for himself from his interpretation of his experience as a whole4 ,it is not unusual to call this world-outlook a man's philosophy of life4 ,if we use the term philosophy in this wide sense it obviously includes whatever light a man may gather from the special sciences1 and whatever light he may gather from a divinely revealed religion if he believes in such1 as well as the light his own reason may shed upon a special and direct study of those ultimate questions themselves1 to which we have just referred4 ,but we mention this wide sense of the term philosophy merely to put it aside2 and to state that we use the term in the sense more commonly accepted nowadays1 the sense in which it is understood to be distinct from the special sciences on the one side and from supernatural theology or the systematic study of divinely revealed religion on the other4 ,philosophy is distinct from the special sciences because while the latter seek the proximate1 the former seeks the ultimate grounds1 reasons and causes of all the facts of human experience4 ,philosophy is distinct from supernatural theology because while the former uses the unaided power of human reason to study the ultimate questions raised by human experience1 the latter uses reason enlightened by ,divine ,revelation to study the contents of this ,revelation in all their bearings on man's life and destiny4 ,hence we arrive at this simple and widely accepted definition of philosophy3 the science of all things through their ultimate reasons and causes as discovered by the unaided light of human reason47#e7 ,the first part of this definition marks off philosophy from the special sciences1 the second part marks it off from supernatural theology4 ,we must remember1 however1 that these three departments of knowledge--scientific1 philosophical1 and revealed--are not isolated from one another in any man's mind2 they overlap in their subject-matter1 and though differing in their respective standpoints they permeate one another through and through4 ,the separation of the special sciences from philosophy1 though adumbrated in the speculations of ancient times and made more definite in the middle ages1 was completed only in modern times through the growth and progress of the special sciences themselves4 ,the line of demarcation between philosophy and supernatural theology must be determined by the proper relations between ,reason and ,faith3 and naturally these relations are a subject of debate between philosophers who believe in the existence of an authentic ,divine ,revelation and philosophers who do not4 ,it is the duty of the philosopher as such to determine by the light of reason whether a ,supreme ,being exists and whether a ,divine ,revelation to man is possible4 ,if he convinces himself of the existence of ,god he will have little difficulty in inferring the possibility of a ,divine ,revelation4 ,the fact of a ,divine ,revelation is a matter not for philosophical but for historical research4 ,now when a man has convinced himself of the existence of ,god and the fact of a ,divine ,revelation--the preambula fidei or prerequisite conditions of ,faith1 as they are called--he must see that it is eminently reasonable for him to believe in the contents of such ,divine ,revelation2 he must see that the truths revealed by ,god cannot possibly trammel the freedom of his own reason in its philosophical inquiries into ultimate problems concerning man and the universe2 he must see that these truths may possibly act as beacons which will keep him from going astray in his own investigations3 knowing that truth cannot contradict truth he knows that if he reaches a conclusion really incompatible with any certainly revealed truth1 such conclusion must be erroneous2 and so he is obliged to reconsider the reasoning processes that led him to such a conclusion47#f7 ,thus1 the position of the ,christian philosopher1 aided in this negative way by the truths of an authentic ,divine ,revelation1 has a distinct advantage over that of the philosopher who does not believe in such revelation and who tries to solve all ultimate questions independently of any light such revelation may shed upon them4 ,yet the latter philosopher as a rule not only regards the 8independent0 position1 which he himself takes up in the name of 8freedom of thought0 and 8freedom of research10 as the superior position1 but as the only one consistent with the dignity of human reason2 and he commonly accuses the ,christian philosopher of allowing reason to be 8enslaved0 in 8the shackles of dogma04 ,we can see at once the unfairness of such a charge when we remember that the ,christian philosopher has convinced himself on grounds of reason alone that ,god exists and has made a revelation to man4 ,his belief in a ,divine ,revelation is a reasoned belief1 a rationabile obsequium 7,rom4 ,,xii4 #a72 and only if it were a blind belief1 unjustifiable on grounds of reason1 would the accusation referred to be a fair one4 ,the ,christian philosopher might retort that it is the unbelieving philosopher himself who really destroys 8freedom of thought and research10 by claiming for the latter what is really an abuse of freedom1 namely license to believe what reason shows to be erroneous4 ,but this counter-charge would be equally unfair1 for the unbelieving philosopher does not claim any such undue license to believe what he knows to be false or to disbelieve what he knows to be true4 ,if he denies the fact or the possibility of a ,divine ,revelation1 and therefore pursues his philosophical investigations without any regard to the contents of such revelation1 it is because he has convinced himself on grounds of reason that such revelation is neither a fact nor a possibility4 ,he and the ,christian philosopher cannot both be right2 one of them must be wrong2 but as reasonable men they should agree to differ rather than hurl unjustifiable charges and counter-charges at each other4 ,all philosophers who believe in the ,christian ,revelation and allow its authentic teachings to guide and supplement their own rational investigation into ultimate questions1 are keenly conscious of the consequent superior depth and fulness and certitude of ,christian philosophy as compared with all the other conflicting and fragmentary philosophies that mark the progress of human speculation on the ultimate problems of man and the universe down through the centuries4 ,they feel secure in the possession of a philosophia perennis17#g7 and none more secure than those of them who complete and confirm that philosophy by the only full and authentic deposit of ,divinely ,revealed ,truth1 which is to be found in the teaching of the ,catholic ,church4 ,the history of philosophical investigation yields no one universally received conception of what philosophy is1 nor would the definition given above be unreservedly accepted4 ,windelband1 in his ,history of ,philosophy7#h7 instances the following predominant conceptions of philosophy according to the chronological order in which they prevailed3 7a7 the systematic investigation of the problems raised by man and the universe 7early ,grecian philosophy3 absence of differentiation of philosophy from the special sciences72 7b7 the practical art of human conduct1 based on rational speculation 7later ,grecian philosophy3 distrust in the value of knowledge1 and emphasis on practical guidance of conduct72 7c7 the helper and handmaid of the ,science of ,revealed ,truth1 i4e4 supernatural theology1 in the solution of ultimate problems 7the ,christian philosophy of the ,fathers of the ,church and of the ,medieval ,schools down to the sixteenth century3 universal recognition of the value of the ,christian ,revelation as an aid to rational investigation72 7d7 a purely rational investigation of those problems1 going beyond the investigations of the special sciences1 and either abstracting from1 or denying the value of1 any light or aid from ,revelation 7differentiation of the domains of science1 philosophy and theology2 modern philosophies from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century2 excessive individualism and rationalism of these as unnaturally divorced from recognition of1 and belief in1 ,divine ,revelation1 and unduly isolated from the progressing positive sciences72 7e7 a critical analysis of the significance and scope and limitations of human knowledge itself 7recent philosophies1 mainly concerned with theories of knowledge and speculations on the nature of the cognitive process and the reliability of its products74 ,these various conceptions are interesting and suggestive2 much might be said about them1 but not to any useful purpose in a brief introductory chapter4 ,let us rather1 adopting the definition already set forth1 try next to map out into its leading departments the whole philosophical domain4 ,,iii4 ,,divisions ,,of ,,philosophy3 ,,speculative ,,and ,,practical ,,philosophy4--,the general problem of classifying all the sciences built up by human thought is a logical problem of no little complexity when one tries to work it out in detail4 ,we refer to this general problem only to mention a widely accepted principle on which it is usually approached1 and because the division of philosophy itself is a section of the general problem4 ,the principle in question is that sciences may be distinguished indeed by partial or total diversity of subject-matter1 but that such diversity is not essential1 that diversity of standpoint is necessary and sufficient to constitute distinct sciences even when these deal with one and the same subject-matter4 ,now applying this principle to philosophy we see firstly that it has the same subject-matter as all the special sciences taken collectively1 but that it is distinct from all of them inasmuch as it studies their data not from the standpoint of the proximate causes1 but from the higher standpoint of the ultimate causes of these data4 ,and we see secondly that philosophy1 having this one higher standpoint throughout all its departments1 is one science2 that its divisions are only material divisions2 that there is not a plurality of philosophies as there is a plurality of sciences1 though there is a plurality of departments in philosophy47#i7 ,let us now see what these departments are4 ,if we ask why people seek knowledge at all1 in any department1 we shall detect two main impelling motives4 ,the first of these is simply the desire to know3 trahimur omnes cupiditate sciendi4 ,the natural feeling of wonder1 astonishment1 8admiratio10 which accompanies our perception of things and events1 prompts us to seek their causes1 to discover the reasons which will make them intelligible to us and enable us to understand them4 ,but while the possession of knowledge for its own sake is thus a motive of research it is not the only motive4 ,we seek knowledge in order to use it for the guidance of our conduct in life1 for the orientation of our activities1 for the improvement of our condition2 knowing that knowledge is power1 we seek it in order to make it minister to our needs4 ,now in the degree in which it fulfils such ulterior purposes1 or is sought for these purposes1 knowledge may be described as practical2 in the degree in which it serves no ulterior end1 or is sought for no ulterior end1 other than that of perfecting our minds1 it may be described as speculative4 ,of course this latter purpose is in itself a highly practical purpose2 nor indeed is there any knowledge1 however speculative1 but has1 or at least is capable of having1 some influence or bearing on the actual tenor and conduct of our lives2 and in this sense all knowledge is practical4 ,still we can distinguish broadly between knowledge which has no direct1 immediate bearing on our acts1 and knowledge that has47#aj7 ,hence the possibility of distinguishing between two great domains of philosophical knowledge--,theoretical or ,speculative ,philosophy1 and ,practical ,philosophy4 ,there are1 in fact1 two great domains into which the data of all human experience may be divided2 and for each distinct domain submitted to philosophical investigation there will be a distinct department of philosophy4 ,a first domain is the order realized in the universe independently of man2 a second is the order which man himself realizes3 things1 therefore1 and acts4 ,the order of the external universe1 the order of nature as it is called1 exists independently of us3 we merely study it 7speculari1 71 we do not create it4 ,the other or practical order is established by our acts of intelligence and will1 and by our bodily action on external things under the direction of those faculties in the arts4 ,hence we have a speculative or theoretical philosophy and a practical philosophy47#aa7 ,,iv4 ,,departments ,,of ,,practical ,,philosophy3 ,,logic1 ,,ethics ,,and ,,esthetics4--,in the domain of human activities1 to the right regulation of which practical philosophy is directed1 we may distinguish two departments of mental activity1 namely intellectual and volitional1 and besides these the whole department of external1 executive or bodily activity4 ,in general the right regulation of acts may be said to consist in directing them to the realization of some ideal2 for all cognitive acts this ideal is the true1 for all appetitive or volitional acts it is the good1 while for all external operations it may be either the beautiful or the useful--the respective objects of the fine arts and the mechanical arts or crafts4 ,logic1 as a practical science1 studies the mental acts and processes involved in discovering and proving truths and systematizing these into sciences1 with a view to directing these acts and processes aright in the accomplishment of this complex task4 ,hence it has for its subject-matter1 in a certain sense1 all the data of human experience1 or whatever can be an object of human thought4 ,but it studies these data not directly or in themselves or for their own sake1 but only in so far as our acts of reason1 which form its direct object1 are brought to bear upon them4 ,in all the other sciences we employ thought to study the various objects of thought as things1 events1 realities2 and hence these may be called 8real0 sciences1 scientiae reales2 while in ,logic we study thought itself1 and even here not speculatively for its own sake or as a reality 7as we study it for instance in ,psychology71 but practically1 as a process capable of being directed towards the discovery and proof of truth2 and hence in contradistinction to the other sciences as 8real10 we call ,logic the 8rational0 science1 scientia rationalis4 ,scholastic philosophers express this distinction by saying that while ,speculative ,philosophy studies real being 7,ens ,reale71 or the objects of direct thought 7objecta primae intentionis mentis71 ,logic studies the being which is the product of thought 7,ens ,rationis71 or objects of reflex thought 7objecta secundae intentionis mentis747#ab7 ,the mental processes involved in the attainment of scientific truth are conception1 judgment and inference2 moreover these processes have to be exercised methodically by the combined application of analysis and synthesis1 or induction and deduction1 to the various domains of human experience4 ,all these processes1 therefore1 and the methods of their application1 constitute the proper subject-matter of ,logic4 ,it has been more or less a matter of debate since the days of ,aristotle whether ,logic should be regarded as a department of philosophical science proper1 or rather as a preparatory discipline1 an instrument or organon of reasoning--as the collection of ,aristotle's own logical treatises was called1--and so as a vestibule or introduction to philosophy4 ,and there is a similar difference of opinion as to whether or not it is advisable to set down ,logic as the first department to be studied in the philosophical curriculum4 ,such doubts arise from differences of view as to the questions to be investigated in ,logic1 and the point to which such investigations should be carried therein4 ,it is possible to distinguish between a more elementary treatment of thought-processes with the avowedly practical aim of setting forth canons of inference and method which would help and train the mind to reason and investigate correctly2 and a more philosophical treatment of those processes with the speculative aim of determining their ultimate significance and validity as factors of knowledge1 as attaining to truth1 as productive of science and certitude4 ,it is only the former field of investigation that is usually accorded to ,logic nowadays2 and thus understood ,logic ought to come first in the curriculum as a preparatory training for philosophical studies1 accompanied1 however1 by certain elementary truths from ,psychology regarding the nature and functions of the human mind4 ,the other domain of deeper and more speculative investigation was formerly explored in what was regarded as a second portion of logical science1 under the title of 8,critical0 ,logic--,logica ,critica4 ,in modern times this is regarded as a distinct department of ,speculative ,philosophy1 under the various titles of ,epistemology1 ,criteriology1 or the ,theory of ,knowledge4 ,ethics or ,moral ,philosophy 71 mos1 mores1 morals1 conduct7 is that department of practical philosophy which has for its subject-matter all human acts1 i4e4 all acts elicited or commanded by the will of man considered as a free1 rational and responsible agent4 ,and it studies human conduct with the practical purpose of discovering the ultimate end or object of this conduct1 and the principles whereby it must be regulated in order to attain to this end4 ,ethics must therefore analyse and account for the distinction of right and wrong or good and bad in human conduct1 for its feature of morality4 ,it must examine the motives that influence conduct3 pleasure1 well-being1 happiness1 duty1 obligation1 moral law1 etc4 ,the supreme determining factor in all such considerations will obviously be the ultimate end of man1 whatever this may be3 his destiny as revealed by a study of his nature and place in the universe4 ,now the nature of man is studied in ,psychology1 as are also the nature1 conditions and effects of his free acts1 and the facilities1 dispositions and forms of character consequent on these4 ,furthermore1 not only from the study of man in ,psychology1 but from the study of the external universe in ,cosmology1 we amass data from which in ,natural ,theology we establish the existence of a ,supreme ,being4 ,we then prove in ,ethics that the last end of man1 his highest perfection1 consists in knowing1 loving1 serving1 and thus glorifying ,god1 both in this life and in the next4 ,hence we can see how these branches of speculative philosophy subserve the practical science of morals4 ,and since a man's interpretation of the moral distinctions--as of right or wrong1 meritorious or blameworthy1 autonomous or of obligation--which he recognizes as pertaining to his own actions--since his interpretation of these distinctions is so intimately bound up with his religious outlook and beliefs1 it is at once apparent that the science of ,ethics will be largely influenced and determined by the system of speculative philosophy which inspires it1 whether this be ,theism1 ,monism1 ,agnosticism1 etc4 ,no doubt the science of ,ethics must take as its data all sorts of moral beliefs1 customs and practices prevalent at any time among men2 but it is not a speculative science which would merely aim at a posteriori inferences or inductive generalizations from these data2 it is a practical1 normative science which aims at discovering the truth as to what is the right and the wrong in human conduct1 and at pointing out the right application of the principles arising out of this truth4 ,hence it is of supreme importance for the philosopher of morals to determine whether the human race has really been vouchsafed a ,divine ,revelation1 and1 convincing himself that ,christianity contains such a revelation1 to recognize the possibility of supplementing and perfecting what his own natural reason can discover by what the ,christian religion teaches about the end of man as the supreme determining principle of human conduct4 ,not that he is to take the revealed truths of ,christianity as principles of moral philosophy2 for these are the principles of the supernatural ,christian ,theology of human morals2 but that as a ,christian philosopher1 i4e4 a philosopher who recognizes the truth of the ,christian ,revelation1 he should reason out philosophically a science of ,ethics which1 so far as it goes1 will be in harmony with the moral teachings of the ,christian ,religion1 and will admit of being perfected by these4 ,this recognition1 as already remarked1 will not be a hindrance but a help to him in exploring the wide domains of the individual1 domestic1 social and religious conduct of man2 in determining1 on the basis of theism established by natural reason1 the right moral conditions and relations of man's conduct as an individual1 as a member of the family1 as a member of the state1 and as a creature of ,god4 ,the nature1 source and sanction of authority1 domestic1 social and religious2 of the dictate of conscience2 of the natural moral law and of all positive law2 of the moral virtues and vices--these are all questions which the philosopher of ,ethics has to explore by the use of natural reason1 and for the investigation of which the ,christian philosopher of ,ethics is incomparably better equipped than the philosopher who1 though possessing the compass of natural reason1 ignores the beacon lights of ,divinely ,revealed ,truths4 ,esthetics1 or the ,philosophy of the ,fine ,arts1 is that department of philosophy which studies the conception of the beautiful and its external expression in the works of nature and of man4 ,the arts themselves1 of course1 whether concerned with the realization of the useful or of the beautiful1 are distinct from sciences1 even from practical sciences47#ac7 ,the technique itself consists in a skill acquired by practice--by practice guided1 however1 by a set of practical canons or rules which are the ripe fruit of experience47#ad7 ,but behind every art there is always some background of more or less speculative truth4 ,the conception of the useful1 however which underlies the mechanical arts and crafts1 is not an ultimate conception calling for any further analysis than it receives in the various special sciences and in metaphysics4 ,but the conception of the beautiful does seem to demand a special philosophical consideration4 ,on the subjective or mental side the esthetic sense1 artistic taste1 the sentiment of the beautiful1 the complex emotions accompanying such experience2 on the objective side the elements or factors requisite to produce this experience2 the relation of the esthetic to the moral1 of the beautiful to the good and the true--these are all distinctly philosophical questions4 ,up to the present time1 however1 their treatment has been divided between the other departments of philosophy--psychology1 cosmology1 natural theology1 general metaphysics1 ethics--rather than grouped together to form an additional distinct department4 ,v4 ,,departments ,,of ,,speculative ,,philosophy3 ,,metaphysics4--,the philosophy which studies the order realized in things apart from our activity1 speculative philosophy1 has been variously divided up into separate departments from the first origins of philosophical speculation4 ,when we remember that all intellectual knowledge of things involves the apprehension of general truths or laws about these things1 and that this apprehension of intelligible aspects common to a more or less extensive group of things involves the exercise of abstraction1 we can understand how the whole domain of speculative knowledge1 whether scientific or philosophical1 can be differentiated into certain layers or levels1 so to speak1 according to various degrees of abstractness and universality in the intelligible aspects under which the data of our experience may be considered4 ,on this principle ,aristotle and the scholastics divided all speculative knowledge into three great domains1 ,physics1 ,mathematics and ,metaphysics1 with their respective proper objects1 ,change1 ,quantity and ,being1 objects which are successively apprehended in three great stages of abstraction traversed by the human mind in its effort to understand and explain the ,universal ,order of things4 ,and as a matter of fact perhaps the first great common and most obvious feature which strikes the mind reflecting on the visible universe is the feature of all-pervading change 771 movement1 evolution1 progress and regress1 growth and decay2 we see it everywhere in a variety of forms1 mechanical or local change1 quantitative change1 qualitative change1 vital change4 ,now the knowledge acquired by the study of things under this common aspect is called ,physics4 ,here the mind abstracts merely from the individualizing differences of this change in individual things1 and fixes its attention on the great1 common1 sensible aspect itself of visible change4 ,but the mind can abstract even from the sensible changes that take place in the physical universe and fix its attention on a static feature in the changing things4 ,this static element 7 71 which the intellect apprehends in material things as naturally inseparable from them 7 71 is their quantity1 their extension in space4 ,when the mind strips a material object of all its visible1 sensible properties--on which its mechanical1 physical and chemical changes depend--there still remains as an object of thought a something formed of parts outside parts in three dimensions of space4 ,this abstract quantity1 quantitas intelligibilis--whether as continuous or discontinuous1 as magnitude or multitude--is the proper object of ,mathematics4 ,but the mind can penetrate farther still into the reality of the material data which it finds endowed with the attributes of change and quantity3 it can eliminate from the object of its thought even this latter or mathematical attribute1 and seize on something still more fundamental4 ,the very essence1 substance1 nature1 being itself1 of the thing1 the underlying subject and root principle of all the thing's operations and attributes1 is something deeper than any of these attributes1 something at least mentally distinct from these latter 7 73 and this something is the proper object of man's highest speculative knowledge1 which ,aristotle called 1 philosophia prima1 the first or fundamental or deepest philosophy47#ae7 ,but he gave this latter order of knowledge another very significant title3 he called it theology or theological science1 1 by a denomination derived a potiori parte1 from its nobler part1 its culmination in the knowledge of ,god4 ,let us see how4 ,for ,aristotle first philosophy is the science of being and its essential attributes47#af7 ,here the mind apprehends its object as static or abstracted from change1 and as immaterial or abstracted from quantity1 the fundamental attribute of material reality--as 4 ,now it is the substance1 nature1 or essence of the things of our direct and immediate experience1 that forms the proper object of this highest science4 ,but in these things the substance1 nature1 or essence1 is not found in real and actual separation from the material attributes of change and quantity2 it is considered separately from these only by an effort of mental abstraction4 ,even the nature of man himself is not wholly immaterial2 nor is the spiritual principle in man1 his soul1 entirely exempt from material conditions4 ,hence in so far as first philosophy studies the being of the things of our direct experience1 its object is immaterial only negatively or by mental abstraction4 ,but does this study bring within the scope of our experience any being or reality that is positively and actually exempt from all change and all material conditions8 ,if so the study of this being1 the ,divine ,being1 will be the highest effort1 the crowning perfection1 of first philosophy2 which we may therefore call the theological science4 8,if10 writes ,aristotle17#ag7 8there really exists a substance absolutely immutable and immaterial1 in a word1 a ,divine ,being--as we hope to prove--then such ,being must be the absolutely first and supreme principle1 and the science that attains to such ,being will be theological40 ,in this triple division of speculative philosophy into ,physics1 ,mathematics1 and ,metaphysics1 it will naturally occur to one to ask3 ,did ,aristotle distinguish between what he called ,physics and what we nowadays call the special physical sciences8 ,he did4 ,these special analytic studies of the various departments of the physical universe1 animate and inanimate1 ,aristotle described indiscriminately as 8partial0 sciences3 -- 4 ,these descriptive1 inductive1 comparative studies1 proceeding a posteriori from effects to causes1 he conceived rather as a preparation for scientific knowledge proper2 this latter he conceived to be a synthetic1 deductive explanation of things1 in the light of some common aspect detected in them as principle or cause of all their concrete characteristics47#ah7 ,such synthetic knowledge of things1 in the light of some such common aspect as change1 is what he regarded as scientific knowledge1 meaning thereby what we mean by philosophical knowledge47#ai7 ,what he called ,physics1 therefore1 is what we nowadays understand as ,cosmology and ,psychology47#bj7 ,mathematical science ,aristotle likewise regarded as science in the full and perfect sense1 i4e4 as philosophical4 ,but just as we distinguish nowadays between the special physical and human sciences on the one hand1 and the philosophy of external nature and man on the other1 so we may distinguish between the special mathematical sciences and a ,philosophy of ,mathematics3 with this difference1 that while the former groups of special sciences are mainly inductive the mathematical group is mainly deductive4 ,furthermore1 the ,philosophy of ,mathematics--which investigates questions regarding the ultimate significance of mathematical concepts1 axioms and assumptions3 unity1 multitude1 magnitude1 quantity1 space1 time1 etc4--does not usually form a separate department in the philosophical curriculum3 its problems are dealt with as they arise in the other departments of ,metaphysics4 ,before outlining the modern divisions of ,metaphysics we may note that this latter term was not used by ,aristotle4 ,we owe it probably to ,andronicus of ,rhodes 7 #dj ,b4,c471 who1 when arranging a complete edition of ,aristotle's works1 placed next in order after the ,physics1 or physical treatises1 all the parts and fragments of the master's works bearing upon the immutable and immaterial object of the philosophia prima2 these he labelled 77 1 post physica1 the books after the physics3 hence the name metaphysics17#ba7 applied to this highest section of speculative philosophy4 ,it was soon noticed that the term1 thus fortuitously applied to such investigations1 conveyed a very appropriate description of their scope and character if interpreted in the sense of 8supra-physica10 or 8trans-physica03 inasmuch as the object of these investigations is a hyperphysical object1 an object that is either positively and really1 or negatively and by abstraction1 beyond the material conditions of quantity and change4 ,st4 ,thomas combines both meanings of the term when he says that the study of its subject-matter comes naturally after the study of physics1 and that we naturally pass from the study of the sensible to that of the suprasensible47#bb7 ,the term philosophia prima has now only an historical interest2 and the term theology1 used without qualification1 is now generally understood to signify supernatural theology4 ,,vi4 ,,departments ,,of ,,metaphysics3 ,,cosmology1 ,,psychology1 ,,and ,,natural ,,theology4--,nowadays the term ,metaphysics is understood as synonymous with speculative philosophy3 the investigation of the being1 nature1 or essence1 and essential attributes of the realities which are also studied in the various special sciences3 the search for the ultimate grounds1 reasons and causes of these realities1 of which the proximate explanations are sought in the special sciences4 ,we have seen that it has for its special object that most abstract aspect of reality whereby the latter is conceived as changeless and immaterial2 and we have seen that a being may have these attributes either by mental abstraction merely1 or in actual reality4 ,in other words the philosophical study of things that are really material not only suggests the possibility1 but establishes the actual existence1 of a ,being that is really changeless and immaterial3 so that metaphysics in all its amplitude would be the philosophical science of things that are negatively 7by abstraction7 or positively 7in reality7 immaterial4 ,this distinction suggests a division of metaphysics into general and special metaphysics4 ,the former would be the philosophical study of all being1 considered by mental abstraction as immaterial2 the latter would be the philosophical study of the really and positively changeless and immaterial ,being1--,god4 ,the former would naturally fall into two great branches3 the study of inanimate nature and the study of living things1 ,cosmology and ,psychology2 while special metaphysics1 the philosophical study of the ,divine ,being1 would constitute ,natural ,theology4 ,these three departments1 one of special metaphysics and two of general metaphysics1 would not be three distinct philosophical sciences1 but three departments of the one speculative philosophical science4 ,the standpoint would be the same in all three sections1 viz4 being considered as static and immaterial by mental abstraction3 for whatever positive knowledge we can reach about being that is really immaterial can be reached only through concepts derived from material being and applied analogically to immaterial being4 ,cosmology and ,psychology divide between them the whole domain of man's immediate experience4 ,cosmology1 utilizing not only the data of direct experience1 but also the conclusions established by the analytic study of these data in the physical sciences1 explores the origin1 nature1 and destiny of the material universe4 ,some philosophers include among the data of ,cosmology all the phenomena of vegetative life1 reserving sentient and rational life for ,psychology2 others include even sentient life in ,cosmology1 reserving the study of human life for ,psychology1 or1 as they would call it1 ,anthropology47#bc7 ,the mere matter of location is of secondary importance4 ,seeing1 however1 that man embodies in himself all three forms of life1 vegetative1 sentient1 and rational1 all three would perhaps more naturally belong to ,psychology1 which would be the philosophical study of life in all its manifestations 71 the vital principle1 the soul74 ,just as the conclusions of the physical sciences are the data of ,cosmology1 so the conclusions of the natural or biological sciences--,zoology1 ,botany1 ,physiology1 ,morphology1 ,cellular ,biology1 etc4--are the data of ,psychology4 ,indeed in ,psychology itself--especially in more recent years--it is possible to distinguish a positive1 analytic1 empirical study of the phenomena of consciousness1 a study which would rank rather as a special than as an ultimate or philosophical science2 and a synthetic1 rational study of the results of this analysis1 a study which would be strictly philosophical in character4 ,this would have for its object to determine the origin1 nature and destiny of living things in general and of man himself in particular4 ,it would inquire into the nature and essential properties of living matter1 into the nature of the subject of conscious states1 into the operations and faculties of the human mind1 into the nature of the human soul and its mode of union with the body1 into the rationality of the human intellect and the freedom of the human will1 the spirituality and immortality of the human soul1 etc4 ,but since the human mind itself is the natural instrument whereby man acquires all his knowledge1 it will be at once apparent that the study of the phenomenon of knowledge itself1 of the cognitive activity of the mind1 can be studied1 and must be studied1 not merely as a natural phenomenon of the mind1 but from the point of view of its special significance as representative of objects other than itself1 from the point of view of its validity or invalidity1 its truth or falsity1 and with the special aim of determining the scope and limitations and conditions of its objective validity4 ,we have already referred to the study of human knowledge from this standpoint1 in connexion with what was said above concerning ,logic4 ,it has a close kinship with ,logic on the one hand1 and with ,psychology on the other2 and nowadays it forms a distinct branch of speculative ,philosophy under the title of ,criteriology1 ,epistemology1 or the ,theory of ,knowledge4 ,arising out of the data of our direct experience1 external and internal1 as studied in the philosophical departments just outlined1 we find a variety of evidences all pointing beyond the domain of this direct experience to the supreme conclusion that there exists of necessity1 distinct from this directly experienced universe1 as its ,creator1 ,conserver1 and ,ruler1 its ,first ,beginning and its ,last ,end1 its ,alpha and ,omega1 ,one ,divine and ,infinite ,being1 the ,deity4 ,the existence and attributes of the ,deity1 and the relations of man and the universe to the ,deity1 form the subject-matter of ,natural ,theology4 ,,vii4 ,,departments ,,of ,,metaphysics3 ,,ontology ,,and ,,epistemology4--,according to the ,aristotelian and scholastic conception speculative philosophy would utilize as data the conclusions of the special sciences--physical1 biological1 and human4 ,it would try to reach a deeper explanation of their data by synthesizing these under the wider aspects of change1 quantity1 and being1 thus bringing to light the ultimate causes1 reasons1 and explanatory principles of things4 ,this whole study would naturally fall into two great branches3 ,general ,metaphysics 7,cosmology and ,psychology71 which would study things exempt from quantity and change not really but only by mental abstraction2 and ,special ,metaphysics 7,natural ,theology71 which would study the positively immaterial and immutable ,being of the ,deity4 ,this division of ,metaphysics1 thoroughly sound in principle1 and based on a sane and rational view of the relation between the special sciences and philosophy1 has been almost entirely7#bd7 supplanted in modern times by a division which1 abstracting from the erroneous attitude that prompted it in the first instance1 has much to recommend it from the standpoint of practical convenience of treatment4 ,the modern division was introduced by ,wolff 7#afgi-agee71 a ,german philosopher1--a disciple of ,leibniz 7#afdf-agaf7 and forerunner of ,kant 7#agbd-ahjd747be7 ,influenced by the excessively deductive method of ,leibniz' philosophy1 which he sought to systematize and to popularize1 he wrongly conceived the metaphysical study of reality as something wholly apart and separate from the inductive investigation of this same reality in the positive sciences4 ,it comprised the study of the most fundamental and essential principles of being1 considered in themselves2 and the deductive application of these principles to the three great domains of actual reality1 the corporeal universe1 the human soul1 and ,god4 ,the study of the first principles of being in themselves would constitute ,general ,metaphysics1 or ,ontology 7-74 ,their applications would constitute three great departments of ,special ,metaphysics3 ,cosmology1 which he described as 8transcendental0 in opposition to the experimental physical sciences2 ,psychology1 which he termed 8rational0 in opposition to the empirical biological sciences2 and finally ,natural ,theology1 which he entitled ,theodicy 7--71 using a term invented by ,leibniz for his essays in vindication of the wisdom and justice of ,divine ,providence notwithstanding the evils of the universe4 8,the spirit that animated this arrangement of the departments of metaphysics10 writes ,mercier1 8was unsound in theory and unfortunate in tendency4 ,it stereotyped for centuries a disastrous divorce between philosophy and the sciences1 a divorce that had its origin in circumstances peculiar to the intellectual atmosphere of the early eighteenth century4 ,as a result of it there was soon no common language or understanding between scientists and philosophers4 ,the terms which expressed the most fundamental ideas--matter1 substance1 movement1 cause1 force1 energy1 and such like--were taken in different senses in science and in philosophy4 ,hence misunderstandings1 aggravated by a growing mutual distrust and hostility1 until finally people came to believe that scientific and metaphysical preoccupations were incompatible if not positively opposed to each other407#bf7 ,how very different from the disintegrating conception here criticized is the traditional ,aristotelian and scholastic conception of the complementary functions of philosophy and the sciences in unifying human knowledge3 a conception thus eloquently expressed by ,,newman in his ,idea of a ,university3--7#bg7 8,all that exists1 as contemplated by the human mind1 forms one large system or complex fact4444 ,now1 it is not wonderful that1 with all its capabilities1 the human mind cannot take in this whole vast fact at a single glance1 or gain possession of it at once4 ,like a short-sighted reader1 its eye pores closely1 and travels slowly1 over the awful volume which lies open for its inspection4 ,or again1 as we deal with some huge structure of many parts and sides1 the mind goes round about it1 noting down1 first one thing1 then another1 as best it may1 and viewing it under different aspects1 by way of making progress towards mastering the whole4444 ,these various partial views or abstractions 444 are called sciences 444 they proceed on the principle of a division of labour4444 ,as they all belong to one and the same circle of objects1 they are one and all connected together2 as they are but aspects of things1 they are severally incomplete in their relation to the things themselves1 though complete in their own idea and for their own respective purposes2 on both accounts they at once need and subserve each other4 ,and further1 the comprehension of the bearings of one science on another1 and the use of each to each1 and the location and limitation and adjustment and due appreciation of them all1 one with another1 this belongs1 ,i conceive1 to a sort of science distinct from all of them1 and in some sense1 a science of sciences1 which is my own conception of what is meant by ,philosophy44440 ,without in any way countenancing such an isolation of metaphysics from the positive sciences1 we may1 nevertheless1 adopt the modern division in substance and in practice4 ,while recognizing the intimate connexion between the special sciences and metaphysics in all its branches1 we may regard as ,general ,metaphysics all inquiries into the fundamental principles of being and of knowing1 of reality and of knowledge2 and as ,special ,metaphysics the philosophical study of physical nature1 of human nature1 and of ,god1 the ,author and ,supreme ,cause of all finite reality4 ,thus1 while special metaphysics would embrace ,cosmology1 ,psychology1 and ,natural ,theology1 general metaphysics would embrace ,ontology and ,epistemology4 ,these two latter disciplines must no doubt investigate what is in a certain sense one and the same subject-matter1 inasmuch as knowledge is knowledge of reality1 nor can the knowing mind 7the subjectum cognoscens7 and the known reality 7the objectum cognitum7 be wholly separated or studied in complete isolation from each other4 ,yet the whole content of human experience1 which forms their common subject-matter1 can be regarded by mental abstraction from the two distinct standpoints of the knowing mind and the known reality1 and can thus give rise to two distinct sets of problems4 ,epistemology is thus concerned with the truth and certitude of human knowledge2 with the subjective conditions and the scope and limits of its validity2 with the subjective or mental factors involved in knowing47#bh7 ,ontology is concerned with the objects of knowledge1 with reality considered in the widest1 deepest1 and most fundamental aspects under which it is conceived by the human mind3 with the being and becoming of reality1 its possibility and its actuality1 its essence and its existence1 its unity and plurality2 with the aspects of truth1 goodness1 perfection1 beauty1 which it assumes in relation with our minds2 with the contingency of finite reality and the grounds and implications both of its actual existence and of its intelligibility2 with the modes of its concrete existence and behaviour1 the supreme categories of reality as they are called3 substance1 individual nature1 and personality2 quantity1 space and time1 quality and relation1 causality and purpose4 ,these are the principal topics investigated in the present volume4 ,the investigation is confined to fundamental concepts and principles1 leaving their applications to be followed out in special metaphysics4 ,furthermore1 the theory of knowledge known as ,moderate ,realism17#bi7 the ,realism of ,aristotle and the ,scholastics1 in regard to the validity of knowledge both sensual and intellectual1 is assumed throughout3 because not alone is this the true theory1 but--as a natural consequence--it is the only theory which renders the individual things and events of human experience really intelligible1 and at the same time keeps the highest and most abstract intellectual speculations of metaphysics in constant and wholesome contact with the concrete1 actual world in which we live1 move1 and have our being4 ,,viii4 ,,remarks ,,on ,,some ,,misgivings ,,and ,,prejudices4--,the student1 especially the beginner1 will find the investigations in this volume rather abstract2 but if he remembers that the content of our intellectual concepts1 be they ever so abstract and universal1 is really embodied in the individual things and events of his daily experience1 he will not be disposed to denounce all ultimate analysis of these concepts as 8unprofitable0 or 8unreal04 ,he will recognize that the reproach of 8talking in the air10 which was levelled by an eminent medieval scholastic7#cj7 at certain philosophers of his time1 tells against the metaphysical speculations of ,conceptualism1 but not against those of ,moderate ,realism4 ,the reproach is commonly cast at all systematic metaphysics nowadays--from prejudices too numerous and varied to admit of investigation here47#ca7 ,the modern prejudice which denies the very possibility of metaphysics1 a prejudice arising from ,phenomenism1 ,positivism1 and ,agnosticism--systems which are themselves no less metaphysical than erroneous--will be examined in due course47#cb7 ,but really in order to dispel all such misgivings one has only to remember that metaphysics1 systematic or otherwise1 is nothing more than a man's reasoned outlook on the world and life4 ,whatever his conscious opinions and convictions may be regarding the nature and purpose of himself1 and other men1 and the world at large--and if he use his reason at all he must have some sort of opinions and convictions1 whether positive or negative1 on these matters--those opinions and convictions are precisely that man's metaphysics4 8,breaking free for the moment from all historical and technical definition1 let us affirm3 ,to get at reality--this is the aim of metaphysics40 ,so writes ,professor ,ladd in the opening chapter of his ,theory of ,reality47#cc7 ,but if this is so1 surely a systematic attempt to 8get at reality10 no matter how deep and wide1 no matter how abstract and universal be the conceptions and speculations to which it leads us1 cannot nevertheless always and of necessity have the effect of involving us in a mirage of illusion and unreality4 ,systematic metaphysics--to quote again the author just referred to--7#cd7 is 444 the necessary result of a patient1 orderly1 well-informed1 and prolonged study of those ultimate problems which are proposed to every reflective mind by the real existences and actual transactions of selves and of things4 ,thus considered it appears as the least abstract and foreign to concrete realities of all the higher pursuits of reason4 ,mathematics is abstract2 logic is abstract2 mathematical and so-called 8pure0 physics are abstract4 ,but metaphysics is bound by its very nature and calling always to keep near to the actual and to the concrete4 ,dive into the depths of speculation indeed it may2 and its ocean is boundless in expanse and deep beyond all reach of human plummets4 ,but it finds its place of standing1 for every new turn of daring explanation1 on some bit of solid ground4 ,for it is actuality which it wishes to understand--although in reflective and interpretative way4 ,to quote from ,professor ,royce3 8,the basis of our whole theory is the bare1 brute fact of experience which you have always with you1 namely1 the fact3 ,something is real4 ,our question is3 ,what is this reality8 or1 again1 ,what is the ultimately real807#ce7 ,the wonderful progress of the positive sciences during the last few centuries has been the occasion of prejudice against metaphysics in a variety of ways4 ,it is objected1 for instance1 that metaphysics has no corresponding progress to boast of2 and from this there is but a small step to the conclusion that all metaphysical speculation is sterile4 ,the comparison is unfair for many reasons4 ,research into the ultimate grounds and causes of things is manifestly more difficult than research into their proximate grounds and causes4 ,again1 while the positive sciences have increased our knowledge mainly in extent rather than in depth1 it is metaphysics and only metaphysics that can increase this knowledge in its unity1 comprehensiveness1 and significance4 ,a positive increase in our knowledge of the manifold data of human experience is not the aim of metaphysics2 its aim is to give an ultimate meaning and interpretation to this knowledge4 ,it is not utilitarian in the narrower sense in which the positive and special sciences are utilitarian by ministering to our material needs2 but in the higher and nobler sense of pointing out to us the bearing of all human knowledge and achievement on our real nature and destiny4 ,true1 indeed1 individual leaders and schools of metaphysics have strayed from the truth and spoken with conflicting and uncertain voices1 especially when they have failed to avail themselves of ,truth ,divinely ,revealed4 ,this1 however1 is not a failure of metaphysics but of individual metaphysicians4 ,and furthermore1 it is undeniable withal1 that the metaphysical labours of the great philosophers in all ages have contributed richly to the enlightenment and civilization of mankind--particularly when these labours have been in concord and co-operation with the elevating and purifying influences of the ,christian religion4 ,of no metaphysical system is this so entirely true as of that embodied in ,scholastic ,philosophy4 ,the greatest intellect of the ,middle ,ages1 ,st4 ,thomas ,aquinas1 gave to this philosophy an expression which is rightly regarded by the modern scholastic as his intellectual charter and the most worthy starting-point of his philosophical investigations4 ,the following passage from an eminent representative of modern scholastic thought7#cf7 is sufficiently suggestive to admit of quotation3-- ,amid the almost uninterrupted disintegration of systems during the last three centuries1 the philosophy of ,st4 ,thomas has alone been able to stand the shock of criticism2 it alone has proved sufficiently solid and comprehensive to serve as an intellectual basis and unifying principle for all the new facts and phenomena brought to light by the modern sciences4 ,and unless we are much mistaken1 those who take up and follow this philosophy will come to think1 as we do1 that on the analysis of mental acts and processes1 on the inner nature of corporeal things1 of living things1 and of man1 on the existence and nature of ,god1 on the foundations of speculative and moral science1 none have thought or written more wisely than ,st4 ,thomas ,aquinas4 ,but though we place our programme and teaching under the patronage of the illustrious name of this prince of scholastics1 we do not regard the ,thomistic philosophy as an ideal beyond possibility of amelioration1 or as a boundary to the activity of the human mind4 ,we do think1 however1 on mature reflection1 that we are acting no less wisely than modestly in taking it as our starting-point and constant standard of reference4 ,this we say in answer to those of our friends and enemies who are occasionally pleased to ask us if we really do mean to lead back the modern mind into the ,middle ,ages1 and to identify philosophy simply with the thought of any one philosopher4 ,manifestly1 we mean nothing of the kind4 ,has not ,leo ,,xiii41 the great initiator of the new scholastic movement1 expressly warned us7#cg7 to be mindful of the present3 8,edicimus libenti gratoque animo recipiendum esse quidquid sapienter dictum1 quidquid utiliter fuerit a quopiam inventum atque excogitatum08 ,st4 ,thomas himself would be the first to rebuke those who would follow his own philosophical opinions in all things against their own better judgment1 and to remind them of what he wrote at the head of his ,summa3 that in philosophy1 of all arguments that based on human authority is the weakest1 8locus ab auctoritate qu fundatur super ratione humana1 est infirmissimus407#ch7 ,again1 therefore1 let us assert that respect for tradition is not servility but mere elementary prudence4 ,respect for a doctrine of whose soundness and worth we are personally convinced is not fetishism2 it is but a rational and rightful tribute to the dominion of ,truth over ,mind4 ,modern scholastics will know how to take to heart and profit by the lessons of the seventeenth and eighteenth century controversies2 they will avoid the mistakes of their predecessors2 they will keep in close contact with the special sciences subsidiary to philosophy and with the views and teachings of modern and contemporary thinkers47#ci7 ,an overweening confidence in the power of the special sciences to solve ultimate questions1 or at least to tell us all that can be known for certain about these problems1 a confidence based on the astonishing progress of those sciences in modern times1 is the source of yet another prejudice against metaphysics4 ,it is a prejudice of the half-educated mind1 of the camp-followers of science1 not of its leaders4 ,these latter are keenly conscious that the solution of ultimate questions lies entirely beyond the methods of the special sciences4 ,not that even the most eminent scientists do not indulge in speculations about ultimate problems--as they have a perfect right to do4 ,but though they may be themselves quite aware that such speculations are distinctly metaphysical1 there are multitudes who seem to think that a theory ceases to be metaphysical and becomes scientific provided only it is broached by a scientific expert as distinct from a metaphysician47#dj7 ,but all sincere thinkers will recognize that no ultimate question about the totality of human experience can be solved by any science which explores merely a portion of this experience4 ,nay1 the more rapid and extensive is the progress of the various special sciences1 the more imperative and insistent becomes the need to collect and collate their separate findings1 to interrogate them one and all as to whether and how far these findings fit in with the facts and conditions of human life and existence1 to determine what light and aid they contribute to the solution of the great and ever recurring questions of the whence8 and whither8 and why8 of man and the universe4 ,one who is a sincere scientist as well as an earnest philosopher has written propos of this necessity in the following terms3-- ,the farther science has pushed back the limits of the discernible universe1 the more insistently do we feel the demand within us for some satisfactory explanation of the whole4 ,the old1 eternal problems rise up before us and clamour loudly and ever more loudly for some newer and better solution4 ,the solution offered by a bygone age was soothing at least1 if it was not final4 ,in the present age1 however1 the problems reappear with an acuteness that is almost painful3 the deep secret of our own human nature1 the questions of our origin and destiny1 the intermeddling of blind necessity and chance and pain in the strange1 tangled drama of our existence1 the foibles and oddities of the human soul1 and all the mystifying problems of social relations3 are not these all so many enigmas which torment and trouble us whithersoever we turn8 ,and all seem to circle around the one essential question3 ,has human nature a real meaning and value1 or is it so utterly amiss that truth and peace will never be its portion87#da7 ,a final difficulty against philosophical research is suggested by the thought that if the philosopher has to take cognizance of all the conclusions of all the special sciences his task is an impossible one1 inasmuch as nowadays at all events it would take a lifetime to become proficient in a few of these sciences not to speak of all of them4 ,there is no question1 however1 of becoming proficient in them2 the philosopher need not be a specialist in any positive science2 his acquaintance with the contents of these sciences need extend no farther than such established conclusions and such current though unverified hypotheses as have an immediate bearing on ultimate or philosophical problems4 ,moreover1 while it would be injurious both to philosophy and to science1 as is proved by the history of both alike1 to separate synthetic from analytic speculation by a divorce between philosophy and science2 while it would be unwise to ignore the conclusions of the special sciences and to base philosophical research exclusively on the data of the plain man's common and unanalysed experience1 it must be remembered on the other hand that the most fundamental truths of speculative and practical philosophy1 the truths that are most important for the right and proper orientation of human life1 can be established and defended independently of the special researches of the positive sciences4 ,the human mind had not to await the discovery of radium in order to prove the existence of ,god4 ,such supreme truths as the existence of ,god1 the immortality of the human soul1 the freedom of the human will1 the existence of a moral law1 the distinction between right and wrong1 etc41 have been always in possession of the human race4 ,it has been1 moreover1 confirmed in its possession of them by ,divine ,revelation4 ,and it has not needed either the rise or the progress of modern science to defend them4 ,these fundamental rational truths constitute a philosophia perennis3 a fund of truth which is1 like all truth1 immutable1 though our human insight into it may develop in depth and clearness4 ,but while this is so it is none the less true that philosophy1 to be progressive in its own order1 must take account of every new fact and conclusion brought to light in every department of scientific--and historical1 and artistic1 and literary1 and every other sort of--research4 ,and this for the simple reason that every such accession1 whether of fact or of theory1 is an enlargement of human experience2 as such it clamours on the one hand for philosophical interpretation1 for explanation in the light of what we know already about the ultimate grounds and causes of things1 for admission into our world-outlook1 for adjustment and co-ordination with the previous contents of the latter2 while1 on the other hand1 by its very appearance on the horizon of human experience it may enrich or illumine1 rectify or otherwise influence1 this outlook or some aspect of it47#db7 ,if1 then1 philosophy has to take account of advances in every other department of human research1 it is clear that its mastery at the present day is a more laborious task than ever it was in the past4 ,in order to get an intelligent grasp of its principles in their applications to the problems raised by the progress of the sciences1 to newly discovered facts and newly propounded hypotheses1 the student must be familiar with these facts and hypotheses2 and all the more so because through the medium of a sensational newspaper press that has more regard for novelty than truth1 these facts and hypotheses are no sooner brought to light by scientists than what are often garbled and distorted versions of them are circulated among the masses47#dc7 ,similarly1 in order that a sound system of speculative and practical philosophy be expounded1 developed1 and defended at the present time1 a system that will embrace and co-ordinate the achieved results of modern scientific research1 a system that will offer the most satisfactory solutions of old difficulties in new forms and give the most reasonable and reliable answers to the ever recurring questionings of man concerning his own nature and destiny--it is clear that the insufficiency of individual effort must be supplemented by the co-operation of numbers4 ,it is the absence of fulness1 completeness1 adequacy1 in most modern systems of philosophy1 their fragmentary character1 the unequal development of their parts1 that accounts very largely for the despairing attitude of the many who nowadays despise and turn away from philosophical speculation4 ,add to this the uncertain voice with which these philosophies speak in consequence of their advocates ignoring the implications of the most stupendous fact in human experience1--the ,christian ,revelation4 ,but there is one philosophy which is free from these defects1 a philosophy which is in complete harmony with ,revealed ,truth1 and which forms with the latter the only true ,philosophy of ,life2 and that one philosophy is the system which1 assimilating the wisdom of ,plato1 ,aristotle and all the other greatest thinkers of the world1 has been traditionally expounded in the ,christian schools--the ,scholastic system of philosophy4 ,it has been elaborated by no one man1 and is the original fruit of no one mind4 ,unlike the philosophies of ,kant or ,hegel or ,spencer or ,james or ,comte or ,bergson1 it is not a 8one-man0 philosophy4 ,it cannot boast of the novelty or originality of the many eccentric and ephemeral 8systems0 which have succeeded one another so rapidly in recent times in the world of intellectual fashion2 but it has ever possessed the enduring novelty of the truth1 which is ever ancient and ever new4 ,now although this philosophy may have been mastered in its broad outlines and applications by specially gifted individuals in past ages1 its progressive exposition and development1 and its application to the vastly extended and ever-growing domains of experience that are being constantly explored by the special sciences1 can never be the work of any individual3 it can be accomplished only by the earnest co-operation of ,christian philosophers in every part of the civilized world47#dd7 ,in carrying on this work we have not to build from the beginning4 8,it has sometimes been remarked10 as ,newman observes17#de7 8when men have boasted of the knowledge of modern times1 that no wonder we see more than the ancients because we are mounted upon their shoulders40 ,yes2 the intellectual toilers of to-day are heirs to the intellectual wealth of their ancestors4 ,we have tradition3 not to despise but to use1 critically1 judiciously1 reverently1 if we are to use it profitably4 ,thomas ,davis has somewhere said that they who demolish the past do not build up for the future4 ,and we have the ,christian ,revelation1 as a lamp to our feet and a light to our paths7#df7 in all those rational investigations which form the appointed task of the philosopher4 ,hence1 ,let knowledge grow from more to more1 ,but more of reverence in us dwell2 ,that mind and soul1 according well1 ,may make one music as before1 ,but vaster47#dg7 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,being ,,and ,,its ,,primary ,,determinations4 #a4 ,,our ,,concept ,,of ,,being3 ,,its ,,expression ,,and ,,features4--,the term 8,being0 7,lat4 ens2 ,gr4 2 ,ger4 ,seiend2 ,fr4 tant7 as present participle of the verb to be 7,lat4 esse2 ,gr4 2 ,ger4 ,sein2 ,fr4 tre7 means existing 7existens1 existere74 ,but the participle has come to be used as a noun2 and as such it does not necessarily imply actual existence hic et nunc4 ,it does indeed imply some relation to actual existence2 for we designate as 8being0 7in the substantive sense7 only whatever we conceive as actually existing or at least as capable of existing2 and it is from the participial sense1 which implies actual existence1 that the substantive sense has been derived4 ,moreover1 the intelligible use of the word 8being0 as a term implies a reference to some actually existing sphere of reality47#dh7 ,it is in the substantive meaning the term will be most frequently used in these pages1 as the context will show4 ,when we speak of 8a being0 in the concrete1 the word has the same meaning as 8thing0 7res7 used in the wide sense in which this latter includes persons1 places1 events1 facts and phenomena of whatsoever kind4 ,in the same sense we speak of 8a reality10 this term having taken on a concrete1 in addition to its original abstract1 meaning4 8,being0 has also this abstract sense when we speak of 8the being or reality of things04 ,finally it may be used in a collective sense to indicate the sum-total of all that is or can be--all reality4 7a7 ,the notion of being1 spontaneously reached by the human mind1 is found on reflection to be the simplest of all notions1 defying every attempt at analysis into simpler notions4 ,it is involved in every other concept which we form of any object of thought whatsoever4 ,without it we could have no concept of anything4 7b7 ,it is thus the first of all notions in the logical order1 i4e4 in the process of rational thought4 7c7 ,it is also the first of all notions in the chronological order1 the first which the human mind forms in the order of time4 ,not1 of course1 that we remember having formed it before any other more determinate notions4 ,but the child's awakening intellectual activity must have proceeded from the simplest1 easiest1 most superficial of all concepts1 to fuller1 clearer1 and more determinate concepts1 i4e4 from the vague and confused notion of 8being0 or 8thing0 to notions of definite modes of being1 or kinds of thing4 7d7 ,this direct notion of being is likewise the most indeterminate of all notions2 though not of course entirely indeterminate4 ,an object of thought1 to be conceivable or intelligible at all by our finite minds1 must be rendered definite in some manner and degree2 and even this widest notion of 8being0 is rendered intelligible only by being conceived as positive and as contrasting with absolute non-being or nothingness47#di7 ,according to the ,hegelian philosophy 8pure thought0 can apparently think 8pure being10 i4e4 being in absolute indeterminateness1 being as not even differentiated from 8pure not-being0 or absolute nothingness4 ,and this absolutely indeterminate confusion 7we may not call it a 8synthesis0 or 8unity07 of something and nothing1 of being and not-being1 of positive and negative1 of affirmation and denial1 would be conceived by our finite minds as the objective correlative of1 and at the same time as absolutely identical with1 its subjective correlative which is 8pure thought04 ,well1 it is with the human mind and its objects1 and how it thinks those objects1 that we are concerned at present2 not with speculations involving the gratuitous assumption of a ,being that would transcend all duality of subject and object1 all determinateness of knowing and being1 all distinction of thought and thing4 ,we believe that the human mind can establish the existence of a ,supreme ,being whose mode of ,thought and ,existence transcends all human comprehension1 but it can do so only as the culminating achievement of all its speculation2 and the transcendent ,being it thus reaches has nothing in common with the monistic ideal-real being of ,hegel's philosophy4 ,in endeavouring to set out from the high a priori ground of such an intangible conception1 the ,hegelian philosophy starts at the wrong end4 7e7 ,further1 the notion of being is the most abstract of all notions1 poorest in intension as it is widest in extension4 ,we derive it from the data of our experience1 and the process by which we reach it is a process of abstraction4 ,we lay aside all the differences whereby things are distinguished from one another2 we do not consider these differences2 we prescind or abstract from them mentally1 and retain for consideration only what is common to all of them4 ,this common element forms the explicit content of our notion of being4 ,it must be noted1 however1 that we do not positively exclude the differences from the object of our concept2 we cannot do this1 for the simple reason that the differences too are 8being10 inasmuch as they too are modes of being4 ,our attitude towards them is negative2 we merely abstain from considering them explicitly1 though they remain in our concept implicitly4 ,the separation effected is only mental1 subjective1 notional1 formal1 negative2 not objective1 not real1 not positive4 ,hence the process by which we narrow down the concept of being to the more comprehensive concept of this or that generic or specific mode of being1 does not add to the former concept anything really new1 or distinct from1 or extraneous to it2 but rather brings out explicitly something that was implicit in the latter4 ,the composition of being with its modes is1 therefore1 only logical composition1 not real4 ,on the other hand1 it would seem that when we abstract a generic mode of being from the specific modes subordinate to the former1 we positively exclude the differentiating characteristics of these species2 and that1 conversely1 when we narrow down the genus to a subordinate species we do so by adding on a differentiating mode which was not contained even implicitly in the generic concept4 ,thus1 for example1 the differentiating concept 8rational0 is not contained even implicitly in the generic concept 8animal03 it is added on ab extra to the latter7#ej7 in order to reach the specific concept of 8rational animal0 or 8man02 so that in abstracting the generic from the subordinate specific concept we prescind objectively and really from the differentiating concept1 by positively excluding this latter4 ,this kind of abstraction is called objective1 real1 positive2 and the composition of such generic and differentiating modes of being is technically known as metaphysical composition4 ,the different modes of being1 which the mind can distinguish at different levels of abstraction in any specific concept--such as 8rational10 8sentient10 8living10 8corporeal10 in the concept of 8man0--are likewise known as 8metaphysical grades0 of being4 ,it has been questioned whether this latter kind of abstraction is always used in relating generic1 specific1 and differential modes of being4 ,at first sight it would not appear to be a quite satisfactory account of the process in cases where the generic notion exhibits a mode of being which can be embodied only in one or other of a number of alternative specific modes by means of differentiae not found in any things lying outside the genus itself4 ,the generic notion of 8plane rectilinear figure0 does not1 of course1 include explicitly its species 8triangle10 8quadrilateral10 8pentagon10 etc42 nor does it include even implicitly any definite one of them4 ,but the concept of each of the differentiating characters1 e4g4 the differentia 8three-sidedness10 is unintelligible except as a mode of a 8plane rectilinear figure047#ea7 ,this1 however1 is only accidental1 i4e4 due to the special objects considered27#eb7 and even here there persists this difference that whereas what differentiates the species of plane rectilinear figures is not explicitly and formally plane-rectilinearity1 that which differentiates finite from infinite being1 or substantial from accidental being1 is itself also formally and explicitly being4 ,but there are other cases in which the abstraction is manifestly objective4 ,thus1 for example1 the differentiating concept 8rational0 does not even implicitly include the generic concept 8animal10 for the former concept may be found realized in beings other than animals2 and the differentiating concept 8living0 does not even implicitly include the concept 8corporeal10 for it may be found realized in incorporeal beings4 7f7 ,since the notion of being is so simple that it cannot be analysed into simpler notions which might serve as its genus and differentia1 it cannot strictly speaking be defined4 ,we can only describe it by considering it from various points of view and comparing it with the various modes in which we find it realized4 ,this is what we have been attempting so far4 ,considering its fundamental relation to existence we might say that 8,being is that which exists or is at least capable of existing03 ,ens est id quod existit vel saltem existere potest4 ,or1 considering its relation to its opposite we might say that 8,being is that which is not absolute nothingness03 ,ens est id quod non est nihil absolutum4 ,or1 considering its relation to our minds1 we might say that 8,being is whatever is thinkable1 whatever can be an object of thought04 7g7 ,the notion of being is so universal that it transcends all actual and conceivable determinate modes of being3 it embraces infinite being and all modes of finite being4 ,in other words it is not itself a generic1 but a transcendental notion4 ,wider than all1 even the widest and highest genera1 it is not itself a genus4 ,a genus is determinable into its species by the addition of differences which lie outside the concept of the genus itself2 being1 as we have seen1 is not in this way determinable into its modes4 #b4 ,,in ,,what ,,sense ,,are ,,all ,,things ,,that ,,exist ,,or ,,can ,,exist ,,said ,,to ,,be 8,,real0 ,,or ,,to ,,have 8,,being08--,a generic concept can be predicated univocally1 i4e4 in the same sense1 of its subordinate species4 ,these latter differ from one another by characteristics which lie outside the concept of the genus1 while they all agree in realizing the generic concept itself3 they do not of course realize it in the same way17#ec7 but as such it is really and truly in each of them and is predicated in the same sense of each4 ,but the characteristics which differentiate all genera and species from one another1 and from the common notion of being1 in which they all agree1 are likewise being4 ,that in which they differ is being1 as well as that in which they agree4 ,hence we do not predicate 8being0 univocally of its various modes4 ,when we say of the various classes of things which make up our experience that they are 8real0 7or 8realities10 or 8beings071 we do not apply this predicate in altogether the same sense to the several classes2 for as applied to each class it connotes the whole content of each1 not merely the part in which this agrees with1 but also the part in which it differs from1 the others4 ,nor yet do we apply the concept of 8being0 in a totally different sense to each separate determinate mode of being4 ,when we predicate 8being0 of its modes the predication is not merely equivocal4 ,the concept expressed by the predicate-term 8being0 is not totally different as applied to each subject-mode2 for in all cases alike it implies either actual existence or some relation thereto4 ,it only remains1 therefore1 that we must regard the notion of being1 when predicated of its several modes1 as partly the same and partly different2 and this is what we mean when we say that the concept of being is analogical1 that being is predicated analogically of its various modes4 ,analogical predication is of two kinds3 a term or concept may be affirmed of a variety of subjects either by analogy of attribution or by analogy of proportion4 ,we may1 for instance1 speak not only of a man as 8healthy10 but also of his food1 his countenance1 his occupation1 his companionship1 etc41 as 8healthy04 ,now health is found really only in the man1 but it is attributed to the other things owing to some extrinsic but real connexion which they have with his health1 whether as cause1 or effect1 or indication1 of the latter4 ,this is analogy of attribution2 the subject of which the predicate is properly and primarily affirmed being known as the primary analogue or analogum princeps1 those to which it is transferred being called the analogata4 ,it underlies the figures of speech known as metynomy and synechdoche4 ,now on account of the various relations that exist between the different modes of being1 relations of cause and effect1 whole and part1 means and end1 ground and consequence1 etc4--relations which constitute the orders of existing and possible things1 the physical and the metaphysical orders--being is of course predicated of its modes by analogy of attribution2 and in such predication infinite being is the primary analogue for finite beings1 and the substance-mode of being for all accident-modes of being4 ,inasmuch1 however1 as being is not merely attributed to these modes extrinsically1 but belongs to all of them intrinsically1 it is also predicated of them by analogy of proportion4 ,this latter sort of analogy is based on similarity of relations4 ,for example1 the act of understanding bears a relation to the mind similar to that which the act of seeing bears to the eye1 and hence we say of the mind that it 8sees0 things when it understands them4 ,or1 again1 we speak of a verdant valley in the sunshine as 8smiling10 because its appearance bears a relation to the valley similar to that which a smile bears to the human countenance4 ,or again1 we speak of the parched earth as 8thirsting0 for the rains1 or of the devout soul as 8thirsting0 for ,god1 because these relations are recognized as similar to that of a thirsty person towards the drink for which he thirsts4 ,in all such cases the analogical concept implies not indeed the same attribute 7differently realized7 in all the analogues 7as in univocal predication7 but rather a similarity in the relation or proportion in which each analogue embodies or realizes some attribute or attributes peculiar to itself4 ,seeing is to the eye as understanding is to the mind2 smiling is to the countenance as the pleasing appearance of its natural features is to the valley4 ,rain is to the parched earth1 and ,god is to the devout soul1 as drink is to the thirsty person4 ,it will be noted that in all such cases the analogical concept is affirmed primarily and properly of some one thing 7the analogum princeps71 and of the other only secondarily1 and relatively to the former4 ,now1 if we reflect on the manner in which being is affirmed of its various modes 7e4g4 of the infinite and the finite2 or of substance and accident2 or of spiritual and corporeal substances2 or of quantities1 or qualities1 or causes1 etc47 we can see firstly that although these differ from one another by all that each of them is1 by the whole being of each1 yet there is an all-pervading similarity between the relations which these modes bear each to its own existence4 ,all have1 or can have1 actual existence3 each according to the grade of perfection of its own reality4 ,if we conceive infinite being as the cause of all finite beings1 then the former exists in a manner appropriate to its all-perfect reality1 and finite beings in a manner proportionate to their limited realities2 and so of the various modes of finite being among themselves4 ,moreover1 we can see secondly1 as will be explained more fully below17#ed7 that being is affirmed of the finite by virtue of its dependence on the infinite1 and of accident by virtue of its dependence on substance47#ee7 ,being or reality is therefore predicated of its modes by analogy of proportion47#ef7 ,is a concept1 when applied in this way1 one1 or is it really manifold8 ,it is not simply one1 for this would yield univocal predication2 nor is it simply manifold1 for this would give equivocal predication4 ,being1 considered in its vague1 imperfect1 inadequate sense1 as involving some common or similar proportion or relation to existence in all its analogues1 is one2 considered as representing clearly and adequately what is thus similarly related to each of the analogues1 it is manifold4 ,analogy of proportion is the basis of the figure of speech known as metaphor4 ,it would be a mistake1 however1 to infer from this that what is thus analogically predicated of a number of things belongs intrinsically and properly only to one of them1 being transferred by a mere extrinsic denomination to the others2 and that therefore it does not express any genuine knowledge on our part about the nature of these other things4 ,it does give us real knowledge about them4 ,metaphor is not equivocation2 but perhaps more usually it is understood not to give us real knowledge because it is understood to be based on resemblances that are merely fanciful1 not real4 ,still1 no matter how slender and remote be the proportional resemblance on which the analogical use of language is based1 in so far forth as it has such a real basis it gives us real insight into the nature of the analogues4 ,and if we hesitate to describe such a use of language as 8metaphorical10 this is only because 8metaphor0 perhaps too commonly connotes a certain transferred and improper extension of the meaning of terms1 based upon a purely fanciful resemblance4 ,all our language is primarily and properly expressive of concepts derived from the sensible appearances of material realities4 ,as applied to the suprasensible1 intelligible aspects of these realities1 such as substance and cause1 or to spiritual realities1 such as the human soul and ,god1 it is analogical in another sense2 not as opposed to univocal1 but as opposed to proper4 ,that is1 it expresses concepts which are not formed directly from the presence of the things which they signify1 but are gathered from other things to which the latter are necessarily related in a variety of ways47#eg7 ,considering the origin of our knowledge1 the material1 the sensible1 the phenomenal1 comes first in order1 and moulds our concepts and language primarily to its own proper representation and expression2 while the spiritual1 the intelligible1 the substantial1 comes later1 and must make use of the concepts and language thus already moulded4 ,if we consider1 however1 not the order in which we get our knowledge1 but the order of reality in the objects of our knowledge1 being or reality is primarily and more properly predicated of the infinite than of the finite1 of the ,creator than of the creature1 of the spiritual than of the material1 of substances than of their accidents and sensible manifestations or phenomena4 ,yet we do not predicate being or reality of the finite1 or of creatures1 in a mere transferred1 extrinsic1 improper sense1 as if these were mere manifestations of the infinite1 or mere effects of the ,first ,cause1 to which alone reality would properly belong4 ,for creatures1 finite things1 are in a true and proper sense also real4 ,duns ,scotus and those who think with him contend that the concept of being1 derived as it is from our experience of finite being1 if applied only analogically to infinite being would give us no genuine knowledge about the latter4 ,they maintain that whenever a universal concept is applied to the objects in which it is realized intrinsically1 it is affirmed of these objects univocally4 ,the notion of being1 in its most imperfect1 inadequate1 indeterminate sense1 is1 they say1 one and the same in so far forth as it is applicable to the infinite and the finite1 and to all the modes of the finite2 and it is therefore predicated of all univocally47#eh7 ,but although they apply the concept of being univocally to the infinite and the finite1 i4e4 to ,god and creatures1 they admit that the reality corresponding to this univocal concept is totally different in ,god and in creatures3 that ,god differs by all that ,he is from creatures1 and they by all that they are from ,him4 ,while1 however1 ,scotists emphasize the formal oneness or identity of the indeterminate common concept1 followers of ,st4 ,thomas emphasize the fact that the various modes of being differ totally1 by all that each of them is1 from one another2 and1 from this radical diversity in the modes of being1 they infer that the common concept should not be regarded as simply the same1 but only as proportionally the same1 as expressive of a similar relation of each intrinsically different mode of reality to actual existence4 ,thomists lay still greater stress1 perhaps1 upon the second consideration referred to above1 as a reason for regarding being as an analogical concept when affirmed of ,creator and creature1 or of substance and accident3 the consideration that the finite is dependent on the infinite1 and accident on substance4 ,if being is realized in a true and proper sense1 and intrinsically1 as it undoubtedly is1 in whatever is distinguishable from nothingness1 why not say that we should affirm being or reality of all things 8either as a genus in the strict sense1 or else in some sense not analogical but proper1 after the manner in which we predicate a genus of its species and individuals8444 ,since the object of our universal idea of being is admitted to be really in all things1 we can evidently abstract from what is proper to substance and to accident1 just as we abstract from what is proper to plants and to animals when we affirm of these that they are living things407#ei7 8,in reply to this difficulty10 ,father ,kleutgen continues17#fj7 8we say in the first place that the idea of being is in truth less analogical and more proper than any belonging to the first sort of analogy i4e4 of attribution1 and that therefore it approaches more closely to generic concepts properly so called4 ,at the same time the difference which separates both from the latter concepts remains4 ,for a name applied to many things is analogical if what it signifies is realized par excellence in one1 and in the others only subordinately and dependently on that4 ,hence it is that ,aristotle regards predication as analogical when something is affirmed of many things 7#a7 either because these have a certain relation to some one thing1 7#b7 or because they depend on some one thing4 ,in the former case the thing signified by the name is really and properly found only in one single thing1 and is affirmed of all the others only in virtue of some real relation of these to the former1 whether this be 7a7 that these things merely resemble that single thing metaphor1 or 7b7 bear some other relation to it1 such as that of effect to cause1 etc4 metonymy4 ,in the latter case the thing signified by the name is really in each of the things of which it is affirmed2 but it is in one alone par excellence1 and in the others only by depending1 for its very existence in them1 on that one4 ,now the object of the term being is found indeed in accidents1 e4g4 in quantity1 colour1 shape2 but certainly it must be applied primarily to substance1 and to accidents only dependently on the latter3 for quantity1 colour1 shape can have being only because the corporeal substance possesses these determinations4 ,but this is not at all the case with a genus and its species4 ,these differ from the genus1 not by any such dependence1 but by the addition of some special perfection to the constituents of the genus2 for example1 in the brute beast sensibility is added to vegetative life1 and in man intelligence is added to sensibility4 ,here there is no relation of dependence for existence4 ,even if we considered human life as that of which life is principally asserted1 we could not say that plants and brute beasts so depended for their life on the life of man that we could not affirm life of them except as dependent on the life of man3 as we cannot attribute being to accidents except by reason of their dependence on substance4 ,hence it is that we can consider apart1 and in itself1 life in general1 and attribute this to all living things without relating it to any other being407#fa7 8,it might still be objected that the one single being of which we may affirm life primarily and principally1 ought to be not human life1 but absolute life4 ,and between this divine life and the life of all other beings there is a relation of dependence1 which reaches even to the very existence of life in these other beings4 ,in fact all life depends on the absolute life1 not indeed in the way accident depends on substance1 but in a manner no less real and far more excellent4 ,this is entirely true2 but what are we to conclude from it if not precisely this1 which scholasticism teaches3 that the perfections found in the various species of creatures can be affirmed of these in the same sense 7univoc71 but that they can be affirmed of ,god and creatures only analogically80 8,from all of which we can understand why it is that in regard to genera and species the analogy is in the things but not in our thoughts1 while in regard to substance and accidents it is both in the things and in our thoughts3 a difference which rests not solely on our manner of conceiving things1 nor a fortiori on mere caprice or fancy1 but which has its basis in the very nature of the things themselves4 ,for though in the former case there is a certain analogy in the things themselves1 inasmuch as the same nature1 that of the genus1 is realized in the species in different ways1 still1 as we have seen1 that is not sufficient1 without the relation of dependence1 to yield a basis for analogy in our thoughts4 ,for it is precisely because accident1 as a determination of substance1 presupposes this latter1 that being cannot be affirmed of accident except as dependent on substance40 ,these paragraphs will have shown with sufficient clearness why we should regard being not as an univocal but as an analogical concept1 when referred to ,god and creatures1 or to substance and accident4 ,for the rest1 the divergence between the ,scotist and the ,thomist views is not very important1 because ,scotists also will deny that being is a genus of which the infinite and the finite would be species2 finite and infinite are not differentiae superadded to being1 inasmuch as each of these differs by its whole reality1 and not merely by a determining portion1 from the other2 it is owing to the limitations of our abstractive way of understanding reality that we have to conceive the infinite by first conceiving being in the abstract1 and then mentally determining this concept by another1 namely1 by the concept of 8infinite mode of being07#fb72 the infinite1 and whatever perfections we predicate formally of the infinite1 transcend all genera1 species and differentiae1 because the distinction of being into infinite and finite is prior to the distinction into genera1 species and differentiae2 this latter distinction applying only to finite1 not to infinite being47#fc7 ,the observations we have just been making in regard to the analogy of being are of greater importance than the beginner can be expected to realize4 ,a proper appreciation of the way in which being or reality is conceived by the mind to appertain to the data of our experience1 is indispensable to the defence of ,theism as against ,agnosticism and ,pantheism4 #c4 ,,real ,,being ,,and ,,logical ,,being4--,we may next illustrate the notion of being by approaching it from another standpoint--by examining a fundamental distinction which may be drawn between real being 7ens reale7 and logical being 7ens rationis74 ,we derive all our knowledge1 through external and internal sense perception1 from the domain of actually existing things1 these things including our own selves and our own minds4 ,we form1 from the data of sense-consciousness1 by an intellectual process proper1 mental representations of an abstract and universal character1 which reveal to us partial aspects and phases of the natures of things4 ,we have no intuitive intellectual insight into these natures4 ,it is only by abstracting their various aspects1 by comparing these in judgments1 and reaching still further aspects by inferences1 that we progress in our knowledge of things--gradually1 step by step1 discursiv1 discurrendo4 ,all this implies reflection on1 and comparison of1 our own ideas1 our mental views of things4 ,it involves the processes of defining and classifying1 affirming and denying1 abstracting and generalizing1 analysing and synthesizing1 comparing and relating in a variety of ways the objects grasped by our thought4 ,now in all these complex functions1 by which alone the mind can interpret rationally what is given to it1 by which alone1 in other words1 it can know reality1 the mind necessarily and inevitably forms for itself 7and expresses in intelligible language7 a series of concepts which have for their objects only the modes in which1 and the relations by means of which1 it makes such gradual progress in its interpretation of what is given to it1 in its knowledge of the real4 ,these concepts are called secundae intentiones mentis--concepts of the second order1 so to speak4 ,and their objects1 the modes and mutual relations of our primae intentiones or direct concepts1 are called entia rationis--logical entities4 ,for example1 abstractness is a mode which affects not the reality which we apprehend intellectually1 but the concept by which we apprehend it4 ,so1 too1 is the universality of a concept1 its communicability or applicability to an indefinite multitude of similar realities--the 8intentio universalitatis10 as it is called--a mode of concept1 not of the realities represented by the latter4 ,so1 likewise1 is the absence of other reality than that represented by the concept1 the relative nothingness or non-being by contrast with which the concept is realized as positive2 and the absolute nothingness or non-being which is the logical correlative of the concept of being2 and the static1 unchanging self-identity of the object as conceived in the abstract47#fd7 ,these are not modes of reality as it is but as it is conceived4 ,again1 the manifold logical relations which we establish between our concepts--relations of 7extensive or intensive7 identity or distinction1 inclusion or inherence1 etc4--are logical entities1 entia rationis3 relations of genus1 species1 differentia1 proprium1 accidens2 the affirmative or negative relation between predicate and subject in judgment27#fe7 the mutual relations of antecedent and consequent in inference4 ,now all these logical entities1 or objecta secundae intentionis mentis1 are relations established by the mind itself between its own thoughts2 they have1 no doubt1 a foundation in the real objects of those thoughts as well as in the constitution and limitations of the mind itself2 but they have themselves1 and can have1 no other being than that which they have as products of thought4 ,their sole being consists in being thought of4 ,they are necessary creations or products of the thought-process as this goes on in the human mind4 ,we see that it is only by means of these relations we can progress in understanding things4 ,in the thought-process we cannot help bringing them to light--and thinking them after the manner of realities1 per modum entis4 ,whatever we think we must think through the concept of 8being02 whatever we conceive we must conceive as 8being02 but on reflection we easily see that such entities as 8nothingness10 8negation or absence or privation of being10 8universality10 8predicate0--and1 in general1 all relations established by our own thought between our own ideas representative of reality--can have themselves no reality proper1 no actual or possible existence1 other than that which they get from the mind in virtue of its making them objects of its own thought4 ,hence the scholastic definition of a logical entity or ens rationis as 8that which has objective being merely in the intellect03 8illud quod habet esse objective tantum in intellectu1 seu 444 id quod a ratione excogitatur ut ens1 cum tamen in se entitatem non habeat047#ff7 ,of course the mental process by which we think such entities1 the mental state in which they are held in consciousness1 is just as real as any other mental process or state4 ,but the entity which is thus held in consciousness has and can have no other reality than what it has by being an object of thought4 ,and this precisely is what distinguishes it from real being1 from reality2 for the latter1 besides the ideal existence it has in the mind which thinks of it1 has1 or at least can have1 a real existence of its own1 independently altogether of our thinking about it4 ,we assume here1 of course--what is established elsewhere1 as against the subjective idealism of phenomenists and the objective idealism of ,berkeley--that the reality of actual things does not consist in their being perceived or thought of1 that their 8esse0 is not 8percipi10 that they have a reality other than and independent of their actual presence to the thought of any human mind4 ,and even purely possible things1 even the creatures of our own fancy1 the fictions of fable and romance1 could1 absolutely speaking and without any contradiction1 have an existence in the actual order1 in addition to the mental existence they receive from those who fancy them4 ,such entities1 therefore1 differ from entia rationis2 they1 too1 are real beings4 ,what the reality of purely possible things is we shall discuss later on4 ,actually existing things at all events we assume to be given to the knowing mind1 not to be created by the latter4 ,even in regard to these1 however1 we must remember that the mind in knowing them1 in interpreting them1 in seeking to penetrate the nature of them1 is not purely passive2 that reality as known to us--or1 in other words1 our knowledge of reality--is the product of a twofold factor3 the subjective which is the mind1 and the objective which is the extramental reality acting on1 and thus revealing itself to1 the mind4 ,hence it is that when we come to analyse in detail our knowledge of the nature of things--or1 in other words1 the natures of things as revealed to our minds--it will not be always easy to distinguish in each particular case the properties1 aspects1 relations1 distinctions1 etc41 which are real 7in the sense of being there in the reality independently of the consideration of the mind7 from those that are merely logical 7in the sense of being produced and superadded to the reality by the mental process itself747#fg7 ,yet it is obviously a matter of the very first importance to determine1 as far as may be possible1 to what extent our knowledge of reality is not merely a mental interpretation1 but a mental construction1 of the latter2 and whether1 if there be a constructive or constitutive factor in thought1 this should be regarded as interfering with the validity of thought as representative of reality4 ,this problem--of the relation of the ens rationis to the ens reale in the process of cognition--has given rise to discussions which1 in modern times1 have largely contributed to the formation of that special branch of philosophical enquiry which is called ,epistemology4 ,but it must not be imagined that this very problem was not discussed1 and very widely discussed1 by philosophers long before the problem of the validity of knowledge assumed the prominent place it has won for itself in modern philosophy4 ,even a moderate familiarity with scholastic philosophy will enable the student to recognize this problem1 in a variety of phases1 in the discussions of the medieval schoolmen concerning the concepts of matter and form1 the simplicity and composition of beings1 and the nature of the various distinctions--whether logical1 virtual1 formal1 or real--which the mind either invents or detects in the realities it endeavours to understand and explain4 #d4 ,,real ,,being ,,and ,,ideal ,,being4--,the latter of these expressions has a multiplicity of kindred meanings4 ,we use it here in the sense of 8being known10 i4e4 to signify the 8esse intentionale10 the mental presence1 which1 in the scholastic theory of knowledge1 an entity of whatsoever kind1 whether real or logical1 must have in the mind of the knower in order that he be aware of that entity4 ,a mere logical entity1 as we have seen1 has and can have no other mode of being than this which consists in being an object of the mind's awareness4 ,all real being1 too1 when it becomes an object of any kind of human cognition whatsoever--of intellectual thought1 whether direct or reflex2 of sense perception1 whether external or internal--must obtain this sort of mental presence or mental existence3 thereby alone can it become an 8objectum cognitum04 ,only by such mental mirroring1 or reproduction1 or reconstruction1 can reality become so related and connected with mind as to reveal itself to mind4 ,under this peculiar relation which we call cognition1 the mind1 as we know from psychology and epistemology1 is not passive3 if reality revealed itself immediately1 as it is1 to a purely passive mind 7were such conceivable71 the existence of error would be unaccountable2 but the mind is not passive3 under the influence of the reality it forms the intellectual concept 7the verbum mentale71 or the sense percept 7the species sensibilis expressa71 in and through which1 and by means of which1 it attains to its knowledge of the real4 ,but prior 7ontologically7 to this mental existence1 and as partial cause of the latter1 there is the real existence or being1 which reality has independently of its being known by any individual human mind4 ,real being1 then1 as distinguished here from ideal being1 is that which exists or can exist extramentally1 whether it is known by the human mind or not1 i4e4 whether it exists also mentally or not4 ,that there is such real being1 apart from the 8thought0-being whereby the mind is constituted formally knowing1 is proved elsewhere2 as also that this esse intentionale has modes which cannot be attributed to the esse reale4 ,we merely note these points here in order to indicate the errors involved in the opposite contentions4 ,our concepts are characterized by abstractness1 by a consequent static immutability1 by a plurality often resulting from purely mental distinctions1 by a universality which transcends those distinctions and unifies the variety of all subordinate concepts in the widest concept of being4 ,now if1 for example1 we attribute the unifying mental mode of universality to real being1 we must draw the pantheistic conclusion that all real being is one3 the logical outcome of extreme realism4 ,if1 again1 we transfer purely mental distinctions to the unity of the ,absolute or ,supreme ,being1 thus making them real1 we thereby deny infinite perfection to the most perfect being conceivable3 an error of which some catholic philosophers of the later middle ages have been accused with some foundation4 ,if1 finally1 we identify the esse reale with the esse intentionale1 and this with the thought-process itself1 we find ourselves at the starting-point of ,hegelian monism47#fh7 #e4 ,,fundamental ,,distinctions ,,in ,,real ,,being4--,leaving logical and ideal being aside1 and fixing our attention exclusively on real being1 we may indicate here a few of the most fundamental distinctions which experience enables us to recognize in our study of the universal order of things4 7a7 ,possible or ,potential ,being and ,actual ,being4--,the first of these distinctions is that between possibility and actuality1 between that which can be and that which actually is4 ,for a proper understanding of this distinction1 which will be dealt with presently1 it is necessary to note here the following divisions of actual being1 which will be studied in detail later on4 7b7 ,infinite ,being and ,finite ,beings4--,all people have a sufficiently clear notion of ,infinite ,being1 or ,infinitely ,perfect ,being3 though not all philosophers are agreed as to how precisely we get this notion1 or whether there actually exists such a being1 or whether if such being does exist we can attain to a certain knowledge of such existence4 ,by infinite being we mean a being possessing all conceivable perfections in the most perfect conceivable manner2 and by finite beings all such beings as have actually any conceivable limitation to their perfection4 ,about these nominal definitions there is no dispute2 and scholasticism identifies their respective objects with ,god and creatures4 7c7 ,necessary ,being and ,contingent ,beings4--,necessary being we conceive as that being which exists of necessity3 being which if conceived at all cannot be conceived as non-existent3 being in the very concept of which is essentially involved the concept of actual existence3 so that the attempt to conceive such being as non-existent would be an attempt to conceive what would be self-contradictory4 ,contingent being1 on the other hand1 is being which is conceived not to exist of necessity3 being which may be conceived as not actually existent3 being in the concept of which is not involved the concept of actual existence4 ,the same observations apply to this distinction as to the preceding one4 ,it is obvious that any being which we regard as actual we must regard either as necessary or as contingent2 and1 secondly1 that necessary being must be considered as absolutely independent1 as having its actual existence from itself1 by its own nature2 while contingent being must be considered as dependent for its actual existence on some being other than itself4 ,hence necessary being is termed ,ens a se1 contingent being ,ens ab alio4 7d7 ,absolute ,being and ,relative ,beings4--,in modern philosophy the terms 8absolute0 and 8relative10 as applied to being1 correspond roughly with the terms 8,god0 and 8creatures0 in the usage of theistic philosophers4 ,but the former pair of terms is really of wider application than the latter4 ,the term absolute means1 etymologically1 that which is loosed1 unfettered1 disengaged or free from bonds 7absolutum1 ab-solvere1 solvo se-luo1 from 73 that1 therefore1 which is not bound up with anything else1 which is in some sense self-sufficing1 independent2 while the relative is that which is in some way bound up with something else1 and which is so far not self-sufficing or independent4 ,that1 therefore1 is ontologically absolute which is in some sense self-sufficing1 independent of other things1 in its existence2 while the ontologically relative is that which depends in some real way for its existence on something else4 ,again1 that is logically absolute which can be conceived and known by us without reference to anything else2 while the logically relative is that which we can conceive and know only through our knowledge of something else4 ,and since we usually name things according to the way in which we conceive them1 we regard as absolute any being which is by itself and of itself that which we conceive it to be1 or that which its name implies2 and as relative any being which is what its name implies only in virtue of some relation to something else47#fi7 ,thus1 a man is a man absolutely1 while he is a friend only relatively to others4 ,it is obvious that the primary and general meaning of the terms 8absolute0 and 8relative0 can be applied and extended in a variety of ways4 ,for instance1 all being may be said to be 8relative0 to the knowing mind1 in the sense that all knowledge involves a transcendental relation of the known object to the knowing subject4 ,in this widest and most improper sense even ,god ,himself is relative1 not however as being1 but as known4 ,again1 when we apply the same attribute to a variety of things we may see that it is found in one of them in the most perfect manner conceivable1 or at least in a fuller and higher degree than it is found in the others2 and that it is found in these others only with some sort of subordination to1 and dependence on1 the former3 we then say that it belongs to this primarily or absolutely1 and to the others only secondarily or relatively4 ,this is a less improper application of the terms than in the preceding case4 ,what we have especially to remember here is that there are many different kinds of dependence or subordination1 all alike giving rise to the same usage4 ,hence1 applying the terms absolute and relative to the predicate 8being0 or 8real0 or 8reality10 it is obvious in the first place that the potential as such can be called 8being10 or 8reality0 only in relation to the actual4 ,it is the actual that is being simpliciter1 par excellence2 the potential is so only in relation to this47#gj7 ,again1 substances may be termed beings absolutely1 while accidents are beings only relatively1 because of their dependence on substances2 though this relation is quite different from the relation of potential to actual being4 ,finally all finite1 contingent realities1 actual and possible1 are what they are only because of their dependence on the ,infinite and ,necessary ,being3 and hence the former are relative and the latter absolute2 though here again the relation is different from that of accident to substance1 or of potential to actual4 ,since the order of being includes all orders1 and since a being is absolutely such-or-such in any order only when that being realizes in all its fulness and purity such-or-such reality1 it follows that the being which realizes in all its fulness the reality of being is the ,absolute ,being in the highest possible sense of this term4 ,this concept of ,absolute ,being is the richest and most comprehensive of all possible concepts3 it is the very antithesis of that other concept of 8being in general0 which is common to everything and distinguished only from nothingness4 ,it includes in itself all actual and possible modes and grades and perfections of finite things1 apart from their limitations1 embodying all of them in the one highest and richest concept of that which makes all of them real and actual1 viz4 the concept of ,actuality or ,actual ,reality itself4 ,hegel and his followers have involved themselves in a pantheistic philosophy by neglecting to distinguish between those two totally different concepts47#ga7 ,a similar error has also resulted from failure to distinguish between the various modes in which being that is relative may be dependent on being that is absolute4 ,god is the ,absolute ,being2 creatures are relative4 ,so too is substance absolute being1 compared with accidents as inhering and existing in substance4 ,but ,god is not therefore to be conceived as the one all-pervading substance1 of which all finite things1 all phenomena1 would be only accidental manifestations4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,becoming ,,and ,,its ,,implications4 #f4 ,,the ,,static ,,and ,,the ,,changing4--,the things we see around us1 the things which make up the immediate data of our experience1 not only are or exist2 they also become1 or come into actual existence2 they change2 they pass out of actual existence4 ,the abstract notion of being represents its object to the mind in a static1 permanent1 changeless1 self-identical condition2 but if this condition were an adequate representation of reality change would be unreal1 would be only an illusion4 ,this is what the ,eleatic philosophers of ancient ,greece believed1 distinguishing merely between being and nothingness4 ,but they were mistaken2 for change in things is too obviously real to be eliminated by calling it an illusion3 even if it were an illusion1 this illusion at least would have to be accounted for4 ,in order1 therefore1 to understand reality we must employ not merely the notion of being 7something static71 but also the notion of becoming1 change1 process1 appearing and disappearing 7something kinetic1 and something dynamic74 ,in doing so1 however1 we must not fall into the error of the opposite extreme from the ,eleatics--by regarding change as the adequate representation of reality4 ,this is what ,heraclitus and the later ,ionians did3 holding that nothing is1 that all becomes 7 71 that change is all reality1 that the stable1 the permanent1 is non-existent1 unreal1 an illusion4 ,this too is false2 for change would be unintelligible without at least an abiding law of change1 a permanent principle of some sort2 which1 in turn1 involves the reality of some sort of abiding1 stable1 permanent being4 ,we must then--with ,aristotle1 as against both of those one-sided conceptions--hold to the reality both of being and of becoming2 and proceed to see how the stable and the changing can both be real4 ,to convince ourselves that they are both real1 very little reflection is needed4 ,we have actual experience of both those elements of reality in our consciousness and memory of our own selves4 ,every human individual in the enjoyment of his mental faculties knows himself as an abiding1 self-identical being1 yet as constantly undergoing real changes2 so that throughout his life he is really the same being1 though just as certainly he really changes4 ,in external nature1 too1 we observe on the one hand innumerable processes of growth and decay1 of motion and interaction2 and on the other hand a similarly all-pervading element of sameness or identity amid all this never-ending change4 #g4 ,,the ,,potential ,,and ,,the ,,actual4 7a7 ,,possibility1 ,,absolute1 ,,relative1 ,,and ,,adequate4--,it is from our experience of actuality and change that we derive not only our notion of temporal duration1 but also our notion of potential being or possibility1 as distinct from that of actual being or actuality4 ,it is from our experience of what actually exists that we are able to determine what can1 and what cannot exist4 ,we know from experience what gold is1 and what a tower is2 and that it is intrinsically possible for a golden tower to exist1 that such an object of thought involves no contradiction1 that therefore its existence is not impossible1 even though it may never actually exist as a fact4 ,similarly1 we know from experience what a square is1 and what a circle is2 and that it is intrinsically impossible for a square circle to exist1 that such an object of thought involves a contradiction1 that therefore not only is such an object never actually existent in fact1 but that it is in no sense real1 in no way possible4 ,thus1 intrinsic 7or objective1 absolute1 logical1 metaphysical7 possibility is the mere non-repugnance of an object of thought to actual existence4 ,any being or object of thought that is conceivable in this way1 that can be conceived as capable of actually existing1 is called intrinsically 7or objectively1 absolutely1 logically1 metaphysically7 possible being4 ,the absence of such intrinsic capability of actual existence gives us the notion of the intrinsically 7objectively1 absolutely1 logically1 metaphysically7 impossible4 ,we shall return to these notions again4 ,they are necessary here for the understanding of real change in the actual universe4 ,fixing our attention now upon the real changes which characterize the data of our experience1 let us inquire what conditions are necessary in order that an intrinsically possible object of thought become here and now an actual being4 ,it matters not whether we select an example from the domain of organic nature1 of inorganic nature1 or of art--whether it be an oak1 or an iceberg1 or a statue4 ,in order that there be here and now an actual oak-tree1 it is necessary not only 7#a7 that such an object be intrinsically possible1 but 7#b7 that there have been planted here an actual acorn1 i4e4 an actual being having in it subjectively and really the passive potentiality of developing into an actual oak-tree1 and 7#c7 that there be in the actual things around the acorn active powers or forces capable of so influencing the latent1 passive potentiality of the acorn as gradually to evolve the oak-tree therefrom4 ,so1 too1 for the 7#a7 intrinsically possible iceberg1 there are needed 7#b7 water capable of becoming ice1 and 7#c7 natural powers or forces capable of forming it into ice and setting this adrift in the ocean4 ,and for the 7#a7 intrinsically possible statue there are needed 7#b7 the block of marble or other material capable of becoming a statue1 and 7#c7 the sculptor having the power to mould this material into an actual statue4 ,in order1 therefore1 that a thing which is not now actual1 but only intrinsically or absolutely possible1 become actual1 there must actually exist some being or beings endowed with the active power or potency of making this possible thing actual4 ,the latter is then said to be relatively1 extrinsically possible--in relation to such being or beings4 ,and obviously a thing may be possible relatively to the power of one being1 and not possible relatively to lesser power of another being3 the statue that is intrinsically possible in the block of marble1 may be extrinsically possible relatively to the skilled sculptor1 but not relatively to the unskilled person who is not a sculptor4 ,furthermore1 relatively to the same agent or agents1 the production of a given effect1 the doing of a given thing1 is said to be physically possible if it can be brought about by such agents acting according to the ordinary course of nature2 if1 in other words they have the physical power to do it4 ,otherwise it is said to be physically impossible1 even though metaphysically or intrinsically possible1 e4g4 it is physically impossible for a dead person to come to life again4 ,a thing is said to be morally possible1 in reference to free and responsible agents1 if they can do it without unreasonable inconvenience2 otherwise it is considered as morally impossible1 even though it be both physically and metaphysically possible3 as often happens in regard to the fulfilment of one's obligations4 ,that which is both intrinsically and extrinsically possible is said to be adequately possible4 ,whatever is intrinsically possible is also extrinsically possible in relation to ,god1 who is ,almighty1 ,omnipotent4 #h4 7b7 ,,subjective 8,,potentia10 ,,active ,,and ,,passive4--,furthermore1 we conceive the ,infinite ,being1 ,almighty ,god1 as capable of creating1 or producing actual being from nothingness1 i4e4 without any actually pre-existing material out of whose passive potentiality the actual being would be developed4 ,creative power or activity does not need any pre-existing subject on which to exercise its influence1 any subject in whose passive potentiality the thing to be created is antecedently implicit4 ,but all other power1 all activity of created causes1 does require some such actually existing subject4 ,if we examine the activities of the agencies that fall within our direct experience1 whether in external nature or in our own selves1 we shall find that in no case does their operative influence or causality extend beyond the production of changes in existing being1 or attain to the production of new actual being out of nothingness4 ,the forces of nature cannot produce an oak without an acorn1 or an iceberg without water2 nor can the sculptor produce a statue except from some pre-existing material4 ,the natural passive potentiality of things is1 moreover1 limited in reference to the active powers of the created universe4 ,these1 for example1 can educe life from the passive potentiality of inorganic matter1 but only by assimilating this matter into a living organism3 they cannot restore life to a human corpse2 yet the latter has in it the capacity to be restored to life by the direct influence of the ,author of ,nature4 ,this special and supernatural potentiality in created things1 under the influence of ,omnipotence1 is known as potentia obedientalis47#gb7 ,this consideration will help us to realize that all reality which is produced by change1 and subject to change1 is essentially a mixture of becoming and being1 of potential and actual4 ,the reality of such being is not tota simul4 ,only immutable being1 whose duration is eternal1 has its reality tota simul3 it alone is purely actual1 the 8,actus ,purus02 and its duration is one eternal 8now10 without beginning1 end1 or succession4 ,but mutable being1 whose duration in actual existence is measured by time1 is actualized only successively3 its actuality at any particular instant does not embody the whole of its reality3 this latter includes also a 8was0 and 8will be02 the thing was potentially what it now is actually1 and it will become actually something which it now is only potentially2 nor shall we have understood even moderately the nature or essence of any mutable being--an oak-tree1 for example--until we have grasped the fact that the whole reality of its nature embraces more than what we find of it actually existing at any given instant of its existence4 ,in other words1 we have to bear in mind that the reality of such a being is not pure actuality but a mixture of potential and actual3 that it is an actus non-purus1 or an actus mixtus4 ,we have to note well that the potential being of a thing is something real--that it is not merely a modus loquendi1 or a modus intelligendi4 ,the oak is in the acorn in some true and real sense3 the potentiality of the oak is something real in the acorn3 if it were not so1 if it were nothing real in the acorn1 we could say with equal truth that a man or a horse or a house is potentially in the acorn2 or1 again with equal truth1 that the oak is potentially in a mustard-seed1 or a grain of corn1 or a pebble1 or a drop of water4 ,therefore the oak is really in the acorn--not actually but potentially1 potentia passiva4 ,the oak-tree is also really in those active forces of nature whose influence on the acorn develop the latter into an actual oak-tree3 it is in those causes not actually1 of course1 but virtually1 for they possess in themselves the operative power--potentia activa sive operativa--to educe the oak-tree out of the acorn4 ,these two potential conditions of a being--in the active causes which produce it1 and in the pre-existing actual thing or things from which it is produced--are called each a real or subjective potency1 potentia realis1 or potentia subjectiva1 in distinction from the mere logical or objective possibility of such a being4 ,and just as the passive potentiality of the statue is something real in the block of marble1 though distinct from the actuality of the statue and from the process by which this is actualized1 so is the active power of making the statue something real in the sculptor1 though distinct from the operation by which he makes the statue4 ,if an agent's power to act1 to produce change1 were not a reality in the agent1 a reality distinct from the action of the latter2 or if a being's capacity to undergo change1 and thereby to become something other1 were not a reality distinct from the process of change1 and from the actual result of this process--it would follow not only that the actual alone is real1 and the merely possible or potential unreal1 but also that no change can be real1 that nothing can really become1 and nothing really disappear47#gc7 #i4 7c7 ,,actuality3 ,,its ,,relation ,,to ,,potentiality4--,it is from our experience of change in the world that we derive our notions of the potential and the actual1 of active power and passive potentiality4 ,the term 8act0 has primarily the same meaning as 8action10 8operation10 that process by which a change is wrought4 ,but the ,latin word actus 7,gr4 1 7 means rather that which is achieved by the actio1 that which is the correlative and complement of the passive potentiality1 the actuality of this latter3 that by which potential being is rendered formally actual1 and1 by way of consequence1 this actual being itself4 8,potentia activa0 and its correlative 8actus0 might1 perhaps1 be appropriately rendered by 8power0 7potestas agendi7 and 8action0 or 8operation02 8potentia passiva0 and its correlative 8actus10 by 8potentiality0 and 8actuality0 respectively4 ,in these correlatives1 the notion underlying the term 8actual0 is manifestly the notion of something completed1 achieved1 perfected--as compared with that of something incomplete1 imperfect1 determinable1 which is the notion of the potential4 ,hence the notions of potentia and actus have been extended widely beyond their primary signification of power to act and the exercise of this power4 ,such pairs of correlatives as the determinable and the determined1 the perfectible and the perfected1 the undeveloped or less developed and the more developed1 the generic and the specific1 are all conceived under the aspect of this widest relation of the potential to the actual4 ,and since we can distinguish successive stages in any process of development1 or an order of logical sequence among the contents of our concept of any concrete reality1 it follows that what will be conceived as an actus in one relation will be conceived as a potentia in another4 ,thus1 the disposition of any faculty--as1 for example1 the scientific habit in the intellect--is an actus or perfection of the faculty regarded as a potentia2 but it is itself a potentia which is actualized in the operation of actually studying4 ,this illustrates the distinction commonly drawn between an 8actus primus0 and an 8actus secundus0 in any particular order or line of reality3 the actus primus is that which presupposes no prior actuality in the same order2 the actus secundus is that which does presuppose another4 ,the act of knowing is an actus secundus which presupposes the cognitive faculty as an actus primus3 the faculty being the first or fundamental equipment of the soul in relation to knowledge4 ,hence the child is said to have knowledge 8in actu primo0 as having the faculty of reason2 and the student to have knowledge 8in actu secundo0 as exercising this faculty4 ,the actus or perfecting principles of which we have spoken so far are all conceived as presupposing an existing subject on which they supervene4 ,they are therefore accidents as distinct from substantial constitutive principles of this subject2 and they are therefore called accidental actualities1 actus 8accidentales04 ,but the actual existence of a being is also conceived as the complement and correlative of its essence3 as that which makes the latter actual1 thus transferring it from the state of mere possibility4 ,hence existence also is called an actus or actuality3 the actus 8existentialis10 to distinguish it from the existing thing's activities and other subsequently acquired characters4 ,in reference to these existence is a 8first actuality0--8,esse est actus primus02 8,prius est esse quam agere03 8,existence is the first actuality02 8,action presupposes existence0--while each of these in reference to existence1 is a 8second actuality10 an actus secundus4 ,when1 furthermore1 we proceed to examine the constitutive principles essential to any being in the concrete1 we may be able to distinguish between principles which are determinable1 passive and persistent throughout all essential change of that being1 and others which are determining1 specifying1 differentiating principles4 ,in water1 for example1 we may distinguish the passive underlying principle which persists throughout the decomposition of water into oxygen and hydrogen1 from the active specifying principle which gives that substratum its specific nature as water4 ,the former or material principle 71 materia7 is potential1 compared with the latter or formal principle 71 1 1 forma1 species1 actus7 as actual4 ,the concept of actus is thus applied to the essence itself3 the actus 8essentialis0 or 8formalis0 of a thing is that which we conceive to be the ultimate1 completing and determining principle of the essence or nature of that thing4 ,in reference to this as well as the other constitutive principles of the thing1 the actual existence of the thing is a 8second actuality10 an actus secundus4 ,in fact all the constitutive principles of the essence of any existing thing1 and all the properties and attributes involved in the essence or necessarily connected with the essence1 must all alike be conceived as logically antecedent to the existential actus whereby they are constituted something in the actual order1 and not mere possible objects of our thought4 ,and from this point of view the existence of a thing is called the ultimate actualization of its essence4 ,hence the scholastic aphorism3 8,esse est ultimus actus rei04 ,the term actus may designate that complement of reality by which potential being is made actual 7actus 8actuans071 or this actual being itself 7actus 8simpliciter dictus074 ,in the latter sense we have already distinguished the ,being that is immutable1 the ,being of ,god1 as the ,actus ,purus1 from the being of all mutable things1 which latter being is necessarily a mixture of potential and actual1 an actus mixtus4 ,now if the essences of corporeal things are composite1 if they are constituted by the union of some determining1 formative principle with a determinable1 passive principle--of 8form0 with 8matter10 in scholastic terminology--we may call these formative principles actus 8informantes02 and if these cannot actually exist except in union with a material principle they may be called actus 8non-subsistentes03 e4g41 the formative principle or 8forma substantialis0 of water1 or the vital principle of a plant4 ,if1 on the other hand1 there exist essences which1 being simple1 do not actualize any material1 determinable principle1 but subsist independently of any such1 they are called actus 8non-informantes10 or actus 8subsistentes04 ,such1 for example1 are ,god1 and pure spirits whose existence is known from revelation4 ,finally1 there may be a kind of actual essence which1 though it naturally actualizes a material principle de facto1 can nevertheless continue to subsist without this latter3 such an actual being would be at once an actus informans and an actus subsistens2 and such1 in fact1 is the human soul4 ,throughout all distinctions between the potential and the actual there runs the conception of the actual as something more perfect than the potential4 ,there is in the actual something positive and real over and above what is in the potential4 ,this is an ultimate fact in our analysis2 and its importance will be realized when we come to apply the notions we have been explaining to the study of change4 ,the notion of grades of perfection in things is one with which everyone is familiar4 ,we naturally conceive some beings as higher upon the scale of reality than others2 as having 8more0 reality1 so to speak--not necessarily1 of course1 in the literal sense of size or quantity--than others2 as being more perfect1 nobler1 of greater worth1 value1 dignity1 excellence1 than others4 ,thus we regard the infinite as more perfect than the finite1 spiritual beings as nobler than material beings1 man as a higher order of being than the brute beast1 this again as surpassing the whole vegetable kingdom1 the lowest form of life as higher on the scale of being than inorganic matter1 the substance-mode of being as superior to all accident-modes1 the actualized state of a being as more perfect than its potential state1 i4e4 as existing in its material1 efficient and ideal or exemplar causes4 ,the grounds and significance of this mental appreciation of relative values in things must be discussed elsewhere4 ,we refer to it here in order to point out another scholastic aphorism1 according to which the higher a thing is in the scale of actual being1 and the more perfect it is accordingly1 the more efficient it will also be as a principle of action1 the more powerful as a cause in the production of changes in other things1 the more operative in actualizing their passive potentialities2 and conversely1 the less actual a thing is1 and therefore the more imperfect1 the greater its passive capacity will be to undergo the influence of agencies that are actual and operative around it4 8,as passive potentiality10 says ,st4 ,thomas17#gd7 8is the mark of potential being1 so active power is the mark of actual being4 ,for a thing acts1 in so far as it is actual2 but is acted on1 so far as it is potential40 ,our knowledge of the nature of things is in fact exclusively based on our knowledge of their activities3 we have no other key to the knowledge of what a thing is than our knowledge of what it does3 8,operari sequitur esse03 8,qualis est operatio talis est natura0--8,acting follows being03 8,conduct is the key to nature04 ,a being that is active or operative in the production of a change is said to be the efficient cause of the change1 the latter being termed the effect4 ,now the greater the change1 i4e4 the higher and more perfect be the grade of reality that is actualized in the change1 the higher too in the scale of being must be the efficient cause of that change4 ,there must be a proportion in degree of perfection or reality between effect and cause4 ,the former cannot exceed in actual perfection the active power1 and therefore the actual being1 of the latter4 ,this is so because we conceive the effect as being produced or actualized through the operative influence of the cause1 and with real dependence on this latter2 and it is inconceivable that a cause should have power to actualize other being1 distinct from itself1 which would be of a higher grade of excellence than itself4 ,the nature of efficient causality1 of the influence by which the cause is related to its effect1 is not easy to determine2 it will be discussed at a subsequent stage of our investigations 7ch4 xi472 but whatever it be1 a little reflection should convince us of the truth of the principle just stated3 that an effect cannot be more perfect than its cause4 ,the medival scholastics embodied this truth in the formula3 ,nemo dat quod non habet--a formula which we must not interpret in the more restricted and literal sense of the words giving and having1 lest we be met with the obvious objection that it is by no means necessary for a boy to have a black eye himself in order to give one to his neighbour6 ,what the formula means is that an agent cannot give to1 or produce in1 any potential subject1 receptive of its causal influence1 an actuality which it does not itself possess virtually1 or in its active power3 that no actuality surpassing in excellence the actual perfection of the cause itself can be found thus virtually in the active power of the latter4 ,there is no question of the cause or agent transferring bodily as it were a part of its own actuality to the subject which is undergoing change7#ge72 nor will such crude imagination images help us to understand what real change1 under the influence of efficient causality1 involves47#gf7 ,an analysis of change will enable us to appreciate more fully the real difficulty of explaining it1 and the futility of any attempt to account for it without admitting the real1 objective validity of the notions of actual and potential being1 of active powers or forces and passive potentialities in the things that are subject to change4 #aj4 ,,analysis ,,of ,,change4--,change 7,mutatio1 ,motus1 1 7 is one of those simplest concepts which cannot be defined4 ,we may describe it1 however1 as the transition of a being from one state to another4 ,if one thing entirely disappeared and another were substituted for it1 we should not regard the former as having been changed into the latter4 ,when one thing is put in the place of another1 each1 no doubt1 undergoes a change of place1 but neither is changed into the other4 ,so1 also1 if we were to conceive a thing as absolutely ceasing to exist1 as lapsing into nothingness at a given instant1 and another as coming into existence out of nothingness at the same instant 7and in the same place71 we should not consider this double event as constituting a real change of the former thing into the latter4 ,and although our senses cannot testify to anything beyond sequence in sense phenomena1 our reason detects in real change something other than a total substitution of things for one another1 or continuous total cessations and inceptions of existence in things4 ,no doubt1 if we conceive the whole phenomenal or perceptible universe and all the beings which constitute this universe as essentially contingent1 and therefore dependent for their reality and their actual existence on a ,supreme1 ,necessary ,being who created and conserves them1 who at any time may cease to conserve any of them1 and produce other and new beings out of nothingness1 then such absolute cessations and inceptions of existence in the world would not be impossible4 ,god might annihilate1 i4e4 cease to conserve in existence1 this or that contingent being at any instant1 and at any instant create a new contingent being1 i4e4 produce it in its totality from no pre-existing material4 ,but there is no reason to suppose that this is what is constantly taking place in ,nature3 that all change is simply a series of annihilations and creations4 ,on the contrary1 the modes of being which appear and disappear in real change1 in the transition of anything from one state to a really different state of being1 do not appear de novo1 ex nihilo1 as absolute beginnings out of nothingness2 or disappear totaliter1 in nihilum1 as absolute endings or lapses of reality into nothingness4 ,the real changes which take place in ,nature are due to the operation of natural causes4 ,these causes1 being finite in their operative powers1 cannot create1 i4e4 produce new being from nothingness4 ,they can1 however1 with the concurrence of the ,omnipotent ,being1 modify existing modes of being1 i4e4 make actual what was only potential in these latter4 ,the notion of change is not verified in the conception of successive annihilations and creations2 for there is involved in the former concept not merely the notion of a real difference between the two actual states1 that before and that after the change1 but also the notion of some potential reality persisting throughout the change1 something capable of being actually so and so before the change and actually otherwise after the change4 ,for real change1 therefore1 we require 7#a7 two positive and really different states of the same being1 a 8terminus a quo0 and a 8terminus ad quem02 and 7#b7 a real process of transition whereby something potential becomes actual4 ,in creation there is no real and positive terminus a quo2 in annihilation there is no real and positive terminus ad quem2 these therefore are not changes in the proper sense of the term4 ,sometimes1 too1 change is affirmed1 by purely extrinsic denomination1 of a thing in which there is no real change1 but only a relation to some other really changing thing4 ,in this sense when an object unknown or unthought of becomes the actual object of somebody's thought or cognition1 it is said to 8change10 though the transition from 8unknown0 to 8known0 involves no real change of state in the object1 but only in the knowing subject4 ,if thought were in any true sense 8constitutive0 of reality1 as many modern philosophers contend1 the change in the object would of course be real4 ,since1 therefore1 change consists in this1 that a thing which is actually in a given state ceases to be actually such and begins to be actually in another state1 it is obvious that there persists throughout the process some reality which is in itself potential and indifferent to either actual state2 and that1 moreover1 something which was actual disappears1 while some new actuality appears1 in this persisting potentiality4 ,the abiding potential principle is called the matter or subject of the change2 the transient actualizing principles are called forms4 ,not all these 8forms0 which precede or result from change are necessarily positive entities in themselves3 they may be mere privations of other forms 78privatio10 73 not all changes result in the acquisition of a new degree of positive actual being2 some result in loss of perfection or actuality4 ,still1 even in these cases1 the state characterized by the less perfect degree of actuality has a determinate actual grade of being which is proper to itself1 and which1 as such1 is not found actually1 but only potentially1 in the state characterized by the more perfect degree of actuality4 ,when1 then1 a being changes from a more perfect to a less perfect state1 the actuality of this less perfect state cannot be adequately accounted for by seeking it in the antecedent and more perfect state3 it is not in this latter state actually1 but only potentially2 nor do we account for it by saying that it is 8equivalently0 in the greater actuality of the latter state3 the two actualizing principles are really distinct1 and neither is wholly or even partially the other4 ,the significance of this consideration will appear presently in connection with the scholastic axiom3 ,quidquid movetur ab alio movetur4 ,meanwhile we must guard against conceiving the potential or material factor in change as a sort of actual but hidden core of reality which itself persists unchanged throughout2 and the formative or actualizing factors as superficially adorning this substratum by constantly replacing one another4 ,such a substitution of imagination images for intellectual thought will not help1 but rather hinder1 all accurate analysis4 ,it is not the potential or material factor in things that changes1 nor yet the actualizing or formal factors1 but the things themselves2 and if 8things0 are subject to 8real change0 it is manifest that this fact can be made intelligible1 if at all1 only by intellectually analysing the things and their changes into constitutive principles or factors which are nor themselves 8things0 or 8changes04 ,were we to arrive only at principles of the latter sort1 so far from explaining anything we would really only have pushed back the problem a step farther4 ,it may be that none of the attempts yet made by philosophers or scientists to offer an ultimate explanation of change is entirely satisfactory1--the scholastic explanation will be gradually outlined in these pages1--but it will be of advantage at least to recognize the shortcomings of theories that are certainly inadequate4 ,we are now in a position to state and explain the important scholastic aphorism embodying what has been called the ,principle of ,change 78,principium ,motus073 ,quidquid movetur1 ab alio movetur3 8,whatever undergoes change is changed by something else04 ,the term motus is here taken in the wide sense of any real transition from potentiality to actuality1 as is evident from the alternative statements of the same principle3 ,nihil potest seipsum reducere e potentia in actum3 8,nothing can reduce itself from potentiality to actuality10 or1 again1 ,potentia1 qua talis1 nequit per semetipsam ad actum reduci1 sed reducitur ab alio principio in actu3 8,the potential as such cannot be reduced by itself to the actual1 but only by some other already actual principle047#gg7 ,this assertion1 rightly understood1 is self-evidently true2 for the state of passive potentiality1 as such1 involves the absence of the correlative actuality in the potential subject2 and since the actual1 as such1 involves a perfection which is not in the potential1 the latter cannot confer upon itself this perfection3 nothing can be the adequate principle or source of a perfection which is not in this principle or source3 nemo dat quod non habet4 ,we have already anticipated the objection arising from the consideration that the state resulting from a change is sometimes in its totality less perfect than the state which existed prior to the change4 ,even in such cases there results from the change a new actuality which was not in the prior state1 and which cannot be conceived as a mere part or residue of the latter1 or regarded as equivalently contained in the latter4 ,even granting1 as we must1 that the net result of such a change is a loss of actuality or perfection in the subject of change1 still there is always a gain which is not accounted for by the loss2 there is always a new actual state which1 as such1 was not in the original state4 ,a more obvious objection to the principle arises from the consideration of vital action2 but it is based on a misunderstanding of the principle under discussion4 ,living things1 it is objected1 move themselves3 their vital action is spontaneous and immanent3 originating within themselves1 it has its term too within themselves1 resulting in their gradual development1 growth1 increase of actuality and perfection4 ,therefore it would appear that they move and perfect themselves2 and hence the so-called 8principle of change0 is not true universally4 ,in reply to all this we admit that vital action is immanent1 remaining within the agent to perfect the latter2 also that it is spontaneous1 inasmuch as when the agent is actually exercising vital functions it need not be actually undergoing the causal influence of any other created agent1 or actually dependent on any such agent4 ,but it must1 nevertheless1 in such action1 be dependent on1 and influenced by1 some actual being other than itself4 ,and the reason is obvious3 ,if by such action it increases its own actual perfection1 and becomes actually other than it was before such action1 then it cannot have given itself the actuality of this perfection1 which it possessed before only potentially4 ,no doubt1 it is not merely passively potential in regard to such actual perfections1 as is the case in non-vital change which results in the subject from the transitive action of some outside cause upon the latter4 ,the living thing has the active power of causing or producing in itself these actual perfections3 there is interaction between its vital parts3 through one organ or faculty it acts upon another1 thus educing an actuality1 a new perfection1 in this other1 and thus developing and perfecting its own being4 ,but even considered as active it cannot be the adequate cause of the actuality acquired through the change4 ,if this actuality is something really over and above the reality of its active and passive potential principles1 then it remains true that change implies the influence of an actual being other than the subject changed3 ,quid quid movetur1 ab alio movetur4 ,the question here arises1 not only in reference to vital agents1 but to all finite1 created causes3 ,does the active cause of change 7together with the passive potentiality of the subject of change1 whether this subject be the agent itself as in immanent activity1 or something other than the agent as in transitive activity71--does this active power account adequately for the new actuality educed in the change8 ,it obviously does not2 for the actuality acquired in the change is1 as such1 a new entity1 a new perfection1 in some degree positively surpassing the total reality of the combined active powers and passive potentialities which it replaces4 ,in other words1 if the actuality resulting from the change is not to be found in the immediate active and passive antecedents of the change1 then we are inevitably referred1 for an adequate explanation of this actuality1 to some actual being above and beyond these antecedents4 ,and to what sort of actual being are we referred8 ,to a being in which the actuality of the effect resides only in the same way as it resides in the immediate active and passive antecedents of the change1 that is potentially8 ,no2 for this would be useless1 merely pushing the difficulty one step farther back4 ,we are obliged rather to infer the existence of an ,actual ,being in whom the actuality of the said effect resides actually3 not formally1 of course1 as it exists in itself when it is produced through the change2 but eminently1 eminenter1 in such a way that its actualization outside ,himself and under ,his influence does not involve in ,him any loss of perfection1 any increase of perfection1 or any manner of change whatsoever4 ,we are compelled in this way to infer1 from the existence of change in the universe of our direct experience1 the existence of a transcendent ,immovable ,prime ,mover1 a ,primum ,movens ,immobile4 ,all the active causes or principles of change which fall under our notice in the universe of direct experience are themselves subject to change4 ,none of them causes change in any other thing without itself undergoing change4 ,the active power of finite causes is itself finite4 ,by educing the potentiality of other things into actuality they gradually use up their own energy2 they diminish and lose their active power of producing effects3 this belongs to the very nature of finite causes as such4 ,moreover1 they are themselves passive as well as active2 interaction is universal among the finite causes which constitute the universe of our direct experience3 they all alike have passive potentiality and undergo change4 ,now1 if any one finite cause in this system cannot adequately account for the new actuality evolved from the potential in any single process of change1 neither can the whole system adequately account for it4 ,what is true of them distributively is true of them taken all together when there is question of what belongs to their nature2 and the fact that their active powers and passive potentialities fall short of the actuality of the effects we attribute to them is a fact that appertains to their very nature as finite things4 ,the phenomenon of continuous change in the universe involves the continuous appearance of new actual being4 ,to account for this constant stream of actuality we are of necessity carried beyond the system of finite1 changing being itself2 we are forced to infer the existence of a source and principle which must itself be purely actual and exempt from all change--a ,being who can cause all the actuality that results from change without losing or gaining or changing in any way ,himself1 because ,he possesses all finite actuality in ,himself in a supereminent manner which transcends all the efforts of finite human intelligence to comprehend or characterize in any adequate or positive manner4 ,the scholastics expressed this in the simple aphorism3 ,omne novum ens est a ,deo4 ,and it is the realization of this profound truth that underlies their teaching on the necessity of the ,divine ,concursus1 i4e4 the influence of the ,infinite ,first ,cause or ,prime ,mover permeating the efficiency of all finite or created causes4 ,here1 for example1 is a brief recent statement of that doctrine3-- 8,if we must admit a causal influence of these things of direct experience on one another1 then a closer examination will convince us that a finite thing can never be the adequate cause of any effect1 but is always1 metaphysically regarded1 only a part-cause1 ever needing to be completed by another cause4 ,every effect is--at least under one aspect1 at least as an effect--something new1 something that was not there before4 ,even were the effect contained1 whether formally or virtually1 in the cause1 it is certainly not identical with this latter1 for if it were there would be no causality1 nothing would #8happen'4 ,in all causing and happening1 something which was heretofore only possible1 becomes real and actual4 ,but things cannot determine themselves to influence others1 or to receive the influence of others1 since they are not dependent in their being on one another4 ,hence the necessary inference that all being1 all happening1 all change1 requires the concurrence of an ,absolute ,principle of being4 ,when two things act on each other the ,absolute ,being must work in and with them1 the same ,absolute ,being in both--to relate them to each other1 and supplement their natural insufficiency40 8,such is the profound teaching about the ,divine ,concursus with every creature4444 ,god works in all and with all4 ,he permeates all reality1 everywhere2 there is no being beyond ,him or independent of ,his conserving and concurring power4 ,just as creatures are brought into being only through ,god's omnipotence1 and of themselves have no independent reality1 so do they need the self-same ever-present1 all-sustaining power to continue in this being and develop it by their activity4 ,every event in ,nature is a transitory1 passing phenomenon1 so bound up with conditions and circumstances that it must disappear to give place to some other4 ,how could a mode of being so incomplete discharge its function in existence without the concurrence of the ,first ,cause807#gh7 ,we have seen now that in the real order the potential presupposes the actual2 for the potential cannot actualize itself1 but can be actualized only by the action of some already actual being4 ,nor can we avoid this consequence by supposing the potential being to have had no actual beginning in time1 but to be eternally in process of actualization2 for even so1 it must be eternally actualized by some other actual being--a position which ,aristotle and some scholastics admit to be possible4 ,whether1 then1 we conceive the actualization as beginning in time or as proceeding from all eternity1 it is self-contradictory to suppose the potential as capable of actualizing itself4 ,it is likewise true that the actual precedes the possible in the order of our knowledge4 ,the concept of a thing as possible presupposes the concept of that thing as actual2 for the possible is understood to be possible only by its intelligible relation to actual existence4 ,this is evidently true of extrinsic possibility2 but our knowledge even of the intrinsic possibility of a thing cannot be the first knowledge we possess in the order of time4 ,our first knowledge is of the actual2 for the mind's first cognitive act must have for object either itself or something not itself4 ,but it knows itself as a consciously acting and therefore actual being4 ,and it comes to know things other than itself only by the fact that such other things act upon it either immediately or mediately through sense-consciousness2 so that in every hypothesis its first known object is something actual47#gi7 ,the priority of the actual as compared with the potential in the real order1 suggests a proof of the existence of ,god in the manner indicated above4 ,it also affords a refutation of ,hegelian monism4 ,the conception of the world1 including all the phenomena of mind and matter1 as the gradual self-manifestation or evolution of a potential being eternally actualizing itself1 is a self-contradictory conception4 ,scholastics rightly maintain that the realities from which we derive our first most abstract and transcendental notion of being in general1 are actual realities4 ,hegelians seize on the object of this notion1 identify it with pure thought1 proclaim it the sole reality1 and endow it with the power of becoming actually everything4 ,it is manifest1 therefore1 that they endow purely potential being with the power of actualizing itself4 ,nor can they fairly avoid this charge by pointing out that although their starting-point is not actual being 7with which the scholastic philosophy of being commences71 yet neither is it possible or potential being1 but being which has neither of these determinations1 being which abstracts from both1 like the real being of the scholastics 7#g1 #ac74 ,for though real being can be an object of abstract human thought without either of the predicates 8existent0 or 8non-existent10 yet it cannot be anything in the real order without either of them4 ,there it must be either actually existent or else merely potential4 ,but ,hegelians claim absolutely indeterminate being to be as such something in the real order2 and though they try to distinguish it from potential being they nevertheless think of it as potential being1 for they distinctly and repeatedly declare that it can become all things1 and does become all things1 and is constantly1 eternally transforming itself by an internal dialectic process into the phenomena which constitute the worlds of mind and matter4 ,contrasting it with the abstract 8inert0 being which they conceive to be the object of the traditional metaphysics1 they endow 8indeterminate being0 with the active power of producing1 and the passive potentiality of becoming1 actually everything4 ,thus1 in order to show a priori how this indeterminate being must evolve itself by internal logical necessity into the world of our direct and immediate experience1 they suppose it to be subject to change and to be at the same time self-actualizing1 in direct opposition to the axiom that potential reality1 reality which is subject to change1 cannot actualize itself3 ,quidquid movetur ab alio moveatur oportet4 #aa4 ,,kinds ,,of ,,change4--,following ,aristotle17#hj7 we may recognize a broad and clear distinction between four great classes of change 71 mutatio7 in the phenomena of our sense experience3 local change 7 1 1 latio72 quantitative change 7 1 1 augmentatio vel diminutio72 qualitative change 7 1 1 alteratio72 and substantial change 7 1 74 ,the three former are accidental1 i4e4 do not reach or affect the essence or substance of the thing that is changed2 the fourth is substantial1 a change of essence4 ,substantial change is regarded as taking place instantaneously1 as soon as the condition brought about by the accidental changes leading up to it becomes naturally incompatible with the essence or nature of the subject4 ,the accidental changes1 on the other hand1 are regarded as taking place gradually1 as realizing and involving a succession of states or conditions in the subject4 ,these changes1 especially when they take place in corporeal things1 are properly described as movement or motion 7motus1 motio74 ,by movement or motion in the strict sense we therefore mean any change which takes place gradually or successively in a corporeal thing4 ,it is only in a wider and improper sense that these terms are sometimes applied to activity of whatsoever kind1 even of spiritual beings4 ,in this sense we speak of thoughts1 volitions1 etc41 as movements of the soul1 motus animae2 or of ,god as the ,prime ,mover ever in motion1 the ,primum ,movens semper in motu4 ,with local change in material things1 as also with quantitative change1 growth and diminution of quantity 7mass and volume71 everyone is perfectly familiar4 ,from the earliest times1 moreover1 we find both in science and philosophy the conception of matter as composed of1 and divisible into1 ultimate particles1 themselves supposed to admit of no further real division1 and hence called atoms 7-1 74 ,from the days of ,grecian atomism men have attempted to show that all change in the ,universe is ultimately reducible to changes of place1 order1 spatial arrangement and collocation1 of those hypothetical atomic factors4 ,it has likewise been commonly assumed that change in mass is solely due to change in the number of those atoms1 and change in volume 7of the same mass7 to the relative density or closeness with which the atoms aggregate together2 though some have held--and it is certainly not inconceivable--that exactly the same material entity1 an atom let us say1 may be capable of real contraction and expansion1 and so of real change of volume3 as distinct from the apparent contraction and expansion of bodies1 a change which is supposed to be due to change of density1 i4e4 to decrease or increase in the dimensions of the pores or interstices between the smaller constituent parts or molecules4 ,however this may be1 the attempts to reduce all change in physical nature to mere mechanical change i4e4 to spatial motions of the masses 7molar motions71 the molecules 7molecular motions71 and the atoms or other ultimate components of matter 7whether vibratory1 undulatory1 rotatory or translational motions71 have never been satisfactory4 ,qualitative change is wider than material change1 for it includes changes in spiritual beings1 i4e4 in beings which are outside the category of quantity and have a mode of existence altogether different from the extensional1 spatial existence which characterizes matter4 ,when1 for instance1 the human mind acquires knowledge1 it undergoes qualitative change4 ,but matter1 too1 has qualities1 and is subject to qualitative change4 ,it is endowed with active qualities1 i4e4 with powers1 forces1 energies1 whereby it can not merely perform mechanical work by producing local changes in the distribution of its mass throughout space1 but also produce physical and chemical changes which seem at least to be different in their nature from mere mechanical changes4 ,it is likewise endowed with passive qualities which appear to the senses to be of various kinds1 differing from one another and from the mechanical or quantitative characteristics of size1 shape1 motion1 rest1 etc4 ,while these latter are called 8primary qualities0 of bodies--because conceived to be more fundamental and more closely inherent in the real and objective nature of matter--or 8common sensibles0 7sensibilia communia71 because perceptible by more than one of our external senses--the former are called 8secondary qualities10 because conceived to be less characteristic of the real and objective nature of matter1 and more largely subjective products of our own sentient cognitive activity--or 8proper sensibles0 7sensibilia propria71 because each of them is apprehended by only one of our external senses3 colour1 sound1 taste1 odour1 temperature1 material state or texture 7e4g4 roughness1 liquidity1 softness1 etc474 ,now about all these perceived qualities and their changes the question has been raised3 ,are they1 as such1 i4e4 as perceived by us1 really in the material things or bodies which make up the physical universe1 and really different in these bodies from the quantitative factors and motions of the latter8 ,or1 as such1 are they not rather partially or wholly subjective phenomena--products1 at least in part1 of our own sense perception1 states of our own consciousness1 having nothing really corresponding to them in the external matter of the universe beyond the quantitative1 mechanical factors and motions whereby matter acts upon our faculties of sense cognition and produces these states of consciousness in us8 ,this is a question of the first importance1 the solution of which belongs to ,epistemology4 ,aristotle would not allow that the objective material universe can be denuded1 in the way just suggested1 of qualities and qualitative change2 and scholastic philosophers have always held the same general view4 ,what we have to note here1 however1 in regard to the question is simply this1 that even if the world of matter were thus simplified by transferring all qualitative change to the subjective domain of consciousness1 the reality of qualitative change and all the problems arising from it would still persist4 ,to transfer qualitative change from object to subject1 from matter to mind1 is certainly something very different from explaining it as reducible to quantitative or mechanical change4 ,the simplification thus effected would be more apparent than real3 it would be simplifying the world of matter by transferring its complexity to the world of mind4 ,this consideration is one which is sometimes lost sight of by scientists who advance mechanical hypotheses as ultimate explanations of the nature and activities of the physical universe4 ,if all material things and processes could be ultimately analysed into configurations and local motions of space-occupying atoms1 homogeneous in nature and differing only in size and shape1 then each of these ultimate atomic factors would be itself exempt from intrinsic change as to its own essence and individuality4 ,in this hypothesis there would be really no such thing as substantial change4 ,the collection of atoms would form an immutable core of material reality1 wholly simple and ever actual4 ,such an hypothesis1 however1 is utterly inadequate as an explanation of the facts of life and consciousness4 ,and even as an account of the processes of the inorganic universe it encounters insuperable difficulties4 ,the common belief of men has always been that even in this domain of reality there are fundamentally different kinds of matter1 kinds which differ from one another not merely in the shape and size and configuration and arrangement of their ultimate actual constituents1 but even in the very substance or nature of these constituents2 and that there are some material changes which affect the actual substance itself of the matter which undergoes them4 ,this belief scholastics1 again following ,aristotle1 hold to be a correct belief1 and one which is well grounded in reason4 ,and this belief in turn involves the view that every type of actual material entity--whether merely inorganic1 or endowed with life1 or even allied with a higher1 spiritual mode of being as in the case of man himself--is essentially composite1 essentially a synthesis of potential and actual principles of being1 and therefore capable of substantial change4 ,the actually existing material being scholastics describe as materia secunda1 the of ,aristotle2 the purely potential factor1 which is actualized in this or that particular kind of matter1 they describe as materia prima1 the of ,aristotle2 the actualizing1 specifying1 formative principle1 they designate as forma substantialis 774 ,and since the purely potential principle cannot actually exist except as actualized by some formative principle1 all substantial change or transition from one substantial type to another is necessarily both a corruptio and a generatio4 ,that is1 it involves the actual disappearance of one substantial form and the actual appearance of another4 ,hence the scholastic aphorism regarding substantial change3 ,corruptio unius est generatio alterius3 the corruption or destruction of one kind of material thing involves the generation of another kind4 ,the concepts of materia prima and forma substantialis are concepts not of phenomenal entities directly accessible to the senses or the imagination1 but of principles which can be reached only mediately and by intellect proper4 ,they cannot be pictured in the imagination1 which can only attain to the sensible4 ,we may help ourselves to grasp them intellectually by the analogy of the shapeless block of marble and the figure educed therefrom by the sculptor1 but this is only an analogy3 just as the statue results from the union of an accidental form with an existing matter1 so this matter itself1 the substance marble1 is composed of a substantial form and a primordial1 potential matter4 ,but there the analogy ceases4 ,furthermore1 when we consider that the proper and primary objects of the human intellect itself are corporeal things or bodies1 and that these bodies actually exist in nature only as composite substances1 subject to essential or substantial change1 we shall realize why it is that the concept of materia prima especially1 being a mediate and negative concept1 is so difficult to grasp2 for1 as the scholastics describe it1 translating ,aristotle's formula1 it is in itself neque quid1 neque quantum1 neque quale1 neque aliquid eorum quibus ens determinatur47#ha7 ,but it is through intellectual concepts alone1 and not through imagination images1 that we may hope to analyse the nature and processes even of the world of corporeal reality2 and1 as ,st4 ,thomas well observes1 it was because the ancient ,greek atomists did not rise above the level of thinking in imagination images that they failed to recognize the existence1 or explain the nature1 of substantial change in the material universe7#hb73 an observation which applies with equal force to those scientists and philosophers of our own time who would fain reduce all physical processes to mere mechanical change4 ,those1 then1 are the principal kinds of change1 as analysed by ,aristotle and the scholastics4 ,we may note1 finally1 that the distinction between immanent and transitive activity is also applied to change--that is1 to change considered as a process1 not to the result of the change1 to change in fieri1 not in facto esse4 ,immanent movement or activity 7motio1 actio immanens7 is that of which the term1 the educed actuality1 remains within the agent--which latter is therefore at once both agens and patiens4 ,vital action is of this kind4 ,transitive movement or activity1 on the other hand 7motio1 actio transiens71 is that of which the term is some actuality educed in a being other than the agent4 ,the patiens is here really distinct from the agens2 and it is in the former1 not in the latter1 that the change takes place3 actio fit in passo4 ,all change in the inorganic universe is of this sort 7#aja74 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,existence ,,and ,,essence4 #ab4 ,,existence4--,in the preceding chapters we examined reality in itself and in its relation to change or becoming4 ,we have now to examine it in relation to its actual existence and to its intrinsic possibility 7#g1 a74 ,existing or being 7in the participial sense3 esse1 existere1 7 is a simple1 indefinable notion4 ,a being is said to exist when it is not merely possible but actual1 when it is not merely potential in its active and passive causes but has become actual through those causes 7existere3 ex-sisto3 ex-stare3 to stand forth1 distinct from its causes72 or1 if it have no causes1 when it simply is 7esse71--in which sense ,god1 the ,necessary1 purely ,actual ,being1 simply is4 ,thus1 existence implies the notion of actuality1 and is conceived as that by which any thing or essence is1 distinct from nothingness1 in the actual order47#hc7 ,or1 again1 it is the actuality of any thing or essence4 ,about any conceivable being we may ask two distinct questions3 7a7 ,what is it8 and 7b7 ,does such a being actually exist8 ,the answer to the former gives us the essence1 what is presented to the mind through the concept2 the answer to the latter informs us about the actual existence of the being or essence in question4 ,to the mind of any individual man the real existence 7as also the real essence7 of any being whatsoever1 not excepting his own1 can be known only through its ideal presence in his mind1 through the concept or percept whereby it becomes for him a 8known object10 an objectum cognitum4 ,but this actual presence of known being to the knowing mind must not be confounded with the real existence of such being 7#d74 ,real being does not get its real existence in our minds or from our minds4 ,our cognition does not produce1 but only discovers1 actually existing reality4 ,the latter1 by acting on the mind1 engenders therein the cognition of itself4 ,now all our knowledge comes through the senses2 and sense cognition is excited in us by the direct action of material or phenomenal being on our sense faculties4 ,but through sense cognition the mind is able to attain to a knowledge both of the possibility and of the actual existence of suprasensible or spiritual realities4 ,hence we cannot describe existence as the power which material realities have to excite in us a knowledge of themselves4 ,their existence is prior to this activity3 prius est esse quam agere4 ,nor can we limit existence to material realities2 for if there are spiritual realities these too have existence1 though this existence can be discerned only by intellect1 and not by sense4 #ac4 ,,essence4--,in any existing thing we can distinguish what the thing is1 its essence1 from its actual existence4 ,if we abstract from the actual existence of a thing1 not considering whether it actually exists or not1 and fix our attention merely on what the thing is1 we are thinking of its real essence4 ,if we positively exclude the notion of actual existence from our concept of the essence1 and think of the latter as not actually existing1 we are considering it formally as a possible essence4 ,there is no being1 even the ,necessary ,being1 whose essence we cannot think of in the former way1 i4e4 without including in our concept the notion of actual existence2 but we cannot without error positively exclude the notion of actual existence from our concept of the ,necessary ,being1 or think of the latter as a merely possible essence4 ,taken in its widest sense1 the essence of a thing 71 essentia1 1 quod quid est1 quidditas7 means that by which a thing is what it is3 id quo res est id quod est3 that which gives us the answer to the question1 ,what is this thing8 ,quid est haec res8 47#hd7 ,now of course any individual thing is what it is just precisely by all the reality that is in it2 but we have no direct or intuitive intellectual insight into this reality2 we understand it only by degrees2 we explore it from various points of view1 abstracting and generalizing partial aspects of it as we compare it with other things and seek to classify and define it3 ratio humana essentias rerum quasi venatur1 as the scholastics say3 the human mind hunts1 as it were1 after the essences or natures of things4 ,understanding the individual datum of sense experience 7what ,aristotle called 1 or 1 and the scholastics hoc aliquid1 or substantia prima71 e4g4 this individual1 ,socrates1 first under the vaguest concept of being1 then gradually under the more and more determinate concepts of substance1 corporeal1 living1 sentient1 rational1 it finally forms the complex concept of his species infima1 expressed by his lowest class-name1 8man10 and explicitly set forth in the definition of his specific nature as a 8rational animal04 ,nor does our reason fail to realize that by reaching this concept of the specific essence or nature of the individual1 ,socrates1 it has not yet grasped all the reality whereby the individual is what he is4 ,it has reached what he has in common with all other individuals of his class1 what is essential to him as a man2 it has distinguished this from the unanalysed something which makes him this particular individual of his class1 and which makes his specific essence this individual essence 7essentia 8atoma10 or 8individua072 and it has also distinguished his essence from those accidental and ever varying attributes which are not essential to him as a man1 and from those which are not essential to him as ,socrates4 ,it is only the unfathomed individual essence1 as existing hic et nunc1 that is concrete4 ,all the mind's generic and specific representations of it--e4g4 of ,socrates as a corporeal substance1 a living being1 a sentient being1 a rational animal--are abstract1 and all more or less inadequate1 none of them exhausting its knowable reality4 ,but it is only in so far as the mind is able to represent concrete individual things by such abstract concepts1 that it can attain to intellectual knowledge of their nature or reality4 ,hence it is that by the term 8essence10 simply and sine addito1 we always mean the essence as grasped by abstract generic or specific concepts 71 species71 and as thus capable of definition 71 ratio rei74 8,the essence10 says ,st4 ,thomas1 8is that by which the thing is constituted in its proper genus or species1 and which we signify by the definition which states what the thing is047#he7 ,thus understood1 the essence is abstract1 and gives the specific or generic type to which the individual thing belongs2 but we may also mean by essence1 the concrete essence1 the individual person or thing 7persona1 suppositum1 res individua74 ,the relations between the objects of those two concepts of essence will be examined later4 ,since the specific essence is conceived as the most fundamental reality in the thing1 and as the seat and source of all the properties and activities of the thing1 it is sometimes defined or described1 in accordance with this notion of it1 as the primary constitutive of the thing and the source of all the properties of the thing4 ,conceived as the foundation of all the properties of the thing it is sometimes called substance 71 substantia74 ,regarded as the source of the thing's activities1 and the principle of its growth or development1 it is called the nature of the thing 71 natura1 from 1 nascor747#hf7 ,since what makes a thing that which it is1 by the same fact differentiates this thing from every other thing1 the essence is rightly conceived as that which gives the thing its characteristic being1 thereby marking it off from all other being4 ,in reality1 of course1 each individual being is distinct by all that it is from every other4 ,but since we get our intellectual knowledge of things by abstracting1 comparing1 generalizing1 and classifying partial aspects of them1 we apprehend part of the imperfectly grasped abstract essence of each individual as common to other classes 7generic71 and part as peculiar to that class itself 7differential72 and thus we differentiate classes of things by what is only part of their essence1 by what we call the differentia of each class1 distinguishing mentally between it and the generic element3 which two are really one1 really identical1 in every individual of the species thus defined and classified4 ,but in the ,aristotelian and scholastic view of the constitution of any corporeal thing1 there is a danger of taking what is really only part of the essence of such a thing for the whole essence4 ,according to this view all corporeal substance is essentially composite1 constituted by two really distinct1 substantial principles1 primal matter 7 1 materia prima7 and substantial form 71 7 united substantially1 as potential and actual principles1 to form one composite nature or essence4 ,now the kind1 or species1 or specific type1 to which a body belongs--e4g41 a horse1 an oak1 gold1 water1 etc4--depends upon the substantial form which actualizes the matter or potential principle4 ,in so far as the corporeal essence is known to us at all it is known through the form1 which is the principle of all the characteristic properties and activities of that particular kind of body4 ,hence it is quite natural that the 1 1 or forma substantialis of a body should often be referred to as the specific essence of the body1 though of course the essence of the body really includes the material as well as the formal factor4 ,we may look at the essence of any being from two points of view4 ,if we consider it as it is conceived actually to exist in the being1 we call it the physical essence4 ,if we consider it after the manner in which it is apprehended and defined by our intellects through generic and differentiating concepts1 we call it the metaphysical essence4 ,thus1 the essence of man conceived by the two defining concepts1 8rational animal10 is the metaphysical essence2 the essence of man as known to be composed of the two really distinct substantial principles1 soul and body1 is the physical essence4 ,understood in this way both are one and the same essence considered from different points of view--as existing in the actual order1 and as conceived by the mind47#hg7 ,the physical essence of any being1 understood as the constitutive principle or principles from which all properties spring1 is either simple or composite according as it is understood to consist of one such constitutive principle1 or to result from the substantial union of two constitutive principles1 a material and a formal4 ,thus1 the essence of ,god1 the essence of a purely spiritual being1 the essence of the human soul1 are physically simple2 the essence of man1 the essences of all corporeal beings1 are physically composite4 ,according to our mode of conceiving1 defining and classifying essences by means of the abstract generic and differential grades of being which we apprehend in them1 all essences1 even physically simple essences1 are conceived as logically and metaphysically composite4 ,moreover we speak and think of their generic and differential factors as 8material0 and 8formal0 respectively1 after the analogy of the composition of corporeal or physically composite essences from the union of two really distinct principles1 matter and form2 the analogy consisting in this1 that as matter is the indeterminate principle which is determined and actuated by form1 so the generic concept is the indeterminate concept which is made definite and specific by that of the differentia47#hh7 ,but when we think of the genus of any corporeal essence as 8material10 and the differentia as 8formal10 we must not consider these 8metaphysical parts0 as really distinct2 whereas the 8physical parts0 of a corporeal substance 7such as man7 are really distinct4 ,the genus 7animal71 although a metaphysical part1 expresses the whole essence 7man7 in an indeterminate way2 whereas the 8matter0 which is a physical part1 does not express the whole essence of man1 nor does the soul which is also a physical part1 but only both together4 ,not a little error has resulted from the confusion of thought whereby genus and differentia have been regarded as material and formal constitutives in the literal sense of those expressions4 #ad4 ,,characteristics ,,of ,,abstract ,,essences4--,when we consider the essences of things not as actually existing1 but as intrinsically possible--the abstract1 metaphysical essences1 therefore--we find that when as objects of our thought they are analysed into their simplest constituents and compared or related with themselves and with one another they present themselves to our minds in these relations as endowed with certain more or less remarkable characteristics4 7a7 ,in the first place1 being abstract1 they present themselves to the mind as being what they are independently of actual existence at any particular time or place4 ,their intelligibility is something apart from any relation to any actual time or place4 ,being intrinsically possible1 they might exist at any time or place2 but as possible1 they are out of time and out of place--detemporalized and delocalized1 if we may be permitted to use such expressions47#hi7 7b7 ,furthermore1 since the intellect forms its notions of them1 through the aid of the senses and the imagination1 from actual realizations of themselves or their constituent factors1 and since it understands them to be intrinsically possible1 or free from intrinsic incompatibility of their constituent factors1 it conceives them to be capable of indefinitely repeated actualizations throughout time and space--unless it sees some special reason to the contrary1 as it does in the case of the ,necessary ,being1 and 7according to some philosophers7 in the case of purely immaterial beings or pure spirits4 ,that is to say it universalizes them1 and sees them to be capable of existing at any and every conceivable time and place4 ,this relation of theirs to space is not likely to be confounded with the immensity or ubiquity of ,god4 ,but their corresponding relation to time is sometimes described as eternity2 and if it is so described it must be carefully distinguished from the positive eternity of ,god1 the ,immutable ,being4 ,to distinguish it from the latter it is usually described as negative eternity1--this indifference of the possible essence to actual existence at any particular point of time4 ,but apart from this relation which we conceive it as having to existence in the order of actual reality1 can we1 or do we1 or must we conceive it as in itself an intrinsic possibility from all eternity1 in the sense that it never began to be intrinsically possible1 and will never cease to be so8 ,must we attribute to it a positive eternity1 not of course of actuality or existence1 but of ideal being1 as an object of thought to an ,eternally ,existing ,mind8 ,what is this supposed eternal possibility of the possible essence8 ,is it nothing actual3 the possible as such is nothing actual4 ,but is it anything real8 ,has it only ideal being--esse ideale or intentionale8 ,and has it this only in and from the human mind1 or independently of the human mind8 ,and also independently of the actual essences from which the human mind gets the data for its thought1--so that we must ascribe to it an eternal ideal being8 ,to these questions we shall return presently4 7c7 ,thirdly1 essences considered apart from their actual existence1 and compared with their own constitutive factors or with one another1 reveal to the mind relations which the mind sees to be necessary1 and which it formulates for itself in necessary judgments1--judgments in materia necessaria4 ,by virtue of the principle of identity an abstract essence is necessarily what it is1 what the mind conceives it to be1 what the mind conceives as its definition4 ,man1 as an object of thought1 is necessarily a rational animal1 whether he actually exists or not4 ,and if he is thought of as existing1 he cannot at the same time be thought of as non-existing1--by the principle of contradiction4 ,an existing man is necessarily an existing man1--by the principle of identity4 ,these logical principles are rooted in the nature of reality1 whether actual or possible1 considered as an object of thought4 ,there is thus a necessary relation between any complex object of thought and each of the constituent factors into which the mind can analyse it4 ,and1 similarly1 there is a necessary negative relation--a relation of exclusion--between any object of thought and anything which the mind sees to be incompatible with that object as a whole1 or with any of its constituent factors4 ,again1 the mind sees necessary relations between abstract essences compared with one another4 ,five and seven are necessarily twelve4 ,whatever begins to exist actually must have a cause4 ,contingent being1 if such exists1 is necessarily dependent for its existence on some other actually existing being4 ,if potential being is actualized it must be actualized by actual being4 ,the three interior angles of a triangle are necessarily equal to two right angles4 ,and so on4 ,but is the abstract essence itself--apart from all mental analysis of it1 apart from all comparison of it with its constituent factors or with other essences--in any sense necessary8 ,there is no question of its actual existence1 but only of itself as an object of thought4 ,now our thought does not seem to demand necessarily1 or have a necessary connexion with1 any particular object of which we do de facto think4 ,what we do think of is determined by our experience of actual things4 ,and the things which we conceive to be possible1 by the exercise of our reason upon the data of our senses1 memory and imagination1 are determined as to their nature and number by our experience of actual things1 even although they themselves can and do pass beyond the domain of actually experienced things4 ,the only necessary object of thought is reality in general3 for the exercise of the function of thought necessarily demands an object1 and this object must be reality of some sort4 ,thought1 as we saw1 begins with actual reality4 ,working upon this1 thought apprehends in it the foundations of those necessary relations and judgments already referred to4 ,considering1 moreover1 the actual data of experience1 our thought can infer from these the actual existence of one ,being ,who must exist by a necessity of ,his ,essence4 ,but1 furthermore1 must all the possible essences which the mind does or can actually think of1 be conceived as necessarily possible in the same sense in which it is suggested that they must be conceived as eternally possible8 ,to this question1 too1 we shall return presently4 7d7 ,finally1 possible essences appear to the mind as immutable1 and consequently indivisible4 ,this means simply that the relations which we establish between them and their constitutive factors are not only necessary but immutable3 that if any constitutive factor of an essence is conceived as removed from it1 or any new factor as added1 we have no longer the original essence but some other essence4 ,if 8animal0 is a being essentially embodying the two objective concepts of 8organism0 and 8sentient10 then on removing either we have no longer the essence 8animal04 ,so1 too1 by adding to these some other element compatible with them1 e4g4 8rational10 we have no longer the essence 8animal10 but the essence 8man04 ,hence possible essences have been likened to numbers1 inasmuch as if we add anything to1 or subtract anything from1 any given number1 we have now no longer the original number but another47#ij7 ,this1 too1 is only an expression of the laws of identity and contradiction4 ,we might ask1 however1 whether1 apart from analysis and comparison of an abstract object of thought with its constitutive notes or factors1 such a possible essence is in itself immutably possible4 ,this is similar to the question whether we can or must conceive such a possible essence as eternally and necessarily possible4 #ae4 ,,grounds ,,of ,,those ,,characteristics4--,in considering the grounds or reasons of the various characteristics just enumerated it may be well to reflect that when we speak of the intrinsic possibility of a possible essence we conceive the latter as something complex1 which we mentally resolve into its constitutive notes or factors or principles1 to see if these are compatible4 ,if they are we pronounce the essence intrinsically possible1 if not we pronounce it intrinsically impossible4 ,for our minds1 absence of internal incompatibility in the content of our concept of any object is the test of its intrinsic possibility4 ,whatever fulfils this test we consider capable of existing4 ,but what about the possibility of the notes1 or factors1 or principles themselves1 whereby we define those essences1 and by the union of which we conceive those essences to be constituted8 ,how do we know that those abstract principles or factors--no one of which can actually exist alone1 since all are abstract--can in certain combinations form possible objects of thought8 ,we can know this only because we have either experienced such objects as actual1 or because we infer their possibility from objects actually experienced4 ,and similarly our knowledge of what is impossible is based upon our experience of the actual4 ,since1 moreover1 our experience of the actual is finite and fallible1 we may err in our judgments as to what essences are1 and what are not1 intrinsically possible47#ia7 ,if now we ask ourselves what intelligible reason can we assign for the characteristics just indicated as belonging to possible essences1 we must fix our attention first of all on the fundamental fact that the human intellect always apprehends its object in an abstract condition4 ,it contemplates the essence apart from the existence in which the essence is subject to circumstances of time and place and change2 it grasps the essence in a static condition as simply identical with itself and distinct from all else2 it sees the essence as indifferent to existence at any place or time2 reflecting then on the actualization of this essence in the existing order of things1 it apprehends the essence as capable of indefinite actualizations 7except in cases where it sees some reason to the contrary71 i4e4 it universalizes the essence2 comparing it with its constituent notes or elements1 and with those of other essences1 it sees and affirms certain relations 7of identity or diversity1 compatibility or incompatibility1 between those notes or elements7 as holding good necessarily and immutably1 and independently of the actual embodiment of those notes or elements in any object existing at any particular place or time4 ,all these features of the relations between the constituents of abstract1 possible essences1 seem so far to be adequately accounted for by the fact that the intellect apprehends those essences in the abstract3 the data in which it apprehends them being given to it through sense experience4 ,what may be inferred from the fact that the human intellect has this power of abstract thought1 is another question7#ib74 ,but granting that it does apprehend essences in this manner1 we seem to have in this fact a sufficient explanation of the features just referred to4 ,we have1 however1 already suggested other questions about the reality of those possible essences4 ,is their possibility1 so far as known to us1 explained by our experience of actual things8 ,or must we think them as eternally1 necessarily and immutably possible8 ,from the manner in which we must apprehend them1 can we infer anything about the reality of an ,eternal1 ,immutable1 ,necessary ,intelligence1 in whose ,thought and ,essence alone those essences1 as apprehended by our minds1 can find their ultimate ground and explanation8 ,these are the questions we must now endeavour to examine4 #af4 ,,possible ,,essences ,,as ,,such ,,are ,,something ,,distinct ,,from ,,mere ,,logical ,,being1 ,,and ,,from ,,nothingness4--,there have been philosophers who have held that the actual alone is real1 and only while it is actual2 that a purely 7intrinsically7 possible essence as such is nothing real2 that the actual alone is possible2 that the purely possible as such is impossible4 ,this view is based on the erroneous assumption that whatever is or becomes actual is so1 or becomes so1 by some sort of unintelligible fatalistic necessity4 ,apart from the fact that it is incompatible with certain truths of theism1 such as the ,divine ,omnipotence and ,freedom in creating1 it also involves the denial of all real becoming or change1 and the assertion that all actuality is eternal2 for if anything becomes actual1 it was previously either possible or impossible2 if impossible1 it could never become actual2 if possible1 then as possible it was something different from the impossible1 or from absolute nothingness4 ,moreover1 the intrinsically possible is capable of becoming actual1 and may be actualized if there exists some actual being with power to actualize it2 but absolute nothingness--or1 in other words1 the intrinsically impossible--cannot be actualized1 even by ,omnipotence2 therefore the possible essence as such is something positive or real1 as distinct from nothingness4 ,finally1 intrinsically possible essences can be clearly distinguished from one another by the mind2 but their negation which is pure non-entity or nothingness cannot be so distinguished4 ,it is therefore clear that possible essences are in some true sense something positive or real4 ,from which it follows that nothingness1 in the strict sense1 is not the mere absence or negation of actuality1 but also the absence or negation of that positive or real something which is intrinsic possibility2 in other words that nothingness in the strict sense means intrinsic impossibility4 ,even those who hold the opinion just rejected--that the purely possible essence as such has no reality in any conceivable sense--would presumably admit that it is an object of human thought at all events2 they would accord to it the being it has from the human mind which thinks it4 ,it would therefore be an ens rationis according to this view1 having only the ideal being which consists in its being constituted and contemplated by the human mind4 ,that it has the ideal being1 the esse ideale or esse intentionale1 which consists in its being contemplated by the human mind as an object of thought1 no one will deny4 ,but a little reflection will show1 firstly1 that this ideal being is something more than the ideal being of an ens rationis1 of a mere logical entity2 and1 secondly1 that a possible essence must have some other ideal being than that which it has in the individual human mind4 ,the possible essence is not a mere logical entity2 for the latter cannot be conceived as capable of existing apart from the human mind1 in the world of actual existences 7#c71 whereas the former can be1 and is in fact1 conceived as capable of such existence4 ,its ideal being in the human mind is1 therefore1 something other than that of a mere logical entity4 ,the ideal being which it has in the human mind as an object of thought is undoubtedly derived from the mind's knowledge of actual things4 ,we think of the essences of actually experienced realities apart from their actual existence4 ,thus abstracted1 we analyse them1 compare them1 reason from them4 ,by these processes we can not merely attain to a knowledge of the actual existence of other realities above and beyond and outside of our own direct and immediate intuitional experience1 but we can also form concepts of multitudes of realities or essences as intrinsically possible1 thus giving these latter an ideal existence in our own minds4 ,here1 then1 the question arises3 ,is this the only ideal being that can be ascribed to such essences8 ,in other words1 are essences intrinsically possible because we think them as intrinsically possible8 ,or is it not rather the case that we think them to be intrinsically possible because they are intrinsically possible8 ,does our thought constitute1 or does it not rather merely discover1 their intrinsic possibility8 ,does the latter result from1 or is it not rather presupposed by1 our thought-activity8 ,the second alternative suggested in each of these questions is the true one4 ,as our thought is not the source of their actuality1 neither is it the source of their intrinsic possibility4 ,solipsism is the reductio ad absurdum of the philosophy which would reduce all actuality experienced by the individual mind to phases1 or phenomena1 or self-manifestations1 of the individual mind itself as the one and only actuality4 ,and no less absurd is the philosophy which would accord to all intrinsically possible realities no being other than the ideal being which they have as the thought-objects of the individual human mind4 ,the study of the actual world of direct experience leads the impartial and sincere inquirer to the conclusion that it is in some true sense a manifestation of mind or intelligence3 not1 however1 of his own mind1 which is itself only a very tiny item in the totality of the actual world1 but of one ,supreme ,intelligence4 ,and in this same ,intelligence the world of possible essences too will be found to have its original and fundamental ideal being4 #ag4 ,,possible ,,essences ,,have1 ,,besides ,,ideal ,,being1 ,,no ,,other ,,sort ,,of ,,being ,,or ,,reality ,,proper ,,and ,,intrinsic ,,to ,,themselves4--,before inquiring further into the manner in which we attain to a knowledge of this ,intelligence1 and of the ideal being of possible essences in this ,intelligence1 we may ask whether1 above and beyond such ideal being1 possible essences have not perhaps from all eternity some being or reality proper and intrinsic to themselves2 not indeed the actual being which they possess when actualized in time1 but yet some kind of intrinsic reality as distinct from the extrinsic ideal being1 or esse intentionale1 which consists merely in this that they are objects of thought present as such to a ,supreme ,intelligence or ,mind4 ,some few medieval scholastics7#ic7 contended that possible essences have from all eternity not indeed the existence they may receive by creation or production in time1 but an intrinsic essential being which1 by creation or production1 may be transferred to the order of actual existences1 and which1 when actual existence ceases 7if they ever receive it71 still continues immutable and incorruptible3 what these writers called the esse essentiae1 as distinct from the esse existentiae1 conceiving it to be intermediate between the latter on the one hand and mere ideal or logical being on the other1 and hence calling it esse diminutum or secundum quid4 ,examining the question from the standpoint of theism1 these authors seem to have thought that since ,god understands these essences as possible from all eternity1 and since this knowledge must have as its term or object something real and positive1 these essences must have some real and proper intrinsic being from all eternity3 otherwise they would be simply nothingness1 and nothingness cannot be the term of the ,divine ,intelligence4 ,but the obvious reply is that though possible essences as such are nothing actual they must be distinguished as realities1 capable of actually existing1 from absolute nothingness2 and that as thus distinguished from absolute nothingness they are really and positively intelligible to the ,divine ,mind1 as indeed they are even to the human mind4 ,to be intelligible they need not have actual being4 ,they must1 no doubt1 be capable of having actual being1 in order to be understood as realities3 it is precisely in this understood capability that their reality consists1 for the real includes not only what actually exists but whatever is capable of actual existence4 ,whatever is opposed to absolute nothingness is real2 and this manifestly includes not only the actual but whatever is intrinsically possible4 ,realities or essences which have not actual being have only ideal being2 and ideal being means simply presence in some mind as an object of thought4 ,scholastic philosophers generally7#id7 hold that possible essences as such have no other being than this2 that before and until such essences actually exist they have of themselves and in themselves no being except the ideal being which they have as objects of the ,divine ,intelligence and the virtual being they have in the ,divine ,omnipotence which may at any time give them actual existence4 ,one convincing reason for this view is the consideration that if possible essences as such had from all eternity any proper and intrinsic being in themselves1 ,god could neither create nor annihilate4 ,for in that hypothesis essences1 on becoming actual1 would not be produced ex nihilo1 inasmuch as before becoming actual they would in themselves and from all eternity have had their own proper real being2 and after ceasing to be actual they would still retain this4 ,but creation is the production of the whole reality of actual being from nothingness2 and is therefore impossible if the actual being is merely produced from an essence already real1 i4e4 having an eternal positive reality of its own4 ,the same is true of annihilation4 ,the theory of eternally existing uncreated matter is no less incompatible with the doctrine of creation than this theory of eternally real and uncreated forms or essences4 ,again1 what could this supposed positive and proper reality of the possible essence be8 ,if it is anything distinct from the mere ideal being of such an essence1 as it is assumed to be1 it must after all be actual being of some sort1 which would apparently have to be actualized again in order to have actual existence6 ,finally1 this supposed eternal reality1 proper to possible essences1 cannot be anything uncreated4 ,for whatever is uncreated is ,god2 and since it is these supposed proper realities of possible essences that are made actual1 and constitute the existing created universe1 the latter would be in this view an actualization of the ,divine ,essence itself1--which is pantheism pure and simple4 ,and neither can this supposed eternal reality1 proper to possible essences1 be anything created4 ,for such creation would be eternal and necessary2 whereas ,god's creative activity is admitted by all scholastics to be essentially free2 and although they are not agreed as to whether 8creation from all eternity0 78creatio ab aeterno07 is possible1 they are agreed that it is not a fact4 ,possible essences as such are therefore nothing actual4 ,furthermore1 as such they have in themselves no positive being4 ,but they are not therefore unreal4 ,they are positively intelligible as capable of actual existence1 and therefore as distinct from logical entities or entia rationis which are not capable of such existence4 ,they are present as objects of thought to mind2 and to some mind other than the individual human mind4 ,about this ideal being which they have in this ,mind we have now in the next place to inquire4 #ah4 ,,inferences ,,from ,,our ,,knowledge ,,of ,,possible ,,essences4--,we have stated that an impartial study of the actual world will lead to the conclusion that it is dependent on a ,supreme ,intelligence2 and we have suggested that in this ,supreme ,intelligence also possible essences as such have their primary ideal being 7#af1 #ag74 ,when the existence of ,god has been established--as it may be established by various lines of argument--from actual things1 we can clearly see1 as will be pointed out presently1 that in the ,divine ,essence all possible essences have the ultimate source of their possibility4 ,but many scholastic philosophers contend that the nature and properties of possible essences1 as apprehended by the human mind1 furnish a distinct and conclusive argument for the existence of a ,supreme ,uncreated ,intelligence47#ie7 ,others deny the validity of such a line of reasoning1 contending that it is based on misapprehension and misinterpretation of those characteristics4 ,all admit that it is not human thought that makes essences possible3 they are intelligible to the human mind because they are possible1 not vice versa47#if7 ,for the human mind the immediate source and ground of their intrinsic possibility and characteristics is the fact that they are given to it in actual experience while it has the power of considering them apart from their actual existence4 ,but 7#a7 are they not independent of experienced actuality1 no less than of the human mind1 so that we are forced to infer from them the reality of a ,supreme ,eternal ,mind in which they have eternal ideal being8 7#b7 ,is not any possible essence 7e4g4 8water10 or 8a triangle07 so necessarily what it is that even if it never did and never will exist1 nay even were there no human or other finite mind to conceive it1 it would still be what it is 7e4g4 8a chemical compound of oxygen and hydrogen10 or 8a plane rectilinear three-sided figure07--so that there must be some ,necessarily ,existing ,intelligence in and from which it has this necessary truth as a possible essence87#ig7 ,these essences1 as known to us1 are so far from being grounded in1 or explained by1 the things of our actual experience1 that we rather regard the latter as grounded in the former4 ,do we not consider possible essences as the prototypes and exemplars to which actual things must conform in order to be actual1 in order to exist at all87#ih7 7#c7 ,finally1 the relations which we apprehend as obtaining between them1 we see to be necessary and immutable relations4 ,they embody necessary truths which are for our minds the standards of all truth4 ,such necessary truths cannot be grounded either in the contingent human mind1 or in the contingent and mutable actuality of the things of our immediate experience4 ,therefore we can and must infer from them the reality of a ,necessary1 ,immutable ,being1 of whose essence they must be imitations4 ,if1 then1 this ideal order of intrinsically possible essences is logically and ontologically prior to the contingent actualizations of any of them 7even though it be posterior to them in the order of our knowledge1 which is based on actual experience71 there must be likewise ontologically prior to all contingent actualities 7including our own minds7 some ,necessary ,intelligence in which this order of possible essences has its ideal being4 #ai4 ,,critical ,,analysis ,,of ,,those ,,inferences4--,the validity of the general line of argument indicated in the preceding paragraphs has been seriously questioned4 ,among other criticisms the following points have been urged7#ii73-- 7#a7 ,actual things furnish the basis of irrefragable proofs of the existence of ,god--the ,supreme1 ,necessary1 ,eternal1 ,omniscient1 and ,omnipotent ,being4 ,but we are here inquiring whether a mind which has not yet so analysed actual being as to see how it involves this conclusion1 or a mind which abstracts altogether from the evidence furnished by actual things for this conclusion1 can prove the existence of such a being from the separate consideration of possible essences1 their attributes and relations4 ,now it is not evident that to such a mind possible essences reveal themselves as having eternal ideal being4 ,such a mind is1 no doubt1 conscious that it is not itself the cause of their possibility4 ,but it sees that actual things plus the abstract character of its own thought account sufficiently for all their features as it knows them4 ,to the question3 ,is not their ideal being eternal8 it can only answer3 ,that will depend on whether the world of actual things can be shown to involve the existence of an ,eternal ,intelligence4 ,until this is proved we cannot say whether possible essences have any ideal being other than that which they have in human minds4 7#b7 ,the actual things from which we get our concepts of possible essences do not exist necessarily4 ,but1 granted their existence1 we know from them that certain essences are de facto possible4 ,they are not necessarily given to us as possible1 any more than actual things are necessarily given to us as actual4 ,of course1 when they are thought of at all1 they are1 as objects of thought1 necessarily and immutably identical with themselves1 and related to one another as mutually compatible or incompatible1 etc4 ,but this necessity of relations1 hypothetical as it is and contingent on the mental processes of analysis and comparison1 involved as it is in the very nature of being and thought1 and expressed as it is in the principles of identity and contradiction1 is just as true of actual contingent essences as of possible essences27#ajj7 and it is something very different from the sort of necessity claimed for possible essences by the contention that they must be conceived as having ideal being necessarily4 ,the ideal being they have in the human mind is certainly not necessary3 the human mind might never have conceived these possible essences4 ,but must the human mind conceive a possible essence as having some ideal being necessarily8 ,no2 unless that mind has already convinced itself1 from a study of actual things1 that an ,eternal1 ,necessary1 ,omniscient ,intelligence exists3 to which1 of course1 such essences would be eternally and necessarily present as objects of thought4 ,if the human mind had already reached this conviction it could then see that 8even if there were no human intellect1 things would still be true in relation to the ,divine ,intellect4 ,but if both intellects were1 per impossibile1 conceived as non-existent truth would persist no longer407#aja7 ,suppose1 therefore1 that it has not yet reached this conviction1 or abstracts altogether from the existence of ,god as known from actual things2 and then1 further1 imagines the actual things of its experience and all human intellects and finite intellects of whatsoever kind as non-existent3 must it still conceive possible things as possible8 ,no2 possibility and impossibility1 truth and falsity will now have ceased to have any meaning4 ,after such attempted abstraction the mind would have before it only what ,balmes describes as 8the abyss of nothing04 ,and ,balmes is right in saying that the mind is unable 8to abstract all existence04 ,but the reason of the inability is not1 as ,balmes contends1 because when it has removed actual things and finite minds there still remains in spite of it a system or order of possible essences which forces it to infer and posit the existence of an ,eternal1 ,necessary ,mind as the source and ground of that order4 ,the reason rather is because the mind sees that the known actual things1 from which it got all its notions of possible essences1 necessarily imply1 as the only intelligible ground of their actuality1 the existence of a ,necessary ,being1 in whose ,intelligence they must have been contained ideally1 and in whose ,omnipotence they must have been contained virtually1 from all eternity4 ,from contingent actuality1 as known to it1 the mind can argue to the eternal actuality of ,necessary ,being1 and to the impossibility either of a state of absolute nothingness1 or of an order of purely possible things apart from all actuality4 7#c7 ,of course1 whether the mind has thus thought out the ultimate implications of the actuality of experienced things or not1 once it has thought and experienced those things it cannot by any effort banish the memory of them from its presence3 they are there still as objects of its thought even when it abstracts from their actual existence4 ,but if1 while it has not yet seen that their actuality implies the existence of a ,necessary1 ,omniscient and ,omnipotent ,being1 it abstracts not only from their actual existence but from the existence of all finite minds 7itself included71 then in that state1 so far as its knowledge goes1 there would be neither actual nor ideal nor possible being4 ,nor can the fact that an ideal order of possible things still persists in its own thought mislead it into concluding that such an ideal order really persists in the hypothesis it has made4 ,for it knows that this ideal order still persists for itself simply because it cannot 8think itself away04 ,it sees all the time that if it could effectively think itself away1 this ideal order would have to disappear with it1 leaving nothing--so far as it knows--either actual or possible4 ,mercier has some apposite remarks on this very point4 8,from the fact10 he writes1 8that those abstract essences1 grasped by our abstractive thought from the dawn of our reason1 have grown so familiar to us1 we easily come to look upon them as pre-existing archetypes or models of our thoughts and of things2 they form a fund of predicates by which we are in the habit of interpreting the data of our experience4 ,so1 too1 the hypothetically necessary relations established by abstract thought between them we come to regard as a sort of eternal system of principles1 endowed with a sort of legislative power1 to which created things and intelligences must conform4 ,but they have really no such pre-existence4 ,the eternal pre-existence of those essence-types1 which ,plato called the #8intelligible world1' the 1 and the supposed eternal legislative power of their relations1 are a sort of mental optical illusion4 ,those abstract essences1 and the principles based upon them1 are the products of our mental activity working on the data of our actual experience4 ,when we enter on the domain of speculative reflection 444 they are there before us2 444 but we must not forget that reflection is consequent on the spontaneous thought-activity which--by working abstractively on the actual data of sensible1 contingent1 changeable1 temporal realities--set them up there4444 ,we know from psychology how those ideal1 abstract essence-types are formed4444 ,but because we have no actual memory of their formation1 which is so rapid as practically to escape consciousness in spontaneous thought1 we are naturally prone to imagine that they are not the product of our own mental action on the data of actual experience1 but that they exist in us1 or rather above us1 and independently of us4 ,we can therefore understand the psychological illusion under which ,plato wrote such passages as the following3 #8,but if anyone should tell me why anything is beautiful1 either because it has a blooming1 florid colour1 or figure1 or anything else of the kind1 ,i dismiss all other reasons1 for ,i am confounded by them all2 but ,i simply1 wholly1 and perhaps navely1 confine myself to this1 that nothing else causes it to be beautiful1 except either the presence or communication of that abstract beauty1 by whatever means and in whatever way communicated2 for ,i cannot yet affirm with certainty1 but only that by means of beauty all beautiful things become beautiful 7 74 ,for this appears to me the safest answer to give both to myself and others1 and adhering to this ,i think that ,i shall never fall into error4444 ,and that by magnitude great things become great1 and greater things greater2 and by littleness less things become less4'7#ajb7 ,st4 ,augustine's doctrine on the invariable laws of numbers1 on the immutable principles of wisdom1 and on truth generally1 draws its inspiration from this ,platonic idealism407#ajc7 ,but this ,platonic doctrine1 attributing to the abstract essences conceived by our thought a reality independent both of our thought and of the actual sense data from which directly or indirectly we derive our concepts of them1 is rejected as unsound by scholastics generally4 ,when we have proved from actual things that ,god exists1 and is the ,intelligent and ,free ,creator of the actual world of our direct experience1 we can of course consider the ,divine ,intellect as contemplating from all eternity the ,divine ,essence1 and as seeing therein the eternal archetypes or ideas of all actual and possible essences4 ,we may thus regard the ,divine ,mind as the eternal 1 or mundus intelligibilis4 ,this1 of course1 is not ,plato's thought2 it is what ,st4 ,augustine substituted for ,platonism1 and very properly4 ,but we must not infer1 from this truth1 that when we contemplate possible essences1 with all the characteristics we may detect in them1 we are contemplating this mundus intelligibilis which is the ,divine ,mind4 ,this was the error of the ontologists4 ,they inferred that since possible essences1 as known by the human mind1 have ideal being independently of the latter and of all actual contingent reality1 the human mind in contemplating them has really an intuition of them as they are seen by the ,divine ,intellect ,itself in the ,divine ,essence2 so that1 in the words of ,gioberti1 the ,primum ,ontologicum1 the ,divine ,being ,himself1 is also the primum logicum1 or first reality apprehended by human thought47#ajd7 ,now those authors who hold that the ideal order of possible essences contemplated by the human mind is seen by the latter1 as so contemplated1 to have some being1 some ideal being1 really independent of the human mind itself1 and of the actual contingent things from which they admit that the human mind derives its knowledge of such essences1--these authors do not hold1 but deny1 that this independent ideal being1 which they claim for these essences1 is anything ,divine1 that it is the ,divine ,essence as seen by the ,divine ,intellect to be imitable ad extra47#aje7 ,hence they cannot fairly be charged with the error of ontologism4 ,renouncing ,plato's exaggerated realism1 and holding that our knowledge of the ideal order of possible essences is derived by our mind from its consideration of actual things1 they yet hold that this ideal order is seen to have some sort of being or reality independent both of the mind and of actual things47#ajf7 ,this is not easy to understand4 ,when we ask1 ,is this supposed independent being 7or reality1 or possibility7 of possible essences the ideal being they have in the ,divine mind8--we are told that it is not27#ajg7 but that it is something from which we can infer1 by reasoning1 this eternal1 necessary1 and immutable ideal being of these same essences in the ,divine ,mind4 ,the considerations urged in the foregoing paragraphs will1 however1 have shown that the validity of this line of reasoning from possible essences to the reality of an ,eternal1 ,divine1 ,immutable ,intelligence is by no means evident or free from difficulties4 ,of course1 when the existence of ,god has been proved from actual things1 the conception of the ,divine ,intelligence and ,essence as the ultimate source of all possible reality1 no less than of all actual reality1 will be found to shed a great deal of new light upon the intrinsic possibility of possible essences4 ,since1 however1 our knowledge of the ,divine is merely analogical1 and since ,god's intuition of possible essences1 as imitations of ,his own ,divine ,essence1 completely transcends our comprehension1 and is totally different from our abstractive knowledge of such essences1 our conception of the manner in which these essences are related to the ,divine ,nature and the ,divine ,attributes1 must be determined after the analogy of the manner in which our own minds are related to these essences4 #bj4 ,,essences ,,are ,,intrinsically ,,possible1 ,,not ,,because ,,god ,,can ,,make ,,them ,,exist ,,actually2 ,,nor ,,yet ,,because ,,he ,,freely ,,wills ,,them ,,to ,,be ,,possible2 ,,nor ,,because ,,he ,,understands ,,them ,,as ,,possible2 ,,but ,,because ,,they ,,are ,,modes ,,in ,,which ,,the ,,divine ,,essence ,,is ,,imitable ad extra4--7a7 ,the ultimate source of the extrinsic possibility of all contingent realities is the ,divine ,omnipotence3 just as the proximate source of the extrinsic possibility of a statue is the power of the sculptor to educe it from the block of wood or marble4 ,but just as the power of the sculptor presupposes the intrinsic possibility of the statue1 so does the ,divine ,omnipotence presuppose the intrinsic possibility of all possible things4 ,it is not1 as ,william of ,ockam 7 #acdg71 a scholastic of the decadent period1 erroneously thought1 because ,god can create things that such things are intrinsically possible1 but rather because they are intrinsically possible ,he can create them4 7b7 ,not less erroneous is the voluntarist theory of ,descartes1 according to which possible essences are intrinsically possible because ,god freely willed them to be possible47#ajh7 ,the actuality of all created things depends1 of course1 on the free will of ,god to create them2 but that possible essences are what they are1 and are related to each other necessarily as they are1 because ,god has willed them to be such1 is absolutely incredible4 ,descartes seems to have been betrayed into this strange error by a false notion of what is requisite for the absolute freedom and independence of the ,divine ,will3 as if this demanded that ,god should be free to will1 e4g4 that two plus two be five1 or that the radii of a circle be unequal1 or that creatures be independent of ,himself1 or that blasphemy be a virtuous act6 ,the intrinsic possibility of essences is not dependent on the ,free ,will of ,god2 the actualization of possible essences is2 but ,god can will to actualize only such essences as ,he sees1 from comprehending ,his own ,divine ,essence1 to be intrinsically possible4 ,but it derogates in no way from the supremacy of the ,divine ,will to conceive its free volition as thus consequent on1 and illumined by1 the ,divine ,knowledge2 whereas it is incompatible with the wisdom and sanctity of ,god1 as well as inconceivable to the human mind1 that the necessary laws of thought and being--such as the principles of contradiction and identity1 the principle of causality1 the first principles of the moral order--should be what they are simply because ,god has freely willed them to be so1 and might therefore have been otherwise4 ,from the fact that we have no direct intuition of the ,divine ,being1 some philosophers have concluded that all speculation on the relation of ,god to the world of our direct experience is necessarily barren and fruitless4 ,this is a phase of agnosticism2 and1 like all error1 it is the exaggeration of a truth3 the truth being that while we may reach real knowledge about the ,divine ,nature and attributes by such speculation1 we can do so only on condition that we are guided by analogies drawn from ,god's creation1 and remember that our concepts1 as applied to ,god1 are analogical 7#b74 8,we can know ,god only by analogy with contingent and finite beings1 and consequently the realities and laws of the contingent and finite world must necessarily serve as our term of comparison4 ,but1 among finite realities1 we see an essential subordination of the extrinsically possible to the intelligible1 of this to the intrinsically possible1 and of this again to the essential type which is presupposed by our thought4 ,therefore1 a pari1 we must consider the omnipotent will of ,god1 which is the first and universal cause of all contingent existences1 as under the direction of the ,divine ,omniscience1 and this in turn as having for its object the ,divine ,essence and in it the essential types whose intrinsic possibility is grounded on the necessary imitability of the ,divine ,being4 8,when1 therefore1 in defence of his position1 ,descartes argues that #8,in ,god willing and knowing are one and the same2 the reason why ,he knows anything is because ,he wills it1 and for this reason only can it be true3 ,ex hoc ipso quod ,deus aliquid velit1 ideo cognoscit1 et ideo tantum talis res est vera'--he is only confusing the issue4 ,we might1 indeed1 retort the argument3 #8,in ,god willing and knowing are one and the same2 the reason why ,he wills anything is because ,he knows it1 and for this reason only can it be good3 ,ex hoc ipso quod aliquid cognoscit1 ideo vult1 et ideo tantum talis res est bona1' but both inferences are equally unwarranted4 ,for1 though willing and knowing are certainly one and the same in ,god1 this one and the same thing is formally and for our minds neither will nor intellect1 but a reality transcending will and intellect1 a substance infinitely above any substances known to us3 1 supersubstantia1 as the ,fathers of the ,church and the ,doctors of the ,schools call it4 ,but of this transcendent substance we have no intuitive knowledge4 ,we must therefore either abandon all attempts to find out anything about it1 or else apprehend it and designate it after the analogy of what we know from direct experience about created life and mind4 ,and as in creatures will is not identical with intellect1 nor either of these with the nature of the being that possesses them2 so what we conceive in ,god under the concept of will1 we must not identify in thought with what we conceive in ,him under the concept of intellect1 nor may we with impunity confound either in our thought with the ,nature or ,essence of the ,divine ,being407#aji7 7c7 ,philosophers who deny the validity of all the arguments advanced by theists in proof of the existence of a transcendent ,supreme ,being1 distinct from the world of direct human experience1 endeavour to account in various ways for the intrinsic possibility of abstract essences4 ,agnostics either deny to these latter any reality whatsoever 7#af71 or else declare the problem of their reality insoluble4 ,monists of the materialist type--who try to reduce all mind to matter and its mere mechanical energies 7#aa7--treat the question in a still more inadequate and unsatisfactory manner2 while the advocates of idealistic monism1 like ,hegel and his followers1 refer us to the supposed ,immanent ,mind of the universe for an ultimate explanation of all intrinsic possibility4 ,certainly this must have its ultimate source in some mind2 and it is not in referring us to an ,eternal ,mind that these philosophers err1 but in their conception of the relation of this mind to the world of direct actual experience4 ,it is not1 however1 with such theories we are concerned just now1 but only with theories put forward by theists4 ,and among these latter it is surprising to find some few7#aaj7 who maintain that the intrinsic possibility of abstract essences depends ultimately and exclusively on these essences themselves1 irrespective of things actually experienced by the human mind1 irrespective of the human mind itself1 and irrespective of the ,divine ,mind and the ,divine ,nature4 ,as to this view1 we have already seen 7#ai7 that if we abstract from all human minds1 and from all actual things that can be directly experienced by such minds1 we are face to face either with the alternative of absolute nothingness wherein the true and the false1 the possible and the impossible1 cease to have any intelligible meaning1 or else with the alternative of a ,supreme1 ,eternal1 ,necessary1 ,omniscient and ,omnipotent ,being1 whose actual existence has been1 or can be1 inferred from the actual data of human experience4 ,now the theist1 who admits the existence of such a ,being1 cannot fail to see that possible essences must have their primary ideal being in the ,divine ,intellect1 and the ultimate source of their intrinsic possibility in the ,divine ,essence ,itself4 ,for1 knowing that ,god can actualize intrinsically possible essences by the creative act1 which is intelligent and free1 he will understand that these essences have their ideal being in the ,divine ,intellect2 that the ,divine ,intellect sees their intrinsic possibility by contemplating the ,divine ,essence as the ,uncreated ,prototype and ,exemplar of all intrinsically possible things2 and that these latter are intrinsically possible precisely because they are possible adumbrations or imitations of the ,divine ,nature4 7d7 ,but are we to conceive that essences are intrinsically possible precisely because the ,divine ,intellect1 by understanding them1 makes them intrinsically possible8 ,or should we rather conceive their intrinsic possibility as antecedent to this act by which the ,divine ,intellect understands them1 and as dependent only on the ,divine ,essence ,itself1 so that essences would be intrinsically possible simply because the ,divine ,essence is what it is1 and because they are possible imitations or expressions of it8 ,here scholastics are not agreed4 ,some7#aaa7 hold that the intrinsic possibility of essences is formally constituted by the act whereby the ,divine ,intellect1 contemplating the ,divine ,essence1 understands the latter to be indefinitely imitable ad extra2 so that as the actuality of things results from the ,fiat of the ,divine ,will1 and as their extrinsic possibility is grounded in the ,divine ,omnipotence1 so their intrinsic possibility is grounded in the ,divine ,intellect4 ,the latter1 by understanding the ,divine ,essence1 would not merely give an ideal being to the intrinsic possibility of essences1 but would make those essences formally possible1 they being only virtually possible in the ,divine ,essence considered antecedently to this act of the ,divine ,intellect4 ,or1 rather1 as some ,scotists explain the matter17#aab7 this ideal being which possible essences have from the ,divine ,intellect is not as extrinsic to them as the ideal being they have from the human intellect1 but is rather the very first being they can be said formally to have1 and is somehow intrinsic to them after the analogy of the being which mere logical entities1 entia rationis1 derive from the human mind3 which being is intrinsic to these entities and is in fact the only being they have or can have4 ,others7#aac7 hold that while1 no doubt1 possible essences have ideal being in the ,divine ,intellect from the fact that they are objects of the ,divine ,knowledge1 yet we must not conceive these essences as deriving their intrinsic possibility from the ,divine ,intellect4 ,for intellect as such presupposes its object4 ,just1 therefore1 as possible essences are not intrinsically possible because they are understood by1 and have ideal being in1 the human mind1 so neither are they intrinsically possible because they are understood by1 and have ideal being in1 the ,divine ,mind4 ,in order to be understood actually1 in order to have ideal being1 in order to be objects of thought1 they must be intelligible2 and in order to be intelligible they must be intrinsically possible4 ,therefore they are formally constituted as intrinsically possible essences1 not by the fact that they are understood by the ,divine ,intellect1 but by the fact that antecedently to this act 7in our way of conceiving the matter3 for there is really no priority of acts or attributes in ,god7 they are already possible imitations of the ,divine ,essence ,itself4 ,this view seems preferable as being more in accordance with the analogy of what takes place in the human mind4 ,the speculative intellect in man does not constitute1 but presupposes its object4 ,now1 while actual things are the objects of ,god's practical science--the 8scientia visionis10 which reaches what is freely decreed by the ,divine ,will1--possible things are the objects of ,god's speculative science--the 8scientia simplicis intelligentiae10 which is not1 like the former1 productive of its object1 but rather contemplative of objects presented to it by and in the ,divine ,essence4 ,why1 then1 ultimately will the notions 8square0 and 8circle0 not coalesce so as to form one object of thought for the human mind1 while the notions 8equilateral0 and 8triangle0 will so coalesce8 ,because the ,essence of ,god1 the ,necessary ,being1 the ,first ,reality1 and the ,source of all contingent reality1 affords no basis for the former as a possible expression or imitation of ,itself2 in other words1 because ,being is not expressible by nothingness1 and a 8square circle0 is nothingness3 while the ,divine ,essence does afford a basis for the latter2 because ,necessary ,being is in some intelligible way imitated1 expressed1 manifested1 by whatever has any being to distinguish it from nothingness1 and an 8equilateral triangle0 has such being and is not nothingness4 ,it is hardly necessary to add that when we conceive the ,divine ,essence1 contemplated by the ,divine ,intellect1 as containing in itself the exemplars or prototypes of all possible things1 we are not to understand the ,divine ,essence as the formal exemplar of each1 or1 a fortiori1 as a vast collection of such formally distinct exemplars2 but only as virtually and equivalently the exemplar of each and all4 ,we are not to conceive that possible essences are seen by the ,divine ,intellect imaged in the ,divine ,essence as in a mirror1 but rather as in their supreme source and principle3 so that they are faint and far off reflections of ,it1 and1 when actualized1 become for us the only means we have1 in this present state1 for reaching any knowledge of the ,deity3 videmus nunc per speculum47#aad7 #ba4 ,,distinction ,,between ,,essence ,,and ,,existence ,,in ,,actually ,,existing ,,contingent ,,or ,,created ,,beings4--,passing now from the consideration of possible essences as such1 to the consideration of actually existing essences1 we have to examine a question which has given rise to a great deal of controversy1 partly on account of its inherent difficulty1 and partly because of a multitude of ambiguities arising from confusion of thought3 ,what is the nature of the distinction between essence and existence in the actually existing things of our experience8 ,we have seen already that the concepts of essence and existence are distinct from each other 7#ab1 #ac72 in other words1 that in all cases there is at least a logical distinction between the essence and the existence of any being4 ,we must1 however1 distinguish between created or contingent beings and the ,uncreated1 ,necessary1 ,self-,existent ,being4 ,the latter exists essentially1 eternally1 by ,his own ,essence1 so that in ,him essence and existence are really identical4 ,his essence is formally ,his ,existence2 and1 therefore1 in thinking of ,his ,essence we cannot positively exclude the notion of existence or think of ,him as non-existent4 ,the distinction between essence and existence1 which we find in our thoughts1 is1 therefore1 when applied to ,god1 a purely logical distinction1 due solely to our finite human mode of thinking1 and having no ground or basis or reason in the reality which is the object of our thought4 ,on this there is complete unanimity among scholastic philosophers4 ,but while we conceive that ,god actually exists by that whereby ,he is ,god1 by ,his ,essence ,itself1 we do not conceive that any created or contingent being exists by that whereby it is what it is1 by its essence4 ,we do not1 for example1 regard the essence of ,socrates1 whether specific or individual 7that whereby he is a man1 or that whereby he is this man1 ,socrates71 as that whereby he actually exists4 ,in other words1 the essence of the existing ,socrates1 being a contingent essence1 does not necessarily demand or imply that it actually exist4 ,our concept of such an essence does not include the note of actual existence4 ,therefore if we find such an essence actually existing we consider this actually existing essence as caused or produced1 and conserved in existence1 by some other being1 viz4 by the ,necessary ,being3 so that if it were not so created and conserved it would be a pure possibility and nothing actual47#aae7 ,the same difference between the ,necessary ,being and contingent beings will be seen from considering their existence4 ,the abstract concept of existence is rendered definite and determinate by the essence which it actualizes4 ,now every finite essence is of some particular kind2 and its existence is rendered determinate by the fact that it is the existence of a definite kind of essence4 ,the existence of a contingent being we conceive as the actuality of its essence2 and its essence as a definite potentiality of existence4 ,thus if we conceive existence as a perfection it is restricted by the finite nature of the potentiality which it actualizes4 ,but the existence of the ,necessary ,being is the plenitude of actuality1 an existence not restricted by being the existence of any essence that is determinate because finite1 but of an essence that is determinate by being above all genera and species1 by being infinite1 by being ,itself pure actuality1 in no sense potential but perfectly and formally identical with actual existence4 ,while1 therefore1 the essence of the ,necessary ,being is a necessarily existing essence1 that of a contingent being is not necessarily existent1 but is conceived as a potentiality which has been de facto actualized or made existent by the ,necessary ,being1 and which may again cease to be actually existent47#aaf7 ,on this too there is unanimity among scholastic philosophers4 ,we distinguish mentally or logically between the essence of an actually existing contingent being and its existence2 considering the former as the potential principle1 in relation to the latter as the actualizing principle1 of the contingent existing reality4 ,but is the distinction between such an essence and its existence something more than a logical distinction8 ,is it a real distinction8 ,this is the question in dispute4 ,and in order to avoid misunderstanding1 we must be clear on these two points3 firstly1 of what essence and existence is there question8 and secondly1 what exactly are we to understand by a real distinction in this matter8 #bb4 ,,state ,,of ,,the ,,question4--,in the first place1 there is no question here of the relation of a possible essence as such to existence4 ,the possible essence of a contingent being1 as such1 has no reality outside the ,divine ,essence1 ,intellect1 ,will1 and ,omnipotence4 ,before the world was created the possible essences of all the beings that constitute it were certainly really distinct from the actual existence of these beings which do constitute the created universe4 ,on this point there can be no difference of opinion4 ,to contend that it is on the eternal reality of the possible essence that actual existence supervenes1 when a contingent being begins to exist1 would be equivalent to contending that it is the ,divine ,essence that becomes actual in the phenomena of our experience3 which is the error of ,pantheism4 ,again1 before a contingent thing comes into actual existence it may be virtually and potentially in the active powers and passive potentialities of other actually existing contingent things3 as the oak1 for instance1 is in the passive potentiality of the acorn and in the active powers of the natural agencies whereby it is evolved from the acorn2 or the statue in the block of marble and in the mind and artistic power of the sculptor4 ,but neither is there any question here of the relation of such potential being or essence as a thing has in its causes to the actual existence of this thing when actually produced4 ,whatever being or essence it has in its active and passive causes is certainly really distinct from the existence which the thing has when it has been actually produced4 ,nor is there any doubt or dispute about this point4 ,at the same time much controversy is due to misunderstandings arising from a confusion of thought which fails to distinguish between the essence as purely possible1 the essence as virtually or potentially in its causes1 and the essence as actually existing4 ,it is about the distinction between the latter and its existence that the whole question is raised4 ,and it must be borne in mind that this essence1 whether it is really distinct from its existence or not1 is itself a positive reality from the moment it is created or produced4 ,the question is whether the creative or productive act--whereby this essence is placed 8outside its causes10 and is now no longer merely possible1 or merely virtual or potential in its causes1 but something real in itself--has for its term one reality1 or two realities1 viz4 the essence as real subjective potentiality of existence1 and the existential act or perfection whereby it is constituted actually existent47#aag7 ,the question is exclusively concerned with the essence which began to exist when the contingent being came into actual existence1 and which ceases to exist when1 or if1 this being again passes out of actual existence2 and the question is whether this essence which actually exists is really distinct from the existence whereby it actually exists4 ,finally1 the question concerns the essence and existence of any and every actual contingent reality1 whether such reality be a substance or an accident4 ,of course it is primarily concerned with the essence and existence of substances2 but it also applies to the essence and existence of accidents in so far as these latter will be found to be really distinct from the substances in which they inhere1 and to have reality proper to themselves4 #bc4 ,,the ,,theory ,,of ,,distinctions ,,in ,,its ,,application ,,to ,,the ,,question4--,in the next place1 what are we to understand by a real distinction in this matter8 ,ambiguity and obscurity of thought in regard to the theory of distinctions1 and in regard to the application of the theory to the present question1 has been probably the most fertile source of much tedious and fruitless controversy in this connexion4 ,anticipating what will be considered more fully at a later stage 7#cj71 we must note here the two main classes of distinction which1 by reflecting on our thought-processes1 we discover between the objects of our thought4 ,the real distinction is that which exists in things independently of the consideration of our minds2 that which is discovered1 but not made1 by the mind2 that which is given to us in and with the data of our experience4 ,for example1 the act of thinking is a reality other than1 and therefore really distinct from1 the mind that thinks2 for the mind persists after the act of thinking has passed away4 ,opposed to this is the mental or logical distinction1 which is the distinction made by the mind itself between two different concepts of one and the same reality2 which is not in the reality independently of our thought1 but is introduced into it by our thought1 regarding the same reality under different aspects or from different points of view4 ,the mind never makes such a distinction without some ground or reason for doing so4 ,sometimes1 however1 this reason will be found exclusively in the mind itself--in the limitations of its modes of thought--and not in the reality which is the matter or object of the thought4 ,the distinction is then said to be purely logical or mental4 ,such distinctions are entia rationis1 logical entities4 ,an example would be the distinction between the concept 8man0 and the concept 8rational animal10 or1 in general1 between any definable object of thought and its definition2 the distinction1 therefore1 between the essence and the existence of the ,necessary ,being is a purely logical distinction1 for in a definition it is the essence of the thing we define1 and existence is of the essence or definition of the ,necessary ,being4 ,sometimes1 again1 the reason for making a mental distinction will be found in the reality itself4 ,what is one and the same reality presents different aspects to the mind and evokes different concepts of itself in the mind3 though really one1 it is virtually manifold2 and the distinction between the concepts of these various aspects is commonly known as a virtual distinction4 ,for example1 when we think of any individual man as a 8rational animal10 though our concept of 8animal nature0 is distinct from that of 8rational nature10 we do not regard these in him as two realities co-existing or combining to form his human nature1 but only as two distinct aspects under which we view the one reality which is his human nature4 ,and we view it under these two aspects because we have actual experience of instances in which animal nature is really distinct and separated from rationality1 e4g41 in the brute beast4 ,or1 again1 since we can recognize three grades of life in man--vegetative1 sentient1 and rational--we conceive the one principle of life1 his soul1 as virtually three principles2 and so we distinguish mentally or virtually between three souls in man1 although in reality there is only one4 ,or1 once more1 when we think of the ,wisdom1 the ,will1 and the ,omnipotence of ,god1 we know that although these concepts represent different aspects of the ,deity1 these aspects are not distinct realities in ,him2 but that because of ,his infinite perfection and infinite simplicity they are all objectively one and the same self-identical reality4 ,a virtual distinction is said to be imperfect 7thus approaching nearer to the nature of a purely logical distinction7 when each of the concepts whereby we apprehend the same reality only prescinds explicitly from what is expressed by the other1 although one of them is found on analysis to include implicitly what is expressed by the other4 ,such is the distinction between the being and the life of any living thing2 or the distinction between the spirituality and the immortality of the human soul2 or the distinction between ,infinite ,wisdom and ,infinite ,power3 the distinction between the divine attributes in general4 ,a virtual distinction is said to be perfect 7thus approaching nearer to the nature of a real distinction7 when neither of the concepts includes either explicitly or implicitly what is expressed by the other4 ,such1 for instance1 is the distinction between the principle of intellectual life and the principle of animal or sentient life in man2 for not only can these exist separately 7the former without the latter1 e4g4 in pure spirits1 the latter without the former1 e4g4 in brute beasts71 but also it will be found that by no analysis does either concept in any way involve the other47#aah7 ,our only object in setting down the various examples just given is to illustrate the general scholastic teaching on the doctrine of distinction4 ,in themselves they are not beyond dispute1 for the general doctrine of distinction is not easy of application in detail2 but they will be sufficient for our present purpose4 ,probably the greatest difficulty in applying the general doctrine will be found to lie in discriminating between virtual distinctions--especially perfect virtual distinctions--and real distinctions47#aai7 ,and this difficulty will be appreciated still more when we learn that a real distinction does not necessarily involve separability of the objects so distinguished4 ,in other words there may be1 in a composite existing individual being1 constitutive factors or principles1 or integral parts1 each of which is a positive real entity1 really distinct from the others1 and yet incapable of existing separately or in isolation from the others4 8,separability10 says ,mercier17#abj7 8is one of the signs of a real distinction2 but it is neither essential to1 nor a necessary property of the latter4 ,two separable things are of course really distinct from each other2 but two entities may be really distinct from each other without being separable or capable of existing apart from each other4 ,thus we believe that the intellect and the will in man are really distinct from each other1 and both alike from the substance of the human soul2 yet they cannot exist isolated from the soul40 ,therefore1 even though the objects which we apprehend as distinct1 by means of distinct concepts1 be understood to be such that they cannot actually exist in isolation from each other1 but only as united in a composite individual being1 still if it can be shown that each of them has its own proper reality independently of our thought1 so that the distinction between them is not the result of our thought1 or introduced by our thought into the individual thing or being which we are considering1 then the distinction must be regarded as real4 ,if1 on the other hand1 it can be shown that the different aspects which we apprehend in any datum by means of distinct concepts have not1 apart from the consideration of the mind1 apart from the analytic activity of our own thought1 each its own proper reality1 but are only distinct mental views of what is objectively one and the same reality1 then the distinction must be regarded as logical1 not real1--and this even although there may be in the richness and fulness of that one reality comparatively to the limited capacity of our minds1 as well as in the very constitution and modes of thought of our minds themselves1 a reason or basis for1 and an explanation of1 the multiplicity of concepts whereby we attain to an understanding of some one reality4 #bd4 ,,solutions ,,of ,,the ,,question4--,postponing further consideration of the serious problems on the validity of knowledge and its relation to reality1 to which those reflections inevitably give rise1 let us now return to the main question3 the nature of the distinction between the essence and the existence of any actually existing contingent being4 ,we need not be surprised to find that the greatest minds have been unable to reach the same solution of this question4 ,for it is but a phase of the more general metaphysical problem--at once both ontological and epistemological--of the nature of reality and the relation of the human mind thereto4 ,nor will any serious modern philosopher who is at all mindful of the wealth of current controversial literature on this very problem1 or of the endless variety of conflicting opinions among contemporary thinkers in regard to it1 be disposed to ridicule the medieval controversies on the doctrine of distinction as applied to essence and existence4 ,no doubt there has been a good deal of mere verbal1 and perhaps trifling1 argumentation on the matter3 it lends itself to the dialectical skill of the controversialist who 8takes sides10 as well as to the serious thought of the open-minded investigator4 ,it is not1 however1 through drawing different conclusions from the same premisses that conflicting solutions of the question have been reached1 but rather through fundamentally different attitudes in regard to the premisses themselves which different philosophers profess to find in the common data of their experience4 ,when we have once grasped what philosophers mean by a logical or a real distinction as applied to the relation between essence and existence we shall not get any very material assistance towards the choice of a solution by considering at length the arguments adduced on either side47#aba7 ,those who believe there is a real distinction7#abb7 between the essence and the existence of all actually existing contingent beings mean by this that the real essence which comes into actual existence by creation1 or by the action of created causes1 is a reality distinct from the existence whereby it actually exists4 ,the actually existing essence is the total term of the creative or productive act2 but what we apprehend in it under the concept of essence is really distinct from what we apprehend in it under the concept of existence3 the existence being a real principle which actualizes the essence1 and this latter being itself another real principle which is in itself a positive1 subjective potentiality of existence47#abc7 ,neither1 of course1 can actually exist without the other3 no actual existence except that of a real essence2 no existing essence except by reason of the existence which makes it actual4 ,but these two real principles of existing contingent being1 inseparable as they are and correlative1 are nevertheless distinct realities--distinct in the objective order and independently of our thought1--and form by their union a really composite product3 the existing thing4 ,we might attempt to illustrate this by the analogy of a body and its shape or colour4 ,the body itself is really distinct from its actual shape and colour3 it may lose them1 and yet remain the same body2 and it may acquire other shapes and colours4 ,at any time the body has actually some particular shape and colour2 but that by which it is formally so shaped and coloured is something really different from the body itself4 ,furthermore1 before the body actually possessed this particular shape and colour1 these were in it potentially3 that is to say1 there were then in the body the real1 passive1 subjective potentialities of this particular shape and colour4 ,so too that by which a real 7contingent7 essence actually exists 7i4e4 the existential act1 existence7 is really distinct from that which actually exists 7i4e4 the essence1 the potentiality of that existential act74 ,the analogy is1 however1 at best only a halting one4 ,for while it is comparatively easy to understand how the passive1 subjective potentiality of a shape or colour can be something real in the already actually existing body1 it is not so easy to understand how the potentiality of existence1 i4e4 the real essence1 can be anything that is itself real and really distinct from the existence47#abd7 ,the oak is really in the acorn1 for the passive1 subjective potentiality of the oak is in the actual acorn2 but is this potentiality anything really distinct from the acorn8 or should we not rather say that the actual acorn is potentially the oak1 or is the potentiality of the oak8 ,at all events even if it is really distinct from the actual acorn1 it is in the actual acorn4 ,but is it possible to conceive a real1 subjective potentiality which does not reside in anything actual87#abe7 ,now if the real essence is really distinct from its existence it must be conceived as a real1 subjective potentiality of existence4 ,yet it cannot be conceived as a potentiality in anything actual3 except indeed in the actually existing essence which is the composite result of its union with the existential act4 ,it is not a real1 subjective potentiality antecedently to the existential act1 and on which the latter is1 as it were1 superimposed37#abf7 in itself1 it is1 in fact1 nothing real except as actualized by the latter2 but1 as we have already observed1 the process of actualization1 whether by direct creation or by the action of created causes1 must be conceived as having for its total term or effect a composite reality resulting from what we can at best imperfectly describe as the union of two correlative1 con-created1 or co-produced principles of being1 a potential and an actual1 really distinct from each other3 that whereby the thing can exist1 the potentiality of existence1 the essence2 and that whereby the thing does exist1 the actuality of essence1 the existence4 ,the description is imperfect because these principles are not con-created or co-produced separately2 but1 rather1 the creation or production of an existing essence1 the efficiency by which it is 8placed outside its causes10 has one single1 though composite1 term3 the actually existing thing4 ,this view1 thus advocating a real distinction between essence and existence1 may obviously be regarded as an emphatic expression of the objective validity of intellectual knowledge4 ,it might be regarded as an application of the more general view that the objective concepts between which the intellect distinguishes in its interpretation of reality should be regarded as representing distinct realities1 except when the distinction is seen to arise not from the nature of the object but from the nature of the subject1 from the limitations and imperfections of our own modes of thought4 ,but in the case of any particular 7disputed7 distinction1 the onus probandi should lie rather on the side of those who contend that such distinction is logical1 and not real4 ,on the other hand1 many philosophers who are no less firmly convinced of the objective validity of intellectual knowledge observe that it is possible to push this principle too far1 or rather to err by excess in its application4 ,instead of placing the burden of proof solely on the side of the logical distinction1 they would place it rather more on the side of the real distinction--in conformity with the maxim of method1 ,entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem4 ,and they think that it is an error by excess to hold the distinction between essence and existence to be real4 ,this brings us to the second alternative opinion3 that the distinction in question is not real1 but only virtual47#abg7 ,according to this view1 the essence and the existence of any existing contingent being are one and the same reality4 ,there is1 however1 in this reality a basis for the two distinct objective concepts--of essence and of existence--whereby we apprehend it4 ,for the contingent being does not exist necessarily3 we see such beings coming into existence and ceasing to exist3 we can therefore think of what they are without thinking of them as actually existent3 in other words1 we can think of them as possible1 and of their existence as that by which they become actual4 ,this is a sufficient reason for distinguishing mentally1 in the existing being1 the essence which exists and the existence by which it exists47#abh7 ,but when we think of the essence of an actually existing being as objectively possible1 or as potential in its causes1 we are no longer thinking of it as anything real in itself1 but only of its ideal being as an object of thought in our minds1 or of the ideal being it has in the ,divine ,mind1 or of the potential being it has in created causes1 or of the virtual being it has in the ,divine ,omnipotence1 or of the ultimate basis of its possibility in the ,divine ,essence4 ,but all these modes of 8being0 we know to be really distinct from the real1 contingent essence itself which begins to exist actually in time1 and may cease once more to exist in time when and if its own nature demands1 and ,god wills1 such cessation4 ,but that the real1 contingent essence itself which so exists1 is something really distinct from the existence whereby it exists2 that it forms with the latter a really composite being2 that it is in itself a real1 subjective potentiality1 receptive of existence as another and actualizing reality1 really distinct from it1 so that the creation or production of any single actually existing contingent being would have for its term two really distinct principles of being1 a potential and an actual1 essence and existence1 created or produced per modum unius1 so to speak3 for asserting all this it is contended by supporters of the virtual distinction that we have no sufficient justifying reason47#abi7 ,hence they conclude that a real distinction must be denied3 ,entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem4 ,though each of these opinions has been defended with a great deal of ability1 and an exhaustive array of arguments1 a mere rehearsal of these latter would not give much material assistance towards a solution of the question4 ,we therefore abstain from repeating them here4 ,there are only a few points in connexion with them to which attention may be directed4 ,in the first place1 some defenders of the real distinction urge that were the distinction not real1 things would exist essentially1 i4e4 necessarily2 and thus the most fundamental ground of distinction between ,god and creatures1 between the ,necessary ,being and contingent beings1 would be destroyed3 creatures would be no longer in their very constitution composite1 mixtures of potentiality and actuality1 but would be purely actual1 absolutely simple and1 in a word1 identical with the ,infinite ,being ,himself4 ,supporters of the virtual distinction deny that those very serious consequences follow from their view4 ,they point out that though the existence of the creature is really identical with its essence1 the essence does not exist necessarily or a se2 the whole existing essence is ab alio1 is caused1 contingent2 and the fundamental distinction between such a being and the ,self-,existing ,being is in this view perfectly clear4 ,nor is the creature1 they contend1 purely actual and absolutely simple2 it need not have existed1 and it may cease to exist2 it has1 therefore1 a potentiality of non-existence1 which is inconceivable in the case of the ,necessary and purely ,actual ,being2 it is1 therefore1 mutable as regards existence2 besides which the essences even of the most simple created beings1 namely pure spirits are composite in the sense that they have faculties and operations really distinct from their substance4 ,secondly1 it is alleged by some defenders of the real distinction that this latter view of the nature of existing contingent reality is a cardinal doctrine in the whole philosophical system of ,st4 ,thomas1 and of scholastics generally3 so fundamental1 in fact1 that many important doctrines1 unanimously held to be true by all scholastics1 cannot be successfully vindicated apart from it47#acj7 ,to which it is replied that there are no important truths of scholastic philosophy which cannot be defended quite adequately apart altogether from the view one may hold on the present question2 and that1 this being the case1 it is unwise to endeavour to base admittedly true doctrines1 which can be better defended otherwise1 upon an opinion which can at best claim only the amount of probability it can derive from the intrinsic merits of the arguments by which it is itself supported47#aca7 ,before passing from this whole question we must note the existence of a third school of thought1 identified mainly with the followers of ,duns ,scotus47#acb7 ,these authors contend that the distinction between essence and existence is not a real distinction1 nor yet1 on the other hand1 is it merely a virtual distinction1 but one which they call formalis1 actualis ex natura rei1 that between a reality and its intrinsic modes4 ,it is better known as the 8,scotistic0 distinction4 ,we shall see the nature of it when dealing ex professo with the general doctrine of distinctions4 ,the multiplicity of these views1 and the unavoidable difficulty experienced in grasping and setting forth their meaning with any tolerable degree of clearness1 would suggest the reflection that in those controversies the medieval scholastics were perhaps endeavouring to think and to express what reality is1 apart from thought and 8independently of the consideration of the mind0--a task which1 conceived in these terms1 must appear fruitless2 and one which1 anyhow1 involves in its very nature the closest scrutiny of the epistemological problem of the power of the human mind to get at least a true and valid1 if not adequate and comprehensive1 insight into the nature of reality4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,reality ,,as ,,one ,,and ,,manifold4 #be4 ,,the ,,transcendental ,,attributes ,,or ,,properties ,,of ,,being3 ,,unity1 ,,truth1 ,,and ,,goodness4--,so far1 we have analysed the notions of ,real ,being1 of ,becoming or ,change1 of ,being as ,possible and as ,actual1 of ,essence and ,existence4 ,before approaching a study of the ,categories or ,suprema ,genera ,entis1 the highest and widest modes in which reality manifests itself1 we have next to consider certain attributes or properties of being which reveal themselves as co-extensive with reality itself4 ,taking human experience in its widest sense1 as embracing all modes that are cognitive or allied with consciousness1 as including intellect1 memory1 imagination1 sense perception1 will and appetite1 as speculative1 ethical or moral1 and esthetic or artistic1--we find that the reality which makes up this complex human experience of ours is universally and necessarily characterized by certain features which we call the transcendental attributes or properties of being1 inasmuch as they transcend all specific and generic modes of being1 pervade all its categories equally1 and are inseparable from any datum of experience4 ,we shall see that they are not really distinct from the reality which they characterize1 but only logically distinct from it1 being aspects under which we apprehend it1 negations or other logical relations which we necessarily annex to it by the mental processes whereby we seek to render it actually intelligible to our minds4 ,the first in order of these ontological attributes is unity3 the concept of that whereby reality considered in itself becomes a definite object of thought4 ,the second in order is truth3 which is the conception of reality considered in its relation to cognitive experience1 to intellect4 ,the third is goodness3 the aspect under which reality is related as an object to appetitive experience1 to will4 ,now when we predicate of any reality under our consideration that it is 8one10 or 8good10 or 8true0--in the ontological sense to be explained1--that which we predicate is not a mere ens rationis1 but something real1 something which is really identical with the subject1 and which is distinguished from the latter in our judgment only by a logical distinction4 ,the attribution of any of these properties to the subject does not1 however1 add anything real to the latter3 it adds merely some logical aspect involved in1 or supposed by1 the attribution4 ,at the same time1 this logical aspect gives us real information by making explicit some real feature of being not explicitly revealed in the concept of being itself1 although involved in1 and following as a property from1 the latter4 ,there do not seem to be any other transcendental properties of being besides the three enumerated4 ,the terms 8reality10 8thing10 8something10 are synonymous expressions of the concept of being itself1 rather than of properties of being4 8,existence0 is not a transcendental attribute of being1 for it is not co-extensive with reality or real being4 ,and although reality must be 8either possible or actual10 8either necessary or contingent10 8either infinite or finite10 etc41 this necessity of verifying in itself one or other member of any such alternatives is not a property of being1 but rather something essentially rooted in the very concept of reality itself4 ,some would regard as a distinct transcendental attribute of being the conception of the latter as an object of esthetic contemplation1 as manifesting order and harmony1 as beautiful4 ,this conception of being will be found1 however1 to flow from the more fundamental aspects of reality considered as true and as good1 rather than directly from the concept of being itself4 #bf4 ,,transcendental ,,unity4--,when we think of anything as one we think of it as undivided in itself4 ,the unity or oneness of being is the undividedness of being3 ,unum est id quod est indivisum in se3 ,universaliter quaecunque non habent divisionem1 inquantum non habent1 sic unum dicuntur47#acc7 ,when1 therefore1 we conceive being as undivided into constitutive parts1 and unmultiplied into repetitions of itself1 we conceive it as a being1 as one4 ,for the concept of being1 formally as one1 it does not seem necessary that we conceive being as divided or distinct from all other being4 ,this second negation1 of identity with other being1 rather follows the conception of being as one3 being is distinct from other being because it is already itself one3 it is a prior negation that formally constitutes its unity1 namely1 the negation of internal division or multiplication of itself3 ,god was truly one from all eternity1 before there was any other being1 any created being1 distinct from ,him4 ,the division or distinction of an object of thought from whatever is not itself is what constitutes the notion of otherness47#acd7 ,it is manifest that being and unity are really identical1 that when we think of being we think of what is really undivided in itself1 that once we introduce dividedness into the object of our concept we are no longer thinking of being but of beings1 i4e4 of a multitude or plurality each member of which is a being and one4 ,for being1 as an object of thought1 is either simple or composite4 ,if simple1 it is not only undivided but indivisible4 ,if composite1 we cannot think of it as a being1 capable of existing1 so long as we think its parts as separate or divided3 only when we think of them as actually united and undivided have we the concept of a being3 and eo ipso we have the concept of being as one1 as a unity47#ace7 ,hence the scholastic formul3 ,ens et unum convertuntur1 and ,omne ens est unum4 ,the truth embodied in these is so self-evident that the expression of it may seem superfluous2 but they are not mere tautologies1 and in the interests of clear and consistent thinking our attention may be profitably directed to them4 ,the same remark applies to much in the present and subsequent chapters on the transcendental attributes of being4 #bg4 ,,kinds ,,of ,,unity4--7a7 ,the unity we have been describing has been called transcendental1 to distinguish it from predicamental unity--the unity which is proper to a special category of being1 namely1 quantity1 and which1 accordingly1 is also called quantitative or mathematical unity4 ,while the former is common to all being1 with which it is really identical1 and to which it adds nothing real1 the latter belongs and is applicable1 properly speaking1 only to the mode of being which is corporeal1 which exists only as affected by quantity1 as occupying space1 as capable of measurement2 and therefore1 also1 this latter unity adds something real to the being which it affects1 namely1 the attribute of quantity1 of which unity is the measure and the generating principle47#acf7 ,for quantity1 as we shall see1 is a mode of being really distinct from the corporeal substance which it affects4 ,the quantity has its own transcendental unity2 so has the substance which it quantifies2 so has the composite whole1 the quantified body1 but this latter transcendental unity1 like the composite being with which it is identical1 is not a unum per se but only a unum per accidens 7cf4 b1 infra74 ,we derive our notion of quantitative or mathematical unity1 which is the principle of counting and the standard of measuring1 from dividing mentally the continuous quantity or magnitude which is one of the immediate data of sense experience4 ,now the distinction between this unit and transcendental unity supposes not merely that quantity is really distinct from the corporeal substance1 but also that the human mind is capable of conceiving as real certain modes of being other than the corporeal1 modes to which quantitative concepts and processes1 such as counting and measuring1 are not properly applicable1 as they are to corporeal reality1 but only in an analogical or transferred sense 7#b74 ,the notion of transcendental unity1 therefore1 bears the same relation to that of quantitative unity1 as the notion of being in general bears to that of quantified or corporeal being4 7b7 ,transcendental unity may be either essential 7or substantial1 8unum per se10 8unum simpliciter071 or accidental 78unum per accidens10 8unum secundum quid074 ,the former characterizes a being which has nothing in it beyond what is essential to it as such1 e4g4 the unity of any substance3 and this unity is twofold--7#a7 unity of simplicity and 7#b7 unity of composition--according as the substance is essentially simple 7such as the human soul or a pure spirit7 or essentially composite 7such as man1 or any corporeal substance3 since every such substance is composed essentially of a formative and an indeterminate principle747#acg7 ,accidental unity is the unity of a being whose constituent factors or contents are not really united in such a way as to form one essence1 whether simple or composite4 ,it is threefold3 7#a7 collective unity1 or unity of aggregation1 as of a heap of stones or a crowd of men2 7#b7 artificial unity1 as of a house or a picture2 and 7#c7 natural or physical unity1 as of any existing substance with its connatural accidents1 e4g4 a living organism with its size1 shape1 qualities1 etc41 or the human soul with its faculties47#ach7 7c7 ,transcendental unity may be either individual 7singular1 numerical1 concrete1 real7 or universal 7specific1 generic1 abstract1 logical74 ,the former is that which characterizes being or reality considered as actually existing or as proximately capable of existing3 the unity of an individual nature or essence3 the unity whereby a being is not merely undivided in itself but incapable of repetition or multiplication of itself4 ,it is only the individual as such that can actually exist3 the abstract and universal is incapable of actually existing as such4 ,we shall examine presently what it is that individuates reality1 and what it is that renders it capable of existing actually in the form of 8things0 or of 8persons0--the forms in which it actually presents itself in our experience4 ,abstract or universal unity is the unity which characterizes a reality conceived as an abstract1 universal object by the human intellect4 ,the object of a specific or generic concept1 8man0 or 8animal10 for example1 is one in this sense1 undivided in itself1 but capable of indefinite multiplication or repetition in the only mode in which it can actually exist--the individual mode4 ,the universal is unum aptum inesse pluribus4 ,finally1 we can conceive any nature or essence without considering it in either of its alternative states--either as individual or as universal4 ,thus conceived it is characterized by a unity which has been commonly designated as abstract1 or 7by ,scotists7 as formal unity4 #bh4 ,,multitude ,,and ,,number4--,the one has for its correlative the manifold4 ,units1 one of which is not the other1 constitute multitude or plurality4 ,if unity is the negation of actual division in being1 multitude results from a second negation1 that1 namely1 by which the undivided being or unit is marked off or divided from other units47#aci7 ,we have defined unity by the negation of actual intrinsic dividedness2 and we have seen it to be compatible with extrinsic dividedness1 or otherness4 ,thus the vague notion of dividedness is anterior to that of unity4 ,now multitude involves dividedness2 but it also involves and presupposes the intrinsic undividedness or unity of each constituent of the manifold4 ,in the real order of things the one is prior to all dividedness2 but on account of the sensuous origin of our concepts we can define the former only by exclusion of the latter4 ,the order in which we obtain these ideas seems1 therefore1 to be as follows3 8first being1 then dividedness1 next unity which excludes dividedness1 and finally multitude which consists of units047#adj7 ,the relation of the one to the manifold is that of undivided being to divided being4 ,the same reality cannot be one and manifold under the same aspect2 though obviously a being may be actually one and potentially manifold or vice versa1 or one under a certain aspect and manifold under another aspect4 ,from the transcendental plurality or multitude which we have just described we can distinguish predicamental or quantitative plurality3 a distinction which is to be understood in the same way as when applied to unity4 ,quantitative multitude is the actually separated or divided condition of quantified being4 ,number is a multitude measured or counted by unity3 it is a counted1 and1 therefore1 necessarily a definite and finite multitude4 ,now it is mathematical unity that is1 properly1 the principle of number and the standard or measure of all counting2 and therefore it is only to realities which fall within the category of quantity--in other words1 to material being--that the concept of number is properly applicable4 ,no doubt we can and do conceive transcendental unity after the analogy of the quantitative unity which is the principle of counting and measuring2 and no doubt we can use the transcendental concept of 8actually undivided being0 as a principle of enumeration1 and so 8count0 or 8enumerate0 spiritual beings2 but this counting is only analogical2 and many philosophers1 following ,aristotle and ,st4 ,thomas1 hold that the concepts of numerical multiplicity and numerical distinction are not properly applicable to immaterial beings1 that these latter differ individually from one another not numerically1 but each by its whole nature or essence1 that is1 formally47#ada7 #bi4 ,,the ,,individual ,,and ,,the ,,universal4--,we have distinguished transcendental unity into individual and universal 7#bg1 c74 ,reality as endowed with universal unity is reality as apprehended by abstract thought to be capable of indefinite repetition or multiplication of itself in actual existence4 ,reality as endowed with individual unity is reality apprehended as actually existing1 or as proximately capable of actually existing1 and as therefore incapable of any repetition or multiplication of itself1 of any division of itself into other 8selves0 or communication of itself to other 8selves04 ,while1 therefore1 the universal has its reality only in the individuals to which it communicates itself1 and which thus embody it1 the individual has its reality in itself and of its own right1 so to speak3 when it actually exists it is 8sui juris10 and as such incommunicable1 8incommunicabilis04 ,the actually existing individual is called in ,latin a 8suppositum0--a term which we shall render by the ,english 8thing0 or 8individual thing04 ,it was called by ,aristotle the 1 substantia prima1 8first substance10 or 8first essence10 to distinguish it from the substance or essence conceived by abstract thought as universal2 the latter being designated as 1 substantia secunda1 8second substance0 or 8second essence04 ,now it is a fundamental assumption in ,aristotelian and scholastic philosophy that whatever actually exists1 or whatever is real in the sense that as such it is proximately capable of actual existence1 is and must be individual3 that the universal as such is not real1 i4e4 as such cannot actually exist4 ,and the manifest reason for this assumption is that whatever actually exists must be1 with entire definiteness and determinateness1 its own self and nothing else3 it cannot be capable of division or repetition of itself1 of that which it really is1 into 8other0 realities which would still be 8that individual thing04 ,but reality considered as universal is capable of such repetition of itself indefinitely4 ,therefore reality cannot actually exist as universal1 but only as individual4 ,this is merely plain common sense2 nor does the idealistic monism which appears to attribute reality to the universal as such1 and which interprets reality exclusively according to the forms in which it presents itself to abstract thought1 really run counter to this consideration2 for what it really holds is not that universals as such are real1 but that they are phases of the all-one reality which is itself one individual being4 ,but many modern philosophers hold that individuality1 no less than universality1 is a form of thought4 ,no doubt 8individuality0 in the abstract is1 no less than universality1 an object abstracted from the data of experience by the mind's analysis of the latter4 ,but this is not what those philosophers mean4 ,they mean that the individual as such is not a real datum of experience4 ,from the ,kantian view that individuality is a purely mental form with which the mind invests the datum1 they draw the subjectivist conclusion that the world1 thus interpreted as consisting of 8individuals10 is a phenomenal or mental product for the objective validity of which there can be to man's speculative reason no sufficient guarantee4 ,to this theory we oppose that of ,aristotle and the scholastics1 not merely that the individual alone is actually existent1 but that as actually existent and as individual it is actually given to us and apprehended by us in internal and external sense experience2 and that although in the inorganic world1 and to some extent in the lower forms of life1 we may not be able to determine for certain what portions of this experience are distinct individuals1 still in the world of living things generally1 and especially of the animal kingdom1 there can be no difficulty in determining this1 for the simple reason that here reality is given to us in sense experience as consisting of distinct individuals4 ,at the same time it is true that we can understand these individual realities1 interpret them1 read the meaning of them1 only by the intellectual function of judgment1 i4e4 by the analytic and synthetic activity whereby we abstract and universalize certain aspects of them1 and use these aspects as predicates of the individuals4 ,now1 seeing that intellectual thought1 as distinct from sense experience1 apprehends its objects only as abstract and potentially universal1 only as static1 self-identical1 possible essences1 and nevertheless predicates these of the concrete1 individual1 contingent1 actually existing 8things0 of sense experience1 identifying them with the latter in affirmative judgments2 seeing moreover1 that--since the intellectual knowledge we thus acquire about the data of sense experience is genuine and not chimerical--those 8objects0 of abstract thought must be likewise real1 and must be really in those individual sense data 7according to the theory of knowledge which finds its expression in ,moderate ,realism71--there arises immediately the problem1 or rather the group of problems1 regarding the relations between reality as revealed to intellect1 i4e4 as abstract and universal1 and reality as revealed to sense1 i4e4 as concrete and individual4 ,in other words1 we have to inquire how we are to interpret intellectually the fact that reality1 which as a possible essence is universal for abstract thought1 is nevertheless1 as actually existing1 individualized for sense--and consequently for intellect reflecting on the data of sense47#adb7 #cj4 ,,the 8,,metaphysical ,,grades ,,of ,,being0 ,,in ,,the ,,individual4--,what1 then is the relation between all that intellect can apprehend in the individual1 viz4 its lowest class essence or specific nature1 and its whole nature as an individual1 its essentia atoma or individual nature8 ,we can best approach this problem by considering first these various abstract thought-objects which intellect can apprehend in the individual4 ,what are called the metaphysical grades of being1 those positive moments of perfection or reality which the mind detects in the individual1 as1 for instance1 substantiality1 materiality1 organic life1 animality1 rationality1 individuality1 in the individual man--whether we describe them as 8phases0 or 8aspects0 or 8formalities0 of being--are undoubtedly distinct objects for abstract thought4 ,why does it thus distinguish between them1 and express them by distinct concepts1 even when it finds them embodied in a single individual8 ,because1 reflecting on the manner in which reality presents itself1 through sense experience1 as actually existing1 it finds resemblances and differences between individually distinct data4 ,it finds in some of them grades of reality which it does not find in others1 individual1 specific1 and generic grades2 and some--transcendental--grades common to all4 ,now between these various grades of being as found in one and the same individual it cannot be denied that there exists a logical distinction with a foundation or ground for it in the individual reality2 because the latter1 being more or less similar to other individual realities1 causes the mind to apprehend it by a number of distinct concepts3 the individuality whereby it differs really from all other individuals of the same species2 the specific1 differential and generic grades of being whereby it is conceptually identified with wider and wider classes of things2 and the transcendental grades whereby it is conceptually identified with all others4 ,the similarity of really distinct individuals1 which is the conceptual identity of their qualities1 is the ground on which we conceptually identify their essences4 ,now is there any reason for thinking that these grounds of similarity1 as found in the individual1 are really distinct from one another in the latter8 ,they are certainly conceptually distinct expressions--each less inadequate than the wider ones--of what is really one individual essence4 ,but we must take them to be all really identical in and with this individual essence1 unless we are prepared to hold conceptual plurality as such to be real plurality2 in which case we should also hold conceptual unity as such to be real unity4 ,but this latter view is precisely the error of extreme realism1 of reifying abstract concepts and holding the 8universale a parte rei03 a theory which leads logically to monism47#adc7 #ca4 ,,individuality4--,the distinction1 therefore1 between these grades of being in the individual1 is a virtual distinction1 i4e4 a logical distinction with a ground for it in the reality4 ,this is the sort of distinction which exists between the specific nature of the individual1 i4e4 what is contained in the definition of the lowest class to which it belongs1 and its individuality1 i4e4 what constitutes its nature or essence as an individual4 ,no doubt the concrete existing individual contains1 besides its individual nature or essence1 a variety of accidental characteristics which serve as marks or signs whereby its individuality is revealed to us4 ,these are called 8individualizing characteristics10 8notae individuantes10 the familiar scholastic list of them being 8forma1 figura1 locus1 tempus1 stirps1 patria1 nomen10 with manifest reference to the individual 8man04 ,but though these characteristics enable us to mark off the individual in space and time from other individuals of the same class1 thus revealing individuality to us in the concrete1 it cannot be held that they constitute the individuality of the nature or substance in each case4 ,if the human substance1 essence1 or nature1 as found in ,socrates1 were held to differ from the human substance1 essence1 or nature1 as found in ,plato1 only by the fact that in each it is affected by a different set of accidents1 i4e4 of modes accidental to the substance as found in each1 then it would follow that this substance is not merely conceptually identical in both1 but that it is really identical in both2 which is the error of extreme realism4 ,as a matter of fact it is the converse that is true3 the sets of accidents are distinct because they affect individual substances already really and individually distinct4 ,it is manifest that the accidents which are separable from the individual substance1 e4g4 name1 shape1 size1 appearance1 location1 etc41 cannot constitute its individuality4 ,there are1 however1 other characteristics which are inseparable from the individual substance1 or which are properties of the latter1 e4g4 the fact that an individual man was born of certain parents4 ,perhaps it is such characteristics that give its individuality to the individual substance87#add7 ,to think so would be to misunderstand the question under discussion4 ,we are not now inquiring into the extrinsic causes whereby actually existing reality is individuated1 into the efficient principles of its individuation1 but into the formal and intrinsic principle of the latter4 ,there must obviously be something intrinsic to the individual reality itself whereby it is individuated4 ,and it is about this intrinsic something we are inquiring4 ,the individual man is this individual1 human nature is thus individuated in him1 by something that is essential to human nature as found in him4 ,this something has been called--after the analogy of the differentia specifica which differentiates species within a genus--the differentia individua of the individual4 ,it has also been called by some the differentia numerica1 and by ,scotists the haecceitas4 ,however we are to conceive this something1 it is certain at all events that1 considered as it is really found in the individual1 it cannot be anything really distinct from the specific nature of the latter4 ,no doubt1 the differentia specifica1 considered in the abstract1 it is not essential and intrinsic to the natura generica considered in the abstract3 it is extrinsic and accidental to the abstract content of the latter notion2 but this is because we are conceiving these grades of being in the abstract4 ,the same is true of the differentia individua as compared with the natura specifica in the abstract4 ,but we are now considering these grades of reality as they are actually in the concrete individual being3 and as they are found here1 we have seen that a real distinction between them is inadmissible4 #cb4 ,,the 8,,principle ,,of ,,individuation04--,how1 then1 are we to conceive this something which individuates reality8 ,it may be well to point out that for the erroneous doctrine of extreme realism1 which issues in monism1 the problem of individuation1 as here understood1 does not arise4 ,for the monist all plurality in being is merely apparent1 not real3 there can be no question of a real distinction between individual and individual47#ade7 ,similarly1 the nominalist and the conceptualist evade the problem4 ,for these the individual alone is not merely formally real3 it alone is fundamentally real3 the universal is not even fundamentally real1 has no foundation in reality1 and thus all scientific knowledge of reality as revealed in sense experience is rendered impossible4 ,but for the moderate realist1 while the individual alone is formally real1 the universal is fundamentally real1 and hence the problem arises4 ,it may be forcibly stated in the form of a paradox3 ,that whereby ,socrates and ,plato are really distinct from each other as individuals is really identical with the human nature which is really in both4 ,but what individuates human nature in ,socrates1 or in ,plato1 is logically distinct from the human nature that is really in ,socrates1 and really in ,plato4 ,we have only to inquire1 therefore1 whether the intrinsic principle of individuation is to be conceived merely as a negation1 as something negative added by the mind to the concept of the specific nature1 whereby the latter is apprehended as incapable of multiplication into 8others0 each of which would be formally that same nature1 or1 in other words1 as incommunicable2 or is the intrinsic ground of this incommunicability to be conceived as something positive1 not indeed as something really distinct from1 and superadded to1 the specific nature1 but as a positive aspect of the latter1 an aspect1 moreover1 not involved in the concept of the specific nature considered in the abstract4 ,of the many views that have been put forward on this question two or three call for some attention4 ,in the opinion of ,thomists generally1 the principle which individuates material things1 thus multiplying numerically the same specific nature1 is to be conceived as a positive mode affecting the latter and revealing it in a new aspect1 whereas the specific nature of the spiritual individual is itself formally an individual4 ,the principle of the latter's individuation is already involved in the very concept of its specific nature1 and therefore is not to be conceived as a distinct positive aspect of the latter but simply as the absence of plurality and communicability in the latter4 ,in material things1 moreover1 the positive mode or aspect whereby the specific nature is found numerically multiplied1 and incommunicable as it exists in each1 consists in the fact that such a specific nature involves in its very constitution a material principle which is actually allied with certain quantitative dimensions4 ,hence the principle which individuates material substances is not to be conceived--after the manner in which ,scotists conceive it--as an ultimate differentia affecting the formal factor of the nature1 determining the specific nature just as the differentia specifica determines the generic nature1 but as a material differentiating principle4 ,what individuates the material individual1 what marks it off as one in itself1 distinct or divided from other individuals of the same specific nature1 and incommunicable in that condition1 is the material factor of that individual's nature--not1 indeed1 the material factor1 materia prima1 considered in the abstract1 but the material factor as proximately capable of actual existence by being allied to certain more or less definite spatial or quantitative dimensions3 8matter affected with quantity03 8materia quantitate signata047#adf7 ,in regard to material substances this doctrine embraces two separate contentions3 7a7 that the principle which individuates such a substance must be conceived as something positive1 not really distinct from1 but yet not contained in1 the specific nature considered in the abstract2 7b7 that this positive aspect is to be found not in the formal but in the material principle of the composite corporeal substance4 ,to the former contention it might be objected that what individuates the specific nature cannot be conceived as anything positive1 superadded to this nature3 it cannot be anything accidental to the latter1 for if it were1 the individual would be only an accidental unity1 a 8unum per accidens0 and would be constituted by an accident1 which we have seen to be inadmissible2 nor1 on the other hand1 can it be anything essential to the specific nature1 for if it were1 then individuals should be capable of adequate essential definition1 and furthermore the definition of the specific nature would not really give the whole essence or quidditas of the individuals--two consequences which are commonly rejected by all scholastics4 ,to this1 however1 it is replied that the principle of individuation is something essential to the specific nature in the sense that it is something intrinsic to1 and really identical with1 the whole real substance or entity of this nature1 though not involved in the abstract concept by the analysis of which we reach the definition or quidditas of this nature4 ,what individuates ,socrates is certainly essential to ,socrates1 and is therefore really identical with his human nature2 it is intrinsic to the human nature in him1 a mode or aspect of his human substance2 yet it does not enter into the definition of his nature--8animal rationale0--for such definition abstracts from individuality4 ,when1 therefore1 we say that definition of the specific nature gives the whole essence of an individual1 we mean that it gives explicitly the abstract 7specific7 essence1 not the individuality which is really identical with this1 nor1 therefore1 the whole substantial reality of the individual4 ,we give different answers to the questions1 8,what is ,socrates80 and 8,who is ,socrates80 ,the answer to the former question--a 8man10 or a 8rational animal0--gives the 8essence10 but not explicitly the whole substantial reality of the individual1 this remaining incapable of adequate conceptual analysis4 ,the latter question we answer by giving the notes that reveal individuality4 ,these1 of course1 are 8accidental0 in the strict sense4 ,but even the principles which constitute the individuality of separate individuals of the same species1 and which differentiate these individuals numerically from one another1 we do not describe as essential differences1 whereas we do describe specific and generic differences as essential4 ,the reason of this is that the latter are abstract1 universal1 conceptual1 amenable to intellectual analysis1 scientifically important1 while the former are just the reverse2 the universal differences alone are principles about which we can have scientific knowledge1 for 8all science is of the abstract and universal027#adg7 and this is what we have in mind when we describe them as 8essential0 or 8formal10 and individual differences as 8entitative0 or 8material04 ,the second point in the ,thomistic doctrine is that corporeal substances are individuated by reason of their materiality4 ,the formative1 specific1 determining principle of the corporeal substance is rendered incommunicable by its union with the material1 determinable principle2 and it becomes individually distinct or separate by the fact that this latter principle1 in order to be capable of union with the given specific form1 has in its very essence an exigence for certain more or less determinate dimensions in space4 ,corporeal things have their natural size within certain limits4 ,the individual of a given corporeal species can exist only because the material principle1 receptive of this specific form1 has a natural relation to the fundamental property of corporeal things1 viz4 quantity1 within certain more or less determinate limits4 ,the form is rendered incommunicable by its reception in the matter4 ,this concrete realization of the form in the matter is individually distinct and separate from other realizations of the same specific form1 by the fact that the matter of this realization demands certain dimensions of quantity3 this latter property being the root-principle of numerical multiplication of corporeal individuals within the same species4 ,on the other hand1 incorporeal substances such as angels or pure spirits1 being 8pure0 forms1 8form subsistentes10 wholly and essentially unallied with any determinable material principle1 are of themselves not only specific but individual2 they are themselves essentially incommunicable1 superior to all multiplication or repeated realization of themselves3 they are such that each can be actualized only 8once and for all03 each is a species in itself3 it is the full1 exhaustive1 and adequate expression of a divine type1 of an exemplar in the ,divine ,mind3 its realization is not1 like that of a material form1 the actuation of an indefinitely determinable material principle3 it sums up and exhausts the imitable perfection of the specific type in its single individuality1 whereas the perfection of the specific type of a corporeal thing cannot be adequately expressed in any single individual realization1 but only by repeated realizations2 nor indeed can it ever be adequately1 exhaustively expressed1 by any finite multitude of these4 ,it follows that in regard to pure spirits the individuating principle and the specific principle are not only really but also logically1 conceptually identical2 that the distinction between individual and individual is here properly a specific distinction2 that it can be described as numerical only in an analogical sense1 if by numerical we mean material or quantitative1 i4e4 the distinction between corporeal individuals of the same species 7#bh74 ,but the distinction between individual human souls is not a specific or formal distinction4 ,these1 though spiritual1 are not pure spirits4 ,they are spiritual substances which1 of their very nature1 are essentially ordained for union with matter4 ,they all belong to the same species--the human species4 ,but they do not constitute individuals of this species unless as existing actually united with matter4 ,each human soul has a transcendental relation to its own body1 to the 8materia signata0 for which1 and in which1 it was created4 ,for each human soul this relation is unique4 ,just as it is the material principle of each human being1 the matter as allied to quantitative dimensions1 that individuates the man1 so it is the unique relation of his soul to the material principle thus spatially determined1 that individuates his soul4 ,now the soul1 even when disembodied and existing after death1 necessarily retains in its very constitution this essential relation to its own body2 and thus it is that disembodied souls1 though not actually allied with matter1 remain numerically distinct and individuated in virtue of their essential relation1 each to its own body4 ,we see1 therefore1 that human souls1 though spiritual1 are an entirely different order of beings1 and must be conceived quite differently1 from pure spirits4 ,we must be content with this brief exposition of the ,thomistic doctrine on individuation4 ,a discussion of the arguments for and against it would carry us too far47#adh7 ,there is no doubt that what reveals the individuality of the corporeal substance to us is its material principle1 in virtue of which its existence is circumscribed within certain limits of time and space and affected with individual characteristics1 8notae individuantes04 ,but the ,thomistic doctrine1 which finds in 8materia signata0 the formal1 intrinsic1 constitutive principle of individuation1 goes much deeper4 ,it is intimately connected with the ,aristotelian theory of knowledge and reality4 ,according to this philosophy the formative principle or 1 the forma subtantialis1 is our sole key to the intelligibility of corporeal things3 these are intelligible in so far forth as they are actual1 and they are actual in virtue of their 8forms04 ,hence the tendency of the scholastic commentators of ,aristotle to use the term 8form0 as synonymous with the term 8nature10 though the whole nature of the corporeal substance embraces the material as well as the formal principle3 for even though it does1 we can understand nothing about this 8nature0 beyond what is intelligible in it in virtue of its 8form40 ,the material principle1 on the other hand1 is the potential1 indeterminate principle1 in itself unintelligible4 ,we know that in ancient ,greek philosophy it was regarded as the 1 the surd and contingent principle in things1 the element which resisted rational analysis and fell outside the scope of 8science10 or 8knowledge of the necessary and universal04 ,while it revealed the forms or natures of things to sense1 it remained itself impervious to intellect1 which grasped these natures and rendered them intelligible only by divesting them of matter1 by abstracting them from matter4 ,reality is intelligible only in so far forth as it is immaterial1 either in fact or by abstraction4 ,the human intellect1 being itself spiritual1 is 8receptive of forms without matter04 ,but being itself allied with matter1 its proper object is none other than the natures or essences of corporeal things1 abstracted1 however1 from the matter in which they are actually 8immersed04 ,the only reason1 therefore1 why any intelligible form or essence which1 as abstract and universal1 is 8one0 for intellect1 is nevertheless actually or potentially 8manifold0 in its reality1 is because it is allied with a material principle4 ,it is the latter that accounts for the numerical multiplication1 in actual reality1 of any intelligible form or essence4 ,if the latter is material it can be actualized only by indefinitely repeated1 numerically or materially distinct1 alliances with matter4 ,it cannot be actualized 8tota simul10 or 8once for all10 as it were4 ,it is1 therefore1 the material principle that not merely reveals1 but also constitutes1 the individuation of such corporeal forms or essences4 ,hence1 too1 the individual as such cannot be adequately apprehended by intellect2 for all intelligible principles of reality are formal1 whereas the individuating principle is material4 ,on the other hand1 if an intelligible essence or form be purely spiritual1 wholly unrelated to any indeterminate1 material principle1 it must be 8one0 not alone conceptually or logically but also really3 it can exist only as 8one03 it is of itself individual3 it can be differentiated from other spiritual essences not materially but only formally1 or1 in other words1 not numerically but by a distinction which is at once individual and specific4 ,two pure spirits cannot be 8two0 numerically and 8one0 specifically1 two for sense and one for intellect1 as two men are3 if they are distinct at all they must be distinct for intellect1 i4e4 they cannot be properly conceived as two members of the same species4 ,in this solution of the question it is not easy to see how the material principle1 which1 by its alliance with quantity1 individuates the form1 is itself individuated so as to be the source and principle of a multiplicity of numerically distinct and incommunicable realizations of this form4 ,perhaps the most that can be said on this point is that we must conceive quantity1 which is the fundamental property of corporeal reality1 as being itself essentially divisible1 and the material principle as deriving from its essential relation to quantity its function of multiplying the same specific nature numerically4 ,of those who reject the ,thomistic doctrine some few contend that it is the actual existence of any specific nature that should be conceived as individuating the latter4 ,no doubt the universal as such cannot exist2 reality in order to exist actually must be individual4 ,yet it cannot be actual existence that individuates it4 ,we must conceive it as individual before conceiving it as actually existent2 and we can conceive it as individual while abstracting from its existence4 ,we can think1 for instance1 of purely possible individual men1 or angels1 as numerically or individually distinct from one another4 ,moreover1 what individuates the nature must be essential to the latter1 but actual existence is not essential to any finite nature4 ,hence actual existence cannot be the principle of individuation47#adi7 ,can it be contended that possible existence is what individuates reality8 ,no2 for possible existence is nothing more than intrinsic capacity to exist actually1 and this is essential to all reality3 it is the criterion whereby we distinguish real being from logical being2 but real being1 as such1 is indifferent to universality or individuality2 as far as the simple concept of real being is concerned the latter may be either universal or individual2 the concept abstracts equally from either condition of being4 ,the vast majority1 therefore1 of those who reject the ,thomistic doctrine on individuation1 support the view that what individuates any nature or substance is simply the whole reality1 the total entity1 of the individual4 ,this total entity of the individual1 though really identical with the specific nature1 must be conceived as something positive1 superadded to the latter1 for it involves a something which is logically or mentally distinct from the latter4 ,this something is what we conceive as a differentia individua1 after the analogy of the differentia specifica which contracts the concept of the genus to that of the species2 and by ,scotists it has been termed 8haecceitas0 or 8thisness04 ,without using the ,scotist terminology1 most of those scholastics who reject the ,thomist doctrine on this point advocate the present view4 ,the individuality or 8thisness0 of the individual substance is regarded as having no special principle in the individual1 other than the whole substantial entity of the latter4 ,if the nature is simple it is of itself individual2 if composite1 the intrinsic principles from which it results--i4e4 matter and form essentially united--suffice to individuate it4 ,in this view1 therefore1 the material principle of any individual man1 for example1 is numerically and individually distinct from that of any other individual1 of itself and independently of its relation either to the formative principle or to quantity4 ,the formative principle1 too1 is individuated of itself1 and not by the material principle which is really distinct from it1 or by its relation to this material principle4 ,likewise the union of both principles1 which is a substantial mode of the composite substance1 is individuated and rendered numerically distinct from all other unions of these two individual principles1 not by either or both these1 but by itself4 ,and finally1 the individual composite substance has its individuation from these two intrinsic principles thus individually united4 ,it may be doubted1 perhaps1 whether this attempt at explaining the real1 individual 8manifoldness0 of what is 8one0 for intellect1 i4e4 the universal1 throws any real light upon the problem4 ,no doubt1 every element or factor which is grasped by intellect in its analysis of reality--matter1 form1 substance1 accident1 quantity1 nay1 even 8individuality0 itself--is apprehended as abstract and universal2 and if we hold the doctrine of ,moderate ,realism1 that the intellect in apprehending the universal attains to reality1 and not merely to a logical figment of its own creation1 the problem of relating intelligibly the reality which is 8one0 for intellect with the same reality as manifestly 8manifold0 in its concrete realizations for sense1 is a genuine philosophical problem4 ,to say that what individuates any real essence or nature1 what deprives it of the 8oneness0 and 8universality0 which it has for intellect1 what makes it 8this10 8that10 or 8the other0 incommunicable individual1 must be conceived to be simply the whole essential reality of that nature itself--leaves us still in ignorance as to why such a nature1 which is really 8one0 for intellect1 can be really 8manifold0 in its actualizations for sense experience4 ,the reason why the nature which is one and universal for abstract thought1 and which is undoubtedly not a logical entity but a reality capable of actual existence1 can be actualized as a manifold of distinct individuals1 must be sought1 we are inclined to think1 in the relation of this nature to a material principle in alliance with quantity which is the source of all purely numerical1 8space and time0 distinctions4 #cc4 ,,individuation ,,of ,,accidents4--,the rle of quantity in the ,thomistic theory of individuation suggests the question3 ,how are accidents themselves individuated8 ,we have referred already 7#bi1 n47 to the view that they are individuated by the individual subjects or substances in which they inhere4 ,if we distinguish again between what reveals individuality and what constitutes it1 there can be no doubt that when accidents of the same kind are found in individually distinct subjects what reveals the numerical distinction between the former is the fact that they are found inhering in the latter4 ,so1 also1 distinction of individual substances is the extrinsic1 genetic1 or causal principle of the numerical distinction between similar accidents arising in these substances4 ,but when the same kind of accident recurs successively in the same individual substance--as1 for example1 when a man performs repeated acts of the same kind--what reveals the numerical or individual distinction between these latter cannot be the individual substance1 for it is one and the same1 but rather the time distinction between the accidents themselves4 ,the intrinsic constitutive principle which formally individuates the accidents of individually distinct substances is1 according to ,thomists generally1 their essential relation to the individual substances in which they appear4 ,it is not clear how this theory can be applied to the fundamental accident of corporeal substances4 ,if the function of formally individuating the corporeal substance itself is to be ascribed in any measure to quantity1 it would seem to follow that this latter must be regarded as individuated by itself1 by its own total entity or reality4 ,and this is the view held by most other scholastics in regard to the individuation of accidents generally3 that these1 like substances1 are individuated by their own total positive reality4 ,when there is question of the same kind of accident recurring in the same individual subject1 the 8time0 distinction between such successive individual accidents of the same kind would appear not merely to reveal their individuality but also to indicate a different relation of each to its subject as existing at that particular point of space and time3 so that the relation of the accident to its individual subject1 as here and now existing in the concrete1 would be the individuating principle of the accident4 ,whether a number of accidents of the same species infima1 and distinct merely numerically1 could exist simultaneously in the same individual subject1 is a question on which scholastic philosophers are not agreed3 the negative opinion1 which has the authority of ,st4 ,thomas1 being the more probable4 ,those various questions on the individuation of accidents will be better understood from a subsequent exposition of the scholastic doctrine on accidents 7,ch4 viii474 ,it may be well to remark that in inquiring about the individuation of substances and accidents we have been considering reality from a static standpoint1 seeking how we are to conceive and interpret intellectually1 or for abstract thought1 the relation of the universal to the individual4 ,if1 however1 we ascribe to 8time0 distinctions any function in individuating accidents of the same kind in the same individual substance1 we are introducing into our analysis the kinetic aspect of reality1 or its subjection to processes of change4 ,we may call attention here to a few other questions of minor import discussed by scholastics4 ,first1 have all individuals of the same species the same substantial perfection1 or can individuals have different grades of substantial perfection within the same species8 ,all admit the obvious fact that individual differs from individual within the same species in the number1 variety1 extent and intensity of their accidental properties and qualities4 ,but1 having the human soul mainly in view1 they disagree as to whether the substantial perfection of the specific nature can be actualized in different grades in different individuals4 ,according to the more common opinion there cannot be different substantial grades of the same specific nature1 for the simple reason that every such grade of substantial perfection should be regarded as specific1 as changing the species3 hence1 e4g4 all human souls are substantially equal in perfection4 ,this view is obviously based upon the conception of specific types or essences as being1 after the analogy of numbers1 immutable when considered in the abstract4 ,and it seems to be confirmed by the consideration that the intrinsic principle of individuation is nothing1 or adds nothing1 really distinct from the specific essence itself4 ,another question in connexion with individuation has derived at least an historical interest from the notable controversy to which it gave rise in the seventeenth century between ,clarke and ,leibniz4 ,the latter1 in accordance with the principles of his system of philosophy1--the ,law of ,sufficient ,reason and the ,law of ,continuity among the monads or ultimate principles of being1--contended that two individual beings so absolutely alike as to be indiscernible would be eo ipso identical1 in other words1 that the reality of two such beings is impossible4 ,of course if we try to conceive two individuals so absolutely alike both in essence and accidents1 both in the abstract and in the concrete1 as to be indiscernible either by our senses or by our intellect1 or by any intellect--even the ,divine ,intellect--we are simply conceiving the same thing twice over4 ,but is there anything impossible or contradictory in thinking that ,god could create two perfectly similar beings1 distinct from each other only individually1 so similar1 however1 that neither human sense nor human intellect could apprehend them as two1 but only as one8 ,the impossibility is not apparent4 ,were they two material individuals they should1 of course1 occupy the same space in order to have similar spatial relations1 but impenetrability is not essential to corporeal substances4 ,and even in the view that each is individuated by its 8materia signata0 it is not impossible to conceive numerically distinct quantified matters allied at the same time to the same dimensions of space4 ,if1 on the other hand1 there be question of two pure spirits1 absolutely similar specifically1 even in the ,thomistic view that here the individual distinction is at the same time specific there seems to be no sufficient ground for denying that the ,divine ,omnipotence could create two or more such individually 7and therefore specifically7 distinct spirits37#aej7 such distinction remaining1 of course1 indiscernible for the finite human intellect4 ,the argument of ,leibniz1 that there would be no sufficient reason for the creation of two such indiscernible beings1 and that it would therefore be repugnant to the ,divine ,wisdom1 is extrinsic to the question of their intrinsic possibility3 if they be intrinsically possible they cannot be repugnant to any attribute of the ,divinity1 either to the ,divine ,omnipotence or to the ,divine ,wisdom4 #cd4 ,,identity4--,considering the order in which we acquire our ideas we are easily convinced that the notion of finite being is antecedent to that of infinite being4 ,moreover1 it is from reflection on finite beings that we arrive at the most abstract notion of being in general4 ,we make the object of this latter notion definite only by dividing it off mentally from nothingness1 conceived per modum entis1 or as an ens rationis4 ,thus the natural way of making our concepts definite is by limiting them2 it is only when we come to reflect on the necessary implications of our concept of 8infinite being0 that we realize the possibility of conceiving a being which is definite without being really limited1 which is definite by the very fact of its infinity1 by its possession of unlimited perfection2 and even then our imperfect human mode of conceiving 8infinite being0 is helped by distinguishing or dividing it off from all finite being and contrasting it with the latter4 ,all this goes to prove the truth of the teaching of ,st4 ,thomas1 that the mental function of dividing or distinguishing precedes our concepts of unity and multitude4 ,now the concepts of identity and distinction are closely allied with those of unity and multitude2 but they add something to these latter4 ,when we think of a being as one we must analyse it further1 look at it under different aspects1 and compare it with itself1 before we can regard it as the same or identical with itself4 ,or1 at least1 we must think of it twice and compare it with itself in the affirmative judgment 8,this is itself10 8,a is ,a10 thus formulating the logical ,principle of ,identity1 in order to come into possession of the concept of identity47#aea7 ,every affirmative categorical judgment asserts identity of the predicate with the subject 78,s is ,p073 asserts1 in other words1 that what we apprehend under the notion of the predicate 7,p7 is really identical with what we have apprehended under the distinct notion of the subject 7,s74 ,the synthetic function of the affirmative categorical judgment identifies in the real order what the analytic function of mental abstraction had separated in the logical order4 ,by saying that the affirmative categorical judgment asserts identity we mean that by asserting that 8this is that10 8man is rational0 we identify 8this0 with 8that10 8man0 with 8rational10 thus denying that they are two1 that they are distinct1 that they differ4 ,identity is one of those elementary concepts which cannot be defined2 but perhaps we may describe it as the logical relation through which the mind asserts the objects of two or more of its thoughts to be really one4 ,if the object formally represented by each of the concepts is one and the same--as1 e4g4 when we compare 8,a0 with 8,a10 or 8man0 with 8rational animal10 or1 in general1 any object with its definition--the identity is both real and logical 7or conceptual1 formal74 ,if the concepts differ in their formal objects while representing one and the same reality--as when we compare 8,st4 ,peter0 with 8head of the apostles10 or 8man0 with 8rational0--the identity is real1 but not logical or formal4 ,finally1 if we represent two or more realities1 8,john1 ,james1 ,thomas10 by the same formal concept1 8man10 the identity is merely logical or formal1 not real4 ,of these three kinds of identity the first is sometimes called adequate1 the second and third inadequate4 ,logical identity may be specific or generic1 according as we identify really distinct individuals under one specific concept1 or really distinct species or classes under one generic concept4 ,again1 it may be essential or accidental1 according as the abstract and universal class-concept under which really distinct members are classified represents a common part of the essence of these members or only a common property or accident4 ,thus ,john1 ,james and ,thomas are essentially identical in their human nature2 they are accidentally identical in being all three fair-haired and six feet in height4 ,logical identity under the concept of quality is based on the real relation of similarity2 logical identity under the concept of quantity is based on the real relation of equality4 ,when we say that essential 7logical7 identity 7e4g4 the identity of ,john1 ,james and ,thomas under the concept of 8man07 is based on the fact that the really distinct individuals have really similar natures1 we merely mean that our knowledge of natures or essences is derived from our knowledge of qualities1 taking 8qualities0 in the wide sense of 8accidents0 generally3 that the properties and activities of things are our only key to the nature of these things3 ,operari sequitur esse4 ,it is not implied1 nor is it true1 that real similarity is a partial real identity3 it is but the ground of a partial logical identity1--identity under the common concept of some quality 7in the wide sense of this term74 ,for example1 the height of ,john is as really distinct from that of ,james as the humanity of ,john is from that of ,james4 ,if1 then1 individual things are really distinct1 how is it that we can represent 7even inadequately7 a multitude of them by one concept8 ,to say that we can do so because they reveal themselves to us as similar to one another is to say what is undoubtedly true2 but this does not solve the problem of the relation between the universal and the individual in human experience3 rather it places us face to face with this problem4 ,reverting now to real identity3 whatever we can predicate affirmatively about a being considered as one1 and as subject of a judgment1 we regard as really identical with that being4 ,we cannot predicate a real part of its real whole1 or vice versa4 ,but our concepts1 when compared together in judgment1 bear logical relations of extension and intension to each other1 that is1 relations of logical part to logical whole4 ,thus1 the logical identity of subject and predicate in the affirmative judgment may be only inadequate47#aeb7 ,but the real identity underlying the affirmative judgment is an adequate real identity4 ,when we say1 for example1 that 8,socrates is wise10 we mean that the object of our concept of 8wisdom0 is in this case really and adequately identical with the object of our concept of 8,socrates03 in other words that we are conceiving one and the same real being under two distinct concepts1 each of which represents1 more or less adequately1 the whole real being1 and one of them in this case less adequately than the other4 ,we have to bear in mind that while considering being as one or manifold1 identical or distinct1 we are thinking of it in its static mode1 as an object of abstract thought1 not in its dynamic and kinetic mode as actually existing in space and time1 and subject to change4 ,it is the identity of being with itself when considered in this static1 unchanging condition1 that is embodied in the logical ,principle of ,identity4 ,in order1 therefore1 that this principle may find its application to being or reality as subject to actual change--and this is the state in which de facto reality is presented to us as an immediate datum of experience--we must seize upon the changing reality and think of it in an indivisible instant apart from the change to which it is actually subject2 only thus does the ,principle of ,identity apply to it--as being1 not as becoming1 not in fieri1 but in facto esse4 ,the ,principle of ,identity1 which applies to all real being1 whether possible or actual1 tells us simply that 8a thing is what it is04 ,but for the understanding of actual being as subject to real change we must supplement the ,principle of ,identity by another principle which tells us that such an actual being not only is actually what it is 7,principle of ,identity71 but also that it is potentially something other than what it actually is1 that it is potentially what it can become actually 7,ch4 ii474 ,we have seen that1 since change is not continuous annihilation and creation1 the changing being must in some real and true sense persist throughout the process of change4 ,it is from experience of change we derive our notion of time-duration2 and the concept of permanence or stability throughout change gives us the notion of a real sameness or abiding self-identity which is compatible with real change4 ,but a being which persists in existence is identical with itself throughout its duration only in so far forth as it has not changed4 ,only the ,necessary ,being1 whose duration is absolutely exempt from all change1 is absolutely or metaphysically identical with ,himself3 ,his duration is eternity--which is one perpetual1 unchanging now4 ,a being which persists unchanged in its essence or nature1 which is exempt from substantial change1 but which is subject to accidental change1 to a succession of accidental qualities such as vital actions--such a being is said to retain its physical identity with itself throughout those changes4 ,such1 for instance1 is the identity of the human soul with itself1 or of any individual living thing during its life1 or even of an inorganic material substance as long as it escapes substantial change4 ,finally1 the persisting identity of a collection of beings1 united by some moral bond so as to form a moral unit1 is spoken of as moral identity as long as the bond remains1 even though the constituent members may be constantly disappearing to be replaced by others3 as in a nation1 a religious society1 a legal corporation1 etc4 #ce4 ,,distinction4--,distinction is the correlative of identity2 it is the absence or negation of the latter4 ,we express the relation called distinction by the negative judgment1 8this is not that02 it is the relation of a being to whatever is not itself1 the relation of one to other4 ,distinction may be either adequate or inadequate1 according as we distinguish one total object of thought from another total object1 or only from a part of itself4 ,for example1 the distinction between ,john and ,james is an adequate real distinction1 while that between ,john and his body is an inadequate real distinction2 the distinction between ,john's rationality and his animality is an adequate logical distinction1 while the distinction between either of these and his humanity is an inadequate logical distinction4 ,we have already 7#bc7 briefly explained and illustrated the most important classification of distinctions3 that into real and logical2 the sub-division of the latter into purely logical and virtual2 and of the latter again into perfect 7complete1 adequate7 and imperfect 7incomplete1 inadequate74 ,but the theory there briefly outlined calls for some further analysis and amplification4 #cf4 ,,logical ,,distinctions ,,and ,,their ,,grounds4--,the purely logical distinction must not be confounded with a mere verbal distinction1 e4g4 that between an 8edifice0 and a 8building10 or between 8truthfulness0 and 8veracity04 ,a logical distinction is a distinction in the concepts3 these must represent one and the same reality but in different ways3 the one may be more explicit1 more fully analysed than the other1 as a definition is in comparison with the thought-object defined2 or the one may represent the object less adequately than the other1 as when we compare 7in intension7 the concepts 8man0 and 8animal02 or the one may be predicated of the other in an affirmative judgment2 or the one may represent the object as concrete and individual1 the other the same object as abstract and universal47#aec7 ,comparing1 in the next place1 the purely logical with the virtual distinction1 we see that the grounds for making these distinctions are different4 ,every distinction made by the mind must have an intelligible ground or reason of some sort--a fundamentum distinctionis4 ,now in the case of the purely logical distinction the ground is understood to consist exclusively in the needs of the mind itself--needs which spring from the mind's own limitations when confronted with the task of understanding or interpreting reality1 of making reality intelligible4 ,purely logical distinctions are therefore seen to be a class of purely logical relations1 i4e4 of those entia rationis which the mind must construct for itself in its effort to understand the real4 ,they have no other reality as objects of thought than the reality they derive from the constitutive or constructive activity of the mind4 ,they are modes1 or forms1 or terms1 of the cognitive activity itself1 not of the reality which is the object apprehended and contemplated by means of this cognitive activity4 ,the virtual distinction1 on the other hand1 although it also1 as an object of thought1 is only an ens rationis--inasmuch as there is no real duality or plurality corresponding to it in the reality into which the mind introduces it1 this reality being a real unity--the virtual distinction is considered1 nevertheless1 to have a ground1 or reason1 or foundation 7for making and introducing it7 in the nature of this one reality2 that is1 it is regarded as having a real foundation1 a fundamentum in re4 ,in so far1 therefore1 as our knowledge is permeated by virtual distinctions1 reality cannot be said to be formally1 but only fundamentally what this knowledge represents it to be4 ,does this fact interfere with the objective validity of our knowledge8 ,not in the least2 for we do not ascribe to the reality the distinctions1 and other such modes or forms1 which we know by reflection to be formally characteristic not of things but of our thought or cognition of things4 ,our knowledge1 therefore1 so far as it goes1 may be a faithful apprehension of reality1 even though it be itself affected by modes not found in the reality4 ,but what is this real foundation of the virtual distinction8 ,what is the fundamentum in re8 ,it is not a real or objective duality in virtue of which we could say that there are1 in the object of our thought1 two beings or realities one of which is not the other4 ,such duality would cause a real distinction4 ,but just here the difficulties of our analysis begin to arise3 for we have to fix our attention on actually existing realities2 and1 assuming that each and every one of these is an individual1 we have to bear in mind the relation of the real to the actual1 of reality as abstract and universal to reality as concrete and individual1 of the simple to the composite1 of the stable to the changing1 of essential to accidental unity--in any and every attempt to discriminate in detail between a real and a virtual distinction4 ,nor is it easy to lay down any general test which will serve even theoretically to discriminate between them4 ,let us see what grounds have been mainly suggested as real foundations for the virtual distinction4 ,if a being which is not only one but simple1 manifests1 in the superior grade of being to which it belongs1 a perfection which is equivalent to many lesser perfections found really distinct and separate elsewhere1 in separate beings of an inferior order1 this is considered a sufficient real ground for considering the former being1 though really one and simple1 as virtually manifold47#aed7 ,the human soul1 as being virtually threefold--rational1 sentient and vegetative--is a case in point3 but only on the assumption that the soul of the individual man can be proved to be one and simple4 ,this1 of course1 all scholastics regard as capable of proof3 even those of them who hold that the powers or faculties whereby it immediately manifests these three grades of perfection are accidental realities1 really distinct from one another and from the substance of the soul itself4 ,again1 the being which is the object of our thought may be so rich in reality or perfection that our finite minds cannot adequately grasp it by any one mental intuition1 but must proceed discursively1 by analysis and abstraction1 taking in partial aspects of it successively through inadequate concepts2 while realizing that these aspects1 these objects of our distinct concepts1 are only partial aspects of one and the same real being4 ,this1 in fact1 is our common experience4 ,but the theory assumes that we are able to determine when these objects of our concepts are only mental aspects of one reality1 and when they are several separate realities2 nay1 even1 that we can determine whether or not they are really distinct entities united together to form one composite individual being1 or only mentally distinct views of one simple individual being4 ,for example1 it is assumed that while the distinction between the sentient and the rational grades of being in a human individual can be shown to be only a virtual distinction1 that between the body and the soul of the same individual can be shown to be a real distinction2 or1 again1 that while the distinction between essence1 intellect1 and will in ,god1 can be shown to be only a virtual distinction1 that between essence1 intellect1 and will in man1 can be shown to be a real distinction4 #cg4 ,,the ,,virtual ,,distinction ,,and ,,the ,,real ,,distinction4--,now scholastics differ considerably in classifying this1 that1 or the other distinction1 as logical or as real2 but this does not prove that it is impossible ever to determine with certitude whether any particular distinction is logical or real4 ,what we are looking for just now is a general test for discriminating1 if such can be found4 ,and this brings us to a consideration of the test suggested in the very definitions themselves4 ,at first sight it would appear to be an impracticable1 if not even an unintelligible test3 8,the distinction is real if it exists in the reality--i4e4 if the reality is two 7or more7 beings1 not one being--antecedently to1 or independently of1 the consideration of the mind2 otherwise the distinction is logical04 ,but--it might be objected--how can we possibly know whether or not any object of perception or thought is one or more than one antecedently to1 or independently of1 the consideration of the mind8 ,it is certainly impossible for us to know what1 or what kind1 reality is1 or whether it is one or manifold1 apart from and prior to1 the exercise of our own cognitive activity4 ,this1 therefore1 cannot be what the test means3 to interpret it in such a sense would be absurd4 ,but when we have perceived reality in our actual sense experience1 when we have interpreted it1 got the meaning of it1 made it intelligible1 and actually understood it1 by the spontaneous exercise of intellect1 the judging and reasoning faculty3 then1 obviously1 we are at liberty to reflect critically on those antecedent spontaneous processes1 on the knowledge which is the result of them1 and the reality which is known through them2 and by such critical reflection on those processes1 their objects and their products1 on the 8reality as perceived and known0 and on the 8perceiving0 and 8knowing0 of it1 we may be able to distinguish between two classes of contributions to the total result which is the 8known reality03 those which we must regard as purely mental1 as modes or forms or subjectively constructed terms of the mental function of cognition itself 7whether perceptual or conceptual71 and those which we must regard as given or presented to the mind as objects1 which are not in any sense constructed or contributed by the mind1 which1 therefore1 are what they are independently of our mental activity1 and which would be and remain what they are1 and what we have apprehended them to be1 even if we had never perceived or thought of them4 ,this1 according to the scholastics1 is the sense--and it is a perfectly intelligible sense--in which we are called on to decide whether the related terms of any given distinction have been merely rendered distinct by the analytic activity of the cognitive process1 or are themselves distinct realities irrespective of this process4 ,that it is possible to carry on successfully1 at least to some extent1 this work of discrimination between the subjective and the objective factors of our cognitive experience1 can scarcely be denied4 ,it is what philosophers in every age have been attempting4 ,there are1 however1 some distinctions about the nature of which philosophers have never been able to agree1 some holding them to be real1 others to be only virtual3 the former view being indicative of the tendency to emphasize the rle of cognition as a passive representation of objectively given reality2 the latter view being an expression of the opposite tendency to emphasize the active or constitutive or constructive factors whereby cognition assimilates to the mind's own mode of being the reality given to it in experience4 ,in all cognition there is an assimilation of reality and mind1 of object and subject4 ,when certain distinctions are held to be real this consideration is emphasized3 that in the cognitive process1 as such1 it is the mind that is assimilated to the objective reality47#aee7 ,when these same distinctions are held to be logical this other consideration is emphasized3 that in the cognitive process reality must also be assimilated to mind1 must be mentalized so to speak3 ,cognitum est in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis3 that in this process the mind must often regard what is one reality under distinct aspects3 and that if we regard these distinct aspects as distinct realities we are violating the principle1 ,entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem4 ,now those philosophers who hold certain distinctions to be virtual1 and not real1 thereby ascribe to cognitive experience a larger sphere of constitutive or constructive influence than would be allowed to it by advocates of the reality of such distinctions4 ,but by doing so are they to be regarded as calling into question the objective validity of human knowledge8 ,by no means3 the fact that the human mind can understand reality only by processes of abstracting1 generalizing1 comparing1 relating1 analysing and synthesizing--processes which involve the production of logical entities--in no way vitiates the value of these modes of understanding3 it merely indicates that they are less perfect than intuitive modes of understanding which would dispense with such logical entities1--the modes characteristic of pure1 angelic intelligences1 or the knowledge of the ,deity4 ,the objective validity of human cognition is not interfered with either by enlarging or by restricting the domain of the mind's constitutive activity in forming such logical entities2 nor1 therefore1 by claiming that certain distinctions are real rather than virtual1 or vice versa4 ,it must be remembered1 moreover1 that the virtual distinction is not purely logical3 it has a foundation in the reality1 a 8fundamentum in re02 and in so far as it has it gives us an insight into the nature of reality4 ,no doubt1 any particular distinction cannot be virtual and at the same time simply real3 either view of it must be erroneous3 and possibly both1 if it happen to be de facto a purely logical distinction4 ,but the error of confounding a virtual distinction with a real is not so great as that of regarding either as a purely logical distinction4 ,now the tendency of much modern philosophy1 under the influence of ,kant1 has been to regard all the categories in which the mind apprehends reality as being wholly and exclusively forms of cognition1 as being in the reality neither formally nor even fundamentally2 and to infer from this an essential1 constitutional inability of the mind to attain to a valid knowledge of reality4 ,but if1 as a matter of fact1 these categories are in the reality formally1 nay1 even if they are in it only fundamentally1 the inference that issues in ,kantian subjectivism is unwarranted4 ,and those categories we hold to be in the reality at least fundamentally2 we therefore reject the ,kantian phenomenism of the speculative reason4 ,moreover1 we can see no valid ground for admitting the ,kantian division of the human mind into two totally separate cognitive compartments1 the speculative and the practical reason1 and ascribing to each compartment cognitive principles and capacities entirely alien to the other4 ,to arrive at a right theory of knowledge human cognitive experience as a whole must be analysed2 but provided the analysis is really an analysis of this experience it may be legitimately directed towards discovering what the mental conditions must be--i4e4 the conditions on the side of the knowing subject1 the subject having the experience--which are necessarily prerequisite for having such experience4 ,and if it be found by such analysis that cognitive experience presupposes in the knowing subject not merely a sentient and intelligent mind1 but a mind which perceives1 imagines1 remembers reality in certain definite ways2 which thinks reality in certain modes and through certain forms which by its own constitutive activity it constructs for itself1 and which it recognizes by reflection to be its own constructions 7e4g4 distinctions1 relations1 affirmations and negations1 abstractions1 generalizations1 etc43 intentiones logicae1 logical entities71--there is no reason whatever in all this for inferring that because the mind is so constituted1 because it has these modes of cognition1 it must necessarily fail to reach1 by means of them1 a true1 valid1 and genuine knowledge of reality4 ,from the fact that human modes of cognition are human1 and not angelic or divine2 from the fact that reality can be known to man only through these modes1 these finite modes of finite human faculties1--we may indeed infer that even our highest knowledge of reality is inadequate1 that it does not comprehend all that is in the reality1 but surely not that it is essentially illusory and of its very nature incapable of giving us any true and valid insight into the nature of reality4 ,fixing our attention on the virtual distinction we see that the mind is supposed by means of it to apprehend1 through a plurality of distinct concepts1 what it knows somehow or other to be one being4 ,now if it knows the reality to be really one1 it knows that the formal object of every distinct concept of this reality is really identical with the objects of all the other concepts of the latter4 ,this condition of things is certainly verified when the mind can see that each of the distinct concepts1 though not explicitly presenting the objects of the others1 nevertheless implicitly and necessarily involves all these other objects37#aef7 for by seeing that the distinct concepts necessarily involve one another objectively it sees that the reality apprehended through all of them must necessarily be one reality4 ,this is what takes place in the imperfect virtual distinction3 the concepts prescind from one another formally1 not objectively4 ,but suppose that the distinct concepts prescind from one another objectively1 so that they cannot be seen by any analysis to involve one another even implicitly1 but present to the mind1 so far as they themselves are concerned1 adequately distinct modes of being--as happens in the perfect virtual distinction1 e4g4 between organic life1 sentient life1 and intellectual life 7in man71 or between animality and rationality 7in man71--then the all-important question arises3 ,how do we know1 in any given case of this kind1 whether or not these adequately distinct thought-objects are identical with one another in the reality8 ,what is the test for determining whether or not1 in a given case1 these objects1 which are many for abstract intellectual thought1 are one being in the real order8 ,the answer seems to be that internal and external sense experience can and does furnish us with embodiments of these intellectual manifolds1--embodiments each of which we apprehend as a being that is really one1 as an individual subject of which they are conceptually distinct predicates4 ,it would appear1 therefore1 that we cannot reach a true conception of what we are to regard as really one1 or really manifold1 by abstract thought alone4 ,it is external and internal sense experience1 not abstract thought1 which first brings us into direct and immediate mental contact with actually existing reality4 ,what we have therefore to determine is this3 ,does sense experience1 or does it not1 reveal reality to us as a real manifold1 not as one being but as beings coexisting outside one another in space1 succeeding one another in time1 interdependent on one another1 interacting on one another1 and by this interaction causing and undergoing real change1 each producing others1 or being produced by others1 really distinct from itself8 ,in other words1 is separateness of existence in time or space1 as revealed in sense experience1 a sufficient index of the real manifoldness of corporeal being1 and of the really distinct individuality of each such being8--or are we to take it that because those space and time distinctions have to be apprehended by thought in order that not merely sense but intellect may apprehend corporeal beings as really manifold1 therefore these distinctions are not in the reality given to us8 ,or1 again1 is each person's own conscious experience of himself as one being1 of his own unity1 and of his distinctness from other persons1 a sufficient index that the distinction between person and person is a real distinction8--or are we to take it that because his feeling of his individual unity through sense consciousness must be interpreted by the thought-concepts of 8one0--8individual0--8person0--8distinct 0 from 8others10 these concepts do not truly express what is really given him to interpret8 ,finally1 if we can infer from the actually existing material reality which forms the immediate datum of direct experience1 or from the human ,ego as given in this experience1 the actual existence of a real mode of being which is not material but spiritual1 by what tests can we determine whether this spiritual mode of being is really one1 or whether there is a real plurality of such beings8 ,the solution of these questions bears directly on the validity of the adequate or 8greater0 real distinction1 the 8distinctio realis major seu absoluta04 ,the philosophy which defends the validity of this distinction1--which holds that the distinction between individual human beings1 and between individual living things generally1 is in the fullest and truest sense a real distinction1--is at all events in conformity with universally prevailing modes of thought and language2 while the monism which repudiates these spontaneous interpretations of experience as invalid by denying all real manifoldness to reality1 can make itself intelligible only by doing violence to thought and language alike4 ,not that this alone is a disproof of monism2 but at all events it creates a presumption against a system to find it running counter to any of those universal spontaneous beliefs which appear to be rooted in man's rational nature4 ,on the other hand1 the philosophy which accords with common belief in proclaiming a real plurality in being has to reconcile intellect with sense1 and the universal with the individual1 by solving the important problem of individuation3 ,what is it that makes real being individual1 if1 notwithstanding the fact that intellect apprehends reality as abstract and universal1 reality nevertheless can exist only as concrete and individual8 7#bi-cc74 #ch4 ,,the ,,real ,,distinction4--,in the next place it must be remembered1 comparing the virtual distinction with the real1 that philosophers have recognized two kinds of real distinction3 the major or absolute real distinction1 and the minor real1 or modal distinction4 ,before defining these let us see what are the usual signs by which a real distinction in general can be recognized4 ,the relation of efficient causality1 of efficient cause and effect1 between two objects of thought1 is sometimes set down as a sure sign of a 7major7 real distinction between them47#aeg7 ,and the reason alleged is that a thing cannot be the efficient cause of itself3 the efficient cause is necessarily extrinsic to the effect and cannot be really identical with the latter4 ,it is to be noted that this test applies to reality as actually existing1 as producing or undergoing change1 and that it is derived from our sense experience of reality in process of change4 ,but since our concept of efficient causality has its origin in our internal experience of our own selves as active agents1 as causing some portion of what enters into our experience1 the test seems to assume that we have already introduced into this experience a real distinction between the self and what is caused by the self4 ,it is not clear that the relation of efficient cause to effect1 as applied to created causes1 can precede and reveal1 in our experience1 the relation of what is really one to what is really other1 in this experience4 ,if the reality revealed to us in our direct experience1 the phenomenal universe1 has been brought into existence by the creative act of a ,supreme ,being1 this1 of course1 implies a real distinction between ,creator and creature4 ,but it does not seem possible in this case1 or indeed in any case1 to prove the existence of the causal relation antecedently to that of the real distinction1 or to utilize the former as an index to the latter4 ,two distinct thought-objects are regarded as really distinct 7#a7 when they are found to exist separately and apart from each other in time or space1 as is the case with any two individuals such as ,john and ,james1 or a man and a horse2 7#b7 when1 although they are found in the same individual1 one of them at least is separable from the other1 in the sense that it can actually exist without that other3 for example1 the soul of any individual man can exist apart from the material principle with which it is actually united to form this living human individual2 the individual himself can exist without the particular accidental modes1 such as sitting1 thinking1 speaking1 which actually affect his being at any particular instant of his existence4 ,from this we can gather in the first place that the distinction between two 8individuals10--individual 8persons0 or individual 8things0--is a real distinction in the fullest and plainest sense of this expression1 a major or absolute real distinction4 ,it is1 moreover1 not merely real but actual4 ,two existing 8individuals0 are always actually divided and separate from each other1 while each is actually one or actually undivided in itself4 ,and they are so 8independently of the consideration of the mind04 ,in the second place1 assuming that the mind can apprehend1 in the individuals of its experience1 a unity resulting from the union or composition of separable factors or principles1 whether essential or accidental #bg 7b72 and assuming that it can know these factors to be really separable 7though actually one and undivided71 that is1 separable in the sense that each of any two such factors1 or at least one of them1 could actually exist without the other1--it regards the distinction between such factors as real4 ,they are really distinct because though actually one and undivided they are potentially manifold4 ,if each has a positive entity of its own1 so that absolutely speaking each could exist without the other1 the distinction is still regarded as an absolute or major real distinction4 ,for example1 the human soul can exist without the body2 the body can exist without the soul1 being actualized by the new formative principle or principles which replace the soul at death2 therefore there is an absolute real distinction between the soul and the body of the living human individual3 although both factors form one actual being1 still1 independently of the consideration of the mind the one factor is not the other3 each is really1 though only potentially1 other than the factor with which it is united3 the relation of 8one0 to 8other0 though not actually verified of either factor 7since there is only one actual being3 the existing individual man71 is potentially and really verified1 i4e4 verifiable of each4 ,again1 the individual corporeal substance can1 absolutely speaking1 exist without its connatural accident of external or local extension2 this latter can1 absolutely speaking1 exist without its connatural substance27#aeh7 therefore these are absolutely and really distinct4 ,if only one of the factors is seen to be capable of existing without the other1 and the latter to be such that it could not actually exist except as united with the former1 so that the separability is not mutual1 the distinction is regarded still as real1 but only as a minor or modal distinction4 ,such1 for instance1 is the distinction between a body and its location1 or its state of rest or motion3 and1 in general1 the distinction between a substance and what are called its accidental modes or modal accidents4 ,the distinction is regarded as real because reflection is held to assure us that it is in the reality itself independently of the mind1 and not merely imposed by the mind on the reality because of some ground or reason in the reality4 ,it is called a modal distinction rather than an absolute real distinction because those accidental modes of a substance do not seem to have of themselves sufficient reality to warrant our calling them 8things0 or 8realities10 but rather merely 8modes0 or 8determinations0 of things or realities4 ,it is significant1 as throwing light on the relation of the virtual to the real distinction1 that some authors call the modal distinction not a real distinction but a 8distinctio media10 i4e4 intermediate between a real and a logical distinction2 and that the question whether it should be called simply a real distinction1 or 8intermediate0 between a real and a logical distinction is regarded by some as 8a purely verbal question407#aei7 ,we shall recur to the modal distinction later 7#fh74 ,in the third place it must be noted that separability in the sense explained1 even non-mutual1 is not regarded as the only index to a real distinction4 ,in other words1 certain distinctions are held by some to be real even though this test of separability does not apply4 ,for instance1 it is commonly held that not merely in man but in all corporeal individuals the formative and the determinable principle of the nature or substance1 the forma substantialis and the materia prima1 are really distinct1 although it is admitted that1 apart from the case of the human soul1 neither can actually exist except in union with the other4 ,what is held in regard to accidental modes is also applied to these essential principles of the corporeal substance3 viz4 that there is here a special reason why such principles cannot actually exist in isolation4 ,of their very nature they are held to be such that they cannot be actualized or actually exist in isolation1 but only in union4 ,but this fact1 it is contended1 does not prove that the principles in question are merely mentally distinct aspects of one reality3 the fact that they cannot actually exist as such separately does not prove that they are not really separable2 and it is contended that they are really and actually separated whenever an individual corporeal substance undergoes substantial change4 ,this1 then1 raises once more the question3 ,what sort of 8separation0 or 8separability0 is the test of a real distinction8 ,is it separateness in and for sense perception1 or separateness in and for intellectual thought8 ,the former is certainly the fundamental index of the real distinction2 for all our knowledge of reality originates in sense experience1 and separateness in time and space1 which marks its data1 is the key to our knowledge of reality as a manifold of really distinct individual beings2 and when we infer from sense-experience the actual existence of a spiritual domain of reality we can conceive its 8individuals0 only after the analogy of the corporeal individuals of our immediate sense experience4 ,scholastic philosophers1 following ,aristotle1 have always taken the manifoldness of reality1 i4e4 its presentation in sense experience in the form of 8individuals10 of 8this0 and 8that10 8 10 8hoc aliquid10 as an unquestioned and unquestionable real datum4 ,not that they navely assumed everything perceived by the senses as an individual1 in time and space1 to be really an individual3 they realized that what is perceived by sense as one limited continuum1 occupying a definite portion of space1 may be in reality an aggregate of many individuals2 and they recognized the need of scrutinizing and analysing those apparent individuals in order to test their real individuality2 but they held1 and rightly1 that sense experience does present to us some data that are unmistakably real individuals--individual men1 for instance4 ,next1 they saw that intellectual thought1 by analysing sense experience1 amasses an ever-growing multitude of abstract and conceptually distinct thought-objects1 which it utilizes as predicates for the interpretation of this sense experience4 ,these thought-objects intellect can unite or separate2 can in some cases positively see to be mutually compatible or incompatible2 can form into ideal or possible complexes4 ,but whether or not the conceptually distinct1 though mutually compatible1 thought-objects forming any such complex1 will be also really distinct from one another1 is a question which evidently cannot arise until such a complex is considered as an actual or possible individual being3 for it is the individual only that exists or can exist4 ,they will be really distinct when found actualized in distinct individuals4 ,even the conceptually one and self-identical abstract thought-object will be really distinct from itself when embodied in distinct individuals2 the one single abstract thought-object1 8humanity10 8human nature10 is really distinct from itself in ,john and in ,james2 the humanity of ,john is really other than the humanity of ,james4 ,of course1 if conceptually distinct thought-objects are seen to be mutually incompatible they cannot be found realized except in really distinct individuals3 the union of them is only an ens rationis4 ,again it may be that the intellect is unable to pronounce positively as to whether they are compatible or not 7#ah73 as to whether the complex forms a possible being or not4 ,but when the intellect positively sees such thought-objects to be mutually compatible--by interpretation of1 and inference from1 its actual sense experience of them as embodied in individuals 7#ah7--;and when1 furthermore1 it now finds a number of them co-existing in some one actual individual1 the question recurs3 ,how can it know whether they are really distinct from each other1 though actually united to form one 7essentially or accidentally composite7 individual1 or only conceptually distinct aspects of one 7simple7 individual #bg 7b78 ,this1 as we have seen already1 is the case for which it is really difficult to find a satisfactory test3 and hence the different views to be found among scholastic philosophers as to the nature of the distinctions which the mind makes or discovers within the individual4 ,the difficulty is this4 ,the conceptual distinction between compatible thought-objects is not a proof of real distinction when these thought-objects are found united in one individual of sense experience1 as e4g4 animality and rationality in man2 and the only distinction given to us by sense experience1 at least directly and immediately1 as undoubtedly real1 is the distinction between corporeal individuals existing apart in space or time1 as e4g4 between man and man4 ,how then1 can we show that any distinctions within the individual are real8 ,well1 we have seen that certain entities1 which are objects of sense or of thought1 or of both1 can disappear from the individual without the residue thereby perishing or ceasing to exist actually as an individual3 the human soul survives1 as an actual individual reality1 after its separation from the material principle with which it formed the individual man2 the individual man persists while the accidental modes that affect him disappear4 ,in such cases as these1 intellect1 interpreting sense experience and reasoning from it1 places a real distinction1 in the composite individual1 between the factors that can continue to exist without others1 and these latter4 ,in doing so it is apparently applying the analogy of the typical real distinction--that between one individual and another4 ,the factor1 or group of factors1 which can continue to exist actually after the separation of the others1 is an individual3 and what were separated from it were apparently real entities1 though they may have perished by the actual separation4 ,but on what ground is the distinction between the material principle and the vital principle of a plant or an animal1 for example1 regarded as real8 ,again on the ground furnished by the analogy of the distinction between individuals of sense experience4 ,note that it is not between the material and the vital principles as objects of abstract thought1 i4e4 between the materiality and the vitality of the plant or the animal1 that a real distinction is claimed3 these are regarded only as conceptually distinct aspects of the plant or the animal2 nor is it admitted that because one of these thought-objects is found embodied elsewhere in nature without the other--materiality without vitality in the inorganic universe--we can therefore conclude that they are really distinct in the plant or the animal4 ,no2 it is between the two principles conceived as coexisting and united in the concrete individual that the real distinction is claimed4 ,and it is held to be a real distinction because substantial change in corporeal things1 i4e4 corruption and generation of individual corporeal substances1 is held to be real4 ,if it is real there is a real separation of essential factors when the individual perishes4 ,and the factors continue to be real1 as potential principles of other individuals1 when any individual corporeal substance perishes4 ,each principle may not continue to exist actually as such in isolation from the other--though some scholastics hold that1 absolutely speaking1 they could be conserved apart1 as actual entities1 by the ,author of ,nature4 ,but they can actually exist as essential principles of other actual individuals3 they are real potentialities1 which become actual in other individuals4 ,thus we see that they are conceived throughout after the analogy of the individual4 ,those who hold that1 absolutely speaking1 the material principle as such1 materia prima1 could actually exist in isolation from any formative principle1 should apparently admit that in such a case it would be an individual reality4 #ci4 ,,some ,,questionable ,,distinctions4 ,,the ,,scotist ,,distinction4--,the difficulty of discriminating between the virtual and the real distinction in an individual has given rise to the conception of distinctions which some maintain to be real1 others to be less than real4 ,the virtual distinction1 as we have hitherto understood it1 may be described as extrinsic inasmuch as it arises in the individual only when we consider the latter under different aspects1 or in different relations to things extrinsic to it4 ,by regarding an individual under different aspects--e4g4 a man under the aspects of animality and rationality--we can predicate contradictory attributes of the individual1 e4g4 of a man that 8he is similar to a horse10 and that 8he is not similar to a horse04 ,now it is maintained by some that although independently of the consideration of the mind the grounds of these contradictory predications are not actually distinct in the individual1 nevertheless even before such consideration the individual has a real intrinsic capacity to have these contradictory predicates affirmed of him3 they can be affirmed of him not merely when he is regarded1 and because he is regarded1 under conceptually different aspects1 but because these principles1 8animality0 and 8rationality10 are already really in him not merely as aspects but as distinct capacities1 as potentially distinct principles of contradictory predications4 ,the virtual distinction1 understood in this way1 is described as intrinsic4 ,it is rejected by some on the ground that1 at least in its application to finite realities1 it involves a violation of the principle of contradiction3 it seems to imply that one and the same individual has in itself absolutely 7and not merely as considered under different aspects and relations7 the capacity to verify of itself contradictory predicates4 ,scotus and his followers go even farther than the advocates of this intrinsic virtual distinction by maintaining the existence of a distinction which on the one hand they hold to be less than real because it is not between 8thing and thing10 and on the other hand to be more than logical or virtual1 because it actually exists between the various thought-objects or 8formalitates0 7such1 e4g4 as animality and rationality7 in the individual1 independently of the analytic activity whereby the mind detects these in the latter4 ,this distinction ,scotists call a 8formal distinction1 actual on the part of the thing0--8distinctio formalis1 actualis ex natura rei40 ,hence the name 8formalists0 applied to ,scotists1 from their advocacy of this 8,scotistic0 distinction4 ,it is1 they explain1 a distinction not between 8things0 78res07 but between 8formalities0 78formalitates074 ,by 8thing0 as opposed to 8formality0 they mean not merely the individual1 but also any positive thought-object which1 though it may not be capable of existing apart1 can really appear in1 or disappear from1 a thing which can so exist3 for instance1 the essential factors of a really composite essence1 its accidental modes1 and its real relations4 ,by 8formality0 they mean a positive thought-object which is absolutely inseparable from the thing in which it is apprehended1 which cannot exist without the thing1 nor the thing without it3 for instance1 all the metaphysical grades of being in an individual1 such as substantiality1 corporeity1 life1 animality1 rationality1 individuality1 in an individual man4 ,the distinction is called 8formal0 because it is between such 8formalities0--each of which is the positive term of a separate concept of the individual4 ,it is called 8actual on the side of the thing0 because it is claimed to be actually in the latter apart from our mental apprehension of the individual4 ,what has chiefly influenced ,scotists in claiming this distinction to be thus actually in the individual1 independently of our mental activity1 is the consideration that these metaphysical grades are grounds on which we can predicate contradictory attributes of the same individual1 e4g4 of an individual man that 8he is similar to a horse0 and that 8he is not similar to a horse03 whence they infer that in order to avoid violation of the principle of contradiction1 we must suppose these grounds to be actually distinct in the thing4 ,to this it is replied1 firstly1 that if such predications were truly contradictory we could avoid violation of the principle of contradiction only by inferring a real distinction--which ,scotists deny to exist--between these grounds2 secondly1 that such predications are not truly contradictory inasmuch as 8he is similar0 really means 8he is partially similar10 and 8he is not similar0 means 8he is not completely similar02 therefore when we say that a man's rationality 8is not the principle whereby he resembles a horse10 and his animality 8is the principle whereby he resembles a horse10 we mean 7a7 that his rationality is not the principle of complete resemblance1 though we know it is the principle of partial resemblance1 inasmuch as we see it to be really identical with that which is the principle of partial resemblance1 viz4 his animality2 and we mean 7b7 that his animality is the principle of his partial resemblance to a horse1 not of total resemblance1 for we know that the animality of a man is not perfectly similar to that of a horse1 the former being really identical with rationality1 the latter with irrationality4 ,when1 then1 we predicate of one thing that 8it is similar to some other thing10 and that 8it is not similar to this other thing0 we are not really predicating contradictories of the same thing2 if we take the predicates as contradictories they are true of the same reality undoubtedly1 but not under the same aspect4 ,scotists themselves admit that the real identity of these aspects involves no violation of the principle of contradiction2 why1 then1 should these be held to be actually distinct formalities independently of the consideration of the mind8 ,how can a distinction that is actual independently of the mind's analysis of the reality be other than real8 ,is not predication a work of the mind8 ,and must not the conditions on which reality verifies the predication be determined by the mind8 ,if1 then1 we see that in order to justify this predication--of 8similar0 and 8not similar0--about any reality1 it is merely necessary that the mind should apprehend this reality to be in its undivided unity equivalent to manifold grades of being or perfection which the mind itself can grasp as mentally distinct aspects1 by distinct concepts1 how can we be justified in supposing that these grades of being are not merely distinguishable1 but actually distinct in the reality itself1 independently of the mind8 ,the ,scotist doctrine here is indicative of the tendency to emphasize1 perhaps unduly1 the assimilation of reality as a datum with the mind which interprets this datum2 to regard the constitution of reality itself as being what abstract thought1 irrespective of sense experience1 would represent it2 and accordingly to place in the reality as being actually there1 independently of thought1 distinctions which as a matter of fact may be merely the product of thought itself4 ,scotists1 by advocating an actual distinction between these grades of being1 as 8formalities0 in the individual1 have exposed themselves to the charge of extreme realism4 ,they teach that each of these 8formalities0 has1 for abstract thought1 a formal unity which is sui generis4 ,and this unity is not regarded as a product of thought1 any more than the distinction between such unities4 ,thus1 the materiality apprehended by thought in all material things is one1 not because it is made one by the abstracting and universalizing activity of thought1 as most if not all other scholastics teach2 it is not merely conceptually one through our thought-activity1 it is formally one apart from the latter2 and it thus knits into a 8formal0 unity all material things4 ,and so does 8life0 all living things2 and 8animality0 all animals2 and 8rationality0 all men4 ,now1 if this 8formal unity0 of any such essential or metaphysical grade of being were regarded as a real unity1 monism would be of course the logically inevitable corollary of the theory4 ,but the 8formal0 unity of any such essential grade of being ,scotists will not admit to be a real unity1 though they hold it to be characteristic of reality independently of our thought4 ,they contend that this unity is quite compatible with the real plurality conferred upon being by the principles which individuate the latter2 and thus they cannot be fairly accused of monism4 ,their reasoning here is characteristically subtle4 ,just as any metaphysical grade of being1 considered as an object of thought1 is in itself neither manifold individually nor one universally--so that1 as ,thomists say1 designating it in this condition as the universale directum1 or metaphysicum1 or fundamentale1 or quoad rem conceptam1 we can truly affirm of it in this condition neither that it is one 7logically1 as a universal7 nor that it is manifold 7really1 as multiplied in actual individuals717#afj7--so likewise1 ,scotists contend1 it is in this condition ontologically1 as an entity in the real order independently of thought1 and as such has a unity of its own1 a formal unity1 which1 while uniting in a formal unity all the individuals that embody it1 is itself incapable of fitting this grade of being for actual existence1 and therefore admits those ultimate individuating principles which make it a real manifold in the actual order47#afa7 ,thus1 the metaphysical grade of being1 which1 as considered in itself1 ,thomists hold to be an abstraction1 having no other unity than that which thought confers upon it by making it logically universal1 ,scotists on the contrary hold to be as such something positive in the ontological order1 having there a 8formal0 unity corresponding to the 8conceptual0 or 8logical0 unity which thought confers upon it by universalizing it4 ,the metaphysical grade of being1 thus conceived as something positive in the real order1 ,scotists will not admit to be a 8reality10 nor the unity which characterizes it a 8real0 unity4 ,but after all1 if such a 8formality0 with its proportionate 8unity10 is independent of thought2 and if on the other hand 8universality0 is the work of thought1 so that the universal as such cannot be real1 it is not easy to see how the ,scotist doctrine escapes the error of extreme realism4 ,the metaphysical grade of being is a 8formality0 only because it is made abstract by thought2 and it has 8unity0 only because it is made logically universal by thought2 therefore to contend that as such it is something positive in the real order1 independently of thought1 is to 8reify0 the abstract and universal as such3 which is extreme realism4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,reality ,,and ,,the ,,true4 #dj4 ,,ontological ,,truth ,,considered ,,from ,,analysis ,,of ,,experience4--,we have seen that when the mind thinks of any reality it apprehends it as 8one10 that ontological unity is a transcendental attribute of being2 and this consideration led us to consider the manifoldness and the distinctions which characterize the totality of our experience4 ,now man himself is a real being surrounded by all the other real beings that constitute the universe4 ,moreover he finds himself endowed with faculties which bring him into conscious relations both with himself and with those other beings2 and only by the proper interpretation of these relations can he understand aright his place in the universe4 ,the first in order of these relations is that of reality to mind 7#be74 ,this relation between mind and reality is what we understand by ,truth4 ,now truth is attributed both to knowledge and to things4 ,we say that a person thinks or judges truly1 that his knowledge is true 7or correct1 or accurate71 when things really are as he thinks or judges them to be4 ,the truth which we thus ascribe to knowledge1 to the mind interpreting reality1 is logical truth3 a relation of concord or conformity of the mind interpreting reality--or1 of the mind's judgment about reality--with the reality itself47#afb7 ,logical truth is dealt with in ,logic and ,epistemology4 ,we are concerned here only with the truth that is attributed to reality1 to things themselves3 ontological1 metaphysical1 transcendental truth1 as it is called4 ,there is nothing abstruse or far-fetched about the use of the terms 8true0 and 8truth0 as equivalent to 8real0 and 8reality04 ,we speak of 8true0 gold1 a 8true0 friend1 a 8veritable0 hero1 etc4 ,now what do we mean by thus ascribing truth to a thing8 ,we mean that it corresponds to a mental type or ideal4 ,we call a liquid true wine or real wine1 for instance1 when it verifies in itself the definition we have formed of the nature of wine4 ,hence whenever we apply the terms 8true0 or 8truth0 to a thing we shall find that we are considering that thing not absolutely and in itself but in reference to an idea in our minds3 we do not say of a thing simply that it is true1 we say that it is truly such or such a thing1 i4e4 that it is really of a certain nature already conceived by our minds4 ,if the appearance of the thing suggests comparison with some such ideal type or nature1 and if the thing is seen on examination not really to verify this nature in itself1 we say that it is not really or truly such or such a thing3 e4g4 that a certain liquid is not really wine1 or is not true wine4 ,when we have no such ideal type to which to refer a thing1 when we do not know its nature1 cannot classify and name it1 we have to suspend our judgment and say that we do not know what the thing really is4 ,hence1 for example1 the new rays discovered by ,rntgen were called provisionally 8,x rays10 their real nature being at first unknown4 ,we see1 then1 that real or ontological truth is simply reality considered as conformable with an ideal type1 with an idea in the mind4 ,whence does the human mind derive these ideal types1 these concepts or definitions of the nature of things8 ,it derives them from actually experienced reality by abstraction1 comparison1 generalization1 and reflection on the data of its experience47#afc7 ,hence it follows that the ontological truth of things is not known by the mind antecedently to the formation of the mental type4 ,it is1 of course1 in the things antecedently to any judgment we form about the things2 and the logical truth of our judgments is dependent on it1 for logical truth is the conformity of our judgments with the real nature of things4 ,but antecedently to all exercise of human thought1 antecedently to our conception of the nature of a thing1 the thing has not for us formal or actual ontological truth3 it has only fundamental or potential ontological truth4 ,if in this condition reality had actual ontological truth for us1 there would be no ground for our distinguishing mentally between the reality and the truth of things2 whereas the existence of this mental or logical distinction is undeniable4 ,the concept of reality is the concept of something absolute2 the concept of ontological truth is the concept of something relative1 not of an absolute but of a relative property of being4 ,but if for the human mind the ontological truth of things is--at least proximately1 immediately1 and in the first place--their conformity with the abstract concepts of essences or natures1 concepts derived by the mind from an analysis of its experience1 how can this ontological truth be one for all men1 or immutable and necessary8 ,for1 since men form different and divergent and conflicting conceptions as to the natures of things1 and so have different views and standards of truth for things1 ontological truth would seem1 according to the exposition just outlined1 to be not one but manifold1 not immutable but variable3 consequences which surely cannot be admitted8 ,the answer to this difficulty will lead us to a deeper and more fundamental conception of what ontological truth really is4 ,first1 then1 we must consider that all men are endowed with the same sort of intellect1 an intellect capable of some insight at least into the nature of things2 that therefore they abstract the same transcendental notions and the same widest concepts from their experience3 transcendental concepts of being1 unity1 truth1 goodness2 generic concepts of substance1 matter1 spirit1 cause1 of accident1 quantity1 multitude1 number1 identity1 similarity1 distinction1 diversity1 etc4 ,they also form the same specific concepts of possible essences4 ,although1 therefore1 they may disagree and err in regard to the application of those concepts1 especially of the lower1 richer and more complex specific concepts1 to the actual data of their experience1 they agree in the fact that they have those common concepts or idea-types of reality2 also in the fact that when they apply those concepts rightly 7i4e4 by logically true judgments7 to the things that make up their experience1 they have so far grasped the real natures of these things2 and finally in recognizing that the ontological truth of these things lies in the conformity of the latter with their true and proper mental types or essences4 ,and just as each of these latter is one1 indivisible1 immutable1 necessary and eternal 7#ad1 #ae71 so is the ontological truth of things1 whether possible or actual1 one1 indivisible1 immutable1 necessary and eternal4 ,of course1 just as the human mind does not constitute but only apprehends reality1 so the human mind does not constitute the ontological truth of reality1 but only apprehends it4 ,every reality is capable of producing in the human mind a more or less adequate mental representation of itself3 in this lies what we may call the potential or fundamental ontological truth of reality4 ,when it does produce such a mental concept of itself its relation of conformity to this concept is its formal ontological truth4 ,of course the human mind may err in applying to any reality a wrong concept2 when it does it has so far failed to grasp the real nature of the thing and therefore the ontological truth which is really identical with this nature4 ,but the thing still has its ontological truth1 independently of the erring mind2 not only fundamental truth1 but also possibly formal truth in so far as it may be rightly apprehended1 and thus related to its proper mental type1 by other human minds4 ,reality itself1 therefore1 is not and cannot be false1 as we shall see more fully later2 error or falsity is an accident only of the mind interpreting reality4 #da4 ,,ontological ,,truth ,,considered ,,synthetically1 ,,from ,,the ,,standpoint ,,of ,,its ,,ultimate ,,real ,,basis4--,so far we have explained ontological truth as a relation of reality to the human intelligence2 but this relation is not one of dependence4 ,the objective term of the relation1 the reality itself1 is anterior to the human mind1 it is not constituted by the latter4 ,the subjective term1 the abstract concept1 is indeed as a vital product dependent on the mind1 but as representative of reality it is determined only by the latter4 ,is there1 however1 an ,intelligence to which reality is essentially conformed1 other than the human intelligence8 ,granted the actual existence of contingent realities1 and granted that the human mind can derive from these realities rational principles which it sees to be necessarily and universally applicable to all the data of experience1 we can demonstrate the existence of a ,necessary ,being1 a ,first and ,self-,existent ,intelligence4 ,realizing1 then1 that ,god has created all things according to ,infinite ,wisdom1 we can see that the essences of things are imitations of exemplar ideas in the ,divine ,mind 7#bj74 ,on the ,divine ,mind they depend essentially for their reality and intelligibility4 ,it is because all created realities1 including the human mind itself1 are adumbrations of the ,divine ,essence1 that they are intelligible to the human mind4 ,thus we see that in the ontological order1 in the order of real gradation and dependence among things1 as distinct from the order of human experience17#afd7 the reason why reality has ontological truth for the human mind is because it is antecedently and essentially in accord with the ,divine ,mind from which it derives its intelligibility4 ,although1 therefore1 ontological truth is for us proximately and immediately the conformity of reality with our own conceptions1 it is primarily and fundamentally the essential conformity of all reality with the ,divine ,mind4 ,all reality1 actual and possible1 including the ,divine ,essence itself1 is actually comprehended by the ,divine ,mind1 is actually in conformity with the exemplar ideas in the ,divine ,mind1 and has therefore ontological truth even independently of its relation to created minds2 but 8in the 7impossible7 hypothesis of the absence of all intellect1 such a thing as truth would be inconceivable047#afe7 ,the reason1 therefore1 why things are ontologically true for our minds1 why our minds can apprehend their essences1 why we can have any true knowledge about them1 is in fact because both our minds and all things else1 being expressions of the ,divine ,essence1 are in essential conformity with the ,divine ,intellect4 ,not that we must know all this in order to have any logical truth1 any true knowledge1 about things2 or in order to ascribe to things the ontological truth which consists in their conformity with our conception of their nature4 ,the atheist can have a true knowledge of things and can recognize in them their conformity with his mental conception of their nature2 only he is unaware of the real and fundamental reason why he can do so4 ,nor can he1 of course1 while denying the existence of ,god1 rise to the fuller conception of ontological truth which consists in the essential conformity of all reality with the ,divine ,intellect1 and its essential dependence on the latter for its intelligibility to the human intellect4 ,naturally1 it is this latter and fuller conception of ontological truth that has been at all times expounded by scholastic philosophers47#aff7 ,we may therefore1 define ontological truth as the essential conformity of reality1 as an object of thought1 with intellect1 and primarily and especially with the ,divine ,intellect4 ,the conformity of reality with the ,divine ,intellect is described as essential to reality1 in the sense that the reality is dependent on the ,divine ,intellect for its intelligibility2 it derives its intelligibility from the latter4 ,the conformity of reality with the human intellect is also essential in the sense that potential conformity with the latter is inseparable from reality2 it is an aspect really identical with1 and only logically distinct from1 the latter4 ,but inasmuch as the actual conformity of reality with our human conception of it is contingent on the existence of human intelligences1 and is not ultimately dependent on the latter1 inasmuch as reality does not derive its intelligibility ultimately from this conception--seeing that rather this conception is derived from the reality and is ultimately dependent on the ,divine ,exemplar1--this conformity of reality with the human mind is sometimes spoken of as accidental to reality in contrast with the relation of dependence which exists between reality and the ,divine ,mind4 ,bearing in mind that reality derives its intelligibility from its essential conformity with the ,divine ,mind1 and that the human mind derives its truth from the reality1 we can understand how it has been said of truth in general that it is first in the ,uncreated ,intellect1 then in things1 then in created intellects2 that the primary source and measure of all truth is the ,divine ,intellect ,itself ,unmeasured1 8mensurans1 non mensuratus02 that created reality is measured by1 or conformed with1 the ,divine ,intellect1 and is in turn the measure of the human intellect1 conforming the latter with itself1 8mensurans et mensurata02 and that1 finally1 the human intellect1 measured by created reality and the ,divine ,mind1 is itself the measure of no natural things but only of the products of human art1 8intellectus noster 444 non mensurans quidem res naturales1 sed artificiales tantum047#afg7 ,is truth one1 then1 or is it manifold8 ,logical truth is manifold--multiplied by the number of created intelligences1 and by the number of distinct cognitions in each4 ,the primary ontological truth which consists in the conformity of all reality with the ,divine ,intellect is one3 there is no real plurality of archetype ideas in the ,divine ,mind2 they are manifold only to our imperfect human mode of thinking4 ,the secondary ontological truth which consists in the conformity of things with the abstract concepts of created intelligences is conditioned by1 and multiplied with1 the manifoldness of the latter47#afh7 ,again to the question3 ,is truth eternal or temporal8--we reply in a similar way that the truth of the ,divine comprehension of reality1 actual and possible1 is eternal1 but that no other truth is eternal4 ,there is no eternal truth outside of ,god4 ,created things are not eternal2 and truth is consecutive on reality3 where there is no reality there is no ontological truth3 the conformity of things with human conceptions and the logical truth of the latter are both alike temporal47#afi7 ,finally1 we may say that the truth of the ,divine ,intellect is immutable2 and so is the essential conformity of all reality with the ,divine ,intellect4 ,the change to which created reality is essentially subject is itself essentially conformed with the ,divine ,mind2 it is1 so to speak1 part and parcel of the ontological truth of this reality in relation to the ,divine ,mind1 and cannot therefore interfere with this ontological truth4 ,when the acorn grows into the oak the whole process has its ontological truth2 that of the acorn changes1 not into falsity1 but into another truth1 that of the oak47#agj7 ,we see1 then1 that as things change1 their truth does not change in the sense of being lost or giving place to falsity3 the truth of one state changes to the truth of another while the ontological truth of the changing reality perseveres immutably4 ,the same immutability attaches to the truth of things in relation to the human mind3 with the qualification1 to which we shall return 7#dc71 that they may occasion false judgments in the human mind1 and on that account be designated 8false04 ,finally1 the logical truth which has its seat in created intelligences is mutable3 it may be increased or diminished1 acquired or lost4 #db4 ,,ontological ,,truth ,a ,,transcendental ,,attribute ,,of ,,reality4--,from what has been said it will be apparent that ontological truth is a transcendental attribute of reality4 ,that is to say1 whatever is real1 whether actual or possible1 is ontologically true2 or1 in scholastic terminology1 8,omne ens est verum2 ,ens et verum convertuntur3 ,all being is true2 ,the real and the true are convertible terms04 ,for in the first place there is no mode or category of real being1 of which the human mind actually thinks1 to which it does not attribute ontological truth in the sense of conformity with the right human conception of it4 ,moreover1 the proper object of the human intellect is reality2 all true knowledge is knowledge of reality4 ,reality of itself is manifestly knowable1 intelligible1 and thus potentially or fundamentally true2 and1 on the other hand1 intellect is1 according to the measure of its capacity1 a faculty of insight into all reality1 into whatever is real3 intellectus potens fieri omnia2 anima 444 quodammodo fit omnia47#aga7 ,deny either of these postulates regarding the terms of the ontological relation1 reality and mind1 and all rational thought is instantly paralysed4 ,hence1 in so far as a reality becomes an actual object of human knowledge it has formal ontological truth in relation both to the human mind and to the ,divine ,mind2 while antecedently to human thought it is fundamentally true1 or intelligible1 to the human mind1 and of course formally true in relation to the ,divine ,mind4 ,thus we see that whatever is real is ontologically true2 that ontological truth is really identical with real being2 that1 applied to the latter1 it is not a mere extrinsic denomination1 but signifies an intrinsic1 positive aspect of reality1 viz4 the real1 essential1 or transcendental relation of all real being to ,mind or ,intellect3 a relation which is logically or conceptually distinct from the notion of reality considered in itself4 #dc4 ,,attribution ,,of ,,falsity ,,to ,,real ,,being4--,if ontological truth is really identical with real being1 if it is an essential aspect of the latter1 a transcendental relation of reality to mind1 it follows immediately that there can be no such thing as transcendental falsity3 if whatever is real is ontologically true1 then the ontologically false must be the unreal1 must be nothingness4 ,and this is really so3 ontologically falsity is nothingness4 ,we have1 therefore1 to discover the real meaning of attributing falsity to things1 as when we speak of a false friend1 false gold1 false teeth1 a false musical note1 a false measure in poetry1 etc4 ,first of all1 then1 it will be noted that each such object has its own real nature and character1 its proper mental correlate1 and1 therefore1 its ontological truth4 ,the false friend is a true or real deceiver1 or traitor1 or coward1 or whatever his real character may be2 the false gold is true or real bronze1 or alloy1 or whatever it may be in reality2 the false teeth are true or real ivory1 or whatever substance they are made of2 a false musical note is a true or real note but not the proper one in its actual setting2 and so of a false measure in poetry4 ,next1 when we thus ascribe falsity to a friend1 or gold1 or such like1 we see that the epithet 8false0 is in reality merely transferred from the false judgment which a person is liable to make about the object4 ,we mean that to judge that person a friend1 or that substance gold1 or those articles real teeth1 would be to form a false judgment4 ,we see that it is only in the judgment there can be falsity2 but we transfer the epithet to the object because the object is likely to occasion the erroneous judgment in the fallible human mind1 by reason of the resemblance of the object to something else which it really is not4 ,we see1 therefore1 that falsity is not in the objects1 but is transferred to them by a purely extrinsic denomination on account of appearances calculated to mislead4 ,we commonly say1 in such cases that 8things mislead us10 that 8appearances deceive us04 ,things1 however1 do not deceive or mislead us necessarily1 but only accidentally3 they are the occasions of our allowing ourselves to be deceived3 the fallibility and limitations of our own minds in interpreting reality are the real cause of our erroneous judgments47#agb7 ,secondly1 there is another improper sense in which we attribute falsity to works of art which fail to realize the artist's ideal4 ,in this sense we speak of a 8false0 note in music1 a 8false0 measure in poetry1 a 8false0 tint in painting1 a 8false0 curve in sculpture or architecture4 8,false0 here means defective1 bad1 wanting in perfection4 ,the object being out of harmony with the ideal or design in the practical intellect of the artist1 we describe it as 8false0 after the analogy of what takes place when we describe as 8false gold0 a substance which is out of harmony with the idea of gold in the speculative intellect4 ,it is in relation to the speculative1 not the practical1 intellect1 that things have ontological truth4 ,all created things are1 of course1 as such1 in conformity not only with the ,divine ,intellect considered as speculative1 but also with the ,divine ,intellect considered as practical4 ,for ,god1 being omnipotent1 does all things according to the designs of ,his ,wisdom4 ,for ,him nothing is accidental1 nothing happens by chance4 ,but the world ,he has freely willed to create is not the best possible world4 ,both in the physical and in the moral order there are things and events which are defective1 which fall short of their natural perfection4 ,this defectiveness1 which is properly physical or moral evil1 is sometimes described as falsity1 lying1 vanity1 etc41 on account of the discrepancy between those things and the ideal of what they should be4 ,but all such defective realities are known to be what they are by the ,divine ,mind1 and may be known as they really are by the human mind4 ,they have1 therefore1 their ontological truth4 ,the question of their perfection or imperfection gives rise to the consideration of quite a different aspect of reality1 namely its goodness4 ,this1 then1 we must deal with in the next place4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,reality ,,and ,,the ,,good4 #dd4 ,,the ,,good ,,as 8,,desirable0 ,,and ,,as 8,,suitable04--,the notion of the good 7,l4 bonum2 ,gr4 7 is one of the most familiar of all notions4 ,but like all other transcendental or widely generic concepts1 the analysis of it opens up some fundamental questions4 ,the princes of ancient ,greek philosophy1 ,socrates1 ,plato and ,aristotle1 gave much anxious thought to its elucidation4 ,the tentative gropings of ,socrates involved an ambiguity which issued in the conflicting philosophies of ,stoicism and ,epicureanism4 ,nor did ,plato succeed in bringing down from the clouds the 8,idea of the ,good0 which he so devotedly worshipped as the ,sun of the ,intellectual ,world4 ,it needed the more sober and searching analysis of the ,stagyrite to bring to light the formula so universally accepted in after ages3 ,the ,good of beings is that which all desire3 ,bonum est quod omnia appetunt47#agc7 ,let us try to reach the fundamental idea underlying the terms 8good10 8goodness10 by some simple examples4 ,the child1 deriving sensible pleasure from a sweetmeat1 cries out3 ,that is good6 ,whatever gratifies its senses1 gives it sensible delight1 it likes or loves4 ,such things it desires1 seeks1 yearns for1 in their absence2 and in their presence enjoys4 ,at this stage the good means simply the pleasure-giving4 ,but as reason develops the human being apprehends and describes as good not merely what is pleasure-giving1 but whatever satisfies any natural need or craving1 whether purely organic1 or purely intellectual1 or more widely human3 food is good because it satisfies a physical1 organic craving2 knowledge is good because it satisfies a natural intellectual thirst2 friendship is good because it satisfies a wider need of the heart4 ,here we notice a transition from 8agreeable0 in the sense of 8pleasure-giving0 to 8agreeable0 in the more proper sense of 8suitable0 or useful4 ,the good is now conceived not in the narrow sense of what yields sensible pleasure but in the wider sense of that which is useful or suitable for the satisfaction of a natural tendency or need1 that which is the object of a natural tendency4 ,next1 let us reflect1 with ,aristotle1 that each of the individual persons and things that make up the world of our direct experience has an end towards which it naturally tends4 ,there is a purpose in the existence of each4 ,each has a nature1 i4e4 an essence which is for it a principle of development1 a source of all the functions and activities whereby it continually adapts itself to its environment and thereby continually fulfils the aim of its existence4 ,by its very nature it tends towards its end along the proper line of its development47#agd7 ,in the world of conscious beings this natural tendency is properly called appetite3 sense appetite of what is apprehended as good by sense cognition1 and rational appetite or will in regard to what is apprehended as good by intellect or reason4 ,in the world of unconscious things this natural tendency is a real tendency and is analogous to conscious appetite4 ,hence it is that ,aristotle1 taking in all grades of real being1 describes the good as that which is the object of any natural tendency or 8appetite0 whatsoever3 the good is the 8appetibile0 or 8desirable10 that which all things seek3 bonum est quod omnia appetunt4 #de4 ,,the ,,good ,,as ,,an 8,,end10 8,,perfecting0 ,,the 8,,nature04--,so far1 we have analysed the notion of what is 8good0 for some being2 and we have gathered that it implies what suits this being1 what contributes to the latter's realization of its end4 ,but we apply the term 8good0 to objects1 and speak of their goodness1 apart from their direct and immediate relation of helpfulness or suitability for us4 ,when1 for instance1 we say of a watch that it is a good one1 or of a soldier that he is a good soldier1 what precisely do we mean by such attribution of goodness to things or persons8 ,a little reflection will show that it is intelligible only in reference to an end or purpose4 ,and we mean by it that the being we describe as good has the powers1 qualities1 equipments1 which fit it for its end or purpose4 ,a being is good whose nature is equipped and adapted for the realization of its natural end or purpose4 ,thus we see that the notion of goodness is correlative with the notion of an end1 towards which1 or for which1 a being has a natural tendency or desire4 ,without the concept of a nature as tending to realize an end or purpose1 the notion of 8the good0 would be inexplicable47#age7 ,and the two formul1 8,the good is that which beings desire1 or towards which they naturally tend10 and 8,the good is that which is adapted to the ends which beings have in their existence10 really come to the same thing2 the former statement resolving itself into the latter as the more fundamental4 ,for the reason why anything is desirable1 why it is the object of a natural tendency1 is because it is good1 and not vice versa4 ,the description of the good as that which is desirable1 8,bonum est id quod est appetibile10 is an a posteriori description1 a description of cause by reference to effect47#agf7 ,a thing is desirable because it is good4 ,why then is it good1 and therefore desirable8 ,because it suits the natural needs1 and is adapted to the nature1 of the being that desires it or tends towards it2 because it helps this being1 agrees with it1 by contributing towards the realization of its end3 ,bonum est id quod convenit natur appetentis3 ,the good is that which suits the nature of the being that desires it4 ,the greatest good for a being is the realization of its end2 and the means towards this are also good because they contribute to this realization4 ,no doubt1 in beings endowed with consciousness the gradual realization of this natural tendency1 by the normal functioning and development of their activities1 is accompanied by pleasurable feeling4 ,the latter is1 in fact1 not an end of action itself1 but rather the natural concomitant1 the effect and index1 of the healthy and normal activity of the conscious being3 delectatio sequitur operationem debitam4 ,it is the pleasure felt in tending towards the good that reveals the good to the conscious agent3 that is1 taking pleasure in its wide sense as the feeling of well-being1 of satisfaction with one's whole condition1 activities and environment4 ,hence it is the anticipated pleasure1 connected by past association with a certain line of action1 that stimulates the conscious being to act in that way again4 ,it is in the first instance because a certain operation or tendency is felt to be pleasing that it is desired1 and apprehended as desirable4 ,nor does the brute beast recognize or respond to any stimulus of action other than pleasure4 ,but man--endowed with reason1 and reflecting on the relation between his own nature and the activities whereby he duly orients his life in his environment--must see that what is pleasure-giving or 8agreeable0 in the ordinary sense of this term is generally so because it is 8agreeable0 in the deeper sense of being 8suitable to his nature10 8adapted to his end10 and therefore 8good04 ,the good1 then1 is whatever suits the nature of a being tending towards its end3 bonum est conveniens natur appetentis4 ,in what precisely does this suitability consist8 ,what suits any nature perfects that nature1 and suits it precisely in so far as it perfects it4 ,but whatever perfects a nature does so only because and in so far as it is a realization of the end towards which this nature tends4 ,here we reach a new notion1 that of 8perfecting0 or 8perfection10 and one which is as essentially connected with the notion of 8end0 or 8purpose10 as the concept of the 8good0 itself is4 ,let us compare these notions of 8goodness10 8end10 and 8perfection04 ,we have said that a watch or a soldier are good when they are adapted to their respective ends4 ,but they are so only because the end itself is already good4 ,and we may ask why any such end is itself good and therefore desirable4 ,for example1 why is the accurate indication of time good1 or the defence of one's country8 ,and obviously in such a series of questions we must come to something which is good and desirable in and for itself1 for its own sake and not as leading and helping towards some remoter good4 ,and this something which is good in and for itself is a last or ultimate end--an absolute1 not a relative1 good4 ,there must be such an absolute good1 such an ultimate end1 if goodness in things is to be made intelligible at all4 ,and it is only in so far as things tend towards this absolute good1 and are adapted to it1 that they can be termed good4 ,the realization of this tendency of things towards the absolute good1 or ultimate end1 is what constitutes the goodness of those things1 and it does so because it perfects their natures4 ,the end towards which any nature tends is the cause of this tendency1 its final cause2 and the influence of a final cause consists precisely in its goodness1 i4e4 in its power of actualizing and perfecting a nature4 ,this influence of the good is sometimes described as the 8diffusive0 character of goodness3 ,bonum est diffusivum sui3 ,goodness tends to diffuse or communicate itself1 to multiply or reproduce itself4 ,this character1 which we may recognize in the goodness of finite1 created things1 is explained in the philosophy of theism as being derived1 with this goodness itself1 from the uncreated goodness of ,god who is the ,ultimate ,end and ,supreme ,good of all reality4 ,every creature has its own proper ultimate end and highest perfection in its being a manifestation1 an expression1 a shewing forth1 of the ,divine ,goodness4 ,it has its own actuality and goodness1 distinct from1 but dependent on1 the ,divine ,goodness2 but inasmuch as its goodness is an expression or imitation of the ,divine ,goodness1 we may1 by an extrinsic denomination1 say that the creature is good by the ,divine ,goodness4 ,in a similar way1 and without any suspicion of pantheism1 we may speak of the goodness of creatures as being a participation of the ,divine ,goodness 7#e74 #df4 ,,the ,,perfect4 ,,analysis ,,of ,,the ,,notion ,,of ,,perfection4--,it is the realization of the end or object or purpose of a nature that perfects the latter1 and so far formally constitutes the goodness of this nature4 ,now the notion of perfection is not exactly the same as the notion of goodness3 although what is perfect is always good1 what is good is not always perfect4 ,the term 8perfect0 comes from the ,latin perficere1 perfectum1 meaning fully made1 thoroughly achieved1 completed1 finished4 ,strictly speaking1 it is only finite being1 potential being1 capable of completion1 that can be spoken of as perfectible1 or1 when fully actualized1 perfect4 ,but by universal usage the term has been extended to the reality of the ,infinite ,being3 we speak of the latter as the ,infinitely ,perfect ,being1 not meaning that this ,being has been 8perfected10 but that ,he is the purely ,actual and ,infinite ,reality4 ,applied to any finite being1 the term 8perfect0 means that this being has attained to the full actuality which we regard as its end1 as the ideal of its natural capacity and tendency4 ,the finite being is subject to change2 it is not actualized all at once1 but gradually2 by the play of those active and passive powers which are rooted in its nature it is gradually actualized1 and thus perfected1 gaining more and more reality or being by the process4 ,but what directs this process and determines the line of its tendency8 ,the good which is the end of the being1 the good towards which the being by its nature tends4 ,this good1 which is the term of the being's natural tendency--which is1 in other words1 its end--is the fundamental principle7#agg7 which perfects the nature of the being1 is the source and explanation of the process whereby this nature is perfected3 bonum est perfectivum3 the good is the perfecting principle of reality4 ,the end itself is 8the good which perfects10 bonum quod2 the 8perfecting0 itself is the formal cause of the goodness of the being that is perfected1 bonum quo2 the being itself which is perfected1 and therefore ameliorated or increased in goodness1 is the bonum cui4 ,in proportion1 therefore1 to the degree in which a being actually possesses the perfection due to its nature it is 8good02 in so far as it lacks this perfection1 it is wanting in goodness1 or is1 as we shall see1 ontologically 8bad0 or 8evil04 ,while1 then1 the notion of the 8good0 implies a relation of the appetite or natural tendency of a being towards its end1 the notion of 8perfection10 or 8perfecting10 conveys to our minds actual reality simply1 or the actualizing of reality4 ,the term 8perfection0 is commonly used as synonymous with actual reality4 ,in so far forth as a reality is actual we say it 8has perfection04 ,but we do not call it 8perfect0 simply1 unless it has all the actuality we conceive to be due to its nature3 so long as it lacks any of this it is only perfect secundum quid1 i4e4 in proportion to the actuality it does possess4 ,hence we define 8the perfect0 as that which is actually lacking in nothing that is due to its nature4 ,the perfect is therefore not simply the good1 but the complete or finished good2 and it is even logically distinct from the latter1 inasmuch as the actuality connoted by the former has added to it the relation to appetite connoted by the latter4 ,similarly 8goodness0 is logically distinct from 8perfection0 by adding the like relation to the latter4 ,although a thing has goodness in so far as it has perfection1 and vice versa1 still its perfection is its actuality simply1 while its goodness is this actuality considered as the term of its natural appetite or tendency4 #dg4 ,,grades ,,of ,,perfection4 ,,reality ,,as ,,standard ,,of ,,value4--,we may distinguish between stages of perfection in the changing reality of the same being1 or grades of perfection in comparing with one another different classes or orders of being4 ,in one and the same being we may distinguish between what is called its first or essential perfection1 which means its essence or nature considered as capable of realizing its purpose in existence by tending effectively towards its end2 what is called its intermediate or accidental perfection1 which consists in all the powers1 faculties and functions whereby this tendency is gradually actualized2 and what is called its final or integral perfection1 which consists in its full actualization by complete attainment of its end4 ,again1 comparing with one another the individual beings that make up our experience1 we classify them1 we arrange them in a hierarchical order of relative 8perfection10 of inferiority or superiority1 according to the different grades of reality or perfection which we think we apprehend in them4 ,thus1 we look on living things as a higher1 nobler1 more perfect order of beings than non-living things1 on animal life as a higher form of being than plant life1 on intelligence as higher than instinct1 on will as superior to sense appetite1 on mind or spirit as nobler than matter1 and so on4 ,now all such comparisons involve the apprehension of some standard of value4 ,an estimation of relative values1 or relative grades of perfection in things1 is unintelligible except in reference to some such standard2 it involves of necessity the intuition of such a standard4 ,we feel sure that some at least of our appreciations are unquestionably correct3 that man1 for instance1 is superior to the brute beast1 and the latter superior to the plant2 that the lowest manifestation of life--in the amba1 or whatever monocellular1 microscopic germ may be the lowest--is higher on the scale of being than the highest expression of the mechanical1 chemical and physical forces of the inorganic universe4 ,and if we ask ourselves what is our standard of comparison1 what is our test or measure1 and why are we sure of our application of it in such cases1 our only answer is that our standard of comparison is reality itself1 actual being1 perfection2 that we rely implicitly on our intuition of such actual reality as manifested to us in varying grades or degrees within our experience2 that without claiming to be infallible in our judgments of comparison1 in our classifications of things1 in our appreciations of their relative perfection1 we may justly assume reality itself to be as such intelligible1 and the human mind to be capable of obtaining some true and certain insight into the nature of reality4 #dh4 ,,the ,,good1 ,,the ,,real1 ,,and ,,the ,,actual4--,having compared 8perfection0 with 8goodness0 and with 8being10 let us next compare the two latter notions with each other4 ,we shall see presently that every actual being has its ontological goodness1 that these are in reality identical4 ,but there is a logical distinction between them4 ,in the first place the term 8being0 is applied par excellence to substances rather than to accidents4 ,but we do not commonly speak of an individual substance1 a person or thing1 as good in reference to essential or substantial perfection47#agh7 ,when we describe a man1 or a machine1 as 8good10 we mean that the man possesses those accidental perfections1 those qualities and endowments1 which are suitable to his nature as a man2 that the machine possesses those properties which adapt it to its end4 ,in the second place the notion of being is absolute2 that of the good is relative1 for it implies the notion not of reality simply but of reality as desirable1 agreeable1 suitable1 as perfecting the nature of a subject1 as being the end1 or conducive to the end1 towards which this nature tends4 ,and since what thus perfects must be something not potential but actual1 it follows that1 unlike real truth1 real goodness is identical not with potential1 but only with actual reality4 ,it is not an attribute of the abstract1 possible essence1 but only of the concrete1 actually existing essence47#agi7 ,from the fact that the notion of the good is relative it follows that the same thing can be simultaneously good and bad in different relations3 8,what is one man's meat is another man's poison04 #di4 ,,kinds ,,of ,,goodness2 ,,divisions ,,of ,,the ,,good4--7a7 ,the goodness of a being may be considered in relation to this being itself1 or to other beings4 ,what is good for a being itself1 what makes it intrinsically and formally good1 bonum sibi1 is whatever perfects it1 and in the fullest sense the realization of its end4 ,hence we speak of a virtuous1 upright man1 whose conduct is in keeping with his nature and conducive to the realization of his end1 as a good man4 ,but a being may also be good to others1 bonum alteri1 by an extrinsic1 active1 effective goodness1 inasmuch as by its action it may help other beings in the realization of their ends4 ,in this sense1 a beneficent man1 who wishes the well-being of his fellow-men and helps them to realize this well-being1 is called a good man4 ,this kind of goodness is what is often nowadays styled philanthropy2 in ,christian ethics it is known as charity4 7b7 ,we have described the good as the term or object of natural tendency or appetite4 ,in the domain of beings not endowed with the power of conscious apprehension1 determinism rules this natural tendency2 this latter is always oriented towards the real good3 it never acts amiss3 it is always directed by the ,divine ,wisdom which has given to things their natures4 ,but in the domain of conscious living agents this natural tendency is consequent on apprehension3 it takes the form of instinctive animal appetite or of rational volition4 ,and since this apprehension of the good may be erroneous1 since what is not really good but evil may be apprehended as good1 the appetite or will1 which follows this apprehension--nil volitum nisi praecognitum--may be borne towards evil sub ratione boni4 ,hence the obvious distinction between real good and apparent good--bonum verum and bonum apparens4 7c7 ,in reference to any individual subject--a man1 for instance--it is manifest that other beings can be good for him in so far as any of them can be his end or a means to the attainment of his end4 ,they are called in reference to him objective goods1 and their goodness objective goodness4 ,but it is equally clear that they are good for him only because he can perfect his own nature by somehow identifying or uniting himself with them1 possessing1 using1 or enjoying them4 ,this possession of the objective good constitutes what has been already referred to as formal or subjective goodness47#ahj7 7d7 ,we have likewise already referred to the fact that in beings endowed with consciousness and appetite proper1 whether sentient or rational1 the function of possessing or attaining to what is objectively good1 to what suits and perfects the nature of the subject1 has for its natural concomitant a feeling of pleasure1 satisfaction1 well-being1 delight1 enjoyment4 ,and we have observed that this pleasurable feeling may then become a stimulus to fresh desire1 may indeed be desired for its own sake4 ,now this subjective1 pleasure-giving possession of an objective good has been itself called by scholastics bonum delectabile--delectable or delight-giving good4 ,the objective good itself considered as an end1 and the perfecting of the subject by its attainment1 have been called bonum honestum--good which is really and absolutely such in itself4 ,while if the good in question is really such only when considered as a means to the attainment of an end1 of something that is good in itself1 the former is called bonum utile--useful good47#aha7 ,in this important triple division bonum honestum is used in the wide sense in which it embraces any real good1 whether physical or moral4 ,as applied to man it would therefore embrace whatever perfects his physical life as well as whatever perfects his nature considered as a rational1 and therefore moral1 being4 ,but in common usage it has been restricted to the latter1 and is in this sense synonymous with moral good1 virtue47#ahb7 ,furthermore1 a good which is an end1 and therefore desirable for its own sake1 whether it be physical or moral1 can be at the same time a means to some higher good and desired for the sake of this latter4 ,hence ,st4 ,thomas1 following ,aristotle1 reduces all the moral goods which are desirable in themselves to two kinds3 that which is desirable only for itself1 which is the last end1 final felicity2 and those which1 while good in themselves1 are also conducive to the former1 and these are the virtues47#ahc7 ,when these various kinds of goodness are examined in reference to the nature1 conduct and destiny of man1 they raise a multitude of problems which belong properly to ,ethics and ,natural ,theology4 ,the fact that man has a composite nature which is the seat of various and conflicting tendencies1 of the flesh and of the spirit2 that he perceives in himself a 8double law10 a higher and a lower appetite2 that he is subject to error in his apprehension of the good2 that he apprehends a distinction between pleasure and duty2 that he feels the latter to be the path to ultimate happiness1--all this accentuates the distinction between real and apparent good1 between bonum honestum1 bonum utile1 and bonum delectabile4 ,the existence of ,god is established in ,natural ,theology2 and in ,ethics1 aided by ,psychology1 it is proved that no finite good can be the last end of man1 that ,god1 the ,supreme1 ,infinite ,good1 is his last end1 and that only in the possession of ,god by knowledge and love can man find his complete and final felicity4 #ej4 ,,goodness ,a ,,transcendental ,,attribute ,,of ,,being4--,we have shown that there is a logical distinction between the concept of 8goodness0 and that of 8being04 ,we have now to show that the distinction is not real1 in other words1 that goodness is a transcendental attribute of all actual reality1 that all being1 in so far forth as it is actual1 has goodness--transcendental or ontological goodness in the sense of appetibility1 desirability1 suitability1 as already explained4 ,when the thesis is formulated in the traditional scholastic statement1 8,omne ens est bonum3 ,all being is good0 it sounds a startling paradox4 ,surely it cannot be contended that everything is good8 ,a cancer in the stomach is not good2 lies are not good2 yet these are actual realities2 cancers exist and lies are told2 therefore not every reality is good4 ,this is unquestionably true4 ,but it does not contradict the thesis rightly understood4 ,the true meaning of the thesis is1 not that every being is good in all respects1 or possesses such goodness as would justify us in describing it as 8good0 in the ordinary sense1 but that every being possesses some goodness3 every being in so far as it has actuality has formal1 intrinsic goodness1 or is1 in other words1 the term or object of natural tendency or desire4 ,this goodness1 which we predicate of any and every actual being1 may be 7#a7 the term of the natural tendency or appetite of that being itself1 bonum sibi1 or 7#b7 it may be conceivably the term of the appetite of some other being1 bonum alteri4 ,let us see whether it can be shown that every actual being has goodness in one or both of these senses4 7#a7 ,bonum sibi4--,is there any intelligible sense in which it can be said that the actuality of any and every existing being is good for that being--bonum sibi8 ,there is4 ,for if we recognize in every such being1 as we must1 a nature1 a potentiality of further actualization1 a tendency towards a state of fuller actuality which is its end2 and if1 furthermore1 we recognize that every such being at any instant not merely is or exists1 but is becoming or changing1 and thereby tending effectively towards its end2 we must admit not merely that the full attainment of its end 7its integral or final perfection7 is 8desired0 by1 and 8perfects10 and is 8good0 for1 that being's nature2 but also that the partial realization of its end1 or1 in other words1 the actuality it has at any instant in its changing condition of existence 7its accidental or intermediate perfection7 is similarly 8good0 for it2 and even that its actual existence as compared with its mere possibility 7its first or essential perfection7 is 8desirable0 and 8good0 for its nature4 ,actually existing beings are intelligible only because they exist for some end or purpose1 which1 by their very existence1 activities1 operations1 conduct1 they tend to realize4 ,if this be admitted we cannot deny that the full attainment of this end or purpose is 8good0 for them--suitable1 desirable1 agreeable1 perfecting them4 ,in so far as they fail in this purpose they are wanting in goodness1 they are bad1 evil4 ,for the realization of their end their natures are endowed with appropriate powers1 faculties1 forces1 by the normal functioning of which they gradually develop and grow in actuality4 ,no real being is by nature inert or aimless2 no real being is without its connatural faculties1 forces and functions4 ,but the natural result of all operation1 of all action and interaction among things1 is actualization of the potential1 amelioration1 development1 growth in perfection and goodness by gradual realization of ends4 ,if by accident any of these powers is wanting1 or acts amiss by failing to contribute its due perfection to the nature1 there is in the being a proportionate want of goodness--it is so far bad1 evil4 ,but1 even so1 the nature of the thing preserves its fundamental orientation towards its end1 towards the perfection natural to it1 and struggles as it were against the evil--tries to make good the deficiency4 ,a cancer in the stomach is never good for the stomach1 or for the living subject of which the stomach is an organ4 ,for the living being the cancer is an evil1 a failure of one of the organs to discharge its functions normally1 an absence of a good1 viz4 the healthy functioning of an organ4 ,but the cancerous growth1 considered in itself and for itself1 biologically and chemically1 has its own nature1 purpose1 tendencies1 laws2 nor can we deny that its development according to these laws is 8good0 for its specific nature17#ahd7 bonum sibi4 ,it may be asked how can the first or essential perfection of an existing substance1 which is nothing else than the actual existence of the nature itself1 be conceived as 8good0 for this nature8 ,it is so inasmuch as the actual existence of the substance is the first stage in the process by which the nature tends towards its end2 an existing nature desires and tends towards the conservation of its own being27#ahe7 hence the saying1 8,self-preservation is the first law of nature02 and hence1 too1 the scholastic aphorism1 8,melius est esse quam non esse04 ,the argument just outlined tends to show that every nature of which we can have direct experience1 or in other words every finite1 contingent nature1 is bonum sibi1 formally and intrinsically good for itself4 ,it is1 of course1 equally applicable to the ,uncreated1 ,necessary ,being ,himself4 ,the ,infinite ,actuality of the ,divine ,nature is essentially the term and end of the ,divine ,love4 ,therefore every actual being has intrinsic1 formal goodness1 whereby it is bonum sibi1 i4e4 its actuality is1 in regard to its nature1 really an object of tendency1 desire1 appetite1 a something that really suits and perfects this nature4 ,thus understood1 the thesis formulates no mere tautology4 ,it makes a real assertion about real being2 nor can the truth of this assertion be proved otherwise than by an argument based1 as ours is1 on the recognition of purpose1 of final causality1 of adaptation of means to ends1 in the actual universe of our experience4 ,notwithstanding all that has been said1 it may still be asked why should those individual beings1 whose existence we have claimed to be good for them1 exist at all4 ,it will be objected that there exist multitudes of beings whose existence is manifestly not good for them4 ,take1 for instance1 the case of the reprobate4 ,if they wish their total annihilation1 if they desire the total cessation of their being1 rather than an existence of eternal punishment1 they undoubtedly wish it as a good4 ,is annihilation or absolute non-existence really a good for them8 ,de facto it is for them1 considered in their actual condition which is accidental to their nature4 ,christ said of the scandal-giver what is surely true of the reprobate3 8,it were better for that man had he never been born04 ,we may admit1 therefore1 that for the reprobate themselves simple non-existence is more desirable1 and better1 than their actual concrete state of existence as reprobate3 because simple non-existence is for them the simple negation of their reality1 whereas the absolute and irreparable loss of their last end1 the total frustration of the purpose for which they came into being1 is for them the greatest conceivable privation4 ,but this condition of the reprobate is accidental to their nature1 alien to the purpose of their being1 a self-incurred failure1 a deliberate thwarting of their natural tendency4 ,it remains true1 therefore1 that their nature is good though incapable of progress1 its purpose is good though frustrated4 ,in so far as they have actual reality they have 8essential0 goodness4 ,their natures still tend towards self-conservation and the realization of their end4 ,they form no real exception to the general truth that 8it is better to be than not to be3 melius est esse quam non esse04 ,it is not annihilation as such that is desired by them1 but only as a less evil alternative than the eternal privation of their last end47#ahf7 ,if the evils accidentally and actually attaching to a certain state of existence make the continuance of this state undesirable for a being1 it by no means follows that the continuance of this being in existence1 simply and in itself1 is less desirable than non-existence4 7#b7 ,,bonum ,,alteri4--,even1 however1 if it were granted that the actual existence of some beings is not good for themselves1 might it not nevertheless be good for other beings1 and in relation to the general scheme of things8 ,is there not an intelligible sense in which every actual being is bonum alteri1 good for other things8 ,here again the same experience of actual reality1 which teaches us that each individual being has a nature whereby it tends to its own good as a particular end1 also teaches us that in the general scheme of reality things are helpful to one another1 nay1 are intended by their interaction and co-operation with one another to subserve the wider end which is the good of the whole system of reality4 ,there is little use in puzzling1 as people sometimes do1 over the raison d'tre of individual things or classes of things in human experience1 over the good or the evil of the existence of these things1 over the question whether or not it would be better that these things should never have existed1 until we have consulted not any isolated portion of human experience but this experience as a whole4 ,in this we can find sufficient evidence for the prevalence of a beneficent purpose everywhere4 ,not that we can read this purpose in every detail of reality4 ,even when we have convinced ourselves that all creation is the work of a ,supreme ,being who is ,infinite ,goodness ,itself1 we cannot gain that full insight into the secret designs of ,his ,providence1 which would be needed in order to 8justify ,his ways0 in all things4 ,but when we have convinced ourselves that the created universe exists because ,god wills it1 we can understand that every actual reality in it must be 8good10 as being an object or term of the ,divine ,will4 ,every created reality is thus bonum alteri inasmuch as it is good for ,god1 not1 of course1 in the impossible sense of perfecting ,him1 but as an imitation and expression of the ,goodness of the ,divine ,nature ,itself4 ,the experience which enables us to reach a knowledge of the existence and nature of ,god1 the ,creator1 ,conserver1 and ,providence of the actual universe1 also teaches us that this universe can have no other ultimate end or good than ,god ,himself1 i4e4 ,god's will to manifest ,his goodness by the extrinsic glory which consists in the knowledge and love of ,him by ,his rational creatures4 ,the omnipotence of the ,creator1 ,his freedom in creating1 and our knowledge of the universe ,he has actually chosen to create from among indefinite possible worlds1 all alike convince us that the actual world is neither the best possible nor the worst possible1 absolutely speaking4 ,but our knowledge of ,his wisdom and power also convinces us that for the purpose of manifesting ,his glory in the measure and degree in which ,he has actually chosen to manifest it by creating the existing universe1 and relatively to the attainment of this specific purpose1 the existing universe is the best possible4 #ea4 ,,optimism ,,and ,,pessimism4--,those few outlines of the philosophy of theism--theses established in ,natural ,theology--will reveal to us the place of theism in relation to 8optimist0 and 8pessimist0 systems of philosophy4 ,pessimism1 as an outcome of philosophical speculation1 is the proclamation in some form or other of the conviction that human existence1 nay1 existence in general1 is a failure1 an evil4 ,it is the analogue1 in relation to will1 of what scepticism is in relation to intellect2 and it is no less self-contradictory than the latter4 ,while the latter points to total paralysis of thought1 the former involves a like paralysis of all will1 all effort1 all purpose in existence--a philosophy of despair1 despondency1 gloom4 ,both are equally erroneous1 equally indicative of philosophical failure1 equally repugnant to the normal1 healthy mind4 ,optimism on the other hand is expressive of the conviction that good predominates in all existence3 melius est esse quam non esse2 that at the root of all reality there is a beneficent purpose which is ever being realized2 that there is in things not merely a truth that can be known but a goodness that can be loved4 ,existence is not an evil1 life is not a failure4 ,this is a philosophy of hope1 buoyancy1 effort and attainment4 ,but is it true1 or is it an empty illusion8 ,well1 to maintain that the actual universe is the best absolutely1 would1 of course1 be absurd4 ,if ,leibniz's 8,principle of ,sufficient ,reason0 obliged him to contend1 in face of the painfully palpable facts of physical and moral evil in the universe1 that this universe is the best absolutely possible1 the best that ,god could create1 we can only say3 so much the worse for his 8,principle04 ,the true optimism is that of the theist who1 admitting the prevalence of evil in the universe1 in the sense to be explained presently1 at the same time holds that throughout creation the good predominates1 that ,god's beneficent purpose in regard to individuals does in the main prevail1 and that ,his glory is manifested in giving to rational creatures the perfection and felicity of knowing and loving ,himself4 ,for the theist1 then1 the problem of the existence of evil in the universe assumes the general form of reconciling the fact of evil in ,god's creation with the fact of ,god's infinite power and goodness4 ,this is a problem for ,natural ,theology4 ,here we have merely to indicate some general principles arising from the consideration of evil as the correlative and antithesis of goodness4 #eb4 ,,evil3 ,,its ,,nature ,,and ,,causes4 ,,manicheism4--,admitting the existence of evil in the universe1 the scholastic apparently withdraws the admission forthwith by denying the reality of evil4 ,the paradox explains itself by comparing the notions of good and evil1 and thus trying to arrive at a proper conception of the latter4 ,if ontological goodness is really identical with actual being1 if being is good in so far as it is actual1 then it would appear that ontological evil must be identical with non-being1 nothingness4 ,and so it is1 in the sense that no evil is a positive1 actual reality1 that all evil is an absence of reality4 ,but just as the good1 though really identical with the actual1 is nevertheless logically distinct from the latter1 so is evil logically distinct from nothingness1 or the absence of reality4 ,as we have seen1 the good is that which perfects a nature1 that which is due to a nature as the realization of the end of the latter4 ,so1 too1 is evil the privation of any perfection due to a nature1 the absence of something positive and something which ought to be present4 ,evil1 therefore1 is not a mere negation or absence of being2 it is the absence of a good1 or in other words the absence of a reality that should be present4 ,all privation is negation1 but not vice versa2 for privation is the negation of something due3 the absence of virtue is a mere negation in an animal1 in man it is a privation4 ,hence the commonly accepted definition of evil3 ,malum est privatio boni debiti3 ,evil is the privation of the goodness due to a thing47#ahg7 ,evil is always1 therefore1 a defect1 a deficiency4 ,the notion of evil is a relative1 not an absolute notion4 ,as goodness is the right relation of a nature to its proper end1 so is evil a failure1 a defect in this relation3 ,malum est privatio ordinis ad finem debitum47#ahh7 ,the very finiteness of a finite being is the absence of further reality in this being2 but as this further reality is not due to such a being1 its absence1 which has sometimes been improperly described as 8metaphysical evil10 is not rightly regarded as evil at all3 except1 indeed1 we were to conceive it as happening to the ,infinite ,being ,himself1 which would be a contradiction in thought4 ,evil1 then1 in its formal concept is nothing positive2 it is essentially negative1 or rather privative4 ,for this very reason1 when we consider evil in the concrete1 i4e4 as affecting actual things1 as occurring in the actual universe--we can scarcely speak of it with propriety as 8existing10--we see that it essentially involves some positive1 real subject which it affects1 some nature which1 by affecting1 it renders so far evil4 ,cancer in the stomach is a real evil of the stomach1 a defect1 a deficiency1 a failure1 in the adaptation of the stomach to its proper end4 ,it is not itself a positive1 absolute1 evil entity4 ,in so far as it is itself a positive1 physical reality1 a growth of living cells1 it has its own nature1 its natural tendency1 its development towards an end in accordance with biological laws3 in all of which it verifies the definition of ontological goodness4 ,but the existence of such a growth in the stomach is pathological1 i4e4 a disease of the stomach1 a prevention of the natural1 normal function of the stomach1 a failure of the latter's adaptation to its end1 and hence an evil for the stomach4 ,lying1 too1 is an evil1 a moral evil of man as a moral subject4 ,but this does not mean that the whole physical process of thinking1 judging1 speaking1 whereby a man lies1 is itself a positive evil entity4 ,the thinking is itself good as a physical act4 ,so is the speaking in itself good as a physical act4 ,whatever of positive reality there is in the whole process is good1 ontologically good4 ,but there is a want of conformity of the language with the thought1 entailing a privation or failure of adaptation of the man as a moral subject with his end1 with his real good2 and in this failure of adaptation1 this privation of goodness1 lies the moral evil of lying4 ,evil1 then1 has a material or subjective cause1 viz4 some positive1 actual reality1 which is good in so far forth as it is actual1 but which is evil1 or wanting in something due to it1 in so far as the privation which we have called evil affects it4 ,but evil has no formal cause3 formally it is not a reality but a privation3 8evil has no formal cause1 but is rather the privation of a form047#ahi7 ,nor has evil any final cause1 for it consists precisely in the failure of a being's natural tendency towards its end1 in the want of adaptation of a nature to its end3 8nor has evil a final cause1 but is rather the privation of a being's due relation to its natural end047#aij7 ,evil cannot be the natural result of a being's tendency towards its end1 or a means to the attainment of this end4 ,for that which is really an end must be good1 and a means derives its goodness from the end to which it is a means4 ,the good1 because it is an end1 or a means to an end1 is desirable2 and so1 too1 might evil be defined a posteriori as that which is the object of no natural tendency or desire1 that from which all things are averse3 malum est quod nullum ens appetit1 vel a quo omnia aversantur4 ,nor can evil be itself an end1 or be as such desired or desirable4 ,real evil is no doubt often sought and desired by conscious beings1 sometimes physical evil1 sometimes moral evil4 ,but it is always desired and embraced as a good1 sub specie boni1 i4e4 when apprehended as here and now good in the sense of gratifying1 pleasure-giving1 bonum delectabile4 ,this is possible because pleasure1 especially organic1 sensible pleasure1 as distinct from the state of real well-being which characterizes true happiness1 is not the exclusive concomitant of seeking and possessing a real good3 it often accompanies the seeking and possessing of a merely apparent good3 and in such cases it is itself a merely apparent good1 and in reality evil4 ,the unfortunate man who commits suicide does not embrace evil as such4 ,he wrongly judges death to be good1 as being in his view a lesser evil than the miseries of his existence1 and under this aspect of goodness he embraces death4 ,finally we have to inquire whether evil has an efficient cause4 ,seeing that it is not merely a logical figment1 seeing that it really affects actual things1 that it really occurs in the actual universe1 it must have a real source among the efficient causes of these actual things that make up the universe4 ,it is undoubtedly due to the action of efficient causes1 i4e4 to the failure1 the defective action1 of efficient causes4 ,but being itself something negative1 a privation1 it cannot properly be said to have an 8efficient0 cause2 for the influence of an efficient cause is positive action1 which in turn must have for its term something positive1 something real1 and therefore good4 ,hence ,st4 ,augustine very properly says that evil should be described as having a 8deficient0 cause rather than an 8efficient0 cause47#aia7 ,in other words1 evil is not the direct1 natural or normal result of the activity of efficient causes2 for this result is always good4 ,it must therefore be always an indirect1 abnormal1 accidental consequence of their activity4 ,let us see how this can be--firstly in regard to physical evil1 then in regard to moral evil4 ,in the action of physical causes we may distinguish between the operative agencies themselves and the subjects in which the effects of these operations are produced4 ,sometimes the effect is wanting in due perfection1 or is in other words imperfect1 physically evil1 because of some defect in the agencies3 the statue may be defective because the sculptor is unskilled1 or his instruments bad2 offspring may be weak or malformed owing to some congenital or accidental weakness or unfitness in the parents4 ,sometimes the evil in the effect is traceable not to the agents but to the materials on which they have to work3 the sculptor and his instruments may be perfect1 but if there be a flaw in the marble the statue will be a failure2 the educator may be efficient1 but if the pupil be wanting in aptitude or application the results cannot be 8good04 ,all this1 however1 does not carry us very far1 for we must still inquire why are the agencies1 or the materials1 themselves defective4 ,moreover1 physical evil sometimes occurs without any defect either in the agencies or in the materials4 ,the effect produced may be incompatible with some minor perfection already in the subject2 it can then be produced only at the sacrifice of this minor perfection3 which sacrifice is for the subject pro tanto an evil4 ,it is in the natural order of things that the production of a new 8form0 or perfection excludes the actuality of a pre-existing form or perfection4 ,all nature is subject to change1 and we have seen that all change is ruled by the law3 ,generatio unius est corruptio alterius4 ,it might perhaps be said that this privation or supplanting of perfections in things by the actualization in these things of incompatible perfections1 is inherent in the nature of things and essential to their finiteness--at least1 if we regard the things not individually but as parts of a whole1 as members of a system1 as subserving a general scheme2--and that therefore such privation should not be regarded as physical evil proper1 but rather as 8metaphysical0 evil1 improperly so called4 ,however we regard it1 it can have no other first source than the ,will of the ,creator decreeing the actual order of the existing universe4 ,and the same must be said of the physical evils proper that are incident to the actual order of things4 ,these evils are 8accidental0 when considered in relation to the individual natures of the created agencies and materials4 ,they are defects or failures of natural tendencies3 were these natural tendencies always realized there would be no such evils4 ,but they are not realized2 and their 8failure0 or 8evil0 is not 8accidental0 in regard to ,god2 for ,god has willed and created these agencies with natural tendencies which ,he has destined to be fulfilled not always and in every detail1 but in such measure as will secure the actual order of the universe and show forth ,his perfections in the finite degree in which ,he has freely chosen to manifest these perfections4 ,the world ,he has chosen to create is not the best absolutely possible3 there are physical evils in it2 but it is the best for the exact purpose for which ,he created it4 ,there is also moral evil in the universe4 ,in comparison with moral evil1 the physical defects in ,god's creation--physical pain and suffering1 material privations and hardships1 decay and death of living things--are not properly evils at all4 ,at least they are not evils in the same profound sense as the deliberate turning away of the moral agent from ,god1 his ,last ,end and ,ultimate ,good1 is an evil4 ,for the physical evils incident to individual beings in the universe can be not only foreseen by ,god but accepted and approved1 so to speak1 by ,his ,will1 as subserving the realization of the total physical good which ,he wills in the universe2 and as subordinate to1 and instrumental in the realization of1 the moral good of mankind3 for it is obvious that in the all-wise designs of ,providence physical evils such as pain1 suffering1 poverty1 hunger1 etc41 may be the means of realizing moral goodness4 ,but moral evil1 on the contrary1 or1 in the language of ,christian ethics1 ,sin--the conscious and deliberate rejection1 by the free agent1 of ,god who is his true good--though necessarily foreseen by ,god in the universe ,he has actually chosen to create1 and therefore necessarily permitted by the ,will of ,god consequently on this foresight1 cannot have been and cannot be intended or approved by ,him4 ,having created man an intelligent and free being1 ,god could not will or decree the revolt of the latter from ,himself4 ,he loves essentially ,his own ,infinite ,goodness3 were ,he to identify ,his ,will with that of the sinning creature ,he would at the same time be turning away from ,his ,goodness3 which is a contradiction in terms4 ,god1 therefore1 does not will moral evil4 ,nevertheless ,he permits it3 otherwise it would not occur1 for nothing can happen 8against ,his will04 ,he has permitted it by freely choosing to create this actual universe of rational and free creatures1 foreseeing that they would sin4 ,he could have created instead a universe of such beings1 in which there would be no moral evil3 for ,he is omnipotent4 ,into the secrets of ,his election it is not given to finite minds to penetrate4 ,acknowledging ,his ,infinite ,power1 ,wisdom and ,goodness1 realizing at the same time the finiteness of our faculties1 we see how rational it is to bow down our minds with ,st4 ,paul and to exclaim in admiration3 8,o1 the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of ,god6 ,how incomprehensible are ,his judgments1 and how unsearchable ,his ways607#aib7 ,if it be objected that ,god's permission of moral evil in the universe is really the cause of this evil1 and makes ,god ,himself responsible for sin and its consequences1 a satisfactory answer is not far to seek4 ,it is absolutely incompatible with ,god's ,infinite ,sanctity that ,he be responsible for sin and its consequences4 ,for these the free will of the creature is alone responsible4 ,the creation of intelligent beings1 endowed with the power freely to love1 honour and serve ,god1 is the most marvellous of all ,god's works4 ,free will is the noblest endowment of a creature of ,god1 as it is also the most mysterious4 ,man1 who by his intelligence has the power to know ,god as his ,supreme ,good1 has by his will the power freely to tend towards ,god and attain to the possession of ,god as his ,last ,end4 ,in so far as man sins1 i4e4 knowingly1 deliberately1 and freely violates the tendency of his nature towards ,god by turning away from ,him1 he and he alone is responsible for the consequences1 because he has the power to accomplish what he knows to be ,god's design in his regard1 and to be his true destiny and path to happiness--viz4 that he tend towards union with ,god and the possession of ,god--and he deliberately fails to make use of this power4 ,such failure and its consequences are1 therefore1 his own2 they leave absolutely untouched and unassailed the ,infinite ,goodness and ,benevolence of ,god's eternal design in his regard4 ,in scholastic form1 the objection is proposed and answered in this way3 8,the cause of a cause is the cause of the latter's effects2 but ,god is the cause of man1 and sin is the latter's effect2 therefore ,god is the cause of sin04 8,that the cause of a non-free cause is the cause of the latter's effects1 we admit4 ,that the cause of a free cause is the cause of the latter's effects1 at least in the sense of permitting1 without intending and being thereby responsible for them1 we also admit2 always in the sense of intending and being responsible for them1 we deny4 ,the positive effects of a created free cause1 those which the latter by nature is intended to produce1 are attributable to the first cause or creator of the free cause1 and the first cause is responsible for them4 ,the failures of the created free cause to produce its natural and intended effects1 are not due to the first cause2 they are not intended by1 nor attributable to1 the first cause2 nor is the latter responsible for them3 they are failures of the free cause1 and of him alone2 though they are of course foreseen and permitted by the first cause or creator of the latter4 ,the minor premiss of the objection we may admit--noting1 however1 that sin is not properly called an effect1 but rather1 like all evil1 a failure of some cause to produce its connatural effect3 it is a defect1 a deficiency1 a privation of some effect1 of some positive perfection1 which the cause ought naturally to have produced4 ,the conclusion of the objection we distinguish1 according to our analysis of the major premiss3 ,god is the cause of sin in the proper sense of intending it1 willing it1 and producing it positively1 and being thereby responsible for it1 we deny2 ,god is the cause of sin in the improper sense of merely foreseeing and permitting it as incidental to the universe ,he has actually willed and decreed to create1 as occurring in this universe by the deliberate failure of free creatures to conform themselves to ,his primary benevolent intention in their regard1 we may grant4 ,and this ,divine permission of moral evil cannot be shown to be incompatible with any attribute of the ,divinity40 ,in the preceding paragraphs we have barely outlined the principles on which the philosophy of theism meets the problem of evil in the universe4 ,we have made assumptions which it is the proper province of ,natural ,theology to establish1 and to that department also we must refer the student for a fuller treatment of the whole problem4 ,it has been sometimes said that the fact of evil in the universe is one of the greatest difficulties against the philosophy of ,theism4 ,if this be taken as an insinuation that the fact of evil can be better explained--or even as well explained--on the assumptions of ,pantheism1 ,monism1 ,manicheism1 or any other philosophy besides ,theism1 it is false4 ,if it means simply that in accounting for evil--whether on principles of ,theism or of any other philosophy--we are forced to raise some ultimate questions in the face of which we must admit that we have come upon depths of mystery which the plummet of our finite intellects cannot hope to fathom1 in this sense indeed the assertion may be admitted4 ,as we have already hinted1 even with the light of the ,christian ,revelation to aid the natural light of reason1 there are questions about the existence and causes of evil which we may indeed ask1 but which we cannot adequately answer4 ,and obviously this is no reflection on ,theism2 while in the latter system we have a more intelligible and more satisfactory analysis of the problem than in any other philosophy4 ,among the ancient ,greek philosophers we find 8matter0 77 identified with 8vacuum0 or 8empty space0 7 7 and this again with 8nothingness0 or non-being 7 74 ,now the concept of evil is the concept of something negative--a privation of goodness1 of being or reality4 ,thus the notion of evil came to be associated with the notion of matter4 ,but the latter notion is not really negative3 it is that of a formless1 chaotic1 disorderly material4 ,when1 therefore1 the ,manicheans attributed a positive reality to evil--conceiving it as the principle of all disorder1 strife1 discord--they naturally regarded all matter as the expression of the ,evil ,principle1 in opposition to soul or spirit as the expression of the ,good ,principle4 ,the ,manichean philosophy of ,evil1 a product of the early ,christian centuries1 has been perhaps the most notable alternative or rival system encountered by the theistic philosophy of ,evil2 for1 notwithstanding the fantastic character of its conceptions ,manicheism has reappeared and reasserted itself repeatedly in after ages1 notably in the ,middle ,ages4 ,its prevalence has probably been due partly to the concreteness of its conceptions and partly to a certain analogy which they bear towards the conception of ,satan and the fallen angels in ,christian theology4 ,in both cases there is the idea of conflict1 strife1 active and irreconcilable opposition1 between the powers of good and the powers of evil4 ,but there the analogy ends4 ,while in ,christian theology the powers of evil are presented as essentially subject to the ,divine ,omnipotence1 in ,manicheism the ,evil ,principle1 the ,summum ,malum1 is presented as a supreme1 self-existent principle1 essentially independent of1 as well as antagonistic to1 the ,divine ,being1 the ,summum ,bonum4 ,since there is evil in the world1 and since good cannot be the cause of evil--so the ,manicheans argue--there must be an essentially ,evil ,first ,principle which is the primary source of all the evil in the universe1 just as there is an essentially ,good ,first ,principle which is the source of all its good4 ,everything in the world--and especially man himself1 composed of matter and spirit--is the expression and the theatre of the essential conflict which is being ever waged between the ,good and the ,evil ,principle4 ,everywhere throughout the universe we find this dualism3 between spirit and matter1 light and darkness1 order and disorder1 etc4 ,from all that has been said in the preceding paragraphs regarding the nature and causes of good and evil the errors of the ,manichean system will be apparent4 ,its fundamental error is the conception of evil as a positive entity4 ,evil is not a positive entity but a privation4 ,and this being so1 its occurrence does not demand a positive efficient cause4 ,it can be explained and accounted for by deficiency or failure in causes that are good in so far forth as they are operative1 but which have not all the goodness their nature demands4 ,and we have seen how this failure of created causes is permitted by the ,first ,cause1 and is not incompatible with ,his ,infinite ,goodness4 ,besides1 the ,manichean conception of an intrinsically evil cause1 a cause that could produce only evil1 is a contradiction in terms4 ,the operation of an efficient cause must have a positive term3 in so far as the term is positive it is good3 and therefore its cause cannot have been totally evil1 but must have been in some degree good4 ,the crucial point in the whole debate is this1 that we cannot conceive evil as a positive entity4 ,by doing so we render reality unintelligible2 we destroy the fundamental ground of any possible distinction between good and evil1 thus rendering both alike inconceivable4 ,each is correlative to the other2 we cannot understand the one without the other4 ,if1 therefore1 goodness is an aspect of real being1 and identical with reality1 evil must be a negation of reality1 and cannot be made intelligible otherwise4 ,finally1 the ,manichean conception of two ,supreme1 ,self-,existent1 ,independent ,first ,principles is obviously self-contradictory4 ,as is shown in ,natural ,theology1 ,being that is absolutely ,supreme1 ,self-,existent and ,necessary1 must by ,its very nature be unique3 there could not be two such ,beings4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,reality ,,and ,,the ,,beautiful4 #ec4 ,,the ,,concept ,,of ,,the ,,beautiful ,,from ,,the ,,standpoint ,,of ,,experience4--,truth and ,goodness characterize reality as related to intellect and to will4 ,intimately connected with these notions is that of the beautiful17#aic7 which we must now briefly analyse4 ,the fine arts have for their common object the expression of the beautiful2 and the department of philosophy which studies these1 the philosophy of the beautiful1 is generally described as ,esthetics47#aid7 ,like the terms 8true0 and 8good10 the term 8beautiful0 72 pulchrum1 beau1 schn1 etc47 is familiar to all4 ,to reach a definition of it let us question experience4 ,what do men commonly mean when1 face to face with some object or event1 they say 8,that is beautiful08 ,they give expression to this sentiment in the presence of a natural object such as a landscape revealing mountain and valley1 lake and river and plain and woodland1 glowing in the golden glow of the setting sun2 or in contemplating some work of art--painting1 sculpture1 architecture1 music3 the ,sistine ,madonna1 the ,moses of ,michael ,angelo1 the ,cathedral of ,notre ,dame1 a symphony of ,beethoven2 or some literary masterpiece3 ,shakespeare's ,macbeth1 or ,dante's ,divina ,commedia1 or ,newman's ,apologia1 or ,kickham's ,knocknagow4 ,there are other things the sight of which arouses no such sentiment1 but leaves us indifferent2 and others again1 the sight of which arouses a contrary sentiment1 to which we give expression by designating them as 8commonplace10 8vulgar10 8ugly04 ,the sentiment in question is one of pleasure and approval1 or of displeasure and disapproval4 ,hence the first fact to note is that the beautiful pleases us1 affects us agreeably1 while the commonplace or the ugly leaves us indifferent or displeases us1 affects us disagreeably4 ,but the good pleases us and affects us agreeably4 ,is the beautiful1 then1 identical with the good8 ,no2 the really beautiful is indeed always good2 but not everything that is good is beautiful2 nor is the pleasure aroused by the good identical with that aroused by the beautiful4 ,whatever gratifies the lower sense appetites and causes organic pleasure is good--bonum delectabile--but is not deemed beautiful4 ,eating and drinking1 resting and sleeping1 indulging the senses of touch1 taste and smell1 are indeed pleasure-giving1 but they have no association with the beautiful4 ,again1 the deformed child may be the object of the mother's special love4 ,but the pleasure thus derived from the good1 as the object of appetite1 desire1 delight1 is not esthetic pleasure4 ,if we examine the latter1 the pleasure caused by the beautiful1 we shall find that it is invariably a pleasure peculiar to knowledge1 to apprehension1 perception1 imagination1 contemplation4 ,hence in the domain of the senses we designate as 8beautiful0 only what can be apprehended by the two higher senses1 seeing and hearing1 which approximate most closely to intellect1 and which1 through the imagination1 furnish data for contemplation to the intellect47#aie7 ,this brings us to ,st4 ,thomas's definition3 ,pulchra sunt qu visa placent3 those things are beautiful whose vision pleases us1--where vision is to be understood in the wide sense of apprehension1 contemplation47#aif7 ,the owner of a beautiful demesne1 or of an art treasure1 may derive pleasure from his sense of proprietorship2 but this is distinct from the esthetic pleasure that may be derived by others1 no less than by himself1 from the mere contemplation of those objects4 ,esthetic pleasure is disinterested3 it springs from the mere contemplation of an object as beautiful2 whereas the pleasure that springs from the object as good is an interested pleasure1 a pleasure of possession4 ,no doubt the beautiful is really identical with the good1 though logically distinct from the latter47#aig7 ,the orderliness which we shall see to be the chief objective factor of beauty1 is itself a perfection of the object1 and as such is good and desirable4 ,hence the beautiful can be an object of interested desire1 but only under the aspect of goodness4 ,under the aspect of beauty the object can excite only the disinterested esthetic pleasure of contemplation4 ,but if esthetic pleasure is derived from contemplation1 is not this identifying the beautiful with the true1 and supplanting art by science8 ,again the consequence is inadmissible2 for not every pleasure peculiar to knowledge is esthetic4 ,there is a pleasure in seeking and discovering truth1 the pleasure which gratifies the scholar and the scientist3 the pleasure of the philologist in tracing roots and paradigms1 of the chemist in analysing unsavoury materials1 of the anatomist in exploring the structure of organisms post mortem4 ,but these things are not 8beautiful04 ,the really beautiful is indeed always true1 but it cannot well be maintained that all truths are beautiful4 ,that two and two are four is a truth1 but in what intelligible sense could it be said to be beautiful8 ,but besides the scientific pleasure of seeking and discovering truth1 there is the pleasure which comes from contemplating the object known4 ,the aim of the scientist or scholar is to discover truth2 that of the artist is1 through knowledge to derive complacency from contemplating the thing known4 ,the scientist or scholar may be also an artist1 or vice versa2 but the scientist's pleasure proper lies exclusively in discovering truth1 whereas that of the artist lies in contemplating something apprehended1 imagined1 conceived4 ,the artist is not concerned as to whether what he apprehends is real or imaginary1 certain or conjectural1 but only as to whether or how far the contemplation of it will arouse emotions of pleasure1 admiration1 enthusiasm2 while the scientist's supreme concern is to know things1 to see them as they are4 ,the beautiful1 then1 is always true1 either as actual or as ideal2 but the true is beautiful only when it so reveals itself as to arouse in us the desire to see or hear it1 to consider it1 to dwell and rest in the contemplation of it4 ,let us accept1 then1 the a posteriori definition of the beautiful as that which it is pleasing to contemplate2 and before inquiring what precisely is it1 on the side of the object1 that makes the latter agreeable to contemplate1 let us examine the subjective factors and conditions of esthetic experience4 #ed4 ,,the ,,esthetic ,,sentiment4 ,,apprehension ,,of ,,the ,,beautiful4--,we have seen that both the appetitive and the cognitive faculties are involved in the experience of the beautiful4 ,contemplation implies cognition2 while the feeling of pleasure1 complacency1 satisfaction1 delight1 indicates the operation of appetite or will4 ,now the notion of the beautiful1 like all our notions1 has its origin in sense experience2 but it is itself suprasensible for it is reached by abstraction1 and this is above the power of sense faculties4 ,while the senses and imagination apprehend beautiful objects the intellect attains to that which makes these objects beautiful1 to the ratio pulchri that is in them4 ,no doubt1 the perception or imagination of beautiful things1 in nature or in art1 produces as its natural concomitant1 a feeling of sensible pleasure4 ,to hear sweet music1 to gaze on the brilliant variety of colours in a gorgeous pageant1 to inhale delicious perfumes1 to taste savoury dishes--all such experiences gratify the senses4 ,but the feeling of such sensible pleasure is quite distinct from the esthetic enjoyment which accompanies the apprehension of the beautiful2 though it is very often confounded with the latter4 ,such sentient states of agreeable feeling are mainly passive1 organic1 physiological2 while esthetic enjoyment1 the appreciation of the beautiful1 is eminently active4 ,it implies the operation of a suprasensible faculty1 the intelligence2 it accompanies the reaction of the latter faculty to some appropriate objective stimulus of the suprasensible1 intelligible order1 to some 8idea0 embodied in the object of sense47#aih7 ,the error of confounding esthetic enjoyment with mere organic sense pleasure is characteristic of all sensist and materialist philosophies4 ,a feeling of sensible gratification always1 no doubt1 accompanies our apprehension and enjoyment of the beautiful2 for just as man is not a merely sentient being so neither is he a pure intelligence4 ,beauty reaches him through the senses2 in order that an object be beautiful for him1 in order that the contemplation of it may please him1 it must be in harmony with his whole human nature1 which is both sentient and intelligent2 it must1 therefore1 be agreeable to the senses and imagination as well as to the intellect4 8,there is no painting10 writes ,m4 ,brunetire17#aii7 8but should be above all a joy to the eye6 no music but should be a delight for the ear60 ,otherwise we shall not apprehend in it the order1 perfection1 harmony1 adaptation to human nature1 whereby we pronounce an object beautiful and rejoice in the contemplation of it4 ,and it is this intellectual activity that is properly esthetic4 8,what makes us consider a colour beautiful10 writes ,bossuet17#bjj7 is the secret judgment we pronounce upon its adaptation to the eye which it pleases4 ,beautiful sounds1 songs1 cadences1 have a similar adaptation to the ear4 ,to apprehend this adaptation promptly and accurately is what is described as having a good ear1 though properly speaking this judgment should be attributed to the intellect4 ,according to some the esthetic sentiment1 the appreciation and enjoyment of the beautiful1 is an exclusively subjective experience1 an emotional state which has all its sources within the conscious subject1 and which has no real1 extramental correlative in things4 ,according to others beauty is already in the extramental reality independently of any subjective conditions1 and has no mental factors in its constitution as an object of experience4 ,both of these extreme views are erroneous4 ,esthetic pleasure1 like all pleasure1 is the natural concomitant of the full1 orderly1 normal exercise of the subject's conscious activities4 ,these activities are called forth by1 and exercised upon1 some object4 ,for esthetic pleasure there must be in the object something the contemplation of which will elicit such harmonious exercise of the faculties4 ,esthetic pleasure1 therefore1 cannot be purely subjective3 there must be an objective factor in its realization4 ,but on the other hand this objective factor cannot provoke esthetic enjoyment independently of the dispositions of the subject4 ,it must be in harmony with those dispositions--cognitive1 appetitive1 affective1 emotional1 temperamental--in order to evoke such a mental view of the object that the contemplation of the latter will cause esthetic pleasure4 ,and it is precisely because these dispositions1 which are so variable from one individual to another1 tinge and colour the mental view1 while this in turn determines the quality of the esthetic judgment and feeling1 that people disagree and dispute interminably about questions of beauty in art and nature4 ,herein beauty differs from truth4 ,no doubt people dispute about the latter also2 but at all events they recognize its objective character and the propriety of an appeal to the independent1 impersonal standard of evidence4 ,not so1 however1 in regard to beauty3 ,de gustibus non est disputandum3 there is no disputing about tastes4 ,the perception of beauty1 the judgment that something is or is not beautiful1 is the product of an act of taste1 i4e4 of the individual's intelligence affected by numerous concrete personal dispositions both of the sentient and of the spiritual order1 not only cognitive and appetitive but temperamental and emotional4 ,moreover1 besides this variety in subjective dispositions1 we have to bear in mind the effects of artistic culture1 of educating the taste4 ,the eye and the ear1 which are the two main channels of data for the intellect1 can be made by training more delicate and exacting1 so that the same level of esthetic appreciation can be maintained only by a constantly increasing measure of artistic stimulation4 ,finally1 apart from all that a beautiful object directly conveys to us for contemplation1 there is something more which it may indirectly suggest3 it arouses a distinct activity of the imagination whereby we fill up1 in our own individual degree and according to our own interpretation1 what has not been actually supplied in it by nature or art4 ,all those influences account sufficiently for the subjectivity and variability of the esthetic sentiment1 for diversity of artistic tastes among individuals1 for the transitions of fashion in art from epoch to epoch and from race to race4 ,but it must not be concluded that the subjective factors in the constitution of the beautiful are wholly changeable4 ,since human nature is fundamentally the same in all men there ought to be a fund of esthetic judgments and pleasures common to all2 there ought to be in nature and in art some things which are recognized and enjoyed as beautiful by all4 ,and there are such4 ,in matters of detail the maxim holds3 ,de gustibus non disputandum4 ,but there are fundamental esthetic judgments for which it does not hold4 ,since men have a common nature1 and since1 as we shall see presently1 there are recognizable and stable objective factors to determine esthetic judgments1 there is a legitimate foundation on which to discuss and establish some esthetic canons of universal validity4 #ee4 ,,objective ,,factors ,,in ,,the ,,constitution ,,of ,,the ,,beautiful4--8,ask the artist10 writes ,st4 ,augustine17#bja7 8whether beautiful things are beautiful because they please us1 or rather please us because they are beautiful1 and he will reply unhesitatingly that they please us because they are beautiful40 ,what1 then is it that makes them beautiful1 and so causes the esthetic pleasure we experience in contemplating them8 ,in order that an object produce pleasure of any sort in a conscious being it must evoke the exercise of this being's faculties2 for the conscious condition which we describe as pleasure is always a reflex of conscious activity4 ,furthermore1 this activity must be full and intense and well-ordered3 if it be excessive or defective1 if it be ill-regulated1 wrongly distributed among the faculties1 it will not have pleasure for its reflex1 but either indifference or pain4 ,hence the object which evokes the esthetic pleasure of contemplation must in the first place be complete or perfect of its kind 7#df74 ,the truncated statue1 the stunted oak1 the deformed animal1 the crippled human being1 are not beautiful4 ,they are wanting in the integrity due to their nature4 ,but this is not enough4 ,to be beautiful1 the object must in the second place have a certain largeness or amplitude1 a certain greatness or power1 whereby it can act energetically on our cognitive faculties and stimulate them to vigorous action4 ,the little1 the trifling1 the commonplace1 the insignificant1 evokes no feeling of admiration4 ,the sight of a small pasture-field leaves us indifferent2 but the vision of vast expanses of meadow and cornfield and woodland exhilarates us4 ,a collection of petty hillocks is uninteresting1 while the towering snow-clad ,alps are magnificent4 ,the multiplication table elicits no emotion2 but the triumphant discovery and proof of some new truth in science1 some far-reaching theorem that opens up new vistas of research or sheds a new light on long familiar facts1 may fill the mind with ecstasies of pure esthetic enjoyment47#bjb7 ,there is no moral beauty in helping up a child that has stumbled and fallen in the mud1 but there is in risking one's life to save the child from burning or drowning4 ,there must1 then1 be in the object a certain largeness which will secure energy of appeal to our cognitive faculties2 but this energy must not be excessive1 it must not dazzle1 it must be in proportion to the capacity of our faculties47#bjc7 ,a third requisite for beauty is that the object be in itself duly proportioned1 orderly1 well arranged4 ,order generally may be defined as right or proper arrangement4 ,we can see in things a twofold order1 dynamic1 or that of subordination1 and static1 or that of co-ordination3 the right arrangement of means towards ends1 and the right arrangement of parts in a whole1 or members in a system4 ,the former indicates the influence of final causes and expresses primarily the goodness of things4 ,the latter is determined by the formal causes of things and expresses primarily their beauty4 ,the order essential to beauty consists in this1 that the manifold and distinct things or acts which contribute to it must form one whole4 ,hence order has been defined as unity in variety3 unitas in varietate2 variety being the material cause1 and unity the formal cause1 of order4 ,but we can apprehend unity in a variety of things only on condition that they are arranged1 i4e4 that they show forth clearly to the mind a set of mutual relations which can be easily grasped4 ,why is it that things mutually related to one another in one way make up what we declare to be a chaotic jumble1 while if related in another way we declare them to be orderly8 ,because unless these relations present themselves in a certain way they will fail to unify the manifold for us4 ,we have an intellectual intuition of the numerical series2 and of proportion1 which is equality of numerical relations4 ,in the domains of magnitude and multitude the mind naturally seeks to detect these proportions4 ,so also in the domains of sensible qualities1 such as sounds and colours1 we have an analogous intuition of a qualitative series1 and we naturally try to detect harmony1 which is the gradation of qualitative relations in this series4 ,the detection of proportion and harmony in a variety of things pleases us1 because we are thus enabled to grasp the manifold as exhibiting unity2 while the absence of these elements leaves us with the dissatisfied feeling of something wanting4 ,whether this be because order in things is the expression of an intelligent will1 of purpose and design1 and therefore calls forth our intelligent and volitional activity1 with its consequent and connatural feeling of satisfaction1 we do not inquire here4 ,but certain it is that order is essential to beauty1 that esthetic pleasure springs only from the contemplation of proportion and harmony1 which give unity to variety47#bjd7 ,and the explanation of this is not far to seek4 ,for the full and vigorous exercise of contemplative activity we need objective variety4 ,whatever lacks variety1 and stimulates us in one uniform manner1 becomes monotonous and causes ennui4 ,while on the other hand mere multiplicity distracts the mind1 disperses and weakens attention1 and begets fatigue4 ,we must1 therefore1 have variety1 but variety combined with the unity that will concentrate and sustain attention1 and thus call forth the highest and keenest energy of intellectual activity4 ,hence the function of rhythm in music1 poetry and oratory2 of composition and perspective in painting2 of design in architecture4 ,the more perfect the relations are which constitute order1 the more clearly will the unity of the object shine forth2 hence the more fully and easily will it be grasped1 and the more intense the esthetic pleasure of contemplating it4 ,st4 ,thomas thus sums up the objective conditions of the beautiful3 integrity or perfection1 proportion or harmony1 and clarity or splendour47#bje7 #ef4 ,,some ,,definitions ,,of ,,the ,,beautiful4--,an object is beautiful when its contemplation pleases us2 and this takes place when the object1 complete and entire in itself1 possesses that order1 harmony1 proportion of parts1 which will call forth the full and vigorous exercise of our cognitive activity4 ,all this amounts to saying that the beauty of a thing is the revelation or manifestation of its natural perfection47#bjf7 ,perfection is thus the foundation of beauty2 the showing forth of this perfection is what constitutes beauty formally4 ,every real being has a nature which constitutes it1 and activities whereby it tends to realize the purpose of its existence4 ,now the perfection of any nature is manifested by the proportion of its constitutive parts and by the harmony of all its activities4 ,hence we see that order is essential to beauty because order shows forth the perfection of the beautiful4 ,an object is beautiful in the degree in which the proportion of its parts and the harmony of its activities show forth the perfection of its nature4 ,thus1 starting with the subjective1 a posteriori definition of beauty from its effect3 beauty is that whose contemplation pleases us--we have passed to the objective and natural definition of beauty by its properties3 beauty is the evident integrity1 order1 proportion and harmony1 of an object--and thence to what we may call the a priori or synthetic definition1 which emphasizes the perfection revealed by the static and dynamic order of the thing3 the beauty of an object is the manifestation of its natural perfection by the proportion of its parts and the harmony of its activities47#bjg7 ,a few samples of the many definitions that have been set forth by various authors will not be without interest4 ,vallet7#bjh7 defines beauty as the splendour of perfection4 ,other authors define it as the splendour of order4 ,these definitions sacrifice clearness to brevity4 ,beauty is the splendour of the true4 ,this definition1 commonly attributed to ,plato1 but without reason1 is inadequate and ambiguous4 ,cousin7#bji7 defines beauty as unity in variety4 ,this leaves out an essential element1 the clarity or clear manifestation of order4 ,kant defines beauty as the power an object possesses of giving free play to the imagination without transgressing the laws of the understanding47#baj7 ,this definition emphasizes the necessary harmony of the beautiful with our cognitive faculties1 and the fact that the esthetic sentiment is not capricious but subject to the laws of the understanding4 ,it is1 however1 inadequate1 in as much as it omits all reference to the objective factors of beauty4 #eg4 ,,classifications4 ,,the ,,beautiful ,,in ,,nature4--,all real beauty is either natural or artificial4 ,natural beauty is that which characterizes what we call the 8works of ,nature0 or the 8works of ,god04 ,artificial beauty is the beauty of 8works of art04 ,again1 just as we can distinguish the real beauty of the latter from the ideal beauty which the human artist conceives in his mind as its archetype and exemplar cause1 so1 too1 we can distinguish between the real beauty of natural things and the ideal beauty of their uncreated archetypes in the ,mind of the ,divine ,artist4 ,we know that the beauty of the human artist's ideal is superior to1 and never fully realized in1 that of the actually achieved product of his art4 ,is the same true of the natural beauty of ,god's works8 ,that the works of ,god in general are beautiful cannot be denied2 ,his ,wisdom 8spreads beauty abroad0 throughout ,his works2 ,he arranges all things according to weight and number and measure3cum pondere1 numero et mensura2 ,his ,providence disposes all things strongly and sweetly3 fortiter et suaviter4 ,but while creatures1 by revealing their own beauty1 reflect the ,uncreated beauty of ,god in the precise degree which ,he has willed from all eternity1 it cannot be said that they all realize the beauty of their ,divine ,exemplars according to ,his primary purpose and decree4 ,since there is physical and moral evil in the universe1 since there are beings which fail to realize their ends1 to attain to the perfection of their natures1 it follows that these beings are not beautiful4 ,in so far forth as they have real being1 and the goodness or perfection which is identical with their reality1 it may be admitted that all real beings are fundamentally beautiful2 for goodness or perfection is the foundation of beauty47#baa7 ,but in so far as they fail to realize the perfection due to their natures they lack even the foundation of beauty4 ,furthermore1 in order that a thing which has the full perfection due to its nature be formally beautiful1 it must actually show forth by the clearness of its proportions and the harmony of its activities the fulness of its natural perfections4 ,but there is no need to prove that this is not universally verified in nature--or in art either4 ,and hence we must infer that formal beauty is not a transcendental attribute of reality47#bab7 ,real beauty may be further divided into material or sensible or physical1 and intellectual or spiritual4 ,the former reveals itself to hearing1 seeing and imagination2 the latter can be apprehended only by intellect2 but intellect depends for all its objects on the data of the imagination4 ,the beauty of spiritual realities is of course of a higher1 nobler and more excellent order than that of the realities of sense4 ,the spiritual beauty which falls directly within human experience is that of the human spirit itself2 from the soul and its experiences we can rise to an apprehension--analogical and inadequate--of the ,beauty of the ,infinite ,being4 ,in the soul itself we can distinguish two sources of beauty3 what we may call its natural endowments such as intellect and will1 and its moral dispositions1 its perfections and excellences as a free1 intelligent1 moral agent--its virtues4 ,beauty of soul1 especially the moral beauty of the virtuous soul1 is incomparably more precious than beauty of body4 ,the latter1 of course1 like all real beauty in ,god's creation1 has its proper dignity as an expression and revelation1 however faint and inadequate1 of the ,uncreated ,beauty of the ,deity4 ,but inasmuch as it is so inferior to the moral beauty proper to man1 in itself so frail and evanescent1 in its influence on human passions so dangerous to virtue1 we can understand why in the ,proverbs of ,solomon it is proclaimed to be vain and deceitful in contrast with the moral beauty of fearing the ,lord3 ,fallax gratia et vana est pulchritudo2 mulier timens dominum ipsa laudabitur47#bac7 #eh4 ,,the ,,beautiful ,,in ,,art4 ,,scope ,,and ,,function ,,of ,,the ,,fine ,,arts4--,the expression of beauty is the aim of the fine arts4 ,art in general is 8the proper conception of a work to be accomplished03 8ars nihil aliud est quam recta ratio aliquorum operum faciendorum047#bad7 ,while the mechanical arts aim at the production of things useful1 the fine arts aim at the production of things beautiful1 i4e4 of works which by their order1 symmetry1 harmony1 splendour1 etc41 will give such apt expression to human ideals of natural beauty as to elicit esthetic enjoyment in the highest possible degree4 ,the artist1 then1 must be a faithful student and admirer of all natural beauty2 not indeed to aim at exact reproduction or imitation of the latter2 but to draw therefrom his inspiration and ideals4 ,even the most beautiful things of nature express only inadequately the ideal beauty which the human mind may gather from the study of them4 ,this ideal is what the artist is ever struggling to express1 with the ever-present and tormenting consciousness that the achievement of his highest effort will fall immeasurably short of giving adequate expression to it4 ,if each of the things of nature were so wholly simple and intelligible as to present the same ideal type of beauty to all1 and leave no room for individual differences of interpretation1 there would be no variety in the products of artistic genius1 except indeed what would result from perfect or imperfect execution4 ,but the things of nature are complex1 and in part at least enigmatical2 they present different aspects to different minds and suggest a variety of interpretations2 they leave large scope to the play of the imagination both as to conception of the ideal itself and as to the arrangement and manipulation of the sensible materials in which the ideal is to find expression4 ,by means of these two functions1 conception and expression1 the genius of the artist seeks to interpret and realize for us ideal types of natural beauty4 ,the qualities of a work of art1 the conditions it must fulfil1 are those already enumerated in regard to beauty generally4 ,it must have unity1 order1 proportion of parts2 it must be true to nature1 not in the sense of a mere copy1 but in the sense of drawing its inspiration from nature1 and so helping us to understand and appreciate the beauties of nature2 it must display a power and clearness of expression adjusted to the capacity of the normal mind4 ,we may add--as indicating the connexion of art with morality--that the work of art must not be such as to excite disapproval or cause pain by shocking any normal faculty1 or running counter to any fundamental belief1 sympathy1 sentiment or feeling1 of the human mind4 ,the contemplation of the really beautiful1 whether in nature or in art1 ought per se to have an elevating1 ennobling1 refining influence on the mind4 ,but the beautiful is not the good2 nor does the cultivation of the fine arts necessarily enrich the mind morally4 ,from the ethical point of view art is one of those indifferent things which the will can make morally good or morally evil4 ,since man is a moral being1 no human interest can fall outside the moral sphere1 or claim independence of the moral law2 and art is a human interest4 ,neither the creator1 nor the critic1 nor the student of a work of art can claim that the latter1 simply because it is a work of art1 is neither morally good nor morally bad2 or that he in his special relation to it is independent of the moral law4 ,under the specious plea that science in seeking truth is neither positively moral nor positively immoral1 but abstracts altogether from the quality of morality1 it is sometimes claimed that1 a pari1 art in its pursuit of the beautiful should be held to abstract from moral distinctions and have no concern for moral good or evil4 ,but in the first place1 though science as such seeks simply the true1 and in this sense abstracts from the good and the evil1 still the man of science both in acquiring and communicating truth is bound by the moral law3 he may not1 under the plea that he is learning or teaching truth1 do anything morally wrong1 anything that will forfeit or endanger moral rectitude1 whether in himself or in others4 ,and in the second place1 owing to the different relations of truth and beauty to moral goodness1 we must deny the parity on which the argument rests4 ,truth appeals to the reason alone2 beauty appeals to the senses1 the heart1 the will1 the passions and emotions3 8,pulchrum trahit ad se desiderium04 ,the scientist expresses truth in abstract laws1 definitions and formulas3 a law of chemistry will help the farmer to fertilize the soil1 or the anarchist to assassinate sovereigns4 ,but the artist expresses beauty in concrete forms calculated to provoke emotions of esthetic enjoyment from the contemplation of them4 ,now there are other pleasure-giving emotions1 sensual and carnal emotions1 the indiscriminate excitement and unbridled indulgence of which the moral law condemns as evil2 and if a work of art be of such a kind that it is directly calculated to excite them1 the artist stands condemned by the moral law1 and that even though his aim may have been to give expression to beauty and call forth esthetic enjoyment merely4 ,if the preponderating influence of the artist's work on the normal human individual be a solicitation of the latter's nature towards what is evil1 what is opposed to his real perfection1 his moral progress1 his last end1 then that artist's work is not a work of art or truly beautiful4 ,the net result of its appeal being evil and unhealthy1 it cannot be itself a thing of beauty4 8,art for art's sake0 is a cry that is now no longer novel4 ,taken literally it is unmeaning1 for art is a means to an end--the expression of the beautiful2 and a means as such cannot be 8for its own sake04 ,but it may signify that art should subserve no extrinsic purpose1 professional or utilitarian2 that it should be disinterested2 that the artist must aim at the conception and expression of the beautiful through a disinterested admiration and enthusiasm for the beautiful4 ,in this sense the formula expresses a principle which is absolutely true1 and which asserts the noble mission of the artist to mankind4 ,but the formula is also commonly understood to claim the emancipation of the artist from the bonds of morality1 and his freedom to conceive and express beauty in whatever forms he pleases1 whether these may aid men to virtue or solicit them to vice4 ,this is the pernicious error to which we have just referred4 ,and we may now add that this erroneous contention is not only ethically but also artistically unsound4 ,for surely art ought to be based on truth3 the artist should understand human nature1 to which his work appeals3 he should not regard as truly beautiful a work the contemplation of which will produce a discord in the soul1 which will disturb the right order of the soul's activities1 which will solicit the lower faculties to revolt against the higher2 and this is what takes place when the artist ignores moral rectitude in the pursuit of his art3 by despising the former he is false to the latter4 ,he fails to realize that the work of art must be judged not merely in relation to the total amount of pleasure it may cause in those who contemplate it1 but also in relation to the quality of this pleasure2 and not merely in relation to esthetic pleasure1 but in relation to the total effect1 the whole concrete influence of the work on all the mental faculties4 ,he fails to see that if this total influence is evil1 the work that causes it cannot be good nor therefore really beautiful4 ,are we to conclude1 then1 that the artist is bound to aim positively and always at producing a good moral effect through his work8 ,by no means4 ,esthetic pleasure is1 as we have said1 indifferent4 ,the pursuit of it1 through the conception and expression of the beautiful1 is the proper and intrinsic end of the fine arts1 and is in itself legitimate so long as it does not run counter to the moral law4 ,it has no need to run counter to the moral law1 nor can it do so without defeating its own end4 ,outside its proper limits art ceases to be art2 within its proper limits it has a noble and elevating mission2 and it can serve indirectly but powerfully the interests of truth and goodness by helping men to substitute for the lower and grosser pleasures of sense the higher and purer esthetic pleasures which issue from the disinterested contemplation of the beautiful4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,the ,,categories ,,of ,,being4 ,,substance ,,and ,,accident4 #ei4 ,,the ,,conception ,,of ,,ultimate ,,categories4--,having examined so far the notion of real being itself1 which is the proper subject-matter of ontology1 and those widest or transcendental notions which are coextensive with that of reality1 we must next inquire into the various modes in which we find real being expressed1 determined1 actualized1 as it falls within our experience4 ,in other words1 we must examine the highest categories of being1 the suprema genera entis4 ,considered from the point of view of the logical arrangement of our concepts1 each of these categories reveals itself as a primary and immediate limitation of the extension of the transcendental concept of real being itself4 ,each is ultimately distinct from the others in the sense that no two of them can be brought under any other as a genus1 nor can we discover any intermediate notion between any one of them and the notion of being itself4 ,the latter notion is not properly a genus of which they would be species1 nor can it be predicated univocally of any two or more of them 7#b74 ,each is itself an ultimate genus1 a genus supremum4 ,by using these notions as predicates of our judgments we are enabled to interpret things1 to obtain a genuine if inadequate insight into reality2 for we assume as established in the ,theory of ,knowledge that all our universal concepts have real and objective validity1 that they give us real knowledge of the nature of those individual things which form the data of our sense experience4 ,hence the study of the categories1 which is for ,logic a classification of our widest concepts1 become for ,metaphysics an inquiry into the modes which characterize real being47#bae7 ,by determining what these modes are1 by studying their characteristics1 by tracing them through the data of experience1 we advance in our knowledge of reality4 ,the most divergent views have prevailed among philosophers both as to what a category is or signifies1 and as to what or how many the really ultimate categories are4 ,is a category1 such as substance1 or quality1 or quantity1 a mode of real being revealed to the knowing mind1 as most ancient and medieval philosophers thought1 with ,aristotle and ,st4 ,thomas8 or is it a mental mode imposed on reality by the knowing mind1 as many modern philosophers have thought1 with ,kant and after him8 ,it is for the ,theory of ,knowledge to examine this alternative2 nor shall we discuss it here except very incidentally3 for we shall assume as true the broad affirmative answer to the first alternative4 ,that is to say1 we shall hold that the mind is able to see1 in the categories generally1 modes of reality2 rejecting the sceptical conclusions of ,kantism in regard to the power of the ,speculative ,reason1 and the principles which lead to such conclusions4 ,as to the number and classification of the ultimate categories1 this is obviously a question which cannot be settled a priori by any such purely deductive analysis of the concept of being as ,hegel seems to have attempted2 but only a posteriori1 i4e4 by an analysis of experience in its broadest sense as including ,matter and ,spirit1 ,nature and ,mind1 ,object and ,subject of ,thought1 and even the ,process of ,thought itself4 ,moreover it is not surprising that with the progress of philosophical reflection1 certain categories should have been studied more deeply at certain epochs than ever previously1 that they should have been 8discovered0 so to speak1 not of course in the sense that the human mind had not been previously in possession of them1 but in the sense that because of closer study they furnished the mind with a richer and fuller power of 8explaining0 things4 ,it is natural1 too1 that historians of philosophy1 intent on tracing the movement of philosophic thought1 should be inclined to over-emphasize the relativity of the categories1 as regards their 8explaining0 value--their relativity to the general mentality of a certain epoch or period47#baf7 ,but there is danger here of confounding certain large hypothetical conceptions1 which are found to yield valuable results at a certain stage in the progress of the sciences17#bag7 with the categories proper of real being4 ,if the mind of man is of the same nature in all men1 if it contemplates the same universe1 if it is capable of reaching truth about this universe--real truth which is immutable1--then the modes of being which it apprehends in the universe1 and by conceiving which it interprets the latter1 must be in the universe as known1 and must be there immutably4 ,nowhere do we find this more clearly illustrated than in the futility of the numerous attempts of modern philosophers to deny the reality of the category of substance1 and to give an intelligible interpretation of experience without the aid of this category4 ,we shall see that as a matter of fact it is impossible to deny in thought the reality of substance1 or to think at all without it1 however philosophers may have denied it in language1--or thought that they denied it when they only rejected some erroneous or indefensible meaning of the term4 #fj4 ,,the ,,aristotelian ,,categories4--,the first palpable distinction we observe in the data of experience is that between substance and accident4 8,we might naturally ask10 writes ,aristotle17#bah7 8whether what is signified by such terms as walking1 sitting1 feeling well1 is a being 7or reality74444 ,and we might be inclined to doubt it1 for no single one of such acts exists by itself 7 71 no one of them is separable from substance 772 it is rather to him who walks1 or sits1 or feels well1 that we give the name of being4 ,that which is a being in the primary meaning of this term1 a being simply and absolutely1 and not merely a being in a certain sense1 or with a qualification1 is substance-- 407#bai7 ,but manifestly1 though substances1 or what in ordinary language we call 8persons0 and 8things0--men1 animals1 plants1 minerals--are real beings in the fullest sense1 nevertheless sitting1 walking1 thinking1 willing1 and actions generally1 are also undoubtedly realities2 so too are states and qualities2 and shape1 size1 posture1 etc4 ,and yet we do not find any of these latter actually existing in themselves like substances1 but only dependently on substances--on 8persons0 or 8things0 that think or walk or act1 or are large or small1 hot or cold1 or have some shape or quality4 ,they are all accidents1 in contradistinction to substance4 ,it is far easier to distinguish between accidents and substance than to give an exhaustive list of the ultimate and irreducible classes of the former4 ,aristotle enumerates nine3 ,quantity 771 ,quality 771 ,relation 7 71 ,action 771 ,passion 771 ,where 771 ,when 771 ,posture 771 ,external ,condition or ,state 774 ,much has been said for and against the exhaustive character of this classification4 ,scholastics generally have defended and adopted it4 ,st4 ,thomas gives the following reasoned analysis of it37#bbj7 ,since accidents may be distinguished by their relations to substance1 we see that some affect substances intrinsically1 others extrinsically2 and in the former case1 either absolutely or relatively3 if relatively we have the category of relation2 if absolutely we have either quantity or quality according as the accident affects the substance by reason of the matter1 or the form1 of the latter4 ,what affects and denominates a substance extrinsically does so either as a cause1 or as a measure1 or otherwise4 ,if as a cause1 the substance is either suffering action1 or acting itself2 if as a measure1 it denominates the subject as in time1 or in place1 or in regard to the relative position of its parts1 its posture1 in the place which it occupies4 ,finally1 if the accident affects the substance extrinsically1 though not as cause or as measure1 but only as characterizing its external condition and immediate surroundings1 as when we describe a man as clothed or armed1 we have the category of condition4 ,it might be said that all this is more ingenious than convincing2 but it is easier to criticize ,aristotle's list than to suggest a better one4 ,in addition to what we have said of it elsewhere17#bba7 a few remarks will be sufficient in the present context4 ,some of the categories1 as being of lesser importance1 we may treat incidentally when dealing with the more important ones4 ,ubi1 ,quando1 and ,situs1 together with the analysis of our notions of ,space and ,time1 fall naturally into the general doctrine of ,quantity4 ,the final category1 1 however interpreted17#bbb7 may be referred to ,quality1 ,quantity1 or ,relation4 ,a more serious point for consideration is the fact1 generally admitted by scholastics17#bbc7 that one and the same real accident may belong to different categories if we regard it from different standpoints4 ,actio and passio are one and the same motus or change1 regarded in relation to the agent and to the effect1 respectively4 ,place1 in regard to the located body belongs to the category ubi1 whereabouts2 in regard to the locating body it is an aspect of the latter's quantity4 ,relation1 as we shall see1 is probably not an entity really distinct from its foundation--quality1 quantity1 or causality4 ,the reason alleged for this partial absence of real distinction between the ,aristotelian categories is that they were thought out primarily from a logical point of view--that of predication47#bbd7 ,and the reason is a satisfactory one1 for real distinction is not necessary for diversity of predication4 ,then1 where they are not really distinct entities these categories are at least aspects so fundamentally distinct and mutually irreducible that each of them is indeed a summum genus immediately under the concept of being in general4 ,it seems a bold claim to make for any scheme of categories1 that it exhausts all the known modes of reality4 ,we often experience objects of thought which seem at first sight incapable of reduction to any of ,aristotle's suprema genera4 ,but more mature reflection will always enable us to find a place for them4 ,in order that any extrinsic denomination of a substance constitute a category distinct from those enumerated1 it must affect the substance in some real way distinct from any of those nine2 and it must moreover be not a mere complex or aggregate of two or more of the latter4 ,hence denominations which objects derive from the fact that they are terms of mental activities which are really immanent1 actiones 8intentionales10--denominations such as 8being known10 8being loved10--neither belong to the category of 8passio0 proper1 nor do they constitute any distinct category4 ,they are entia rationis1 logical relations4 ,again1 while efficient causation resolves itself into the categories of actio and passio1 the causation of final1 formal and material causes cannot be referred to these categories1 but neither does it constitute any new category4 ,the influence of a final cause consists in nothing more than its being a good which is the term of appetite or desire4 ,the causation of the formal cause consists in its formally constituting the effect3 it is always either a substantial or an accidental form1 and so must be referred to the categories of substance1 or quality1 or quantity4 ,similarly material causality consists in this that the matter is a partial constitutive principle of the composite being2 and it therefore refers us to the category of substance4 ,it may be noted1 too1 that the ontological principles of a composite being--such as primal matter and substantial form--since they are themselves not properly 8beings10 but only 8principles of being10 are said to belong each to its proper category1 not formally but only referentially1 not formaliter but only reductiv4 ,finally1 the various properties that are assigned to certain accidents themselves are either logical relations 7such as 8not having a contrary0 or 8being a measure071 or real relations1 or intrinsic modes of the accident itself 7as when a quality is said to have a certain 8intensity072 but in all cases where they are not mere logical entities they will be found to come under one or other of the ,aristotelian categories4 ,the 8real being0 which is thus 8determined0 into the supreme modes or categories of substance and accidents is1 of course1 8being0 considered substantially as essential 7whether possible or actual71 and not merely being that is actually existent1 existential being1 in the participial sense4 ,furthermore1 it is primarily finite or created being that is so determined4 ,the ,infinite ,being is above the categories1 super-substantial4 ,it is because substance is the most perfect of the categories1 and because the ,infinite ,being verifies in ,himself in an incomprehensibly perfect manner all the perfections of substance1 that we speak of ,him as a substance3 remembering always that these essentially finite human concepts are to be predicated of ,him only analogically 7#b1 #e74 ,it may be inquired whether 8accident0 is a genus which should be predicated univocally of the nine ,aristotelian categories as species8 or is the concept of 8accident0 only analogical1 so that these nine categories would be each a summum genus in the strict sense1 i4e4 an ultimate and immediate determination of the concept of 8being0 itself8 ,we have seen already that the concept of 8being0 as applied to 8substance0 and 8accident0 is analogical 7#b74 ,so1 too1 it is analogical as applied to the various categories of accidents4 ,for the characteristic note of 8accident10 that of 8affecting1 inhering in0 a subject1 can scarcely be said to be verified 8in the same way10 8univocally10 of the various kinds of accidents2 it is therefore more probably correct not to regard 8accident0 as a genus proper1 but to conceive each kind of accident as a summum genus coming immediately under the transcendental concept of 8being04 #fa4 ,,the ,,phenomenist ,,attack ,,on ,,the ,,traditional ,,doctrine ,,of ,,substance4--,passing now to the question of the existence and nature of substances1 and their relation to accidents1 we shall find evidences of misunderstandings to which many philosophical errors may be ascribed at least in part4 ,it is a fairly common contention that the distinction between substance and accident is really a groundless distinction2 that we have experience merely of transient events or happenings1 internal and external1 with relations of coexistence or sequence between them2 that it is an illusion to suppose1 underlying these1 an inert1 abiding basis called 8substance02 that this can be at best but a useless name for each of the collections of external and internal appearances which make up our total experience of the outer world and of our own minds4 ,this is the general position of phenomenists4 8,what do you know of substance10 they ask us1 8except that it is an indeterminate and unknown something underlying phenomena8 ,and even if you could prove its existence1 what would it avail you1 since in its nature it is1 and must remain1 unknown8 ,no doubt the mind naturally supposes this #8something' underlying phenomena2 but it is a mere mental fiction the reality of which cannot be proved1 and the nature of which is admitted1 even by some who believe in its real existence1 to be unknowable40 ,now there can be no doubt about the supreme importance of this question3 all parties are pretty generally agreed that on the real or fictitious character of substance the very existence of genuine metaphysics in the traditional sense depends4 ,and at first sight the possibility of such a controversy as the present one seems very strange4 8,is it credible10 asks ,mercier17#bbe7 8that thinkers of the first order1 like ,hume1 ,mill1 ,spencer1 ,kant1 ,wundt1 ,paulsen1 ,littr1 ,taine1 should have failed to recognize the substantial character of things1 and of the ,ego or ,self8 ,must they not have seen that they were placing themselves in open revolt against sound common sense8 ,and on the other hand is it likely that the genius of ,aristotle could have been duped by the nave illusion which phenomenists must logically ascribe to him8 ,or that all those sincere and earnest teachers who adopted and preserved in scholastic philosophy for centuries the peripatetic distinction between substance and accidents should have been all utterly astray in interpreting an elementary fact of common sense80 ,there must have been misunderstandings1 possibly on both sides1 and much waste of argument in refuting chimeras4 ,let us endeavour to find out what they are and how they gradually arose4 ,phenomenism has had its origin in the ,idealism which confines the human mind to a knowledge of its own states1 proclaiming the unknowability of any reality other than these2 and in the ,positivism which admits the reality only of that which falls directly within external and internal sense experience4 ,descartes did not deny the substantiality of the soul1 nor even of bodies2 but his idealist theory of knowledge rendered suspect all information derived by his deductive1 a priori method of reasoning from supposed innate ideas1 regarding the nature and properties of bodies4 ,locke rejected the innatism of ,descartes1 ascribing to sense experience a positive rle in the formation of our ideas1 and proving conclusively that we have no such intuitive and deductively derived knowledge of real substances as ,descartes contended for47#bbf7 ,locke himself did not deny the existence of substances17#bbg7 any more than ,descartes4 ,but unfortunately he propounded the mistaken assumption of ,idealism1 that the mind can know only its own states2 and also the error of thinking that because we have not an intuitive insight into the specific nature of individual substances we can know nothing at all through any channel about their nature3 and he gathered from this latter error a general notion or definition of substance which is a distinct departure from what ,aristotle and the medieval scholastics had traditionally understood by substance4 ,for ,locke substance is merely a supposed1 but unknown1 support for accidents47#bbh7 ,setting out with these two notions--that all objects of knowledge must be states or phases of mind1 and that material substance is a supposed1 but unknown and unknowable1 substratum of the qualities revealed to our minds in the process of sense perception--it was easy for ,berkeley to support by plausible arguments his denial of the reality of any such things as material substances4 ,and it was just as easy1 if somewhat more audacious1 on the part of ,hume to argue quite logically that if the supposed but unknowable substantial substratum of external sense phenomena is illusory1 so likewise is the supposed substantial ,ego which is thought to underlie and support the internal phenomena of consciousness4 ,hume's rejection of substance is apparently complete and absolute1 and is so interpreted by many of his disciples4 ,but a thorough-going phenomenism is in reality impossible2 no philosophers have ever succeeded in thinking out an intelligible theory of things without the concepts of 8matter10 and 8spirit10 and 8things10 and the 8,ego0 or 8,self10 however they may have tried to dispense with them2 and these are concepts of substances4 ,hence there are those who doubt that ,hume was serious in his elaborate reasoning away of substances4 ,the fact is that ,hume 8reasoned away0 substance only in the sense of an unknowable substratum of phenomena1 and not in the sense of a something that exists in itself47#bbi7 ,so far from denying the existence of entities that exist in themselves1 he seems to have multiplied these beyond the wildest dreams of all previous philosophers by substantializing accidents47#bcj7 ,what he does call into doubt is the capacity of the human mind to attain to a knowledge of the specific natures of such entities2 and even here the arguments of phenomenism strike the false ,cartesian theory of knowledge1 rather than the sober and moderate teachings of scholasticism regarding the nature and limitations of our knowledge of substances4 #fb4 ,,the ,,scholastic ,,view ,,of ,,our ,,knowledge ,,in ,,regard ,,to ,,the ,,existence ,,and ,,nature ,,of ,,substances4--,what1 then1 are these latter teachings8 ,that we have a direct1 intellectual insight into the specific essence or nature of a corporeal substance such as gold1 similar to our insight into the abstract essence of a triangle8 ,by no means2 ,locke was quite right in rejecting the ,cartesian claim to intuitions which were supposed to yield up all knowledge of things by 8mathematical10 i4e4 deductive1 a priori reasoning4 ,the scholastic teaching is briefly as follows3-- ,first1 as regards our knowledge of the existence of substances1 and the manner in which we obtain our concept of substance4 ,we get this concept from corporeal substances1 and afterwards apply it to spiritual substances2 so that our knowledge of the former is 8immediate0 only in the relative sense of being prior to the latter1 not in the sense that it is a direct intuition of the natures of corporeal substances4 ,we have no such direct insight into their natures4 ,but our concept of them as actually existing is also immediate in the sense that at first we spontaneously conceive every object which comes before our consciousness as something existing in itself4 ,the child apprehends each separate stimulant of its sense perception--resistance1 colour1 sound1 etc4--as a 8this 0or a 8that10 i4e4 as a separate something1 existing there in itself2 in other words it apprehends all realities as substances3 not1 of course1 that the child has yet any reflex knowledge of what a substance is1 but unknowingly it applies to all realities at first the concept which it undoubtedly possesses 8something existing in itself04 ,it likewise apprehends each such reality as 8one0 or 8undivided in itself10 and as 8distinct from other things04 ,such is the child's immediate1 direct1 and implicit idea of substance4 ,but if we are to believe ,hume1 what is true of the child remains true of the man3 for the latter1 too1 8every perception is a substance1 and every distinct part of a perception a distinct substance047#bca7 ,nothing1 however1 could be more manifestly at variance with the facts4 ,for as reason is developed and reflective analysis proceeds1 the child most undoubtedly realizes that not everything that falls within its experience has the character of 8a something existing in itself and distinct from other things04 8,walking10 8talking10 and 8actions0 generally1 it apprehends as realities1--as realities which1 however1 do not 8exist in themselves10 but in other beings1 in the beings that 8walk0 and 8talk0 and 8act04 ,and these latter beings it still apprehends as 8existing in themselves10 and as thus differing from the former1 which 8exist not in themselves but in other things04 ,thus the child comes into possession of the notion of 8accident10 and of the further notion of 8substance0 as something which not only exists in itself 71 ens in se subsistens71 but which is also a support or subject of accidents 71 substans1 substare747#bcb7 ,nor1 indeed1 need the child's reason be very highly developed in order to realize that if experience furnishes it with 8beings that do not exist in themselves10 there must also be beings which do exist in themselves3 that if 8accidents0 exist at all it would be unintelligible and self-contradictory to deny the existence of 8substances04 ,hence1 in the order of our experience the first1 implicit notion of substance is that of 8something existing in itself0 772 the first explicit notion of it1 however1 is that by which it is apprehended as 8a subject or support of accidents0 71 sub-stare1 substantia72 then by reflection we go back to the explicit notion of it as 8something existing in itself04 ,in the real or ontological order the perfection of 8existing in itself0 is manifestly more fundamental than that of 8supporting accidents04 ,it is in accordance with a natural law of language that we name things after the properties whereby they reveal themselves to us1 rather than by names implying what is more fundamental and essential in them4 8,to exist in itself0 is an absolute perfection1 essential to substance2 8to support accidents0 is only a relative perfection2 nor can we know a priori but a substance might perhaps exist without any accidents3 we only know that accidents cannot exist without some substance1 or subject1 or power which will sustain them in existence4 ,can substance be apprehended by the senses1 or only by intellect8 ,strictly speaking1 only by intellect3 it is neither a 8proper object0 of any one sense1 such as taste1 or colour1 or sound2 nor a 8common object0 of more than one sense1 as extension is with regard to sight and touch3 it is1 in scholastic language1 not a 8sensibile per se10 not itself an object of sense knowledge1 but only 8sensibile per accidens10 i4e4 it may be said to be 8accidentally0 an object of sense because of its conjunction with accidents which are the proper objects of sense3 so that when the senses perceive accidents what they are really perceiving is the substance affected by the accidents4 ,but strictly and properly it is by intellect we consciously grasp that which in the reality is the substance3 while the external and internal sense faculties make us aware of various qualities1 activities1 or other accidents external to the 8self10 or of various states and conditions of the 8self10 the intellect--which is a faculty of the same soul as the sense faculties--makes us simultaneously aware of corporeal substances actually existing outside us1 or of the concrete substance of the 8ego0 or 8self10 existing and revealing itself to us in and through its conscious activities1 as the substantial1 abiding1 and unifying subject and principle of these conscious activities4 ,thus1 then1 do we attain to the concept of substance in general1 to a conviction of the concrete actual existence of that mode of being the essential characteristic of which is 8to exist in itself04 ,in the next place1 how do we reach a knowledge of the specific natures of substances87#bcc7 ,what is the character1 and what are the limitations1 of such knowledge8 ,here1 especially1 the very cautious and moderate doctrine of scholasticism has been largely misconceived and misrepresented by phenomenists and others4 ,about the specific nature of substances we know just precisely what their accidents reveal to us--that and no more4 ,we have no intuitive insight into their natures2 all our knowledge here is abstractive and discursive4 ,as are their properties--their activities1 energies1 qualities1 and all their accidents--so is their nature4 ,we know of the latter just what we can infer from the former4 ,operari sequitur esse2 we have no other key than this to knowledge of their specific natures4 ,we have experience of them only through their properties1 their behaviour1 their activities2 analysis of this experience1 a posteriori reasoning from it1 inductive generalization based upon it3 such are the only channels we possess1 the only means at our disposal1 for reaching a knowledge of their natures4 #fc4 ,,phenomenist ,,difficulties ,,against ,,this ,,view4 ,,its ,,vindication4--,now the phenomenist will really grant all this4 ,his only objection will be that such knowledge of substance is really no knowledge at all2 or that1 such as it is1 it is useless4 ,but surely the knowledge that this mode of being really exists1 that there is a mode of being which 8exists in itself10 is already some knowledge1 and genuine knowledge1 of substance8 ,no doubt1 the information contained in this very indeterminate and generic concept is imperfect2 but then it is only a starting point1 an all-important starting point1 however2 for not only is it perfectible but every item of knowledge we gather from experience perfects it1 whereas without it the intellect is paralysed in its attempt to interpret experience3 indeed so indispensable is this concept of substance to the human mind that1 as we have seen1 no philosopher has ever been really able to dispense with it4 ,when phenomenists say that what we call mind is only a bundle of perceptions and ideas2 when they speak of the flow of events1 which is ourselves1 of which we are conscious17#bcd7 the very language they themselves make use of cries out against their professed phenomenism4 ,for why speak of 8we10 8ourselves10 etc41 if there be no 8we0 or 8ourselves0 other than the perceptions1 ideas1 events1 etc41 referred to8 ,of course the explanation of this strange attitude on the part of these philosophers is simple enough2 they have a wrong conception of substance and of the relation of accidents thereto2 they appear to imagine that according to the traditional teaching nothing of all we can discover about accidents--or1 as they prefer to term them1 8phenomena0--can possibly throw any light upon the nature of substance3 as if the rle of phenomena were to cover up and conceal from us some sort of inner core 7which they call substance71 and not rather to reveal to us the nature of that 8being1 existing in itself10 of which these phenomena are the properties and manifestations4 ,the denial of substance leads inevitably to the substantializing of accidents4 ,it is possible that the manner in which some scholastics have spoken of accidents has facilitated this error47#bce7 ,anyhow the error is one that leads inevitably to contradictions in thought itself4 ,mill1 for instance1 following out the arbitrary postulates of subjectivism and phenomenism1 finally analysed all reality into present sensations of the individual consciousness1 plus permanent possibilities of sensations4 ,now1 consistently with the idealistic postulate1 these 8permanent possibilities0 should be nothing more than a certain tone1 colouring1 quality of the 8present0 sensation1 due to the fact that this has in it1 as part and parcel of itself1 feelings of memory and expectation2 in which case the 8present sensation10 taken in its concrete fulness1 would be the sole reality1 and would exist in itself4 ,this 8solipsism0 is the ultimate logical issue of subjective idealism1 and it is a sufficient reductio ad absurdum of the whole system4 ,or else1 to evade this issue1 the 8permanent possibilities0 are supposed to be something really other than the 8present sensations04 ,in which case we must ask what ,mill can mean by a 8permanent possibility04 ,whether it be subjective or objective possibility1 it is presumably1 according to ,mill's thought1 some property or appurtenance of the individual consciousness1 i4e4 a quality proper to a subject or substance47#bcf7 ,but to deny that the conscious subject is a substance1 and at the same time to contend that it is a 8permanent possibility of sensation10 i4e4 that it has properties which can appertain only to a substance1 is simply to hold what is self-contradictory4 ,after these explanations it will be sufficient merely to state formally the proof that substances really exist4 ,it is exceedingly simple1 and its force will be appreciated from all that has been said so far3 ,whatever we become aware of as existing at all must exist either in itself1 or by being sustained1 supported in existence1 in something else in which it inheres4 ,if it exists in itself it is a substance2 if not it is an accident1 and then the 8something else0 which supports it1 must in turn either exist in itself or in something else4 ,but since an infinite regress in things existing not in themselves but in other things is impossible1 we are forced to admit the reality of a mode of being which exists in itself--viz4 substance4 ,or1 again1 we are forced to admit the real existence of accidents--or1 if you will1 8phenomena0 or 8appearances0--i4e4 of realities or modes of being whose nature is manifestly to modify or qualify in some way or other some subject in which they inhere4 ,can we conceive a state which is not a state of something8 a phenomenon or appearance which is not an appearance of something8 a vital act which is not an act of a living thing8 a sensation1 thought1 desire1 emotion1 unless of some conscious being that feels1 thinks1 desires1 experiences the emotion8 ,no2 and therefore since such accidental modes of being really exist1 there exists also the substantial mode of being in which they inhere4 ,and the experienced realities which verify this notion of 8substance0 as the 8mode of being which exists in itself10 are manifestly not one but manifold4 ,individual 8persons0 and 8things0--men1 animals1 plants--are all so many really and numerically distinct substances 7#ch74 ,so1 too1 are the ultimate individual elements in the inorganic universe1 whatever these may be 7#ca74 ,nor does the universal interaction of these individuals on one another1 or their manifold forms of interdependence on one another throughout the course of their ever-changing existence and activities1 interfere in any way with the substantiality of the mode of being of each4 ,these mutual relations of all sorts1 very real and actual as they undoubtedly are1 only constitute the universe a cosmos1 thus endowing it with unity of order1 but not with unity of substance 7#bg74 ,let us now meet the objection of ,hume3 that there is no substantial soul distinct from its acts1 that it is only the sum-total of the acts1 each of these being a substance4 ,the objection has been repeated in the metaphorical language in which ,huxley and ,taine speak of the soul1 the living soul1 as nothing more than a republic of conscious states1 or the movement of a luminous sheaf etc4 ,and ,locke and ,berkeley had already contended that an apple or an orange is nothing more than a collection or sum-total of sensible qualities1 so that if we conceive these removed there is nothing left1 for beyond these there was nothing there4 ,now we admit that the substance of the soul is not adequately distinct from its acts1 or the substance of the apple or orange from its qualities4 ,as a matter of fact we never experience substance apart from accidents or accidents apart from substance27#bcg7 we do not know whether there exists1 or even whether there can exist1 a created substance devoid of all accidents2 nor can we know1 from the light of reason alone1 whether any accidents could exist apart from substance47#bch7 ,we have1 therefore1 no ground in natural experience for demonstrating such an adequate real distinction 7#ch7 between substance and accidents as would involve the separability of the latter from the former4 ,but that the acts of the soul are so many really distinct entities1 each 8existing in itself10 each therefore a substance1 so that the term 8soul0 is merely a title we give to their sum-total2 and similarly the terms 8apple0 and 8orange0 merely titles of collections of qualities each of which would be an entity existing in itself and really distinct from the others1 each in other words a substance1--this we entirely deny4 ,we regard it as utterly unreasonable of phenomenists thus to multiply substances4 ,our contention is that the individual soul or mind is one substance1 and that it is partially and really1 though not adequately1 distinct from the various conscious acts1 states1 processes1 functions1 which are certainly themselves real entities1--entities1 however1 the reality of which is dependent on that of the soul1 entities which this dependent or 8inhering0 mode of being marks off as distinct in their nature1 and incapable of total identification with that other non-inhering or subsisting mode of being which characterizes the substance of the soul4 ,we cannot help thinking that this phenomenist denial of substance1 with its consequent inevitable substantialization of accidents1 is largely due to a mistaken manner of regarding the concrete existing object as a mere mechanical bundle of distinct and independent abstractions4 ,every aspect of it is mentally isolated from the others and held apart as an 8impression10 an 8idea10 etc4 ,then the object is supposed to be constituted by1 and to consist of1 a sum-total of these separate 8elements10 integrated together by some sort of mental chemistry4 ,the attempt is next made to account for our total conscious experience of reality by a number of principles or laws of what is known as 8association of ideas04 ,and phenomenists discourse learnedly about these laws in apparent oblivion of the fact that by denying the reality of any substantial1 abiding1 self-identical soul1 distinct from the transient conscious states of the passing moment1 they have left out of account the only reality capable of 8associating0 any mental states1 or making mental life at all intelligible4 ,once the soul is regarded merely as 8a series of conscious states10 or a 8stream of consciousness10 or a succession of 8pulses of cognitive consciousness10 such elementary facts as memory1 unity of consciousness1 the feeling of personal identity and personal responsibility1 become absolutely inexplicable47#bci7 ,experience1 therefore1 does reveal to us the real existence of substances1 of 8things that exist in themselves10 and likewise the reality of other modes of being which have their actuality only by inhering in the substances which they affect4 8,a substance10 says ,st4 ,thomas1 8is a thing whose nature it is to exist not in another1 whereas an accident is a thing whose nature it is to exist in another407#bdj7 ,every concrete being that falls within our experience--a man1 an oak1 an apple--furnishes us with the data of these two concepts3 the being existing in itself1 the substance2 and secondly1 its accidents4 ,the former concept comprises only constitutive principles which we see to be essential to that sort of being3 the material1 the vegetative1 the sentient1 the rational principle1 in a man1 or his soul and his body2 the material principle and the formal or vital principle in an apple4 ,the latter concept1 that of accidents1 comprises only those characteristics of the thing which are no doubt real1 but which do not constitute the essence of the being1 which can change or be absent without involving the destruction of that essence4 ,an intellectual analysis of our experience enables us--and1 as we have remarked above1 it alone enables us--to distinguish between these two classes of objective concepts1 the concept of the principles that are essential to the substance or being that exists in itself1 and the concept of the attributes that are accidental to this being2 and experience alone enables us1 by studying the latter group1 the accidents of the being1 whether naturally separable or naturally inseparable from the latter1 to infer from those accidents whatever we can know about the former group1 about the principles that constitute the specific nature of the particular kind of substance that may be under investigation4 ,it may1 perhaps1 be urged against all this1 that experience does not warrant our placing a real distinction between the entities we describe as 8accidents0 and those which we claim to be constitutive of the 8substance10 or 8thing which exists in itself02 that all the entities without exception1 which we apprehend by distinct concepts in any concrete existing being such as a man1 an oak1 or an apple1 are only one and the same individual reality looked at under different aspects2 that the distinction between them is only a logical or mental distinction2 that we separate in thought what is one in reality because we regard each aspect in the abstract and apart from the others2 that to suppose in any such concrete being the existence of two distinct modes of reality--viz4 a reality that exists in itself1 and other realities inhering in this latter--is simply to make the mistake of transferring to the real order of concrete things what we find in the logical order of conceptual abstractions4 ,this objection1 which calls for serious consideration1 leads to a different conclusion from the previous objection4 ,it suggests the conclusion1 not that substances are unreal1 but that accidents are unreal4 ,even if it were valid it would leave untouched the existence of substances4 ,we hope to meet it satisfactorily by establishing presently the existence of accidents really distinct from the substances in which they inhere4 ,while the objection draws attention to the important truth that distinctions recognized in the conceptual order are not always real1 it certainly does not prove that all accidents are only mentally distinct aspects of substance4 ,for surely a man's thoughts1 volitions1 feelings1 emotions1 his conscious states generally1 changing as they do from moment to moment1 are not really identical with the man himself who continues to exist throughout this incessant change2 yet they are realities1 appearing and disappearing and having all their actuality in him1 while he persists as an actual being 8existing in himself04 #fd4 ,,erroneous ,,views ,,on ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,substance4--,if we fail to remember that the notion of substance1 as 8a being existing in itself and supporting the accidents which affect it10 is a most abstract and generic notion2 if we transfer it in this abstract condition to the real order2 if we imagine that the concrete individual substances which actually exist in the real order merely verify this widest notion and are devoid of all further content2 that they possess in themselves no further richness of reality2 if we forget that actual substances1 in all the variety of their natures1 as material1 or living1 or sentient1 or rational and spiritual1 are indeed full1 vibrant1 palpitating with manifold and diversified reality2 if we rob them of all this perfection or locate it in their accidents as considered apart from themselves1--we are likely to form very erroneous notions both of substances and of accidents1 and of their real relations to one another4 ,it will help us to form accurate concepts of them1 concepts really warranted by experience1 if we examine briefly some of the more remarkable misconceptions of substance that have at one time or other gained currency4 7a7 ,substance is not a concrete core on which concrete accidents are superimposed1 or a sort of kernel of which they form the rind4 ,such a way of conceiving them is as misleading as it is crude and material4 ,no doubt the language which1 for want of better1 we have to employ in regard to substance and accidents1 suggests fancies of that kind3 we speak of substance 8supporting10 8sustaining0 accidents1 and of these as 8supported by10 and 8inhering in0 the former4 ,but this does not really signify any juxtaposition or superposition of concrete entities4 ,the substance is a subject determinable by its various accidents2 these are actualizations of its potentiality2 its relation to them is the relation of the potential to the actual1 of a 8material0 or 8determinable0 subject to 8formal0 or 8determining0 principles4 ,but the appearance or disappearance of accidents never takes place in the same concrete subject3 by their variations the concrete subject is changed3 at any instant the substance affected by its accidents is one individual concrete being 7#bg71 and the inevitable result of any modification in them is that this individual1 concrete being is changed1 is no longer the same4 ,no doubt1 it preserves its substantial identity throughout accidental change1 but not its concrete identity1--that is to say1 not wholly4 ,this is the characteristic of every finite being1 subject to change and existing in time3 it has the actuality of its being1 not tota simul1 but only gradually1 successively 7#aj74 ,from this1 too1 we see that although substance is a more perfect mode of being than accident--because the former exists in itself while the latter has its actuality only in something else1--nevertheless1 created1 finite substance is a mode of being which is itself imperfect1 and perfectible by accidents3 another illustration of the truth that all created perfection is only relative1 not absolute4 ,to the notion of 8inherence0 we shall return in connexion with our treatment of accidents 7#fe74 7b7 ,again1 substance is wrongly conceived as an inert substratum underlying accidents4 ,this false notion appears to have originated with ,descartes3 he conceived the two great classes of created substances1 matter and spirit1 as essentially inert4 ,for him1 matter is simply a res extensa2 extension in three dimensions constitutes its essence1 and extension is of course inert3 all motion is given to matter and conserved in it by ,god4 ,spirit or soul is simply a res cogitans1 a being whose essence is thought2 but in thinking spirit too is passive1 for it simply receives ideas as wax does the impress of a seal4 ,nay1 even when soul or spirit wills it is really inert or passive1 for ,god puts all its volitions into it47#bda7 ,from these erroneous conceptions the earlier disciples of ,descartes took the obvious step forward into ,occasionalism2 and to them likewise may be traced the conviction of many contemporary philosophers that the human soul--a being that is so eminently vital and active--cannot possibly be a substance3 neither indeed could it be1 if substance were anything like what ,descartes conceived it to be4 ,the ,german philosophers1 ,wundt and ,paulsen1 for example1 argue that the soul cannot be a substance4 ,but when we inquire what they mean by substance1 what do we find8 ,that with them the concept of substance applies only to the corporeal universe1 where it properly signifies the atoms which are 8the absolutely permanent substratum1 qualitatively and quantitatively unchangeable1 of all corporeal reality047#bdb7 ,no wonder they would argue that the soul is not a substance6 ,no actually existing substance is inert4 ,what is true1 however1 is this1 that when we conceive a being as a substance1 when we think of it under the abstract concept of substance1 we of course abstract from its concrete existence as an active agent2 in other words we consider it not from the dynamic1 but from the static aspect1 not as it is in the concrete1 but as constituting an object of abstract thought3 and so the error of ,descartes seems to have been that already referred to1--the mistake of transferring to the real order conditions that obtain only in the logical order4 7c7 ,to the ,cartesian conception of substances as inert entities endowed only with motions communicated to them ab extra1 the mechanical or atomist conception of reality1 as it is called1 ,leibniz opposed the other extreme conception of substances as essentially active entities4 ,for him substance is an ens prditum vi agendi3 activity is the fundamental note in the concept of substance4 ,these essentially active entities he conceived as being all simple and unextended1 the corporeal no less than the spiritual ones4 ,and he gave them the title of monads4 ,it is unnecessary for our present purpose to go into any details of his ingenious dynamic theory of the universe as a vast system of these monads4 ,we need only remark that while combating the theory of inert substances he himself erred in the opposite extreme4 ,he conceived every monad as endowed essentially with active tendency or effort which is never without its effect1--an exclusively immanent effect1 however1 which is the constant result of constant immanent action3 for he denied the possibility of transitive activity1 actio transiens2 and he conceived the immanent activity of the monad as being in its nature perceptive17#bdc7 that is to say1 cognitive or representative1 in the sense that each monad1 though 8wrapt up in itself1 doorless and windowless10 if we may so describe it1 nevertheless mirrors more or less inchoatively1 vaguely1 or clearly1 all other monads1 and is thus itself a miniature of the whole universe1 a microcosm of the macrocosm4 ,apart from the fancifulness of his whole system1 a fancifulness which is1 however1 perhaps more apparent than real1 his conception of substance is much less objectionable than that of ,descartes4 ,for as a matter of fact every individual1 actually existing substance is endowed with an internal directive tendency towards some term to be realized or attained by its activities4 ,every substance has a transcendental relation to the operations which are natural to it1 and whereby it tends to realize the purpose of its being4 ,but nevertheless substance should not be defined by action1 for all action of created substances is an accident1 not a substance2 nor even by its transcendental relation to action1 for when we conceive it under this aspect we conceive it as an agent or cause1 not as a substance simply4 ,the latter concept abstracts from action and reveals its object simply as 8a reality existing in itself04 ,when we think of a substance as a principle of action we describe it by the term nature4 7d7 ,a very widespread notion of substance is the conception of it as a 8permanent10 8stable10 8persisting0 subject of 8transient10 8ephemeral0 realities called accidents or phenomena4 ,this view of substance is mainly due to the influence of ,kant's philosophy4 ,according to his teaching we can think the succession of phenomena which appear to our sense consciousness only by the aid of a pure intuition in which our sensibility apprehends them1 viz4 time4 ,now the application of the category of substance to this pure intuition of our sensibility engenders a schema of the imagination1 viz4 the persistence of the object in time4 ,persistence1 therefore1 is for him the essential note of substance4 ,herbert ,spencer1 too1 has given apt expression to this widely prevalent notion3 8,existence means nothing more than persistence2 and hence in ,mind that which persists in spite of all changes1 and maintains the unity of the aggregate in defiance of all attempts to divide it1 is that of which existence in the full sense of the word must be predicated--that which we must postulate as the substance of ,mind in contradistinction to the varying forms it assumes4 ,but if so1 the impossibility of knowing the substance of ,mind is manifest407#bdd7 ,thus1 substance is conceived as the unique but hidden and unknowable basis of all the phenomena which constitute the totality of human experience4 ,what is to be said of such a conception8 ,there is just this much truth in it3 that substance is relatively stable or permanent1 i4e4 in comparison with accidents2 the latter cannot survive the destruction or disappearance of the substance in which they inhere1 while a substance can persist through incessant change of its accidents4 ,but accidents are not absolutely ephemeral1 nor is substance absolutely permanent3 were an accident to exist for ever it would not cease to be an accident1 nor would a substance be any less a substance were it created and then instantaneously annihilated4 ,but in the latter case the human mind could not apprehend the substance2 for since all human cognitive experience takes place in time1 which involves duration1 the mind can apprehend a substance only on condition that the latter has some permanence1 some appreciable duration in existence4 ,this fact1 too1 explains in some measure the error of conceiving permanence as essential to a substance4 ,but the error has another source also3 ,under the influence of subjective idealism philosophers have come to regard the individual's consciousness of his own self1 the consciousness of the ,ego1 as the sole and unique source of our concept of substance4 ,the passage we have just quoted from ,spencer is an illustration4 ,and since the spiritual principle of our conscious acts is a permanent principle which abides throughout all of them1 thus explaining the unity of the individual human consciousness1 those who conceive substance in general after the model of the ,ego1 naturally conceive it as an essentially stable subject of incessant and evanescent processes4 ,but it is quite arbitrary thus to conceive the ,ego as the sole type of substance4 ,bodies are substances as well as spirits1 matter as well as mind4 ,and the permanence of corporeal substances is merely relative4 ,nevertheless they are really substances4 ,the relative stability of spirit which is immortal1 and the relative instability of matter which is corruptible1 have nothing to do with the substantiality of either4 ,both alike are substances1 for both alike have that mode of being which consists in their existing in themselves1 and not by inhering in other things as accidents do4 7e7 ,spencer's conception of substance as the permanent1 unknowable ground of phenomena1 implies that substance is one1 not manifold1 and thus suggests the view of reality known as ,monism4 ,there is yet another mistaken notion of substance1 the notion in which the well known pantheistic philosophy of ,spinoza has had its origin4 ,spinoza appears to have given the ambiguous definition of ,descartes--8,substantia est res quae ita existit1 ut nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum0--an interpretation which narrowed its application down to the ,necessary ,being2 for he defined substance in the following terms3 8,per substantiam intelligo id quod est in se et per se concipitur3 hoc est1 id cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei a quo formari debeat04 ,by the ambiguous phrase1 that substance 8requires no other thing for existing10 ,descartes certainly meant to convey what has always been understood by the scholastic expression that substance 8exists in itself04 ,he certainly did not mean that substance is a reality which 8exists of itself10 i4e4 that it is what scholastics mean by ,ens a se1 the ,being that has its actuality from its own essence1 by virtue of its very nature1 and in absolute independence of all other being2 for such ,being is ,one alone1 the ,necessary ,being1 ,god ,himself1 whereas ,descartes clearly held and taught the real existence of finite1 created substances47#bde7 ,yet ,spinoza's definition of substance is applicable only to such a being that our concept of this being shows forth the actual existence of the latter as absolutely explained and accounted for by reference to the essence of this being itself1 and independently of any reference to other being4 ,in other words1 it applies only to the ,necessary ,being4 ,this conception of substance is the starting-point of ,spinoza's pantheistic philosophy4 ,now1 the scholastic definition of substance and ,spinoza's definition embody two entirely distinct notions4 ,spinoza's definition conveys what scholastics mean by the ,self-,existent ,being1 ,ens a se2 and this the scholastics distinguish from caused or created being1 ens ab alio4 ,both phrases refer formally and primarily1 not to the mode of a being's existence when it does exist1 but to the origin of this existence in relation to the being's essence2 and specifically it marks the distinction between the ,essence that is self-explaining1 self-existent1 essentially actual 78a se071 the ,necessary ,being1 and essences that do not themselves explain or account for their own actual existence1 essences that have not their actual existence from themselves or of themselves1 essences that are in regard to their actual existence contingent or dependent1 essences which1 therefore1 if they actually exist1 can do so only dependently on some other being whence they have derived this existence 78ab alio07 and on which they essentially depend for its continuance4 ,not the least evil of ,spinoza's definition is the confusion caused by gratuitously wresting an important philosophical term like substance from its traditional sense and using it with quite a different meaning2 and the same is true in its measure of the other mistaken notions of substance which we have been examining4 ,by defining substance as an ens in se1 or per se stans1 scholastic philosophers mean simply that substance does not depend intrinsically on any subjective or material cause in which its actuality would be supported2 they do not mean to imply that it does not depend extrinsically on an efficient cause from which it has its actuality and by which it is conserved in being4 ,they assert that all created substances1 no less than all accidents1 have their being 8ab alio0 from ,god2 that they exist only by the ,divine creation and conservation1 and act only by the ,divine concursus or concurrence2 but while substances and accidents are both alike dependent on this extrinsic conserving and concurring influence of a ,divine1 ,transcendent ,being1 substances are exempt from this other and distinct mode of dependence which characterizes accidents3 intrinsic dependence on a subject in which they have their actuality47#bdf7 ,when we say that substance exists 8in itself10 obviously we do not attach to the preposition 8in0 any local signification1 as a part existing 8in0 the whole4 ,nor do we mean that they exist 8in0 themselves in the same sense as they have their being 8in0 ,god4 ,in a certain true sense all creatures exist 8in0 ,god3 ,in ipso enim vivimus1 et movemur1 et sumus 7,acts xxii41 #bh71 in the sense that they are kept in being by ,his omnipresent conserving power4 ,but ,he does not sustain them as a subject in which they inhere1 as substance sustains the accidents which determine it1 thereby giving expression to its concrete actuality47#bdg7 ,by saying that substance exists 8in itself0 we mean to exclude the notion of its existing 8in another0 thing1 as an accident does4 ,and this we shall understand better by examining a little more closely this peculiar mode of being which characterizes accidents4 #fe4 ,,the ,,nature ,,of ,,accident4 ,,its ,,relation ,,to ,,substance4 ,,its ,,causes4--,from all that has preceded we will have gathered the general notion of accident as that mode of real being which is found to have its reality1 not by existing in itself1 but by affecting1 determining1 some substance in which it inheres as in a subject4 ,what do we mean by saying that accidents inhere in substances as their subjects8 ,here we must at once lay aside as erroneous the crude conception of something as located spatially within something else1 as contained in container1 as e4g4 water in a vessel2 and the equally crude conception of something being in something else as a part is in the whole1 as e4g4 an arm is in the body4 ,such imaginations are wholly misleading4 ,the actually existing substance has its being or reality2 it is an actual essence4 ,each real accident of it is likewise a reality1 and has an essence1 distinct from that of the substance1 yet not wholly independent of the latter3 it is a determination of the determinable being of the substance1 affecting or modifying the latter in some way or other1 and having no other raison d'tre than this rle of actualizing in some specific way some receptive potentiality of the concrete substance4 ,and since its reality is thus dependent on that of the substance which it affects1 we cannot ascribe to it actual essence or being in the same sense as we ascribe this to substance1 but only analogically7#bdh7 7#b74 ,hence scholastics commonly teach that we ought to conceive an accident rather as an 8entity of an entity10 8ens entis10 than as an entity simply2 rather as inhering1 indwelling1 affecting 7in-esse7 some subject1 than simply as existing itself 7esse72 as something whose essence is rather the determination1 affection1 modification of an essence than itself an essence proper1 the term 8essence0 designating properly only a substance3 accidentis esse est inesse47#bdi7 ,this conception might1 no doubt1 if pressed too far1 be inapplicable to absolute accidents1 like quantity1 which are something more than mere modifications of substance2 but it rightly emphasizes the dependence of the reality of accident on that of substance1 the non-substantial and 8diminished0 character of the 8accident0-mode of being2 it also helps to show that the 8inherence0 of accident in substance is a relation--of determining to determinable being--which is sui generis2 and finally it puts us on our guard against the errors that may be1 and have been1 committed by conceiving accidents in the abstract and reasoning about them apart from their substances1 as if they themselves were substances4 ,this 8inherence0 of accident in substance1 this mode of being whereby it affects1 determines or modifies the substance1 differs from accident to accident2 these1 in fact1 are classified into suprema genera by reason of their different ways of affecting substance 7#fj74 ,to this we shall return later4 ,here we may inquire1 about this general relation of accident to substance1 whether it is essential to an accident actually to inhere in a substance1 if not immediately1 then at least through the medium of some other accident4 ,we suggest this latter alternative because as we shall see presently there are some accidents1 such as colour1 taste1 shape1 which immediately affect the extension of a body1 and only through this the substance of the body itself4 ,now the ordinary course of nature never presents us with accidents except as inhering1 mediately or immediately1 in a substance4 ,nor is it probable that the natural light of our reason would ever suggest to us the possibility of an exception to this general law4 ,but the ,christian philosopher knows1 from ,divine ,revelation1 that in the ,blessed ,eucharist the quantity or extension of bread and wine1 together with the taste1 colour1 form1 etc41 which affect this extension1 remain in existence after their connatural substance of bread and wine has disappeared by transubstantiation4 ,in the supernatural order of ,his providence ,god preserves these accidents in existence without a subject2 but in this state1 though they do not actually inhere in any substance1 they retain their natural aptitude and exigence for such inherence4 ,the ,christian philosopher1 therefore1 will not define accident as 8the mode of being which inheres in a subject10 but as 8the mode of being which in the ordinary course of nature inheres in a subject10 or as 8the mode of being which has a natural exigence to inhere in a subject04 ,it is not actual inherence1 but the natural exigence to inhere1 that is essential to an accident as such47#bej7 ,furthermore1 an accident needs a substance not formally qua substance1 or as a mode of being naturally existing in itself2 it needs a substance as a subject in which to inhere1 which it will in some way affect1 determine1 qualify2 but the subject in which it immediately inheres need not always be a substance3 it may be some other accident1 in which case both of course will naturally require some substance as their ultimate basis4 ,comparing now the concept of accident with that of substance1 we find that the latter is presupposed by the former2 that the latter is prior in thought to the former2 that we conceive accident as something over and above1 something superadded to substance as subject4 ,for instance1 we can define matter and form without the prior concept of body1 or animality and rationality without the prior concept of man2 but we cannot define colour without the prior concept of body1 or the faculty of speech without the prior concept of man47#bea7 ,substance1 therefore1 is prior in thought to accident2 but is the substance itself also prior temporally 7prior tempore7 to its accidents8 ,it is prior in time to some of them1 no doubt2 the individual human being is thus prior1 for instance1 to the knowledge he may acquire during life4 ,but there is no reason for saying that a substance must be prior in time to all its accidents27#beb7 so far as we can discover1 no created substance comes into existence devoid of all accidents3 corporeal substance devoid of internal quantity1 or spiritual substance devoid of intellect and will4 ,if prior in thought1 though not necessarily in time1 to its accidents1 is a substance prior to its accidents really1 ontologically 7prior natura78 ,yes2 it is the real or ontological principle of its accidents2 it sustains them1 and they depend on it4 ,it is a passive or material cause 7using the term 8material0 in the wide sense1 as applicable even to spiritual substances71 or a receptive subject1 determined in some way by them as formal principles4 ,it is at the same time an efficient and passive cause of some of its own accidents3 the soul is an efficient cause of its own immanent processes of thought and volition1 and at the same time a passive principle of them1 undergoing real change by their occurrence4 ,of others it is merely a receptive1 determinable subject1 of those1 namely1 which have an adequate and necessary foundation in its own essence1 and which are called properties in the strict sense3 without these it cannot exist1 though they do not constitute its essence1 or enter into the concept of the latter2 but it is not prior to them in time1 nor is it the efficient cause of them2 it is1 however1 a real principle of them1 an essence from the reality of which they necessarily result1 and on which their own reality depends4 ,such1 for instance1 is the faculty of thought1 or volition1 or speech in regard to man4 ,the accident-mode of being is1 therefore1 a mode of being which determines a substance in some real way4 ,its formal effect is to give the substance some real and definite determination3 not esse simpliciter but esse tale4 ,with the substance it constitutes a concrete real being which is unum per accidens1 not unum per se4 ,the accident has no formal cause3 it is itself a 8form0 and its causality is that of a formal cause1 which consists in its communicating itself to a subject1 and1 by its union therewith1 constituting some new reality--in this case a concrete being endowed with 8accidental0 unity4 ,accidents have of course1 a material cause2 not1 however1 in the sense of a materia ex qua1 a material from which they are constituted1 inasmuch as they are simple 8forms02 but in the sense of a subject in which they are received and in which they inhere2 and this 8material cause0 is1 proximately or remotely1 substance4 ,substance also is the final cause1 the raison d'tre1 of the reality of the accidental mode of being4 ,accidents exist for the perfecting of substances3 accidentia sunt propter substantiam4 ,as we have seen already1 and as will appear more clearly later on1 the fundamental reason for the reality of an accidental mode of being1 really distinct from the created or finite substance 7for the ,infinite ,substance has no accidents71 is that the created substance is imperfect1 limited in its actual perfection1 does not exist tota simul1 but develops1 through a process of change in time1 from its first or essential perfection1 through intermediate perfections1 till it reaches the final perfection 7#df7 of its being4 ,have all accidents efficient causes8 ,those which are called common accidents as distinct from proper accidents or properties 7#ff7 have undoubtedly efficient causes3 the various agencies which produce real but accidental changes in the individual substances of the universe4 ,proper accidents1 however1 inasmuch as they of necessity exist simultaneously with the substances to which they belong1 and flow from these substances by a necessity of the very essence of these latter1 cannot be said to have any efficient causes other than those which contribute by their efficiency to the substantial changes by which these substances are brought into actual existence2 nor can they be said to be caused efficiently by these substances themselves1 but only to 8flow0 or 8result0 necessarily from the latter1 inasmuch as they come into existence simultaneously with1 but dependently on1 these substances4 ,hence1 while substances are universally regarded as real principles of their properties--as1 for instance1 the soul in regard to intellect and will1 or corporeal substance in regard to quantity--they are not really efficient causes of their properties1 i4e4 they do not produce these properties by action4 ,for these properties are antecedent to all action of the substance2 nor can a created substance act by its essence1 but only through active powers1 or faculties1 or forces1 which meditate between the essence of a created substance and its actions1 and which are the proximate principles of these actions1 while the substance or nature is their remote principle4 ,hence the 8properties0 which necessarily result from a substance or nature1 have as their efficient causes the agencies productive of the substance itself47#bec7 #ff4 ,,main ,,divisions ,,of ,,accidents4--,these considerations will help us to understand the significance of a few important divisions of accidents3 into proper and common1 inseparable and separable4 ,we shall then be in a position to examine the nature of the distinction between accidents and substance1 and to establish the existence of accidents really distinct from substance4 7a7 ,the attributes which we affirm of substance1 other than the notes constitutive of its essence1 are divided into proper accidents1 or properties in the strict sense 71 proprium71 and common accidents1 or accidents in the more ordinary sense 71 ac-cidens74 ,a property is an accident which belongs exclusively to a certain class or kind of substance1 and is found always in all members of that class1 inasmuch as it has an adequate foundation in the nature of that substance and a necessary connexion therewith4 ,such1 for instance1 are the faculties of intellect and will in all spiritual beings2 the faculties of speaking1 laughing1 weeping in man2 the temporal and spatial mode of being which characterizes all created substances47#bed7 ,when regarded from the logical point of view1 as attributes predicable of their substances considered as logical subjects1 they are distinguished on the one hand from what constitutes the essence of this subject 7as genus1 differentia1 species71 but also on the other hand from those attributes which cannot be seen to have any absolutely necessary connexion with this subject4 ,the latter attributes alone are called logical accidents1 the test being the absence of a necessary connexion in thought with the logical subject47#bee7 ,but the former class1 which are distinguished from 8logical0 accidents and called logical properties 78propria07 are none the less real accidents when considered from the ontological standpoint2 for they do not constitute the essence of the substance2 they are outside the concept of the latter1 and super-added--though necessarily--to it4 ,whether1 however1 all or any of these 8properties10 which philosophers thus classify as real or ontological accidents1 8proper0 accidents1 of certain substances1 are really distinct from the concrete1 individual substances to which they belong1 or are only aspects of the latter1 8substantial modes10 only virtually distinct in each case from the individual substance itself1--is another and more difficult question 7#fi74 ,such a property is certainly not really separable from its substance2 we cannot conceive either to exist really without the other2 though we can by abstraction think1 and reason1 and speak1 about either apart from the other47#bef7 ,real inseparability is1 however1 regarded by scholastic philosophers as quite compatible with what they understand by a real distinction 7#ch74 ,a common accident is one which has no such absolutely necessary connexion with its substance as a 8property0 has2 one which1 therefore1 can be conceived as absent from the substance without thereby entailing the destruction of the latter's essence1 or of anything bound up by a necessity of thought with this essence4 ,and such common accidents are of two kinds4 ,they may be such that in the ordinary course of nature1 and so far as its forces and laws are concerned1 they are never found to be absent from their connatural substances--inseparable accidents4 ,thus the colour of the ,ethiopian is an inseparable accident of his human nature as an ,ethiopian2 he is naturally black2 but if born of ,ethiopian parents he would still be an ,ethiopian even if he happened to grow up white instead of black4 ,we could not1 however1 conceive an ,ethiopian1 or any other human being1 existing without the faculties 7not the use7 of intellect and will1 or the faculty 7not the organs1 or the actual exercise of the faculty7 of human speech4 ,or common accidents may be such that they are sometimes present in their substances1 and sometimes absent--separable accidents4 ,these are by far the most numerous class of accidents3 thinking1 willing1 talking1 and actions generally2 health or illness2 virtues1 vices1 acquired habits2 rest or motion1 temperature1 colour1 form1 location1 etc4 7b7 ,the next important division of accidents is that into mere extrinsic denominations and intrinsic accidents2 the latter being subdivided into modal and absolute accidents1 respectively4 ,an absolute accident is one which not merely affects its substance intrinsically1 giving the latter an actual determination or mode of being1 of some sort or other1 but which has moreover some entity or reality proper to itself whereby it thus affects the substance1 an entity really distinct from the essence of the substance thus determined by it4 ,such1 for instance1 are all vital activities of living things27#beg7 knowledge1 and other acquired habits2 quantity1 the fundamental accident whereby corporeal substances are all capable of existing extended in space2 and such sensible qualities and energies of matter as heat1 colour1 mechanical force1 electrical energy1 etc4 ,such1 too1 according to many1 are intellect1 will1 and sense faculties in man4 ,there are1 however1 other intrinsic determinations of substance1 other modifications of the latter1 which do not seem to involve any new or additional reality in the substance1 over and above the modification itself4 ,such1 for instance1 are motion1 rest1 external form or figure1 in bodies4 ,these are called modal accidents4 ,they often affect not the substance itself immediately1 but some absolute accident of the latter1 and are hence called 8accidental modes04 ,those enumerated are obviously modes of the quantity of bodies4 ,now the appearance or disappearance of such an accident in a substance undoubtedly involves a real change in the latter1 and not merely in our thought2 when a body moves1 or comes to rest1 or alters its form1 there is a change in the reality as well as in our thought2 and in this sense these accidents are real and intrinsic to their substances4 ,yet1 though we cannot say that motion1 rest1 shape1 etc41 are really identical with the body and only mentally distinct aspects of it1 at the same time neither can we say that by their appearance or disappearance the body gains or loses any reality other than an accidental determination of itself2 whereas it does gain something more than this when it is heated1 or electrified1 or increased in quantity2 just as a man who acquires knowledge1 or virtue1 is not only really modified1 but is modified by real entities which he has acquired1 not having actually possessed them before4 ,finally1 there are accidents which do not affect the substance intrinsically at all1 which do not determine any real change in it1 but merely give it an extrinsic denomination in relation to something outside it 7#fj74 ,thus1 while the quality of heat is an absolute accident in a body1 the action whereby the latter heats neighbouring bodies is no new reality in the body itself1 and produces no real change in the latter1 but only gives it the extrinsic denomination of heating in reference to these other bodies in which the effect really takes place4 ,similarly the location of any corporeal substance in space or in time relatively to others in the space or time series--its external place 7ubi7 or time 7quando71 as they are called--or the relative position of its parts 7situs7 in the place occupied by it3 these do not intrinsically determine it or confer upon it any intrinsic modification of its substance4 ,not1 indeed1 that they are mere entia rationis1 mere logical fictions of our thought4 ,they are realities1 but not realities which affect the substances denominated from them2 they are accidental modes of other substances1 or of the absolute accidents of other substances4 ,finally1 the accident which we call a 8real relation0 presupposes in its subject some absolute accident such as quantity or quality1 or some real and intrinsic change determining these1 or affecting the substance itself2 but whether relation is itself a reality over and above such foundation1 is a disputed question4 ,from these classifications of accidents it will be at once apparent that the general notion of accident1 as a dependent mode of being1 superadded to the essence of a substance and in some way determining the latter1 is realized in widely different and merely analogical ways in the different ultimate classes of accidents4 #fg4 ,,real ,,existence ,,of ,,accidents4 ,,nature ,,of ,,the ,,distinction ,,between ,,accidents ,,and ,,substance4--,it would be superfluous to prove the general proposition that accidents really exist4 ,in establishing the real existence of substances we have seen that the real existence of some accidents at least has never been seriously denied4 ,these are often called nowadays phenomena2 and philosophers who have denied or doubted the real existence of substances have been called 8phenomenists0 simply because they have admitted the real existence only of these phenomena2 though1 if they were as logical as ,hume they might have seen with him that such denial1 so far from abolishing substance1 could only lead to the substantializing of accidents 7#fc74 ,but while undoubtedly there are realities which 8exist in themselves10 such as individual men1 animals and plants1 there is no reason for attributing this same mode of existence to entities such as the thoughts1 volitions1 emotions1 virtues or vices1 of the individual man2 or the instinct1 hunger1 or illness of the dog2 or the colour1 perfume1 or form of the rose4 ,the concrete individual man1 or dog1 or rose1 reveals itself to our minds as a substantial entity1 affected with these various accidental entities which are really distinct from the substantial entity itself and from one another4 ,nay1 in most of the instances just cited1 they are physically separable from the substantial entity in which they inhere2 not of course in the sense that they could actually exist without it1 but in the sense that it can and does continue to exist actually without them 7#ch72 for it continues to exist while they come and go1 appear and disappear47#beh7 ,of course the concrete individual man1 or dog1 or rose1 does not continue to exist actually unchanged1 and totally identical with itself throughout the change of accidents 7#fd71 for the accidents are part of the concrete individual reality2 nay1 even the substance itself of the concrete individual does not remain totally unaffected by the change of the accidents2 because if they really affect it1 as they do1 their change cannot leave it totally unaffected2 substance is not at all a changeless1 concrete core1 surrounded by an ever-changing rind or vesture of accidents2 or a dark1 hidden1 immutable and inscrutable background of a panorama of phenomena 7#fd74 ,but though it is beyond all doubt really affected by the change of its accidents1 it is also beyond all doubt independent of them in regard to the essential mode of its being1 in as much as it exists and continues to exist in itself throughout all fluctuation of its accidents2 while these on the other hand have only that essentially dependent mode of being whereby they are actual only by affecting and determining some subject in which they inhere and which supports their actuality4 ,the existence1 therefore1 of some accidents1 which are not only really distinct but even physically separable from their substances1 cannot reasonably be called into question4 ,to deny the existence of such accidents1 or1 what comes to the same thing1 their real distinction from substance1 is to take up some one of these three equally untenable positions3 that all the changes which take place within and around us are substantial changes2 or1 that there is no such thing as real change1 all change being a mental illusion2 or1 that contradictory states can be affirmed of the same reality47#bei7 ,but the nature of the real distinction between accidents and substance is not in all cases so easy to determine4 ,nor can we discuss the question here in reference to each summum genus of accident separately4 ,deferring to the chapter on ,relation the question of the distinction of this particular accident from substance and the other categories1 we may confine our attention here to the distinction between substance and the three classes of accidents we have called extrinsic denominations1 modal accidents1 and absolute accidents respectively4 8,there are accidents10 writes ,kleutgen17#bfj7 8which place nothing and change nothing in the subject itself1 but are ascribed to it by reason of some extrinsic thing2 others1 again1 produce indeed in the subject itself some new mode of being1 but without their existing in it as a new reality1 distinct from its reality2 others1 finally1 are themselves a new reality1 and have thus a being which is proper to themselves1 though this being is of course dependent on the substance4 ,these latter alone can be really distinct from the substance1 in the full sense in which a real distinction is that between thing and thing4 ,now ,cartesian philosophers have denied that there are any such accidents as those of the latter class2 rejecting the division of accidents into absolute and modal1 they teach that all accidents are mere modifications or determinations of substance1 that they consist solely of various locations and combinations of the ultimate parts of a substance1 or relations of the latter to other substances40 ,now all extrinsic denominations of a substance do seem on analysis ultimately to resolve themselves partly into relations of the latter to other substances1 and partly into modal or absolute accidents of other substances4 ,hence we may confine our attention here to the distinction between these two classes of accident and their connatural substances4 ,and1 approaching this question1 it will be well for us to bear two things in mind4 ,in the first place1 our definitions both of substance and of accident are abstract and generic or universal4 ,but the abstract and universal does not exist as such4 ,the concrete1 individual1 actually existing substance is never merely 8a being that naturally exists in itself10 nor is the accident of such a substance merely a verification of its definition as 8a being that naturally inheres in something else04 ,in every case what really and actually exists is the individual1 a being concreted of substance and accidents1 a being which is ever and always a real unity1 composite no doubt1 but really one2 and this no matter what sort of distinction we hold to obtain between the substance and its accidents4 ,this is important2 its significance will be better appreciated according as we examine the distinctions in question4 ,secondly1 as scholastics understand a real distinction1 this can obtain not merely between different 8persons0 or 8things0 which are separate from one another in time or space1 but also between different constitutive principles of any one single concrete1 composite1 individual being 7#ch74 ,we have seen that they are not agreed as to whether the essence and the existence of any actual creature are really distinct or not 7#bd74 ,and it may help us to clear up our notion of 8accident0 if we advert here to their discussion of the question whether or not an accident ought to be regarded as having an existence of its own1 an existence proper to itself4 ,those who think that the distinction between essence and existence in created things is a real distinction1 hold that accidents as such have no existence of their own1 that they are actualized by the existence of the substance1 or rather of the concrete1 composite individual2 that since the latter is a real unity--not a mere artificial aggregation of entities1 but a being naturally one--it can have only one existence3 ,impossibile est quod unius rei non sit unum esse27#bfa7 that by this one existence the concrete1 composite essence of the substance1 as affected and determined by its accidents1 is actualized4 ,they contend that if each of the principles1 whether substantial or accidental1 of a concrete individual being had its own existence1 their union1 no matter how intimate1 could not form a natural unitary being1 an individual1 but only an aggregate of such beings4 ,it is neither the matter1 nor the form1 nor the corporeal substance apart from its accidents1 that exists3 it is the substance completely determined by all its accidents and modes that is the proper subject of existence47#bfb7 ,it alone is actualized1 and that by one existence1 which is the 8ultimate actuality0 of the concrete1 composite1 individual essence3 esse est ultimus actus4 ,hence it is too1 they urge1 that an accident should be conceived not properly as 8a being10 but only as that whereby a being is such or such3 ,accidens non est ens1 sed ens entis4 ,but it cannot be so conceived if we attribute to it an existence of its own2 for then it would be 8a being0 in the full and proper sense of the word4 ,this is the view of ,st4 ,thomas1 and of ,thomists generally4 ,the arguments in support of it are serious1 but not convincing4 ,and the same may be said of the reasons adduced for the opposite view3 that existence not being really distinct from essence1 accidents in so far as they can be said to have an essence of their own have likewise an existence of their own4 ,supporters of this view not only admit but maintain that the entity of a real1 existing accident is a 8diminished0 entity1 inasmuch as it is dependent in a sense in which a really existing substance is not dependent4 ,they simply deny the ,thomist assertion that substantial and accidental principles cannot combine to form a real and natural unit1 an individual being1 if each be accorded an existence appropriate and proportionate to its partial essence2 nor indeed can ,thomists prove this assertion4 ,moreover1 if existence be not really distinct from essence1 there is no more inconvenience in the claim that partial existences can combine to form one complete existence1 unum esse1 than in the ,thomist claim that partial essences1 such as substantial and accidental constitutive principles1 can combine to form one complete essence1 one individual subject of existence4 ,then1 furthermore1 it is urged that the substance exists prior in time to some of its accidents2 that it is prior in nature to its properties1 which are understood to proceed or flow from it2 and that therefore its existence cannot be theirs1 any more than its essence can be theirs4 ,finally1 it is pointed out that since existence is the actuality of essence1 the existence which actualizes a substance cannot be identical with that which actualizes an accident4 ,at all events1 whether the one existence of the concrete individual substance as determined by its accidents be as it were a simple and indivisible existential act1 which actualizes the composite individual subject1 as ,thomists hold1 or whether it be a composite existential act1 really identical with the composite individual subject1 as in the other view17#bfc7 this concrete existence of the individual is constantly varying with the variation of the accidents of the individual4 ,this is equally true on either view4 ,inquiring into the distinction between substance and its intrinsic accidents1 whether modal or absolute1 we have first to remark that all accidents cannot possibly be reduced to relations2 for if relation itself is something extrinsic to the things related1 it must at least presuppose a real and intrinsic foundation or basis for itself in the things related4 ,local motion1 for instance1 is a change in the spatial relations of a body to other bodies4 ,but it cannot be merely this4 ,for if spatial relations are not mere subjective or mental fabrications1 if they are in any intelligible sense real1 then a change in them must involve a change of something intrinsic to the bodies concerned4 ,now ,descartes1 in denying the existence of absolute accidents1 in reducing all accidents to modes of substances1 understood by modes not any intrinsic determinations of substance1 but only extrinsic determinations of the latter4 ,all accidents of material substance were for him mere locations1 arrangements1 dispositions of its extended parts3 extension being its essence4 ,similarly1 all accidents of spiritual substance were for him mere modalities and mutual relations of its 8thought0 or 8consciousness03 this latter being for him the essence of spirit4 ,we have here not only the error of identifying or confounding accidents such as thought and extension with their connatural substances1 spirit and matter1 but also the error of supposing that extrinsic relations and modes of a substance1 and changes in these1 can be real1 without there being in the substances themselves any intrinsic1 real1 changeable accidents1 which would account for the extrinsic relations and their changes4 ,if there are no intrinsic accidents1 really affecting and determining substances1 and yet really distinct from the latter1 then we must admit either that all change is an illusion or else that all change is substantial2 and this is the dilemma that really confronts the ,cartesian philosophy4 #fh4 ,,modal ,,accidents ,,and ,,the ,,modal ,,distinction4--,the real distinction which we claim to exist between a substance and its intrinsic accidents is not the same in all cases3 in regard to some accidents1 which we have called intrinsic modes of the substance1 it is a minor or modal real distinction2 in regard to others which we have called absolute accidents1 it is a major real distinction 7#ch74 ,let us first consider the former4 ,the term mode has a variety of meanings1 some very wide1 some restricted4 ,when one concept determines or limits another in any way we may call it a mode of the latter4 ,if there is no real distinction between the determining and the determined thought-object1 the mode is called a metaphysical mode3 as rationality is of animality in man4 ,again1 created things are all 8modes0 of being2 and the various aspects of a creature may be called 8modes0 of the latter3 as 8finiteness0 is a mode of every created being4 ,we do not use the term in those wide senses in the present context4 ,here we understand by a mode some positive reality which so affects another and distinct reality as to determine the latter proximately to some definite way of existing or acting1 to which the latter is itself indifferent2 without1 however1 adding to the latter any new and proper entity other than the said determination47#bfd7 ,such modes are called physical modes4 ,and some philosophers maintain that there are not only accidental modes1 thus really distinct from the substance1 but that there are even some substantial modes really distinct from the essence of the substance which they affect3 for instance1 that the really distinct constitutive principles of any individual corporeal substance1 matter and form1 are actually united only in virtue of a substantial mode whereby each is ordained for union with the other2 or that subsistence1 whereby the individual substance is made a subsistent and incommunicable 8person0 or 8thing10 is a substantial mode of the individual nature47#bfe7 ,with these latter we are not concerned here1 but only with accidental modes1 such as external shape or figure1 local motion1 position1 action17#bff7 etc4 ,now when a substance is affected by such accidents as these it is impossible on the one hand to maintain that they add any new positive entity of their own to it2 they do not seem to have any reality over and above the determination or modification in which their very presence in the substance consists4 ,and on the other hand it cannot be denied that they express some real predicate which can be affirmed of the substance in virtue of their presence in it1 and that independently of our thought2 in other words it cannot be maintained that they are mere figments or forms of thought1 mere entia rationis4 ,if a piece of wax has a certain definite shape1 this shape is inseparable from the wax3 it is nothing except in the wax1 for it cannot exist apart from the wax2 but in the wax it is something in some real sense distinct from the wax1 inasmuch as the wax would persist even if it disappeared4 ,no doubt it is essential to the wax1 as extended in space1 to have some shape or other2 but it is indifferent to any particular shape1 and hence something distinct from it is required to remove this indifference4 ,this something is the particular shape it actually possesses4 ,the shape1 therefore1 is an accidental mode of the extension of the wax1 a mode which is really distinct1 by a minor real distinction1 from this extension which is its immediate subject47#bfg7 ,hence we conclude that there are accidental modes1 or modal accidents1 really distinct from the subjects in which they inhere4 #fi4 ,,distinction ,,between ,,substance ,,and ,,its 8,,proper0 ,,accidents4 ,,unity ,,of ,,the ,,concrete ,,being4--,turning next to the distinction between absolute accidents and substance1 we have seen already that separable absolute accidents such as acquired habits of mind and certain sensible qualities and energies of bodies are really distinct from their subjects4 ,absolute accidents which are naturally inseparable from their subjects--such as external quantity or spatial extension or volume is in regard to the corporeal substance--are also really distinct from their subjects2 though we cannot know by reason alone whether or how far such accidents are absolutely separable from these subjects3 from ,christian ,revelation we know that extension at least is separable from the substance of a body1 and with extension all the other corporeal accidents which inhere immediately in extension47#bfh7 ,but a special difficulty arises in regard to the nature of the distinction between a substance and its proper accidents17#bfi7 i4e4 those which have such an adequate and necessary ground in the essence of the substance that the latter cannot exist without them3 accidents which are simultaneous with the substance and proceed necessarily from it1 such as the internal quantity of a corporeal substance1 or the intellectual and appetitive powers or faculties of a spiritual substance4 ,the medieval scholastic philosophers were by no means unanimous as to the nature of this distinction4 ,their discussion of the question centres mainly around the distinction between the spiritual human soul and its spiritual faculties1 intellect and will1 and between these faculties themselves4 ,it is instructive--as throwing additional light on what they understood by a real distinction--to find that while ,thomists generally have held that the distinction here in question is a real distinction1 many other scholastics have held that it is only a virtual distinction1 while ,scotists have generally taught that it is a formal distinction 7#ce-ci74 ,kleutgen7#bgj7 interprets the formal distinction advocated by ,scotus in the present context as really equivalent to the virtual distinction4 ,st4 ,bonaventure1 after referring to the latter distinction1 and to the real distinction propounded by ,st4 ,thomas1 adopts himself an intermediate view3 that the faculties of the soul are indeed really distinct from one another1 but nevertheless are not really distinct1 as accidental entities1 from the substance of the soul itself4 ,we see how this can be by considering that the material and formal principles which constitute a corporeal substance1 though really distinct from each other1 are not really distinct from the substance itself4 ,they are not accidents of the latter but constitute its essence1 and so are to be referred reductiv to the category of substance4 ,so1 by analogy1 the faculties of the soul1 though really distinct from each other1 do not belong to any accidental category really distinct from the substance of the soul1 but belong reductiv to the latter category1 not indeed as constituting1 but as flowing immediately and necessarily from1 the substance of the soul itself47#bga7 ,and1 like ,st4 ,thomas1 he finds the ultimate source and explanation of this multiplicity of faculties and forces in the finiteness of the created substance as such47#bgb7 ,but ,st4 ,thomas went farther than ,st4 ,bonaventure1 for he taught--as indeed ,thomists generally teach1 and many who are not ,thomists--that the faculties of the human soul are really distinct from one another1 not merely as proximate principles of really distinct vital acts1 but as accidental entities or essences2 and that as such they are really distinct from the essence or substance itself of the human soul4 ,the arguments in favour of this view will be given in their proper place in connexion with the category of ,quality4 ,if they are not demonstrative in their force1 they are certainly such that the view for which they make is very highly probable2 but we are concerned here to show1 in this concluding section1 that the recognition of a real distinction in general between substance and its accidents does not in any way compromise the real unity of the concrete individual being4 ,it has been widely accused of doing so by philosophers who try to discredit this view without fully understanding it4 ,this characteristically modern attitude is illustrated by the persistent attempts that have been made in recent times to throw ridicule on what they describe as the 8faculty psychology047#bgc7 ,the source of this groundless charge lies partly in the mistaken conception of accident and substance as concrete entities superadded the one to the other2 partly in the mistaken notion that the union of substance and accidents cannot result in a real unity1 that there cannot be more or less perfect grades of real unity 7#bg72 and partly in the false assumption that real distinction always implies mutual separability of concrete entities4 ,of these errors we need only refer to that concerning unity4 ,modern philosophers not uncommonly conceive the union of substance and accidents as being necessarily a mere mechanical union or aggregation1 and oppose it to 8organic0 unity which they regard as a real unity involving the richness of an energetic1 8living0 multiplicity4 ,this involves a misrepresentation of the traditional scholastic view4 ,the union of substance and accident is not a mechanical union4 ,nothing could be farther from the minds of the scholastic interpreters of ,aristotle than the conception of the ultimate principles of the universe of our experience as inert entities moved according to purely mechanical laws2 or of the individual concrete being as a mere machine1 or a mere aggregate of mechanical elements4 ,they recognized even in the individual inorganic substance an internal1 unifying1 active and directive principle of all the energies and activities of the thing--its substantial form4 ,and if this is all those philosophers mean by the metaphorical transference of the terms 8organic unity10 8internal living principle of development10 etc41 to the mineral world1 they are so far in accord with the traditional scholastic philosophy27#bgd7 while if they mean that all substances are principles of 8vital0 energy1 or that all reality is one organic unity1 in the literal sense of these terms1 they are committing themselves either to the palpably false theory of pan-psychism1 or to the gratuitous reassertion of a very old and very crude form of monism4 ,by 8organic0 unity we understand the unity of any living organism1 a unity which is much more perfect than that of the parts of a machine1 or than any natural juxtaposition of material parts in an inorganic whole2 for the organs1 though distinct in number and in nature from one another1 are united by an internal principle to form one living individual1 so that if any organ were separated from the living organism it would cease to be an organ47#bge7 ,but organic unity is not by any means the most perfect kind of unity conceivable47#bgf7 ,the living organism exists and develops and attains to the perfection of its being only through a multiplicity of integral parts extended in space4 ,the spiritual substance is subject to no such dispersion of its being4 ,from its union with the faculties whereby it attains to its natural development1 there results a real unity of a higher order than that of any organism4 ,and nevertheless1 even though the unity of the concrete spiritual substance and its faculties be so far higher than a mechanical or even an organic unity1 it is not perfect4 ,even though the faculties of the soul be determinations of its substance1 even though they flow from it as actualities demanded by its essence for the normal and natural development of its being1 still it is a complete subsisting essence of its kind without them2 it possesses its essential perfection without them1 so that however intimate be their union with it they can never form one essence with it2 it needs them only for the fuller development of its being by acquiring further intermediate perfections and thus attaining to its final perfection 7#df74 ,and here we touch on the most fundamental ground of the distinction1 in all created things1 between their substance and their accidental perfections4 ,unlike the ,necessary1 ,absolute ,being1 whose infinite perfection is the eternal actuality of ,his essence1 no creature possesses the actuality of its being tota simul1 but only by a progressive development whereby it gradually acquires really new intermediate and final perfections1 really distinct from1 though naturally due to1 its essence4 ,hence1 even though some of its accidents--properties such as the powers and faculties we have been discussing--be not really distinct from the essence wherewith they are necessarily connected1 this is not true of its acquired habits and dispositions1 or of the activities which proceed from these latter as their proximate principles4 ,at the same time the concrete being is1 at every moment of its existence and development1 a real unity1 but a unity which1 involving in itself as it does a real multiplicity of distinct principles1 must ever fall infinitely short of the perfect type of real unity--that realized only in the ,self-,existent1 ,necessary ,being4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,nature ,,and ,,person4 #gj4 ,,some ,,divisions ,,of ,,substances4--,in the preceding chapter we discussed the nature of substance and accident in general1 and the relation between a substance and its accidents4 ,we must next examine the category of substance more in detail1 terminating as it does in the important concept of personality or person4 ,this latter conception is one which must have its origin for all philosophers in the study of the human individual1 but which1 for scholastic philosophers1 is completed and perfected by the light of ,christian ,revelation4 ,we shall endeavour to show in the first place what can be gathered from the light of reason about the constitution of personality1 and also briefly to note how ,christian ,revelation has increased our insight into the perfections involved in it4 ,as leading up to the concept of person1 we must set forth certain divisions or classifications of substance3 into first and second substances1 and into complete and incomplete substances47#bgg7 7a7 ,the specific and generic natures of substantial entities do not inhere1 like accidents1 in individual substances2 they constitute the essence of the latter1 and hence these universals are called substances4 ,but the universal as such does not really exist2 it is realized only in individuals2 in the logical order it pre-supposes the individual as a logical subject of which it is affirmed1 a subjectum attributionis seu praedicationis4 ,hence it is called a second substance1 while the individual substance is called a first substance4 ,of course we can predicate attributes of universal substances1 and use these as logical subjects1 as when we say 8,man is mortal04 ,but such propositions have no real meaning1 and give us no information about reality1 except in so far as we can refer their predicates 78mortal071 through the medium of their universal subjects 78man071 back ultimately to the individual substances 7,john1 ,james1 etc47 which alone are real1 and in which alone the universal 78man07 has its reality4 ,hence the individual is1 in the logical order1 the ultimate and fundamental subject of all our predications4 ,and furthermore1 the individual substance cannot be used as a logical predicate of anything underlying itself1 while the universal substance can be so used in relation to the individual4 ,in the ontological order1 of course1 the universal substance is individualized1 and1 as individual1 it is the subject in which all accidents inhere1 their subjectum inhaesionis3 the only subject of many of them1 and the remote or ultimate subject of those of them which inhere immediately in other accidents4 ,thus while in the ontological order all substances1 whether we think of them as universal or as individual1 are the ultimate subjects of inhesion for all real accidents1 in the logical order it is only the individual substance that is the ultimate subject of attribution for all logical predicates4 ,hence it was that the individual substance 7 71 vindicating for itself more fully the rle of subject1 was called by ,aristotle 1 substantia prima1 while he called the universal1 specific or generic substance1 1 substantia secunda47#bgh7 ,these are1 of course1 two ways of regarding substance1 and not two really distinct species of substance as genus4 ,the distinction between the membra dividentia is logical1 not real4 ,the perfectly intelligible sense in which ,aristotle and the scholastics designate the universal a substance1 the sense of moderate realism1 according to which the universal constitutes1 and is identical with1 the essence of the individual 8person0 or 8thing10 is entirely different from the sense in which many exponents of modern monistic idealism conceive the universal as the substance par excellence1 the ens realissimum1 determining1 expressing1 evolving itself in the individual phenomena of mind and of nature1 which would be merely its manifestations47#bgi7 7b7 ,the divisions of substance into spiritual and corporeal1 of the latter into inorganic and organic1 of these again into vegetative and animal1 and finally of animal substances into brute animals and human beings1--offer no special difficulties4 ,all purely natural or rational knowledge of the possibility and nature of purely spiritual substances is based on the analogy of our knowledge of the human soul1 which1 though a spiritual substance1 is not a pure spirit1 but is naturally allied with matter in its mode of existence4 ,the individual human being offers to human experience the sole example of the sufficiently mysterious conjunction and combination of matter and spirit1 of the corporeal mode of being and the spiritual mode of being1 to form one composite substance1 partly corporeal and partly spiritual4 7c7 ,this in turn suggests the division of substances into simple and composite4 ,the latter are those which we understand to be constituted by the natural and substantial union of two really distinct but incomplete substantial principles1 a formative1 determining1 specifying principle1 and a material1 determinable1 indifferent principle3 such are all corporeal substances whether inorganic1 vegetative1 sentient1 or rational4 ,the former1 or simple substances1 are those which we understand to be constituted by a sole and single substantial principle which determines and specifies their essence1 without the conjunction of any material1 determinable principle4 ,we have no direct and immediate experience of any complete created substance of this kind2 but each of us has such direct experience of an incomplete simple substance1 viz4 his own soul2 while we can infer from our experience the existence of other incomplete simple substances1 viz4 the formative principles of corporeal substances1 as also the possibility of such complete simple substances as pure spirits1 and the actual existence of the perfectly simple1 uncreated substance of the ,infinite ,being4 7d7 ,if there are such things as composite substances1 i4e4 substances constituted by the substantial union of two really distinct principles1 then it follows that while the composite substance itself is complete1 each of its substantial constitutive principles is incomplete4 ,of course there are many philosophers nowadays who reject as mere mental fictions1 as products of mere logical distinctions1 and as devoid of objective validity1 the notions of composite substance and incomplete substance4 ,nor is this to be wondered at when we remember what a variety of groundless and gratuitous notions are current in regard to substance itself 7#fd74 ,but understanding substance in the traditional sense already explained 7#fb71 there is nothing whatever inconsistent in the notion of a composite substance1 or of an incomplete substance1--provided these notions are understood in the sense to be explained presently4 ,nay1 more1 not only are these notions intrinsically possible3 we must even hold them to be objectively valid and real1 to be truly expressive of the nature of reality1 unless we are prepared to hold that there is no such thing as substantial change in the universe1 and that man himself is a mere aggregate of material atoms moved according to mechanical laws and inhabited by a conscious soul1 or thinking principle1 rather than an individual being with one definite substantial nature4 ,what1 then1 are we to understand by complete and incomplete substances respectively8 ,a substance is regarded as complete in the fullest sense when it is wanting in no substantial principle without which it would be incapable of existing and discharging all its functions in the actual order as an individual of some definite species4 ,of course no created substance exists or discharges its functions unless it is endowed with some accidents1 e4g4 with properties1 faculties1 forces1 etc4 ,but there is no question of these here4 ,we are considering only the essential perfections of the substance4 ,thus1 then1 any existing individual of any species--a man1 a horse1 an oak--is a complete substance in this fullest sense4 ,it is complete in the line of substance1 in substantial perfection1 8in ordine substantialitatis10 inasmuch as it can exist 7and does actually exist7 without being conjoined or united substantially with any other substance to form a composite substance other than itself4 ,and it is complete in the line of specific perfection1 8in ordine speciei10 because not only can it exist without such conjunction with any other substantial principle1 but it can discharge all the functions natural to its species1 and thus tend towards its final perfection 7#dg7 without such conjunction4 ,but it is conceivable that a substance might be complete in the line of substantial perfections1 and thus be capable of existing in the actual order and discharging there some of the functions of its species without conjunction with any other substantial principle1 and yet be incapable of discharging all the functions natural to an individual of its species without conjunction with some other substantial principle1 in which case it would be incomplete in the line of specific perfection1 though complete in everything pertaining to its substantiality4 ,we know of one such substance1--the human soul4 ,being spiritual and immortal1 it can exist apart from the body to which it is united by nature1 and in this separated condition retain and exercise its spiritual faculties of intellect and will2 it is therefore complete as regards the distinctively substantial perfection whereby it is 8capable of existing in itself04 ,but being of its nature destined for union with a material principle1 constituting an individual of the human species only by means of such union1 and being capable of discharging some of the functions of this species1 viz4 the sentient and vegetative functions1 only when so united1 it has not all the perfections of its species independently of the body2 and it is therefore an incomplete substance in the line of specific perfections1 though complete in those essential to its substantiality4 ,again1 if it be true that just as man is composed of two substantial principles1 soul and body1 so every living thing is composed of a substantial vital principle and a substantial material principle1 and that every inorganic individual thing is likewise composed of two really distinct substantial principles1 a formative and a passive or material principle2 and if1 furthermore1 it be true that apart from the spiritual principle in man every other vital or formative principle of the composite 8things0 of our experience is of such a nature that it cannot actually exist except in union with some material principle1 and vice versa1--then it follows necessarily that all such substantial principles of these complete composite substances are themselves incomplete substances3 and incomplete not only in regard to perfections which would make them subsisting individuals of a species1 but 7unlike the human soul7 incomplete even in the line of substantiality itself1 inasmuch as no one of them is capable of actually existing at all except in union with its connatural and correlative principle4 ,thus we arrive at the notion of substances that are incomplete in the line of specific perfections1 or in that of substantial perfections1 or even in both lines4 ,an incomplete substance1 therefore1 is not one which verifies the definition of substance only in part4 ,the incomplete substance fully verifies the definition of a substance47#bhj7 ,it is conjoined1 no doubt1 with another to form a complete substance2 but it does not exist in the other1 or in the composite substance1 as accidents do4 ,it is a substantial principle of the composite substance1 not an accidental determination of the latter1 or of the other substantial principle with which it is conjoined4 ,it thus verifies the notion of substance as a mode of being which naturally exists in itself2 and united with its correlative substantial principle it discharges the function of supporting all accidental determinations which affect the composite substantial essence4 ,since1 however1 it does not exist itself independently as an individual of a species1 but only forms the complete individual substance by union with its correlative substantial principle1 it may be1 and has been1 accurately described as not belonging to the category of substance formally1 but only referentially1 8reductiv04 ,the concepts of composite substance1 of complete and incomplete substances1 understood as we have just explained them1 are therefore perfectly intelligible in themselves4 ,and this is all we are concerned to show in the present context4 ,this is not the place to establish the theses of psychology and cosmology from which they are borrowed4 ,that the human soul is spiritual and immortal2 that its union with a really distinct material principle to form the individual human substance or nature is a substantial union2 that all living organisms and all inorganic bodies are really composite substances and subject to substantial change3 these various theses of scholastic philosophy we here assume to be true4 ,and if they are true the conception of incomplete substances naturally united to form a complete composite substance is not only intelligible as an hypothesis but is objectively true and valid as a thesis2 and thus the notion of an incomplete substance is not only a consistent and legitimate notion1 but is also a notion which gives mental expression to an objective reality4 ,we may add this consideration3 ,the concept of an accident really distinct from its substance involves no intrinsic repugnance4 ,yet an accident is a mode of being which is so weak and wanting in reality1 if we may speak in such terms1 that it cannot naturally exist except by inhering1 mediately or immediately1 in the stronger and more real mode of being which is substance4 ,but an incomplete substance is a higher grade of reality than any accident4 ,therefore if accidents can be real1 a fortiori incomplete substances can be real4 #ga4 ,,substance ,,and ,,nature4--,we have already pointed out 7#ac7 that the terms 8essence10 8substance10 and 8nature0 denote what is really the same thing1 regarded under different aspects4 ,the term 8essence0 is somewhat wider than 8substance10 inasmuch as it means 8what a thing is10 whether the thing be a substance1 an accident1 or a concrete existing individual including substance and accidents4 ,the traditional meaning of the term 8nature0 in ,aristotelian and scholastic philosophy is unmistakable4 ,it means the essence or substance of an individual person or thing1 regarded as the fundamental principle of the latter's activities4 ,every finite individual comes into existence incomplete1 having no doubt its essential perfections and properties actually1 but its intermediate and final perfections only potentially 7#dg74 ,these it realizes gradually1 through the exercise of its connatural activities4 ,every being is essentially intended for activity of some sort3 8,omne ens est propter suam operationem10 says ,st4 ,thomas4 ,and by the constant interplay of their activities these beings realize and sustain the universal order which makes the world a cosmos4 ,there is in all things an immanent purpose or finality which enables us to speak of the whole system which they form as 8,universal ,nature047#bha7 ,therefore what we call a substance or essence from the static point of view we call a nature when we consider it from the dynamic standpoint1 or as an agent47#bhb7 ,no doubt the forces1 faculties and powers1 the active and passive accidental principles1 whereby such an agent exerts and undergoes action1 are the proximate principles of all this action and change1 but the remote and fundamental principle of the latter is the essence or substance of the agent itself1 in other words its nature4 ,not all modern scholastics1 however1 are willing thus to identify nature with substance4 ,we have no intuitive insight into what any real essence or substance is2 our knowledge of it is discursive1 derived by inference from the phenomena1 the operations1 the conduct of things1 in accordance with the principle1 ,operari sequitur esse4 ,moreover1 the actually existing1 concrete individual--a man1 for instance--has a great variety of activities1 spiritual1 sentient1 vegetative1 and inorganic2 he has1 moreover1 in the constitution of his body a variety of distinct organs and members2 he assimilates into his body a variety of inorganic substances2 the tissues of his body appear to be different in kind2 the vital functions which subserve nutrition1 growth and reproduction are at least analogous to mechanical1 physical and chemical changes1 if indeed they are not really and simply such2 it may be1 therefore1 that the ultimate material constituents of his body remain substantially unaltered in their passage into1 and through1 and out of the cycle of his vegetative life2 that they retain their elemental substantial forms while they assume a new nature by becoming parts of the one organic whole1 whose higher directive principle dominates and co-ordinates all their various energies47#bhc7 ,if this be so there is in the same individual a multiplicity of really and actually distinct substances2 each of these1 moreover1 has its own existence proportionate to its essence1 since the existence of a created reality is not really distinct from its essence2 nor is there any reason for saying that any of these substances is incomplete2 what we have a right to say is that no one of them separately is a complete nature1 that each being an incomplete nature unites with all the others to form one complete nature3 inasmuch as no one of them separately is an adequate intrinsic principle of all the functions which it can discharge1 and is naturally destined to discharge1 by its natural union with the others1 whereas there results from their union a new fundamental principle of a co-ordinated and harmonized system of operations--in a word1 a new nature4 ,this line of thought implies among other things 7a7 the view that whereas there is no ground for admitting the existence of incomplete substances1 there is ground for distinguishing between complete and incomplete natures2 7b7 the view that from the union or conjunction of an actual multiplicity of substances1 each remaining unaltered and persisting in its existence actually distinct from the others1 there can arise one single complete nature--a nature which will be one being simply and really1 unum ens per se et simpliciter1 and not merely an aggregate of beings or an accidental unity1 unum per accidens1--and there does arise such a nature whenever the component substances not merely co-operate to discharge certain functions which none of them could discharge separately 7which indeed is true of an accidental union1 as of two horses drawing a load which neither could draw by itself71 but when they unite in a more permanent and intimate way according to what we call 8natural laws0 or 8laws of nature10 so as to form a new fundamental principle of such functions47#bhd7 ,these views undoubtedly owe their origin to the belief that certain facts brought to light by the physical and biological sciences in modern times afford strong evidence that the elementary material constituents of bodies1 whether inorganic or living1 remain substantially unaltered while combining to form the multitudinous natural kinds or natures of those living or non-living material things4 ,it was to reconcile this supposed plurality of actually distinct and diverse substances in the individual with the indubitable real unity of the latter1 that these philosophers distinguished between substance and nature4 ,but it is not clear that the facts alleged afford any such evidence4 ,of course if the philosopher approaches the consideration of it with what we may call the atomic preconception of material substances as permanent1 unchangeable entities1 this view will preclude all recognition of substantial change in the universe2 it will therefore force him to conclude that each individual1 composite agent has a unity which must be less than substantial1 and which1 because he feels it to be more than a mere accidental or artificial unity1 he will describe as natural1 as a union to form one nature4 ,but if he approach the evidence in question with the view that substantial change is possible1 this view1 involving the recognition of incomplete substances as real1 will remove all necessity for distinguishing between substance and nature1 and will enable him to conclude that however various and manifold be the activities of the individual1 their co-ordination and unification1 as proceeding from the individual1 point to a substantial unity in the latter as their fundamental principle1 a unity resulting from the union of incomplete substances4 ,this latter is undoubtedly the view of ,st4 ,thomas1 of practically all the medieval scholastics1 and of most scholastics in modern times4 ,nor do we see any sufficient reason for receding from it1 or admitting the modern distinction between substance and nature4 ,and if it be objected that the view which admits the reality of incomplete substances and substantial change is as much a preconception as what we have called the atomic view of substance1 our answer is1 once more1 that since we have no intellectual intuition into the real constitution of the substances which constitute the universe1 since we can argue to this only by observing and reasoning from their activities on the principle ,operari requitur esse1 the evidence alone must decide which view of these substances is the correct one4 ,does the evidence afforded us by a scientific analysis of all the functions1 inorganic1 vegetative1 sentient and rational1 of an individual man1 forbid us to conclude that he is one complete substance1 resulting from the union of two incomplete substantial principles1 a spiritual soul and a material principle8 and at the same time compel us to infer that he is one complete nature resulting from the union of a plurality of principles supposed to be complete as substances and incomplete as natures8 ,we believe that it does not2 nor can we see that any really useful purpose is served by thus setting up a real distinction between substance and nature4 ,from the evidence to hand it is neither more nor less difficult to infer unity of substance than unity of nature in the individual4 ,the inference in question is an inference from facts in the phenomenal order1 in the domain of the senses1 to what must be actually there in the noumenal order1 in the domain of nature or substance1 a domain which cannot be reached by the senses but only by intellect4 ,nor will any imagination images which picture for us the physical fusion or coalescence of material things in the domain of the senses help us in the least to conceive in any positive way the mode in which incomplete natures or substances unite to form a complete nature or substance4 ,for these latter facts belong to the domain which the senses cannot reach at all1 and which intellect can reach only inferentially and not by direct insight4 ,hence we consider the view which regards real unity of nature as compatible with real and actual plurality of complete substances in the individual1 as improbable4 ,at the same time we do not believe that this view is a necessary corollary from the real identification of essence with existence in created things4 ,we have seen that even if accidents have their own existence in so far as they have their own essence--as they have if essence and existence be really identical--nevertheless the concrete substance as determined by its accidents can have a really unitary existence1 unum esse corresponding to and identical with its composite constitution 7#fg74 ,similarly1 if the existence of each incomplete substance is identical with its incomplete essence1 this is no obstacle to the complete substance--which results from the union of two such incomplete substantial principles--having one complete unitary existence identical with its composite essence4 ,hence it is useless to argue against the view that a plurality of actually distinct and complete substances can unite to form a complete nature which will be really one being1 on the ground that each complete substance has already its own existence and that things which have and preserve their own existence cannot form one being4 ,such an argument is inconclusive2 for although one being has of course only one existence1 it has not been proved that this one existence cannot result from the union of many incomplete existences3 especially if these existences be identical with the incomplete essences which are admittedly capable of uniting to form one complete essence4 ,it may1 however1 be reasonably urged against the opinion under criticism that1 since the complete substances are supposed to remain complete and unchanged in their state of combination1 it is difficult to see how this combination can be a real union and not merely an extrinsic juxtaposition1--one which remains in reality a merely accidental conjunction1 even though we may dignify it with the title of a 8natural union04 ,and finally it may be pointed out that in this view the operations of the individual have not really one ultimate intrinsic principle at all1 since behind the supposed unity of nature there is a more fundamental plurality of actually distinct substances4 #gb4 ,,subsistence ,,and ,,personality4--,we have already examined the relation between the individual and the universal1 between first and second substances1 in connexion with the doctrine of ,individuation 7#ca-c74 ,and we then saw that whatever it be that individuates the universal nature1 it is at all events not to be regarded as anything extrinsic and superadded to this nature in the individual1 as anything really distinct from this nature3 that1 for instance1 what makes ,plato's human nature to be ,plato's is not anything really distinct from the human nature that is in ,plato4 ,we have now to fix our attention on the nature as individualized4 ,we have to consider the complete individual nature or substance itself in actually existing individual 8things0 or 8persons04 ,we must remember that scholastics are not agreed as to whether there is a real distinction or only a virtual distinction between the actual existence and the complete individual essence or substance or nature of created individual beings 7#ba-d74 ,furthermore we have seen that philosophers who study the metaphysics of the inorganic world and of the lower forms of life are unable to say with certainty what is the individual in these domains3 whether it is the chemical molecule or the chemical atom or the electron2 whether it is the single living cell or the living mass consisting of a plurality of such cells 7#ca74 ,but we have also seen that as we ascend the scale of living things all difficulty in designating the genuine individual disappears3 that a man1 a horse1 an oak tree1 are undoubtedly individual beings4 ,bearing these things in mind we have now to inquire into what has been called the subsistence or personality of the complete individual substance or nature3 that perfection which enables us formally to designate the latter a 8subsisting thing07#bhe7 or a 8person04 ,by personality we mean the subsistence of a complete individual rational nature4 ,we shall therefore inquire into the meaning of the generic term subsistentia 7or suppositalitas71 subsistence1 in the abstract4 ,but let us look at it first in the concrete4 ,a complete individual nature or substance1 when it exists in the actual order1 really distinct and separate in its own complete entity from every other existing being1 exercising its powers and discharging its functions of its own right and according to the laws of its own being1 is said to subsist1 or to have the perfection of subsistence4 ,in this state it not only exists in itself as every substance does2 it is not only incommunicable to any other being as every individual is1 in contradistinction with second or universal substances which are1 as such1 indefinitely communicable to individuals2 but it is also a complete whole1 incommunicable as a mere integral or essential part to some other whole1 unlike the incomplete substantial constituents1 or integral parts1 members or organs of1 say1 an individual organic body2 and finally it is incommunicable in the sense that it is not capable of being assumed into the subsisting unity of some other superior 8suppositum0 or 8person04 ,all those characteristics we find in the individual 8subsisting thing0 or 8person04 ,it 8exists in itself0 and is not communicable to another substance as an accident1 because it is itself a substance4 ,it is not communicable to individuals as a universal1 because it is itself an individual4 ,it is not communicable as an integral or essential part to a whole1 because it is itself a complete substance and nature47#bhf7 ,finally it is not communicable to1 and cannot be assumed into1 the unity of a higher personality so as to subsist by virtue of the latter's subsistence1 because it has a perfection incompatible with such assumption1 viz4 its own proper subsistence1 whereby it is already an actually subsisting thing or person in its own right1 or sui juris1 so to speak4 ,the mention of this last sort of incommunicability would be superfluous1 and indeed unintelligible1 did we not know from ,divine ,revelation that the human nature of our ,divine ,lord and ,saviour1 ,jesus ,christ1 though it is a complete and most perfect individual nature1 is nevertheless not a person1 because ,it is assumed into the ,personality of the ,second ,person of the ,divine ,trinity1 and1 united hypostatically or personally with this ,divine ,person1 subsists by virtue of the ,divine ,subsistence of the latter4 ,we see1 therefore1 what subsistence does for a complete individual nature in the static order4 ,it makes this nature sui juris1 incommunicable1 and entirely independent in the mode of its actual being3 leaving untouched1 of course1 the essential dependence of the created 8subsisting thing0 or 8person0 on the ,creator4 ,in the dynamic order1 the order of activity and development1 subsistence makes the complete individual nature not only the ultimate principle by which all the functions of the individual are discharged1 but also the ultimate principle or agent which exercises these functions3 while the nature as such is the ultimate principium ,,quo1 the nature as subsisting is the ultimate principium ,,quod1 in regard to all actions emanating from this nature4 ,hence the scholastic aphorism3 ,actiones sunt suppositorum4 ,that is1 all actions emanating from a complete individual nature are always ascribed and attributed to the latter as subsisting1 to the 8subsisting thing0 or 8person04 ,in regard to an individual human person1 for instance1 whether his intellect thinks1 or his will resolves1 or his imagination pictures things1 or his eyes see1 or his hand writes1 or his stomach digests1 or his lungs breathe1 or his head aches1 it is the man1 the person1 properly1 that discharges or suffers all these functions1 though by means of different faculties1 organs and members2 and it is to him properly that we ascribe all of them47#bhg7 ,now the individual human person is neither his soul1 nor his body1 nor even both conceived as two2 he is one being1 one complete substance or nature composed partly of a spiritual principle or soul and partly of a material principle which the soul 8informs0 and so constitutes a living human body4 ,hence the human soul itself1 whether we consider it as united to the material principle in the living human person1 or as disembodied and separate from its connatural material principle1 is not a complete substance1 is not capable of subsisting and having its human activities referred ultimately to itself as the subsisting1 personal principle which elicits these activities4 ,no doubt the disembodied soul has actual existence1 but it has not the perfection of subsistence or personality3 it is not a complete individual of the human species to which it belongs1 and therefore it cannot be properly called a human person1 a complete subsisting individual of the human species47#bhh7 ,furthermore1 even though an individual nature be complete as a nature1 endowed with all the substantial and specific perfections which constitute it a complete individual of the species to which it belongs1 nevertheless if it is assumed into the personality of another and higher nature1 and subsists in personal union with the latter and by virtue of the latter's subsistence1 then that nature1 not having its own proper and connatural subsistence1 is not itself a person4 ,nor can the actions which are elicited by means of it be ascribed ultimately to it2 they must be ascribed to the person by whose subsistence it subsists and into whose personality it has been assumed4 ,if an individual human nature be thus hypostatically or personally assumed into1 and united with1 a higher ,divine ,personality1 and subsists only by this ,personality1 such a human nature will be really and truly an individual nature of the human species2 the actions elicited through it and performed by means of it will be really and truly human actions2 but it will not be a human person2 while its actions will be really and truly the actions of the ,divine ,person1 and will therefore be also really and truly divine3 they will be the actions of the ,god-,man1 divine and human1 theandric4 ,all this we know only from ,divine ,revelation concerning the hypostatic union of the human nature of ,christ with the ,person of the ,divine ,word2 nor could we know it otherwise4 ,but all this does not modify1 it only supplements and completes1 what the light of reason discloses to us regarding the subsistence or personality of any complete individual nature4 ,we are now in a position to give nominal definitions of subsistence and personality both in the abstract and in the concrete1 i4e4 definitions which will indicate to us what exactly it is that these terms denote17#bhi7 and which will thus enable us to inquire into their connotation1 or in other words to ask what is it precisely that constitutes subsistence or personality4 ,by 8subsistence0 78subsistentia10 8suppositalitas07 we mean that perfection whereby a fully complete individual nature is rendered in every way1 in its being and in its actions1 distinct from and incommunicable to any and every other being1 so that it exists and acts sui juris1 autonomously1 independently of every other being save the ,creator47#bij7 ,by a 8subsisting being0 in the concrete 71 8suppositum10 hypostasis71 we mean a being endowed with this perfection of subsistence2 in other words1 a being that is a complete individual nature existing and acting in every way distinct from and incommunicable to any other being1 so that it exists and acts sui juris1 autonomously4 8,personality0 is simply the subsistence of a complete individual nature that is rational1 intelligent4 ,a 8person0 is simply a subsisting nature that is rational1 intelligent3 ,persona est suppositum rationale4 ,the definition given by ,botius is classic3 8,persona est substantia individua ,,rationalis naturae03 8the individual substance of a rational nature10--where the term individual is understood to imply actually existing and subsisting4 ,the special name which has thus been traditionally applied to rational or intelligent subsisting beings 7as distinct from animals1 plants1 and material 8things07--the term 8person0 78persona10 a mask3 per-sonus2 cf4 ,gr4 1 from 1 the face1 countenance7--originally meaning a rle or character in a drama1 came to be applied to the subsisting human individual1 and to connote a certain dignity of the latter as compared with the lower or non-rational beings of the universe4 ,and in fact the ascription of its actions to the subsisting being is more deeply grounded in the subsistence of rational1 intelligent beings1 who1 as free agents1 can more properly direct and control these actions47#bia7 #gc4 ,,distinction ,,between ,,the ,,individual ,,nature ,,and ,,its ,,subsistence4 ,,what ,,constitutes ,,personality8--,knowing now what we mean by the terms 8subsistence10 8suppositum10 8person10 and 8personality10 we have next to inquire in what precisely does subsistence consist4 ,what is it that constitutes a complete individual nature a 8subsisting being10 or if the nature be rational1 a 8person08 ,subsistence connotes1 over and above the mode of 8existing in itself0 which characterizes all substance1 the notion that the substance or nature is individual1 that it is complete1 that it is in every way incommunicable1 that it is sui juris or autonomous in its existence and activities4 ,these notions are all positive2 they imply positive perfections3 even incommunicability is really a positive perfection though the term is negative4 ,but is any one of the positive perfections1 thus contained in the notion of subsistence1 a positive something over and above1 and really distinct from1 the perfection already implied in the concept of a complete individual nature as such8 ,some of those philosophers who regard the distinction between essence and existence in creatures as a real distinction1 identify the subsistence of the complete individual nature with its actual existence1 thus placing a real distinction between nature and subsistence or personality47#bib7 ,apart from these1 however1 it is not likely that any philosophers1 guided by the light of reason alone1 would ever have held1 or even suspected1 that the subsistence of an actually existing individual nature is a positive perfection really distinct from1 and superadded to1 the latter4 ,for we never1 in our natural experience1 encounter an existing individual substance1 or nature1 or agent1 that is not distinct1 autonomous1 independent1 sui juris1 and incommunicable in its mode of being and acting4 ,rigorously1 however1 this would only prove that subsistence is a perfection naturally inseparable from the complete individual nature2 conceivably it might still be really distinct from the latter4 ,but whether or not such real distinction could be suspected by the unaided light of reason working on natural experience1 at all events what we know from ,divine ,revelation concerning the hypostatic union of the human nature of our ,lord ,jesus ,christ with the ,person of the ,divine ,word1 enables us to realize that there can be1 in the actual order of things1 a complete individual nature which is not a 8subsisting being0 or 8person02 for the human nature of our ,lord is de facto such a nature1--and ab actu ad posse valet consecutio4 ,this information1 however1 is not decisive in determining the character of the distinction between the individual substance or nature and its subsistence4 ,it may be that the complete individual nature is eo ipso and identically a 8subsisting being0 or 8person10 that it is always independent1 autonomous1 sui juris1 by the very fact that it is a complete individual nature1 unless it is ,,de ,,facto assumed into the personality of a higher nature1 so that in this intercommunication with the latter1 in the unity of the latter's personality1 it is not independent1 autonomous1 sui juris1 but dependent1 subordinate1 and alterius juris4 ,in this condition1 it loses nothing positive by the fact that it is not now a person and has not its own subsistence2 nor does it gain any natural perfection1 for it was ex hypothesi complete and perfect as a nature2 but it gains something supernatural inasmuch as it now subsists in a manner wholly undue to it47#bic7 ,according to this view1 therefore1 subsistence would not be a perfection really distinct from the complete individual nature2 it would be a mentally distinct aspect of the latter1 a positive aspect1 however1 consisting in this nature's completeness1 its self-sufficing1 autonomous character1 and consequent incommunicability47#bid7 ,the principal difficulty against this view is a theological difficulty4 ,as formulated by ,urraburu17#bie7 it appears to involve an ambiguity in the expression 8substantial union04 ,it is briefly this3 ,if the subsistence proper to a complete individual nature adds no positive perfection to the latter1 so that the latter necessarily subsists and is a person unless it is actually assumed into a higher personality1 and by the very fact that it is not actually so assumed1 then the human nature of ,christ 8is as complete in every way and in every line of substantial perfection1 by virtue of its own proper entity1 when actually united with the ,divine ,person1 as it would be were it not so united1 or as the person of ,peter1 or ,paul1 or any other human person is04 ,but this implies that there are in ,christ 8two substances complete in every respect04 ,now between two such substances 8there cannot be a substantial union10 a union which would constitute 8one being10 8unum per se ens04 ,hence the view in question would appear to be inadmissible4 ,but it is not proved that the union of 8two substances complete in every respect0 cannot result in the constitution of a being that is really and genuinely one--8unum per se ens0--in the case in which the union is a personal union4 ,the hypostatic union of the human nature of ,christ with the ,divine ,person is primarily a personal union whereby the former nature subsists by and in the ,divine ,personality4 ,it has the effect of constituting the united terms 8one subsisting being10 and therefore has supereminently1 if not formally1 the effect of a 8substantial union04 ,nay1 it is a 8substantial0 union in the sense that it is a union of two substances1 not of a substance and accidents2 and also in the sense that it is not a mere accidental aggregation or artificial juxtaposition of substances1 resulting merely in the constitution of collective or artificial unity1 a unum per accidens4 ,but is it a 8substantial0 union in the sense that it is such a union of substances as results in one 8nature08 ,most certainly not2 for this was the heresy of the ,monophysites3 that in ,christ there is only one nature resulting from the union of the human nature with the ,divine4 ,if then1 with ,urraburu1 we mean by 8nature0 simply 8substance regarded as a principle of action0 7#ga71 and if1 furthermore1 the hypostatic union does not result in one 8nature10 neither does it result in one 8substance10 nor can it be a 8substantial0 or 8natural0 union in this sense47#bif7 ,he does not say1 of course1 that the hypostatic union is a 8substantial union0 which results in 8one nature10 or even explicitly that it results in 8one substance10 but he says that the two substances are 8substantially conjoined10 8substantialiter conjunguntur02 and he continues1 8a substantial union is such a conjunction of two substantial realities that there results from it one substantial something1 which is truly and properly one0--8unio enim substantialis1 est talis duarum rerum substantialium conjunctio1 per quam resultat unum aliquid substantiale quod vere et proprie sit unum107#big7--;and he concludes that 8there is something substantial wanting in the human nature of ,christ1 viz4 personality1 which1 of course1 is most abundantly supplied in the hypostatic union by the ,divine ,person0--8reliquum est1 ut naturae humanae in ,christo aliquid desit substantiale1 nempe personalitas1 quod per unionem hypostaticam cumulatissime suppleatur a ,verbo407#bih7 ,now1 this 8aliquid substantiale0 cannot be 8aliquid naturale0 in the sense that it is something constitutive of the human substance or nature2 for the human substance or nature of ,christ is certainly complete and perfect as a substance or nature4 ,it must be some complement or mode1 that is naturally due to it1 but supernaturally supplied by the ,person of the ,divine ,word47#bii7 ,this brings us to the view that subsistence is a something positive1 distinct in some real way1 and not merely in our concepts1 from the complete individual substance4 ,according to the more common view of catholic philosophers 7and theologians7 subsistence is some positive perfection really distinct from the complete individual nature4 ,but the supporters of this general view explain it in different ways4 ,we have already referred to the view of certain ,thomists who1 identifying subsistence with the actual existence of the complete substance or nature1 place a real distinction between the existence and the substance or nature4 ,other ,thomists1 while defending the latter distinction1 point out that actual existence confers no real perfection1 but only actualizes the real2 they hold1 therefore1 that subsistence is not existence1 but is rather a perfection of the real1 essential1 or substantial order1 as distinct from the existential order--a perfection presupposed by actual existence1 and whose proper function is to unify all the substantial constituents and accidental determinations of the individual substance or nature1 thus making it a really unitary being--8unum ens per se0--proximately capable of being actualized by the simple existential act3 which latter is the ultimate actuality of the real being3 esse est ultimus actus47#cjj7 ,the concrete individual nature1 containing as it does a plurality of really distinct principles1 substantial and accidental1 needs some unifying principle to make these one incommunicable reality1 proximately capable of receiving a corresponding unitary existential act3 without such a principle1 they say1 each of the substantial and accidental principles in the concrete individual nature would have its own existence3 so that the result would be not really one being1 but a being really manifold and only accidentally one--8unum per accidens04 ,this principle is subsistence4 ,the human nature of our ,divine ,lord has not its own connatural subsistence2 this is supplied by the subsistence of the ,divine ,person4 ,moreover1 since the human nature in question has not its own subsistence1 neither has it its own existence2 existence is the actuality of the subsisting being2 therefore there is in ,christ but one existence1 that of the ,divine ,person1 whereby also the human nature of ,christ exists47#cja7 ,of those who deny that the distinction between the existence and the essence of any created nature is a real distinction1 some hold in the present matter the ,scotist view that subsistence is not a positive perfection really distinct from the complete individual nature4 ,others1 however1 hold what we have ventured to regard as the more common view3 that personality is something positive and really distinct from nature4 ,but they explain what they conceive subsistence to be without any reference to existence1 and without distinguishing between the essential and the existential order of reality4 ,the most common explanation seems to be that subsistence is a unifying principle of the concrete individual nature1 as stated above4 ,thus conceived1 it is not an absolute reality2 nor is the distinction between it and the nature a major real distinction4 ,it is a substantial mode 7#fh71 naturally superadded to the substance and modally distinct from the latter4 ,it so completes and determines the substance or nature that the latter not only exists in itself but is also1 by virtue of this mode1 incommunicable in every way and sui juris47#cjb7 ,it gives to the substance that ultimate determinateness which an accidental mode such as a definite shape or location gives to the accident of quantity47#cjc7 ,this mode is absent 7supernaturally7 from the human nature of our ,divine ,lord2 this nature is therefore communicable2 and the ,personality of the ,divine ,word supernaturally supplies the function of this absent natural mode4 ,it must be confessed that it is not easy to understand how this or any other substantial mode can be really distinct from the substance it modifies4 ,and in truth the distinction is not real in the full sense3 it is not between thing and thing1 inter rem et rem4 ,all that is claimed for it is that it is not merely mental2 that it is not merely an ens rationis which the mind projects into the reality2 that it is a positive perfection of the nature or substance1 a perfection which1 though naturally inseparable from the latter1 is not absolutely inseparable1 and which1 therefore1 is de facto supernaturally absent from the human nature and replaced by the ,divine ,personality in the case of the hypostatic union4 ,it belongs1 moreover1 to the order of substance1 not to that of accidents3 the substantial mode differs from the accidental mode1 or modal accident1 in this1 that it gives to the substance some ultimate determining perfection which appertains to the substance as such1 and whereby the substance is completed in the order of 8existing in itself04 ,subsistence is not an accident1 even though it supervenes on the complete nature1 for it determines the substance of the latter1 not in relation to any line of accidental activity1 as a power or faculty1 nor as something modifying it accidentally1 but as a mode which ultimately determines and perfects it in the order of substantial reality itself1 in the order of 8existing in itself0 in such a full and perfect manner as to be sui juris and incommunicable4 ,the main difficulty against this view is also theological3 ,if subsistence is a positive perfection it either belongs to the complete individual nature or it does not2 in the former case the humanity of ,christ1 assumed by the ,divine ,word1 was not a complete human nature2 in the latter case the individual human nature can exist without it3 and both consequences are equally inadmissable4 ,but it may be replied that1 granting the first member of the disjunctive1 the consequence inferred from it does not really follow3 subsistence belongs to the complete individual nature as an ultimate natural complement2 but when it is absent and supplied supernaturally by the ,divine ,personality the nature is still complete as a nature3 it is wanting in no absolute or entitative perfection1 but only in a modality which is supereminently supplied by the ,divine ,personality4 ,neither is the consequence from the second member of the disjunctive a valid inference4 ,for though personality as a mode does not belong to the essence of an individual human nature1 no such individual nature can exist without some personality1 either its own or another3 just as extension cannot exist without some shape1 though any particular shape is not essential to it4 ,to sum up1 then1 the doctrine of the two preceding sections3 ,what are we to understand by a person1 and by personality8 ,unquestionably our conception of person and personality 7concrete and abstract7 is mainly determined1 and very rightly so1 by an analysis of what constitutes the actually existing individual of the human species4 ,whatever our concept be1 it must certainly be realized and verified in all human individuals3 these1 before all other beings1 must be included in the denotation of our concept of person4 ,in fact1 for the philosopher1 guided by the natural light of reason alone1 the term can have hardly any other connotation4 ,he will1 no doubt1 ascribe personality1 as the highest mode of being he knows of1 to the ,supreme ,being2 but he will here ascribe it only in an analogical and supereminent way2 and only from ,divine ,revelation can he know that this ,supreme ,being has not a single but a threefold ,personality4 ,again1 his consideration of the nature of the human soul as an embodied substance which is nevertheless spiritual and immortal will enable him to affirm the possibility of purely spiritual created beings2 and these he will of course conceive as persons4 ,but1 conceiving the human soul itself as a constituent principle of the human individual1 he will not conceive the soul itself as a person4 ,the philosopher who understands the traditional ,aristotelian conceptions of substance1 of individual substance 7substantia prima71 of incomplete1 complete1 and composite substances1 of substance considered as nature or principle of action1 of substance considered as hypostasis1 as the actually existing individual being which is the ultimate logical subject of all predications and the ultimate ontological subject of all real determinations3 the philosopher who understands these concepts1 and who admits them to be validly grounded in experience1 and to offer as far as they go a correct interpretation of reality1 will have no difficulty in making up his mind about what is requisite to constitute a person4 ,wherever he finds an existing individual being of any species1 a being which1 even if it is really composite1 is nevertheless really one1 such a being he will pronounce to be a 8subsisting individual being04 ,he may not be able1 in the inorganic world or among the lower forms of life1 to distinguish for certain what is the real individual from what may be perhaps only an accidental1 if natural1 colony or group of real individuals4 ,as a test he will always seek for the manifestation of an internal directive principle whereby all the vital functions of the organized mass of matter in question are co-ordinated in such a manner as to make for the preservation1 growth and development of the whole throughout a definite life cycle from birth to death4 ,this formative and directive principle is evidence of an individual unity of nature and subsistence2 and such evidence is abundantly present in 8individuals0 of all the higher species in botany and zoology4 ,the 8individual subsisting being0 will therefore be a 8complete individual substance or nature1 existing and acting in every way distinct from and incommunicable to any other being1 so that it exists and acts sui juris1 autonomously04 ,if such an individual nature is not merely corporeal but organic or animate1 not merely animate but sentient1 and not merely sentient but rational or intelligent1 i4e4 constituted at least in part by a spiritual substantial principle whereby the individual is intelligent and free1 then that individual is a person4 ,every individual of the human species is such4 ,and all that is essential to his complete individual human nature enters into and constitutes his person in the concrete4 ,not merely1 therefore1 his intellect and will2 not merely his soul considered as 8mind10 i4e4 as the basis and principle of his whole conscious and subconscious psychic life2 or also as the principle of his merely organic life2 or also as the actualizing principle of his corporeal nature2 but no less also the corporeal principle itself of his composite being1 the body itself with all its parts and members and organs3 all these without exception belong equally to the human person2 all of them without exception go to constitute the ,ego47#cjd7 ,this1 which is the ,aristotelian and scholastic view of the human person1 is in perfect accord with the common-sense view of the matter as evidenced by the ordinary usages of language4 ,we speak intelligibly no less than correctly when we say that a man's body is part of his person as well as his soul or mind4 ,and we make a no less accurate1 intelligible1 and necessary distinction1 when we distinguish between all that which constitutes the human person and that whereby we know ourselves and other human individuals to be persons4 ,yet this distinction is not kept clearly in mind by many modern philosophers1 who1 approaching the study of personality exclusively from the side of what the individual consciousness testifies as to the unity and continuity 7or otherwise7 of mental life in the individual1 are scandalized at the assertion that the human body can have anything to do with human personality4 #gd4 ,,consciousness ,,of ,,the ,,personal ,,self4--,in order to form the concept of person1 and to find that concept verified in the data of our experience1 it is absolutely essential that we be endowed with the faculty of intelligence1 the spiritual power of forming abstract concepts2 and secondly1 that having formed the concept of person as a 8rational or intelligent subsisting being10 we be capable1 by the exercise of reflex consciousness1 to find in our own mental life the data from which we can conclude that this concept of person is verified in each and every one of ourselves4 ,it is because we are endowed with intelligence that we can form all the abstract notions--of substance1 individual1 subsistence1 existence1 etc41--which enter into and constitute our concept of person4 ,and it is because we can1 by means of this faculty1 reflect on our own mental operations1 and infer from them that each of us is a complete individual rational nature subsisting independently and incommunicably1 that we can know ourselves to be persons4 ,how the human individual forms these concepts and finds them verified in his own 8self10 how he gradually comes into conscious possession of the knowledge of his own individual being as an ,ego1 self1 or person1 are problems for ,psychology47#cje7 ,it will be sufficient here to point out that there are grounds for distinguishing between the individual's implicit subjective awareness of his subsistence or 8selfhood0--an awareness which accompanies all his conscious mental functions1 and which becomes more explicit and definite as the power of introspection and reflex consciousness develops--and the 8abstract quasi-objective notion of his own personality habitually possessed by every human being047#cjf7 ,the individual human being immediately apprehends his own existence1 and his abiding unity or sameness throughout incessantly changing states1 in the temporal series of his conscious activities2 but his knowledge of the nature of his own being can be the result only of a long and carefully conducted analysis of his own activities1 and of inferences based on the character of these activities4 ,the former or implicit knowledge of the self in the concrete is direct and intuitive4 ,the individual ,ego apprehends itself in its states4 ,this knowledge comes mainly from within1 and is subject to gradual development4 ,father ,maher thus describes how the child comes gradually into possession of it3-- ,as thoughts of pleasures and pains repeated in the past and expected in the future grow more distinct1 the dissimilarity between these and the permanent abiding self comes to be more fully realized4 ,passing emotions of fear1 anger1 vanity1 pride1 or sympathy1 accentuate the difference4 ,but most probably it is the dawning sense of power to resist and overcome rising impulse1 and the dim nascent consciousness of responsibility1 which lead up to the final revelation1 until at last1 in some reflective act of memory or choice1 or in some vague effort to understand the oft-heard 8,i10 the great truth is manifested to him3 the child enters1 as it were1 into possession of his personality1 and knows himself as a ,self-conscious ,being4 ,the ,ego does not create but discovers itself4 ,in ,jouffroy's felicitous phrase1 it 8breaks its shell10 and finds that it is a ,personal ,agent with an existence and individuality of its own1 standing henceforward alone in opposition to the universe47#cjg7 ,after this stage is reached1 the human individual easily distinguishes between the 8self0 as the cause or subject of the states1 and the states as modifications of the self4 ,this distinction is implicit in the concomitant awareness of self which accompanies all exercise of direct cognitive consciousness4 ,it is explicit in all deliberate acts of reflex1 introspective self-consciousness4 ,the data from which we form the abstract concepts of substance1 nature1 individual1 person1 self1 etc41 and from which we arrive by reasoning at a philosophical knowledge of the nature and personality of the human individual1 are furnished mainly by introspection2 but also in part by external observation of the universe around us4 ,concomitantly1 however1 with the process by which we become implicitly but immediately aware of the ,ego or self as an abiding self-identical person in and through our own mental activity1 we gradually form a quasi-objective and historical view of our own personality as one of a number of similar personalities around us in the universe4 ,this view1 says ,father ,maher1 gathers into itself the history of my past life--the actions of my childhood1 boyhood1 youth1 and later years4 ,interwoven with them all is the image of my bodily organism1 and clustering around are a fringe of recollections of my dispositions1 habits1 and character1 of my hopes and regrets1 of my resolutions and failures1 along with a dim consciousness of my position in the minds of other selves4 ,under the form of a representation of this composite art1 bound together by the thread of memory1 each of us ordinarily conceives his complete abiding personality4 ,this idea is necessarily undergoing constant modification2 and it is in comparing the present form of the representation with the past1 whilst adverting to considerable alterations in my character1 bodily appearance1 and the like1 that ,i sometimes say3 8,i am completely changed10 8,i am quite another person10 though ,i am1 of course1 convinced that it is the same 8,i0 who am changed in accidental qualities4 ,it is because this complex notion of my personality is an abstraction from my remembered experiences that a perversion of imagination and a rupture of memory can sometimes induce the so-called 8illusions or alterations of personality047#cjh7 ,when we remember that this objective conception of the self is so dependent on the function of memory1 and that the normal exercise of this faculty is in turn so dependent on the normal functioning of the brain and the nervous system17#cji7 we can hazard an intelligible explanation of the abnormal facts recorded by most modern psychologists concerning hypnotism1 somnambulism and 8double0 or 8multiple0 consciousness47#caj7 ,father ,maher1 ascribing these phenomena partly to dislocations of memory1 partly to unusual groupings of mental states according to the laws of mental association--groupings that arise from peculiar physiological connexions between the various neural functionings of the brain centres1--and partly to semi-conscious or reflex nerve processes1 emphasizes an important fact that is sometimes lost sight of3 the fact that some section at least of the individual's conscious mental life is common to1 and present throughout1 the two or more 8states0 or 8conditions0 between which any such abnormal individual is found to alternate4 ,this consideration is itself sufficient to disprove the theory--to which we shall presently refer--that there is or may be in the individual human being a double1 or even a multiple 8human personality04 #ge4 ,,false ,,theories ,,of ,,personality4--,it is plain that conscious mental activity cannot constitute human personality1 or subconscious mental activity either1 for all activity is of the accidental mode of being1 is an accident1 whereas a person must be a substance4 ,of course it is the self-conscious cognitive activity of the human individual that reveals to the latter his own self as a person3 it is the exercise of reflex consciousness combined with memory that gives us the feeling of personal identity with ourselves throughout the changing events of our mental and bodily life4 ,furthermore1 this self-consciousness has its root in the rational nature of the human individual2 and rationality of nature is the differentiating principle which makes the subsisting individual a 8person0 as distinct from a 7subsisting7 8thing04 ,but then1 it is not the feeling of personal identity that constitutes the person4 ,actual consciousness is neither the essence1 nor the source1 nor even the index of personality2 for it is only an activity1 and an activity which reveals immediately not the person as such1 but the nature as rational27#caa7 nor does the rational 7substantial7 principle of a composite nature constitute the latter a person2 but only the subsistence of the complete 7composite7 individual nature itself4 ,these considerations are sufficiently obvious2 they presuppose1 however1 the truth of the traditional doctrine already explained in regard to the existence1 nature and cognoscibility of substance4 ,philosophers who have misunderstood and rejected and lost this traditional doctrine of substance have propounded many varieties of unsatisfactory and inconsistent theories in regard to what constitutes 8person0 and 8personality04 ,the main feature of all such theories is their identification of personality with the habitual consciousness of self1 or habitual feeling of personal identity3 a feeling which1 however1 must be admitted to include memory in some form1 while the function of memory in any shape or form cannot be satisfactorily explained on any theory of the human ,ego which denies that there is a human substance persisting permanently as a unifying principle of successive mental states 7#fc-d74 ,so far as ,english philosophy is concerned such theories appear to have had their origin in ,locke's teaching on person and personal identity4 ,discussing the notions of identity and diversity17#cab7 he distinguishes between the identity of an individual substance with itself in its duration throughout time1 and what he terms personal identity2 while by identity in general he means not abstract identity but the concrete permanence of a thing throughout time 7#cd74 ,on this we have to call attention to the fact that just as duration is not essential to the constitution of a substance1 so neither is it essential to the constitution of a complete subsisting individual substance or person 7#fd72 though it is1 of course1 an essential condition for all human apprehension whether of substance or of person4 ,locke was wrong1 therefore1 in confounding what reveals to us the abiding permanence1 identity or sameness of a subsisting thing or person 7whether the 8self0 or any other subsisting thing or person7 throughout its duration in time1 with what constitutes the subsisting thing or person4 ,furthermore1 his distinction between substantial identity1 i4e4 the sameness of an individual substance with itself throughout time1 and personal identity or sameness1 was also an error4 ,for as long as there is substantial unity1 continuity1 or identity of the subsisting individual substance1 so long is there unity1 continuity1 or identity of its subsistence1 or of its personality if it be a rational substance4 ,the subsistence of a complete individual inorganic substance is changed as soon as the individual undergoes substantial change3 we have them no longer the same subsisting individual being4 ,so1 too1 the subsistence of the organic individual is changed as soon as the latter undergoes substantial change by the dissolution of life1 by the separation of its formative and vital substantial principle from its material substantial principle3 after such dissolution we have no longer the same subsisting plant or animal4 ,and1 finally1 the subsistence of an individual man is changed1 or interrupted1 or ceases by death1 which separates his soul1 his vital principle1 from his body4 ,we say1 moreover1 that in the latter case the human person ceases to exist when the identity or permanence of his subsisting substance or nature terminates at death2 for personal identity we hold to be the identity of the complete subsisting substance or nature with itself4 ,but ,locke1 who practically agrees with what we have said regarding the abiding identity of the subsisting individual being with itself--whether this individual be an inorganic individual1 a plant1 a brute beast1 or a man7#cac7--;distinguishes at this point between identity of the subsisting individual substance and personal identity4 ,of identity in general he says that 8to conceive and judge of it aright1 we must consider what idea the word it is applied to stands for2 it being one thing to be the same substance1 another the same man1 and a third the same person1 if person1 man1 and substance1 are three names standing for three different ideas047#cad7 ,and1 struggling to dissociate 8person0 from 8substance10 he continues thus3-- ,to find wherein personal identity consists1 we must consider what person stands for2 which1 ,i think1 is a thinking1 intelligent being1 that has reason and reflection1 and can consider itself as itself1 the same thinking thing in different times and places2 which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking1 and1 as it seems to me1 essential to it4 ,when we see1 hear1 smell1 taste1 feel1 meditate1 or will any thing1 we know that we do so4 ,thus it is always as to our present sensations and perceptions1 and by this every one is to himself what he calls self2 it not being considered in this case whether the same self be continued in the same or divers substances4 ,for since consciousness always accompanies thinking1 and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self1 and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things2 in this alone consists personal identity1 i4e4 the sameness of a rational being3 and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought1 so far reaches the identity of that person2 it is the same self now it was then2 and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it1 that that action was done47#cae7 ,the definition of person in this passage as 8a thinking1 intelligent being10 etc41 is not far removed from our own definition2 but surely conscious thought is not 8that which makes every one to be what he calls self10 seeing that conscious thought is only an activity or function of the 8rational being04 ,it is conscious thought1 of course1 including memory1 that reveals the 8rational being0 to himself as a self1 and as the same or identical self throughout time2 but unless the 8rational being10 or the 8thinking1 intelligent being1 that has reason and reflection10 etc4--which is ,locke's own definition of 8person0--were there all the time identical with itself1 exercising those distinct and successive acts of consciousness and memory1 and unifying them1 how could these acts even reveal the 8person0 or his 8personal identity0 to himself1 not to speak of their constituting personality or personal identity8 ,it is perfectly plain that these acts presuppose the 8person10 the 8thinking1 intelligent being10 or1 as we have expressed it1 the 8subsisting1 rational1 individual nature0 already constituted2 and it is equally plain that the 8personal identity0 which they reveal is constituted by1 and consists simply in1 the duration or continued existence of this same subsisting individual rational nature2 nor could these acts reveal any identity1 personal or otherwise1 unless they were the acts of one and the same actually subsisting1 existing and persisting substance4 ,yet ,locke thinks he can divorce personal identity from identity of substance1 and account for the former independently of the latter4 ,in face of the obvious difficulty that actual consciousness is not continuous but intermittent1 he tries to maintain that the consciousness which links together present states with remembered states is sufficient to constitute personal identity even although there may have intervened between the present and the past states a complete change of substance1 so that it is really a different substance which experiences the present states from that which experienced the past states4 ,the question ,whether we are the same thinking thing1 i4e4 the same substance or no 444 concerns not personal identity at all3 the question being1 what makes the same person1 and not whether it be the same identical substance1 which always thinks in the same person3 different substances1 by the same consciousness 7where they do partake in it71 being united into one person1 as well as different bodies by the same life are united into one animal1 whose identity is preserved1 in that change of substances1 by the unity of one continued life 444 for animal identity is preserved in identity of life1 and not of substance47#caf7 ,here the contention is that we can have 8the same person0 and yet not necessarily 8the same identical substance10 because consciousness may give a personal unity to distinct and successive substances in the individual man just as animal life gives an analogous unity to distinct and successive substances in the individual animal4 ,this is very superficial2 for it only substitutes for the problem of human personality the similar problem of explaining the unity and sameness of subsistence in the individual living thing3 a problem which involves the fact of memory in animals4 ,for scholastic philosophers unity of life in the living thing1 involving the fact of memory in animals1 is explained by the perfectly intelligible and will-grounded teaching that there is in each individual living thing a formative and vital principle which is substantial1 a forma substantialis1 which unites1 in the abiding self-identical unity of a complete individual composite substance1 the material principle of the corporeal substances which thus go1 in the incessant process of substantial change known as metabolism1 to form partially1 and to support the substantial continuity of1 the living individual4 ,while the latter is thus in constant process of material1 or partial1 substantial change1 it remains1 as long as it lives1 the same complete individual substance1 and this in virtue of the abiding substantial formative and vital principle which actuates and animates it4 ,the abiding permanence or self-identity of the subsisting individual substance which feels or thinks1 and remembers1 is an intelligible1 and indeed the only intelligible1 ground and explanation of memory1 and of our consciousness of personal identity4 ,but if we leave out of account this abiding continuity and self-identity of the subsisting individual substance or nature1 which is the subject1 cause and agent of these acts of memory and consciousness1 how can these latter1 in and by themselves1 possibly form1 or even indeed reveal to us1 our personal identity8 ,locke felt this difficulty2 and he tried in vain to meet it3 in vain1 for it is insuperable4 ,he merely suggests that 8the same consciousness 444 can be transferred from one thinking substance to another10 in which case 8it will be possible that two thinking substances may make successively one person047#cag7 ,this is practically his last word on the question1--and it is worthy of note1 for it virtually substantializes consciousness4 ,it makes consciousness1 which is really only an act or a series of acts1 a something substantial and subsisting4 ,we have seen already how modern phenomenists1 once they reject the notion of substance as invalid or superfluous1 must by that very fact equivalently substantialize accidents 7#fa72 for substance1 being a necessary category of human thought as exercised on reality1 cannot really be dispensed with4 ,and we see in the present context an illustration of this fact4 ,the abiding self-identity of the human person cannot be explained otherwise than by the abiding self-identical subsistence of the individual human substance4 ,if personal identity were constituted and determined by consciousness1 by the series of conscious states connected and unified by memory1 then it would appear that the human being in infancy1 in sleep1 in unconsciousness1 or in a state of insanity1 is not a human person6 ,philosophers who have not the hardihood to deny human personality to the individual of the human species in these states1 and who on the other hand will not recognize the possession of a rational nature or substance by the subsisting individual as the ground of the latter's personality and personal identity1 have recourse to the hypothesis of a sub-conscious1 or 8sub-liminal0 consciousness in the individual1 as a substitute4 ,if by this they merely meant an abiding substantial rational principle of all mental activities1 even of those which may be semi-conscious or sub-conscious1 they would be merely calling by another name what we call the rational nature of man4 ,and the fact that they refer to this principle as the sub-conscious 8self0 or 8,ego0 shows how insistent is the rational need for rooting personality and personal identity in something which is a substance4 ,but they do not and will not conceive it as a substance2 whereas if it is not this1 if it is only a 8process10 or a 8function10 or a 8series0 or 8stream0 of processes or functions1 it can no more constitute or explain1 or even reveal1 personal identity1 than a series or stream of conscious states can47#cah7 ,unable as he was to explain how the same consciousness could persist throughout a succession of really and adequately distinct substances 7except by virtually substantializing consciousness71 ,locke nevertheless persisted in holding that consciousness and consciousness alone 7including memory1 which1 however1 is inexplicable on any other theory than that of a subsisting and persisting substance or nature which remembers71 constitutes personality and personal identity4 ,we have dwelt upon his teaching mainly because all modern phenomenists try to explain personality on the same principles--i4e4 independently of the doctrine of substance4 ,as a corollary from his doctrine he inferred that if a man completely and irrevocably loses consciousness or rather memory of his past life1 though he remains the same 8man0 he is no longer the same 8person03 8if it be possible for the same man to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times1 it is past doubt the same man would at different times make different persons027#cai7 and he goes on in this sense to give a literal interpretation to the modes of speech we have referred to above47#cbj7 ,he likewise admitted that two or more 8persons10 i4e4 consciousnesses1 can be linked with the same individual human being1 or the same individual human soul1 alternately appearing and disappearing1 giving place successively to one another4 ,when any one of these 8personalities0 or consciousnesses ceases to be actual1 it must in ,locke's view cease to be in any sense real3 so that there could not be two or more personalities at the same time in the same individual human being4 ,modern psychologists1 however1 of the phenomenist school1 convinced that sub-conscious mental activities are not only possible1 but that the fact of such activities is well established by a variety of experiences1 have extended ,locke's conception of personality 7as actual consciousness7 to embrace groups of mental activities which may emerge only intermittently 8above the threshold of consciousness04 ,hence they explain the abnormal cases of double or multiple consciousness already referred to1 as being manifestations of really distinct 8personalities0 in one and the same human individual4 ,in normal human beings there is1 they say1 only one normally 8conscious personality04 ,the sub-conscious mental activities of such an individual they bulk together as forming this individual's 8sub-liminal0 or 8sub-conscious0 ,ego or 8self03 presumably a distinct personality from the conscious one4 ,in the abnormal cases of 8double-consciousness0 the subliminal self struggles for mastery over the conscious self and is for a time successful3 the two personalities thus for a time changing places as it were4 ,in the rarer or more abnormal cases of treble or multiple consciousness1 there are presumably three or more 8personalities0 engaged in the struggle1 each coming to the surface in turn and submerging the others4 ,it is not the fancifulness of this theory that one might object to so much as its utter inadequacy to explain the facts1 nay1 its utter unintelligibility on the principles of those who propound it4 ,for we must not lose sight of the fact that it is propounded by philosophers who purport to explain mental life and human personality without recourse to a substantial soul1 to any substantial basis of mental life1 or indeed to the concept of substance at all3 by philosophers who will talk of a mental process without admitting mind or soul as a substance or subject of that process1 of a 8series0 or 8stream0 of mental functions or activities without allowing any agent that would exercise those functions1 or any substantial abiding principle that would unify the series or stream and know it as such2 philosophers who regard the ,ego1 8self10 or 8person10 as nothing other than the group or series or stream of mental states1 and not as anything of which these are the states2 and1 finally1 who speak of these groups of functions or activities as 8personalities0--which they describe as 8struggling0 with one another--apparently oblivious of the fact that by using such language they are in their thought at least transforming these activities into agents1 these states into subjects of states1 in a word1 these accidents into substances2 or else they are making their language and their thought alike unintelligible47#cba7 ,of course those numerous modern philosophers who1 like ,james1 try to 8find a place for all the experiential facts unencumbered by any hypothesis like that of an individual substantial soul1 presumably save that of passing states of mind0 ibid41 p4 #dhj1 do not really leave these 8states0 suspended in mid-air as it were4 ,the imperative need for admitting the reality of substance always ultimately asserts itself3 as when ,james recognizes the necessity of admitting something 8more than the bare fact of co-existence of a passing thought with a passing brain-state0 ,principles of ,psychology1 i41 p4 #cdf--;apud ,,maher1 ibid41 p4 #dhc4 ,only his speculation as to what constitutes this 8something #8more' which lies behind our mental states0 ibid41 p4 #dhe is not particularly convincing3 8,for my own part10 he says1 8,i confess that the moment ,i become metaphysical and try to define the more1 ,i find the notion of some sort of an anima mundi thinking in all of us to be a more promising hypothesis1 in spite of all its difficulties1 than that of a lot of absolutely individual souls0 ibid41 p4 #cdf--;apud ,,maher1 ibid44 ,this restatement of the medieval pantheistic theory known as ,averrosm1 ,monopsychism1 or the theory of the intellectus separatus cf4 ,,de ,,wulf1 ,history of ,medieval ,philosophy1 pp4 #cha sqq41 is a somewhat disappointing contribution to ,metaphysics from the most brilliant of our modern psychologists4 ,the 8difficulties0 of this 8more promising hypothesis0 had discredited it a rather long time before ,professor ,james resurrected it cf4 criticisms--apud ,,maher1 ibid44 ,,chapter ,x4 ,,some ,,accident-,,modes ,,of ,,being3 ,,quality4 #gf4 ,,ontology ,,and ,,the ,,accident-,,modes ,,of ,,being4--,under the ultimate category or genus supremum of ,substance experience reveals to us two broadly distinct sub-classes3 corporeal substances1 8bodies0 or 8material0 things1 and spiritual substances or 8spirits04 ,of these latter we have direct experience only of one class1 viz4 embodied spirits or human souls4 ,the investigation of the nature of these belongs to ,psychology1 and from the data of that science we may infer1 by the light of reason1 the possibility of another class of spirits1 viz4 pure spirits1 beings of whose actual existence we know from ,divine ,revelation4 ,the existence of a ,supreme ,being1 ,whom we must conceive analogically as substance and spirit1 is demonstrated by the light of reason in ,natural ,theology4 ,the investigation of the nature of corporeal substances belongs properly to ,cosmology4 ,hence in the present treatise we have no further direct concern with the substance-mode of reality27#cbb7 but only with its accident-modes1 and not with all of these4 ,not with all of them2 for those which belong properly to spiritual substances1 or properly to corporeal substances1 call for special treatment in ,psychology and ,cosmology respectively4 ,in the main1 only such species of accidents as are common to matter and spirit alike1 will form the subject of the remaining portion of the present volume4 ,only the broader aspects of such categories as ,quality1 ,quantity and ,causality--aspects which have a more direct bearing on the ,theory of ,being and the ,theory of ,knowledge in general1--call for treatment in ,general ,metaphysics4 ,a more detailed treatment must be sought in other departments of ,philosophy4 #gg4 ,,nature ,,of ,,the ,,accident ,,called ,,quality4--,in the widest sense of the term1 ,quality is synonymous with logical attribute4 ,in this sense whatever can be predicated of a subject1 whatever logically determines a subject in any way for our thought is a quality or 8attribute0 of that subject4 ,in a sense almost equally wide the term is used to designate any real determination1 whether substantial or accidental1 of a subject4 ,in this sense the differential element1 or differentia specifica1 determines the generic element1 or genus1 of a substance3 it tells us what kind or species the substance is3 e4g4 what kind of animal a man is1 viz4 rational2 what kind of living thing an animal is1 viz4 sentient2 what kind of body or corporeal thing a plant is1 viz4 living4 ,and hence scholastics have said of the predicable 8differentia specifica0 that it is predicated adjectivally1 or as a quality1 to tell us in what the thing consists1 or what is its nature3 differentia specifica praedicatur in quale quid3 it gives us the determining principle of the specific nature4 ,or1 again1 quality is used synonymously with any accidental determination of a substance4 ,in this sense magnitude1 location1 action1 etc41 though they determine a subject in different accidental ways1 nevertheless are all indiscriminately said to 8qualify0 it in the sense of determining it somehow or other1 and are therefore called 8qualities0 in the wide sense of 8accidents04 ,hence1 again1 the scholastics have said that inasmuch as all accidents determine or qualify their subjects1 they are predicated of these qualitatively1 and may be called in a wide sense 8qualifications0 or 8qualities03 omnia genera accidentium qualificant substantiam et praedicantur in quale4 ,it is in this wide sense that we use the term when we say that the 7specific7 nature 7or 8kind07 of a thing is revealed by its 8qualities02 for the nature of a thing is revealed by all its accidents4 ,and when we infer the nature of a thing from its activities1 in accordance with the maxim ,qualis est operatio talis est natura1 we must take the term 8operatio0 or 8activity0 to include the operation of the thing on our cognitive faculties1 the states of cognitive consciousness thus aroused in us1 and all the other accidents thus revealed to us in the thing by its 8knowledge-eliciting0 action on our minds4 ,but the term ,quality has been traditionally restricted1 after ,aristotle1 to designate properly one particular category of accidents distinct from the others and from substance4 ,a definition proper of any genus supremum is of course out of the question4 ,but it is not easy to give even a description which will convey an accurate notion of the special category of ,quality1 and mark it off from the other accident-categories4 ,if we say with ,aristotle that quality is 8that whereby we are enabled to describe what sort 71 quale7 anything is07#cbc7--;e4g4 that it is white by whiteness1 strong by strength1 etc4--we are only illustrating the abstract by the concrete4 ,but even this serves the purpose of helping us to realize what quality in general means4 ,for we are more familiar with the concrete than with the abstract3 and we can see a broad distinction between the question3 8,what sort is that thing8 ,qualis est ista res80 7,quality71 and the question3 8,how large is that thing8 ,quanta est ista res80 7,quantity71 or 8,where is that thing80 7,place71 or 8,what is it doing8 ,what is happening to it80 7,actio et ,passio71 or 8,what does it resemble80 7,relation71 etc4 ,this will help us to realize that there are accidental modes of being which affect substances in a different way from all the extrinsic denominations of the latter 7#fj71 and also in a different way from ,quantity1 ,relation1 and ,causality2 and these modes of being1 whereby the substance is of such a sort1 or in such a condition1 we call qualities4 ,and if we inquire what special kind of determination of the substance is common to qualities1 and marks these off from the other accidents1 we shall find it to consist in this1 that quality is an accidental mode of being which so affects the substance that it disposes the latter well or ill in regard to the perfections natural to this particular kind of substance3 it alters the latter accidentally by increasing or diminishing its natural perfection4 ,we have seen that no created substance has all the perfection natural to its kind1 tota simul or ab initio 7#df72 that it fulfils its rle in existence by development1 by tending towards its full or final perfection4 ,the accidental realities which supervene on its essence1 and thus alter its perfection within the limits of its kind or species1 are what we call qualities4 ,they diversify the substance accidentally in its perfection1 in its concrete mode of existing and behaving3 by their appearance and disappearance they do not change the essential perfection of the substance 7#df71 they do not effect a substantial change2 but they change its intermediate1 accidental perfection2 and this qualitative change is technically known and described as alteration7#cbd7 7#aa74 ,hence we find ,quality described by ,st4 ,thomas as the sort of accident which modifies or disposes the substance in itself3 8accidens modificativum sen dispositivum substantiaein seipsa10 and by ,albertus ,magnus somewhat more explicitly as 8the sort of accident which completes and perfects substance in its existence and activity3 accidens complens ac perficiens substantiam tarn in existendo quam in operando047#cbe7 ,this notion will be conveyed with sufficient clearness if we describe ,quality as that absolute accident which determines a substance after the manner of an accidental 8differentia10 affecting the essential perfection of the substance in regard to its existence or to its activity4 ,hence 7#a7 the ,pure ,actuality of the ,infinitely ,perfect ,being cannot admit qualities1 inasmuch as quality implies only a relative and limited perfection2 7#b7 the qualities of a corporeal substance are grounded in the formative principle which gives that substance its specific nature and is the principle of its tendency and development towards its final perfection1 whereas its quantity is grounded in its determinable or material principle2 7#c7 the essential differentiating principles of substances--being known to us not intuitively1 but only abstractively and discursively1 i4e4 by inference from the behaviour of these substances1 from the effects of their activities--are often designated not by what constitutes them intrinsically1 but by the accidental perfections or qualities which are our only key to a knowledge of them4 ,for instance1 we differentiate the nature of man from that of the brute beast by describing the former as rational3 a term which really designates not the essence or nature itself1 but one of its fundamental qualities1 viz4 the faculty of reason4 #gh4 ,,immediate ,,sub-,,classes ,,of ,,quality ,,as ,genus ,supremum4--,on account of the enormous variety of qualities which characterize the data of our experience1 the problem of classifying qualities is not a simple one4 ,its details belong to the special sciences and to the other departments of philosophy4 ,here we must confine ourselves to an attempt at indicating the immediate sub-classes of the genus supremum4 ,and in this context it will not be out of place to call attention to a remarkable1 and in our view quite erroneous1 trend of modern thought4 ,it accompanied the advent of what is known as atomism or the mechanical conception of the universe1 a conception much in vogue about half a century ago1 but against which there are already abundant evidences of a strong reaction4 ,we refer to the inclination of scientists and philosophers to eliminate ,quality altogether as an ultimately distinct category of human experience1 by reducing all qualities to quantity1 local relations1 and mechanical or spatial motions of matter 7cf4 #aa74 ,in this theory all the sensible qualities of the material universe would be really and objectively nothing more than locations and motions of the ultimate constituents of perceptible matter4 ,all the chemical1 physical and mechanical energies or forces of external nature would be purely quantitative dispositions or configurations of matter in motion3 realities that could be exhaustively known by mathematical analysis and measurement4 ,and when it was found that qualitative concepts stubbornly resisted all attempts at elimination1 or reduction to quantitative concepts1 even in the investigation of the material universe or external nature1 scientists and philosophers of external nature thought to get rid of them by locating them exclusively in the human mind1 and thus pushing them over on psychologists and philosophers of the mind for further and final exorcism4 ,for a time extreme materialists1 less wise than daring1 endeavoured to reduce even mind and all its conscious states and processes to a mere subjective aspect of what1 looked at objectively1 would be merely matter in motion47#cbf7 ,it can be shown in ,cosmology1 ,psychology1 and ,epistemology that all such attempts to analyse qualities into something other than qualities1 are utterly unsatisfactory and unsuccessful4 ,and we may see even from an enumeration of some of the main classes of qualities that such attempts were foredoomed to failure4 ,scholastic ,philosophy has generally adopted ,aristotle's division of qualities into four great groups37#cbg7 7#a7 1 habitus vel dispositio2 7#b7 1 potentia naturalis vel impotentia2 7#c7 1 potentiae passivae et passiones2 7#d7 1 forma vel figura4 ,st4 ,thomas offers the following ground for this classification4 ,since quality1 he says17#cbh7 is an accidental determination of the substance itself1 i4e4 of the perfection of its concrete existence and activity1 and since we may distinguish four aspects of the substance3 its nature itself as perfectible2 its intrinsic principles of acting and receiving action1 principles springing from the formative1 specific constituent of its nature2 its receptivity of change effected by such action1 a receptivity grounded in the determinable or material principle of its nature2 and finally its quantity1 if it be a corporeal substance1--we can likewise distinguish between 7#a7 acquired habits or dispositions1 such as health1 knowledge1 virtue1 vice1 etc41 which immediately determine the perfection of the substance1 disposing it well or ill in relation to its last end2 7#b7 intrinsic natural forces1 faculties1 powers of action1 aptitudes1 capacities1 such as intellect1 will1 imagination1 instinct1 organic vital forces1 physical1 chemical1 mechanical energies2 7#c7 states resulting in a corporeal being from the action of its milieu upon it3 the passions and emotions of sentient living things1 such as sensations of pleasure1 pain1 anger1 etc42 the sensible qualities of matter1 such as colour1 taste1 smell1 temperature1 feel or texture1 etc42 and1 finally 7#d7 the quality of form or shape which is a mere determination of the quantity of a corporeal substance4 ,this classification is not indeed perfect1 for the same individual quality can be placed in different classes when looked at from different standpoints3 heat1 for instance1 may be regarded as a natural operative power of a substance in a state of combustion1 or as a sensible quality produced in that substance by the operation of other agencies4 ,but it has the merit of being an exhaustive classification2 and philosophers have not succeeded in improving on it4 ,qualities of the third and fourth class do not call for special treatment4 ,in the third class1 ,aristotle's distinction between 7qualitates passibiles7 and 7passiones7 is based upon the relatively permanent or transient character of the quality in question4 ,the transient quality1 such as the blush produced by shame or the pallor produced by fear1 would be a passio27#cbi7 whereas the more permanent quality1 such as the natural colour of the countenance1 would be a passibilis qualitas4 ,the 8passions0 or sensible changes which result from certain conscious states1 and affect the organism of the sentient living being1 are included in this class as passiones2 while the visible manifestations of more permanent mental derangement or insanity would be included in it as passibiles qualitates4 ,we may1 perhaps1 get a fairly clear and comprehensive notion of all that is contained in this class as 8sensible qualities0 by realizing that these embrace whatever is the immediate cause or the immediate result of the sense modification involved in any act or process of sense consciousness4 ,such 8sensible qualities10 therefore1 belong in part to the objects which provoke sense perception1 and in part to the sentient subject which elicits the conscious act4 ,one of the most important problems in the ,theory of ,knowledge1 and one which ramifies into ,cosmology and ,psychology1 is that of determining the precise significance of these 8sensible qualities10--and especially in determining whether they are qualities of an extramental reality1 or merely states of the individual mind or consciousness itself4 ,form or figure1 which constitutes the fourth class of quality1 is a mode of the quantity of a body1 being merely the particular surface termination of its extension or volume4 ,considered as a mode of abstract or mathematical quantity1 it belongs to the domain of mathematics4 ,considered in the concrete body1 it is the physical1 sensible form1 shape1 or figure1 of the latter2 and here it may be either natural or artificial1 according as it results from the unimpeded action of natural forces or from these forces as manipulated and directed by intelligent agents4 ,it is worthy of special note that while extension or volume is indicative of the material principle of corporeal substances1 the figure or shape naturally assumed by this volume is determined by their formative principle1 and is thus indicative of their specific nature4 ,this is already noticeable in the inorganic world1 where many of the chemically different substances assume each its own distinctive crystalline form4 ,but it is particularly in the domains of botany and zoology that the natural external form of the living individual organism is recognized as one of the most important grounds of its classification and one of the surest tests of its specific nature47#ccj7 #gi4 ,,habits ,,and ,,dispositions4--,every created being is subject to change1 capable of development or retrogression1 endowed with a natural tendency towards some end which it can reach by a natural process of activity1 and which constitutes for it1 when attained1 its full and final perfection 7#ff74 ,through this process of change it acquires accidental modes of being which help it or hinder it1 dispose it or indispose it1 in the exercise of its natural activities1 and therefore also in the concrete perfection of its nature as tending towards its natural end4 ,such an accidental mode of being is acquired by a series of transient actions and experiences1 actiones et passiones3 after these have passed away it remains1 and not merely as a state or condition resulting from the changes wrought in the subject by these experiences1 but as a disposition towards easier repetition of such experiences4 ,moreover1 it may be not a mere transient disposition1 but something stable and permanent1 not easily removed or annulled1 a dispositio difficile mobilis4 ,and just as it is essentially indicative of past actions whereby it was acquired1 so1 too1 the very raison d'tre of its actuality is to dispose its subject for further and future changes1 for operations and effects which are not yet actual but only potential in this subject4 ,such an accidental mode of being is what ,aristotle called 1 and the scholastics habitus4 ,with ,aristotle1 they define habit as a more or less stable disposition whereby a subject is well or ill disposed in itself or in relation to other things3 ,habitus dicitur dispositio difficile mobilis secundum quam bene vel male disponitur subjectum aut secundum se aut in ordine ad aliud47#cca7 ,the difference between a habit 77 and a simple disposition 77 is that the former is by nature a more or less stable quality while the latter is unstable and transient4 ,moreover1 the facilities acquired by repeated action of the organs or members of men or animals1 and the particular 8set0 acquired by certain tools or instruments from continued use1 are more properly called dispositions than habits3 they are not habits in the strict sense1 though they are often called habits in the ordinary and looser usage of common speech4 ,a little reflection will show that the only proper subjects of natural habits in the strict sense are the spiritual faculties of an intelligent and free agent4 ,since all natural habits are acquired by the past activities1 and dispose for the future activities1 of a being not absolutely perfect1 but partly potential and partly actual1 and subject to change1 it follows that only finite beings can have habits4 ,but1 furthermore1 beings that are not free1 that have not control or dominion of their own actions1 that have not freedom of choice1 are determined by their nature1 by a necessary law of their activity1 to elicit the actions which they do actually elicit3 such beings are by their nature determinata ad unumn2 they are confined necessarily to the particular lines of action whereby they fulfil their rle in the actual order of things4 ,as ,aristotle remarks1 you may throw the same stone repeatedly in the same direction and with the same velocity3 it will never acquire a habit of moving in that direction with that velocity47#ccb7 ,the same is true of plants and animals2 for a habit in the strict sense implies not merely a certain mutability in its subject2 it implies1 and consists in1 a stable modification of some power or faculty which can have its activities directed indifferently in one or other of a variety of channels or lines3 the power or faculty which is the proper subject of a habit must be a potentia dirigibilis vel determinabilis ad diversa4 ,hence merely material powers of action--such as the mechanical1 physical and chemical forces of inorganic nature1 or the organic powers of living bodies1 whether vegetative or merely sentient1--since they are all of themselves1 of their nature1 determined to certain lines of action1 and to these only1--such powers cannot become the subjects of habits1 of stable dispositions towards one line of action rather than another4 8,the powers of material nature10 says ,st4 ,thomas1 8do not elicit their operations by means of habits1 for they are of themselves already adequately determined to their particular lines of action407#ccc7 ,only the spiritual faculties of free agents are1 then1 the proper seat of real habits4 ,only of free agents can we say strictly that 8habit is second nature04 ,only these can direct the operations of their intellect and will1 and through these latter the operations of their sense faculties1 both cognitive and appetitive1 in a way conducive to their last end or in a way that deviates therefrom1 by attaching their intellects to truth or to error1 their wills to virtue or to vice1 and thus forming in these faculties stable dispositions or habits47#ccd7 ,is there any sense1 then1 in which we can speak of the sentient 7cognitive and appetitive7 and executive powers of man as the seat of habits8 ,the activities of those faculties are under the control of intellect and will2 the acts elicited by the former are commanded by the latter2 they are acts that issue primarily from the latter faculties2 and hence the dispositions that result from repetition of these acts and give a facility for further repetition of them--acts of talking1 walking1 singing1 playing musical instruments1 exercising any handicraft--are partly1 though only secondarily1 dispositions formed in these sentient faculties 7the 8trained0 eye1 the 8trained0 ear1 the 8discriminating0 sense of taste1 the 8alert0 sense of touch in the deaf1 dumb1 or blind71 or in these executive powers1 whereby the latter more promptly and easily obey the 8command0 of the higher faculties2 but they are primarily and principally habits of these higher faculties themselves rendering the latter permanently 8apt0 to 8command0 and utilize the subordinate powers in the repetition of such acts47#cce7 ,unquestionably the bodily organs acquire by exercise a definite 8set0 which facilitates their further exercise4 ,but this 8set0 is not something that they can use themselves2 nor is it something that removes or lessens a natural indeterminateness or indifference of these powers2 for they are not indifferent3 they must act1 at any instant1 in the one way which their concrete nature in all its surroundings actually demands4 ,they themselves are only instruments of the higher faculties2 these alone have freedom of choice between lines of action2 it is only the stable modifications which these acquire1 which they themselves can use1 and which dispose them by lessening their indeterminateness1 that are properly called habits4 ,there are1 therefore1 in the organic faculties of man dispositions which give facility of action4 ,there are1 moreover1 organic dispositions which dispose the organism not for action but for its union with the formative principle or soul3 habituales dispositiones materiae ad formam47#ccf7 ,aristotle gives as instances bodily health or beauty47#ccg7 ,but these dispositiones materiales ad formam he does not call habits1 any more than the organic dispositiones ad operationem just referred to3 and for this reason1 that although all these dispositions have a certain degree of stability in the organism--a stability which they derive1 moreover1 from the soul which is the formative principle that secures the continuity and individual identity of the organism1--yet they are not of themselves1 of their own nature1 stable2 whereas the acquired dispositions of the spiritual faculties1 intellect and will1 rooted as they are in a subject that is spiritual and substantially immutable1 are of their own nature stable and permanent4 ,nor are all dispositions of these latter faculties to be deemed habits1 but only those which arise from acts which give them the special character of stability4 ,hence mere opinion in the intellectual order1 as distinct from science1 or a mere inclination resulting from a few isolated acts1 as distinct from a virtue or a vice in the moral order1 are not habits47#cch7 ,habits1 therefore1 belong properly to the faculties of a spiritual substance2 indirectly1 however1 they extend their influence to the lower or organic powers dependent on1 and controlled by1 the spiritual faculties4 ,to the various dispositions and facilities of action acquired by animals through 8training10 8adaptation10 8acclimatization10 etc41 we may apply what has been said in regard to the sense faculties and executive powers of the human body4 ,just as we may regard the internal sense faculties 7memory1 imagination1 sense appetite7 in man as in a secondary and subordinate way subjects of habits1 in so far as these faculties act under the direction and control of human reason and will17#cci7 so also the organic dispositions induced in irrational animals by the direction and guidance of human reason may indeed be regarded as extensions or effects of the habits that dispose the rational human faculties1 but not as themselves in the strict sense habits47#cdj7 ,if1 then1 habits belong properly to intellect and will1 and if their function is to dispose or indispose the human agent for the attainment of the perfection in which his last end consists1 we must naturally look to ,psychology and ,ethics for a detailed analysis of them4 ,here we must be content with a word on their origin1 their effects1 and their importance4 ,habits are produced by acts4 ,the act modifies the faculty4 ,if1 for instance1 nothing remained in our cognitive faculties after each transient cognitive act had passed1 memory would be inexplicable and knowledge impossible2 nor could the repetition of any act ever become easier than its first performance4 ,this something that remains is a habit1 or the beginning of a habit ,a habit may be produced by a single act3 the mind's first intuition of an axiom or principle produces a habit or habitual knowledge of that principle4 ,but as a rule it requires a repetition of any act1 and that for a long time at comparatively short intervals1 to produce a habit of that act1 a stable disposition whereby it can be readily repeated2 and to strengthen and perfect the habit the acts must be formed with a growing degree of intensity and energy4 ,progress in virtue demands sustained and increasingly earnest efforts4 ,the natural effect of habit is to perfect the faculty17#cda7 to increase its energy1 to make it more prompt to act1 and thus to facilitate the performance of the act for which the habit disposes it4 ,it also engenders and develops a natural need or tendency or desire to repeat the act1 and a natural aversion from the acts opposed to the habit4 ,finally1 according as the habit grows1 the performance of the act demands less effort1 calls for less actual attention2 thus the habit diminishes the feeling of effort and tends to bring about a quasi-automatic and semi-conscious form of activity4 ,good habits are those which perfect the nature of the agent1 which advance it towards the realization of its end2 bad habits are those which retard and prevent the realization of this end4 ,hence the ethical importance1 to the human person1 of forming1 fostering and confirming good habits1 as also of avoiding1 resisting and eradicating bad habits1 can scarcely be exaggerated4 ,the profound and all-pervading influence of habit in the mental and moral life of man is unfortunately far from being adequately appreciated even by those responsible for the secular1 moral and religious education of the young4 ,this is perhaps mainly due to the fact that the influence of habit on the conduct of life1 enormous as it is in fact1 is so secret1 so largely unconscious1 that it easily escapes notice4 ,careful reflection on our actions1 diligent study of the springs of action in our everyday life1 are needed to reveal this influence4 ,but the more we analyse human conduct in ourselves and others1 the more firmly convinced we become that human character and conduct are mainly dependent on the formation of habits4 ,habits are the grand conserving and perfecting--or the terrible undermining and destroying--force of life4 ,they are the fruit of our past and the seed of our future4 ,in them the words of ,leibniz find their fullest verification3 8the present is laden with the past and pregnant with the future04 ,by forming good habits we escape the disheartening difficulties of perpetual beginnings2 and thus the labour we devote to the acquisition of wisdom and virtue has its first rich recompense in the facility it gives us to advance on the path of progress4 ,it has been truly and rightly said that all genuine education consists in the formation of good habits4 #hj4 ,,powers1 ,,faculties ,,and ,,forces4--,a natural operative power1 faculty1 or force 71 potentia1 facultas1 virtus agendi7 is a quality which renders the nature of the individual agent apt to elicit certain actions4 ,by impotence or incapacity 71 impotentia1 incapacitas7 ,aristotle meant not an opposite kind of quality1 in contradistinction to power or faculty1 but only a power of a weaker order1 differing in degree1 not in kind1 from the real power which renders an agent proximately capable of acting2 such weaker capacities1 for instance1 as the infant's power to walk1 or the defective eyesight of the aged4 ,it is to the individual subsisting person or thing that all the actions proceeding from the latter are ascribed3 actiones sunt suppositorum3 the 8suppositum0 or person is the principium ,,quod agit4 ,and it acts in accordance with its nature2 this latter is the principium ,,quo agens agit3 the nature is the substance or essence as a principle of the actions whereby the individual tends to realize its end4 ,but is a created1 finite nature the immediate or proximate principle of its activities1 so that it is operative per se8 ,or is it only their remote principle1 eliciting them not by itself but only by means of powers1 faculties1 forces1 which are themselves accidental perfections of the substance and really distinct from it1 qualities intermediate between the latter and its actions1 being the proximate principles of the latter8 ,no doubt when any individual nature is acted upon by other agencies1 when it undergoes real change under the influence of its environment1 its passive potentiality is being so far forth actualized4 ,moreover when the nature itself acts immanently1 the term of such action remaining within the agent itself to actualize or perfect it1 some passive potentiality of the agent is being actualized4 ,in these cases the nature before being thus actualized was really capable of such actualization4 ,this passive potentiality1 however1 is itself nothing actual1 it implies no actual perfection in the nature4 ,but we must distinguish carefully from this passive or receptive potentiality of a nature its active or operative powers--potentiae operativae4 ,these may be themselves actual perfections in the nature1 accidental perfections actually in the nature1 and perhaps really distinct from it4 ,that they are indeed actual perfections of the nature is fairly obvious3 it is an actual perfection of a nature to be proximately and immediately1 and without any further complement or addition to its reality1 capable of acting2 and this is true whether the action in question be immanent or transitive3 if it be immanent1 the perfection resulting from the action1 the term of the latter1 will be a perfection of the agent itself1 and in this case the agent by virtue of its operative power will have had the capacity of perfecting itself2 while if the action be transitive the agent will have had1 in virtue of its operative power1 the capacity of producing perfections in other things4 ,in either case such capacity is undoubtedly an actual perfection of the agent that possesses it4 ,hence the truth of the scholastic formula3 ,omne agens agit in quantum est in ,,actu1 patiatur vero inquantum est in ,,potentia4 ,furthermore1 all such operative powers are really distinct from the actions which immediately proceed from them3 this1 too1 is obvious1 for while the operative power is a stable1 abiding characteristic of the agent1 the actions elicited by means of it are transient4 ,but what is the nature of this operative power in relation to the nature itself of the agent8 ,it is an actual perfection of this nature4 ,it is1 moreover1 unlike acquired habits1 native to this nature1 born with it so to speak1 naturally inseparable from it4 ,further still1 operative powers would seem to be all properties 7#fi7 of their respective natures3 inasmuch as it is only in virtue of the operative power that the nature can act1 and there can be no nature without connatural operations whereby it tends to realize the full and final perfection of its being1 the perfection which is the very raison d'tre of its presence in the actual order of things4 ,the question therefore narrows itself down to this3 ,are operative powers1 which perfect the nature of which they are properties1 really distinct from this nature1 or are they only virtually distinct aspects under which we view the nature itself8 ,for example1 when we speak of intellect and will as being faculties of the human soul1 do we merely mean that intellect is the soul itself regarded as capable of reasoning1 and will the soul itself regarded as capable of willing8 ,or do we mean that the soul is not by itself and in virtue of its own essence capable of reasoning and willing2 that it can reason and will only through the instrumentality of two realities of the accidental order1 really distinct from1 though at the same time necessarily rooted in and springing from1 the substance of the soul itself3 realities which we call powers or faculties8 ,or again1 when we speak of a man or an animal as having various sense faculties--internal and external1 cognitive1 appetitive1 executive--do we merely mean that the living1 sentient organism is itself directly capable of eliciting acts of various kinds3 of imagining1 desiring1 seeing1 hearing1 etc48 ,or do we mean that the organism can elicit these various acts only by means of several accidental realities1 really distinct from1 and inhering in1 itself8 ,if such operative powers or faculties are naturally inseparable from the substance in which they inhere1 if they are so necessarily consequent on the nature of the latter that it cannot exist without them1 are they anything more than virtually distinct aspects of the substance itself8 ,on this question1 as we have already seen 7#fi71 scholastics are not agreed4 ,st4 ,thomas1 and ,thomists generally1 maintain that intellect and will are really distinct from the substance of the soul1 and likewise that the sense faculties are really distinct from the substance of the animated organism in which they inhere47#cdb7 ,in this view the distinction is not merely a virtual distinction between different aspects of the soul 7or the organism7 itself1 grounded in the variety and complexity of the acts which emanate from the latter3 the faculties are real entities of the accidental order1 mediating between the substance and its actions1 and involving in the concrete being a plurality which1 however1 is not incompatible with the real unity of the latter 7#fi74 ,the following are some of the arguments urged in proof of a real distinction3-- 7a7 ,existence and action are two really distinct actualities2 therefore the potentialities which they actualize must be really distinct3 for such is the transcendental relation between the potential and the actual that any potential subject and the corresponding perfection which actualizes it must belong to the same genus supremum3 the one cannot be a substance and the other an accident47#cdc7 ,now existence is the actuality of essence and action is the actuality of operative power or faculty4 ,but action is certainly an accident2 therefore the operative power which it actualizes must also be an accident1 and must therefore be really distinct from the substance of which it is a power1 and of which existence is the actuality4 ,this line of argument applies with equal force to all created natures47#cdd7 ,in the ,infinite ,being alone are operation and substance identical4 ,no creature is operative in virtue of its substance4 ,the actions of a creature cannot be actualizations of its substance3 existence is the actualization of its substance2 therefore its actions must be actualizations of potentialities which are accidents distinct from its substance2 in other words1 of operative powers which belong indeed necessarily to its substance but are really distinct from the latter4 ,this argument rests on very ultimate metaphysical conceptions4 ,but not all scholastics will admit the assumptions it involves4 ,how1 for instance1 does it appear that the created or finite substance as such cannot be immediately operative8 ,even were it immediately operative its actions would still be accidents1 and the distinction between ,creator and creature would stand untouched4 ,the operative power must be an accident because the action which actualizes it1 the 8actus secundus10 is an accident4 ,but the consequentia has not been proved1 and it is not self-evident4 ,on the theory of the real distinction1 is not the operative power itself an actual perfection of the substance1 and therefore in some sort an actualization of the latter8 ,and yet they are not in the same ultimate category1 in eodem genere supremo4 ,the nature which is the potential subject1 perfected by the operative power1 is a substance1 while the operative power which perfects the substance by actualizing this potentiality is an accident4 ,of course there is not exactly the same correlation between substance and operative power as between the latter and action4 ,but anyhow the action is in some true sense an actualization of the substance1 at least through the medium of the power1 unless we are prepared to break up the concrete unity of the agent by referring the action solely to the power of the agent1 and isolating the substance of the latter as a sort of immutable core which merely 8exists03 a mode of conceiving the matter1 which looks very like the mistake of reifying abstract concepts4 ,and if the action is in any true sense an actualization of the substance1 we have1 after all1 a potentia and actus which are not in the same ultimate category4 ,these considerations carry us1 of course1 right into what is perhaps the most fundamental of all metaphysical problems3 that of the mode in which finite reality is actual4 ,in its concrete actuality every finite real being is essentially subject to change3 its actuality is not tota simul3 at every instant it not only is but is becoming3 it is a mixture of potentiality and actuality3 it is ever really changing1 and yet the 8it0 which changes can in some real degree and for some real space of time persist or endure identical with itself as a 8subsisting thing0 or 8person04 ,how1 then1 are we to conceive aright the mode of its actuality8 ,take the concrete existing being at any instant of its actuality3 suppose that it is not merely undergoing change through the influence of other beings in its environment1 or through its own immanent action1 but that it is itself 8acting10 whether immanently or transitively4 ,if we consider that at this instant its existence is 8really distinct0 from its action we cannot mean by this that there is in it an unchanging substantial core1 which is actually merely 8existing10 and a vesture of active and passive accidental principles1 which is just now actual 7though always in a state of flux or change7 by 8acting0 or 8being acted on047#cde7 ,such a conception would conflict with the truth that the existing substance is ever being really and actually1 though accidentally1 determined1 changed1 modified1 improved or disimproved1 in its total concrete existing reality4 ,even when these changes are not so profound as to destroy its substantial identity and thus terminate its actuality as an individual being1 even when1 in other words1 they are not substantial1 they are none the less real and really affect the substance4 ,since they are real they necessarily involve the recognition of really distinct principles in the concrete being and preclude the view that the distinctions which we recognize in the ever-changing modes of its actuality1 as revealed to us in time and space1 are all merely conceptual or logical distinctions projected by the mind into what would therefore be in fact a simple and immutable reality4 ,the denial of any real distinction between successive actual states1 or between co-existing principles of those states1 in any finite being1 would lead logically to the ,eleatic doctrine1 i4e4 to denial of the reality of change4 ,on the other hand1 while recognizing that change is a reality and not a subjective mental illusion1 and that real change can be grounded only in a plurality of really distinct principles in the finite individual being1 we must at the same time hold that this plurality of really distinct principles in the individual does not destroy a real unity1 stability1 and self-identical continuity of the individual being in the mode of its actuality throughout time4 ,not1 of course1 that this stability or sameness of the individual throughout time is complete and adequate to the exclusion of all real change1 but it is certainly a real continuity of one and the same individual being3 to deny this would be to remove all permanence from reality and to reduce all real being to flux or change1 i4e4 to the of the ,ionian philosopher1 ,heraclitus4 ,we cannot get a true conception of any finite reality by considering it merely from the static point of view1 which is the natural standpoint of abstract thought2 we must view it also from the dynamic-kinetic standpoint1 i4e4 not merely as an essence or principle of existence1 but as a power or principle of action1 and of consequent change1 evolution1 or decay4 ,and the philosophy which is the latest fashion among contemporary systems1 that of the brilliant ,french thinker and writer1 ,bergson1 has at all events the merit of emphasizing this important truth1 that if our philosophical analysis of experience is to be fruitful we must try to grasp reality not merely as it presents itself to abstract thought at any section drawn by the latter through the incessant process of its fieri or continuous actualization in time1 but also to grasp and analyse as far as possible the fieri or process itself1 and bring to light whatever we find that this process implies4 ,these considerations may help the student to estimate for himself the value and the limitations of the argument which has suggested them4 7b7 ,a thing cannot be really identical with a variety of things that are really distinct from one another2 but the faculties of the soul are really distinct from one another2 therefore they must be really distinct from the substance of the soul4 ,the minor premiss is supported by these considerations3 ,the vegetative and sentient operations of the human individual are operations of the living organism1 while the higher operations of rational thought and volition are operations of the soul alone1 the spiritual or immaterial principle in the individual4 ,but the immaterial principle cannot be really and adequately identical with the animated organism4 ,therefore the powers or immediate principles of these two classes of functions1 belonging as they do to two really 7though not adequately7 distinct substantial principles1 cannot be really identical with one of them1 viz4 with the soul itself1 the spiritual principle4 ,again3 ,the exercise of certain functions by the human individual is subordinate to1 and dependent on the previous exercise of other functions4 ,for example1 actual volition is necessarily dependent and consequent on actual thought3 we cannot will or desire any good without first knowing it as a good4 ,but the immediate principle of any function or activity cannot be dependent on or subordinate to itself4 ,therefore the immediate principles of such controlling and controlled activities--intellect and will1 for example--must be really distinct faculties47#cdf7 7c7 ,suppose the substance or nature of an agent--the human individual1 for instance--were really identical with all its powers or faculties1 that these were merely the nature itself viewed under different aspects1 so that there would be in reality only one operative power in the individual1 then there would be no reason why the individual could not or should not at any instant elicit one single action or operation which would be simultaneously an act of thinking1 willing1 seeing1 hearing1 etc41 i4e4 which would have at once in itself the modalities of all human activities4 ,but universal experience testifies1 on the contrary1 that the operations of the individual are each of some particular mode only1 that he cannot elicit every mode of human activity simultaneously1 that he never elicits one single act having a variety of modes4 ,but why could he not1 if his substance or nature itself were the one and only proximate principle of all his modes of activity8 ,because the conditions for the full and adequate exercise of this one single or proximate principle 7at once substance and power7 are never realized6 ,but it is arbitrary to assume the existence of a power which could never pass fully into the act connatural to it4 ,and moreover1 even if these conditions are partially realized we should see as a consequence of this some human activity which would manifest in some degree at least all the modalities of the various human actions of which we have experience4 ,but we have no experience of a single human activity manifesting in any degree the modalities of the numerous and really distinct human activities which experience reveals to us4 ,hence the variety of these really distinct modes of activity can be explained only by the fact that the human individual elicits them through proximate operative principles or powers which are really distinct from one another and from the nature itself of the individual47#cdg7 ,the problem of analysing and classifying the forces1 faculties1 or powers of the subsisting things and persons in the universe of our experience1 belongs partly to ,cosmology and partly to ,psychology4 ,in the latter it becomes mainly a problem of classifying our mental acts1 functions1 or processes--our states of consciousness4 ,apart from the question whether or not our mental faculties are really distinct from one another and from the human nature or substance itself of the individual1 the problem of their proper classification is important from the point of view of method and of accurate psychological analysis4 ,we have seen already 7#fi7 that the greatest scholastic philosophers are not unanimous in declaring the distinction to be real4 ,but it is at least a virtual distinction2 and even as such it gives rise to the problem of classification4 ,it will be sufficient here to indicate the general principle on which the classification proceeds3 ,wherever the acts are adequately distinct they proceed from distinct powers2 and the acts are adequately distinct when they have adequately distinct formal objects47#cdh7 ,potentiae specificantur per actus et objecta4 ,the operation or act is the correlative of the power or faculty2 and the formal object or term of the operation is the final cause of the latter1 the end for which it is elicited4 ,on this basis ,aristotle and the scholastics distinguish two mental faculties of the higher or spiritual order1 intellect and will2 and in the lower or sense order of mental life they distinguish one appetitive faculty1 sense appetite1 and several cognitive sense faculties4 ,these latter comprise the internal sense faculties1 viz4 the sensus communis or unifying and associating sense1 the imagination1 sense memory1 and instinct2 and the external sense faculties comprise sight1 sound1 taste1 smell and touch4 #ha4 ,,some ,,characteristics ,,of ,,qualities4--7a7 ,qualities have contraries4 ,health and illness1 virtue and vice1 science and error1 etc41 are opposed as contraries4 ,this1 however1 is not a property of qualities2 it is not verified in powers1 or in forms and figures2 and it is verified in accidents which are not qualities1 e4g4 in actio and passio4 7b7 ,quality is the basis or 8fundamentum0 of all relations of similarity and dissimilarity4 ,this attribute seems to be in the strict sense a property of all qualities4 ,substances are similar in so far as they have the same kind of qualities1 dissimilar in so far as they have different kinds4 ,similarity of substances is the main index to identity of nature or kind2 but it must not be confounded with the latter4 ,the latter cannot always be inferred even from a high degree of similarity3 some specifically distinct classes of things are very similar to one another4 ,nor1 on the other hand1 is full and complete similarity a necessary consequence of identity of nature3 individuals of the same species are often very dissimilar1 very unlike one another4 7c7 ,qualities admit of varying degrees of intensity4 ,they can increase or diminish in the same substance1 while numerically 7and specifically7 distinct substances can have the same kind of quality in different degrees4 ,this is manifest in regard to 8habits10 8passions0 and 8sensible qualities04 ,on the other hand1 it is clearly not true of 8form0 or 8figure04 ,different individuals can have the same kind of 8natural power0 in different degrees4 ,one man may be naturally of keener intellect and stronger will than another3 the weak power was what ,aristotle called 7impotentia74 ,but whether the natural powers of the same individual can themselves increase or decrease in strength or intensity--and not merely the habits that affect these powers--is not so clear4 ,operative powers are certainly perfected 7or injured7 by the acquisition of good 7or bad7 habits4 ,in the view of those who deny a real distinction between natural operative power or faculty and substance1 it is1 of course1 the substance itself that is so perfected 7or injured74 ,this attribute1 therefore1 is not found in all qualities2 but it is found in qualities alone1 and not in any other category or mode of being4 ,how are we to conceive this variation in intensity1 this growth or diminution of any quality1 in a substance in which such change takes places8 ,on this point philosophers are not agreed4 ,by 8degree of intensity0--8intensio vel remissio qualitatis0--we understand the degree 7or change of degree7 in which the same numerical quality affects the same part or the same power of its subject1 thus rendering this part or power formally more or less 8qualified0 in some particular way4 ,this is clearly something quite different from the extension of the same quality to different parts 7or its withdrawal from different parts7 of the same extended subject4 ,in a corporeal1 extended substance1 there can accordingly be question of both kinds of change1 intensive and extensive2 while in a simple1 spiritual substance there can obviously be question only of intensive change of qualities4 ,and the fact of intensive change of qualities is an undeniable fact of experience4 ,in what manner does it take place8 ,some authors conceive it as an addition or subtraction of grades or degrees of the same quality4 ,others1 conceiving qualities as simple1 indivisible entities or 8forms10 and thence denying the possibility of distinct grades of any quality1 conceive such change to take place by this simple entity affecting its subject more or less intimately1 becoming more or less firmly rooted1 as it were1 in its subject47#cdi7 ,and they explain this more or less perfect mode of inherence in a variety of ways1 all of which are grounded on certain texts of ,st4 ,thomas37#cej7 the quality receives a new accidental mode whereby it 8communicates itself to0 the subject1 and 8informs0 the latter1 more or less perfectly2 or1 it is educed more or less fully from the potentiality of its subject1 thus qualifying the latter in the degree in which it is educed from1 and rooted in1 the latter4 ,these explanations are instructive1 as illustrating the view that the actual reality of the accidental mode of being consists in its affecting1 determining1 the subject in which it inheres4 ,st4 ,thomas1 professing that he can attach no intelligible meaning to addition or substraction of grades17#cea7 teaches that the habit of charity1 for example1 can be increased 8secundum essentiam0 by 8inhering more perfectly10 8being more firmly rooted0 in its subject2 for1 he says1 since it is an accident1 8ejus esse est inesse4 ,unde nihil est aliud ipsam secundum essentiam augeri1 quam eam magis inesse subjecto1 quod est magis eam radicari in subjecto4 ,augetur ergo essentialiter444 ita quod magis ac magis in subjecto esse incipiat407#ceb7 ,and elsewhere he concludes with the words3 8,ponere igitur quod aliqua qualitas non augeatur secundum essentiam1 sed augeatur secundum radicationem in subjecto vel secundum intensionem actus1 est ponere contradictoria esse simul047#cec7 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,quantity1 ,,space ,,and ,,time4 #hb4 ,,analysis ,,of ,,the ,,concept ,,of ,,quantity4--,a detailed study of ,quantity1 including ,space and ,time1 and the ,aristotelian categories ,ubi1 ,quando and ,situs1 belongs to ,cosmology4 ,here we shall confine ourselves mainly to the exposition of certain elementary notions preparatory to such detailed study2 and we shall assume the validity of the ,scholastic ,theory of ,knowledge3 that a real1 material world exists independently of our minds2 that it consists of material substances or bodies1 animate and inanimate1 endowed with the fundamental accident of quantity or extension2 that these bodies possess1 moreover1 many other real accidents such as qualities and energies1 chemical1 physical and mechanical2 that they are subject to real change1 local1 quantitative1 qualitative and substantial2 that our concepts of space and time1 derived from those of extension and change1 are not purely subjective or mental forms of cognition1 but are objectively valid notions grounded in the reality of the corporeal universe and giving us a genuine1 if inadequate1 insight into the nature of this reality4 ,among the characteristics recognized by physicists in all perceptible matter--divisibility1 commensurability1 impenetrability1 passivity or inertia1 subjection to external forces or energies1 external extension or volume1 internal quantity or mass--there are none more fundamental than those of volume and mass1 or extension and quantity47#ced7 ,nowhere1 however1 do we find a better illustration of the fact that it is impossible to give a definition proper of any supreme category1 or even a description of it by the aid of any more elementary notions1 than in the attempts of philosophers to describe ,quantity4 ,when1 for instance1 we describe external1 actual1 local1 or spatial extension as that accident of a corporeal substance or body in virtue of which the latter so exists that it has parts outside parts in space1 we have to admit at once that the notions expressed by the terms 8parts10 8outside0 and 8space0 are no simpler than the notion of extension itself3 in fact our notions of 8place0 7locus7 and 8space0 7spatium7 are derived from1 and presuppose1 that of extension4 ,this1 however1 is no serious disadvantage2 for the description1 such as it is1 indicates what we mean by the terms 8local1 spatial1 external1 actual extension10 and declares this latter to be an accident of corporeal substances4 ,extension1 as it is actually in the concrete body1 affected by a variety of sensible qualities1 is called physical extension2 regarded in the abstract1 apart from these qualities1 it is called geometrical or mathematical extension3 trina dimensio1 or extension in three dimensions1 length1 breadth and depth4 ,if we abstract from one of these we have extension in two dimensions1 superficial extension2 if we abstract from two1 we have extension in one dimension1 linear extension2 and if we abstract from all three we have the extreme limiting concept of the mathematical point4 ,of these four abstract mathematical concepts1 8point10 8line10 8surface10 and 8volume10 each expresses the mathematical limitation of the succeeding one4 ,we cannot conceive a body existing by having parts outside parts in space1 each part occupying exclusively a place appropriated to itself1 unless we conceive the body1 the corporeal substance1 as having already a plurality of really distinct or distinguishable parts in itself1 and abstracting from all relation to space4 ,the substance must be conceived as having a plurality of really distinct or distinguishable integral parts of itself1 before these parts can be conceived as existing outside one another1 each in its own place4 ,and the property in virtue of which the corporeal substance has in itself this plurality of distinct integral parts1 whereby it is capable of occupying space1 and of being impenetrable1 divisible1 measurable1 etc41 is called internal1 radical1 potential quantity or extension47#cee7 ,the corporeal substance itself is1 of course1 essentially composite1 essentially divisible into two essential constitutive principles1 the passive1 determinable1 or material principle 7materia prima71 and the specifying1 determining1 formative principle 7forma substantialis74 ,then we conceive this essentially composite substance as necessarily endowed with the property of internal quantity whereby it is composite in another order3 composed of1 and divisible into1 really distinct integral parts1 each of which is1 of course1 essentially composite like the whole itself47#cef7 ,finally we conceive that the corporeal substance1 endowed with this property1 has also1 as a connatural but really distinct and absolutely separable effect of the latter1 the accidental mode of being1 called external or local extension1 in virtue of which it actually occupies space1 and thus becomes the subject of all those qualities whereby it is perceptible to our senses4 ,we have next to inquire into the relations between these three distinct objective concepts1 corporeal substance1 internal quantity1 and local or external extension4 #hc4 ,,corporeal ,,substance1 ,,quantity ,,and ,,extension4--,the corporeal substance is an essentially composite substance1 resulting from the union of two distinct essential constitutive principles4 ,it exists in itself and is the ultimate subject of all the determinations whereby it reveals itself to our senses4 ,its actual extension in space is a fundamental mode or determination of its reality1 but it is a mode which is distinct from the reality itself of the corporeal substance4 ,aristotle regarded the distinction as real4 ,in his ,metaphysics he declares that the three dimensions of bodies are quantities1 not substances1 that quantity is not a substance1 whereas that in which it ultimately inheres is a substance27#ceg7 in his ,physics he says that substance is of itself indivisible and is made divisible by its quantity or extension27#ceh7 in his ,de ,anima7#cei7 he observes that external quantity is directly perceptible by the senses 7sensibile per se7 while substance is only indirectly perceptible 7sensibile per accidens737#cfj7 from which it is inferred that substance and extension cannot be really identical4 ,again1 ,st4 ,thomas argues that a corporeal substance as such1 and so far as its essence is concerned1 is indifferent to greater or less extension in space1 that the whole nature or substance of a man1 for instance1 is indifferent to1 and independent of1 his particular size at any point of time1 that while he grows from childhood to manhood it is his external quantity that changes1 but not his humanity1 his human essence1 nature1 or substance47#cfa7 ,considerations such as these1 though they do not indeed amount to cogent proofs of a real distinction between spatial extension and corporeal substance1 should make any serious philosopher hesitate to identify these absolutely1 as ,descartes and his followers did when they declared the essence of corporeal substance to consist in three dimensions of spatial extension4 ,even looking at the matter from the point of view of natural reason alone1 and apart altogether from any light that may be thrown upon it for the ,christian philosopher by ,divine ,revelation1 it is only the superficial thinker who will conclude that because extension--which reveals to his intellect through the medium of external sense perception the presence of a corporeal substance--is naturally inseparable from the latter1 therefore it is really and absolutely identical with this latter4 ,the philosopher who remembers how little is known for certain about the ultimate1 essential constitution of bodies or corporeal substances1 will be slow to conclude that the spatially extended mode of their being enters into the constitution of their essence1 and is not rather an accidental determination whereby these substances have their integral parts dispersed or extended in space and thus revealed to the human intellect through sense perception4 ,and if he be a ,christian philosopher he will naturally inquire whether any truth of the ,christian ,revelation will help indirectly to determine the question4 ,descartes and his followers were ,christian philosophers2 and hence it was all the more rash and imprudent of them1 in spite of what they knew concerning the ,blessed ,eucharist1 to identify the corporeal substance with its spatial extension4 ,they knew that by transubstantiation the bread and wine are changed substantially into the ,body and ,blood of ,christ4 ,but all the appearances or phenomena of bread and wine remain after transubstantiation1 the ,eucharistic species as they are called1 the taste1 colour1 form1 etc41 in a word1 all the sensible qualities of these substances1 including the extension in which they immediately inhere4 ,from the revealed truth that the substances disappear1 and from the manifest fact that all their accidents remain1 ,christian philosophers and theologians have rightly drawn the sufficiently obvious inference that the spatially extended quantity1 which immediately supports all the other sensible qualities1 must be itself an absolute accident not only really distinct1 but by the absolute power of ,god really separable1 from its connatural substance1 the bread and the wine respectively2 and that this extended quantity remains in this state of actual separation miraculously supported by the direct influence of the ,divine ,omnipotence4 ,and while ,christian philosophers who hold this view can defend it from all charges of inconsistency1 unreasonableness and impossibility1 ,descartes and his followers can defend their particular view only by the admission that in the case of the consecrated ,eucharist our senses are deceived4 ,in this view1 while no accidents of the bread and wine remain objectively1 ,god ,himself produces directly in our minds the subjective1 mental states which the bread and wine produced before consecration47#cfb7 ,this gratuitous aspersion is cast on the trustworthiness of sense perception1 simply on account of the preconceived theory identifying the corporeal substance with its extension4 ,according to the common view1 on the other hand1 the senses are not really deceived4 ,that to which they testify is really there1 viz4 the whole collection of natural accidents of bread and wine4 ,it is not the function of the senses1 but of the intellect1 to testify to the presence of the substance4 ,of course the unbeliever looking at the consecrated species1 or the believer who looks at them not knowing that they have been consecrated1 thinks that the substance of bread and the substance of wine are there4 ,each is deceived intellectually1 the one by his unbelief of a truth1 the other by his ignorance of a fact4 ,if both knew of the fact of consecration1 and if the former believed in the effect of it1 neither would be deceived47#cfc7 ,while the ,cartesian view is thus open to such serious objections1 the only plausible difficulty against the traditional view is that of conceiving how the reality of a merely accidental mode of being1 such as extension1 can be sustained in the actual order of things apart from its connatural substance1 and yet not become itself eo ipso a substance4 ,needless to say we have no positive conception of the manner in which the ,divine ,omnipotence thus sustains extension2 but since this latter1 being an absolute accident1 and not a mere modal determination of the substance1 has a reality of its own1 the miraculous persistence of this reality cannot be shown to be impossible4 ,nor is it1 in this separated condition1 itself a substance1 for it still retains its natural aptitude for inherence in its connatural substance2 and this aptitude alone1 not actual inherence1 is of its essence as an accident 7#fe73 retaining this natural aptitude it cannot possibly become a substance1 it cannot be identified with the substantial mode of being which has essentially the very opposite aptitude1 that of existing in itself4 ,external extension1 then1 is an absolute accident1 really distinct from the corporeal substance1 and naturally though not absolutely inseparable from the latter4 ,it is the natural concomitant or consequence of the internal quantity whereby the corporeal substance has in itself a plurality of distinct integral parts4 ,this internal quantity itself is either an aspect of the corporeal substance itself1 only virtually distinct from the latter1 or else in the strict sense a property1 absolutely inseparable1 if really distinct1 from the substance4 ,natural experience furnishes no example of a corporeal substance actually existing devoid of internal quantity or internal distinction of integral parts47#cfd7 ,but scholastic philosophers are not agreed as to whether the corporeal substance is itself and by its own essence a manifold of really distinct integral parts 7in which case internal quantity would be merely the aspect under which the essence is thus regarded as an integral whole constituted by a plurality of distinct integral parts2 while1 looked at as an essence1 it would be an essential whole constituted by the union of two essential parts or principles7--or whether it is formally constituted an integral whole1 not by its essence 7which makes it only an essential whole1 an essentially composite substance71 but by a property really distinct1 though necessarily flowing1 from this essence1 viz4 internal quantity4 ,according to the former view the material principle 7materia prima7 of the composite corporeal substance is such that the essence resulting from its union with the formative principle 7forma substantialis7 is necessarily an integral whole with distinguishable integral parts1 each of which naturally demands the spatially extended mode of being which external extension de facto confers upon it4 ,according to the latter view1 which is that of ,st4 ,thomas and his followers generally1 the corporeal substance as such has no mode of composition other than essential composition3 it is not of itself an integral whole1 compounded of distinct or distinguishable integral parts 7each of which would be1 like the whole1 essentially composite73 of itself it is indivisible into integral parts3 it is1 therefore1 in this order of being1 simple and not composite4 ,it has1 no doubt1 by reason of its material principle1 an absolutely necessary exigence for divisibility into distinct integral parts1 for integral composition in other words4 ,but this actual integral composition1 this actual divisibility1 is the formal effect of a property really distinct from the substantial essence itself2 and this property is internal quantity3 the connatural1 but absolutely separable1 complement of this internal quantity being1 as in the other view1 local or spatial extension4 ,in both views external extension is an absolute accident of the corporeal substance2 and in the ,thomist view internal quantity would also appear to be an absolute accident1 and not a mere mode4 ,it is instructive to reflect how far this scholastic doctrine removes us from the ,cartesian view which sets up an absolute antithesis between mind or spirit1 and matter or body1 placing the essence of the former in thought and that of the latter in extension4 ,according to the scholastic view the spiritual substance is an immaterial 8actuality0 or 8form02 it is essentially simple1 and not like a corporeal substance an essentially composite substance resulting from the union of a formative principle or 8form0 with a passive1 determinable1 material principle4 ,and since it is the material principle that demands the property of internal quantity and the accident of external extension1 whereby the corporeal substance becomes an integral whole with its parts extended in space1 it follows that the spiritual substance1 having no material principle in its constitution1 is not only essentially simple--to the exclusion of distinct principles of its essence1--but is also and as a consequence integrally simple1 to the exclusion of distinct integral parts1 and of the extended or characteristically corporeal mode of occupying space4 ,so far there is contrast between the two great substantial modes of finite being1 matter and spirit2 but the contrast is by no means an absolute antithesis4 ,for if we look at the essence alone of the corporeal substance it is not of itself actually extended in space3 in the ,thomist view it is not even of itself divisible into distinct integral parts4 ,it differs from spirit in this that while the latter is essentially simple the former is essentially composite and has by reason of this compositeness a natural aptitude for divisibility into parts and for the extension of these parts in space1 an aptitude which spirit does not possess4 ,but the corporeal substance may exist without actual extension1 and consequently without any of those other attributes such as impenetrability1 solidity1 colour1 etc41 through which it is perceptible to our senses4 ,in this condition1 how does it differ from spirit8 ,in being essentially composite1 and in being perhaps endowed with distinguishable integral parts47#cfe7 ,but in this condition the essential mode of its being has a relation to space which closely resembles the mode in which spirit exists in space3 it is related to space somewhat in the manner in which the soul is in the space occupied by the body--whole in the whole of this space and whole in every assignable portion of this space4 ,so that after all1 different as matter and spirit undoubtedly are1 the difference between them is by no means that sort of ,cartesian chasm which human thought must for ever fail to bridge4 ,by virtue of its external extension the corporeal substance exists by having distinguishable parts outside parts in space4 ,we can conceive any perceptible volume of matter as being perfectly continuous1 if it has no actual limits or actual distinction of parts within itself1 but is one individual being completely filling the whole space within its outer surface2 or imperfectly continuous1 if while being one and undivided it has within its volume pores or interstices1 whether these be empty or filled with some other sort of matter2 or as made up of contiguous integral parts if each or these is really distinct and actually divided from every other1 while each actually touches with its outer limits the adjacent limits of the parts lying next to it1 so that all the internal parts or limits are co-terminous2 or as made up of separate1 discrete or distant parts no one of which actually touches any other4 ,it is clear that there must be1 in any actually extended volume of matter1 ultimate parts which are really continuous--unless we are to hold1 with dynamists1 that our perception of extension is produced in our minds by the action of extramental points or centres of force which are themselves simple or unextended4 ,but the physical phenomena of contraction1 expansion1 absorption1 undulatory and vibratory motions accompanying our sensations of light1 heat and sound1 as well as many other physical phenomena1 all point to the fact that volumes of matter which are apparently continuous are really porous3 the molecular structure of perceptible matter is an accepted physical theory2 and scientists also universally accept as a working hypothesis the existence of an imperceptible material medium pervading and filling all real space1 though there is no agreement as to the properties with which they suppose this hypothetical medium1 the 8ether10 to be endowed4 ,again1 as regards the divisibility of extended matter1 it is obvious that if we conceive extension in three dimensions geometrically1 mathematically or in the abstract1 any such volume or extension is indefinitely divisible in thought4 ,but if we inquire how far any concrete1 actually existing volume of matter is divisible1 we know in the first place that we cannot divide the body of any actual organic living thing indefinitely without destroying its life1 and so its specific character4 ,nor can we carry on the division of inorganic matter indefinitely for want of sufficiently delicate dividing instruments4 ,but apart from this the science of chemistry points to the fact that every inorganic chemical compound has an ultimate individual unit1 the chemical molecule1 which we cannot sub-divide without destroying the specific nature of the compound by resolving it into its elements or into less complex compounds4 ,furthermore1 each 8elementary0 or 8chemically simple0 body--such as gold1 oxygen1 carbon1 etc4--seems resolvable into units called 8atoms10 which appear to be ultimate individual units in the sense that if their mass can be subdivided 7as appears possible from researches that have originated in the discovery of radium7 the subdivisions are specifically different kinds of matter from that of the atom so divided4 ,in the inorganic world the perceptible mass of matter is certainly not an individual being1 a unum per se1 but only a collection of individual atoms or molecules1 a unum per accidens4 ,whether the molecule or the atom of the chemically elementary body is the 8individual10 cannot be determined with any degree of certitude4 ,it would appear1 however1 that every specifically distinct type of inorganic matter1 whether compound or elementary1 requires for its existence a certain minimal volume1 by the sub-division of which the type is substantially changed2 and this is manifestly true of organic or living matter3 so that matter as it naturally exists would appear not to be indefinitely divisible4 ,if in a chemically homogeneous mass of inorganic matter 7such as carbon or water7 the chemical molecule be regarded as the 8individual10 this cannot be the case in any organic1 living thing1 for whatever matter is assimilated into the living substance of such a being eo ipso undergoes substantial change whereby it loses the nature it had and becomes a constituent of the living individual4 ,the substantial1 8individual0 unity of the organic living being seems to be compatible not merely with qualitative 7structural and functional7 heterogeneity of parts1 but also with 7perhaps even complete7 spatial separateness of these parts4 ,if the structure of the living body is really 8molecular10 i4e4 if it has distances between its ultimate integral units1 so that these are not in spatial contact1 then the fact that the formative1 vital principle 7forma substantialis1 anima7 unifies this material manifold1 and constitutes it an 8individual0 by actualizing and vitalizing each and all of the material units1 spatially separate as they are1--this fact will help us to realize that the formative principle of the composite corporeal substance has not of itself the spatial1 extended mode of being1 but that the substance derives the latter from its material principle 7materia prima74 #hd4 ,,place ,,and ,,space4--,from the concept of the volume or actual extension of a body we pass immediately to that of the 8place0 7locus7 which it occupies4 ,we may distinguish between the internal and the external place of a body4 ,by the former we understand the outer 7convex7 surface of the body itself1 regarded as a receptacle containing the volume of the body4 ,if1 therefore1 there were only one body in existence it would have its own internal place3 this is independent of other bodies4 ,not so1 however1 the external place2 for by the external place of a body we mean the immediately surrounding 7concave7 surface1 formed by the bodies which circumscribe the body in question1 and considered formally as an immovable container of this body4 ,this is a free rendering of ,aristotle's definition3 ,place is the first 7or immediate7 immovable surface 7or limit7 of that which contains a body3 prima immobilis superficies ejus quod continet47#cff7 ,if a hollow sphere were filled with water1 the inner or concave surface of the sphere would be the 8external place0 of the water4 ,not1 however1 this surface considered materially1 but formally as a surface1 so that if the sphere could be removed1 and another instantaneously substituted for it1 the water would still be contained within the same formal surface2 its locus externus would remain the same4 ,and1 again1 it is the containing surface considered as immovable or as circumscribing that definite portion of space1 that constitutes the locus externus or 8external place0 of the located body3 so that if the sphere with the water were moved the latter would thereby obtain a new external location1 for though the containing surface be still materially and formally the same1 it is no longer the same as a locating surface1 seeing that it now marks off a portion of space different from that marked off by it before it was moved4 ,aristotle's definition defines what is known as the proper external place of a body4 ,from this we distinguish the common external place or location of a body3 understanding by the latter1 or 8locus communis10 the whole collection of spatial relations of the body in question to all the bodies in its immediate neighbourhood4 ,it is by indicating these relations1 or some of them1 that we assign the ,aristotelian category1 or extrinsic denomination1 ,ubi47#cfg7 ,regarded ontologically1 the internal place of a body is an absolute accident3 it is the accident which gives the latter concrete volume or external extension1 and it is not really distinct from the latter4 ,the external place of a body includes in addition the spatial relations of the latter to other bodies1 relations grounded in the volumes of those bodies4 ,it is by reason of these spatial relations with certain bodies1 that a being is said to be 8present0 in a certain place4 ,a corporeal extended substance is said to occupy space circumscriptiv1 or by having parts outside parts in the place it occupies4 ,a finite or created spiritual substance is said to occupy space definitiv inasmuch as it can naturally exercise its influence only within certain more or less extended spatial limits3 as the human soul does within the confines of the body47#cfh7 ,the ,infinite ,being is said to occupy space repletiv4 ,the actual presence of ,god in all real space1 conserving in its existence all created1 contingent reality1 is called the ,divine ,ubiquity4 ,the perfection whereby ,god can be present in other worlds and other spaces which ,he may actualize is called the ,divine ,immensity4 ,the local presence of a finite being to other finite beings is itself a positive perfection--based on its actual extension if it be an extended corporeal substance1 or on its power of operating within a certain space if it be a spiritual substance4 ,the fact that in the case of a finite being this local presence is itself limited1 is at once a corollary and an index of the finiteness of the being in question4 ,only the ,infinite ,being is omnipresent or ubiquitous4 ,but every finite being1 whether corporeal or spiritual1 from the very fact that it exists at all1 must exist somewhere or have some locus internus1 and it must have some local presence if there are other corporeal1 extended beings in existence4 ,thus the local presence of a being is a 7finite7 perfection which seems to be grounded in the very nature itself of the creature47#cfi7 ,from the concept of place we pass naturally to the more complex and abstract notion of space4 ,it is1 of course1 by cognitive processes1 both sentient and intellectual1 that we come into possession of the abstract concept of space4 ,these processes are subjective in the sense that they are processes of the individual's mental faculties4 ,distinguishing between the processes and the object or content which is brought into consciousness1 or put in presence of the mind1 by means of them2 and assuming that this object or content is not a mere form or groove of our cognitive activity1 not a mere antecedent condition requisite on the mental side for the conscious exercise of this activity on its data1 but that on the contrary it is1 or involves1 an objective1 extramental reality apprehended by the mind1--we go on to inquire in what this objective reality consists4 ,in approaching the question we must first note that what is true of every abstract and universal concept is true of the concept of space1 viz4 that the abstractness and universality 78intentio universalitatis07 of real being1 as apprehended by the intellect1 are modes or forms of thought1 entia rationis1 logical conditions and relations which are created by thought1 and which exist only in and for thought2 while the reality itself is the object apprehended in these modes and under these conditions3 ,universale est formaliter in mente et fundamentaliter in re4 ,now through the concept of space we apprehend a reality4 ,our concept of real space has for its object an actual reality4 ,what is this reality8 ,if space is real1 in what does its reality consist8 ,we answer that the reality which we apprehend through this concept is the total amount of the actual extension or magnitude of all created and coexisting bodies2 not1 however1 this total magnitude considered absolutely and in itself1 but as endowed with real and mutual relations of all its parts to one another17#cgj7 relations which are apprehended by us as distances1 linear1 superficial1 and voluminal4 ,such1 then1 is the reality corresponding to our concept of real and actual space4 ,but no sooner have we reached this concept than we may look at its object in the abstract1 remove mentally all limits from it1 and conceive all extended bodies as actually non-existent4 ,what is the result8 ,the result is that we have now present to our minds the possibility of the existence of extended bodies1 and a concomitant imagination image 7which memory will not allow us to banish from consciousness7 of a vast and boundless emptiness1 an indefinite and unmeasurable vacuum in which bodies were or may be4 ,the intellectual concept is now not a concept of any actual object1 but of a mere possibility3 the possibility of a corporeal1 extended universe4 ,this is the concept of what we call ideal or possible space2 and like the concept of any other possible reality it is derived by us from our experience of actual reality1--in this case from our experience of extended bodies as actually existing4 ,the corporeal universe has not existed from all eternity1 but it was possible from all eternity4 ,when we think of that possibility as antecedent to all creation1 we are thinking of bodies1 and of their extension1 as possible2 and the concept of their total extension as possible is the concept of ideal or possible space4 ,this concept is1 through a psychological necessity1 accompanied by an imagination image of what we call imaginary space3 the unlimited vacuity which preceded corporeal creation1 which would still persist were the latter totally annihilated1 which reaches out indefinitely beyond its actual limits1 which imagination pictures for us as a receptacle in which bodies may exist but which all the time our reason assures us is actually nothing1 being really only the known possibility of corporeal creatures4 ,this familiar notion of an empty receptacle for bodies is what we have in mind when we think of bodies as existing 8in space04 ,hence we say that space1 as conceived by the human mind1 is not a mere subjective form of cognition1 a mere ens rationis1 inasmuch as our concept has a foundation in reality1 viz4 the actual extension of all existing bodies2 nor is it on the other hand simply a real entity1 because this actual extension of bodies does not really exist in the manner in which we apprehend it under the abstract concept of space1 as a mere possibility1 or empty receptacle1 of bodies4 ,space is therefore an ens rationis cum fundamento in re4 ,a great variety of interesting but abstruse questions arise from the consideration of space2 but they belong properly to ,cosmology and ,natural ,theology4 ,for example3 ,is real space actually infinite in magnitude1 or finite8 ,in other words1 besides the whole solar system--which is in reality merely one star plus its planets and their satellites1--is there in existence an actually infinite multitude of such stellar worlds8 ,it is not likely that this can ever be determined empirically4 ,many philosophers maintain that the question must be answered in the negative1 inasmuch as an actually infinite multitude is impossible4 ,others1 however1 deny that the impossibility of an actually infinite multitude can be proved47#cga7 ,again1 within the limits of the actual corporeal universe1 are there really vacant spaces1 or is all space within these limits actually 7or even necessarily7 filled with an all-pervading ether or corporeal medium of some sort8 ,how would local motion be possible if all space were full of impenetrable matter8 ,how would the real interaction of distant bodies on one another be possible if there were only vacant space between them8 ,is the real volume or extension of a corporeal substance 7as distinct from its apparent volume1 which is supposed to include interstices1 or spaces not filled with that body7 actually or necessarily unchangeable8 ,or is the internal quantity of a body actually or necessarily unchangeable8 ,can more than one individual corporeal substance simultaneously occupy exactly the same space8 7,this is not possible naturally1 for impenetrability is a natural consequence of local extension2 but it is possible miraculously--if all the bodies1 or all except one1 be miraculously deprived of local or spatial extension47 ,can the same individual body be present at the same time in totally different and distant places8 7,not naturally1 of course2 but how it can happen even miraculously is a more difficult question than the preceding one4 ,it is in virtue of its actual or local extension that a body is present sensibly in a definite place4 ,deprived miraculously of this extension it can be simultaneously in several places1 as our ,blessed ,lord's ,body is in the ,eucharist4 ,but if a body has its natural local extension at one definite place1 does this extension so confine its presence to this place that it cannot be simultaneously present--miraculously1 and without its local extension--at other places8 ,the most we can say is that the absolute impossibility of this is neither self-evident nor capable of cogent proof4 ,the ,body of our ,lord has its natural local extension in heaven--for heaven1 which will be the abode of the glorified bodies of the blessed after the general resurrection1 must be not merely a state or condition1 but a place--and at the same time it is sacramentally present in many places on earth47 #he4 ,,time3 ,,its ,,apprehension ,,and ,,measurement4--,if the concept of space is difficult to analyse1 and gives rise to some practically insoluble problems1 this is still more true of the concept of time4 8,what1 then1 is time80 exclaims ,st4 ,augustine in his ,confessions47#cgb7 8,if no one asks me1 ,i know2 but if ,i am asked to explain it1 then ,i do not know60 ,we reach the notion of space through our external perception of extension by the senses of sight and touch4 ,so also we derive the notion of time from our perception of motion or change1 and mainly from our consciousness of change and succession in our own conscious states4 ,the concept of time involves immediately two other concepts1 that of duration1 and that of succession4 ,duration1 or continuance in existence1 is of two kinds1 permanent and successive4 ,permanent duration is the duration of an immutable being1 formally and in so far as it is immutable4 ,successive duration is the continued existence or duration of a being that is subject to change1 formally and in so far as it is mutable4 ,now real change involves a continuous succession of real states1 it is a continuous process or fieri2 and it is the duration of a being subject to such change that we call time or temporal duration4 ,had we no consciousness of change1 or succession of states1 we could have no notion of time2 though we might have a notion of unchanging duration if per impossibile our cognitive activity were itself devoid of any succession of conscious states and had for its object only unchanging reality4 ,but since our cognitive activity is de facto successive we can apprehend permanent or unchanging duration1 not as it is in itself1 but only after the analogy of successive or temporal duration 7#hf74 ,the continuous series of successive states involved in change is1 therefore1 the real and objective content of our notion of time2 just as the co-existing total of extension forms the content of our notion of space4 ,the concept of space is the concept of something static2 that of time is the concept of something kinetic4 ,time is the continuity of change3 where there is change there is time2 without change time would be inconceivable4 ,change involves succession1 and succession involves the temporal elements of 8before0 and 8after10 separated by the indivisible limiting factor called the 8now0 or 8present instant04 ,the 8past0 and the 8future0 are the two parts of time1 while the 8present instant0 is not a part of time1 but a point of demarcation at which the future flows into the past4 ,change is a reality2 it is a real mode of the existence of mutable things2 but neither the immediately past state1 nor the immediately future state of a changing reality1 are actual at the present instant3 it is only to the permanent1 abiding mind1 apprehending real change1 and endowed with memory and expectation1 that the past and the future are actually 7and1 of course1 only ideally1 not really7 present4 ,and it is only by holding past and future in present consciousness1 by distinguishing mentally between them1 by counting or measuring the continuous flow of successive states from future to past1 through the present instant1 that the mind comes into possession of the concept of time47#cgc7 ,the mind thus apprehends time as the measure of the continuous flow of successive states in things subject to change4 ,as thus apprehended1 time is not merely the reality of change3 it is the successive continuity or duration of change considered as a measure of change4 ,it is that within which all changes are conceived to happen3 just as space is conceived as that within which all extended things are conceived to exist4 ,we have said that without real change or motion there could be no time4 ,we can now add that without a mind to apprehend and measure this motion there could be no time4 ,as ,st4 ,thomas declares1 following ,aristotle3 ,si non esset anima non esset tempus47#cgd7 ,for time1 as apprehended by means of our abstract and universal concept1 is not simply a reality1 but a reality endowed with logical relations1 or1 in other words1 a logical entity grounded in reality1 an ens rationis cum fundamento in re4 ,this brings us to ,aristotle's classic definition17#cge7 which is at once pithy and pregnant3 1 3 ,tempus est numerus motus secundum prius et posterius3 ,time is the measure of motion or change by what we conceive as before and after1 or future and past1 in its process4 ,every change involves its own intrinsic flow of states from future to past4 ,it is by mentally distinguishing these states1 and by thus computing1 counting1 numbering1 the continuous flow or change1 that we derive from the latter the notion of time47#cgf7 ,if1 then1 we consider all created things1 all things subject to change1 we shall realize that real time commenced with the creation of the first of them and will continue as long as they 7or any of them7 continue to exist4 ,we thus arrive at a conception of time in general1 analogous to that of space3 the whole continuous series of successions1 in changing things1 from future to past1 regarded as that in which these changes occur1 and which is the measure of them4 ,here1 too1 as in the case of space1 we can distinguish real time1 which is the total duration of actual changes1 from ideal or imaginary time which is the conceived and imagined duration of merely possible changes4 ,but a more important distinction is that between intrinsic or internal time1 or the duration of any concrete mutable reality considered in itself1 and extrinsic or external time1 which is some other extrinsic temporal duration with which we compare1 and by which we may measure1 the former duration4 ,every change or motion has its own internal time2 and this is what we have been so far endeavouring to analyse4 ,if two men start at the same instant to walk in the same direction1 and if one walk three miles and the other four1 while the hands of a watch mark the lapse of an hour1 the external time of each walk will be the same1 will coincide with one and the same motion of the hands of the watch used as a measure4 ,but the internal time of the four-mile walk will be greater than that of the three-mile walk4 ,the former will be a greater amount of change than the latter2 and therefore its internal time1 estimated by this amount absolutely1 will be greater than that of the latter estimated by its amount absolutely47#cgg7 ,the greater the amount of a change the greater the internal time-duration or series of successive states which measures this change absolutely47#cgh7 ,just as the category ,where is indicated by the spatial relations of a body to other bodies1 so the category ,when is indicated1 in regard to any event or process1 by its commensuration or comparison with other events or processes4 ,this brings us to the notion of measurement4 ,to measure anything quantitatively is to apply to it successively some quantitative unit taken as a standard and to count the number of times it contains this unit4 ,this is a process of mentally breaking up continuous quantity or magnitude--whether permanent or successive1 i4e4 whether extension or motion--into discontinuous quantity or multitude4 ,if the measurement of permanent quantity by spatial units1 and the choosing of such units1 are difficult processes17#cgi7 those of measuring successive quantity and fixing on temporal units are more difficult still4 ,is there any natural motion or change of a general character1 whereby we can measure 7externally7 the time-duration of all other changes8 ,the motions of the earth itself--on its axis and around the sun--at once suggest themselves4 ,and these motions form in fact the natural general standard for measuring the time of all other events in the universe4 ,all artificial or mechanical devices1 such as hour-glasses1 watches1 clocks1 chronometers1 etc41 are simply contrivances for the more convenient application of that general and natural standard to all particular events4 ,it requires a little reflection to realize that all our means of measuring time-duration can only attain to approximate accuracy1 inasmuch as our faculties of sense perception1 no matter by what devices they are aided1 are so limited in range and penetration that fluctuations which fall below the minima sensibilia cannot be detected4 ,it is a necessary condition of any motion used as a standard for time-measurement that it be regular4 ,that the standard motions we actually employ are absolutely regular we have no guarantee4 ,we can test their regularity only up to the point at which our power of detecting irregularity fails4 ,reflection will also show that our appreciation of time-duration is also relative1 not absolute4 ,it is always a comparison of one flow or current of conscious experiences with another4 ,it is the greater regularity of astronomical motions1 as compared with changes or processes experienced as taking place within ourselves1 that causes us to fix on the former as the more suitable standard for the measurement of time4 8,there is indeed10 writes ,father ,maher17#chj7 8a certain rhythm in many of the processes of our organic life1 such as respiration1 circulation1 and the recurrent needs of food and sleep1 which probably contribute much to our power of estimating duration4444 ,the irregular character and varying duration of conscious states1 however1 soon bring home to us the unfitness of these subjective phenomena to serve as a standard measure of time40 ,moreover1 our estimate of duration is largely dependent on the nature of the estimated experiences and of our mental attitude towards them3 8,a period with plenty of varied incident1 such as a fortnight's travel1 passes rapidly at the time4 ,whilst we are interested in each successive experience we have little spare attention to notice the duration of the experience4 ,there is almost complete lapse of the #8enumerating' activity4 ,but in retrospect such a period expands1 because it is estimated by the number and variety of the impressions which it presents to recollection4 ,on the other hand a dull1 monotonous1 or unattractive occupation1 which leaves much of our mental energy free to advert to its duration1 is over-estimated whilst taking place4 ,a couple of hours spent impatiently waiting for a train1 a few days in idleness on board ship1 a week confined to one's room1 are often declared to constitute an #8age'4 ,but when they are past such periods1 being empty of incident1 shrink up into very small dimensions4444 ,similarly1 recent intervals are exaggerated compared with equal periods more remote4 ,whilst as we grow older and new experiences become fewer and less impressive1 each year at its close seems shorter than its predecessor407#cha7 ,from those facts it would seem perfectly legitimate to draw this rather surprising inference3 that if the rate of all the changes taking place in the universe were to be suddenly and simultaneously altered in the same direction--all increased or all diminished in the same degree--and if our powers of perception were simultaneously so altered as to be readjusted to this new rate of change1 we could not become aware of the alteration47#chb7 ,supposing1 for instance1 that the rate of motion were doubled1 the same amount of change would take place in the new day as actually took place in the old4 ,the external or comparative time of all movements--that is to say1 the time of which alone we can have any appreciation--would be the same as of old4 ,the new day would1 of course1 appear only half as long as the old to a mind not readjusted to the new conditions2 but this would still be external time4 ,but would the internal1 intrinsic time of each movement be unaltered8 ,it would be the same for the readjusted mind as it was previously for the mind adjusted to these previous conditions4 ,by an unaltered mind1 however1 by the ,divine ,mind1 for instance1 the same amount of motion would be seen to constitute the same movement under both conditions1 but to take place twice as quickly under the new conditions as it did under the old4 ,this again1 however1 involves a comparison1 and thus informs us merely of external or relative time4 ,if we identify intrinsic time with amount of change1 making the latter the measure of the former1 we must conclude that alteration in the rate of a motion does not alter its absolute time3 and this is evident when we reflect that the very notion of a rate of motion involves the comparison of the latter with some other motion47#chc7 ,finally1 we have no positive conception of the manner in which time duration is related to1 or known by1 the ,divine ,eternal ,mind1 which is present to all time--past1 present and future4 ,besides the question of the relativity of time1 there are many other curious and difficult questions which arise from a consideration of time-duration1 but a detailed consideration of them belongs to ,cosmology4 ,we will merely indicate a few of them4 ,how far is time reversible1 at least in the case of purely mechanical movements87#chd7 ,had time a beginning8 ,we know from ,revelation that de facto it had4 ,but can we determine by the light of reason alone whether or not it must have had a beginning8 ,the greatest philosophers are divided as to possibility or impossibility of created reality existing from all eternity4 ,st4 ,thomas has stated1 as his considered opinion1 that the impossibility of creatio ab aeterno cannot be proved4 ,if a series of creatures could have existed successively from all eternity1 and therefore without any first term of the series1 this would involve the possibility of an actually infinite multitude of creatures2 but an actually infinite multitude of creatures1 whether existing simultaneously or successively1 is regarded by most philosophers as being self-contradictory and intrinsically impossible4 ,and this although the ,divine ,essence1 being infinitely imitable ad extra1 and being clearly comprehended as such by the ,divine ,mind1 contains virtually the ,divine exemplars of an infinite multitude of possible creatures4 ,those who defend the possibility of an actually infinite multitude of creatures consider this fact of the infinite imitability of the ,divine ,essence as the ground of this possibility4 ,on the other hand1 those who hold that an actually infinite multitude is self-contradictory deny the validity of this argument from possibility to actuality2 and they bring forward such serious considerations and arguments in favour of their own view that this latter has been at all times much more commonly advocated than the former one47#che7 ,will time have an end8 ,all the evidence of the physical sciences confirms the truth of the ,christian faith that external time1 as measured by the motions of the heavens1 will have an end4 ,but the internal or intrinsic time which will be the measure of the activities of immortal creatures will have no end47#chf7 #hf4 ,,duration ,,of ,,immutable ,,being3 ,,eternity4--,we have seen that duration is the perseverance or continuance of a being in its existence4 ,the duration of the ,absolutely ,immutable ,being is a positive perfection identical with the essence itself of this ,being4 ,it is a duration without beginning1 without end1 without change or succession1 a permanent as distinct from a successive duration1 for it is the duration of the ,necessary ,being1 whose essence is ,pure ,actuality4 ,this duration is eternity3 an interminable duration existing all together4 ,aeternitas est interminabilis duratio tota simul existens4 ,this is the common definition of eternity in the proper sense of the term--absolute or necessary eternity4 ,the word 8interminabilis0 connotes a positive perfection3 the exclusion of beginning and end4 ,the word 8tota0 does not imply that the eternity has parts4 ,the expression 8tota simul0 excludes the imperfection which is characteristic of time duration1 viz4 the succession of 8before0 and 8after04 ,the definition given by ,botius7#chg7 emphasizes these points1 as also the indefectible character of immutable life in the ,eternal ,being3 ,aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul et prefecta possessio4 ,there is1 in the next place1 a kind of duration which has been called hypothetical1 relative1 or borrowed eternity3 aeternitas hypothetica1 relativa1 participata1 also called by scholastics 8aeviternitas04 ,it is the duration in existence of a being that is contingent1 but of its nature incorruptible1 immortal1 such as the human soul or a pure spirit4 ,even if such a being existed from all eternity its existence would be contingent1 dependent on a real principle distinct from itself3 its duration1 therefore1 would not be eternity in the strict sense4 ,on the other hand1 once created by ,god1 its nature would demand conservation without end2 nor could it naturally cease to exist1 though absolutely speaking it could cease to exist were ,god to withdraw from it ,his conserving power4 ,its duration1 therefore1 differs from the duration of corporeal creatures which are by nature subject to change1 decay1 and cessation of their being4 ,a contingent spiritual substance has by nature a beginning to its duration1 or at least a duration which is not essential to it but dependent on the ,necessary ,being1 a duration1 however1 which is naturally without end2 whereas the duration of the corporeal being has by nature both a beginning and an end4 ,but philosophers are not agreed as to the nature and ground of the distinction between these two kinds of duration in contingent beings4 ,no contingent being is self-existent1 neither has any contingent being the principle of its own duration in its own essence4 ,just as it cannot begin to exist of itself1 so neither can it continue to exist of itself4 ,at the same time1 granted that it has obtained from ,god actual existence1 some kind or degree of duration1 of continuance in that existence1 seems to be naturally due to its essence4 ,otherwise conservation would be not only really but formally a continued creation4 ,it is such indeed on the part of ,god3 in ,god there is no variety of activity4 ,but on the part of the creature1 the preservation of the latter in existence1 and therefore some degree of duration1 seems to be due to it on the hypothesis that it has been brought into existence at all4 ,the conserving influence of ,god is to its duration in existence what the concurring influence of ,god is to the exercise of its activities47#chh7 ,in this sense the duration of a finite being in existence is a positive perfection which we may regard as a property of its nature4 ,but is this perfection or property of the creature which we call duration1 7a7 essentially successive in all creatures1 spiritual as well as corporeal8 ,and 7b7 is it really identical with their actual existence 7or with the reality of whatever change or actualization occurs to their existence71 or it is a mode of this existence or change1 really distinct from the latter and conferring upon the latter the perfection of continuity or persistence8 ,this1 at all events1 is universally admitted3 that we cannot become aware of any duration otherwise than through our apprehension of change2 that we have direct knowledge only of successive duration2 that we can conceive the permanent duration of immutable reality only after the analogy of successive duration1 or as the co-existence of immutable reality with the successive duration of mutable things4 ,now some philosophers identify successive duration with change1 and hold that successive duration is formally the duration of things subject to change2 that in so far as a being is subject to change its duration is successive1 and in so far as it is free from change its duration approaches the essentially permanent duration of the ,eternal1 ,immutable ,being2 that therefore the duration of corporeal1 corruptible1 mortal beings is par excellence successive or temporal duration 7tempus72 that spiritual beings1 which are substantially immutable1 but nevertheless have a successive series of spiritual activities1 have a sort of duration more perfect1 because more permanent1 than mere temporal duration1 but less perfect1 because less permanent1 than eternal duration 7aevum1 aeviternitas72 while the ,absolutely ,immutable ,being alone has perfect permanent duration 7aeternitas747#chi7 ,it is not clear whether according to this view we should distinguish between the duration of spiritual substances as permanent1 and that of their acts as successive2 or why we should not attribute permanent duration to corporeal substances and their permanent accidents1 confining successive duration formally to motion or change itself4 ,it is1 moreover1 implied in this view that duration is not any really distinct perfection or mode superadded to the actuality of the being that endures4 ,other philosophers hold that all duration of creatures is successive2 that no individual creature has a mixture of permanent and successive duration2 that this successive duration is really distinct from that which endures by means of it2 that it is really distinct even from the reality of change or motion itself2 that it is a real mode the formal function of which is to confer on the enduring reality a series of actualities in the order of 8succession of posterior to prior10 a series of intrinsic quandocationes 7analagous to the intrinsic locations which their extension confers upon bodies in space74 ,these philosophers distinguish between continuous or 7indefinitely7 divisible successive duration1 the 7indefinitely divisible7 parts of which are 8past0 and 8future10 and the present not a 8part0 but only an 8indivisible limit0 between the two parts2 and discontinuous or indivisible successive duration1 whose parts are separate and indivisible units of duration succeeding one another discontinuously3 each part being a real but indivisible duration1 so that besides the parts that are past and future1 the present is also a part1 which is--like an instant of time--indivisible1 but which is also--unlike an instant of time--a real duration4 ,the former kind of successive duration they ascribe to corporeal1 corruptible creatures2 the latter to spiritual1 incorruptible creatures4 ,this view is defended with much force and ingenuity by ,de ,san in his ,cosmologia27#cij7 where also a full discussion of most of the other questions we have touched upon will be found4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,relation2 ,,the ,,relative ,,and ,,the ,,absolute4 #hg4 ,,importance ,,of ,,the ,,present ,,category4--,an analysis of the concept of ,relation will be found to have a very direct bearing both on the ,theory of ,being and on the ,theory of ,knowledge4 ,for the human mind knowledge is embodied in the mental act of judgment1 and this is an act of comparison1 an act whereby we relate or refer one concept to another4 ,the act of cognition itself involves a relation between the knowing subject and the known object1 between the mind and reality4 ,reality itself is understood only by our mentally recognizing or establishing relations between the objects which make up for us the whole knowable universe4 ,this universe we apprehend not as a multitude of isolated1 unconnected individuals1 but as an ordered whole whose parts are inter-related by their mutual co-ordinations and subordinations4 ,the order we apprehend in the universe results from these various inter-relations whereby we apprehend it as a system4 ,what we call a law of nature1 for instance1 is nothing more or less than the expression of some constant relation which we believe to exist between certain parts of this system4 ,the study of ,relation1 therefore1 belongs not merely to ,logic or the ,theory of ,knowledge1 but also to the ,theory of ,being1 to ,metaphysics4 ,what1 then1 is a relation8 ,what is the object of this mental concept which we express by the term relation8 ,are there in the known and knowable universe of our experience real relations8 ,or are all relations merely logical1 pure creations of our cognitive activity8 ,can we classify relations1 whether real or logical8 ,what constitutes a relation formally8 ,what are the properties or characteristics of relations8 ,these are some of the questions we must attempt to answer4 ,again1 there is much ambiguity1 and not a little error1 in the use of the terms 8absolute0 and 8relative0 in modern philosophy4 ,to some of these sources of confusion we have referred already 7#e74 ,it is a commonplace of modern philosophy1 a thing accepted as unquestioned and unquestionable1 that we know1 and can know1 only the relative4 ,there is a true sense in this1 but the true sense is not the generally accepted one4 ,considering the order in which our knowledge of reality progresses it is unquestionable that we first simply perceive 8things0 successively1 things more or less similar or dissimilar1 without realizing in what they agree or differ4 ,to realize the latter involves reflection and comparison4 ,similarly we perceive 8events0 in succession1 events some of which depend on others1 but without at first noting or realizing this dependence4 ,in other words we apprehend at first apart from their relations1 or as absolute1 things and events which are really relative2 and we do so spontaneously1 without realizing even that we perceive them as absolute4 ,the seed needs soil and rain and sunshine for its growth2 but these do not need the seed4 ,the turbine needs the water1 but the water does not need the turbine4 ,when we realize such facts as these1 by reflection1 contrasting what is dependent with what is independent1 what is like or unlike1 before or after1 greater or less than1 other things1 with what each of these is in itself1 we come into conscious possession of the notion of 8the relative0 and oppose this to the notion of 8the absolute04 ,what we conceive as dependent we conceive as relative2 what we conceive1 by negation1 as independent1 we conceive as absolute4 ,then by further observation and reflection we gradually realize that what we apprehended as independent of certain things is dependent on certain other things2 that the same thing may be independent in some respects and dependent in other respects4 ,the rain does not depend on the seed which it causes to germinate1 but it does depend on the clouds4 ,the water which turns the turbine does not depend on the turbine1 but it does depend on the rain2 and the rain depends on the evaporation of the waters of the ocean2 and the evaporation on the solar heat2 and this again on chemical and physical processes in the sun2 and so on1 as far as sense experience will carry us3 until we realize that everything which falls directly within this sense experience is dependent and therefore relative4 ,similarly1 the accident of quantity1 in virtue of which we pronounce one of two bodies to be larger than the other1 is something absolute as compared with this relation itself2 but as compared with the substance in which it inheres1 it is dependent on the latter1 or relative to the latter1 while the substance is absolute1 or free from dependence on it4 ,but if substance is absolute as compared with accident1 in the sense that substance is not dependent on a subject in which to inhere1 but exists in itself1 it is not absolute in the sense understood by ,spinoza1 in the sense of existing of itself1 independently of any efficient cause to account for its origin 7#fd74 ,all the substances in the universe of our direct sense experience are contingent1 dependent ab alio1 and therefore in this sense relative1 not absolute4 ,this is the true sense in which relativity is an essential note of the reality of all the data of the world of our sense experience4 ,they are all contingent1 or relative1 or conditioned existences4 ,and1 as ,kant rightly taught1 this experience forces us inevitably to think of a ,necessary1 ,absolute1 ,unconditioned ,being1 on whom these all depend4 ,but1 as can be proved in ,natural ,theology against ,kant1 this concept is not a mere regulative idea of the reason1 a form of thought whereby we systematize our experience3 it is a concept the object of which is not merely a necessity of thought but also an objectively existing reality47#cia7 ,but in the thought of most modern philosophers relativism1 or the doctrine that 8we can know only the relative10 is something very different from all this4 ,for positivists1 disciples of ,auguste ,comte 7#agih-aheg71 it means that we can know only the phenomena which fall under the notice of our senses1 and the laws of resemblance1 succession1 etc41 according to which they occur4 ,all 8theological0 quests for supra-mundane causes and reasons of these events1 and all 8metaphysical0 quests for suprasensible forces1 powers1 influences1 in the events themselves1 as explaining or accounting for these latter1 are according to this theory necessarily futile3 the mind must rest content with a knowledge of the positive facts of sense1 and their relations4 ,relativism is thus another name for ,positivism4 ,for the psychological sensism of ,english philosophers from ,hobbes #aehh-afgi and ,locke #afcb-agjd down to ,mill #ahjf-gc and ,bain #ahah-aijc relativism means that all conscious cognition--which they tend to reduce to modes and complexes of sensation--must be1 and can only be1 a cognition of the changing1 the transitional1 the relative47#cib7 ,according to an extreme form of this theory the mind can apprehend only relations1 but not the terms of any of these relations3 it can apprehend nothing as absolute4 ,moreover the relations which it apprehends it creates itself4 ,thus all reality is reduced to a system of relations4 ,for ,mill the supreme category of real being was ,sensation3 but sensation can be only a feeling of a relation3 thus the supreme category of real being would be ,relation47#cic7 ,but the main current of relativism is that which has issued from ,kant's philosophy and worked itself out in various currents such as ,spencer's ,agnosticism1 ,hegel's ,monism1 and ,renouvier's ,neo-criticism47#cid7 ,the mind can know only what is related to it1 what is present to it1 what is in it2 not what is apart from it1 distinct from it4 ,the mind cannot know the real nature of the extramental1 nor even if there be an extramental real4 ,subject and object in knowledge are really one3 individual minds are only self-conscious phases in the ever-evolving reality of the ,one ,sole ,actual ,being4 ,these are but a few of the erroneous currents of modern relativism4 ,a detailed analysis of them belongs to the ,theory of ,knowledge4 ,but it may be pointed out here that they are erroneous because they have distorted and exaggerated certain profound truths concerning the scope and limits of human knowledge4 ,it is true that we have no positive1 proper1 intuitive knowledge of the ,absolute ,being who is the ,first ,cause and ,last ,end of the universe2 that all our knowledge of the nature and attributes of the ,infinite ,being is negative1 analogical1 abstractive4 ,in a certain sense1 therefore1 ,he is above the scope of our faculties2 ,he is ,incomprehensible4 ,but it is false to say that ,he is ,unknowable2 that our knowledge of ,him1 inadequate and imperfect as it is1 is not genuine1 real1 and instructive1 as far as it goes4 ,again1 a distinct knowledge of any object implies defining1 limiting1 distinguishing1 comparing1 relating1 judging2 analysing and synthesizing4 ,it implies therefore that we apprehend things in relations with other things4 ,but this supposes an antecedent1 if indistinct1 apprehension of the 8things0 themselves4 ,indeed we cannot help pronouncing as simply unintelligible the contention that all knowledge is of relations1 and that we can have no knowledge of things as absolute4 ,how could we become aware of relations without being aware of the terms related8 ,spencer himself admits that the very reasoning whereby we establish the 8relativity of knowledge0 leads us inevitably to assert as necessary the existence of the non-relative1 the ,absolute37#cie7 a necessity which ,kant also recognizes4 ,finally1 the fact that reality1 in order to be known1 must be present to the knowing mind--or1 in other words1 that knowledge itself is a relation between object and subject--in no way justifies the conclusion that we cannot know the real nature of things as they are in themselves1 absolutely1 but only our own subjective1 mental impressions or representations of the absolute reality1 in itself unknowable47#cif7 ,the obvious fact that any reality in order to be known must be related to the knowing mind1 seems to be regarded by some philosophers as if it were a momentous discovery4 ,then1 conceiving the 8thing-in-itself10 the absolute1 as a something standing out of all relation to mind1 they declare solemnly that we cannot know the absolute3 a declaration which may be interpreted either as a mere truism--that we cannot know a thing without knowing it6--or as a purely gratuitous assertion1 that besides the world of realities which reveal themselves to our minds there is another world of unattained and unattainable 8things-in-themselves0 which are as it were the real realities6 ,these philosophers have yet to show that there is anything absurd or impossible in the view that there is simply one world of realities--realities which exist absolutely in themselves apart from our apprehension of them and which in the process of cognition come into relation with our minds47#cig7 ,moreover1 if besides this world of known and knowable realities there were such a world of 8transcendental0 things-in-themselves as these philosophers discourse of1 such a world would have very little concern for us17#cih7 since by definition and ex hypothesi it would be for us necessarily as if it were not3 indeed the hypothesis of such a transcendental world is self-contradictory1 for even did it exist we could not think of it4 ,the process of cognition has indeed its difficulties and mysteries4 ,to examine these1 to account for the possibility of truth and error1 to analyse the grounds and define the scope and limits of human certitude1 are problems for the ,theory of ,knowledge1 on the domain of which we are trenching perhaps too far already in the present context4 ,but at all events to conceive reality as absolute in the sense of being totally unrelated to mind1 and then to ask3 ,is reality so transformed in the very process of cognition that the mind cannot possibly apprehend it or represent it as it really is8--this certainly is to misconceive and mis-state in a hopeless fashion the main problem of ,epistemology4 #hh4 ,,analysis ,,of ,,the ,,concept ,,of ,,relation4--,relation is one of those ultimate concepts which does not admit of definition proper4 ,and like other ultimate concepts it is familiar to all4 ,two lines1 each measuring a yard1 are equal to each other in length3 equality is a quantitative relation4 ,the number #b is half of #d1 and #d is twice #b3 half and double express each a quantitative relation of inequality4 ,if two twin brothers are like each other we have the qualitative relation of resemblance or similarity2 if a negro and a ,european are unlike each other we have the qualitative relation of dissimilarity4 ,the steam of the locomotive moves the train3 a relation of efficient causality1 of efficient cause to effect4 ,the human eye is adapted to the function of seeing3 a relation of purpose or finality1 of means to end4 ,and so on4 ,the objective concept of relation thus establishes a conceptual unity between a pair of things in the domain of some other category4 ,like quantity1 quality1 actio and passio1 etc41 it is an ultimate mode of reality as apprehended through human experience4 ,but while the reality of the other accident-categories appertains to substances considered absolutely or in isolation from one another1 the reality of this category which we call relation appertains indivisibly to two 7or more7 together1 so that when one of these is taken or considered apart from the other 7or others7 the relation formally disappears4 ,each of the other 7absolute7 accidents is formally 8something0 78aliquid02 8071 whereas the formal function of relation is to refer something 8to something0 else 78ad aliquid02 8 074 ,the other accidents formally inhere in a subject1 8habent esse in subjecto02 relation1 considered formally as such1 does not inhere in a subject1 but gives the latter a respect1 or bearing1 or reference1 or ordination1 to or towards something else3 8relatio dat subjecto respectum vel esse ad aliquid aliud04 ,the length of each of two lines is an absolute accident of that line1 but the relation of equality or inequality is intelligible only of both together4 ,destroy one line and the relation is destroyed1 though the other line retains its length absolutely and unaltered4 ,and so of the other examples just given4 ,relation1 then1 considered formally as such1 is not an absolute accident inhering in a subject1 but is a reference of this subject to some other thing1 this latter being called the term of the relation4 ,hence relation is described by the scholastics as the ordination or respect or reference of one thing to another3 ordo vel respectus vel habitudo unius ad aliud4 ,the relation of a subject to something else as term is formally not anything absolute1 8aliquid0 in that subject1 but merely refers this subject to something else as term1 8ad aliquid04 ,hence ,aristotle's designation of relation as 8 10 8ad aliquid10 8to or towards something04 8,we conceive as relations 10 he says1 8those things whose very entity itself we regard as being somehow of other things or to another thing407#cii7 ,to constitute a relation of whatsoever kind1 three elements or factors are essential3 the two extremes of the relation1 viz4 the subject of the relation and the term to which the subject is referred1 and what is called the foundation1 or basis1 or ground1 or reason1 of the relation 7fundamentum relationis74 ,this latter is the cause or reason on account of which the subject bears the relation to its term4 ,it is always something absolute1 in the extremes of the relation4 ,hence it follows that we may regard any relation in two ways1 either formally as the actual bond or link of connexion between the extremes1 or fundamentally1 i4e4 as in its cause or foundation in these extremes4 ,this is expressed technically by distinguishing between the relation secundum esse in and secundum esse ad1 i4e4 between the absolute entity of its foundation in the subject and the purely relative entity in which the relation itself formally consists4 ,needless to say1 the latter1 whatever it is1 does not add any absolute entity to that of either extreme4 ,but in what does this relative entity itself consist8 ,before attempting an answer to this question we must endeavour to distinguish1 in the next section 7#hi71 between purely logical relations and relations which are in some true sense real4 ,here we may note certain corollaries from the concept of relation as just analysed4 ,realities of which the objective concept of relation is verified derive from this latter certain properties or special characteristics4 ,the first of these is reciprocity3 two related extremes are as such intelligible only in reference to each other3 father to son1 half to double1 like to like1 etc41 and vice versa3 ,correlativa se invicem connotant4 ,the second is that things related to one another are collateral or concomitant in nature3 ,correlativa sunt simul natura3 neither related extreme is as such naturally prior to the other4 ,this is to be understood of the relation only in its formal aspect1 not fundamentally4 ,fundamentally or materialiter1 the cause for instance is naturally prior to its effect4 ,the third is that related things are concomitant logically1 or in the order of knowledge3 ,correlativa sunt simul cognitione3 a reality can be known and defined as relative to another reality only by the simultaneous cognition of both extremes of the relation4 #hi4 ,,logical ,,relations4--,logical relations are those which are created by our own thought1 and which can have no being other than the being which they have in and for our thought4 ,that there are such relations1 which are the exclusive product of our thought-activity1 is universally admitted4 ,the mind can reflect on its own direct concepts2 it can compare and co-ordinate and subordinate them among themselves2 it thus forms ideas of relations between those concepts1 ideas which the scholastics call reflex or logical ideas1 or 8secund intentiones mentis04 ,these relations are entia rationis1 purely logical relations4 ,such1 for instance1 are the relations of genus to species1 of predicate to subject1 the relations described in ,logic as the prdicabilia4 ,moreover we can compare our direct universal concepts with the individual realities they represent1 and see that this feature or mode of universality in the concept1 its 8intentio universalitatis0 is a logical relation of the concept to the reality which it represents3 a logical relation1 inasmuch as its subject 7the concept7 and its foundation 7the abstractness of the concept7 are in themselves pure products of our thought-activity4 ,furthermore1 we are forced by the imperfection of the thought-processes whereby we apprehend reality--conception of abstract ideas1 limitation of concepts in extension and intension1 affirmation and negation1 etc4--to apprehend conceptual limitations1 negations1 comparisons1 etc41 in a word1 all logical entities1 as if they were realities1 or after the manner of realities1 i4e4 to conceive what is really 8nothing0 as if it were really 8something10 to conceive the non-ens as if it were an ens1 to conceive it per modum entis 7#c74 ,and when we compare these logical entities with one another1 or with real entities1 the relations thus established by our thought are all logical relations4 ,finally1 it follows from this same imperfection in our human modes of thought that we sometimes understand things only by attributing to these certain logical relations1 i4e4 relations which affect not the reality of these things1 their esse reale1 but only the mode of their presence in our minds1 their esse ideale 7#d74 ,in view of the distinction between logical relations and those we shall presently describe as real relations1 and especially in view of the prevalent tendency in modern philosophy to regard all relations as merely logical1 it would be desirable to classify logical relations and to indicate the ways in which they are created by1 or result from1 our thought-processes4 ,we know of no more satisfactory analysis than that accomplished by ,st4 ,thomas ,aquinas in various parts of his many monumental and enduring works4 ,in his ,commentaries on the ,sentences7#djj7 he enumerates four ways in which logical relations arise from our thought-processes4 ,in his ,quaestiones ,disputatae7#dja7 he reduces these to two3 some logical relations1 he says1 are invented by the intellect reflecting on its own concepts and are attributed to these concepts2 others arise from the fact that the intellect can understand things only by relating1 grouping1 classifying them1 only by introducing among them an arrangement or system of relations through which alone it can understand them1 relations which it could only erroneously ascribe to these things as they really exist1 since they are only projected1 as it were1 into these things by the mind4 ,thus1 though it consciously thinks of these things as so related1 it deliberately abstains from asserting that these relations really affect the things themselves4 ,now the mistake of all those philosophers1 whether ancient1 medieval or modern1 who deny that any relations are real1 seems to be that they carry this abstention too far4 ,they contend that all relations are simply read into the reality by our thought2 that none are in the reality in any true sense independently of our thought4 ,they thus exaggerate the rle of thought as a constitutive factor of known or experienced reality2 and they often do so to such a degree that according to their philosophy human thought not merely discovers or knows reality but practically constitutes or creates it3 or at all events to such a degree that cognition would be mainly a process whereby reality is assimilated to mind and not rather a process whereby mind is assimilated to reality4 ,against all such idealist tendencies in philosophy we assert that not all relations are logical1 that there are some relations which are not mere products of thought1 but which are themselves real4 #ij4 ,,real ,,relations2 ,,their ,,existence ,,vindicated4--,a real relation is one which is not a mere product of thought1 but which obtains between real things independently of our thought4 ,for a real relation there must be 7a7 a real1 individual subject2 7b7 a real foundation2 and 7c7 a real1 individual term1 really distinct from the subject4 ,if the subject of the relation1 or its foundation1 be not real1 but a mere ens rationis1 obviously the relation cannot be more than logical4 ,if1 moreover1 the term be not a really distinct entity from the subject1 then the relation can be nothing more than a mental comparison of some thing with itself1 either under the same aspect or under mentally distinct aspects4 ,a relation is real in the fullest sense when the extremes are mutually related in virtue of a foundation really existing in both4 ,hence ,st ,thomas' definition of a real relation as a connexion between some two things in virtue of something really found in both3 habitudo inter aliqua duo secundum aliquid realiter conveniens utrique47#djb7 ,now the question3 ,are there in the real world1 among the things which make up the universe of our experience1 relations which are not merely logical1 which are not a mere product of our thought8--can admit of only one reasonable answer4 ,that there are relations which are in some true sense real and independent of our thought-activity must be apparent to everyone whose mental outlook on things has not been warped by the specious sophistries of some form or other of ,subjective ,idealism4 ,for ex professo refutations of ,idealist theories the student must consult treatises on the ,theory of ,knowledge4 ,a few considerations on the present point will be sufficiently convincing here4 ,first1 then1 let us appeal to the familiar examples mentioned above4 ,are not two lines1 each a yard long1 really equal in length1 whether we know it or not8 ,is not a line a yard long really greater than another line a foot in length1 whether we know it or not8 ,surely our thought does not create but discovers the equality or inequality4 ,the twin brothers really resemble each other1 even when no one is thinking of this resemblance2 the resemblance is there whether anyone adverts to it or not4 ,the motion of the train really depends on the force of the steam2 it is not our thought that produces this relation of dependence4 ,the eye is really so constructed as to perceive light1 and the light is really such by nature as to arouse the sensation of vision2 surely it is not our thought that produces this relation of mutual adaptation in these realities4 ,such relations are1 therefore1 in some true sense real and independent of our thought3 unless indeed we are prepared to say with idealists that the lines1 the brothers1 the train1 the steam1 the eye1 and the light--in a word1 that not merely relations1 but all accidents and substances1 all realities--are mere products of thought1 ideas1 states of consciousness4 ,again1 order is but a system of relations of co-ordination and subordination between really distinct things4 ,but there is real order in the universe4 ,and therefore there are real relations in the universe4 ,there is real order in the universe3 ,in the physical universe do we not experience a real subordination of effects to causes1 a real adaptation of means to ends8 ,and in the moral universe is not this still more apparent8 ,the domestic society1 the family1 is not merely an aggregate of individuals any one of whom we may designate indiscriminately husband or wife1 father or mother1 brother or sister4 ,these relations of order are real2 they are obviously not the product of our thought1 not produced by it1 but only discovered1 apprehended by it4 ,it is a profound truth that not all the reality of the universe which presents itself to the human mind for analysis and interpretation1 not all the reality of this universe1 is to be found in the mere sum-total of the individual entities that constitute it1 considering these entities each absolutely and in isolation from the others4 ,nor does all its real perfection consist in the mere sum-total of the absolute perfections intrinsic to1 and inherent in1 those various individual entities4 ,over and above these individual entities and their absolute perfections1 there is a domain of reality1 and of real perfections1 consisting in the real adaptation1 interaction1 interdependence1 arrangement1 co-ordination and subordination1 of those absolute entities and perfections among themselves4 ,and if we realize this profound truth7#djc7 we shall have no difficulty in recognizing that1 while the thought-processes whereby we interpret this universe produce logical relations which we utilize in this interpretation1 there is also in this universe itself a system of relations which are real1 which are not invented1 but are merely detected1 by our minds4 ,according to idealists1 relation is a subjective category of the mind4 ,it belongs to phenomena only on the introduction of the latter into the understanding4 8,laws no more exist in phenomena10 writes ,kant17#djd7 8than phenomena exist in themselves2 the former are relative to the subject in which the phenomena inhere1 in so far as this subject is endowed with understanding2 just as the latter are relative to this same subject in so far as it is endowed with sensibility40 ,this is ambiguous and misleading4 ,of course1 laws or any other relations do not exist for us1 are not known by us1 are not brought into relation to our understanding1 as long as we do not consciously grasp the two terms and the foundation on which the law1 or any other relation1 rests4 ,but there are relations whose terms and foundations are anterior to1 and independent of1 our thought1 and which consequently are not a product of thought4 8,sensations1 or other feelings being given10 writes ,j4 ,s4 ,mill17#dje7 8succession and simultaneousness are the two conditions to the alternative of which they are subjected by the nature of our faculties40 ,but1 as ,m4 ,boirac pertinently asks17#djf7 8why do we apply in any particular case the one alternative of the two-faced category rather than the other8 ,is it not because in every case the concrete application made by our faculties is determined by the objects themselves1 by an objective and real foundation of the relation80 #ia4 ,,mutual ,,and ,,mixed ,,relations2 ,,transcendental ,,relations4--,there are1 then1 relations which are in some true sense real4 ,but in what does the reality of a real relation consist8 ,before answering this question we must examine the main classes of real relations4 ,we have already referred to the mutual relation as one which has a real foundation in both of the extremes1 such as the relation between father and son1 or between a greater and a lesser quantity1 or between two equal quantities1 or between two similar people47#djg7 ,such a relation is called a relatio aequiperantiae1 a relation of the same denomination1 if it has the same name on both sides1 as 8equal--equal10 8similar--similar10 8friend--friend10 etc4 ,it is called a relatio disquiperantiae1 of different denomination1 if it has a different name1 indicating a different kind of relation1 on either side1 as 8father--son10 8cause--effect10 8master--servant10 etc4 ,distinct from this is the non-mutual or mixed relation1 which has a real foundation only in one extreme1 so that the relation of this to the other extreme is real1 while the relation of the latter to the former is only logical47#djh7 ,for instance1 the relation of every creature to the ,creator is a real relation1 for the essential dependence of the creature on the ,creator is a relation grounded in the very nature of the creature as a contingent being4 ,but the relation of the ,creator to the creature is only logical1 for the creative act on which it is grounded implies in the ,creator no reality distinct from ,his substance1 which substance has no necessary relation to any creature4 ,similarly1 the relation of the 7finite7 knowing mind to the known object is a real relation1 for it is grounded in a new quality1 viz4 knowledge1 whereby the mind is perfected4 ,but the relation of the object to the mind is not a real relation1 for by becoming actually known the object itself does not undergo any real change or acquire any new reality or perfection4 ,we have seen already 7#db1 #ej7 that all reality has a transcendental or essential relation to intellect and to will1 ontological truth and ontological goodness4 ,these relations of reality to the ,divine ,intellect and ,will are formally or actually verified in all things2 whereas the transcendental truth and goodness of any thing in regard to any created intellect and will are formal or actual only when that thing is actually known and willed by such created faculties3 the relations of a thing to a mind that does not actually know and desire that thing are only fundamental or potential truth and goodness4 ,this brings us to a second great division of relations1 into essential or transcendental and accidental or predicamental4 ,an essential or transcendental relation is one which is involved in the very essence itself of the related thing4 ,it enters into and is inseparable from the concept of the latter4 ,thus in the concept of the creature as such there is involved an essential relation of the latter's dependence on the ,creator4 ,so1 too1 every individual reality involves essential relations of identity with itself and distinction from other things1 and essential relations of truth and goodness to the ,divine ,mind and created minds4 ,knowledge involves an essential relation to a known object4 ,accidents involve the essential relation of an aptitude to inhere in substances4 ,actio involves an essential relation to an agens1 and passio to a patiens2 matter to form and form to matter4 ,and so on4 ,in general1 wherever any subject has an intrinsic and essential exigence or aptitude or inclination1 whereby there is established a connexion of this subject with1 or a reference to1 something else1 an ordination or 8ordo0 to something else1 there we have an 8essential0 relation47#dji7 ,such a relation is termed 8transcendental0 because it can be verified of a subject in any category2 and1 since it adds nothing real to its subject it does not of itself constitute any new category of real being4 ,like the logical relation it is referred to here in order to bring out1 by way of contrast1 the accidental or predicamental relation which is the proper subject-matter of the present chapter4 #ib4 ,,predicamental ,,relations2 ,,their ,,foundations ,,and ,,divisions4--,an accidental or predicamental relation is one which is not essential to the related subject1 but superadded to1 and separable from1 the latter4 ,such1 for instance1 are relations of equality or inequality1 similarity or dissimilarity4 ,it is not involved in the nature of the subject itself1 but is superinduced on the latter by reason of some real foundation really distinct from the nature of this subject4 ,its sole function is to refer the subject to the term1 while the essential or transcendental relation is rather an intrinsic attribute or aptitude of the nature itself as a principle of action1 or an effect of action4 ,the real1 accidental relation is the one which ,aristotle placed in a category apart as one of the ultimate accidental modes of real being4 ,hence it is called a 8predicamental0 relation4 ,what are its principal sub-classes8 ,real relations are divided according to the nature of their foundations4 ,but some relations are real ex utraque parte--mutual relations1 while others are real only on the side--mixed relations4 ,moreover1 some real relations are transcendental1 others predicamental4 ,aristotle in assigning three distinct grounds of predicamental relations seems to have included some relations that are transcendental47#daj7 ,he distinguishes7#daa7 7a7 relations grounded in unity and multitude2 7b7 relations grounded in efficient causality2 and 7c7 relations grounded in 8commensuration04 7a7 ,by 8unity and multitude0 he is commonly interpreted to mean identity or diversity not merely in quantity1 but in any 8formal0 factor1 and therefore also in quality1 and in nature or substance4 ,things that are one in quantity we term equal2 one in quality1 similar2 one in substance1 identical4 ,and if they are not one in these respects we call them unequal1 dissimilar1 distinct or diverse1 respectively4 ,about quantity as a foundation for real1 predicamental relations there can be no difficulty4 ,indeed it is in a certain sense implied in all relations--at least as apprehended by the human mind4 ,for we apprehend relations1 of whatsoever kind1 by mental comparison1 and this involves the consciousness of number or plurality1 of two things compared47#dab7 ,and when we compare things on the basis of any quality we do so only by distinguishing and measuring intensive grades in this quality1 after the analogy of extensive or quantitative measurement 7#hj74 ,nevertheless just as quality is a distinct accident irreducible to quantity 7#gg71 so are relations based on quality different from those based on quantity4 ,but what about substance or nature as a foundation of predicamental relations8 ,for these1 as distinct from transcendental relations1 some accident really distinct from the substance seems to be required4 ,the substantial1 individual identity of any real being with itself is only a logical relation1 for there are not two really distinct extremes4 ,the specific identity of ,john with ,james in virtue of their common human nature is a real relation but it would appear to be transcendental47#dac7 ,the relation of the real ,john and the real ,james to our knowledge of them is the transcendental relation of any reality to knowledge1 the relation of ontological truth4 ,this relation is essentially actual in regard to the ,divine mind1 but only potential1 and accidentally actual1 in regard to any created mind 7#db74 ,the relation of real distinction between two individual substances is a real but transcendental relation1 grounded in the transcendental attribute of oneness which characterizes every real being 7#bf1 #bg74 7b7 ,efficient causality1 actio et passio1 can undoubtedly be the ground of real predicamental relations4 ,if the action is transitive7#dad7 the patiens or recipient of the real change acquires by this latter the basis of a relation of real dependence on the cause or agens4 ,again1 if the action provokes reaction1 so that there is real interaction1 each agens being also patiens1 there arises a mutual predicamental relation of interdependence between the two agencies4 ,furthermore1 if the agent itself is in any way really perfected by the action there arises a real predicamental relation which is mutual3 not merely a real relation of effect to agent but also of agent to effect4 ,this is true in all cases of what scholastics call 8univocal0 as distinct from 8equivocal0 causation4 ,of the former1 in which the agent produces an effect like in nature to itself1 the propagation of their species by living things is the great example4 ,here not only is the relation of offspring to parents a real relation1 but that of parents to offspring is also a real relation4 ,and this real relation is permanent because it is grounded not merely in the transient generative processes but in some real and abiding result of these processes--either some physical disposition in the parents themselves17#dae7 or some specific perfection attributed by extrinsic denomination to the individual parents3 the parents are in a sense continued in their offspring3 8generation really perpetuates the species1 the specific nature1 and in this sense may be said to perfect the individual parents047#daf7 ,in cases of 8equivocal0 causation--i4e4 where the effect is different in nature from the cause1 as when a man builds a house--the agent does not so clearly benefit by the action1 so that in such cases1 while the relation of the effect to the cause is real1 some authors would regard that of the cause to the effect as logical47#dag7 ,when1 however1 we remember that the efficient activity of all created causes is necessarily dependent on the ,divine ,concursus1 and necessarily involves change in the created cause itself1 we can regard this change as in all cases the ground of a real relation of the created cause to its effect4 ,but the creating and conserving activity of the ,divine ,being cannot ground a real relation of the latter to creatures because the ,divine ,being is ,pure and ,unchangeable ,actuality1 acquiring no new perfection1 and undergoing no real change1 by such activity47#dah7 7c7 ,by commensuration as a basis of real relations ,aristotle does not mean quantitative measurement1 but the determination of the perfection of one reality by its being essentially conformed to1 and regulated by1 another3 as the perfection of knowledge or science1 for instance1 is determined by the perfection of its object4 ,this sort of commensuration1 or essential ordination of one reality to another1 is obviously the basis of transcendental relations4 ,some authors would consider that besides the transcendental relation of science to its object1 a relation which is independent of the actual existence of the latter1 there also exists an accidental relation in science to its object as long as this latter is in actual existence4 ,but rather it should be said that just as the transcendental truth-relation of any real object to intellect is fundamental 7potential7 or formal 7actual7 according as this intellect merely can know this object or actually does know it1 so also the transcendental relation of knowledge to its object is fundamental or formal according as this object is merely possible or actually existing4 ,we gather from the foregoing analysis that the three main classes of predicamental relations are those based on quantity1 quality1 and causality1 respectively4 #ic4 ,,in ,,what ,,does ,,the ,,reality ,,of ,,predicamental ,,relations ,,consist8--,we have seen that not all relations are purely logical4 ,there are real relations2 and of these some are not merely aspects of the other categories of real being1 not merely transcendental attributes virtually distinct from1 but really identical with1 these other absolute modes of real being which we designate as 8substance10 8quantity10 8quality10 8cause10 8effect10 etc4 ,there are real relations which form a distinct accidental mode of real being and so constitute a category apart4 ,the fact1 however1 that these predicamental relations have been placed by ,aristotle and his followers in a category apart does not of itself prove that the predicamental relation is a special reality sui generis1 really and adequately distinct from the realities which constitute the other categories 7#fj74 ,if the predicamental relation be not a purely logical entity1 if it be an ens rationis cum fundamento in re1 or1 in other words1 if the object of our concept of 8predicamental relation10 has a foundation in reality 7e4g4 like the concepts of 8space0 and 8time071 then it may reasonably be placed in a category apart1 even although it may not be itself formally a reality4 ,we have therefore to see whether or not the predicamental relation is1 or embodies1 any mode of real being adequately distinct from these modes which constitute the other categories4 ,the predicamental relation is real in the sense that it implies1 in addition to two really distinct extremes1 a real foundation in one or both of these extremes1 a real accident such as quantity1 quality1 or causality4 ,that is to say1 considered in its foundation or cause1 considered fundamentally or secundum suum esse in subjecto1 the predicamental relation is real1 inasmuch as its foundation is a reality independently of the consideration of the mind4 ,no doubt1 if the predicamental relation1 adequately considered1 implies no other reality than that of its foundation and terms1 then the predicamental relation does not contain any special reality sui generis1 distinct from substances1 quality1 quantity1 and other such absolute modes of real being4 ,this1 however1 does not prevent its ranking as a distinct category provided it adds a virtually distinct and altogether peculiar aspect to those absolute realities4 ,now1 considered adequately1 the predicamental relation adds to the reality it has in its foundation the actual reference of subject to term4 ,in fact1 it is in this reference of subject to term1 this 8esse ad10 that the relation formally consists4 ,the question therefore may be stated thus3 ,is this formal relation of subject to term1 this 8esse ad0 a real entity sui generis1 really distinct from the absolute entities of subject1 term and foundation1 and in contradistinction to these and all absolute entities a 8relative entity10 actually existing in the real universe independently of our thought8 ,or is it1 on the contrary1 itself formally a mere product of our thought1 a product of the mental act of comparison1 an ens rationis an aspect superadded by our minds to the extremes compared1 and to the foundation in virtue of which we compare them8 ,a good many scholastics1 and some of them men of great name17#dai7 have espoused the former alternative1 considering that the reality of the predicamental relation cannot be vindicated--against idealists1 who would reduce all relations to mere logical entities--otherwise than by according to the relation considered formally1 i4e4 secundum suum 8esse ad10 an entity in the actual order of things independent of our thought3 adding as an argument that if relation formally as such is anything at all1 if all relation be not a mere mental fabrication1 it is essentially a 8relative0 entity1 and that manifestly a 8relative0 entity cannot be really identical with any 8absolute0 entity4 ,and they claim for this view the authority of ,st ,thomas47#dbj7 ,the great majority of scholastics1 however1 espouse the second alternative3 that the relation1 considered formally1 8secundum esse ad10 is a product of our mental comparison of subject with term4 ,it is not itself a real entity or a real mode1 superadded to the reality of extremes and foundation4 ,in the first place there is no need to suppose the reality of such a relative entity4 ,entia non sunt multiplicanda prter necessitatem4 ,it is an abuse of realism to suppose that the formal element of a relation1 its 8esse ad10 is a distinct and separate reality4 ,the reality of the praedicamental relation is safeguarded without any such postulate4 ,since the predicamental relation1 considered adequately1 i4e4 not merely formally but fundamentally1 not merely secundum esse ad but secundum esse in1 involves as its foundation an absolute accident which is real independently of our thought1 the predicamental relation is not a mere ens rationis4 ,it has a foundation in reality4 ,it is an ens rationis cum fundamento in re4 ,this is a sufficient counter-assertion to ,idealism1 and a sufficient reason for treating relation as a distinct category of real being4 ,that there is no need for such a relative entity will be manifest if we consider the simple case of two bars of iron each a yard long4 ,the length of each is an absolute accident of each4 ,the length of either1 considered absolutely and in itself1 is not formally the equality of this with the other4 ,nor are both lengths considered separately the formal relation of equality4 ,but both considered together are the adequate foundation of this formal relation2 both considered together are this relation potentially1 fundamentally1 so that all that is needed for the actual1 formal relation of equality is the mental apprehension of the two lengths together4 ,the mental process of comparison is the only thing required to make the potential relation actual2 and the product of this mental process is the formality or 8esse ad0 of the relation1 the actual reference of the extremes to each other4 ,besides the absolute accidents which constitute the foundation of the relation something more is required for the constitution of the adequate predicamental relation4 ,this 8something more10 however1 is a mind capable of comparing the extremes1 and not any real entity distinct from extremes and foundation4 ,antecedently to the act of comparison the formally relative element of the relation1 its 8esse ad10 was not anything actual2 it was the mere comparability of the extremes in virtue of the foundation4 ,if the 8esse ad0 were a separate real entity1 a relative entity1 really distinct from extremes and foundation1 what sort of entity could it be8 ,being an accident1 it should inhere in1 or be a mode of its subject4 ,but if it did it would lose its formally relative character by becoming an inherent mode of an absolute reality4 ,while to conceive it as an entity astride on both extremes1 and bridging or connecting these together1 would be to substitute the crude imagery of the imagination for intellectual thought4 ,in the second place1 if a subject can acquire a relation1 or lose a relation1 without undergoing any real change1 then the relation considered formally as such1 or secundum 8esse ad10 cannot be a reality4 ,but a subject can acquire or lose a relation without undergoing any real change4 ,therefore the relation considered formally1 as distinct from its foundation and extremes1 is not a reality4 ,the minor of this argument may be proved by the consideration of a few simple examples4 ,a child already born is neither larger nor smaller than its brother that will be born two years hence47#dba7 ,but after the birth of the latter child the former can acquire those relations successively without any real change in itself1 and merely by the growth of the younger child4 ,again1 one white ball ,a is similar in colour to another white ball ,b4 ,paint the latter black1 and eo ipso the former loses its relation of resemblance without any real change in itself4 ,and this appears to be the view of ,st4 ,thomas4 ,if1 he writes1 another man becomes equal in size to me by growing while ,i remain unchanged in size1 then although eo ipso ,i become equal in size to him1 thus acquiring a new relation1 nevertheless ,i gain or acquire nothing new3 8nihil advenit mihi de novo1 per hoc quod incipio esse alteri aequalis per ejus mutationem04 ,relation1 he says1 is an extramental reality by reason of its foundation or cause1 whereby one reality is referred to another47#dbb7 ,relation itself1 considered formally as distinct from its foundation1 is not a reality2 it is real only inasmuch as its foundation is real47#dbc7 ,again1 relation is something inherent1 but not formally as a relation1 and hence it can disappear without any real change in its subject47#dbd7 ,a real relation may be destroyed in one or other of two ways3 either by the destruction or change of the foundation in the subject1 or by the destruction of the term1 entailing the cessation of the reference1 without any change in the subject47#dbe7 ,hence1 too1 the reason alleged by ,st4 ,thomas why relation1 unlike the other categories of real being1 can be itself divided into logical entity and real entity1 ens rationis and ens reale3 because formally it is an ens rationis1 and only fundamentally1 or in virtue of its foundation1 is it an ens reale47#dbf7 ,and hence1 finally1 the reason why ,st4 ,thomas1 following ,aristotle1 describes relation as having a 8lesser reality10 an 8esse debilius107#dbg7 than the other or absolute categories of real being3 not as if it were a sort of diminutive entity1 intermediate between nothingness and the absolute modes of reality1 but because being dependent for its formal actuality not merely on a foundation in its subject1 but also on a term to which the latter is referred1 it can perish not merely by the destruction of its subject like other accidents1 but also by the destruction of its term while subject and foundation remain unchanged4 ,if1 then1 the real relation1 considered formally or 8secundum esse ad0 is not a reality1 the relation under this aspect is a logical1 not a real1 accident4 ,to constitute a mutual real relation there is needed a foundation in both of the extremes4 ,as long as the term of the relation does not actually exist1 not only does the relation not exist formally and actually1 but it is not even adequately potential3 the foundation in the subject alone is not an adequate foundation4 ,to this view1 which denies any distinct reality to the predicamental relation considered formally1 it has been objected that the predicamental relation is thus confounded with the transcendental relation4 ,but this is not so2 for the transcendental relation is always essential to its subject1 whatever this subject may be1 while the predicamental relation1 considered formally1 is a logical accident separable from its subject1 and considered fundamentally it is some absolute accident really distinct from the substance of the related extremes4 ,for instance1 the action which mediates between cause and effect is itself transcendentally related to both2 while it is at the same time the adequate foundation whereby cause and effect are predicamentally related to each other47#dbh7 ,if what we have called the formal element of a relation be nothing really distinct from the extremes and foundation1 it follows that some real relations between creatures are really identical with their substances27#dbi7 and to this it has been objected that no relation in creatures can be1 quoad rem1 substantial3 8,nulla relatio10 says ,st4 ,thomas17#dcj7 8est substantia secundum rem in creaturis04 ,to this it may be replied that even in these cases the relation itself1 considered adequately1 is not wholly identical with the substance of either extreme4 ,it superadds a separable logical accident to these47#dca7 ,finally it is objected that the view which denies a distinct reality to the formal element of a real relation1 to its 8esse ad10 equivalently denies all reality to relations1 and is therefore in substance identical with the idealist doctrine already rejected 7#ij74 ,but this is a misconception4 ,according to idealists1 relations grounded on quality1 quantity1 causality1 etc41 are exclusively in the intellect1 in our mental activity and its mental products1 in our concepts alone1 and are in no true sense characteristic of reality4 ,this is very different from saying that our concepts of such relations are grounded in the realities compared1 and that these realities are really endowed with everything that constitutes such relations1 the comparative act of the intellect being required merely to apprehend these characteristics and so to give the relation its formal completeness47#dcb7 ,there is all the difference that exists between a theory which so exaggerates the constitutive function of thought as to reduce all intellectual knowledge to a knowledge of mere subjective mental appearances1 and a theory which1 while recognizing this function and its products1 will not allow that these cast any cloud or veil between the intellect and a genuine insight into objective reality4 ,these mental processes are guided by reality2 the entia rationis which are their products are grounded in reality2 moreover we can quite well distinguish between these mental modes and products of our intellectual activity and the real contents revealed to the mind in these modes and processes4 ,so long1 therefore1 as we avoid the mistake of ascribing to the objective reality itself any of these mental modes 7as1 for instance1 extreme realists do when they assert the extramental reality of the formal universal71 our recognition of them can in no way jeopardize the objective validity of intellectual knowledge4 ,perhaps an excessive timidity in this direction is in some degree accountable for the 8abuse of realism0 which ascribes to the formal element of a relation a distinct extramental17#dcc7 objective reality4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,causality2 ,,classification ,,of ,,causes4 #id4 ,,traditional ,,concept ,,of ,,cause4--,the modes of real being which we have been so far examining--substance1 quality1 quantity1 relation--are modes of reality considered as static4 ,but it was pointed out in an early chapter 7ch4 ii47 that the universe of our experience is subject to change1 that it is ever becoming1 that it is the scene of a continuous world-process which is apparently regulated by more or less stable principles or laws1 these laws and processes constituting the universal order which it is the duty of the philosopher to study and explain4 ,we must now return to this kinetic and dynamic aspect of reality1 and investigate the principles of change in things by a study of ,causes4 ,as with the names of the other ultimate categories1 so too here1 the general sense of the term 8cause0 7causa1 7 is familiar to all1 while analysis reveals a great variety of modalities of this common signification4 ,we understand by a cause anything which has a positive influence of any sort on the being or happening of something else4 ,in philosophy this is the meaning which has been attached traditionally to the term since the days of ,aristotle2 though in its present-day scientific use the term has almost lost this meaning1 mainly through the influence of modern phenomenism47#dcd7 ,the traditional notion of cause is usually expounded by comparing it with certain kindred notions3 principle1 condition1 occasion1 reason4 ,a principle is that from which anything proceeds in any way whatsoever47#dce7 ,any sort of intrinsic connexion between two objects of thought is sufficient to constitute the one a 8principle0 of the other2 but a mere extrinsic or time sequence is not sufficient4 ,a logical principle is some truth from which further truths are or may be derived4 ,a real principle is some reality from which the being or happening of something originates and proceeds47#dcf7 ,if this procession involves a real and positive influence of the principle on that which proceeds from it1 such a real principle is a cause4 ,but there may be a real and intrinsic connexion without any such influence4 ,for instance1 in the substantial changes which occur in physical nature the generation of the new substantial formative principle necessarily presupposes the privation of the one which antecedently 8informed0 the material principle2 but this 8privatio formae0 has no positive influence on the generation of the new 8form02 it is1 however1 the necessary and natural antecedent to the generation of the latter2 hence although this 8privatio formae0 is a real principle of substantial change 7the process or fieri7 it is not a cause of the latter4 ,the notion of principle1 even of real principle1 is therefore wider than the notion of cause47#dcg7 ,a condition1 in the proper sense of a necessary condition or conditio sine qua non1 is something which must be realized or fulfilled before the event or effect in question can happen or be produced4 ,on the side of the latter there is real dependence1 but from the side of the former there is no real and positive influence on the happening of the event4 ,the influence of the condition is negative2 or1 if positive1 it is only indirect1 consisting in the removal of some obstacle--8removens probibens0--to the positive influence of the cause4 ,in this precisely a condition differs from a cause3 windows1 for instance1 are a condition for the lighting of a room in the daylight1 but the sun is the cause4 ,the distinction is clear and intelligible1 nor may it be ignored in a philosophical analysis of causality4 ,at the same time it is easy to understand that where1 as in the inductive sciences1 there is question of discovering all the antecedents1 positive and negative1 of any given kind of phenomenon1 in order to bring to light and formulate the law or laws according to which such phenomenon occurs1 the distinction between cause and condition is of minor importance47#dch7 ,an occasion is any circumstance or combination of circumstances favourable to the action of a free cause4 ,for instance1 a forced sale is an occasion for buying cheaply2 night is an occasion of theft2 bad companionship is an occasion of sin4 ,an occasion has no intrinsic connexion with the effect as in the case of a principle1 nor is it necessary for the production of the effect as in the case of a condition4 ,it is spoken of only in connexion with the action of a free cause2 and it differs from a cause in having no positive and direct influence on the production of the effect4 ,it has1 however1 a real though indirect influence on the production of the effect by soliciting and aiding the determination of the free efficient cause to act4 ,in so far as it does exert such an influence it may be regarded as a partial efficient cause1 not a physical but a moral cause1 of the effect4 ,to ask for the reason of any event or phenomenon1 or of the nature or existence of any reality1 is to demand an explanation of the latter2 it is to seek what accounts for the latter1 what makes this intelligible to our minds4 ,whatever is a cause is therefore also a reason1 but the latter notion is wider than the former4 ,whatever explains a truth is a logical reason of the latter4 ,but since all truths are concerned with realities they must have ultimately real reasons1 i4e4 explanatory principles inherent in the realities themselves4 ,the knowledge of these real or ontological principles of things is the logical reason of our understanding of the things themselves4 ,but the ontological principles1 which are the real reasons of the things1 are wider in extent than the causes of these things1 for they include principles that are not causes4 ,furthermore1 the grades of reality which we discover in things by the activity of abstract thought1 and whereby we compare1 classify and define those things1 we apprehend as explanatory principles of the latter2 and these principles1 though really in the things1 and therefore real 8reasons10 are not 8causes04 ,thus1 life is a real reason1 though not a cause1 of sensibility in the animal organism2 the soul's independence of matter in its mode of existence is a real reason1 though not a cause1 of its spiritual activities4 ,hence1 between a reason and that which it accounts for there may be only a logical distinction1 while between a cause and that which it causes there must be a real distinction 7#ch74 ,to understand all the intrinsic principles which constitute the essence of anything is to know the sufficient reason of its reality4 ,to understand all the extrinsic principles which account for its actual existence is to know the sufficient reason of its existence2 and to understand this latter adequately is to realize that the thing depends ultimately for its actual existence on a ,reality or ,being which necessarily exists by virtue of its own essence4 ,what has been called the ,principle of ,sufficient ,reason asserts1 when applied to reality1 that every existing reality must have a sufficient reason for existing and for being what it is47#dci7 ,unlike the ,principle of ,causality which is an axiomatic or self-evident truth1 this principle is rather a necessary postulate of all knowledge1 an assumption that reality is intelligible4 ,it does not mean that all reality1 or even any single finite reality1 is adequately intelligible to our finite minds4 ,in the words of ,bossuet1 we do not know everything about anything3 8nous ne savons le tout de rien04 ,in regard to contingent essences1 if these be composite we can find a sufficient reason why they are such in their constitutive principles2 but in regard to simple essences1 or to the simple constitutive principles of composite essences1 we can find no sufficient reason why they are such in anything even logically distinct from themselves3 they are what they are because they are what they are1 and to demand why they are what they are1 is1 as ,aristotle remarked1 to ask an idle question4 ,at the same time1 when we have convinced ourselves that their actual existence involves the existence of a ,supreme1 ,self-,existent1 ,intelligent ,being1 we can see that the essence of this ,being is the ultimate ground of the intrinsic possibility of all finite essences 7#bj74 ,in regard to contingent existences the ,principle of ,sufficient ,reason is coincident with the ,principle of ,causality1 inasmuch as the sufficient reason of the actual existence of any contingent thing consists in the extrinsic real principles which are its causes4 ,the existence of contingent things involves the existence of a ,necessary ,being4 ,we may say that the sufficient reason for the existence of the ,necessary ,being is the ,divine ,essence ,itself2 but this is merely denying that there is outside this ,being any sufficient reason1 i4e4 any cause of the latter's existence2 it is the recognition that the ,principle of ,causality is inapplicable to the ,necessary ,being4 ,the ,principle of ,sufficient ,reason1 in this application of it1 is logically posterior to the ,principle of ,causality47#ddj7 #ie4 ,,classification ,,of ,,causes3 ,,aristotle',s ,,fourfold ,,division4--,in modern times many scientists and philosophers have thought it possible to explain the order and course of nature1 the whole cosmic process and the entire universe of our experience1 by an appeal to the operation of efficient causes4 ,espousing a mechanical1 as opposed to a teleological1 conception of the universe1 they have denied or ignored all influence of purpose1 and eschewed all study of final causes4 ,furthermore1 misconceiving or neglecting the category of substance1 and the doctrine of substantial change1 they find no place in their speculations for any consideration of formal and material causes4 ,yet without final1 formal and material causes1 so fully analysed by ,aristotle7#dda7 and the scholastics1 no satisfactory explanation of the world of our experience can possibly be found4 ,let us therefore commence by outlining the traditional fourfold division of causes4 ,we have seen already that change involves composition or compositeness in the thing that is subject to change4 ,hence two intrinsic principles contribute to the constitution of such a thing1 the one a passive1 determinable principle1 its material cause1 the other an active1 determining principle1 its formal cause4 ,some changes in material things are superficial1 not reaching to the substance itself of the thing2 these are accidental1 involving the union of some accidental 8form0 with the concrete pre-existing substance as material 7materia 8secunda074 ,others are more profound1 changes of the substance itself2 these are substantial1 involving the union of a new substantial 8form0 with the primal material principal 7materia 8prima07 of the substance undergoing the change4 ,but whether the change be substantial or accidental we can always distinguish in the resulting composite thing two intrinsic constitutive principles1 its formal cause and its material cause4 ,the agencies in nature which1 by their activity1 bring about change1 are efficient causes4 ,finally1 since it is an undeniable fact that there is order in the universe1 that its processes give evidence of regularity1 of operation according to law1 that the cosmos reveals a harmonious co-ordination of manifold agencies and a subordination of means to ends1 it follows that there must be working in and through all nature a directive principle1 a principle of plan or design1 a principle according to which those manifold agencies work together in fulfilment of a purpose1 for the attainment of ends4 ,hence the reality of a fourth class of causes1 final causes4 ,the separate influence of each of those four kinds of cause can be clearly illustrated by reference to the production of any work of art4 ,when1 for instance1 a sculptor chisels a statue from a block of marble1 the latter is the material cause 7materia secunda7 of the statue1 the form which he induces on it by his labour is the formal cause 7forma accidentalis71 the sculptor himself as agent is the efficient cause1 and the motive from which he works--money fame1 esthetic pleasure1 etc4--is the final cause4 ,the formal and material causes are intrinsic to the effect2 they constitute the effect in facto esse1 the distinction of each from the latter being an inadequate real distinction4 ,it is not so usual nowadays to call these intrinsic constitutive principles of things causes of the latter2 but they verify the general definition of cause4 ,the other two causes1 the efficient and the final1 are extrinsic to the effect1 and really and adequately distinct from it17#ddb7 extrinsic principles of its production1 its fieri4 ,this classification of causes is adequate27#ddc7 it answers all the questions that can be asked in explanation of the production of any effect3 a quo8 ex quo8 per quid8 propter quid8 ,nor is there any sort of cause which cannot be brought under some one or other of those four heads4 ,what is called an 8exemplar cause10 causa exemplaris1 i4e4 the ideal or model or plan in the mind of an intelligent agent1 according to which he aims and strives to execute his work1 may be regarded as an extrinsic formal cause2 or again1 in so far as it aids and equips the agent for his task1 an efficient cause2 or1 again1 in so far as it represents a good to be realized1 a final cause47#ddd7 ,the objects of our knowledge are in a true sense causes of our knowledge3 any such object may be regarded as an efficient cause1 both physical and moral1 of this knowledge1 in so far as by its action on our minds it determines the activity of our cognitive faculties2 or1 again1 as a final cause1 inasmuch as it is the end and aim of the knowledge4 ,the essence of the soul is1 as we have seen 7#fi71 not exactly an efficient cause of the faculties which are its properties2 but it is their final cause1 inasmuch as their raison d'tre is to perfect it2 and their subjective or material cause1 inasmuch as it is the seat and support of these faculties4 ,the fourfold division is analogical1 not univocal3 though the matter1 the form1 the agent1 and the end or purpose1 all contribute positively to the production of the effect1 it is clear that the character of the causal influence is widely different in each case4 ,again1 its members do not demand distinct subjects3 all four classes of cause may be verified in the same subject4 ,for instance1 the human soul is a formal cause in regard to the composite human individual1 a material cause in regard to its habits1 an efficient cause in regard to its acts1 and a final cause in regard to its faculties4 ,furthermore1 the fourfold division is not an immediate division1 for it follows the division of cause in general into intrinsic and extrinsic causes4 ,finally1 it is a division of the causes which we find to be operative in the universe4 ,but the philosophical study of the universe will lead us gradually to the conviction that itself and all the causes in it are themselves contingent1 themselves caused by and dependent on1 a ,cause outside or extrinsic to the universe1 a ,first1 ,uncaused1 ,uncreated1 ,self-,existent1 ,necessary ,cause 7,causa ,prima1 ,increata71 at once the efficient and final cause of all things4 ,in contrast with this ,uncreated1 ,first ,cause1 all the other causes we have now to investigate are called created or second causes 7causae secundae1 creatae74 ,a cause may be either total1 adequate1 or partial1 inadequate1 according as the effect is due to its influence solely1 or to its influence in conjunction with1 or dependence on1 the influence of some other cause or causes of the same order4 ,a created cause1 therefore1 is a total cause if the effect is due to its influence independently of other created causes2 though of course all created causes are dependent1 both as to their existence and as to their causality1 on the influence of the ,first ,cause4 ,without the activity of created efficient and final causes the ,first ,cause can accomplish directly whatever these can accomplish--except their very causality itself1 which cannot be actualized without them1 but for which ,he can supply eminenter4 ,similarly1 while it is incompatible with ,his ,infinite ,perfection that ,he discharge the function of material or formal cause of finite composite things1 ,he can immediately create these latter by the simultaneous production 7ex nihilo7 and union of their material and formal principles4 ,a cause is said to be in actu secundo when it is actually exercising its causal influence4 ,antecedently to such exercise1 at least prioritate naturae1 it is said to be in actu primo3 when it has the expedite power to discharge its function as cause it is in actu primo proximo1 while if its power is in any way incomplete1 hampered or unready1 it is in actu primo remoto4 ,many other divisions of cause1 subordinate to the ,aristotelian division1 will be explained in connexion with the members of this latter4 #if4 ,,material ,,and ,,formal ,,causes4--,these are properly subject-matter for ,cosmology4 ,we will therefore very briefly supplement what has been said already concerning them in connexion with the doctrine of ,change 7ch4 ii474 ,by a material cause we mean that out of which anything is made3 id ex quo aliquid fit4 ,matter is correlative with form3 from the union of these there results a composite reality endowed with either essential or accidental unity--with the former if the material principle be absolutely indeterminate and the correlative form substantial1 with the latter if the material principle be some actually existing individual reality and the form some supervening accident4 ,properly speaking only corporeal substances have material causes17#dde7 but the term 8material cause0 is used in an extended sense to signify any potential1 passive1 receptive subject of formative or actuating principles3 thus the soul is the subjective or material cause of its faculties and habits2 essence of existence2 genus of differentia1 etc4 ,in what does the positive causal influence of a material cause consist8 ,how does it contribute positively to the actualization of the composite reality of which it is the material cause8 ,it receives and unites with the form which is educed from its potentiality by the action of efficient causes1 and thus contributes to the generation of the concrete1 composite individual reality47#ddf7 ,it is by reason of the causality of the formal cause that we speak of a thing being formally such or such4 ,as correlative of material cause it finds its proper application in reference to the constitution of corporeal things4 ,the formative principle1 called forma substantialis1 which actuates1 determines1 specifies the material principle1 and by union with the latter constitutes an individual corporeal substance of a definite kind1 is the 7substantial7 formal cause of this composite substance47#ddg7 ,the material principle of corporeal things is of itself indifferent to any species of body2 it is the form that removes this indefiniteness and determines the matter1 by its union with the latter1 to constitute a definite type of corporeal substance47#ddh7 ,the existence of different species of living organisms and different types of inorganic matter in the universe implies in the constitution of these things a common material principle1 materia prima1 and a multiplicity of differentiating1 specifying1 formative principles1 formae substantiales4 ,that the distinction between these two principles in the constitution of any individual corporeal substance1 whether living or inorganic1 is not merely a virtual distinction between metaphysical 7generic and specific7 grades of being in the individual1 but a real distinction between separable entities1 is a scholastic thesis established in the ,special ,metaphysics of the organic and inorganic domains of the universe47#ddi7 ,since the form is a perfecting1 actuating principle1 the term is often used synonymously with actus1 actuality4 ,and since besides the essential perfection which a being has by virtue of its substantial form it may have accidental perfections by reason of supervening accidental forms1 these1 too1 are formal causes4 ,in what does the causal influence of the formal cause consist8 ,in communicating itself intrinsically to the material principle or passive subject from whose potentiality it is evoked by the action of efficient causes2 in actuating that potentiality by intrinsic union therewith1 and thus determining the individual subject to be actually or formally an individual of such or such a kind4 ,the material and formal causes are intrinsic principles of the constitution of things4 ,we next pass to an analysis of the two extrinsic causes1 and firstly of the efficient cause and its causality4 #ig4 ,,efficient ,,cause2 ,,traditional ,,concept ,,explained4--,by efficient cause we understand that by which anything takes place1 happens1 occurs3 id a quo aliquid fit4 ,the world of our external and internal experience is the scene of incessant changes3 men and things not only are1 but are constantly becoming4 ,now every such change is originated by some active principle1 and this we call the efficient cause of the change4 ,aristotle called it or 1 the kinetic or moving principle2 or again1 1 principium motus vel mutationis in alio1 8the principle of motion or change in some other thing04 ,the result achieved by this change1 the actualized potentiality1 is called the effect2 the causality itself of the efficient cause is called action 771 motion1 change--and1 from the point of view of the effect1 passio 774 ,the perfection or endowment whereby an efficient cause acts1 i4e4 its efficiency 771 is called active power 7potentia seu virtus activa72 it is also called force or potential energy in reference to inanimate agents1 faculty in reference to animate agents1 especially men and animals4 ,this active power of an efficient cause or agent is to be carefully distinguished from the passive potentiality acted upon and undergoing change4 ,the former connotes a perfection1 the latter an imperfection3 unumquodque agit inquantum est in actu1 patitur vero inquantum1 est in potentia4 ,the scope of the active power of a cause is the measure of its actuality1 of its perfection in the scale of reality2 while the extent of the passive potentiality of patiens is a measure of its relative imperfection4 ,the actuation of the former is actio1 that of the latter passio4 ,the point of ontological connexion of the two potentiae is the change 7motus1 71 this being at once the formal perfecting of the passive potentiality in the patiens or effect1 and the immediate term of the efficiency or active power of the agens or cause4 ,actio and passio1 therefore1 are not expressions of one and the same concept2 they express two distinct concepts of one and the same reality1 viz4 the change3 actio et passio sunt idem numero motus4 ,this change takes place formally in the subject upon which the efficient cause acts1 for it is an actuation of the potentiality of the former under the influence of the latter3 2 4 ,considered in the potentiality of this subject--8 3 hujus in hococ0--it is called passio4 ,considered as a term of the active power of the cause--8 3 hujus per hoc0--it is called actio4 ,the fact that actio and passio are really and objectively one and the same motus does not militate against their being regarded as two separate supreme categories1 for they are objects of distinct concepts17#dej7 and this is sufficient to constitute them distinct categories 7#fj74 ,doubts are sometimes raised1 as ,st4 ,thomas remarks17#dea7 about the assertion that the action of an agent is not formally in the latter but in the patiens3 actio fit in passo4 ,it is clear1 however1 he continues1 that the action is formally in the patiens for it is the actuation not of any potentiality of the agent1 but of the passive potentiality of the patiens3 it is in the latter that the motus or change1 which is both actio and passio1 takes place1 dependently of course on the influence of the agent1 or efficient cause of the change4 ,the active power of an efficient cause is an index of the latter's actuality2 the exercise of this power 7i4e4 action7 does not formally perfect the agent1 for it is not an actuation of any passive potentiality of the latter2 it formally perfects the patiens4 ,only immanent action perfects the agent1 and then not as agent but as patiens or receiver of the actuality effected by the action 7cf4 #ajc infra74 ,we may1 then1 define efficient cause as the extrinsic principle of the change or production of anything by means of action3 principium extrinsicum a quo fluit motus vel productio rei mediante actione4 ,it is a 8first0 principle as compared with material and formal causes for its influence is obviously prior in nature to theirs2 also as compared with the other extrinsic cause1 the final cause1 in ordine executionis1 not1 however1 in ordine intentionis4 ,the 8end10 not as realized but as realizable1 not in execution but in intention1 discharges its function and exerts its influence as 8final cause0 and in this order the final cause1 as will appear later1 is the first of all causes3 finis est ultimus in executione sed primus in intentione4 8,change or production10 in the definition1 is to be understood not in the strict sense in which it presupposes an existing subject or material1 but in the wide sense in which it includes any production of new reality1 even creation or production ex nihilo4 8,action10 too1 is to be understood in the wide sense in which it includes the action of the ,first ,cause1 which action is really identical with the essence of the latter4 ,we conceive creation after the analogy of the efficient action of created or 8second0 causes3 we have no proper concept of the infinite perfection of the ,divine activity4 ,in all created efficient causes not only is the action itself1 but also the efficiency1 force1 power1 faculty1 which is its proximate principle1 really distinct from the nature or essence of the agent2 the former is a substance1 the latter an accident4 ,finally1 the action of a created efficient cause is either transitive 7transiens7 or immanent 7immanens7 according as the change wrought by the action takes place in something else 7as when the sun heats or lights the earth7 or in the cause itself 7as when a man reasons or wills74 ,in the former case the action perfects not the agent but the other thing1 the patiens2 in the latter case it perfects the agent itself1 agens and patiens being here the same identical concrete individual47#deb7 #ih4 ,,some ,,scholia ,,on ,,causation4 ,,the ,,principle ,,of ,,causality4--,before enumerating the principal kinds of efficient cause1 and analysing the nature of efficient causality1 we may set down here certain self-evident axioms and aphorisms concerning causation in general4 7a7 ,the most important of these is the ,principle of ,causality1 which has been enunciated in a variety of ways3 ,whatever happens has a cause2 ,whatever begins to be has a cause2 ,whatever is contingent has a cause2 ,nothing occurs without a cause4 ,not everything that begins to be has necessarily a material cause1 or a formal cause1 really distinct from itself4 ,for instance1 simple spiritual beings1 like the human soul1 have no material cause1 nor any formal cause or constitutive principle distinct from their essence4 ,similarly1 the whole universe1 having been created ex nihilo1 had no pre-existing material cause4 ,all the material beings1 however1 which are produced1 generated1 brought into actual existence in the course of the incessant changes which characterize the physical universe1 have both material and formal causes4 ,but the ,principle of ,causality refers mainly to extrinsic causes4 ,it is commonly understood only of efficient causes2 and only in regard to these is it self-evident4 ,we shall see that as a matter of fact nothing happens without a final cause3 that intelligent purpose pervades reality through and through4 ,this1 however1 is a conclusion1 not a principle4 ,what is really a self-evident1 axiomatic1 necessary principle is that whatever happens has an ,,efficient cause4 ,only the ,necessary1 ,self-,existing1 ,eternal ,being1 has the sufficient reason of ,his actual existence in ,himself1 in ,his own essence4 ,that any being which is contingent could exist independently of some other actual being as the cause of this existence2 that it could have come into existence or begun to exist from absolute nothingness1 or be produced or brought into actual existence without any actual being to produce it2 or that1 once existing and subject to change1 it could undergo change and have its potentialities actualized without any actual being to cause such change 7#aj7--;all this is positively unthinkable and absolutely repugnant to our intelligence2 all this our reason peremptorily declares to be intrinsically impossible4 ,nor is there question of a mere psychological inconceivability1 such as might be due to a long-continued custom of associating the idea of a 8beginning0 with the idea of a 8cause0 of this beginning--as phenomenists generally contend47#dec7 ,there is question of an impossibility which our reason categorically dictates to be a real1 ontological impossibility4 ,the ,principle of ,causality is therefore a necessary1 a priori1 self-evident principle4 7b7 ,every effect must have an adequate efficient cause1 i4e4 a cause sufficiently perfect1 sufficiently high on the scale of being1 to have the active power to produce the effect in question2 otherwise the effect would be partially uncaused1 which is impossible4 7c7 ,an effect cannot as such be actually more perfect than its adequate 7created7 cause4 ,the reason is that the effect as such is really dependent for its actuality on its adequate created cause4 ,it derives its actuality from the latter4 ,now it is inconceivable that an agent could be the active1 productive principle of a greater perfection1 a higher grade of actuality1 than itself possesses4 ,whatever be the nature of efficient causality1 actio and passio 7#ajb71 or of the dependence of the produced actuality upon the active power of its adequate efficient cause 7#aj71 the reality of this dependence forbids us to think that in the natural order of efficient causation a higher grade of reality can be actualized than the agent is capable of actualizing1 or that the agent can naturally actualize a higher or more perfect grade of reality than is actually its own4 ,we must1 however1 bear in mind that there is question of the adequate created cause of an effect2 and that to account fully for the actualization of any potential reality whatsoever we are forced to recognize in all causation of created efficient causes the concursus of the ,first ,cause4 7d7 ,the actuality of the effect is in its adequate created cause or causes1 not actually and formally1 but potentially or virtually4 ,if the cause produce an effect of the same kind as itself 7causa univoca71 as when living organisms propagate their species1 the perfection of the effect is said to be in the cause equivalently 7aequivalenter72 if it produce an effect of a different kind from itself 7causa analoga71 as when a sculptor makes a statue1 the perfection of the effect is said to be in the cause eminently 7eminenter74 7e7 ,omne agens agit inquantum est in actu4 ,the operative power of a being is in proportion to its own actual perfection3 the higher an agent is on the scale of reality1 or in other words the more perfect its grade of being1 the higher and more perfect will be the effects achieved by the exercise of its operative powers4 ,in fact our chief test of the perfection of any nature is analysis of its operations4 ,hence the maxim so often referred to already3-- 7f7 ,operari sequitur esse2 qualis est operatio talis est natura2 modus operandi sequitur modum essendi4 ,operation is the key to nature2 we know what any thing is by what it does4 7g7 ,nihil agit ultra suam speciem2 or1 again1 ,omne agens agit simile sibi4 ,these are inductive generalizations gathered from experience1 and have reference to the natural operation of agents1 especially in the organic world4 ,living organisms reproduce only their own kind4 ,moreover1 every agency in the universe has operative powers of a definite kind2 acting according to its nature it produces certain effects and these only2 others it cannot produce3 this is1 in the natural order of things1 and with the natural concursus of the ,first ,cause4 ,but created causes have a passive obediential capacity 7potentia obedientialis7 whereby their nature can be so elevated by the ,first ,cause that they can produce1 with ,his special1 supernatural concursus1 effects of an entirely higher order than those within the ambit of their natural powers47#ded7 7h7 ,from a known effect1 of whatsoever kind1 we can argue with certainty1 a posteriori1 to the existence of an adequate efficient cause1 and to some knowledge of the nature of such a cause47#dee7 ,by virtue of the principle of causality we can infer the existence of an adequate cause containing either equivalently or eminently all the perfections of the effect in question4 #ii4 ,,classification ,,of ,,efficient ,,causes4--7a7 ,we have already referred to the distinction between the ,first ,cause and ,second or ,created ,causes4 ,the former is absolutely independent of all other beings both as to ,his power and as to the exercise of this power4 ,the latter are dependent1 for both1 upon the former4 ,the distinction between a first1 or primary1 or independent cause1 and second1 or subordinate1 or dependent causes can be understood not only of causes universally1 but also as obtaining among created causes themselves4 ,in general the subordination of a cause to a superior or anterior cause may be either essential or accidental3 essential1 when the second cause depends--either for its existence or for an indispensable complement of its efficiency--on the present actual influence of the other cause2 accidental when the second cause has indeed received its existence or efficiency from this other cause1 but is now no longer dependent1 for its existence or action1 on the latter4 ,thus1 living organisms are1 as causes1 accidentally subordinate to their parent organisms3 they derived their existence from the latter1 but are independent of these when in their maturity they continue to exist1 and live1 and act of themselves and for themselves4 ,but all creatures1 on the other hand1 are1 as causes1 essentially subordinate to the ,creator1 inasmuch as they can exist and act only in constant dependence on the ever present and ever actual conserving and concurring influence of the ,creator4 ,it is obvious that all the members of any series of causes essentially subordinate the one to the other must exist simultaneously4 ,whether such a series could be infinite depends1 therefore1 on the question whether an actually infinite multitude is intrinsically possible4 ,this difficulty cannot be urged with such force against an infinite regress in causes accidentally subordinate to one another2 for here such a regress would not involve an actually infinite multitude of things existing simultaneously4 ,in the case of essentially subordinate causes1 moreover1 the series1 whatever about its infinity1 must contain1 or rather imply above it1 one cause which is first in the sense of being independent1 or exempt from the subordination characteristic of all the others4 ,and the reason is obvious3 ,since no one of them can exist or act except dependently on another1 and this on another1 and so on1 it is manifest that the series cannot exist at all unless there is some one cause which1 unlike all the others1 exists and acts without such subordination or dependence4 ,hence1 in essentially subordinate causes an infinite regress is impossible47#def7 ,in ,natural ,theology these considerations are of supreme importance4 7b7 ,an efficient cause may be described as immanent or transitive according as the term of its action remains within the cause itself1 or is produced in something else4 ,the action of the ,first ,cause is formally immanent1 being identical with the ,divine ,nature itself2 it is virtually transitive when it is creative1 or operative among creatures4 7c7 ,an efficient cause is either a principal or an instrumental cause4 ,when two causes so combine to produce an effect that one of them uses the other the former is called the principal and the latter the instrumental cause4 ,thus ,i am the principal cause of the words ,i am writing2 my pen is the instrumental cause of them4 ,such an effect is always attributed to the principal cause1 not to the instrumental4 ,the notion of an instrument is quite a familiar notion4 ,an instrument helps the principal agent to do what the latter could not otherwise do1 or at least not so easily4 ,an instrument therefore is really a cause4 ,it contributes positively to the production of the effect4 ,how does it do so8 ,by reason of its nature or structure it influences1 modifies1 and directs in a particular way1 the efficiency of the principal cause4 ,but this property of the instrumental cause comes into play only when the latter is being actually used by a principal cause4 ,a pen1 a saw1 a hammer1 a spade1 have each its own instrumentality4 ,the pen will not cut1 nor the saw mould iron1 nor the hammer dig1 nor the spade write1 for the agent that uses them4 ,each will produce its own kind of effect when used2 but none of them will produce any effect except when used3 though each has in itself permanently and inherently the power to produce its own proper effect in use47#deg7 ,we have instanced the use of artificial instruments4 ,but nature itself provides some agencies with what may be called natural instruments4 ,the semen whereby living organisms propagate their kind is an instance4 ,in a less proper sense the various members of the body are called instruments of the human person as principal cause1 8instrumenta conjuncta04 ,the notion of an instrumental cause involves then 7a7 subordination of the latter1 in its instrumental activity1 to a principal cause1 7b7 incapacity to produce the effect otherwise than by modifying and directing the influence of the principal cause4 ,this property whereby the instrumental cause modifies or determines in a particular way the influence of the principal cause1 is called by ,st4 ,thomas an actio or operatio of the former2 the distinction between the principal and the instrumental cause being that whereas the former acts by virtue of a power permanently inherent in it as a natural perfection1 the latter acts as an instrument only by virtue of the transient motion which it derives from the principal cause which utilizes it47#deh7 ,we may1 therefore1 define an instrumental cause as one which1 when acting as an instrument1 produces the effect not by virtue of its inherent power alone1 but by virtue of a power communicated to it by some principal cause which acts through it4 ,a principal cause1 on the other hand1 is one which produces its effect by virtue of an active power permanently inherent in itself4 ,the designations principal and instrumental are obviously correlative4 ,moreover1 all created causes may be called instrumental in relation to the ,first ,cause4 ,for1 not only are they dependent on the latter for the conservation of their nature and active powers2 they are also dependent1 in their action1 in their actual exercise of these powers1 on the ,first ,cause 7for the concursus of the latter747#dei7 ,yet some created causes have these powers permanently1 and can exercise them without subordination to other creatures2 while others need1 for the exercise of their proper functions1 not only the ,divine concursus1 but also the motion of other creatures4 ,hence the former are rightly called principal created causes1 and the latter instrumental created causes4 7d7 ,efficient causes are divided into free causes and necessary causes4 ,a free or self-determining cause is one which is not determined by its nature to one line of action1 but has the power of choosing1 or determining itself1 to act or abstain1 when all the conditions requisite for acting are present4 ,man is a free agent1 or free cause1 of his deliberate actions4 ,a necessary cause1 or natural cause as it is sometimes called1 is one which is determined by its nature to one invariable line of action1 so that1 granted the conditions requisite for action1 it cannot naturally abstain from acting in that invariable manner4 ,all the physical agencies of the inorganic world1 all plant and animal organisms beneath man himself1 are necessary causes4 ,the freedom of the human will is established against determinism in ,psychology47#dfj7 ,the difficulties of determinists against this doctrine are for the most part based on misconceptions1 or on erroneous and gratuitous assumptions4 ,we may mention two of them here47#dfa7 ,free activity1 they say1 would be causeless activity3 it would violate the 8law of universal causation04 ,we reply that free activity is by no means causeless activity4 ,the free agent himself is in the fullest and truest sense the efficient cause of his free acts4 ,it is by his causal1 efficient influence that the act of free choice is determined and elicited4 ,free causality evidently does not violate the necessary1 a priori principle set forth above under the title of the ,principle of ,causality4 ,but--they urge in the second place--it violates the 8law of universal causation10 i4e4 the law that every event in nature must be the result of some set of phenomenal antecedents which necessitate it1 and which1 therefore1 whenever verified1 must produce this result and no other2 and by violating this law it removes all supposed 8free0 activities from the domain of that regularity and uniformity without which no scientific knowledge of such phenomena would be possible4 ,to this we reply1 firstly1 that the law of uniform causation in nature1 the law which is known as the 8,law of the ,uniformity of ,nature10 and which1 under the title of the 8,law of ,universal ,causation0 is confounded by determinists and phenomenists with the entirely distinct 8,principle of ,causality0--is not by any means a law of necessary causation47#dfb7 ,the statement that ,nature is uniform in its activities is not the expression of an a priori1 necessary truth1 like the ,principle of ,causality4 ,it is a generalization from experience4 ,and experience testifies to the existence of grades in this all-prevailing uniformity4 ,in the domain of physical nature it is the expression of the ,free ,will of the ,author of ,nature1 who may miraculously derogate from this physical uniformity for higher1 moral ends4 ,in the domain of deliberate human activities it is the expression of that less rigorous but no less real uniformity which is dependent on the free will of man4 ,and just as the possibility of miracles in the former domain does not destroy the regularity on which the generalizations of the physical sciences are based1 so neither does the fact of human free will render worthless or unreliable the generalizations of the human sciences 7ethical1 social1 political1 economic1 etc47 about human conduct4 ,were the appearance of miracles in the physical domain1 or the ordinary play of free will in the human domain1 entirely capricious1 motiveless1 purposeless1 the results would1 of course1 be chaotic1 precarious1 unaccountable1 unintelligible1 and scientific knowledge of them would be impossible3 for the assumption that reality is the work of intelligent purpose1 and is therefore a regular1 orderly expression of law1 in other words1 the assumption that the universe is intelligible1 is a prerequisite condition for scientific knowledge about the universe4 ,but determinists seem to assume that ,divine ,providence and human free will must necessarily imply that the whole universe of physical phenomena and human activities would be an unintelligible chaos2 and having erected this philosophical scarecrow on a gratuitous assumption they think it will gradually exorcise all belief in ,divine ,providence and human freedom from the 8scientific0 mind6 7e7 ,efficient causes are either physical or moral4 ,a physical efficient cause is one which produces its effect by its own proper power and action--whether immediately or by means of an instrument4 ,for instance1 the billiard player is the physical cause of the motion he imparts to the balls by means of the cue4 ,a moral cause is one which produces its effect by the representation of something as good or evil to the mind of a free agent2 by inducing the latter through example1 advice1 persuasion1 promises1 threats1 commands1 entreaties1 etc41 to produce the effect in question4 ,for instance1 a master is the moral cause of what his servant does in obedience to his commands4 ,the motives set forth by way of inducement to the latter are of course final causes of the latter's action4 ,but the former1 by setting them forth1 is the moral cause of the action3 he is undoubtedly more than a mere condition2 he contributes positively and efficiently to the effect4 ,his physical causation1 however1 does not reach to the effect itself1 but only to the effect wrought in the mind of the servant by his command4 ,it is causally connected with the physical action of the servant by means of an intermediate link which we may call mental or psychical causation--actio 8intentionalis10--the action of cognition on the mind of a cognitive agent4 ,the agent employed by a moral cause to produce an effect physically may be called an instrumental cause in a wide and less proper sense of this term1 the instrumentality being moral1 not physical4 ,only free agents can be moral causes2 and as a rule they are termed moral causes only when they produce the effect through the physical operation of another free agent4 ,what if they employ not free agents1 nor yet inanimate instruments1 but agents endowed with sense cognition and sense appetite1 to produce effects8 ,if a man set his dog at another1 is he the moral or the physical cause of the injuries inflicted by the dog8 ,that he is the principal efficient cause is unquestionable4 ,but is he the principal physical cause and the dog the instrument8 ,we think it is more proper to call the principal efficient cause a moral cause in all cases where there intervenes between his physical action and the effect an intermediate link of 8psychical0 or 8intentional0 action1 even though1 as in the present example1 this psychical link is of the sentient1 not the intellectual1 order4 7f7 ,the efficient cause1 like other causes1 may be either partial or total1 according as it produces the effect by co-operation with other causes1 or by itself alone4 ,the aim of the inductive sciences is to discover for each kind of natural event or phenomenon the 8total cause0 in the comprehensive sense of the whole group of positive agencies or causes proper1 and negative antecedent and concomitant conditions which are indispensable and necessitating principles of the happening of such kind of event47#dfc7 7g7 ,we can distinguish between the immediate or determining1 the more or less proximate1 and the more or less remote1 efficient causes of an event4 ,thus1 the application of the fuse to the charge of dynamite in a rock is the immediate or determining cause of the explosion which bursts the rock2 the lighting of the fuse1 the placing of the charge1 etc41 the more proximate causes2 the making of the fuse1 dynamite1 instruments1 etc41 the more remote causes4 ,again the aim of the inductive sciences is to discover the 8total proximate cause0 of events17#dfd7 leaving the investigation of ultimate causes1 as well as the analysis of causality itself1 to philosophy4 7h7 ,finally1 we must distinguish between the individual agent itself as cause 7the suppositum or person that acts72 the agent's nature and active power as causes2 and the action1 or exercise of this power as cause4 ,the former1 the individual1 concrete agent1 is the 8principium quod agit10 and is called the 8causa ut quae04 ,the nature and the active power of the agent are each a 8principium quo agens agit10 the remote and the proximate principle of action respectively2 and each is called a 8causa ut qua04 ,the action of the agent is the cause of the effect in the sense that the actual production or fieri of anything is the immediate cause of this thing in facto esse4 ,corresponding to these distinctions we distinguish between the cause in actu primo remoto1 in actu primo proximo1 and in actu secundo4 ,these distinctions are of no little importance4 ,by ignoring them1 and by losing sight of the intrinsic 7formal and material7 causes of natural phenomena1 many modern scientists and philosophers have confounded cause and effect with the process itself of causation1 and declared that cause and effect are not distinct realities1 but only two mental aspects of one and the same reality47#dfe7 ,the same may be said of all the distinctions so far enumerated4 ,they are absolutely essential to the formation of clear ideas on the question of causality4 ,no term in familiar use is of more profound philosophical significance1 and at the same time more elastic and ambiguous in its popular meanings1 than the term cause4 ,this is keenly felt in the ,logic of the ,inductive ,sciences1 where not only the discovery1 but the exact measurement1 of physical causes1 is the goal of research4 8,when we call one thing10 writes ,mr4 ,joseph17#dff7 8the cause of another1 the real relation between them is not always the same4444 ,we say that molecular action is the cause of heat1 that the heat of the sun is the cause of growth1 that starvation is sometimes the cause of death1 that jealousy is a frequent cause of crime4 ,we should in the first case maintain that cause and effect are reciprocally necessary2 no heat without molecular motion and no molecular motion without heat4 ,in the second the effect cannot exist without the cause1 but the cause may exist without the effect1 for the sun shines on the moon but nothing grows there4 ,in the third the cause cannot exist without the effect1 for starvation must produce death1 but the effect may exist without the cause1 since death need not have been produced by starvation4 ,in the fourth case we can have the cause without the effect1 and also the effect without the cause2 for jealousy may exist without producing crime1 and crime may occur without the motive of jealousy4 ,it is plain then that we do not always mean the same thing by our words when we say that two things are related as cause and effect2 and anyone who would classify and name the various modes in which two things may be causally related would do a great service to clear thinking40 ,in the popular acceptation of the term cause1 the same kind of event can have a plurality of 7efficient7 causes4 ,death1 for example1 may be brought about in different cases by different diseases or accidents4 ,but if we understand by the total efficient cause of any given kind of effect the sum-total of agencies and conditions which when present necessitate this kind of an effect1 and which are collectively and severally indispensable for its production1 then it is obvious that a given kind of effect can have only one kind of such total group of antecedents as total cause1 just as any one individual effect can have only one individual total cause1 viz4 the one which actually produced it2 a similar total cause would produce a similar effect1 but could not produce the numerically identical individual effect of the other similar cause47#dfg7 ,the medieval scholastics discussed the question in connexion with the problem of individuation3 8,would ,alexander the ,great have been the same individual had he been born of other parents than ,philip and ,olympia80 ,the question is hardly intelligible4 ,the person born of these other parents might indeed have been as similar as you will to the actual ,alexander of history1 but would not and could not have been the actual ,alexander of history4 ,nowadays the question discussed in this connexion is not so much whether the same kind of natural phenomenon can be produced by different kinds of total cause--for the answer to this question depends wholly on the wider or the narrower meaning attached to the term 8total cause107#dfh7--;but rather whether or how far the inductive scientist's ideal of searching always for the necessitating and indispensable cause 7or1 as it is also called1 the 8reciprocating0 or 8commensurate0 cause7 is a practical ideal4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,efficient ,,causality2 ,,phenomenism ,,and ,,occasionalism4 #ajj4 ,,objective ,,validity ,,of ,,the ,,traditional ,,concept ,,of ,,efficient ,,causality4--,we have seen how modern sensists1 phenomenists1 and positivists have doubted or denied the power of the human mind to attain to a knowledge of any objective reality corresponding to the category of substance 7 #fa sqq474 ,they treat in a similar way the traditional concept of efficient causality4 ,and in delivering their open or veiled attacks on the real validity of this notion they have made a misleading use of the proper and legitimate function of the inductive sciences4 ,the chief aim of the natural scientist is to seek out and bring to light the whole group of necessitating and indispensable 7phenomenal7 antecedents of any given kind of event1 and to formulate the natural law of their connexion with this kind of event4 ,there is no particular objection to his calling these antecedents the invariable1 or even the necessary or necessitating1 antecedents of the event2 provided he does not claim what he cannot prove--and what1 as we shall see later 7#ajd71 is not true1 viz4--that the invariability or necessity of this connexion between phenomenal antecedents and consequents is wholly inviolable1 fatal1 absolute in character4 ,he may rightly claim for any such established connexion the hypothetical1 conditional necessity which characterizes all inductively established laws of physical nature4 ,there are such antecedents and consequents in the universe2 there are connexions between them which are more than mere casual connexions of time sequence1 which are connexions of physical law1 inasmuch as they are connexions based on the natures of agencies in an orderly universe1 connexions of these agencies with their natural effects4 ,all this is undeniable4 ,moreover1 so long as the scientist confines himself to inferences concerning such connexions between phenomena1 to inferences and generalizations based on the assumed uniformity of nature1 he is working in his proper sphere4 ,nay1 even if he chooses to designate these groups of invariable phenomenal antecedents by the title of 8physical causes0 we know what he means2 though we perceive some danger of confusion1 inasmuch as we see him arrogating to the notion of regularity or uniformity of connexion i4e4 to the notion of physical law1 a term1 causality1 which traditionally expressed something quite distinct from this1 viz4 the notion of positive influence of one thing on the being or happening of another4 ,but when phenomenist philosophers adopt this usage we cannot feel reassured against the danger of confusion by such protestations as those of ,mill in the following passage3--7#dfi7 ,i premise1 then1 that when in the course of this inquiry ,i speak of the cause of any phenomenon1 ,i do not mean a cause which is not itself a phenomenon2 ,i make no research into the ultimate or ontological cause of anything4 ,to adopt a distinction familiar in the writings of the ,scotch metaphysicians1 and especially of ,reid1 the causes with which ,i concern myself are not efficient1 but physical causes4 ,they are causes in that sense alone1 in which one physical fact is said to be the cause of another4 ,of the efficient causes of phenomena1 or whether any such causes exist at all ,i am not called upon to give an opinion4 ,the notion of causation is deemed1 by the schools of metaphysics most in vogue at the present moment1 to imply a mysterious and most powerful tie1 such as cannot1 or at least does not1 exist between any physical fact and that other physical fact on which it is invariably consequent1 and which is popularly termed its cause2 and thence is deduced the supposed necessity of ascending higher1 into the essences and inherent constitution of things1 to find the true cause1 the cause which is not only followed by1 but actually produces1 the effect4 ,no such necessity exists for the purposes of the present inquiry1 nor will any such doctrine be found in the following pages4 ,the only notion of a cause1 which the theory of induction requires1 is such a notion as can be gained by experience4 ,the ,law of ,causation1 which is the main pillar of inductive science1 is but the familiar truth1 that invariability of succession is found by observation to obtain between every fact in nature and some other fact which has preceded it2 independently of all considerations respecting the ultimate mode of production of phenomena1 and of every other question regarding the nature of 8,things in themselves04 ,this passage--which expresses fairly well the phenomenist and positivist attitude in regard to the reality1 or at least the cognoscibility1 of efficient causes--fairly bristles with inaccuracies1 misconceptions1 and false insinuations47#dgj7 ,but we are concerned here only with the denial that any notion of an efficient cause 8can be gained from experience10 and the doubt consequently cast on the objective validity of this notion4 ,the ,sensism which regards our highest intellectual activities as mere organic associations of sentient states of consciousness1 has for its logical issue the ,positivism which contends that all valid knowledge is confined to the existence and time and space relations of sense phenomena4 ,in thus denying to the mind all power of attaining to a valid knowledge of anything suprasensible--such as substance1 power1 force1 efficient cause1 etc4--,positivism passes over into ,agnosticism4 ,in refutation of this philosophy1 in so far as it denies that we have any grounds in experience for believing in the real existence of efficient causes1 we may set down in the first place this universal belief itself of the human race that there are in the universe efficient causes of the events that happen in it4 ,men universally believe that they themselves as agents contribute by a real and positive influence to the actual occurrence of their own thoughts1 reasonings1 wishes1 desires1 sensations2 that their mental resolves to speak1 walk1 write1 eat1 or perform any other external1 bodily works do really1 positively1 and efficiently produce or cause those works2 that external phenomena have a real influence on happenings in their own bodies1 that fire burns them and food nourishes them2 that external phenomena also have a real and positive influence on their sense organs1 and through these on their minds by the production there of conscious states such as sensations2 finally that external phenomena have a real and positive influence on one another2 that by action and interaction they really produce the changes that are constantly taking place in the universe3 that the sun does really heat and light the earth1 that the sowing of the seed in springtime has really a positive influence on the existence of crops in the harvest1 that the taking of poison has undoubtedly a real influence on the death which results from it4 ,and if any man of ordinary intelligence and plain common sense is told that such belief is an illusion1 that in all such cases the connexion between the things1 facts or events which he designates as 8cause0 and 8effect10 is a mere connexion of invariable time sequence between antecedents and consequents1 that in no case is there evidence of any positive1 productive influence of the one fact upon the other1 he will either smile incredulously and decline to take his objector seriously1 or he will simply ask the latter to prove the universal belief to be an illusion4 ,his conviction of the real and objective validity of his notion of efficient cause1 as something which positively influences the happening of things1 is so profound and ineradicable that it must necessarily be grounded in1 and confirmed by1 his constant experience of the real world in which he lives and moves4 ,not that he professes to be able to explain the nature of this efficient influence in which he believes4 ,even if he were a philosopher he might not be able to satisfy himself or others on this point ,but being a plain man of ordinary intelligence he has sense enough to distinguish between the existence of a fact and its nature1 its explanation1 its quomodo2 and to believe in the real existence of a positive efficient1 productive influence of cause on effect1 however this influence is to be conceived or explained4 ,a second argument for the objective validity of the concept of efficient cause may be drawn from a consideration of the ,principle of ,causality4 ,the experience on which the plain man grounds his belief in the validity of his notion of cause is not mere uninterpreted sense experience in its raw and brute condition1 so to speak2 it is this sense experience rationalized1 assimilated into his intelligence--spontaneously and half unconsciously1 perhaps--by the light of the self-evident ,principle of ,causality1 that whatever happens has a cause4 ,when the plain man believes that all the various agencies in nature1 like those enumerated above1 are not merely temporal antecedents or concomitants of their effects1 but are really productive of those effects1 he is really applying the universal and necessary truth--that an 8event10 a 8happening10 a 8change10 a 8commencement0 of any new actual mode of being demands the existence of another actual being as cause--the truth embodied in the ,principle of ,causality1 to this1 that1 and the other event of his experience3 he is locating the 8causes0 of these events in the various persons and things which he regards as the agents or producers of these events4 ,in making such applications he may very possibly err in detail4 ,but no actual application of the principle at all is really required for establishing the objective validity of the concept of cause4 ,there are philosophers who--erroneously1 as we shall see--deny that the ,principle of ,causality finds its application in the domain of created things1 who hold1 in other words1 that no created beings can be efficient causes 7#ajb71 and who nevertheless recognize1 and quite rightly1 that the concept of efficient cause is an objectively valid concept4 ,and they do so because they see that since events1 beginnings1 happenings1 changes1 are real1 there must be really and objectively existent an efficient cause of them--whatever and wherever such efficient cause may be3 whether it be one or manifold1 finite or infinite1 etc4 ,we have already examined ,hume's attempt to deny the ontological necessity of the ,principle of ,causality and to substitute therefor a subjectively or psychologically necessary 8feeling of expectation0 grounded on habitual association of ideas4 ,kant1 on the other hand1 admits the self-evident1 necessary character of the ,principle2 but holds that1 since this necessity is engendered by the mind's imposing a subjective form of thought on the data of sense consciousness1 the principle is validly applicable only to connexions within the world of mental appearances1 and not at all to the world of real being4 ,he thus transfers the discussion to the domain of ,epistemology1 where in opposition to his theory of knowledge the ,principle of ,causality can be shown to be applicable to all contingent reality1 and to be therefore legitimately employed in ,natural ,theology for the purpose of establishing the real existence of an ,uncaused ,first ,cause4 #aja4 ,,origin ,,of ,,the ,,concept ,,of ,,efficient ,,cause4--,we have seen that universal belief in the real existence of efficient causes is grounded in experience4 ,the formation of the concept1 and its application or extension to the world within and around us1 are gradual47#dga7 ,active power1 force1 energy1 efficiency1 faculty1 or by whatever other name we may call it1 is of course experienced only in its actual exercise1 in action1 motion1 production of change4 ,our first experience of its exercise is found in our consciousness of our own personal activities1 mental and bodily3 in our thinking1 willing or choosing1 in our deliberate control of our mental processes1 and in the deliberate exercise of our sense faculties and bodily organs4 ,in all this we are conscious of exerting power1 force1 energy3 we apprehend ourselves as agents or efficient causes of our mental processes and bodily movements4 ,we apprehend these happenings as due to the exercise of our own power to produce them4 ,seeing other human beings behave like ourselves1 we infer by analogy that they also possess and exercise active powers like our own1 that they1 too1 are efficient causes4 ,finally1 observing that effects like to those produced by ourselves1 whether in ourselves or in the material world around us1 are also consequent on certain other changes in external nature1 whether organic or inorganic1 we infer by analogy that these corporeal things have also powers1 forces1 energies1 whereby they produce these effects4 ,while our senses testify only to time and space connexions between physical happenings in external nature1 our intellect apprehends action and interaction1 i4e4 causal dependence of events on the active influence or efficiency of physical things as agents or causes47#dgb7 ,thus1 our knowledge of the existence and nature of the forces1 powers and energies which constitute material things efficient causes is posterior to1 and derived by analogy from1 our knowledge of the mental and bodily powers which reveal themselves to us in our conscious vital processes as constituting our own personal efficient causality4 ,this conception of efficient causality even in the inanimate things of external nature1 after the analogy of our own vital powers as revealed in our conscious activities1 is sometimes disparaged as nave anthropomorphism4 ,it just depends on the manner and degree in which we press the analogy4 ,observing that our earlier notion of cause is 8the notion of power combined with a purpose and an end0 7thus including efficient and final causality71 ,newman remarks7#dgc7 that 8,accordingly1 wherever the world is young1 the movements and changes of physical nature have been and are spontaneously ascribed by its people to the presence and will of hidden agents1 who haunt every part of it1 the woods1 the mountains and the streams1 the air and the stars1 for good or for evil--just as children again1 by beating the ground after falling1 imply that what has bruised them has intelligence04 ,this is anthropomorphism4 ,so1 too1 would be the conception of the forces or powers of inanimate nature as powers of sub-conscious 8perception0 and 8appetition0 7,leibniz71 or1 again1 as rudimentary or diminished 8will-power0 7,cousin747#dgd7 8,physical phenomena1 as such1 are without sense10 as ,newman rightly observes2 and consequently we may not attribute to them any sort of conscious efficiency1 whether perceptive or appetitive4 ,but ,newman appears to err in the opposite direction when he adds that 8experience teaches us nothing about physical phenomena as causes047#dge7 ,the truth lies between these extremes4 ,taking experience in the wide sense in which it includes rational interpretation of1 and inference from1 the data of internal and external sense perception1 experience certainly reveals to us the existence of physical phenomena as efficient causes1 or in other words that there is real and efficient causality not only in our own persons but also in the external physical universe2 and as to the nature of this causality it also gives us at least some little reliable information4 ,by pursuing this latter question a little we shall be led to examine certain difficulties which lie at the root of ,occasionalism3 the error of denying that creatures1 or at least merely corporeal creatures1 can be in any true sense efficient causes4 ,a detailed inquiry into the nature of the active powers1 forces or energies of the inorganic universe1 i4e4 into the nature of corporeal efficient causality1 belongs to ,cosmology2 just as a similar inquiry into vital1 sentient and spiritual efficient causality belongs to ,psychology4 ,here we have only to ascertain what is common and essential to all efficient causality as such1 what in general is involved in the exercise of efficient causality1 in actio and passio1 and what are the main implications revealed in a study of it4 #ajb4 ,,analysis ,,of ,,efficient ,,causality1 ,,or ,actio ,,and ,passio3 7a7 ,,the ,,first ,,cause ,,and ,,created ,,causes4--,we have already referred to the universal dependence of all created causes on the ,first ,cause2 and we shall have occasion to return to it in connexion with ,occasionalism4 ,god has created all second causes2 ,he has given them their powers of action2 ,he conserves their being and their powers in existence2 ,he applies these powers or puts them in act2 ,he concurs with all their actions2 ,he is therefore the principal cause of all their effects2 and in relation to ,him they are as instrumental causes3 8,deus est causa actionis cujuslibet inquantum dat virtutem agendi1 et inquantum conservat eam1 et inquantum applicat actioni1 et inquantum ejus virtute omnis alia virtus agit407#dgf7 ,in our analysis of change 7#aj7 we saw why no finite1 created agent can be the adequate cause of the new actualities or perfections involved in change1 and how we are therefore obliged1 by a necessity of thought1 to infer the existence of a ,first ,cause1 an ,unchanging1 ,infinite ,source of these new actualities47#dgg7 ,the principle upon which the argument was based is this3 that the actuality of the effect is something over and above the reality which it had in the passive potentiality of its created material cause and in the active powers of its created efficient cause antecedently to its production3 that therefore the production of this actuality1 this novum esse1 implies the influence--by way of co-operation or concursus with the created efficient cause--of an ,actual ,being in whom the actuality of all effects is contained in an eminently perfect way4 ,even with the ,divine concursus a created cause cannot itself create1 because even with this concursus its efficiency attains only to the modifying or changing of pre-existing being3 and in creation there is no pre-existing being1 no material cause1 no real passive potentiality to be actuated4 ,but without this concursus not only can it not create2 it cannot even1 as an efficient cause1 actuate a real pre-existing potentiality4 ,and why8 ,because its efficiency cannot attain to the production of new actuality4 ,it determines the mode of this actuality1 and therein precisely lies the efficiency of the created cause4 ,but the positive entity or perfection of this new actuality can be produced only by the ,infinite1 ,changeless1 ,inexhaustible ,source of all actuality1 co-operating with the created cause7#dgh7 7#ajc74 ,but1 it might be objected1 perhaps created efficient causes are themselves the adequate and absolutely independent principles of the whole actuality of their effects8 ,they cannot be such2 and that for the simple reason that they are not always in act4 ,were they such they should be always and necessarily in act3 they should always and necessarily contain in themselves1 and that actually and in an eminently perfect manner1 all the perfections of all the effects which they gradually produce in the universe4 ,but experience shows us that created causes are not always acting1 that their active power1 their causality in actu primo is not to be identified with their action1 their causality in actu secundo2 and reason tells us that since this is so1 since action is something more than active power1 since a cause acting has more actuality than the same cause not acting1 it must have been determined or reduced to action by some actuality other than itself4 ,this surplus of actuality or perfection in an acting cause1 as compared with the same cause prior to its acting1 is the ,divine concursus4 ,in other words1 an active power which is really distinct from its action requires to be moved or reduced to its act 7which is actio7 no less than a passive potentiality required to be moved to its act 7which is passio71 by some really distinct actual being4 ,a created efficient cause1 therefore1 by passing from the state of rest1 or mere power to act1 into the state of action1 is perfected by having its active power actualized1 i4e4 by the ,divine concursus3 in this sense action is a perfection of the agent4 ,but it is not an entitative perfection of the latter's essence2 it is not a permanent or stable elevation or perfection of the latter's powers2 it is not the completion of any passive potentiality of the latter2 nor therefore is it properly speaking a change of the agent as such2 it is1 as we have said already1 rather an index of the latter's perfection in the scale of real being47#dgi7 ,action really perfects the patiens2 and only when this is identical in its concrete individuality with the agens is the latter permanently perfected by the action4 ,the action of created causes1 therefore1 depends on the action of the ,first ,cause4 ,we derive our notion of action from the former and apply it analogically to the latter4 ,if we compare them we shall find that1 notwithstanding many differences1 the notion of action in general involves a 8simple0 or 8unmixed0 perfection which can1 without anthropomorphism1 be applied analogically to the ,divine ,action4 ,the ,divine ,action is identical with the ,divine ,power and the ,divine ,essence4 ,in creatures essence1 power and action are really distinct4 ,the ,divine ,action1 when creative1 has not for its term a change in the strict sense 7#aj1 #aa71 for it produces being ex nihilo1 whereas the action of creatures cannot have for term the production of new being ex nihilo1 but only the change of pre-existing being4 ,the ,divine ,action1 whether in creating or conserving or concurring with creatures1 implies in ,god no real transition from power to act2 whereas the action of creatures does imply such transition in them4 ,such are the differences2 but with them there is this point of agreement3 the ,divine ,action implies in ,god an efficiency which has for its term the origin of new being dependently on this efficiency47#dhj7 ,so1 too1 does the action of creatures4 ,positive efficient influence on the one side1 and the origin1 production1 or 8fieri0 of new actual being on the other1 with a relation of real dependence on this efficiency3 such is the essential note of all efficient causality1 whether of ,god or of creatures47#dha7 #ajc4 7b7 ,,actio ,,immanens ,,and ,,actio ,,transiens4--,let us compare in the next place the perfectly immanent spiritual causality of thought1 the less perfectly immanent organic causality of living things1 and the transitive physical causality of the agencies of inorganic nature4 ,the term of an immanent action remains either within the very faculty which elicits it1 affecting this faculty as a habit3 thus acts of thought terminate in the intellectual habits called sciences1 acts of free choice in the habits of will called virtues or vices47#dhb7 ,or it remains at least within the agent3 as when in the vital process of nutrition the various parts and members of the living organism so interact as procure the growth and development of the living individual which is the cause of these functions47#dhc7 ,in those cases the agent itself is the patiens1 whereas every agency in the inorganic universe acts not upon itself1 but only on some other thing1 transitively4 ,but immanent action1 no less than transitive action1 is productive of real change--not1 of course1 in the physical sense in which this term is identified with 8motion0 and understood of corporeal change1 but in the metaphysical sense of an actuation of some passive potentiality 7#aj1 #aa747dhd7 ,what1 then1 do we find common to the immanent and the transitive causality of created causes8 ,an active power or influence on the side of the agent1 an actuation of this active power1 either by the action of other causes on this agent1 or by the fulfilment of all conditions requisite for the action of the agent1 and in all cases by the concursus of the ,first ,cause2 and1 on the side of the effect1 the production of some new actuality1 the actuation of some passive potentiality1 dependently on the cause now in action4 ,thus we see that in all cases action1 or the exercise of efficient causality1 implies that something which was not actual becomes actual1 that something which was not1 now is2 and that this becoming1 this actuation1 this production1 is really and essentially dependent on the influence1 the efficiency1 of some actual being or beings1 which we therefore call efficient causes4 #ajd4 ,,erroneous ,,theories ,,of ,,efficient ,,causality4 ,,imagination ,,and ,,thought4--,are we certain of anything more about the nature of this connecting link between efficient cause and effect1 which we call action8 ,speculations and theories there are indeed in abundance4 ,some of these can be shown to be false2 and thus our knowledge of the real nature of action may be at least negatively if not positively perfected4 ,our concept of action is derived1 like all our concepts1 from experience2 and although we are conscious of spiritual action in the exercise of intellect and will1 yet it is inseparably allied with sentient action and this again with organic and corporeal action4 ,nor can we conceive or describe spiritual action without the aid of imagination images1 or in language other than that borrowed from the domain of corporeal things1 which are the proper object of the human intellect47#dhe7 ,now in all this there is a danger3 the danger of mistaking imagination images for thoughts1 and of giving a literal sense to language in contexts where this language must be rightly understood to apply only analogically4 ,in analysing the nature of efficient causality we might be tempted to think that we understood it by imagining some sort of a flow or transference of some sort of actual reality from agens to patiens4 ,it is quite true that in describing action1 the actual connecting link between agens and patiens1 we have to use language suggestive of some such imagination image4 ,we have no option in the matter1 for all human language is based upon sense consciousness of physical phenomena4 ,when we describe efficiency as an 8influence0 of cause on effect1 or the effect as 8dependent0 on the cause1 the former term suggests a 8flowing10 just as the latter suggests a 8hanging04 ,so1 too1 when we speak of the effect as 8arising10 8originating10 8springing10 or 8emanating10 from the cause47#dhf7 ,but we have got to ask ourselves what such language means1 i4e41 what concepts it expresses1 and not what imagination images accompany the use of it4 ,now when we reflect that the senses testify only to time and space sequences and collocations of the phenomena which we regard as causally connected1 and when we feel convinced that there is something more than this in the causal connexion1--which something more we describe in the terms illustrated above1--we must inquire whether we have any rational ground for thinking that this something more is really anything in the nature of a spatial transference of some actual reality from agens to patiens4 ,there are indeed many philosophers and scientists who seem to believe that there is such a local transference of some actuality from cause to effect1 that efficient causality is explained by it1 and cannot be intelligibly explained otherwise4 ,as a matter of fact there is no rational ground for believing in any such transference1 and even were there such transference1 so far from its being the only intelligible explanation of efficient causality1 it would leave the whole problem entirely unexplained--and not merely the problem of spiritual1 immanent causality1 to which it is manifestly inapplicable1 but even the problem of corporeal1 transitive causality47#dhg7 ,we have already referred at some length 7#i-aa7 to the philosophy which has endeavoured to reduce all change1 or at least all corporeal change1 to mechanical change2 all qualities1 powers1 forces1 energies of the universe1 to ultimate particles or atoms of matter in motion2 and all efficient causality to a flow or transference of spatial motion from particle to particle or from body to body4 ,a full analysis of all such theories belongs to ,cosmology4 ,but we may recall a few of the more obvious considerations already urged against them4 ,in the first place1 the attempt to explain all qualities in the material universe--all the powers1 forces1 energies1 of matter--by maintaining that objectively and extramentally they are all purely quantitative realities1 all spatial motions of matter--does not explain the qualitative factors and distinctions in the world of our sense experience at all1 but simply transfers the problem of explaining them from the philosophy of matter to the philosophy of mind1 by making them all subjective after the manner of ,kant's analysis of experience 7#aa74 ,in the second place1 when we endeavour to conceive1 to apprehend intellectually1 how motion1 or indeed any other physical or real entity1 could actually pass or be transferred from agens to patiens1 whether these be spatially in contact or not1 we find such a supposition positively unintelligible4 ,motion is not a substance2 and if it is an accident it cannot migrate from subject to subject4 ,the idea that corporeal efficient causality--even mechanical causality--can be explained by such a transference of actual accidental modes of being from agens to patiens is based on a very crude and erroneous conception of what an accidental mode of being really is 7#fe74 ,the more we reflect on the nature of real change in the universe1 and of the efficient causality whereby it is realized1 the more convinced we must become that there can be no satisfactory explanation of these facts which does not recognize and take account of this great fundamental fact3 that contingent real being is not all actual1 that it is partly potential and partly actual2 that therefore our concepts of 8passive potentiality0 and 8active power0 are not mere subjective mental motions1 with at best a mere regulative or systematizing function 7after the manner of ,kant's philosophy71 but that they are really and objectively valid concepts--concepts which from the time of ,aristotle have given philosophers the only insight into the nature of efficient causality which is at any rate satisfactory and intelligible as far as it goes4 ,of this great fact the advocates of the mechanical theory of efficient causality have1 in the third place1 failed to take account4 ,and it is partly because with the revival of atomism at the dawn of modern philosophy this traditional ,aristotelian conception of contingent being as potential and actual was lost sight of 7#fd71 that such a crude and really unintelligible account of efficient causality1 as a 8flow of motion10 has been able to find such continued and widespread acceptance4 ,another reason of the prevalence of this tendency to 8explain0 all physical efficient causality as a propagation of spatial motions of matter is to be found in the sensist view of the human mind which confounds intellectual thought with mental imagery1 which countenances only picturable factors in its 8explanations10 and denounces as 8metaphysical10 8occult10 and 8unverifiable0 all explanatory principles such as forces1 powers1 potentialities1 etc41 which are not directly picturable in the imagination47#dhh7 ,and it is a curious fact that it is such philosophers themselves who are really guilty of the charge which they lay at the door of the traditional metaphysics3 the charge of offering explanations--of efficient causality1 for instance--which are really no explanations4 ,for while they put forward their theory of the 8flow of motion0 as a real explanation of the quomodo of efficient causality--and the ultimate and only explanation of it within reach of the human mind1 if we are to accept their view of the matter--the exponent of the traditional metaphysics more modestly confines himself to setting forth the inevitable implications of the fact of efficient causality1 and1 without purporting to offer any positive explanation of the real nature of action or efficient influence1 he is content to supplement his analysis negatively by pointing out the unintelligible and illusory character of their proffered 8explanations04 ,in the exact methods of the physical sciences1 their quantitative evaluation of all corporeal forces whether mechanical1 physical1 or chemical1 in terms of mechanical work1 which is measured by the motion of matter through space1 and in the great physical generalization known as the law of the equivalence of energies1 or of the equality of action and reaction1--we can detect yet further apparent reasons for the conception of efficient causality as a mere transference or interchange of actual physical and measurable entities among bodies4 ,it is an established fact not only that all corporeal agents gradually lose their energy or power of action by actually exercising this power1 but that this loss of energy is in direct proportion to the amount of energy gained by the recipients of their action2 and this fact would naturally suggest the mental picture of a transference of some actual measurable entity from cause to effect4 ,but it does not necessarily imply such transference--even if the latter were intelligible1 which1 as we have seen1 it is not4 ,the fact is quite intelligibly explained by the natural supposition that in proportion as the agens exhausts its active power by exercise the patiens gains in some form of actuality4 ,similarly1 the fact that all forms of corporeal energy can be measured in terms of mechanical energy does not at all imply that they all really are mechanical energy1 but only that natural agents can by the use of one form of energy produce another form in equivalent quantity4 ,and finally1 the law of the conservation of corporeal energy in the universe is explained by the law of the equality of action and reaction1 and without recourse to the unintelligible supposition that this sum-total of energy is one unchanging and unchangeable actuality4 ,there is just one other consideration which at first sight appears to favour the 8transference0 theory of causality1 but which on analysis shows how illusory the proffered explanation is1 and how unintelligible the simplest phenomenon of change must be to those who fail to grasp the profound significance of the principle that all real being which is subject to change must of necessity be partly potential and partly actual4 ,we allude to the general assumption of physical scientists that corporeal action of whatsoever kind takes place only on contact1 whether mediate or immediate1 between the bodies in question47#dhi7 ,now it is well to bear in mind that this is not a self-evident truth or principle1 but only an hypothesis1 a very legitimate hypothesis and one which works admirably1 but still only an hypothesis4 ,it implies the assumption that some sort of substance--called the universal ether--actually exists and fills all space1 serving as a medium for the action of gravitation1 light1 radiant heat1 electricity and magnetism1 between the earth and the other planets1 the sun and the stars4 ,this whole supposition is the only thinkable alternative to actio in distans4 ,if those bodies really act on one another--and the fact that they do is undeniable1--and if there were no such medium between them1 then the causal influence of one body should be able to produce an effect in another body spatially distant from1 and not physically connected by any material medium with1 the former4 ,hence two questions3 ,is this alternative1 actio in distans1 imaginable8 i4e4 can we form any positive imagination image of how this would take place8 ,and secondly3 ,is it thinkable1 conceivable1 intrinsically possible8 ,we need not hesitate to answer the former question in the negative4 ,but as to the latter question all we can say is that we have never met any cogent proof of the intrinsic impossibility of actio in distans4 ,the efficient action of a finite cause implies that it has active power and is conserved in existence with this power by the ,creator or ,first ,cause1 that this power is reduced to act by the ,divine concursus1 and that dependently on this cause so acting some change takes place1 some potentiality is actualized in some other finite being4 ,nothing more than this is involved in the general concept of efficient causality4 ,of course real influence on the one side1 and real dependence on the other1 imply some real connexion of cause with effect4 ,but is spatial connexion a necessary condition of real connexion8 ,is a physical1 phenomenal1 imaginable1 efflux of some entity out of the cause into the effect1 either immediately or through some medium as a channel1 a necessary condition for real influence8 ,there is nothing of the kind in spiritual causality2 and to demand anything of the kind for causality in general would be to make imagination1 not thought1 the test and measure of the real4 ,but perhaps spatial connexion is essential to the real connexion involved in this particular kind of causality1 corporeal causality8 ,perhaps4 ,but it has never been proved4 ,too little is known about the reality of space1 about the ultimate nature of material phenomena and their relation to our minds1 to justify anything like dogmatism on such an ultimate question4 ,it may well be that if we had a deeper insight into these things we could pronounce actio in distans to be absolutely incompatible with the essences of the things which do as a matter of fact constitute the actual corporeal universe4 ,but in the absence of such insight we cannot pronounce actio in distans to be intrinsically impossible4 ,physical scientists assume that as a matter of fact bodies do not act in distans4 ,granted the assumption to be correct1 it still remains an open question whether by a miracle they could act in distans1 i4e4 whether or not such action would be incompatible with their nature as finite corporeal causes4 ,owing to a very natural tendency to rest in imagination images we are inclined not only to pronounce as impossible any process the mode of which is not positively imaginable1 but also to think that we rightly understand a process once we have provided ourselves with an imagination image of it--when as a matter of fact this image may cover an entirely groundless conception or theory of the process4 ,hence the fairly prevalent idea that while actio in distans is impossible1 the interaction of bodies on contact is perfectly intelligible and presents no difficulties4 ,when a billiard ball in motion strikes another at rest it communicates some or all of its motion to the other1 and that is all3 nothing simpler6 ,and then all the physical1 chemical1 and substantial changes in the material universe are reducible to this common denominator6 ,the atomic philosophy1 with its two modest postulates of matter and motion1 is a delightfully simple philosophy2 but unfortunately for its philosophical prestige it does not explain causality or change4 ,nor can these facts be explained by any philosophy which ignores the most elementary implication of all real change3 the implication that changing reality involves real passive potentialities and real active powers or forces in the phenomena which constitute the changing reality of the universe4 #aje4 ,,the ,,subject ,,of ,,efficient ,,causality4 ,,occasionalism4--,we have established the objective validity of the concept of efficient causality and analysed its implications4 ,there have been philosophers who1 while admitting the objective validity of the concept1 have maintained that no creature1 or at least no corporeal creature1 can be an efficient cause4 ,efficient influence is1 in their view1 incompatible with the nature of a corporeal substance3 only spiritual substances can be efficient causes3 corporeal things1 conditions1 and happenings1 are all only the occasions on which spiritual substances act efficiently in and through all created nature4 ,hence the name of the theory3 ,occasionalism4 ,there are two forms of it3 the milder1 which admits that created spirits or minds are efficient causes2 and the more extreme view1 according to which no creature can be an efficient cause1 inasmuch as efficient causality is essentially a ,divine attribute1 a prerogative of the ,divinity4 ,this error was not unknown in the ,middle ,ages17#dij7 but it was in the seventeenth century that certain disciples of ,descartes1--,geulincx 7#afbe-affi7 and ,malebranche 7#afch-agae71--;expressly inferred it from the ,cartesian antithesis of matter and spirit and the ,cartesian doctrine that matter is essentially inert1 or inactive4 ,according to the gratuitous and unproven assertion laid down by ,geulincx as a principle3 ,quod nescis quomodo fiat1 id non facis1--we do not cause our own sensations or reasoning processes1 nor our own bodily movements1 inasmuch as we do not know how these take place2 nor can bodies cause them1 any more than our own created spirits1 inasmuch as bodies are essentially inactive4 ,according to ,malebranche the mind can perceive no necessary nexus between effects and any cause other than the ,divine ,will27#dia7 moreover reflection convinces us that efficient causality is something essentially ,divine and incommunicable to creatures27#dib7 and finally neither bodies can be causes1 for they are essentially inert1 nor our minds and wills1 for we do not know how a volition could move any organ or member of our bodies47#dic7 ,yet ,malebranche1 at the cost of inconsistency with his own principles1 safeguards free will in man by allowing an exclusively immanent efficiency to spiritual causes47#did7 ,such is the teaching of ,occasionalism4 ,our criticism of it will be brief47#die7 7#a7 ,against the doctrine that creatures generally are not1 and cannot be1 efficient causes1 we direct the first argument already outlined 7#ajj7 against ,phenomenism and ,positivism1--the argument from the universal belief of mankind1 based on the testimony of consciousness as rationally interpreted by human intelligence4 ,consciousness testifies not merely that processes of thought1 imagination1 sensation1 volition1 etc41 take place within our minds2 not merely that our bodily movements1 such as speaking1 walking1 writing1 occur2 but that we are the causes of them47#dif7 ,it is idle to say that we do not efficiently move our limbs because we may not be able to understand or explain fully 8how an unextended volition can move a material limb047#dig7 ,consciousness testifies to the fact that the volition does move the limb2 and that is enough47#dih7 ,the fact is one thing1 the quomodo of the fact is quite another thing4 ,nor is there any ground whatever for the assertion that a cause1 in order to produce an effect1 must understand how the exercise of its own efficiency brings that effect about4 ,moreover1 ,malebranche's concession of at least immanent activity to the will is at all events an admission that there is in the nature of the creature as such nothing incompatible with its being an efficient cause4 7#b7 ,although ,malebranche bases his philosophy mainly on deductive1 a priori reasonings from a consideration of the ,divine attributes1 his system is really derogatory to the perfection of the ,first ,cause1 and especially to the ,divine ,wisdom4 ,to say1 for instance1 that ,god created an organ so well adapted to discharge the function of seeing as the human eye1 and then to deny that the latter discharges this or any function1 is tantamount to accusing ,god of folly4 ,there is no reason in this system why any created thing or condition of things would be even the appropriate occasion of the ,first ,cause producing any definite effect4 ,everything would be an equally appropriate occasion1 or rather nothing would be in any intelligible sense an appropriate occasion1 for any exercise of the ,divine causality4 ,the admirable order of the universe--with its unity in variety1 its adaptation of means to ends1 its gradation of created perfections--is an intelligible manifestation of the ,divine perfections on the assumption that creatures efficiently co-operate with the ,first ,cause in realizing and maintaining this order4 ,but if they were all inert1 inoperative1 useless for this purpose1 what could be the raison d'tre of their diversified endowments and perfections8 ,so far from manifesting the wisdom1 power and goodness of ,god they would evidence an aimless and senseless prodigality4 7#c7 ,occasionalism imperils the distinction between creatures and a personal ,god4 ,although ,malebranche1 fervent catholic that he was1 protested against the pantheism of 8le misrable ,spinoza10 his own system contains the undeveloped germ of this pernicious error4 ,for1 if creatures are not efficient causes not only are their variety and multiplicity meaningless1 as contributing nothing towards the order of the universe1 but their very existence as distinct realities seems to have no raison d'tre4 ,malebranche emphasizes the truth that ,god does nothing useless3 ,dieu ne fait rien d'inutile4 ,very well4 ,if1 then1 a being does nothing1 what purpose is served by its existence8 ,of what use is it8 ,what is the measure of a creature's reality1 if not its action and its power of action8 ,so intimately in fact is this notion of causality bound up with the notion of the very reality of things that the concept of an absolutely inert1 inactive reality is scarcely intelligible4 ,it is almost an axiom in scholastic philosophy that every nature has its correlative activity1 every being its operation3 ,omne ens est propter suam operationem2 ,omnis natura ordinatur ad propriam operationem4 ,hence if what we call creatures had really no proper activity distinct from that of the ,first ,cause1 on what grounds could we suppose them to have a real and proper existence of their own distinct from the reality of the ,infinite ,being8 ,or who could question the lawfulness of the inference that they are not really creatures1 but only so many phases1 aspects1 manifestations of the one and sole existing reality8 ,which is ,pantheism4 7#d7 ,occasionalism leads to ,subjective ,idealism by destroying all ground for the objective validity of human science4 ,how do we know the real natures of things8 ,by reasoning from their activities in virtue of the principle1 ,operari sequitur esse47#dii7 ,but if things have no activities1 no operations1 such reasoning is illusory4 ,how1 for instance1 do we justify by rational demonstration1 in opposition to subjectivism1 the common-sense interpretation of the data of sense consciousness as revealing to us the real and extramental existence of a material universe8 ,by arguing1 in virtue of the principle of causality1 from our consciousness of our own passivity in external sense perception1 to the real existence of bodies outside our minds1 as excitants of our cognitive activity and partial causes of these conscious1 perceptive processes4 ,but if occasionalism were true such inference would be illusory1 and we should infer1 with ,berkeley1 that only ,god and minds exist1 but not any material universe4 ,malebranche admits the possible validity of this inference to immaterialism from his principles1 and grounds his own belief in the existence of an external material universe solely on faith in ,divine ,revelation47#ejj7 ,it only remains to answer certain difficulties urged by occasionalists against the possibility of attributing real efficiency to creatures4 7#a7 ,they argue that efficient causality is something essentially ,divine1 and therefore cannot be communicated to creatures4 ,we reply that while the absolutely independent causality of the ,first ,cause is essentially ,divine1 another kind or order of causality1 dependent on the former1 but none the less real1 can be and is communicated to creatures4 ,and just as the fact that creatures have real being1 real existence1 distinct from1 but dependent on1 the existence of the ,infinite ,being1 does not derogate from the supremacy of the latter1 so the fact that creatures have real efficient causality1 distinct from1 but dependent on1 the causality of the ,first ,cause1 does not derogate from the latter's supremacy4 7#b7 ,they urge that efficient causality is creative1 and therefore infinite and incommunicable4 ,we reply that there is a plain distinction between creative activity and the efficient activity we claim for creatures4 ,creation is the production of new being from nothingness4 ,god alone1 the ,infinite ,being1 can create2 and1 furthermore1 according to the common view of ,theistic philosophers a creature cannot even be an instrument of the ,first ,cause in this production of new being from nothingness4 ,and the main reason for this appears to be that the efficiency of the creature1 acting1 of course1 with the ,divine concursus1 necessarily presupposes some pre-existing being as material on which to operate1 and is confined to the change or determination of new forms or modes of this pre-existing reality4 ,such efficiency1 subordinate to the ,divine concursus and limited to such an order of effects1 is plainly distinct from creative activity4 7#c7 ,but the creature1 acting with the ,divine concursus1 either contributes something real and positive to the effect or contributes nothing4 ,the former alternative is inadmissible1 for ,god is the cause of everything real and positive3 omne novum ens est a ,deo4 ,and in the latter alternative1 which is the true one1 the concursus is superfluous2 ,god does all2 and creatures are not really efficient causes4 ,we reply that the former alternative1 not the latter1 is the true one4 ,but the former alternative does not imply that the creature produces any new reality independently of the ,first ,cause2 nor is it incompatible with the truth that ,god is the author and cause of all positive reality3 omne novum ens est a ,deo4 ,no doubt1 were we to conceive the co-operation of ,god and the creature after the manner of the co-operation of two partial causes of the same order1 producing by their joint efficiency some one total effect--like the co-operation of two horses drawing a cart1--it would follow that the creature's share of the joint effect would be independent of the ,divine concursus and attributable to the creature alone1 that the creature would produce some reality independently of the ,first ,cause4 ,but that is not the way in which the ,first ,cause concurs with created causes4 ,they are not partial causes of the same order4 ,each is a total cause in its own order4 ,they so co-operate that ,god1 besides having created and now conserving the second cause1 and moving the latter's power to act1 produces ,himself the whole effect directly and immediately by the efficiency of ,his concursus2 while at the same time the second cause1 thus reduced to act1 and acting with the concursus1 also directly and immediately produces the whole effect4 ,there is one effect1 one change in facto esse1 one change in fieri1 and therefore one action as considered in the subject changed1 since the action takes place in this latter3 actio fit in passo4 ,this change1 this action considered thus passively1 or 8in passo10 is the total term of each efficiency1 the ,divine and the created1 not partly of the one and partly of the other4 ,it is one and indivisible2 it is wholly due to1 and wholly attained by1 each efficiency2 not1 however1 under the same formal aspect4 ,we may distinguish in it two formalities3 it is a novum ens1 a new actuality1 something positive and actual superadded to the existing order of real1 contingent being2 but it is not 8being in general0 or 8actuality in general10 it is some specifically1 nay individually1 determinate mode of actuality or actual being4 ,we have seen that it is precisely because every real effect has the former aspect that it demands for its adequate explanation1 and as its only intelligible source1 the presence and influence of a purely actual1 unchanging1 infinite1 inexhaustible productive principle of all actual contingent reality3 hence the necessity and efficacy of the ,divine concursus4 ,and similarly it is because the new actuality involved in every change is an individually definite mode of actuality that we can detect in it the need for1 and the efficacy of1 the created cause3 the nature of this latter1 the character and scope and intensity of its active power is what determines the individuality of the total result1 to the total production of which it has by the aid of the ,divine concursus attained4 7#d7 ,but ,god can ,himself produce the total result under both formalities without any efficiency of the creature4 ,therefore the difficulty remains that the latter efficiency is superfluous and useless3 and entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem4 ,we reply that as a matter of fact the effects produced in the ordinary course of nature are produced by ,god under both formalities2 but also by the created cause under both formalities3 inasmuch as the formalities are but mentally distinct aspects of one real result which is1 as regards its extrinsic causes1 individual and indivisible4 ,the distinction of these formal aspects only helps us to realize how de facto such an effect is due to the cooperation of the ,first ,cause and created causes4 ,that ,god could produce all such effects without any created causes--we must distinguish4 ,some such effects ,he could not produce without created causes1 for such production would be self-contradictory4 ,he could not produce1 for instance1 a volition except as the act of a created will1 or a thought except as the act of a created intellect1 or a vital change except as the act of a living creature4 ,but apart from such cases which would involve an intrinsic impossibility1 ,god could of course produce1 without created agents1 the effects which ,he does produce through their created efficiency4 ,it is1 however1 not a question of what could be1 but of what actually is4 ,and we think that the arguments already set forth prove conclusively that creatures are not de facto the inert1 inactive1 aimless and unmeaning things they would be if ,occasionalism were the true interpretation of the universe of our actual experience2 but that these creatures are in a true sense efficient causes1 and that just as by their very co-existence with ,god1 as contingent beings1 they do not derogate from ,his ,infinite ,actuality but rather show forth ,his ,infinity1 so by their cooperation with ,him as subordinate and dependent efficient causes they do not derogate from ,his supremacy as ,first ,cause1 but rather show forth the infinite and inexhaustible riches of ,his ,wisdom and ,omnipotence4 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,final ,,causes2 ,,universal ,,order4 #ajf4 ,,two ,,conceptions ,,of ,,experience1 ,,the ,,mechanical ,,and ,,the ,,teleological4--,we have seen that all change in the universe demands for its explanation certain real principles1 viz4 passive potentiality1 actualization1 and active power or efficiency2 in other words that it points to material1 formal and efficient causes4 ,do these principles suffice to explain the course of nature to the inquiring mind8 ,mechanists say1 ,yes2 these principles explain it so far as it is capable of explanation4 ,teleologists say1 ,no2 these principles do not of themselves account for the universe of our experience3 this universe reveals itself as a cosmos3 hence it demands for its explanation real principles or causes of another sort1 final causes1 the existence of which implies purpose1 plan or design1 and therefore also intelligence4 ,the problem whether or not the universe manifests the existence and influence of final causes has been sometimes formulated in this striking fashion3 ,is it that birds have wings in order to fly1 or is it merely that they fly because they have wings8 ,such a graphic statement of the problem is misleading1 for it suggests that the alternatives are mutually exclusive1 that we must vote either for final causes or for efficient causes4 ,as a matter of fact we accept both4 ,efficient causes account for the course of nature2 but they need to be determined by the influence of final causes4 ,moreover1 the question how far this influence of final causes extends--finality 7finalitas71 as it is technically termed--is a secondary question2 nor does the advocate of final causality in the universe undertake to decide its nature and scope in every instance and detail1 any more than the physical scientist does to point out all the physical laws embodied in an individual natural event1 or the biologist to say whether a doubtful specimen of matter is organic or inorganic1 or whether a certain sort of living cell is animal or vegetable4 ,the teleologist's thesis1 as against that of mechanism1 is simply that there are final causes in the universe1 that the universe does really manifest the presence and influence of final causes47#eja7 ,there are two ways1 however1 of conceiving this influence as permeating the universe4 ,the conception of final causality in general is1 as we shall see1 the conception of acting for an end1 from a motive1 with a purpose1 plan or design for the attainment of something4 ,it implies arrangement1 ordination1 adaptation of means to ends 7#ee74 ,now at least there appears to be1 pervading the universe everywhere and directing its activities1 such an adaptation4 ,the admirable equilibrium of forces which secures the regular motions of the heavenly bodies2 the exact mixture of gases which makes our atmosphere suitable for organic life2 the distance and relative positions of the sun and the earth1 which secure conditions favourable to organic life2 the chemical transformations whereby inorganic elements and compounds go to form the living substance of plants and are thus prepared for assimilation as food by animal organisms2 the wonderfully graded hierarchy of living species in the animate world1 and the mutual interdependence of plants and animals2 the endless variety of instincts which secure the preservation and well-being of living individuals and species2 most notably the adaptability and adaptation of other mundane creatures to human uses by man himself1--innumerable facts such as these convince us that the things of the universe are useful to one another1 that they are constituted and disposed in relation to one another as if they had been deliberately chosen to suit one another1 to fit in harmoniously together in mutual co-ordination and subordination so that by their interaction and interdependence they work out a plan or design and subserve as means to definite ends4 ,this suitability of things relatively to one another1 this harmony of the nature and activity of each with the nature and activity of every other1 we may designate as extrinsic finality4 ,the ,creator has willed so to arrange and dispose all creatures in conditions of space and time that such harmonious but purely extrinsic relations of mutual adaptation do de facto obtain and continue to prevail between them under ,his guidance4 ,but are these creatures themselves1 in their own individual natures1 equally indifferent to any definite mode of action1 so that the orderly concurrence of their activities is due to an initial collocation and impulse divinely impressed upon them from without1 and not to any purposive principle intrinsic to themselves individually8 ,descartes1 ,leibniz and certain supporters of the theory of atomic dynamism regarding the constitution of matter1 while recognizing a relative and extrinsic finality in the universe in the sense explained1 seem to regard the individual agencies of the universe as mere efficient causes1 not of themselves endowed with any immanent1 intrinsic directive principle of their activities1 and so contributing by mere extrinsic arrangement to the order of the universe4 ,scholastic philosophers1 on the contrary1 following the thought of ,aristotle17#ejb7 consider that every agency in the universe is endowed with an intrinsic principle of finality which constantly directs its activities towards the realization of a perfection which is proper to it and which constitutes its intrinsic end 7#de-df74 ,and while each thus tends to its own proper perfection by the natural play of its activities1 each is so related to all others that they simultaneously realize the extrinsic purpose which consists in the order and harmony of the whole universe4 ,thus the extrinsic and relative finality whereby all conspire to constitute the universe a cosmos is secondary and posterior and subordinate to the deeper1 intrinsic1 immanent and absolute finality whereby each individual created nature moves by a tendency or law of its being towards the realization of a good which perfects it as its natural end4 ,in order to understand the nature of this intrinsic and extrinsic finality in the universe1 and to vindicate its existence against the philosophy of ,mechanism1 we must next analyse the concept1 and investigate the influence1 of what are called final causes4 #ajg4 ,,the ,,concept ,,of ,,final ,,cause2 ,,its ,,objective ,,validity ,,in ,,all ,,nature4 ,,classification ,,of ,,final ,,causes4--,when we speak of the end of the year1 or the end of a wall1 we mean the extreme limit or ultimate point2 and the term conveys no notion of a cause4 ,similarly1 were a person to say 8,i have got to the end of my work10 we should understand him to mean simply that he had finished it4 ,but when people act deliberately and as intelligent beings1 they usually act for some conscious purpose1 with some object in view1 for the achievement or attainment of something2 they continue to act until they have attained this object2 when they have attained it they cease to act2 its attainment synchronizes with the end of their action1 taking this term in the sense just illustrated4 ,probably this is the reason why the term end has been extended from its original sense to signify the object for the attainment of which an intelligent agent acts4 ,this object of conscious desire induces the agent to seek it2 and because it thus influences the agent to act it verifies the notion of a cause3 it is a final cause1 an end in the causal sense4 ,for instance1 a young man wishes to become a medical doctor3 the art of healing is the end he wishes to secure4 ,for this purpose he pursues a course of studies and passes certain examinations2 these acts whereby he qualifies himself by obtaining a certain fund of knowledge and skill are means to the end intended by him4 ,he need not desire these preparatory labours for their own sake2 but he does desire them as useful for his purpose1 as means to his end3 in so far as he wills them as means he wills them not for their own sake but because of the end1 propter finem4 ,he apprehends the end as a good2 he intends its attainment2 he elects or selects certain acts or lines of action as means suitable for this purpose4 ,an end or final cause1 therefore1 may be defined as something apprehended as a good1 and which1 because desired as such1 influences the will to choose some action or line of action judged necessary or useful for the attainment of this good4 ,hence ,aristotle's definition of end as 3 id cujus gratia aliquid fit3 that for the sake of which an agent acts4 ,the end understood in this sense is a motive of action2 not only would the action not take place without the agent's intending the end1 showing the latter to be a conditio sine qua non2 but1 more than this1 the end as a good1 apprehended and willed1 has a positive influence on the ultimate effect or issue1 so that it is really a cause4 ,man is conscious of this 8finality10 or influence of final causes on his own deliberate actions4 ,as an intelligent being he acts 8for ends10 and orders or regulates his actions as means to those ends2 so much so that when we see a man's acts1 his whole conduct1 utterly unrelated to rational ends1 wholly at variance and out of joint with the usual ends of intelligent human activity1 we take it as an indication of loss of reason1 insanity4 ,furthermore1 man is free2 he chooses the ends for which he acts2 he acts electiv propter fines4 ,but in the domain of animal life and activity is there any evidence of the influence of final causes8 ,most undoubtedly4 ,watch the movements of animals seeking their prey2 observe the wide domain of animal instincts2 study the elaborate and intricate lines of action whereby they protect and foster and preserve their lives1 and rear their young and propagate their species3 could there be clearer or more abundant evidence that in all this conduct they are influenced by objects which they apprehend and seek as sensible goods8 ,not that they can conceive in the abstract the ratio bonitatis in these things1 or freely choose them as good1 for they are incapable of abstract thought and consequent free choice2 but that these sensible objects1 apprehended by them in the concrete1 do really influence or move their sense appetites to desire and seek them2 and the influence of an object on sense appetite springs from the goodness of this object 7#dd1 #de74 ,they tend towards apprehended goods2 they act apprehensiv propter fines47#ejc7 ,finally1 even in the domains of unconscious agencies1 of plant life and inorganic nature1 we have evidence of the influence of final causes4 ,for here too we witness innumerable varied1 complex1 ever-renewed activities1 constantly issuing in results useful to1 and good for1 the agents which elicit them3 operations which contribute to the development and perfection of the natures of these agents 7#df74 ,now if similar effects demand similar causes how can we refuse to recognize even in these activities of physical nature the influence of final causes8 ,whenever and wherever we find a great and complex variety of active powers1 forces1 energies1 issuing invariably in effects which suit and develop and perfect the agents in question1--in a word1 which are good for these agents1--whether the latter be conscious or unconscious1 does not reason itself dictate to us that all such domains of action must be subject to the influence of final causes8 ,of course it would be mere unreflecting anthropomorphism to attribute to unconscious agencies a conscious subjection to the attracting and directing influence of such causes4 ,but the recognition of such influence in this domain implies no nave supposition of that sort4 ,it does1 however1 imply this very reasonable view3 that there must be some reason or ground in the nature or constitution of even an inanimate agent for its acting always in a uniform manner1 conducive to its own development and perfection2 that there must be in the nature of each and every one of the vast multitude of such agents which make up the whole physical universe a reason or ground for each co-operating constantly and harmoniously with all the others to secure and preserve that general order and regularity which enables us to pronounce the universe not a chaos but a cosmos4 ,now that ground or reason in things1 whereby they act in such a manner--not indifferently1 chaotically1 capriciously1 aimlessly1 unintelligibly1 but definitely1 regularly1 reliably1 purposively1 intelligibly--is a real principle of their natures1 impressing on their natures a definite tendency1 directive of their activities towards results which1 as being suited to these natures1 bear to these latter the relation of final causes4 ,a directive principle need not itself be conscious2 the inner directive principle of inanimate agents towards what is good for them1 what perfects them1 what is therefore in a true and real sense their end 7#de1 #df71 is not conscious4 ,but in virtue of it they act as if they were conscious1 nay intelligent1 i4e4 they act executiv propter fines4 ,of course the existence of this principle in inanimate agencies necessarily implies intelligence3 this indeed is our very contention against the whole philosophy of mechanism1 positivism and agnosticism4 ,but is this intelligence really identical with the agencies of nature1 so that all the phenomena of experience1 which constitute the cosmos or universe1 are but phases in the evolution of ,one ,sole ,reality which is continually manifesting itself under the distinct aspects of nature and mind8 ,or is this intelligence1 though virtually immanent in the universe1 really distinct from it--really transcendent1--a ,supreme ,intelligence which has created and continues to conserve this universe and govern all its activities8 ,this is a distinct question3 it is the question of ,monism or ,theism as an ultimate interpretation of human experience4 ,we conclude then that what we call finality1 or the influence of final causes1 pervades the whole universe2 that in the domain of conscious agents it is conscious1 instinctive when it solicits sense appetite1 voluntary when it solicits intelligent will2 that in the domain of unconscious agencies it is not conscious but 8natural0 or 8physical0 soliciting the 8nature0 or 8appetitus naturalis0 of these agencies4 ,before inquiring into the nature of final causality we may indicate briefly the main divisions of final causes3 some of these concern the domain of human activity and are of importance to ,ethics rather than to ,ontology4 7a7 ,we have already distinguished between intrinsic and extrinsic finality4 ,an intrinsic final cause is an end or object which perfects the nature itself of the agent which tends towards it3 nourishment1 for instance1 is an intrinsic end in relation to the living organism4 ,an extrinsic final cause is not one towards which the nature of the agent immediately tends1 but one which1 intended by some other agent1 is de facto realized by the tendency of the former towards its own intrinsic end4 ,thus1 the general order of the universe is an extrinsic end in relation to each individual agency in the universe3 it is an end intended by the ,creator and de facto realized by each individual agency acting in accordance with its own particular nature4 7b7 ,very similar to this is the familiar distinction between the finis operis and the finis operantis4 ,the former is the end necessarily and de facto realized by the act itself1 by its very nature1 independently of any other end the agent may have expressly intended to attain by means of it4 ,the latter is the end expressly intended by the agent1 and which may vary for one and the same kind of act4 ,for instance1 the finis operis of an act of almsgiving is the actual aiding of the mendicant2 the finis operantis may be charity1 or self-denial1 or vanity1 or whatever other motive influences the giver4 7c7 ,akin to those also is the distinction between an unconscious1 or physical1 or 8natural0 end1 and a conscious1 or mental1 or 8intentional0 end4 ,the former is that towards which the nature or 8appetitus naturalis0 of unconscious agencies tends2 the latter is an end apprehended by a conscious agent4 7d7 ,an end may be either ultimate or proximate or intermediate4 ,an ultimate end is one which is sought for its own sake1 as contrasted with an intermediate end which is willed rather as a means to the former1 and with a proximate end which is intended last and sought first as a means to realizing the others4 ,it should be noted that proximate and intermediate ends1 in so far as they are sought for the sake of some ulterior end1 are not ends at all but rather means2 only in so far as they present some good desirable for its own sake1 are they properly ends1 or final causes4 ,furthermore1 an ultimate end may be such absolutely or relatively3 absolutely if it cannot possibly be subordinated or referred to any ulterior or higher good2 relatively if1 though ultimate in a particular order as compared with means leading up to it1 it is nevertheless capable of being subordinated to a higher good1 though not actually referred to this latter by any explicit volition of the agent that seeks it4 7e7 ,we can regard the end for which an agent acts either objectively1--finis 8objectivus10--or formally1--finis 8formalis04 ,the former is the objective good itself which the agent wishes to realize1 possess or enjoy2 the latter is the act whereby the agent formally secures1 appropriates1 unites himself with1 this objective good4 ,thus1 ,god ,himself is the objective happiness 7beatitudo objectiva7 of man1 while man's actual possession of1 or union with1 ,god1 by knowledge and love1 is man's formal happiness 7beatitudo formalis74 7f7 ,we may distinguish also between the real end 7finis 8qui0 or 8cujus01 and the personal end 7finis 8cui074 ,the former is the good which the agent desires1 the good for the sake of which 8cujus0 gratia7 he acts4 ,the latter is the subject or person to whom he wishes this good1 or for whom he wishes to procure it4 ,thus1 a labourer may work to earn a sustenance for himself or also for his family4 ,the real and the personal end are never willed separately1 but always as one concrete good4 7g7 ,the distinction between a principal end and an accessory end 7motivum 8impulsivum07 is obvious4 ,the former can move to act of itself without the latter1 but the latter strengthens the influence of the former4 ,a really charitable person1 while efficaciously moved to give alms by sympathy with the poor1 may not be uninfluenced by vanity to let others know of his charity4 7h7 ,finally we may note the theological distinction between the natural end1 and the supernatural end1 of man as a rational and moral agent4 ,the former is the end due to man's nature1 the latter is an end which is gratuitous and undue to his nature4 ,god might not have created the world or man1 and in this sense even the natural end of man is a gratuitous gift of ,god2 but granted that ,god did decree to create the world and man1 an end corresponding to man's nature and powers was due to him3 the knowledge1 service and love of ,god as known to man by the light of natural reason4 ,but as a matter of fact ,god1 in ,his actual providence1 has decreed for man an incomparably higher and purely gratuitous end1 an end revealed to man by ,god ,himself1 an end entirely undue not only to man but to any and every possible creature3 the ,beatific ,vision of the ,divine ,essence for ever in heaven4 #ajh4 ,,causality ,,of ,,the ,,final ,,cause2 ,,relation ,,of ,,the ,,latter ,,to ,,efficient1 ,,formal1 ,,and ,,material ,,causes4--,we can best analyse the influence of the final cause by studying this influence as exerted on conscious and intelligent agents4 ,the final cause has a positive influence of some sort on the production1 happening1 actualization of effects4 ,what is the nature of this influence8 ,the final cause exerts its influence by being a good1 an apprehended good2 it exerts this influence on the appetite of the agent1 soliciting the latter to perform certain acts for the realization1 attainment1 possession1 or enjoyment of this good4 ,but it must not be conceived as the efficient cause of this movement of the appetite1 nor may its influence be conceived as action4 ,an efficient cause must actually exist in order to act2 but when the final cause1 as an apprehended good1 exerts its influence on the appetite it is not yet actual3 not until the agent1 by his action1 has realized the end and actually attained it1 does the end1 as a good1 actually exist4 ,we must distinguish between the end as attained and the end as intended1 between the finis in executione and the finis in intentione4 ,it is not the end as attained that is a final cause2 as attained it is an effect pure and simple4 ,it is the end as intended that is a final cause2 and as intended it does not yet actually exist3 hence its influence cannot be by way of action4 ,perhaps it is the idea or cognition of the intended end that exerts the peculiar influence of final cause8 ,no2 the idea or cognition of the end actually exists1 no doubt1 in the conscious agent1 but this is only a condition1 a conditio sine qua non1 for the apprehended good1 the final cause1 to exert its influence3 nil volitum nisi praecognitum4 ,it is not the cognition of the good1 however1 that moves the agent to act1 it is not the idea of the good that the agent desires or strives for1 but the good itself4 ,it is the good itself1 the known good1 that exerts the influence1 and this influence consists in the passive inclination or attraction or tendency of the appetite towards the good3 a tendency which necessarily results from the very presence of the good 7not really or physically of course1 but representatively1 mentally1 8intentionally10 by 8esse intentionale02 cf4 #d7 in the agent's consciousness1 and which is formally the actualization of the causal power or influence of the final cause4 8,just as the efficient cause influences by acting10 says ,st4 ,thomas17#ejd7 8so the final cause influences by being yearned for and desired04 ,looked at from the side of the agent that undergoes it1 this influence is a passive yielding3 this next becomes an active motion of appetite2 and in the case of free will a deliberate act of intending the end1 followed by acts of choosing means1 and finally by acts commanding the executive faculties to employ these means4 ,looked at from the side of the final cause1 the influence consists in an attraction of appetite towards union with itself as a good4 ,the matter cannot be analysed much further2 nor will imagination images help us here any more than in the case of efficient causality4 ,it must be noted1 however1 that the influence of the final cause is the influence not of a reality as actual1 or in its esse actuale1 but of a reality as present to a perceiving mind1 or in its esse intentionale4 ,at the same time it would be a mistake to infer from this that the influence of the final cause is not real4 ,it is sometimes described as 8intentional0 causality1 8causalitas intentionalis02 but this must not be taken to mean that it is not real3 for it is not the 8esse intentionale0 of the good1 i4e4 the cognition of the good1 its presence in the mind or consciousness of the agent1 that moves the latter's appetite3 it is the apprehended good1 apprehended as real1 as possible of actual attainment1 that moves the agent to act4 ,the influence may not be physical in the sense of being productive of1 or interchangeable with1 or measurable by1 corporeal energy1 or in terms of mechanical work2 nor is it2 but it is none the less real4 ,but if the influence of a final cause really reaches to the effect of the agent's actions only through the medium of the latter's appetite1 and therefore through a link of 8intentional0 causality1 does it not at once follow that the attribution of final causality to the domain of unconscious and inorganic activities1 can be at best merely metaphorical8 ,the attribution to such agencies of an 8appetitus naturalis0 is intelligible indeed as a striking and perhaps not unpoetic metaphor4 ,but to contend that it is anything more than a metaphor1 to claim seriously that inanimate agencies are swayed and influenced by 8ends10--is not this really to substitute mysticism and mystery for rational speculation and analysis8 ,mechanists are wont to dismiss the doctrine of final causes in the physical universe with offhand charges of this kind4 ,they are but too ready to attribute it to a mystical attitude of mind4 ,final causes1 they say1 are not discovered in inanimate nature by the cold1 calculating1 unemotional analysis to which reason submits its activities1 but are read into it by minds which allow themselves to be prompted by the imagination and emotions to personify and anthropomorphize inanimate agencies4 ,the accusation is as plausible as it is unjust4 ,it is plausible because the attribution of final causes to inanimate nature1 and of an 8appetitus naturalis0 to its agencies1 seems to imply the recognition of conscious1 mental1 8intentional0 influence in this domain4 ,but it really implies nothing of the sort2 and hence the injustice of the charge4 ,what it does imply is the existence of a genuine analogy between the nature and natural activities of physical agencies on the one hand and the appetite and appetitive activities of conscious agencies on the other4 ,the existence of this analogy is absolutely undeniable4 ,the orderly1 invariable and uniformly suitable character of physical activities1 simply forces our reason to recognize in physical agencies natures which tend towards their development1 and which by their activities attain to what is good for them1 to what perfects them4 ,in other words we have to recognize that each by its natural line of activity attains to results that are good and useful to it just as if it apprehended them as such and consciously tended towards them4 ,the analogy is there2 and the recognition of it1 so far from being a 8mystic0 interpretation of facts1 is an elementary logical exercise of our reasoning faculty4 ,the scholastics emphasized their recognition of the analogy by calling the nature of an unconscious agent1--the principle of its active tendencies towards the realization of its own perfection--an 8appetitus naturalis03 an expression into which no one familiar with scholastic terminology would venture to read any element of mysticism47#eje7 ,every separate agency in nature has a uniform mode of activity2 by following out this line of action each co-operates with all the others in maintaining the orderly course of nature4 ,these are facts which call for explanation4 ,they are not explained by the supposition of mechanists that these agencies are mere efficient causes3 efficient causality does not account for order1 it has got simply nothing to do with order or regularity4 ,consequently the last word of the mechanical philosophy on the fact of order in the universe is--,agnosticism4 ,in opposition to this attitude we are far from contending that there is no mystery1 or that all is clear either in regard to the fact of change or the fact of regularity4 ,just as we cannot explain everything in efficient causality1 so neither can we explain everything in final causality4 ,but we do contend that the element of order1 development1 evolution1 even in the physical universe1 can be partially explained by recognizing in its several agencies a nature1 a principle of development1 a passive inclination implanted in the very being of these agencies by the ,intelligent ,author of their being4 ,in conscious agencies this inclination or tendency to actions conformable or connatural to their being is not always in act2 it is aroused by conscious cognition1 perception1 or imagination of a good1 and operates intermittently4 ,in unconscious agencies it is congenital and constantly in act1 i4e4 as a tendency1 not as actually operative3 for its actual development due conditions of environment are required3 the seed will not grow without a suitable soil1 temperature1 moisture1 etc4 ,in conscious agencies the tendency1 considered entitatively or as a reality in them1 is an accidental form2 in unconscious agencies it is their forma substantialis1 the formative substantial principle1 which determines the specific type to which their nature belongs47#ejf7 ,in all agencies the inclination or appetite or tendency to action arises from a form2 an elicited appetite from an 8intentional0 form1 a natural appetite from a 8natural0 form3 ,omnis inclinatio seu appetitus consequitur formam2 appetitus elicitus formam intentionalem1 appetitus naturalis formam naturalem4 ,the scholastic view that final causality pervades all things is expressed in the aphorism1 ,omne agens agit propter finem3 ,every agency acts for an end4 ,from our analysis of final causality it will be seen that the 8end0 becomes a cause by exercising its influence on the agent or efficient cause1 and thus initiating the action of the latter4 ,we have seen already that material and formal causes exercise their causality dependently on the efficient cause of the change or effect produced by the latter4 ,we now see that the final cause1 the end as intended1 determines the action of the efficient cause2 hence its causality holds the primacy as compared with that of the other causes3 it is in this sense the cause of causes1 causa causarum47#ejg7 ,but while the end as intended is the starting point of the whole process1 the end as attained is the ultimate term of the latter4 ,hence the scholastic aphorism3 ,finis est primus in intentione et ultimus in executione4 ,and this is true where the process involves a series of acts attaining to means subordinate to an end3 this latter is the first thing intended and the last attained4 ,the final cause1 the end as intended1 is extrinsic to the effect4 ,it is intrinsic to the efficient cause4 ,it is a 8forma0 or determinative principle of the latter3 a forma intentionalis in conscious agents1 a forma naturalis in unconscious agents4 #aji4 ,,nature ,,and ,,the ,,laws ,,of ,,nature4 ,,character ,,and ,,grounds ,,of ,,their ,,necessity ,,and ,,universality4 ,,scientific ,,determinism ,,and ,,philosophic ,,fatalism4--,by the term nature we have seen that ,aristotle and the scholastics meant the essence or substance of an agent regarded as inner principle of the latter's normal activities1 as determining the bent or inclination of these1 and therefore as in a real sense their final cause4 ,hence ,aristotle's definition of nature as a certain principle or cause of the motion and rest of the thing in which that principle is rooted fundamentally and essentially and not merely accidentally47#ejh7 ,the scholastics1 recognizing that this intentio naturae1 this subjection to finality1 in unconscious agencies must be the work and the index of intelligence1 in other words that this analogical finality in inanimate things must connote a proper finality1 a properly purposive mode of action1 in the author of these things1 conceived this nature or intentio naturae as the impression of a divine art or plan upon the very being of all creatures by the ,creator ,himself4 ,hence ,st4 ,thomas's profound and well-known description of nature as 8the principle of a divine art impressed upon things1 in virtue of which they move towards determinate ends04 ,defining art as the just conception of external works to be accomplished17#eji7 he observes that nature is a sort of art3 8as if a ship-builder were to endow his materials with the power of moving and adapting themselves so as to form or construct a ship047#eaj7 ,and elsewhere he remarks that nature differs from art only in this that the former is an intrinsic1 the latter an extrinsic1 principle of the work which is accomplished through its influence3 so that if the art whereby a ship is constructed were intrinsic to the materials1 the ship would be constructed by nature as it actually is by art47#eaa7 ,such1 then1 is the teleological conception of the nature of each individual agency in the universe4 ,when we speak of 8universal nature10 8external nature10 8physical nature10 8the course of nature10 8the laws of nature10 etc4 we are using the term in a collective sense to signify the sum-total of all the agencies which constitute the whole physical universe2 and furthermore in all such contexts we usually understand by nature the world of corporeal things as distinct from the domain of mind or spirit4 ,the proof of this view1--that the agencies of the physical universe are not merely efficient causes1 but that they act under the influence of ends2 that they have definite lines of action which are natural to them1 and whereby they realize their own individual development and the maintenance of the universe as a cosmos2 that by doing so they reveal the influence of intelligent purpose1--the proof of this view lies1 as we have seen1 in the fact that their activities are regular1 uniform1 and mutually useful1 or1 in other words1 that they are productive of order 7#aaj74 ,bearing this in mind let us inquire into the various meanings discernible in the very familiar expressions1 8laws of nature10 8physical laws10 8natural laws047#eab7 ,we may understand firstly by a law of nature this innate tendency we have been describing as impressed upon the very being of all created things by the ,creator4 ,it is in this sense we speak of a thing acting 8naturally10 or 8according to the law of its nature10 or 8according to its nature10 when we see it acting according to what we conceive to be the end intended for it1 acting in a manner conducive to the development of its own individuality1 the preservation of its specific type or kind1 and the fulfilment of its rle in the general scheme of things4 ,what this 8natural0 mode of action is for this particular kind of thing1 we gather from our experience of the regular or normal activity of things of its kind4 ,thus1 we say it is a law of oxygen and hydrogen to combine in definite proportions1 under suitable conditions1 to form water2 a law of all particles of matter in the universe to tend to move towards one another with a definite acceleration2 a law of living organisms to reproduce their kind4 ,this usage comes nearest to the original meaning of the term law3 a precept or command imposed on intelligent agents by a superior4 ,for we conceive this natural tendency impressed on physical agencies by the ,creator after the analogy of a precept or command4 ,and we have good reason to do so3 because uniformity of conduct in intelligent agents is the normal result of their obedience to a law imposed upon them2 and we see in the activities of the physical universe an all-pervading feature of regularity4 ,secondly1 we transfer the term law to this result itself of the natural tendency of the being1 of the convergence of its activities towards its end4 ,that is to say1 we call the uniform mode of action of an agent a law of nature1 a natural or physical law4 ,this usage1 which is common in the positive sciences1 implies a less profound1 a more superficial1 but a perfectly legitimate mode of apprehending and studying the changes and phenomena of the physical universe4 ,thirdly1 since the several agencies of the universe co-exist in time and space1 since they constantly interact on one another1 since for the exercise of the natural activities of each certain extrinsic conditions of relationship with its environment must be fulfilled1 an accurate knowledge and exact formulation of these relations are obviously requisite for a scientific and practical insight into the mode of activity of any natural agency4 ,in fact the physical scientist may and does take for granted the natural tendency and the uniformity of action resulting therefrom1 and confines himself to discovering and formulating the relations between any given kind of action and the extrinsic conditions requisite for its exercise4 ,such1 for instance1 would be any chemical 8law0 setting forth the measure1 and the conditions of temperature1 pressure1 etc41 in which certain chemical elements combine to form a certain chemical compound4 ,to all such formulae scientists give the title of physical laws1 or laws of physical nature4 ,these formulae1 descriptive of the manner in which a phenomenon takes place1 setting forth with the greatest possible quantitative exactness the phenomenal factors7#eac7 that enter into and precede and accompany it1 are laws in a still more superficial and still less philosophical sense1 but a sense which is most commonly--and justly--accepted in the positive or physical sciences4 ,before examining the feature and characteristic of necessity and universality which enters into all these various conceptions of a 8physical law0 we have here to observe that it would make for clearness1 and for a better understanding between physics and metaphysics1 between science and philosophy1 between the investigator who seeks by observation and experiment for the proximate phenomenal conditions and 8physical0 causes of phenomena1 and the investigator who seeks for the ultimate real ground and explanation of these latter by speculative analysis of them1 and by reasoning from the scientist's discoveries about them1--if it were understood and agreed that investigation into the scope and significance and ultimate ground of this feature of stability in the laws of physical nature belongs to the philosopher rather than to the scientist4 ,we have already called attention to the fact that the propriety of such an obviously reasonable and intelligible division of labour is almost universally admitted in theory both by scientists and by philosophers2 though1 unfortunately1 it is not always remembered in practice 7#ajj74 ,in theory the scientist assumes1 and very properly assumes1 that the agencies with which he deals are not capricious1 unreliable1 irregular1 but stable1 reliable1 regular in their mode of action1 that in similar sets of conditions and circumstances they will act uniformly4 ,without inquiring into the ultimate grounds of this assumption he premises that all his conclusions1 all his inductive generalizations about the activity of these agencies1 will hold good of these latter just in so far as they do act according to his general postulate as to their regularity4 ,he then proceeds1 by the inductive processes of hypothesis and experimental verification1 to determine what agencies produce such or such an event1 under what conditions they bring this about1 what are all the phenomenal conditions1 positive and negative1 antecedent and concomitant1 in the absence of any one of which this event will not happen1 and in the presence of all of which it will happen4 ,these are1 in accordance with his assumption1 determining causes of the event2 the knowledge of them is from the speculative point of view extremely important1 and from the practical standpoint of invention and applied science extremely useful4 ,as a scientist he has no other knowledge in view3 he aims at discovering the 8how10 the quomodo1 of natural phenomena1--how1 for instance1 under what conditions and in what measure1 water is produced from oxygen and hydrogen4 ,when he has discovered all these positive and negative conditions his scientific knowledge of the formation of water is complete4 ,but there are other questions in regard to natural phenomena to which the experimental methods of the positive sciences can offer no reply4 ,they can tell us nothing about the wider 8how0 which resolves itself into a 8why40 ,they can give no information about the ultimate causes1 origins1 reasons1 or essences1 of those phenomena4 ,as ,pasteur and other equally illustrious scientists have proclaimed1 experimental science is essentially positive1 i4e4 confined to the proximate phenomenal conditions and causes of things2 it has nothing to say1 nor has it any need or any right to say anything1 about the ultimate nature1 or first origin1 or final destiny1 of the things and events of the universe4 ,yet such questions arise1 and clamour insistently for solution4 ,how is it1 or why is it1 that natural phenomena are uniformly linked to certain other phenomenal antecedents or 8physical0 causes8 ,is it absolutely impossible1 inconceivable1 that this sequence should be found not to obtain in even a single individual instance8 ,why should there be such uniform 8sequences0 or 8laws0 at all8 ,are there exceptions1 or can there be exceptions to these 8laws of physical nature08 ,what is the character and what are the grounds of the necessity of these laws8 ,every living organism comes from a living cell--not from any living cell1 but from some particular kind of living cell4 ,but why are there such kinds of cells8 ,why are there living cells at all8 ,whence their first origin8 ,again1 granted that there are different kinds or types of living cells1 why should a particular kind of cell give rise1 by division and evolution1 to an organism of the same kind or type as the parent organisms8 ,why does it not always do so8 ,why are what biologists describe as 8monsters0 in the organic kingdom possible8 ,and why1 since they are possible1 are they not as numerous as what are recognized as the normal types or kinds of living organisms8 ,now these are questions in regard to which not only every professing physical scientist and every professing metaphysician1 but every thinking man1 must take up some attitude or other4 ,a refusal to consider them1 on the plea that they are insoluble1 is just as definite an attitude as any other2 nor by assuming this attitude does any man1 even though he be a specialist in some department of the positive or physical sciences1 escape being a 8metaphysician0 or a 8philosopher10 however much he may deprecate such titles2 for he is taking up a reasoned attitude--we presume it is such1 and not the outcome of mere prejudice--on ultimate questions4 ,and this is philosophy2 this is metaphysics4 ,when1 therefore1 a physical scientist either avows or insinuates that because the methods of physical science1 which are suitable for the discovery of the proximate causes of phenomena1 can tell him nothing about ultimate questions concerning these phenomena1 therefore there is nothing to be known about these questions1 he is not only committing himself1 nolens volens1 to definite philosophical views1 but he is doing a serious disservice to physical science itself by misconceiving and mis-stating its rightful scope and limits4 ,he has just an equal right with any other man to utilize the established truths of physical science to help him in answering ultimate questions4 ,nay1 he may even use the unverified hypotheses and systematic conceptions7#ead7 of physical science for what they are worth in helping him to determine his general world-view4 ,but his competence as a specialist in physical science does not confer upon him any special qualification for estimating the value of these truths and hypotheses as evidence in the domain of ultimate problems4 ,nor can he1 because he is a scientist1 or even because he may go so far as to assert the right of speaking in the name of 8science10 claim for his particular interpretation the privilege of exemption from criticism2 and this is true no matter what his interpretation may be--whether it be agnosticism1 mechanism1 teleologism1 monism1 or theism4 ,these observations may appear elementary and obvious2 but the insinuation of positivism and phenomenism1 that whatever is not itself phenomenal and verifiable by the experimental methods of the physical sciences is in no wise knowable1 and the insinuation of mechanists that their world-view is the only one compatible with the truths of science and therefore the only 8scientific0 philosophy1 justify us in reiterating and emphasizing even such obvious methodological considerations4 ,bearing them in mind1 let us now examine the uniformity and necessity of the laws of physical nature4 ,understanding by natural law the natural inclination or tendency of the creature to a definite line of activity1 this law is of itself determining or necessitating4 ,moreover1 it is absolutely inseparable from the essence of the creature4 ,granted that the creature exists1 it has this tendency to exert and direct all its forces and energies in a definite1 normal way1 for the realization of its end4 ,this nisus naturae is never absent2 it is observable even where1 as in the generation of 8monsters0 by living organisms1 it partially fails to attain its end4 ,a law of nature1 taken in this sense1 is absolutely necessary to1 and inseparable from1 the created agent2 it admits of no exceptions2 no agent can exist without it2 for it is identical with the very being of the agent ,but the uniformity of action resulting from this natural tendency1 the uniform series of normal operations whereby it realizes its end1 is not absolutely necessary1 inviolable1 unexceptional4 ,in the first place the ,author of ,nature can1 for a higher or moral purpose1 prevent any created agency supernaturally1 miraculously1 from actually exercising its active powers in accordance with its nature for the prosecution of its natural end4 ,but apart altogether from this1 abstracting from all special interference of the ,first ,cause1 and confining our attention to the natural order itself1 we have to consider that for any physical agency to act in its natural or normal manner certain extrinsic conditions are always requisite3 oxygen and hydrogen1 for instance1 will combine to produce water1 but only under certain conditions of contact1 pressure1 temperature1 etc4 ,this general requirement arises from the fact already mentioned1 that physical agencies co-exist in time and space and are constantly interacting4 ,these extrinsic conditions are1 of course1 not expressly stated in the formulation of those uniformities and quantitative descriptions called 8laws of nature0 in the second and third interpretations of this expression as explained above4 ,it is taken as understood that the law applies only if and when and where all such conditions are verified4 ,the law1 therefore1 as stated categorically1 does not express an absolutely necessary1 universal1 and unexceptional truth4 ,it may admit of exceptions4 ,in the next place1 when we come to examine these exceptions to uniformity1 these failures or frustrations of the normal or natural activities of physical agencies1 we find it possible to distinguish roughly1 with ,aristotle1 between two groups of such 8uniformities0 or 8laws04 ,there are firstly those which1 so far as our experience goes1 seem to prevail always 771 unexceptionally2 and secondly1 those which seem to prevail generally1 for the most part 7 71 though not unexceptionally4 ,the former would be the outcome of active powers1 energies1 forces1 de facto present and prevalent always and everywhere in all physical agencies1 and of such a character that the conditions requisite for their actual operation would be always verified4 ,such1 for instance1 would be the force of gravity in all ponderable matter2 and hence the law of gravitation is regarded as all-pervading1 universal1 unexceptional4 ,but there are other natural or normal effects which are the outcome of powers1 forces1 energies1 not all-pervading1 but restricted to special groups of agencies1 dependent for their actual production on the presence of a great and complex variety of extrinsic conditions1 and liable therefore to be impeded by the interfering action of numerous other natural agencies4 ,such1 for instance1 would be the natural powers and processes whereby living organisms propagate their kind4 ,the law1 therefore1 which states it to be a uniformity of nature that living organisms reproduce offspring similar to themselves in kind1 is a general law1 admitting exceptions4 ,operations and effects which follow from the nature of their causes are called natural 7 1 747#eae7 ,some causes produce their natural effects always 7 71 others produce their natural effects usually1 as a general rule 7 747#eaf7 ,operations and effects which are produced by the interfering influence of extrinsic agencies 7 8violent10 as opposed to natural71 and not in accordance with the nature of their principal cause1 are called by ,aristotle accidental 7 1 72 and these1 he remarks1 people commonly describe as due to chance 7 747#eag7 ,all are familiar with events or happenings described as 8fortuitous10 8accidental10 8exceptional10 8unexpected10 with things happening by 8chance10 by 7good or bad7 8luck0 or 8fortune047#eah7 ,there are terms in all languages expressive of this experience--casus1 sors1 fortuna1 1 etc4 ,the notion underlying all of them is that of something occurring unintentionally1 praeter intentionem agentis4 ,whether chance effects result from the action of intelligent agents or from the operation of physical causes they are not 8intended10--by the deliberate purpose of the intelligent agent in the one case1 or by the natural tendency1 the intentio naturae1 of the mere physical agency in the other4 ,such an effect1 therefore1 has not a natural cause2 hence it is considered exceptional1 and is always more or less unexpected4 ,nature1 as ,aristotle rightly observes17#eai7 never produces a chance effect4 ,his meaning is1 that whenever such an effect occurs it is not brought about in accordance with the natural tendency of any physical agency4 ,it results from a collision or coincidence of two or more such agencies1 each acting according to its nature4 ,the hunter's act of firing at a wild fowl is an intentional act4 ,the boy's act of coming into the thicket to gather wild flowers is an intentional act4 ,the accidental shooting of the boy is the result of a coincidence of the two intentional acts4 ,similarly1 each of all the various agencies which bring about the development of an embryo in the maternal womb has its own immediate and particular natural effect1 and only mediately contributes to the general effect of bringing the embryo to maturity4 ,as a rule these particular effects are favourable to the general effect4 ,but sometimes the immediate ends do not subserve this ulterior purpose4 ,the result is accidental1 exceptional1 a deviation from the normal type1 an anomaly1 a 8monster0 in the domain of living organisms4 ,aristotle's analysis1 correct so far1 is incomplete4 ,it assigns no ultimate explanation of the fact that there are such encounters of individual natural tendencies in the universe1 such failures in the subordination of particular ends to wider ulterior ends4 ,as a matter of fact these chance effects1 although not 8intended0 by the natures of individual created agencies1 are not wholly and entirely unintended4 ,they are not wholly aimless4 ,they enter into the general plan and scheme of things as known and willed by the ,author of ,nature4 ,they are known to ,his ,intelligence1 and willed and ruled by ,his ,providence4 ,for ,him there can be no such thing as chance4 ,effects that are accidental in relation to created causes1 effects that run counter to the nature or intentio naturae of these1 are foreseen and willed by ,him and made to subserve that wider and more general end which is the universal order of the world that ,he has actually willed to create4 ,it is only in relation to the natures of individual agencies1 and to the limited horizon of our finite intelligences1 that such phenomena can present the aspect of fortuitous or chance occurrences4 ,before passing on to deal1 in our concluding section1 with the great fact of order1 let us briefly compare with the foregoing explanation of nature and its laws the attempt of mechanists to explain these without recognizing in the physical universe any influence of final causes1 or any indication of a purposive intelligence4 ,we have ventured to describe their attitude as philosophic fatalism47#ebj7 ,according to their view there is no ground for the distinction between phenomena that happen 8naturally0 and phenomena that happen 8accidentally0 or 8by chance04 ,all alike happen by the same kind of general necessity3 the generation of a 8monster0 is as 8natural0 as the generation of normal offspring2 the former1 when it occurs1 is just as inevitably the outcome of the physical forces at work in the particular case as the latter is the outcome of the particular set of efficient causes which do actually produce the normal result3 the only difference is that the former1 occurring less frequently and as the result of a rarer and less known conjunction of 8physical0 causes than the latter1 is not expected by us to occur1 and is consequently regarded1 when it does occur1 as exceptional4 ,now it is quite true that what we call 8chance0 effects1 or 8exceptional0 effects1 result just as inevitably from the set of forces operative in their case1 as normal effects result from the forces operative in theirs4 ,but this leaves for explanation something which the mechanist cannot explain4 ,he regards a physical law merely as a generalization1 beyond experience1 of some experienced uniformity2 and he holds that all our physical laws are provisional in the sense that a wider and deeper knowledge of the actual conditions of interaction among the physical forces of the universe would enable us to eliminate exceptions--which are all apparent1 not real--by restating our laws in such a comprehensive way as to include all such cases4 ,we may1 indeed1 admit that our physical laws are open to revision and restatement in this sense1 and are de facto often modified in this sense by the progress of science4 ,but the important point is this1 that the mechanist does not admit the existence1 in physical agencies1 of any law in the sense of a natural inclination towards an end1 or in any sense in which it would imply intelligence1 design1 or purpose4 ,on the contrary1 claiming as he does that all physical phenomena are reducible to mechanical motions of inert masses1 atoms1 or particles of matter in space1 he is obliged to regard all physical agencies as being1 so far as their nature is concerned1 wholly indifferent to any particular form of activity47#eba7 ,committed to the indefensible view that all qualitative change is reducible to quantitative 7#aa71 and all material differences to differences in the location of material particles and in the velocity and direction of the spatial motion impressed upon each by others extrinsic to itself1 he has left himself no factors wherewith to explain the actual order and course of the universe1 other than the purely indifferent factors of essentially or naturally homogeneous particles of inert matter endowed with local motion4 ,we emphasize this feature of indifference2 for the conception of an inert particle of matter subject to mechanical motion impressed upon it from without1 is the very type of an indifferent agency4 ,what such an entity will do1 whether or not it will move1 with what velocity and in what direction it will move--in a word1 its entire conduct1 its rle in the universe1 the sum-total of its functions--nothing of all this is dependent on itself2 everything depends on agencies extrinsic to it1 and on its extrinsic time-and-space relations to these agencies2 and these latter in turn are in the same condition as itself4 ,now is it conceivable that agencies of this kind1 of themselves absolutely indifferent to any particular kind of effect1 suitable or unsuitable1 regular or irregular1 orderly or disorderly1 could actually produce and maintain the existing order of the universe8 ,if they were themselves produced by an ,all-,wise and ,all-,powerful ,being1 and definitely arranged in spatial relations to one another1 and initial mechanical motion in definite directions and velocities impressed on the different parts of the system1 there is no denying that ,infinite ,wisdom and ,power could1 by ,divine concurrence even with such indifferent agencies1 realize and maintain a cosmos1 or orderly universe4 ,such purely extrinsic finality 7#ajf7 could1 absolutely speaking1 account for the existence of order1 uniformity1 regularity1 system2 though all the evidence furnished by the universe of our actual experience points to the existence of intrinsic finality also as understood by ,aristotle and the scholastics4 ,but the mechanist will not allow even extrinsic finality2 he will not recognize in the actual universe of our experience any evidence of a ,ruling ,intelligence realizing a plan or design for an intelligent purpose2 he denies the necessity of the inference from the data of human experience to the existence of a ,guiding ,intelligence4 ,and what are his alternatives8 ,he may choose one or other of two4 ,he may restate in the more scientific and imposing terminology of modern mechanics the crude conception of the ancient ,greek atomists3 that the actual order of the universe is the absolutely inevitable and fatal outcome of a certain collocation of the moving masses of the physical universe1 a collocation favourable to order1 a collocation which just happened to occur by some happy chance from the essentially aimless1 purposeless1 indifferent and chaotic motions of those material masses and particles4 ,we say 8chaotic10 for chaos is the absence of cosmos2 and order is the fact that has got to be explained4 ,in the concept of indifferent1 inert atoms of matter moving through space there is emphatically no principle of order27#ebb7 and hence the mechanist who will not admit the necessity of inferring an ,intelligence to give these moving masses or atoms the collocation favourable to order is forced to 8explain0 this supposed collocation by attributing it to pure chance--the concursus fortuitus atomorum of the ancient ,greeks4 ,when1 however1 we reflect that the more numerous these atoms and the more varied and complex their motions1 the smaller is the chance of a collocation favourable to order2 that the atoms and motions are supposed actually to surpass any assignable number2 that therefore the chance of any such favourable collocation occurring is indefinitely smaller than any measurable proportion1--we can draw our own conclusions about the value of such a speculation as a rational 8explanation0 of the existing cosmos4 ,and this apart altogether from the consideration that the fact to be explained is not merely the momentary occurrence of an orderly collocation1 but the maintenance of an orderly system of cosmic phenomena throughout the lapse of all time4 ,no orderly finite system of mechanical motions arranged by human skill can preserve its orderly motions indefinitely without intelligent human supervision3 the neglected machine will get out of order1 run down1 wear out1 if left to itself2 and we are asked to believe that the whole universe is one vast machine which not only goes on without intelligent supervision1 but which actually made itself by chance67#ebc7 ,naturally such an 8explanation0 of the universe does not commend itself to any man of serious thought1 whatever his difficulties may be against the argument from the fact of order in the universe to the existence of an ,intelligent ,designer4 ,add to this the consideration that the mechanist theory does not even claim to account for the first origin of the universe3 it postulates the existence of matter in motion4 ,in regard to this supreme problem of the first origin of the universe the attitude of the mechanist is avowedly agnostic2 and in view of what we have just remarked about the 8chance0 theory as an 8explanation0 of the existing order of the universe1 it is no matter for surprise that most mechanists reject this theory and embrace the agnostic attitude in regard to this latter problem also4 ,whether the agnostic attitude they assume be negative or positive1 i4e4 whether they are content to say that they themselves at least fail to find any satisfactory rational explanation of the origin and nature of the cosmos1 or contend further that no rational solution of these problems is within the reach of the human mind1 their teaching is refuted in ,natural ,theology1 where the theistic solution of these problems is set forth and vindicated4 #aaj4 ,,the ,,order ,,of ,,the ,,universe2 ,a ,,fact ,,and ,,its ,,implications4--,the considerations so far submitted in this chapter1 as pointing to the existence and influence of final causes in the universe1 will be strengthened and completed by a brief analysis of order and its implications4 ,we have seen already 7#ee7 that the apprehension of order in things implies the recognition of some unifying principle in what is manifold4 ,what1 in general1 is the nature of this principle8 ,it is the point of view1 the standpoint from which the unifying arrangement or disposition of the manifold is carried out2 in other words it is the end1 object1 or purpose1 of the orderly arrangement4 ,the arrangement1 and the order resulting from it1 will vary according to the end in view--whether1 for instance1 it be an arrangement of books in a library1 of pictures in a gallery1 of materials in an edifice1 of parts in a machine4 ,hence ,st4 ,thomas's definition of order as the due adaptation of means to ends3 recta ratio rerum ad finem4 ,when this adaptation is the work of human intelligence the order realized is artificial1 when it is the work of nature the order realized is natural4 ,art is an extrinsic principle of order1 nature implies indeed also an intelligent extrinsic principle of order1 but is itself an intrinsic principle of order3 the works of nature and those of art have this feature in common1 that they manifest adaptation of means to ends47#ebd7 ,the subordination of means to ends realizes an order which has for its unifying principle the influence of an end1 a final cause4 ,the group of dynamic relations thus revealed constitutes what is called teleological order1 the order of purpose or finality4 ,the realization or execution of such an order implies the simultaneous existence of co-ordinated parts or members in a system1 a realized whole with complex1 co-ordinated1 orderly parts1 the principle of unity in this system being the form of the whole4 ,this realized1 disposed1 or constituted order1 is called the esthetic order 7#ee71 the order of co-ordination1 composition1 constitution4 ,in ultimate analysis1 however1 these two orders1 the teleological and the esthetic1 having as respective unifying principles the final cause and the formal cause1 are not two really distinct orders1 but rather two aspects of one and the same order3 we have seen that in the things of nature the intrinsic end or final cause of each is identical with its forma substantialis or formal cause 7#ajh74 ,but the final cause is naturally prior to the formal cause1 and consequently the teleological order is more fundamental than the esthetic4 ,st4 ,augustine's definition of order as 8the arrangement of a multiplicity of things1 similar and dissimilar1 according its proper place to each107#ebe7 reveals the material cause of order in the multiplicity of varied elements1 the formal cause of order in the group of relations resulting from the arrangement or dispositio1 and the efficient cause of order in the agent that disposes or arranges them4 ,the final cause1 though not directly mentioned1 is implied in the fact that the place of each factor in the system is necessarily determined by the function it has to fulfil1 the part it is suited by its nature to play1 in contributing to the realization of the end or purpose of the arrangement4 ,if1 then1 order is the right arrangement or disposition of things according to their destination1 or in the mutual relations demanded by their ends1 it necessarily follows that the very existence of natural order in the universe implies that this universe is not a work of chance but a purposive work1 just as the existence of artificial order in products of human art implies that these products are not the result of chance but of activity influenced by final causes47#ebf7 ,it is in fact impossible to conceive order except as resulting from the influence of final causes4 ,right reason rejects as an utterly inadequate explanation of the natural order of the universe the fantastic and far-fetched supposition of a chance collocation of indifferent1 undetermined and aimless physical agencies47#ebg7 ,if we find in the actual physical universe difficulties against the view that this universe reveals the influence of final causes1 such difficulties do not arise from the fact that there is order in the universe1 but rather from the fact that with this order there seems to coexist some degree of disorder also4 ,in so far forth as there is natural order there is cogent evidence of the influence of final causes4 ,and so necessary is this inference that even one single authentic instance of natural order in an otherwise chaotic universe would oblige us to infer the existence and influence of a final cause to account for that solitary instance4 ,we mean by an authentic instance one which evidences a real and sustained uniformity1 regularity1 mutual co-ordination and subordination of factors in the behaviour of any group of natural agencies2 for we allow that transient momentary collocations and concurrences of indifferent agencies1 acting aimlessly and without purpose as a matter of fact1 might present to our minds1 accustomed to seek for orderly and purposive phenomena1 the deceptive appearance of order4 ,order1 then1 we take it1 necessarily implies the existence and influence of final causes4 ,this in turn1 as we have already observed1 implies with equal necessity the existence of ,intelligent ,purpose4 ,if1 then1 there is natural order in the universe1 there must exist an ,intelligent ,will to account for this natural order4 ,leaving the development of this line of argument to its proper place in ,natural ,theology1 there remains the simple question of fact3 ,is the physical universe a cosmos8 ,does it reveal order--a natural order distinct from the artificial order realized by the human mind in the mechanical and fine arts1 an order1 therefore1 realized not by the human mind but by some other mind1 by the ,divine ,mind8 ,the evidences of such order superabound4 ,we have already referred to some of them 7#ajf71 nor is there any need to labour the matter4 ,two points1 however1 in connexion with this universally recognized fact of order in the universe1 call for a brief mention before we conclude4 ,they are in the nature of difficulties against the ordinary1 reasonable view of the matter1 the view on which the theistic argument from order is based4 ,in accordance with the ,kantian theory of knowledge it is objected that the order which we apprehend1 or think we apprehend1 in the universe1 is not really in the universe of our experience1 but is as it were projected into this universe by our own minds in the very process of cognition itself4 ,it is therefore not real but only apparent1 not noumenal but only phenomenal4 ,it is simply a product of the categorizing1 unifying1 systematizing activity of our minds4 ,it is a feature of the phenomenon or mental product1 i4e4 of the noumenal datum as invested with a category of thought4 ,but whether or not it is a characteristic of the real universe itself man's speculative reason is by its very constitution essentially incapable of ever discovering4 ,the theory of knowledge on which this difficulty is based can be shown to be unsound and erroneous4 ,for a criticism of the theory we must refer the reader to scholastic works on ,epistemology4 ,it may be observed1 however1 apart from the merits or demerits of the theory1 that the experienced fact of order is by no means demolished or explained away by any questions that may be raised about the exact location of the fact1 if we may so express it4 ,order is a fact1 an undeniable1 experienced fact2 and it looms just as large1 and cries out just as insistently for explanation1 with whichever of the imposing adjectives 8noumenal0 or 8phenomenal0 a philosopher may choose to qualify it2 nor do we diminish its reality by calling it phenomenal one whit more than we increase that reality by calling it noumenal4 ,the other difficulty arises from the existence of disorder in the universe4 ,pessimists of the type of ,schopenhauer or ,nietzsche concentrate their attention so exclusively on the evidences of disorder1 the failures of adaptation of means to ends1 the defects and excesses1 the prodigality and penury1 the pain and suffering1 which abound in physical nature--not to speak of moral evil1--that they become blind to all evidences of order1 and proclaim all belief in order an illusion4 ,the picture of ,nature1 red in tooth and claw ,with ravine7#ebh7 is1 however1 the product of a morbid and distraught imagination rather than a sane view of the facts4 ,the undeniable existence of disorder1 of physical evils1 defects1 failures1 frustrations of natural tendency in the universe1 does not obscure or conceal from the normal1 unbiassed mind the equally undeniable evidences of a great and wide and generally prevailing order4 ,nor does it conceal from such a mind the fact that the existence of order in any measure or degree implies of necessity the existence of plan or design1 and therefore of intelligent purpose also4 ,inferring from this fact of order the existence of a ,supreme ,intelligence1 and inferring by other lines of reasoning from the data of experience the dependence of the universe on this ,intelligence as ,creator1 ,conserver and ,ruler1 the theist is confronted with the reality of moral and physical evil 7#eb71 i4e4 of disorder in the universe4 ,but he does not see in this disorder anything essentially incompatible with his established conclusion that the universe is a finite creation of ,infinite ,wisdom1 and a free manifestation of the latter to man4 ,if the actual universe is imperfect1 he knows that ,god created it freely and might have created a more perfect or a less perfect one4 ,knowing that ,god is ,all-,powerful as ,he is ,all-,wise1 he knows that the actual universe1 though imperfect absolutely1 is perfect relatively1 in that it infallibly reveals the ,divine ,wisdom and ,goodness exactly in the measure in which ,god has willed to reveal ,himself in ,his works4 ,conscious on the one hand that his finite mind cannot trace in detail all the purposes of ,god in nature1 or assign to all individual events their divinely appointed ends1 he is confident on the other hand that the whole universe is intelligible only as the working out of a ,divine plan1 and not otherwise4 ,to his mind as a theist these lines are a clearer expression of rationally grounded optimism than they were perhaps even to the poet who penned them3-- ,i trust in nature for the stable laws ,of beauty and utility4 ,spring shall plant ,and ,autumn garner to the end of time4 ,i trust in ,god--the right shall be the right ,and other than the wrong1 while ,he endures2 ,i trust in my own soul1 that can perceive ,the outward and the inward1 ,nature's good ,and ,god's47#ebi7 ,we have seen that the agencies which constitute the universal order have each its own inner principle of finality2 that these agencies are not isolated but mutually related in such ways that the ends of each subserve an extrinsic and remoter end which is none other than this universal order whereby we recognize the world as a cosmos4 ,the maintenance of this order is the intrinsic end of the universe as a whole3 an end which is immanent in the universe1 an end which is of course a good4 ,but this universal order itself is for an end1 an extrinsic1 transcendent end1 distinct from itself2 and this end1 too1 must be a good4 8,the universe10 says ,st4 ,thomas17#ecj7 8has the good of order and another distinct good40 ,the universal order1 says ,aristotle1 has itself an end1 a good1 which is one1 and to which all else is ordained3 8 047#eca7 ,what can this ,supreme ,good be1 this absolutely ,ultimate ,end1 this ,transcendent ,principle of all nature1 and of all nature's tendencies and activities8 ,whence comes this universal tendency of all nature1 if not from the ,being who is the ,one1 ,eternal1 ,immutable ,prime ,mover17#ecb7 and whose moving influence is ,love87#ecc7 ,such is the profound thought of ,aristotle1 a thought re-echoed so sublimely by the immortal poet of ,christian philosophy in the closing line of the ,paradiso3-- ,l'amor che muove il ,sole e l'altre stelle4 ,the immediate factors of the universal order of nature1 themselves devoid of intelligence1 must therefore be the work of ,intelligent ,will4 ,to arrange these factors as parts of one harmonious whole1 as members of one orderly system1 ,supreme ,wisdom must have conceived the plan and chosen the means to realize it4 ,the manifestation of ,god's glory by the realization of this plan1 such is the ultimate transcendent end of the whole created universe4 8,the whole order of the universe10 writes ,st4 ,thomas1 developing the thought of ,aristotle17#ecd7 8is for the ,prime ,mover thereof2 this order has for its purpose the working out in an orderly universe of the plan conceived and willed by the ,prime ,mover4 ,and hence the ,prime ,mover is the principle of this universal order40 ,the truths so briefly outlined in this closing chapter on the order and purpose of the universe have nowhere found more apt and lucid philosophical formulation than in the monumental writings of the ,angel of the ,christian ,schools2 nor perhaps have they ever elsewhere appeared in a more felicitous setting of poetic imagery than in these stanzas from the immortal epic of the ,poet of the ,christian ,schools3-- 444 ,le cose tutte quante ,hann' ordine tra lora2 e questa forma ,che l'universo a ,dio fa simigliante4 ,qui veggion l'alte creature l'orma ,dell'eterno ,valore1 il quale fine ,al quale fatta la toccata norma4 ,nell' ordine ch'io dico sono accline ,tutte nature per diverse sorti ,pi al ,principio loro e men vicine2 ,onde si muovono a diversi porti ,per lo gran mar dell'essere1 e ciascuna ,con instinto a lei dato che la porti4 ,questi ne porta il fuoco inver la ,luna3 ,questi ne' cuor mortali permotore2 ,questi la terra in se stringe ed aduna4 ,n pur le creature1 che son fuore ,d'intelligenza1 quest' arco saetta ,ma quelle ch' hanno intelletto ed amore4 ,la ,providenza1 che cotanto assetta1 ,del suo lume fa il ciel sempre quieto1 ,nel qual si volge quel ch'ha maggior fretta3 ,ed ora li1 com' a sito decreto1 ,cen porta la virt di quella corda1 ,che ci che scocca drizzo in segno lieto47#ece7 ,,index4 ,absolute1 the1 #dg sq42 and relative1 #ccb sqq4 ,accidents1 individuation of1 #acc sqq42 causes of1 #bce-f2 divisions of1 #bcg sqq42 existence and relation to substance1 #bcb sqq41 #bdj sqq41 #bdc1 #bdg n41 #bdi1 #cac4 ,actio et passio1 v4 causality1 causes4 ,actio intentionalis1 #cgh4 ,actio in distans1 #cie-f4 ,action1 immanent and transitive1 #gc1 #cfi1 #cia-b4 ,actual and potential1 #eb sqq4 and passim4 ,actuality1 goodness and perfection1 #agc sqq4 ,actus ,purus1 #ed1 #eh4 ,,aegidius1 #ajh n4 ,aeveternitas1 aevum1 #bcj4 ,agnosticism1 #if1 #ig1 #cce1 #chc1 #dji1 #dad1 #dbg4 ,,albertus ,,magnus1 #ajh n41 #bja n41 #bhh4 ,,alexander ,,of ,,hales1 #aaj n41 #aab n4 ,analogy1 analogical predication1 #cf sqq41 #abb n41 #bab1 #bdj1 #bgb1 #ccj2 a4 inference1 #chf-g1 #cia4 ,,andronicus ,,of ,,rhodes1 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,theology1 natural1 #ae1 #ai1 #ahb1 #ahi1 #bhe1 #ccd1 #dch1 #dcj4 ,,thomas1 ,,st41 on division of philosophy1 #i1 #ah1 #bf2 on analogy1 #cf2 on absolute being1 #di2 on action1 #fj1 #fd2 on essences1 #gf1 #gi1 #ib2 on existence and essences1 #ajb n41 #aaj n41 #aab n42 on unity1 #aaf n41 #aag n41 #aai n41 #abj n41 #aef n41 #bej2 on individuation1 #abg n42 on ontological truth1 #afb-c1 and falsity1 #afe n42 on the good1 #afi n41 #agd n41 #agf n41 #ahj n42 on evil1 #ahc n41 #ahd n42 on the beautiful1 #aic n41 #aid n41 #bjj n42 on ,aristotle's categories1 #baj1 #baa n42 on substance and accident1 #bji n41 #bbc n41 #bca n41 #bcb n41 #bcd n41 #bda n41 #bdc n41 #bdh2 on essence as nature1 #beh-fa2 on subsistence and personality1 #bfc n41 #bff n41 #bfi2 on quality1 #bhc1 #bij1 #bic2 on habits1 #bid-f2 on power and substance1 #cjj sqq42 on grades in quality1 #cjg-h2 on quantity and corporeal substance1 #caa sqq42 on body and spirit1 #cad-f2 on time1 #cbc-d2 on creatio ab aeterno1 #cbh2 on duration1 #ccj n42 on relations1 #cci-dj1 #cda n41 #cdb n41 #cdd n41 #cdg1 #cdh n41 #cea n41 #cec n41 #ced n41 #cee n41 #cef n42 on classification of causes1 #cfb n42 on material and formal causes1 #cfe n42 on action1 #cfg-h2 on instrumental cause1 #cge2 on created causes1 #chh n41 #chi n42 on occasionalism1 #djj n42 on final causality1 #djh n41 #dab n41 #dae n42 on nature and art1 #dag1 #dbh n42 on order1 #dbh1 #dcb n41 #dcc4 ,thought and imagery1 #cib-f4 ,time1 analysis of1 #cbb sqq42 problems on1 #cbh4 ,tradition1 #ca4 ,transcendental and generic notions1 #ce2 attributes of being1 #aad sqq42 relations1 #cde4 ,transubstantiation1 #bcc4 ,truth1 ontological1 #aeh sqq4 ,,turner1 #ba n4 ,ubi1 category of1 #cji1 #cai4 ,ubiquity1 ,divine1 #cai4 ,uniformity of ,nature1 #cgg2 and law1 #dah2 and inductive science1 #dai2 degrees of1 #dbb sqq4 ,union1 substantial and personal1 #bfh4 ,unity1 doctrine of1 #aad sqq41 #bdb-c2 8organic0 and 8mechanical10 #bdi-ea1 #bfj-a1 #bgh2 of living individual1 #bhj-a1 #cja-e2 conceptual1 #ccg4 ,universal and individual 7v4 individuation71 #beb-c4 ,univocal1 v4 analogical4 ,,urraburu1 #ce1 #hg n41 #hh n41 #ii n41 #abd n42 on modes1 #bde n42 on nature and person1 #bfg-h1 #bgj n41 #bhh n41 #cde n41 #cee n42 on instrumental causes1 #cgd n42 on cause1 #cic n4 ,vacuum1 and motion1 #cba4 ,,vallet1 #bja4 ,variety1 and beauty1 #bjj4 ,,vasquez1 #aaj n4 ,,veitch1 #ccd n4 ,vital change1 #fd-e4 -- acts1 #bdf n4 ,voluntarism1 #if-g4 ,weltanschauung1 ,world-view1 #d1 #bi1 #cj4 ,,william ,,of ,,ockam1 #ie4 ,,windelband1 #g1 #bjh n4 ,,wolff1 #ba1 #ih4 ,,wundt1 #bac1 #bbf1 #bfg n4 ,,zigliara1 #fd n41 #ajg n41 #aef n41 #cja n41 #cbj n41 #cih n4 ,,footnotes #a #b vols4 ,longmans1 #aiab4 #b ,institutions ,metaphysica1 quas ,roma1 in ,pontificia ,universitate ,gregoriana tradiderat ,p4 ,,joannes ,,josephus ,,urraburu1 ,s4,j4 ,volumen ,secundum3 ,ontologia 7,rome1 #ahia74 #c ,french version by ,,sierp1 #d vols4 ,paris1 ,gaume1 #ahfh4 #d ,ontologie1 ou ,mtaphysique ,gnrale1 par ,d4 ,,mercier4 ,louvain1 #cme dit41 #aijb4 #e 4--,,aristotle1 ,metaph41 ,i41 #a4 8,sapientia philosophia est scientia quae considerat primas et universales causas40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,in ,metaph41 ,i41 ,i4 #b4 #f ,cf4 ,,de ,,wulf1 ,scholasticism ,old and ,new1 pp4 #ei-fa1 #aia-d2 ,history of ,medieval ,philosophy1 pp4 #caa-ac2 also two articles in the ,irish ,ecclesiastical ,record 7,march and ,may1 #aijf7 on ,thoughts on ,philosophy and ,religion1 and an article in the ,irish ,theological ,quarterly 7,october1 #aiaj7 on ,philosophy and ,sectarianism in ,belfast ,university1 by the present writer4 #g ,cf4 ,encyclical ,aeterni ,patris1 on ,philosophical ,studies1 by ,pope ,leo ,,xiii41 ,august #d1ahhj4 #h ,introduction1 #a4 #i ,as a brief general statement of the matter this is sufficiently accurate and will not be misunderstood4 ,of course the general standpoint of ultimate causes and reasons admits within itself some variety of aspects4 ,thus ,epistemology and ,psychology deal with human thought1 but under different aspects2 ,psychology and ,ethics deal with human volition1 but under different aspects1 etc4 #aj 8,theoreticus sive speculativis intellectus1 in hoc proprie ab operativo sive practico distinguitur1 quod speculativus habet pro fine veritatem quam considerat1 practicus autem veritatem consideratam ordinat in operationem tamquam in finem2 et ideo differunt ab invicem fine2 finis speculativae est veritas1 finis operativae sive practicae actio40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,in lib4 ,boetii de ,trinitate4 #aa ,here is ,st4 ,thomas' exposition and justification of the doctrine in the text3 8,sapientis est ordinare4 ,cujus ratio est1 quia sapientia est potissima perfectio rationis1 cujus proprium est cognoscere ordinem4444 ,ordo autem quadrupliciter ad rationem comparatatur4 ,est enim quidam ordo quem ratio non facit1 sed solum considerat1 sicut est ordo rerum naturalium4 ,alius autem est ordo1 quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu1 puta cum ordinat conceptus suos ad invicem1 et signa conceptuum1 quae sunt voces significativae4 ,tertius autem est quem ratio considerando facit in operationibus voluntatis4 ,quartus autem est ordo quem ratio considerando facit in exterioribus rebus1 quarum ipsa est causa1 sicut in arca et domo4 ,et quia consideratio rationis per habitum perficitur1 secundum hos diversos ordines quos proprie ratio considerat1 sunt diversae scientiae4 ,nam ad philosophiam naturalem pertinet considerare ordinem rerum quem ratio humana considerat sed non facit2 ita quod sub naturali philosophia comprehendamus et metaphysicam4 ,ordo autem quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu1 pertinet ad rationalem philosophiam1 cujus est considerare ordinem partium orationis ad invicem et ordinem principiorum ad invicem et ad conclusiones4 ,ordo autem actionum voluntariarum pertinet ad considerationem moralis philosophiae4 ,ordo autem quem ratio considerando facit in rebus exterioribus constitutis per rationem humanam1 pertinet ad artes mechanicas40--,in ,x4 ,ethic4 ad ,nichom41 i41 lect4 #a4 #ab ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 i41 ,introduction1 ch4 ii4 and iii4 #ac ,,aristotle and the scholastics distinguished between the domain of the practical 71 1 agere1 agibilia7 and the operative or productive 71 1 facere1 factibilia74 #ad ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 i41 #h4 #ae 8,qudam igitur sunt speculabilium qu dependent a materia secundum esse1 quia non nisi in materia esse possunt1 et hc distinguuntur quia dependent qudam a materia secundum esse et intellectum1 sicut illa in quorum definitione ponitur materia sensibilis3 unde sine materia sensibili intelligi non possunt2 ut in definitione hominis oportet accipere carnem et ossa3 et de his est physica sive scientia naturalis4 ,qudam vero sunt qu1 quamvis dependeant a materia sensibili secundum esse1 non tamen secundum intellectum1 quia in eorum definitionibus non ponitur materia sensibilis1 ut linea et numerus3 et de his est mathematica4 ,qudam vero sunt speculabilia qu non dependent a materia secundum esse1 quia sine materia esse possunt3 sive nunquam sint in materia1 sicut ,deus et angelus1 sive in quibusdam sint in materia et in quibusdam non1 ut substantia1 qualitas1 potentia et actus1 unum et multa1 etc41 de quibus omnibus est theologia1 id est scientia divina1 quia prcipuum cognitorum in ea est ,deus4 ,alio nomine dicitur metaphysica1 id est1 transphysica1 quia post physicam dicenda occurrit nobis1 quibus ex sensibilibus competit in insensibilia devenire4 ,dicitur etiam philosophia prima1 in quantum scientiae ali ab ea principia sua accipientes eam sequuntur40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,in lib4 ,boetii de ,trinitate1 q4 #e1 a4 #a4 #af 4--,metaph4 ,,iii41 ,i 7ed4 ,didot74 #ag ,metaph4 ,x41 ch4 vii41 #e and #f4 #ah ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 ii41 #bea-e4 #ai ,when the term 8science0 is used nowadays in contradistinction to 8philosophy10 it usually signifies the knowledge embodied in what are called the special1 or positive1 or inductive sciences--a knowledge which ,aristotle would not regard as strictly or fully scientific4 #bj ,aristotle's conception of the close relation between ,physics 7or the ,philosophy of ,nature7 and those analytic studies which we nowadays describe as the physical sciences1 bears witness to the close alliance which he conceived to exist between sense observation on the one hand and rational speculation on the other4 ,this sane view of the continuity of human knowledge1 a view to which the ,schoolmen of the ,middle ,ages were ever faithful1 was supplanted at the dawn of modern philosophy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the opposite view1 which led to a divorce between physics and metaphysics1 and to a series of misunderstandings which still prevail with equal detriment to science and philosophy alike4 #ba ,cf4 ,,de ,,wulf1 ,history of ,medieval ,philosophy1 pp4 #bh-i1 #ff2 ,,mercier1 ,ontologie1 ,introd41 p4 v41 n4 #bb 8,dicitur metaphysica scientia id est1 transphysica1 quia post physicam dicenda occurrit nobis1 quibus ex sensibilibus competit in insensibilia devenire40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,in ,lib4 ,boetii de ,trinitate1 q4 #e1 a4 #a4 #bc ,this is also the title of the social and ethnological study of the various races of men1 their primitive habits1 customs1 institutions1 etc4 #bd ,not entirely2 for instance1 what is perhaps the most comprehensive course of philosophy published in recent times1 the ,philosophia ,lacensis 7#aa vols41 ,herder1 #ahhh-aijj7 apparently follows the arrangement of metaphysics outlined above4 ,the fundamental questions on knowing and being1 which usually constitute distinct departments under the respective titles of ,epistemology and ,ontology1 are here treated under the comprehensive title of ,institutiones ,logicales 7#c vols474 ,however1 they are really metaphysical problems1 problems of speculative philosophy1 wherever they be treated2 and the fact that the questions usually treated in ,ontology are here treated in a volume apart 7vol4 iii4 of the ,institutiones ,logicales3 under the peculiar title of ,logica ,realis71 and not in the volumes assigned to general metaphysics1 shows the necessity and convenience of the more modern arrangement4 ,general metaphysics are dealt with in #b vols4 of ,institutiones ,philosophiae ,naturalis and #c vols4 of ,institutiones ,psychologicae2 special metaphysics in the ,institutiones ,theodicae 7#a vol472 ethics in #b vols4 of ,institutiones ,juris ,naturae4 #be ,cf4 ,,turner1 ,history of ,philosophy1 p4 #ebe4 #bf ,,mercier1 ,logique1 ,introd41 #i4 #bg pp4 #de1 #ea4 #bh ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 i41 #ag4 #bi ,cf4 ibid4 i41 ,introd41 ch4 i4 #cj ,,cajetan1 ,in #b ,post ,anal41 ch4 xiii4 #ca ,cf4 ,,mercier1 ,ontologie1 #f-ac2 ,,ladd1 ,a ,theory of ,reality1 ch4 i4 #cb infra1 ch4 viii42 ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 ii41 ,part ,,iv41 ch4 iii4-vi42 ,part ,v41 ch4 i4 #cc p4 #ah--;in which context will be found a masterly analysis and criticism of current prejudices and objections against systematic metaphysics4 #cd ibid4 pp4 #ai-bj4 #ce ,,royce1 ,the ,conception of ,god1 p4 #bjg4 #cf ,,mercier1 ,logique1 ,introd41 #ad4 #cg ,encyclical1 ,aeterni ,patris1 on philosophical studies4 #ch ,summa ,theologica1 #a1 q4 #a1 a4 #h1 ad4 #b4 #ci ,cf4 ,,mercier1 ,origines de la psychologie contemporaine1 ch4 viii42 ,,de ,,wulf1 ,scholasticism ,old and ,new 7passim74 #dj ,cf4 ,,ladd1 op4 cit41 pp4 #i1 #aj4 #da ,,eucken1 ,gesammelte ,aufsaetze zur ,philosophie und ,lebensanschauung1 #aeg 7,leipzig1 #aijc74 #db ,cf4 art4 ,philosophy and the ,sciences at ,louvain1 in the ,irish ,ecclesiastical ,record1 ,may1 #aije1 reprinted as ,appendix in ,,de ,,wulf',s ,scholasticism ,old and ,new4 #dc ,hence the necessity of equipping the student of philosophy with a knowledge of the main conclusions and theories of the sciences that have an immediate bearing on philosophy3 chemistry1 physics1 geology1 astronomy1 mechanics1 the axioms and postulates of pure and applied mathematics1 cellular biology1 embryology1 the physiology of the nervous system1 botany and zoology1 political economy1 sociology and ethnology4 ,nowhere is the system of combining the scientific with the philosophical formation of mind more thoroughly carried out at the present time than in the curriculum of the ,philosophical ,institute at the ,university of ,louvain4 ,in the ,college of ,maynooth not only is the study of philosophy completed by a fuller course of ,christian ,theology1--both disciplines thus combining to give the student all the essential elements of a complete ,philosophy of ,life 7ii471--but it is preceded by an elementary training in the physical sciences and accompanied by courses on the history of scientific theories in chemistry1 physics1 physiology1 and general biology4 #dd 8,we may mention it in passing10 writes ,mercier in his general introduction to philosophy 7,logique1 #a1 p4 #f7--8;it was this feeling of individual impotence in face of the task confronting the philosopher at the present day1 that inspired the foundation of the ,philosophical ,institute at the ,university of ,louvain04 ,he had previously outlined the project in his ,rapport sur les tudes philosophiques at the ,congress of ,mechlin in #ahia4 ,here are a few brief extracts from that memorable document3 8,since individual effort feels itself well nigh powerless in the presence of the field of observation which goes on widening day by day1 association must make up for the insufficiency of the isolated worker2 men of analysis and men of synthesis must come together and form1 by their daily intercourse and united action1 an atmosphere suited to the harmonious development of science and philosophy alike44440 8,man has multiplied his power of vision2 he enters the world of the infinitely small2 he fixes his scrutinizing gaze upon regions where our most powerful telescopes discern no limits4 ,physics and ,chemistry progress with giant strides in the study of the properties of matter and of the combinations of its elements4 ,geology and ,astronomy reconstruct the history of the origin and formation of our planet4 ,biology and the natural sciences study the minute structure of living organisms1 their distribution in space and succession in time2 and ,embryology explores their origin4 ,the archological1 philological and social sciences reconstruct the past ages of our history and civilizations4 ,what an inexhaustible mine is here to exploit1 what regions to explore and materials to analyse and interpret2 finally what pioneers we must engage in the work if we are to have a share in garnering those treasures60 #de ,grammar of ,assent1 p4 #bbi4 #df ,lucerna pedibus meis verbum tuum1 et lumen semitis meis4--,ps4 cxviii41 #aje4 #dg ,,tennyson1 ,in ,memoriam4 #dh ,cf4 ,logic1 i41 #abc4 #di ,cf4 ,logic1 i41 pp4 #bjd-f4 #ej ,cf4 ,,scotus1 ,summa ,theologica1 edit4 by ,montefortino 7,rome1 #aijj71 i41 p4 #ajf1 ,ad tertium4 #ea ,cf4 ,logic1 i41 pp4 #aai-bj4 #eb ,cf4 ,,scotus1 op4 cit41 i41 pp4 #ajd1 #abi2 also ,,urraburu1 ,ontologia1 ,disp4 ,,iii41 ,cap4 ,,ii41 ,art4 ,,iii41 p4 #aee4 #ec ,hence ,st4 ,thomas calls the things about which a generic or specific concept is predicated 8analoga secundum esse et non secundum intentionem0 7,in #a ,sent41 ,dist4 xix41 q4 #e1 a4 #b1 ad a am73 we bring them under the same notion or 8intentio0 7e4g4 8living being071 but the content of this notion is realized in the various things 7e4g4 in ,socrates1 this horse1 that rose-tree1 etc47 in varying and unequal degrees of perfection4 ,hence1 too1 this univocal relation of the genus to its subordinate subjects is sometimes 7improperly7 called 8analogy of inequality04 #ed ,cf4 infra1 ch4 viii4 #ee ,cf4 ,,kleutgen1 ,philosophie der ,vorzeit1 #eii1 #fjj4 #ef ,this1 of course1 is the proper sort of analogical predication3 the predication based upon similarity of proportions or relations4 ,etymologically1 analogy means equality of proportions 7,cf4 ,logic1 ii41 p4 #afj74 ,on the whole subject the student may consult with profit ,cajetan's ,opusculum de ,nominum ,analogia1 published as an appendix to vol4 iv4 of ,st4 ,thomas' ,qustiones ,disputat in ,de ,maria's edition 7#ahhc74 #eg ,cf4 ,,kleutgen1 op4 cit41 #dj-db4 #eh ,cf4 ,,scotus1 op4 cit41 i41 pp4 #cah-bb1 #abe-aca1 #ajb-g 7especially p4 #abh1 ,ad tertium72 p4 #aca1 ,ad sextum2 p4 #cba1 ,ad tertium4 #ei ,,kleutgen1 op4 cit41 #eii4 #fj ibid41 #fjj4 #fa ,,suarez1 ,metaph41 ,dist4 xxviii41 #c2 ,dist4 xxxii41 #b4 #fb ,,scotus1 op4 cit41 i41 pp4 #ajf-g1 #abh-i4 #fc ibid41 p4 #ajg4 #fd ,cf4 ,,kleutgen1 ,la philosophie scolastique 78,die ,philosophie der ,vorzeit074 ,fr4 trans4 by ,sierp 7,paris1 #ahfh71 vol4 i41 p4 #ff1 #ce4 #fe ,the logical copula1 which expresses this relation and asserts the truth of the judgment1 expresses1 of course1 a logical entity1 an ens rationis4 ,true judgments may be stated about logical entities as well as about realities4 ,but since the former can be conceived only after the manner of the latter1 the appropriateness of using the verb which expresses existence or reality1 as the logical copula1 will be at once apparent4 ,cf4 ,logic1 i41 p4 #bdi1 n4 #a4 #ff ,,suarez1 ,metaph41 ,dist4 #ed1 i41 #f4 #fg ,cf4 ,logic1 i41 pp4 #bh-i4 #fh ,cf4 ,,kleutgen1 op4 cit41 #eea-b4 #fi ,cf4 ,logic1 i41 pp4 #gj-a4 #gj 8,esse actum quondam nominat3 non enim dicitur esse aliquid ex hoc1 quod est in potentia1 sed ex hoc1 quod est in actu40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,contra ,gent4 i41 c4 xxii41 #d4 #ga ,certain medieval philosophers had made the same mistake4 ,st4 ,thomas points out their error frequently4 ,cf4 ,contra ,gentes1 i41 c4 xxvi3 8,quia id1 quod commune est1 per additionem specificatur vel individuatur1 stimaverunt1 divinum esse1 cui nulla fit additio1 non esse aliquid proprium1 sed esse commune omnium3 non considerantes1 quod id1 quod commune est1 vel universale1 sine additione esse non potest1 sed sine additione consideratur4 ,non enim animal potest esse absque rationali vel irrationali differentia1 quamvis sine his differentiis consideretur2 licet enim cogitetur universale absque additione1 non tamen absque receptibilitate additionis est4 ,nam si animali nulla differentia addi posset1 genus non esset2 et similiter est de omnibus aliis nominibus4 ,divinum autem esse est absque additione1 non solum cogitatione1 sed etiam in rerum natura2 et non solum absque additione1 sed absque receptibilitate additionis4 ,unde ex hoc ipso quod additionem non recipit1 nec recipere potest1 magis concludi potest quod ,deus non sit esse commune1 sed esse proprium4 ,etenim ex hoc ipso suum esse ab omnibus aliis distinguitur1 quia nihil ei addi potest40 #gb ,cf4 ,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,,qq4 ,,dd4 ,de ,potentia1 q4 i4 art4 #a1 ad4 #ah4 #gc ,,aristotle1 ,metaph41 c4 iv41 v41 apud ,,kleutgen1 op4 cit41 iii41 p4 #fj4 #gd ,contra ,gentes1 ,,ii41 c4 vii4 #ge ,cf4 ,,laminne1 ,cause et ,effet--,revue neo-scolastique1 ,february1 #aiad1 p4 #ch4 #gf ,st4 ,thomas uses what is for him strong language when he describes such a view as ridiculous3 8,ridiculum est dicere quod ideo corpus non agat1 quia accidens non transit de subjecto in subjectum2 non enim hoc modo dicitur corpus calidum calefacere1 quod idem numero calor1 qui est in calefaciente corpore1 transeat ad corpus calefactum2 sed quia virtute caloris1 qui est in calefaciente corpore1 alius calor numero fit actu in corpore calefacto1 qui prior erat in eo in potentia4 ,agens enim naturale non est traducens propriam formam in alterum subjectum1 sed reducens subjectum quod patitur de potentia in actum40--,contra ,gentes1 ,l4 ,,iii41 c4 lxix4 #gg ,cf4 ,,zigliara1 ,ontologia 7#h71 ix41 ,quintum4 ,cf4 also ,,aristotle1 ,metaph4 v41 ,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,in ,metaph41 v41 #ad1 and ,contra ,gentes1 i41 c4 xvi41 where he emphasizes the truth that potential being presupposes actual being3 8,quamvis id quod quandoque est in potentia1 quandoque in actu1 prius sit tempore in potentia quam in actu1 tamen simpliciter actus est prior potentia2 quia potentia non educit se in actum1 sed opportet quod educatur in actum per aliquid quod sit in actu4 ,omne igitur quod est aliquo modo in potentia1 habet aliquid prius se04 #gh ,,klimke1 ,der ,monismus und seine philosophischen ,grundlagen1 p4 #ahe4 ,cf4 ,irish ,theological ,quarterly1 vol4 vii4 7,april1 #aiab71 p4 #aeg sqq41 art4 ,reflections on ,some ,forms of ,monism4 #gi ,for relations of potentia and actus1 cf4 ,,mercier1 ,ontologie1 #bad4 #hj ,cf4 ,physics1 v41 #a2 ,de ,anima1 i41 #c4 #ha 1 1 1 1 4--,metaph4 vi41 c4 iii4 #hb 8,decepit antiquos philosophos hanc rationem inducentes1 ignorantia formae substantialis4 ,non enim adhuc tantum profecerant ut intellectus eorum se elevaret ad aliquid quod est supra sensibilia3 et ideo illas formas tantum consideraverunt1 qu sunt sensibilia propria vel communia4 ,hujusmodi autem manifestum est esse accidentia1 ut album et nigrum1 magnum et parvum1 et hujusmodi4 ,forma autem substantialis non est sensibilis nisi per accidens1 et ideo ad ejus cognitionem non bervenerunt1 ut scirent ipsam materiam distinguere40--,in ,metaph4 vii41 #b4 #hc 8,esse actum quemdam nominat3 non enim dicitur esse aliquid1 ex hoc quod est in potentia1 sed ex hoc quod est in actu40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,contra ,gentes1 i41 ch4 xxii41 #d4 #hd ,the etymology of ,aristotle's description of the essence as is not easy to explain4 ,the expression supposes a dative understood1 e4g4 1 the being proper to man4 ,to the question 2 what is the being or essence proper to man8 the answer is3 that which gives the definition of man1 that which explains what he is-- 4 ,is the imperfect1 1 an archaic form for the present1 2 or is it a deliberate suggestion of the profound doctrine that the essence as ideal1 or possible1 is anterior to its actual1 physical realization8 ,commentators are not agreed4 ,cf4 ,,matthias ,,kappes1 ,aristoteles-,lexicon1 p4 #be 7,paderborn1 #ahid72 ,,mercier1 ,ontologie1 p4 #cj n4 #he ,essentia est illud per quod res constituitur in proprio genere vel specie1 et quod significamus per definitionem indicantem quid est res4--,de ,ente et ,essentia1 ch4 i4 #hf ,,aristotle1 ,metaph41 v41 #d2 ,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,de ,potentia ,dei1 q4 ix41 art4 #a4 #hg ,sometimes1 however1 the expression 8metaphysical essence0 is used to signify those objective concepts1 and those only1 without which the thing cannot be conceived1 7or sometimes1 even the one which is considered most fundamental among these71 and therefore as not explicitly involving the concepts of properties which follow necessarily from the former2 while the 8physical essence0 is understood to signify all those real elements without which the thing cannot actually exist1 including1 therefore1 all such necessary properties4 ,taken in this sense the physical essence of man would include not merely soul and body1 but also such properties as the capacity of speech1 of laughter1 of using tools1 of cooking food1 etc4 #hh ,et ex hoc patet ratio1 writes ,st4 ,thomas1 quare genus et species et differentia se habeant proportionaliter ad materiam1 formam et compositum in natura1 quamvis non sint idem cum illis2 quia neque genus est materia1 sed sumitur a materia ut significans totum2 nec differentia est forma1 sed sumitur a forma ut significans totum4 ,unde dicimus hominem esse animal rationale1 et non ex animali et rationali2 sicut dicimus eum esse ex corpore et anima4 ,ex corpore enim et anima dicitur esse homo1 sicut ex duabus rebus qudam tertia res constituta1 qu neutra illarum est3 homo enim nec est anima neque corpus2 sed si homo aliquo modo ex animali et rationali dicatur esse1 non erit sicut res tertia ex duabus rebus sed sicut intellectus conceptus tertius ex duobus intellectibus4 ,intellectus enim animalis est sine determinatione formae specialis naturam exprimens rei1 ex eo quod est materiale respectu ultimae perfectionis4 ,intellectus autem hujus differentiae1 rationalis1 consistit in determinatione formae specialis3 ex quibus duobus intellectibus constituitur intellectus speciei vel definitionis4 ,et ideo sicut res constituta ex aliquibus non recipit prdicationem earum rerum ex quibus constituitur2 ita nec intellectus recipit prdicationem eorum intellectuum ex quibus constituitur2 non enim dicimus1 quod definitio sit genus vel differentia4--,de ,ente et ,essentia1 cap4 iii4 #hi ,cf4 ,,mercier1 ,psychologie1 vol4 ii41 #afi 7#fth edit41 #aijc1 pp4 #bd-e74 #ij ,cf4 ,,aristotle1 ,metaph41 ,l4 viii41 #aj2 ,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,in viii41 ,metaph41 ,lect4 iii41 par4 i4 #ia ,cf4 ,,mercier1 ,ontologie1 pp4 #db-c4 ,how do we know that not only water 7,h#b,o7 is a possible essence but also hydrogen di-oxide 7,h#b,o#b78 ,because the latter substance has been actually formed by chemists 7,cf4 ,,roscoe1 ,elementary ,chemistry1 ,lesson ,,vi474 ,is hydrogen tri-oxyde 7,h#b,o#c7 a possible substance8 ,we may ask chemists1--and they may not be able to tell us with any certainty whether it is or not4 #ib ,the actual existence of a thinking mind is of course a necessary condition1 in the actual order1 for the apprehension of objects in this abstract way4 ,but such existence is no part of the apprehended object4 ,that the human mind1 which is itself finite1 contingent1 allied with matter1 and dependent on the activity of corporeal sense organs for the objects of its knowledge1 should nevertheless have the power to apprehend contingent realities apart from their contingent actual existence in time and space1--is a fact of the greatest significance as regards the nature of the mind itself4 ,but if we try to prove the existence of ,god from a consideration of the nature and powers of the human mind1 our argument proceeds from the actual1 and is distinct from any argument based exclusively on the nature and properties of possible essences as such4 ,st4 ,augustine's argument assumes as a fact that the human mind represents to itself possible essences as having reality independently both of its own thought and of any actual existence of such essences 7,cf4 ,,de ,,munnynck1 ,praelectiones de ,dei ,existentia1 p4 #bc74 ,but is this a fact8 ,this is the really debatable point4 #ic ,among others ,henry of ,,ghent 7 #abic2 ,cf4 ,,de ,,wulf1 ,history of ,medieval ,philosophy1 pp4 #cfd-f2 ,,kleutgen1 ,philosophie der ,vorzeit1 ,dissert1 vi41 cap4 ii41 #b #eha-e71 ,capreolus 7#achj-addd71 certain ,scotists1 and certain theosophists of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries1 are credited with this peculiar view4 ,for numerous references1 ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 ,ontologia1 ,disp4 iii41 cap4 ii41 art4 v4 pp4 #fej-fc4 #id ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 pp4 #feb-c1 for references2 among others1 to ,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,de ,potentia1 q4 #c1 art4 #a1 ad #bum2 art4 #g1 ad #ajum2 art4 #e1 argum4 #bo2 ibid41 ad #bum4 ,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 #ad1 art4 #i2 q4 #de1 art4 #a2 ibid4 1 art4 #b1 ad #bum2 q4 #fa1 art4 #b1 corp4 #ie ,among others1 ,,balmes 7,fundamental ,philosophy1 bk4 iv41 ch4 xxvi471 ,,lepidi 7,ontologia1 quoted by ,,de ,,munynck1 ,praelectiones de ,dei ,existentia1 ,louvain1 #aijd1 p4 #ai72 ,,de ,,munynck 7ibid41 pp4 #ai-bc1 #df-g1 #ge72 ,,hickey 7,theologia ,naturalis1 pp4 #ca-d72 ,,driscoll 7,god1 pp4 #gb sqq472 ,,lacordaire 7,god1 p4 #ba72 ,,kleutgen1 ,philosophie der ,vorzeit1 ,dissert4 iv41 #dgf4 #if ,truth is not the work of any human intelligence1 says ,st4 ,augustine1 nor can any one arrogate to himself the right to say 8my truth10 or 8thy truth10 but all must say simply 8the truth03 8,quapropter1 nullo modo negaveris esse incommutabilem veritatem1 haec omnia1 quae incommutabiliter vera sunt1 continentem1 quam non possis dicere vel tuam vel meam1 vel cujuscumque hominis1 sed omnibus incommutabilia vera cernentibus1 tamquam miris modis secretum et publicum lumen1 praesto esse ac se praebere communiter3 omne autem quod communiter omnibus ratiocinantibus atque intelligentibus praesto est1 ad ullius eorum proprie naturam pertinere quis dixerit80--,de ,libero ,arbitrio1 lib4 ii41 ch4 xii4 ,cf4 his striking expression of the same thought in his ,commentary1 ,super ,genesim ad ,litteram1 lib4 ii41 cap4 vii43 8,we may conceive the heavens and the earth1 that were created in six days1 ceasing to exist2 but can we conceive the number #8six' ceasing to be the sum of six units803 8,facilius coelum et terra transire possunt1 quae secundum numerum senarium fabricata sunt1 quam effici possit ut senarius numerus suis partibus non compleatur0 7apud ,,mercier1 ,ontologie1 pp4 #ce-f74 #ig ,cf4 ,,balmes 7,fundamental ,philosophy1 bk4 iv41 ch4 xxvi471 who1 analysing the truth of the proposition 8,two circles of equal diameters are equal10 as an example of the necessary1 eternal1 immutable characteristics of possible essences1 goes so far as to write 7italics ours73 8,what would happen1 if1 withdrawing all bodies1 all sensible representations1 and even all intelligences1 we should imagine absolute and universal nothing8 ,we see the truth of the proposition even on this supposition3 for it is impossible for us to hold it to be false4 ,on every supposition1 our understanding sees a connection which it cannot destroy3 the condition once established1 the result will infallibly follow4 8,an absolutely necessary connection1 founded neither on us1 nor on the external world1 which exists before anything we can imagine1 and subsists after we have annihilated all by an effort of our understanding1 must be based upon something1 it cannot have nothing for its origin3 to say this would be to assert a necessary fact without a sufficient reason4 8,it is true that in the proposition now before us nothing real is affirmed1 but if we reflect carefully we find even here the greatest difficulty for those who deny a real foundation to pure possibility4 ,what is remarkable in this phenomenon1 is precisely this1 that our understanding feels itself forced to give its assent to a proposition which affirms an absolutely necessary connection without any relation to an existing object4 ,it is conceivable that an intelligence affected by other beings may know their nature and relations2 but it is not so easy of comprehension how it can discover their nature and relations in an absolutely necessary manner1 when it abstracts all existence1 when the ground upon which the eyes of the understanding are fixed1 is the abyss of nothing4 8,we deceive ourselves when we imagine it possible to abstract all existence4 ,even when we suppose our mind to have lost sight of every thing1 a very easy supposition1 granting that we find in our consciousness the contingency of our being1 the understanding still perceives a possible order1 and imagines it to be all occupied with pure possibility1 independent of a being upon which it is based4 ,we repeat1 that this is an illusion1 which disappears so soon as we reflect upon it4 ,in pure nothing1 nothing is possible2 there are no relations1 no connections of any kind2 in nothing there are no combinations1 it is a ground upon which nothing can be pictured4 8,the objectivity of our ideas and the perception of necessary relations in a possible order1 reveal a communication of our understanding with a being on which is founded all possibility4 ,this possibility can be explained on no supposition except that which makes the communication consist in the action of ,god giving to our mind faculties perceptive of the necessary relation of certain ideas1 based upon necessary being1 and representative of ,his infinite essence40 ,balmes1 therefore1 does not mean that we could continue to see essences as possible were we to imagine withdrawn not merely finite minds but even the ,divine ,mind4 ,in such an absurd hypothesis1 nothing would appear true or false1 possible or impossible4 ,but he contends that even when we try to think away all minds1 even the ,divine ,mind1 we still see possible essences to be possible4 ,and from this he argues that1 since we have successfully thought away finite minds and the actuality of essences1 while the possibility of these latter still persists1 these must be grounded in the ,mind of ,god1 the ,actual1 ,eternal1 ,necessary ,being1 where they have eternal ideal being4 ,cf4 ,,de ,,munnynck 7op4 cit41 pp4 #bb-c73 8,ponamus mundum non esse1 nec supponamus ,dei existentiam4 ,in nihilo illo1 omne ens actuale excludens1 remanet intacta--hoc certissime scimus ex objectivo valore intellectus nostri--realitas aeterna1 immutabilis1 ordinis idealis4 ,illa realitas essentiarum1 he adds 7ibid41 n4 #b71 independens ab omni actuali existentia1 atque ab omni actu intellectus1 est fundamentum metaphysicum realismi platonici4--,habet praeterea mirum hoc systema1 ut omnes sciunt1 fundamentum criteriologicum4 ,essentiae sunt1 nec tamen existunt4 ,illa realitas1 praeter mundum totum1 praeter entia rationis1 indestructibilis perseverat1 nec tamen actualis est4 ,haec quomodo intelligi possit nescimus1 nisi ponatur illam fundari in plenitudine aeterna1 infinita1 absoluta ,esse absoluti4 ,hoc ente supremo posito1 omnia lucidissima se praebent intellectui2 illo ,deo optimo--quem non possumus1 perspectis illis altissimis1 non adorare--sublato1 admittendae sunt essentiae rerum ab aeterno reales sine actuali existentia2 atque proinde quid non-individuale est reale in se1 quod tamen concipi non potest nisi objective in mente40 #ih ,cf4 ,,st4 ,,augustine1 ,de ,libero ,arbitrio1 lib4 ii41 ch4 viii4 #ii ,cf4 especially ,,mercier1 ,ontologie1 pp4 #dj-di4 #ajj ,it is1 for example1 just as necessarily and immutably true of any actually existing man that he cannot be at the same time existing and not existing as it is that a man cannot be an irrational animal4 #aja 8,unde1 etiamsi intellectus humanus non esset1 adhuc res dicerentur verae in ordine ad intellectum divinum4 ,sed si uterque intellectus1 quod est impossibile1 intelligeretur auferri1 nullo modo ratio veritatis remaneret40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,de ,veritate1 q4 i41 art4 ii4 #ajb ,phdo1 #ajj1 ,c4 ff4 #ajc ,,mercier1 ,ontologie1 pp4 #de-g4 #ajd ,cf4 ,,de ,,munnynck1 op4 cit41 pp4 #bd-e4 #aje ,cf4 ,,de ,,munnynck1 op4 cit41 pp4 #bd-e4 #ajf ibid41 pp4 #bb1 #bd4 #ajg 8,qu objecta non divina esse1 luce clarius apparet4 ,attamen ilia ponderando1 modumque inspiciendo quo representantur a mente humana1 atque praesupponendo valorem objectivum intellectus1 concludimus ex ideis ad realitates illas qu in ,esse divino fundantur 444 ratione horum objectorum scil4 idearum nostrarum percipimus1 ope ratiocinii1 illa positive aeterna et immutabilia1 qu reapse in ,deitate fundantur1 atque sunt ipse ,deus quatenus imitabilis40--ibid41 pp4 #bd-e4 ,cf4 extract quoted above1 p4 #ia n4 #ajh 8,non ideo voluit ,deus mundum creare in tempore1 quia vidit melius sic fore1 quam si creasset ab terno2 nec voluit tres angulos trianguli quales esse duobus rectis1 quia cognovit aliter fieri non posse4 ,sed contra1 quia voluit creare mundum in tempore1 ideo sic melius est1 quam si creatus fuisset ab terno1 et quia voluit tres angulos trianguli necessario quales esse duobus rectis1 idcirco jam verum est1 et aliter fieri non potest1 atque ita de reliquis40--,,descartes1 in ,resp4 ad ,sext4 ,objectiones1 ad #fum scrupulum4 #aji ,,mercier1 op4 cit41 pp4 #eh-fj4 #aaj ,,urraburu 7op4 cit4 ,disp4 iii41 cap4 ii41 iii41 p4 #fga7 mentions ,wolff1 ,leibniz1 ,genuensis and ,storchenau as holding this view4 #aaa ,among others1 ,liberatore1 ,lahousse1 ,pesch1 ,harper4 ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 ibid4 #aab ,dupasquier1 ,mastrius and ,rada1 apud ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 ibid41 pp4 #fgi-ha4 #aac ,urraburu1 ,schiffini1 ,mendive4 ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 ibid41 p4 #fga4 #aad #a ,cor4 xiii4 #ab4 #aae 8,ex hoc ipso quod quidditati esse attribuitur1 non solum esse1 sed ipsa quidditas creari dicitur3 quia antequam esse habeat1 nihil est1 nisi forte in intellectu creantis1 ubi non est creatura1 sed creatrix essentia40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,de ,potentia1 q4 iii41 art4 v41 ad #b um4 #aaf 8,ipsum esse competit primo agenti secundum propriam naturam3 esse enim ,dei est ejus substantia1 ut ostensum est 7,c4 ,g41 ,lib4 i41 c4 #bb74 ,quod autem competit alicui secundum naturam suam1 non convenit aliis nisi per modum participationis1 sicut calor aliis corporibus ab igne i4e4 as caused or produced in them4 ,cf4 ,kleutgen1 op4 cit41 ,dissert41 i41 c4 iii41 #fa4 ,ipsum igitur esse competit aliis omnibus a primo agente per participationem quamdam4 ,quod autem alicui competit per participationem1 non est substantia ejus4 ,impossibile est igitur quod substantia alterius entis praeter agens primum sit ipsum esse4 ,hinc est quod ,exod4 iii41 proprium nomen ,dei ponitur esse qui est1 quia ejus solius proprium est1 quod sua substantia non sit aliud quam suum esse40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,contra ,gentes1 ,l4 ii41 cap4 #eb1 n4 #g4 8,quod inest alicui ab agente1 oportet esse actum ejus2 agentis enim est facere aliquid actu4 ,ostensum est autem supra1 quod omnes aliae substanti habent esse a primo agente1 et per hoc ips substanti creat sunt1 quod esse ab alio habent4 ,ipsum igitur esse inest substantiis creatis ut quidam actus earum4 ,id autem1 cui actus inest1 potentia est3 nam actus in quantum hujusmodi ad potentiam refertur4 ,in qualibet igitur substantia creata est potentia et actus40--ibid41 cap4 #ec1 n4 #b4 8,omne quod recipit aliquid ab alio1 est in potentia respectu illius3 et hoc quod receptum est in eo1 est actus ejus2 ergo oportet1 quod ipsa forma vel quidditas1 qu est intelligentia i4e4 a pure spirit1 sit in potentia respectu esse1 quod a ,deo recipit1 et illud esse receptum est per modum actus1 et ita invenitur actus et potentia in intelligentiis i4e4 pure spirits1 non tamen forma et materia nisi aequivoce40--,de ,ente et ,essentia1 cap4 v4 ,cf4 also ,summa ,theol41 ,p4 i41 q4 iii41 art4 #d2 q4 xiii41 art4 #aa2 q4 lxxv41 art4 #e1 ad #d um4 ,quodlibeta1 ii41 art4 #c2 ix41 art4 #f4 ,de ,potentia1 q4 vii41 art4 #b4 ,in ,metaph41 iii41 ,dist4 vi41 q4 #b1 art4 #b4 ,contra ,gentes1 ,l4 ii41 cap4 #ed1 #fh4 ,st4 ,thomas is usually interpreted as teaching that the distinction between essence and existence in created things is a real distinction4 ,but there are some who have been unable to convince themselves that the ,angelic ,doctor has made his mind entirely clear on the subject4 ,kleutgen1 for instance1 writes 7op4 cit41 ,dissert4 vi41 c4 ii41 #egd1 n4 #b73 8,in the extracts quoted above ,st4 ,thomas clearly states that the distinction made by our thought is based on the nature of created things1 but not that this distinction is that which exists between different parts1 dependent on one another1 each having its own proper being or reality40 #aag ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 #bdi1 #eo4 #aah ,cf4 ,,reinstadler1 ,ontologia1 lib4 ii41 cap4 i41 art4 ii41 #b4 #aai ,zigliara 7,ontologia 7#ad71 iii4 iv47 gives the virtual distinction as a sub-class of the real distinction2 adding1 however 7according to ,goudin1 ,metaph41 ,disp4 i41 q4 iii4 art4 ii41 i7 that 8this virtual distinction is not so much a real distinction as the basis of a mental distinction04 #abj op4 cit41 p4 #aaj4 #aba ,these may be seen in abundance in the works of any of the scholastic writers1 medieval or modern1 who discuss the question4 ,cf41 e4g4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 #bea-d4 #abb ,besides ,st4 ,thomas 7cf4 supra1 p4 #ajb1 n4 #b71 ,albertus ,magnus 7#aaic-abhj71 ,aegidius ,romanus 7 circa #acjj71 ,capreolus 7#achj-addd71 ,soncinas 7 #adid71 ,cajetan 7#adfh-aecd71 ,sylvester ,ferrariensis 7#adgd-aebh71 ,dominicus ,baez 7#aebh-afjd71 ,john of ,st4 ,thomas 7#aehi-afdd71 ,goudin 7#afci-ie71 are among the most noted scholastics to hold this view4 ,it is supported by the members of the ,dominican ,order generally2 and by not a few ,jesuits among recent scholastic writers2 also by ,,mercier1 op4 cit41 #dh-ea4 #abc ,cf4 ,,kleutgen1 op4 cit41 #ege4 #abd ibid41 #egg4 #abe ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 ,disp4 iv41 cap4 i41 art4 #b1 pp4 #gcj-ca4 #abf 8,esse rei quamvis sit aliud ab ejus essentia1 non tamen est intelligendum1 quod sit aliquod superadditum1 ad modum accidentis1 sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae4 ,et ideo hoc nomen1 quod imponitur ab esse 7ens7 significat idem cum nomine quod imponitur ab ipsa essentia40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,in ,metaph41 ,l4 iv41 l4 #b4 #abg ,among the advocates of this view are ,alexander of ,hales 7 #abde71 ,aureolus 7 #acbb71 ,durandus 7 #accb71 ,gabriel ,biel 7 #adie71 ,suarez 7#aedh-afag71 ,toletus 7#aecb-aeif71 ,vasquez 7#aeea-afjd71 ,gregory of ,valentia 7 circa #afjj71 and the ,jesuits generally3 some few regarding the distinction as purely logical1 e4g4 ,franzelin 7apud ,,mercier1 op4 cit41 #dg1 p4 #aaj1 n4 #b74 ,for details and arguments on both sides1 cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 ,disp4 iv41 cap4 i41 art4 #b4 #abh 8,compositum ex esse et essentia dicitur de ratione entis creati secundum fundamentum1 quod in ipso ente creato habet2 hoc autem fundamentum non est aliud nisi quia creatura non habet ex se actu existere1 sed tantum est ens potentiale1 quod ab alio potest esse participare3 nam hinc fit1 ut essentia creaturae concipiatur a nobis ut potentiale quid1 esse vero ut modus seu actus1 quo talis essentia ens in actu constituitur40--,,suarez1 ,metaph41 ,disp4 xxxi41 #ac4 #abi ,when we speak of an essence as receiving existence1 we do not necessarily imply a real distinction between receiver and received3 8,non est imaginandum quod una res sit1 quae participat sicut essentia1 et alia quae participatur sicut esse1 sed quia una et eadem res est realitas modo participato et per vim alterius sicut per vim agentis3 haec enim realitas de se non est nisi sub modo possibili2 quod autem sit et vocari possit actus1 hoc habet per vim agentis40--,,alexander ,,of ,,hales1 ,in ,metaph41 ,l4 vii41 text #bb4 8,non omne acceptum10 writes ,st4 ,thomas1 8est receptum in aliquo subjecto2 alioquin non posset dici quod tota substantia rei creatae sit accepta a ,deo1 cum totius substantiae non sit aliquod subjectum receptivum0--,summa ,theol41 ,i41 q4 xxvii41 art4 ii41 ad4 #cum4 #acj ,cf4 ,,mercier1 op4 cit41 #di4 ,some of these doctrines we shall examine later1 by way of illustration1 in connexion with the ,unity of being4 #aca ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 ibid41 art4 iii41 ,obj4 #i1 ,resp4 #acb ,this view is advocated by1 among others1 ,duns ,scotus 7#abff-acjh71 ,henry of ,ghent 7 #abic71 ,francis de ,vittoria 7#adhj-aeff71 ,dominicus de ,soto 7#adif-aefj71 ,molina 7#aece-afjj71 ,fonseca 7#aedh-ig71 and ,scotists generally4 #acc ,,aristotle1 ,metaph41 lib4 #e1 text ii41 cap4 #f2 ,,st4 ,,thomas1 in loc4 et alibi4 #acd 8,si 444 modus entis accipiatur 444 secundum divisionem unius ab altero1 444 hoc exprimit hoc nomen aliquid1 dicitur enim aliquid quasi aliud quid4 ,unde sicut ens dicitur unum inquantum est indivisum in se1 ita dicitur aliquid inquantum est ab aliis diversum40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,de ,veritate1 q4 #a1 a4 #a4 #ace 8,nam omne ens est aut simplex1 aut compositum4 ,quod autem est simplex1 est indivisum et actu et potentia4 ,quod autem est compositum1 non habet esse1 quamdiu partes ejus sint divisae1 sed postquam constituunt et componunt ipsum compositum4 ,unde manifestum est quod esse cujuslibet rei consistit in indivisione2 et inde est1 quod unumquodque sicut custodit suum esse1 ita custodit suam unitatem40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 xi41 a4 #a4 #acf 8,unum vero quod est principium numeri1 addit supra substantiam rationem mensurae1 quae est propria passio quantitatis1 et primo invenitur in unitate4 ,et dicitur per privationem vel negationem divisionis1 quae est secundum quantitatem continuam4 ,nam numerus ex divisione continui causatur40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,in ,metaph41 lib4 #d1 lect4 #b1 par4 b4 #acg ,those who regard the distinction between the essence and the existence of an actually existing substance as real consider the latter as an ens unum per se4 ,the existence of a real distinction between the essential constitutive factors of a composite substance is universally regarded by scholastics as compatible with essential unity--unitas per se--in the latter4 ,such factors are really distinct1 and separable or divisible1 but actually undivided4 ,so also1 the union of an individual nature and its subsistence 7#gc7 forms a unum per se 7unum compositionis7 in the view of those who place a real distinction between these factors4 #ach ,of course essential unity of composition is also 8natural04 ,cf4 ,,kleutgen1 op4 cit41 #fca-h4 #aci 8,unum quod convertitur cum ente ponit quidem ipsum ens1 sed nihil superaddit1 nisi negationem divisionis4 ,multitudo autem ei correspondens addit supra res1 qu dicuntur mult1 quod unaquque earum sit una1 et quod una earum non sit altera4444 ,et sic1 cum unum addat supra ens unam negationem1 secundum quod aliquid est indivisum in se1 multitudo addit duas negationes1 prout scilicet aliquid est in se indivisum1 et prout est ab alio divisum1 et unum eorum non esse alterum40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,de ,potent41 q4 #i1 a4 #g4 #adj 8,sic ergo primo in intellectu nostro cadit ens1 et deinde divisio1 et post hoc unum quod divisionem privat1 et ultimo multitudo qu ex unitatibus constituitur40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,in ,metaph41 lib4 #aj1 lect4 #d1 par4 c4 #ada ,omnis pluralitas consequitur aliquam divisionem4 ,est autem duplex divisio3 una materialis qu fit secundum divisionem continui1 et hanc sequitur numerus1 qui est species quantitatis4 ,unde talis numerus1 non est nisi in rebus materialibus habentibus quantitatem4 ,alia est divisio formalis1 qu fit per oppositas vel diversas formas3 et hanc divisionem sequitur multitudo qu non est in aliquo genere1 sed est de transcendentibus1 secundum quod ens dividitur per unum et multa4 ,et talem multitudinem solam contingit esse in rebus immaterialibus4--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 xxx41 art4 #c4 #adb ,we may confine our attention here to substances1 assuming for the present that accidents are individuated by the individual substances in which they inhere4 ,we may note further that it is only corporeal individuals that fall directly within our experience4 ,we can1 of course1 infer from the latter the actual existence of individual spiritual realities subsisting apart from matter1 viz4 human souls after death1 and also the possibility of purely spiritual individual beings such as angels4 ,but when we conceive these as individuals we must conceive them after the analogy of individuals in the domain of corporeal reality3 it is only through concepts derived from this domain1 and finding their proper application within it1 that we can have any knowledge of suprasensible or spiritual realities1 viz4 by applying those concepts analogically to the latter4 #adc ,the 8formal-actual0 distinction1 which ,scotists advocate between these grades of being1 we shall examine later4 #add ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 p4 #bhj3 8,principium 444 intrinsicum vel formale est aliquid insitum rei1 pertinensque ad intrinsecam et ultimam individui constitutionem1 et fundans formalitatem illam1 quae individitatio dicitur4 ,sicut enim materia est in homine1 v4g4 principium et fundamentum propter quod est1 ac praedicatur materialis1 et forma fundat in eodem praedicatum rationalis1 totaque natura composita1 humanitas1 praedicatum hominis2 ita quaerimus quid sit illud primum principium1 unde existit in quovis individuo sua peculiaris ac propria individuatio40 #ade ,in ancient ,greece the ,eleatics argued against the possibility of real plurality somewhat in this wise3 ,if there were really different beings any two of them would differ from each other only by some third reality1 and this again from each of the former by a fourth and a fifth reality1 and so on ad infinitum3 which would involve the absurdities of infinite number and infinite regress4 ,a similar argument was used by the medieval pantheist1 ,david of ,dinant1 to identify ,god with the material principle of corporeal reality3 ,god and primary matter exist and do not differ2 therefore they are identical3 for if they differed they should differ by something distinct from either1 and this again should differ from both by something distinct from all three1 and so on ad infinitum3 which is absurd4 ,such sophisms arise from accepting the purely abstract view of reality as adequate4 ,we have seen already1 in dealing with the abstract notion of being1 that from this point of view it must be recognized and admitted that the reality whereby things differ 7viz4 being7 is also the reality wherein they agree 7viz4 being1 also74 ,the paradox is restated below in regard to individuation4 #adf ,materia 444 dupliciter accipitur1 scilicet1 ut signata et non signata4 ,et dicitur signata1 secundum quod consideratur cum determinatione dimensionum harum scilicet vel illarum2 non signata autem1 qu sine determinatione dimensionum consideratur4 ,secundum hoc igitur est sciendum1 quod materia signata est individuationis principium4--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,de ,veritate1 q4 ii41 art4 #f1 ad4 #g;am4 #adg ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 ,disp4 ii41 cap4 #b1 iii41 pp4 #bga-c4 #adh ,these will easily be found in any of the fuller scholastic treatises4 ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 ,disp4 ii41 cap4 #b1 art4 #d4 ,philosophia ,lacencis1 ,logica1 #abhb sqq42 ,,mercier1 ,ontologie1 #cf-db2 ,,kleutgen1 ,philosophie ,scolastique1 #faj sqq42 ,,bulliat1 ,thsaurus ,philosophiae ,thomisticae 7,nantes1 #ahii71 pp4 #aga sqq4--a useful book of reference for the teaching of ,st4 ,thomas4 #adi ,a kindred view to this is the view that subsistence 78subsistentia10 8suppositalitas07 or personality 78personalitas07 is the principle of individuation4 ,we shall see later in what subsistence or personality is supposed to consist4 ,here it is sufficient to observe that the individual nature as such has not necessarily subsistence or personality2 hence it cannot be individuated by this latter4 #aej ,the consistent attitude for the ,thomist here would1 however1 appear to be a denial that such a thing would be intrinsically possible4 #aea ,hujusmodi relatio non potest consistere nisi in quodam ordine1 quem ratio adinvenit alicujus ad seipsum secundum aliquas ejus duas considerationes4--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 xxviii41 art4 #c1 ad4 #b;am4 #aeb ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 vol4 i41 #ei4 #aec ,it is only the concrete and individual that as such can exist actually2 the abstract and universal as such cannot exist actually3 abstractness and universality are mental modes--entia rationis--annexed by the mind to the real content of its concepts3 considered as thought-objects they are themselves not real entities3 they do not affect reality as given to us in our experience4 ,but perhaps concreteness and individuality are also mere mental modes1 affecting reality not as given to us in our experience but only as subjected to the process of intellectual conception1 or at least as subjected to the process of sense perception8 ,this would appear to be part of the general ,kantian theory of knowledge3 that we can apprehend reality as concrete and individual only because space and time1 which characterize the concrete and individual mode of being1 are mental modes which must be applied to reality as a prerequisite condition for rendering the latter capable of apprehension in our experience4 ,this contention is examined in another context4 ,cf4 infra1 pp4 #ade1 #adg1 #aea4 #aed ,thus the recognition of a virtual distinction in a being is a sign of the relative perfection of the latter3 the being involves in its higher sort of unity perfections elsewhere dispersed and separate4 ,the being is of a higher order than if the principles of these perfections in it were really distinct from one another4 ,but the virtual distinction also seems to imply a relative imperfection when it is found in creatures1 inasmuch as here the thought-objects so distinguished are always principles of a plurality of really distinct accidental perfections3 and real plurality in a being is less perfect than unity4--,cf4 ,,kleutgen1 op4 cit41 #fcc4 #aee 8,omnis cognitio est a potentia et objecto1 sive a cognoscente et cognito4 ,ratio a priori est1 quia omnis cognitio saltem creata est expressio et imitatio atque imago vitalis objecti4 ,inquantum igitur est vitalis1 procedit a cognoscente2 implicat enim cognoscentem vivere per aliquid1 quod ab ipso non est1 sed pure illud recipit ab alio mere passive se habendo2 inquantum vero cognitio est expressio1 imitatio et imago objecti1 procedit ab objecto0--,,silvester ,,maurus1 ,quaest4 ,philos41 q4 #b4 ,this is the common scholastic distinction3 cognition as a product representative or expressive of reality is a product determined by the influence of reality 7as active7 on the mind 7as passive72 cognition as a vital process is active1 a reaction of mind to the influence of reality4 ,it may be remarked1 however1 that the cognitive process1 as vital1 has always a positive term4 ,our cognitive processes are partly at least processes of abstracting1 comparing1 relating1 universalizing3 processes which produce 8intentiones logicas0 or 8entia rationis10 such as the 8intentio universalitatis0 the relation of subject to predicate1 and other logical relations and logical distinctions3 and hence arises the difficulty1 when we come to reflect on our cognitive experience1 of discriminating between these 8logical entities0 and the reality which we interpret by means of them3 of discriminating1 in other words1 between logical and real distinctions4 #aef ,it is not necessary of course that this implicit embodiment of all the others1 by any one of them1 be seen to be mutual4 ,it is sufficient1 for instance1 that of the concepts a1 b1 c and d1 a be seen implicitly to involve b1 b to involve c1 etc41 though not vice versa4 ,however1 it must be remarked that in the exercise of thought upon its abstract objects we feel something wanting to our intellectual insight as long as the relations we apprehend are not reciprocal4 ,in the sciences of abstract quantity we approximate to the ideal of establishing reciprocal relations throughout the whole system of the concepts analysed4 ,but abstract thought does not give us an adequate apprehension of the real3 it represents reality only under the static aspect1 and as abstract1 i4e4 apart from the individualizing conditions of time and space which affect its concrete1 actual existence as revealed in sense experience4 ,were we to neglect the latter1 and consider merely what abstract thought gives us1 we should regard as really one what is one for thought4 ,but what is one for thought is the universal2 and the logical issue of holding the universal as such to be real is monism4 ,or again1 to put the matter in another way1 in so far as intellect sees the objects of its various abstract concepts to involve one another necessarily1 it has no reason--as long as it ignores the verdict of sense experience on the real manifoldness of actually existing being--to abstain from attributing a real unity to the whole system of abstract thought-objects which it contemplates as reciprocally and necessarily interrelated4 ,on the contrary1 it should pronounce that whatever plurality can be unified by the dialectically necessary relations discovered by thought1 is really one1 and must be regarded as one reality3 which1 again1 is monism4 ,but a philosophy which thus ignores sense experience must be one-sided and misleading4 #aeg ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 ,disp4 ii41 cap4 ii41 art4 #e 7p4 #cai74 #aeh ,cf4 infra1 #hc4 #aei ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 ibid4 p4 #cbb4 #afj ,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,de ,ente et ,essentia1 cap4 iv43 8,ideo1 si quaeratur utrum ista natura possit dici una vel plures1 neutrum concedendum est3 quia utrumque est extra intellectum conceptum humanitatis1 et utrumque potest sibi accidere4 ,si enim pluralitas esset de ratione ejus1 nunquam posset esse una3 cum tamen una sit secundum quod est in ,sorte4 ,similiter si unitas esset de intellectu et ratione ejus1 tunc esset una et eadem natura ,sortis et ,platonis1 nec posset in pluribus plurificari40 ,cf4 ,,zigliara1 ,summa ,philos41 ,ontologia 7#a71 iv41 v42 7#c7 iv4 #afa 8,licet enim 7natura7 nunquam sit sine aliquo istorum1 non tamen est de se aliquod istorum1 ita etiam in rerum natura secundum illam entitatem habet verum #8esse' extra animam reale3 et secundum illam entitatem habet unitatem sibi proportionabilem1 quae est indifferens ad singularitatem1 ita quod non1 repugnat illi unitati de se1 quod cum quacumque unitate singularitatis ponatur40--,,scotus1 ,in ,l4 ,sent41 #b1 dist4 iii41 q4 #g4--;,cf4 ,,de ,,wulf1 ,history of ,medieval ,philosophy1 p4 #cgb4 #afb ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 ii41 #bdh4 ,moral truth or veracity--the conformity of language with thought--is treated in ,ethics4 #afc ,cf4 ,,mercier1 ,ontologie1 ,p4 ii41 #d1 i4 #afd ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 ii41 #beb-d4 #afe 8,si omnis intellectus 7quod est impossibile7 intelligeretur auferri1 nullo modo ratio veritatis remaneret40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,de ,veritate1 q4 i41 art #a1 #b in fine4 #aff ,cf4 ,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,de ,veritate1 q4 i41 and passim4 #afg ,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,de ,veritate1 q4 i41 art4 #b4 #afh ,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,de ,veritate1 q4 i41 art4 #d2 ,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 #af1 art4 #f4 #afi 8,si intellectus humanus non esset1 adhuc res dicerentur ver in ordine ad intellectum divinum4 ,sed si uterque intellectus1 quod est impossibile1 intelligeretur auferri1 nullo modo ratio veritatis remaneret40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,de ,veritate1 q4 i41 art4 #b4 #agj 8,si ergo accipiatur veritas rei secundum ordinem ad intellectum divinum1 tunc quidem mutatur veritas rei mutablis in aliam veritatem1 non in falsitatem40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ibid4 q4 i41 art4 #f4 #aga ,cf4 ,,aristotle1 ,de ,anima1 iii42 ,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,de ,veritate1 q4 i41 art4 #a4 #agb 8,res per se non fallunt1 sed per accidens4 ,dant enim occasionem falsitatis2 eo quod similitudinem eorum gerunt quorum non habent existentiam4444 ,res notitiam sui facit in anima per ea quae de ipsa exterius apparent 444 et ideo quando in aliqua re apparent sensibiles qualitates demonstrantes naturam quae eis non subest1 dicitur res illa esse falsa4444 ,nec tamen res est hoc modo causa falsitatis in anima1 quod necessario falsitatem causat40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 #ag1 art4 #a1 ad4 #b2 ,de ,veritate1 q4 i41 art4 #aj1 c4 #agc 1 4--,,aristotle1 ,eth41 i4 #agd ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 ii41 #bag4 #age 8,bonum autem1 cum habeat notionem appetibilis1 importat habitudinem caus finalis40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 #e1 art4 #b1 ad4 #a4 #agf 8,prima autem non possunt notificari per aliqua priora1 sed notificantur per posteriora1 sicut caus per proprios effectus4 ,cum autem bonum proprie sit motivum appetitus1 describitur bonum per motum appetitus1 sicut solet manifestari vis motiva per motum4 ,et ideo dicit 7,aristoteles7 quod philosophi bene enunciaverunt bonum esse id quod omnia appetunt40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,comment4 in ,eth4 ,nich41 i41 lect4 #a;a4 #agg ,the 8end10 which is last in the order of actual attainment1 is first as the ideal term of the aim or tendency of the nature3 finis est ultimus in executione1 sed primus in intentione3 it is that for the sake of which1 and with a view to which1 the whole process of actualization or 8perfecting0 goes on4 ,cf4 infra1 #ajh4 #agh 8,licet bonum et ens sint idem secundum rem2 quia tamen differunt secundum rationem1 non eodem modo dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et bonum simpliciter4 ,nam1 cum ens dicat aliquid esse in actu1 actus autem proprie ordinem habeat ad potentiam1 secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid dicitur esse ens secundum quod primo secernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum2 hoc autem est esse substantiale rei uniuscujusque4 ,unde per suum esse substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter2 per actus autem superadditos dicitur aliquid esse secundum quid4444 ,sic ergo secundum primum esse1 quod est substantiale1 dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et bonum secundum quid1 id est1 inquantum est ens2 secundum vero ultimum actum dicitur aliquid ens secundum quid1 et bonum simpliciter40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 #e1 art4 #a1 ad4 #a4 #agi 8,respectus 444 qui importatur nomine boni est habitudo perfectivi secundum quodaliquid natum est perficere non solum secundum rationem speciei i4e4 the abstract essence1 sed secundum esse quod habet in rebus2 hoc enim modo finis perficit ea quae sunt ad finem40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,de ,veritate1 q4 #bf1 art4 #f4 #ahj ,cf4 the familiar ethical distinction between objective1 and formal or subjective happiness1 beatitudo objectiva and beatitudo formalis seu subjectiva4 #aha 8,in motu appetitus1 id quod est appetibile terminans motum appetitus secundum quid1 ut medium per quod tenditur in aliud1 vocatur utile4 ,id autem quod appetitur ut ultimum terminans totaliter motum appetitus sicut quaedam res in quam per se appetitus tendit1 vocatur honestum2 quia honestum dicitur quod per se desideratur4 ,id autem quod terminat motum appetitus1 ut quies in se desiderata1 est delectabile40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 #e1 art4 #c4 #ahb ,excellentia hominis maxime consideratur secundum virtutem1 quae est dis positio perfecti ad optimum1 ut dicitur in #f ,physic4 ,et ideo1 honestum1 proprie loquendo1 in idem refertur cum virtute4--ibid41 #b;a #b;ae1 q4 #ade1 art4 ,i1 c4 #ahc 8,eorum quae propter se apprehenduntur1 quaedam apprehenduntur solum propter se1 et nunquam propter aliud1 sicut felicitas1 quae est ultimus finis2 quaedam vero apprehenduntur et propter se1 in quantum habent in seipsis aliquam rationem bonitatis1 etiamsi nihil aliud boni per ea nobis accideret1 et tamen sunt appetibilia propter aliud1 in quantum scilicet perducunt nos in aliquod bonum perfectius3 et hoc modo virtutes sunt propter se apprehendendae40--ibid41 ad ,i4 #ahd ,cf4 ,,mercier1 op4 cit41 p4 #bcf4 #ahe 8,omnia 444 quae jam habent esse1 illud esse suum naturaliter amant1 et ipsam tota virtute conservant4444 ,ipsum igitur esse habet rationem boni4 ,unde sicut impossibile est quod sit aliquod ens quod non habeat esse1 ita necesse est quod omne ens sit bonum ex hoc ipso quod habet esse40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,de ,veritate1 q4 #ba1 art4 #b1 c4 #ahf 8,non-esse secundum se non est appetibile1 sed per accidens1 inquantum scilicet ablatio alicujus mali est appetibilis2 quod malum quidem aufertur per non-esse2 ablatio vero mali non est appetibilis1 nisi inquantum per malum privatur quoddam esse4 ,illud igitur1 quod per se est appetibile1 est esse2 non-esse vero1 per accidens tantum1 inquantum scilicet quoddam esse appetitur1 quo homo non sustinet privari2 et sic etiam per accidens non-esse dicitur bonum40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 #e1 art4 #b1 ad4 #c4 #ahg 8,malum est defectus boni quod natum est et debet haberi40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 #di1 art4 #a1 c4 #ahh ibid4 #ahi 8,causam formalem malum non habet1 sed est magis privatio formae40--,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 #di1 art4 #a1 c4 #aij 8,nec causam finalem habet malum1 sed magis est privatio ordinis ad debitum finem40--ibid4 #aia 8,non est causa efficiens sed deficiens mali1 quia malum non est effectio sed defectio40--,de ,civ4 ,dei1 xii41 #g4 #aib 8,o1 altitudo divitiarum sapientiae1 et scientiae ,dei6 ,quam incomprehensibilia sunt judicia ejus1 et investigabiles viae ejus60--,rom4 xi41 #cc4 #aic ,connected with the transcendental notion of unity is another concept1 that of order1 which will be more fully examined when we come to treat of causes4 #aid ,,baumgarten1 a ,german philosopher of the eighteenth century1 was the first to use the term ,aesthetica in this sense4 #aie 8,dicendum est quod pulchrum est idem bono sola ratione differens4 ,cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt1 de ratione boni est1 quod in eo quietetur appetitus2 sed ad rationem pulchri attinet quod in ejus aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus2 unde et illi sensus prcipue respiciunt pulchrum1 qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt1 scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes2 dicimus enim pulchra visibilia et pulchros sonos2 in sensibilibus autem aliorum sensuum non utimur nomine pulchritudinis2 non enim dicimus pulchros sapores1 aut odores40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 ia4 ii41 q4 #bg1 art4 #a1 ad4 #c4 #aif 8,ad rationem pulchri pertinet1 quod in ejus aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus 444 ita quod pulchrum dicatur id1 cujus ipsa apprehensio placet40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 ia4 ii41 q4 #bg1 art4 #a1 ad4 #c4 ,and the ,angelic ,doctor justifies the extended use of the term vision3 8,de aliquo nomine dupliciter convenit loqui1 uno modo secundum ejus primam impositionem1 alio modo secundum usum nominis1 sicut patet in nomine visionis1 quod primo impositum est ad significandum actum sensus visus2 sed propter dignitatem et certitudinem hujus sensus extensum est hoc nomen1 secundum usum loquentium1 ad omnem cognitionem aliorum sensuum2 dicimus enim3 ,vide quomodo sapit1 vel quomodo redolet1 vel quomodo est calidum2 et ulterius etiam ad cognitionem intellectus1 secundum illud ,matt4 v4 #h3 ,beati mundi corde quoniam ipsi ,deum videbunt40--i41 q4 #fg1 art4 #a1 c4 #aig 8,pulchrum et bonum in subjecto quidem sunt idem1 quia super eandem rem fundantur1 scilicet super formam1 et propter hoc bonum laudatur ut pulchrum3 sed ratione differunt3 nam bonum proprie respicit appetitum3 444 et ideo habet rationem finis4444 ,pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam3 pulchra enim dicuntur qu visa placent40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 #e1 art4 #d1 ad4 #a4 #aih ,cf4 ,,de ,,wulf1 ,la ,valeur esthtique de la moralit dans l'art1 pp4 #bh-i4 #aii ,l',art et la ,morale1 p4 #bi4 #bjj ,de la connaissance de ,dieu et de soi-mme1 ch4 i41 #h4 #bja ,de ,vera ,religione1 c4 #cb4 #bjb ,cf4 ,,poincar1 ,confrence sur les rapports de l'analyse et de la physique mathematique4--apud ,,mercier1 ,ontologie1 #bgd1 pp4 #edf-g n4 #bjc ,when the object so excels in greatness or grandeur as to exceed more or less our capacity to realize it we speak of it as sublime4 ,the sublime calls forth emotions of self-abasement1 reverence1 and even fear4 ,if an object possessing the other requisites of beauty is wanting in due magnitude1 we describe it as pretty or elegant4 ,the terms grace1 graceful1 apply especially to gait1 gesture1 movement4 #bjd ,on this point all the great philosophers are unanimous4 ,for ,plato1 beauty whether of soul or of body1 whether of animate or of inanimate things1 results not from chance1 but from order1 rectitude1 art3 1 7,plato1 ,gorg4 #ejf;,d74 ,aristotle places beauty in grandeur and order3 7,poetics1 ch4 viii41 n4 #h74 7,metaph41 xii41 ch4 iii41 n4 #aa74 8,nihil10 writes ,st4 ,augustine1 8est ordinatum quod non sit pulchrum40 8,pulchra10 says ,st4 ,thomas1 8dicuntur quae visa placent2 unde pulchrum in debita proportione consistit0 7,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 #e1 art4 #d1 ad4 #a74 #bje 8,ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur2 primo quidem integritas sive perfectio2 quae enim diminuta sunt1 hoc ipso turpia sunt2 et debita proportio sive consonantia2 et iterum claritas40--,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 #ci1 art4 #h1 c4 ,elsewhere he omits integrity1 supposing it implied in order3 8ad rationem pulchri sive decori concurrit et claritas et debita proportio04 ,and elsewhere again he omits clarity1 this being a necessary effect of order3 8pulchrum in debita proportione consistit04 #bjf ,by 8natural perfection0 is meant the perfection which a nature acquires by the realization of its end 7#e73 7,aristotle74 #bjg ,this definition coincides with that found in a medieval scholastic treatise ,de ,pulchro et ,bono1 attributed to ,st4 ,thomas or ,albertus ,magnas3 8,ratio pulchri in universali consistit in resplendentia formae super partes materiae proportionatas1 vel super diversas vires vel actiones40 ,cf4 ,,mercier1 ,ontologie1 p4 #eed4 #bjh ,l',ide du beau dans la philosophie de ,s4 ,thomas d',aquin1 p4 #b4 #bji ,du ,vrai1 du ,beau et du ,bien1 viie leon4 #baj ,kritik der ,urtheilskraft1 ,th4 i41 ,abschn4 #a1 ,b4 #a1 passim4 #baa 8,omnis corporea creatura 444 bonum est infimum1 et in genere suo pulchrum quoniam forma et specie continetur40--,,st4 ,,augustine1 ,de ,vera ,relig41 c4 #bj4 #bab ,at the same time it must be borne in mind that many of the judgments by which things are pronounced 8ugly0 or 8commonplace0 are erroneous4 ,this is partly because they are based on first and superficial sense impressions3 beauty must be apprehended and judged by the intellect1 and by the intellect 8informed0 with genuine knowledge2 to the eye of enlightened intelligence there are beauties of structure and organization in the beetle or the tadpole as well as in the peacock or the spaniel4 ,it is partly1 too1 because we unconsciously or semi-consciously apply standards of human beauty to beings that are merely animal3 8,to know really whether there are ugly monkeys we should have to consult a monkey2 for the beauty we unconsciously look for1 and certainly do not find1 in the monkey1 is the beauty of the human form2 and when we declare the monkey ugly what we really mean is that it would be ugly if it were a human being2 which is undeniable40--,,sully-,,prudhomme1 ,l',expression dans les beaux arts1 p4 #ajd4 #bac ,proverbs1 xxxi4 #cj4 #bad ,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 ia1 iiae1 q4 #eg1 art4 #c1 c4 #bae ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 i41 #gj sqq4 #baf ,cf4 ,,windelband1 ,history of ,philosophy 7tr4 ,tufts71 ,introduction4 #bag ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 ii4 ,p4 iv41 ch4 v4 #bah ,metaph41 vi41 #a4 #bai ,cf4 ,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 #ij1 art4 #b3 8,illud proprie dicitur esse quod ipsum habet esse quasi in suo esse subsistens4 ,unde sol substanti proprie et vere dicuntur entia2 accidens vero non habet esse sed eo aliquid est1 et hac ratione ens dicitur 444 accidens dicitur magis entis quam ens40 #bbj ,in ,metaph41 ,l4 v41 lect4 #i2 cf4 ,in ,physic41 ,l4 iii41 lect4 #e4 #bba ,science of ,logic1 i41 #ga1 #gc-gf4 #bbb ibid41 #gd1 #gf4 #bbc ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 #bfh 7p4 #ffh72 ,,mercier1 ,logique1 #cc 7#dth edit41 p4 #ii74 #bbd ,cf4 ,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,in ,metaph41 ,l4 xi41 lect4 #i3 8,sed sciendum est quod prdicamenta diversificantur secundum diversos modos prdicandi4 ,unde idem1 secundum quod diversimode de diversis prdicatur1 ad diversa prdicamenta pertinet4444 ,similiter motus secundum quod prdicatur de subjecto in quo est1 constituit prdicamentum passionis4 ,secundum autem quod prdicatur de eo a quo est1 constituit prdicamentum actionis40 #bbe ,ontologie1 #ach 7#crd edit41 p4 #bfc74 #bbf ,cf4 ,essay concerning ,human ,understanding1 book iv41 ch4 vi41 #aa3 8,had we such ideas of substances1 as to know what real constitutions produce those sensible qualities we find in them1 and how these qualities flowed from thence1 we could1 by the specific ideas of their real essences in our own minds1 more certainly find out their properties1 and discover what properties they had or had not1 than we can now by our senses3 and to know the properties of gold1 it would be no more necessary that gold should exist1 than it is necessary for the knowing the properties of a triangle1 that the triangle should exist in any matter2 the idea in our minds would serve for the one as well as the other40 #bbg 8,sensation convinces us that there are solid1 extended substances2 and reflection1 that there are thinking ones3 experience assures us of the existence of such beings40--ibid41 book ii41 ch4 xxiii41 #bi4 ,locke protested repeatedly against the charge that he denied the existence of substances4 #bbh ,the notion one has of pure substance is 8only a supposition of he knows not what support of such qualities1 which are capable of producing simple ideas in us2 which qualities are commonly called accidents4444 ,the idea then we have1 to which we give the general name substance1 being nothing but the supposed1 but unknown support of those qualities we find existing1 which we imagine cannot subsist1 #8sine re substante1' without something to support them1 we call that support substantia40--book ii41 ch4 xxiii41 #b4 ,in the following passage we may detect the idealistic insinuation that knowledge reaches only to 8ideas0 or mental states1 not to the extramental reality1 the 8secret1 abstract nature of substance03 8,whatever therefore be the secret abstract nature of substance in general1 all the ideas we have of particular distinct sorts of substances1 are nothing but several combinations of simple ideas1 co-existing in such1 though unknown1 cause of their union1 as makes the whole subsist of itself04 ,it belongs1 of course1 to the ,theory of ,knowledge1 not to the ,theory of ,being1 to show how groundless the idealistic assumption is4 #bbi ,inquiring into the causes of our 8impressions0 and 8ideas10 he admits the existence of 8bodies0 which cause them and 8minds0 which experience them3 8,we may well ask1 ,what causes induce us to believe in the existence of body8 but 'tis vain to ask1 ,whether there be body or not8 ,that is a point1 which we must take for granted in all our reasonings40--,a ,treatise on ,human ,nature1 ,part iv41 ii4 #bcj ,of the definition of a substance as something which may exist by itself1 he says3 8this definition agrees to everything that can possibly be conceiv'd2 and will never serve to distinguish substance from accident1 or the soul from its perceptions4444 ,since all our perceptions are different from each other1 and from everything else in the universe1 they are also distinct and separable1 and may be consider'd as separately existent1 and may exist separately1 and have no need of anything else to support their existence4 ,they are1 therefore1 substances1 as far as this definition explains a substance40--ibid41 v4 8,we have no perfect idea of substance1 but 444 taking it for something that can exist by itself1 'tis evident every perception is a substance1 and every distinct part of a perception a distinct substance40--ibid4 #bca ,cf4 ,,mercier1 op4 cit41 #adb 7p4 #bgb74 #bcb ,cf4 ,,kleutgen1 op4 cit41 ,dissert4 vi41 ch4 iii41 li1 #eib4 #bcc ,assuming for the moment that we can know substance to be not one but manifold3 that experience reveals to us a plurality of numerically or really1 and even specifically and generically1 distinct substances4 ,cf4 infra1 p4 #bba4 #bcd ,cf4 ,,huxley1 ,hume1 bk4 ii41 ch4 ii4 ,,taine1 ,de ,l',intelligence1 t4 i41 ,preface1 and passim4 #bce ,cf4 #fe1 infra4 #bcf ,such terms as 8corruptible10 8destructible10 etc41 imply certain attributes of a thing which can be corrupted1 destroyed4 ,conceiving this attribute in the abstract we form the terms 8corruptibility10 8destructibility10 etc4 ,so1 too1 the term 8possibility0 formed from the adjective 8possible10 simply implies in the abstract what the latter implies in the concrete--an active or passive power of a thing to cause or to become something2 or else the mind's conception of the non-repugnance of this something4 ,to substantialize a possibility1 therefore1 is sufficiently absurd2 but to speak of a possibility as real and at the same time to deny the reality of any subject in which it would have its reality1 is no less so4 #bcg except in the ,blessed ,eucharist3 here we know from ,divine ,revelation that the accidents of bread and wine exist apart from their connatural substance4 ,we cannot1 by the light of reason1 prove positively the possibility of such separate existence of accidents2 at the most1 men of the supreme genius of an ,aristotle may have strongly suspected such possibility1 and may have convinced themselves of the futility of all attempts to prove in any way the impossibility of such a condition of things4 ,nor can we1 even with the light of ,revelation1 do any more than show the futility of such attempts1 thus negatively defending the possibility of what we know from ,revelation to be a fact4 #bch ,cf4 n4 #a4 #bci ,cf4 ,,maher1 ,psychology1 ch4 xxii41 for a full analysis and refutation of phenomenist theories that would deny the substantiality of the human person4 #bdj 8,substantia est res1 cujus naturae debetur esse non in alio2 accidens vero est res1 cujus naturae debetur esse in alio40--,quodlib41 ix41 a4 #e1 ad4 #b4 #bda ,cf4 ,,descartes1 ,oeuvres1 edit4 ,cousin1 tome ix41 p4 #aff--;apud ,,mercier1 ,ontologie1 p4 #bhj4 #bdb ,,paulsen1 ,einleitung in die ,philosophie1 ,berlin1 #ahif1 ,s4 #ace--;apud ,,mercier1 loc4 cit4 #bdc and also appetitive2 as in mental life appetition is a natural consequent of perception4 ,it is in accordance with this latter idea that ,wundt conceives all reality as being in its ultimate nature appetitive activity3 the ,ego is a 8volitional unit0 and the universe a 8collection of volitional units04--,cf4 ,,wundt1 ,system der ,philosophie1 ,leipzig1 #ahhi1 ,s4 #dae-dba4 #bdd ,principles of ,psychology1 ,pt4 ii41 ch4 i41 #ei4 #bde ,but from ,descartes' doctrine of two passive substances so antithetically opposed to each other the transition to ,spinozism was easy and obvious4 ,if mind and matter are so absolutely opposed as thought and extension1 how can they unite to form one human individual in man8 ,if both are purely passive1 and if ,god alone puts into them their conscious states and their mechanical movements respectively1 what remains proper to each but a pure passivity that would really be common to both8 ,would it not be more consistent then to refer this thought-essence or receptivity of conscious activities1 and this extension-essence or receptivity of mechanical movements1 to ,god as their proper source1 to regard them as two attributes of ,his unique and self-existent substance1 and thus to regard ,god as substantially immanent in all phenomena1 and these as only different expressions of ,his all-pervading essence8 ,this is what ,spinoza did2 and his monism in one form or other is the last word of many contemporary philosophers on the nature of the universe which constitutes the totality of human experience4--,cf4 ,h,,ffding1 ,outlines of ,psychology1 ch4 ii41 and criticism of same apud ,,maher1 ,psychology1 ch4 xxiii4 #bdf 8,esse substanti non dependet ab esse alterius sicut ei inhrens1 licet omnia dependeant a ,deo sicut a causa prima40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,de ,causa ,materi1 cap4 viii4 #bdg ,cf4 ,,kleutgen1 op4 cit4 #eid4 #bdh ,ibid41 #eig-fjj4 #bdi 8,illud proprie dicitur esse1 quod ipsum habet esse1 quasi in suo esse subsistens4 ,unde sol substanti proprie et vere dicuntur entia2 accidens vero non habet esse1 sed eo aliquid est1 et hac ratione ens dicitur3 sicut albedo dicitur ens quia ea aliquid est album4 ,et propter hoc dicitur in ,metaph41 l4 #g al4 #f1 c4 i4 ,arist41 quod accidens dicitur magis entis quam ens40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 i4 q4 #ij1 art4 #b4 8,illud cui advenit accidens1 est ens in se completum consistens in suo esse1 quod quidem esse naturaliter prcedit accidens1 quod supervenit3 et ideo accidens superveniens1 ex conjunctione sui cum eo1 cui supervenit1 non causat illud esse in quo res subsistit per quod res est ens per se3 sed causat quoddam esse secundum1 sine quo res subsistens intelligi potest esse1 sicut primum potest intelligi sine secundo1 vel prdicatum sine subjecto4 ,unde ex accidente et subjecto non fit unum per se1 sed unum per accidens1 et ideo ex eorum conjunctione non resultat essentia qudam1 sicut ex conjunctione form cum materia3 propter quod accidens neque rationem complet essenti habet1 neque pars complet essenti est1 sed sicut est ens secundum quid1 ita et essentiam secundum quid habet40--,de ,ente et ,essentia1 ch4 vii4 #bej 8,non est definitio substanti1 ens per se sine subjecto1 nec definitio accidentis1 ens in subjecto2 sed quidditati seu essenti substanti competit habere esse non in subjecto2 quidditati autem sive essenti accidentis competit habere esse in subjecto40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 iii41 q4 #gg1 art4 #a1 ad4 #b4 #bea ,cf4 ,,kleutgen1 op4 cit41 #eie-eif4 #beb ibid41 #fai4 #bec ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 #cbj-cbe4 #bed ,,kleutgen1 op4 cit41 #fah1 #fbd4 #bee ,this logical usage is applied equally to attributes of a logical subject which is not itself a substance but an accident2 it turns solely on the point whether the concept of the logical predicate of a judgment is or is not connected by an absolute logical connexion1 a connexion of thought1 with the concept of the logical subject4 #bef ,cf4 ,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,quaest4 ,disp41 ,de ,spir4 ,creat41 art4 #aa1 ad4 #g4 #beg ,cf41 however1 #fh1 p4 #bdf1 n4 #b1 infra4 #beh ,st4 ,thomas1 whose language is usually so moderate1 thus expresses his view of the doctrine afterwards propounded by ,descartes when the latter declared the essence of the soul to be thought3 8,quidquid dicatur de potentiis animae1 tamen nullus unquam opinatur1 nisi insanus1 quod habitus et actus animae sint ipsa ejus essentia40--,quaest4 ,disp41 ,de ,spir4 ,creat41 art4 #aa1 ad #a4 ,for a very convincing treatment of this question1 cf4 ,,kleutgen1 op4 cit41 #fbe-fbf4 #bei ,,de ,,san1 ,cosmologia1 #cbc1 apud ,,mercier1 op4 cit41 #aeh4 #bfj op4 cit41 #fbe4 #bfa ,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 iii41 q4 #ag1 art4 #b1 c4 #bfb ,hence ,st4 ,thomas says1 in regard to the ,blessed ,eucharist1 that the accidents of bread and wine had not an existence of their own as long as the substance of bread and wine was there2 that this is true of accidents generally2 that it is not they that exist1 but rather their subjects2 that their function is to determine these subjects to exist as characterized in a certain way1 as whiteness gives snow a white existence3 8,dicendum quod accidentia panis et vini1 manente substantia panis et vini non habebant ipsa esse sicut nec alia accidentia1 sed subjecta eorum habebant hujusmodi esse per ea1 sicut nix est alba per albedinem40--,summa ,theol41 iii41 q4 #gg1 art4 #a1 ad4 #d4 #bfc ,for the arguments on both sides cf4 ,,mercier1 ,ontologie1 #aef 7pp4 #cjh sqq474 ,the indirect argument which the author derives from the fact that the ,divine ,concursus is necessary for the activity of creatures1 while offering an intelligible explanation of this necessity on ,thomistic principles1 does not touch the probability of other explanations4 #bfd ,cf4 ,,urraburu',s definition3 8entitas vel realitas a subjecto realiter distincta1 cujus totum esse consistit in ultima determinatione rei ad aliquod munus obeundum1 vel ad aliquam realem denominationem actu habendam1 sine qua1 saltem in individuo sumpta1 res eadem potest existere absolute04--op4 cit41 #abj 7p4 #chj74 #bfe ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 #bia 7p4 #hed1 quarta opinio71 p4 #hed4 #bff ,whether immanent vital acts--especially of the spiritual faculties in man3 thoughts1 volitions1 etc4--are mere modes1 or whether they are absolute accidents1 having their own proper and positive reality which perfects their subject by affecting it1 is a disputed question4 ,habits1 acquired by repetition of such acts1 e4g4 knowledge and virtue1 belonging as they do to the category of quality1 are more than mere modalities of the human subject3 they have an absolute1 positive entity1 whereby they add to the total perfection of the latter4 #bfg ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 #aba 7pp4 #chf sqq474 #bfh ,the fact that ,aristotle ,metaph41 lib4 vii4 7al4 vi471 ch4 iii4 seems to have placed a real distinction between extension and corporeal substance1 while he could not have suspected the absolute separability of the former from the latter1 would go to show that he did not regard separability as the only test of a real distinction4 ,cf4 ,,kleutgen1 op4 cit41 ibid4 #bfi ,obviously we are not concerned herewith all the attributes which by a necessity of thought we ascribe to an essence1 e4g4 the corruptibility of a corporeal substance1 or the immortality of a spiritual substance4 ,these are not entities really distinct from the substance1 but only aspects which we recognize to be necessary corollaries of its nature4 ,we are concerned only with properties which are real powers1 faculties1 forces1 aptitudes of things4--,cf4 ,,kleutgen1 op4 cit41 #fbg4 #bgj op4 cit41 #fbh4 #bga 8,tertii sunt1 qui dicunt1 quod potentiae animae nec adeo sunt idem ipsi animae1 sicut sunt ejus principia intrinsica et essentialia1 nec adeo diversae1 ut cedant in aliud genus1 sicut accidentia2 sed in genere substantiae sunt per reductionem 444 et ideo quasi medium tenentes inter utramque opinionem dicunt1 quasdam animae potentias sic differre ad invicem1 ut nullo modo dici possint una potentia3 non tamen concedunt1 eas simpliciter diversificari secundum essentiam1 ita ut dicantur diversae essentiae1 sed differre essentialiter in genere potentiae1 ita ut dicantur diversa instrumenta ejusdem substantiae40--,in lib4 ii41 dist4 xxiv41 p4 #a1 art4 #b1 q4 #a4 ,in the same context he explains what we are to understand by referring anything to a certain category per reductionem3 8,sunt enim quaedam1 quae sunt in genere per se1 aliqua per reductionem ad idem genus4 ,illa per se sunt in genere1 quae participant essentiam completam generis1 ut species et individua2 illa vero per reductionem1 quae nan dicunt completam essentiam4444 ,quaedam reducuntur sicut principia 444 aut essentialia1 sicut sunt materia et forma in genere substantiae2 aut integrantia1 sicut partes substantiae4444 ,quaedam reducuntur sicut viae 444 aut sicut viae ad res1 et sic motus et mutationes1 ut generatio1 reducuntur ad substantiam2 aut sicut viae a rebus1 et sic habent reduci potentiae ad genus substantiae4 ,prima enim agendi potentia1 quae egressum dicitur habere ab ipsa substantia1 ad idem genus reducitur1 quae non adeo elongatur ab ipsa substantia1 ut dicat aliam essentiam completam40--ibid41 ad4 #h4 #bgb 8,quoniam potentia creaturae arctata est1 non potuit creatura habere posse perfectum1 nisi esset in ea potentiarum multitudo1 ex quarum collectione sive adunatione1 una supplente defectum alterius1 resultaret unum posse completum1 sicut manifeste animadverti potest in organis humani corporis1 quorum unumquodque indiget a virtute alterius adjuvari40--,in lib4 ii41 dist4 xxiv41 p4 #a1 art4 #b1 q4 #h4 #bgc ,the student will find in ,,maher',s ,psychology 7ch4 iii47 a clear and well-reasoned exposition of the inconsistency and groundlessness of such attacks on the doctrine of faculties4 #bgd ,cf4 ,,kleutgen1 op4 cit41 #fcf-fcg4 #bge 8,cum corpus hominis aut cujuslibet alterius animalis sit quoddam totum naturale1 dicit unum ex eo quod unam formam habeat qua perficitur non solum secundum aggregationem aut compositionem1 ut accidit in domo et in aliis hujusmodi4 ,unde opportet quod quaelibet pars hominis et animalis recipiat esse i4e4 sibi proprium et speciem ab anima sicut a propria forma4 ,unde ,philosophus dicit 7l4 ii4 de anima1 text4 #i71 quod recedente anima neque oculus neque caro neque aliqua pars manet nisi aequivoce40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,quaest4 ,disp4 de anima1 art4 #aj--;apud ,,kleutgen1 op4 cit41 #fcb4 #bgf ,the most perfect real unity is of course that which includes all perfection in the simplicity of its actual essence1 without any dispersion or plurality of its being1 without any admixture of accident or potentiality4 ,such is the unity of the ,infinite ,being alone4 ,no finite being possesses its actuality tota simul4 ,and the creature falls short of perfect unity in proportion as it attains to this actuality only by a multiplicity of real changes1 by a variety of really distinct principles and powers1 essential and accidental1 in its concrete mode of being4 ,in proportion as created things are higher or lower in the scale of being 7#dg71 they realize a higher or a lower grade of unity in their mode of individual existence4 #bgg ,we are concerned here only with finite1 created substances1 as distinct from the ,divine ,uncreated ,substance on whom these depend 7#fd74 #bgh ,,aristotle1 ,categ4 ch4 iii41 passim2 ,metaph41 l4 v4 7al4 vi471 ch4 viii42 ,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,in ,metaph41 l4 v4 lect4 #aj2 ,,kleutgen1 op4 cit41 #ehi-eia4 #bgi ,cf4 ,,kleutgen1 op4 cit41 #ehg1 #fjb-fjc4 #bhj ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 #bgg1 #bgi4 #bha ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 ii41 #bag 7pp4 #ff sqq474 #bhb ,sciendum est quod nomen naturae significat quodlibet principium intrinsicum motus2 secundum quod ,philosophus dicit quod natura est principium motus in eo in quo est per se1 et non secundum accidens4--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 iii41 q4 #b1 art4 #a in c4 #bhc ,and here we are reminded of the view of many medieval scholastics of high authority1 that the same material entity can have at the same time a plurality of formative principles or substantial forms of different grades of perfection4 #bhd ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 #bhb 7p4 #hbe74 #bhe ,for want of a more appropriate rendering we translate the ,latin term suppositum 7,gr4 7 by the phrase 8subsisting thing02 though the classical terms are really generic3 suppositum being a genus of which there are two species1 suppositum irrationale 78thing0 or 8subsisting thing07 and suppositum rationale 78person074--,cf4 infra1 pp4 #bfe-f4 #bhf ,complete in every way3 in substantial and in specific perfections4 ,the separated soul1 though it is an existing individual substance1 retains its essential communicability to its connatural material principle1 the body4 ,hence it has not 8subsistence10 it is not a 8person04--,cf4 infra1 p4 #bfd4 #bhg 8,per se agere convenit per se existenti4 ,sed per se existens quandoque potest dici aliquid1 si non sit inhrens ut accidens1 vel ut forma materialis1 etiamsi sit pars4 ,sed proprie et per se subsistens dicitur quod neque est praedicto modo inhrens neque est pars4 ,secundum quem modum oculus aut manus non potest dici per se subsistens1 et per consequens nec per se operans4 ,unde et operationes partium attribuuntur toti per partes4 ,dicimus enim quod homo videt per oculum et palpat per manum40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 #ge1 art4 #b1 ad4 #b4 #bhh ,cf4 preceding note4 ,st4 ,thomas continues3 8,potest igitur dici quod anima intelligit1 sicut oculus videt1 sed magis proprie dicitur quod homo intelligat per animam0 7ibid472 and elsewhere he writes3 8,dicendum quod anima est pars humanae speciei i4e4 naturae4 ,et ideo1 licet sit separata1 quia tamen retinet naturam unibilitatis1 non potest dici substantia individua quae est hypostasis vel substantia prima1 sicut nec manus1 nec quaecumque alia partium hominis2 et sic non competit ei neque definitio personae1 neque nomen40--,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 #bi1 art4 #a1 ad4 #e4 #bhi ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 i41 #ed-e4 #bij ,all created subsisting things and persons depend1 of course1 essentially on the ,necessary ,being for their existence and for their activity4 ,this ,necessary ,being we know from ,revelation to be ,triune1 ,three in ,persons1 ,one in ,nature4 ,the subsistence of each ,divine ,person of the ,blessed ,trinity excludes all modes of dependence4 #bia 8,hoc 444 quod est per se agere1 excellentiori modo convenit substantiis rationalis naturae quam aliis4 ,nam solae substantiae rationales habent dominium sui actus1 ita quod in eis est agere et non agere2 aliae vero substantiae magis aguntur quam agunt4 ,et ideo conveniens fuit ut substantia individua rationalis naturae speciale nomen haberet40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,quaest4 ,disp4 de ,potentia1 q4 ix41 art4 #a1 ad4 #c4 #bib ,cf4 ,,billot1 ,de ,verbo ,incarnato1 q4 ii4--apud ,,mercier1 op4 cit41 #aea 7pp4 #bii-cjj74 #bic ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 #bia1 for an exhaustive list of the authorities in favour of each of the various views propounded in this present context4 #bid 8,natura singularis et integra per se consituitur in sua independentia1 non aliquo positivo addito ultra illam entitatem positivam1 qua est haec natura40--,,scotus1 iii41 ,dist4 i4 q4 #a1 n4 #i and n4 #aa1 ad4 #c4 ,cf4 ,,suarez1 ,metaph41 ,disp4 xxxiv4 #b2 ,,kleutgen1 op4 cit41 #faf2 ,,franzelin1 ,de verbo ,incarnato1 ,th4 xxix4 #bie op4 cit41 #bic 7p4 #hfa74 #bif ,neither is it a natural union in the sense of being due to the human nature2 it is wholly undue to the latter1 and is in this sense supernatural4 #big op4 cit41 #bic 7p4 #hfa74 #bih ibid4 ,farther on 7p4 #hfc7 he says it is certain that the ,divine ,nature of the ,word is substantially united with humanity in a unity of person or subsistence3 8certum est eamdem naturam divinam substantialiter uniri cum humanitate in unitate suppositi20 and for this he considers that the human nature must be incomplete 8in ratione personae04 ,but this proves nothing2 for of course the human nature must be wanting in personality4 ,but it is complete as a nature4 ,nor does the aphorism he quotes--8,quidquid substantiae in sua specie completae accedit1 accidens est10--apply to subsistence or personality supervening on a complete substance4 #bii 8,humanitas illa scil4 ,christi1 quamvis completa in esse naturae1 non tamen habet ultimum complementum in genere substantiae cum in se non subsistat40--ibid41 #bif 7p4 #hff74 #cjj ,this view1 which has many supporters1 is clearly explained and ably defended by ,,mercier in his ,ontologie1 #aea 7pp4 #bih-cjb71 #eb 7pp4 #acd-e71 #di 7p4 #abg1 n4 #a74 #cja ,cf4 ,,mercier1 op4 cit41 #di 7p4 #abg1 n4 #a74 #cjb ,hence ,urraburu gives this real definition of subsistence3 ultimus naturae terminus in ordine substantiali sive in ratione existentis per se3 the ultimate term 7or determination7 of a nature in the order of substantiality or of 8existing by itself0--op4 cit41 #bif 7p4 #hff74 #cjc 8,sicut enim modus accidentalis figurae terminat quantitatem1 et modus ubicationis constituit rem hic et non alibi1 ita modus substantialis personalitatis terminans naturam reddit illam incommunicabilem alieno supposito40--,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 #bia 7p4 #hed74 #cjd ,the terms 8,self10 8,ego10 and 8,person0 we take to be identical in reference to the human individual4 ,the mind is not the ,ego1 self1 or person1 but only a part of it4--,cf4 ,,maher1 ,psychology1 ch4 vi41 p4 #ajd4 #cje ,cf4 ,,maher1 ,psychology1 ch4 xvii4 #cjf ibid41 p4 #cfe4 #cjg ,cf4 ,,maher1 ,psychology1 p4 #cfc4 #cjh ,cf4 ,,maher1 ,psychology1 p4 #cfe 7italics in last sentence ours74 #cji ,cf4 ,,rickaby1 ,first ,principles1 p4 #cgj4 #caj ,cf4 ,,maher1 ibid41 pp4 #dhg-ib2 ,,mercier1 ,psychologie1 ii41 pp4 #aig-bbd 7#fth edit472 ,ontologie1 #aec 7p4 #cjd74 #caa ,there are cogent theological reasons also against the view that consciousness constitutes personality4 ,for instance1 the human nature of our ,divine ,lord has its own proper consciousness1 which1 nevertheless1 does not constitute this nature a person4 #cab ,essay ,concerning ,human ,understanding1 bk4 ii41 ch4 xxvii4 #cac 8,that being then one plant which has such an organization of parts in one coherent body partaking of one common life1 it continues to be the same plant as long as it continues to partake of the same life1 though that life be communicated to different particles of matter vitally united to the living plant1 in a like continued organization conformable to that sort of plants4444 8,the case is not so much different in brutes1 but that anyone may hence see what makes an animal and continues it the same4444 8,this also shows wherein the identity of the same man consists3 viz4 in nothing but a participation of the same continued life1 by constantly fleeting particles of matter1 in succession vitally united to the same organized body4444 ,for if the identity of soul alone makes the same man1 and there be nothing in the nature of matter why the same individual spirit may be united i4e4 successively to different bodies1 it will be possible that 444 men living in distant ages1 and of different tempers1 may have been the same man44440--,essay ,concerning ,human ,understanding1 bk4 ii4 ch4 xxvii4 #d-f4 ,yet though 8identity of soul0 does not make 8the same man10 ,locke goes on immediately to assert that identity of consciousness1 which is but a function of the soul1 makes the same person4 #cad ,essay ,concerning ,human ,understanding1 bk4 ii41 ch4 xxvii41 #g4 ,names do not stand for ideas or concepts but for conceived realities2 and the question here is3 ,what is the conceived reality 7in the existing human individual7 for which the term 8person0 stands8 #cae ibid41 #i4 #caf ,essay ,concerning ,human ,understanding1 bk4 ii41 ch4 xxvii41 #ac1 #ad4 #cag ,essay ,concerning ,human ,understanding1 bk4 ii41 ch4 xxvii41 #ac4 #cah ,for a searching criticism of such theories of the ,ego or human person1 cf4 ,,maher1 ,psychology1 ch4 xxii4 #cai ibid41 #ai4 #cbj p4 #bgf4 #cba ,cf4 ,,maher',s criticism of ,professor ,james' theory on double personality 7op4 cit41 ch4 xxii41 pp4 #dia-b73 8,professor ,james devotes much space to these 'mutations' of the ,ego1 yet overlooks the fact that they are peculiarly fatal1 not to his adversaries1 but to his own theory that #8the present thought is the only thinker1' and that seeming identity is sufficiently preserved by each thought 'appropriating' and #8inheriting' the contents of its predecessor4 ,the difficulties presented to this process of inheritance by such facts as sleep and swooning have been already dwelt upon cf4 ibid41 p4 #dhj 7c72 but here they are if possible increased4 ,the last conscious thought of1 say1 ,felida #b has to transmit its gathered experience not to its proximate conscious successor1 which is ,felida #a1 but across seven months of vacuum until on the extinction of ,felida #a the next conscious thought which constitutes ,felida #b is born into existence4 ,if the single personality is hard for ,mr4 ,james to explain1 #8double-personality' at least doubles his difficulties40 #cbb ,cf4 infra1 #hb4 #cbc 1 4--,categ41 ch4 iv4 ,cf4 ,,st4 ,,thomas3 8,haec est ratio formalis qualitatis1 per quam respondemus interroganti qualis res sit40 #cbd ,the other accidents1 e4g4 actio and passio1 in so far as they change the perfection of the substance1 do so only by producing qualities in it4 ,quantity1 which is the connatural accident of all corporeal substance1 adds of itself no special complement or degree of accidental perfection to the latter1 in the sense of disposing 7or indisposing7 the latter for the attainment of the full and final perfection due to its specific nature2 but only in the sense that it supposes more or less of that kind of substance to exist1 or in the sense in which it is understood to include the qualities of which it may be the immediate subject4--,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 #cbf4 #cbe ,in ,praedicamenta1 ch4 i4 #cbf ,cf4 ,,maher1 ,psychology1 ch4 xii1 xiii1 xxiii1 xxv4 ,,bergson rightly recognizes the irreducibility of quality to quantity 7,essai sur les donnes immediates de la conscience1 passim74 ,but he wrongly infers from this 8fundamental antinomy10 as he calls it1 the existence1 in each human individual1 of a two-fold ,ego1 a deeper self where all is quality1 and a superficial self which projects conscious states1 in static and numerical isolation from one another1 into a homogeneous space where all is quantitative1 mathematical4 ,the reasonable inference is merely that the human mind recognizes in the data of its experience a certain richness and variety of modes of real being4 #cbg ,metaph4 ,v41 ch4 xiv41 where the four groups are finally reduced to two4 #cbh ,summa ,theol41 ia1 iiae1 q4 #di1 art4 #b4 #cbi ,to be distinguished from the passio which is correlative of actio and which consists in the actual undergoing of the latter1 the actual reception of the accidental form which is the term of the latter4 #ccj 8,inter omnes qualitates1 figurae maxime sequuntur et demonstrant speciem rerum4 ,quod maxime in plantis et animalibus patet1 in quibus nullo certiori indicio diversitas specierum dijudicari potest1 quam diversitate figurae40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,in ,,vii4 ,physic1 lect4 #e4 #cca ,every natural habit1 as we have just seen1 has an essential relation to activity4 ,every such habit inheres immediately in some operative faculty1 as science in the intellect1 or justice in the will4 ,all natural habits are operative4 ,there is1 however1 as we know from ,divine ,revelation1 an 8entitative0 habit1 a habitus entitativus1 which affects the substance itself of the human soul1 ennobling its natural mode of being and so perfecting it as to raise it to a higher or supernatural plane of being1 to an order of existence altogether undue to its nature3 the supernaturally infused habit of sanctifying grace4 #ccb ,eth4 ,eud41 ii41 #b4 #ccc 8,vires naturales non agunt operationes suas mediantibus aliquibus habitibus1 quia secundum seipsas sunt determinatae ad unum40--,summa ,theol41 ia ii1 q4 #di1 art4 #d1 ad #b4 #ccd 8,intellectus 444 est subjectum habitus4 ,illi enim competit esse subjectum habitus quod est in potentia ad multa2 et hoc maxime competit intellectui44440--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 ia1 iie1 q4 #ej1 art4 #d1 ad4 #a4 8,omnis potentia quae diversimode potest ordinari ad agendum1 indiget habitu1 quo bene disponatur ad suum actum4 ,voluntas autem cum sit potentia rationalis1 diversimode potest ad agendum ordinari3 et ideo oportet in voluntate aliquem habitum ponere1 quo bene disponatur ad suum actum 44410--ibid4 art4 #e1 in c4 #cce 8,habitualis dispositio requiritur ubi subjectum est in potentia ad multa4 ,operationes vero quae sunt ab anima per corpus1 principaliter quidem sunt ipsius animae1 secundario vero ipsius corporis4 ,habitus autem proportionantur operationibus2 unde ex similibus actibus similes habitus causantur1 ut dicitur in #b ,ethic41 cap4 #a et #b2 in corpore vero possunt esse secundario1 inquantum scilicet corpus disponitur et habilitatur ad prompte deserviendum operationibus animae40--,summa ,theol41 ia ii1 q4 #di1 art4 #a1 in c4 #ccf ,cf4 ,,st4 ,,thomas1 ibid41 q4 #ej1 art4 #a4--,,mercier1 ,ontologie1 #afd4 #ccg ,according to the scholastic theory of matter and form the matter must be predisposed by certain qualities for the reception of a given substantial form4 ,the chemical elements which form a compound will not do so in any and every condition1 but only when definitely disposed and brought together under favourable conditions4 ,these elementary qualities1 considered in themselves1 are not habits or dispositions3 8,unde qualitates simplices elementorum1 quae secundum unum modum determinatum naturis elementorum conveniunt1 non dicimus dispositiones vel habitus1 sed simplices qualitates40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ibid41 q4 #di1 art4 #d1 in ,c4 ,they are natural qualities and not dispositions produced by disposing causes4 #cch ,st4 ,thomas regards the distinction between habits and mere dispositions as a distinction not of degree but of kind3 8,dispositio et habitus possunt distingui sicut diversae species unius generis subalterni1 ut dicantur dispositiones illae qualitates primae speciei quibus convenit secundum propriam rationem ut de facili amittantur1 quia habent causas mutabiles1 ut aegritudo et sanitas2 habitus vero dicantur illae qualitates quae secundum suam rationem habent quod non de facili transmutentur quia habent causas immobiles2 sicut scientia et virtutes2 et secundum hoc disposito non fit habitus40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 ia1 ii1 q4 #di1 art4 #b1 ad4 #c4 #cci 8,vires sensitivae dupliciter possunt considerari3 uno modo1 secundum quod operanter ex instinctu naturae2 alio modo1 secundum quod operantur ex imperio rationis4 ,secundum igitur quod operantur ex instinctu naturae1 sic ordinantur ad unum1 sicut et natura2 et ideo sicut in potentiis naturalibus non sunt aliqui habitus1 ta etiam nec in potentiis sensitivis1 secundum quod ex instinctu naturae operantur4 ,secundum vero quod operantur ex imperio rationis1 sic ad diversa ordinari possunt3 et sic possunt esse in eis aliqui habitus1 quibus bene aut male ad aliquid disponuntur40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ibid41 q4 #ej1 art4 #c1 in c4 ,in this context the angelic doctor1 following ,aristotle1 places the virtues of temperance and fortitude in the sense appetite as controlled by the rational will4 ,for the same reason he admits the possibility of habits in the faculties of internal sense perception1 though not in the external senses 7ibid41 ad4 #c74 #cdj 8,quia bruta animalia a ratione hominis per quandam consuetudinem disponuntur ad aliquid operandum sic1 vel aliter1 hoc modo in brutis animalibus habitus quodammodo poni possunt4444 ,deficit tamen ratio habitus quantum ad usum voluntatis quia non habent dominium utendi vel non utendi1 quod videtur ad rationem habitus pertinere2 et ideo1 proprie loquendo1 in eis habitus esse non possunt40--ibid41 ad4 #b4 #cda ,it must not be forgotten that habit is an accident1 an accidental perfection of the substance or nature of an individual agent2 it immediately affects the operative power of the agent1 which operative power is itself an accident of this agent's nature 7constituting the second sub-class of the accident1 ,quality74 ,habit is thus at once an actuality or actualization of the operative power and a potentiality of further and more perfect acts4 ,it is intermediate between the operative power and the complete actualization which the power receives by the acts that spring from the latter as perfected by the habit4 ,faculty and habit form one complete proximate principle of those acts3 a principle which is at once a partial actualization of the individual agent's nature and a potentiality of further actualization of this nature4 #cdb 8,si potentiae animae non sunt ipsa essentia animae1 sequitur quod sint accidentia in aliquo novem generum contenta4 ,sunt enim in secunda specie qualitatis1 qu dicitur potentia vel impotentia naturalis40--,q4 ,disp4 de ,spir4 ,creat41 art4 #aa1 in c4 #cdc ,cf4 ,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 #gf1 art4 #a1 in c4--8,cum potentia et actus dividant ens1 et quodlibet genus entis1 opportet quod ad idem genus referatur potentia et actus2 et ideo si actus non est in genere substantiae1 potentia1 qu dicitur ad illum actum1 non potest esse in genere substantiae4 ,operatio autem animae non est in genere substantiae1 sed in solo ,deo1 cujus operatio est ejus substantia40--,cf4 ,,zigliara1 ,ontologia 7#i71 xi43 8,actus et potentia essentialiter ad illum actum ordinata sunt in eodem genere supremo40 #cdd 8,nec in angelo1 nec in aliqua creatura1 virtus vel potentia operativa est idem quod sua essentia4444 ,actus ad quem comparatur potentia operativa est operatio4 ,in angelo autem non est idem intelligere et esse2 nec aliqua alia operatio1 aut in ipso aut in quocunque alio creato1 est idem quod ejus esse4 ,unde essentia angeli non est ejus potentia intellectiva1 nec alicujus creati essentia est ejus operativa potentia40--ibid41 q4 #ed1 art #c4 #cde ,as we shall see later1 action as such does not perfect or change the agens1 unless when1 as in immanent action1 the agens is identical with the patiens4 ,action formally actualizes or perfects the patiens3 actio fit in passo4 ,but the exercise of any activity by an agent undoubtedly connotes or implies a perfection of this agent4 ,it is not1 however1 that the actual operation as such 7unless it is immanent7 adds a new perfection to the agent4 ,rather the agent's power of acting1 revealed to us in its exercise1 is for us a measure of the actual perfection of the agent4 ,but the question remains3 ,is this power or perfection1 so far as we know it1 a substantial perfection8 ,is it the very perfection itself of the agent's substance or nature as known to us8 ,or is it an accidental perfection which is for us an index of a corresponding degree of substantial perfection8 ,in getting our knowledge of the nature of a substance from a consideration of its sensible accidents1 its phenomena1 its operations--according to the rule1 ,operari sequitur esse3 qualis est operatio talis est natura--can we use a single inference1 from action to nature1 or must we use a double inference1 from action to power1 and from power to nature8 ,but even if we have to make the double inference1 this of itself does not prove any more than a conceptual distinction between power and nature4 #cdf ,cf44 ,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,q4 ,disp4 de spir4 creat41 art4 #aa1 in c4--,,maher1 ,psychology ch4 iii4 #cdg ,cf4 ,,mercier1 ,ontologie1 #afh4 #cdh ,cf4 ibid41 op4 cit41 #afi2 ,,maher1 ,psychology1 ch4 iii4 7p4 #bi1 n4 #c47 #cdi ,of course all accidents are 8forms0 in the sense of being determining principles of their subjects1 these being considered as determinable or receptive principles4 ,even quantity is a form in this sense4 ,but quantity itself does not appear to be a 8simple0 principle in the sense of being 8indivisible03 its very function is to make the corporeal substance divisible into integral parts4 ,what then of all those qualities which inhere immediately in the quantity of corporeal substances8 ,they are determinations or affections of a composite1 extended1 divisible subject4 ,conceived in the abstract they have1 of course1 the attributes of indivisibility1 immutability1 etc41 characteristic of all abstract essences 7#ad74 ,but in their physical actuality in what intelligible sense can they be said to be simple1 indivisible entities8 #cej ,summa ,theol41 ia1 iiae1 q4 #eb1 art4 #b2 iia1 iiae1 q4 #bd1 art4 #d1 #e4--,q4 ,disp4 de ,virtutibus in communi1 q4 i1 art4 #aa1 in c4--,i4 ,in ,sentent41 ,dist41 #ag1 q4 #b1 art4 #b4--;,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 #cbi-ccb1 for arguments and authorities4 ,the author himself defends the former view1 according to which alteration takes place by a real addition or substraction of grades of the same quality4 #cea ,i4 ,in ,sentent41 ,dist41 #ag1 q4 #b1 art4 #b4 #ceb iia1 iiae1 q4 #bd1 art4 #d1 ad4 #c4 #cec ,q4 ,disp4 de ,virtut41 q4 #a1 art4 #aa1 in c4 #ced ,the scientific concept of 8volume0 is identical with the common and philosophical concept of 8external1 actual1 local1 or spatial extension04 ,the functions ascribed by physics and mechanics to the 8mass0 of a body have no other source1 in the body1 than what philosophers understand by the 8internal extension0 or 8quantity0 of the body4--,cf4 ,nys1 ,cosmologie 7,louvain1 #aijc71 #aib-bjc4 #cee ,the terms quantity and extension are commonly taken as synonymous2 but quantity is more properly applied to the internal plurality of integral parts of the substance itself1 extension to the dispersion of these parts outside one another in space4 #cef ,hence ,aristotle's definition in ,metaph41 iv43 8,quantum dicitur1 quod est in insita divisibile1 quorum utrumque aut singula unum quid et hoc quid apta sunt esse03 a quantified substance is one which is divisible into parts that are really in it i4e4 partes integrantes1 parts each of which is capable of becoming a distinct subsisting individual thing4--,cf4 ,,nys1 ,cosmologie1 #aed4 #ceg 8,longitudo1 latitudo et profunditas quantitates quaedam1 sed non substantiae sunt4 ,quantitas enim non est substantia1 sed magis cui haec ipsa primo insunt illud est substantia40--,metaph41 ,l4 vii41 ch4 iii4 #ceh ,physic1 ,l4 i41 ch4 ii4 #cei ,l4 ii41 ch4 iv4 #cfj ,cf4 #fb supra4 #cfa 8,propria 444 totalitas substantiae continetur indifferenter in parva vel magna quantitate2 sicut 444 tota natura hominis in magno1 vel parvo homine40--,summa ,theol41 iii41 q4 #gf1 art4 #a1 ad4 #c4 #cfb ,no argument in favour of this view can be based on the use of the term species 78manentibus dumtaxat speciebus panis et vini07 by the ,fathers of the ,council of ,trent4 ,for them1 as for all ,catholic philosophers and theologians of the time1 the scholastic term species1 used in such a context1 meant simply the objective1 perceptible accidents of the substance4 ,cf4 ,,nys1 op4 cit41 #age4 #cfc ,hence the significance of the lines in ,,st4 ,,thomas' hymn1 ,adoro ,te devote3-- ,visus1 tactus1 gustus in te fallitur1 ,sed auditu solo tuto creditur4 #cfd and neither does ,revelation4 ,the ,body of our ,blessed ,lord exists in the ,eucharist without its connatural external extension and consequent impenetrability4 ,but according to the common teaching of ,catholic theologians it has its internal quantity1 its distinct integral parts1 organs and members--really distinct from one another1 though interpenetrating and not spatially external to one another4 ,its mode of existence in the space occupied by the sacramental species is thus analogous to the mode in which the soul is in the body1 or a pure spirit in space4 #cfe ,we know from ,revelation that the ,body of our ,lord exists in this way in the ,eucharist4 ,we know1 too1 from ,revelation that after the general resurrection the glorified bodies of the just will be real bodies1 real corporeal substances1 and nevertheless that they will be endowed with properties very different from those which they possess in the present state3 that they will be immortal1 incorruptible1 impassible1 8spiritual0 7cf4 #a ,cor4 xv474 ,the ,catholic philosopher who adds those scattered rays of revealed light to what his own rational analysis of experience tells him about matter and spirit1 will understand the possibility of such a kinship between the latter as will make the fact of their union in his own nature and person not perhaps any less wonderful1 but at any rate a little less surprising and inscrutable3 and this without committing himself to the objective idealism whereby ,berkeley1 while endeavouring to show the utter unreality of matter1 only succeeded in persuading himself that its reality was not independent of all mind4 #cff 8 1 40--,physic1 ,l4 iv41 ch4 iv4 7#f74 #cfg ,the category ,situs is commonly interpreted to signify the mutual spatial relations or dispositions of the various parts of a body in the place actually occupied by the latter4 #cfh ,a body deprived of its connatural extension exists in space in a manner analogous to that in which the soul is in the body4 ,the ,body of our ,divine ,lord is in the ,eucharist in this manner--8sacramentaliter04 #cfi ,cf4 ,,kleutgen1 op4 cit41 #fbd4 #cgj ,cf4 ,,zigliara1 ,ontologia 7#ce71 iv4 #cga ,cf4 ,,nys1 ,la ,notion d',espace 7,louvain1 #aija71 pp4 #ie sqq4--,la ,notion de ,temps 7,louvain1 #ahih71 pp4 #abc sqq4 #cgb 8,quid est ergo tempus8 ,si nemo ex me quaerat1 scio2 si quaerenti explicare velim1 nescio40--,confess4 ,l4 xi41 ch4 xiv4 #cgc 8,cum enim intelligimus extrema diversa alicujus medii1 et anima dicat1 illa esse duo nunc1 hoc prius1 illud posterius quasi numerando prius et posterius in motu1 tunc hoc dicimus esse tempus40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 in ,phys41 ,l4 iv4 lect4 #ag;a4 #cgd ,sentent41 ,dist4 xix41 q4 ii41 art4 #a4--;,cf4 ,lect4 xxiii4 in iv4 ,physic4 #cge ,physic41 iv41 ch4 xi4--,cf4 ,,st4 ,,thomas in loc4 #cgf 8,the conception of variation united with sameness is not1 however1 the whole cognition of time4 ,for this the mind must be able to combine in thought two different movements or pulsations of consciousness1 so as to represent an interval between them4 ,it must hold together two nows1 conceiving them1 in succession1 yet uniting them through that intellectual synthetic activity by which we enumerate a collection of objects--a process or act which carries concomitantly the consciousness of its own continuous unity40--,,maher1 ,psychology1 ch4 xvii4 #cgg ,that is1 provided we abstract from all comparison of this internal time duration with that of any other current of conscious experiences in the estimating mind4 ,as a matter of fact we always and necessarily compare the time duration of any particular experienced change with that of the remaining portion of the whole current of successive conscious states which make up our mental life4 ,and thus we feel1 not that the four-mile walk had a longer time duration than the three-mile walk1 but rather that it took place at a quicker rate1 more rapidly1 than the latter4 ,but if a mind which had no other consciousness of change whatsoever than1 e4g4 that of the two walks experienced successively1 no other standard change with which to compare each of them as it occurred--if such a mind experienced each in this way1 would it pronounce the four-mile walk to have occupied a longer time than the three-mile walk8--,cf4 infra1 p4 #cbg4 #cgh ,this is true on the assumption that the intrinsic time-duration of a successive1 continuous change1 its divisibility into distinct 8nows0 related as 8before0 and 8after10 is really identical with the continuous1 successive states constituting the change itself1 and is not a really distinct mode superadded to this change1 a continuous series of 8quandocationes10 distinct from the change1 and giving the latter its temporal duration4 ,but many philosophers hold that in all creatures duration is a mode of their existence really distinct from the creatures themselves that have this duration or continued existence4--,cf4 infra1 #hf4 #cgi ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 ii41 #bdf1 pp4 #bja sqq4 #chj op4 cit41 c4 xvii4 #cha op4 cit41 c4 xvii4 #chb ,cf4 ,,nys1 ,la ,notion de ,temps 7,lovain1 #ahih71 p4 #ajd4 #chc ,the fact that we can perceive and estimate temporal duration only extrinsically1 and in ultimate analysis by comparison with the flow of our own conscious states1 and that therefore we can have no perception or conception of the intrinsic time duration of any change1 seems to have been overlooked by ,,de ,,san 7,cosmologia1 pp4 #ebh-i7 when he argues from our perception of different rates of motion1 in favour of the view that time duration is not really identical with motion or change1 but a superadded mode1 really distinct from the latter4 #chd ,cf4 ,,nys1 ,la ,notion de ,temps1 pp4 #he sqq4 #che ,cf4 ,,nys1 op4 cit41 pp4 #abj sqq41 for a defence of the view that an actually infinite multitude involves no contradiction4 #chf ibid41 pp4 #afb-i4 #chg ,de ,consolatione1 ,l4 v41 pr4 ult4 #chh ,cf4 ,,kleutgen1 op4 cit41 #fbd4 #chi 8,est ergo dicendum1 quod1 cum aeternitas sit mensura esse permanentis secundum quod aliquid recedit a permanentia essendi1 secundum hoc recedit ab aeternitate4 ,quaedam autem sic recedunt a permanentia essendi1 quod esse eorum est subjectum transmutationis1 vel in transmutatiose consistit2 et hujusmodi mensurantur tempore1 sicut omnis motus1 et etiam esse omnium corruptibilium4 ,quaedam vero recedunt minus a permanentia essendi1 quia esse eorum nec in transmutatione consistit nec est subjectum transmutationis2 tamen habent transmutationem adjunctam vel in actu vel in potentia 444 patet de angelis1 quod scilicet habent esse intransmutabile cum transmutabilitate secundum electionem1 quantum ad eorum naturam pertinet1 et cum transmutabilitate intelligentiarum1 et affectionum1 et locorum suo modo4 ,et ideo hujusmodi mensurantur aevo1 quod est medium inter aeternitatem et tempus4 ,esse autem quod mensurat aeternitas1 nec est mutabile nec mutabilitati adjunctum4 ,sic ergo tempus habet prius et posterius1 aevum non habet in se prius et posterius1 sed ei conjungi possunt2 aeternitas autem non habet prius neque posterius1 neque ea compatitur40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 x41 art4 #e1 in c4 #cij pp4 #eag-eg4 #cia ,invisibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi1 per ea quae facta sunt intellecta1 conspiciuntur1 sempiterna quoque ejus virtus et divinitas1 ita ut qui veritatem ,dei in injustitia detinent sint inexcusabiles4--,rom4 ii4 #bj #ah4 #cib ,cf4 ,,maher1 ,psychology 7#dth edit471 pp4 #ij-b4 #cic ,for a clear and trenchant criticism of modern relativist theories1 cf4 ,,veitch1 ,knowing and ,being1 especially ch4 iv41 8,relation10 pp4 #abi sqq4 #cid ,cf4 ,,mercier1 op4 cit41 #agi-hj4 #cie ,principles of ,psychology1 ,p4 ii41 ch4 iii41 #hh4 #cif ,cf4 ,,maher1 ,psychology1 pp4 #aeg-i4 #cig 8,we cannot of course perceive an unperceived world1 nor can we conceive a world the conception of which is not in the mind2 but there is no contradiction or absurdity in the proposition3 #8,a material world of three dimensions has existed for a time unperceived and unthought of by any created being1 and then revealed itself to human minds'40--,,maher1 ,psychology1 p4 iii1 n4 #cih 8,i do not pretend to demonstrate anything1 nor do ,i feel much concern1 about any unknowable noumenon which never reveals itself in my consciousness4 ,if there be in existence an inscrutable #8transcendental ,ego1' eternally screened from my ken by this self-asserting #8empirical ,ego1' ,i confess ,i feel very little interest in the nature or the welfare of the former4 ,the only soul about which ,i care is that which immediately presents itself in its acts1 which thinks1 wills1 remembers1 believes1 loves1 repents1 and hopes40--,,maher1 op4 cit41 p4 #dge4 ,cf4 ,,mercier1 op4 cit41 #ahj1 pp4 #cfc4 #cii 1 1 1 1 4--,categ4 v4 #a4 #djj ,i ,sentent41 ,dist4 xxvi41 q4 #b1 art4 #a4 #dja 8,sicut realis relatio consistit in ordine rei ad rem1 ita relatio rationis consistit in ordine intellectuum ordination of concepts2 quod quidem dupliciter potest contingere4 ,uno modo secundum quod iste ordo est adinventus per intellectum1 et attributus ei1 quod relative dicitur2 et hujusmodi sunt relationes quae attribuuntur ab intellectu rebus intellectis1 prout sunt intellectae1 sicut relatio generis et speciei2 has enim relationes ratio adinvenit considerando ordinem ejus1 quod est in intellectu ad res1 quae sunt extra1 vel etiam ordinem intellectuum ad invicem4 ,alio modo secundum quod hujusmodi relationes consequuntur modum intelligendi1 videlicet quod intellectus intelligit aliquid in ordine ad aliud2 licet illum ordinem intellectus non adinveniat1 sed magis ex quadam necessitate consequatur modum intelligendi4 ,et hujusmodi relationes intellectus non attribuit ei1 quod est in intellectu1 sed ei1 quod est in re4 ,et hoc quidem contingit secundum quod aliqua non habentia secundum se ordinem1 ordinate intelliguntur2 licet intellectus non intelligit ea habere ordinem1 quia sic esset falsus4 ,ad hoc autem quod aliqua habeant ordinem1 oportet quod utrumque sit ens1 et utrumque ordinabile ad aliud4 ,quandoque autem intellectus accipit aliqua duo ut entia1 quorum alterum tantum vel neutrum est ens2 sicut cum accipit duo futura1 vel unum praesens et aliud futurum1 et intelligit unum cum ordine ad aliud1 dicit alterum esse prius altero2 unde istae relationes sunt rationis tantum1 utpote modum intelligendi consequentes4 ,quandoque vero accipit unum ut duo1 et intelligit ea cum quodam ordine2 sicut cum dicitur aliquid esse idem sibi3 et sic talis relatio est rationis tantum4 ,quandoque vero accipit aliqua duo ut ordinabilia ad invicem1 inter quae non est ordo medius1 immo alterum ipsorum essentialiter est ordo2 sicut cum dicit relationem accidere subjecto2 unde talis relatio relationis ad quodcumque aliud est rationis tantum4 ,quandoque vero accipit aliquid cum ordine ad aliud1 inquantum est terminus ordinis alterius ad ipsum1 licet ipsum non ordinetur ad aliud3 sicut accipiendo scibile ut terminum ordinis scientiae ad ipsum40--,de ,potentia1 q4 vii41 art4 #aa2 cf4 ibid4 art4 #aj4 8,cum relatio requirit duo extrema1 tripliciter se habet ad hoc quod sit res naturae aut rationis4 ,quandoque enim ex utraque parte est res rationis tantum1 quando scilicet ordo vel habitudo non potest esse inter aliqua nisi secundum apprehensionem intellectus tantum1 utpote cum dicimus idem eidem idem4 ,nam secundum quod ratio apprehendit bis aliquod unum statuit illud ut duo2 et sic apprehendit quandam habitudinem ipsius ad seipsum4 ,et similiter est de omnibus relationibus quae sunt inter ens et non ens1 quas format ratio1 inquantum apprehendit non ens ut quoddam extremum4 ,et idem est de omnibus relationibus quae consequuntur actum rationis1 ut genus1 species1 et hujusmodi44440--,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 xiii41 art4 #g4 #djb ,summa ,theol41#a4 q4 xiii4 art4 #g4 ,elsewhere he points the distinction in these terms3 8,respectus ad aliud aliquando est in ipsa natura rerum1 utpote quando aliquae res secundum suam naturam ad invicem ordinatae sunt1 et ad invicem inclinationem habent2 et hujusmodi relationes oportet esse reales4444 ,aliquando vero respectus significatus per ea1 quae dicuntur ,ad aliquid1 est tantum in ipsa apprehensione rationis conferentis unum alteri2 et tunc est relatio rationis tantum1 sicut cum comparat ratio hominem animali1 ut speciem ad genus40--ibid41 q4 xxviii41 art4 #a4 #djc ,st4 ,thomas gives expression to it in these sentences3 8,perfectio et bonum quae sunt in rebus extra animam1 non solum attenduntur secundum aliquid absolute inhaerens rebus1 sed etiam secundum ordinem unius rei ad aliam2 sicut etiam in ordine partium exercitus1 bonum exercitus consistit3 huic enim ordini comparat ,philosophus ,aristot41 xii4 7x47 ,metaph41 ,comment4 #eb sqq4 ordinem universi4 ,oportet1 ergo in ipsis rebus ordinem quemdam esse2 hic autem ordo relatio quaedam est4444 ,sic ergo oportet quod res habentes ordinem ad aliquid1 realiter referantur ad ipsum1 et quod in eis aliqua res sit relatio40--,,qq4 ,disp4 ,de ,potentia1 q4 vii41 art4 #i4 #djd ,kritik der reinen ,vernunft1 bk4 i41 ,hauptst4 ii41 ,abschn4 ii41 #bf4 #dje ,logic1 bk4 i41 ch4 iii41 #aj4 #djf ,l',ide du phnomne1 p4 #aha--;apud ,,mercier1 op4 cit41 #agc4 #djg 8,quaedam vero relationes sunt quantum ad utrumque extremum res naturae1 quando scilicet est habitudo inter aliqua duo secundum aliquid realiter conveniens utrique2 sicut patet de omnibus relationibus quae consequuntur quantitatem1 ut magnum et parvum1 duplum et dimidium1 et hujusmodi2 nam quantitas est in utroque extremorum3 et simile est de relationibus quae consequuntur actionem et passionem1 ut motivum et mobile1 pater et filius1 et similia40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 xiii41 art4 #g4 #djh 8,quandoque vero relatio in uno extremorum est res naturae1 et in altero est res rationis tantum3 et hoc contingit quandocunque duo extrema non sunt unius ordinis2 sicut sensus et scientia referuntur ad sensibile et scibile2 quae quidem1 inquantum sunt res quaedam in esse naturale existentes1 sunt extra ordinem esse sensibilis et intelligibilis4 ,et ideo in scientia quidem et sensu est relatio realis1 inquantum ordinantur ad sciendum vel sentiendum res2 sed res ipsae in se consideratae sunt extra ordinem hujusmodi2 unde in eis non est aliqua relatio realiter ad scientiam et sensum1 sed secundum rationem tantum1 inquantum intellectus apprehendit ea ut terminos relationum scientiae et sensus4 ,unde ,philosophus dicit in #e ,metaph41 text4 #bj1 quod non dicuntur relative1 eo quod ipsa referantur ad alia1 sed quia alia referantur ad ipsa40--ibid4 #dji ,being really and adequately identical with its foundation1 which is the essence of its subject1 this relation does not necessarily need the actual existence of its term4 ,thus actual knowledge or science1 which is a habit of the mind1 has a transcendental relation to its object even though this latter be not actual but only a pure possibility4 ,similarly the accident of quantity sustained without its connatural substance in the ,eucharist1 retains its transcendental relation to the latter4--,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 #cce 7p4 #iig74 #daj ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 #ccf 7p4 #iij74 #daa ,metaph41 ,l4 v41 ch4 xv4 ,cf4 ,,st4 ,,thomas1 in loc41 lect4 #ag1 where1 approving of this triple division1 he writes3 8,cum enim relatio quae est in rebus1 consistat in ordine unius rei ad aliam1 oportet tot modis hujusmodi relationes esse1 quot modis contingit unam rem ad aliam ordinari4 ,ordinatur autem una res ad aliam1 vel secundum esse1 prout esse unius rei dependet ab alia1 et sic est tertius modus4 ,vel secundum virtutem activam et passivam1 secundum quod una res ab alia recipit1 vel alteri confert aliquid2 et sic est secundus modus4 ,vel secundum quod quantitas unius rei potest mensurari per aliam2 et sic est primus modus40 #dab ,cf4 ,,mercier1 op4 cit41 #age4 ,for transcendental and predicamental unity1 cf4 supra1 #bf1 #bh4 #dac ,cf4 infra1 p4 #cee4 ,some authors hold that the relation in question is predicamental4 ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 p4 #ihg4 ,the nature or essence of any individual would seem to imply in its very concept a transcendental relation of specific identity with all other actual and possible individual embodiments of this essence4 ,the point is one of secondary importance4 #dad ,even virtually1 though not formally4 ,the creative act is not formally transitive2 it is virtually so3 and in the creature it grounds the latter's relation of real dependence on the ,creator4 #dae ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 #ccf 7p4 #ihi71 #cda 7p4 #ajaa72 ,,st4 ,,thomas1 iii4 ,sentent41 ,dist41 viii41 q4 i41 art4 #e4 #daf ,,mercier1 op4 cit41 #age4 #dag ,,mercier1 ibid4 #dah 8,cum igitur ,deus sit extra totum ordinem creaturae1 et omnes creaturae ordinentur ad ipsum et non e converso2 manifestum est quod creaturae realiter1 referuntur ad ipsum ,deum2 sed in ,deo non est aliqua realis relatio ejus ad creaturas1 sed secundum rationem tantum1 inquantum creaturae referantur ad ipsum40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 xiii41 art4 #g4 #dai ,among others ,cajetan1 ,ferriariensis1 ,capreolus1 ,baez1 ,joannes a ,st4 ,thoma4 ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 #cch 7p4 #iid72 ,,mercier1 op4 cit41 #agd4 ,it would be interesting to know how precisely those authors conceived this 8relative0 entity1 this 8esse ad0 as a reality independent of their own thought-activity4 ,cf4 art4 by the present writer in the ,irish ,theological ,quarterly 7vol4 vii41 ,april1 #aiab3 8,reflections on some ,forms of ,monism10 pp4 #afg-h73 8,the whole universe of direct experience displays a unity of order or design which pervades it through and through2 it is a revelation of intelligent purpose4 ,now a ,cosmos1 an orderly universe--which is intelligible only as the expression of intelligent purpose1 and not otherwise--is a system of interrelated factors4 ,but relating is unintelligible except as an expression of the activity of mind or spirit1 that is1 of something at least analogous to our mental activity of comparing and judging4 ,scholastic philosophers1 as we know1 discuss the question whether or how far the exact object of our #8relation' concept is real2 that is1 whether this object is1 in itself and apart from the terms related and the foundation1 a mere ens rationis1 a product of our thought1 or whether it is in itself something more than this2 and some of them hold that there are relations which1 in themselves and formally as relations1 are something more than mere products of our thought4 ,now if there be such relations1 since they are not products of our thought1 we may fairly ask3 ,must they be the product of some thought8 ,and from our analysis of our very notion of what a relation is1 it would seem that they must be in some sort or other a product or expression of some thought-activity3 even relations between material things4 ,it is in determining how precisely this is1 or can be1 that the theist and the monist differ4 ,the theist regards all material things1 with their real relations--and all our finite human minds1 which apprehend the material world and its relations and themselves and one another--as being indeed in a true sense terms or objects of the ,thought of ,god2 not1 however1 as therefore identical or consubstantial with the ,divine ,spirit1 but as distinct from ,it though dependent on ,it3 inasmuch as he holds the ,divine ,thought to be creative1 and regards all these things as its created terms4 ,the kinship he detects between matter and spirit lies precisely in this1 that matter is for him a created term of the ,divine ,thought4 ,for him too1 therefore1 matter can have no existence except as a term of thought--the creative ,thought of ,god40 ,not that 8the intelligible relations apprehended by us in matter are 444 identical in reality with the thought-activity of the ,divine ,mind10 as ,ontologists have taught cf4 supra1 #ad1 #ah1 #ai2 nor that we can directly infer the existence of a ,supreme ,spirit from the existence of matter1 as ,berkeley tried to do by erroneously regarding the latter merely as an essentially mind-dependent phenomenon2 because 8for the orthodox theist matter is in its own proper nature not spiritual1 mental1 psychical2 not anything after the manner of a thought-process1 or endowed with the spirit-mode of being04 ,if predicamental relations1 such as quality or similarity of material things1 are1 as those medieval scholastics contended1 real entities1 8relative0 in their nature1 and really distinct from their extremes and foundations1 did those scholastics conceive such 8relative entities0 as essentially mind-dependent entities8 ,if they did they would probably have conceived them in the sense of ,berkeley1 as created terms of the ,divine ,thought1 rather than in the ,ontologist sense which would identify them with the ,divine ,thought itself4 ,but it is not likely that they conceived such relative entities as essentially thought-dependent1 any more than the absolute material realities related to one another by means of these relative entities4 ,on the other hand it is not easy to see how such relative entities can be anything more than mere products of some thought-activity or other4 #dbj ,they rely especially on this text from the ,de ,potentia 7q4 vii41 art4 #i73 8,relatio est debilioris esse inter omnia praedicamenta2 ideo putaverunt quidam eam esse ex secundis intellectibus4 ,secundum ergo hanc positionem sequeretur quod relatio non sit in rebus extra animam sed in solo intellectu1 sicut intentio generis et speciei1 et secundarum substantiarum4 ,hoc autem esse non potest4 ,in nullo enim praedicamento ponitur aliquid nisi res praeter animam existens4 ,nam ens rationis dividitur contra ens divisum per decem praedicamenta4444 ,si autem relatio non est in rebus extra animam non poneretur ad aliquid unum genus praedicamenti40 #dba ,cf4 ,,st4 ,,anselm1 ,monolog41 ch4 xxvi4 #dbb 8,relatio habet quod sit res naturae ex sua causa per quam una res naturalem ordinem habet ad alteram40--,quodl4 #a1 art4 #b4 #dbc 8,in hoc differt ,ad ,aliquid i4e4 ,relation ab aliis generibus2 quod alia genera ex propria sui ratione habent1 quod aliquid sint1 sicut quantitas ex hoc ipso quod est quantitas1 aliquid ponit3 et similiter est de aliis4 ,sed ,ad ,aliquid ex propria sui generis ratione non habet1 quod ponat aliquid1 sed ad aliquid4444 ,habet autem relatio quod sit aliquid reale ex eo1 quod relationem causat40--,quodl4 #i1 art4 #d4 ,cf4 ,de ,potentia1 q4 ii41 art4 #e4 #dbd 8,relatio est aliquid inhaerens licet non ex hoc ipso quod est relatio4444 ,et ideo nihil prohibet1 quod esse desinat hujusmodi accidens sine mutatione ejus in quo est40--,de ,potentia1 q4 vii41 art4 #i1 ad4 #g4 #dbe 8,et utroque modo contingit in realibus relationibus destrui relationem3 vel per destructionem quantitatis or other foundation1 unde ad hanc mutationem quantitatis sequitur per accidens mutatio relationis3 vel etiam secundum quod cessat respectus ad alterum1 remoto illo ad quod referebatur2 et tunc relatio cessat1 nulla mutatione facta in ipsa4 ,unde in illis in quibus non est relatio nisi secundum hunc respectum1 veniunt et recedunt relationes sine aliqua mutatione ejus1 quod refertur40--,in i4 ,sent41 ,dist4 xxvi41 q4 ii41 art4 #a1 ad4 #c4 #dbf 8,relationes differunt in hoc ab omnibus aliis rerum generibus1 quia ea quae sunt aliorum generum1 ex ipsa ratione sui generis habent1 quod sint res naturae1 sicut quantitates ex ratione quantitatis1 et qualitates ex ratione qualitatis4 ,sed relationes non habent quod sint res naturae ex ratione respectus ad alterum4444 ,sed relatio habet quod sit res naturae ex sua causa1 per quam una res naturalem ordinem habet ad alteram1 qui quidem ordo naturalis et realis est ipsis ipsa relatio40--,quodl41 #a1 art4 #b4 #dbg ,cf4 supra1 p4 #cea1 n4 #a2 in which context we may reasonably suppose him to be arguing that relation considered adequately is not a mere logical entity1 8ex secundis intellectibus10 inasmuch as1 having a real foundation in things outside the mind1 it is in this respect real1 independently of our thought4 #dbh ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 #cda 7p4 #ajjh74 #dbi ibid41 p4 #ajjg2 cf4 supra1 p4 #cdg4 #dcj ,in i4 ,sentent41 ,dist4 iv41 q4 #a1 art4 #a1 ad4 #c4 #dca ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 ibid41 pp4 #ajjf-g3 8,deinde nullam relationem esse substantiam scripsit ,s4 ,thomas vel quia plerumque ratio fundandi non est substantia 444 vel potius quia semper relatio1 etiam cum in substantia fundatur1 aliquid addit supra substantiam cujuslibet extremi relati singillatim sumpti1 quia non identificatur cum fundamento prout se tenet ex parte solius subjecti1 vel solius termini1 sed prout se tenet ea parte utriusque4 ,quare relatio 444 semper exprimit denominationem contingentem et accidentaliter supervenientem subjecto1 utpote quae adesse vel abesse potest1 prout adsit vel deficiat terminus40 #dcb 8,illi enim the reference is to certain medieval idealists quamvis agnoscerent duo alba existentia negabant dari actu in rebus formalem similaritatem i4e4 even after the comparative activity of thought1 sed formalem similitudinem1 et aliam quamvis relationem1 reponebant in actu intellectus unum cum alio comparantis2 nos vero ante actum intellectus agnoscimus in rebus1 quidquid sufficit ad constituendam relationem similitudinis1 diversitatis1 paternitatis1 etc41 ita ut hujusmodi denominationes non verificentur de actu intellectus unum cum alio comparantis1 sed plenam habeant in rebus ipsis verificationem40--,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 p4 #ajaj4 #dcc ,in what sense 8extramental08--,cf4 supra1 p4 #cej1 n4 #a 7end74 #dcd ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 ii41 #bah4 ,for the concepts of 8cause0 and 8causality0 in the inductive sciences1 as well as for much that cannot be repeated here1 the student may consult with advantage vol4 ii41 p4 iv41 ch4 iii41 iv4 and vi4 of the work referred to4 #dce 8,id a quo aliquid procedit quocunque modo40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 xxxiii41 art4 #a4 #dcf ,hence ,aristotle's definition of principle1 including both logical and real principles3 4--,metaph4 ,,iv41 ch4 i4 #dcg ,a cause must be prior in nature to its effect1 but not necessarily prior in time4 ,in fact the action of the cause and the production of the effect must be simultaneous4 ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 ii41 #bbj4 ,considered formally as correlatives they are simul natura4 ,a principle must likewise be in some sense prior to what proceeds from it1 not necessarily1 however1 by priority of time1 nor by priority of nature involving real dependence4 ,the ,christian ,revelation regarding the ,blessed ,trinity involves that the ,first ,divine ,person is the 8principle0 from which the ,second proceeds1 and the ,first and the ,second the 8principle0 from which the ,third proceeds2 yet here there is no dependence or inequality1 or any priority except the 8relation of origin0 be called priority4 #dch ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 ii41 #baf4 #dci ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 i41 #af2 ii41 #bad1 #bbd 7p4 #aac74 #ddj ,cf4 ,,mercier1 op4 cit41 #beb4 #dda ,cf4 ,physic41 ,lib4 ii41 cap4 #c2 ,metaph41 ,lib4 i41 cap4 #c2 v41 cap4 #b4 #ddb i4e4 from the effect considered formally as a term of the activity2 in the case of immanent activity1 as1 e4g4 thought or volition1 where the effect remains within the agent 7as a verbum mentale or other mental term71 uniting with the concrete reality of the latter1 the effect is not adequately distinct from the agent as affected by this term or product4 #ddc ,cf4 ,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,in ,physic41 ii41 lect4 #aj3 8,necesse est quatuor esse causas3 quia cum causa sit1 ad quam sequitur esse alterius1 esse ejus quod habet causam potest considerari dupliciter3 uno modo absolute1 et sic causa essendi est forma per quam aliquid est ens in actu2 alio modo secundum quod de potentia ente fit actu ens3 et quia omne quod est in potentia1 reducitur ad actum per id quod est actu ens1 ex hoc necesse est esse duas alias causas1 scilicet materiam1 et agentem quod reducit materiam de potentia in actum4 ,actio autem agentis ad aliquod determinatum tendit1 sicut ab aliquo determinato principio procedit2 nam omne agens agit quod est sibi conveniens4 ,id autem ad quod intendit actio agentis dicitur causa finalis4 ,sic igitur necesse est esse causas quatuor40 #ddd ,cf4 ,,mercier1 op4 cit41 #bdg-h4 #dde ,certain medieval scholastics1 especially of the ,franciscan ,school1 regarded spiritual substances as having in their constitution a certain potential1 determinable principle1 which they called 8materia04 ,st4 ,thomas1 without objecting to the designation1 insisted that such potential principle cannot be the same as the materia prima of corporeal substances 7cf4 ,de ,substantis ,separatis1 ch4 vii474 #ddf ,cf4 ,,st4 ,,thomas3 8,actio est actus activi et passio est actus passivi0 7iii4 ,physic41 l4 #e72 8,materia non fit causa in actu nisi secundum quod alteratur et mutatur0 7i4 ,contra ,gentes1 xvii472 8,materia est causa formae1 inquantum forma non est nisi in materia0 7,de ,princip4 ,naturae74 #ddg ,cf4 ,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,de ,princip4 ,naturae1 ibid43 8444 et similiter forma est causa materiae1 inquantum materia non habet esse in actu nisi per formam2 materia enim et forma dicuntur relative ad invicem2 dicuntur etiam relative ad compositum1 sicut pars ad totum04 #ddh 8,materia cum sit infinitarum formarum determinatur per formam1 et per eam consequitur aliquam speciem40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 vii41 art4 #a4 #ddi ,to ,special ,metaphysics also belongs the controverted question whether or not a plurality of really distinct substantial forms can enter into the constitution of an individual corporeal substance4 ,when we classify corporeal things into genera and species according to their natural kinds 7cf4 ,science of ,logic1 i41 #fg71 these latter are determined by the formae substantiales of the things classified1 and are called infim species4 ,numerically distinct individuals which have 7conceptually7 the same forma substantialis1 fall into the same infima species2 while if such individuals have 7conceptually and numerically7 distinct formae substanialis they fall into distinct infimae species of some higher common genus4 ,the wider the generic concept the larger the group of individuals which it unifies3 it is a principle of conceptual unity1 i4e4 of universality4 ,the objects of our generic1 differential1 and specific concepts1 throughout this process of classification1 are only virtually distinct metaphysical grades of being in the individuals4 ,now if the forma substantialis which yields the unifying concept of the species infima for the individuals1 and the material principle which is the ground of the numerical distinction between these latter1 were likewise regarded by the scholastics as being merely virtually distinct metaphysical grades of being1 in each individual1 then the question of a plurality of really distinct forms in one and the same individual would have no meaning3 all 8forms0 in the latter would be only virtually distinct from one another and from the material principle4 ,but the scholastics did not conceive that the real ground for grouping individuals into species infimae was the same as that for grouping these latter into wider genera4 ,they regarded the relation between the forma substantialis and the materia prima in the individual as quite different from that between the generic and specific grades of being in the individual 7cf4 supra1 #ch2 ,science of ,logic1 i41 #dd2 ,,joseph1 ,introduction to ,logic1 pp4 #ic-f74 ,while they considered the latter a relation of virtual distinction they held the former to be one of real distinction4 ,and while they recognized the concept of the species infima to be a principle of conceptual unity in grouping the individuals together mentally1 ,st4 ,thomas emphasized especially the rle of the forma substantialis 7on which that concept was founded7 as a principle of real unity in the individual3 8,ab eodam habet res esse et unitatem4 ,manifestum est autem quod res habet esse per formam4 ,unde et per formam res habet unitatem0 7,quodlib4 i41 art4 #f74 ,if we accept this doctrine of ,st4 ,thomas the arguments which he bases on it against the possibility of a plurality of distinct substantial forms in the same corporeal individual are unanswerable 7,cf4 ,,mercier1 ,ontologie1 #bae74 #dej 8,idem actus secundum rem est duorum secundum diversam rationem3 agentis quidem1 secundum quod est ab eo1 patientis autem1 secundum quod est in ipso4444 ,ex eo quod actio et passio sunt unus motus non sequitur quod actio et passio1 vel doctio et doctrina1 sint idem2 sed quod motus cui inest utrumque eorum1 sit idem4 ,qui quidem motus secundum unam rationem est actio1 et secundum aliam rationem est passio2 alterum enim est secundum rationem esse actus hujus1 ut in hoc1 et esse actus hujus1 ut ab hoc2 motus autem dicitur actio secundum quod est actus agentis ut ab hoc2 dicitur autem passio secundum quod est actus patientis ut in hoc4 ,et sic patet quod licet motus sit idem moventis et moti1 propter hoc quod abstrahit ab utraque ratione3 tamen actio et passio differunt propter hoc quod diversas rationes in sua significatione habent40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,in ,phys41 iii4 #a4 #e4 #dea 8,solet dubium esse apud quosdam1 utrum motus sit in movente1 aut in mobili4444 ,sed manifestum est quod actus cujuslibet est in eo cujus est actus2 actus autem motus est in mobili1 cum sit actus mobilis1 causatus tamen in eo a movente 444 cum motus sit actus existentis in potentia1 sequitur quod motus non sit actus alicujus inquantum est movens1 sed inquantum est mobile40--ibid41 #a4 #d4 #deb ,some languages mark the distinction between these two kinds of action3 8,differt autem facere et agere3 quia factio est actio transiens in exteriorem materiam1 sicut aedificare1 secare et hujusmodi2 agere autem est actio permanenslin ipso agente sicut videre1 velle et hujusmodi40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol4 iae iia1 q4 lxvii41 art4 #d1 c4 #dec ,hume went even farther1 at least in language2 for he alleged 7whether he really believed is another question7 that he could overcome the supposed merely psychological difficulty1 that he could easily--and1 presumably1 without doing violence to his rational nature--conceive a non-existent thing as coming into existence without a cause6 ,he proclaimed that he could achieve the feat of thinking what the universal voice of mankind has declared to be unthinkable3 an absolute beginning of being from nothingness4 8,the knowledge of this relation 7causality7 is not10 he writes1 8in any instance attained by reasonings a priori2 but arises entirely from experience1 when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other 07,works1 ed4 ,green and ,grose1 iv41 #bd74 8,all distinct ideas are separable from each other1 and1 as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct1 'twill be easy for us 767 to conceive any object as nonexistent this moment1 and existent the next1 without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or producing principle0 7,treatise on ,human ,nature1 p4 #cha74 ,on this argument 787 even such an ardent admirer of the pan-phenomenist as ,huxley was1 is forced to remark that 8it is of the circular sort1 for the major premise1 that all distinct ideas are separable in thought1 assumes the question at issue0 7,,huxley',s ,hume1 p4 #abb74 #ded ,thus1 for instance1 man1 elevated by sanctifying grace1 can perform acts which merit the supernatural reward of the ,beatific ,vision4 #dee ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 ii41 #bca4 #def ,cf4 ,,aristotle1 ,metaph41 ii41 cap4 #b4 #deg ,cf4 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 #cib 7p4 #aabc73 8,unde adaequata virtus instrumentalis videtur conflari ex naturali instrumenti virtute vel efficacitate et ex virtute causae principalis sibi transeunter addita1 docente ,s4 ,thoma3 ,instrumentum virtutem instrumentalem acquirit dupliciter scilicet quando accipit formam instrumenti et quando movetur a principali agente ad effectum 7,summa ,theol41 iii41 q4 xix41 art4 #c1 ad4 #b740 #deh 8,ad aliquem effectum aliquid operatur dupliciter4 ,uno modo sicut per se agens2 et dicitur per se agere quod agit per aliquam formam sibi inhaerentem per modum naturae completae1 sive habeat illam formam a se1 sive ab alio4444 ,alio modo aliquid operatur ad effectum aliquem instrumentaliter1 quod quidem non operatur ad effectum per formam sibi inhaerentem1 sed solum inquantum est motum a per se agente4 ,haec est ratio instrumenti1 inquantum est instrumentum1 ut moveat motum2 unde sicut se habet forma completa ad per se agentem1 ita se habet motus1 quo movetur a principale agente1 ad instrumentum1 sicut serra operatur ad scamnum4 ,quamvis enim serra habeat aliquam actionem quae sibi competit secundum propriam formam1 ut dividere2 tamen aliquem effectum habet qui sibi non competit1 nisi inquantum est mota ab artifice1 scilicet facere rectam incisionem1 et convenientem formae artis3 et sic instrumentum habet duas operationes2 unam quae competit ei secundam rationem propriam2 aliam quae competit ei secundam quod est motum a per se agente1 quae transcendit virtutem propriae formae40--,de ,veritate1 q4 xxvii41 art4 #d4 ,it is not clear1 however1 that ,st4 ,thomas regarded these two 8operationes0 of the instrumental cause as really distinct1 for he says that it acts as an instrument 7i4e4 modifies the efficiency of the principal cause7 only by exercising its own proper function3 8,omne agens instrumentale exsequitur actionem principalis agentis per aliquam operationem propriam1 et connaturalem sibi1 sicut calor naturalis generat carnem dissolvendo et digerendo1 et serra operatur ad factionem scamni secando0 7,contra ,gentes1 ii41 ch4 xxi473 from which he goes on to argue that no creature can act even as an instrumental cause in creating4--,cf4 iv4 ,sent41 ,dist4 i41 q4 i41 art4 #d1 sol4 #b4--;,de ,potentia1 q4 iii41 art4 #g4--,summa ,theol41 iii41 q4 lxii41 art4 #a1 ad4 #b4 #dei ,st4 ,thomas1 proving the necessity of the ,divine concursus for all created causes1 illustrates the general distinction between a principal and an instrumental cause3 8,virtus naturalis quae est rebus naturalibus in sua institutione collata1 inest eis ut quaedem forma habens esse ratum et firmum in natura4 ,sed id quod a ,deo fit in re naturali1 quo actualiter agat1 est ut intentio sola1 habens esse quoddam incompletum1 per modum quo 444 virtus artis est in instrumento artificis4 ,sicut ergo securi per artem dari potuit acumen1 ut esset forma in ea permanens1 non autem dari ei potuit quod vis artis esset in ea quasi quaedam forma permanens1 nisi haberet intellectum2 ita rei naturali potuit conferri virtus propria1 ut forma in ipsa permanens1 non autem vis qua agit ad esse ut instrumentum primae causae1 nisi daretur ei quod esset universale essendi principium2 nec iterum virtuti naturali conferri potuit ut moveret seipsam1 nec ut conservaret se in esse3 unde sicut patet quod instrumento artificis conferri non oportuit quod operaretur absque motu artis2 ita rei naturali conferri non potuit quod operaretur absque operatione divina40--,,qq4 ,,dd4 ,de4 ,pot41 q4 iii41 art4 #g4 #dfj ,cf4 ,,maher1 ,psychology1 ch4 xix4--,,mercier1 ,psychologie1 ii41 ch4 i4 #b4 #dfa ,for a fuller treatment of this whole subject1 cf4 ,science of ,logic1 ii41 ,part iv41 chs4 iii41 iv42 ,part v41 ch4 i4--,,maher1 ,psychology1 ch4 xix41 pp4 #dbc-d4 #dfb ,cf4 ,,newman1 ,grammar of ,assent1 ,part i41 ch4 iv41 #a 7#e71 7#f72 #b1 remark #a4 #dfc ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 ii41 #baf1 #bah1 #bai4 #dfd ibid41 #baf4 #dfe ibid41 #bbj4 #dff ,introduction to ,logic1 pp4 #fd-e4 #dfg ,cf4 what was said above 7#cb7 about the causal or extrinsic1 as distinct from the intrinsic1 principle of individuation4 #dfh 8,whenever science tries to find the cause not of a particular event1 such as the ,french ,revolution 7whose cause must be as unique as that event itself is71 but of an event of a kind1 such as consumption1 or commercial crises1 it looks in the last resort for a commensurate cause4 ,what is that exact state or condition of the body1 given which it must and without which it cannot be in consumption8 ,what are those conditions in a commercial community1 given which there must and without which there cannot be a commercial crisis80--,,joseph1 op4 cit41 p4 #fe4 ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 ii41 #bba4 #dfi ,system of ,logic1 iii41 v41 #b4 #dgj ,for instance3 7a7 ,the 8ontological0 or 8true0 cause1 which 8actually produces0 the effect1 need not necessarily be the 8ultimate0 cause of the latter4 7b7 ,a 8physical fact0 can be the cause of another in the sense of being the invariable antecedent 7or physical cause7 of the latter1 but not 8in that sense alone02 it may also be an efficient cause of the latter by exerting an active influence on the happening of this latter4 7c7 ,whether or not efficiency is 8a mysterious and most powerful tie10 at any rate it does exist between 8physical facts0 in the universe4 7d7 ,its analysis reveals not a 8supposed necessity of ascending 444 to 444 the true cause1 444 which 444 produces the effect10 as if the proximate causes did not also truly produce the latter2 but a real necessity of ascending to a ,first ,cause as the source and support and complement of the real efficiency of these proximate causes4 7e7 ,a merely logical theory of ,induction does not indeed demand any inquiry either into the efficiency of natural agencies1 or into the nature and grounds of the 8invariability0 or 8necessity0 or 8law0 whereby these are connected with their effects4 ,but a philosophical theory of ,induction does imply such inquiries4 ,and here phenomenist writers like ,mill have laid themselves open to two accusations4 ,for while professing merely to abstract from the problem of efficiency they have tried equivalently to deny its existence by proclaiming it superfluous and insoluble1 besides consciously or unconsciously misrepresenting it4 ,and similarly1 in dealing with the invariability of causal sequences in the universe1 with the necessary character of its physical laws1 they have misconceived this necessity as being mechanical1 fatal1 absolutely inviolable2 and have wrongly proclaimed its ultimate grounds to be unknowable 7,agnosticism74 ,cf4 infra1 #ajd2 ,science of ,logic1 ii41 ,part ,,iv41 chs4 iii41 iv41 and v42 ,part ,v41 ch4 i4 ,thus1 while eschewing the genuine ,metaphysics1 which seeks the real nature and causes of the world of our experience1 as superfluous and futile1 they have substituted for it a masked and spurious metaphysics which they have wrongly fathered on ,physical ,science3 a mass of more or less superficial speculations which have not even the merit of consistency4 ,no philosopher1 starting with their views on the nature of the human mind1 can consistently claim for the latter any really valid or reliable knowledge of laws1 any more than of causes4 ,for the knowledge of a law1 even as a generalized fact1 is a knowledge that claims to pass beyond the limits of the individual's present and remembered experiences4 ,but there can be no rational justification1 whether psychological or ontological1 for the certain reliability of such a step1 in the philosophy which logically reduces all certain knowledge to the mere awareness of a flow of successive sensations supposed to constitute the total content of the individual consciousness and the total reality of human experience4 #dga ,cf4 ,,maher1 ,psychology1 ch4 xvii41 pp4 #cfh-gj4--,,mercier1 op4 cit41 #bbi4 #dgb 8,when an effort of attention combines two ideas1 when one billiard ball moves another1 when a steam hammer flattens out a lump of solid iron1 when a blow on the head knocks a man down1 in all these cases there is something more than1 and essentially different from1 the mere sequence of two phenomena3 there is effective force--causal action of an agent endowed with real energy40--,,maher1 op4 cit41 ibid41 p4 #cgj4 #dgc ,grammar of ,assent1 p4 #ff4 #dgd ,cf4 ,,domet ,,de ,,vorges1 ,cause efficiente et cause finale1 p4 #ci4 ,volitional activity is no doubt the most prominent type of efficient causality in our mental life4 ,but it is not the only type2 we have direct conscious experience of intellectual effort1 of the work of the imagination1 of the exercise of organic and muscular energy4 ,there is no warrant therefore for conceiving all efficient power or energy1 after the model of will-power1 as ,newman among others appears to have done when he wrote in these terms3 8,starting1 then1 from experience1 ,i consider a cause to be an effective will3 and by the doctrine of causation1 ,i mean the notion1 or first principle1 that all things come of effective will0 7ibid41 p4 #fh74 ,no doubt1 all things do come ultimately from the effective will of ,god4 ,this1 however1 is not a first principle1 but a remote philosophical conclusion4 #dge ibid41 p4 #ff4 #dgf ,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,,qq4 ,disp4 ,de ,potentia1 q4 iii41 art4 #g1 in c4 #dgg 8,nulla res per seipsam movet vel agit1 nisi sit movens non motum4444 ,et quia natura inferior agens non agit nisi mota 444 et hoc non cessat quousque perveniatur ad ,deum1 sequitur de necessitate quod ,deus sit causa actionis cujuslibet rei naturalis1 ut movens et applicans virtutem ad agendum40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,de ,potentia ,dei1 q4 iii41 art4 #g4 #dgh ,this is the principle repeatedly expressed by ,,st4 ,,thomas3 8,unde quarto modo unum est causa alterius1 sicut principale agens est causa actionis instrumenti3 et hoc modo etiam oportet dicere1 quod ,deus est causa omnis actionis rei naturalis4 ,quanto enim aliqua causa est altior1 tanto est communior et efficacior1 tanto profundius ingreditur in effectum1 et de remotiori potentia ipsum reducit in actum4 ,in qualibet autem re naturali invenimus quod est ens et quod est res naturalis1 et quod est talis vel talis naturae4 ,quorum primum est commune omnibus entibus2 secundum omnibus rebus naturalibus2 tertium in una specie2 et quartum1 si addamus accidentia1 est proprium huic individuo4 ,hoc ergo individuum agendo non potest constituere aliud in simili specie1 nisi prout est instrumentum illius causae quae respicit totam speciem et ulterius totum esse naturae inferioris4 ,et propter hoc nihil agit in speciem in istis inferioribus 444 nec aliquid agit ad esse nisi per virtutem ,dei4 ,ipsum enim esse est communissimus effectus1 primus et intimior omnibus aliis effectibus2 et ideo soli ,deo competit secundum virtutem propriam talis effectus3 unde etiam1 ut dicitur in ,lib4 de ,causis 7prop4 #i71 intelligentia non dat esse1 nisi prout est in ea virtus divina4 ,sic ergo ,deus est causa omnis actionis prout quodlibet agens est instrumentum divinae virtutis operantis40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,de ,potentia ,dei1 q4 iii4 art #g4--;,cf4 supra1 #ii 7c71 p4 #cge1 n4 #b4 #dgi ,why1 then1 is a finite cause not capable of acting uninterruptedly8 why are its powers1 forces1 energies1 fatigued1 lessened1 exhausted by exercise8 ,simply because its action is proportionate to its powers1 and these to its finite nature4 #dhj 8,creatio non est mutatio nisi secundum modum intelligendi tantum4 ,nam de ratione mutationis est quod aliquid idem se habeat aliter nunc et prius4444 ,sed in creatione1 per quam producitur tota substantia rei1 non potest accipi aliquid idem aliter se habens nunc et prius1 nisi secundum intellectum tantum2 sicut si intelligatur aliqua res prius non fuisse totaliter1 et postea esse4 ,sed cum actio et passio conveniant in una substantia motus1 et differant solum secundum habitudines diveras 444 oportet quod subtracto motu1 non remaneant nisi diversae habitudines in creante et creato4 ,sed quia modus significandi sequitur modum intelligendi 444 creatio significatur per modum mutationis2 et propter hoc dicitur quod creare est ex nihilo aliquid facere2 quamvis facere et fieri magis in hoc conveniant quam mutare et mutari2 quia facere et fieri important habitudinem causae ad effectum et effectus ad causam1 sed mutationem ex consequenti40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 xlv41 art4 #b1 ad4 #b4 #dha 8,remoto motu1 actio nihil aliud importat quam ordinem originis effectus secundum quod effectus a causa aliqua procedit40--op4 cit41 i4 q4 xli41 art4 #a1 ad #b4 #dhb ,the act of the will is1 of course1 virtually transitive when it wills or determines bodily movements4--,cf4 ,,maher1 ,psychology1 chs4 x41 xxiii4 7pp4 #eag-bd74 #dhc ,at the same time it must be noted that organic vital activity is transitive in the sense that no part or member of the organism acts upon itself1 but only on other parts1 in the production of the local1 quantitative and qualitative changes involved in nutrition4 ,it is subject to the inductively established law which seems to regulate all corporeal action3 that all such action involves reaction of the patiens on the agens4 ,mental activity is outside this law4 ,cognitive and appetitive faculties do not react on the objects which reduce these faculties to act1 thus arousing their immanent activity4--,cf4 ,,mercier1 op4 cit41 #bbg4 #dhd ,cf4 ,,mercier1 op4 cit4 #dhe ,cf4 ,,maher1 ,psychology1 chs4 xiii4 and xiv4 #dhf ,cf4 ,,urraburu3 8,vel1 si mavis1 dic causam efficientem esse causam1 a qua fit aliquid1 vel a quo proprie oritur actio1 intelligendo per actionem emanationem et fluxum ac dependentiam effectus a causa40--op4 cit41 #chi 7p4 #aaab74 #dhg ,cf4 ,,mercier1 op4 cit41 #bbi3 8,l'action1 l'efficience1 qu'est elle1 en quoi consiste-t-elle8 ,est-ce une sorte d'coulement de la cause dans l'effet8 videmment non4 ,lorsque nous voulons nous lever une conception mtaphysique1 nous nous raccrochons une image sensible1 et nous nous persuadons volontiers1 que la nettet de la premire rpond la facilit avec laquelle nous nous figurons la seconde4 ,il faut se dfier de cette illusion4 ,puisque l'action1 mme corporelle1 ne modifie point l'agent1 la causalit efficiente ne peut consister dans un influx physique1 qui passerait de la cause dans l'effet40 #dhh ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 ii41 #bbh-i4 #dhi ,we might add this other fact3 that all kinds of corporeal activity and change 7#aa7 seem to involve motion or local change4 ,this does not prove that they all are motion or local change4 ,the significance of the fact lies probably in this1 that local motion is necessary for procuring and continuing physical contact between the interacting physical agencies4--,cf4 ,,nys1 ,cosmologie1 #bbg-i4 #dij ,cf4 ,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,contra ,gentes1 iii41 #fi4 #dia 8,une cause vritable est une cause1 entre laquelle et son effet l'esprit aperoit une liaison ncessaire3 c'est ainsi que je l'entendes4 ,this is ambiguous4 ,or il n'y a que l'tre infiniment parfait entre la volont duquel et les effets l'esprit aperoive une liaison ncessaire4 ,il n'y a donc que ,dieu qui soit vritable cause1 et il semble mme qu'il y ait contradiction dire que les hommes puissent l'tre0--,de la rcherche de la vrit1 ,liv4 #fme1 #b;e partie1 ch4 iii4 #dib 8,si l'on vient considrer attentivement l'ide que l'on a de cause ou de puissance d'agir1 on ne peut en douter que cette ide ne prsente quelque chose de divin40--ibid4 #dic 8,il n'y a point d'homme qui sache seulement ce qu'il faut faire pour remuer un de ses doigts par le moyen des esprits animaux40--ibid4 #did 8,j'ai toujours soutenue que l'me tait l'unique cause de ses actes1 c'est dire de ses dterminations libres ou de ses actes bons ou mauvais4444 ,j'ai toujours soutenu que l'me tait active1 mais que ses actes ne produisaient rien de physique40--,rflexions sur la prmotion physique4 8,je crois que la volont est une puissance active1 qu'elle a un vritable pouvoir de se dterminer2 mais son action est immanente2 c'est une action qui ne produit rien par son efficace propre1 pas mme le mouvement de son bras40--,rponse la #cme lettre d',arnauld4 #die ,cf4 ,,mercier1 op4 cit41 #bcj-b2 ,,zigliara1 ,ontologia 7#de72 ,,urraburu1 op4 cit41 #cic sqq4 #dif ,we may reasonably ask the occasionalist to suppose for the moment that we are efficient causes of our mental processes and to tell us what better proof of it could he demand1 or what better proof could be forthcoming1 than this proof from consciousness4 #dig ,,maher1 ,psychology1 ch4 x41 p4 #bbj4 #dih ,should anyone doubt that consciousness does testify to this fact1 we may prove it inductively from the constant correlation between the mental state and the bodily movement3 8,i will to move my arm1 it moves2 ,i will that it remain at rest1 it does not move2 ,i will that its movement be more or less strong and rapid1 the strength and rapidity vary with the determination of my will4 ,what more complete inductive proof can we have of the efficiency of our will-action on the external world80--,,mercier1 op4 cit41 #bca4 #dii 8,si effectus non producuntur ex actione rerum creatarum1 sed solum ex actione ,dei1 impossibile est quod per effectus manifestetur virtus alicujus causae creatae3 non enim effectus ostendit virtutem causae nisi ratione actionis1 quae a virtute procedens ad effectum terminatur4 ,natura autem causae non cognoscitur per effectum1 nisi inquantum per ipsum cognoscitur virtus1 quae naturam consequitur4 ,si igitur res creatae non habent actiones ad producendum effectum1 sequitur1 quod nunquam naturam alicujus rei creatae poterit cognosci per effectum2 et sic subtrahitur nobis omnis cognitio scientiae naturalis1 in qua praecipuae demonstrationes per effectum sequuntur40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,contra ,gentes1 ,l4 iii41 cap4 #fi4 #ejj 8,je demeure d'accord que la foi oblige croire qu'il y a des corps2 mais1 pour l'vidence1 il me semble qu'elle n'est point entire1 et que nous ne sommes point invinciblement ports croire qu'il y ait quelqu'autre chose que ,dieu et notre esprit40--,rcherche de la vrite1 #fme claircissement4 #eja ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 ii41 #bag4 #ejb ,metaph41 v41 #ag4 #ejc 8,quaedam vero ad bonum inclinantur cum aliqua cognitione2 non quidem sic quod cognoscant ipsam rationem boni1 sed cognoscunt aliquod bonum particulare4444 ,inclinatio autem hanc cognitionem sequens dicitur appetitus sensitivus4 ,quaedam vero inclinantur ad bonum cum cognitione qua cognoscant ipsam boni rationem2 et haec inclinatio dicitur voluntas40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 xlix41 art4 #a4 #ejd 8,sicut influere causae efficientis est agere1 ita influere causae finalis est appeti et desiderari40--,de ,veritate1 q4 xxii41 art4 #b4 #eje ,in its modern usage the term 8intention0 is inseparable from the notion of conscious direction4 ,the scholastics used the term 8intentio0 in a wider and deeper sense to connote the natural tendency of all created agencies towards their natural activities and lines of development4 ,and in unconscious agencies they did not hesitate to refer to it as 8intentio naturae0 or 8appetitus naturalis04 #ejf 8,res naturalis per formam qua perficitur in sua specie1 habet inclinationem in proprias operationes et proprium finem1 quem per operationes consequitur2 quale enim unumquodque est1 talia operatur1 et in sibi convenientia tendit40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,contra ,gentes1 iv41 #ai4 8,omnia suo modo per appetitum inclinantur in bonum1 sed diversimode4 ,quaedam enim inclinantur in bonum per solam naturalem habitudinem absque cognitione1 sicut plantae et corpora inanimata2 et talis inclinatio ad bonum vocatur appetitus naturalis40--,summa ,theol41 i41 q4 xlix41 art4 #a4 #ejg 8,causa efficiens et finis sibi correspondent invicem1 quia efficiens est principium motus1 finis autem terminus4 ,et similiter materia et forma3 nam forma dat esse1 materia autem recipit4 ,est igitur efficiens causa finis1 finis autem causa efficientis4 ,efficiens est causa finis quantum ad esse1 quidem1 quia movendo perducit efficiens ad hoc1 quod sit finis4 ,finis autem est causa efficientis non quantum ad esse sed quantum ad rationem causalitatis4 ,nam efficiens est causa in quantum agit2 non autem agit nisi causa gratia finis4 ,unde ex fine habet suam causalitatem efficiens40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,in ,metaph41 v41 #b4 8,sciendum quod licet finis sit ultimus in esse in quibusdam1 in causalitate tamen est prior semper1 unde dicitur causa causarum1 quia est causa causalitatis in omnibus causis4 ,est enim causa causalitatis efficientis1 ut jam dictum est4 ,efficiens autem est causa causalitatis et materiae et formae40--ibid41 lect4 #c4 #ejh 1 4 ,natura est principium quoddam et causa cur id moveatur et quiescat1 in quo inest primum1 per se et non secundum accidens4--,physic41 ,l4 ii41 cap4 #a4 #eji 8,ars nihil aliud est quam recta ratio aliquorum operum faciendorum40--,summa ,theol4 ia iiae1 q4 lvii41 art4 #c4--;,cf4 ,in ,post4 ,anal41 l4 #a4 #eaj 8,natura nihil aliud est quam ratio cujusdam artis1 scilicet divinae1 indita rebus qua ipsae res moventur ad finem determinatum2 sicut si artifex factor navis posset lignis tribuere quod ex seipsis moverentur ad navis formam inducendam40--,in ,,ii ,phys41 lect4 #ad4 8,omnia naturalia1 in ea quae eis conveniunt1 sunt inclinata1 habentia in seipsis aliquod inclinationis principium1 ratione cujus eorum inclinatio naturalis est1 ita ut quodammodo ipsa vadant1 et non solum ducantur in fines debitos40--,de ,veritate1 q4 xxii41 art4 #g4 #eaa 8,in nullo enim alio natura ab arte videtur differre1 nisi quia natura est principium intrinsecum1 et ars est principium extrinsicum4 ,si enim ars factiva navis esset intrinseca ligno1 facta fuisset navis a natura1 sicut modo fit ab arte40--,in ,,ii4 ,phys41 lect4 #ac4 #eab ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 ii41 #bag4 #eac ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 ii1 #bbg4 #ead ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 ii41 #bbf-ca4 #eae ,,aristotle1 ,metaph41 iv41 ch4 v4 #eaf ,physic41 ii41 ch4 v4 #eag ibid4 #eah ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 ii41 #bfd1 #bfh-i4 #eai 4--,de ,coelo1 ii41 #h4 #ebj ,fatalism is the view that all things happen by a blind1 inevitable1 eternally foredoomed and unintelligible necessity4 ,thus ,,seneca 7,nat4 ,quaest41 ,l4 ,,iii41 cap4 #cf7 describes fatum as necessitas omnium rerum actionumque1 quam nulla vis rumpat4 ,this necessitas ineluctabilis is totally different from the conditional physical necessity of the course of ,nature dependently on the ,fiat of a ,supreme ,free ,will guided by ,supreme ,intelligence 7,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 #bbd1 #bdi1 #bec1 #beg74 ,if the necessity of actual occurrences is not ultimately traceable to the ,fiat of an ,intelligent ,will--and mechanists deny that it can be so traced--it is rightly described as fatalistic1 blind1 purposeless1 unintelligible4 #eba ,cf4 ,,mercier1 op4 cit41 #bei1 #bfj4 #ebb 8,expliquer par une rencontre fortuite1 la convergence d'lments1 dont chacun a sa pousse propre1 c'est rendre raison de la convergence par des principes de divergence4444 ,il est donc contradictoire d'attribuer au hasard la raison explicative de l'ordre40--,,mercier1 op4 cit41 #bfj4 #ebc ,cf4 ,science of ,logic1 ii41 #bbd1 #bej1 and passim4 #ebd 8,similiter ex prioribus pervenitur ad posteriora in arte et in natura3 unde si artificialia1 ut domus1 fierent a natura1 hoc ordine fierent1 quo nunc fiunt per artem3 scilicet prius institueretur fundamentum1 et postea erigerentur parietes1 et ultimo supponeretur tectum4444 ,et similiter si ea quae fiunt a natura fierent ab arte1 hoc modo fierent sicut apta nata sunt fieri a natura2 ut patet in sanitate1 quam contigit fieri1 et ab arte et a natura4444 ,unde manifestum est quod in natura est alterum propter alterum1 scilicet priora propter posteriora1 sicut et in arte40--,,st4 ,,thomas1 ,in ,,ii4 ,phys41 lect4 #ac4--;,cf4 supra1 p4 #dag1 n4 #c4 #ebe 8,ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio40--,de ,civ4 ,dei1 xix41 #ac4 #ebf ,cf4 ,,mercier1 op4 cit41 #beg-fa4 #ebg 8,la convergence de causes indiffrentes qui ralisent d'une manire harmonieuse et persistante un mme objet ordonn1 ne s'explique point par des coincidences fortuites2 elle rclame un principe interne de convergence40--,ibid41 #bfj4 #ebh ,,tennyson1 ,in ,memoriam1 lvi4 #ebi ,,browning1 ,a ,soul's ,tragedy1 ,act4 #a4 #ecj 8,universum habet bonum ordinis et bonum separatum40--,in ,metaph41 xii41 l4 #ab4 #eca ,,aristotle1 ,metaph41 xi41 #aj4 ,does ,aristotle teach that ,god moves the universe only as its ,final ,cause1 as the ,supreme ,good towards which it tends1 or also as ,efficient ,cause8 ,his thought is here obscure1 and has given rise to much controversy among his interpreters4 #ecb 1 4--,ibid41 xi41 #h4 #ecc 7 7 1 4--ibid41 #g4 #ecd 8,totus ordo universi est propter primum moventem1 ut scilicet explicetur in universo ordinato id quod est in intellectu et voluntate primi moventis4 ,et sic oportet quod a primo movente sit tota ordinatio universi40--,ibid41 xii41 l4 #ab4 #ece 444 ,among themselves all things ,have order2 and from hence the form1 which makes ,the universe resemble ,god4 ,in this ,the higher creatures see the printed steps ,of that eternal worth1 which is the end ,whither the line is drawn4 ,all natures lean ,in this their order1 diversely1 some more1 ,some less approaching to their primal source4 ,thus they to different havens are moved on ,through the vast sea of being1 and each one ,with instinct giv'n1 that bears it in its course2 ,this to the lunar sphere directs the fire1 ,this prompts the hearts of mortal animals1 ,this the brute earth together knits and binds4 ,nor only creatures1 void of intellect1 ,are aim'd at by this bow2 but even those ,that have intelligence and love1 are pierced4 ,that ,providence1 who so well orders all1 ,with her own light makes ever calm the heaven1 ,in which the substance that hath greatest speed ,is turned3 and thither now1 as to our seat ,predestin'd1 we are carried by the force ,of that strong cord1 that never looses dart1 ,but at fair aim and glad 444 --,,dante1 ,paradiso1 ,cant4 i4 7tr4 by ,,cary74