,on ,liberty4 ,by ,john ,stuart ,mill4 ,with an ,introduction by ,w4 ,l4 ,courtney1 ,,ll4,d4 ,the ,walter ,scott ,publishing ,co41 ,ltd4 ,london and ,felling-on-,tyne ,new ,york and ,melbourne ,to the beloved and deplored memory of her who was the inspirer1 and in part the author1 of all that is best in my writings--the friend and wife whose exalted sense of truth and right was my strongest incitement1 and whose approbation was my chief reward--,i dedicate this volume4 ,like all that ,i have written for many years1 it belongs as much to her as to me2 but the work as it stands has had1 in a very insufficient degree1 the inestimable advantage of her revision2 some of the most important portions having been reserved for a more careful re-examination1 which they are now never destined to receive4 ,were ,i but capable of interpreting to the world one-half the great thoughts and noble feelings which are buried in her grave1 ,i should be the medium of a greater benefit to it than is ever likely to arise from anything that ,i can write1 unprompted and unassisted by her all but unrivalled wisdom4 ,,introduction4 ,i4 ,john ,stuart ,mill was born on #bjth ,may #ahjf4 ,he was a delicate child1 and the extraordinary education designed by his father was not calculated to develop and improve his physical powers4 ,i never was a boy1 he says2 never played cricket4 ,his exercise was taken in the form of walks with his father1 during which the elder ,mill lectured his son and examined him on his work4 ,it is idle to speculate on the possible results of a different treatment4 ,mill remained delicate throughout his life1 but was endowed with that intense mental energy which is so often combined with physical weakness4 ,his youth was sacrificed to an idea2 he was designed by his father to carry on his work2 the individuality of the boy was unimportant4 ,a visit to the south of ,france at the age of fourteen1 in company with the family of ,general ,sir ,samuel ,bentham1 was not without its influence4 ,it was a glimpse of another atmosphere1 though the studious habits of his home life were maintained4 ,moreover1 he derived from it his interest in foreign politics1 which remained one of his characteristics to the end of his life4 ,in #ahbc he was appointed junior clerk in the ,examiners' ,office at the ,india ,house4 ,mill's first essays were written in the ,traveller about a year before he entered the ,india ,house4 ,from that time forward his literary work was uninterrupted save by attacks of illness4 ,his industry was stupendous4 ,he wrote articles on an infinite variety of subjects1 political1 metaphysical1 philosophic1 religious1 poetical4 ,he discovered ,tennyson for his generation1 he influenced the writing of ,carlyle's ,french ,revolution as well as its success4 ,and all the while he was engaged in studying and preparing for his more ambitious works1 while he rose step by step at the ,india ,office4 ,his ,essays on ,unsettled ,questions in ,political ,economy were written in #ahca1 although they did not appear until thirteen years later4 ,his ,system of ,logic1 the design of which was even then fashioning itself in his brain1 took thirteen years to complete1 and was actually published before the ,political ,economy4 ,in #ahdd appeared the article on ,michelet1 which its author anticipated would cause some discussion1 but which did not create the sensation he expected4 ,next year there were the ,claims of ,labour and ,guizot1 and in #ahdg his articles on ,irish affairs in the ,morning ,chronicle4 ,these years were very much influenced by his friendship and correspondence with ,comte1 a curious comradeship between men of such different temperament4 ,in #ahdh ,mill published his ,political ,economy1 to which he had given his serious study since the completion of his ,logic4 ,his articles and reviews1 though they involved a good deal of work--as1 for instance1 the re-perusal of the ,iliad and the ,odyssey in the original before reviewing ,grote's ,greece--were recreation to the student4 ,the year #ahef saw him head of the ,examiners' ,office in the ,india ,house1 and another two years brought the end of his official work1 owing to the transfer of ,india to the ,crown4 ,in the same year his wife died4 ,liberty was published shortly after1 as well as the ,thoughts on ,parliamentary ,reform1 and no year passed without ,mill making important contributions on the political1 philosophical1 and ethical questions of the day4 ,seven years after the death of his wife1 ,mill was invited to contest ,westminster4 ,his feeling on the conduct of elections made him refuse to take any personal action in the matter1 and he gave the frankest expression to his political views1 but nevertheless he was elected by a large majority4 ,he was not a conventional success in the ,house2 as a speaker he lacked magnetism4 ,but his influence was widely felt4 ,for the sake of the ,house of ,commons at large1 said ,mr4 ,gladstone1 ,i rejoiced in his advent and deplored his disappearance4 ,he did us all good4 ,after only three years in ,parliament1 he was defeated at the next ,general ,election by ,mr4 ,w4 ,h4 ,smith4 ,he retired to ,avignon1 to the pleasant little house where the happiest years of his life had been spent in the companionship of his wife1 and continued his disinterested labours4 ,he completed his edition of his father's ,analysis of the ,mind1 and also produced1 in addition to less important work1 ,the ,subjection of ,women1 in which he had the active co-operation of his step-daughter4 ,a book on ,socialism was under consideration1 but1 like an earlier study of ,sociology1 it never was written4 ,he died in #ahgc1 his last years being spent peacefully in the pleasant society of his step-daughter1 from whose tender care and earnest intellectual sympathy he caught maybe a far-off reflection of the light which had irradiated his spiritual life4 ,,ii4 ,the circumstances under which ,john ,stuart ,mill wrote his ,liberty are largely connected with the influence which ,mrs4 ,taylor wielded over his career4 ,the dedication is well known4 ,it contains the most extraordinary panegyric on a woman that any philosopher has ever penned4 ,were ,i but capable of interpreting to the world one-half the great thoughts and noble feelings which are buried in her grave1 ,i should be the medium of a greater benefit to it than is ever likely to arise from anything that ,i can write1 unprompted and unassisted by her all but unrivalled wisdom4 ,it is easy for the ordinary worldly cynicism to curl a sceptical lip over sentences like these4 ,there may be exaggeration of sentiment1 the necessary and inevitable reaction of a man who was trained according to the dry light of so unimpressionable a man as ,james ,mill1 the father2 but the passage quoted is not the only one in which ,john ,stuart ,mill proclaims his unhesitating belief in the intellectual influence of his wife4 ,the treatise on ,liberty was written especially under her authority and encouragement1 but there are many earlier references to the power which she exercised over his mind4 ,mill was introduced to her as early as #ahca1 at a dinner-party at ,mr4 ,taylor's house1 where were present1 amongst others1 ,roebuck1 ,w4 ,j4 ,fox1 and ,miss ,harriet ,martineau4 ,the acquaintance rapidly ripened into intimacy and the intimacy into friendship1 and ,mill was never weary of expatiating on all the advantages of so singular a relationship4 ,in some of the presentation copies of his work on ,political ,economy1 he wrote the following dedication3--,to ,mrs4 ,john ,taylor1 who1 of all persons known to the author1 is the most highly qualified either to originate or to appreciate speculation on social advancement1 this work is with the highest respect and esteem dedicated4 ,an article on the enfranchisement of women was made the occasion for another encomium4 ,we shall hardly be wrong in attributing a much later book1 ,the ,subjection of ,women1 published in #ahfi1 to the influence wielded by ,mrs4 ,taylor4 ,finally1 the pages of the ,autobiography ring with the dithyrambic praise of his almost infallible counsellor4 ,the facts of this remarkable intimacy can easily be stated4 ,the deductions are more difficult4 ,there is no question that ,mill's infatuation was the cause of considerable trouble to his acquaintances and friends4 ,his father openly taxed him with being in love with another man's wife4 ,roebuck1 ,mrs4 ,grote1 ,mrs4 ,austin1 ,miss ,harriet ,martineau were amongst those who suffered because they made some allusion to a forbidden subject4 ,mrs4 ,taylor lived with her daughter in a lodging in the country2 but in #ahea her husband died1 and then ,mill made her his wife4 ,opinions were widely divergent as to her merits2 but every one agreed that up to the time of her death1 in #aheh1 ,mill was wholly lost to his friends4 ,george ,mill1 one of ,mill's younger brothers1 gave it as his opinion that she was a clever and remarkable woman1 but nothing like what ,john took her to be4 ,carlyle1 in his reminiscences1 described her with ambiguous epithets4 ,she was vivid1 iridescent1 pale and passionate and sad-looking1 a living-romance heroine of the royalist volition and questionable destiny4 ,it is not possible to make much of a judgment like this1 but we get on more certain ground when we discover that ,mrs4 ,carlyle said on one occasion that she is thought to be dangerous1 and that ,carlyle added that she was worse than dangerous1 she was patronising4 ,the occasion when ,mill and his wife were brought into close contact with the ,carlyles is well known4 ,the manuscript of the first volume of the ,french ,revolution had been lent to ,mill1 and was accidentally burnt by ,mrs4 ,mill's servant4 ,mill and his wife drove up to ,carlyle's door1 the wife speechless1 the husband so full of conversation that he detained ,carlyle with desperate attempts at loquacity for two hours4 ,but ,dr4 ,garnett tells us1 in his ,life of ,carlyle1 that ,mill made a substantial reparation for the calamity for which he was responsible by inducing the aggrieved author to accept half of the #bjj which he offered4 ,mrs4 ,mill1 as ,i have said1 died in #aheh1 after seven years of happy companionship with her husband1 and was buried at ,avignon4 ,the inscription which ,mill wrote for her grave is too characteristic to be omitted3--,her great and loving heart1 her noble soul1 her clear1 powerful1 original1 and comprehensive intellect1 made her the guide and support1 the instructor in wisdom and the example in goodness1 as she was the sole earthly delight of those who had the happiness to belong to her4 ,as earnest for all public good as she was generous and devoted to all who surrounded her1 her influence has been felt in many of the greatest improvements of the age1 and will be in those still to come4 ,were there even a few hearts and intellects like hers1 this earth would already become the hoped-for ,heaven4 ,these lines prove the intensity of ,mill's feeling1 which is not afraid of abundant verbiage2 but they also prove that he could not imagine what the effect would be on others1 and1 as ,grote said1 only ,mill's reputation could survive these and similar displays4 ,every one will judge for himself of this romantic episode in ,mill's career1 according to such experience as he may possess of the philosophic mind and of the value of these curious but not infrequent relationships4 ,it may have been a piece of infatuation1 or1 if we prefer to say so1 it may have been the most gracious and the most human page in ,mill's career4 ,mrs4 ,mill may have flattered her husband's vanity by echoing his opinions1 or she may have indeed been an ,egeria1 full of inspiration and intellectual helpfulness4 ,what usually happens in these cases1--although the philosopher himself1 through his belief in the equality of the sexes1 was debarred from thinking so1--is the extremely valuable action and reaction of two different classes and orders of mind4 ,to any one whose thoughts have been occupied with the sphere of abstract speculation1 the lively and vivid presentment of concrete fact comes as a delightful and agreeable shock4 ,the instinct of the woman often enables her not only to apprehend but to illustrate a truth for which she would be totally unable to give the adequate philosophic reasoning4 ,on the other hand1 the man1 with the more careful logical methods and the slow processes of formal reasoning1 is apt to suppose that the happy intuition which leaps to the conclusion is really based on the intellectual processes of which he is conscious in his own case4 ,thus both parties to the happy contract are equally pleased4 ,the abstract truth gets the concrete illustration2 the concrete illustration finds its proper foundation in a series of abstract inquiries4 ,perhaps ,carlyle's epithets of iridescent and vivid refer incidentally to ,mrs4 ,mill's quick perceptiveness1 and thus throw a useful light on the mutual advantages of the common work of husband and wife4 ,but it savours almost of impertinence even to attempt to lift the veil on a mystery like this4 ,it is enough to say1 perhaps1 that however much we may deplore the exaggeration of ,mill's references to his wife1 we recognise that1 for whatever reason1 the pair lived an ideally happy life4 ,it still1 however1 remains to estimate the extent to which ,mrs4 ,taylor1 both before and after her marriage with ,mill1 made actual contributions to his thoughts and his public work4 ,here ,i may be perhaps permitted to avail myself of what ,i have already written in a previous work4#a ,mill gives us abundant help in this matter in the ,autobiography4 ,when first he knew her1 his thoughts were turning to the subject of ,logic4 ,but his published work on the subject owed nothing to her1 he tells us1 in its doctrines4 ,it was ,mill's custom to write the whole of a book so as to get his general scheme complete1 and then laboriously to re-write it in order to perfect the phrases and the composition4 ,doubtless ,mrs4 ,taylor was of considerable help to him as a critic of style4 ,but to be a critic of doctrine she was hardly qualified4 ,mill has made some clear admissions on this point4 ,the only actual revolution which has ever taken place in my modes of thinking was already complete1#b he says1 before her influence became paramount4 ,there is a curiously humble estimate of his own powers 7to which ,dr4 ,bain has called attention71 which reads at first sight as if it contradicted this4 ,during the greater part of my literary life ,i have performed the office in relation to her1 which1 from a rather early period1 ,i had considered as the most useful part that ,i was qualified to take in the domain of thought1 that of an interpreter of original thinkers1 and mediator between them and the public4 ,so far it would seem that ,mill had sat at the feet of his oracle2 but observe the highly remarkable exception which is made in the following sentence3--,for ,i had always a humble opinion of my own powers as an original thinker1 except in abstract science 7logic1 metaphysics1 and the theoretic principles of political economy and politics47#c ,if ,mill then was an original thinker in logic1 metaphysics1 and the science of economy and politics1 it is clear that he had not learnt these from her lips4 ,and to most men logic and metaphysics may be safely taken as forming a domain in which originality of thought1 if it can be honestly professed1 is a sufficient title of distinction4 ,mrs4 ,taylor's assistance in the ,political ,economy is confined to certain definite points4 ,the purely scientific part was1 we are assured1 not learnt from her4 ,but it was chiefly her influence which gave to the book that general tone by which it is distinguished from all previous expositions of political economy that had any pretensions to be scientific1 and which has made it so useful in conciliating minds which those previous expositions had repelled4 ,this tone consisted chiefly in making the proper distinction between the laws of the production of wealth1 which are real laws of ,nature1 dependent on the properties of objects1 and the modes of its distribution1 which1 subject to certain conditions1 depend on human will4444 ,i had indeed partially learnt this view of things from the thoughts awakened in me by the speculations of ,st4 ,simonians2 but it was made a living principle1 pervading and animating the book1 by my wife's promptings4#d ,the part which is italicised is noticeable4 ,here1 as elsewhere1 ,mill thinks out the matter by himself2 the concrete form of the thoughts is suggested or prompted by the wife4 ,apart from this general tone1 ,mill tells us that there was a specific contribution4 ,the chapter which has had a greater influence on opinion than all the rest1 that on the ,probable ,future of the ,labouring ,classes1 is entirely due to her4 ,in the first draft of the book that chapter did not exist4 ,she pointed out the need of such a chapter1 and the extreme imperfection of the book without it2 she was the cause of my writing it4 ,from this it would appear that she gave ,mill that tendency to ,socialism which1 while it lends a progressive spirit to his speculations on politics1 at the same time does not manifestly accord with his earlier advocacy of peasant proprietorships4 ,nor1 again1 is it1 on the face of it1 consistent with those doctrines of individual liberty which1 aided by the intellectual companionship of his wife1 he propounded in a later work4 ,the ideal of individual freedom is not the ideal of ,socialism1 just as that invocation of governmental aid to which the ,socialist resorts is not consistent with the theory of laisser-faire4 ,yet ,liberty was planned by ,mill and his wife in concert4 ,perhaps a slight visionariness of speculation was no less the attribute of ,mrs4 ,mill than an absence of rigid logical principles4 ,be this as it may1 she undoubtedly checked the half-recognised leanings of her husband in the direction of ,coleridge and ,carlyle4 ,whether this was an instance of her steadying influence1#e or whether it added one more unassimilated element to ,mill's diverse intellectual sustenance1 may be wisely left an open question4 ,we cannot1 however1 be wrong in attributing to her the parentage of one book of ,mill1 ,the ,subjection of ,women4 ,it is true that ,mill had before learnt that men and women ought to be equal in legal1 political1 social1 and domestic relations4 ,this was a point on which he had already fallen foul of his father's essay on ,government4 ,but ,mrs4 ,taylor had actually written on this very point1 and the warmth and fervour of ,mill's denunciations of women's servitude were unmistakably caught from his wife's view of the practical disabilities entailed by the feminine position4 ,,iii4 ,liberty was published in #ahei1 when the nineteenth century was half over1 but in its general spirit and in some of its special tendencies the little tract belongs rather to the standpoint of the eighteenth century than to that which saw its birth4 ,in many of his speculations ,john ,stuart ,mill forms a sort of connecting link between the doctrines of the earlier ,english empirical school and those which we associate with the name of ,mr4 ,herbert ,spencer4 ,in his ,logic1 for instance1 he represents an advance on the theories of ,hume1 and yet does not see how profoundly the victories of ,science modify the conclusions of the earlier thinker4 ,similarly1 in his ,political ,economy1 he desires to improve and to enlarge upon ,ricardo1 and yet does not advance so far as the modifications of political economy by ,sociology1 indicated by some later--and especially ,german--speculations on the subject4 ,in the tract on ,liberty1 ,mill is advocating the rights of the individual as against ,society at the very opening of an era that was rapidly coming to the conclusion that the individual had no absolute rights against ,society4 ,the eighteenth century view is that individuals existed first1 each with their own special claims and responsibilities2 that they deliberately formed a ,social ,state1 either by a contract or otherwise2 and that then finally they limited their own action out of regard for the interests of the social organism thus arbitrarily produced4 ,this is hardly the view of the nineteenth century4 ,it is possible that logically the individual is prior to the ,state2 historically and in the order of ,nature1 the ,state is prior to the individual4 ,in other words1 such rights as every single personality possesses in a modern world do not belong to him by an original ordinance of ,nature1 but are slowly acquired in the growth and development of the social state4 ,it is not the truth that individual liberties were forfeited by some deliberate act when men made themselves into a ,commonwealth4 ,it is more true to say1 as ,aristotle said long ago1 that man is naturally a political animal1 that he lived under strict social laws as a mere item1 almost a nonentity1 as compared with the ,order1 ,society1 or ,community to which he belonged1 and that such privileges as he subsequently acquired have been obtained in virtue of his growing importance as a member of a growing organisation4 ,but if this is even approximately true1 it seriously restricts that liberty of the individual for which ,mill pleads4 ,the individual has no chance1 because he has no rights1 against the social organism4 ,society can punish him for acts or even opinions which are anti-social in character4 ,his virtue lies in recognising the intimate communion with his fellows4 ,his sphere of activity is bounded by the common interest4 ,just as it is an absurd and exploded theory that all men are originally equal1 so it is an ancient and false doctrine to protest that a man has an individual liberty to live and think as he chooses in any spirit of antagonism to that larger body of which he forms an insignificant part4 ,nowadays this view of ,society and of its development1 which we largely owe to the ,philosophie ,positive of ,m4 ,auguste ,comte1 is so familiar and possibly so damaging to the individual initiative1 that it becomes necessary to advance and proclaim the truth which resides in an opposite theory4 ,all progress1 as we are aware1 depends on the joint process of integration and differentiation2 synthesis1 analysis1 and then a larger synthesis seem to form the law of development4 ,if it ever comes to pass that ,society is tyrannical in its restrictions of the individual1 if1 as for instance in some forms of ,socialism1 based on deceptive analogies of ,nature's dealings1 the type is everything and the individual nothing1 it must be confidently urged in answer that the fuller life of the future depends on the manifold activities1 even though they may be antagonistic1 of the individual4 ,in ,england1 at all events1 we know that government in all its different forms1 whether as ,king1 or as a caste of nobles1 or as an oligarchical plutocracy1 or even as trades unions1 is so dwarfing in its action that1 for the sake of the future1 the individual must revolt4 ,just as our former point of view limited the value of ,mill's treatise on ,liberty1 so these considerations tend to show its eternal importance4 ,the omnipotence of ,society means a dead level of uniformity4 ,the claim of the individual to be heard1 to say what he likes1 to do what he likes1 to live as he likes1 is absolutely necessary1 not only for the variety of elements without which life is poor1 but also for the hope of a future age4 ,so long as individual initiative and effort are recognised as a vital element in ,english history1 so long will ,mill's ,liberty1 which he confesses was based on a suggestion derived from ,von ,humboldt1 remain as an indispensable contribution to the speculations1 and also to the health and sanity1 of the world4 ,what his wife really was to ,mill1 we shall1 perhaps1 never know4 ,but that she was an actual and vivid force1 which roused the latent enthusiasm of his nature1 we have abundant evidence4 ,and when she died at ,avignon1 though his friends may have regained an almost estranged companionship1 ,mill was1 personally1 the poorer4 ,into the sorrow of that bereavement we cannot enter3 we have no right or power to draw the veil4 ,it is enough to quote the simple words1 so eloquent of an unspoken grief--,i can say nothing which could describe1 even in the faintest manner1 what that loss was and is4 ,but because ,i know that she would have wished it1 ,i endeavour to make the best of what life ,i have left1 and to work for her purposes with such diminished strength as can be derived from thoughts of her1 and communion with her memory4 ,w4 ,l4 ,,courtney4 ,,london1 ,july #eth1 #aija4 ,,footnotes3 #a ,life of ,john ,stuart ,mill1 chapter vi4 7,walter ,scott47 #b ,autobiography1 p4 #aij4 #c ,ibid41 p4 #bdb4 #d ,autobiography1 pp4 #bdf1 #bdg4 #e ,cf4 an instructive page in the ,autobiography1 p4 #beb4 ,,contents4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,page ,,introductory #a ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,of ,,the ,,liberty ,,of ,,thought ,,and ,,discussion #bh ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,of ,,individuality1 ,,as ,,one ,,of ,,the ,,elements ,,of ,,well-,,being #ajc ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,of ,,the ,,limits ,,to ,,the ,,authority ,,of ,,society ,,over ,,the ,,individual #adj ,,chapter ,v4 ,,applications #agg ,the grand1 leading principle1 towards which every argument unfolded in these pages directly converges1 is the absolute and essential importance of human development in its richest diversity4--,,wilhelm ,,von ,,humboldt3 ,sphere and ,duties of ,government4 ,,on ,,liberty4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,introductory4 ,the subject of this ,essay is not the so-called ,liberty of the ,will1 so unfortunately opposed to the misnamed doctrine of ,philosophical ,necessity2 but ,civil1 or ,social ,liberty3 the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual4 ,a question seldom stated1 and hardly ever discussed1 in general terms1 but which profoundly influences the practical controversies of the age by its latent presence1 and is likely soon to make itself recognised as the vital question of the future4 ,it is so far from being new1 that in a certain sense1 it has divided mankind1 almost from the remotest ages2 but in the stage of progress into which the more civilised portions of the species have now entered1 it presents itself under new conditions1 and requires a different and more fundamental treatment4 ,the struggle between ,liberty and ,authority is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of history with which we are earliest familiar1 particularly in that of ,greece1 ,rome1 and ,england4 ,but in old times this contest was between subjects1 or some classes of subjects1 and the government4 ,by liberty1 was meant protection against the tyranny of the political rulers4 ,the rulers were conceived 7except in some of the popular governments of ,greece7 as in a necessarily antagonistic position to the people whom they ruled4 ,they consisted of a governing ,one1 or a governing tribe or caste1 who derived their authority from inheritance or conquest1 who1 at all events1 did not hold it at the pleasure of the governed1 and whose supremacy men did not venture1 perhaps did not desire1 to contest1 whatever precautions might be taken against its oppressive exercise4 ,their power was regarded as necessary1 but also as highly dangerous2 as a weapon which they would attempt to use against their subjects1 no less than against external enemies4 ,to prevent the weaker members of the community from being preyed upon by innumerable vultures1 it was needful that there should be an animal of prey stronger than the rest1 commissioned to keep them down4 ,but as the king of the vultures would be no less bent upon preying on the flock than any of the minor harpies1 it was indispensable to be in a perpetual attitude of defence against his beak and claws4 ,the aim1 therefore1 of patriots1 was to set limits to the power which the ruler should be suffered to exercise over the community2 and this limitation was what they meant by liberty4 ,it was attempted in two ways4 ,first1 by obtaining a recognition of certain immunities1 called political liberties or rights1 which it was to be regarded as a breach of duty in the ruler to infringe1 and which if he did infringe1 specific resistance1 or general rebellion1 was held to be justifiable4 ,a second1 and generally a later expedient1 was the establishment of constitutional checks2 by which the consent of the community1 or of a body of some sort1 supposed to represent its interests1 was made a necessary condition to some of the more important acts of the governing power4 ,to the first of these modes of limitation1 the ruling power1 in most ,european countries1 was compelled1 more or less1 to submit4 ,it was not so with the second2 and to attain this1 or when already in some degree possessed1 to attain it more completely1 became everywhere the principal object of the lovers of liberty4 ,and so long as mankind were content to combat one enemy by another1 and to be ruled by a master1 on condition of being guaranteed more or less efficaciously against his tyranny1 they did not carry their aspirations beyond this point4 ,a time1 however1 came1 in the progress of human affairs1 when men ceased to think it a necessity of nature that their governors should be an independent power1 opposed in interest to themselves4 ,it appeared to them much better that the various magistrates of the ,state should be their tenants or delegates1 revocable at their pleasure4 ,in that way alone1 it seemed1 could they have complete security that the powers of government would never be abused to their disadvantage4 ,by degrees1 this new demand for elective and temporary rulers became the prominent object of the exertions of the popular party1 wherever any such party existed2 and superseded1 to a considerable extent1 the previous efforts to limit the power of rulers4 ,as the struggle proceeded for making the ruling power emanate from the periodical choice of the ruled1 some persons began to think that too much importance had been attached to the limitation of the power itself4 ,that 7it might seem7 was a resource against rulers whose interests were habitually opposed to those of the people4 ,what was now wanted was1 that the rulers should be identified with the people2 that their interest and will should be the interest and will of the nation4 ,the nation did not need to be protected against its own will4 ,there was no fear of its tyrannising over itself4 ,let the rulers be effectually responsible to it1 promptly removable by it1 and it could afford to trust them with power of which it could itself dictate the use to be made4 ,their power was but the nation's own power1 concentrated1 and in a form convenient for exercise4 ,this mode of thought1 or rather perhaps of feeling1 was common among the last generation of ,european liberalism1 in the ,continental section of which it still apparently predominates4 ,those who admit any limit to what a government may do1 except in the case of such governments as they think ought not to exist1 stand out as brilliant exceptions among the political thinkers of the ,continent4 ,a similar tone of sentiment might by this time have been prevalent in our own country1 if the circumstances which for a time encouraged it1 had continued unaltered4 ,but1 in political and philosophical theories1 as well as in persons1 success discloses faults and infirmities which failure might have concealed from observation4 ,the notion1 that the people have no need to limit their power over themselves1 might seem axiomatic1 when popular government was a thing only dreamed about1 or read of as having existed at some distant period of the past4 ,neither was that notion necessarily disturbed by such temporary aberrations as those of the ,french ,revolution1 the worst of which were the work of a usurping few1 and which1 in any case1 belonged1 not to the permanent working of popular institutions1 but to a sudden and convulsive outbreak against monarchical and aristocratic despotism4 ,in time1 however1 a democratic republic came to occupy a large portion of the earth's surface1 and made itself felt as one of the most powerful members of the community of nations2 and elective and responsible government became subject to the observations and criticisms which wait upon a great existing fact4 ,it was now perceived that such phrases as self-government1 and the power of the people over themselves1 do not express the true state of the case4 ,the people who exercise the power are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised2 and the self-government spoken of is not the government of each by himself1 but of each by all the rest4 ,the will of the people1 moreover1 practically means1 the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people2 the majority1 or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority3 the people1 consequently1 may desire to oppress a part of their number2 and precautions are as much needed against this1 as against any other abuse of power4 ,the limitation1 therefore1 of the power of government over individuals1 loses none of its importance when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community1 that is1 to the strongest party therein4 ,this view of things1 recommending itself equally to the intelligence of thinkers and to the inclination of those important classes in ,european society to whose real or supposed interests democracy is adverse1 has had no difficulty in establishing itself2 and in political speculations the tyranny of the majority is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be on its guard4 ,like other tyrannies1 the tyranny of the majority was at first1 and is still vulgarly1 held in dread1 chiefly as operating through the acts of the public authorities4 ,but reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant--society collectively1 over the separate individuals who compose it--its means of tyrannising are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries4 ,society can and does execute its own mandates3 and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right1 or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle1 it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression1 since1 though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties1 it leaves fewer means of escape1 penetrating much more deeply into the details of life1 and enslaving the soul itself4 ,protection1 therefore1 against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough3 there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling2 against the tendency of society to impose1 by other means than civil penalties1 its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them2 to fetter the development1 and1 if possible1 prevent the formation1 of any individuality not in harmony with its ways1 and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own4 ,there is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence3 and to find that limit1 and maintain it against encroachment1 is as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs1 as protection against political despotism4 ,but though this proposition is not likely to be contested in general terms1 the practical question1 where to place the limit--how to make the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control--is a subject on which nearly everything remains to be done4 ,all that makes existence valuable to any one1 depends on the enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people4 ,some rules of conduct1 therefore1 must be imposed1 by law in the first place1 and by opinion on many things which are not fit subjects for the operation of law4 ,what these rules should be1 is the principal question in human affairs2 but if we except a few of the most obvious cases1 it is one of those which least progress has been made in resolving4 ,no two ages1 and scarcely any two countries1 have decided it alike2 and the decision of one age or country is a wonder to another4 ,yet the people of any given age and country no more suspect any difficulty in it1 than if it were a subject on which mankind had always been agreed4 ,the rules which obtain among themselves appear to them self-evident and self-justifying4 ,this all but universal illusion is one of the examples of the magical influence of custom1 which is not only1 as the proverb says1 a second nature1 but is continually mistaken for the first4 ,the effect of custom1 in preventing any misgiving respecting the rules of conduct which mankind impose on one another1 is all the more complete because the subject is one on which it is not generally considered necessary that reasons should be given1 either by one person to others1 or by each to himself4 ,people are accustomed to believe1 and have been encouraged in the belief by some who aspire to the character of philosophers1 that their feelings1 on subjects of this nature1 are better than reasons1 and render reasons unnecessary4 ,the practical principle which guides them to their opinions on the regulation of human conduct1 is the feeling in each person's mind that everybody should be required to act as he1 and those with whom he sympathises1 would like them to act4 ,no one1 indeed1 acknowledges to himself that his standard of judgment is his own liking2 but an opinion on a point of conduct1 not supported by reasons1 can only count as one person's preference2 and if the reasons1 when given1 are a mere appeal to a similar preference felt by other people1 it is still only many people's liking instead of one4 ,to an ordinary man1 however1 his own preference1 thus supported1 is not only a perfectly satisfactory reason1 but the only one he generally has for any of his notions of morality1 taste1 or propriety1 which are not expressly written in his religious creed2 and his chief guide in the interpretation even of that4 ,men's opinions1 accordingly1 on what is laudable or blamable1 are affected by all the multifarious causes which influence their wishes in regard to the conduct of others1 and which are as numerous as those which determine their wishes on any other subject4 ,sometimes their reason--at other times their prejudices or superstitions3 often their social affections1 not seldom their anti-social ones1 their envy or jealousy1 their arrogance or contemptuousness3 but most commonly1 their desires or fears for themselves--their legitimate or illegitimate self-interest4 ,wherever there is an ascendant class1 a large portion of the morality of the country emanates from its class interests1 and its feelings of class superiority4 ,the morality between ,spartans and ,helots1 between planters and negroes1 between princes and subjects1 between nobles and roturiers1 between men and women1 has been for the most part the creation of these class interests and feelings3 and the sentiments thus generated1 react in turn upon the moral feelings of the members of the ascendant class1 in their relations among themselves4 ,where1 on the other hand1 a class1 formerly ascendant1 has lost its ascendancy1 or where its ascendancy is unpopular1 the prevailing moral sentiments frequently bear the impress of an impatient dislike of superiority4 ,another grand determining principle of the rules of conduct1 both in act and forbearance1 which have been enforced by law or opinion1 has been the servility of mankind towards the supposed preferences or aversions of their temporal masters1 or of their gods4 ,this servility1 though essentially selfish1 is not hypocrisy2 it gives rise to perfectly genuine sentiments of abhorrence2 it made men burn magicians and heretics4 ,among so many baser influences1 the general and obvious interests of society have of course had a share1 and a large one1 in the direction of the moral sentiments3 less1 however1 as a matter of reason1 and on their own account1 than as a consequence of the sympathies and antipathies which grew out of them3 and sympathies and antipathies which had little or nothing to do with the interests of society1 have made themselves felt in the establishment of moralities with quite as great force4 ,the likings and dislikings of society1 or of some powerful portion of it1 are thus the main thing which has practically determined the rules laid down for general observance1 under the penalties of law or opinion4 ,and in general1 those who have been in advance of society in thought and feeling have left this condition of things unassailed in principle1 however they may have come into conflict with it in some of its details4 ,they have occupied themselves rather in inquiring what things society ought to like or dislike1 than in questioning whether its likings or dislikings should be a law to individuals4 ,they preferred endeavouring to alter the feelings of mankind on the particular points on which they were themselves heretical1 rather than make common cause in defence of freedom1 with heretics generally4 ,the only case in which the higher ground has been taken on principle and maintained with consistency1 by any but an individual here and there1 is that of religious belief3 a case instructive in many ways1 and not least so as forming a most striking instance of the fallibility of what is called the moral sense3 for the odium theologicum1 in a sincere bigot1 is one of the most unequivocal cases of moral feeling4 ,those who first broke the yoke of what called itself the ,universal ,church1 were in general as little willing to permit difference of religious opinion as that church itself4 ,but when the heat of the conflict was over1 without giving a complete victory to any party1 and each church or sect was reduced to limit its hopes to retaining possession of the ground it already occupied2 minorities1 seeing that they had no chance of becoming majorities1 were under the necessity of pleading to those whom they could not convert1 for permission to differ4 ,it is accordingly on this battle-field1 almost solely1 that the rights of the individual against society have been asserted on broad grounds of principle1 and the claim of society to exercise authority over dissentients1 openly controverted4 ,the great writers to whom the world owes what religious liberty it possesses1 have mostly asserted freedom of conscience as an indefeasible right1 and denied absolutely that a human being is accountable to others for his religious belief4 ,yet so natural to mankind is intolerance in whatever they really care about1 that religious freedom has hardly anywhere been practically realised1 except where religious indifference1 which dislikes to have its peace disturbed by theological quarrels1 has added its weight to the scale4 ,in the minds of almost all religious persons1 even in the most tolerant countries1 the duty of toleration is admitted with tacit reserves4 ,one person will bear with dissent in matters of church government1 but not of dogma2 another can tolerate everybody1 short of a ,papist or a ,unitarian2 another1 every one who believes in revealed religion2 a few extend their charity a little further1 but stop at the belief in a ,god and in a future state4 ,wherever the sentiment of the majority is still genuine and intense1 it is found to have abated little of its claim to be obeyed4 ,in ,england1 from the peculiar circumstances of our political history1 though the yoke of opinion is perhaps heavier1 that of law is lighter1 than in most other countries of ,europe2 and there is considerable jealousy of direct interference1 by the legislative or the executive power1 with private conduct2 not so much from any just regard for the independence of the individual1 as from the still subsisting habit of looking on the government as representing an opposite interest to the public4 ,the majority have not yet learnt to feel the power of the government their power1 or its opinions their opinions4 ,when they do so1 individual liberty will probably be as much exposed to invasion from the government1 as it already is from public opinion4 ,but1 as yet1 there is a considerable amount of feeling ready to be called forth against any attempt of the law to control individuals in things in which they have not hitherto been accustomed to be controlled by it2 and this with very little discrimination as to whether the matter is1 or is not1 within the legitimate sphere of legal control2 insomuch that the feeling1 highly salutary on the whole1 is perhaps quite as often misplaced as well grounded in the particular instances of its application4 ,there is1 in fact1 no recognised principle by which the propriety or impropriety of government interference is customarily tested4 ,people decide according to their personal preferences4 ,some1 whenever they see any good to be done1 or evil to be remedied1 would willingly instigate the government to undertake the business2 while others prefer to bear almost any amount of social evil1 rather than add one to the departments of human interests amenable to governmental control4 ,and men range themselves on one or the other side in any particular case1 according to this general direction of their sentiments2 or according to the degree of interest which they feel in the particular thing which it is proposed that the government should do1 or according to the belief they entertain that the government would1 or would not1 do it in the manner they prefer2 but very rarely on account of any opinion to which they consistently adhere1 as to what things are fit to be done by a government4 ,and it seems to me that in consequence of this absence of rule or principle1 one side is at present as often wrong as the other2 the interference of government is1 with about equal frequency1 improperly invoked and improperly condemned4 ,the object of this ,essay is to assert one very simple principle1 as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control1 whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties1 or the moral coercion of public opinion4 ,that principle is1 that the sole end for which mankind are warranted1 individually or collectively1 in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number1 is self-protection4 ,that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community1 against his will1 is to prevent harm to others4 ,his own good1 either physical or moral1 is not a sufficient warrant4 ,he cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so1 because it will make him happier1 because1 in the opinions of others1 to do so would be wise1 or even right4 ,these are good reasons for remonstrating with him1 or reasoning with him1 or persuading him1 or entreating him1 but not for compelling him1 or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise4 ,to justify that1 the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else4 ,the only part of the conduct of any one1 for which he is amenable to society1 is that which concerns others4 ,in the part which merely concerns himself1 his independence is1 of right1 absolute4 ,over himself1 over his own body and mind1 the individual is sovereign4 ,it is1 perhaps1 hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties4 ,we are not speaking of children1 or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood4 ,those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others1 must be protected against their own actions as well as against external injury4 ,for the same reason1 we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage4 ,the early difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are so great1 that there is seldom any choice of means for overcoming them2 and a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end1 perhaps otherwise unattainable4 ,despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians1 provided the end be their improvement1 and the means justified by actually effecting that end4 ,liberty1 as a principle1 has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion4 ,until then1 there is nothing for them but implicit obedience to an ,akbar or a ,charlemagne1 if they are so fortunate as to find one4 ,but as soon as mankind have attained the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion 7a period long since reached in all nations with whom we need here concern ourselves71 compulsion1 either in the direct form or in that of pains and penalties for non-compliance1 is no longer admissible as a means to their own good1 and justifiable only for the security of others4 ,it is proper to state that ,i forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right1 as a thing independent of utility4 ,i regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions2 but it must be utility in the largest sense1 grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being4 ,those interests1 ,i contend1 authorise the subjection of individual spontaneity to external control1 only in respect to those actions of each1 which concern the interest of other people4 ,if any one does an act hurtful to others1 there is a prim facie case for punishing him1 by law1 or1 where legal penalties are not safely applicable1 by general disapprobation4 ,there are also many positive acts for the benefit of others1 which he may rightfully be compelled to perform2 such as1 to give evidence in a court of justice2 to bear his fair share in the common defence1 or in any other joint work necessary to the interest of the society of which he enjoys the protection2 and to perform certain acts of individual beneficence1 such as saving a fellow-creature's life1 or interposing to protect the defenceless against ill-usage1 things which whenever it is obviously a man's duty to do1 he may rightfully be made responsible to society for not doing4 ,a person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction1 and in either case he is justly accountable to them for the injury4 ,the latter case1 it is true1 requires a much more cautious exercise of compulsion than the former4 ,to make any one answerable for doing evil to others1 is the rule2 to make him answerable for not preventing evil1 is1 comparatively speaking1 the exception4 ,yet there are many cases clear enough and grave enough to justify that exception4 ,in all things which regard the external relations of the individual1 he is de jure amenable to those whose interests are concerned1 and if need be1 to society as their protector4 ,there are often good reasons for not holding him to the responsibility2 but these reasons must arise from the special expediencies of the case3 either because it is a kind of case in which he is on the whole likely to act better1 when left to his own discretion1 than when controlled in any way in which society have it in their power to control him2 or because the attempt to exercise control would produce other evils1 greater than those which it would prevent4 ,when such reasons as these preclude the enforcement of responsibility1 the conscience of the agent himself should step into the vacant judgment seat1 and protect those interests of others which have no external protection2 judging himself all the more rigidly1 because the case does not admit of his being made accountable to the judgment of his fellow-creatures4 ,but there is a sphere of action in which society1 as distinguished from the individual1 has1 if any1 only an indirect interest2 comprehending all that portion of a person's life and conduct which affects only himself1 or if it also affects others1 only with their free1 voluntary1 and undeceived consent and participation4 ,when ,i say only himself1 ,i mean directly1 and in the first instance3 for whatever affects himself1 may affect others through himself2 and the objection which may be grounded on this contingency1 will receive consideration in the sequel4 ,this1 then1 is the appropriate region of human liberty4 ,it comprises1 first1 the inward domain of consciousness2 demanding liberty of conscience1 in the most comprehensive sense2 liberty of thought and feeling2 absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects1 practical or speculative1 scientific1 moral1 or theological4 ,the liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle1 since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people2 but1 being almost of as much importance as the liberty of thought itself1 and resting in great part on the same reasons1 is practically inseparable from it4 ,secondly1 the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits2 of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character2 of doing as we like1 subject to such consequences as may follow3 without impediment from our fellow-creatures1 so long as what we do does not harm them1 even though they should think our conduct foolish1 perverse1 or wrong4 ,thirdly1 from this liberty of each individual1 follows the liberty1 within the same limits1 of combination among individuals2 freedom to unite1 for any purpose not involving harm to others3 the persons combining being supposed to be of full age1 and not forced or deceived4 ,no society in which these liberties are not1 on the whole1 respected1 is free1 whatever may be its form of government2 and none is completely free in which they do not exist absolute and unqualified4 ,the only freedom which deserves the name1 is that of pursuing our own good in our own way1 so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs1 or impede their efforts to obtain it4 ,each is the proper guardian of his own health1 whether bodily1 or mental and spiritual4 ,mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves1 than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest4 ,though this doctrine is anything but new1 and1 to some persons1 may have the air of a truism1 there is no doctrine which stands more directly opposed to the general tendency of existing opinion and practice4 ,society has expended fully as much effort in the attempt 7according to its lights7 to compel people to conform to its notions of personal1 as of social excellence4 ,the ancient commonwealths thought themselves entitled to practise1 and the ancient philosophers countenanced1 the regulation of every part of private conduct by public authority1 on the ground that the ,state had a deep interest in the whole bodily and mental discipline of every one of its citizens2 a mode of thinking which may have been admissible in small republics surrounded by powerful enemies1 in constant peril of being subverted by foreign attack or internal commotion1 and to which even a short interval of relaxed energy and self-command might so easily be fatal1 that they could not afford to wait for the salutary permanent effects of freedom4 ,in the modern world1 the greater size of political communities1 and above all1 the separation between spiritual and temporal authority 7which placed the direction of men's consciences in other hands than those which controlled their worldly affairs71 prevented so great an interference by law in the details of private life2 but the engines of moral repression have been wielded more strenuously against divergence from the reigning opinion in self-regarding1 than even in social matters2 religion1 the most powerful of the elements which have entered into the formation of moral feeling1 having almost always been governed either by the ambition of a hierarchy1 seeking control over every department of human conduct1 or by the spirit of ,puritanism4 ,and some of those modern reformers who have placed themselves in strongest opposition to the religions of the past1 have been noway behind either churches or sects in their assertion of the right of spiritual domination3 ,m4 ,comte1 in particular1 whose social system1 as unfolded in his ,trait de ,politique ,positive1 aims at establishing 7though by moral more than by legal appliances7 a despotism of society over the individual1 surpassing anything contemplated in the political ideal of the most rigid disciplinarian among the ancient philosophers4 ,apart from the peculiar tenets of individual thinkers1 there is also in the world at large an increasing inclination to stretch unduly the powers of society over the individual1 both by the force of opinion and even by that of legislation3 and as the tendency of all the changes taking place in the world is to strengthen society1 and diminish the power of the individual1 this encroachment is not one of the evils which tend spontaneously to disappear1 but1 on the contrary1 to grow more and more formidable4 ,the disposition of mankind1 whether as rulers or as fellow-citizens to impose their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on others1 is so energetically supported by some of the best and by some of the worst feelings incident to human nature1 that it is hardly ever kept under restraint by anything but want of power2 and as the power is not declining1 but growing1 unless a strong barrier of moral conviction can be raised against the mischief1 we must expect1 in the present circumstances of the world1 to see it increase4 ,it will be convenient for the argument1 if1 instead of at once entering upon the general thesis1 we confine ourselves in the first instance to a single branch of it1 on which the principle here stated is1 if not fully1 yet to a certain point1 recognised by the current opinions4 ,this one branch is the ,liberty of ,thought3 from which it is impossible to separate the cognate liberty of speaking and of writing4 ,although these liberties1 to some considerable amount1 form part of the political morality of all countries which profess religious toleration and free institutions1 the grounds1 both philosophical and practical1 on which they rest1 are perhaps not so familiar to the general mind1 nor so thoroughly appreciated by many even of the leaders of opinion1 as might have been expected4 ,those grounds1 when rightly understood1 are of much wider application than to only one division of the subject1 and a thorough consideration of this part of the question will be found the best introduction to the remainder4 ,those to whom nothing which ,i am about to say will be new1 may therefore1 ,i hope1 excuse me1 if on a subject which for now three centuries has been so often discussed1 ,i venture on one discussion more4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,of ,,the ,,liberty ,,of ,,thought ,,and ,,discussion4 ,the time1 it is to be hoped1 is gone by1 when any defence would be necessary of the liberty of the press as one of the securities against corrupt or tyrannical government4 ,no argument1 we may suppose1 can now be needed1 against permitting a legislature or an executive1 not identified in interest with the people1 to prescribe opinions to them1 and determine what doctrines or what arguments they shall be allowed to hear4 ,this aspect of the question1 besides1 has been so often and so triumphantly enforced by preceding writers1 that it need not be specially insisted on in this place4 ,though the law of ,england1 on the subject of the press1 is as servile to this day as it was in the time of the ,tudors1 there is little danger of its being actually put in force against political discussion1 except during some temporary panic1 when fear of insurrection drives ministers and judges from their propriety2#f and1 speaking generally1 it is not1 in constitutional countries1 to be apprehended that the government1 whether completely responsible to the people or not1 will often attempt to control the expression of opinion1 except when in doing so it makes itself the organ of the general intolerance of the public4 ,let us suppose1 therefore1 that the government is entirely at one with the people1 and never thinks of exerting any power of coercion unless in agreement with what it conceives to be their voice4 ,but ,i deny the right of the people to exercise such coercion1 either by themselves or by their government4 ,the power itself is illegitimate4 ,the best government has no more title to it than the worst4 ,it is as noxious1 or more noxious1 when exerted in accordance with public opinion1 than when in or opposition to it4 ,if all mankind minus one1 were of one opinion1 and only one person were of the contrary opinion1 mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person1 than he1 if he had the power1 would be justified in silencing mankind4 ,were an opinion a personal possession of no value except to the owner2 if to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were simply a private injury1 it would make some difference whether the injury was inflicted only on a few persons or on many4 ,but the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is1 that it is robbing the human race2 posterity as well as the existing generation2 those who dissent from the opinion1 still more than those who hold it4 ,if the opinion is right1 they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth3 if wrong1 they lose1 what is almost as great a benefit1 the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth1 produced by its collision with error4 ,it is necessary to consider separately these two hypotheses1 each of which has a distinct branch of the argument corresponding to it4 ,we can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavouring to stifle is a false opinion2 and if we were sure1 stifling it would be an evil still4 ,first3 the opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may possibly be true4 ,those who desire to suppress it1 of course deny its truth2 but they are not infallible4 ,they have no authority to decide the question for all mankind1 and exclude every other person from the means of judging4 ,to refuse a hearing to an opinion1 because they are sure that it is false1 is to assume that their certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty4 ,all silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility4 ,its condemnation may be allowed to rest on this common argument1 not the worse for being common4 ,unfortunately for the good sense of mankind1 the fact of their fallibility is far from carrying the weight in their practical judgment1 which is always allowed to it in theory2 for while every one well knows himself to be fallible1 few think it necessary to take any precautions against their own fallibility1 or admit the supposition that any opinion1 of which they feel very certain1 may be one of the examples of the error to which they acknowledge themselves to be liable4 ,absolute princes1 or others who are accustomed to unlimited deference1 usually feel this complete confidence in their own opinions on nearly all subjects4 ,people more happily situated1 who sometimes hear their opinions disputed1 and are not wholly unused to be set right when they are wrong1 place the same unbounded reliance only on such of their opinions as are shared by all who surround them1 or to whom they habitually defer3 for in proportion to a man's want of confidence in his own solitary judgment1 does he usually repose1 with implicit trust1 on the infallibility of the world in general4 ,and the world1 to each individual1 means the part of it with which he comes in contact2 his party1 his sect1 his church1 his class of society3 the man may be called1 by comparison1 almost liberal and large-minded to whom it means anything so comprehensive as his own country or his own age4 ,nor is his faith in this collective authority at all shaken by his being aware that other ages1 countries1 sects1 churches1 classes1 and parties have thought1 and even now think1 the exact reverse4 ,he devolves upon his own world the responsibility of being in the right against the dissentient worlds of other people2 and it never troubles him that mere accident has decided which of these numerous worlds is the object of his reliance1 and that the same causes which make him a ,churchman in ,london1 would have made him a ,buddhist or a ,confucian in ,pekin4 ,yet it is as evident in itself as any amount of argument can make it1 that ages are no more infallible than individuals2 every age having held many opinions which subsequent ages have deemed not only false but absurd2 and it is as certain that many opinions1 now general1 will be rejected by future ages1 as it is that many1 once general1 are rejected by the present4 ,the objection likely to be made to this argument1 would probably take some such form as the following4 ,there is no greater assumption of infallibility in forbidding the propagation of error1 than in any other thing which is done by public authority on its own judgment and responsibility4 ,judgment is given to men that they may use it4 ,because it may be used erroneously1 are men to be told that they ought not to use it at all8 ,to prohibit what they think pernicious1 is not claiming exemption from error1 but fulfilling the duty incumbent on them1 although fallible1 of acting on their conscientious conviction4 ,if we were never to act on our opinions1 because those opinions may be wrong1 we should leave all our interests uncared for1 and all our duties unperformed4 ,an objection which applies to all conduct1 can be no valid objection to any conduct in particular4 ,it is the duty of governments1 and of individuals1 to form the truest opinions they can2 to form them carefully1 and never impose them upon others unless they are quite sure of being right4 ,but when they are sure 7such reasoners may say71 it is not conscientiousness but cowardice to shrink from acting on their opinions1 and allow doctrines which they honestly think dangerous to the welfare of mankind1 either in this life or in another1 to be scattered abroad without restraint1 because other people1 in less enlightened times1 have persecuted opinions now believed to be true4 ,let us take care1 it may be said1 not to make the same mistake3 but governments and nations have made mistakes in other things1 which are not denied to be fit subjects for the exercise of authority3 they have laid on bad taxes1 made unjust wars4 ,ought we therefore to lay on no taxes1 and1 under whatever provocation1 make no wars8 ,men1 and governments1 must act to the best of their ability4 ,there is no such thing as absolute certainty1 but there is assurance sufficient for the purposes of human life4 ,we may1 and must1 assume our opinion to be true for the guidance of our own conduct3 and it is assuming no more when we forbid bad men to pervert society by the propagation of opinions which we regard as false and pernicious4 ,i answer that it is assuming very much more4 ,there is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true1 because1 with every opportunity for contesting it1 it has not been refuted1 and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation4 ,complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion1 is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action2 and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right4 ,when we consider either the history of opinion1 or the ordinary conduct of human life1 to what is it to be ascribed that the one and the other are no worse than they are8 ,not certainly to the inherent force of the human understanding2 for1 on any matter not self-evident1 there are ninety-nine persons totally incapable of judging of it1 for one who is capable2 and the capacity of the hundredth person is only comparative2 for the majority of the eminent men of every past generation held many opinions now known to be erroneous1 and did or approved numerous things which no one will now justify4 ,why is it1 then1 that there is on the whole a preponderance among mankind of rational opinions and rational conduct8 ,if there really is this preponderance--which there must be1 unless human affairs are1 and have always been1 in an almost desperate state--it is owing to a quality of the human mind1 the source of everything respectable in man either as an intellectual or as a moral being1 namely1 that his errors are corrigible4 ,he is capable of rectifying his mistakes1 by discussion and experience4 ,not by experience alone4 ,there must be discussion1 to show how experience is to be interpreted4 ,wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument3 but facts and arguments1 to produce any effect on the mind1 must be brought before it4 ,very few facts are able to tell their own story1 without comments to bring out their meaning4 ,the whole strength and value1 then1 of human judgment1 depending on the one property1 that it can be set right when it is wrong1 reliance can be placed on it only when the means of setting it right are kept constantly at hand4 ,in the case of any person whose judgment is really deserving of confidence1 how has it become so8 ,because he has kept his mind open to criticism of his opinions and conduct4 ,because it has been his practice to listen to all that could be said against him2 to profit by as much of it as was just1 and expound to himself1 and upon occasion to others1 the fallacy of what was fallacious4 ,because he has felt1 that the only way in which a human being can make some approach to knowing the whole of a subject1 is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion1 and studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every character of mind4 ,no wise man ever acquired his wisdom in any mode but this2 nor is it in the nature of human intellect to become wise in any other manner4 ,the steady habit of correcting and completing his own opinion by collating it with those of others1 so far from causing doubt and hesitation in carrying it into practice1 is the only stable foundation for a just reliance on it3 for1 being cognisant of all that can1 at least obviously1 be said against him1 and having taken up his position against all gainsayers--knowing that he has sought for objections and difficulties1 instead of avoiding them1 and has shut out no light which can be thrown upon the subject from any quarter--he has a right to think his judgment better than that of any person1 or any multitude1 who have not gone through a similar process4 ,it is not too much to require that what the wisest of mankind1 those who are best entitled to trust their own judgment1 find necessary to warrant their relying on it1 should be submitted to by that miscellaneous collection of a few wise and many foolish individuals1 called the public4 ,the most intolerant of churches1 the ,roman ,catholic ,church1 even at the canonisation of a saint1 admits1 and listens patiently to1 a devil's advocate4 ,the holiest of men1 it appears1 cannot be admitted to posthumous honours1 until all that the devil could say against him is known and weighed4 ,if even the ,newtonian philosophy were not permitted to be questioned1 mankind could not feel as complete assurance of its truth as they now do4 ,the beliefs which we have most warrant for1 have no safeguard to rest on1 but a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them unfounded4 ,if the challenge is not accepted1 or is accepted and the attempt fails1 we are far enough from certainty still2 but we have done the best that the existing state of human reason admits of2 we have neglected nothing that could give the truth a chance of reaching us3 if the lists are kept open1 we may hope that if there be a better truth1 it will be found when the human mind is capable of receiving it2 and in the meantime we may rely on having attained such approach to truth1 as is possible in our own day4 ,this is the amount of certainty attainable by a fallible being1 and this the sole way of attaining it4 ,strange it is1 that men should admit the validity of the arguments for free discussion1 but object to their being pushed to an extreme2 not seeing that unless the reasons are good for an extreme case1 they are not good for any case4 ,strange that they should imagine that they are not assuming infallibility1 when they acknowledge that there should be free discussion on all subjects which can possibly be doubtful1 but think that some particular principle or doctrine should be forbidden to be questioned because it is so certain1 that is1 because they are certain that it is certain4 ,to call any proposition certain1 while there is any one who would deny its certainty if permitted1 but who is not permitted1 is to assume that we ourselves1 and those who agree with us1 are the judges of certainty1 and judges without hearing the other side4 ,in the present age--which has been described as destitute of faith1 but terrified at scepticism--in which people feel sure1 not so much that their opinions are true1 as that they should not know what to do without them--the claims of an opinion to be protected from public attack are rested not so much on its truth1 as on its importance to society4 ,there are1 it is alleged1 certain beliefs1 so useful1 not to say indispensable to well-being1 that it is as much the duty of governments to uphold those beliefs1 as to protect any other of the interests of society4 ,in a case of such necessity1 and so directly in the line of their duty1 something less than infallibility may1 it is maintained1 warrant1 and even bind1 governments1 to act on their own opinion1 confirmed by the general opinion of mankind4 ,it is also often argued1 and still oftener thought1 that none but bad men would desire to weaken these salutary beliefs2 and there can be nothing wrong1 it is thought1 in restraining bad men1 and prohibiting what only such men would wish to practise4 ,this mode of thinking makes the justification of restraints on discussion not a question of the truth of doctrines1 but of their usefulness2 and flatters itself by that means to escape the responsibility of claiming to be an infallible judge of opinions4 ,but those who thus satisfy themselves1 do not perceive that the assumption of infallibility is merely shifted from one point to another4 ,the usefulness of an opinion is itself matter of opinion3 as disputable1 as open to discussion1 and requiring discussion as much1 as the opinion itself4 ,there is the same need of an infallible judge of opinions to decide an opinion to be noxious1 as to decide it to be false1 unless the opinion condemned has full opportunity of defending itself4 ,and it will not do to say that the heretic may be allowed to maintain the utility or harmlessness of his opinion1 though forbidden to maintain its truth4 ,the truth of an opinion is part of its utility4 ,if we would know whether or not it is desirable that a proposition should be believed1 is it possible to exclude the consideration of whether or not it is true8 ,in the opinion1 not of bad men1 but of the best men1 no belief which is contrary to truth can be really useful3 and can you prevent such men from urging that plea1 when they are charged with culpability for denying some doctrine which they are told is useful1 but which they believe to be false8 ,those who are on the side of received opinions1 never fail to take all possible advantage of this plea2 you do not find them handling the question of utility as if it could be completely abstracted from that of truth3 on the contrary1 it is1 above all1 because their doctrine is the truth1 that the knowledge or the belief of it is held to be so indispensable4 ,there can be no fair discussion of the question of usefulness1 when an argument so vital may be employed on one side1 but not on the other4 ,and in point of fact1 when law or public feeling do not permit the truth of an opinion to be disputed1 they are just as little tolerant of a denial of its usefulness4 ,the utmost they allow is an extenuation of its absolute necessity1 or of the positive guilt of rejecting it4 ,in order more fully to illustrate the mischief of denying a hearing to opinions because we1 in our own judgment1 have condemned them1 it will be desirable to fix down the discussion to a concrete case2 and ,i choose1 by preference1 the cases which are least favourable to me--in which the argument against freedom of opinion1 both on the score of truth and on that of utility1 is considered the strongest4 ,let the opinions impugned be the belief in a ,god and in a future state1 or any of the commonly received doctrines of morality4 ,to fight the battle on such ground1 gives a great advantage to an unfair antagonist2 since he will be sure to say 7and many who have no desire to be unfair will say it internally71 ,are these the doctrines which you do not deem sufficiently certain to be taken under the protection of law8 ,is the belief in a ,god one of the opinions1 to feel sure of which1 you hold to be assuming infallibility8 ,but ,i must be permitted to observe1 that it is not the feeling sure of a doctrine 7be it what it may7 which ,i call an assumption of infallibility4 ,it is the undertaking to decide that question for others1 without allowing them to hear what can be said on the contrary side4 ,and ,i denounce and reprobate this pretension not the less1 if put forth on the side of my most solemn convictions4 ,however positive any one's persuasion may be1 not only of the falsity1 but of the pernicious consequences--not only of the pernicious consequences1 but 7to adopt expressions which ,i altogether condemn7 the immorality and impiety of an opinion2 yet if1 in pursuance of that private judgment1 though backed by the public judgment of his country or his contemporaries1 he prevents the opinion from being heard in its defence1 he assumes infallibility4 ,and so far from the assumption being less objectionable or less dangerous because the opinion is called immoral or impious1 this is the case of all others in which it is most fatal4 ,these are exactly the occasions on which the men of one generation commit those dreadful mistakes1 which excite the astonishment and horror of posterity4 ,it is among such that we find the instances memorable in history1 when the arm of the law has been employed to root out the best men and the noblest doctrines2 with deplorable success as to the men1 though some of the doctrines have survived to be 7as if in mockery7 invoked1 in defence of similar conduct towards those who dissent from them1 or from their received interpretation4 ,mankind can hardly be too often reminded that there was once a man named ,socrates1 between whom and the legal authorities and public opinion of his time1 there took place a memorable collision4 ,born in an age and country abounding in individual greatness1 this man has been handed down to us by those who best knew both him and the age1 as the most virtuous man in it2 while we know him as the head and prototype of all subsequent teachers of virtue1 the source equally of the lofty inspiration of ,plato and the judicious utilitarianism of ,aristotle1 i mastri di color che sanno1 the two headsprings of ethical as of all other philosophy4 ,this acknowledged master of all the eminent thinkers who have since lived--whose fame1 still growing after more than two thousand years1 all but outweighs the whole remainder of the names which make his native city illustrious--was put to death by his countrymen1 after a judicial conviction1 for impiety and immorality4 ,impiety1 in denying the gods recognised by the ,state2 indeed his accuser asserted 7see the ,apologia7 that he believed in no gods at all4 ,immorality1 in being1 by his doctrines and instructions1 a corruptor of youth4 ,of these charges the tribunal1 there is every ground for believing1 honestly found him guilty1 and condemned the man who probably of all then born had deserved best of mankind1 to be put to death as a criminal4 ,to pass from this to the only other instance of judicial iniquity1 the mention of which1 after the condemnation of ,socrates1 would not be an anticlimax3 the event which took place on ,calvary rather more than eighteen hundred years ago4 ,the man who left on the memory of those who witnessed his life and conversation1 such an impression of his moral grandeur1 that eighteen subsequent centuries have done homage to him as the ,almighty in person1 was ignominiously put to death1 as what8 ,as a blasphemer4 ,men did not merely mistake their benefactor2 they mistook him for the exact contrary of what he was1 and treated him as that prodigy of impiety1 which they themselves are now held to be1 for their treatment of him4 ,the feelings with which mankind now regard these lamentable transactions1 especially the later of the two1 render them extremely unjust in their judgment of the unhappy actors4 ,these were1 to all appearance1 not bad men--not worse than men commonly are1 but rather the contrary2 men who possessed in a full1 or somewhat more than a full measure1 the religious1 moral1 and patriotic feelings of their time and people3 the very kind of men who1 in all times1 our own included1 have every chance of passing through life blameless and respected4 ,the high-priest who rent his garments when the words were pronounced1 which1 according to all the ideas of his country1 constituted the blackest guilt1 was in all probability quite as sincere in his horror and indignation1 as the generality of respectable and pious men now are in the religious and moral sentiments they profess2 and most of those who now shudder at his conduct1 if they had lived in his time1 and been born ,jews1 would have acted precisely as he did4 ,orthodox ,christians who are tempted to think that those who stoned to death the first martyrs must have been worse men than they themselves are1 ought to remember that one of those persecutors was ,saint ,paul4 ,let us add one more example1 the most striking of all1 if the impressiveness of an error is measured by the wisdom and virtue of him who falls into it4 ,if ever any one1 possessed of power1 had grounds for thinking himself the best and most enlightened among his cotemporaries1 it was the ,emperor ,marcus ,aurelius4 ,absolute monarch of the whole civilised world1 he preserved through life not only the most unblemished justice1 but what was less to be expected from his ,stoical breeding1 the tenderest heart4 ,the few failings which are attributed to him1 were all on the side of indulgence3 while his writings1 the highest ethical product of the ancient mind1 differ scarcely perceptibly1 if they differ at all1 from the most characteristic teachings of ,christ4 ,this man1 a better ,christian in all but the dogmatic sense of the word1 than almost any of the ostensibly ,christian sovereigns who have since reigned1 persecuted ,christianity4 ,placed at the summit of all the previous attainments of humanity1 with an open1 unfettered intellect1 and a character which led him of himself to embody in his moral writings the ,christian ideal1 he yet failed to see that ,christianity was to be a good and not an evil to the world1 with his duties to which he was so deeply penetrated4 ,existing society he knew to be in a deplorable state4 ,but such as it was1 he saw1 or thought he saw1 that it was held together1 and prevented from being worse1 by belief and reverence of the received divinities4 ,as a ruler of mankind1 he deemed it his duty not to suffer society to fall in pieces2 and saw not how1 if its existing ties were removed1 any others could be formed which could again knit it together4 ,the new religion openly aimed at dissolving these ties3 unless1 therefore1 it was his duty to adopt that religion1 it seemed to be his duty to put it down4 ,inasmuch then as the theology of ,christianity did not appear to him true or of divine origin2 inasmuch as this strange history of a crucified ,god was not credible to him1 and a system which purported to rest entirely upon a foundation to him so wholly unbelievable1 could not be foreseen by him to be that renovating agency which1 after all abatements1 it has in fact proved to be2 the gentlest and most amiable of philosophers and rulers1 under a solemn sense of duty1 authorised the persecution of ,christianity4 ,to my mind this is one of the most tragical facts in all history4 ,it is a bitter thought1 how different a thing the ,christianity of the world might have been1 if the ,christian faith had been adopted as the religion of the empire under the auspices of ,marcus ,aurelius instead of those of ,constantine4 ,but it would be equally unjust to him and false to truth1 to deny1 that no one plea which can be urged for punishing anti-,christian teaching1 was wanting to ,marcus ,aurelius for punishing1 as he did1 the propagation of ,christianity4 ,no ,christian more firmly believes that ,atheism is false1 and tends to the dissolution of society1 than ,marcus ,aurelius believed the same things of ,christianity2 he who1 of all men then living1 might have been thought the most capable of appreciating it4 ,unless any one who approves of punishment for the promulgation of opinions1 flatters himself that he is a wiser and better man than ,marcus ,aurelius--more deeply versed in the wisdom of his time1 more elevated in his intellect above it--more earnest in his search for truth1 or more single-minded in his devotion to it when found2--let him abstain from that assumption of the joint infallibility of himself and the multitude1 which the great ,antoninus made with so unfortunate a result4 ,aware of the impossibility of defending the use of punishment for restraining irreligious opinions1 by any argument which will not justify ,marcus ,antoninus1 the enemies of religious freedom1 when hard pressed1 occasionally accept this consequence1 and say1 with ,dr4 ,johnson1 that the persecutors of ,christianity were in the right2 that persecution is an ordeal through which truth ought to pass1 and always passes successfully1 legal penalties being1 in the end1 powerless against truth1 though sometimes beneficially effective against mischievous errors4 ,this is a form of the argument for religious intolerance1 sufficiently remarkable not to be passed without notice4 ,a theory which maintains that truth may justifiably be persecuted because persecution cannot possibly do it any harm1 cannot be charged with being intentionally hostile to the reception of new truths2 but we cannot commend the generosity of its dealing with the persons to whom mankind are indebted for them4 ,to discover to the world something which deeply concerns it1 and of which it was previously ignorant2 to prove to it that it had been mistaken on some vital point of temporal or spiritual interest1 is as important a service as a human being can render to his fellow-creatures1 and in certain cases1 as in those of the early ,christians and of the ,reformers1 those who think with ,dr4 ,johnson believe it to have been the most precious gift which could be bestowed on mankind4 ,that the authors of such splendid benefits should be requited by martyrdom2 that their reward should be to be dealt with as the vilest of criminals1 is not1 upon this theory1 a deplorable error and misfortune1 for which humanity should mourn in sackcloth and ashes1 but the normal and justifiable state of things4 ,the propounder of a new truth1 according to this doctrine1 should stand1 as stood1 in the legislation of the ,locrians1 the proposer of a new law1 with a halter round his neck1 to be instantly tightened if the public assembly did not1 on hearing his reasons1 then and there adopt his proposition4 ,people who defend this mode of treating benefactors1 cannot be supposed to set much value on the benefit2 and ,i believe this view of the subject is mostly confined to the sort of persons who think that new truths may have been desirable once1 but that we have had enough of them now4 ,but1 indeed1 the dictum that truth always triumphs over persecution1 is one of those pleasant falsehoods which men repeat after one another till they pass into commonplaces1 but which all experience refutes4 ,history teems with instances of truth put down by persecution4 ,if not suppressed for ever1 it may be thrown back for centuries4 ,to speak only of religious opinions3 the ,reformation broke out at least twenty times before ,luther1 and was put down4 ,arnold of ,brescia was put down4 ,fra ,dolcino was put down4 ,savonarola was put down4 ,the ,albigeois were put down4 ,the ,vaudois were put down4 ,the ,lollards were put down4 ,the ,hussites were put down4 ,even after the era of ,luther1 wherever persecution was persisted in1 it was successful4 ,in ,spain1 ,italy1 ,flanders1 the ,austrian empire1 ,protestantism was rooted out2 and1 most likely1 would have been so in ,england1 had ,queen ,mary lived1 or ,queen ,elizabeth died4 ,persecution has always succeeded1 save where the heretics were too strong a party to be effectually persecuted4 ,no reasonable person can doubt that ,christianity might have been extirpated in the ,roman ,empire4 ,it spread1 and became predominant1 because the persecutions were only occasional1 lasting but a short time1 and separated by long intervals of almost undisturbed propagandism4 ,it is a piece of idle sentimentality that truth1 merely as truth1 has any inherent power denied to error1 of prevailing against the dungeon and the stake4 ,men are not more zealous for truth than they often are for error1 and a sufficient application of legal or even of social penalties will generally succeed in stopping the propagation of either4 ,the real advantage which truth has1 consists in this1 that when an opinion is true1 it may be extinguished once1 twice1 or many times1 but in the course of ages there will generally be found persons to rediscover it1 until some one of its reappearances falls on a time when from favourable circumstances it escapes persecution until it has made such head as to withstand all subsequent attempts to suppress it4 ,it will be said1 that we do not now put to death the introducers of new opinions3 we are not like our fathers who slew the prophets1 we even build sepulchres to them4 ,it is true we no longer put heretics to death2 and the amount of penal infliction which modern feeling would probably tolerate1 even against the most obnoxious opinions1 is not sufficient to extirpate them4 ,but let us not flatter ourselves that we are yet free from the stain even of legal persecution4 ,penalties for opinion1 or at least for its expression1 still exist by law2 and their enforcement is not1 even in these times1 so unexampled as to make it at all incredible that they may some day be revived in full force4 ,in the year #aheg1 at the summer assizes of the county of ,cornwall1 an unfortunate man1#g said to be of unexceptionable conduct in all relations of life1 was sentenced to twenty-one months' imprisonment1 for uttering1 and writing on a gate1 some offensive words concerning ,christianity4 ,within a month of the same time1 at the ,old ,bailey1 two persons1 on two separate occasions1#h were rejected as jurymen1 and one of them grossly insulted by the judge and by one of the counsel1 because they honestly declared that they had no theological belief2 and a third1 a foreigner1#i for the same reason1 was denied justice against a thief4 ,this refusal of redress took place in virtue of the legal doctrine1 that no person can be allowed to give evidence in a court of justice1 who does not profess belief in a ,god 7any god is sufficient7 and in a future state2 which is equivalent to declaring such persons to be outlaws1 excluded from the protection of the tribunals2 who may not only be robbed or assaulted with impunity1 if no one but themselves1 or persons of similar opinions1 be present1 but any one else may be robbed or assaulted with impunity1 if the proof of the fact depends on their evidence4 ,the assumption on which this is grounded1 is that the oath is worthless1 of a person who does not believe in a future state2 a proposition which betokens much ignorance of history in those who assent to it 7since it is historically true that a large proportion of infidels in all ages have been persons of distinguished integrity and honour72 and would be maintained by no one who had the smallest conception how many of the persons in greatest repute with the world1 both for virtues and for attainments1 are well known1 at least to their intimates1 to be unbelievers4 ,the rule1 besides1 is suicidal1 and cuts away its own foundation4 ,under pretence that atheists must be liars1 it admits the testimony of all atheists who are willing to lie1 and rejects only those who brave the obloquy of publicly confessing a detested creed rather than affirm a falsehood4 ,a rule thus self-convicted of absurdity so far as regards its professed purpose1 can be kept in force only as a badge of hatred1 a relic of persecution2 a persecution1 too1 having the peculiarity1 that the qualification for undergoing it1 is the being clearly proved not to deserve it4 ,the rule1 and the theory it implies1 are hardly less insulting to believers than to infidels4 ,for if he who does not believe in a future state1 necessarily lies1 it follows that they who do believe are only prevented from lying1 if prevented they are1 by the fear of hell4 ,we will not do the authors and abettors of the rule the injury of supposing1 that the conception which they have formed of ,christian virtue is drawn from their own consciousness4 ,these1 indeed1 are but rags and remnants of persecution1 and may be thought to be not so much an indication of the wish to persecute1 as an example of that very frequent infirmity of ,english minds1 which makes them take a preposterous pleasure in the assertion of a bad principle1 when they are no longer bad enough to desire to carry it really into practice4 ,but unhappily there is no security in the state of the public mind1 that the suspension of worse forms of legal persecution1 which has lasted for about the space of a generation1 will continue4 ,in this age the quiet surface of routine is as often ruffled by attempts to resuscitate past evils1 as to introduce new benefits4 ,what is boasted of at the present time as the revival of religion1 is always1 in narrow and uncultivated minds1 at least as much the revival of bigotry2 and where there is the strong permanent leaven of intolerance in the feelings of a people1 which at all times abides in the middle classes of this country1 it needs but little to provoke them into actively persecuting those whom they have never ceased to think proper objects of persecution4#aj ,for it is this--it is the opinions men entertain1 and the feelings they cherish1 respecting those who disown the beliefs they deem important1 which makes this country not a place of mental freedom4 ,for a long time past1 the chief mischief of the legal penalties is that they strengthen the social stigma4 ,it is that stigma which is really effective1 and so effective is it that the profession of opinions which are under the ban of society is much less common in ,england1 than is1 in many other countries1 the avowal of those which incur risk of judicial punishment4 ,in respect to all persons but those whose pecuniary circumstances make them independent of the good will of other people1 opinion1 on this subject1 is as efficacious as law2 men might as well be imprisoned1 as excluded from the means of earning their bread4 ,those whose bread is already secured1 and who desire no favours from men in power1 or from bodies of men1 or from the public1 have nothing to fear from the open avowal of any opinions1 but to be ill-thought of and ill-spoken of1 and this it ought not to require a very heroic mould to enable them to bear4 ,there is no room for any appeal ad misericordiam in behalf of such persons4 ,but though we do not now inflict so much evil on those who think differently from us1 as it was formerly our custom to do1 it may be that we do ourselves as much evil as ever by our treatment of them4 ,socrates was put to death1 but the ,socratic philosophy rose like the sun in heaven1 and spread its illumination over the whole intellectual firmament4 ,christians were cast to the lions1 but the ,christian church grew up a stately and spreading tree1 overtopping the older and less vigorous growths1 and stifling them by its shade4 ,our merely social intolerance kills no one1 roots out no opinions1 but induces men to disguise them1 or to abstain from any active effort for their diffusion4 ,with us1 heretical opinions do not perceptibly gain1 or even lose1 ground in each decade or generation2 they never blaze out far and wide1 but continue to smoulder in the narrow circles of thinking and studious persons among whom they originate1 without ever lighting up the general affairs of mankind with either a true or a deceptive light4 ,and thus is kept up a state of things very satisfactory to some minds1 because1 without the unpleasant process of fining or imprisoning anybody1 it maintains all prevailing opinions outwardly undisturbed1 while it does not absolutely interdict the exercise of reason by dissentients afflicted with the malady of thought4 ,a convenient plan for having peace in the intellectual world1 and keeping all things going on therein very much as they do already4 ,but the price paid for this sort of intellectual pacification1 is the sacrifice of the entire moral courage of the human mind4 ,a state of things in which a large portion of the most active and inquiring intellects find it advisable to keep the genuine principles and grounds of their convictions within their own breasts1 and attempt1 in what they address to the public1 to fit as much as they can of their own conclusions to premises which they have internally renounced1 cannot send forth the open1 fearless characters1 and logical1 consistent intellects who once adorned the thinking world4 ,the sort of men who can be looked for under it1 are either mere conformers to commonplace1 or time-servers for truth1 whose arguments on all great subjects are meant for their hearers1 and are not those which have convinced themselves4 ,those who avoid this alternative1 do so by narrowing their thoughts and interest to things which can be spoken of without venturing within the region of principles1 that is1 to small practical matters1 which would come right of themselves1 if but the minds of mankind were strengthened and enlarged1 and which will never be made effectually right until then3 while that which would strengthen and enlarge men's minds1 free and daring speculation on the highest subjects1 is abandoned4 ,those in whose eyes this reticence on the part of heretics is no evil1 should consider in the first place1 that in consequence of it there is never any fair and thorough discussion of heretical opinions2 and that such of them as could not stand such a discussion1 though they may be prevented from spreading1 do not disappear4 ,but it is not the minds of heretics that are deteriorated most1 by the ban placed on all inquiry which does not end in the orthodox conclusions4 ,the greatest harm done is to those who are not heretics1 and whose whole mental development is cramped1 and their reason cowed1 by the fear of heresy4 ,who can compute what the world loses in the multitude of promising intellects combined with timid characters1 who dare not follow out any bold1 vigorous1 independent train of thought1 lest it should land them in something which would admit of being considered irreligious or immoral8 ,among them we may occasionally see some man of deep conscientiousness1 and subtle and refined understanding1 who spends a life in sophisticating with an intellect which he cannot silence1 and exhausts the resources of ingenuity in attempting to reconcile the promptings of his conscience and reason with orthodoxy1 which yet he does not1 perhaps1 to the end succeed in doing4 ,no one can be a great thinker who does not recognise1 that as a thinker it is his first duty to follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may lead4 ,truth gains more even by the errors of one who1 with due study and preparation1 thinks for himself1 than by the true opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer themselves to think4 ,not that it is solely1 or chiefly1 to form great thinkers1 that freedom of thinking is required4 ,on the contrary1 it is as much1 and even more indispensable1 to enable average human beings to attain the mental stature which they are capable of4 ,there have been1 and may again be1 great individual thinkers1 in a general atmosphere of mental slavery4 ,but there never has been1 nor ever will be1 in that atmosphere1 an intellectually active people4 ,where any people has made a temporary approach to such a character1 it has been because the dread of heterodox speculation was for a time suspended4 ,where there is a tacit convention that principles are not to be disputed2 where the discussion of the greatest questions which can occupy humanity is considered to be closed1 we cannot hope to find that generally high scale of mental activity which has made some periods of history so remarkable4 ,never when controversy avoided the subjects which are large and important enough to kindle enthusiasm1 was the mind of a people stirred up from its foundations1 and the impulse given which raised even persons of the most ordinary intellect to something of the dignity of thinking beings4 ,of such we have had an example in the condition of ,europe during the times immediately following the ,reformation2 another1 though limited to the ,continent and to a more cultivated class1 in the speculative movement of the latter half of the eighteenth century2 and a third1 of still briefer duration1 in the intellectual fermentation of ,germany during the ,goethian and ,fichtean period4 ,these periods differed widely in the particular opinions which they developed2 but were alike in this1 that during all three the yoke of authority was broken4 ,in each1 an old mental despotism had been thrown off1 and no new one had yet taken its place4 ,the impulse given at these three periods has made ,europe what it now is4 ,every single improvement which has taken place either in the human mind or in institutions1 may be traced distinctly to one or other of them4 ,appearances have for some time indicated that all three impulses are well-nigh spent2 and we can expect no fresh start1 until we again assert our mental freedom4 ,let us now pass to the second division of the argument1 and dismissing the supposition that any of the received opinions may be false1 let us assume them to be true1 and examine into the worth of the manner in which they are likely to be held1 when their truth is not freely and openly canvassed4 ,however unwillingly a person who has a strong opinion may admit the possibility that his opinion may be false1 he ought to be moved by the consideration that however true it may be1 if it is not fully1 frequently1 and fearlessly discussed1 it will be held as a dead dogma1 not a living truth4 ,there is a class of persons 7happily not quite so numerous as formerly7 who think it enough if a person assents undoubtingly to what they think true1 though he has no knowledge whatever of the grounds of the opinion1 and could not make a tenable defence of it against the most superficial objections4 ,such persons1 if they can once get their creed taught from authority1 naturally think that no good1 and some harm1 comes of its being allowed to be questioned4 ,where their influence prevails1 they make it nearly impossible for the received opinion to be rejected wisely and considerately1 though it may still be rejected rashly and ignorantly2 for to shut out discussion entirely is seldom possible1 and when it once gets in1 beliefs not grounded on conviction are apt to give way before the slightest semblance of an argument4 ,waiving1 however1 this possibility--assuming that the true opinion abides in the mind1 but abides as a prejudice1 a belief independent of1 and proof against1 argument--this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being4 ,this is not knowing the truth4 ,truth1 thus held1 is but one superstition the more1 accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth4 ,if the intellect and judgment of mankind ought to be cultivated1 a thing which ,protestants at least do not deny1 on what can these faculties be more appropriately exercised by any one1 than on the things which concern him so much that it is considered necessary for him to hold opinions on them8 ,if the cultivation of the understanding consists in one thing more than in another1 it is surely in learning the grounds of one's own opinions4 ,whatever people believe1 on subjects on which it is of the first importance to believe rightly1 they ought to be able to defend against at least the common objections4 ,but1 some one may say1 ,let them be taught the grounds of their opinions4 ,it does not follow that opinions must be merely parroted because they are never heard controverted4 ,persons who learn geometry do not simply commit the theorems to memory1 but understand and learn likewise the demonstrations2 and it would be absurd to say that they remain ignorant of the grounds of geometrical truths1 because they never hear any one deny1 and attempt to disprove them4 ,undoubtedly3 and such teaching suffices on a subject like mathematics1 where there is nothing at all to be said on the wrong side of the question4 ,the peculiarity of the evidence of mathematical truths is1 that all the argument is on one side4 ,there are no objections1 and no answers to objections4 ,but on every subject on which difference of opinion is possible1 the truth depends on a balance to be struck between two sets of conflicting reasons4 ,even in natural philosophy1 there is always some other explanation possible of the same facts2 some geocentric theory instead of heliocentric1 some phlogiston instead of oxygen2 and it has to be shown why that other theory cannot be the true one3 and until this is shown1 and until we know how it is shown1 we do not understand the grounds of our opinion4 ,but when we turn to subjects infinitely more complicated1 to morals1 religion1 politics1 social relations1 and the business of life1 three-fourths of the arguments for every disputed opinion consist in dispelling the appearances which favour some opinion different from it4 ,the greatest orator1 save one1 of antiquity1 has left it on record that he always studied his adversary's case with as great1 if not with still greater1 intensity than even his own4 ,what ,cicero practised as the means of forensic success1 requires to be imitated by all who study any subject in order to arrive at the truth4 ,he who knows only his own side of the case1 knows little of that4 ,his reasons may be good1 and no one may have been able to refute them4 ,but if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side2 if he does not so much as know what they are1 he has no ground for preferring either opinion4 ,the rational position for him would be suspension of judgment1 and unless he contents himself with that1 he is either led by authority1 or adopts1 like the generality of the world1 the side to which he feels most inclination4 ,nor is it enough that he should hear the arguments of adversaries from his own teachers1 presented as they state them1 and accompanied by what they offer as refutations4 ,that is not the way to do justice to the arguments1 or bring them into real contact with his own mind4 ,he must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them2 who defend them in earnest1 and do their very utmost for them4 ,he must know them in their most plausible and persuasive form2 he must feel the whole force of the difficulty which the true view of the subject has to encounter and dispose of2 else he will never really possess himself of the portion of truth which meets and removes that difficulty4 ,ninety-nine in a hundred of what are called educated men are in this condition2 even of those who can argue fluently for their opinions4 ,their conclusion may be true1 but it might be false for anything they know3 they have never thrown themselves into the mental position of those who think differently from them1 and considered what such persons may have to say2 and consequently they do not1 in any proper sense of the word1 know the doctrine which they themselves profess4 ,they do not know those parts of it which explain and justify the remainder2 the considerations which show that a fact which seemingly conflicts with another is reconcilable with it1 or that1 of two apparently strong reasons1 one and not the other ought to be preferred4 ,all that part of the truth which turns the scale1 and decides the judgment of a completely informed mind1 they are strangers to2 nor is it ever really known1 but to those who have attended equally and impartially to both sides1 and endeavoured to see the reasons of both in the strongest light4 ,so essential is this discipline to a real understanding of moral and human subjects1 that if opponents of all important truths do not exist1 it is indispensable to imagine them1 and supply them with the strongest arguments which the most skilful devil's advocate can conjure up4 ,to abate the force of these considerations1 an enemy of free discussion may be supposed to say1 that there is no necessity for mankind in general to know and understand all that can be said against or for their opinions by philosophers and theologians4 ,that it is not needful for common men to be able to expose all the misstatements or fallacies of an ingenious opponent4 ,that it is enough if there is always somebody capable of answering them1 so that nothing likely to mislead uninstructed persons remains unrefuted4 ,that simple minds1 having been taught the obvious grounds of the truths inculcated on them1 may trust to authority for the rest1 and being aware that they have neither knowledge nor talent to resolve every difficulty which can be raised1 may repose in the assurance that all those which have been raised have been or can be answered1 by those who are specially trained to the task4 ,conceding to this view of the subject the utmost that can be claimed for it by those most easily satisfied with the amount of understanding of truth which ought to accompany the belief of it2 even so1 the argument for free discussion is no way weakened4 ,for even this doctrine acknowledges that mankind ought to have a rational assurance that all objections have been satisfactorily answered2 and how are they to be answered if that which requires to be answered is not spoken8 or how can the answer be known to be satisfactory1 if the objectors have no opportunity of showing that it is unsatisfactory8 ,if not the public1 at least the philosophers and theologians who are to resolve the difficulties1 must make themselves familiar with those difficulties in their most puzzling form2 and this cannot be accomplished unless they are freely stated1 and placed in the most advantageous light which they admit of4 ,the ,catholic ,church has its own way of dealing with this embarrassing problem4 ,it makes a broad separation between those who can be permitted to receive its doctrines on conviction1 and those who must accept them on trust4 ,neither1 indeed1 are allowed any choice as to what they will accept2 but the clergy1 such at least as can be fully confided in1 may admissibly and meritoriously make themselves acquainted with the arguments of opponents1 in order to answer them1 and may1 therefore1 read heretical books2 the laity1 not unless by special permission1 hard to be obtained4 ,this discipline recognises a knowledge of the enemy's case as beneficial to the teachers1 but finds means1 consistent with this1 of denying it to the rest of the world3 thus giving to the lite more mental culture1 though not more mental freedom1 than it allows to the mass4 ,by this device it succeeds in obtaining the kind of mental superiority which its purposes require2 for though culture without freedom never made a large and liberal mind1 it can make a clever nisi prius advocate of a cause4 ,but in countries professing ,protestantism1 this resource is denied2 since ,protestants hold1 at least in theory1 that the responsibility for the choice of a religion must be borne by each for himself1 and cannot be thrown off upon teachers4 ,besides1 in the present state of the world1 it is practically impossible that writings which are read by the instructed can be kept from the uninstructed4 ,if the teachers of mankind are to be cognisant of all that they ought to know1 everything must be free to be written and published without restraint4 ,if1 however1 the mischievous operation of the absence of free discussion1 when the received opinions are true1 were confined to leaving men ignorant of the grounds of those opinions1 it might be thought that this1 if an intellectual1 is no moral evil1 and does not affect the worth of the opinions1 regarded in their influence on the character4 ,the fact1 however1 is1 that not only the grounds of the opinion are forgotten in the absence of discussion1 but too often the meaning of the opinion itself4 ,the words which convey it1 cease to suggest ideas1 or suggest only a small portion of those they were originally employed to communicate4 ,instead of a vivid conception and a living belief1 there remain only a few phrases retained by rote2 or1 if any part1 the shell and husk only of the meaning is retained1 the finer essence being lost4 ,the great chapter in human history which this fact occupies and fills1 cannot be too earnestly studied and meditated on4 ,it is illustrated in the experience of almost all ethical doctrines and religious creeds4 ,they are all full of meaning and vitality to those who originate them1 and to the direct disciples of the originators4 ,their meaning continues to be felt in undiminished strength1 and is perhaps brought out into even fuller consciousness1 so long as the struggle lasts to give the doctrine or creed an ascendency over other creeds4 ,at last it either prevails1 and becomes the general opinion1 or its progress stops2 it keeps possession of the ground it has gained1 but ceases to spread further4 ,when either of these results has become apparent1 controversy on the subject flags1 and gradually dies away4 ,the doctrine has taken its place1 if not as a received opinion1 as one of the admitted sects or divisions of opinion3 those who hold it have generally inherited1 not adopted it2 and conversion from one of these doctrines to another1 being now an exceptional fact1 occupies little place in the thoughts of their professors4 ,instead of being1 as at first1 constantly on the alert either to defend themselves against the world1 or to bring the world over to them1 they have subsided into acquiescence1 and neither listen1 when they can help it1 to arguments against their creed1 nor trouble dissentients 7if there be such7 with arguments in its favour4 ,from this time may usually be dated the decline in the living power of the doctrine4 ,we often hear the teachers of all creeds lamenting the difficulty of keeping up in the minds of believers a lively apprehension of the truth which they nominally recognise1 so that it may penetrate the feelings1 and acquire a real mastery over the conduct4 ,no such difficulty is complained of while the creed is still fighting for its existence3 even the weaker combatants then know and feel what they are fighting for1 and the difference between it and other doctrines2 and in that period of every creed's existence1 not a few persons may be found1 who have realised its fundamental principles in all the forms of thought1 have weighed and considered them in all their important bearings1 and have experienced the full effect on the character1 which belief in that creed ought to produce in a mind thoroughly imbued with it4 ,but when it has come to be a hereditary creed1 and to be received passively1 not actively--when the mind is no longer compelled1 in the same degree as at first1 to exercise its vital powers on the questions which its belief presents to it1 there is a progressive tendency to forget all of the belief except the formularies1 or to give it a dull and torpid assent1 as if accepting it on trust dispensed with the necessity of realising it in consciousness1 or testing it by personal experience2 until it almost ceases to connect itself at all with the inner life of the human being4 ,then are seen the cases1 so frequent in this age of the world as almost to form the majority1 in which the creed remains as it were outside the mind1 encrusting and petrifying it against all other influences addressed to the higher parts of our nature2 manifesting its power by not suffering any fresh and living conviction to get in1 but itself doing nothing for the mind or heart1 except standing sentinel over them to keep them vacant4 ,to what an extent doctrines intrinsically fitted to make the deepest impression upon the mind may remain in it as dead beliefs1 without being ever realised in the imagination1 the feelings1 or the understanding1 is exemplified by the manner in which the majority of believers hold the doctrines of ,christianity4 ,by ,christianity ,i here mean what is accounted such by all churches and sects--the maxims and precepts contained in the ,new ,testament4 ,these are considered sacred1 and accepted as laws1 by all professing ,christians4 ,yet it is scarcely too much to say that not one ,christian in a thousand guides or tests his individual conduct by reference to those laws4 ,the standard to which he does refer it1 is the custom of his nation1 his class1 or his religious profession4 ,he has thus1 on the one hand1 a collection of ethical maxims1 which he believes to have been vouchsafed to him by infallible wisdom as rules for his government2 and on the other1 a set of every-day judgments and practices1 which go a certain length with some of those maxims1 not so great a length with others1 stand in direct opposition to some1 and are1 on the whole1 a compromise between the ,christian creed and the interests and suggestions of worldly life4 ,to the first of these standards he gives his homage2 to the other his real allegiance4 ,all ,christians believe that the blessed are the poor and humble1 and those who are ill-used by the world2 that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven2 that they should judge not1 lest they be judged2 that they should swear not at all2 that they should love their neighbour as themselves2 that if one take their cloak1 they should give him their coat also2 that they should take no thought for the morrow2 that if they would be perfect1 they should sell all that they have and give it to the poor4 ,they are not insincere when they say that they believe these things4 ,they do believe them1 as people believe what they have always heard lauded and never discussed4 ,but in the sense of that living belief which regulates conduct1 they believe these doctrines just up to the point to which it is usual to act upon them4 ,the doctrines in their integrity are serviceable to pelt adversaries with2 and it is understood that they are to be put forward 7when possible7 as the reasons for whatever people do that they think laudable4 ,but any one who reminded them that the maxims require an infinity of things which they never even think of doing1 would gain nothing but to be classed among those very unpopular characters who affect to be better than other people4 ,the doctrines have no hold on ordinary believers--are not a power in their minds4 ,they have a habitual respect for the sound of them1 but no feeling which spreads from the words to the things signified1 and forces the mind to take them in1 and make them conform to the formula4 ,whenever conduct is concerned1 they look round for ,mr4 ,a and ,b to direct them how far to go in obeying ,christ4 ,now we may be well assured that the case was not thus1 but far otherwise1 with the early ,christians4 ,had it been thus1 ,christianity never would have expanded from an obscure sect of the despised ,hebrews into the religion of the ,roman empire4 ,when their enemies said1 ,see how these ,christians love one another 7a remark not likely to be made by anybody now71 they assuredly had a much livelier feeling of the meaning of their creed than they have ever had since4 ,and to this cause1 probably1 it is chiefly owing that ,christianity now makes so little progress in extending its domain1 and after eighteen centuries1 is still nearly confined to ,europeans and the descendants of ,europeans4 ,even with the strictly religious1 who are much in earnest about their doctrines1 and attach a greater amount of meaning to many of them than people in general1 it commonly happens that the part which is thus comparatively active in their minds is that which was made by ,calvin1 or ,knox1 or some such person much nearer in character to themselves4 ,the sayings of ,christ coexist passively in their minds1 producing hardly any effect beyond what is caused by mere listening to words so amiable and bland4 ,there are many reasons1 doubtless1 why doctrines which are the badge of a sect retain more of their vitality than those common to all recognised sects1 and why more pains are taken by teachers to keep their meaning alive2 but one reason certainly is1 that the peculiar doctrines are more questioned1 and have to be oftener defended against open gainsayers4 ,both teachers and learners go to sleep at their post1 as soon as there is no enemy in the field4 ,the same thing holds true1 generally speaking1 of all traditional doctrines--those of prudence and knowledge of life1 as well as of morals or religion4 ,all languages and literatures are full of general observations on life1 both as to what it is1 and how to conduct oneself in it2 observations which everybody knows1 which everybody repeats1 or hears with acquiescence1 which are received as truisms1 yet of which most people first truly learn the meaning1 when experience1 generally of a painful kind1 has made it a reality to them4 ,how often1 when smarting under some unforeseen misfortune or disappointment1 does a person call to mind some proverb or common saying1 familiar to him all his life1 the meaning of which1 if he had ever before felt it as he does now1 would have saved him from the calamity4 ,there are indeed reasons for this1 other than the absence of discussion3 there are many truths of which the full meaning cannot be realised1 until personal experience has brought it home4 ,but much more of the meaning even of these would have been understood1 and what was understood would have been far more deeply impressed on the mind1 if the man had been accustomed to hear it argued pro and con by people who did understand it4 ,the fatal tendency of mankind to leave off thinking about a thing when it is no longer doubtful1 is the cause of half their errors4 ,a contemporary author has well spoken of the deep slumber of a decided opinion4 ,but what6 7it may be asked7 ,is the absence of unanimity an indispensable condition of true knowledge8 ,is it necessary that some part of mankind should persist in error1 to enable any to realise the truth8 ,does a belief cease to be real and vital as soon as it is generally received--and is a proposition never thoroughly understood and felt unless some doubt of it remains8 ,as soon as mankind have unanimously accepted a truth1 does the truth perish within them8 ,the highest aim and best result of improved intelligence1 it has hitherto been thought1 is to unite mankind more and more in the acknowledgment of all important truths3 and does the intelligence only last as long as it has not achieved its object8 ,do the fruits of conquest perish by the very completeness of the victory8 ,i affirm no such thing4 ,as mankind improve1 the number of doctrines which are no longer disputed or doubted will be constantly on the increase3 and the well-being of mankind may almost be measured by the number and gravity of the truths which have reached the point of being uncontested4 ,the cessation1 on one question after another1 of serious controversy1 is one of the necessary incidents of the consolidation of opinion2 a consolidation as salutary in the case of true opinions1 as it is dangerous and noxious when the opinions are erroneous4 ,but though this gradual narrowing of the bounds of diversity of opinion is necessary in both senses of the term1 being at once inevitable and indispensable1 we are not therefore obliged to conclude that all its consequences must be beneficial4 ,the loss of so important an aid to the intelligent and living apprehension of a truth1 as is afforded by the necessity of explaining it to1 or defending it against1 opponents1 though not sufficient to outweigh1 is no trifling drawback from1 the benefit of its universal recognition4 ,where this advantage can no longer be had1 ,i confess ,i should like to see the teachers of mankind endeavouring to provide a substitute for it2 some contrivance for making the difficulties of the question as present to the learner's consciousness1 as if they were pressed upon him by a dissentient champion1 eager for his conversion4 ,but instead of seeking contrivances for this purpose1 they have lost those they formerly had4 ,the ,socratic dialectics1 so magnificently exemplified in the dialogues of ,plato1 were a contrivance of this description4 ,they were essentially a negative discussion of the great questions of philosophy and life1 directed with consummate skill to the purpose of convincing any one who had merely adopted the commonplaces of received opinion1 that he did not understand the subject--that he as yet attached no definite meaning to the doctrines he professed2 in order that1 becoming aware of his ignorance1 he might be put in the way to attain a stable belief1 resting on a clear apprehension both of the meaning of doctrines and of their evidence4 ,the school disputations of the middle ages had a somewhat similar object4 ,they were intended to make sure that the pupil understood his own opinion1 and 7by necessary correlation7 the opinion opposed to it1 and could enforce the grounds of the one and confute those of the other4 ,these last-mentioned contests had indeed the incurable defect1 that the premises appealed to were taken from authority1 not from reason2 and1 as a discipline to the mind1 they were in every respect inferior to the powerful dialectics which formed the intellects of the ,socratici viri3 but the modern mind owes far more to both than it is generally willing to admit1 and the present modes of education contain nothing which in the smallest degree supplies the place either of the one or of the other4 ,a person who derives all his instruction from teachers or books1 even if he escape the besetting temptation of contenting himself with cram1 is under no compulsion to hear both sides2 accordingly it is far from a frequent accomplishment1 even among thinkers1 to know both sides2 and the weakest part of what everybody says in defence of his opinion1 is what he intends as a reply to antagonists4 ,it is the fashion of the present time to disparage negative logic--that which points out weaknesses in theory or errors in practice1 without establishing positive truths4 ,such negative criticism would indeed be poor enough as an ultimate result2 but as a means to attaining any positive knowledge or conviction worthy the name1 it cannot be valued too highly2 and until people are again systematically trained to it1 there will be few great thinkers1 and a low general average of intellect1 in any but the mathematical and physical departments of speculation4 ,on any other subject no one's opinions deserve the name of knowledge1 except so far as he has either had forced upon him by others1 or gone through of himself1 the same mental process which would have been required of him in carrying on an active controversy with opponents4 ,that1 therefore1 which when absent1 it is so indispensable1 but so difficult1 to create1 how worse than absurd is it to forego1 when spontaneously offering itself6 ,if there are any persons who contest a received opinion1 or who will do so if law or opinion will let them1 let us thank them for it1 open our minds to listen to them1 and rejoice that there is some one to do for us what we otherwise ought1 if we have any regard for either the certainty or the vitality of our convictions1 to do with much greater labour for ourselves4 ,it still remains to speak of one of the principal causes which make diversity of opinion advantageous1 and will continue to do so until mankind shall have entered a stage of intellectual advancement which at present seems at an incalculable distance4 ,we have hitherto considered only two possibilities3 that the received opinion may be false1 and some other opinion1 consequently1 true2 or that1 the received opinion being true1 a conflict with the opposite error is essential to a clear apprehension and deep feeling of its truth4 ,but there is a commoner case than either of these2 when the conflicting doctrines1 instead of being one true and the other false1 share the truth between them2 and the nonconforming opinion is needed to supply the remainder of the truth1 of which the received doctrine embodies only a part4 ,popular opinions1 on subjects not palpable to sense1 are often true1 but seldom or never the whole truth4 ,they are a part of the truth2 sometimes a greater1 sometimes a smaller part1 but exaggerated1 distorted1 and disjoined from the truths by which they ought to be accompanied and limited4 ,heretical opinions1 on the other hand1 are generally some of these suppressed and neglected truths1 bursting the bonds which kept them down1 and either seeking reconciliation with the truth contained in the common opinion1 or fronting it as enemies1 and setting themselves up1 with similar exclusiveness1 as the whole truth4 ,the latter case is hitherto the most frequent1 as1 in the human mind1 one-sidedness has always been the rule1 and many-sidedness the exception4 ,hence1 even in revolutions of opinion1 one part of the truth usually sets while another rises4 ,even progress1 which ought to superadd1 for the most part only substitutes one partial and incomplete truth for another2 improvement consisting chiefly in this1 that the new fragment of truth is more wanted1 more adapted to the needs of the time1 than that which it displaces4 ,such being the partial character of prevailing opinions1 even when resting on a true foundation2 every opinion which embodies somewhat of the portion of truth which the common opinion omits1 ought to be considered precious1 with whatever amount of error and confusion that truth may be blended4 ,no sober judge of human affairs will feel bound to be indignant because those who force on our notice truths which we should otherwise have overlooked1 overlook some of those which we see4 ,rather1 he will think that so long as popular truth is one-sided1 it is more desirable than otherwise that unpopular truth should have one-sided asserters too2 such being usually the most energetic1 and the most likely to compel reluctant attention to the fragment of wisdom which they proclaim as if it were the whole4 ,thus1 in the eighteenth century1 when nearly all the instructed1 and all those of the uninstructed who were led by them1 were lost in admiration of what is called civilisation1 and of the marvels of modern science1 literature1 and philosophy1 and while greatly overrating the amount of unlikeness between the men of modern and those of ancient times1 indulged the belief that the whole of the difference was in their own favour2 with what a salutary shock did the paradoxes of ,rousseau explode like bombshells in the midst1 dislocating the compact mass of one-sided opinion1 and forcing its elements to recombine in a better form and with additional ingredients4 ,not that the current opinions were on the whole farther from the truth than ,rousseau's were2 on the contrary1 they were nearer to it2 they contained more of positive truth1 and very much less of error4 ,nevertheless there lay in ,rousseau's doctrine1 and has floated down the stream of opinion along with it1 a considerable amount of exactly those truths which the popular opinion wanted2 and these are the deposit which was left behind when the flood subsided4 ,the superior worth of simplicity of life1 the enervating and demoralising effect of the trammels and hypocrisies of artificial society1 are ideas which have never been entirely absent from cultivated minds since ,rousseau wrote2 and they will in time produce their due effect1 though at present needing to be asserted as much as ever1 and to be asserted by deeds1 for words1 on this subject1 have nearly exhausted their power4 ,in politics1 again1 it is almost a commonplace1 that a party of order or stability1 and a party of progress or reform1 are both necessary elements of a healthy state of political life2 until the one or the other shall have so enlarged its mental grasp as to be a party equally of order and of progress1 knowing and distinguishing what is fit to be preserved from what ought to be swept away4 ,each of these modes of thinking derives its utility from the deficiencies of the other2 but it is in a great measure the opposition of the other that keeps each within the limits of reason and sanity4 ,unless opinions favourable to democracy and to aristocracy1 to property and to equality1 to co-operation and to competition1 to luxury and to abstinence1 to sociality and individuality1 to liberty and discipline1 and all the other standing antagonisms of practical life1 are expressed with equal freedom1 and enforced and defended with equal talent and energy1 there is no chance of both elements obtaining their due2 one scale is sure to go up and the other down4 ,truth1 in the great practical concerns of life1 is so much a question of the reconciling and combining of opposites1 that very few have minds sufficiently capacious and impartial to make the adjustment with an approach to correctness1 and it has to be made by the rough process of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners4 ,on any of the great open questions just enumerated1 if either of the two opinions has a better claim than the other1 not merely to be tolerated1 but to be encouraged and countenanced1 it is the one which happens at the particular time and place to be in a minority4 ,that is the opinion which1 for the time being1 represents the neglected interests1 the side of human well-being which is in danger of obtaining less than its share4 ,i am aware that there is not1 in this country1 any intolerance of differences of opinion on most of these topics4 ,they are adduced to show1 by admitted and multiplied examples1 the universality of the fact1 that only through diversity of opinion is there1 in the existing state of human intellect1 a chance of fair-play to all sides of the truth4 ,when there are persons to be found1 who form an exception to the apparent unanimity of the world on any subject1 even if the world is in the right1 it is always probable that dissentients have something worth hearing to say for themselves1 and that truth would lose something by their silence4 ,it may be objected1 ,but some received principles1 especially on the highest and most vital subjects1 are more than half-truths4 ,the ,christian morality1 for instance1 is the whole truth on that subject1 and if any one teaches a morality which varies from it1 he is wholly in error4 ,as this is of all cases the most important in practice1 none can be fitter to test the general maxim4 ,but before pronouncing what ,christian morality is or is not1 it would be desirable to decide what is meant by ,christian morality4 ,if it means the morality of the ,new ,testament1 ,i wonder that any one who derives his knowledge of this from the book itself1 can suppose that it was announced1 or intended1 as a complete doctrine of morals4 ,the ,gospel always refers to a pre-existing morality1 and confines its precepts to the particulars in which that morality was to be corrected1 or superseded by a wider and higher2 expressing itself1 moreover1 in terms most general1 often impossible to be interpreted literally1 and possessing rather the impressiveness of poetry or eloquence than the precision of legislation4 ,to extract from it a body of ethical doctrine1 has ever been possible without eking it out from the ,old ,testament1 that is1 from a system elaborate indeed1 but in many respects barbarous1 and intended only for a barbarous people4 ,st4 ,paul1 a declared enemy to this ,judaical mode of interpreting the doctrine and filling up the scheme of his ,master1 equally assumes a pre-existing morality1 namely1 that of the ,greeks and ,romans2 and his advice to ,christians is in a great measure a system of accommodation to that2 even to the extent of giving an apparent sanction to slavery4 ,what is called ,christian1 but should rather be termed theological1 morality1 was not the work of ,christ or the ,apostles1 but is of much later origin1 having been gradually built up by the ,catholic church of the first five centuries1 and though not implicitly adopted by moderns and ,protestants1 has been much less modified by them than might have been expected4 ,for the most part1 indeed1 they have contented themselves with cutting off the additions which had been made to it in the middle ages1 each sect supplying the place by fresh additions1 adapted to its own character and tendencies4 ,that mankind owe a great debt to this morality1 and to its early teachers1 ,i should be the last person to deny2 but ,i do not scruple to say of it1 that it is1 in many important points1 incomplete and one-sided1 and that unless ideas and feelings1 not sanctioned by it1 had contributed to the formation of ,european life and character1 human affairs would have been in a worse condition than they now are4 ,christian morality 7so called7 has all the characters of a reaction2 it is1 in great part1 a protest against ,paganism4 ,its ideal is negative rather than positive2 passive rather than active2 ,innocence rather than ,nobleness2 ,abstinence from ,evil1 rather than energetic ,pursuit of ,good3 in its precepts 7as has been well said7 thou shalt not predominates unduly over thou shalt4 ,in its horror of sensuality1 it made an idol of asceticism1 which has been gradually compromised away into one of legality4 ,it holds out the hope of heaven and the threat of hell1 as the appointed and appropriate motives to a virtuous life3 in this falling far below the best of the ancients1 and doing what lies in it to give to human morality an essentially selfish character1 by disconnecting each man's feelings of duty from the interests of his fellow-creatures1 except so far as a self-interested inducement is offered to him for consulting them4 ,it is essentially a doctrine of passive obedience2 it inculcates submission to all authorities found established2 who indeed are not to be actively obeyed when they command what religion forbids1 but who are not to be resisted1 far less rebelled against1 for any amount of wrong to ourselves4 ,and while1 in the morality of the best ,pagan nations1 duty to the ,state holds even a disproportionate place1 infringing on the just liberty of the individual2 in purely ,christian ethics1 that grand department of duty is scarcely noticed or acknowledged4 ,it is in the ,koran1 not the ,new ,testament1 that we read the maxim--,a ruler who appoints any man to an office1 when there is in his dominions another man better qualified for it1 sins against ,god and against the ,state4 ,what little recognition the idea of obligation to the public obtains in modern morality1 is derived from ,greek and ,roman sources1 not from ,christian2 as1 even in the morality of private life1 whatever exists of magnanimity1 high-mindedness1 personal dignity1 even the sense of honour1 is derived from the purely human1 not the religious part of our education1 and never could have grown out of a standard of ethics in which the only worth1 professedly recognised1 is that of obedience4 ,i am as far as any one from pretending that these defects are necessarily inherent in the ,christian ethics1 in every manner in which it can be conceived1 or that the many requisites of a complete moral doctrine which it does not contain1 do not admit of being reconciled with it4 ,far less would ,i insinuate this of the doctrines and precepts of ,christ himself4 ,i believe that the sayings of ,christ are all1 that ,i can see any evidence of their having been intended to be2 that they are irreconcilable with nothing which a comprehensive morality requires2 that everything which is excellent in ethics may be brought within them1 with no greater violence to their language than has been done to it by all who have attempted to deduce from them any practical system of conduct whatever4 ,but it is quite consistent with this1 to believe that they contain1 and were meant to contain1 only a part of the truth2 that many essential elements of the highest morality are among the things which are not provided for1 nor intended to be provided for1 in the recorded deliverances of the ,founder of ,christianity1 and which have been entirely thrown aside in the system of ethics erected on the basis of those deliverances by the ,christian ,church4 ,and this being so1 ,i think it a great error to persist in attempting to find in the ,christian doctrine that complete rule for our guidance1 which its author intended it to sanction and enforce1 but only partially to provide4 ,i believe1 too1 that this narrow theory is becoming a grave practical evil1 detracting greatly from the value of the moral training and instruction1 which so many well-meaning persons are now at length exerting themselves to promote4 ,i much fear that by attempting to form the mind and feelings on an exclusively religious type1 and discarding those secular standards 7as for want of a better name they may be called7 which heretofore co-existed with and supplemented the ,christian ethics1 receiving some of its spirit1 and infusing into it some of theirs1 there will result1 and is even now resulting1 a low1 abject1 servile type of character1 which1 submit itself as it may to what it deems the ,supreme ,will1 is incapable of rising to or sympathising in the conception of ,supreme ,goodness4 ,i believe that other ethics than any which can be evolved from exclusively ,christian sources1 must exist side by side with ,christian ethics to produce the moral regeneration of mankind2 and that the ,christian system is no exception to the rule1 that in an imperfect state of the human mind1 the interests of truth require a diversity of opinions4 ,it is not necessary that in ceasing to ignore the moral truths not contained in ,christianity1 men should ignore any of those which it does contain4 ,such prejudice1 or oversight1 when it occurs1 is altogether an evil2 but it is one from which we cannot hope to be always exempt1 and must be regarded as the price paid for an inestimable good4 ,the exclusive pretension made by a part of the truth to be the whole1 must and ought to be protested against1 and if a reactionary impulse should make the protestors unjust in their turn1 this one-sidedness1 like the other1 may be lamented1 but must be tolerated4 ,if ,christians would teach infidels to be just to ,christianity1 they should themselves be just to infidelity4 ,it can do truth no service to blink the fact1 known to all who have the most ordinary acquaintance with literary history1 that a large portion of the noblest and most valuable moral teaching has been the work1 not only of men who did not know1 but of men who knew and rejected1 the ,christian faith4 ,i do not pretend that the most unlimited use of the freedom of enunciating all possible opinions would put an end to the evils of religious or philosophical sectarianism4 ,every truth which men of narrow capacity are in earnest about1 is sure to be asserted1 inculcated1 and in many ways even acted on1 as if no other truth existed in the world1 or at all events none that could limit or qualify the first4 ,i acknowledge that the tendency of all opinions to become sectarian is not cured by the freest discussion1 but is often heightened and exacerbated thereby2 the truth which ought to have been1 but was not1 seen1 being rejected all the more violently because proclaimed by persons regarded as opponents4 ,but it is not on the impassioned partisan1 it is on the calmer and more disinterested bystander1 that this collision of opinions works its salutary effect4 ,not the violent conflict between parts of the truth1 but the quiet suppression of half of it1 is the formidable evil3 there is always hope when people are forced to listen to both sides2 it is when they attend only to one that errors harden into prejudices1 and truth itself ceases to have the effect of truth1 by being exaggerated into falsehood4 ,and since there are few mental attributes more rare than that judicial faculty which can sit in intelligent judgment between two sides of a question1 of which only one is represented by an advocate before it1 truth has no chance but in proportion as every side of it1 every opinion which embodies any fraction of the truth1 not only finds advocates1 but is so advocated as to be listened to4 ,we have now recognised the necessity to the mental well-being of mankind 7on which all their other well-being depends7 of freedom of opinion1 and freedom of the expression of opinion1 on four distinct grounds2 which we will now briefly recapitulate4 ,first1 if any opinion is compelled to silence1 that opinion may1 for aught we can certainly know1 be true4 ,to deny this is to assume our own infallibility4 ,secondly1 though the silenced opinion be an error1 it may1 and very commonly does1 contain a portion of truth2 and since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth1 it is only by the collision of adverse opinions1 that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied4 ,thirdly1 even if the received opinion be not only true1 but the whole truth2 unless it is suffered to be1 and actually is1 vigorously and earnestly contested1 it will1 by most of those who receive it1 be held in the manner of a prejudice1 with little comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds4 ,and not only this1 but1 fourthly1 the meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost1 or enfeebled1 and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct3 the dogma becoming a mere formal profession1 inefficacious for good1 but cumbering the ground1 and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction1 from reason or personal experience4 ,before quitting the subject of freedom of opinion1 it is fit to take some notice of those who say1 that the free expression of all opinions should be permitted1 on condition that the manner be temperate1 and do not pass the bounds of fair discussion4 ,much might be said on the impossibility of fixing where these supposed bounds are to be placed2 for if the test be offence to those whose opinion is attacked1 ,i think experience testifies that this offence is given whenever the attack is telling and powerful1 and that every opponent who pushes them hard1 and whom they find it difficult to answer1 appears to them1 if he shows any strong feeling on the subject1 an intemperate opponent4 ,but this1 though an important consideration in a practical point of view1 merges in a more fundamental objection4 ,undoubtedly the manner of asserting an opinion1 even though it be a true one1 may be very objectionable1 and may justly incur severe censure4 ,but the principal offences of the kind are such as it is mostly impossible1 unless by accidental self-betrayal1 to bring home to conviction4 ,the gravest of them is1 to argue sophistically1 to suppress facts or arguments1 to misstate the elements of the case1 or misrepresent the opposite opinion4 ,but all this1 even to the most aggravated degree1 is so continually done in perfect good faith1 by persons who are not considered1 and in many other respects may not deserve to be considered1 ignorant or incompetent1 that it is rarely possible on adequate grounds conscientiously to stamp the misrepresentation as morally culpable2 and still less could law presume to interfere with this kind of controversial misconduct4 ,with regard to what is commonly meant by intemperate discussion1 namely invective1 sarcasm1 personality1 and the like1 the denunciation of these weapons would deserve more sympathy if it were ever proposed to interdict them equally to both sides2 but it is only desired to restrain the employment of them against the prevailing opinion3 against the unprevailing they may not only be used without general disapproval1 but will be likely to obtain for him who uses them the praise of honest zeal and righteous indignation4 ,yet whatever mischief arises from their use1 is greatest when they are employed against the comparatively defenceless2 and whatever unfair advantage can be derived by any opinion from this mode of asserting it1 accrues almost exclusively to received opinions4 ,the worst offence of this kind which can be committed by a polemic1 is to stigmatise those who hold the contrary opinion as bad and immoral men4 ,to calumny of this sort1 those who hold any unpopular opinion are peculiarly exposed1 because they are in general few and uninfluential1 and nobody but themselves feel much interest in seeing justice done them2 but this weapon is1 from the nature of the case1 denied to those who attack a prevailing opinion3 they can neither use it with safety to themselves1 nor1 if they could1 would it do anything but recoil on their own cause4 ,in general1 opinions contrary to those commonly received can only obtain a hearing by studied moderation of language1 and the most cautious avoidance of unnecessary offence1 from which they hardly ever deviate even in a slight degree without losing ground3 while unmeasured vituperation employed on the side of the prevailing opinion1 really does deter people from professing contrary opinions1 and from listening to those who profess them4 ,for the interest1 therefore1 of truth and justice1 it is far more important to restrain this employment of vituperative language than the other2 and1 for example1 if it were necessary to choose1 there would be much more need to discourage offensive attacks on infidelity1 than on religion4 ,it is1 however1 obvious that law and authority have no business with restraining either1 while opinion ought1 in every instance1 to determine its verdict by the circumstances of the individual case2 condemning every one1 on whichever side of the argument he places himself1 in whose mode of advocacy either want of candour1 or malignity1 bigotry1 or intolerance of feeling manifest themselves2 but not inferring these vices from the side which a person takes1 though it be the contrary side of the question to our own3 and giving merited honour to every one1 whatever opinion he may hold1 who has calmness to see and honesty to state what his opponents and their opinions really are1 exaggerating nothing to their discredit1 keeping nothing back which tells1 or can be supposed to tell1 in their favour4 ,this is the real morality of public discussion2 and if often violated1 ,i am happy to think that there are many controversialists who to a great extent observe it1 and a still greater number who conscientiously strive towards it4 ,,footnotes3 #f ,these words had scarcely been written1 when1 as if to give them an emphatic contradiction1 occurred the ,government ,press ,prosecutions of #aheh4 ,that ill-judged interference with the liberty of public discussion has not1 however1 induced me to alter a single word in the text1 nor has it at all weakened my conviction that1 moments of panic excepted1 the era of pains and penalties for political discussion has1 in our own country1 passed away4 ,for1 in the first place1 the prosecutions were not persisted in2 and1 in the second1 they were never1 properly speaking1 political prosecutions4 ,the offence charged was not that of criticising institutions1 or the acts or persons of rulers1 but of circulating what was deemed an immoral doctrine1 the lawfulness of ,tyrannicide4 ,if the arguments of the present chapter are of any validity1 there ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing1 as a matter of ethical conviction1 any doctrine1 however immoral it may be considered4 ,it would1 therefore1 be irrelevant and out of place to examine here1 whether the doctrine of ,tyrannicide deserves that title4 ,i shall content myself with saying1 that the subject has been at all times one of the open questions of morals2 that the act of a private citizen in striking down a criminal1 who1 by raising himself above the law1 has placed himself beyond the reach of legal punishment or control1 has been accounted by whole nations1 and by some of the best and wisest of men1 not a crime1 but an act of exalted virtue2 and that1 right or wrong1 it is not of the nature of assassination1 but of civil war4 ,as such1 ,i hold that the instigation to it1 in a specific case1 may be a proper subject of punishment1 but only if an overt act has followed1 and at least a probable connection can be established between the act and the instigation4 ,even then1 it is not a foreign government1 but the very government assailed1 which alone1 in the exercise of self-defence1 can legitimately punish attacks directed against its own existence4 #g ,thomas ,pooley1 ,bodmin ,assizes1 ,july #ca1 #aheg4 ,in ,december following1 he received a free pardon from the ,crown4 #h ,george ,jacob ,holyoake1 ,august #ag1 #aheg2 ,edward ,truelove1 ,july1 #aheg4 #i ,baron de ,gleichen1 ,marlborough-,street ,police ,court1 ,august #d1 #aheg4 #aj ,ample warning may be drawn from the large infusion of the passions of a persecutor1 which mingled with the general display of the worst parts of our national character on the occasion of the ,sepoy insurrection4 ,the ravings of fanatics or charlatans from the pulpit may be unworthy of notice2 but the heads of the ,evangelical party have announced as their principle1 for the government of ,hindoos and ,mahomedans1 that no schools be supported by public money in which the ,bible is not taught1 and by necessary consequence that no public employment be given to any but real or pretended ,christians4 ,an ,under-,secretary of ,state1 in a speech delivered to his constituents on the #abth of ,november1 #aheg1 is reported to have said3 ,toleration of their faith 7the faith of a hundred millions of ,british subjects71 the superstition which they called religion1 by the ,british ,government1 had had the effect of retarding the ascendency of the ,british name1 and preventing the salutary growth of ,christianity4444 ,toleration was the great corner-stone of the religious liberties of this country2 but do not let them abuse that precious word toleration4 ,as he understood it1 it meant the complete liberty to all1 freedom of worship1 among ,christians1 who worshipped upon the same foundation4 ,it meant toleration of all sects and denominations of ,christians who believed in the one mediation4 ,i desire to call attention to the fact1 that a man who has been deemed fit to fill a high office in the government of this country1 under a liberal ,ministry1 maintains the doctrine that all who do not believe in the divinity of ,christ are beyond the pale of toleration4 ,who1 after this imbecile display1 can indulge the illusion that religious persecution has passed away1 never to return8 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,of ,,individuality1 ,,as ,,one ,,of ,,the ,,elements ,,of ,,well-,,being4 ,such being the reasons which make it imperative that human beings should be free to form opinions1 and to express their opinions without reserve2 and such the baneful consequences to the intellectual1 and through that to the moral nature of man1 unless this liberty is either conceded1 or asserted in spite of prohibition2 let us next examine whether the same reasons do not require that men should be free to act upon their opinions--to carry these out in their lives1 without hindrance1 either physical or moral1 from their fellow-men1 so long as it is at their own risk and peril4 ,this last proviso is of course indispensable4 ,no one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions4 ,on the contrary1 even opinions lose their immunity1 when the circumstances in which they are expressed are such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act4 ,an opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor1 or that private property is robbery1 ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press1 but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn-dealer1 or when handed about among the same mob in the form of a placard4 ,acts1 of whatever kind1 which1 without justifiable cause1 do harm to others1 may be1 and in the more important cases absolutely require to be1 controlled by the unfavourable sentiments1 and1 when needful1 by the active interference of mankind4 ,the liberty of the individual must be thus far limited2 he must not make himself a nuisance to other people4 ,but if he refrains from molesting others in what concerns them1 and merely acts according to his own inclination and judgment in things which concern himself1 the same reasons which show that opinion should be free1 prove also that he should be allowed1 without molestation1 to carry his opinions into practice at his own cost4 ,that mankind are not infallible2 that their truths1 for the most part1 are only half-truths2 that unity of opinion1 unless resulting from the fullest and freest comparison of opposite opinions1 is not desirable1 and diversity not an evil1 but a good1 until mankind are much more capable than at present of recognising all sides of the truth1 are principles applicable to men's modes of action1 not less than to their opinions4 ,as it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions1 so is it that there should be different experiments of living2 that free scope should be given to varieties of character1 short of injury to others2 and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically1 when any one thinks fit to try them4 ,it is desirable1 in short1 that in things which do not primarily concern others1 individuality should assert itself4 ,where1 not the person's own character1 but the traditions or customs of other people are the rule of conduct1 there is wanting one of the principal ingredients of human happiness1 and quite the chief ingredient of individual and social progress4 ,in maintaining this principle1 the greatest difficulty to be encountered does not lie in the appreciation of means towards an acknowledged end1 but in the indifference of persons in general to the end itself4 ,if it were felt that the free development of individuality is one of the leading essentials of well-being2 that it is not only a co-ordinate element with all that is designated by the terms civilisation1 instruction1 education1 culture1 but is itself a necessary part and condition of all those things2 there would be no danger that liberty should be under-valued1 and the adjustment of the boundaries between it and social control would present no extraordinary difficulty4 ,but the evil is1 that individual spontaneity is hardly recognised by the common modes of thinking1 as having any intrinsic worth1 or deserving any regard on its own account4 ,the majority1 being satisfied with the ways of mankind as they now are 7for it is they who make them what they are71 cannot comprehend why those ways should not be good enough for everybody2 and what is more1 spontaneity forms no part of the ideal of the majority of moral and social reformers1 but is rather looked on with jealousy1 as a troublesome and perhaps rebellious obstruction to the general acceptance of what these reformers1 in their own judgment1 think would be best for mankind4 ,few persons1 out of ,germany1 even comprehend the meaning of the doctrine which ,wilhelm von ,humboldt1 so eminent both as a savant and as a politician1 made the text of a treatise--that the end of man1 or that which is prescribed by the eternal or immutable dictates of reason1 and not suggested by vague and transient desires1 is the highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole2 that1 therefore1 the object towards which every human being must ceaselessly direct his efforts1 and on which especially those who design to influence their fellow-men must ever keep their eyes1 is the individuality of power and development2 that for this there are two requisites1 freedom1 and a variety of situations2 and that from the union of these arise individual vigour and manifold diversity1 which combine themselves in originality4#aa ,little1 however1 as people are accustomed to a doctrine like that of ,von ,humboldt1 and surprising as it may be to them to find so high a value attached to individuality1 the question1 one must nevertheless think1 can only be one of degree4 ,no one's idea of excellence in conduct is that people should do absolutely nothing but copy one another4 ,no one would assert that people ought not to put into their mode of life1 and into the conduct of their concerns1 any impress whatever of their own judgment1 or of their own individual character4 ,on the other hand1 it would be absurd to pretend that people ought to live as if nothing whatever had been known in the world before they came into it2 as if experience had as yet done nothing towards showing that one mode of existence1 or of conduct1 is preferable to another4 ,nobody denies that people should be so taught and trained in youth1 as to know and benefit by the ascertained results of human experience4 ,but it is the privilege and proper condition of a human being1 arrived at the maturity of his faculties1 to use and interpret experience in his own way4 ,it is for him to find out what part of recorded experience is properly applicable to his own circumstances and character4 ,the traditions and customs of other people are1 to a certain extent1 evidence of what their experience has taught them2 presumptive evidence1 and as such1 have a claim to his deference3 but1 in the first place1 their experience may be too narrow2 or they may not have interpreted it rightly4 ,secondly1 their interpretation of experience may be correct1 but unsuitable to him4 ,customs are made for customary circumstances1 and customary characters3 and his circumstances or his character may be uncustomary4 ,thirdly1 though the customs be both good as customs1 and suitable to him1 yet to conform to custom1 merely as custom1 does not educate or develop in him any of the qualities which are the distinctive endowment of a human being4 ,the human faculties of perception1 judgment1 discriminative feeling1 mental activity1 and even moral preference1 are exercised only in making a choice4 ,he who does anything because it is the custom1 makes no choice4 ,he gains no practice either in discerning or in desiring what is best4 ,the mental and moral1 like the muscular powers1 are improved only by being used4 ,the faculties are called into no exercise by doing a thing merely because others do it1 no more than by believing a thing only because others believe it4 ,if the grounds of an opinion are not conclusive to the person's own reason1 his reason cannot be strengthened1 but is likely to be weakened by his adopting it3 and if the inducements to an act are not such as are consentaneous to his own feelings and character 7where affection1 or the rights of others1 are not concerned71 it is so much done towards rendering his feelings and character inert and torpid1 instead of active and energetic4 ,he who lets the world1 or his own portion of it1 choose his plan of life for him1 has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation4 ,he who chooses his plan for himself1 employs all his faculties4 ,he must use observation to see1 reasoning and judgment to foresee1 activity to gather materials for decision1 discrimination to decide1 and when he has decided1 firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision4 ,and these qualities he requires and exercises exactly in proportion as the part of his conduct which he determines according to his own judgment and feelings is a large one4 ,it is possible that he might be guided in some good path1 and kept out of harm's way1 without any of these things4 ,but what will be his comparative worth as a human being8 ,it really is of importance1 not only what men do1 but also what manner of men they are that do it4 ,among the works of man1 which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying1 the first in importance surely is man himself4 ,supposing it were possible to get houses built1 corn grown1 battles fought1 causes tried1 and even churches erected and prayers said1 by machinery--by automatons in human form--it would be a considerable loss to exchange for these automatons even the men and women who at present inhabit the more civilised parts of the world1 and who assuredly are but starved specimens of what nature can and will produce4 ,human nature is not a machine to be built after a model1 and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it1 but a tree1 which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides1 according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing4 ,it will probably be conceded that it is desirable people should exercise their understandings1 and that an intelligent following of custom1 or even occasionally an intelligent deviation from custom1 is better than a blind and simply mechanical adhesion to it4 ,to a certain extent it is admitted1 that our understanding should be our own3 but there is not the same willingness to admit that our desires and impulses should be our own likewise2 or that to possess impulses of our own1 and of any strength1 is anything but a peril and a snare4 ,yet desires and impulses are as much a part of a perfect human being1 as beliefs and restraints3 and strong impulses are only perilous when not properly balanced2 when one set of aims and inclinations is developed into strength1 while others1 which ought to co-exist with them1 remain weak and inactive4 ,it is not because men's desires are strong that they act ill2 it is because their consciences are weak4 ,there is no natural connection between strong impulses and a weak conscience4 ,the natural connection is the other way4 ,to say that one person's desires and feelings are stronger and more various than those of another1 is merely to say that he has more of the raw material of human nature1 and is therefore capable1 perhaps of more evil1 but certainly of more good4 ,strong impulses are but another name for energy4 ,energy may be turned to bad uses2 but more good may always be made of an energetic nature1 than of an indolent and impassive one4 ,those who have most natural feeling1 are always those whose cultivated feelings may be made the strongest4 ,the same strong susceptibilities which make the personal impulses vivid and powerful1 are also the source from whence are generated the most passionate love of virtue1 and the sternest self-control4 ,it is through the cultivation of these1 that society both does its duty and protects its interests3 not by rejecting the stuff of which heroes are made1 because it knows not how to make them4 ,a person whose desires and impulses are his own--are the expression of his own nature1 as it has been developed and modified by his own culture--is said to have a character4 ,one whose desires and impulses are not his own1 has no character1 no more than a steam-engine has a character4 ,if1 in addition to being his own1 his impulses are strong1 and are under the government of a strong will1 he has an energetic character4 ,whoever thinks that individuality of desires and impulses should not be encouraged to unfold itself1 must maintain that society has no need of strong natures--is not the better for containing many persons who have much character--and that a high general average of energy is not desirable4 ,in some early states of society1 these forces might be1 and were1 too much ahead of the power which society then possessed of disciplining and controlling them4 ,there has been a time when the element of spontaneity and individuality was in excess1 and the social principle had a hard struggle with it4 ,the difficulty then was1 to induce men of strong bodies or minds to pay obedience to any rules which required them to control their impulses4 ,to overcome this difficulty1 law and discipline1 like the ,popes struggling against the ,emperors1 asserted a power over the whole man1 claiming to control all his life in order to control his character--which society had not found any other sufficient means of binding4 ,but society has now fairly got the better of individuality2 and the danger which threatens human nature is not the excess1 but the deficiency1 of personal impulses and preferences4 ,things are vastly changed1 since the passions of those who were strong by station or by personal endowment were in a state of habitual rebellion against laws and ordinances1 and required to be rigorously chained up to enable the persons within their reach to enjoy any particle of security4 ,in our times1 from the highest class of society down to the lowest1 every one lives as under the eye of a hostile and dreaded censorship4 ,not only in what concerns others1 but in what concerns only themselves1 the individual1 or the family1 do not ask themselves--what do ,i prefer8 or1 what would suit my character and disposition8 or1 what would allow the best and highest in me to have fair-play1 and enable it to grow and thrive8 ,they ask themselves1 what is suitable to my position8 what is usually done by persons of my station and pecuniary circumstances8 or 7worse still7 what is usually done by persons of a station and circumstances superior to mine8 ,i do not mean that they choose what is customary1 in preference to what suits their own inclination4 ,it does not occur to them to have any inclination1 except for what is customary4 ,thus the mind itself is bowed to the yoke3 even in what people do for pleasure1 conformity is the first thing thought of2 they live in crowds2 they exercise choice only among things commonly done3 peculiarity of taste1 eccentricity of conduct1 are shunned equally with crimes3 until by dint of not following their own nature1 they have no nature to follow3 their human capacities are withered and starved3 they become incapable of any strong wishes or native pleasures1 and are generally without either opinions or feelings of home growth1 or properly their own4 ,now is this1 or is it not1 the desirable condition of human nature8 ,it is so1 on the ,calvinistic theory4 ,according to that1 the one great offence of man is ,self-will4 ,all the good of which humanity is capable1 is comprised in ,obedience4 ,you have no choice2 thus you must do1 and no otherwise3 whatever is not a duty1 is a sin4 ,human nature being radically corrupt1 there is no redemption for any one until human nature is killed within him4 ,to one holding this theory of life1 crushing out any of the human faculties1 capacities1 and susceptibilities1 is no evil3 man needs no capacity1 but that of surrendering himself to the will of ,god3 and if he uses any of his faculties for any other purpose but to do that supposed will more effectually1 he is better without them4 ,that is the theory of ,calvinism2 and it is held1 in a mitigated form1 by many who do not consider themselves ,calvinists2 the mitigation consisting in giving a less ascetic interpretation to the alleged will of ,god2 asserting it to be his will that mankind should gratify some of their inclinations2 of course not in the manner they themselves prefer1 but in the way of obedience1 that is1 in a way prescribed to them by authority2 and1 therefore1 by the necessary conditions of the case1 the same for all4 ,in some such insidious form there is at present a strong tendency to this narrow theory of life1 and to the pinched and hidebound type of human character which it patronises4 ,many persons1 no doubt1 sincerely think that human beings thus cramped and dwarfed1 are as their ,maker designed them to be2 just as many have thought that trees are a much finer thing when clipped into pollards1 or cut out into figures of animals1 than as nature made them4 ,but if it be any part of religion to believe that man was made by a good being1 it is more consistent with that faith to believe1 that this ,being gave all human faculties that they might be cultivated and unfolded1 not rooted out and consumed1 and that he takes delight in every nearer approach made by his creatures to the ideal conception embodied in them1 every increase in any of their capabilities of comprehension1 of action1 or of enjoyment4 ,there is a different type of human excellence from the ,calvinistic2 a conception of humanity as having its nature bestowed on it for other purposes than merely to be abnegated4 ,pagan self-assertion is one of the elements of human worth1 as well as ,christian self-denial4#ab ,there is a ,greek ideal of self-development1 which the ,platonic and ,christian ideal of self-government blends with1 but does not supersede4 ,it may be better to be a ,john ,knox than an ,alcibiades1 but it is better to be a ,pericles than either2 nor would a ,pericles1 if we had one in these days1 be without anything good which belonged to ,john ,knox4 ,it is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves1 but by cultivating it and calling it forth1 within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others1 that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation2 and as the works partake the character of those who do them1 by the same process human life also becomes rich1 diversified1 and animating1 furnishing more abundant aliment to high thoughts and elevating feelings1 and strengthening the tie which binds every individual to the race1 by making the race infinitely better worth belonging to4 ,in proportion to the development of his individuality1 each person becomes more valuable to himself1 and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others4 ,there is a greater fulness of life about his own existence1 and when there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is composed of them4 ,as much compression as is necessary to prevent the stronger specimens of human nature from encroaching on the rights of others1 cannot be dispensed with2 but for this there is ample compensation even in the point of view of human development4 ,the means of development which the individual loses by being prevented from gratifying his inclinations to the injury of others1 are chiefly obtained at the expense of the development of other people4 ,and even to himself there is a full equivalent in the better development of the social part of his nature1 rendered possible by the restraint put upon the selfish part4 ,to be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others1 develops the feelings and capacities which have the good of others for their object4 ,but to be restrained in things not affecting their good1 by their mere displeasure1 develops nothing valuable1 except such force of character as may unfold itself in resisting the restraint4 ,if acquiesced in1 it dulls and blunts the whole nature4 ,to give any fair-play to the nature of each1 it is essential that different persons should be allowed to lead different lives4 ,in proportion as this latitude has been exercised in any age1 has that age been noteworthy to posterity4 ,even despotism does not produce its worst effects1 so long as ,individuality exists under it2 and whatever crushes individuality is despotism1 by whatever name it may be called1 and whether it professes to be enforcing the will of ,god or the injunctions of men4 ,having said that ,individuality is the same thing with development1 and that it is only the cultivation of individuality which produces1 or can produce1 well-developed human beings1 ,i might here close the argument3 for what more or better can be said of any condition of human affairs1 than that it brings human beings themselves nearer to the best thing they can be8 or what worse can be said of any obstruction to good1 than that it prevents this8 ,doubtless1 however1 these considerations will not suffice to convince those who most need convincing2 and it is necessary further to show1 that these developed human beings are of some use to the undeveloped--to point out to those who do not desire liberty1 and would not avail themselves of it1 that they may be in some intelligible manner rewarded for allowing other people to make use of it without hindrance4 ,in the first place1 then1 ,i would suggest that they might possibly learn something from them4 ,it will not be denied by anybody1 that originality is a valuable element in human affairs4 ,there is always need of persons not only to discover new truths1 and point out when what were once truths are true no longer1 but also to commence new practices1 and set the example of more enlightened conduct1 and better taste and sense in human life4 ,this cannot well be gainsaid by anybody who does not believe that the world has already attained perfection in all its ways and practices4 ,it is true that this benefit is not capable of being rendered by everybody alike3 there are but few persons1 in comparison with the whole of mankind1 whose experiments1 if adopted by others1 would be likely to be any improvement on established practice4 ,but these few are the salt of the earth2 without them1 human life would become a stagnant pool4 ,not only is it they who introduce good things which did not before exist2 it is they who keep the life in those which already existed4 ,if there were nothing new to be done1 would human intellect cease to be necessary8 ,would it be a reason why those who do the old things should forget why they are done1 and do them like cattle1 not like human beings8 ,there is only too great a tendency in the best beliefs and practices to degenerate into the mechanical2 and unless there were a succession of persons whose ever-recurring originality prevents the grounds of those beliefs and practices from becoming merely traditional1 such dead matter would not resist the smallest shock from anything really alive1 and there would be no reason why civilisation should not die out1 as in the ,byzantine ,empire4 ,persons of genius1 it is true1 are1 and are always likely to be1 a small minority2 but in order to have them1 it is necessary to preserve the soil in which they grow4 ,genius can only breathe freely in an atmosphere of freedom4 ,persons of genius are1 ex vi termini1 more individual than any other people--less capable1 consequently1 of fitting themselves1 without hurtful compression1 into any of the small number of moulds which society provides in order to save its members the trouble of forming their own character4 ,if from timidity they consent to be forced into one of these moulds1 and to let all that part of themselves which cannot expand under the pressure remain unexpanded1 society will be little the better for their genius4 ,if they are of a strong character1 and break their fetters1 they become a mark for the society which has not succeeded in reducing them to commonplace1 to point at with solemn warning as wild1 erratic1 and the like2 much as if one should complain of the ,niagara river for not flowing smoothly between its banks like a ,dutch canal4 ,i insist thus emphatically on the importance of genius1 and the necessity of allowing it to unfold itself freely both in thought and in practice1 being well aware that no one will deny the position in theory1 but knowing also that almost every one1 in reality1 is totally indifferent to it4 ,people think genius a fine thing if it enables a man to write an exciting poem1 or paint a picture4 ,but in its true sense1 that of originality in thought and action1 though no one says that it is not a thing to be admired1 nearly all1 at heart1 think that they can do very well without it4 ,unhappily this is too natural to be wondered at4 ,originality is the one thing which unoriginal minds cannot feel the use of4 ,they cannot see what it is to do for them3 how should they8 ,if they could see what it would do for them1 it would not be originality4 ,the first service which originality has to render them1 is that of opening their eyes3 which being once fully done1 they would have a chance of being themselves original4 ,meanwhile1 recollecting that nothing was ever yet done which some one was not the first to do1 and that all good things which exist are the fruits of originality1 let them be modest enough to believe that there is something still left for it to accomplish1 and assure themselves that they are more in need of originality1 the less they are conscious of the want4 ,in sober truth1 whatever homage may be professed1 or even paid1 to real or supposed mental superiority1 the general tendency of things throughout the world is to render mediocrity the ascendant power among mankind4 ,in ancient history1 in the middle ages1 and in a diminishing degree through the long transition from feudality to the present time1 the individual was a power in himself2 and if he had either great talents or a high social position1 he was a considerable power4 ,at present individuals are lost in the crowd4 ,in politics it is almost a triviality to say that public opinion now rules the world4 ,the only power deserving the name is that of masses1 and of governments while they make themselves the organ of the tendencies and instincts of masses4 ,this is as true in the moral and social relations of private life as in public transactions4 ,those whose opinions go by the name of public opinion1 are not always the same sort of public3 in ,america they are the whole white population2 in ,england1 chiefly the middle class4 ,but they are always a mass1 that is to say1 collective mediocrity4 ,and what is a still greater novelty1 the mass do not now take their opinions from dignitaries in ,church or ,state1 from ostensible leaders1 or from books4 ,their thinking is done for them by men much like themselves1 addressing them or speaking in their name1 on the spur of the moment1 through the newspapers4 ,i am not complaining of all this4 ,i do not assert that anything better is compatible1 as a general rule1 with the present low state of the human mind4 ,but that does not hinder the government of mediocrity from being mediocre government4 ,no government by a democracy or a numerous aristocracy1 either in its political acts or in the opinions1 qualities1 and tone of mind which it fosters1 ever did or could rise above mediocrity1 except in so far as the sovereign ,many have let themselves be guided 7which in their best times they always have done7 by the counsels and influence of a more highly gifted and instructed ,one or ,few4 ,the initiation of all wise or noble things1 comes and must come from individuals2 generally at first from some one individual4 ,the honour and glory of the average man is that he is capable of following that initiative2 that he can respond internally to wise and noble things1 and be led to them with his eyes open4 ,i am not countenancing the sort of hero-worship which applauds the strong man of genius for forcibly seizing on the government of the world and making it do his bidding in spite of itself4 ,all he can claim is1 freedom to point out the way4 ,the power of compelling others into it1 is not only inconsistent with the freedom and development of all the rest1 but corrupting to the strong man himself4 ,it does seem1 however1 that when the opinions of masses of merely average men are everywhere become or becoming the dominant power1 the counterpoise and corrective to that tendency would be1 the more and more pronounced individuality of those who stand on the higher eminences of thought4 ,it is in these circumstances most especially1 that exceptional individuals1 instead of being deterred1 should be encouraged in acting differently from the mass4 ,in other times there was no advantage in their doing so1 unless they acted not only differently1 but better4 ,in this age the mere example of nonconformity1 the mere refusal to bend the knee to custom1 is itself a service4 ,precisely because the tyranny of opinion is such as to make eccentricity a reproach1 it is desirable1 in order to break through that tyranny1 that people should be eccentric4 ,eccentricity has always abounded when and where strength of character has abounded2 and the amount of eccentricity in a society has generally been proportional to the amount of genius1 mental vigour1 and moral courage which it contained4 ,that so few now dare to be eccentric1 marks the chief danger of the time4 ,i have said that it is important to give the freest scope possible to uncustomary things1 in order that it may in time appear which of these are fit to be converted into customs4 ,but independence of action1 and disregard of custom are not solely deserving of encouragement for the chance they afford that better modes of action1 and customs more worthy of general adoption1 may be struck out2 nor is it only persons of decided mental superiority who have a just claim to carry on their lives in their own way4 ,there is no reason that all human existences should be constructed on some one1 or some small number of patterns4 ,if a person possesses any tolerable amount of common-sense and experience1 his own mode of laying out his existence is the best1 not because it is the best in itself1 but because it is his own mode4 ,human beings are not like sheep2 and even sheep are not undistinguishably alike4 ,a man cannot get a coat or a pair of boots to fit him1 unless they are either made to his measure1 or he has a whole warehouseful to choose from3 and is it easier to fit him with a life than with a coat1 or are human beings more like one another in their whole physical and spiritual conformation than in the shape of their feet8 ,if it were only that people have diversities of taste1 that is reason enough for not attempting to shape them all after one model4 ,but different persons also require different conditions for their spiritual development2 and can no more exist healthily in the same moral1 than all the variety of plants can in the same physical1 atmosphere and climate4 ,the same things which are helps to one person towards the cultivation of his higher nature1 are hindrances to another4 ,the same mode of life is a healthy excitement to one1 keeping all his faculties of action and enjoyment in their best order1 while to another it is a distracting burthen1 which suspends or crushes all internal life4 ,such are the differences among human beings in their sources of pleasure1 their susceptibilities of pain1 and the operation on them of different physical and moral agencies1 that unless there is a corresponding diversity in their modes of life1 they neither obtain their fair share of happiness1 nor grow up to the mental1 moral1 and aesthetic stature of which their nature is capable4 ,why then should tolerance1 as far as the public sentiment is concerned1 extend only to tastes and modes of life which extort acquiescence by the multitude of their adherents8 ,nowhere 7except in some monastic institutions7 is diversity of taste entirely unrecognised2 a person may1 without blame1 either like or dislike rowing1 or smoking1 or music1 or athletic exercises1 or chess1 or cards1 or study1 because both those who like each of these things1 and those who dislike them1 are too numerous to be put down4 ,but the man1 and still more the woman1 who can be accused either of doing what nobody does1 or of not doing what everybody does1 is the subject of as much depreciatory remark as if he or she had committed some grave moral delinquency4 ,persons require to possess a title1 or some other badge of rank1 or of the consideration of people of rank1 to be able to indulge somewhat in the luxury of doing as they like without detriment to their estimation4 ,to indulge somewhat1 ,i repeat3 for whoever allow themselves much of that indulgence1 incur the risk of something worse than disparaging speeches--they are in peril of a commission de lunatico1 and of having their property taken from them and given to their relations4#ac ,there is one characteristic of the present direction of public opinion1 peculiarly calculated to make it intolerant of any marked demonstration of individuality4 ,the general average of mankind are not only moderate in intellect1 but also moderate in inclinations3 they have no tastes or wishes strong enough to incline them to do anything unusual1 and they consequently do not understand those who have1 and class all such with the wild and intemperate whom they are accustomed to look down upon4 ,now1 in addition to this fact which is general1 we have only to suppose that a strong movement has set in towards the improvement of morals1 and it is evident what we have to expect4 ,in these days such a movement has set in2 much has actually been effected in the way of increased regularity of conduct1 and discouragement of excesses2 and there is a philanthropic spirit abroad1 for the exercise of which there is no more inviting field than the moral and prudential improvement of our fellow-creatures4 ,these tendencies of the times cause the public to be more disposed than at most former periods to prescribe general rules of conduct1 and endeavour to make every one conform to the approved standard4 ,and that standard1 express or tacit1 is to desire nothing strongly4 ,its ideal of character is to be without any marked character2 to maim by compression1 like a ,chinese lady's foot1 every part of human nature which stands out prominently1 and tends to make the person markedly dissimilar in outline to commonplace humanity4 ,as is usually the case with ideals which exclude one-half of what is desirable1 the present standard of approbation produces only an inferior imitation of the other half4 ,instead of great energies guided by vigorous reason1 and strong feelings strongly controlled by a conscientious will1 its result is weak feelings and weak energies1 which therefore can be kept in outward conformity to rule without any strength either of will or of reason4 ,already energetic characters on any large scale are becoming merely traditional4 ,there is now scarcely any outlet for energy in this country except business4 ,the energy expended in that may still be regarded as considerable4 ,what little is left from that employment1 is expended on some hobby2 which may be a useful1 even a philanthropic hobby1 but is always some one thing1 and generally a thing of small dimensions4 ,the greatness of ,england is now all collective3 individually small1 we only appear capable of anything great by our habit of combining2 and with this our moral and religious philanthropists are perfectly contented4 ,but it was men of another stamp than this that made ,england what it has been2 and men of another stamp will be needed to prevent its decline4 ,the despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance to human advancement1 being in unceasing antagonism to that disposition to aim at something better than customary1 which is called1 according to circumstances1 the spirit of liberty1 or that of progress or improvement4 ,the spirit of improvement is not always a spirit of liberty1 for it may aim at forcing improvements on an unwilling people2 and the spirit of liberty1 in so far as it resists such attempts1 may ally itself locally and temporarily with the opponents of improvement2 but the only unfailing and permanent source of improvement is liberty1 since by it there are as many possible independent centres of improvement as there are individuals4 ,the progressive principle1 however1 in either shape1 whether as the love of liberty or of improvement1 is antagonistic to the sway of ,custom1 involving at least emancipation from that yoke2 and the contest between the two constitutes the chief interest of the history of mankind4 ,the greater part of the world has1 properly speaking1 no history1 because the despotism of ,custom is complete4 ,this is the case over the whole ,east4 ,custom is there1 in all things1 the final appeal2 justice and right mean conformity to custom2 the argument of custom no one1 unless some tyrant intoxicated with power1 thinks of resisting4 ,and we see the result4 ,those nations must once have had originality2 they did not start out of the ground populous1 lettered1 and versed in many of the arts of life2 they made themselves all this1 and were then the greatest and most powerful nations in the world4 ,what are they now8 ,the subjects or dependants of tribes whose forefathers wandered in the forests when theirs had magnificent palaces and gorgeous temples1 but over whom custom exercised only a divided rule with liberty and progress4 ,a people1 it appears1 may be progressive for a certain length of time1 and then stop3 when does it stop8 ,when it ceases to possess individuality4 ,if a similar change should befall the nations of ,europe1 it will not be in exactly the same shape3 the despotism of custom with which these nations are threatened is not precisely stationariness4 ,it proscribes singularity1 but it does not preclude change1 provided all change together4 ,we have discarded the fixed costumes of our forefathers2 every one must still dress like other people1 but the fashion may change once or twice a year4 ,we thus take care that when there is change1 it shall be for change's sake1 and not from any idea of beauty or convenience2 for the same idea of beauty or convenience would not strike all the world at the same moment1 and be simultaneously thrown aside by all at another moment4 ,but we are progressive as well as changeable3 we continually make new inventions in mechanical things1 and keep them until they are again superseded by better2 we are eager for improvement in politics1 in education1 even in morals1 though in this last our idea of improvement chiefly consists in persuading or forcing other people to be as good as ourselves4 ,it is not progress that we object to2 on the contrary1 we flatter ourselves that we are the most progressive people who ever lived4 ,it is individuality that we war against3 we should think we had done wonders if we had made ourselves all alike2 forgetting that the unlikeness of one person to another is generally the first thing which draws the attention of either to the imperfection of his own type1 and the superiority of another1 or the possibility1 by combining the advantages of both1 of producing something better than either4 ,we have a warning example in ,china--a nation of much talent1 and1 in some respects1 even wisdom1 owing to the rare good fortune of having been provided at an early period with a particularly good set of customs1 the work1 in some measure1 of men to whom even the most enlightened ,european must accord1 under certain limitations1 the title of sages and philosophers4 ,they are remarkable1 too1 in the excellence of their apparatus for impressing1 as far as possible1 the best wisdom they possess upon every mind in the community1 and securing that those who have appropriated most of it shall occupy the posts of honour and power4 ,surely the people who did this have discovered the secret of human progressiveness1 and must have kept themselves steadily at the head of the movement of the world4 ,on the contrary1 they have become stationary--have remained so for thousands of years2 and if they are ever to be farther improved1 it must be by foreigners4 ,they have succeeded beyond all hope in what ,english philanthropists are so industriously working at--in making a people all alike1 all governing their thoughts and conduct by the same maxims and rules2 and these are the fruits4 ,the modern rgime of public opinion is1 in an unorganised form1 what the ,chinese educational and political systems are in an organised2 and unless individuality shall be able successfully to assert itself against this yoke1 ,europe1 notwithstanding its noble antecedents and its professed ,christianity1 will tend to become another ,china4 ,what is it that has hitherto preserved ,europe from this lot8 ,what has made the ,european family of nations an improving1 instead of a stationary portion of mankind8 ,not any superior excellence in them1 which1 when it exists1 exists as the effect1 not as the cause2 but their remarkable diversity of character and culture4 ,individuals1 classes1 nations1 have been extremely unlike one another3 they have struck out a great variety of paths1 each leading to something valuable2 and although at every period those who travelled in different paths have been intolerant of one another1 and each would have thought it an excellent thing if all the rest could have been compelled to travel his road1 their attempts to thwart each other's development have rarely had any permanent success1 and each has in time endured to receive the good which the others have offered4 ,europe is1 in my judgment1 wholly indebted to this plurality of paths for its progressive and many-sided development4 ,but it already begins to possess this benefit in a considerably less degree4 ,it is decidedly advancing towards the ,chinese ideal of making all people alike4 ,m4 de ,tocqueville1 in his last important work1 remarks how much more the ,frenchmen of the present day resemble one another1 than did those even of the last generation4 ,the same remark might be made of ,englishmen in a far greater degree4 ,in a passage already quoted from ,wilhelm von ,humboldt1 he points out two things as necessary conditions of human development1 because necessary to render people unlike one another2 namely1 freedom1 and variety of situations4 ,the second of these two conditions is in this country every day diminishing4 ,the circumstances which surround different classes and individuals1 and shape their characters1 are daily becoming more assimilated4 ,formerly1 different ranks1 different neighbourhoods1 different trades and professions1 lived in what might be called different worlds2 at present1 to a great degree in the same4 ,comparatively speaking1 they now read the same things1 listen to the same things1 see the same things1 go to the same places1 have their hopes and fears directed to the same objects1 have the same rights and liberties1 and the same means of asserting them4 ,great as are the differences of position which remain1 they are nothing to those which have ceased4 ,and the assimilation is still proceeding4 ,all the political changes of the age promote it1 since they all tend to raise the low and to lower the high4 ,every extension of education promotes it1 because education brings people under common influences1 and gives them access to the general stock of facts and sentiments4 ,improvements in the means of communication promote it1 by bringing the inhabitants of distant places into personal contact1 and keeping up a rapid flow of changes of residence between one place and another4 ,the increase of commerce and manufactures promotes it1 by diffusing more widely the advantages of easy circumstances1 and opening all objects of ambition1 even the highest1 to general competition1 whereby the desire of rising becomes no longer the character of a particular class1 but of all classes4 ,a more powerful agency than even all these1 in bringing about a general similarity among mankind1 is the complete establishment1 in this and other free countries1 of the ascendency of public opinion in the ,state4 ,as the various social eminences which enabled persons entrenched on them to disregard the opinion of the multitude1 gradually become levelled2 as the very idea of resisting the will of the public1 when it is positively known that they have a will1 disappears more and more from the minds of practical politicians2 there ceases to be any social support for non-conformity--any substantive power in society1 which1 itself opposed to the ascendency of numbers1 is interested in taking under its protection opinions and tendencies at variance with those of the public4 ,the combination of all these causes forms so great a mass of influences hostile to ,individuality1 that it is not easy to see how it can stand its ground4 ,it will do so with increasing difficulty1 unless the intelligent part of the public can be made to feel its value--to see that it is good there should be differences1 even though not for the better1 even though1 as it may appear to them1 some should be for the worse4 ,if the claims of ,individuality are ever to be asserted1 the time is now1 while much is still wanting to complete the enforced assimilation4 ,it is only in the earlier stages that any stand can be successfully made against the encroachment4 ,the demand that all other people shall resemble ourselves1 grows by what it feeds on4 ,if resistance waits till life is reduced nearly to one uniform type1 all deviations from that type will come to be considered impious1 immoral1 even monstrous and contrary to nature4 ,mankind speedily become unable to conceive diversity1 when they have been for some time unaccustomed to see it4 ,,footnotes3 #aa ,the ,sphere and ,duties of ,government1 from the ,german of ,baron ,wilhelm von ,humboldt1 pp4 #aa-ac4 #ab ,sterling's ,essays4 #ac ,there is something both contemptible and frightful in the sort of evidence on which1 of late years1 any person can be judicially declared unfit for the management of his affairs2 and after his death1 his disposal of his property can be set aside1 if there is enough of it to pay the expenses of litigation--which are charged on the property itself4 ,all the minute details of his daily life are pried into1 and whatever is found which1 seen through the medium of the perceiving and describing faculties of the lowest of the low1 bears an appearance unlike absolute commonplace1 is laid before the jury as evidence of insanity1 and often with success2 the jurors being little1 if at all1 less vulgar and ignorant than the witnesses2 while the judges1 with that extraordinary want of knowledge of human nature and life which continually astonishes us in ,english lawyers1 often help to mislead them4 ,these trials speak volumes as to the state of feeling and opinion among the vulgar with regard to human liberty4 ,so far from setting any value on individuality--so far from respecting the rights of each individual to act1 in things indifferent1 as seems good to his own judgment and inclinations1 judges and juries cannot even conceive that a person in a state of sanity can desire such freedom4 ,in former days1 when it was proposed to burn atheists1 charitable people used to suggest putting them in a madhouse instead3 it would be nothing surprising nowadays were we to see this done1 and the doers applauding themselves1 because1 instead of persecuting for religion1 they had adopted so humane and ,christian a mode of treating these unfortunates1 not without a silent satisfaction at their having thereby obtained their deserts4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,of ,,the ,,limits ,,to ,,the ,,authority ,,of ,,society ,,over ,,the ,,individual4 ,what1 then1 is the rightful limit to the sovereignty of the individual over himself8 ,where does the authority of society begin8 ,how much of human life should be assigned to individuality1 and how much to society8 ,each will receive its proper share1 if each has that which more particularly concerns it4 ,to individuality should belong the part of life in which it is chiefly the individual that is interested2 to society1 the part which chiefly interests society4 ,though society is not founded on a contract1 and though no good purpose is answered by inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it1 every one who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit1 and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest4 ,this conduct consists1 first1 in not injuring the interests of one another2 or rather certain interests which1 either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding1 ought to be considered as rights2 and secondly1 in each person's bearing his share 7to be fixed on some equitable principle7 of the labours and sacrifices incurred for defending the society or its members from injury and molestation4 ,these conditions society is justified in enforcing1 at all costs to those who endeavour to withhold fulfilment4 ,nor is this all that society may do4 ,the acts of an individual may be hurtful to others1 or wanting in due consideration for their welfare1 without going the length of violating any of their constituted rights4 ,the offender may then be justly punished by opinion though not by law4 ,as soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others1 society has jurisdiction over it1 and the question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it1 becomes open to discussion4 ,but there is no room for entertaining any such question when a person's conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself1 or needs not affect them unless they like 7all the persons concerned being of full age1 and the ordinary amount of understanding74 ,in all such cases there should be perfect freedom1 legal and social1 to do the action and stand the consequences4 ,it would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine1 to suppose that it is one of selfish indifference1 which pretends that human beings have no business with each other's conduct in life1 and that they should not concern themselves about the well-doing or well-being of one another1 unless their own interest is involved4 ,instead of any diminution1 there is need of a great increase of disinterested exertion to promote the good of others4 ,but disinterested benevolence can find other instruments to persuade people to their good1 than whips and scourges1 either of the literal or the metaphorical sort4 ,i am the last person to undervalue the self-regarding virtues2 they are only second in importance1 if even second1 to the social4 ,it is equally the business of education to cultivate both4 ,but even education works by conviction and persuasion as well as by compulsion1 and it is by the former only that1 when the period of education is past1 the self-regarding virtues should be inculcated4 ,human beings owe to each other help to distinguish the better from the worse1 and encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter4 ,they should be for ever stimulating each other to increased exercise of their higher faculties1 and increased direction of their feelings and aims towards wise instead of foolish1 elevating instead of degrading1 objects and contemplations4 ,but neither one person1 nor any number of persons1 is warranted in saying to another human creature of ripe years1 that he shall not do with his life for his own benefit what he chooses to do with it4 ,he is the person most interested in his own well-being3 the interest which any other person1 except in cases of strong personal attachment1 can have in it1 is trifling1 compared with that which he himself has2 the interest which society has in him individually 7except as to his conduct to others7 is fractional1 and altogether indirect3 while1 with respect to his own feelings and circumstances1 the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by any one else4 ,the interference of society to overrule his judgment and purposes in what only regards himself1 must be grounded on general presumptions2 which may be altogether wrong1 and even if right1 are as likely as not to be misapplied to individual cases1 by persons no better acquainted with the circumstances of such cases than those are who look at them merely from without4 ,in this department1 therefore1 of human affairs1 ,individuality has its proper field of action4 ,in the conduct of human beings towards one another1 it is necessary that general rules should for the most part be observed1 in order that people may know what they have to expect2 but in each person's own concerns1 his individual spontaneity is entitled to free exercise4 ,considerations to aid his judgment1 exhortations to strengthen his will1 may be offered to him1 even obtruded on him1 by others2 but he himself is the final judge4 ,all errors which he is likely to commit against advice and warning1 are far outweighed by the evil of allowing others to constrain him to what they deem his good4 ,i do not mean that the feelings with which a person is regarded by others1 ought not to be in any way affected by his self-regarding qualities or deficiencies4 ,this is neither possible nor desirable4 ,if he is eminent in any of the qualities which conduce to his own good1 he is1 so far1 a proper object of admiration4 ,he is so much the nearer to the ideal perfection of human nature4 ,if he is grossly deficient in those qualities1 a sentiment the opposite of admiration will follow4 ,there is a degree of folly1 and a degree of what may be called 7though the phrase is not unobjectionable7 lowness or depravation of taste1 which1 though it cannot justify doing harm to the person who manifests it1 renders him necessarily and properly a subject of distaste1 or1 in extreme cases1 even of contempt3 a person could not have the opposite qualities in due strength without entertaining these feelings4 ,though doing no wrong to any one1 a person may so act as to compel us to judge him1 and feel to him1 as a fool1 or as a being of an inferior order3 and since this judgment and feeling are a fact which he would prefer to avoid1 it is doing him a service to warn him of it beforehand1 as of any other disagreeable consequence to which he exposes himself4 ,it would be well1 indeed1 if this good office were much more freely rendered than the common notions of politeness at present permit1 and if one person could honestly point out to another that he thinks him in fault1 without being considered unmannerly or presuming4 ,we have a right1 also1 in various ways1 to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one1 not to the oppression of his individuality1 but in the exercise of ours4 ,we are not bound1 for example1 to seek his society2 we have a right to avoid it 7though not to parade the avoidance71 for we have a right to choose the society most acceptable to us4 ,we have a right1 and it may be our duty1 to caution others against him1 if we think his example or conversation likely to have a pernicious effect on those with whom he associates4 ,we may give others a preference over him in optional good offices1 except those which tend to his improvement4 ,in these various modes a person may suffer very severe penalties at the hands of others1 for faults which directly concern only himself2 but he suffers these penalties only in so far as they are the natural1 and1 as it were1 the spontaneous consequences of the faults themselves1 not because they are purposely inflicted on him for the sake of punishment4 ,a person who shows rashness1 obstinacy1 self-conceit--who cannot live within moderate means--who cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgences--who pursues animal pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and intellect--must expect to be lowered in the opinion of others1 and to have a less share of their favourable sentiments2 but of this he has no right to complain1 unless he has merited their favour by special excellence in his social relations1 and has thus established a title to their good offices1 which is not affected by his demerits towards himself4 ,what ,i contend for is1 that the inconveniences which are strictly inseparable from the unfavourable judgment of others1 are the only ones to which a person should ever be subjected for that portion of his conduct and character which concerns his own good1 but which does not affect the interests of others in their relations with him4 ,acts injurious to others require a totally different treatment4 ,encroachment on their rights2 infliction on them of any loss or damage not justified by his own rights2 falsehood or duplicity in dealing with them2 unfair or ungenerous use of advantages over them2 even selfish abstinence from defending them against injury--these are fit objects of moral reprobation1 and1 in grave cases1 of moral retribution and punishment4 ,and not only these acts1 but the dispositions which lead to them1 are properly immoral1 and fit subjects of disapprobation which may rise to abhorrence4 ,cruelty of disposition2 malice and ill-nature2 that most anti-social and odious of all passions1 envy2 dissimulation and insincerity2 irascibility on insufficient cause1 and resentment disproportioned to the provocation2 the love of domineering over others2 the desire to engross more than one's share of advantages 7the ,greek3 pleonexia of the ,greeks72 the pride which derives gratification from the abasement of others2 the egotism which thinks self and its concerns more important than everything else1 and decides all doubtful questions in its own favour2--these are moral vices1 and constitute a bad and odious moral character3 unlike the self-regarding faults previously mentioned1 which are not properly immoralities1 and to whatever pitch they may be carried1 do not constitute wickedness4 ,they may be proofs of any amount of folly1 or want of personal dignity and self-respect2 but they are only a subject of moral reprobation when they involve a breach of duty to others1 for whose sake the individual is bound to have care for himself4 ,what are called duties to ourselves are not socially obligatory1 unless circumstances render them at the same time duties to others4 ,the term duty to oneself1 when it means anything more than prudence1 means self-respect or self-development2 and for none of these is any one accountable to his fellow-creatures1 because for none of them is it for the good of mankind that he be held accountable to them4 ,the distinction between the loss of consideration which a person may rightly incur by defect of prudence or of personal dignity1 and the reprobation which is due to him for an offence against the rights of others1 is not a merely nominal distinction4 ,it makes a vast difference both in our feelings and in our conduct towards him1 whether he displeases us in things in which we think we have a right to control him1 or in things in which we know that we have not4 ,if he displeases us1 we may express our distaste1 and we may stand aloof from a person as well as from a thing that displeases us2 but we shall not therefore feel called on to make his life uncomfortable4 ,we shall reflect that he already bears1 or will bear1 the whole penalty of his error2 if he spoils his life by mismanagement1 we shall not1 for that reason1 desire to spoil it still further3 instead of wishing to punish him1 we shall rather endeavour to alleviate his punishment1 by showing him how he may avoid or cure the evils his conduct tends to bring upon him4 ,he may be to us an object of pity1 perhaps of dislike1 but not of anger or resentment2 we shall not treat him like an enemy of society3 the worst we shall think ourselves justified in doing is leaving him to himself1 if we do not interfere benevolently by showing interest or concern for him4 ,it is far otherwise if he has infringed the rules necessary for the protection of his fellow-creatures1 individually or collectively4 ,the evil consequences of his acts do not then fall on himself1 but on others2 and society1 as the protector of all its members1 must retaliate on him2 must inflict pain on him for the express purpose of punishment1 and must take care that it be sufficiently severe4 ,in the one case1 he is an offender at our bar1 and we are called on not only to sit in judgment on him1 but1 in one shape or another1 to execute our own sentence3 in the other case1 it is not our part to inflict any suffering on him1 except what may incidentally follow from our using the same liberty in the regulation of our own affairs1 which we allow to him in his4 ,the distinction here pointed out between the part of a person's life which concerns only himself1 and that which concerns others1 many persons will refuse to admit4 ,how 7it may be asked7 can any part of the conduct of a member of society be a matter of indifference to the other members8 ,no person is an entirely isolated being2 it is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself1 without mischief reaching at least to his near connections1 and often far beyond them4 ,if he injures his property1 he does harm to those who directly or indirectly derived support from it1 and usually diminishes1 by a greater or less amount1 the general resources of the community4 ,if he deteriorates his bodily or mental faculties1 he not only brings evil upon all who depended on him for any portion of their happiness1 but disqualifies himself for rendering the services which he owes to his fellow-creatures generally2 perhaps becomes a burthen on their affection or benevolence2 and if such conduct were very frequent1 hardly any offence that is committed would detract more from the general sum of good4 ,finally1 if by his vices or follies a person does no direct harm to others1 he is nevertheless 7it may be said7 injurious by his example2 and ought to be compelled to control himself1 for the sake of those whom the sight or knowledge of his conduct might corrupt or mislead4 ,and even 7it will be added7 if the consequences of misconduct could be confined to the vicious or thoughtless individual1 ought society to abandon to their own guidance those who are manifestly unfit for it8 ,if protection against themselves is confessedly due to children and persons under age1 is not society equally bound to afford it to persons of mature years who are equally incapable of self-government8 ,if gambling1 or drunkenness1 or incontinence1 or idleness1 or uncleanliness1 are as injurious to happiness1 and as great a hindrance to improvement1 as many or most of the acts prohibited by law1 why 7it may be asked7 should not law1 so far as is consistent with practicability and social convenience1 endeavour to repress these also8 ,and as a supplement to the unavoidable imperfections of law1 ought not opinion at least to organise a powerful police against these vices1 and visit rigidly with social penalties those who are known to practise them8 ,there is no question here 7it may be said7 about restricting individuality1 or impeding the trial of new and original experiments in living4 ,the only things it is sought to prevent are things which have been tried and condemned from the beginning of the world until now2 things which experience has shown not to be useful or suitable to any person's individuality4 ,there must be some length of time and amount of experience1 after which a moral or prudential truth may be regarded as established3 and it is merely desired to prevent generation after generation from falling over the same precipice which has been fatal to their predecessors4 ,i fully admit that the mischief which a person does to himself1 may seriously affect1 both through their sympathies and their interests1 those nearly connected with him1 and in a minor degree1 society at large4 ,when1 by conduct of this sort1 a person is led to violate a distinct and assignable obligation to any other person or persons1 the case is taken out of the self-regarding class1 and becomes amenable to moral disapprobation in the proper sense of the term4 ,if1 for example1 a man1 through intemperance or extravagance1 becomes unable to pay his debts1 or1 having undertaken the moral responsibility of a family1 becomes from the same cause incapable of supporting or educating them1 he is deservedly reprobated1 and might be justly punished2 but it is for the breach of duty to his family or creditors1 not for the extravagance4 ,if the resources which ought to have been devoted to them1 had been diverted from them for the most prudent investment1 the moral culpability would have been the same4 ,george ,barnwell murdered his uncle to get money for his mistress1 but if he had done it to set himself up in business1 he would equally have been hanged4 ,again1 in the frequent case of a man who causes grief to his family by addiction to bad habits1 he deserves reproach for his unkindness or ingratitude2 but so he may for cultivating habits not in themselves vicious1 if they are painful to those with whom he passes his life1 or who from personal ties are dependent on him for their comfort4 ,whoever fails in the consideration generally due to the interests and feelings of others1 not being compelled by some more imperative duty1 or justified by allowable self-preference1 is a subject of moral disapprobation for that failure1 but not for the cause of it1 nor for the errors1 merely personal to himself1 which may have remotely led to it4 ,in like manner1 when a person disables himself1 by conduct purely self-regarding1 from the performance of some definite duty incumbent on him to the public1 he is guilty of a social offence4 ,no person ought to be punished simply for being drunk2 but a soldier or a policeman should be punished for being drunk on duty4 ,whenever1 in short1 there is a definite damage1 or a definite risk of damage1 either to an individual or to the public1 the case is taken out of the province of liberty1 and placed in that of morality or law4 ,but with regard to the merely contingent1 or1 as it may be called1 constructive injury which a person causes to society1 by conduct which neither violates any specific duty to the public1 nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable individual except himself2 the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear1 for the sake of the greater good of human freedom4 ,if grown persons are to be punished for not taking proper care of themselves1 ,i would rather it were for their own sake1 than under pretence of preventing them from impairing their capacity of rendering to society benefits which society does not pretend it has a right to exact4 ,but ,i cannot consent to argue the point as if society had no means of bringing its weaker members up to its ordinary standard of rational conduct1 except waiting till they do something irrational1 and then punishing them1 legally or morally1 for it4 ,society has had absolute power over them during all the early portion of their existence3 it has had the whole period of childhood and nonage in which to try whether it could make them capable of rational conduct in life4 ,the existing generation is master both of the training and the entire circumstances of the generation to come2 it cannot indeed make them perfectly wise and good1 because it is itself so lamentably deficient in goodness and wisdom2 and its best efforts are not always1 in individual cases1 its most successful ones2 but it is perfectly well able to make the rising generation1 as a whole1 as good as1 and a little better than1 itself4 ,if society lets any considerable number of its members grow up mere children1 incapable of being acted on by rational consideration of distant motives1 society has itself to blame for the consequences4 ,armed not only with all the powers of education1 but with the ascendency which the authority of a received opinion always exercises over the minds who are least fitted to judge for themselves2 and aided by the natural penalties which cannot be prevented from falling on those who incur the distaste or the contempt of those who know them2 let not society pretend that it needs1 besides all this1 the power to issue commands and enforce obedience in the personal concerns of individuals1 in which1 on all principles of justice and policy1 the decision ought to rest with those who are to abide the consequences4 ,nor is there anything which tends more to discredit and frustrate the better means of influencing conduct1 than a resort to the worse4 ,if there be among those whom it is attempted to coerce into prudence or temperance1 any of the material of which vigorous and independent characters are made1 they will infallibly rebel against the yoke4 ,no such person will ever feel that others have a right to control him in his concerns1 such as they have to prevent him from injuring them in theirs2 and it easily comes to be considered a mark of spirit and courage to fly in the face of such usurped authority1 and do with ostentation the exact opposite of what it enjoins2 as in the fashion of grossness which succeeded1 in the time of ,charles ,,ii41 to the fanatical moral intolerance of the ,puritans4 ,with respect to what is said of the necessity of protecting society from the bad example set to others by the vicious or the self-indulgent2 it is true that bad example may have a pernicious effect1 especially the example of doing wrong to others with impunity to the wrong-doer4 ,but we are now speaking of conduct which1 while it does no wrong to others1 is supposed to do great harm to the agent himself3 and ,i do not see how those who believe this1 can think otherwise than that the example1 on the whole1 must be more salutary than hurtful1 since1 if it displays the misconduct1 it displays also the painful or degrading consequences which1 if the conduct is justly censured1 must be supposed to be in all or most cases attendant on it4 ,but the strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the public with purely personal conduct1 is that when it does interfere1 the odds are that it interferes wrongly1 and in the wrong place4 ,on questions of social morality1 of duty to others1 the opinion of the public1 that is1 of an overruling majority1 though often wrong1 is likely to be still oftener right2 because on such questions they are only required to judge of their own interests2 of the manner in which some mode of conduct1 if allowed to be practised1 would affect themselves4 ,but the opinion of a similar majority1 imposed as a law on the minority1 on questions of self-regarding conduct1 is quite as likely to be wrong as right2 for in these cases public opinion means1 at the best1 some people's opinion of what is good or bad for other people2 while very often it does not even mean that2 the public1 with the most perfect indifference1 passing over the pleasure or convenience of those whose conduct they censure1 and considering only their own preference4 ,there are many who consider as an injury to themselves any conduct which they have a distaste for1 and resent it as an outrage to their feelings2 as a religious bigot1 when charged with disregarding the religious feelings of others1 has been known to retort that they disregard his feelings1 by persisting in their abominable worship or creed4 ,but there is no parity between the feeling of a person for his own opinion1 and the feeling of another who is offended at his holding it2 no more than between the desire of a thief to take a purse1 and the desire of the right owner to keep it4 ,and a person's taste is as much his own peculiar concern as his opinion or his purse4 ,it is easy for any one to imagine an ideal public1 which leaves the freedom and choice of individuals in all uncertain matters undisturbed1 and only requires them to abstain from modes of conduct which universal experience has condemned4 ,but where has there been seen a public which set any such limit to its censorship8 or when does the public trouble itself about universal experience8 ,in its interferences with personal conduct it is seldom thinking of anything but the enormity of acting or feeling differently from itself2 and this standard of judgment1 thinly disguised1 is held up to mankind as the dictate of religion and philosophy1 by nine-tenths of all moralists and speculative writers4 ,these teach that things are right because they are right2 because we feel them to be so4 ,they tell us to search in our own minds and hearts for laws of conduct binding on ourselves and on all others4 ,what can the poor public do but apply these instructions1 and make their own personal feelings of good and evil1 if they are tolerably unanimous in them1 obligatory on all the world8 ,the evil here pointed out is not one which exists only in theory2 and it may perhaps be expected that ,i should specify the instances in which the public of this age and country improperly invests its own preferences with the character of moral laws4 ,i am not writing an essay on the aberrations of existing moral feeling4 ,that is too weighty a subject to be discussed parenthetically1 and by way of illustration4 ,yet examples are necessary1 to show that the principle ,i maintain is of serious and practical moment1 and that ,i am not endeavouring to erect a barrier against imaginary evils4 ,and it is not difficult to show1 by abundant instances1 that to extend the bounds of what may be called moral police1 until it encroaches on the most unquestionably legitimate liberty of the individual1 is one of the most universal of all human propensities4 ,as a first instance1 consider the antipathies which men cherish on no better grounds than that persons whose religious opinions are different from theirs1 do not practise their religious observances1 especially their religious abstinences4 ,to cite a rather trivial example1 nothing in the creed or practice of ,christians does more to envenom the hatred of ,mahomedans against them1 than the fact of their eating pork4 ,there are few acts which ,christians and ,europeans regard with more unaffected disgust1 than ,mussulmans regard this particular mode of satisfying hunger4 ,it is1 in the first place1 an offence against their religion2 but this circumstance by no means explains either the degree or the kind of their repugnance2 for wine also is forbidden by their religion1 and to partake of it is by all ,mussulmans accounted wrong1 but not disgusting4 ,their aversion to the flesh of the unclean beast is1 on the contrary1 of that peculiar character1 resembling an instinctive antipathy1 which the idea of uncleanness1 when once it thoroughly sinks into the feelings1 seems always to excite even in those whose personal habits are anything but scrupulously cleanly1 and of which the sentiment of religious impurity1 so intense in the ,hindoos1 is a remarkable example4 ,suppose now that in a people1 of whom the majority were ,mussulmans1 that majority should insist upon not permitting pork to be eaten within the limits of the country4 ,this would be nothing new in ,mahomedan countries4#ad ,would it be a legitimate exercise of the moral authority of public opinion8 and if not1 why not8 ,the practice is really revolting to such a public4 ,they also sincerely think that it is forbidden and abhorred by the ,deity4 ,neither could the prohibition be censured as religious persecution4 ,it might be religious in its origin1 but it would not be persecution for religion1 since nobody's religion makes it a duty to eat pork4 ,the only tenable ground of condemnation would be1 that with the personal tastes and self-regarding concerns of individuals the public has no business to interfere4 ,to come somewhat nearer home3 the majority of ,spaniards consider it a gross impiety1 offensive in the highest degree to the ,supreme ,being1 to worship him in any other manner than the ,roman ,catholic2 and no other public worship is lawful on ,spanish soil4 ,the people of all ,southern ,europe look upon a married clergy as not only irreligious1 but unchaste1 indecent1 gross1 disgusting4 ,what do ,protestants think of these perfectly sincere feelings1 and of the attempt to enforce them against non-,catholics8 ,yet1 if mankind are justified in interfering with each other's liberty in things which do not concern the interests of others1 on what principle is it possible consistently to exclude these cases8 or who can blame people for desiring to suppress what they regard as a scandal in the sight of ,god and man8 ,no stronger case can be shown for prohibiting anything which is regarded as a personal immorality1 than is made out for suppressing these practices in the eyes of those who regard them as impieties2 and unless we are willing to adopt the logic of persecutors1 and to say that we may persecute others because we are right1 and that they must not persecute us because they are wrong1 we must beware of admitting a principle of which we should resent as a gross injustice the application to ourselves4 ,the preceding instances may be objected to1 although unreasonably1 as drawn from contingencies impossible among us3 opinion1 in this country1 not being likely to enforce abstinence from meats1 or to interfere with people for worshipping1 and for either marrying or not marrying1 according to their creed or inclination4 ,the next example1 however1 shall be taken from an interference with liberty which we have by no means passed all danger of4 ,wherever the ,puritans have been sufficiently powerful1 as in ,new ,england1 and in ,great ,britain at the time of the ,commonwealth1 they have endeavoured1 with considerable success1 to put down all public1 and nearly all private1 amusements3 especially music1 dancing1 public games1 or other assemblages for purposes of diversion1 and the theatre4 ,there are still in this country large bodies of persons by whose notions of morality and religion these recreations are condemned2 and those persons belonging chiefly to the middle class1 who are the ascendant power in the present social and political condition of the kingdom1 it is by no means impossible that persons of these sentiments may at some time or other command a majority in ,parliament4 ,how will the remaining portion of the community like to have the amusements that shall be permitted to them regulated by the religious and moral sentiments of the stricter ,calvinists and ,methodists8 ,would they not1 with considerable peremptoriness1 desire these intrusively pious members of society to mind their own business8 ,this is precisely what should be said to every government and every public1 who have the pretension that no person shall enjoy any pleasure which they think wrong4 ,but if the principle of the pretension be admitted1 no one can reasonably object to its being acted on in the sense of the majority1 or other preponderating power in the country2 and all persons must be ready to conform to the idea of a ,christian commonwealth1 as understood by the early settlers in ,new ,england1 if a religious profession similar to theirs should ever succeed in regaining its lost ground1 as religions supposed to be declining have so often been known to do4 ,to imagine another contingency1 perhaps more likely to be realised than the one last mentioned4 ,there is confessedly a strong tendency in the modern world towards a democratic constitution of society1 accompanied or not by popular political institutions4 ,it is affirmed that in the country where this tendency is most completely realised--where both society and the government are most democratic--the ,united ,states--the feeling of the majority1 to whom any appearance of a more showy or costly style of living than they can hope to rival is disagreeable1 operates as a tolerably effectual sumptuary law1 and that in many parts of the ,union it is really difficult for a person possessing a very large income1 to find any mode of spending it1 which will not incur popular disapprobation4 ,though such statements as these are doubtless much exaggerated as a representation of existing facts1 the state of things they describe is not only a conceivable and possible1 but a probable result of democratic feeling1 combined with the notion that the public has a right to a veto on the manner in which individuals shall spend their incomes4 ,we have only further to suppose a considerable diffusion of ,socialist opinions1 and it may become infamous in the eyes of the majority to possess more property than some very small amount1 or any income not earned by manual labour4 ,opinions similar in principle to these1 already prevail widely among the artisan class1 and weigh oppressively on those who are amenable to the opinion chiefly of that class1 namely1 its own members4 ,it is known that the bad workmen who form the majority of the operatives in many branches of industry1 are decidedly of opinion that bad workmen ought to receive the same wages as good1 and that no one ought to be allowed1 through piecework or otherwise1 to earn by superior skill or industry more than others can without it4 ,and they employ a moral police1 which occasionally becomes a physical one1 to deter skilful workmen from receiving1 and employers from giving1 a larger remuneration for a more useful service4 ,if the public have any jurisdiction over private concerns1 ,i cannot see that these people are in fault1 or that any individual's particular public can be blamed for asserting the same authority over his individual conduct1 which the general public asserts over people in general4 ,but1 without dwelling upon supposititious cases1 there are1 in our own day1 gross usurpations upon the liberty of private life actually practised1 and still greater ones threatened with some expectation of success1 and opinions proposed which assert an unlimited right in the public not only to prohibit by law everything which it thinks wrong1 but in order to get at what it thinks wrong1 to prohibit any number of things which it admits to be innocent4 ,under the name of preventing intemperance1 the people of one ,english colony1 and of nearly half the ,united ,states1 have been interdicted by law from making any use whatever of fermented drinks1 except for medical purposes3 for prohibition of their sale is in fact1 as it is intended to be1 prohibition of their use4 ,and though the impracticability of executing the law has caused its repeal in several of the ,states which had adopted it1 including the one from which it derives its name1 an attempt has notwithstanding been commenced1 and is prosecuted with considerable zeal by many of the professed philanthropists1 to agitate for a similar law in this country4 ,the association1 or ,alliance as it terms itself1 which has been formed for this purpose1 has acquired some notoriety through the publicity given to a correspondence between its ,secretary and one of the very few ,english public men who hold that a politician's opinions ought to be founded on principles4 ,lord ,stanley's share in this correspondence is calculated to strengthen the hopes already built on him1 by those who know how rare such qualities as are manifested in some of his public appearances1 unhappily are among those who figure in political life4 ,the organ of the ,alliance1 who would deeply deplore the recognition of any principle which could be wrested to justify bigotry and persecution1 undertakes to point out the broad and impassable barrier which divides such principles from those of the association4 ,all matters relating to thought1 opinion1 conscience1 appear to me1 he says1 to be without the sphere of legislation2 all pertaining to social act1 habit1 relation1 subject only to a discretionary power vested in the ,state itself1 and not in the individual1 to be within it4 ,no mention is made of a third class1 different from either of these1 viz4 acts and habits which are not social1 but individual2 although it is to this class1 surely1 that the act of drinking fermented liquors belongs4 ,selling fermented liquors1 however1 is trading1 and trading is a social act4 ,but the infringement complained of is not on the liberty of the seller1 but on that of the buyer and consumer2 since the ,state might just as well forbid him to drink wine1 as purposely make it impossible for him to obtain it4 ,the ,secretary1 however1 says1 ,i claim1 as a citizen1 a right to legislate whenever my social rights are invaded by the social act of another4 ,and now for the definition of these social rights4 ,if anything invades my social rights1 certainly the traffic in strong drink does4 ,it destroys my primary right of security1 by constantly creating and stimulating social disorder4 ,it invades my right of equality1 by deriving a profit from the creation of a misery1 ,i am taxed to support4 ,it impedes my right to free moral and intellectual development1 by surrounding my path with dangers1 and by weakening and demoralising society1 from which ,i have a right to claim mutual aid and intercourse4 ,a theory of social rights1 the like of which probably never before found its way into distinct language--being nothing short of this--that it is the absolute social right of every individual1 that every other individual shall act in every respect exactly as he ought2 that whosoever fails thereof in the smallest particular1 violates my social right1 and entitles me to demand from the legislature the removal of the grievance4 ,so monstrous a principle is far more dangerous than any single interference with liberty2 there is no violation of liberty which it would not justify2 it acknowledges no right to any freedom whatever1 except perhaps to that of holding opinions in secret1 without ever disclosing them3 for the moment an opinion which ,i consider noxious1 passes any one's lips1 it invades all the social rights attributed to me by the ,alliance4 ,the doctrine ascribes to all mankind a vested interest in each other's moral1 intellectual1 and even physical perfection1 to be defined by each claimant according to his own standard4 ,another important example of illegitimate interference with the rightful liberty of the individual1 not simply threatened1 but long since carried into triumphant effect1 is ,sabbatarian legislation4 ,without doubt1 abstinence on one day in the week1 so far as the exigencies of life permit1 from the usual daily occupation1 though in no respect religiously binding on any except ,jews1 is a highly beneficial custom4 ,and inasmuch as this custom cannot be observed without a general consent to that effect among the industrious classes1 therefore1 in so far as some persons by working may impose the same necessity on others1 it may be allowable and right that the law should guarantee to each1 the observance by others of the custom1 by suspending the greater operations of industry on a particular day4 ,but this justification1 grounded on the direct interest which others have in each individual's observance of the practice1 does not apply to the self-chosen occupations in which a person may think fit to employ his leisure2 nor does it hold good1 in the smallest degree1 for legal restrictions on amusements4 ,it is true that the amusement of some is the day's work of others2 but the pleasure1 not to say the useful recreation1 of many1 is worth the labour of a few1 provided the occupation is freely chosen1 and can be freely resigned4 ,the operatives are perfectly right in thinking that if all worked on ,sunday1 seven days' work would have to be given for six days' wages3 but so long as the great mass of employments are suspended1 the small number who for the enjoyment of others must still work1 obtain a proportional increase of earnings2 and they are not obliged to follow those occupations1 if they prefer leisure to emolument4 ,if a further remedy is sought1 it might be found in the establishment by custom of a holiday on some other day of the week for those particular classes of persons4 ,the only ground1 therefore1 on which restrictions on ,sunday amusements can be defended1 must be that they are religiously wrong2 a motive of legislation which never can be too earnestly protested against4 ,deorum injuri ,diis cur4 ,it remains to be proved that society or any of its officers holds a commission from on high to avenge any supposed offence to ,omnipotence1 which is not also a wrong to our fellow-creatures4 ,the notion that it is one man's duty that another should be religious1 was the foundation of all the religious persecutions ever perpetrated1 and if admitted1 would fully justify them4 ,though the feeling which breaks out in the repeated attempts to stop railway travelling on ,sunday1 in the resistance to the opening of ,museums1 and the like1 has not the cruelty of the old persecutors1 the state of mind indicated by it is fundamentally the same4 ,it is a determination not to tolerate others in doing what is permitted by their religion1 because it is not permitted by the persecutor's religion4 ,it is a belief that ,god not only abominates the act of the misbeliever1 but will not hold us guiltless if we leave him unmolested4 ,i cannot refrain from adding to these examples of the little account commonly made of human liberty1 the language of downright persecution which breaks out from the press of this country1 whenever it feels called on to notice the remarkable phenomenon of ,mormonism4 ,much might be said on the unexpected and instructive fact1 that an alleged new revelation1 and a religion founded on it1 the product of palpable imposture1 not even supported by the prestige of extraordinary qualities in its founder1 is believed by hundreds of thousands1 and has been made the foundation of a society1 in the age of newspapers1 railways1 and the electric telegraph4 ,what here concerns us is1 that this religion1 like other and better religions1 has its martyrs2 that its prophet and founder was1 for his teaching1 put to death by a mob2 that others of its adherents lost their lives by the same lawless violence2 that they were forcibly expelled1 in a body1 from the country in which they first grew up2 while1 now that they have been chased into a solitary recess in the midst of a desert1 many in this country openly declare that it would be right 7only that it is not convenient7 to send an expedition against them1 and compel them by force to conform to the opinions of other people4 ,the article of the ,mormonite doctrine which is the chief provocative to the antipathy which thus breaks through the ordinary restraints of religious tolerance1 is its sanction of polygamy2 which1 though permitted to ,mahomedans1 and ,hindoos1 and ,chinese1 seems to excite unquenchable animosity when practised by persons who speak ,english1 and profess to be a kind of ,christians4 ,no one has a deeper disapprobation than ,i have of this ,mormon institution2 both for other reasons1 and because1 far from being in any way countenanced by the principle of liberty1 it is a direct infraction of that principle1 being a mere riveting of the chains of one half of the community1 and an emancipation of the other from reciprocity of obligation towards them4 ,still1 it must be remembered that this relation is as much voluntary on the part of the women concerned in it1 and who may be deemed the sufferers by it1 as is the case with any other form of the marriage institution2 and however surprising this fact may appear1 it has its explanation in the common ideas and customs of the world1 which teaching women to think marriage the one thing needful1 make it intelligible that many a woman should prefer being one of several wives1 to not being a wife at all4 ,other countries are not asked to recognise such unions1 or release any portion of their inhabitants from their own laws on the score of ,mormonite opinions4 ,but when the dissentients have conceded to the hostile sentiments of others1 far more than could justly be demanded2 when they have left the countries to which their doctrines were unacceptable1 and established themselves in a remote corner of the earth1 which they have been the first to render habitable to human beings2 it is difficult to see on what principles but those of tyranny they can be prevented from living there under what laws they please1 provided they commit no aggression on other nations1 and allow perfect freedom of departure to those who are dissatisfied with their ways4 ,a recent writer1 in some respects of considerable merit1 proposes 7to use his own words71 not a crusade1 but a civilizade1 against this polygamous community1 to put an end to what seems to him a retrograde step in civilisation4 ,it also appears so to me1 but ,i am not aware that any community has a right to force another to be civilised4 ,so long as the sufferers by the bad law do not invoke assistance from other communities1 ,i cannot admit that persons entirely unconnected with them ought to step in and require that a condition of things with which all who are directly interested appear to be satisfied1 should be put an end to because it is a scandal to persons some thousands of miles distant1 who have no part or concern in it4 ,let them send missionaries1 if they please1 to preach against it2 and let them1 by any fair means 7of which silencing the teachers is not one71 oppose the progress of similar doctrines among their own people4 ,if civilisation has got the better of barbarism when barbarism had the world to itself1 it is too much to profess to be afraid lest barbarism1 after having been fairly got under1 should revive and conquer civilisation4 ,a civilisation that can thus succumb to its vanquished enemy1 must first have become so degenerate1 that neither its appointed priests and teachers1 nor anybody else1 has the capacity1 or will take the trouble1 to stand up for it4 ,if this be so1 the sooner such a civilisation receives notice to quit1 the better4 ,it can only go on from bad to worse1 until destroyed and regenerated 7like the ,western ,empire7 by energetic barbarians4 ,,footnote3 #ad ,the case of the ,bombay ,parsees is a curious instance in point4 ,when this industrious and enterprising tribe1 the descendants of the ,persian fire-worshippers1 flying from their native country before the ,caliphs1 arrived in ,western ,india1 they were admitted to toleration by the ,hindoo sovereigns1 on condition of not eating beef4 ,when those regions afterwards fell under the dominion of ,mahomedan conquerors1 the ,parsees obtained from them a continuance of indulgence1 on condition of refraining from pork4 ,what was at first obedience to authority became a second nature1 and the ,parsees to this day abstain both from beef and pork4 ,though not required by their religion1 the double abstinence has had time to grow into a custom of their tribe2 and custom1 in the ,east1 is a religion4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,applications4 ,the principles asserted in these pages must be more generally admitted as the basis for discussion of details1 before a consistent application of them to all the various departments of government and morals can be attempted with any prospect of advantage4 ,the few observations ,i propose to make on questions of detail1 are designed to illustrate the principles1 rather than to follow them out to their consequences4 ,i offer1 not so much applications1 as specimens of application2 which may serve to bring into greater clearness the meaning and limits of the two maxims which together form the entire doctrine of this ,essay1 and to assist the judgment in holding the balance between them1 in the cases where it appears doubtful which of them is applicable to the case4 ,the maxims are1 first1 that the individual is not accountable to society for his actions1 in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself4 ,advice1 instruction1 persuasion1 and avoidance by other people if thought necessary by them for their own good1 are the only measures by which society can justifiably express its dislike or disapprobation of his conduct4 ,secondly1 that for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others1 the individual is accountable and may be subjected either to social or to legal punishments1 if society is of opinion that the one or the other is requisite for its protection4 ,in the first place1 it must by no means be supposed1 because damage1 or probability of damage1 to the interests of others1 can alone justify the interference of society1 that therefore it always does justify such interference4 ,in many cases1 an individual1 in pursuing a legitimate object1 necessarily and therefore legitimately causes pain or loss to others1 or intercepts a good which they had a reasonable hope of obtaining4 ,such oppositions of interest between individuals often arise from bad social institutions1 but are unavoidable while those institutions last2 and some would be unavoidable under any institutions4 ,whoever succeeds in an overcrowded profession1 or in a competitive examination2 whoever is preferred to another in any contest for an object which both desire1 reaps benefit from the loss of others1 from their wasted exertion and their disappointment4 ,but it is1 by common admission1 better for the general interest of mankind1 that persons should pursue their objects undeterred by this sort of consequences4 ,in other words1 society admits no rights1 either legal or moral1 in the disappointed competitors1 to immunity from this kind of suffering2 and feels called on to interfere1 only when means of success have been employed which it is contrary to the general interest to permit--namely1 fraud or treachery1 and force4 ,again1 trade is a social act4 ,whoever undertakes to sell any description of goods to the public1 does what affects the interest of other persons1 and of society in general2 and thus his conduct1 in principle1 comes within the jurisdiction of society3 accordingly1 it was once held to be the duty of governments1 in all cases which were considered of importance1 to fix prices1 and regulate the processes of manufacture4 ,but it is now recognised1 though not till after a long struggle1 that both the cheapness and the good quality of commodities are most effectually provided for by leaving the producers and sellers perfectly free1 under the sole check of equal freedom to the buyers for supplying themselves elsewhere4 ,this is the so-called doctrine of ,free ,trade1 which rests on grounds different from1 though equally solid with1 the principle of individual liberty asserted in this ,essay4 ,restrictions on trade1 or on production for purposes of trade1 are indeed restraints2 and all restraint1 qu restraint1 is an evil3 but the restraints in question affect only that part of conduct which society is competent to restrain1 and are wrong solely because they do not really produce the results which it is desired to produce by them4 ,as the principle of individual liberty is not involved in the doctrine of ,free ,trade1 so neither is it in most of the questions which arise respecting the limits of that doctrine3 as for example1 what amount of public control is admissible for the prevention of fraud by adulteration2 how far sanitary precautions1 or arrangements to protect work-people employed in dangerous occupations1 should be enforced on employers4 ,such questions involve considerations of liberty1 only in so far as leaving people to themselves is always better1 cteris paribus1 than controlling them3 but that they may be legitimately controlled for these ends1 is in principle undeniable4 ,on the other hand1 there are questions relating to interference with trade1 which are essentially questions of liberty2 such as the ,maine ,law1 already touched upon2 the prohibition of the importation of opium into ,china2 the restriction of the sale of poisons2 all cases1 in short1 where the object of the interference is to make it impossible or difficult to obtain a particular commodity4 ,these interferences are objectionable1 not as infringements on the liberty of the producer or seller1 but on that of the buyer4 ,one of these examples1 that of the sale of poisons1 opens a new question2 the proper limits of what may be called the functions of police2 how far liberty may legitimately be invaded for the prevention of crime1 or of accident4 ,it is one of the undisputed functions of government to take precautions against crime before it has been committed1 as well as to detect and punish it afterwards4 ,the preventive function of government1 however1 is far more liable to be abused1 to the prejudice of liberty1 than the punitory function2 for there is hardly any part of the legitimate freedom of action of a human being which would not admit of being represented1 and fairly too1 as increasing the facilities for some form or other of delinquency4 ,nevertheless1 if a public authority1 or even a private person1 sees any one evidently preparing to commit a crime1 they are not bound to look on inactive until the crime is committed1 but may interfere to prevent it4 ,if poisons were never bought or used for any purpose except the commission of murder1 it would be right to prohibit their manufacture and sale4 ,they may1 however1 be wanted not only for innocent but for useful purposes1 and restrictions cannot be imposed in the one case without operating in the other4 ,again1 it is a proper office of public authority to guard against accidents4 ,if either a public officer or any one else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge which had been ascertained to be unsafe1 and there were no time to warn him of his danger1 they might seize him and turn him back1 without any real infringement of his liberty2 for liberty consists in doing what one desires1 and he does not desire to fall into the river4 ,nevertheless1 when there is not a certainty1 but only a danger of mischief1 no one but the person himself can judge of the sufficiency of the motive which may prompt him to incur the risk3 in this case1 therefore 7unless he is a child1 or delirious1 or in some state of excitement or absorption incompatible with the full use of the reflecting faculty71 he ought1 ,i conceive1 to be only warned of the danger2 not forcibly prevented from exposing himself to it4 ,similar considerations1 applied to such a question as the sale of poisons1 may enable us to decide which among the possible modes of regulation are or are not contrary to principle4 ,such a precaution1 for example1 as that of labelling the drug with some word expressive of its dangerous character1 may be enforced without violation of liberty3 the buyer cannot wish not to know that the thing he possesses has poisonous qualities4 ,but to require in all cases the certificate of a medical practitioner1 would make it sometimes impossible1 always expensive1 to obtain the article for legitimate uses4 ,the only mode apparent to me1 in which difficulties may be thrown in the way of crime committed through this means1 without any infringement1 worth taking into account1 upon the liberty of those who desire the poisonous substance for other purposes1 consists in providing what1 in the apt language of ,bentham1 is called preappointed evidence4 ,this provision is familiar to every one in the case of contracts4 ,it is usual and right that the law1 when a contract is entered into1 should require as the condition of its enforcing performance1 that certain formalities should be observed1 such as signatures1 attestation of witnesses1 and the like1 in order that in case of subsequent dispute1 there may be evidence to prove that the contract was really entered into1 and that there was nothing in the circumstances to render it legally invalid3 the effect being1 to throw great obstacles in the way of fictitious contracts1 or contracts made in circumstances which1 if known1 would destroy their validity4 ,precautions of a similar nature might be enforced in the sale of articles adapted to be instruments of crime4 ,the seller1 for example1 might be required to enter into a register the exact time of the transaction1 the name and address of the buyer1 the precise quality and quantity sold2 to ask the purpose for which it was wanted1 and record the answer he received4 ,when there was no medical prescription1 the presence of some third person might be required1 to bring home the fact to the purchaser1 in case there should afterwards be reason to believe that the article had been applied to criminal purposes4 ,such regulations would in general be no material impediment to obtaining the article1 but a very considerable one to making an improper use of it without detection4 ,the right inherent in society1 to ward off crimes against itself by antecedent precautions1 suggests the obvious limitations to the maxim1 that purely self-regarding misconduct cannot properly be meddled with in the way of prevention or punishment4 ,drunkenness1 for example1 in ordinary cases1 is not a fit subject for legislative interference2 but ,i should deem it perfectly legitimate that a person1 who had once been convicted of any act of violence to others under the influence of drink1 should be placed under a special legal restriction1 personal to himself2 that if he were afterwards found drunk1 he should be liable to a penalty1 and that if when in that state he committed another offence1 the punishment to which he would be liable for that other offence should be increased in severity4 ,the making himself drunk1 in a person whom drunkenness excites to do harm to others1 is a crime against others4 ,so1 again1 idleness1 except in a person receiving support from the public1 or except when it constitutes a breach of contract1 cannot without tyranny be made a subject of legal punishment2 but if either from idleness or from any other avoidable cause1 a man fails to perform his legal duties to others1 as for instance to support his children1 it is no tyranny to force him to fulfil that obligation1 by compulsory labour1 if no other means are available4 ,again1 there are many acts which1 being directly injurious only to the agents themselves1 ought not to be legally interdicted1 but which1 if done publicly1 are a violation of good manners and coming thus within the category of offences against others may rightfully be prohibited4 ,of this kind are offences against decency2 on which it is unnecessary to dwell1 the rather as they are only connected indirectly with our subject1 the objection to publicity being equally strong in the case of many actions not in themselves condemnable1 nor supposed to be so4 ,there is another question to which an answer must be found1 consistent with the principles which have been laid down4 ,in cases of personal conduct supposed to be blamable1 but which respect for liberty precludes society from preventing or punishing1 because the evil directly resulting falls wholly on the agent2 what the agent is free to do1 ought other persons to be equally free to counsel or instigate8 ,this question is not free from difficulty4 ,the case of a person who solicits another to do an act1 is not strictly a case of self-regarding conduct4 ,to give advice or offer inducements to any one1 is a social act1 and may therefore1 like actions in general which affect others1 be supposed amenable to social control4 ,but a little reflection corrects the first impression1 by showing that if the case is not strictly within the definition of individual liberty1 yet the reasons on which the principle of individual liberty is grounded1 are applicable to it4 ,if people must be allowed1 in whatever concerns only themselves1 to act as seems best to themselves at their own peril1 they must equally be free to consult with one another about what is fit to be so done2 to exchange opinions1 and give and receive suggestions4 ,whatever it is permitted to do1 it must be permitted to advise to do4 ,the question is doubtful1 only when the instigator derives a personal benefit from his advice2 when he makes it his occupation1 for subsistence or pecuniary gain1 to promote what society and the state consider to be an evil4 ,then1 indeed1 a new element of complication is introduced2 namely1 the existence of classes of persons with an interest opposed to what is considered as the public weal1 and whose mode of living is grounded on the counteraction of it4 ,ought this to be interfered with1 or not8 ,fornication1 for example1 must be tolerated1 and so must gambling2 but should a person be free to be a pimp1 or to keep a gambling-house8 ,the case is one of those which lie on the exact boundary line between two principles1 and it is not at once apparent to which of the two it properly belongs4 ,there are arguments on both sides4 ,on the side of toleration it may be said1 that the fact of following anything as an occupation1 and living or profiting by the practice of it1 cannot make that criminal which would otherwise be admissible2 that the act should either be consistently permitted or consistently prohibited2 that if the principles which we have hitherto defended are true1 society has no business1 as society1 to decide anything to be wrong which concerns only the individual2 that it cannot go beyond dissuasion1 and that one person should be as free to persuade1 as another to dissuade4 ,in opposition to this it may be contended1 that although the public1 or the ,state1 are not warranted in authoritatively deciding1 for purposes of repression or punishment1 that such or such conduct affecting only the interests of the individual is good or bad1 they are fully justified in assuming1 if they regard it as bad1 that its being so or not is at least a disputable question3 ,that1 this being supposed1 they cannot be acting wrongly in endeavouring to exclude the influence of solicitations which are not disinterested1 of instigators who cannot possibly be impartial--who have a direct personal interest on one side1 and that side the one which the ,state believes to be wrong1 and who confessedly promote it for personal objects only4 ,there can surely1 it may be urged1 be nothing lost1 no sacrifice of good1 by so ordering matters that persons shall make their election1 either wisely or foolishly1 on their own prompting1 as free as possible from the arts of persons who stimulate their inclinations for interested purposes of their own4 ,thus 7it may be said7 though the statutes respecting unlawful games are utterly indefensible--though all persons should be free to gamble in their own or each other's houses1 or in any place of meeting established by their own subscriptions1 and open only to the members and their visitors--yet public gambling-houses should not be permitted4 ,it is true that the prohibition is never effectual1 and that whatever amount of tyrannical power is given to the police1 gambling-houses can always be maintained under other pretences2 but they may be compelled to conduct their operations with a certain degree of secrecy and mystery1 so that nobody knows anything about them but those who seek them2 and more than this1 society ought not to aim at4 ,there is considerable force in these arguments2 ,i will not venture to decide whether they are sufficient to justify the moral anomaly of punishing the accessary1 when the principal is 7and must be7 allowed to go free2 or fining or imprisoning the procurer1 but not the fornicator1 the gambling-house keeper1 but not the gambler4 ,still less ought the common operations of buying and selling to be interfered with on analogous grounds4 ,almost every article which is bought and sold may be used in excess1 and the sellers have a pecuniary interest in encouraging that excess2 but no argument can be founded on this1 in favour1 for instance1 of the ,maine ,law2 because the class of dealers in strong drinks1 though interested in their abuse1 are indispensably required for the sake of their legitimate use4 ,the interest1 however1 of these dealers in promoting intemperance is a real evil1 and justifies the ,state in imposing restrictions and requiring guarantees1 which but for that justification would be infringements of legitimate liberty4 ,a further question is1 whether the ,state1 while it permits1 should nevertheless indirectly discourage conduct which it deems contrary to the best interests of the agent2 whether1 for example1 it should take measures to render the means of drunkenness more costly1 or add to the difficulty of procuring them1 by limiting the number of the places of sale4 ,on this as on most other practical questions1 many distinctions require to be made4 ,to tax stimulants for the sole purpose of making them more difficult to be obtained1 is a measure differing only in degree from their entire prohibition2 and would be justifiable only if that were justifiable4 ,every increase of cost is a prohibition1 to those whose means do not come up to the augmented price2 and to those who do1 it is a penalty laid on them for gratifying a particular taste4 ,their choice of pleasures1 and their mode of expending their income1 after satisfying their legal and moral obligations to the ,state and to individuals1 are their own concern1 and must rest with their own judgment4 ,these considerations may seem at first sight to condemn the selection of stimulants as special subjects of taxation for purposes of revenue4 ,but it must be remembered that taxation for fiscal purposes is absolutely inevitable2 that in most countries it is necessary that a considerable part of that taxation should be indirect2 that the ,state1 therefore1 cannot help imposing penalties1 which to some persons may be prohibitory1 on the use of some articles of consumption4 ,it is hence the duty of the ,state to consider1 in the imposition of taxes1 what commodities the consumers can best spare2 and fortiori1 to select in preference those of which it deems the use1 beyond a very moderate quantity1 to be positively injurious4 ,taxation1 therefore1 of stimulants1 up to the point which produces the largest amount of revenue 7supposing that the ,state needs all the revenue which it yields7 is not only admissible1 but to be approved of4 ,the question of making the sale of these commodities a more or less exclusive privilege1 must be answered differently1 according to the purposes to which the restriction is intended to be subservient4 ,all places of public resort require the restraint of a police1 and places of this kind peculiarly1 because offences against society are especially apt to originate there4 ,it is1 therefore1 fit to confine the power of selling these commodities 7at least for consumption on the spot7 to persons of known or vouched-for respectability of conduct2 to make such regulations respecting hours of opening and closing as may be requisite for public surveillance1 and to withdraw the licence if breaches of the peace repeatedly take place through the connivance or incapacity of the keeper of the house1 or if it becomes a rendezvous for concocting and preparing offences against the law4 ,any further restriction ,i do not conceive to be1 in principle1 justifiable4 ,the limitation in number1 for instance1 of beer and spirit-houses1 for the express purpose of rendering them more difficult of access1 and diminishing the occasions of temptation1 not only exposes all to an inconvenience because there are some by whom the facility would be abused1 but is suited only to a state of society in which the labouring classes are avowedly treated as children or savages1 and placed under an education of restraint1 to fit them for future admission to the privileges of freedom4 ,this is not the principle on which the labouring classes are professedly governed in any free country2 and no person who sets due value on freedom will give his adhesion to their being so governed1 unless after all efforts have been exhausted to educate them for freedom and govern them as freemen1 and it has been definitively proved that they can only be governed as children4 ,the bare statement of the alternative shows the absurdity of supposing that such efforts have been made in any case which needs be considered here4 ,it is only because the institutions of this country are a mass of inconsistencies1 that things find admittance into our practice which belong to the system of despotic1 or what is called paternal1 government1 while the general freedom of our institutions precludes the exercise of the amount of control necessary to render the restraint of any real efficacy as a moral education4 ,it was pointed out in an early part of this ,essay1 that the liberty of the individual1 in things wherein the individual is alone concerned1 implies a corresponding liberty in any number of individuals to regulate by mutual agreement such things as regard them jointly1 and regard no persons but themselves4 ,this question presents no difficulty1 so long as the will of all the persons implicated remains unaltered2 but since that will may change1 it is often necessary1 even in things in which they alone are concerned1 that they should enter into engagements with one another2 and when they do1 it is fit1 as a general rule1 that those engagements should be kept4 ,yet in the laws1 probably1 of every country1 this general rule has some exceptions4 ,not only persons are not held to engagements which violate the rights of third parties1 but it is sometimes considered a sufficient reason for releasing them from an engagement1 that it is injurious to themselves4 ,in this and most other civilised countries1 for example1 an engagement by which a person should sell himself1 or allow himself to be sold1 as a slave1 would be null and void2 neither enforced by law nor by opinion4 ,the ground for thus limiting his power of voluntarily disposing of his own lot in life1 is apparent1 and is very clearly seen in this extreme case4 ,the reason for not interfering1 unless for the sake of others1 with a person's voluntary acts1 is consideration for his liberty4 ,his voluntary choice is evidence that what he so chooses is desirable1 or at the least endurable1 to him1 and his good is on the whole best provided for by allowing him to take his own means of pursuing it4 ,but by selling himself for a slave1 he abdicates his liberty2 he foregoes any future use of it1 beyond that single act4 ,he therefore defeats1 in his own case1 the very purpose which is the justification of allowing him to dispose of himself4 ,he is no longer free2 but is thenceforth in a position which has no longer the presumption in its favour1 that would be afforded by his voluntarily remaining in it4 ,the principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free4 ,it is not freedom1 to be allowed to alienate his freedom4 ,these reasons1 the force of which is so conspicuous in this peculiar case1 are evidently of far wider application2 yet a limit is everywhere set to them by the necessities of life1 which continually require1 not indeed that we should resign our freedom1 but that we should consent to this and the other limitation of it4 ,the principle1 however1 which demands uncontrolled freedom of action in all that concerns only the agents themselves1 requires that those who have become bound to one another1 in things which concern no third party1 should be able to release one another from the engagement3 and even without such voluntary release1 there are perhaps no contracts or engagements1 except those that relate to money or money's worth1 of which one can venture to say that there ought to be no liberty whatever of retractation4 ,baron ,wilhelm von ,humboldt1 in the excellent essay from which ,i have already quoted1 states it as his conviction1 that engagements which involve personal relations or services1 should never be legally binding beyond a limited duration of time2 and that the most important of these engagements1 marriage1 having the peculiarity that its objects are frustrated unless the feelings of both the parties are in harmony with it1 should require nothing more than the declared will of either party to dissolve it4 ,this subject is too important1 and too complicated1 to be discussed in a parenthesis1 and ,i touch on it only so far as is necessary for purposes of illustration4 ,if the conciseness and generality of ,baron ,humboldt's dissertation had not obliged him in this instance to content himself with enunciating his conclusion without discussing the premises1 he would doubtless have recognised that the question cannot be decided on grounds so simple as those to which he confines himself4 ,when a person1 either by express promise or by conduct1 has encouraged another to rely upon his continuing to act in a certain way--to build expectations and calculations1 and stake any part of his plan of life upon that supposition1 a new series of moral obligations arises on his part towards that person1 which may possibly be overruled1 but cannot be ignored4 ,and again1 if the relation between two contracting parties has been followed by consequences to others2 if it has placed third parties in any peculiar position1 or1 as in the case of marriage1 has even called third parties into existence1 obligations arise on the part of both the contracting parties towards those third persons1 the fulfilment of which1 or at all events the mode of fulfilment1 must be greatly affected by the continuance or disruption of the relation between the original parties to the contract4 ,it does not follow1 nor can ,i admit1 that these obligations extend to requiring the fulfilment of the contract at all costs to the happiness of the reluctant party2 but they are a necessary element in the question2 and even if1 as ,von ,humboldt maintains1 they ought to make no difference in the legal freedom of the parties to release themselves from the engagement 7and ,i also hold that they ought not to make much difference71 they necessarily make a great difference in the moral freedom4 ,a person is bound to take all these circumstances into account1 before resolving on a step which may affect such important interests of others2 and if he does not allow proper weight to those interests1 he is morally responsible for the wrong4 ,i have made these obvious remarks for the better illustration of the general principle of liberty1 and not because they are at all needed on the particular question1 which1 on the contrary1 is usually discussed as if the interest of children was everything1 and that of grown persons nothing4 ,i have already observed that1 owing to the absence of any recognised general principles1 liberty is often granted where it should be withheld1 as well as withheld where it should be granted2 and one of the cases in which1 in the modern ,european world1 the sentiment of liberty is the strongest1 is a case where1 in my view1 it is altogether misplaced4 ,a person should be free to do as he likes in his own concerns2 but he ought not to be free to do as he likes in acting for another1 under the pretext that the affairs of another are his own affairs4 ,the ,state1 while it respects the liberty of each in what specially regards himself1 is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his exercise of any power which it allows him to possess over others4 ,this obligation is almost entirely disregarded in the case of the family relations1 a case1 in its direct influence on human happiness1 more important than all others taken together4 ,the almost despotic power of husbands over wives need not be enlarged upon here because nothing more is needed for the complete removal of the evil1 than that wives should have the same rights1 and should receive the protection of law in the same manner1 as all other persons2 and because1 on this subject1 the defenders of established injustice do not avail themselves of the plea of liberty1 but stand forth openly as the champions of power4 ,it is in the case of children1 that misapplied notions of liberty are a real obstacle to the fulfilment by the ,state of its duties4 ,one would almost think that a man's children were supposed to be literally1 and not metaphorically1 a part of himself1 so jealous is opinion of the smallest interference of law with his absolute and exclusive control over them2 more jealous than of almost any interference with his own freedom of action3 so much less do the generality of mankind value liberty than power4 ,consider1 for example1 the case of education4 ,is it not almost a self-evident axiom1 that the ,state should require and compel the education1 up to a certain standard1 of every human being who is born its citizen8 ,yet who is there that is not afraid to recognise and assert this truth8 ,hardly any one indeed will deny that it is one of the most sacred duties of the parents 7or1 as law and usage now stand1 the father71 after summoning a human being into the world1 to give to that being an education fitting him to perform his part well in life towards others and towards himself4 ,but while this is unanimously declared to be the father's duty1 scarcely anybody1 in this country1 will bear to hear of obliging him to perform it4 ,instead of his being required to make any exertion or sacrifice for securing education to the child1 it is left to his choice to accept it or not when it is provided gratis6 ,it still remains unrecognised1 that to bring a child into existence without a fair prospect of being able1 not only to provide food for its body1 but instruction and training for its mind1 is a moral crime1 both against the unfortunate offspring and against society2 and that if the parent does not fulfil this obligation1 the ,state ought to see it fulfilled1 at the charge1 as far as possible1 of the parent4 ,were the duty of enforcing universal education once admitted1 there would be an end to the difficulties about what the ,state should teach1 and how it should teach1 which now convert the subject into a mere battle-field for sects and parties1 causing the time and labour which should have been spent in educating1 to be wasted in quarrelling about education4 ,if the government would make up its mind to require for every child a good education1 it might save itself the trouble of providing one4 ,it might leave to parents to obtain the education where and how they pleased1 and content itself with helping to pay the school fees of the poorer class of children1 and defraying the entire school expenses of those who have no one else to pay for them4 ,the objections which are urged with reason against ,state education1 do not apply to the enforcement of education by the ,state1 but to the ,state's taking upon itself to direct that education2 which is a totally different thing4 ,that the whole or any large part of the education of the people should be in ,state hands1 ,i go as far as any one in deprecating4 ,all that has been said of the importance of individuality of character1 and diversity in opinions and modes of conduct1 involves1 as of the same unspeakable importance1 diversity of education4 ,a general ,state education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another2 and as the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power in the government1 whether this be a monarch1 a priesthood1 an aristocracy1 or the majority of the existing generation1 in proportion as it is efficient and successful1 it establishes a despotism over the mind1 leading by natural tendency to one over the body4 ,an education established and controlled by the ,state1 should only exist1 if it exist at all1 as one among many competing experiments1 carried on for the purpose of example and stimulus1 to keep the others up to a certain standard of excellence4 ,unless1 indeed1 when society in general is in so backward a state that it could not or would not provide for itself any proper institutions of education1 unless the government undertook the task2 then1 indeed1 the government may1 as the less of two great evils1 take upon itself the business of schools and universities1 as it may that of joint stock companies1 when private enterprise1 in a shape fitted for undertaking great works of industry1 does not exist in the country4 ,but in general1 if the country contains a sufficient number of persons qualified to provide education under government auspices1 the same persons would be able and willing to give an equally good education on the voluntary principle1 under the assurance of remuneration afforded by a law rendering education compulsory1 combined with ,state aid to those unable to defray the expense4 ,the instrument for enforcing the law could be no other than public examinations1 extending to all children1 and beginning at an early age4 ,an age might be fixed at which every child must be examined1 to ascertain if he 7or she7 is able to read4 ,if a child proves unable1 the father1 unless he has some sufficient ground of excuse1 might be subjected to a moderate fine1 to be worked out1 if necessary1 by his labour1 and the child might be put to school at his expense4 ,once in every year the examination should be renewed1 with a gradually extending range of subjects1 so as to make the universal acquisition1 and what is more1 retention1 of a certain minimum of general knowledge1 virtually compulsory4 ,beyond that minimum1 there should be voluntary examinations on all subjects1 at which all who come up to a certain standard of proficiency might claim a certificate4 ,to prevent the ,state from exercising1 through these arrangements1 an improper influence over opinion1 the knowledge required for passing an examination 7beyond the merely instrumental parts of knowledge1 such as languages and their use7 should1 even in the higher class of examinations1 be confined to facts and positive science exclusively4 ,the examinations on religion1 politics1 or other disputed topics1 should not turn on the truth or falsehood of opinions1 but on the matter of fact that such and such an opinion is held1 on such grounds1 by such authors1 or schools1 or churches4 ,under this system1 the rising generation would be no worse off in regard to all disputed truths1 than they are at present2 they would be brought up either churchmen or dissenters as they now are1 the state merely taking care that they should be instructed churchmen1 or instructed dissenters4 ,there would be nothing to hinder them from being taught religion1 if their parents chose1 at the same schools where they were taught other things4 ,all attempts by the state to bias the conclusions of its citizens on disputed subjects1 are evil2 but it may very properly offer to ascertain and certify that a person possesses the knowledge1 requisite to make his conclusions1 on any given subject1 worth attending to4 ,a student of philosophy would be the better for being able to stand an examination both in ,locke and in ,kant1 whichever of the two he takes up with1 or even if with neither3 and there is no reasonable objection to examining an atheist in the evidences of ,christianity1 provided he is not required to profess a belief in them4 ,the examinations1 however1 in the higher branches of knowledge should1 ,i conceive1 be entirely voluntary4 ,it would be giving too dangerous a power to governments1 were they allowed to exclude any one from professions1 even from the profession of teacher1 for alleged deficiency of qualifications3 and ,i think1 with ,wilhelm von ,humboldt1 that degrees1 or other public certificates of scientific or professional acquirements1 should be given to all who present themselves for examination1 and stand the test2 but that such certificates should confer no advantage over competitors1 other than the weight which may be attached to their testimony by public opinion4 ,it is not in the matter of education only1 that misplaced notions of liberty prevent moral obligations on the part of parents from being recognised1 and legal obligations from being imposed1 where there are the strongest grounds for the former always1 and in many cases for the latter also4 ,the fact itself1 of causing the existence of a human being1 is one of the most responsible actions in the range of human life4 ,to undertake this responsibility--to bestow a life which may be either a curse or a blessing--unless the being on whom it is to be bestowed will have at least the ordinary chances of a desirable existence1 is a crime against that being4 ,and in a country either over-peopled1 or threatened with being so1 to produce children1 beyond a very small number1 with the effect of reducing the reward of labour by their competition1 is a serious offence against all who live by the remuneration of their labour4 ,the laws which1 in many countries on the ,continent1 forbid marriage unless the parties can show that they have the means of supporting a family1 do not exceed the legitimate powers of the state3 and whether such laws be expedient or not 7a question mainly dependent on local circumstances and feelings71 they are not objectionable as violations of liberty4 ,such laws are interferences of the state to prohibit a mischievous act--an act injurious to others1 which ought to be a subject of reprobation1 and social stigma1 even when it is not deemed expedient to superadd legal punishment4 ,yet the current ideas of liberty1 which bend so easily to real infringements of the freedom of the individual1 in things which concern only himself1 would repel the attempt to put any restraint upon his inclinations when the consequence of their indulgence is a life1 or lives1 of wretchedness and depravity to the offspring1 with manifold evils to those sufficiently within reach to be in any way affected by their actions4 ,when we compare the strange respect of mankind for liberty1 with their strange want of respect for it1 we might imagine that a man had an indispensable right to do harm to others1 and no right at all to please himself without giving pain to any one4 ,i have reserved for the last place a large class of questions respecting the limits of government interference1 which1 though closely connected with the subject of this ,essay1 do not1 in strictness1 belong to it4 ,these are cases in which the reasons against interference do not turn upon the principle of liberty3 the question is not about restraining the actions of individuals1 but about helping them3 it is asked whether the government should do1 or cause to be done1 something for their benefit1 instead of leaving it to be done by themselves1 individually1 or in voluntary combination4 ,the objections to government interference1 when it is not such as to involve infringement of liberty1 may be of three kinds4 ,the first is1 when the thing to be done is likely to be better done by individuals than by the government4 ,speaking generally1 there is no one so fit to conduct any business1 or to determine how or by whom it shall be conducted1 as those who are personally interested in it4 ,this principle condemns the interferences1 once so common1 of the legislature1 or the officers of government1 with the ordinary processes of industry4 ,but this part of the subject has been sufficiently enlarged upon by political economists1 and is not particularly related to the principles of this ,essay4 ,the second objection is more nearly allied to our subject4 ,in many cases1 though individuals may not do the particular thing so well1 on the average1 as the officers of government1 it is nevertheless desirable that it should be done by them1 rather than by the government1 as a means to their own mental education--a mode of strengthening their active faculties1 exercising their judgment1 and giving them a familiar knowledge of the subjects with which they are thus left to deal4 ,this is a principal1 though not the sole1 recommendation of jury trial 7in cases not political72 of free and popular local and municipal institutions2 of the conduct of industrial and philanthropic enterprises by voluntary associations4 ,these are not questions of liberty1 and are connected with that subject only by remote tendencies2 but they are questions of development4 ,it belongs to a different occasion from the present to dwell on these things as parts of national education2 as being1 in truth1 the peculiar training of a citizen1 the practical part of the political education of a free people1 taking them out of the narrow circle of personal and family selfishness1 and accustoming them to the comprehension of joint interests1 the management of joint concerns--habituating them to act from public or semi-public motives1 and guide their conduct by aims which unite instead of isolating them from one another4 ,without these habits and powers1 a free constitution can neither be worked nor preserved1 as is exemplified by the too-often transitory nature of political freedom in countries where it does not rest upon a sufficient basis of local liberties4 ,the management of purely local business by the localities1 and of the great enterprises of industry by the union of those who voluntarily supply the pecuniary means1 is further recommended by all the advantages which have been set forth in this ,essay as belonging to individuality of development1 and diversity of modes of action4 ,government operations tend to be everywhere alike4 ,with individuals and voluntary associations1 on the contrary1 there are varied experiments1 and endless diversity of experience4 ,what the ,state can usefully do1 is to make itself a central depository1 and active circulator and diffuser1 of the experience resulting from many trials4 ,its business is to enable each experimentalist to benefit by the experiments of others1 instead of tolerating no experiments but its own4 ,the third1 and most cogent reason for restricting the interference of government1 is the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its power4 ,every function superadded to those already exercised by the government1 causes its influence over hopes and fears to be more widely diffused1 and converts1 more and more1 the active and ambitious part of the public into hangers-on of the government1 or of some party which aims at becoming the government4 ,if the roads1 the railways1 the banks1 the insurance offices1 the great joint-stock companies1 the universities1 and the public charities1 were all of them branches of the government2 if1 in addition1 the municipal corporations and local boards1 with all that now devolves on them1 became departments of the central administration2 if the employs of all these different enterprises were appointed and paid by the government1 and looked to the government for every rise in life2 not all the freedom of the press and popular constitution of the legislature would make this or any other country free otherwise than in name4 ,and the evil would be greater1 the more efficiently and scientifically the administrative machinery was constructed--the more skilful the arrangements for obtaining the best qualified hands and heads with which to work it4 ,in ,england it has of late been proposed that all the members of the civil service of government should be selected by competitive examination1 to obtain for those employments the most intelligent and instructed persons procurable2 and much has been said and written for and against this proposal4 ,one of the arguments most insisted on by its opponents1 is that the occupation of a permanent official servant of the ,state does not hold out sufficient prospects of emolument and importance to attract the highest talents1 which will always be able to find a more inviting career in the professions1 or in the service of companies and other public bodies4 ,one would not have been surprised if this argument had been used by the friends of the proposition1 as an answer to its principal difficulty4 ,coming from the opponents it is strange enough4 ,what is urged as an objection is the safety-valve of the proposed system4 ,if indeed all the high talent of the country could be drawn into the service of the government1 a proposal tending to bring about that result might well inspire uneasiness4 ,if every part of the business of society which required organised concert1 or large and comprehensive views1 were in the hands of the government1 and if government offices were universally filled by the ablest men1 all the enlarged culture and practised intelligence in the country1 except the purely speculative1 would be concentrated in a numerous bureaucracy1 to whom alone the rest of the community would look for all things3 the multitude for direction and dictation in all they had to do2 the able and aspiring for personal advancement4 ,to be admitted into the ranks of this bureaucracy1 and when admitted1 to rise therein1 would be the sole objects of ambition4 ,under this rgime1 not only is the outside public ill-qualified1 for want of practical experience1 to criticise or check the mode of operation of the bureaucracy1 but even if the accidents of despotic or the natural working of popular institutions occasionally raise to the summit a ruler or rulers of reforming inclinations1 no reform can be effected which is contrary to the interest of the bureaucracy4 ,such is the melancholy condition of the ,russian empire1 as is shown in the accounts of those who have had sufficient opportunity of observation4 ,the ,czar himself is powerless against the bureaucratic body2 he can send any one of them to ,siberia1 but he cannot govern without them1 or against their will4 ,on every decree of his they have a tacit veto1 by merely refraining from carrying it into effect4 ,in countries of more advanced civilisation and of a more insurrectionary spirit1 the public1 accustomed to expect everything to be done for them by the ,state1 or at least to do nothing for themselves without asking from the ,state not only leave to do it1 but even how it is to be done1 naturally hold the ,state responsible for all evil which befalls them1 and when the evil exceeds their amount of patience1 they rise against the government and make what is called a revolution2 whereupon somebody else1 with or without legitimate authority from the nation1 vaults into the seat1 issues his orders to the bureaucracy1 and everything goes on much as it did before2 the bureaucracy being unchanged1 and nobody else being capable of taking their place4 ,a very different spectacle is exhibited among a people accustomed to transact their own business4 ,in ,france1 a large part of the people having been engaged in military service1 many of whom have held at least the rank of non-commissioned officers1 there are in every popular insurrection several persons competent to take the lead1 and improvise some tolerable plan of action4 ,what the ,french are in military affairs1 the ,americans are in every kind of civil business2 let them be left without a government1 every body of ,americans is able to improvise one1 and to carry on that or any other public business with a sufficient amount of intelligence1 order1 and decision4 ,this is what every free people ought to be3 and a people capable of this is certain to be free2 it will never let itself be enslaved by any man or body of men because these are able to seize and pull the reins of the central administration4 ,no bureaucracy can hope to make such a people as this do or undergo anything that they do not like4 ,but where everything is done through the bureaucracy1 nothing to which the bureaucracy is really adverse can be done at all4 ,the constitution of such countries is an organisation of the experience and practical ability of the nation1 into a disciplined body for the purpose of governing the rest2 and the more perfect that organisation is in itself1 the more successful in drawing to itself and educating for itself the persons of greatest capacity from all ranks of the community1 the more complete is the bondage of all1 the members of the bureaucracy included4 ,for the governors are as much the slaves of their organisation and discipline1 as the governed are of the governors4 ,a ,chinese mandarin is as much the tool and creature of a despotism as the humblest cultivator4 ,an individual ,jesuit is to the utmost degree of abasement the slave of his order1 though the order itself exists for the collective power and importance of its members4 ,it is not1 also1 to be forgotten1 that the absorption of all the principal ability of the country into the governing body is fatal1 sooner or later1 to the mental activity and progressiveness of the body itself4 ,banded together as they are--working a system which1 like all systems1 necessarily proceeds in a great measure by fixed rules--the official body are under the constant temptation of sinking into indolent routine1 or1 if they now and then desert that mill-horse round1 of rushing into some half-examined crudity which has struck the fancy of some leading member of the corps3 and the sole check to these closely allied1 though seemingly opposite1 tendencies1 the only stimulus which can keep the ability of the body itself up to a high standard1 is liability to the watchful criticism of equal ability outside the body4 ,it is indispensable1 therefore1 that the means should exist1 independently of the government1 of forming such ability1 and furnishing it with the opportunities and experience necessary for a correct judgment of great practical affairs4 ,if we would possess permanently a skilful and efficient body of functionaries--above all1 a body able to originate and willing to adopt improvements2 if we would not have our bureaucracy degenerate into a pedantocracy1 this body must not engross all the occupations which form and cultivate the faculties required for the government of mankind4 ,to determine the point at which evils1 so formidable to human freedom and advancement1 begin1 or rather at which they begin to predominate over the benefits attending the collective application of the force of society1 under its recognised chiefs1 for the removal of the obstacles which stand in the way of its well-being2 to secure as much of the advantages of centralised power and intelligence1 as can be had without turning into governmental channels too great a proportion of the general activity1 is one of the most difficult and complicated questions in the art of government4 ,it is1 in a great measure1 a question of detail1 in which many and various considerations must be kept in view1 and no absolute rule can be laid down4 ,but ,i believe that the practical principle in which safety resides1 the ideal to be kept in view1 the standard by which to test all arrangements intended for overcoming the difficulty1 may be conveyed in these words3 the greatest dissemination of power consistent with efficiency2 but the greatest possible centralisation of information1 and diffusion of it from the centre4 ,thus1 in municipal administration1 there would be1 as in the ,new ,england ,states1 a very minute division among separate officers1 chosen by the localities1 of all business which is not better left to the persons directly interested2 but besides this1 there would be1 in each department of local affairs1 a central superintendence1 forming a branch of the general government4 ,the organ of this superintendence would concentrate1 as in a focus1 the variety of information and experience derived from the conduct of that branch of public business in all the localities1 from everything analogous which is done in foreign countries1 and from the general principles of political science4 ,this central organ should have a right to know all that is done1 and its special duty should be that of making the knowledge acquired in one place available for others4 ,emancipated from the petty prejudices and narrow views of a locality by its elevated position and comprehensive sphere of observation1 its advice would naturally carry much authority2 but its actual power1 as a permanent institution1 should1 ,i conceive1 be limited to compelling the local officers to obey the laws laid down for their guidance4 ,in all things not provided for by general rules1 those officers should be left to their own judgment1 under responsibility to their constituents4 ,for the violation of rules1 they should be responsible to law1 and the rules themselves should be laid down by the legislature2 the central administrative authority only watching over their execution1 and if they were not properly carried into effect1 appealing1 according to the nature of the case1 to the tribunal to enforce the law1 or to the constituencies to dismiss the functionaries who had not executed it according to its spirit4 ,such1 in its general conception1 is the central superintendence which the ,poor ,law ,board is intended to exercise over the administrators of the ,poor ,rate throughout the country4 ,whatever powers the ,board exercises beyond this limit1 were right and necessary in that peculiar case1 for the cure of rooted habits of maladministration in matters deeply affecting not the localities merely1 but the whole community2 since no locality has a moral right to make itself by mismanagement a nest of pauperism1 necessarily overflowing into other localities1 and impairing the moral and physical condition of the whole labouring community4 ,the powers of administrative coercion and subordinate legislation possessed by the ,poor ,law ,board 7but which1 owing to the state of opinion on the subject1 are very scantily exercised by them71 though perfectly justifiable in a case of first-rate national interest1 would be wholly out of place in the superintendence of interests purely local4 ,but a central organ of information and instruction for all the localities1 would be equally valuable in all departments of administration4 ,a government cannot have too much of the kind of activity which does not impede1 but aids and stimulates1 individual exertion and development4 ,the mischief begins when1 instead of calling forth the activity and powers of individuals and bodies1 it substitutes its own activity for theirs2 when1 instead of informing1 advising1 and1 upon occasion1 denouncing1 it makes them work in fetters1 or bids them stand aside and does their work instead of them4 ,the worth of a ,state1 in the long run1 is the worth of the individuals composing it2 and a ,state which postpones the interests of their mental expansion and elevation1 to a little more of administrative skill1 or of that semblance of it which practice gives1 in the details of business2 a ,state which dwarfs its men1 in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes1 will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished2 and that the perfection of machinery to which it has sacrificed everything1 will in the end avail it nothing1 for want of the vital power which1 in order that the machine might work more smoothly1 it has preferred to banish4