,a ,,system ,,of ,,logic                
,,ratiocinative ,,and ,,inductive       
,,vol4 ,,ii4     ,a ,,system ,,of       
,,logic  ,,ratiocinative ,,and          
,,inductive  ,,being ,a ,,connected     
,,view ,,of ,,the ,,principles ,,of     
,,evidence ,,and ,,the ,,methods ,,of   
,,scientific ,,investigation  ,,by      
,,john ,,stuart ,,mill   ,,in ,,two     
,,volumes  ,,vol4 ,,ii4  ,,seventh      
,,edition   ,,london3 ,,longmans1       
,,green1 ,,reader1 ,,and ,,dyer         
,,mdccclxviii     ,,contents ,,of ,,the 
,,second ,,volume4     ,,book ,,iii4    
,,on ,,induction4--7,continued47        
,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,of the ,limits to the 
,explanation of ,laws of   ,nature2 and 
of ,hypotheses4     #a4 ,can all the    
sequences in nature be resolvable into  
one law8    #c      #b4 ,ultimate laws  
cannot be less numerous than the        
distinguishable feelings of our nature  
#d      #c4 ,in what sense ultimate     
facts can be explained                  
#g      #d4 ,the proper use of          

scientific hypotheses                   
#h      #e4 ,their indispensableness    
#af      #f4 ,legitimate1 how           
distinguished from illegitimate         
hypotheses    #ah      #g4 ,some        
inquiries apparently hypothetical are   
really inductive   #be     ,,chapter    
,,xv4 ,of ,progressive ,effects2 and of 
the ,continued               ,action of 
,causes4     #a4 ,how a progressive     
effect results from the simple          
continuance        of the cause         
#bi      #b4 --and from the             
progressiveness of the cause            
#cc      #c4 ,derivative laws generated 
from a single ultimate law          #cf 
,,chapter ,,xvi4 ,of ,empirical ,laws4  
#a4 ,definition of an empirical law     
#ch      #b4 ,derivative laws commonly  
depend on collocations               #ci
      #c4 ,the collocations of the      
permanent causes are not reducible      
to any law                              
#da      #d4 ,hence empirical laws      
cannot be relied on beyond the limits   

of actual experience                    
#da      #e4 ,generalizations which rest
 only on the ,method of ,agreement      
can only be received as empirical laws  
#dc      #f4 ,signs from which an       
observed uniformity of sequence may be  
presumed to be resolvable               
#dd      #g4 ,two kinds of empirical    
laws                                    
#dg     ,,chapter ,,xvii4 ,of ,chance1  
and its ,elimination4     #a4 ,the proof
 of empirical laws depends on the theory
 of chance   #di      #b4 ,chance       
defined and characterized               
#ej      #c4 ,the elimination of chance 
#ee      #d4 ,discovery of residual     
phenomena by eliminating chance         
#eg      #e4 ,the doctrine of chances   
#ei     ,,chapter ,,xviii4 ,of the      
,calculation of ,chances4     #a4       
,foundation of the doctrine of chances1 
as taught by        mathematics         
#fa      #b4 ,the doctrine tenable      
#fc      #c4 ,on what foundation it     
really rests                            

#fd      #d4 ,its ultimate dependence on
 causation                          #fh 
#e4 ,theorem of the doctrine of chances 
which relates to the        cause of a  
given event                             
#gb      #f4 ,how applicable to the     
elimination of chance                   
#gd     ,,chapter ,,xix4 ,of the        
,extension of ,derivative ,laws to      
,adjacent   ,cases4     #a4 ,derivative 
laws1 when not casual1 are almost always
        contingent on collocations      
#gh      #b4 ,on what grounds they can  
be extended to cases beyond the         
bounds of actual experience             
#hj      #c4 ,those cases must be       
adjacent cases                          
#hb     ,,chapter ,,xx4 ,of ,analogy4   
#a4 ,various senses of the word analogy 
#hf      #b4 ,nature of analogical      
evidence                                
#hg      #c4 ,on what circumstances its 
value depends                       #ia 
,,chapter ,,xxi4 ,of the ,evidence of   
the ,law of ,universal   ,causation4    

#a4 ,the law of causality does not rest 
on an instinct             #ie      #b4 
,but on an induction by simple          
enumeration                    #ajj     
#c4 ,in what cases such induction is    
allowable                    #ajb       
#d4 ,the universal prevalence of the law
 of causality1 on what        grounds   
admissible                              
#aje     ,,chapter ,,xxii4 ,of          
,uniformities of ,coexistence not       
dependent   on ,causation4     #a4      
,uniformities of coexistence which      
result from laws of        sequence     
#aaj      #b4 ,the properties of ,kinds 
are uniformities of coexistence         
#aaa      #c4 ,some are derivative1     
others ultimate                         
#aac      #d4 ,no universal axiom of    
coexistence                             
#aad      #e4 ,the evidence of          
uniformities of coexistence1 how        
measured    #aag      #f4 ,when         
derivative1 their evidence is that of   
empirical laws    #aag      #g4 ,so also

 when ultimate                          
#aai      #h4 ,the evidence stronger in 
proportion as the law is more           
general                                 
#abj      #i4 ,every distinct ,kind must
 be examined                            
#aba     ,,chapter ,,xxiii4 ,of         
,approximate ,generalizations1 and      
,probable   ,evidence4     #a4 ,the     
inferences called probable1 rest on     
approximate        generalizations      
#abd      #b4 ,approximate              
generalizations less useful in science  
than        in life                     
#abd      #c4 ,in what cases they may be
 resorted to                        #abf
      #d4 ,in what manner proved        
#abg      #e4 ,with what precautions    
employed                                
#acj      #f4 ,the two modes of         
combining probabilities                 
#aca      #g4 ,how approximate          
generalizations may be converted into   
accurate generalizations equivalent to  
them                  #acf     ,,chapter

 ,,xxiv4 ,of the ,remaining ,laws of    
,nature4     #a4 ,propositions which    
assert mere existence                   
#aci      #b4 ,resemblance1 considered  
as a subject of science                 
#ada      #c4 ,the axioms and theorems  
of mathematics comprise the             
principal laws of resemblance           
#adc      #d4 --and those of order in   
place1 and rest on induction by         
simple enumeration                      
#ade      #e4 ,the propositions of      
arithmetic affirm the modes of formation
        of some given number            
#adf      #f4 ,those of algebra affirm  
the equivalence of different modes      
of formation of numbers generally       
#aea      #g4 ,the propositions of      
geometry are laws of outward nature     
#aed      #h4 ,why geometry is almost   
entirely deductive                      
#aef      #i4 ,function of mathematical 
truths in the other sciences1 and       
limits of that function                 
#aeh     ,,chapter ,,xxv4 ,of the       

,grounds of ,disbelief4     #a4         
,improbability and impossibility        
#afa      #b4 ,examination of ,hume's   
doctrine of miracles                    
#afb      #c4 ,the degrees of           
improbability correspond to differences 
in        the nature of the             
generalization with which an assertion  
conflicts                               
#aff      #d4 ,a fact is not incredible 
because the chances are against it  #agj
      #e4 ,are coincidences less        
credible than other facts8              
#agb      #f4 ,an opinion of ,laplace   
examined                                
#age     ,,book ,,iv4    ,,of           
,,operations ,,subsidiary ,,to          
,,induction4     ,,chapter ,i4 ,of      
,observation and ,description4     #a4  
,observation1 how far a subject of logic
                      #ahc      #b4 ,a  
great part of what seems observation is 
really inference   #ahd      #c4 ,the   
description of an observation affirms   
more than is        contained in the    

observation                             
#ahg      #d4 --namely an agreement     
among phenomena2 and the comparison     
of phenomena to ascertain such          
agreements is a preliminary        to   
induction                               
#aij     ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,of            
,abstraction1 or the ,formation of      
,conceptions4     #a4 ,the comparison   
which is a preliminary to induction     
implies        general conceptions      
#aic      #b4 --but these need not be   
pre-existent                            
#aid      #c4 ,a general conception1    
originally the result of a comparison1  
becomes itself the type of comparison   
#aih      #d4 ,what is meant by         
appropriate conceptions                 
#bjj      #e4 --and by clear conceptions
                                   #bjc 
#f4 ,further illustration of the subject
                          #bje          
,,chapter ,,iii4 ,of ,naming1 as        
subsidiary to ,induction4     #a4 ,the  
fundamental property of names as an     

instrument of        thought            
#bji      #b4 ,names are not            
indispensable to induction              
#baj      #c4 ,in what manner           
subservient to it                       
#baa      #d4 ,general names not a mere 
contrivance to economize the        use 
of language                             
#bac     ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,of the        
,requisites of a ,philosophical         
,language1   and the ,principles of     
,definition4     #a4 ,first requisite of
 philosophical language1 a steady and   
determinate meaning for every general   
name                   #bae      #b4    
,names in common use have often a loose 
connotation           #bae      #c4     
--which the logician should fix1 with as
 little alteration        as possible   
#bah      #d4 ,why definition is often a
 question not of words but of           
things                                  
#bbj      #e4 ,how the logician should  
deal with the transitive                
applications of words                   

#bbd      #f4 ,evil consequences of     
casting off any portion of the          
customary connotation of words          
#bbi     ,,chapter ,v4 ,on the ,natural 
,history of the ,variations in   the    
,meaning of ,terms4     #a4 ,how        
circumstances originally accidental     
become incorporated        into the     
meaning of words                        
#bcf      #b4 --and sometimes become the
 whole meaning                     #bch 
#c4 ,tendency of words to become        
generalized                      #bdj   
#d4 --and to become specialized         
#bdc     ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,the           
,principles of a ,philosophical         
,language   further considered4     #a4 
,second requisite of philosophical      
language1 a name for        every       
important meaning                       
#bdh      #b4 --viz4 first1 an accurate 
descriptive terminology            #bdh 
#c4 --secondly1 a name for each of the  
more important results        of        
scientific abstraction                  

#beb      #d4 --thirdly1 a nomenclature1
 or system of the names of        ,kinds
                                        
#bee      #e4 ,peculiar nature of the   
connotation of names which belong       
to a nomenclature                       
#beg      #f4 ,in what cases language   
may1 and may not1 be used               
mechanically                            
#bei     ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,of           
,classification1 as subsidiary to       
,induction4     #a4 ,classification as  
here treated of1 wherein different from 
the classification implied in naming    
#bff      #b4 ,theory of natural groups 
#bfg      #c4 ,are natural groups given 
by type1 or by definition8          #bga
      #d4 ,kinds are natural groups     
#bgd      #e4 ,how the names of ,kinds  
should be constructed                   
#bhj     ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,of          
,classification by ,series4     #a4     
,natural groups should be arranged in a 
natural series        #bhd      #b4 ,the
 arrangement should follow the degrees  

of the main        phenomenon           
#bhe      #c4 --which implies the       
assumption of a type-species            
#bhg      #d4 ,how the divisions of the 
series should be determined         #bhh
      #e4 ,zoology affords the          
completest type of scientific           
classification                          
#bhi     ,,book ,v4    ,,on ,,fallacies4
     ,,chapter ,i4 ,of ,fallacies in    
,general4     #a4 ,theory of fallacies a
 necessary part of logic                
#bie      #b4 ,casual mistakes are not  
fallacies                               
#big      #c4 ,the moral sources of     
erroneous opinion1 how related to       
the intellectual                        
#big     ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,classification
 of ,fallacies4     #a4 ,on what        
criteria a classification of fallacies  
should be        grounded               
#cja      #b4 ,the five classes of      
fallacies                               
#cjb      #c4 ,the reference of a       
fallacy to one or another class is      

sometimes arbitrary                     
#cje     ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,fallacies of 
,simple ,inspection1 or  priori         
,fallacies4     #a4 ,character of this  
class of ,fallacies                     
#cji      #b4 ,natural prejudice of     
mistaking subjective laws for           
objective1 exemplified in popular       
superstitions              #caj      #c4
 ,natural prejudices1 that things which 
we think of together        must exist  
together1 and that what is inconceivable
        must be false                   
#cad      #d4 ,natural prejudice1 of    
ascribing objective existence to        
abstractions                            
#cba      #e4 ,fallacy of the           
,sufficient ,reason                     
#cbb      #f4 ,natural prejudice1 that  
the differences in nature correspond    
to the distinctions in language         
#cbe      #g4 ,prejudice1 that a        
phenomenon cannot have more than one    
cause                                   
#cbi      #h4 ,prejudice1 that the      

conditions of a phenomenon must         
resemble the phenomenon                 
#ccb     ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,fallacies of  
,observation4     #a4 ,non-observation1 
and ,mal-observation                    
#cda      #b4 ,non-observation of       
instances1 and non-observation of       
circumstances                           
#cda      #c4 ,examples of the former   
#cdb      #d4 --and of the latter       
#cdg      #e4 ,mal-observation          
characterized and exemplified           
#ceb     ,,chapter ,v4 ,fallacies of    
,generalization4     #a4 ,character of  
the class                               
#cef      #b4 ,certain kinds of         
generalization must always be groundless
    #cef      #c4 ,attempts to resolve  
phenomena radically different into      
the same                                
#ceg      #d4 ,fallacy of mistaking     
empirical for causal laws               
#cei      #e4 ,post hoc1 ergo propter   
hoc2 and the deductive fallacy          
corresponding to it                     

#cfd      #f4 ,fallacy of ,false        
,analogies                              
#cff      #g4 ,function of metaphors in 
reasoning                           #cgc
      #h4 ,how fallacies of             
generalization grow out of bad          
classification                          
#cge     ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,fallacies of  
,ratiocination4     #a4 ,introductory   
,remarks                                
#cgg      #b4 ,fallacies in the         
conversion and quipollency of           
propositions                            
#cgg      #c4 ,fallacies in the         
syllogistic process                     
#cgi      #d4 ,fallacy of changing the  
premises                                
#cgi     ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,fallacies of 
,confusion4     #a4 ,fallacy of         
,ambiguous ,terms                       
#chd      #b4 ,fallacy of ,petitio      
,principii                              
#cif      #c4 ,fallacy of ,ignoratio    
,elenchi                                
#dje     ,,book ,,vi4    ,,on ,,the     

,,logic ,,of ,,the ,,moral ,,sciences4  
,,chapter ,i4 ,introductory ,remarks4   
#a4 ,the backward state of the ,moral   
,sciences can only be        remedied by
 applying to them the methods of        
,physical        ,science1 duly extended
 and generalized                        
#dac      #b4 ,how far this can be      
attempted in the present work           
#dae     ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,of ,liberty   
and ,necessity4     #a4 ,are human      
actions subject to the law of causality8
           #dag      #b4 ,the doctrine  
commonly called ,philosophical          
,necessity1 in        what sense true   
#dah      #c4 ,inappropriateness and    
pernicious effect of the term           
,necessity                              
#dbj      #d4 ,a motive not always the  
anticipation of a pleasure or a         
pain                                    
#dbd     ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,that there   
is1 or may be1 a ,science of   ,human   
,nature4     #a4 ,there may be sciences 
which are not exact sciences            

#dbf      #b4 ,to what scientific type  
the ,science of ,human ,nature          
corresponds                             
#dbi     ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,of the ,laws  
of ,mind4     #a4 ,what is meant by     
,laws of ,mind                          
#dcb      #b4 ,is there a science of    
,psychology8                            
#dcc      #c4 ,the principal            
investigations of ,psychology           
characterized     #dce      #d4         
,relation of mental facts to physical   
conditions              #ddj            
,,chapter ,v4 ,of ,ethology1 or the     
,science of the ,formation of           
,character4     #a4 ,the ,empirical     
,laws of ,human ,nature                 
#dde      #b4 --are merely approximate  
generalizations4 ,the universal         
laws are those of the formation of      
character                 #ddg      #c4 
,the laws of the formation of character 
cannot be ascertained        by         
observation and experiment              
#ddi      #d4 --but must be studied     

deductively                             
#ded      #e4 ,the ,principles of       
,ethology are the axiomata media of     
mental science                          
#dee      #f4 ,ethology characterized   
#dei     ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,general       
,considerations on the ,social ,science4
     #a4 ,are ,social ,phenomena a      
subject of ,science8                    
#dfa      #b4 ,of what nature the       
,social ,science must be                
#dfc     ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,of the       
,chemical1 or ,experimental1 ,method in 
the   ,social ,science4     #a4         
,characters of the mode of thinking     
which deduces political        doctrines
 from specific experience               
#dff      #b4 ,in the ,social ,science  
experiments are impossible              
#dfh      #c4 --the ,method of          
,difference inapplicable                
#dfi      #d4 --and the ,methods of     
,agreement1 and of ,concomitant         
,variations1 inconclusive               
#dga      #e4 ,the ,method of ,residues 

also inconclusive1 and presupposes      
,deduction                              
#dgb     ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,of the      
,geometrical1 or ,abstract ,method4     
#a4 ,characters of this mode of thinking
                          #dgf      #b4 
,examples of the ,geometrical ,method   
#dgh      #c4 ,the interest-philosophy  
of the ,bentham school                  
#dgi     ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,of the        
,physical1 or ,concrete ,deductive      
,method4     #a4 ,the ,direct and       
,inverse ,deductive ,methods            
#dhf      #b4 ,difficulties of the      
,direct ,deductive ,method in the       
,social        ,science                 
#dhi      #c4 ,to what extent the       
different branches of sociological      
speculation can be studied apart4       
,political ,economy        characterized
                                        
#dib      #d4 ,political ,ethology1 or  
the science of national character       
#dig      #e4 ,the ,empirical ,laws of  
the ,social ,science                    

#ejj      #f4 ,the ,verification of the 
,social ,science                        
#ejb     ,,chapter ,x4 ,of the ,inverse 
,deductive1 or ,historical ,method4     
#a4 ,distinction between the general    
,science of ,society1 and        special
 sociological inquiries                 
#ejf      #b4 ,what is meant by a ,state
 of ,society8                           
#ejf      #c4 ,the ,progressiveness of  
,man and ,society                       
#ejh      #d4 ,the laws of the          
succession of states of society can only
        be ascertained by the ,inverse  
,deductive ,method               #eaa   
#e4 ,social ,statics1 or the science of 
the ,coexistences of        ,social     
,phenomena                              
#eac      #f4 ,social ,dynamics1 or the 
science of the ,successions of ,social  
,phenomena                              
#eba      #g4 ,outlines of the          
,historical ,method                     
#ebb      #h4 ,future prospects of      
,sociological ,inquiry                  

#ebe     ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,additional    
,elucidations of the ,science of        
,history4     #a4 ,the subjection of    
historical facts to uniform laws is     
verified by statistics                  
#ebi      #b4 --does not imply the      
insignificance of moral causes          
#ecb      #c4 --nor the inefficacy of   
the characters of individuals and       
of the acts of governments              
#ece      #d4 ,the historical importance
 of eminent men and of the        policy
 of governments illustrated             
#edj     ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,of the ,logic
 of ,practice1 or ,art2 including       
,morality and ,policy4     #a4 ,morality
 not a science1 but an ,art             
#edd      #b4 ,relation between rules of
 art and the theorems of the            
corresponding science                   
#edd      #c4 ,what is the proper       
function of rules of art8               
#edf      #d4 ,art cannot be ,deductive 
#edh      #e4 ,every ,art consists of   
truths of ,science1 arranged in the     

order suitable for some practical use   
#edi      #f4 ,teleology1 or the        
,doctrine of ,ends                      
#eej      #g4 ,necessity of an ultimate 
standard1 or first principle of         
,teleology                              
#eeb      #h4 ,conclusion               
#eed     ,,book ,,iii4  ,,continued4    
,,of ,,induction4   ,in such cases the  
inductive and deductive methods of      
inquiry may be said to go hand in hand1 
the one verifying the conclusions       
deduced by the other2 and the           
combination of experiment and theory1   
which may thus be brought to bear in    
such cases1 forms an engine of discovery
 infinitely more powerful than either   
taken separately4 ,this state of any    
department of science is perhaps of all 
others the most interesting1 and that   
which promises the most to              
research4--,,sir ,j4 ,,herschel1        
,discourse on the ,study of ,natural    
,philosophy4     ,,chapter ,,xiv4  ,,of 
,,the ,,limits ,,to ,,the ,,explanation 

,,of ,,laws ,,of ,,nature2 ,,and ,,of   
,,hypotheses4    #a4 ,the preceding     
considerations have led us to recognise 
a distinction between two kinds of laws1
 or observed uniformities in nature3    
ultimate laws1 and what may be termed   
derivative laws4 ,derivative laws are   
such as are deducible from1 and may1 in 
any of the modes which we have pointed  
out1 be resolved into1 other and more   
general ones4 ,ultimate laws are those  
which cannot4 ,we are not sure that any 
of the uniformities with which we are   
yet acquainted are ultimate laws2 but we
 know that there must be ultimate laws2 
and that every resolution of a          
derivative law into more general laws1  
brings us nearer to them4  ,since we are
 continually discovering that           
uniformities1 not previously known to be
 other than ultimate1 are derivative1   
and resolvable into more general laws2  
since 7in other words7 we are           
continually discovering the explanation 
of some sequence which was previously   

known only as a fact2 it becomes an     
interesting question whether there are  
any necessary limits to this            
philosophical operation1 or whether it  
may proceed until all the uniform       
sequences in nature are resolved into   
some one universal law4 ,for this seems1
 at first sight1 to be the ultimatum    
towards which the progress of induction1
 by the ,deductive ,method resting on a 
basis of observation and experiment1 is 
tending4 ,projects of this kind were    
universal in the infancy of philosophy2 
any speculations which held out a less  
brilliant prospect1 being in those early
 times deemed not worth pursuing4 ,and  
the idea receives so much apparent      
countenance from the nature of the most 
remarkable achievements of modern       
science1 that speculators are even now  
frequently appearing1 who profess either
 to have solved the problem1 or to      
suggest modes in which it may one day be
 solved4 ,even where pretensions of this
 magnitude are not made1 the character  

of the solutions which are given or     
sought of particular classes of         
phenomena1 often involves such          
conceptions of what constitutes         
explanation1 as would render the notion 
of explaining all phenomena whatever by 
means of some one cause or law1         
perfectly admissible4    #b4 ,it is     
therefore useful to remark1 that the    
ultimate ,laws of ,nature cannot        
possibly be less numerous than the      
distinguishable sensations or other     
feelings of our nature2--those1 ,i mean1
 which are distinguishable from one     
another in quality1 and not merely in   
quantity or degree4 ,for example2 since 
there is a phenomenon sui generis1      
called colour1 which our consciousness  
testifies to be not a particular degree 
of some other phenomenon1 as heat or    
odour or motion1 but intrinsically      
unlike all others1 it follows that there
 are ultimate laws of colour2 that      
though the facts of colour may admit of 
explanation1 they never can be explained

 from laws of heat or odour alone1 or of
 motion alone1 but that however far the 
explanation may be carried1 there will  
always remain in it a law of colour4 ,i 
do not mean that it might not possibly  
be shown that some other phenomenon1    
some chemical or mechanical action for  
example1 invariably precedes1 and is the
 cause of1 every phenomenon of colour4  
,but though this1 if proved1 would be an
 important extension of our knowledge of
 nature1 it would not explain how or why
 a motion1 or a chemical action1 can    
produce a sensation of colour2 and      
however diligent might be our scrutiny  
of the phenomena1 whatever number of    
hidden links we might detect in the     
chain of causation terminating in the   
colour1 the last link would still be a  
law of colour1 not a law of motion1 nor 
of any other phenomenon whatever4 ,nor  
does this observation apply only to     
colour1 as compared with any other of   
the great classes of sensations2 it     
applies to every particular colour1 as  

compared with others4 ,white colour can 
in no manner be explained exclusively by
 the laws of the production of red      
colour4 ,in any attempt to explain it1  
we cannot but introduce1 as one element 
of the explanation1 the proposition that
 some antecedent or other produces the  
sensation of white4  ,the ideal limit1  
therefore1 of the explanation of natural
 phenomena 7towards which as towards    
other ideal limits we are constantly    
tending1 without the prospect of ever   
completely attaining it7 would be to    
show that each distinguishable variety  
of our sensations1 or other states of   
consciousness1 has only one sort of     
cause2 that1 for example1 whenever we   
perceive a white colour1 there is some  
one condition or set of conditions which
 is always present1 and the presence of 
which always produces in us that        
sensation4 ,as long as there are several
 known modes of production of a         
phenomenon1 7several different          
substances1 for instance1 which have the

 property of whiteness1 and between     
which we cannot trace any other         
resemblance17 so long it is not         
impossible that one of these modes of   
production may be resolved into another1
 or that all of them may be resolved    
into some more general mode of          
production not hitherto recognised4 ,but
 when the modes of production are       
reduced to one1 we cannot1 in point of  
simplification1 go any further4 ,this   
one may not1 after all1 be the ultimate 
mode2 there may be other links to be    
discovered between the supposed cause   
and the effect2 but we can only further 
resolve the known law1 by introducing   
some other law hitherto unknown2 which  
will not diminish the number of ultimate
 laws4  ,in what cases1 accordingly1 has
 science been most successful in        
explaining phenomena1 by resolving their
 complex laws into laws of greater      
simplicity and generality8 ,hitherto    
chiefly in cases of the propagation of  
various phenomena through space3 and1   

first and principally1 the most         
extensive and important of all facts of 
that description1 the fact of motion4   
,now this is exactly what might be      
expected from the principles here laid  
down4 ,not only is motion one of the    
most universal of all phenomena1 it is  
also 7as might be expected from that    
circumstance7 one of those which1       
apparently at least1 are produced in the
 greatest number of ways2 but the       
phenomenon itself is always1 to our     
sensations1 the same in every respect   
but degree4 ,differences of duration1 or
 of velocity1 are evidently differences 
in degree only2 and differences of      
direction in space1 which alone has any 
semblance of being a distinction in     
kind1 entirely disappear 7so far as our 
sensations are concerned7 by a change in
 our own position2 indeed the very same 
motion appears to us1 according to our  
position1 to take place in every variety
 of direction1 and motions in every     
different direction to take place in the

 same4 ,and again1 motion in a straight 
line and in a curve are no otherwise    
distinct than that the one is motion    
continuing in the same direction1 the   
other is motion which at each instant   
changes its direction4 ,there is1       
therefore1 according to the principles  
,i have stated1 no absurdity in         
supposing that all motion may be        
produced in one and the same way2 by the
 same kind of cause4 ,accordingly1 the  
greatest achievements in physical       
science have consisted in resolving one 
observed law of the production of motion
 into the laws of other known modes of  
production1 or the laws of several such 
modes into one more general mode2 as    
when the fall of bodies to the earth1   
and the motions of the planets1 were    
brought under the one law of the mutual 
attraction of all particles of matter2  
when the motions said to be produced by 
magnetism were shown to be produced by  
electricity2 when the motions of fluids 
in a lateral direction1 or even contrary

 to the direction of gravity1 were shown
 to be produced by gravity2 and the     
like4 ,there is an abundance of distinct
 causes of motion still unresolved into 
one another2 gravitation1 heat1         
electricity1 chemical action1 nervous   
action1 and so forth2 but whether the   
efforts of the present generation of    
savans to resolve all these different   
modes of production into one1 are       
ultimately successful or not1 the       
attempt so to resolve them is perfectly 
legitimate4 ,for though these various   
causes produce1 in other respects1      
sensations intrinsically different1 and 
are not1 therefore1 capable of being    
resolved into one another1 yet in so far
 as they all produce motion1 it is quite
 possible that the immediate antecedent 
of the motion may in all these different
 cases be the same2 nor is it impossible
 that these various agencies themselves 
may1 as the new doctrines assert1 all of
 them have for their own immediate      
antecedent1 modes of molecular motion4  

,we need not extend our illustration to 
other cases1 as for instance to the     
propagation of light1 sound1 heat1      
electricity1 c4 through space1 or any of
 the other phenomena which have been    
found susceptible of explanation by the 
resolution of their observed laws into  
more general laws4 ,enough has been said
 to display the difference between the  
kind of explanation and resolution of   
laws which is chimerical1 and that of   
which the accomplishment is the great   
aim of science2 and to show into what   
sort of elements the resolution must be 
effected1 if at all4    #c4 ,as1        
however1 there is scarcely any one of   
the principles of a true method of      
philosophizing which does not require to
 be guarded against errors on both      
sides1 ,i must enter a caveat against   
another misapprehension1 of a kind      
directly contrary to the preceding4 ,m4 
,comte1 among other occasions on which  
he has condemned1 with some asperity1   
any attempt to explain phenomena which  

are evidently primordial1 7meaning1     
apparently1 no more than that every     
peculiar phenomenon must have at least  
one peculiar and therefore inexplicable 
law17 has spoken of the attempt to      
furnish any explanation of the colour   
belonging to each substance1 la couleur 
lmentaire propre  chaque substance1 as  
essentially illusory4 ,no one1 says he1 
in our time attempts to explain the     
particular specific gravity of each     
substance or of each structure4 ,why    
should it be otherwise as to the        
specific colour1 the notion of which is 
undoubtedly no less primordial8#a  ,now 
although1 as he elsewhere observes1 a   
colour must always remain a different   
thing from a weight or a sound1         
varieties of colour might nevertheless  
follow1 or correspond to1 given         
varieties of weight1 or sound1 or some  
other phenomenon as different as these  
are from colour itself4 ,it is one      
question what a thing is1 and another   
what it depends on2 and though to       

ascertain the conditions of an          
elementary phenomenon is not to obtain  
any new insight into the nature of the  
phenomenon itself1 that is no reason    
against attempting to discover the      
conditions4 ,the interdict against      
endeavouring to reduce distinctions of  
colour to any common principle1 would   
have held equally good against a like   
attempt on the subject of distinctions  
of sound2 which nevertheless have been  
found to be immediately preceded and    
caused by distinguishable varieties in  
the vibrations of elastic bodies3 though
 a sound1 no doubt1 is quite as         
different as a colour is from any motion
 of particles1 vibratory or otherwise4  
,we might add1 that1 in the case of     
colours1 there are strong positive      
indications that they are not ultimate  
properties of the different kinds of    
substances1 but depend on conditions    
capable of being superinduced upon all  
substances2 since there is no substance 
which cannot1 according to the kind of  

light thrown upon it1 be made to assume 
almost any colour2 and since almost     
every change in the mode of aggregation 
of the particles of the same substance1 
is attended with alterations in its     
colour1 and in its optical properties   
generally4  ,the real defect in the     
attempts which have been made to account
 for colours by the vibrations of a     
fluid1 is not that the attempt itself is
 unphilosophical1 but that the existence
 of the fluid1 and the fact of its      
vibratory motion1 are not proved2 but   
are assumed1 on no other ground than the
 facility they are supposed to afford of
 explaining the phenomena4 ,and this    
consideration leads to the important    
question of the proper use of scientific
 hypotheses2 the connexion of which with
 the subject of the explanation of the  
phenomena of nature1 and of the         
necessary limits to that explanation1   
needs not be pointed out4    #d4 ,an    
hypothesis is any supposition which we  
make 7either without actual evidence1 or

 on evidence avowedly insufficient7 in  
order to endeavour to deduce from it    
conclusions in accordance with facts    
which are known to be real2 under the   
idea that if the conclusions to which   
the hypothesis leads are known truths1  
the hypothesis itself either must be1 or
 at least is likely to be1 true4 ,if the
 hypothesis relates to the cause1 or    
mode of production of a phenomenon1 it  
will serve1 if admitted1 to explain such
 facts as are found capable of being    
deduced from it4 ,and this explanation  
is the purpose of many1 if not most1    
hypotheses4 ,since explaining1 in the   
scientific sense1 means resolving an    
uniformity which is not a law of        
causation1 into the laws of causation   
from which it results1 or a complex law 
of causation into simpler and more      
general ones from which it is capable of
 being deductively inferred2 if there do
 not exist any known laws which fulfil  
this requirement1 we may feign or       
imagine some which would fulfil it2 and 

this is making an hypothesis4  ,an      
hypothesis being a mere supposition1    
there are no other limits to hypotheses 
than those of the human imagination2 we 
may1 if we please1 imagine1 by way of   
accounting for an effect1 some cause of 
a kind utterly unknown1 and acting      
according to a law altogether           
fictitious4 ,but as hypotheses of this  
sort would not have any of the          
plausibility belonging to those which   
ally themselves by analogy with known   
laws of nature1 and besides would not   
supply the want which arbitrary         
hypotheses are generally invented to    
satisfy1 by enabling the imagination to 
represent to itself an obscure          
phenomenon in a familiar light2 there is
 probably no hypothesis in the history  
of science in which both the agent      
itself and the law of its operation were
 fictitious4 ,either the phenomenon     
assigned as the cause is real1 but the  
law according to which it acts1 merely  
supposed2 or the cause is fictitious1   

but is supposed to produce its effects  
according to laws similar to those of   
some known class of phenomena4 ,an      
instance of the first kind is afforded  
by the different suppositions made      
respecting the law of the planetary     
central force1 anterior to the discovery
 of the true law1 that the force varies 
as the inverse square of the distance2  
which also suggested itself to ,newton1 
in the first instance1 as an hypothesis1
 and was verified by proving that it led
 deductively to ,kepler's laws4         
,hypotheses of the second kind are such 
as the vortices of ,descartes1 which    
were fictitious1 but were supposed to   
obey the known laws of rotatory motion2 
or the two rival hypotheses respecting  
the nature of light1 the one ascribing  
the phenomena to a fluid emitted from   
all luminous bodies1 the other 7now     
generally received7 attributing them to 
vibratory motions among the particles of
 an ether pervading all space4 ,of the  
existence of either fluid there is no   

evidence1 save the explanation they are 
calculated to afford of some of the     
phenomena2 but they are supposed to     
produce their effects according to known
 laws2 the ordinary laws of continued   
locomotion in the one case1 and in the  
other1 those of the propagation of      
undulatory movements among the particles
 of an elastic fluid4  ,according to the
 foregoing remarks1 hypotheses are      
invented to enable the ,deductive       
,method to be earlier applied to        
phenomena4 ,but#b in order to discover  
the cause of any phenomenon by the      
,deductive ,method1 the process must    
consist of three parts2 induction1      
ratiocination1 and verification4        
,induction1 7the place of which1        
however1 may be supplied by a prior     
deduction17 to ascertain the laws of the
 causes2 ratiocination1 to compute from 
those laws1 how the causes will operate 
in the particular combination known to  
exist in the case in hand2 verification1
 by comparing this calculated effect    

with the actual phenomenon4 ,no one of  
these three parts of the process can be 
dispensed with4 ,in the deduction which 
proves the identity of gravity with the 
central force of the solar system1 all  
the three are found4 ,first1 it is      
proved from the moon's motions1 that the
 earth attracts her with a force varying
 as the inverse square of the distance4 
,this 7though partly dependent on prior 
deductions7 corresponds to the first1 or
 purely inductive1 step1 the            
ascertainment of the law of the cause4  
,secondly1 from this law1 and from the  
knowledge previously obtained of the    
moon's mean distance from the earth1 and
 of the actual amount of her deflexion  
from the tangent1 it is ascertained with
 what rapidity the earth's attraction   
would cause the moon to fall1 if she    
were no further off1 and no more acted  
upon by extraneous forces1 than         
terrestrial bodies are3 that is the     
second step1 the ratiocination4         
,finally1 this calculated velocity being

 compared with the observed velocity    
with which all heavy bodies fall1 by    
mere gravity1 towards the surface of the
 earth1 7sixteen feet in the first      
second1 forty-eight in the second1 and  
so forth1 in the ratio of the odd       
numbers1 #a1 #c1 #e1 c417 the two       
quantities are found to agree4 ,the     
order in which the steps are here       
presented1 was not that of their        
discovery2 but it is their correct      
logical order1 as portions of the proof 
that the same attraction of the earth   
which causes the moon's motion1 causes  
also the fall of heavy bodies to the    
earth3 a proof which is thus complete in
 all its parts4  ,now1 the ,hypothetical
 ,method suppresses the first of the    
three steps1 the induction to ascertain 
the law2 and contents itself with the   
other two operations1 ratiocination and 
verification2 the law which is reasoned 
from1 being assumed1 instead of proved4 
,this process may evidently be          
legitimate on one supposition1 namely1  

if the nature of the case be such that  
the final step1 the verification1 shall 
amount to1 and fulfil the conditions of1
 a complete induction4 ,we want to be   
assured that the law we have            
hypothetically assumed is a true one2   
and its leading deductively to true     
results will afford this assurance1     
provided the case be such that a false  
law cannot lead to a true result2       
provided no law1 except the very one    
which we have assumed1 can lead         
deductively to the same conclusions     
which that leads to4 ,and this proviso  
is often realized4 ,for example1 in the 
very complete specimen of deduction     
which we just cited1 the original major 
premise of the ratiocination1 the law of
 the attractive force1 was ascertained  
in this mode2 by this legitimate        
employment of the ,hypothetical ,method4
 ,newton began by an assumption1 that   
the force which at each instant deflects
 a planet from its rectilineal course1  
and makes it describe a curve round the 

sun1 is a force tending directly towards
 the sun4 ,he then proved that if this  
be so1 the planet will describe1 as we  
know by ,kepler's first law that it does
 describe1 equal areas in equal times2  
and1 lastly1 he proved that if the force
 acted in any other direction whatever1 
the planet would not describe equal     
areas in equal times4 ,it being thus    
shown that no other hypothesis would    
accord with the facts1 the assumption   
was proved2 the hypothesis became an    
inductive truth4 ,not only did ,newton  
ascertain by this hypothetical process  
the direction of the deflecting force2  
he proceeded in exactly the same manner 
to ascertain the law of variation of the
 quantity of that force4 ,he assumed    
that the force varied inversely as the  
square of the distance2 showed that from
 this assumption the remaining two of   
,kepler's laws might be deduced2 and    
finally1 that any other law of variation
 would give results inconsistent with   
those laws1 and inconsistent1 therefore1

 with the real motions of the planets1  
of which ,kepler's laws were known to be
 a correct expression4  ,i have said    
that in this case the verification      
fulfils the conditions of an induction3 
but an induction of what sort8 ,on      
examination we find that it conforms to 
the canon of the ,method of ,difference4
 ,it affords the two instances1 ,a ,b   
,c1 a b c1 and ,b ,c1 b c4 ,a represents
 central force2 ,a ,b ,c1 the planets   
plus a central force2 ,b ,c1 the planets
 apart from a central force4 ,the       
planets with a central force give a1    
areas proportional to the times2 the    
planets without a central force give b c
 7a set of motions7 without a1 or with  
something else instead of a4 ,this is   
the ,method of ,difference in all its   
strictness4 ,it is true1 the two        
instances which the method requires are 
obtained in this case1 not by           
experiment1 but by a prior deduction4   
,but that is of no consequence4 ,it is  
immaterial what is the nature of the    

evidence from which we derive the       
assurance that ,a ,b ,c will produce a b
 c1 and ,b ,c only b c2 it is enough    
that we have that assurance4 ,in the    
present case1 a process of reasoning    
furnished ,newton with the very         
instances1 which1 if the nature of the  
case had admitted of it1 he would have  
sought by experiment4  ,it is thus      
perfectly possible1 and indeed is a very
 common occurrence1 that what was an    
hypothesis at the beginning of the      
inquiry1 becomes a proved law of nature 
before its close4 ,but in order that    
this should happen1 we must be able1    
either by deduction or experiment1 to   
obtain both the instances which the     
,method of ,difference requires4 ,that  
we are able from the hypothesis to      
deduce the known facts1 gives only the  
affirmative instance1 ,a ,b ,c1 a b c4  
,it is equally necessary that we should 
be able to obtain1 as ,newton did1 the  
negative instance ,b ,c1 b c2 by showing
 that no antecedent1 except the one     

assumed in the hypothesis1 would in     
conjunction with ,b ,c produce a4  ,now 
it appears to me that this assurance    
cannot be obtained1 when the cause      
assumed in the hypothesis is an unknown 
cause1 imagined solely to account for a4
 ,when we are only seeking to determine 
the precise law of a cause already      
ascertained1 or to distinguish the      
particular agent which is in fact the   
cause1 among several agents of the same 
kind1 one or other of which it is       
already known to be1 we may then obtain 
the negative instance4 ,an inquiry1     
which of the bodies of the solar system 
causes by its attraction some particular
 irregularity in the orbit or periodic  
time of some satellite or comet1 would  
be a case of the second description4    
,newton's was a case of the first4 ,if  
it had not been previously known that   
the planets were hindered from moving in
 straight lines by some force tending   
towards the interior of their orbit1    
though the exact direction was doubtful2

 or if it had not been known that the   
force increased in some proportion or   
other as the distance diminished1 and   
diminished as it increased2 ,newton's   
argument would not have proved his      
conclusion4 ,these facts1 however1 being
 already certain1 the range of          
admissible suppositions was limited to  
the various possible directions of a    
line1 and the various possible numerical
 relations between the variations of the
 distance1 and the variations of the    
attractive force3 now among these it was
 easily shown that different            
suppositions could not lead to identical
 consequences4  ,accordingly1 ,newton   
could not have performed his second     
great scientific operation1 that of     
identifying terrestrial gravity with the
 central force of the solar system1 by  
the same hypothetical method4 ,when the 
law of the moon's attraction had been   
proved from the data of the moon itself1
 then on finding the same law to accord 
with the phenomena of terrestrial       

gravity1 he was warranted in adopting it
 as the law of those phenomena likewise2
 but it would not have been allowable   
for him1 without any lunar data1 to     
assume that the moon was attracted      
towards the earth with a force as the   
inverse square of the distance1 merely  
because that ratio would enable him to  
account for terrestrial gravity3 for it 
would have been impossible for him to   
prove that the observed law of the fall 
of heavy bodies to the earth could not  
result from any force1 save one         
extending to the moon1 and proportional 
to the inverse square4  ,it appears1    
then1 to be a condition of a genuinely  
scientific hypothesis1 that it be not   
destined always to remain an hypothesis1
 but be of such a nature as to be either
 proved or disproved by comparison with 
observed facts4 ,this condition is      
fulfilled when the effect is already    
known to depend on the very cause       
supposed1 and the hypothesis relates    
only to the precise mode of dependence2 

the law of the variation of the effect  
according to the variations in the      
quantity or in the relations of the     
cause4 ,with these may be classed the   
hypotheses which do not make any        
supposition with regard to causation1   
but only with regard to the law of      
correspondence between facts which      
accompany each other in their           
variations1 though there may be no      
relation of cause and effect between    
them4 ,such were the different false    
hypotheses which ,kepler made respecting
 the law of the refraction of light4 ,it
 was known that the direction of the    
line of refraction varied with every    
variation in the direction of the line  
of incidence1 but it was not known how2 
that is1 what changes of the one        
corresponded to the different changes of
 the other4 ,in this case any law1      
different from the true one1 must have  
led to false results4 ,and1 lastly1 we  
must add to these1 all hypothetical     
modes of merely representing1 or        

describing1 phenomena2 such as the      
hypothesis of the ancient astronomers   
that the heavenly bodies moved in       
circles2 the various hypotheses of      
excentrics1 deferents1 and epicycles1   
which were added to that original       
hypothesis2 the nineteen false          
hypotheses which ,kepler made and       
abandoned respecting the form of the    
planetary orbits2 and even the doctrine 
in which he finally rested1 that those  
orbits are ellipses1 which was but an   
hypothesis like the rest until verified 
by facts4  ,in all these cases1         
verification is proof2 if the           
supposition accords with the phenomena  
there needs no other evidence of it4    
,but in order that this may be the case1
 ,i conceive it to be necessary1 when   
the hypothesis relates to causation1    
that the supposed cause should not only 
be a real phenomenon1 something actually
 existing in nature1 but should be      
already known to exercise1 or at least  
to be capable of exercising1 an         

influence of some sort over the effect4 
,in any other case1 it is no evidence of
 the truth of the hypothesis that we are
 able to deduce the real phenomena from 
it4  ,is it1 then1 never allowable1 in a
 scientific hypothesis1 to assume a     
cause2 but only to ascribe an assumed   
law to a known cause8 ,i do not assert  
this4 ,i only say1 that in the latter   
case alone can the hypothesis be        
received as true merely because it      
explains the phenomena3 in the former   
case it is only useful by suggesting a  
line of investigation which may possibly
 terminate in obtaining real proof4 ,for
 this purpose1 as is justly remarked by 
,m4 ,comte1 it is indispensable that the
 cause suggested by the hypothesis      
should be in its own nature susceptible 
of being proved by other evidence4 ,this
 seems to be the philosophical import of
 ,newton's maxim1 7so often cited with  
approbation by subsequent writers17 that
 the cause assigned for any phenomenon  
must not only be such as if admitted    

would explain the phenomenon1 but must  
also be a vera causa4 ,what he meant by 
a vera causa ,newton did not indeed very
 explicitly define2 and ,dr4 ,whewell1  
who dissents from the propriety of any  
such restriction upon the latitude of   
framing hypotheses1 has had little      
difficulty in showing#c that his        
conception of it was neither precise nor
 consistent with itself3 accordingly his
 optical theory was a signal instance of
 the violation of his own rule4 ,it is  
certainly not necessary that the cause  
assigned should be a cause already      
known2 else how could we ever become    
acquainted with any new cause8 ,but what
 is true in the maxim is1 that the      
cause1 though not known previously1     
should be capable of being known        
thereafter2 that its existence should be
 capable of being detected1 and its     
connexion with the effect ascribed to it
 should be susceptible of being proved1 
by independent evidence4 ,the           
hypothesis1 by suggesting observations  

and experiments1 puts us on the road to 
that independent evidence if it be      
really attainable2 and till it be       
attained1 the hypothesis ought not to   
count for more than a conjecture4    #e4
 ,this function1 however1 of hypotheses1
 is one which must be reckoned          
absolutely indispensable in science4    
,when ,newton said1 ,hypotheses non     
fingo1 he did not mean that he deprived 
himself of the facilities of            
investigation afforded by assuming in   
the first instance what he hoped        
ultimately to be able to prove4 ,without
 such assumptions1 science could never  
have attained its present state3 they   
are necessary steps in the progress to  
something more certain2 and nearly      
everything which is now theory was once 
hypothesis4 ,even in purely experimental
 science1 some inducement is necessary  
for trying one experiment rather than   
another2 and though it is abstractedly  
possible that all the experiments which 
have been tried1 might have been        

produced by the mere desire to ascertain
 what would happen in certain           
circumstances1 without any previous     
conjecture as to the result2 yet1 in    
point of fact1 those unobvious1         
delicate1 and often cumbrous and tedious
 processes of experiment1 which have    
thrown most light upon the general      
constitution of nature1 would hardly    
ever have been undertaken by the persons
 or at the time they were1 unless it had
 seemed to depend on them whether some  
general doctrine or theory which had    
been suggested1 but not yet proved1     
should be admitted or not4 ,if this be  
true even of merely experimental        
inquiry1 the conversion of experimental 
into deductive truths could still less  
have been effected without large        
temporary assistance from hypotheses4   
,the process of tracing regularity in   
any complicated1 and at first sight     
confused set of appearances1 is         
necessarily tentative3 we begin by      
making any supposition1 even a false    

one1 to see what consequences will      
follow from it2 and by observing how    
these differ from the real phenomena1 we
 learn what corrections to make in our  
assumption4 ,the simplest supposition   
which accords with the more obvious     
facts1 is the best to begin with2       
because its consequences are the most   
easily traced4 ,this rude hypothesis is 
then rudely corrected1 and the operation
 repeated2 and the comparison of the    
consequences deducible from the         
corrected hypothesis1 with the observed 
facts1 suggests still further           
correction1 until the deductive results 
are at last made to tally with the      
phenomena4 ,some fact is as yet little  
understood1 or some law is unknown3 we  
frame on the subject an hypothesis as   
accordant as possible with the whole of 
the data already possessed2 and the     
science1 being thus enabled to move     
forward freely1 always ends by leading  
to new consequences capable of          
observation1 which either confirm or    

refute1 unequivocally1 the first        
supposition4 ,neither induction nor     
deduction would enable us to understand 
even the simplest phenomena1 if we did  
not often commence by anticipating on   
the results2 by making a provisional    
supposition1 at first essentially       
conjectural1 as to some of the very     
notions which constitute the final      
object of the inquiry4#d ,let any one   
watch the manner in which he himself    
unravels a complicated mass of evidence2
 let him observe how1 for instance1 he  
elicits the true history of any         
occurrence from the involved statements 
of one or of many witnesses3 he will    
find that he does not take all the items
 of evidence into his mind at once1 and 
attempt to weave them together3 he      
extemporises1 from a few of the         
particulars1 a first rude theory of the 
mode in which the facts took place1 and 
then looks at the other statements one  
by one1 to try whether they can be      
reconciled with that provisional theory1

 or what alterations or additions it    
requires to make it square with them4   
,in this way1 which has been justly     
compared to the ,methods of             
,approximation of mathematicians1 we    
arrive1 by means of hypotheses1 at      
conclusions not hypothetical4#e    #f4  
,it is perfectly consistent with the    
spirit of the method1 to assume in this 
provisional manner not only an          
hypothesis respecting the law of what we
 already know to be the cause1 but an   
hypothesis respecting the cause itself4 
,it is allowable1 useful1 and often even
 necessary1 to begin by asking ourselves
 what cause may have produced the       
effect1 in order that we may know in    
what direction to look out for evidence 
to determine whether it actually did4   
,the vortices of ,descartes would have  
been a perfectly legitimate hypothesis1 
if it had been possible1 by any mode of 
exploration which we could entertain the
 hope of ever possessing1 to bring the  
reality of the vortices1 as a fact in   

nature1 conclusively to the test of     
observation4 ,the hypothesis was        
vicious1 simply because it could not    
lead to any course of investigation     
capable of converting it from an        
hypothesis into a proved fact4 ,it might
 chance to be disproved1 either by some 
want of correspondence with the         
phenomena it purported to explain1 or   
7as actually happened7 by some          
extraneous fact4 ,the free passage of   
comets through the spaces in which these
 vortices should have been1 convinced   
men that these vortices did not exist4#f
 ,but the hypothesis would have been    
false1 though no such direct evidence of
 its falsity had been procurable4       
,direct evidence of its truth there     
could not be4  ,the prevailing          
hypothesis of a luminiferous ether1 in  
other respects not without analogy to   
that of ,descartes1 is not in its own   
nature entirely cut off from the        
possibility of direct evidence in its   
favour4 ,it is well known that the      

difference between the calculated and   
the observed times of the periodical    
return of ,encke's comet1 has led to a  
conjecture that a medium capable of     
opposing resistance to motion is        
diffused through space4 ,if this surmise
 should be confirmed1 in the course of  
ages1 by the gradual accumulation of a  
similar variance in the case of the     
other bodies of the solar system1 the   
luminiferous ether would have made a    
considerable advance towards the        
character of a vera causa1 since the    
existence would have been ascertained of
 a great cosmical agent1 possessing some
 of the attributes which the hypothesis 
assumes2 though there would still remain
 many difficulties1 and the             
identification of the ether with the    
resisting medium would even1 ,i imagine1
 give rise to new ones4 ,at present1    
however1 this supposition cannot be     
looked upon as more than a conjecture2  
the existence of the ether still rests  
on the possibility of deducing from its 

assumed laws a considerable number of   
the phenomena of light2 and this        
evidence ,i cannot regard as conclusive1
 because we cannot have1 in the case of 
such an hypothesis1 the assurance that  
if the hypothesis be false it must lead 
to results at variance with the true    
facts4  ,accordingly1 most thinkers of  
any degree of sobriety allow1 that an   
hypothesis of this kind is not to be    
received as probably true because it    
accounts for all the known phenomena2   
since this is a condition sometimes     
fulfilled tolerably well by two         
conflicting hypotheses2 while there are 
probably a thousand more which are      
equally possible1 but which1 for want of
 anything analogous in our experience1  
our minds are unfitted to conceive4 ,but
 it seems to be thought that an         
hypothesis of the sort in question is   
entitled to a more favourable reception1
 if1 besides accounting for all the     
facts previously known1 it has led to   
the anticipation and prediction of      

others which experience afterwards      
verified2 as the undulatory theory of   
light led to the prediction1            
subsequently realized by experiment1    
that two luminous rays might meet each  
other in such a manner as to produce    
darkness4 ,such predictions and their   
fulfilment are1 indeed1 well calculated 
to impress the uninformed1 whose faith  
in science rests solely on similar      
coincidences between its prophecies and 
what comes to pass4 ,but it is strange  
that any considerable stress should be  
laid upon such a coincidence by persons 
of scientific attainments4 ,if the laws 
of the propagation of light accord with 
those of the vibrations of an elastic   
fluid in as many respects as is         
necessary to make the hypothesis afford 
a correct expression of all or most of  
the phenomena known at the time1 it is  
nothing strange that they should accord 
with each other in one respect more4    
,though twenty such coincidences should 
occur1 they would not prove the reality 

of the undulatory ether2 it would not   
follow that the phenomena of light were 
results of the laws of elastic fluids1  
but at most that they are governed by   
laws partially identical with these2    
which1 we may observe1 is already       
certain1 from the fact that the         
hypothesis in question could be for a   
moment tenable4#g ,cases may be cited1  
even in our imperfect acquaintance with 
nature1 where agencies that we have good
 reason to consider as radically        
distinct1 produce their effects1 or some
 of their effects1 according to laws    
which are identical4 ,the law1 for      
example1 of the inverse square of the   
distance1 is the measure of the         
intensity not only of gravitation1 but  
7it is believed7 of illumination1 and of
 heat diffused from a centre4 ,yet no   
one looks upon this identity as proving 
similarity in the mechanism by which the
 three kinds of phenomena are produced4 
,according to ,dr4 ,whewell1 the        
coincidence of results predicted from an

 hypothesis1 with facts afterwards      
observed1 amounts to a conclusive proof 
of the truth of the theory4 ,if ,i copy 
a long series of letters1 of which the  
last half dozen are concealed1 and if ,i
 guess these aright1 as is found to be  
the case when they are afterwards       
uncovered1 this must be because ,i have 
made out the import of the inscription4 
,to say1 that because ,i have copied all
 that ,i could see1 it is nothing       
strange that ,i should guess those which
 ,i cannot see1 would be absurd1 without
 supposing such a ground for guessing4#h
 ,if any one1 from examining the greater
 part of a long inscription1 can        
interpret the characters so that the    
inscription gives a rational meaning in 
a known language1 there is a strong     
presumption that his interpretation is  
correct2 but ,i do not think the        
presumption much increased by his being 
able to guess the few remaining letters 
without seeing them3 for we should      
naturally expect 7when the nature of the

 case excludes chance7 that even an     
erroneous interpretation which accorded 
with all the visible parts of the       
inscription would accord also with the  
small remainder2 as would be the case1  
for example1 if the inscription had been
 designedly so contrived as to admit of 
a double sense4 ,i assume that the      
uncovered characters afford an amount of
 coincidence too great to be merely     
casual3 otherwise the illustration is   
not a fair one4 ,no one supposes the    
agreement with the phenomena of light   
with the theory of undulations to be    
merely fortuitous4 ,it must arise from  
the actual identity of some of the laws 
of undulations with some of those of    
light3 and if there be that identity1 it
 is reasonable to suppose that its      
consequences would not end with the     
phenomena which first suggested the     
identification1 nor be even confined to 
such phenomena as were known at the     
time4 ,but it does not follow1 because  
some of the laws agree with those of    

undulations1 that there are any actual  
undulations2 no more than it followed   
because some 7though not so many7 of the
 same laws agreed with those of the     
projection of particles1 that there was 
actual emission of particles4 ,even the 
undulatory hypothesis does not account  
for all the phenomena of light4 ,the    
natural colours of objects1 the compound
 nature of the solar ray1 the absorption
 of light1 and its chemical and vital   
action1 the hypothesis leaves as        
mysterious as it found them2 and some of
 these facts are1 at least apparently1  
more reconcileable with the emission    
theory than with that of ,young and     
,fresnel4 ,who knows but that some third
 hypothesis1 including all these        
phenomena1 may in time leave the        
undulatory theory as far behind as that 
has left the theory of ,newton and his  
successors8  ,to the statement1 that the
 condition of accounting for all the    
known phenomena is often fulfilled      
equally well by two conflicting         

hypotheses1 ,dr4 ,whewell makes answer  
that he knows of no such case in the    
history of science1 where the phenomena 
are at all numerous and complicated4#i  
,such an affirmation1 by a writer of    
,dr4 ,whewell's minute acquaintance with
 the history of science1 would carry    
great authority1 if he had not1 a few   
pages before1 taken pains to refute     
it1#aj by maintaining that even the     
exploded scientific hypotheses might    
always1 or almost always1 have been so  
modified as to make them correct        
representations of the phenomena4 ,the  
hypothesis of vortices1 he tells us1    
was1 by successive modifications1       
brought to coincide in its results with 
the ,newtonian theory and with the      
facts4 ,the vortices did not indeed     
explain all the phenomena which the     
,newtonian theory was ultimately found  
to account for1 such as the precession  
of the equinoxes2 but this phenomenon   
was not1 at the time1 in the            
contemplation of either party1 as one of

 the facts to be accounted for4 ,all the
 facts which they did contemplate1 we   
may believe on ,dr4 ,whewell's authority
 to have accorded as accurately with the
 ,cartesian hypothesis1 in its finally  
improved state1 as with ,newton's4  ,but
 it is not1 ,i conceive1 a valid reason 
for accepting any given hypothesis1 that
 we are unable to imagine any other     
which will account for the facts4 ,there
 is no necessity for supposing that the 
true explanation must be one which1 with
 only our present experience1 we could  
imagine4 ,among the natural agents with 
which we are acquainted1 the vibrations 
of an elastic fluid may be the only one 
whose laws bear a close resemblance to  
those of light2 but we cannot tell that 
there does not exist an unknown cause1  
other than an elastic ether diffused    
through space1 yet producing effects    
identical in some respects with those   
which would result from the undulations 
of such an ether4 ,to assume that no    
such cause can exist1 appears to me an  

extreme case of assumption without      
evidence4  ,i do not mean to condemn    
those who employ themselves in working  
out into detail this sort of hypotheses2
 it is useful to ascertain what are the 
known phenomena1 to the laws of which   
those of the subject of inquiry bear the
 greatest1 or even a great analogy1     
since this may suggest 7as in the case  
of the luminiferous ether it actually   
did7 experiments to determine whether   
the analogy which goes so far does not  
extend still further4 ,but that1 in     
doing this1 we should imagine ourselves 
to be seriously inquiring whether the   
hypothesis of an ether1 an electric     
fluid1 or the like1 is true2 that we    
should fancy it possible to obtain the  
assurance that the phenomena are        
produced in that way and no other2 seems
 to me1 ,i confess1 unworthy of the     
present improved conceptions of the     
methods of physical science4 ,and at the
 risk of being charged with want of     
modesty1 ,i cannot help expressing      

astonishment that a philosopher of ,dr4 
,whewell's abilities and attainments    
should have written an elaborate        
treatise on the philosophy of induction1
 in which he recognises absolutely no   
mode of induction except that of trying 
hypothesis after hypothesis until one is
 found which fits the phenomena2 which  
one1 when found1 is to be assumed as    
true1 with no other reservation than    
that if on re-examination it should     
appear to assume more than is needful   
for explaining the phenomena1 the       
superfluous part of the assumption      
should be cut off4 ,and this without the
 slightest distinction between the cases
 in which it may be known beforehand    
that two different hypotheses cannot    
lead to the same result1 and those in   
which1 for aught we can ever know1 the  
range of suppositions1 all equally      
consistent with the phenomena1 may be   
infinite4#aa    #g4 ,it is necessary1   
before quitting the subject of          
hypotheses1 to guard against the        

appearance of reflecting upon the       
scientific value of several branches of 
physical inquiry1 which1 though only in 
their infancy1 ,i hold to be strictly   
inductive4 ,there is a great difference 
between inventing agencies to account   
for classes of phenomena1 and           
endeavouring1 in conformity with known  
laws1 to conjecture what former         
collocations of known agents may have   
given birth to individual facts still in
 existence4 ,the latter is the          
legitimate operation of inferring from  
an observed effect1 the existence1 in   
time past1 of a cause similar to that by
 which we know it to be produced in all 
cases in which we have actual experience
 of its origin4 ,this1 for example1 is  
the scope of the inquiries of geology2  
and they are no more illogical or       
visionary than judicial inquiries1 which
 also aim at discovering a past event by
 inference from those of its effects    
which still subsist4 ,as we can         
ascertain whether a man was murdered or 

died a natural death1 from the          
indications exhibited by the corpse1 the
 presence or absence of signs of        
struggling on the ground or on the      
adjacent objects1 the marks of blood1   
the footsteps of the supposed murderers1
 and so on1 proceeding throughout on    
uniformities ascertained by a perfect   
induction without any mixture of        
hypothesis2 so if we find1 on and       
beneath the surface of our planet1      
masses exactly similar to deposits from 
water1 or to results of the cooling of  
matter melted by fire1 we may justly    
conclude that such has been their       
origin2 and if the effects1 though      
similar in kind1 are on a far larger    
scale than any which are now produced1  
we may rationally1 and without          
hypothesis1 conclude either that the    
causes existed formerly with greater    
intensity1 or that they have operated   
during an enormous length of time4      
,further than this no geologist of      
authority has1 since the rise of the    

present enlightened school of geological
 speculation1 attempted to go4  ,in many
 geological inquiries it doubtless      
happens that though the laws to which   
the phenomena are ascribed are known    
laws1 and the agents known agents1 those
 agents are not known to have been      
present in the particular case4 ,in the 
speculation respecting the igneous      
origin of trap or granite1 the fact does
 not admit of direct proof1 that those  
substances have been actually subjected 
to intense heat4 ,but the same thing    
might be said of all judicial inquiries 
which proceed on circumstantial         
evidence4 ,we can conclude that a man   
was murdered1 though it is not proved by
 the testimony of eye-witnesses that    
some person who had the intention of    
murdering him was present on the spot4  
,it is enough1 for most purposes1 if no 
other known cause could have generated  
the effects shown to have been produced4
  ,the celebrated speculation of        
,laplace concerning the origin of the   

earth and planets1 participates         
essentially in the inductive character  
of modern geological theory4 ,the       
speculation is1 that the atmosphere of  
the sun originally extended to the      
present limits of the solar system2 from
 which1 by the process of cooling1 it   
has contracted to its present           
dimensions2 and since1 by the general   
principles of mechanics1 the rotation of
 the sun and of its accompanying        
atmosphere must increase in rapidity as 
its volume diminishes1 the increased    
centrifugal force generated by the more 
rapid rotation1 overbalancing the action
 of gravitation1 has caused the sun to  
abandon successive rings of vaporous    
matter1 which are supposed to have      
condensed by cooling1 and to have become
 the planets4 ,there is in this theory  
no unknown substance introduced on      
supposition1 nor any unknown property or
 law ascribed to a known substance4 ,the
 known laws of matter authorize us to   
suppose that a body which is constantly 

giving out so large an amount of heat as
 the sun is1 must be progressively      
cooling1 and that1 by the process of    
cooling1 it must contract2 if1          
therefore1 we endeavour1 from the       
present state of that luminary1 to infer
 its state in a time long past1 we must 
necessarily suppose that its atmosphere 
extended much farther than at present1  
and we are entitled to suppose that it  
extended as far as we can trace effects 
such as it might naturally leave behind 
it on retiring2 and such the planets    
are4 ,these suppositions being made1 it 
follows from known laws that successive 
zones of the solar atmosphere might be  
abandoned2 that these would continue to 
revolve round the sun with the same     
velocity as when they formed part of its
 substance2 and that they would cool    
down1 long before the sun itself1 to any
 given temperature1 and consequently to 
that at which the greater part of the   
vaporous matter of which they consisted 
would become liquid or solid4 ,the known

 law of gravitation would then cause    
them to agglomerate in masses1 which    
would assume the shape our planets      
actually exhibit2 would acquire1 each   
about its own axis1 a rotatory movement2
 and would in that state revolve1 as the
 planets actually do1 about the sun1 in 
the same direction with the sun's       
rotation1 but with less velocity1       
because in the same periodic time which 
the sun's rotation occupied when his    
atmosphere extended to that point4      
,there is thus1 in ,laplace's theory1   
nothing1 strictly speaking1             
hypothetical3 it is an example of       
legitimate reasoning from a present     
effect to a possible past cause1        
according to the known laws of that     
cause4 ,the theory therefore is1 as ,i  
have said1 of a similar character to the
 theories of geologists2 but            
considerably inferior to them in point  
of evidence4 ,even if it were proved    
7which it is not7 that the conditions   
necessary for determining the breaking  

off of successive rings would certainly 
occur2 there would still be a much      
greater chance of error in assuming that
 the existing laws of nature are the    
same which existed at the origin of the 
solar system1 than in merely presuming  
7with geologists7 that those laws have  
lasted through a few revolutions and    
transformations of a single one among   
the bodies of which that system is      
composed4     ,,chapter ,,xv4  ,,of     
,,progressive ,,effects2 ,,and ,,of     
,,the ,,continued ,,action ,,of         
,,causes4    #a4 ,in the last four      
chapters we have traced the general     
outlines of the theory of the generation
 of derivative laws from ultimate ones4 
,in the present chapter our attention   
will be directed to a particular case of
 the derivation of laws from other laws1
 but a case so general1 and so          
important1 as not only to repay1 but to 
require1 a separate examination4 ,this  
is1 the case of a complex phenomenon    
resulting from one simple law1 by the   

continual addition of an effect to      
itself4  ,there are some phenomena1 some
 bodily sensations for example1 which   
are essentially instantaneous1 and whose
 existence can only be prolonged by the 
prolongation of the existence of the    
cause by which they are produced4 ,but  
most phenomena are in their own nature  
permanent2 having begun to exist1 they  
would exist for ever unless some cause  
intervened having a tendency to alter or
 destroy them4 ,such1 for example1 are  
all the facts or phenomena which we call
 bodies4 ,water1 once produced1 will not
 of itself relapse into a state of      
hydrogen and oxygen2 such a change      
requires some agent having the power of 
decomposing the compound4 ,such1 again1 
are the positions in space1 and the     
movements1 of bodies4 ,no object at rest
 alters its position without the        
intervention of some conditions         
extraneous to itself2 and when once in  
motion1 no object returns to a state of 
rest1 or alters either its direction or 

its velocity1 unless some new external  
conditions are superinduced4 ,it1       
therefore1 perpetually happens that a   
temporary cause gives rise to a         
permanent effect4 ,the contact of iron  
with moist air for a few hours1 produces
 a rust which may endure for centuries2 
or a projectile force which launches a  
cannon ball into space1 produces a      
motion which would continue for ever    
unless some other force counteracted it4
  ,between the two examples which we    
have here given1 there is a difference  
worth pointing out4 ,in the former 7in  
which the phenomenon produced is a      
substance1 and not a motion of a        
substance71 since the rust remains for  
ever and unaltered unless some new cause
 supervenes1 we may speak of the contact
 of air a hundred years ago as even the 
proximate cause of the rust which has   
existed from that time until now4 ,but  
when the effect is motion1 which is     
itself a change1 we must use a different
 language4 ,the permanency of the effect

 is now only the permanency of a series 
of changes4 ,the second foot1 or inch1  
or mile of motion1 is not the mere      
prolonged duration of the first foot1 or
 inch1 or mile1 but another fact which  
succeeds1 and which may in some respects
 be very unlike the former1 since it    
carries the body through a different    
region of space4 ,now1 the original     
projectile force which set the body     
moving is the remote cause of all its   
motion1 however long continued1 but the 
proximate cause of no motion except that
 which took place at the first instant4 
,the motion at any subsequent instant is
 proximately caused by the motion which 
took place at the instant preceding4 ,it
 is on that1 and not on the original    
moving cause1 that the motion at any    
given moment depends4 ,for1 suppose that
 the body passes through some resisting 
medium1 which partially counteracts the 
effect of the original impulse1 and     
retards the motion3 this counteraction  
7it needs scarcely here be repeated7 is 

as strict an example of obedience to the
 law of the impulse1 as if the body had 
gone on moving with its original        
velocity2 but the motion which results  
is different1 being now a compound of   
the effects of two causes acting in     
contrary directions1 instead of the     
single effect of one cause4 ,now1 what  
cause does the body obey in its         
subsequent motion8 ,the original cause  
of motion1 or the actual motion at the  
preceding instant8 ,the latter3 for when
 the object issues from the resisting   
medium1 it continues moving1 not with   
its original1 but with its retarded     
velocity4 ,the motion having once been  
diminished1 all that which follows is   
diminished4 ,the effect changes1 because
 the cause which it really obeys1 the   
proximate cause1 the real cause in fact1
 has changed4 ,this principle is        
recognised by mathematicians when they  
enumerate among the causes by which the 
motion of a body is at any instant      
determined1 the force generated by the  

previous motion2 an expression which    
would be absurd if taken to imply that  
this force was an intermediate link     
between the cause and the effect1 but   
which really means only the previous    
motion itself1 considered as a cause of 
further motion4 ,we must1 therefore1 if 
we would speak with perfect precision1  
consider each link in the succession of 
motions as the effect of the link       
preceding it4 ,but if1 for the          
convenience of discourse1 we speak of   
the whole series as one effect1 it must 
be as an effect produced by the original
 impelling force2 a permanent effect    
produced by an instantaneous cause1 and 
possessing the property of              
self-perpetuation4  ,let us now suppose 
that the original agent or cause1       
instead of being instantaneous1 is      
permanent4 ,whatever effect has been    
produced up to a given time1 would      
7unless prevented by the intervention of
 some new cause7 subsist permanently1   
even if the cause were to perish4       

,since1 however1 the cause does not     
perish1 but continues to exist and to   
operate1 it must go on producing more   
and more of the effect2 and instead of  
an uniform effect1 we have a progressive
 series of effects1 arising from the    
accumulated influence of a permanent    
cause4 ,thus1 the contact of iron with  
the atmosphere causes a portion of it to
 rust2 and if the cause ceased1 the     
effect already produced would be        
permanent1 but no further effect would  
be added4 ,if1 however1 the cause1      
namely1 exposure to moist air1          
continues1 more and more of the iron    
becomes rusted1 until all which is      
exposed is converted into a red powder1 
when one of the conditions of the       
production of rust1 namely1 the presence
 of unoxidized iron1 has ceased1 and the
 effect cannot any longer be produced4  
,again1 the earth causes bodies to fall 
towards it1 that is1 the existence of   
the earth at a given instant1 causes an 
unsupported body to move towards it at  

the succeeding instant3 and if the earth
 were annihilated1 as much of the effect
 as is already produced would continue2 
the object would go on moving in the    
same direction1 with its acquired       
velocity1 until intercepted by some body
 or deflected by some other force4 ,the 
earth1 however1 not being annihilated1  
goes on producing in the second instant 
an effect similar and of equal amount   
with the first1 which two effects being 
added together1 there results an        
accelerated velocity2 and this operation
 being repeated at each successive      
instant1 the mere permanence of the     
cause1 though without increase1 gives   
rise to a constant progressive increase 
of the effect1 so long as all the       
conditions1 negative and positive1 of   
the production of that effect1 continue 
to be realized4  ,it is obvious that    
this state of things is merely a case of
 the ,composition of ,causes4 ,a cause  
which continues in action1 must on a    
strict analysis be considered as a      

number of causes exactly similar1       
successively introduced1 and producing  
by their combination the sum of the     
effects which they would severally      
produce if they acted singly4 ,the      
progressive rusting of the iron is in   
strictness the sum of the effects of    
many particles of air acting in         
succession upon corresponding particles 
of iron4 ,the continued action of the   
earth upon a falling body is equivalent 
to a series of forces1 applied in       
successive instants1 each tending to    
produce a certain constant quantity of  
motion2 and the motion at each instant  
is the sum of the effects of the new    
force applied at the preceding instant1 
and the motion already acquired4 ,in    
each instant1 a fresh effect1 of which  
gravity is the proximate cause1 is added
 to the effect of which it was the      
remote cause3 or 7to express the same   
thing in another manner7 the effect     
produced by the earth's influence at the
 instant last elapsed1 is added to the  

sum of the effects of which the remote  
causes were the influences exerted by   
the earth at all the previous instants  
since the motion began4 ,the case1      
therefore1 comes under the principle of 
a concurrence of causes producing an    
effect equal to the sum of their        
separate effects4 ,but as the causes    
come into play not all at once1 but     
successively1 and as the effect at each 
instant is the sum of the effects of    
those causes only which have come into  
action up to that instant1 the result   
assumes the form of an ascending series2
 a succession of sums1 each greater than
 that which preceded it2 and we have    
thus a progressive effect from the      
continued action of a cause4  ,since the
 continuance of the cause influences the
 effect only by adding to its quantity1 
and since the addition takes place      
according to a fixed law 7equal         
quantities in equal times71 the result  
is capable of being computed on         
mathematical principles4 ,in fact1 this 

case1 being that of infinitesimal       
increments1 is precisely the case which 
the differential calculus was invented  
to meet4 ,the questions1 what effect    
will result from the continual addition 
of a given cause to itself1 and what    
amount of the cause1 being continually  
added to itself1 will produce a given   
amount of the effect1 are evidently     
mathematical questions1 and to be       
treated1 therefore1 deductively4 ,if1 as
 we have seen1 cases of the ,composition
 of ,causes are seldom adapted for any  
other than deductive investigation1 this
 is especially true in the case now     
examined1 the continual composition of a
 cause with its own previous effects2   
since such a case is peculiarly amenable
 to the deductive method1 while the     
undistinguishable manner in which the   
effects are blended with one another and
 with the causes1 must make the         
treatment of such an instance           
experimentally1 still more chimerical   
than in any other case4    #b4 ,we shall

 next advert to a rather more intricate 
operation of the same principle1 namely1
 when the cause does not merely continue
 in action1 but undergoes1 during the   
same time1 a progressive change in those
 of its circumstances which contribute  
to determine the effect4 ,in this case1 
as in the former1 the total effect goes 
on accumulating by the continual        
addition of a fresh effect to that      
already produced1 but it is no longer by
 the addition of equal quantities in    
equal times2 the quantities added are   
unequal1 and even the quality may now be
 different4 ,if the change in the state 
of the permanent cause be progressive1  
the effect will go through a double     
series of changes1 arising partly from  
the accumulated action of the cause1 and
 partly from the changes in its action4 
,the effect is still a progressive      
effect1 produced however1 not by the    
mere continuance of a cause1 but by its 
continuance and its progressiveness     
combined4  ,a familiar example is       

afforded by the increase of the         
temperature as summer advances1 that is1
 as the sun draws nearer to a vertical  
position1 and remains a greater number  
of hours above the horizon4 ,this       
instance exemplifies in a very          
interesting manner the twofold operation
 on the effect1 arising from the        
continuance of the cause1 and from its  
progressive change4 ,when once the sun  
has come near enough to the zenith1 and 
remains above the horizon long enough1  
to give more warmth during one diurnal  
rotation than the counteracting cause1  
the earth's radiation1 can carry off1   
the mere continuance of the cause would 
progressively increase the effect1 even 
if the sun came no nearer and the days  
grew no longer2 but in addition to this1
 a change takes place in the accidents  
of the cause 7its series of diurnal     
positions71 tending to increase the     
quantity of the effect4 ,when the summer
 solstice has passed1 the progressive   
change in the cause begins to take place

 the reverse way2 but1 for some time1   
the accumulating effect of the mere     
continuance of the cause exceeds the    
effect of the changes in it1 and the    
temperature continues to increase4      
,again1 the motion of a planet is a     
progressive effect1 produced by causes  
at once permanent and progressive4 ,the 
orbit of a planet is determined         
7omitting perturbations7 by two causes3 
first1 the action of the central body1 a
 permanent cause1 which alternately     
increases and diminishes as the planet  
draws nearer to or goes further from its
 perihelion1 and which acts at every    
point in a different direction2 and1    
secondly1 the tendency of the planet to 
continue moving in the direction and    
with the velocity which it has already  
acquired4 ,this force also grows greater
 as the planet draws nearer to its      
perihelion1 because as it does so its   
velocity increases2 and less1 as it     
recedes from its perihelion3 and this   
force as well as the other acts at each 

point in a different direction1 because 
at every point the action of the central
 force1 by deflecting the planet from   
its previous direction1 alters the line 
in which it tends to continue moving4   
,the motion at each instant is          
determined by the amount and direction  
of the motion1 and the amount and       
direction of the sun's action1 at the   
previous instant3 and if we speak of the
 entire revolution of the planet as one 
phenomenon 7which1 as it is periodical  
and similar to itself1 we often find it 
convenient to do17 that phenomenon is   
the progressive effect of two permanent 
and progressive causes1 the central     
force and the acquired motion4 ,those   
causes happening to be progressive in   
the particular way which is called      
periodical1 the effect necessarily is so
 too2 because the quantities to be added
 together returning in a regular order1 
the same sums must also regularly       
return4  ,this example is worthy of     
consideration also in another respect4  

,though the causes themselves are       
permanent1 and independent of all       
conditions known to us1 the changes     
which take place in the quantities and  
relations of the causes are actually    
caused by the periodical changes in the 
effects4 ,the causes1 as they exist at  
any moment1 having produced a certain   
motion1 that motion1 becoming itself a  
cause1 reacts upon the causes1 and      
produces a change in them4 ,by altering 
the distance and direction of the       
central body relatively to the planet1  
and the direction and quantity of the   
force in the direction of the tangent1  
it alters the elements which determine  
the motion at the next succeeding       
instant4 ,this change renders the next  
motion somewhat different2 and this     
difference1 by a fresh reaction upon the
 causes1 renders the next motion again  
different1 and so on4 ,the original     
state of the causes might have been     
such1 that this series of actions       
modified by reactions would not have    

been periodical4 ,the sun's action1 and 
the original impelling force1 might have
 been in such a ratio to one another1   
that the reaction of the effect would   
have been such as to alter the causes   
more and more1 without ever bringing    
them back to what they were at any      
former time4 ,the planet would then have
 moved in a parabola1 or an hyperbola1  
curves not returning into themselves4   
,the quantities of the two forces were1 
however1 originally such1 that the      
successive reactions of the effect bring
 back the causes1 after a certain time1 
to what they were before2 and from that 
time all the variations continue to     
recur again and again in the same       
periodical order1 and must so continue  
while the causes subsist and are not    
counteracted4    #c4 ,in all cases of   
progressive effects1 whether arising    
from the accumulation of unchanging or  
of changing elements1 there is an       
uniformity of succession not merely     
between the cause and the effect1 but   

between the first stages of the effect  
and its subsequent stages4 ,that a body 
in vacuo falls sixteen feet in the first
 second1 forty-eight in the second1 and 
so on in the ratio of the odd numbers1  
is as much an uniform sequence as that  
when the supports are removed the body  
falls4 ,the sequence of spring and      
summer is as regular and invariable as  
that of the approach of the sun and     
spring3 but we do not consider spring to
 be the cause of summer2 it is evident  
that both are successive effects of the 
heat received from the sun1 and that1   
considered merely in itself1 spring     
might continue for ever1 without having 
the slightest tendency to produce       
summer4 ,as we have so often remarked1  
not the conditional1 but the            
unconditional invariable antecedent is  
termed the cause4 ,that which would not 
be followed by the effect unless        
something else had preceded1 is not the 
cause1 however invariable the sequence  
may in fact be4  ,it is in this way that

 most of those uniformities of          
succession are generated1 which are not 
cases of causation4 ,when a phenomenon  
goes on increasing1 or periodically     
increases and diminishes1 or goes       
through any continued and unceasing     
process of variation reducible to an    
uniform rule or law of succession1 we do
 not on this account presume that any   
two successive terms of the series are  
cause and effect4 ,we presume the       
contrary2 we expect to find that the    
whole series originates either from the 
continued action of fixed causes1 or    
from causes which go through a          
corresponding process of continuous     
change4 ,a tree grows from half an inch 
high to a hundred feet2 and some trees  
will generally grow to that height1     
unless prevented by some counteracting  
cause4 ,but we do not call the seedling 
the cause of the full-grown tree2 the   
invariable antecedent it certainly is1  
and we know very imperfectly on what    
other antecedents the sequence is       

contingent1 but we are convinced that it
 is contingent on something2 because the
 homogeneousness of the antecedent with 
the consequent1 the close resemblance of
 the seedling to the tree in all        
respects except magnitude1 and the      
graduality of the growth1 so exactly    
resembling the progressively            
accumulating effect produced by the long
 action of some one cause1 leave no     
possibility of doubting that the        
seedling and the tree are two terms in a
 series of that description1 the first  
term of which is yet to seek4 ,the      
conclusion is further confirmed by this1
 that we are able to prove by strict    
induction the dependence of the growth  
of the tree1 and even of the continuance
 of its existence1 upon the continued   
repetition of certain processes of      
nutrition1 the rise of the sap1 the     
absorptions and exhalations by the      
leaves1 c42 and the same experiments    
would probably prove to us that the     
growth of the tree is the accumulated   

sum of the effects of these continued   
processes1 were we not1 for want of     
sufficiently microscopic eyes1 unable to
 observe correctly and in detail what   
those effects are4  ,this supposition by
 no means requires that the effect      
should not1 during its progress1 undergo
 many modifications besides those of    
quantity1 or that it should not         
sometimes appear to undergo a very      
marked change of character4 ,this may be
 either because the unknown cause       
consists of several component elements  
or agents1 whose effects1 accumulating  
according to different laws1 are        
compounded in different proportions at  
different periods in the existence of   
the organized being2 or because1 at     
certain points in its progress1 fresh   
causes or agencies come in1 or are      
evolved1 which intermix their laws with 
those of the prime agent4     ,,chapter 
,,xvi4  ,,of ,,empirical ,,laws4    #a4 
,scientific inquirers give the name of  
,empirical ,laws to those uniformities  

which observation or experiment has     
shown to exist1 but on which they       
hesitate to rely in cases varying much  
from those which have been actually     
observed1 for want of seeing any reason 
why such a law should exist4 ,it is     
implied1 therefore1 in the notion of an 
empirical law1 that it is not an        
ultimate law2 that if true at all1 its  
truth is capable of being1 and requires 
to be1 accounted for4 ,it is a          
derivative law1 the derivation of which 
is not yet known4 ,to state the         
explanation1 the why1 of the empirical  
law1 would be to state the laws from    
which it is derived2 the ultimate causes
 on which it is contingent4 ,and if we  
knew these1 we should also know what are
 its limits2 under what conditions it   
would cease to be fulfilled4  ,the      
periodical return of eclipses1 as       
originally ascertained by the           
persevering observation of the early    
eastern astronomers1 was an empirical   
law1 until the general laws of the      

celestial motions had accounted for it4 
,the following are empirical laws still 
waiting to be resolved into the simpler 
laws from which they are derived4 ,the  
local laws of the flux and reflux of the
 tides in different places3 the         
succession of certain kinds of weather  
to certain appearances of sky3 the      
apparent exceptions to the almost       
universal truth that bodies expand by   
increase of temperature3 the law that   
breeds1 both animal and vegetable1 are  
improved by crossing3 that gases have a 
strong tendency to permeate animal      
membranes3 that substances containing a 
very high proportion of nitrogen 7such  
as hydrocyanic acid and morphia7 are    
powerful poisons3 that when different   
metals are fused together1 the alloy is 
harder than the various elements3 that  
the number of atoms of acid required to 
neutralize one atom of any base1 is     
equal to the number of atoms of oxygen  
in the base3 that the solubility of     
substances in one another1 depends#ab   

7at least in some degree7 on the        
similarity of their elements4  ,an      
empirical law1 then1 is an observed     
uniformity1 presumed to be resolvable   
into simpler laws1 but not yet resolved 
into them4 ,the ascertainment of the    
empirical laws of phenomena often       
precedes by a long interval the         
explanation of those laws by the        
,deductive ,method2 and the verification
 of a deduction usually consists in the 
comparison of its results with empirical
 laws previously ascertained4    #b4    
,from a limited number of ultimate laws 
of causation1 there are necessarily     
generated a vast number of derivative   
uniformities1 both of succession and of 
coexistence4 ,some are laws of          
succession or of coexistence between    
different effects of the same cause3 of 
these we had examples in the last       
chapter4 ,some are laws of succession   
between effects and their remote causes2
 resolvable into the laws which connect 
each with the intermediate link4        

,thirdly1 when causes act together and  
compound their effects1 the laws of     
those causes generate the fundamental   
law of the effect1 namely1 that it      
depends on the coexistence of those     
causes4 ,and1 finally1 the order of     
succession or of coexistence which      
obtains among effects1 necessarily      
depends on their causes4 ,if they are   
effects of the same cause1 it depends on
 the laws of that cause2 if on different
 causes1 it depends on the laws of those
 causes severally1 and on the           
circumstances which determine their     
coexistence4 ,if we inquire further when
 and how the causes will coexist1 that1 
again1 depends on their causes3 and we  
may thus trace back the phenomena higher
 and higher1 until the different series 
of effects meet in a point1 and the     
whole is shown to have depended         
ultimately on some common cause2 or     
until1 instead of converging to one     
point1 they terminate in different      
points1 and the order of the effects is 

proved to have arisen from the          
collocation of some of the primeval     
causes1 or natural agents4 ,for example1
 the order of succession and of         
coexistence among the heavenly motions1 
which is expressed by ,kepler's laws1 is
 derived from the coexistence of two    
primeval causes1 the sun1 and the       
original impulse or projectile force    
belonging to each planet4#ac ,kepler's  
laws are resolved into the laws of these
 causes and the fact of their           
coexistence4  ,derivative laws1         
therefore1 do not depend solely on the  
ultimate laws into which they are       
resolvable3 they mostly depend on those 
ultimate laws1 and an ultimate fact2    
namely1 the mode of coexistence of some 
of the component elements of the        
universe4 ,the ultimate laws of         
causation might be the same as at       
present1 and yet the derivative laws    
completely different1 if the causes     
coexisted in different proportions1 or  
with any difference in those of their   

relations by which the effects are      
influenced4 ,if1 for example1 the sun's 
attraction1 and the original projectile 
force1 had existed in some other ratio  
to one another than they did 7and we    
know of no reason why this should not   
have been the case71 the derivative laws
 of the heavenly motions might have been
 quite different from what they are4    
,the proportions which exist happen to  
be such as to produce regular elliptical
 motions2 any other proportions would   
have produced different ellipses1 or    
circular1 or parabolic1 or hyperbolic   
motions1 but still regular ones2 because
 the effects of each of the agents      
accumulate according to an uniform law2 
and two regular series of quantities1   
when their corresponding terms are      
added1 must produce a regular series of 
some sort1 whatever the quantities      
themselves are4    #c4 ,now this        
last-mentioned element in the resolution
 of a derivative law1 the element which 
is not a law of causation1 but a        

collocation of causes1 cannot itself be 
reduced to any law4 ,there is 7as       
formerly remarked#ad7 no uniformity1 no 
norma1 principle1 or rule1 perceivable  
in the distribution of the primeval     
natural agents through the universe4    
,the different substances composing the 
earth1 the powers that pervade the      
universe1 stand in no constant relation 
to one another4 ,one substance is more  
abundant than others1 one power acts    
through a larger extent of space than   
others1 without any pervading analogy   
that we can discover4 ,we not only do   
not know of any reason why the sun's    
attraction and the force in the         
direction of the tangent coexist in the 
exact proportion they do1 but we can    
trace no coincidence between it and the 
proportions in which any other          
elementary powers in the universe are   
intermingled4 ,the utmost disorder is   
apparent in the combination of the      
causes2 which is consistent with the    
most regular order in their effects2 for

 when each agent carries on its own     
operations according to an uniform law1 
even the most capricious combination of 
agencies will generate a regularity of  
some sort2 as we see in the             
kaleidoscope1 where any casual          
arrangement of coloured bits of glass   
produces by the laws of reflection a    
beautiful regularity in the effect4     
#d4 ,in the above considerations lies   
the justification of the limited degree 
of reliance which scientific inquirers  
are accustomed to place in empirical    
laws4  ,a derivative law which results  
wholly from the operation of some one   
cause1 will be as universally true as   
the laws of the cause itself2 that is1  
it will always be true except where some
 one of those effects of the cause1 on  
which the derivative law depends1 is    
defeated by a counteracting cause4 ,but 
when the derivative law results not from
 different effects of one cause1 but    
from effects of several causes1 we      
cannot be certain that it will be true  

under any variation in the mode of      
coexistence of those causes1 or of the  
primitive natural agents on which the   
causes ultimately depend4 ,the          
proposition that coal beds rest on      
certain descriptions of strata          
exclusively1 though true on the earth so
 far as our observation has reached1    
cannot be extended to the moon or the   
other planets1 supposing coal to exist  
there2 because we cannot be assured that
 the original constitution of any other 
planet was such as to produce the       
different depositions in the same order 
as in our globe4 ,the derivative law in 
this case depends not solely on laws1   
but on a collocation2 and collocations  
cannot be reduced to any law4  ,now it  
is the very nature of a derivative law  
which has not yet been resolved into its
 elements1 in other words1 an empirical 
law1 that we do not know whether it     
results from the different effects of   
one cause1 or from effects of different 
causes4 ,we cannot tell whether it      

depends wholly on laws1 or partly on    
laws and partly on a collocation4 ,if it
 depends on a collocation1 it will be   
true in all the cases in which that     
particular collocation exists4 ,but1    
since we are entirely ignorant1 in case 
of its depending on a collocation1 what 
the collocation is1 we are not safe in  
extending the law beyond the limits of  
time and place in which we have actual  
experience of its truth4 ,since within  
those limits the law has always been    
found true1 we have evidence that the   
collocations1 whatever they are1 on     
which it depends1 do really exist within
 those limits4 ,but1 knowing of no rule 
or principle to which the collocations  
themselves conform1 we cannot conclude  
that because a collocation is proved to 
exist within certain limits of place or 
time1 it will exist beyond those limits4
 ,empirical laws1 therefore1 can only be
 received as true within the limits of  
time and place in which they have been  
found true by observation3 and not      

merely the limits of time and place1 but
 of time1 place1 and circumstance3 for  
since it is the very meaning of an      
empirical law that we do not know the   
ultimate laws of causation on which it  
is dependent1 we cannot foresee1 without
 actual trial1 in what manner or to what
 extent the introduction of any new     
circumstance may affect it4    #e4 ,but 
how are we to know that an uniformity1  
ascertained by experience1 is only an   
empirical law8 ,since1 by the           
supposition1 we have not been able to   
resolve it into any other laws1 how do  
we know that it is not an ultimate law  
of causation8  ,i answer1 that no       
generalization amounts to more than an  
empirical law when the only proof on    
which it rests is that of the ,method of
 ,agreement4 ,for it has been seen that 
by that method alone we never can arrive
 at causes4 ,the utmost that the ,method
 of ,agreement can do is1 to ascertain  
the whole of the circumstances common to
 all cases in which a phenomenon is     

produced3 and this aggregate includes   
not only the cause of the phenomenon1   
but all phenomena with which it is      
connected by any derivative uniformity1 
whether as being collateral effects of  
the same cause1 or effects of any other 
cause which1 in all the instances we    
have been able to observe1 coexisted    
with it4 ,the method affords no means of
 determining which of these uniformities
 are laws of causation1 and which are   
merely derivative laws1 resulting from  
those laws of causation and from the    
collocation of the causes4 ,none of     
them1 therefore1 can be received in any 
other character than that of derivative 
laws1 the derivation of which has not   
been traced2 in other words1 empirical  
laws3 in which light1 all results       
obtained by the ,method of ,agreement   
7and therefore almost all truths        
obtained by simple observation without  
experiment7 must be considered1 until   
either confirmed by the ,method of      
,difference1 or explained deductively1  

in other words accounted for  priori4   
,these empirical laws may be of greater 
or less authority1 according as there is
 reason to presume that they are        
resolvable into laws only1 or into laws 
and collocations together4 ,the         
sequences which we observe in the       
production and subsequent life of an    
animal or a vegetable1 resting on the   
,method of ,agreement only1 are mere    
empirical laws2 but though the          
antecedents in those sequences may not  
be the causes of the consequents1 both  
the one and the other are doubtless1 in 
the main1 successive stages of a        
progressive effect originating in a     
common cause1 and therefore independent 
of collocations4 ,the uniformities1 on  
the other hand1 in the order of         
superposition of strata on the earth1   
are empirical laws of a much weaker     
kind1 since they not only are not laws  
of causation1 but there is no reason to 
believe that they depend on any common  
cause3 all appearances are in favour of 

their depending on the particular       
collocation of natural agents which at  
some time or other existed on our globe1
 and from which no inference can be     
drawn as to the collocation which exists
 or has existed in any other portion of 
the universe4    #f4 ,our definition of 
an empirical law including not only     
those uniformities which are not known  
to be laws of causation1 but also those 
which are1 provided there be reason to  
presume that they are not ultimate laws2
 this is the proper place to consider by
 what signs we may judge that even if an
 observed uniformity be a law of        
causation1 it is not an ultimate but a  
derivative law4  ,the first sign is1 if 
between the antecedent a and the        
consequent b there be evidence of some  
intermediate link2 some phenomenon of   
which we can surmise the existence1     
though from the imperfection of our     
senses or of our instruments we are     
unable to ascertain its precise nature  
and laws4 ,if there be such a phenomenon

 7which may be denoted by the letter x71
 it follows that even if a be the cause 
of b1 it is but the remote cause1 and   
that the law1 a causes b1 is resolvable 
into at least two laws1 a causes x1 and 
x causes b4 ,this is a very frequent    
case1 since the operations of nature    
mostly take place on so minute a scale1 
that many of the successive steps are   
either imperceptible1 or very           
indistinctly perceived4  ,take1 for     
example1 the laws of the chemical       
composition of substances2 as that      
hydrogen and oxygen being combined1     
water is produced4 ,all we see of the   
process is1 that the two gases being    
mixed in certain proportions1 and heat  
or electricity being applied1 an        
explosion takes place1 the gases        
disappear1 and water remains4 ,there is 
no doubt about the law1 or about its    
being a law of causation4 ,but between  
the antecedent 7the gases in a state of 
mechanical mixture1 heated or           
electrified71 and the consequent 7the   

production of water71 there must be an  
intermediate process which we do not    
see4 ,for if we take any portion        
whatever of the water1 and subject it to
 analysis1 we find that it always       
contains hydrogen and oxygen2 nay1 the  
very same proportions of them1 namely1  
two thirds1 in volume1 of hydrogen1 and 
one third oxygen4 ,this is true of a    
single drop2 it is true of the minutest 
portion which our instruments are       
capable of appreciating4 ,since1 then1  
the smallest perceptible portion of the 
water contains both those substances1   
portions of hydrogen and oxygen smaller 
than the smallest perceptible must have 
come together in every such minute      
portion of space2 must have come closer 
together than when the gases were in a  
state of mechanical mixture1 since 7to  
mention no other reasons7 the water     
occupies far less space than the gases4 
,now1 as we cannot see this contact or  
close approach of the minute particles1 
we cannot observe with what             

circumstances it is attended1 or        
according to what laws it produces its  
effects4 ,the production of water1 that 
is1 of the sensible phenomena which     
characterize the compound1 may be a very
 remote effect of those laws4 ,there may
 be innumerable intervening links2 and  
we are sure that there must be some4    
,having full proof that corpuscular     
action of some kind takes place previous
 to any of the great transformations in 
the sensible properties of substances1  
we can have no doubt that the laws of   
chemical action1 as at present known1   
are not ultimate but derivative laws2   
however ignorant we may be1 and even    
though we should for ever remain        
ignorant1 of the nature of the laws of  
corpuscular action from which they are  
derived4  ,in like manner1 all the      
processes of vegetative life1 whether in
 the vegetable properly so called or in 
the animal body1 are corpuscular        
processes4 ,nutrition is the addition of
 particles to one another1 sometimes    

merely replacing other particles        
separated and excreted1 sometimes       
occasioning an increase of bulk or      
weight1 so gradual1 that only after a   
long continuance does it become         
perceptible4 ,various organs1 by means  
of peculiar vessels1 secrete from the   
blood1 fluids1 the component particles  
of which must have been in the blood1   
but which differ from it most widely    
both in mechanical properties and in    
chemical composition4 ,here1 then1 are  
abundance of unknown links to be filled 
up2 and there can be no doubt that the  
laws of the phenomena of vegetative or  
organic life are derivative laws1       
dependent on properties of the          
corpuscles1 and of those elementary     
tissues which are comparatively simple  
combinations of corpuscles4  ,the first 
sign1 then1 from which a law of         
causation1 though hitherto unresolved1  
may be inferred to be a derivative law1 
is any indication of the existence of an
 intermediate link or links between the 

antecedent and the consequent4 ,the     
second is1 when the antecedent is an    
extremely complex phenomenon1 and its   
effects therefore1 probably1 in part at 
least1 compounded of the effects of its 
different elements2 since we know that  
the case in which the effect of the     
whole is not made up of the effects of  
its parts1 is exceptional1 the          
,composition of ,causes being by far the
 more ordinary case4  ,we will          
illustrate this by two examples1 in one 
of which the antecedent is the sum of   
many homogeneous1 in the other of       
heterogeneous1 parts4 ,the weight of a  
body is made up of the weights of its   
minute particles3 a truth which         
astronomers express in its most general 
terms1 when they say that bodies1 at    
equal distances1 gravitate to one       
another in proportion to their quantity 
of matter4 ,all true propositions1      
therefore1 which can be made concerning 
gravity1 are derivative laws2 the       
ultimate law into which they are all    

resolvable being1 that every particle of
 matter attracts every other4 ,as our   
second example1 we may take any of the  
sequences observed in meteorology3 for  
instance1 a diminution of the pressure  
of the atmosphere 7indicated by a fall  
of the barometer7 is followed by rain4  
,the antecedent is here a complex       
phenomenon1 made up of heterogeneous    
elements2 the column of the atmosphere  
over any particular place consisting of 
two parts1 a column of air1 and a column
 of aqueous vapour mixed with it2 and   
the change in the two together          
manifested by a fall of the barometer1  
and followed by rain1 must be either a  
change in one of these1 or in the other1
 or in both4 ,we might1 then1 even in   
the absence of any other evidence1 form 
a reasonable presumption1 from the      
invariable presence of both these       
elements in the antecedent1 that the    
sequence is probably not an ultimate    
law1 but a result of the laws of the two
 different agents2 a presumption only to

 be destroyed when we had made ourselves
 so well acquainted with the laws of    
both1 as to be able to affirm that those
 laws could not by themselves produce   
the observed result4  ,there are but few
 known cases of succession from very    
complex antecedents1 which have not     
either been actually accounted for from 
simpler laws1 or inferred with great    
probability 7from the ascertained       
existence of intermediate links of      
causation not yet understood7 to be     
capable of being so accounted for4 ,it  
is1 therefore1 highly probable that all 
sequences from complex antecedents are  
thus resolvable1 and that ultimate laws 
are in all cases comparatively simple4  
,if there were not the other reasons    
already mentioned for believing that the
 laws of organized nature are resolvable
 into simpler laws1 it would be almost a
 sufficient reason that the antecedents 
in most of the sequences are so very    
complex4    #g4 ,in the preceding       
discussion we have recognised two kinds 

of empirical laws3 those known to be    
laws of causation1 but presumed to be   
resolvable into simpler laws2 and those 
not known to be laws of causation at    
all4 ,both these kinds of laws agree in 
the demand which they make for being    
explained by deduction1 and agree in    
being the appropriate means of verifying
 such deduction1 since they represent   
the experience with which the result of 
the deduction must be compared4 ,they   
agree1 further1 in this1 that until     
explained1 and connected with the       
ultimate laws from which they result1   
they have not attained the highest      
degree of certainty of which laws are   
susceptible4 ,it has been shown on a    
former occasion that laws of causation  
which are derivative1 and compounded of 
simpler laws1 are not only1 as the      
nature of the case implies1 less        
general1 but even less certain1 than the
 simpler laws from which they result2   
not in the same degree to be relied on  
as universally true4 ,the inferiority of

 evidence1 however1 which attaches to   
this class of laws1 is trifling1        
compared with that which is inherent in 
uniformities not known to be laws of    
causation at all4 ,so long as these are 
unresolved1 we cannot tell on how many  
collocations1 as well as laws1 their    
truth may be dependent2 we can never1   
therefore1 extend them with any         
confidence to cases in which we have not
 assured ourselves1 by trial1 that the  
necessary collocation of causes1        
whatever it may be1 exists4 ,it is to   
this class of laws alone that the       
property1 which philosophers usually    
consider as characteristic of empirical 
laws1 belongs in all its strictness2 the
 property of being unfit to be relied on
 beyond the limits of time1 place1 and  
circumstance1 in which the observations 
have been made4 ,these are empirical    
laws in a more emphatic sense2 and when 
,i employ that term 7except where the   
context manifestly indicates the        
reverse7 ,i shall generally mean to     

designate those uniformities only1      
whether of succession or of coexistence1
 which are not known to be laws of      
causation4     ,,chapter ,,xvii4  ,,of  
,,chance ,,and ,,its ,,elimination4     
#a4 ,considering then as empirical laws 
only those observed uniformities        
respecting which the question whether   
they are laws of causation must remain  
undecided until they can be explained   
deductively1 or until some means are    
found of applying the ,method of        
,difference to the case1 it has been    
shown in the preceding chapter1 that    
until an uniformity can1 in one or the  
other of these modes1 be taken out of   
the class of empirical laws1 and brought
 either into that of laws of causation  
or of the demonstrated results of laws  
of causation1 it cannot with any        
assurance be pronounced true beyond the 
local and other limits within which it  
has been found so by actual observation4
 ,it remains to consider how we are to  
assure ourselves of its truth even      

within those limits2 after what quantity
 of experience a generalization which   
rests solely on the ,method of          
,agreement1 can be considered           
sufficiently established1 even as an    
empirical law4 ,in a former chapter1    
when treating of the ,methods of ,direct
 ,induction1 we expressly reserved this 
question1#ae and the time is now come   
for endeavouring to solve it4  ,we found
 that the ,method of ,agreement has the 
defect of not proving causation1 and can
 therefore only be employed for the     
ascertainment of empirical laws4 ,but we
 also found that besides this           
deficiency1 it labours under a          
characteristic imperfection1 tending to 
render uncertain even such conclusions  
as it is in itself adapted to prove4    
,this imperfection arises from          
,plurality of ,causes4 ,although two or 
more cases in which the phenomenon a has
 been met with1 may have no common      
antecedent except ,a1 this does not     
prove that there is any connexion       

between a and ,a1 since a may have many 
causes1 and may have been produced1 in  
these different instances1 not by       
anything which the instances had in     
common1 but by some of those elements in
 them which were different4 ,we         
nevertheless observed1 that in          
proportion to the multiplication of     
instances pointing to ,a as the         
antecedent1 the characteristic          
uncertainty of the method diminishes1   
and the existence of a law of connexion 
between ,a and a more nearly approaches 
to certainty4 ,it is now to be          
determined1 after what amount of        
experience this certainty may be deemed 
to be practically attained1 and the     
connexion between ,a and a may be       
received as an empirical law4  ,this    
question may be otherwise stated in more
 familiar terms3--,after how many and   
what sort of instances may it be        
concluded1 that an observed coincidence 
between two phenomena is not the effect 
of chance8  ,it is of the utmost        

importance for understanding the logic  
of induction1 that we should form a     
distinct conception of what is meant by 
chance1 and how the phenomena which     
common language ascribes to that        
abstraction are really produced4    #b4 
,chance is usually spoken of in direct  
antithesis to law2 whatever 7it is      
supposed7 cannot be ascribed to any law1
 is attributed to chance4 ,it is1       
however1 certain1 that whatever happens 
is the result of some law2 is an effect 
of causes1 and could have been predicted
 from a knowledge of the existence of   
those causes1 and from their laws4 ,if  
,i turn up a particular card1 that is a 
consequence of its place in the pack4   
,its place in the pack was a consequence
 of the manner in which the cards were  
shuffled1 or of the order in which they 
were played in the last game2 which1    
again1 were effects of prior causes4 ,at
 every stage1 if we had possessed an    
accurate knowledge of the causes in     
existence1 it would have been           

abstractedly possible to foretell the   
effect4  ,an event occurring by chance1 
may be better described as a coincidence
 from which we have no ground to infer  
an uniformity3 the occurrence of a      
phenomenon in certain circumstances1    
without our having reason on that       
account to infer that it will happen    
again in those circumstances4 ,this1    
however1 when looked closely into1      
implies that the enumeration of the     
circumstances is not complete4 ,whatever
 the fact be1 since it has occurred     
once1 we may be sure that if all the    
same circumstances were repeated1 it    
would occur again2 and not only if all1 
but there is some particular portion of 
those circumstances1 on which the       
phenomenon is invariably consequent4    
,with most of them1 however1 it is not  
connected in any permanent manner3 its  
conjunction with those is said to be the
 effect of chance1 to be merely casual4 
,facts casually conjoined are separately
 the effects of causes1 and therefore of

 laws2 but of different causes1 and     
causes not connected by any law4  ,it is
 incorrect1 then1 to say that any       
phenomenon is produced by chance2 but we
 may say that two or more phenomena are 
conjoined by chance1 that they coexist  
or succeed one another only by chance3  
meaning that they are in no way related 
through causation2 that they are neither
 cause and effect1 nor effects of the   
same cause1 nor effects of causes       
between which there subsists any law of 
coexistence1 nor even effects of the    
same collocation of primeval causes4    
,if the same casual coincidence never   
occurred a second time1 we should have  
an easy test for distinguishing such    
from the coincidences which are the     
results of a law4 ,as long as the       
phenomena had been found together only  
once1 so long1 unless we knew some more 
general laws from which the coincidence 
might have resulted1 we could not       
distinguish it from a casual one2 but if
 it occurred twice1 we should know that 

the phenomena so conjoined must be in   
some way connected through their causes4
  ,there is1 however1 no such test4 ,a  
coincidence may occur again and again1  
and yet be only casual4 ,nay1 it would  
be inconsistent with what we know of the
 order of nature1 to doubt that every   
casual coincidence will sooner or later 
be repeated1 as long as the phenomena   
between which it occurred do not cease  
to exist1 or to be reproduced4 ,the     
recurrence1 therefore1 of the same      
coincidence more than once1 or even its 
frequent recurrence1 does not prove that
 it is an instance of any law2 does not 
prove that it is not casual1 or1 in     
common language1 the effect of chance4  
,and yet1 when a coincidence cannot be  
deduced from known laws1 nor proved by  
experiment to be itself a case of       
causation1 the frequency of its         
occurrence is the only evidence from    
which we can infer that it is the result
 of a law4 ,not1 however1 its absolute  
frequency4 ,the question is not whether 

the coincidence occurs often or seldom1 
in the ordinary sense of those terms2   
but whether it occurs more often than   
chance will account for2 more often than
 might rationally be expected if the    
coincidence were casual4 ,we have to    
decide1 therefore1 what degree of       
frequency in a coincidence1 chance will 
account for4 ,and to this there can be  
no general answer4 ,we can only state   
the principle by which the answer must  
be determined3 the answer itself will be
 different in every different case4     
,suppose that one of the phenomena1 ,a1 
exists always1 and the other phenomenon1
 ,b1 only occasionally3 it follows that 
every instance of ,b will be an instance
 of its coincidence with ,a1 and yet the
 coincidence will be merely casual1 not 
the result of any connexion between     
them4 ,the fixed stars have been        
constantly in existence since the       
beginning of human experience1 and all  
phenomena that have come under human    
observation have1 in every single       

instance1 coexisted with them2 yet this 
coincidence1 though equally invariable  
with that which exists between any of   
those phenomena and its own cause1 does 
not prove that the stars are its cause1 
nor that they are in anywise connected  
with it4 ,as strong a case of           
coincidence1 therefore1 as can possibly 
exist1 and a much stronger one in point 
of mere frequency than most of those    
which prove laws1 does not here prove a 
law3 why8 because1 since the stars exist
 always1 they must coexist with every   
other phenomenon1 whether connected with
 them by causation or not4 ,the         
uniformity1 great though it be1 is no   
greater than would occur on the         
supposition that no such connexion      
exists4  ,on the other hand1 suppose    
that we were inquiring whether there be 
any connexion between rain and any      
particular wind4 ,rain1 we know1        
occasionally occurs with every wind2    
therefore the connexion1 if it exists1  
cannot be an actual law2 but still1 rain

 may be connected with some particular  
wind through causation2 that is1 though 
they cannot be always effects of the    
same cause 7for if so they would        
regularly coexist71 there may be some   
causes common to the two1 so that in so 
far as either is produced by those      
common causes1 they will1 from the laws 
of the causes1 be found to coexist4     
,how1 then1 shall we ascertain this8    
,the obvious answer is1 by observing    
whether rain occurs with one wind more  
frequently than with any other4 ,that1  
however1 is not enough2 for perhaps that
 one wind blows more frequently than any
 other2 so that its blowing more        
frequently in rainy weather is no more  
than would happen1 although it had no   
connexion with the causes of rain1      
provided it were not connected with     
causes adverse to rain4 ,in ,england1   
westerly winds blow during about twice  
as great a portion of the year as       
easterly4 ,if1 therefore1 it rains only 
twice as often with a westerly1 as with 

an easterly wind1 we have no reason to  
infer that any law of nature is         
concerned in the coincidence4 ,if it    
rains more than twice as often1 we may  
be sure that some law is concerned2     
either there is some cause in nature    
which1 in this climate1 tends to produce
 both rain and a westerly wind1 or a    
westerly wind has itself some tendency  
to produce rain4 ,but if it rains less  
than twice as often1 we may draw a      
directly opposite inference3 the one1   
instead of being a cause1 or connected  
with causes1 of the other1 must be      
connected with causes adverse to it1 or 
with the absence of some cause which    
produces it2 and though it may still    
rain much oftener with a westerly wind  
than with an easterly1 so far would this
 be from proving any connexion between  
the phenomena1 that the connexion proved
 would be between rain and an easterly  
wind1 to which1 in mere frequency of    
coincidence1 it is less allied4  ,here1 
then1 are two examples3 in one1 the     

greatest possible frequency of          
coincidence1 with no instance whatever  
to the contrary1 does not prove that    
there is any law2 in the other1 a much  
less frequency of coincidence1 even when
 non-coincidence is still more frequent1
 does prove that there is a law4 ,in    
both cases the principle is the same4   
,in both we consider the positive       
frequency of the phenomena themselves1  
and how great frequency of coincidence  
that must of itself bring about1 without
 supposing any connexion between them1  
provided there be no repugnance2        
provided neither be connected with any  
cause tending to frustrate the other4   
,if we find a greater frequency of      
coincidence than this1 we conclude that 
there is some connexion2 if a less      
frequency1 that there is some           
repugnance4 ,in the former case1 we     
conclude that one of the phenomena can  
under some circumstances cause the      
other1 or that there exists something   
capable of causing them both2 in the    

latter1 that one of them1 or some cause 
which produces one of them1 is capable  
of counteracting the production of the  
other4 ,we have thus to deduct from the 
observed frequency of coincidence1 as   
much as may be the effect of chance1    
that is1 of the mere frequency of the   
phenomena themselves2 and if anything   
remains1 what does remain is the        
residual fact which proves the existence
 of a law4  ,the frequency of the       
phenomena can only be ascertained within
 definite limits of space and time2     
depending as it does on the quantity and
 distribution of the primeval natural   
agents1 of which we can know nothing    
beyond the boundaries of human          
observation1 since no law1 no           
regularity1 can be traced in it1        
enabling us to infer the unknown from   
the known4 ,but for the present purpose 
this is no disadvantage1 the question   
being confined within the same limits as
 the data4 ,the coincidences occurred in
 certain places and times1 and within   

those we can estimate the frequency with
 which such coincidences would be       
produced by chance4 ,if1 then1 we find  
from observation that ,a exists in one  
case out of every two1 and ,b in one    
case out of every three2 then if there  
be neither connexion nor repugnance     
between them1 or between any of their   
causes1 the instances in which ,a and ,b
 will both exist1 that is to say will   
coexist1 will be one case in every six4 
,for ,a exists in three cases out of    
six3 and ,b1 existing in one case out of
 every three without regard to the      
presence or absence of ,a1 will exist in
 one case out of those three4 ,there    
will therefore be1 of the whole number  
of cases1 two in which ,a exists without
 ,b2 one case of ,b without ,a2 two in  
which neither ,b nor ,a exists1 and one 
case out of six in which they both      
exist4 ,if then1 in point of fact1 they 
are found to coexist oftener than in one
 case out of six2 and1 consequently1 ,a 
does not exist without ,b so often as   

twice in three times1 nor ,b without ,a 
so often as once in every twice2 there  
is some cause in existence which tends  
to produce a conjunction between ,a and 
,b4  ,generalizing the result1 we may   
say1 that if ,a occurs in a larger      
proportion of the cases where ,b is1    
than of the cases where ,b is not2 then 
will ,b also occur in a larger          
proportion of the cases where ,a is1    
than of the cases where ,a is not2 and  
there is some connexion1 through        
causation1 between ,a and ,b4 ,if we    
could ascend to the causes of the two   
phenomena1 we should find1 at some      
stage1 either proximate or remote1 some 
cause or causes common to both2 and if  
we could ascertain what these are1 we   
could frame a generalization which would
 be true without restriction of place or
 time3 but until we can do so1 the fact 
of a connexion between the two phenomena
 remains an empirical law4    #c4       
,having considered in what manner it may
 be determined whether any given        

conjunction of phenomena is casual1 or  
the result of some law2 to complete the 
theory of chance1 it is necessary that  
we should now consider those effects    
which are partly the result of chance   
and partly of law1 or1 in other words1  
in which the effects of casual          
conjunctions of causes are habitually   
blended in one result with the effects  
of a constant cause4  ,this is a case of
 ,composition of ,causes2 and the       
peculiarity of it is1 that instead of   
two or more causes intermixing their    
effects in a regular manner with those  
of one another1 we have now one constant
 cause1 producing an effect which is    
successively modified by a series of    
variable causes4 ,thus1 as summer       
advances1 the approach of the sun to a  
vertical position tends to produce a    
constant increase of temperature2 but   
with this effect of a constant cause1   
there are blended the effects of many   
variable causes1 winds1 clouds1         
evaporation1 electric agencies and the  

like1 so that the temperature of any    
given day depends in part on these      
fleeting causes1 and only in part on the
 constant cause4 ,if the effect of the  
constant cause is always accompanied and
 disguised by effects of variable       
causes1 it is impossible to ascertain   
the law of the constant cause in the    
ordinary manner1 by separating it from  
all other causes and observing it apart4
 ,hence arises the necessity of an      
additional rule of experimental inquiry4
  ,when the action of a cause ,a is     
liable to be interfered with1 not       
steadily by the same cause or causes1   
but by different causes at different    
times1 and when these are so frequent1  
or so indeterminate1 that we cannot     
possibly exclude all of them from any   
experiment1 though we may vary them2 our
 resource is1 to endeavour to ascertain 
what is the effect of all the variable  
causes taken together4 ,in order to do  
this1 we make as many trials as         
possible1 preserving ,a invariable4 ,the

 results of these different trials will 
naturally be different1 since the       
indeterminate modifying causes are      
different in each3 if1 then1 we do not  
find these results to be progressive1   
but1 on the contrary1 to oscillate about
 a certain point1 one experiment giving 
a result a little greater1 another a    
little less1 one a result tending a     
little more in one direction1 another a 
little more in the contrary direction2  
while the average or middle point does  
not vary1 but different sets of         
experiments 7taken in as great a variety
 of circumstances as possible7 yield the
 same mean1 provided only they be       
sufficiently numerous2 then that mean or
 average result1 is the part1 in each   
experiment1 which is due to the cause   
,a1 and is the effect which would have  
been obtained if ,a could have acted    
alone3 the variable remainder is the    
effect of chance1 that is1 of causes the
 coexistence of which with the cause ,a 
was merely casual4 ,the test of the     

sufficiency of the induction in this    
case is1 when any increase of the number
 of trials from which the average is    
struck1 does not materially alter the   
average4  ,this kind of elimination1 in 
which we do not eliminate any one       
assignable cause1 but the multitude of  
floating unassignable ones1 may be      
termed the ,elimination of ,chance4 ,we 
afford an example of it when we repeat  
an experiment1 in order1 by taking the  
mean of different results1 to get rid of
 the effects of the unavoidable errors  
of each individual experiment4 ,when    
there is no permanent cause such as     
would produce a tendency to error       
peculiarly in one direction1 we are     
warranted by experience in assuming that
 the errors on one side will1 in a      
certain number of experiments1 about    
balance the errors on the contrary side4
 ,we therefore repeat the experiment1   
until any change which is produced in   
the average of the whole by further     
repetition1 falls within limits of error

 consistent with the degree of accuracy 
required by the purpose we have in      
view4#af    #d4 ,in the supposition     
hitherto made1 the effect of the        
constant cause ,a has been assumed to   
form so great and conspicuous a part of 
the general result1 that its existence  
never could be a matter of uncertainty1 
and the object of the eliminating       
process was only to ascertain how much  
is attributable to that cause2 what is  
its exact law4 ,cases1 however1 occur in
 which the effect of a constant cause is
 so small1 compared with that of some of
 the changeable causes with which it is 
liable to be casually conjoined1 that of
 itself it escapes notice1 and the very 
existence of any effect arising from a  
constant cause is first learnt1 by the  
process which in general serves only for
 ascertaining the quantity of that      
effect4 ,this case of induction may be  
characterized as follows4 ,a given      
effect is known to be chiefly1 and not  
known not to be wholly1 determined by   

changeable causes4 ,if it be wholly so  
produced1 then if the aggregate be taken
 of a sufficient number of instances1   
the effects of these different causes   
will cancel one another4 ,if1 therefore1
 we do not find this to be the case1    
but1 on the contrary1 after such a      
number of trials has been made that no  
further increase alters the average     
result1 we find that average to be1 not 
zero1 but some other quantity1 about    
which1 though small in comparison with  
the total effect1 the effect            
nevertheless oscillates1 and which is   
the middle point in its oscillation2 we 
may conclude this to be the effect of   
some constant cause3 which cause1 by    
some of the methods already treated of1 
we may hope to detect4 ,this may be     
called the discovery of a residual      
phenomenon by eliminating the effects of
 chance4  ,it is in this manner1 for    
example1 that loaded dice may be        
discovered4 ,of course no dice are so   
clumsily loaded that they must always   

throw certain numbers2 otherwise the    
fraud would be instantly detected4 ,the 
loading1 a constant cause1 mingles with 
the changeable causes which determine   
what cast will be thrown in each        
individual instance4 ,if the dice were  
not loaded1 and the throw were left to  
depend entirely on the changeable       
causes1 these in a sufficient number of 
instances would balance one another1 and
 there would be no preponderant number  
of throws of any one kind4 ,if1         
therefore1 after such a number of trials
 that no further increase of their      
number has any material effect upon the 
average1 we find a preponderance in     
favour of a particular throw2 we may    
conclude with assurance that there is   
some constant cause acting in favour of 
that throw1 or in other words1 that the 
dice are not fair2 and the exact amount 
of the unfairness4 ,in a similar manner1
 what is called the diurnal variation of
 the barometer1 which is very small     
compared with the variations arising    

from the irregular changes in the state 
of the atmosphere1 was discovered by    
comparing the average height of the     
barometer at different hours of the day4
 ,when this comparison was made1 it was 
found that there was a small difference1
 which on the average was constant1     
however the absolute quantities might   
vary1 and which difference1 therefore1  
must be the effect of a constant cause4 
,this cause was afterwards ascertained1 
deductively1 to be the rarefaction of   
the air1 occasioned by the increase of  
temperature as the day advances4    #e4 
,after these general remarks on the     
nature of chance1 we are prepared to    
consider in what manner assurance may be
 obtained that a conjunction between two
 phenomena1 which has been observed a   
certain number of times1 is not casual1 
but a result of causation1 and to be    
received therefore as one of the        
uniformities of nature1 though 7until   
accounted for  priori7 only as an       
empirical law4  ,we will suppose the    

strongest case1 namely1 that the        
phenomenon ,b has never been observed   
except in conjunction with ,a4 ,even    
then1 the probability that they are     
connected is not measured by the total  
number of instances in which they have  
been found together1 but by the excess  
of that number above the number due to  
the absolute frequency of ,a4 ,if1 for  
example1 ,a exists always1 and therefore
 coexists with everything1 no number of 
instances of its coexistence with ,b    
would prove a connexion2 as in our      
example of the fixed stars4 ,if ,a be a 
fact of such common occurrence that it  
may be presumed to be present in half of
 all the cases that occur1 and therefore
 in half the cases in which ,b occurs1  
it is only the proportional excess above
 half1 that is to be reckoned as        
evidence towards proving a connexion    
between ,a and ,b4  ,in addition to the 
question1 ,what is the number of        
coincidences which1 on an average of a  
great multitude of trials1 may be       

expected to arise from chance alone8    
there is also another question1 namely1 
,of what extent of deviation from that  
average is the occurrence credible1 from
 chance alone1 in some number of        
instances smaller than that required for
 striking a fair average8 ,it is not    
only to be considered what is the       
general result of the chances in the    
long run1 but also what are the extreme 
limits of variation from the general    
result1 which may occasionally be       
expected as the result of some smaller  
number of instances4  ,the consideration
 of the latter question1 and any        
consideration of the former beyond that 
already given to it1 belong to what     
mathematicians term the doctrine of     
chances1 or1 in a phrase of greater     
pretension1 the ,theory of              
,probabilities4     ,,chapter ,,xviii4  
,,of ,,the ,,calculation ,,of ,,chances4
    #a4 ,probability1 says ,laplace1#ag 
has reference partly to our ignorance1  
partly to our knowledge4 ,we know that  

among three or more events1 one1 and    
only one1 must happen2 but there is     
nothing leading us to believe that any  
one of them will happen rather than the 
others4 ,in this state of indecision1 it
 is impossible for us to pronounce with 
certainty on their occurrence4 ,it is1  
however1 probable that any one of these 
events1 selected at pleasure1 will not  
take place2 because we perceive several 
cases1 all equally possible1 which      
exclude its occurrence1 and only one    
which favours it4  ,the theory of       
chances consists in reducing all events 
of the same kind to a certain number of 
cases equally possible1 that is1 such   
that we are equally undecided as to     
their existence2 and in determining the 
number of these cases which are         
favourable to the event of which the    
probability is sought4 ,the ratio of    
that number to the number of all the    
possible cases1 is the measure of the   
probability2 which is thus a fraction1  
having for its numerator the number of  

cases favourable to the event1 and for  
its denominator the number of all the   
cases which are possible4  ,to a        
calculation of chances1 then1 according 
to ,laplace1 two things are necessary3  
we must know that of several events some
 one will certainly happen1 and no more 
than one2 and we must not know1 nor have
 any reason to expect1 that it will be  
one of these events rather than another4
 ,it has been contended that these are  
not the only requisites1 and that       
,laplace has overlooked1 in the general 
theoretical statement1 a necessary part 
of the foundation of the doctrine of    
chances4 ,to be able 7it has been said7 
to pronounce two events equally         
probable1 it is not enough that we      
should know that one or the other must  
happen1 and should have no grounds for  
conjecturing which4 ,experience must    
have shown that the two events are of   
equally frequent occurrence4 ,why1 in   
tossing up a halfpenny1 do we reckon it 
equally probable that we shall throw    

cross or pile8 ,because we know that in 
any great number of throws1 cross and   
pile are thrown about equally often2 and
 that the more throws we make1 the more 
nearly the equality is perfect4 ,we may 
know this if we please by actual        
experiment2 or by the daily experience  
which life affords of events of the same
 general character2 or deductively1 from
 the effect of mechanical laws on a     
symmetrical body acted upon by forces   
varying indefinitely in quantity and    
direction4 ,we may know it1 in short1   
either by specific experience1 or on the
 evidence of our general knowledge of   
nature4 ,but1 in one way or the other1  
we must know it1 to justify us in       
calling the two events equally probable2
 and if we knew it not1 we should       
proceed as much at haphazard in staking 
equal sums on the result1 as in laying  
odds4  ,this view of the subject was    
taken in the first edition of the       
present work3 but ,i have since become  
convinced1 that the theory of chances1  

as conceived by ,laplace and by         
mathematicians generally1 has not the   
fundamental fallacy which ,i had        
ascribed to it4  ,we must remember that 
the probability of an event is not a    
quality of the event itself1 but a mere 
name for the degree of ground which we1 
or some one else1 have for expecting it4
 ,the probability of an event to one    
person is a different thing from the    
probability of the same event to        
another1 or to the same person after he 
has acquired additional evidence4 ,the  
probability to me1 that an individual of
 whom ,i know nothing but his name1 will
 die within the year1 is totally altered
 by my being told1 the next minute1 that
 he is in the last stage of a           
consumption4 ,yet this makes no         
difference in the event itself1 nor in  
any of the causes on which it depends4  
,every event is in itself certain1 not  
probable3 if we knew all1 we should     
either know positively that it will     
happen1 or positively that it will not4 

,but its probability to us means the    
degree of expectation of its occurrence1
 which we are warranted in entertaining 
by our present evidence4  ,bearing this 
in mind1 ,i think it must be admitted1  
that even when we have no knowledge     
whatever to guide our expectations1     
except the knowledge that what happens  
must be some one of a certain number of 
possibilities1 we may still reasonably  
judge1 that one supposition is more     
probable to us than another supposition2
 and if we have any interest at stake1  
we shall best provide for it by acting  
conformably to that judgment4    #b4    
,suppose that we are required to take a 
ball from a box1 of which we only know  
that it contains balls both black and   
white1 and none of any other colour4 ,we
 know that the ball we select will be   
either a black or a white ball2 but we  
have no ground for expecting black      
rather than white1 or white rather than 
black4 ,in that case1 if we are obliged 
to make a choice1 and to stake something

 on one or the other supposition1 it    
will1 as a question of prudence1 be     
perfectly indifferent which2 and we     
shall act precisely as we should have   
acted if we had known beforehand that   
the box contained an equal number of    
black and white balls4 ,but though our  
conduct would be the same1 it would not 
be founded on any surmise that the balls
 were in fact thus equally divided2 for 
we might1 on the contrary1 know1 by     
authentic information1 that the box     
contained ninety-nine balls of one      
colour1 and only one of the other2      
still1 if we are not told which colour  
has only one1 and which has ninety-nine1
 the drawing of a white and of a black  
ball will be equally probable to us2 we 
shall have no reason for staking        
anything on the one event rather than on
 the other2 the option between the two  
will be a matter of indifference2 in    
other words it will be an even chance4  
,but let it now be supposed that instead
 of two there are three colours--white1 

black1 and red2 and that we are entirely
 ignorant of the proportion in which    
they are mingled4 ,we should then have  
no reason for expecting one more than   
another1 and if obliged to bet1 should  
venture our stake on red1 white1 or     
black1 with equal indifference4 ,but    
should we be indifferent whether we     
betted for or against some one colour1  
as1 for instance1 white8 ,surely not4   
,from the very fact that black and red  
are each of them separately equally     
probable to us with white1 the two      
together must be twice as probable4 ,we 
should in this case expect not-white    
rather than white1 and so much rather1  
that we would lay two to one upon it4   
,it is true1 there might for aught we   
knew be more white balls than black and 
red together2 and if so1 our bet would1 
if we knew more1 be seen to be a        
disadvantageous one4 ,but so also1 for  
aught we knew1 might there be more red  
balls than black and white1 or more     
black balls than white and red1 and in  

such case the effect of additional      
knowledge would be to prove to us that  
our bet was more advantageous than we   
had supposed it to be4 ,there is in the 
existing state of our knowledge a       
rational probability of two to one      
against white2 a probability fit to be  
made a basis of conduct4 ,no reasonable 
person would lay an even wager in favour
 of white1 against black and red2 though
 against black alone1 or red alone1 he  
might do so without imprudence4  ,the   
common theory1 therefore1 of the        
calculation of chances1 appears to be   
tenable4 ,even when we know nothing     
except the number of the possible and   
mutually excluding contingencies1 and   
are entirely ignorant of their          
comparative frequency1 we may have      
grounds1 and grounds numerically        
appreciable1 for acting on one          
supposition rather than on another2 and 
this is the meaning of ,probability4    
#c4 ,the principle1 however1 on which   
the reasoning proceeds1 is sufficiently 

evident4 ,it is the obvious one1 that   
when the cases which exist are shared   
among several kinds1 it is impossible   
that each of those kinds should be a    
majority of the whole3 on the contrary1 
there must be a majority against each   
kind1 except one at most2 and if any    
kind has more than its share in         
proportion to the total number1 the     
others collectively must have less4     
,granting this axiom1 and assuming that 
we have no ground for selecting any one 
kind as more likely than the rest to    
surpass the average proportion1 it      
follows that we cannot rationally       
presume this of any2 which we should do1
 if we were to bet in favour of it1     
receiving less odds than in the ratio of
 the number of the other kinds4 ,even1  
therefore1 in this extreme case of the  
calculation of probabilities1 which does
 not rest on special experience at all1 
the logical ground of the process is our
 knowledge1 such knowledge as we then   
have1 of the laws governing the         

frequency of occurrence of the different
 cases2 but in this case the knowledge  
is limited to that which1 being         
universal and axiomatic1 does not       
require reference to specific           
experience1 or to any considerations    
arising out of the special nature of the
 problem under discussion4  ,except1    
however1 in such cases as games of      
chance1 where the very purpose in view  
requires ignorance instead of knowledge1
 ,i can conceive no case in which we    
ought to be satisfied with such an      
estimate of chances as this2 an estimate
 founded on the absolute minimum of     
knowledge respecting the subject4 ,it is
 plain that1 in the case of the coloured
 balls1 a very slight ground of surmise 
that the white balls were really more   
numerous than either of the other       
colours1 would suffice to vitiate the   
whole of the calculations made in our   
previous state of indifference4 ,it     
would place us in that position of more 
advanced knowledge1 in which the        

probabilities1 to us1 would be different
 from what they were before2 and in     
estimating these new probabilities we   
should have to proceed on a totally     
different set of data1 furnished no     
longer by mere counting of possible     
suppositions1 but by specific knowledge 
of facts4 ,such data it should always be
 our endeavour to obtain2 and in all    
inquiries1 unless on subjects equally   
beyond the range of our means of        
knowledge and our practical uses1 they  
may be obtained1 if not good1 at least  
better than none at all4#ah  ,it is     
obvious1 too1 that even when the        
probabilities are derived from          
observation and experiment1 a very      
slight improvement in the data1 by      
better observations1 or by taking into  
fuller consideration the special        
circumstances of the case1 is of more   
use than the most elaborate application 
of the calculus to probabilities founded
 on the data in their previous state of 
inferiority4 ,the neglect of this       

obvious reflection has given rise to    
misapplications of the calculus of      
probabilities which have made it the    
real opprobrium of mathematics4 ,it is  
sufficient to refer to the applications 
made of it to the credibility of        
witnesses1 and to the correctness of the
 verdicts of juries4 ,in regard to the  
first1 common sense would dictate that  
it is impossible to strike a general    
average of the veracity1 and other      
qualifications for true testimony1 of   
mankind1 or of any class of them2 and   
even if it were possible1 the employment
 of it for such a purpose implies a     
misapprehension of the use of averages3 
which serve indeed to protect those     
whose interest is at stake1 against     
mistaking the general result of large   
masses of instances1 but are of         
extremely small value as grounds of     
expectation in any one individual       
instance1 unless the case be one of     
those in which the great majority of    
individual instances do not differ much 

from the average4 ,in the case of a     
witness1 persons of common sense would  
draw their conclusions from the degree  
of consistency of his statements1 his   
conduct under cross-examination1 and the
 relation of the case itself to his     
interests1 his partialities1 and his    
mental capacity1 instead of applying so 
rude a standard 7even if it were capable
 of being verified7 as the ratio between
 the number of true and the number of   
erroneous statements which he may be    
supposed to make in the course of his   
life4  ,again1 on the subject of juries1
 or other tribunals1 some mathematicians
 have set out from the proposition that 
the judgment of any one judge1 or       
juryman1 is1 at least in some small     
degree1 more likely to be right than    
wrong1 and have concluded that the      
chance of a number of persons concurring
 in a wrong verdict is diminished1 the  
more the number is increased2 so that if
 the judges are only made sufficiently  
numerous1 the correctness of the        

judgment may be reduced almost to       
certainty4 ,i say nothing of the        
disregard shown to the effect produced  
on the moral position of the judges by  
multiplying their numbers2 the virtual  
destruction of their individual         
responsibility1 and weakening of the    
application of their minds to the       
subject4 ,i remark only the fallacy of  
reasoning from a wide average1 to cases 
necessarily differing greatly from any  
average4 ,it may be true that taking all
 causes one with another1 the opinion of
 any one of the judges would be oftener 
right than wrong2 but the argument      
forgets that in all but the more simple 
cases1 in all cases in which it is      
really of much consequence what the     
tribunal is1 the proposition might      
probably be reversed2 besides which1 the
 cause of error1 whether arising from   
the intricacy of the case or from some  
common prejudice or mental infirmity1 if
 it acted upon one judge1 would be      
extremely likely to affect all the      

others in the same manner1 or at least a
 majority1 and thus render a wrong      
instead of a right decision more        
probable1 the more the number was       
increased4  ,these are but samples of   
the errors frequently committed by men  
who1 having made themselves familiar    
with the difficult formul which algebra 
affords for the estimation of chances   
under suppositions of a complex         
character1 like better to employ those  
formul in computing what are the        
probabilities to a person half informed 
about a case1 than to look out for means
 of being better informed4 ,before      
applying the doctrine of chances to any 
scientific purpose1 the foundation must 
be laid for an evaluation of the        
chances1 by possessing ourselves of the 
utmost attainable amount of positive    
knowledge4 ,the knowledge required is   
that of the comparative frequency with  
which the different events in fact      
occur4 ,for the purposes1 therefore1 of 
the present work1 it is allowable to    

suppose1 that conclusions respecting the
 probability of a fact of a particular  
kind1 rest on our knowledge of the      
proportion between the cases in which   
facts of that kind occur1 and those in  
which they do not occur3 this knowledge 
being either derived from specific      
experiment1 or deduced from our         
knowledge of the causes in operation    
which tend to produce1 compared with    
those which tend to prevent1 the fact in
 question4  ,such calculation of chances
 is grounded on an induction2 and to    
render the calculation legitimate1 the  
induction must be a valid one4 ,it is   
not less an induction1 though it does   
not prove that the event occurs in all  
cases of a given description1 but only  
that out of a given number of such      
cases1 it occurs in about so many4 ,the 
fraction which mathematicians use to    
designate the probability of an event1  
is the ratio of these two numbers2 the  
ascertained proportion between the      
number of cases in which the event      

occurs1 and the sum of all the cases1   
those in which it occurs and in which it
 does not occur taken together4 ,in     
playing at cross and pile1 the          
description of cases concerned are      
throws1 and the probability of cross is 
one-half1 because if we throw often     
enough1 cross is thrown about once in   
every two throws4 ,in the cast of a die1
 the probability of ace is one-sixth2   
not simply because there are six        
possible throws1 of which ace is one1   
and because we do not know any reason   
why one should turn up rather than      
another2 though ,i have admitted the    
validity of this ground in default of a 
better2 but because we do actually know1
 either by reasoning or by experience1  
that in a hundred1 or a million of      
throws1 ace is thrown about one-sixth of
 that number1 or once in six times4     
#d4 ,i say1 either by reasoning or by   
experience2 meaning specific experience4
 ,but in estimating probabilities1 it is
 not a matter of indifference from which

 of these two sources we derive our     
assurance4 ,the probability of events as
 calculated from their mere frequency in
 past experience1 affords a less secure 
basis for practical guidance1 than their
 probability as deduced from an equally 
accurate knowledge of the frequency of  
occurrence of their causes4  ,the       
generalization1 that an event occurs in 
ten out of every hundred cases of a     
given description1 is as real an        
induction as if the generalization were 
that it occurs in all cases4 ,but when  
we arrive at the conclusion by merely   
counting instances in actual experience1
 and comparing the number of cases in   
which ,a has been present with the      
number in which it has been absent1 the 
evidence is only that of the method of  
,agreement1 and the conclusion amounts  
only to an empirical law4 ,we can make a
 step beyond this when we can ascend to 
the causes on which the occurrence of ,a
 or its non-occurrence will depend1 and 
form an estimate of the comparative     

frequency of the causes favourable and  
of those unfavourable to the occurrence4
 ,these are data of a higher order1 by  
which the empirical law derived from a  
mere numerical comparison of affirmative
 and negative instances will be either  
corrected or confirmed1 and in either   
case we shall obtain a more correct     
measure of probability than is given by 
that numerical comparison4 ,it has been 
well remarked that in the kind of       
examples by which the doctrine of       
chances is usually illustrated1 that of 
balls in a box1 the estimate of         
probabilities is supported by reasons of
 causation1 stronger than specific      
experience4 ,what is the reason that in 
a box where there are nine black balls  
and one white1 we expect to draw a black
 ball nine times as much 7in other      
words1 nine times as often1 frequency   
being the gauge of intensity in         
expectation7 as a white8 ,obviously     
because the local conditions are nine   
times as favourable1 because the hand   

may alight in nine places and get a     
black ball1 while it can only alight in 
one place and find a white ball2 just   
for the same reason that we do not      
expect to succeed in finding a friend in
 a crowd1 the conditions in order that  
we and he should come together being    
many and difficult4 ,this of course     
would not hold to the same extent were  
the white balls of smaller size than the
 black1 neither would the probability   
remain the same3 the larger ball would  
be much more likely to meet the hand4#ai
  ,it is1 in fact1 evident1 that when   
once causation is admitted as an        
universal law1 our expectation of events
 can only be rationally grounded on that
 law4 ,to a person who recognises that  
every event depends on causes1 a thing's
 having happened once is a reason for   
expecting it to happen again1 only      
because proving that there exists1 or is
 liable to exist1 a cause adequate to   
produce it4#bj ,the frequency of the    
particular event1 apart from all surmise

 respecting its cause1 can give rise to 
no other induction than that per        
enumerationem simplicem2 and the        
precarious inferences derived from this1
 are superseded1 and disappear from the 
field1 as soon as the principle of      
causation makes its appearance there4   
,notwithstanding1 however1 the abstract 
superiority of an estimate of           
probability grounded on causes1 it is a 
fact that in almost all cases in which  
chances admit of estimation sufficiently
 precise to render their numerical      
appreciation of any practical value1 the
 numerical data are not drawn from      
knowledge of the causes1 but from       
experience of the events themselves4    
,the probabilities of life at different 
ages1 or in different climates2 the     
probabilities of recovery from a        
particular disease2 the chances of the  
birth of male or female offspring2 the  
chances of the destruction of houses or 
other property by fire2 the chances of  
the loss of a ship in a particular      

voyage2 are deduced from bills of       
mortality1 returns from hospitals1      
registers of births1 of shipwrecks1 c41 
that is1 from the observed frequency not
 of the causes1 but of the effects4 ,the
 reason is1 that in all these classes of
 facts1 the causes are either not       
amenable to direct observation at all1  
or not with the requisite precision1 and
 we have no means of judging of their   
frequency except from the empirical law 
afforded by the frequency of the        
effects4 ,the inference does not the    
less depend on causation alone4 ,we     
reason from an effect to a similar      
effect by passing through the cause4 ,if
 the actuary of an insurance office     
infers from his tables that among a     
hundred persons now living1 of a        
particular age1 five on the average will
 attain the age of seventy1 his         
inference is legitimate1 not for the    
simple reason that this is the          
proportion who have lived till seventy  
in times past1 but because the fact of  

their having so lived shows that this is
 the proportion existing1 at that place 
and time1 between the causes which      
prolong life to the age of seventy1 and 
those tending to bring it to an earlier 
close4#ba    #e4 ,from the preceding    
principles it is easy to deduce the     
demonstration of that theorem of the    
doctrine of probabilities1 which is the 
foundation of its application to        
inquiries for ascertaining the          
occurrence of a given event1 or the     
reality of an individual fact4 ,the     
signs or evidences by which a fact is   
usually proved1 are some of its         
consequences3 and the inquiry hinges    
upon determining what cause is most     
likely to have produced a given effect4 
,the theorem applicable to such         
investigations is the ,sixth ,principle 
in ,laplace's ,essai ,philosophique sur 
les ,probabilits1 which is described by 
him as the fundamental principle of that
 branch of the ,analysis of ,chances1   
which consists in ascending from events 

to their causes4#bb  ,given an effect to
 be accounted for1 and there being      
several causes which might have produced
 it1 but of the presence of which in the
 particular case nothing is known2 the  
probability that the effect was produced
 by any one of these causes is as the   
antecedent probability of the cause1    
multiplied by the probability that the  
cause1 if it existed1 would have        
produced the given effect4  ,let ,m be  
the effect1 and ,a1 ,b1 two causes1 by  
either of which it might have been      
produced4 ,to find the probability that 
it was produced by the one and not by   
the other1 ascertain which of the two is
 most likely to have existed1 and which 
of them1 if it did exist1 was most      
likely to produce the effect ,m3 the    
probability sought is a compound of     
these two probabilities4  ,,case ,i4    
,let the causes be both alike in the    
second respect2 either ,a or ,b1 when it
 exists1 being supposed equally likely  
7or equally certain7 to produce ,m2 but 

let ,a be in itself twice as likely as  
,b to exist1 that is1 twice as frequent 
a phenomenon4 ,then it is twice as      
likely to have existed in this case1 and
 to have been the cause which produced  
,m4  ,for1 since ,a exists in nature    
twice as often as ,b2 in any #cjj cases 
in which one or other existed1 ,a has   
existed #bjj times and ,b #ajj4 ,but    
either ,a or ,b must have existed       
wherever ,m is produced3 therefore in   
#cjj times that ,m is produced1 ,a was  
the producing cause #bjj times1 ,b only 
#ajj1 that is1 in the ratio of #b to #a4
 ,thus1 then1 if the causes are alike in
 their capacity of producing the effect1
 the probability as to which actually   
produced it1 is in the ratio of their   
antecedent probabilities4  ,,case ,,ii4 
,reversing the last hypothesis1 let us  
suppose that the causes are equally     
frequent1 equally likely to have        
existed1 but not equally likely1 if they
 did exist1 to produce ,m3 that in three
 times in which ,a occurs1 it produces  

that effect twice1 while ,b1 in three   
times1 produces it only once4 ,since the
 two causes are equally frequent in     
their occurrence2 in every six times    
that either one or the other exists1 ,a 
exists three times and ,b three times4  
,a1 of its three times1 produces ,m in  
two2 ,b1 of its three times1 produces ,m
 in one4 ,thus1 in the whole six times1 
,m is only produced thrice2 but of that 
thrice it is produced twice by ,a1 once 
only by ,b4 ,consequently1 when the     
antecedent probabilities of the causes  
are equal1 the chances that the effect  
was produced by them are in the ratio of
 the probabilities that if they did     
exist they would produce the effect4    
,,case ,,iii4 ,the third case1 that in  
which the causes are unlike in both     
respects1 is solved by what has         
preceded4 ,for1 when a quantity depends 
on two other quantities1 in such a      
manner that while either of them remains
 constant it is proportional to the     
other1 it must necessarily be           

proportional to the product of the two  
quantities1 the product being the only  
function of the two which obeys that law
 of variation4 ,therefore1 the          
probability that ,m was produced by     
either cause1 is as the antecedent      
probability of the cause1 multiplied by 
the probability that if it existed it   
would produce ,m4 ,which was to be      
demonstrated4  ,or we may prove the     
third case as we proved the first and   
second4 ,let ,a be twice as frequent as 
,b2 and let them also be unequally      
likely1 when they exist1 to produce ,m3 
let ,a produce it twice in four times1  
,b thrice in four times4 ,the antecedent
 probability of ,a is to that of ,b as  
#b to #a2 the probabilities of their    
producing ,m are as #b to #c2 the       
product of these ratios is the ratio of 
#d to #c3 and this will be the ratio of 
the probabilities that ,a or ,b was the 
producing cause in the given instance4  
,for1 since ,a is twice as frequent as  
,b1 out of twelve cases in which one or 

other exists1 ,a exists in #h and ,b in 
#d4 ,but of its eight cases1 ,a1 by the 
supposition1 produces ,m in only #d1    
while ,b of its four cases produces ,m  
in #c4 ,m1 therefore1 is only produced  
at all in seven of the twelve cases2 but
 in four of these it is produced by ,a1 
in three by ,b2 hence1 the probabilities
 of its being produced by ,a and by ,b  
are as #d to #c1 and are expressed by   
the fractions #d_/g and #c_/g4 ,which   
was to be demonstrated4    #f4 ,it      
remains to examine the bearing of the   
doctrine of chances on the peculiar     
problem which occupied us in the        
preceding chapter1 namely1 how to       
distinguish coincidences which are      
casual from those which are the result  
of law2 from those in which the facts   
which accompany or follow one another   
are somehow connected through causation4
  ,the doctrine of chances affords means
 by which1 if we knew the average number
 of coincidences to be looked for       
between two phenomena connected only    

casually1 we could determine how often  
any given deviation from that average   
will occur by chance4 ,if the           
probability of any casual coincidence1  
considered in itself1 be #a_/m1 the     
probability that the same coincidence   
will be repeated n times in succession  
is #a_/mn4 ,for example1 in one throw of
 a die the probability of ace being     
#a_/f2 the probability of throwing ace  
twice in succession will be #a divided  
by the square of #f1 or #a_/cf4 ,for ace
 is thrown at the first throw once in   
six1 or six in thirty-six times1 and of 
those six1 the die being cast again1 ace
 will be thrown but once2 being         
altogether once in thirty-six times4    
,the chance of the same cast three times
 successively is1 by a similar          
reasoning1 #a_/fc or #a_/baf3 that is1  
the event will happen1 on a large       
average1 only once in two hundred and   
sixteen throws4  ,we have thus a rule by
 which to estimate the probability that 
any given series of coincidences arises 

from chance2 provided we can measure    
correctly the probability of a single   
coincidence4 ,if we can obtain an       
equally precise expression for the      
probability that the same series of     
coincidences arises from causation1 we  
should only have to compare the numbers4
 ,this however1 can rarely be done4 ,let
 us see what degree of approximation can
 practically be made to the necessary   
precision4  ,the question falls within  
,laplace's sixth principle1 just        
demonstrated4 ,the given fact1 that is  
to say1 the series of coincidences1 may 
have originated either in a casual      
conjunction of causes1 or in a law of   
nature4 ,the probabilities1 therefore1  
that the fact originated in these two   
modes1 are as their antecedent          
probabilities1 multiplied by the        
probabilities that if they existed they 
would produce the effect4 ,but the      
particular combination of chances1 if it
 occurred1 or the law of nature if real1
 would certainly produce the series of  

coincidences4 ,the probabilities1       
therefore1 that the coincidences are    
produced by the two causes in question1 
are as the antecedent probabilities of  
the causes4 ,one of these1 the          
antecedent probability of the           
combination of mere chances which would 
produce the given result1 is an         
appreciable quantity4 ,the antecedent   
probability of the other supposition may
 be susceptible of a more or less exact 
estimation1 according to the nature of  
the case4  ,in some cases1 the          
coincidence1 supposing it to be the     
result of causation at all1 must be the 
result of a known cause3 as the         
succession of aces1 if not accidental1  
must arise from the loading of the die4 
,in such cases we may be able to form a 
conjecture as to the antecedent         
probability of such a circumstance1 from
 the characters of the parties          
concerned1 or other such evidence2 but  
it would be impossible to estimate that 
probability with anything like numerical

 precision4 ,the counter-probability1   
however1 that of the accidental origin  
of the coincidence1 dwindling so rapidly
 as it does at each new trial2 the stage
 is soon reached at which the chance of 
unfairness in the die1 however small in 
itself1 must be greater than that of a  
casual coincidence3 and on this ground1 
a practical decision can generally be   
come to without much hesitation1 if     
there be the power of repeating the     
experiment4  ,when1 however1 the        
coincidence is one which cannot be      
accounted for by any known cause1 and   
the connexion between the two phenomena1
 if produced by causation1 must be the  
result of some law of nature hitherto   
unknown2 which is the case we had in    
view in the last chapter2 then1 though  
the probability of a casual coincidence 
may be capable of appreciation1 that of 
the counter-supposition1 the existence  
of an undiscovered law of nature1 is    
clearly unsusceptible of even an        
approximate valuation4 ,in order to have

 the data which such a case would       
require1 it would be necessary to know  
what proportion of all the individual   
sequences or coexistences occurring in  
nature are the result of law1 and what  
proportion are mere casual coincidences4
 ,it being evident that we cannot form  
any plausible conjecture as to this     
proportion1 much less appreciate it     
numerically1 we cannot attempt any      
precise estimation of the comparative   
probabilities4 ,but of this we are sure1
 that the detection of an unknown law of
 nature--of some previously unrecognised
 constancy of conjunction among         
phenomena--is no uncommon event4 ,if1   
therefore1 the number of instances in   
which a coincidence is observed1 over   
and above that which would arise on the 
average from the mere concurrence of    
chances1 be such that so great an amount
 of coincidences from accident alone    
would be an extremely uncommon event2 we
 have reason to conclude that the       
coincidence is the effect of causation1 

and may be received 7subject to         
correction from further experience7 as  
an empirical law4 ,further than this1 in
 point of precision1 we cannot go2 nor1 
in most cases1 is greater precision     
required1 for the solution of any       
practical doubt4#bc     ,,chapter ,,xix4
  ,,of ,,the ,,extension ,,of           
,,derivative ,,laws ,,to ,,adjacent     
,,cases4    #a4 ,we have had frequent   
occasion to notice the inferior         
generality of derivative laws1 compared 
with the ultimate laws from which they  
are derived4 ,this inferiority1 which   
affects not only the extent of the      
propositions themselves1 but their      
degree of certainty within that extent1 
is most conspicuous in the uniformities 
of coexistence and sequence obtaining   
between effects which depend ultimately 
on different primeval causes4 ,such     
uniformities will only obtain where     
there exists the same collocation of    
those primeval causes4 ,if the          
collocation varies1 though the laws     

themselves remain the same1 a totally   
different set of derivative uniformities
 may1 and generally will1 be the result4
  ,even where the derivative uniformity 
is between different effects of the same
 cause1 it will by no means obtain as   
universally as the law of the cause     
itself4 ,if a and b accompany or succeed
 one another as effects of the cause ,a1
 it by no means follows that ,a is the  
only cause which can produce them1 or   
that if there be another cause1 as ,b1  
capable of producing a1 it must produce 
b likewise4 ,the conjunction therefore  
of a and b perhaps does not hold        
universally1 but only in the instances  
in which a arises from ,a4 ,when it is  
produced by a cause other than ,a1 a and
 b may be dissevered4 ,day 7for example7
 is always in our experience followed by
 night2 but day is not the cause of     
night2 both are successive effects of a 
common cause1 the periodical passage of 
the spectator into and out of the       
earth's shadow1 consequent on the       

earth's rotation1 and on the            
illuminating property of the sun4 ,if1  
therefore1 day is ever produced by a    
different cause or set of causes from   
this1 day will not1 or at least may not1
 be followed by night4 ,on the sun's own
 surface1 for instance1 this may be the 
case4  ,finally1 even when the          
derivative uniformity is itself a law of
 causation 7resulting from the          
combination of several causes71 it is   
not altogether independent of           
collocations4 ,if a cause supervenes1   
capable of wholly or partially          
counteracting the effect of any one of  
the conjoined causes1 the effect will no
 longer conform to the derivative law4  
,while1 therefore1 each ultimate law is 
only liable to frustration from one set 
of counteracting causes1 the derivative 
law is liable to it from several4 ,now1 
the possibility of the occurrence of    
counteracting causes which do not arise 
from any of the conditions involved in  
the law itself1 depends on the original 

collocations4  ,it is true that 7as we  
formerly remarked7 laws of causation1   
whether ultimate or derivative1 are1 in 
most cases1 fulfilled even when         
counteracted2 the cause produces its    
effect1 though that effect is destroyed 
by something else4 ,that the effect may 
be frustrated1 is1 therefore1 no        
objection to the universality of laws of
 causation4 ,but it is fatal to the     
universality of the sequences or        
coexistences of effects1 which compose  
the greater part of the derivative laws 
flowing from laws of causation4 ,when1  
from the law of a certain combination of
 causes1 there results a certain order  
in the effects2 as from the combination 
of a single sun with the rotation of an 
opaque body round its axis1 there       
results1 on the whole surface of that   
opaque body1 an alternation of day and  
night2 then if we suppose one of the    
combined causes counteracted1 the       
rotation stopped1 the sun extinguished1 
or a second sun superadded1 the truth of

 that particular law of causation is in 
no way affected2 it is still true that  
one sun shining on an opaque revolving  
body will alternately produce day and   
night2 but since the sun no longer does 
shine on such a body1 the derivative    
uniformity1 the succession of day and   
night on the given planet1 is no longer 
true4 ,those derivative uniformities1   
therefore1 which are not laws of        
causation1 are 7except in the rare case 
of their depending on one cause alone1  
not on a combination of causes17 always 
more or less contingent on collocations2
 and are hence subject to the           
characteristic infirmity of empirical   
laws1 that of being admissible only     
where the collocations are known by     
experience to be such as are requisite  
for the truth of the law1 that is1 only 
within the conditions of time and place 
confirmed by actual observation4    #b4 
,this principle1 when stated in general 
terms1 seems clear and indisputable2 yet
 many of the ordinary judgments of      

mankind1 the propriety of which is not  
questioned1 have at least the semblance 
of being inconsistent with it4 ,on what 
grounds1 it may be asked1 do we expect  
that the sun will rise to-morrow8       
,to-morrow is beyond the limits of time 
comprehended in our observations4 ,they 
have extended over some thousands of    
years past1 but they do not include the 
future4 ,yet we infer with confidence   
that the sun will rise to-morrow2 and   
nobody doubts that we are entitled to do
 so4 ,let us consider what is the       
warrant for this confidence4  ,in the   
example in question1 we know the causes 
on which the derivative uniformity      
depends4 ,they are1 the sun giving out  
light1 the earth in a state of rotation 
and intercepting light4 ,the induction  
which shows these to be the real causes1
 and not merely prior effects of a      
common cause1 being complete2 the only  
circumstances which could defeat the    
derivative law are such as would destroy
 or counteract one or other of the      

combined causes4 ,while the causes      
exist1 and are not counteracted1 the    
effect will continue4 ,if they exist and
 are not counteracted to-morrow1 the sun
 will rise to-morrow4  ,since the       
causes1 namely the sun and the earth1   
the one in the state of giving out      
light1 the other in a state of rotation1
 will exist until something destroys    
them2 all depends on the probabilities  
of their destruction1 or of their       
counteraction4 ,we know by observation  
7omitting the inferential proofs of an  
existence for thousands of ages         
anterior71 that these phenomena have    
continued for 7say7 five thousand years4
 ,within that time there has existed no 
cause sufficient to diminish them       
appreciably2 nor which has counteracted 
their effect in any appreciable degree4 
,the chance1 therefore1 that the sun may
 not rise to-morrow1 amounts to the     
chance that some cause1 which has not   
manifested itself in the smallest degree
 during five thousand years1 will exist 

to-morrow in such intensity as to       
destroy the sun or the earth1 the sun's 
light or the earth's rotation1 or to    
produce an immense disturbance in the   
effect resulting from those causes4     
,now1 if such a cause will exist        
to-morrow1 or at any future time1 some  
cause1 proximate or remote1 of that     
cause must exist now1 and must have     
existed during the whole of the five    
thousand years4 ,if1 therefore1 the sun 
do not rise to-morrow1 it will be       
because some cause has existed1 the     
effects of which though during five     
thousand years they have not amounted to
 a perceptible quantity1 will in one day
 become overwhelming4 ,since this cause 
has not been recognised during such an  
interval of time1 by observers stationed
 on our earth1 it must1 if it exist1 be 
either some agent whose effects develop 
themselves gradually and very slowly1 or
 one which existed in regions beyond our
 observation1 and is now on the point of
 arriving in our part of the universe4  

,now all causes which we have experience
 of1 act according to laws incompatible 
with the supposition that their effects1
 after accumulating so slowly as to be  
imperceptible for five thousand years1  
should start into immensity in a single 
day4 ,no mathematical law of proportion 
between an effect and the quantity or   
relations of its cause1 could produce   
such contradictory results4 ,the sudden 
development of an effect of which there 
was no previous trace1 always arises    
from the coming together of several     
distinct causes1 not previously         
conjoined2 but if such sudden           
conjunction is destined to take place1  
the causes1 or their causes1 must have  
existed during the entire five thousand 
years2 and their not having once come   
together during that period1 shows how  
rare that particular combination is4 ,we
 have1 therefore1 the warrant of a rigid
 induction for considering it probable1 
in a degree undistinguishable from      
certainty1 that the known conditions    

requisite for the sun's rising will     
exist to-morrow4    #c4 ,but this       
extension of derivative laws1 not       
causative1 beyond the limits of         
observation1 can only be to adjacent    
cases4 ,if instead of to-morrow we had  
said this day twenty thousand years1 the
 inductions would have been anything but
 conclusive4 ,that a cause which1 in    
opposition to very powerful causes1     
produced no perceptible effect during   
five thousand years1 should produce a   
very considerable one by the end of     
twenty thousand1 has nothing in it which
 is not in conformity with our          
experience of causes4 ,we know many     
agents1 the effect of which in a short  
period does not amount to a perceptible 
quantity1 but by accumulating for a much
 longer period becomes considerable4    
,besides1 looking at the immense        
multitude of the heavenly bodies1 their 
vast distances1 and the rapidity of the 
motion of such of them as are known to  
move1 it is a supposition not at all    

contradictory to experience that some   
body may be in motion towards us1 or we 
towards it1 within the limits of whose  
influence we have not come during five  
thousand years1 but which in twenty     
thousand more may be producing effects  
upon us of the most extraordinary kind4 
,or the fact which is capable of        
preventing sunrise may be1 not the      
cumulative effect of one cause1 but some
 new combination of causes2 and the     
chances favourable to that combination1 
though they have not produced it once in
 five thousand years1 may produce it    
once in twenty thousand4 ,so that the   
inductions which authorize us to expect 
future events1 grow weaker and weaker   
the further we look into the future1 and
 at length become inappreciable4  ,we   
have considered the probabilities of the
 sun's rising to-morrow1 as derived from
 the real laws1 that is1 from the laws  
of the causes on which that uniformity  
is dependent4 ,let us now consider how  
the matter would have stood if the      

uniformity had been known only as an    
empirical law2 if we had not been aware 
that the sun's light1 and the earth's   
rotation 7or the sun's motion71 were the
 causes on which the periodical         
occurrence of daylight depends4 ,we     
could have extended this empirical law  
to cases adjacent in time1 though not to
 so great a distance of time as we can  
now4 ,having evidence that the effects  
had remained unaltered and been         
punctually conjoined for five thousand  
years1 we could infer that the unknown  
causes on which the conjunction is      
dependent had existed undiminished and  
uncounteracted during the same period4  
,the same conclusions1 therefore1 would 
follow as in the preceding case2 except 
that we should only know that during    
five thousand years nothing had occurred
 to defeat perceptibly this particular  
effect2 while1 when we know the causes1 
we have the additional assurance1 that  
during that interval no such change has 
been noticeable in the causes           

themselves1 as by any degree of         
multiplication or length of continuance 
could defeat the effect4  ,to this must 
be added1 that when we know the causes1 
we may be able to judge whether there   
exists any known cause capable of       
counteracting them2 while as long as    
they are unknown1 we cannot be sure but 
that if we did know them1 we could      
predict their destruction from causes   
actually in existence4 ,a bedridden     
savage1 who had never seen the cataract 
of ,niagara1 but who lived within       
hearing of it1 might imagine that the   
sound he heard would endure for ever2   
but if he knew it to be the effect of a 
rush of waters over a barrier of rock   
which is progressively wearing away1 he 
would know that within a number of ages 
which may be calculated1 it will be     
heard no more4 ,in proportion1          
therefore1 to our ignorance of the      
causes on which the empirical law       
depends1 we can be less assured that it 
will continue to hold good2 and the     

farther we look into futurity1 the less 
improbable is it that some one of the   
causes1 whose coexistence gives rise to 
the derivative uniformity1 may be       
destroyed or counteracted4 ,with every  
prolongation of time1 the chances       
multiply of such an event1 that is to   
say1 its non-occurrence hitherto becomes
 a less guarantee of its not occurring  
within the given time4 ,if1 then1 it is 
only to cases which in point of time are
 adjacent 7or nearly adjacent7 to those 
which we have actually observed1 that   
any derivative law1 not of causation1   
can be extended with an assurance       
equivalent to certainty1 much more is   
this true of a merely empirical law4    
,happily1 for the purposes of life it is
 to such cases alone that we can almost 
ever have occasion to extend them4  ,in 
respect of place1 it might seem that a  
merely empirical law could not be       
extended even to adjacent cases2 that we
 could have no assurance of its being   
true in any place where it has not been 

specially observed4 ,the past duration  
of a cause is a guarantee for its future
 existence1 unless something occurs to  
destroy it2 but the existence of a cause
 in one or any number of places1 is no  
guarantee for its existence in any other
 place1 since there is no uniformity in 
the collocations of primeval causes4    
,when1 therefore1 an empirical law is   
extended beyond the local limits within 
which it has been found true by         
observation1 the cases to which it is   
thus extended must be such as are       
presumably within the influence of the  
same individual agents4 ,if we discover 
a new planet within the known bounds of 
the solar system 7or even beyond those  
bounds1 but indicating its connexion    
with the system by revolving round the  
sun71 we may conclude1 with great       
probability1 that it revolves on its    
axis4 ,for all the known planets do so2 
and this uniformity points to some      
common cause1 antecedent to the first   
records of astronomical observation3 and

 though the nature of this cause can    
only be matter of conjecture1 yet if it 
be1 as is not unlikely1 and as          
,laplace's theory supposes1 not merely  
the same kind of cause1 but the same    
individual cause 7such as an impulse    
given to all the bodies at once71 that  
cause1 acting at the extreme points of  
the space occupied by the sun and       
planets1 is likely1 unless defeated by  
some counteracting cause1 to have acted 
at every intermediate point1 and        
probably somewhat beyond2 and therefore 
acted1 in all probability1 upon the     
supposed newly-discovered planet4       
,when1 therefore1 effects which are     
always found conjoined1 can be traced   
with any probability to an identical    
7and not merely a similar7 origin1 we   
may with the same probability extend the
 empirical law of their conjunction to  
all places within the extreme local     
boundaries within which the fact has    
been observed2 subject to the           
possibility of counteracting causes in  

some portion of the field4 ,still more  
confidently may we do so when the law is
 not merely empirical2 when the         
phenomena which we find conjoined are   
effects of ascertained causes1 from the 
laws of which the conjunction of their  
effects is deducible4 ,in that case1 we 
may both extend the derivative          
uniformity over a larger space1 and with
 less abatement for the chance of       
counteracting causes4 ,the first1       
because instead of the local boundaries 
of our observation of the fact itself1  
we may include the extreme boundaries of
 the ascertained influence of its       
causes4 ,thus the succession of day and 
night1 we know1 holds true of all the   
bodies of the solar system except the   
sun itself2 but we know this only       
because we are acquainted with the      
causes3 if we were not1 we could not    
extend the proposition beyond the orbits
 of the earth and moon1 at both         
extremities of which we have the        
evidence of observation for its truth4  

,with respect to the probability of     
counteracting causes1 it has been seen  
that this calls for a greater abatement 
of confidence1 in proportion to our     
ignorance of the causes on which the    
phenomena depend4 ,on both accounts1    
therefore1 a derivative law which we    
know how to resolve1 is susceptible of a
 greater extension to cases adjacent in 
place1 than a merely empirical law4     
,,chapter ,,xx4  ,,of ,,analogy4    #a4 
,the word ,analogy1 as the name of a    
mode of reasoning1 is generally taken   
for some kind of argument supposed to be
 of an inductive nature1 but not        
amounting to a complete induction4      
,there is no word1 however1 which is    
used more loosely1 or in a greater      
variety of senses1 than ,analogy4 ,it   
sometimes stands for arguments which may
 be examples of the most rigorous       
,induction4 ,archbishop ,whately1 for   
instance1 following ,ferguson and other 
writers1 defines ,analogy conformably to
 its primitive acceptation1 that which  

was given to it by mathematicians1      
,resemblance of ,relations4 ,in this    
sense1 when a country which has sent out
 colonies is termed the mother country1 
the expression is analogical1 signifying
 that the colonies of a country stand in
 the same relation to her in which      
children stand to their parents4 ,and if
 any inference be drawn from this       
resemblance of relations1 as1 for       
instance1 that obedience or affection is
 due from colonies to the mother        
country1 this is called reasoning by    
analogy4 ,or if it be argued that a     
nation is most beneficially governed by 
an assembly elected by the people1 from 
the admitted fact that other            
associations for a common purpose1 such 
as joint-stock companies1 are best      
managed by a committee chosen by the    
parties interested2 this1 too1 is an    
argument from analogy in the preceding  
sense1 because its foundation is1 not   
that a nation is like a joint stock     
company1 or ,parliament like a board of 

directors1 but that ,parliament stands  
in the same relation to the nation in   
which a board of directors stands to a  
joint stock company4 ,now1 in an        
argument of this nature1 there is no    
inherent inferiority of conclusiveness4 
,like other arguments from resemblance1 
it may amount to nothing1 or it may be a
 perfect and conclusive induction4 ,the 
circumstance in which the two cases     
resemble1 may be capable of being shown 
to be the material circumstance2 to be  
that on which all the consequences1     
necessary to be taken into account in   
the particular discussion1 depend4 ,in  
the example last given1 the resemblance 
is one of relation2 the fundamentum     
relationis being the management by a few
 persons1 of affairs in which a much    
greater number are interested along with
 them4 ,now1 some may contend that this 
circumstance which is common to the two 
cases1 and the various consequences     
which follow from it1 have the chief    
share in determining all the effects    

which make up what we term good or bad  
administration4 ,if they can establish  
this1 their argument has the force of a 
rigorous induction2 if they cannot1 they
 are said to have failed in proving the 
analogy between the two cases2 a mode of
 speech which implies that when the     
analogy can be proved1 the argument     
founded on it cannot be resisted4    #b4
 ,it is on the whole more usual1        
however1 to extend the name of          
analogical evidence to arguments from   
any sort of resemblance1 provided they  
do not amount to a complete induction3  
without peculiarly distinguishing       
resemblance of relations4 ,analogical   
reasoning1 in this sense1 may be reduced
 to the following formula3--,two things 
resemble each other in one or more      
respects2 a certain proposition is true 
of the one2 therefore it is true of the 
other4 ,but we have nothing here by     
which to discriminate analogy from      
induction1 since this type will serve   
for all reasoning from experience4 ,in  

the strictest induction1 equally with   
the faintest analogy1 we conclude       
because ,a resembles ,b in one or more  
properties1 that it does so in a certain
 other property4 ,the difference is1    
that in the case of a complete induction
 it has been previously shown1 by due   
comparison of instances1 that there is  
an invariable conjunction between the   
former property or properties and the   
latter property2 but in what is called  
analogical reasoning1 no such           
conjunction has been made out4 ,there   
have been no opportunities of putting in
 practice the ,method of ,difference1 or
 even the ,method of ,agreement2 but we 
conclude 7and that is all which the     
argument of analogy amounts to7 that a  
fact m1 known to be true of ,a1 is more 
likely to be true of ,b if ,b agrees    
with ,a in some of its properties 7even 
though no connexion is known to exist   
between m and those properties71 than if
 no resemblance at all could be traced  
between ,b and any other thing known to 

possess the attribute m4  ,to this      
argument it is of course requisite1 that
 the properties common to ,a with ,b    
shall be merely not known to be         
connected with m2 they must not be      
properties known to be unconnected with 
it4 ,if1 either by processes of         
elimination1 or by deduction from       
previous knowledge of the laws of the   
properties in question1 it can be       
concluded that they have nothing to do  
with m1 the argument of analogy is put  
out of court4 ,the supposition must be  
that m is an effect really dependent on 
some property of ,a1 but we know not on 
which4 ,we cannot point out any of the  
properties of ,a1 which is the cause of 
m1 or united with it by any law4 ,after 
rejecting all which we know to have     
nothing to do with it1 there remain     
several between which we are unable to  
decide3 of which remaining properties1  
,b possesses one or more4 ,this         
accordingly1 we consider as affording   
grounds1 of more or less strength1 for  

concluding by analogy that ,b possesses 
the attribute m4  ,there can be no doubt
 that every such resemblance which can  
be pointed out between ,b and ,a1       
affords some degree of probability1     
beyond what would otherwise exist1 in   
favour of the conclusion drawn from it4 
,if ,b resembled ,a in all its ultimate 
properties1 its possessing the attribute
 m would be a certainty1 not a          
probability3 and every resemblance which
 can be shown to exist between them1    
places it by so much the nearer to that 
point4 ,if the resemblance be in an     
ultimate property1 there will be        
resemblance in all the derivative       
properties dependent on that ultimate   
property1 and of these m may be one4 ,if
 the resemblance be in a derivative     
property1 there is reason to expect     
resemblance in the ultimate property on 
which it depends1 and in the other      
derivative properties dependent on the  
same ultimate property4 ,every          
resemblance which can be shown to exist1

 affords ground for expecting an        
indefinite number of other resemblances3
 the particular resemblance sought will1
 therefore1 be oftener found among      
things thus known to resemble1 than     
among things between which we know of no
 resemblance4#bd  ,for example1 ,i might
 infer that there are probably          
inhabitants in the moon1 because there  
are inhabitants on the earth1 in the    
sea1 and in the air3 and this is the    
evidence of analogy4 ,the circumstance  
of having inhabitants is here assumed   
not to be an ultimate property1 but 7as 
is reasonable to suppose7 a consequence 
of other properties2 and depending1     
therefore1 in the case of the earth1 on 
some of its properties as a portion of  
the universe1 but on which of those     
properties we know not4 ,now the moon   
resembles the earth in being a solid1   
opaque1 nearly spherical substance1     
appearing to contain1 or to have        
contained1 active volcanoes2 receiving  
heat and light from the sun1 in about   

the same quantity as our earth2         
revolving on its axis2 composed of      
materials which gravitate1 and obeying  
all the various laws resulting from that
 property4 ,and ,i think no one will    
deny that if this were all that was     
known of the moon1 the existence of     
inhabitants in that luminary would      
derive from these various resemblances  
to the earth1 a greater degree of       
probability than it would otherwise     
have3 though the amount of the          
augmentation it would be useless to     
attempt to estimate4  ,if1 however1     
every resemblance proved between ,b and 
,a1 in any point not known to be        
immaterial with respect to m1 forms some
 additional reason for presuming that ,b
 has the attribute m2 it is clear1      
contra1 that every dissimilarity which  
can be proved between them1 furnishes a 
counter-probability of the same nature  
on the other side4 ,it is not indeed    
unusual that different ultimate         
properties should1 in some particular   

instances1 produce the same derivative  
property2 but on the whole it is certain
 that things which differ in their      
ultimate properties1 will differ at     
least as much in the aggregate of their 
derivative properties1 and that the     
differences which are unknown will on   
the average of cases bear some          
proportion to those which are known4    
,there will1 therefore1 be a competition
 between the known points of agreement  
and the known points of difference in ,a
 and ,b2 and according as the one or the
 other may be deemed to preponderate1   
the probability derived from analogy    
will be for or against ,b's having the  
property m4 ,the moon1 for instance1    
agrees with the earth in the            
circumstances already mentioned2 but    
differs in being smaller1 in having its 
surface more unequal1 and apparently    
volcanic throughout1 in having1 at least
 on the side next the earth1 no         
atmosphere sufficient to refract light1 
no clouds1 and 7it is therefore         

concluded7 no water4 ,these differences1
 considered merely as such1 might       
perhaps balance the resemblances1 so    
that analogy would afford no presumption
 either way4 ,but considering that some 
of the circumstances which are wanting  
on the moon are among those which1 on   
the earth1 are found to be indispensable
 conditions of animal life1 we may      
conclude that if that phenomenon does   
exist in the moon1 7or at all events on 
the nearer side17 it must be as an      
effect of causes totally different from 
those on which it depends here2 as a    
consequence1 therefore1 of the moon's   
differences from the earth1 not of the  
points of agreement4 ,viewed in this    
light1 all the resemblances which exist 
become presumptions against1 not in     
favour of1 the moon's being inhabited4  
,since life cannot exist there in the   
manner in which it exists here1 the     
greater the resemblance of the lunar    
world to the terrestrial in other       
respects1 the less reason we have to    

believe that it can contain life4       
,there are1 however1 other bodies in our
 system1 between which and the earth    
there is a much closer resemblance2     
which possess an atmosphere1 clouds1    
consequently water 7or some fluid       
analogous to it71 and even give strong  
indications of snow in their polar      
regions2 while the cold1 or heat1 though
 differing greatly on the average from  
ours1 is1 in some parts at least of     
those planets1 possibly not more extreme
 than in some regions of our own which  
are habitable4 ,to balance these        
agreements1 the ascertained differences 
are chiefly in the average light and    
heat1 velocity of rotation1 density of  
material1 intensity of gravity1 and     
similar circumstances of a secondary    
kind4 ,with regard to these planets1    
therefore1 the argument of analogy gives
 a decided preponderance in favour of   
their resembling the earth in any of its
 derivative properties1 such as that of 
having inhabitants2 though1 when we     

consider how immeasurably multitudinous 
are those of their properties which we  
are entirely ignorant of1 compared with 
the few which we know1 we can attach but
 trifling weight to any considerations  
of resemblance in which the known       
elements bear so inconsiderable a       
proportion to the unknown4  ,besides the
 competition between analogy and        
diversity1 there may be a competition of
 conflicting analogies4 ,the new case   
may be similar in some of its           
circumstances to cases in which the fact
 m exists1 but in others to cases in    
which it is known not to exist4 ,amber  
has some properties in common with      
vegetable1 others with mineral products4
 ,a painting of unknown origin1 may     
resemble1 in certain of its characters1 
known works of a particular master1 but 
in others it may as strikingly resemble 
those of some other painter4 ,a vase may
 bear some analogy to works of ,grecian1
 and some to those of ,etruscan1 or     
,egyptian art4 ,we are of course        

supposing that it does not possess any  
quality which has been ascertained1 by a
 sufficient induction1 to be a          
conclusive mark either of the one or of 
the other4    #c4 ,since the value of an
 analogical argument inferring one      
resemblance from other resemblances     
without any antecedent evidence of a    
connexion between them1 depends on the  
extent of ascertained resemblance1      
compared first with the amount of       
ascertained difference1 and next with   
the extent of the unexplored region of  
unascertained properties2 it follows    
that where the resemblance is very      
great1 the ascertained difference very  
small1 and our knowledge of the         
subject-matter tolerably extensive1 the 
argument from analogy may approach in   
strength very near to a valid induction4
 ,if1 after much observation of ,b1 we  
find that it agrees with ,a in nine out 
of ten of its known properties1 we may  
conclude with a probability of nine to  
one1 that it will possess any given     

derivative property of ,a4 ,if we       
discover1 for example1 an unknown animal
 or plant1 resembling closely some known
 one in the greater number of the       
properties we observe in it1 but        
differing in some few1 we may reasonably
 expect to find in the unobserved       
remainder of its properties1 a general  
agreement with those of the former2 but 
also a difference corresponding         
proportionately to the amount of        
observed diversity4  ,it thus appears   
that the conclusions derived from       
analogy are only of any considerable    
value1 when the case to which we reason 
is an adjacent case2 adjacent1 not as   
before1 in place or time1 but in        
circumstances4 ,in the case of effects  
of which the causes are imperfectly or  
not at all known1 when consequently the 
observed order of their occurrence      
amounts only to an empirical law1 it    
often happens that the conditions which 
have coexisted whenever the effect was  
observed1 have been very numerous4 ,now 

if a new case presents itself1 in which 
all these conditions do not exist1 but  
the far greater part of them do1 some   
one or a few only being wanting1 the    
inference that the effect will occur1   
notwithstanding this deficiency of      
complete resemblance to the cases in    
which it has been observed1 may1 though 
of the nature of analogy1 possess a high
 degree of probability4 ,it is hardly   
necessary to add that1 however          
considerable this probability may be1 no
 competent inquirer into nature will    
rest satisfied with it when a complete  
induction is attainable2 but will       
consider the analogy as a mere          
guide-post1 pointing out the direction  
in which more rigorous investigations   
should be prosecuted4  ,it is in this   
last respect that considerations of     
analogy have the highest scientific     
value4 ,the cases in which analogical   
evidence affords in itself any very high
 degree of probability1 are1 as we have 
observed1 only those in which the       

resemblance is very close and extensive2
 but there is no analogy1 however faint1
 which may not be of the utmost value in
 suggesting experiments or observations 
that may lead to more positive          
conclusions4 ,when the agents and their 
effects are out of the reach of further 
observation and experiment1 as in the   
speculations already alluded to         
respecting the moon and planets1 such   
slight probabilities are no more than an
 interesting theme for the pleasant     
exercise of imagination2 but any        
suspicion1 however slight1 that sets an 
ingenious person at work to contrive an 
experiment1 or affords a reason for     
trying one experiment rather than       
another1 may be of the greatest benefit 
to science4  ,on this ground1 though ,i 
cannot accept as positive doctrines any 
of those scientific hypotheses which are
 unsusceptible of being ultimately      
brought to the test of actual induction1
 such1 for instance1 as the two theories
 of light1 the emission theory of the   

last century1 and the undulatory theory 
which predominates in the present1 ,i am
 yet unable to agree with those who     
consider such hypotheses to be worthy of
 entire disregard4 ,as is well said by  
,hartley 7and concurred in by a thinker 
in general so diametrically opposed to  
,hartley's opinions as ,dugald          
,stewart71 any hypothesis which has so  
much plausibility as to explain a       
considerable number of facts1 helps us  
to digest these facts in proper order1  
to bring new ones to light1 and make    
experimenta crucis for the sake of      
future inquirers4#be ,if an hypothesis  
both explains known facts1 and has led  
to the prediction of others previously  
unknown1 and since verified by          
experience1 the laws of the phenomenon  
which is the subject of inquiry must    
bear at least a great similarity to     
those of the class of phenomena to which
 the hypothesis assimilates it2 and     
since the analogy which extends so far  
may probably extend farther1 nothing is 

more likely to suggest experiments      
tending to throw light upon the real    
properties of the phenomenon1 than the  
following out such an hypothesis4 ,but  
to this end it is by no means necessary 
that the hypothesis be mistaken for a   
scientific truth4 ,on the contrary1 that
 illusion is in this respect1 as in     
every other1 an impediment to the       
progress of real knowledge1 by leading  
inquirers to restrict themselves        
arbitrarily to the particular hypothesis
 which is most accredited at the time1  
instead of looking out for every class  
of phenomena between the laws of which  
and those of the given phenomenon any   
analogy exists1 and trying all such     
experiments as may tend to the discovery
 of ulterior analogies pointing in the  
same direction4     ,,chapter ,,xxi4    
,,of ,,the ,,evidence ,,of ,,the ,,law  
,,of ,,universal ,,causation4    #a4 ,we
 have now completed our review of the   
logical processes by which the laws1 or 
uniformities1 of the sequence of        

phenomena1 and those uniformities in    
their coexistence which depend on the   
laws of their sequence1 are ascertained 
or tested4 ,as we recognised in the     
commencement1 and have been enabled to  
see more clearly in the progress of the 
investigation1 the basis of all these   
logical operations is the law of        
causation4 ,the validity of all the     
,inductive ,methods depends on the      
assumption that every event1 or the     
beginning of every phenomenon1 must have
 some cause2 some antecedent1 on the    
existence of which it is invariably and 
unconditionally consequent4 ,in the     
,method of ,agreement this is obvious2  
that method avowedly proceeding on the  
supposition that we have found the true 
cause as soon as we have negatived every
 other4 ,the assertion is equally true  
of the ,method of ,difference4 ,that    
method authorizes us to infer a general 
law from two instances2 one1 in which ,a
 exists together with a multitude of    
other circumstances1 and ,b follows2    

another1 in which1 ,a being removed1 and
 all other circumstances remaining the  
same1 ,b is prevented4 ,what1 however1  
does this prove8 ,it proves that ,b1 in 
the particular instance1 cannot have had
 any other cause than ,a2 but to        
conclude from this that ,a was the      
cause1 or that ,a will on other         
occasions be followed by ,b1 is only    
allowable on the assumption that ,b must
 have some cause2 that among its        
antecedents in any single instance in   
which it occurs1 there must be one which
 has the capacity of producing it at    
other times4 ,this being admitted1 it is
 seen that in the case in question that 
antecedent can be no other than ,a2 but1
 that if it be no other than ,a it must 
be ,a1 is not proved1 by these instances
 at least1 but taken for granted4 ,there
 is no need to spend time in proving    
that the same thing is true of the other
 ,inductive ,methods4 ,the universality 
of the law of causation is assumed in   
them all4  ,but is this assumption      

warranted8 ,doubtless 7it may be said7  
most phenomena are connected as effects 
with some antecedent or cause1 that is1 
are never produced unless some          
assignable fact has preceded them2 but  
the very circumstance that complicated  
processes of induction are sometimes    
necessary1 shows that cases exist in    
which this regular order of succession  
is not apparent to our unaided          
apprehension4 ,if1 then1 the processes  
which bring these cases within the same 
category with the rest1 require that we 
should assume the universality of the   
very law which they do not at first     
sight appear to exemplify1 is not this a
 petitio principii8 ,can we prove a     
proposition1 by an argument which takes 
it for granted8 ,and if not so proved1  
on what evidence does it rest8  ,for    
this difficulty1 which ,i have purposely
 stated in the strongest terms it will  
admit of1 the school of metaphysicians  
who have long predominated in this      
country find a ready salvo4 ,they       

affirm1 that the universality of        
causation is a truth which we cannot    
help believing2 that the belief in it is
 an instinct1 one of the laws of our    
believing faculty4 ,as the proof of     
this1 they say1 and they have nothing   
else to say1 that everybody does believe
 it2 and they number it among the       
propositions1 rather numerous in their  
catalogue1 which may be logically argued
 against1 and perhaps cannot be         
logically proved1 but which are of      
higher authority than logic1 and so     
essentially inherent in the human mind1 
that even he who denies them in         
speculation1 shows by his habitual      
practice that his arguments make no     
impression upon himself4  ,into the     
merits of this question1 considered as  
one of psychology1 it would be foreign  
to my purpose to enter here3 but ,i must
 protest against adducing1 as evidence  
of the truth of a fact in external      
nature1 the disposition1 however strong 
or however general1 of the human mind to

 believe it4 ,belief is not proof1 and  
does not dispense with the necessity of 
proof4 ,i am aware1 that to ask for     
evidence of a proposition which we are  
supposed to believe instinctively1 is to
 expose oneself to the charge of        
rejecting the authority of the human    
faculties2 which of course no one can   
consistently do1 since the human        
faculties are all which any one has to  
judge by3 and inasmuch as the meaning of
 the word evidence is supposed to be1   
something which when laid before the    
mind1 induces it to believe2 to demand  
evidence when the belief is ensured by  
the mind's own laws1 is supposed to be  
appealing to the intellect against the  
intellect4 ,but this1 ,i apprehend1 is a
 misunderstanding of the nature of      
evidence4 ,by evidence is not meant     
anything and everything which produces  
belief4 ,there are many things which    
generate belief besides evidence4 ,a    
mere strong association of ideas often  
causes a belief so intense as to be     

unshakeable by experience or argument4  
,evidence is not that which the mind    
does or must yield to1 but that which it
 ought to yield to1 namely1 that1 by    
yielding to which1 its belief is kept   
conformable to fact4 ,there is no appeal
 from the human faculties generally1 but
 there is an appeal from one human      
faculty to another2 from the judging    
faculty1 to those which take cognizance 
of fact1 the faculties of sense and     
consciousness4 ,the legitimacy of this  
appeal is admitted whenever it is       
allowed that our judgments ought to be  
conformable to fact4 ,to say that belief
 suffices for its own justification is  
making opinion the test of opinion2 it  
is denying the existence of any outward 
standard1 the conformity of an opinion  
to which constitutes its truth4 ,we call
 one mode of forming opinions right and 
another wrong1 because the one does1 and
 the other does not1 tend to make the   
opinion agree with the fact--to make    
people believe what really is1 and      

expect what really will be4 ,now a mere 
disposition to believe1 even if supposed
 instinctive1 is no guarantee for the   
truth of the thing believed4 ,if1       
indeed1 the belief ever amounted to an  
irresistible necessity1 there would then
 be no use in appealing from it1 because
 there would be no possibility of       
altering it4 ,but even then the truth of
 the belief would not follow2 it would  
only follow that mankind were under a   
permanent necessity of believing what   
might possibly not be true2 in other    
words1 that a case might occur in which 
our senses or consciousness1 if they    
could be appealed to1 might testify one 
thing1 and our reason believe another4  
,but in fact there is no such permanent 
necessity4 ,there is no proposition of  
which it can be asserted that every     
human mind must eternally and           
irrevocably believe it4 ,many of the    
propositions of which this is most      
confidently stated1 great numbers of    
human beings have disbelieved4 ,the     

things which it has been supposed that  
nobody could possibly help believing1   
are innumerable2 but no two generations 
would make out the same catalogue of    
them4 ,one age or nation believes       
implicitly what to another seems        
incredible and inconceivable2 one       
individual has not a vestige of a belief
 which another deems to be absolutely   
inherent in humanity4 ,there is not one 
of these supposed instinctive beliefs   
which is really inevitable4 ,it is in   
the power of every one to cultivate     
habits of thought which make him        
independent of them4 ,the habit of      
philosophical analysis1 7of which it is 
the surest effect to enable the mind to 
command1 instead of being commanded by1 
the laws of the merely passive part of  
its own nature17 by showing to us that  
things are not necessarily connected in 
fact because their ideas are connected  
in our minds1 is able to loosen         
innumerable associations which reign    
despotically over the undisciplined or  

early-prejudiced mind4 ,and this habit  
is not without power even over those    
associations which the school of which  
,i have been speaking regard as connate 
and instinctive4 ,i am convinced that   
any one accustomed to abstraction and   
analysis1 who will fairly exert his     
faculties for the purpose1 will1 when   
his imagination has once learnt to      
entertain the notion1 find no difficulty
 in conceiving that in some one for     
instance of the many firmaments into    
which sidereal astronomy now divides the
 universe1 events may succeed one       
another at random1 without any fixed    
law2 nor can anything in our experience1
 or in our mental nature1 constitute a  
sufficient1 or indeed any1 reason for   
believing that this is nowhere the case4
  ,were we to suppose 7what it is       
perfectly possible to imagine7 that the 
present order of the universe were      
brought to an end1 and that a chaos     
succeeded in which there was no fixed   
succession of events1 and the past gave 

no assurance of the future2 if a human  
being were miraculously kept alive to   
witness this change1 he surely would    
soon cease to believe in any uniformity1
 the uniformity itself no longer        
existing4 ,if this be admitted1 the     
belief in uniformity either is not an   
instinct1 or it is an instinct          
conquerable1 like all other instincts1  
by acquired knowledge4  ,but there is no
 need to speculate on what might be1    
when we have positive and certain       
knowledge of what has been4 ,it is not  
true as a matter of fact1 that mankind  
have always believed that all the       
successions of events were uniform and  
according to fixed laws4 ,the ,greek    
philosophers1 not even excepting        
,aristotle1 recognised ,chance and      
,spontaneity 7,greek3 tych and ,greek3  
to automaton7 as among the agents in    
nature2 in other words1 they believed   
that to that extent there was no        
guarantee that the past had been similar
 to itself1 or that the future would    

resemble the past4 ,even now a full half
 of the philosophical world1 including  
the very same metaphysicians who contend
 most for the instinctive character of  
the belief in uniformity1 consider one  
important class of phenomena1 volitions1
 to be an exception to the uniformity1  
and not governed by a fixed law4#bf     
#b4 ,as was observed in a former        
place1#bg the belief we entertain in the
 universality1 throughout nature1 of the
 law of cause and effect1 is itself an  
instance of induction2 and by no means  
one of the earliest which any of us1 or 
which mankind in general1 can have made4
 ,we arrive at this universal law1 by   
generalization from many laws of        
inferior generality4 ,we should never   
have had the notion of causation 7in the
 philosophical meaning of the term7 as a
 condition of all phenomena1 unless many
 cases of causation1 or in other words1 
many partial uniformities of sequence1  
had previously become familiar4 ,the    
more obvious of the particular          

uniformities suggest1 and give evidence 
of1 the general uniformity1 and the     
general uniformity1 once established1   
enables us to prove the remainder of the
 particular uniformities of which it is 
made up4 ,as1 however1 all rigorous     
processes of induction presuppose the   
general uniformity1 our knowledge of the
 particular uniformities from which it  
was first inferred was not1 of course1  
derived from rigorous induction1 but    
from the loose and uncertain mode of    
induction per enumerationem simplicem3  
and the law of universal causation1     
being collected from results so         
obtained1 cannot itself rest on any     
better foundation4  ,it would seem1     
therefore1 that induction per           
enumerationem simplicem not only is not 
necessarily an illicit logical process1 
but is in reality the only kind of      
induction possible2 since the more      
elaborate process depends for its       
validity on a law1 itself obtained in   
that inartificial mode4 ,is there not   

then an inconsistency in contrasting the
 looseness of one method with the       
rigidity of another1 when that other is 
indebted to the looser method for its   
own foundation8  ,the inconsistency1    
however1 is only apparent4 ,assuredly1  
if induction by simple enumeration were 
an invalid process1 no process grounded 
on it could be valid2 just as no        
reliance could be placed on telescopes1 
if we could not trust our eyes4 ,but    
though a valid process1 it is a fallible
 one1 and fallible in very different    
degrees3 if therefore we can substitute 
for the more fallible forms of the      
process1 an operation grounded on the   
same process in a less fallible form1 we
 shall have effected a very material    
improvement4 ,and this is what          
scientific induction does4  ,a mode of  
concluding from experience must be      
pronounced untrustworthy1 when          
subsequent experience refuses to confirm
 it4 ,according to this criterion1      
induction by simple enumeration--in     

other words1 generalization of an       
observed fact from the mere absence of  
any known instance to the               
contrary--affords in general a          
precarious and unsafe ground of         
assurance2 for such generalizations are 
incessantly discovered1 on further      
experience1 to be false4 ,still1        
however1 it affords some assurance1     
sufficient1 in many cases1 for the      
ordinary guidance of conduct4 ,it would 
be absurd to say1 that the              
generalizations arrived at by mankind in
 the outset of their experience1 such as
 these1 ,food nourishes1 ,fire burns1   
,water drowns1 were unworthy of         
reliance4#bh ,there is a scale of       
trustworthiness in the results of the   
original unscientific ,induction2 and on
 this diversity 7as observed in the     
fourth chapter of the present book7     
depend the rules for the improvement of 
the process4 ,the improvement consists  
in correcting one of these inartificial 
generalizations by means of another4 ,as

 has been already pointed out1 this is  
all that art can do4 ,to test a         
generalization1 by showing that it      
either follows from1 or conflicts with1 
some stronger induction1 some           
generalization resting on a broader     
foundation of experience1 is the        
beginning and end of the logic of       
,induction4    #c4 ,now the             
precariousness of the method of simple  
enumeration is in an inverse ratio to   
the largeness of the generalization4    
,the process is delusive and            
insufficient1 exactly in proportion as  
the subject-matter of the observation is
 special and limited in extent4 ,as the 
sphere widens1 this unscientific method 
becomes less and less liable to mislead2
 and the most universal class of truths1
 the law of causation for instance1 and 
the principles of number and of         
geometry1 are duly and satisfactorily   
proved by that method alone1 nor are    
they susceptible of any other proof4    
,with respect to the whole class of     

generalizations of which we have        
recently treated1 the uniformities which
 depend on causation1 the truth of the  
remark just made follows by obvious     
inference from the principles laid down 
in the preceding chapters4 ,when a fact 
has been observed a certain number of   
times to be true1 and is not in any     
instance known to be false2 if we at    
once affirm that fact as an universal   
truth or law of nature1 without testing 
it by any of the four methods of        
induction1 nor deducing it from other   
known laws1 we shall in general err     
grossly3 but we are perfectly justified 
in affirming it as an empirical law1    
true within certain limits of time1     
place1 and circumstance1 provided the   
number of coincidences be greater than  
can with any probability be ascribed to 
chance4 ,the reason for not extending it
 beyond those limits is1 that the fact  
of its holding true within them may be a
 consequence of collocations1 which     
cannot be concluded to exist in one     

place because they exist in another2 or 
may be dependent on the accidental      
absence of counteracting agencies1 which
 any variation of time1 or the smallest 
change of circumstances1 may possibly   
bring into play4 ,if we suppose1 then1  
the subject-matter of any generalization
 to be so widely diffused that there is 
no time1 no place1 and no combination of
 circumstances1 but must afford an      
example either of its truth or of its   
falsity1 and if it be never found       
otherwise than true1 its truth cannot   
depend on any collocations1 unless such 
as exist at all times and places2 nor   
can it be frustrated by any             
counteracting agencies1 unless by such  
as never actually occur4 ,it is1        
therefore1 an empirical law coextensive 
with all human experience2 at which     
point the distinction between empirical 
laws and laws of nature vanishes1 and   
the proposition takes its place among   
the most firmly established as well as  
largest truths accessible to science4   

,now1 the most extensive in its         
subject-matter of all generalizations   
which experience warrants1 respecting   
the sequences and coexistences of       
phenomena1 is the law of causation4 ,it 
stands at the head of all observed      
uniformities1 in point of universality1 
and therefore 7if the preceding         
observations are correct7 in point of   
certainty4 ,and if we consider1 not what
 mankind would have been justified in   
believing in the infancy of their       
knowledge1 but what may rationally be   
believed in its present more advanced   
state1 we shall find ourselves warranted
 in considering this fundamental law1   
though itself obtained by induction from
 particular laws of causation1 as not   
less certain1 but on the contrary1 more 
so1 than any of those from which it was 
drawn4 ,it adds to them as much proof as
 it receives from them4 ,for there is   
probably no one even of the best        
established laws of causation which is  
not sometimes counteracted1 and to      

which1 therefore1 apparent exceptions do
 not present themselves1 which would    
have necessarily and justly shaken the  
confidence of mankind in the            
universality of those laws1 if inductive
 processes founded on the universal law 
had not enabled us to refer those       
exceptions to the agency of             
counteracting causes1 and thereby       
reconcile them with the law with which  
they apparently conflict4 ,errors1      
moreover1 may have slipped into the     
statement of any one of the special     
laws1 through inattention to some       
material circumstance3 and instead of   
the true proposition1 another may have  
been enunciated1 false as an universal  
law1 though leading1 in all cases       
hitherto observed1 to the same result4  
,to the law of causation1 on the        
contrary1 we not only do not know of any
 exception1 but the exceptions which    
limit or apparently invalidate the      
special laws1 are so far from           
contradicting the universal one1 that   

they confirm it2 since in all cases     
which are sufficiently open to our      
observation1 we are able to trace the   
difference of result1 either to the     
absence of a cause which had been       
present in ordinary cases1 or to the    
presence of one which had been absent4  
,the law of cause and effect1 being thus
 certain1 is capable of imparting its   
certainty to all other inductive        
propositions which can be deduced from  
it2 and the narrower inductions may be  
regarded as receiving their ultimate    
sanction from that law1 since there is  
no one of them which is not rendered    
more certain than it was before1 when we
 are able to connect it with that larger
 induction1 and to show that it cannot  
be denied1 consistently with the law    
that everything which begins to exist   
has a cause4 ,and hence we are justified
 in the seeming inconsistency1 of       
holding induction by simple enumeration 
to be good for proving this general     
truth1 the foundation of scientific     

induction1 and yet refusing to rely on  
it for any of the narrower inductions4  
,i fully admit that if the law of       
causation were unknown1 generalization  
in the more obvious cases of uniformity 
in phenomena would nevertheless be      
possible1 and though in all cases more  
or less precarious1 and in some         
extremely so1 would suffice to          
constitute a certain measure of         
probability3 but what the amount of this
 probability might be1 we are dispensed 
from estimating1 since it never could   
amount to the degree of assurance which 
the proposition acquires1 when1 by the  
application to it of the ,four ,methods1
 the supposition of its falsity is shown
 to be inconsistent with the ,law of    
,causation4 ,we are therefore logically 
entitled1 and1 by the necessities of    
scientific ,induction1 required1 to     
disregard the probabilities derived from
 the early rude method of generalizing1 
and to consider no minor generalization 
as proved except so far as the law of   

causation confirms it1 nor probable     
except so far as it may reasonably be   
expected to be so confirmed4    #d4 ,the
 assertion1 that our inductive processes
 assume the law of causation1 while the 
law of causation is itself a case of    
induction1 is a paradox1 only on the old
 theory of reasoning1 which supposes the
 universal truth1 or major premise1 in a
 ratiocination1 to be the real proof of 
the particular truths which are         
ostensibly inferred from it4 ,according 
to the doctrine maintained in the       
present treatise1#bi the major premise  
is not the proof of the conclusion1 but 
is itself proved1 along with the        
conclusion from the same evidence4 ,all 
men are mortal is not the proof that    
,lord ,palmerston is mortal2 but our    
past experience of mortality authorizes 
us to infer both the general truth and  
the particular fact1 and the one with   
exactly the same degree of assurance as 
the other4 ,the mortality of ,lord      
,palmerston is not an inference from the

 mortality of all men1 but from the     
experience which proves the mortality of
 all men2 and is a correct inference    
from experience1 if that general truth  
is so too4 ,this relation between our   
general beliefs and their particular    
applications holds equally true in the  
more comprehensive case which we are now
 discussing4 ,any new fact of causation 
inferred by induction1 is rightly       
inferred1 if no other objection can be  
made to the inference than can be made  
to the general truth that every event   
has a cause4 ,the utmost certainty which
 can be given to a conclusion arrived at
 in the way of inference1 stops at this 
point4 ,when we have ascertained that   
the particular conclusion must stand or 
fall with the general uniformity of the 
laws of nature--that it is liable to no 
doubt except the doubt whether every    
event has a cause--we have done all that
 can be done for it4 ,the strongest     
assurance we can obtain of any theory   
respecting the cause of a given         

phenomenon1 is that the phenomenon has  
either that cause or none4  ,the latter 
supposition might have been an          
admissible one in a very early period of
 our study of nature4 ,but we have been 
able to perceive that in the stage which
 mankind have now reached1 the          
generalization which gives the ,law of  
,universal ,causation has grown into a  
stronger and better induction1 one      
deserving of greater reliance1 than any 
of the subordinate generalizations4 ,we 
may even1 ,i think1 go a step further   
than this1 and regard the certainty of  
that great induction as not merely      
comparative1 but1 for all practical     
purposes1 absolute4  ,the considerations
 which1 as ,i apprehend1 give1 at the   
present day1 to the proof of the law of 
uniformity of succession as true of all 
phenomena without exception1 this       
character of completeness and           
conclusiveness1 are the                 
following3--,first1 that we now know it 
directly to be true of far the greatest 

number of phenomena2 that there are none
 of which we know it not to be true1 the
 utmost that can be said being1 that of 
some we cannot positively from direct   
evidence affirm its truth2 while        
phenomenon after phenomenon1 as they    
become better known to us1 are          
constantly passing from the latter class
 into the former2 and in all cases in   
which that transition has not yet taken 
place1 the absence of direct proof is   
accounted for by the rarity or the      
obscurity of the phenomena1 our         
deficient means of observing them1 or   
the logical difficulties arising from   
the complication of the circumstances in
 which they occur2 insomuch that1       
notwithstanding as rigid a dependence on
 given conditions as exists in the case 
of any other phenomenon1 it was not     
likely that we should be better         
acquainted with those conditions than we
 are4 ,besides this first class of      
considerations1 there is a second1 which
 still further corroborates the         

conclusion4 ,although there are         
phenomena the production and changes of 
which elude all our attempts to reduce  
them universally to any ascertained law2
 yet in every such case1 the phenomenon1
 or the objects concerned in it1 are    
found in some instances to obey the     
known laws of nature4 ,the wind1 for    
example1 is the type of uncertainty and 
caprice1 yet we find it in some cases   
obeying with as much constancy as any   
phenomenon in nature the law of the     
tendency of fluids to distribute        
themselves so as to equalize the        
pressure on every side of each of their 
particles2 as in the case of the trade  
winds1 and the monsoons4 ,lightning     
might once have been supposed to obey no
 laws2 but since it has been ascertained
 to be identical with electricity1 we   
know that the very same phenomenon in   
some of its manifestations is implicitly
 obedient to the action of fixed causes4
 ,i do not believe that there is now one
 object or event in all our experience  

of nature1 within the bounds of the     
solar system at least1 which has not    
either been ascertained by direct       
observation to follow laws of its own1  
or been proved to be closely similar to 
objects and events which1 in more       
familiar manifestations1 or on a more   
limited scale1 follow strict laws3 our  
inability to trace the same laws on a   
larger scale and in the more recondite  
instances1 being accounted for by the   
number and complication of the modifying
 causes1 or by their inaccessibility to 
observation4  ,the progress of          
experience1 therefore1 has dissipated   
the doubt which must have rested on the 
universality of the law of causation    
while there were phenomena which seemed 
to be sui generis1 not subject to the   
same laws with any other class of       
phenomena1 and not as yet ascertained to
 have peculiar laws of their own4 ,this 
great generalization1 however1 might    
reasonably have been1 as it in fact was1
 acted on as a probability of the       

highest order1 before there were        
sufficient grounds for receiving it as a
 certainty4 ,for1 whatever has been     
found true in innumerable instances1 and
 never found to be false after due      
examination in any1 we are safe in      
acting on as universal provisionally1   
until an undoubted exception appears2   
provided the nature of the case be such 
that a real exception could scarcely    
have escaped our notice4 ,when every    
phenomenon that we ever knew            
sufficiently well to be able to answer  
the question1 had a cause on which it   
was invariably consequent1 it was more  
rational to suppose that our inability  
to assign the causes of other phenomena 
arose from our ignorance1 than that     
there were phenomena which were         
uncaused1 and which happened to be      
exactly those which we had hitherto had 
no sufficient opportunity of studying4  
,it must1 at the same time1 be remarked1
 that the reasons for this reliance do  
not hold in circumstances unknown to us1

 and beyond the possible range of our   
experience4 ,in distant parts of the    
stellar regions1 where the phenomena may
 be entirely unlike those with which we 
are acquainted1 it would be folly to    
affirm confidently that this general law
 prevails1 any more than those special  
ones which we have found to hold        
universally on our own planet4 ,the     
uniformity in the succession of events1 
otherwise called the law of causation1  
must be received not as a law of the    
universe1 but of that portion of it only
 which is within the range of our means 
of sure observation1 with a reasonable  
degree of extension to adjacent cases4  
,to extend it further is to make a      
supposition without evidence1 and to    
which1 in the absence of any ground from
 experience for estimating its degree of
 probability1 it would be idle to       
attempt to assign any4#cj     ,,chapter 
,,xxii4  ,,of ,,uniformities ,,of       
,,coexistence ,,not ,,dependent ,,on    
,,causation4    #a4 ,the order of the   

occurrence of phenomena in time1 is     
either successive or simultaneous2 the  
uniformities1 therefore1 which obtain in
 their occurrence1 are either           
uniformities of succession or of        
coexistence4 ,uniformities of succession
 are all comprehended under the law of  
causation and its consequences4 ,every  
phenomenon has a cause1 which it        
invariably follows2 and from this are   
derived other invariable sequences among
 the successive stages of the same      
effect1 as well as between the effects  
resulting from causes which invariably  
succeed one another4  ,in the same      
manner with these derivative            
uniformities of succession1 a great     
variety of uniformities of coexistence  
also take their rise4 ,coordinate       
effects of the same cause naturally     
coexist with one another4 ,high water at
 any point on the earth's surface1 and  
high water at the point diametrically   
opposite to it1 are effects uniformly   
simultaneous1 resulting from the        

direction in which the combined         
attractions of the sun and moon act upon
 the waters of the ocean4 ,an eclipse of
 the sun to us1 and an eclipse of the   
earth to a spectator situated in the    
moon1 are in like manner phenomena      
invariably coexistent2 and their        
coexistence can equally be deduced from 
the laws of their production4  ,it is an
 obvious question1 therefore1 whether   
all the uniformities of coexistence     
among phenomena may not be accounted for
 in this manner4 ,and it cannot be      
doubted that between phenomena which are
 themselves effects1 the coexistences   
must necessarily depend on the causes of
 those phenomena4 ,if they are effects  
immediately or remotely of the same     
cause1 they cannot coexist except by    
virtue of some laws or properties of    
that cause3 if they are effects of      
different causes1 they cannot coexist   
unless it be because their causes       
coexist2 and the uniformity of          
coexistence1 if such there be1 between  

the effects1 proves that those          
particular causes1 within the limits of 
our observation1 have uniformly been    
coexistent4    #b4 ,but these same      
considerations compel us to recognise   
that there must be one class of         
coexistences which cannot depend on     
causation2 the coexistences between the 
ultimate properties of things--those    
properties which are the causes of all  
phenomena1 but are not themselves caused
 by any phenomenon1 and a cause for     
which could only be sought by ascending 
to the origin of all things4 ,yet among 
these ultimate properties there are not 
only coexistences1 but uniformities of  
coexistence4 ,general propositions may  
be1 and are1 formed1 which assert that  
whenever certain properties are found1  
certain others are found along with     
them4 ,we perceive an object2 say1 for  
instance1 water4 ,we recognise it to be 
water1 of course by certain of its      
properties4 ,having recognised it1 we   
are able to affirm of it innumerable    

other properties2 which we could not do 
unless it were a general truth1 a law or
 uniformity in nature1 that the set of  
properties by which we identify the     
substance as water1 always have those   
other properties conjoined with them4   
,in a former place1#ca it has been      
explained in some detail what is meant  
by the ,kinds of objects2 those classes 
which differ from one another not by a  
limited and definite1 but by an         
indefinite and unknown1 number of       
distinctions4 ,to this we have now to   
add1 that every proposition by which    
anything is asserted of a ,kind1 affirms
 an uniformity of coexistence4 ,since we
 know nothing of ,kinds but their       
properties1 the ,kind1 to us1 is the set
 of properties by which it is           
identified1 and which must of course be 
sufficient to distinguish it from every 
other kind4#cb ,in affirming anything1  
therefore1 of a ,kind1 we are affirming 
something to be uniformly coexistent    
with the properties by which the kind is

 recognised2 and that is the sole       
meaning of the assertion4  ,among the   
uniformities of coexistence which exist 
in nature1 may hence be numbered all the
 properties of ,kinds4 ,the whole of    
these1 however1 are not independent of  
causation1 but only a portion of them4  
,some are ultimate properties1 others   
derivative2 of some1 no cause can be    
assigned1 but others are manifestly     
dependent on causes4 ,thus1 pure        
atmospheric air is a ,kind1 and one of  
its most unequivocal properties is its  
gaseous form3 this property1 however1   
has for its cause the presence of a     
certain quantity of latent heat2 and if 
that heat could be taken away 7as has   
been done from so many gases in         
,faraday's experiments71 the gaseous    
form would doubtless disappear1 together
 with numerous other properties which   
depend on1 or are caused by1 that       
property4  ,in regard to all substances 
which are chemical compounds1 and which 
therefore may be regarded as products of

 the juxtaposition of substances        
different in ,kind from themselves1     
there is considerable reason to presume 
that the specific properties of the     
compound are consequent1 as effects1 on 
some of the properties of the elements1 
though little progress has yet been made
 in tracing any invariable relation     
between the latter and the former4      
,still more strongly will a similar     
presumption exist1 when the object      
itself1 as in the case of organized     
beings1 is no primeval agent1 but an    
effect1 which depends on a cause or     
causes for its very existence4 ,the     
,kinds therefore which are called in    
chemistry simple substances1 or         
elementary natural agents1 are the only 
ones1 any of whose properties can with  
certainty be considered ultimate2 and of
 these the ultimate properties are      
probably much more numerous that we at  
present recognise1 since every          
successful instance of the resolution of
 the properties of their compounds into 

simpler laws1 generally leads to the    
recognition of properties in the        
elements distinct from any previously   
known4 ,the resolution of the laws of   
the heavenly motions1 established the   
previously unknown ultimate property of 
a mutual attraction between all bodies3 
the resolution1 so far as it has yet    
proceeded1 of the laws of               
crystallization1 of chemical            
composition1 electricity1 magnetism1 c41
 points to various polarities1          
ultimately inherent in the particles of 
which bodies are composed2 the          
comparative atomic weights of different 
kinds of bodies were ascertained by     
resolving1 into more general laws1 the  
uniformities observed in the proportions
 in which substances combine with one   
another2 and so forth4 ,thus although   
every resolution of a complex uniformity
 into simpler and more elementary laws  
has an apparent tendency to diminish the
 number of the ultimate properties1 and 
really does remove many properties from 

the list2 yet1 7since the result of this
 simplifying process is to trace up an  
ever greater variety of different       
effects to the same agents17 the further
 we advance in this direction1 the      
greater number of distinct properties we
 are forced to recognise in one and the 
same object3 the coexistences of which  
properties must accordingly be ranked   
among the ultimate generalities of      
nature4    #c4 ,there are1 therefore1   
only two kinds of propositions which    
assert uniformity of coexistence between
 properties4 ,either the properties     
depend on causes1 or they do not4 ,if   
they do1 the proposition which affirms  
them to be coexistent is a derivative   
law of coexistence between effects1 and 
until resolved into the laws of         
causation on which it depends1 is an    
empirical law1 and to be tried by the   
principles of induction to which such   
laws are amenable4 ,if1 on the other    
hand1 the properties do not depend on   
causes1 but are ultimate properties2    

then if it be true that they invariably 
coexist1 they must all be ultimate      
properties of one and the same ,kind2   
and it is of these only that the        
coexistences can be classed as a        
peculiar sort of laws of nature4  ,when 
we affirm that all crows are black1 or  
that all negroes have woolly hair1 we   
assert an uniformity of coexistence4 ,we
 assert that the property of blackness1 
or of having woolly hair1 invariably    
coexists with the properties which1 in  
common language1 or in the scientific   
classification that we adopt1 are taken 
to constitute the class crow1 or the    
class negro4 ,now1 supposing blackness  
to be an ultimate property of black     
objects1 or woolly hair an ultimate     
property of the animals which possess   
it2 supposing that these properties are 
not results of causation1 are not       
connected with antecedent phenomena by  
any law2 then if all crows are black1   
and all negroes have woolly hair1 these 
must be ultimate properties of the ,kind

 crow1 or negro1 or of some ,kind which 
includes them4 ,if1 on the contrary1    
blackness or woolly hair be an effect   
depending on causes1 these general      
propositions are manifestly empirical   
laws2 and all that has already been said
 respecting that class of               
generalizations may be applied without  
modification to these4  ,now1 we have   
seen that in the case of all            
compounds--of all things1 in short1     
except the elementary substances and    
primary powers of nature--the           
presumption is1 that the properties do  
really depend upon causes2 and it is    
impossible in any case whatever to be   
certain that they do not4 ,we therefore 
should not be safe in claiming for any  
generalization respecting the           
coexistence of properties1 a degree of  
certainty to which1 if the properties   
should happen to be the result of       
causes1 it would have no claim4 ,a      
generalization respecting coexistence1  
or in other words respecting the        

properties of ,kinds1 may be an ultimate
 truth1 but it may1 also1 be merely a   
derivative one2 and since1 if so1 it is 
one of those derivative laws which are  
neither laws of causation1 nor have been
 resolved into the laws of causation on 
which they depend1 it can possess no    
higher degree of evidence than belongs  
to an empirical law4    #d4 ,this       
conclusion will be confirmed by the     
consideration of one great deficiency1  
which precludes the application to the  
ultimate uniformities of coexistence1 of
 a system of rigorous scientific        
induction1 such as the uniformities in  
the succession of phenomena have been   
found to admit of4 ,the basis of such a 
system is wanting3 there is no general  
axiom1 standing in the same relation to 
the uniformities of coexistence as the  
law of causation does to those of       
succession4 ,the ,methods of ,induction 
applicable to the ascertainment of      
causes and effects1 are grounded on the 
principle that everything which has a   

beginning must have some cause or other2
 that among the circumstances which     
actually existed at the time of its     
commencement1 there is certainly some   
one combination1 on which the effect in 
question is unconditionally consequent1 
and on the repetition of which it would 
certainly again recur4 ,but in an       
inquiry whether some kind 7as crow7     
universally possesses a certain property
 7as blackness71 there is no room for   
any assumption analogous to this4 ,we   
have no previous certainty that the     
property must have something which      
constantly coexists with it2 must have  
an invariable coexistent1 in the same   
manner as an event must have an         
invariable antecedent4 ,when we feel    
pain1 we must be in some circumstances  
under which if exactly repeated we      
should always feel pain4 ,but when we   
are conscious of blackness1 it does not 
follow that there is something else     
present of which blackness is a constant
 accompaniment4 ,there is1 therefore1 no

 room for elimination2 no ,method of    
,agreement or ,difference1 or of        
,concomitant ,variations 7which is but a
 modification either of the ,method of  
,agreement or of the ,method of         
,difference74 ,we cannot conclude that  
the blackness we see in crows must be an
 invariable property of crows1 merely   
because there is nothing else present of
 which it can be an invariable property4
 ,we therefore inquire into the truth of
 a proposition like ,all crows are      
black1 under the same disadvantage as   
if1 in our inquiries into causation1 we 
were compelled to let in1 as one of the 
possibilities1 that the effect may in   
that particular instance have arisen    
without any cause at all4  ,to overlook 
this grand distinction was1 as it seems 
to me1 the capital error in ,bacon's    
view of inductive philosophy4 ,the      
principle of elimination1 that great    
logical instrument which he had the     
immense merit of first bringing into    
general use1 he deemed applicable in the

 same sense1 and in as unqualified a    
manner1 to the investigation of the     
coexistences1 as to that of the         
successions of phenomena4 ,he seems to  
have thought that as every event has a  
cause1 or invariable antecedent1 so     
every property of an object has an      
invariable coexistent1 which he called  
its ,form3 and the examples he chiefly  
selected for the application and        
illustration of his method1 were        
inquiries into such ,forms2 attempts to 
determine in what else all those objects
 resembled1 which agreed in some one    
general property1 as hardness or        
softness1 dryness or moistness1 heat or 
coldness4 ,such inquiries could lead to 
no result4 ,the objects seldom have any 
such circumstances in common4 ,they     
usually agree in the one point inquired 
into1 and in nothing else4 ,a great     
proportion of the properties which1 so  
far as we can conjecture1 are the       
likeliest to be really ultimate1 would  
seem to be inherently properties of many

 different ,kinds of things1 not allied 
in any other respect4 ,and as for the   
properties which1 being effects of      
causes1 we are able to give some account
 of1 they have generally nothing to do  
with the ultimate resemblances or       
diversities in the objects themselves1  
but depend on some outward              
circumstances1 under the influence of   
which any objects whatever are capable  
of manifesting those properties2 as is  
emphatically the case with those        
favourite subjects of ,bacon's          
scientific inquiries1 hotness and       
coldness2 as well as with hardness and  
softness1 solidity and fluidity1 and    
many other conspicuous qualities4  ,in  
the absence1 then1 of any universal law 
of coexistence1 similar to the universal
 law of causation which regulates       
sequence1 we are thrown back upon the   
unscientific induction of the ancients1 
per enumerationem simplicem1 ubi non    
reperitur instantia contradictoria4 ,the
 reason we have for believing that all  

crows are black1 is simply that we have 
seen and heard of many black crows1 and 
never one of any other colour4 ,it      
remains to be considered how far this   
evidence can reach1 and how we are to   
measure its strength in any given case4 
#e4 ,it sometimes happens that a mere   
change in the mode of verbally          
enunciating a question1 though nothing  
is really added to the meaning          
expressed1 is of itself a considerable  
step towards its solution4 ,this1 ,i    
think1 happens in the present instance4 
,the degree of certainty of any         
generalization which rests on no other  
evidence than the agreement1 so far as  
it goes1 of all past observation1 is but
 another phrase for the degree of       
improbability that an exception1 if any 
existed1 could have hitherto remained   
unobserved4 ,the reason for believing   
that all crows are black1 is measured by
 the improbability that crows of any    
other colour should have existed to the 
present time without our being aware of 

it4 ,let us state the question in this  
last mode1 and consider what is implied 
in the supposition that there may be    
crows which are not black1 and under    
what conditions we can be justified in  
regarding this as incredible4  ,if there
 really exist crows which are not black1
 one of two things must be the fact4    
,either the circumstance of blackness1  
in all crows hitherto observed1 must be1
 as it were1 an accident1 not connected 
with any distinction of ,kind2 or if it 
be a property of ,kind1 the crows which 
are not black must be a new ,kind1 a    
,kind hitherto overlooked1 though coming
 under the same general description by  
which crows have hitherto been          
characterized4 ,the first supposition   
would be proved true if we were to      
discover casually a white crow among    
black ones1 or if it were found that    
black crows sometimes turn white4 ,the  
second would be shown to be the fact if 
in ,australia or ,central ,africa a     
species or a race of white or grey crows

 were found to exist4    #f4 ,the former
 of these suppositions necessarily      
implies that the colour is an effect of 
causation4 ,if blackness1 in the crows  
in which it has been observed1 be not a 
property of ,kind1 but can be present or
 absent without any difference generally
 in the properties of the object2 then  
it is not an ultimate fact in the       
individuals themselves1 but is certainly
 dependent on a cause4 ,there are1 no   
doubt1 many properties which vary from  
individual to individual of the same    
,kind1 even the same infima species1 or 
lowest ,kind4 ,some flowers may be      
either white or red1 without differing  
in any other respect4 ,but these        
properties are not ultimate2 they depend
 on causes4 ,so far as the properties of
 a thing belong to its own nature1 and  
do not arise from some cause extrinsic  
to it1 they are always the same in the  
same ,kind4 ,take1 for instance1 all    
simple substances and elementary powers2
 the only things of which we are certain

 that some at least of their properties 
are really ultimate4 ,colour is         
generally esteemed the most variable of 
all properties3 yet we do not find that 
sulphur is sometimes yellow and         
sometimes white1 or that it varies in   
colour at all1 except so far as colour  
is the effect of some extrinsic cause1  
as of the sort of light thrown upon it1 
the mechanical arrangement of the       
particles1 7as after fusion7 c4 ,we do  
not find that iron is sometimes fluid   
and sometimes solid at the same         
temperature2 gold sometimes malleable   
and sometimes brittle2 that hydrogen    
will sometimes combine with oxygen and  
sometimes not2 or the like4 ,if from    
simple substances we pass to any of     
their definite compounds1 as water1     
lime1 or sulphuric acid1 there is the   
same constancy in their properties4     
,when properties vary from individual to
 individual1 it is either in the case of
 miscellaneous aggregations1 such as    
atmospheric air or rock1 composed of    

heterogeneous substances1 and not       
constituting or belonging to any real   
,kind1#cc or it is in the case of       
organic beings4 ,in them1 indeed1 there 
is variability in a high degree4        
,animals of the same species and race1  
human beings of the same age1 sex1 and  
country1 will be most different1 for    
example1 in face and figure4 ,but       
organized beings 7from the extreme      
complication of the laws by which they  
are regulated7 being more eminently     
modifiable1 that is1 liable to be       
influenced by a greater number and      
variety of causes1 than any other       
phenomena whatever2 having also         
themselves had a beginning1 and         
therefore a cause2 there is reason to   
believe that none of their properties   
are ultimate1 but all of them           
derivative1 and produced by causation4  
,and the presumption is confirmed1 by   
the fact that the properties which vary 
from one individual to another1 also    
generally vary more or less at different

 times in the same individual2 which    
variation1 like any other event1        
supposes a cause1 and implies1          
consequently1 that the properties are   
not independent of causation4  ,if1     
therefore1 blackness be merely          
accidental in crows1 and capable of     
varying while the ,kind remains the     
same1 its presence or absence is        
doubtless no ultimate fact1 but the     
effect of some unknown cause3 and in    
that case the universality of the       
experience that all crows are black is  
sufficient proof of a common cause1 and 
establishes the generalization as an    
empirical law4 ,since there are         
innumerable instances in the            
affirmative1 and hitherto none at all in
 the negative1 the causes on which the  
property depends must exist everywhere  
in the limits of the observations which 
have been made2 and the proposition may 
be received as universal within those   
limits1 and with the allowable degree of
 extension to adjacent cases4    #g4    

,if1 in the second place1 the property1 
in the instances in which it has been   
observed1 is not an effect of causation1
 it is a property of ,kind2 and in that 
case the generalization can only be set 
aside by the discovery of a new ,kind of
 crow4 ,that1 however1 a peculiar ,kind1
 not hitherto discovered1 should exist  
in nature1 is a supposition so often    
realized1 that it cannot be considered  
at all improbable4 ,we have nothing to  
authorize us in attempting to limit the 
,kinds of things which exist in nature4 
,the only unlikelihood would be that a  
new ,kind should be discovered in       
localities which there was previously   
reason to believe had been thoroughly   
explored2 and even this improbability   
depends on the degree of conspicuousness
 of the difference between the          
newly-discovered ,kind and all others1  
since new ,kinds of minerals1 plants1   
and even animals1 previously overlooked 
or confounded with known species1 are   
still continually detected in the most  

frequented situations4 ,on this second  
ground1 therefore1 as well as on the    
first1 the observed uniformity of       
coexistence can only hold good as an    
empirical law1 within the limits not    
only of actual observation1 but of an   
observation as accurate as the nature of
 the case required4 ,and hence it is    
that 7as remarked in an early chapter of
 the present ,book7 we so often give up 
generalizations of this class at the    
first summons4 ,if any credible witness 
stated that he had seen a white crow1   
under circumstances which made it not   
incredible that it should have escaped  
notice previously1 we should give full  
credence to the statement4  ,it appears1
 then1 that the uniformities which      
obtain in the coexistence of            
phenomena1--those which we have reason  
to consider as ultimate1 no less than   
those which arise from the laws of      
causes yet undetected--are entitled to  
reception only as empirical laws2 are   
not to be presumed true except within   

the limits of time1 place1 and          
circumstance1 in which the observations 
were made1 or except in cases strictly  
adjacent4    #h4 ,we have seen in the   
last chapter that there is a point of   
generality at which empirical laws      
become as certain as laws of nature1 or 
rather1 at which there is no longer any 
distinction between empirical laws and  
laws of nature4 ,as empirical laws      
approach this point1 in other words1 as 
they rise in their degree of generality1
 they become more certain2 their        
universality may be more strongly relied
 on4 ,for1 in the first place1 if they  
are results of causation 7which1 even in
 the class of uniformities treated of in
 the present chapter1 we never can be   
certain that they are not7 the more     
general they are1 the greater is proved 
to be the space over which the necessary
 collocations prevail1 and within which 
no causes exist capable of counteracting
 the unknown causes on which the        
empirical law depends4 ,to say that     

anything is an invariable property of   
some very limited class of objects1 is  
to say that it invariably accompanies   
some very numerous and complex group of 
distinguishing properties2 which1 if    
causation be at all concerned in the    
matter1 argues a combination of many    
causes1 and therefore a great liability 
to counteraction2 while the             
comparatively narrow range of the       
observations renders it impossible to   
predict to what extent unknown          
counteracting causes may be distributed 
throughout nature4 ,but when a          
generalization has been found to hold   
good of a very large proportion of all  
things whatever1 it is already proved   
that nearly all the causes which exist  
in nature have no power over it2 that   
very few changes in the combination of  
causes can effect it2 since the greater 
number of possible combinations must    
have already existed in some one or     
other of the instances in which it has  
been found true4 ,if1 therefore1 any    

empirical law is a result of causation1 
the more general it is1 the more it may 
be depended on4 ,and even if it be no   
result of causation1 but an ultimate    
coexistence1 the more general it is1 the
 greater amount of experience it is     
derived from1 and the greater therefore 
is the probability that if exceptions   
had existed1 some would already have    
presented themselves4  ,for these       
reasons1 it requires much more evidence 
to establish an exception to one of the 
more general empirical laws than to the 
more special ones4 ,we should not have  
any difficulty in believing that there  
might be a new ,kind of crow2 or a new  
kind of bird resembling a crow in the   
properties hitherto considered          
distinctive of that ,kind4 ,but it would
 require stronger proof to convince us  
of the existence of a ,kind of crow     
having properties at variance with any  
generally recognised universal property 
of birds2 and a still higher degree if  
the properties conflict with any        

recognised universal property of        
animals4 ,and this is conformable to the
 mode of judgment recommended by the    
common sense and general practice of    
mankind1 who are more incredulous as to 
any novelties in nature1 according to   
the degree of generality of the         
experience which these novelties seem to
 contradict4    #i4 ,still1 however1    
even these greater generalizations1     
which embrace comprehensive ,kinds1     
containing under them a great number and
 variety of infim species1 are only     
empirical laws1 resting on induction by 
simple enumeration merely1 and not on   
any process of elimination1 a process   
wholly inapplicable to this sort of     
case4 ,such generalizations1 therefore1 
ought to be grounded on an examination  
of all the infim species comprehended in
 them1 and not of a portion only4 ,we   
cannot conclude 7where causation is not 
concerned71 because a proposition is    
true of a number of things resembling   
one another only in being animals1 that 

it is therefore true of all animals4    
,if1 indeed1 anything be true of species
 which differ more from one another than
 either differs from a third1           
7especially if that third species       
occupies in most of its known properties
 a position between the two former17    
there is some probability that the same 
thing will also be true of that         
intermediate species2 for it is often1  
though by no means universally1 found1  
that there is a sort of parallelism in  
the properties of different ,kinds1 and 
that their degree of unlikeness in one  
respect bears some proportion to their  
unlikeness in others4 ,we see this      
parallelism in the properties of the    
different metals2 in those of sulphur1  
phosphorus1 and carbon2 of chlorine1    
iodine1 and bromine2 in the natural     
orders of plants and animals1 c4 ,but   
there are innumerable anomalies and     
exceptions to this sort of conformity2  
if indeed the conformity itself be      
anything but an anomaly and an exception

 in nature4  ,universal propositions1   
therefore1 respecting the properties of 
superior ,kinds1 unless grounded on     
proved or presumed connexion by         
causation1 ought not to be hazarded     
except after separately examining every 
known sub-kind included in the larger   
,kind4 ,and even then such              
generalizations must be held in         
readiness to be given up on the         
occurrence of some new anomaly1 which1  
when the uniformity is not derived from 
causation1 can never1 even in the case  
of the most general of these empirical  
laws1 be considered very improbable4    
,thus all the universal propositions    
which it has been attempted to lay down 
respecting simple substances1 or        
concerning any of the classes which have
 been formed among simple substances1   
7and the attempt has been often made17  
have1 with the progress of experience1  
either faded into inanity1 or been      
proved to be erroneous2 and each ,kind  
of simple substance remains with its own

 collection of properties apart from the
 rest1 saving a certain parallelism with
 a few other ,kinds1 the most similar to
 itself4 ,in organized beings1 indeed1  
there are abundance of propositions     
ascertained to be universally true of   
superior genera1 to many of which the   
discovery hereafter of any exceptions   
must be regarded as extremely           
improbable4 ,but these1 as already      
observed1 are1 we have every reason to  
believe1 properties dependent on        
causation4  ,uniformities of            
coexistence1 then1 not only when they   
are consequences of laws of succession1 
but also when they are ultimate truths1 
must be ranked1 for the purpose of      
logic1 among empirical laws2 and are    
amenable in every respect to the same   
rules with those unresolved uniformities
 which are known to be dependent on     
causation4     ,,chapter ,,xxiii4  ,,of 
,,approximate ,,generalizations1 ,,and  
,,probable ,,evidence4    #a4 ,in our   
inquiries into the nature of the        

inductive process1 we must not confine  
our notice to such generalizations from 
experience as profess to be universally 
true4 ,there is a class of inductive    
truths avowedly not universal2 in which 
it is not pretended that the predicate  
is always true of the subject2 but the  
value of which1 as generalizations1 is  
nevertheless extremely great4 ,an       
important portion of the field of       
inductive knowledge does not consist of 
universal truths1 but of approximations 
to such truths2 and when a conclusion is
 said to rest on probable evidence1 the 
premises it is drawn from are usually   
generalizations of this sort4  ,as every
 certain inference respecting a         
particular case1 implies that there is  
ground for a general proposition1 of the
 form1 ,every ,a is ,b2 so does every   
probable inference suppose that there is
 ground for a proposition of the form1  
,most ,a are ,b3 and the degree of      
probability of the inference in an      
average case1 will depend on the        

proportion between the number of        
instances existing in nature which      
accord with the generalization1 and the 
number of those which conflict with it4 
#b4 ,propositions in the form1 ,most ,a 
are ,b1 are of a very different degree  
of importance in science1 and in the    
practice of life4 ,to the scientific    
inquirer they are valuable chiefly as   
materials for1 and steps towards1       
universal truths4 ,the discovery of     
these is the proper end of science3 its 
work is not done if it stops at the     
proposition that a majority of ,a are   
,b1 without circumscribing that majority
 by some common character1 fitted to    
distinguish them from the minority4     
,independently of the inferior precision
 of such imperfect generalizations1 and 
the inferior assurance with which they  
can be applied to individual cases1 it  
is plain that1 compared with exact      
generalizations1 they are almost useless
 as means of discovering ulterior truths
 by way of deduction4 ,we may1 it is    

true1 by combining the proposition ,most
 ,a are ,b1 with an universal           
proposition1 ,every ,b is ,c1 arrive at 
the conclusion that ,most ,a are ,c4    
,but when a second proposition of the   
approximate kind is introduced1--or even
 when there is but one1 if that one be  
the major premise1--nothing can in      
general be positively concluded4 ,when  
the major is ,most ,b are ,d1 then1 even
 if the minor be ,every ,a is ,b1 we    
cannot infer that most ,a are ,d1 or    
with any certainty that even some ,a are
 ,d4 ,though the majority of the class  
,b have the attribute signified by ,d1  
the whole of the sub-class ,a may belong
 to the minority4#cd  ,though so little 
use can be made1 in science1 of         
approximate generalizations1 except as a
 stage on the road to something better1 
for practical guidance they are often   
all we have to rely on4 ,even when      
science has really determined the       
universal laws of any phenomenon1 not   
only are those laws generally too much  

encumbered with conditions to be adapted
 for every-day use1 but the cases which 
present themselves in life are too      
complicated1 and our decisions require  
to be taken too rapidly1 to admit of    
waiting till the existence of a         
phenomenon can be proved by what have   
been scientifically ascertained to be   
universal marks of it4 ,to be indecisive
 and reluctant to act1 because we have  
not evidence of a perfectly conclusive  
character to act on1 is a defect        
sometimes incident to scientific minds1 
but which1 wherever it exists1 renders  
them unfit for practical emergencies4   
,if we would succeed in action1 we must 
judge by indications which1 though they 
do not generally mislead us1 sometimes  
do2 and must make up1 as far as         
possible1 for the incomplete            
conclusiveness of any one indication1 by
 obtaining others to corroborate it4    
,the principles of induction applicable 
to approximate generalization are       
therefore a not less important subject  

of inquiry1 than the rules for the      
investigation of universal truths2 and  
might reasonably be expected to detain  
us almost as long1 were it not that     
these principles are mere corollaries   
from those which have been already      
treated of4    #c4 ,there are two sorts 
of cases in which we are forced to guide
 ourselves by generalizations of the    
imperfect form1 ,most ,a are ,b4 ,the   
first is1 when we have no others2 when  
we have not been able to carry our      
investigation of the laws of the        
phenomena any farther2 as in the        
following propositions3 ,most dark-eyed 
persons have dark hair2 ,most springs   
contain mineral substances2 ,most       
stratified formations contain fossils4  
,the importance of this class of        
generalizations is not very great2 for1 
though it frequently happens that we see
 no reason why that which is true of    
most individuals of a class is not true 
of the remainder1 nor are able to bring 
the former under any general description

 which can distinguish them from the    
latter1 yet if we are willing to be     
satisfied with propositions of a less   
degree of generality1 and to break down 
the class ,a into subclasses1 we may    
generally obtain a collection of        
propositions exactly true4 ,we do not   
know why most wood is lighter than      
water1 nor can we point out any general 
property which discriminates wood that  
is lighter than water from that which is
 heavier4 ,but we know exactly what     
species are the one and what the other4 
,and if we meet with a specimen not     
conformable to any known species 7the   
only case in which our previous         
knowledge affords no other guidance than
 the approximate generalization71 we can
 generally make a specific experiment1  
which is a surer resource4  ,it often   
happens1 however1 that the proposition1 
,most ,a are ,b1 is not the ultimatum of
 our scientific progress1 though the    
knowledge we possess beyond it cannot   
conveniently be brought to bear upon the

 particular instance4 ,in such a case we
 know well enough what circumstances    
distinguish the portion of ,a which has 
the attribute ,b from the portion which 
has it not1 but have no means1 or have  
not time1 to examine whether those      
characteristic circumstances exist or   
not in the individual case4 ,this is the
 situation we are generally in when the 
inquiry is of the kind called moral1    
that is1 of the kind which has in view  
to predict human actions4 ,to enable us 
to affirm anything universally          
concerning the actions of classes of    
human beings1 the classification must be
 grounded on the circumstances of their 
mental culture and habits1 which in an  
individual case are seldom exactly      
known2 and classes grounded on these    
distinctions would never precisely      
accord with those into which mankind are
 divided for social purposes4 ,all      
propositions which can be framed        
respecting the actions of human beings  
as ordinarily classified1 or as         

classified according to any kind of     
outward indications1 are merely         
approximate4 ,we can only say1 ,most    
persons of a particular age1 profession1
 country1 or rank in society1 have such 
and such qualities2 or1 ,most persons   
when placed in certain circumstances act
 in such and such a way4 ,not that we do
 not often know well enough on what     
causes the qualities depend1 or what    
sort of persons they are who act in that
 particular way2 but we have seldom the 
means of knowing whether any individual 
person has been under the influence of  
those causes1 or is a person of that    
particular sort4 ,we could replace the  
approximate generalizations by          
propositions universally true2 but these
 would hardly ever be capable of being  
applied to practice4 ,we should be sure 
of our majors1 but we should not be able
 to get minors to fit3 we are forced1   
therefore1 to draw our conclusions from 
coarser and more fallible indications4  
#d4 ,proceeding now to consider1 what is

 to be regarded as sufficient evidence  
of an approximate generalization2 we can
 have no difficulty in at once          
recognising that when admissible at all1
 it is admissible only as an empirical  
law4 ,propositions of the form1 ,every  
,a is ,b1 are not necessarily laws of   
causation1 or ultimate uniformities of  
coexistence2 propositions like ,most ,a 
are ,b cannot be so4 ,propositions      
hitherto found true in every observed   
instance1 may yet be no necessary       
consequence of laws of causation1 or of 
ultimate uniformities1 and unless they  
are so1 may1 for aught we know1 be false
 beyond the limits of actual            
observation3 still more evidently must  
this be the case with propositions which
 are only true in a mere majority of the
 observed instances4  ,there is some    
difference1 however1 in the degree of   
certainty of the proposition1 ,most ,a  
are ,b1 according as that approximate   
generalization composes the whole of our
 knowledge of the subject1 or not4      

,suppose1 first1 that the former is the 
case4 ,we know only that most ,a are ,b1
 not why they are so1 nor in what       
respect those which are1 differ from    
those which are not4 ,how then did we   
learn that most ,a are ,b8 ,precisely in
 the manner in which we should have     
learnt1 had such happened to be the     
fact1 that all ,a are ,b4 ,we collected 
a number of instances sufficient to     
eliminate chance1 and having done so1   
compared the number of instances in the 
affirmative with the number in the      
negative4 ,the result1 like other       
unresolved derivative laws1 can be      
relied on solely within the limits not  
only of place and time1 but also of     
circumstance1 under which its truth has 
been actually observed2 for as we are   
supposed to be ignorant of the causes   
which make the proposition true1 we     
cannot tell in what manner any new      
circumstance might perhaps affect it4   
,the proposition1 ,most judges are      
inaccessible to bribes1 would be found  

true of ,englishmen1 ,frenchmen1        
,germans1 ,north ,americans1 and so     
forth2 but if on this evidence alone we 
extended the assertion to ,orientals1 we
 should step beyond the limits1 not only
 of place but of circumstance1 within   
which the fact had been observed1 and   
should let in possibilities of the      
absence of the determining causes1 or   
the presence of counteracting ones1     
which might be fatal to the approximate 
generalization4  ,in the case where the 
approximate proposition is not the      
ultimatum of our scientific knowledge1  
but only the most available form of it  
for practical guidance2 where we know1  
not only that most ,a have the attribute
 ,b1 but also the causes of ,b1 or some 
properties by which the portion of ,a   
which has that attribute is             
distinguished from the portion which has
 it not2 we are rather more favourably  
situated than in the preceding case4    
,for we have now a double mode of       
ascertaining whether it be true that    

most ,a are ,b2 the direct mode1 as     
before1 and an indirect one1 that of    
examining whether the proposition admits
 of being deduced from the known cause1 
or from any known criterion1 of ,b4 ,let
 the question1 for example1 be whether  
most ,scotchmen can read8 ,we may not   
have observed1 or received the testimony
 of others respecting1 a sufficient     
number and variety of ,scotchmen to     
ascertain this fact2 but when we        
consider that the cause of being able to
 read is the having been taught it1     
another mode of determining the question
 presents itself1 namely1 by inquiring  
whether most ,scotchmen have been sent  
to schools where reading is effectually 
taught4 ,of these two modes1 sometimes  
one and sometimes the other is the more 
available4 ,in some cases1 the frequency
 of the effect is the more accessible to
 that extensive and varied observation  
which is indispensable to the           
establishment of an empirical law2 at   
other times1 the frequency of the       

causes1 or of some collateral           
indications4 ,it commonly happens that  
neither is susceptible of so            
satisfactory an induction as could be   
desired1 and that the grounds on which  
the conclusion is received are          
compounded of both4 ,thus a person may  
believe that most ,scotchmen can read1  
because1 so far as his information      
extends1 most ,scotchmen have been sent 
to school1 and most ,scotch schools     
teach reading effectually2 and also     
because most of the ,scotchmen whom he  
has known or heard of1 could read2      
though neither of these two sets of     
observations may by itself fulfil the   
necessary conditions of extent and      
variety4  ,although the approximate     
generalization may in most cases be     
indispensable for our guidance1 even    
when we know the cause1 or some certain 
mark1 of the attribute predicated2 it   
needs hardly be observed that we may    
always replace the uncertain indication 
by a certain one1 in any case in which  

we can actually recognise the existence 
of the cause or mark4 ,for example1 an  
assertion is made by a witness1 and the 
question is1 whether to believe it4 ,if 
we do not look to any of the individual 
circumstances of the case1 we have      
nothing to direct us but the approximate
 generalization1 that truth is more     
common than falsehood1 or1 in other     
words1 that most persons1 on most       
occasions1 speak truth4 ,but if we      
consider in what circumstances the cases
 where truth is spoken differ from those
 in which it is not1 we find1 for       
instance1 the following3 the witness's  
being an honest person or not2 his being
 an accurate observer or not2 his having
 an interest to serve in the matter or  
not4 ,now1 not only may we be able to   
obtain other approximate generalizations
 respecting the degree of frequency of  
these various possibilities1 but we may 
know which of them is positively        
realized in the individual case4 ,that  
the witness has or has not an interest  

to serve1 we perhaps know directly2 and 
the other two points indirectly1 by     
means of marks2 as1 for example1 from   
his conduct on some former occasion2 or 
from his reputation1 which1 though a    
very uncertain mark1 affords an         
approximate generalization 7as1 for     
instance1 ,most persons who are believed
 to be honest by those with whom they   
have had frequent dealings1 are really  
so7 which approaches nearer to an       
universal truth than the approximate    
general proposition with which we set   
out1 viz4 ,most persons on most         
occasions speak truth4  ,as it seems    
unnecessary to dwell further on the     
question of the evidence of approximate 
generalizations1 we shall proceed to a  
not less important topic1 that of the   
cautions to be observed in arguing from 
these incompletely universal            
propositions to particular cases4    #e4
 ,so far as regards the direct          
application of an approximate           
generalization to an individual         

instance1 this question presents no     
difficulty4 ,if the proposition1 ,most  
,a are ,b1 has been established1 by a   
sufficient induction1 as an empirical   
law1 we may conclude that any particular
 ,a is ,b with a probability            
proportioned to the preponderance of the
 number of affirmative instances over   
the number of exceptions4 ,if it has    
been found practicable to attain        
numerical precision in the data1 a      
corresponding degree of precision may be
 given to the evaluation of the chances 
of error in the conclusion4 ,if it can  
be established as an empirical law that 
nine out of every ten ,a are ,b1 there  
will be one chance in ten of error in   
assuming that any ,a1 not individually  
known to us1 is a ,b3 but this of course
 holds only within the limits of time1  
place1 and circumstance1 embraced in the
 observations1 and therefore cannot be  
counted on for any sub-class or variety 
of ,a 7or for ,a in any set of external 
circumstances7 which were not included  

in the average4 ,it must be added1 that 
we can guide ourselves by the           
proposition1 ,nine out of every ten ,a  
are ,b1 only in cases of which we know  
nothing except that they fall within the
 class ,a4 ,for if we know1 of any      
particular instance i1 not only that it 
falls under ,a1 but to what species or  
variety of ,a it belongs1 we shall      
generally err in applying to i the      
average struck for the whole genus1 from
 which the average corresponding to that
 species alone would1 in all            
probability1 materially differ4 ,and so 
if i1 instead of being a particular sort
 of instance1 is an instance known to be
 under the influence of a particular set
 of circumstances4 ,the presumption     
drawn from the numerical proportions in 
the whole genus would probably1 in such 
a case1 only mislead4 ,a general average
 should only be applied to cases which  
are neither known1 nor can be presumed1 
to be other than average cases4 ,such   
averages1 therefore1 are commonly of    

little use for the practical guidance of
 any affairs but those which concern    
large numbers4 ,tables of the chances of
 life are useful to insurance offices1  
but they go a very little way towards   
informing any one of the chances of his 
own life1 or any other life in which he 
is interested1 since almost every life  
is either better or worse than the      
average4 ,such averages can only be     
considered as supplying the first term  
in a series of approximations2 the      
subsequent terms proceeding on an       
appreciation of the circumstances       
belonging to the particular case4    #f4
 ,from the application of a single      
approximate generalization to individual
 cases1 we proceed to the application of
 two or more of them together to the    
same case4  ,when a judgment applied to 
an individual instance is grounded on   
two approximate generalizations taken in
 conjunction1 the propositions may      
co-operate towards the result in two    
different ways4 ,in the one1 each       

proposition is separately applicable to 
the case in hand1 and our object in     
combining them is to give to the        
conclusion in that particular case the  
double probability arising from the two 
propositions separately4 ,this may be   
called joining two probabilities by way 
of ,addition2 and the result is a       
probability greater than either4 ,the   
other mode is1 when only one of the     
propositions is directly applicable to  
the case1 the second being only         
applicable to it by virtue of the       
application of the first4 ,this is      
joining two probabilities by way of     
,ratiocination or ,deduction2 the result
 of which is a less probability than    
either4 ,the type of the first argument 
is1 ,most ,a are ,b2 most ,c are ,b2    
this thing is both an ,a and a ,c2      
therefore it is probably a ,b4 ,the type
 of the second is1 ,most ,a are ,b2 most
 ,c are ,a2 this is a ,c2 therefore it  
is probably an ,a1 therefore it is      
probably a ,b4 ,the first is exemplified

 when we prove a fact by the testimony  
of two unconnected witnesses2 the       
second1 when we adduce only the         
testimony of one witness that he has    
heard the thing asserted by another4 ,or
 again1 in the first mode it may be     
argued that the accused committed the   
crime1 because he concealed himself1 and
 because his clothes were stained with  
blood2 in the second1 that he committed 
it because he washed or destroyed his   
clothes1 which is supposed to render it 
probable that they were stained with    
blood4 ,instead of only two links1 as in
 these instances1 we may suppose chains 
of any length4 ,a chain of the former   
kind was termed by ,bentham#ce a        
self-corroborative chain of evidence2   
the second1 a self-infirmative chain4   
,when approximate generalizations are   
joined by way of addition1 we may deduce
 from the theory of probabilities laid  
down in a former chapter1 in what manner
 each of them adds to the probability of
 a conclusion which has the warrant of  

them all4  ,in the early editions of    
this treatise1 the joint probability    
arising from the sum of two independent 
probabilities was estimated in the      
following manner4 ,if1 on an average1   
two of every three ,as are ,bs1 and     
three of every four ,cs are ,bs1 the    
probability that something which is both
 an ,a and a ,c is a ,b1 will be more   
than two in three1 or than three in     
four4 ,of every twelve things which are 
,as1 all except four are ,bs by the     
supposition2 and if the whole twelve1   
and consequently those four1 have the   
characters of ,c likewise1 three of     
these will be ,bs on that ground4       
,therefore1 out of twelve which are both
 ,as and ,cs1 eleven are ,bs4 ,to state 
the argument in another way2 a thing    
which is both an ,a and a ,c1 but which 
is not a ,b1 is found in only one of    
three sections of the class ,a1 and in  
only one of four sections of the class  
,c2 but this fourth of ,c being spread  
over the whole of ,a indiscriminately1  

only one-third part of it 7or           
one-twelfth of the whole number7 belongs
 to the third section of ,a2 therefore a
 thing which is not a ,b occurs only    
once1 among twelve things which are both
 ,as and ,cs4 ,the argument would in the
 language of the doctrine of chances1 be
 thus expressed3 the chance that an ,a  
is not a ,b is #a_/c1 the chance that a 
,c is not a ,b is #a_/d2 hence if the   
thing be both an ,a and a ,c1 the chance
 is #a_/c of #a_/d  #a_/ab4  ,it has1   
however1 been pointed out to me by a    
mathematical friend1 that in this       
statement the evaluation of the chances 
is erroneous4 ,the correct mode of      
setting out the possibilities is as     
follows4 ,if the thing 7let us call it  
,t7 which is both an ,a and a ,c1 is a  
,b1 something is true which is only true
 twice in every thrice1 and something   
else which is only true thrice in every 
four times4 ,the first fact being true  
eight times in twelve1 and the second   
being true six times in every eight1 and

 consequently six times in those eight2 
both facts will be true only six times  
in twelve4 ,on the other hand if ,t1    
although it is both an ,a and a ,c1 is  
not a ,b1 something is true which is    
only true once in every thrice1 and     
something else which is only true once  
in every four times4 ,the former being  
true four times out of twelve1 and the  
latter once in every four1 and therefore
 once in those four2 both are only true 
in one case out of twelve4 ,so that ,t  
is a ,b six times in twelve1 and ,t is  
not a ,b1 only once3 making the         
comparative probabilities1 not eleven to
 one1 as ,i had previously made them1   
but six to one4  ,it may be asked1 what 
happens in the remaining cases8 since in
 this calculation seven out of twelve   
cases seem to have exhausted the        
possibilities4 ,if ,t is a ,b in only   
six cases of every twelve1 and a not-,b 
in only one1 what is it in the other    
five8 ,the only supposition remaining   
for those cases is that it is neither a 

,b nor not a ,b1 which is impossible4   
,but this impossibility merely proves   
that the state of things supposed in the
 hypothesis does not exist in those     
cases4 ,they are cases that do not      
furnish anything which is both an ,a and
 a ,c4  ,to make this intelligible1 we  
will substitute for our symbols a       
concrete case4 ,let there be two        
witnesses1 ,m and ,n1 whose             
probabilities of veracity correspond    
with the ratios of the preceding        
example3 ,m speaks truth twice in every 
thrice1 ,n thrice in every four times4  
,the question is1 what is the           
probability that a statement1 in which  
they both concur1 will be true4 ,the    
cases may be classed as follows4 ,both  
the witnesses will speak truly six in   
every twelve times2 both falsely once in
 twelve times4 ,therefore1 if they both 
agree in an assertion1 it will be true  
six times1 for once that it will be     
false4 ,what happens in the remaining   
cases is here evident2 there will be    

five cases in every twelve in which the 
witnesses will not agree4 ,m will speak 
truth and ,n falsehood in two cases of  
every twelve2 ,n will speak truth and ,m
 falsehood in three cases1 making in all
 five4 ,in these cases1 however1 the    
witnesses will not agree in their       
testimony4 ,but disagreement between    
them is excluded by the supposition4    
,there are1 therefore1 only seven cases 
which are within the conditions of the  
hypothesis2 of which seven1 veracity    
exists in six1 and falsehood in one4    
,resuming our former symbols1 in five   
cases out of twelve ,t is not both an ,a
 and a ,c1 but an ,a only1 or a ,c only4
 ,the cases in which it is both are only
 seven1 in six of which it is a ,b1 in  
one not a ,b1 making the chance six to  
one1 or #f_/g and #a_/g respectively4   
,in this correct1 as in the former      
incorrect computation1 it is of course  
presupposed that the probabilities      
arising from ,a and ,c are independent  
of each other4 ,there must not be any   

such connexion between ,a and ,c1 that  
when a thing belongs to the one class it
 will therefore belong to the other1 or 
even have a greater chance of doing so4 
,otherwise the not-,bs which are ,cs may
 be1 most or even all of them1 identical
 with the not-,bs which are ,as2 in     
which last case the probability arising 
from ,a and ,c together will be no      
greater than that arising from ,a alone4
  ,when approximate generalizations are 
joined together in the other mode1 that 
of deduction1 the degree of probability 
of the inference1 instead of increasing1
 diminishes at each step4 ,from two such
 premises as ,most ,a are ,b1 ,most ,b  
are ,c1 we cannot with certainty        
conclude that even a single ,a is ,c2   
for the whole of the portion of ,a which
 in any way falls under ,b1 may perhaps 
be comprised in the exceptional part of 
it4 ,still1 the two propositions in     
question afford an appreciable          
probability that any given ,a is ,c1    
provided the average on which the second

 proposition is grounded1 was taken     
fairly with reference to the first2     
provided the proposition1 ,most ,b are  
,c1 was arrived at in a manner leaving  
no suspicion that the probability       
arising from it is otherwise than fairly
 distributed over the section of ,b     
which belongs to ,a4 ,for though the    
instances which are ,a may be all in the
 minority1 they may1 also1 be all in the
 majority2 and the one possibility is to
 be set against the other4 ,on the      
whole1 the probability arising from the 
two propositions taken together1 will be
 correctly measured by the probability  
arising from the one1 abated in the     
ratio of that arising from the other4   
,if nine out of ten ,swedes have light  
hair1 and eight out of nine inhabitants 
of ,stockholm are ,swedes1 the          
probability arising from these two      
propositions1 that any given inhabitant 
of ,stockholm is light-haired1 will     
amount to eight in ten2 though it is    
rigorously possible that the whole      

,swedish population of ,stockholm might 
belong to that tenth section of the     
people of ,sweden who are an exception  
to the rest4  ,if the premises are known
 to be true not of a bare majority1 but 
of nearly the whole1 of their respective
 subjects1 we may go on joining one such
 proposition to another for several     
steps1 before we reach a conclusion not 
presumably true even of a majority4 ,the
 error of the conclusion will amount to 
the aggregate of the errors of all the  
premises4 ,let the proposition1 ,most ,a
 are ,b1 be true of nine in ten2 ,most  
,b are ,c1 of eight in nine3 then not   
only will one ,a in ten not be ,c1      
because not ,b1 but even of the         
nine-tenths which are ,b1 only          
eight-ninths will be ,c3 that is1 the   
cases of ,a which are ,c will be only   
#h_/i of #i_/aj1 or four-fifths4 ,let us
 now add ,most ,c are ,d1 and suppose   
this to be true of seven cases out of   
eight2 the proportion of ,a which is ,d 
will be only #g_/h of #h_/i of #i_/aj1  

or #g_/aj4 ,thus the probability        
progressively dwindles4 ,the experience1
 however1 on which our approximate      
generalizations are grounded1 has so    
rarely been subjected to1 or admits of1 
accurate numerical estimation1 that we  
cannot in general apply any measurement 
to the diminution of probability which  
takes place at each illation2 but must  
be content with remembering that it does
 diminish at every step1 and that unless
 the premises approach very nearly      
indeed to being universally true1 the   
conclusion after a very few steps is    
worth nothing4 ,a hearsay of a hearsay1 
or an argument from presumptive evidence
 depending not on immediate marks but on
 marks of marks1 is worthless at a very 
few removes from the first stage4    #g4
 ,there are1 however1 two cases in which
 reasonings depending on approximate    
generalizations may be carried to any   
length we please with as much assurance1
 and are as strictly scientific1 as if  
they were composed of universal laws of 

nature4 ,but these cases are exceptions 
of the sort which are currently said to 
prove the rule4 ,the approximate        
generalizations are as suitable1 in the 
cases in question1 for purposes of      
ratiocination1 as if they were complete 
generalizations1 because they are       
capable of being transformed into       
complete generalizations exactly        
equivalent4  ,first3 ,if the approximate
 generalization is of the class in which
 our reason for stopping at the         
approximation is not the impossibility1 
but only the inconvenience1 of going    
further2 if we are cognizant of the     
character which distinguishes the cases 
that accord with the generalization from
 those which are exceptions to it2 we   
may then substitute for the approximate 
proposition1 an universal proposition   
with a proviso4 ,the proposition1 ,most 
persons who have uncontrolled power     
employ it ill1 is a generalization of   
this class1 and may be transformed into 
the following3--,all persons who have   

uncontrolled power employ it ill1       
provided they are not persons of unusual
 strength of judgment and rectitude of  
purpose4 ,the proposition1 carrying the 
hypothesis or proviso with it1 may then 
be dealt with no longer as an           
approximate1 but as an universal        
proposition2 and to whatever number of  
steps the reasoning may reach1 the      
hypothesis1 being carried forward to the
 conclusion1 will exactly indicate how  
far that conclusion is from being       
applicable universally4 ,if in the      
course of the argument other approximate
 generalizations are introduced1 each of
 them being in like manner expressed as 
an universal proposition with a         
condition annexed1 the sum of all the   
conditions will appear at the end as the
 sum of all the errors which affect the 
conclusion4 ,thus1 to the proposition   
last cited1 let us add the              
following3--,all absolute monarchs have 
uncontrolled power1 unless their        
position is such that they need the     

active support of their subjects 7as was
 the case with ,queen ,elizabeth1       
,frederick of ,prussia1 and others74    
,combining these two propositions1 we   
can deduce from them an universal       
conclusion1 which will be subject to    
both the hypotheses in the premises2    
,all absolute monarchs employ their     
power ill1 unless their position makes  
them need the active support of their   
subjects1 or unless they are persons of 
unusual strength of judgment and        
rectitude of purpose4 ,it is of no      
consequence how rapidly the errors in   
our premises accumulate1 if we are able 
in this manner to record each error1 and
 keep an account of the aggregate as it 
swells up4  ,secondly3 there is a case  
in which approximate propositions1 even 
without our taking note of the          
conditions under which they are not true
 of individual cases1 are yet1 for the  
purposes of science1 universal ones2    
namely1 in the inquiries which relate to
 the properties not of individuals1 but 

of multitudes4 ,the principal of these  
is the science of politics1 or of human 
society4 ,this science is principally   
concerned with the actions not of       
solitary individuals1 but of masses2    
with the fortunes not of single persons1
 but of communities4  ,for the          
statesman1 therefore1 it is generally   
enough to know that most persons act or 
are acted upon in a particular way2     
since his speculations and his practical
 arrangements refer almost exclusively  
to cases in which the whole community1  
or some large portion of it1 is acted   
upon at once1 and in which1 therefore1  
what is done or felt by most persons    
determines the result produced by or    
upon the body at large4 ,he can get on  
well enough with approximate            
generalizations on human nature1 since  
what is true approximately of all       
individuals is true absolutely of all   
masses4 ,and even when the operations of
 individual men have a part to play in  
his deductions1 as when he is reasoning 

of kings1 or other single rulers1 still1
 as he is providing for indefinite      
duration1 involving an indefinite       
succession of such individuals1 he must 
in general both reason and act as if    
what is true of most persons were true  
of all4  ,the two kinds of              
considerations above adduced are a      
sufficient refutation of the popular    
error1 that speculations on society and 
government1 as resting on merely        
probable evidence1 must be inferior in  
certainty and scientific accuracy to the
 conclusions of what are called the     
exact sciences1 and less to be relied on
 in practice4 ,there are reasons enough 
why the moral sciences must remain      
inferior to at least the more perfect of
 the physical3 why the laws of their    
more complicated phenomena cannot be so 
completely deciphered1 nor the phenomena
 predicted with the same degree of      
assurance4 ,but though we cannot attain 
to so many truths1 there is no reason   
that those we can attain should deserve 

less reliance1 or have less of a        
scientific character4 ,of this topic1   
however1 ,i shall treat more            
systematically in the concluding ,book1 
to which place any further consideration
 of it must be deferred4     ,,chapter  
,,xxiv4  ,,of ,,the ,,remaining ,,laws  
,,of ,,nature4    #a4 ,in the ,first    
,book1 we found that all the assertions 
which can be conveyed by language1      
express some one or more of five        
different things3 ,existence2 ,order in 
,place2 ,order in ,time2 ,causation2 and
 ,resemblance4#cf ,of these1 ,causation1
 in our view of the subject1 not being  
fundamentally different from ,order in  
,time1 the five species of possible     
assertions are reduced to four4 ,the    
propositions which affirm ,order in     
,time1 in either of its two modes1      
,coexistence and ,succession1 have      
formed1 thus far1 the subject of the    
present ,book4 ,and we have now         
concluded the exposition1 so far as it  
falls within the limits assigned to this

 work1 of the nature of the evidence on 
which these propositions rest1 and the  
processes of investigation by which they
 are ascertained and proved4 ,there     
remain three classes of facts3          
,existence1 ,order in ,place1 and       
,resemblance2 in regard to which the    
same questions are now to be resolved4  
,regarding the first of these1 very     
little needs be said4 ,existence in     
general1 is a subject not for our       
science1 but for metaphysics4 ,to       
determine what things can be recognised 
as really existing1 independently of our
 own sensible or other impressions1 and 
in what meaning the term is1 in that    
case1 predicated of them1 belongs to the
 consideration of ,things in themselves1
 from which1 throughout this work1 we   
have as much as possible kept aloof4    
,existence1 so far as ,logic is         
concerned about it1 has reference only  
to phenomena2 to actual1 or possible1   
states of external or internal          
consciousness1 in ourselves or others4  

,feelings of sensitive beings1 or       
possibilities of having such feelings1  
are the only things the existence of    
which can be a subject of logical       
induction1 because the only things of   
which the existence in individual cases 
can be a subject of experience4  ,it is 
true that a thing is said by us to      
exist1 even when it is absent1 and      
therefore is not and cannot be          
perceived4 ,but even then1 its existence
 is to us only another word for our     
conviction that we should perceive it on
 a certain supposition2 namely1 if we   
were in the needful circumstances of    
time and place1 and endowed with the    
needful perfection of organs4 ,my belief
 that the ,emperor of ,china exists1 is 
simply my belief that if ,i were        
transported to the imperial palace or   
some other locality in ,pekin1 ,i should
 see him4 ,my belief that ,julius ,csar 
existed1 is my belief that ,i should    
have seen him if ,i had been present in 
the field of ,pharsalia1 or in the      

senate-house at ,rome4 ,when ,i believe 
that stars exist beyond the utmost range
 of my vision1 though assisted by the   
most powerful telescopes yet invented1  
my belief1 philosophically expressed1   
is1 that with still better telescopes1  
if such existed1 ,i could see them1 or  
that they may be perceived by beings    
less remote from them in space1 or whose
 capacities of perception are superior  
to mine4  ,the existence1 therefore1 of 
a phenomenon1 is but another word for   
its being perceived1 or for the inferred
 possibility of perceiving it4 ,when the
 phenomenon is within the range of      
present observation1 by present         
observation we assure ourselves of its  
existence2 when it is beyond that range1
 and is therefore said to be absent1 we 
infer its existence from marks or       
evidences4 ,but what can these evidences
 be8 ,other phenomena2 ascertained by   
induction to be connected with the given
 phenomenon1 either in the way of       
succession or of coexistence4 ,the      

simple existence1 therefore1 of an      
individual phenomenon1 when not directly
 perceived1 is inferred from some       
inductive law of succession or          
coexistence3 and is consequently not    
amenable to any peculiar inductive      
principles4 ,we prove the existence of a
 thing1 by proving that it is connected 
by succession or coexistence with some  
known thing4  ,with respect to general  
propositions of this class1 that is1    
which affirm the bare fact of existence1
 they have a peculiarity which renders  
the logical treatment of them a very    
easy matter2 they are generalizations   
which are sufficiently proved by a      
single instance4 ,that ghosts1 or       
unicorns1 or sea-serpents exist1 would  
be fully established if it could be     
ascertained positively that such things 
had been even once seen4 ,whatever has  
once happened1 is capable of happening  
again2 the only question relates to the 
conditions under which it happens4  ,so 
far1 therefore1 as relates to simple    

existence1 the ,inductive ,logic has no 
knots to untie4 ,and we may proceed to  
the remaining two of the great classes  
into which facts have been divided2     
,resemblance1 and ,order in ,space4     
#b4 ,resemblance and its opposite1      
except in the case in which they assume 
the names of ,equality and ,inequality1 
are seldom regarded as subjects of      
science2 they are supposed to be        
perceived by simple apprehension2 by    
merely applying our senses or directing 
our attention to the two objects at     
once1 or in immediate succession4 ,and  
this simultaneous1 or virtually         
simultaneous1 application of our        
faculties to the two things which are to
 be compared1 does necessarily          
constitute the ultimate appeal1 wherever
 such application is practicable4 ,but1 
in most cases1 it is not practicable3   
the objects cannot be brought so close  
together that the feeling of their      
resemblance 7at least a complete feeling
 of it7 directly arises in the mind4 ,we

 can only compare each of them with some
 third object1 capable of being         
transported from one to the other4 ,and 
besides1 even when the objects can be   
brought into immediate juxtaposition1   
their resemblance or difference is but  
imperfectly known to us1 unless we have 
compared them minutely1 part by part4   
,until this has been done1 things in    
reality very dissimilar often appear    
undistinguishably alike4 ,two lines of  
very unequal length will appear about   
equal when lying in different           
directions2 but place them parallel1    
with their farther extremities even1 and
 if we look at the nearer extremities1  
their inequality becomes a matter of    
direct perception4  ,to ascertain       
whether1 and in what1 two phenomena     
resemble or differ1 is not always1      
therefore1 so easy a thing as it might  
at first appear4 ,when the two cannot be
 brought into juxtaposition1 or not so  
that the observer is able to compare    
their several parts in detail1 he must  

employ the indirect means of reasoning  
and general propositions4 ,when we      
cannot bring two straight lines         
together1 to determine whether they are 
equal1 we do it by the physical aid of a
 foot rule applied first to one and then
 to the other1 and the logical aid of   
the general proposition or formula1     
,things which are equal to the same     
thing are equal to one another4 ,the    
comparison of two things through the    
intervention of a third thing1 when     
their direct comparison is impossible1  
is the appropriate scientific process   
for ascertaining resemblances and       
dissimilarities1 and is the sum total of
 what ,logic has to teach on the        
subject4  ,an undue extension of this   
remark induced ,locke to consider       
reasoning itself as nothing but the     
comparison of two ideas through the     
medium of a third1 and knowledge as the 
perception of the agreement or          
disagreement of two ideas3 doctrines    
which the ,condillac school blindly     

adopted1 without the qualifications and 
distinctions with which they were       
studiously guarded by their illustrious 
author4 ,where1 indeed1 the agreement or
 disagreement 7otherwise called         
resemblance or dissimilarity7 of any two
 things is the very matter to be        
determined1 as is the case particularly 
in the sciences of quantity and         
extension2 there1 the process by which a
 solution1 if not attainable by direct  
perception1 must be indirectly sought1  
consists in comparing these two things  
through the medium of a third4 ,but this
 is far from being true of all          
inquiries4 ,the knowledge that bodies   
fall to the ground is not a perception  
of agreement or disagreement1 but of a  
series of physical occurrences1 a       
succession of sensations4 ,locke's      
definitions of knowledge and of         
reasoning required to be limited to our 
knowledge of1 and reasoning about1      
resemblances4 ,nor1 even when thus      
restricted1 are the propositions        

strictly correct2 since the comparison  
is not made1 as he represents1 between  
the ideas of the two phenomena1 but     
between the phenomena themselves4 ,this 
mistake has been pointed out in an      
earlier part of our inquiry1#cg and we  
traced it to an imperfect conception of 
what takes place in mathematics1 where  
very often the comparison is really made
 between the ideas1 without any appeal  
to the outward senses2 only1 however1   
because in mathematics a comparison of  
the ideas is strictly equivalent to a   
comparison of the phenomena themselves4 
,where1 as in the case of numbers1      
lines1 and figures1 our idea of an      
object is a complete picture of the     
object1 so far as respects the matter in
 hand2 we can1 of course1 learn from the
 picture1 whatever could be learnt from 
the object itself by mere contemplation 
of it as it exists at the particular    
instant when the picture is taken4 ,no  
mere contemplation of gunpowder would   
ever teach us that a spark would make it

 explode1 nor1 consequently1 would the  
contemplation of the idea of gunpowder  
do so3 but the mere contemplation of a  
straight line shows that it cannot      
inclose a space3 accordingly the        
contemplation of the idea of it will    
show the same4 ,what takes place in     
mathematics is thus no argument that the
 comparison is between the ideas only4  
,it is always1 either indirectly or     
directly1 a comparison of the phenomena4
  ,in cases in which we cannot bring the
 phenomena to the test of direct        
inspection at all1 or not in a manner   
sufficiently precise1 but must judge of 
their resemblance by inference from     
other resemblances or dissimilarities   
more accessible to observation1 we of   
course require1 as in all cases of      
ratiocination1 generalizations or formul
 applicable to the subject4 ,we must    
reason from laws of nature2 from the    
uniformities which are observable in the
 fact of likeness or unlikeness4    #c4 
,of these laws or uniformities1 the most

 comprehensive are those supplied by    
mathematics2 the axioms relating to     
equality1 inequality1 and               
proportionality1 and the various        
theorems thereon founded4 ,and these are
 the only ,laws of ,resemblance which   
require to be1 or which can be1 treated 
apart4 ,it is true there are innumerable
 other theorems which affirm            
resemblances among phenomena2 as that   
the angle of the reflection of light is 
equal to its angle of incidence         
7equality being merely exact resemblance
 in magnitude74 ,again1 that the        
heavenly bodies describe equal areas in 
equal times2 and that their periods of  
revolution are proportional 7another    
species of resemblance7 to the          
sesquiplicate powers of their distances 
from the centre of force4 ,these and    
similar propositions affirm             
resemblances1 of the same nature with   
those asserted in the theorems of       
mathematics2 but the distinction is1    
that the propositions of mathematics are

 true of all phenomena whatever1 or at  
least without distinction of origin2    
while the truths in question are        
affirmed only of special phenomena1     
which originate in a certain way2 and   
the equalities1 proportionalities1 or   
other resemblances1 which exist between 
such phenomena1 must necessarily be     
either derived from1 or identical with1 
the law of their origin--the law of     
causation on which they depend4 ,the    
equality of the areas described in equal
 times by the planets1 is derived from  
the laws of the causes2 and1 until its  
derivation was shown1 it was an         
empirical law4 ,the equality of the     
angles of reflexion and incidence is    
identical with the law of the cause2 for
 the cause is the incidence of a ray of 
light upon a reflecting surface1 and the
 equality in question is the very law   
according to which that cause produces  
its effects4 ,this class1 therefore1 of 
the uniformities of resemblance between 
phenomena1 are inseparable1 in fact and 

in thought1 from the laws of the        
production of those phenomena3 and the  
principles of induction applicable to   
them are no other than those of which we
 have treated in the preceding chapters 
of this ,book4  ,it is otherwise with   
the truths of mathematics4 ,the laws of 
equality and inequality between spaces1 
or between numbers1 have no connexion   
with laws of causation4 ,that the angle 
of reflexion is equal to the angle of   
incidence1 is a statement of the mode of
 action of a particular cause2 but that 
when two straight lines intersect each  
other the opposite angles are equal1 is 
true of all such lines and angles1 by   
whatever cause produced4 ,that the      
squares of the periodic times of the    
planets are proportional to the cubes of
 their distances from the sun1 is an    
uniformity derived from the laws of the 
causes 7or forces7 which produce the    
planetary motions2 but that the square  
of any number is four times the square  
of half the number1 is true             

independently of any cause4 ,the only   
laws of resemblance1 therefore1 which we
 are called upon to consider            
independently of causation1 belong to   
the province of mathematics4    #d4 ,the
 same thing is evident with respect to  
the only one remaining of our five      
categories1 ,order in ,place4 ,the order
 in place1 of the effects of a cause1 is
 7like everything else belonging to the 
effects7 a consequence of the laws of   
that cause4 ,the order in place1 or1 as 
we have termed it1 the collocation1 of  
the primeval causes1 is 7as well as     
their resemblance7 in each instance an  
ultimate fact1 in which no laws or      
uniformities are traceable4 ,the only   
remaining general propositions          
respecting order in place1 and the only 
ones which have nothing to do with      
causation1 are some of the truths of    
geometry2 laws through which we are     
able1 from the order in place of certain
 points1 lines1 or spaces1 to infer the 
order in place of others which are      

connected with the former in some known 
mode2 quite independently of the        
particular nature of those points1      
lines1 or spaces1 in any other respect  
than position or magnitude1 as well as  
independently of the physical cause from
 which in any particular case they      
happen to derive their origin4  ,it thus
 appears that mathematics is the only   
department of science into the methods  
of which it still remains to inquire4   
,and there is the less necessity that   
this inquiry should occupy us long1 as  
we have already1 in the ,second ,book1  
made considerable progress in it4 ,we   
there remarked1 that the directly       
inductive truths of mathematics are few 
in number2 consisting of the axioms1    
together with certain propositions      
concerning existence1 tacitly involved  
in most of the so-called definitions4   
,and we gave what appeared conclusive   
reasons for affirming that these        
original premises1 from which the       
remaining truths of the science are     

deduced1 are1 notwithstanding all       
appearances to the contrary1 results of 
observation and experience2 founded1 in 
short1 on the evidence of the senses4   
,that things equal to the same thing are
 equal to one another1 and that two     
straight lines which have once          
intersected one another continue to     
diverge1 are inductive truths2 resting1 
indeed1 like the law of universal       
causation1 only on induction per        
enumerationem simplicem2 on the fact    
that they have been perpetually         
perceived to be true1 and never once    
found to be false4 ,but1 as we have seen
 in a recent chapter that this evidence1
 in the case of a law so completely     
universal as the law of causation1      
amounts to the fullest proof1 so is this
 even more evidently true of the general
 propositions to which we are now       
adverting2 because1 as a perception of  
their truth in any individual case      
whatever1 requires only the simple act  
of looking at the objects in a proper   

position1 there never could have been in
 their case 7what1 for a long period1   
there were in the case of the law of    
causation7 instances which were         
apparently1 though not really1          
exceptions to them4 ,their infallible   
truth was recognised from the very dawn 
of speculation2 and as their extreme    
familiarity made it impossible for the  
mind to conceive the objects under any  
other law1 they were1 and still are1    
generally considered as truths          
recognised by their own evidence1 or by 
instinct4    #e4 ,there is something    
which seems to require explanation1 in  
the fact that the immense multitude of  
truths 7a multitude still as far from   
being exhausted as ever7 comprised in   
the mathematical sciences1 can be       
elicited from so small a number of      
elementary laws4 ,one sees not1 at      
first1 how it is that there can be room 
for such an infinite variety of true    
propositions1 on subjects apparently so 
limited4  ,to begin with the science of 

number4 ,the elementary or ultimate     
truths of this science are the common   
axioms concerning equality1 namely1     
,things which are equal to the same     
thing are equal to one another1 and     
,equals added to equals make equal sums1
 7no other axioms are required1#ch7     
together with the definitions of the    
various numbers4 ,like other so-called  
definitions1 these are composed of two  
things1 the explanation of a name1 and  
the assertion of a fact3 of which the   
latter alone can form a first principle 
or premise of a science4 ,the fact      
asserted in the definition of a number  
is a physical fact4 ,each of the numbers
 two1 three1 four1 c41 denotes physical 
phenomena1 and connotes a physical      
property of those phenomena4 ,two1 for  
instance1 denotes all pairs of things1  
and twelve all dozens of things1        
connoting what makes them pairs1 or     
dozens2 and that which makes them so is 
something physical2 since it cannot be  
denied that two apples are physically   

distinguishable from three apples1 two  
horses from one horse1 and so forth3    
that they are a different visible and   
tangible phenomenon4 ,i am not          
undertaking to say what the difference  
is2 it is enough that there is a        
difference of which the senses can take 
cognizance4 ,and although a hundred and 
two horses are not so easily            
distinguished from a hundred and three1 
as two horses are from three--though in 
most positions the senses do not        
perceive any difference--yet they may be
 so placed that a difference will be    
perceptible1 or else we should never    
have distinguished them1 and given them 
different names4 ,weight is confessedly 
a physical property of things2 yet small
 differences between great weights are  
as imperceptible to the senses in most  
situations1 as small differences between
 great numbers2 and are only put in     
evidence by placing the two objects in a
 peculiar position--namely1 in the      
opposite scales of a delicate balance4  

,what1 then1 is that which is connoted  
by a name of number8 ,of course some    
property belonging to the agglomeration 
of things which we call by the name2 and
 that property is1 the characteristic   
manner in which the agglomeration is    
made up of1 and may be separated into1  
parts4 ,i will endeavour to make this   
more intelligible by a few explanations4
  ,when we call a collection of objects 
two1 three1 or four1 they are not two1  
three1 or four in the abstract2 they are
 two1 three1 or four things of some     
particular kind2 pebbles1 horses1       
inches1 pounds weight4 ,what the name of
 number connotes is1 the manner in which
 single objects of the given kind must  
be put together1 in order to produce    
that particular aggregate4 ,if the      
aggregate be of pebbles1 and we call it 
two1 the name implies that1 to compose  
the aggregate1 one pebble must be joined
 to one pebble4 ,if we call it three1   
one and one and one pebble must be      
brought together to produce it1 or else 

one pebble must be joined to an         
aggregate of the kind called two1       
already existing4 ,the aggregate which  
we call four1 has a still greater number
 of characteristic modes of formation4  
,one and one and one and one pebble may 
be brought together2 or two aggregates  
of the kind called two may be united2 or
 one pebble may be added to an aggregate
 of the kind called three4 ,every       
succeeding number in the ascending      
series1 may be formed by the junction of
 smaller numbers in a progressively     
greater variety of ways4 ,even limiting 
the parts to two1 the number may be     
formed1 and consequently may be divided1
 in as many different ways as there are 
numbers smaller than itself2 and1 if we 
admit of threes1 fours1 c41 in a still  
greater variety4 ,other modes of        
arriving at the same aggregate present  
themselves1 not by the union of smaller1
 but by the dismemberment of larger     
aggregates4 ,thus1 three pebbles may be 
formed by taking away one pebble from an

 aggregate of four2 two pebbles1 by an  
equal division of a similar aggregate2  
and so on4  ,every arithmetical         
proposition2 every statement of the     
result of an arithmetical operation2 is 
a statement of one of the modes of      
formation of a given number4 ,it affirms
 that a certain aggregate might have    
been formed by putting together certain 
other aggregates1 or by withdrawing     
certain portions of some aggregate2 and 
that1 by consequence1 we might reproduce
 those aggregates from it1 by reversing 
the process4  ,thus1 when we say that   
the cube of #ab is #agbh1 what we affirm
 is this3 that if1 having a sufficient  
number of pebbles or of any other       
objects1 we put them together into the  
particular sort of parcels or aggregates
 called twelves2 and put together these 
twelves again into similar collections2 
and1 finally1 make up twelve of these   
largest parcels2 the aggregate thus     
formed will be such a one as we call    
#agbh2 namely1 that which 7to take the  

most familiar of its modes of formation7
 may be made by joining the parcel      
called a thousand pebbles1 the parcel   
called seven hundred pebbles1 the parcel
 called twenty pebbles1 and the parcel  
called eight pebbles4  ,the converse    
proposition1 that the cube root of #agbh
 is #ab1 asserts that this large        
aggregate may again be decomposed into  
the twelve twelves of twelves of pebbles
 which it consists of4  ,the modes of   
formation of any number are innumerable2
 but when we know one mode of formation 
of each1 all the rest may be determined 
deductively4 ,if we know that a is      
formed from b and c1 b from a and e1 c  
from d and f1 and so forth1 until we    
have included all the numbers of any    
scale we choose to select1 7taking care 
that for each number the mode of        
formation be really a distinct one1 not 
bringing us round again to the former   
numbers1 but introducing a new number17 
we have a set of propositions from which
 we may reason to all the other modes of

 formation of those numbers from one    
another4 ,having established a chain of 
inductive truths connecting together all
 the numbers of the scale1 we can       
ascertain the formation of any one of   
those numbers from any other by merely  
travelling from one to the other along  
the chain4 ,suppose that we know only   
the following modes of formation3 #f  #d
  #b1 #d  #g - #c1 #g  #e  #b1 #e  #i - 
#d4 ,we could determine how #f may be   
formed from #i4 ,for #f  #d  #b  #g - #c
  #b  #e  #b - #c  #b  #i - #d  #b - #c 
#b4 ,it may therefore be formed by      
taking away #d and #c1 and adding #b and
 #b4 ,if we know besides that #b  #b    
#d1 we obtain #f from #i in a simpler   
mode1 by merely taking away #c4  ,it is 
sufficient1 therefore1 to select one of 
the various modes of formation of each  
number1 as a means of ascertaining all  
the rest4 ,and since things which are   
uniform1 and therefore simple1 are most 
easily received and retained by the     
understanding1 there is an obvious      

advantage in selecting a mode of        
formation which shall be alike for all2 
in fixing the connotation of names of   
number on one uniform principle4 ,the   
mode in which our existing numerical    
nomenclature is contrived possesses this
 advantage1 with the additional one1    
that it happily conveys to the mind two 
of the modes of formation of every      
number4 ,each number is considered as   
formed by the addition of an unit to the
 number next below it in magnitude1 and 
this mode of formation is conveyed by   
the place which it occupies in the      
series4 ,and each is also considered as 
formed by the addition of a number of   
units less than ten1 and a number of    
aggregates each equal to one of the     
successive powers of ten2 and this mode 
of its formation is expressed by its    
spoken name1 and by its numerical       
character4  ,what renders arithmetic the
 type of a deductive science1 is the    
fortunate applicability to it of a law  
so comprehensive as ,the sums of equals 

are equals3 or 7to express the same     
principle in less familiar but more     
characteristic language71 ,whatever is  
made up of parts1 is made up of the     
parts of those parts4 ,this truth1      
obvious to the senses in all cases which
 can be fairly referred to their        
decision1 and so general as to be       
coextensive with nature itself1 being   
true of all sorts of phenomena1 7for all
 admit of being numbered17 must be      
considered an inductive truth1 or law of
 nature1 of the highest order4 ,and     
every arithmetical operation is an      
application of this law1 or of other    
laws capable of being deduced from it4  
,this is our warrant for all            
calculations4 ,we believe that five and 
two are equal to seven1 on the evidence 
of this inductive law1 combined with the
 definitions of those numbers4 ,we      
arrive at that conclusion 7as all know  
who remember how they first learned it7 
by adding a single unit at a time3 #e   
#a  #f1 therefore #e  #a  #a  #f  #a    

#g3 and again #b  #a  #a1 therefore #e  
#b  #e  #a  #a  #g4    #f4 ,innumerable 
as are the true propositions which can  
be formed concerning particular numbers1
 no adequate conception could be gained1
 from these alone1 of the extent of the 
truths composing the science of number4 
,such propositions as we have spoken of 
are the least general of all numerical  
truths4 ,it is true that even these are 
coextensive with all nature3 the        
properties of the number four are true  
of all objects that are divisible into  
four equal parts1 and all objects are   
either actually or ideally so divisible4
 ,but the propositions which compose the
 science of algebra are true1 not of a  
particular number1 but of all numbers2  
not of all things under the condition of
 being divided in a particular way1 but 
of all things under the condition of    
being divided in any way--of being      
designated by a number at all4  ,since  
it is impossible for different numbers  
to have any of their modes of formation 

completely in common1 it is a kind of   
paradox to say1 that all propositions   
which can be made concerning numbers    
relate to their modes of formation from 
other numbers1 and yet that there are   
propositions which are true of all      
numbers4 ,but this very paradox leads to
 the real principle of generalization   
concerning the properties of numbers4   
,two different numbers cannot be formed 
in the same manner from the same        
numbers2 but they may be formed in the  
same manner from different numbers2 as  
nine is formed from three by multiplying
 it into itself1 and sixteen is formed  
from four by the same process4 ,thus    
there arises a classification of modes  
of formation1 or in the language        
commonly used by mathematicians1 a      
classification of ,functions4 ,any      
number1 considered as formed from any   
other number1 is called a function of   
it2 and there are as many kinds of      
functions as there are modes of         
formation4 ,the simple functions are by 

no means numerous1 most functions being 
formed by the combination of several of 
the operations which form simple        
functions1 or by successive repetitions 
of some one of those operations4 ,the   
simple functions of any number x are all
 reducible to the following forms3 x  a1
 x - a1 a x1 x_/a1 xa1 a root of x1 log4
 x 7to the base a71 and the same        
expressions varied by putting x for a   
and a for x1 wherever that substitution 
would alter the value3 to which perhaps 
ought to be added sin x1 and arc 7sin   
x74 ,all other functions of x are formed
 by putting some one or more of the     
simple functions in the place of x or a1
 and subjecting them to the same        
elementary operations4  ,in order to    
carry on general reasonings on the      
subject of ,functions1 we require a     
nomenclature enabling us to express any 
two numbers by names which1 without     
specifying what particular numbers they 
are1 shall show what function each is of
 the other2 or1 in other words1 shall   

put in evidence their mode of formation 
from one another4 ,the system of general
 language called algebraical notation   
does this4 ,the expressions a and a#b   
#c;a denote1 the one any number1 the    
other the number formed from it in a    
particular manner4 ,the expressions a1  
b1 n1 and 7a  b7n1 denote any three     
numbers1 and a fourth which is formed   
from them in a certain mode4  ,the      
following may be stated as the general  
problem of the algebraical calculus3 ,f 
being a certain function of a given     
number1 to find what function ,f will be
 of any function of that number4 ,for   
example1 a binomial a  b is a function  
of its two parts a and b1 and the parts 
are1 in their turn1 functions of a  b3  
now 7a  b7n is a certain function of the
 binomial2 what function will this be of
 a and b1 the two parts8 ,the answer to 
this question is the binomial theorem4  
,the formula 7a  b7n  an  7n _/ #a7 a7n 
- #a7 b  77n7n - #a77 _/ 7#ab77 a7n -   
#b7 b#b  c41 shows in what manner the   

number which is formed by multiplying a 
b into itself n times1 might be formed  
without that process1 directly from a1  
b1 and n4 ,and of this nature are all   
the theorems of the science of number4  
,they assert the identity of the result 
of different modes of formation4 ,they  
affirm that some mode of formation from 
x1 and some mode of formation from a    
certain function of x1 produce the same 
number4  ,besides these general theorems
 of formul1 what remains in the         
algebraical calculus is the resolution  
of equations4 ,but the resolution of an 
equation is also a theorem4 ,if the     
equation be x#b  ax  b1 the resolution  
of this equation1 viz4 x  -7#a_/b7 a    
root of77#a_/d7 a#b  b71 is a general   
proposition1 which may be regarded as an
 answer to the question1 ,if b is a     
certain function of x and a 7namely x#b 
ax71 what function is x of b and a8 ,the
 resolution of equations is1 therefore1 
a mere variety of the general problem as
 above stated4 ,the problem is--,given a

 function1 what function is it of some  
other function8 ,and in the resolution  
of an equation1 the question is1 to find
 what function of one of its own        
functions the number itself is4  ,such  
as above described1 is the aim and end  
of the calculus4 ,as for its processes1 
every one knows that they are simply    
deductive4 ,in demonstrating an         
algebraical theorem1 or in resolving an 
equation1 we travel from the datum to   
the qusitum by pure ratiocination2 in   
which the only premises introduced1     
besides the original hypotheses1 are the
 fundamental axioms already             
mentioned--that things equal to the same
 thing are equal to one another1 and    
that the sums of equal things are equal4
 ,at each step in the demonstration or  
in the calculation1 we apply one or     
other of these truths1 or truths        
deducible from them1 as1 that the       
differences1 products1 c41 of equal     
numbers are equal4  ,it would be        
inconsistent with the scale of this     

work1 and not necessary to its design1  
to carry the analysis of the truths and 
processes of algebra any farther2 which 
is also the less needful1 as the task   
has been1 to a very great extent1       
performed by other writers4 ,peacock's  
,algebra1 and ,dr4 ,whewell's ,doctrine 
of ,limits1 are full of instruction on  
the subject4 ,the profound treatises of 
a truly philosophical mathematician1    
,professor ,de ,morgan1 should be       
studied by every one who desires to     
comprehend the evidence of mathematical 
truths1 and the meaning of the obscurer 
processes of the calculus2 and the      
speculations of ,m4 ,comte1 in his      
,cours de ,philosophie ,positive1 on the
 philosophy of the higher branches of   
mathematics1 are among the many valuable
 gifts for which philosophy is indebted 
to that eminent thinker4    #g4 ,if the 
extreme generality1 and remoteness not  
so much from sense as from the visual   
and tactual imagination1 of the laws of 
number1 renders it a somewhat difficult 

effort of abstraction to conceive those 
laws as being in reality physical truths
 obtained by observation2 the same      
difficulty does not exist with regard to
 the laws of extension4 ,the facts of   
which those laws are expressions1 are of
 a kind peculiarly accessible to the    
senses1 and suggesting eminently        
distinct images to the fancy4 ,that     
geometry is a strictly physical science 
would doubtless have been recognised in 
all ages1 had it not been for the       
illusions produced by two circumstances4
 ,one of these is the characteristic    
property1 already noticed1 of the facts 
of geometry1 that they may be collected 
from our ideas or mental pictures of    
objects as effectually as from the      
objects themselves4 ,the other is1 the  
demonstrative character of geometrical  
truths2 which was at one time supposed  
to constitute a radical distinction     
between them and physical truths1 the   
latter1 as resting on merely probable   
evidence1 being deemed essentially      

uncertain and unprecise4 ,the advance of
 knowledge has1 however1 made it        
manifest that physical science1 in its  
better understood branches1 is quite as 
demonstrative as geometry4 ,the task of 
deducing its details from a few         
comparatively simple principles is found
 to be anything but the impossibility it
 was once supposed to be2 and the notion
 of the superior certainty of geometry  
is an illusion1 arising from the ancient
 prejudice which1 in that science1      
mistakes the ideal data from which we   
reason1 for a peculiar class of         
realities1 while the corresponding ideal
 data of any deductive physical science 
are recognised as what they really are1 
mere hypotheses4  ,every theorem in     
geometry is a law of external nature1   
and might have been ascertained by      
generalizing from observation and       
experiment1 which in this case resolve  
themselves into comparison and          
measurement4 ,but it was found          
practicable1 and being practicable1 was 

desirable1 to deduce these truths by    
ratiocination from a small number of    
general laws of nature1 the certainty   
and universality of which are obvious to
 the most careless observer1 and which  
compose the first principles and        
ultimate premises of the science4 ,among
 these general laws must be included the
 same two which we have noticed as      
ultimate principles of the ,science of  
,number also1 and which are applicable  
to every description of quantity2 viz4  
,the sums of equals are equal1 and      
,things which are equal to the same     
thing are equal to one another2 the     
latter of which may be expressed in a   
manner more suggestive of the           
inexhaustible multitude of its          
consequences1 by the following terms3   
,whatever is equal to any one of a      
number of equal magnitudes1 is equal to 
any other of them4 ,to these two must be
 added1 in geometry1 a third law of     
equality1 namely1 that lines1 surfaces1 
or solid spaces1 which can be so applied

 to one another as to coincide1 are     
equal4 ,some writers have asserted that 
this law of nature is a mere verbal     
definition2 that the expression equal   
magnitudes means nothing but magnitudes 
which can be so applied to one another  
as to coincide4 ,but in this opinion ,i 
cannot agree4 ,the equality of two      
geometrical magnitudes cannot differ    
fundamentally in its nature from the    
equality of two weights1 two degrees of 
heat1 or two portions of duration1 to   
none of which would this pretended      
definition of equality be suitable4     
,none of these things can be so applied 
to one another as to coincide1 yet we   
perfectly understand what we mean when  
we call them equal4 ,things are equal in
 magnitude1 as things are equal in      
weight1 when they are felt to be exactly
 similar in respect of the attribute in 
which we compare them3 and the          
application of the objects to each other
 in the one case1 like the balancing    
them with a pair of scales in the other1

 is but a mode of bringing them into a  
position in which our senses can        
recognise deficiencies of exact         
resemblance that would otherwise escape 
our notice4  ,along with these three    
general principles or axioms1 the       
remainder of the premises of geometry   
consists of the so-called definitions1  
that is to say1 propositions asserting  
the real existence of the various       
objects therein designated1 together    
with some one property of each4 ,in some
 cases more than one property is        
commonly assumed1 but in no case is more
 than one necessary4 ,it is assumed that
 there are such things in nature as     
straight lines1 and that any two of them
 setting out from the same point1       
diverge more and more without limit4    
,this assumption1 7which includes and   
goes beyond ,euclid's axiom that two    
straight lines cannot inclose a space17 
is as indispensable in geometry1 and as 
evident1 resting on as simple1 familiar1
 and universal observation1 as any of   

the other axioms4 ,it is also assumed   
that straight lines diverge from one    
another in different degrees2 in other  
words1 that there are such things as    
angles1 and that they are capable of    
being equal or unequal4 ,it is assumed  
that there is such a thing as a circle1 
and that all its radii are equal2 such  
things as ellipses1 and that the sums of
 the focal distances are equal for every
 point in an ellipse2 such things as    
parallel lines1 and that those lines are
 everywhere equally distant4#ci    #h4  
,it is a matter of more than curiosity  
to consider1 to what peculiarity of the 
physical truths which are the subject of
 geometry1 it is owing that they can all
 be deduced from so small a number of   
original premises3 why it is that we can
 set out from only one characteristic   
property of each kind of phenomenon1 and
 with that and two or three general     
truths relating to equality1 can travel 
from mark to mark until we obtain a vast
 body of derivative truths1 to all      

appearance extremely unlike those       
elementary ones4  ,the explanation of   
this remarkable fact seems to lie in the
 following circumstances4 ,in the first 
place1 all questions of position and    
figure may be resolved into questions of
 magnitude4 ,the position and figure of 
any object are determined1 by           
determining the position of a sufficient
 number of points in it2 and the        
position of any point may be determined 
by the magnitude of three rectangular   
co-ordinates1 that is1 of the           
perpendiculars drawn from the point to  
three planes at right angles to one     
another1 arbitrarily selected4 ,by this 
transformation of all questions of      
quality into questions only of quantity1
 geometry is reduced to the single      
problem of the measurement of           
magnitudes1 that is1 the ascertainment  
of the equalities which exist between   
them4 ,now when we consider that by one 
of the general axioms1 any equality1    
when ascertained1 is proof of as many   

other equalities as there are other     
things equal to either of the two       
equals2 and that by another of those    
axioms1 any ascertained equality is     
proof of the equality of as many pairs  
of magnitudes as can be formed by the   
numerous operations which resolve       
themselves into the addition of the     
equals to themselves or to other equals2
 we cease to wonder that in proportion  
as a science is conversant about        
equality1 it should afford a more       
copious supply of marks of marks2 and   
that the sciences of number and         
extension1 which are conversant with    
little else than equality1 should be the
 most deductive of all the sciences4    
,there are also two or three of the     
principal laws of space or extension    
which are unusually fitted for rendering
 one position or magnitude a mark of    
another1 and thereby contributing to    
render the science largely deductive4   
,first2 the magnitudes of inclosed      
spaces1 whether superficial or solid1   

are completely determined by the        
magnitudes of the lines and angles which
 bound them4 ,secondly1 the length of   
any line1 whether straight or curve1 is 
measured 7certain other things being    
given7 by the angle which it subtends1  
and vice vers4 ,lastly1 the angle which 
any two straight lines make with each   
other at an inaccessible point1 is      
measured by the angles they severally   
make with any third line we choose to   
select4 ,by means of these general laws1
 the measurement of all lines1 angles1  
and spaces whatsoever might be          
accomplished by measuring a single      
straight line and a sufficient number of
 angles2 which is the plan actually     
pursued in the trigonometrical survey of
 a country2 and fortunate it is that    
this is practicable1 the exact          
measurement of long straight lines being
 always difficult1 and often impossible1
 but that of angles very easy4 ,three   
such generalizations as the foregoing   
afford such facilities for the indirect 

measurement of magnitudes1 7by supplying
 us with known lines or angles which are
 marks of the magnitude of unknown ones1
 and thereby of the spaces which they   
inclose17 that it is easily intelligible
 how from a few data we can go on to    
ascertain the magnitude of an indefinite
 multitude of lines1 angles1 and spaces1
 which we could not easily1 or could not
 at all1 measure by any more direct     
process4    #i4 ,such are the few       
remarks which it seemed necessary to    
make in this place1 respecting the laws 
of nature which are the peculiar subject
 of the sciences of number and          
extension4 ,the immense part which those
 laws take in giving a deductive        
character to the other departments of   
physical science1 is well known2 and is 
not surprising1 when we consider that   
all causes operate according to         
mathematical laws4 ,the effect is always
 dependent on1 or is a function of1 the 
quantity of the agent2 and generally of 
its position also4 ,we cannot1          

therefore1 reason respecting causation1 
without introducing considerations of   
quantity and extension at every step2   
and if the nature of the phenomena      
admits of our obtaining numerical data  
of sufficient accuracy1 the laws of     
quantity become the grand instrument for
 calculating forward to an effect1 or   
backward to a cause4 ,that in all other 
sciences1 as well as in geometry1       
questions of quality are scarcely ever  
independent of questions of quantity1   
may be seen from the most familiar      
phenomena4 ,even when several colours   
are mixed on a painter's palette1 the   
comparative quantity of each entirely   
determines the colour of the mixture4   
,with this mere suggestion of the       
general causes which render mathematical
 principles and processes so predominant
 in those deductive sciences which      
afford precise numerical data1 ,i must1 
on the present occasion1 content myself3
 referring the reader who desires a more
 thorough acquaintance with the subject1

 to the first two volumes of ,m4        
,comte's systematic work4  ,in the same 
work1 and more particularly in the third
 volume1 are also fully discussed the   
limits of the applicability of          
mathematical principles to the          
improvement of other sciences4 ,such    
principles are manifestly inapplicable1 
where the causes on which any class of  
phenomena depend are so imperfectly     
accessible to our observation1 that we  
cannot ascertain1 by a proper induction1
 their numerical laws2 or where the     
causes are so numerous1 and intermixed  
in so complex a manner with one another1
 that even supposing their laws known1  
the computation of the aggregate effect 
transcends the powers of the calculus as
 it is1 or is likely to be2 or lastly1  
where the causes themselves are in a    
state of perpetual fluctuation2 as in   
physiology1 and still more1 if possible1
 in the social science4 ,the            
mathematical solutions of physical      
questions become progressively more     

difficult and imperfect1 in proportion  
as the questions divest themselves of   
their abstract and hypothetical         
character1 and approach nearer to the   
degree of complication actually existing
 in nature2 insomuch that beyond the    
limits of astronomical phenomena1 and of
 those most nearly analogous to them1   
mathematical accuracy is generally      
obtained at the expense of the reality  
of the inquiry3 while even in           
astronomical questions1 notwithstanding 
the admirable simplicity of their       
mathematical elements1 our feeble       
intelligence becomes incapable of       
following out effectually the logical   
combinations of the laws on which the   
phenomena are dependent1 as soon as we  
attempt to take into simultaneous       
consideration more than two or three    
essential influences4#dj ,of this1 the  
problem of the ,three ,bodies has       
already been cited1 more than once1 as a
 remarkable instance2 the complete      
solution of so comparatively simple a   

question having vainly tried the skill  
of the most profound mathematicians4 ,we
 may conceive1 then1 how chimerical     
would be the hope that mathematical     
principles could be advantageously      
applied to phenomena dependent on the   
mutual action of the innumerable minute 
particles of bodies1 as those of        
chemistry1 and still more1 of           
physiology2 and for similar reasons     
those principles remain inapplicable to 
the still more complex inquiries1 the   
subjects of which are phenomena of      
society and government4  ,the value of  
mathematical instruction as a           
preparation for those more difficult    
investigations1 consists in the         
applicability not of its doctrines1 but 
of its method4 ,mathematics will ever   
remain the most perfect type of the     
,deductive ,method in general2 and the  
applications of mathematics to the      
deductive branches of physics1 furnish  
the only school in which philosophers   
can effectually learn the most difficult

 and important portion of their art1 the
 employment of the laws of simpler      
phenomena for explaining and predicting 
those of the more complex4 ,these       
grounds are quite sufficient for deeming
 mathematical training an indispensable 
basis of real scientific education1 and 
regarding 7according to the dictum which
 an old but unauthentic tradition       
ascribes to ,plato7 one who is ,greek3  
agemetrtos1 as wanting in one of the    
most essential qualifications for the   
successful cultivation of the higher    
branches of philosophy4     ,,chapter   
,,xxv4  ,,of ,,the ,,grounds ,,of       
,,disbelief4    #a4 ,the method of      
arriving at general truths1 or general  
propositions fit to be believed1 and the
 nature of the evidence on which they   
are grounded1 have been discussed1 as   
far as space and the writer's faculties 
permitted1 in the twenty-four preceding 
chapters4 ,but the result of the        
examination of evidence is not always   
belief1 nor even suspension of judgment2

 it is sometimes disbelief4 ,the        
philosophy1 therefore1 of induction and 
experimental inquiry is incomplete1     
unless the grounds not only of belief1  
but of disbelief1 are treated of2 and to
 this topic we shall devote one1 and the
 final1 chapter4  ,by disbelief is not  
here to be understood the mere absence  
of belief4 ,the ground for abstaining   
from belief is simply the absence or    
insufficiency of proof2 and in          
considering what is sufficient evidence 
to support any given conclusion1 we have
 already1 by implication1 considered    
what evidence is not sufficient for the 
same purpose4 ,by disbelief is here     
meant1 not the state of mind in which we
 form no opinion concerning a subject1  
but that in which we are fully persuaded
 that some opinion is not true2 insomuch
 that if evidence1 even of great        
apparent strength1 7whether grounded on 
the testimony of others or on our own   
supposed perceptions17 were produced in 
favour of the opinion1 we should believe

 that the witnesses spoke falsely1 or   
that they1 or we ourselves if we were   
the direct percipients1 were mistaken4  
,that there are such cases1 no one is   
likely to dispute4 ,assertions for which
 there is abundant positive evidence are
 often disbelieved1 on account of what  
is called their improbability1 or       
impossibility4 ,and the question for    
consideration is what1 in the present   
case1 these words mean1 and how far and 
in what circumstances the properties    
which they express are sufficient       
grounds for disbelief4    #b4 ,it is to 
be remarked in the first place1 that the
 positive evidence produced in support  
of an assertion which is nevertheless   
rejected on the score of impossibility  
or improbability1 is never such as      
amounts to full proof4 ,it is always    
grounded on some approximate            
generalization4 ,the fact may have been 
asserted by a hundred witnesses2 but    
there are many exceptions to the        
universality of the generalization that 

what a hundred witnesses affirm is true4
 ,we may seem to ourselves to have      
actually seen the fact3 but1 that we    
really see what we think we see1 is by  
no means an universal truth2 our organs 
may have been in a morbid state2 or we  
may have inferred something1 and        
imagined that we perceived it4 ,the     
evidence1 then1 in the affirmative being
 never more than an approximate         
generalization1 all will depend on what 
the evidence in the negative is4 ,if    
that also rests on an approximate       
generalization1 it is a case for        
comparison of probabilities4 ,if the    
approximate generalizations leading to  
the affirmative are1 when added         
together1 less strong1 or in other      
words1 farther from being universal1    
than the approximate generalizations    
which support the negative side of the  
question1 the proposition is said to be 
improbable1 and is to be disbelieved    
provisionally4 ,if however an alleged   
fact be in contradiction1 not to any    

number of approximate generalizations1  
but to a completed generalization       
grounded on a rigorous induction1 it is 
said to be impossible1 and is to be     
disbelieved totally4  ,this last        
principle1 simple and evident as it     
appears1 is the doctrine which1 on the  
occasion of an attempt to apply it to   
the question of the credibility of      
miracles1 excited so violent a          
controversy4 ,hume's celebrated         
doctrine1 that nothing is credible which
 is contradictory to experience1 or at  
variance with laws of nature1 is merely 
this very plain and harmless            
proposition1 that whatever is           
contradictory to a complete induction is
 incredible4 ,that such a maxim as this 
should either be accounted a dangerous  
heresy1 or mistaken for a great and     
recondite truth1 speaks ill for the     
state of philosophical speculation on   
such subjects4  ,but does not 7it may be
 asked7 the very statement of the       
proposition imply a contradiction8 ,an  

alleged fact1 according to this theory1 
is not to be believed if it contradict a
 complete induction4 ,but it is         
essential to the completeness of an     
induction that it shall not contradict  
any known fact4 ,is it not then a       
petitio principii to say1 that the fact 
ought to be disbelieved because the     
induction opposed to it is complete8    
,how can we have a right to declare the 
induction complete1 while facts1        
supported by credible evidence1 present 
themselves in opposition to it8  ,i     
answer1 we have that right whenever the 
scientific canons of induction give it  
to us2 that is1 whenever the induction  
can be complete4 ,we have it1 for       
example1 in a case of causation in which
 there has been an experimentum crucis4 
,if an antecedent ,a1 superadded to a   
set of antecedents in all other respects
 unaltered1 is followed by an effect ,b 
which did not exist before1 ,a is1 in   
that instance at least1 the cause of ,b1
 or an indispensable part of its cause2 

and if ,a be tried again with many      
totally different sets of antecedents   
and ,b still follows1 then it is the    
whole cause4 ,if these observations or  
experiments have been repeated so often1
 and by so many persons1 as to exclude  
all supposition of error in the         
observer1 a law of nature is            
established2 and so long as this law is 
received as such1 the assertion that on 
any particular occasion ,a took place1  
and yet ,b did not follow1 without any  
counteracting cause1 must be            
disbelieved4 ,such an assertion is not  
to be credited on any less evidence than
 what would suffice to overturn the law4
 ,the general truths1 that whatever has 
a beginning has a cause1 and that when  
none but the same causes exist1 the same
 effects follow1 rest on the strongest  
inductive evidence possible2 the        
proposition that things affirmed by even
 a crowd of respectable witnesses are   
true1 is but an approximate             
generalization2 and--even if we fancy we

 actually saw or felt the fact which is 
in contradiction to the law--what a     
human being can see is no more than a   
set of appearances2 from which the real 
nature of the phenomenon is merely an   
inference1 and in this inference        
approximate generalizations usually have
 a large share4 ,if1 therefore1 we make 
our election to hold by the law1 no     
quantity of evidence whatever ought to  
persuade us that there has occurred     
anything in contradiction to it4 ,if1   
indeed1 the evidence produced is such   
that it is more likely that the set of  
observations and experiments on which   
the law rests should have been          
inaccurately performed or incorrectly   
interpreted1 than that the evidence in  
question should be false1 we may believe
 the evidence2 but then we must abandon 
the law4 ,and since the law was received
 on what seemed a complete induction1 it
 can only be rejected on evidence       
equivalent2 namely1 as being            
inconsistent not with any number of     

approximate generalizations1 but with   
some other and better established law of
 nature4 ,this extreme case1 of a       
conflict between two supposed laws of   
nature1 has probably never actually     
occurred where1 in the process of       
investigating both the laws1 the true   
canons of scientific induction had been 
kept in view2 but if it did occur1 it   
must terminate in the total rejection of
 one of the supposed laws4 ,it would    
prove that there must be a flaw in the  
logical process by which either one or  
the other was established3 and if there 
be so1 that supposed general truth is no
 truth at all4 ,we cannot admit a       
proposition as a law of nature1 and yet 
believe a fact in real contradiction to 
it4 ,we must disbelieve the alleged     
fact1 or believe that we were mistaken  
in admitting the supposed law4  ,but in 
order that any alleged fact should be   
contradictory to a law of causation1 the
 allegation must be1 not simply that the
 cause existed without being followed by

 the effect1 for that would be no       
uncommon occurrence2 but that this      
happened in the absence of any adequate 
counteracting cause4 ,now in the case of
 an alleged miracle1 the assertion is   
the exact opposite of this4 ,it is1 that
 the effect was defeated1 not in the    
absence1 but in consequence of a        
counteracting cause1 namely1 a direct   
interposition of an act of the will of  
some being who has power over nature2   
and in particular of a ,being1 whose    
will being assumed to have endowed all  
the causes with the powers by which they
 produce their effects1 may well be     
supposed able to counteract them4 ,a    
miracle 7as was justly remarked by      
,brown#da7 is no contradiction to the   
law of cause and effect2 it is a new    
effect1 supposed to be produced by the  
introduction of a new cause4 ,of the    
adequacy of that cause1 if present1     
there can be no doubt2 and the only     
antecedent improbability which can be   
ascribed to the miracle1 is the         

improbability that any such cause       
existed4  ,all1 therefore1 which ,hume  
has made out1 and this he must be       
considered to have made out1 is1 that   
7at least in the imperfect state of our 
knowledge of natural agencies1 which    
leaves it always possible that some of  
the physical antecedents may have been  
hidden from us17 no evidence can prove a
 miracle to any one who did not         
previously believe the existence of a   
being or beings with supernatural power2
 or who believes himself to have full   
proof that the character of the ,being  
whom he recognises1 is inconsistent with
 his having seen fit to interfere on the
 occasion in question4  ,if we do not   
already believe in supernatural         
agencies1 no miracle can prove to us    
their existence4 ,the miracle itself1   
considered merely as an extraordinary   
fact1 may be satisfactorily certified by
 our senses or by testimony2 but nothing
 can ever prove that it is a miracle3   
there is still another possible         

hypothesis1 that of its being the result
 of some unknown natural cause3 and this
 possibility cannot be so completely    
shut out1 as to leave no alternative but
 that of admitting the existence and    
intervention of a being superior to     
nature4 ,those1 however1 who already    
believe in such a being1 have two       
hypotheses to choose from1 a            
supernatural and an unknown natural     
agency2 and they have to judge which of 
the two is the most probable in the     
particular case4 ,in forming this       
judgment1 an important element of the   
question will be the conformity of the  
result to the laws of the supposed      
agent1 that is1 to the character of the 
,deity as they conceive it4 ,but1 with  
the knowledge which we now possess of   
the general uniformity of the course of 
nature1 religion1 following in the wake 
of science1 has been compelled to       
acknowledge the government of the       
universe as being on the whole carried  
on by general laws1 and not by special  

interpositions4 ,to whoever holds this  
belief1 there is a general presumption  
against any supposition of divine agency
 not operating through general laws1 or 
in other words1 there is an antecedent  
improbability in every miracle1 which1  
in order to outweigh it1 requires an    
extraordinary strength of antecedent    
probability derived from the special    
circumstances of the case4    #c4 ,it   
appears from what has been said1 that   
the assertion that a cause has been     
defeated of an effect which is connected
 with it by a completely ascertained law
 of causation1 is to be disbelieved or  
not1 according to the probability or    
improbability that there existed in the 
particular instance an adequate         
counteracting cause4 ,to form an        
estimate of this1 is not more difficult 
than of other probabilities4 ,with      
regard to all known causes capable of   
counteracting the given causes1 we have 
generally some previous knowledge of the
 frequency or rarity of their           

occurrence1 from which we may draw an   
inference as to the antecedent          
improbability of their having been      
present in any particular case4 ,and    
neither in respect to known or unknown  
causes are we required to pronounce on  
the probability of their existing in    
nature1 but only of their having existed
 at the time and place at which the     
transaction is alleged to have happened4
 ,we are seldom1 therefore1 without the 
means 7when the circumstances of the    
case are at all known to us7 of judging 
how far it is likely that such a cause  
should have existed at that time and    
place without manifesting its presence  
by some other marks1 and 7in the case of
 an unknown cause7 without having       
hitherto manifested its existence in any
 other instance4 ,according as this     
circumstance1 or the falsity of the     
testimony1 appears more improbable1 that
 is1 conflicts with an approximate      
generalization of a higher order1 we    
believe the testimony1 or disbelieve it2

 with a stronger or a weaker degree of  
conviction1 according to the            
preponderance3 at least until we have   
sifted the matter further4  ,so much1   
then1 for the case in which the alleged 
fact conflicts1 or appears to conflict1 
with a real law of causation4 ,but a    
more common case1 perhaps1 is that of   
its conflicting with uniformities of    
mere coexistence1 not proved to be      
dependent on causation3 in other words1 
with the properties of ,kinds4 ,it is   
with these uniformities principally1    
that the marvellous stories related by  
travellers are apt to be at variance3 as
 of men with tails1 or with wings1 and  
7until confirmed by experience7 of      
flying fish2 or of ice1 in the          
celebrated anecdote of the ,dutch       
travellers and the ,king of ,siam4      
,facts of this description1 facts       
previously unheard of but which could   
not from any known law of causation be  
pronounced impossible1 are what ,hume   
characterizes as not contrary to        

experience1 but merely unconformable to 
it2 and ,bentham1 in his treatise on    
,evidence1 denominates them facts       
disconformable in specie1 as            
distinguished from such as are          
disconformable in toto or in degree4    
,in a case of this description1 the fact
 asserted is the existence of a new     
,kind2 which in itself is not in the    
slightest degree incredible1 and only to
 be rejected if the improbability that  
any variety of object existing at the   
particular place and time should not    
have been discovered sooner1 be greater 
than that of error or mendacity in the  
witnesses4 ,accordingly1 such           
assertions1 when made by credible       
persons1 and of unexplored places1 are  
not disbelieved1 but at most regarded as
 requiring confirmation from subsequent 
observers2 unless the alleged properties
 of the supposed new ,kind are at       
variance with known properties of some  
larger kind which includes it2 or in    
other words1 unless1 in the new ,kind   

which is asserted to exist1 some        
properties are said to have been found  
disjoined from others which have always 
been known to accompany them2 as in the 
case of ,pliny's men1 or any other kind 
of animal of a structure different from 
that which has always been found to     
coexist with animal life4 ,on the mode  
of dealing with any such case1 little   
needs be added to what has been said on 
the same topic in the twenty-second     
chapter4#db ,when the uniformities of   
coexistence which the alleged fact would
 violate1 are such as to raise a strong 
presumption of their being the result of
 causation1 the fact which conflicts    
with them is to be disbelieved2 at least
 provisionally1 and subject to further  
investigation4 ,when the presumption    
amounts to a virtual certainty1 as in   
the case of the general structure of    
organized beings1 the only question     
requiring consideration is whether1 in  
phenomena so little understood1 there   
may not be liabilities to counteraction 

from causes hitherto unknown2 or whether
 the phenomena may not be capable of    
originating in some other way1 which    
would produce a different set of        
derivative uniformities4 ,where 7as in  
the case of the flying fish1 or the     
ornithorhynchus7 the generalization to  
which the alleged fact would be an      
exception is very special and of limited
 range1 neither of the above            
suppositions can be deemed very         
improbable2 and it is generally1 in the 
case of such alleged anomalies1 wise to 
suspend our judgment1 pending the       
subsequent inquiries which will not fail
 to confirm the assertion if it be true4
 ,but when the generalization is very   
comprehensive1 embracing a vast number  
and variety of observations1 and        
covering a considerable province of the 
domain of nature2 then1 for reasons     
which have been fully explained1 such an
 empirical law comes near to the        
certainty of an ascertained law of      
causation3 and any alleged exception to 

it cannot be admitted1 unless on the    
evidence of some law of causation proved
 by a still more complete induction4    
,such uniformities in the course of     
nature as do not bear marks of being the
 results of causation1 are1 as we have  
already seen1 admissible as universal   
truths with a degree of credence        
proportioned to their generality4 ,those
 which are true of all things whatever1 
or at least which are totally           
independent of the varieties of ,kinds1 
namely1 the laws of number and          
extension1 to which we may add the law  
of causation itself1 are probably the   
only ones1 an exception to which is     
absolutely and permanently incredible4  
,accordingly1 it is to assertions       
supposed to be contradictory to these   
laws1 or to some others coming near to  
them in generality1 that the word       
impossibility 7at least total           
impossibility7 seems to be generally    
confined4 ,violations of other laws1 of 
special laws of causation for instance1 

are said1 by persons studious of        
accuracy in expression1 to be impossible
 in the circumstances of the case2 or   
impossible unless some cause had existed
 which did not exist in the particular  
case4#dc ,of no assertion1 not in       
contradiction to some of these very     
general laws1 will more than            
improbability be asserted by any        
cautious person2 and improbability not  
of the highest degree1 unless the time  
and place in which the fact is said to  
have occurred1 render it almost certain 
that the anomaly1 if real1 could not    
have been overlooked by other observers4
 ,suspension of judgment is in all other
 cases the resource of the judicious    
inquirer2 provided the testimony in     
favour of the anomaly presents1 when    
well sifted1 no suspicious              
circumstances4  ,but the testimony is   
scarcely ever found to stand that test1 
in cases in which the anomaly is not    
real4 ,in the instances on record in    
which a great number of witnesses1 of   

good reputation and scientific          
acquirements1 have testified to the     
truth of something which has turned out 
untrue1 there have almost always been   
circumstances which1 to a keen observer 
who had taken due pains to sift the     
matter1 would have rendered the         
testimony untrustworthy4 ,there have    
generally been means of accounting for  
the impression on the senses or minds of
 the alleged percipients1 by fallacious 
appearances2 or some epidemic delusion1 
propagated by the contagious influence  
of popular feeling1 has been concerned  
in the case2 or some strong interest has
 been implicated--religious zeal1 party 
feeling1 vanity1 or at least the passion
 for the marvellous1 in persons strongly
 susceptible of it4 ,when none of these 
or similar circumstances exist to       
account for the apparent strength of the
 testimony2 and where the assertion is  
not in contradiction either to those    
universal laws which know no            
counteraction or anomaly1 or to the     

generalizations next in                 
comprehensiveness to them1 but would    
only amount1 if admitted1 to the        
existence of an unknown cause or an     
anomalous ,kind1 in circumstances not so
 thoroughly explored but that it is     
credible that things hitherto unknown   
may still come to light2 a cautious     
person will neither admit nor reject the
 testimony1 but will wait for           
confirmation at other times and from    
other unconnected sources4 ,such ought  
to have been the conduct of the ,king of
 ,siam when the ,dutch travellers       
affirmed to him the existence of ice4   
,but an ignorant person is as obstinate 
in his contemptuous incredulity as he is
 unreasonably credulous4 ,anything      
unlike his own narrow experience he     
disbelieves1 if it flatters no          
propensity2 any nursery tale is         
swallowed implicitly by him if it does4 
#d4 ,i shall now advert to a very       
serious misapprehension of the          
principles of the subject1 which has    

been committed by some of the writers   
against ,hume's ,essay on ,miracles1 and
 by ,bishop ,butler before them1 in     
their anxiety to destroy what appeared  
to them a formidable weapon of assault  
against the ,christian religion2 and the
 effect of which is entirely to confound
 the doctrine of the ,grounds of        
,disbelief4 ,the mistake consists in    
overlooking the distinction between     
7what may be called7 improbability      
before the fact1 and improbability after
 it2 or 7since1 as ,mr4 ,venn remarks1  
the distinction of past and future is   
not the material circumstance7 between  
the improbability of a mere guess being 
right1 and the improbability of an      
alleged fact being true4  ,many events  
are altogether improbable to us1 before 
they have happened1 or before we are    
informed of their happening1 which are  
not in the least incredible when we are 
informed of them1 because not contrary  
to any1 even approximate1 induction4 ,in
 the cast of a perfectly fair die1 the  

chances are five to one against throwing
 ace1 that is1 ace will be thrown on an 
average only once in six throws4 ,but   
this is no reason against believing that
 ace was thrown on a given occasion1 if 
any credible witness asserts it2 since  
though ace is only thrown once in six   
times1 some number which is only thrown 
once in six times must have been thrown 
if the die was thrown at all4 ,the      
improbability1 then1 or in other words1 
the unusualness1 of any fact1 is no     
reason for disbelieving it1 if the      
nature of the case renders it certain   
that either that or something equally   
improbable1 that is1 equally unusual1   
did happen4 ,nor is this all3 for even  
if the other five sides of the die were 
all twos1 or all threes1 yet as ace     
would still on the average come up once 
in every six throws1 its coming up in a 
given throw would be not in any way     
contradictory to experience4 ,if we     
disbelieved all facts which had the     
chances against them beforehand1 we     

should believe hardly anything4 ,we are 
told that ,a4 ,b4 died yesterday3 the   
moment before we were so told1 the      
chances against his having died on that 
day may have been ten thousand to one2  
but since he was certain to die at some 
time or other1 and when he died must    
necessarily die on some particular day1 
while the preponderance of chances is   
very great against every day in         
particular1 experience affords no ground
 for discrediting any testimony which   
may be produced to the event's having   
taken place on a given day4  ,yet it has
 been considered1 by ,dr4 ,campbell and 
others1 as a complete answer to ,hume's 
doctrine 7that things are incredible    
which are contrary to the uniform course
 of experience71 that we do not         
disbelieve1 merely because the chances  
were against them1 things in strict     
conformity to the uniform course of     
experience2 that we do not disbelieve an
 alleged fact merely because the        
combination of causes on which it       

depends occurs only once in a certain   
number of times4 ,it is evident that    
whatever is shown by observation1 or can
 be proved from laws of nature1 to occur
 in a certain proportion 7however small7
 of the whole number of possible cases1 
is not contrary to experience2 though we
 are right in disbelieving it1 if some  
other supposition respecting the matter 
in question involves on the whole a less
 departure from the ordinary course of  
events4 ,yet1 on such grounds as this   
have able writers been led to the       
extraordinary conclusion1 that nothing  
supported by credible testimony ought   
ever to be disbelieved4    #e4 ,we have 
considered two species of events1       
commonly said to be improbable2 one kind
 which are in no way extraordinary1 but 
which1 having an immense preponderance  
of chances against them1 are improbable 
until they are affirmed1 but no longer2 
another kind which1 being contrary to   
some recognised law of nature1 are      
incredible on any amount of testimony   

except such as would be sufficient to   
shake our belief in the law itself4 ,but
 between these two classes of events1   
there is an intermediate class1         
consisting of what are commonly termed  
,coincidences3 in other words1 those    
combinations of chances which present   
some peculiar and unexpected regularity1
 assimilating them1 in so far1 to the   
results of law4 ,as if1 for example1 in 
a lottery of a thousand tickets1 the    
numbers should be drawn in the exact    
order of what are called the natural    
numbers1 #a1 #b1 #c1 c4 ,we have still  
to consider the principles of evidence  
applicable to this case3 whether there  
is any difference between coincidences  
and ordinary events1 in the amount of   
testimony or other evidence necessary to
 render them credible4  ,it is certain1 
that on every rational principle of     
expectation1 a combination of this      
peculiar sort may be expected quite as  
often as any other given series of a    
thousand numbers2 that with perfectly   

fair dice1 sixes will be thrown twice1  
thrice1 or any number of times in       
succession1 quite as often in a thousand
 or a million throws1 as any other      
succession of numbers fixed upon        
beforehand2 and that no judicious player
 would give greater odds against the one
 series than against the other4         
,notwithstanding this1 there is a       
general disposition to regard the one as
 much more improbable than the other1   
and as requiring much stronger evidence 
to make it credible4 ,such is the force 
of this impression1 that it has led some
 thinkers to the conclusion1 that nature
 has greater difficulty in producing    
regular combinations than irregular     
ones2 or in other words1 that there is  
some general tendency of things1 some   
law1 which prevents regular combinations
 from occurring1 or at least from       
occurring so often as others4 ,among    
these thinkers may be numbered          
,d',alembert2 who1 in an ,essay on      
,probabilities to be found in the fifth 

volume of his ,mlanges1 contends that   
regular combinations1 though equally    
probable according to the mathematical  
theory with any others1 are physically  
less probable4 ,he appeals to common    
sense1 or in other words1 to common     
impressions2 saying1 if dice thrown     
repeatedly in our presence gave sixes   
every time1 should we not1 before the   
number of throws had reached ten1 7not  
to speak of thousands of millions17 be  
ready to affirm1 with the most positive 
conviction1 that the dice were false8   
,the common and natural impression is in
 favour of ,d',alembert3 the regular    
series would be thought much more       
unlikely than an irregular4 ,but this   
common impression is1 ,i apprehend1     
merely grounded on the fact1 that       
scarcely anybody remembers to have ever 
seen one of these peculiar coincidences3
 the reason of which is simply that no  
one's experience extends to anything    
like the number of trials1 within which 
that or any other given combination of  

events can be expected to happen4 ,the  
chance of sixes on a single throw of two
 dice being #a_/cf1 the chance of sixes 
ten times in succession is #a divided by
 the tenth power of #cf2 in other words1
 such a concurrence is only likely to   
happen once in #c1fef1aeh1ddj1jfb1igf   
trials1 a number which no dice-player's 
experience comes up to a millionth part 
of4 ,but if1 instead of sixes ten times1
 any other given succession of ten      
throws had been fixed upon1 it would    
have been exactly as unlikely that in   
any individual's experience that        
particular succession had ever occurred2
 although this does not seem equally    
improbable1 because no one could        
possibly have remembered whether it had 
occurred or not1 and because the        
comparison is tacitly made1 not between 
sixes ten times and any one particular  
series of throws1 but between all       
regular and all irregular successions   
taken together4  ,that 7as ,d',alembert 
says7 if the succession of sixes was    

actually thrown before our eyes1 we     
should ascribe it not to chance1 but to 
unfairness in the dice1 is              
unquestionably true4 ,but this arises   
from a totally different principle4 ,we 
should then be considering1 not the     
probability of the fact in itself1 but  
the comparative probability with which1 
when it is known to have happened1 it   
may be referred to one or to another    
cause4 ,the regular series is not at all
 less likely than the irregular one to  
be brought about by chance1 but it is   
much more likely than the irregular one 
to be produced by design2 or by some    
general cause operating through the     
structure of the dice4 ,it is the nature
 of casual combinations to produce a    
repetition of the same event1 as often  
and no oftener than any other series of 
events4 ,but it is the nature of general
 causes to reproduce1 in the same       
circumstances1 always the same event4   
,common sense and science alike dictate 
that1 all other things being the same1  

we should rather attribute the effect to
 a cause which if real would be very    
likely to produce it1 than to a cause   
which would be very unlikely to produce 
it4 ,according to ,laplace's sixth      
theorem1 which we demonstrated in a     
former chapter1 the difference of       
probability arising from the superior   
efficacy of the constant cause1         
unfairness in the dice1 would after a   
very few throws far outweigh any        
antecedent probability which there could
 be against its existence4  ,d',alembert
 should have put the question in another
 manner4 ,he should have supposed that  
we had ourselves previously tried the   
dice1 and knew by ample experience that 
they were fair4 ,another person then    
tries them in our absence1 and assures  
us that he threw sixes ten times in     
succession4 ,is the assertion credible  
or not8 ,here the effect to be accounted
 for is not the occurrence itself1 but  
the fact of the witness's asserting it4 
,this may arise either from its having  

really happened1 or from some other     
cause4 ,what we have to estimate is the 
comparative probability of these two    
suppositions4  ,if the witness affirmed 
that he had thrown any other series of  
numbers1 supposing him to be a person of
 veracity1 and tolerable accuracy1 and  
to profess that he took particular      
notice1 we should believe him4 ,but the 
ten sixes are exactly as likely to have 
been really thrown as the other series4 
,if1 therefore1 this assertion is less  
credible than the other1 the reason must
 be1 not that it is less likely than the
 other to be made truly1 but that it is 
more likely than the other to be made   
falsely4  ,one reason obviously presents
 itself why what is called a            
coincidence1 should be oftener asserted 
falsely than an ordinary combination4   
,it excites wonder4 ,it gratifies the   
love of the marvellous4 ,the motives1   
therefore1 to falsehood1 one of the most
 frequent of which is the desire to     
astonish1 operate more strongly in      

favour of this kind of assertion than of
 the other kind4 ,thus far there is     
evidently more reason for discrediting  
an alleged coincidence1 than a statement
 in itself not more probable1 but which 
if made would not be thought remarkable4
 ,there are cases1 however1 in which the
 presumption on this ground would be the
 other way4 ,there are some witnesses   
who1 the more extraordinary an          
occurrence might appear1 would be the   
more anxious to verify it by the utmost 
carefulness of observation before they  
would venture to believe it1 and still  
more before they would assert it to     
others4    #f4 ,independently1 however1 
of any peculiar chances of mendacity    
arising from the nature of the          
assertion1 ,laplace contends1 that      
merely on the general ground of the     
fallibility of testimony1 a coincidence 
is not credible on the same amount of   
testimony on which we should be         
warranted in believing an ordinary      
combination of events4 ,in order to do  

justice to his argument1 it is necessary
 to illustrate it by the example chosen 
by himself4  ,if1 says ,laplace1 there  
were one thousand tickets in a box1 and 
one only has been drawn out1 then if an 
eye-witness affirms that the number     
drawn was #gi1 this1 though the chances 
were #iii in #ajjj against it1 is not on
 that account the less credible2 its    
credibility is equal to the antecedent  
probability of the witness's veracity4  
,but if there were in the box #iii black
 balls and only one white1 and the      
witness affirms that the white ball was 
drawn1 the case according to ,laplace is
 very different3 the credibility of his 
assertion is but a small fraction of    
what it was in the former case2 the     
reason of the difference being as       
follows4  ,the witnesses of whom we are 
speaking must1 from the nature of the   
case1 be of a kind whose credibility    
falls materially short of certainty3 let
 us suppose1 then1 the credibility of   
the witness in the case in question to  

be #i_/aj2 that is1 let us suppose that 
in every ten statements which the       
witness makes1 nine on an average are   
correct1 and one incorrect4 ,let us now 
suppose that there have taken place a   
sufficient number of drawings to exhaust
 all the possible combinations1 the     
witness deposing in every one4 ,in one  
case out of every ten in all these      
drawings he will actually have made a   
false announcement4 ,but in the case of 
the thousand tickets these false        
announcements will have been distributed
 impartially over all the numbers1 and  
of the #iii cases in which ,no4 #gi was 
not drawn1 there will have been only one
 case in which it was announced4 ,on the
 contrary1 in the case of the thousand  
balls1 7the announcement being always   
either black or white17 if white was not
 drawn1 and there was a false           
announcement1 that false announcement   
must have been white2 and since by the  
supposition there was a false           
announcement once in every ten times1   

white will have been announced falsely  
in one tenth part of all the cases in   
which it was not drawn1 that is1 in one 
tenth part of #iii cases out of every   
thousand4 ,white1 then1 is drawn1 on an 
average1 exactly as often as ,no4 #gi1  
but it is announced1 without having been
 really drawn1 #iii times as often as   
,no4 #gi2 the announcement therefore    
requires a much greater amount of       
testimony to render it credible4#dd  ,to
 make this argument valid it must of    
course be supposed1 that the            
announcements made by the witness are   
average specimens of his general        
veracity and accuracy2 or1 at least1    
that they are neither more nor less so  
in the case of the black and white      
balls1 than in the case of the thousand 
tickets4 ,this assumption1 however1 is  
not warranted4 ,a person is far less    
likely to mistake1 who has only one form
 of error to guard against1 than if he  
had #iii different errors to avoid4 ,for
 instance1 in the example chosen1 a     

messenger who might make a mistake once 
in ten times in reporting the number    
drawn in a lottery1 might not err once  
in a thousand times if sent simply to   
observe whether a ball was black or     
white4 ,laplace's argument therefore is 
faulty even as applied to his own case4 
,still less can that case be received as
 completely representing all cases of   
coincidence4 ,laplace has so contrived  
his example1 that though black answers  
to #iii distinct possibilities1 and     
white only to one1 the witness has      
nevertheless no bias which can make him 
prefer black to white4 ,the witness did 
not know that there were #iii black     
balls in the box and only one white2 or 
if he did1 ,laplace has taken care to   
make all the #iii cases so              
undistinguishably alike1 that there is  
hardly a possibility of any cause of    
falsehood or error operating in favour  
of any of them1 which would not operate 
in the same manner if there were only   
one4 ,alter this supposition1 and the   

whole argument falls to the ground4 ,let
 the balls1 for instance1 be numbered1  
and let the white ball be ,no4 #gi4     
,considered in respect of their colour1 
there are but two things which the      
witness can be interested in asserting1 
or can have dreamt or hallucinated1 or  
has to choose from if he answers at     
random1 viz4 black and white3 but       
considered in respect of the numbers    
attached to them1 there are a thousand3 
and if his interest or error happens to 
be connected with the numbers1 though   
the only assertion he makes is about the
 colour1 the case becomes precisely     
assimilated to that of the thousand     
tickets4 ,or instead of the balls       
suppose a lottery1 with #ajjj tickets   
and but one prize1 and that ,i hold ,no4
 #gi1 and being interested only in that1
 ask the witness not what was the number
 drawn1 but whether it was #gi or some  
other4 ,there are now only two cases1 as
 in ,laplace's example2 yet he surely   
would not say that if the witness       

answered #gi1 the assertion would be in 
an enormous proportion less credible1   
than if he made the same answer to the  
same question asked in the other way4   
,if1 for instance1 7to put a case       
supposed by ,laplace himself17 he has   
staked a large sum on one of the        
chances1 and thinks that by announcing  
its occurrence he shall increase his    
credit2 he is equally likely to have    
betted on any one of the #iii numbers   
which are attached to black balls1 and  
so far as the chances of mendacity from 
this cause are concerned1 there will be 
#iii times as many chances of his       
announcing black falsely1 as white4  ,or
 suppose a regiment of #ajjj men1 #iii  
,englishmen and one ,frenchman1 and that
 of these one man has been killed1 and  
it is not known which4 ,i ask the       
question1 and the witness answers1 the  
,frenchman4 ,this was not only as       
improbable  priori1 but is in itself as 
singular a circumstance1 as remarkable a
 coincidence1 as the drawing of the     

white ball3 yet we should believe the   
statement as readily1 as if the answer  
had been ,john ,thompson4 ,because      
though the #iii ,englishmen were all    
alike in the point in which they        
differed from the ,frenchman1 they were 
not1 like the #iii black balls1         
undistinguishable in every other        
respect2 but being all different1 they  
admitted as many chances of interest or 
error1 as if each man had been of a     
different nation2 and if a lie was told 
or a mistake made1 the misstatement was 
as likely to fall on any ,jones or      
,thompson of the set1 as on the         
,frenchman4  ,the example of a          
coincidence selected by ,d',alembert1   
that of sixes thrown on a pair of dice  
ten times in succession1 belongs to this
 sort of cases rather than to such as   
,laplace's4 ,the coincidence is here far
 more remarkable1 because of far rarer  
occurrence1 than the drawing of the     
white ball4 ,but though the             
improbability of its really occurring is

 greater1 the superior probability of   
its being announced falsely cannot be   
established with the same evidence4 ,the
 announcement black represented #iii    
cases1 but the witness may not have     
known this1 and if he did1 the #iii     
cases are so exactly alike1 that there  
is really only one set of possible      
causes of mendacity corresponding to the
 whole4 ,the announcement sixes not     
drawn ten times1 represents1 and is     
known by the witness to represent1 a    
great multitude of contingencies1 every 
one of which being unlike every other1  
there may be a different and a fresh set
 of causes of mendacity corresponding to
 each4  ,it appears to me1 therefore1   
that ,laplace's doctrine is not strictly
 true of any coincidences1 and is wholly
 inapplicable to most3 and that to know 
whether a coincidence does or does not  
require more evidence to render it      
credible than an ordinary event1 we must
 refer1 in every instance1 to first     
principles1 and estimate afresh what is 

the probability that the given testimony
 would have been delivered in that      
instance1 supposing the fact which it   
asserts not to be true4  ,with these    
remarks we close the discussion of the  
,grounds of ,disbelief2 and along with  
it1 such exposition as space admits1 and
 as the writer has it in his power to   
furnish1 of the ,logic of ,induction4   
,,footnotes3  #a ,cours de ,philosophie 
,positive1 ii4 #fef4  #b ,vide supra1   
book iii4 ch4 xi4  #c ,philosophy of    
,discovery1 pp4 #ahe et seqq4  #d       
,philosophie ,positive1 ii4 #dcd-dcg4   
#e ,as an example of legitimate         
hypothesis according to the test here   
laid down1 has been justly cited that of
 ,broussais1 who1 proceeding on the very
 rational principle that every disease  
must originate in some definite part or 
other of the organism1 boldly assumed   
that certain fevers1 which not being    
known to be local were called           
constitutional1 had their origin in the 
mucous membrane of the alimentary canal4

 ,the supposition was indeed1 as is now 
generally admitted1 erroneous2 but he   
was justified in making it1 since by    
deducing the consequences of the        
supposition1 and comparing them with the
 facts of those maladies1 he might be   
certain of disproving his hypothesis if 
it was ill founded1 and might expect    
that the comparison would materially aid
 him in framing another more conformable
 to the phenomena4  ,the doctrine now   
universally received1 that the earth is 
a natural magnet1 was originally an     
hypothesis of the celebrated ,gilbert4  
,another hypothesis1 to the legitimacy  
of which no objection can lie1 and which
 is well calculated to light the path of
 scientific inquiry1 is that suggested  
by several recent writers1 that the     
brain is a voltaic pile1 and that each  
of its pulsations is a discharge of     
electricity through the system4 ,it has 
been remarked that the sensation felt by
 the hand from the beating of a brain1  
bears a strong resemblance to a voltaic 

shock4 ,and the hypothesis1 if followed 
to its consequences1 might afford a     
plausible explanation of many           
physiological facts1 while there is     
nothing to discourage the hope that we  
may in time sufficiently understand the 
conditions of voltaic phenomena to      
render the truth of the hypothesis      
amenable to observation and experiment4 
,the attempt to localize1 in different  
regions of the brain1 the physical      
organs of our different mental faculties
 and propensities1 was1 on the part of  
its original author1 a legitimate       
example of a scientific hypothesis2 and 
we ought not1 therefore1 to blame him   
for the extremely slight grounds on     
which he often proceeded1 in an         
operation which could only be tentative1
 though we may regret that materials    
barely sufficient for a first rude      
hypothesis should have been hastily     
worked up into the vain semblance of a  
science4 ,if there be really a connexion
 between the scale of mental endowments 

and the various degrees of complication 
in the cerebral system1 the nature of   
that connexion was in no other way so   
likely to be brought to light as by     
framing1 in the first instance1 an      
hypothesis similar to that of ,gall4    
,but the verification of any such       
hypothesis is attended1 from the        
peculiar nature of the phenomena1 with  
difficulties which phrenologists have   
not shown themselves even competent to  
appreciate1 much less to overcome4  ,mr4
 ,darwin's remarkable speculation on the
 ,origin of ,species is another         
unimpeachable example of a legitimate   
hypothesis4 ,what he terms natural      
selection is not only a vera causa1 but 
one proved to be capable of producing   
effects of the same kind with those     
which the hypothesis ascribes to it3 the
 question of possibility is entirely one
 of degree4 ,it is unreasonable to      
accuse ,mr4 ,darwin 7as has been done7  
of violating the rules of ,induction4   
,the rules of ,induction are concerned  

with the conditions of ,proof4 ,mr4     
,darwin has never pretended that his    
doctrine was proved4 ,he was not bound  
by the rules of ,induction1 but by those
 of ,hypothesis4 ,and these last have   
seldom been more completely fulfilled4  
,he has opened a path of inquiry full of
 promise1 the results of which none can 
foresee4 ,and is it not a wonderful feat
 of scientific knowledge and ingenuity  
to have rendered so bold a suggestion1  
which the first impulse of every one was
 to reject at once1 admissible and      
discussable1 even as a conjecture8  #f  
,whewell's ,phil4 of ,discovery1 pp4    
#bge1 #bgf4  #g ,what has most          
contributed to accredit the hypothesis  
of a physical medium for the conveyance 
of light1 is the certain fact that light
 travels1 7which cannot be proved of    
gravitation17 that its communication is 
not instantaneous1 but requires time1   
and that it is intercepted 7which       
gravitation is not7 by intervening      
objects4 ,these are analogies between   

its phenomena and those of the          
mechanical motion of a solid or fluid   
substance4 ,but we are not entitled to  
assume that mechanical motion is the    
only power in nature capable of         
exhibiting those attributes4  #h ,phil4 
of ,disc4 p4 #bgd4  #i ,p4 #bga4  #aj   
,p4 #bea and the whole of ,appendix ,g4 
#aa ,in ,dr4 ,whewell's latest version  
of his theory 7,philosophy of           
,discovery1 p4 #cca7 he makes a         
concession respecting the medium of the 
transmission of light1 which1 taken in  
conjunction with the rest of his        
doctrine on the subject1 is not1 ,i     
confess1 very intelligible to me1 but   
which goes far towards removing1 if it  
does not actually remove1 the whole of  
the difference between us4 ,he is       
contending1 against ,sir ,william       
,hamilton1 that all matter has weight4  
,sir ,william1 in proof of the contrary1
 cited the luminiferous ether1 and the  
calorific and electric fluids1 which1 he
 said1 we can neither denude of their   

character of substance1 nor clothe with 
the attribute of weight4 ,to which1     
continues ,dr4 ,whewell1 my reply is1   
that precisely because ,i cannot clothe 
these agents with the attribute of      
,weight1 ,i do denude them of the       
character of ,substance4 ,they are not  
substances1 but agencies4 ,these        
,imponderable ,agents1 are not properly 
called ,imponderable ,fluids4 ,this ,i  
conceive that ,i have proved4 ,nothing  
can be more philosophical4 ,but if the  
luminiferous ether is not matter1 and   
fluid matter too1 what is the meaning of
 its undulations8 ,can an agency        
undulate8 ,can there be alternate motion
 forward and backward of the particles  
of an agency8 ,and does not the whole   
mathematical theory of the undulations  
imply them to be material8 ,is it not a 
series of deductions from the known     
properties of elastic fluids8 ,this     
opinion of ,dr4 ,whewell reduces the    
undulations to a figure of speech1 and  
the undulatory theory to the proposition

 which all must admit1 that the         
transmission of light takes place       
according to laws which present a very  
striking and remarkable agreement with  
those of undulations4 ,if ,dr4 ,whewell 
is prepared to stand by this doctrine1  
,i have no difference with him on the   
subject4  ,since this chapter was       
written1 the hypothesis of the          
luminiferous ether has acquired a great 
accession of apparent strength1 by being
 adopted into the new doctrine of the   
,conservation of ,force1 as affording a 
mechanism by which to explain the mode  
of production not of light only1 but of 
heat1 and probably of all the other     
so-called imponderable agencies4 ,in the
 present immature stage of the great    
speculation in question1 ,i would not   
undertake to define the ultimate        
relation of the hypothetical fluid to   
it2 but ,i must remark that the         
essential part of the new theory1 the   
reciprocal convertibility and           
interchangeability of these great cosmic

 agencies1 is quite independent of the  
molecular motions which have been       
imagined as the immediate causes of     
those different manifestations and of   
their substitutions for one another2 and
 the former doctrine by no means        
necessarily carries the latter with it4 
,i confess that the entire theory of the
 vibrations of the ether1 and the       
movements which these vibrations are    
supposed to communicate to the particles
 of solid bodies1 seems to me at present
 the weakest part of the new system1    
tending rather to weigh down than to    
prop up those of its doctrines which    
rest on real scientific induction4  #ab 
,thus1 water1 of which eight-ninths in  
weight are oxygen1 dissolves most bodies
 which contain a high proportion of     
oxygen1 such as all the nitrates1 7which
 have more oxygen than any others of the
 common salts17 most of the sulphates1  
many of the carbonates1 c4 ,again1      
bodies largely composed of combustible  
elements1 like hydrogen and carbon1 are 

soluble in bodies of similar            
composition2 rosin1 for instance1 will  
dissolve in alcohol1 tar in oil of      
turpentine4 ,this empirical             
generalization is far from being        
universally true2 no doubt because it is
 a remote1 and therefore easily         
defeated1 result of general laws too    
deep for us at present to penetrate2 but
 it will probably in time suggest       
processes of inquiry1 leading to the    
discovery of those laws4  #ac ,or       
7according to ,laplace's theory7 the sun
 and the sun's rotation4  #ad ,supra1   
book iii4 ch4 v4  #g4  #ae ,supra1 book 
iii4 ch4 x4  #b4  #af ,in the preceding 
discussion1 the mean is spoken of as if 
it were exactly the same thing with the 
average4 ,but the mean for purposes of  
inductive inquiry1 is not the average1  
or arithmetical mean1 though in a       
familiar illustration of the theory the 
difference may be disregarded4 ,if the  
deviations on one side of the average   
are much more numerous than those on the

 other 7these last being fewer but      
greater71 the effect due to the         
invariable cause1 as distinct from the  
variable ones1 will not coincide with   
the average1 but will be either below or
 above the average1 whichever be the    
side on which the greatest number of the
 instances are found4 ,this follows from
 a truth1 ascertained both inductively  
and deductively1 that small deviations  
from the true central point are greatly 
more frequent than large ones4 ,the     
mathematical law is1 that the most      
probable determination of one or more   
invariable elements from observation is 
that in which the sum of the squares of 
the individual aberrations1 or          
deviations1 shall be the least possible4
 ,see this principle stated1 and its    
grounds popularly explained1 by ,sir    
,john ,herschel1 in his review of       
,quetelet on ,probabilities1 ,essays1   
pp4 #cie et seq4  #ag ,essai            
,philosophique sur les ,probabilits1    
fifth ,paris ,edition1 p4 #g4  #ah ,it  

even appears to me that the calculation 
of chances1 where there are no data     
grounded either on special experience or
 on special inference1 must1 in an      
immense majority of cases1 break down1  
from sheer impossibility of assigning   
any principle by which to be guided in  
setting out the list of possibilities4  
,in the case of the coloured balls we   
have no difficulty in making the        
enumeration1 because we ourselves       
determine what the possibilities shall  
be4 ,but suppose a case more analogous  
to those which occur in nature3 instead 
of three colours1 let there be in the   
box all possible colours3 we being      
supposed ignorant of the comparative    
frequency with which different colours  
occur in nature1 or in the productions  
of art4 ,how is the list of cases to be 
made out8 ,is every distinct shade to   
count as a colour8 ,if so1 is the test  
to be a common eye1 or an educated eye1 
a painter's for instance8 ,on the answer
 to these questions would depend whether

 the chances against some particular    
colour would be estimated at ten1       
twenty1 or perhaps five hundred to one4 
,while if we knew from experience that  
the particular colour occurs on an      
average a certain number of times in    
every hundred or thousand1 we should not
 require to know anything either of the 
frequency or of the number of the other 
possibilities4  #ai ,prospective ,review
 for ,february #ahej4  #bj ,if this be  
not so1 why do we feel so much more     
probability added by the first instance1
 than by any single subsequent instance8
 ,why1 except that the first instance   
gives us its possibility 7a cause       
adequate to it71 while every other only 
gives us the frequency of its           
conditions8 ,if no reference to a cause 
be supposed1 possibility would have no  
meaning2 yet it is clear1 that1         
antecedent to its happening1 we might   
have supposed the event impossible1     
i4e41 have believed that there was no   
physical energy really existing in the  

world equal to producing it4444 ,after  
the first time of happening1 which is1  
then1 more important to the whole       
probability than any other single       
instance 7because proving the           
possibility71 the number of times       
becomes important as an index to the    
intensity or extent of the cause1 and   
its independence of any particular time4
 ,if we took the case of a tremendous   
leap1 for instance1 and wished to form  
an estimate of the probability of its   
succeeding a certain number of times2   
the first instance1 by showing its      
possibility 7before doubtful7 is of the 
most importance2 but every succeeding   
leap shows the power to be more         
perfectly under control1 greater and    
more invariable1 and so increases the   
probability2 and no one would think of  
reasoning in this case straight from one
 instance to the next1 without referring
 to the physical energy which each leap 
indicated4 ,is it not then clear that we
 do not ever 7let us rather say1 that we

 do not in an advanced state of our     
knowledge7 conclude directly from the   
happening of an event to the probability
 of its happening again2 but that we    
refer to the cause1 regarding the past  
cases as an index to the cause1 and the 
cause as our guide to the               
future8--,ibid4  #ba ,the writer last   
quoted says that the valuation of       
chances by comparing the number of cases
 in which the event occurs with the     
number in which it does not occur1 would
 generally be wholly erroneous1 and is  
not the true theory of probability4 ,it 
is at least that which forms the        
foundation of insurance1 and of all     
those calculations of chances in the    
business of life which experience so    
abundantly verifies4 ,the reason which  
the reviewer gives for rejecting the    
theory1 is that it would regard an event
 as certain which had hitherto never    
failed2 which is exceedingly far from   
the truth1 even for a very large number 
of constant successes4 ,this is not a   

defect in a particular theory1 but in   
any theory of chances4 ,no principle of 
evaluation can provide for such a case  
as that which the reviewer supposes4 ,if
 an event has never once failed1 in a   
number of trials sufficient to eliminate
 chance1 it really has all the certainty
 which can be given by an empirical law3
 it is certain during the continuance of
 the same collocation of causes which   
existed during the observations4 ,if it 
ever fails1 it is in consequence of some
 change in that collocation4 ,now1 no   
theory of chances will enable us to     
infer the future probability of an event
 from the past1 if the causes in        
operation1 capable of influencing the   
event1 have intermediately undergone a  
change4  #bb ,pp4 #ah1 #ai4 ,the theorem
 is not stated by ,laplace in the exact 
terms in which ,i have stated it2 but   
the identity of import of the two modes 
of expression is easily demonstrable4   
#bc ,for a fuller treatment of the many 
interesting questions raised by the     

theory of probabilities1 ,i may now     
refer to a recent work by ,mr4 ,venn1   
,fellow of ,caius ,college1 ,cambridge1 
,the ,logic of ,chance2 one of the most 
thoughtful and philosophical treatises  
on any subject connected with ,logic and
 ,evidence1 which have been produced in 
this or any other country for many      
years4 ,some criticisms contained in it 
have been very useful to me in revising 
the corresponding chapters of the       
present work4 ,in several of ,mr4       
,venn's opinions1 however1 ,i do not    
agree4 ,what these are will be obvious  
to any reader of ,mr4 ,venn's work who  
is also a reader of this4  #bd ,there   
was no greater foundation for this than 
for ,newton's celebrated conjecture that
 the diamond was combustible4 ,he       
grounded his guess on the very high     
refracting power of the diamond1        
comparatively to its density2 a         
peculiarity which had been observed to  
exist in combustible substances2 and on 
similar grounds he conjectured that     

water1 though not combustible1 contained
 a combustible ingredient4 ,experiment  
having subsequently shown that in both  
instances he guessed right1 the prophecy
 is considered to have done great honour
 to his scientific sagacity2 but it is  
to this day uncertain whether the guess 
was1 in truth1 what there are so many   
examples of in the history of science1 a
 farsighted anticipation of a law       
afterwards to be discovered4 ,the       
progress of science has not hitherto    
shown ground for believing that there is
 any real connexion between             
combustibility and a high refracting    
power4  #be ,hartley's ,observations on 
,man1 vol4 i4 p4 #af4 ,the passage is   
not in ,priestley's curtailed edition4  
#bf ,i am happy to be able to quote the 
following excellent passage from ,mr4   
,baden ,powell's ,essay on the          
,inductive ,philosophy1 in confirmation1
 both in regard to history and to       
doctrine1 of the statement made in the  
text4 ,speaking of the conviction of the

 universal and permanent uniformity of  
nature1 ,mr4 ,powell says 7pp4 #ih-ajj71
  ,we may remark that this idea1 in its 
proper extent1 is by no means one of    
popular acceptance or natural growth4   
,just so far as the daily experience of 
every one goes1 so far indeed he comes  
to embrace a certain persuasion of this 
kind1 but merely to this limited extent1
 that what is going on around him at    
present1 in his own narrow sphere of    
observation1 will go on in like manner  
in future4 ,the peasant believes that   
the sun which rose to-day will rise     
again to-morrow2 that the seed put into 
the ground will be followed in due time 
by the harvest this year as it was last 
year1 and the like2 but has no notion of
 such inferences in subjects beyond his 
immediate observation4 ,and it should be
 observed that each class of persons1 in
 admitting this belief within the       
limited range of his own experience1    
though he doubt or deny it in everything
 beyond1 is1 in fact1 bearing           

unconscious testimony to its universal  
truth4 ,nor1 again1 is it only among the
 most ignorant that this limitation is  
put upon the truth4 ,there is a very    
general propensity to believe that      
everything beyond common experience1 or 
especially ascertained laws of nature1  
is left to the dominion of chance or    
fate or arbitrary intervention2 and even
 to object to any attempted explanation 
by physical causes1 if conjecturally    
thrown out for an apparently            
unaccountable phenomenon4  ,the precise 
doctrine of the generalization of this  
idea of the uniformity of nature1 so far
 from being obvious1 natural1 or        
intuitive1 is utterly beyond the        
attainment of the many4 ,in all the     
extent of its universality it is        
characteristic of the philosopher4 ,it  
is clearly the result of philosophic    
cultivation and training1 and by no     
means the spontaneous offspring of any  
primary principle naturally inherent in 
the mind1 as some seem to believe4 ,it  

is no mere vague persuasion taken up    
without examination1 as a common        
prepossession to which we are always    
accustomed2 on the contrary1 all common 
prejudices and associations are against 
it4 ,it is pre-eminently an acquired    
idea4 ,it is not attained without deep  
study and reflection4 ,the best informed
 philosopher is the man who most firmly 
believes it1 even in opposition to      
received notions2 its acceptance depends
 on the extent and profoundness of his  
inductive studies4  #bg ,supra1 book    
iii4 ch4 iii4  #a4  #bh ,it deserves    
remark1 that these early generalizations
 did not1 like scientific inductions1   
presuppose causation4 ,what they did    
presuppose1 was uniformity in physical  
facts4 ,but the observers were as ready 
to presume uniformity in the            
coexistences of facts as in the         
sequences4 ,on the other hand1 they     
never thought of assuming that this     
uniformity was a principle pervading all
 nature3 their generalizations did not  

imply that there was uniformity in      
everything1 but only that as much       
uniformity as existed within their      
observation1 existed also beyond it4    
,the induction1 ,fire burns1 does not   
require for its validity that all nature
 should observe uniform laws1 but only  
that there should be uniformity in one  
particular class of natural phenomena3  
the effects of fire on the senses and on
 combustible substances4 ,and uniformity
 to this extent was not assumed1        
anterior to the experience1 but proved  
by the experience4 ,the same observed   
instances which proved the narrower     
truth1 proved as much of the wider one  
as corresponded to it4 ,it is from      
losing sight of this fact1 and          
considering the law of causation in its 
full extent as necessarily presupposed  
in the very earliest generalizations1   
that persons have been led into the     
belief that the law of causation is     
known  priori1 and is not itself a      
conclusion from experience4  #bi ,book  

ii4 chap4 iii4  #cj ,one of the most    
rising thinkers of the new generation in
 ,france1 ,m4 ,taine 7who has given1 in 
the ,revue des ,deux ,mondes1 the most  
masterly analysis1 at least in one point
 of view1 ever made of the present      
work71 though he rejects1 on this and   
similar points of psychology1 the       
intuition theory in its ordinary form1  
nevertheless assigns to the law of      
causation1 and to some other of the most
 universal laws1 that certainty beyond  
the bounds of human experience1 which ,i
 have not been able to accord to them4  
,he does this on the faith of our       
faculty of abstraction1 in which he     
seems to recognise an independent source
 of evidence1 not indeed disclosing     
truths not contained in our experience1 
but affording an assurance which        
experience cannot give1 of the          
universality of those which it does     
contain4 ,by abstraction ,m4 ,taine     
seems to think that we are able1 not    
merely to analyse that part of nature   

which we see1 and exhibit apart the     
elements which pervade it1 but to       
distinguish such of them as are elements
 of the system of nature considered as a
 whole1 not incidents belonging to our  
limited terrestrial experience4 ,i am   
not sure that ,i fully enter into ,m4   
,taine's meaning2 but ,i confess ,i do  
not see how any mere abstract           
conception1 elicited by our minds from  
our experience1 can be evidence of an   
objective fact in universal ,nature1    
beyond what the experience itself bears 
witness of2 or how1 in the process of   
interpreting in general language the    
testimony of experience1 the limitations
 of the testimony itself can be cast    
off4  #ca ,book i4 chap4 vii4  #cb ,in  
some cases1 a ,kind is sufficiently     
identified by some one remarkable       
property3 but most commonly several are 
required2 each property considered      
singly1 being a joint property of that  
and of other ,kinds4 ,the colour and    
brightness of the diamond are common to 

it with the paste from which false      
diamonds are made2 its octohedral form  
is common to it with alum1 and magnetic 
iron ore2 but the colour and brightness 
and the form together1 identify its     
,kind2 that is1 are a mark to us that it
 is combustible2 that when burnt it     
produces carbonic acid2 that it cannot  
be cut with any known substance2        
together with many other ascertained    
properties1 and the fact that there     
exist an indefinite number still        
unascertained4  #cc ,this doctrine of   
course assumes that the allotropic forms
 of what is chemically the same         
substance are so many different ,kinds2 
and such1 in the sense in which the word
 ,kind is used in this treatise1 they   
really are4  #cd ,mr4 ,de ,morgan1 in   
his ,formal ,logic1 makes the just      
remark1 that from two such premises as  
,most ,a are ,b1 and ,most ,a are ,c1 we
 may infer with certainty that some ,b  
are ,c4 ,but this is the utmost limit of
 the conclusions which can be drawn from

 two approximate generalizations1 when  
the precise degree of their             
approximation to universality is unknown
 or undefined4  #ce ,rationale of       
,judicial ,evidence1 vol4 iii4 p4 #bbd4 
#cf ,supra1 vol4 i4 p4 #aae4  #cg       
,supra1 book i4 ch4 v4  #a1 and book ii4
 ch4 v4  #e4  #ch ,the axiom1 ,equals   
subtracted from equals leave equal      
differences1 may be demonstrated from   
the two axioms in the text4 ,if ,a  a   
and ,b  b1 ,a - ,b  a - b4 ,for if not1 
let ,a - ,b  a - b  c4 ,then since ,b   
b1 adding equals to equals1 ,a  a  c4   
,but ,a  a4 ,therefore a  a  c1 which is
 impossible4  ,this proposition having  
been demonstrated1 we may1 by means of  
it1 demonstrate the following3 ,if      
equals be added to unequals1 the sums   
are unequal4 ,if ,a  a and ,b not  b1 ,a
  ,b is not  a  b4 ,for suppose it be   
so4 ,then1 since ,a  a and ,a  ,b  a  b1
 subtracting equals from equals1 ,b  b2 
which is contrary to the hypothesis4    
,so again1 it may be proved that two    

things1 one of which is equal and the   
other unequal to a third thing1 are     
unequal to one another4 ,if ,a  a and ,a
 not  ,b1 neither is a  ,b4 ,for suppose
 it to be equal4 ,then since ,a  a and a
  ,b1 and since things equal to the same
 thing are equal to one another1 ,a  ,b3
 which is contrary to the hypothesis4   
#ci ,geometers have usually preferred to
 define parallel lines by the property  
of being in the same plane and never    
meeting4 ,this1 however1 has rendered it
 necessary for them to assume1 as an    
additional axiom1 some other property of
 parallel lines2 and the unsatisfactory 
manner in which properties for that     
purpose have been selected by ,euclid   
and others has always been deemed the   
opprobrium of elementary geometry4 ,even
 as a verbal definition1 equidistance is
 a fitter property to characterize      
parallels by1 since it is the attribute 
really involved in the signification of 
the name4 ,if to be in the same plane   
and never to meet were all that is meant

 by being parallel1 we should feel no   
incongruity in speaking of a curve as   
parallel to its asymptote4 ,the meaning 
of parallel lines is1 lines which pursue
 exactly the same direction1 and which1 
therefore1 neither draw nearer nor go   
farther from one another2 a conception  
suggested at once by the contemplation  
of nature4 ,that the lines will never   
meet is of course included in the more  
comprehensive proposition that they are 
everywhere equally distant4 ,and that   
any straight lines which are in the same
 plane and not equidistant will         
certainly meet1 may be demonstrated in  
the most rigorous manner from the       
fundamental property of straight lines  
assumed in the text1 viz4 that if they  
set out from the same point1 they       
diverge more and more without limit4    
#dj ,philosophie ,positive1 iii4        
#dad-daf4  #da ,see the two remarkable  
notes 7,a7 and 7,f71 appended to his    
,inquiry into the ,relation of ,cause   
and ,effect4  #db ,supra1 pp4 #aai1     

#abj4  #dc ,a writer to whom ,i have    
several times referred1 gives as the    
definition of an impossibility1 that    
which there exists in the world no cause
 adequate to produce4 ,this definition  
does not take in such impossibilities as
 these--that two and two should make    
five2 that two straight lines should    
inclose a space2 or that anything should
 begin to exist without a cause4 ,i can 
think of no definition of impossibility 
comprehensive enough to include all its 
varieties1 except the one which ,i have 
given3 viz4 ,an impossibility is that1  
the truth of which would conflict with a
 complete induction1 that is1 with the  
most conclusive evidence which we       
possess of universal truth4  ,as to the 
reputed impossibilities which rest on no
 other grounds than our ignorance of any
 cause capable of producing the supposed
 effects2 very few of them are certainly
 impossible1 or permanently incredible4 
,the facts of travelling seventy miles  
an hour1 painless surgical operations1  

and conversing by instantaneous signals 
between ,london and ,new ,york1 held a  
high place1 not many years ago1 among   
such impossibilities4  #dd ,not1        
however1 as might at first sight appear1
 #iii times as much4 ,a complete        
analysis of the cases shows that 7always
 assuming the veracity of the witness to
 be #i_/aj7 in #aj1jjj drawings1 the    
drawing of ,no4 #gi will occur nine     
times1 and be announced incorrectly     
once2 the credibility therefore of the  
announcement of ,no4 #gi is #i_/aj2     
while the drawing of a white ball will  
occur nine times1 and be announced      
incorrectly #iii times4 ,the credibility
 therefore of the announcement of white 
is #i_/ajjh1 and the ratio of the two   
#ajjh3aj2 the one announcement being    
thus only about a hundred times more    
credible than the other1 instead of #iii
 times4     ,,book ,,iv4  ,,of          
,,operations ,,subsidiary ,,to          
,,induction4   ,clear and distinct ideas
 are terms which1 though familiar and   

frequent in men's mouths1 ,i have reason
 to think every one who uses does not   
perfectly understand4 ,and possibly it  
is but here and there one who gives     
himself the trouble to consider them so 
far as to know what he himself or others
 precisely mean by them2 ,i have1       
therefore1 in most places1 chose to put 
determinate or determined1 instead of   
clear and distinct1 as more likely to   
direct men's thoughts to my meaning in  
this matter4--,,locke',s ,essay on the  
,human ,understanding2 ,epistle to the  
,reader4  ,il ne peut y avoir qu'une    
mthode parfaite1 qui est la mthode      
naturelle2 on nomme ainsi un arrangement
 dans lequel les tres du mme genre      
seraient plus voisins entre eux que ceux
 de tous les autres genres2 les genres  
du mme ordre1 plus que ceux de tous les 
autres ordres2 et ainsi de suite4 ,cette
 mthode est l'idal auquel l'histoire    
naturelle doit tendre2 car il est vident
 que si l'on y parvenait1 l'on aurait   
l'expression exacte et complte de la    

nature entire4--,,cuvier1 ,rgne ,animal1
 ,introduction4  ,deux grandes notions  
philosophiques dominent la thorie       
fondamentale de la mthode naturelle     
proprement dite1 savoir la formation des
 groupes naturels1 et ensuite leur      
succession hirarchique4--,,comte1 ,cours
 de ,philosophie ,positive1 #dbme leon4 
,,chapter ,i4  ,,of ,,observation ,,and 
,,description4    #a4 ,the inquiry which
 occupied us in the two preceding books1
 has conducted us to what appears a     
satisfactory solution of the principal  
problem of ,logic1 according to the     
conception ,i have formed of the        
science4 ,we have found1 that the mental
 process with which ,logic is           
conversant1 the operation of            
ascertaining truths by means of         
evidence1 is always1 even when          
appearances point to a different theory 
of it1 a process of induction4 ,and we  
have particularized the various modes of
 induction1 and obtained a clear view of
 the principles to which it must        

conform1 in order to lead to results    
which can be relied on4  ,the           
consideration of ,induction1 however1   
does not end with the direct rules for  
its performance4 ,something must be said
 of those other operations of the mind1 
which are either necessarily presupposed
 in all induction1 or are instrumental  
to the more difficult and complicated   
inductive processes4 ,the present book  
will be devoted to the consideration of 
these subsidiary operations3 among which
 our attention must first be given to   
those1 which are indispensable          
preliminaries to all induction          
whatsoever4  ,induction being merely the
 extension to a class of cases1 of      
something which has been observed to be 
true in certain individual instances of 
the class2 the first place among the    
operations subsidiary to induction1 is  
claimed by ,observation4 ,this is not1  
however1 the place to lay down rules for
 making good observers2 nor is it within
 the competence of ,logic to do so1 but 

of the art of intellectual ,education4  
,our business with observation is only  
in its connexion with the appropriate   
problem of logic1 the estimation of     
evidence4 ,we have to consider1 not how 
or what to observe1 but under what      
conditions observation is to be relied  
on2 what is needful1 in order that the  
fact1 supposed to be observed1 may      
safely be received as true4    #b4 ,the 
answer to this question is very simple1 
at least in its first aspect4 ,the sole 
condition is1 that what is supposed to  
have been observed shall really have    
been observed2 that it be an            
observation1 not an inference4 ,for in  
almost every act of our perceiving      
faculties1 observation and inference are
 intimately blended4 ,what we are said  
to observe is usually a compound result1
 of which one-tenth may be observation1 
and the remaining nine-tenths inference4
  ,i affirm1 for example1 that ,i hear a
 man's voice4 ,this would pass1 in      
common language1 for a direct           

perception4 ,all1 however1 which is     
really perception1 is that ,i hear a    
sound4 ,that the sound is a voice1 and  
that voice the voice of a man1 are not  
perceptions but inferences4 ,i affirm1  
again1 that ,i saw my brother at a      
certain hour this morning4 ,if any      
proposition concerning a matter of fact 
would commonly be said to be known by   
the direct testimony of the senses1 this
 surely would be so4 ,the truth1        
however1 is far otherwise4 ,i only saw a
 certain coloured surface2 or rather ,i 
had the kind of visual sensations which 
are usually produced by a coloured      
surface2 and from these as marks1 known 
to be such by previous experience1 ,i   
concluded that ,i saw my brother4 ,i    
might have had sensations precisely     
similar1 when my brother was not there4 
,i might have seen some other person so 
nearly resembling him in appearance1 as1
 at the distance1 and with the degree of
 attention which ,i bestowed1 to be     
mistaken for him4 ,i might have been    

asleep1 and have dreamed that ,i saw    
him2 or in a state of nervous disorder1 
which brought his image before me in a  
waking hallucination4 ,in all these     
modes1 many have been led to believe    
that they saw persons well known to     
them1 who were dead or far distant4 ,if 
any of these suppositions had been true1
 the affirmation that ,i saw my brother 
would have been erroneous2 but whatever 
was matter of direct perception1 namely 
the visual sensations1 would have been  
real4 ,the inference only would have    
been ill grounded2 ,i should have       
ascribed those sensations to a wrong    
cause4  ,innumerable instances might be 
given1 and analysed in the same manner1 
of what are vulgarly called errors of   
sense4 ,there are none of them properly 
errors of sense2 they are erroneous     
inferences from sense4 ,when ,i look at 
a candle through a multiplying glass1 ,i
 see what seems a dozen candles instead 
of one3 and if the real circumstances of
 the case were skilfully disguised1 ,i  

might suppose that there were really    
that number2 there would be what is     
called an optical deception4 ,in the    
kaleidoscope there really is that       
deception3 when ,i look through the     
instrument1 instead of what is actually 
there1 namely a casual arrangement of   
coloured fragments1 the appearance      
presented is that of the same           
combination several times repeated in   
symmetrical arrangement round a point4  
,the delusion is of course effected by  
giving me the same sensations which ,i  
should have had if such a symmetrical   
combination had really been presented to
 me4 ,if ,i cross two of my fingers1 and
 bring any small object1 a marble for   
instance1 into contact with both1 at    
points not usually touched              
simultaneously by one object1 ,i can    
hardly1 if my eyes are shut1 help       
believing that there are two marbles    
instead of one4 ,but it is not my touch 
in this case1 nor my sight in the other1
 which is deceived2 the deception1      

whether durable or only momentary1 is in
 my judgment4 ,from my senses ,i have   
only the sensations1 and those are      
genuine4 ,being accustomed to have those
 or similar sensations when1 and only   
when1 a certain arrangement of outward  
objects is present to my organs1 ,i have
 the habit of instantly1 when ,i        
experience the sensations1 inferring the
 existence of that state of outward     
things4 ,this habit has become so       
powerful1 that the inference1 performed 
with the speed and certainty of an      
instinct1 is confounded with intuitive  
perceptions4 ,when it is correct1 ,i am 
unconscious that it ever needed proof2  
even when ,i know it to be incorrect1 ,i
 cannot without considerable effort     
abstain from making it4 ,in order to be 
aware that it is not made by instinct   
but by an acquired habit1 ,i am obliged 
to reflect on the slow process through  
which ,i learnt to judge by the eye of  
many things which ,i now appear to      
perceive directly by sight2 and on the  

reverse operation performed by persons  
learning to draw1 who with difficulty   
and labour divest themselves of their   
acquired perceptions1 and learn afresh  
to see things as they appear to the eye4
  ,it would be easy to prolong these    
illustrations1 were there any need to   
expatiate on a topic so copiously       
exemplified in various popular works4   
,from the examples already given1 it is 
seen sufficiently1 that the individual  
facts from which we collect our         
inductive generalizations are scarcely  
ever obtained by observation alone4     
,observation extends only to the        
sensations by which we recognise        
objects2 but the propositions which we  
make use of1 either in science or in    
common life1 relate mostly to the       
objects themselves4 ,in every act of    
what is called observation1 there is at 
least one inference--from the sensations
 to the presence of the object2 from the
 marks or diagnostics1 to the entire    
phenomenon4 ,and hence1 among other     

consequences1 follows the seeming       
paradox1 that a general proposition     
collected from particulars is often more
 certainly true than any one of the     
particular propositions from which1 by  
an act of induction1 it was inferred4   
,for1 each of those particular 7or      
rather singular7 propositions involved  
an inference1 from the impression on the
 senses to the fact which caused that   
impression3 and this inference may have 
been erroneous in any one of the        
instances1 but cannot well have been    
erroneous in all of them1 provided their
 number was sufficient to eliminate     
chance4 ,the conclusion1 therefore1 that
 is1 the general proposition1 may       
deserve more complete reliance than it  
would be safe to repose in any one of   
the inductive premises4  ,the logic of  
observation1 then1 consists solely in a 
correct discrimination between that1 in 
a result of observation1 which has      
really been perceived1 and that which is
 an inference from the perception4      

,whatever portion is inference1 is      
amenable to the rules of induction      
already treated of1 and requires no     
further notice here3 the question for us
 in this place is1 when all which is    
inference is taken away1 what remains4  
,there remains1 in the first place1 the 
mind's own feelings or states of        
consciousness1 namely1 its outward      
feelings or sensations1 and its inward  
feelings--its thoughts1 emotions1 and   
volitions4 ,whether anything else       
remains1 or all else is inference from  
this2 whether the mind is capable of    
directly perceiving or apprehending     
anything except states of its own       
consciousness--is a problem of          
metaphysics not to be discussed in this 
place4 ,but after excluding all         
questions on which metaphysicians       
differ1 it remains true1 that for most  
purposes the discrimination we are      
called upon practically to exercise is  
that between sensations or other        
feelings1 of our own or of other people1

 and inferences drawn from them4 ,and on
 the theory of ,observation this is all 
which seems necessary to be said for the
 purposes of the present work4    #c4   
,if1 in the simplest observation1 or in 
what passes for such1 there is a large  
part which is not observation but       
something else2 so in the simplest      
description of an observation1 there is1
 and must always be1 much more asserted 
than is contained in the perception     
itself4 ,we cannot describe a fact1     
without implying more than the fact4    
,the perception is only of one          
individual thing2 but to describe it is 
to affirm a connexion between it and    
every other thing which is either       
denoted or connoted by any of the terms 
used4 ,to begin with an example1 than   
which none can be conceived more        
elementary3 ,i have a sensation of      
sight1 and ,i endeavour to describe it  
by saying that ,i see something white4  
,in saying this1 ,i do not solely affirm
 my sensation2 ,i also class it4 ,i     

assert a resemblance between the thing  
,i see1 and all things which ,i and     
others are accustomed to call white4 ,i 
assert that it resembles them in the    
circumstance in which they all resemble 
one another1 in that which is the ground
 of their being called by the name4     
,this is not merely one way of          
describing an observation1 but the only 
way4 ,if ,i would either register my    
observation for my own future use1 or   
make it known for the benefit of others1
 ,i must assert a resemblance between   
the fact which ,i have observed and     
something else4 ,it is inherent in a    
description1 to be the statement of a   
resemblance1 or resemblances4  ,we thus 
see that it is impossible to express in 
words any result of observation1 without
 performing an act possessing what ,dr4 
,whewell considers to be characteristic 
of ,induction4 ,there is always         
something introduced which was not      
included in the observation itself2 some
 conception common to the phenomenon    

with other phenomena to which it is     
compared4 ,an observation cannot be     
spoken of in language at all without    
declaring more than that one            
observation2 without assimilating it to 
other phenomena already observed and    
classified4 ,but this identification of 
an object--this recognition of it as    
possessing certain known                
characteristics--has never been         
confounded with ,induction4 ,it is an   
operation which precedes all induction1 
and supplies it with its materials4 ,it 
is a perception of resemblances1        
obtained by comparison4  ,these         
resemblances are not always apprehended 
directly1 by merely comparing the object
 observed with some other present       
object1 or with our recollection of an  
object which is absent4 ,they are often 
ascertained through intermediate marks1 
that is1 deductively4 ,in describing    
some new kind of animal1 suppose me to  
say that it measures ten feet in length1
 from the forehead to the extremity of  

the tail4 ,i did not ascertain this by  
the unassisted eye4 ,i had a two-foot   
rule which ,i applied to the object1    
and1 as we commonly say1 measured it2 an
 operation which was not wholly manual1 
but partly also mathematical1 involving 
the two propositions1 ,five times two is
 ten1 and ,things which are equal to the
 same thing are equal to one another4   
,hence1 the fact that the animal is ten 
feet long is not an immediate           
perception1 but a conclusion from       
reasoning2 the minor premises alone     
being furnished by observation of the   
object4 ,nevertheless1 this is called an
 observation or a description of the    
animal1 not an induction respecting it4 
,to pass at once from a very simple to a
 very complex example3 ,i affirm that   
the earth is globular4 ,the assertion is
 not grounded on direct perception2 for 
the figure of the earth cannot1 by us1  
be directly perceived1 though the       
assertion would not be true unless      
circumstances could be supposed under   

which its truth could be so perceived4  
,that the form of the earth is globular 
is inferred from certain marks1 as for  
instance from this1 that its shadow     
thrown upon the moon is circular2 or    
this1 that on the sea1 or any extensive 
plain1 our horizon is always a circle2  
either of which marks is incompatible   
with any other than a globular form4 ,i 
assert further1 that the earth is that  
particular kind of globe which is termed
 an oblate spheroid2 because it is found
 by measurement in the direction of the 
meridian1 that the length on the surface
 of the earth which subtends a given    
angle at its centre1 diminishes as we   
recede from the equator and approach the
 poles4 ,but these propositions1 that   
the earth is globular1 and that it is an
 oblate spheroid1 assert1 each of them1 
an individual fact2 in its own nature   
capable of being perceived by the senses
 when the requisite organs and the      
necessary position are supposed1 and    
only not actually perceived because     

those organs and that position are      
wanting4 ,this identification of the    
earth1 first as a globe1 and next as an 
oblate spheroid1 which1 if the fact     
could have been seen1 would have been   
called a description of the figure of   
the earth1 may without impropriety be so
 called when1 instead of being seen1 it 
is inferred4 ,but we could not without  
impropriety call either of these        
assertions an induction from facts      
respecting the earth4 ,they are not     
general propositions collected from     
particular facts1 but particular facts  
deduced from general propositions4 ,they
 are conclusions obtained deductively1  
from premises originating in induction3 
but of these premises some were not     
obtained by observation of the earth1   
nor had any peculiar reference to it4   
,if1 then1 the truth respecting the     
figure of the earth is not an induction1
 why should the truth respecting the    
figure of the earth's orbit be so8 ,the 
two cases only differ in this1 that the 

form of the orbit was not1 like the form
 of the earth itself1 deduced by        
ratiocination from facts which were     
marks of ellipticity1 but was got at by 
boldly guessing that the path was an    
ellipse1 and finding afterwards1 on     
examination1 that the observations were 
in harmony with the hypothesis4         
,according to ,dr4 ,whewell1 however1   
this process of guessing and verifying  
our guesses is not only induction1 but  
the whole of induction3 no other        
exposition can be given of that logical 
operation4 ,that he is wrong in the     
latter assertion1 the whole of the      
preceding book has1 ,i hope1            
sufficiently proved2 and that the       
process by which the ellipticity of the 
planetary orbits was ascertained1 is not
 induction at all1 was attempted to be  
shown in the second chapter of the same 
book4#a ,we are now1 however1 prepared  
to go more into the heart of the matter 
than at that earlier period of our      
inquiry1 and to show1 not merely what   

the operation in question is not1 but   
what it is4    #d4 ,we observed1 in the 
second chapter1 that the proposition the
 earth moves in an ellipse1 so far as it
 only serves for the colligation or     
connecting together of actual           
observations1 7that is1 as it only      
affirms that the observed positions of  
the earth may be correctly represented  
by as many points in the circumference  
of an imaginary ellipse17 is not an     
induction1 but a description3 it is an  
induction1 only when it affirms that the
 intermediate positions1 of which there 
has been no direct observation1 would be
 found to correspond to the remaining   
points of the same elliptic             
circumference4 ,now1 though this real   
induction is one thing1 and the         
description another1 we are in a very   
different condition for making the      
induction before we have obtained the   
description1 and after it4 ,for inasmuch
 as the description1 like all other     
descriptions1 contains the assertion of 

a resemblance between the phenomenon    
described and something else2 in        
pointing out something which the series 
of observed places of a planet          
resembles1 it points out something in   
which the several places themselves     
agree4 ,if the series of places         
correspond to as many points of an      
ellipse1 the places themselves agree in 
being situated in that ellipse4 ,we     
have1 therefore1 by the same process    
which gave us the description1 obtained 
the requisites for an induction by the  
,method of ,agreement4 ,the successive  
observed places of the earth being      
considered as effects1 and its motion as
 the cause which produces them1 we find 
that those effects1 that is1 those      
places1 agree in the circumstance of    
being in an ellipse4 ,we conclude that  
the remaining effects1 the places which 
have not been observed1 agree in the    
same circumstance1 and that the law of  
the motion of the earth is motion in an 
ellipse4  ,the ,colligation of ,facts1  

therefore1 by means of hypotheses1 or1  
as ,dr4 ,whewell prefers to say1 by     
means of ,conceptions1 instead of being1
 as he supposes1 ,induction itself1     
takes its proper place among operations 
subsidiary to ,induction4 ,all          
,induction supposes that we have        
previously compared the requisite number
 of individual instances1 and           
ascertained in what circumstances they  
agree4 ,the ,colligation of ,facts is no
 other than this preliminary operation4 
,when ,kepler1 after vainly endeavouring
 to connect the observed places of a    
planet by various hypotheses of circular
 motion1 at last tried the hypothesis of
 an ellipse and found it answer to the  
phenomena2 what he really attempted1    
first unsuccessfully and at last        
successfully1 was to discover the       
circumstance in which all the observed  
positions of the planet agreed4 ,and    
when he in like manner connected another
 set of observed facts1 the periodic    
times of the different planets1 by the  

proposition that the squares of the     
times are proportional to the cubes of  
the distances1 what he did was simply to
 ascertain the property in which the    
periodic times of all the different     
planets agreed4  ,since1 therefore1 all 
that is true and to the purpose in ,dr4 
,whewell's doctrine of ,conceptions     
might be fully expressed by the more    
familiar term ,hypothesis2 and since his
 ,colligation of ,facts by means of     
appropriate ,conceptions1 is but the    
ordinary process of finding by a        
comparison of phenomena1 in what        
consists their agreement or resemblance2
 ,i would willingly have confined myself
 to those better understood expressions1
 and persevered to the end in the same  
abstinence which ,i have hitherto       
observed from ideological discussions2  
considering the mechanism of our        
thoughts to be a topic distinct from and
 irrelevant to the principles and rules 
by which the trustworthiness of the     
results of thinking is to be estimated4 

,since1 however1 a work of such high    
pretensions1 and1 it must also be said1 
of so much real merit1 has rested the   
whole theory of ,induction upon such    
ideological considerations1 it seems    
necessary for others who follow1 to     
claim for themselves and their doctrines
 whatever position may properly belong  
to them on the same metaphysical ground4
 ,and this is the object of the         
succeeding chapter4     ,,chapter ,,ii4 
,,of ,,abstraction1 ,,or ,,the          
,,formation ,,of ,,conceptions4    #a4  
,the metaphysical inquiry into the      
nature and composition of what have been
 called ,abstract ,ideas1 or in other   
words1 of the notions which answer in   
the mind to classes and to general      
names1 belongs not to ,logic1 but to a  
different science1 and our purpose does 
not require that we should enter upon it
 here4 ,we are only concerned with the  
universally acknowledged fact1 that such
 notions or conceptions do exist4 ,the  
mind can conceive a multitude of        

individual things as one assemblage or  
class2 and general names do really      
suggest to us certain ideas or mental   
representations1 otherwise we could not 
use the names with consciousness of a   
meaning4 ,whether the idea called up by 
a general name is composed of the       
various circumstances in which all the  
individuals denoted by the name agree1  
and of no others1 7which is the doctrine
 of ,locke1 ,brown1 and the             
,conceptualists27 or whether it be the  
idea of some one of those individuals1  
clothed in its individualizing          
peculiarities1 but with the accompanying
 knowledge that those peculiarities are 
not properties of the class1 7which is  
the doctrine of ,berkeley1 ,mr4         
,bailey1#b and the modern ,nominalists27
 or whether 7as held by ,mr4 ,james     
,mill7 the idea of the class is that of 
a miscellaneous assemblage of           
individuals belonging to the class2 or  
whether1 finally1 7what appears to be   
the truest opinion17 it be any one or   

any other of all these1 according to the
 accidental circumstances of the case2  
certain it is1 that some idea or mental 
conception is suggested by a general    
name1 whenever we either hear it or     
employ it with consciousness of a       
meaning4 ,and this1 which we may call if
 we please a general idea1 represents in
 our minds the whole class of things to 
which the name is applied4 ,whenever we 
think or reason concerning the class1 we
 do so by means of this idea4 ,and the  
voluntary power which the mind has1 of  
attending to one part of what is present
 to it at any moment1 and neglecting    
another part1 enables us to keep our    
reasonings and conclusions respecting   
the class unaffected by anything in the 
idea or mental image which is not       
really1 or at least which we do not     
really believe to be1 common to the     
whole class4#c  ,there are1 then1 such  
things as general conceptions1 or       
conceptions by means of which we can    
think generally3 and when we form a set 

of phenomena into a class1 that is1 when
 we compare them with one another to    
ascertain in what they agree1 some      
general conception is implied in this   
mental operation4 ,and inasmuch as such 
a comparison is a necessary preliminary 
to ,induction1 it is most true that     
,induction could not go on without      
general conceptions4    #b4 ,but it does
 not therefore follow that these general
 conceptions must have existed in the   
mind previously to the comparison4 ,it  
is not a law of our intellect1 that in  
comparing things with each other and    
taking note of their agreement we merely
 recognise as realized in the outward   
world something that we already had in  
our minds4 ,the conception originally   
found its way to us as the result of    
such a comparison4 ,it was obtained 7in 
metaphysical phrase7 by abstraction from
 individual things4 ,these things may be
 things which we perceived or thought of
 on former occasions1 but they may also 
be the things which we are perceiving or

 thinking of on the very occasion4 ,when
 ,kepler compared the observed places of
 the planet ,mars1 and found that they  
agreed in being points of an elliptic   
circumference1 he applied a general     
conception which was already in his     
mind1 having been derived from his      
former experience4 ,but this is by no   
means universally the case4 ,when we    
compare several objects and find them to
 agree in being white1 or when we       
compare the various species of          
ruminating animals and find them to     
agree in being cloven-footed1 we have   
just as much a general conception in our
 minds as ,kepler had in his3 we have   
the conception of a white thing1 or the 
conception of a cloven-footed animal4   
,but no one supposes that we necessarily
 bring these conceptions with us1 and   
superinduce them 7to adopt ,dr4         
,whewell's expression7 upon the facts3  
because in these simple cases everybody 
sees that the very act of comparison    
which ends in our connecting the facts  

by means of the conception1 may be the  
source from which we derive the         
conception itself4 ,if we had never seen
 any white object or had never seen any 
cloven-footed animal before1 we should  
at the same time and by the same mental 
act acquire the idea1 and employ it for 
the colligation of the observed         
phenomena4 ,kepler1 on the contrary1    
really had to bring the idea with him1  
and superinduce it upon the facts2 he   
could not evolve it out of them3 if he  
had not already had the idea1 he would  
not have been able to acquire it by a   
comparison of the planet's positions4   
,but this inability was a mere accident3
 the idea of an ellipse could have been 
acquired from the paths of the planets  
as effectually as from anything else1 if
 the paths had not happened to be       
invisible4 ,if the planet had left a    
visible track1 and we had been so placed
 that we could see it at the proper     
angle1 we might have abstracted our     
original idea of an ellipse from the    

planetary orbit4 ,indeed1 every         
conception which can be made the        
instrument for connecting a set of      
facts1 might have been originally       
evolved from those very facts4 ,the     
conception is a conception of something2
 and that which it is a conception of1  
is really in the facts1 and might1 under
 some supposable circumstances1 or by   
some supposable extension of the        
faculties which we actually possess1    
have been detected in them4 ,and not    
only is this always in itself possible1 
but it actually happens1 in almost all  
cases in which the obtaining of the     
right conception is a matter of any     
considerable difficulty4 ,for if there  
be no new conception required2 if one of
 those already familiar to mankind will 
serve the purpose1 the accident of being
 the first to whom the right one occurs1
 may happen to almost anybody2 at least 
in the case of a set of phenomena which 
the whole scientific world are engaged  
in attempting to connect4 ,the honour1  

in ,kepler's case1 was that of the      
accurate1 patient1 and toilsome         
calculations by which he compared the   
results that followed from his different
 guesses1 with the observations of      
,tycho ,brahe2 but the merit was very   
small of guessing an ellipse2 the only  
wonder is that men had not guessed it   
before1 nor could they have failed to do
 so if there had not existed an         
obstinate  priori prejudice that the    
heavenly bodies must move1 if not in a  
circle1 in some combination of circles4 
,the really difficult cases are those in
 which the conception destined to create
 light and order out of darkness and    
confusion1 has to be sought for among   
the very phenomena which it afterwards  
serves to arrange4 ,why1 according to   
,dr4 ,whewell himself1 did the ancients 
fail in discovering the laws of         
mechanics1 that is1 of equilibrium and  
of the communication of motion8 ,because
 they had not1 or at least had not      
clearly1 the ideas or conceptions of    

pressure and resistance1 momentum1 and  
uniform and accelerating force4 ,and    
whence could they have obtained these   
ideas1 except from the very facts of    
equilibrium and motion8 ,the tardy      
development of several of the physical  
sciences1 for example of optics1        
electricity1 magnetism1 and the higher  
generalizations of chemistry1 he        
ascribes to the fact that mankind had   
not yet possessed themselves of the     
,idea of ,polarity1 that is1 the idea of
 opposite properties in opposite        
directions4 ,but what was there to      
suggest such an idea1 until1 by a       
separate examination of several of these
 different branches of knowledge1 it was
 shown that the facts of each of them   
did present1 in some instances at least1
 the curious phenomenon of opposite     
properties in opposite directions8 ,the 
thing was superficially manifest only in
 two cases1 those of the magnet1 and of 
electrified bodies2 and there the       
conception was encumbered with the      

circumstance of material poles1 or fixed
 points in the body itself1 in which    
points this opposition of properties    
seemed to be inherent4 ,the first       
comparison and abstraction had led only 
to this conception of poles2 and if     
anything corresponding to that          
conception had existed in the phenomena 
of chemistry or optics1 the difficulty  
now justly considered so great1 would   
have been extremely small4 ,the         
obscurity rose from the fact1 that the  
polarities in chemistry and optics were 
distinct species1 though of the same    
genus1 with the polarities in           
electricity and magnetism3 and that in  
order to assimilate the phenomena to one
 another1 it was necessary to compare a 
polarity without poles1 such for        
instance as is exemplified in the       
polarization of light1 and the polarity 
with 7apparent7 poles1 which we see in  
the magnet2 and to recognise that these 
polarities1 while different in many     
other respects1 agree in the one        

character which is expressed by the     
phrase1 opposite properties in opposite 
directions4 ,from the result of such a  
comparison it was that the minds of     
scientific men formed this new general  
conception3 between which1 and the first
 confused feeling of an analogy between 
some of the phenomena of light and those
 of electricity and magnetism1 there is 
a long interval1 filled up by the       
labours and more or less sagacious      
suggestions of many superior minds4     
,the conceptions1 then1 which we employ 
for the colligation and methodization of
 facts1 do not develop themselves from  
within1 but are impressed upon the mind 
from without2 they are never obtained   
otherwise than by way of comparison and 
abstraction1 and1 in the most important 
and the most numerous cases1 are evolved
 by abstraction from the very phenomena 
which it is their office to colligate4  
,i am far1 however1 from wishing to     
imply that it is not often a very       
difficult thing to perform this process 

of abstraction well1 or that the success
 of an inductive operation does not1 in 
many cases1 principally depend on the   
skill with which we perform it4 ,bacon  
was quite justified in designating as   
one of the principal obstacles to good  
induction1 general conceptions wrongly  
formed1 notiones temer  rebus abstract3 
to which ,dr4 ,whewell adds1 that not   
only does bad abstraction make bad      
induction1 but that in order to perform 
induction well1 we must have abstracted 
well2 our general conceptions must be   
clear and appropriate to the matter in  
hand4    #c4 ,in attempting to show what
 the difficulty in this matter really   
is1 and how it is surmounted1 ,i must   
beg the reader1 once for all1 to bear   
this in mind2 that although in          
discussing the opinions of a different  
school of philosophy1 ,i am willing to  
adopt their language1 and to speak1     
therefore1 of connecting facts through  
the instrumentality of a conception1    
this technical phraseology means neither

 more nor less than what is commonly    
called comparing the facts with one     
another and determining in what they    
agree4 ,nor has the technical expression
 even the advantage of being            
metaphysically correct4 ,the facts are  
not connected1 except in a merely       
metaphorical acceptation of the term4   
,the ideas of the facts may become      
connected1 that is1 we may be led to    
think of them together2 but this        
consequence is no more than what may be 
produced by any casual association4     
,what really takes place1 is1 ,i        
conceive1 more philosophically expressed
 by the common word ,comparison1 than by
 the phrases to connect or to           
superinduce4 ,for1 as the general       
conception is itself obtained by a      
comparison of particular phenomena1 so1 
when obtained1 the mode in which we     
apply it to other phenomena is again by 
comparison4 ,we compare phenomena with  
each other to get the conception1 and we
 then compare those and other phenomena 

with the conception4 ,we get the        
conception of an animal 7for instance7  
by comparing different animals1 and when
 we afterwards see a creature resembling
 an animal1 we compare it with our      
general conception of an animal2 and if 
it agrees with that general conception1 
we include it in the class4 ,the        
conception becomes the type of          
comparison4  ,and we need only consider 
what comparison is1 to see that where   
the objects are more than two1 and still
 more when they are an indefinite       
number1 a type of some sort is an       
indispensable condition of the          
comparison4 ,when we have to arrange and
 classify a great number of objects     
according to their agreements and       
differences1 we do not make a confused  
attempt to compare all with all4 ,we    
know that two things are as much as the 
mind can easily attend to at a time1 and
 we therefore fix upon one of the       
objects1 either at hazard or because it 
offers in a peculiarly striking manner  

some important character1 and1 taking   
this as our standard1 compare it with   
one object after another4 ,if we find a 
second object which presents a          
remarkable agreement with the first1    
inducing us to class them together1 the 
question instantly arises1 in what      
particular circumstances do they agree8 
and to take notice of these             
circumstances is already a first stage  
of abstraction1 giving rise to a general
 conception4 ,having advanced thus far1 
when we now take in hand a third object 
we naturally ask ourselves the question1
 not merely whether this third object   
agrees with the first1 but whether it   
agrees with it in the same circumstances
 in which the second did8 in other      
words1 whether it agrees with the       
general conception which has been       
obtained by abstraction from the first  
and second8 ,thus we see the tendency of
 general conceptions1 as soon as formed1
 to substitute themselves as types1 for 
whatever individual objects previously  

answered that purpose in our            
comparisons4 ,we may1 perhaps1 find that
 no considerable number of other objects
 agree with this first general          
conception2 and that we must drop the   
conception1 and beginning again with a  
different individual case1 proceed by   
fresh comparisons to a different general
 conception4 ,sometimes1 again1 we find 
that the same conception will serve1 by 
merely leaving out some of its          
circumstances2 and by this higher effort
 of abstraction1 we obtain a still more 
general conception2 as in the case      
formerly referred to1 the scientific    
world rose from the conception of poles 
to the general conception of opposite   
properties in opposite directions2 or as
 those ,south-,sea islanders1 whose     
conception of a quadruped had been      
abstracted from hogs 7the only animals  
of that description which they had      
seen71 when they afterwards compared    
that conception with other quadrupeds1  
dropped some of the circumstances1 and  

arrived at the more general conception  
which ,europeans associate with the     
term4  ,these brief remarks contain1 ,i 
believe1 all that is well-grounded in   
the doctrine1 that the conception by    
which the mind arranges and gives unity 
to phenomena must be furnished by the   
mind itself1 and that we find the right 
conception by a tentative process1      
trying first one and then another until 
we hit the mark4 ,the conception is not 
furnished by the mind until it has been 
furnished to the mind2 and the facts    
which supply it are sometimes extraneous
 facts1 but more often the very facts   
which we are attempting to arrange by   
it4 ,it is quite true1 however1 that in 
endeavouring to arrange the facts1 at   
whatever point we begin1 we never       
advance three steps without forming a   
general conception1 more or less        
distinct and precise2 and that this     
general conception becomes the clue     
which we instantly endeavour to trace   
through the rest of the facts1 or       

rather1 becomes the standard with which 
we thenceforth compare them4 ,if we are 
not satisfied with the agreements which 
we discover among the phenomena by      
comparing them with this type1 or with  
some still more general conception which
 by an additional stage of abstraction  
we can form from the type2 we change our
 path1 and look out for other           
agreements3 we recommence the comparison
 from a different starting-point1 and so
 generate a different set of general    
conceptions4 ,this is the tentative     
process which ,dr4 ,whewell speaks of2  
and which has not unnaturally suggested 
the theory1 that the conception is      
supplied by the mind itself3 since the  
different conceptions which the mind    
successively tries1 it either already   
possessed from its previous experience1 
or they were supplied to it in the first
 stage of the corresponding act of      
comparison2 so that1 in the subsequent  
part of the process1 the conception     
manifested itself as something compared 

with the phenomena1 not evolved from    
them4    #d4 ,if this be a correct      
account of the instrumentality of       
general conceptions in the comparison   
which necessarily precedes ,induction1  
we shall easily be able to translate    
into our own language what ,dr4 ,whewell
 means by saying that conceptions1 to be
 subservient to ,induction1 must be     
clear and appropriate4  ,if the         
conception corresponds to a real        
agreement among the phenomena2 if the   
comparison which we have made of a set  
of objects has led us to class them     
according to real resemblances and      
differences2 the conception which does  
this cannot fail to be appropriate1 for 
some purpose or other4 ,the question of 
appropriateness is relative to the      
particular object we have in view4 ,as  
soon as1 by our comparison1 we have     
ascertained some agreement1 something   
which can be predicated in common of a  
number of objects2 we have obtained a   
basis on which an inductive process is  

capable of being founded4 ,but the      
agreements1 or the ulterior consequences
 to which those agreements lead1 may be 
of very different degrees of importance4
 ,if1 for instance1 we only compare     
animals according to their colour1 and  
class those together which are coloured 
alike1 we form the general conceptions  
of a white animal1 a black animal1 c41  
which are conceptions legitimately      
formed2 and if an induction were to be  
attempted concerning the causes of the  
colours of animals1 this comparison     
would be the proper and necessary       
preparation for such an induction1 but  
would not help us towards a knowledge of
 the laws of any other of the properties
 of animals3 while if1 with ,cuvier1 we 
compare and class them according to the 
structure of the skeleton1 or1 with     
,blainville1 according to the nature of 
their outward integuments1 the          
agreements and differences which are    
observable in these respects are not    
only of much greater importance in      

themselves1 but are marks of agreements 
and differences in many other important 
particulars of the structure and mode of
 life of the animals4 ,if1 therefore1   
the study of their structure and habits 
be our object1 the conceptions generated
 by these last comparisons are far more 
appropriate than those generated by the 
former4 ,nothing1 other than this1 can  
be meant by the appropriateness of a    
conception4  ,when ,dr4 ,whewell says   
that the ancients1 or the schoolmen1 or 
any modern inquirers1 missed discovering
 the real law of a phenomenon because   
they applied to it an inappropriate     
instead of an appropriate conception2 he
 can only mean that in comparing various
 instances of the phenomenon1 to        
ascertain in what those instances       
agreed1 they missed the important points
 of agreement2 and fastened upon such as
 were either imaginary1 and not         
agreements at all1 or if real           
agreements1 were comparatively trifling1
 and had no connexion with the          

phenomenon1 the law of which was sought4
  ,aristotle1 philosophizing on the     
subject of motion1 remarked that certain
 motions apparently take place          
spontaneously2 bodies fall to the       
ground1 flame ascends1 bubbles of air   
rise in water1 c43 and these he called  
natural motions2 while others not only  
never take place without external       
incitement1 but even when such          
incitement is applied1 tend             
spontaneously to cease2 which1 to       
distinguish them from the former1 he    
called violent motions4 ,now1 in        
comparing the so-called natural motions 
with one another1 it appeared to        
,aristotle that they agreed in one      
circumstance1 namely1 that the body     
which moved 7or seemed to move7         
spontaneously1 was moving towards its   
own place2 meaning thereby the place    
from whence it originally came1 or the  
place where a great quantity of matter  
similar to itself was assembled4 ,in the
 other class of motions1 as when bodies 

are thrown up in the air1 they are1 on  
the contrary1 moving from their own     
place4 ,now1 this conception of a body  
moving towards its own place may justly 
be considered inappropriate2 because1   
though it expresses a circumstance      
really found in some of the most        
familiar instances of motion apparently 
spontaneous1 yet1 first1 there are many 
other cases of such motion1 in which    
that circumstance is absent3 the motion1
 for instance1 of the earth and planets4
 ,secondly1 even when it is present1 the
 motion1 on closer examination1 would   
often be seen not to be spontaneous3 as1
 when air rises in water1 it does not   
rise by its own nature1 but is pushed up
 by the superior weight of the water    
which presses upon it4 ,finally1 there  
are many cases in which the spontaneous 
motion takes place in the contrary      
direction to what the theory considers  
as the body's own place2 for instance1  
when a fog rises from a lake1 or when   
water dries up4 ,the agreement1         

therefore1 which ,aristotle selected as 
his principle of classification1 did not
 extend to all cases of the phenomenon  
he wanted to study1 spontaneous motion2 
while it did include cases of the       
absence of the phenomenon1 cases of     
motion not spontaneous4 ,the conception 
was hence inappropriate4 ,we may add    
that1 in the case in question1 no       
conception would be appropriate2 there  
is no agreement which runs through all  
the cases of spontaneous or apparently  
spontaneous motion and no others3 they  
cannot be brought under one law3 it is a
 case of ,plurality of ,causes4#d    #e4
 ,so much for the first of ,dr4         
,whewell's conditions1 that conceptions 
must be appropriate4 ,the second is1    
that they shall be clear3 and let us    
consider what this implies4 ,unless the 
conception corresponds to a real        
agreement1 it has a worse defect than   
that of not being clear2 it is not      
applicable to the case at all4 ,among   
the phenomena1 therefore1 which we are  

attempting to connect by means of the   
conception1 we must suppose that there  
really is an agreement1 and that the    
conception is a conception of that      
agreement4 ,in order1 then1 that it may 
be clear1 the only requisite is1 that we
 shall know exactly in what the         
agreement consists2 that it shall have  
been carefully observed1 and accurately 
remembered4 ,we are said not to have a  
clear conception of the resemblance     
among a set of objects1 when we have    
only a general feeling that they        
resemble1 without having analysed their 
resemblance1 or perceived in what points
 it consists1 and fixed in our memory an
 exact recollection of those points4    
,this want of clearness1 or1 as it may  
be otherwise called1 this vagueness1 in 
the general conception1 may be owing    
either to our having no accurate        
knowledge of the objects themselves1 or 
merely to our not having carefully      
compared them4 ,thus a person may have  
no clear idea of a ship because he has  

never seen one1 or because he remembers 
but little1 and that faintly1 of what he
 has seen4 ,or he may have a perfect    
knowledge and remembrance of many ships 
of various kinds1 frigates among the    
rest1 but he may have no clear but only 
a confused idea of a frigate1 because he
 has never been told1 and has not       
compared them sufficiently to have      
remarked and remembered1 in what        
particular points a frigate differs from
 some other kind of ship4  ,it is not1  
however1 necessary1 in order to have    
clear ideas1 that we should know all the
 common properties of the things which  
we class together4 ,that would be to    
have our conception of the class        
complete as well as clear4 ,it is       
sufficient if we never class things     
together without knowing exactly why we 
do so1--without having ascertained      
exactly what agreements we are about to 
include in our conception2 and if1 after
 having thus fixed our conception1 we   
never vary from it1 never include in the

 class anything which has not those     
common properties1 nor exclude from it  
anything which has4 ,a clear conception 
means a determinate conception2 one     
which does not fluctuate1 which is not  
one thing to-day and another to-morrow1 
but remains fixed and invariable1 except
 when1 from the progress of our         
knowledge1 or the correction of some    
error1 we consciously add to it or alter
 it4 ,a person of clear ideas1 is a     
person who always knows in virtue of    
what properties his classes are         
constituted2 what attributes are        
connoted by his general names4  ,the    
principal requisites1 therefore1 of     
clear conceptions1 are habits of        
attentive observation1 an extensive     
experience1 and a memory which receives 
and retains an exact image of what is   
observed4 ,and in proportion as any one 
has the habit of observing minutely and 
comparing carefully a particular class  
of phenomena1 and an accurate memory for
 the results of the observation and     

comparison1 so will his conceptions of  
that class of phenomena be clear2       
provided he has the indispensable habit1
 7naturally1 however1 resulting from    
those other endowments17 of never using 
general names without a precise         
connotation4  ,as the clearness of our  
conceptions chiefly depends on the      
carefulness and accuracy of our         
observing and comparing faculties1 so   
their appropriateness1 or rather the    
chance we have of hitting upon the      
appropriate conception in any case1     
mainly depends on the activity of the   
same faculties4 ,he who by habit1       
grounded on sufficient natural aptitude1
 has acquired a readiness in accurately 
observing and comparing phenomena1 will 
perceive so many more agreements and    
will perceive them so much more rapidly 
than other people1 that the chances are 
much greater of his perceiving1 in any  
instance1 the agreement on which the    
important consequences depend4    #f4   
,it is of so much importance that the   

part of the process of investigating    
truth1 discussed in this chapter1 should
 be rightly understood1 that ,i think it
 is desirable to restate the results we 
have arrived at1 in a somewhat different
 mode of expression4  ,we cannot        
ascertain general truths1 that is1      
truths applicable to classes1 unless we 
have formed the classes in such a manner
 that general truths can be affirmed of 
them4 ,in the formation of any class1   
there is involved a conception of it as 
a class1 that is1 a conception of       
certain circumstances as being those    
which characterize the class1 and       
distinguish the objects composing it    
from all other things4 ,when we know    
exactly what these circumstances are1 we
 have a clear idea 7or conception7 of   
the class1 and of the meaning of the    
general name which designates it4 ,the  
primary condition implied in having this
 clear idea1 is that the class be really
 a class2 that it correspond to a real  
distinction2 that the things it includes

 really do agree with one another in    
certain particulars1 and differ1 in     
those same particulars1 from all other  
things4 ,a person without clear ideas1  
is one who habitually classes together1 
under the same general names1 things    
which have no common properties1 or none
 which are not possessed also by other  
things2 or who1 if the usage of other   
people prevents him from actually       
misclassing things1 is unable to state  
to himself the common properties in     
virtue of which he classes them rightly4
  ,but it is not the sole requisite of  
classification that the classes should  
be real classes1 framed by a legitimate 
mental process4 ,some modes of classing 
things are more valuable than others for
 human uses1 whether of speculation or  
of practice2 and our classifications are
 not well made1 unless the things which 
they bring together not only agree with 
each other in something which           
distinguishes them from all other       
things1 but agree with each other and   

differ from other things in the very    
circumstances which are of primary      
importance for the purpose 7theoretical 
or practical7 which we have in view1 and
 which constitutes the problem before   
us4 ,in other words1 our conceptions1   
though they may be clear1 are not       
appropriate for our purpose1 unless the 
properties we comprise in them are those
 which will help us towards what we wish
 to understand--i4 e41 either those     
which go deepest into the nature of the 
things1 if our object be to understand  
that1 or those which are most closely   
connected with the particular property  
which we are endeavouring to            
investigate4  ,we cannot1 therefore1    
frame good general conceptions          
beforehand4 ,that the conception we have
 obtained is the one we want1 can only  
be known when we have done the work for 
the sake of which we wanted it2 when we 
completely understand the general       
character of the phenomena1 or the      
conditions of the particular property   

with which we concern ourselves4        
,general conceptions formed without this
 thorough knowledge1 are ,bacon's       
notiones temer  rebus abstract4 ,yet    
such premature conceptions we must be   
continually making up1 in our progress  
to something better4 ,they are an       
impediment to the progress of knowledge1
 only when they are permanently         
acquiesced in4 ,when it has become our  
habit to group things in wrong          
classes--in groups which either are not 
really classes1 having no distinctive   
points of agreement 7absence of clear   
ideas71 or which are not classes of     
which anything important to our purpose 
can be predicated 7absence of           
appropriate ideas72 and when1 in the    
belief that these badly made classes are
 those sanctioned by ,nature1 we refuse 
to exchange them for others1 and cannot 
or will not make up our general         
conceptions from any other elements2 in 
that case all the evils which ,bacon    
ascribes to his notiones temer abstract 

really occur4 ,this was what the        
ancients did in physics1 and what the   
world in general does in morals and     
politics to the present day4  ,it would 
thus1 in my view of the matter1 be an   
inaccurate mode of expression to say1   
that obtaining appropriate conceptions  
is a condition precedent to             
generalization4 ,throughout the whole   
process of comparing phenomena with one 
another for the purpose of              
generalization1 the mind is trying to   
make up a conception2 but the conception
 which it is trying to make up is that  
of the really important point of        
agreement in the phenomena4 ,as we      
obtain more knowledge of the phenomena  
themselves1 and of the conditions on    
which their important properties depend1
 our views on this subject naturally    
alter2 and thus we advance from a less  
to a more appropriate general           
conception1 in the progress of our      
investigations4  ,we ought not1 at the  
same time1 to forget that the really    

important agreement cannot always be    
discovered by mere comparison of the    
very phenomena in question1 without the 
aid of a conception acquired elsewhere2 
as in the case1 so often referred to1 of
 the planetary orbits4  ,the search for 
the agreement of a set of phenomena is  
in truth very similar to the search for 
a lost or hidden object4 ,at first we   
place ourselves in a sufficiently       
commanding position1 and cast our eyes  
round us1 and if we can see the object  
it is well2 if not1 we ask ourselves    
mentally what are the places in which it
 may be hid1 in order that we may there 
search for it3 and so on1 until we      
imagine the place where it really is4   
,and here too we require to have had a  
previous conception1 or knowledge1 of   
those different places4 ,as in this     
familiar process1 so in the             
philosophical operation which it        
illustrates1 we first endeavour to find 
the lost object or recognise the common 
attribute1 without conjecturally        

invoking the aid of any previously      
acquired conception1 or in other words1 
of any hypothesis4 ,having failed in    
this1 we call upon our imagination for  
some hypothesis of a possible place1 or 
a possible point of resemblance1 and    
then look1 to see whether the facts     
agree with the conjecture4  ,for such   
cases something more is required than a 
mind accustomed to accurate observation 
and comparison4 ,it must be a mind      
stored with general conceptions1        
previously acquired1 of the sorts which 
bear affinity to the subject of the     
particular inquiry4 ,and much will also 
depend on the natural strength and      
acquired culture of what has been termed
 the scientific imagination2 on the     
faculty possessed of mentally arranging 
known elements into new combinations1   
such as have not yet been observed in   
nature1 though not contradictory to any 
known laws4  ,but the variety of        
intellectual habits1 the purposes which 
they serve1 and the modes in which they 

may be fostered and cultivated1 are     
considerations belonging to the ,art of 
,education3 a subject far wider than    
,logic1 and which this treatise does not
 profess to discuss4 ,here1 therefore1  
the present chapter may properly close4 
,,chapter ,,iii4  ,,of ,,naming1 ,,as   
,,subsidiary ,,to ,,induction4    #a4   
,it does not belong to the present      
undertaking to dwell on the importance  
of language as a medium of human        
intercourse1 whether for purposes of    
sympathy or of information4 ,nor does   
our design admit of more than a passing 
allusion to that great property of      
names1 on which their functions as an   
intellectual instrument are1 in reality1
 ultimately dependent2 their potency as 
a means of forming1 and of riveting1    
associations among our other ideas3 a   
subject on which an able thinker#e has  
thus written3--  ,names are impressions 
of sense1 and as such take the strongest
 hold on the mind1 and of all other     
impressions can be most easily recalled 

and retained in view4 ,they therefore   
serve to give a point of attachment to  
all the more volatile objects of thought
 and feeling4 ,impressions that when    
passed might be dissipated for ever1    
are1 by their connexion with language1  
always within reach4 ,thoughts1 of      
themselves1 are perpetually slipping out
 of the field of immediate mental       
vision2 but the name abides with us1 and
 the utterance of it restores them in a 
moment4 ,words are the custodiers of    
every product of mind less impressive   
than themselves4 ,all extensions of     
human knowledge1 all new                
generalizations1 are fixed and spread1  
even unintentionally1 by the use of     
words4 ,the child growing up learns1    
along with the vocables of his          
mother-tongue1 that things which he     
would have believed to be different1    
are1 in important points1 the same4     
,without any formal instruction1 the    
language in which we grow up teaches us 
all the common philosophy of the age4   

,it directs us to observe and know      
things which we should have overlooked2 
it supplies us with classifications     
ready made1 by which things are arranged
 7as far as the light of by-gone        
generations admits7 with the objects to 
which they bear the greatest total      
resemblance4 ,the number of general     
names in a language1 and the degree of  
generality of those names1 afford a test
 of the knowledge of the era1 and of the
 intellectual insight which is the      
birthright of any one born into it4  ,it
 is not1 however1 of the functions of   
,names1 considered generally1 that we   
have here to treat1 but only of the     
manner and degree in which they are     
directly instrumental to the            
investigation of truth2 in other words1 
to the process of induction4    #b4     
,observation and ,abstraction1 the      
operations which formed the subject of  
the two foregoing chapters1 are         
conditions indispensable to induction2  
there can be no induction where they are

 not4 ,it has been imagined that ,naming
 is also a condition equally            
indispensable4 ,there are thinkers who  
have held that language is not solely1  
according to a phrase generally current1
 an instrument of thought1 but the      
instrument3 that names1 or something    
equivalent to them1 some species of     
artificial signs1 are necessary to      
reasoning2 that there could be no       
inference1 and consequently no          
induction1 without them4 ,but if the    
nature of reasoning was correctly       
explained in the earlier part of the    
present work1 this opinion must be held 
to be an exaggeration1 though of an     
important truth4 ,if reasoning be from  
particulars to particulars1 and if it   
consist in recognising one fact as a    
mark of another1 or a mark of a mark of 
another1 nothing is required to render  
reasoning possible1 except senses and   
association3 senses to perceive that two
 facts are conjoined2 association1 as   
the law by which one of those two facts 

raises up the idea of the other4#f ,for 
these mental phenomena1 as well as for  
the belief or expectation which follows1
 and by which we recognise as having    
taken place1 or as about to take place1 
that of which we have perceived a mark1 
there is evidently no need of language4 
,and this inference of one particular   
fact from another is a case of          
induction4 ,it is of this sort of       
induction that brutes are capable3 it is
 in this shape that uncultivated minds  
make almost all their inductions1 and   
that we all do so in the cases in which 
familiar experience forces our          
conclusions upon us without any active  
process of inquiry on our part1 and in  
which the belief or expectation follows 
the suggestion of the evidence1 with the
 promptitude and certainty of an        
instinct4#g    #c4 ,but though inference
 of an inductive character is possible  
without the use of signs1 it could      
never1 without them1 be carried much    
beyond the very simple cases which we   

have just described1 and which form1 in 
all probability1 the limit of the       
reasonings of those animals to whom     
conventional language is unknown4       
,without language1 or something         
equivalent to it1 there could only be as
 much reasoning from experience as can  
take place without the aid of general   
propositions4 ,now1 though in strictness
 we may reason from past experience to a
 fresh individual case without the      
intermediate stage of a general         
proposition1 yet without general        
propositions we should seldom remember  
what past experience we have had1 and   
scarcely ever what conclusions that     
experience will warrant4 ,the division  
of the inductive process into two parts1
 the first ascertaining what is a mark  
of the given fact1 the second whether in
 the new case that mark exists1 is      
natural1 and scientifically             
indispensable4 ,it is1 indeed1 in a     
majority of cases1 rendered necessary by
 mere distance of time4 ,the experience 

by which we are to guide our judgments  
may be other people's experience1 little
 of which can be communicated to us     
otherwise than by language3 when it is  
our own1 it is generally experience long
 past2 unless1 therefore1 it were       
recorded by means of artificial signs1  
little of it 7except in cases involving 
our intenser sensations or emotions1 or 
the subjects of our daily and hourly    
contemplation7 would be retained in the 
memory4 ,it is hardly necessary to add1 
that when the inductive inference is of 
any but the most direct and obvious     
nature--when it requires several        
observations or experiments1 in varying 
circumstances1 and the comparison of one
 of these with another--it is impossible
 to proceed a step1 without the         
artificial memory which words bestow4   
,without words1 we should1 if we had    
often seen ,a and ,b in immediate and   
obvious conjunction1 expect ,b whenever 
we saw ,a2 but to discover their        
conjunction when not obvious1 or to     

determine whether it is really constant 
or only casual1 and whether there is    
reason to expect it under any given     
change of circumstances1 is a process   
far too complex to be performed without 
some contrivance to make our remembrance
 of our own mental operations accurate4 
,now1 language is such a contrivance4   
,when that instrument is called to our  
aid1 the difficulty is reduced to that  
of making our remembrance of the meaning
 of words accurate4 ,this being secured1
 whatever passes through our minds may  
be remembered accurately1 by putting it 
carefully into words1 and committing the
 words either to writing or to memory4  
,the function of ,naming1 and           
particularly of ,general ,names1 in     
,induction1 may be recapitulated as     
follows4 ,every inductive inference     
which is good at all1 is good for a     
whole class of cases3 and1 that the     
inference may have any better warrant of
 its correctness than the mere clinging 
together of two ideas1 a process of     

experimentation and comparison is       
necessary2 in which the whole class of  
cases must be brought to view1 and some 
uniformity in the course of nature      
evolved and ascertained1 since the      
existence of such an uniformity is      
required as a justification for drawing 
the inference in even a single case4    
,this uniformity1 therefore1 may be     
ascertained once for all2 and if1 being 
ascertained1 it can be remembered1 it   
will serve as a formula for making1 in  
particular cases1 all such inferences as
 the previous experience will warrant4  
,but we can only secure its being       
remembered1 or give ourselves even a    
chance of carrying in our memory any    
considerable number of such             
uniformities1 by registering them       
through the medium of permanent signs2  
which 7being1 from the nature of the    
case1 signs not of an individual fact1  
but of an uniformity1 that is1 of an    
indefinite number of facts similar to   
one another7 are general signs2         

universals2 general names1 and general  
propositions4    #d4 ,and here ,i cannot
 omit to notice an oversight committed  
by some eminent thinkers2 who have said 
that the cause of our using general     
names is the infinite multitude of      
individual objects1 which1 making it    
impossible to have a name for each1     
compels us to make one name serve for   
many4 ,this is a very limited view of   
the function of general names4 ,even if 
there were a name for every individual  
object1 we should require general names 
as much as we now do4 ,without them we  
could not express the result of a single
 comparison1 nor record any one of the  
uniformities existing in nature2 and    
should be hardly better off in respect  
to ,induction than if we had no names at
 all4 ,with none but names of           
individuals1 7or in other words1 proper 
names17 we might1 by pronouncing the    
name1 suggest the idea of the object1   
but we could not assert any proposition2
 except the unmeaning ones formed by    

predicating two proper names one of     
another4 ,it is only by means of general
 names that we can convey any           
information1 predicate any attribute1   
even of an individual1 much more of a   
class4 ,rigorously speaking we could get
 on without any other general names than
 the abstract names of attributes2 all  
our propositions might be of the form   
such an individual object possesses such
 an attribute1 or such an attribute is  
always 7or never7 conjoined with such   
another attribute4 ,in fact1 however1   
mankind have always given general names 
to objects as well as attributes1 and   
indeed before attributes3 but the       
general names given to objects imply    
attributes1 derive their whole meaning  
from attributes2 and are chiefly useful 
as the language by means of which we    
predicate the attributes which they     
connote4  ,it remains to be considered  
what principles are to be adhered to in 
giving general names1 so that these     
names1 and the general propositions in  

which they fill a place1 may conduce    
most to the purposes of ,induction4     
,,chapter ,,iv4  ,,of ,,the ,,requisites
 ,,of ,a ,,philosophical ,,language1    
,,and ,,the ,,principles ,,of           
,,definition4    #a4 ,in order that we  
may possess a language perfectly        
suitable for the investigation and      
expression of general truths1 there are 
two principal1 and several minor1       
requisites4 ,the first is1 that every   
general name should have a meaning1     
steadily fixed1 and precisely           
determined4 ,when1 by the fulfilment of 
this condition1 such names as we possess
 are fitted for the due performance of  
their functions1 the next requisite1 and
 the second in order of importance1 is  
that we should possess a name wherever  
one is needed2 wherever there is        
anything to be designated by it1 which  
it is of importance to express4  ,the   
former of these requisites is that to   
which our attention will be exclusively 
directed in the present chapter4    #b4 

,every general name1 then1 must have a  
certain and knowable meaning4 ,now the  
meaning 7as has so often been explained7
 of a general connotative name1 resides 
in the connotation2 in the attribute on 
account of which1 and to express which1 
the name is given4 ,thus1 the name      
animal being given to all things which  
possess the attributes of sensation and 
voluntary motion1 the word connotes     
those attributes exclusively1 and they  
constitute the whole of its meaning4 ,if
 the name be abstract1 its denotation is
 the same with the connotation of the   
corresponding concrete3 it designates   
directly the attribute1 which the       
concrete term implies4 ,to give a       
precise meaning to general names is1    
then1 to fix with steadiness the        
attribute or attributes connoted by each
 concrete general name1 and denoted by  
the corresponding abstract4 ,since      
abstract names1 in the order of their   
creation1 do not precede but follow     
concrete ones1 as is proved by the      

etymological fact that they are almost  
always derived from them2 we may        
consider their meaning as determined by1
 and dependent on1 the meaning of their 
concrete3 and thus the problem of giving
 a distinct meaning to general language1
 is all included in that of giving a    
precise connotation to all concrete     
general names4  ,this is not difficult  
in the case of new names2 of the        
technical terms created by scientific   
inquirers for the purposes of science or
 art4 ,but when a name is in common use1
 the difficulty is greater2 the problem 
in this case not being that of choosing 
a convenient connotation for the name1  
but of ascertaining and fixing the      
connotation with which it is already    
used4 ,that this can ever be a matter of
 doubt1 is a sort of paradox4 ,but the  
vulgar 7including in that term all who  
have not accurate habits of thought7    
seldom know exactly what assertion they 
intend to make1 what common property    
they mean to express1 when they apply   

the same name to a number of different  
things4 ,all which the name expresses   
with them1 when they predicate it of an 
object1 is a confused feeling of        
resemblance between that object and some
 of the other things which they have    
been accustomed to denote by the name4  
,they have applied the name ,stone to   
various objects previously seen2 they   
see a new object1 which appears to them 
somewhat like the former1 and they call 
it a stone1 without asking themselves in
 what respect it is like1 or what mode  
or degree of resemblance the best       
authorities1 or even they themselves1   
require as a warrant for using the name4
 ,this rough general impression of      
resemblance is1 however1 made up of     
particular circumstances of resemblance2
 and into these it is the business of   
the logician to analyse it2 to ascertain
 what points of resemblance among the   
different things commonly called by the 
name1 have produced in the common mind  
this vague feeling of likeness2 have    

given to the things the similarity of   
aspect1 which has made them a class1 and
 has caused the same name to be bestowed
 upon them4  ,but though general names  
are imposed by the vulgar without any   
more definite connotation than that of a
 vague resemblance2 general propositions
 come in time to be made1 in which      
predicates are applied to those names1  
that is1 general assertions are made    
concerning the whole of the things which
 are denoted by the name4 ,and since by 
each of these propositions some         
attribute1 more or less precisely       
conceived1 is of course predicated1 the 
ideas of these various attributes thus  
become associated with the name1 and in 
a sort of uncertain way it comes to     
connote them2 there is a hesitation to  
apply the name in any new case in which 
any of the attributes familiarly        
predicated of the class do not exist4   
,and thus1 to common minds1 the         
propositions which they are in the habit
 of hearing or uttering concerning a    

class1 make up in a loose way a sort of 
connotation for the class-name4 ,let us 
take1 for instance1 the word ,civilized4
 ,how few could be found1 even among the
 most educated persons1 who would       
undertake to say exactly what the term  
,civilized connotes4 ,yet there is a    
feeling in the minds of all who use it1 
that they are using it with a meaning2  
and this meaning is made up1 in a       
confused manner1 of everything which    
they have heard or read that civilized  
men1 or civilized communities1 are1 or  
may be expected to be4  ,it is at this  
stage1 probably1 in the progress of a   
concrete name1 that the corresponding   
abstract name generally comes into use4 
,under the notion that the concrete name
 must of course convey a meaning1 or in 
other words1 that there is some property
 common to all things which it denotes1 
people give a name to this common       
property2 from the concrete ,civilized1 
they form the abstract ,civilization4   
,but since most people have never       

compared the different things which are 
called by the concrete name1 in such a  
manner as to ascertain what properties  
these things have in common1 or whether 
they have any2 each is thrown back upon 
the marks by which he himself has been  
accustomed to be guided in his          
application of the term3 and these1     
being merely vague hearsays and current 
phrases1 are not the same in any two    
persons1 nor in the same person at      
different times4 ,hence the word 7as    
,civilization1 for example7 which       
professes to be the designation of the  
unknown common property1 conveys        
scarcely to any two minds the same idea4
 ,no two persons agree in the things    
they predicate of it2 and when it is    
itself predicated of anything1 no other 
person knows1 nor does the speaker      
himself know with precision1 what he    
means to assert4 ,many other words which
 could be named1 as the word honour1 or 
the word gentleman1 exemplify this      
uncertainty still more strikingly4  ,it 

needs scarcely be observed1 that general
 propositions of which no one can tell  
exactly what they assert1 cannot        
possibly have been brought to the test  
of a correct induction4 ,whether a name 
is to be used as an instrument of       
thinking1 or as a means of communicating
 the result of thought1 it is imperative
 to determine exactly the attribute or  
attributes which it is to express3 to   
give it1 in short1 a fixed and          
ascertained connotation4    #c4 ,it     
would1 however1 be a complete           
misunderstanding of the proper office of
 a logician in dealing with terms       
already in use1 if we were to think that
 because a name has not at present an   
ascertained connotation1 it is competent
 to any one to give it such a           
connotation at his own choice4 ,the     
meaning of a term actually in use is not
 an arbitrary quantity to be fixed1 but 
an unknown quantity to be sought4  ,in  
the first place1 it is obviously        
desirable to avail ourselves1 as far as 

possible1 of the associations already   
connected with the name2 not enjoining  
the employment of it in a manner which  
conflicts with all previous habits1 and 
especially not so as to require the     
rupture of those strongest of all       
associations between names1 which are   
created by familiarity with propositions
 in which they are predicated of one    
another4 ,a philosopher would have      
little chance of having his example     
followed1 if he were to give such a     
meaning to his terms as should require  
us to call the ,north ,american ,indians
 a civilized people1 or the higher      
classes in ,france or ,england savages2 
or to say that civilized people live by 
hunting1 and savages by agriculture4    
,were there no other reason1 the extreme
 difficulty of effecting so complete a  
revolution in speech would be more than 
a sufficient one4 ,the endeavour should 
be1 that all generally received         
propositions into which the term enters1
 should be at least as true after its   

meaning is fixed1 as they were before2  
and that the concrete name1 therefore1  
should not receive such a connotation as
 shall prevent it from denoting things  
which1 in common language1 it is        
currently affirmed of4 ,the fixed and   
precise connotation which it receives1  
should not be in deviation from1 but in 
agreement 7as far as it goes7 with1 the 
vague and fluctuating connotation which 
the term already had4  ,to fix the      
connotation of a concrete name1 or the  
denotation of the corresponding         
abstract1 is to define the name4 ,when  
this can be done without rendering any  
received assertions inadmissible1 the   
name can be defined in accordance with  
its received use1 which is vulgarly     
called defining not the name but the    
thing4 ,what is meant by the improper   
expression of defining a thing1 7or     
rather a class of things--for nobody    
talks of defining an individual17 is to 
define the name1 subject to the         
condition that it shall denote those    

things4 ,this1 of course1 supposes a    
comparison of the things1 feature by    
feature and property by property1 to    
ascertain what attributes they agree in2
 and not unfrequently an operation      
strictly inductive1 for the purpose of  
ascertaining some unobvious agreement1  
which is the cause of the obvious       
agreements4  ,for1 in order to give a   
connotation to a name1 consistently with
 its denoting certain objects1 we have  
to make our selection from among the    
various attributes in which those       
objects agree4 ,to ascertain in what    
they do agree is1 therefore1 the first  
logical operation requisite4 ,when this 
has been done as far as is necessary or 
practicable1 the question arises1 which 
of these common attributes shall be     
selected to be associated with the name4
 ,for if the class which the name       
denotes be a ,kind1 the common          
properties are innumerable2 and even if 
not1 they are often extremely numerous4 
,our choice is first limited by the     

preference to be given to properties    
which are well known1 and familiarly    
predicated of the class2 but even these 
are often too numerous to be all        
included in the definition1 and1        
besides1 the properties most generally  
known may not be those which serve best 
to mark out the class from all others4  
,we should therefore select from among  
the common properties1 7if among them   
any such are to be found17 those on     
which it has been ascertained by        
experience1 or proved by deduction1 that
 many others depend2 or at least which  
are sure marks of them1 and from whence1
 therefore1 many others will follow by  
inference4 ,we thus see that to frame a 
good definition of a name already in    
use1 is not a matter of choice but of   
discussion1 and discussion not merely   
respecting the usage of language1 but   
respecting the properties of things1 and
 even the origin of those properties4   
,and hence every enlargement of our     
knowledge of the objects to which the   

name is applied1 is liable to suggest an
 improvement in the definition4 ,it is  
impossible to frame a perfect set of    
definitions on any subject1 until the   
theory of the subject is perfect3 and as
 science makes progress1 its definitions
 are also progressive4    #d4 ,the      
discussion of ,definitions1 in so far as
 it does not turn on the use of words   
but on the properties of things1 ,dr4   
,whewell calls the ,explication of      
,conceptions4 ,the act of ascertaining1 
better than before1 in what particulars 
any phenomena which are classed together
 agree1 he calls in his technical       
phraseology1 unfolding the general      
conception in virtue of which they are  
so classed4 ,making allowance for what  
appears to me the darkening and         
misleading tendency of this mode of     
expression1 several of his remarks are  
so much to the purpose1 that ,i shall   
take the liberty of transcribing them4  
,he observes1#h that many of the        
controversies which have had an         

important share in the formation of the 
existing body of science1 have assumed  
the form of a battle of ,definitions4   
,for example1 the inquiry concerning the
 laws of falling bodies1 led to the     
question whether the proper definition  
of a uniform force is that it generates 
a velocity proportional to the space    
from rest1 or to the time4 ,the         
controversy of the vis viva was what was
 the proper definition of the measure of
 force4 ,a principal question in the    
classification of minerals is1 what is  
the definition of a mineral species4    
,physiologists have endeavoured to throw
 light on their subject by defining     
organization1 or some similar term4     
,questions of the same nature are still 
open respecting the definitions of      
,specific ,heat1 ,latent ,heat1         
,chemical ,combination1 and ,solution4  
,it is very important for us to observe1
 that these controversies have never    
been questions of insulated and         
arbitrary definitions1 as men seem often

 tempted to imagine them to have been4  
,in all cases there is a tacit          
assumption of some proposition which is 
to be expressed by means of the         
definition1 and which gives it its      
importance4 ,the dispute concerning the 
definition thus acquires a real value1  
and becomes a question concerning true  
and false4 ,thus in the discussion of   
the question1 ,what is a uniform force8 
it was taken for granted that gravity is
 a uniform force4 ,in the debate of the 
vis viva1 it was assumed that in the    
mutual action of bodies the whole effect
 of the force is unchanged4 ,in the     
zoological definition of species1 7that 
it consists of individuals which have1  
or may have1 sprung from the same       
parents17 it is presumed that           
individuals so related resemble each    
other more than those which are excluded
 by such a definition2 or1 perhaps1 that
 species so defined have permanent and  
definite differences4 ,a definition of  
organization1 or of some other term1    

which was not employed to express some  
principle1 would be of no value4  ,the  
establishment1 therefore1 of a right    
definition of a term1 may be a useful   
step in the explication of our          
conceptions2 but this will be the case  
then only when we have under our        
consideration some proposition in which 
the term is employed4 ,for then the     
question really is1 how the conception  
shall be understood and defined in order
 that the proposition may be true4  ,to 
unfold our conceptions by means of      
definitions has never been serviceable  
to science1 except when it has been     
associated with an immediate use of the 
definitions4 ,the endeavour to define a 
,uniform ,force was combined with the   
assertion that gravity is a uniform     
force3 the attempt to define            
,accelerating ,force was immediately    
followed by the doctrine that           
accelerating forces may be compounded3  
the process of defining ,momentum was   
connected with the principle that       

momenta gained and lost are equal3      
naturalists would have given in vain the
 definition of ,species which we have   
quoted1 if they had not also given the  
characters of species so separated4444  
,definition may be the best mode of     
explaining our conception1 but that     
which alone makes it worth while to     
explain it in any mode1 is the          
opportunity of using it in the          
expression of truth4 ,when a definition 
is propounded to us as a useful step in 
knowledge1 we are always entitled to ask
 what principle it serves to enunciate4 
,in giving1 then1 an exact connotation  
to the phrase1 an uniform force1 the    
condition was understood1 that the      
phrase should continue to denote        
gravity4 ,the discussion1 therefore1    
respecting the definition1 resolved     
itself into this question1 ,what is     
there of an uniform nature in the       
motions produced by gravity8 ,by        
observations and comparisons1 it was    
found1 that what was uniform in those   

motions was the ratio of the velocity   
acquired to the time elapsed2 equal     
velocities being added in equal times4  
,an uniform force1 therefore1 was       
defined1 a force which adds equal       
velocities in equal times4 ,so1 again1  
in defining momentum4 ,it was already a 
received doctrine1 that when two objects
 impinge upon one another1 the momentum 
lost by the one is equal to that gained 
by the other4 ,this proportion it was   
deemed necessary to preserve1 not from  
the motive 7which operates in many other
 cases7 that it was firmly fixed in     
popular belief2 for the proposition in  
question had never been heard of by any 
but the scientifically instructed4 ,but 
it was felt to contain a truth3 even a  
superficial observation of the phenomena
 left no doubt that in the propagation  
of motion from one body to another1     
there was something of which the one    
body gained precisely what the other    
lost2 and the word momentum had been    
invented to express this unknown        

something4 ,the settlement1 therefore1  
of the definition of momentum1 involved 
the determination of the question1 ,what
 is that of which a body1 when it sets  
another body in motion1 loses exactly as
 much as it communicates8 ,and when     
experiment had shown that this something
 was the product of the velocity of the 
body by its mass1 or quantity of matter1
 this became the definition of momentum4
  ,the following remarks1#i therefore1  
are perfectly just3 ,the business of    
definition is part of the business of   
discovery4444 ,to define1 so that our   
definition shall have any scientific    
value1 requires no small portion of that
 sagacity by which truth is detected4444
 ,when it has been clearly seen what    
ought to be our definition1 it must be  
pretty well known what truth we have to 
state4 ,the definition1 as well as the  
discovery1 supposes a decided step in   
our knowledge to have been made4 ,the   
writers on ,logic1 in the middle ages1  
made ,definition the last stage in the  

progress of knowledge2 and in this      
arrangement at least1 the history of    
science1 and the philosophy derived from
 the history1 confirm their speculative 
views4 ,for in order to judge finally   
how the name which denotes a class may  
best be defined1 we must know all the   
properties common to the class1 and all 
the relations of causation or dependence
 among those properties4  ,if the       
properties which are fittest to be      
selected as marks of other common       
properties are also obvious and         
familiar1 and especially if they bear a 
great part in producing that general air
 of resemblance which was the original  
inducement to the formation of the      
class1 the definition will then be most 
felicitous4 ,but it is often necessary  
to define the class by some property not
 familiarly known1 provided that        
property be the best mark of those which
 are known4 ,m4 de ,blainville1 for     
instance1 founded his definition of life
 on the process of decomposition and    

recomposition which incessantly takes   
place in every living body1 so that the 
particles composing it are never for two
 instants the same4 ,this is by no means
 one of the most obvious properties of  
living bodies2 it might escape          
altogether the notice of an unscientific
 observer4 ,yet great authorities       
7independently of ,m4 de ,blainville1   
who is himself a first-rate authority7  
have thought that no other property so  
well answers the conditions required for
 the definition4    #e4 ,having laid    
down the principles which ought for the 
most part to be observed in attempting  
to give a precise connotation to a term 
in use1 ,i must now add1 that it is not 
always practicable to adhere to those   
principles1 and that even when          
practicable1 it is occasionally not     
desirable4  ,cases in which it is       
impossible to comply with all the       
conditions of a precise definition of a 
name in agreement with usage1 occur very
 frequently4 ,there is often no one     

connotation capable of being given to a 
word1 so that it shall still denote     
everything it is accustomed to denote2  
or that all the propositions into which 
it is accustomed to enter1 and which    
have any foundation in truth1 shall     
remain true4 ,independently of          
accidental ambiguities1 in which the    
different meanings have no connexion    
with one another2 it continually happens
 that a word is used in two or more     
senses derived from each other1 but yet 
radically distinct4 ,so long as a term  
is vague1 that is1 so long as its       
connotation is not ascertained and      
permanently fixed1 it is constantly     
liable to be applied by extension from  
one thing to another1 until it reaches  
things which have little1 or even no1   
resemblance to those which were first   
designated by it4  ,suppose1 says       
,dugald ,stewart1 in his ,philosophical 
,essays1#aj that the letters ,a1 ,b1 ,c1
 ,d1 ,e1 denote a series of objects2    
that ,a possesses some one quality in   

common with ,b2 ,b a quality in common  
with ,c2 ,c a quality in common with ,d2
 ,d a quality in common with ,e2 while  
at the same time1 no quality can be     
found which belongs in common to any    
three objects in the series4 ,is it not 
conceivable1 that the affinity between  
,a and ,b may produce a transference of 
the name of the first to the second2 and
 that1 in consequence of the other      
affinities which connect the remaining  
objects together1 the same name may pass
 in succession from ,b to ,c2 from ,c to
 ,d2 and from ,d to ,e8 ,in this manner1
 a common appellation will arise between
 ,a and ,e1 although the two objects    
may1 in their nature and properties1 be 
so widely distant from each other1 that 
no stretch of imagination can conceive  
how the thoughts were led from the      
former to the latter4 ,the transitions1 
nevertheless1 may have been all so easy 
and gradual1 that1 were they            
successfully detected by the fortunate  
ingenuity of a theorist1 we should      

instantly recognise1 not only the       
verisimilitude1 but the truth of the    
conjecture3 in the same way as we admit1
 with the confidence of intuitive       
conviction1 the certainty of the        
well-known etymological process which   
connects the ,latin preposition e or ex 
with the ,english substantive stranger1 
the moment that the intermediate links  
of the chain are submitted to our       
examination4#aa  ,the applications which
 a word acquires by this gradual        
extension of it from one set of objects 
to another1 ,stewart1 adopting an       
expression from ,mr4 ,payne ,knight1    
calls its transitive applications2 and  
after briefly illustrating such of them 
as are the result of local or casual    
associations1 he proceeds as            
follows3#ab--  ,but although by far the 
greater part of the transitive or       
derivative applications of words depend 
on casual and unaccountable caprices of 
the feelings or the fancy1 there are    
certain cases in which they open a very 

interesting field of philosophical      
speculation4 ,such are those1 in which  
an analogous transference of the        
corresponding term may be remarked      
universally1 or very generally1 in other
 languages2 and in which1 of course1 the
 uniformity of the result must be       
ascribed to the essential principles of 
the human frame4 ,even in such cases1   
however1 it will by no means be always  
found1 on examination1 that the various 
applications of the same term have      
arisen from any common quality or       
qualities in the objects to which they  
relate4 ,in the greater number of       
instances1 they may be traced to some   
natural and universal associations of   
ideas1 founded in the common faculties1 
common organs1 and common condition of  
the human race4444 ,according to the    
different degrees of intimacy and       
strength in the associations on which   
the transitions of language are founded1
 very different effects may be expected 
to arise4 ,where the association is     

slight and casual1 the several meanings 
will remain distinct from each other1   
and will often1 in process of time1     
assume the appearance of capricious     
varieties in the use of the same        
arbitrary sign4 ,where the association  
is so natural and habitual as to become 
virtually indissoluble1 the transitive  
meanings will coalesce in one complex   
conception2 and every new transition    
will become a more comprehensive        
generalization of the term in question4 
,i solicit particular attention to the  
law of mind expressed in the last       
sentence1 and which is the source of the
 perplexity so often experienced in     
detecting these transitions of meaning4 
,ignorance of that law is the shoal on  
which some of the most powerful         
intellects which have adorned the human 
race have been stranded4 ,the inquiries 
of ,plato into the definitions of some  
of the most general terms of moral      
speculation are characterized by ,bacon 
as a far nearer approach to a true      

inductive method than is elsewhere to be
 found among the ancients1 and are1     
indeed1 almost perfect examples of the  
preparatory process of comparison and   
abstraction3 but1 from being unaware of 
the law just mentioned1 he often wasted 
the powers of this great logical        
instrument on inquiries in which it     
could realize no result1 since the      
phenomena1 whose common properties he so
 elaborately endeavoured to detect1 had 
not really any common properties4 ,bacon
 himself fell into the same error in his
 speculations on the nature of heat1 in 
which he evidently confounded under the 
name hot1 classes of phenomena which had
 no property in common4 ,stewart        
certainly overstates the matter when he 
speaks of a prejudice which has         
descended to modern times from the      
scholastic ages1 that when a word admits
 of a variety of significations1 these  
different significations must all be    
species of the same genus1 and must     
consequently include some essential idea

 common to every individual to which the
 generic term can be applied3#ac for    
both ,aristotle and his followers were  
well aware that there are such things as
 ambiguities of language1 and delighted 
in distinguishing them4 ,but they never 
suspected ambiguity in the cases where  
7as ,stewart remarks7 the association on
 which the transition of meaning was    
founded is so natural and habitual1 that
 the two meanings blend together in the 
mind1 and a real transition becomes an  
apparent generalization4 ,accordingly   
they wasted infinite pains in           
endeavouring to find a definition which 
would serve for several distinct        
meanings at once3 as in an instance     
noticed by ,stewart himself1 that of    
causation2 the ambiguity of the word    
which1 in the ,greek language1          
corresponds to the ,english word cause1 
having suggested to them the vain       
attempt of tracing the common idea      
which1 in the case of any effect1       
belongs to the efficient1 to the matter1

 to the form1 and to the end4 ,the idle 
generalities 7he adds7 we meet with in  
other philosophers1 about the ideas of  
the good1 the fit1 and the becoming1    
have taken their rise from the same     
undue influence of popular epithets on  
the speculations of the learned4#ad     
,among the words which have undergone so
 many successive transitions of meaning 
that every trace of a property common to
 all the things they are applied to1 or 
at least common and also peculiar to    
those things1 has been lost1 ,stewart   
considers the word ,beautiful to be one4
 ,and 7without attempting to decide a   
question which in no respect belongs to 
logic7 ,i cannot but feel1 with him1    
considerable doubt1 whether the word    
beautiful connotes the same property    
when we speak of a beautiful colour1 a  
beautiful face1 a beautiful scene1 a    
beautiful character1 and a beautiful    
poem4 ,the word was doubtless extended  
from one of these objects to another on 
account of a resemblance between them1  

or more probably1 between the emotions  
they excited2 and1 by this progressive  
extension1 it has at last reached things
 very remote from those objects of sight
 to which there is no doubt that it was 
first appropriated2 and it is at least  
questionable whether there is now any   
property common to all the things which1
 consistently with usage1 may be called 
beautiful1 except the property of       
agreeableness1 which the term certainly 
does connote1 but which cannot be all   
that people usually intend to express by
 it1 since there are many agreeable     
things which are never called beautiful4
 ,if such be the case1 it is impossible 
to give to the word ,beautiful any fixed
 connotation1 such that it shall denote 
all the objects which in common use it  
now denotes1 but no others4 ,a fixed    
connotation1 however1 it ought to have2 
for1 so long as it has not1 it is unfit 
to be used as a scientific term1 and is 
a perpetual source of false analogies   
and erroneous generalizations4  ,this1  

then1 constitutes a case in             
exemplification of our remark1 that even
 when there is a property common to all 
the things denoted by a name1 to erect  
that property into the definition and   
exclusive connotation of the name is not
 always desirable4 ,the various things  
called beautiful unquestionably resemble
 one another in being agreeable2 but to 
make this the definition of beauty1 and 
so extend the word ,beautiful to all    
agreeable things1 would be to drop      
altogether a portion of meaning which   
the word really1 though indistinctly1   
conveys1 and to do what depends on us   
towards causing those qualities of the  
objects which the word previously1      
though vaguely1 pointed at1 to be       
overlooked and forgotten4 ,it is better1
 in such a case1 to give a fixed        
connotation to the term by restricting1 
than by extending its use2 rather       
excluding from the epithet ,beautiful   
some things to which it is commonly     
considered applicable1 than leaving out 

of its connotation any of the qualities 
by which1 though occasionally lost sight
 of1 the general mind may have been     
habitually guided in the commonest and  
most interesting applications of the    
term4 ,for there is no question that    
when people call anything beautiful1    
they think they are asserting more than 
that it is merely agreeable4 ,they think
 they are ascribing a peculiar sort of  
agreeableness1 analogous to that which  
they find in some other of the things to
 which they are accustomed to apply the 
same name4 ,if1 therefore1 there be any 
peculiar sort of agreeableness which is 
common though not to all1 yet to the    
principal things which are called       
beautiful1 it is better to limit the    
denotation of the term to those things1 
than to leave that kind of quality      
without a term to connote it1 and       
thereby divert attention from its       
peculiarities4    #f4 ,the last remark  
exemplifies a rule of terminology1 which
 is of great importance1 and which has  

hardly yet been recognised as a rule1   
but by a few thinkers of the present    
century4 ,in attempting to rectify the  
use of a vague term by giving it a fixed
 connotation1 we must take care not to  
discard 7unless advisedly1 and on the   
ground of a deeper knowledge of the     
subject7 any portion of the connotation 
which the word1 in however indistinct a 
manner1 previously carried with it4 ,for
 otherwise language loses one of its    
inherent and most valuable properties1  
that of being the conservator of ancient
 experience2 the keeper-alive of those  
thoughts and observations of former     
ages1 which may be alien to the         
tendencies of the passing time4 ,this   
function of language is so often        
overlooked or undervalued1 that a few   
observations on it appear to be         
extremely required4  ,even when the     
connotation of a term has been          
accurately fixed1 and still more if it  
has been left in the state of a vague   
unanalysed feeling of resemblance2 there

 is a constant tendency in the word1    
through familiar use1 to part with a    
portion of its connotation4 ,it is a    
well-known law of the mind1 that a word 
originally associated with a very       
complex cluster of ideas1 is far from   
calling up all those ideas in the mind1 
every time the word is used3 it calls up
 only one or two1 from which the mind   
runs on by fresh associations to another
 set of ideas1 without waiting for the  
suggestion of the remainder of the      
complex cluster4 ,if this were not the  
case1 processes of thought could not    
take place with anything like the       
rapidity which we know they possess4    
,very often1 indeed1 when we are        
employing a word in our mental          
operations1 we are so far from waiting  
until the complex idea which corresponds
 to the meaning of the word is          
consciously brought before us in all its
 parts1 that we run on to new trains of 
ideas by the other associations which   
the mere word excites1 without having   

realized in our imagination any part    
whatever of the meaning3 thus using the 
word1 and even using it well and        
accurately1 and carrying on important   
processes of reasoning by means of it1  
in an almost mechanical manner2 so much 
so1 that some metaphysicians1           
generalizing from an extreme case1 have 
fancied that all reasoning is but the   
mechanical use of a set of terms        
according to a certain form4 ,we may    
discuss and settle the most important   
interests of towns or nations1 by the   
application of general theorems or      
practical maxims previously laid down1  
without having had consciously suggested
 to us1 once in the whole process1 the  
houses and green fields1 the thronged   
market-places and domestic hearths1 of  
which not only those towns and nations  
consist1 but which the words town and   
nation confessedly mean4  ,since1 then1 
general names come in this manner to be 
used 7and even to do a portion of their 
work well7 without suggesting to the    

mind the whole of their meaning1 and    
often with the suggestion of a very     
small1 or no part at all of that        
meaning2 we cannot wonder that words so 
used come in time to be no longer       
capable of suggesting any other of the  
ideas appropriated to them1 than those  
with which the association is most      
immediate and strongest1 or most kept up
 by the incidents of life3 the remainder
 being lost altogether2 unless the mind1
 by often consciously dwelling on them1 
keeps up the association4 ,words        
naturally retain much more of their     
meaning to persons of active            
imagination1 who habitually represent to
 themselves things in the concrete1 with
 the detail which belongs to them in the
 actual world4 ,to minds of a different 
description1 the only antidote to this  
corruption of language is predication4  
,the habit of predicating of the name1  
all the various properties which it     
originally connoted1 keeps up the       
association between the name and those  

properties4  ,but in order that it may  
do so1 it is necessary that the         
predicates should themselves retain     
their association with the properties   
which they severally connote4 ,for the  
propositions cannot keep the meaning of 
the words alive1 if the meaning of the  
propositions themselves should die4 ,and
 nothing is more common than for        
propositions to be mechanically         
repeated1 mechanically retained in the  
memory1 and their truth undoubtingly    
assented to and relied on1 while yet    
they carry no meaning distinctly home to
 the mind2 and while the matter of fact 
or law of nature which they originally  
expressed is as much lost sight of1 and 
practically disregarded1 as if it never 
had been heard of at all4 ,in those     
subjects which are at the same time     
familiar and complicated1 and especially
 in those which are so in as great a    
degree as moral and social subjects are1
 it is a matter of common remark how    
many important propositions are believed

 and repeated from habit1 while no      
account could be given1 and no sense is 
practically manifested1 of the truths   
which they convey4 ,hence it is1 that   
the traditional maxims of old           
experience1 though seldom questioned1   
have often so little effect on the      
conduct of life2 because their meaning  
is never1 by most persons1 really felt1 
until personal experience has brought it
 home4 ,and thus also it is that so many
 doctrines of religion1 ethics1 and even
 politics1 so full of meaning and       
reality to first converts1 have         
manifested 7after the association of    
that meaning with the verbal formulas   
has ceased to be kept up by the         
controversies which accompanied their   
first introduction7 a tendency to       
degenerate rapidly into lifeless dogmas2
 which tendency1 all the efforts of an  
education expressly and skilfully       
directed to keeping the meaning alive1  
are barely sufficient to counteract4    
,considering1 then1 that the human mind1

 in different generations1 occupies     
itself with different things1 and in one
 age is led by the circumstances which  
surround it to fix more of its attention
 upon one of the properties of a thing1 
in another age upon another2 it is      
natural and inevitable that in every age
 a certain portion of our recorded and  
traditional knowledge1 not being        
continually suggested by the pursuits   
and inquiries with which mankind are at 
that time engrossed1 should fall asleep1
 as it were1 and fade from the memory4  
,it would be in danger of being totally 
lost1 if the propositions or formulas1  
the results of the previous experience1 
did not remain1 as forms of words it may
 be1 but of words that once really      
conveyed1 and are still supposed to     
convey1 a meaning3 which meaning1 though
 suspended1 may be historically traced1 
and when suggested1 may be recognised by
 minds of the necessary endowments as   
being still matter of fact1 or truth4   
,while the formulas remain1 the meaning 

may at any time revive2 and as on the   
one hand the formulas progressively lose
 the meaning they were intended to      
convey1 so1 on the other1 when this     
forgetfulness has reached its height and
 begun to produce obvious consequences1 
minds arise which from the contemplation
 of the formulas rediscover the truth1  
when truth it was1 which was contained  
in them1 and announce it again to       
mankind1 not as a discovery1 but as the 
meaning of that which they have been    
taught1 and still profess to believe4   
,thus there is a perpetual oscillation  
in spiritual truths1 and in spiritual   
doctrines of any significance1 even when
 not truths4 ,their meaning is almost   
always in a process either of being lost
 or of being recovered4 ,whoever has    
attended to the history of the more     
serious convictions of mankind--of the  
opinions by which the general conduct of
 their lives is1 or as they conceive    
ought to be1 more especially            
regulated--is aware that even when      

recognising verbally the same doctrines1
 they attach to them at different       
periods a greater or a less quantity1   
and even a different kind1 of meaning4  
,the words in their original acceptation
 connoted1 and the propositions         
expressed1 a complication of outward    
facts and inward feelings1 to different 
portions of which the general mind is   
more particularly alive in different    
generations of mankind4 ,to common      
minds1 only that portion of the meaning 
is in each generation suggested1 of     
which that generation possesses the     
counterpart in its own habitual         
experience4 ,but the words and          
propositions lie ready to suggest to any
 mind duly prepared the remainder of the
 meaning4 ,such individual minds are    
almost always to be found3 and the lost 
meaning1 revived by them1 again by      
degrees works its way into the general  
mind4  ,the arrival of this salutary    
reaction may however be materially      
retarded1 by the shallow conceptions and

 incautious proceedings of mere         
logicians4 ,it sometimes happens that   
towards the close of the downward       
period1 when the words have lost part of
 their significance1 and have not yet   
begun to recover it1 persons arise whose
 leading and favourite idea is the      
importance of clear conceptions and     
precise thought1 and the necessity1     
therefore1 of definite language4 ,these 
persons1 in examining the old formulas1 
easily perceive that words are used in  
them without a meaning2 and if they are 
not the sort of persons who are capable 
of rediscovering the lost signification1
 they naturally enough dismiss the      
formula1 and define the name without    
reference to it4 ,in so doing they      
fasten down the name to what it connotes
 in common use at the time when it      
conveys the smallest quantity of        
meaning2 and introduce the practice of  
employing it1 consistently and          
uniformly1 according to that            
connotation4 ,the word in this way      

acquires an extent of denotation far    
beyond what it had before2 it becomes   
extended to many things to which it was 
previously1 in appearance capriciously1 
refused4 ,of the propositions in which  
it was formerly used1 those which were  
true in virtue of the forgotten part of 
its meaning are now1 by the clearer     
light which the definition diffuses1    
seen not to be true according to the    
definition2 which1 however1 is the      
recognised and sufficiently correct     
expression of all that is perceived to  
be in the mind of any one by whom the   
term is used at the present day4 ,the   
ancient formulas are consequently       
treated as prejudices2 and people are no
 longer taught as before1 though not to 
understand them1 yet to believe that    
there is truth in them4 ,they no longer 
remain in the general mind surrounded by
 respect1 and ready at any time to      
suggest their original meaning4         
,whatever truths they contain are not   
only1 in these circumstances1           

rediscovered far more slowly1 but1 when 
rediscovered1 the prejudice with which  
novelties are regarded is now1 in some  
degree at least1 against them1 instead  
of being on their side4  ,an example may
 make these remarks more intelligible4  
,in all ages1 except where moral        
speculation has been silenced by outward
 compulsion1 or where the feelings which
 prompt to it still continue to be      
satisfied by the traditional doctrines  
of an established faith1 one of the     
subjects which have most occupied the   
minds of thinking persons is the        
inquiry1 ,what is virtue8 or1 ,what is a
 virtuous character8 ,among the         
different theories on the subject which 
have1 at different times1 grown up and  
obtained partial currency1 every one of 
which reflected as in the clearest      
mirror1 the express image of the age    
which gave it birth2 there was one1     
according to which virtue consists in a 
correct calculation of our own personal 
interests1 either in this world only1 or

 also in another4 ,to make this theory  
plausible1 it was of course necessary   
that the only beneficial actions which  
people in general were accustomed to    
see1 or were therefore accustomed to    
praise1 should be such as were1 or at   
least might without contradicting       
obvious facts be supposed to be1 the    
result of a prudential regard to        
self-interest2 so that the words really 
connoted no more1 in common acceptation1
 than was set down in the definition4   
,suppose1 now1 that the partisans of    
this theory had contrived to introduce a
 consistent and undeviating use of the  
term according to this definition4      
,suppose that they had seriously        
endeavoured1 and had succeeded in the   
endeavour1 to banish the word           
disinterestedness from the language2 had
 obtained the disuse of all expressions 
attaching odium to selfishness or       
commendation to self-sacrifice1 or which
 implied generosity or kindness to be   
anything but doing a benefit in order to

 receive a greater personal advantage in
 return4 ,need we say1 that this        
abrogation of the old formulas for the  
sake of preserving clear ideas and      
consistency of thought1 would have been 
a great evil8 while the very            
inconsistency incurred by the           
coexistence of the formulas with        
philosophical opinions which seemed to  
condemn them as absurdities1 operated as
 a stimulus to the re-examination of the
 subject2 and thus the very doctrines   
originating in the oblivion into which a
 part of the truth had fallen1 were     
rendered indirectly1 but powerfully1    
instrumental to its revival4  ,the      
doctrine of the ,coleridge school1 that 
the language of any people among whom   
culture is of old date1 is a sacred     
deposit1 the property of all ages1 and  
which no one age should consider itself 
empowered to alter--borders indeed1 as  
thus expressed1 on an extravagance2 but 
it is grounded on a truth1 frequently   
overlooked by that class of logicians   

who think more of having a clear than of
 having a comprehensive meaning2 and who
 perceive that every age is adding to   
the truths which it has received from   
its predecessors1 but fail to see that a
 counter process of losing truths       
already possessed1 is also constantly   
going on1 and requiring the most        
sedulous attention to counteract it4    
,language is the depository of the      
accumulated body of experience to which 
all former ages have contributed their  
part1 and which is the inheritance of   
all yet to come4 ,we have no right to   
prevent ourselves from transmitting to  
posterity a larger portion of this      
inheritance than we may ourselves have  
profited by4 ,however much we may be    
able to improve on the conclusions of   
our forefathers1 we ought to be careful 
not inadvertently to let any of their   
premises slip through our fingers4 ,it  
may be good to alter the meaning of a   
word1 but it is bad to let any part of  
the meaning drop4 ,whoever seeks to     

introduce a more correct use of a term  
with which important associations are   
connected1 should be required to possess
 an accurate acquaintance with the      
history of the particular word1 and of  
the opinions which in different stages  
of its progress it served to express4   
,to be qualified to define the name1 we 
must know all that has ever been known  
of the properties of the class of       
objects which are1 or originally were1  
denoted by it4 ,for if we give it a     
meaning according to which any          
proposition will be false which has ever
 been generally held to be true1 it is  
incumbent on us to be sure that we know 
and have considered all which those1 who
 believed the proposition1 understood by
 it4     ,,chapter ,v4  ,,on ,,the      
,,natural ,,history ,,of ,,the          
,,variations ,,in ,,the ,,meaning ,,of  
,,terms4    #a4 ,it is not only in the  
mode which has now been pointed out1    
namely by gradual inattention to a      
portion of the ideas conveyed1 that     

words in common use are liable to shift 
their connotation4 ,the truth is1 that  
the connotation of such words is        
perpetually varying2 as might be        
expected from the manner in which words 
in common use acquire their connotation4
 ,a technical term1 invented for        
purposes of art or science1 has1 from   
the first1 the connotation given to it  
by its inventor2 but a name which is in 
every one's mouth before any one thinks 
of defining it1 derives its connotation 
only from the circumstances which are   
habitually brought to mind when it is   
pronounced4 ,among these circumstances1 
the properties common to the things     
denoted by the name1 have naturally a   
principal place2 and would have the sole
 place1 if language were regulated by   
convention rather than by custom and    
accident4 ,but besides these common     
properties1 which if they exist are     
certainly present whenever the name is  
employed1 any other circumstance may    
casually be found along with it1 so     

frequently as to become associated with 
it in the same manner1 and as strongly1 
as the common properties themselves4 ,in
 proportion as this association forms   
itself1 people give up using the name in
 cases in which those casual            
circumstances do not exist4 ,they prefer
 using some other name1 or the same name
 with some adjunct1 rather than employ  
an expression which will call up an idea
 they do not want to excite4 ,the       
circumstance originally casual1 thus    
becomes regularly a part of the         
connotation of the word4  ,it is this   
continual incorporation of circumstances
 originally accidental1 into the        
permanent signification of words1 which 
is the cause that there are so few exact
 synonymes4 ,it is this also which      
renders the dictionary meaning of a     
word1 by universal remark so imperfect  
an exponent of its real meaning4 ,the   
dictionary meaning is marked out in a   
broad1 blunt way1 and probably includes 
all that was originally necessary for   

the correct employment of the term2 but 
in process of time so many collateral   
associations adhere to words1 that      
whoever should attempt to use them with 
no other guide than the dictionary1     
would confound a thousand nice          
distinctions and subtle shades of       
meaning which dictionaries take no      
account of2 as we notice in the use of a
 language in conversation or writing by 
a foreigner not thoroughly master of it4
 ,the history of a word1 by showing the 
causes which determine its use1 is in   
these cases a better guide to its       
employment than any definition2 for     
definitions can only show its meaning at
 the particular time1 or at most the    
series of its successive meanings1 but  
its history may show the law by which   
the succession was produced4 ,the word  
gentleman1 for instance1 to the correct 
employment of which a dictionary would  
be no guide1 originally meant simply a  
man born in a certain rank4 ,from this  
it came by degrees to connote all such  

qualities or adventitious circumstances 
as were usually found to belong to      
persons of that rank4 ,this             
consideration at once explains why in   
one of its vulgar acceptations it means 
any one who lives without labour1 in    
another without manual labour1 and in   
its more elevated signification it has  
in every age signified the conduct1     
character1 habits1 and outward          
appearance1 in whomsoever found1 which1 
according to the ideas of that age1     
belonged or were expected to belong to  
persons born and educated in a high     
social position4  ,it continually       
happens that of two words1 whose        
dictionary meanings are either the same 
or very slightly different1 one will be 
the proper word to use in one set of    
circumstances1 another in another1      
without its being possible to show how  
the custom of so employing them         
originally grew up4 ,the accident that  
one of the words was used and not the   
other on a particular occasion or in a  

particular social circle1 will be       
sufficient to produce so strong an      
association between the word and some   
speciality of circumstances1 that       
mankind abandon the use of it in any    
other case1 and the speciality becomes  
part of its signification4 ,the tide of 
custom first drifts the word on the     
shore of a particular meaning1 then     
retires and leaves it there4  ,an       
instance in point is the remarkable     
change which1 in the ,english language  
at least1 has taken place in the        
signification of the word loyalty4 ,that
 word originally meant in ,english1 as  
it still means in the language from     
whence it came1 fair1 open dealing1 and 
fidelity to engagements2 in that sense  
the quality it expressed was part of the
 ideal chivalrous or knightly character4
 ,by what process1 in ,england1 the term
 became restricted to the single case of
 fidelity to the throne1 ,i am not      
sufficiently versed in the history of   
courtly language to be able to          

pronounce4 ,the interval between a loyal
 chevalier and a loyal subject is       
certainly great4 ,i can only suppose    
that the word was1 at some period1 the  
favourite term at court to express      
fidelity to the oath of allegiance2     
until at length those who wished to     
speak of any other1 and as it was       
probably deemed1 inferior sort of       
fidelity1 either did not venture to use 
so dignified a term1 or found it        
convenient to employ some other in order
 to avoid being misunderstood4    #b4   
,cases are not unfrequent in which a    
circumstance1 at first casually         
incorporated into the connotation of a  
word which originally had no reference  
to it1 in time wholly supersedes the    
original meaning1 and becomes not merely
 a part of the connotation1 but the     
whole of it4 ,this is exemplified in the
 word pagan1 paganus2 which originally1 
as its etymology imports1 was equivalent
 to villager2 the inhabitant of a pagus1
 or village4 ,at a particular era in the

 extension of ,christianity over the    
,roman empire1 the adherents of the old 
religion1 and the villagers or country  
people1 were nearly the same body of    
individuals1 the inhabitants of the     
towns having been earliest converted2 as
 in our own day1 and at all times1 the  
greater activity of social intercourse  
renders them the earliest recipients of 
new opinions and modes1 while old habits
 and prejudices linger longest among the
 country people3 not to mention that the
 towns were more immediately under the  
direct influence of the government1     
which at that time had embraced         
,christianity4 ,from this casual        
coincidence1 the word paganus carried   
with it1 and began more and more        
steadily to suggest1 the idea of a      
worshipper of the ancient divinities2   
until at length it suggested that idea  
so forcibly that people who did not     
desire to suggest the idea avoided using
 the word4 ,but when paganus had come to
 connote heathenism1 the very           

unimportant circumstance1 with reference
 to that fact1 of the place of          
residence1 was soon disregarded in the  
employment of the word4 ,as there was   
seldom any occasion for making separate 
assertions respecting heathens who lived
 in the country1 there was no need for a
 separate word to denote them2 and pagan
 came not only to mean heathen1 but to  
mean that exclusively4  ,a case still   
more familiar to most readers is that of
 the word villain or villein4 ,this     
term1 as everybody knows1 had in the    
middle ages a connotation as strictly   
defined as a word could have1 being the 
proper legal designation for those      
persons who were the subjects of the    
less onerous forms of feudal bondage4   
,the scorn of the semibarbarous military
 aristocracy for these their abject     
dependants1 rendered the act of likening
 any person to this class of people a   
mark of the greatest contumely3 the same
 scorn led them to ascribe to the same  
people all manner of hateful qualities1 

which doubtless also1 in the degrading  
situation in which they were held1 were 
often not unjustly imputed to them4     
,these circumstances combined to attach 
to the term villain1 ideas of crime and 
guilt in so forcible a manner1 that the 
application of the epithet even to those
 to whom it legally belonged became an  
affront1 and was abstained from whenever
 no affront was intended4 ,from that    
time guilt was part of the connotation2 
and soon became the whole of it1 since  
mankind were not prompted by any urgent 
motive to continue making a distinction 
in their language between bad men of    
servile station and bad men of any other
 rank in life4  ,these and similar      
instances in which the original         
signification of a term is totally      
lost--another and an entirely distinct  
meaning being first engrafted upon the  
former1 and finally substituted for     
it--afford examples of the double       
movement which is always taking place in
 language3 two counter-movements1 one of

 ,generalization1 by which words are    
perpetually losing portions of their    
connotation1 and becoming of less       
meaning and more general acceptation2   
the other of ,specialization1 by which  
other1 or even these same words1 are    
continually taking on fresh connotation2
 acquiring additional meaning1 by being 
restricted in their employment to a part
 only of the occasions on which they    
might properly be used before4 ,this    
double movement is of sufficient        
importance in the natural history of    
language1 7to which natural history the 
artificial modifications ought always to
 have some degree of reference17 to     
justify our dwelling a little longer on 
the nature of the twofold phenomenon1   
and the causes to which it owes its     
existence4    #c4 ,to begin with the    
movement of generalization4 ,it is      
unnecessary to dwell on the changes in  
the meaning of names which take place   
merely from their being used ignorantly1
 by persons who1 not having properly    

mastered the received connotation of a  
word1 apply it in a looser and wider    
sense than belongs to it4 ,this1        
however1 is a real source of alterations
 in the language2 for when a word1 from 
being often employed in cases where one 
of the qualities which it connotes does 
not exist1 ceases to suggest that       
quality with certainty1 then even those 
who are under no mistake as to the      
proper meaning of the word1 prefer      
expressing that meaning in some other   
way1 and leave the original word to its 
fate4 ,the word ',squire as standing for
 an owner of a landed estate2 ,parson1  
as denoting not the rector of the       
parish1 but clergymen in general2       
,artist1 to denote only a painter or    
sculptor2 are cases in point4#ae        
,independently1 however1 of the         
generalization of names through their   
ignorant misuse1 there is a tendency in 
the same direction1 consistently with a 
perfect knowledge of their meaning2     
arising from the fact1 that the number  

of things known to us1 and of which we  
feel a desire to speak1 multiply faster 
than the names for them4 ,except on     
subjects for which there has been       
constructed a scientific terminology1   
with which unscientific persons do not  
meddle1 great difficulty is generally   
found in bringing a new name into use2  
and independently of that difficulty1 it
 is natural to prefer giving to a new   
object a name which at least expresses  
its resemblance to something already    
known1 since by predicating of it a name
 entirely new we at first convey no     
information4 ,in this manner the name of
 a species often becomes the name of a  
genus2 as salt1 for example1 or oil2 the
 former of which words originally       
denoted only the muriate of soda1 the   
latter1 as its etymology indicates1 only
 olive oil2 but which now denote large  
and diversified classes of substances   
resembling these in some of their       
qualities1 and connote only those common
 qualities1 instead of the whole of the 

distinctive properties of olive oil and 
sea salt4 ,the words glass and soap are 
used by modern chemists in a similar    
manner1 to denote genera of which the   
substances vulgarly so called are single
 species4 ,and it often happens1 as in  
those instances1 that the term keeps its
 special signification in addition to   
its more general one1 and becomes       
ambiguous1 that is1 two names instead of
 one4  ,these changes1 by which words in
 ordinary use become more and more      
generalized1 and less and less          
expressive1 take place in a still       
greater degree with the words which     
express the complicated phenomena of    
mind and society4 ,historians1          
travellers1 and in general those who    
speak or write concerning moral and     
social phenomena with which they are not
 familiarly acquainted1 are the great   
agents in this modification of language4
 ,the vocabulary of all except unusually
 instructed as well as thinking persons1
 is1 on such subjects1 eminently scanty4

 ,they have a certain small set of words
 to which they are accustomed1 and which
 they employ to express phenomena the   
most heterogeneous1 because they have   
never sufficiently analysed the facts to
 which those words correspond in their  
own country1 to have attached perfectly 
definite ideas to the words4 ,the first 
,english conquerors of ,bengal1 for     
example1 carried with them the phrase   
landed proprietor into a country where  
the rights of individuals over the soil 
were extremely different in degree1 and 
even in nature1 from those recognised in
 ,england4 ,applying the term with all  
its ,english associations in such a     
state of things2 to one who had only a  
limited right they gave an absolute     
right1 from another because he had not  
an absolute right they took away all    
right1 drove whole classes of people to 
ruin and despair1 filled the country    
with banditti1 created a feeling that   
nothing was secure1 and produced1 with  
the best intentions1 a disorganization  

of society which had not been produced  
in that country by the most ruthless of 
its barbarian invaders4 ,yet the usage  
of persons capable of so gross a        
misapprehension1 determines the meaning 
of language2 and the words they thus    
misuse grow in generality1 until the    
instructed are obliged to acquiesce2 and
 to employ those words 7first freeing   
them from vagueness by giving them a    
definite connotation7 as generic terms1 
subdividing the genera into species4    
#d4 ,while the more rapid growth of     
ideas than of names thus creates a      
perpetual necessity for making the same 
names serve1 even if imperfectly1 on a  
greater number of occasions2 a          
counter-operation is going on1 by which 
names become on the contrary restricted 
to fewer occasions1 by taking on1 as it 
were1 additional connotation1 from      
circumstances not originally included in
 the meaning1 but which have become     
connected with it in the mind by some   
accidental cause4 ,we have seen above1  

in the words pagan and villain1         
remarkable examples of the              
specialization of the meaning of words  
from casual associations1 as well as of 
the generalization of it in a new       
direction1 which often follows4         
,similar specializations are of frequent
 occurrence in the history even of      
scientific nomenclature4 ,it is by no   
means uncommon1 says ,dr4 ,paris1 in his
 ,pharmacologia1#af to find a word which
 is used to express general characters  
subsequently become the name of a       
specific substance in which such        
characters are predominant2 and we shall
 find that some important anomalies in  
nomenclature may be thus explained4 ,the
 term ,greek3 ,arsenikon1 from which the
 word ,arsenic is derived1 was an       
ancient epithet applied to those natural
 substances which possessed strong and  
acrimonious properties1 and as the      
poisonous quality of arsenic was found  
to be remarkably powerful1 the term was 
especially applied to ,orpiment1 the    

form in which this metal most usually   
occurred4 ,so the term ,verbena 7quasi  
,herbena7 originally denoted all those  
herbs that were held sacred on account  
of their being employed in the rites of 
sacrifice1 as we learn from the poets2  
but as one herb was usually adopted upon
 these occasions1 the word ,verbena came
 to denote that particular herb only1   
and it is transmitted to us to this day 
under the same title1 viz4 ,verbena or  
,vervain1 and indeed until lately it    
enjoyed the medical reputation which its
 sacred origin conferred upon it1 for it
 was worn suspended around the neck as  
an amulet4 ,vitriol1 in the original    
application of the word1 denoted any    
crystalline body with a certain degree  
of transparency 7vitrum72 it is hardly  
necessary to observe that the term is   
now appropriated to a particular        
species3 in the same manner1 ,bark1     
which is a general term1 is applied to  
express one genus1 and by way of        
eminence1 it has the article ,the       

prefixed1 as ,the bark3 the same        
observation will apply to the word      
,opium1 which1 in its primitive sense1  
signifies any juice 7,greek3 opos1      
,succus71 while it now only denotes one 
species1 viz4 that of the poppy4 ,so1   
again1 ,elaterium was used by           
,hippocrates to signify various internal
 applications1 especially purgatives1 of
 a violent and drastic nature 7from the 
word ,greek3 elaun1 agito1 moveo1       
stimulo71 but by succeeding authors it  
was exclusively applied to denote the   
active matter which subsides from the   
juice of the wild cucumber4 ,the word   
,fecula1 again1 originally meant to     
imply any substance which was derived by
 spontaneous subsidence from a liquid   
7from fx1 the grounds or settlement of  
any liquor72 afterwards it was applied  
to ,starch1 which is deposited in this  
manner by agitating the flour of wheat  
in water2 and lastly1 it has been       
applied to a peculiar vegetable         
principle1 which1 like starch1 is       

insoluble in cold1 but completely       
soluble in boiling water1 with which it 
forms a gelatinous solution4 ,this      
indefinite meaning of the word fecula   
has created numerous mistakes in        
pharmaceutic chemistry2 ,elaterium1 for 
instance1 is said to be fecula1 and1 in 
the original sense of the word1 it is   
properly so called1 inasmuch as it is   
procured from a vegetable juice by      
spontaneous subsidence1 but in the      
limited and modern acceptation of the   
term1 it conveys an erroneous idea2 for 
instead of the active principle of the  
juice residing in fecula1 it is a       
peculiar proximate principle1 sui       
generis1 to which ,i have ventured to   
bestow the name of ,elatin4 ,for the    
same reason1 much doubt and obscurity   
involve the meaning of the word         
,extract1 because it is applied         
generally to any substance obtained by  
the evaporation of a vegetable solution1
 and specifically to a peculiar         
proximate principle1 possessed of       

certain characters1 by which it is      
distinguished from every other          
elementary body4  ,a generic term is    
always liable to become thus limited to 
a single species1 or even individual1 if
 people have occasion to think and speak
 of that individual or species much     
oftener than of anything else which is  
contained in the genus4 ,thus by cattle1
 a stage-coachman will understand       
horses2 beasts1 in the language of      
agriculturists1 stands for oxen2 and    
birds1 with some sportsmen1 for         
partridges only4 ,the law of language   
which operates in these trivial         
instances1 is the very same in          
conformity to which the terms ,greek3   
,theos1 ,deus1 and ,god1 were adopted   
from ,polytheism by ,christianity1 to   
express the single object of its own    
adoration4 ,almost all the terminology  
of the ,christian ,church is made up of 
words originally used in a much more    
general acceptation3 ,ecclesia1         
,assembly2 ,bishop1 ,episcopus1         

,overseer2 ,priest1 ,presbyter1 ,elder2 
,deacon1 ,diaconus1 ,administrator2     
,sacrament1 a vow of allegiance2        
,evangelium1 good tidings2 and some     
words1 as ,minister1 are still used both
 in the general and in the limited      
sense4 ,it would be interesting to trace
 the progress by which author came1 in  
its most familiar sense1 to signify a   
writer1 and ,greek3 poits1 or maker1 a  
poet4  ,of the incorporation into the   
meaning of a term1 of circumstances     
accidentally connected with it at some  
particular period1 as in the case of    
,pagan1 instances might easily be       
multiplied4 ,physician 7,greek3         
physikos1 or naturalist7 became1 in     
,england1 synonymous with a healer of   
diseases1 because until a comparatively 
late period medical practitioners were  
the only naturalists4 ,clerc1 or        
clericus1 a scholar1 came to signify an 
ecclesiastic1 because the clergy were   
for many centuries the only scholars4   
,of all ideas1 however1 the most liable 

to cling by association to anything with
 which they have ever been connected by 
proximity1 are those of our pleasures   
and pains1 or of the things which we    
habitually contemplate as sources of our
 pleasures or pains4 ,the additional    
connotation1 therefore1 which a word    
soonest and most readily takes on1 is   
that of agreeableness or painfulness1 in
 their various kinds and degrees3 of    
being a good or bad thing2 desirable or 
to be avoided2 an object of hatred1 of  
dread1 contempt1 admiration1 hope1 or   
love4 ,accordingly there is hardly a    
single name1 expressive of any moral or 
social fact calculated to call forth    
strong affections either of a favourable
 or of a hostile nature1 which does not 
carry with it decidedly and irresistibly
 a connotation of those strong          
affections1 or1 at the least1 of        
approbation or censure2 insomuch that to
 employ those names in conjunction with 
others by which the contrary sentiments 
were expressed1 would produce the effect

 of a paradox1 or even a contradiction  
in terms4 ,the baneful influence of a   
connotation thus acquired1 on the       
prevailing habits of thought1 especially
 in morals and politics1 has been well  
pointed out on many occasions by        
,bentham4 ,it gives rise to the fallacy 
of question-begging names4 ,the very    
property which we are inquiring whether 
a thing possesses or not1 has become so 
associated with the name of the thing as
 to be part of its meaning1 insomuch    
that by merely uttering the name we     
assume the point which was to be made   
out3 one of the most frequent sources of
 apparently self-evident propositions4  
,without any further multiplication of  
examples to illustrate the changes which
 usage is continually making in the     
signification of terms1 ,i shall add1 as
 a practical rule1 that the logician1   
not being able to prevent such          
transformations1 should submit to them  
with a good grace when they are         
irrevocably effected1 and if a          

definition is necessary1 define the word
 according to its new meaning2 retaining
 the former as a second signification1  
if it is needed1 and if there is any    
chance of being able to preserve it     
either in the language of philosophy or 
in common use4 ,logicians cannot make   
the meaning of any but scientific terms3
 that of all other words is made by the 
collective human race4 ,but logicians   
can ascertain clearly what it is which1 
working obscurely1 has guided the       
general mind to a particular employment 
of a name2 and when they have found     
this1 they can clothe it in such        
distinct and permanent terms1 that      
mankind shall see the meaning which     
before they only felt1 and shall not    
suffer it to be afterwards forgotten or 
misapprehended4     ,,chapter ,,vi4     
,,the ,,principles ,,of ,a              
,,philosophical ,,language ,,further    
,,considered4    #a4 ,we have1 thus far1
 considered only one of the requisites  
of a language adapted for the           

investigation of truth2 that its terms  
shall each of them convey a determinate 
and unmistakeable meaning4 ,there are1  
however1 as we have already remarked1   
other requisites2 some of them important
 only in the second degree1 but one     
which is fundamental1 and barely yields 
in point of importance1 if it yields at 
all1 to the quality which we have       
already discussed at so much length4    
,that the language may be fitted for its
 purposes1 not only should every word   
perfectly express its meaning1 but there
 should be no important meaning without 
its word4 ,whatever we have occasion to 
think of often1 and for scientific      
purposes1 ought to have a name          
appropriated to it4  ,this requisite of 
philosophical language may be considered
 under three different heads2 that      
number of separate conditions being     
involved in it4    #b4 ,first3 there    
ought to be all such names1 as are      
needful for making such a record of     
individual observations that the words  

of the record shall exactly show what   
fact it is which has been observed4 ,in 
other words1 there should be an accurate
 ,descriptive ,terminology4  ,the only  
things which we can observe directly    
being our own sensations1 or other      
feelings1 a complete descriptive        
language would be one in which there    
should be a name for every variety of   
elementary sensation or feeling4        
,combinations of sensations or feelings 
may always be described1 if we have a   
name for each of the elementary feelings
 which compose them2 but brevity of     
description1 and clearness 7which often 
depends very much on brevity17 are      
greatly promoted by giving distinctive  
names not to the elements alone1 but    
also to all combinations which are of   
frequent recurrence4 ,on this occasion  
,i cannot do better than quote from ,dr4
 ,whewell#ag some of the excellent      
remarks which he has made on this       
important branch of our subject4  ,the  
meaning of descriptive technical terms  

can be fixed in the first instance only 
by convention1 and can be made          
intelligible only by presenting to the  
senses that which the terms are to      
signify4 ,the knowledge of a colour by  
its name can only be taught through the 
eye4 ,no description can convey to a    
hearer what we mean by apple-green or   
,french-grey4 ,it might1 perhaps1 be    
supposed that1 in the first example1 the
 term apple1 referring to so familiar an
 object1 sufficiently suggests the      
colour intended4 ,but it may easily be  
seen that this is not true2 for apples  
are of many different hues of green1 and
 it is only by a conventional selection 
that we can appropriate the term to one 
special shade4 ,when this appropriation 
is once made1 the term refers to the    
sensation1 and not to the parts of the  
term2 for these enter into the compound 
merely as a help to the memory1 whether 
the suggestion be a natural connexion as
 in 'apple-green1' or a casual one as in
 ',french-grey4' ,in order to derive due

 advantage from technical terms of this 
kind1 they must be associated           
immediately with the perception to which
 they belong2 and not connected with it 
through the vague usages of common      
language4 ,the memory must retain the   
sensation2 and the technical word must  
be understood as directly as the most   
familiar word1 and more distinctly4     
,when we find such terms as tin-white or
 pinchbeck-brown1 the metallic colour so
 denoted ought to start up in our memory
 without delay or search4  ,this1 which 
it is most important to recollect with  
respect to the simpler properties of    
bodies1 as colour and form1 is no less  
true with respect to more compound      
notions4 ,in all cases the term is fixed
 to a peculiar meaning by convention2   
and the student1 in order to use the    
word1 must be completely familiar with  
the convention1 so that he has no need  
to frame conjectures from the word      
itself4 ,such conjectures would always  
be insecure1 and often erroneous4 ,thus 

the term papilionaceous applied to a    
flower is employed to indicate1 not only
 a resemblance to a butterfly1 but a    
resemblance arising from five petals of 
a certain peculiar shape and            
arrangement2 and even if the resemblance
 were much stronger than it is in such  
cases1 yet1 if it were produced in a    
different way1 as for example1 by one   
petal1 or two only1 instead of a        
'standard1' two 'wings1' and a 'keel'   
consisting of two parts more or less    
united into one1 we should be no longer 
justified in speaking of it as a        
'papilionaceous' flower4  ,when1        
however1 the thing named is1 as in this 
last case1 a combination of simple      
sensations1 it is not necessary1 in     
order to learn the meaning of the word1 
that the student should refer back to   
the sensations themselves2 it may be    
communicated to him through the medium  
of other words2 the terms1 in short1 may
 be defined4 ,but the names of          
elementary sensations1 or elementary    

feelings of any sort1 cannot be defined2
 nor is there any mode of making their  
signification known but by making the   
learner experience the sensation1 or    
referring him1 through some known mark1 
to his remembrance of having experienced
 it before4 ,hence it is only the       
impressions on the outward senses1 or   
those inward feelings which are         
connected in a very obvious and uniform 
manner with outward objects1 that are   
really susceptible of an exact          
descriptive language4 ,the countless    
variety of sensations which arise1 for  
instance1 from disease1 or from peculiar
 physiological states1 it would be in   
vain to attempt to name2 for as no one  
can judge whether the sensation ,i have 
is the same with his1 the name cannot   
have1 to us two1 real community of      
meaning4 ,the same may be said1 to a    
considerable extent1 of purely mental   
feelings4 ,but in some of the sciences  
which are conversant with external      
objects1 it is scarcely possible to     

surpass the perfection to which this    
quality of a philosophical language has 
been carried4  ,the formation#ah of an  
exact and extensive descriptive language
 for botany has been executed with a    
degree of skill and felicity1 which1    
before it was attained1 could hardly    
have been dreamt of as attainable4      
,every part of a plant has been named2  
and the form of every part1 even the    
most minute1 has had a large assemblage 
of descriptive terms appropriated to it1
 by means of which the botanist can     
convey and receive knowledge of form and
 structure1 as exactly as if each minute
 part were presented to him vastly      
magnified4 ,this acquisition was part of
 the ,linnan reform4444 ',tournefort1'  
says ,decandolle1 'appears to have been 
the first who really perceived the      
utility of fixing the sense of terms in 
such a way as always to employ the same 
word in the same sense1 and always to   
express the same idea by the same words2
 but it was ,linnus who really created  

and fixed this botanical language1 and  
this is his fairest claim to glory1 for 
by this fixation of language he has shed
 clearness and precision over all parts 
of the science4'  ,it is not necessary  
here to give any detailed account of the
 terms of botany4 ,the fundamental ones 
have been gradually introduced1 as the  
parts of plants were more carefully and 
minutely examined4 ,thus the flower was 
necessarily distinguished into the      
calyx1 the corolla1 the stamens1 and the
 pistils2 the sections of the corolla   
were termed petals by ,columna2 those of
 the calyx were called sepals by        
,necker4 ,sometimes terms of greater    
generality were devised2 as perianth1 to
 include the calyx and corolla1 whether 
one or both of these were present2      
pericarp1 for the part enclosing the    
grain1 of whatever kind it be1 fruit1   
nut1 pod1 c4 ,and it may easily be      
imagined1 that descriptive terms may1 by
 definition and combination1 become very
 numerous and distinct4 ,thus leaves may

 be called pinnatifid1 pinnatipartite1  
pinnatisect1 pinnatilobate1 palmatifid1 
palmatipartite1 c41 and each of these   
words designates different combinations 
of the modes and extent of the divisions
 of the leaf with the divisions of its  
outline4 ,in some cases1 arbitrary      
numerical relations are introduced into 
the definition3 thus1 a leaf is called  
bilobate1 when it is divided into two   
parts by a notch2 but if the notch go to
 the middle of its length1 it is bifid2 
if it go near the base of the leaf1 it  
is bipartite2 if to the base1 it is     
bisect4 ,thus1 too1 a pod of a          
cruciferous plant is a siliqua1 if it is
 four times as long as it is broad1 but 
if it be shorter than this it is a      
silicula4 ,such terms being established1
 the form of the very complex leaf or   
frond of a fern 7,hymenophyllum         
,wilsoni7 is exactly conveyed by the    
following phrase3--'fronds rigid        
pinnate1 pinn recurved subunilateral1   
pinnatifid1 the segments linear         

undivided or bifid spinuloso-serrate4'  
,other characters1 as well as form1 are 
conveyed with the like precision3       
,colour by means of a classified scale  
of colours4444 ,this was done with most 
precision by ,werner1 and his scale of  
colours is still the most usual standard
 of naturalists4 ,werner also introduced
 a more exact terminology with regard to
 other characters which are important in
 mineralogy1 as lustre1 hardness4 ,but  
,mohs improved upon this step by giving 
a numerical scale of hardness1 in which 
talc is #a1 gypsum #b1 calc spar #c1 and
 so on4444 ,some properties1 as specific
 gravity1 by their definition give at   
once a numerical measure2 and others1 as
 crystalline form1 require a very       
considerable array of mathematical      
calculation and reasoning1 to point out 
their relations and gradations4    #c4  
,thus far of ,descriptive ,terminology1 
or of the language requisite for placing
 on record our observation of individual
 instances4 ,but when we proceed from   

this to ,induction1 or rather to that   
comparison of observed instances which  
is the preparatory step towards it1 we  
stand in need of an additional and a    
different sort of general names4        
,whenever1 for purposes of ,induction1  
we find it necessary to introduce 7in   
,dr4 ,whewell's phraseology7 some new   
general conception2 that is1 whenever   
the comparison of a set of phenomena    
leads to the recognition in them of some
 common circumstance1 which1 our        
attention not having been directed to it
 on any former occasion1 is to us a new 
phenomenon2 it is of importance that    
this new conception1 or this new result 
of abstraction1 should have a name      
appropriated to it2 especially if the   
circumstance it involves be one which   
leads to many consequences1 or which is 
likely to be found also in other classes
 of phenomena4 ,no doubt1 in most cases 
of the kind1 the meaning might be       
conveyed by joining together several    
words already in use4 ,but when a thing 

has to be often spoken of1 there are    
more reasons than the saving of time and
 space1 for speaking of it in the most  
concise manner possible4 ,what darkness 
would be spread over geometrical        
demonstrations1 if wherever the word    
circle is used1 the definition of a     
circle were inserted instead of it4 ,in 
mathematics and its applications1 where 
the nature of the processes demands that
 the attention should be strongly       
concentrated1 but does not require that 
it should be widely diffused1 the       
importance of concentration also in the 
expressions has always been duly felt2  
and a mathematician no sooner finds that
 he shall often have occasion to speak  
of the same two things together1 than he
 at once creates a term to express them 
whenever combined3 just as1 in his      
algebraical operations1 he substitutes  
for 7am  bn7 p_/q1 or for a_/b  b_/c    
c_/d  c41 the single letter ,p1 ,q1 or  
,s2 not solely to shorten his symbolical
 expressions1 but to simplify the purely

 intellectual part of his operations1 by
 enabling the mind to give its exclusive
 attention to the relation between the  
quantity ,s and the other quantities    
which enter into the equation1 without  
being distracted by thinking            
unnecessarily of the parts of which ,s  
is itself composed4  ,but there is      
another reason1 in addition to that of  
promoting perspicuity1 for giving a     
brief and compact name to each of the   
more considerable results of abstraction
 which are obtained in the course of our
 intellectual phenomena4 ,by naming     
them1 we fix our attention upon them2 we
 keep them more constantly before the   
mind4 ,the names are remembered1 and    
being remembered1 suggest their         
definition2 while if instead of specific
 and characteristic names1 the meaning  
had been expressed by putting together a
 number of other names1 that particular 
combination of words already in common  
use for other purposes would have had   
nothing to make itself remembered by4   

,if we want to render a particular      
combination of ideas permanent in the   
mind1 there is nothing which clenches it
 like a name specially devoted to       
express it4 ,if mathematicians had been 
obliged to speak of that to which a     
quantity1 in increasing or diminishing1 
is always approaching nearer1 so that   
the difference becomes less than any    
assignable quantity1 but to which it    
never becomes exactly equal1 instead of 
expressing all this by the simple       
phrase1 the limit of a quantity1 we     
should probably have long remained      
without most of the important truths    
which have been discovered by means of  
the relation between quantities of      
various kinds and their limits4 ,if     
instead of speaking of momentum1 it had 
been necessary to say1 the product of   
the number of units of velocity in the  
velocity by the number of units of mass 
in the mass1 many of the dynamical      
truths now apprehended by means of this 
complex idea would probably have escaped

 notice1 for want of recalling the idea 
itself with sufficient readiness and    
familiarity4 ,and on subjects less      
remote from the topics of popular       
discussion1 whoever wishes to draw      
attention to some new or unfamiliar     
distinction among things1 will find no  
way so sure as to invent or select      
suitable names for the express purpose  
of marking it4  ,a volume devoted to    
explaining what the writer means by     
civilization1 does not raise so vivid a 
conception of it as the single          
expression1 that ,civilization is a     
different thing from ,cultivation2 the  
compactness of that brief designation   
for the contrasted quality being an     
equivalent for a long discussion4 ,so1  
if we would impress forcibly upon the   
understanding and memory the distinction
 between the two different conceptions  
of a representative government1 we      
cannot more effectually do so than by   
saying that ,delegation is not          
,representation4 ,hardly any original   

thoughts on mental or social subjects   
ever make their way among mankind1 or   
assume their proper importance in the   
minds even of their inventors1 until    
aptly-selected words or phrases have1 as
 it were1 nailed them down and held them
 fast4    #d4 ,of the three essential   
parts of a philosophical language1 we   
have now mentioned two3 a terminology   
suited for describing with precision the
 individual facts observed2 and a name  
for every common property of any        
importance or interest1 which we detect 
by comparing those facts3 including 7as 
the concretes corresponding to those    
abstract terms7 names for the classes   
which we artificially construct in      
virtue of those properties1 or as many  
of them1 at least1 as we have frequent  
occasion to predicate anything of4  ,but
 there is a sort of classes1 for the    
recognition of which no such elaborate  
process is necessary2 because each of   
them is marked out from all others not  
by some one property1 the detection of  

which may depend on a difficult act of  
abstraction1 but by its properties      
generally4 ,i mean1 the ,kinds of       
things1 in the sense which1 in this     
treatise1 has been specially attached to
 that term4 ,by a ,kind1 it will be     
remembered1 we mean one of those classes
 which are distinguished from all others
 not by one or a few definite           
properties1 but by an unknown multitude 
of them3 the combination of properties  
on which the class is grounded1 being a 
mere index to an indefinite number of   
other distinctive attributes4 ,the class
 horse is a ,kind1 because the things   
which agree in possessing the characters
 by which we recognise a horse1 agree in
 a great number of other properties1 as 
we know1 and1 it cannot be doubted1 in  
many more than we know4 ,animal1 again1 
is a ,kind1 because no definition that  
could be given of the name animal could 
either exhaust the properties common to 
all animals1 or supply premises from    
which the remainder of those properties 

could be inferred4 ,but a combination of
 properties which does not give evidence
 of the existence of any other          
independent peculiarities1 does not     
constitute a ,kind4 ,white horse1       
therefore1 is not a ,kind2 because      
horses which agree in whiteness1 do not 
agree in anything else1 except the      
qualities common to all horses1 and     
whatever may be the causes or effects of
 that particular colour4  ,on the       
principle that there should be a name   
for everything which we have frequent   
occasion to make assertions about1 there
 ought evidently to be a name for every 
,kind2 for as it is the very meaning of 
a ,kind that the individuals composing  
it have an indefinite multitude of      
properties in common1 it follows that1  
if not with our present knowledge1 yet  
with that which we may hereafter        
acquire1 the ,kind is a subject to which
 there will have to be applied many     
predicates4 ,the third component element
 of a philosophical language1 therefore1

 is that there shall be a name for every
 ,kind4 ,in other words1 there must not 
only be a terminology1 but also a       
nomenclature4  ,the words ,nomenclature 
and ,terminology are employed by most   
authors almost indiscriminately2 ,dr4   
,whewell being1 as far as ,i am aware1  
the first writer who has regularly      
assigned to the two words different     
meanings4 ,the distinction however which
 he has drawn between them being real   
and important1 his example is likely to 
be followed2 and 7as is apt to be the   
case when such innovations in language  
are felicitously made7 a vague sense of 
the distinction is found to have        
influenced the employment of the terms  
in common practice1 before the          
expediency had been pointed out of      
discriminating them philosophically4    
,every one would say that the reform    
effected by ,lavoisier and              
,guyton-,morveau in the language of     
chemistry consisted in the introduction 
of a new nomenclature1 not of a new     

terminology4 ,linear1 lanceolate1 oval1 
or oblong1 serrated1 dentate1 or crenate
 leaves1 are expressions forming part of
 the terminology of botany1 while the   
names ,viola odorata1 and ,ulex         
,europus1 belong to its nomenclature4   
,a nomenclature may be defined1 the     
collection of the names of all the      
,kinds with which any branch of         
knowledge is conversant2 or more        
properly1 of all the lowest ,kinds1 or  
infim species--those which may be       
subdivided indeed1 but not into ,kinds1 
and which generally accord with what in 
natural history are termed simply       
species4 ,science possesses two splendid
 examples of a systematic nomenclature2 
that of plants and animals1 constructed 
by ,linnus and his successors1 and that 
of chemistry1 which we owe to the       
illustrious group of chemists who       
flourished in ,france towards the close 
of the eighteenth century4 ,in these two
 departments1 not only has every known  
species1 or lowest ,kind1 a name        

assigned to it1 but when new lowest     
,kinds are discovered1 names are at once
 given to them on an uniform principle4 
,in other sciences the nomenclature is  
not at present constructed on any       
system1 either because the species to be
 named are not numerous enough to       
require one1 7as in geometry for        
example17 or because no one has yet     
suggested a suitable principle for such 
a system1 as in mineralogy2 in which the
 want of a scientifically constructed   
nomenclature is now the principal cause 
which retards the progress of the       
science4    #e4 ,a word which carries on
 its face that it belongs to a          
nomenclature1 seems at first sight to   
differ from other concrete general names
 in this--that its meaning does not     
reside in its connotation1 in the       
attributes implied in it1 but in its    
denotation1 that is1 in the particular  
group of things which it is appointed to
 designate2 and cannot1 therefore1 be   
unfolded by means of a definition1 but  

must be made known in another way4 ,this
 opinion1 however1 appears to me        
erroneous4 ,words belonging to a        
nomenclature differ1 ,i conceive1 from  
other words mainly in this1 that besides
 the ordinary connotation1 they have a  
peculiar one of their own3 besides      
connoting certain attributes1 they also 
connote that those attributes are       
distinctive of a ,kind4 ,the term       
peroxide of iron1 for example1 belonging
 by its form to the systematic          
nomenclature of chemistry1 bears on its 
face that it is the name of a peculiar  
,kind of substance4 ,it moreover        
connotes1 like the name of any other    
class1 some portion of the properties   
common to the class2 in this instance   
the property of being a compound of iron
 and the largest dose of oxygen with    
which iron will combine4 ,these two     
things1 the fact of being such a        
compound1 and the fact of being a ,kind1
 constitute the connotation of the name 
peroxide of iron4 ,when we say of the   

substance before us1 that it is the     
peroxide of iron1 we thereby assert1    
first1 that it is a compound of iron and
 a maximum of oxygen1 and next1 that the
 substance so composed is a peculiar    
,kind of substance4  ,now1 this second  
part of the connotation of any word     
belonging to a nomenclature is as       
essential a portion of its meaning as   
the first part1 while the definition    
only declares the first3 and hence the  
appearance that the signification of    
such terms cannot be conveyed by a      
definition3 which appearance1 however1  
is fallacious4 ,the name ,viola odorata 
denotes a ,kind1 of which a certain     
number of characters1 sufficient to     
distinguish it1 are enunciated in       
botanical works4 ,this enumeration of   
characters is surely1 as in other cases1
 a definition of the name4 ,no1 say     
some1 it is not a definition1 for the   
name ,viola odorata does not mean those 
characters2 it means that particular    
group of plants1 and the characters are 

selected from among a much greater      
number1 merely as marks by which to     
recognise the group4 ,but to this ,i    
reply1 that the name does not mean that 
group1 for it would be applied to that  
group no longer than while the group is 
believed to be an infima species2 if it 
were to be discovered that several      
distinct ,kinds have been confounded    
under this one name1 no one would any   
longer apply the name ,viola odorata to 
the whole of the group1 but would apply 
it1 if retained at all1 to one only of  
the ,kinds contained therein4 ,what is  
imperative1 therefore1 is not that the  
name shall denote one particular        
collection of objects1 but that it shall
 denote a ,kind1 and a lowest ,kind4    
,the form of the name declares that1    
happen what will1 it is to denote an    
infima species2 and that1 therefore1 the
 properties which it connotes1 and which
 are expressed in the definition1 are to
 be connoted by it no longer than while 
we continue to believe that those       

properties1 when found together1        
indicate a ,kind1 and that the whole of 
them are found in no more than one      
,kind4  ,with the addition of this      
peculiar connotation1 implied in the    
form of every word which belongs to a   
systematic nomenclature2 the set of     
characters which is employed to         
discriminate each ,kind from all other  
,kinds 7and which is a real definition7 
constitutes as completely as in any     
other case the whole meaning of the     
term4 ,it is no objection to say that   
7as is often the case in natural        
history7 the set of characters may be   
changed1 and another substituted as     
being better suited for the purpose of  
distinction1 while the word1 still      
continuing to denote the same group of  
things1 is not considered to have       
changed its meaning4 ,for this is no    
more than may happen in the case of any 
other general name3 we may1 in reforming
 its connotation1 leave its denotation  
untouched2 and it is generally desirable

 to do so4 ,the connotation1 however1 is
 not the less for this the real meaning1
 for we at once apply the name wherever 
the characters set down in the          
definition are found2 and that which    
exclusively guides us in applying the   
term1 must constitute its signification4
 ,if we find1 contrary to our previous  
belief1 that the characters are not     
peculiar to one species1 we cease to use
 the term coextensively with the        
characters2 but then it is because the  
other portion of the connotation fails2 
the condition that the class must be a  
,kind4 ,the connotation1 therefore1 is  
still the meaning2 the set of           
descriptive characters is a true        
definition2 and the meaning is unfolded1
 not indeed 7as in other cases7 by the  
definition alone1 but by the definition 
and the form of the word taken together4
    #f4 ,we have now analysed what is   
implied in the two principal requisites 
of a philosophical language2 first1     
precision1 or definiteness1 and         

secondly1 completeness4 ,any further    
remarks on the mode of constructing a   
nomenclature must be deferred until we  
treat of ,classification2 the mode of   
naming the ,kinds of things being       
necessarily subordinate to the mode of  
arranging those ,kinds into larger      
classes4 ,with respect to the minor     
requisites of terminology1 some of them 
are well stated and illustrated in the  
,aphorisms concerning the ,language of  
,science1 included in ,dr4 ,whewell's   
,philosophy of the ,inductive ,sciences4
 ,these1 as being of secondary          
importance in the peculiar point of view
 of ,logic1 ,i shall not further refer  
to1 but shall confine my observations to
 one more quality1 which1 next to the   
two already treated of1 appears to be   
the most valuable which the language of 
science can possess4 ,of this quality a 
general notion may be conveyed by the   
following aphorism3  ,whenever the      
nature of the subject permits our       
reasoning processes to be1 without      

danger1 carried on mechanically1 the    
language should be constructed on as    
mechanical principles as possible2 while
 in the contrary case1 it should be so  
constructed that there shall be the     
greatest possible obstacles to a merely 
mechanical use of it4  ,i am aware that 
this maxim requires much explanation1   
which ,i shall at once proceed to give4 
,and first1 as to what is meant by using
 a language mechanically4 ,the complete 
or extreme case of the mechanical use of
 language1 is when it is used without   
any consciousness of a meaning1 and with
 only the consciousness of using certain
 visible or audible marks in conformity 
to technical rules previously laid down4
 ,this extreme case is nowhere realized 
except in the figures of arithmetic and 
the symbols of algebra1 a language      
unique in its kind1 and approaching as  
nearly to perfection1 for the purposes  
to which it is destined1 as can1        
perhaps1 be said of any creation of the 
human mind4 ,its perfection consists in 

the completeness of its adaptation to a 
purely mechanical use4 ,the symbols are 
mere counters1 without even the         
semblance of a meaning apart from the   
convention which is renewed each time   
they are employed1 and which is altered 
at each renewal1 the same symbol a or x 
being used on different occasions to    
represent things which 7except that1    
like all things1 they are susceptible of
 being numbered7 have no property in    
common4 ,there is nothing1 therefore1 to
 distract the mind from the set of      
mechanical operations which are to be   
performed upon the symbols1 such as     
squaring both sides of the equation1    
multiplying or dividing them by the same
 or by equivalent symbols1 and so forth4
 ,each of these operations1 it is true1 
corresponds to a syllogism2 represents  
one step of a ratiocination relating not
 to the symbols1 but to the things      
signified by them4 ,but as it has been  
found practicable to frame a technical  
form1 by conforming to which we can make

 sure of finding the conclusion of the  
ratiocination1 our end can be completely
 attained without our ever thinking of  
anything but the symbols4 ,being thus   
intended to work merely as mechanism1   
they have the qualities which mechanism 
ought to have4 ,they are of the least   
possible bulk1 so that they take up     
scarcely any room1 and waste no time in 
their manipulation2 they are compact1   
and fit so closely together that the eye
 can take in the whole at once of almost
 every operation which they are employed
 to perform4  ,these admirable          
properties of the symbolical language of
 mathematics have made so strong an     
impression on the minds of many         
thinkers1 as to have led them to        
consider the symbolical language in     
question as the ideal type of           
philosophical language generally2 to    
think that names in general1 or 7as they
 are fond of calling them7 signs1 are   
fitted for the purposes of thought in   
proportion as they can be made to       

approximate to the compactness1 the     
entire unmeaningness1 and the capability
 of being used as counters without a    
thought of what they represent1 which   
are characteristic of the a and b1 the x
 and y1 of algebra4 ,this notion has led
 to sanguine views of the acceleration  
of the progress of science by means     
which1 ,i conceive1 cannot possibly     
conduce to that end1 and forms part of  
that exaggerated estimate of the        
influence of signs1 which has           
contributed in no small degree to       
prevent the real laws of our            
intellectual operations from being      
rightly understood4  ,in the first      
place1 a set of signs by which we reason
 without consciousness of their meaning1
 can be serviceable1 at most1 only in   
our deductive operations4 ,in our direct
 inductions we cannot for a moment      
dispense with a distinct mental image of
 the phenomena1 since the whole         
operation turns on a perception of the  
particulars in which those phenomena    

agree and differ4 ,but1 further1 this   
reasoning by counters is only suitable  
to a very limited portion even of our   
deductive processes4 ,in our reasonings 
respecting numbers1 the only general    
principles which we ever have occasion  
to introduce1 are these1 ,things which  
are equal to the same thing are equal to
 one another1 and ,the sums or          
differences of equal things are equal1  
with their various corollaries4 ,not    
only can no hesitation ever arise       
respecting the applicability of these   
principles1 since they are true of all  
magnitudes whatever2 but every possible 
application of which they are           
susceptible1 may be reduced to a        
technical rule2 and such1 in fact1 the  
rules of the calculus are4 ,but if the  
symbols represent any other things than 
mere numbers1 let us say even straight  
or curve lines1 we have then to apply   
theorems of geometry not true of all    
lines without exception1 and to select  
those which are true of the lines we are

 reasoning about4 ,and how can we do    
this unless we keep completely in mind  
what particular lines these are8 ,since 
additional geometrical truths may be    
introduced into the ratiocination in any
 stage of its progress1 we cannot suffer
 ourselves1 during even the smallest    
part of it1 to use the names            
mechanically 7as we use algebraical     
symbols7 without an image annexed to    
them4 ,it is only after ascertaining    
that the solution of a question         
concerning lines can be made to depend  
on a previous question concerning       
numbers1 or in other words after the    
question has been 7to speak technically7
 reduced to an equation1 that the       
unmeaning signs become available1 and   
that the nature of the facts themselves 
to which the investigation relates can  
be dismissed from the mind4 ,up to the  
establishment of the equation1 the      
language in which mathematicians carry  
on their reasoning does not differ in   
character from that employed by close   

reasoners on any other kind of subject4 
,i do not deny that every correct       
ratiocination1 when thrown into the     
syllogistic shape1 is conclusive from   
the mere form of the expression1        
provided none of the terms used be      
ambiguous2 and this is one of the       
circumstances which have led some       
writers to think that if all names were 
so judiciously constructed and so       
carefully defined as not to admit of any
 ambiguity1 the improvement thus made in
 language would not only give to the    
conclusions of every deductive science  
the same certainty with those of        
mathematics1 but would reduce all       
reasonings to the application of a      
technical form1 and enable their        
conclusiveness to be rationally assented
 to after a merely mechanical process1  
as is undoubtedly the case in algebra4  
,but1 if we except geometry1 the        
conclusions of which are already as     
certain and exact as they can be made1  
there is no science but that of number1 

in which the practical validity of a    
reasoning can be apparent to any person 
who has looked only at the form of the  
process4 ,whoever has assented to what  
was said in the last ,book concerning   
the case of the ,composition of ,causes1
 and the still stronger case of the     
entire supersession of one set of laws  
by another1 is aware that geometry and  
algebra are the only sciences of which  
the propositions are categorically true3
 the general propositions of all other  
sciences are true only hypothetically1  
supposing that no counteracting cause   
happens to interfere4 ,a conclusion1    
therefore1 however correctly deduced1 in
 point of form1 from admitted laws of   
nature1 will have no other than an      
hypothetical certainty4 ,at every step  
we must assure ourselves that no other  
law of nature has superseded1 or        
intermingled its operation with1 those  
which are the premises of the reasoning2
 and how can this be done by merely     
looking at the words8 ,we must not only 

be constantly thinking of the phenomena 
themselves1 but we must be constantly   
studying them2 making ourselves         
acquainted with the peculiarities of    
every case to which we attempt to apply 
our general principles4  ,the algebraic 
notation1 considered as a philosophical 
language1 is perfect in its adaptation  
to the subjects for which it is commonly
 employed1 namely those of which the    
investigations have already been reduced
 to the ascertainment of a relation     
between numbers4 ,but1 admirable as it  
is for its own purpose1 the properties  
by which it is rendered such are so far 
from constituting it the ideal model of 
philosophical language in general1 that 
the more nearly the language of any     
other branch of science approaches to   
it1 the less fit that language is for   
its own proper functions4 ,on all other 
subjects1 instead of contrivances to    
prevent our attention from being        
distracted by thinking of the meaning of
 our signs1 we ought to wish for        

contrivances to make it impossible that 
we should ever lose sight of that       
meaning even for an instant4  ,with this
 view1 as much meaning as possible      
should be thrown into the formation of  
the word itself2 the aids of derivation 
and analogy being made available to keep
 alive a consciousness of all that is   
signified by it4 ,in this respect those 
languages have an immense advantage     
which form their compounds and          
derivatives from native roots1 like the 
,german1 and not from those of a foreign
 or dead language1 as is so much the    
case with ,english1 ,french1 and        
,italian3 and the best are those which  
form them according to fixed analogies1 
corresponding to the relations between  
the ideas to be expressed4 ,all         
languages do this more or less1 but     
especially1 among modern ,european      
languages1 the ,german2 while even that 
is inferior to the ,greek1 in which the 
relation between the meaning of a       
derivative word and that of its         

primitive is in general clearly marked  
by its mode of formation2 except in the 
case of words compounded with           
prepositions1 which are often1 in both  
those languages1 extremely anomalous4   
,but all that can be done1 by the mode  
of constructing words1 to prevent them  
from degenerating into sounds passing   
through the mind without any distinct   
apprehension of what they signify1 is   
far too little for the necessity of the 
case4 ,words1 however well constructed  
originally1 are always tending1 like    
coins1 to have their inscription worn   
off by passing from hand to hand2 and   
the only possible mode of reviving it is
 to be ever stamping it afresh1 by      
living in the habitual contemplation of 
the phenomena themselves1 and not       
resting in our familiarity with the     
words that express them4 ,if any one1   
having possessed himself of the laws of 
phenomena as recorded in words1 whether 
delivered to him originally by others1  
or even found out by himself1 is content

 from thenceforth to live among these   
formul1 to think exclusively of them1   
and of applying them to cases as they   
arise1 without keeping up his           
acquaintance with the realities from    
which these laws were collected--not    
only will he continually fail in his    
practical efforts1 because he will apply
 his formul without duly considering    
whether1 in this case and in that1 other
 laws of nature do not modify or        
supersede them2 but the formul          
themselves will progressively lose their
 meaning to him1 and he will cease at   
last even to be capable of recognising  
with certainty whether a case falls     
within the contemplation of his formula 
or not4 ,it is1 in short1 as necessary1 
on all subjects not mathematical1 that  
the things on which we reason should be 
conceived by us in the concrete1 and    
clothed in circumstances1 as it is in   
algebra that we should keep all         
individualizing peculiarities sedulously
 out of view4  ,with this remark we     

close our observations on the           
,philosophy of ,language4     ,,chapter 
,,vii4  ,,of ,,classification1 ,,as     
,,subsidiary ,,to ,,induction4    #a4   
,there is1 as has been frequently       
remarked in this work1 a classification 
of things1 which is inseparable from the
 fact of giving them general names4     
,every name which connotes an attribute1
 divides1 by that very fact1 all things 
whatever into two classes1 those which  
have the attribute and those which have 
it not2 those of which the name can be  
predicated1 and those of which it       
cannot4 ,and the division thus made is  
not merely a division of such things as 
actually exist1 or are known to exist1  
but of all such as may hereafter be     
discovered1 and even of all which can be
 imagined4  ,on this kind of            
,classification we have nothing to add  
to what has previously been said4 ,the  
,classification which requires to be    
discussed as a separate act of the mind1
 is altogether different4 ,in the one1  

the arrangement of objects in groups1   
and distribution of them into           
compartments1 is a mere incidental      
effect consequent on the use of names   
given for another purpose1 namely that  
of simply expressing some of their      
qualities4 ,in the other the arrangement
 and distribution are the main object1  
and the naming is secondary to1 and     
purposely conforms itself to1 instead of
 governing1 that more important         
operation4  ,classification1 thus       
regarded1 is a contrivance for the best 
possible ordering of the ideas of       
objects in our minds2 for causing the   
ideas to accompany or succeed one       
another in such a way as shall give us  
the greatest command over our knowledge 
already acquired1 and lead most directly
 to the acquisition of more4 ,the       
general problem of ,classification1 in  
reference to these purposes1 may be     
stated as follows3 ,to provide that     
things shall be thought of in such      
groups1 and those groups in such an     

order1 as will best conduce to the      
remembrance and to the ascertainment of 
their laws4  ,classification thus       
considered1 differs from classification 
in the wider sense1 in having reference 
to real objects exclusively1 and not to 
all that are imaginable3 its object     
being the due co-ordination in our minds
 of those things only1 with the         
properties of which we have actually    
occasion to make ourselves acquainted4  
,but1 on the other hand1 it embraces all
 really existing objects4 ,we cannot    
constitute any one class properly1      
except in reference to a general        
division of the whole of nature2 we     
cannot determine the group in which any 
one object can most conveniently be     
placed1 without taking into             
consideration all the varieties of      
existing objects1 all at least which    
have any degree of affinity with it4 ,no
 one family of plants or animals could  
have been rationally constituted1 except
 as part of a systematic arrangement of 

all plants or animals2 nor could such a 
general arrangement have been properly  
made1 without first determining the     
exact place of plants and animals in a  
general division of nature4    #b4      
,there is no property of objects which  
may not be taken1 if we please1 as the  
foundation for a classification or      
mental grouping of those objects2 and in
 our first attempts we are likely to    
select for that purpose properties which
 are simple1 easily conceived1 and      
perceptible on a first view1 without any
 previous process of thought4 ,thus     
,tournefort's arrangement of plants was 
founded on the shape and divisions of   
the corolla2 and that which is commonly 
called the ,linnan 7though ,linnus also 
suggested another and more scientific   
arrangement7 was grounded chiefly on the
 number of the stamens and pistils4     
,but these classifications1 which are at
 first recommended by the facility they 
afford of ascertaining to what class any
 individual belongs1 are seldom much    

adapted to the ends of that             
,classification which is the subject of 
our present remarks4 ,the ,linnan       
arrangement answers the purpose of      
making us think together of all those   
kinds of plants which possess the same  
number of stamens and pistils2 but to   
think of them in that manner is of      
little use1 since we seldom have        
anything to affirm in common of the     
plants which have a given number of     
stamens and pistils4 ,if plants of the  
class ,pentandria1 order ,monogynia1    
agreed in any other properties1 the     
habit of thinking and speaking of the   
plants under a common designation would 
conduce to our remembering those common 
properties so far as they were          
ascertained1 and would dispose us to be 
on the look-out for such of them as were
 not yet known4 ,but since this is not  
the case1 the only purpose of thought   
which the ,linnan classification serves 
is that of causing us to remember1      
better than we should otherwise have    

done1 the exact number of stamens and   
pistils of every species of plants4     
,now1 as this property is of little     
importance or interest1 the remembering 
it with any particular accuracy is of no
 moment4 ,and1 inasmuch as1 by          
habitually thinking of plants in those  
groups1 we are prevented from habitually
 thinking of them in groups which have a
 greater number of properties in common1
 the effect of such a classification1   
when systematically adhered to1 upon our
 habits of thought1 must be regarded as 
mischievous4  ,the ends of scientific   
classification are best answered1 when  
the objects are formed into groups      
respecting which a greater number of    
general propositions can be made1 and   
those propositions more important1 than 
could be made respecting any other      
groups into which the same things could 
be distributed4 ,the properties1        
therefore1 according to which objects   
are classified1 should1 if possible1 be 
those which are causes of many other    

properties3 or at any rate1 which are   
sure marks of them4 ,causes are         
preferable1 both as being the surest and
 most direct of marks1 and as being     
themselves the properties on which it is
 of most use that our attention should  
be strongly fixed4 ,but the property    
which is the cause of the chief         
peculiarities of a class1 is            
unfortunately seldom fitted to serve    
also as the diagnostic of the class4    
,instead of the cause1 we must generally
 select some of its more prominent      
effects1 which may serve as marks of the
 other effects and of the cause4  ,a    
classification thus formed is properly  
scientific or philosophical1 and is     
commonly called a ,natural1 in          
contradistinction to a ,technical or    
,artificial1 classification or          
arrangement4 ,the phrase ,natural       
,classification seems most peculiarly   
appropriate to such arrangements as     
correspond1 in the groups which they    
form1 to the spontaneous tendencies of  

the mind1 by placing together the       
objects most similar in their general   
aspect3 in opposition to those technical
 systems which1 arranging things        
according to their agreement in some    
circumstance arbitrarily selected1 often
 throw into the same group objects which
 in the general aggregate of their      
properties present no resemblance1 and  
into different and remote groups1 others
 which have the closest similarity4 ,it 
is one of the most valid recommendations
 of any classification to the character 
of a scientific one1 that it shall be a 
natural classification in this sense    
also2 for the test of its scientific    
character is the number and importance  
of the properties which can be asserted 
in common of all objects included in a  
group2 and properties on which the      
general aspect of the things depends1   
are1 if only on that ground1 important1 
as well as1 in most cases1 numerous4    
,but1 though a strong recommendation1   
this circumstance is not a sine qu non2 

since the most obvious properties of    
things may be of trifling importance    
compared with others that are not       
obvious4 ,i have seen it mentioned as a 
great absurdity in the ,linnan          
classification1 that it places 7which by
 the way it does not7 the violet by the 
side of the oak3 it certainly dissevers 
natural affinities1 and brings together 
things quite as unlike as the oak and   
the violet are4 ,but the difference1    
apparently so wide1 which renders the   
juxtaposition of those two vegetables so
 suitable an illustration of a bad      
arrangement1 depends1 to the common eye1
 mainly on mere size and texture2 now if
 we made it our study to adopt the      
classification which would involve the  
least peril of similar rapprochements1  
we should return to the obsolete        
division into trees1 shrubs1 and herbs1 
which though of primary importance with 
regard to more general aspect1 yet      
7compared even with so petty and        
unobvious a distinction as that into    

dicotyledons and monocotyledons7 answers
 to so few differences in the other     
properties of plants1 that a            
classification founded on it            
7independently of the indistinctness of 
the lines of demarcation7 would be as   
completely artificial and technical as  
the ,linnan4  ,our natural groups1      
therefore1 must often be founded not on 
the obvious1 but on the unobvious       
properties of things1 when these are of 
greater importance4 ,but in such cases  
it is essential that there should be    
some other property or set of           
properties1 more readily recognisable by
 the observer1 which coexist with1 and  
may be received as marks of1 the        
properties which are the real groundwork
 of the classification4 ,a natural      
arrangement1 for example1 of animals1   
must be founded in the main on their    
internal structure1 but 7as has been    
justly remarked7 it would be absurd that
 we should not be able to determine the 
genus and species of an animal without  

first killing it4 ,on this ground1 the  
preference1 among zoological            
classifications1 is probably due to that
 of ,m4 de ,blainville1 founded on the  
differences in the external integuments2
 differences which correspond1 much more
 accurately than might be supposed1 to  
the really important varieties1 both in 
the other parts of the structure1 and in
 the habits and history of the animals4 
,this shows1 more strongly than ever1   
how extensive a knowledge of the        
properties of objects is necessary for  
making a good classification of them4   
,and as it is one of the uses of such a 
classification that by drawing attention
 to the properties on which it is       
founded1 and which if the classification
 be good are marks of many others1 it   
facilitates the discovery of those      
others2 we see in what manner our       
knowledge of things1 and our            
classification of them1 tend mutually   
and indefinitely to the improvement of  
each other4  ,we said just now that the 

classification of objects should follow 
those of their properties which indicate
 not only the most numerous1 but also   
the most important peculiarities4 ,what 
is here meant by importance8 ,it has    
reference to the particular end in view2
 and the same objects1 therefore1 may   
admit with propriety of several         
different classifications4 ,each science
 or art forms its classification of     
things according to the properties which
 fall within its special cognizance1 or 
of which it must take account in order  
to accomplish its peculiar practical    
end4 ,a farmer does not divide plants1  
like a botanist1 into dicotyledonous and
 monocotyledonous1 but into useful      
plants and weeds4 ,a geologist divides  
fossils1 not like a zoologist1 into     
families corresponding to those of      
living species1 but into fossils of the 
secondary and of the tertiary periods1  
above the coal and below the coal1 c4   
,whales are or are not fish1 according  
to the purpose for which we are         

considering them4 ,if we are speaking of
 the internal structure and physiology  
of the animal1 we must not call them    
fish2 for in these respects they deviate
 widely from fishes3 they have warm     
blood1 and produce and suckle their     
young as land quadrupeds do4 ,but this  
would not prevent our speaking of the   
whale fishery1 and calling such animals 
fish on all occasions connected with    
this employment2 for the relations thus 
rising depend upon the animal's living  
in the water1 and being caught in a     
manner similar to other fishes4 ,a plea 
that human laws which mention fish do   
not apply to whales1 would be rejected  
at once by an intelligent judge4#ai     
,these different classifications are all
 good1 for the purposes of their own    
particular departments of knowledge or  
practice4 ,but when we are studying     
objects not for any special practical   
end1 but for the sake of extending our  
knowledge of the whole of their         
properties and relations1 we must       

consider as the most important          
attributes1 those which contribute most1
 either by themselves or by their       
effects1 to render the things like one  
another1 and unlike other things2 which 
give to the class composed of them the  
most marked individuality2 which fill1  
as it were1 the largest space in their  
existence1 and would most impress the   
attention of a spectator who knew all   
their properties but was not specially  
interested in any4 ,classes formed on   
this principle may be called1 in a more 
emphatic manner than any others1 natural
 groups4    #c4 ,on the subject of these
 groups ,dr4 ,whewell lays down a       
theory1 grounded on an important truth1 
which he has1 in some respects1         
expressed and illustrated very          
felicitously2 but also1 as it appears to
 me1 with some admixture of error4 ,it  
will be advantageous1 for both these    
reasons1 to extract the statement of his
 doctrine in the very words he has used4
  ,natural groups1 according to this    

theory1#bj are given by ,type1 not by   
,definition4 ,and this consideration    
accounts for that indefiniteness and    
indecision which we frequently find in  
the descriptions of such groups1 and    
which must appear so strange and        
inconsistent to any one who does not    
suppose these descriptions to assume any
 deeper ground of connexion than an     
arbitrary choice of the botanist4 ,thus 
in the family of the rose-tree1 we are  
told that the ovules are very rarely    
erect1 the stigmata usually simple4 ,of 
what use1 it might be asked1 can such   
loose accounts be8 ,to which the answer 
is1 that they are not inserted in order 
to distinguish the species1 but in order
 to describe the family1 and the total  
relations of the ovules and the stigmata
 of the family are better known by this 
general statement4 ,a similar           
observation may be made with regard to  
the ,anomalies of each group1 which     
occur so commonly1 that ,mr4 ,lindley1  
in his ,introduction to the ,natural    

,system of ,botany1 makes the           
',anomalies' an article in each family4 
,thus1 part of the character of the     
,rosace is1 that they have alternate    
stipulate leaves1 and that the albumen  
is obliterated2 but yet in ,lowea1 one  
of the genera of this family1 the stipul
 are absent2 and the albumen is present 
in another1 ,neillia4 ,this implies1 as 
we have already seen1 that the          
artificial character 7or diagnosis1 as  
,mr4 ,lindley calls it17 is imperfect4  
,it is1 though very nearly1 yet not     
exactly1 commensurate with the natural  
group3 and hence in certain cases this  
character is made to yield to the       
general weight of natural affinities4   
,these views1--of classes determined by 
characters which cannot be expressed in 
words1--of propositions which state1 not
 what happens in all cases1 but only    
usually1--of particulars which are      
included in a class1 though they        
transgress the definition of it1 may    
probably surprise the reader4 ,they are 

so contrary to many of the received     
opinions respecting the use of          
definitions1 and the nature of          
scientific propositions1 that they will 
probably appear to many persons highly  
illogical and unphilosophical4 ,but a   
disposition to such a judgment arises in
 a great measure from this1 that the    
mathematical and mathematico-physical   
sciences have1 in a great degree1       
determined men's views of the general   
nature and form of scientific truth2    
while ,natural ,history has not yet had 
time or opportunity to exert its due    
influence upon the current habits of    
philosophizing4 ,the apparent           
indefiniteness and inconsistency of the 
classifications and definitions of      
,natural ,history belongs1 in a far     
higher degree1 to all other except      
mathematical speculations2 and the modes
 in which approximations to exact       
distinctions and general truths have    
been made in ,natural ,history1 may be  
worthy our attention1 even for the light

 they throw upon the best modes of      
pursuing truth of all kinds4  ,though in
 a ,natural group of objects a          
definition can no longer be of any use  
as a regulative principle1 classes are  
not therefore left quite loose1 without 
any certain standard or guide4 ,the     
class is steadily fixed1 though not     
precisely limited2 it is given1 though  
not circumscribed2 it is determined1 not
 by a boundary line without1 but by a   
central point within2 not by what it    
strictly excludes1 but by what it       
eminently includes2 by an example1 not  
by a precept2 in short1 instead of a    
,definition we have a ,type for our     
director4  ,a ,type is an example of any
 class1 for instance a species of a     
genus1 which is considered as eminently 
possessing the character of the class4  
,all the species which have a greater   
affinity with this type-species than    
with any others1 form the genus1 and are
 arranged about it1 deviating from it in
 various directions and different       

degrees4 ,thus a genus may consist of   
several species which approach very near
 the type1 and of which the claim to a  
place with it is obvious2 while there   
may be other species which straggle     
further from this central knot1 and     
which yet are clearly more connected    
with it than with any other4 ,and even  
if there should be some species of which
 the place is dubious1 and which appear 
to be equally bound to two generic      
types1 it is easily seen that this would
 not destroy the reality of the generic 
groups1 any more than the scattered     
trees of the intervening plain prevent  
our speaking intelligibly of the        
distinct forests of two separate hills4 
,the type-species of every genus1 the   
type-genus of every family1 is1 then1   
one which possesses all the characters  
and properties of the genus in a marked 
and prominent manner4 ,the type of the  
,rose family has alternate stipulate    
leaves1 wants the albumen1 has the      
ovules not erect1 has the stigmata      

simple1 and besides these features1     
which distinguish it from the exceptions
 or varieties of its class1 it has the  
features which make it prominent in its 
class4 ,it is one of those which possess
 clearly several leading attributes2 and
 thus1 though we cannot say of any one  
genus that it must be the type of the   
family1 or of any one species that it   
must be the type of the genus1 we are   
still not wholly to seek2 the type must 
be connected by many affinities with    
most of the others of its group2 it must
 be near the centre of the crowd1 and   
not one of the stragglers4  ,in this    
passage 7the latter part of which       
especially ,i cannot help noticing as an
 admirable example of philosophic style7
 ,dr4 ,whewell has stated very clearly  
and forcibly1 but 7,i think7 without    
making all necessary distinctions1 one  
of the principles of a ,natural         
,classification4 ,what this principle   
is1 what are its limits1 and in what    
manner he seems to me to have           

overstepped them1 will appear when we   
have laid down another rule of ,natural 
,arrangement1 which appears to me still 
more fundamental4    #d4 ,the reader is 
by this time familiar with the general  
truth 7which ,i restate so often on     
account of the great confusion in which 
it is commonly involved71 that there are
 in nature distinctions of ,kind2       
distinctions not consisting in a given  
number of definite properties1 plus the 
effects which follow from those         
properties1 but running through the     
whole nature1 through the attributes    
generally1 of the things so             
distinguished4 ,our knowledge of the    
properties of a ,kind is never complete4
 ,we are always discovering1 and        
expecting to discover1 new ones4 ,where 
the distinction between two classes of  
things is not one of ,kind1 we expect to
 find their properties alike1 except    
where there is some reason for their    
being different4 ,on the contrary1 when 
the distinction is in ,kind1 we expect  

to find the properties different unless 
there be some cause for their being the 
same4 ,all knowledge of a ,kind must be 
obtained by observation and experiment  
upon the ,kind itself2 no inference     
respecting its properties from the      
properties of things not connected with 
it by ,kind1 goes for more than the sort
 of presumption usually characterized as
 an analogy1 and generally in one of its
 fainter degrees4  ,since the common    
properties of a true ,kind1 and         
consequently the general assertions     
which can be made respecting it1 or     
which are certain to be made hereafter  
as our knowledge extends1 are indefinite
 and inexhaustible2 and since the very  
first principle of natural              
classification is that of forming the   
classes so that the objects composing   
each may have the greatest number of    
properties in common2 this principle    
prescribes that every such              
classification shall recognise and adopt
 into itself all distinctions of ,kind1 

which exist among the objects it        
professes to classify4 ,to pass over any
 distinctions of ,kind1 and substitute  
definite distinctions1 which1 however   
considerable they may be1 do not point  
to ulterior unknown differences1 would  
be to replace classes with more by      
classes with fewer attributes in common2
 and would be subversive of the ,natural
 ,method of ,classification4            
,accordingly all natural arrangements1  
whether the reality of the distinction  
of ,kinds was felt or not by their      
framers1 have been led1 by the mere     
pursuit of their own proper end1 to     
conform themselves to the distinctions  
of ,kind1 so far as these had been      
ascertained at the time4 ,the ,species  
of ,plants are not only real ,kinds1 but
 are probably1#ba all of them1 real     
lowest ,kinds1 ,infim ,species2 which if
 we were to subdivide1 as of course it  
is open to us to do1 into subclasses1   
the subdivision would necessarily be    
founded on definite distinctions1 not   

pointing 7apart from what may be known  
of their causes or effects7 to any      
difference beyond themselves4  ,in so   
far as a natural classification is      
grounded on real ,kinds1 its groups are 
certainly not conventional2 it is       
perfectly true that they do not depend  
upon an arbitrary choice of the         
naturalist4 ,but it does not follow1    
nor1 ,i conceive1 is it true1 that these
 classes are determined by a type1 and  
not by characters4 ,to determine them by
 a type would be as sure a way of       
missing the ,kind1 as if we were to     
select a set of characters arbitrarily4 
,they are determined by characters1 but 
these are not arbitrary4 ,the problem   
is1 to find a few definite characters   
which point to the multitude of         
indefinite ones4 ,kinds are ,classes    
between which there is an impassable    
barrier2 and what we have to seek is1   
marks whereby we may determine on which 
side of the barrier an object takes its 
place4 ,the characters which will best  

do this should be chosen3 if they are   
also important in themselves1 so much   
the better4 ,when we have selected the  
characters1 we parcel out the objects   
according to those characters1 and not1 
,i conceive1 according to resemblance to
 a type4 ,we do not compose the species 
,ranunculus acris1 of all plants which  
bear a satisfactory degree of           
resemblance to a model-buttercup1 but of
 those which possess certain characters 
selected as marks by which we might     
recognise the possibility of a common   
parentage2 and the enumeration of those 
characters is the definition of the     
species4  ,the question next arises1    
whether1 as all ,kinds must have a place
 among the classes1 so all the classes  
in a natural arrangement must be ,kinds8
 ,and to this ,i answer1 certainly not4 
,the distinctions of ,kinds are not     
numerous enough to make up the whole of 
a classification4 ,very few of the      
genera of plants1 or even of the        
families1 can be pronounced with        

certainty to be ,kinds4 ,the great      
distinctions of ,vascular and ,cellular1
 ,dicotyledonous or ,exogenous and      
,monocotyledonous or ,endogenous plants1
 are perhaps differences of ,kind2 the  
lines of demarcation which divide those 
classes seem 7though even on this ,i    
would not pronounce positively7 to go   
through the whole nature of the plants4 
,but the different species of a genus1  
or genera of a family1 usually have in  
common only a limited number of         
characters4 ,a ,rose does not seem to   
differ from a ,rubus1 or the ,umbellifer
 from the ,ranunculace1 in much else    
than the characters botanically assigned
 to those genera or those families4     
,unenumerated differences certainly do  
exist in some cases2 there are families 
of plants which have peculiarities of   
chemical composition1 or yield products 
having peculiar effects on the animal   
economy4 ,the ,crucifer and ,fungi      
contain an unusual proportion of        
nitrogen2 the ,labiat are the chief     

sources of essential oils1 the ,solane  
are very commonly narcotic1 c4 ,in these
 and similar cases there are possibly   
distinctions of ,kind2 but it is by no  
means indispensable that there should   
be4 ,genera and ,families may be        
eminently natural1 though marked out    
from one another by properties limited  
in number2 provided those properties are
 important1 and the objects contained in
 each genus or family resemble each     
other more than they resemble anything  
which is excluded from the genus or     
family4  ,after the recognition and     
definition1 then1 of the infim species1 
the next step is to arrange those infim 
species into larger groups3 making these
 groups correspond to ,kinds wherever it
 is possible1 but in most cases without 
any such guidance4 ,and in doing this it
 is true that we are naturally and      
properly guided1 in most cases at least1
 by resemblance to a type4 ,we form our 
groups round certain selected ,kinds1   
each of which serves as a sort of       

exemplar of its group4 ,but though the  
groups are suggested by types1 ,i cannot
 think that a group when formed is      
determined by the type2 that in deciding
 whether a species belongs to the group1
 a reference is made to the type1 and   
not to the characters2 that the         
characters cannot be expressed in words4
 ,this assertion is inconsistent with   
,dr4 ,whewell's own statement of the    
fundamental principle of classification1
 namely1 that general assertions shall  
be possible4 ,if the class did not      
possess any characters in common1 what  
general assertions would be possible    
respecting it8 ,except that they all    
resemble each other more than they      
resemble anything else1 nothing whatever
 could be predicated of the class4  ,the
 truth is1 on the contrary1 that every  
genus or family is framed with distinct 
reference to certain characters1 and is 
composed1 first and principally1 of     
species which agree in possessing all   
those characters4 ,to these are added1  

as a sort of appendix1 such other       
species1 generally in small number1 as  
possess nearly all the properties       
selected2 wanting some of them one      
property1 some another1 and which1 while
 they agree with the rest almost as much
 as these agree with one another1 do not
 resemble in an equal degree any other  
group4 ,our conception of the class     
continues to be grounded on the         
characters2 and the class might be      
defined1 those things which either      
possess that set of characters1 or      
resemble the things that do so1 more    
than they resemble anything else4  ,and 
this resemblance itself is not1 like    
resemblance between simple sensations1  
an ultimate fact1 unsusceptible of      
analysis4 ,even the inferior degree of  
resemblance is created by the possession
 of common characters4 ,whatever        
resembles the genus ,rose more than it  
resembles any other genus1 does so      
because it possesses a greater number of
 the characters of that genus1 than of  

the characters of any other genus4 ,nor 
can there be any real difficulty in     
representing1 by an enumeration of      
characters1 the nature and degree of the
 resemblance which is strictly          
sufficient to include any object in the 
class4 ,there are always some properties
 common to all things which are         
included4 ,others there often are1 to   
which some things1 which are            
nevertheless included1 are exceptions4  
,but the objects which are exceptions to
 one character are not exceptions to    
another3 the resemblance which fails in 
some particulars must be made up for in 
others4 ,the class1 therefore1 is       
constituted by the possession of all the
 characters which are universal1 and    
most of those which admit of exceptions4
 ,if a plant had the ovules erect1 the  
stigmata divided1 possessed the albumen1
 and was without stipules1 it possibly  
would not be classed among the ,rosace4 
,but it may want any one1 or more than  
one of those characters1 and not be     

excluded4 ,the ends of a scientific     
classification are better answered by   
including it4 ,since it agrees so       
nearly1 in its known properties1 with   
the sum of the characters of the class1 
it is likely to resemble that class more
 than any other in those of its         
properties which are still undiscovered4
  ,not only1 therefore1 are natural     
groups1 no less than any artificial     
classes1 determined by characters2 they 
are constituted in contemplation of1 and
 by reason of1 characters4 ,but it is in
 contemplation not of those characters  
only which are rigorously common to all 
the objects included in the group1 but  
of the entire body of characters1 all of
 which are found in most of those       
objects1 and most of them in all4 ,and  
hence our conception of the class1 the  
image in our minds which is             
representative of it1 is that of a      
specimen complete in all the characters2
 most naturally a specimen which1 by    
possessing them all in the greatest     

degree in which they are ever found1 is 
the best fitted to exhibit clearly1 and 
in a marked manner1 what they are4 ,it  
is by a mental reference to this        
standard1 not instead of1 but in        
illustration of1 the definition of the  
class1 that we usually and              
advantageously determine whether any    
individual or species belongs to the    
class or not4 ,and this1 as it seems to 
me1 is the amount of truth contained in 
the doctrine of ,types4  ,we shall see  
presently that where the classification 
is made for the express purpose of a    
special inductive inquiry1 it is not    
optional1 but necessary for fulfilling  
the conditions of a correct ,inductive  
,method1 that we should establish a     
type-species or genus1 namely1 the one  
which exhibits in the most eminent      
degree the particular phenomenon under  
investigation4 ,but of this hereafter4  
,it remains1 for completing the theory  
of natural groups1 that a few words     
should be said on the principles of the 

nomenclature adapted to them4    #e4 ,a 
,nomenclature in science1 is1 as we have
 said1 a system of the names of ,kinds4 
,these names1 like other class-names1   
are defined by the enumeration of the   
characters distinctive of the class4    
,the only merit which a set of names can
 have beyond this1 is to convey1 by the 
mode of their construction1 as much     
information as possible3 so that a      
person who knows the thing1 may receive 
all the assistance which the name can   
give in remembering what he knows1 while
 he who knows it not1 may receive as    
much knowledge respecting it as the case
 admits of1 by merely being told its    
name4  ,there are two modes of giving to
 the name of a ,kind this sort of       
significance4 ,the best1 but which      
unfortunately is seldom practicable1 is 
when the word can be made to indicate1  
by its formation1 the very properties   
which it is designed to connote4 ,the   
name of a ,kind does not1 of course1    
connote all the properties of the ,kind1

 since these are inexhaustible1 but such
 of them as are sufficient to           
distinguish it2 such as are sure marks  
of all the rest4 ,now1 it is very rarely
 that one property1 or even any two or  
three properties1 can answer this       
purpose4 ,to distinguish the common     
daisy from all other species of plants  
would require the specification of many 
characters4 ,and a name cannot1 without 
being too cumbrous for use1 give        
indication1 by its etymology or mode of 
construction1 of more than a very small 
number of these4 ,the possibility1      
therefore1 of an ideally perfect        
,nomenclature1 is probably confined to  
the one case in which we are happily in 
possession of something nearly          
approaching to it2 the ,nomenclature of 
elementary ,chemistry4 ,the substances1 
whether simple or compound1 with which  
chemistry is conversant1 are ,kinds1    
and1 as such1 the properties which      
distinguish each of them from the rest  
are innumerable2 but in the case of     

compound substances 7the simple ones are
 not numerous enough to require a       
systematic nomenclature71 there is one  
property1 the chemical composition1     
which is of itself sufficient to        
distinguish the ,kind2 and is 7with     
certain reservations not yet thoroughly 
understood7 a sure mark of all the other
 properties of the compound4 ,all that  
was needful1 therefore1 was to make the 
name of every compound express1 on the  
first hearing1 its chemical composition2
 that is1 to form the name of the       
compound1 in some uniform manner1 from  
the names of the simple substances which
 enter into it as elements4 ,this was   
done1 most skilfully and successfully1  
by the ,french chemists4 ,the only thing
 left unexpressed by them was the exact 
proportion in which the elements were   
combined2 and even this1 since the      
establishment of the atomic theory1 it  
has been found possible to express by a 
simple adaptation of their phraseology4 
,but where the characters which must be 

taken into consideration in order       
sufficiently to designate the ,kind1 are
 too numerous to be all signified in the
 derivation of the name1 and where no   
one of them is of such preponderant     
importance as to justify its being      
singled out to be so indicated1 we may  
avail ourselves of a subsidiary         
resource4 ,though we cannot indicate the
 distinctive properties of the ,kind1 we
 may indicate its nearest natural       
affinities1 by incorporating into its   
name the name of the proximate natural  
group of which it is one of the species4
 ,on this principle is founded the      
admirable binary nomenclature of botany 
and zoology4 ,in this nomenclature the  
name of every species consists of the   
name of the genus1 or natural group next
 above it1 with a word added to         
distinguish the particular species4 ,the
 last portion of the compound name is   
sometimes taken from some one of the    
peculiarities in which that species     
differs from others of the genus2 as    

,clematis integrifolia1 ,potentilla     
alba1 ,viola palustris1 ,artemisia      
vulgaris2 sometimes from a circumstance 
of an historical nature1 as ,narcissus  
poeticus1 ,potentilla tormentilla       
7indicating that the plant was formerly 
known by the latter name71 ,exacum      
,candollii 7from the fact that ,de      
,candolle was its first discoverer72 and
 sometimes the word is purely           
conventional1 as ,thlaspi               
bursa-pastoris1 ,ranunculus thora2 it is
 of little consequence which2 since the 
second1 or as it is usually called1 the 
specific name1 could at most express1   
independently of convention1 no more    
than a very small portion of the        
connotation of the term4 ,but by adding 
to this the name of the superior genus1 
we may make the best amends we can for  
the impossibility of so contriving the  
name as to express all the distinctive  
characters of the ,kind4 ,we make it1 at
 all events1 express as many of those   
characters as are common to the         

proximate natural group in which the    
,kind is included4 ,if even those common
 characters are so numerous or so little
 familiar as to require a further       
extension of the same resource1 we      
might1 instead of a binary1 adopt a     
ternary nomenclature1 employing not only
 the name of the genus1 but that of the 
next natural group in order of          
generality above the genus1 commonly    
called the ,family4 ,this was done in   
the mineralogical nomenclature proposed 
by ,professor ,mohs4 ,the names framed  
by him were not composed of two1 but of 
three elements1 designating respectively
 the ,species1 the ,genus1 and the      
,order2 thus he has such species as     
,rhombohedral ,lime ,haloide1           
,octohedral ,fluor ,haloide1 ,prismatic 
,hal ,baryte4#bb ,the binary            
construction1 however1 has been found   
sufficient in botany and zoology1 the   
only sciences in which this general     
principle has hitherto been successfully
 adopted in the construction of a       

nomenclature4  ,besides the advantage   
which this principle of nomenclature    
possesses1 in giving to the names of    
species the greatest quantity of        
independent significance which the      
circumstances of the case admit of1 it  
answers the further end of immensely    
economizing the use of names1 and       
preventing an otherwise intolerable     
burden on the memory4 ,when the names of
 species become extremely numerous1 some
 artifice 7as ,dr4 ,whewell#bc observes7
 becomes absolutely necessary to make it
 possible to recollect or apply them4   
,the known species of plants1 for       
example1 were ten thousand in the time  
of ,linnus1 and are now probably sixty  
thousand4 ,it would be useless to       
endeavour to frame and employ separate  
names for each of these species4 ,the   
division of the objects into a          
subordinated system of classification   
enables us to introduce a ,nomenclature 
which does not require this enormous    
number of names4 ,each of the genera has

 its name1 and the species are marked by
 the addition of some epithet to the    
name of the genus4 ,in this manner about
 seventeen hundred generic names1 with a
 moderate number of specific names1 were
 found by ,linnus sufficient to         
designate with precision all the species
 of vegetables known at his time4 ,and  
though the number of generic names has  
since greatly increased1 it has not     
increased in anything like the          
proportion of the multiplication of     
known species4     ,,chapter ,,viii4    
,,of ,,classification ,,by ,,series4    
#a4 ,thus far1 we have considered the   
principles of scientific classification 
so far only as relates to the formation 
of natural groups2 and at this point    
most of those who have attempted a      
theory of natural arrangement1          
including1 among the rest1 ,dr4         
,whewell1 have stopped4 ,there remains1 
however1 another1 and a not less        
important portion of the theory1 which  
has not yet1 as far as ,i am aware1 been

 systematically treated of by any writer
 except ,m4 ,comte4 ,this is1 the       
arrangement of the natural groups into a
 natural series4#bd  ,the end of        
,classification1 as an instrument for   
the investigation of nature1 is 7as     
before stated7 to make us think of those
 objects together1 which have the       
greatest number of important common     
properties2 and which therefore we have 
oftenest occasion1 in the course of our 
inductions1 for taking into joint       
consideration4 ,our ideas of objects are
 thus brought into the order most       
conducive to the successful prosecution 
of inductive inquiries generally4 ,but  
when the purpose is to facilitate some  
particular inductive inquiry1 more is   
required4 ,to be instrumental to that   
purpose1 the classification must bring  
those objects together1 the simultaneous
 contemplation of which is likely to    
throw most light upon the particular    
subject4 ,that subject being the laws of
 some phenomenon or some set of         

connected phenomena2 the very phenomenon
 or set of phenomena in question must be
 chosen as the groundwork of the        
classification4  ,the requisites of a   
classification intended to facilitate   
the study of a particular phenomenon1   
are1 first1 to bring into one class all 
,kinds of things which exhibit that     
phenomenon1 in whatever variety of forms
 or degrees2 and secondly1 to arrange   
those ,kinds in a series according to   
the degree in which they exhibit it1    
beginning with those which exhibit most 
of it1 and terminating with those which 
exhibit least4 ,the principal example1  
as yet1 of such a classification1 is    
afforded by comparative anatomy and     
physiology1 from which1 therefore1 our  
illustrations shall be taken4    #b4    
,the object being supposed to be1 the   
investigation of the laws of animal     
life2 the first step1 after forming the 
most distinct conception of the         
phenomenon itself1 possible in the      
existing state of our knowledge1 is to  

erect into one great class 7that of     
animals7 all the known ,kinds of beings 
where that phenomenon presents itself2  
in however various combinations with    
other properties1 and in however        
different degrees4 ,as some of these    
,kinds manifest the general phenomenon  
of animal life in a very high degree1   
and others in an insignificant degree1  
barely sufficient for recognition2 we   
must1 in the next place1 arrange the    
various ,kinds in a series1 following   
one another according to the degrees in 
which they severally exhibit the        
phenomenon2 beginning therefore with    
man1 and ending with the most imperfect 
kinds of zoophytes4  ,this is merely    
saying that we should put the instances1
 from which the law is to be inductively
 collected1 into the order which is     
implied in one of the four ,methods of  
,experimental ,inquiry discussed in the 
preceding ,book2 the fourth ,method1    
that of ,concomitant ,variations4 ,as   
formerly remarked1 this is often the    

only method to which recourse can be    
had1 with assurance of a true           
conclusion1 in cases in which we have   
but limited means of effecting1 by      
artificial experiments1 a separation of 
circumstances usually conjoined4 ,the   
principle of the method is1 that facts  
which increase or diminish together1 and
 disappear together1 are either cause   
and effect1 or effects of a common      
cause4 ,when it has been ascertained    
that this relation really subsists      
between the variations1 a connexion     
between the facts themselves may be     
confidently laid down1 either as a law  
of nature or only as an empirical law1  
according to circumstances4  ,that the  
application of this ,method must be     
preceded by the formation of such a     
series as we have described1 is too     
obvious to need being pointed out2 and  
the mere arrangement of a set of objects
 in a series1 according to the degrees  
in which they exhibit some fact of which
 we are seeking the law1 is too         

naturally suggested by the necessities  
of our inductive operations1 to require 
any lengthened illustration here4 ,but  
there are cases in which the arrangement
 required for the special purpose1      
becomes the determining principle of the
 classification of the same objects for 
general purposes4 ,this will naturally  
and properly happen1 when those laws of 
the objects which are sought in the     
special inquiry enact so principal a    
part in the general character and       
history of those objects--exercise so   
much influence in determining all the   
phenomena of which they are either the  
agents or the theatre--that all other   
differences existing among the objects  
are fittingly regarded as mere          
modifications of the one phenomenon     
sought2 effects determined by the       
co-operation of some incidental         
circumstance with the laws of that      
phenomenon4 ,thus in the case of        
animated beings1 the differences between
 one class of animals and another may   

reasonably be considered as mere        
modifications of the general phenomenon1
 animal life2 modifications arising     
either from the different degrees in    
which that phenomenon is manifested in  
different animals1 or from the          
intermixture of the effects of          
incidental causes peculiar to the nature
 of each1 with the effects produced by  
the general laws of life2 those laws    
still exercising a predominant influence
 over the result4 ,such being the case1 
no other inductive inquiry respecting   
animals can be successfully carried on1 
except in subordination to the great    
inquiry into the universal laws of      
animal life4 ,and the classification of 
animals best suited to that one purpose1
 is the most suitable to all the other  
purposes of zoological science4    #c4  
,to establish a classification of this  
sort1 or even to apprehend it when      
established1 requires the power of      
recognising the essential similarity of 
a phenomenon1 in its minuter degrees and

 obscurer forms1 with what is called the
 same phenomenon in the greatest        
perfection of its development2 that is1 
of identifying with each other all      
phenomena which differ only in degree1  
and in properties which we suppose to be
 caused by difference of degree4 ,in    
order to recognise this identity1 or in 
other words1 this exact similarity of   
quality1 the assumption of a            
type-species is indispensable4 ,we must 
consider as the type of the class1 that 
among the ,kinds included in it1 which  
exhibits the properties constitutive of 
the class1 in the highest degree2       
conceiving the other varieties as       
instances of degeneracy1 as it were1    
from that type2 deviations from it by   
inferior intensity of the characteristic
 property or properties4 ,for every     
phenomenon is best studied 7cteris      
paribus7 where it exists in the greatest
 intensity4 ,it is there that the       
effects which either depend on it1 or   
depend on the same causes with it1 will 

also exist in the greatest degree4 ,it  
is there1 consequently1 and only there1 
that those effects of it1 or joint      
effects with it1 can become fully known 
to us1 so that we may learn to recognise
 their smaller degrees1 or even their   
mere rudiments1 in cases in which the   
direct study would have been difficult  
or even impossible4 ,not to mention that
 the phenomenon in its higher degrees   
may be attended by effects or collateral
 circumstances which in its smaller     
degrees do not occur at all1 requiring  
for their production in any sensible    
amount a greater degree of intensity of 
the cause than is there met with4 ,in   
man1 for example1 7the species in which 
both the phenomenon of animal and that  
of organic life exist in the highest    
degree17 many subordinate phenomena     
develop themselves in the course of his 
animated existence1 which the inferior  
varieties of animals do not show4 ,the  
knowledge of these properties may       
nevertheless be of great avail towards  

the discovery of the conditions and laws
 of the general phenomenon of life1     
which is common to man with those       
inferior animals4 ,and they are1 even1  
rightly considered as properties of     
animated nature itself2 because they may
 evidently be affiliated to the general 
laws of animated nature2 because we may 
fairly presume that some rudiments or   
feeble degrees of those properties would
 be recognised in all animals by more   
perfect organs1 or even by more perfect 
instruments1 than ours2 and because     
those may be correctly termed properties
 of a class1 which a thing exhibits     
exactly in proportion as it belongs to  
the class1 that is1 in proportion as it 
possesses the main attributes           
constitutive of the class4    #d4 ,it   
remains to consider how the internal    
distribution of the series may most     
properly take place3 in what manner it  
should be divided into ,orders1         
,families1 and ,genera4  ,the main      
principle of division must of course be 

natural affinity2 the classes formed    
must be natural groups3 and the         
formation of these has already been     
sufficiently treated of4 ,but the       
principles of natural grouping must be  
applied in subordination to the         
principle of a natural series4 ,the     
groups must not be so constituted as to 
place in the same group things which    
ought to occupy different points of the 
general scale4 ,the precaution necessary
 to be observed for this purpose is1    
that the primary divisions must be      
grounded not on all distinctions        
indiscriminately1 but on those which    
correspond to variations in the degree  
of the main phenomenon4 ,the series of  
,animated ,nature should be broken into 
parts at the points where the variation 
in the degree of intensity of the main  
phenomenon 7as marked by its principal  
characters1 ,sensation1 ,thought1       
,voluntary ,motion1 c47 begins to be    
attended by conspicuous changes in the  
miscellaneous properties of the animal4 

,such well-marked changes take place1   
for example1 where the class ,mammalia  
ends2 at the points where ,fishes are   
separated from ,insects1 ,insects from  
,mollusca1 c4 ,when so formed1 the      
primary natural groups will compose the 
series by mere juxtaposition1 without   
redistribution2 each of them            
corresponding to a definite portion of  
the scale4 ,in like manner each family  
should1 if possible1 be so subdivided1  
that one portion of it shall stand      
higher and the other lower1 though of   
course contiguous1 in the general scale2
 and only when this is impossible is it 
allowable to ground the remaining       
subdivisions on characters having no    
determinable connexion with the main    
phenomenon4  ,where the principal       
phenomenon so far transcends in         
importance all other properties on which
 a classification could be grounded1 as 
it does in the case of animated         
existence1 any considerable deviation   
from the rule last laid down is in      

general sufficiently guarded against by 
the first principle of a natural        
arrangement1 that of forming the groups 
according to the most important         
characters4 ,all attempts at a          
scientific classification of animals1   
since first their anatomy and physiology
 were successfully studied1 have been   
framed with a certain degree of         
instinctive reference to a natural      
series1 and have accorded in many more  
points than they have differed1 with the
 classification which would most        
naturally have been grounded on such a  
series4 ,but the accordance has not     
always been complete2 and it still is   
often a matter of discussion1 which of  
several classifications best accords    
with the true scale of intensity of the 
main phenomenon4 ,cuvier1 for example1  
has been justly criticized for having   
formed his natural groups with an undue 
degree of reference to the mode of      
alimentation1 a circumstance directly   
connected only with organic life1 and   

not lending to the arrangement most     
appropriate for the purposes of an      
investigation of the laws of animal     
life1 since both carnivorous and        
herbivorous or frugivorous animals are  
found at almost every degree in the     
scale of animal perfection4             
,blainville's classification has been   
considered by high authorities to be    
free from this defect2 as representing  
correctly1 by the mere order of the     
principal groups1 the successive        
degeneracy of animal nature from its    
highest to its most imperfect           
exemplification4    #e4 ,a              
classification of any large portion of  
the field of nature in conformity to the
 foregoing principles1 has hitherto been
 found practicable only in one great    
instance1 that of animals4 ,in the case 
even of vegetables1 the natural         
arrangement has not been carried beyond 
the formation of natural groups4        
,naturalists have found1 and probably   
will continue to find it impossible to  

form those groups into any series1 the  
terms of which correspond to real       
gradations in the phenomenon of         
vegetative or organic life4 ,such a     
difference of degree may be traced      
between the class of ,vascular ,plants  
and that of ,cellular1 which includes   
lichens1 alg1 and other substances whose
 organization is simpler and more       
rudimentary than that of the higher     
order of vegetables1 and which therefore
 approach nearer to mere inorganic      
nature4 ,but when we rise much above    
this point1 we do not find any          
sufficient difference in the degree in  
which different plants possess the      
properties of organization and life4    
,the dicotyledons are of more complex   
structure1 and somewhat more perfect    
organization1 than the monocotyledons3  
and some dicotyledonous families1 such  
as the ,composit1 are rather more       
complex in their organization than the  
rest4 ,but the differences are not of a 
marked character1 and do not promise to 

throw any particular light upon the     
conditions and laws of vegetable life   
and development4 ,if they did1 the      
classification of vegetables would have 
to be made1 like that of animals1 with  
reference to the scale or series        
indicated4  ,although the scientific    
arrangements of organic nature afford as
 yet the only complete example of the   
true principles of rational             
classification1 whether as to the       
formation of groups or of series1 those 
principles are applicable to all cases  
in which mankind are called upon to     
bring the various parts of any extensive
 subject into mental co-ordination4     
,they are as much to the point when     
objects are to be classed for purposes  
of art or business1 as for those of     
science4 ,the proper arrangement1 for   
example1 of a code of laws1 depends on  
the same scientific conditions as the   
classifications in natural history2 nor 
could there be a better preparatory     
discipline for that important function1 

than the study of the principles of a   
natural arrangement1 not only in the    
abstract1 but in their actual           
application to the class of phenomena   
for which they were first elaborated1   
and which are still the best school for 
learning their use4 ,of this the great  
authority on codification1 ,bentham1 was
 perfectly aware3 and his early         
,fragment on ,government1 the admirable 
introduction to a series of writings    
unequalled in their department1 contains
 clear and just views 7as far as they   
go7 on the meaning of a natural         
arrangement1 such as could scarcely have
 occurred to any one who lived anterior 
to the age of ,linnus and ,bernard de   
,jussieu4  ,,footnotes3  #a ,supra1 book
 iii4 ch4 ii4  #c1 #d1 #e4  #b ,mr4     
,bailey has given by far the best       
statement of this theory4 ,the general  
name1 he says1 raises up the image      
sometimes of one individual of the class
 formerly seen1 sometimes of another1   
not unfrequently of many individuals in 

succession2 and it sometimes suggests an
 image made up of elements from several 
different objects1 by a latent process  
of which ,i am not conscious4 7,letters 
on the ,philosophy of the ,human ,mind1 
#ast series1 letter #bb47 ,but ,mr4     
,bailey must allow that we carry on     
inductions and ratiocinations respecting
 the class1 by means of this idea or    
conception of some one individual in it4
 ,this is all ,i require4 ,the name of a
 class calls up some idea1 through which
 we can1 to all intents and purposes1   
think of the class as such1 and not     
solely of an individual member of it4   
#c ,i have entered rather fully into    
this question in chap4 xvii4 of ,an     
,examination of ,sir ,william           
,hamilton's ,philosophy1 headed ,the    
,doctrine of ,concepts or ,general      
,notions1 which contains my last views  
on the subject4  #d ,other examples of  
inappropriate conceptions are given by  
,dr4 ,whewell 7,phil4 ,ind4 ,sc4 ii4    
#ahe7 as follows3--,aristotle and his   

followers endeavoured in vain to account
 for the mechanical relation of forces  
in the lever1 by applying the           
inappropriate geometrical conceptions of
 the properties of the circle3 they     
failed in explaining the form of the    
luminous spot made by the sun shining   
through a hole1 because they applied the
 inappropriate conception of a circular 
quality in the sun's light3 they        
speculated to no purpose about the      
elementary composition of bodies1       
because they assumed the inappropriate  
conception of likeness between the      
elements and the compound1 instead of   
the genuine notion of elements merely   
determining the qualities of the        
compound4 ,but in these cases there is  
more than an inappropriate conception2  
there is a false conception2 one which  
has no prototype in nature1 nothing     
corresponding to it in facts4 ,this is  
evident in the last two examples1 and is
 equally true in the first2 the         
properties of the circle which were     

referred to1 being purely fantastical4  
,there is1 therefore1 an error beyond   
the wrong choice of a principle of      
generalization2 there is a false        
assumption of matters of fact4 ,the     
attempt is made to resolve certain laws 
of nature into a more general law1 that 
law not being one which1 though real1 is
 inappropriate1 but one wholly          
imaginary4  #e ,professor ,bain4  #f    
,this sentence having been erroneously  
understood as if ,i had meant to assert 
that belief is nothing but an           
irresistible association1 ,i think it   
necessary to observe that ,i express no 
theory respecting the ultimate analysis 
either of reasoning or of belief1 two of
 the most obscure points in analytical  
psychology4 ,i am speaking not of the   
powers themselves1 but of the previous  
conditions necessary to enable those    
powers to exert themselves3 of which    
conditions ,i am contending that        
language is not one1 senses and         
association being sufficient without it4

  #g ,mr4 ,bailey agrees with me in     
thinking that whenever from something   
actually present to my senses conjoined 
with past experience1 ,i feel satisfied 
that something has happened1 or will    
happen1 or is happening1 beyond the     
sphere of my personal observation1 ,i   
may with strict propriety be said to    
reason3 and of course to reason         
inductively1 for demonstrative reasoning
 is excluded by the circumstances of the
 case4 7,the ,theory of ,reasoning1 #bnd
 ed4 p4 #bg47  #h ,novum ,organum       
,renovatum1 pp4 #ce-cg4  #i ,nov4 ,org4 
,renov41 pp4 #ci1 #dj4  #aj ,p4 #bag1   
#dto edition4  #aa ,e1 ex1 extra1       
extraneus1 tranger1 stranger4  ,another 
etymological example sometimes cited is 
the derivation of the ,english uncle    
from the ,latin avus4 ,it is scarcely   
possible for two words to bear fewer    
outward marks of relationship1 yet there
 is but one step between them2 avus1    
avunculus1 uncle4  ,so pilgrim1 from    
ager3 per agrum1 peragrinus1 peregrinus1

 pellegrino1 pilgrim4  #ab ,p4 #bbf-g4  
#ac ,essays1 p4 #bad4  #ad ,ibid4 #bae4 
#ae ,such cases give a clear insight    
into the process of the degeneration of 
languages in periods of history when    
literary culture was suspended2 and we  
are now in danger of experiencing a     
similar evil through the superficial    
extension of the same culture4 ,so many 
persons without anything deserving the  
name of education have become writers by
 profession1 that written language may  
almost be said to be principally wielded
 by persons ignorant of the proper use  
of the instrument1 and who are spoiling 
it more and more for those who          
understand it4 ,vulgarisms1 which creep 
in nobody knows how1 are daily depriving
 the ,english language of valuable modes
 of expressing thought4 ,to take a      
present instance3 the verb transpire    
formerly conveyed very expressively its 
correct meaning1 viz4 to become known   
through unnoticed channels--to exhale1  
as it were1 into publicity through      

invisible pores1 like a vapour or gas   
disengaging itself4 ,but of late a      
practice has commenced of employing this
 word1 for the sake of finery1 as a mere
 synonym of to happen3 the events which 
have transpired in the ,crimea1 meaning 
the incidents of the war4 ,this vile    
specimen of bad ,english is already seen
 in the despatches of noblemen and      
viceroys3 and the time is apparently not
 far distant when nobody will understand
 the word if used in its proper sense4  
,it is a great error to think that these
 corruptions of language do no harm4    
,those who are struggling with the      
difficulty 7and who know by experience  
how great it already is7 of expressing  
oneself clearly with precision1 find    
their resources continually narrowed by 
illiterate writers1 who seize and twist 
from its purpose some form of speech    
which once served to convey briefly and 
compactly an unambiguous meaning4 ,it   
would hardly be believed how often a    
writer is compelled to a circumlocution 

by the single vulgarism1 introduced     
during the last few years1 of using the 
word alone as an adverb1 only not being 
fine enough for the rhetoric of         
ambitious ignorance4 ,a man will say to 
which ,i am not alone bound by honour   
but also by law1 unaware that what he   
has unintentionally said is1 that he is 
not alone bound1 some other person being
 bound with him4 ,formerly if any one   
said1 ,i am not alone responsible for   
this1 he was understood to mean1 7what  
alone his words mean in correct         
,english17 that he is not the sole      
person responsible2 but if he now used  
such an expression1 the reader would be 
confused between that and two other     
meanings2 that he is not only           
responsible but something more2 or that 
he is responsible not only for this but 
for something besides4 ,the time is     
coming when ,tennyson's ,,oenone could  
not say ,i will not die alone1 lest she 
should be supposed to mean that she     
would not only die but do something     

else4  ,the blunder of writing predicate
 for predict has become so widely       
diffused that it bids fair to render one
 of the most useful terms in the        
scientific vocabulary of ,logic         
unintelligible4 ,the mathematical and   
logical term to eliminate is undergoing 
a similar destruction4 ,all who are     
acquainted either with the proper use of
 the word or with its etymology1 know   
that to eliminate a thing is to thrust  
it out2 but those who know nothing about
 it1 except that it is a fine-looking   
phrase1 use it in a sense precisely the 
reverse1 to denote1 not turning anything
 out1 but bringing it in4 ,they talk of 
eliminating some truth1 or other useful 
result1 from a mass of details4 ,i      
suspect that this error must at first   
have arisen from some confusion between 
to eliminate and to enucleate4  ,though 
no such evil consequences as take place 
in these instances1 are likely to arise 
from the modern freak of writing        
sanatory instead of sanitary1 it        

deserves notice as a charming specimen  
of pedantry engrafted upon ignorance4   
,those who thus undertake to correct the
 spelling of the classical ,english     
writers1 are not aware that the meaning 
of sanatory1 if there were such a word  
in the language1 would have reference   
not to the preservation of health1 but  
to the cure of disease4  #af ,historical
 ,introduction1 vol4 i4 pp4 #ff-h4  #ag 
,history of ,scientific ,ideas1 ii4     
#aaj1 #aaa4  #ah ,hist4 ,sc4 ,id4 ii4   
#aaa-aac4  #ai ,nov4 ,org4 ,renov4 pp4  
#bhf1 #bhg4  #bj ,hist4 ,sc4 ,id4 ii4   
#abj-abb4  #ba ,i say probably1 not     
certainly1 because this is not the      
consideration by which a botanist       
determines what shall or shall not be   
admitted as a species4 ,in natural      
history those objects belong to the same
 species1 which are1 or consistently    
with experience might have been1        
produced from the same stock4 ,but this 
distinction1 in most1 and probably in   
all cases1 happily accords with the     

other4 ,it seems to be a law of         
physiology1 that animals and plants do  
really1 in the philosophical as well as 
the popular sense1 propagate their kind2
 transmitting to their descendants all  
the distinctions of ,kind 7down to the  
most special or lowest ,kind7 which they
 themselves possess4  #bb ,nov4 ,org4   
,renov4 p4 #bgd4  #bc ,hist4 ,sc4 ,id4  
i4 #acc4  #bd ,dr4 ,whewell1 in his     
reply 7,philosophy of ,discovery1 p4    
#bgj7 says that he stopped short of1 or 
rather passed by1 the doctrine of a     
series of organized beings1 because he  
thought it bad and narrow philosophy4   
,if he did1 it was evidently without    
understanding this form of the doctrine2
 for he proceeds to quote a passage from
 his ,history1 in which the doctrine he 
condemns is designated as that of a mere
 linear progression in nature1 which    
would place each genus in contact only  
with the preceding and succeeding ones4 
,now the series treated of in the text  
agrees with this linear progression in  

nothing whatever but in being a         
progression4  ,it would surely be       
possible to arrange all places 7for     
example7 in the order of their distance 
from the ,north ,pole1 though there     
would be not merely a plurality1 but a  
whole circle of places at every single  
gradation in the scale4     ,,book ,v4  
,,on ,,fallacies4   ,errare non modo    
affirmando et negando1 sed etiam        
sentiendo1 et in tacit hominum          
cogitatione contingit4--,,hobbes1       
,computatio sive ,logica1 ch4 v4  ,il   
leur semble qu'il n'y a qu' douter par  
fantaisie1 et qu'il n'y a qu' dire en   
gnral que notre nature est infirme2 que 
notre esprit est plein d'aveuglement2   
qu'il faut avoir un grand soin de se    
dfaire de ses prjugs1 et autres choses  
semblables4 ,ils pensent que cela suffit
 pour ne plus se laisser sduire  ses    
sens1 et pour ne plus se tromper du     
tout4 ,il ne suffit pas de dire que     
l'esprit est foible1 il faut lui faire  
sentir ses foiblesses4 ,ce n'est pas    

assez de dire qu'il est sujet  l'erreur1
 il faut lui dcouvrir en quoi consistent
 ses erreurs4--,,malebranche1 ,recherche
 de la ,vrit4     ,,chapter ,i4  ,,of   
,,fallacies ,,in ,,general4    #a4 ,it  
is a maxim of the schoolmen1 that       
contrariorum eadem est scientia3 we     
never really know what a thing is1      
unless we are also able to give a       
sufficient account of its opposite4     
,conformably to this maxim1 one         
considerable section1 in most treatises 
on ,logic1 is devoted to the subject of 
,fallacies2 and the practice is too well
 worthy of observance1 to allow of our  
departing from it4 ,the philosophy of   
reasoning1 to be complete1 ought to     
comprise the theory of bad as well as of
 good reasoning4  ,we have endeavoured  
to ascertain the principles by which the
 sufficiency of any proof can be tested1
 and by which the nature and amount of  
evidence needful to prove any given     
conclusion can be determined beforehand4
 ,if these principles were adhered to1  

then although the number and value of   
the truths ascertained would be limited 
by the opportunities1 or by the         
industry1 ingenuity1 and patience1 of   
the individual inquirer1 at least error 
would not be embraced instead of truth4 
,but the general consent of mankind1    
founded on their experience1 vouches for
 their being far indeed from even this  
negative kind of perfection in the      
employment of their reasoning powers4   
,in the conduct of life--in the         
practical business of mankind--wrong    
inferences1 incorrect interpretations of
 experience1 unless after much culture  
of the thinking faculty1 are absolutely 
inevitable3 and with most people1 after 
the highest degree of culture they ever 
attain1 such erroneous inferences1      
producing corresponding errors in       
conduct1 are lamentably frequent4 ,even 
in the speculations to which eminent    
intellects have systematically devoted  
themselves1 and in reference to which   
the collective mind of the scientific   

world is always at hand to aid the      
efforts and correct the aberrations of  
individuals1 it is only from the more   
perfect sciences1 from those of which   
the subject-matter is the least         
complicated1 that opinions not resting  
on a correct induction have at length1  
generally speaking1 been expelled4 ,in  
the departments of inquiry relating to  
the more complex phenomena of nature1   
and especially those of which the       
subject is man1 whether as a moral and  
intellectual1 a social1 or even as a    
physical being2 the diversity of        
opinions still prevalent among          
instructed persons1 and the equal       
confidence with which those of the most 
contrary ways of thinking cling to their
 respective tenets1 are proof not only  
that right modes of philosophizing are  
not yet generally adopted on those      
subjects1 but that wrong ones are3 that 
inquirers have not only in general      
missed the truth1 but have often        
embraced error2 that even the most      

cultivated portion of our species have  
not yet learned to abstain from drawing 
conclusions which the evidence does not 
warrant4  ,the only complete safeguard  
against reasoning ill1 is the habit of  
reasoning well2 familiarity with the    
principles of correct reasoning1 and    
practice in applying those principles4  
,it is1 however1 not unimportant to     
consider what are the most common modes 
of bad reasoning2 by what appearances   
the mind is most likely to be seduced   
from the observance of true principles  
of induction2 what1 in short1 are the   
most common and most dangerous varieties
 of ,apparent ,evidence1 whereby persons
 are misled into opinions for which     
there does not exist evidence really    
conclusive4  ,a catalogue of the        
varieties of apparent evidence which are
 not real evidence1 is an enumeration of
 ,fallacies4 ,without such an           
enumeration1 therefore1 the present work
 would be wanting in an essential point4
 ,and while writers who included in     

their theory of reasoning nothing more  
than ratiocination1 have1 in consistency
 with this limitation1 confined their   
remarks to the fallacies which have     
their seat in that portion of the       
process of investigation2 we1 who       
profess to treat of the whole process1  
must add to our directions for          
performing it rightly1 warnings against 
performing it wrongly in any of its     
parts3 whether the ratiocinative or the 
experimental portion of it be in fault1 
or the fault lie in dispensing with     
ratiocination and induction altogether4 
#b4 ,in considering the sources of      
unfounded inference1 it is unnecessary  
to reckon the errors which arise1 not   
from a wrong method1 nor even from      
ignorance of the right one1 but from a  
casual lapse1 through hurry or          
inattention1 in the application of the  
true principles of induction4 ,such     
errors1 like the accidental mistakes in 
casting up a sum1 do not call for       
philosophical analysis or               

classification2 theoretical             
considerations can throw no light upon  
the means of avoiding them4 ,in the     
present treatise our attention is       
required1 not to mere inexpertness in   
performing the operation in the right   
way1 7the only remedies for which are   
increased attention and more sedulous   
practice17 but to the modes of          
performing it in a way fundamentally    
wrong2 the conditions under which the   
human mind persuades itself that it has 
sufficient grounds for a conclusion     
which it has not arrived at by any of   
the legitimate methods of               
induction--which it has not even        
carelessly or overhastily1 endeavoured  
to test by those legitimate methods4    
#c4 ,there is another branch of what may
 be called the ,philosophy of ,error1   
which must be mentioned here1 though    
only to be excluded from our subject4   
,the sources of erroneous opinions are  
twofold1 moral and intellectual4 ,of    
these1 the moral do not fall within the 

compass of this work4 ,they may be      
classed under two general heads2        
,indifference to the attainment of      
truth1 and ,bias3 of which last the most
 common case is that in which we are    
biassed by our wishes2 but the liability
 is almost as great to the undue        
adoption of a conclusion which is       
disagreeable to us1 as of one which is  
agreeable1 if it be of a nature to bring
 into action any of the stronger        
passions4 ,persons of timid character   
are the more predisposed to believe any 
statement1 the more it is calculated to 
alarm them4 ,indeed it is a             
psychological law1 deducible from the   
most general laws of the mental         
constitution of man1 that any strong    
passion renders us credulous as to the  
existence of objects suitable to excite 
it4  ,but the moral causes of opinions1 
though with most persons the most       
powerful of all1 are but remote causes3 
they do not act directly1 but by means  
of the intellectual causes2 to which    

they bear the same relation that the    
circumstances called1 in the theory of  
medicine1 predisposing causes1 bear to  
exciting causes4 ,indifference to truth 
cannot1 in and by itself1 produce       
erroneous belief2 it operates by        
preventing the mind from collecting the 
proper evidences1 or from applying to   
them the test of a legitimate and rigid 
induction2 by which omission it is      
exposed unprotected to the influence of 
any species of apparent evidence which  
offers itself spontaneously1 or which is
 elicited by that smaller quantity of   
trouble which the mind may be willing to
 take4 ,as little is ,bias a direct     
source of wrong conclusions4 ,we cannot 
believe a proposition only by wishing1  
or only by dreading1 to believe it4 ,the
 most violent inclination to find a set 
of propositions true1 will not enable   
the weakest of mankind to believe them  
without a vestige of intellectual       
grounds--without any1 even apparent1    
evidence4 ,it acts indirectly1 by       

placing the intellectual grounds of     
belief in an incomplete or distorted    
shape before his eyes4 ,it makes him    
shrink from the irksome labour of a     
rigorous induction1 when he has a       
misgiving that its result may be        
disagreeable2 and in such examination as
 he does institute1 it makes him exert  
that which is in a certain measure      
voluntary1 his attention1 unfairly1     
giving a larger share of it to the      
evidence which seems favourable to the  
desired conclusion1 a smaller to that   
which seems unfavourable4 ,it operates1 
too1 by making him look out eagerly for 
reasons1 or apparent reasons1 to support
 opinions which are conformable1 or     
resist those which are repugnant1 to his
 interests or feelings2 and when the    
interests or feelings are common to     
great numbers of persons1 reasons are   
accepted and pass current1 which would  
not for a moment be listened to in that 
character1 if the conclusion had nothing
 more powerful than its reasons to speak

 in its behalf4 ,the natural or acquired
 partialities of mankind are continually
 throwing up philosophical theories1 the
 sole recommendation of which consists  
in the premises they afford for proving 
cherished doctrines1 or justifying      
favourite feelings3 and when any one of 
these theories has been so thoroughly   
discredited as no longer to serve the   
purpose1 another is always ready to take
 its place4 ,this propensity1 when      
exercised in favour of any widely-spread
 persuasion or sentiment1 is often      
decorated with complimentary epithets2  
and the contrary habit of keeping the   
judgment in complete subordination to   
evidence1 is stigmatized by various hard
 names1 as scepticism1 immorality1      
coldness1 hard-heartedness1 and similar 
expressions according to the nature of  
the case4 ,but though the opinions of   
the generality of mankind1 when not     
dependent on mere habit and inculcation1
 have their root much more in the       
inclinations than in the intellect1 it  

is a necessary condition to the triumph 
of the moral bias that it should first  
pervert the understanding4 ,every       
erroneous inference1 though originating 
in moral causes1 involves the           
intellectual operation of admitting     
insufficient evidence as sufficient2 and
 whoever was on his guard against all   
kinds of inconclusive evidence which can
 be mistaken for conclusive1 would be in
 no danger of being led into error even 
by the strongest bias4 ,there are minds 
so strongly fortified on the            
intellectual side1 that they could not  
blind themselves to the light of truth1 
however really desirous of doing so2    
they could not1 with all the inclination
 in the world1 pass off upon themselves 
bad arguments for good ones4 ,if the    
sophistry of the intellect could be     
rendered impossible1 that of the        
feelings1 having no instrument to work  
with1 would be powerless4 ,a            
comprehensive classification of all     
those things which1 not being evidence1 

are liable to appear such to the        
understanding1 will1 therefore1 of      
itself include all errors of judgment   
arising from moral causes1 to the       
exclusion only of errors of practice    
committed against better knowledge4  ,to
 examine1 then1 the various kinds of    
apparent evidence which are not evidence
 at all1 and of apparently conclusive   
evidence which do not really amount to  
conclusiveness1 is the object of that   
part of our inquiry into which we are   
about to enter4  ,the subject is not    
beyond the compass of classification and
 comprehensive survey4 ,the things1     
indeed1 which are not evidence of any   
given conclusion1 are manifestly        
endless1 and this negative property1    
having no dependence on any positive    
ones1 cannot be made the groundwork of a
 real classification4 ,but the things   
which1 not being evidence1 are          
susceptible of being mistaken for it1   
are capable of a classification having  
reference to the positive property which

 they possess1 of appearing to be       
evidence4 ,we may arrange them1 at our  
choice1 on either of two principles2    
according to the cause which makes them 
appear to be evidence1 not being so2 or 
according to the particular kind of     
evidence which they simulate4 ,the      
,classification of ,fallacies which will
 be attempted in the ensuing chapter1 is
 founded on these considerations        
jointly4     ,,chapter ,,ii4            
,,classification ,,of ,,fallacies4      
#a4 ,in attempting to establish certain 
general distinctions which shall mark   
out from one another the various kinds  
of ,fallacious ,evidence1 we propose to 
ourselves an altogether different aim   
from that of several eminent thinkers1  
who have given1 under the name of       
,political or other ,fallacies1 a mere  
enumeration of a certain number of      
erroneous opinions2 false general       
propositions which happen to be often   
met with2 loci communes of bad arguments
 on some particular subject4 ,logic is  

not concerned with the false opinions   
which people happen to entertain1 but   
with the manner in which they come to   
entertain them4 ,the question is not1   
what facts have at any time been        
erroneously supposed to be proof of     
certain other facts1 but what property  
in the facts it was which led any one to
 this mistaken supposition4  ,when a    
fact is supposed1 though incorrectly1 to
 be evidentiary of1 or a mark of1 some  
other fact1 there must be a cause of the
 error2 the supposed evidentiary fact   
must be connected in some particular    
manner with the fact of which it is     
deemed evidentiary1--must stand in some 
particular relation to it1 without which
 relation it would not be regarded in   
that light4 ,the relation may either be 
one resulting from the simple           
contemplation of the two facts side by  
side with one another1 or it may depend 
on some process of mind1 by which a     
previous association has been           
established between them4 ,some         

peculiarity of relation1 however1 there 
must be2 the fact which can1 even by the
 wildest aberration1 be supposed to     
prove another fact1 must stand in some  
special position with regard to it2 and 
if we could ascertain and define that   
special position1 we should perceive the
 origin of the error4  ,we cannot regard
 one fact as evidentiary of another1    
unless we believe that the two are      
always1 or in the majority of cases1    
conjoined4 ,if we believe ,a to be      
evidentiary of ,b1 if when we see ,a we 
are inclined to infer ,b from it1 the   
reason is because we believe that       
wherever ,a is1 ,b also either always or
 for the most part exists1 either as an 
antecedent1 a consequent1 or a          
concomitant4 ,if when we see ,a we are  
inclined not to expect ,b--if we believe
 ,a to be evidentiary of the absence of 
,b--it is because we believe that where 
,a is1 ,b either is never1 or at least  
seldom1 found4 ,erroneous conclusions1  
in short1 no less than correct          

conclusions1 have an invariable relation
 to a general formula1 either expressed 
or tacitly implied4 ,when we infer some 
fact from some other fact which does not
 really prove it1 we either have        
admitted1 or1 if we maintained          
consistency1 ought to admit1 some       
groundless general proposition          
respecting the conjunction of the two   
phenomena4  ,for every property1        
therefore1 in facts1 or in our mode of  
considering facts1 which leads us to    
believe that they are habitually        
conjoined when they are not1 or that    
they are not when in reality they are1  
there is a corresponding kind of        
,fallacy2 and an enumeration of         
fallacies would consist in a            
specification of those properties in    
facts1 and those peculiarities in our   
mode of considering them1 which give    
rise to this erroneous opinion4    #b4  
,to begin1 then2 the supposed connexion1
 or repugnance1 between the two facts1  
may either be a conclusion from evidence

 7that is1 from some other proposition  
or propositions7 or may be admitted     
without any such ground2 admitted1 as   
the phrase is1 on its own evidence2     
embraced as self-evident1 as an         
axiomatic truth4 ,this gives rise to the
 first great distinction1 that between  
,fallacies of ,inference1 and ,fallacies
 of ,simple ,inspection4 ,in the latter 
division must be included not only all  
cases in which a proposition is believed
 and held for true1 literally without   
any extrinsic evidence1 either of       
specific experience or general          
reasoning2 but those more frequent cases
 in which simple inspection creates a   
presumption in favour of a proposition2 
not sufficient for belief1 but          
sufficient to cause the strict          
principles of a regular induction to be 
dispensed with1 and creating a          
predisposition to believe it on evidence
 which would be seen to be insufficient 
if no such presumption existed4 ,this   
class1 comprehending the whole of what  

may be termed ,natural ,prejudices1 and 
which ,i shall call indiscriminately    
,fallacies of ,simple ,inspection or    
,fallacies  priori1 shall be placed at  
the head of our list4  ,fallacies of    
,inference1 or erroneous conclusions    
from supposed evidence1 must be         
subdivided according to the nature of   
the apparent evidence from which the    
conclusions are drawn2 or 7what is the  
same thing7 according to the particular 
kind of sound argument which the fallacy
 in question simulates4 ,but there is a 
distinction to be first drawn1 which    
does not answer to any of the divisions 
of sound arguments1 but arises out of   
the nature of bad ones4 ,we may know    
exactly what our evidence is1 and yet   
draw a false conclusion from it2 we may 
conceive precisely what our premises    
are1 what alleged matters of fact1 or   
general principles1 are the foundation  
of our inference2 and yet1 because the  
premises are false1 or because we have  
inferred from them what they will not   

support1 our conclusion may be          
erroneous4 ,but a case1 perhaps even    
more frequent1 is that in which the     
error arises from not conceiving our    
premises with due clearness1 that is1   
7as shown in the preceding ,book1#a7    
with due fixity3 forming one conception 
of our evidence when we collect or      
receive it1 and another when we make use
 of it2 or unadvisedly1 and in general  
unconsciously1 substituting1 as we      
proceed1 different premises in the place
 of those with which we set out1 or a   
different conclusion for that which we  
undertook to prove4 ,this gives         
existence to a class of fallacies which 
may be justly termed 7in a phrase       
borrowed from ,bentham7 ,fallacies of   
,confusion2 comprehending1 among others1
 all those which have their source in   
language1 whether arising from the      
vagueness or ambiguity of our terms1 or 
from casual associations with them4     
,when the fallacy is not one of         
,confusion1 that is1 when the           

proposition believed1 and the evidence  
on which it is believed1 are steadily   
apprehended and unambiguously expressed1
 there remain to be made two cross      
divisions4 ,the ,apparent ,evidence may 
be either particular facts1 or foregone 
generalizations2 that is1 the process   
may simulate either simple ,induction1  
or ,deduction2 and again1 the evidence1 
whether consisting of supposed facts or 
of general propositions1 may be false in
 itself1 or1 being true1 may fail to    
bear out the conclusion attempted to be 
founded on it4 ,this gives us first1    
,fallacies of ,induction and ,fallacies 
of ,deduction1 and then a subdivision of
 each of these1 according as the        
supposed evidence is false1 or true but 
inconclusive4  ,fallacies of ,induction1
 where the facts on which the induction 
proceeds are erroneous1 may be termed   
,fallacies of ,observation4 ,the term is
 not strictly accurate1 or rather1 not  
accurately coextensive with the class of
 fallacies which ,i propose to designate

 by it4 ,induction is not always        
grounded on facts immediately observed1 
but sometimes on facts inferred3 and    
when these last are erroneous1 the error
 may not be1 in the literal sense of the
 term1 an instance of bad observation1  
but of bad inference4 ,it will be       
convenient1 however1 to make only one   
class of all the inductions of which the
 error lies in not sufficiently         
ascertaining the facts on which the     
theory is grounded2 whether the cause of
 failure be mal-observation1 or simple  
non-observation1 and whether the        
mal-observation be direct1 or by means  
of intermediate marks which do not prove
 what they are supposed to prove4 ,and  
in the absence of any comprehensive term
 to denote the ascertainment1 by        
whatever means1 of the facts on which an
 induction is grounded1 ,i will venture 
to retain for this class of fallacies1  
under the explanation now given1 the    
title of ,fallacies of ,observation4    
,the other class of inductive fallacies1

 in which the facts are correct1 but the
 conclusion not warranted by them1 are  
properly denominated ,fallacies of      
,generalization3 and these1 again1 fall 
into various subordinate classes or     
natural groups1 some of which will be   
enumerated in their proper place4  ,when
 we now turn to ,fallacies of           
,deduction1 namely those modes of       
incorrect argumentation in which the    
premises1 or some of them1 are general  
propositions1 and the argument a        
ratiocination2 we may of course         
subdivide these also into two species   
similar to the two preceding1 namely1   
those which proceed on false premises1  
and those of which the premises1 though 
true1 do not support the conclusion4    
,but of these species1 the first must   
necessarily fall under some one of the  
heads already enumerated4 ,for the error
 must be either in those premises which 
are general propositions1 or in those   
which assert individual facts4 ,in the  
former case it is an ,inductive         

,fallacy1 of one or the other class2 in 
the latter it is a ,fallacy of          
,observation3 unless1 in either case1   
the erroneous premise has been assumed  
on simple inspection1 in which case the 
fallacy is  priori4 ,or finally1 the    
premises1 of whichever kind they are1   
may never have been conceived in so     
distinct a manner as to produce any     
clear consciousness by what means they  
were arrived at2 as in the case of what 
is called reasoning in a circle3 and    
then the fallacy is one of ,confusion4  
,there remain1 therefore1 as the only   
class of fallacies having properly their
 seat in deduction1 those in which the  
premises of the ratiocination do not    
bear out its conclusion2 the various    
cases1 in short1 of vicious             
argumentation1 provided against by the  
rules of the syllogism4 ,we shall call  
these1 ,fallacies of ,ratiocination4    
,we have thus five distinguishable      
classes of fallacy1 which may be        
expressed in the following synoptic     

table3--    ,fallacies      of ,simple  
,inspection            #a4 ,fallacies   
priori4      of ,inference        from  
evidence distinctly           conceived 
,inductive ,fallacies         #b4       
,fallacies of ,observation4             
#c4 ,fallacies of ,generalization4      
,deductive ,fallacies         #d4       
,fallacies of ,ratiocination4           
from evidence indistinctly              
conceived                 #e4 ,fallacies
 of ,confusion4    #c4 ,we must not1    
however1 expect to find that men's      
actual errors always1 or even commonly1 
fall so unmistakeably under some one of 
these classes1 as to be incapable of    
being referred to any other4 ,erroneous 
arguments do not admit of such a sharply
 cut division as valid arguments do4 ,an
 argument fully stated1 with all its    
steps distinctly set out1 in language   
not susceptible of misunderstanding1    
must1 if it be erroneous1 be so in some 
one of these five modes unequivocally3  
or indeed of the first four1 since the  

fifth1 on such a supposition1 would     
vanish4 ,but it is not in the nature of 
bad reasoning to express itself thus    
unambiguously4 ,when a sophist1 whether 
he is imposing on himself or attempting 
to impose on others1 can be constrained 
to throw his sophistry into so distinct 
a form1 it needs1 in a large proportion 
of cases1 no further exposure4  ,in all 
arguments1 everywhere but in the        
schools1 some of the links are          
suppressed2  fortiori when the arguer   
either intends to deceive1 or is a lame 
and inexpert thinker1 little accustomed 
to bring his reasoning processes to any 
test3 and it is in those steps of the   
reasoning which are made in this tacit  
and half-conscious1 or even wholly      
unconscious manner1 that the error      
oftenest lurks4 ,in order to detect the 
fallacy1 the proposition thus silently  
assumed must be supplied2 but the       
reasoner1 most likely1 has never really 
asked himself what he was assuming3 his 
confuter1 unless permitted to extort it 

from him by the ,socratic mode of       
interrogation1 must himself judge what  
the suppressed premise ought to be in   
order to support the conclusion4 ,and   
hence1 in the words of ,archbishop      
,whately1 it must be often a matter of  
doubt1 or rather1 of arbitrary choice1  
not only to which genus each kind of    
fallacy should be referred1 but even to 
which kind to refer any one individual  
fallacy2 for since1 in any course of    
argument1 one premise is usually        
suppressed1 it frequently happens in the
 case of a fallacy1 that the hearers are
 left to the alternative of supplying   
either a premise which is not true1 or  
else1 one which does not prove the      
conclusion3 e4 g4 if a man expatiates on
 the distress of the country1 and thence
 argues that the government is          
tyrannical1 we must suppose him to      
assume either that 'every distressed    
country is under a tyranny1' which is a 
manifest falsehood1 or merely that      
'every country under a tyranny is       

distressed1' which1 however true1 proves
 nothing1 the middle term being         
undistributed4 ,the former would be     
ranked1 in our distribution1 among      
fallacies of generalization1 the latter 
among those of ratiocination4 ,which are
 we to suppose the speaker meant us to  
understand8 ,surely 7if he understood   
himself7 just whichever each of his     
hearers might happen to prefer3 some    
might assent to the false premise2      
others allow the unsound syllogism4     
,almost all fallacies1 therefore1 might 
in strictness be brought under our fifth
 class1 ,fallacies of ,confusion4 ,a    
fallacy can seldom be absolutely        
referred to any of the other classes2 we
 can only say1 that if all the links    
were filled up which should be capable  
of being supplied in a valid argument1  
it would either stand thus 7forming a   
fallacy of one class71 or thus 7a       
fallacy of another72 or at furthest we  
may say1 that the conclusion is most    
likely to have originated in a fallacy  

of such and such a class4 ,thus in the  
illustration just quoted1 the error     
committed may be traced with most       
probability to a fallacy of             
generalization2 that of mistaking an    
uncertain mark1 or piece of evidence1   
for a certain one2 concluding from an   
effect to some one of its possible      
causes1 when there are others which     
would have been equally capable of      
producing it4  ,yet1 though the five    
classes run into each other1 and a      
particular error often seems to be      
arbitrarily assigned to one of them     
rather than to any of the rest1 there is
 considerable use in so distinguishing  
them4 ,we shall find it convenient to   
set apart1 as ,fallacies of ,confusion1 
those of which confusion is the most    
obvious characteristic2 in which no     
other cause can be assigned for the     
mistake committed1 than neglect or      
inability to state the question         
properly1 and to apprehend the evidence 
with definiteness and precision4 ,in the

 remaining four classes ,i shall place  
not only the cases in which the evidence
 is clearly seen to be what it is1 and  
yet a wrong conclusion drawn from it1   
but also those in which1 although there 
be confusion1 the confusion is not the  
sole cause of the error1 but there is   
some shadow of a ground for it in the   
nature of the evidence itself4 ,and in  
distributing these cases of partial     
confusion among the four classes1 ,i    
shall1 when there can be any hesitation 
as to the precise seat of the fallacy1  
suppose it to be in that part of the    
process in which1 from the nature of the
 case1 and the tendencies of the human  
mind1 an error would in the particular  
circumstances be the most probable4     
,after these observations we shall      
proceed1 without further preamble1 to   
consider the five classes in their      
order4     ,,chapter ,,iii4  ,,fallacies
 ,,of ,,simple ,,inspection2 ,,or       
,,priori ,,fallacies4    #a4 ,the tribe 
of errors of which we are to treat in   

the first instance1 are those in which  
no actual inference takes place at all3 
the proposition 7it cannot in such cases
 be called a conclusion7 being embraced1
 not as proved1 but as requiring no     
proof2 as a self-evident truth2 or else 
as having such intrinsic verisimilitude1
 that external evidence not in itself   
amounting to proof1 is sufficient in aid
 of the antecedent presumption4  ,an    
attempt to treat this subject           
comprehensively would be a transgression
 of the bounds prescribed to this work1 
since it would necessitate the inquiry  
which1 more than any other1 is the grand
 question of what is called metaphysics1
 viz4 ,what are the propositions which  
may reasonably be received without      
proof8 ,that there must be some such    
propositions all are agreed1 since there
 cannot be an infinite series of proof1 
a chain suspended from nothing4 ,but to 
determine what these propositions are1  
is the opus magnum of the more recondite
 mental philosophy4 ,two principal      

divisions of opinion on the subject have
 divided the schools of philosophy from 
its first dawn4 ,the one recognises no  
ultimate premises but the facts of our  
subjective consciousness2 our           
sensations1 emotions1 intellectual      
states of mind1 and volitions4 ,these1  
and whatever by strict rules of         
induction can be derived from these1 it 
is possible1 according to this theory1  
for us to know2 of all else we must     
remain in ignorance4 ,the opposite      
school hold that there are other        
existences1 suggested indeed to our     
minds by these subjective phenomena1 but
 not inferrible from them1 by any       
process either of deduction or of       
induction2 which1 however1 we must1 by  
the constitution of our mental nature   
recognise as realities2 and realities1  
too1 of a higher order than the         
phenomena of our consciousness1 being   
the efficient causes and necessary      
substrata of all ,phenomena4 ,among     
these entities they reckon ,substances1 

whether matter or spirit2 from the dust 
under our feet to the soul1 and from    
that to ,deity4 ,all these1 according to
 them1 are preternatural or supernatural
 beings1 having no likeness in          
experience1 though experience is        
entirely a manifestation of their       
agency4 ,their existence1 together with 
more or less of the laws to which they  
conform in their operations1 are1 on    
this theory1 apprehended and recognised 
as real by the mind itself intuitively3 
experience 7whether in the form of      
sensation or of mental feeling7 having  
no other part in the matter than as     
affording facts which are consistent    
with these necessary postulates of      
reason1 and which are explained and     
accounted for by them4  ,as it is       
foreign to the purpose of the present   
treatise to decide between these        
conflicting theories1 we are precluded  
from inquiring into the existence1 or   
defining the extent and limits1 of      
knowledge  priori1 and from             

characterizing the kind of correct      
assumption which the fallacy of         
incorrect assumption1 now under         
consideration1 simulates4 ,yet since it 
is allowed on both sides that such      
assumptions are often made improperly1  
we may find it practicable1 without     
entering into the ultimate metaphysical 
grounds of the discussion1 to state some
 speculative propositions1 and suggest  
some practical cautions1 respecting the 
forms in which such unwarranted         
assumptions are most likely to be made4 
#b4 ,in the cases in which1 according to
 the thinkers of the ontological school1
 the mind apprehends1 by intuition1     
things1 and the laws of things1 not     
cognizable by our sensitive faculty2    
those intuitive1 or supposed intuitive1 
perceptions are undistinguishable from  
what the opposite school are accustomed 
to call ideas of the mind4 ,when they   
themselves say that they perceive the   
things by an immediate act of a faculty 
given for that purpose by their         

,creator1 it would be said of them by   
their opponents that they find an idea  
or conception in their own minds1 and   
from the idea or conception1 infer the  
existence of a corresponding objective  
reality4 ,nor would this be an unfair   
statement1 but a mere version into other
 words of the account given by many of  
themselves2 and one to which the more   
clear-sighted of them might1 and        
generally do1 without hesitation1       
subscribe4 ,since1 therefore1 in the    
cases which lay the strongest claims to 
be examples of knowledge  priori1 the   
mind proceeds from the idea of a thing  
to the reality of the thing itself1 we  
cannot be surprised by finding that     
illicit assumptions  priori consist in  
doing the same thing erroneously3 in    
mistaking subjective facts for          
objective1 laws of the percipient mind  
for laws of the perceived object1       
properties of the ideas or conceptions  
for properties of the things conceived4 
,accordingly1 a large proportion of the 

erroneous thinking which exists in the  
world proceeds on a tacit assumption1   
that the same order must obtain among   
the objects in nature which obtains     
among our ideas of them4 ,that if we    
always think of two things together1 the
 two things must always exist together4 
,that if one thing makes us think of    
another as preceding or following it1   
that other must precede it or follow it 
in actual fact4 ,and conversely1 that   
when we cannot conceive two things      
together they cannot exist together1 and
 that their combination may1 without    
further evidence1 be rejected from the  
list of possible occurrences4  ,few     
persons1 ,i am inclined to think1 have  
reflected on the great extent to which  
this fallacy has prevailed1 and         
prevails1 in the actual beliefs and     
actions of mankind4 ,for a first        
illustration of it1 we may refer to a   
large class of popular superstitions4   
,if any one will examine in what        
circumstances most of those things      

agree1 which in different ages and by   
different portions of the human race    
have been considered as omens or        
prognostics of some interesting event1  
whether calamitous or fortunate2 they   
will be found very generally            
characterized by this peculiarity1 that 
they cause the mind to think of that1 of
 which they are therefore supposed to   
forebode the actual occurrence4 ,talk of
 the devil1 and he will appear1 has     
passed into a proverb4 ,talk of the     
devil1 that is1 raise the idea1 and the 
reality will follow4 ,in times when the 
appearance of that personage in a       
visible form was thought to be no       
unfrequent occurrence1 it has doubtless 
often happened to persons of vivid      
imagination and susceptible nerves1 that
 talking of the devil has caused them to
 fancy they saw him2 as1 even in our    
more incredulous days1 listening to     
ghost stories predisposes us to see     
ghosts2 and thus1 as a prop to the      
priori fallacy1 there might come to be  

added an auxiliary fallacy of           
mal-observation1 with one of false      
generalization grounded on it4          
,fallacies of different orders often    
herd or cluster together in this        
fashion1 one smoothing the way for      
another4 ,but the origin of the         
superstition is evidently that which we 
have assigned4 ,in like manner it has   
been universally considered unlucky to  
speak of misfortune4 ,the day on which  
any calamity happened has been          
considered an unfortunate day1 and there
 has been a feeling everywhere1 and in  
some nations a religious obligation1    
against transacting any important       
business on that day4 ,for on such a day
 our thoughts are likely to be of       
misfortune4 ,for a similar reason1 any  
untoward occurrence in commencing an    
undertaking has been considered ominous 
of failure2 and often1 doubtless1 has   
really contributed to it1 by putting the
 persons engaged in the enterprise more 
or less out of spirits3 but the belief  

has equally prevailed where the         
disagreeable circumstance was1          
independently of superstition1 too      
insignificant to depress the spirits by 
any influence of its own4 ,all know the 
story of ,csar's accidentally stumbling 
in the act of landing on the ,african   
coast2 and the presence of mind with    
which he converted the direful presage  
into a favourable one by exclaiming1    
,africa1 ,i embrace thee4 ,such omens1  
it is true1 were often conceived as     
warnings of the future1 given by a      
friendly or a hostile deity2 but this   
very superstition grew out of a         
pre-existing tendency2 the god was      
supposed to send1 as an indication of   
what was to come1 something which people
 were already disposed to consider in   
that light4 ,so in the case of lucky or 
unlucky names4 ,herodotus tells us how  
the ,greeks1 on the way to ,mycale1 were
 encouraged in their enterprise by the  
arrival of a deputation from ,samos1 one
 of the members of which was named      

,hegesistratus1 the leader of armies4   
,cases may be pointed out in which      
something which could have no real      
effect but to make persons think of     
misfortune1 was regarded not merely as a
 prognostic1 but as something           
approaching to an actual cause of it4   
,the ,greek3 euphmei of the ,greeks1 and
 favete linguis1 or bona verba quso1 of 
the ,romans1 evince the care with which 
they endeavoured to repress the         
utterance of any word expressive or     
suggestive of ill fortune2 not from     
notions of delicate politeness1 to which
 their general mode of conduct and      
feeling had very little reference1 but  
from bon fide alarm lest the event so   
suggested to the imagination should in  
fact occur4 ,some vestige of a similar  
superstition has been known to exist    
among uneducated persons even in our own
 day3 it is thought an unchristian thing
 to talk of1 or suppose1 the death of   
any person while he is alive4 ,it is    
known how careful the ,romans were to   

avoid1 by an indirect mode of speech1   
the utterance of any word directly      
expressive of death or other calamity3  
how instead of mortuus est they said    
vixit2 and be the event fortunate or    
otherwise instead of adverse4 ,the name 
,maleventum1 of which ,salmasius so     
sagaciously detected the ,thessalian    
origin 7,greek3 ,maloeis1 ,greek3       
,maloentos71 they changed into the      
highly propitious denomination1         
,beneventum2 ,egesta into ,segesta2 and 
,epidamnus1 a name so interesting in its
 associations to the reader of          
,thucydides1 they exchanged for         
,dyrrhachium1 to escape the perils of a 
word suggestive of damnum or detriment4 
,if an hare cross the highway1 says ,sir
 ,thomas ,browne1#b there are few above 
threescore that are not perplexed       
thereat2 which notwithstanding is but an
 augurial terror1 according to that     
received expression1 ,inauspicatum dat  
iter oblatus lepus4 ,and the ground of  
the conceit was probably no greater than

 this1 that a fearful animal passing by 
us portended unto us something to be    
feared2 as upon the like consideration  
the meeting of a fox presaged some      
future imposture4 ,such superstitions as
 these last must be the result of study2
 they are too recondite for natural or  
spontaneous growth4 ,but when the       
attempt was once made to construct a    
science of predictions1 any association1
 though ever so faint or remote1 by     
which an object could be connected in   
however far-fetched a manner with ideas 
either of prosperity or of danger and   
misfortune1 was enough to determine its 
being classed among good or evil omens4 
,an example of rather a different kind  
from any of these1 but falling under the
 same principle1 is the famous attempt  
on which so much labour and ingenuity   
were expended by the alchemists1 to make
 gold potable4 ,the motive to this was a
 conceit that potable gold could be no  
other than the universal medicine3 and  
why gold8 ,because it was so precious4  

,it must have all marvellous properties 
as a physical substance1 because the    
mind was already accustomed to marvel at
 it4  ,from a similar feeling1 every    
substance1 says ,dr4 ,paris1#c whose    
origin is involved in mystery1 has at   
different times been eagerly applied to 
the purposes of medicine4 ,not long     
since1 one of those showers which are   
now known to consist of the excrements  
of insects1 fell in the north of ,italy2
 the inhabitants regarded it as manna1  
or some supernatural panacea1 and they  
swallowed it with such avidity1 that it 
was only by extreme address that a small
 quantity was obtained for a chemical   
examination4 ,the superstition1 in this 
instance1 though doubtless partly of a  
religious character1 probably in part   
also arose from the prejudice that a    
wonderful thing must of course have     
wonderful properties4    #c4 ,the       
instances of  priori fallacy which we   
have hitherto cited belong to the class 
of vulgar errors1 and do not now1 nor in

 any but a rude age ever could1 impose  
upon minds of any considerable          
attainments4 ,but those to which we are 
about to proceed1 have been1 and still  
are1 all but universally prevalent among
 thinkers4 ,the same disposition to give
 objectivity to a law of the mind--to   
suppose that what is true of our ideas  
of things must be true of the things    
themselves--exhibits itself in many of  
the most accredited modes of            
philosophical investigation1 both on    
physical and on metaphysical subjects4  
,in one of its most undisguised         
manifestations1 it embodies itself in   
two maxims1 which lay claim to axiomatic
 truth3 ,things which we cannot think of
 together1 cannot coexist2 and ,things  
which we cannot help thinking of        
together1 must coexist4 ,i am not sure  
that the maxims were ever expressed in  
these precise words1 but the history    
both of philosophy and of popular       
opinions abounds with exemplifications  
of both forms of the doctrine4  ,to     

begin with the latter of them3 ,things  
which we cannot think of except         
together1 must exist together4 ,this is 
assumed in the generally received and   
accredited mode of reasoning which      
concludes that ,a must accompany ,b in  
point of fact1 because it is involved in
 the idea4 ,such thinkers do not reflect
 that the idea1 being a result of       
abstraction1 ought to conform to the    
facts1 and cannot make the facts conform
 to it4 ,the argument is at most        
admissible as an appeal to authority2 a 
surmise1 that what is now part of the   
idea1 must1 before it became so1 have   
been found by previous inquirers in the 
facts4 ,nevertheless1 the philosopher   
who more than all others made           
professions of rejecting authority1     
,descartes1 constructed his system on   
this very basis4 ,his favourite device  
for arriving at truth1 even in regard to
 outward things1 was by looking into his
 own mind for it4 ,credidi me1 says his 
celebrated maxim1 pro regul generali    

sumere posse1 omne id quod vald dilucid 
et distinct concipiebam1 verum esse2    
whatever can be very clearly conceived1 
must certainly exist2 that is1 as he    
afterwards explains it1 if the idea     
includes existence4 ,and on this ground 
he infers that geometrical figures      
really exist1 because they can be       
distinctly conceived4 ,whenever         
existence is involved in an idea1 a     
thing conformable to the idea must      
really exist2 which is as much as to    
say1 whatever the idea contains must    
have its equivalent in the thing2 and   
what we are not able to leave out of the
 idea cannot be absent from the         
reality4#d ,this assumption pervades the
 philosophy not only of ,descartes1 but 
of all the thinkers who received their  
impulse mainly from him1 in particular  
the two most remarkable among them1     
,spinoza and ,leibnitz1 from whom the   
modern ,german metaphysical philosophy  
is essentially an emanation4 ,i am      
indeed disposed to think that the       

fallacy now under consideration has been
 the cause of two-thirds of the bad     
philosophy1 and especially of the bad   
metaphysics1 which the human mind has   
never ceased to produce4 ,our general   
ideas contain nothing but what has been 
put into them1 either by our passive    
experience1 or by our active habits of  
thought2 and the metaphysicians in all  
ages1 who have attempted to construct   
the laws of the universe by reasoning   
from our supposed necessities of        
thought1 have always proceeded1 and only
 could proceed1 by laboriously finding  
in their own minds what they themselves 
had formerly put there1 and evolving    
from their ideas of things what they had
 first involved in those ideas4 ,in this
 way all deeply-rooted opinions and     
feelings are enabled to create apparent 
demonstrations of their truth and       
reasonableness1 as it were out of their 
own substance4  ,the other form of the  
fallacy2 ,things which we cannot think  
of together cannot exist                

together1--including as one of its      
branches1 that what we cannot think of  
as existing cannot exist at all1--may   
thus be briefly expressed3 ,whatever is 
inconceivable must be false4  ,against  
this prevalent doctrine ,i have         
sufficiently argued in a former ,book1#e
 and nothing is required in this place  
but examples4 ,it was long held that    
,antipodes were impossible because of   
the difficulty which was found in       
conceiving persons with their heads in  
the same direction as our feet4 ,and it 
was one of the received arguments       
against the ,copernican system1 that we 
cannot conceive so great a void space as
 that system supposes to exist in the   
celestial regions4 ,when men's          
imaginations had always been used to    
conceive the stars as firmly set in     
solid spheres1 they naturally found much
 difficulty in imagining them in so     
different1 and1 as it doubtless appeared
 to them1 so precarious a situation4    
,but they had no right to mistake the   

limitation 7whether natural1 or1 as it  
in fact proved1 only artificial7 of     
their own faculties1 for an inherent    
limitation of the possible modes of     
existence in the universe4  ,it may be  
said in objection1 that the error in    
these cases was in the minor premise1   
not the major2 an error of fact1 not of 
principle2 that it did not consist in   
supposing that what is inconceivable    
cannot be true1 but in supposing        
antipodes to be inconceivable1 when     
present experience proves that they can 
be conceived4 ,even if this objection   
were allowed1 and the proposition that  
what is inconceivable cannot be true    
were suffered to remain unquestioned as 
a speculative truth1 it would be a truth
 on which no practical consequence could
 ever be founded1 since1 on this        
showing1 it is impossible to affirm of  
any proposition1 not being a            
contradiction in terms1 that it is      
inconceivable4 ,antipodes were really1  
not fictitiously1 inconceivable to our  

ancestors3 they are indeed conceivable  
to us2 and as the limits of our power of
 conception have been so largely        
extended1 by the extension of our       
experience and the more varied exercise 
of our imagination1 so may posterity    
find many combinations perfectly        
conceivable to them which are           
inconceivable to us4 ,but1 as beings of 
limited experience1 we must always and  
necessarily have limited conceptive     
powers2 while it does not by any means  
follow that the same limitation obtains 
in the possibilities of nature1 nor even
 in her actual manifestations4  ,rather 
more than a century and a half ago it   
was a scientific maxim1 disputed by no  
one1 and which no one deemed to require 
any proof1 that a thing cannot act where
 it is not4 ,with this weapon the       
,cartesians waged a formidable war      
against the theory of gravitation1      
which1 according to them1 involving so  
obvious an absurdity1 must be rejected  
in limine3 the sun could not possibly   

act upon the earth1 not being there4 ,it
 was not surprising that the adherents  
of the old systems of astronomy should  
urge this objection against the new2 but
 the false assumption imposed equally on
 ,newton himself1 who in order to turn  
the edge of the objection1 imagined a   
subtle ether which filled up the space  
between the sun and the earth1 and by   
its intermediate agency was the         
proximate cause of the phenomena of     
gravitation4 ,it is inconceivable1 said 
,newton1 in one of his letters to ,dr4  
,bentley1#f that inanimate brute matter 
should1 without the mediation of        
something else1 which is not material1  
operate upon and affect other matter    
without mutual contact4444 ,that gravity
 should be innate1 inherent1 and        
essential to matter1 so that one body   
may act on another1 at a distance1      
through a vacuum1 without the mediation 
of anything else1 by and through which  
their action and force may be conveyed  
from one to another1 is to me so great  

an absurdity1 that ,i believe no man1   
who in philosophical matters has a      
competent faculty of thinking1 can ever 
fall into it4 ,this passage should be   
hung up in the cabinet of every         
cultivator of science who is ever       
tempted to pronounce a fact impossible  
because it appears to him inconceivable4
 ,in our own day one would be more      
tempted1 though with equal injustice1 to
 reverse the concluding observation1 and
 consider the seeing any absurdity at   
all in a thing so simple and natural1 to
 be what really marks the absence of a  
competent faculty of thinking4 ,no one  
now feels any difficulty in conceiving  
gravity to be1 as much as any other     
property is1 inherent1 and essential to 
matter1 nor finds the comprehension of  
it facilitated in the smallest degree by
 the supposition of an ether 7though    
some recent inquirers do give this as an
 explanation of it72 nor thinks it at   
all incredible that the celestial bodies
 can and do act where they1 in actual   

bodily presence1 are not4 ,to us it is  
not more wonderful that bodies should   
act upon one another without mutual     
contact1 than that they should do so    
when in contact2 we are familiar with   
both these facts1 and we find them      
equally inexplicable1 but equally easy  
to believe4 ,to ,newton1 the one1       
because his imagination was familiar    
with it1 appeared natural and a matter  
of course1 while the other1 for the     
contrary reason1 seemed too absurd to be
 credited4  ,it is strange that any one1
 after such a warning1 should rely      
implicitly on the evidence  priori of   
such propositions as these1 that matter 
cannot think2 that space1 or extension1 
is infinite2 that nothing can be made   
out of nothing 7ex nihilo nihil fit74   
,whether these propositions are true or 
not this is not the place to determine1 
nor even whether the questions are      
soluble by the human faculties4 ,but    
such doctrines are no more self-evident 
truths1 than the ancient maxim that a   

thing cannot act where it is not1 which 
probably is not now believed by any     
educated person in ,europe4#g ,matter   
cannot think2 why8 because we cannot    
conceive thought to be annexed to any   
arrangement of material particles4      
,space is infinite1 because having never
 known any part of it which had not     
other parts beyond it1 we cannot        
conceive an absolute termination4 ,ex   
nihilo nihil fit1 because having never  
known any physical product without a    
pre-existing physical material1 we      
cannot1 or think we cannot1 imagine a   
creation out of nothing4 ,but these     
things may in themselves be as          
conceivable as gravitation without an   
intervening medium1 which ,newton       
thought too great an absurdity for any  
person of a competent faculty of        
philosophical thinking to admit3 and    
even supposing them not conceivable1    
this1 for aught we know1 may be merely  
one of the limitations of our very      
limited minds1 and not in nature at all4

  ,no writer has more directly          
identified himself with the fallacy now 
under consideration1 or has embodied it 
in more distinct terms1 than ,leibnitz4 
,in his view1 unless a thing was not    
merely conceivable1 but even            
explainable1 it could not exist in      
nature4 ,all natural phenomena1         
according to him1 must be susceptible of
 being accounted for  priori4 ,the only 
facts of which no explanation could be  
given but the will of ,god1 were        
miracles properly so called4 ,je        
reconnais1 says he1#h qu'il n'est pas   
permis de nier ce qu'on n'entend pas2   
mais j'ajoute qu'on a droit de nier 7au 
moins dans l'ordre naturel7 ce qui      
absolument n'est point intelligible ni  
explicable4 ,je soutiens aussi 444      
qu'enfin la conception des cratures     
n'est pas la mesure du pouvoir de ,dieu1
 mais que leur conceptivit1 ou force de 
concevoir1 est la mesure du pouvoir de  
la nature1 tout ce qui est conforme     
l'ordre naturel pouvant tre conu ou     

entendu par quelque crature4  ,not      
content with assuming that nothing can  
be true which we are unable to conceive1
 scientific inquirers have frequently   
given a still further extension to the  
doctrine1 and held that1 even of things 
not altogether inconceivable1 that which
 we can conceive with the greatest ease 
is likeliest to be true4 ,it was long an
 admitted axiom1 and is not yet entirely
 discredited1 that nature always acts by
 the simplest means1 i4e4 by those which
 are most easily conceivable4#i ,a large
 proportion of all the errors ever      
committed in the investigation of the   
laws of nature1 have arisen from the    
assumption that the most familiar       
explanation or hypothesis must be the   
truest4 ,one of the most instructive    
facts in scientific history is the      
pertinacity with which the human mind   
clung to the belief that the heavenly   
bodies must move in circles1 or be      
carried round by the revolution of      
spheres2 merely because those were in   

themselves the simplest suppositions3   
though1 to make them accord with the    
facts which were ever contradicting them
 more and more1 it became necessary to  
add sphere to sphere and circle to      
circle1 until the original simplicity   
was converted into almost inextricable  
complication4    #d4 ,we pass to another
  priori fallacy or natural prejudice1  
allied to the former1 and originating as
 that does1 in the tendency to presume  
an exact correspondence between the laws
 of the mind and those of things        
external to it4 ,the fallacy may be     
enunciated in this general              
form--,whatever can be thought of apart 
exists apart3 and its most remarkable   
manifestation consists in the           
personification of abstractions4        
,mankind in all ages have had a strong  
propensity to conclude that wherever    
there is a name1 there must be a        
distinguishable separate entity         
corresponding to the name2 and every    
complex idea which the mind has formed  

for itself by operating upon its        
conceptions of individual things1 was   
considered to have an outward objective 
reality answering to it4 ,fate1 ,chance1
 ,nature1 ,time1 ,space1 were real      
beings1 nay1 even gods4 ,if the analysis
 of qualities in the earlier part of    
this work be correct1 names of qualities
 and names of substances stand for the  
very same sets of facts or phenomena2   
whiteness and a white thing are only    
different phrases1 required by          
convenience for speaking of the same    
external fact under different relations4
 ,not such1 however1 was the notion     
which this verbal distinction suggested 
of old1 either to the vulgar or to the  
scientific4 ,whiteness was an entity1   
inhering or sticking in the white       
substance3 and so of all other          
qualities4 ,so far was this carried1    
that even concrete general terms were   
supposed to be1 not names of indefinite 
numbers of individual substances1 but   
names of a peculiar kind of entities    

termed ,universal ,substances4 ,because 
we can think and speak of man in        
general1 that is1 of all persons in so  
far as possessing the common attributes 
of the species1 without fastening our   
thoughts permanently on some one        
individual person2 therefore man in     
general was supposed to be1 not an      
aggregate of individual persons1 but an 
abstract or universal man1 distinct from
 these4  ,it may be imagined what havoc 
metaphysicians trained in these habits  
made with philosophy1 when they came to 
the largest generalizations of all4     
,substanti ,secund of any kind were bad 
enough1 but such ,substanti ,secund as  
,greek3 to on1 for example1 and ,greek3 
to hen1 standing for peculiar entities  
supposed to be inherent in all things   
which exist1 or which are said to be    
one1 were enough to put an end to all   
intelligible discussion2 especially     
since1 with a just perception that the  
truths which philosophy pursues are     
general truths1 it was soon laid down   

that these general substances were the  
only subjects of science1 being         
immutable1 while individual substances  
cognizable by the senses1 being in a    
perpetual flux1 could not be the subject
 of real knowledge4 ,this               
misapprehension of the import of general
 language constitutes ,mysticism1 a word
 so much oftener written and spoken than
 understood4 ,whether in the ,vedas1 in 
the ,platonists1 or in the ,hegelians1  
mysticism is neither more nor less than 
ascribing objective existence to the    
subjective creations of our own         
faculties1 to ideas or feelings of the  
mind2 and believing that by watching and
 contemplating these ideas of its own   
making1 it can read in them what takes  
place in the world without4    #e4      
,proceeding with the enumeration of     
priori fallacies1 and endeavouring to   
arrange them with as much reference as  
possible to their natural affinities1 we
 come to another1 which is also nearly  
allied to the fallacy preceding the     

last1 standing in the same relation to  
one variety of it as the fallacy last   
mentioned does to the other4 ,this1 too1
 represents nature as under incapacities
 corresponding to those of our          
intellect2 but instead of only asserting
 that nature cannot do a thing because  
we cannot conceive it done1 goes the    
still greater length of averring that   
nature does a particular thing1 on the  
sole ground that we can see no reason   
why she should not4 ,absurd as this     
seems when so plainly stated1 it is a   
received principle among scientific     
authorities for demonstrating  priori   
the laws of physical phenomena4 ,a      
phenomenon must follow a certain law1   
because we see no reason why it should  
deviate from that law in one way rather 
than in another4 ,this is called the    
,principle of the ,sufficient           
,reason2#aj and by means of it          
philosophers often flatter themselves   
that they are able to establish1 without
 any appeal to experience1 the most     

general truths of experimental physics4 
,take1 for example1 two of the most     
elementary of all laws1 the law of      
inertia and the first law of motion4 ,a 
body at rest cannot1 it is affirmed1    
begin to move unless acted upon by some 
external force3 because1 if it did1 it  
must either move up or down1 forward or 
backward1 and so forth2 but if no       
outward force acts upon it1 there can be
 no reason for its moving up rather than
 down1 or down rather than up1 c41 ergo1
 it will not move at all4  ,this        
reasoning ,i conceive to be entirely    
fallacious1 as indeed ,dr4 ,brown1 in   
his treatise on ,cause and ,effect1 has 
shown with great acuteness and justness 
of thought4 ,we have before remarked1   
that almost every fallacy may be        
referred to different genera by         
different modes of filling up the       
suppressed steps2 and this particular   
one may1 at our option1 be brought under
 petitio principii4 ,it supposes that   
nothing can be a sufficient reason for a

 body's moving in one particular        
direction1 except some external force4  
,but this is the very thing to be       
proved4 ,why not some internal force8   
,why not the law of the thing's own     
nature8 ,since these philosophers think 
it necessary to prove the law of        
inertia1 they of course do not suppose  
it to be self-evident2 they must1       
therefore1 be of opinion that1          
previously to all proof1 the supposition
 of a body's moving by internal impulse 
is an admissible hypothesis2 but if so1 
why is not the hypothesis also          
admissible1 that the internal impulse   
acts naturally in some one particular   
direction1 not in another8 ,if          
spontaneous motion might have been the  
law of matter1 why not spontaneous      
motion towards the sun1 towards the     
earth1 or towards the zenith8 ,why not1 
as the ancients supposed1 towards a     
particular place in the universe1       
appropriated to each particular kind of 
substance8 ,surely it is not allowable  

to say that spontaneity of motion is    
credible in itself1 but not credible if 
supposed to take place in any           
determinate direction4  ,indeed1 if any 
one chose to assert that all bodies when
 uncontrolled set out in a direct line  
towards the north pole1 he might equally
 prove his point by the principle of the
 ,sufficient ,reason4 ,by what right is 
it assumed that a state of rest is the  
particular state which cannot be        
deviated from without special cause8    
,why not a state of motion1 and of some 
particular sort of motion8 ,why may we  
not say that the natural state of a     
horse left to himself is to amble1      
because otherwise he must either trot1  
gallop1 or stand still1 and because we  
know no reason why he should do one of  
these rather than another8 ,if this is  
to be called an unfair use of the       
sufficient reason1 and the other a fair 
one1 there must be a tacit assumption   
that a state of rest is more natural to 
a horse than a state of ambling4 ,if    

this means that it is the state which   
the animal will assume when left to     
himself1 that is the very point to be   
proved2 and if it does not mean this1 it
 can only mean that a state of rest is  
the simplest state1 and therefore the   
most likely to prevail in nature1 which 
is one of the fallacies or natural      
prejudices we have already examined4    
,so again of the ,first ,law of ,motion2
 that a body once moving will1 if left  
to itself1 continue to move uniformly in
 a straight line4 ,an attempt is made to
 prove this law by saying1 that if not1 
the body must deviate either to the     
right or to the left1 and that there is 
no reason why it should do one more than
 the other4 ,but who could know1        
antecedently to experience1 whether     
there was a reason or not8 ,might it not
 be the nature of bodies1 or of some    
particular bodies1 to deviate towards   
the right8 or if the supposition is     
preferred1 towards the east1 or south8  
,it was long thought that bodies1       

terrestrial ones at least1 had a natural
 tendency to deflect downwards2 and     
there is no shadow of anything          
objectionable in the supposition1 except
 that it is not true4 ,the pretended    
proof of the law of motion is even more 
manifestly untenable than that of the   
law of inertia1 for it is flagrantly    
inconsistent2 it assumes that the       
continuance of motion in the direction  
first taken is more natural than        
deviation either to the right or to the 
left1 but denies that one of these can  
possibly be more natural than the other4
 ,all these fancies of the possibility  
of knowing what is natural or not       
natural by any other means than         
experience1 are1 in truth1 entirely     
futile4 ,the real and only proof of the 
laws of motion1 or of any other law of  
the universe1 is experience2 it is      
simply that no other suppositions       
explain or are consistent with the facts
 of universal nature4  ,geometers have1 
in all ages1 been open to the imputation

 of endeavouring to prove the most      
general facts of the outward world by   
sophistical reasoning1 in order to avoid
 appeals to the senses4 ,archimedes1    
says ,professor ,playfair1#aa           
established some of the elementary      
propositions of statics by a process in 
which he borrows no principle from      
experiment1 but establishes his         
conclusion entirely by reasoning        
priori4 ,he assumes1 indeed1 that equal 
bodies1 at the ends of the equal arms of
 a lever1 will balance one another2 and 
also that a cylinder or parallelopiped  
of homogeneous matter1 will be balanced 
about its centre of magnitude4 ,these1  
however1 are not inferences from        
experience2 they are1 properly speaking1
 conclusions deduced from the principle 
of the ,sufficient ,reason4 ,and to this
 day there are few geometers who would  
not think it far more scientific to     
establish these or any other premises in
 this way1 than to rest their evidence  
on that familiar experience which in the

 case in question might have been so    
safely appealed to4    #f4 ,another     
natural prejudice1 of most extensive    
prevalence1 and which had a great share 
in producing the errors fallen into by  
the ancients in their physical          
inquiries1 was this3 ,that the          
differences in nature must correspond to
 our received distinctions2 that effects
 which we are accustomed1 in popular    
language1 to call by different names1   
and arrange in different classes1 must  
be of different natures1 and have       
different causes4 ,this prejudice1 so   
evidently of the same origin with those 
already treated of1 marks more          
especially the earliest stage of        
science1 when it has not yet broken     
loose from the trammels of every-day    
phraseology4 ,the extraordinary         
prevalence of the fallacy among the     
,greek philosophers may be accounted for
 by their generally knowing no other    
language than their own2 from which it  
was a consequence that their ideas      

followed the accidental or arbitrary    
combinations of that language1 more     
completely than can happen among the    
moderns to any but illiterate persons4  
,they had great difficulty in           
distinguishing between things which     
their language confounded1 or in putting
 mentally together things which it      
distinguished2 and could hardly combine 
the objects in nature1 into any classes 
but those which were made for them by   
the popular phrases of their own        
country3 or at least could not help     
fancying those classes to be natural1   
and all others arbitrary and artificial4
 ,accordingly1 scientific investigation 
among the ,greek schools of speculation 
and their followers in the middle ages1 
was little more than a mere sifting and 
analysing of the notions attached to    
common language4 ,they thought that by  
determining the meaning of words1 they  
could become acquainted with facts4     
,they took for granted1 says ,dr4       
,whewell1#ab that philosophy must result

 from the relations of those notions    
which are involved in the common use of 
language1 and they proceeded to seek it 
by studying such notions4 ,in his next  
chapter1 ,dr4 ,whewell has so well      
illustrated and exemplified this error1 
that ,i shall take the liberty of       
quoting him at some length4  ,the       
propensity to seek for principles in the
 common usages of language may be       
discerned at a very early period4 ,thus 
we have an example of it in a saying    
which is reported of ,thales1 the       
founder of ,greek philosophy4 ,when he  
was asked1 ',what is the greatest       
thing8' he replied ',place2 for all     
other things are in the world1 but the  
world is in it4' ,in ,aristotle we have 
the consummation of this mode of        
speculation4 ,the usual point from which
 he starts in his inquiries is1 that we 
say thus or thus in common language4    
,thus1 when he has to discuss the       
question whether there be1 in any part  
of the universe1 a void1 or space in    

which there is nothing1 he inquires     
first in how many senses we say that one
 thing is in another4 ,he enumerates    
many of these2 we say the part is in the
 whole1 as the finger is in the hand2   
again we say1 the species is in the     
genus1 as man is included in animal2    
again1 the government of ,greece is in  
the king2 and various other senses are  
described and exemplified1 but of all   
these the most proper is when we say a  
thing is in a vessel1 and generally in  
place4 ,he next examines what place is1 
and comes to this conclusion1 that 'if  
about a body there be another body      
including it1 it is in place1 and if    
not1 not4' ,a body moves when it changes
 its place2 but he adds1 that if water  
be in a vessel1 the vessel being at     
rest1 the parts of the water may still  
move1 for they are included by each     
other2 so that while the whole does not 
change its place1 the parts may change  
their place in a circular order4        
,proceeding then to the question of a   

void1 he as usual examines the different
 senses in which the term is used1 and  
adopts as the most proper1 place without
 matter3 with no useful result4  ,again1
 in a question concerning mechanical    
action1 he says1 ',when a man moves a   
stone by pushing it with a stick1 we say
 both that the man moves the stone1 and 
that the stick moves the stone1 but the 
latter more properly4'  ,again1 we find 
the ,greek philosophers applying        
themselves to extract their dogmas from 
the most general and abstract notions   
which they could detect2 for example1   
from the conception of the ,universe as 
,one or as ,many things4 ,they tried to 
determine how far we may1 or must1      
combine with these conceptions that of a
 whole1 of parts1 of number1 of limits1 
of place1 of beginning or end1 of full  
or void1 of rest1 or motion1 of cause   
and effect1 and the like4 ,the analysis 
of such conceptions with such a view1   
occupies1 for instance1 almost the whole
 of ,aristotle's ,treatise on the       

,heavens4  ,the following paragraph     
merits particular attention3--,another  
mode of reasoning1 very widely applied  
in these attempts1 was the doctrine of  
contrarieties1 in which it was assumed1 
that adjectives or substances which are 
in common language1 or in some abstract 
mode of conception1 opposed to each     
other1 must point at some fundamental   
antithesis in nature1 which it is       
important to study4 ,thus ,aristotle    
says that the ,pythagoreans1 from the   
contrasts which number suggests1        
collected ten principles--,limited and  
,unlimited1 ,odd and ,even1 ,one and    
,many1 ,right and ,left1 ,male and      
,female1 ,rest and ,motion1 ,straight   
and ,curved1 ,light and ,darkness1 ,good
 and ,evil1 ,square and ,oblong4444     
,aristotle himself deduced the doctrine 
of four elements and other dogmas by    
oppositions of the same kind4  ,of the  
manner in which1 from premises obtained 
in this way1 the ancients attempted to  
deduce laws of nature1 an example is    

given in the same work a few pages      
further on4 ,aristotle decides that     
there is no void1 on such arguments as  
this4 ,in a void there could be no      
difference of up and down2 for as in    
nothing there are no differences1 so    
there are none in a privation or        
negation2 but a void is merely a        
privation or negation of matter2        
therefore1 in a void1 bodies could not  
move up and down1 which it is in their  
nature to do4 ,it is easily seen 7,dr4  
,whewell very justly adds7 that such a  
mode of reasoning elevates the familiar 
forms of language1 and the intellectual 
connexions of terms1 to a supremacy over
 facts2 making truth depend upon whether
 terms are or are not privative1 and    
whether we say that bodies fall         
naturally4  ,the propensity to assume   
that the same relations obtain between  
objects themselves1 which obtain between
 our ideas of them1 is here seen in the 
extreme stage of its development4 ,for  
the mode of philosophizing1 exemplified 

in the foregoing instances1 assumes no  
less than that the proper way of        
arriving at knowledge of nature1 is to  
study nature itself subjectively2 to    
apply our observation and analysis not  
to the facts1 but to the common notions 
entertained of the facts4  ,many other  
equally striking examples may be given  
of the tendency to assume that things   
which for the convenience of common life
 are placed in different classes1 must  
differ in every respect4 ,of this nature
 was the universal and deeply-rooted    
prejudice of antiquity and the middle   
ages1 that celestial and terrestrial    
phenomena must be essentially different1
 and could in no manner or degree depend
 on the same laws4 ,of the same kind1   
also1 was the prejudice against which   
,bacon contended1 that nothing produced 
by nature could be successfully imitated
 by man3 ,calorem solis et ignis toto   
genere differre2 ne scilicet homines    
putent se per opera ignis1 aliquid      
simile iis qu in ,natura fiunt1 educere 

et formare posse3 and again1            
,compositionem tantum opus ,hominis1    
,mistionem vero opus solius ,natur esse3
 ne scilicet homines sperent aliquam ex 
arte ,corporum naturalium generationem  
aut transformationem4#ac ,the grand     
distinction in the ancient scientific   
speculations1 between natural and       
violent motions1 though not without a   
plausible foundation in the appearances 
themselves1 was doubtless greatly       
recommended to adoption by its          
conformity to this prejudice4    #g4    
,from the fundamental error of the      
scientific inquirers of antiquity1 we   
pass1 by a natural association1 to a    
scarcely less fundamental one of their  
great rival and successor1 ,bacon4 ,it  
has excited the surprise of philosophers
 that the detailed system of inductive  
logic1 which this extraordinary man     
laboured to construct1 has been turned  
to so little direct use by subsequent   
inquirers1 having neither continued1    
except in a few of its generalities1 to 

be recognised as a theory1 nor having   
conducted in practice to any great      
scientific results4 ,but this1 though   
not unfrequently remarked1 has scarcely 
received any plausible explanation2 and 
some1 indeed1 have preferred to assert  
that all rules of induction are useless1
 rather than suppose that ,bacon's rules
 are grounded on an insufficient        
analysis of the inductive process4      
,such1 however1 will be seen to be the  
fact1 as soon as it is considered1 that 
,bacon entirely overlooked ,plurality of
 ,causes4 ,all his rules tacitly imply  
the assumption1 so contrary to all we   
now know of nature1 that a phenomenon   
cannot have more than one cause4  ,when 
he is inquiring into what he terms the  
forma calidi aut frigidi1 gravis aut    
levis1 sicci aut humidi1 and the like1  
he never for an instant doubts that     
there is some one thing1 some invariable
 condition or set of conditions1 which  
is present in all cases of heat1 or     
cold1 or whatever other phenomenon he is

 considering2 the only difficulty being 
to find what it is2 which accordingly he
 tries to do by a process of            
elimination1 rejecting or excluding1 by 
negative instances1 whatever is not the 
forma or cause1 in order to arrive at   
what is4 ,but1 that this forma or cause 
is one thing1 and that it is the same in
 all hot objects1 he has no more doubt  
of1 than another person has that there  
is always some cause or other4 ,in the  
present state of knowledge it could not 
be necessary1 even if we had not already
 treated so fully of the question1 to   
point out how widely this supposition is
 at variance with the truth4 ,it is     
particularly unfortunate for ,bacon     
that1 falling into this error1 he should
 have fixed almost exclusively upon a   
class of inquiries in which it was      
especially fatal2 namely1 inquiries into
 the causes of the sensible qualities of
 objects4 ,for his assumption1          
groundless in every case1 is false in a 
peculiar degree with respect to those   

sensible qualities4 ,in regard to       
scarcely any of them has it been found  
possible to trace any unity of cause1   
any set of conditions invariably        
accompanying the quality4 ,the          
conjunctions of such qualities with one 
another constitute the variety of       
,kinds1 in which1 as already remarked1  
it has not been found possible to trace 
any law4 ,bacon was seeking for what did
 not exist4 ,the phenomenon of which he 
sought for the one cause has oftenest no
 cause at all1 and when it has1 depends 
7as far as hitherto ascertained7 on an  
unassignable variety of distinct causes4
  ,and on this rock every one must      
split1 who represents to himself as the 
first and fundamental problem of science
 to ascertain what is the cause of a    
given effect1 rather than what are the  
effects of a given cause4 ,it was shown1
 in an early stage of our inquiry into  
the nature of ,induction1#ad how much   
more ample are the resources which      
science commands for the latter than for

 the former inquiry1 since it is upon   
the latter only that we can throw any   
direct light by means of experiment2 the
 power of artificially producing an     
effect1 implying a previous knowledge of
 at least one of its causes4 ,if we     
discover the causes of effects1 it is   
generally by having previously          
discovered the effects of causes3 the   
greatest skill in devising crucial      
instances for the former purpose may    
only end1 as ,bacon's physical inquiries
 did1 in no result at all4 ,was it that 
his eagerness to acquire the power of   
producing for man's benefit effects of  
practical importance to human life1     
rendering him impatient of pursuing that
 end by a circuitous route1 made even   
him1 the champion of experiment1 prefer 
the direct mode1 though one of mere     
observation1 to the indirect1 in which  
alone experiment was possible8 ,or had  
even ,bacon not entirely cleared his    
mind from the notion of the ancients1   
that rerum cognoscere causas was the    

sole object of philosophy1 and that to  
inquire into the effects of things      
belonged to servile and mechanical arts8
  ,it is worth remarking that1 while the
 only efficient mode of cultivating     
speculative science was missed from an  
undue contempt of manual operations1 the
 false speculative views thus engendered
 gave in their turn a false direction to
 such practical and mechanical aims as  
were suffered to exist4 ,the assumption 
universal among the ancients and in the 
middle ages1 that there were principles 
of heat and cold1 dryness and moisture1 
c41 led directly to a belief in alchemy2
 in a transmutation of substances1 a    
change from one ,kind into another4 ,why
 should it not be possible to make gold8
 ,each of the characteristic properties 
of gold has its forma1 its essence1 its 
set of conditions1 which if we could    
discover1 and learn how to realize1 we  
could superinduce that particular       
property upon any other substance1 upon 
wood1 or iron1 or lime1 or clay4 ,if1   

then1 we could effect this with respect 
to every one of the essential properties
 of the precious metal1 we should have  
converted the other substance into gold4
 ,nor did this1 if once the premises    
were granted1 appear to transcend the   
real powers of mankind4 ,for daily      
experience showed that almost every one 
of the distinctive sensible properties  
of any object1 its consistence1 its     
colour1 its taste1 its smell1 its shape1
 admitted of being totally changed by   
fire1 or water1 or some other chemical  
agent4 ,the form of all those qualities 
seeming1 therefore1 to be within human  
power either to produce or to           
annihilate1 not only did the            
transmutation of substances appear      
abstractedly possible1 but the          
employment of the power1 at our choice1 
for practical ends1 seemed by no means  
hopeless4#ae  ,a prejudice1 universal in
 the ancient world1 and from which      
,bacon was so far from being free1 that 
it pervaded and vitiated the whole      

practical part of his system of logic1  
may with good reason be ranked high in  
the order of ,fallacies of which we are 
now treating4    #h4 ,there remains one 
priori fallacy or natural prejudice1 the
 most deeply-rooted1 perhaps1 of all    
which we have enumerated3 one which not 
only reigned supreme in the ancient     
world1 but still possesses almost       
undisputed dominion over many of the    
most cultivated minds2 and some of the  
most remarkable of the numerous         
instances by which ,i shall think it    
necessary to exemplify it1 will be taken
 from recent thinkers4 ,this is1 that   
the conditions of a phenomenon must1 or 
at least probably will1 resemble the    
phenomenon itself4  ,conformably to what
 we have before remarked to be of       
frequent occurrence1 this fallacy might 
without much impropriety have been      
placed in a different class1 among      
,fallacies of ,generalization3 for      
experience does afford a certain degree 
of countenance to the assumption4 ,the  

cause does1 in very many cases1 resemble
 its effect2 like produces like4 ,many  
phenomena have a direct tendency to     
perpetuate their own existence1 or to   
give rise to other phenomena similar to 
themselves4 ,not to mention forms       
actually moulded on one another1 as     
impressions on wax and the like1 in     
which the closest resemblance between   
the effect and its cause is the very law
 of the phenomenon2 all motion tends to 
continue itself1 with its own velocity1 
and in its own original direction2 and  
the motion of one body tends to set     
others in motion1 which is indeed the   
most common of the modes in which the   
motions of bodies originate4 ,we need   
scarcely refer to contagion1            
fermentation1 and the like2 or to the   
production of effects by the growth or  
expansion of a germ or rudiment         
resembling on a smaller scale the       
completed phenomenon1 as in the growth  
of a plant or animal from an embryo1    
that embryo itself deriving its origin  

from another plant or animal of the same
 kind4 ,again1 the thoughts1 or         
reminiscences1 which are effects of our 
past sensations1 resemble those         
sensations2 feelings produce similar    
feelings by way of sympathy2 acts       
produce similar acts by involuntary or  
voluntary imitation4 ,with so many      
appearances in its favour1 no wonder if 
a presumption naturally grew up1 that   
causes must necessarily resemble their  
effects1 and that like could only be    
produced by like4  ,this principle of   
fallacy has usually presided over the   
fantastical attempts to influence the   
course of nature by conjectural means1  
the choice of which was not directed by 
previous observation and experiment4    
,the guess almost always fixed upon some
 means which possessed features of real 
or apparent resemblance to the end in   
view4 ,if a charm was wanted1 as by     
,ovid's ,medea1 to prolong life1 all    
long-lived animals1 or what were        
esteemed such1 were collected and brewed

 into a broth3--               444 nec  
defuit illic      ,squamea ,cinyphii    
tenuis membrana chelydri                
,vivacisque jecur cervi3 quibus insuper 
addit      ,ora caputque novem cornicis 
scula pass4  ,a similar notion was      
embodied in the celebrated medical      
theory called the ,doctrine of          
,signatures1 which is no less1 says ,dr4
 ,paris1#af than a belief that every    
natural substance which possesses any   
medicinal virtue indicates by an obvious
 and well-marked external character the 
disease for which it is a remedy1 or the
 object for which it should be employed4
 ,this outward character was generally  
some feature of resemblance1 real or    
fantastical1 either to the effect it was
 supposed to produce1 or to the         
phenomenon over which its power was     
thought to be exercised4 ,thus the lungs
 of a fox must be a specific for asthma1
 because that animal is remarkable for  
its strong powers of respiration4       
,turmeric has a brilliant yellow colour1

 which indicates that it has the power  
of curing the jaundice2 for the same    
reason1 poppies must relieve diseases of
 the head2 ,agaricus those of the       
bladder2 ,cassia fistula the affections 
of the intestines1 and ,aristolochia the
 disorders of the uterus3 the polished  
surface and stony hardness which so     
eminently characterize the seeds of the 
,lithospermum officinale 7common        
gromwell7 were deemed a certain         
indication of their efficacy in         
calculous and gravelly disorders2 for a 
similar reason1 the roots of the        
,saxifraga granulata 7white saxifrage7  
gained reputation in the cure of the    
same disease2 and the ,euphrasia        
7eye-bright7 acquired fame1 as an       
application in complaints of the eye1   
because it exhibits a black spot in its 
corolla resembling the pupil4 ,the      
blood-stone1 the ,heliotropium of the   
ancients1 from the occasional small     
specks or points of a blood-red colour  
exhibited on its green surface1 is even 

at this very day employed in many parts 
of ,england and ,scotland1 to stop a    
bleeding from the nose2 and nettle tea  
continues a popular remedy for the cure 
of ,urticaria4 ,it is also asserted that
 some substances bear the signatures of 
the humours1 as the petals of the red   
rose that of the blood1 and the roots of
 rhubarb and the flowers of saffron that
 of the bile4  ,the early speculations  
respecting the chemical composition of  
bodies were rendered abortive by no     
circumstance more1 than by their        
invariably taking for granted that the  
properties of the elements must resemble
 those of the compounds which were      
formed from them4  ,to descend to more  
modern instances2 it was long thought1  
and was stoutly maintained by the       
,cartesians and even by ,leibnitz       
against the ,newtonian system1 7nor did 
,newton himself1 as we have seen1       
contest the assumption1 but eluded it by
 an arbitrary hypothesis71 that nothing 
7of a physical nature at least7 could   

account for motion1 except previous     
motion2 the impulse or impact of some   
other body4 ,it was very long before the
 scientific world could prevail upon    
itself to admit attraction and repulsion
 7i4 e4 spontaneous tendencies of       
particles to approach or recede from one
 another7 as ultimate laws1 no more     
requiring to be accounted for than      
impulse itself1 if indeed the latter    
were not1 in truth1 resolvable into the 
former4 ,from the same source arose the 
innumerable hypotheses devised to       
explain those classes of motions which  
appeared more mysterious than others    
because there was no obvious mode of    
attributing them to impulse1 as for     
example the voluntary motions of the    
human body4 ,such were the interminable 
systems of vibrations propagated along  
the nerves1 or animal spirits rushing up
 and down between the muscles and the   
brain2 which1 if the facts could have   
been proved1 would have been an         
important addition to our knowledge of  

physiological laws2 but the mere        
invention1 or arbitrary supposition of  
them1 could not unless by the strongest 
delusion be supposed to render the      
phenomena of animal life more           
comprehensible1 or less mysterious4     
,nothing1 however1 seemed satisfactory1 
but to make out that motion was caused  
by motion2 by something like itself4 ,if
 it was not one kind of motion1 it must 
be another4 ,in like manner it was      
supposed that the physical qualities of 
objects must arise from some similar    
quality1 or perhaps only some quality   
bearing the same name1 in the particles 
or atoms of which the objects were      
composed2 that a sharp taste1 for       
example1 must arise from sharp          
particles4 ,and reversing the inference1
 the effects produced by a phenomenon   
must1 it was supposed1 resemble in their
 physical attributes the phenomenon     
itself4 ,the influences of the planets  
were supposed to be analogous to their  
visible peculiarities3 ,mars1 being of a

 red colour1 portended fire and         
slaughter2 and the like4  ,passing from 
physics to metaphysics1 we may notice   
among the most remarkable fruits of this
  priori fallacy1 two closely analogous 
theories1 employed in ancient and modern
 times to bridge over the chasm between 
the world of mind and that of matter3   
the species sensibiles of the           
,epicureans1 and the modern doctrine of 
perception by means of ideas4 ,these    
theories are indeed1 probably1 indebted 
for their existence not solely to the   
fallacy in question1 but to that fallacy
 combined with another natural prejudice
 already adverted to1 that a thing      
cannot act where it is not4 ,in both    
doctrines it is assumed that the        
phenomenon which takes place in us when 
we see or touch an object1 and which we 
regard as an effect of that object1 or  
rather as its presence to our organs1   
must of necessity resemble very closely 
the outward object itself4 ,to fulfil   
this condition1 the ,epicureans supposed

 that objects were constantly projecting
 in all directions impalpable images of 
themselves1 which entered at the eyes   
and penetrated to the mind2 while modern
 metaphysicians1 though they rejected   
this hypothesis1 agreed in deeming it   
necessary to suppose that not the thing 
itself1 but a mental image or           
representation of it1 was the direct    
object of perception4 ,dr4 ,reid had to 
employ a world of argument and          
illustration to familiarize people with 
the truth1 that the sensations or       
impressions on our minds need not       
necessarily be copies of1 or bear any   
resemblance to1 the causes which produce
 them2 in opposition to the natural     
prejudice which led people to assimilate
 the action of bodies upon our senses1  
and through them upon our minds1 to the 
transfer of a given form from one object
 to another by actual moulding4 ,the    
works of ,dr4 ,reid are even now the    
most effectual course of study for      
detaching the mind from the prejudice of

 which this was an example4 ,and the    
value of the service which he thus      
rendered to popular philosophy1 is not  
much diminished although we may hold1   
with ,brown1 that he went too far in    
imputing the ideal theory as an actual  
tenet1 to the generality of the         
philosophers who preceded him1 and      
especially to ,locke and ,hume3 for if  
they did not themselves consciously fall
 into the error1 unquestionably they    
often led their readers into it4  ,the  
prejudice1 that the conditions of a     
phenomenon must resemble the phenomenon1
 is occasionally exaggerated1 at least  
verbally1 into a still more palpable    
absurdity2 the conditions of the thing  
are spoken of as if they were the very  
thing itself4 ,in ,bacon's              
model-inquiry1 which occupies so great a
 space in the ,novum ,organum1 the      
inquisitio in formam calidi1 the        
conclusion which he favours is that heat
 is a kind of motion2 meaning of course 
not the feeling of heat1 but the        

conditions of the feeling2 meaning1     
therefore1 only that wherever there is  
heat1 there must first be a particular  
kind of motion2 but he makes no         
distinction in his language between     
these two ideas1 expressing himself as  
if heat1 and the conditions of heat1    
were one and the same thing4 ,so        
,darwin1 in the beginning of his        
,zoonomia1 says1 ,the word idea has     
various meanings in the writers of      
metaphysic3 it is here used simply for  
those notions of external things which  
our organs of sense bring us acquainted 
with originally1 7thus far the          
proposition1 though vague1 is           
unexceptionable in meaning17 and is     
defined a contraction1 a motion1 or     
configuration1 of the fibres which      
constitute the immediate organ of sense4
 ,our notions1 a configuration of the   
fibres6 ,what kind of logician must he  
be who thinks that a phenomenon is      
defined to be the condition on which he 
supposes it to depend8 ,accordingly he  

says soon after1 not that our ideas are 
caused by1 or consequent on1 certain    
organic phenomena1 but our ideas are    
animal motions of the organs of sense4  
,and this confusion runs through the    
four volumes of the ,zoonomia2 the      
reader never knows whether the writer is
 speaking of the effect1 or of its      
supposed cause2 of the idea1 a state of 
mental consciousness1 or of the state of
 the nerves and brain which he considers
 it to presuppose4  ,i have given a     
variety of instances in which the       
natural prejudice1 that causes and their
 effects must resemble one another1 has 
operated in practice so as to give rise 
to serious errors4 ,i shall now go      
further1 and produce from writings even 
of the present or very recent times1    
instances in which this prejudice is    
laid down as an established principle4  
,m4 ,victor ,cousin1 in the last of his 
celebrated lectures on ,locke1          
enunciates the maxim in the following   
unqualified terms4 ,tout ce qui est vrai

 de l'effet est vrai de la cause4 ,a    
doctrine to which1 unless in some       
peculiar and technical meaning of the   
words cause and effect1 it is not to be 
imagined that any person would literally
 adhere3 but he who could so write must 
be far enough from seeing1 that the very
 reverse might be the fact2 that there  
is nothing impossible in the supposition
 that no one property which is true of  
the effect might be true of the cause4  
,without going quite so far in point of 
expression1 ,coleridge1 in his          
,biographia ,literaria1#ag affirms as an
 evident truth1 that the law of         
causality holds only between homogeneous
 things1 i4 e4 things having some common
 property1 and therefore cannot extend  
from one world into another1 its        
opposite3 hence1 as mind and matter have
 no common property1 mind cannot act    
upon matter1 nor matter upon mind4 ,what
 is this but the  priori fallacy of     
which we are speaking8 ,the doctrine1   
like many others of ,coleridge1 is taken

 from ,spinoza1 in the first book of    
whose ,ethica 7,de ,deo7 it stands as   
the ,third ,proposition1 ,qu res nihil  
commune inter se habent1 earum una      
alterius causa esse non potest1 and is  
there proved from two so-called axioms1 
equally gratuitous with itself3 but     
,spinoza1 ever systematically           
consistent1 pursued the doctrine to its 
inevitable consequence1 the materiality 
of ,god4  ,the same conception of       
impossibility led the ingenious and     
subtle mind of ,leibnitz to his         
celebrated doctrine of a pre-established
 harmony4 ,he1 too1 thought that mind   
could not act upon matter1 nor matter   
upon mind1 and that the two1 therefore1 
must have been arranged by their ,maker 
like two clocks1 which1 though          
unconnected with one another1 strike    
simultaneously1 and always point to the 
same hour4 ,malebranche's equally famous
 theory of ,occasional ,causes was      
another form of the same conception3    
instead of supposing the clocks         

originally arranged to strike together1 
he held that when the one strikes1 ,god 
interposes1 and makes the other strike  
in correspondence with it4  ,descartes1 
in like manner1 whose works are a rich  
mine of almost every description of     
priori fallacy1 says that the ,efficient
 ,cause must at least have all the      
perfections of the effect1 and for this 
singular reason3 ,si enim ponamus       
aliquid in ide reperiri quod non fuerit 
in ejus caus1 hoc igitur habet a nihilo2
 of which it is scarcely a parody to    
say1 that if there be pepper in the soup
 there must be pepper in the cook who   
made it1 since otherwise the pepper     
would be without a cause4 ,a similar    
fallacy is committed by ,cicero in his  
second book ,de ,finibus1 where1        
speaking in his own person against the  
,epicureans1 he charges them with       
inconsistency in saying that the        
pleasures of the mind had their origin  
from those of the body1 and yet that the
 former were more valuable1 as if the   

effect could surpass the cause4 ,animi  
voluptas oritur propter voluptatem      
corporis1 et major est animi voluptas   
quam corporis8 ita fit ut gratulator    
ltior sit quam is cui gratulatur4 ,even 
that1 surely1 is not an impossibility3 a
 person's good fortune has often given  
more pleasure to others than it gave to 
the person himself4  ,descartes1 with no
 less readiness1 applies the same       
principle the converse way1 and infers  
the nature of the effects from the      
assumption that they must1 in this or   
that property or in all their           
properties1 resemble their cause4 ,to   
this class belong his speculations1 and 
those of so many others after him1      
tending to infer the order of the       
universe1 not from observation1 but by  
priori reasoning from supposed qualities
 of the ,godhead4 ,this sort of         
inference was probably never carried to 
a greater length than it was in one     
particular instance by ,descartes1 when1
 as a proof of one of his physical      

principles1 that the quantity of motion 
in the universe is invariable1 he had   
recourse to the immutability of the     
,divine ,nature4 ,reasoning of a very   
similar character is however nearly as  
common now as it was in his time1 and   
does duty largely as a means of fencing 
off disagreeable conclusions4 ,writers  
have not yet ceased to oppose the theory
 of divine benevolence to the evidence  
of physical facts1 to the principle of  
population for example4 ,and people seem
 in general to think that they have used
 a very powerful argument1 when they    
have said1 that to suppose some         
proposition true1 would be a reflection 
on the goodness or wisdom of the ,deity4
 ,put into the simplest possible terms1 
their argument is1 ,if it had depended  
on me1 ,i would not have made the       
proposition true1 therefore it is not   
true4 ,put into other words it stands   
thus3 ,god is perfect1 therefore 7what  
,i think7 perfection must obtain in     
nature4 ,but since in reality every one 

feels that nature is very far from      
perfect1 the doctrine is never applied  
consistently4 ,it furnishes an argument 
which 7like many others of a similar    
character7 people like to appeal to when
 it makes for their own side4 ,nobody is
 convinced by it1 but each appears to   
think that it puts religion on his side 
of the question1 and that it is a useful
 weapon of offence for wounding an      
adversary4  ,although several other     
varieties of  priori fallacy might      
probably be added to those here         
specified1 these are all against which  
it seems necessary to give any special  
caution4 ,our object is to open1 without
 attempting or affecting to exhaust1 the
 subject4 ,having illustrated1          
therefore1 this first class of          
,fallacies at sufficient length1 ,i     
shall proceed to the second4            
,,chapter ,,iv4  ,,fallacies ,,of       
,,observation4    #a4 ,from the         
fallacies which are properly            
,prejudices1 or presumptions antecedent 

to1 and superseding1 proof1 we pass to  
those which lie in the incorrect        
performance of the proving process4 ,and
 as ,proof1 in its widest extent1       
embraces one or more1 or all1 of three  
processes1 ,observation1                
,generalization1 and ,deduction2 we     
shall consider in their order the errors
 capable of being committed in these    
three operations4 ,and first1 of the    
first mentioned4  ,a fallacy of         
misobservation may be either negative or
 positive2 either ,non-observation or   
,mal-observation4 ,it is                
non-observation1 when all the error     
consists in overlooking1 or neglecting1 
facts or particulars which ought to have
 been observed4 ,it is mal-observation1 
when something is not simply unseen1 but
 seen wrong2 when the fact or           
phenomenon1 instead of being recognised 
for what it is in reality1 is mistaken  
for something else4    #b4              
,non-observation may either take place  
by overlooking instances1 or by         

overlooking some of the circumstances of
 a given instance4 ,if we were to       
conclude that a fortune-teller was a    
true prophet1 from not adverting to the 
cases in which his predictions had been 
falsified by the event1 this would be   
non-observation of instances2 but if we 
overlooked or remained ignorant of the  
fact that in cases where the predictions
 had been fulfilled1 he had been in     
collusion with some one who had given   
him the information on which they were  
grounded1 this would be non-observation 
of circumstances4  ,the former case1 in 
so far as the act of induction from     
insufficient evidence is concerned1 does
 not fall under this second class of    
,fallacies1 but under the third1        
,fallacies of ,generalization4 ,in every
 such case1 however1 there are two      
defects or errors instead of one3 there 
is the error of treating the            
insufficient evidence as if it were     
sufficient1 which is a ,fallacy of the  
third class2 and there is the           

insufficiency itself2 the not having    
better evidence2 which1 when such       
evidence1 or in other words1 when other 
instances1 were to be had1 is           
,non-observation3 and the erroneous     
inference1 so far as it is to be        
attributed to this cause1 is a ,fallacy 
of the second class4  ,it belongs not to
 our purpose to treat of non-observation
 as arising from casual inattention1    
from general slovenliness of mental     
habits1 want of due practice in the use 
of the observing faculties1 or          
insufficient interest in the subject4   
,the question pertinent to logic        
is--,granting the want of complete      
competency in the observer1 on what     
points is that insufficiency on his part
 likely to lead him wrong8 or rather1   
what sorts of instances1 or of          
circumstances in any given instance1 are
 most likely to escape the notice of    
observers generally2 of mankind at      
large4    #c4 ,first1 then1 it is       
evident that when the instances on one  

side of a question are more likely to be
 remembered and recorded than those on  
the other2 especially if there be any   
strong motive to preserve the memory of 
the first1 but not of the latter2 these 
last are likely to be overlooked1 and   
escape the observation of the mass of   
mankind4 ,this is the recognised        
explanation of the credit given1 in     
spite of reason and evidence1 to many   
classes of impostors3 to quack doctors1 
and fortune-tellers in all ages2 to the 
cunning man of modern times and the     
oracles of old4 ,few have considered the
 extent to which this fallacy operates  
in practice1 even in the teeth of the   
most palpable negative evidence4 ,a     
striking example of it is the faith     
which the uneducated portion of the     
agricultural classes1 in this and other 
countries1 continue to repose in the    
prophecies as to weather supplied by    
almanac makers3 though every season     
affords to them numerous cases of       
completely erroneous prediction2 but as 

every season also furnishes some cases  
in which the prediction is fulfilled1   
this is enough to keep up the credit of 
the prophet1 with people who do not     
reflect on the number of instances      
requisite for what we have called1 in   
our inductive terminology1 the          
,elimination of ,chance2 since a certain
 number of casual coincidences not only 
may but will happen1 between any two    
unconnected events4  ,coleridge1 in one 
of the essays in the ,friend1 has       
illustrated the matter we are now       
considering1 in discussing the origin of
 a proverb1 which1 differently worded1  
is to be found in all the languages of  
,europe1 viz4 ,fortune favours fools4   
,he ascribes it partly to the tendency  
to exaggerate all effects that seem     
disproportionate to their visible cause1
 and all circumstances that are in any  
way strongly contrasted with our notions
 of the persons under them4 ,omitting   
some explanations which would refer the 
error to mal-observation1 or to the     

other species of non-observation 7that  
of circumstances71 ,i take up the       
quotation farther on4 ,unforeseen       
coincidences may have greatly helped a  
man1 yet if they have done for him only 
what possibly from his own abilities he 
might have effected for himself1 his    
good luck will excite less attention1   
and the instances be less remembered4   
,that clever men should attain their    
objects seems natural1 and we neglect   
the circumstances that perhaps produced 
that success of themselves1 without the 
intervention of skill or foresight2 but 
we dwell on the fact and remember it1 as
 something strange1 when the same       
happens to a weak or ignorant man4 ,so  
too1 though the latter should fail in   
his undertakings from concurrences that 
might have happened to the wisest man1  
yet his failure being no more than might
 have been expected and accounted for   
from his folly1 it lays no hold on our  
attention1 but fleets away among the    
other undistinguished waves in which the

 stream of ordinary life murmurs by us1 
and is forgotten4 ,had it been as true  
as it was notoriously false1 that those 
all-embracing discoveries1 which have   
shed a dawn of science on the art of    
chemistry1 and give no obscure promise  
of some one great constitutive law1 in  
the light of which dwell dominion and   
the power of prophecy2 if these         
discoveries1 instead of having been1 as 
they really were1 preconcerted by       
meditation1 and evolved out of his own  
intellect1 had occurred by a set of     
lucky accidents to the illustrious      
father and founder of philosophic       
alchemy2 if they had presented          
themselves to ,professor ,davy          
exclusively in consequence of his luck  
in possessing a particular galvanic     
battery2 if this battery1 as far as     
,davy was concerned1 had itself been an 
accident1 and not 7as in point of fact  
it was7 desired and obtained by him for 
the purpose of ensuring the testimony of
 experience to his principles1 and in   

order to bind down material nature under
 the inquisition of reason1 and force   
from her1 as by torture1 unequivocal    
answers to prepared and preconceived    
questions1--yet still they would not    
have been talked of or described as     
instances of luck1 but as the natural   
results of his admitted genius and known
 skill4 ,but should an accident have    
disclosed similar discoveries to a      
mechanic at ,birmingham or ,sheffield1  
and if the man should grow rich in      
consequence1 and partly by the envy of  
his neighbours and partly with good     
reason1 be considered by them as a man  
below par in the general powers of his  
understanding2 then1 ',o what a lucky   
fellow6 ,well1 ,fortune does favour     
fools--that's for certain6--,it is      
always so6' ,and forthwith the exclaimer
 relates half a dozen similar instances4
 ,thus accumulating the one sort of     
facts and never collecting the other1 we
 do1 as poets in their diction1 and     
quacks of all denominations do in their 

reasoning1 put a part for the whole4    
,this passage very happily sets forth   
the manner in which1 under the loose    
mode of induction which proceeds per    
enumerati onem simplicem1 not seeking   
for instances of such a kind as to be   
decisive of the question1 but           
generalizing from any which occur1 or   
rather which are remembered1 opinions   
grow up with the apparent sanction of   
experience1 which have no foundation in 
the laws of nature at all4 ,itaque recte
 respondit ille1 7we may say with       
,bacon1#ah7 qui cum suspensa tabula in  
templo ei monstraretur eorum1 qui vota  
solverant1 quod naufragii periculo      
elapsi sint1 atque interrogando         
premeretur1 anne tum quidem ,deorum     
numen agnosceret1 qusivit denuo1 ,at ubi
 sunt illi depicti qui post vota        
nuncupata perierunt8 ,eadem ratio est   
fere omnis superstitionis1 ut in        
,astrologicis1 in ,somniis1 ,ominibus1  
,nemesibus1 et hujusmodi2 in quibus1    
homines delectati hujusmodi vanitatibus1

 advertunt eventus1 ubi implentur2 ast  
ubi fallunt1 licet multo frequentius1   
tamen negligunt1 et prtereunt4 ,and he  
proceeds to say1 that independently of  
the love of the marvellous1 or any other
 bias in the inclinations1 there is a   
natural tendency in the intellect itself
 to this kind of fallacy2 since the mind
 is more moved by affirmative instances1
 though negative ones are of most use in
 philosophy2 ,is tamen humano           
intellectui error est proprius et       
perpetuus1 ut magis moveatur et         
excitetur ,affirmativis quam ,negativis2
 cum rite et ordine quum se utrique     
prbere debeat2 quin contra1 in omni     
,axiomate vero constituendo1 major vis  
est instanti negativ4  ,but the greatest
 of all causes of non-observation is a  
preconceived opinion4 ,this it is which1
 in all ages1 has made the whole race of
 mankind1 and every separate section of 
it1 for the most part unobservant of all
 facts1 however abundant1 even when     
passing under their own eyes1 which are 

contradictory to any first appearance1  
or any received tenet4 ,it is worth     
while to recal occasionally to the      
oblivious memory of mankind some of the 
striking instances in which opinions    
that the simplest experiment would have 
shown to be erroneous1 continued to be  
entertained because nobody ever thought 
of trying that experiment4 ,one of the  
most remarkable of these was exhibited  
in the ,copernican controversy4 ,the    
opponents of ,copernicus argued that the
 earth did not move1 because if it did1 
a stone let fall from the top of a high 
tower would not reach the ground at the 
foot of the tower1 but at a little      
distance from it1 in a contrary         
direction to the earth's course2 in the 
same manner 7said they7 as1 if a ball is
 let drop from the mast-head while the  
ship is in full sail1 it does not fall  
exactly at the foot of the mast1 but    
nearer to the stern of the vessel4 ,the 
,copernicans would have silenced these  
objectors at once if they had tried     

dropping a ball from the mast-head1     
since they would have found that it does
 fall exactly at the foot1 as the theory
 requires3 but no2 they admitted the    
spurious fact1 and struggled vainly to  
make out a difference between the two   
cases4 ,the ball was no part of the     
ship--and the motion forward was not    
natural1 either to the ship or to the   
ball4 ,the stone1 on the other hand1 let
 fall from the top of the tower1 was a  
part of the earth2 and therefore1 the   
diurnal and annular revolutions which   
were natural to the earth1 were also    
natural to the stone3 the stone would1  
therefore1 retain the same motion with  
the tower1 and strike the ground        
precisely at the bottom of it4#ai       
,other examples1 scarcely less striking1
 are recorded by ,dr4 ,whewell1#bj where
 imaginary laws of nature have continued
 to be received as real1 merely because 
no person had steadily looked at facts  
which almost every one had the          
opportunity of observing4 ,a vague and  

loose mode of looking at facts very     
easily observable1 left men for a long  
time under the belief that a body ten   
times as heavy as another falls ten     
times as fast2 that objects immersed in 
water are always magnified1 without     
regard to the form of the surface2 that 
the magnet exerts an irresistible force2
 that crystal is always found associated
 with ice2 and the like4 ,these and many
 others are examples how blind and      
careless man can be even in observation 
of the plainest and commonest           
appearances2 and they show us that the  
mere faculties of perception1 although  
constantly exercised upon innumerable   
objects1 may long fail in leading to any
 exact knowledge4  ,if even on physical 
facts1 and these of the most obvious    
character1 the observing faculties of   
mankind can be to this degree the       
passive slaves of their preconceived    
impressions1 we need not be surprised   
that this should be so lamentably true  
as all experience attests it to be1 on  

things more nearly connected with their 
stronger feelings--on moral1 social1 and
 religious subjects4 ,the information   
which an ordinary traveller brings back 
from a foreign country1 as the result of
 the evidence of his senses1 is almost  
always such as exactly confirms the     
opinions with which he set out4 ,he has 
had eyes and ears for such things only  
as he expected to see4 ,men read the    
sacred books of their religion1 and pass
 unobserved therein1 multitudes of      
things utterly irreconcileable with even
 their own notions of moral excellence4 
,with the same authorities before them1 
different historians1 alike innocent of 
intentional misrepresentation1 see only 
what is favourable to ,protestants or   
,catholics1 royalists or republicans1   
,charles ,i4 or ,cromwell2 while others1
 having set out with the preconception  
that extremes must be in the wrong1 are 
incapable of seeing truth and justice   
when these are wholly on one side4  ,the
 influence of a preconceived theory is  

well exemplified in the superstitions of
 barbarians respecting the virtues of   
medicaments and charms4 ,the negroes1   
among whom coral1 as of old among       
ourselves1 is worn as an amulet1 affirm1
 according to ,dr4 ,paris1#ba that its  
colour is always affected by the state  
of health of the wearer1 it becoming    
paler in disease4 ,on a matter open to  
universal observation1 a general        
proposition which has not the smallest  
vestige of truth is received as a result
 of experience2 the preconceived opinion
 preventing1 it would seem1 any         
observation whatever on the subject4    
#d4 ,for illustration of the first      
species of non-observation1 that of     
,instances1 what has now been stated may
 suffice4 ,but there may also be        
non-observation of some material        
circumstances1 in instances which have  
not been altogether overlooked--nay1    
which may be the very instances on which
 the whole superstructure of a theory   
has been founded4 ,as1 in the cases     

hitherto examined1 a general proposition
 was too rashly adopted1 on the evidence
 of particulars1 true indeed1 but       
insufficient to support it2 so in the   
cases to which we now turn1 the         
particulars themselves have been        
imperfectly observed1 and the singular  
propositions on which the generalization
 is grounded1 or some at least of those 
singular propositions1 are false4       
,such1 for instance1 was one of the     
mistakes committed in the celebrated    
phlogistic theory2 a doctrine which     
accounted for combustion by the         
extrication of a substance called       
phlogiston1 supposed to be contained in 
all combustible matter4 ,the hypothesis 
accorded tolerably well with superficial
 appearances3 the ascent of flame       
naturally suggests the escape of a      
substance2 and the visible residuum of  
ashes1 in bulk and weight1 generally    
falls extremely short of the combustible
 material4 ,the error was1              
non-observation of an important portion 

of the actual residue1 namely1 the      
gaseous products of combustion4 ,when   
these were at last noticed and brought  
into account1 it appeared to be an      
universal law1 that all substances gain 
instead of losing weight by undergoing  
combustion2 and1 after the usual attempt
 to accommodate the old theory to the   
new fact by means of an arbitrary       
hypothesis 7that phlogiston had the     
quality of positive levity instead of   
gravity71 chemists were conducted to the
 true explanation1 namely1 that instead 
of a substance separated1 there was on  
the contrary a substance absorbed4      
,many of the absurd practices which have
 been deemed to possess medicinal       
efficacy1 have been indebted for their  
reputation to non-observance of some    
accompanying circumstance which was the 
real agent in the cures ascribed to     
them4 ,thus1 of the sympathetic powder  
of ,sir ,kenelm ,digby3 ,whenever any   
wound had been inflicted1 this powder   
was applied to the weapon that had      

inflicted it1 which was1 moreover1      
covered with ointment1 and dressed two  
or three times a day4 ,the wound itself1
 in the meantime1 was directed to be    
brought together1 and carefully bound up
 with clean linen rags1 but above all1  
to be let alone for seven days1 at the  
end of which period the bandages were   
removed1 when the wound was generally   
found perfectly united4 ,the triumph of 
the cure was decreed to the mysterious  
agency of the sympathetic powder which  
had been so assiduously applied to the  
weapon1 whereas it is hardly necessary  
to observe that the promptness of the   
cure depended on the total exclusion of 
air from the wound1 and upon the        
sanative operations of nature not having
 received any disturbance from the      
officious interference of art4 ,the     
result1 beyond all doubt1 furnished the 
first hint which led surgeons to the    
improved practice of healing wounds by  
what is technically called the first    
intention4#bb ,in all records1 adds ,dr4

 ,paris1 of extraordinary cures         
performed by mysterious agents1 there is
 a great desire to conceal the remedies 
and other curative means which were     
simultaneously administered with them2  
thus ,oribasius commends in high terms a
 necklace of ,pony root for the cure of 
epilepsy2 but we learn that he always   
took care to accompany its use with     
copious evacuations1 although he assigns
 to them no share of credit in the cure4
 ,in later times we have a good specimen
 of this species of deception1 presented
 to us in a work on ,scrofula by ,mr4   
,morley1 written1 as we are informed1   
for the sole purpose of restoring the   
much injured character and use of the   
,vervain2 in which the author directs   
the root of this plant to be tied with a
 yard of white satin riband around the  
neck1 where it is to remain until the   
patient is cured2 but mark--during this 
interval he calls to his aid the most   
active medicines in the materia         
medica4#bc  ,in other cases the cures   

really produced by rest1 regimen1 and   
amusement1 have been ascribed to the    
medicinal1 or occasionally to the       
supernatural1 means which were put in   
requisition4 ,the celebrated ,john      
,wesley1 while he commemorates the      
triumph of sulphur and supplication over
 his bodily infirmity1 forgets to       
appreciate the resuscitating influence  
of four months' repose from his         
apostolic labours2 and such is the      
disposition of the human mind to place  
confidence in the operation of          
mysterious agents1 that we find him more
 disposed to attribute his cure to a    
brown paper plaister of egg and         
brimstone1 than to ,dr4 ,fothergill's   
salutary prescription of country air1   
rest1 asses' milk1 and horse            
exercise4#bd  ,in the following example1
 the circumstance overlooked was of a   
somewhat different character4 ,when the 
yellow fever raged in ,america1 the     
practitioners trusted exclusively to the
 copious use of mercury2 at first this  

plan was deemed so universally          
efficacious1 that1 in the enthusiasm of 
the moment1 it was triumphantly         
proclaimed that death never took place  
after the mercury had evinced its effect
 upon the system3 all this was very     
true1 but it furnished no proof of the  
efficacy of that metal1 since the       
disease in its aggravated form was so   
rapid in its career1 that it swept away 
its victims long before the system could
 be brought under mercurial influence1  
while in its milder shape it passed off 
equally well without any assistance from
 art4#be  ,in these examples the        
circumstance overlooked was cognizable  
by the senses4 ,in other cases1 it is   
one the knowledge of which could only be
 arrived at by reasoning2 but the       
fallacy may still be classed under the  
head to which1 for want of a more       
appropriate name1 we have given the     
appellation ,fallacies of               
,non-observation4 ,it is not the nature 
of the faculties which ought to have    

been employed1 but the non-employment of
 them1 which constitutes this ,natural  
,order of ,fallacies4 ,wherever the     
error is negative1 not positive2        
wherever it consists especially in      
overlooking1 in being ignorant or       
unmindful of some fact which1 if known  
and attended to1 would have made a      
difference in the conclusion arrived at2
 the error is properly placed in the    
,class which we are considering4 ,in    
this ,class1 there is not1 as in all    
other fallacies there is1 a positive    
mis-estimate of evidence actually had4  
,the conclusion would be just1 if the   
portion which is seen of the case were  
the whole of it2 but there is another   
portion overlooked1 which vitiates the  
result4  ,for instance1 there is a      
remarkable doctrine which has           
occasionally found a vent in the public 
speeches of unwise legislators1 but     
which only in one instance that ,i am   
aware of has received the sanction of a 
philosophical writer1 namely ,m4        

,cousin1 who1 in his preface to the     
,gorgias of ,plato1 contending that     
punishment must have some other and     
higher justification than the prevention
 of crime1 makes use of this            
argument--that if punishment were only  
for the sake of example1 it would be    
indifferent whether we punished the     
innocent or the guilty1 since the       
punishment1 considered as an example1 is
 equally efficacious in either case4    
,now we must1 in order to go along with 
this reasoning1 suppose1 that the person
 who feels himself under temptation1    
observing somebody punished1 concludes  
himself to be in danger of being        
punished likewise1 and is terrified     
accordingly4 ,but it is forgotten that  
if the person punished is supposed to be
 innocent1 or even if there be any doubt
 of his guilt1 the spectator will       
reflect that his own danger1 whatever it
 may be1 is not contingent on his       
guiltiness1 but threatens him equally if
 he remains innocent1 and how therefore 

is he deterred from guilt by the        
apprehension of such punishment8 ,m4    
,cousin supposes that people will be    
dissuaded from guilt by whatever renders
 the condition of the guilty more       
perilous1 forgetting that the condition 
of the innocent 7also one of the        
elements in the calculation7 is1 in the 
case supposed1 made perilous in         
precisely an equal degree4 ,this is a   
fallacy of overlooking2 or of           
non-observation1 within the intent of   
our classification4  ,fallacies of this 
description are the great               
stumbling-block to correct thinking in  
political economy4 ,the economical      
workings of society afford numerous     
cases in which the effects of a cause   
consist of two sets of phenomena3 the   
one immediate1 concentrated1 obvious to 
all eyes1 and passing1 in common        
apprehension1 for the whole effect2 the 
other widely diffused1 or lying deeper  
under the surface1 and which is exactly 
contrary to the former4 ,take1 for      

instance1 the common notion so plausible
 at the first glance1 of the            
encouragement given to industry by      
lavish expenditure4 ,a1 who spends his  
whole income1 and even his capital1 in  
expensive living1 is supposed to give   
great employment to labour4 ,b1 who     
lives on a small portion1 and invests   
the remainder in the funds1 is thought  
to give little or no employment4 ,for   
everybody sees the gains which are made 
by ,a's tradesmen1 servants1 and others1
 while his money is spending4 ,b's      
savings1 on the contrary1 pass into the 
hands of the person whose stock he      
purchased1 who with it pays a debt he   
owed to some banker1 who lends it again 
to some merchant or manufacturer2 and   
the capital being laid out in hiring    
spinners and weavers1 or carriers and   
the crews of merchant vessels1 not only 
gives immediate employment to at least  
as much industry as ,a employs during   
the whole of his career1 but coming back
 with increase by the sale of the goods 

which have been manufactured or         
imported1 forms a fund for the          
employment of the same and perhaps a    
greater quantity of labour in           
perpetuity4 ,but the observer does not  
see1 and therefore does not consider1   
what becomes of ,b's money2 he does see 
what is done with ,a's3 he observes the 
amount of industry which ,a's profusion 
feeds2 he observes not the far greater  
quantity which it prevents from being   
fed2 and thence the prejudice1 universal
 to the time of ,adam ,smith1 that      
prodigality encourages industry1 and    
parsimony is a discouragement to it4    
,the common argument against free trade 
was a fallacy of the same nature4 ,the  
purchaser of ,british silk encourages   
,british industry2 the purchaser of     
,lyons silk encourages only ,french2 the
 former conduct is patriotic1 the latter
 ought to be interdicted by law4 ,the   
circumstance is overlooked1 that the    
purchaser of any foreign commodity      
necessarily causes1 directly or         

indirectly1 the export of an equivalent 
value of some article of home production
 7beyond what would otherwise be        
exported71 either to the same foreign   
country or to some other2 which fact1   
though from the complication of the     
circumstances it cannot always be       
verified by specific observation1 no    
observation can possibly be brought to  
contradict1 while the evidence of       
reasoning on which it rests is          
irrefragable4 ,the fallacy is1          
therefore1 the same as in the preceding 
case1 that of seeing a part only of the 
phenomena1 and imagining that part to be
 the whole3 and may be ranked among     
,fallacies of ,non-observation4    #e4  
,to complete the examination of the     
second of our five classes1 we have now 
to speak of ,mal-observation2 in which  
the error does not lie in the fact that 
something is unseen1 but that something 
seen is seen wrong4  ,perception being  
infallible evidence of whatever is      
really perceived1 the error now under   

consideration can be committed no       
otherwise than by mistaking for         
conception what is in fact inference4   
,we have formerly shown how intimately  
the two are blended in almost everything
 which is called observation1 and still 
more in every ,description4#bf ,what is 
actually on any occasion perceived by   
our senses being so minute in amount1   
and generally so unimportant a portion  
of the state of facts which we wish to  
ascertain or to communicate2 it would be
 absurd to say that either in our       
observations1 or in conveying their     
result to others1 we ought not to mingle
 inference with fact2 all that can be   
said is1 that when we do so we ought to 
be aware of what we are doing1 and to   
know what part of the assertion rests on
 consciousness1 and is therefore        
indisputable1 what part on inference1   
and is therefore questionable4  ,one of 
the most celebrated examples of an      
universal error produced by mistaking an
 inference for the direct evidence of   

the senses1 was the resistance made1 on 
the ground of common sense1 to the      
,copernican system4 ,people fancied they
 saw the sun rise and set1 the stars    
revolve in circles round the pole4 ,we  
now know that they saw no such thing2   
what they really saw was a set of       
appearances1 equally reconcileable with 
the theory they held and with a totally 
different one4 ,it seems strange that   
such an instance as this1 of the        
testimony of the senses pleaded with the
 most entire conviction in favour of    
something which was a mere inference of 
the judgment1 and1 as it turned out1 a  
false inference1 should not have opened 
the eyes of the bigots of common sense1 
and inspired them with a more modest    
distrust of the competency of mere      
ignorance to judge the conclusions of   
cultivated thought4  ,in proportion to  
any person's deficiency of knowledge and
 mental cultivation1 is generally his   
inability to discriminate between his   
inferences and the perceptions on which 

they were grounded4 ,many a marvellous  
tale1 many a scandalous anecdote1 owes  
its origin to this incapacity4 ,the     
narrator relates1 not what he saw or    
heard1 but the impression which he      
derived from what he saw or heard1 and  
of which perhaps the greater part       
consisted of inference1 though the whole
 is related not as inference but as     
matter-of-fact4 ,the difficulty of      
inducing witnesses to restrain within   
any moderate limits the intermixture of 
their inferences with the narrative of  
their perceptions1 is well known to     
experienced cross-examiners2 and still  
more is this the case when ignorant     
persons attempt to describe any natural 
phenomenon4 ,the simplest narrative1    
says ,dugald ,stewart1#bg of the most   
illiterate observer involves more or    
less of hypothesis2 nay1 in general1 it 
will be found that1 in proportion to his
 ignorance1 the greater is the number of
 conjectural principles involved in his 
statements4 ,a village apothecary 7and1 

if possible1 in a still greater degree1 
an experienced nurse7 is seldom able to 
describe the plainest case1 without     
employing a phraseology of which every  
word is a theory3 whereas a simple and  
genuine specification of the phenomena  
which mark a particular disease2 a      
specification unsophisticated by fancy1 
or by preconceived opinions1 may be     
regarded as unequivocal evidence of a   
mind trained by long and successful     
study to the most difficult of all arts1
 that of the faithful interpretation of 
nature4  ,the universality of the       
confusion between perceptions and the   
inferences drawn from them1 and the     
rarity of the power to discriminate the 
one from the other1 ceases to surprise  
us when we consider that in the far     
greater number of instances the actual  
perceptions of our senses are of no     
importance or interest to us except as  
marks from which we infer something     
beyond them4 ,it is not the colour and  
superficial extension perceived by the  

eye that are important to us1 but the   
object1 of which those visible          
appearances testify the presence2 and   
where the sensation itself is           
indifferent1 as it generally is1 we have
 no motive to attend particularly to it1
 but acquire a habit of passing it over 
without distinct consciousness1 and     
going on at once to the inference4 ,so  
that to know what the sensation actually
 was1 is a study in itself1 to which    
painters1 for example1 have to train    
themselves by special and long-continued
 discipline and application4 ,in things 
further removed from the dominion of the
 outward senses1 no one who has not     
great experience in psychological       
analysis is competent to break this     
intense association2 and when such      
analytic habits do not exist in the     
requisite degree1 it is hardly possible 
to mention any of the habitual judgments
 of mankind on subjects of a high degree
 of abstraction1 from the being of a    
,god and the immortality of the soul    

down to the multiplication table1 which 
are not1 or have not been1 considered as
 matter of direct intuition4 ,so strong 
is the tendency to ascribe an intuitive 
character to judgments which are mere   
inferences1 and often false ones4 ,no   
one can doubt that many a deluded       
visionary has actually believed that he 
was directly inspired from ,heaven1 and 
that the ,almighty had conversed with   
him face to face2 which yet was only1 on
 his part1 a conclusion drawn from      
appearances to his senses1 or feelings  
in his internal consciousness1 which    
afforded no warrant for any such belief4
 ,a caution1 therefore1 against this    
class of errors1 is not only needful but
 indispensable2 though to determine     
whether1 on any of the great questions  
of metaphysics1 such errors are actually
 committed1 belongs not to this place1  
but1 as ,i have so often said1 to a     
different science4     ,,chapter ,v4    
,,fallacies ,,of ,,generalization4      
#a4 ,the class of ,fallacies of which we

 are now to speak1 is the most extensive
 of all2 embracing a greater number and 
variety of unfounded inferences than any
 of the other classes1 and which it is  
even more difficult to reduce to        
sub-classes or species4 ,if the attempt 
made in the preceding books to define   
the principles of well-grounded         
generalization has been successful1 all 
generalizations not conformable to those
 principles might1 in a certain sense1  
be brought under the present class3 when
 however the rules are known and kept in
 view1 but a casual lapse committed in  
the application of them1 this is a      
blunder1 not a fallacy4 ,to entitle an  
error of generalization to the latter   
epithet1 it must be committed on        
principle2 there must lie in it some    
erroneous general conception of the     
inductive process2 the legitimate mode  
of drawing conclusions from observation 
and experiment must be fundamentally    
misconceived4  ,without attempting      
anything so chimerical as an exhaustive 

classification of all the misconceptions
 which can exist on the subject1 let us 
content ourselves with noting1 among the
 cautions which might be suggested1 a   
few of the most useful and needful4     
#b4 ,in the first place1 there are      
certain kinds of generalization which1  
if the principles already laid down be  
correct1 must be groundless3 experience 
cannot afford the necessary conditions  
for establishing them by a correct      
induction4 ,such1 for instance1 are all 
inferences from the order of nature     
existing on the earth1 or in the solar  
system1 to that which may exist in      
remote parts of the universe2 where the 
phenomena1 for aught we know1 may be    
entirely different1 or may succeed one  
another according to different laws1 or 
even according to no fixed law at all4  
,such1 again1 in matters dependent on   
causation1 are all universal negatives1 
all propositions that assert            
impossibility4 ,the non-existence of any
 given phenomenon1 however uniformly    

experience may as yet have testified to 
the fact1 proves at most that no cause1 
adequate to its production1 has yet     
manifested itself2 but that no such     
causes exist in nature can only be      
inferred if we are so foolish as to     
suppose that we know all the forces in  
nature4 ,the supposition would at least 
be premature while our acquaintance with
 some even of those which we do know is 
so extremely recent4 ,and however much  
our knowledge of nature may hereafter be
 extended1 it is not easy to see how    
that knowledge could ever be complete1  
or how1 if it were1 we could ever be    
assured of its being so4  ,the only laws
 of nature which afford sufficient      
warrant for attributing impossibility   
7even with reference to the existing    
order of nature1 and to our own region  
of the universe71 are first1 those of   
number and extension1 which are         
paramount to the laws of the succession 
of phenomena1 and not exposed to the    
agency of counteracting causes2 and     

secondly1 the universal law of causality
 itself4 ,that no variation in any      
effect or consequent will take place    
while the whole of the antecedents      
remain the same1 may be affirmed with   
full assurance4 ,but1 that the addition 
of some new antecedent might not        
entirely alter and subvert the          
accustomed consequent1 or that          
antecedents competent to do this do not 
exist in nature1 we are in no case      
empowered positively to conclude4    #c4
 ,it is next to be remarked that all    
generalizations which profess1 like the 
theories of ,thales1 ,democritus1 and   
others of the early ,greek speculators1 
to resolve all things into some one     
element1 or like many modern theories1  
to resolve phenomena radically different
 into the same1 are necessarily false4  
,by radically different phenomena ,i    
mean impressions on our senses which    
differ in quality1 and not merely in    
degree4 ,on this subject what appeared  
necessary was said in the chapter on the

 ,limits to the ,explanation of ,laws of
 ,nature2 but as the fallacy is even in 
our own times a common one1 ,i shall    
touch on it somewhat further in this    
place4  ,when we say that the force     
which retains the planets in their      
orbits is resolved into gravity1 or that
 the force which makes substances       
combine chemically is resolved into     
electricity1 we assert in the one case  
what is1 and in the other case what     
might1 and probably will ultimately1 be 
a legitimate result of induction4 ,in   
both these cases1 motion is resolved    
into motion4 ,the assertion is1 that a  
case of motion1 which was supposed to be
 special1 and to follow a distinct law  
of its own1 conforms to and is included 
in the general law which regulates      
another class of motions4 ,but1 from    
these and similar generalizations1      
countenance and currency have been given
 to attempts to resolve1 not motion into
 motion1 but heat into motion1 light    
into motion1 sensation itself into      

motion2 states of consciousness into    
states of the nervous system1 as in the 
ruder forms of the materialist          
philosophy2 vital phenomena into        
mechanical or chemical processes1 as in 
some schools of physiology4  ,now ,i am 
far from pretending that it may not be  
capable of proof1 or that it will not be
 an important addition to our knowledge 
if proved1 that certain motions in the  
particles of bodies are among the       
conditions of the production of heat or 
light2 that certain assignable physical 
modifications of the nerves may be the  
conditions not only of our sensations or
 emotions1 but even of our thoughts2    
that certain mechanical and chemical    
conditions may1 in the order of nature1 
be sufficient to determine to action the
 physiological laws of life4 ,all ,i    
insist upon1 in common with every       
thinker who entertains any clear idea of
 the logic of science1 is1 that it shall
 not be supposed that by proving these  
things one step would be made towards a 

real explanation of heat1 light1 or     
sensation2 or that the generic          
peculiarity of those phenomena can be in
 the least degree evaded by any such    
discoveries1 however well established4  
,let it be shown1 for instance1 that the
 most complex series of physical causes 
and effects succeed one another in the  
eye and in the brain to produce a       
sensation of colour2 rays falling on the
 eye1 refracted1 converging1 crossing   
one another1 making an inverted image on
 the retina1 and after this a           
motion--let it be a vibration1 or a rush
 of nervous fluid1 or whatever else you 
are pleased to suppose1 along the optic 
nerve--a propagation of this motion to  
the brain itself1 and as many more      
different motions as you choose2 still1 
at the end of these motions1 there is   
something which is not motion1 there is 
a feeling or sensation of colour4       
,whatever number of motions we may be   
able to interpolate1 and whether they be
 real or imaginary1 we shall still find1

 at the end of the series1 a motion     
antecedent and a colour consequent4 ,the
 mode in which any one of the motions   
produces the next1 might possibly be    
susceptible of explanation by some      
general law of motion2 but the mode in  
which the last motion produces the      
sensation of colour1 cannot be explained
 by any law of motion2 it is the law of 
colour3 which is1 and must always       
remain1 a peculiar thing4 ,where our    
consciousness recognises between two    
phenomena an inherent distinction2 where
 we are sensible of a difference which  
is not merely of degree1 and feel that  
no adding one of the phenomena to itself
 would produce the other2 any theory    
which attempts to bring either under the
 laws of the other must be false2 though
 a theory which merely treats the one as
 a cause or condition of the other1 may 
possibly be true4    #d4 ,among the     
remaining forms of erroneous            
generalization1 several of those most   
worthy of and most requiring notice have

 fallen under our examination in former 
places1 where1 in investigating the     
rules of correct induction1 we have had 
occasion to advert to the distinction   
between it and some common mode of the  
incorrect4 ,in this number is what ,i   
have formerly called the natural        
,induction of uninquiring minds1 the    
,induction of the ancients1 which       
proceeds per enumerationem simplicem3   
,this1 that1 and the other ,a are ,b1 ,i
 cannot think of any ,a which is not ,b1
 therefore every ,a is ,b4 ,as a final  
condemnation of this rude and slovenly  
mode of generalization1 ,i will quote   
,bacon's emphatic denunciation of it2   
the most important part1 as ,i have more
 than once ventured to assert1 of the   
permanent service rendered by him to    
philosophy4 ,inductio qu procedit per   
enumerationem simplicem1 res puerilis   
est1 et precario concludit 7concludes   
only by your leave1 or provisionally17  
et periculo exponitur ab instanti       
contradictori1 et plerumque secundum    

pauciora quam par est1 et ex his        
tantummodo qu prsto sunt pronunciat4 ,at
 ,inductio qu ad inventionem et         
demonstrationem ,scientiarum et ,artium 
erit utilis1 ,naturam separare debet1   
per rejectiones et exclusiones debitas2 
ac deinde post negativas tot quot       
sufficiunt1 super affirmativas          
concludere4  ,i have already said that  
the mode of ,simple ,enumeration is     
still the common and received method of 
,induction in whatever relates to man   
and society4 ,of this a very few        
instances1 more by way of memento than  
of instruction1 may suffice4 ,what1 for 
example1 is to be thought of all the    
common-sense maxims for which the       
following may serve as the universal    
formula1 ,whatsoever has never been1    
will never be4 ,as for example3 negroes 
have never been as civilized as whites  
sometimes are1 therefore it is          
impossible they should be so4 ,women1 as
 a class1 are supposed not to have      
hitherto been equal in intellect to men1

 therefore they are necessarily         
inferior4 ,society cannot prosper       
without this or the other institution2  
e4g4 in ,aristotle's time1 without      
slavery2 in later times1 without an     
established priesthood1 without         
artificial distinctions of rank1 c4 ,one
 poor person in a thousand1 educated1   
while the nine hundred and ninety-nine  
remain uneducated1 has usually aimed at 
raising himself out of his class1       
therefore education makes people        
dissatisfied with the condition of a    
labourer4 ,bookish men1 taken from      
speculative pursuits and set to work on 
something they know nothing about1 have 
generally been found or thought to do it
 ill2 therefore philosophers are unfit  
for business1 c4 c4 ,all these are      
inductions by simple enumeration4       
,reasons having some reference to the   
canons of scientific investigation have 
been attempted to be given1 however     
unsuccessfully1 for some of these       
propositions2 but to the multitude of   

those who parrot them1 the enumeratio   
simplex1 ex his tantummodo qu prsto sunt
 pronuncians1 is the sole evidence4     
,their fallacy consists in this1 that   
they are inductions without elimination3
 there has been no real comparison of   
instances1 nor even ascertainment of the
 material facts in any given instance4  
,there is also the further error1 of    
forgetting that such generalizations1   
even if well established1 could not be  
ultimate truths1 but must be results of 
laws much more elementary2 and          
therefore1 until deduced from such1     
could at most be admitted as empirical  
laws1 holding good within the limits of 
space and time by which the particular  
observations that suggested the         
generalization were bounded4  ,this     
error1 of placing more empirical laws1  
and laws in which there is no direct    
evidence of causation1 on the same      
footing of certainty as laws of cause   
and effect1 an error which is at the    
root of perhaps the greater number of   

bad inductions1 is exemplified only in  
its grossest form in the kind of        
generalizations to which we have now    
referred4 ,these1 indeed1 do not possess
 even the degree of evidence which      
pertains to a well-ascertained empirical
 law2 but admit of refutation on the    
empirical ground itself1 without        
ascending to causal laws4 ,a little     
reflection1 indeed1 will show that mere 
negations can only form the ground of   
the lowest and least valuable kind of   
empirical law4 ,a phenomenon has never  
been noticed2 this only proves that the 
conditions of that phenomenon have not  
yet occurred in experience1 but does not
 prove that they may not occur          
hereafter4 ,there is a better kind of   
empirical law than this1 namely1 when a 
phenomenon which is observed presents   
within the limits of observation a      
series of gradations1 in which a        
regularity1 or something like a         
mathematical law1 is perceptible3 from  
which1 therefore1 something may be      

rationally presumed as to those terms of
 the series which are beyond the limits 
of observation4 ,but in negation there  
are no gradations1 and no series3 the   
generalizations1 therefore1 which deny  
the possibility of any given condition  
of man and society merely because it has
 never yet been witnessed1 cannot       
possess this higher degree of validity  
even as empirical laws4 ,what is more1  
the minuter examination which that      
higher order of empirical laws          
presupposes1 being applied to the       
subject-matter of these1 not only does  
not confirm but actually refutes them4  
,for in reality the past history of ,man
 and ,society1 instead of exhibiting    
them as immovable1 unchangeable1        
incapable of ever presenting new        
phenomena1 shows them on the contrary to
 be1 in many most important particulars1
 not only changeable1 but actually      
undergoing a progressive change4 ,the   
empirical law1 therefore1 best          
expressive1 in most cases1 of the       

genuine result of observation1 would be1
 not that such and such a phenomenon    
will continue unchanged1 but that it    
will continue to change in some         
particular manner4  ,accordingly1 while 
almost all generalizations relating to  
,man and ,society1 antecedent to the    
last fifty years1 have erred in the     
gross way which we have attempted to    
characterize1 namely1 by implicitly     
assuming that human nature and society  
will for ever revolve in the same orbit1
 and exhibit essentially the same       
phenomena2 which is also the vulgar     
error of the ostentatiously practical1  
the votaries of so-called common sense1 
in our day1 especially in ,great        
,britain2 the more thinking minds of the
 present age1 having applied a more     
minute analysis to the past records of  
our race1 have for the most part adopted
 a contrary opinion1 that the human     
species is in a state of necessary      
progression1 and that from the terms of 
the series which are past we may infer  

positively those which are yet to come4 
,of this doctrine1 considered as a      
philosophical tenet1 we shall have      
occasion to speak more fully in the     
concluding ,book4 ,if not1 in all its   
forms1 free from error1 it is at least  
free from the gross and stupid error    
which we previously exemplified4 ,but1  
in all except the most eminently        
philosophical minds1 it is infected with
 precisely the same kind of fallacy as  
that is4 ,for we must remember that even
 this other and better generalization1  
the progressive change in the condition 
of the human species1 is1 after all1 but
 an empirical law3 to which1 too1 it is 
not difficult to point out exceedingly  
large exceptions2 and even if these     
could be got rid of1 either by disputing
 the facts or by explaining and limiting
 the theory1 the general objection      
remains valid against the supposed law1 
as applicable to any other than what1 in
 our third book1 were termed ,adjacent  
,cases4 ,for not only is it no ultimate1

 but not even a causal law4 ,changes do 
indeed take place in human affairs1 but 
every one of those changes depends on   
determinate causes2 the progressiveness 
of the species is not a cause1 but a    
summary expression for the general      
result of all the causes4 ,so soon as1  
by a quite different sort of induction1 
it shall be ascertained what causes have
 produced these successive changes1 from
 the beginning of history1 in so far as 
they have really taken place1 and by    
what causes of a contrary tendency they 
have been occasionally checked or       
entirely counteracted1 we may then be   
prepared to predict the future with     
reasonable foresight2 we may be in      
possession of the real law of the       
future2 and may be able to declare on   
what circumstances the continuance of   
the same onward movement will eventually
 depend4 ,but this it is the error of   
many of the more advanced thinkers1 in  
the present age1 to overlook2 and to    
imagine that the empirical law collected

 from a mere comparison of the condition
 of our species at different past times1
 is a real law1 is the law of its       
changes1 not only past but also to come4
 ,the truth is1 that the causes on which
 the phenomena of the moral world       
depend1 are in every age1 and almost in 
every country1 combined in some         
different proportion2 so that it is     
scarcely to be expected that the general
 result of them all should conform very 
closely1 in its details at least1 to any
 uniformly progressive series4 ,and all 
generalizations which affirm that       
mankind have a tendency to grow better  
or worse1 richer or poorer1 more        
cultivated or more barbarous1 that      
population increases faster than        
subsistence1 or subsistence than        
population1 that inequality of fortune  
has a tendency to increase or to break  
down1 and the like1 propositions of     
considerable value as empirical laws    
within certain 7but generally rather    
narrow7 limits1 are in reality true or  

false according to times and            
circumstances4  ,what we have said of   
empirical generalizations from times    
past to times still to come1 holds      
equally true of similar generalizations 
from present times to times past2 when  
persons whose acquaintance with moral   
and social facts is confined to their   
own age1 take the men and the things of 
that age for the type of men and things 
in general1 and apply without scruple to
 the interpretation of the events of    
history1 the empirical laws which       
represent sufficiently for daily        
guidance the common phenomena of human  
nature at that time and in that         
particular state of society4 ,if        
examples are wanted1 almost every       
historical work1 until a very recent    
period1 abounded in them4 ,the same may 
be said of those who generalize         
empirically from the people of their own
 country to the people of other         
countries1 as if human beings felt1     
judged1 and acted1 everywhere in the    

same manner4    #e4 ,in the foregoing   
instances1 the distinction is confounded
 between empirical laws1 which express  
merely the customary order of the       
succession of effects1 and the laws of  
causation on which the effects depend4  
,there may1 however1 be incorrect       
generalization when this mistake is not 
committed2 when the investigation takes 
its proper direction1 that of causes1   
and the result erroneously obtained     
purports to be a really causal law4     
,the most vulgar form of this fallacy is
 that which is commonly called post hoc1
 ergo propter hoc1 or1 cum hoc1 ergo    
propter hoc4 ,as when it was inferred   
that ,england owed her industrial       
pre-eminence to her restrictions on     
commerce3 as when the old school of     
financiers1 and some speculative        
writers1 maintained that the national   
debt was one of the causes of national  
prosperity3 as when the excellence of   
the ,church1 of the ,houses of ,lords   
and ,commons1 of the procedure of the   

law courts1 c41 were inferred from the  
mere fact that the country had prospered
 under them4 ,in such cases as these1 if
 it can be rendered probable by other   
evidence that the supposed causes have  
some tendency to produce the effect     
ascribed to them1 the fact of its having
 been produced1 though only in one      
instance1 is of some value as a         
verification by specific experience3 but
 in itself it goes scarcely any way at  
all towards establishing such a         
tendency1 since1 admitting the effect1 a
 hundred other antecedents could show an
 equally strong title of that kind to be
 considered as the cause4  ,in these    
examples we see bad generalization      
posteriori1 or empiricism properly so   
called3 causation inferred from casual  
conjunction1 without either due         
elimination1 or any presumption arising 
from known properties of the supposed   
agent4 ,but bad generalization  priori  
is fully as common3 which is properly   
called false theory2 conclusions drawn1 

by way of deduction1 from properties of 
some one agent which is known or        
supposed to be present1 all other       
coexisting agents being overlooked4 ,as 
the former is the error of sheer        
ignorance1 so the latter is especially  
that of semi-instructed minds2 and is   
mainly committed in attempting to       
explain complicated phenomena by a      
simpler theory than their nature admits 
of4 ,as when one school of physicians   
sought for the universal principle of   
all disease in lentor and morbid        
viscidity of the blood1 and imputing    
most bodily derangements to mechanical  
obstructions1 thought to cure them by   
mechanical remedies2#bh while another1  
the chemical school1 acknowledged no    
source of disease but the presence of   
some hostile acid or alkali1 or some    
deranged condition in the chemical      
composition of the fluid or solid parts1
 and conceived1 therefore1 that all     
remedies must act by producing chemical 
changes in the body4 ,we find           

,tournefort busily engaged in testing   
every vegetable juice1 in order to      
discover in it some traces of an acid or
 alkaline ingredient1 which might confer
 upon it medicinal activity4 ,the fatal 
errors into which such an hypothesis was
 liable to betray the practitioner1     
received an awful illustration in the   
history of the memorable fever that     
raged at ,leyden in the year #afii1 and 
which consigned two-thirds of the       
population of that city to an untimely  
grave2 an event which in a great measure
 depended upon the ,professor ,sylvius  
de la ,boe1 who having just embraced the
 chemical doctrines of ,van ,helmont1   
assigned the origin of the distemper to 
a prevailing acid1 and declared that its
 cure could alone only be effected by   
the copious administration of absorbent 
and testaceous medicines4#bi  ,these    
aberrations in medical theory have their
 exact parallels in politics4 ,all the  
doctrines which ascribe absolute        
goodness to particular forms of         

government1 particular social           
arrangements1 and even to particular    
modes of education1 without reference to
 the state of civilization and the      
various distinguishing characters of the
 society for which they are intended1   
are open to the same objection--that of 
assuming one class of influencing       
circumstances to be the paramount rulers
 of phenomena which depend in an equal  
or greater degree on many others4 ,but  
on these considerations it is the less  
necessary that we should now dwell1 as  
they will occupy our attention more     
largely in the concluding ,book4    #f4 
,the last of the modes of erroneous     
generalization to which ,i shall advert1
 is that to which we may give the name  
of ,false ,analogies4 ,this ,fallacy    
stands distinguished from those already 
treated of by the peculiarity1 that it  
does not even simulate a complete and   
conclusive induction1 but consists in   
the misapplication of an argument which 
is at best only admissible as an        

inconclusive presumption1 where real    
proof is unattainable4  ,an argument    
from analogy1 is an inference that what 
is true in a certain case1 is true in a 
case known to be somewhat similar1 but  
not known to be exactly parallel1 that  
is1 to be similar in all the material   
circumstances4 ,an object has the       
property ,b3 another object is not known
 to have that property1 but resembles   
the first in a property ,a1 not known to
 be connected with ,b2 and the          
conclusion to which the analogy points1 
is that this object has the property ,b 
also4 ,as1 for example1 that the planets
 are inhabited1 because the earth is so4
 ,the planets resemble the earth in     
describing elliptical orbits round the  
sun1 in being attracted by it and by one
 another1 in being nearly spherical1    
revolving on their axes1 c42 but it is  
not known that any of these properties1 
or all of them together1 are the        
conditions on which the possession of   
inhabitants is dependent1 or are marks  

of those conditions4 ,nevertheless1 so  
long as we do not know what the         
conditions are1 they may be connected by
 some law of nature with those common   
properties2 and to the extent of that   
possibility the planets are more likely 
to be inhabited1 than if they did not   
resemble the earth at all4 ,this        
non-assignable and generally small      
increase of probability1 beyond what    
would otherwise exist1 is all the       
evidence which a conclusion can derive  
from analogy4 ,for if we have the       
slightest reason to suppose any real    
connexion between the two properties ,a 
and ,b1 the argument is no longer one of
 analogy4 ,if it had been ascertained   
7,i purposely put an absurd supposition7
 that there was a connexion by causation
 between the fact of revolving on an    
axis and the existence of animated      
beings1 or if there were any reasonable 
ground for even suspecting such a       
connexion1 a probability would arise of 
the existence of inhabitants in the     

planets1 which might be of any degree of
 strength1 up to a complete induction2  
but we should then infer the fact from  
the ascertained or presumed law of      
causation1 and not from the analogy of  
the earth4  ,the name analogy1 however1 
is sometimes employed by extension to   
denote those arguments of an inductive  
character but not amounting to a real   
induction1 which are employed to        
strengthen the argument drawn from a    
simple resemblance4 ,though ,a1 the     
property common to the two cases1 cannot
 be shown to be the cause or effect of  
,b1 the analogical reasoner will        
endeavour to show that there is some    
less close degree of connexion between  
them2 that ,a is one of a set of        
conditions from which1 when all united1 
,b would result2 or is an occasional    
effect of some cause which has been     
known also to produce ,b2 and the like4 
,any of which things1 if shown1 would   
render the existence of ,b by so much   
more probable1 than if there had not    

been even that amount of known connexion
 between ,b and ,a4  ,now an error or   
fallacy of analogy may occur in two     
ways4 ,sometimes it consists in         
employing an argument of either of the  
above kinds with correctness indeed1 but
 overrating its probative force4 ,this  
very common aberration is sometimes     
supposed to be particularly incident to 
persons distinguished for their         
imagination2 but in reality it is the   
characteristic intellectual vice of     
those whose imaginations are barren1    
either from want of exercise1 natural   
defect1 or the narrowness of their range
 of ideas4 ,to such minds objects       
present themselves clothed in but few   
properties2 and as1 therefore1 few      
analogies between one object and another
 occur to them1 they almost invariably  
overrate the degree of importance of    
those few3 while one whose fancy takes a
 wider range1 perceives and remembers so
 many analogies tending to conflicting  
conclusions1 that he is much less likely

 to lay undue stress on any of them4 ,we
 always find that those are the greatest
 slaves to metaphorical language1 who   
have but one set of metaphors4  ,but    
this is only one of the modes of error  
in the employment of arguments of       
analogy4 ,there is another1 more        
properly deserving the name of fallacy2 
namely1 when resemblance in one point is
 inferred from resemblance in another   
point1 though there is not only no      
evidence to connect the two             
circumstances by way of causation1 but  
the evidence tends positively to        
disconnect them4 ,this is properly the  
,fallacy of ,false ,analogies4  ,as a   
first instance1 we may cite that        
favourite argument in defence of        
absolute power1 drawn from the analogy  
of paternal government in a family1     
which government1 however much in need  
of control1 is not and cannot be        
controlled by the children themselves1  
while they remain children4 ,paternal   
government1 says the argument1 works    

well2 therefore1 despotic government in 
a state will work well4 ,i wave1 as not 
pertinent in this place1 all that could 
be said in qualification of the alleged 
excellence of paternal government4      
,however this might be1 the argument    
from the family to the state would not  
the less proceed on a false analogy2    
implying that the beneficial working of 
parental government depends1 in the     
family1 on the only point which it has  
in common with political despotism1     
namely1 irresponsibility4 ,whereas it   
depends1 when real1 not on that but on  
two other circumstances of the case1 the
 affection of the parent for the        
children1 and the superiority of the    
parent in wisdom and experience2 neither
 of which properties can be reckoned on1
 or are at all likely to exist1 between 
a political despot and his subjects2 and
 when either of these circumstances     
fails even in the family1 and the       
influence of the irresponsibility is    
allowed to work uncorrected1 the result 

is anything but good government4 ,this1 
therefore1 is a false analogy4  ,another
 example is the not uncommon dictum1    
that bodies politic have youth1         
maturity1 old age1 and death1 like      
bodies natural3 that after a certain    
duration of prosperity1 they tend       
spontaneously to decay4 ,this also is a 
false analogy1 because the decay of the 
vital powers in an animated body can be 
distinctly traced to the natural        
progress of those very changes of       
structure which1 in their earlier       
stages1 constitute its growth to        
maturity3 while in the body politic the 
progress of those changes cannot1       
generally speaking1 have any effect but 
the still further continuance of growth3
 it is the stoppage of that progress1   
and the commencement of retrogression1  
that alone would constitute decay4      
,bodies politic die1 but it is of       
disease1 or violent death3 they have no 
old age4  ,the following sentence from  
,hooker's ,ecclesiastical ,polity is an 

instance of a false analogy from        
physical bodies to what are called      
bodies politic4 ,as there could be in   
natural bodies no motion of anything    
unless there were some which moveth all 
things1 and continueth immovable3 even  
so in politic societies there must be   
some unpunishable1 or else no man shall 
suffer punishment4 ,there is a double   
fallacy here1 for not only the analogy1 
but the premise from which it is drawn1 
is untenable4 ,the notion that there    
must be something immovable which moves 
all other things1 is the old scholastic 
error of a primum mobile4  ,the         
following instance ,i quote from        
,archbishop ,whately's ,rhetoric3 ,it   
would be admitted that a great and      
permanent diminution in the quantity of 
some useful commodity1 such as corn1 or 
coal1 or iron1 throughout the world1    
would be a serious and lasting loss2 and
 again1 that if the fields and coal     
mines yielded regularly double          
quantities1 with the same labour1 we    

should be so much the richer2 hence it  
might be inferred1 that if the quantity 
of gold and silver in the world were    
diminished one-half1 or were doubled1   
like results would follow2 the utility  
of these metals1 for the purposes of    
coin1 being very great4 ,now there are  
many points of resemblance and many of  
difference1 between the precious metals 
on the one hand1 and corn1 coal1 c41 on 
the other2 but the important            
circumstance to the supposed argument   
is1 that the utility of gold and silver 
7as coin1 which is far the chief7       
depends on their value1 which is        
regulated by their scarcity2 or rather1 
to speak strictly1 by the difficulty of 
obtaining them2 whereas1 if corn and    
coal were ten times as abundant 7i4e4   
more easily obtained71 a bushel of      
either would still be as useful as now4 
,but if it were twice as easy to procure
 gold as it is1 a sovereign would be    
twice as large2 if only half as easy it 
would be of the size of a               

half-sovereign1 and this 7besides the   
trifling circumstance of the cheapness  
or dearness of gold ornaments7 would be 
all the difference4 ,the analogy1       
therefore1 fails in the point essential 
to the argument4  ,the same author      
notices1 after ,bishop ,copleston1 the  
case of ,false ,analogy which consists  
in inferring from the similarity in many
 respects between the metropolis of a   
country and the heart of the animal     
body1 that the increased size of the    
metropolis is a disease4  ,some of the  
false analogies on which systems of     
physics were confidently grounded in the
 time of the ,greek philosophers1 are   
such as we now call fanciful1 not that  
the resemblances are not often real1 but
 that it is long since any one has been 
inclined to draw from them the          
inferences which were then drawn4 ,such1
 for instance1 are the curious          
speculations of the ,pythagoreans on the
 subject of numbers4 ,finding that the  
distances of the planets bore or seemed 

to bear to one another a proportion not 
varying much from that of the divisions 
of the monochord1 they inferred from it 
the existence of an inaudible music1    
that of the spheres3 as if the music of 
a harp had depended solely on the       
numerical proportions1 and not on the   
material1 nor even on the existence of  
any material1 any strings at all4 ,it   
has been similarly imagined that certain
 combinations of numbers1 which were    
found to prevail in some natural        
phenomena1 must run through the whole of
 nature3 as that there must be four     
elements1 because there are four        
possible combinations of hot and cold1  
wet and dry2 that there must be seven   
planets1 because there were seven       
metals1 and even because there were     
seven days of the week4 ,kepler himself 
thought that there could be only six    
planets because there were only five    
regular solids4 ,with these we may class
 the reasonings1 so common in the       
speculations of the ancients1 founded on

 a supposed perfection in nature3       
meaning by nature the customary order of
 events as they take place of themselves
 without human interference4 ,this also 
is a rude guess at an analogy supposed  
to pervade all phenomena1 however       
dissimilar4 ,since what was thought to  
be perfection appeared to obtain in some
 phenomena1 it was inferred 7in         
opposition to the plainest evidence7 to 
obtain in all4 ,we always suppose that  
which is better to take place in nature1
 if it be possible1 says ,aristotle3 and
 the vaguest and most heterogeneous     
qualities being confounded together     
under the notion of being better1 there 
was no limit to the wildness of the     
inferences4 ,thus1 because the heavenly 
bodies were perfect1 they must move in  
circles and uniformly4 ,for they 7the   
,pythagoreans7 would not allow1 says    
,geminus1#cj of any such disorder among 
divine and eternal things1 as that they 
should sometimes move quicker and       
sometimes slower1 and sometimes stand   

still2 for no one would tolerate such   
anomaly in the movements even of a man1 
who was decent and orderly4 ,the        
occasions of life1 however1 are often   
reasons for men going quicker or slower2
 but in the incorruptible nature of the 
stars1 it is not possible that any cause
 can be alleged of quickness or         
slowness4 ,it is seeking an argument of 
analogy very far1 to suppose that the   
stars must observe the rules of decorum 
in gait and carriage1 prescribed for    
themselves by the long-bearded          
philosophers satirized by ,lucian4  ,as 
late as the ,copernican controversy it  
was urged as an argument in favour of   
the true theory of the solar system1    
that it placed the fire1 the noblest    
element1 in the centre of the universe4 
,this was a remnant of the notion that  
the order of nature must be perfect1 and
 that perfection consisted in conformity
 to rules of precedency in dignity1     
either real or conventional4 ,again1    
reverting to numbers3 certain numbers   

were perfect1 therefore those numbers   
must obtain in the great phenomena of   
nature4 ,six was a perfect number1 that 
is1 equal to the sum of all its factors2
 an additional reason why there must be 
exactly six planets4 ,the ,pythagoreans1
 on the other hand1 attributed          
perfection to the number ten2 but agreed
 in thinking that the perfect number    
must be somehow realized in the heavens2
 and knowing only of nine heavenly      
bodies1 to make up the enumeration1 they
 asserted that there was an antichthon  
or counter-earth1 on the other side of  
the sun1 invisible to us4#ca ,even      
,huygens was persuaded that when the    
number of the heavenly bodies had       
reached twelve1 it could not admit of   
any further increase4 ,creative power   
could not go beyond that sacred number4 
,some curious instances of false analogy
 are to be found in the arguments of the
 ,stoics to prove the equality of all   
crimes1 and the equal wretchedness of   
all who had not realized their idea of  

perfect virtue4 ,cicero1 towards the end
 of his ,fourth ,book ,de ,finibus1     
states some of these as follows4 ,ut1   
inquit1 in fidibus plurimis1 si nulla   
earum ita contenta numeris sit1 ut      
concentum servare possit1 omnes que     
incontent sunt2 sic peccata1 quia       
discrepant1 que discrepant2 paria sunt  
igitur4 ,to which ,cicero himself aptly 
answers1 que contingit omnibus fidibus1 
ut incontent sint2 illud non continuo1  
ut que incontent4 ,the ,stoic resumes3  
,ut enim1 inquit1 gubernator que peccat1
 si palcarum navem evertit1 et si auri2 
item que peccat qui parentem1 et qui    
servum1 injuri verberat2 assuming1 that 
because the magnitude of the interest at
 stake makes no difference in the mere  
defect of skill1 it can make none in the
 moral defect3 a false analogy4 ,again1 
,quis ignorat1 si plures ex alto        
emergere velint1 propius fore eos quidem
 ad respirandum1 qui ad summam jam aquam
 appropinquant1 sed nihilo magis        
respirare posse1 quam eos1 qui sunt in  

profundo8 ,nihil ergo adjuvat procedere1
 et progredi in virtute1 quominus       
miserrimus sit1 antequam ad eam         
pervenerit1 quoniam in aqu nihil        
adjuvat3 et quoniam catuli1 qui jam     
despecturi sunt1 cci que1 et ii qui modo
 nati2 ,platonem quoque necesse est1    
quoniam nondum videbat sapientiam1 que  
ccum animo1 ac ,phalarim fuisse4        
,cicero1 in his own person1 combats     
these false analogies by other analogies
 tending to an opposite conclusion4     
,ista similia non sunt1 ,cato4444 ,illa 
sunt similia2 hebes acies est cuipiam   
oculorum3 corpore alius languescit3 hi  
curatione adhibit levantur in dies3     
alter valet plus quotidie3 alter videt4 
,hi similes sunt omnibus1 qui virtuti   
student2 levantur vitiis1 levantur      
erroribus4    #g4 ,in these and all     
other arguments drawn from remote       
analogies1 and from metaphors1 which are
 cases of analogy1 it is apparent       
7especially when we consider the extreme
 facility of raising up contrary        

analogies and conflicting metaphors7    
that so far from the metaphor or analogy
 proving anything1 the applicability of 
the metaphor is the very thing to be    
made out4 ,it has to be shown that in   
the two cases asserted to be analogous1 
the same law is really operating2 that  
between the known resemblance and the   
inferred one there is some connexion by 
means of causation4 ,cicero and ,cato   
might have bandied opposite analogies   
for ever2 it rested with each of them to
 prove by just induction1 or at least to
 render probable1 that the case         
resembled the one set of analogous cases
 and not the other1 in the circumstances
 on which the disputed question really  
hinged4 ,metaphors1 for the most part1  
therefore1 assume the proposition which 
they are brought to prove3 their use is1
 to aid the apprehension of it2 to make 
clearly and vividly comprehended what it
 is that the person who employs the     
metaphor is proposing to make out2 and  
sometimes also1 by what media he        

proposes to do so4 ,for an apt metaphor1
 though it cannot prove1 often suggests 
the proof4  ,for instance1 when         
,d',alembert 7,i believe7 remarked that 
in certain governments1 only two        
creatures find their way to the highest 
places1 the eagle and the serpent2 the  
metaphor not only conveys with great    
vividness the assertion intended1 but   
contributes towards substantiating it1  
by suggesting1 in a lively manner1 the  
means by which the two opposite         
characters thus typified effect their   
rise4 ,when it is said that a certain   
person misunderstands another because   
the lesser of two objects cannot        
comprehend the greater1 the application 
of what is true in the literal sense of 
the word comprehend1 to its metaphorical
 sense1 points to the fact which is the 
ground and justification of the         
assertion1 viz4 that one mind cannot    
thoroughly understand another unless it 
can contain it in itself1 that is1      
unless it possesses all that is         

contained in the other4 ,when it is     
urged as an argument for education1 that
 if the soil is left uncultivated1 weeds
 will spring up1 the metaphor1 though no
 proof1 but a statement of the thing to 
be proved1 states it in terms which1 by 
suggesting a parallel case1 put the mind
 upon the track of the real proof4 ,for1
 the reason why weeds grow in an        
uncultivated soil1 is that the seeds of 
worthless products exist everywhere1 and
 can germinate and grow in almost all   
circumstances1 while the reverse is the 
case with those which are valuable2 and 
this being equally true of mental       
products1 this mode of conveying an     
argument1 independently of its          
rhetorical advantages1 has a logical    
value2 since it not only suggests the   
grounds of the conclusion1 but points to
 another case in which those grounds    
have been found1 or at least deemed to  
be1 sufficient4  ,on the other hand1    
when ,bacon1 who is equally conspicuous 
in the use and abuse of figurative      

illustration1 says that the stream of   
time has brought down to us only the    
least valuable part of the writings of  
the ancients1 as a river carries froth  
and straws floating on its surface1     
while more weighty objects sink to the  
bottom2 this1 even if the assertion     
illustrated by it were true1 would be no
 good illustration1 there being no      
parity of cause4 ,the levity by which   
substances float on a stream1 and the   
levity which is synonymous with         
worthlessness1 have nothing in common   
except the name2 and 7to show how little
 value there is in the metaphor7 we need
 only change the word into buoyancy1 to 
turn the semblance of argument involved 
in ,bacon's illustration against        
himself4  ,a metaphor1 then1 is not to  
be considered as an argument1 but as an 
assertion that an argument exists2 that 
a parity subsists between the case from 
which the metaphor is drawn and that to 
which it is applied4 ,this parity may   
exist though the two cases be apparently

 very remote from one another2 the only 
resemblance existing between them may be
 a resemblance of relations1 an analogy 
in ,ferguson's and ,archbishop          
,whately's sense3 as in the preceding   
instance1 in which an illustration from 
agriculture was applied to mental       
cultivation4    #h4 ,to terminate the   
subject of ,fallacies of                
,generalization1 it remains to be said1 
that the most fertile source of them is 
bad classification3 bringing together in
 one group1 and under one name1 things  
which have no common properties1 or none
 but such as are too unimportant to     
allow general propositions of any       
considerable value to be made respecting
 the class4 ,the misleading effect is   
greatest1 when a word which in common   
use expresses some definite fact1 is    
extended by slight links of connexion to
 cases in which that fact does not      
exist1 but some other or others1 only   
slightly resembling it4 ,thus ,bacon1#cb
 in speaking of the ,idola or ,fallacies

 arising from notions temere et         
inqualiter  rebus abstract1 exemplifies 
them by the notion of ,humidum or ,wet1 
so familiar in the physics of antiquity 
and of the middle ages4 ,invenietur     
verbum istud1 ,humidum1 nihil aliud quam
 nota confusa diversarum actionum1 qu   
nullam constantiam aut reductionem      
patiuntur4 ,significat enim1 et quod    
circa aliud corpus facile se            
circumfundit2 et quod in se est         
indeterminabile1 nec consistere potest2 
et quod facile cedit undique2 et quod   
facile se dividit et dispergit2 et quod 
facile se unit et colligit2 et quod     
facile fluit1 et in motu ponitur2 et    
quod alteri corpori facile adhret1 idque
 madefacit2 et quod facile reducitur in 
liquidum1 sive colliquatur1 cum antea   
consisteret4 ,itaque quum ad hujus      
nominis prdicationem et impositionem    
ventum sit2 si alia accipias1 flamma    
humida est2 si alia accipias1 aer       
humidus non est2 si alia1 pulvis minutus
 humidus est2 si alia1 vitrum humidum   

est3 ut facile appareat1 istam notionem 
ex aqu tantum1 et communibus et         
vulgaribus liquoribus1 absque ull debit 
verificatione1 temere abstractam esse4  
,bacon himself is not exempt from a     
similar accusation when inquiring into  
the nature of heat3 where he            
occasionally proceeds like one who      
seeking for the cause of hardness1 after
 examining that quality in iron1 flint1 
and diamond1 should expect to find that 
it is something which can be traced also
 in hard water1 a hard knot1 and a hard 
heart4  ,the word ,greek3 kinsis in the 
,greek philosophy1 and the words        
,generation and ,corruption both then   
and long afterwards1 denoted such a     
multitude of heterogeneous phenomena1   
that any attempt at philosophizing in   
which those words were used was almost  
as necessarily abortive as if the word  
hard had been taken to denote a class   
including all the things mentioned      
above4 ,greek3 ,kinsis1 for instance1   
which properly signified motion1 was    

taken to denote not only all motion but 
even all change3 ,greek3 alloisis being 
recognised as one of the modes of       
,greek3 kinsis4 ,the effect was1 to     
connect with every form of ,greek3      
alloisis or change1 ideas drawn from    
motion in the proper and literal sense1 
and which had no real connexion with any
 other kind of ,greek3 kinsis than that4
 ,aristotle and ,plato laboured under a 
continual embarrassment from this misuse
 of terms4 ,but if we proceed further in
 this direction we shall encroach upon  
the ,fallacy of ,ambiguity1 which       
belongs to a different class1 the last  
in order of our classification1         
,fallacies of ,confusion4     ,,chapter 
,,vi4  ,,fallacies ,,of ,,ratiocination4
    #a4 ,we have now1 in our progress   
through the classes of ,fallacies1      
arrived at those to which1 in the common
 books of logic1 the appellation is in  
general exclusively appropriated2 those 
which have their seat in the            
ratiocinative or deductive part of the  

investigation of truth4 ,on these       
fallacies it is the less necessary for  
us to insist at any length1 as they have
 been most satisfactorily treated in a  
work familiar to almost all1 in this    
country at least1 who feel any interest 
in these speculations1 ,archbishop      
,whately's ,logic4 ,against the more    
obvious forms of this class of          
fallacies1 the rules of the syllogism   
are a complete protection4 ,not 7as we  
have so often said7 that the            
ratiocination cannot be good unless it  
be in the form of a syllogism2 but that1
 by showing it in that form1 we are sure
 to discover if it be bad1 or at least  
if it contain any fallacy of this class4
    #b4 ,among ,fallacies of            
,ratiocination1 we ought perhaps to     
include the errors committed in         
processes which have the appearance     
only1 not the reality1 of an inference  
from premises2 the fallacies connected  
with the conversion and quipollency of  
propositions4 ,i believe errors of this 

description to be far more frequently   
committed than is generally supposed1 or
 than their extreme obviousness might   
seem to admit of4 ,for example1 the     
simple conversion of an universal       
affirmative proposition1 ,all ,a are ,b1
 therefore all ,b are ,a1 ,i take to be 
a very common form of error3 though     
committed1 like many other fallacies1   
oftener in the silence of thought than  
in express words1 for it can scarcely be
 clearly enunciated without being       
detected4 ,and so with another form of  
fallacy1 not substantially different    
from the preceding3 the erroneous       
conversion of an hypothetical           
proposition4 ,the proper converse of an 
hypothetical proposition is this3 ,if   
the consequent be false1 the antecedent 
is false2 but this1 ,if the consequent  
be true1 the antecedent is true1 by no  
means holds good1 but is an error       
corresponding to the simple conversion  
of an universal affirmative4 ,yet hardly
 anything is more common than for       

people1 in their private thoughts1 to   
draw this inference4 ,as when the       
conclusion is accepted1 which it so     
often is1 for proof of the premises4    
,that the premises cannot be true if the
 conclusion is false1 is the            
unexceptionable foundation of the       
legitimate mode of reasoning called a   
reductio ad absurdum4 ,but people       
continually think and express           
themselves1 as if they also believed    
that the premises cannot be false if the
 conclusion is true4 ,the truth1 or     
supposed truth1 of the inferences which 
follow from a doctrine1 often enables it
 to find acceptance in spite of gross   
absurdities in it4 ,how many            
philosophical systems which had scarcely
 any intrinsic recommendation1 have been
 received by thoughtful men because they
 were supposed to lend additional       
support to religion1 morality1 some     
favourite view of politics1 or some     
other cherished persuasion3 not merely  
because their wishes were thereby       

enlisted on its side1 but because its   
leading to what they deemed sound       
conclusions appeared to them a strong   
presumption in favour of its truth3     
though the presumption1 when viewed in  
its true light1 amounted only to the    
absence of that particular evidence of  
falsehood1 which would have resulted    
from its leading by correct inference to
 something already known to be false4   
,again1 the very frequent error in      
conduct1 of mistaking reverse of wrong  
for right1 is the practical form of a   
logical error with respect to the       
,opposition of ,propositions4 ,it is    
committed for want of the habit of      
distinguishing the contrary of a        
proposition from the contradictory of   
it1 and of attending to the logical     
canon1 that contrary propositions1      
though they cannot both be true1 may    
both be false4 ,if the error were to    
express itself in words1 it would run   
distinctly counter to this canon4 ,it   
generally1 however1 does not so express 

itself1 and to compel it to do so is the
 most effectual method of detecting and 
exposing it4    #c4 ,among ,fallacies of
 ,ratiocination are to be ranked in the 
first place1 all the cases of vicious   
syllogism laid down in the books4 ,these
 generally resolve themselves into      
having more than three terms to the     
syllogism1 either avowedly1 or in the   
covert mode of an undistributed         
middleterm1 or an illicit process of one
 of the two extremes4 ,it is not1       
indeed1 very easy fully to convict an   
argument of falling under any one of    
these vicious cases in particular2 for  
the reason already more than once       
referred to1 that the premises are      
seldom formally set out3 if they were1  
the fallacy would impose upon nobody2   
and while they are not1 it is almost    
always to a certain degree optional in  
what manner the suppressed link shall be
 filled up4 ,the rules of the syllogism 
are rules for compelling a person to be 
aware of the whole of what he must      

undertake to defend if he persists in   
maintaining his conclusion4 ,he has it  
almost always in his power to make his  
syllogism good by introducing a false   
premise2 and hence it is scarcely ever  
possible decidedly to affirm that any   
argument involves a bad syllogism3 but  
this detracts nothing from the value of 
the syllogistic rules1 since it is by   
them that a reasoner is compelled       
distinctly to make his election what    
premises he is prepared to maintain4    
,the election made1 there is generally  
so little difficulty in seeing whether  
the conclusion follows from the premises
 set out1 that we might without much    
logical impropriety have merged this    
fourth class of fallacies in the fifth1 
or ,fallacies of ,confusion4    #d4     
,perhaps1 however1 the commonest1 and   
certainly the most dangerous fallacies  
of this class1 are those which do not   
lie in a single syllogism1 but slip in  
between one syllogism and another in a  
chain of argument1 and are committed by 

changing the premises4 ,a proposition is
 proved1 or an acknowledged truth laid  
down1 in the first part of an           
argumentation1 and in the second a      
further argument is founded not on the  
same proposition1 but on some other1    
resembling it sufficiently to be        
mistaken for it4 ,instances of this     
fallacy will be found in almost all the 
argumentative discourses of unprecise   
thinkers2 and we need only here advert  
to one of the obscurer forms of it1     
recognised by the schoolmen as the      
fallacy  dicto secundum quid ad dictum  
simpliciter4 ,this is committed when1 in
 the premises1 a proposition is asserted
 with a qualification1 and the          
qualification lost sight of in the      
conclusion2 or oftener1 when a          
limitation or condition1 though not     
asserted1 is necessary to the truth of  
the proposition1 but is forgotten when  
that proposition comes to be employed as
 a premise4 ,many of the bad arguments  
in vogue belong to this class of error4 

,the premise is some admitted truth1    
some common maxim1 the reasons or       
evidence for which have been forgotten1 
or are not thought of at the time1 but  
if they had been thought of would have  
shown the necessity of so limiting the  
premise that it would no longer have    
supported the conclusion drawn from it4 
,of this nature is the fallacy in what  
is called1 by ,adam ,smith and others1  
the ,mercantile ,theory in ,political   
,economy4 ,that theory sets out from the
 common maxim1 that whatever brings in  
money enriches2 or that every one is    
rich in proportion to the quantity of   
money he obtains4 ,from this it is      
concluded that the value of any branch  
of trade1 or of the trade of the country
 altogether1 consists in the balance of 
money it brings in2 that any trade which
 carries more money out of the country  
than it draws into it is a losing trade2
 that therefore money should be         
attracted into the country and kept     
there1 by prohibitions and bounties3 and

 a train of similar corollaries4 ,all   
for want of reflecting that if the      
riches of an individual are in          
proportion to the quantity of money he  
can command1 it is because that is the  
measure of his power of purchasing      
money's worth2 and is therefore subject 
to the proviso that he is not debarred  
from employing his money in such        
purchases4 ,the premise1 therefore1 is  
only true secundum quid2 but the theory 
assumes it to be true absolutely1 and   
infers that increase of money is        
increase of riches1 even when produced  
by means subversive of the condition    
under which alone money can be riches4  
,a second instance is1 the argument by  
which it used to be contended1 before   
the commutation of tithe1 that tithes   
fell on the landlord1 and were a        
deduction from rent2 because the rent of
 tithe-free land was always higher than 
that of land of the same quality1 and   
the same advantages of situation1       
subject to tithe4 ,whether it be true or

 not that a tithe falls on rent1 a      
treatise on ,logic is not the place to  
examine2 but it is certain that this is 
no proof of it4 ,whether the proposition
 be true or false1 tithe-free land must1
 by the necessity of the case1 pay a    
higher rent4 ,for if tithes do not fall 
on rent1 it must be because they fall on
 the consumer2 because they raise the   
price of agricultural produce4 ,but if  
the produce be raised in price1 the     
farmer of tithe-free as well as the     
farmer of tithed land gets the benefit4 
,to the latter the rise is but a        
compensation for the tithe he pays2 to  
the first1 who pays none1 it is clear   
gain1 and therefore enables him1 and if 
there be freedom of competition forces  
him1 to pay so much more rent to his    
landlord4 ,the question remains1 to what
 class of fallacies this belongs4 ,the  
premise is1 that the owner of tithed    
land receives less rent than the owner  
of tithe-free land2 the conclusion is1  
that therefore he receives less than he 

himself would receive if tithe were     
abolished4 ,but the premise is only true
 conditionally2 the owner of tithed land
 receives less than what the owner of   
tithe-free land is enabled to receive   
when other lands are tithed2 while the  
conclusion is applied to a state of     
circumstances in which that condition   
fails1 and in which1 by consequence1 the
 premise would not be true4 ,the        
fallacy1 therefore1 is  dicto secundum  
quid ad dictum simpliciter4  ,a third   
example is the opposition sometimes made
 to legitimate interferences of         
government in the economical affairs of 
society1 grounded on a misapplication of
 the maxim1 that an individual is a     
better judge than the government1 of    
what is for his own pecuniary interest4 
,this objection was urged to ,mr4       
,wakefield's principle of colonization2 
the concentration of the settlers1 by   
fixing such a price on unoccupied land  
as may preserve the most desirable      
proportion between the quantity of land 

in culture1 and the labouring           
population4 ,against this it was argued1
 that if individuals found it for their 
advantage to occupy extensive tracts of 
land1 they1 being better judges of their
 own interest than the legislature      
7which can only proceed on general      
rules7 ought not to be restrained from  
doing so4 ,but in this argument it was  
forgotten that the fact of a person's   
taking a large tract of land is evidence
 only that it is his interest to take as
 much as other people1 but not that it  
might not be for his interest to content
 himself with less1 if he could be      
assured that other people would do so   
too2 an assurance which nothing but a   
government regulation can give4 ,if all 
other people took much1 and he only a   
little1 he would reap none of the       
advantages derived from the             
concentration of the population and the 
consequent possibility of procuring     
labour for hire1 but would have placed  
himself1 without equivalent1 in a       

situation of voluntary inferiority4 ,the
 proposition1 therefore1 that the       
quantity of land which people will take 
when left to themselves is that which is
 most for their interest to take1 is    
true only secundum quid3 it is only     
their interest while they have no       
guarantee for the conduct of one        
another4 ,but the arrangement disregards
 the limitation1 and takes the          
proposition for true simpliciter4  ,one 
of the conditions oftenest dropped1 when
 what would otherwise be a true         
proposition is employed as a premise for
 proving others1 is the condition of    
time4 ,it is a principle of political   
economy that prices1 profits1 wages1 c4 
always find their level2 but this is    
often interpreted as if it meant that   
they are always1 or generally1 at their 
level2 while the truth is1 as ,coleridge
 epigrammatically expresses it1 that    
they are always finding their level1    
which might be taken as a paraphrase or 
ironical definition of a storm4  ,under 

the same head of fallacy 7 dicto        
secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter7    
might be placed all the errors which are
 vulgarly called misapplications of     
abstract truths3 that is1 where a       
principle1 true 7as the common          
expression is7 in the abstract1 that is1
 all modifying causes being supposed    
absent1 is reasoned on as if it were    
true absolutely1 and no modifying       
circumstance could ever by possibility  
exist4 ,this very common form of error  
it is not requisite that we should      
exemplify here1 as it will be           
particularly treated of hereafter in its
 application to the subjects on which it
 is most frequent and most fatal1 those 
of politics and society4#cc             
,,chapter ,,vii4  ,,fallacies ,,of      
,,confusion4    #a4 ,under this fifth   
and last class it is convenient to      
arrange all those fallacies1 in which   
the source of error is not so much a    
false estimate of the probative force of
 known evidence1 as an indistinct1      

indefinite1 and fluctuating conception  
of what the evidence is4  ,at the head  
of these stands that multitudinous body 
of fallacious reasonings1 in which the  
source of error is the ambiguity of     
terms3 when something which is true if a
 word be used in a particular sense1 is 
reasoned on as if it were true in       
another sense4 ,in such a case there is 
not a mal-estimation of evidence1       
because there is not properly any       
evidence to the point at all2 there is  
evidence1 but to a different point1     
which from a confused apprehension of   
the meaning of the terms used1 is       
supposed to be the same4 ,this error    
will naturally be oftener committed in  
our ratiocinations than in our direct   
inductions1 because in the former we are
 deciphering our own or other people's  
notes1 while in the latter we have the  
things themselves present1 either to the
 senses or to the memory4 ,except1      
indeed1 when the induction is not from  
individual cases to a generality1 but   

from generalities to a still higher     
generalization2 in that case the fallacy
 of ambiguity may affect the inductive  
process as well as the ratiocinative4   
,it occurs in ratiocination in two ways3
 when the middleterm is ambiguous1 or   
when one of the terms of the syllogism  
is taken in one sense in the premises1  
and in another sense in the conclusion4 
,some good exemplifications of this     
fallacy are given by ,archbishop        
,whately4 ,one case1 says he1 which may 
be regarded as coming under the head of 
,ambiguous ,middle1 is 7what ,i believe 
logical writers mean by ',fallacia      
,figur ,dictionis1'7 the fallacy built  
on the grammatical structure of         
language1 from men's usually taking for 
granted that paronymous 7or conjugate7  
words1 i4e4 those belonging to each     
other1 as the substantive1 adjective1   
verb1 c4 of the same root1 have a       
precisely corresponding meaning2 which  
is by no means universally the case4    
,such a fallacy could not indeed be even

 exhibited in strict logical form1 which
 would preclude even the attempt at it1 
since it has two middleterms in sound as
 well as sense4 ,but nothing is more    
common in practice than to vary         
continually the terms employed1 with a  
view to grammatical convenience2 nor is 
there anything unfair in such a         
practice1 as long as the meaning is     
preserved unaltered2 e4g4 'murder should
 be punished with death2 this man is a  
murderer1 therefore he deserves to die1'
 c4 ,here we proceed on the assumption  
7in this case just7 that to commit      
murder1 and to be a murderer1--to       
deserve death1 and to be one who ought  
to die1 are1 respectively1 equivalent   
expressions2 and it would frequently    
prove a heavy inconvenience to be       
debarred this kind of liberty2 but the  
abuse of it gives rise to the ,fallacy  
in question3 e4g4 projectors are unfit  
to be trusted2 this man has formed a    
project1 therefore he is unfit to be    
trusted3 here the sophist proceeds on   

the hypothesis that he who forms a      
project must be a projector3 whereas the
 bad sense that commonly attaches to the
 latter word1 is not at all implied in  
the former4 ,this fallacy may often be  
considered as lying not in the ,middle1 
but in one of the terms of the          
,conclusion2 so that the conclusion     
drawn shall not be1 in reality1 at all  
warranted by the premises1 though it    
will appear to be so1 by means of the   
grammatical affinity of the words3 e4g4 
to be acquainted with the guilty is a   
presumption of guilt2 this man is so    
acquainted1 therefore we may presume    
that he is guilty3 this argument        
proceeds on the supposition of an exact 
correspondence between presume and      
presumption1 which1 however1 does not   
really exist2 for 'presumption' is      
commonly used to express a kind of      
slight suspicion2 whereas1 'to presume' 
amounts to actual belief4 ,there are    
innumerable instances of a              
non-correspondence in paronymous words1 

similar to that above instanced2 as     
between art and artful1 design and      
designing1 faith and faithful1 c42 and  
the more slight the variation of the    
meaning1 the more likely is the fallacy 
to be successful2 for when the words    
have become so widely removed in sense  
as 'pity' and 'pitiful1' every one would
 perceive such a fallacy1 nor could it  
be employed but in jest4#cd  ,the       
present ,fallacy is nearly allied to1 or
 rather1 perhaps1 may be regarded as a  
branch of1 that founded on etymology2   
viz4 when a term is used1 at one time in
 its customary1 and at another in its   
etymological sense4 ,perhaps no example 
of this can be found that is more       
extensively and mischievously employed  
than in the case of the word            
representative3 assuming that its right 
meaning must correspond exactly with the
 strict and original sense of the verb  
'represent1' the sophist persuades the  
multitude1 that a member of the ,house  
of ,commons is bound to be guided in all

 points by the opinion of his           
constituents2 and1 in short1 to be      
merely their spokesman2 whereas law and 
custom1 which in this case may be       
considered as fixing the meaning of the 
term1 require no such thing1 but enjoin 
the representative to act according to  
the best of his own judgment1 and on his
 own responsibility4  ,the following are
 instances of great practical           
importance1 in which arguments are      
habitually founded on a verbal          
ambiguity4  ,the mercantile public are  
frequently led into this fallacy by the 
phrase1 scarcity of money4 ,in the      
language of commerce money has two      
meanings3 currency1 or the circulating  
medium2 and capital seeking investment1 
especially investment on loan4 ,in this 
last sense the word is used when the    
money market is spoken of1 and when the 
value of money is said to be high or    
low1 the rate of interest being meant4  
,the consequence of this ambiguity is1  
that as soon as scarcity of money in the

 latter of these senses begins to be    
felt1--as soon as there is difficulty of
 obtaining loans1 and the rate of       
interest is high1--it is concluded that 
this must arise from causes acting upon 
the quantity of money in the other and  
more popular sense2 that the circulating
 medium must have diminished in         
quantity1 or ought to be increased4 ,i  
am aware that1 independently of the     
double meaning of the term1 there are in
 facts themselves some peculiarities1   
giving an apparent support to this      
error2 but the ambiguity of the language
 stands on the very threshold of the    
subject1 and intercepts all attempts to 
throw light upon it4  ,another ambiguous
 expression which continually meets us  
in the political controversies of the   
present time1 especially in those which 
relate to organic changes1 is the phrase
 influence of property3 which is        
sometimes used for the influence of     
respect for superior intelligence1 or   
gratitude for the kind offices which    

persons of large property have it so    
much in their power to bestow2 at other 
times for the influence of fear2 fear of
 the worst sort of power1 which large   
property also gives to its possessor1   
the power of doing mischief to          
dependents4 ,to confound these two1 is  
the standing fallacy of ambiguity       
brought against those who seek to purify
 the electoral system from corruption   
and intimidation4 ,persuasive influence1
 acting through the conscience of the   
voter1 and carrying his heart and mind  
with it1 is beneficial--therefore 7it is
 pretended7 coercive influence1 which   
compels him to forget that he is a moral
 agent1 or to act in opposition to his  
moral convictions1 ought not to be      
placed under restraint4  ,another word  
which is often turned into an instrument
 of the fallacy of ambiguity1 is        
,theory4 ,in its most proper            
acceptation1 theory means the completed 
result of philosophical induction from  
experience4 ,in that sense1 there are   

erroneous as well as true theories1 for 
induction may be incorrectly performed1 
but theory of some sort is the necessary
 result of knowing anything of a        
subject1 and having put one's knowledge 
into the form of general propositions   
for the guidance of practice4 ,in this1 
the proper sense of the word1 ,theory is
 the explanation of practice4 ,in       
another and a more vulgar sense1 theory 
means any mere fiction of the           
imagination1 endeavouring to conceive   
how a thing may possibly have been      
produced1 instead of examining how it   
was produced4 ,in this sense only are   
theory1 and theorists1 unsafe guides2   
but because of this1 ridicule or        
discredit is attempted to be attached to
 theory in its proper sense1 that is1 to
 legitimate generalization1 the end and 
aim of all philosophy2 and a conclusion 
is represented as worthless1 just       
because that has been done1 which if    
done correctly1 constitutes the highest 
worth that a principle for the guidance 

of practice can possess1 namely1 to     
comprehend in a few words the real law  
on which a phenomenon depends1 or some  
property or relation which is           
universally true of it4  ,the ,church is
 sometimes understood to mean the clergy
 alone1 sometimes the whole body of     
believers1 or at least of communicants4 
,the declamations respecting the        
inviolability of church property are    
indebted for the greater part of their  
apparent force to this ambiguity4 ,the  
clergy1 being called the church1 are    
supposed to be the real owners of what  
is called church property2 whereas they 
are in truth only the managing members  
of a much larger body of proprietors1   
and enjoy on their own part a mere      
usufruct1 not extending beyond a life   
interest4  ,the following is a ,stoical 
argument taken from ,cicero ,de         
,finibus1 book the third3 ,quod est     
bonum1 omne laudabile est4 ,quod autem  
laudabile est1 omne honestum est4 ,bonum
 igitur quod est1 honestum est4 ,here   

the ambiguous word is laudabile1 which  
in the minor premise means anything     
which mankind are accustomed1 on good   
grounds1 to admire or value2 as beauty1 
for instance1 or good fortune3 but in   
the major1 it denotes exclusively moral 
qualities4 ,in much the same manner the 
,stoics endeavoured logically to justify
 as philosophical truths1 their         
figurative and rhetorical expressions of
 ethical sentiment3 as that the virtuous
 man is alone free1 alone beautiful1    
alone a king1 c4 ,whoever has virtue has
 ,good 7because it has been previously  
determined not to call anything else    
good72 but1 again1 ,good necessarily    
includes freedom1 beauty1 and even      
kingship1 all these being good things2  
therefore whoever has virtue has all    
these4  ,the following is an argument of
 ,descartes to prove1 in his  priori    
manner1 the being of a ,god4 ,the       
conception1 says he1 of an infinite     
,being proves the real existence of such
 a being4 ,for if there is not really   

any such being1 ,i must have made the   
conception2 but if ,i could make it1 ,i 
can also unmake it2 which evidently is  
not true2 therefore there must be1      
externally to myself1 an archetype1 from
 which the conception was derived4 ,in  
this argument 7which1 it may be         
observed1 would equally prove the real  
existence of ghosts and of witches7 the 
ambiguity is in the pronoun ,i1 by      
which1 in one place1 is to be understood
 my will1 in another the laws of my     
nature4 ,if the conception1 existing as 
it does in my mind1 had no original     
without1 the conclusion would           
unquestionably follow that ,i made it2  
that is1 the laws of my nature must have
 somehow evolved it3 but that my will   
made it1 would not follow4 ,now when    
,descartes afterwards adds that ,i      
cannot unmake the conception1 he means  
that ,i cannot get rid of it by an act  
of my will3 which is true1 but is not   
the proposition required4 ,i can as much
 unmake this conception as ,i can any   

other3 no conception which ,i have once 
had1 can ,i ever dismiss by mere        
volition3 but what some of the laws of  
my nature have produced1 other laws1 or 
those same laws in other circumstances1 
may1 and often do1 subsequently efface4 
,analogous to this are some of the      
ambiguities in the free-will            
controversy2 which1 as they will come   
under special consideration in the      
concluding ,book1 ,i only mention memori
 caus4 ,in that discussion1 too1 the    
word ,i is often shifted from one       
meaning to another1 at one time standing
 for my volitions1 at another time for  
the actions which are the consequences  
of them1 or the mental dispositions from
 which they proceed4 ,the latter        
ambiguity is exemplified in an argument 
of ,coleridge 7in his ,aids to          
,reflection71 in support of the freedom 
of the will4 ,it is not true1 he says1  
that a man is governed by motives2 the  
man makes the motive1 not the motive the
 man2 the proof being that what is a    

strong motive to one man is no motive at
 all to another4 ,the premise is true1  
but only amounts to this1 that different
 persons have different degrees of      
susceptibility to the same motive2 as   
they have also to the same intoxicating 
liquid1 which however does not prove    
that they are free to be drunk or not   
drunk1 whatever quantity of the fluid   
they may drink4 ,what is proved is1 that
 certain mental conditions in the person
 himself1 must co-operate1 in the       
production of the act1 with the external
 inducement3 but those mental conditions
 also are the effect of causes2 and     
there is nothing in the argument to     
prove that they can arise without a     
cause--that a spontaneous determination 
of the will1 without any cause at all1  
ever takes place1 as the free-will      
doctrine supposes4  ,the double use1 in 
the free-will controversy1 of the word  
,necessity1 which sometimes stands only 
for ,certainty1 at other times for      
,compulsion2 sometimes for what cannot  

be prevented1 at other times only for   
what we have reason to be assured will  
not2 we shall have occasion hereafter to
 pursue to some of its ulterior         
consequences4  ,a most important        
ambiguity1 both in common and in        
metaphysical language1 is thus pointed  
out by ,archbishop ,whately in the      
,appendix to his ,logic3 ,same 7as well 
as ,one1 ,identical1 and other words    
derived from them17 is used frequently  
in a sense very different from its      
primary one1 as applicable to a single  
object2 being employed to denote great  
similarity4 ,when several objects are   
undistinguishably alike1 one single     
description will apply equally to any of
 them2 and thence they are said to be   
all of one and the same nature1         
appearance1 c4 ,as1 e4g4 when we say    
'this house is built of the same stone  
with such another1' we only mean that   
the stones are undistinguishable in     
their qualities2 not that the one       
building was pulled down1 and the other 

constructed with the materials4 ,whereas
 sameness1 in the primary sense1 does   
not even necessarily imply similarity2  
for if we say of any man that he is     
greatly altered since such a time1 we   
understand1 and indeed imply by the very
 expression1 that he is one person1     
though different in several qualities4  
,it is worth observing also1 that ,same1
 in the secondary sense1 admits1        
according to popular usage1 of degrees3 
we speak of two things being nearly the 
same1 but not entirely3 personal        
identity does not admit of degrees4     
,nothing1 perhaps1 has contributed more 
to the error of ,realism than           
inattention to this ambiguity4 ,when    
several persons are said to have one and
 the same opinion1 thought1 or idea1    
many men1 overlooking the true simple   
statement of the case1 which is1 that   
they are all thinking alike1 look for   
something more abstruse and mystical1   
and imagine there must be some ,one     
,thing1 in the primary sense1 though not

 an individual1 which is present at once
 in the mind of each of these persons2  
and thence readily sprung ,plato's      
theory of ,ideas1 each of which was1    
according to him1 one real1 eternal     
object1 existing entire and complete in 
each of the individual objects that are 
known by one name4  ,it is1 indeed1 not 
a matter of inference but of authentic  
history1 that ,plato's doctrine of      
,ideas1 and the ,aristotelian doctrine  
7in this respect similar to the         
,platonic7 of substantial forms and     
second substances1 grew up in the       
precise way here pointed out2 from the  
supposed necessity of finding1 in things
 which were said to have the same       
nature1 or the same qualities1 something
 which was the same in the very sense in
 which a man is the same as himself4    
,all the idle speculations respecting   
,greek3 to on1 to hen1 to homoion1 and  
similar abstractions1 so common in the  
ancient and in some modern schools of   
thought1 sprang from the same source4   

,the ,aristotelian logicians saw1       
however1 one case of the ambiguity1 and 
provided against it with their peculiar 
felicity in the invention of technical  
language1 when they distinguished things
 which differed both specie and numero1 
from those which differed numero tantum1
 that is1 which were exactly alike 7in  
some particular respect at least7 but   
were distinct individuals4 ,an extension
 of this distinction to the two meanings
 of the word ,same1 namely1 things which
 are the same specie tantum1 and a thing
 which is the same numero as well as    
specie1 would have prevented the        
confusion which has been a source of so 
much darkness and such an abundance of  
positive error in metaphysical          
philosophy4  ,one of the most singular  
examples of the length to which a       
thinker of eminence may be led away by  
an ambiguity of language1 is afforded by
 this very case4 ,i refer to the famous 
argument by which ,bishop ,berkeley     
flattered himself that he had for ever  

put an end to scepticism1 atheism1 and  
irreligion4 ,it is briefly as follows4  
,i thought of a thing yesterday2 ,i     
ceased to think of it2 ,i think of it   
again to-day4 ,i had1 therefore1 in my  
mind yesterday an idea of the object2 ,i
 have also an idea of it to-day2 this   
idea is evidently not another1 but the  
very same idea4 ,yet an intervening time
 elapsed in which ,i had it not4 ,where 
was the idea during this interval8 ,it  
must have been somewhere2 it did not    
cease to exist2 otherwise the idea ,i   
had yesterday could not be the same     
idea2 no more than the man ,i see alive 
to-day can be the same whom ,i saw      
yesterday1 if the man has died in the   
meanwhile4 ,now an idea cannot be       
conceived to exist anywhere except in a 
mind2 and hence there must exist an     
,universal ,mind1 in which all ideas    
have their permanent residence1 during  
the intervals of their conscious        
presence in our own minds4  ,it is      
evident that ,berkeley here confounded  

sameness numero with sameness specie1   
that is1 with exact resemblance1 and    
assumed the former where there was only 
the latter2 not perceiving that when we 
say we have the same thought to-day     
which we had yesterday1 we do not mean  
the same individual thought1 but a      
thought exactly similar3 as we say that 
we have the same illness which we had   
last year1 meaning only the same sort of
 illness4  ,in one remarkable instance  
the scientific world was divided into   
two furiously hostile parties by an     
ambiguity of language affecting a branch
 of science which1 more completely than 
most others1 enjoys the advantage of a  
precise and well-defined terminology4 ,i
 refer to the famous dispute respecting 
the vis viva1 the history of which is   
given at large in ,professor ,playfair's
 ,dissertation4 ,the question was1      
whether the force of a moving body was  
proportional 7its mass being given7 to  
its velocity simply1 or to the square of
 its velocity3 and the ambiguity was in 

the word ,force4 ,one of the effects1   
says ,playfair1 produced by a moving    
body is proportional to the square of   
the velocity1 while another is          
proportional to the velocity simply3    
from whence clearer thinkers were       
subsequently led to establish a double  
measure of the efficiency of a moving   
power1 one being called vis viva1 and   
the other momentum4 ,about the facts1   
both parties were from the first agreed3
 the only question was1 with which of   
the two effects the term force should   
be1 or could most conveniently be1      
associated4 ,but the disputants were by 
no means aware that this was all2 they  
thought that force was one thing1 the   
production of effects another2 and the  
question1 by which set of effects the   
force which produced both the one and   
the other should be measured1 was       
supposed to be a question not of        
terminology but of fact4  ,the ambiguity
 of the word ,infinite is the real      
fallacy in the amusing logical puzzle of

 ,achilles and the ,tortoise1 a puzzle  
which has been too hard for the         
ingenuity or patience of many           
philosophers1 and which no less a       
thinker than ,sir ,william ,hamilton    
considered as insoluble2 as a sound     
argument1 though leading to a palpable  
falsehood4 ,the fallacy1 as ,hobbes     
hinted1 lies in the tacit assumption    
that whatever is infinitely divisible is
 infinite2 but the following solution1  
7to the invention of which ,i have no   
claim17 is more precise and             
satisfactory4  ,the argument is1 let    
,achilles run ten times as fast as the  
tortoise1 yet if the tortoise has the   
start1 ,achilles will never overtake    
him4 ,for suppose them to be at first   
separated by an interval of a thousand  
feet3 when ,achilles has run these      
thousand feet1 the tortoise will have   
got on a hundred2 when ,achilles has run
 those hundred1 the tortoise will have  
run ten1 and so on for ever3 therefore  
,achilles may run for ever without      

overtaking the tortoise4  ,now1 the for 
ever1 in the conclusion1 means1 for any 
length of time that can be supposed2 but
 in the premises ever does not mean any 
length of time3 it means any number of  
subdivisions of time4 ,it means that we 
may divide a thousand feet by ten1 and  
that quotient again by ten1 and so on as
 often as we please2 that there never   
needs be an end to the subdivisions of  
the distance1 nor consequently to those 
of the time in which it is performed4   
,but an unlimited number of subdivisions
 may be made of that which is itself    
limited4 ,the argument proves no other  
infinity of duration than may be        
embraced within five minutes4 ,as long  
as the five minutes are not expired1    
what remains of them may be divided by  
ten1 and again by ten1 as often as we   
like1 which is perfectly compatible with
 their being only five minutes          
altogether4 ,it proves1 in short1 that  
to pass through this finite space       
requires a time which is infinitely     

divisible1 but not an infinite time3 the
 confounding of which distinction       
,hobbes had already seen to be the gist 
of the fallacy4  ,the following         
ambiguities of the word right 7in       
addition to the obvious and familiar one
 of a right and the adjective right7 are
 extracted from a forgotten paper of my 
own1 in a periodical3--  ,speaking      
morally1 you are said to have a right to
 do a thing1 if all persons are morally 
bound not to hinder you from doing it4  
,but1 in another sense1 to have a right 
to do a thing is the opposite of having 
no right to do it1 i4e4 of being under a
 moral obligation to forbear doing it4  
,in this sense1 to say that you have a  
right to do a thing1 means that you may 
do it without any breach of duty on your
 part2 that other persons not only ought
 not to hinder you1 but have no cause to
 think worse of you for doing it4 ,this 
is a perfectly distinct proposition from
 the preceding4 ,the right which you    
have by virtue of a duty incumbent upon 

other persons1 is obviously quite a     
different thing from a right consisting 
in the absence of any duty incumbent    
upon yourself4 ,yet the two things are  
perpetually confounded4 ,thus a man will
 say he has a right to publish his      
opinions2 which may be true in this     
sense1 that it would be a breach of duty
 in any other person to interfere and   
prevent the publication3 but he assumes 
thereupon1 that in publishing his       
opinions1 he himself violates no duty2  
which may either be true or false1      
depending1 as it does1 on his having    
taken due pains to satisfy himself1     
first1 that the opinions are true1 and  
next1 that their publication in this    
manner1 and at this particular juncture1
 will probably be beneficial to the     
interests of truth on the whole4  ,the  
second ambiguity is that of confounding 
a right of any kind1 with a right to    
enforce that right by resisting or      
punishing a violation of it4 ,people    
will say1 for example1 that they have a 

right to good government1 which is      
undeniably true1 it being the moral duty
 of their governors to govern them well4
 ,but in granting this1 you are supposed
 to have admitted their right or liberty
 to turn out their governors1 and       
perhaps to punish them1 for having      
failed in the performance of this duty2 
which1 far from being the same thing1 is
 by no means universally true1 but      
depends on an immense number of varying 
circumstances1 requiring to be          
conscientiously weighed before adopting 
or acting on such a resolution4 ,this   
last example is 7like others which have 
been cited7 a case of fallacy within    
fallacy2 it involves not only the second
 of the two ambiguities pointed out1 but
 the first likewise4  ,one not unusual  
form of the ,fallacy of ,ambiguous      
,terms1 is known technically as the     
,fallacy of ,composition and ,division3 
when the same term is collective in the 
premises1 distributive in the           
conclusion1 or vice vers3 or when the   

middle term is collective in one        
premise1 distributive in the other4 ,as 
if one were to say 7,i quote from       
,archbishop ,whately7 ,all the angles of
 a triangle are equal to two right      
angles3 ,,abc is an angle of a triangle2
 therefore ,,abc is equal to two right  
angles4444 ,there is no fallacy more    
common1 or more likely to deceive1 than 
the one now before us4 ,the form in     
which it is most usually employed is to 
establish some truth1 separately1       
concerning each single member of a      
certain class1 and thence to infer the  
same of the whole collectively4 ,as in  
the argument one sometimes hears1 to    
prove that the world could do without   
great men4 ,if ,columbus 7it is said7   
had never lived1 ,america would still   
have been discovered1 at most only a few
 years later2 if ,newton had never      
lived1 some other person would have     
discovered the law of gravitation2 and  
so forth4 ,most true3 these things would
 have been done1 but in all probability 

not until some one had again been found 
with the qualities of ,columbus or      
,newton4 ,because any one great man     
might have had his place supplied by    
other great men1 the argument concludes 
that all great men could have been      
dispensed with4 ,the term great men is  
distributive in the premises and        
collective in the conclusion4  ,such    
also is the fallacy which probably      
operates on most adventurers in         
lotteries2 e4g4 'the gaining of a high  
prize is no uncommon occurrence2 and    
what is no uncommon occurrence may      
reasonably be expected2 therefore the   
gaining of a high prize may reasonably  
be expected3' the conclusion when       
applied to the individual 7as in        
practice it is7 must be understood in   
the sense of 'reasonably expected by a  
certain individual2' therefore for the  
major premise to be true1 the middle    
term must be understood to mean1 'no    
uncommon occurrence to some one         
particular person2' whereas for the     

minor 7which has been placed first7 to  
be true1 you must understand it of 'no  
uncommon occurrence to some one or      
other2' and thus you will have the      
,fallacy of ,composition4  ,this is a   
,fallacy with which men are extremely   
apt to deceive themselves2 for when a   
multitude of particulars are presented  
to the mind1 many are too weak or too   
indolent to take a comprehensive view of
 them1 but confine their attention to   
each single point1 by turns2 and then   
decide1 infer1 and act1 accordingly3    
e4g4 the imprudent spendthrift1 finding 
that he is able to afford this1 or that1
 or the other expense1 forgets that all 
of them together will ruin him4 ,the    
debauchee destroys his health by        
successive acts of intemperance1 because
 no one of those acts would be of itself
 sufficient to do him any serious harm4 
,a sick person reasons with himself1    
one1 and another1 and another1 of my    
symptoms1 do not prove that ,i have a   
fatal disease2 and practically concludes

 that all taken together do not prove   
it4    #b4 ,we have now sufficiently    
exemplified one of the principal ,genera
 in this ,order of ,fallacies2 where1   
the source of error being the ambiguity 
of terms1 the premises are verbally what
 is required to support the conclusion1 
but not really so4 ,in the second great 
,fallacy of ,confusion they are neither 
verbally nor really sufficient1 though1 
from their multiplicity and confused    
arrangement1 and still oftener from     
defect of memory1 they are not seen to  
be what they are4 ,the fallacy ,i mean  
is that of ,petitio ,principii1 or      
begging the question2 including the more
 complex and not uncommon variety of it1
 which is termed ,reasoning in a        
,circle4  ,petitio ,principii1 as       
defined by ,archbishop ,whately1 is the 
fallacy in which the premise either     
appears manifestly to be the same as the
 conclusion1 or is actually proved from 
the conclusion1 or is such as would     
naturally and properly so be proved4 ,by

 the last clause ,i presume is meant1   
that it is not susceptible of any other 
proof2 for otherwise1 there would be no 
fallacy4 ,to deduce from a proposition1 
propositions from which it would itself 
more naturally be deduced1 is often an  
allowable deviation from the usual      
didactic order2 or at most1 what1 by an 
adaptation of a phrase familiar to      
mathematicians1 may be called a logical 
inelegance4#ce  ,the employment of a    
proposition to prove that on which it is
 itself dependent for proof1 by no means
 implies the degree of mental imbecility
 which might at first be supposed4 ,the 
difficulty of comprehending how this    
fallacy could possibly be committed1    
disappears when we reflect that all     
persons1 even the instructed1 hold a    
great number of opinions without exactly
 recollecting how they came by them4    
,believing that they have at some former
 time verified them by sufficient       
evidence1 but having forgotten what the 
evidence was1 they may easily be        

betrayed into deducing from them the    
very propositions which are alone       
capable of serving as premises for their
 establishment4 ,as if1 says ,archbishop
 ,whately1 one should attempt to prove  
the being of a ,god from the authority  
of ,holy ,writ2 which might easily      
happen to one with whom both doctrines1 
as fundamental tenets of his religious  
creed1 stand on the same ground of      
familiar and traditional belief4        
,arguing in a circle1 however1 is a     
stronger case of the fallacy1 and       
implies more than the mere passive      
reception of a premise by one who does  
not remember how it is to be proved4 ,it
 implies an actual attempt to prove two 
propositions reciprocally from one      
another2 and is seldom resorted to1 at  
least in express terms1 by any person in
 his own speculations1 but is committed 
by those who1 being hard pressed by an  
adversary1 are forced into giving       
reasons for an opinion of which1 when   
they began to argue1 they had not       

sufficiently considered the grounds4 ,as
 in the following example from          
,archbishop ,whately3 ,some mechanicians
 attempt to prove 7what they ought to   
lay down as a probable but doubtful     
hypothesis#cf7 that every particle of   
matter gravitates equally3 'why8'       
'because those bodies which contain more
 particles ever gravitate more strongly1
 i4e4 are heavier3' 'but1 7it may be    
urged17 those which are heaviest are not
 always more bulky2' 'no1 but they      
contain more particles1 though more     
closely condensed3' 'how do you know    
that8' 'because they are heavier3' 'how 
does that prove it8' 'because all       
particles of matter gravitating equally1
 that mass which is specifically the    
heavier must needs have the more of them
 in the same space4' ,it appears to me  
that the fallacious reasoner1 in his    
private thoughts1 would not be likely to
 proceed beyond the first step4 ,he     
would acquiesce in the sufficiency of   
the reason first given1 bodies which    

contain more particles are heavier4 ,it 
is when he finds this questioned1 and is
 called upon to prove it1 without       
knowing how1 that he tries to establish 
his premise by supposing proved what he 
is attempting to prove by it4 ,the most 
effectual way1 in fact1 of exposing a   
,petitio ,principii1 when circumstances 
allow of it1 is by challenging the      
reasoner to prove his premises2 which if
 he attempts to do1 he is necessarily   
driven into arguing in a circle4  ,it is
 not uncommon1 however1 for thinkers1   
and those not of the lowest description1
 to be led1 even in their own thoughts1 
not indeed into formally proving each of
 two propositions from the other1 but   
into admitting propositions which can   
only be so proved4 ,in the preceding    
example the two together form a complete
 and consistent1 though hypothetical1   
explanation of the facts concerned4 ,and
 the tendency to mistake mutual         
coherency for truth2 to trust one's     
safety to a strong chain though it has  

no point of support2 is at the bottom of
 much which1 when reduced to the strict 
forms of argumentation1 can exhibit     
itself no otherwise than as reasoning in
 a circle4 ,all experience bears        
testimony to the enthralling effect of  
neat concatenation in a system of       
doctrines1 and the difficulty with which
 people admit the persuasion that       
anything which holds so well together   
can possibly fall4  ,since every case   
where a conclusion which can only be    
proved from certain premises is used for
 the proof of those premises1 is a case 
of petitio principii1 that fallacy      
includes a very great proportion of all 
incorrect reasoning4 ,it is necessary1  
for completing our view of the fallacy1 
to exemplify some of the disguises under
 which it is accustomed to mask itself1 
and to escape exposure4  ,a proposition 
would not be admitted by any person in  
his senses as a corollary from itself1  
unless it were expressed in language    
which made it seem different4 ,one of   

the commonest modes of so expressing it1
 is to present the proposition itself in
 abstract terms1 as a proof of the same 
proposition expressed in concrete       
language4 ,this is a very frequent mode1
 not only of pretended proof1 but of    
pretended explanation2 and is parodied  
when ,molire makes one of his absurd    
physicians say1 l'opium endormit        
parcequ'il a une vertu soporifique1 or1 
in the equivalent doggrel1         ,mihi
  docto doctore1        ,domandatur     
causam et rationem quare      ,opium    
facit dormire4        ,a quoi respondeo1
        ,quia est in eo        ,virtus  
dormitiva1      ,cujus est natura       
,sensus assoupire4  ,the words ,nature  
and ,essence are grand instruments of   
this mode of begging the question4 ,as  
in the well-known argument of the       
scholastic theologians1 that the mind   
thinks always1 because the essence of   
the mind is to think4 ,locke had to     
point out1 that if by essence is here   
meant some property which must manifest 

itself by actual exercise at all times1 
the premise is a direct assumption of   
the conclusion2 while if it only means  
that to think is the distinctive        
property of a mind1 there is no         
connexion between the premise and the   
conclusion1 since it is not necessary   
that a distinctive property should be   
perpetually in action4  ,the following  
is one of the modes in which these      
abstract terms1 ,nature and ,essence1   
are used as instruments of this fallacy4
 ,some particular properties of a thing 
are selected1 more or less arbitrarily1 
to be termed its nature or essence2 and 
when this has been done1 these          
properties are supposed to be invested  
with a kind of indefeasibleness2 to have
 become paramount to all the other      
properties of the thing1 and incapable  
of being prevailed over or counteracted 
by them4 ,as when ,aristotle1 in a      
passage already cited1 decides that     
there is no void on such arguments as   
this3 in a void there could be no       

difference of up and down2 for as in    
nothing there are no differences1 so    
there are none in a privation or        
negation2 but a void is merely a        
privation or negation of matter2        
therefore1 in a void1 bodies could not  
move up and down1 which it is in their  
nature to do4#cg ,in other words2 it is 
in the nature of bodies to move up and  
down1 ergo any physical fact which      
supposes them not so to move1 cannot be 
authentic4 ,this mode of reasoning1 by  
which a bad generalization is made to   
overrule all facts which contradict it1 
is petitio principii in one of its most 
palpable forms4  ,none of the modes of  
assuming what should be proved are in   
more frequent use than what are termed  
by ,bentham question-begging            
appellatives2 names which beg the       
question under the disguise of stating  
it4 ,the most potent of these are such  
as have a laudatory or vituperative     
character4 ,for instance1 in politics1  
the word ,innovation4 ,the dictionary   

meaning of this term being merely a     
change to something new1 it is difficult
 for the defenders even of the most     
salutary improvement to deny that it is 
an innovation2 yet the word having      
acquired in common usage a vituperative 
connotation in addition to its          
dictionary meaning1 the admission is    
always construed as a large concession  
to the disadvantage of the thing        
proposed4  ,the following passage from  
the argument in refutation of the       
,epicureans1 in the second book of      
,cicero de ,finibus1 affords a fine     
example of this sort of fallacy4 ,et    
quidem illud ipsum non nimium probo 7et 
tantum patior7 philosophum loqui de     
cupiditatibus finiendis4 ,an potest     
cupiditas finiri8 tollenda est1 atque   
extrahenda radicitus4 ,quis est enim1 in
 quo sit cupiditas1 quin recte cupidus  
dici possit8 ,ergo et avarus erit1 sed  
finite3 adulter1 verum habebit modum3 et
 luxuriosus eodem modo4 ,qualis ista    
philosophia est1 qu non interitum       

afferat pravitatis1 sed sit contenta    
mediocritate vitiorum8 ,the question    
was1 whether certain desires1 when kept 
within bounds1 are vices or not2 and the
 argument decides the point by applying 
to them a word 7cupiditas7 which implies
 vice4 ,it is shown1 however1 in the    
remarks which follow1 that ,cicero did  
not intend this as a serious argument1  
but as a criticism on what he deemed an 
inappropriate expression4 ,rem ipsam    
prorsus probo3 elegantiam desidero4     
,appellet hc desideria natur2           
cupiditatis nomen servet alio1 c4 ,but  
many persons1 both ancient and modern1  
have employed this1 or something        
equivalent to it1 as a real and         
conclusive argument4 ,we may remark that
 the passage respecting cupiditas and   
cupidus is also an example of another   
fallacy already noticed1 that of        
,paronymous ,terms4  ,many more of the  
arguments of the ancient moralists1 and 
especially of the ,stoics1 fall within  
the definition of ,petitio ,principii4  

,in the ,de ,finibus1 for example1 which
 ,i continue to quote as being probably 
the best extant exemplification at once 
of the doctrines and the methods of the 
schools of philosophy existing at that  
time2 of what value as arguments are    
such pleas as those of ,cato in the     
third book3 ,that if virtue were not    
happiness1 it could not be a thing to   
boast of3 ,that if death or pain were   
evils1 it would be impossible not to    
fear them1 and it could not1 therefore1 
be laudable to despise them1 c4 ,in one 
way of viewing these arguments1 they may
 be regarded as appeals to the authority
 of the general sentiment of mankind1   
which had stamped its approval upon     
certain actions and characters by the   
phrases referred to2 but that such could
 have been the meaning intended is very 
unlikely1 considering the contempt of   
the ancient philosophers for vulgar     
opinion4 ,in any other sense they are   
clear cases of ,petitio ,principii1     
since the word laudable1 and the idea of

 boasting1 imply principles of conduct2 
and practical maxims can only be proved 
from speculative truths1 namely from the
 properties of the subject matter1 and  
cannot1 therefore1 be employed to prove 
those properties4 ,as well might it be  
argued that a government is good because
 we ought to support it1 or that there  
is a ,god because it is our duty to pray
 to him4  ,it is assumed by all the     
disputants in the ,de ,finibus as the   
foundation of the inquiry into the      
summum bonum1 that sapiens semper beatus
 est4 ,not simply that wisdom gives the 
best chance of happiness1 or that wisdom
 consists in knowing what happiness is1 
and by what things it is promoted2 these
 propositions would not have been enough
 for them3--but that the sage always is1
 and must of necessity be1 happy4 ,the  
idea that wisdom could be consistent    
with unhappiness1 was always rejected as
 inadmissible3 the reason assigned by   
one of the interlocutors1 near the      
beginning of the third book1 being1 that

 if the wise could be unhappy1 there was
 little use in pursuing wisdom4 ,but by 
unhappiness they did not mean pain or   
suffering2 to that1 it was granted that 
the wisest person was liable in common  
with others3 he was happy1 because in   
possessing wisdom he had the most       
valuable of all possessions1 the most to
 be sought and prized of all things1 and
 to possess the most valuable thing was 
to be the most happy4 ,by laying it     
down1 therefore1 at the commencement of 
the inquiry1 that the sage must be      
happy1 the disputed question respecting 
the summum bonum was in fact begged2    
with the further assumption1 that pain  
and suffering1 so far as they can       
coexist with wisdom1 are not            
unhappiness1 and are no evil4  ,the     
following are additional instances of   
,petitio ,principii1 under more or less 
of disguise4  ,plato1 in the ,sophistes1
 attempts to prove that things may exist
 which are incorporeal1 by the argument 
that justice and wisdom are incorporeal1

 and justice and wisdom must be         
something4 ,here1 if by something be    
meant1 as ,plato did in fact mean1 a    
thing capable of existing in and by     
itself1 and not as a quality of some    
other thing1 he begs the question in    
asserting that justice and wisdom must  
be something3 if he means anything else1
 his conclusion is not proved4 ,this    
fallacy might also be classed under     
ambiguous middleterm3 something1 in the 
one premise1 meaning some substance1 in 
the other merely some object of thought1
 whether substance or attribute4  ,it   
was formerly an argument employed in    
proof of what is now no longer a popular
 doctrine1 the infinite divisibility of 
matter1 that every portion of matter1   
however small1 must at least have an    
upper and an under surface4 ,those who  
used this argument did not see that it  
assumed the very point in dispute1 the  
impossibility of arriving at a minimum  
of thickness2 for if there be a minimum1
 its upper and under surface will of    

course be one3 it will be itself a      
surface1 and no more4 ,the argument owes
 its very considerable plausibility to  
this1 that the premise does actually    
seem more obvious than the conclusion1  
though really identical with it4 ,as    
expressed in the premise1 the           
proposition appeals directly and in     
concrete language to the incapacity of  
the human imagination for conceiving a  
minimum4 ,viewed in this light1 it      
becomes a case of the  priori fallacy or
 natural prejudice1 that whatever cannot
 be conceived cannot exist4 ,every      
fallacy of ,confusion 7it is almost     
unnecessary to repeat7 will1 if cleared 
up1 become a fallacy of some other sort2
 and it will be found of deductive or   
ratiocinative fallacies generally1 that 
when they mislead1 there is mostly1 as  
in this case1 a fallacy of some other   
description lurking under them1 by      
virtue of which chiefly it is that the  
verbal juggle1 which is the outside or  
body of this kind of fallacy1 passes    

undetected4  ,euler's ,algebra1 a book  
otherwise of great merit1 but full1 to  
overflowing1 of logical errors in       
respect to the foundation of the        
science1 contains the following argument
 to prove that minus multiplied by minus
 gives plus1 a doctrine the opprobrium  
of all mere mathematicians1 and which   
,euler had not a glimpse of the true    
method of proving4 ,he says1 minus      
multiplied by minus cannot give minus2  
for minus multiplied by plus gives      
minus1 and minus multiplied by minus    
cannot give the same product as minus   
multiplied by plus4 ,now one is obliged 
to ask1 why minus multiplied by minus   
must give any product at all8 and if it 
does1 why its product cannot be the same
 as that of minus multiplied by plus8   
for this would seem1 at the first       
glance1 not more absurd than that minus 
by minus should give the same as plus by
 plus1 the proposition which ,euler     
prefers to it4 ,the premise requires    
proof1 as much as the conclusion3 nor   

can it be proved1 except by that more   
comprehensive view of the nature of     
multiplication1 and of algebraic        
processes in general1 which would also  
supply a far better proof of the        
mysterious doctrine which ,euler is here
 endeavouring to demonstrate4  ,a       
striking instance of reasoning in a     
circle is that of some ethical writers1 
who first take for their standard of    
moral truth what1 being the general1    
they deem to be the natural or          
instinctive sentiments and perceptions  
of mankind1 and then explain away the   
numerous instances of divergence from   
their assumed standard1 by representing 
them as cases in which the perceptions  
are unhealthy4 ,some particular mode of 
conduct or feeling is affirmed to be    
unnatural2 why8 because it is abhorrent 
to the universal and natural sentiments 
of mankind4 ,finding no such sentiment  
in yourself1 you question the fact2 and 
the answer is 7if your antagonist is    
polite71 that you are an exception1 a   

peculiar case4 ,but neither 7say you7 do
 ,i find in the people of some other    
country1 or of some former age1 any such
 feeling of abhorrence2 ay1 but their   
feelings were sophisticated and         
unhealthy4  ,one of the most notable    
specimens of reasoning in a circle is   
the doctrine of ,hobbes1 ,rousseau1 and 
others1 which rests the obligations by  
which human beings are bound as members 
of society1 on a supposed social        
compact4 ,i wave the consideration of   
the fictitious nature of the compact    
itself2 but when ,hobbes1 through the   
whole ,leviathan1 elaborately deduces   
the obligation of obeying the sovereign1
 not from the necessity or utility of   
doing so1 but from a promise supposed to
 have been made by our ancestors1 on    
renouncing savage life and agreeing to  
establish political society1 it is      
impossible not to retort by the         
question1 why are we bound to keep a    
promise made for us by others8 or why   
bound to keep a promise at all8 ,no     

satisfactory ground can be assigned for 
the obligation1 except the mischievous  
consequences of the absence of faith and
 mutual confidence among mankind4 ,we   
are1 therefore1 brought round to the    
interests of society1 as the ultimate   
ground of the obligation of a promise2  
and yet those interests are not admitted
 to be a sufficient justification for   
the existence of government and law4    
,without a promise it is thought that we
 should not be bound to that which is   
implied in all modes of living in       
society1 namely1 to yield a general     
obedience to the laws therein           
established2 and so necessary is the    
promise deemed1 that if none has        
actually been made1 some additional     
safety is supposed to be given to the   
foundations of society by feigning one4 
#c4 ,two principal subdivisions of the  
class of ,fallacies of ,confusion having
 been disposed of2 there remains a      
third1 in which the confusion is not1 as
 in the ,fallacy of ,ambiguity1 in      

misconceiving the import of the         
premises1 nor1 as in ,petitio           
,principii1 in forgetting what the      
premises are1 but in mistaking the      
conclusion which is to be proved4 ,this 
is the fallacy of ,ignoratio ,elenchi1  
in the widest sense of the phrase2 also 
called by ,archbishop ,whately the      
,fallacy of ,irrelevant ,conclusion4    
,his examples and remarks are highly    
worthy of citation4  ,various kinds of  
propositions are1 according to the      
occasion1 substituted for the one of    
which proof is required3 sometimes the  
particular for the universal2 sometimes 
a proposition with different terms2 and 
various are the contrivances employed to
 effect and to conceal this             
substitution1 and to make the conclusion
 which the sophist has drawn1 answer    
practically the same purpose as the one 
he ought to have established4 ,we say1  
'practically the same purpose1' because 
it will very often happen that some     
emotion will be excited1 some sentiment 

impressed on the mind1 7by a dexterous  
employment of this fallacy71 such as    
shall bring men into the disposition    
requisite for your purpose2 though they 
may not have assented to1 or even stated
 distinctly in their own minds1 the     
proposition which it was your business  
to establish4 ,thus if a sophist has to 
defend one who has been guilty of some  
serious offence1 which he wishes to     
extenuate1 though he is unable          
distinctly to prove that it is not such1
 yet if he can succeed in making the    
audience laugh at some casual matter1 he
 has gained practically the same point4 
,so also if any one has pointed out the 
extenuating circumstances in some       
particular case of offence1 so as to    
show that it differs widely from the    
generality of the same class1 the       
sophist if he find himself unable to    
disprove these circumstances1 may do    
away the force of them1 by simply       
referring the action to that very class1
 which no one can deny that it belongs  

to1 and the very name of which will     
excite a feeling of disgust sufficient  
to counteract the extenuation2 e4g4 let 
it be a case of peculation1 and that    
many mitigating circumstances have been 
brought forward which cannot be denied2 
the sophistical opponent will reply1    
',well1 but after all1 the man is a     
rogue1 and there is an end of it2' now  
in reality this was 7by hypothesis7     
never the question2 and the mere        
assertion of what was never denied1     
ought not1 in fairness1 to be regarded  
as decisive3 but1 practically1 the      
odiousness of the word1 arising in great
 measure from the association of those  
very circumstances which belong to most 
of the class1 but which we have supposed
 to be absent in this particular        
instance1 excites precisely that feeling
 of disgust1 which in effect destroys   
the force of the defence4 ,in like      
manner we may refer to this head all    
cases of improper appeal to the         
passions1 and everything else which is  

mentioned by ,aristotle as extraneous to
 the matter in hand 7,greek3 ex tou     
pragmatos74  ,again1 instead of proving 
that 'this prisoner has committed an    
atrocious fraud1' you prove that the    
fraud he is accused of is atrocious3    
instead of proving 7as in the well-known
 tale of ,cyrus and the two coats7 that 
the taller boy had a right to force the 
other boy to exchange coats with him1   
you prove that the exchange would have  
been advantageous to both3 instead of   
proving that the poor ought to be       
relieved in this way rather than in     
that1 you prove that the poor ought to  
be relieved3 instead of proving that the
 irrational agent--whether a brute or a 
madman--can never be deterred from any  
act by apprehension of punishment 7as   
for instance a dog from sheep-biting1 by
 fear of being beaten71 you prove that  
the beating of one dog does not operate 
as an example to other dogs1 c4  ,it is 
evident that ignoratio elenchi may be   
employed as well for the apparent       

refutation of your opponent's           
proposition1 as for the apparent        
establishment of your own2 for it is    
substantially the same thing1 to prove  
what was not denied or to disprove what 
was not asserted4 ,the latter practice  
is not less common1 and it is more      
offensive1 because it frequently amounts
 to a personal affront1 in attributing  
to a person1 opinions1 c41 which he     
perhaps holds in abhorrence4 ,thus1 when
 in a discussion one party vindicates1  
on the ground of general expediency1 a  
particular instance of resistance to    
government in a case of intolerable     
oppression1 the opponent may gravely    
maintain1 'that we ought not to do evil 
that good may come2' a proposition which
 of course had never been denied1 the   
point in dispute being1 'whether        
resistance in this particular case were 
doing evil or not4' ,or again1 by way of
 disproving the assertion of the right  
of private judgment in religion1 one may
 hear a grave argument to prove that 'it

 is impossible every one can be right in
 his judgment4'  ,the works of          
controversial writers are seldom free   
from this fallacy4 ,the attempts1 for   
instance1 to disprove the population    
doctrines of ,malthus1 have been mostly 
cases of ignoratio elenchi4 ,malthus has
 been supposed to be refuted if it could
 be shown that in some countries or ages
 population has been nearly stationary2 
as if he had asserted that population   
always increases in a given ratio1 or   
had not expressly declared that it      
increases only in so far as it is not   
restrained by prudence1 or kept down by 
poverty and disease4 ,or1 perhaps1 a    
collection of facts is produced to prove
 that in some one country the people are
 better off with a dense population than
 they are in another country with a thin
 one2 or that the people have become    
more numerous and better off at the same
 time4 ,as if the assertion were that a 
dense population could not possibly be  
well off3 as if it were not part of the 

very doctrine1 and essential to it1 that
 where there is a more abundant capital 
there may be a greater population       
without any increase of poverty1 or even
 with a diminution of it4  ,the         
favourite argument against ,berkeley's  
theory of the non-existence of matter1  
and the most popularly effective1 next  
to a grin#ch--;an argument1 moreover1   
which is not confined to coxcombs1 nor  
to men like ,samuel ,johnson1 whose     
greatly overrated ability certainly did 
not lie in the direction of metaphysical
 speculation1 but is the stock argument 
of the ,scotch school of                
metaphysicians--is a palpable ignoratio 
elenchi4 ,the argument is perhaps as    
frequently expressed by gesture as by   
words1 and one of its commonest forms   
consists in knocking a stick against the
 ground4 ,this short and easy           
confutation overlooks the fact1 that in 
denying matter1 ,berkeley did not deny  
anything to which our senses bear       
witness1 and therefore cannot be        

answered by any appeal to them4 ,his    
scepticism related to the supposed      
substratum1 or hidden cause of the      
appearances perceived by our senses3 the
 evidence of which1 whatever may be     
thought of its conclusiveness1 is       
certainly not the evidence of sense4    
,and it will always remain a signal     
proof of the want of metaphysical       
profundity of ,reid1 ,stewart1 and1 ,i  
am sorry to add1 of ,brown1 that they   
should have persisted in asserting that 
,berkeley1 if he believed his own       
doctrine1 was bound to walk into the    
kennel1 or run his head against a post4 
,as if persons who do not recognise an  
occult cause of their sensations1 could 
not possibly believe that a fixed order 
subsists among the sensations           
themselves4 ,such a want of             
comprehension of the distinction between
 a thing and its sensible manifestation1
 or1 in metaphysical language1 between  
the noumenon and the phenomenon1 would  
be impossible to even the dullest       

disciple of ,kant or ,coleridge4  ,it   
would be easy to add a greater number of
 examples of this fallacy1 as well as of
 the others which ,i have attempted to  
characterize4 ,but a more copious       
exemplification does not seem to be     
necessary2 and the intelligent reader   
will have little difficulty in adding to
 the catalogue from his own reading and 
experience4 ,we shall therefore here    
close our exposition of the general     
principles of logic1 and proceed to the 
supplementary inquiry which is necessary
 to complete our design4  ,,footnotes3  
#a ,supra1 p4 #bjd4  #b ,vulgar ,errors1
 book v4 chap4 #ba4  #c ,pharmacologia1 
,historical ,introduction1 p4 #af4  #d  
,the author of one of the ,bridgewater  
,treatises has fallen1 as it seems to   
me1 into a similar fallacy when1 after  
arguing in rather a curious way to prove
 that matter may exist without any of   
the known properties of matter1 and may 
therefore be changeable1 he concludes   
that it cannot be eternal1 because      

eternal 7passive7 existence necessarily 
involves incapability of change4 ,i     
believe it would be difficult to point  
out any other connexion between the     
facts of eternity and unchangeableness1 
than a strong association between the   
two ideas4 ,most of the  priori         
arguments1 both religious and           
anti-religious1 on the origin of things1
 are fallacies drawn from the same      
source4  #e ,supra1 book ii4 chap4 v4   
#f1 and ch4 vii4  #a1 #b1 #c4 ,see also 
,examination of ,sir ,william           
,hamilton's ,philosophy1 chap4 vi4 and  
elsewhere4  #f ,i quote this passage    
from ,playfair's celebrated             
,dissertations on the ,progress of      
,mathematical and ,physical ,science4   
#g ,this statement ,i must now correct1 
as too unqualified4 ,the maxim in       
question was maintained with full       
conviction by no less an authority than 
,sir ,william ,hamilton4 ,see my        
,examination1 chap4 xxiv4  #h ,nouveaux 
,essais sur l',entendement              

,humain--,avant-propos4 7,,oeuvres1     
,paris ed4 #ahdb1 vol4 i4 p4 #ai47  #i  
,this doctrine also was accepted as     
true1 and conclusions were grounded on  
it1 by ,sir ,william ,hamilton4 ,see    
,examination1 chap4 xxiv4  #aj ,not that
 of ,leibnitz1 but the principle        
commonly appealed to under that name by 
mathematicians4  #aa ,dissertation1 ut  
supra1 p4 #bg4  #ab ,hist4 ,ind4 ,sc4   
,book i4 chap4 i4  #ac ,novum ,organum1 
,aph4 #ge4  #ad ,supra1 book iii4 ch4   
vii4  #d4  #ae ,it is hardly needful to 
remark that nothing is here intended to 
be said against the possibility at some 
future period of making gold2 by first  
discovering it to be a compound1 and    
putting together its different elements 
or ingredients4 ,but this is a totally  
different idea from that of the seekers 
of the grand arcanum4  #af              
,pharmacologia1 pp4 #dc-e4  #ag ,vol4 i4
 chap4 #h4  #ah ,nov4 ,org41 ,aph4 #df4 
#ai ,playfair's ,dissertation1 sect4 #d4
  #bj ,nov4 ,org4 ,renov41 p4 #fa4  #ba 

,pharmacologia1 p4 #ba4  #bb            
,pharmacologia1 pp4 #bc-d4  #bc ,ibid4  
p4 #bh4  #bd ,ibid4 p4 #fb4  #be        
,pharmacologia1 pp4 #fa-b4  #bf ,supra1 
p4 #ahb4  #bg ,elements of the          
,philosophy of the ,mind1 vol4 ii4 ch4  
#d1 sect4 #e4  #bh ,thus ,fourcroy1 says
 ,dr4 ,paris1 explained the operation of
 mercury by its specific gravity1 and   
the advocates of this doctrine favoured 
the general introduction of the         
preparations of iron1 especially in     
scirrhus of the spleen or liver1 upon   
the same hypothetical principle2 for1   
say they1 whatever is most forcible in  
removing the obstruction must be the    
most proper instrument of cure2 such is 
steel1 which1 besides the attenuating   
power with which it is furnished1 has   
still a greater force in this case from 
the gravity of its particles1 which1    
being seven times specifically heavier  
than any vegetable1 acts in proportion  
with a stronger impulse1 and therefore  
is a more powerful deobstruent4 ,this   

may be taken as a specimen of the style 
in which these mechanical physicians    
reasoned and practised4--,pharmacologia1
 pp4 #ch-i4  #bi ,pharmacologia1 pp4    
#ci1 #dj4  #cj ,i quote from ,dr4       
,whewell's ,hist4 ,ind4 ,sc4 #crd ed4 i4
 #abi4  #ca ,hist4 ,ind4 ,sc4 i4 #eb4   
#cb ,nov4 ,org4 ,aph4 #fj4  #cc ,an     
advocate1 says ,mr4 ,de ,morgan 7,formal
 ,logic1 p4 #bgj71 is sometimes guilty  
of the argument  dicto secundum quid ad 
dictum simpliciter3 it is his business  
to do for his client all that his client
 might honestly do for himself4 ,is not 
the word in italics frequently omitted8 
,might any man honestly try to do for   
himself all that counsel frequently try 
to do for him8 ,we are often reminded of
 the two men who stole the leg of       
mutton2 one could swear he had not got  
it1 the other that he had not taken it4 
,the counsel is doing his duty by his   
client1 the client has left the matter  
to his counsel4 ,between the unexecuted 
intention of the client1 and the        

unintended execution of the counsel1    
there may be a wrong done1 and1 if we   
are to believe the usual maxims1 no     
wrong-doer4  ,the same writer justly    
remarks 7p4 #bea7 that there is a       
converse fallacy1  dicto simpliciter ad 
dictum secundum quid1 called by the     
scholastic logicians1 fallacia          
accidentis2 and another which may be    
called  dicto secundum quid ad dictum   
secundum alterum quid 7p4 #bfe74 ,for   
apt instances of both1 ,i must refer the
 reader to ,mr4 ,de ,morgan's able      
chapter on ,fallacies4  #cd ,an example 
of this fallacy is the popular error    
that strong drink must be a cause of    
strength4 ,there is here fallacy within 
fallacy2 for granting that the words    
strong and strength were not 7as they   
are7 applied in a totally different     
sense to fermented liquors and to the   
human body1 there would still be        
involved the error of supposing that an 
effect must be like its cause2 that the 
conditions of a phenomenon are likely to

 resemble the phenomenon itself2 which  
we have already treated of as an  priori
 fallacy of the first rank4 ,as well    
might it be supposed that a strong      
poison will make the person who takes   
it1 strong4  #ce ,in his later editions1
 ,archbishop ,whately confines the name 
of ,petitio ,principii to those cases in
 which one of the premises either is    
manifestly the same in sense with the   
conclusion1 or is actually proved from  
it1 or is such as the persons you are   
addressing are not likely to know1 or to
 admit1 except as an inference from the 
conclusion3 as1 e4g4 if any one should  
infer the authenticity of a certain     
history1 from its recording such and    
such facts1 the reality of which rests  
on the evidence of that history4  #cf   
,no longer even a probable hypothesis1  
since the establishment of the atomic   
theory2 it being now certain that the   
integral particles of different         
substances gravitate unequally4 ,it is  
true that these particles1 though real  

minima for the purposes of chemical     
combination1 may not be the ultimate    
particles of the substance2 and this    
doubt alone renders the hypothesis      
admissible1 even as an hypothesis4  #cg 
,hist4 ,ind4 ,sc4 i4 #cd4  #ch ,and     
coxcombs vanquish ,berkeley with a grin4
     ,,book ,,vi4  ,,on ,,the ,,logic   
,,of ,,the ,,moral ,,sciences4   ,si    
l'homme peut prdire1 avec une assurance 
presque entire1 les phnomnes dont il    
connat les lois2 si lors mme qu'elles   
lui sont inconnues1 il peut1 d'aprs     
l'exprience1 prvoir avec une grande     
probabilit les vnemens de l'avenir2     
pourquoi regarderait-on comme une       
entreprise chimrique1 celle de tracer   
avec quelque vraisemblance le tableau   
des destines futures de l'espce humaine1
 d'aprs les rsultats de son histoire8   
,le seul fondement de croyance dans les 
sciences naturelles1 est cette ide1 que 
les lois gnrales1 connues ou ignores1   
qui rglent les phnomnes de l'univers1   
sont ncessaires et constantes2 et par   

quelle raison ce principe serait-il     
moins vrai pour le dveloppement des     
facults intellectuelles et morales de   
l'homme1 que pour les autres oprations  
de la nature8 ,enfin1 puisque des       
opinions formes d'aprs l'exprience 444  
sont la seule rgle de la conduite des   
hommes les plus sages1 pourquoi         
interdirait-on au philosophe d'appuyer  
ses conjectures sur cette mme base1     
pourvu qu'il ne leur attribue pas une   
certitude suprieure  celle qui peut     
natre du nombre1 de la constance1 de    
l'exactitude des                        
observations8--,,condorcet1 ,esquisse   
d'un ,tableau ,historique des ,progrs de
 l',esprit ,humain4     ,,chapter ,i4   
,,introductory ,,remarks4    #a4        
,principles of ,evidence and ,theories  
of ,method are not to be constructed    
priori4 ,the laws of our rational       
faculty1 like those of every other      
natural agency1 are only learnt by      
seeing the agent at work4 ,the earlier  
achievements of science were made       

without the conscious observance of any 
,scientific ,method2 and we should never
 have known by what process truth is to 
be ascertained1 if we had not previously
 ascertained many truths4 ,but it was   
only the easier problems which could be 
thus resolved3 natural sagacity1 when it
 tried its strength against the more    
difficult ones1 either failed           
altogether1 or if it succeeded here and 
there in obtaining a solution1 had no   
sure means of convincing others that its
 solution was correct4 ,in scientific   
investigation1 as in all other works of 
human skill1 the way of obtaining the   
end is seen as it were instinctively by 
superior minds in some comparatively    
simple case1 and is then1 by judicious  
generalization1 adapted to the variety  
of complex cases4 ,we learn to do a     
thing in difficult circumstances1 by    
attending to the manner in which we have
 spontaneously done the same thing in   
easier ones4  ,this truth is exemplified
 by the history of the various branches 

of knowledge which have successively1 in
 the ascending order of their           
complication1 assumed the character of  
sciences2 and will doubtless receive    
fresh confirmation from those1 of which 
the final scientific constitution is yet
 to come1 and which are still abandoned 
to the uncertainties of vague and       
popular discussion4 ,although several   
other sciences have emerged from this   
state at a comparatively recent date1   
none now remain in it except those which
 relate to man himself1 the most complex
 and most difficult subject of study on 
which the human mind can be engaged4    
,concerning the physical nature of man1 
as an organized being1--though there is 
still much uncertainty and much         
controversy1 which can only be          
terminated by the general acknowledgment
 and employment of stricter rules of    
induction than are commonly             
recognised1--there is1 however1 a       
considerable body of truths which all   
who have attended to the subject        

consider to be fully established2 nor is
 there now any radical imperfection in  
the method observed in this department  
of science by its most distinguished    
modern teachers4 ,but the laws of ,mind1
 and1 in even a greater degree1 those of
 ,society1 are so far from having       
attained a similar state of even partial
 recognition1 that it is still a        
controversy whether they are capable of 
becoming subjects of science in the     
strict sense of the term3 and among     
those who are agreed on this point1     
there reigns the most irreconcileable   
diversity on almost every other4 ,here1 
therefore1 if anywhere1 the principles  
laid down in the preceding ,books may be
 expected to be useful4  ,if1 on matters
 so much the most important with which  
human intellect can occupy itself1 a    
more general agreement is ever to exist 
among thinkers2 if what has been        
pronounced the proper study of mankind  
is not destined to remain the only      
subject which ,philosophy cannot succeed

 in rescuing from ,empiricism2 the same 
process through which the laws of many  
simpler phenomena have by general       
acknowledgment been placed beyond       
dispute1 must be consciously and        
deliberately applied to those more      
difficult inquiries4 ,if there are some 
subjects on which the results obtained  
have finally received the unanimous     
assent of all who have attended to the  
proof1 and others on which mankind have 
not yet been equally successful2 on     
which the most sagacious minds have     
occupied themselves from the earliest   
date1 and have never succeeded in       
establishing any considerable body of   
truths1 so as to be beyond denial or    
doubt2 it is by generalizing the methods
 successfully followed in the former    
inquiries1 and adapting them to the     
latter1 that we may hope to remove this 
blot on the face of science4 ,the       
remaining chapters are an endeavour to  
facilitate this most desirable object4  
#b4 ,in attempting this1 ,i am not      

unmindful how little can be done towards
 it in a mere treatise on ,logic1 or how
 vague and unsatisfactory all precepts  
of ,method must necessarily appear1 when
 not practically exemplified in the     
establishment of a body of doctrine4    
,doubtless1 the most effectual mode of  
showing how the sciences of ,ethics and 
,politics may be constructed1 would be  
to construct them3 a task which1 it     
needs scarcely be said1 ,i am not about 
to undertake4 ,but even if there were no
 other examples1 the memorable one of   
,bacon would be sufficient to           
demonstrate1 that it is sometimes both  
possible and useful to point out the    
way1 though without being oneself       
prepared to adventure far into it4 ,and 
if more were to be attempted1 this at   
least is not a proper place for the     
attempt4  ,in substance1 whatever can be
 done in a work like this for the ,logic
 of the ,moral ,sciences1 has been or   
ought to have been accomplished in the  
five preceding ,books2 to which the     

present can be only a kind of supplement
 or appendix1 since the methods of      
investigation applicable to moral and   
social science must have been already   
described1 if ,i have succeeded in      
enumerating and characterizing those of 
science in general4 ,it remains1        
however1 to examine which of those      
methods are more especially suited to   
the various branches of moral inquiry2  
under what peculiar facilities or       
difficulties they are there employed2   
how far the unsatisfactory state of     
those inquiries is owing to a wrong     
choice of methods1 how far to want of   
skill in the application of right ones2 
and what degree of ultimate success may 
be attained or hoped for1 by a better   
choice or more careful employment of    
logical processes appropriate to the    
case4 ,in other words1 whether moral    
sciences exist1 or can exist2 to what   
degree of perfection they are           
susceptible of being carried2 and by    
what selection or adaptation of the     

methods brought to view in the previous 
part of this work1 that degree of       
perfection is attainable4  ,at the      
threshold of this inquiry we are met by 
an objection1 which1 if not removed1    
would be fatal to the attempt to treat  
human conduct as a subject of science4  
,are the actions of human beings1 like  
all other natural events1 subject to    
invariable laws8 ,does that constancy of
 causation1 which is the foundation of  
every scientific theory of successive   
phenomena1 really obtain among them8    
,this is often denied2 and for the sake 
of systematic completeness1 if not from 
any very urgent practical necessity1 the
 question should receive a deliberate   
answer in this place4 ,we shall devote  
to the subject a chapter apart4         
,,chapter ,,ii4  ,,of ,,liberty ,,and   
,,necessity4    #a4 ,the question1      
whether the law of causality applies in 
the same strict sense to human actions  
as to other phenomena1 is the celebrated
 controversy concerning the freedom of  

the will3 which1 from at least as far   
back as the time of ,pelagius1 has      
divided both the philosophical and the  
religious world4 ,the affirmative       
opinion is commonly called the doctrine 
of ,necessity1 as asserting human       
volitions and actions to be necessary   
and inevitable4 ,the negative maintains 
that the will is not determined1 like   
other phenomena1 by antecedents1 but    
determines itself2 that our volitions   
are not1 properly speaking1 the effects 
of causes1 or at least have no causes   
which they uniformly and implicitly     
obey4  ,i have already made it          
sufficiently apparent that the former of
 these opinions is that which ,i        
consider the true one2 but the          
misleading terms in which it is often   
expressed1 and the indistinct manner in 
which it is usually apprehended1 have   
both obstructed its reception1 and      
perverted its influence when received4  
,the metaphysical theory of free will1  
as held by philosophers1 7for the       

practical feeling of it1 common in a    
greater or less degree to all mankind1  
is in no way inconsistent with the      
contrary theory17 was invented because  
the supposed alternative of admitting   
human actions to be necessary1 was      
deemed inconsistent with every one's    
instinctive consciousness1 as well as   
humiliating to the pride and even       
degrading to the moral nature of man4   
,nor do ,i deny that the doctrine1 as   
sometimes held1 is open to these        
imputations2 for the misapprehension in 
which ,i shall be able to show that they
 originate1 unfortunately is not        
confined to the opponents of the        
doctrine1 but participated in by many1  
perhaps we might say by most1 of its    
supporters4    #b4 ,correctly conceived1
 the doctrine called ,philosophical     
,necessity is simply this3 that1 given  
the motives which are present to an     
individual's mind1 and given likewise   
the character and disposition of the    
individual1 the manner in which he will 

act might be unerringly inferred3 that  
if we knew the person thoroughly1 and   
knew all the inducements which are      
acting upon him1 we could foretell his  
conduct with as much certainty as we can
 predict any physical event4 ,this      
proposition ,i take to be a mere        
interpretation of universal experience1 
a statement in words of what every one  
is internally convinced of4 ,no one who 
believed that he knew thoroughly the    
circumstances of any case1 and the      
characters of the different persons     
concerned1 would hesitate to foretell   
how all of them would act4 ,whatever    
degree of doubt he may in fact feel1    
arises from the uncertainty whether he  
really knows the circumstances1 or the  
character of some one or other of the   
persons1 with the degree of accuracy    
required3 but by no means from thinking 
that if he did know these things1 there 
could be any uncertainty what the       
conduct would be4 ,nor does this full   
assurance conflict in the smallest      

degree with what is called our feeling  
of freedom4 ,we do not feel ourselves   
the less free1 because those to whom we 
are intimately known are well assured   
how we shall will to act in a particular
 case4 ,we often1 on the contrary1      
regard the doubt what our conduct will  
be1 as a mark of ignorance of our       
character1 and sometimes even resent it 
as an imputation4 ,the religious        
metaphysicians who have asserted the    
freedom of the will1 have always        
maintained it to be consistent with     
divine foreknowledge of our actions3 and
 if with divine1 then with any other    
foreknowledge4 ,we may be free1 and yet 
another may have reason to be perfectly 
certain what use we shall make of our   
freedom4 ,it is not1 therefore1 the     
doctrine that our volitions and actions 
are invariable consequents of our       
antecedent states of mind1 that is      
either contradicted by our              
consciousness1 or felt to be degrading4 
,but the doctrine of causation1 when    

considered as obtaining between our     
volitions and their antecedents1 is     
almost universally conceived as         
involving more than this4 ,many do not  
believe1 and very few practically feel1 
that there is nothing in causation but  
invariable1 certain1 and unconditional  
sequence4 ,there are few to whom mere   
constancy of succession appears a       
sufficiently stringent bond of union for
 so peculiar a relation as that of cause
 and effect4 ,even if the reason        
repudiates1 the imagination retains1 the
 feeling of some more intimate          
connexion1 of some peculiar tie1 or     
mysterious constraint exercised by the  
antecedent over the consequent4 ,now    
this it is which1 considered as applying
 to the human will1 conflicts with our  
consciousness1 and revolts our feelings4
 ,we are certain that1 in the case of   
our volitions1 there is not this        
mysterious constraint4 ,we know that we 
are not compelled1 as by a magical      
spell1 to obey any particular motive4   

,we feel1 that if we wished to prove    
that we have the power of resisting the 
motive1 we could do so1 7that wish      
being1 it needs scarcely be observed1 a 
new antecedent27 and it would be        
humiliating to our pride1 and 7what is  
of more importance7 paralysing to our   
desire of excellence if we thought      
otherwise4 ,but neither is any such     
mysterious compulsion now supposed1 by  
the best philosophical authorities1 to  
be exercised by any other cause over its
 effect4 ,those who think that causes   
draw their effects after them by a      
mystical tie1 are right in believing    
that the relation between volitions and 
their antecedents is of another nature4 
,but they should go farther1 and admit  
that this is also true of all other     
effects and their antecedents4 ,if such 
a tie is considered to be involved in   
the word necessity1 the doctrine is not 
true of human actions2 but neither is it
 then true of inanimate objects4 ,it    
would be more correct to say that matter

 is not bound by necessity than that    
mind is so4  ,that the free-will        
metaphysicians1 being mostly of the     
school which rejects ,hume's and        
,brown's analysis of ,cause and ,effect1
 should miss their way for want of the  
light which that analysis affords1      
cannot surprise us4 ,the wonder is1 that
 the necessarians1 who usually admit    
that philosophical theory1 should in    
practice equally lose sight of it4 ,the 
very same misconception of the doctrine 
called ,philosophical ,necessity1 which 
prevents the opposite party from        
recognising its truth1 ,i believe to    
exist more or less obscurely in the     
minds of most necessarians1 however they
 may in words disavow it4 ,i am much    
mistaken if they habitually feel that   
the necessity which they recognise in   
actions is but uniformity of order1 and 
capability of being predicted4 ,they    
have a feeling as if there were at      
bottom a stronger tie between the       
volitions and their causes3 as if1 when 

they asserted that the will is governed 
by the balance of motives1 they meant   
something more cogent than if they had  
only said1 that whoever knew the        
motives1 and our habitual               
susceptibilities to them1 could predict 
how we should will to act4 ,they commit1
 in opposition to their own scientific  
system1 the very same mistake which     
their adversaries commit in obedience to
 theirs2 and in consequence do really in
 some instances suffer those depressing 
consequences1 which their opponents     
erroneously impute to the doctrine      
itself4    #c4 ,i am inclined to think  
that this error is almost wholly an     
effect of the associations with a word2 
and that it would be prevented1 by      
forbearing to employ1 for the expression
 of the simple fact of causation1 so    
extremely inappropriate a term as       
,necessity4 ,that word1 in its other    
acceptations1 involves much more than   
mere uniformity of sequence3 it implies 
irresistibleness4 ,applied to the will1 

it only means that the given cause will 
be followed by the effect1 subject to   
all possibilities of counteraction by   
other causes3 but in common use it      
stands for the operation of those causes
 exclusively1 which are supposed too    
powerful to be counteracted at all4     
,when we say that all human actions take
 place of necessity1 we only mean that  
they will certainly happen if nothing   
prevents3--when we say that dying of    
want1 to those who cannot get food1 is a
 necessity1 we mean that it will        
certainly happen whatever may be done to
 prevent it4 ,the application of the    
same term to the agencies on which human
 actions depend1 as is used to express  
those agencies of nature which are      
really uncontrollable1 cannot fail1 when
 habitual1 to create a feeling of       
uncontrollableness in the former also4  
,this however is a mere illusion4 ,there
 are physical sequences which we call   
necessary1 as death for want of food or 
air2 there are others which1 though as  

much cases of causation as the former1  
are not said to be necessary1 as death  
from poison1 which an antidote1 or the  
use of the stomach-pump1 will sometimes 
avert4 ,it is apt to be forgotten by    
people's feelings1 even if remembered by
 their understandings1 that human       
actions are in this last predicament3   
they are never 7except in some cases of 
mania7 ruled by any one motive with such
 absolute sway1 that there is no room   
for the influence of any other4 ,the    
causes1 therefore1 on which action      
depends1 are never uncontrollable2 and  
any given effect is only necessary      
provided that the causes tending to     
produce it are not controlled4 ,that    
whatever happens1 could not have        
happened otherwise unless something had 
taken place which was capable of        
preventing it1 no one surely needs      
hesitate to admit4 ,but to call this by 
the name necessity is to use the term in
 a sense so different from its primitive
 and familiar meaning1 from that which  

it bears in the common occasions of     
life1 as to amount almost to a play upon
 words4 ,the associations derived from  
the ordinary sense of the term will     
adhere to it in spite of all we can do3 
and though the doctrine of ,necessity1  
as stated by most who hold it1 is very  
remote from fatalism1 it is probable    
that most necessarians are fatalists1   
more or less1 in their feelings4  ,a    
fatalist believes1 or half believes 7for
 nobody is a consistent fatalist71 not  
only that whatever is about to happen1  
will be the infallible result of the    
causes which produce it1 7which is the  
true necessarian doctrine17 but moreover
 that there is no use in struggling     
against it2 that it will happen however 
we may strive to prevent it4 ,now1 a    
necessarian1 believing that our actions 
follow from our characters1 and that our
 characters follow from our             
organization1 our education1 and our    
circumstances1 is apt to be1 with more  
or less of consciousness on his part1 a 

fatalist as to his own actions1 and to  
believe that his nature is such1 or that
 his education and circumstances have so
 moulded his character1 that nothing can
 now prevent him from feeling and acting
 in a particular way1 or at least that  
no effort of his own can hinder it4 ,in 
the words of the sect which in our own  
day has most perseveringly inculcated   
and most perversely misunderstood this  
great doctrine1 his character is formed 
for him1 and not by him2 therefore his  
wishing that it had been formed         
differently is of no use2 he has no     
power to alter it4 ,but this is a grand 
error4 ,he has1 to a certain extent1 a  
power to alter his character4 ,its      
being1 in the ultimate resort1 formed   
for him1 is not inconsistent with its   
being1 in part1 formed by him as one of 
the intermediate agents4 ,his character 
is formed by his circumstances          
7including among these his particular   
organization72 but his own desire to    
mould it in a particular way1 is one of 

those circumstances1 and by no means one
 of the least influential4 ,we cannot1  
indeed1 directly will to be different   
from what we are4 ,but neither did those
 who are supposed to have formed our    
characters1 directly will that we should
 be what we are4 ,their will had no     
direct power except over their own      
actions4 ,they made us what they did    
make us1 by willing1 not the end1 but   
the requisite means2 and we1 when our   
habits are not too inveterate1 can1 by  
similarly willing the requisite means1  
make ourselves different4 ,if they could
 place us under the influence of certain
 circumstances1 we1 in like manner1 can 
place ourselves under the influence of  
other circumstances4 ,we are exactly as 
capable of making our own character1 if 
we will1 as others are of making it for 
us4  ,yes 7answers the ,owenite71 but   
these words1 if we will1 surrender the  
whole point3 since the will to alter our
 own character is given us1 not by any  
efforts of ours1 but by circumstances   

which we cannot help2 it comes to us    
either from external causes1 or not at  
all4 ,most true3 if the ,owenite stops  
here1 he is in a position from which    
nothing can expel him4 ,our character is
 formed by us as well as for us2 but the
 wish which induces us to attempt to    
form it is formed for us2 and how8 ,not1
 in general1 by our organization1 nor   
wholly by our education1 but by our     
experience2 experience of the painful   
consequences of the character we        
previously had3 or by some strong       
feeling of admiration or aspiration1    
accidentally aroused4 ,but to think that
 we have no power of altering our       
character1 and to think that we shall   
not use our power unless we desire to   
use it1 are very different things1 and  
have a very different effect on the     
mind4 ,a person who does not wish to    
alter his character1 cannot be the      
person who is supposed to feel          
discouraged or paralysed by thinking    
himself unable to do it4 ,the depressing

 effect of the fatalist doctrine can    
only be felt where there is a wish to do
 what that doctrine represents as       
impossible4 ,it is of no consequence    
what we think forms our character1 when 
we have no desire of our own about      
forming it2 but it is of great          
consequence that we should not be       
prevented from forming such a desire by 
thinking the attainment impracticable1  
and that if we have the desire1 we      
should know that the work is not so     
irrevocably done as to be incapable of  
being altered4  ,and indeed1 if we      
examine closely1 we shall find that this
 feeling1 of our being able to modify   
our own character if we wish1 is itself 
the feeling of moral freedom which we   
are conscious of4 ,a person feels       
morally free who feels that his habits  
or his temptations are not his masters1 
but he theirs3 who even in yielding to  
them knows that he could resist2 that   
were he desirous of altogether throwing 
them off1 there would not be required   

for that purpose a stronger desire than 
he knows himself to be capable of       
feeling4 ,it is of course necessary1 to 
render our consciousness of freedom     
complete1 that we should have succeeded 
in making our character all we have     
hitherto attempted to make it2 for if we
 have wished and not attained1 we have1 
to that extent1 not power over our own  
character1 we are not free4 ,or at      
least1 we must feel that our wish1 if   
not strong enough to alter our          
character1 is strong enough to conquer  
our character when the two are brought  
into conflict in any particular case of 
conduct4 ,and hence it is said with     
truth1 that none but a person of        
confirmed virtue is completely free4    
,the application of so improper a term  
as ,necessity to the doctrine of cause  
and effect in the matter of human       
character1 seems to me one of the most  
signal instances in philosophy of the   
abuse of terms1 and its practical       
consequences one of the most striking   

examples of the power of language over  
our associations4 ,the subject will     
never be generally understood1 until    
that objectionable term is dropped4 ,the
 free-will doctrine1 by keeping in view 
precisely that portion of the truth     
which the word ,necessity puts out of   
sight1 namely the power of the mind to  
co-operate in the formation of its own  
character1 has given to its adherents a 
practical feeling much nearer to the    
truth than has generally 7,i believe7   
existed in the minds of necessarians4   
,the latter may have had a stronger     
sense of the importance of what human   
beings can do to shape the characters of
 one another2 but the free-will doctrine
 has1 ,i believe1 fostered in its       
supporters a much stronger spirit of    
self-culture4    #d4 ,there is still one
 fact which requires to be noticed 7in  
addition to the existence of a power of 
self-formation7 before the doctrine of  
the causation of human actions can be   
freed from the confusion and            

misapprehensions which surround it in   
many minds4 ,when the will is said to be
 determined by motives1 a motive does   
not mean always1 or solely1 the         
anticipation of a pleasure or of a pain4
 ,i shall not here inquire whether it be
 true that1 in the commencement1 all our
 voluntary actions are mere means       
consciously employed to obtain some     
pleasure1 or avoid some pain4 ,it is at 
least certain that we gradually1 through
 the influence of association1 come to  
desire the means without thinking of the
 end3 the action itself becomes an      
object of desire1 and is performed      
without reference to any motive beyond  
itself4 ,thus far1 it may still be      
objected1 that1 the action having       
through association become pleasurable1 
we are1 as much as before1 moved to act 
by the anticipation of a pleasure1      
namely the pleasure of the action       
itself4 ,but granting this1 the matter  
does not end here4 ,as we proceed in the
 formation of habits1 and become        

accustomed to will a particular act or a
 particular course of conduct because it
 is pleasurable1 we at last continue to 
will it without any reference to its    
being pleasurable4 ,although1 from some 
change in us or in our circumstances1 we
 have ceased to find any pleasure in the
 action1 or perhaps to anticipate any   
pleasure as the consequence of it1 we   
still continue to desire the action1 and
 consequently to do it4 ,in this manner 
it is that habits of hurtful excess     
continue to be practised although they  
have ceased to be pleasurable2 and in   
this manner also it is that the habit of
 willing to persevere in the course     
which he has chosen1 does not desert the
 moral hero1 even when the reward1      
however real1 which he doubtless        
receives from the consciousness of      
well-doing1 is anything but an          
equivalent for the sufferings he        
undergoes1 or the wishes which he may   
have to renounce4  ,a habit of willing  
is commonly called a purpose2 and among 

the causes of our volitions1 and of the 
actions which flow from them1 must be   
reckoned not only likings and aversions1
 but also purposes4 ,it is only when our
 purposes have become independent of the
 feelings of pain or pleasure from which
 they originally took their rise1 that  
we are said to have a confirmed         
character4 ,a character1 says ,novalis1 
is a completely fashioned will3 and the 
will1 once so fashioned1 may be steady  
and constant1 when the passive          
susceptibilities of pleasure and pain   
are greatly weakened1 or materially     
changed4  ,with the corrections and     
explanations now given1 the doctrine of 
the causation of our volitions by       
motives1 and of motives by the desirable
 objects offered to us1 combined with   
our particular susceptibilities of      
desire1 may be considered1 ,i hope1 as  
sufficiently established for the        
purposes of this treatise4#a            
,,chapter ,,iii4  ,,that ,,there ,,is1  
,,or ,,may ,,be1 ,a ,,science ,,of      

,,human ,,nature4    #a4 ,it is a common
 notion1 or at least it is implied in   
many common modes of speech1 that the   
thoughts1 feelings1 and actions of      
sentient beings are not a subject of    
science1 in the same strict sense in    
which this is true of the objects of    
outward nature4 ,this notion seems to   
involve some confusion of ideas1 which  
it is necessary to begin by clearing up4
  ,any facts are fitted1 in themselves1 
to be a subject of science1 which follow
 one another according to constant laws2
 although those laws may not have been  
discovered1 nor even be discoverable by 
our existing resources4 ,take1 for      
instance1 the most familiar class of    
meteorological phenomena1 those of rain 
and sunshine4 ,scientific inquiry has   
not yet succeeded in ascertaining the   
order of antecedence and consequence    
among these phenomena1 so as to be able1
 at least in our regions of the earth1  
to predict them with certainty1 or even 
with any high degree of probability4    

,yet no one doubts that the phenomena   
depend on laws1 and that these must be  
derivative laws resulting from known    
ultimate laws1 those of heat1           
electricity1 vaporization1 and elastic  
fluids4 ,nor can it be doubted that if  
we were acquainted with all the         
antecedent circumstances1 we could1 even
 from those more general laws1 predict  
7saving difficulties of calculation7 the
 state of the weather at any future     
time4 ,meteorology1 therefore1 not only 
has in itself every natural requisite   
for being1 but actually is1 a science2  
though1 from the difficulty of observing
 the facts on which the phenomena depend
 7a difficulty inherent in the peculiar 
nature of those phenomena7 the science  
is extremely imperfect2 and were it     
perfect1 might probably be of little    
avail in practice1 since the data       
requisite for applying its principles to
 particular instances would rarely be   
procurable4  ,a case may be conceived1  
of an intermediate character between the

 perfection of science1 and this its    
extreme imperfection4 ,it may happen    
that the greater causes1 those on which 
the principal part of the phenomena     
depends1 are within the reach of        
observation and measurement2 so that if 
no other causes intervened1 a complete  
explanation could be given not only of  
the phenomenon in general1 but of all   
the variations and modifications which  
it admits of4 ,but inasmuch as other1   
perhaps many other causes1 separately   
insignificant in their effects1         
co-operate or conflict in many or in all
 cases with those greater causes2 the   
effect1 accordingly1 presents more or   
less of aberration from what would be   
produced by the greater causes alone4   
,now if these minor causes are not so   
constantly accessible1 or not accessible
 at all1 to accurate observation2 the   
principal mass of the effect may still1 
as before1 be accounted for1 and even   
predicted2 but there will be variations 
and modifications which we shall not be 

competent to explain thoroughly1 and our
 predictions will not be fulfilled      
accurately1 but only approximately4  ,it
 is thus1 for example1 with the theory  
of the tides4 ,no one doubts that       
,tidology 7as ,dr4 ,whewell proposes to 
call it7 is really a science4 ,as much  
of the phenomena as depends on the      
attraction of the sun and moon is       
completely understood1 and may in any1  
even unknown1 part of the earth's       
surface1 be foretold with certainty2 and
 the far greater part of the phenomena  
depends on those causes4 ,but           
circumstances of a local or casual      
nature1 such as the configuration of the
 bottom of the ocean1 the degree of     
confinement from shores1 the direction  
of the wind1 c41 influence1 in many or  
in all places1 the height and time of   
the tide2 and a portion of these        
circumstances being either not          
accurately knowable1 not precisely      
measurable1 or not capable of being     
certainly foreseen1 the tide in known   

places commonly varies from the         
calculated result of general principles 
by some difference that we cannot       
explain1 and in unknown ones may vary   
from it by a difference that we are not 
able to foresee or conjecture4          
,nevertheless1 not only is it certain   
that these variations depend on causes1 
and follow their causes by laws of      
unerring uniformity2 not only1          
therefore1 is tidology a science1 like  
meteorology1 but it is1 what hitherto at
 least meteorology is not1 a science    
largely available in practice4 ,general 
laws may be laid down respecting the    
tides1 predictions may be founded on    
those laws1 and the result will in the  
main1 though often not with complete    
accuracy1 correspond to the predictions4
  ,and this is what is or ought to be   
meant by those who speak of sciences    
which are not exact sciences4 ,astronomy
 was once a science1 without being an   
exact science4 ,it could not become     
exact until not only the general course 

of the planetary motions1 but the       
perturbations also1 were accounted for1 
and referred to their causes4 ,it has   
become an exact science1 because its    
phenomena have been brought under laws  
comprehending the whole of the causes by
 which the phenomena are influenced1    
whether in a great or only in a trifling
 degree1 whether in all or only in some 
cases1 and assigning to each of those   
causes the share of effect which really 
belongs to it4 ,but in the theory of the
 tides the only laws as yet accurately  
ascertained1 are those of the causes    
which affect the phenomenon in all      
cases1 and in a considerable degree2    
while others which affect it in some    
cases only1 or1 if in all1 only in a    
slight degree1 have not been            
sufficiently ascertained and studied to 
enable us to lay down their laws2 still 
less to deduce the completed law of the 
phenomenon1 by compounding the effects  
of the greater with those of the minor  
causes4 ,tidology1 therefore1 is not yet

 an exact science2 not from any inherent
 incapacity of being so1 but from the   
difficulty of ascertaining with complete
 precision the real derivative          
uniformities4 ,by combining1 however1   
the exact laws of the greater causes1   
and of such of the minor ones as are    
sufficiently known1 with such empirical 
laws or such approximate generalizations
 respecting the miscellaneous variations
 as can be obtained by specific         
observation1 we can lay down general    
propositions which will be true in the  
main1 and on which1 with allowance for  
the degree of their probable inaccuracy1
 we may safely ground our expectations  
and our conduct4    #b4 ,the science of 
human nature is of this description4 ,it
 falls far short of the standard of     
exactness now realized in ,astronomy2   
but there is no reason that it should   
not be as much a science as ,tidology   
is1 or as ,astronomy was when its       
calculations had only mastered the main 
phenomena1 but not the perturbations4   

,the phenomena with which this science  
is conversant being the thoughts1       
feelings1 and actions of human beings1  
it would have attained the ideal        
perfection of a science if it enabled us
 to foretell how an individual would    
think1 feel1 or act1 throughout life1   
with the same certainty with which      
astronomy enables us to predict the     
places and the occultations of the      
heavenly bodies4 ,it needs scarcely be  
stated that nothing approaching to this 
can be done4 ,the actions of individuals
 could not be predicted with scientific 
accuracy1 were it only because we cannot
 foresee the whole of the circumstances 
in which those individuals will be      
placed4 ,but further1 even in any given 
combination of 7present7 circumstances1 
no assertion1 which is both precise and 
universally true1 can be made respecting
 the manner in which human beings will  
think1 feel1 or act4 ,this is not1      
however1 because every person's modes of
 thinking1 feeling1 and acting1 do not  

depend on causes2 nor can we doubt that 
if1 in the case of any individual1 our  
data could be complete1 we even now know
 enough of the ultimate laws by which   
mental phenomena are determined1 to     
enable us in many cases to predict1 with
 tolerable certainty1 what1 in the      
greater number of supposable            
combinations of circumstances1 his      
conduct or sentiments would be4 ,but the
 impressions and actions of human beings
 are not solely the result of their     
present circumstances1 but the joint    
result of those circumstances and of the
 characters of the individuals3 and the 
agencies which determine human character
 are so numerous and diversified1       
7nothing which has happened to the      
person throughout life being without its
 portion of influence17 that in the     
aggregate they are never in any two     
cases exactly similar4 ,hence1 even if  
our science of human nature were        
theoretically perfect1 that is1 if we   
could calculate any character as we can 

calculate the orbit of any planet1 from 
given data2 still1 as the data are never
 all given1 nor ever precisely alike in 
different cases1 we could neither make  
positive predictions1 nor lay down      
universal propositions4  ,inasmuch1     
however1 as many of those effects which 
it is of most importance to render      
amenable to human foresight and control 
are determined1 like the tides1 in an   
incomparably greater degree by general  
causes1 than by all partial causes taken
 together2 depending in the main on     
those circumstances and qualities which 
are common to all mankind1 or at least  
to large bodies of them1 and only in a  
small degree on the idiosyncrasies of   
organization or the peculiar history of 
individuals2 it is evidently possible   
with regard to all such effects1 to make
 predictions which will almost always be
 verified1 and general propositions     
which are almost always true4 ,and      
whenever it is sufficient to know how   
the great majority of the human race1 or

 of some nation or class of persons1    
will think1 feel1 and act1 these        
propositions are equivalent to universal
 ones4 ,for the purposes of political   
and social science this is sufficient4  
,as we formerly remarked1#b an          
approximate generalization is1 in social
 inquiries1 for most practical purposes 
equivalent to an exact one2 that which  
is only probable when asserted of       
individual human beings indiscriminately
 selected1 being certain when affirmed  
of the character and collective conduct 
of masses4  ,it is no disparagement1    
therefore1 to the science of ,human     
,nature1 that those of its general      
propositions which descend sufficiently 
into detail to serve as a foundation for
 predicting phenomena in the concrete1  
are for the most part only approximately
 true4 ,but in order to give a genuinely
 scientific character to the study1 it  
is indispensable that these approximate 
generalizations1 which in themselves    
would amount only to the lowest kind of 

empirical laws1 should be connected     
deductively with the laws of nature from
 which they result2 should be resolved  
into the properties of the causes on    
which the phenomena depend4 ,in other   
words1 the science of ,human ,nature may
 be said to exist1 in proportion as the 
approximate truths1 which compose a     
practical knowledge of mankind1 can be  
exhibited as corollaries from the       
universal laws of human nature on which 
they rest2 whereby the proper limits of 
those approximate truths would be shown1
 and we should be enabled to deduce     
others for any new state of             
circumstances1 in anticipation of       
specific experience4  ,the proposition  
now stated is the text on which the two 
succeeding chapters will furnish the    
comment4     ,,chapter ,,iv4  ,,of ,,the
 ,,laws ,,of ,,mind4    #a4 ,what the   
,mind is1 as well as what ,matter is1 or
 any other question respecting ,things  
in themselves1 as distinguished from    
their sensible manifestations1 it would 

be foreign to the purposes of this      
treatise to consider4 ,here1 as         
throughout our inquiry1 we shall keep   
clear of all speculations respecting the
 mind's own nature1 and shall understand
 by the laws of mind1 those of mental   
,phenomena2 of the various feelings or  
states of consciousness of sentient     
beings4 ,these1 according to the        
classification we have uniformly        
followed1 consist of ,thoughts1         
,emotions1 ,volitions1 and ,sensations2 
the last being as truly states of ,mind 
as the three former4 ,it is usual indeed
 to speak of sensations as states of    
body1 not of mind4 ,but this is the     
common confusion1 of giving one and the 
same name to a phenomenon and to the    
proximate cause or conditions of the    
phenomenon4 ,the immediate antecedent of
 a sensation is a state of body1 but the
 sensation itself is a state of mind4   
,if the word mind means anything1 it    
means that which feels4 ,whatever       
opinion we hold respecting the          

fundamental identity or diversity of    
matter and mind1 in any case the        
distinction between mental and physical 
facts1 between the internal and the     
external world1 will always remain1 as a
 matter of classification3 and in that  
classification1 sensations1 like all    
other feelings1 must be ranked as mental
 phenomena4 ,the mechanism of their     
production1 both in the body itself and 
in what is called outward nature1 is all
 that can with any propriety be classed 
as physical4  ,the phenomena of mind1   
then1 are the various feelings of our   
nature1 both those improperly called    
physical1 and those peculiarly          
designated as mental3 and by the laws of
 mind1 ,i mean the laws according to    
which those feelings generate one       
another4    #b4 ,all states of mind are 
immediately caused either by other      
states of mind1 or by states of body4   
,when a state of mind is produced by a  
state of mind1 ,i call the law concerned
 in the case1 a law of ,mind4 ,when a   

state of mind is produced directly by a 
state of body1 the law is a law of      
,body1 and belongs to physical science4 
,with regard to those states of mind    
which are called sensations1 all are    
agreed that these have for their        
immediate antecedents1 states of body4  
,every sensation has for its proximate  
cause some affection of the portion of  
our frame called the nervous system2    
whether this affection originate in the 
action of some external object1 or in   
some pathological condition of the      
nervous organization itself4 ,the laws  
of this portion of our nature--the      
varieties of our sensations1 and the    
physical conditions on which they       
proximately depend--manifestly belong to
 the province of ,physiology4  ,whether 
the remainder of our mental states are  
similarly dependent on physical         
conditions1 is one of the vexat         
questiones in the science of human      
nature4 ,it is still disputed whether   
our thoughts1 emotions1 and volitions   

are generated through the intervention  
of material mechanism2 whether we have  
organs of thought and of emotion1 in the
 same sense in which we have organs of  
sensation4 ,many eminent physiologists  
hold the affirmative4 ,these contend1   
that a thought 7for example7 is as much 
the result of nervous agency1 as a      
sensation3 that some particular state of
 our nervous system1 in particular of   
that central portion of it called the   
brain1 invariably precedes1 and is      
presupposed by1 every state of our      
consciousness4 ,according to this       
theory1 one state of mind is never      
really produced by another3 all are     
produced by states of body4 ,when one   
thought seems to call up another by     
association1 it is not really a thought 
which recals a thought2 the association 
did not exist between the two thoughts1 
but between the two states of the brain 
or nerves which preceded the thoughts3  
one of those states recals the other1   
each being attended1 in its passage1 by 

the particular state of consciousness   
which is consequent on it4 ,on this     
theory the uniformities of succession   
among states of mind would be mere      
derivative uniformities1 resulting from 
the laws of succession of the bodily    
states which cause them4 ,there would be
 no original mental laws1 no ,laws of   
,mind in the sense in which ,i use the  
term1 at all3 and mental science would  
be a mere branch1 though the highest and
 most recondite branch1 of the science  
of physiology4 ,m4 ,comte1 accordingly1 
claims the scientific cognizance of     
moral and intellectual phenomena        
exclusively for physiologists2 and not  
only denies to ,psychology1 or ,mental  
,philosophy properly so called1 the     
character of a science1 but places it1  
in the chimerical nature of its objects 
and pretensions1 almost on a par with   
astrology4  ,but1 after all has been    
said which can be said1 it remains      
incontestible that there exist          
uniformities of succession among states 

of mind1 and that these can be          
ascertained by observation and          
experiment4 ,further1 that every mental 
state has a nervous state for its       
immediate antecedent and proximate      
cause1 though extremely probable1 cannot
 hitherto be said to be proved1 in the  
conclusive manner in which this can be  
proved of sensations2 and even were it  
certain1 yet every one must admit that  
we are wholly ignorant of the           
characteristics of these nervous states2
 we know not1 and at present have no    
means of knowing1 in what respect one of
 them differs from another2 and our only
 mode of studying their successions or  
coexistences must be by observing the   
successions and coexistences of the     
mental states1 of which they are        
supposed to be the generators or causes4
 ,the successions1 therefore1 which     
obtain among mental phenomena1 do not   
admit of being deduced from the         
physiological laws of our nervous       
organization3 and all real knowledge of 

them must continue1 for a long time at  
least1 if not always1 to be sought in   
the direct study1 by observation and    
experiment1 of the mental successions   
themselves4 ,since therefore the order  
of our mental phenomena must be studied 
in those phenomena1 and not inferred    
from the laws of any phenomena more     
general1 there is a distinct and        
separate ,science of ,mind4  ,the       
relations1 indeed1 of that science to   
the science of physiology must never be 
overlooked or undervalued4 ,it must by  
no means be forgotten that the laws of  
mind may be derivative laws resulting   
from laws of animal life1 and that their
 truth therefore may ultimately depend  
on physical conditions2 and the         
influence of physiological states or    
physiological changes in altering or    
counteracting the mental successions1 is
 one of the most important departments  
of psychological study4 ,but1 on the    
other hand1 to reject the resource of   
psychological analysis1 and construct   

the theory of the mind solely on such   
data as physiology at present affords1  
seems to me as great an error in        
principle1 and an even more serious one 
in practice4 ,imperfect as is the       
science of mind1 ,i do not scruple to   
affirm1 that it is in a considerably    
more advanced state than the portion of 
physiology which corresponds to it2 and 
to discard the former for the latter    
appears to me an infringement of the    
true canons of inductive philosophy1    
which must produce1 and which does      
produce1 erroneous conclusions in some  
very important departments of the       
science of human nature4    #c4 ,the    
subject1 then1 of ,psychology1 is the   
uniformities of succession1 the laws1   
whether ultimate or derivative1         
according to which one mental state     
succeeds another2 is caused by1 or at   
least1 is caused to follow1 another4 ,of
 these laws1 some are general1 others   
more special4 ,the following are        
examples of the most general laws4      

,first3 ,whenever any state of          
consciousness has once been excited in  
us1 no matter by what cause2 an inferior
 degree of the same state of            
consciousness1 a state of consciousness 
resembling the former1 but inferior in  
intensity1 is capable of being          
reproduced in us1 without the presence  
of any such cause as excited it at      
first4 ,thus1 if we have once seen or   
touched an object1 we can afterwards    
think of the object though it be absent 
from our sight or from our touch4 ,if we
 have been joyful or grieved at some    
event1 we can think of1 or remember our 
past joy or grief1 though no new event  
of a happy or painful nature has taken  
place4 ,when a poet has put together a  
mental picture of an imaginary object1 a
 ,castle of ,indolence1 a ,una1 or a    
,hamlet1 he can afterwards think of the 
ideal object he has created1 without any
 fresh act of intellectual combination4 
,this law is expressed by saying1 in the
 language of ,hume1 that every mental   

impression has its idea4  ,secondly3    
,these ideas1 or secondary mental       
states1 are excited by our impressions1 
or by other ideas1 according to certain 
laws which are called ,laws of          
,association4 ,of these laws the first  
is1 that similar ideas tend to excite   
one another4 ,the second is1 that when  
two impressions have been frequently    
experienced 7or even thought of7 either 
simultaneously or in immediate          
succession1 then whenever one of these  
impressions1 or the idea of it1 recurs1 
it tends to excite the idea of the      
other4 ,the third law is1 that greater  
intensity in either or both of the      
impressions1 is equivalent1 in rendering
 them excitable by one another1 to a    
greater frequency of conjunction4 ,these
 are the laws of ideas3 on which ,i     
shall not enlarge in this place1 but    
refer the reader to works professedly   
psychological1 in particular to ,mr4    
,james ,mill's ,analysis of the         
,phenomena of the ,human ,mind1 where   

the principal laws of association1 along
 with many of their applications1 are   
copiously exemplified1 and with a       
masterly hand4#c  ,these simple or      
elementary ,laws of ,mind have been     
ascertained by the ordinary methods of  
experimental inquiry2 nor could they    
have been ascertained in any other      
manner4 ,but a certain number of        
elementary laws having thus been        
obtained1 it is a fair subject of       
scientific inquiry how far those laws   
can be made to go in explaining the     
actual phenomena4 ,it is obvious that   
complex laws of thought and feeling not 
only may1 but must1 be generated from   
these simple laws4 ,and it is to be     
remarked1 that the case is not always   
one of ,composition of ,causes3 the     
effect of concurring causes is not      
always precisely the sum of the effects 
of those causes when separate1 nor even 
always an effect of the same kind with  
them4 ,reverting to the distinction     
which occupies so prominent a place in  

the theory of induction2 the laws of the
 phenomena of mind are sometimes        
analogous to mechanical1 but sometimes  
also to chemical laws4 ,when many       
impressions or ideas are operating in   
the mind together1 there sometimes takes
 place a process1 of a similar kind to  
chemical combination4 ,when impressions 
have been so often experienced in       
conjunction1 that each of them calls up 
readily and instantaneously the ideas of
 the whole group1 those ideas sometimes 
melt and coalesce into one another1 and 
appear not several ideas1 but one2 in   
the same manner as1 when the seven      
prismatic colours are presented to the  
eye in rapid succession1 the sensation  
produced is that of white4 ,but as in   
this last case it is correct to say that
 the seven colours when they rapidly    
follow one another generate white1 but  
not that they actually are white2 so it 
appears to me that the ,complex ,idea1  
formed by the blending together of      
several simpler ones1 should1 when it   

really appears simple1 7that is1 when   
the separate elements are not           
consciously distinguishable in it17 be  
said to result from1 or be generated by1
 the simple ideas1 not to consist of    
them4 ,our idea of an orange really     
consists of the simple ideas of a       
certain colour1 a certain form1 a       
certain taste and smell1 c41 because we 
can1 by interrogating our consciousness1
 perceive all these elements in the     
idea4 ,but we cannot perceive1 in so    
apparently simple a feeling as our      
perception of the shape of an object by 
the eye1 all that multitude of ideas    
derived from other senses1 without which
 it is well ascertained that no such    
visual perception would ever have had   
existence2 nor1 in our idea of          
,extension1 can we discover those       
elementary ideas of resistance1 derived 
from our muscular frame1 in which it has
 been conclusively shown that the idea  
originates4 ,these therefore are cases  
of mental chemistry3 in which it is     

proper to say that the simple ideas     
generate1 rather than that they compose1
 the complex ones4  ,with respect to all
 the other constituents of the mind1 its
 beliefs1 its abstruser conceptions1 its
 sentiments1 emotions1 and volitions2   
there are some 7among whom are ,hartley1
 and the author of the ,analysis7 who   
think that the whole of these are       
generated from simple ideas of          
sensation1 by a chemistry similar to    
that which we have just exemplified4    
,these philosophers have made out a     
great part of their case1 but ,i am not 
satisfied that they have established the
 whole of it4 ,they have shown that     
there is such a thing as mental         
chemistry2 that the heterogeneous nature
 of a feeling ,a1 considered in relation
 to ,b and ,c1 is no conclusive argument
 against its being generated from ,b and
 ,c4 ,having proved this1 they proceed  
to show1 that where ,a is found1 ,b and 
,c were or may have been present1 and   
why therefore1 they ask1 should not ,a  

have been generated from ,b and ,c8 ,but
 even if this evidence were carried to  
the highest degree of completeness which
 it admits of2 if it were shown 7which  
hitherto it has not1 in all cases1 been7
 that certain groups of associated ideas
 not only might have been1 but actually 
were1 present whenever the more         
recondite mental feeling was            
experienced2 this would amount only to  
the ,method of ,agreement1 and could not
 prove causation until confirmed by the 
more conclusive evidence of the ,method 
of ,difference4 ,if the question be     
whether ,belief is a mere case of close 
association of ideas1 it would be       
necessary to examine experimentally if  
it be true that any ideas whatever1     
provided they are associated with the   
required degree of closeness1 give rise 
to belief4 ,if the inquiry be into the  
origin of moral feelings1 the feeling   
for example of moral reprobation1 it is 
necessary to compare all the varieties  
of actions or states of mind which are  

ever morally disapproved1 and see       
whether in all these cases it can be    
shown1 or reasonably surmised1 that the 
action or state of mind had become      
connected by association1 in the        
disapproving mind1 with some particular 
class of hateful or disgusting ideas2   
and the method employed is1 thus far1   
that of ,agreement4 ,but this is not    
enough4 ,supposing this proved1 we must 
try further by the ,method of           
,difference1 whether this particular    
kind of hateful or disgusting ideas1    
when it becomes associated with an      
action previously indifferent1 will     
render that action a subject of moral   
disapproval4 ,if this question can be   
answered in the affirmative1 it is shown
 to be a law of the human mind1 that an 
association of that particular          
description is the generating cause of  
moral reprobation4 ,that all this is the
 case has been rendered extremely       
probable1 but the experiments have not  
been tried with the degree of precision 

necessary for a complete and absolutely 
conclusive induction4#d  ,it is further 
to be remembered1 that even if all which
 this theory of mental phenomena        
contends for could be proved1 we should 
not be the more enabled to resolve the  
laws of the more complex feelings into  
those of the simpler ones4 ,the         
generation of one class of mental       
phenomena from another1 whenever it can 
be made out1 is a highly interesting    
fact in psychological chemistry2 but it 
no more supersedes the necessity of an  
experimental study of the generated     
phenomenon1 than a knowledge of the     
properties of oxygen and sulphur enables
 us to deduce those of sulphuric acid   
without specific observation and        
experiment4 ,whatever1 therefore1 may be
 the final issue of the attempt to      
account for the origin of our judgments1
 our desires1 or our volitions1 from    
simpler mental phenomena1 it is not the 
less imperative to ascertain the        
sequences of the complex phenomena      

themselves1 by special study in         
conformity to the canons of ,induction4 
,thus1 in respect to ,belief1           
psychologists will always have to       
inquire1 what beliefs we have by direct 
consciousness1 and according to what    
laws one belief produces another2 what  
are the laws1 in virtue of which one    
thing is recognised by the mind1 either 
rightly or erroneously1 as evidence of  
another thing4 ,in regard to ,desire1   
they will have to examine what objects  
we desire naturally1 and by what causes 
we are made to desire things originally 
indifferent1 or even disagreeable to us2
 and so forth4 ,it may be remarked1 that
 the general laws of association prevail
 among these more intricate states of   
mind1 in the same manner as among the   
simpler ones4 ,a desire1 an emotion1 an 
idea of the higher order of abstraction1
 even our judgments and volitions when  
they have become habitual1 are called up
 by association1 according to precisely 
the same laws as our simple ideas4      

#d4 ,in the course of these inquiries it
 will be natural and necessary to       
examine1 how far the production of one  
state of mind by another is influenced  
by any assignable state of body4 ,the   
commonest observation shows that        
different minds are susceptible in very 
different degrees1 to the action of the 
same psychological causes4 ,the idea1   
for example1 of a given desirable       
object1 will excite in different minds  
very different degrees of intensity of  
desire4 ,the same subject of meditation1
 presented to different minds1 will     
excite in them very unequal degrees of  
intellectual action4 ,these differences 
of mental susceptibility in different   
individuals may be1 first1 original and 
ultimate facts1 or1 secondly1 they may  
be consequences of the previous mental  
history of those individuals1 or thirdly
 and lastly1 they may depend on         
varieties of physical organization4     
,that the previous mental history of the
 individuals must have some share in    

producing or in modifying the whole of  
their mental character1 is an inevitable
 consequence of the laws of mind2 but   
that differences of bodily structure    
also co-operate1 is the opinion of all  
physiologists1 confirmed by common      
experience4 ,it is to be regretted that 
hitherto this experience1 being accepted
 in the gross1 without due analysis1 has
 been made the groundwork of empirical  
generalizations most detrimental to the 
progress of real knowledge4  ,it is     
certain that the natural differences    
which really exist in the mental        
predispositions or susceptibilities of  
different persons1 are often not        
unconnected with diversities in their   
organic constitution4 ,but it does not  
therefore follow that these organic     
differences must in all cases influence 
the mental phenomena directly and       
immediately4 ,they often affect them    
through the medium of their             
psychological causes4 ,for example1 the 
idea of some particular pleasure may    

excite in different persons1 even       
independently of habit or education1    
very different strengths of desire1 and 
this may be the effect of their         
different degrees or kinds of nervous   
susceptibility2 but these organic       
differences1 we must remember1 will     
render the pleasurable sensation itself 
more intense in one of these persons    
than in the other2 so that the idea of  
the pleasure will also be an intenser   
feeling1 and will1 by the operation of  
mere mental laws1 excite an intenser    
desire1 without its being necessary to  
suppose that the desire itself is       
directly influenced by the physical     
peculiarity4 ,as in this1 so in many    
cases1 such differences in the kind or  
in the intensity of the physical        
sensations as must necessarily result   
from differences of bodily organization1
 will of themselves account for many    
differences not only in the degree1 but 
even in the kind1 of the other mental   
phenomena4 ,so true is this1 that even  

different qualities of mind1 different  
types of mental character1 will         
naturally be produced by mere           
differences of intensity in the         
sensations generally3 as is well pointed
 out in an able essay on ,dr4           
,priestley1 mentioned in a former       
chapter3--  ,the sensations which form  
the elements of all knowledge are       
received either simultaneously or       
successively2 when several are received 
simultaneously1 as the smell1 the taste1
 the colour1 the form1 c4 of a fruit1   
their association together constitutes  
our idea of an object2 when received    
successively1 their association makes up
 the idea of an event4 ,anything1 then1 
which favours the associations of       
synchronous ideas1 will tend to produce 
a knowledge of objects1 a perception of 
qualities2 while anything which favours 
association in the successive order1    
will tend to produce a knowledge of     
events1 of the order of occurrences1 and
 of the connexion of cause and effect3  

in other words1 in the one case a       
perceptive mind1 with a discriminate    
feeling of the pleasurable and painful  
properties of things1 a sense of the    
grand and the beautiful1 will be the    
result3 in the other1 a mind attentive  
to the movements and phenomena1 a       
ratiocinative and philosophic intellect4
 ,now it is an acknowledged principle1  
that all sensations experienced during  
the presence of any vivid impression1   
become strongly associated with it1 and 
with each other2 and does it not follow1
 that the synchronous feelings of a     
sensitive constitution1 7i4e4 the one   
which has vivid impressions17 will be   
more intimately blended than in a       
differently formed mind8 ,if this       
suggestion has any foundation in truth1 
it leads to an inference not            
unimportant2 that where nature has      
endowed an individual with great        
original susceptibility1 he will        
probably be distinguished by fondness   
for natural history1 a relish for the   

beautiful and great1 and moral          
enthusiasm2 where there is but a        
mediocrity of sensibility1 a love of    
science1 of abstract truth1 with a      
deficiency of taste and of fervour1 is  
likely to be the result4  ,we see from  
this example1 that when the general laws
 of mind are more accurately known1 and 
above all1 more skilfully applied to the
 detailed explanation of mental         
peculiarities1 they will account for    
many more of those peculiarities than is
 ordinarily supposed4 ,unfortunately the
 reaction of the last and present       
generation against the philosophy of the
 eighteenth century has produced a very 
general neglect of this great department
 of analytical inquiry2 of which1       
consequently1 the recent progress has   
been by no means proportional to its    
early promise4 ,the majority of those   
who speculate on human nature1 prefer   
dogmatically to assume that the mental  
differences which they perceive1 or     
think they perceive1 among human beings1

 are ultimate facts1 incapable of being 
either explained or altered1 rather than
 take the trouble of fitting themselves1
 by the requisite processes of thought1 
for referring those mental differences  
to the outward causes by which they are 
for the most part produced1 and on the  
removal of which they would cease to    
exist4 ,the ,german school of           
metaphysical speculation1 which has not 
yet lost its temporary predominance in  
,european thought1 has had this among   
many other injurious influences3 and at 
the opposite extreme of the             
psychological scale1 no writer1 either  
of early or of recent date1 is          
chargeable in a higher degree with this 
aberration from the true scientific     
spirit1 than ,m4 ,comte4  ,it is certain
 that1 in human beings at least1        
differences in education and in outward 
circumstances are capable of affording  
an adequate explanation of by far the   
greatest portion of character2 and that 
the remainder may be in great part      

accounted for by physical differences in
 the sensations produced in different   
individuals by the same external or     
internal cause4 ,there are1 however1    
some mental facts which do not seem to  
admit of these modes of explanation4    
,such1 to take the strongest case1 are  
the various instincts of animals1 and   
the portion of human nature which       
corresponds to those instincts4 ,no mode
 has been suggested1 even by way of     
hypothesis1 in which these can receive  
any satisfactory1 or even plausible1    
explanation from psychological causes   
alone2 and there is great reason to     
think that they have as positive1 and   
even as direct and immediate1 a         
connexion with physical conditions of   
the brain and nerves1 as any of our mere
 sensations have4 ,a supposition which  
7it is perhaps not superfluous to add7  
in no way conflicts with the            
indisputable fact1 that these instincts 
may be modified to any extent1 or       
entirely conquered1 in human beings at  

least1 by other mental influences1 and  
by education4  ,whether organic causes  
exercise a direct influence over any    
other classes of mental phenomena1 is   
hitherto as far from being ascertained1 
as is the precise nature of the organic 
conditions even in the case of          
instincts4 ,the physiology1 however1 of 
the brain and nervous system is in a    
state of such rapid advance1 and is     
continually bringing forth such new and 
interesting results1 that if there be   
really a connexion between mental       
peculiarities and any varieties         
cognizable by our senses in the         
structure of the cerebral and nervous   
apparatus1 the nature of that connexion 
is now in a fair way of being found out4
 ,the latest discoveries in cerebral    
physiology appear to have proved1 that  
any such connexion which may exist is of
 a radically different character from   
that contended for by ,gall and his     
followers1 and that whatever may        
hereafter be found to be the true theory

 of the subject1 phrenology at least is 
untenable4     ,,chapter ,v4  ,,of      
,,ethology1 ,,or ,,the ,,science ,,of   
,,the ,,formation ,,of ,,character4     
#a4 ,the laws of mind as characterized  
in the preceding chapter1 compose the   
universal or abstract portion of the    
philosophy of human nature2 and all the 
truths of common experience1            
constituting a practical knowledge of   
mankind1 must1 to the extent to which   
they are truths1 be results or          
consequences of these4 ,such familiar   
maxims1 when collected  posteriori from 
observation of life1 occupy among the   
truths of the science the place of what1
 in our analysis of ,induction1 have so 
often been spoken of under the title of 
,empirical ,laws4  ,an ,empirical ,law  
7it will be remembered7 is an           
uniformity1 whether of succession or of 
coexistence1 which holds true in all    
instances within our limits of          
observation1 but is not of a nature to  
afford any assurance that it would hold 

beyond those limits2 either because the 
consequent is not really the effect of  
the antecedent1 but forms part along    
with it of a chain of effects1 flowing  
from prior causes not yet ascertained2  
or because there is ground to believe   
that the sequence 7though a case of     
causation7 is resolvable into simpler   
sequences1 and1 depending therefore on a
 concurrence of several natural         
agencies1 is exposed to an unknown      
multitude of possibilities of           
counteraction4 ,in other words1 an      
empirical law is a generalization1 of   
which1 not content with finding it true1
 we are obliged to ask1 why is it true8 
knowing that its truth is not absolute1 
but dependent on some more general      
conditions1 and that it can only be     
relied on in so far as there is ground  
of assurance that those conditions are  
realized4  ,now1 the observations       
concerning human affairs collected from 
common experience1 are precisely of this
 nature4 ,even if they were universally 

and exactly true within the bounds of   
experience1 which they never are1 still 
they are not the ultimate laws of human 
action2 they are not the principles of  
human nature1 but results of those      
principles under the circumstances in   
which mankind have happened to be       
placed4 ,when the ,psalmist said in his 
haste that all men are liars1 he        
enunciated what in some ages and        
countries is borne out by ample         
experience2 but it is not a law of man's
 nature to lie2 though it is one of the 
consequences of the laws of human       
nature1 that lying is nearly universal  
when certain external circumstances     
exist universally1 especially           
circumstances productive of habitual    
distrust and fear4 ,when the character  
of the old is asserted to be cautious1  
and of the young impetuous1 this1 again1
 is but an empirical law2 for it is not 
because of their youth that the young   
are impetuous1 nor because of their age 
that the old are cautious4 ,it is       

chiefly1 if not wholly1 because the old1
 during their many years of life1 have  
generally had much experience of its    
various evils1 and having suffered or   
seen others suffer much from incautious 
exposure to them1 have acquired         
associations favourable to              
circumspection3 while the young1 as well
 from the absence of similar experience 
as from the greater strength of the     
inclinations which urge them to         
enterprise1 engage themselves in it more
 readily4 ,here1 then1 is the           
explanation of the empirical law2 here  
are the conditions which ultimately     
determine whether the law holds good or 
not4 ,if an old man has not been oftener
 than most young men in contact with    
danger and difficulty1 he will be       
equally incautious3 if a youth has not  
stronger inclinations than an old man1  
he probably will be as little           
enterprising4 ,the empirical law derives
 whatever truth it has1 from the causal 
laws of which it is a consequence4 ,if  

we know those laws1 we know what are the
 limits to the derivative law3 while1 if
 we have not yet accounted for the      
empirical law--if it rest only on       
observation--there is no safety in      
applying it far beyond the limits of    
time1 place1 and circumstance1 in which 
the observations were made4  ,the really
 scientific truths1 then1 are not these 
empirical laws1 but the causal laws     
which explain them4 ,the empirical laws 
of those phenomena which depend on known
 causes1 and of which a general theory  
can therefore be constructed1 have1     
whatever may be their value in practice1
 no other function in science than that 
of verifying the conclusions of theory4 
,still more must this be the case when  
most of the empirical laws amount1 even 
within the limits of observation1 only  
to approximate generalizations4    #b4  
,this however is not1 so much as is     
sometimes supposed1 a peculiarity of the
 sciences called moral4 ,it is only in  
the simplest branches of science that   

empirical laws are ever exactly true2   
and not always in those4 ,astronomy1 for
 example1 is the simplest of all the    
sciences which explain1 in the concrete1
 the actual course of natural events4   
,the causes or forces1 on which         
astronomical phenomena depend1 are fewer
 in number than those which determine   
any other of the great phenomena of     
nature4 ,accordingly1 as each effect    
results from the conflict of but few    
causes1 a great degree of regularity and
 uniformity might be expected to exist  
among the effects2 and such is really   
the case3 they have a fixed order1 and  
return in cycles4 ,but propositions     
which should express1 with absolute     
correctness1 all the successive         
positions of a planet until the cycle is
 completed1 would be of almost          
unmanageable complexity1 and could be   
obtained from theory alone4 ,the        
generalizations which can be collected  
on the subject from direct observation1 
even such as ,kepler's law1 are mere    

approximations3 the planets1 owing to   
their perturbations by one another1 do  
not move in exact ellipses4 ,thus even  
in astronomy1 perfect exactness in the  
mere empirical laws is not to be looked 
for2 much less1 then1 in more complex   
subjects of inquiry4  ,the same example 
shows how little can be inferred against
 the universality or even the simplicity
 of the ultimate laws1 from the         
impossibility of establishing any but   
approximate empirical laws of the       
effects4 ,the laws of causation         
according to which a class of phenomena 
are produced may be very few and simple1
 and yet the effects themselves may be  
so various and complicated that it shall
 be impossible to trace any regularity  
whatever completely through them4 ,for  
the phenomena in question may be of an  
eminently modifiable character2 insomuch
 that innumerable circumstances are     
capable of influencing the effect1      
although they may all do it according to
 a very small number of laws4 ,suppose  

that all which passes in the mind of man
 is determined by a few simple laws3    
still1 if those laws be such that there 
is not one of the facts surrounding a   
human being1 or of the events which     
happen to him1 that does not influence  
in some mode or degree his subsequent   
mental history1 and if the circumstances
 of different human beings are extremely
 different1 it will be no wonder if very
 few propositions can be made respecting
 the details of their conduct or        
feelings1 which will be true of all     
mankind4  ,now1 without deciding whether
 the ultimate laws of our mental nature 
are few or many1 it is at least certain 
that they are of the above description4 
,it is certain that our mental states1  
and our mental capacities and           
susceptibilities1 are modified1 either  
for a time or permanently1 by everything
 which happens to us in life4           
,considering therefore how much these   
modifying causes differ in the case of  
any two individuals1 it would be        

unreasonable to expect that the         
empirical laws of the human mind1 the   
generalizations which can be made       
respecting the feelings or actions of   
mankind without reference to the causes 
that determine them1 should be anything 
but approximate generalizations4 ,they  
are the common wisdom of common life1   
and as such are invaluable2 especially  
as they are mostly to be applied to     
cases not very dissimilar to those from 
which they were collected4 ,but when    
maxims of this sort1 collected from     
,englishmen1 come to be applied to      
,frenchmen1 or when those collected from
 the present day are applied to past or 
future generations1 they are apt to be  
very much at fault4 ,unless we have     
resolved the empirical law into the laws
 of the causes on which it depends1 and 
ascertained that those causes extend to 
the case which we have in view1 there   
can be no reliance placed in our        
inferences4 ,for every individual is    
surrounded by circumstances different   

from those of every other individual2   
every nation or generation of mankind   
from every other nation or generation3  
and none of these differences are       
without their influence in forming a    
different type of character4 ,there is1 
indeed1 also a certain general          
resemblance2 but peculiarities of       
circumstances are continually           
constituting exceptions even to the     
propositions which are true in the great
 majority of cases4  ,although1 however1
 there is scarcely any mode of feeling  
or conduct which is1 in the absolute    
sense1 common to all mankind2 and though
 the generalizations which assert that  
any given variety of conduct or feeling 
will be found universally1 7however     
nearly they may approximate to truth    
within given limits of observation17    
will be considered as scientific        
propositions by no one who is at all    
familiar with scientific investigation2 
yet all modes of feeling and conduct met
 with among mankind have causes which   

produce them2 and in the propositions   
which assign those causes1 will be found
 the explanation of the empirical laws1 
and the limiting principle of our       
reliance on them4 ,human beings do not  
all feel and act alike in the same      
circumstances2 but it is possible to    
determine what makes one person1 in a   
given position1 feel or act in one way1 
another in another2 how any given mode  
of feeling and conduct1 compatible with 
the general laws 7physical and mental7  
of human nature1 has been1 or may be1   
formed4 ,in other words1 mankind have   
not one universal character1 but there  
exist universal laws of the ,formation  
of ,character4 ,and since it is by these
 laws1 combined with the facts of each  
particular case1 that the whole of the  
phenomena of human action and feeling   
are produced1 it is on these that every 
rational attempt to construct the       
science of human nature in the concrete1
 and for practical purposes1 must       
proceed4    #c4 ,the laws1 then1 of the 

formation of character being the        
principal object of scientific inquiry  
into human nature2 it remains to        
determine the method of investigation   
best fitted for ascertaining them4 ,and 
the logical principles according to     
which this question is to be decided1   
must be those which preside over every  
other attempt to investigate the laws of
 very complex phenomena4 ,for it is     
evident that both the character of any  
human being1 and the aggregate of the   
circumstances by which that character   
has been formed1 are facts of a high    
order of complexity4 ,now to such cases 
we have seen that the ,deductive        
,method1 setting out from general laws1 
and verifying their consequences by     
specific experience1 is alone           
applicable4 ,the grounds of this great  
logical doctrine have formerly been     
stated3 and its truth will derive       
additional support from a brief         
examination of the specialities of the  
present case4  ,there are only two modes

 in which laws of nature can be         
ascertained3 deductively1 and           
experimentally3 including under the     
denomination of experimental inquiry1   
observation as well as artificial       
experiment4 ,are the laws of the        
formation of character susceptible of a 
satisfactory investigation by the method
 of experimentation8 ,evidently not2    
because1 even if we suppose unlimited   
power of varying the experiment1 7which 
is abstractedly possible1 though no one 
but an oriental despot has that power1  
or if he had1 would probably be disposed
 to exercise it17 a still more essential
 condition is wanting2 the power of     
performing any of the experiments with  
scientific accuracy4  ,the instances    
requisite for the prosecution of a      
directly experimental inquiry into the  
formation of character1 would be a      
number of human beings to bring up and  
educate1 from infancy to mature age4    
,and to perform any one of these        
experiments with scientific propriety1  

it would be necessary to know and record
 every sensation or impression received 
by the young pupil from a period long   
before it could speak2 including its own
 notions respecting the sources of all  
those sensations and impressions4 ,it is
 not only impossible to do this         
completely1 but even to do so much of it
 as should constitute a tolerable       
approximation4 ,one apparently trivial  
circumstance which eluded our vigilance1
 might let in a train of impressions and
 associations sufficient to vitiate the 
experiment as an authentic exhibition of
 the effects flowing from given causes4 
,no one who has sufficiently reflected  
on education is ignorant of this truth3 
and whoever has not1 will find it most  
instructively illustrated in the        
writings of ,rousseau and ,helvetius on 
that great subject4  ,under this        
impossibility of studying the laws of   
the formation of character by           
experiments purposely contrived to      
elucidate them1 there remains the       

resource of simple observation4 ,but if 
it be impossible to ascertain the       
influencing circumstances with any      
approach to completeness even when we   
have the shaping of them ourselves1 much
 more impossible is it when the cases   
are further removed from our            
observation1 and altogether out of our  
control4 ,consider the difficulty of the
 very first step--of ascertaining what  
actually is the character of the        
individual1 in each particular case that
 we examine4 ,there is hardly any person
 living1 concerning some essential part 
of whose character there are not        
differences of opinion even among his   
intimate acquaintances3 and a single    
action1 or conduct continued only for a 
short time1 goes a very little way      
towards ascertaining it4 ,we can only   
make our observations in a rough way1   
and en masse2 not attempting to         
ascertain completely in any given       
instance1 what character has been       
formed1 and still less by what causes2  

but only observing in what state of     
previous circumstances it is found that 
certain marked mental qualities or      
deficiencies oftenest exist4 ,these     
conclusions1 besides that they are mere 
approximate generalizations1 deserve no 
reliance even as such1 unless the       
instances are sufficiently numerous to  
eliminate not only chance1 but every    
assignable circumstance in which a      
number of the cases examined may happen 
to have resembled one another4 ,so      
numerous and various1 too1 are the      
circumstances which form individual     
character1 that the consequence of any  
particular combination is hardly ever   
some definite and strongly marked       
character1 always found where that      
combination exists1 and not otherwise4  
,what is obtained1 even after the most  
extensive and accurate observation1 is  
merely a comparative result2 as for     
example1 that in a given number of      
,frenchmen1 taken indiscriminately1     
there will be found more persons of a   

particular mental tendency1 and fewer of
 the contrary tendency1 than among an   
equal number of ,italians or ,english1  
similarly taken2 or thus3 of a hundred  
,frenchmen and an equal number of       
,englishmen1 fairly selected1 and       
arranged according to the degree in     
which they possess a particular mental  
characteristic1 each number1 #a1 #b1 #c1
 c41 of the one series1 will be found to
 possess more of that characteristic    
than the corresponding number of the    
other4 ,since1 therefore1 the comparison
 is not one of kinds1 but of ratios and 
degrees2 and since in proportion as the 
differences are slight1 it requires a   
greater number of instances to eliminate
 chance2 it cannot often happen to any  
one to know a sufficient number of cases
 with the accuracy requisite for making 
the sort of comparison last mentioned2  
less than which1 however1 would not     
constitute a real induction4            
,accordingly there is hardly one current
 opinion respecting the characters of   

nations1 classes1 or descriptions of    
persons1 which is universally           
acknowledged as indisputable4#e  ,and   
finally1 if we could even obtain by way 
of experiment a much more satisfactory  
assurance of these generalizations than 
is really possible1 they would still be 
only empirical laws4 ,they would show1  
indeed1 that there was some connexion   
between the type of character formed1   
and the circumstances existing in the   
case2 but not what the precise connexion
 was1 nor to which of the peculiarities 
of those circumstances the effect was   
really owing4 ,they could only1         
therefore1 be received as results of    
causation1 requiring to be resolved into
 the general laws of the causes3 until  
the determination of which1 we could not
 judge within what limits the derivative
 laws might serve as presumptions in    
cases yet unknown1 or even be depended  
on as permanent in the very cases from  
which they were collected4 ,the ,french 
people had1 or were supposed to have1 a 

certain national character3 but they    
drive out their royal family and        
aristocracy1 alter their institutions1  
pass through a series of extraordinary  
events for half a century1 and at the   
end of that time are found to be1 in    
many respects1 greatly altered4 ,a long 
list of mental and moral differences are
 observed1 or supposed1 to exist between
 men and women3 but at some future1 and1
 it may be hoped1 not distant period1   
equal freedom and an equally independent
 social position come to be possessed by
 both1 and their differences of         
character are either removed or totally 
altered4  ,but if the differences which 
we think we observe between ,french and 
,english1 or between men and women1 can 
be connected with more general laws2 if 
they be such as might be expected to be 
produced by the differences of          
government1 former customs1 and physical
 peculiarities in the two nations1 and  
by the diversities of education1        
occupations1 personal independence1 and 

social privileges1 and whatever original
 differences there may be in bodily     
strength and nervous sensibility1       
between the two sexes2 then1 indeed1 the
 coincidence of the two kinds of        
evidence justifies us in believing that 
we have both reasoned rightly and       
observed rightly4 ,our observation1     
though not sufficient as proof1 is ample
 as verification4 ,and having           
ascertained not only the empirical laws1
 but the causes1 of the peculiarities1  
we need be under no difficulty in       
judging how far they may be expected to 
be permanent1 or by what circumstances  
they would be modified or destroyed4    
#d4 ,since1 then1 it is impossible to   
obtain really accurate propositions     
respecting the formation of character   
from observation and experiment alone1  
we are driven perforce to that which1   
even if it had not been the             
indispensable1 would have been the most 
perfect1 mode of investigation1 and     
which it is one of the principal aims of

 philosophy to extend2 namely1 that     
which tries its experiments not on the  
complex facts1 but on the simple ones of
 which they are compounded2 and after   
ascertaining the laws of the causes1 the
 composition of which gives rise to the 
complex phenomena1 then considers       
whether these will not explain and      
account for the approximate             
generalizations which have been framed  
empirically respecting the sequences of 
those complex phenomena4 ,the laws of   
the formation of character are1 in      
short1 derivative laws1 resulting from  
the general laws of mind2 and are to be 
obtained by deducing them from those    
general laws2 by supposing any given set
 of circumstances1 and then considering 
what1 according to the laws of mind1    
will be the influence of those          
circumstances on the formation of       
character4  ,a science is thus formed1  
to which ,i would propose to give the   
name of ,ethology1 or the ,science of   
,character2 from ,greek3 thos1 a word   

more nearly corresponding to the term   
character as ,i here use it1 than any   
other word in the same language4 ,the   
name is perhaps etymologically          
applicable to the entire science of our 
mental and moral nature2 but if1 as is  
usual and convenient1 we employ the name
 ,psychology for the science of the     
elementary laws of mind1 ,ethology will 
serve for the ulterior science which    
determines the kind of character        
produced1 in conformity to those general
 laws1 by any set of circumstances1     
physical and moral4 ,according to this  
definition1 ,ethology is the science    
which corresponds to the art of         
education2 in the widest sense of the   
term1 including the formation of        
national or collective character as well
 as individual4 ,it would indeed be vain
 to expect 7however completely the laws 
of the formation of character might be  
ascertained7 that we could know so      
accurately the circumstances of any     
given case as to be able positively to  

predict the character that would be     
produced in that case4 ,but we must     
remember that a degree of knowledge far 
short of the power of actual prediction1
 is often of much practical value4      
,there may be great power of influencing
 phenomena1 with a very imperfect       
knowledge of the causes by which they   
are in any given instance determined4   
,it is enough that we know that certain 
means have a tendency to produce a given
 effect1 and that others have a tendency
 to frustrate it4 ,when the             
circumstances of an individual or of a  
nation are in any considerable degree   
under our control1 we may1 by our       
knowledge of tendencies1 be enabled to  
shape those circumstances in a manner   
much more favourable to the ends we     
desire1 than the shape which they would 
of themselves assume4 ,this is the limit
 of our power2 but within this limit the
 power is a most important one4  ,this  
science of ,ethology may be called the  
,exact ,science of ,human ,nature2 for  

its truths are not1 like the empirical  
laws which depend on them1 approximate  
generalizations1 but real laws4 ,it is1 
however1 7as in all cases of complex    
phenomena7 necessary to the exactness of
 the propositions1 that they should be  
hypothetical only1 and affirm           
tendencies1 not facts4 ,they must not   
assert that something will always1 or   
certainly1 happen2 but only that such   
and such will be the effect of a given  
cause1 so far as it operates            
uncounteracted4 ,it is a scientific     
proposition1 that bodily strength tends 
to make men courageous2 not that it     
always makes them so3 that an interest  
on one side of a question tends to bias 
the judgment2 not that it invariably    
does so3 that experience tends to give  
wisdom2 not that such is always its     
effect4 ,these propositions1 being      
assertive only of tendencies1 are not   
the less universally true because the   
tendencies may be frustrated4    #e4    
,while on the one hand ,psychology is   

altogether1 or principally1 a science of
 observation and experiment1 ,ethology1 
as ,i have conceived it1 is1 as ,i have 
already remarked1 altogether deductive4 
,the one ascertains the simple laws of  
,mind in general1 the other traces their
 operation in complex combinations of   
circumstances4 ,ethology stands to      
,psychology in a relation very similar  
to that in which the various branches of
 natural philosophy stand to mechanics4 
,the principles of ,ethology are        
properly the middle principles1 the     
axiomata media 7as ,bacon would have    
said7 of the science of mind3 as        
distinguished1 on the one hand from the 
empirical laws resulting from simple    
observation1 and on the other from the  
highest generalizations4  ,and this     
seems a suitable place for a logical    
remark1 which1 though of general        
application1 is of peculiar importance  
in reference to the present subject4    
,bacon has judiciously observed that the
 axiomata media of every science        

principally constitute its value4 ,the  
lowest generalizations1 until explained 
by and resolved into the middle         
principles of which they are the        
consequences1 have only the imperfect   
accuracy of empirical laws2 while the   
most general laws are too general1 and  
include too few circumstances1 to give  
sufficient indication of what happens in
 individual cases1 where the            
circumstances are almost always         
immensely numerous4 ,in the importance1 
therefore1 which ,bacon assigns1 in     
every science1 to the middle principles1
 it is impossible not to agree with him4
 ,but ,i conceive him to have been      
radically wrong in his doctrine         
respecting the mode in which these      
axiomata media should be arrived at2    
though there is no one proposition laid 
down in his works for which he has been 
more extravagantly eulogized4 ,he       
enunciates as an universal rule1 that   
induction should proceed from the lowest
 to the middle principles1 and from     

those to the highest1 never reversing   
that order1 and consequently leaving no 
room for the discovery of new principles
 by way of deduction at all4 ,it is not 
to be conceived that a man of his       
sagacity could have fallen into this    
mistake1 if there had existed in his    
time1 among the sciences which treat of 
successive phenomena1 one single        
instance of a deductive science1 such as
 mechanics1 astronomy1 optics1          
acoustics1 c4 now are4 ,in those        
sciences it is evident that the higher  
and middle principles are by no means   
derived from the lowest1 but the        
reverse4 ,in some of them the very      
highest generalizations were those      
earliest ascertained with any scientific
 exactness2 as1 for example 7in         
mechanics71 the laws of motion4 ,those  
general laws had not indeed at first the
 acknowledged universality which they   
acquired after having been successfully 
employed to explain many classes of     
phenomena to which they were not        

originally seen to be applicable2 as    
when the laws of motion were employed1  
in conjunction with other laws1 to      
explain deductively the celestial       
phenomena4 ,still1 the fact remains1    
that the propositions which were        
afterwards recognised as the most       
general truths of the science1 were1 of 
all its accurate generalizations1 those 
earliest arrived at4 ,bacon's greatest  
merit cannot therefore consist1 as we   
are so often told that it did1 in       
exploding the vicious method pursued by 
the ancients of flying to the highest   
generalizations first1 and deducing the 
middle principles from them2 since this 
is neither a vicious nor an exploded1   
but the universally accredited method of
 modern science1 and that to which it   
owes its greatest triumphs4 ,the error  
of ancient speculation did not consist  
in making the largest generalizations   
first1 but in making them without the   
aid or warrant of rigorous inductive    
methods1 and applying them deductively  

without the needful use of that         
important part of the ,deductive ,method
 termed ,verification4  ,the order in   
which truths of the various degrees of  
generality should be ascertained1       
cannot1 ,i apprehend1 be prescribed by  
any unbending rule4 ,i know of no maxim 
which can be laid down on the subject1  
but to obtain those first1 in respect to
 which the conditions of a real         
induction can be first and most         
completely realized4 ,now1 wherever our 
means of investigation can reach causes1
 without stopping at the empirical laws 
of the effects1 the simplest cases1     
being those in which fewest causes are  
simultaneously concerned1 will be most  
amenable to the inductive process2 and  
these are the cases which elicit laws of
 the greatest comprehensiveness4 ,in    
every science1 therefore1 which has     
reached the stage at which it becomes a 
science of causes1 it will be usual as  
well as desirable first to obtain the   
highest generalizations1 and then deduce

 the more special ones from them4 ,nor  
can ,i discover any foundation for the  
,baconian maxim1 so much extolled by    
subsequent writers1 except this3 ,that  
before we attempt to explain deductively
 from more general laws any new class of
 phenomena1 it is desirable to have gone
 as far as is practicable in            
ascertaining the empirical laws of those
 phenomena2 so as to compare the results
 of deduction1 not with one individual  
instance after another1 but with general
 propositions expressive of the points  
of agreement which have been found among
 many instances4 ,for if ,newton had    
been obliged to verify the theory of    
gravitation1 not by deducing from it    
,kepler's laws1 but by deducing all the 
observed planetary positions which had  
served ,kepler to establish those laws1 
the ,newtonian theory would probably    
never have emerged from the state of an 
hypothesis4#f  ,the applicability of    
these remarks to the special case under 
consideration1 cannot admit of question4

 ,the science of the formation of       
character is a science of causes4 ,the  
subject is one to which those among the 
canons of induction1 by which laws of   
causation are ascertained1 can be       
rigorously applied4 ,it is1 therefore1  
both natural and advisable to ascertain 
the simplest1 which are necessarily the 
most general1 laws of causation first1  
and to deduce the middle principles from
 them4 ,in other words1 ,ethology1 the  
deductive science1 is a system of       
corollaries from ,psychology1 the       
experimental science4    #f4 ,of these1 
the earlier alone has been1 as yet1     
really conceived or studied as a        
science2 the other1 ,ethology1 is still 
to be created4 ,but its creation has at 
length become practicable4 ,the         
empirical laws1 destined to verify its  
deductions1 have been formed in         
abundance by every successive age of    
humanity2 and the premises for the      
deductions are now sufficiently         
complete4 ,excepting the degree of      

uncertainty which still exists as to the
 extent of the natural differences of   
individual minds1 and the physical      
circumstances on which these may be     
dependent1 7considerations which are of 
secondary importance when we are        
considering mankind in the average1 or  
en masse17 ,i believe most competent    
judges will agree that the general laws 
of the different constituent elements of
 human nature are even now sufficiently 
understood1 to render it possible for a 
competent thinker to deduce from those  
laws with a considerable approach to    
certainty1 the particular type of       
character which would be formed1 in     
mankind generally1 by any assumed set of
 circumstances4 ,a science of ,ethology1
 founded on the laws of ,psychology1 is 
therefore possible2 though little has   
yet been done1 and that little not at   
all systematically1 towards forming it4 
,the progress of this important but most
 imperfect science will depend on a     
double process3 first1 that of deducing 

theoretically the ethological           
consequences of particular circumstances
 of position1 and comparing them with   
the recognised results of common        
experience2 and secondly1 the reverse   
operation2 increased study of the       
various types of human nature that are  
to be found in the world2 conducted by  
persons not only capable of analysing   
and recording the circumstances in which
 these types severally prevail1 but also
 sufficiently acquainted with           
psychological laws1 to be able to       
explain and account for the             
characteristics of the type1 by the     
peculiarities of the circumstances3 the 
residuum alone1 when there proves to be 
any1 being set down to the account of   
congenital predispositions4  ,for the   
experimental or  posteriori part of this
 process1 the materials are continually 
accumulating by the observation of      
mankind4 ,so far as thought is          
concerned1 the great problem of         
,ethology is to deduce the requisite    

middle principles from the general laws 
of ,psychology4 ,the subject to be      
studied is1 the origin and sources of   
all those qualities in human beings     
which are interesting to us1 either as  
facts to be produced1 to be avoided1 or 
merely to be understood3 and the object 
is1 to determine1 from the general laws 
of mind1 combined with the general      
position of our species in the universe1
 what actual or possible combinations of
 circumstances are capable of promoting 
or of preventing the production of those
 qualities4 ,a science which possesses  
middle principles of this kind1 arranged
 in the order1 not of causes1 but of the
 effects which it is desirable to       
produce or to prevent1 is duly prepared 
to be the foundation of the             
corresponding ,art4 ,and when ,ethology 
shall be thus prepared1 practical       
education will be the mere              
transformation of those principles into 
a parallel system of precepts1 and the  
adaptation of these to the sum total of 

the individual circumstances which exist
 in each particular case4  ,it is hardly
 necessary again to repeat1 that1 as in 
every other deductive science1          
verification  posteriori must proceed   
pari passu with deduction  priori4 ,the 
inference given by theory as to the type
 of character which would be formed by  
any given circumstances1 must be tested 
by specific experience of those         
circumstances whenever obtainable2 and  
the conclusions of the science as a     
whole1 must undergo a perpetual         
verification and correction from the    
general remarks afforded by common      
experience respecting human nature in   
our own age1 and by history respecting  
times gone by4 ,the conclusions of      
theory cannot be trusted1 unless        
confirmed by observation2 nor those of  
observation1 unless they can be         
affiliated to theory1 by deducing them  
from the laws of human nature1 and from 
a close analysis of the circumstances of
 the particular situation4 ,it is the   

accordance of these two kinds of        
evidence separately taken--the          
consilience of  priori reasoning and    
specific experience--which forms the    
only sufficient ground for the          
principles of any science so immersed in
 matter1 dealing with such complex and  
concrete phenomena1 as ,ethology4       
,,chapter ,,vi4  ,,general              
,,considerations ,,on ,,the ,,social    
,,science4    #a4 ,next after the       
science of individual man1 comes the    
science of man in society3 of the       
actions of collective masses of mankind1
 and the various phenomena which        
constitute social life4  ,if the        
formation of individual character is    
already a complex subject of study1 this
 subject must be1 in appearance at      
least1 still more complex2 because the  
number of concurrent causes1 all        
exercising more or less influence on the
 total effect1 is greater1 in the       
proportion in which a nation1 or the    
species at large1 exposes a larger      

surface to the operation of agents1     
psychological and physical1 than any    
single individual4 ,if it was necessary 
to prove1 in opposition to an existing  
prejudice1 that the simpler of the two  
is capable of being a subject of        
science2 the prejudice is likely to be  
yet stronger against the possibility of 
giving a scientific character to the    
study of ,politics1 and of the phenomena
 of ,society4 ,it is1 accordingly1 but  
of yesterday that the conception of a   
political or social science has existed1
 anywhere but in the mind of here and   
there an insulated thinker1 generally   
very ill prepared for its realization3  
though the subject itself has of all    
others engaged the most general         
attention1 and been a theme of          
interested and earnest discussions1     
almost from the beginning of recorded   
time4  ,the condition indeed of         
politics1 as a branch of knowledge1 was 
until very lately1 and has scarcely even
 yet ceased to be1 that which ,bacon    

animadverted on1 as the natural state of
 the sciences while their cultivation is
 abandoned to practitioners2 not being  
carried on as a branch of speculative   
inquiry1 but only with a view to the    
exigencies of daily practice1 and the   
fructifera experimenta1 therefore1 being
 aimed at1 almost to the exclusion of   
the lucifera4 ,such was medical         
investigation1 before physiology and    
natural history began to be cultivated  
as branches of general knowledge4 ,the  
only questions examined were1 what diet 
is wholesome1 or what medicine will cure
 some given disease2 without any        
previous systematic inquiry into the    
laws of nutrition1 and of the healthy   
and morbid action of the different      
organs1 on which laws the effect of any 
diet or medicine must evidently depend4 
,and in politics1 the questions which   
engaged general attention were          
similar3--,is such an enactment1 or such
 a form of government1 beneficial or the
 reverse--either universally1 or to some

 particular community8 without any      
previous inquiry into the general       
conditions by which the operation of    
legislative measures1 or the effects    
produced by forms of government1 are    
determined4 ,students in politics thus  
attempted to study the pathology and    
therapeutics of the social body1 before 
they had laid the necessary foundation  
in its physiology2 to cure disease1     
without understanding the laws of       
health4 ,and the result was such as it  
must always be when persons1 even of    
ability1 attempt to deal with the       
complex questions of a science before   
its simpler and more elementary truths  
have been established4  ,no wonder that 
when the phenomena of society have so   
rarely been contemplated in the point of
 view characteristic of science1 the    
philosophy of society should have made  
little progress2 should contain few     
general propositions sufficiently       
precise and certain1 for common         
inquirers to recognise in them a        

scientific character4 ,the vulgar notion
 accordingly is1 that all pretension to 
lay down general truths on politics and 
society is quackery2 that no            
universality and no certainty are       
attainable in such matters4 ,what partly
 excuses this common notion is1 that it 
is really not without foundation in one 
particular sense4 ,a large proportion of
 those who have laid claim to the       
character of philosophic politicians1   
have attempted1 not to ascertain        
universal sequences1 but to frame       
universal precepts4 ,they have imagined 
some one form of government1 or system  
of laws1 to fit all cases2 a pretension 
well meriting the ridicule with which it
 is treated by practitioners1 and wholly
 unsupported by the analogy of the art  
to which1 from the nature of its        
subject1 that of politics must be the   
most nearly allied4 ,no one now supposes
 it possible that one remedy can cure   
all diseases1 or even the same disease  
in all constitutions and habits of body4

  ,it is not necessary even to the      
perfection of a science1 that the       
corresponding art should possess        
universal1 or even general1 rules4 ,the 
phenomena of society might not only be  
completely dependent on known causes1   
but the mode of action of all those     
causes might be reducible to laws of    
considerable simplicity1 and yet no two 
cases might admit of being treated in   
precisely the same manner4 ,so great    
might be the variety of circumstances on
 which the results in different cases   
depend1 that the art might not have a   
single general precept to give1 except  
that of watching the circumstances of   
the particular case1 and adapting our   
measures to the effects which1 according
 to the principles of the science1      
result from those circumstances4 ,but   
although1 in so complicated a class of  
subjects1 it is impossible to lay down  
practical maxims of universal           
application1 it does not follow that the
 phenomena do not conform to universal  

laws4    #b4 ,all phenomena of society  
are phenomena of human nature1 generated
 by the action of outward circumstances 
upon masses of human beings3 and if1    
therefore1 the phenomena of human       
thought1 feeling1 and action1 are       
subject to fixed laws1 the phenomena of 
society cannot but conform to fixed     
laws1 the consequence of the preceding4 
,there is1 indeed1 no hope that these   
laws1 though our knowledge of them were 
as certain and as complete as it is in  
astronomy1 would enable us to predict   
the history of society1 like that of the
 celestial appearances1 for thousands of
 years to come4 ,but the difference of  
certainty is not in the laws themselves1
 it is in the data to which these laws  
are to be applied4 ,in astronomy the    
causes influencing the result are few1  
and change little1 and that little      
according to known laws2 we can         
ascertain what they are now1 and thence 
determine what they will be at any epoch
 of a distant future4 ,the data1        

therefore1 in astronomy1 are as certain 
as the laws themselves4 ,the            
circumstances1 on the contrary1 which   
influence the condition and progress of 
society1 are innumerable1 and           
perpetually changing2 and though they   
all change in obedience to causes1 and  
therefore to laws1 the multitude of the 
causes is so great as to defy our       
limited powers of calculation4 ,not to  
say that the impossibility of applying  
precise numbers to facts of such a      
description1 would set an impassable    
limit to the possibility of calculating 
them beforehand1 even if the powers of  
the human intellect were otherwise      
adequate to the task4  ,but1 as before  
remarked1 an amount of knowledge quite  
insufficient for prediction1 may be most
 valuable for guidance4 ,the science of 
society would have attained a very high 
point of perfection1 if it enabled us1  
in any given condition of social        
affairs1 in the condition for instance  
of ,europe or any ,european country at  

the present time1 to understand by what 
causes it had1 in any and every         
particular1 been made what it was2      
whether it was tending to any1 and to   
what1 changes2 what effects each feature
 of its existing state was likely to    
produce in the future2 and by what means
 any of those effects might be          
prevented1 modified1 or accelerated1 or 
a different class of effects            
superinduced4 ,there is nothing         
chimerical in the hope that general     
laws1 sufficient to enable us to answer 
these various questions for any country 
or time with the individual             
circumstances of which we are well      
acquainted1 do really admit of being    
ascertained2 and that the other branches
 of human knowledge1 which this         
undertaking presupposes1 are so far     
advanced that the time is ripe for its  
commencement4 ,such is the object of the
 ,social ,science4  ,that the nature of 
what ,i consider the true method of the 
science may be made more palpable1 by   

first showing what that method is not2  
it will be expedient to characterize    
briefly two radical misconceptions of   
the proper mode of philosophizing on    
society and government1 one or other of 
which is1 either explicitly or more     
often unconsciously1 entertained by     
almost all who have meditated or argued 
respecting the logic of politics since  
the notion of treating it by strict     
rules1 and on ,baconian principles1 has 
been current among the more advanced    
thinkers4 ,these erroneous methods1 if  
the word method can be applied to       
erroneous tendencies arising from the   
absence of any sufficiently distinct    
conception of method1 may be termed the 
,experimental1 or ,chemical1 mode of    
investigation1 and the ,abstract1 or    
,geometrical1 mode4 ,we shall begin with
 the former4     ,,chapter ,,vii4  ,,of 
,,the ,,chemical1 ,,or ,,experimental1  
,,method ,,in ,,the ,,social ,,science4 
#a4 ,the laws of the phenomena of       
society are1 and can be1 nothing but the

 laws of the actions and passions of    
human beings united together in the     
social state4 ,men1 however1 in a state 
of society1 are still men2 their actions
 and passions are obedient to the laws  
of individual human nature4 ,men are    
not1 when brought together1 converted   
into another kind of substance1 with    
different properties2 as hydrogen and   
oxygen are different from water1 or as  
hydrogen1 oxygen1 carbon1 and azote1 are
 different from nerves1 muscles1 and    
tendons4 ,human beings in society have  
no properties but those which are       
derived from1 and may be resolved into1 
the laws of the nature of individual    
man4 ,in social phenomena the           
,composition of ,causes is the universal
 law4  ,now1 the method of              
philosophizing which may be termed      
chemical overlooks this fact1 and       
proceeds as if the nature of man as an  
individual were not concerned at all1 or
 were concerned in a very inferior      
degree1 in the operations of human      

beings in society4 ,all reasoning in    
political or social affairs1 grounded on
 principles of human nature1 is objected
 to by reasoners of this sort1 under    
such names as abstract theory4 ,for the 
direction of their opinions and conduct1
 they profess to demand1 in all cases   
without exception1 specific experience4 
,this mode of thinking is not only      
general with practitioners in politics1 
and with that very numerous class who   
7on a subject which no one1 however     
ignorant1 thinks himself incompetent to 
discuss7 profess to guide themselves by 
common sense rather than by science2 but
 is often countenanced by persons with  
greater pretensions to instruction2     
persons who1 having sufficient          
acquaintance with books and with the    
current ideas to have heard that ,bacon 
taught mankind to follow experience1 and
 to ground their conclusions on facts   
instead of metaphysical dogmas--think   
that1 by treating political facts in as 
directly experimental a method as       

chemical facts1 they are showing        
themselves true ,baconians1 and proving 
their adversaries to be mere syllogizers
 and schoolmen4 ,as1 however1 the notion
 of the applicability of experimental   
methods to political philosophy cannot  
coexist with any just conception of     
these methods themselves1 the kind of   
arguments from experience which the     
chemical theory brings forth as its     
fruits 7and which form the staple1 in   
this country especially1 of             
parliamentary and hustings oratory17 are
 such as1 at no time since ,bacon1 would
 have been admitted to be valid in      
chemistry itself1 or in any other branch
 of experimental science4 ,they are such
 as these2 that the prohibition of      
foreign commodities must conduce to     
national wealth1 because ,england has   
flourished under it1 or because         
countries in general which have adopted 
it have flourished2 that our laws1 or   
our internal administration1 or our     
constitution1 are excellent for a       

similar reason3 and the eternal         
arguments from historical examples1 from
 ,athens or ,rome1 from the fires in    
,smithfield or the ,french ,revolution4 
,i will not waste time in contending    
against modes of argumentation which no 
person1 with the smallest practice in   
estimating evidence1 could possibly be  
betrayed into2 which draw conclusions of
 general application from a single      
unanalysed instance1 or arbitrarily     
refer an effect to some one among its   
antecedents1 without any process of     
elimination or comparison of instances4 
,it is a rule both of justice and of    
good sense to grapple not with the      
absurdest1 but with1 the most reasonable
 form of a wrong opinion4 ,we shall     
suppose our inquirer acquainted with the
 true conditions of experimental        
investigation1 and competent in point of
 acquirements for realizing them1 so far
 as they can be realized4 ,he shall know
 as much of the facts of history as mere
 erudition can teach--as much as can be 

proved by testimony1 without the        
assistance of any theory2 and if those  
mere facts1 properly collated1 can      
fulfil the conditions of a real         
induction1 he shall be qualified for the
 task4  ,but1 that no such attempt can  
have the smallest chance of success1 has
 been abundantly shown in the tenth     
chapter of the ,third ,book4#g ,we there
 examined whether effects which depend  
on a complication of causes can be made 
the subject of a true induction by      
observation and experiment2 and         
concluded1 on the most convincing       
grounds1 that they cannot4 ,since1 of   
all effects1 none depend on so great a  
complication of causes as social        
phenomena1 we might leave our case to   
rest in safety on that previous showing4
 ,but a logical principle as yet so     
little familiar to the ordinary run of  
thinkers1 requires to be insisted on    
more than once1 in order to make the due
 impression2 and the present being the  
case which of all others exemplifies it 

the most strongly1 there will be        
advantage in re-stating the grounds of  
the general maxim1 as applied to the    
specialities of the class of inquiries  
now under consideration4    #b4 ,the    
first difficulty which meets us in the  
attempt to apply experimental methods   
for ascertaining the laws of social     
phenomena1 is that we are without the   
means of making artificial experiments4 
,even if we could contrive experiments  
at leisure1 and try them without limit1 
we should do so under immense           
disadvantage2 both from the             
impossibility of ascertaining and taking
 note of all the facts of each case1 and
 because 7those facts being in a        
perpetual state of change7 before       
sufficient time had elapsed to ascertain
 the result of the experiment1 some     
material circumstances would always have
 ceased to be the same4 ,but it is      
unnecessary to consider the logical     
objections which would exist to the     
conclusiveness of our experiments1 since

 we palpably never have the power of    
trying any4 ,we can only watch those    
which nature produces1 or which are     
produced for other reasons4 ,we cannot  
adapt our logical means to our wants1 by
 varying the circumstances as the       
exigencies of elimination may require4  
,if the spontaneous instances1 formed by
 cotemporary events and by the          
successions of phenomena recorded in    
history1 afford a sufficient variation  
of circumstances1 an induction from     
specific experience is attainable2      
otherwise not4 ,the question to be      
resolved is1 therefore1 whether the     
requisites for induction respecting the 
causes of political effects or the      
properties of political agents1 are to  
be met with in history8 including under 
the term1 cotemporary history4 ,and in  
order to give fixity to our conceptions1
 it will be advisable to suppose this   
question asked in reference to some     
special subject of political inquiry or 
controversy2 such as that frequent topic

 of debate in the present century1 the  
operation of restrictive and prohibitory
 commercial legislation upon national   
wealth4 ,let this1 then1 be the         
scientific question to be investigated  
by specific experience4    #c4 ,in order
 to apply to the case the most perfect  
of the methods of experimental inquiry1 
the ,method of ,difference1 we require  
to find two instances1 which tally in   
every particular except the one which is
 the subject of inquiry4 ,if two nations
 can be found which are alike in all    
natural advantages and disadvantages2   
whose people resemble each other in     
every quality1 physical and moral1      
spontaneous and acquired2 whose habits1 
usages1 opinions1 laws and institutions 
are the same in all respects1 except    
that one of them has a more protective  
tariff1 or in other respects interferes 
more with the freedom of industry2 if   
one of these nations is found to be     
rich1 and the other poor1 or one richer 
than the other1 this will be an         

experimentum crucis3 a real proof by    
experience1 which of the two systems is 
most favourable to national riches4 ,but
 the supposition that two such instances
 can be met with is manifestly absurd4  
,nor is such a concurrence even         
abstractly possible4 ,two nations which 
agreed in everything except their       
commercial policy1 would agree also in  
that4 ,differences of legislation are   
not inherent and ultimate diversities2  
are not properties of ,kinds4 ,they are 
effects of pre-existing causes4 ,if the 
two nations differ in this portion of   
their institutions1 it is from some     
difference in their position1 and thence
 in their apparent interests1 or in some
 portion or other of their opinions1    
habits1 and tendencies2 which opens a   
view of further differences without any 
assignable limit1 capable of operating  
on their industrial prosperity1 as well 
as on every other feature of their      
condition1 in more ways than can be     
enumerated or imagined4 ,there is thus a

 demonstrated impossibility of          
obtaining1 in the investigations of the 
social science1 the conditions required 
for the most conclusive form of inquiry 
by specific experience4  ,in the absence
 of the direct1 we may next try1 as in  
other cases1 the supplementary resource1
 called in a former place the ,indirect 
,method of ,difference3 which1 instead  
of two instances differing in nothing   
but the presence or absence of a given  
circumstance1 compares two classes of   
instances respectively agreeing in      
nothing but the presence of a           
circumstance on the one side and its    
absence on the other4 ,to choose the    
most advantageous case conceivable1 7a  
case far too advantageous to be ever    
obtained17 suppose that we compare one  
nation which has a restrictive policy1  
with two or more nations agreeing in    
nothing but in permitting free trade4   
,we need not now suppose that either of 
these nations agrees with the first in  
all its circumstances2 one may agree    

with it in some of its circumstances1   
and another in the remainder4 ,and it   
may be argued1 that if these nations    
remain poorer than the restrictive      
nation1 it cannot be for want either of 
the first or of the second set of       
circumstances1 but it must be for want  
of the protective system4 ,if 7we might 
say7 the restrictive nation had         
prospered from the one set of causes1   
the first of the free-trade nations     
would have prospered equally2 if by     
reason of the other1 the second would3  
but neither has3 therefore the          
prosperity was owing to the             
restrictions4 ,this will be allowed to  
be a very favourable specimen of an     
argument from specific experience in    
politics1 and if this be inconclusive1  
it would not be easy to find another    
preferable to it4  ,yet1 that it is     
inconclusive1 scarcely requires to be   
pointed out4 ,why must the prosperous   
nation have prospered from one cause    
exclusively8 ,national prosperity is    

always the collective result of a       
multitude of favourable circumstances2  
and of these1 the restrictive nation may
 unite a greater number than either of  
the others1 though it may have all of   
those circumstances in common with      
either one or the other of them4 ,its   
prosperity may be partly owing to       
circumstances common to it with one of  
those nations1 and partly with the      
other1 while they1 having each of them  
only half the number of favourable      
circumstances1 have remained inferior4  
,so that the closest imitation which can
 be made1 in the social science1 of a   
legitimate induction from direct        
experience1 gives but a specious        
semblance of conclusiveness1 without any
 real value4    #d4 ,the ,method of     
,difference in either of its forms being
 thus completely out of the question1   
there remains the ,method of ,agreement4
 ,but we are already aware of how little
 value this method is1 in cases         
admitting ,plurality of ,causes3 and    

social phenomena are those in which the 
plurality prevails in the utmost        
possible extent4  ,suppose that the     
observer makes the luckiest hit which   
could be given by any conceivable       
combination of chances3 that he finds   
two nations which agree in no           
circumstance whatever1 except in having 
a restrictive system1 and in being      
prosperous2 or a number of nations1 all 
prosperous1 which have no antecedent    
circumstances common to them all but    
that of having a restrictive policy4 ,it
 is unnecessary to go into the          
consideration of the impossibility of   
ascertaining from history1 or even from 
cotemporary observation1 that such is   
really the fact3 that the nations agree 
in no other circumstance capable of     
influencing the case4 ,let us suppose   
this impossibility vanquished1 and the  
fact ascertained that they agree only in
 a restrictive system as an antecedent1 
and industrial prosperity as a          
consequent4 ,what degree of presumption 

does this raise1 that the restrictive   
system caused the prosperity8 ,one so   
trifling as to be equivalent to none at 
all4 ,that some one antecedent is the   
cause of a given effect1 because all    
other antecedents have been found       
capable of being eliminated1 is a just  
inference1 only if the effect can have  
but one cause4 ,if it admits of several1
 nothing is more natural than that each 
of these should separately admit of     
being eliminated4 ,now1 in the case of  
political phenomena1 the supposition of 
unity of cause is not only wide of the  
truth1 but at an immeasurable distance  
from it4 ,the causes of every social    
phenomenon which we are particularly    
interested about1 security1 wealth1     
freedom1 good government1 public virtue1
 general intelligence1 or their         
opposites1 are infinitely numerous3     
especially the external or remote       
causes1 which alone are1 for the most   
part1 accessible to direct observation4 
,no one cause suffices of itself to     

produce any of these phenomena2 while   
there are countless causes which have   
some influence over them1 and may       
co-operate either in their production or
 in their prevention4 ,from the mere    
fact1 therefore1 of our having been able
 to eliminate some circumstance1 we can 
by no means infer that this circumstance
 was not instrumental to the effect in  
some of the very instances from which we
 have eliminated it4 ,we can conclude   
that the effect is sometimes produced   
without it2 but not that1 when present1 
it does not contribute its share4       
,similar objections will be found to    
apply to the ,method of ,concomitant    
,variations4 ,if the causes which act   
upon the state of any society produced  
effects differing from one another in   
kind2 if wealth depended on one cause1  
peace on another1 a third made people   
virtuous1 a fourth intelligent2 we      
might1 though unable to sever the causes
 from one another1 refer to each of them
 that property of the effect which waxed

 as it waxed1 and which waned as it     
waned4 ,but every attribute of the      
social body is influenced by innumerable
 causes2 and such is the mutual action  
of the coexisting elements of society1  
that whatever affects any one of the    
more important of them1 will by that    
alone1 if it does not affect the others 
directly1 affect them indirectly4 ,the  
effects1 therefore1 of different agents 
not being different in quality1 while   
the quantity of each is the mixed result
 of all the agents1 the variations of   
the aggregate cannot bear an uniform    
proportion to those of any one of its   
component parts4    #e4 ,there remains  
the ,method of ,residues2 which appears1
 on the first view1 less foreign to this
 kind of inquiry than the three other   
methods1 because it only requires that  
we should accurately note the           
circumstances of some one country1 or   
state of society4 ,making allowance1    
thereupon1 for the effect of all causes 
whose tendencies are known1 the residue 

which those causes are inadequate to    
explain may plausibly be imputed to the 
remainder of the circumstances which are
 known to have existed in the case4     
,something similar to this is the method
 which ,coleridge#h describes himself as
 having followed in his political essays
 in the ,morning ,post4 ,on every great 
occurrence ,i endeavoured to discover in
 past history the event that most nearly
 resembled it4 ,i procured1 whenever it 
was possible1 the contemporary          
historians1 memorialists1 and           
pamphleteers4 ,then fairly subtracting  
the points of difference from those of  
likeness1 as the balance favoured the   
former or the latter1 ,i conjectured    
that the result would be the same or    
different4 ,as1 for instance1 in the    
series of essays entitled ',a comparison
 of ,france under ,napoleon with ,rome  
under the first ,csars1' and in those   
which followed1 'on the probable final  
restoration of the ,bourbons4' ,the same
 plan ,i pursued at the commencement of 

the ,spanish ,revolution1 and with the  
same success1 taking the war of the     
,united ,provinces with ,philip ,,ii4 as
 the groundwork of the comparison4 ,in  
this inquiry he no doubt employed the   
,method of ,residues2 for1 in           
subtracting the points of difference    
from those of likeness1 he doubtless    
weighed1 and did not content himself    
with numbering1 them3 he doubtless took 
those points of agreement only1 which he
 presumed from their own nature to be   
capable of influencing the effect1 and1 
allowing for that influence1 concluded  
that the remainder of the result would  
be referable to the points of           
difference4  ,whatever may be the       
efficacy of this method1 it is1 as we   
long ago remarked1 not a method of pure 
observation and experiment2 it          
concludes1 not from a comparison of     
instances1 but from the comparison of an
 instance with the result of a previous 
deduction4 ,applied to social phenomena1
 it presupposes that the causes from    

which part of the effect proceeded are  
already known2 and as we have shown that
 these cannot have been known by        
specific experience1 they must have been
 learnt by deduction from principles of 
human nature2 experience being called in
 only as a supplementary resource1 to   
determine the causes which produced an  
unexplained residue4 ,but if the        
principles of human nature may be had   
recourse to for the establishment of    
some political truths1 they may for all4
 ,if it be admissible to say1 ,england  
must have prospered by reason of the    
prohibitory system1 because after       
allowing for all the other tendencies   
which have been operating1 there is a   
portion of prosperity still to be       
accounted for2 it must be admissible to 
go to the same source for the effect of 
the prohibitory system1 and examine what
 account the laws of human motives and  
actions will enable us to give of its   
tendencies4 ,nor1 in fact1 will the     
experimental argument amount to         

anything1 except in verification of a   
conclusion drawn from those general     
laws4 ,for we may subtract the effect of
 one1 two1 three1 or four causes1 but we
 shall never succeed in subtracting the 
effect of all causes except one3 while  
it would be a curious instance of the   
dangers of too much caution1 if1 to     
avoid depending on  priori reasoning    
concerning the effect of a single cause1
 we should oblige ourselves to depend on
 as many separate  priori reasonings as 
there are causes operating concurrently 
with that particular cause in some given
 instance4  ,we have now sufficiently   
characterized the gross misconception of
 the mode of investigation proper to    
political phenomena1 which ,i have      
termed the ,chemical ,method4 ,so       
lengthened a discussion would not have  
been necessary1 if the claim to decide  
authoritatively on political doctrines  
were confined to persons who had        
competently studied any one of the      
higher departments of physical science4 

,but since the generality of those who  
reason on political subjects1           
satisfactorily to themselves and to a   
more or less numerous body of admirers1 
know nothing whatever of the methods of 
physical investigation beyond a few     
precepts which they continue to parrot  
after ,bacon1 being entirely unaware    
that ,bacon's conception of scientific  
inquiry has done its work1 and that     
science has now advanced into a higher  
stage2 there are probably many to whom  
such remarks as the foregoing may still 
be useful4 ,in an age in which chemistry
 itself1 when attempting to deal with   
the more complex chemical sequences1    
those of the animal or even the         
vegetable organism1 has found it        
necessary to become1 and has succeeded  
in becoming1 a ,deductive ,science--it  
is not to be apprehended that any person
 of scientific habits1 who has kept pace
 with the general progress of the       
knowledge of nature1 can be in danger of
 applying the methods of elementary     

chemistry to explore the sequences of   
the most complex order of phenomena in  
existence4     ,,chapter ,,viii4  ,,of  
,,the ,,geometrical1 ,,or ,,abstract    
,,method4    #a4 ,the misconception     
discussed in the preceding chapter is1  
as we said1 chiefly committed by persons
 not much accustomed to scientific      
investigation3 practitioners in         
politics1 who rather employ the         
commonplaces of philosophy to justify   
their practice1 than seek to guide their
 practice by philosophic principles3 or 
imperfectly educated persons1 who1 in   
ignorance of the careful selection and  
elaborate comparison of instances       
required for the formation of a sound   
theory1 attempt to found one upon a few 
coincidences which they have casually   
noticed4  ,the erroneous method of which
 we are now to treat1 is1 on the        
contrary1 peculiar to thinking and      
studious minds4 ,it never could have    
suggested itself but to persons of some 
familiarity with the nature of          

scientific research2 who1--being aware  
of the impossibility of establishing1 by
 casual observation or direct           
experimentation1 a true theory of       
sequences so complex as are those of the
 social phenomena1--have recourse to the
 simpler laws which are immediately     
operative in those phenomena1 and which 
are no other than the laws of the nature
 of the human beings therein concerned4 
,these thinkers perceive 7what the      
partisans of the chemical or            
experimental theory do not7 that the    
science of society must necessarily be  
deductive4 ,but1 from an insufficient   
consideration of the specific nature of 
the subject matter1--and often because  
7their own scientific education having  
stopped short in too early a stage7     
geometry stands in their minds as the   
type of all deductive science1 it is to 
geometry rather than to astronomy and   
natural philosophy1 that they           
unconsciously assimilate the deductive  
science of society4  ,among the         

differences between geometry 7a science 
of coexistent facts1 altogether         
independent of the laws of the          
succession of phenomena71 and those     
physical ,sciences of ,causation which  
have been rendered deductive1 the       
following is one of the most            
conspicuous3 ,that geometry affords no  
room for what so constantly occurs in   
mechanics and its applications1 the case
 of conflicting forces2 of causes which 
counteract or modify one another4 ,in   
mechanics we continually find two or    
more moving forces producing1 not       
motion1 but rest2 or motion in a        
different direction from that which     
would have been produced by either of   
the generating forces4 ,it is true that 
the effect of the joint forces is the   
same when they act simultaneously1 as if
 they had acted one after another1 or by
 turns2 and it is in this that the      
difference between mechanical and       
chemical laws consists4 ,but still the  
effects1 whether produced by successive 

or by simultaneous action1 do1 wholly or
 in part1 cancel one another3 what the  
one force does1 the other1 partly or    
altogether1 undoes4 ,there is no similar
 state of things in geometry4 ,the      
result which follows from one           
geometrical principle has nothing that  
conflicts with the result which follows 
from another4 ,what is proved true from 
one geometrical theorem1 what would be  
true if no other geometrical principles 
existed1 cannot be altered and made no  
longer true by reason of some other     
geometrical principle4 ,what is once    
proved true is true in all cases1       
whatever supposition may be made in     
regard to any other matter4  ,now a     
conception1 similar to this last1 would 
appear to have been formed of the social
 science1 in the minds of the earlier of
 those who have attempted to cultivate  
it by a deductive method4 ,mechanics    
would be a science very similar to      
geometry1 if every motion resulted from 
one force alone1 and not from a conflict

 of forces4 ,in the geometrical theory  
of society1 it seems to be supposed that
 this is really the case with the social
 phenomena2 that each of them results   
always from only one force1 one single  
property of human nature4  ,at the point
 which we have now reached1 it cannot be
 necessary to say anything either in    
proof or in illustration of the         
assertion that such is not the true     
character of the social phenomena4      
,there is not1 among these most complex 
and 7for that reason7 most modifiable of
 all phenomena1 any one over which      
innumerable forces do not exercise      
influence2 which does not depend on a   
conjunction of very many causes4 ,we    
have not1 therefore1 to prove the notion
 in question to be an error1 but to     
prove that the error has been committed2
 that so mistaken a conception of the   
mode in which the phenomena of society  
are produced1 has actually been         
ascertained4    #b4 ,one numerous       
division of the reasoners who have      

treated social facts according to       
geometrical methods1 not admitting any  
modification of one law by another1 must
 for the present be left out of         
consideration2 because in them this     
error is complicated with1 and is the   
effect of1 another fundamental          
misconception1 of which we have already 
taken some notice1 and which will be    
further treated of before we conclude4  
,i speak of those who deduce political  
conclusions not from laws of nature1 not
 from sequences of phenomena1 real or   
imaginary1 but from unbending practical 
maxims4 ,such1 for example1 are all who 
found their theory of politics on what  
is called abstract right1 that is to    
say1 on universal precepts2 a pretension
 of which we have already noticed the   
chimerical nature4 ,such1 in like       
manner1 are those who make the          
assumption of a social contract1 or any 
other kind of original obligation1 and  
apply it to particular cases by mere    
interpretation4 ,but in this the        

fundamental error is the attempt to     
treat an art like a science1 and to have
 a deductive art2 the irrationality of  
which will be shown in a future chapter4
 ,it will be proper to take our         
exemplification of the geometrical      
theory from those thinkers who have     
avoided this additional error1 and who  
entertain1 so far1 a juster idea of the 
nature of political inquiry4  ,we may   
cite1 in the first instance1 those who  
assume as the principle of their        
political philosophy that government is 
founded on fear2 that the dread of each 
other is the one motive by which human  
beings were originally brought into a   
state of society1 and are still held in 
it4 ,some of the earlier scientific     
inquirers into politics1 in particular  
,hobbes1 assumed this proposition1 not  
by implication1 but avowedly1 as the    
foundation of their doctrine1 and       
attempted to build a complete philosophy
 of politics thereupon4 ,it is true that
 ,hobbes did not find this one maxim    

sufficient to carry him through the     
whole of his subject1 but was obliged to
 eke it out by the double sophism of an 
original contract4 ,i call this a double
 sophism2 first1 as passing off a       
fiction for a fact1 and1 secondly1      
assuming a practical principle1 or      
precept1 as the basis of a theory2 which
 is a petitio principii1 since 7as we   
noticed in treating of that ,fallacy7   
every rule of conduct1 even though it be
 so binding a one as the observance of a
 promise1 must rest its own foundations 
on the theory of the subject1 and the   
theory1 therefore1 cannot rest upon it4 
#c4 ,passing over less important        
instances1 ,i shall come at once to the 
most remarkable example afforded by our 
own times of the geometrical method in  
politics2 emanating from persons who    
were well aware of the distinction      
between science and art2 who knew that  
rules of conduct must follow1 not       
precede1 the ascertainment of laws of   
nature1 and that the latter1 not the    

former1 is the legitimate field for the 
application of the deductive method4 ,i 
allude to the interest-philosophy of the
 ,bentham school4  ,the profound and    
original thinkers who are commonly known
 under this description1 founded their  
general theory of government on one     
comprehensive premise1 namely1 that     
men's actions are always determined by  
their interests4 ,there is an ambiguity 
in this last expression2 for1 as the    
same philosophers1 especially ,bentham1 
gave the name of an interest to anything
 which a person likes1 the proposition  
may be understood to mean only this1    
that men's actions are always determined
 by their wishes4 ,in this sense1       
however1 it would not bear out any of   
the consequences which these writers    
drew from it2 and the word1 therefore1  
in their political reasonings1 must be  
understood to mean 7which is also the   
explanation they themselves1 on such    
occasions1 gave of it7 what is commonly 
termed private1 or worldly1 interest4   

,taking the doctrine1 then1 in this     
sense1 an objection presents itself in  
limine which might be deemed a fatal    
one1 namely1 that so sweeping a         
proposition is far from being           
universally true4 ,human beings are not 
governed in all their actions by their  
worldly interests4 ,this1 however1 is by
 no means so conclusive an objection as 
it at first appears2 because in politics
 we are for the most part concerned with
 the conduct not of individual persons1 
but either of a series of persons 7as a 
succession of kings7 or a body or mass  
of persons1 as a nation1 an aristocracy1
 or a representative assembly4 ,and     
whatever is true of a large majority of 
mankind1 may without much error be taken
 for true of any succession of persons1 
considered as a whole1 or of any        
collection of persons in which the act  
of the majority becomes the act of the  
whole body4 ,although1 therefore1 the   
maxim is sometimes expressed in a manner
 unnecessarily paradoxical1 the         

consequences drawn from it will hold    
equally good if the assertion be limited
 as follows--,any succession of persons1
 or the majority of any body of persons1
 will be governed in the bulk of their  
conduct by their personal interests4 ,we
 are bound to allow to this school of   
thinkers the benefit of this more       
rational statement of their fundamental 
maxim1 which is also in strict          
conformity to the explanations which1   
when considered to be called for1 have  
been given by themselves4  ,the theory  
goes on to infer1 quite correctly1 that 
if the actions of mankind are determined
 in the main by their selfish interests1
 the only rulers who will govern        
according to the interest of the        
governed1 are those whose selfish       
interests are in accordance with it4    
,and to this is added a third           
proposition1 namely1 that no rulers have
 their selfish interest identical with  
that of the governed1 unless it be      
rendered so by accountability1 that is1 

by dependence on the will of the        
governed4 ,in other words 7and as the   
result of the whole71 that the desire of
 retaining or the fear of losing their  
power1 and whatever is thereon          
consequent1 is the sole motive which can
 be relied on for producing on the part 
of rulers a course of conduct in        
accordance with the general interest4   
,we have thus a fundamental theorem of  
political science1 consisting of three  
syllogisms1 and depending chiefly on two
 general premises1 in each of which a   
certain effect is considered as         
determined only by one cause1 not by a  
concurrence of causes4 ,in the one1 it  
is assumed that the actions of average  
rulers are determined solely by         
self-interest2 in the other1 that the   
sense of identity of interest with the  
governed1 is produced and producible by 
no other cause than responsibility4     
,neither of these propositions is by any
 means true2 the last is extremely wide 
of the truth4  ,it is not true that the 

actions even of average rulers are      
wholly1 or anything approaching to      
wholly1 determined by their personal    
interest1 or even by their own opinion  
of their personal interest4 ,i do not   
speak of the influence of a sense of    
duty1 or feelings of philanthropy1      
motives never to be mainly relied on1   
though 7except in countries or during   
periods of great moral debasement7 they 
influence almost all rulers in some     
degree1 and some rulers in a very great 
degree4 ,but ,i insist only on what is  
true of all rulers1 viz4 that the       
character and course of their actions is
 largely influenced 7independently of   
personal calculation7 by the habitual   
sentiments and feelings1 the general    
modes of thinking and acting1 which     
prevail throughout the community of     
which they are members2 as well as by   
the feelings1 habits1 and modes of      
thought which characterize the          
particular class in that community to   
which they themselves belong4 ,and no   

one will understand or be able to       
decypher their system of conduct1 who   
does not take all these things into     
account4 ,they are also much influenced 
by the maxims and traditions which have 
descended to them from other rulers1    
their predecessors2 which maxims and    
traditions have been known to retain an 
ascendancy during long periods1 even in 
opposition to the private interests of  
the rulers for the time being4 ,i put   
aside the influence of other less       
general causes4 ,although1 therefore1   
the private interest of the rulers or of
 the ruling class is a very powerful    
force1 constantly in action1 and        
exercising the most important influence 
upon their conduct2 there is also1 in   
what they do1 a large portion which that
 private interest by no means affords a 
sufficient explanation of3 and even the 
particulars which constitute the        
goodness or badness of their government1
 are in some1 and no small degree1      
influenced by those among the           

circumstances acting upon them1 which   
cannot1 with any propriety1 be included 
in the term self-interest4  ,turning now
 to the other proposition1 that         
responsibility to the governed is the   
only cause capable of producing in the  
rulers a sense of identity of interest  
with the community2 this is still less  
admissible as an universal truth1 than  
even the former4 ,i am not speaking of  
perfect identity of interest1 which is  
an impracticable chimera2 which1 most   
assuredly1 responsibility to the people 
does not give4 ,i speak of identity in  
essentials2 and the essentials are      
different at different places and times4
 ,there are a large number of cases in  
which those things which it is most for 
the general interest that the rulers    
should do1 are also those which they are
 prompted to do by their strongest      
personal interest1 the consolidation of 
their power4 ,the suppression1 for      
instance1 of anarchy and resistance to  
law1--the complete establishment of the 

authority of the central government1 in 
a state of society like that of ,europe 
in the middle ages1--is one of the      
strongest interests of the people1 and  
also of the rulers simply because they  
are the rulers3 and responsibility on   
their part could not strengthen1 though 
in many conceivable ways it might       
weaken1 the motives prompting them to   
pursue this object4 ,during the greater 
part of the reign of ,queen ,elizabeth1 
and of many other monarchs who might be 
named1 the sense of identity of interest
 between the sovereign and the majority 
of the people was probably stronger than
 it usually is in responsible           
governments3 everything that the people 
had most at heart1 the monarch had at   
heart too4 ,had ,peter the ,great1 or   
the rugged savages whom he began to     
civilize1 the truest inclination towards
 the things which were for the real     
interest of those savages8  ,i am not   
here attempting to establish a theory of
 government1 and am not called upon to  

determine the proportional weight which 
ought to be given to the circumstances  
which this school of geometrical        
politicians left out of their system1   
and those which they took into it4 ,i am
 only concerned to show that their      
method was unscientific2 not to measure 
the amount of error which may have      
affected their practical conclusions4   
,it is but justice to them1 however1 to 
remark1 that their mistake was not so   
much one of substance as of form2 and   
consisted in presenting in a systematic 
shape1 and as the scientific treatment  
of a great philosophical question1 what 
should have passed for that which it    
really was1 the mere polemics of the    
day4 ,although the actions of rulers are
 by no means wholly determined by their 
selfish interests1 it is chiefly as a   
security against those selfish interests
 that constitutional checks are         
required2 and for that purpose such     
checks1 in ,england1 and the other      
nations of modern ,europe1 can in no    

manner be dispensed with4 ,it is        
likewise true1 that in these same       
nations1 and in the present age1        
responsibility to the governed is the   
only means practically available to     
create a feeling of identity of         
interest1 in the cases1 and on the      
points1 where that feeling does not     
sufficiently exist4 ,to all this1 and to
 the arguments which may be founded on  
it in favour of measures for the        
correction of our representative system1
 ,i have nothing to object2 but ,i      
confess my regret1 that the small though
 highly important portion of the        
philosophy of government1 which was     
wanted for the immediate purpose of     
serving the cause of parliamentary      
reform1 should have been held forth by  
thinkers of such eminence as a complete 
theory4  ,it is not to be imagined      
possible1 nor is it true in point of    
fact1 that these philosophers regarded  
the few premises of their theory as     
including all that is required for      

explaining social phenomena1 or for     
determining the choice of forms of      
government and measures of legislation  
and administration4 ,they were too      
highly instructed1 of too comprehensive 
intellect1 and some of them of too sober
 and practical a character1 for such an 
error4 ,they would have applied and did 
apply their principles with innumerable 
allowances4 ,but it is not allowances   
that are wanted4 ,there is little chance
 of making due amends in the            
superstructure of a theory for the want 
of sufficient breadth in its            
foundations4 ,it is unphilosophical to  
construct a science out of a few of the 
agencies by which the phenomena are     
determined1 and leave the rest to the   
routine of practice or the sagacity of  
conjecture4 ,we either ought not to     
pretend to scientific forms1 or we ought
 to study all the determining agencies  
equally1 and endeavour1 so far as it can
 be done1 to include all of them within 
the pale of the science2 else we shall  

infallibly bestow a disproportionate    
attention upon those which our theory   
takes into account1 while we misestimate
 the rest1 and probably underrate their 
importance4 ,that the deductions should 
be from the whole and not from a part   
only of the laws of nature that are     
concerned1 would be desirable even if   
those omitted were so insignificant in  
comparison with the others1 that they   
might1 for most purposes and on most    
occasions1 be left out of the account4  
,but this is far indeed from being true 
in the social science4 ,the phenomena of
 society do not depend1 in essentials1  
on some one agency or law of human      
nature1 with only inconsiderable        
modifications from others4 ,the whole of
 the qualities of human nature influence
 those phenomena1 and there is not one  
which influences them in a small degree4
 ,there is not one1 the removal or any  
great alteration of which would not     
materially affect the whole aspect of   
society1 and change more or less the    

sequences of social phenomena generally4
  ,the theory which has been the subject
 of these remarks is in this country at 
least1 the principal cotemporary example
 of what ,i have styled the geometrical 
method of philosophizing in the social  
science2 and our examination of it has1 
for this reason1 been more detailed than
 would otherwise have been suitable to a
 work like the present4 ,having now     
sufficiently illustrated the two        
erroneous methods1 we shall pass without
 further preliminary to the true method2
 that which proceeds 7conformably to the
 practice of the more complex physical  
sciences7 deductively indeed1 but by    
deduction from many1 not from one or a  
very few1 original premises2 considering
 each effect as 7what it really is7 an  
aggregate result of many causes1        
operating sometimes through the same1   
sometimes through different mental      
agencies1 or laws of human nature4      
,,chapter ,,ix4  ,,of ,,the ,,physical1 
,,or ,,concrete ,,deductive ,,method4   

#a4 ,after what has been said to        
illustrate the nature of the inquiry    
into social phenomena1 the general      
character of the method proper to that  
inquiry is sufficiently evident1 and    
needs only to be recapitulated1 not     
proved4 ,however complex the phenomena1 
all their sequences and coexistences    
result from the laws of the separate    
elements4 ,the effect produced1 in      
social phenomena1 by any complex set of 
circumstances1 amounts precisely to the 
sum of the effects of the circumstances 
taken singly3 and the complexity does   
not arise from the number of the laws   
themselves1 which is not remarkably     
great2 but from the extraordinary number
 and variety of the data or elements--of
 the agents which1 in obedience to that 
small number of laws1 co-operate towards
 the effect4 ,the ,social ,science1     
therefore 7which1 by a convenient       
barbarism1 has been termed ,sociology17 
is a deductive science2 not1 indeed1    
after the model of geometry1 but after  

that of the more complex physical       
sciences4 ,it infers the law of each    
effect from the laws of causation on    
which that effect depends2 not1 however1
 from the law merely of one cause1 as in
 the geometrical method2 but by         
considering all the causes which        
conjunctly influence the effect1 and    
compounding their laws with one another4
 ,its method1 in short1 is the ,concrete
 ,deductive ,method2 that of which      
astronomy furnishes the most perfect1   
natural philosophy a somewhat less      
perfect example1 and the employment of  
which1 with the adaptations and         
precautions required by the subject1 is 
beginning to regenerate physiology4     
,nor does it admit of doubt1 that       
similar adaptations and precautions are 
indispensable in sociology4 ,in         
applying1 to that most complex of all   
studies1 what is demonstrably the sole  
method capable of throwing the light of 
science even upon phenomena of a far    
inferior degree of complication1 we     

ought to be aware that the same superior
 complexity which renders the instrument
 of ,deduction more necessary1 renders  
it also more precarious2 and we must be 
prepared to meet1 by appropriate        
contrivances1 this increase of          
difficulty4  ,the actions and feelings  
of human beings in the social state1    
are1 no doubt1 entirely governed by     
psychological and ethological laws3     
whatever influence any cause exercises  
upon the social phenomena1 it exercises 
through those laws4 ,supposing therefore
 the laws of human actions and feelings 
to be sufficiently known1 there is no   
extraordinary difficulty in determining 
from those laws1 the nature of the      
social effects which any given cause    
tends to produce4 ,but when the question
 is that of compounding several         
tendencies together1 and computing the  
aggregate result of many coexistent     
causes2 and especially when1 by         
attempting to predict what will actually
 occur in a given case1 we incur the    

obligation of estimating and compounding
 the influences of all the causes which 
happen to exist in that case2 we attempt
 a task1 to proceed far in which1       
surpasses the compass of the human      
faculties4  ,if all the resources of    
science are not sufficient to enable us 
to calculate  priori1 with complete     
precision1 the mutual action of three   
bodies gravitating towards one another2 
it may be judged with what prospect of  
success we should endeavour to calculate
 the result of the conflicting          
tendencies which are acting in a        
thousand different directions and       
promoting a thousand different changes  
at a given instant in a given society3  
although we might and ought to be able1 
from the laws of human nature1 to       
distinguish correctly enough the        
tendencies themselves1 so far as they   
depend on causes accessible to our      
observation2 and to determine the       
direction which each of them1 if acting 
alone1 would impress upon society1 as   

well as1 in a general way at least1 to  
pronounce that some of these tendencies 
are more powerful than others4  ,but1   
without dissembling the necessary       
imperfections of the  priori method when
 applied to such a subject1 neither     
ought we1 on the other hand1 to         
exaggerate them4 ,the same objections1  
which apply to the ,method of ,deduction
 in this its most difficult employment1 
apply to it1 as we formerly showed1#i in
 its easiest2 and would even there have 
been insuperable1 if there had not      
existed1 as was then fully explained1 an
 appropriate remedy4 ,this remedy       
consists in the process which1 under the
 name of ,verification1 we have         
characterized as the third essential    
constituent part of the ,deductive      
,method2 that of collating the          
conclusions of the ratiocination either 
with the concrete phenomena themselves1 
or1 when such are obtainable1 with their
 empirical laws4 ,the ground of         
confidence in any concrete deductive    

science is not the  priori reasoning    
itself1 but the accordance between its  
results and those of observation        
posteriori4 ,either of these processes1 
apart from the other1 diminishes in     
value as the subject increases in       
complication1 and this in so rapid a    
ratio as soon to become entirely        
worthless2 but the reliance to be placed
 in the concurrence of the two sorts of 
evidence1 not only does not diminish in 
anything like the same proportion1 but  
is not necessarily much diminished at   
all4 ,nothing more results than a       
disturbance in the order of precedency  
of the two processes1 sometimes         
amounting to its actual inversion3      
insomuch that instead of deducing our   
conclusions by reasoning1 and verifying 
them by observation1 we in some cases   
begin by obtaining them conjecturally   
from specific experience1 and afterwards
 connect them with the principles of    
human nature by  priori reasonings1     
which reasonings are thus a real        

,verification4  ,the only thinker who1  
with a competent knowledge of scientific
 methods in general1 has attempted to   
characterize the ,method of ,sociology1 
,m4 ,comte1 considers this inverse order
 as inseparably inherent in the nature  
of sociological speculation4 ,he looks  
upon the social science as essentially  
consisting of generalizations from      
history1 verified1 not originally       
suggested1 by deduction from the laws of
 human nature4 ,though there is a truth 
contained in this opinion1 of which ,i  
shall presently endeavour to show the   
importance1 ,i cannot but think that    
this truth is enunciated in too         
unlimited a manner1 and that there is   
considerable scope in sociological      
inquiry for the direct1 as well as for  
the inverse1 ,deductive ,method4  ,it   
will1 in fact1 be shown in the next     
chapter1 that there is a kind of        
sociological inquiries to which1 from   
their prodigious complication1 the      
method of direct deduction is altogether

 inapplicable1 while by a happy         
compensation it is precisely in these   
cases that we are able to obtain the    
best empirical laws3 to these inquiries1
 therefore1 the ,inverse ,method is     
exclusively adapted4 ,but there are     
also1 as will presently appear1 other   
cases in which it is impossible to      
obtain from direct observation anything 
worthy the name of an empirical law2 and
 it fortunately happens that these are  
the very cases in which the ,direct     
,method is least affected by the        
objection which undoubtedly must always 
affect it in a certain degree4  ,we     
shall begin1 then1 by looking at the    
,social ,science as a science of direct 
,deduction1 and considering what can be 
accomplished in it1 and under what      
limitations1 by that mode of            
investigation4 ,we shall1 then1 in a    
separate chapter1 examine and endeavour 
to characterize the inverse process4    
#b4 ,it is evident1 in the first place1 
that ,sociology1 considered as a system 

of deductions  priori1 cannot be a      
science of positive predictions1 but    
only of tendencies4 ,we may be able to  
conclude1 from the laws of human nature 
applied to the circumstances of a given 
state of society1 that a particular     
cause will operate in a certain manner  
unless counteracted2 but we can never be
 assured to what extent or amount it    
will so operate1 or affirm with         
certainty that it will not be           
counteracted2 because we can seldom     
know1 even approximately1 all the       
agencies which may coexist with it1 and 
still less calculate the collective     
result of so many combined elements4    
,the remark1 however1 must here be once 
more repeated1 that knowledge           
insufficient for prediction may be most 
valuable for guidance4 ,it is not       
necessary for the wise conduct of the   
affairs of society1 no more than of any 
one's private concerns1 that we should  
be able to foresee infallibly the       
results of what we do4 ,we must seek our

 objects by means which may perhaps be  
defeated1 and take precautions against  
dangers which possibly may never be     
realized4 ,the aim of practical politics
 is to surround any given society with  
the greatest possible number of         
circumstances of which the tendencies   
are beneficial1 and to remove or        
counteract1 as far as practicable1 those
 of which the tendencies are injurious4 
,a knowledge of the tendencies only1    
though without the power of accurately  
predicting their conjunct result1 gives 
us to a certain extent this power4  ,it 
would1 however1 be an error to suppose  
that even with respect to tendencies1 we
 could arrive in this manner at any     
great number of propositions which will 
be true in all societies without        
exception4 ,such a supposition would be 
inconsistent with the eminently         
modifiable nature of the social         
phenomena1 and the multitude and variety
 of the circumstances by which they are 
modified2 circumstances never the same1 

or even nearly the same1 in two         
different societies1 or in two different
 periods of the same society4 ,this     
would not be so serious an obstacle if1 
though the causes acting upon society in
 general are numerous1 those which      
influence any one feature of society    
were limited in number2 for we might    
then insulate any particular social     
phenomenon1 and investigate its laws    
without disturbance from the rest4 ,but 
the truth is the very opposite of this4 
,whatever affects1 in an appreciable    
degree1 any one element of the social   
state1 affects through it all the other 
elements4 ,the mode of production of all
 social phenomena is one great case of  
,intermixture of ,laws4 ,we can never   
either understand in theory or command  
in practice the condition of a society  
in any one respect1 without taking into 
consideration its condition in all other
 respects4 ,there is no social          
phenomenon which is not more or less    
influenced by every other part of the   

condition of the same society1 and      
therefore by every cause which is       
influencing any other of the            
contemporaneous social phenomena4 ,there
 is1 in short1 what physiologists term a
 consensus1 similar to that existing    
among the various organs and functions  
of the physical frame of man and the    
more perfect animals2 and constituting  
one of the many analogies which have    
rendered universal such expressions as  
the body politic and body natural4 ,it  
follows from this consensus1 that unless
 two societies could be alike in all the
 circumstances which surround and       
influence them1 7which would imply their
 being alike in their previous history17
 no portion whatever of the phenomena   
will1 unless by accident1 precisely     
correspond2 no one cause will produce   
exactly the same effects in both4 ,every
 cause1 as its effect spreads through   
society1 comes somewhere in contact with
 different sets of agencies1 and thus   
has its effects on some of the social   

phenomena differently modified2 and     
these differences1 by their reaction1   
produce a difference even in those of   
the effects which would otherwise have  
been the same4 ,we can never1 therefore1
 affirm with certainty that a cause     
which has a particular tendency in one  
people or in one age will have exactly  
the same tendency in another1 without   
referring back to our premises1 and     
performing over again for the second age
 or nation1 that analysis of the whole  
of its influencing circumstances which  
we had already performed for the first4 
,the deductive science of society will  
not lay down a theorem1 asserting in an 
universal manner the effect of any      
cause2 but will rather teach us how to  
frame the proper theorem for the        
circumstances of any given case4 ,it    
will not give the laws of society in    
general1 but the means of determining   
the phenomena of any given society from 
the particular elements or data of that 
society4  ,all the general propositions 

which can be framed by the deductive    
science1 are therefore1 in the strictest
 sense of the word1 hypothetical4 ,they 
are grounded on some supposititious set 
of circumstances1 and declare how some  
given cause would operate in those      
circumstances1 supposing that no others 
were combined with them4 ,if the set of 
circumstances supposed have been copied 
from those of any existing society1 the 
conclusions will be true of that        
society1 provided1 and in as far as1 the
 effect of those circumstances shall not
 be modified by others which have not   
been taken into the account4 ,if we     
desire a nearer approach to concrete    
truth1 we can only aim at it by taking1 
or endeavouring to take1 a greater      
number of individualizing circumstances 
into the computation4  ,considering1    
however1 in how accelerating a ratio the
 uncertainty of our conclusions         
increases1 as we attempt to take the    
effect of a greater number of concurrent
 causes into our calculations2 the      

hypothetical combinations of            
circumstances on which we construct the 
general theorems of the science1 cannot 
be made very complex1 without so        
rapidly-accumulating a liability to     
error as must soon deprive our          
conclusions of all value4 ,this mode of 
inquiry1 considered as a means of       
obtaining general propositions1 must1   
therefore1 on pain of frivolity1 be     
limited to those classes of social facts
 which1 though influenced like the rest 
by all sociological agents1 are under   
the immediate influence1 principally at 
least1 of a few only4    #c4            
,notwithstanding the universal consensus
 of the social phenomena1 whereby       
nothing which takes place in any part of
 the operations of society is without   
its share of influence on every other   
part2 and notwithstanding the paramount 
ascendancy which the general state of   
civilization and social progress in any 
given society must hence exercise over  
all the partial and subordinate         

phenomena2 it is not the less true that 
different species of social facts are in
 the main dependent1 immediately and in 
the first resort1 on different kinds of 
causes2 and therefore not only may with 
advantage1 but must1 be studied apart3  
just as in the natural body we study    
separately the physiology and pathology 
of each of the principal organs and     
tissues1 though every one is acted upon 
by the state of all the others3 and     
though the peculiar constitution and    
general state of health of the organism 
co-operates with1 and often             
preponderates over1 the local causes1 in
 determining the state of any particular
 organ4  ,on these considerations is    
grounded the existence of distinct and  
separate1 though not independent1       
branches or departments of sociological 
speculation4  ,there is1 for example1   
one large class of social phenomena1 in 
which the immediately determining causes
 are principally those which act through
 the desire of wealth2 and in which the 

psychological law mainly concerned is   
the familiar one1 that a greater gain is
 preferred to a smaller4 ,i mean1 of    
course1 that portion of the phenomena of
 society which emanate from the         
industrial1 or productive1 operations of
 mankind2 and from those of their acts  
through which the distribution of the   
products of those industrial operations 
takes place1 in so far as not effected  
by force1 or modified by voluntary gift4
 ,by reasoning from that one law of     
human nature1 and from the principal    
outward circumstances 7whether universal
 or confined to particular states of    
society7 which operate upon the human   
mind through that law1 we may be enabled
 to explain and predict this portion of 
the phenomena of society1 so far as they
 depend on that class of circumstances  
only2 overlooking the influence of any  
other of the circumstances of society2  
and therefore neither tracing back the  
circumstances which we do take into     
account1 to their possible origin in    

some other facts in the social state1   
nor making allowance for the manner in  
which any of those other circumstances  
may interfere with1 and counteract or   
modify1 the effect of the former4 ,a    
science may thus be constructed1 which  
has received the name of ,political     
,economy4  ,the motive which suggests   
the separation of this portion of the   
social phenomena from the rest1 and the 
creation of a distinct science relating 
to them is1--that they do mainly depend1
 at least in the first resort1 on one   
class of circumstances only2 and that   
even when other circumstances interfere1
 the ascertainment of the effect due to 
the one class of circumstances alone1 is
 a sufficiently intricate and difficult 
business to make it expedient to perform
 it once for all1 and then allow for the
 effect of the modifying circumstances2 
especially as certain fixed combinations
 of the former are apt to recur often1  
in conjunction with ever-varying        
circumstances of the latter class4      

,political ,economy1 as ,i have said on 
another occasion1 concerns itself only  
with such of the phenomena of the social
 state as take place in consequence of  
the pursuit of wealth4 ,it makes entire 
abstraction of every other human passion
 or motive2 except those which may be   
regarded as perpetually antagonizing    
principles to the desire of wealth1     
namely1 aversion to labour1 and desire  
of the present enjoyment of costly      
indulgences4 ,these it takes1 to a      
certain extent1 into its calculations1  
because these do not merely1 like our   
other desires1 occasionally conflict    
with the pursuit of wealth1 but         
accompany it always as a drag or        
impediment1 and are therefore           
inseparably mixed up in the             
consideration of it4 ,political ,economy
 considers mankind as occupied solely in
 acquiring and consuming wealth2 and    
aims at showing what is the course of   
action into which mankind1 living in a  
state of society1 would be impelled1 if 

that motive1 except in the degree in    
which it is checked by the two perpetual
 counter-motives above adverted to1 were
 absolute ruler of all their actions4   
,under the influence of this desire1 it 
shows mankind accumulating wealth1 and  
employing that wealth in the production 
of other wealth2 sanctioning by mutual  
agreement the institution of property2  
establishing laws to prevent individuals
 from encroaching upon the property of  
others by force or fraud2 adopting      
various contrivances for increasing the 
productiveness of their labour2 settling
 the division of the produce by         
agreement1 under the influence of       
competition 7competition itself being   
governed by certain laws1 which laws are
 therefore the ultimate regulators of   
the division of the produce72 and       
employing certain expedients 7as money1 
credit1 c47 to facilitate the           
distribution4 ,all these operations1    
though many of them are really the      
result of a plurality of motives1 are   

considered by political economy as      
flowing solely from the desire of       
wealth4 ,the science then proceeds to   
investigate the laws which govern these 
several operations1 under the           
supposition that man is a being who is  
determined1 by the necessity of his     
nature1 to prefer a greater portion of  
wealth to a smaller1 in all cases1      
without any other exception than that   
constituted by the two counter-motives  
already specified4 ,not that any        
political economist was ever so absurd  
as to suppose that mankind are really   
thus constituted1 but because this is   
the mode in which science must          
necessarily proceed4 ,when an effect    
depends on a concurrence of causes1     
these causes must be studied one at a   
time1 and their laws separately         
investigated1 if we wish1 through the   
causes1 to obtain the power of either   
predicting or controlling the effect2   
since the law of the effect is          
compounded of the laws of all the causes

 which determine it4 ,the law of the    
centripetal and that of the projectile  
force must have been known1 before the  
motions of the earth and planets could  
be explained1 or many of them predicted4
 ,the same is the case with the conduct 
of man in society4 ,in order to judge   
how he will act under the variety of    
desires and aversions which are         
concurrently operating upon him1 we must
 know how he would act under the        
exclusive influence of each one in      
particular4 ,there is1 perhaps1 no      
action of a man's life in which he is   
neither under the immediate nor under   
the remote influence of any impulse but 
the mere desire of wealth4 ,with respect
 to those parts of human conduct of     
which wealth is not even the principal  
object1 to these political economy does 
not pretend that its conclusions are    
applicable4 ,but there are also certain 
departments of human affairs1 in which  
the acquisition of wealth is the main   
and acknowledged end4 ,it is only of    

these that political economy takes      
notice4 ,the manner in which it         
necessarily proceeds is that of treating
 the main and acknowledged end as if it 
were the sole end2 which1 of all        
hypotheses equally simple1 is the       
nearest to the truth4 ,the political    
economist inquires1 what are the actions
 which would be produced by this desire1
 if within the departments in question  
it were unimpeded by any other4 ,in this
 way a nearer approximation is obtained 
than would otherwise be practicable to  
the real order of human affairs in those
 departments4 ,this approximation has   
then to be corrected by making proper   
allowance for the effects of any        
impulses of a different description1    
which can be shown to interfere with the
 result in any particular case4 ,only in
 a few of the most striking cases 7such 
as the important one of the principle of
 population7 are these corrections      
interpolated into the expositions of    
political economy itself2 the strictness

 of purely scientific arrangement being 
thereby somewhat departed from1 for the 
sake of practical utility4 ,so far as it
 is known or may be presumed1 that the  
conduct of mankind in the pursuit of    
wealth is under the collateral influence
 of any other of the properties of our  
nature1 than the desire of obtaining the
 greatest quantity of wealth with the   
least labour and self-denial1 the       
conclusions of political economy will so
 far fail of being applicable to the    
explanation or prediction of real       
events1 until they are modified by a    
correct allowance for the degree of     
influence exercised by the other        
cause4#aj  ,extensive and important     
practical guidance may be derived1 in   
any given state of society1 from general
 propositions such as those above       
indicated2 even though the modifying    
influence of the miscellaneous causes   
which the theory does not take into     
account1 as well as the effect of the   
general social changes in progress1 be  

provisionally overlooked4 ,and though it
 has been a very common error of        
political economists to draw conclusions
 from the elements of one state of      
society1 and apply them to other states 
in which many of the elements are not   
the same2 it is even then not difficult1
 by tracing back the demonstrations1 and
 introducing the new premises in their  
proper places1 to make the same general 
course of argument which served for the 
one case1 serve for the others too4     
,for example1 it has been greatly the   
custom of ,english political economists 
to discuss the laws of the distribution 
of the produce of industry1 on a        
supposition which is scarcely realized  
anywhere out of ,england and ,scotland1 
namely1 that the produce is shared among
 three classes1 altogether distinct from
 one another1 labourers1 capitalists1   
and landlords2 and that all these are   
free agents1 permitted in law and in    
fact to set upon their labour1 their    
capital1 and their land1 whatever price 

they are able to get for it4 ,the       
conclusions of the science1 being all   
adapted to a society thus constituted1  
require to be revised whenever they are 
applied to any other4 ,they are         
inapplicable where the only capitalists 
are the landlords1 and the labourers are
 their property1 as in slave countries4 
,they are inapplicable where the almost 
universal landlord is the state as in   
,india4 ,they are inapplicable where the
 agricultural labourer is generally the 
owner both of the land itself and of the
 capital1 as frequently in ,france1 or  
of the capital only1 as in ,ireland4    
,but though it may often be very justly 
objected to the existing race of        
political economists that they attempt  
to construct a permanent fabric out of  
transitory materials2 that they take for
 granted the immutability of            
arrangements of society1 many of which  
are in their nature fluctuating or      
progressive1 and enunciate with as      
little qualification as if they were    

universal and absolute truths1          
propositions which are perhaps          
applicable to no state of society except
 the particular one in which the writer 
happened to live2 this does not take    
away the value of the propositions1     
considered with reference to the state  
of society from which they were drawn4  
,and even as applicable to other states 
of society1 it must not be supposed that
 the science is so incomplete and       
unsatisfactory as this might seem to    
prove4 ,though many of its conclusions  
are only locally true1 its method of    
investigation is applicable universally2
 and as whoever has solved a certain    
number of algebraic equations1 can      
without difficulty solve all others of  
the same kind1 so whoever knows the     
political economy of ,england1 or even  
of ,yorkshire1 knows that of all        
nations1 actual or possible1 provided he
 have good sense enough not to expect   
the same conclusion to issue from       
varying premises4 ,whoever is thoroughly

 master of the laws which1 under free   
competition1 determine the rent1        
profits1 and wages1 received by         
landlords1 capitalists1 and labourers1  
in a state of society in which the three
 classes are completely separate1 will  
have no difficulty in determining the   
very different laws which regulate the  
distribution of the produce among the   
classes interested in it1 in any of the 
states of cultivation and landed        
property set forth in the foregoing     
extract4#aa    #d4 ,i would not here    
undertake to decide what other          
hypothetical or abstract sciences       
similar to ,political ,economy1 may     
admit of being carved out of the general
 body of the social science2 what other 
portions of the social phenomena are in 
a sufficiently close and complete       
dependence1 in the first resort1 on a   
peculiar class of causes1 to make it    
convenient to create a preliminary      
science of those causes2 postponing the 
consideration of the causes which act   

through them1 or in concurrence with    
them1 to a later period of the inquiry4 
,there is however among these separate  
departments one which cannot be passed  
over in silence1 being of a more        
comprehensive and commanding character  
than any of the other branches into     
which the social science may admit of   
being divided4 ,like them1 it is        
directly conversant with the causes of  
only one class of social facts1 but a   
class which exercises1 immediately or   
remotely1 a paramount influence over the
 rest4 ,i allude to what may be termed  
,political ,ethology1 or the theory of  
the causes which determine the type of  
character belonging to a people or to an
 age4 ,of all the subordinate branches  
of the social science1 this is the most 
completely in its infancy4 ,the causes  
of national character are scarcely at   
all understood1 and the effect of       
institutions or social arrangements upon
 the character of the people is         
generally that portion of their effects 

which is least attended to1 and least   
comprehended4 ,nor is this wonderful1   
when we consider the infant state of the
 ,science of ,ethology itself1 from     
whence the laws must be drawn1 of which 
the truths of political ethology can be 
but results and exemplifications4  ,yet 
to whoever well considers the matter1 it
 must appear that the laws of national  
7or collective7 character are by far the
 most important class of sociological   
laws4 ,in the first place1 the character
 which is formed by any state of social 
circumstances is in itself the most     
interesting phenomenon which that state 
of society can possibly present4        
,secondly1 it is also a fact which      
enters largely into the production of   
all the other phenomena4 ,and above all1
 the character1 that is1 the opinions1  
feelings1 and habits1 of the people1    
though greatly the results of the state 
of society which precedes them1 are also
 greatly the causes of the state of     
society which follows them2 and are the 

power by which all those of the         
circumstances of society which are      
artificial1 laws and customs for        
instance1 are altogether moulded3       
customs evidently1 laws no less really1 
either by the direct influence of public
 sentiment upon the ruling powers1 or by
 the effect which the state of national 
opinion and feeling has in determining  
the form of government and shaping the  
character of the governors4  ,as might  
be expected1 the most imperfect part of 
those branches of social inquiry which  
have been cultivated as separate        
sciences1 is the theory of the manner in
 which their conclusions are affected by
 ethological considerations4 ,the       
omission is no defect in them as        
abstract or hypothetical sciences1 but  
it vitiates them in their practical     
application as branches of a            
comprehensive social science4 ,in       
political economy for instance1         
empirical laws of human nature are      
tacitly assumed by ,english thinkers1   

which are calculated only for ,great    
,britain and the ,united ,states4 ,among
 other things1 an intensity of          
competition is constantly supposed1     
which1 as a general mercantile fact1    
exists in no country in the world except
 those two4 ,an ,english political      
economist1 like his countrymen in       
general1 has seldom learned that it is  
possible that men1 in conducting the    
business of selling their goods over a  
counter1 should care more about their   
ease or their vanity than about their   
pecuniary gain4 ,yet those who know the 
habits of the ,continent of ,europe are 
aware how apparently small a motive     
often outweighs the desire of           
money-getting1 even in the operations   
which have money-getting for their      
direct object4 ,the more highly the     
science of ethology is cultivated1 and  
the better the diversities of individual
 and national character are understood1 
the smaller1 probably1 will the number  
of propositions become1 which it will be

 considered safe to build on as         
universal principles of human nature4   
,these considerations show that the     
process of dividing off the social      
science into compartments1 in order that
 each may be studied separately1 and its
 conclusions afterwards corrected for   
practice by the modifications supplied  
by the others1 must be subject to at    
least one important limitation4 ,those  
portions alone of the social phenomena  
can with advantage be made the subjects1
 even provisionally1 of distinct        
branches of science1 into which the     
diversities of character between        
different nations or different times    
enter as influencing causes only in a   
secondary degree4 ,those phenomena1 on  
the contrary1 with which the influences 
of the ethological state of the people  
are mixed up at every step 7so that the 
connexion of effects and causes cannot  
be even rudely marked out without taking
 those influences into consideration7   
could not with any advantage1 nor       

without great disadvantage1 be treated  
independently of political ethology1    
nor1 therefore1 of all the circumstances
 by which the qualities of a people are 
influenced4 ,for this reason 7as well as
 for others which will hereafter appear7
 there can be no separate ,science of   
,government2 that being the fact which1 
of all others1 is most mixed up1 both as
 cause and effect1 with the qualities of
 the particular people or of the        
particular age4 ,all questions          
respecting the tendencies of forms of   
government must stand part of the       
general science of society1 not of any  
separate branch of it4  ,this general   
,science of ,society1 as distinguished  
from the separate departments of the    
science 7each of which asserts its      
conclusions only conditionally1 subject 
to the paramount control of the laws of 
the general science7 now remains to be  
characterized4 ,and as will be shown    
presently1 nothing of a really          
scientific character is here possible1  

except by the inverse deductive method4 
,but before we quit the subject of those
 sociological speculations which proceed
 by way of direct deduction1 we must    
examine in what relation they stand to  
that indispensable element in all       
deductive sciences1 ,verification by    
,specific ,experience--comparison       
between the conclusions of reasoning and
 the results of observation4    #e4 ,we 
have seen that1 in most deductive       
sciences1 and among the rest in         
,ethology itself1 which is the immediate
 foundation of the ,social ,science1 a  
preliminary work of preparation is      
performed on the observed facts1 to fit 
them for being rapidly and accurately   
collated 7sometimes even for being      
collated at all7 with the conclusions of
 theory4 ,this preparatory treatment    
consists in finding general propositions
 which express concisely what is common 
to large classes of observed facts3 and 
these are called the empirical laws of  
the phenomena4 ,we have1 therefore1 to  

inquire1 whether any similar preparatory
 process can be performed on the facts  
of the social science2 whether there are
 any empirical laws in history or       
statistics4  ,in statistics1 it is      
evident that empirical laws may         
sometimes be traced2 and the tracing    
them forms an important part of that    
system of indirect observation on which 
we must often rely for the data of the  
,deductive ,science4 ,the process of the
 science consists in inferring effects  
from their causes2 but we have often no 
means of observing the causes1 except   
through the medium of their effects4 ,in
 such cases the deductive science is    
unable to predict the effects1 for want 
of the necessary data2 it can determine 
what causes are capable of producing any
 given effect1 but not with what        
frequency and in what quantities those  
causes exist4 ,an instance in point is  
afforded by a newspaper now lying before
 me4 ,a statement was furnished by one  
of the official assignees in bankruptcy1

 showing among the various bankruptcies 
which it had been his duty to           
investigate1 in how many cases the      
losses had been caused by misconduct of 
different kinds1 and in how many by     
unavoidable misfortunes4 ,the result    
was1 that the number of failures caused 
by misconduct greatly preponderated over
 those arising from all other causes    
whatever4 ,nothing but specific         
experience could have given sufficient  
ground for a conclusion to this purport4
 ,to collect1 therefore1 such empirical 
laws 7which are never more than         
approximate generalizations7 from direct
 observation1 is an important part of   
the process of sociological inquiry4    
,the experimental process is not here to
 be regarded as a distinct road to the  
truth1 but as a means 7happening        
accidentally to be the only1 or the     
best1 available7 for obtaining the      
necessary data for the deductive        
science4 ,when the immediate causes of  
social facts are not open to direct     

observation1 the empirical law of the   
effects gives us the empirical law      
7which in that case is all that we can  
obtain7 of the causes likewise4 ,but    
those immediate causes depend on remote 
causes2 and the empirical law1 obtained 
by this indirect mode of observation1   
can only be relied on as applicable to  
unobserved cases1 so long as there is   
reason to think that no change has taken
 place in any of the remote causes on   
which the immediate causes depend4 ,in  
making use1 therefore1 of even the best 
statistical generalizations for the     
purpose of inferring 7though it be only 
conjecturally7 that the same empirical  
laws will hold in any new case1 it is   
necessary that we be well acquainted    
with the remoter causes1 in order that  
we may avoid applying the empirical law 
to cases which differ in any of the     
circumstances on which the truth of the 
law ultimately depends4 ,and thus1 even 
where conclusions derived from specific 
observation are available for practical 

inferences in new cases1 it is necessary
 that the deductive science should stand
 sentinel over the whole process2 that  
it should be constantly referred to1 and
 its sanction obtained to every         
inference4  ,the same thing holds true  
of all generalizations which can be     
grounded on history4 ,not only there are
 such generalizations1 but it will      
presently be shown that the general     
science of society1 which inquires into 
the laws of succession and coexistence  
of the great facts constituting the     
state of society and civilization at any
 time1 can proceed in no other manner   
than by making such                     
generalizations--afterwards to be       
confirmed by connecting them with the   
psychological and ethological laws on   
which they must really depend4    #f4   
,but 7reserving this question for its   
proper place7 in those more special     
inquiries which form the subject of the 
separate branches of the social science1
 this twofold logical process and       

reciprocal verification is not possible3
 specific experience affords nothing    
amounting to empirical laws4 ,this is   
particularly the case where the object  
is to determine the effect of any one   
social cause among a great number acting
 simultaneously2 the effect1 for        
example1 of corn laws1 or of a          
prohibitive commercial system generally4
 ,though it may be perfectly certain1   
from theory1 what kind of effects corn  
laws must produce1 and in what general  
direction their influence must tell upon
 industrial prosperity2 their effect is 
yet of necessity so much disguised by   
the similar or contrary effects of other
 influencing agents1 that specific      
experience can at most only show that on
 the average of some great number of    
instances1 the cases where there were   
corn laws exhibited the effect in a     
greater degree than those where there   
were not4 ,now the number of instances  
necessary to exhaust the whole round of 
combinations of the various influential 

circumstances1 and thus afford a fair   
average1 never can be obtained4 ,not    
only we can never learn with sufficient 
authenticity the facts of so many       
instances1 but the world itself does not
 afford them in sufficient numbers1     
within the limits of the given state of 
society and civilization which such     
inquiries always presuppose4 ,having    
thus no previous empirical              
generalizations with which to collate   
the conclusions of theory1 the only mode
 of direct verification which remains is
 to compare those conclusions with the  
result of an individual experiment or   
instance4 ,but here the difficulty is   
equally great4 ,for in order to verify a
 theory by an experiment1 the           
circumstances of the experiment must be 
exactly the same with those contemplated
 in the theory4 ,but in social phenomena
 the circumstances of no two cases are  
exactly alike4 ,a trial of corn laws in 
another country or in a former          
generation1 would go a very little way  

towards verifying a conclusion drawn    
respecting their effect in this         
generation and in this country4 ,it thus
 happens1 in most cases1 that the only  
individual instance really fitted to    
verify the predictions of theory is the 
very instance for which the predictions 
were made2 and the verification comes   
too late to be of any avail for         
practical guidance4  ,although1 however1
 direct verification is impossible1     
there is an indirect verification1 which
 is scarcely of less value1 and which is
 always practicable4 ,the conclusion    
drawn as to the individual case1 can    
only be directly verified in that case2 
but it is verified indirectly1 by the   
verification of other conclusions1 drawn
 in other individual cases from the same
 laws4 ,the experience which comes too  
late to verify the particular           
proposition to which it refers1 is not  
too late to help towards verifying the  
general sufficiency of the theory4 ,the 
test of the degree in which the science 

affords safe ground for predicting 7and 
consequently for practically dealing    
with7 what has not yet happened1 is the 
degree in which it would have enabled us
 to predict what has actually occurred4 
,before our theory of the influence of a
 particular cause1 in a given state of  
circumstances1 can be entirely trusted1 
we must be able to explain and account  
for the existing state of all that      
portion of the social phenomena which   
that cause has a tendency to influence4 
,if1 for instance1 we would apply our   
speculations in political economy to the
 prediction or guidance of the phenomena
 of any country1 we must be able to     
explain all the mercantile or industrial
 facts of a general character1          
appertaining to the present state of    
that country3 to point out causes       
sufficient to account for all of them1  
and prove1 or show good ground for      
supposing1 that these causes have really
 existed4 ,if we cannot do this1 it is a
 proof either that the facts which ought

 to be taken into account are not yet   
completely known to us1 or that although
 we know the facts1 we are not masters  
of a sufficiently perfect theory to     
enable us to assign their consequences4 
,in either case we are not1 in the      
present state of our knowledge1 fully   
competent to draw conclusions1          
speculative or practical1 for that      
country4 ,in like manner if we would    
attempt to judge of the effect which any
 political institution would have1      
supposing that it could be introduced   
into any given country2 we must be able 
to show that the existing state of the  
practical government of that country1   
and of whatever else depends thereon1   
together with the particular character  
and tendencies of the people1 and their 
state in respect to the various elements
 of social well-being1 are such as the  
institutions they have lived under1 in  
conjunction with the other circumstances
 of their nature or of their position1  
were calculated to produce4  ,to prove  

7in short7 that our science1 and our    
knowledge of the particular case1 render
 us competent to predict the future1 we 
must show that they would have enabled  
us to predict the present and the past4 
,if there be anything which we could not
 have predicted1 this constitutes a     
residual phenomenon1 requiring further  
study for the purpose of explanation2   
and we must either search among the     
circumstances of the particular case    
until we find one which1 on the         
principles of our existing theory1      
accounts for the unexplained phenomenon1
 or we must turn back1 and seek the     
explanation by an extension and         
improvement of the theory itself4       
,,chapter ,x4  ,,of ,,the ,,inverse     
,,deductive1 ,,or ,,historical ,,method4
    #a4 ,there are two kinds of         
sociological inquiry4 ,in the first     
kind1 the question proposed is1 what    
effect will follow from a given cause1 a
 certain general condition of social    
circumstances being presupposed4 ,as1   

for example1 what would be the effect of
 imposing or of repealing corn laws1 of 
abolishing monarchy or introducing      
universal suffrage1 in the present      
condition of society and civilization in
 any ,european country1 or under any    
other given supposition with regard to  
the circumstances of society in general3
 without reference to the changes which 
might take place1 or which may already  
be in progress1 in those circumstances4 
,but there is also a second inquiry1    
namely1 what are the laws which         
determine those general circumstances   
themselves4 ,in this last the question  
is1 not what will be the effect of a    
given cause in a certain state of       
society1 but what are the causes which  
produce1 and the phenomena which        
characterize1 ,states of ,society       
generally4 ,in the solution of this     
question consists the general ,science  
of ,society2 by which the conclusions of
 the other and more special kind of     
inquiry must be limited and controlled4 

#b4 ,in order to conceive correctly the 
scope of this general science1 and      
distinguish it from the subordinate     
departments of sociological speculation1
 it is necessary to fix the ideas       
attached to the phrase1 a ,state of     
,society4 ,what is called a state of    
society1 is the simultaneous state of   
all the greater social facts or         
phenomena4 ,such are1 the degree of     
knowledge1 and of intellectual and moral
 culture1 existing in the community1 and
 in every class of it2 the state of     
industry1 of wealth and its             
distribution2 the habitual occupations  
of the community2 their division into   
classes1 and the relations of those     
classes to one another2 the common      
beliefs which they entertain on all the 
subjects most important to mankind1 and 
the degree of assurance with which those
 beliefs are held2 their tastes1 and the
 character and degree of their sthetic  
development2 their form of government1  
and the more important of their laws and

 customs4 ,the condition of all these   
things1 and of many more which will     
readily suggest themselves1 constitute  
the state of society or the state of    
civilization at any given time4  ,when  
states of society1 and the causes which 
produce them1 are spoken of as a subject
 of science1 it is implied that there   
exists a natural correlation among these
 different elements2 that not every     
variety of combination of these general 
social facts is possible1 but only      
certain combinations2 that1 in short1   
there exist ,uniformities of            
,coexistence between the states of the  
various social phenomena4 ,and such is  
the truth2 as is indeed a necessary     
consequence of the influence exercised  
by every one of those phenomena over    
every other4 ,it is a fact implied in   
the consensus of the various parts of   
the social body4  ,states of society are
 like different constitutions or        
different ages in the physical frame2   
they are conditions not of one or a few 

organs or functions1 but of the whole   
organism4 ,accordingly1 the information 
which we possess respecting past ages1  
and respecting the various states of    
society now existing in different       
regions of the earth1 does1 when duly   
analysed1 exhibit uniformities4 ,it is  
found that when one of the features of  
society is in a particular state1 a     
state of many other features1 more or   
less precisely determinate1 always or   
usually coexists with it4  ,but the     
uniformities of coexistence obtaining   
among phenomena which are effects of    
causes1 must 7as we have so often       
observed7 be corollaries from the laws  
of causation by which these phenomena   
are really determined4 ,the mutual      
correlation between the different       
elements of each state of society1 is   
therefore a derivative law1 resulting   
from the laws which regulate the        
succession between one state of society 
and another3 for the proximate cause of 
every state of society is the state of  

society immediately preceding it4 ,the  
fundamental problem1 therefore1 of the  
social science1 is to find the laws     
according to which any state of society 
produces the state which succeeds it and
 takes its place4 ,this opens the great 
and vexed question of the               
progressiveness of man and society2 an  
idea involved in every just conception  
of social phenomena as the subject of a 
science4    #c4 ,it is one of the       
characters1 not absolutely peculiar to  
the sciences of human nature and        
society1 but belonging to them in a     
peculiar degree1 to be conversant with a
 subject-matter whose properties are    
changeable4 ,i do not mean changeable   
from day to day1 but from age to age2 so
 that not only the qualities of         
individuals vary1 but those of the      
majority are not the same in one age as 
in another4  ,the principal cause of    
this peculiarity is the extensive and   
constant reaction of the effects upon   
their causes4 ,the circumstances in     

which mankind are placed1 operating     
according to their own laws and to the  
laws of human nature1 form the          
characters of the human beings2 but the 
human beings1 in their turn1 mould and  
shape the circumstances1 for themselves 
and for those who come after them4 ,from
 this reciprocal action there must      
necessarily result either a cycle or a  
progress4 ,in astronomy also1 every fact
 is at once effect and cause2 the       
successive positions of the various     
heavenly bodies produce changes both in 
the direction and in the intensity of   
the forces by which those positions are 
determined4 ,but in the case of the     
solar system1 these mutual actions bring
 round again1 after a certain number of 
changes1 the former state of            
circumstances2 which of course leads to 
the perpetual recurrence of the same    
series in an unvarying order4 ,those    
bodies1 in short1 revolve in orbits3 but
 there are 7or1 conformably to the laws 
of astronomy1 there might be7 others    

which1 instead of an orbit1 describe a  
trajectory--a course not returning into 
itself4 ,one or other of these must be  
the type to which human affairs must    
conform4  ,one of the thinkers who      
earliest conceived the succession of    
historical events as subject to fixed   
laws1 and endeavoured to discover these 
laws by an analytical survey of history1
 ,vico1 the celebrated author of the    
,scienza ,nuova1 adopted the former of  
these opinions4 ,he conceived the       
phenomena of human society as revolving 
in an orbit2 as going through           
periodically the same series of changes4
 ,though there were not wanting         
circumstances tending to give some      
plausibility to this view1 it would not 
bear a close scrutiny3 and those who    
have succeeded ,vico in this kind of    
speculations have universally adopted   
the idea of a trajectory or progress1 in
 lieu of an orbit or cycle4  ,the words 
,progress and ,progressiveness are not  
here to be understood as synonymous with

 improvement and tendency to            
improvement4 ,it is conceivable that the
 laws of human nature might determine1  
and even necessitate1 a certain series  
of changes in man and society1 which    
might not in every case1 or which might 
not on the whole1 be improvements4 ,it  
is my belief indeed that the general    
tendency is1 and will continue to be1   
saving occasional and temporary         
exceptions1 one of improvement2 a       
tendency towards a better and happier   
state4 ,this1 however1 is not a question
 of the method of the social science1   
but a theorem of the science itself4    
,for our purpose it is sufficient1 that 
there is a progressive change both in   
the character of the human race1 and in 
their outward circumstances so far as   
moulded by themselves3 that in each     
successive age the principal phenomena  
of society are different from what they 
were in the age preceding1 and still    
more different from any previous age3   
the periods which most distinctly mark  

these successive changes being intervals
 of one generation1 during which a new  
set of human beings have been educated1 
have grown up from childhood1 and taken 
possession of society4  ,the            
progressiveness of the human race is the
 foundation on which a method of        
philosophizing in the social science has
 been of late years erected1 far        
superior to either of the two modes     
which had previously been prevalent1 the
 chemical or experimental1 and the      
geometrical modes4 ,this method1 which  
is now generally adopted by the most    
advanced thinkers on the ,continent1    
consists in attempting1 by a study and  
analysis of the general facts of        
history1 to discover 7what these        
philosophers term7 the law of progress3 
which law1 once ascertained1 must       
according to them enable us to predict  
future events1 just as after a few terms
 of an infinite series in algebra we are
 able to detect the principle of        
regularity in their formation1 and to   

predict the rest of the series to any   
number of terms we please4 ,the         
principal aim of historical speculation 
in ,france1 of late years1 has been to  
ascertain this law4 ,but while ,i gladly
 acknowledge the great services which   
have been rendered to historical        
knowledge by this school1 ,i cannot but 
deem them to be mostly chargeable with a
 fundamental misconception of the true  
method of social philosophy4 ,the       
misconception consists in supposing that
 the order of succession which we may be
 able to trace among the different      
states of society and civilization which
 history presents to us1 even if that   
order were more rigidly uniform than it 
has yet been proved to be1 could ever   
amount to a law of nature4 ,it can only 
be an empirical law4 ,the succession of 
states of the human mind and of human   
society cannot have an independent law  
of its own2 it must depend on the       
psychological and ethological laws which
 govern the action of circumstances on  

men and of men on circumstances4 ,it is 
conceivable that those laws might be    
such1 and the general circumstances of  
the human race such1 as to determine the
 successive transformations of man and  
society to one given and unvarying      
order4 ,but even if the case were so1 it
 cannot be the ultimate aim of science  
to discover an empirical law4 ,until    
that law could be connected with the    
psychological and ethological laws on   
which it must depend1 and1 by the       
consilience of deduction  priori with   
historical evidence1 could be converted 
from an empirical law into a scientific 
one1 it could not be relied on for the  
prediction of future events1 beyond1 at 
most1 strictly adjacent cases4 ,m4      
,comte alone1 among the new historical  
school1 has seen the necessity of thus  
connecting all our generalizations from 
history with the laws of human nature4  
#d4 ,but1 while it is an imperative rule
 never to introduce any generalization  
from history into the social science    

unless sufficient grounds can be pointed
 out for it in human nature1 ,i do not  
think any one will contend that it would
 have been possible1 setting out from   
the principles of human nature and from 
the general circumstances of the        
position of our species1 to determine   
priori the order in which human         
development must take place1 and to     
predict1 consequently1 the general facts
 of history up to the present time4     
,after the first few terms of the       
series1 the influence exercised over    
each generation by the generations which
 preceded it1 becomes 7as is well       
observed by the writer last referred to7
 more and more preponderant over all    
other influences2 until at length what  
we now are and do1 is in a very small   
degree the result of the universal      
circumstances of the human race1 or even
 of our own circumstances acting through
 the original qualities of our species1 
but mainly of the qualities produced in 
us by the whole previous history of     

humanity4 ,so long a series of actions  
and reactions between ,circumstances and
 ,man1 each successive term being       
composed of an ever greater number and  
variety of parts1 could not possibly be 
computed by human faculties from the    
elementary laws which produce it4 ,the  
mere length of the series would be a    
sufficient obstacle1 since a slight     
error in any one of the terms would     
augment in rapid progression at every   
subsequent step4  ,if1 therefore1 the   
series of the effects themselves did    
not1 when examined as a whole1 manifest 
any regularity1 we should in vain       
attempt to construct a general science  
of society4 ,we must in that case have  
contented ourselves with that           
subordinate order of sociological       
speculation formerly noticed1 namely1   
with endeavouring to ascertain what     
would be the effect of the introduction 
of any new cause1 in a state of society 
supposed to be fixed2 a knowledge       
sufficient for the more common          

exigencies of daily political practice1 
but liable to fail in all cases in which
 the progressive movement of society is 
one of the influencing elements2 and    
therefore more precarious in proportion 
as the case is more important4 ,but     
since both the natural varieties of     
mankind1 and the original diversities of
 local circumstances1 are much less     
considerable than the points of         
agreement1 there will naturally be a    
certain degree of uniformity in the     
progressive development of the species  
and of its works4 ,and this uniformity  
tends to become greater1 not less1 as   
society advances2 since the evolution of
 each people1 which is at first         
determined exclusively by the nature and
 circumstances of that people1 is       
gradually brought under the influence   
7which becomes stronger as civilization 
advances7 of the other nations of the   
earth1 and of the circumstances by which
 they have been influenced4 ,history    
accordingly does1 when judiciously      

examined1 afford ,empirical ,laws of    
,society4 ,and the problem of general   
sociology is to ascertain these1 and    
connect them with the laws of human     
nature1 by deductions showing that such 
were the derivative laws naturally to be
 expected as the consequences of those  
ultimate ones4  ,it is1 indeed1 hardly  
ever possible1 even after history has   
suggested the derivative law1 to        
demonstrate  priori that such was the   
only order of succession or of          
coexistence in which the effects could1 
consistently with the laws of human     
nature1 have been produced4 ,we can at  
most make out that there were strong    
priori reasons for expecting it1 and    
that no other order of succession or    
coexistence would have been so likely to
 result from the nature of man and the  
general circumstances of his position4  
,often we cannot do even this2 we cannot
 even show that what did take place was 
probable  priori1 but only that it was  
possible4 ,this1 however1--which1 in the

 ,inverse ,deductive ,method that we are
 now characterizing1 is a real process  
of verification1--is as indispensable1  
as verification by specific experience  
has been shown to be1 where the         
conclusion is originally obtained by the
 direct way of deduction4 ,the empirical
 laws must be the result of but a few   
instances1 since few nations have ever  
attained at all1 and still fewer by     
their own independent development1 a    
high stage of social progress4 ,if1     
therefore1 even one or two of these few 
instances be insufficiently known1 or   
imperfectly analysed into their         
elements1 and therefore not adequately  
compared with other instances1 nothing  
is more probable than that a wrong      
empirical law will emerge instead of the
 right one4 ,accordingly1 the most      
erroneous generalizations are           
continually made from the course of     
history3 not only in this country1 where
 history cannot yet be said to be at all
 cultivated as a science1 but in other  

countries1 where it is so cultivated1   
and by persons well versed in it4 ,the  
only check or corrective is1 constant   
verification by psychological and       
ethological laws4 ,we may add to this1  
that no one but a person competently    
skilled in those laws is capable of     
preparing the materials for historical  
generalization1 by analysing the facts  
of history1 or even by observing the    
social phenomena of his own time4 ,no   
other will be aware of the comparative  
importance of different facts1 nor      
consequently know what facts to look    
for1 or to observe2 still less will he  
be capable of estimating the evidence of
 facts which1 as is the case with most1 
cannot be ascertained by direct         
observation or learnt from testimony1   
but must be inferred from marks4    #e4 
,the ,empirical ,laws of ,society are of
 two kinds2 some are uniformities of    
coexistence1 some of succession4        
,according as the science is occupied in
 ascertaining and verifying the former  

sort of uniformities or the latter1 ,m4 
,comte gives it the title of ,social    
,statics1 or of ,social ,dynamics2      
conformably to the distinction in       
mechanics between the conditions of     
equilibrium and those of movement2 or in
 biology1 between the laws of           
organization and those of life4 ,the    
first branch of the science ascertains  
the conditions of stability in the      
social union3 the second1 the laws of   
progress4 ,social ,dynamics is the      
theory of ,society considered in a state
 of progressive movement2 while ,social 
,statics is the theory of the consensus 
already spoken of as existing among the 
different parts of the social organism2 
in other words1 the theory of the mutual
 actions and reactions of               
contemporaneous social phenomena2       
making#ab provisionally1 as far as      
possible1 abstraction1 for scientific   
purposes1 of the fundamental movement   
which is at all times gradually         
modifying the whole of them4  ,in this  

first point of view1 the provisions of  
sociology will enable us to infer one   
from another 7subject to ulterior       
verification by direct observation7 the 
various characteristic marks of each    
distinct mode of social existence2 in a 
manner essentially analogous to what is 
now habitually practised in the anatomy 
of the physical body4 ,this preliminary 
aspect1 therefore1 of political science1
 of necessity supposes that 7contrary to
 the existing habits of philosophers7   
each of the numerous elements of the    
social state1 ceasing to be looked at   
independently and absolutely1 shall be  
always and exclusively considered       
relatively to all the other elements1   
with the whole of which it is united by 
mutual interdependence4 ,it would be    
superfluous to insist here upon the     
great and constant utility of this      
branch of sociological speculation4 ,it 
is1 in the first place1 the             
indispensable basis of the theory of    
social progress4 ,it may1 moreover1 be  

employed1 immediately1 and of itself1 to
 supply the place1 provisionally at     
least1 of direct observation1 which in  
many cases is not always practicable for
 some of the elements of society1 the   
real condition of which may however be  
sufficiently judged of by means of the  
relations which connect them with others
 previously known4 ,the history of the  
sciences may give us some notion of the 
habitual importance of this auxiliary   
resource1 by reminding us1 for example1 
how the vulgar errors of mere erudition 
concerning the pretended acquirements of
 the ancient ,egyptians in the higher   
astronomy1 were irrevocably dissipated  
7even before sentence had been passed on
 them by a sounder erudition7 from the  
single consideration of the inevitable  
connexion between the general state of  
astronomy and that of abstract geometry1
 then evidently in its infancy4 ,it     
would be easy to cite a multitude of    
analogous cases1 the character of which 
could admit of no dispute4 ,in order to 

avoid exaggeration1 however1 it should  
be remarked1 that these necessary       
relations among the different aspects of
 society cannot1 from their very nature1
 be so simple and precise that the      
results observed could only have arisen 
from some one mode of mutual            
co-ordination4 ,such a notion1 already  
too narrow in the science of life1 would
 be completely at variance with the     
still more complex nature of            
sociological speculations4 ,but the     
exact estimation of these limits of     
variation1 both in the healthy and in   
the morbid state1 constitutes1 at least 
as much as in the anatomy of the natural
 body1 an indispensable complement to   
every theory of ,sociological ,statics2 
without which the indirect exploration  
above spoken of would often lead into   
error4  ,this is not the place for      
methodically demonstrating the existence
 of a necessary relation among all the  
possible aspects of the same social     
organism2 a point on which1 in principle

 at least1 there is now little          
difference of opinion among sound       
thinkers4 ,from whichever of the social 
elements we choose to set out1 we may   
easily recognise that it has always a   
connexion1 more or less immediate1 with 
all the other elements1 even with those 
which at first sight appear the most    
independent of it4 ,the dynamical       
consideration of the progressive        
development of civilized humanity1      
affords1 no doubt1 a still more         
efficacious means of effecting this     
interesting verification of the         
consensus of the social phenomena1 by   
displaying the manner in which every    
change in any one part1 operates        
immediately1 or very speedily1 upon all 
the rest4 ,but this indication may be   
preceded1 or at all events followed1 by 
a confirmation of a purely statical     
kind2 for1 in politics as in mechanics1 
the communication of motion from one    
object to another proves a connexion    
between them4 ,without descending to the

 minute interdependence of the different
 branches of any one science or art1 is 
it not evident that among the different 
sciences1 as well as among most of the  
arts1 there exists such a connexion1    
that if the state of any one well marked
 division of them is sufficiently known 
to us1 we can with real scientific      
assurance infer1 from their necessary   
correlation1 the contemporaneous state  
of every one of the others8 ,by a       
further extension of this consideration1
 we may conceive the necessary relation 
which exists between the condition of   
the sciences in general and that of the 
arts in general1 except that the mutual 
dependence is less intense in proportion
 as it is more indirect4 ,the same is   
the case when1 instead of considering   
the aggregate of the social phenomena in
 some one people1 we examine it         
simultaneously in different             
contemporaneous nations2 between which  
the perpetual reciprocity of influence1 
especially in modern times1 cannot be   

contested1 though the consensus must in 
this case be ordinarily of a less       
decided character1 and must decrease    
gradually with the affinity of the cases
 and the multiplicity of the points of  
contact1 so as at last1 in some cases1  
to disappear almost entirely2 as for    
example between ,western ,europe and    
,eastern ,asia1 of which the various    
general states of society appear to have
 been hitherto almost independent of one
 another4  ,these remarks are followed  
by illustrations of one of the most     
important1 and until lately1 most       
neglected1 of the general principles    
which1 in this division of the social   
science1 may be considered as           
established2 namely1 the necessary      
correlation between the form of         
government existing in any society and  
the contemporaneous state of            
civilization3 a natural law1 which      
stamps the endless discussions and      
innumerable theories respecting forms of
 government in the abstract1 as         

fruitless and worthless1 for any other  
purpose than as a preparatory treatment 
of materials to be afterwards used for  
the construction of a better philosophy4
  ,as already remarked1 one of the main 
results of the science of social statics
 would be to ascertain the requisites of
 stable political union4 ,there are some
 circumstances which1 being found in all
 societies without exception1 and in the
 greatest degree where the social union 
is most complete1 may be considered     
7when psychological and ethological laws
 confirm the indication7 as conditions  
of the existence of the complex         
phenomenon called a ,state4 ,for        
example1 no numerous society has ever   
been held together without laws1 or     
usages equivalent to them2 without      
tribunals1 and an organized force of    
some sort to execute their decisions4   
,there have always been public          
authorities whom1 with more or less     
strictness and in cases more or less    
accurately defined1 the rest of the     

community obeyed1 or according to       
general opinion were bound to obey4 ,by 
following out this course of inquiry we 
shall find a number of requisites1 which
 have been present in every society that
 has maintained a collective existence1 
and on the cessation of which it has    
either merged in some other society1 or 
reconstructed itself on some new basis1 
in which the conditions were conformed  
to4 ,although these results1 obtained by
 comparing different forms and states of
 society1 amount in themselves only to  
empirical laws2 some of them1 when once 
suggested1 are found to follow with so  
much probability from general laws of   
human nature1 that the consilience of   
the two processes raises the evidence to
 proof1 and the generalizations to the  
rank of scientific truths4  ,this seems 
to be affirmable 7for instance7 of the  
conclusions arrived at in the following 
passage2 extracted1 with some           
alterations1 from a criticism on the    
negative philosophy of the eighteenth   

century1#ac and which ,i quote1 though  
7as in some former instances7 from      
myself1 because ,i have no better way of
 illustrating the conception ,i have    
formed of the kind of theorems of which 
sociological statics would consist4     
,the very first element of the social   
union1 obedience to a government of some
 sort1 has not been found so easy a     
thing to establish in the world4 ,among 
a timid and spiritless race like the    
inhabitants of the vast plains of       
tropical countries1 passive obedience   
may be of natural growth2 though even   
there we doubt whether it has ever been 
found among any people with whom        
fatalism1 or in other words1 submission 
to the pressure of circumstances as a   
divine decree1 did not prevail as a     
religious doctrine4 ,but the difficulty 
of inducing a brave and warlike race to 
submit their individual arbitrium to any
 common umpire1 has always been felt to 
be so great1 that nothing short of      
supernatural power has been deemed      

adequate to overcome it2 and such tribes
 have always assigned to the first      
institution of civil society a divine   
origin4 ,so differently did those judge 
who knew savage men by actual           
experience1 from those who had no       
acquaintance with them except in the    
civilized state4 ,in modern ,europe     
itself1 after the fall of the ,roman    
empire1 to subdue the feudal anarchy and
 bring the whole people of any ,european
 nation into subjection to government   
7though ,christianity in the most       
concentrated form of its influence was  
co-operating in the work7 required      
thrice as many centuries as have elapsed
 since that time4  ,now if these        
philosophers had known human nature     
under any other type than that of their 
own age1 and of the particular classes  
of society among whom they lived1 it    
would have occurred to them1 that       
wherever this habitual submission to law
 and government has been firmly and     
durably established1 and yet the vigour 

and manliness of character which        
resisted its establishment have been in 
any degree preserved1 certain requisites
 have existed1 certain conditions have  
been fulfilled1 of which the following  
may be regarded as the principal4       
,first3 there has existed1 for all who  
were accounted citizens1--for all who   
were not slaves1 kept down by brute     
force1--a system of education1 beginning
 with infancy and continued through     
life1 of which whatever else it might   
include1 one main and incessant         
ingredient was restraining discipline4  
,to train the human being in the habit1 
and thence the power1 of subordinating  
his personal impulses and aims1 to what 
were considered the ends of society2 of 
adhering1 against all temptation1 to the
 course of conduct which those ends     
prescribed2 of controlling in himself   
all feelings which were liable to       
militate against those ends1 and        
encouraging all such as tended towards  
them2 this was the purpose1 to which    

every outward motive that the authority 
directing the system could command1 and 
every inward power or principle which   
its knowledge of human nature enabled it
 to evoke1 were endeavoured to be       
rendered instrumental4 ,the entire civil
 and military policy of the ancient     
commonwealths was such a system of      
training2 in modern nations its place   
has been attempted to be supplied1      
principally1 by religious teaching4 ,and
 whenever and in proportion as the      
strictness of the restraining discipline
 was relaxed1 the natural tendency of   
mankind to anarchy re-asserted itself2  
the state became disorganized from      
within2 mutual conflict for selfish     
ends1 neutralized the energies which    
were required to keep up the contest    
against natural causes of evil2 and the 
nation1 after a longer or briefer       
interval of progressive decline1 became 
either the slave of a despotism1 or the 
prey of a foreign invader4  ,the second 
condition of permanent political society

 has been found to be1 the existence1 in
 some form or other1 of the feeling of  
allegiance or loyalty4 ,this feeling may
 vary in its objects1 and is not        
confined to any particular form of      
government2 but whether in a democracy  
or in a monarchy1 its essence is always 
the same2 viz4 that there be in the     
constitution of the state something     
which is settled1 something permanent1  
and not to be called in question2       
something which1 by general agreement1  
has a right to be where it is1 and to be
 secure against disturbance1 whatever   
else may change4 ,this feeling may      
attach itself1 as among the ,jews 7and  
in most of the commonwealths of         
antiquity71 to a common ,god or gods1   
the protectors and guardians of their   
state4 ,or it may attach itself to      
certain persons1 who are deemed to be1  
whether by divine appointment1 by long  
prescription1 or by the general         
recognition of their superior capacity  
and worthiness1 the rightful guides and 

guardians of the rest4 ,or it may       
connect itself with laws2 with ancient  
liberties or ordinances4 ,or1 finally1  
7and this is the only shape in which the
 feeling is likely to exist hereafter17 
it may attach itself to the principles  
of individual freedom and political and 
social equality1 as realized in         
institutions which as yet exist nowhere1
 or exist only in a rudimentary state4  
,but in all political societies which   
have had a durable existence1 there has 
been some fixed point3 something which  
people agreed in holding sacred2 which1 
wherever freedom of discussion was a    
recognised principle1 it was of course  
lawful to contest in theory1 but which  
no one could either fear or hope to see 
shaken in practice2 which1 in short     
7except perhaps during some temporary   
crisis7 was in the common estimation    
placed beyond discussion4 ,and the      
necessity of this may easily be made    
evident4 ,a state never is1 nor until   
mankind are vastly improved1 can hope to

 be1 for any long time exempt from      
internal dissension2 for there neither  
is nor has ever been any state of       
society in which collisions did not     
occur between the immediate interests   
and passions of powerful sections of the
 people4 ,what1 then1 enables nations to
 weather these storms1 and pass through 
turbulent times without any permanent   
weakening of the securities for         
peaceable existence8 ,precisely         
this--that however important the        
interests about which men fell out1 the 
conflict did not affect the fundamental 
principle of the system of social union 
which happened to exist2 nor threaten   
large portions of the community with the
 subversion of that on which they had   
built their calculations1 and with which
 their hopes and aims had become        
identified4 ,but when the questioning of
 these fundamental principles is 7not   
the occasional disease1 or salutary     
medicine1 but7 the habitual condition of
 the body politic2 and when all the     

violent animosities are called forth1   
which spring naturally from such a      
situation1 the state is virtually in a  
position of civil war2 and can never    
long remain free from it in act and     
fact4  ,the third essential condition of
 stability in political society1 is a   
strong and active principle of cohesion 
among the members of the same community 
or state4 ,we need scarcely say that we 
do not mean nationality1 in the vulgar  
sense of the term2 a senseless antipathy
 to foreigners2 indifference to the     
general welfare of the human race1 or an
 unjust preference of the supposed      
interests of our own country2 a         
cherishing of bad peculiarities because 
they are national1 or a refusal to adopt
 what has been found good by other      
countries4 ,we mean a principle of      
sympathy1 not of hostility2 of union1   
not of separation4 ,we mean a feeling of
 common interest among those who live   
under the same government1 and are      
contained within the same natural or    

historical boundaries4 ,we mean1 that   
one part of the community do not        
consider themselves as foreigners with  
regard to another part2 that they set a 
value on their connexion--feel that they
 are one people1 that their lot is cast 
together1 that evil to any of their     
fellow-countrymen is evil to themselves1
 and do not desire selfishly to free    
themselves from their share of any      
common inconvenience by severing the    
connexion4 ,how strong this feeling was 
in those ancient commonwealths which    
attained any durable greatness1 every   
one knows4 ,how happily ,rome1 in spite 
of all her tyranny1 succeeded in        
establishing the feeling of a common    
country among the provinces of her vast 
and divided empire1 will appear when any
 one who has given due attention to the 
subject shall take the trouble to point 
it out4 ,in modern times the countries  
which have had that feeling in the      
strongest degree have been the most     
powerful countries2 ,england1 ,france1  

and1 in proportion to their territory   
and resources1 ,holland and             
,switzerland2 while ,england in her     
connexion with ,ireland1 is one of the  
most signal examples of the consequences
 of its absence4 ,every ,italian knows  
why ,italy is under a foreign yoke2     
every ,german knows what maintains      
despotism in the ,austrian empire2 the  
evils of ,spain flow as much from the   
absence of nationality among the        
,spaniards themselves1 as from the      
presence of it in their relations with  
foreigners3 while the completest        
illustration of all is afforded by the  
republics of ,south ,america1 where the 
parts of one and the same state adhere  
so slightly together1 that no sooner    
does any province think itself aggrieved
 by the general government than it      
proclaims itself a separate nation4     
#f4 ,while the derivative laws of social
 statics are ascertained by analysing   
different states of society1 and        
comparing them with one another1 without

 regard to the order of their           
succession2 the consideration of the    
successive order is1 on the contrary1   
predominant in the study of social      
dynamics1 of which the aim is to observe
 and explain the sequences of social    
conditions4 ,this branch of the social  
science would be as complete as it can  
be made1 if every one of the leading    
general circumstances of each generation
 were traced to its causes in the       
generation immediately preceding4 ,but  
the consensus is so complete1           
7especially in modern history17 that in 
the filiation of one generation and     
another1 it is the whole which produces 
the whole1 rather than any part a part4 
,little progress1 therefore1 can be made
 in establishing the filiation1 directly
 from laws of human nature1 without     
having first ascertained the immediate  
or derivative laws according to which   
social states generate one another as   
society advances2 the axiomata media of 
,general ,sociology4  ,the empirical    

laws which are most readily obtained by 
generalization from history do not      
amount to this4 ,they are not the middle
 principles themselves1 but only        
evidence towards the establishment of   
such principles4 ,they consist of       
certain general tendencies which may be 
perceived in society2 a progressive     
increase of some social elements and    
diminution of others1 or a gradual      
change in the general character of      
certain elements4 ,it is easily seen1   
for instance1 that as society advances1 
mental tend more and more to prevail    
over bodily qualities1 and masses over  
individuals3 that the occupation of all 
that portion of mankind who are not     
under external restraint is at first    
chiefly military1 but society becomes   
progressively more and more engrossed   
with productive pursuits1 and the       
military spirit gradually gives way to  
the industrial2 to which many similar   
truths might be added4 ,and with        
generalizations of this description1    

ordinary inquirers1 even of the         
historical school now predominant on the
 ,continent1 are satisfied4 ,but these  
and all such results are still at too   
great a distance from the elementary    
laws of human nature on which they      
depend1--too many links intervene1 and  
the concurrence of causes at each link  
is far too complicated1--to enable these
 propositions to be presented as direct 
corollaries from those elementary       
principles4 ,they have1 therefore1 in   
the minds of most inquirers1 remained in
 the state of empirical laws1 applicable
 only within the bounds of actual       
observation2 without any means of       
determining their real limits1 and of   
judging whether the changes which have  
hitherto been in progress are destined  
to continue indefinitely1 or to         
terminate1 or even to be reversed4      
#g4 ,in order to obtain better empirical
 laws1 we must not rest satisfied with  
noting the progressive changes which    
manifest themselves in the separate     

elements of society1 and in which       
nothing is indicated but the relation of
 fragments of the effect to             
corresponding fragments of the cause4   
,it is necessary to combine the statical
 view of social phenomena with the      
dynamical1 considering not only the     
progressive changes of the different    
elements1 but the contemporaneous       
condition of each2 and thus obtain      
empirically the law of correspondence   
not only between the simultaneous       
states1 but between the simultaneous    
changes1 of those elements4 ,this law of
 correspondence it is1 which1 duly      
verified  priori1 would become the real 
scientific derivative law of the        
development of humanity and human       
affairs4  ,in the difficult process of  
observation and comparison which is here
 required1 it would evidently be a great
 assistance if it should happen to be   
the fact1 that some one element in the  
complex existence of social man is      
pre-eminent over all others as the prime

 agent of the social movement4 ,for we  
could then take the progress of that one
 element as the central chain1 to each  
successive link of which1 the           
corresponding links of all the other    
progressions being appended1 the        
succession of the facts would by this   
alone be presented in a kind of         
spontaneous order1 far more nearly      
approaching to the real order of their  
filiation than could be obtained by any 
other merely empirical process4  ,now1  
the evidence of history and that of     
human nature combine1 by a striking     
instance of consilience1 to show that   
there really is one social element which
 is thus predominant1 and almost        
paramount1 among the agents of the      
social progression4 ,this is1 the state 
of the speculative faculties of mankind2
 including the nature of the beliefs    
which by any means they have arrived at1
 concerning themselves and the world by 
which they are surrounded4  ,it would be
 a great error1 and one very little     

likely to be committed1 to assert that  
speculation1 intellectual activity1 the 
pursuit of truth1 is among the more     
powerful propensities of human nature1  
or holds a predominating place in the   
lives of any1 save decidedly            
exceptional1 individuals4 ,but1         
notwithstanding the relative weakness of
 this principle among other sociological
 agents1 its influence is the main      
determining cause of the social         
progress2 all the other dispositions of 
our nature which contribute to that     
progress1 being dependent on it for the 
means of accomplishing their share of   
the work4 ,thus 7to take the most       
obvious case first17 the impelling force
 to most of the improvements effected in
 the arts of life1 is the desire of     
increased material comfort2 but as we   
can only act upon external objects in   
proportion to our knowledge of them1 the
 state of knowledge at any time is the  
limit of the industrial improvements    
possible at that time2 and the progress 

of industry must follow1 and depend on1 
the progress of knowledge4 ,the same    
thing may be shown to be true1 though it
 is not quite so obvious1 of the        
progress of the fine arts4 ,further1 as 
the strongest propensities of           
uncultivated or half-cultivated human   
nature 7being the purely selfish ones1  
and those of a sympathetic character    
which partake most of the nature of     
selfishness7 evidently tend in          
themselves to disunite mankind1 not to  
unite them1--to make them rivals1 not   
confederates2 social existence is only  
possible by a disciplining of those more
 powerful propensities1 which consists  
in subordinating them to a common system
 of opinions4 ,the degree of this       
subordination is the measure of the     
completeness of the social union1 and   
the nature of the common opinions       
determines its kind4 ,but in order that 
mankind should conform their actions to 
any set of opinions1 these opinions must
 exist1 must be believed by them4 ,and  

thus1 the state of the speculative      
faculties1 the character of the         
propositions assented to by the         
intellect1 essentially determines the   
moral and political state of the        
community1 as we have already seen that 
it determines the physical4  ,these     
conclusions1 deduced from the laws of   
human nature1 are in entire accordance  
with the general facts of history4      
,every considerable change historically 
known to us in the condition of any     
portion of mankind1 when not brought    
about by external force1 has been       
preceded by a change1 of proportional   
extent1 in the state of their knowledge1
 or in their prevalent beliefs4 ,as     
between any given state of speculation1 
and the correlative state of everything 
else1 it was almost always the former   
which first showed itself2 though the   
effects1 no doubt1 reacted potently upon
 the cause4 ,every considerable advance 
in material civilization has been       
preceded by an advance in knowledge3 and

 when any great social change has come  
to pass1 either in the way of gradual   
development or of sudden conflict1 it   
has had for its precursor a great change
 in the opinions and modes of thinking  
of society4 ,polytheism1 ,judaism1      
,christianity1 ,protestantism1 the      
critical philosophy of modern ,europe1  
and its positive science--each of these 
has been a primary agent in making      
society what it was at each successive  
period1 while society was but           
secondarily instrumental in making them1
 each of them 7so far as causes can be  
assigned for its existence7 being mainly
 an emanation not from the practical    
life of the period1 but from the        
previous state of belief and thought4   
,the weakness of the speculative        
propensity in mankind generally1 has    
not1 therefore1 prevented the progress  
of speculation from governing that of   
society at large2 it has only1 and too  
often1 prevented progress altogether1   
where the intellectual progression has  

come to an early stand for want of      
sufficiently favourable circumstances4  
,from this accumulated evidence1 we are 
justified in concluding1 that the order 
of human progression in all respects    
will mainly depend on the order of      
progression in the intellectual         
convictions of mankind1 that is1 on the 
law of the successive transformations of
 human opinions4 ,the question remains1 
whether this law can be determined2 at  
first from history as an empirical law1 
then converted into a scientific theorem
 by deducing it  priori from the        
principles of human nature4 ,as the     
progress of knowledge and the changes in
 the opinions of mankind are very slow1 
and manifest themselves in a            
well-defined manner only at long        
intervals2 it cannot be expected that   
the general order of sequence should be 
discoverable from the examination of    
less than a very considerable part of   
the duration of the social progress4 ,it
 is necessary to take into consideration

 the whole of past time1 from the first 
recorded condition of the human race1 to
 the memorable phenomena of the last and
 present generations4    #h4 ,the       
investigation which ,i have thus        
endeavoured to characterize1 has been   
systematically attempted1 up to the     
present time1 by ,m4 ,comte alone4 ,his 
work is hitherto the only known example 
of the study of social phenomena        
according to this conception of the     
,historical ,method4 ,without discussing
 here the worth of his conclusions1 and 
especially of his predictions and       
recommendations with respect to the     
,future of society1 which appear to me  
greatly inferior in value to his        
appreciation of the ,past1 ,i shall     
confine myself to mentioning one        
important generalization1 which ,m4     
,comte regards as the fundamental law of
 the progress of human knowledge4       
,speculation he conceives to have1 on   
every subject of human inquiry1 three   
successive stages2 in the first of which

 it tends to explain the phenomena by   
supernatural agencies1 in the second by 
metaphysical abstractions1 and in the   
third or final state confines itself to 
ascertaining their laws of succession   
and similitude4 ,this generalization    
appears to me to have that high degree  
of scientific evidence1 which is derived
 from the concurrence of the indications
 of history with the probabilities      
derived from the constitution of the    
human mind4 ,nor could it be easily     
conceived1 from the mere enunciation of 
such a proposition1 what a flood of     
light it lets in upon the whole course  
of history2 when its consequences are   
traced1 by connecting with each of the  
three states of human intellect which it
 distinguishes1 and with each successive
 modification of those three states1 the
 correlative condition of other social  
phenomena4#ad  ,but whatever decision   
competent judges may pronounce on the   
results arrived at by any individual    
inquirer1 the method now characterized  

is that by which the derivative laws of 
social order and of social progress must
 be sought4 ,by its aid we may hereafter
 succeed not only in looking far forward
 into the future history of the human   
race1 but in determining what artificial
 means may be used1 and to what extent1 
to accelerate the natural progress in so
 far as it is beneficial2 to compensate 
for whatever may be its inherent        
inconveniences or disadvantages2 and to 
guard against the dangers or accidents  
to which our species is exposed from the
 necessary incidents of its progression4
 ,such practical instructions1 founded  
on the highest branch of speculative    
sociology1 will form the noblest and    
most beneficial portion of the          
,political ,art4  ,that of this science 
and art even the foundations are but    
beginning to be laid1 is sufficiently   
evident4 ,but the superior minds are    
fairly turning themselves towards that  
object4 ,it has become the aim of really
 scientific thinkers to connect by      

theories the facts of universal history3
 it is acknowledged to be one of the    
requisites of a general system of social
 doctrine1 that it should explain1 so   
far as the data exist1 the main facts of
 history2 and a ,philosophy of ,history 
is generally admitted to be at once the 
verification1 and the initial form1 of  
the ,philosophy of the ,progress of     
,society4  ,if the endeavours now making
 in all the more cultivated nations1 and
 beginning to be made even in ,england  
7usually the last to enter into the     
general movement of the ,european mind7 
for the construction of a ,philosophy of
 ,history1 shall be directed and        
controlled by those views of the nature 
of sociological evidence which ,i have  
7very briefly and imperfectly7 attempted
 to characterize2 they cannot fail to   
give birth to a sociological system     
widely removed from the vague and       
conjectural character of all former     
attempts1 and worthy to take its place1 
at last1 among the sciences4 ,when this 

time shall come1 no important branch of 
human affairs will be any longer        
abandoned to empiricism and unscientific
 surmise3 the circle of human knowledge 
will be complete1 and it can only       
thereafter receive further enlargement  
by perpetual expansion from within4     
,,chapter ,,xi4  ,,additional           
,,elucidations ,,of ,,the ,,science ,,of
 ,,history4    #a4 ,the doctrine which  
the preceding chapters were intended to 
enforce and elucidate--that the         
collective series of social phenomena1  
in other words the course of history1 is
 subject to general laws1 which         
philosophy may possibly detect--has been
 familiar for generations to the        
scientific thinkers of the ,continent1  
and has for the last quarter of a       
century passed out of their peculiar    
domain1 into that of newspapers and     
ordinary political discussion4 ,in our  
own country1 however1 at the time of the
 first publication of this ,treatise1 it
 was almost a novelty1 and the          

prevailing habits of thought on         
historical subjects were the very       
reverse of a preparation for it4 ,since 
then a great change has taken place1 and
 has been eminently promoted by the     
important work of ,mr4 ,buckle2 who1    
with characteristic energy1 flung down  
this great principle1 together with many
 striking exemplifications of it1 into  
the arena of popular discussion1 to be  
fought over by a sort of combatants1 in 
the presence of a sort of spectators1   
who would never even have been aware    
that there existed such a principle if  
they had been left to learn its         
existence from the speculations of pure 
science4 ,and hence has arisen a        
considerable amount of controversy1     
tending not only to make the principle  
rapidly familiar to the majority of     
cultivated minds1 but also to clear it  
from the confusions and                 
misunderstandings by which it was but   
natural that it should for a time be    
clouded1 and which impair the worth of  

the doctrine to those who accept it1 and
 are the stumbling-block of many who do 
not4  ,among the impediments to the     
general acknowledgment1 by thoughtful   
minds1 of the subjection of historical  
facts to scientific laws1 the most      
fundamental continues to be that which  
is grounded on the doctrine of ,free    
,will1 or in other words1 on the denial 
that the law of invariable ,causation   
holds true of human volitions3 for if it
 does not1 the course of history1 being 
the result of human volitions1 cannot be
 a subject of scientific laws1 since the
 volitions on which it depends can      
neither be foreseen1 nor reduced to any 
canon of regularity even after they have
 occurred4 ,i have discussed this       
question1 as far as seemed suitable to  
the occasion1 in a former chapter3 and  
,i only think it necessary to repeat1   
that the doctrine of the ,causation of  
human actions1 improperly called the    
doctrine of ,necessity1 affirms no      
mysterious nexus1 or overruling         

fatality3 it asserts only that men's    
actions are the joint result of the     
general laws and circumstances of human 
nature1 and of their own particular     
characters2 those characters again being
 the consequence of the natural and     
artificial circumstances that           
constituted their education1 among which
 circumstances must be reckoned their   
own conscious efforts4 ,any one who is  
willing to take 7if the expression may  
be permitted7 the trouble of thinking   
himself into the doctrine as thus       
stated1 will find it1 ,i believe1 not   
only a faithful interpretation of the   
universal experience of human conduct1  
but a correct representation of the mode
 in which he himself1 in every          
particular case1 spontaneously          
interprets his own experience of that   
conduct4  ,but if this principle is true
 of individual man1 it must be true of  
collective man4 ,if it is the law of    
human life1 the law must be realized in 
history4 ,the experience of human       

affairs when looked at en masse1 must be
 in accordance with it if true1 or      
repugnant to it if false4 ,the support  
which this  posteriori verification     
affords to the law1 is the part of the  
case which has been most clearly and    
triumphantly brought out by ,mr4        
,buckle4  ,the facts of statistics1     
since they have been made a subject of  
careful recordation and study1 have     
yielded conclusions1 some of which have 
been very startling to persons not      
accustomed to regard moral actions as   
subject to uniform laws4 ,the very      
events which in their own nature appear 
most capricious and uncertain1 and which
 in any individual case no attainable   
degree of knowledge would enable us to  
foresee1 occur1 when considerable       
numbers are taken into the account1 with
 a degree of regularity approaching to  
mathematical4 ,what act is there which  
all would consider as more completely   
dependent on individual character1 and  
on the exercise of individual free will1

 than that of slaying a fellow creature8
 ,yet in any large country1 the number  
of murders1 in proportion to the        
population1 varies 7it has been found7  
very little from one year to another1   
and in its variations never deviates    
widely from a certain average4 ,what is 
still more remarkable1 there is a       
similar approach to constancy in the    
proportion of these murders annually    
committed with every particular kind of 
instrument4 ,there is a like            
approximation to identity1 as between   
one year and another1 in the comparative
 number of legitimate and of            
illegitimate births4 ,the same thing is 
found true of suicides1 accidents1 and  
all other social phenomena of which the 
registration is sufficiently perfect2   
one of the most curiously illustrative  
examples being the fact1 ascertained by 
the registers of the ,london and ,paris 
post-offices1 that the number of letters
 posted which the writers have forgotten
 to direct1 is nearly the same1 in      

proportion to the whole number of       
letters posted1 in one year as in       
another4 ,year after year1 says ,mr4    
,buckle1 the same proportion of         
letter-writers forget this simple act2  
so that for each successive period we   
can actually foretell the number of     
persons whose memory will fail them in  
regard to this trifling1 and as it might
 appear1 accidental occurrence4#ae      
,this singular degree of regularity en  
masse1 combined with the extreme of     
irregularity in the cases composing the 
mass1 is a felicitous verification      
posteriori of the law of causation in   
its application to human conduct4       
,assuming the truth of that law1 every  
human action1 every murder for instance1
 is the concurrent result of two sets of
 causes4 ,on the one part1 the general  
circumstances of the country and its    
inhabitants2 the moral1 educational1    
economical1 and other influences        
operating on the whole people1 and      
constituting what we term the state of  

civilization4 ,on the other part1 the   
great variety of influences special to  
the individual3 his temperament1 and    
other peculiarities of organization1 his
 parentage1 habitual associates1        
temptations1 and so forth4 ,if we now   
take the whole of the instances which   
occur within a sufficiently large field 
to exhaust all the combinations of these
 special influences1 or in other words1 
to eliminate chance2 and if all these   
instances have occurred within such     
narrow limits of time1 that no material 
change can have taken place in the      
general influences constituting the     
state of civilization of the country2 we
 may be certain1 that if human actions  
are governed by invariable laws1 the    
aggregate result will be something like 
a constant quantity4 ,the number of     
murders committed within that space and 
time1 being the effect partly of general
 causes which have not varied1 and      
partly of partial causes the whole round
 of whose variations has been included1 

will be1 practically speaking1          
invariable4  ,literally and             
mathematically invariable it is not1 and
 could not be expected to be3 because   
the period of a year is too short to    
include all the possible combinations of
 partial causes1 while it is1 at the    
same time1 sufficiently long to make it 
probable that in some years at least1 of
 every series1 there will have been     
introduced new influences of a more or  
less general character2 such as a more  
vigorous or a more relaxed police2 some 
temporary excitement from political or  
religious causes2 or some incident      
generally notorious1 of a nature to act 
morbidly on the imagination4 ,that in   
spite of these unavoidable imperfections
 in the data1 there should be so very   
trifling a margin of variation in the   
annual results1 is a brilliant          
confirmation of the general theory4     
#b4 ,the same considerations which thus 
strikingly corroborate the evidence of  
the doctrine1 that historical facts are 

the invariable effects of causes1 tend  
equally to clear that doctrine from     
various misapprehensions1 the existence 
of which has been put in evidence by the
 recent discussions4 ,some persons1 for 
instance1 seemingly imagine the doctrine
 to imply1 not merely that the total    
number of murders committed in a given  
space and time1 is entirely the effect  
of the general circumstances of society1
 but that every particular murder is so 
too3 that the individual murderer is1 so
 to speak1 a mere instrument in the     
hands of general causes2 that he himself
 has no option1 or if he has1 and chose 
to exercise it1 some one else would be  
necessitated to take his place3 that if 
any one of the actual murderers had     
abstained from the crime1 some person   
who would otherwise have remained       
innocent1 would have committed an extra 
murder to make up the average4 ,such a  
corollary would certainly convict any   
theory which necessarily led to it of   
absurdity4 ,it is obvious1 however1 that

 each particular murder depends1 not on 
the general state of society only1 but  
on that combined with causes special to 
the case1 which are generally much more 
powerful3 and if these special causes1  
which have greater influence than the   
general ones in causing every particular
 murder1 have no influence on the number
 of murders in a given period1 it is    
because the field of observation is so  
extensive as to include all possible    
combinations of the special causes--all 
varieties of individual character and   
individual temptation compatible with   
the general state of society4 ,the      
collective experiment1 as it may be     
termed1 exactly separates the effect of 
the general from that of the special    
causes1 and shows the net result of the 
former3 but it declares nothing at all  
respecting the amount of influence of   
the special causes1 be it greater or    
smaller1 since the scale of the         
experiment extends to the number of     
cases within which the effects of the   

special causes balance one another1 and 
disappear in that of the general causes4
  ,i will not pretend that all the      
defenders of the theory have always kept
 their language free from this same     
confusion1 and have shown no tendency to
 exalt the influence of general causes  
at the expense of special4 ,i am of     
opinion1 on the contrary1 that they have
 done so in a very great degree1 and by 
so doing have encumbered their theory   
with difficulties1 and laid it open to  
objections1 which do not necessarily    
affect it4 ,some1 for example 7among    
whom is ,mr4 ,buckle himself71 have     
inferred1 or allowed it to be supposed  
that they inferred1 from the regularity 
in the recurrence of events which depend
 on moral qualities1 that the moral     
qualities of mankind are little capable 
of being improved1 or are of little     
importance in the general progress of   
society1 compared with intellectual or  
economic causes4 ,but to draw this      
inference is to forget that the         

statistical tables1 from which the      
invariable averages are deduced1 were   
compiled from facts occurring within    
narrow geographical limits and in a     
small number of successive years2 that  
is1 from a field the whole of which was 
under the operation of the same general 
causes1 and during too short a time to  
allow of much change therein4 ,all moral
 causes but those common to the country 
generally1 have been eliminated by the  
great number of instances taken2 and    
those which are common to the whole     
country have not varied considerably1 in
 the short space of time comprised in   
the observations4 ,if we admit the      
supposition that they have varied2 if we
 compare one age with another1 or one   
country with another1 or even one part  
of a country with another1 differing in 
position and character as to the moral  
elements1 the crimes committed within a 
year give no longer the same1 but a     
widely different numerical aggregate4   
,and this cannot but be the case3 for   

inasmuch as every single crime committed
 by an individual mainly depends on his 
moral qualities1 the crimes committed by
 the entire population of the country   
must depend in an equal degree on their 
collective moral qualities4 ,to render  
this element inoperative upon the large 
scale1 it would be necessary to suppose 
that the general moral average of       
mankind does not vary from country to   
country or from age to age2 which is not
 true1 and even if it were true1 could  
not possibly be proved by any existing  
statistics4 ,i do not on this account   
the less agree in the opinion of ,mr4   
,buckle1 that the intellectual element  
in mankind1 including in that expression
 the nature of their beliefs1 the amount
 of their knowledge1 and the development
 of their intelligence1 is the          
predominant circumstance in determining 
their progress4 ,but ,i am of this      
opinion1 not because ,i regard their    
moral or economical condition either as 
less powerful or less variable agencies1

 but because these are in a great degree
 the consequences of the intellectual   
condition1 and are1 in all cases1       
limited by it2 as was observed in the   
preceding chapter4 ,the intellectual    
changes are the most conspicuous agents 
in history1 not from their superior     
force1 considered in themselves1 but    
because practically they work with the  
united power belonging to all three4#af 
#c4 ,there is another distinction often 
neglected in the discussion of this     
subject1 which it is extremely important
 to observe4 ,the theory of the         
subjection of social progress to        
invariable laws1 is often held in       
conjunction with the doctrine1 that     
social progress cannot be materially    
influenced by the exertions of          
individual persons1 or by the acts of   
governments4 ,but though these opinions 
are often held by the same persons1 they
 are two very different opinions1 and   
the confusion between them is the       
eternally recurring error of confounding

 ,causation with ,fatalism4 ,because    
whatever happens will be the effect of  
causes1 human volitions among the rest1 
it does not follow that volitions1 even 
those of peculiar individuals1 are not  
of great efficacy as causes4 ,if any one
 in a storm at sea1 because about the   
same number of persons in every year    
perish by shipwreck1 should conclude    
that it was useless for him to attempt  
to save his own life1 we should call him
 a ,fatalist2 and should remind him that
 the efforts of shipwrecked persons to  
save their lives are so far from being  
immaterial1 that the average amount of  
those efforts is one of the causes on   
which the ascertained annual number of  
deaths by shipwreck depend4 ,however    
universal the laws of social development
 may be1 they cannot be more universal  
or more rigorous than those of the      
physical agencies of nature2 yet human  
will can convert these into instruments 
of its designs1 and the extent to which 
it does so makes the chief difference   

between savages and the most highly     
civilized people4 ,human and social     
facts1 from their more complicated      
nature1 are not less1 but more1         
modifiable1 than mechanical and chemical
 facts2 human agency1 therefore1 has    
still greater power over them4 ,and     
accordingly1 those who maintain that the
 evolution of society depends           
exclusively1 or almost exclusively1 on  
general causes1 always include among    
these the collective knowledge and      
intellectual development of the race4   
,but if of the race1 why not also of    
some powerful monarch or thinker1 or of 
the ruling portion of some political    
society1 acting through its government8 
,though the varieties of character among
 ordinary individuals neutralize one    
another on any large scale1 exceptional 
individuals in important positions do   
not in any given age neutralize one     
another2 there was not another          
,themistocles1 or ,luther1 or ,julius   
,csar1 of equal powers and contrary     

dispositions1 who exactly balanced the  
given ,themistocles1 ,luther1 and ,csar1
 and prevented them from having any     
permanent effect4 ,moreover1 for aught  
that appears1 the volitions of          
exceptional persons1 or the opinions and
 purposes of the individuals who at some
 particular time compose a government1  
may be indispensable links in the chain 
of causation by which even the general  
causes produce their effects2 and ,i    
believe this to be the only tenable form
 of the theory4  ,lord ,macaulay1 in a  
celebrated passage of one of his early  
essays 7let me add that it was one which
 he did not himself choose to reprint71 
gives expression to the doctrine of the 
absolute inoperativeness of great men1  
more unqualified1 ,i should think1 than 
has been given to it by any writer of   
equal abilities4 ,he compares them to   
persons who merely stand on a loftier   
height1 and thence receive the sun's    
rays a little earlier1 than the rest of 
the human race4 ,the sun illuminates the

 hills while it is still below the      
horizon1 and truth is discovered by the 
highest minds a little before it becomes
 manifest to the multitude4 ,this is the
 extent of their superiority4 ,they are 
the first to catch and reflect a light  
which1 without their assistance1 must in
 a short time be visible to those who   
lie far beneath them4#ag ,if this       
metaphor is to be carried out1 it       
follows that if there had been no       
,newton1 the world would not only have  
had the ,newtonian system1 but would    
have had it equally soon2 as the sun    
would have risen just as early to       
spectators in the plain if there had    
been no mountain at hand to catch still 
earlier rays4 ,and so it would be1 if   
truths1 like the sun1 rose by their own 
proper motion1 without human effort2 but
 not otherwise4 ,i believe that if      
,newton had not lived1 the world must   
have waited for the ,newtonian          
philosophy until there had been another 
,newton1 or his equivalent4 ,no ordinary

 man1 and no succession of ordinary men1
 could have achieved it4 ,i will not go 
the length of saying that what ,newton  
did in a single life1 might not have    
been done in successive steps by some of
 those who followed him1 each singly    
inferior to him in genius4 ,but even the
 least of those steps required a man of 
great intellectual superiority4 ,eminent
 men do not merely see the coming light 
from the hill-top1 they mount on the    
hill-top and evoke it2 and if no one had
 ever ascended thither1 the light1 in   
many cases1 might never have risen upon 
the plain at all4 ,philosophy and       
religion are abundantly amenable to     
general causes2 yet few will doubt1 that
 had there been no ,socrates1 no ,plato1
 and no ,aristotle1 there would have    
been no philosophy for the next two     
thousand years1 nor in all probability  
then2 and that if there had been no     
,christ1 and no ,st4 ,paul1 there would 
have been no ,christianity4  ,the point 
in which1 above all1 the influence of   

remarkable individuals is decisive1 is  
in determining the celerity of the      
movement4 ,in most states of society it 
is the existence of great men which     
decides even whether there shall be any 
progress4 ,it is conceivable that       
,greece1 or that ,christian ,europe1    
might have been progressive in certain  
periods of their history through general
 causes only3 but if there had been no  
,mahomet1 would ,arabia have produced   
,avicenna or ,averroes1 or ,caliphs of  
,bagdad or of ,cordova8 ,in determining1
 however1 in what manner and order the  
progress of mankind shall take place if 
it take place at all1 much less depends 
on the character of individuals4 ,there 
is a sort of necessity established in   
this respect by the general laws of     
human nature2 by the constitution of the
 human mind4 ,certain truths cannot be  
discovered1 or inventions made1 unless  
certain others have been made first2    
certain social improvements1 from the   
nature of the case1 can only follow1 and

 not precede1 others4 ,the order of     
human progress1 therefore1 may to a     
certain extent have definite laws       
assigned to it3 while as to its         
celerity1 or even as to its taking place
 at all1 no generalization1 extending to
 the human species generally1 can       
possibly be made2 but only some very    
precarious approximate generalizations1 
confined to the small portion of mankind
 in whom there has been anything like   
consecutive progress within the         
historical period1 and deduced from     
their special position1 or collected    
from their particular history4 ,even    
looking to the manner of progress1 the  
order of succession of social states1   
there is need of great flexibility in   
our generalizations4 ,the limits of     
variation in the possible development of
 social1 as of animal life1 are a       
subject of which little is yet          
understood1 and are one of the great    
problems in social science4 ,it is1 at  
all events1 a fact1 that different      

portions of mankind1 under the influence
 of different circumstances1 have       
developed themselves in a more or less  
different manner and into different     
forms2 and among these determining      
circumstances1 the individual character 
of their great speculative thinkers or  
practical organizers may well have been 
one4 ,who can tell how profoundly the   
whole subsequent history of ,china may  
have been influenced by the             
individuality of ,confucius8 and of     
,sparta 7and hence of ,greece and the   
world7 by that of ,lycurgus8            
,concerning the nature and extent of    
what a great man under favourable       
circumstances can do for mankind1 as    
well as of what a government can do for 
a nation1 many different opinions are   
possible2 and every shade of opinion on 
these points is consistent with the     
fullest recognition that there are      
invariable laws of historical phenomena4
 ,of course the degree of influence     
which has to be assigned to these more  

special agencies1 makes a great         
difference in the precision which can be
 given to the general laws1 and in the  
confidence with which predictions can be
 grounded on them4 ,whatever depends on 
the peculiarities of individuals1       
combined with the accident of the       
positions they hold1 is necessarily     
incapable of being foreseen4            
,undoubtedly these casual combinations  
might be eliminated like any others1 by 
taking a sufficiently large cycle3 the  
peculiarities of a great historical     
character make their influence felt in  
history sometimes for several thousand  
years1 but it is highly probable that   
they may make no difference at all at   
the end of fifty millions4 ,since1      
however1 we cannot obtain an average of 
the vast length of time necessary to    
exhaust all the possible combinations of
 great men and circumstances1 as much of
 the law of evolution of human affairs  
as depends upon this average1 is and    
remains inaccessible to us3 and within  

the next thousand years1 which are of   
considerably more importance to us than 
the whole remainder of the fifty        
millions1 the favourable and            
unfavourable combinations which will    
occur will be to us purely accidental4  
,we cannot foresee the advent of great  
men4 ,those who introduce new           
speculative thoughts or great practical 
conceptions into the world1 cannot have 
their epoch fixed beforehand4 ,what     
science can do1 is this4 ,it can trace  
through past history the general causes 
which had brought mankind into that     
preliminary state1 which when the right 
sort of great man appeared1 rendered    
them accessible to his influence4 ,if   
this state continues1 experience renders
 it tolerably certain that in a longer  
or shorter period the great man will be 
produced2 provided that the general     
circumstances of the country and people 
are 7which very often they are not7     
compatible with his existence2 of which 
point also1 science can in some measure 

judge4 ,it is in this manner that the   
results of progress1 except as to the   
celerity of their production1 can be1 to
 a certain extent1 reduced to regularity
 and law4 ,and the belief that they can 
be so1 is equally consistent with       
assigning very great1 or very little    
efficacy1 to the influence of           
exceptional men1 or of the acts of      
governments4 ,and the same may be said  
of all other accidents and disturbing   
causes4    #d4 ,it would nevertheless be
 a great error to assign only a trifling
 importance to the agency of eminent    
individuals1 or of governments4 ,it must
 not be concluded that the influence of 
either is small1 because they cannot    
bestow what the general circumstances of
 society1 and the course of its previous
 history1 have not prepared it to       
receive4 ,neither thinkers nor          
governments effect all that they intend1
 but in compensation they often produce 
important results which they did not in 
the least foresee4 ,great men1 and great

 actions1 are seldom wasted3 they send  
forth a thousand unseen influences1 more
 effective than those which are seen2   
and though nine out of every ten things 
done1 with a good purpose1 by those who 
are in advance of their age1 produce no 
material effect1 the tenth thing        
produces effects twenty times as great  
as any one would have dreamed of        
predicting from it4 ,even the men who   
for want of sufficiently favourable     
circumstances left no impress at all    
upon their own age1 have often been of  
the greatest value to posterity4 ,who   
could appear to have lived more entirely
 in vain1 than some of the early        
heretics8 ,they were burnt or massacred1
 their writings extirpated1 their memory
 anathematized1 and their very names and
 existence left for seven or eight      
centuries in the obscurity of musty     
manuscripts--their history to be        
gathered1 perhaps1 only from the        
sentences by which they were condemned4 
,yet the memory of these men--men who   

resisted certain pretensions or certain 
dogmas of the ,church in the very age in
 which the unanimous assent of          
,christendom was afterwards claimed as  
having been given to them1 and asserted 
as the ground of their authority--broke 
the chain of tradition1 established a   
series of precedents for resistance1    
inspired later ,reformers with the      
courage1 and armed them with the        
weapons1 which they needed when mankind 
were better prepared to follow their    
impulse4 ,to this example from men1 let 
us add another from governments4 ,the   
comparatively enlightened rule of which 
,spain had the benefit during a         
considerable part of the eighteenth     
century1 did not correct the fundamental
 defects of the ,spanish people2 and in 
consequence1 though it did great        
temporary good1 so much of that good    
perished with it1 that it may plausibly 
be affirmed to have had no permanent    
effect4 ,the case has been cited as a   
proof how little governments can do1 in 

opposition to the causes which have     
determined the general character of the 
nation4 ,it does show how much there is 
which they cannot do2 but not that they 
can do nothing4 ,compare what ,spain was
 at the beginning of that half century  
of liberal government1 with what she had
 become at its close4 ,that period      
fairly let in the light of ,european    
thought upon the more educated classes2 
and it never afterwards ceased to go on 
spreading4 ,previous to that time the   
change was in an inverse direction2     
culture1 light1 intellectual and even   
material activity1 were becoming        
extinguished4 ,was it nothing to arrest 
this downward and convert it into an    
upward course8 ,how much that ,charles  
the ,third and ,aranda could not do1 has
 been the ultimate consequence of what  
they did6 ,to that half century ,spain  
owes that she has got rid of the        
,inquisition1 that she has got rid of   
the monks1 that she now has parliaments 
and 7save in exceptional intervals7 a   

free press1 and the feelings of freedom 
and citizenship1 and is acquiring       
railroads and all the other constituents
 of material and economical progress4   
,in the ,spain which preceded that era  
there was not a single element at work1 
which could have led to these results in
 any length of time1 if the country had 
continued to be governed as it was by   
the last princes of the ,austrian       
dynasty1 or if the ,bourbon rulers had  
been from the first what1 both in ,spain
 and in ,naples1 they afterwards became4
  ,and if a government can do much1 even
 when it seems to have done little1 in  
causing positive improvement1 still     
greater are the issues dependent on it  
in the way of warding off evils1 both   
internal and external1 which else would 
stop improvement altogether4 ,a good or 
a bad counsellor1 in a single city at a 
particular crisis1 has affected the     
whole subsequent fate of the world4 ,it 
is as certain as any contingent judgment
 respecting historical events can be1   

that if there had been no ,themistocles 
there would have been no victory of     
,salamis2 and had there not1 where would
 have been all our civilization8 ,how   
different again would have been the     
issue if ,epaminondas1 or ,timoleon1 or 
even ,iphicrates1 instead of ,chares and
 ,lysicles1 had commanded at ,chroneia4 
,as is well said in the second of two   
,essays on the ,study of ,history1#ah in
 my judgment the soundest and most      
philosophical productions which the     
recent controversies on this subject    
have called forth2 historical science   
authorizes not absolute1 but only       
conditional predictions4 ,general causes
 count for much1 but individuals also   
produce great changes in history1 and   
colour its whole complexion long after  
their death4444 ,no one can doubt that  
the ,roman republic would have subsided 
into a military despotism if ,julius    
,csar had never lived2 7thus much was   
rendered practically certain by general 
causes73 but is it at all clear that in 

that case ,gaul would ever have formed a
 province of the empire8 ,might not     
,varus have lost his three legions on   
the banks of the ,rhone8 and might not  
that river have become the frontier     
instead of the ,rhine8 ,this might well 
have happened if ,csar and ,crassus had 
changed provinces2 and it is surely     
impossible to say that in such an event 
the venue 7as lawyers say7 of ,european 
civilization might not have been        
changed4 ,the ,norman ,conquest in the  
same way was as much the act of a single
 man1 as the writing of a newspaper     
article2 and knowing as we do the       
history of that man and his family1 we  
can retrospectively predict with all but
 infallible certainty1 that no other    
person 7no other in that age1 ,i        
presume1 is meant71 could have          
accomplished the enterprise4 ,if it had 
not been accomplished1 is there any     
ground to suppose that either our       
history or our national character would 
have been what they are8  ,as is most   

truly remarked by the same writer1 the  
whole stream of ,grecian history1 as    
cleared up by ,mr4 ,grote1 is one series
 of examples how often events on which  
the whole destiny of subsequent         
civilization turned1 were dependent on  
the personal character for good or evil 
of some one individual4 ,it must be     
said1 however1 that ,greece furnishes   
the most extreme example of this nature 
to be found in history1 and is a very   
exaggerated specimen of the general     
tendency4 ,it has happened only that    
once1 and will probably never happen    
again1 that the fortunes of mankind     
depended upon keeping a certain order of
 things in existence in a single town1  
or a country scarcely larger than       
,yorkshire2 capable of being ruined or  
saved by a hundred causes1 of very      
slight magnitude in comparison with the 
general tendencies of human affairs4    
,neither ordinary accidents1 nor the    
characters of individuals1 can ever     
again be so vitally important as they   

then were4 ,the longer our species      
lasts1 and the more civilized it        
becomes1 the more1 as ,comte remarks1   
does the influence of past generations  
over the present1 and of mankind en     
masse over every individual in it1      
predominate over other forces3 and      
though the course of affairs never      
ceases to be susceptible of alteration  
both by accidents and by personal       
qualities1 the increasing preponderance 
of the collective agency of the species 
over all minor causes1 is constantly    
bringing the general evolution of the   
race into something which deviates less 
from a certain and preappointed track4  
,historical science1 therefore1 is      
always becoming more possible3 not      
solely because it is better studied1 but
 because1 in every generation1 it       
becomes better adapted for study4       
,,chapter ,,xii4  ,,of ,,the ,,logic    
,,of ,,practice1 ,,or ,,art2 ,,including
 ,,morality ,,and ,,policy4    #a4 ,in  
the preceding chapters we have          

endeavoured to characterize the present 
state of those among the branches of    
knowledge called ,moral1 which are      
sciences in the only proper sense of the
 term1 that is1 inquiries into the      
course of nature4 ,it is customary1     
however1 to include under the term moral
 knowledge1 and even 7though improperly7
 under that of moral science1 an inquiry
 the results of which do not express    
themselves in the indicative1 but in the
 imperative mood1 or in periphrases     
equivalent to it2 what is called the    
knowledge of duties2 practical ethics1  
or morality4  ,now1 the imperative mood 
is the characteristic of art1 as        
distinguished from science4 ,whatever   
speaks in rules1 or precepts1 not in    
assertions respecting matters of fact1  
is art3 and ethics1 or morality1 is     
properly a portion of the art           
corresponding to the sciences of human  
nature and society4#ai  ,the ,method1   
therefore1 of ,ethics1 can be no other  
than that of ,art1 or ,practice1 in     

general3 and the portion yet            
uncompleted1 of the task which we       
proposed to ourselves in the concluding 
,book1 is to characterize the general   
,method of ,art1 as distinguished from  
,science4    #b4 ,in all branches of    
practical business1 there are cases in  
which individuals are bound to conform  
their practice to a pre-established     
rule1 while there are others in which it
 is part of their task to find or       
construct the rule by which they are to 
govern their conduct4 ,the first1 for   
example1 is the case of a judge1 under a
 definite written code4 ,the judge is   
not called upon to determine what course
 would be intrinsically the most        
advisable in the particular case in     
hand1 but only within what rule of law  
it falls2 what the legislator has       
ordained to be done in the kind of case1
 and must therefore be presumed to have 
intended in the individual case4 ,the   
method must here be wholly and          
exclusively one of ratiocination1 or    

syllogism2 and the process is obviously1
 what in our analysis of the syllogism  
we showed that all ratiocination is1    
namely the interpretation of a formula4 
,in order that our illustration of the  
opposite case may be taken from the same
 class of subjects as the former1 we    
will suppose1 in contrast with the      
situation of the judge1 the position of 
a legislator4 ,as the judge has laws for
 his guidance1 so the legislator has    
rules1 and maxims of policy2 but it     
would be a manifest error to suppose    
that the legislator is bound by these   
maxims in the same manner as the judge  
is bound by the laws1 and that all he   
has to do is to argue down from them to 
the particular case1 as the judge does  
from the laws4 ,the legislator is bound 
to take into consideration the reasons  
or grounds of the maxim2 the judge has  
nothing to do with those of the law1    
except so far as a consideration of them
 may throw light upon the intention of  
the law-maker1 where his words have left

 it doubtful4 ,to the judge1 the rule1  
once positively ascertained1 is final2  
but the legislator1 or other            
practitioner1 who goes by rules rather  
than by their reasons1 like the         
old-fashioned ,german tacticians who    
were vanquished by ,napoleon1 or the    
physician who preferred that his        
patients should die by rule rather than 
recover contrary to it1 is rightly      
judged to be a mere pedant1 and the     
slave of his formulas4  ,now1 the       
reasons of a maxim of policy1 or of any 
other rule of art1 can be no other than 
the theorems of the corresponding       
science4  ,the relation in which rules  
of art stand to doctrines of science may
 be thus characterized4 ,the art        
proposes to itself an end to be         
attained1 defines the end1 and hands it 
over to the science4 ,the science       
receives it1 considers it as a          
phenomenon or effect to be studied1 and 
having investigated its causes and      
conditions1 sends it back to art with a 

theorem of the combination of           
circumstances by which it could be      
produced4 ,art then examines these      
combinations of circumstances1 and      
according as any of them are or are not 
in human power1 pronounces the end      
attainable or not4 ,the only one of the 
premises1 therefore1 which ,art         
supplies1 is the original major premise1
 which asserts that the attainment of   
the given end is desirable4 ,science    
then lends to ,art the proposition      
7obtained by a series of inductions or  
of deductions7 that the performance of  
certain actions will attain the end4    
,from these premises ,art concludes that
 the performance of these actions is    
desirable1 and finding it also          
practicable1 converts the theorem into a
 rule or precept4    #c4 ,it deserves   
particular notice1 that the theorem or  
speculative truth is not ripe for being 
turned into a precept1 until the whole1 
and not a part merely1 of the operation 
which belongs to science1 has been      

performed4 ,suppose that we have        
completed the scientific process only up
 to a certain point2 have discovered    
that a particular cause will produce the
 desired effect1 but have not           
ascertained all the negative conditions 
which are necessary1 that is1 all the   
circumstances which1 if present1 would  
prevent its production4 ,if1 in this    
imperfect state of the scientific       
theory1 we attempt to frame a rule of   
art1 we perform that operation          
prematurely4 ,whenever any counteracting
 cause1 overlooked by the theorem1 takes
 place1 the rule will be at fault3 we   
shall employ the means and the end will 
not follow4 ,no arguing from or about   
the rule itself will then help us       
through the difficulty3 there is nothing
 for it but to turn back and finish the 
scientific process which should have    
preceded the formation of the rule4 ,we 
must re-open the investigation1 to      
inquire into the remainder of the       
conditions on which the effect depends2 

and only after we have ascertained the  
whole of these1 are we prepared to      
transform the completed law of the      
effect into a precept1 in which those   
circumstances or combinations of        
circumstances which the science exhibits
 as conditions1 are prescribed as means4
  ,it is true that1 for the sake of     
convenience1 rules must be formed from  
something less than this ideally perfect
 theory2 in the first place1 because the
 theory can seldom be made ideally      
perfect2 and next1 because1 if all the  
counteracting contingencies1 whether of 
frequent or of rare occurrence1 were    
included1 the rules would be too        
cumbrous to be apprehended and          
remembered by ordinary capacities1 on   
the common occasions of life4 ,the rules
 of art do not attempt to comprise more 
conditions than require to be attended  
to in ordinary cases2 and are therefore 
always imperfect4 ,in the manual arts1  
where the requisite conditions are not  
numerous1 and where those which the     

rules do not specify are generally      
either plain to common observation or   
speedily learnt from practice1 rules may
 often be safely acted on by persons who
 know nothing more than the rule4 ,but  
in the complicated affairs of life1 and 
still more in those of states and       
societies1 rules cannot be relied on1   
without constantly referring back to the
 scientific laws on which they are      
founded4 ,to know what are the practical
 contingencies which require a          
modification of the rule1 or which are  
altogether exceptions to it1 is to know 
what combinations of circumstances would
 interfere with1 or entirely counteract1
 the consequences of those laws3 and    
this can only be learnt by a reference  
to the theoretic grounds of the rule4   
,by a wise practitioner1 therefore1     
rules of conduct will only be considered
 as provisional4 ,being made for the    
most numerous cases1 or for those of    
most ordinary occurrence1 they point out
 the manner in which it will be least   

perilous to act1 where time or means do 
not exist for analysing the actual      
circumstances of the case1 or where we  
cannot trust our judgment in estimating 
them4 ,but they do not at all supersede 
the propriety of going through 7when    
circumstances permit7 the scientific    
process requisite for framing a rule    
from the data of the particular case    
before us4 ,at the same time1 the common
 rule may very properly serve as an     
admonition that a certain mode of action
 has been found by ourselves and others 
to be well adapted to the cases of most 
common occurrence2 so that if it be     
unsuitable to the case in hand1 the     
reason of its being so will be likely to
 arise from some unusual circumstance4  
#d4 ,the error is therefore apparent1 of
 those who would deduce the line of     
conduct proper to particular cases1 from
 supposed universal practical maxims2   
overlooking the necessity of constantly 
referring back to the principles of the 
speculative science1 in order to be sure

 of attaining even the specific end     
which the rules have in view4 ,how much 
greater still1 then1 must the error be1 
of setting up such unbending principles1
 not merely as universal rules for      
attaining a given end1 but as rules of  
conduct generally2 without regard to the
 possibility1 not only that some        
modifying cause may prevent the         
attainment of the given end by the means
 which the rule prescribes1 but that    
success itself may conflict with some   
other end1 which may possibly chance to 
be more desirable4  ,this is the        
habitual error of many of the political 
speculators whom ,i have characterized  
as the geometrical school2 especially in
 ,france1 where ratiocination from rules
 of practice forms the staple commodity 
of journalism and political oratory2 a  
misapprehension of the functions of     
,deduction which has brought much       
discredit1 in the estimation of other   
countries1 upon the spirit of           
generalization so honourably            

characteristic of the ,french mind4 ,the
 common-places of politics1 in ,france1 
are large and sweeping practical maxims1
 from which1 as ultimate premises1 men  
reason downwards to particular          
applications1 and this they call being  
logical and consistent4 ,for instance1  
they are perpetually arguing that such  
and such a measure ought to be adopted1 
because it is a consequence of the      
principle on which the form of          
government is founded2 of the principle 
of legitimacy1 or the principle of the  
sovereignty of the people4 ,to which it 
may be answered1 that if these be really
 practical principles1 they must rest on
 speculative grounds2 the sovereignty of
 the people 7for example7 must be a     
right foundation for government1 because
 a government thus constituted tends to 
produce certain beneficial effects4     
,inasmuch1 however1 as no government    
produces all possible beneficial        
effects1 but all are attended with more 
or fewer inconveniences2 and since these

 cannot usually be combated by means    
drawn from the very causes which produce
 them2 it would be often a much stronger
 recommendation of some practical       
arrangement1 that it does not follow    
from what is called the general         
principle of the government1 than that  
it does4 ,under a government of         
legitimacy1 the presumption is far      
rather in favour of institutions of     
popular origin2 and in a democracy1 in  
favour of arrangements tending to check 
the impetus of popular will4 ,the line  
of argumentation so commonly mistaken in
 ,france for political philosophy1 tends
 to the practical conclusion that we    
should exert our utmost efforts to      
aggravate1 instead of alleviating1      
whatever are the characteristic         
imperfections of the system of          
institutions which we prefer1 or under  
which we happen to live4    #e4 ,the    
grounds1 then1 of every rule of art1 are
 to be found in the theorems of science4
 ,an art1 or a body of art1 consists of 

the rules1 together with as much of the 
speculative propositions as comprises   
the justification of those rules4 ,the  
complete art of any matter1 includes a  
selection of such a portion from the    
science1 as is necessary to show on what
 conditions the effects1 which the art  
aims at producing1 depend4 ,and ,art in 
general1 consists of the truths of      
,science1 arranged in the most          
convenient order for practice1 instead  
of the order which is the most          
convenient for thought4 ,science groups 
and arranges its truths1 so as to enable
 us to take in at one view as much as   
possible of the general order of the    
universe4 ,art1 though it must assume   
the same general laws1 follows them only
 into such of their detailed            
consequences as have led to the         
formation of rules of conduct2 and      
brings together from parts of the field 
of science most remote from one another1
 the truths relating to the production  
of the different and heterogeneous      

conditions necessary to each effect     
which the exigencies of practical life  
require to be produced4  ,science1      
therefore1 following one cause to its   
various effects1 while art traces one   
effect to its multiplied and diversified
 causes and conditions2 there is need of
 a set of intermediate scientific       
truths1 derived from the higher         
generalities of science1 and destined to
 serve as the generalia or first        
principles of the various arts4 ,the    
scientific operation of framing these   
intermediate principles1 ,m4 ,comte     
characterizes as one of those results of
 philosophy which are reserved for      
futurity4 ,the only complete example    
which he points out as actually         
realized1 and which can be held up as a 
type to be imitated in more important   
matters1 is the general theory of the   
art of ,descriptive ,geometry1 as       
conceived by ,m4 ,monge4 ,it is not1    
however1 difficult to understand what   
the nature of these intermediate        

principles must generally be4 ,after    
framing the most comprehensive possible 
conception of the end to be aimed at1   
that is1 of the effect to be produced1  
and determining in the same             
comprehensive manner the set of         
conditions on which that effect depends2
 there remains to be taken1 a general   
survey of the resources which can be    
commanded for realizing this set of     
conditions2 and when the result of this 
survey has been embodied in the fewest  
and most extensive propositions         
possible1 those propositions will       
express the general relation between the
 available means and the end1 and will  
constitute the general scientific theory
 of the art2 from which its practical   
methods will follow as corollaries4     
#f4 ,but though the reasonings which    
connect the end or purpose of every art 
with its means1 belong to the domain of 
,science1 the definition of the end     
itself belongs exclusively to ,art1 and 
forms its peculiar province4 ,every art 

has one first principle1 or general     
major premise1 not borrowed from        
science2 that which enunciates the      
object aimed at1 and affirms it to be a 
desirable object4 ,the builder's art    
assumes that it is desirable to have    
buildings2 architecture 7as one of the  
fine arts71 that it is desirable to have
 them beautiful or imposing4 ,the       
hygienic and medical arts assume1 the   
one that the preservation of health1 the
 other that the cure of disease1 are    
fitting and desirable ends4 ,these are  
not propositions of science4            
,propositions of science assert a matter
 of fact3 an existence1 a coexistence1 a
 succession1 or a resemblance4 ,the     
propositions now spoken of do not assert
 that anything is1 but enjoin or        
recommend that something should be4     
,they are a class by themselves4 ,a     
proposition of which the predicate is   
expressed1 by the words ought or should 
be1 is generically different from one   
which is expressed by is1 or will be4   

,it is true that1 in the largest sense  
of the words1 even these propositions   
assert something as a matter of fact4   
,the fact affirmed in them is1 that the 
conduct recommended excites in the      
speaker's mind the feeling of           
approbation4 ,this1 however1 does not go
 to the bottom of the matter2 for the   
speaker's approbation is no sufficient  
reason why other people should approve2 
nor ought it to be a conclusive reason  
even with himself4 ,for the purposes of 
practice1 every one must be required to 
justify his approbation3 and for this   
there is need of general premises1      
determining what are the proper objects 
of approbation1 and what the proper     
order of precedence among those objects4
  ,these general premises1 together with
 the principal conclusions which may be 
deduced from them1 form 7or rather might
 form7 a body of doctrine1 which is     
properly the ,art of ,life1 in its three
 departments1 ,morality1 ,prudence or   
,policy1 and sthetics2 the ,right1 the  

,expedient1 and the ,beautiful or       
,noble1 in human conduct and works4 ,to 
this art1 7which1 in the main1 is       
unfortunately still to be created17 all 
other arts are subordinate2 since its   
principles are those which must         
determine whether the special aim of any
 particular art is worthy and desirable1
 and what is its place in the scale of  
desirable things4 ,every art is thus a  
joint result of laws of nature disclosed
 by science1 and of the general         
principles of what has been called      
,teleology1 or the ,doctrine of         
,ends2#bj which1 borrowing the language 
of the ,german metaphysicians1 may also 
be termed1 not improperly1 the          
,principles of ,practical ,reason4  ,a  
scientific observer or reasoner1 merely 
as such1 is not an adviser for practice4
 ,his part is only to show that certain 
consequences follow from certain causes1
 and that to obtain certain ends1       
certain means are the most effectual4   
,whether the ends themselves are such as

 ought to be pursued1 and if so1 in what
 cases and to how great a length1 it is 
no part of his business as a cultivator 
of science to decide1 and science alone 
will never qualify him for the decision4
 ,in purely physical science1 there is  
not much temptation to assume this      
ulterior office2 but those who treat of 
human nature and society invariably     
claim it2 they always undertake to say1 
not merely what is1 but what ought to   
be4 ,to entitle them to do this1 a      
complete doctrine of ,teleology is      
indispensable4 ,a scientific theory1    
however perfect1 of the subject matter1 
considered merely as part of the order  
of nature1 can in no degree serve as a  
substitute4 ,in this respect the various
 subordinate arts afford a misleading   
analogy4 ,in them there is seldom any   
visible necessity for justifying the    
end1 since in general its desirableness 
is denied by nobody1 and it is only when
 the question of precedence is to be    
decided between that end and some other1

 that the general principles of         
,teleology have to be called in3 but a  
writer on ,morals and ,politics requires
 those principles at every step4 ,the   
most elaborate and well-digested        
exposition of the laws of succession and
 coexistence among mental or social     
phenomena1 and of their relation to one 
another as causes and effects1 will be  
of no avail towards the art of ,life or 
of ,society1 if the ends to be aimed at 
by that art are left to the vague       
suggestions of the intellectus sibi     
permissus1 or are taken for granted     
without analysis or questioning4    #g4 
,there is1 then1 a ,philosophia ,prima  
peculiar to ,art1 as there is one which 
belongs to ,science4 ,there are not only
 first principles of ,knowledge1 but    
first principles of ,conduct4 ,there    
must be some standard by which to       
determine the goodness or badness1      
absolute and comparative1 of ends1 or   
objects of desire4 ,and whatever that   
standard is1 there can be but one3 for  

if there were several ultimate          
principles of conduct1 the same conduct 
might be approved by one of those       
principles and condemned by another2 and
 there would be needed some more general
 principle1 as umpire between them4     
,accordingly1 writers on moral          
philosophy have mostly felt the         
necessity not only of referring all     
rules of conduct1 and all judgments of  
praise and blame1 to principles1 but of 
referring them to some one principle2   
some rule1 or standard1 with which all  
other rules of conduct were required to 
be consistent1 and from which by        
ultimate consequence they could all be  
deduced4 ,those who have dispensed with 
the assumption of such an universal     
standard1 have only been enabled to do  
so by supposing that a moral sense1 or  
instinct1 inherent in our constitution1 
informs us1 both what principles of     
conduct we are bound to observe1 and    
also in what order these should be      
subordinated to one another4  ,the      

theory of the foundations of morality is
 a subject which it would be out of     
place1 in a work like this1 to discuss  
at large1 and which could not to any    
useful purpose be treated incidentally4 
,i shall content myself therefore with  
saying1 that the doctrine of intuitive  
moral principles1 even if true1 would   
provide only for that portion of the    
field of conduct which is properly      
called moral4 ,for the remainder of the 
practice of life some general principle1
 or standard1 must still be sought2 and 
if that principle be rightly chosen1 it 
will be found1 ,i apprehend1 to serve   
quite as well for the ultimate principle
 of ,morality1 as for that of ,prudence1
 ,policy1 or ,taste4  ,without          
attempting in this place to justify my  
opinion1 or even to define the kind of  
justification which it admits of1 ,i    
merely declare my conviction1 that the  
general principle to which all rules of 
practice ought to conform1 and the test 
by which they should be tried1 is that  

of conduciveness to the happiness of    
mankind1 or rather1 of all sentient     
beings3 in other words1 that the        
promotion of happiness is the ultimate  
principle of ,teleology4#ba  ,i do not  
mean to assert that the promotion of    
happiness should be itself the end of   
all actions1 or even of all rules of    
action4 ,it is the justification1 and   
ought to be the controller1 of all ends1
 but is not itself the sole end4 ,there 
are many virtuous actions1 and even     
virtuous modes of action 7though the    
cases are1 ,i think1 less frequent than 
is often supposed7 by which happiness in
 the particular instance is sacrificed1 
more pain being produced than pleasure4 
,but conduct of which this can be truly 
asserted1 admits of justification only  
because it can be shown that on the     
whole more happiness will exist in the  
world1 if feelings are cultivated which 
will make people1 in certain cases1     
regardless of happiness4 ,i fully admit 
that this is true3 that the cultivation 

of an ideal nobleness of will and       
conduct1 should be to individual human  
beings an end1 to which the specific    
pursuit either of their own happiness or
 of that of others 7except so far as    
included in that idea7 should1 in any   
case of conflict1 give way4 ,but ,i hold
 that the very question1 what           
constitutes this elevation of character1
 is itself to be decided by a reference 
to happiness as the standard4 ,the      
character itself should be1 to the      
individual1 a paramount end1 simply     
because the existence of this ideal     
nobleness of character1 or of a near    
approach to it1 in any abundance1 would 
go further than all things else towards 
making human life happy2 both in the    
comparatively humble sense1 of pleasure 
and freedom from pain1 and in the higher
 meaning1 of rendering life1 not what it
 now is almost universally1 puerile and 
insignificant--but such as human beings 
with highly developed faculties can care
 to have4    #h4 ,with these remarks we 

must close this summary view of the     
application of the general logic of     
scientific inquiry to the moral and     
social departments of science4          
,notwithstanding the extreme generality 
of the principles of method which ,i    
have laid down1 7a generality which1 ,i 
trust1 is not1 in this instance1        
synonymous with vagueness7 ,i have      
indulged the hope that to some of those 
on whom the task will devolve of        
bringing those most important of all    
sciences into a more satisfactory state1
 these observations may be useful2 both 
in removing erroneous1 and in clearing  
up the true1 conceptions of the means by
 which1 on subjects of so high a degree 
of complication1 truth can be attained4 
,should this hope be realized1 what is  
probably destined to be the great       
intellectual achievement of the next two
 or three generations of ,european      
thinkers will have been in some degree  
forwarded4  ,,footnotes3  #a ,some      
arguments and explanations1             

supplementary to those in the text1 will
 be found in ,an ,examination of ,sir   
,william ,hamilton's ,philosophy1 chap4 
xxvi4  #b ,supra1 p4 #acg4  #c ,when    
this chapter was written1 ,mr4 ,bain had
 not yet published even the first part  
7,the ,senses and the ,intellect7 of his
 profound ,treatise on the ,mind4 ,in   
this1 the laws of association have been 
more comprehensively stated and more    
largely exemplified than by any previous
 writer2 and the work1 having been      
completed by the publication of ,the    
,emotions and the ,will1 may now be     
referred to as incomparably the most    
complete analytical exposition of the   
mental phenomena1 on the basis of a     
legitimate ,induction1 which has yet    
been produced4  ,many striking          
applications of the laws of association 
to the explanation of complex mental    
phenomena1 are also to be found in ,mr4 
,herbert ,spencer's ,principles of      
,psychology4  #d ,in the case of the    
moral sentiments the place of direct    

experiment is to a considerable extent  
supplied by historical experience1 and  
we are able to trace with a tolerable   
approach to certainty the particular    
associations by which those sentiments  
are engendered4 ,this has been          
attempted1 so far as respects the       
sentiment of justice1 in a little work  
by the present author1 entitled         
,utilitarianism4  #e ,the most          
favourable cases for making such        
approximate generalizations are what may
 be termed collective instances2 where  
we are fortunately enabled to see the   
whole class respecting which we are     
inquiring1 in action at once2 and1 from 
the qualities displayed by the          
collective body1 are able to judge what 
must be the qualities of the majority of
 the individuals composing it4 ,thus the
 character of a nation is shown in its  
acts as a nation2 not so much in the    
acts of its government1 for those are   
much influenced by other causes2 but in 
the current popular maxims1 and other   

marks of the general direction of public
 opinion2 in the character of the       
persons or writings that are held in    
permanent esteem or admiration2 in laws 
and institutions1 so far as they are the
 work of the nation itself1 or are      
acknowledged and supported by it2 and so
 forth4 ,but even here there is a large 
margin of doubt and uncertainty4 ,these 
things are liable to be influenced by   
many circumstances3 they are partly     
determined by the distinctive qualities 
of that nation or body of persons1 but  
partly also by external causes which    
would influence any other body of       
persons in the same manner4 ,in order1  
therefore1 to make the experiment really
 complete1 we ought to be able to try it
 without variation upon other nations3  
to try how ,englishmen would act or feel
 if placed in the same circumstances in 
which we have supposed ,frenchmen to be 
placed2 to apply1 in short1 the ,method 
of ,difference as well as that of       
,agreement4 ,now these experiments we   

cannot try1 nor even approximate to4  #f
 ,to which1 says ,dr4 ,whewell1 we may  
add1 that it is certain from the history
 of the subject1 that in that case the  
hypothesis would never have been framed 
at all4  ,dr4 ,whewell 7,philosophy of  
,discovery1 pp4 #bgg-bhb7 defends       
,bacon's rule against the preceding     
strictures4 ,but his defence consists   
only in asserting and exemplifying a    
proposition which ,i had myself stated1 
viz4 that though the largest            
generalizations may be the earliest     
made1 they are not at first seen in     
their entire generality1 but acquire it 
by degrees1 as they are found to explain
 one class after another of phenomena4  
,the laws of motion1 for example1 were  
not known to extend to the celestial    
regions1 until the motions of the       
celestial bodies had been deduced from  
them4 ,this however does not in any way 
affect the fact1 that the middle        
principles of astronomy1 the central    
force for example1 and the law of the   

inverse square1 could not have been     
discovered1 if the laws of motion1 which
 are so much more universal1 had not    
been known first4 ,on ,bacon's system of
 step-by-step generalization1 it would  
be impossible in any science to ascend  
higher than the empirical laws2 a remark
 which ,dr4 ,whewell's own ,inductive   
,tables1 referred to by him in support  
of his argument1 amply bear out4  #g    
,vol4 i4 p4 #did to the end of the      
chapter4  #h ,biographia ,literaria1 i4 
#bad4  #i ,supra1 vol4 i4 p4 #ejj4  #aj 
,essays on some ,unsettled ,questions of
 ,political ,economy1 pp4 #acg-adj4  #aa
 ,the quotations in this paragraph are  
from a paper written by the author1 and 
published in a periodical in #ahcd4  #ab
 ,cours de ,philosophie ,positive1 iv4  
#cbe-i4  #ac ,since reprinted entire in 
,dissertations and ,discussions1 as the 
concluding paper of the first volume4   
#ad ,this great generalization is often 
unfavourably criticised 7as by ,dr4     
,whewell for instance7 under a          

misapprehension of its real import4 ,the
 doctrine1 that the theological         
explanation of phenomena belongs only to
 the infancy of our knowledge of them1  
ought not to be construed as if it was  
equivalent to the assertion1 that       
mankind1 as their knowledge advances1   
will necessarily cease to believe in any
 kind of theology4 ,this was ,m4        
,comte's opinion2 but it is by no means 
implied in his fundamental theorem4 ,all
 that is implied is1 that in an advanced
 state of human knowledge1 no other     
,ruler of the ,world will be            
acknowledged than one who rules by      
universal laws1 and does not at all1 or 
does not unless in very peculiar cases1 
produce events by special               
interpositions4 ,originally all natural 
events were ascribed to such            
interpositions4 ,at present every       
educated person rejects this explanation
 in regard to all classes of phenomena  
of which the laws have been fully       
ascertained2 though some have not yet   

reached the point of referring all      
phenomena to the idea of ,law1 but      
believe that rain and sunshine1 famine  
and pestilence1 victory and defeat1     
death and life1 are issues which the    
,creator does not leave to the operation
 of his general laws1 but reserves to be
 decided by express acts of volition4   
,m4 ,comte's theory is the negation of  
this doctrine4  ,dr4 ,whewell equally   
misunderstands ,m4 ,comte's doctrine    
respecting the second1 or metaphysical  
stage of speculation4 ,m4 ,comte did not
 mean that discussions concerning ideas 
are limited to an early stage of        
inquiry1 and cease when science enters  
into the positive stage4 7,philosophy of
 ,discovery1 pp4 #bbf et seq47 ,in all  
,m4 ,comte's speculations as much stress
 is laid on the process of clearing up  
our conceptions1 as on the ascertainment
 of facts4 ,when ,m4 ,comte speaks of   
the metaphysical stage of speculation1  
he means the stage in which men speak of
 ,nature and other abstractions as if   

they were active forces1 producing      
effects2 when ,nature is said to do     
this1 or forbid that2 when ,nature's    
horror of a vacuum1 ,nature's           
non-admission of a break1 ,nature's vis 
medicatrix1 were offered as explanations
 of phenomena2 when the qualities of    
things were mistaken for real entities  
dwelling in the things2 when the        
phenomena of living bodies were thought 
to be accounted for by being referred to
 a vital force2 when1 in short1 the     
abstract names of phenomena were        
mistaken for the causes of their        
existence4 ,in this sense of the word it
 cannot be reasonably denied that the   
metaphysical explanation of phenomena1  
equally with the theological1 gives way 
before the advance of real science4     
,that the final1 or positive stage1 as  
conceived by ,m4 ,comte1 has been       
equally misunderstood1 and that1        
notwithstanding some expressions open to
 just criticism1 ,m4 ,comte never       
dreamed of denying the legitimacy of    

inquiry into all causes which are       
accessible to human investigation1 ,i   
have pointed out in a former place4  #ae
 ,buckle's ,history of ,civilization1 i4
 #cj4  #af ,i have been assured by an   
intimate friend of ,mr4 ,buckle that he 
would not have withheld his assent from 
these remarks1 and that he never        
intended to affirm or imply that mankind
 are not progressive in their moral as  
well as in their intellectual qualities4
 ,in dealing with his problem1 he       
availed himself of the artifice resorted
 to by the ,political ,economist1 who   
leaves out of consideration the generous
 and benevolent sentiments1 and founds  
his science on the proposition that     
mankind are actuated by acquisitive     
propensities alone1 not because such is 
the fact1 but because it is necessary to
 begin by treating the principal        
influence as if it was the sole one1 and
 make the due corrections afterwards4   
,he desired to make abstraction of the  
intellect as the determining and        

dynamical element of the progression1   
eliminating the more dependent set of   
conditions1 and treating the more active
 one as if it were an entirely          
independent variable4  ,the same friend 
of ,mr4 ,buckle states that when he used
 expressions which seemed to exaggerate 
the influence of general at the expense 
of special causes1 and especially at the
 expense of the influence of individual 
minds1 ,mr4 ,buckle really intended no  
more than to affirm emphatically that   
the greatest men cannot effect great    
changes in human affairs unless the     
general mind has been in some           
considerable degree prepared for them by
 the general circumstances of the age2 a
 truth which1 of course1 no one thinks  
of denying4 ,and there certainly are    
passages in ,mr4 ,buckle's writings     
which speak of the influence exercised  
by great individual intellects in as    
strong terms as could be desired4  #ag  
,essay on ,dryden1 in ,miscellaneous    
,writings1 i4 #ahf4  #ah ,in the        

,cornhill ,magazine for ,june and ,july 
#ahfa4  #ai ,it is almost superfluous to
 observe1 that there is another meaning 
of the word ,art1 in which it may be    
said to denote the poetical department  
or aspect of things in general1 in      
contradistinction to the scientific4 ,in
 the text1 the word is used in its      
older1 and ,i hope1 not yet obsolete    
sense4  #bj ,the word ,teleology is     
also1 but inconveniently and improperly1
 employed by some writers as a name for 
the attempt to explain the phenomena of 
the universe from final causes4  #ba    
,for an express discussion and          
vindication of this principle1 see the  
little volume entitled ,utilitarianism4 
,,the ,,end4     ,transcriber's ,notes4 
,spelling irregularities where there was
 no obviously preferred version were    
left as is4 ,variants include3          
cotemporary and contemporary2           
commonplaces and common-places2         
dependents and dependants2 dreamed and  
dreamt2 derivatives of enclose and      

inclose2 e4 g4 and e4g42 i4 e4 and i4e42
 misestimate and mis-estimate2 recal and
 recall 7and derivatives72 derivatives  
of paraphrase and periphrase2 subclass  
and sub-class 7and derivatives74        
,changed ,phemomena to ,phenomena on    
page xv3 ,successions of ,social        
,phenomena4  ,changed page reference for
 section #d of ,chapter ,,xi on page xv 
of the ,table of ,contents from #eci to 
#edj4  ,changed oberved to observed on  
page #ag3 the observed facts4  ,a       
closing double quotation mark is missing
 on page #ag4 ,it was added after the   
sentence that ends with object of the   
inquiry4  ,changed neverthless to       
nevertheless on page #ajd3 phenomena    
would nevertheless4  ,for the           
mathematical formulas appearing on pages
 #aeb and #aec3 parentheses were added  
to make the linear form of the formula  
correct2 and the radical sign was       
replaced by root of4 ,the equal sign was
 preserved in arc 7sin  x71 although it 
makes more sense without it4  ,page #bdj

 contains the word ',squire4 ,it        
intentionally begins with an apostrophe1
 not an unmatched single quotation mark1
 and was left as originally printed4    
,changed eupiditatibus to cupiditatibus 
on page #dja3 de cupiditatibus          
finiendis4 ,and shortly thereafter1     
changed eupiditas to cupiditas3 ,an     
potest cupiditas finiri4 ,and then a bit
 further on1 changed he to hc3 hc       
desideria natur4