,,tr,,bner',s ,,oriental ,,series4 ,,the ,,sarva-,,darsana-,,samgraha ,,or ,,review ,,of ,,the ,,different ,,systems ,,of ,,hindu ,,philosophy4 ,,by ,m,,dhava ,,ch,,rya4 ,,translated ,,by ,e4 ,b4 ,,cowell1 ,m4,a4 ,,professor ,,of ,,sanskrit ,,and ,,fellow ,,of ,,corpus ,,christi ,,college ,,in ,,the ,,university ,,of ,,cambridge1 ,,and ,,honorary ,,ll4,d4 ,,of ,,the ,,university ,,of ,,edinburgh4 ,,and ,a4 ,e4 ,,gough1 ,m4,a4 ,,professor ,,of ,,philosophy ,,in ,,the ,,presidency ,,college1 ,,and ,,principal ,,of ,,the ,,madrasa1 ,,calcutta4 ,,london3 ,,tr,,bner ,,co41 ,,ludgate ,,hill4 #ahhb4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,preface4 ,i well remember the interest excited among the learned ,hindus of ,calcutta by the publication of the ,sarva-darsana-samgraha of ,mdhava chrya in the ,bibliotheca ,indica in #aheh4 ,it was originally edited by ,pandit svarachandra ,vidysgara1 but a subsequent edition1 with no important alterations1 was published in #ahgb by ,pandit ,trntha ,tarkavchaspati4 ,the work had been used by ,wilson in his ,sketch of the ,religious ,sects of the ,hindus 7first published in the ,asiatic ,researches1 vol4 xvi41 ,calcutta1 #ahbh72 but it does not appear to have been ever much known in ,india4 ,,ms4 copies of it are very scarce2 and those found in the ,north of ,india1 as far as ,i have had an opportunity of examining them1 seem to be all derived from one copy1 brought originally from the ,south1 and therefore written in the ,telugu character4 ,certain mistakes are found in all alike1 and probably arose from some illegible readings in the old ,telugu original4 ,i have noticed the same thing in the ,ngar copies of ,mdhava's ,commentary on the ,black ,yajur ,veda1 which are current in the ,north of ,india4 ,as ,i was at that time the ,oriental ,secretary of the ,bengal ,asiatic ,society1 ,i was naturally attracted to the book2 and ,i subsequently read it with my friend ,pandit ,mahesachandra ,nyyaratna1 the present ,principal of the ,sanskrit ,college at ,calcutta4 ,i always hoped to translate it into ,english2 but ,i was continually prevented by other engagements while ,i remained in ,india4 ,soon after my return to ,england1 ,i tried to carry out my intention2 but ,i found that several chapters1 to which ,i had not paid the same attention as to the rest1 were too difficult to be translated in ,england1 where ,i could no longer enjoy the advantage of reference to my old friends the ,pandits of the ,sanskrit ,college4 ,in despair ,i laid my translation aside for years1 until ,i happened to learn that my friend1 ,mr4 ,a4 ,e4 ,gough1 at that time a ,professor in the ,sanskrit ,college at ,benares1 was thinking of translating the book4 ,i at once proposed to him that we should do it together1 and he kindly consented to my proposal2 and we accordingly each undertook certain chapters of the work4 ,he had the advantage of the help of some of the ,pandits of ,benares1 especially of ,pandit ,rma ,misra1 the assistant ,professor of ,snkhya1 who was himself a ,rmnuja2 and ,i trust that1 though we have doubtless left some things unexplained or explained wrongly1 we may have been able to throw light on many of the dark sayings with which the original abounds4 ,our translations were originally published at intervals in the ,benares ,pandit between #ahgd and #ahgh2 but they have been carefully revised for their present republication4 ,the work itself is an interesting specimen of ,hindu critical ability4 ,the author successively passes in review the sixteen philosophical systems current in the fourteenth century in the ,south of ,india1 and gives what appeared to him to be their most important tenets1 and the principal arguments by which their followers endeavoured to maintain them2 and he often displays some quaint humour as he throws himself for the time into the position of their advocate1 and holds1 as it were1 a temporary brief in behalf of opinions entirely at variance with his own4#a ,we may sometimes differ from him in his judgment of the relative importance of their doctrines1 but it is always interesting to see the point of view of an acute native critic4 ,in the course of his sketches he frequently explains at some length obscure details in the different systems2 and ,i can hardly imagine a better guide for the ,european reader who wishes to study any one of these ,darsanas in its native authorities4 ,in one or two cases 7as notably in the ,bauddha1 and perhaps in the ,jaina system7 he could only draw his materials second-hand from the discussions in the works of ,brahmanical controversialists2 but in the great majority he quotes directly from the works of their founders or leading exponents1 and he is continually following in their track even where he does not quote their exact words4#b ,the systems are arranged from the ,vednta point of view1--our author having been elected1 in ,a4,d4 #acca1 the head of the ,smrta order in the ,math of ,sringeri in the ,mysore territory1 founded by ,samkara chrya1 the great ,vedntist teacher of the eighth century1 through whose efforts the ,vednta became what it is at present--the acknowledged view of ,hindu orthodoxy4 ,the systems form a gradually ascending scale1--the first1 the ,chrvka and ,bauddha1 being the lowest as the furthest removed from the ,vednta1 and the last1 the ,snkhya and ,yoga1 being the highest as approaching most nearly to it4 ,the sixteen systems here discussed attracted to their study the noblest minds in ,india throughout the medival period of its history4 ,hiouen ,thsang says of the schools in his day3 ,les coles philosophiques sont constamment en lutte1 et le bruit de leurs discussions passionnes s'lve comme les flots de la mer4 ,les hrtiques des diverses sectes s'attachent des matres particuliers1 et1 par des voies diffrentes1 marchent tous au mme but4 ,we can still catch some faint echo of the din as we read the medival literature4 ,thus1 for instance1 when ,king ,harsha wanders among the ,vindhya forests1 he finds seated on the rocks and reclining under the trees rhata begging monks1 ,svetapadas1 ,mahpsupatas1 ,pndarabhikshus1 ,bhgavatas1 ,varnins1 ,kesaluchanas1 ,lokyatikas1 ,kpilas1 ,kndas1 ,aupanishadas1 svarakrins1 ,dharmasstrins1 ,paurnikas1 ,sptatantavas1 ,sbdas1 ,pchartrikas1 c41 all listening to their own accepted tenets and zealously defending them4#c ,many of these sects will occupy us in the ensuing pages2 many of them also are found in ,mdhava's poem on the controversial triumphs of ,samkara chrya1 and in the spurious prose work on the same subject1 ascribed to ,anantnandagiri4 ,well may some old poet have put into the mouth of ,yudhishthira the lines which one so often hears from the lips of modern pandits-- ,ved vibhinnh smritayo vibhinn1 ,nsau munir yasya matam na bhinnam1 ,dharmasya tattvam nihitam guhym1 ,mahjano yena gatah sa panthh4#d ,and may we not also say with ,clement of ,alexandria1 ,greek3 mias toinyn ouss ts altheias1 to gar pseudos myrias ektropas echei1 kathaper hai bakchai ta tou ,penthes diaphorsasai mel hai ts philosophias ts te barbarou ts te ,hellniks haireseis1 hekast hoper elachen1 hs pasan auchei tn altheian1 phtos d'1 oimai1 anatol panta phtizetai4 ,e4 ,b4 ,c4 ,,footnotes3 ,footnote #a3 ,the most remarkable instance of this philosophical equanimity is that of ,vchaspati ,misra1 who wrote standard treatises on each of the six systems except the ,vaiseshika1 adopting1 of course1 the peculiar point of view of each1 and excluding for the time every alien tenet4 ,footnote #b3 ,an index of the names of authors and works quoted is given in ,dr4 ,hall's ,bibliographical ,catalogue1 pp4 #afb-afd1 and also in ,professor ,aufrecht's ,bodleian ,catalogue1 p4 #bdg4 ,footnote #c3 ,srharsha-charita1 p4 #bjd 7,calcutta ed47 ,footnote #d3 ,found in the ,mahbh4 iii4 #agdjb1 with some variations4 ,i give them as ,i have heard them from ,pandit ,rmanryana ,vidyratna4 ,,contents4 ,page ,i4 ,the ,chrvka ,system 7,e4 ,b4 ,c47 #b ,,ii4 ,the ,bauddha ,system 7,a4 ,e4 ,g47 #ab ,,iii4 ,the rhata or ,jaina ,system 7,e4 ,b4 ,c47 #cf ,,iv4 ,the ,rmnuja ,system 7,a4 ,e4 ,g47 #fd ,v4 ,the ,prna-praja ,system 7,a4 ,e4 ,g47 #hg ,,vi4 ,the ,nakulsa-,psupata ,system 7,a4 ,e4 ,g47 #ajc ,,vii4 ,the ,saiva ,system 7,e4 ,b4 ,c47 #aab ,,viii4 ,the ,pratyabhij or ,recognitive ,system 7,a4 ,e4 ,g47 #abh ,,ix4 ,the ,rasesvara or ,mercurial ,system 7,a4 ,e4 ,g47 #acg ,x4 ,the ,vaiseshika or ,aulkya ,system 7,e4 ,b4 ,c47 #ade ,,xi4 ,the ,akshapda or ,nyya ,system 7,e4 ,b4 ,c47 #afa ,,xii4 ,the ,jaiminya ,system 7,e4 ,b4 ,c47 #agh ,,xiii4 ,the ,pninya ,system 7,e4 ,b4 ,c47 #bjc ,,xiv4 ,the ,snkhya ,system 7,e4 ,b4 ,c47 #bba ,,xv4 ,the ,ptajala or ,yoga ,system 7,e4 ,b4 ,c47 #bca ,,xvi4 ,the ,vednta or ,system of ,samkara chrya #bgc ,,appendix--,on the ,updhi 7,e4 ,b4 ,c47 #bge 99 99 99 99 99 ,,the ,,sarva-,,darsana-,,sangraha4 ,,the ,,prologue4 #a4 ,i worship ,siva1 the abode of eternal knowledge1 the storehouse of supreme felicity2 by whom the earth and the rest were produced1 in him only has this all a maker4 #b4 ,daily ,i follow my ,guru ,sarvaja-,vishnu1 who knows all the gamas1 the son of ,srngapni1 who has gone to the further shore of the seas of all the systems1 and has contented the hearts of all mankind by the proper meaning of the term ,soul4 #c4 ,the synopsis of all the systems is made by the venerable ,mdhava mighty in power1 the ,kaustubha-jewel of the milk-ocean of the fortunate ,syana4 #d4 ,having thoroughly searched the ,sstras of former teachers1 very hard to be crossed1 the fortunate ,syana-,mdhava#e the lord has expounded them for the delight of the good4 ,let the virtuous listen with a mind from which all envy has been far banished2 who finds not delight in a garland strung of various flowers8 ,,footnotes3 ,footnote #e3 ,dr4 ,a4 ,c4 ,burnell1 in his preface to his edition of the ,vamsa-,brhmana1 has solved the riddle of the relation of ,mdhava and ,syana4 ,syana is a pure ,dravidian name given to a child who is born after all the elder children have died4 ,mdhava elsewhere calls ,syana his younger brother1 as an allegorical description of his body1 himself being the eternal soul4 ,his use of the term ,syana-,mdhavah here 7not the dual7 seems to prove that the two names represent the same person4 ,the body seems meant by the ,syana of the third sloka4 ,myana was the father of ,mdhava1 and the true reading may be srman-myana4 ,,chapter ,i4 ,,the ,,ch,,rv,,ka ,,system4 ,we have said in our preliminary invocation salutation to ,siva1 the abode of eternal knowledge1 the storehouse of supreme felicity1 but how can we attribute to the ,divine ,being the giving of supreme felicity1 when such a notion has been utterly abolished by ,chrvka1 the crest-gem of the atheistical school1 the follower of the doctrine of ,brihaspati8 ,the efforts of ,chrvka are indeed hard to be eradicated1 for the majority of living beings hold by the current refrain-- ,while life is yours1 live joyously2 ,none can escape ,death's searching eye3 ,when once this frame of ours they burn1 ,how shall it e'er again return8 ,the mass of men1 in accordance with the ,sstras of policy and enjoyment1 considering wealth and desire the only ends of man1 and denying the existence of any object belonging to a future world1 are found to follow only the doctrine of ,chrvka4 ,hence another name for that school is ,lokyata1--a name well accordant with the thing signified4#f ,in this school the four elements1 earth1 c41 are the original principles2 from these alone1 when transformed into the body1 intelligence is produced1 just as the inebriating power is developed from the mixing of certain ingredients2#g and when these are destroyed1 intelligence at once perishes also4 ,they quote the ,sruti for this ,brihad rany4 ,up4 ii4 #d1 #ab1 ,springing forth from these elements1 itself solid knowledge1 it is destroyed when they are destroyed1--after death no intelligence remains4#h ,therefore the soul is only the body distinguished by the attribute of intelligence1 since there is no evidence for any soul distinct from the body1 as such cannot be proved1 since this school holds that perception is the only source of knowledge and does not allow inference1 c4 ,the only end of man is enjoyment produced by sensual pleasures4 ,nor may you say that such cannot be called the end of man as they are always mixed with some kind of pain1 because it is our wisdom to enjoy the pure pleasure as far as we can1 and to avoid the pain which inevitably accompanies it2 just as the man who desires fish takes the fish with their scales and bones1 and having taken as many as he wants1 desists2 or just as the man who desires rice1 takes the rice1 straw and all1 and having taken as much as he wants1 desists4 ,it is not therefore for us1 through a fear of pain1 to reject the pleasure which our nature instinctively recognises as congenial4 ,men do not refrain from sowing rice1 because forsooth there are wild animals to devour it2 nor do they refuse to set the cooking-pots on the fire1 because forsooth there are beggars to pester us for a share of the contents4 ,if any one were so timid as to forsake a visible pleasure1 he would indeed be foolish like a beast1 as has been said by the poet-- ,the pleasure which arises to men from contact with sensible objects1 ,is to be relinquished as accompanied by pain1--such is the reasoning of fools2 ,the berries of paddy1 rich with the finest white grains1 ,what man1 seeking his true interest1 would fling away because covered with husk and dust8#i ,if you object that1 if there be no such thing as happiness in a future world1 then how should men of experienced wisdom engage in the agnihotra and other sacrifices1 which can only be performed with great expenditure of money and bodily fatigue1 your objection cannot be accepted as any proof to the contrary1 since the agnihotra1 c41 are only useful as means of livelihood1 for the ,veda is tainted by the three faults of untruth1 self-contradiction1 and tautology2#aj then again the impostors who call themselves ,vaidic pundits are mutually destructive1 as the authority of the jna-knda is overthrown by those who maintain that of the karma-knda1 while those who maintain the authority of the jna-knda reject that of the karma-knda2 and lastly1 the three ,vedas themselves are only the incoherent rhapsodies of knaves1 and to this effect runs the popular saying-- ,the ,agnihotra1 the three ,vedas1 the ascetic's three staves1 and smearing oneself with ashes1-- ,brihaspati says1 these are but means of livelihood for those who have no manliness nor sense4 ,hence it follows that there is no other hell than mundane pain produced by purely mundane causes1 as thorns1 c42 the only ,supreme is the earthly monarch whose existence is proved by all the world's eyesight2 and the only ,liberation is the dissolution of the body4 ,by holding the doctrine that the soul is identical with the body1 such phrases as ,i am thin1 ,i am black1 c41 are at once intelligible1 as the attributes of thinness1 c41 and self-consciousness will reside in the same subject the body2 like and the use of the phrase my body is metaphorical the head of ,rhu ,rhu being really all head4 ,all this has been thus summed up-- ,in this school there are four elements1 earth1 water1 fire1 and air2 ,and from these four elements alone is intelligence produced1-- ,just like the intoxicating power from kinwa1 c41 mixed together2 ,since in ,i am fat1 ,i am lean1 these attributes#aa abide in the same subject1 ,and since fatness1 c41 reside only in the body1#ab it alone is the soul and no other1 ,and such phrases as my body are only significant metaphorically4 ,be it so1 says the opponent2 your wish would be gained if inference1 c41 had no force of proof2 but then they have this force2 else1 if they had not1 then how1 on perceiving smoke1 should the thoughts of the intelligent immediately proceed to fire2 or why1 on hearing another say1 ',there are fruits on the bank of the river1' do those who desire fruit proceed at once to the shore8 ,all this1 however1 is only the inflation of the world of fancy4 ,those who maintain the authority of inference accept the sign or middle term as the causer of knowledge1 which middle term must be found in the minor and be itself invariably connected with the major4#ac ,now this invariable connection must be a relation destitute of any condition accepted or disputed2#ad and this connection does not possess its power of causing inference by virtue of its existence1 as the eye1 c41 are the cause of perception1 but by virtue of its being known4 ,what then is the means of this connection's being known8 ,we will first show that it is not perception4 ,now perception is held to be of two kinds1 external and internal i4e41 as produced by the external senses1 or by the inner sense1 mind4 ,the former is not the required means2 for although it is possible that the actual contact of the senses and the object will produce the knowledge of the particular object thus brought in contact1 yet as there can never be such contact in the case of the past or the future1 the universal proposition#ae which was to embrace the invariable connection of the middle and major terms in every case becomes impossible to be known4 ,nor may you maintain that this knowledge of the universal proposition has the general class as its object1 because if so1 there might arise a doubt as to the existence of the invariable connection in this particular case#af as1 for instance1 in this particular smoke as implying fire4 ,nor is internal perception the means1 since you cannot establish that the mind has any power to act independently towards an external object1 since all allow that it is dependent on the external senses1 as has been said by one of the logicians1 ,the eye1 c41 have their objects as described2 but mind externally is dependent on the others4 ,nor can inference be the means of the knowledge of the universal proposition1 since in the case of this inference we should also require another inference to establish it1 and so on1 and hence would arise the fallacy of an ad infinitum retrogression4 ,nor can testimony be the means thereof1 since we may either allege in reply1 in accordance with the ,vaiseshika doctrine of ,kanda1 that this is included in the topic of inference2 or else we may hold that this fresh proof of testimony is unable to leap over the old barrier that stopped the progress of inference1 since it depends itself on the recognition of a sign in the form of the language used in the child's presence by the old man2#ag and1 moreover1 there is no more reason for our believing on another's word that smoke and fire are invariably connected1 than for our receiving the ipse dixit of ,manu1 c4 which1 of course1 we ,chrvkas reject4 ,and again1 if testimony were to be accepted as the only means of the knowledge of the universal proposition1 then in the case of a man to whom the fact of the invariable connection between the middle and major terms had not been pointed out by another person1 there could be no inference of one thing as fire on seeing another thing as smoke2 hence1 on your own showing1 the whole topic of inference for oneself#ah would have to end in mere idle words4 ,then again comparison1#ai c41 must be utterly rejected as the means of the knowledge of the universal proposition1 since it is impossible that they can produce the knowledge of the unconditioned connection i4e41 the universal proposition1 because their end is to produce the knowledge of quite another connection1 viz41 the relation of a name to something so named4 ,again1 this same absence of a condition1#bj which has been given as the definition of an invariable connection i4e41 a universal proposition1 can itself never be known2 since it is impossible to establish that all conditions must be objects of perception2 and therefore1 although the absence of perceptible things may be itself perceptible1 the absence of non-perceptible things must be itself non-perceptible2 and thus1 since we must here too have recourse to inference1 c41 we cannot leap over the obstacle which has already been planted to bar them4 ,again1 we must accept as the definition of the condition1 it is that which is reciprocal or equipollent in extension#ba with the major term though not constantly accompanying the middle4 ,these three distinguishing clauses1 not constantly accompanying the middle term1 constantly accompanying the major term1 and being constantly accompanied by it i4e41 reciprocal1 are needed in the full definition to stop respectively three such fallacious conditions1 in the argument to prove the non-eternity of sound1 as being produced1 the nature of a jar1 and the not causing audition2#bb wherefore the definition holds1--and again it is established by the sloka of the great ,doctor beginning samsama4#bc ,but since the knowledge of the condition must here precede the knowledge of the condition's absence1 it is only when there is the knowledge of the condition1 that the knowledge of the universality of the proposition is possible1 i4e41 a knowledge in the form of such a connection between the middle term and major term as is distinguished by the absence of any such condition2 and on the other hand1 the knowledge of the condition depends upon the knowledge of the invariable connection4 ,thus we fasten on our opponents as with adamantine glue the thunderbolt-like fallacy of reasoning in a circle4 ,hence by the impossibility of knowing the universality of a proposition it becomes impossible to establish inference1 c4#bd ,the step which the mind takes from the knowledge of smoke1 c41 to the knowledge of fire1 c41 can be accounted for by its being based on a former perception or by its being an error2 and that in some cases this step is justified by the result1 is accidental just like the coincidence of effects observed in the employment of gems1 charms1 drugs1 c4 ,from this it follows that fate1 c41#be do not exist1 since these can only be proved by inference4 ,but an opponent will say1 if you thus do not allow adrishta1 the various phenomena of the world become destitute of any cause4 ,but we cannot accept this objection as valid1 since these phenomena can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things4 ,thus it has been said-- ,the fire is hot1 the water cold1 refreshing cool the breeze of morn2 ,by whom came this variety8 from their own nature was it born4 ,and all this has been also said by ,brihaspati-- ,there is no heaven1 no final liberation1 nor any soul in another world1 ,nor do the actions of the four castes1 orders1 c41 produce any real effect4 ,the ,agnihotra1 the three ,vedas1 the ascetic's three staves1 and smearing one's self with ashes1 ,were made by ,nature as the livelihood of those destitute of knowledge and manliness4 ,if a beast slain in the ,jyotishtoma rite will itself go to heaven1 ,why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father8#bf ,if the ,srddha produces gratification to beings who are dead1 ,then here1 too1 in the case of travellers when they start1 it is needless to give provisions for the journey4 ,if beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the ,srddha here1 ,then why not give the food down below to those who are standing on the housetop8 ,while life remains let a man live happily1 let him feed on ghee even though he runs in debt2 ,when once the body becomes ashes1 how can it ever return again8 ,if he who departs from the body goes to another world1 ,how is it that he comes not back again1 restless for love of his kindred8 ,hence it is only as a means of livelihood that ,brahmans have established here ,all these ceremonies for the dead1--there is no other fruit anywhere4 ,the three authors of the ,vedas were buffoons1 knaves1 and demons4 ,all the well-known formul of the pandits1 jarphar1 turphar1 c4#bg ,and all the obscene rites for the queen commanded in the ,aswamedha1 ,these were invented by buffoons1 and so all the various kinds of presents to the priests1#bh ,while the eating of flesh was similarly commanded by night-prowling demons4 ,hence in kindness to the mass of living beings must we fly for refuge to the doctrine of ,chrvka4 ,such is the pleasant consummation4 ,e4 ,b4 ,c4 ,,footnotes3 ,footnote #f3 ,sankara1 ,bhskara1 and other commentators name the ,lokyatikas1 and these appear to be a branch of the ,sect of ,chrvka 7,colebrooke74 ,lokyata may be etymologically analysed as prevalent in the world 7loka and yata74 ,laukyatika occurs in ,pnini's ukthagana4 ,footnote #g3 ,kinwa is explained as drug or seed used to produce fermentation in the manufacture of spirits from sugar1 bassia1 c4 ,colebrooke quotes from ,sankara3 ,the faculty of thought results from a modification of the aggregate elements in like manner as sugar with a ferment and other ingredients becomes an inebriating liquor2 and as betel1 areca1 lime1 and extract of catechu chewed together have an exhilarating property not found in those substances severally4 ,footnote #h3 ,of course ,sankara1 in his commentary1 gives a very different interpretation1 applying it to the cessation of individual existence when the knowledge of the ,supreme is once attained4 ,cf4 ,sabara's ,comm4 ,jaimini ,st41 i4 i4 #e4 ,footnote #i3 ,i take kana as here equal to the ,bengali kunr4 ,cf4 ,atharva-,v41 xi4 #c1 #e4 ,asvh kan gvas tandul masaks tushh4 ,footnote #aj3 ,see ,nyya ,stras1 ii4 #eg4 ,footnote #aa3 ,i4e41 personality and fatness1 c4 ,footnote #ab3 ,i read dehe for dehah4 ,footnote #ac3 ,literally1 must be an attribute of the subject and have invariable concomitance 7vypti74 ,footnote #ad3 ,for the sandigdha and nischita updhi see ,siddhnta ,muktvali1 p4 #abe4 ,the former is accepted only by one party4 ,footnote #ae3 ,literally1 the knowledge of the invariable concomitance 7as of smoke by fire74 ,footnote #af3 ,the attributes of the class are not always found in every member1--thus idiots are men1 though man is a rational animal2 and again1 this particular smoke might be a sign of a fire in some other place4 ,footnote #ag3 ,see ,shitya ,darpana 7,ballantyne's trans4 p4 #af71 and ,siddhnta-,m41 p4 #hj4 ,footnote #ah3 ,the properly logical1 as distinguished from the rhetorical1 argument4 ,footnote #ai3 ,upamna or the knowledge of a similarity is the instrument in the production of an inference from similarity4 ,this particular inference consists in the knowledge of the relation of a name to something so named4 ,ballantyne's ,tarka ,sangraha4 ,footnote #bj3 ,the updhi is the condition which must be supplied to restrict a too general middle term1 as in the inference the mountain has smoke because it has fire1 if we add wet fuel as the condition of the fire1 the middle term will be no longer too general4 ,in the case of a true vypti1 there is1 of course1 no updhi4 ,footnote #ba3 ',greek3 ,antistrephei 7,pr4 ,anal41 ii4 #be74 ,we have here our ,a with distributed predicate4 ,footnote #bb3 ,if we omitted the first clause1 and only made the updhi that which constantly accompanies the major term and is constantly accompanied by it1 then in the ,naiyyika argument sound is non-eternal1 because it has the nature of sound1 being produced would serve as a ,mmmsaka updhi1 to establish the vyabhichra fallacy1 as it is reciprocal with non-eternal2 but the omitted clause excludes it1 as an updhi must be consistent with either party's opinions1 and1 of course1 the ,naiyyika maintains that being produced always accompanies the class of sound4 ,similarly1 if we defined the updhi as not constantly accompanying the middle term and constantly accompanied by the major1 we might have as an updhi the nature of a jar1 as this is never found with the middle term 7the class or nature of sound only residing in sound1 and that of a jar only in a jar71 while1 at the same time1 wherever the class of jar is found there is also found non-eternity4 ,lastly1 if we defined the updhi as not constantly accompanying the middle term1 and constantly accompanying the major1 we might have as a ,mmmsaka updhi the not causing audition1 i4e41 the not being apprehended by the organs of hearing2 but this is excluded1 as non-eternity is not always found where this is1 ether being inaudible and yet eternal4 ,footnote #bc3 ,this refers to an obscure sloka of ,udayanchrya1 where a reciprocal and a non-reciprocal universal connection 7i4e41 universal propositions which severally do and do not distribute their predicates7 relate to the same argument 7as e4g41 to prove the existence of smoke71 there that non-reciprocating term of the second will be a fallacious middle1 which is not invariably accompanied by the other reciprocal of the first4 ,thus the mountain has smoke because it has fire 7here fire and smoke are non-reciprocating1 as fire is not found invariably accompanied by smoke though smoke is by fire71 or because it has fire from wet fuel 7smoke and fire from wet fuel being reciprocal and always accompanying each other72 the non-reciprocating term of the former 7fire7 will give a fallacious inference1 because it is also1 of course1 not invariably accompanied by the special kind of fire1 that produced from wet fuel4 ,but this will not be the case where the non-reciprocating term is thus invariably accompanied by the other reciprocal1 as the mountain has fire because it has smoke2 here1 though fire and smoke do not reciprocate1 yet smoke will be a true middle1 because it is invariably accompanied by heat1 which is the reciprocal of fire4 ,i wish to add here1 once for all1 that ,i own my explanation of this1 as well as many another1 difficulty in the ,sarva-darsana-sangraha to my old friend and teacher1 ,pandit ,mahesa ,chandra ,nyyaratna1 of the ,calcutta ,sanskrit ,college4 ,footnote #bd3 ,cf4 ,sextus ,empiricus1 ,p4 ,hyp4 ii4 ,in the chapter on the ,buddhist system infra1 we have an attempt to establish the authority of the universal proposition from the relation of cause and effect or genus and species4 ,footnote #be3 ,adrishta1 i4e41 the merit and demerit in our actions which produce their effects in future births4 ,footnote #bf3 ,this is an old ,buddhist retort4 ,see ,burnouf1 ,introd41 p4 #bji4 ,footnote #bg3 ,rig-,veda1 x4 #ajf4 ,for the ,aswamedha rites1 see ,wilson's ,rig-,veda1 ,preface1 vol4 ii4 p4 xiii4 ,footnote #bh3 ,or this may mean and all the various other things to be handled in the rites4 ,,chapter ,,ii4 ,,the ,,bauddha ,,system4 ,at this point the ,buddhists remark3 ,as for what you 7,chrvkas7 laid down as to the difficulty of ascertaining invariable concomitance1 your position is unacceptable1 inasmuch as invariable concomitance is easily cognisable by means of identity and causality4 ,it has accordingly been said-- ,from the relation of cause and effect1 or from identity as a determinant1 results a law of invariable concomitance--not through the mere observation of the desired result in similar cases1 nor through the non-observation of it in dissimilar cases4#bi ,on the hypothesis 7of the ,naiyyikas7 that it is concomitance and non-concomitance 7e4g41 ,a is where ,b is1 ,a is not where ,b is not7 that determine an invariable connection1 the unconditional attendance of the major or the middle term would be unascertainable1 it being impossible to exclude all doubt with regard to instances past and future1 and present but unperceived4 ,if one 7a ,naiyyika7 rejoin that uncertainty in regard to such instances is equally inevitable on our system1 we reply3 ,say not so1 for such a supposition as that an effect may be produced without any cause would destroy itself by putting a stop to activity of any kind2 for such doubts alone are to be entertained1 the entertainment of which does not implicate us in practical absurdity and the like1 as it has been said1 ,doubt terminates where there is a practical absurdity4#cj #a4 ,by ascertainment of an effectuation1 then1 of that 7viz41 of the designate of the middle7 is ascertained the invariable concomitance 7of the major72 and the ascertainment of such effectuation may arise from the well-known series of five causes1 in the perceptive cognition or non-cognition of cause and effect4 ,that fire and smoke1 for instance1 stand in the relation of cause and effect is ascertained by five indications1 viz41 7#a47 ,that an effect is not cognised prior to its effectuation1 that 7#b47 the cause being perceived 7#c47 the effect is perceived1 and that after the effect is cognised 7#d47 there is its non-cognition1 7#e47 when the 7material7 cause is no longer cognised4 #b4 ,in like manner an invariable concomitance is ascertained by the ascertainment of identity 7e4g41 a sisu-tree is a tree1 or wherever we observe the attributes of a sisu we observe also the attribute arboreity71 an absurdity attaching to the contrary opinion1 inasmuch as if a sisu-tree should lose its arboreity it would lose its own self4 ,but1 on the other hand1 where there exists no absurdity1 and where a 7mere7 concomitance is again and again observed1 who can exclude all doubt of failure in the concomitance8 ,an ascertainment of the identity of sisu and tree is competent in virtue of the reference to the same object 7i4e41 predication71--,this tree is a sisu4 ,for reference to the same object 7predication7 is not competent where there is no difference whatever 7e4g41 to say1 ,a jar is a jar1 is no combination of diverse attributes in a common subject71 because the two terms cannot1 as being synonymous1 be simultaneously employed2 nor can reference to the same object take place where there is a reciprocal exclusion 7of the two terms71 inasmuch as we never find1 for instance1 horse and cow predicated the one of the other4 ,it has thus been evinced that an effect or a self-same supposes a cause or a self-same 7as invariable concomitants74 ,if a man does not allow that inference is a form of evidence1 pramna1 one may reply3 ,you merely assert thus much1 that inference is not a form of evidence3 do you allege no proof of this1 or do you allege any8 ,the former alternative is not allowable according to the maxim that bare assertion is no proof of the matter asserted4 ,nor is the latter alternative any better1 for if while you assert that inference is no form of evidence1 you produce some truncated argument 7to prove1 i4e41 infer1 that it is none71 you will be involved in an absurdity1 just as if you asserted your own mother to be barren4 ,besides1 when you affirm that the establishment of a form of evidence and of the corresponding fallacious evidence results from their homogeneity1 you yourself admit induction by identity4 ,again1 when you affirm that the dissentiency of others is known by the symbolism of words1 you yourself allow induction by causality4 ,when you deny the existence of any object on the ground of its not being perceived1 you yourself admit an inference of which non-perception is the middle term4 ,conformably it has been said by ,tathgata-- ,the admission of a form of evidence in general results from its being present to the understanding of others4 ,the existence of a form of evidence also follows from its negation by a certain person4 ,all this has been fully handled by great authorities2 and we desist for fear of an undue enlargement of our treatise4 ,these same ,bauddhas discuss the highest end of man from four standpoints4 ,celebrated under the designations of ,mdhyamika1 ,yogchra1 ,sautrntika1 and ,vaibhshika1 these ,buddhists adopt respectively the doctrines of a universal void 7nihilism71 an external void 7subjective idealism71 the inferribility of external objects 7representationism71 and the perceptibility of external objects 7presentationism74#ca ,though the venerated ,buddha be the only one teacher 7his disciples7 are fourfold in consequence of this diversity of views2 just as when one has said1 ,the sun has set1 the adulterer1 the thief1 the divinity student1 and others understand that it is time to set about their assignations1 their theft1 their religious duties1 and so forth1 according to their several inclinations4 ,it is to be borne in mind that four points of view have been laid out1 viz41 7#a47 ,all is momentary1 momentary2 7#b47 all is pain1 pain2 7#c47 all is like itself alone2 7#d47 all is void1 void4 ,of these points of view1 the momentariness of fleeting things1 blue and so forth 7i4e41 whatever be their quality71 is to be inferred from their existence2 thus1 whatever is is momentary 7or fluxional7 like a bank of clouds1 and all these things are4#cb ,nor may any one object that the middle term 7existence7 is unestablished2 for an existence consisting of practical efficiency is established by perception to belong to the blue and other momentary things2 and the exclusion of existence from that which is not momentary is established1 provided that we exclude from it the non-momentary succession and simultaneity1 according to the rule that exclusion of the continent is exclusion of the contained4 ,now this practical efficiency 7here identified with existence7 is contained under succession and simultaneity1 and no medium is possible between succession and non-succession 7or simultaneity72 there being a manifest absurdity in thinking otherwise1 according to the rule-- ,in a reciprocal contradiction there exists no ulterior alternative2 ,nor is their unity in contradictories1 there being a repugnance in the very statement4#cc ,and this succession and simultaneity being excluded from the permanent1 and also excluding from the permanent all practical efficiency1 determine existence of the alternative of momentariness4--,q4,e4,d4 ,perhaps some one may ask3 ,why may not practical efficiency reside in the non-fluxional 7or permanent78 ,if so1 this is wrong1 as obnoxious to the following dilemma4 ,has your permanent a power of past and future practical efficiency during its exertion of present practical efficiency or no8 ,on the former alternative 7if it has such power71 it cannot evacuate such past and future efficiency1 because we cannot deny that it has power1 and because we infer the consequence1 that which can at any time do anything does not fail to do that at that time1 as1 for instance1 a complement of causes1 and this entity is thus powerful4 ,on the latter alternative 7if the permanent has no such power of past and future agency71 it will never do anything1 because practical efficiency results from power only2 what at any time does not do anything1 that at that time is unable to do it1 as1 for instance1 a piece of stone does not produce a germ2 and this entity while exerting its present practical efficiency1 does not exert its past and future practical efficiency4 ,such is the contradiction4 ,you will perhaps rejoin3 ,by assuming successive subsidiaries1 there is competent to the permanent entity a successive exertion of past and future practical efficiency4 ,if so1 we would ask you to explain3 ,do the subsidiaries assist the entity or not8 ,if they do not1 they are not required2 for if they do nothing1 they can have nothing to do with the successive exertion4 ,if they do assist the thing1 is this assistance 7or supplementation7 other than the thing or not8 ,if it is other than the thing1 then this adscititious 7assistance7 is the cause1 and the non-momentary entity is not the cause3 for the effect will then follow1 by concomitance and non-concomitance1 the adventitious supplementation4 ,thus it has been said3 ,what have rain and shine to do with the soul8 ,their effect is on the skin of man2 ,if the soul were like the skin1 it would be non-permanent2 and if the skin were like the soul1 there could be no effect produced upon it4 ,perhaps you will say3 ,the entity produces its effect1 together with its subsidiaries4 ,well1 then 7we reply71 let the entity not give up its subsidiaries1 but rather tie them lest they fly with a rope round their neck1 and so produce the effect which it has to produce1 and without forfeiting its own proper nature4 ,besides 7we continue71 does the additament 7or supplementation7 constituted by the subsidiaries give rise to another additament or not8 ,in either case the afore-mentioned objections will come down upon you like a shower of stones4 ,on the alternative that the additament takes on another additament1 you will be embarrassed by a many-sided regress in infinitum4 ,if when the additament is to be generated another auxiliary 7or additament7 be required1 there will ensue an endless series of such additaments3 this must be confessed to be one infinite regress4 ,for example1 let a seed be granted to be productive when an additament is given1 consisting of a complement of objects such as water1 wind1 and the like1 as subsidiaries2 otherwise an additament would be manifested without subsidiaries4 ,now the seed in taking on the additament takes it on with the need of 7ulterior7 subsidiaries2 otherwise1 as there would always be subsidiaries1 it would follow that a germ would always be arising from the seed4 ,we shall now have to add to the seed another supplementation by subsidiaries themselves requiring an additament4 ,if when this additament is given1 the seed be productive only on condition of subsidiaries as before1 there will be established an infinite regression of additaments to 7or supplementations of7 the seed1 to be afforded by the subsidiaries4 ,again1 we ask1 does the supplementation required for the production of the effect produce its effect independently of the seed and the like1 or does it require the seed and the like8 ,on the first alternative 7if the supplementation works independently71 it would ensue that the seed is in no way a cause4 ,on the second 7if the supplementation require the seed71 the seed1 or whatever it may be that is thus required1 must take on a supplementation or additament1 and thus there will be over and over again an endless series of additaments added to the additament constituted by the seed2 and thus a second infinite regression is firmly set up4 ,in like manner the subsidiary which is required will add another subsidiary to the seed1 or whatever it may be that is the subject of the additions1 and thus there will be an endless succession of additaments added to the additaments to the seed which is supplemented by the subsidiaries2 and so a third infinite regression will add to your embarrassment4 ,now 7or the other grand alternative71 let it be granted that a supplementation identical with the entity 7the seed1 or whatever it may be7 is taken on4 ,if so1 the former entity1 that minus the supplementation1 is no more1 and a new entity identical with the supplementation1 and designated 7in the technology of ,buddhism7 kurvad rpa 7or effect-producing object71 comes into being3 and thus the tree of my desires 7my doctrine of a universal flux7 has borne its fruit4 ,practical efficiency1 therefore1 in the non-momentary is inadmissible4 ,nor is practical efficiency possible apart from succession in time2 for such a possibility is redargued by the following dilemma4 ,is this 7permanent7 entity 7which you contend for7 able to produce all its effects simultaneously1 or does it continue to exist after production of effects8 ,on the former alternative1 it will result that the entity will produce its effects just as much at one time as at another2 on the second alternative1 the expectation of its permanency is as reasonable as expecting seed eaten by a mouse to germinate4 ,that to which contrary determinations are attributed is diverse1 as heat and cold2 but this thing is determined by contrary attributions4 ,such is the argumentation applied to the cloud 7to prove that it has not a permanent but a fluxional existence74 ,nor is the middle term disallowable1 for possession and privation of power and impotence are allowed in regard to the permanent 7which you assert7 at different times4 ,the concomitance and non-concomitance already described 7viz41 ,that which can at any time do anything does not fail to do that at that time1 and ,what at any time does not do anything1 that at that time is unable to do it7 are affirmed 7by us7 to prove the existence of such power4 ,the negative rule is3 ,what at any time is unable to produce anything1 that at that time does not produce it1 as a piece of stone1 for example1 does not produce a germ2 and this entity 7the seed1 or whatever it may be71 while exerting a present practical efficiency1 is incapable of past and future practical efficiencies4 ,the contradiction violating this rule is3 ,what at any time does anything1 that at that time is able to do that thing1 as a complement of causes is able to produce its effect2 and this 7permanent7 entity exerts at time past and time future the practical efficiencies proper to those times4 7,to recapitulate47 ,existence is restricted to the momentary2 there being observed in regard to existence a negative rule1 that in regard to permanent succession and simultaneity being excluded1 existence which contains succession and simultaneity is not cognisable2 and there being observed in regard to existence a positive rule1 in virtue of a concomitance observed 7viz41 that the existent is accompanied or pervaded by the momentary71 and in virtue of a non-concomitance observed 7viz41 that the non-momentary is accompanied or pervaded by the non-existent74 ,therefore it has been said by ,jna-sr-- ,what is is momentary1 as a cloud1 and as these existent things2 ,the power of existence is relative to practical efficiency1 and belongs to the ideal2 but this power exists not as eternal in things eternal 7ether1 c472 ,nor is there only one form1 otherwise one thing could do the work of another2 ,for two reasons1 therefore 7viz41 succession and simultaneity71 a momentary flux is congruous and remains true in regard to that which we have to prove4 ,nor is it to be held1 in acceptance of the hypothesis of the ,vaiseshikas and ,naiyyikas1 that existence is a participation in the universal form existence2 for were this the case1 universality1 particularity1 and co-inhesion 7which do not participate in the universal7 could have no existence4 ,nor is the ascription of existence to universality1 particularity1 and co-inhesion dependent on any sui generis existence of their own2 for such an hypothesis is operose1 requiring too many sui generis existences4 ,moreover1 the existence of any universal is disproved by a dilemma regarding the presence or non-presence 7of the one in the many72 and there is not presented to us any one form running through all the diverse momentary things1 mustard-seeds1 mountains1 and so forth1 like the string running through the gems strung upon it4 ,moreover 7we would ask71 is the universal omnipresent or present everywhere in its subjicible subjects8 ,if it is everywhere1 all things in the universe will be confounded together 7chaos will be eternal71 and you will be involved in a tenet you reject1 since ,prasasta-pda has said1 ,present in all its subjects4 ,again 7if the universal is present only in its proper subjects71 does the universal 7the nature of a jar7 residing in an already existing jar1 on being attached to another jar now in making1 come from the one to attach itself to the other1 or not come from it8 ,on the first alternative 7if it comes71 the universal must be a substance 7for substances alone underlie qualities and motions72 whereas1 if it does not come1 it cannot attach itself to the new jar4 ,again 7we ask71 when the jar ceases to exist1 does the universal outlast it1 or cease to exist1 or go to another place8 ,on the first supposition it will exist without a subject to inhere in2 on the second1 it will be improper to call it eternal 7as you do72 on the third1 it will follow that it is a substance 7or base of qualities and motions74 ,destroyed as it is by the malign influence of these and the like objections1 the universal is unauthenticated4 ,conformably it has been said-- ,great is the dexterity of that which1 existing in one place1 engages without moving from that place in producing itself in another place4 ,this entity 7universality7 is not connected with that wherein it resides1 and yet pervades that which occupies that place3 great is this miracle4 ,it goes not away1 nor was it there1 nor is it subsequently divided1 it quits not its former repository3 what a series of difficulties6 ,if you ask3 ,on what does the assurance that the one exists in the many rest8 ,you must be satisfied with the reply that we concede it to repose on difference from that which is different 7or exclusion of heterogeneity74 ,we dismiss further prolixity4 ,that all transmigratory existence is identical with pain is the common verdict of all the founders of institutes1 else they would not be found desirous to put a stop to it and engaging in the method for bringing it to an end4 ,we must1 therefore1 bear in mind that all is pain1 and pain alone4 ,if you object3 ,when it is asked1 like what8 you must quote an instance1--we reply3 ,not so1 for momentary objects self-characterised being momentary1 have no common characters1 and therefore it is impossible to say that this is like that4 ,we must therefore hold that all is like itself alone1 like itself alone4 ,in like manner we must hold that all is void1 and void alone4 ,for we are conscious of a determinate negation4 ,this silver or the like has not been seen by me in sleeping or waking4 ,if what is seen were 7really7 existent1 then reality would pertain to the corresponding act of vision1 to the 7nacre1 c471 which is the basis of its particular nature 7or haecceity71 to the silver1 c41 illusorily superposed upon that basis1 to the connection between them1 to the co-inherence1 and so forth3 a supposition not entertained by any disputant4 ,nor is a semi-effete existence admissible4 ,no one imagines that one-half of a fowl may be set apart for cooking1 and the other half for laying eggs4 ,the venerated ,buddha1 then1 having taught that of the illusorily superposed 7silver1 c471 the basis 7nacre1 c471 the connection between them1 the act of vision1 and the videns1 if one or more be unreal it will perforce ensue that all are unreal1 all being equally objects of the negation2 the ,mdhyamikas excellently wise explain as follows1 viz41 that the doctrine of ,buddha terminates in that of a total void 7universal baselessness or nihilism7 by a slow progression like the intrusive steps of a mendicant1 through the position of a momentary flux1 and through the 7gradual7 negation of the illusory assurances of pleasurable sensibility1 of universality1 and of reality4 ,the ultimate principle1 then1 is a void emancipated from four alternatives1 viz41 from reality1 from unreality1 from both 7reality and unreality71 and from neither 7reality nor unreality74 ,to exemplify this3 ,if real existence were the nature of a water-pot and the like1 the activity of its maker 7the potter7 would be superfluous4 ,if non-existence be its nature the same objection will accrue2 as it is said-- ,necessity of a cause befits not the existent1 ether and the like1 for instance2 ,no cause is efficacious of a non-existent effect1 flowers of the sky and the like1 for instance4 ,the two remaining alternatives1 as self-contradictory1 are inadmissible4 ,it has accordingly been laid down by the venerated ,buddha in the ,alankrvatra#cd-- ,of things discriminated by intellect1 no nature is ascertained2#ce ,those things are therefore shown to be inexplicable and natureless4 ,and again-- ,this matter perforce results1 which the wise declare1 ,no sooner are objects thought than they are dissipated4 ,that is to say1 the objects are not determined by any one of the four alternatives4 ,hence it is that it has been said-- ,a religious mendicant1 an amorous man1 and a dog have three views of a woman's person1 respectively that it is a carcass1 that it is a mistress1 and that it is a prey4 ,in consequence1 then1 of these four points of view1 when all ideas are come to an end1 final extinction1 which is a void1 will result4 ,accordingly we have overtaken our end1 and there is nothing to be taught to us4 ,there consequently remain only two duties to the student--interrogation and acceptance4 ,of these1 interrogation is the putting of questions in order to attain knowledge not yet attained4 ,acceptance is assent to the matters stated by the sacred teacher4 ,these 7,bauddha nihilists7 are excellent in assenting to that which the religious teacher enounces1 and defective in interrogation1 whence their conventional designation of ,mdhyamikas 7or mediocre74 ,certain other ,buddhists are styled ,yogchras1 because while they accept the four points of view proclaimed by the spiritual guide1 and the void of external things1 they make the interrogation3 ,why has a void of the internal 7or baselessness of mental phenomena7 been admitted8 ,for their technology is as follows3--,self-subsistent cognition must be allowed1 or it will follow that the whole universe is blind4 ,it has conformably been proclaimed by ,dharmakrti3 ,to one who disallows perception the vision of objects is not competent4 ,an external percipibile is not admissible in consequence of the following dilemma4 ,does the object cognitively apprehensible arise from an entity or not8 ,it does not result from an entity1 for that which is generated has no permanence4 ,nor is it non-resultant1 for what has not come into being is non-existent4 ,or 7we may proceed7 do you hold that a past object is cognitively apprehensible1 as begetting cognition8 ,if so1 this is childish nonsense1 because it conflicts with the apparent presentness of the object1 and because on such a supposition the sense organs 7and other imperceptible things7 might be apprehended4 ,further 7we ask71 ,is the percipibile a simple atom or a complex body8 ,the latter it cannot be1 this alternative being ejected by the dilemma as to whether part or whole is perceived4 ,the former alternative is equally impossible1 an atom being supersensible1 and it not being able to combine simultaneously with six others2 as it has been said-- ,if an atom could simultaneously combine with six1 it would have six surfaces2 ,and each of these being taken separately1 there would be a body of atomic dimension4 ,intellect1 therefore1 as having no other percipibile but itself1 is shown to be itself its own percipibile1 self-subsistent1 luminous with its own light1 like light4 ,therefore it has been said-- ,there is naught to be objectified by intellect2 there is no cognition ulterior thereto2 ,there being no distinction between percept and percipient1 intellect shines forth of itself alone4 ,the identity of percipient and percept is inferrible1 thus3 ,that which is cognised by any cognition is not other than that cognition1 as soul1 for instance1 is not other than the cognition of soul2 and blue and other momentary objects are cognised by cognitions4 ,for if there were a difference 7between percept and percipient71 the object could not now have any connection with the cognition1 there being no identity to determine a constancy of connection1 and nothing to determine the rise of such a connection4 ,as for the appearance of an interval between the object and subject consciousnesses1 this is an illusion1 like the appearance of two moons when there is only one4 ,the cause of this illusion is ideation of difference in a stream without beginning and without interruption2 as it has been said-- ,as invariably cognised together1 the blue object and the cognition thereof are identical2 ,and the difference should be accounted for by illusory cognitions1 as in the example of the single moon4 ,and again-- ,though there is no division1 the soul or intellect1 by reason of illusory perceptions1 ,appears to possess a duality of cognitions1 of percepts and of percipient4 ,nor must it be supposed that 7on this hypothesis7 the juice1 the energy1 and the digestion derivable from an imaginary and an actual sweetmeat will be the same2 for it cannot be questioned that though the intellect be in strictness exempt from the modes of object and subject1 yet there is competent to it a practical distinction in virtue of the succession of illusory ideas without beginning1 by reason of its possessing diverse modes percept and percipient1 conformably to its illusory supposition of practical agency1 just as to those whose eyes are dim with some morbid affection a hair and another minute object may appear either diverse or identical2 as it has been said-- ,as the intellect1 not having object and subject modes1 appears1 by reason of illusory cognitions1 ,illuded with the diverse forms of perception1 percept and percipient2 ,so when the intellect has posited a diversity1 as in the example of the differences of the cognition of a hair and the like1 ,then it is not to be doubted that it is characterised as percipient and percept4 ,thus it has been evinced that intellect1 as affected by beginningless ideation1 manifests itself under diverse forms4 ,when1 therefore1 by constancy of reflection 7on the four points of view7 aforesaid1 all ideation has been interrupted1 there arises knowledge purged from the illusions which take the form of objects1 such illusions being now melted away2 and this is technically called ,mahodaya 7the grand exaltation1 emancipation74 ,others again 7the ,sautrntikas7 hold that the position that there is no external world is untenable1 as wanting evidence4 ,nor 7they contend7 can it be maintained that invariability of simultaneous cognition is an evidence1 for this simultaneous cognition which you accept as proof of the identity of subject and object is indecisive1 being found in dubious and in contrary instances4 ,if you rejoin 7they proceed73 ,let there be a proof of this identity1 and let this proof be invariability of simultaneous cognition1--we refuse this1 because inasmuch as cognition must ultimately have some object1 it is manifested in duality1 and because such invariability of simultaneity as to time and place is impossible4 ,moreover 7they continue71 if the object1 blue or whatever it be1 were only a form of cognition1 it should be presented as ,ego1 not as ,hoc aliquid1 because the cognition and the object would be identical4 ,perhaps you will say3 ,a blue form consisting of cognition is illusorily presented as external and as other than self1 and consequently the ,ego is not suggested2 and so it has been said-- ,this side of knowledge which appears external to the other portion1 ,this appearance of duality in the unity of cognition is an illusion4 ,and again-- ,the principle to be known as internal also manifests itself as if it were external4 ,to this we reply 7say the ,sautrntikas73 ,this is untenable1 for if there be no external objects1 there being no genesis of such1 the comparison as if they were external is illegitimate4 ,no man in his senses would say1 ,vasumitra looks like the son of a childless mother4 ,again1 if the manifestation of identity be proved by the illusoriness of the presentment of duality1 and the presentment of duality be proved illusory by the manifestation of identity1 you are involved in a logical circle4 ,without controversy we observe that cognitions take external things1 blue or whatever they may be1 as their objects1 and do not take merely internal modifications as such1 and we see that men in their everyday life overlook their internal states4 ,thus this argument which you adduce to prove that there is difference between subject and object1 turns out a mere absurdity1 like milky food made of cow-dung4 ,when then you say as if it were external1 you must already suppose an external percipibile1 and your own arrow will return upon you and wound you4 ,if any one object that the externality of an object synchronous with the cognition is inadmissible1 we 7,sautrntikas7 reply that this objection is inadmissible1 inasmuch as the subject in juxtaposition to the sensory imposes its form upon the cognition then in production1 and the object is inferrible from the form thus imposed4 ,the interrogation and response on this point have been thus summarised-- ,if it be asked1 ,how can there be a past percipibile8 ,they recognise perceptibility1 ,and a competent inferribility of the individual thing is its imposition of its form4 ,to exemplify4 ,as nourishment is inferred from a thriving look1 as nationality is inferred from language1 and as affection is inferred from flurried movements1 so from the form of knowledge a knowable may be inferred4 ,therefore it has been said-- ,with half 7of itself7 the object moulds 7the cognition7 without losing the nature of a half2 ,the evidence1 therefore1 of the recognition of a knowable is the nature of the knowable4 ,for consciousness of the cognition cannot be the being of the cognition1 for this consciousness is everywhere alike1 and if indifference were to attach itself to this1 it would reduce all things to indifference4 ,accordingly the formal argument for the existence of external things3 ,those things which while a thing exists appear only at times1 all depend upon something else than that thing2 as1 for instance1 if ,i do not wish to speak or to walk1 presentments of speaking or walking must suppose others desirous of speaking or walking2 and in like manner the presentments of activity under discussion1 while there exists the recognition of a subject of them1 are only at times manifested as blue and so forth4 ,of these1 the recognition of a subject is the presentation of the ,ego1 the manifestation as blue and so forth is a presentment of activity1 as it has been said-- ,that is a recognition of a subject which is conversant about the ,ego3 ,that is a presentment of activity which manifests blue and the rest4 ,over and above1 therefore1 the complement of subject-recognitions1 let it be understood that there is an external object world perceptible1 which is the cause of presentments of activity2 and that this external world does not rise into being only from time to time on occasion of presentments resulting from ideation4 ,according to the view of the ,sensationalists 7vijnavdin71 ideation is a power of generating such and such sensations 7or presentments of activity7 in subject-recognitions which exist as a single stream4 ,the maturescence of this power is its readiness to produce its effect2 of this the result is a presentment 7or sensation72 the antecedent momentary object 7sensation7 in the mental train is accepted as the cause1 no other mental train being admitted to exercise such causality4 ,it must therefore be stated that all momentary objects 7fleeting sensations7 in the subject-consciousness are alike able to bring about that maturescence of ideation in the subject-consciousness1 which maturescence is productive of presentments of activity4 ,if any one 7of these fleeting sensations7 had not this power1 none would possess it1 all existing alike in the stream of subject-recognitions4 ,on the supposition that they all have this power1 the effects cannot be diversified1 and therefore any intelligent man1 however unwilling1 if he has a clear understanding1 must decide1 without putting out of sight the testimony of his consciousness1 that to account for the occasional nature 7of sense percepts7 the six cognitions of sound1 touch1 colour1 taste1 and smell1 of pleasure1 and so forth1 are produced on occasion of four conditions4 ,these four conditions are known as 7#a47 the data1 7#b47 the suggestion1 7#c47 the medium1 and 7#d47 the dominant 7organ74 ,of these1 the form of blue or the like arises from the condition of blue data in the understanding in which there is a manifestation of blue or the like1 which manifestation is styled a cognition4 ,the resuscitation of forms or cognitions arises from suggestion as a condition4 ,the restriction to the apprehension of this or that object arises from the medium1 light1 for instance1 as a condition1 and from the dominant1 the eye1 for example1 as another condition4 ,the eye1 as determinant of one particular cognition 7form7 where taste1 c41 might have been equally cognised1 is able to become dominant2 for in everyday life he who determines is regarded as dominant4 ,we must thus recognise four causes of pleasure and the rest which constitute the understanding and its modifications4 ,so also the universe1 which consists of mind and its modifications1 is of five kinds1 entitled 7#a47 the sensational1 7#b47 the perceptional1 7#c47 the affectional1 7#d47 the verbal1 and 7#e47 the impressional4 ,of these1 the sensible world 7rpa-skandha7 is the sense organs and their objects1 according to the etymology1 viz41 that objects are discriminated 7rpyante7 by these4 ,the perceptional world is the stream of subject-recognitions and of presentments of activity4 ,the affectional world is the stream of feelings of pleasure and pain generated by the two aforesaid worlds4 ,the verbal 7or symbolical7 world is the stream of cognitions conversant about words--the words cow1 and so forth4 ,the impressional world is the miseries1 as desire1 aversion1 c41 caused by the affectional world1 the lesser miseries1 as conceit1 pride1 c41 and merit and demerit4 ,reflecting1 therefore1 that this universe is pain1 an abode of pain1 and an instrument of pain1 a man should acquire a knowledge of the principles1 the method of suppressing this pain4 ,hence it has been said-- ,the principles sanctioned by ,buddha are to the saint the four methods of suppressing the aggregate of pain4#cf ,in these words the sense of pain is known to every one2 the aggregate means the cause of pain4 ,this aggregate is twofold1 as 7#a47 determined by concurrence2 or 7#b47 determined by causation4 ,of these1 there is an aphorism comprising the aggregate determined by concurrence1 which other causes resort to this effect2 the condition of these causes thus proceeding is concurrence2 the concurrence of causes is the result of this only1 and not of any conscious being1--such is the meaning of the aphorism4 ,to exemplify this4 ,a germ1 caused by a seed1 is generated by the concurrence of six elements4 ,of these1 earth as an element produces hardness and smell in the germ2 water as an element produces viscidity and moisture2 light as an element produces colour and warmth2 air as an element produces touch and motion2 ether as an element produces expansion and sound2 the season as an element produces a fitting soil1 c4 ,the aphorism comprising the aggregate determined by causation is3 ,with the ,tathgatas the nature of these conditions is fixed by production1 or by non-production2 there is continuance as a condition1 and determination by a condition1 and conformity of the production to the cause2 that is to say1 according to the doctrine of the ,tathgata ,buddhas1 the nature of these conditions1 that is1 the causal relation between the cause and effect1 results from production or from non-production4 ,that which comes into being1 provided that something exists1 is the effect of that as its cause2 such is the explanation of the nature 7or causal relation74 ,continuance as a condition is where the effect is not found without its cause4 ,the 7abstract7 affix tal 7in the word sthitita7 has the sense of the concrete4 ,determination by a condition is the determination of the effect by the cause4 ,here some one might interpose the remark that the relation of cause and effect cannot exist apart from some conscious agent4 ,for this reason it is added that there existing a cause1 conformity of the genesis to that cause is the nature which is fixed in conditions 7that is1 in causes and effects72 and in all this no intelligent designer is observed4#cg ,to illustrate this1 the causal determination of a genesis to be gone through is as follows3--,from the seed the germ1 from the germ the stalk1 from the stalk the hollow stem1 from the hollow stem the bud1 from the bud the spicules1 from the spicules the blossom1 from the blossom the fruit4 ,in this external aggregate neither the cause1 the seed and the rest1 nor the effect1 the germ and the rest1 has any consciousness of bringing a germ into being1 or of being brought into being by the seed4 ,in like manner in mental facts two causes are to be recognised4 ,there is a whole ocean of scientific matter before us1 but we desist1 apprehensive of making our treatise unduly prolix4 ,emancipation is the suppression of these two causal aggregates1 or the rise of pure cognition subsequent to such suppression4 ,the method 7path1 road7 is the mode of suppressing them4 ,and this method is the knowledge of the principles1 and this knowledge accrues from former ideas4 ,such is the highest mystery4 ,the name ,sautrntika arose from the fact that the venerated ,buddha said to certain of his disciples who asked what was the ultimate purport 7anta7 of the aphorism 7stra71 ,as you have inquired the final purport of the aphorism1 be ,sautrntikas4 ,certain ,bauddhas1 though there exist the external world1 consisting of odours1 c41 and the internal1 consisting of colours1 c41 in order to produce unbelief in these1 declared the universe to be a void4 ,these the venerated ,buddha styled ,prthamika 7primary7 disciples4 ,a second school1 attached to the apprehension of sensations only1 maintain that sensation is the only reality4 ,a third school1 who contend that both are true 7the internal and the external71 and maintain that sensible objects are inferrible4 ,others hold all this to be absurd language 7viruddh bhsh71 and are known under the designation of ,vaibhshikas4 ,their technical language springs up as follows3--,according to the doctrine of inferrible sensibles1 there being no perceptible object1 and consequently no object from which a universal rule can be attained1 it will be impossible that any illation should take place1 and therefore a contradiction will emerge to the consciousness of all mankind4 ,objects1 therefore1 are of two kinds1 sensible and cogitable4 ,of these apprehension is a non-discriminative instrument of knowledge as other than mere representation2 cognition which is discriminative is not a form of evidence1 as being a merely ideal cognition4 ,therefore it has been said-- ,apprehension1 exempt from ideality and not illusory1 is non-discriminative4 ,discrimination1 as resulting from the appearances of things1 is without controversy an illusion4 ,the perceptible evidence of things is perception3 if it were aught else1 ,there could neither be things1 nor evidence of things derived from verbal communication1 inference1 or sense4 ,here some one may say3 ,if discriminative cognition be unauthentic1 how is the apprehension of real objects by one energising thereon and the universal consentiency of mankind to be accounted for8 ,let it be replied3 ,this question does not concern us1 for these may be accounted for by the possibility of an indirect apprehension of objects1 just as if we suppose the light of a gem to be a gem 7we may yet handle the gem1 because it underlies the light1 while if we were to take nacre for silver1 we could not lay hold of any silver74 ,the rest has been fully discussed in describing the ,sautrntikas 7cf4 p4 #bg71 and therefore need not here be further detailed4 ,it should not be contended that a diversity of instruction according to the disciples' modes of thought is not traditional 7or orthodox72 for it is said in the gloss on the ,bodha-chitta-- ,the instructions of the leader of mankind 7,buddha7 accommodating themselves to the character and disposition 7of those who are to be taught71 ,are said to be diverse in many ways1 according to a plurality of methods4 ,for as deep or superficial1 and sometimes both deep and superficial1 ,instructions are diverse1 and diverse is the doctrine of a universal void which is a negation of duality4 ,it is well known in ,buddhist doctrine that the worship of the twelve inner seats 7yatana7 is conducive to felicity4 ,after acquiring wealth in abundance1 the twelve inner seats ,are to be thoroughly reverenced2 what use of reverencing aught else below8 ,the five organs of knowledge1 the five organs of action1 ,the common sensory and the intellect have been described by the wise as the twelve inner seats4 ,the system of the ,buddhists is described as follows in the ,viveka-vilsa3-- ,of the ,bauddhas ,sugata 7,buddha7 is the deity1 and the universe is momentarily fluxional2 ,the following four principles in order are to be known by the name of the noble truths3-- ,pain1 the inner seats1 and from them an aggregate is held1#ch ,and the path 7method72 of all this let the explication be heard in order4 ,pain1 and the skandhas of the embodied one1 which are declared to be five1-- ,sensation1 consciousness1 name1 impression1 and form4 ,the five organs of sense1 the five objects of sense1 sound and the rest1 the common sensory1 ,and 7the intellect7 the abode of merit1--these are the twelve inner seats4 ,this should be the complement of desire and so forth1 when it arises in the heart of man4 ,under the name of soul's own nature1 it should be the aggregate4 ,the fixed idea that all impressions are momentary1 ,this is to be known as the path1 and is also styled emancipation4 ,furthermore1 there are two instruments of science1 perception and inference4 ,the ,bauddhas are well known to be divided into four sects1 the ,vaibhshikas and the rest4 ,the ,vaibhshika highly esteems an object concomitant to the cognition2 ,the ,sautrntika allows no external object apprehensible by perception2 ,the ,yogchra admits only intellect accompanied with forms2 ,the ,mdhyamikas hold mere consciousness self-subsistent4 ,all the four 7sects of7 ,bauddhas proclaim the same emancipation1 ,arising from the extirpation of desire1 c41 the stream of cognitions and impressions4 ,the skin garment1 the water-pot1 the tonsure1 the rags1 the single meal in the forenoon1 ,the congregation1 and the red vesture1 are adopted by the ,bauddha mendicants4#ci ,a4 ,e4 ,g4 ,,footnotes3 ,footnote #bi3 ,this sloka is quoted in the ,benares ,pandit1 vol4 i4 p4 #hi1 with a commentary1 and the latter part of the second line is there read more correctly1 'darsann na na darsant4 ,footnote #cj3 ,kusumnjali1 iii4 #g4 ,footnote #ca3 ,the ,bauddhas are thus divided into-- 7#a47 ,mdhyamikas or ,nihilists4 7#b47 ,yogchras or ,subjective ,idealists4 7#c47 ,sautrntikas or ,representationists4 7#d47 ,vaibhshikas or ,presentationists4 ,footnote #cb3 ,cf4 ,ferrier's ,lectures and ,remains1 vol4 i4 p4 #aai4 ,suppose yourself gazing on a gorgeous sunset4 ,the whole western heavens are glowing with roseate hues1 but you are aware that within half an hour all these glorious tints will have faded away into a dull ashen grey4 ,you see them even now melting away before your eyes1 although your eyes cannot place before you the conclusion which your reason draws4 ,and what conclusion is that8 ,that conclusion is that you never1 even for the shortest time that can be named or conceived1 see any abiding colour1 any colour which truly is4 ,within the millionth part of a second the whole glory of the painted heavens has undergone an incalculable series of mutations4 ,one shade is supplanted by another with a rapidity which sets all measurement at defiance1 but because the process is one to which no measurement applies1444 reason refuses to lay an arrestment on any period of the passing scene1 or to declare that it is1 because in the very act of being it is not2 it has given place to something else4 ,it is a series of fleeting colours1 no one of which is1 because each of them continually vanishes in another4 ,footnote #cc3 ,principium exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria4 ,footnote #cd3 ,query1 ,lankvatra8 ,footnote #ce3 ,cf4 ,ferrier's ,institutes of ,metaphysic1 p4 #bac4 ,if every completed object of cognition must consist of object plus the subject1 the object without the subject must be incomplete1 that is1 inchoate--that is1 no possible object of knowledge at all4 ,this is the distressing predicament to which matter is reduced by the tactics of speculation2 and this predicament is described not unaptly by calling it a flux--or1 as we have depicted it elsewhere1 perhaps more philosophically1 as a never-ending redemption of nonsense into sense1 and a never-ending relapse of sense into nonsense4 ,footnote #cf3 ,cf4 ,burnouf1 ,lotus1 p4 #ebj4--,should we read samudaya8 ,footnote #cg3 ,cf4 ,g4 ,h4 ,lewes' ,history of ,philosophy1 vol4 i4 p4 #he4 ,we not only see that the architect's plan determined the arrangement of materials in the house1 but we see why it must have done so1 because the materials have no spontaneous tendency to group themselves into houses2 that not being a recognised property of bricks1 mortar1 wood1 and glass4 ,but what we know of organic materials is that they have this spontaneous tendency to arrange themselves in definite forms2 precisely as we see chemical substances arranging themselves in definite forms without the intervention of any extra-chemical agency4 ,footnote #ch3 ,these are not the usual four 'sublime truths2' cf4 p4 #cj4 ,footnote #ci3 ,mdhava probably derived most of his knowledge of ,buddhist doctrines from ,brahmanical works2 consequently some of his explanations 7as1 e4g41 that of samudya or samudaya1 c47 seem to be at variance with those given in ,buddhist works4 ,,chapter ,,iii4 ,,the ,,rhata ,,system4 ,the ,gymnosophists#dj 7,jainas71 rejecting these opinions of the ,muktakachchhas1#da and maintaining continued existence to a certain extent1 overthrow the doctrine of the momentariness of everything4 7,they say73 ,if no continuing soul is accepted1 then even the arrangement of the means for attaining worldly fruit in this life will be useless4 ,but surely this can never be imagined as possible--that one should act and another reap the consequences6 ,therefore as this conviction1 ,i who previously did the deed1 am the person who now reap its consequences1 establishes undoubtedly the existence of a continuing soul1 which remains constant through the previous and the subsequent period1 the discriminating ,jaina ,arhats reject as untenable the doctrine of momentary existence1 i4e41 an existence which lasts only an instant1 and has no previous or subsequent part4 ,but the opponent may maintain1 ,the unbroken stream 7of momentary sensations7 has been fairly proved by argument1 so who can prevent it8 ,in this way1 since our tenet has been demonstrated by the argument1 'whatever is1 is momentary1 c41' it follows that in each parallel line of successive experiences the previous consciousness is the agent and the subsequent one reaps the fruit4 ,nor may you object that1 'if this were true1 effects might extend beyond all bounds'--i4e41 ,a might act1 and ,b receive the punishment--because there is an essentially controlling relation in the very nature of cause and effect4 ,thus we see that when mango seeds1 after being steeped in sweet juices1 are planted in prepared soil1 there is a definite certainty that sweetness will be found in the shoot1 the stalk1 the stem1 the branches1 the peduncle1 c41 and so on by an unbroken series to the fruit itself2 or again1 when cotton seeds have been sprinkled with lac juice1 there will be a similar certainty of finding1 through the same series of shoot1 c41 an ultimate redness in the cotton4 ,as it has been said-- ',in whatever series of successive states the original impression of the action was produced1 ',there verily accrues the result1 just like the redness produced in cotton4 ',when lac juice1 c41 are poured on the flower of the citron1 c41 ',a certain capacity is produced in it1--do you not see it8' ,but all this is only a drowning man's catching at a straw1 for it is overthrown by the following dilemma3-- ,in the example of the cloud1 c4 supra1 p4 #ae1 was your favourite momentariness proved by this very proof or by some other8 ,it could not be the former1 because your alleged momentariness is not always directly visible in the cloud1 and consequently1 as your example is not an ascertained fact1 your supposed inference falls to the ground4 ,nor can it be the latter--because you might always prove your doctrine of momentariness by this new proof 7if you had it71 and consequently your argument regarding all existence whatever is1 is momentary1 c4 would become needless4 ,if you take as your definition of existence that which produces an effect1 this will not hold1 as it would include even the bite of a snake imagined in the rope1 since this undoubtedly produces the effect of fear4 ,hence it has been said that the definition of an existence is that which possesses an origin1 an end1 and an intermediate duration4 ,as for what was said in p4 #af that the momentariness of objects is proved by the fact that the contrary assumption leads to contradictory attributes of capacity and want of capacity existing contemporaneously1 that also is wrong--for the alleged contradiction is not proved1 as the holders of the ,syd-vda#db doctrine vide infra willingly admit the indeterminateness of the action of causes4 ,as for what was said of the example of the cotton1 that is only mere words1 since no proof is given1 and we do not accept even in that instance a separate destruction at each moment4 ,and again1 your supposed continued series cannot be demonstrated without some subject to give it coherence1 as has been said1 ,in individual things which are of the same class or successively produced or in mutual contact1 there may be a continued series2 and this series is held to be one throughout all4 ,nor is our objection obviated by your supposed definite relation between causes and effects4 ,for even on your own admission it would follow that something experienced by the teacher's mind might be remembered by that of the pupil whom he had formed1 or the latter might experience the fruits of merit which the former had acquired2 and thus we should have the twofold fault that the thing done passed away without result1 and that the fruit of the thing not done was enjoyed4 ,this has been said by the author of the ,siddhasenvkya-- ,the loss of the thing done1--the enjoyment of the fruit of a thing not done1--the dissolution of all existence1--and the abolition of memory1--bold indeed is the ,buddhist antagonist1 when1 in the teeth of these four objections1 he seeks to establish his doctrine of momentary destruction6 ,moreover1 7on your supposition of momentary existence71 as at the time of the perception 7the second moment7 the object 7of the first moment7 does not exist1 and similarly at the time of the object's existence the perception does not exist1 there can be no such things as a perceiver and a thing perceived1 and consequently the whole course of the world would come to an end4 ,nor may you suppose that the object and the perception are simultaneous1 because this would imply that1 like the two horns of an animal1 they did not stand in the relation of cause and effect as this relation necessarily involves succession1 and consequently the lambana1 or the object's data supra1 p4 #bi1 would be abolished as one of the four concurrent causes 7pratyaya74#dc ,if you say that the object may still be perceived1 inasmuch as it will impress its form on the perception1 even though the one may have existed in a different moment from the other1 this too will not hold4 ,for if you maintain that the knowledge acquired by perception has a certain form impressed upon it1 you are met by the impossibility of explaining how a momentary perception can possess the power of impressing a form2 and if you say that it has no form impressed upon it1 you are equally met by the fact that1 if we are to avoid incongruity1 there must be some definite condition to determine the perception and knowledge in each several case4 ,thus by perception the abstract consciousness1 which before existed uninfluenced by the external object1 becomes modified under the form of a jar1 c41 with a definite reference to each man's personality i4e41 ,i see the jar1 and it is not merely the passive recipient of a reflection like a mirror4 ,moreover1 if the perception only reproduced the form of the object1 there would be an end of using such words as far1 near1 c41 of the objects4#dd ,nor can you accept this conclusion1 as exactly in accordance with your own views1 because1 in spite of all our logic1 the stubborn fact remains that we do use such phrases as the mountain is nearer or further1 long or large4 ,nor may you say that it is the object 7which supplies the form7 that really possesses these qualities of being 'further1' c41 and they are applied by a fashion of speech to the perception though not really belonging to it--because we do not find that this is the case in a mirror i4e41 it does not become a far reflection because it represents a far object4 ,and again1 as the perception produced by an object follows it in assuming the form of blue1 so too1 if the object be insentient1 it ought equally to assume its form and so become itself insentient4 ,and thus1 according to the proverb1 wishing to grow1 you have destroyed your root1 and your cause has fallen into hopeless difficulties4 ,if1 in your wish to escape this difficulty1 you assert that the perception does not follow the object in being insentient1 then there would be no perception that the object is insentient1#de and so it is a case of the proverb1 ,while he looks for one thing which he has lost1 another drops4 ,but what harm will it be if there is no perception of a thing's being insentient8 ,we reply1 that if its being insentient is not perceived1 while its blue form is perceived1 the two may be quite distinct and as different from each other as a jar and cloth1 or it may be a case of indeterminateness so that the two may be only occasionally found together1 as smoke with fire4 ,and again1 if insentience is not perceived contemporaneously with the blue form1 how could there then be conformity between them so that both the blue and the insentience should together constitute the character of the thing8 ,we might just as well maintain that1 on perceiving a post1 the unperceived universe entered into it as also constituting its character4#df ,all this collection of topics for proof has been discussed at full length by the ,jaina authors1 ,pratpachandra and others1 in the ,prameyakamalamrtanda1 c41 and is here omitted for fear of swelling the book too much4 ,therefore those who wish for the summum bonum of man must not accept the doctrine of ,buddha1 but rather honour only the rhata doctrine4 ,the ,arhat's nature has been thus described by ,arhachchandra-sri1#dg in his ptanischaylankra4 ,the divine ,arhat is the supreme lord1 the omniscient one1 who has overcome all faults1 desire1 c41--adored by the three worlds1 the declarer of things as they are4 ,but may it not be objected that no such omniscient soul can enter the path of proof1 since none of the five affirmative proofs can be found to apply1 as has been declared by ,tauttita ,bhatta ,kumrila#dh8 #a4 ,no omniscient being is seen by the sense here in this world by ourselves or others2 nor is there any part of him seen which might help us as a sign to infer his existence4 #b4 ,nor is there any injunction 7vidhi7 of scripture which reveals an eternal omniscient one1 nor can the meaning of the explanatory passages 7arthavda7 be applied here4 #c4 ,his existence is not declared by those passages which refer to quite other topics2 and it cannot be contained in any emphatic repetitions 7anuvda71 as it had never been mentioned elsewhere before4 #d4 ,an omniscient being who had a beginning can never be the subject of the eternal ,veda2 and how can he be established by a made and spurious ,veda8 #e4 ,do you say that this omniscient one is accepted on his own word8 ,how can you establish either when they thus both depend on reciprocal support8 #f4 ,if you say1 ',the saying is true because it was uttered by one omniscient1 and this proves the ,arhat's existence2' how can either point be established without some previously established foundation8 #g4 ,but they who accept a supposed omniscient on the baseless word of a parviscient know nothing of the meaning of a real omniscient's words4 #h4 ,and again1 if we now could see anything like an omniscient being1 we might have a chance of recognising him by the well-known fourth proof1 comparison 7upamna74 #i4 ,and the teaching of ,buddha as well as that of ,jina1 which embraces virtue1 vice1 c41 would not be established as authoritative1 if there were not in him the attribute of omniscience1#di and so on4 ,we reply as follows3--,as for the supposed contradiction of an ,arhat's existence1 derived from the failure of the five affirmative proofs1--this is untenable1 because there are proofs1 as inference1 c41 which do establish#ej his existence4 ,thus any soul will become omniscient when1 7its natural capacity for grasping all objects remaining the same71 the hindrances to such knowledge are done away4 ,whatever thing has a natural capacity for knowing any object1 will1 when its hindrances to such knowledge are done away1 actually know it1 just as the sense of vision cognises form1 directly the hindrances of darkness1 c41 are removed4 ,now there is such a soul1 which has its hindrances done away1 its natural capacity for grasping all things remaining unchanged2 therefore there is an omniscient being4 ,nor is the assertion unestablished that the soul has a natural capacity for grasping all things2 for otherwise the ,mmmsist could not maintain that a knowledge of all possible cases can be produced by the authoritative injunction of a text1#ea--nor could there otherwise be the knowledge of universal propositions1 such as that in our favourite argument1 ,all things are indeterminate from the very fact of their existence and1 of course1 a follower of the ,nyya will grant that universal propositions can be known1 though he will dispute the truth of this particular one4 ,now it is clear that the teachers of the ,prva ,mmms accept the thesis that the soul has a natural capacity for grasping all things2 since they allow that a knowledge embracing all things can be produced by the discussion of injunctions and prohibitions1 as is said by ,sabara in his commentary on the ,stras1 i4 #a1 #b1 ,a precept makes known the past1 the present1 the future1 the minute1 the obstructed1 the distant1 c4 ,nor can you say that it is impossible to destroy the obstructions which hinder the soul's knowing all things1 because we ,jainas are convinced that there are certain special means to destroy these obstructions1 viz41 the three gems1 right intuition1 c4 ,by this charm also1 all inferior assaults of argument can be put to flight4 ,but the ,naiyyika may interpose1 ,you talk of the pure intelligence1 which1 after all hindrances are done away1 sees all objects1 having sense-perception at its height2 but this is irrelevant1 because there can be no hindrance to the omniscient1 as from all eternity he has been always liberated4 ,we reply that there is no proof of your eternally liberated being4 ,there cannot be an omniscient who is eternally liberated1 from the very fact of his being liberated1 like other liberated persons1--since the use of the term liberated necessarily implies the having been previously bound2 and if the latter is absent1 the former must be too1 as is seen in the case of the ether4 ,but is not this being's existence definitely proved by his being the maker of that eternal series of effects1 the earth1 c48 according to the well-known argument1 'the earth1 c41 must have had a maker1 because they have the nature of effects1 as a jar4' ,this argument1 however1 will not hold1 because you cannot prove that they have the nature of effects4 ,you cannot establish this from the fact of their being composed of parts1 because this supposition falls upon the horns of a dilemma4 ,does this being composed of parts mean 7i47 the being in contact with the parts2 or 7ii47 the being in intimate relation to the parts2 or 7iii47 the being produced from parts2 or 7iv47 the being a substance in intimate relation2 or 7v47 the being the object of an idea involving the notion of parts8 ,not the first1 because it would apply too widely1 as it would include ether since this1 though not itself composed of parts1 is in contact with the parts of other things2 nor the second1 because it would similarly include genus1 c4 as this resides in a substance by intimate relation1 and yet itself is not composed of parts2 nor the third1 because this involves a term 7produced7 just as much disputed as the one directly in question2#eb nor the fourth1 because its neck is caught in the pillory of the following alternative3--,do you mean by your phrase used above that it is to be a substance1 and to have something else in intimate relation to itself1--or do you mean that it must have intimate relation to something else1 in order to be valid for your argument8 ,if you say the former1 it will equally apply to ether1 since this is a substance1 and has its qualities resident in it by intimate relation2 if you say the latter1 your new position involves as much dispute as the original point1 since you would have to prove the existence of intimate relation in the parts1 or the so-called intimate causes1 which you mean by something else4 ,we use these terms in compliance with your terminology2 but1 of course1 from our point of view1 we do not allow such a thing as intimate relation1 as there is no proof of its existence4 ,nor can the fifth alternative be allowed1 because this would reach too far1 as it would include soul1 c41 since soul can be the object of an idea involving the notion of parts1 and yet it is acknowledged to be not an effect4#ec ,nor can you maintain that the soul may still be indiscerptible in itself1 but by reason of its connection with something possessing parts may itself become metaphorically the object of an idea involving the notion of parts1 because there is a mutual contradiction in the idea of that which has no parts and that which is all-pervading1 just as the atom which is indiscerptible but not all-pervading4 ,and1 moreover1 is there only one maker8 ,or1 again1 is he independent8 ,in the former case your position will apply too far1 as it will extend erroneously to palaces1 c41 where we see for ourselves the work of many different men1 as carpenters1 c41 and in the second case if all the world were produced by this one maker1 all other agents would be superfluous4 ,as it has been said in the ,vtargastuti1 or ,praise of ,jina-- #a4 ,there is one eternal maker for the world1 all-pervading1 independent1 and true2 they have none of these inextricable delusions1 whose teacher art thou4 ,and again-- #b4 ,there is here no maker acting by his own free will1 else his influence would extend to the making of a mat4 ,what would be the use of yourself or all the artisans1 if swara fabricates the three worlds8 ,therefore it is right to hold1 as we do1 that omniscience is produced when the hindrances are removed by the three means before alluded to4 ,nor need the objection be made that right intuition1 c41 are impossible1 as there is no other teacher to go to1--because this universal knowledge can be produced by the inspired works of former omniscient ,jinas4 ,nor is our doctrine liable to the imputation of such faults as ,anyonysrayat1#ed c41 because we accept an eternal succession of revealed doctrines and omniscient teachers1 like the endless series of seed springing from shoot and shoot from seed4 ,so much for this preliminary discussion4 ,the well-known triad called the three gems1 right intuition1 c41 are thus described in the ,paramgamasra 7which is devoted to the exposition of the doctrines of the ,arhats7--,right intuition1 right knowledge1 right conduct are the path of liberation4 ,this has been thus explained by ,yogadeva3-- 7a47 ,when the meaning of the predicaments1 the soul1 c41 has been declared by an ,arhat in exact accordance with their reality1 absolute faith in the teaching1 i4e41 the entire absence of any contrary idea1 is right intuition4 ,and to this effect runs the ,tattvrtha-stra1 ,faith in the predicaments#ee is right 'intuition4' ,or1 as another definition gives it1 ,acquiescence in the predicaments declared by a ,jina is called 'right faith2' it is produced either by natural character or by the guru's instruction4 ,natural character means the soul's own nature1 independent of another's teaching2 instruction is the knowledge produced by the teaching of another in the form of explanation1 c4 7b47 ,right knowledge is a knowledge of the predicaments1 soul1 c41 according to their real nature1 undisturbed by any illusion or doubt2 as it has been said-- ,that knowledge1 which embraces concisely or in detail the predicaments as they actually are1 is called 'right knowledge' by the wise4 ,this knowledge is fivefold as divided into mati1 sruta1 avadhi1 manas-paryya1 and kevala2 as it has been said1 ,mati1 sruta1 avadhi1 manas-paryya1 and kevala1 these are knowledge4 ,the meaning of this is as follows3-- #a4 ,mati is that by which one cognises an object through the operation of the senses and the mind1 all obstructions of knowledge being abolished4 #b4 ,sruta is the clear knowledge produced by mati1 all the obstructions of knowledge being abolished4 #c4 ,avadhi is the knowledge of special objects caused by the abolition of hindrances1 which is effected by right intuition1 c4#ef #d4 ,manas-paryya is the clear definite knowledge of another's thoughts1 produced by the abolition of all the obstructions of knowledge caused by the veil of envy4 #e4 ,kevala is that pure unalloyed knowledge for the sake of which ascetics practise various kinds of penance4 ,the first of these 7mati7 is not self-cognised1 the other four are4 ,thus it has been said-- ,true knowledge is a proof which nothing can overthrow1 and which manifests itself as well as its object2 it is both supersensuous and itself an object of cognition1 as the object is determined in two ways4 ,but the full account of the further minute divisions must be got from the authoritative treatise above-mentioned4 7c47 ,right conduct is the abstaining from all actions tending to evil courses by one who possesses faith and knowledge1 and who is diligent in cutting off the series of actions and their effects which constitutes mundane existence4 ,this has been explained at length by the ,arhat-- #a4 ,right conduct is described as the entire relinquishment of blamable impulses2 this has been subjected to a fivefold division1 as the 'five vows1' ahims1 snrita1 asteya1 brahmachary1 and aparigraha4#eg #b4 ,the 'vow' of ahims is the avoidance of injuring life by any act of thoughtlessness in any movable or immovable thing4 #c4 ,a kind1 salutary1 and truthful speech is called the 'vow' of snrita4 ,that truthful speech is not truthful1 which is unkind to others and prejudicial4 #d4 ,the not taking what is not given is declared to be the 'vow' of asteya2 the external life is a man's property1 and1 when it is killed1 it is killed by some one who seizes it4 #e4 ,the 'vow' of brahmachary 7chastity7 is eighteen-fold1 viz41 the abandonment of all desires1#eh heavenly or earthly1 in thought1 word1 and deed1 and whether by one's own action or by one's consent1 or by one's causing another to act4 #f4 ,the 'vow' of aparigraha is the renouncing of all delusive interest in everything that exists not2 since bewilderment of thought may arise from a delusive interest even in the unreal4 #g4 ,when carried out by the five states of mind in a fivefold order1 these great 'vows' of the world produce the eternal abode4 ,the full account of the five states of mind 7bhvan7 has been given in the following passage of which we only quote one sloka-- ,let him carry out the 'vow' of snrita uninterruptedly by the abstinence from laughter1 greed1 fear1 and anger1 and by the deliberate avoidance of speech1#ei--;and so forth4 ,these three1 right intuition1 right knowledge1 and right conduct1 when united1 produce liberation1 but not severally2 just as1 in the case of an elixir1 it is the knowledge of what it is1 faith in its virtues1 and the actual application of the medicine1#fj united1 which produce the elixir's effect1 but not severally4 ,here we may say concisely that the tattvas or predicaments are two1 jva and ajva2 the soul1 jva1 is pure intelligence2 the non-soul1 ajva1 is pure non-intelligence4 ,padmanandin has thus said-- ,the two highest predicaments are 'soul' and 'non-soul2' 'discrimination' is the power of discriminating these two1 in one who pursues what is to be pursued1 and rejects what is to be rejected4 ,the affection1 c41 of the agent are to be rejected2 these are objects for the non-discriminating2 the supreme light of knowledge is alone to be pursued1 which is defined as upayoga4 ,upayoga or the true employment of the soul's activities takes place when the vision of true knowledge recognises the manifestation of the soul's innate nature2 but as long as the soul1 by the bond of pradesa and the mutual interpenetration of form which it produces between the soul and the body1 considers itself as identified with its actions and the body which they produce1 knowledge should rather be defined as the cause of its recognising that it is other than these4#fa ,intelligence 7chaitanya7 is common to all souls1 and is the real nature of the soul viewed as parinata i4e41 as it is in itself2 but by the influence of upasamakshaya and kshayopasama it appears in the mixed form as possessing both1#fb or again1 by the influence of actions as they arise1 it assumes the appearance of foulness1 c4#fc ,as has been said by ,vchakchrya in a stra-- ,the aupasamika1 the ,kshyika1 and the 'mixed' states are the nature of the soul1 and also the audayika and the ,prinmika4 #a4 ,the aupasamika state of the soul arises when all the effects of past actions have ceased1 and no new actions arise to affect the future1 as when water becomes temporarily pure through the defiling mud sinking to the bottom by the influence of the clearing nut-plant1#fd c4 #b4 ,the ,kshyika state arises when there is the absolute abolition of actions and their effects1 as in final liberation4 #c4 ,the mixed 7misra7 state combines both these1 as when water is partly pure4 #d4 ,the audayika state is when actions arise exerting an inherent influence on the future4 ,the ,prinmika state is the soul's innate condition1 as pure intelligence1 c41 and disregarding its apparent states1 as 7#a71 7#b71 7#c71 7#d74fe ,this nature1 in one of the above-described varieties1 is the character of every soul whether happy or unhappy4 ,this is the meaning of the stra quoted above4 ,this has been explained in the ,svarpa-sambodhana-- ,not different from knowledge1 and yet not identical with it1--in some way both different and the same1--knowledge is its first and last2 such is the soul described to be4 ,if you say that1 ,as difference and identity are mutually exclusive1 we must have one or the other in the case of the soul1 and its being equally both is absurd1 we reply1 that there is no evidence to support you when you characterise it as absurd4 ,only a valid non-perception#ff can thus preclude a suggestion as absurd2 but this is not found in the present case1 since 7in the opinion of us1 the advocates of the ,syd-vda7 it is perfectly notorious that all things present a mingled nature of many contradictory attributes4 ,others lay down a different set of tattvas from the two mentioned above1 jva and ajva2 they hold that there are five astikyas or categories1--jva1 ksa1 dharma1 adharma1 and pudgala4 ,to all these five we can apply the idea of existence 7asti71#fg as connected with the three divisions of time1 and we can similarly apply the idea of body 7kya71#fh from their occupying several parts of space4 ,the jvas 7souls7 are divided into two1 the mundane and the released4 ,the mundane pass from birth to birth2 and these are also divided into two1 as those possessing an internal sense 7samanaska71 and those destitute of it 7amanaska74 ,the former possesses samj1 i4e41 the power of apprehension1 talking1 acting1 and receiving instruction2 the latter are those without this power4 ,these latter are also divided into two1 as locomotive 7trasa71 or immovable 7sthvara74 ,the locomotive are those possessing at least two senses touch and taste1 as shell-fish1 worms1 c41 and are thus of four kinds as possessing two1 three1 four1 or five senses2 the immovable are earth1 water1 fire1 air1 and trees4#fi ,but here a distinction must be made4 ,the dust of the road is properly earth1 but bricks1 c41 are aggregated bodies of earth1 and that soul by whom this body is appropriated becomes earthen-bodied1 and that soul which will hereafter appropriate it is the earth-soul4 ,the same four divisions must also be applied to the others1 water1 c4 ,now the souls which have appropriated or will appropriate the earth1 c41 as their bodies1 are reckoned as immovable2 but earth1 c41 and the bodies of earth1 c41 are not so reckoned1 because they are inanimate4#gj ,these other immovable things1 and such as only possess the one sense of touch1 are considered as released1 since they are incapable of passing into any other state of existence4 ,dharma1 adharma1 and ksa are singular categories and not generic1 and they have not the attribute of action1 but they are the causes of a substance's change of place4 ,dharma1 merit1 and adharma1 demerit1 are well known4 ,they assist souls in progressing or remaining stationary in the universally extended#ga sky or ether characterised by light1 and also called ,lokksa2 hence the presence of the category merit is to be inferred from progress1 that of demerit from stationariness4 ,the effect of ksa is seen when one thing enters into the space previously occupied by another4 ,pudgala1 body1 possesses touch1 taste1 and colour4 ,bodies are of two kinds1 atomic and compound4 ,atoms cannot be enjoyed2#gb the compounds are the binary and other combinations4 ,atoms are produced by the separation of these binary and other compounds1 while these arise from the conjunction of atoms4 ,compounds sometimes arise from separation and conjunction combined2 hence they are called pudgalas1 because they fill 7pr71 and dissolve 7gal74 ,although time is not properly an astikya1 because it does not occupy many separate parts of space as mentioned in the definition1 still it is a dravya or tattva1 as the definition will hold2 substance 7dravya7 possesses qualities and action4#gc ,qualities reside in substance but do not themselves possess qualities1 as the general qualities1 knowledge1 c41 of the jva1 form1 c41 of the body1 and the power of causing progress1 stationariness1 and motion into a place previously occupied1 in the case respectively of merit1 demerit1 and ksa4 ,action 7paryya7 has thus been defined2 the actions 7paryyh7 of a substance are1 as has been said1 its existence1 its production1 its being what it is1 its development1 its course to the end1 as1 e4g41 in the jva1 the knowledge of objects1 as of a jar1 c41 happiness1 pain1 c42 in the pudgala1 the lump of clay1 the jar1 c42 in merit and demerit1 the special functions of progress1 c4 ,thus there are six substances or tattvas i4e41 the five above mentioned and time4 ,others reckon the tattvas as seven1 as has been said-- ,the tattvas are jva1 ajva1 srava1 bandha1 samvara1 nirjar1 and moksha4 ,jva and ajva have been already described4 srava is described as the movement of the soul called yoga1#gd through its participation in the movement of its various bodies1 audrika1 c4 ,as a door opening into the water is called srava1 because it causes the stream to descend through it1#ge so this yoga is called srava1 because by it as by a pipe actions and their consequences flow in upon the soul4 ,or1 as a wet garment collects the dust brought to it from every side by the wind1 so the soul1 wet with previous sins1 collects1 by its manifold points of contact with the body1 the actions which are brought to it by yoga4 ,or as1 when water is thrown on a heated lump of iron1 the iron absorbs the water altogether1 so the jva1 heated by previous sins1 receives from every side the actions which are brought by yoga4 ,kashya 7sin1 defilement7 is so called because it hurts 7kash7 the soul by leading it into evil states2 it comprises anger1 pride1 delusion1 and lust4 srava is twofold1 as good or evil4 ,thus abstaining from doing injury is a good yoga of the body2 speaking what is true1 measured1 and profitable is a good yoga of the speech4 ,these various subdivisions of srava have been described at length in several ,stras4 srava is the impulse to action with body1 speech1 or mind1 and it is good or evil as it produces merit or demerit1 c4 ,others1 however1 explain it thus3--srava is the action of the senses which impels the soul towards external objects2 the light of the soul1 coming in contact with external objects by means of the senses1 becomes developed as the knowledge of form1 c4#gf ,bandha1 bondage1 is when the soul1 by the influence of false intuition1 non-indifference1 carelessness1 and sin 7kashya71 and also by the force of yoga1 assumes various bodies occupying many parts of space1 which enter into its own subtile body1 and which are suited to the bond of its previous actions4 ,as has been said-- ,through the influence of sin the individual soul assumes bodies suitable to its past actions1 this is1 'bondage4' ,in this quotation the word sin 7kashya7 is used to include the other three causes of bondage as well as that properly so termed4 ,vchakchrya has thus enumerated the causes of bondage3 ,the causes of bondage are false intuition1 non-indifference1 carelessness1 and sin4 7a7 ,false intuition is twofold1--either innate from one's natural character1 as when one disbelieves ,jaina doctrines from the influence of former evil actions1 irrespectively of another's teaching1--or derived1 when learned by another's teaching4 7b7 ,non-indifference is the non-restraint of the five senses1 and the internal organ from the set of six1 earth1 c4 7c7 ,carelessness 7pramda7 is a want of effort to practise the five kinds of samiti1 gupti1 c4 7d7 ,sin consists of anger1 c4 ,here we must make the distinction that the four things1 false intuition1 c41 cause those kinds of bondage called sthiti and anubhva2 yoga or srava causes those kinds called prakriti and pradesa4 ,bondage is fourfold1 as has been said3 ,prakriti1 sthiti1 anubhva1 and pradesa are its four kinds4 #a4 ,prakriti means the natural qualities1 as bitterness or sweetness in the vimba plant or molasses4 ,this may be subdivided into eight mla-prakritis4#gg ,thus obstructions 7varana7#gh cloud the knowledge and intuition1 as a cloud obscures the sun or a shade the lamp4 ,this is 7a7 jnnvarana1 or 7b7 darsanvarana4 7c7 ,an object recognised as simultaneously existing or non-existing produces mingled pleasure and pain1 as licking honey from a sword's edge1--this is vedanya4 7d7 ,a delusion 7mohanya7 in intuition produces want of faith in the ,jaina categories1 like association with the wicked2 delusion in conduct produces want of self-restraint1 like intoxication4 7e7 yus produces the bond of body1 like a snare4#gi 7f7 ,nman1 or the name1 produces various individual appellations1 as a painter paints his different pictures4 7g7 ,gotra produces the idea of noble and ignoble1 as the potter fashions his pots4 7h7 ,antarya produces obstacles to liberality1 c41 as the treasurer hinders the king by considerations of economy4 ,thus is the prakriti-bandha eightfold1 being denominated as the eight mla-prakritis1 with subdivisions according to the different actions of the various subject-matter4 ,and thus has ,umswti-vchakchrya#hj declared3 ,the first kind of bandha consists of obstructions of the knowledge and the intuition1 vedanya1 mohanya1 yus1 nman1 gotra1 and antarya2 and he has also reckoned up the respective subdivisions of each as five1 nine1 twenty-eight1 four1 two1 forty1 two1 and fifteen4 ,all this has been explained at full length in the ,vidynanda and other works1 and here is omitted through fear of prolixity4 #b4 ,sthiti4 ,as the milk of the goat1 cow1 buffalo1 c41 have continued unswerving from their sweet nature for so long a period1 so the first three mla-prakritis1 jnnvarana1 c41 and the last1 antarya1 have not swerved from their respective natures even through the period described in the words1 sthiti lasts beyonds crores of crores of periods of time measured by thirty sgaropamas4#ha ,this continuance is sthiti4 #c4 ,anubhva4 ,as in the milk of goats1 cows1 buffaloes1 c41 there exists1 by its rich or poor nature1 a special capacity for producing#hb its several effects1 so in the different material bodies produced by our actions there exists a special capacity 7anubhva7 for producing their respective effects4 #d4 ,pradesa4 ,the bandha called pradesa is the entrance into the different parts of the soul by the masses1 made up of an endless number of parts1 of the various bodies which are developed by the consequences of actions4 ,samvara is the stopping of srava--that by which the influence of past actions 7karman7 is stopped from entering into the soul4 ,it is divided into gupti1 samiti1 c4 ,gupti is the withdrawal of the soul from that impulse 7yoga7 which causes mundane existence1--it is threefold1 as relating to body1 speech1 or mind4 ,samiti is the acting so as to avoid injury to all living beings4 ,this is divided into five kinds1 as ry1#hc bhsh1 c41 as has been explained by ,hemachandra4 #a4 ,in a public highway1 kissed by the sun's rays1 to walk circumspectly so as to avoid injuring living beings1 this the good call ry4 #b4 ,let him practise#hd a measured utterance in his intercourse with all people2 this is called bhsh-samiti1 dear to the restrainers of speech4 #c4 ,the food which the sage takes1 ever free from the forty-two faults which may accrue to alms1 is called the eshan-samiti4#he #d4 ,carefully looking at it and carefully seating himself upon it1 let him take a seat1 c41 set it down1 and meditate1--this is called the dna-samiti4 #e4 ,that the good man should carefully perform his bodily evacuations in a spot free from all living creatures1#hf--this is the utsarga-samiti4#hg ,hence samvara has been etymologically analysed as that which closes 7sam vrinoti7 the door of the stream of srava1#hh as has been said by the learned1 'srava is the cause of mundane existence1 samvara is the cause of liberation2#hi this is the rhat doctrine in a handful2 all else is only the amplification of this4' ,nirjar is the causing the fruit of past actions to decay by self-mortification1 c42 it destroys by the body the merit and demerit of all the previously performed actions1 and the resulting happiness and misery2 self-mortification means the plucking out of the hair1 c4 ,this nirjar is twofold1#ij temporary 7yathkla7 and ancillary 7aupakramanika74 ,it is temporary as when a desire is dormant in consequence of the action having produced its fruit1 and at that particular time1 from this completion of the object aimed at1 nirjar arises1 being caused by the consumption of the desire1 c4 ,but when1 by the force of asceticism1 the sage turns all actions into means for attaining his end 7liberation71 this is the nirjar of actions4 ,thus it has been said3 ,from the decaying of the actions which are the seeds of mundane existence1 nirjar arises1 which is twofold1 sakm and akm4 ,that called sakm belongs to ascetics1 the akm to other embodied spirits4#ia ,moksha4 ,since at the moment of its attainment there is an entire absence of all future actions1 as all the causes of bondage 7false perception1 c47 are stopped1#ib and since all past actions are abolished in the presence of the causes of nirjar1 there arises the absolute release from all actions1--this is moksha2 as it has been said3 ,moksha is the absolute release from all actions by the decay 7nirjar7 of the causes of bondage and of existence4 ,then the soul rises upward to the end of the world4 ,as a potter's wheel1 whirled by the stick and hands1 moves on even after these have stopped1 until the impulse is exhausted1 so the previous repeated contemplations of the embodied soul for the attainment of moksha exert their influence even after they have ceased1 and bear the soul onward to the end of the world2 or1 as the gourd1 encased with clay1 sinks in the water1 but rises to the surface when freed from its encumbrance1 so the soul1 delivered from works1 rises upward by its isolation1#ic from the bursting of its bonds like the elastic seed of the castor-oil plant1 or by its own native tendency like the flame4 ,bondage is the condition of being unseparated1 with a mutual interpenetration of parts between the soul and the body2 sanga is merely mutual contact4 ,this has been declared as follows3-- ,liberation is unhindered1 from the continuance of former impulses1 from the absence of sanga1 from the cutting of all bonds1 and from the natural development of the soul's own powers of motion1 like the potter's wheel1 the gourd with its clay removed1 the seed of the castor-oil plant1 or the flame of fire4 ,hence they recite a sloka3-- ,however often they go away1 the planets return1 the sun1 moon1 and the rest2 ,but never to this day have returned any who have gone to lokksa4 ,others hold moksha to be the abiding in the highest regions1 the soul being absorbed in bliss1 with its knowledge unhindered and itself untainted by any pain or impression thereof4 ,others hold nine tattwas1 adding merit and demerit to the foregoing seven1--these two being the causes of pleasure and pain4 ,this has been declared in the ,siddhnta1 ,jva1 ajva1 punya1 ppa1 srava1 samvara1 nirjarana1 bandha1 and moksha1 are the nine tattwas4 ,as our object is only a summary1 we desist here4 ,here the ,jainas everywhere introduce their favourite logic called the sapta-bhang-naya1#id or the system of the seven paralogisms1 may be1 it is1 may be1 it is not1 may be1 it is and it is not1 may be1 it is not predicable1 may be1 it is1 and yet not predicable1 may be1 it is not1 and not predicable1 may be1 it is and it is not1 and not predicable4 ,all this ,anantavrya has thus laid down3-- #a4 ,when you wish to establish a thing1 the proper course is to say 'may be1 it is2' when you wish to deny it1 'may be1 it is not4' #b4 ,when you desire to establish each in turn1 let your procedure likewise embrace both2 when you wish to establish both at once1 let it be declared 'indescribable' from the impossibility to describe it4 #c4 ,the fifth process is enjoined when you wish to establish the first as well as its indescribableness2 when the second as well as its indescribableness1 the occasion for the sixth process arises4 #d4 ,the seventh is required when all three characters are to be employed simultaneously4 ,syt1 may be1 is here an indeclinable particle in the form of a part of a verb1 used to convey the idea of indeterminateness2 as it has been said-- ,this particle syt is in the form of a verb1 but1 from its being connected with the sense1 it denotes indeterminateness in sentences1 and has a qualifying effect on the implied meaning4 ,if1 again1 the word syt denoted determinateness1 then it would be needless in the phrase1 may be1 it is2 but since it really denotes indeterminateness1 may be1 it is1 means it is somehow2 syt1 may be1 conveys the meaning of somehow1 kathamchit2 and so it is not really useless4 ,as one has said-- ,the doctrine of the syd-vda arises from our everywhere rejecting the idea of the absolute2#ie it depends on the sapta-bhang-naya1 and it lays down the distinction between what is to be avoided and to be accepted4 ,if a thing absolutely exists1 it exists altogether1 always1 everywhere1 and with everybody1 and no one at any time or place would ever make an effort to obtain or avoid it1 as it would be absurd to treat what is already present as an object to be obtained or avoided4 ,but if it be relative 7or indefinite71 the wise will concede that at certain times and in certain places any one may seek or avoid it4 ,moreover1 suppose that the question to be asked is this3 ,is being or non-being the real nature of the thing8 ,the real nature of the thing cannot be being1 for then you could not properly use the phrase1 ,it is a pot 7ghatsti71 as the two words is and pot would be tautological2 nor ought you to say1 ,it is not a pot1 as the words thus used would imply a direct contradiction2 and the same argument is to be used in other questions4#if ,as it has been declared-- ,it must not be said ',it is a pot1' since the word 'pot' implies 'is2' ,nor may you say 'it is not a pot1' for existence and non-existence are mutually exclusive1 c4 ,the whole is thus to be summed up4 ,four classes of our opponents severally hold the doctrine of existence1 non-existence1 existence and non-existence successively1 and the doctrine that everything is inexplicable 7anirvachanyat72#ig three other classes hold one or other of the three first theories combined with the fourth4#ih ,now1 when they meet us with the scornful questions1 ,does the thing exist8 c41 we have an answer always possible1 ,it exists in a certain way1 c41 and our opponents are all abashed to silence1 and victory accrues to the holder of the ,syd-vda1 which ascertains the entire meaning of all things4 ,thus said the teacher in the ,sydvda-majar-- ,a thing of an entirely indeterminate nature is the object only of the omniscient2 a thing partly determined is held to be the true object of scientific investigation4#ii ,when our reasonings based on one point proceed in the revealed way1 it is called the revealed ,syd-vda1 which ascertains the entire meaning of all things4 ,all other systems are full of jealousy from their mutual propositions and counter-propositions2 it is only the doctrine of the ,arhat which with no partiality equally favours all sects4 ,the ,jaina doctrine has thus been summed up by ,jinadatta-sri-- ,the hindrances belonging to vigour1 enjoyment1 sensual pleasure1 giving and receiving1--sleep1 fear1 ignorance1 aversion1 laughter1 liking1 disliking1 love1 hatred1 want of indifference1 desire1 sorrow1 deceit1 these are the eighteen 'faults' 7dosha7 according to our system4#ajj ,the divine ,jina is our ,guru1 who declares the true knowledge of the tattwas4 ,the path#aja of emancipation consists of knowledge1 intuition1 and conduct4 ,there are two means of proof 7pramna7 in the ,syd-vda doctrine1--sense-perception and inference4 ,all consists of the eternal and the non-eternal2 there are nine or seven tattwas4 ,the jva1 the ajva1 merit and demerit1 srava1 samvara1 bandha1 nirjar1 mukti1--we will now explain each4 ,jva is defined as intelligence2 ajva is all other than it2 merit means bodies which arise from good actions1 demerit the opposite2 srava is the bondage of actions1#ajb nirjar is the unloosing thereof2 moksha arises from the destruction of the eight forms of karman or action4 ,but by some teachers merit is included in samvara1#ajc and demerit in srava4 ,of the soul which has attained the four infinite things#ajd and is hidden from the world1 and whose eight actions are abolished1 absolute liberation is declared by ,jina4 ,the ,swetmbaras are the destroyers of all defilement1 they live by alms1#aje they pluck out their hair1 they practise patience1 they avoid all association1 and are called the ,jaina ,sdhus4 ,the ,digambaras pluck out their hair1 they carry peacocks' tails in their hands1 they drink from their hands1 and they eat upright in the giver's house1--these are the second class of the ,jaina ,rishis4 ,a woman attains not the highest knowledge1 she enters not ,mukti1--so say the ,digambaras2 but there is a great division on this point between them and the ,swetmbaras4#ajf ,e4 ,b4 ,c4 ,,footnotes3 ,footnote #dj3 ,vivasanas1 without garments4 ,footnote #da3 ,the ,buddhists are also called ,muktakachchhas1 alluding to a peculiarity of dress1 apparently a habit of wearing the hem of the lower garment untucked4--,colebrooke4 ,footnote #db3 ,in p4 #bf1 line #c1 read ,syd-vdinm4 ,footnote #dc3 ,i propose to read in p4 #bf1 line #e1 infra1 grhyasya for agrhyasya4 ,footnote #dd3 ,as these terms necessarily relate to the perceiver4 ,footnote #de3 ,i correct the reading tasygrahanam to tasy grahanam 7tasy being jadatyh74 ,footnote #df3 ,i4e41 if you say that the avayava may be not seen though the avayavin is seen1 then ,i may say that the post is the avayavin1 and the unperceived three worlds its avayava6 ,footnote #dg3 ,i read arhatsvarpam arhachchandra in p4 #bg1 line #c1 infra4 ,footnote #dh3 ,the following passage occurs in some part of ,kumrila's writings in an argument against the ,jainas4 ,it is curious that in the ,snkara-digvijaya1 chap4 lv41 it is mentioned that ,kumrila had a little relenting towards the ,jainas at the end of his life4 ,he repented of having so cruelly persecuted them1 and acknowledged that there was some truth in their teaching4 ,jainagurumukht kaschid vidyleso jtah4 ,footnote #di3 ,kumrila tries to prove that no such being can exist1 as his existence is not established by any one of the five recognised proofs1--the sixth1 abhva1 being negative1 is1 of course1 not applicable4 ,i understand the last sloka as showing the inapplicability of presumption or arth-patti4 ,a ,jaina would say1 ,if the ,arhat were not omniscient1 his words would not be true and authoritative1 but we see that they are1 therefore he is omniscient4 ,he answers by retorting that the same argument might be used of ,buddha by a ,buddhist2 and as the ,jaina himself would disallow it in that case1 it cannot be convincing in his own4 ,footnote #ej3 ,in p4 #bi1 line #b1 read tatsadbhvvedakasya for tatsadbhvdekasya4 ,footnote #ea3 ,in p4 #bi1 line #i1 for nikhilrthajant notpatty1 ,i propose to read nikhilrthajnotpatty4 ,footnote #eb3 ,janya is included in ,krya and equally disputed4 ,footnote #ec3 ,thus ,i am possessed of a body 7aham ,sarr71 my hand1 c41 are all sentences in which a predicate involving the notion of parts is applied to the soul ,i4 ,footnote #ed3 ,reasoning in a circle4 ,i suppose the c4 includes the ,anavasthdosha or reasoning ad infinitum4 ,he accepts the supposed fault1 and holds that it is actually borne out in a case before everybody's eyes4 ,footnote #ee3 ,in p4 #ca1 line #e1 infra1 read tattvrthe for tattvrtham4 ,footnote #ef3 ,i read in p4 #cb1 line #i1 ,samyagdarsandi for asamyagdarsandi2 but the old text may mean caused by the abolition of hindrances produced by the qualities1 wrong intuition1 c4 ,footnote #eg3 ,cf4 the five yamas in the ,yoga-stras1 ii4 #cj4 ,hemachandra 7,abhidh #ha7 calls them yamas4 ,footnote #eh3 ,i read kmnm for kmnm in p4 #cc1 line #g 7#b #c #c #ah74 ,footnote #ei3 ,for abhshana1 see ,hemach4 #af4 ,footnote #fj3 ,i propose in p4 #cc1 line #ag1 rasayanajnasraddhvachranni for rasyanajanam sraddhnvaranni4 ,for avachrana1 see ,susruta1 vol4 ii4 p4 #aeg1 c4 ,if anvarana be the true reading1 ,i suppose it must mean the absence of obstructions4 ,footnote #fa3 ,this is a hard passage1 but some light is thrown on it by the scholiast to ,hemachandra1 ,abhidh4 #gi4 ,footnote #fb3 ,or this may mean by the influence of upasamakshaya or kshayopasama1 it appears characterised by one or the other4 ,footnote #fc3 ,i read in p4 #cd1 line #g1 kalushdykrena for kalushnykrena4 ,the upasamakshaya and kshayopasama seem to correspond to the aupasamika and kshyika states about to be described4 ,footnote #fd3 ,strychnos potatorum4 ,footnote #fe3 ,just as in the ,snkhya philosophy1 the soul is not really bound though it seems to itself to be so4 ,footnote #ff3 ,a valid non-perception is when an object is not seen1 and yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present1 such as the eye1 light1 c4 ,footnote #fg3 ,i read in p4 #ce1 line #e1 'stti for sthiti4 ,footnote #fh3 ,hence the term here used for category--astikya4 ,footnote #fi3 ,these 7by ,hemach4 ,abhidh4 #ba71 possess only one sense--touch4 ,in p4 #ce1 line #aj1 ,i read sankhagandolakaprabhritayas trass chaturvidhh prithivyaptejo4 ,footnote #gj3 ,in p4 #ce1 line #af1 ,i read teshm ajvatvt for teshm jvatvt4 ,if we keep the old reading we must translate it1 because the former only are animate4 ,footnote #ga3 ,in p4 #ce1 line #c from bottom1 ,i read sarvatrvasthite for sarvatrvasthiti4 ,in the preceding line ,i read lokenvachchhinne for lokenvichchhinne4 ,footnote #gb3 ,cf4 ,siddhnta-muktvali1 p4 #bg4 ,the vishaya is upabhoga-sdhanam1 but it begins with the dvyanuka4 ,this category takes up the forms of sthvara which were excluded from jva4 ,footnote #gc3 ,it is an interesting illustration how thoroughly ,mdhava for the time throws himself into the ,jaina system which he is analysing1 when we see that he gives the ,jaina terminology for this definition of dravya1--cf4 ,vaisesh4 ,stra1 i4 #a1 #ae4 ,paryya is explained as karman in ,hemach4 ,anek4 ,paryya1 in p4 #cf1 line #aa 7infra1 p4 #ec1 line #i71 seems used in a different sense from that which it bears elsewhere4 ,i have taken it doubtingly as in ,hemach4 ,abhidh4 #aejc1 paryyo 'nukramah kramah4 ,footnote #gd3 ,yoga seems to be here the natural impulse of the soul to act4 ,footnote #ge3 ,in line #ah1 read sravanakranatvd4 ,footnote #gf3 ,the jnna is one1 but it becomes apparently manifold by its connection with the senses and external objects4 ,footnote #gg3 ,these are also called the eight karmans in ,govindnanda's gloss1 ,ved4 ,st41 ii4 #b1 #cc4 ,footnote #gh3 ,the ,calcutta ,,ms4 reads daranyasya for varanyasya1 in p4 #cg1 last line4 ,but varanya may be used for varana 7,pn4 iii4 #d1 #fh74 ,cf4 ,yoga ,st41 ii4 #eb1 where ,vysa's ,comm4 has varanya4 ,footnote #gi3 ,jlavat8 ,the printed text has jalavat4 ,footnote #hj3 ,umsvmi-8 ,footnote #ha3 ,for the sgaropama1 see ,wilson's ,essays1 vol4 i4 p4 #cji4 ,in p4 #ch1 line #af1 ,i read itydyuktakld rdhvam api for the obscure itydyuktam kladurddhnavat4 ,i also read at the end of the line prachyutih sthitih for prachyutisthitih4 ,footnote #hb3 ,in p4 #ch1 line #ah1 read svakryakarane4 ,footnote #hc3 ,in p4 #ci1 line #b and line #e1 for rshy read ry1--a bad misreading4 ,footnote #hd3 ,in p4 #ci1 line #f1 ,i read padyet for padyat4 ,footnote #he3 ,in p4 #ci1 line #i1 for seshan read saishan4 ,footnote #hf3 ,in p4 #ci1 line #ab1 join nirjantu and jagattale4 ,footnote #hg3 ,mdhava omits the remaining divisions of samvara4 ,wilson1 ,essays1 vol4 i4 p4 #caa1 gives them as parishah1 endurance1 as of a vow2 yatidharma1 the ten duties of an ascetic1 patience1 gentleness1 c42 bhvan1 conviction1 such as that worldly existences are not eternal1 c42 chritra1 virtuous observance4 ,footnote #hh3 ,in p4 #ci1 line #ad1 read sravasrotaso4 ,footnote #hi3 ,for moha1 in line #af1 read moksha4 ,footnote #ij3 ,in p4 #ci1 line #b infra1 ,i read yathkla- for yath kla-4 ,footnote #ia3 ,this passage is very difficult and not improbably corrupt1 and my interpretation of it is only conjectural4 ,the ordinary nirjar is when an action attains its end 7like the lulling of a passion by the gratification71 this lull is temporary4 ,that nirjar is ancillary which is rendered by asceticism a means to the attainment of the highest good4 ,the former is akm1 desireless1 because at the moment the desire is satisfied and so dormant2 the latter is sakm1 because the ascetic conquers the lower desire under the overpowering influence of the higher desire for liberation4 ,footnote #ib3 ,i read nirodhe for nirodhah in p4 #dj1 line #f2 cf4 p4 #cg1 line #ac4 ,the causes of bondage produce the assumption of bodies in which future actions are to be performed4 ,footnote #ic3 ,literally absence of sanga4 ,footnote #id3 ,in p4 #da1 line #g1 read sapta-bhang-naya1 see ,ved4 ,s4 ,gloss41 ii4 #b1 #bc4 ,footnote #ie3 ,i cannot understand the words at the end of the first line1 kim vritatadvidheh1 and therefore leave them untranslated4 ,footnote #if3 ,thus ,govindnanda applies it 7,ved4 ,st41 ii4 #b1 #cc7 to may be it is one1 may be it is many1 c4 ,footnote #ig3 ',greek3 ,akatalpsia,akatalpsia4 ,this is ,sriharsha's tenet in the ,khandana-khanda-khdya4 ,footnote #ih3 ,in p4 #db1 line #ag1 for matenmisritni read matena misritni4 ,footnote #ii3 ,in p4 #dc1 line #b1 for na yasya read nayasya4 ,footnote #ajj3 ,this list is badly printed in the ,calcutta edition4 ,it is really identical with that given in ,hemachandra's ,abhidhna-chintmani1 #gb1 #gc2 but we must correct the readings to antarys1 rgadweshv aviratih smarah1 and hso for hims4 ,the order of the eighteen doshas in the ,calcutta edition is given by ,hemachandra as #d1 #e1 #a1 #b1 #c1 #aj1 #aa1 #ab1 #g1 #i1 #ag1 #af1 #ah1 #h1 #f1 #ae1 #ac1 #ad4 ,footnote #aja3 ,in p4 #dc1 line #ac1 for vartini read vartinih4 ,footnote #ajb3 ,this seems corrupt1--a line is probably lost4 ,footnote #ajc3 ,in last line1 for samsrave read samvare4 ,footnote #ajd3 ,does this mean the knowledge of the world1 the soul1 the liberated and liberation8 ,these are called ananta4 ,see ,weber's ,bhagavat1 pp4 #bej1 #bfa-bff4 ,footnote #aje3 ,sarajoharanh is explained by the rajoharanadhrin 7 vratin7 of ,halyudha1 ii4 #ahi4 ,footnote #ajf3 ,cf4 ,wilson1 ,essays1 i4 #cdj4 ,for strm read str4 ,,chapter ,,iv4 ,,the ,r,m,,nuja ,,system4 ,this doctrine of the rhatas deserves a rational condemnation1 for whereas there is only one thing really existent1 the simultaneous co-existence of existence1 non-existence and other modes in a plurality of really existing things is an impossibility4 ,nor should any one say3 ,granting the impossibility of the co-existence of existence and non-existence1 which are reciprocally contradictory1 why should there not be an alternation between existence and non-existence8 there being the rule that it is action1 not ,ens1 that alternates4 ,nor let it be supposed that the whole universe is multiform1 in reliance upon the examples of the elephant-headed ,ganesa and of the incarnation of ,vishnu as half man1 half lion2 for the elephantine and the leonine nature existing in one part1 and the human in another1 and consequently there being no contradiction1 those parts being different1 these examples are inapplicable to the maintenance of a nature multiform as both existent and non-existent in one and the same part 7or place74 ,again1 if any one urge3 ,let there be existence in one form1 and non-existence in another1 and thus both will be compatible2 we rejoin3 ,not so1 for if you had said that at different times existence and non-existence may be the nature of anything1 then indeed there would have been no vice in your procedure4 ,nor is it to be contended3 ,let the multiformity of the universe be like the length and shortness which pertain to the same thing 7in different relations72 for in these 7in this length and shortness7 there is no contrariety1 inasmuch as they are contrasted with different objects4 ,therefore1 for want of evidence1 existence and non-existence as reciprocally contradictory cannot reside at the same time in the same thing4 ,in a like manner may be understood the refutation of the other bhangas 7rhata tenets74 ,again1 we ask1 is this doctrine of the seven bhangas1 which lies at the base of all this1 itself uniform 7as excluding one contradictory71 or multiform 7as conciliating contradictories74 ,if it is uniform1 there will emerge a contradiction to your thesis that all things are multiform2 if it is multiform1 you have not proved what you wished to prove1 a multiform statement 7as both existent and non-existent7 proving nothing4#ajg ,in either case1 there is rope for a noose for the neck of the ,syd-,vdin4 ,an admirable author of institutes has the founder of the rhata system1 dear to the gods 7uninquiring pietist71 proved himself to be1 when he has not ascertained whether his result is the settling of nine or of seven principles1 nor the investigator who settles them1 nor his organon1 the modes of evidence1 nor the matter to be evidenced1 whether it be ninefold or not6 ,in like manner if it be admitted that the soul has 7as the rhatas say71 an extension equal to that of the body1 it will follow that in the case of the souls of ascetics1 who by the efficacy of asceticism assume a plurality of bodies1 there is a differentiation of the soul for each of those bodies4 ,a soul of the size of a human body would not 7in the course of its transmigrations7 be able to occupy the whole body of an elephant2 and again1 when it laid aside its elephantine body to enter into that of an ant1 it would lose its capacity of filling its former frame4 ,and it cannot be supposed that the soul resides successively in the human1 elephantine1 and other bodies1 like the light of a lamp which is capable of contraction and expansion1 according as it occupies the interior of a little station on the road-side in which travellers are supplied with water1 or the interior of a stately mansion2 for it would follow 7from such a supposition7 that the soul being susceptible of modifications and consequently non-eternal1 there would be a loss of merits and a fruition of good and evil unmerited4 ,as if then we had thrown their best wrestler1 the redargution of the rest of their categories may be anticipated from this exposition of the manner in which their treatment of the soul has been vitiated4 ,their doctrine1 therefore1 as repugnant to the eternal1 infallible revelation1 cannot be adopted4 ,the venerated ,vysa accordingly propounded the aphorism 7ii4 #b1 #cc71 ,nay1 because it is impossible in one2 and this same aphorism has been analysed by ,rmnuja with the express purpose of shutting out the doctrine of the ,jainas4 ,the tenets of ,rmnuja are as follows3--,three categories are established1 as soul1 not-soul1 and ,lord2 or as subject1 object1 and supreme disposer4 ,thus it has been said-- ,lord1 soul1 and not-soul are the triad of principles3 ,hari 7,vishnu7 ,is ,lord2 individual spirits are souls2 and the visible world is not-soul4 ,others1 again 7the followers of ,sankarchrya71 maintain that pure intelligence1 exempt from all differences1 the absolute1 alone is really existent2 and that this absolute whose essence is eternal1 pure1 intelligent1 and free1 the identity of which with the individuated spirit is learnt from the reference to the same object 7predication71 ,that art thou1 undergoes bondage and emancipation4 ,the universe of differences 7or conditions7 such as that of subject and object1 is all illusorily imagined by illusion as in that 7one reality71 as is attested by a number of texts3 ,existent only1 fair sir1 was this in the beginning1 ,one only without a second1 and so forth4 ,maintaining this1 and acknowledging a suppression of this beginningless illusion by knowledge of the unity 7and identity7 of individuated spirits and the undifferenced absolute1 in conformity with hundreds of texts from the ,upanishads1 such as ,he that knows spirit passes beyond sorrow2 rejecting also any real plurality of things1 in conformity with the text condemnatory of duality1 viz41 ,death after death he undergoes who looks upon this as manifold2 and thinking themselves very wise1 the ,snkaras will not tolerate this division 7viz41 the distribution of things into soul1 not-soul1 and ,lord74 ,to all this the following counterposition is laid down3--,this might be all well enough if there were any proof of such illusion4 ,but there is no such ignorance 7or illusion71 an unbeginning entity1 suppressible by knowledge1 testified in the perceptions1 ,i am ignorant1 ,i know not myself and other things4 ,thus it has been said 7to explain the views of the ,snkara7-- ,entitative from everlasting1 which is dissolved by knowledge1 ,such is illusion4 ,this definition the wise enunciate4 ,this perception 7they would further contend7 is not conversant about the absence of knowledge4 ,for who can maintain this1 and to whom8 ,one who leans on the arm of ,prabhkara1 or one to whom ,kumrila-bhatta gives his hand8 ,not the former1 for in the words-- ,by means of its own and of another's form1 eternal in the existent and non-existent1 ,thing is recognised something by some at certain times4 ,non-entity is but another entity by some kind of relation4 ,non-entity is but another entity1 naught else1 for naught else is observed4 ,they deny any non-entity ulterior to entity4 ,non-entity being cognisable by the sixth instrument of knowledge 7anupalabdhi71 and knowledge being always an object of inference1 the absence of knowledge cannot be an object of perception4 ,if1 again1 any one who maintains non-entity to be perceptible should employ the above argument 7from the perceptions1 ,i am ignorant1 ,i know not myself1 and other things72 it may be replied3 ,is there1 or is there not1 in the consciousness1 ,i am ignorant1 an apprehension of self as characterised by an absence1 and of knowledge as the thing absent or non-existent8 ,if there is such apprehension1 consciousness of the absence of knowledge will be impossible1 as involving a contradiction4 ,if there is not1 consciousness of the absence of knowledge1 which consciousness presupposes a knowledge of the subject and of the thing absent1 will not readily become possible4 ,inasmuch 7the ,snkaras continue7 as the foregoing difficulties do not occur if ignorance 7or illusion7 be entitative1 this consciousness 7,i am ignorant1 ,i know not myself1 and other things7 must be admitted to be conversant about an entitative ignorance4 ,all this 7the ,rmnuja replies7 is about as profitable as it would be for a ruminant animal to ruminate upon ether2 for an entitative ignorance is not more supposable than an absence of knowledge4 ,for 7we would ask71 is any self-conscious principle presented as an object and as a subject 7of ignorance7 as distinct from cognition8 ,if it is presented1 how1 since ignorance of a thing is terminable by knowledge of its essence1 can the ignorance continue8 ,if none such is presented1 how can we be conscious of an ignorance which has no subject and no object8 ,if you say3 ,a pure manifestation of the spiritual essence is revealed only by the cognition opposed to ignorance 7or illusion71 and thus there is no absurdity in the consciousness of ignorance accompanied with a consciousness of its subject and object2 then we rejoin3--,unfortunately for you1 this 7consciousness of subject7 must arise equally in the absence of knowledge 7for such we define illusion to be71 notwithstanding your assertion to the contrary4 ,it must1 therefore1 be acknowledged that the cognition1 ,i am ignorant1 ,i know not myself and other things1 is conversant about an absence of cognition allowed by us both4 ,well1 then 7the ,snkaras may contend71 let the form of cognition evidentiary of illusion1 which is under disputation1 be inference1 as follows3--,right knowledge must have had for its antecedent another entity 7sc4 illusion71 an entity different from mere prior non-existence of knowledge1 which envelops the objects of knowledge1 which is terminable by knowledge1 which occupies the place of knowledge1 inasmuch as it 7the right knowledge7 illuminates an object not before illuminated1 like the light of a lamp springing up for the first time in the darkness4 ,this argument 7we reply7 will not stand grinding 7in the dialectic mill72 for to prove the 7antecedent7 illusion1 you will require an ulterior illusion which you do not admit1 and a violation of your own tenets will ensue1 while if you do not so prove it1 it may or may not exist2 and1 moreover1 the example is incompatible with the argument1 for it cannot be the lamp that illumines the hitherto unillumined object1 since it is knowledge only that illumines2 and an illumination of objects may be effected by knowledge even without the lamp1 while the light of the lamp is only ancillary to the visual organ which effectuates the cognition1 ancillary mediately through the dispulsion of the obstruent darkness4 ,we dismiss further prolixity4 ,the counterposition 7of the ,rmnujas7 is as follows3--,the illusion under dispute does not reside in ,brahman1 who is pure knowledge1 because it is an illusion1 like the illusion about nacre1 c4 ,if any one ask3 ,has not the self-conscious entity that underlies the illusion about nacre1 c41 knowledge only for its nature8 they reply3 ,do not start such difficulties2 for we suppose that consciousness by its bare existence has the nature of creating conformity to the usage about 7i4e41 the name and notion of7 some object2 and such consciousness1 also called knowledge1 apprehension1 comprehension1 intelligence1 c41 constitutes the soul1 or knowledge1 of that which acts and knows4 ,if any one ask3 ,how can the soul1 if it consists of cognition1 have cognition as a quality8 they reply3 ,this question is futile2 for as a gem1 the sun1 and other luminous things1 existing in the form of light1 are substances in which light as a quality inheres--for light1 as existing elsewhere than in its usual receptacle1 and as being a mode of things though a substance1 is still styled and accounted a quality derived from determination by that substance1--so this soul1 while it exists as a self-luminous intelligence1 has also intelligence as its quality4 ,accordingly the ,vedic texts3 ,a lump of salt is always within and without one entire mass of taste1 so also this soul is within and without an entire mass of knowledge2 ,herein this person is itself a light2 ,of the knowledge of that which knows there is no suspension2 ,he who knows1 smells this2 and so also1 ,this is the soul which1 consisting of knowledge1 is the light within the heart2 ,for this person is the seer1 the hearer1 the taster1 the smeller1 the thinker1 the understander1 the doer2 ,the person is knowledge1 and the like texts4 ,it is not to be supposed that the ,veda also affords evidence of the existence of the cosmical illusion1 in the text1 ,enveloped in untruth 7anrita72 for the word untruth 7anrita7 denotes that which is other than truth 7rita74 ,the word rita has a passive sense1 as appears from the words1 ,drinking rita4 ,rita means works done without desire of fruit2 having as its reward the attainment of the bliss of the ,supreme ,spirit through his propitiation4 ,in the text in question1 untruth 7anrita7 designates the scanty fruit enjoyed during transmigratory existence as opposed to that 7which results from propitiation of the ,supreme ,spirit71 which temporal fruit is obstructive to the attainment of supreme existence 7brahman72 the entire text 7when the context is supplied7 being3 ,they who find not this supreme sphere 7brahma-loka7 are enveloped in untruth4 ,in such texts1 again1 as ,let him know illusion 7my7 to be the primary emanative cause 7prakriti71 the term 7my7 designates the emanative cause1 consisting of the three cords 7guna71 and creative of the diversified universe4 ,it does not designate the inexplicable illusion 7for which the ,snkaras contend74 ,in such passages as1 ,by him the defender of the body of the child1 moving rapidly1 the thousand illusions 7my7 of the barbarian were swooped upon as by a hawk1 we observe that the word illusion 7my7 designates the really existent weapon of a ,titan1 capable of projective diversified creation4 ,the ,veda1 then1 never sets out an inexplicable illusion4 ,nor 7is the cosmical illusion to be inferred from the grand text1 ,that art thou71 inasmuch as the words1 ,that art thou1 being incompetent to teach unity1 and indicating a conditionate ,supreme ,spirit1 we cannot understand by them the essential unity of the mutually exclusive supreme and individual spirits2 for such a supposition 7as that they are identical7 would violate the law of excluded middle4 ,to explain this4 ,the term ,that denotes the ,supreme ,spirit exempt from all imperfections1 of illimitable excellence1 a repository of innumerable auspicious attributes1 to whom the emanation1 sustentation1 retractation of the universe is a pastime2#ajh such being the ,supreme ,spirit1 spoken of in such texts as1 ,that desired1 let me be many1 let me bring forth4 ,perhaps the word ,thou1 referring to the same object 7as the word ,that71 denotes the ,supreme ,spirit characterised by consciousness1 having all individual spirits as his body2 for a reference to the same object designates one thing determined by two modes4 ,here1 perhaps1 an ,advaita-vdin may reply3 ,why may not the purport of the reference to the same object in the words1 ,that art thou1 be undifferenced essence1 the unity of souls1 these words 7,that and thou7 having a 7reciprocally7 implicate power by abandonment of opposite portions of their meaning2 as is the case in the phrase1 ,this is that ,devadatta4 ,in the words1 ,this is that ,devadatta1 we understand by the word ,that1 a person in relation to a different time and place1 and by the word ,this1 a person in relation to the present time and place4 ,that both are one and the same is understood by the form of predication 7reference to the same object74 ,now as one and the same thing cannot at the same time be known as in different times and places1 the two words 7,this and ,that7 must refer to the essence 7and not to the accidents of time and place71 and unity of essence can be understood4 ,similarly in the text1 ,that art thou1 there is implicated an indivisible essence by abandonment of the contradictory portions 7of the denotation71 viz41 finite cognition 7which belongs to the individual soul or ,thou71 and infinite cognition 7which belongs to the real or unindividual soul74 ,this suggestion 7the ,rmnujas reply7 is unsatisfactory1 for there is no opposition 7between ,this and ,that7 in the example 7,this is that ,devadatta71 and consequently not the smallest particle of implication 7lakshan1 both ,this and ,that being used in their denotative capacity74 ,the connection of one object with two times past and present involves no contradiction4 ,and any contradiction supposed to arise from relation to different places may be avoided by a supposed difference of time1 the existence in the distant place being past1 and the existence in the near being present4 ,even if we concede to you the implication1 the 7supposed7 contradiction being avoidable by supposing one term 7either ,that or ,thou7 to be implicative1 it is unnecessary to admit that both words are implicative4 ,otherwise 7if we admit that both words are implicative71 if it be granted that the one thing may be recognised1 with the concomitant assurance that it differs as this and as that1 permanence in things will be inadmissible1 and the ,buddhist assertor of a momentary flux of things will be triumphant4 ,we have1 therefore 7the ,rmnujas continue71 laid it down in this question that there is no contradiction in the identity of the individual and the ,supreme ,spirit1 the individual spirits being the body and the ,supreme ,spirit the soul4 ,for the individual spirit as the body1 and therefore a form1 of the ,supreme ,spirit1 is identical with the ,supreme ,spirit1 according to another text1 ,who abiding in the soul1 is the controller of the soul1 who knows the soul1 of whom soul is the body4 ,your statement of the matter1 therefore1 is too narrow4 ,,all words are designatory of the ,supreme ,spirit4 ,they are not all synonymous1 a variety of media being possible2 thus as all organised bodies1 divine1 human1 c41 are forms of individual spirits1 so all things 7are the body of ,supreme ,spirit71 all things are identical with ,supreme ,spirit4 ,hence-- ,god1 ,man1 ,yaksha1 ,pischa1 serpent1 ,rkshasa1 bird1 tree1 creeper1 wood1 stone1 grass1 jar1 cloth1--these and all other words1 be they what they may1 which are current among mankind as denotative by means of their base and its suffixes1 as denoting those things1 in denoting things of this or that apparent constitution1 really denote the individual souls which assumed to them such body1 and the whole complexus of things terminating in the ,supreme ,spirit ruling within4 ,that ,god and all other words whatsoever ultimately denote the ,supreme ,spirit is stated in the ,tattva-muktval and in the ,chaturantara-- ,god1 and all other words1 designate the soul1 none else than ,that1 called the established entity1 ,of this there is much significant and undoubted exemplification in common speech and in the ,veda2 ,existence when dissociated from spirit is unknown2 in the form of gods1 mortals1 and the rest ,when pervading the individual spirit1 the infinite has made a diversity of names and forms in the world4 ,in these words the author1 setting forth that all words1 ,god1 and the rest1 designate the body1 and showing in the words1 ,no unity in systems1 c41 the characteristic of body1 and showing in the words1 ,by words which are substitutes for the essence of things1 c41 that it is established that nothing is different from the universal ,lord1 lays down in the verses1 ,significant of the essence1 c41 that all words ultimately designate the ,supreme ,spirit4 ,all this may be ascertained from that work4 ,the same matter has been enforced by ,rmnuja in the ,vedrtha-sangraha1 when analysing the ,vedic text about names and forms4 ,moreover1 every form of evidence having some determinate object1 there can be no evidence of an undetermined 7unconditionate7 reality4 ,even in non-discriminative perception it is a determinate 7or conditioned7 thing that is cognised4 ,else in discriminative perception there could not be shown to be a cognition characterised by an already presented form4 ,again1 that text1 ,that art thou1 is not sublative of the universe as rooted in illusion1 like a sentence declaratory that what was illusorily presented1 as a snake is a piece of rope2 nor does knowledge of the unity of the absolute and the soul bring 7this illusory universe7 to an end2 for we have already demonstrated that there is no proof of these positions4 ,nor is there an absurdity 7as the ,snkaras would say71 on the hypothesis enunciatory of the reality of the universe1 in affirming that by a cognition of one there is a cognition of all things3 for it is easily evinced that the mundane egg1 consisting of the primary cause 7prakriti71 intellect1 self-position1 the rudimentary elements1 the gross elements1 the organs 7of sense and of action71 and the fourteen worlds1 and the gods1 animals1 men1 immovable things1 and so forth1 that exist within it1 constituting a complex of all forms1 is all an effect1 and that from the single cognition of absolute spirit as its 7emanative7 cause1 when we recognise that all this is absolute spirit 7there being a tautology between cause and effect71 there arises cognition of all things1 and thus by cognition of one cognition of all4 ,besides1 if all else than absolute spirit were unreal1 then all being non-existent1 it would follow that by one cognition all cognition would be sublated4 ,it is laid down 7by the ,rmnujas7 that retractation into the universe 7pralaya7 is when the universe1 the body whereof consists of souls and the originant 7prakriti71 returns to its imperceptible state1 unsusceptible of division by names and forms1 existing as absolute spirit the emanative cause2 and that creation 7or emanation7 is the gross or perceptible condition of absolute spirit1 the body whereof is soul and not soul divided by diversity of names and forms1 in the condition of the 7emanative7 effect of absolute spirit4 ,in this way the identity of cause and effect laid down in the aphorism 7of ,vysa7 treating of origination1 is easily explicable4 ,the statements that the ,supreme ,spirit is void of attributes1 are intended 7it is shown7 to deny thereof phenomenal qualities which are to be escaped from by those that desire emancipation4 ,the texts which deny plurality are explained as allowed to be employed for the denial of the real existence of things apart from the ,supreme ,spirit1 which is identical with all things1 it being ,supreme ,spirit which subsists under all forms as the soul of all1 all things sentient and unsentient being forms as being the body of absolute ,spirit4#aji ,what is the principle here involved1 pluralism or monism1 or a universe both one and more than one8 ,of these alternatives monism is admitted in saying that ,supreme ,spirit alone subsists in all forms as all is its body2 both unity and plurality are admitted in saying that one only ,supreme ,spirit subsists under a plurality of forms diverse as soul and not-soul2 and plurality is admitted in saying that the essential natures of soul1 not-soul1 and the ,lord1 are different1 and not to be confounded4 ,of these 7soul1 not-soul1 and the ,lord71 individual spirits1 or souls1 consisting of uncontracted and unlimited pure knowledge1 but enveloped in illusion1 that is1 in works from all eternity1 undergo contraction and expansion of knowledge according to the degrees of their merits4 ,soul experiences fruition1 and after reaping pleasures and pains proportionate to merits and demerits1 there ensues knowledge of the ,lord1 or attainment of the sphere of the ,lord4 ,of things which are not-soul1 and which are objects of fruition 7or experience of pleasure and pain71 unconsciousness1 unconduciveness to the end of man1 susceptibility of modification1 and the like1 are the properties4 ,of the ,supreme ,lord the attributes are subsistence1 as the internal controller 7or animator7 of both the subjects and the objects of fruition2 the boundless glory of illimitable knowledge1 dominion1 majesty1 power1 brightness1 and the like1 the countless multitude of auspicious qualities2 the generation at will of all things other than himself1 whether spiritual or non-spiritual2 various and infinite adornment with unsurpassable excellence1 singular1 uniform1 and divine4 ,venkata-ntha has given the following distribution of things3-- ,those who know it have declared the principle to be twofold1 substance and non-substance2 ,substance is dichotomised as unsentient and sentient2 the former being the unevolved 7avyakta71 and time4 ,the latter is the 'near' 7pratyak7 and the 'distant' 7park72 the 'near' being twofold1 as either soul or the ,lord2 ,the 'distant' is eternal glory and intelligence2 the other principle some have called the unsentient primary4 ,of these-- ,substance undergoes a plurality of conditions2 the originant is possessed of goodness and the other cords2 ,time has the form of years1 c42 soul is atomic and cognisant2 the other spirit is the ,lord2 ,eternal bliss has been declared as transcending the three cords 7or modes of phenomenal existence71 and also as characterised by goodness2 ,the cognisable manifestation of the cognisant is intelligence2 thus are the characteristics of substance summarily recounted4 ,of these 7soul1 not-soul1 and the ,lord71 individual spirits1 called souls1 are different from the ,supreme ,spirit and eternal4 ,thus the text3 ,two birds1 companions1 friends1 c4 7,rig-,veda1 i4 #afd1 #bj74 ,accordingly it is stated 7in the aphorisms of ,kanda1 iii4 #b1 #bj71 ,souls are diverse by reason of diversity of conditions4 ,the eternity of souls is often spoken of in revelation-- ,the soul is neither born1 nor dies1 nor having been shall it again cease to be2 ,unborn1 unchanging1 eternal1 this ancient of days is not killed when the body is killed 7,bhagavad-gt1 ii4 #bj74 ,otherwise 7were the soul not eternal7 there would follow a failure of requital and a fruition 7of pleasures and pains7 unmerited4 ,it has accordingly been said 7in the aphorisms of ,gautama1 iii4 #be73 ,because no birth is seen of one who is devoid of desire4 ,that the soul is atomic is well known from revelation-- ,if the hundredth part of a hair be imagined to be divided a hundred times1 ,the soul may be supposed a part of that1 and yet it is capable of infinity4 ,and again-- ,soul is of the size of the extremity of the spoke of a wheel4 ,spirit is to be recognised by the intelligence as atomic4 ,the visible1 unsentient world1 designated by the term not-soul1 is divided into three1 as the object1 the instrument1 or the site of fruition4 ,of this world the efficient and substantial cause is the ,deity1 known under the names ,purushottama 7best of spirits71 ,vsudeva 7a patronymic of ,krishna71 and the like4 ,vsudeva is the supreme absolute spirit1 endowed with auspicious attributes1 ,the substantial cause1 the efficient of the worlds1 the animator of spirits4 ,this same ,vsudeva1 infinitely compassionate1 tender to those devoted to him1 the ,supreme ,spirit1 with the purpose of bestowing various rewards apportioned to the deserts of his votaries in consequence of pastime1 exists under five modes1 distinguished as adoration 7arch71 emanation 7vibhava71 manifestation 7vyha71 the subtile 7skshma71 and the internal controller4 7#a47 ,adoration is images1 and so forth4 7#b47 ,emanation is his incarnation1 as ,rma1 and so forth4 7#c47 ,his manifestation is fourfold1 as ,vsudeva1 ,sankarshana1 ,pradyumna1 and ,aniruddha4 7#d47 ,the subtile is the entire ,supreme ,spirit1 with six attributes1 called ,vsudeva4 ,his attributes are exemption from sin1 and the rest4 ,that he is exempt from sin is attested in the ,vedic text3 ,passionless1 deathless1 without sorrow1 without hunger1 desiring truth1 true in purpose4 7#e47 ,the internal controller1 the actuator of all spirits1 according to the text3 ,who abiding in the soul1 rules the soul within4 ,when by worshipping each former embodiment a mass of sins inimical to the end of the soul 7i4e41 emancipation7 have been destroyed1 the votary becomes entitled to practise the worship of each latter embodiment4 ,it has1 therefore1 been said-- ,vsudeva1 in his tenderness to his votaries1 gives1 as desired by each1 ,according to the merits of his qualified worshippers1 large recompense4 ,for that end1 in pastime he makes to himself his five embodiments2 ,images and the like are 'adoration2' his incarnations are 'emanations2' ,as ,sankarshana1 ,vsudeva1 ,pradyumna1 ,aniruddha1 his manifestation is to be known to be fourfold2 'the subtile' is the entire six attributes2 ,that self-same called ,vsudeva is styled the ,supreme ,spirit2 ,the internal controller is declared as residing in the soul1 the actuator of the soul1 ,described in a multitude of texts of the ,upanishads1 such as ',who abiding in the soul4' ,by the worship of 'adoration1' a man casting off his defilement becomes a qualified votary2 ,by the subsequent worship of 'emanation1' he becomes qualified for the worship of 'manifestation2' next1 ,by the worship thereafter of 'the subtile1' he becomes able to behold the 'internal controller4' ,the worship of the ,deity is described in the ,pacha-rtra as consisting of five elements1 viz41 7#a47 the access1 7#b47 the preparation1 7#c47 oblation1 7#d47 recitation1 7#e47 devotion4 ,of these1 access is the sweeping1 smearing1 and so forth1 of the way to the temple4 ,the preparation is the provision of perfumes1 flowers1 and the like appliances of worship4 ,oblation is worship of the deities4 ,recitation is the muttered ejaculation of sacred texts1 with attention to what they mean1 the rehearsal of hymns and lauds of ,vishnu1 the commemoration of his names1 and study of institutes which set forth the truth4 ,devotion is meditation on the ,deity4 ,when the vision of the visible world has been brought to a close by knowledge accumulated by the merit of such worship1 the infinitely compassionate ,supreme ,spirit1 tender to his votaries1 bestows upon the votary devoted to his lord and absorbed in his lord1 his own sphere infinite and endless1 marked by consciousness of being like him1 from which there is no future return 7to the sorrows of transmigratory existence74 ,so the traditionary text-- ,when they have come to me1 the high-souled no longer undergo future birth1 a receptacle of pain1 transitory1 having attained to the supreme consummation4 ,vsudeva1 having found his votary1 bestows upon him his own mansion1 blissful1 undecaying1 from whence there is no more return4 ,after laying up all this in his heart1 leaning upon the teaching of the great ,upanishad1 and finding the gloss on the ,vednta aphorisms by the venerated ,bodhyanachrya too prolix1 ,rmnuja composed a commentary on the ,srrakammns 7or ,vednta theosophy74 ,in this the sense of the first aphorism1 ,then hence the absolute must be desired to be known1 is given as follows3--,the word then in this aphorism means1 after understanding the hitherto-current sacred rites4 ,thus the glossator writes3 ,after learning the sacred rites1 he desires to know the absolute4 ,the word hence states the reason1 viz41 because one who has read the ,veda and its appendages and understands its meaning is averse from sacred rites1 their recompense being perishable4 ,the wish to know the absolute springs up in one who longs for permanent liberation1 as being the means of such liberation4 ,by the word absolute is designated the ,supreme ,spirit1 from whom are essentially excluded all imperfections1 who is of illimitable excellence1 and of innumerable auspicious attributes4 ,since then the knowledge of sacred rites and the performance of those rites is mediately through engendering dispassionateness1 and through putting away the defilement of the understanding1 an instrument of the knowledge of the absolute2 and knowledge of sacred rites and knowledge of the absolute being consequently cause and effect1 the former and the latter ,mmns constitute one system of institutes4 ,on this account the glossator has described this system as one with the sixteenfold system of ,jaimini4 ,that the fruit of sacred rites is perishable1 and that of the knowledge of the absolute imperishable1 has been laid down in virtue of ,vedic texts1 such as3 ,scanning the spheres gained by rites1 let him become passionless2 ,not wrought by the rite performed1 accompanied with inference and disjunctive reasoning4 ,revelation1 by censuring each when unaccompanied by the other1 shows that it is knowledge together with works that is efficacious of emancipation1 in the words3 ,blind darkness they enter who prefer illusion1 and a greater darkness still do they enter who delight in knowledge only2 knowledge and illusion1 he who knows these both1 he passing beyond death together with illusion1 tastes immortality by knowledge4 ,conformably it is said in the ,pachartra-rahasya-- ,that ocean of compassion1 the ,lord1 tender to his votaries1 ,for his worshipper's sake takes five embodiments upon him4 ,these are styled ,adoration1 ,emanation1 ,manifestation1 the ,subtile1 the ,internal ,controller1 ,resorting whereto souls attain to successive stages of knowledge4 ,as a man's sins are worn away by each successive worship1 ,he becomes qualified for the worship of each next embodiment4 ,thus day by day1 according to religion1 revealed and traditional1 ,by the aforesaid worship ,vsudeva becomes propitious to mankind4 ,hari1 when propitiated by devotion in the form of meditation1 ,at once brings to a close that illusion which is the aggregate of works4 ,then in souls the essential attributes1 from which transmigration has vanished1 ,are manifested1 auspicious1 omniscience1 and the rest4 ,these qualities are common to the emancipated spirits and the ,lord1 ,universal efficiency alone among them is peculiar to the ,deity4 ,emancipated spirits are ulterior to the infinite absolute1 which is unsusceptible of aught ulterior2 ,they enjoy all beatitudes together with that ,spirit4 ,it is therefore stated that those who suffer the three kinds of pain must1 for the attainment of immortality1 investigate the absolute spirit known under such appellations as the ,highest ,being4 ,according to the maxim3 ,the base and the suffix convey the meaning conjointly1 and of these the meaning of the suffix takes the lead1 the notion of desire is predominant 7in the word jijsitavya71 and desired knowledge is the predicate 7in the aphorism1 ,then hence the absolute must be desired to be known74 ,knowledge is cognition designated by such terms as meditation1 devotion2 not the merely superficial knowledge derived from verbal communication1 such being competent to any one who hears a number of words and understands the force of each1 even without any predication2 in conformity with such ,vedic texts as3 ,self indeed it is that is to be seen1 to be heard1 to be thought1 to be pondered2 ,he should meditate that it is self alone2 ,having known1 let him acquire excellent wisdom2 ,he should know that which is beyond knowledge4 ,in these texts to be heard is explanatory1 hearing being understood 7but not enounced7 in the text about sacred study 7viz41 shadangena vedo'dhyeyo jeyascha1 the ,veda1 with its six appendages1 is to be studied and known72 so that a man who has studied the ,veda must of his own accord1 in acquiring the ,veda and its appendages1 engage in hearing1 in order to ascertain the sense by examining it and the occasion of its enouncement4 ,the term to be thought 7or to be inferred7 is also explanatory1 cogitation 7or inference7 being understood as the complementary meaning of hearing1 according to the aphorism3 ,before its signification is attained the system is significant4 ,meditation is a reminiscence consisting of an unbroken succession of reminiscences like a stream of oil1 it being revealed in the text1 in continuity of reminiscence there is a solution of all knots1--that it is unintermittent reminiscence that is the means of emancipation4 ,and this reminiscence is tantamount to intuition4 ,cut is his heart's knot1 solved are all his doubts1 ,and exhausted are all his works1 when he has seen the ,highest and ,lowest1 because he becomes one with that ,supreme4 ,so also in the words1 ,self indeed is to be seen1 it is predicated of this reminiscence that it is an intuition4 ,reminiscence becomes intuitional through the vivacity of the representations4 ,the author of the ,vkya has treated of all this in detail in the passage beginning ,cognition is meditation4 ,the characters of this meditation are laid out in the text3 ,this soul is not attainable by exposition1 nor by wisdom1 nor by much learning2 ,whom ,god chooses by him ,god may be attained4 ,to him this self unfolds its own nature4 ,for it is that which is dearest which is choice-worthy1 and as the soul finds itself most dear1 so the ,lord is of ,himself most dear1 as was declared by the ,lord ,himself-- ,to them always devoted1 who worship me with love1 ,i give the devotion of understanding whereby they come to me4 ,and again-- ,that ,supreme ,spirit1 ,arjuna1 is attainable by faith unwavering4 ,but devotion 7or faith7 is a kind of cognition which admits no other motive than the illimitable beatitude1 and is free from all other desires2 and the attainment of this devotion is by discrimination and other means4 ,as is said by the author of the ,vkya3 ,attainment thereof results from discrimination 7viveka71 exemption 7vimoka71 practice 7abhysa71 observance 7kriy71 excellence 7kalyna71 freedom from despondency 7anavasda71 satisfaction 7anuddharsha71 according to the equivalence 7of the definition71 and the explication 7of these terms74 ,of these means1 discrimination is purity of nature1 resultant from eating undefiled food1 and the explication 7of discrimination7 is ,from purity of diet1 purity of understanding1 and by purity of understanding the unintermittent reminiscence4 ,exemption is non-attachment to sensuous desires2 the explication being1 ,let the quietist meditate4 ,practice is reiteration2 and of this a traditionary explication is quoted 7from the ,bhagavad-gt7 by 7,rmnuja7 the author of the commentary3 ,for ever modified by the modes thereof4 ,observance is the performance of rites enjoined in revelation and tradition according to one's ability2 the explication being 7the ,vedic text71 ,he who has performed rites is the best of those that know the supreme4 ,the excellences are veracity1 integrity1 clemency1 charity 7alms-giving71 and the like2 the explication being1 ,it is attained by veracity4 ,freedom from despondency is the contrary of dejection2 the explication being1 ,this soul is not attained by the faint-hearted4 ,satisfaction is the contentment which arises from the contrary of dejection2 the explication being1 ,quiescent1 self-subdued4 ,it has thus been shown that by the devotion of one in whom the darkness has been dispelled by the grace of the ,supreme ,spirit1 propitiated by certain rites and observances1 which devotion is meditation transformed into a presentative manifestation of soul1 without ulterior motive1 as incessantly and illimitably desired1 the sphere of the ,supreme ,spirit 7,vaikuntha7 is attained4 ,thus ,ymuna says3 ,attainable by the final and absolute devotion of faith in one internally purified by both 7works and knowledge72 that is1 in one whose internal organ is rectified by the devotion of works and knowledge4 ,in anticipation of the inquiry1 ,but what absolute is to be desired to be known8 the definition is given 7in the second aphorism74 ,from which the genesis1 and so forth1 of this4 ,the genesis1 and so forth1 the creation 7emanation71 sustentation1 and retractation 7of the universe74 ,the purport of the aphorism is that the emanation1 sustentation1 and retractation of this universe1 inconceivably multiform in its structure1 and interspersed with souls1 from ,brahm to a tuft of grass1 of determinate place1 time1 and fruition1 is from this same universal ,lord1 whose essence is contrary to all qualities which should be escaped from1 of illimitable excellences1 such as indefeasible volition1 and of innumerable auspicious attributes1 omniscient1 and omnipotent4 ,in anticipation of the further inquiry1 ,what proof is there of an absolute of this nature8 ,it is stated that the system of institutes itself is the evidence 7in the third aphorism73 ,because it has its source from the system4 ,to have its source from the system is to be that whereof the cause or evidence is the system4 ,the system1 then1 is the source 7or evidence7 of the absolute1 as being the cause of knowing the self1 which is the cause of knowing the absolute4 ,nor is the suspicion possible that the absolute may be reached by some other form of evidence4 ,for perception can have no conversancy about the absolute since it is supersensible4 ,nor can inference1 for the illation1 the ocean1 and the rest1 must have a maker1 because it is an effect like a water-pot1 is worth about as much as a rotten pumpkin4 ,it is evinced that it is such texts as1 ,whence also these elements1 that prove the existence of the absolute thus described4 ,though the absolute 7it may be objected7 be unsusceptible of any other kind of proof1 the system1 did it not refer to activity and cessation of activity1 could not posit the absolute aforesaid4 ,to avoid by anticipation any queries on this point1 it is stated 7in the fourth aphorism73 ,but that is from the construction4 ,this is intended to exclude the doubt anticipated4 ,the evidence1 then1 of the system is the only evidence that can be given of the absolute4 ,why8 ,because of the construction1 that is because the absolute1 that is1 the highest end for man1 is construed as the subject 7of the first aphorism1 viz41 ,then thence the absolute is to be desired to be known74 ,moreover1 a sentence which has nothing to do either with activity or with cessation of activity is not therefore void of purpose1 for we observe that sentences merely declaratory of the nature of things1 such as1 ,a son is born to you1 ,this is not a snake1 convey a purpose1 viz41 the cessation of joy or of fear4 ,thus there is nothing unaccounted for4 ,we have here given only a general indication4 ,the details may be learnt from the original 7viz41 ,rmnuja's ,bhshya on the ,vednta aphorisms72 we therefore decline a further treatment1 apprehensive of prolixity2 and thus all is clear4#aaj ,a4 ,e4 ,g4 ,,footnotes3 ,footnote #ajg3 ,cf4 ,the argument in defence of the ,maxim of ,contradiction is that it is a postulate employed in all the particular statements as to matters of daily experience that a man understands and acts upon when heard from his neighbours2 a postulate such that1 if you deny it1 no speech is either significant or trustworthy to inform and guide those who hear it4 ,you may cite innumerable examples both of speech and action in the detail of life1 which the ,herakleitean must go through like other persons1 and when1 if he proceeded upon his own theory1 he could neither give nor receive information by speech1 nor ground any action upon the beliefs which he declares to co-exist in his own mind4 ,accordingly the ,herakleitean ,kratylus 7so ,aristotle says7 renounced the use of affirmative speech1 and simply pointed with his finger4--,grote's ,aristotle1 vol4 ii4 pp4 #big1 #bih4 ,footnote #ajh3 ,cf4 the dictum of ,herakleitus3 ,making worlds is ,zeus's pastime2 and that of ,plato 7,laws1 ,book vii4 p4 #hjc73 ,man is made to be the plaything of ,god4 ,footnote #aji3 ,whose body nature is1 and ,god the soul4--,pope4 ,footnote #aaj3 ,for further details respecting ,rmnuja and his system1 see ,wilson's ,works1 vol4 i4 pp4 #cd-df2 and ,banerjea's ,dialogues1 ix4 ,the ,tattva-muktval was printed in the ,pandit for ,september #ahga2 but the lines quoted in p4 #gc are not found there4 ,,chapter ,v4 ,,the ,,system ,,of ,,purna-,,prajna4 nanda-trtha 7,prna-praja1 or ,madhva7 rejected this same ,rmnuja system1 because1 though like his own views1 it teaches the atomic size of the soul1 the servitude of the soul1 the existence of the ,veda without any personal author1 the authenticity of the ,veda1 the self-evidence of the instruments of knowledge1 the triad of evidences1 dependency upon the ,pacha-rtra1 the reality of plurality in the universe1 and so forth1--yet1 in accepting three hypotheses as to reciprocally contradictory divisions1 c41 it coincides with the tenets of the ,jainas4 ,showing that ,he is soul1 ,that art thou1 and a number of other texts of the ,upanishads bear a different import under a different explanation1 he set up a new system under the guise of a new explication of the ,brahma-,mmns 7or ,vednta74 ,for in his doctrine ultimate principles are dichotomised into independent and dependent2 as it is stated in the ,tattva-viveka3-- ,independent and dependent1 two principles are received2 ,the independent is ,vishnu the ,lord1 exempt from imperfections1 and of inexhaustible excellences4 ,here it will be urged 7by the ,advaita-vdins73 ,why predicate of the absolute these inexhaustible excellences in the teeth of the ,upanishads1 which lay down that the absolute principle is void of homogeneity and heterogeneity1 and of all plurality in itself8 ,to this be it replied3 ,not so1 for these texts of the ,upanishads1 as contradictory of many proofs positive of duality1 cannot afford proof of universal unity2 perception1 for example1 in the consciousness1 ,this is different from that1 pronounces a difference between things1 blue and yellow1 and so forth4 ,the opponent will rejoin3 ,do you hold that perception is cognisant of a perceptional difference1 or of a difference constituted by the thing and its opposite8 ,the former alternative will not hold3 for without a cognition of the thing and its opposite1 the recognition of the difference1 which presupposes such a cognition1 will be impossible4 ,on the latter alternative it must be asked1 ,is the apprehension of the difference preceded by an apprehension of the thing and its contrary1 or are all the three 7the thing1 its contrary1 and the contrariety7 simultaneously apprehended8 ,it cannot be thus preceded1 for the operation of the intellect is without delay 7or without successive steps71 and there would also result a logical seesaw 7apprehension of the difference presupposing apprehension of the thing and its contrary1 and apprehension of the thing and its contrary presupposing apprehension of the difference74 ,nor can there be a simultaneous apprehension 7of the thing1 its contrary1 and the difference72 for cognitions related as cause and effect cannot be simultaneous1 and the cognition of the thing is the cause of the recognition of the difference2 the causal relation between the two being recognised by a concomitance and non-concomitance 7mutual exclusion71 the difference not being cognised even when the thing is present1 without a cognition of its absent contrary4 ,the perception of difference1 therefore 7the opponent concludes71 is not easily admissible4 ,to this let the reply be as follows3--,are these objections proclaimed against one who maintains a difference identical with the things themselves1 or against one who maintains a difference between things as the subjects of attributes8 ,in the former case1 you will be1 as the saying runs1 punishing a respectable ,brhman for the offence of a thief1 the objections you adduce being irrelevant4 ,if it be urged that if it is the essence of the thing that is the difference1 then it will no longer require a contrary counterpart2 but if difference presuppose a contrary counterpart1 it will exist everywhere2 this statement must be disallowed1 for while the essence of a thing is first known as different from everything else1 the determinate usage 7name and notion7 may be shown to depend upon a contrary counterpart2 for example1 the essence of a thing so far as constituted by its dimensions is first cognised1 and afterwards it becomes the object of some determinate judgment1 as long or short in relation to some particular counterpart 7or contrasted object74 ,accordingly1 it is said in the ,vishnu-tattva-nirnaya3 ,difference is not proved to exist by the relation of determinant and determinate2 for this relation of determinant and determinate 7or predicate and subject7 presupposes difference2 and if difference were proved to depend upon the thing and its counterpart1 and the thing and its counterpart to presuppose difference1 difference as involving a logical circle could not be accounted for2 but difference is itself a real predicament 7or ultimate entity74 ,for this reason 7viz41 because difference is a thing7 it is that men in quest of a cow do not act 7as if they had found her7 when they see a gayal1 and do not recall the word cow4 ,nor let it be objected that 7if difference be a real entity and as such perceived7 on seeing a mixture of milk and water1 there would be a presentation of difference2 for the absence of any manifestation of1 and judgment about1 the difference1 may be accounted for by the force of 7the same7 obstructives 7as hinder the perception of other things71 viz41 aggregation of similars and the rest4 ,thus it has been said 7in the ,snkhya-krik1 v4 vii47-- ,from too great remoteness1 from too great nearness1 from defect in the organs1 from instability of the common sensory1 ,from subtilty1 from interposition1 from being overpowered1 and from aggregation of similars4 ,there is no perception respectively of a tree and the like on the peak of a mountain1 because of its too great remoteness2 of collyrium applied to the eyes1 and so forth1 because of too great proximity2 of lightning and the like1 because of a defect in the organs2 of a jar or the like in broad daylight1 by one whose common sensory is bewildered by lust and other passions1 because of instability of the common sensory2 of an atom and the like1 because of their subtility2 of things behind a wall1 and so forth1 because of interposition2 of the light of a lamp and the like1 in the day-time1 because of its being overpowered2 of milk and water1 because of the aggregation of similars4 ,or let the hypothesis of difference in qualities be granted1 and no harm is done2 for given the apprehension of a subject of attributes and of its contrary1 the presentation of difference in their modes is possible4 ,nor let it be supposed that on the hypothesis of difference in the modes of things1 as each difference must be different from some ulterior difference1 there will result an embarrassing progression to infinity1 there being no occasion for the occurrence of the said ulterior difference1 inasmuch as we do not observe that men think and say that two things are different as differenced from the different4 ,nor can an ulterior difference be inferred from the first difference1 for there being no difference to serve as the example in such inference1 there cannot but be a non-occurrence of inference4 ,and thus it must be allowed that in raising the objection you have begged for a little oil-cake1 and have had to give us gallons of oil4 ,if there be no difference for the example the inference cannot emerge4 ,the bride is not married for the destruction of the bridegroom4 ,there being1 then1 no fundamental difficulty1 this infinite progression presents no trouble4 ,difference 7duality7 is also ascertained by inference4 ,thus the ,supreme ,lord differs from the individual soul as the object of its obedience2 and he who is to be obeyed by any person differs from that person1 a king1 for instance1 from his attendant4 ,for men1 desiring as they do the end of man1 ,let me have pleasure1 let me not have the slightest pain1 if they covet the position of their lord1 do not become objects of his favour1 nay1 rather1 they become recipients of all kinds of evil4 ,he who asserts his own inferiority and the excellence of his superior1 he it is who is to be commended2 and the gratified superior grants his eulogist his desire4 ,therefore it has been said3-- ,kings destroy those who assert themselves to be kings1 ,and grant to those who proclaim their kingly pre-eminence all that they desire4 ,thus the statement of those 7,advaita-vdins7 in their thirst to be one with the ,supreme ,lord1 that the supreme excellence of ,vishnu is like a mirage1 is as if they were to cut off their tongues in trying to get a fine plantain1 since it results that through offending this supreme ,vishnu they must enter into the hell of blind darkness 7andha-tamasa74 ,the same thing is laid down by ,madhya-mandira in the ,mahbhrata-ttparya-nirnaya3-- ,o ,daityas1 enemies of the eternal1 ,vishnu's anger is waxed great2 ,he hurls the ,daityas into the blind darkness1 because they decide blindly4 ,this service 7or obedience of which we have spoken7 is trichotomised into 7#a47 stigmatisation1 7#b47 imposition of names1 7#c47 worship4 ,of these1 7#a47 stigmatisation is 7the branding upon oneself7 of the weapons of ,nryana 7or ,vishnu7 as a memorial of him1 and as a means of attaining the end which is needful 7emancipation74 ,thus the sequel of the ,skalya-samhit3-- ,the man who bears branded in him the discus of the immortal ,vishnu1 which is the might of the gods1 ,he1 shaking off his guilt1 goes to the heaven 7,vaikuntha7 which ascetics1 whose desires are passed away1 enter into3 ,the discus ,sudarsana by which1 uplifted in his arm1 the gods entered that heaven2 ,marked wherewith the ,manus projected the emanation of the world1 that weapon ,brhmans wear 7stamped upon them72 ,stigmatised wherewith they go to the supreme sphere of ,vishnu2 ,marked with the stigmas of the wide-striding 7,vishnu71 let us become beatified4 ,again1 the ,taittiryaka ,upanishad says3 ,he whose body is not branded1 is raw1 and tastes it not3 votaries bearing it attain thereto4 ,the particular parts to be branded are specified in the gneya-purna3-- ,on his right hand let the ,brhman wear ,sudarsana1 ,on his left the conch-shell3 thus have those who know the ,veda declared4 ,in another passage is given the invocation to be recited on being branded with the discus3-- ,sudarsana1 brightly blazing1 effulgent as ten million suns1 ,show unto me1 blind with ignorance1 the everlasting way of ,vishnu4 ,thou aforetime sprangest from the sea1 brandished in the hand of ,vishnu1 ,adored by all the gods2 ,o ,pnchajanya1 to thee be adoration4 7#b47 ,imposition of names is the appellation of sons and others by such names as ,kesava1 as a continual memorial of the name of the ,supreme ,lord4 7#c47 ,worship is of ten kinds1 viz41 with the voice1 7#a47 veracity1 7#b47 usefulness1 7#c47 kindliness1 7#d47 sacred study2 with the body1 7#e47 alms-giving1 7#f47 defence1 7#g47 protection2 with the common sensory1 7#h47 mercy1 7#i47 longing1 and 7#aj47 faith4 ,worship is the dedication to ,nryana of each of these as it is realised4 ,thus it has been said3-- ,stigmatisation1 imposition of names1 worship2 the last is of ten kinds4 ,difference 7or duality between the ,supreme ,being and the universe7 may also be inferred from cognisability and other marks4 ,so also difference 7or duality7 may be understood from revelation1 from texts setting out duality in emancipation and beatitude1 such as3 ,all rejoice over truth attained2 truthful1 and celebrating the gift of the divine ,indra1 they recount his glory2 ,sarva1 among those that know the truth1 ,o ,brhman1 is in the universe1 true spirit2 true is individual spirit2 truth is duality1 truth is duality1 in me is illusion1 in me illusion1 in me illusion4 ,again3-- ,after attaining this knowledge1 becoming like unto me1 ,in creation they are not born again1 in retractation they perish not 7,bhagavad-gt1 xiv4 #b74 ,according also to such aphorisms as1 ,excepting cosmical operation because of occasion1 and because of non-proximity4 ,nor should suggestion be made that individual spirit is ,god in virtue of the text1 ,he that knows the absolute becomes the absolute2 for this text is hyperbolically eulogistic1 like the text1 ,worshipping a ,brhman devoutly a ,sdra becomes a ,brhman1 i4e41 becomes exalted4 ,if any one urge that according to the text3-- ,if the universe existed it would doubtless come to an end1 this duality is merely illusory1 and in reality a unity1 and that duality is learnt to be illusorily imagined2 it may be replied3 ,what you say is true1 but you do not understand its meaning2 for the real meaning is1 ,if this world had been produced1 it would1 without doubt1 come to an end2 therefore this universe is from everlasting1 a fivefold dual universe2 and it is not non-existent1 because it is mere illusion4 ,illusion is defined to be the will of the ,lord1 in virtue of the testimony of many such passages as3-- ,the great illusion1 ignorance1 necessity1 the bewilderment1 ,the originant1 ideation1--thus is thy will called1 ,o ,infinite4 ,the originant1 because it originates greatly2 ideation1 because it produces ideas2 ,the illusion of ,hari1 who is called a1 is termed 7avidy7 ignorance3 ,styled 7my7 illusion1 because it is pre-eminent1 for the name my is used of the pre-eminent2 ,the excellent knowledge of ,vishnu is called1 though one only1 by these names2 ,for ,hari is excellent knowledge1 and this is characterised by spontaneous beatitude4 ,that in which this excellent knowledge produces knowledge and effects sustentation thereof1 that is pure illusion1 as known and sustained1 therefore by the ,supreme ,lord duality is not illusorily imagined4 ,for in the ,lord illusory imagination of the universe is not possible1 illusory imagination arising from non-perception of differences 7which as an imperfection is inconsistent with the divine nature74 ,if it be asked how then that 7illusory duality7 is predicated1 the answer is that in reality there is a non-duality1 that is in reality1 ,vishnu being better than all else1 has no equal and no superior4 ,accordingly1 the grand revelation3-- ,a difference between soul and the ,lord1 a difference between the unsentient and the ,lord1 ,a difference among souls1 and a difference of the unsentient and the soul each from the other4 ,also the difference of unsentient things from one another1 the world with its five divisions4 ,this same is real and from all eternity2 if it had had a beginning it would have an end3 ,whereas it does not come to an end2 and it is not illusorily imagined3 ,for if it were imagined it would cease1 but it never ceases4 ,that there is no duality is therefore the doctrine of those that lack knowledge2 ,for this the doctrine of those that have knowledge is known and sustained by ,vishnu4 ,the purpose1 then1 of all revelations is to set out the supreme excellence of ,vishnu4 ,with this in view the ,lord declared3-- ,two are these persons in the universe1 the perishable and the imperishable2 ,the perishable is all the elements1 the imperishable is the unmodified4 ,the other1 the most excellent person1 called the ,supreme ,spirit1 ,is the undecaying ,lord1 who pervading sustains the three worlds4 ,since transcending the perishable1 ,i am more excellent than the imperishable 7soul71 ,hence ,i am celebrated among men and in the ,veda as the best of persons 7,purushottama72 ,he who uninfatuated knows me thus the best of persons1 he all-knowing worships me in every wise4 ,thus this most mysterious institute is declared1 blameless 7,arjuna73 ,knowing this a man may be wise1 and may have done what he has to do1 ,o ,bhrata 7,bhagavad-gt1 xv4 #af-bj74 ,so in the ,mah-varha-- ,the primary purport of all the ,vedas relates to the supreme spouse of ,sri2 ,its purport regarding the excellence of any other deity must be subordinate4 ,it is reasonable that the primary purport should regard the supreme excellence of ,vishnu4 ,for emancipation is the highest end of all men1 according to the text of the ,bhllaveya ,upanishad3 ,while merit1 wealth1 and enjoyment are transitory1 emancipation is eternal2 therefore a wise man should strive unceasingly to attain thereto4 ,and emancipation is not won without the grace of ,vishnu1 according to the text of the ,nryana ,upanishad3 ,through whose grace is the highest state1 through whose essence he is liberated from transmigration1 while inferior men propitiating the divinities are not emancipated2 the supreme object of discernment to those who desire to be liberated from this snare of works4 ,according also to the words of the ,vishnu-purna-- ,if he be propitiated1 what may not here be won8 ,enough of all wealth and enjoyments4 ,these are scanty enough4 ,on climbing the tree of the supreme essence1 without doubt a man attains to the fruit of emancipation4 ,and it is declared that the grace of ,vishnu is won only through the knowledge of his excellence1 not through the knowledge of non-duality4 ,nor is there in this doctrine any confliction with texts declaratory of the identity 7of personal and impersonal spirit7 such as1 ,that art thou 7for this pretended identity7 is mere babbling from ignorance of the real purport4 ,the word ,that1 when undetermined1 designates the eternally unknown1 ,the word ,thou designates a knowable entity2 how can these be one8 ,and this text 7,that art thou7 indicates similarity 7not identity7 like the text1 ,the sun is the sacrificial post4 ,thus the grand revelation3-- ,the ultimate unity of the individual soul is either similarity of cognition1 ,or entrance into the same place1 or in relation to the place of the individual2 ,not essential unity1 for even when it is emancipated it is different1 ,the difference being independence and completeness 7in the ,supreme ,spirit71 and smallness and dependence 7in the individual spirit74 ,or to propose another explanation of the text1 tm tat tvam asi1 ,that art thou1 it may be divided1 tm tat tvam asi4 ,he alone is soul as possessing independence and other attributes1 and thou art not-that 7atat7 as wanting those attributes2 and thus the doctrine of unity is utterly expelled4 ,thus it has been said3-- ,or the division may be ,atat tvam1 and thus unity will be well got rid of4 ,according1 therefore1 to the ,tattva-vda-rahasya1 the words in the nine examples 7in the ,chhndogya ,upanishad71 ,he like a bird tied with a string1 c41 teach unity with the view of giving an example of non-duality4 ,accordingly the ,mahopanishad3-- ,like a bird and the string2 like the juices of various trees2 ,like rivers and the sea2 like fresh and salt water2 ,like a robber and the robbed2 like a man and his energy2 ,so are soul and the ,lord diverse1 for ever different4 ,nevertheless from subtilty 7or imperceptibility7 of form1 the supreme ,hari ,is not seen by the dim-sighted to be other than the individual spirit1 though he is its actuator2 ,on knowing their diversity a man is emancipated3 otherwise he is bound4 ,and again-- ,brahm1 ,siva1 and the greatest of the gods decay with the decay of their bodies2 ,greater than these is ,hari1 undecaying1 because his body is for the sustentation of ,lakshm4 ,by reason of all his attributes1 independence1 power1 knowledge1 pleasure1 and the rest1 ,all they1 all the deities1 are in unlimited obedience to him4 ,and again3-- ,knowing ,vishnu1 full of all excellences1 the soul1 exempted from transmigration1 ,rejoices in his presence for ever1 enjoying painless bliss4 ,vishnu is the refuge of liberated souls1 and their supreme ruler4 ,obedient to him are they for ever2 he is the ,lord4 ,that by knowledge of one thing there is knowledge of all things may be evinced from its supremacy and causality1 not from the falsity of all things4 ,for knowledge of the false cannot be brought about by knowledge of real existence4 ,as we see the current assurance and expression that by knowing or not knowing its chief men a village is known or not known2 and as when the father the cause is known1 a man knows the son2 7so by knowing the supreme and the cause1 the inferior and the effect is known74 ,otherwise 7on the doctrine of the ,advaita-vdins that the world is false and illusory7 the words one and lump in the text1 ,by one lump of clay1 fair sir1 all that is made of clay is recognised1 would be used to no purpose1 for the text must be completed by supplying the words1 ,by reason of clay recognised4 ,for the text1 ,utterance with the voice1 modification1 name1 clay 7or other determinate object71--these alone are real1 cannot be assumed to impart the falsity of things made2 the reality of these being admitted1 for what is meant is1 that of which utterance with the voice is a modification1 is unmodified1 eternal2 and a name such as clay1 such speech is true4 ,otherwise it would result that the words name and alone would be otiose4 ,there is no proof anywhere1 then1 that the world is unreal4 ,besides 7we would ask7 is the statement that the world is false itself true or false4 ,if the statement is true1 there is a violation of a real non-duality4 ,if the statement is untrue1 it follows that the world is true4 ,perhaps it may be objected that this dilemma is a kind of fallacious reasoning1 like the dilemma3 ,is transitoriness permanent or transitory8 ,there is a difficulty in either case4 ,as it is said by the author of the ,nyya-nirvna3 ,the proof of the permanence of the transitory1 as being both permanent and transitory1 is a paralogism4 ,and in the ,trkika-raksh-- ,when a mode cannot be evinced to be either such and such1 or not such and such1 ,the denial of a subject characterised by such a mode is called ,nitya-sama4 ,with the implied mention of this same technical expression it is stated in the ,prabodha-siddhi3 ,equality of characteristic modes results from significancy4 ,if it be said1 ,this then is a valid rejoinder1 we reply1 ,this is a mere scaring of the uninstructed1 for the source of fallacy has not been pointed out4 ,this is twofold1 general and particular3 of these1 the former is self-destructive1 and the latter is of three kinds1 defect of a requisite element1 excess of an element not requisite1 and residence in that which is not the subjicible subject4 ,of these 7two forms of the fallacy71 the general form is not suspected1 no self-pervasion being observed in the dilemma in question 7viz41 ,is the statement that the world is unreal itself true or false8 c47 ,so likewise the particular2 for if a water-jar be said to be non-existent1 the affirmation of its non-existence is equally applicable to the water-jar as that of its existence4 ,if you reply3 ,we accept the unreality 7or falsity7 of the world1 not its non-existence2 this reply is about as wise as the procedure of the carter who will lose his head rather than pay a hundred pieces of money1 but will at once give five score2 for falsity and non-existence are synonymous4 ,we dismiss further prolixity4 ,the meaning of the first aphorism1 viz41 ,then hence the absolute is to be desired to be known1 is as follows3--,the word then is allowed to purport auspiciousness1 and to designate subsequency to the qualification 7of the aspirant74 ,the word hence indicates a reason4 ,accordingly it is stated in the ,gruda-purna3-- ,all the aphorisms begin with the words ,then and ,hence regularly2 what then is the reason of this8 ,and what is the sense of those words1 ,o sage8 ,why are those the most excellent8 ,tell me this1 ,brahm1 that ,i may know it truly4 ,thus addressed by ,nrada1 the most excellent ,brahm replied3-- ,the word ,then is used of subsequency and of competency1 and in an auspicious sense1 ,and the word ,thence is employed to indicate the reason4 ,it is laid down that we must institute inquiries about the absolute1 because emancipation is not attained without the grace of ,nryana1 and his grace is not attained without knowledge4 ,the absolute1 about which the inquiry is to be instituted1 is described in the words 7of the second aphorism73 ,from which the genesis1 and so forth1 of this4 ,the meaning of the sentence is that the absolute is that from which result emanation1 sustentation1 and retractation2 according to the words of the ,skanda-purna-- ,he is ,hari the sole ruler1 the spirit from whom are emanation1 sustentation1 retractation1 necessity1 knowledge1 involution 7in illusion71 and bondage and liberation2 and according to such ,vedic texts1 ,from which are these4 ,the evidence adducible for this is described 7in the third aphorism73 ,because it has its source from the system4 ,that the absolute should be reached by way of inference is rejected by such texts as1 ,he that knows not the ,veda cogitates not that mighty one2 ,him described in the ,upanishads4 ,inference1 moreover1 is not by itself authoritative1 as is said in the ,kaurma-purna-- ,inference1 unaccompanied by revelation1 in no case ,can definitely prove a matter1 nor can any other form of evidence2 ,whatsoever other form of evidence1 companioned by revelation and tradition1 ,acquires the rank of probation1 about this there can be no hesitation4 ,what a ,sstra 7or system of sacred institutes7 is1 has been stated in the ,skanda-purna3-- ,the ,rig-veda1 the ,yajur-veda1 the ,sma-veda1 the ,atharva-veda1 the ,mahbhrata1 the ,pacha-rtra1 and the original ,rmyana1 are called ,sstras4 ,that also which is conformable to these is called ,sstra4 ,any aggregate of composition other than this is a heterodoxy4 ,according1 then1 to the rule that the sense of the sacred institutes is not to be taken from other sources than these1 the ,monist view1 viz41 that the purport of the texts of the ,veda relates not to the duality learnt from those but to non-duality1 is rejected3 for as there is no proof of a ,god from inference1 so there is no proof of the duality between ,god and other things from inference4 ,therefore there can be in these texts no mere explanation of such duality1 and the texts must be understood to indicate the duality4 ,hence it is that it has said3-- ,i ever laud ,nryana1 the one being to be known from genuine revelation1 who transcends the perishable and the imperishable1 without imperfections1 and of inexhaustible excellences4 ,it has thus been evinced that the sacred institutes are the evidence of 7the existence of7 this 7ultimate reality1 ,brahman74 7,the fourth aphorism is73 ,but that is from the construction4 ,in regard to this1 the commencement and other elements are stated to be the marks of the construction1 in the ,brihat-samhit3-- ,commencement1 conclusion1 reiteration1 novelty1 profit1 eulogy1 and demonstration1 are the marks by which the purport is ascertained4 ,it is thus stated that in accordance with the purport of the ,upanishads the absolute is to be apprehended only from the sacred institutes4 ,we have here given merely a general indication4 ,what remains may be sought from the nandatrtha-bhshya-vykhyna 7or exposition of the ,commentary of nanda-trtha74 ,we desist for fear of giving an undue prolixity to our treatise4 ,this mystery was promulgated by ,prna-praja ,madhya-mandira1 who esteemed himself the third incarnation of ,vyu3-- ,the first was ,hanumat1 the second ,bhma1 ,the third ,prna-praja1 the worker of the work of the ,lord4 ,after expressing the same idea in various passages1 he has written the following stanza at the conclusion of his work3-- ,that whereof the three divine forms are declared in the text of the ,veda1 sufficiently ,has that been set forth2 this is the whole majesty in the splendour of the ,veda2 ,the first incarnation of the ,wind-god was he that bowed to the words of ,rma 7,hanumat72 the second was ,bhma2 ,by this ,madhva1 who is the third1 this book has been composed in regard to ,kesava4 ,the import of this stanza may be learnt by considering various ,vedic texts4 ,the purport of this is that ,vishnu is the principle above all others in every system of sacred institutes4 ,thus all is clear4#aaa ,a4 ,e4 ,g4 ,,footnotes3 ,footnote #aaa3 ,for a further account of nanda-trtha or ,madhva see ,wilson1 ,works1 vol4 i4 pp4 #ach-aej4 ,his ,commentary on the ,brahma-stras has been printed in ,calcutta4 ,,chapter ,,vi4 ,,the ,p,,supata ,,system ,,of ,,nakul,,sa4 ,certain ,mhesvaras disapprove of this doctrine of the ,vaishnavas known by its technicalities of the servitude of souls and the like1 inasmuch as bringing with it the pains of dependence upon another1 it cannot be a means of cessation of pain and other desired ends4 ,they recognise as stringent such arguments as1 ,those depending on another and longing for independence do not become emancipated1 because they still depend upon another1 being destitute of independence like ourselves and others2 and1 ,liberated spirits possess the attributes of the ,supreme ,deity1 because at the same time1 that they are spirits they are free from the germ of every pain as the ,supreme ,deity is4 ,recognising these arguments1 these ,mhesvaras adopt the ,psupata system1 which is conversant about the exposition of five categories1 as the means to the highest end of man4 ,in this system the first aphorism is3 ,now then we shall expound the ,psupata union and rites of ,pasupati4 ,the meaning is as follows3--,the word now refers to something antecedent1 and this something antecedent is the disciple's interrogation of the spiritual teacher4 ,the nature of a spiritual teacher is explicated in the ,ganakrik3-- ,but there are eight pentads to be known1 and a group1 one with three factors2 ,he that knows this ninefold aggregate is a self-purifier1 a spiritual guide4 ,the acquisitions1 the impurities1 the expedients1 the localities1 the perseverance1 the purifications1 ,the initiations1 and the powers1 are the eight pentads2 and there are three functions4 ,the employment in the above line of the neuter numeral three 7trni71 instead of the feminine three 7tisrah71 is a ,vedic construction4 7a47 ,acquisition is the fruit of an expedient while realising1 and is divided into five members1 viz41 knowledge1 penance1 permanence of the body1 constancy1 and purity4 ,thus ,haradattchrya says3 ,knowledge1 penance1 permanence1 constancy1 and purity as the fifth4 7b47 ,impurity is an evil condition pertaining to the soul4 ,this is of five kinds1 false conception and the rest4 ,thus ,haradatta also says3-- ,false conception1 demerit1 attachment1 interestedness1 and falling1 ,these five1 the root of bondage1 are in this system especially to be shunned4 7c47 ,an expedient is a means of purifying the aspirant to liberation4 ,these expedients are of five kinds1 use of habitation1 and the rest4 ,thus he also says3-- ,use of habitation1 pious muttering1 meditation1 constant recollection of ,rudra1 ,and apprehension1 are determined to be the five expedients of acquirements4 7d47 ,locality is that by which1 after studying the categories1 the aspirant attains increase of knowledge and austerity1 viz41 spiritual teachers and the rest4 ,thus he says3-- ,the spiritual teachers1 a cavern1 a special place1 the burning-ground1 and ,rudra only4 7e47 ,perseverance is the endurance in one or other of these pentads until the attainment of the desired end1 and is distributed into the differenced and the rest4 ,thus it is said3-- ,the differenced1 the undifferenced1 muttering1 acceptance1 and devotion as the fifth4 7f47 ,purification is the putting away1 once for all1 of false conception and the other four impurities4 ,it is distributed into five species according to the five things to be put away4 ,thus it is said-- ,the loss of ignorance1 of demerit1 of attachment1 of interestedness1 ,and of falling1 is declared to be the fivefold purification of the state of bondage4 7g47 ,the five initiations are thus enumerated3-- ,the material1 the proper time1 the rite1 the image1 and the spiritual guide as the fifth4 7h47 ,the five powers are as follow3-- ,devotion to the spiritual guide1 clearness of intellect1 conquest of pleasure and pain1 ,merit and carefulness1 are declared the five heads of power4 ,the three functions are the modes of earning daily food consistent with propriety1 for the diminution of the five impurities1 viz41 mendicancy1 living upon alms1 and living upon what chance supplies4 ,all the rest is to be found in the standard words of this sect4 ,in the first aphorism above recited1 the word now serves to introduce the exposition of the termination of pain 7or emancipation71 that being the object of the interrogation about the putting away of pain personal1 physical1 and hyperphysical4 ,by the word pasu we are to understand the effect 7or created world71 the word designating that which is dependent on something ulterior4 ,by the word pati we are to understand the cause 7or principium71 the word designating the ,lord1 who is the cause of the universe1 the pati1 or ruler4 ,the meaning of the words sacrifices and rites every one knows4 ,in this system the cessation of pain is of two kinds1 impersonal and personal4 ,of these1 the impersonal consists in the absolute extirpation of all pains2 the personal in supremacy consisting of the visual and active powers4 ,of these two powers the visual1 while only one power1 is1 according to its diversity of objects1 indirectly describable as of five kinds1 vision1 audition1 cogitation1 discrimination1 and omniscience4 ,of these five1 vision is cognition of every kind of visual1 tactual1 and other sensible objects1 though imperceptible1 intercepted1 or remote4 ,audition is cognition of principles1 conversant about all articulate sounds4 ,cogitation is cognition of principles1 conversant about all kinds of thoughts4 ,discrimination is cognition of principles conversant about the whole system of institutes1 according to the text and according to its significance4 ,omniscience is cognition of principles ever arising and pervaded by truth1 relative to all matters declared or not declared1 summary or in detail1 classified and specialised4 ,such is this intellectual power4 ,the active power1 though one only1 is indirectly describable as of three kinds1 the possession of the swiftness of thought1 the power of assuming forms at will1 and the faculty of expatiation4 ,of these1 the possession of the swiftness of thought is ability to act with unsurpassable celerity4 ,the power of assuming forms at will is the faculty of employing at pleasure1 and irrespective of the efficacy of works1 the organs similar and dissimilar of an infinity of organisms4 ,the faculty of expatiation is the possession of transcendent supremacy even when such organs are not employed4 ,such is this active power4 ,all that is effected or educed1 depending on something ulterior1 it is threefold1 sentiency1 the insentient1 and the sentient4 ,of these1 sentiency is the attribute of the sentients4 ,it is of two degrees according to its nature as cognitive or incognitive4 ,cognitive sentiency is dichotomised as proceeding discriminately and as proceeding indiscriminately4 ,the discriminate procedure1 manifestable by the instruments of knowledge1 is called the cogitative4 ,for by the cogitant organ every sentient being is cognisant of objects in general1 discriminated or not discriminated1 when irradiated by the light which is identical with the external things4 ,the incognitive sentiency1 again1 is either characterised or not characterised by the objects of the sentient soul4 ,the insentient1 which while unconscious is dependent on the conscious1 is of two kinds1 as styled the effect and as styled the cause4 ,the insentient1 styled the effect1 is of ten kinds1 viz41 the earth and the other four elements1 and their qualities1 colour1 and the rest4 ,the insentient1 called the causal insentient1 is of thirteen kinds1 viz41 the five organs of cognition1 the five organs of action1 and the three internal organs1 intellect1 the egoising principle1 and the cogitant principle1 which have for their respective functions ascertainment1 the illusive identification of self with not-self1 and determination4 ,the sentient spirit1 that to which transmigratory conditions pertain1 is also of two kinds1 the appetent and non-appetent4 ,the appetent is the spirit associated with an organism and organs2 the non-appetent is the spirit apart from organism and organs4 ,the details of all this are to be found in the ,pachrtha-bhshyadpik and other works4 ,the cause is that which retracts into itself and evolves the whole creation4 ,this though one is said to be divided according to a difference of attributes and actions 7into ,mahesvara1 ,vishnu1 c47 ,the ,lord is the possessor of infinite1 visual1 and active power4 ,he is absolutely first as connected eternally with this lordship or supremacy1 as possessing a supremacy not adventitious or contingent4 ,this is expounded by the author of the darsa1 and other institutional authorities4 ,union is a conjunction of the soul with ,god through the intellect1 and is of two degrees1 that characterised by action1 and that characterised by cessation of action4 ,of these1 union characterised by action consists of pious muttering1 meditation1 and so forth2 union characterised by cessation of action is called consciousness1 c4 ,rite or ritual is activity efficacious of merit as its end4 ,it is of two orders1 the principal and the subsidiary4 ,of these1 the principal is the direct means of merit1 religious exercise4 ,religious exercise is of two kinds1 acts of piety and postures4 ,the acts of piety are bathing with sand1 lying upon sand1 oblations1 mutterings1 and devotional perambulation4 ,thus the revered ,nakulsa says3-- ,he should bathe thrice a day1 he should lie upon the dust4 ,oblation is an observance divided into six members4 ,thus the author of the aphorisms says3-- ,he should worship with the six kinds of oblations1 viz41 laughter1 song1 dance1 muttering hum1 adoration1 and pious ejaculation4 ,laughter is a loud laugh1 ,aha1 ,aha1 by dilatation of the throat and lips4 ,song is a celebration of the qualities1 glories1 c41 of ,mahesvara1 according to the conventions of the ,gandharva-sstra1 or art of music4 ,the dance also is to be employed according to the ars saltatoria1 accompanied with gesticulations with hands and feet1 and with motions of the limbs1 and with outward indications of internal sentiment4 ,the ejaculation hum is a sacred utterance1 like the bellowing of a bull1 accomplished by a contact of the tongue with the palate1 an imitation of the sound hudung1 ascribed to a bull1 like the exclamation ,vashat4 ,where the uninitiated are1 all this should be gone through in secret4 ,other details are too familiar to require exposition4 ,the postures are snoring1 trembling1 limping1 wooing1 acting absurdly1 talking nonsensically4 ,snoring is showing all the signs of being asleep while really awake4 ,trembling is a convulsive movement of the joints as if under an attack of rheumatism4 ,limping is walking as if the legs were disabled4 ,wooing is simulating the gestures of an innamorato on seeing a young and pretty woman4 ,acting absurdly is doing acts which every one dislikes1 as if bereft of all sense of what should and what should not be done4 ,talking nonsensically is the utterance of words which contradict each other1 or which have no meaning1 and the like4 ,the subsidiary religious exercise is purificatory subsequent ablution for putting an end to the sense of unfitness from begging1 living on broken food1 c4 ,thus it is said by the author of the aphorisms3 ,bearing the marks of purity by after-bathing4 7,it has been stated above that omniscience1 a form of the cognitive power1 is cognition of principles ever arising and pervaded by truth1 relative to all matters declared or not declared1 summary1 or in detail74 ,the summary is the enouncement of the subjects of attributes generally4 ,this is accomplished in the first aphorism3 7,now then we shall expound the ,psupata union and rites of ,pasupati74 ,detail is the fivefold enouncement of the five categories according to the instruments of true knowledge4 ,this is to be found in the ,rskara-bhshya4 ,distribution is the distinct enouncement of these categories1 as far as possible according to definitions4 ,it is an enumeration of these according to their prevailing characters1 different from that of other recognised systems4 ,for example1 the cessation of pain 7or emancipation7 is in other systems 7as in the ,sankhya7 the mere termination of miseries1 but in this system it is the attainment of supremacy or of the divine perfections4 ,in other systems the create is that which has become1 and that which shall become1 but in this system it is eternal1 the spirits1 and so forth1 the sentient and insentient4 ,in other systems the principium is determined in its evolution or creative activity by the efficacy of works1 whereas in this system the principium is the ,lord not thus determined4 ,in other institutes union results in isolation1 c41 while in these institutes it results in cessation of pains by attainment of the divine perfections4 ,in other systems paradise and similar spheres involve a return to metempsychosis1 but in this system they result in nearness to the ,supreme ,being1 either followed or not followed by such return to transmigratory experiences4 ,great1 indeed1 an opponent may say1 is this aggregate of illusions1 since if ,god's causality be irrespective of the efficacy of works1 then merits will be fruitless1 and all created things will be simultaneously evolved 7there being no reason why this should be created at one time1 and that at another71 and thus there will emerge two difficulties4 ,think not so1 replies the ,psupata1 for your supposition is baseless4 ,if the ,lord1 irrespective of the efficacy of works1 be the cause of all1 and thus the efficacy of works be without results1 what follows8 ,if you rejoin that an absence of motives will follow1 in whom1 we ask1 will this absence of motives follow8 ,if the efficacy of works be without result1 will causality belong to the doer of the works as to the ,lord8 ,it cannot belong to the doer of the works1 for it is allowed that the efficacy of works is fruitful only when furthered by the will of the creator1 and the efficacy so furthered may sometimes be fruitless1 as in the case of the works of ,yayti1 and others4 ,from this it will by no means follow that no one will engage in works1 for they will engage in them as the husbandman engages in husbandry1 though the crop be uncertain4 ,again1 sentient creatures engage in works because they depend on the will of the creator4 ,nor does the causality pertain to the ,lord alone1 for as all his desires are already satisfied1 he cannot be actuated by motives to be realised by works4 ,as for your statement1 continues the ,psupata1 that all things will be simultaneously evolved1 this is unreasonable1 inasmuch as we hold that causal efficiency resides in the unobstructed active power which conforms itself to the will of the ,lord1 whose power is inconceivable4 ,it has accordingly been said by those versed in sacred tradition3-- ,since he1 acting according to his will1 is not actuated by the efficacy of works1 ,for this reason is he in this system the cause of all causes4 ,some one may urge3 ,in another system emancipation is attained through a knowledge of ,god1 where does the difference lie8 ,say not so1 replies the ,psupata1 for you will be caught in a trilemma4 ,is the mere knowledge of ,god the cause of emancipation1 or the presentation1 or the accurate characterisation1 of ,god8 ,not the mere knowledge1 for then it would follow that the study of any system would be superfluous1 inasmuch as without any institutional system one might1 like the uninstructed1 attain emancipation by the bare cognition that ,mahdeva is the lord of the gods4 ,nor is presentation or intuition of the deity the cause of emancipation1 for no intuition of the deity is competent to sentient creatures burdened with an accumulation of various impurities1 and able to see only with the eyes of the flesh4 ,on the third alternative1 viz41 that the cause of emancipation is an accurate characterisation of the deity1 you will be obliged to consent to our doctrine1 inasmuch as such accurate characterisation cannot be realised apart from the system of the ,psupatas4 ,therefore it is that our great teacher has said3-- ,if by mere knowledge1 it is not according to any system1 but intuition is unattainable2 ,there is no accurate characterisation of principles otherwise than by the five categories4 ,therefore those excellent persons who aspire to the highest end of man must adopt the system of the ,psupatas1 which undertakes the exposition of the five categories4 ,a4 ,e4 ,g4 ,,chapter ,,vii4 ,,the ,,saiva-,,darsana4 ,the seventh system in ,mdhava's ,sarva-darsana-sangraha is the ,saiva-darsana4 ,this sect is very prevalent in the ,south of ,india1 especially in the ,tamil country2 it is said to have arisen there about the eleventh century ,a4,d4 ,several valuable contributions have been lately made to our knowledge of its tenets in the publications of the ,rev4 ,h4 ,r4 ,hoisington and the ,rev4 ,t4 ,foulkes4 ,the former especially1 by his excellent articles in the ,american ,oriental ,society's ,journal1 has performed a great service to the students of ,hindu philosophy4 ,he has there translated the ,tattuva-,kattalei1 or law of the ,tattwas1 the ,siva-,gnnapotham1 or instruction in the knowledge of ,god1 and the ,siva-,piraksam1 or light of ,siva1 and the three works shed immense light on the outline as given by ,mdhava4 ,one great use of the latter is to enable us to recognise the original ,sanskrit names in their ,tamil disguise1 no easy matter occasionally1 as arul for anugraha and tdchei for dksh may testify4 ,the ,saivas have considerable resemblance to the ,theistic ,snkhya2 they hold that ,god1 souls1 and matter are from eternity distinct entities1 and the object of philosophy is to disunite the soul from matter and gradually to unite it to ,god4 ,siva is the chief deity of the system1 and the relation between the three is quaintly expressed by the allegory of a beast1 its fetters1 and its owner4 ,pasupati is a well-known name of ,siva1 as the master or creator of all things4 ,there seem to be three different sets of so-called ,saiva stras4 ,one is in five books1 called by ,colebrooke the ,pasupati-sstra1 which is probably the work quoted by ,mdhava in his account of the ,nakulsa ,psupatas2 another is in three books1 with a commentary by ,kshemarja1 with its first stra1 chatanyam tm4 ,the third was commented on by ,abhinava-gupta1 and opens with the sloka given in the ,sarva-,darsana-,sangraha1 p4 #ia1 lines #a-d4 ,the ,,ms4 which ,i consulted in ,calcutta read the first words-- ,kathachid sdya ,mahesvarasya dsyam4 ,none of these works1 however1 appear to be the authority of the present sect4 ,they seem chiefly to have relied on the twenty-eight gamas and some of the ,purnas4 ,a list of the gamas is given in ,mr4 ,foulkes' ,catechism of the ,saiva ,religion2 and of these the ,kirana and ,karana are quoted in the following treatise4 ,,the ,,saiva-,,darsana4 ,certain1 however1 of the ,mhesvara sect receiving the system of truth authoritatively laid down in the ,saiva gama1#aab reject the foregoing opinion that the ,supreme ,being is a cause as independent of our actions1 c41 on the ground of its being liable to the imputation of partiality and cruelty4 ,they1 on the contrary1 hold the opinion that the ,supreme ,being is a cause in dependence on our actions1 c42 and they maintain that there are three categories distinguished as the ,lord1 the soul1 and the world 7or literally the master1 the cattle1 and the fetter74 ,as has been said by those well versed in the ,tantra doctrines-- ,the ,guru of the world1 having first condensed in one stra the great tantra1 possessed of three categories and four feet1 has again declared the same at full length4 ,the meaning of this is as follows3--,its three categories are the three before mentioned2 its four feet are learning1 ceremonial action1 meditation1 and morality1 hence it is called the great ,tantra1 possessed of three categories and four feet4 ,now the souls are not independent1 and the fetters are unintelligent1 hence the ,lord1 as being different from these1 is first declared2 next follows the account of the souls as they agree with him in possessing intelligence2 lastly follow the fetters or matter1 such is the order of the arrangement4#aac ,since the ceremony of initiation is the means to the highest human end1 and this cannot be accomplished without knowledge which establishes the undoubted greatness of the hymns1 the ,lords of the hymns1 c41 and is a means for the ascertainment of the real nature of the cattle1 the fetter1 and the master1 we place as first the foot of knowledge 7jna7 which makes known all this unto us4#aad ,next follows the foot of ceremonial action 7kriy7 which declares the various rules of initiation with the divers component parts thereof4 ,without meditation the end cannot be attained1 hence the foot of meditation 7yoga7 follows next1 which declares the various kinds of yoga with their several parts4 ,and as meditation is worthless without practice1 i4e41 the fulfilling what is enjoined and the abstaining from what is forbidden1 lastly follows the fourth foot of practical duty 7chary71 which includes all this4 ,now ,siva is held to be the ,lord 7or master74 ,although participation in the divine nature of ,siva belongs to liberated souls and to such beings as ,vidyesvara1 c41 yet these are not independent1 since they depend on the ,supreme ,being2 and the nature of an effect is recognised to belong to the worlds1 c41 which resemble him1 from the very fact of the orderly arrangement of their parts4 ,and from their thus being effects we infer that they must have been caused by an intelligent being4 ,by the strength of this inference is the universal acknowledgment of a ,supreme ,being confirmed4 ,but may we not object that it is not proved that the body is thus an effect8 for certainly none has ever1 at any time or place1 seen a body being made by any one4 ,we grant it3 yet it is not proper to deny that a body has some maker on the ground that its being made has not been seen by any one1 since this can be established from inference if not from actual perception4 ,bodies1 c41 must be effects1 because they possess an orderly arrangement of parts1 or because they are destructible1 as jars1 c42 and from their being effects it is easy to infer that they must have been caused by an intelligent being4 ,thus the subject in the argument sc4 bodies1 c4 must have had a maker1 from the fact that it is an effect1 like jars1 c42 that which has the afore-mentioned middle term 7sdhana7 must have the afore-mentioned major 7sdhya72 and that which has not the former will not have the latter1 as the soul1 c4#aae ,the argument which establishes the authority of the original inference to prove a ,supreme ,being has been given elsewhere1 so we refrain from giving it at length here4 ,in fact1 that ,god is the universal agent1 but not irrespective of the actions done by living beings1 is proved by the current verse#aaf-- ,this ignorant jvtman1 incapable of its own true pleasures or pains1 if it were only under ,god's direction and its own merits not taken into account1 would always go to heaven or always to hell4#aag ,nor can you object that this opinion violates ,god's independence1 since it does not really violate an agent's independence to allow that he does not act irrespectively of means2 just as we say that the king's bounty shows itself in gifts1 but these are not irrespective of his treasurer4 ,as has been said by the ,siddha ,guru-- ,it belongs to independence to be uncontrolled and itself to employ means1 c42 ,this is an agent's true independence1 and not the acting irrespectively of works1 c4 ,and thus we conclude that inference 7as well as ,sruti7 establishes the existence of an agent who knows the various fruits of action1 their means1 material causes1 c41 according to the laws of the various individual merits4 ,this has been thus declared by the venerable ,brihaspati-- ,he who knows the fruits to be enjoyed1 their means and material causes1-- ,apart from him this world knows not how the desert that resides in accumulated actions should ripen4-- ,the universe is the subject of our argument1 and it must have had an intelligent maker1 ,this we maintain from its being an effect1 just as we see in any other effect1 as jars1 c4 ,god's omniscience also is proved from his being identical with everything1 and also from the fact that an ignorant being cannot produce a thing4#aah ,this has been said by the illustrious ,mrigendra#aai-- ,he is omniscient from his being the maker of all things3 for it is an established principle ,that he only can make a thing who knows it with its means1 parts1 and end4 ,well1 our opponents may say1 we concede that ,god is an independent maker1 but then he has no body4#abj ,now experience shows that all effects1 as jars1 c41 are produced by beings possessed of bodies1 as potters1 c42 but if ,god were possessed of a body1 then he would be like us subject to trouble1 and no longer be omniscient or omnipotent4 ,we1 however1 deny this1 for we see that the incorporeal soul does still produce motion1 c41 in its associated body2 moreover1 even though we conceded that ,god did possess a body1 we should still maintain that the alleged defects would not necessarily ensue4 ,the ,supreme ,being1 as he has no possible connection with the fetters of matter1 such as mala1#aba action1 c41 cannot have a material body1 but only a body of pure energy 7,skta71#abb since we know that his body is composed of the five hymns which are forms of ,sakti1 according to the well-known text3 ,the ,supreme has the ,isna as his head1 the ,tatpurusha as his mouth1 the ,aghora as his heart1 the ,vmedeva as his secret parts1 and the ,sadyojta as his feet4#abc ,and this body1 created according to his own will1 is not like our bodies1 but is the cause of the five operations of the ,supreme1 which are respectively grace1 obscuration1 destruction1 preservation1 and production4#abd ,this has been said in the ,srmat ,mrigendra-- ,from the impossibility of its possessing mala1 c41 the body of the ,supreme is of pure energy1 and not like ours4 ,and it has also been said elsewhere-- ,his body is composed of the five mantras which are subservient to the five operations1 ,and his head1 c41 are formed out of the sa1 ,tatpurusha1 ,aghora1 ,vma1 and other hymns4 ,if you object to this view that such passages in the gamas as ',he is five-faced and fifteen-eyed1' assert prominently the fact that the ,supreme ,being is endowed with a body1 organs1 c41 we concede what you say1 but we maintain that there is no contradiction in his assuming such forms to show his mercy to his devoted servants1 since meditation1 worship1 c41 are impossible towards a ,being entirely destitute of form4 ,this has been said in the ,paushkara-- ,this form of his is mentioned for the preservation of the devotee4 ,and similarly elsewhere-- ,thou art to be worshipped according to rule as possessed of form2 ,for the understanding cannot reach to a formless object4 ,bhojarja#abe has thus detailed the five operations-- ,fivefold are his operations1 creation1 preservation1 destruction1 and obscuration1 ,and to these must be added the active grace of him who is eternally exalted4 ,now these five operations1 in the view of the pure ,path1 are held to be performed directly by ,siva1 but in that of the toilsome ,path they are ascribed to ,ananta1#abf as is declared in the ,srmat ,karana#abg-- ,in the ,pure ,path ,siva is declared to be the only agent1 but ,ananta in that which is opposed to the ,one ,supreme4 ,it must here be understood that the word ,siva includes in its proper meaning the ,lord1 all those who have attained to the state of ,siva1 as the ,lords of the ,mantras1 ,maheswara1 the emancipated souls who have become ,sivas1 and the inspired teachers 7vchakas71 together with all the various means1 as initiation1 c41 for obtaining the state of ,siva4 ,thus has been explained the first category1 the ,lord 7pati74 ,we now proceed to explain the second category1 the soul 7pasu74 ,the individual soul which is also known by such synonyms as the non-atomic1#abh the ,kshetraja1 or knower of the body1#abi c41 is the ,pasu4 ,for we must not say with the ,chrvkas that it is the same as the body1 since on this view we could not account for memory1 as there is a proverb that one man cannot remember what another has seen4 ,nor may we say with the ,naiyyikas that it is cognisable by perception1#acj as this would involve an ad infinitum regressus4 ,as has been said-- ,if the soul were cognisable1 there would need to be again a second knower2#aca ,and this would require another still1 if the second were itself to be known4 ,nor must we hold it non-pervading with the ,jainas1 nor momentary with the ,bauddhas1 since it is not limited by space or time4 ,as has been said-- ,that object which is unlimited in its nature by space or time1 ,they hold to be eternal and pervading1--hence the soul's all-pervadingness and eternity4 ,nor may we say with the ,vedntin that it is only one1 since the apportionment of different fruits proves that there are many individual souls2 nor with the ,snkhyas that it is devoid of action1 since1 when all the various fetters are removed1 ,sruti informs us of a state of identity with ,siva1 which consists in intelligence in the form of an eternal and infinite vision and action4#acb ,this has been declared in the ,srmat ,mrigendra-- ,it is revealed that identity with ,siva results when all fetters are removed4 ,and again-- ,intelligence consists in vision and action1 and since in his soul ,this exists always and on every side1 therefore1 after liberation1 ,sruti calls it that which faces every way4 ,it is also said in the ,tattva-praksa-- ,the liberated souls are themselves ,sivas1 but these are liberated by his favour2 ,he is to be known as the one eternally liberated1 whose body is the five ,mantras4 ,now the souls are threefold1 as denominated vijnkalh1 pralaykalh1 and sakalh4#acc 7a47 ,the first are those who are under the influence of mala only1 since their actions are cancelled by receiving their proper fruits1 or by abstraction1 contemplation1 and knowledge1 and since they have no fetters in the form of enjoyments1 such as kal1 c4 7which fetters would1 however1 be the cause of cancelling actions by bringing about their proper fruit74 7b47 ,the second are those who are under the influence of mala and karman1 since in their case kal1 c41 are destroyed by mundane destructions1 hence their name pralaykala4 7c47 ,the third are those who are bound in the three fetters of mala1 my1 and karman1 hence their name sakala4 ,the first class are again subdivided into sampta-kalushh and asampta-kalushh1 according as their inherent corruption is perfectly exhausted or not4 ,the former1--having received the mature penalties of their corruptions1--are now1 as foremost of men and worthy of the privilege1 raised by ,siva's favour to the rank of the ,lords of ,knowledge 7the ,vidyesvaras71 ,ananta1 and the rest4 ,this ogdoad of the ,lords of ,knowledge is described in the ,bahudaivatya-- ,ananta1 and ,skshma1 and ,sivottama1 ,ekanetra1 and again ,ekarudra and ,trimrttika1 ,srkantha and ,sikhandin1--these are declared to be the ,vidyesvaras4 ,the latter ,siva1 in his mercy1 raises to the rank of the seventy million ,mantras4#acd ,all this is explained in the ,tattva-praksa4#ace ,similarly ,soma-,sambhu has said-- ,one class is named vijnkala1 the second pralaykala1 ,the third sakala1--these are the three whom the ,sstra regards as objects of mercy4 ,the first is united to mala alone1 the second to mala and karma1 ,the third are united to all the tattvas beginning with kal and ending with 'earth4'#acf ,the ,pralaykalh are also twofold1 as being pakvapsadvaya or not1 i4e41 those in whom the two remaining fetters are matured1 and those in whom they are not4 ,the former attain liberation1 but the latter1 by the power of karman1 are endowed with the puryashtaka#acg body1 and pass through various births4 ,as has been said in the ,tattva-praksa-- ,those among the ,pralaykalas whose karman and mala are immature1 ,go1 united with the puryashtaka body1 into many births by the power of karman4 ,the puryashtaka is also thus described in the same work-- ,the puryashtaka is composed of the internal organ1 thought 7dh71 karman1 and the instruments4 ,this is thus explained by ,aghora ,siva chrya1 the puryashtaka is a subtile body apportioned to each individual soul1 which continues from the creation until the close of the kalpa1 or until liberation3 it is composed of the thirty#ach tattvas beginning with 'earth' and ending with kal4 ,as has been said in the ,tattva-sangraha-- ,this set of tattvas1 commencing with 'earth' and ending with kal1 is assigned to each soul1 ,and wanders by the law of karman through all the bodies produced by the world4 ,the following is the full meaning of this passage3--,the word internal organ1 which properly includes mind1 intelligence1 egoism1 and reason1#aci includes also the seven tattvas which enter into the production of enjoyment or experience1 viz41 those called kal1 time1 fate1 knowledge1 concupiscence1 nature1 and quality2#adj the words thought 7dh7 and karman signify the five cognisable gross elements1 and their originators1 the subtile rudiments4 ,by the word instruments are comprehended the ten organs of sense and action4 ,but is it not declared in the ,srmat ,klottara that ',the set of five1 sound1 touch1 form1 taste and smell1 intelligence1 mind and egoism1 these constitute the puryashtaka8' ,how1 then1 can any different account be maintained8 ,we grant this1 and hence the venerable ,rma ,kantha has explained that stra in its literal meaning i4 e41 as puryashtaka1 is derived from ashta1 eight1 so why should we be prolix in the discussion8 ,still1 if you ask how we can reconcile our account with the strict nominal definition of puryashtaka1 we reply that there is really no contradiction1 as we maintain that it is composed of a set of eight in the following manner3--7#a47 ,the five elements2 7#b47 the five rudiments2 7#c47 the five organs of knowledge2 7#d47 those of action2 7#e47 the fourfold internal organ2 7#f47 their instrument2#ada 7#g47 nature prakriti2 and 7#h47 the class composed of the five1 beginning with kal1 which form a kind of case4#adb ,now in the case of some of those souls who are joined to the puryashtaka body1 ,mahesvara ,ananta having compassionated them as possessed of peculiar merit1 constitutes them here as lords of the world2 as has been said-- ,mahesvara pities some and grants them to be lords of the world4 ,the class called sakala is also divided into two1 as pakvakalusha and apakvakalusha4 ,as for the former1 the ,supreme ,being1 in conformity with their maturity 7paripka71 puts forth a power agreeable thereto1 and transfers them to the position of the hundred and eighteen ,lords of the ,mantras1 signified by the words ,mandal1 c41 as has been said-- ,the rest are denominated sakala1 from their connection with ,kal1 c41 seized by time whose mouths are days2 ,the ,supreme of his own will makes one hundred and eighteen of these the ,lords of the ,mantras4 ,eight of these are called ,mandalins2 eight again are ,krodha1 c42 ,vresa1 ,srkantha1 and the hundred ,rudras1--these together are the hundred and eighteen4 ,in their case again1 the ,supreme1 having assumed the form of a teacher1 stops the continued accession of maturity and contracts his manifested power1 and ultimately grants to them liberation by the process of initiation2 as has been said-- ,these creatures whose mala is matured1 by putting forth a healing power1 ,he1 assuming the form of a teacher1 unites by initiation to the highest principle4 ,it is also said in the ,srmad ,mrigendra-- ,he removes from that infinitesimal soul all the bonds which previously exerted a contrary influence over it4#adc ,all this has been explained at great length by ,nryana-,kantha1 and there it is to be studied2 but we are obliged to pass on through fear of prolixity4 ,but as for the second class1 or those called apakvakalusha1 the ,supreme ,being1 as impelled by the desert of their respective actions1 appoints them1 as bound and endued with infinitesimal bodies1 to enjoy the rewards of their previous actions4#add ,as has been said-- ,the other souls1 bound in their material bonds he appoints to enjoy their various deserts1 ,according to their respective actions3 such are the various kinds of souls4 ,we now proceed to describe the third category1 matter 7or psa74 ,this is fourfold1 mala1#a karman1 my1 and rodha-sakti4#ade ,but it may be objected1 ,is it not said in the ,saiva gamas that the chief things are the ,lord1 souls1 and matter8 ,now the ,lord has been shown to mean ,siva1 'souls' mean atoms 7or beings endowed with atomic bodies71 and matter 7or 'bond'7 is said to be the pentad1#adf hence matter will be fivefold4 ,how then is it now reckoned to be only fourfold8 ,to this we reply as follows3--,although the vindu or nasal dot1 which is the germinal atom of my1 and is called a ,siva-tattva1 may be well regarded as material in comparison with the highest liberation as defined by the attainment of the state of ,siva1 still it cannot really be considered as matter when we remember that it is a secondary kind of liberation as causing the attainment of the state of such deities as ,vidyesvara1 c4 ,thus we see there is no contradiction4 ,hence it has been said in the ,tattva-praksa-- ,the bonds of matter will be fourfold4 ,and again in the ,srmad ,mrigendra-- ,the enveloper-controller 7mala71 the overpowerer 7rodha71 action1 and the work of ,my1 ,these are the four 'bonds1' and they are collectively called by the name of 'merit4' ,the following is the meaning of this couplet3-- 7#a47 ,enveloping1 because mala exceedingly obscures and veils the soul's powers of vision and action2 controlling1 because mala1 a natural impurity1 controls the soul by its independent influence4 ,as has been said-- ,mala1 though itself one1 by manifold influence interrupts the soul's vision and action2 ,it is to be regarded as the husk in rice or rust on copper4#adg 7#b47 ,the overpowerer is the obscuring power2 this is called a bond or matter in a metaphorical sense1 since this energy of ,siva obscures the soul by superintending matter rather than by itself partaking of the nature of matter4 ,thus it has been said-- ,of these ,i am the chief energy1 and the gracious friend of all1 ,i am metaphorically called psa1#adh because ,i follow desert4 7#c47 ,action or rather its consequences1 karman as being performed by those who desire the fruit4 ,it is in the form of merit or demerit1 like the seed and shoot1 and it is eternal in a never-beginning series4 ,as has been said in the ,srmat ,kirana-- ,as ,mala has no beginning1 its least actions are beginningless3 ,if an eternal character is thus established1 then what cause could produce any change therein8 7#d47 ,my1 because herein as an energy of the ,divine ,being all the world is potentially contained 7mti7 at a mundane destruction1 and again at a creation it all comes 7yti7 into manifestation1 hence the derivation of the name4 ,this has been said in the ,srmat ,saurabheya-- ,the effects1 as a form of the ,divine energy1 are absorbed therein at a mundane destruction1 ,and again at a renovation it is manifested anew in the form of effects as kal1 c4#adi ,although much more might be added on this topic1 yet we stop here through fear of extending this treatise too far4 ,thus have the three categories been declared1--the ,lord1 the soul1 and matter4 ,a different mode of treating the subject is found in the ,jnaratnval1 c41 in such lines as-- ,the ,lord1 knowledge1 ignorance1 the soul1 matter1 and the cause ,of the cessation thereof1--these are collectively the six categories4 ,but our readers must seek for full information from the work itself4 ,thus our account of the system is complete4 ,e4 ,b4 ,c4 ,,footnotes3 ,footnote #aab3 ,colebrooke speaks of the ,pasupati-sstra 7,mahesvara-siddhnta or ,sivgama71 as the text-book of the ,psupata sect4 ,the gamas are said to be twenty-eight 7see their names in the ,rev4 ,t4 ,foulkes' ,catechism of the ,saiva ,religion74 ,footnote #aac3 ,there must be three eternal entities1 ,deity1 soul1 matter2 as the water is co-eternal with the sea and the salt with the water1 so soul is co-eternal with the ,deity1 and psa is eternally co-existent with soul 7,j4 ,a4 ,o4 ,s4 iv4 pp4 #fg1 #he74 ,in p4 #eh we find the advaita of the ,vednta attacked4 ,in p4 #fb it is said that the soul is eternally entangled in matter1 and ,god carries on his five operations 7see infra7 to disentangle it1 bringing out all that is required for previous desert4 ,footnote #aad3 ,these four feet are the four stages of religious life 7see ,j4 ,a4 ,o4 ,s4 iv4 pp4 #ace1 #ahj71 called in ,tamil sarithei1 kirikei1 yokam1 and gnnam4 ,the first is the stage of practical piety and performance of the prescribed duties and rites2 the second is that of the confirmatory sacrament and the five purifications involved in true pj2 the third is that of the eight observances of the yogin2 the fourth is that of knowledge which prepares the soul for intimate union with ,god4 ,footnote #aae3 ,cf4 ,colebrooke1 ,essays 7#b;d ed471 vol4 i4 p4 #cae4 ,footnote #aaf3 ,nyyena may here mean argument4 ,footnote #aag3 ,scil4 if there were only one cause there would be only one invariable effect4 ,the very existence of various effects proves that there must be other concurrent causes 7as human actions7 necessary4 ,the argument seems to me to require here this unnatural stress to be laid on eva1 but this is certainly not the original meaning of the passage2 it occurs ,mahbhrata1 iii4 #aadd 7cf4 ,gaudapda1 ,s4 ,kr4 #fa74 ,footnote #aah3 ,in p4 #hb1 line #c1 infra1 ,i read ,karansambhavchcha4 ,footnote #aai3 ,this may be the same with the ,meyknda of the ,tamil work in ,j4 ,a4 ,o4 ,s4 ,his poem was called the ,mrigendra7874 ,footnote #abj3 ,should we read tvad anasarrah in p4 #hc1 line #b8 ,footnote #aba3 ,i retain this word1 see infra4 ,footnote #abb3 ,my 7or ,prakriti7 is the material1 ,sakti the instrumental1 and ,deity the efficient cause 7,j4 ,a4 ,o4 ,s4 iv4 p4 #ee74 ,footnote #abc3 ,these are the five first names of the eleven mantras which are included in the five kals 7,j4 ,a4 ,o4 ,s4 iv4 pp4 #bch-bdc74 ,the ,sivalinga 7the visible object of worship for the enlightened7 is composed of mantras1 and is to be regarded as the body of ,siva 7see ,j4 ,a4 ,o4 ,s4 iv4 p4 #aja74 ,these five mantras are given in the inverse order in ,taitt4 ranyaka1 x4 #dc-dg 7cf4 ,nyy-mlvist4 p4 #c74 ,footnote #abd3 ,these are the operations of the five manifestations of ,siva 7see ,j4 ,a4 ,o4 ,s4 iv4 #h1 #ah7 which in their descending order are ,sthkkiyam 7i4e41 ,sadkshaya87 or ,sad-,siva1 who is ,siva and ,sakti combined1 and the source of grace to all souls2 ,ichchuran or ,mayesuran1 the obscure2 ,sutta-vittei 7,suddhavidy7 which is properly the ,hindu triad1 ,rudra1 ,vishnu1 and ,brahma4 ,they are respectively symbolised by the nda1 vindu1 m1 u1 and a of ,om4 ,footnote #abe3 ,in ,wilson's ,mackenzie ,cat4 i4 p4 #ach1 we find a ,tntrik work1 the ,narapati-jaya-chary1 ascribed to ,bhoja the king of ,dhr4 ,footnote #abf3 ,ananta is a name of ,siva in the ,atharva-siras ,upanishad 7see ,indische ,stud4 i4 #che74 ,footnote #abg3 ,this is the fourth of the twenty-eight gamas 7see ,foulkes' ,catechism74 ,footnote #abh3 ,anu8 ,the soul1 when clothed with these primary things 7desire1 knowledge1 action1 c471 is an exceedingly small body 7,foulkes74 ,ananu is used as an epithet of ,brahman in ,brihad ,ar4 ,up4 iii4 #h4 #h4 ,footnote #abi3 ,see ,ind4 ,studien1 i4 #cja4 ,footnote #acj3 ,the mind or internal sense perceives soul 7see ,bhsh ,parichchheda1 sloka #di74 ,footnote #aca3 ,delete the iti in p4 #hd1 line #e1 infra4 ,footnote #acb3 ,cf4 the ,nakulsa ,psupatas1 p4 #gf1 #d 7supra1 p4 #ajc74 ,footnote #acc3 ,for these three classes see ,j4 ,a4 ,o4 ,s4 iv4 pp4 #hg1 #acg4 ,they are there described as being respectively under the influence of navam malam only1 or this with kanmam malam1 or these with mayei malam4 ,the navam is described as original sin1 or that source of evil which was always attached to the soul2 kanmam is that fate which inheres in the soul's organism and metes out its deserts2 mayei is matter in its obscuring or entangling power1 the source of the senses4 ,mdhava uses kal1 c41 for my4 ,the reason is to be found in ,j4 ,a4 ,o4 ,s4 p4 #gj1 where it is said that the five vidytattvas 7kal1 vidy1 rga1 niyati1 and kal7 and the twenty-four tmatattvas 7sc4 the gross and subtile elements1 and organs of sense and action1 with the intellectual faculties manas1 buddhi1 ahamkra1 and chitta71 are all developed from my4 ,this exactly agrees with the quotation from ,soma ,sambhu1 infra4 ,we may compare with it what ,mdhava says1 p4 #gg1 in his account of the ,nakulsa ,psupatas1 where he describes kal as unintelligent1 and composed of the five elements1 the five tanmtras1 and the ten organs1 with buddhi1 ahamkra and manas4 ,footnote #acd3 ,see ,j4 ,a4 ,o4 ,s4 iv4 p4 #acg4 ,i read anugrahakarant in p4 #hf1 line #c4 ,footnote #ace3 ,i omit the quotation1 as it only repeats the preceding4 ,it1 however1 names the three classes as vijna-kevala1 pralaya-kevala1 and sakala4 ,footnote #acf3 ,i4e41 thus including five of the vidytattvas and all the twenty-four tmatattvas4 ,footnote #acg3 ,this term seems to be derived from pur1 body 7cf4 purisaya for purusha1 ,brihad r4 ,up4 ii4 #e1 #ah71 and ashtaka 7cf4 also the ,snkhya ,pravachana ,bhshya1 p4 #ace74 ,footnote #ach3 ,or rather thirty-one8 ,footnote #aci3 ,manas1 buddhi1 ahamkra1 chitta4 ,footnote #adj3 ,these are the seven vidy-tattvas1 kal1 kla1 niyati 7fate71 vidy1 rga1 prakriti1 and guna4 ,hoisington1 however1 puts purushan the principle of life1 instead of guna1 which seems better1 as the three gunas are included in prakriti4 ,he translates kal by continency1 and describes it as the power by which the senses are subdued and the carnal self brought into subjection4 ,footnote #ada3 ,this instrument 7karana7 seems to mean what ,hoisington calls purushan or the principle of life which establishes or supports the whole system in its operation2 he makes it one of the seven vidytattvas4 ,according to ,mdhava1 it should be what he calls guna4 ,footnote #adb3 ,the thirty-one tattvas are as follow3--,twenty-four tmatattvas1 five elements1 five tanmtras1 ten organs of sense and action1 four organs of the antahkarana1 and seven vidytattvas as enumerated above4 7,see ,j4 ,a4 ,o4 ,s4 iv4 pp4 #af-ag47 ,footnote #adc3 ,i take anu in this verse as the soul1 but it may mean the second kind of mala mentioned by ,hoisington4 ,the first kind of mala is the my-mala1 the second nava-mala1 the third kanma-mala 7karman74 ,footnote #add3 ,the soul1 when clothed with these primary things 7desire1 knowledge1 action1 the kaldipanchaka1 c471 is an exceedingly small body 7,foulkes74 ,one of the three malas is called nava1 and is described as the source of sin and suffering to souls4 ,footnote #ade3 ,the first three are the three kinds of mala in the ,j4 ,a4 ,o4 ,s41 viz41 navam1 kanmam1 and myei1 the last is the obscuring power of ,myesuran 7cf4 vol4 iv4 pp4 #ac1 #ad74 ,the ,saivas hold that ,psa1 like the ,snkhya ,prakriti1 is in itself eternal1 although its connection with any particular soul is temporary 7see ,j4 ,a4 ,o4 ,s4 iv4 p4 #bbh74 ,footnote #adf3 ,these are the five1 vindu1 mala1 karman1 my1 and rodhasakti4 ,vindu is described in ,foulkes' translation of the ,siva-praksa-patalai3 ,a sound proceeds out of the mystical syllable om2444 and in that sound a rudimentary atom of matter is developed4 ,from this atom are developed the four sounds1 the fifty-one ,sanskrit letters1 the ,vedas1 ,mantras1 c41 the bodily1 intellectual1 and external enjoyments of the soul that have not attained to spiritual knowledge at the end of each period of the world's existence1 and have been swept away by the waters of the world-destroying deluge2 after these the three stages of heavenly happiness are developed1 to be enjoyed by the souls that have a favourable balance of meritorious deeds1 or have devoted themselves to the service of ,god or the abstract contemplation of the ,deity1 viz41 7#a47 the enjoyment of the abode of ,siva2 7#b47 that of near approach to him2 7#c47 that of union with him4 ,vindu is similarly described1 ,j4 ,a4 ,o4 ,s4 iv4 pp4 #aeb1 #aec 7cf4 also ,weber1 ,rmatpanya ,up4 pp4 #cab-cae74 ,footnote #adg3 ,see the same illustrations in ,j4 ,a4 ,o4 ,s4 iv4 p4 #aej4 ,footnote #adh3 ,some forced derivation seems here intended as of psa from pascht4 ,footnote #adi3 ,in p4 #ij1 line #b1 read s kryena4 ,,chapter ,,viii4 ,,the ,,pratyabhijna-,,darsana1 ,,or ,,recognitive ,,system4 ,other ,mhesvaras are dissatisfied with the views set out in the ,saiva system as erroneous in attributing to motiveless and insentient things causality 7in regard to the bondage and liberation of transmigrating spirits74 ,they therefore seek another system1 and proclaim that the construction of the world 7or series of environments of those spirits7 is by the mere will of the ,supreme ,lord4 ,they pronounce that this ,supreme ,lord1 who is at once other than and the same with the several cognitions and cognita1 who is identical with the transcendent self posited by one's own consciousness1 by rational proof1 and by revelation1 and who possesses independence1 that is1 the power of witnessing all things without reference to aught ulterior1 gives manifestation1 in the mirror of one's own soul1 to all entities#aej as if they were images reflected upon it4 ,thus looking upon recognition as a new method for the attainment of ends and of the highest end1 available to all men alike1 without any the slightest trouble and exertion1 such as external and internal worship1 suppression of the breath1 and the like1 these ,mhesvaras set forth the system of recognition 7pratyabhij74 ,the extent of this system is thus described by one of their authorities-- ,the aphorisms1 the commentary1 the gloss1 the two explications1 the greater and the less1 ,the five topics1 and the expositions1--such is the system of recognition4 ,the first aphorism in their text-book is as follows#aea3-- ,having reached somehow or other the condition of a slave of ,mahesvara1 and wishing also to help mankind1 ,i set forth the recognition of ,mahesvara1 as the method of attaining all felicity4 ,this aphorism may be developed as follows3-- ,somehow or other1 by a propitiation1 effected by ,god1 of the lotus feet of a spiritual director identical with ,god1 having reached1 having fully attained1 this condition1 having made it the unintercepted object of fruition to myself4 ,thus knowing that which has to be known1 he is qualified to construct a system for others3 otherwise the system would be a mere imposture4 ,mahesvara is the reality of unintermitted self-luminousness1 beatitude1 and independence1 by portions of whose divine essence ,vishnu1 ,virichi1 and other deities are deities1 who1 though they transcend the fictitious world1 are yet implicated in the infinite illusion4 ,the condition of being a slave to ,mahesvara is the being a recipient of that independence or absoluteness which is the essence of the divine nature1 a slave being one to whom his lord grants all things according to his will and pleasure 7i4e41 dsya1 from d74 ,the word mankind imports that there is no restriction of the doctrine to previously qualified students4 ,whoever he may be to whom this exposition of the divine nature is made1 he reaps its highest reward1 the emanatory principium itself operating to the highest end of the transmigrating souls4 ,it has been accordingly laid down in the ,siva-drishti by that supreme guide the revered ,somnandantha-- ,when once the nature of ,siva that resides in all things has been known with tenacious recognition1 whether by proof or by instruction in the words of a spiritual director1 ,there is no further need of doing aught1 or of any further reflection4 ,when he knows ,suvarna 7or ,siva7 a man may cease to act and to reflect4 ,the word also excludes the supposition that there is room in self which has recognised the nature of ,mahesvara1 and which manifests to itself its own identity with him1 and is therefore fully satisfied1 for any other motive than felicity for others4 ,the well-being of others is a motive1 whatever may be said1 for the definition of a motive applies to it3 for there is no such divine curse laid upon man that self-regard should be his sole motive to the exclusion of a regard for others4 ,thus ,akshapda 7i4 #bd7 defines a motive3 ,a motive is that object towards which a man energises4 ,the preposition upa in upapdayami 7,i set forth7 indicates proximity3 the result is the bringing of mankind near unto ,god4 ,hence the word all in the phrase the method of attaining all felicities4 ,for when the nature of the ,supreme ,being is attained1 all felicities1 which are but the efflux thereof1 are overtaken1 as if a man acquired the mountain ,rohana 7,adam's ,peak71 he would acquire all the treasures it contains4 ,if a man acquire the divine nature1 what else is there that he can ask for8 ,accordingly ,utpalchrya says-- ,what more can they ask who are rich in the wealth of devotion8 ,what else can they ask who are poor in this8 ,we have thus explained the motive expressed in the words the method of attaining all felicities1 on the supposition that the compound term is a ,tatpurusha genitively constructed4 ,let it be taken as a ,bahuvrhi or relative compound4 ,then the recognition of ,mahesvara1 the knowing him through vicarious idols1 has for its motive the full attainment1 the manifestation1 of all felicities1 of every external and internal permanent happiness in their proper nature4 ,in the language of everyday life1 recognition is a cognition relative to an object represented in memory3 for example1 ,this 7perceived7 is the same 7as the remembered7 ,chaitra4 ,in the recognition propounded in this system1--there being a ,god whose omnipotence is learnt from the accredited legendaries1 from accepted revelation1 and from argumentation1--there arises in relation to my presented personal self the cognition that ,i am that very ,god1--in virtue of my recollection of the powers of that ,god4 ,this same recognition ,i set forth4 ,to set forth is to enforce4 ,i establish this recognition by a stringent process which renders it convincing4 ,such is the articulate development of the first aphorism of the ,recognitive ,institutes4 ,here it may be asked3 ,if soul is manifested only as consubstantial with ,god1 why this laboured effort to exhibit the recognition8 ,the answer is this3--,the recognition is thus exhibited1 because though the soul is1 as you contend1 continually manifested as self-luminous 7and therefore identical with ,god71 it is nevertheless under the influence of the cosmothetic illusion manifested as partial1 and therefore the recognition must be exhibited by an expansion of the cognitive and active powers in order to achieve the manifestation of the soul as total 7the self being to the natural man a part1 to the man of insight the whole1 of the divine pleroma74 ,thus1 then1 the syllogism3 ,this self must be ,god1 because it possesses cognitive and active powers2 for so far forth as any one is cognitive and active1 to that extent he is a lord1 like a lord in the world of everyday life1 or like a king1 therefore the soul is ,god4 ,the five-membered syllogism is here employed1 because so long as we deal with the illusory order of things1 the teaching of the ,naiyyikas may be accepted4 ,it has thus been said by the son of ,udaykara-- ,what self-luminous self can affirm or deny that self-active and cognitive is ,mahesvara the primal being8 ,such recognition must be effected by an expansion of the powers1 the self being cognised under illusion1 and imperfectly discerned4 ,and again-- ,the continuance of all living creatures in this transmigratory world lasts as long as their respiratory involucrum2 knowledge and action are accounted the life of living creatures4 ,of these1 knowledge is spontaneously developed1 and action 7or ritual71 which is best at ,ksi1 ,is indicated by others also3 different from these is real knowledge4 ,and also-- ,the knowledge of these things follows the sequence of those things3 ,the knower1 whose essence is beatitude and knowledge without succession1 is ,mahesvara4 ,somnandantha also says-- ,he always knows by identity with ,siva3 he always knows by identity with the real4 ,again at the end of the section on knowledge-- ,unless there were this unity with ,siva1 cognitions could not exist as facts of daily life3 ,unity with ,god is proved by the unity of light4 ,he is the one knower 7or illuminator of cognitions74 ,he is ,mahesvara1 the great ,lord1 by reason of the unbroken continuity of objects3 ,pure knowledge and action are the playful activity of the deity4 ,the following is an explanation of ,abhinava-gupta3--,the text1 ,after that as it shines shines the all of things1 by the light of that shines diversely this ,,all1 teaches that ,god illumines the whole round of things by the glory of ,his luminous intelligence1 and that the diversity or plurality of the object world1 whereby the light which irradiates objects is a blue1 a yellow light1 and the like1 arises from diversity of tint cast upon the light by the object4 ,in reality1 ,god is without plurality or difference1 as transcending all limitations of space1 time1 and figure4 ,he is pure intelligence1 self-luminousness1 the manifester2 and thus we may read in the ,saiva aphorisms1 ,self is intelligence4 ,his synonymous titles are ,intelligential ,essence1 ,unintermitted ,cognition1 ,irrespective ,intuition1 ,existence as a mass of ,beatitude1 ,supreme ,domination4 ,this self-same existing self is knowledge4 ,by pure knowledge and action 7in the passage of ,somnandantha cited above7 are meant real or transcendent cognition and activity4 ,of these1 the cognition is self-luminousness1 the activity is energy constructive of the world or series of spheres of transmigratory experience4 ,this is described in the section on activity-- ,he by his power of bliss gives light unto these objects1 through the efficacy of his will3 this activity is creativeness4 ,and at the close of the same section-- ,the mere will of ,god1 when he wills to become the world under its forms of jar1 of cloth1 and other objects1 is his activity worked out by motive and agent4 ,this process of essence into emanation1 whereby if this be that comes to be1 cannot be attributed to motiveless1 insentient things4 ,according to these principles1 causality not pertaining either to the insentient or to the non-divine intelligence1 the mere will of ,mahesvara1 the absolute ,lord1 when he wills to emanate into thousands of forms1 as this or that difference1 this or that action1 this or that modification of entity1 of birth1 continuance1 and the like1 in the series of transmigratory environments1--his mere will is his progressively higher and higher activity1 that is to say1 his universal creativeness4 ,how he creates the world by his will alone is clearly exhibited in the following illustration-- ,the tree or jar produced by the mere will of thaumaturgists1 without clay1 without seed1 continues to serve its proper purpose as tree or jar4 ,if clay and similar materials were really the substantial cause of the jar and the rest1 how could they be produced by the mere volition of the thaumaturgist8 ,if you say3 ,some jars and some plants are made of clay1 and spring from seeds1 while others arise from the bare volition of the thaumaturgist2 then we should inform you that it is a fact notorious to all the world that different things must emanate from different materials4 ,as for those who say that a jar or the like cannot be made without materials to make it of1 and that when a thaumaturgist makes one he does so by putting atoms in motion by his will1 and so composing it3 they may be informed that unless there is to be a palpable violation of the causal relation1 all the co-efficients1 without exception1 must be desiderated2 to make the jar there must be the clay1 the potter's staff1 the potter's wheel1 and all the rest of it2 to make a body there must be the congress of the male and female1 and the successive results of that congress4 ,now1 if that be the case1 the genesis of a jar1 a body1 or the like1 upon the mere volition of the thaumaturgist1 would be hardly possible4 ,on the other hand1 there is no difficulty in supposing that ,mahdeva1 amply free to remain within or to over-step any limit whatever1 the ,lord1 manifold in his operancy1 the intelligent principle1 thus operates4 ,thus it is that ,vasuguptchrya says-- ,to him that painted this world-picture without materials1 without appliances1 without a wall to paint it on1--to him be glory1 to him resplendent with the lunar digit1 to him that bears the trident4 ,it may be asked3 ,if the supersensible self be no other than ,god1 how comes this implication in successive transmigratory conditions8 ,the answer is given in the section treating of accredited institution-- ,this agent of cognition1 blinded by illusion1 transmigrates through the fatality of works3 ,taught his divine nature by science1 as pure intelligence1 he is enfranchised4 ,it may be asked3 ,if the subject and the object are identical1 what difference can there be between the self bound and the self liberated in regard to the objects cognisable by each8 ,the answer to this question is given in a section of the ,tattvrtha-,sangraha-- ,self liberated cognises all that is cognisable as identical with itself1 like ,mahesvara free from bondage3 the other 7or unliberated7 self has in it infinite plurality4 ,an objection may be raised3 ,if the divine nature is essential to the soul1 there can be no occasion to seek for this recognition2 for if all requisites be supplied1 the seed does not fail to germinate because it is unrecognised4 ,why1 then1 this toilsome effort for the recognition of the soul8 ,to such an objection we reply3 ,only listen to the secret we shall tell you4 ,all activity about objects is of two degrees1 being either external1 as the activity of the seed in developing the plant1 or internal1 as the activity which determines felicity1 which consists in an intuition which terminates in the conscious self4 ,the first degree of activity presupposes no such recognition as the system proposes1 the second does presuppose it4 ,in the ,recognitive ,system the peculiar activity is the exertion of the power of unifying personal and impersonal spirit1 a power which is the attainment of the highest and of mediate ends1 the activity consisting in the intuition ,i am ,god4 ,to this activity a recognition of the essential nature of the soul is a pre-requisite4 ,it may be urged that peculiar activity terminating in the conscious self is observed independent of recognition4 ,to this it is replied3 ,a certain damsel1 hearing of the many good qualities of a particular gallant1 fell in love with him before she had seen him1 and agitated by her passion and unable to suffer the pain of not seeing him1 wrote to him a love-letter descriptive of her condition4 ,he at once came to her1 but when she saw him she did not recognise in him the qualities she had heard about2 he appeared much the same as any other man1 and she found no gratification in his society4 ,so soon1 however1 as she recognised those qualities in him as her companions now pointed them out1 she was fully gratified4 ,in like manner1 though the personal self be manifested as identical with the universal soul1 its manifestation effects no complete satisfaction so long as there is no recognition of those attributes2 but as soon as it is taught by a spiritual director to recognise in itself the perfections of ,mahesvara1 his omniscience1 omnipotence1 and other attributes1 it attains the whole pleroma of being4 ,it is therefore said in the fourth section-- ,as the gallant standing before the damsel is disdained as like all other men1 so long as he is unrecognised1 though he humble himself before her with all manner of importunities3 ,in like manner the personal self of mankind1 though it be the universal soul1 in which there is no perfection unrealised1 attains not its own glorious nature2 and therefore this recognition thereof must come into play4 ,this system has been treated in detail by ,abhinava-gupta and other teachers1 but as we have in hand a summary exposition of systems1 we cannot extend the discussion of it any further lest our work become too prolix4 ,this then may suffice4#aeb ,a4 ,e4 ,g4 ,,footnotes3 ,footnote #aej3 ,read bhvn for bhvt4 ,footnote #aea3 ,cf4 supra1 p4 #aac4 ,mdhava here condenses ,abhinava ,gupta's commentary4 ,abhinava ,gupta lived in the beginning of the eleventh century 7see ,bhler's ,tour in ,cashmere1 pp4 #ff1 #hj74 ,footnote #aeb3 ,i have seen in ,calcutta a short ,comm4 on the ,siva stras by ,utpala1 the son of ,udaykara 7cf4 pp4 #acj1 #aca74--;,e4 ,b4 ,c4 ,,chapter ,,ix4 ,,the ,,rasesvara-,,darsana ,,or ,,mercurial ,,system4#aec ,other ,mhesvaras there are who1 while they hold the identity of self with ,god1 insist upon the tenet that the liberation in this life taught in all the systems depends upon the stability of the bodily frame1 and therefore celebrate the virtues of mercury or quicksilver as a means of strengthening the system4 ,mercury is called prada1 because it is a means of conveyance beyond the series of transmigratory states4 ,thus it has been said-- ,it gives the farther shore of metempsychosis3 it is called prada4 ,and again in the ,rasrnava-- ,it is styled prada because it is employed for the highest end by the best votaries4 ,since this in sleep identical with me1 goddess1 arises from my members1 and is the exudation of my body1 it is called rasa4 ,it may be urged that the literal interpretation of these words is incorrect1 the liberation in this life being explicable in another manner4 ,this objection is not allowable1 liberation being set out in the six systems as subsequent to the death of the body1 and upon this there can be no reliance1 and consequently no activity to attain to it free from misgivings4 ,this is also laid down in the same treatise-- ,liberation is declared in the six systems to follow the death of the body4 ,such liberation is not cognised in perception like an emblic myrobalan fruit in the hand4 ,therefore a man should preserve that body by means of mercury and of medicaments4 ,govinda-bhagavat also says-- ,holding that the enjoyments of wealth and of the body are not permanent1 one should strive ,after emancipation2 but emancipation results from knowledge1 knowledge from study1 and study is only possible in a healthy body4 ,the body1 some one may say1 is seen to be perishable1 how can its permanency be effected8 ,think not so1 it is replied1 for though the body1 as a complexus of six sheaths or wrappers of the soul1 is dissoluble1 yet the body1 as created by ,hara and ,gaur under the names of mercury and mica1 may be perdurable4 ,thus it is said in the ,rasahridaya-- ,they who1 without quitting the body1 have attained to a new body1 the creation of ,hara and ,gaur1 ,they are to be lauded1 perfected by mercury1 at whose service is the aggregate of magic texts4 ,the ascetic1 therefore1 who aspires to liberation in this life should first make to himself a glorified body4 ,and inasmuch as mercury is produced by the creative conjunction of ,hara and ,gaur1 and mica is produced from ,gaur1 mercury and mica are severally identified with ,hara and ,gaur in the verse-- ,mica is thy seed1 and mercury is my seed2 ,the combination of the two1 ,o goddess1 is destructive of death and poverty4 ,this is very little to say about the matter4 ,in the ,rasesvara-siddhnta many among the gods1 the ,daityas1 the ,munis1 and mankind1 are declared to have attained to liberation in this life by acquiring a divine body through the efficacy of quicksilver4 ,certain of the gods1 ,mahesa and others2 certain ,daityas1 ,sukra and others2 ,certain ,munis1 the ,blakhilyas and others2 certain kings1 ,somesvara and others2 ,govinda-bhagavat1 ,govinda-nyaka1 ,charvati1 ,kapila1 ,vyli1 ,kpli1 ,kandalyana1 ,these and many others proceed perfected1 liberated while alive1 ,having attained to a mercurial body1 and therewith identified4 ,the meaning of this1 as explicated by ,paramesvara to ,paramesvar1 is as follows3-- ,by the method of works is attained1 ,o supreme of goddesses1 the preservation of the body2 ,and the method of works is said to be twofold1 mercury and air1 ,mercury and air swooning carry off diseases1 dead they restore to life1 ,bound they give the power of flying about4 ,the swooning state of mercury is thus described-- ,they say quicksilver to be swooning when it is perceived1 as characterised thus-- ,of various colours1 and free from excessive volatility4 ,a man should regard that quicksilver as dead1 in which the following marks are seen-- ,wetness1 thickness1 brightness1 heaviness1 mobility4 ,the bound condition is described in another place as follows3-- ,the character of bound quicksilver is that it is-- ,continuous1 fluent1 luminous1 pure1 heavy1 and that it parts asunder under friction4 ,some one may urge3 ,if the creation of mercury by ,hara and ,gaur were proved1 it might be allowed that the body could be made permanent2 but how can that be proved8 ,the objection is not allowable1 inasmuch as that can be proved by the eighteen modes of elaboration4 ,thus it is stated by the authorities-- ,eighteen modes of elaboration are to be carefully discriminated1 ,in the first place1 as pure in every process1 for perfecting the adepts4 ,and these modes of elaboration are enumerated thus-- ,sweating1 rubbing1 swooning1 fixing1 dropping1 coercion1 restraining1 ,kindling1 going1 falling into globules1 pulverising1 covering1 ,internal flux1 external flux1 burning1 colouring1 and pouring1 ,and eating it by parting and piercing it1--are the eighteen modes of treating quicksilver4 ,these treatments have been described at length by ,govinda-bhagavat1 ,sarvaja-rmesvara and the other ancient authorities1 and are here omitted to avoid prolixity4 ,the mercurial system is not to be looked upon as merely eulogistic of the metal1 it being immediately1 through the conservation of the body1 a means to the highest end1 liberation4 ,thus it is said in the ,rasrnava-- ,declare to me1 ,o god1 that supremely efficacious destruction of the blood1 that destruction of the body1 imparted by thee1 whereby it attained the power of flying about in the sky4 ,goddess 7he replied71 quicksilver is to be applied both to the blood and to the body4 ,this makes the appearance of body and blood alike4 ,a man should first try it upon the blood1 and then apply it to the body4 ,it will be asked3 ,why should we make this effort to acquire a celestial body1 seeing that liberation is effected by the self-manifestation of the supreme principle1 existence1 intelligence1 and beatitude8 ,we reply3 ,this is no objection1 such liberation being inaccessible unless we acquire a healthy body4 ,thus it is said in the ,rasahridaya-- ,that intelligence and bliss set forth in all the systems in which a multitude of uncertainties are melted away1 ,though it manifest itself1 what can it effect for beings whose bodies are unglorified8 ,he who is worn out with decrepitude1 though he be free from cough1 from asthma1 and similar infirmities1 ,he is not qualified for meditation in whom the activities of the cognitive organs are obstructed4 ,a youth of sixteen addicted to the last degree to the enjoyment of sensual pleasures1 ,an old man in his dotage1 how should either of these attain to emancipation8 ,some one will object3 ,it is the nature of the personal soul to pass through a series of embodiments1 and to be liberated is to be extricated from that series of embodiments2 how1 then1 can these two mutually exclusive conditions pertain to the same bodily tenement8 ,the objection is invalid1 as unable to stand before the following dilemmatic argument3--,is this extrication1 as to the nature of which all the founders of institutes are at one1 to be held as cognisable or as incognisable8 ,if it is incognisable1 it is a pure chimera2 if it is cognisable1 we cannot dispense with life1 for that which is not alive cannot be cognisant of it4 ,thus it is said in the ,rasasiddhnta-- ,the liberation of the personal soul is declared in the mercurial system1 ,o subtile thinker4 ,in the tenets of other schools which repose on a diversity of argument1 ,know that this knowledge and knowable is allowed in all sacred texts2 ,one not living cannot know the knowable1 and therefore there is and must be life4 ,and this is not to be supposed to be unprecedented1 for the adherents of the doctrine of ,vishnu-svmin maintain the eternity of the body of ,vishnu half-man and half-lion4 ,thus it is said in the ,skra-siddhi-- ,i glorify the man-lion set forth by ,vishnu-svmin1 ,whose only body is existence1 intelligence1 and eternal and inconceivably perfect beatitude4 ,if the objection be raised that the body of the man-lion1 which appears as composite and as coloured1 is incompatible with real existence1 it may be replied3 ,how can the body of the man-lion be otherwise than really existent1 proved as it is by three kinds of proof3 7#a47 by the intuition of ,sanaka and others2 7#b47 by ,vedic texts such as1 ,a thousand heads has ,purusha2 and 7#c47 by ,purnic texts such as1 ,that wondrous child1 lotus-eyed1 four-armed1 armed with the conch-shell1 the club1 and other weapons8 ,real existence and other like predicates are affirmed also by ,srknta-misra1 the devoted adherent of ,vishnu-svmin4 ,let1 then1 those who aspire to the highest end of personal souls be assured that the eternity of the body which we are setting forth is by no means a mere innovation4 ,it has thus been said-- ,what higher beatitude is there than a body undecaying1 immortal1 ,the repository of sciences1 the root of merit1 riches1 pleasure1 liberation8 ,it is mercury alone that can make the body undecaying and immortal1 as it is said-- ,only this supreme medicament can make the body undecaying and imperishable4 ,why describe the efficacy of this metal8 ,its value is proved even by seeing it1 and by touching it1 as it is said in the ,rasrnava-- ,from seeing it1 from touching it1 from eating it1 from merely remembering it1 ,from worshipping it1 from tasting it1 from imparting it1 appear its six virtues4 ,equal merit accrues from seeing mercury as accrues from seeing all the phallic emblems ,on earth1 those at ,kedra1 and all others whatsoever4 ,in another place we read-- ,the adoration of the sacred quicksilver is more beatific than the worship of all the phallic emblems at ,ksi and elsewhere1 ,inasmuch as there is attained thereby enjoyment1 health1 exemption from decay1 and immortality4 ,the sin of disparaging mercury is also set out-- ,the adept on hearing quicksilver heedlessly disparaged should recall quicksilver to mind4 ,he should at once shun the blasphemer1 who is by his blasphemy for ever filled with sin4 ,the attainment1 then1 of the highest end of the personal soul takes place by an intuition of the highest principle by means of the practice of union 7,greek3 hensis7 after the acquisition of a divine body in the manner we have described4 ,thereafter-- ,the light of pure intelligence shines forth unto certain men of holy vision1 ,which1 seated between the two eyebrows1 illumines the universe1 like fire1 or lightning1 or the sun3 ,perfect beatitude1 unalloyed1 absolute1 the essence whereof is luminousness1 undifferenced1 ,from which all troubles are fallen away1 knowable1 tranquil1 self-recognised3 ,fixing the internal organ upon that1 seeing the whole universe manifested1 made of pure intelligence1 ,the aspirant even in this life attains to the absolute1 his bondage to works annulled4 ,a ,vedic text also declares3 ,that is ,rasa 7mercury71 having obtained this he becomes beatitude4 ,thus1 then1 it has been shown that mercury alone is the means of passing beyond the burden of transmigratory pains4 ,and conformably we have a verse which sets forth the identity between mercury and the supreme self-- ,may that mercury1 which is the very self1 preserve us from dejection and from the terrors of metempsychosis1 ,which is naturally to be applied again and again by those that aspire to liberation from the enveloping illusion1 ,which perfected endures1 which plays not again when the soul awakes1 ,which1 when it arises1 pains no other soul1 which shines forth by itself from itself4 ,a4 ,e4 ,g4 ,,footnotes3 ,footnote #aec3 ,cf4 ,marco ,polo's account of the ,indian yogs in ,colonel ,yule's edit4 vol4 ii4 p4 #cjj4 ,prada-pna is one of the practices of the ,siddhopsakas in the ,sankara-digvijaya1 #di1 to obviate apamrityu1 aklamrityu1 c4 ,,chapter ,x4 ,,the ,,vaiseshika ,,or ,,aul,,kya ,,darsana4#aed ,whoso wishes to escape the reality of pain1 which is established by the consciousness of every soul through its being felt to be essentially contrary to every rational being1 and wishes therefore to know the means of such escape1--learns that the knowledge of the ,supreme ,being is the true means thereof1 from the authority of such passages as these 7,svetsvatara ,upan4 vi4 #bj7-- ,when men shall roll up the sky as a piece of leather1 ,then shall there be an end of pain without the knowledge of ,siva4 ,now the knowledge of the ,supreme is to be gained by hearing 7sravana71 thought 7manana71 and reflection 7bhvan71 as it has been said-- ,by scripture1 by inference1 and by the force of repeated meditation1-- ,by these three methods producing knowledge1 he gains the highest union 7yoga74 ,here thought depends on inference1 and inference depends on the knowledge of the vypti 7or universal proposition71 and the knowledge of the vypti follows the right understanding of the categories1--hence the saint ,kanda#aee establishes the six categories in his tenfold treatise1 commencing with the words1 ,now1 therefore1 we shall explain duty4 ,in the first book1 consisting of two daily lessons1 he describes all the categories which are capable of intimate relation4 ,in the first hnika he defines those which possess genus 7jti71 in the second genus 7or generality7 itself and particularity4 ,in the similarly divided second book he discusses substance1 giving in the first hnika the characteristics of the five elements1 and in the second he establishes the existence of space and time4 ,in the third book he defines the soul and the internal sense1 the former in the first hnika1 the latter in the second4 ,in the fourth book he discusses the body and its adjuncts1 the latter in the first hnika1 and the former in the second4 ,in the fifth book he investigates action2 in the first hnika he considers action as connected with the body1 in the second as belonging to the mind4 ,in the sixth book he examines merit and demerit as revealed in ,sruti2 in the first hnika he discusses the merit of giving1 receiving gifts1 c41 in the second the duties of the four periods of religious life4 ,in the seventh book he discusses quality and intimate relation2 in the first hnika he considers the qualities independent of thought1 in the second those qualities which are related to it1 and also intimate relation4 ,in the eighth book he examines indeterminate and determinate perception1 and means of proof4 ,in the ninth book he discusses the characteristics of intellect4 ,in the tenth book he establishes the different kinds of inference4#aef ,the method of this system is said to be threefold1 enunciation1 definition1 and investigation4#aeg ,but1 it may be objected1 ought we not to include 'division1' and so make the method fourfold1 not threefold8 ,we demur to this1 because division is really included in a particular kind of enunciation4 ,thus when we declare that substance1 quality1 action1 generality1 particularity1 and intimate relation are the only six positive categories1--this is an example of enunciation4 ,if you ask ,what is the reason for this definite order of the categories8 we answer as follows3--,since substance is the chief1 as being the substratum of all the categories1 we enounce this first2 next quality1 since it resides in its generic character in all substances though different substances have different qualities2 then action1 as it agrees with substance and quality in possessing generality2#aeh then generality1 as residing in these three2 then particularity1 inasmuch as it possesses intimate relation2#aei lastly1 intimate relation itself2 such is the principle of arrangement4 ,if you ask1 ,why do you say that there are only six categories since 'non-existence' is also one8 we answer3 ,because we wish to speak of the six as positive categories1 i4e41 as being the objects of conceptions which do not involve a negative idea4 ,still1 the objector may retort1 how do you establish this definite number 'only six'8 for either horn of the alternative fails4 ,for1 we ask1 is the thing to be thus excluded already thoroughly ascertained or not8 ,if it is thoroughly ascertained1 why do you exclude it8 and still more so1 if it is not thoroughly ascertained8 ,what sensible man1 pray1 spends his strength in denying that a mouse has horns8 ,thus your definite number 'only six' fails as being inapplicable4 ,this1 however1 we cannot admit2 if darkness1 c41 are allowed to form certainly a seventh category 7as non-existence71 we thus 7by our definite number7 deny it to be one of the six positive categories1--and if others attempt to include capacity1 number1 c41 which we allow to be certainly positive existences1 we thus deny that they make a seventh category4 ,but enough of this long discussion4 ,substantiality1 c4 7dravyatvdi71 i4e41 the genera of substance1 quality1 and action1 are the definition of the triad substance1 quality1 and action respectively4 ,the genus of substance 7dravyatva7 is that which1 while it alike exists with intimate relation in the 7eternal7 sky and the 7transitory7 lotus1 is itself eternal1#afj and does not exist with intimate relation in smell4#afa ,the genus of quality 7gunatva7 is that which is immediately subordinate to the genus existence1 and exists with intimate relation in whatever is not an intimate or mediate cause4#afb ,the genus of action 7karmatva7 is that which is immediately subordinate to the genus existence1 and is not found with intimate relation in anything eternal4#afc ,generality 7or genus1 smnya7 is that which is found in many things with intimate relation1 and can never be the counter-entity to emergent non-existence4#afd ,particularity#afe 7visesha7 exists with intimate relation1 but it is destitute of generality1 which stops mutual non-existence4#aff ,intimate relation 7samavya7 is that connection which itself has not intimate relation4#afg ,such are the definitions of the six categories4 ,substance is ninefold1--earth1 water1 fire1 air1 ether1 time1 space1 soul1 and mind4 ,the genera of earth1 c4 7prithivtva71 are the definitions of the first four4 ,the genus of earth is that generality which is immediately subordinate to substance1 and resides in the same subject with colour produced by baking4#afh ,the genus of water is that generality which is found with intimate relation in water1 being also found in intimate relation in river and sea4 ,the genus of fire is that generality which is found with intimate relation in fire1 being also found with intimate relation in the moon and gold4 ,the genus of air is that which is immediately subordinate to substance1 and is found with intimate relation in the organ of the skin4#afi ,as ether1 space1 and time1 from their being single1 cannot be subordinate genera1 their several names stand respectively for their technical appellations4 ,ether is the abode of particularity1 and is found in the same subject with the non-eternal 7janya7 special quality which is not produced by contact4#agj ,time is that which1 being a pervading substance1 is the abode of the mediate cause#aga of that idea of remoteness 7paratva7 which is not found with intimate relation in space2#agb while space is that pervading substance which possesses no special qualities and yet is not time4#agc ,the general terms tmatva and manastva are the respective definitions of soul 7tman7 and mind 7manas74 ,the general idea of soul is that which is subordinate to substance1 being also found with intimate relation in that which is without form#agd 7amrtta74 ,the general idea of mind is that which is subordinate to substance1 being also found existing with intimate relation in an atom1 but unlike other atoms not the intimate cause of any substance4 ,there are twenty-four qualities2 seventeen are mentioned directly in ,kanda's ,stras 7i4 #a1 #f71 colour1 taste1 smell1 touch1 number1 quantity1 severalty1 conjunction1 disjunction1 remoteness1 proximity1 intelligence1 pleasure1 pain1 desire1 aversion1 and effort2 and1 besides these1 seven others are understood in the word and1 viz41 gravity1 fluidity1 viscidity1 faculty1 merit1 demerit1 and sound4 ,their respective genera 7rpatva1 c47 are their several definitions4 ,the class or genus of colour is that which is subordinate to quality and exists with intimate relation in blue4 ,in the same way may be formed the definitions of the rest4 ,action is fivefold1 according to the distinction of throwing upwards1 throwing downwards1 contracting1 expanding1 and going3 revolution1 evacuating1 c41 being included under going4 ,the genus of throwing upwards1 c41 will be their respective definitions4 ,the genus of throwing upwards is a subordinate genus to action2 it exists with intimate relation1 and is to be known as the mediate cause of conjunction with a higher place4 ,in the same manner are to be made the definitions of throwing downwards1 c4 ,generality 7or genus7 is twofold1 extensive and non-extensive2 existence is extensive as found with intimate connection in substance and quality1 or in quality and action2 substance1 c41 are non-extensive4 ,the definition of generality has been given before4 ,particularity and intimate relation cannot be divided1--in the former case in consequence of the infinite number of separate particularities1 in the latter from intimate relation being but one2 their definitions have been given before4 ,there is a popular proverb-- ,duality1 change produced by baking1 and disjunction produced by disjunction1--he whose mind vacillates not in these three is the true ,vaiseshika2 and therefore we will now show the manner of the production of duality1 c4 ,there is here first the contact of the organ of sense with the object2 thence there arises the knowledge of the genus unity2 then the distinguishing perception apekshbuddhi by which we apprehend this is one1 this is one1 c42 then the production of duality1 dvitva 7in the object72#age then the knowledge of the abstract genus of duality 7dvitvatva72 then the knowledge of the quality duality as it exists in the two things2 then imagination#agf 7samskra74#agg ,but it may here be asked what is the proof of duality1 c41 being thus produced from apekshbuddhi8 ,the great doctor 7,udayana7 maintained that apekshbuddhi must be the producer of duality1 c41 because duality is never found separated from it1 while1 at the same time1 we cannot hold apekshbuddhi as the cause only of its being known and therefore it follows that it must be the cause of its being produced#agh1 just as contact is with regard to sound4 ,we1 however1 maintain the same opinion by a different argument2 duality1 c41 cannot be held to be made known 7jpya7 by that non-eternal apprehension whose object is two or more individual unities 7i4e41 apekshbuddhi71 because these are qualities which reside in a plurality of subjects and not in any one individual#agi just as severalty does and1 therefore1 as apekshbuddhi is not their jpaka1 it must be their janaka4 ,next we will describe the order of the successive destructions4 ,from apekshbuddhi arises1 simultaneously with the production of duality 7dvitva71 the destruction of the knowledge of the genus of unity2 next from the knowledge of the genus of duality 7dvitvatva7 arises1 simultaneously with the knowledge of the quality duality1 the destruction of apekshbuddhi2 next from the destruction of apekshbuddhi arises1 simultaneously with the knowledge of the two substances1 the destruction of the duality2 next from the knowledge of the two substances arises1 simultaneously with the production of imagination 7samskra71 the destruction of the knowledge of the quality2 and next from imagination arises the destruction of the knowledge of the substances4 ,the evidence for the destruction of one kind of knowledge by another1 and for the destruction of another knowledge by imagination1 is to be found in the following argument2 these knowledges themselves which are the subjects of the discussion are successively destroyed by the rise of others produced from them1 because knowledge1 like sound1 is a special quality of an all-pervading substance1 and of momentary duration4#ahj ,i may briefly add1 that when you have the knowledge of the genus of unity simultaneously with an action in one of the two things themselves1 producing that separation which is the opposite to the conjunction that produced the whole1 in that case you have the subsequent destruction of duality produced by the destruction of its abiding-place 7the two things72 but where you have this separate action taking place simultaneously with the rise of apekshbuddhi1 there you have the destruction of duality produced by the united influence of both4#aha ,apekshbuddhi is to be considered as that operation of the mind which is the counter-entity to that emergent non-existence 7i4e41 destruction7 which itself causes a subsequent destruction4#ahb ,next we will inquire in how many moments1 commencing with the destruction of the compound of two atoms 7the dvyanuka71 another compound of two atoms is produced1 having colour1 c4 ,in the course of this investigation the mode of production will be explained4 ,first1 the compound of two atoms is gradually destroyed by the series of steps commencing with the contact of fire2#ahc secondly1 from the conjunction of fire arises the destruction of the qualities black1 c41 in the single atom2 thirdly1 from another conjunction of fire arises the production of red1 c41 in the atom2 fourthly1 from conjunction with a soul possessing merit arises an action#ahd in the atom for the production of a substance2 fifthly1 by that action is produced a separation of that atom from its former place2 sixthly1 there is produced thereby the destruction of its conjunction with that former place2 seventhly1 is produced the conjunction with another atom2 eighthly1 from these two atoms arises the compound of two atoms2 ninthly1 from the qualities1 c41 of the causes 7i4e41 the atoms7 are produced colour1 c41 the qualities of the effect 7i4e41 the dvyanuka74 ,such is the order of the series of nine moments4 ,the other two series1#ahe that of the ten and that of the eleven moments1 are omitted for fear of prolixity4 ,such is the mode of production1 if we hold 7with the ,vaiseshikas7 that the baking process takes place in the atoms of the jar4#ahf ,the ,naiyyikas1 however1 maintain that the baking process takes place in the jar4 ,disjunction produced by disjunction is twofold1--that produced by the disjunction of the intimate or material causes only1 and that produced by the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause i4e41 the place4 ,we will first describe the former kind4 ,it is a fixed rule that when the action of breaking arises in the material cause which is inseparably connected with the effect i4e41 in one of the two halves of the pot1 and produces a disjunction from the other half1 there is not produced at that time a disjunction from the place or point of space occupied by the pot2 and1 again1 when there is a disjunction from that point of space occupied by the pot1 the disjunction from the other half is not contemporary with it1 but has already taken place4 ,for just as we never see smoke without its cause1 fire1 so we never see that effect of the breaking in the pot which we call the disjunction from the point of space1#ahg without there having previously been the origination of that disjunction of the halves which stops the conjunction whereby the pot was brought into being4 ,therefore the action of breaking in the parts produces the disjunction of one part from another1 but not the disjunction from the point of space2 next1 this disjunction of one part from another produces the destruction of that conjunction which had brought the pot into existence2 and thence arises the destruction of the pot1 according to the principle1 cessante caus cessat effectus4 ,the pot being thus destroyed1 that disjunction1 which resides in both the halves 7which are the material or intimate causes of the pot7 during the time that is marked by the destruction of the pot or perhaps having reference only to one independent half1 initiates1 in the case of that half where the breaking began1 a disjunction from the point of space which had been connected with the pot2 but not in the case of the other half1 as there is no cause to produce it4#ahh ,but the second kind is as follows3--,as action which arises in the hand1 and causes a disjunction from that with which it was in contact1 initiates a disjunction#ahi from the points of space in which the original conjunction took place2 and this is the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause4 ,when the action in the hand produces an effect in relation to any points of space1 it initiates also in the same direction a disjunction of the intimate effect and the non-effect2 thus the disjunction of the body the intimate effect and the points of space arises from the disjunction of the hand and the points of space the hand being an intimate or material cause of the body1 but the points of space being not a cause4 ,this second disjunction is not produced by the action of the body1 because the body is supposed to be at the time inactive2 nor is it produced by the action of the hand1 because it is impossible that an action residing in some other place as the hand should produce the effect of disjunction in the body4 ,therefore we conclude by exhaustion that we must accept the view--that it is the disjunction of the intimate cause and the non-cause#aij which causes the second disjunction of the body and the points of space4 ,but an opponent may here object that what you formerly stated 7p4 #adg7 as to existence being denied of darkness1 c41 is surely unreasonable2 for1 in fact1 there are no less than four different opinions maintained on this point1--thus 7a47 the ,bhtta ,mmmsakas and the ,vedntins hold that darkness is a substance2 7b47 ,srdhara chrya#aia holds that the colour of dark blue is imposed and thus darkness will be a quality2 7c47 some of the ,prbhkara ,mmmsakas hold that it is the absence of the cognition of light2 7d47 the ,naiyyikas1 c41 hold that it is the absence of light4 ,in reply1 we assert that as for the first alleged opinion 7a47 it is quite out of the question1 as it is consistent with neither of the two possible alternatives2 for if darkness is a substance1 it must either be one of the nine well-known substances1 earth1 c41#aib or some different one4 ,but it cannot be any one of the nine1 since1 under whichever one you would place it1 all the qualities of that substance should certainly be found in it2 nor can you1 on the other hand1 assert that it is some substance different from these nine1 since1 being in itself destitute of qualities1 it cannot properly be a substance at all the very definition of substance being that which is the substratum of qualities1 and therefore1 of course1 it cannot be a different substance from the nine4 ,but you may ask1 ,how can you say that darkness is destitute of qualities1 when it is perceived as possessed of the dark blue of the tamla blossom8 ,we reply1 that this is merely an error1 as when men say that the colourless sky is blue4 ,but enough of this onslaught on ancient sages4#aic 7b47 ,hence it follows that darkness cannot have its colour imposed upon it1 since you cannot have an imposition of colour without supposing some substratum to receive it2#aid and again1 we cannot conceive the eye as capable of imposing a colour when deprived of the concurrent cause1 the external light4 ,nor can we accept that it is an impression independent of the eye i4e41 produced by the internal sense1 mind1 because the concurrence of the eye is not a superfluous but an indispensable condition to its being produced4 ,nor can you maintain that absence or non-existence 7abhva#aie7 is incapable of being expressed by affirmative tense affixes and1 therefore1 as we do use such phrases as tenebr oriuntur1 darkness cannot be a mere non-existence2 because your assertion is too broad1 as it would include such cases of non-existence as a mundane collapse1 destruction1 inattention1#aif c4 and yet we all know that men do speak of any of these things as past1 present1 or future1 and yet all are cases of abhva4 7c47 ,hence darkness cannot be the absence of the cognition of light1 since1 by the well-known rule that that organ which perceives a certain object can also perceive its absence1 it would follow that darkness would be perceived by the mind since it is the mind which perceives cognitions4#aig ,hence we conclude that the fourth or remaining opinion must be the true one1 viz41 that darkness is only the absence of light4 ,and it need not be objected that it is very difficult to account for the attribution to non-existence of the qualities of existence1 for we all see that the quality happiness is attributed to the absence of pain1 and the idea of separation is connected with the absence of conjunction4 ,and you need not assert that this absence of light must be the object of a cognition produced by the eye in dependence on light1 since it is the absence of an object possessing colour1#aih as we see in the case of a jar's absence1 because by the very rule on which you rely1 viz41 that that on which the eye depends to perceive an object1 it must also depend on to perceive that object's absence1 it follows that as there is no dependence of the eye on light to perceive light1 it need not depend thereon to perceive this light's absence4 ,nor need our opponent retort that the cognition of darkness as the absence of light necessitates the cognition of the place where the absence resides and this will require light1 as such an assertion is quite untenable1 for we cannot admit that in order to have a conception of absence it is necessary to have a conception of the place where the absence resides1 else we could not have the perception of the cessation of sound1 as is implied in such an expression as the tumult has ceased4#aii ,hence1 having all these difficulties in his mind1 the venerable ,kanda uttered his aphorism as an ipse dixit to settle the question3 ,dravya-guna-karma-nish-patti-vaidharmyd abhvas tamas 7,vais4 ,st4 v4 #b1 #ai71 ,darkness is really non-existence1 since it is dissimilar to the production of substances1 qualities1 or actions4 ,the same thing has been also established by the argument that darkness is perceived by the eye#bjj without light1 whereas all substances1 if perceptible at all1 require the presence of light as well as of the eye to be visible4 ,non-existence 7abhva7 is considered to be the seventh category1 as established by negative proofs4 ,it may be concisely defined as that which1 itself not having intimate relation1 is not intimate relation2#bja and this is twofold1 relative non-existence#bjb and reciprocal non-existence4 ,the former is again divided into antecedent1 emergent1 and absolute4 ,antecedent is that non-existence which1 though without any beginning1 is not everlasting2 emergent is that which1 though having a beginning1 is everlasting2 absolute is that non-existence which abides in its own counter-entity2#bjc reciprocal non-existence is that which1 being different from absolute1 has yet no defined limit i4e41 no terminus ad quem nor terminus a quo1 as antecedent and emergent have4 ,if you raise the objection that 'reciprocal non-existence' is really the same as 'absolute non-existence1' we reply that this is indeed to lose one's way in the king's highroad2 for reciprocal non-existence is that negation whose opposite is held to be identity1 as a jar is not cloth2 but absolute non-existence is that negation whose opposite is connection1 as there is no colour in the air4#bjd ,nor need you here raise the objection that abhva can never be a means of producing any good to man1 for we maintain that it is his summum bonum1 in the form of final beatitude1 which is only another term for the absolute abolition of all pain and therefore comes under the category of abhva4 ,e4 ,b4 ,c4 ,,footnotes3 ,footnote #aed3 ,the ,vaiseshikas are called ,aulkyh in ,hemachandra's ,abhidhna-chintmani2 in the ,vyu-purna 7quoted in ,aufrecht's ,catal4 p4 #ec b1 l4 #bc71 ,akshapda1 ,kanda1 ,ulka1 and ,vatsa are called the sons of ,siva4 ,footnote #aee3 ,he is here called by his synonym ,kanabhaksha4 ,footnote #aef3 ,it is singular that this is inaccurate4 ,the ninth book treats of that perception which arises from supersensible contact1 c41 and inference4 ,the tenth treats of the mutual difference of the qualities of the soul1 and the three causes4 ,footnote #aeg3 ,for this extract from the old bhshya of ,vtsyyana1 see ,colebrooke's ,essays 7new edition71 vol4 i4 p4 #bhe4 ,footnote #aeh3 ,cf4 ,bhsh-parichchheda1 sloka #ad4 ,footnote #aei3 ,particularity 7visesha7 resides by intimate relation in the eternal atoms1 c4 ,footnote #afj3 ,this clause is added1 as otherwise the definition would apply to duality and conjunction4 ,footnote #afa3 ,this is added1 as otherwise the definition would apply to existence 7satt71 which is the summum genus1 to which substance1 quality1 and action are immediately subordinate4 ,footnote #afb3 ,existence 7satt7 is the genus of dravya1 guna1 and kriy4 ,dravya alone can be the intimate cause of anything2 and all actions are the mediate 7or non-intimate7 cause of conjunction and disjunction4 ,some qualities 7as samyoga1 rpa1 c47 may be mediate causes1 but this is accidental and does not belong to the essence of guna1 as many gunas can never be mediate causes4 ,footnote #afc3 ,as all karmas are transitory1 karmatva is only found in the anitya4 ,i correct in p4 #aje1 line #bj1 nity-samavetatva2 this is the reading of the ,,ms4 in the ,calcutta ,sanskrit ,college ,library4 ,footnote #afd3 ,i4e41 it can never be destroyed4 ,indestructibility1 however1 is found in time1 space1 c42 to exclude these1 therefore1 the former clause of the definition is added4 ,footnote #afe3 ,particularity 7whence the name ,vaiseshika7 is not individuality1 as of this particular flash of lightning1--but it is the individuality either of those eternal substances which1 being single1 have no genus1 as ether1 time1 and space2 or of the different atomic minds2 or of the atoms of the four remaining substances1 earth1 water1 fire1 and air1 these atoms being supposed to be the ne plus ultra1 and as they have no parts1 they are what they are by their own indivisible nature4 ,ballantyne translated visesha as ultimate difference4 ,i am not sure whether the individual soul has visesha4 ,footnote #aff3 ,mutual non-existence 7anyonybhva7 exists between two notions which have no property in common1 as a pot is not cloth2 but the genus is the same in two pots1 both alike being pots4 ,footnote #afg3 ,samavyasambandbhvt samavyo na jtih1 ,siddh4 ,mukt4 7,samyoga being a guna has gunatva existing in it with intimate relation74 ,footnote #afh3 ,the feel or touch of earth is said to be neither hot nor cold1 and its colour1 taste1 smell1 and touch are changed by union with fire 7,bhsh-parichchheda1 sl4 #ajc1 #ajd74 ,footnote #afi3 ,the organ of touch is an arial integument4--,colebrooke4 ,footnote #agj3 ,sound is twofold1--produced from contact1 as the first sound1 and produced from sound1 as the second4 ,janya is added to exclude ,god's knowledge1 while samyogjanya excludes the soul's1 which is produced by contact1 as of the soul and mind1 mind and the senses1 c4 ,footnote #aga3 ,the mediate cause itself is the conjunction of time with some body1 c41 existing in time1--this latter is the intimate cause1 while the knowledge of the revolutions of the sun is the instrumental cause4 ,in p4 #ajf1 line #ab1 read adhikaranam4 ,footnote #agb3 ,paratva being of two kinds1 daisika and klika4 ,footnote #agc3 ,time1 space1 and mind have no special qualities2 the last1 however1 is not pervading but atomic4 ,footnote #agd3 ,the three other padrthas1 beside soul1 which are amrtta1--time1 ether1 and space1--are not genera4 ,footnote #age3 ,all numbers1 from duality upwards1 are artificial1 i4e41 they are made by our minds2 unity alone exists in things themselves--each being one2 and they only become two1 c41 by our choosing to regard them so1 and thus joining them in thought4 ,footnote #agf3 ,samskra is here the idea conceived by the mind--created1 in fact1 by its own energies out of the material previously supplied to it by the senses and the internal organ or mind4 7,cf4 the tables in p4 #aec47 ,footnote #agg3 ,here and elsewhere ,i omit the metrical summary of the original1 as it adds nothing new to the previous prose4 ,footnote #agh3 ,every cause must be either jpaka or janaka2 apekshbuddhi1 not being the former1 must be the latter4 ,footnote #agi3 ,apekshbuddhi apprehends this is one1 this is one1 c42 but duality1 for instance1 does not reside in either of these1 but in both together4 ,footnote #ahj3 ,the ,vaiseshikas held that the jvtman and space are each an all-pervading substance1 but the individual portions of each have different special qualities2 hence one man knows what another is ignorant of1 and one portion of ether has sound when another portion has not4 ,dr4 ,rer1 in his version of the ,bhsh-,parichchheda1 has mistranslated an important ,stra which bears on this point4 ,it is said in ,stra #bf-- ----athksasarrinam1 avypyavrittih kshaniko visesha-guna ishyate1 which does not mean the special qualities of ether and soul are limitation to space and momentary duration1 but the special qualities of ether and soul 7i4e41 sound1 knowledge1 c47 are limited to different portions and of momentary duration4 ,footnote #aha3 ,the author here mentions two other causes of the destruction of dvitva besides that already given in p4 #aeb1 l4 #ad 7apekshbuddhi-nsa71 viz41 srayansa1 and the united action of both3-- #a4 ,ekatva-jna ,avayava-kriy 4 4 4 #b4 ,apekshbuddhi ,avayava-vibhga ,avayava-kriy4 #c4 ,dvitvotpatti and ,avayava-samyoga-nsa ,avayava-vibhga4 ekatva-jna-nsa #d4 ,dvitvatvajna ,dvitvdhrasya ,avayava-samyoga-nsa4 7i4e41 avayavinah7 nsah #e4 ,dvitvaguna-buddhi,dvitva-nsa dhra-nsa and of avayavin74 7i4e41 apekshbuddhi-nsa 7of avayavin74 #f4 ,dvitva-nsa and 4 4 4 ,dvitva-nsa4 dravya-buddhi ,the second and third columns represent what takes place when1 in the course of the six steps of ekatvajna1 c41 one of the two parts is itself divided either at the first or the second moment4 ,in the first case1 the dvitva of the whole is destroyed in the fifth moment1 and therefore its only cause is its immediately preceding dvitvdhra-nsa1 or1 as ,mdhava calls it1 srayanivritti4 ,in the second case1 the nsa arrives at the same moment simultaneously by both columns 7#a7 and 7#c71 and hence it may be ascribed to the united action of two causes1 apekshbuddhi-nsa and dhra-nsa4 ,any kriy which arose in one of the parts after the second moment would be unimportant1 as the nsa of the dvitva of the whole would take place by the original sequence in column 7#a7 in the sixth moment2 and in this way it would be too late to affect that result4 ,footnote #ahb3 ,i4e41 from the destruction of apekshbuddhi follows the destruction of dvitva2 but the other destructions previously described were followed by some production1--thus the knowledge of dvitvatva arose from the destruction of ekatvajna1 c4 7cf4 ,siddh4 ,mukt41 p4 #ajg74 ,i may remind the reader that in ,hindu logic the counter-entity to the non-existence of a thing is the thing itself4 ,footnote #ahc3 ,from the conjunction of fire is produced an action in the atoms of the jar2 thence a separation of one atom from another2 thence a destruction of the conjunction of atoms which made the black 7or unbaked7 jar2 thence the destruction of the compound of two atoms4 ,footnote #ahd3 ,i4e41 a kind of initiative tendency4 ,footnote #ahe3 ,these are explained at full length in the ,siddhnta ,muktval1 pp4 #ajd1 #aje4 ,in the first series we have--#a4 the destruction of the dvyanuka and simultaneously a disjunction from the old place produced by the disjunction 7of the parts72 #b4 the destruction of the black colour in the dvyanuka1 and the simultaneous destruction of the conjunction of the dvyanuka with that place2 #c4 the production of the red colour in the atoms1 and the simultaneous conjunction with another place2 #d4 the cessation of the action in the atom produced by the original conjunction of fire4 ,the remaining #e-aj agree with the #d-i above4 ,footnote #ahf3 ,the ,vaiseshikas hold that when a jar is baked1 the old black jar is destroyed1 its several compounds of two atoms1 c41 being destroyed2 the action of the fire then produces the red colour in the separate atoms1 and1 joining these into new compounds1 eventually produces a new red jar4 ,the exceeding rapidity of the steps prevents the eye's detecting the change of the jars4 ,the followers of the ,nyya maintain that the fire penetrates into the different compounds of two or more atoms1 and1 without any destruction of the old jar1 produces its effects on these compounds1 and thereby changes not the jar but its colour1 c41--it is still the same jar1 only it is red1 not black4 ,footnote #ahg3 ,in p4 #aji1 line #ad1 ,i read gaganavibhgakartritvasya4 ,footnote #ahh3 ,the ,siddhnta ,muktval1 p4 #aab1 describes the series of steps3--#a4 ,an action1 as of breaking1 in one of the halves2 #b4 the disjunction of the two halves2 #c4 the destruction of the conjunction which originally produced the pot2 #d4 the destruction of the pot2 #e4 by the disjunction of the two halves is produced a disjunction of the severed half from the old place2 #f4 the destruction of the conjunction with that old place2 #g4 the conjunction with the new place2 #h4 the cessation of the original impulse of fracture4 ,here the second disjunction 7viz41 of the half of the pot and the place7 is produced by the previous disjunction of the halves1 the intimate causes of the pot4 ,footnote #ahi3 ,the original has a plural vibhgn1 i4e41 disjunctions from the several points4 ,footnote #aij3 ,i4e41 the disjunction of the hand and the points of space4 ,footnote #aia3 ,the author of a commentary on the ,bhagavad ,gt4 ,footnote #aib3 ,for dravydi read prithivydi4 ,footnote #aic3 ,i am not sure that it would not be better to read viddhavevidhay1 rewounding the wounded1 instead of vriddhavvadhay4 ,footnote #aid3 ,unless you see the rope you cannot mistake it for a serpent4 ,footnote #aie3 ,in p4 #aaj1 last line1 read 'bhve4 ,footnote #aif3 ,read in p4 #aaj1 last line1 anavadhndishu4 ,vidhipratyaya properly means an imperative or potential affix implying command2 but the pandit takes vidhi here as bhvabodhaka-kriy4 ,it has that meaning in ,kvya-praksa1 ,v4 7p4 #aad1 l4 #a74 ,footnote #aig3 ,the mind perceives loka-jna1 therefore it would perceive its absence1 i4e41 darkness1 but this last is perceived by the eye4 ,footnote #aih3 ,i4e41 light possesses colour1 and we cannot see a jar's absence in the dark4 ,footnote #aii3 ,sound resides in the imperceptible ether1 and cessation is the dhvamsbhva1 or emergent non-existence4 ,footnote #bjj3 ,the reading pratyayavedyatvena seems supported by p4 #aaj1 last line1 but it is difficult to trace the argument2 ,i have1 therefore1 ventured hesitatingly to read pratyakshavedyatvena1 and would refer to the commentary 7,vais4 ,st4 p4 #bej71 yadi hi nla-rpavan nlam rpam eva v tamah syt1 vhylokapragraham antarena chakshush na grihyeta4 ,footnote #bja3 ,intimate relation has also no intimate relation4 ,footnote #bjb3 ,relative non-existence 7samsargbhva7 is the negation of a relation2 thus the jar is not in the house is absolute non-existence1 it was not in the house is antecedent1 and it will not be in the house is emergent1 non-existence4 ,footnote #bjc3 ,i4e41 the absolute absence of the jar is found in the jar1 as1 of course1 the jar does not reside in the jar1 but in the spot of ground1--it is the jti ghatatva which resides in the jar4 ,footnote #bjd3 ,the opposite is there is colour in the air4 ,,chapter ,,xi4 ,,the ,,akshap,,da 7,,or ,,ny,,ya7 ,,darsana4 ,the principle that final bliss1 i4e41 the absolute abolition of pain1 arises from the knowledge of the truth though in a certain sense universally accepted1 is established in a special sense as a particular tenet#bje of the ,nyya school1 as is declared by the author of the aphorisms in the words proof1 that which is to be proved1 c41--from knowledge of the truth as to these things there is the attainment of final bliss4 ,this is the first aphorism of the ,nyya ,sstra4 ,now the ,nyya ,sstra consists of five books1 and each book contains two daily portions4 ,in the first daily portion of the first book the venerable ,gotama discusses the definitions of nine categories1 beginning with proof1 and in the second those of the remaining seven1 beginning with discussion 7vda74 ,in the first daily portion of the second book he examines doubt1 discusses the four kinds of proof1 and refutes the suggested objections to their being instruments of right knowledge2 and in the second he shows that presumption1 c41 are really included in the four kinds of proof already given and therefore need not be added by the ,mmmsakas as separate ones4 ,in the first daily portion of the third book he examines the soul1 the body1 the senses1 and their objects2 in the second1 understanding 7buddhi71 and mind 7manas74 ,in the first daily portion of the fourth book he examines volition 7pravritti71 the faults1 transmigration1 fruit of actions1 pain1 and final liberation2 in the second he investigates the truth#bjf as to the causes of the faults1 and also wholes and parts4 ,in the first daily portion of the fifth book he discusses the various kinds of futility 7jti71 and in the second the various kinds of occasion for rebuke 7nigrahasthna1 or unfitness to be argued with74 ,in accordance with the principle that to know the thing to be measured you must first know the measure1 proof 7pramna7 is first enunciated1 and as this must be done by defining it1 we have first a definition of proof4 ,proof is that which is always accompanied by right knowledge1 and is at the same time not disjoined from the proper instruments as the eye1 c41 and from the site of knowledge i4e41 the soul2#bjg and this definition thus includes the peculiar tenet of the ,nyya ,school that ,god is a source of right knowledge1#bjh as the author of the aphorisms has expressly declared 7ii4 #fh71 and the fact of the ,veda's being a cause of right knowledge1 like spells and the medical science1 follows from the fact that the fit one who gave the ,veda was a source of right knowledge4 ,and thus too hath the universally renowned teacher ,udayana1 who saw to the farthest shore of the ocean of logic1 declared in the fourth chapter of the ,kusumjali3 ,right knowledge is accurate comprehension1 and right knowing is the possession thereof2 authoritativeness is1 according to ,gotama's school1 the being separated from all absence thereof4 ,he in whose intuitive unerring perception1 inseparably united to ,him and dependent on no foreign inlets1 the succession of all the various existing objects is contained1--all the chaff of our suspicion being swept away by the removal of all possible faults as caused by the slightest want of observation in ,him1--,he1 ,siva1 is my authority2 what have ,i to do with others1 darkened as their authority must ever be with rising doubts8 ,proof is fourfold1 as being divided into perception1 inference1 analogy1 and testimony4 ,the thing to be proved or the object of right notion is of twelve kinds1 viz41 soul1 body1 the senses1 their objects1 understanding1 mind1 volition1 faults1 transmigrations1 fruit1 pain1 and final liberation4 ,doubt is a knowledge whose nature is uncertainty2 and this is threefold1 as being caused by the object's possessing only qualities which are common to other things also1 and therefore not distinctive1--or by its possessing only irrelevant qualities of its own1 which do not help us in determining the particular point in question1#bji--or by conflicting testimony4 ,the thing which one proposes to one's self before proceeding to act1 is a motive 7prayojana72 this is twofold1 i4e41 visible and invisible4 ,an example is a fact brought forward as a ground for establishing a general principle1 and it may be either affirmative or negative4#baj ,a tenet 7siddhnta7 is something which is accepted as being authoritatively settled as true2 it is of four kinds1 as being common to all the schools1 peculiar to one school1 a pregnant assumption leading1 if conceded1 to a further conclusion1 and an implied dogma 7i4 #bf-ca74 ,the member 7of a demonstration7 is a part of the sentence containing an inference for the sake of another2 and these are five1 the proposition1 the reason1 the example1 the application1 and the conclusion 7i4 #cb-ch74 ,confutation 7tarka1 i4 #ci7 is the showing that the admission of a false minor necessitates the admission of a false major#baa 7cf4 ,st4 i4 #ci1 and iv4 #c72 and this is of eleven kinds1 as vyghta1 tmsraya1 itaretarsraya1 c4 ,ascertainment 7nirnaya1 i4 #dj7 is right knowledge or a perception of the real state of the case4 ,it is of four kinds as produced by perception1 inference1 analogy1 or testimony4 ,discussion 7vda7 is a particular kind of conversation1 having as its end the ascertainment of truth 7i4 #da74 ,wrangling 7jalpa7 is the talk of a man only wishing for victory1 who is ready to employ arguments for either side of the question 7i4 #db74 ,cavilling 7vitand7 is the talk of a man who does not attempt to establish his own side of the question 7i4 #dc74 ,dialogue 7kath7 is the taking of two opposite sides by two disputants4 ,a fallacy is an inconclusive reason which is supposed to prove something1 and this may be of five kinds1 the erratic1 the contradictory1 the uncertain1 the unproved1 and the precluded or mistimed 7,st4 i4 #dd-di74 ,unfairness 7chhala7 is the bringing forward a contrary argument by using a term wilfully in an ambiguous sense2 this is of three kinds1 as there may be fraud in respect of a term1 the meaning1 or a metaphorical phrase 7i4 #ej-ed74 ,futility 7jti7 is a self-destructive argument 7i4 #eh74 ,this is of twenty-four kinds 7as described in the fifth book of the ,nyya aphorisms7 7#a-ch74 ,occasion for rebuke is where the disputant loses his cause by stupidity1 and this is of twenty-two kinds 7as described in the fifth book of the aphorisms1 #dd-fg74 ,we do not insert here all the minute subdivisions through fear of being too prolix1--they are fully explained in the aphorisms4 ,but here an objector may say1 ,if these sixteen topics1 proof1 c41 are all thus fully discussed1 how is it that it has received the name of the ,nyya ,sstra1 as reasoning1 i4e41 ,nyya1 or logic1 properly forms only a small part of the topics which it treats of8 ,we allow the force of the objection2 still as names are proverbially said to be given for some special reason1 we maintain that the name ,nyya was rightly applied to ,gotama's system1 since reasoning1 or inference for the sake of another1 is justly held to be a predominant feature from its usefulness in all kinds of knowledge1 and from its being a necessary means for every kind of pursuit4 ,so it has been said by ,sarvaja1 ,this is the pre-eminent science of ,nyya from its establishing our doctrines against opponents1 and from its producing action2#bab and by ,pakshila ,swmin1 ,this is the science of reasoning 7nvkshik7 divided into the different categories1 'proof1' c42 the lamp of all sciences1 the means for aiding all actions1 the ultimate appeal of all religious duties1 well proved in the declarations of science4#bac ,but here an objector may say1 ,when you declare that final liberation arises from the knowledge of the truth1 do you mean that liberation ensues immediately upon this knowledge being attained8 ,we reply1 ,no1 for it is said in the second ,nyya aphorism1 ,pain1 birth1 activity1 faults1 false notions1--on the successive annihilation of these in turn1 there is the annihilation of the one next before it1 by means of this knowledge of the truth4 ,now false notions are the thinking the body1 c41 which are not the soul1 to be the soul2 faults are a desire for those things which seem agreeable to the soul1 and a dislike to those things which seem disagreeable to it1#bad though in reality nothing is either agreeable or disagreeable to the soul4 ,and through the mutual reaction of these different faults the stupid man desires and the desiring man is stupid2 the stupid man is angry1 and the angry man is stupid4 ,moreover the man1 impelled by these faults1 does those things which are forbidden3 thus by the body he does injury1 theft1 c42 by the voice1 falsehood1 c42 by the mind1 malevolence1 c42 and this same sinful activity produces demerit4 ,or1 again1 he may do laudable actions by his body1 as alms1 saving others1 c41 truthful speaking1 upright counsel1 c41 by his voice1 and guilelessness1 c41 by his mind2 and this same right activity produces merit4 ,but both are forms of activity1 and each leads to a similar laudable or blamable birth or bodily manifestation2 and while this birth lasts there arises the impression of pain1 which we are conscious of as of something that jars against us4 ,now this series1 beginning with false notions and ending with pain1 is continually going on1 and is what we mean by the words mundane existence1 which rolls on ceaselessly1 like a waterwheel4 ,and whenever some pre-eminent man1 by the force of his previous good deeds1 obtains through the teaching of a great teacher the knowledge that all this present life is only a scene of pain and bound up with pain1 he recognises that it is all to be avoided1 and desires to abolish the ignorance1 c41 which are the causes that produced it4#bae ,then he learns that the one means to abolish it is the knowledge of the truth2 and as he meditates on the objects of right knowledge divided into the four sciences1#baf there arises in his mind the knowledge of the truth1 or1 in other words1 a right view of things as they are2 and from this knowledge of the truth false notions disappear4 ,when false notions disappear1 the faults pass away2 with them ceases activity2 and with it ceases birth2 and with the cessation of birth comes the entire abolition of pain1 and this absolute abolition is final bliss4 ,its absoluteness consists in this1 that nothing similar to that which is thus abolished can ever revive1 as is expressly said in the second aphorism of the ,nyya ,stras3 ,pain1 birth1 activity1 faults1 false notions1--since1 on the successive annihilation of these in turn1 there is the annihilation of the one next before it1 there is on the annihilation of the last of them final beatitude4 ,but is not your definition of the summum bonum1 liberation1 i4e41 'the absolute abolition of pain1' after all as much beyond our reach as treacle on the elbow is to the tongue2#bag why then is this continually put forth as if it were established beyond all dispute8 ,we reply that as all those who maintain liberation in any form do include therein the absolute abolition of pain1 our definition1 as being thus a tenet accepted in all the schools1 may well be called the royal highway#bah of philosophy4 ,no one1 in fact1 maintains that pain is possible without the individual's activity4 ,thus even the ,mdhyamika's opinion that liberation consists in the abolition of soul1 does not controvert our point1 so far at any rate as that it is the abolition of pain4 ,but if you proceed to argue that the soul1 as being the cause of pain1 is to be abolished just like the body1 c41 we reply that this does not hold1 since it fails under either alternative4 ,for do you mean by the soul1 7a47 the continued succession of cognitions1 or 7b47 something different therefrom8 7a47 ,if the former1 we make no objection1 since we ,naiyyikas allow that cognition is evanescent1#bai and we do desire to abolish cognition as a cause of pravritti or action#bbj1 for who would oppose a view which makes for his own side8 7b47 ,but if the latter1 then1 since it must be eternal1#bba its abolition is impossible2 and1 again1 a second objection would be that no one would try to gain your supposed summum bonum2 for surely no sensible person would strive to annihilate the soul1 which is always the dearest of all1 on the principle that everything else is dear for the soul's pleasure2 and1 again1 everybody uses such a phrase as liberated1 and this very term refutes the idea of annihilation or abolition4 ,but why not say with those ,bauddhas who hold the doctrine of pure intelligence i4e41 the ,yogchras and the ,sautrntikas#bbb1 that 'the summum bonum' is the rising of pure intelligence consequent on the cessation of the conscious subject8 ,to this view we object that there is an absence of means2 and also it cannot be established that the locus or subject of the two states is the same4 ,for the former1 if it is replied that the well-known fourfold set of ,bauddha contemplations#bbc are to be accepted as the cause1 we answer that1 as according to the ,bauddha tenet of the momentary existence of all things there cannot be one abiding subject of these contemplations1 they will necessarily exercise a languid power like studies pursued at irregular intervals1 and be thus ineffectual to produce any distinct recognition of the real nature of things4 ,and for the latter1 since the continued series of cognitions when accompanied by the natural obstacles#bbd is said to be bound1 and when freed from those obstacles is said to be liberated1 you cannot establish an identity of the subject in the two states so as to be able to say that the very same being which was bound is now liberated4 ,nor do we find the path of the ,jainas1 viz41 that ,liberation is the releasing from all 'obstructions1' a path entirely free from bars to impede the wayfarer4 ,pray1 will our ,jaina friend kindly inform us what he means by obstruction8#bbe ,if he answers merit1 demerit1 and error1 we readily grant what he says4 ,but if he maintains that the body is the true obstruction1 and hence ,liberation is the continual upspringing of the soul consequent on the body's annihilation1 as of a parrot released from its cage1 then we must inquire whether this said soul possesses form or not4 ,if it possesses form1 then has it parts or not8 ,if it has no parts1 then1 since the well-known definition of an atom will apply here as that which has form without parts1 it will follow that the attributes of the soul are1 like those of an atom1 imperceptible to the senses4#bbf ,if you say that it has parts1 then the general maxim that whatever has parts is non-eternal1 would necessitate that the soul is non-eternal2 and if this were conceded1 then two grand difficulties against the ,providential course of the world would burst in unopposed1 viz41 that what the soul has done would1 at its cessation1 perish with it and thus fail of producing the proper fruit1 while it would have reaped during life the effects of what it had not done as the good and evil which happened to it would not be the consequences of its actions in a former birth4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the ,jaina maintains that the soul does not possess form at all1 then how can he talk of the soul's upspringing1 since all such actions as motion necessarily involve an agent possessing form8#bbg ,again1 if we take the ,chrvka's view that the only bondage is dependence on another1 and therefore independence is the true liberation1--if by independence he means the cessation of pain1 we have no need to controvert it4 ,but if he means autocratic power1 then no sensible man can concede it1 as the very idea of earthly power involves the idea of a capability of being increased and of being equalled4#bbh ,again1 the ,snkhya opinion1 which first lays down that nature and soul are utterly distinct1 and then holds that liberation is the soul's remaining as it is in itself after nature on being known has withdrawn1--even this opinion accepts our tenet of the abolition of pain2 but there is left a difficulty as to whether this cognition of the distinction between nature and soul resides in the soul or in nature4 ,it is not consistent to say that it resides in the soul1 since the soul is held to be unchangeable1 and this would seem to involve that previously it had been hampered by ignorance2 nor can we say that it resides in nature1 since nature is always held to be unintelligent4 ,moreover1 is nature spontaneously active or inactive8 ,if the former1 then it follows that there can be no liberation at all1 since the spontaneous actions of things cannot be set aside2 and if the latter1 the course of mundane existence would at once cease to go on4 ,again1 we have the same recognition of our abolition of pain in the doctrine of ,bhatta ,sarvaja and his followers1 that ,liberation is the manifestation of an eternal happiness incapable of being increased2 but here we have the difficulty that an eternal happiness does not come within the range of definite proof4 ,if you allege ,sruti as the proof1 we reply that ,sruti has no place when the thing itself is precluded by a valid non-perception2#bbi or if you allow its authority1 then you will have to concede the existence of such things as floating stones4#bcj ,but if you give up the view that 'liberation is the manifestation of happiness1' and then accept such a view as that which holds it to be only the cessation of pain1 does not your conduct resemble that of the dyspeptic patient who refused sweet milk and preferred sour rice-gruel8 ,your satire1 however1 falls powerless1 as fitter for some speech in a play rather than for a grave philosophical argument4 ,the truth is that all happiness must be included under the category of pain1 since1 like honey mixed with poison1 it is always accompanied by pain1 either as admitting of increase1#bca or as being an object of perception1 or as being exposed to many hostile influences1 or as involving an irksome necessity of seeking all kinds of instruments for its production4 ,nor may you retort on us that we have fulfilled the proverb of seeking one thing and dropping another in the search1 since we have abolished happiness as being ever tainted by some incidental pain1 and1 at the same time1 our own favourite alternative is one which no one can consider desirable4 ,for the truth is that any attempt to establish happiness as the summum bonum1 since it is inevitably accompanied by various causes of pain1 is only like the man who would try to grasp a red-hot ball of iron under the delusion that it was gold4 ,in the case of objects of enjoyment got together by rightful means1 we may find many firefly-like pleasures2 but then how many are the rainy days to drown them8 ,and in the case of those got together by wrong means1 the mind cannot even conceive the future issue which will be brought about4 ,let our intelligent readers consider all this1 and not attempt to disguise their own conscious experience4 ,therefore it is that we hold it as indisputable that for him1 pre-eminent among his fellows1 who1 through the favour of the ,supreme ,being1 has1 by the regular method of listening to the revealed ,sruti1 c41 attained unto the knowledge of the real nature of the soul1 for him the absolute abolition of pain is the true ,liberation4 ,but it may be objected1 ,is there any proof at all for the existence of a ,supreme ,being1 i4e41 perception1 inference1 or ,sruti8 ,certainly perception cannot apply here1 since the ,deity1 as devoid of form1 c41 must be beyond the senses4 ,nor can inference hold1 since there is no universal proposition or true middle term which can apply4#bcb ,nor can ,sruti1 since neither of the resulting alternatives can be sustained2 for is it supposed to reveal1 as being itself eternal1 or as non-eternal8 ,under the former view an established tenet of our school would be contradicted viz41 that the ,veda is non-eternal2 under the latter1 we should be only arguing in a circle4#bcc ,as for comparison and any other proof which might be adduced as that sometimes called presumption1 c41 they need not be thought of for a moment1 as their object matter is definitely limited1 and cannot apply to the present case4#bcd ,therefore the ,supreme ,being seems to be as unreal as a hare's horn4 ,but all this elaborate disputation need excite no flurry in the breast of the intelligent1 as it can be at once met by the old argument1 ,the mountain1 seas1 c41 must have had a maker from their possessing the nature of effects just like a jar4 7a47 ,nor can our middle term possessing the nature of effects be rejected as unproved 7asiddha71 since it can be established beyond a doubt by the fact of the subject's possessing parts4 ,but what are we to understand by this 'possessing parts'8 ,is it 'existing in contact with parts1' or 'in intimate relation with parts'8 ,it cannot be the first1 since this would equally apply to such eternal things as ether1#bce c42 nor can it be the second1 since this would prove too much1 as applying to such cases as the eternal species1 thread1 which abides in intimate relation with the individual threads4 ,it therefore fails as a middle term for your argument4 ,we reply1 that it holds if we explain the possessing parts as belonging to the class of those substances which exist in intimate relation4#bcf ,or we may adopt another view and maintain that it is easy to infer the possessing the nature of effects from the consideration of their possessing intermediate magnitude4#bcg 7b47 ,nor can our middle term be rejected as contradictory 7viruddha71#bch since there is no such acknowledged universal proposition connected with it as would establish the opposite major term to that in our syllogism i4e41 that they must have had no maker4 7c47 ,nor is our middle term too general 7anaiknta71 since it is never found in opposite instances such as the lake1 which is the vipaksha in the argument1 ,the mountain has fire because it has smoke4 7d47 ,nor again is it precluded 7bdhita or kltyayopadishta71 for there is no superior evidence to exercise such a precluding power4 7e47 ,nor is it counter-balanced 7sat-pratipakshita71 for there does not appear to be any such equally valid antagonist4 ,if you bring forward as an antagonistic syllogism1 ,the mountains1 c41 cannot have had a maker1 from the fact that they were not produced by a body1 just as is the case with the eternal ether1--this pretended inference will no more stand examination than the young fawn can stand the attack of the full-grown lion2 for the additional words by a body are useless1 since from the fact that they were not produced would be a sufficient middle term by itself and the argument thus involves the fallacy called vypyatvsiddhi4#bci ,nor can you retort1 ,well1 let this then be our middle term2 for you cannot establish it as a real fact4 ,nor again is it possible to raise the smallest shadow of a fear lest our middle term should be liable to limitation by any suggested condition 7updhi71#bdj such as the being produced by a corporeal agent1 to limit our old reason from having the nature of effects1 because we have on our side a valid line of argument to establish our view1 viz41 ,if the mountains1 c41 had no maker1 then they would not be effects but all do acknowledge that they have the nature of effects1 for in this world that is not an effect which can attain its proper nature independently of any series of concurrent causes4 ,and this series inevitably involves the idea of some sort of maker2 and ,i mean by being a maker the being possessed of that combination of volition1 desire to act1 and knowledge of the proper means1 which sets in motion all other causes1 but is itself set in motion by none4 ,and hence we hold that if the necessity of a maker were overthrown1 the necessity of the action of all the other causes would be simultaneously overthrown1 since these are dependent thereon2 and this would lead to the monstrous doctrine that effects could be produced without any cause at all4 ,there is a rule laid down by ,sankara-kinkara which applies directly to the present case-- ,when a middle term is accompanied by a sound argument to establish its validity1 ,then you cannot attempt to supply a limiting condition on account of the supposed non-invariable concomitance of the major term4 ,if you maintain that there are many sound counter-arguments1 such as ,if the ,supreme ,being were a maker1 ,he would be possessed of a body1 c41 we reply1 that all such reasoning is equally inconsistent1 whether we allow that ,supreme ,being's existence to be established or not4#bda ,as has been said by ,udayana chrya in the ,kusumjali1 iii4 #e-- ,if ,sruti1 c41 have any authority1 your negative argument fails from being precluded2 if they are fallacious1 our old objection of a 'baseless inference' returns stronger than ever4 ,nor need we fear the possibility of any other contradiction to our argument1 since it would be overthrown by either alternative of ,god's being known or unknown4#bdb ,well1 let all this be granted2 but the activity of ,god in creating the world1 what end did it have in view8 ,his own advantage or some other being's8 ,if it was for the former end1 was it in order to attain something desired1 or to avoid something not desired8 ,it could not be the first1 because this would be quite incongruous in a being who possesses every possible desire gratified2 and for the same reason too it could not be the second4 ,if it was for the latter end the advantage of another it would be equally incongruous2 for who would call that being wise who busied himself in acting for another8 ,if you replied that ,his activity was justified by compassion1 any one would at once retort that this feeling of compassion should have rather induced ,him to create all living beings happy1 and not checkered with misery1 since this militates against ,his compassion2 for we define compassion as the disinterested wish to avoid causing another pain4 ,hence we conclude that it is not befitting for ,god to create the world4 ,this has been said by ,bhattchrya-- ,not even a fool acts without some object in view2 ,suppose that ,god did not create the world1 what end would be left undone by ,him8-- ,we reply1 ,o thou crest-jewel of the atheistic school1 be pleased for a moment to close thy envy-dimmed eyes1 and to consider the following suggestions4 ,his action in creation is indeed solely caused by compassion2 but the idea of a creation which shall consist only of happiness is inconsistent with the nature of things1 since there cannot but arise eventual differences from the different results which will ripen from the good or evil actions of the beings who are to be created4 ,nor need you object that this would interfere with ,god's own independence as ,he would thus seem to depend on others' actions1 since there is the well-known saying1 ,one's own body does not hinder one2 nay rather it helps to carry out one's aims2#bdc and for this there is authority in such passages of the ,veda as that 7in the ,svetsvatara ,upanishad1 iii4 #b71 ,there is one ,rudra only2 he admits#bdd not of a second1 c4 ,but then how will you remedy your deadly sickness of reasoning in a circle8 for you have to prove the ,veda by the authority of ,god1 and then again you have to prove ,god's existence by the ,veda4 ,we reply1 that we defy you to point out any reasoning in a circle in our argument4 ,do you suspect this reciprocal dependence of each1 which you call reasoning in a circle1 in regard to their being produced or in regard to their being known8#bde ,it cannot be the former1 for though the production of the ,veda is dependent on ,god1 still as ,god ,himself is eternal1 there is no possibility of ,his being produced2 nor can it be in regard to their being known1 for even if our knowledge of ,god were dependent on the ,veda1 the ,veda might be learned from some other source2 nor1 again1 can it be in regard to the knowledge of the non-eternity of the ,veda1 for the non-eternity of the ,veda is easily perceived by any yogin endowed with the transcendent faculties 7tvra1#bdf c47 ,therefore1 when ,god has been rendered propitious by the performance of duties which produce ,his favour1 the desired end1 ,liberation1 is obtained2 thus everything is clear4 ,e4 ,b4 ,c4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,note ,,on ,,pages #agb1 #agc4 ,we have here an exemplification of the five fallacies or hetvbhsas of the modern ,hindu logic 7cf4 ,siddhntamukt41 #ga1 ,tarkasamgr41 #ee-fg71 viz41 anaiknta1 viruddha1 asiddha1 kltyayopadishta or bdhita1 and pratipakshita or sat-pratipaksha4 ,the four first of these generally correspond to the savyabhichra or erratic1 viruddha or contradictory1 sdhyasama or unproved1 and attakla or mistimed1 i4e41 precluded1 as given in the list of fallacies of the older logic in p4 #afd2 but pratipakshita corresponds imperfectly to prakaranasama4 ,the prakaranasama or uncertain reason is properly that reason which is equally available for both sides1 as1 e4g41 the argument1 ,sound is eternal because it is audible1 which could be met by the equally plausible argument1 ,sound is non-eternal because it is audible2 or1 according to other authorities1 it is that reason which itself raises the same difficulties as the original question1 as1 e4g41 sound is non-eternal because eternal qualities are not perceived in it2 here this alleged reason is as much the subject of dispute as the old question1 ,is sound eternal8 ,but the pratipakshita reason is one which is counter-balanced by an equally valid reason1 as ,sound is eternal because it is audible1 and ,sound is non-eternal because it is a product4 ,,footnotes3 ,footnote #bje3 ,cf4 ,nyya ,stras1 i4 #bi4 ,footnote #bjf3 ,in p4 #aab1 line #af1 of the ,calcutta edition1 ,i read doshanimitta-tattva for doshanimittakatva 7compare ,nyya ,st4 iv4 #fh74 ,footnote #bjg3 ,without this last clause the definition might include the objects 7vishaya71 as these are1 of course1 connected with right knowledge4 ,footnote #bjh3 svara is a cause of right knowledge 7pramna7 according to the definition1 because he is pramy srayah4 ,footnote #bji3 ,on this compare ,siddhnta-,muktvali1 p4 #aae4 ,footnote #baj3 ,on these compare my note to ,colebrooke's ,essays1 vol4 i4 p4 #cae4 ,footnote #baa3 ,our coming to the conclusion that there can be no smoke in the hill if there be no fire1 while we see the smoke1 is the confutation of there being no fire in the hill 7,ballantyne74 ,or1 in other words1 the mountain must have the absence-of-smoke 7vypaka7 if it has the absence-of-fire 7the false vypya74 ,footnote #bab3 ,action 7pravritti7 follows after the ascertainment of the truth by nyya4 ,footnote #bac3 ,cp4 ,vtsyyana's ,comment41 p4 #f4 ,the ,calcutta edition reads prakrtit for parkshit4 ,footnote #bad3 ,the printed text omits the third fault1 a stupid indifference1 moha1 which is however referred to presently4 ,footnote #bae3 ,in p4 #aaf1 line #c1 ,i would read tannirvartakam for tannivartakam4 ,footnote #baf3 ,this refers to the couplet so often quoted in ,hindu authors1 ,logic1 the three ,vedas1 trade and agriculture1 and the eternal doctrine of polity1--these four sciences are the causes of the stability of the world 7cf4 ,manu1 vii4 #dc74 ,it occurs in ,kmandaki's ,ntisra1 ii4 #b1 and seems to be referred to in ,vtsyyana's ,com4 p4 #c1 from which ,mdhava is here borrowing4 ,footnote #bag3 ,compare the ,english proverb1 ,as soon as the cat can lick her ear4 ,footnote #bah3 ,literally the bell-road1 i4e41 the chief road through a village1 or that by which elephants1 c41 decorated with tinkling ornaments1 proceed4--,wilson's ,dict4 ,footnote #bai3 ,the cognition is produced in the first moment1 remains during the second1 and ceases in the third4 ,footnote #bbj3 ,see ,nyya ,st4 i4 #b4 ,footnote #bba3 ,as otherwise why should we require liberation at all8 ,or rather the author probably assumes that other ,naiyyikas have sufficiently established this point against its opponents1 cf4 p4 #afg1 line #aa4 ,footnote #bbb3 ,see supra1 pp4 #bd-cb4 ,footnote #bbc3 ,all is momentary1 all is pain1 all is sui generis1 all is unreal4 ,footnote #bbd3 ,in the form of the various klesas or afflictions4 ,footnote #bbe3 varana1 cf4 pp4 #ee1 #eh4 ,footnote #bbf3 ,but the ,nyya holds that the attributes of the soul1 as happiness1 desire1 aversion1 c41 are perceived by the internal sense1 mind 7,bhsh ,p4 #hc74 ,footnote #bbg3 ,the reading mrtapratibandht is difficult1 but ,i believe that pratibandha means here vypti1 as it does in ,snkhya ,stras1 i4 #ajj4 ,footnote #bbh3 ,the true summum bonum must be niratisaya1--incapable of being added to4 ,footnote #bbi3 ,yogynupalabdhi is when an object is not seen1 and yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present1 as the eye1 light1 c4 ,footnote #bcj3 ,alluding to the ,vedic phrase1 grvnah plavanti1 see ,uttara ,naishadha1 xvii4 #cg4 ,the phrase asmnah plavanti occurs in ,shadv4 ,br4 #e1 #ab4 ,footnote #bca3 ,or perhaps capable of being surpassed4 ,footnote #bcb3 ,since the ,supreme ,being is a single instance4 ,footnote #bcc3 ,since the ,veda1 if non-eternal1 must to be authoritative have been created by ,god1 and yet it is brought forward to reveal the existence of ,god4 ,footnote #bcd3 ,the ,nyya holds presumption to be included under inference1 and comparison is declared to be the ascertaining the relation of a name to the thing named4 ,footnote #bce3 ,since ether is connected by contact with the parts of everything1 as e4g41 a jar4 ,footnote #bcf3 ,the whole 7as the jar7 resides by intimate relation in its parts 7as the jar's two halves74 ,but the eternal substances1 ether1 time1 the soul1 mind1 and the atoms of earth1 water1 fire1 and air1 do not thus reside in anything1 although1 of course1 the category visesha does reside in them by intimate relation4 ,the word substances excludes tantutva1 and existing in intimate relation excludes ether1 c4 ,footnote #bcg3 ,intermediate between infinite and infinitesimal1 all eternal substances being the one or the other4 ,footnote #bch3 ,the viruddha-hetu is that which is never found where the major term is4 ,footnote #bci3 ,this and much more of the whole discussion is taken from the ,kusumjali1 v4 #b1 and ,i extract my note on the passage there4 ,the older ,naiyyikas maintained that the argument 'the mountain has fire because it has blue smoke1' involved the fallacy of vypyatvsiddhi1 because the alleged middle term was unnecessarily restricted 7see ,siddhnta ,muktv4 p4 #gg74 ,the moderns1 however1 more wisely consider it as a harmless error1 and they would rather meet the objection by asserting that there is no proof to establish the validity of the assumed middle term4 ,footnote #bdj3 ,for the updhi cf4 pp4 #g1 #h4 ,footnote #bda3 ,as in the former case it would be clear that it is a subject for separate discussion2 and in the latter you would be liable to the fault of sraysiddhi1 a baseless inference1 since your subject 7or minor term71 being itself non-existent1 cannot be the locus or subject of a negation 7cf4 ,kusumjali1 iii4 #b74 ,just as that subject from which a given attribute is excluded cannot be unreal1 so neither can an unreal thing be the subject of a negation4 ,footnote #bdb3 ,if ,god is known1 then ,his existence must be granted2 if ,he is not known1 how can we argue about ,him8 ,i read lines #ae1 #af1 in p4 #abj of the ,calcutta edition1 vikalpaparhatatvt1 and then begin the next clause with syd etat4 ,the printed text1 vikalpaparhatah syt tad etat1 seems unintelligible4 ,footnote #bdc3 ,the aggregate of the various subtile bodies constitutes ,hiranyagarbha1 or the supreme soul viewed in ,his relation to the world as creator1 while the aggregate of the gross bodies similarly constitutes his gross body 7virj74 ,footnote #bdd3 ,the usual reading is tasthur for tasthe4 ,footnote #bde3 ,for these divisions of the anyonysraya fallacy1 see ,nyyastra vritti1 i4 #ci 7p4 #cc74 ,footnote #bdf3 ,for tvra cf4 ,yoga stras1 i4 #ba1 #bb4 ,,chapter ,,xii4 ,,the ,,jaimini-,,darsana4 ,an objector may here ask1 ,are you not continually repeating that merit 7dharma7 comes from the practice of duty 7dharma71 but how is duty to be defined or proved8 ,listen attentively to my answer4 ,a reply to this question has been given in the older#bdg ,mmms by the holy sage ,jaimini4 ,now the ,mmms consists of twelve books4#bdh ,in the first book is discussed the authoritativeness of those collections of words which are severally meant by the terms injunction 7vidhi71 explanatory passage 7arthavda71 hymn 7mantra71 tradition 7smriti71 and name4 ,in the second1 certain subsidiary discussions as e4g41 on aprva relating to the difference of various rites1 refutation of 7erroneously alleged7 proofs1 and difference of performance as in constant and voluntary offerings4 ,in the third1 ,sruti1 sign or sense of the passage 7linga71 context 7vkya71 c41 and their respective weight when in apparent opposition to one another1 the ceremonies called pratipatti-karmni1 things mentioned incidentally 7anrabhydhta71 things accessory to several main objects1 as prayjas1 c41 and the duties of the sacrificer4 ,in the fourth1 the influence on other rites of the principal and subordinate rites1 the fruit caused by the juh being made of the butea frondosa1 c41 and the dice-playing1 c41 which form subordinate parts of the rjasya sacrifice4 ,in the fifth1 the relative order of different passages of ,sruti1 c41 the order of different parts of a sacrifice as the seventeen animals at the vjapeya1 the multiplication and non-multiplication of rites1 and the respective force of the words of ,sruti1 order of mention1 c41 in determining the order of performance4 ,in the sixth1 the persons qualified to offer sacrifices1 their obligations1 the substitutes for enjoined materials1 supplies for lost or injured offerings1 expiatory rites1 the sattra offerings1 things proper to be given1 and the different sacrificial fires4 ,in the seventh1 transference of the ceremonies of one sacrifice to another by direct command in the ,vaidic text1 and then as inferred by name or sign4 ,in the eighth1 transference by virtue of the clearly expressed or obscurely expressed sign1 or by the predominant sign1 and cases where no transference takes place4 ,in the ninth1 the beginning of the discussion on the adaptation of hymns when quoted in a new connection 7ha71 the adaptation of smans and mantras1 and collateral questions connected therewith4 ,in the tenth1 the discussion of occasions where the non-performance of the primary rite involves the preclusion and non-performance of the dependent rites1 and of occasions where rites are precluded because other rites produce their special result1 discussions connected with the graha offerings1 certain smans1 and various other things1 and a discussion on the different kinds of negation4 ,in the eleventh1 the incidental mention and subsequently the fuller discussion of tantra#bdi where several acts are combined into one1 and vpa or the performing an act more than once4 ,in the twelfth1 a discussion on prasanga where the rite is performed for one chief purpose1 but with an incidental further reference1 tantra1 cumulation of concurrent rites 7samuchchaya7 and option4 ,now the first topic which introduces the discussions of the ,prva-,mmms arises from the aphorism1 ,now therefore a desire to know duty is to be entertained by thee4 ,now the learned describe a topic as consisting of five members1 and these are 7a47 the subject1 7b47 the doubt1 7c47 the prim facie argument1 7d47 the demonstrated conclusion1 and 7e47 the connection 7sangati74 ,the topic is discussed according to the doctrines held by the great teachers of the system4 ,thus the subject to be discussed is the sentence1 ,the ,veda is to be read4 ,now the doubt which arises is whether the study of ,jaimini's sstra concerning duty1 beginning with the aphorism1 ,duty is a thing which is to be recognised by an instigatory passage1 and ending with and from seeing it in the anvhrya1 is to be commenced or not4 ,the prim facie argument is that it is not to be commenced1 whether the injunction to read the ,veda be held to have a visible and present or an invisible and future fruit4 7a47 ,if you say that this injunction must have a visible fruit1 and this can be no other#bej than the knowledge of the meaning of what is read1 we must next ask you whether this said reading is enjoined as something which otherwise would not have been thought of1 or whether as something which otherwise would have been optional1 as we see in the rule for shelling rice4#bea ,it cannot be the former1 for the reading of the ,veda is a means of knowing the sense thereof from its very nature as reading1 just as in the parallel instance of reading the ,mahbhrata2 and we see by this argument that it would present itself as an obvious means quite independently of the injunction4 ,well1 then1 let it be the latter alternative2 just as the baked flour cake called purodsa is made only of rice prepared by being unhusked in a mortar1 when1 but for the injunction1 it might have been unhusked by the finger-nails4 ,there1 however1 the new moon and full moon sacrifices only produce their unseen effect1 which is the principal aprva1 by means of the various minor effects or subordinate aprvas1 produced by the various subordinate parts of the whole ceremony2 and consequently the minor aprva of the unhusking is the reason there for the restricting injunction4 ,but in the case which we are discussing1 there is no such reason for any such restriction1 as the rites can be equally well performed by gaining the knowledge of the ,veda's meaning by reading a written book1 or by studying under an authorised teacher4 ,hence we conclude that there is no injunction to study the ,prva ,mmms as a means of knowing the sense of the ,veda4 7b47 ,what1 then1 becomes of the ,vedic injunction1 ',the ,veda is to be read'8 ,well1 you must be content with the fact that the injunction will have heaven as its future fruit1 although it merely enjoins the making oneself master of the literal words of the ,vedic text without any care to understand the meaning which they may convey1 since heaven1 though not expressly mentioned1 is to be assumed as the fruit1 according to the analogy of the ,visvajit offering4 ,just as ,jaimini1 in his aphorism 7iv4 #c1 #ae71 ,let that fruit be heaven1 since it equally applies to all1 establishes that those who are not expressly mentioned are still qualified to offer the ,visvajit sacrifice1 and infers by argument that its characteristic fruit is heaven1 so let us assume it to be in the present case also4 ,as it has been said-- ,since the visible fruit would be equally obtained without the injunction1 this cannot be its sole object2 we must rather suppose heaven to be the fruit from the injunction's significance1 after the analogy of the ,visvajit1 c4 ,thus1 too1 we shall keep the ,smriti rule from being violated3 ,having read the ,veda1 let him bathe4 ,for this rule clearly implies that no long interval is to take place between reading the ,veda and the student's return to his home2 while1 according to your opinion1 after he had read the ,veda1 he would still have to remain in his preceptor's house to read the ,mmms discussions1 and thus the idea of no interval between would be contradicted4 ,therefore for these three reasons1 7a47 that the study of ,mmms is not enjoined1 7b47 that heaven can be obtained by the simple reading of the text1 and 7c47 that the rule for the student's return to his home is thus fulfilled1 we maintain that the study of the ,mmms discussions on duty is not to be commenced4 ,the authoritative conclusion 7siddhnta71 however1 is as follows3-- ,we grant that it cannot be a case of vidhi1 for it might have been adopted on other grounds2 but not even ,indra with his thunderbolt could make us lose our hold of the other alternative that it is a case of niyama4 ,in the sentence1 ,the ,veda is to be read1 the affix tavya expresses an enforcing power in the word1#beb which is to be rendered visible by a corresponding action in man1 bringing a certain effect into existence2 and this enforcing power seeks some corresponding end which is connected with the man's creative effort4 ,now it cannot be the act itself of reading1 as suggested by the whole word adhyetavya1 which it thus seeks as an end2 for this act of reading1 thus expressed by the word1 could never be regarded as an end1 since it is a laborious operation of the voice and mind1 consisting in the articulate utterance of the portion read4 ,nor could the portion read1 as suggested by the whole sentence1 be regarded as the end4 ,for the mass of words called ,veda1 which is what we really mean by the words portion read1 being eternal and omnipresent1 could never fulfil the conditions of the four fruits of action1 production1 c4#bec ,therefore the only true end which remains to us is the knowledge of the meaning1 as obtained by carrying out the sense of the words of the injunction4 ,according to the old rule1 ,he has the right who has the want1 the power1 and the wit1 those who are aiming to understand certain things1 as the new and full moon sacrifices1 use their daily reading to learn the truth about them4 ,and the injunction for reading1 since it virtually excludes the reading of written books1 c4 from the well-known technical sense of the word read when used in this connection1 conveys the idea that the reading the ,veda enjoined has a consecrated character as taught by a duly authorised teacher4 ,therefore1 as the principal aprva1 produced by the great new and full moon sacrifices1 necessitates and establishes the subordinate aprvas produced by the inferior sacrificial acts1 as unhusking the rice1 c41 so the mass of aprva produced by all the sacrifices necessitates and establishes a previous aprva produced by the restricting injunction 7niyama71 which prescribes reading the ,veda as the means to know how to perform these sacrifices4 ,if you hesitate to concede that a niyama could have this future influence called aprva1 the same doubt might equally invalidate the efficacy of a vidhi as the two stand on the same level as to their enjoining power4 ,nor is the supposition a valid one that heaven is the fruit1 according to the analogy of the ,visvajit offering1 since1 if there is a present and visible fruit in the form of a knowledge of the meaning of the sacred text1 it is improper to suppose any other future and unseen fruit4 ,thus it has been said-- ,where a seen fruit is obtained1 you must not suppose an unseen one2 but if a vidhi has the restricting meaning of a niyama1 it does not thereby become meaningless4 ,but an objector may say1 ,although a man who reads the simple text of the ,veda may not attain to a knowledge of its meaning1 still1 as he who reads the ,veda with its angas1 grammar1 c41 may attain to this knowledge1 the study of ,mmms will be useless4 ,but this is not true3 for even though he may attain to a simple knowledge of the literal meaning1 all deeper investigation must depend on this kind of discussion4 ,for instance1 when it is said1 ,he offers anointed gravel1 neither grammar nor nigama#bed nor nirukta will determine the true meaning that it is to be anointed with ghee and not with oil1 c42 it is only by a ,mmms discussion that the true meaning is unravelled from the rest of the passage1 ,verily1 ghee is brightness4#bee ,it is therefore established that the study of ,mmms is enjoined4 ,nor need it be supposed that this contradicts the passage of ,smriti1 ,having read the ,veda1 let him bathe1 which implies that he should now leave his teacher's house1 and prohibits any further delay2 as the words do not necessarily imply that the return to the paternal roof is to follow immediately on his having read the ,veda1 but only that it is to follow it at some time1 and that both actions are to be done by the same person1 just as we see in the common phrase1 ,having bathed1 he eats4 ,therefore from the purport of the injunction we conclude that the study of the ,prva ,mmms ,sstra1 consisting of a thousand topics1#bef is to be commenced4 ,this topic is connected with the main subject of the ,sstra as being a subsidiary digression1 as it is said1 ,they call that a subsidiary digression which helps to establish the main subject4#beg ,i now proceed to give a sketch of the discussion of the same topic in accordance with the teaching of the ,guru ,prabhkara4 ,in the ,smriti rule1#beh ,let him admit as a pupil the ,brahman lad when eight years old 7by investing him with the sacred cord71 let him instruct him1 the object of the direction appears to be the pupil's instruction4 ,now a direction must have reference to somebody to be directed2 and if you ask who is here to be directed1 ,i reply1 ,he who desires to be a teacher1 since1 by ,pnini's rule 7i4 #c1 #cf71 the root n is used in the tmanepada when honour1 c41 are implied1 i4e41 here the duty which a teacher performs to his pupils4 ,he who is to be directed as to admitting a pupil is the same person who is to be directed as to teaching him1 since both are the object of one and the same command4 ,hence the inspired sage ,manu has said 7ii4 #adj71 ,the ,brhman who girds his pupil with the sacrificial cord and then instructs him in the ,veda1 with its subsidiary angas and mystic doctrines1 they call a spiritual teacher 7chrya74 ,now the teaching which is the function of the teacher cannot be fulfilled without the learning which is the function of the pupil1 and therefore the very injunction to teach implies and establishes a corresponding obligation to learn1 since the influencer's efforts fail without those of one to be influenced4 ,if you object that this view does not make reading the ,veda the object of definite injunction1 ,i reply1 ,what matters it to us if it is not8 ,for even if there is no reason for us to admit a separate injunction for reading the ,veda1 it will still remain perpetually enjoined as a duty1 because the passage which mentions it is a perpetual anuvda or supplementary repetition4#bei ,therefore the former prim facie argument and its answer1 which were given before under the idea that there was a definite injunction to read the ,veda1 must now be discussed in another way to suit this new view4 ,now the prim facie argument was that the study of ,mmms1 not being authoritatively enjoined1 is not to be commenced2 the conclusion was that it is to be commenced as being thus authoritatively enjoined4 ,now the upholders of the former or prim facie view argue as follows3--,we put to the advocates of the conclusion the following dilemma3 ,does the injunction to teach imply that the pupil is to understand the meaning of what is read1 or does it only refer to the bare reading8 ,it cannot be the former1 for obviously the act of teaching cannot depend for its fulfilment on the pupil's understanding what is taught as this will depend on his ability as a recipient2 and the latter will not help you1 as1 if the bare reading is sufficient1 the ,mmms discussions in question will have no subject or use4 ,for their proper subject is a point in the ,veda1 which is doubted about from having been only looked at in a rough and impromptu way2 now if there is no need of understanding the meaning at all1 why should we talk of doubts and still more of any hope of ascertaining the true meaning by means of laborious discussion8 ,and therefore in accordance with the well-known principle1 ',that which is a thing of use and not a matter of doubt is an object of attainment to an intelligent man1 as1 for instance1 a jar which is in broad light and in contact with the external and internal senses1' as there is in the present case no such thing as a subject to exercise it upon1 or a useful end to be attained by it1 we maintain that the study of ,mmms is not to be commenced4 ,we grant1 in reply1 that the injunction to teach does not imply a corresponding necessity that the student must understand the meaning2 still when a man has read the ,veda with its subsidiary angas1 and has comprehended the general connection of the words with their respective meanings1 this will imply an understanding of the meaning of the ,veda1 just as it would in any ordinary human compositions4 ,but may we not say that1 just as in the case of the mother who said to her son1 ',eat poison1' the meaning literally expressed by the words was not what she wished to convey1 since she really intended to forbid his eating anything at all in such and such a house2 so if the literal meaning of the ,veda does not express its real purport1 the old objection will recur with full force that the study of ,mmms will have neither subject nor end as there will be no use in understanding the literal meaning1 since1 as in the mother's case1 it may only lead astray1 and so common sense must be the ultimate judge4 ,we reply1 that your supposed illustration and the case in question are not really parallel4 ,in the supposed illustration the primary meaning of the words would be obviously precluded1 because a direction to eat poison would be inconceivable in the mouth of an authoritative and trustworthy speaker like a mother1 and you would know at once that this could not be what she wished to say2 but in the case of the ,veda1 which is underived from any personal author1 why should not the literal meaning be the one actually intended8 ,and it is just the doubts that arise1 as they occasionally will do1 in reference to this intended meaning1 which will be the proper subject of ,mmms discussion2 and the settlement of these doubts will be its proper end4 ,therefore1 whenever the true meaning of the ,veda is not obtained#bfj by that reading which is virtually prescribed by the authoritative injunction to a ,brahman to teach1 it will be a proper subject for systematic discussion2 and hence we hold that the study of ,mmms is enjoined1 and should be commenced4 ,well1#bfa be it so say the followers of the ,nyya1 but how can the ,vedas be said to be underived from any personal author1 when there is no evidence to establish this8 ,would you maintain that they have no personal author because1 although there is an unbroken line of tradition1 there is no remembrance of any author1 just as is the case with the soul8#bfb ,this argument is weak1 because the alleged characteristics unbroken tradition1 c4 are not proved2 for those who hold the human origin of the ,vedas maintain that the line of tradition was interrupted at the time of the dissolution of the universe4 ,and1 again1 what is meant by this assertion that the author is not remembered8 ,is it 7#a47 that no author is believed1 or 7#b47 that no author is remembered8 ,the first alternative cannot be accepted1 since we hold that ,god is proved to have been the author4 ,nor can the second1 because it cannot stand the test of the following dilemma1 viz41 is it meant 7a47 that no author of the ,veda is remembered by some one person1 or 7b47 by any person whatever8 ,the former supposition breaks down1 as it would prove too much1 since it would apply to such an isolated stanza as ,he who is religious and has overcome pride and anger1 c4#bfc ,and the latter supposition is inadmissible1 since it would be impossible for any person who was not omniscient to know that no author of the ,veda was recollected by any person whatever4 ,moreover1 there is actual proof that the ,veda had a personal author1 for we argue as follows3--,the sentences of the ,veda must have originated from a personal author1 since they have the character of sentences like those of ,klidsa and other writers4 ,and1 again1 the sentences of the ,veda have been composed by a competent person1 since1 while they possess authority1 they have1 at the same time1 the character of sentences1 like those of ,manu and other sages4 ,but ask the ,mmmsakas may it not be assumed that all study of the ,veda was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor1 since the study of the ,veda must always have had one common character which was the same in former times as now2 and therefore this uninterrupted succession has force to prove the eternity of the ,veda8 ,this reasoning1 however the ,naiyyikas answer1 cannot rise to the height of proof1 for it has no more validity than such obviously illusory reasoning1 as ,all study of the ,mahbhrata was preceded by an earlier study of it by the pupil's preceptor1 since it is the study of the ,mahbhrata1 which must have been the same in former times as now4 ,but the ,mmmsakas will ask whether there is not a difference between these two cases1 since the ,smriti declares that ,vishnu incarnate as ,vysa was the author of the ,mahbhrata1 in accordance with the line1 ,who else than the lotus-eyed ,vishnu could be the maker of the ,mahbhrata8 while nothing of this sort is recorded in any ,smriti in regard to the ,veda4 ,this argument1 however1 is pithless1 since those words of the ,purushaskta 7,rig ,v41 x4 #ij71 ,from him sprang the ,rich and ,sman verses2 from him sprang the ,metres2 from him the ,yajus arose2 prove that the ,veda had a maker4 ,further proceed the ,naiyyikas we hold that sound is non-eternal#bfd because it has genus1 and is also perceptible to the external organs of beings such as ourselves1 just as a jar is4#bfe ,but1 you may object1 is not this argument refuted by the proof arising from the fact that we recognise the letter g 7for example7 as the same we have heard before8 ,this objection1 however1 is extremely weak1 for the recognition in question is powerless to refute our argument1 since it has reference only to identity of species1 as in the case of a man whose hair has been cut and has grown again1 or of a jasmine which has blossomed afresh4 ,but asks the ,mmmsaka how can the ,veda have been uttered by the incorporeal ,paramesvara1 who has no palate or other organs of speech1 and therefore cannot have pronounced the letters8 ,this objection answers the ,naiyyika is not happy1 because1 though ,paramesvara is by nature incorporeal1 he can yet assume a body in sport1 in order to show kindness to his worshippers4 ,consequently the arguments in favour of the doctrine that the ,veda had no personal author are inconclusive4 ,i shall now says the ,mmmsaka clear up the whole question4 ,what is meant by this paurusheyatva derivation from a personal author which it is sought to prove8 ,is it 7#a47 mere procession 7utpannatva7 from a person1 like the procession of the ,veda from persons such as ourselves1 when we daily utter it8 or 7#b47 is it the arrangement--with a view to its manifestation--of knowledge acquired by other modes of proof1 as in the case of treatises composed by persons like ourselves8 ,if the first meaning be intended1 there will be no dispute between us4#bff ,if the second sense be meant1 ,i ask whether it is established 7a47 by inference1#bfg or 7b47 by supernatural testimony8 7a47 ,the former alternative cannot be correct1 because your argument would equally apply to the sentences in dramas such as the ,mlatmdhava which1 of course1 being a work of fiction1 has no authoritative character4 ,if you qualify your argument by inserting the saving clause1 while they possess authority1#bfh as supra1 p4 #ahh1 line #ba1 even this explanation will fail to satisfy a philosopher4 ,for the sentences of the ,veda are universally defined to be sentences which prove things that are not provable by other evidence4 ,but if you could establish that these ,vedic sentences only prove what is provable by other evidence1 this definition would be at once contradicted1 just as if a man were to say that his mother was a barren woman4 ,and even if we granted that ,paramesvara might assume a body in sport1 in order to show kindness to his worshippers1 it would not at all follow that he would perceive things beyond the reach of the senses1 from the want of any means of apprehending objects removed from him in place1 in time1 and in nature4#bfi ,nor is it to be assumed that his eyes and other senses alone would have the power of producing such knowledge1 for we can only draw upon our imagination in accordance with our past experience4 ,this has been declared by the ,guru ,prabhkara when he refutes the supposition of an omniscient author-- ,wherever we do find the power of an organ intensified1#bgj it is done without its going beyond its own proper objects2 thus it may appear in the power of seeing the very distant or the very minute1 but not in the ear's becoming cognisant of form4 ,hence 7b47 we also maintain that your position cannot be established by any supposed supernatural testimony as that quoted above from the ,rig-,veda1 from him sprang the ,rich and ,sman verses4 ,for the rule of ,pnini 7iv4 #c1 #aja7 will still remain inviolate1 that the grammatical affixes with which such names as ,kthaka1 ,klpa1 and ,taittirya are formed1 impart to those derivatives the sense of uttered by ,katha1 ,kalpin1 c41 though we maintain that these names have reference not to those parts of the ,veda as first composed by these sages1 but to the fact that these sages instituted certain schools of traditional study4 ,and in the same way we hold in reference to this verse from the ,rig-,veda that it only refers to the institution of certain schools of traditional study of these ,vedas4 ,nor will any supposed inference establish the non-eternity of sound1 because as we said before it is opposed to the evidence of our consciousness1 since we certainly recognise the letter now heard as the one heard before4 ,nor is it reasonable to reply that1 although the letters are not the same1 they seem to be so on account of their identity of species4 ,for here we ask our opponents a question--,is this idea that the apparent sameness arises from identity of species put forward from a wish to preclude entirely any idea of the letters being the same1 or only from an imagined fear of error because experience shows that the recognition will sometimes be erroneous as in the cases of the hair and jasmine mentioned above8 7a47 ,if it arises from the latter reason1 we ,mmmsakas1 who hold that the ,veda is its own evidence1 have said in reference to this timid imagination-- ,he who foolishly imagines that something as yet unknown to him will come hereafter to stop his present conclusion1 will go to utter ruin in every transaction of life1 his mind a mass of doubts4 7b47 ,but the ,naiyyikas will ask does not this recognition of g and other letters as the same which we heard before refer to the species which exists the same in each1 and not to the several individual letters1 since1 in fact1 we perceive that they are different as uttered by different persons1 otherwise we could not make such distinctions as we do when we say ',somasarman is reading'8 ,this objection1 however1 has as little brilliancy as its predecessors1 for as there is no proof of any distinction between the individual g's1 there is no proof that we ought to assume any such thing as a species g2 and we maintain that1 just as to the man who does not understand the ,naiyyika doctrine of the species g1 the one species in the ,naiyyika view will by the influence of distinction of place1 magnitude1 form1 and individual sounds1 appear as if it were variously modified as itself distinct in place1 as small1 as great1 as long1 as short2 so to the man who does not understand our ,mmmsaka doctrine of one individual g1 the one g 7in our view7 will by the diversity of manifesters1#bga appear to him associated with their respective peculiarities2 and as contrary characters are in this way ascribed to the letter g1 there is a fallacious appearance of distinction between different g's4 ,but does this ascription of contrary characters1 which is thus regarded as creating a difference between the g's1 result 7#a47 from the nature of the thing1 or 7#b47 from our imagination8 ,there is no proof of the former alternative2 for1 if it were true1 as an inherent difference would have to be admitted between different g's1 we should have to say1 ,chaitra has uttered ten g's1 and not ,chaitra has uttered the same g ten times4 ,on the latter supposition1 there is no proof of any inherent distinction between g's1 for inherent oneness is not destroyed by a difference of external disguises4 ,thus we must not conceive1 from the apparent distinction caused by such external disguises as jars1 c41 that there is any inherent distinction1 as of parts1 in the one indivisible ether4 ,the current use of the rejected phrase i4e41 different as applied to the g's is really caused by the noise1 which in each case is different4 ,this has been said by the great teacher-- ,the object which the ,naiyyikas seek by supposing a species is1 in fact1 gained from the letter itself2 and the object which they aim at by supposing an individuality in letters1 is attained from audible noises2#bgb so that the assumption of species is useless4 ,and again-- ,since in regard to sounds such an irresistible instinct of recognition is always awake within us1 it precludes by its superior evidence all the inferences to prove sound's non-eternity4 ,this at once refutes the argument given in the ,naiyyika treatise by ,vgswara1 entitled ,mna-manohara1 sound is non-eternal from the fact of its being a special quality belonging to an organ of sense#bgc 7sc4 the ear71 just as colour is to the eye4 ,we can also refute it in the following ways3 7a47 ,if we follow the ,snkhya and ,vednta view that sound is a substance1 it is evidently overthrown#bgd as in that case sound cannot be a quality2 7b47 if we take it as referring to the noise1 not the sound1 we have no dispute1 as it only establishes what we ourselves allow2 and 7c47 the inference is overthrown by the limiting condition updhi of asrvanatva1 or the not causing audition4#bge ,so ,udayana tries at great length to establish that1 although ether1 the site of sound1 is imperceptible1 the non-existence of that which abides in this site is perceptible2 and he then brings forward as an evidence for the non-eternity of sound1 that sense perception which causes the use of such common expressions as ,the tumult is stopped1 ,the sound has arisen4#bgf ,but he is sufficiently answered#bgg by our old reply in p4 #aic1 that the fallacious appearance of distinction arises from contrary characters being erroneously ascribed1 just as1 in the story1 the demon ,tla went away as well as ,betla when the offering of blood was given to the latter4#bgh ,and as for the objection raised by the author of the ,nyyabhshana1#bgi that1 if sound were eternal1 the conclusion must follow that it would be either always perceptible or always imperceptible1 this also is obviated by our allowing that we only perceive that sound which is manifested by our articulate noise4#bhj ,and as for the 7,naiyyika7 argument against the existence#bha of such a constant relation as this which is supposed between the manifested sound and the manifesting noise1 since they both come simultaneously in contact with the sense of hearing1 this is invalid1 as it will indisputably apply with equal force in the case of the soul4#bhb ,therefore as the ,veda is thus proved to have not originated from any personal author1 and as the minutest germ of suspicion against it is thus absolutely destroyed1 we hold it as satisfactorily demonstrated that it has a self-established authority in all matters relating to duty4 ,well#bhc say our opponents1 let this question rest2 but how about another well-known controversy8 ,it is said-- ',the ,snkhyas hold that both authoritativeness and non-authoritativeness are self-proved2 the followers of the ,nyya hold that both are proved by something else as inference1 c42 the ,buddhists hold that the latter is self-proved and the former proved by something else2 the teachers of the ,veda maintain that authoritativeness is self-proved and non-authoritativeness proved by something else4' ,now we ask1 amidst all this discussion1 how do the ,mmmsakas accept as established their tenet that the authoritativeness of duty is self-proved8 ,and what is the meaning of this so-called self-proved authoritativeness8 ,is it 7a47 that authoritativeness springs from itself8 or 7b47 that it springs from the right knowledge in which it resides8 or 7c47 that it springs from the instrumental causes as the eye1 c4 which produced the right knowledge in which it resides8 or 7d47 that it resides in a particular knowledge produced by the instrumental causes which produced the right knowledge8#bhd or 7e47 that it resides in a particular knowledge produced by the instrumental causes only which produced the right knowledge8 7a47 ,it cannot be the first1 because wherever the relation of cause and effect is found there must be a difference1 and therefore these two cannot reside in the same subject i4e41 authoritativeness cannot cause itself4 7b47 ,it cannot be the second1 because if knowledge1 which is a quality1 were the cause of authoritativeness1 it would have to be a substance1 as being an intimate cause4#bhe 7c47 ,it cannot be the third1 because 'authoritativeness' cannot properly be 'produced' at all1#bhf whether we call it a general characteristic 7updhi7 or a species 7jti72#bhg for if we call it an updhi1 it is defined as the absolute non-existence of any contradiction to a certain kind of knowledge which does not possess the nature of recollection2#bhh and this cannot be produced1 for we all allow that absolute non-existence is eternal2 and still less can we speak of its being produced1 if we regard it as a species4 7d47 ,nor can it be the fourth1 for wrong knowledge as well as right knowledge is a particular kind of knowledge1 and the instrumental causes which produce the general are included in those which produce the particular1#bhi just as the general idea 'seed1' as applied to 'tree1' is included in the particular seed of any special tree1 as1 e4g41 the ,dalbergia ,sisu2 otherwise we might suppose that the particular had no instrumental cause at all4 ,your definition would therefore extend too far and include erroneous as well as true knowledge2 for non-authoritativeness1 which ,vedantists and most ,mmmsakas allow to be produced by something external1 must also be considered as residing in a particular knowledge i4e41 a wrong knowledge produced in part by the instrumental causes which produced the right knowledge4 7e47 ,as for your fifth view1 we ask whether by being produced by the instrumental causes only which produced right knowledge1 you mean to include or exclude the absence of a 'defect'8 ,it cannot be the former alternative2 because the followers of the ,nyya who hold that authoritativeness is proved by something external as inference1 c41 would at once grant that authoritativeness is produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge combined with the absence of a 'defect4' ,neither can it be the latter alternative2 for1 inasmuch as it is certain that the absence of a 'defect' is found combined with the various instrumental causes1 this absence of a 'defect' is fixed as by adamantine glue to be a cause of right knowledge1 since right knowledge will always accompany its presence1 and be absent if it is absent1#bij and it will at the same time be not an unimportant condition4#bia ,if you object that non-existence 7or absence7 cannot be a cause1 we reply by asking you whether non-existence can be an effect or not8 ,if it cannot1 then we should have to allow that cloth is eternal1 as its emergent non-existence or destruction would be impossible4 ,if it can be an effect1 then why should it not be a cause also8 ,so this rope binds you at both ends4 ,this has also been said by ,udayana in his ,kusumjali1 i4 #aj-- ',as existence1 so too non-existence is held to be a cause as well as an effect4' ,the argument1 in my opinion1 runs as follows3--,right knowledge depends on some cause#bib other than the common causes of knowledge1 from the very fact that1 while it is an effect1 it is also knowledge1 just as wrong knowledge does4#bic ,authoritativeness is known through something external to itself e4g41 inference1 because doubt arises in regard to it in an unfamiliar case1 as we also see in non-authoritativeness4 ,therefore1 as we can prove that authoritativeness is both produced and recognised by means of something external1 the ,mmms tenet that 'authoritativeness is self-proved' is like a gourd overripe and rotten4 ,this long harangue of our opponent1 however1 is but a vain attempt to strike the sky with his fist2 for 7a47 we mean by our phrase self-proved that while right knowledge is produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge1 it is not produced by any other cause 7as defect1 c47 ,the following is our argument as drawn out in full3--,right knowledge is not produced by any other instrumental causes than those of knowledge1 while1 at the same time1 it is produced by these1 because it is not the site of wrongness of knowledge1--just like a jar4#bid ,nor can ,udayana's#bie argument be brought forward as establishing the dependence of authoritativeness on something external1 for it is swallowed up by the dragon of the equally potent contradictory argument4 ,right knowledge is not produced by any cause which is other than the causes of knowledge and is also other than 'defect1'#bif from the very fact of its being knowledge--like wrong knowledge4 ,again1 since right knowledge can arise from the causes of knowledge per se1 it would be a needless complexity to suppose that anything else is a cause1 whether you call it a guna or the absence of a defect 7dosha74#big ,but surely if the presence of a defect is the cause of wrong knowledge1 it is difficult to deny that its absence must be a cause of right knowledge8 ,we meet this1 however1 by maintaining that the absence of defect is only an indirect and remote cause1 as it only acts negatively by preventing wrong knowledge4 ,as it has been said-- ,therefore we reasonably conclude from the presence of gunas the absence of 'defects1'#bih from their absence the non-existence of the two kinds of non-authoritativeness1#bii and from this the general conclusion4#cjj 7b47 ,we maintain that the recognition of right knowledge is produced by the same causes only which make us perceive the first knowledge#cja sc4 the eye1 mind1 c4 ,nor can you object that this view is precluded1 because it would imply that there could be no such thing as doubt2 for we answer that doubt arises in cases where1 although all the causes which produce knowledge are present1 there is also the simultaneous presence of some opposing cause1 as a defect1 c4 ,as for your argument ,o ,naiyyika6 given supra1 in p4 #aih1 lines #ag-bd1 ,i ask1 ,is your own argument an authoritative proof by itself or not8 ,if it is1 it proves too much for it would properly apply to itself and lead us to infer its own dependence on external proof1 whereas you hold it to be independent of such2 and if it is not1 we should have a case of regressus in infinitum1 for it will want some other proof to confirm its authoritativeness1 and this too in its turn will want some fresh proof1 and so on for ever4 ,as for the argument urged by ,udayana#cjb in the ,kusumjali1 when he tries to establish that immediate and vehement action does not depend on the agent's certainty as to the authoritativeness of the speech which sets him acting3 ,action depends on wish1 its vehemence on that of the wish1#cjc wish on the knowledge that the thing wished for is a means to attain some wished-for end1 and this is only ascertained by an inference based on some 'sign' which proves that the thing is closely connected with the wished-for end1 and this inference depends on the things being in direct contact with the agent's senses2 but throughout the whole series of antecedent steps the ,mmms idea of the perception of authoritativeness is never once found as a cause of action4 ,all this appears to us simple bluster1 like that of the thief who ostentatiously throws open all his limbs before me1 when ,i had actually found the gold under his armpit4 ,it is only the knowledge that the thing is a means to attain the desired end1 and this knowledge recognised as authoritative and right knowledge1 which causes the definite volition to arise at all2 and in this we can distinctly trace the influence of that very perception of authoritativeness whose existence he so vehemently pretended to deny4 ,if unhesitating action ever arose in any case from doubt1 then1 as it might always arise so in every given case1 all ascertainment of authoritativeness would be useless2 and as the very existence of what is unascertained is rendered uncertain1 poor authoritativeness would have to be considered as dead and buried6 ,but enough of this prolix controversy2 since it has been said-- ,therefore the authoritativeness of a cognition1 which 7authoritativeness7 presented itself as representing a real fact1 may be overthrown by the perception of a 'defect1' which perception is produced by some sign that proves the discrepancy between the cognition and the fact4#cjd ,now with regard to the ,veda1 which is the self-proved and authoritative criterion in regard to duty1 we have the following divergency between the two great ,mmms schools3--,the ,veda is composed of three portions1 respectively called hymns 7mantra71 explanatory passages 7arthavda71 and injunctions 7vidhi72 and by injunction we mean such sentences as ,let him who desires heaven sacrifice with the jyotishtoma4 ,here ta1 the affix of the third person singular1 denotes an enjoining power1 which is coloured or rendered definite by the meaning of the root1 according to the opinion of the followers of ,bhatta ,kumrila1 who maintain that words signify#cje something definite by themselves apart from the sentence4 ,the followers of ,guru ,prabhkara1 on the contrary1 hold that the whole sentence is a command relating to the sacrifice1 as they maintain that words only signify an action or something to be done4#cjf ,thus all has been made plain4 ,e4 ,b4 ,c4 ,,footnotes3 ,footnote #bdg3 ,mdhava here calls it the prch ,mmms4 ,footnote #bdh3 ,cf4 ,j4 ,nyyamlvist1 pp4 #e-i4 ,footnote #bdi3 ,thus it is said that he who desires to be a family priest should offer a black-necked animal to ,agni1 a parti-coloured one to ,soma1 and a black-necked one to ,agni4 ,should this be a case for tantra or not8 ,by tantra one offering to ,agni would do for both2 but as the offering to ,soma comes between1 they cannot be united1 and thus it must be a case of vpa1 i4e41 offering the two separately 7,j4 ,nyyaml1 xi4 #a1 #ac74 ,footnote #bej3 ,in p4 #abc1 line #d1 ,i read vilakshana-drishtaphala4 ,footnote #bea3 ,in the former case it would be a vidhi1 in the latter a niyama4 ,cf4 the lines vidhir atyantam aprpto niyamah pkshike sati1 tatra chnyatra cha prptau parisamkhy vidhyate4 ,footnote #beb3 ,the ,mmms holds that the potential and similar affixes1 which constitute a vidhi1 have a twofold power2 by the one they express an active volition of the agent1 corresponding to the root-meaning 7artha-bhvan72 by the other an enforcing power in the word 7sabda-bhvan74 ,thus in svargakmo yajeta1 the eta implies let him produce heaven by means of certain acts which together make up a sacrifice possessing a certain mystic influence2 next it implies an enforcing power residing in itself 7as it is the word of the self-existent ,veda and not of ,god7 which sets the hearer upon this course of action4 ,footnote #bec3 ,these four fruits of action are obscure1 and ,i do not remember to have seen them alluded to elsewhere4 ,i was told in ,india that they were a thing's coming into being1 growing1 declining1 and perishing4 ,if so1 they are the second1 third1 fifth1 and sixth of the six vikras mentioned in ,sankara's ,vajraschi1 #b1 i4e41 asti1 jyate1 vardhate1 viparinamate1 apakshyate1 nasyati4 ,i do not see how there could be any reference to the four kinds of aprva1 sc4 phala1 samudya1 utpatti1 and anga1 described in ,nyya ,m4 ,v4 ii4 #a1 #b4 ,footnote #bed3 ,the nigamas are the ,vedic quotations in ,yska's nirukta4 ,footnote #bee3 ,see ,nyya-ml-vistara1 i4 #d1 #ai4 ,footnote #bef3 ,the exact number is #iae4 ,footnote #beg3 ,this is to explain the last of the five members1 the samgati4 ,footnote #beh3 ,cf4 ,asvalyana's ,grihya ,stras1 i4 #ai1 #a4 ,footnote #bei3 ,the anuvda1 of course1 implies a previous vidhi1 which it thus repeats and supplements1 and so carries with it an equal authority4 ,the anuvda in the present case is the passage which mentions that the ,veda is to be read1 as it enforces the previous vidhi as to teaching4 ,footnote #bfj3 ,i read in p4 #abg1 line #ab1 anava-gamyamnasya1 and so the recension given in the ,nyya ,m4 ,v4 p4 #ad1 na budhyamnasya4 ,footnote #bfa3 ,in the next two or three pages ,i have frequently borrowed from ,dr4 ,muir's translation in his ,sanskrit ,texts1 vol4 iii4 p4 #hh4 ,footnote #bfb3 ,the soul may be traced back through successive transmigrations1 but you never get back to its beginning4 ,footnote #bfc3 ,mdhava means that the author of this stanza1 though unknown to many people1 was not necessarily unknown to all1 as his contemporaries1 no doubt1 knew who wrote it1 and his descendants might perhaps still be aware of the fact4 ,in this case1 therefore1 we have an instance of a composition of which some persons did not know the origin1 but which1 nevertheless1 had a human author4 ,the stanza in question is quoted in full in ,bhtlingk's ,indische ,sprche1 ,no4 #eeih1 from the ,,ms4 anthology called the ,subhshitrnava4 ,for muktaka1 see ,sh4 ,darp41 #eeh4 ,footnote #bfd3 ,the eternity of the ,veda depends on this tenet of the ,mmms that sound is eternal4 ,footnote #bfe3 ,eternal things 7as the atoms of earth1 fire1 water1 and air1 minds1 time1 space1 ether1 and soul7 have visesha1 not smnya or genus1 and they are all imperceptible to the senses4 ,genera are themselves eternal 7though the individuals in which they reside are not71 but they have not themselves genus4 ,both these arguments belong rather to the ,nyya-vaiseshika school than to the ,nyya4 ,footnote #bff3 ,the ,mmmsaka allows that the uchchrana or utterance is non-eternal4 ,footnote #bfg3 ,the inference will be as follows3 ,the ,vedas were arranged after being acquired by other modes of proof1 with a view to their manifestation1 from the very fact of their having the nature of sentences1 just like the compositions of ,manu1 c4 ,footnote #bfh3 ,the argument will now run1 ,the ,vedas were arranged after being acquired by other modes of proof1 because1 while they possess authority1 they still have the nature of sentences1 like the composition of ,manu1 c4 ,footnote #bfi3 ,in assuming a material body1 he would be subject to material limitations4 ,footnote #bgj3 ,the ,jainas allow thirty-four such superhuman developments 7atisayh7 in their saints4 ,footnote #bga3 ,jaimini maintains that the vibrations of the air manifest the always existing sound4 ,footnote #bgb3 ,what is meant by 'noise' 7nda7 is these 'conjunctions' and 'disjunctions1' occasioned by the vibrations of the air4--,ballantyne1 ,mmms ,aphorisms1 i4 #ag4 ,footnote #bgc3 ,the ,nyya holds that colour and sound are respectively special qualities of the elements light and ether2 and as the organs of seeing and hearing are composed of light and ether1 each will1 of course1 have its corresponding special quality4 ,footnote #bgd3 ,in p4 #aca1 line #g1 ,i read pratyakshsiddheh4 ,footnote #bge3 ,cf4 my note pp4 #g1 #h1 7on the ,chrvka-darsana7 for the updhi4 ,the updhi or condition limits a too general middle term2 it is defined as that which always accompanies the major term1 but does not always accompany the middle4 ,thus if the condition produced from wet fuel is added to fire1 the argument the mountain has smoke because it has fire is no longer a false one4 ,here1 in answer to the ,nyya argument in the text1 our author objects that its middle term 7from the fact of its being a special quality belonging to an organ of sense7 is too wide1 i4e41 it is sometimes found where the major term non-eternal is not found1 as1 e4g41 in sound itself1 according to the ,mmms doctrine4 ,to obviate this he proposes to add the condition1 not causing audition1 as he will readily concede that all those things are non-eternal which1 while not causing audition1 are special qualities belonging to an organ of sense1 as1 e4g41 colour4 ,but ,i need scarcely add that this addition would make the whole argument nugatory4 ,in fact1 the ,prva ,mmms and the ,nyya can never argue together on this question of the eternity of sound1 as their points of view are so totally different4 ,footnote #bgf3 ,in the former case we have the dhwamsa of sound1 in the latter its prgabhva4 ,footnote #bgg3 ,in p4 #aca1 line #ab1 ,i read samapauhi for sampohi1 i4e41 the passive aorist of sam apa h4 ,footnote #bgh3 ,i do not know this legend4 ,tla and ,betla are the two demons who carry ,vikramditya on their shoulders in the ,simhsan-batts4 ,it appears to be referred to here as illustrating how one answer can suffice for two opponents4 ,footnote #bgi3 ,this is probably a work by ,bhsarvaja 7see ,dr4 ,hall's ,bibl4 ,index1 p4 #bf74 ,footnote #bhj3 ,dhvani1 or our articulate noise1 produces the vibrations of air which render manifest the ever-existing sound4 ,there is always an eternal but inaudible hum going on1 which we modify into a definite speech by our various articulations4 ,i take samskrita here as equivalent to abhivyakta4 ,footnote #bha3 ,i read in p4 #aca1 line #ae1 samskrakasamskryabhvbhvnumnam4 ,footnote #bhb3 ,it would be a case of vyabhichra4 ,the ,naiyyika argument would seem to be something as follows3--,sound is not thus manifested by noise1 since both are simultaneously perceived by the senses1 just as we see in the parallel case of the individual and its species2 these are both perceived together1 but the individual is not manifested by the species4 ,but the ,mmms rejoins that this would equally apply to the soul and knowledge2 as the internal sense perceives both simultaneously1 and therefore knowledge ought not to be manifested by the soul1 which is contrary to experience4 ,but ,i am not sure that ,i rightly understand the argument4 ,footnote #bhc3 ,here begins a long prva-paksha1 from p4 #aca1 line #ah1 down to p4 #acc1 line #i2 see p4 #aih infra4 ,footnote #bhd3 ,this is ,prabhkara's view 7see ,siddh4 ,muktv41 p4 #aah74 ,the first knowledge is in the form ,this is a jar2 the second knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form ,i perceive the jar2 and this latter produces authoritativeness 7prmnya71 which resides in it as its characteristic4 ,footnote #bhe3 ,substances are intimate causes to their qualities1 and only substances have qualities2 now if authoritativeness1 which is a characteristic of right knowledge1 were caused by it1 it would be a quality of it1 that is1 right knowledge would be its intimate cause and therefore a substance4 ,footnote #bhf3 ,the eye1 c41 would be its instrumental causes4 ,footnote #bhg3 ,the first three categories substance1 quality1 and action1 are called jtis or species2 the last four1 genus1 visesha1 intimate relation1 and non-existence1 are called updhis or general characteristics4 ,footnote #bhh3 ,the ,prva ,mmms denies that recollection is right knowledge4 ,footnote #bhi3 ,wrong knowledge is produced by the same instrumental causes 7as the eye1 c47 which produced right knowledge1 but by these together with a defect1 as biliousness1 distance c4 ,footnote #bij3 ,scil4 if there be doshbhva there is pram2 if not1 not4 ,in p4 #acb1 line #bj1 ,i read doshbhvatvena for doshbhvasahakritatvena4 ,footnote #bia3 ,anyathsiddhatvam means niyataprvavartitve sati anvasyakatvam4 ,footnote #bib3 ,scil4 or the absence of defect1 doshbhva4 ,footnote #bic3 ,wrong knowledge has doshbhva or the presence of a defect as its cause1 in addition to the common causes4 ,footnote #bid3 ,wrongness of knowledge 7apramtva7 can only reside in knowledge as a characteristic or quality thereof2 it cannot reside in a jar4 ,the jar is1 of course1 produced by other instrumental causes than those of knowledge 7as1 e4g41 the potter's stick1 c471 but it is not produced by these other causes in combination with being also produced by the instrumental causes of knowledge 7with which it has nothing directly to do72 and so by a quibble1 which is less obvious in ,sanskrit than in ,english1 this wretched sophism is allowed to pass muster4 ,the jar is not produced-by-any-other-instrumental-cause s-than-those-of-knowledge1-while- at-the-same-time-it-is-produced-by-these 4 ,footnote #bie3 ,i suppose this is the argument given at the close of the previous long prva-paksha4 ,footnote #bif3 ,these words and is other than defect 7dosha-vyatirikta7 are1 of course1 meaningless as far as right knowledge is concerned2 they are simply added to enable the author to bring in wrong knowledge as an example4 ,wrong knowledge is caused by the causes of knowledge plus defect2 right knowledge by the former alone4 ,footnote #big3 ,the ,nyya holds that wrong knowledge is produced by a defect1 as jaundice1 c41 in the eye1 and right knowledge by a guna or virtue 7as the direct contact of the healthy organ with a true object71 or by the absence of a defect4 ,footnote #bih3 ,the guna 7or ,greek3 beltist hexis7 of an organ is not properly a cause of pram but rather doshbhva-bodhaka4 ,footnote #bii3 ,scil4 doubtful 7sandigdha7 and ascertained non-authoritativeness 7nischitprmnya74 ,footnote #cjj3 ,utsarga is a general conclusion which is not necessarily true in every particular case2 but here it means the conclusion that right knowledge has no special causes but the common causes of knowledge1 the eye1 c4 ,footnote #cja3 ,the first knowledge is ,this is a jar1 the second knowledge is the cognition of this perception in the form ,i perceive the jar2 and simultaneously with it arises the cognition of the truth of the perception1 i4e41 its authoritativeness or prmnya4 ,footnote #cjb3 ,this seems to be a quotation of ,udayana's own words1 and no doubt is taken from his very rare prose commentary on the ,kusumjali1 a specimen of which ,i printed in the preface to my edition4 ,this passage must come from the fifth book 7v4 #f874 ,footnote #cjc3 ,i read tat-prchuryam for tatprchurye in p4 #acd1 line #g4 ,footnote #cjd3 ,this stanza affirms that according to the ,mmms school1 while authoritativeness is self-proved1 non-authoritativeness is proved from something else 7as inference1 c47 ,footnote #cje3 ,i take vyutpatti here as used for sakti2 siddhe means ghatdau4 ,footnote #cjf3 ,these are the two great ,mmms schools4 ,the former1 called abhihitnvaya-vdinah1 hold 7like the ,naiyyika school7 that words by themselves can express their separate meaning by the function abhidh or denotation2 these are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing one connected idea4 ,the latter1 called anvitbhidhna-vdinah1 hold that words only express a meaning as parts of a sentence and grammatically connected with each other2 they only mean an action or something connected with an action4 ,in gm naya1 gm does not properly mean gotva1 but nayannvita-gotva1 i4e41 the bovine genus as connected with bringing4 ,we cannot have a case of a noun without some governing verb1 and vice vers4 ,cf4 ,waitz1 as quoted by ,professor ,sayce 7,comparative ,philology1 page #acf73 ,we do not think in words but in sentences2 hence we may assert that a living language consists of sentences1 not of words4 ,but a sentence is formed not of single independent words1 but of words which refer to one another in a particular manner1 like the corresponding thought1 which does not consist of single independent ideas1 but of such as1 connected1 form a whole1 and determine one another mutually4 ,,chapter ,,xiii4 ,,the ,p,,nini-,,darsana4#cjg ,if any one asks1 ,where are we to learn how to separate a root and an affix so as to be able to say1 ',this part is the original root and this is an affix1' may we not reply that to those who have drunk the waters of ,patajali this question produces no confusion1 since it is notorious that the rules of grammar have reference to this very point of the separation of the original roots and affixes8 ,thus the very first sentence of the venerable ,patajali1 the author of the ,great ,commentary1 is atha sabdnussanam1 ,now comes the exposition of words4 ,the particle atha 7now7 is used here as implying a new topic or a commencement2 and by the phrase1 exposition of words1 is meant the system of grammar put forth by ,pnini4 ,now a doubt might here arise as to whether this phrase implies that the exposition of words is to be the main topic or not2 and it is to obviate any such doubt that he employed the particle atha1 since this particle implies that what follows is to be treated as the main topic to the exclusion of everything else4 ,the word exposition 7anussana71 as here used1 implies that thereby ,vaidic words1 such as those in the line sam no devr abhishtaye1#cjh c41 and secular words as ancillary to these1 as the common words for cow1 horse1 man1 elephant1 bird1 c41 are made the subject of the exposition1 i4e41 are deduced from their original roots and properly formed1 or1 in other words1 are explained as divided into root and affix4 ,we must consider that the compound in this phrase represents a genitive of the object sabdnussanam standing for sabdasynussanam1 and as there is a rule of ,pnini 7karmani cha1 ii4 #b1 #ad71 which prohibits composition in such a construction1 we are forced to concede that the phrase sabdnussanam does not come before us as a duly authorised compound4 ,here1 however1 arises a discussion as to the true application of the alleged rule of ,pnini1 for we hold that1 by ii4 #c1 #ff1 wherever an object and an agent are both expressed in one and the same sentence in connection with a word ending with a krit affix1 there the object alone can be put in the genitive and not the agent2#cji this limitation arising from our taking ubhayaprpti in the stra as a bahuvrhi compound4#caj ,thus we must say1 ,wonderful is the milking of cows by an unpractised cowherd4 ,we may1 however1 remark in passing that some authors do maintain that the agent may in such cases be put in the genitive 7as well as the object72 hence we find it stated in the ,ksik ,commentary3 ,some authors maintain that there should be an option in such cases without any distinction1 and thus they would equally allow such a construction as 'the exposition of words of the teacher' or 'by the teacher4' ,inasmuch1 however1 as the words of the phrase in question really mean that the exposition intended relates to words and not to things1 and since this can be at once understood without any mention of the agent1 i4e41 the teacher1 any such mention would be plainly superfluous2 and therefore as the object and the agent are not both expressed in one and the same sentence1 this is not an instance of the genitive of the object 7coming under ii4 #c1 #ff1 and ii4 #b1 #ad71 but rather an instance of quite another rule1 viz41 ii4 #c1 #fe1 which directs that an agent or an object1 in connection with a word ending with a krit affix1 is to be put in the genitive which in this instance is expressed by the tatpurusha compound2 and the compound in question will be strictly analogous to such recognised forms as idhma-pravraschana1 palsa-stana1 c4#caa ,or we might argue that the genitive case implied in this shashthtatpurusha is one of the class called residual1 in accordance with ,pnini's rule 7ii4 #c1 #ej71 ,let the genitive be used in the residuum1 i4e41 in the other constructions not provided for by special rules2#cab and in this way we might defend the phrase against the opponent's attack4 ,but1 it might be replied1 your alleged 'residual genitive' could be assumed everywhere1 and we should thus find all the prohibitions of composition in constructions with a genitive case rendered utterly nugatory4 ,this we readily grant1 and hence ,bhartrihari in his ,vkyapadya has shown that these rules are mainly useful where the question relates to the accent4#cac ,to this effect are the words of the great doctor ,vardhamna-- ,in secular utterances men may proceed as they will1 ,but in ,vaidic paths let minute accuracy of speech be employed4 ,thus have they explained the meaning of ,pnini's stras1 since ,he himself uses such phrases as janikartuh and tatprayojakah4#cad ,hence it follows that the full meaning of the sentence in question 7of the ,mahbhshya7 is that it is to be understood that the rules of grammar which may be taken as a synonym for 'the exposition concerning words' are now commenced4 ,well1 then1 for the sake of directly understanding this intended meaning1 it would have been better to have said 'now comes grammar1' as the words 'now comes the exposition of words' involve a useless excess of letters4 ,this objection cannot1 however1 be allowed1 since the employment of such a word as sabdnussanam1 the sense of which can be so readily inferred from its etymology1 proves that the author intends to imply an end which shall establish that grammar is a subordinate study 7anga7 to the ,veda4#cae ,otherwise1 if there were no such end set forth1 there would be no consequent application of the readers to the study of grammar4 ,nor may you say that this application will be sufficiently enforced by the injunction for study1 the ,veda with its six subordinate parts must be read as a duty without any 7special7 end1#caf because1 even though there be such an injunction1 it will not follow that students will apply to this study1 if no end is mentioned which will establish that it is an anga of the ,veda4 ,thus in old times the students1 after reading the ,veda1 used to be in haste to say-- ,are not ,vaidic words established by the ,veda and secular by common life1 ,and therefore grammar is useless8 ,therefore it was only when they understood it to be an anga of the ,veda that they applied themselves to its study4 ,so in the same way the students of the present day would not be likely to apply themselves to it either4 ,it is to obviate this danger that it becomes necessary to set forth some end which shall1 at the same time1 establish that grammar is an anga of the ,veda4 ,if1 when the end is explained1 they should still not apply themselves1 then1 being destitute of all knowledge of the true formation of secular words1 they would become involved in sin in the course of sacrificial acts1 and would consequently lose their religious merit4 ,hence the followers of sacrifice read1 ,one who keeps up a sacrificial fire1 on using an incorrect word1 should offer an expiatory offering to ,saraswat4 ,now it is to declare this end which establishes that it is an anga of the ,veda that he uses the words atha sabdnussanam and not atha vykaranam4 ,now the rules of grammar must have an end1 and a thing's end is determined by men's pursuit of it with a view thereto4 ,just as in a sacrifice undertaken with a view to heaven1 heaven is the end2 in the same way the end of the exposition of words is instruction concerning words1 i4e41 propriety of speech4 ,but1 an objector may say1 will not the desired end be still unattained for want of the true means to it8 ,nor can it be said that reading the ,veda word by word is the true means2 for this cannot be a means for the understanding of words1 since their number is infinite1 as divided into proper and improper words4#cag ,thus there is a tradition that ,brihaspati for a thousand divine years taught to ,indra the study of words as used in their individual forms when the ,veda is read word by word1#cah and still he came not to the end4 ,here the teacher was ,brihaspati1 the pupil was ,indra1 and the time of study a thousand years of the gods2 and yet the termination was not reached1--how much less1 then1 in our day1 let a man live ever so long8 ,learning is rendered efficient by four appropriate means1--reading1 understanding1 practising1 and handing it on to others2 but in the proposed way life would only suffice for the bare time of reading2 therefore the reading word by word is not a means for the knowledge of words1 and consequently1 as we said at first1 the desired end is not established4 ,we reply1 however1 that it was never conceded that the knowledge of words was to be attained by this reading word by word4 ,and again1 since general and special rules apply at once to many examples1 when these are divided into the artificial parts called roots1 c4 7just as one cloud rains over many spots of ground71 in this way we can easily comprehend an exposition of many words4 ,thus1 for instance1 by the general rule 7iii4 #b1 #a71 karmani1 the affix an is enjoined after a root when the object is in composition with it2 and by this rule we learn many words1 as kumbhakra1 a potter1 kndalva1 a cutter of stems1 c4 ,but the supplementary special rule 7iii4 #b1 #c71 to 'nupasarge kah1 directing that the affix ka is to be used after a root that ends in long when there is no upasarga1 shows how impracticable this reading word by word would be since it would never teach us how to distinguish an upasarga4 ,but since there are other angas1 why do you single out grammar as the one object of honour8 ,we reply1 that among the six angas the principal one is grammar1 and labour devoted to what is the principal is sure to bear fruit4 ,thus it has been said-- ,nigh unto ,brahman himself1 the highest of all religious austerities1 ,the wise have called grammar the first anga of the ,veda4 ,hence we conclude that the exposition of words is the direct end of the rules of grammar1 but its indirect end is the preservation1 c41 of the ,veda4 ,hence it has been said by the worshipful author of the great ,commentary quoting a ,vrttika1 the end 7or motive7 is preservation1 inference1 scripture1 facility1 and assurance4#cai ,moreover prosperity arises from the employment of a correct word2 thus ,ktyyana has said1 ,there is prosperity in the employment of a word according to the sstra2 it is equal to the words of the ,veda itself4 ,others also have said that a single word thoroughly understood and rightly used becomes in ,swarga the desire-milking cow4 ,thus 7they say7-- ,they proceed to heaven1 with every desired happiness1 in well-yoked chariots of harnessed speech2 ,but those who use such false forms as achkramata must trudge thither on foot4#cbj ,nor need you ask how can an irrational word possess such power8 since we have revelation declaring that it is like to the great god4 ,for the ,sruti says1 ,four are its horns1 three its feet1 two its heads1 and seven its hands1--roars loudly the threefold-bound bull1 the great god enters mortals 7,rig-,veda1 iv4 #eh1 #c74 ,the great commentator thus explains it3--,the four horns are the four kinds of words--nouns1 verbs1 prepositions1 and particles2 its three feet mean the three times1 past1 present1 and future1 expressed by the tense-affixes1 lat1 c42 the two heads1 the eternal and temporary 7or produced7 words1 distinguished as the manifested and the manifester2 its seven hands are the seven case affixes1 including the conjugational terminations2 threefold bound1 as enclosed in the three organs--the chest1 the throat1 and the head4 ,the metaphor bull 7vrishabha7 is applied from its pouring forth 7varshana71 i4e41 from its giving fruit when used with knowledge4 ,loudly roars1 i4e41 utters sound1 for the root ru means sound2 here by the word sound developed speech 7or language7#cba is implied2 the great god enters mortals1--the great god1 i4e41 speech1--enters mortals1 i4e41 men endowed with the attribute of mortality4 ,thus is declared the likeness of speech#cbb to the supreme ,brahman4 ,the eternal word1 called sphota1 without parts1 and the cause of the world1 is verily ,brahman2 thus it has been declared by ,bhartrihari in the part of his book called the ,brahmaknda-- ,brahman1 without beginning or end1 the indestructible essence of speech1 ,which is developed in the form of things1 and whence springs the creation of the world4 ,but since there is a well-known twofold division of words into nouns and verbs1 how comes this fourfold division8 ,we reply1 because this1 too1 is well known4 ,thus it has been said in the ,prakrnaka-- ,some make a twofold division of words1 some a fourfold or a fivefold1 ,drawing them up from the sentences as root1 affix1 and the like4 ,helrja interprets the fivefold division as including karmapravachanyas4#cbc ,but the fourfold division1 mentioned by the great commentator1 is proper1 since karmapravachanyas distinguish a connection produced by a particular kind of verb1 and thus1 as marking out a particular kind of connection and so marking out a particular kind of verb1 they are really included in compounded prepositions 7upasargas74#cbd ,but1 say some1 why do you talk so much of an eternal sound called sphota8 ,this we do not concede1 since there is no proof that there is such a thing4 ,we reply that our own perception is the proof4 ,thus there is one word cow1 since all men have the cognition of a word distinct from the various letters composing it4 ,you cannot say1 in the absence of any manifest contradiction1 that this perception of the word is a false perception4 ,hence you must concede that there is such a thing as sphota1 as otherwise you cannot account for the cognition of the meaning of the word4 ,for the answer that its cognition arises from the letters cannot bear examination1 since it breaks down before either horn of the following dilemma3--,are the letters supposed to produce this cognition of the meaning in their united or their individual capacity8 ,not the first1 for the letters singly exist only for a moment1 and therefore cannot form a united whole at all2 and not the second1 since the single letters have no power to produce the cognition of the meaning which the word is to convey4 ,there is no conceivable alternative other than their single or united capacity2 and therefore it follows 7say the wise in these matters7 that1 as the letters cannot cause the cognition of the meaning1 there must be a sphota by means of which arises the knowledge of the meaning2 and this sphota is an eternal sound1 distinct from the letters and revealed by them1 which causes the cognition of the meaning4 ,it is disclosed 7sphutyate7 or revealed by the letters1 hence it is called sphota1 as revealed by the letters2 or from it is disclosed the meaning1 hence it is called sphota as causing the knowledge of the meaning1--these are the two etymologies to explain the meaning of the word4 ,and thus it hath been said by the worshipful ,patajali in the great ,commentary1 ,now what is the word 'cow' gauh8 ,it is that word by which1 when pronounced1 there is produced the simultaneous cognition of dewlap1 tail1 hump1 hoofs1 and horns4 ,this is expounded by ,kaiyata in the passage commencing1 ,grammarians maintain that it is the word1 as distinct from the letters1 which expresses the meaning1 since1 if the letters expressed it1 there would be no use in pronouncing the second and following ones as the first would have already conveyed all we wished1 and ending1 ,the ,vkyapadya has established at length that it is the sphota which1 distinct from the letters and revealed by the sound1 expresses the meaning4#cbe ,here1 however1 an objector may urge1 ,but should we not rather say that the sphota has no power to convey the meaning1 as it fails under either of the following alternatives1 for is it supposed to convey the meaning when itself manifested or unmanifested8 ,not the latter1 because it would then follow that we should find the effect of conveying the meaning always produced1 since1 as sphota is supposed to be eternal1 and there would thus be an ever-present cause independent of all subsidiary aids1 the effect could not possibly fail to appear4 ,therefore1 to avoid this fault1 we must allow the other alternative1 viz41 that sphota conveys the meaning when it is itself manifested4 ,well1 then1 do the manifesting letters exercise this manifesting power separately or combined8 ,whichever alternative you adopt1 the very same faults which you alleged against the hypothesis of the letters expressing the meaning1 will have to be met in your hypothesis that they have this power to manifest sphota4 ,this has been said by ,bhatta in his ,mmms-sloka-vrttika-- ,the grammarian who holds that sphota is manifested by the letters as they are severally apprehended1 though itself one and indivisible1 does not thereby escape from a single difficulty4 ,the truth is1 that1 as ,pnini 7i4 #d1 #ad7 and ,gotama 7,st4 ii4 #abc7 both lay it down that letters only then form a word when they have an affix at the end1 it is the letters which convey the word's meaning through the apprehension of the conventional association of ideas which they help4#cbf ,if you object that as there are the same letters in rasa as in sara1 in nava as in vana1 in dn as in nad1 in mra as in rma1 in rja as in jra1 c41 these several pairs of words would not convey a different meaning1 we reply that the difference in the order of the letters will produce a difference in the meaning4 ,this has been said by ,tauttita-- ,as are the letters in number and kind1 whose power is perceived in conveying any given meaning of a word1 so will be the meaning which they convey4 ,therefore1 as there is a well-known rule that when the same fault attaches to both sides of an argument it cannot be urged against one alone1 we maintain that the hypothesis of the existence of a separate thing called sphota is unnecessary1 as we have proved that it is the letters which express the word's meaning your arguments against our view having been shown to be irrelevant4 ,all this long oration is really only like a drowning man's catching at a straw2#cbg for either of the alternatives is impossible1 whether you hold that it is the single letters or their aggregation which conveys the meaning of the word4 ,it cannot be the former1 because a collection of separate letters1 without any one pervading cause1#cbh could never produce the idea of a word any more than a collection of separate flowers would form a garland without a string4 ,nor can it be the latter1 because the letters1 being separately pronounced and done with1 cannot combine into an aggregate4 ,for we use the term aggregate where a number of objects are perceived to be united together in one place2 thus we apply it to a ,grislea tomentosa1 an ,acacia catechu1 a ,butea frondosa1 c41 or to an elephant1 a man1 a horse1 c41 seen together in one place2 but these letters are not perceived thus united together1 as they are severally produced and pass away2 and even on the hypothesis of their having a manifesting power1 they can have no power to form an aggregate1 as they can only manifest a meaning successively and not simultaneously4 ,nor can you imagine an artificial aggregate in the letters1 because this would involve a mutual dependence 7or reasoning in a circle72 for1 on the one hand1 the letters would only become a word when their power to convey one meaning had been established2 and1 on the other hand1 their power to convey one meaning would only follow when the fact of their being a word was settled4 ,therefore1 since it is impossible that letters should express the meaning1 we must accept the hypothesis of sphota4 ,but even on your own hypothesis that there is a certain thing called sphota which expresses the meaning1 the same untenable alternative will recur which we discussed before2 and therefore it will only be a case of the proverb that 'the dawn finds the smuggler with the revenue-officer's house close by4'#cbi ,this1 however1 is only the inflation of the world of fancy from the wide difference between the two cases4 ,for the first letter1 in its manifesting power1 reveals the invisible sphota1 and each successive letter makes this sphota more and more manifest1 just as the ,veda1 after one reading1 is not retained1 but is made sure by repetition2 or as the real nature of a jewel is not clearly seen at the first glance1 but is definitely manifested at the final examination4 ,this is in accordance with the authoritative saying 7of the teacher73 ,the seed is implanted by the sounds1 and1 when the idea is ripened by the successive repetition1 the word is finally ascertained simultaneously with the last uttered letter4 ,therefore1 since ,bhartrihari has shown in his first book that the letters of a word being many and successive cannot manifest the meaning of the word1 as is implied by the very phrase1 ,we gain such and such a meaning from such and such a word1 we are forced to assume the existence#ccj of an indivisible sphota as a distinct category1 which has the power to manifest the word's meaning4 ,all this has been established in the discussion 7in the ,mahbhshya7 on genus 7jti71 which aims at proving that the meaning of all words is ultimately that summum genus1 i4e41 that existence whose characteristic is perfect knowledge of the supreme reality#cca 7,brahman74 ,but if all words mean only that supreme existence1 then all words will be synonyms1 having all the same meaning2 and your grand logical ingenuity would produce an astonishing result in demonstrating the uselessness of human language as laboriously using several words to no purpose at the same time6 ,thus it has been said-- ,the employment of synonymous terms at the same time is to be condemned2 for they only express their meaning in turn and not by combination4 ,therefore this opinion of yours is really hardly worth the trouble of refuting4 ,all this is only the ruminating of empty ether2 for just as the colourless crystal is affected by different objects which colour it as blue1 red1 yellow1 c41 so1 since the summum genus1 ,brahman1 is variously cognised through its connection with different things1 as severally identified with each1 we thus account for the use of the various conventional words which arise from the different species1#ccb as cow1 c41 these being existence 7the summum genus7 as found in the individual cow1 c4 ,to this purport we have the following authoritative testimony-- ,just as crystal1 that colourless substance1 when severally joined with blue1 red1 or yellow objects1 is seen as possessing that colour4 ,and so it has been said by ,hari1 ,existence pure and simple being divided1 when found in cows1 c41 by reason of its connection with different subjects1 is called this or that species1 and on it all words depend4 ,this they call the meaning of the stem and of the root4 ,this is existence1 this the great soul2 and it is this which the affixed tva1 tal1 c41 express 7,pnini v4 #a1 #aai74 ,existence is that great summum genus which is found in cows1 horses1 c41 differentiated by the various subjects in which it resides2 and the inferior species1 cow1 horse1 c41 are not really different from it2 for the species cow and horse 7gotva and asvatva7 are not really new subjects1 but each is existence as residing in the subject cow and horse4 ,therefore all words1 as expressing definite meanings1 ultimately rest on that one summum genus existence1 which is differentiated by the various subjects1 cows1 c41 in which it resides2 and hence existence is the meaning of the stem-word 7prtipadika74 ,a root is sometimes defined as that which expresses bhva2#ccc now1 as bhva is existence1 the meaning of a root is really existence4#ccd ,others say that a root should be defined as that which expresses action 7kriy72 but here again the meaning of a root will really be existence1 since this action will be a genus1 as it is declared to reside in many subjects1 in accordance with the common definition of a genus1 in the line-- ,others say that action 7kriy7 is a genus1 residing in many individuals4 ,so1 too1 if we accept ,pnini's definition 7v4 #a1 #aai71 ,let the affixes tva and tal come after a word denoting anything1 when we speak of the nature 7bhva7 thereof1 it is clear from the very fact that abstract terms ending in tva or t as asvatva and asvat are used in the sense of bhva1 that they do express existence4 ,this is pure existence from its being free from all coming into being or ceasing to be2 it is eternal1 since1 as all phenomena are developments thereof1 it is devoid of any limit in space1 time1 or substance3 this existence is called the great soul4 ,such is the meaning of ,hari's two kriks quoted above4 ,so1 too1 it is laid down in the discussion on sambandha in ,hari's verses that the ultimate meaning of all words is that something whose characteristic is perfect knowledge of the real meaning of the word ,substance4 ,the true ,reality is ascertained by its illusory forms2 the true substance is declared by words through illusory disguises2 as the object1 ',devadatta's house1' is apprehended by a transitory cause of discrimination1#cce but by the word 'house' itself1 the pure idea without owners is expressed4#ccf ,so1 too1 the author of the ,mahbhshya1 when explaining the ,vrttika1#ccg a word1 its meaning1 and its connection being fixed1 in the passage beginning substance is eternal1 has shown that the meaning of all words is ,brahman1 expressed by the word substance and determined by various unreal#cch conditions as the nature of horse1 c4 ,according to the opinion of ,vjapyyana1 who maintains that all words mean a genus1 words like cow1 c41#cci denote a genus which resides by intimate relation in different substances2 and when this genus is apprehended1 through its connection with it we apprehend the particular substance in which it resides4 ,words like white1 c41 denote a genus which similarly resides in qualities2 through the connection with genus we apprehend the quality1 and through the connection with the quality we apprehend the individual substance4 ,so in the case of words expressing particular names1 in consequence of the recognition that this is the same person from his first coming into existence to his final destruction1 in spite of the difference produced by the various states of childhood1 youth1 adolescence1 c41 we must accept a fixed genus as ,devadatta-hood1#cdj c4 as directly denoted by them4 ,so1 too1 in words expressing action a genus is denoted2 this is the root-meaning1 as in pathati1 he reads1 c41 since we find here a meaning common to all who read4 ,in the doctrine of ,vydi1 who maintained that words meant individual things and not classes or genera1 the individual thing is put forward as that which is primarily denoted1 while the genus is implied as a characteristic mark2 and he thus avoids the alleged faults of indefiniteness1 and wandering away from its proper subject4#cda ,both views are allowed by the great teacher ,pnini2 since in i4 #b1 #eh1 he accepts the theory that a word means the genus1 where he says that when the singular is used to express the class the plural may be optionally used as in the sentence1 ,a ,brhman is to be honoured1 which may equally run1 ,brhmans are to be honoured2 while in i4 #b1 #fd1 he accepts the theory that a word means the individual thing1 where he says1 ,in any individual case there is but one retained of things similar in form i4e41 the dual means ,rma and ,rma1 and the plural means ,rma1 and ,rma and ,rma2 but we retain only one1 adding a dual or plural affix4 ,grammar1 in fact1 being adapted to all assemblies1 can accept both theories without being compromised4 ,therefore both theories are in a sense true2#cdb but the real fact is that all words ultimately mean the ,supreme ,brahman4 ,as it has been said-- ,therefore under the divisions of the meanings of words1 one true universal meaning1 identical with the one existent1 shines out in many forms as the thing denoted4 ,hari also1 in his chapter discussing sambandha1 thus describes the nature of this true meaning-- ,that meaning in which the subject1 the object1 and the perception which unites them are insusceptible of doubt1#cdc that only is called the truth by those who know the end of the three ,vedas4 ,so too in his description of substance1 he says-- ,that which remains as the ,real during the presence of modification1 as the gold remains under the form of the earring1--that wherein change comes and goes1 that they call the ,supreme ,nature4 ,the essential unity of the word and its meaning is maintained in order to preserve inviolate the non-duality of all things which is a cardinal doctrine of our philosophy4 ,this ,supreme ,nature is the thing denoted by all words1 and it is identical with the word2 but the relation of the two1 while they are thus ultimately identical1 varies as does the relation of the two souls4#cdd ,the meaning of this ,krik is that ,brahman is the one object denoted by all words2 and this one object has various differences imposed upon it according to each particular form2 but the conventional variety of the differences produced by these illusory conditions is only the result of ignorance4 ,non-duality is the true state2 but through the power of concealment#cde exercised by illusion at the time of the conventional use of words a manifold expansion takes place1 just as is the case during sleep4 ,thus those skilled in ,vednta lore tell us-- ,as all the extended world of dreams is only the development of illusion in me1 so all this extended waking world is a development of illusion likewise4 ,when the unchangeable ,supreme ,brahman is thus known as the existent joy-thought and identical with the individual soul1 and when primeval ignorance is abolished1 final bliss is accomplished1 which is best defined as the abiding in identity with this ,brahman1 according to the text1 ,he who is well versed in the ,word-,brahman attains to the ,supreme ,brahman4#cdf ,and thus we establish the fact that the exposition of words is the means to final bliss4 ,thus it has been said-- ,they call it the door of emancipation1 the medicine of the diseases of speech1 the purifier of all sciences1 the science of sciences4#cdg ,and so again-- ,this is the first foot-round of the stages of the ladder of final bliss1 this is the straight royal road of the travellers to emancipation4 ,therefore our final conclusion is that the ,sstra of grammar should be studied as being the means for attaining the chief end of man4 ,e4 ,b4 ,c4 ,,footnotes3 ,footnote #cjg3 ,mdhava uses this peculiar term because the grammarians adopted and fully developed the idea of the ,prva-,mmms school that sound is eternal4 ,he therefore treats of sphota here1 and not in his ,jaimini chapter4 ,footnote #cjh3 ,rig-,veda1 x4 #i1 #d4 ,footnote #cji3 ,sabdnussana1 if judged by the apparent sense of ,pnini1 ii4 #b1 #ad1 would be a wrong compound2 but it is not so1 because ii4 #b1 #ad must be interpreted in the sense of ii4 #c1 #ff1 whence it follows that the compound would only be wrong if there were an agent expressed as well as an object1 i4e41 if such a word as chryena followed4 ,in the example given1 we cannot say scharyo godoho sikshitena goplena 7as it would violate ii4 #b1 #ad71 neither can we say scharyo gavm doho' sikshitasya goplasya 7as it would violate ii4 #c1 #ff74 ,footnote #caj3 ,that is1 the ubhayaprpti of ii4 #c1 #ff1 is a bahuvrhi agreeing with kriti in ii4 #c1 #fe4 ,these points are all discussed at some length in the ,commentaries on ,pnini4 ,footnote #caa3 ,these actually occur in the ,commentaries to ,pnini1 ii4 #b1 #h2 iii4 #c1 #aag1 c4 ,footnote #cab3 ,this takes in all cases of relation1 sambandha 7i4e41 shashth-sambandha74 ,footnote #cac3 ,as in such rules as vi4 #b1 #aci4 ,footnote #cad3 ,these compounds occur in ,pnini's own stras 7i4 #d1 #cj1 and i4 #d1 #ee71 and would violate his own rule in ii4 #b1 #ae1 if we were to interpret the latter without some such saving modification as shashth seshe4 ,footnote #cae3 ,the very word sabda in sabdnussanam implies the ,veda1 since this is pre-eminently sabda4 ,footnote #caf3 ,compare ,max ,mller1 ,sansk4 ,liter41 p4 #aac4 ,it is quoted as from the ,veda in the ,mahbhshya4 ,footnote #cag3 ,in the ,calcutta text1 p4 #ach1 dele danda in line #c after bhavet1 and insert it in line #d after sabdnm4 ,footnote #cah3 ,as in the so-called pada text4 ,footnote #cai3 ,see ,ballantyne's ,mahbhshya1 pp4 #ab1 #fd4 ,footnote #cbj3 ,achkramata seems put here as a purposely false form of the frequentative of kram for achankramyata4 ,footnote #cba3 ,or it may mean the developed universe4 ,compare the lines of ,bhartrihari which immediately follow4 ,footnote #cbb3 ,one would naturally supply sabdasya after smyam1 but the ,mahbhshya has nah smyam 7see ,ballantyne's ed41 p4 #bg74 ,footnote #cbc3 ,i4e41 prepositions used separately as governing cases of their own1 and not 7as usually in ,sanskrit7 in composition4 ,footnote #cbd3 ,the karmapravachanyas imply a verb other than the one expressed1 and they are said to determine the relation which is produced by this understood verb4 ,thus in the example1 ,skalyasamhitm anu prvarshat1 he rained after the ,skalya hymns1 anu implies an understood verb nisamya1 having heard1 and this verb shows that there is a relation of cause and effect between the hymns and the rain4 ,this anu is said to determine this relation4 ,footnote #cbe3 ,see ,ballantyne's ed41 p4 #aj4 ,footnote #cbf3 ,this is not very clear1 the anu in anugraha might mean kramena1 and so imply the successive order of the letters4 ,footnote #cbg3 ,in the ,calcutta edition1 p4 #adb1 line #aa1 ,i read kalpam for kalpanam4 ,footnote #cbh3 ,in p4 #adb1 line #c1 ,i add vin after nimittam4 ,footnote #cbi3 ,the ghatta is the place where dues and taxes are collected4 ,some one anxious to evade payment is going by a private way by night1 but he arrives at the tax-collector's house just as day dawns and is thus caught4 ,hence the proverb means uddesysiddhi4 ,footnote #ccj3 ,in p4 #adc1 line #ac1 ,i read sphotakabhvam for sphotbhvam4 ,footnote #cca3 ,cf4 ,ballantyne's ,transl4 of the ,mahbhshya1 pp4 #i1 #cb4 ,footnote #ccb3 ,the ,mmms holds that a word means the genus 7jti7 and not the individual 7vyakti72 the ,nyya holds that a word means an individual as distinguished by such and such a genus 7or species74 ,footnote #ccc3 ,cf4 ,rig-,veda ,prtis4 xii4 #e4 ,footnote #ccd3 ,he here is trying to show that his view is confirmed by the commonly received definitions of some grammatical terms4 ,footnote #cce3 ,since ,devadatta is only its transient owner4 ,footnote #ccf3 ,so by the words horse1 cow1 c41 ,brahman is really meant1 the one abiding existence4 ,footnote #ccg3 ,cf4 ,ballantyne's ,mahbhshya1 pp4 #dd1 #ej4 ,footnote #cch3 ,in p4 #ade1 line #h1 read asatya for asvattha4 ,footnote #cci3 ,we have here the well-known four grammatical categories1 jti1 guna1 dravya or sanjn1 and kriy4 ,footnote #cdj3 ,but cf4 ,siddh4 ,muktv41 p4 #f1 line #ab4 ,footnote #cda3 ,thus we read in the ,siddhnta ,muktvali1 p4 #hb1 that the ,mmms holds that a word means the genus and not the individual1 since otherwise there would be vyabhichra and nantya 7cf4 also ,mahesachandra ,nyyaratna's note1 ,kvya-praksa1 p4 #aj74 ,if a word is held to mean only one individual1 there will be the first fault1 as it will wander away and equally express others which it should not include2 if it is held to mean many individuals1 it will have an endless variety of meanings and be indefinite4 ,footnote #cdb3 ,this seems the meaning of the text as printed tasmt dvayam satyam1 but ,i should prefer to read conjecturally tasmd advayam satyam1 therefore non-duality is the truth4 ,footnote #cdc3 ,scil4 they can only be the absolute ,brahman who alone exists4 ,footnote #cdd3 ,scil4 the individual soul 7jva7 and ,brahman4 ,footnote #cde3 ,the ,samvriti of the text seems to correspond to the varana so frequent in ,vednta books4 ,footnote #cdf3 ,this passage is quoted in the ,maitr ,upanishad1 vi4 #bb4 ,footnote #cdg3 ,adhividyam occurs in ,taitt4 ,upanishad1 i4 #c1 #a1 where it is explained by ',samkara as vidysv adhi yad dar'sanam tad adhividyam4 ,,chapter ,,xiv4 ,,the ,s,,nkhya-,,darsana4 ,but how can we accept the doctrine of illusory emanation thus held by the grammarians1 following the guidance of the prva and uttara ,mmms schools1 when the system of development propounded by the ,snkhyas is still alive to oppose it8 ,such is their loud vaunt4 ,now the ,sstra of this school may be concisely said to maintain four several kinds of existences1 viz41 that which is evolvent#cdh only1 that which is evolute only1 that which is both evolute and evolvent1 and that which is neither4 7a47 ,of these the first is that which is only evolvent1 called the root-evolvent or the primary2 it is not itself the evolute of anything else4 ,it evolves1 hence it is called the evolvent 7prakriti7 since it denotes in itself the equilibrium of the three qualities1 goodness1 activity1 and darkness4 ,this is expressed in the ,snkhya ,krik1 the root-evolvent is no evolute4 ,it is called the root-evolvent1 as being both root and evolvent2 it is the root of all the various effects1 as the so-called great one1 c41 but of it1 as the primary1 there is no root1 as otherwise we should have a regressus ad infinitum4 ,nor can you reply that such a regressus ad infinitum is no objection1 if1 like the continued series of seed and shoot1 it can be proved by the evidence of our senses1#cdi--;because here there is no evidence to establish the hypothesis4 7b47 ,the evolutes and evolvents are the great one1 egoism1 and the subtile elements1--thus the ,snkhya ,krik 7 #c71 the seven1 the great one1 c41 are evolute-evolvents4 ,the seven are the seven principles1 called the great one1 c4 ,among these the great principle1 called also the intellect1#cej c41 is itself the evolute of nature and the evolvent of egoism2 in the same manner the principle egoism1 called also self-consciousness 7abhimna71 is the evolute of the great one1 intellect2 but this same principle1 as affected by the quality of darkness1 is the evolvent of the five rudiments called subtile elements2 and1 as affected by the quality of goodness1 it is the evolvent of the eleven organs1 viz41 the five organs of perception1 the eye1 ear1 nose1 tongue1 and skin2 the five organs of action1 the voice1 hands1 feet1 anus1 and generative organ2 and the mind1 partaking of the character of both2 nor can you object that in our arrangement the third quality1 activity1 is idle1 as it acts as a cause by producing action in the others4 ,this has been thus declared by svara ,krishna in his ,kriks#cea 7 #bd-bg71 ,self-consciousness is egoism4 ,thence proceeds a twofold creation1 the elevenfold set and the five elemental rudiments4 ,from modified#ceb egoism originates the class of eleven imbued with goodness2 from egoism as the source of the elements originate the rudimentary elements1 and these are affected by darkness2 but it is only from egoism as affected by activity that the one and the other rise4 ,the intellectual organs are the eyes1 the ears1 the nose1 the tongue1 and the skin2 those of action are the voice1 feet1 hands1 anus1 and organ of generation4 ,in this set is mind1 which has the character of each2 it determines1 and it is an organ 7like the other ten7 from having a common property with them4#cec ,all this has been explained at length by the teacher ,vchaspati ,misra in the ,snkhya-tattva-kaumud4 7c47 ,the evolute only means the five gross elements1 ether1 c41 and the eleven organs1 as said in the ,krik1 ,the evolute consists of sixteen2 that is1 the set of sixteen is evolute only1 and not evolvent4 ,although it may be said that earth1 c41 are the evolvents of such productions as cows1 jars1 c41 yet these are not a different principle 7tattva7 from earth1 c41 and therefore earth1 c41 are not what we term evolvents2 as the accepted idea of an evolvent is that which is the material cause of a separate principle2 and in cows1 jars1 c41 there is the absence of being any such first principle1 in consequence of their being all alike gross i4e41 possessed of dimensions and perceptible to the senses4 ,the five gross elements1 ether1 c41 are respectively produced from sound1 touch1 form1 taste1 and smell1 each subtile element being accompanied by all those which precede it1 and thus the gross elements will have respectively one1 two1 three1 four1 and five qualities4#ced ,the creation of the organs has been previously described4 ,this is thus propounded in the ,snkhya ,krik 7 #bb7-- ,from nature springs the great one1 from this egoism1 from this the set of sixteen1 and from five among the sixteen proceed the five gross elements4 7d47 ,the soul is neither1--as is said in the ,krik1 ,the soul is neither evolvent nor evolute4 ,that is1 the soul1 being absolute1 eternal1 and subject to no development1 is itself neither the evolvent nor the evolute of aught beside4 ,three kinds of proof are accepted as establishing these twenty-five principles2 and thus the ,krik 7 #d74 ,perception1 inference1 and the testimony of worthy persons are acknowledged to be the threefold proof1 for they comprise every mode of demonstration4 ,it is from proof that there results belief of that which is to be proven4 ,here a fourfold discussion arises as to the true nature of cause and effect4 ,the ,saugatas#cee maintain that the existent is produced from the non-existent2 the ,naiyyikas1 c41 that the 7as yet7 non-existent is produced from the existent2 the ,vedntins1 that all effects are an illusory emanation from the existent and not themselves really existent2 while the ,snkhyas hold that the existent is produced from the existent4 7a47 ,now the first opinion is clearly untenable1 since that which is itself non-existent and unsubstantial can never be a cause any more than the hare's horn2 and1 again1 the real and unreal can never be identical4 7b47 ,nor can the non-existent be produced from the existent2 since it is impossible that that which1 previous to the operation of the originating cause1 was as non-existent as a hare's horn should ever be produced1 i4e41 become connected with existence2 for not even the cleverest man living can make blue yellow4#cef ,if you say1 ,but are not existence and non-existence attributes of the same jar8 this is incorrect1 since we cannot use such an expression as its quality in regard to a non-existent subject1 for it would certainly imply that the subject itself did exist4 ,hence we conclude that the effect is existent even previously to the operation of the cause1 which only produces the manifestation of this already existent thing1 just like the manifestation of the oil in sesame seed by pressing1 or of the milk in cows by milking4 ,again1 there is no example whatever to prove the production of a thing previously non-existent4 ,moreover1 the cause must produce its effect as being either connected with it or not connected2 in the former alternative the effect's existence is settled by the rule that connection can only be between two existent things2 in the latter1 any and every effect might arise from any and every cause1 as there is nothing to determine the action of an unconnected thing4 ,this has been thus put by the ,snkhya teacher3--,from the supposed non-existence of the effect1 it can have no connection with causes which always accompany existence2 and to him who holds the production of a non-connected thing there arises an utter want of determinateness4 ,if you rejoin that the cause1 though not connected with its effect1 can yet produce it1 where it has a capacity of so doing1 and this capacity of producing is to be inferred from seeing the effect actually produced1 still this cannot be allowed1 since in such a case as there is a capacity for producing oil in sesame seeds1 you cannot determine1 while the oil is non-existent1 that there is this capacity in the sesame seeds1 whichever alternative you may accept as to their being connected or not with the oil since our before-mentioned dilemma will equally apply here4 ,from our tenet that the cause and effect are identical1 it follows that the effect does not exist distinct from the cause2 thus the cloth is not something distinct from the threads1 as it abides in the latter as its material cause2 but where this identity is not found1 there we do not find the relation of cause and effect2 thus a horse and a cow are distinct from each other for one is not produced from the other1 and therefore their qualities are not the same2 but the cloth is an acknowledged effect1 and therefore not anything different from its cause4#ceg ,if you object that1 if this were true1 the separate threads ought to fulfil the office of clothing1 we reply1 that the office of clothing is fulfilled by the threads manifesting the nature of cloth when they are placed in a particular arrangement4 ,as the limbs of a tortoise when they retire within its shell are concealed1 and1 when they come forth1 are revealed1 so the particular effects1 as cloth1 c41 of a cause1 as threads1 c41 when they come forth and are revealed1 are said to be produced2 and when they retire and are concealed1 they are said to be destroyed2 but there is no such thing as the production of the non-existent or the destruction of the existent4 ,as has been said in the ,bhagavad ,gt 7ii4 #af7-- ,there is no existence for the non-existent1 nor non-existence for the existent4 ,and1 in fact1 it is by inference from its effects that we establish the existence of the great evolvent1 ,nature 7prakriti74 ,this has been said in the ,krik1 #i-- ,effect exists1 for what exists not can by no operation of cause be brought into existence2 materials1 too1 are selected which are fit for the purpose2 everything is not by every means possible2 what is capable does that to which it is competent2 and like is produced from like4#ceh ,nor can we say with the ,vedntin that the world is an illusory emanation from the one existent ,brahman1 because we have no contradictory evidence to preclude by its superior validity the prim facie belief that the external world is real as we have in the case of mistaking a rope for a snake1 where a closer inspection will discover the error2 and again1 where the subject and the attributed nature are so dissimilar as the pure intelligent ,brahman and the unintelligent creation1 we can no more allow the supposed attribution to be possible than in the case of gold and silver which no one mistakes for each other4 ,hence we conclude that an effect which is composed of happiness1 misery1 and stupidity1 must imply a cause similarly composed2 and our argument is as follows3--,the subject of the argument1 viz41 the external world1 must have a material cause composed of happiness1 misery1 and stupidity1 because it is itself endued therewith2 whatever is endued with certain attributes must have a cause endued with the same1--thus a ring has gold for its material cause1 because it has the attributes of gold2 our subject is a similar case1 therefore we may draw a similar conclusion4 ,what we call being composed of happiness in the external world is the quality of goodness2 the being composed of misery is the quality of activity2#cei the being composed of stupidity is the quality of darkness2 hence we establish our cause composed of the three qualities 7i4e41 prakriti1 ,nature74 ,and we see that individual objects are found by experience to have these three qualities2 thus ,maitra's happiness is found in his wife ,satyavat1 because the quality of goodness in her is manifested towards him2 but she is the misery of her fellow-wives1 because the quality of activity is manifested towards them2 while she causes indifference to ,chaitra who does not possess her1 because towards him the quality of darkness is manifested4 ,so1 too1 in other cases also2 thus a jar1 when obtained1 causes us pleasure2 when seized by others it causes us pain2 but it is viewed with indifference by one who has no interest in it4 ,now this being regarded with no interest is what we mean by stupidity1 since the word moha is derived from the root muh1 to be confused1 since no direct action of the mind arises towards those objects to which it is indifferent4 ,therefore we hold that all things1 being composed of pleasure1 pain1 and stupidity1 must have as their cause ,nature1 which consists of the three qualities4 ,and so it is declared in the ,svetsvatara ,upanishad 7iv4 #e7-- ,the one unborn1 for his enjoyment1 approaches the one unborn 7,nature7 which is red1 white1 and black1 and produces a manifold and similar offspring2 the other unborn abandons her when once she has been enjoyed4 ,here the words red1 white1 and black1 express the qualities activity1 goodness1 and darkness1 from their severally possessing the same attributes of colouring1 manifesting1 and concealing4 ,here1 however1 it may be objected1 ,but will not your unintelligent ,nature1 without the superintendence of something intelligent1 fail to produce these effects1 intellect1 c48 therefore there must be some intelligent superintendent2 and hence we must assume an all-seeing1 supreme ,lord4 ,we reply that this does not follow1 since even unintelligent ,nature will act under the force of an impulse2 and experience shows us that an unintelligent thing1 without any intelligent superintendent1 does act for the good of the soul1 just as the unintelligent milk acts for the growth of the calf1 or just as the unintelligent rain acts for the welfare of living creatures2 and so unintelligent ,nature will act for the liberation of the soul4 ,as it has been said in the ,krik 7 #eg7-- ,as the unintelligent milk acts for the nourishment of the calf1 so ,nature acts for the liberation of soul4 ,but as for the doctrine of a ,supreme ,being who acts from compassion1 which has been proclaimed by beat of drum by the advocates of his existence1 this has well-nigh passed away out of hearing1 since the hypothesis fails to meet either of the two alternatives4 ,for does he act thus before or after creation8 ,if you say before1 we reply that as pain cannot arise in the absence of bodies1 c41 there will be no need1 as long as there is no creation1 for his desire to free living beings from pain which is the main characteristic of compassion2 and if you adopt the second alternative1 you will be reasoning in a circle1 as on the one hand you will hold that ,god created the world through compassion as this is ,his motive in acting at all1 and on the other hand#cfj that ,he compassionated after ,he had created4 ,therefore we hold that the development of unintelligent ,nature even without any intelligent superintendent--in the order of the series intellect1 self-consciousness1 c41--is caused by the union of ,nature and ,soul1 and the moving impulse is the good of ,soul4 ,just as there takes place a movement in the iron in the proximity of the unmoved magnet1 so there takes place a movement in ,nature in the proximity of the unmoved ,soul2 and this union of ,nature and ,soul is caused by mutual dependence1 like the union of the lame man and the blind man4 ,nature1 as the thing to be experienced1 depends on ,soul the experiencer2 and ,soul looks to final bliss1 as it seeks to throw off the three kinds of pain1 which1 though really apart from it1 have fallen upon it by its coming under the shadow of intellect through not recognising its own distinction therefrom4#cfa ,this final bliss or absolute isolation is produced by the discrimination of ,nature and ,soul1 nor is this end possible without it2 therefore ,soul depends on ,nature for its final bliss4 ,just as a lame man and a blind man1#cfb travelling along with a caravan1 by some accident having become separated from their companions1 wandered slowly about in great dismay1 till by good luck they met each other1 and then the lame man mounted on the blind man's back1 and the blind man1 following the path indicated by the lame man1 reached his desired goal1 as did the lame man also1 mounted on the other's shoulders2 so1 too1 creation is effected by ,nature and the soul1 which are likewise mutually dependent4 ,this has been said in the ,krik 7 #ba7-- ,for the soul's contemplation of ,nature and for its final separation the union of both takes place1 as of the lame man and the blind man4 ,by that union a creation is formed4 ,well1 ,i grant that ,nature's activity may take place for the good of the soul1 but how do you account for its ceasing to act8 ,i reply1 that as a wilful woman whose faults have once been seen by her husband does not return to him1 or as an actress1 having performed her part1 retires from the stage1 so too does ,nature desist4 ,thus it is said in the ,krik 7 #ei7-- ,as an actress1 having exhibited herself to the spectators1 desists from the dance1 so does ,nature desist1 having manifested herself to ,soul4 ,for this end has the doctrine of those who follow ,kapila1 the founder of the atheistic ,snkhya ,school1 been propounded4 ,e4 ,b4 ,c4 ,,footnotes3 ,footnote #cdh3 ,i borrow this term from ,dr4 ,hall4 ,footnote #cdi3 ,compare ,kusumjali1 i4 #d4 ,footnote #cej3 ,one great defect in the ,snkhya nomenclature is the ambiguity between the terms for intellect 7buddh7 and those for mind 7manas74 ,mdhava here applies to the former the term antahkarana or internal organ1 the proper term for the latter4 ,i have ventured to alter it in the translation4 ,footnote #cea3 ,it is singular that this is ,mdhava's principal ,snkhya authority1 and not the ,snkhya ,stras4 ,footnote #ceb3 ,vaikrita is here a technical term meaning that goodness predominates over darkness and activity4 ,on this ,krik1 comp4 ,dr4 ,hall's preface to the ,snkhya-sra1 pp4 #cj-ce4 ,footnote #cec3 ,as produced1 like them1 from modified egoism4 ,the reading samkalpavikalptmakam must be corrected by the ,snkhya ,krik4 ,footnote #ced3 ,cf4 ,colebrooke ,essays1 vol4 i4 p4 #bef4 ,the tanmtras will reproduce themselves as the respective qualities of the gross elements4 ,footnote #cee3 ,a name of the ,buddhists4 ,footnote #cef3 ,i4e41 the nature of a thing 7,svabhva7 cannot be altered--a man cannot be made a cow1 nor a woman a man4 ,footnote #ceg3 ,i take arthntaram here as simply bhinnam 7cf4 ,trntha ,tarkavchaspati's note1 ,tattva ,kaumud1 p4 #dg74 ,footnote #ceh3 ,colebrooke's translation4 ,footnote #cei3 ,or passion1 rajas4 ,footnote #cfj3 ,in other words--on the one hand the existing misery of beings induced ,god to create a world in order to relieve their misery1 and on the other hand it was the existence of a created world which caused their misery at all4 ,footnote #cfa3 ,bondage1 c41 reside in the intellect1 and are only reflected upon soul through its proximity 7cf4 ,snkhyapravachanabhshya1 i4 #eh74 ,footnote #cfb3 ,this apologue is a widely spread piece of folk-lore4 ,it is found in the ,babylonian ,talmud1 ,sanhedrim1 fol4 #ia1 b1 and in the ,gesta ,romanorum4 ,,chapter ,,xv4 ,,the ,,patanjali-,,dars,,na4 ,we now set forth the doctrine of that school which professes the opinions of such ,munis as ,patajali and others1 who originated the system of the ,theistic ,snkhya philosophy4 ,this school follows the so-called ,yoga ,sstra promulgated by ,patajali1 and consisting of four chapters1 which also bears the name of the ,snkhya ,pravachana1 or detailed explanation of the ,snkhya4#cfc ,in the first chapter thereof the venerable ,patajali1 having in the opening aphorism1 ,now is the exposition of ,concentration 7yoga71 avowed his commencement of the ,yoga ,sstra1 proceeds in the second aphorism to give a definition of his subject1 ,concentration is the hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle1 and then he expounds at length the nature of ,meditation 7samdhi74 ,in the second chapter1 in the series of aphorisms commencing1 ,the practical part of ,concentration is mortification1 muttering1 and resignation to the ,supreme1 he expounds the practical part of yoga proper to him whose mind is not yet thoroughly abstracted 7iii4 #i71 viz41 the five external subservients or means1 forbearance1 and the rest4 ,in the third chapter1 in the series commencing ,attention is the fastening of the mind on some spot1 he expounds the three internal subservients--attention1 contemplation1 and meditation1 collectively called by the name subjugation 7samyama71 and also the various superhuman powers which are their subordinate fruit4 ,in the fourth chapter1 in the series commencing1 ,perfections spring from birth1 plants1 spells1 mortification1 and meditation1 he expounds the highest end1 ,emancipation1 together with a detailed account of the five so-called perfections 7siddhis74 ,this school accepts the old twenty-five principles of the ,snkhya1 ,nature1 c42 only adding the ,supreme ,being as the twenty-sixth--a ,soul untouched by affliction1 action1 fruit1 or stock of desert1 who of ,his own will assumed a body in order to create1 and originated all secular or ,vaidic traditions1#cfd and is gracious towards those living beings who are burned in the charcoal of mundane existence4 ,but how can such an essence as soul1 undefiled as the glossy leaf of a lotus1 be said to be burned1 that we should need to accept any ,supreme ,being as gracious to it8 ,to this we reply1 that the quality ,goodness develops itself as the understanding1 and it is this which is1 as it were1 burned by the quality ,activity2 and the soul1 by the influence of ,darkness1 blindly identifying itself with this suffering quality1 is also said itself to suffer4 ,thus the teachers have declared-- ,it is ,goodness which suffers under the form of the understanding and the substances belonging to ,activity which torment1#cfe ,and it is through the modification of ,darkness1 as wrongly identifying1 that the ,soul is spoken of as suffering4 ,it has been also said by ,patajali1#cff ,the power of the enjoyer1 which is itself incapable of development or of transference1 in an object which is developed and transferred experiences the modifications thereof4 ,now the power of the enjoyer is the power of intelligence1 and this is the soul2 and in an object which is developed and transferred1 or reflected1--i4e41 in the thinking principle or the understanding1--it experiences the modifications thereof1 i4e41 the power of intelligence1 being reflected in the understanding1 receives itself the shadow of the understanding1 and imitates the modifications of it4 ,thus the soul1 though in itself pure1 sees according to the idea produced by the understanding2 and1 while thus seeing at second-hand1 though really it is different from the understanding1 it appears identical therewith4 ,it is while the soul is thus suffering1 that1 by the practice of the eight subservient means1 forbearance1 religious observance1 c41 earnestly1 uninterruptedly1 and for a long period1 and by continued resignation to the ,supreme ,being1 at length there is produced an unclouded recognition of the distinction between the quality ,goodness and the ,soul2 and the five afflictions1 ignorance1 c41 are radically destroyed1 and the various stocks of desert1 fortunate or unfortunate1 are utterly abolished1 and1 the undefiled soul abiding emancipated1 perfect ,emancipation is accomplished4 ,the words of the first aphorism1 ,now is the exposition of concentration1 establish the four preliminaries which lead to the intelligent reader's carrying the doctrine into practice1 viz41 the object-matter1 the end proposed1 the connection between the treatise and the object1 and the person properly qualified to study it4 ,the word now 7atha7 is accepted as having here an inceptive meaning1 as intimating that a distinct topic is now commenced4 ,but1 it may be objected1 there are several possible significations of this word atha2 why1 then1 should you show an unwarranted partiality for this particular 'inceptive' meaning8 ,the great ,canon for nouns and their gender the ,amara ,kosha ,dictionary gives many such meanings4 ',atha is used in the sense of an auspicious particle1--after1--now 7inceptive71--what8 7interrogatively71--and all 7comprehensively74' ,now we willingly surrender such senses as interrogation or comprehensiveness2 but since there are four senses certainly suitable1 i4e41 'after1' 'an auspicious particle1' 'reference to a previous topic1' and 'the inceptive now1' there is no reason for singling out the last4 ,this objection1 however1 will not stand1 for it cannot bear the following alternative4 ,if you maintain the sense of after1 then do you hold that it implies following after anything whatever1 or only after some definite cause as comprehended under the general definition of causation1#cfg i4e41 previous existence relatively to the effect8 ,it cannot be the former1 for1 in accordance with the proverb that ,no one stands for a single moment inactive1 everybody must always do everything after previously doing something else2 and since this is at once understood without any direct mention at all1 there could be no use in employing the particle atha to convey this meaning4 ,nor can it be the latter alternative2 because1 although we fully grant that the practice of concentration does in point of fact follow after previous tranquillity1 c41 yet these are rather the necessary preliminaries to the work of exposition1 and consequently cannot have that avowed predominance which the presumed cause should have4 ,but why should we not hold that the word atha implies that this very exposition is avowedly the predominant object1 and does follow after previous tranquillity of mind1 c48 ,we reply1 that the aphorism uses the term exposition 7anussana71 and this word1 etymologically analysed1 implies that by which the yoga is explained1 accompanied with definitions1 divisions1 and detailed means and results2 and there is no rule that such an exposition must follow previous tranquillity of mind1 c41 the rule rather being that1 as far as the teacher is concerned1 it must follow a profound knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to others2 for it is rather the student's desire to know and his derived knowledge1 which should have quiet of mind1 c41 as their precursors1 in accordance with the words of ,sruti3 ,therefore having become tranquil1 self-subdued1 loftily indifferent1 patient1 full of faith and intent1 let him see the soul in the soul4#cfh ,nor can the word atha imply the necessary precedence1 in the teacher1 of a profound knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to others2 because1 even granting that both these are present1 they need not to be mentioned thus prominently1 as they are powerless in themselves to produce the necessary intelligence and effort in the student4 ,still however we may settle these points the question arises1 ,is the exposition of the yoga ascertained to be a cause of final beatitude or not8 ,if it is1 then it is still a desirable object1 even if certain presupposed conditions should be absent2 and if it is not1 then it must be undesirable1 whatever conditions may be present4#cfi ,but it is clear that the exposition in question is such a cause1 since we have such a passage of the ,sruti as that in the ,katha ,upanishad1 ii4 #ab3 ,by the acquirement of yoga or intense concentration on the ,supreme ,soul1 the wise man having meditated leaves behind joy and sorrow2 and again1 such a passage of the ,smriti as that in the ,bhagavad ,gt1 ii4 #ec3 ,the intellect unwavering in contemplation will then attain yoga4 ,hence we conclude that it is untenable to interpret atha as implying that the exposition must follow after a previous inquiry on the part of the student1 or after a previous course of ascetic training and use of elixirs1 c4 to render the body strong4 ,but in the case of the ,vednta ,stras1 which open with the aphorism1 ,now1 therefore1 there is the wish to know ,brahman1 ,sankara chrya has declared that the inceptive meaning of atha must be left out of the question1 as the wish to know ,brahman is not to be undertaken at will2 and therefore it must be there interpreted to mean after1 i4e41 that this desire must follow a previous course of tranquillity1 c41 as laid down by the well-known rule which enjoins the practice of tranquillity1 self-control1 indifference1 endurance1 contemplation1 and faith1 the object being to communicate the teaching to a proper student as distinguished by the possession of the four so-called means4#cgj ,well1 then1 let us grant that atha cannot mean 'after2' but why should it not be simply an auspicious particle8 ,but this it cannot be1 from the absence of any connection between the context and such auspicious meaning4 ,auspiciousness implies the obtaining of an unimpeached and desired good1 and what is desired is so desired as being the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain2 but this auspiciousness cannot belong to the exposition of yoga1 since it is in itself neither pleasure nor the cessation of pain4#cga ,therefore it cannot be at all established that the meaning of the aphorism is that the exposition of the yoga is auspicious2 for auspiciousness cannot be either the primary meaning of atha or its secondary meaning by metonymy1 since it is its very sound which is in itself auspicious without any reference to the meaning1 like that of a drum4 ,but why not say that just as an implied meaning may enter into the direct meaning of a sentence1 so an effect like this of auspiciousness may also be included1 since both are equally unexpressed so far as the actual words are concerned8#cgb ,we reply1 that in the meaning of a sentence the connection must be between the meaning of one word and that of another2 otherwise we should be guilty of breaking the seal which the rule of the grammarians has set1 that verbal expectancy#cgc can be fulfilled by words alone4 ,but ought not a prayer for an auspicious commencement to be put at the beginning of a ,sstra1 in order to lay the hosts of obstacles that would hinder the completion of the work which the author desires to begin1 and also to observe the immemorial practice of the good1 since it has been said by the wise1 ',those sstras become widely famous which have auspicious commencements1 auspicious middles1 and auspicious endings1 and their students have long lives and are invincible in disputation'8#cgd ,now the word atha implies 'auspiciousness1' since there is a ,smriti which says1 ',the word ,om and the word atha1--these two in the ancient time1 ',cleaving the throat of ,brahman1 came forth2 therefore they are both auspicious4' ,therefore let the word atha stand here as signifying 'auspiciousness1' like the word 'vriddhi' used by ,pnini in his opening stra 'vriddhir d aich4'#cge ,this view1 however1 is untenable2 since the very word atha1 when heard1 has an auspicious influence1 even though it be employed to convey some other special signification1 just as the hearing the sound of lutes1 flutes1 c4 is auspicious for one starting on a journey4 ,if you still object1 ,how can the particle atha have any other effect1 if it is specially used here to produce the idea that the meaning of the sentence is that a new topic is commenced8 we reply that it certainly can have such other additional effect1 just as we see that jars of water brought for some other purpose are auspicious omens at the commencement of a journey4#cgf ,nor does this contradict the smriti1 since the smriti will still hold good1 as the words they are both auspicious mean only that they produce an auspicious effect4 ,nor can the particle atha have here the meaning of reference to a previous topic1 since the previously mentioned faults will all equally apply here1 as this meaning really involves that of after which we have already discussed and rejected4 ,and again1 in such discussions as this1 as to whether this particular atha means the inceptive now or after1 if another topic had been previously suggested1 then reference thereto would be a possible meaning2 but in the present case where no other topic has been previously suggested it is not a possible meaning4 ,therefore1 by exhaustion1 the commentator finally adopts1 for the atha of the stra1 the remaining meaning of the inceptive now4 ,so1 when it is said in the ,tndya ,brhmana1 xvi4 #h1 #a2 xvi4 #aj1 #a1 ,now this is the ,jyotis1 ,now this is the ,visvajyotis1#cgg the particle atha is accepted as signifying the commencement of the description of a particular sacrifice1 just as the atha in the commencement of the ,mahbhshya1 now comes the exposition of words1 signifies the commencement of the ,institutes of ,grammar4 ,this has been declared by ,vysa in his ,commentary on the ,yoga ,aphorisms1 the atha in this opening aphorism indicates a commencement2 and ,vchaspati has similarly explained it in his gloss2 therefore it may be considered as settled that the atha here indicates a commencement and also signifies auspiciousness4 ,therefore1 accepting the view that this atha implies a commencement1 let the student be left in peace to strive after a successful understanding of the sstra through the attainment of the yoga1 which is its proposed subject1 by means of the teacher's explanation of its entire purport4 ,but here some one may say1 ,does not the smriti of ,yjavalkya say1 ',hiranyagarbha is the promulgator of the ,yoga1 and no other ancient sage8' how then is ,patajali the teacher thereof8 ,we reply that it was for this reason that the venerable ,patajali1#cgh that ocean of compassion1 considering how difficult it was to grasp all the different forms of ,yoga scattered up and down in the ,purnas1 c41 and wishing to collect together their essence1 commenced his anussana1--the preposition anu implying that it was a teaching which followed a primary revelation and was not itself the immediate origin of the system4 ,since this atha in the aphorism signifies commencement1 the full meaning of the sentence comes out as follows3 be it known that the institute for the exposition of the yoga is now commenced4 ,in this institute the object-matter1 as being that which is produced by it1 is yoga or the concentration of the mind1 with its means and its fruit2 the producing this is its inferior end2 supreme absorption 7kaivalya7 is the highest end of the yoga when it is produced4 ,the connection between the institute and yoga is that of the producer and the thing to be produced2 the connection between yoga and supreme absorption is that of the means and the end2 and this is well known from ,sruti and ,smriti1 as ,i have before shown4 ,and it is established by the general context that those who aim at liberation are the duly qualified persons to hear this institute4 ,nor need any one be alarmed lest a similar course should be adopted with the opening aphorism of the ,vednta stras1 ,now1 therefore1 there is a wish to know ,brahman2 and lest here1 too1 we should seek to establish by the general context that all persons who aim at liberation are duly qualified students of the ,vednta4 ,for the word atha1 as there used1 signifies succession or after2 and it is a settled point that the doctrine can only be transmitted through a regular channel to duly qualified students1 and consequently the question cannot arise as to whether any other meaning is suggested by the context4 ,hence it has been said1 ,when ,sruti comes as the determining authority 'the subject-matter' and the rest have no place4#cgi ,the full meaning of this is as follows3 ,where a thing is not apprehended from the ,veda itself1 there the subject-matter and the rest can establish the true meaning1 not otherwise2 but wherever we can attain the meaning by a direct text1 there the other modes of interpretation are irrelevant4 ,for when a thing is declared by a text of the ,veda which makes its meaning obvious at once1 the subject-matter and the rest either establish a contrary conclusion or one not contrary4 ,now1 in the former case1 the authority which would establish this contrary conclusion is by the very nature of sruti already precluded from having any force2 and in the latter it is useless4 ,this is all declared in ,jaimini's aphorism iii4 #c1 #ad2 ,a definite text1 a 'sign1' the 'sentence1' the 'subject-matter1' the 'relative position1' or 'the title1'--when any of these come into collision1 the later in order is the weaker because its meaning is more remote#chj and therefore less obvious4 ,it has been thus summed up-- ,a text always precludes the rest2 the 'title' is always precluded by any of the preceding modes2 ,but whether any intervening one is precluded1 or itself precludes1 depends on circumstances4 ,therefore after all this long discussion it may be now considered as settled that1 since it has an object1 as well as the other preliminaries1 the study of the ,sstra1 which teaches the ,yoga1 is to be commenced like that of the ,vednta1 which discusses the nature of ,brahman4 ,but1 it may be objected1 it is the ,yoga which was said to be the object-matter1 since it is this which is to be produced1 not the ,sstra4 ,we grant that the ,yoga is the principal object1 as that which is to be produced2 but since it is produced by the ,sstra1 especially directed thereto1 this ,sstra is the means for its production1 and1 as a general rule1 the agent's activity is directly concerned with the means rather than with the end4 ,just as the operations of ,devadatta the woodcutter1 i4e41 his lifting his arm up and down1 c41 relate rather to the instrument1 i4e41 the axe1 than to the object1 i4e41 the tree1 so here the speaker1 ,patajali1 in his immediate action of speaking1 means the ,yoga-,sstra as his primary object1 while he intends the ,yoga itself in his ultimate action of denotation4 ,in consequence of this distinction1 the real meaning is that the commencing the ,yogasstra is that which primarily claims our attention2 while the yoga1 or the restraint of the modifications of the mind1 is what is to be expounded in this ,sstra4 ,but as we read in the lists of roots that the root yuj is used in the sense of 'joining1' should not the word yoga1 its derivative1 mean 'conjunction1' and not 'restraint'8 ,and indeed this has been said by ,yjavalkya3#cha-- ',the conjunction of the individual and the supreme souls is called yoga4' ,this1 however1 is untenable1 since there is no possibility of any such action1#chb c41 in either as would produce this conjunction of the two souls4 ,nor1 again1 is such an explanation needed in order to remove the opposition of other philosophical schools2 for the notion of the conjunction of two eternal things is opposed to the doctrines of the ,vaiseshika and ,nyya schools and therefore they would still oppose our theory4 ,and even if we accepted the explanation in accordance with the ,mmms or ,vednta1 our ,yogasstra would be rendered nugatory by this concession and the very ground cut from under our feet2 because the identity of the individual and supreme souls being in that school something already accomplished1 it could not be regarded as something to be produced by our ,sstra4 ,and lastly1 as it is notorious that roots are used in many different senses1 the root yuj may very well be used here in the sense of contemplation4#chc ,thus it has been said-- ,particles1 prepositions1 and roots--these three are all held to be of manifold meaning2 instances found in reading are their evidence4 ,therefore some authors expressly give yuj in this sense1 and insert in their lists yuj in the sense of samdhi4 ,nor does this contradict ,yjavalkya's declaration1 as the word yoga1 used by him1 may bear this meaning2 and he has himself said-- ,samdhi is the state of identity of the individual and supreme souls2 this abiding absolutely in ,brahman is the samdhi of the individual soul4 ,it has been also said by the venerable ,vysa in his ,commentary on the ,yoga-stras1 i4 #a1 ,yoga is samdhi4 ,an objection however1 may be here raised that the term samdhi is used by ,patajali in ii4 #bi in the sense of one of the eight ancillary parts#chd of the eightfold concentration 7or yoga72 and the whole cannot be thus itself a part as well as a whole1 since the principal and the ancillary must be completely different from each other1 as all their attendant circumstances must be different1 just as we see in the darsaprnamsa sacrifices and their ancillary rites the prayjas1 and therefore samdhi cannot be the meaning of yoga4 ,we however reply that this objection is incorrect2 for although the term samdhi is used for etymological reasons#che to express the ancillary part which is really defined in iii4 #c as the contemplation which assumes the form of the object1 and is apparently devoid of any nature of its own2 still the further use of this term to describe the principal state is justified by the author's wish to declare the ultimate oneness of the two states as the inferior ultimately merges into the superior4 ,nor can you hold that etymology alone can decide where a word can be used2 because if so1 as the word go1 a bull1 is derived by all grammarians from the root gam1 to go1 we ought never to use the phrase a standing bull as the two words would be contradictory1 and the man ,devadatta1 when going1 would properly be called go1 a bull2 and1 moreover1 the ,stra1 i4 #b1 distinctly gives us a definite justification for employing the word in this sense when it declares that concentration 7yoga7 is the suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle4 ,the second or principal sense of samdhi will therefore be quite distinct from the first or inferior4 ,but surely if yoga is held to be the suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle1 then as these modifications abide in the soul as themselves partaking of the nature of knowledge1 their suppression1 or in other words their 'destruction1' would also abide in the soul1 since it is a principle in logic that the antecedent non-existence and destruction abide in the same subject as the counter-entity to these negations2#chf and consequently in accordance with the maxim1 ',this newly produced character will affect the subject in which it resides1' the absolute independence of the soul itself would be destroyed4 ,this1 however1 we do not allow2 because we maintain that these various modifications which are to be hindered1#chg such as right notion1 misconception1 fancy1 sleep1 and memory 7i4 #f71 are attributes of the internal organ 7chitta71 since the power of pure intelligence1 which is unchangeable1 cannot become the site of this discriminative perception4 ,nor can you object that this unchangeable nature of the intelligent soul#chh has not been proved1 since there is an argument to establish it2 for the intelligent soul must be unchangeable from the fact that it always knows1 while that which is not always knowing is not unchangeable1 as the internal organ1 c4 ,and so again1 if this soul were susceptible of change1 then1 as this change would be occasional1 we could not predicate its always knowing these modifications4 ,but the true view is1 that while the intelligent soul always remains as the presiding witness1 there is another essentially pure substance#chi which abides always the same2 and as it is this which is affected by any given object1 so it is this perceptible substance which is reflected as a shadow on the soul1 and so produces an impression2#cij and thus ,soul itself is preserved in its own proper independence1 and it is maintained to be the always knowing1 and no suspicion of change alights upon it4 ,that object by which the understanding becomes affected is known2 that object by which it is not affected is not known2 for the understanding is called susceptible of change1 because it resembles the iron1 as it is susceptible of being affected or not by the influence or want of influence of the object which resembles the magnet1--this influence or want of influence producing respectively knowledge or the want of knowledge4 ,but inasmuch as the understanding and the senses which spring from egoism are all-pervading1 are they not always connected with all objects1 and thus would it not follow that there should be a knowledge everywhere and always of all things8 ,we reply that even although we grant that they are all-pervading1 it is only where a given understanding has certain modifications in a given body1 and certain objects are in a connection with that body1 that the knowledge of these objects only1 and none other1 is produced to that understanding2 and therefore1 as this limitation is absolute1 we hold that objects are just like magnets1 and affect the understanding just as these do iron1--coming in contact with it through the channels of the senses4 ,therefore1 the modifications belong to the understanding1 not to the soul2 and so says the ,sruti1 ,desire1 volition1 doubt1 faith1 want of faith1 firmness1 want of firmness1--all this is only the mind4 ,moreover1 the sage ,pachasikha declared the unchangeable nature of the intelligent soul1 ,the power that enjoys is unchangeable2 and so ,patajali also 7iv4 #ah71 ,the modifications of the understanding are always known1--this arises from the unchangeableness of the ,ruling ,soul4 ,the following is the argument drawn out formally to establish the changeableness of the understanding4 ,the understanding is susceptible of change because its various objects are now known and now not known1 just like the organ of hearing and the other organs of sense4 ,now1 this change is notoriously threefold1 i4e41 a change of property1 of aspect1#cia and of condition4 ,when the subject1 the understanding1 perceives the colour blue1 c41 there is a change of property just as when the substance gold becomes a bracelet1 a diadem1 or an armlet2 there is a change of aspect when the property becomes present1 past1 or future2 and there is a change of condition when there is a manifestation or non-manifestation#cib of the perception1 as of blue1 c42 or1 in the case of gold1 the relative newness or oldness at two different moments would be its change of condition4 ,these three kinds of change must be traced out by the reader for himself in different other cases4 ,and thus we conclude that there is nothing inconsistent in our thesis that1 since right notion and the other modifications are attributes of the understanding1 their suppression will also have its site in the same organ4 ,our opponent now urges a fresh and long objection to what we have said above4 ,but if we accept your definition that 'yoga is the suppression of the modifications of the chitta1' this will apply also to 'sound sleep1' since there too we may find the suppression or suspension of the modifications found in kshipta1 vikshipta1 mdha1#cic c42 but this would be wrong1 because it is impossible for the 'afflictions' to be abolished so long as those states called kshipta1 c41 remain at all1 and because they only hinder the attainment of the summum bonum4 ,let us examine this more closely4 ,for the understanding is called kshipta1 'restless1' when it is restless with an excess of the quality rajas1 as being tossed about amidst various objects which engage it4 ,it is called mdha1 'blinded1' when it is possessed by the modification 'sleep' and is sunk in a sea of darkness owing to an excess of the quality tamas4 ,it is called vikshipta1 'unrestless1' when it is different from the first state#cid as filled with the quality sattva4 ,we must here1 however1 note a distinction2 for1 in accordance with the line of the ,bhagavad ,gt 7vi4 #cd71 ',the mind1 ,o ,krishna1 is fickle1 turbulent1 violent1 and obstinate1' the mind1 though naturally restless1 may occasionally become fixed by the transient fixedness of its objects2 but restlessness is innate to it1 or it is produced in it by sickness1 c41 or other consequences of former actions2 as it is said in the ,yoga ,stras1 i4 #cj1 ',sickness1 languor1 doubt1 carelessness1 laziness1 addiction to objects1 erroneous perception1 failure to attain some stage1 and instability1--these distractions of the mind are called obstacles4' ,here 'sickness' means fever1 c41 caused by the want of equilibrium between the three humours2 'languor' is the mind's want of activity2 'doubt' is a sort of notion which embraces two opposite alternatives2 'carelessness' is a negligence of using the means for producing meditation2 'laziness' is a want of exertion from heaviness of body1 speech1 or mind2 'addiction to objects' is an attachment to objects of sense2 'erroneous perception' is a mistaken notion of one thing for another2 'failure to attain some stage' is the failing for some reason or other to arrive at the state of abstract meditation2 'instability' is the mind's failure to continue there1 even when the state of abstract meditation has been reached4 ,therefore we maintain that the suppression of the mind's modifications cannot be laid down as the definition of yoga4 ,we reply1 that even although we allow that1 so far as regards the three conditions of the mind called kshipta1 mdha1 and vikshipta1 which as being connected with the three qualities are all to be avoided as faulty states1 the suppression of the modifications in these conditions is itself something to be avoided and so cannot be called yoga1 this does not apply to the other two conditions called ekgra and niruddha1 which are to be pursued and attained2 and therefore the suppression of the modifications in these two praiseworthy conditions is rightly to be considered as yoga4 ,now by ekgra we mean that state when the mind1 entirely filled with the sattva quality1 is devoted to the one object of meditation2 and by niruddha we mean that state when all its developments are stopped1 and only their latent impressions or potentialities remain4 ,now this samdhi1 meditation in the highest sense1 is twofold3 that in which there is distinct recognition 7samprajta71 and that in which distinct recognition is lost 7asamprajta7 ,yoga ,s41 i4 #ag1 #ah4cie ,the former is defined as that meditation where the thought is intent on its own object1 and all the modifications1 such as right notion1 c41 so far as they depend on external things1 are suppressed1 or1 according to the etymology of the term1 it is where the intellect#cif is thoroughly recognised 7samyak prajyate7 as distinct from ,nature4 ,it has a fourfold division1 as savitarka1 savichra1 snanda1 and ssmita4 ,now this meditation is a kind of pondering 7bhvan71 which is the taking into the mind again and again1 to the exclusion of all other objects1 that which is to be pondered4 ,and that which is thus to be pondered is of two kinds1 being either swara or the twenty-five principles4 ,and these principles also are of two kinds--senseless and not senseless4 ,twenty-four1 including nature1 intellect1 egoism1 c41 are senseless2 that which is not senseless is ,soul4 ,now among these objects which are to be pondered1 when1 having taken as the object the gross elements1 as earth1 c41 pondering is pursued in the form of an investigation as to which is antecedent and which consequent1#cig or in the form of a union of the word1 its meaning1 and the idea which is to be produced cf4 i4 #db2 then the meditation is called argumentative 7savitarka74 ,when1 having taken as its object something subtile1 as the five subtile elements and the internal organ1 pondering is pursued in relation to space1 time1 c41 then the meditation is called deliberative 7savichra74 ,when the mind1 commingled with some passion and darkness1 is pondered1 then the meditation is called beatific 7snanda71 because goodness is then predominant1 which consists in the manifestation of joy4#cih ,when pondering is pursued1 having as its object the pure element of goodness1 unaffected by even a little of passion or darkness1 then that meditation is called egoistical 7ssmita71 because here personal existence#cii only remains1 since the intellectual faculty becomes now predominant1 and the quality of goodness has become quite subordinate as a mere stepping-stone to higher things4 ,but the meditation1 where distinct recognition is lost1 consists in the suppression of all modifications whatever4 ,but it may be asked was not 'concentration' defined as the suppression of all the modifications8 ,how1 then1 can the 'meditation where there is distinct recognition' be included in it at all1 since we still find active in it that modification of the mind1 with the quality of goodness predominant1 which views the soul and the quality of goodness as distinct from each other8 ,this1 however1 is untenable1 because we maintain that concentration is the suppression of the modifications of the thinking power1 as especially stopping the operation of the afflictions1 the actions1 the fructifications1 and the stock of deserts4#djj ,the afflictions 7klesa7 are well known as five1 viz41 ignorance1 egoism1 desire1 aversion1 and tenacity of mundane existence4 ,but here a question is at once raised1 ,in what sense is the word avidy1 ignorance1 used here8 ,is it to be considered as an avyaybhva compound1 where the former portion is predominant1 as in the word above-board8#dja or is it a tatpurusha or karmadhraya compound1 where the latter portion is predominant1 as in the word town-clerk8 or is it a bahuvrhi compound1 where both portions are dependent on something external to the compound1 as blue-eyed8 ,it cannot be the first2 for if the former portion of the compound were predominant1 then we should have the negation the emphatic part in avidy 7i4e41 it would be an instance of what is called the express negation1 or prasajya-pratishedha72#djb and consequently1 as avidy would be thus emphatically a negation1 it would be unable to produce positive results1 as the afflictions1 c41 and the very form of the word should not be feminine1 but neuter4 ,it cannot be the second2 for any knowledge1 whatever thing's absence it may be characterised by 7a vidy71 opposes the afflictions1 c41 and cannot therefore be their source4 ,nor can it be the third2 for then1--in accordance with the words of the author of the ,vritti1#djc there is a bahuvrhi compound which is formed with some word meaning 'existence' used after 'not1' with the optional elision of this subsequent word#djd--we must explain this supposed bahuvrhi compound avidy as follows3 ,that buddhi is to be characterised as avidy 7sc4 an adjective71 of which there is not a vidy existing4 ,but this explanation is untenable2 for such an avidy could not become the source of the afflictions2#dje and yet1 on the other hand1 it ought to be their source1#djf even though it were associated with the suppression of all the modifications1#djg and were also accompanied by that discriminative knowledge of the soul and the quality of goodness which is found in the ssmita meditation4 ,now it is said in the ,yoga ,stras1 ii4 #d1 ,ignorance is the field or place of origin1 i4e41 source of the others1 whether they be dormant1 extenuated1 intercepted1 or simple4 ,they are said to be dormant when they are not manifested for want of something to wake them up2 they are called extenuated when1 through one's meditating on something that is opposed to them1 they are rendered inert2 they are called intercepted when they are overpowered by some other strong affliction2 they are called simple when they produce their several effects in the direct vicinity of what co-operates with them4 ,this has been expressed by ,vchaspati ,misra1 in his ,gloss on ,vysa's ,commentary1 in the following memorial stanza3-- ,the dormant 'afflictions' are found in those souls which are absorbed in the tattvas i4e41 not embodied1 but existing in an interval of mundane destruction2 the 'extenuated'#djh are found in yogins2 but the 'intercepted' and the 'simple' in those who are in contact with worldly objects4 ,no one proposes the fourth solution of the compound avidy as a dvandva compound1#dji where both portions are equally predominant1 because we cannot recognise here two equally independent subjects4 ,therefore under any one of these three admissible alternatives#daj the common notion of ignorance as being the cause of the 'afflictions' would be overthrown4 ,we do not1 however1 concede this objector's view1 because we may have recourse to the other kind of negation called paryudsa where the affirmative part is emphatic1 and maintain that avidy means a contradictory or wrong kind of knowledge1 the reverse of vidy2 and so it has been accepted by ancient writers4 ,thus it has been said-- ,the particle implying 'negation' does not signify 'absence' or 'non-existence' when connected with a noun or a root2 thus the words abrhmana and adharma respectively signify1 'what is other than a ,brhman' and 'what is contrary to justice4' ,and again-- ,we are to learn all the uses of words from the custom of the ancient writers2 therefore a word must not be wrested from the use in which it has been already employed4 ,vchaspati also says1#daa ,the connection of words and their meanings depends on general consent for its certainty2 and since we occasionally see that a tatpurusha negation1 where the latter portion is properly predominant1 may overpower the direct meaning of this latter portion by its contradiction of it1 we conclude that even here too in avidy the real meaning is something contrary to vidy i4e41 the negative non-knowledge becomes ultimately the positive ignorance#dab4 ,it is with a view to this that it is said in the ,yoga ,aphorisms ii4 #e1 ,ignorance is the notion that the non-eternal1 the impure1 pain1 and the non-soul are 7severally7 eternal1 pure1 pleasure1 and soul4 ,viparyaya1 misconception1 is defined as the imagining of a thing in what is not that thing1#dac i4e41 in its opposite2 as1 for instance1 the imagining the eternal in a non-eternal thing1 i4e41 a jar1 or the imagining the pure in the impure body1#dad when it has been declared by a proverbial couplet#dae-- ,the wise recognise the body as impure1 from its original place the womb1--from its primal seed1--from its composition of humours1 c41--from perspiration1--from death as even a ,brhman's body defiles1--and from the fact that it has to be made pure by rites4 ,so1--in accordance with the principle enounced in the aphorism 7ii4 #ae71 ,to the discriminating everything is simply pain1 through the pain which arises in the ultimate issue of everything1#daf or through the anxiety to secure it while it is enjoyed1 or through the latent impressions which it leaves behind1 and also from the mutual opposition of the influences of the three qualities in the form of pleasure1 pain1 and stupid indifference1--ignorance transfers the idea of pleasure to what is really pain1 as1 e4g41 garlands1 sandal-wood1 women1 c42 and similarly it conceives the non-soul1 e4g41 the body1 c41 as the soul4 ,as it has been said-- ,but ignorance is when living beings transfer the notion of 'soul' to the 'non-soul1' as the body1 c42 ,this causes bondage2 but in the abolition thereof is liberation4 ,thus this ignorance consists of four kinds4#dag ,but it may be objected in these four special kinds of ignorance should there not be given some general definition applying to them all1 as otherwise their special characteristics cannot be established8 ,for thus it has been said by ,bhatta ,kumrila-- ',without some general definition1 a more special definition cannot be given by itself2 therefore it must not be even mentioned here4' ,this1 however1 must not be urged here1 as it is sufficiently met by the general definition of misconception1 already adduced above1 as the imagining of a thing in its opposite4 ,egoism 7asmit7 is the notion that the two separate things1 the soul and the quality of purity1#dah are one and the same1 as is said 7ii4 #f71 ,egoism is the identifying of the seer with the power of sight4 ,desire 7rga7 is a longing1 in the shape of a thirst1 for the means of enjoyment1 preceded by the remembrance of enjoyment1 on the part of one who has known joy4 ,aversion 7dvesha7 is the feeling of blame felt towards the means of pain1 similarly preceded by the remembrance of pain1 on the part of one who has known it4 ,this is expressed in the two aphorisms1 ,desire is what dwells on pleasure2 ,aversion is what dwells on pain 7ii4 #g1 #h74 ,here a grammatical question may be raised1 ,are we to consider this word anusayin 7'dwelling'7 as formed by the krit affix nini in the sense of 'what is habitual1' or the taddhita affix ini in the sense of matup8 ,it cannot be the former1 since the affix nini cannot be used after a root compounded with a preposition as anus2 for1 as the word supi has already occurred in the ,stra1 iii4 #b1 #d1 and has been exerting its influence in the following stras1 this word must have been introduced a second time in the ,stra1 iii4 #b1 #gh1 supy ajtau ninis tchchhlye1#dai on purpose to exclude prepositions1 as these have no case terminations2 and even if we did strain a point to allow them1 still it would follow by the ,stra1 vii4 #b1 #aae1 acho niti1#dbj that the radical vowel must be subject to vriddhi1 and so the word must be anusyin1 in accordance with the analogy of such words as atisyin1 c4 ,nor is the latter view tenable 7i4e41 that it is the taddhita affix ini#dba71 since ini is forbidden by the technical verse-- ',these two affixes#dbb are not used after a monosyllable nor a krit formation1 nor a word meaning 'genus1' nor with a word in the locative case2' and the word anusaya is clearly a krit formation as it ends with the affix ach#dbc which brings it under this prohibition1 and so renders it insusceptible of the affix ini4 ,consequently1 the word anusayin in the ,yoga aphorism is one the formation of which it is very hard to justify4#dbd ,this cavil1 however1 is not to be admitted2 since the rule is only to be understood as applying generally1 not absolutely1 as it does not refer to something of essential importance4 ,hence the author of the ,vritti has said-- ,the word iti1 as implying the idea of popular acceptation1 is everywhere connected with the examples of this rule#dbe i4e41 it is not an absolute law4 ,therefore1 sometimes the prohibited cases are found1 as kryin1 kryika where the affixes are added after a krit formation1 tandulin1 tandulika where they are added after a word meaning genus4 ,hence the prohibition is only general1 not absolute1 after krit formations and words meaning genus1 and therefore the use of the affix ini is justified1 although the word anusaya is formed by a krit affix4 ,this doubt therefore is settled4 ,the fifth affliction1 called tenacity of mundane existence 7abhinivesa71 is what prevails in the case of all living beings1 from the worm up to the philosopher1 springing up daily1 without any immediate cause1 in the form of a dread1 ,may ,i not be separated from the body1 things sensible1 c41 through the force of the impression left by the experience of the pain of the deaths which were suffered in previous lives1 this is proved by universal experience1 since every individual has the wish1 ,may ,i not cease to be1 ,may ,i be4 ,this is declared in the aphorism1 ,tenacity of mundane existence1 flowing on through its own nature1 is notorious even in the case of the philosopher ii4 #i4 ,these five1 ignorance1 c41 are well known as the afflictions 7klesa71 since they afflict the soul1 as bringing upon it various mundane troubles4 ,we next describe the karmsaya of ii4 #ab1 the stock of works or merits in the mind4 ,works 7karman7 consist of enjoined or forbidden actions1 as the jyotishtoma sacrifice1 brhmanicide1 c4 ,stock 7saya7 is the balance of the fruits of previous works1 which lie stored up in the mind in the form of mental deposits of merit or demerit1 until they ripen in the individual soul's own experience as rank1 years1 and enjoyment ii4 #ac4 ,now concentration yoga consists by i4 #b in the suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle1 which stops the operation of the afflictions1 c42 and this suppression is not considered to be merely the non-existence of the modifications i4e41 a mere negation1 because1 if it were a mere negation1 it could not produce positive impressions on the mind2 but it is rather the site of this non-existence1#dbf--;a particular state of the thinking principle1 called by the four names which will be fully described hereafter1 madhumat1 madhupratk1 visok1 and samskraseshat4 ,the word nirodha thus corresponds to its etymological explanation as that in which the modifications of the thinking principle1 right notion1 misconception1 c41 are suppressed 7nirudhyante74 ,this suppression of the modifications is produced by exercise and dispassion i4 #ab4 ,exercise is the repeated effort that the internal organ shall remain in its proper state i4 #ac4 ,this remaining in its proper state is a particular kind of development1 whereby the thinking principle remains in its natural state1 unaffected by those modifications which at different times assume the form of revealing1 energising1 and controlling4#dbg ,exercise is an effort directed to this1 an endeavour again and again to reduce the internal organ to such a condition4 ,the locative case1 sthitau1 in the aphorism is intended to express the object or aim1 as in the well-known phrase1 ,he kills the elephant for its skin4#dbh ,dispassion is the consciousness of having overcome desire in him who thirsts after neither the objects that are seen nor those that are heard of in revelation i4 #ae4 ,dispassion is thus the reflection1 ,these objects are subject to me1 not ,i to them1 in one who feels no interest in the things of this world or the next1 from perceiving the imperfections attached to them4 ,now1 in order to reduce the afflictions which hinder meditation and to attain meditation1 the yogin must first direct his attention to practical concentration1 and exercise and dispassion are of especial use in its attainment4 ,this has been said by ,krishna in the ,bhagavad ,gt vi4 #c-- ,action is the means to the sage who wishes to rise to yoga2 ,but to him who has risen to it1 tranquillity is said to be the means4 ,patajali has thus defined the practical yoga3 ,practical concentration is mortification1 recitation of texts1 and resignation to the ,lord ii4 #a4 ,yjavalkya has described mortification-- ,by the way prescribed in sacred rule1 by the difficult chndryana fast1 c41 ,thus to dry up the body they call the highest of all mortifications4#dbi ,recitation of texts is the repetition of the syllable ,om1 the gyatr1 c4 ,now these mantras are of two kinds1 ,vaidik and ,tntrik4 ,the ,vaidik are also of two kinds1 those chanted and those not chanted4 ,those chanted are the smans2 those not chanted are either in metre1 i4e41 the richas1 or in prose1 i4e41 the yajmshi1 as has been said by ,jaimini1#dcj ,of these1 that is a rich in which by the force of the sense there is a definite division into pdas or portions of a verse2 the name sman is applied to chanted portions2 the word yajus is applied to the rest4 ,those mantras are called ,tntrik which are set forth in sacred books that are directed to topics of voluntary devotion2#dca and these are again threefold1 as female1 male1 and neuter2 as it has been said-- ,the mantras are of three kinds1 as female1 male1 and neuter3 ,the female are those which end in the wife of fire 7i4e41 the exclamation svh72 the neuter those which end in namas2 ,the rest are male1 and considered the best4 ,they are all-powerful in mesmerising another's will1 c4 ,they are called all-powerful 7siddha7 because they counteract all defects in their performance1 and produce their effect even when the ordinary consecrating ceremonies1 as bathing1 c41 have been omitted4 ,now the peculiar consecrating ceremonies 7samskra7 are ten1 and they have been thus described in the ,srad-tilaka-- ,there are said to be ten preliminary ceremonies which give to mantras efficacy3 ,these mantras are thus made complete2 they are thoroughly consecrated4 ,the 'begetting1' the 'vivifying1' the 'smiting1' the 'awakening1' ,the 'sprinkling1' the 'purifying1' the 'fattening1' ,the 'satisfying1' the 'illumining1' the 'concealing1'--these are the ten consecrations of mantras4 ,the 'begetting' 7janana7 is the extracting of the mantra from its vowels and consonants4 ,the wise man should mutter the several letters of the mantra1 each united to ,om1 ,according to the number of the letters4 ,this they call the 'vivifying' 7jvana74 ,having written the letters of the mantra1 let him smite each with sandal-water1 ,uttering at each the mystic 'seed' of air4#dcb ,this is called the 'smiting' 7tdana74 ,having written the letters of the mantra1 let him strike them with oleander flowers1 ,each enumerated with a letter4 ,this is called the 'awakening' 7bodhana74 ,let the adept1 according to the ritual prescribed in his own special tantra1 ,sprinkle the letters1 according to their number1 with leaves of the ,ficus religiosa4 ,this is the 'sprinkling' 7abhisheka74 ,having meditated on the mantra in his mind1 let him consume by the jyotir-mantra ,the threefold impurity of the mantra4 ,this is the 'purification' 7vimal-karana74 ,the utterance of the jyotir-mantra1 together with ,om1 and the mantras of ,vyoman and ,agni1 ,and the sprinkling of every letter with water from a bunch of kusa grass1 ,with the mystical seed of water#dcc duly muttered1--this is held to be the 'fattening' 7pyyana74 ,the satiating libation over the mantra with mantra-hallowed water is the 'satisfying' 7tarpana74 ,the joining of the mantra with ,om and the 'seeds' of ,my#dcd and ,ram#dce is called its 'illumining' 7dpana74 ,the non-publication of the mantra which is being muttered--this is its 'concealing' 7gopana74 ,these ten consecrating ceremonies are kept close in all tantras2 ,and the adept who practises them according to the tradition obtains his desire2 ,and ruddha1 klita1 vichhinna1 supta1 sapta1 and the rest1 ,all these faults in the mantra rites are abolished by these excellent consecrations4 ,but enough of this venturing to make public the tantra mysteries connected with mantras1 which has suddenly led us astray like an unexpected ,bacchanalian dance4#dcf ,the third form of practical yoga1 resignation to the ,lord 7svara-pranidhna71 is the consigning all one's works1 whether mentioned or not1 without regard to fruit1 to the ,supreme ,lord1 the ,supremely ,venerable4 ,as it has been said-- ,whatever ,i do1 good or bad1 voluntary or involuntary1 ,that is all made over to thee2 ,i act as impelled by thee4 ,this self-resignation is also sometimes defined as the surrender of the fruits of one's actions1 and is thus a peculiar kind of faith1 since most men act only with a selfish regard to the fruit4 ,thus it is sung in the ,bhagavad ,gt ii4 #dg-- ,let thy sole concern be with action and never with the fruits2 ,be not attracted by the fruit of the action1 nor be thou attached to inaction4 ,the harmfulness of aiming at the fruit of an action has been declared by the venerable ,nlakantha-bhrat-- ,even a penance accomplished by great effort1 but vitiated by desire1 ,produces only disgust in the ,great ,lord1 like milk which has been licked by a dog4 ,now this prescribed practice of mortification1 recitation1 and resignation is itself called yoga1 because it is a means for producing yoga1 this being an instance of the function of words called superimponent pure ,indication1 as in the well-known example1 ,butter is longevity4 ,indication is the establishing of another meaning of a word from the incompatibility of its principal meaning with the rest of the sentence1 and from the connection of this new meaning with the former2 it is twofold1 as founded on notoriety or on a motive4 ,this has been declared in the ,kvya-praksa ii4 #i-- ,when1 in consequence of the incompatibility of the principal meaning of a word1 and yet in connection with it1 another meaning is indicated through notoriety or a motive1 this is ',indication1' the superadded function of the word4 ,now the word this i4e41 tat in the neuter1 which the neuter yat in the extract would have naturally led us to expect instead of the feminine s would have signified some neuter word1 like implying1 which is involved as a subordinate part of the verb is indicated4 ,but s is used in the feminine by attraction to agree with lakshan1 this is indication1 i4e41 the neuter this is put in the feminine through its dependence on the predicate4 ,this has been explained by ,kaiyata1 ,of those pronouns which imply the identity of the subject and the predicate1 the former takes the gender of the former1 the latter of the latter4#dcg ,now expert 7kusala7 in business is an example of ,indication from notoriety2 for the word kusala1 which is significant in its parts by being analysed etymologically as kusam lti1 one who gathers kusa grass for the sacrifice1 is here employed to mean expert through the relation of a similarity in character1 as both are persons of discernment2 and this does not need a motive any more than ,denotation does1 since each is the using a word in its recognised conventional sense in accordance with the immemorial tradition of the elders4 ,hence it has been said-- ,some instances of 'indication' are known by notoriety from their immediate significance1 just as is the case in 'denotation' the primary power of a word4 ,therefore indication based on notoriety has no regard to any motive4 ,although a word1 when it is employed1 first establishes its principal meaning1 and then by that meaning a second meaning is subsequently indicated1 and so indication belongs properly to the principal meaning and not to the word2 still1 since it is superadded to the word which originally established the primary meaning1 it is called improperly by metonymy a function of the word4 ,it was with a view to this that the author of the ,kvya-praksa used the expression1 ,this is ',indication1' the superadded function of the word4 ,but the indication based on a motive is of six kinds3 #a4 inclusive indication1#dch as the lances enter where we really mean men with the lances2 #b4 indicative indication1 as the benches shout where the spectators are meant without the benches2 #c4 qualified#dci superimponent indication1 as the man of the ,panjb is an ox here the object is not swallowed up in the simile2 #d4 qualified introsusceptive indication1 as that ox here the man is swallowed up in the simile2 #e4 pure superimponent indication1 as gh is life2 #f4 pure introsusceptive indication1 as verily this is life4 ,this has been all explained in the ,kvya-praksa ii4 #aj-ab4 ,but enough of this churning of the depths of rhetorical discussions4 ,this yoga has been declared to have eight things ancillary to it 7anga72 these are the forbearances1 religious observances1 postures1 suppression of the breath1 restraint1 attention1 contemplation1 and meditation ii4 #bi4 ,patajali says1 ,forbearance consists in not wishing to kill1 veracity1 not stealing1 continence1 not coveting ii4 #cj4 ,religious observances are purifications1 contentment1 mortification1 recitation of texts1 and resignation to the ,lord ii4 #cb2 and these are described in the ,vishnu ,purna vi4 #g1 #cf-ch-- ,the sage who brings his mind into a fit state for attaining ,brahman1 practises1 void of all desire1 ,continence1 abstinence from injury1 truth1 non-stealing1 and non-coveting2 ,self-controlled1 he should practise recitation of texts1 purification1 contentment1 and austerity1 ,and then he should make his mind intent on the ,supreme ,brahman4 ,these are respectively called the five 'forbearances' and the five 'religious observances2' ,they bestow excellent rewards when done through desire of reward1 and eternal liberation to those void of desire4 ,a 'posture' is what is steady and pleasant ii4 #df2 it is of ten kinds1 as the padma1 bhadra1 vra1 svastika1 dandaka1 sopsraya1 paryanka1 krauchanishadana1 ushtranishadana1 samasamsthna4 ,yjavalkya has described each of them in the passage which commences-- ,let him hold fast his two great toes with his two hands1 but in reverse order1 ,having placed the soles of his feet1 ,o chief of ,brhmans1 on his thighs2 ,this will be the padma posture1 held in honour by all4 ,the descriptions of the others must be sought in that work4--,when this steadiness of posture has been attained1 regulation of the breath is practised1 and this consists in a cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration ii4 #di4 ,inspiration is the drawing in of the external air2 expiration is the expelling of the air within the body2 and regulation of the breath is the cessation of activity in both movements4 ,but it may be objected this cannot be accepted as a general definition of 'regulation of breath1' since it fails to apply to the special kinds1 as rechaka1 praka1 and kumbhaka4 ,we reply that there is here no fault in the definition1 since the cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration is found in all these special kinds4 ,thus rechaka1 which is the expulsion of the air within the body1 is only that regulation of the breath1 which has been mentioned before as expiration2 and praka1 which is the regulated retention of the external air within the body1 is the inspiration2 and kumbhaka is the internal suspension of breathing1 when the vital air1 called prna1 remains motionless like water in a jar 7kumbha74 ,thus the cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration applies to all1 and consequently the objector's doubt is needless4 ,now this air1 beginning from sunrise1 remains two ghatiks and a half#ddj in each artery#dda 7ndi71 like the revolving buckets on a waterwheel4#ddb ,thus in the course of a day and night there are produced #ba1fjj inspirations and expirations4 ,hence it has been said by those who know the secret of transmitting the mantras1 concerning the transmission of the ajapmantra#ddc-- ,six hundred to ,ganesa1 six thousand to the self-existent ,brahman1 ,six thousand to ,vishnu1 six thousand to ,siva1 ,one thousand to the ,guru 7,brihaspati71 one thousand to the ,supreme ,soul1 ,and one thousand to the soul3 thus ,i make over the performed muttering4 ,so at the time of the passing of the air through the arteries1 the elements1 earth1 c41 must be understood1 according to their different colours1 by those who wish to obtain the highest good4 ,this has been thus explained by the wise-- ,let each artery convey the air two ghats and a half from sunrise4 ,there is a continual resemblance of the two arteries#ddd to the buckets on a revolving waterwheel4 ,nine hundred inspirations and expirations of the air take place in the hour1 ,and all combined produce the total of twenty-one thousand six hundred in a day and night4 ,the time that is spent in uttering thirty-six guna letters1#dde ,that time elapses while the air passes along in the interval between two arteries4 ,there are five elements in each of the two conducting arteries1-- ,they bear it along day and night2 these are to be known by the self-restrained4 ,fire bears above1 water below2 air moves across2 ,earth in the half-hollow2 ether moves everywhere4 ,they bear along in order1--air1 fire1 water1 earth1 ether2 ,this is to be known in its due order in the two conducting arteries4 ,the palas#ddf of earth are fifty1 of water forty1 ,of fire thirty1 of air twenty1 of ether ten4 ,this is the amount of time taken for the bearing2 but the reason that the two arteries are so disturbed ,is that earth has five properties1#ddg water four1 ,fire has three1 air two1 and ether one4 ,there are ten palas for each property2 hence earth has fifty palas1 ,and each1 from water downwards1 loses successively4 ,now the five properties of earth ,are odour1 savour1 colour1 tangibility1 and audibleness2 and these decrease one by one4 ,the two elements1 earth and water1 produce their fruit by the influence of 'quiet1' ,but fire1 air1 and ether by the influence of 'brightness1' 'restlessness1' and 'immensity4'#ddh ,the characteristic signs of earth1 water1 fire1 air1 and ether are now declared2-- ,of the first steadfastness of mind2 through the coldness of the second arises desire2 ,from the third anger and grief2 from the fourth fickleness of mind2 ,from the fifth the absence of any object1 or mental impressions of latent merit4 ,let the devotee place his thumbs in his ears1 and a middle finger in each nostril1 ,and the little finger and the one next to it in the corners of his mouth1 and the two remaining fingers in the corners of his eyes1 ,then there will arise in due order the knowledge of the earth and the other elements within him1 ,the first four by yellow1 white1 dark red1 and dark blue spots1#ddi--the ether has no symbol4 ,when the element air is thus comprehended and its restraint is accomplished1 the evil influence of works which concealed discriminating knowledge is destroyed ii4 #eb2 hence it has been said-- ,there is no austerity superior to regulation of the breath4#dej ,and again-- ,as the dross of metals1 when they are melted1 is consumed1 ,so the serpents of the senses are consumed by regulation of the breath4#dea ,now in this way1 having his mind purified by the forbearances and the other things subservient to concentration1 the devotee is to attain self-mastery 7samyama7#deb and restraint 7pratyhra74 ,restraint is the accommodation of the senses1 as the eye1 c41 to the nature of the mind1#dec which is intent on the soul's unaltered nature1 while they abandon all concernment with their own several objects1 which might excite desire or anger or stupid indifference4 ,this is expressed by the etymology of the word2 the senses are drawn to it 7 hri71 away from them 7pratpa74 ,but is it not the mind which is then intent upon the soul and not the senses1 since these are only adapted for external objects1 and therefore have no power for this supposed action8 ,how1 therefore1 could they be accommodated to the nature of the mind8 ,what you say is quite true2 and therefore the author of the aphorisms1 having an eye to their want of power for this1 introduced the words as it were1 to express resemblance4 ,restraint is1 as it were1 the accommodation of the senses to the nature of the mind in the absence of concernment with each one's own object ii4 #ed4 ,their absence of concernment with their several objects for the sake of being accommodated to the nature of the mind is this resemblance which we mean4 ,since1 when the mind is restrained1 the eye1 c41 are restrained1 no fresh effort is to be expected from them1 and they follow the mind as bees follow their king4 ,this has been declared in the ,vishnu-purna vi4 #g1 #dc1 #dd-- ,let the devotee1 restraining his organs of sense1 which ever tend to pursue external objects1 ,himself intent on restraint1 make them conformable to the mind2 ,by this is effected the entire subjugation of the unsteady senses2 ,if they are not controlled1 the yogin will not accomplish his yoga4#ded ,attention 7dhran7 is the fixing the mind1 by withdrawing it from all other objects1 on some place1 whether connected with the internal self1 as the circle of the navel1 the lotus of the heart1 the top of the sushumn artery1 c41 or something external1 as ,prajpati1 ,vsava1 ,hiranyagarbha1 c4 ,this is declared by the aphorism1 ',attention' is the fixing the mind on a place iii4 #a2 and so1 too1 say the followers of the ,purnas-- ,by regulation of breath having controlled the air1 and by restraint the senses1 ,let him next make the perfect asylum the dwelling-place of his mind4#dee ,the continual flow of thought in this place1 resting on the object to be contemplated1 and avoiding all incongruous thoughts1 is contemplation 7dhyna72 thus it is said1 ,a course of uniform thought there1 is 'contemplation' iii4 #b4 ,others also have said-- ,a continued succession of thoughts1 intent on objects of that kind and desiring no other1 ,this is 'contemplation1'--it is thus effected by the first six of the ancillary things4 ,we incidentally1 in elucidating something else1 discussed the remaining eighth ancillary thing1 meditation 7samdhi1 see p4 #bdc74 ,by this practice of the ancillary means of yoga1 pursued for a long time with uninterrupted earnestness1 the afflictions which hinder meditation are abolished1 and through exercise and dispassion the devotee attains to the perfections designated by the names ,madhumat and the rest4 ,but why do you needlessly frighten us with unknown and monstrous words from the dialects of ,karnta1 ,gauda1#def and ,lta8#deg ,we do not want to frighten you1 but rather to gratify you by explaining the meaning of these strange words2 therefore let the reader who is so needlessly alarmed listen to us with attention4 i4 ,the ,madhumat perfection1--this is the perfection of meditation1 called the knowledge which holds to the truth1 consisting in the illumination of unsullied purity by means of the contemplation of goodness1 composed of the manifestation of joy1 with every trace of passion or darkness abolished by exercise1 dispassion1 c4 ,thus it is said in the aphorisms1 ,in that case there is the knowledge which holds to the truth i4 #dh4 ,it holds to the truth1 i4e41 to the real2 it is never overshadowed by error4 ,in that case1 i4e41 when firmly established1 there arises this knowledge to the second yogin4 ,for the yogins or devotees to the practice of yoga are well known to be of four kinds1 viz41-- i4 ,the prthamakalpika1 in whom the light has just entered1#deh but1 as it has been said1 he has not won the light which consists in the power of knowing another's thoughts1 c42 #b4 ,the madhubhmika1 who possesses the knowledge which holds to the truth2 #c4 ,the prajjyotis1 who has subdued the elements and the senses2 #d4 ,the atikrnta-bhvanya1 who has attained the highest dispassion4 ii4 ,the ,madhupratk perfections are swiftness like thought1 c4 ,these are declared to be swiftness like thought1 the being without organs1 and the conquest of nature iii4 #di4 ,swiftness like thought is the attainment by the body of exceeding swiftness of motion1 like thought2 the being without bodily organs#dei is the attainment by the senses1 irrespective of the body1 of powers directed to objects in any desired place or time2 the conquest of nature is the power of controlling all the manifestations of nature4 ,these perfections appear to the full in the third kind of yogin1 from the subjugation by him of the five senses and their essential conditions4#dfj ,these perfections are severally sweet1 each one by itself1 as even a particle of honey is sweet1 and therefore the second state is called ,madhupratk i4e41 that whose parts are sweet4 iii4 ,the ,visok perfection consists in the supremacy over all existences1 c4 ,this is said in the aphorisms1 ,to him who possesses1 to the exclusion of all other ideas1 the discriminative knowledge of the quality of goodness and the soul1 arises omniscience and the supremacy over all existences iii4 #ej4 ,the supremacy over all existences is the overcoming like a master all entities1 as these are but the developments of the quality of goodness in the mind the other qualities of passion and darkness being already abolished1 and exist only in the form of energy and the objects to be energised upon4#dfa ,the discriminative knowledge of them1 as existing in the modes subsided1 emerged1 or not to be named1#dfb is omniscience4 ,this is said in the aphorisms i4 #cf1 ,or a luminous immediate cognition1 free from sorrow#dfc may produce steadiness of mind4 iv4 ,the ,samskraseshat state is also called asamprajta1 i4e41 that meditation in which distinct recognition of an object is lost2 it is that meditation without a seed i4e41 without any object which is able to stop the afflictions that produce fruits to be afterwards experienced in the shape of rank1 length of life1 and enjoyment2 and this meditation belongs to him who1 in the cessation of all modifications of the internal organ1 has reached the highest dispassion4 ,the other kind of meditation i4e41 that in which distinct recognition of an object is lost is preceded by that exercise of thought which produces the entire cessation of modifications2 it has nothing left but the latent impressions of thought after the departure of all objects i4e41 samskrasesha1 i4 #ah4 ,thus this foremost of men1 being utterly passionless towards everything1 finds that the seeds of the afflictions1 like burned rice-grains1 are bereft of the power to germinate1 and they are abolished together with the internal organ4 ,when these are destroyed1 there ensues1 through the full maturity of his unclouded discriminative knowledge1 an absorption of all causes and effects into the primal prakriti2 and the soul1 which is the power of pure intelligence1 abiding in its own real nature1 and escaped from all connection with the phenomenal understanding 7buddhi71 or with existence1 reaches absolute isolation 7kaivalya74 ,final liberation is described by ,patajali as two perfections3 ,absolute isolation is the repressive absorption#dfd of the 'qualities' which have consummated the ends of the soul1 i4e41 enjoyment and liberation1 or the abiding of the power of intelligence in its own nature iv4 #cc4 ,nor should any one object1 ,why1 however1 should not the individual be born again even though this should have been attained8 for that is settled by the well-known principle that with the cessation of the cause the effect ceases1 and therefore this objection is utterly irrelevant1 as admitting neither inquiry nor decision2 for otherwise1 if the effect could arise even in the absence of the cause1 we should have blind men finding jewels1 and such like absurdities2 and the popular proverb for the impossible would become a possibility4 ,and so1 too1 says the ,sruti1 ,a blind man found a jewel2 one without fingers seized it2 one without a neck put it on2 and a dumb man praised it4#dfe ,thus we see that1 like the authoritative treatises on medicine1 the ,yoga-sstra consists of four divisions2 as those on medicine treat of disease1 its cause1 health1 and medicine1 so the ,yoga-sstra also treats of phenomenal existence1 its cause1 liberation1 and its cause4 ,this existence of ours1 full of pain1 is what is to be escaped from2 the connection of nature and the soul is the cause of our having to experience this existence2 the absolute abolition of this connection is the escape2 and right insight is the cause thereof4#dff ,the same fourfold division is to be similarly traced as the case may be in other ,sstras also4 ,thus all has been made clear4 ,the system of ,sankara1 which comes next in succession1 and which is the crest-gem of all systems1 has been explained by us elsewhere2 it is therefore left untouched here4#dfg ,e4 ,b4 ,c4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,note ,,on ,,the ,,yoga4 ,there is an interesting description of the ,yogins on the ,mountain ,raivataka in ,mgha 7iv4 #ee73-- ,there the votaries of meditation1 well skilled in benevolence 7maitr7 and those other purifiers of the mind1--having successfully abolished the 'afflictions' and obtained the 'meditation possessed of a seed1' and having reached that knowledge which recognises the essential difference between the quality ,goodness and the ,soul1--desire yet further to repress even this ultimate meditation4 ,it is curious to notice that maitr1 which plays such a prominent part in ,buddhism1 is counted in the ,yoga as only a preliminary condition from which the votary is to take1 as it were1 his first start towards his final goal4 ,it is called a parikarman 7 prasdhaka7 in ,vysa's ,comm4 i4 #cc 7cf4 iii4 #bb71 whence the term is borrowed by ,mgha4 ,bhoja expressly says that this purifying process is an external one1 and not an intimate portion of yoga itself2 just as in arithmetic the operations of addition1 c41 are valuable1 not in themselves1 but as aids in effecting the more important calculations which arise subsequently4 ,the ,yoga seems directly to allude to ,buddhism in this marked depreciation of its cardinal virtue4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,note ,,on ,p4 #bcg1 ,,last ,,line4 ,for the word vykopa in the original here 7see also p4 #bdb1 l4 #c infra71 cf4 ,kusumjali1 p4 #f1 l4 #g4 ,,footnotes3 ,footnote #cfc3 ,on this see ,dr4 ,hall's ,pref4 to ,snkhya ,pr4 ,bhsh41 p4 #bj2 ,s4 ,sra1 p4 #aa4 ,footnote #cfd3 ,i4e41 he revealed the ,veda1 and also originated the meanings of words1 as well as instructed the first fathers of mankind in the arts of life4 ,footnote #cfe3 ,i read ye for te with ,dr4 ,hall's ,,ms4 ,tapya means rather susceptible of suffering4 ,footnote #cff3 ,this is really ,vysa's comm4 on ,st41 iv4 #ba4 ,footnote #cfg3 ,cf4 ,bhsh-parichchheda1 #ae1 a4 ,footnote #cfh3 ,satapatha ,br41 xiv4 #g1 #b1 #bh4 ,footnote #cfi3 ,i read in the second clause tadbhve'pi1 understanding by tad the different conditions which atha is supposed to assume as being necessarily present4 ,footnote #cgj3 ,these are1 i41 the discrimination of the eternal from the phenomenal2 ii41 the rejection of the fruit of actions here or hereafter2 iii41 the possession of the six qualities1 tranquillity1 c42 and1 iv41 the desire for liberation4 ,footnote #cga3 ,it may be sukha-janaka1 but it is not itself sukha4 ,footnote #cgb3 ,granting that atha does not here mean auspicious1 why should not this be the implied meaning1 as all allow that the particle atha does produce an auspicious influence8 ,footnote #cgc3 i4e41 a word's incapacity to convey a meaning without some other word to complete the construction4 ,footnote #cgd3 ,this is found with some variations in the ,mahbhshya 7p4 #g1 ,kielhorn's ed47 ,footnote #cge3 ,the commentators hold that the word vriddhih is placed at the beginning of the first stra1 while gunah in the second is placed at the end 7ad en gunah71 in order to ensure an auspicious opening1 vriddhi meaning increase1 prosperity1 as well as the second strengthening of a vowel4 ,footnote #cgf3 ,in the old ,bengali poem ,chand1 we have an interesting list of these omens4 ,the hero ,chandraketu1 starting on a journey1 has the following good omens3 ,on his right hand a cow1 a deer1 a ,brhman1 a full-blown lotus2 on his left1 a jackal and a jar full of water4 ,he hears on his right hand the sound of fire and a cowherdess calling milk to buyers4 ,he sees a cow with her calf1 a woman calling jaya1 drv grass1 rice1 garlands of flowers1 diamonds1 sapphires1 pearls1 corals2 and on the left twelve women4 ,he hears drums and cymbals1 and men dancing and singing ,hari4 ,it is1 however1 all spoiled by seeing a guana 7godhik74 ,the author adds1 ,this is a bad omen according to all sstras1 and so is a tortoise1 a rhinoceros1 the tuberous root of the water-lily1 and a hare4 ,elsewhere1 a vulture1 a kite1 a lizard1 and a woodman carrying wood are called bad omens4 ,footnote #cgg3 ,these are the names of two out of the four sacrifices lasting for one day1 in which a thousand cows are given to the officiating ,brhmans4 ,footnote #cgh3 ,he is here called phanipati1 lord of snakes1--,patajali1 the author of the ,mahbhshya1 being represented as a snake in mythology4 ,footnote #cgi3 ,cf4 ,sankara1 ,vednta-,st41 iii4 #c1 #di4 ,footnote #chj3 ,this is the ,mmms rule for settling the relative value of the proofs that one thing is ancillary to another4 #a4 ,sruti1 a definite text1 as let him offer with curds1 where curds are clearly an ancillary part of the sacrifice4 #b4 ,linga1 a sign1 or the sense of the words1 as leading to an inference1 as in the text he divides by the ladle2 here we infer that the thing to be divided must be a liquid like ghee1 since a ladle could not divide solid things like the baked flour cakes4 #c4 ,vkya1 the being mentioned in one sentence1 i4e41 the context1 as in the text '7,i cut7 thee for food1' thus saying1 he cuts the branch2 here the words 7,i cut7 thee for food are ancillary to the action of cutting2 or in the text1 ,i offer the welcome 7oblation7 to ,agni1 the words the welcome 7oblation7 to ,agni1 as they form one sentence with the words ,i offer1 are ancillary to the act of offering4 #d4 ,prakarana1 the subject-matter viewed as a whole1 with an interdependence of its parts1 as in the darsa-prnamsa sacrifice1 where the prayja ceremonies1 which have no special fruit mentioned1 produce1 as parts1 a mystic influence 7aprva7 which helps forward that influence of the whole by which the worshippers obtain heaven4 ,here the prakarana proves them to be ancillary4 #e4 ,sthna 7or krama71 relative position or order1 as the recital of the hymn ,sundhadhvam1 c41 ,be ye purified for the divine work1 in connection with the mention of the snnyya vessels1 where this position proves that the hymn is ancillary to the action of sprinkling those vessels4 #f4 ,samkhy1 title2 thus the ,yajur-veda is called the special book for the adhvaryu priests2 hence in any rite mentioned in it they are prima facie to be considered as the priests employed4 ,the order in the aphorism represents the relative weight to be attached to each2 the first1 sruti1 being the most important2 the last1 samkhy1 the least4 ,cf4 ,jaimini's ,stras1 iii4 #c1 #ad2 ,mmmsparibhsh1 pp4 #h1 #i4 ,footnote #cha3 ,i4e41 ,yogi-,yjavalkya1 the author of the ,yjavalkya-gt4 ,see ,hall1 ,bibl4 ,index1 p4 #ad2 ,aufrecht1 ,bodl4 ,catal41 p4 #hg b4 ,footnote #chb3 ,karman seems here used for kriy1 which properly belongs only to the body1 as the soul is drashtri4 ,footnote #chc3 ,scil4 samdhi1 or the restraining the mind and senses to profound contemplation4 ,footnote #chd3 ,scil4 forbearance1 religious observance1 postures1 suppression of the breath1 restraint1 attention1 contemplation1 and meditation 7samdhi74 ,footnote #che3 ,see ,bhoja1 ,comm4 iii4 #c1 samyag dhyate mano yatra sa samdhih4 ,footnote #chf3 ,thus1 e4g41 the antecedent non-existence and the destruction of the pot are found in the two halves in which the pot itself 7the counter-entity to its own non-existence7 resides by intimate relation 7samavya-sambandha74 ,footnote #chg3 ,i read niroddhavynm for nirodhnm4 ,footnote #chh3 ,chit-sakti and chiti-sakti soul4 ,footnote #chi3 ,the sattva of the buddhi or the internal organ4 ,footnote #cij3 ,this second substance1 mind or understanding 7buddhi1 chitta71 is like a looking-glass1 which reflects the image of the object on a second looking-glass 7sc4 soul74 ,footnote #cia3 ,vchaspati explains lakshana as klabheda4 ,footnote #cib3 ,i take di as meaning asphutatva4 ,the change of state takes place between the several moments of the lakshana-parinma4 ,cf4 the ,commentaries on iii4 #ac4 ,footnote #cic3 ,these are generally called the five states of the thinking principle1 chittabhmayas or avasths4 ,cf4 ,commentary1 i4 #b1 #ah4 ,footnote #cid3 ,these three conditions respectively characterise men1 demons1 and gods4 ,footnote #cie3 ,much of this is taken from ,bhoja's ,commentary1 and ,i have borrowed ,ballantyne's translation4 ,footnote #cif3 ,can chitta mean soul here8 ,footnote #cig3 ,i4e41 as1 e4g41 whether the senses produce the elements or the elements the senses1 c4 ,footnote #cih3 ,in p4 #afd1 line #d infra1 read sukhapraksamayasya4 ,footnote #cii3 ,in p4 #afd1 line #b infra1 read sattmtra for sattva-4 ,bhoja well distinguishes asmit from ahamkra4 ,footnote #djj3 ,for these see infra1 and cf4 ,yoga ,s41 ii4 #c1 #ab1 #ac4 ,footnote #dja3 ,i have ventured to alter the examples1 to suit the ,english translation4 ,footnote #djb3 ,where the negation is prominent it is called prasajya-pratishedha2 but where it is not prominent1 we have the paryudsa negation4 ,in the former the negative is connected with the verb2 in the latter it is generally compounded with some other word1 as1 e4g4-- 7a47 ,not a drum was heard1 not a funeral note4 7b47 ,unwatched the garden bough shall sway4 ,the former corresponds to the logician's atyantbhva1 the latter to anyonybhva or bheda4 ,footnote #djc3 ,cf4 the vrttika in ,siddhnta ,kaum41 i4 #dja4 ,footnote #djd3 ,thus adhana stands for avidya-mnadhana1 with vidyamna omitted in the compound4 ,footnote #dje3 ,as its subject would confessedly be buddhi4 ,footnote #djf3 ,as it is avidy after all4 ,footnote #djg3 ,in p4 #afe1 lines #af1 #ag1 read 7with my ,,ms4 of ,vchaspati's ,gloss71 sarvavrittinirodhasampanny api tathtvaprasangt4 ,footnote #djh3 ,i read tanvavasthscha with the printed edition of ,vchaspati's ,gloss4 ,if tanudagdhscha is correct1 it must mean tanutvena dagdhh4 ,footnote #dji3 ,as in rmalakshmanau1 ,rma and ,lakshmana4 ,footnote #daj3 ,i read pakshatraye for pakshadvaye4 ,footnote #daa3 ,in his ,comm4 on ,st41 ii4 #e4 ,footnote #dab3 ,thus inimicus is not a friend1 nor1 on the other hand1 a non-friend1 but something positive1 an enemy4 ,so agoshpada is said to mean a forest4 ,footnote #dac3 ,cf4 ,yoga ,st41 i4 #h4 ,footnote #dad3 ,in p4 #aff1 line #d infra1 read kydau for krydau4 ,footnote #dae3 ,this couplet is quoted by ,vysa in his ,comm4 on ,yoga ,stras1 ii4 #e1 and ,i have followed ,vchaspati in his explanation of it2 he calls it vaiysak gth4 ,footnote #daf3 ,since the continued enjoyment of an object only increases the desire for more1 and its loss gives correspondent regret 7cf4 ,bhag4 ,g4 xviii4 #ch74 ,footnote #dag3 ,literally1 it has four feet4 ,footnote #dah3 ,thus sight1 or the power of seeing1 is a modification of the quality of sattva unobstructed by rajas and tamas4 ,footnote #dai3 ,let the affix nini be used after a root in the sense of what is habitual1 when the upapada1 or subordinate word1 is not a word meaning 'genus' and ends in a case4 ,footnote #dbj3 ,let vriddhi be the substitute of a base ending in a vowel1 when that which has an indicatory or n follows2 nini has an indicatory n4 ,footnote #dba3 ,sc4 anusaya ini anusayin4 ,footnote #dbb3 ,ini and than1 which respectively leave in and ika2 thus danda gives dandin and dandika4 ,the line is quoted by ,boehtlingk1 vol4 ii4 p4 #bag1 on ,pn4 v4 #b1 #aae1 and is explained in the ,ksik1 ad loc4 ,the different prohibitions are illustrated by the examples3--7#a47 svavn1 khavn2 7#b47 krakavn2 7#c47 vyghravn1 simhavn2 7#d47 dandavat sl 7i4e41 dand asym santi74 ,footnote #dbc3 ,by iii4 #c1 #ef4 ,footnote #dbd3 ,it is curious to see the great grammarian's favourite study obtruding itself here on such a slender pretext4 ,footnote #dbe3 ,see the ,ksik on ,pn4 v4 #b1 #aae4 ,for vivakshrtha 7meaning general currency71 compare ,commentary on ,pn4 ii4 #b1 #bg4 ,the edition in the ,benares ,pandit reads vishayaniyamrtha4 ,footnote #dbf3 i4e41 ,thus nirodha is not vritter abhvah1 but abhvasysryah4 ,footnote #dbg3 ,i read in p4 #afh1 last line1 praksapravrittiniyamarpa1 from ,bhoja's comment on i4 #ab4 ,footnote #dbh3 ,see ,ksik1 ii4 #c1 #cf4 ,footnote #dbi3 ,this passage probably occurs in the ,yjavalkya-gt of ,yogi-yjavalkya4 ,see ,colebrooke's ,essays 7ed4 #b71 vol4 i4 p4 #ade1 note4 ,footnote #dcj3 ,mmms ,stras1 ii4 #a1 #ce-cg4 ,footnote #dca3 ,the tantras are not properly concerned with what is nitya or naimittika2 they are kmya4 ,footnote #dcb3 ,the vja of air is the syllable jam4 ,footnote #dcc3 ,the vja of water is the syllable bam4 ,footnote #dcd3 ,hrm4 ,footnote #dce3 ,srm4 ,footnote #dcf3 ,tndava is the frantic dance of the god4 ,siva and his votaries4 ,footnote #dcg3 ,literally they take severally in order the gender of one of the two4 ,cf4 ,theb ips quod ,boeoti caput est1 ,livy1 xlii4 #dd2 ,animal hoc providum1 acutum1 plenum rationis et consilii1 quem vocamus hominem1 ,cic41 ,legg1 i4 #g4 ,footnote #dch3 ,i have borrowed these terms from ,ballantyne's translation of the ,shitya-darpana4 ,footnote #dci3 ,qualified indication arises from likeness1 as the man is like an ox from his stupidity2 pure indication from any other relation1 as cause and effect1 c41 thus butter is the cause of longevity4 ,footnote #ddj3 ,i4e41 an hour1 a ghatik being twenty-four minutes4 ,footnote #dda3 ,the nds or tubular vessels are generally reckoned to be #aja1 with ten principal ones2 others make sixteen principal nds4 ,they seem taken afterwards in pairs4 ,footnote #ddb3 ,mdhava uses the same illustration in his commentary on the passage in the ,aitareya ,brhmana 7iii4 #bi71 where the relation of the vital airs1 the seasons1 and the mantras repeated with the offerings to the seasons1 is discussed4 ,the seasons never stand still2 following each other in order one by one1 as spring1 summer1 the rains1 autumn1 the cold and the foggy seasons1 each consisting of two months1 and so constituting the year of twelve months1 they continue revolving again and again like a waterwheel 7ghatyantravat72 hence the seasons never pause in their course4 ,footnote #ddc3 ,this refers to a peculiar tenet of ,hindu mysticism1 that each involuntary inspiration and expiration constitutes a mantra1 as their sound expresses the word so'ham 7i4e41 hamsah71 ,i am he4 ,this mantra is repeated #ba1fjj times in every twenty-four hours2 it is called the ajapmantra1 i4e41 the mantra uttered without voluntary muttering4 ,footnote #ddd3 ,i4e41 that which conveys the inhaled and the exhaled breath4 ,footnote #dde3 ,i cannot explain this4 ,we might read guruvarnnm for gunavarnnm1 as the time spent in uttering a guruvarna is a vipala1 sixty of which make a pala1 and two and a half palas make a minute2 but this seems inconsistent with the other numerical details4 ,the whole passage may be compared with the opening of the fifth act of the ,mlatmdhava4 ,footnote #ddf3 ,sixty palas make a ghatik 7#ej #dj #cj #bj #aj #aej1 i4e41 the palas in two and a half ghatiks or one hour74 ,footnote #ddg3 ,cf4 ,colebrooke's ,essays1 vol4 i4 p4 #bef4 ,footnote #ddh3 ,literally the being ever more4 ,footnote #ddi3 ,for these colours cf4 ,chhndogya ,up41 viii4 #f2 ,maitri ,up41 vi4 #cj4 ,footnote #dej3 ,this is an anonymous quotation in ,vysa's ,comm4 ,footnote #dea3 ,this seems a variation of ,sloka #g of the ,amrita-nda ,up4 ,see ,weber1 ,indische ,stud41 ix4 #bf4 ,footnote #deb3 ,this is defined in the ,yoga ,st41 iii4 #d1 as consisting of the united operation towards one object of contemplation1 attention1 and meditation4 ,footnote #dec3 ,i4e41 the internal organ 7chitta74 ,footnote #ded3 ,this couplet is corrupt in the text4 ,i follow the reading of the ,bombay edition of the ,purna 7only reading in line #c chaltmanm74 ,footnote #dee3 ,vishnu-pur41 vi4 #g1 #de1 with one or two variations4 ,the perfect asylum is ,brahman1 formless or possessing form4 ,footnote #def3 ,the old name for the central part of ,bengal4 ,footnote #deg3 ,a country comprising ,khandesh and part of ,guzerat2 it is the ,greek3 ,larik of ,ptolemy4 ,footnote #deh3 ,in p4 #agh1 l4 #b1 infra1 read pravritta for pravritti4 ,cf4 ,yoga ,s41 iii4 #eb in ,bhoja's ,comm4 7#ej in ,vysa's ,comm47 ,footnote #dei3 ,read vikaranabhvah2 ,vchaspati explains it as videhnm indriynm karanabhvah4 ,footnote #dfj3 ,vysa has karanapachakarpajaya2 ,vchaspati explains rpa by grahandi 7cf4 iii4 #dg74 ,footnote #dfa3 ,i read in p4 #agi1 l4 #aa1 vyava-syavyavaseytmaknm1 from ,vysa's ,comm4 ,footnote #dfb3 ,i4e41 as past1 present1 or future4 ,footnote #dfc3 ,visok4 ,footnote #dfd3 ,this is explained by ,vchaspati1 ,the latent impressions produced by the states of the internal organ called vyutthna 7when it is chiefly characterised by 'activity1' or 'darkness1' iii4 #i7 and nirodha 7when it is chiefly characterised by the quality of 'goodness'71 are absorbed in the internal organ itself2 this in 'egoism' 7asmit72 'egoism' in the 'merely once resolvable' 7i4e41 buddhi72 and buddhi into the 'irresolvable' 7i4e41 prakriti74 ,prakriti consists of the three 'qualities' in equilibrium2 and the entire creation1 consisting of causes and effects1 is the development of these 'qualities' when one or another becomes predominant4 ,footnote #dfe3 ,this curious passage occurs in the ,taittirya-ranyaka i4 #aa1 #e4 ,mdhava in his ,comment1 there explains it of the soul1 and quotes the ,svetsv4 ,up41 iii4 #ai4 ,mdhava here takes avindat as he pierced the jewel1 but ,i have followed his correct explanation in the ,comm4 ,footnote #dff3 ,this is taken from ,vchaspati's ,comm4 on ,yoga ,s4 ii4 #ae4 ,cf4 the four truths of ,buddhism4 ,footnote #dfg3 ,this probably refers to the ,pachadas4 ,a ,calcutta ,pandit told me that it referred to the ,prameya-vivarana-sangraha 7cf4 ,dr4 ,burnell's preface to his edition of the ,devatdhyya-brhmana1 p4 x71 but1 if this is the same as the vivarana-prameya-sangraha1 it is by ,bhrattrthavidyranya 7see ,dr4 ,burnell's ,cat of ,tanjore ,,mss4 p4 #hh74 ,,appendix4 ,,on ,,the ,,up,,dhi 7cf4 supra1 pp4 #g1 #h1 #agd1 #aid74 ,as the updhi or condition is a peculiarity of ,hindu logic which is little known in ,europe1 ,i have added the following translation of the sections in the ,bhsh-parichchheda and the ,siddhnta-muktval1 which treat of it4 cxxxvii4 ,that which always accompanies the major term 7sdhya71 but does not always accompany the middle 7hetu71 is called the ,condition 7updhi72 its examination is now set forth4 ,our author now proceeds to define the updhi or condition1#dfh which is used to stop our acquiescence in a universal proposition as laid down by another person2--that which always accompanies1 c4 ,the meaning of this is that the so-called condition1 while it invariably accompanies that which is accepted as the major term1 does not thus invariably accompany that which our opponent puts forward as his middle term4 ,thus in the false argument1 ,the mountain has smoke because it has fire1 we may advance wet fuel1 or rather the being produced from wet fuel1 as an updhi1 since wet fuel is necessarily found wherever smoke is1 but not always where fire is1 as e4g41 in a red-hot iron ball4 ,but1 the opponent may suggest1 if this were true1 would it not follow that 7a7 in the case of the too wide middle term in the argument1 ',this second son of ,mitr's1 whom ,i have not seen1 must be dark because he is ,mitr's son1' we could not allege 'the being produced from feeding on vegetables'#dfi as a 'condition1'--inasmuch as it does not invariably accompany a dark colour1 since a dark colour does also reside in things like unbaked jars1 c41 which have nothing to do with feeding on vegetables8 7b7 ,again1 in the argument1 ',the air must be perceptible to sense#dgj because it is the site of touch1' we could not allege the 'possessing proportionate form' as a 'condition2' because perceptibility to the internal sense is found in the soul1 c41 and yet soul1 c41 have no form and therefore the 'possessing proportionate form' does not invariably accompany perceptibility4 7c7 ,again1 in the argument1',destruction is itself perishable1 because it is produced1' we could not allege as a 'condition' the 'being included in some positive category of existence'#dga destruction being a form of non-existence1 called emergent1 dvamsbhva1 inasmuch as perishability is found in antecedent non-existence1 and this certainly cannot be said to be included in any positive category of existence4 ,we1 however1 deny this1 and maintain that the true meaning of the definition is simply this1--that whatever fact or mark we take to determine definitely1 in reference to the topic1 the major term which our condition is invariably to accompany1 that same fact or mark must be equally taken to determine the middle term which our said condition is not invariably to accompany4 ,thus 7a7 the being produced from feeding on vegetables invariably accompanies a dark colour1 as determined by the fact that it is ,mitr's son1 whose dark colour is discussed and this very fact is the alleged middle term of the argument2 but the pretended contradictory instance of the dark jar is not in point1 as this was not the topic discussed4 7b7 ,again1 possessing proportionate form invariably accompanies perceptibility as determined by the fact that the thing perceived is an external object2 while it does not invariably accompany the alleged middle term the being the site of touch1 which is equally to be determined by the fact that the thing perceived is to be an external object4#dgb 7c7 ,again1 in the argument destruction is perishable from its being produced1 the being included in some positive category of existence invariably accompanies the major term perishable1 when determined by the attribute of being produced4 ,and this is the middle term advanced2 and therefore the alleged contradictory instance1 antecedent non-existence1 is not in point1 since nobody pretends that this is produced at all4 ,but it is to be observed that there is nothing of this kind in valid middle terms1 i4e41 there is nothing there which invariably accompanies the major term when determined by a certain fact or mark1 and does not so accompany the middle term when similarly determined4 ,this is peculiar to the so-called condition4 ,should the reader object that in each of our previous examples there has been given a separate determining mark or attribute which was to be found in each of the cases included under each2 how then1 in the absence of some general rule1 are we to find out what this determining mark is to be in any particular given case8 ,we reply that in the case of any middle term which is too general1 the required general rule consists in the constant presence of one or other of the following alternatives1 viz41 that the subjects thus to be included are either 7i47 the acknowledged site of the major term1 and also the site of the condition1#dgc or else 7ii47 the acknowledged site of the too general middle term1 but excluding the said condition2#dgd and it will be when the case is determined by the presence of one or other of these alternatives that the condition will be considered as always accompanying the major term1 and not always accompanying the middle term4#dge cxxxviii4 ,all true ,conditions reside in the same subjects with their major terms2#dgf and1 their subjects being thus common1 the 7erring7 middle term will be equally too general in regard to the ,condition and the major term4#dgg cxxxix4 ,it is in order to prove faulty generality in a middle term that the ,condition has to be employed4 ,the meaning of this is that it is in consequence of the middle term being found too general in regard to the condition1 that we infer that it is too general in regard to the major term2 and hence the use of having a condition at all4 7a47 ,thus1 where the condition invariably accompanies an unlimited#dgh major term1 we infer that the middle term is too general in regard to the major term1 from the very fact that it is too general in regard to the condition2 as1 for example1 in the instance the mountain has smoke because it has fire1 where we infer that the fire is too general in regard to smoke1 since it is too general in regard to wet fuel2 for there is a rule that what is too general for that which invariably accompanies must also be too general for that which is invariably accompanied4 7b47 ,but where we take some fact or mark to determine definitely the major term which the condition is invariably to accompany1--there it is from the middle term's being found too general in regard to the condition in cases possessing this fact1 or mark that we infer that the middle term is equally too general in regard to the major term4 ,thus in the argument1 ,b is dark because he is ,mitr's son1 the middle term the fact of being ,mitr's son is too general in regard to the sdhya1 dark colour1 because it is too general in regard to the updhi1 feeding on vegetables1 as seen in the case of ,mitr's second son ,mitr's parentage being the assumed fact or mark1 and ,mitr herself not having fed on vegetables previous to his birth4 ,but an objector might here interpose1 ,if your definition of a condition be correct1 surely a pretended condition which fulfils your definition can always be found even in the case of a valid middle term4 ,for instance1 in the stock argument 'the mountain must have fire because it has smoke1' we may assume as our pretended condition 'the being always found elsewhere than in the mountain2' since this certainly does not always 'accompany the middle term1' inasmuch as it is not found in the mountain itself where the smoke is acknowledged to be2 and yet it apparently does 'always accompany the major term1' since in every other known case of fire we certainly find it1 and as for the present case you must remember that the presence of fire in this mountain is the very point in dispute4 ,to this we reply ,you never may take such a condition as the being always found elsewhere than in the subject or minor term 7unless this can be proved by some direct sense-evidence which precludes all dispute72 because1 in the first place1 you cannot produce any argument to convince your antagonist that this condition does invariably accompany the major term since he naturally maintains that the present case is exactly one in point against you2 and1 secondly1 because it is self-contradictory as the same nugatory condition may be equally employed to overthrow the contrary argument4 ,but if you can establish it by direct sense-evidence1 then the being always found elsewhere than in the subject becomes a true condition1 and serves to render nugatory the false argument which a disputant tries to establish4 ,thus in the illusory argument the fire must be non-hot because it is artificial1 we can have a valid condition in the being always found elsewhere than in fire1 since we can prove by sense-evidence that fire is hot1#dgi thus the updhi here is a means of overthrowing the false argument4 ,where the fact of its always accompanying the major term1 c41 is disputed1 there we have what is called a disputed condition4#dhj ,but the being found elsewhere than in the subject can never be employed even as a disputed condition1 in accordance with the traditional rules of logical controversy4#dha ,e4 ,b4 ,c4 ,,footnotes3 ,footnote #dfh3 ,the updhi is the condition which must be supplied to restrict a too general middle term4 ,if the middle term1 as thus restricted1 is still found in the minor term1 the argument is valid2 if not1 it fails4 ,thus1 in ,the mountain has smoke because it has fire 7which rests on the false premise that all fire is accompanied by smoke71 we must add wet fuel as the condition of fire2 and if the mountain has wet fuel as well as fire1 of course it will have smoke4 ,similarly1 the alleged argument that ,b is dark because he is ,mitr's son fails1 if we can establish that the dark colour of her former offspring ,a depended not on his being her son1 but on her happening to have fed on vegetables instead of ghee4 ,if we can prove that she still keeps to her old diet1 of course our amended middle term will still prove ,b to be dark1 but not otherwise4 ,footnote #dfi3 ,the ,hindus think that a child's dark colour comes from the mother's living on vegetables1 while its fair colour comes from her living on ghee4 ,footnote #dgj3 ,by ,bhsh-parich4 sl4 #be1 the four elements1 earth1 water1 air1 and fire1 are sparsavat1 but by sl4 #bg of these air is neither pratyaksha nor rpavat4 ,footnote #dga3 ,this condition would imply that we could only argue from this middle term the being produced in cases of positive existence1 not non-existence4 ,footnote #dgb3 ,soul1 of course1 is not external2 but our topic was not soul1 but air4 ,footnote #dgc3 ,as1 e4g41 the mountain and ,mitr's first son in the two false arguments1 ,the mountain has smoke because it has fire 7when the fire-possessing red-hot iron ball has no smoke71 and ,mitr's first son ,a is dark because he is ,mitr's offspring 7when her second son ,b is fair74 ,these two subjects possess the respective sdhyas or major terms smoke and dark colour1 and therefore are respectively the subjects where the conditions wet fuel and the mother's feeding on vegetables are to be respectively applied4 ,footnote #dgd3 ,as1 e4g41 the red-hot ball of iron and ,mitr's second son2 as these1 though possessing the respective middle terms fire and the being ,mitr's offspring do not possess the respective conditions wet fuel or the mother's feeding on vegetables1 nor1 consequently1 the respective major terms 7sdhya7 smoke and dark colour4 ,footnote #dge3 ,this will exclude the objected case of dark jars in 7a71 as it falls under neither of these two alternatives2 for1 though they are the sites of the sdhya dark colour1 they do not admit the condition the feeding on vegetables1 nor the middle term the being ,mitr's son4 ,footnote #dgf3 ,i4e41 wherever there is fire produced by wet fuel there is smoke4 ,the condition and the major term are equipollent in their extension4 ,footnote #dgg3 ,where the hetu is found and not the sdhya 7as in the red-hot ball of iron71 there the updhi also is not applicable4 ,footnote #dgh3 ,i4e41 one which requires no determining fact or mark1 such as the three objected arguments required in #acg4 ,footnote #dgi3 ,the disputant says1 ,fire must be non-hot because it is artificial4 ,well1 you rejoin1 then it must only be an artificiality which is always found elsewhere than in fire1--i4e41 one which will not answer your purpose in trying to prove your point4 ,here the proposed updhi the being always found elsewhere than in fire answers to the definition1 as it does not always accompany the hetu possessing artificiality1 but it does always accompany the sdhya non-hot1 as fire is proved by sense-evidence to be hot4 ,footnote #dhj3 ,as in the argument1 ,the earth1 c41 must have had a maker because they have the nature of effects1 where the ,theist disputes the ,atheistic condition the being produced by one possessing a body4 ,see ,kusumjali1 v4 #b4 ,footnote #dha3 ,in fact1 it would abolish all disputation at the outset1 as each party would produce a condition which from his own point of view would reduce his opponent to silence4 ,in other words1 a true condition must be consistent with either party's opinions4 ,,the ,,end4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,tr,,bner',s ,,oriental ,,series4 ,a knowledge of the commonplace1 at least1 of ,oriental literature1 philosophy1 and religion is as necessary to the general reader of the present day as an acquaintance with the ,latin and ,greek classics was a generation or so ago4 ,immense strides have been made within the present century in these branches of learning2 ,sanskrit has been brought within the range of accurate philology1 and its invaluable ancient literature thoroughly investigated2 the language and sacred books of the ,zoroastrians have been laid bare2 ,egyptian1 ,assyrian1 and other records of the remote past have been deciphered1 and a group of scholars speak of still more recondite ,accadian and ,hittite monuments2 but the results of all the scholarship that has been devoted to these subjects have been almost inaccessible to the public because they were contained for the most part in learned or expensive works1 or scattered throughout the numbers of scientific periodicals4 ,messrs4 ,trbner ,co41 in a spirit of enterprise which does them infinite credit1 have determined to supply the constantly-increasing want1 and to give in a popular1 or1 at least1 a comprehensive form1 all this mass of knowledge to the world4--,times4 99 99 99 99 99 ,second ,edition1 post #hvo1 pp4 xxxii4-#gdh1 with ,map1 cloth1 price #bas4 ,,the ,,indian ,,empire3 ,,its ,,people1 ,,history1 ,,and ,,products4 ,by the ,,hon4 ,,sir ,w4 ,w4 ,,hunter1 ,k4,c4,s4,i41 ,c4,s4,i41 ,c4,i4,e41 ,,ll4,d41 ,member of the ,viceroy's ,legislative ,council1 ,director-,general of ,statistics to the ,government of ,india4 ,being a ,revised ,edition1 brought up to date1 and incorporating the general results of the ,census of #ahha4 ,it forms a volume of more than #gjj pages1 and is a marvellous combination of literary condensation and research4 ,it gives a complete account of the ,indian ,empire1 its history1 peoples1 and products1 and forms the worthy outcome of seventeen years of labour with exceptional opportunities for rendering that labour fruitful4 ,nothing could be more lucid than ,sir ,william ,hunter's expositions of the economic and political condition of ,india at the present time1 or more interesting than his scholarly history of the ,india of the past4--,the ,times4 ,,the ,,following ,,works ,,have ,,already ,,appeared3-- ,third ,edition1 post #hvo1 cloth1 pp4 xvi4-#dbh1 price #afs4 ,,essays ,,on ,,the ,,sacred ,,language1 ,,writings1 ,,and ,,religion ,,of ,,the ,,parsis4 ,,by ,,martin ,,haug1 ,,ph4,d41 ,late of the ,universities of ,tbingen1 ,gttingen1 and ,bonn2 ,superintendent of ,sanskrit ,studies1 and ,professor of ,sanskrit in the ,poona ,college4 ,,edited ,,and ,,enlarged ,,by ,,dr4 ,e4 ,w4 ,,west4 ,to which is added a ,biographical ,memoir of the late ,dr4 ,,haug by ,prof4 ,e4 ,p4 ,,evans4 ,i4 ,history of the ,researches into the ,sacred ,writings and ,religion of the ,parsis1 from the ,earliest ,times down to the ,present4 ,,ii4 ,languages of the ,parsi ,scriptures4 ,,iii4 ,the ,zend-,avesta1 or the ,scripture of the ,parsis4 ,,iv4 ,the ,zoroastrian ,religion1 as to its ,origin and ,development4 ',essays on the ,sacred ,language1 ,writings1 and ,religion of the ,parsis1' by the late ,dr4 ,martin ,haug1 edited by ,dr4 ,e4 ,w4 ,west4 ,the author intended1 on his return from ,india1 to expand the materials contained in this work into a comprehensive account of the ,zoroastrian religion1 but the design was frustrated by his untimely death4 ,we have1 however1 in a concise and readable form1 a history of the researches into the sacred writings and religion of the ,parsis from the earliest times down to the present--a dissertation on the languages of the ,parsi ,scriptures1 a translation of the ,zend-,avesta1 or the ,scripture of the ,parsis1 and a dissertation on the ,zoroastrian religion1 with especial reference to its origin and development4--,times4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 cloth1 pp4 viii4-#agf1 price #gs4 #f;d4 ,,texts ,,from ,,the ,,buddhist ,,canon ,,commonly ,,known ,,as ,,dhammapada4 ,with ,accompanying ,narratives4 ,translated from the ,chinese by ,s4 ,,beal1 ,b4,a41 ,professor of ,chinese1 ,university ,college1 ,london4 ,the ,dhammapada1 as hitherto known by the ,pali ,text ,edition1 as edited by ,fausbll1 by ,max ,mller's ,english1 and ,albrecht ,weber's ,german translations1 consists only of twenty-six chapters or sections1 whilst the ,chinese version1 or rather recension1 as now translated by ,mr4 ,beal1 consists of thirty-nine sections4 ,the students of ,pali who possess ,fausbll's text1 or either of the above-named translations1 will therefore needs want ,mr4 ,beal's ,english rendering of the ,chinese version2 the thirteen above-named additional sections not being accessible to them in any other form2 for1 even if they understand ,chinese1 the ,chinese original would be unobtainable by them4 ,mr4 ,beal's rendering of the ,chinese translation is a most valuable aid to the critical study of the work4 ,it contains authentic texts gathered from ancient canonical books1 and generally connected with some incident in the history of ,buddha4 ,their great interest1 however1 consists in the light which they throw upon everyday life in ,india at the remote period at which they were written1 and upon the method of teaching adopted by the founder of the religion4 ,the method employed was principally parable1 and the simplicity of the tales and the excellence of the morals inculcated1 as well as the strange hold which they have retained upon the minds of millions of people1 make them a very remarkable study4--,times4 ,mr4 ,beal1 by making it accessible in an ,english dress1 has added to the great services he has already rendered to the comparative study of religious history4--,academy4 ,valuable as exhibiting the doctrine of the ,buddhists in its purest1 least adulterated form1 it brings the modern reader face to face with that simple creed and rule of conduct which won its way over the minds of myriads1 and which is now nominally professed by #ade millions1 who have overlaid its austere simplicity with innumerable ceremonies1 forgotten its maxims1 perverted its teaching1 and so inverted its leading principle that a religion whose founder denied a ,god1 now worships that founder as a god himself4--,scotsman4 99 99 99 99 99 ,second ,edition1 post #hvo1 cloth1 pp4 xxiv4-#cfj1 price #ajs4 #f;d4 ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,indian ,,literature4 ,,by ,,albrecht ,,weber4 ,translated from the ,second ,german ,edition by ,,john ,,mann1 ,m4,a41 and ,,th,,odor ,,zachariae1 ,ph4,d41 with the sanction of the ,author4 ,dr4 ,,buhler1 ,inspector of ,schools in ,india1 writes3--,when ,i was ,professor of ,oriental ,languages in ,elphinstone ,college1 ,i frequently felt the want of such a work to which ,i could refer the students4 ,professor ,,cowell1 of ,cambridge1 writes3--,it will be especially useful to the students in our ,indian colleges and universities4 ,i used to long for such a book when ,i was teaching in ,calcutta4 ,hindu students are intensely interested in the history of ,sanskrit literature1 and this volume will supply them with all they want on the subject4 ,professor ,,whitney1 ,yale ,college1 ,new ,haven1 ,conn41 ,u4,s4,a41 writes3--,i was one of the class to whom the work was originally given in the form of academic lectures4 ,at their first appearance they were by far the most learned and able treatment of their subject2 and with their recent additions they still maintain decidedly the same rank4 ,is perhaps the most comprehensive and lucid survey of ,sanskrit literature extant4 ,the essays contained in the volume were originally delivered as academic lectures1 and at the time of their first publication were acknowledged to be by far the most learned and able treatment of the subject4 ,they have now been brought up to date by the addition of all the most important results of recent research4--,times4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 cloth1 pp4 xii4-#aih1 accompanied by ,two ,language ,maps1 price #gs4 #f;d4 ,a ,,sketch ,,of ,,the ,,modern ,,languages ,,of ,,the ,,east ,,indies4 ,,by ,,robert ,n4 ,,cust4 ,the ,author has attempted to fill up a vacuum1 the inconvenience of which pressed itself on his notice4 ,much had been written about the languages of the ,east ,indies1 but the extent of our present knowledge had not even been brought to a focus4 ,it occurred to him that it might be of use to others to publish in an arranged form the notes which he had collected for his own edification4 ,supplies a deficiency which has long been felt4--,times4 ,the book before us is then a valuable contribution to philological science4 ,it passes under review a vast number of languages1 and it gives1 or professes to give1 in every case the sum and substance of the opinions and judgments of the best-informed writers4--,saturday ,review4 99 99 99 99 99 ,second ,corrected ,edition1 post #hvo1 pp4 xii4-#aaf1 cloth1 price #es4 ,,the ,,birth ,,of ,,the ,,war-,,god4 ,a ,poem4 ,,by ,,kalidasa4 ,translated from the ,sanskrit into ,english ,verse by ,,ralph ,t4 ,h4 ,,griffith1 ,m4,a4 ,a very spirited rendering of the ,kumrasambhava1 which was first published twenty-six years ago1 and which we are glad to see made once more accessible4--,times4 ,mr4 ,griffith's very spirited rendering is well known to most who are at all interested in ,indian literature1 or enjoy the tenderness of feeling and rich creative imagination of its author4--,indian ,antiquary4 ,we are very glad to welcome a second edition of ,professor ,griffith's admirable translation4 ,few translations deserve a second edition better4--,athenum4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 #dcb1 cloth1 price #afs4 ,a ,,classical ,,dictionary ,,of ,,hindu ,,mythology ,,and ,,religion1 ,,geography1 ,,history1 ,,and ,,literature4 ,,by ,,john ,,dowson1 ,m4,r4,a4,s41 ,late ,professor of ,hindustani1 ,staff ,college4 ,this not only forms an indispensable book of reference to students of ,indian literature1 but is also of great general interest1 as it gives in a concise and easily accessible form all that need be known about the personages of ,hindu mythology whose names are so familiar1 but of whom so little is known outside the limited circle of savants4--,times4 ,it is no slight gain when such subjects are treated fairly and fully in a moderate space2 and we need only add that the few wants which we may hope to see supplied in new editions detract but little from the general excellence of ,mr4 ,dowson's work4--,saturday ,review4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 with ,view of ,mecca1 pp4 cxii4-#agb1 cloth1 price #is4 ,,selections ,,from ,,the ,,koran4 ,,by ,,edward ,,william ,,lane1 ,translator of ,the ,thousand and ,one ,nights2 c1 c4 ,a ,new ,edition1 ,revised and ,enlarged1 with an ,introduction by ,,stanley ,,lane ,,poole4 444 ,has been long esteemed in this country as the compilation of one of the greatest ,arabic scholars of the time1 the late ,mr4 ,lane1 the well-known translator of the ',arabian ,nights4'444 ,the present editor has enhanced the value of his relative's work by divesting the text of a great deal of extraneous matter introduced by way of comment1 and prefixing an introduction4--,times4 ,mr4 ,poole is both a generous and a learned biographer4444 ,mr4 ,poole tells us the facts 444 so far as it is possible for industry and criticism to ascertain them1 and for literary skill to present them in a condensed and readable form4--,englishman1 ,calcutta4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 vi4-#cfh1 cloth1 price #ads4 ,,modern ,,india ,,and ,,the ,,indians1 ,,being ,a ,,series ,,of ,,impressions1 ,,notes1 ,,and ,,essays4 ,,by ,,monier ,,williams1 ,d4,c4,l41 ,hon4 ,,ll4,d4 of the ,university of ,calcutta1 ,hon4 ,member of the ,bombay ,asiatic ,society1 ,boden ,professor of ,sanskrit in the ,university of ,oxford4 ,third ,edition1 revised and augmented by considerable ,additions1 with ,illustrations and a ,map4 ,in this volume we have the thoughtful impressions of a thoughtful man on some of the most important questions connected with our ,indian ,empire4444 ,an enlightened observant man1 travelling among an enlightened observant people1 ,professor ,monier ,williams has brought before the public in a pleasant form more of the manners and customs of the ,queen's ,indian subjects than we ever remember to have seen in any one work4 ,he not only deserves the thanks of every ,englishman for this able contribution to the study of ,modern ,india--a subject with which we should be specially familiar--but he deserves the thanks of every ,indian1 ,parsee or ,hindu1 ,buddhist and ,moslem1 for his clear exposition of their manners1 their creeds1 and their necessities4--,times4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 xliv4-#cgf1 cloth1 price #ads4 ,,metrical ,,translations ,,from ,,sanskrit ,,writers4 ,with an ,introduction1 many ,prose ,versions1 and ,parallel ,passages from ,classical ,authors4 ,,by ,j4 ,,muir1 ,c4,i4,e41 ,d4,c4,l41 ,,ll4,d41 ,ph4,d4 444 ,an agreeable introduction to ,hindu poetry4--,times4 444 ,a volume which may be taken as a fair illustration alike of the religions and moral sentiments and of the legendary lore of the best ,sanskrit writers4--,edinburgh ,daily ,review4 99 99 99 99 99 ,second ,edition1 post #hvo1 pp4 xxvi4-#bdd1 cloth1 price #ajs4 #f;d4 ,,the ,,gulistan2 ,,or1 ,,rose ,,garden ,,of ,,shekh ,,mushliu',d-,,din ,,sadi ,,of ,,shiraz4 ,translated for the ,first ,time into ,prose and ,verse1 with an ,introductory ,preface1 and a ,life of the ,author1 from the ,atish ,kadah1 ,,by ,,edward ,b4 ,,eastwick1 ,c4,b41 ,m4,a41 ,f4,r4,s41 ,m4,r4,a4,s4 ,it is a very fair rendering of the original4--,times4 ,the new edition has long been desired1 and will be welcomed by all who take any interest in ,oriental poetry4 ,the ,gulistan is a typical ,persian verse-book of the highest order4 ,mr4 ,eastwick's rhymed translation 444 has long established itself in a secure position as the best version of ,sadi's finest work4--,academy4 ,it is both faithfully and gracefully executed4--,tablet4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in ,two ,volumes1 post #hvo1 pp4 viii4-#djh and viii4-#cdh1 cloth1 price #bhs4 ,,miscellaneous ,,essays ,,relating ,,to ,,indian ,,subjects4 ,,by ,,brian ,,houghton ,,hodgson1 ,,esq41 ,f4,r4,s41 ,late of the ,bengal ,civil ,service2 ,corresponding ,member of the ,institute2 ,chevalier of the ,legion of ,honour2 late ,british ,minister at the ,court of ,nepal1 c1 c4 ,,contents ,,of ,,vol4 ,i4 ,,section ,i4--,on the ,kocch1 ,bd1 and ,dhiml ,tribes4--,part ,i4 ,vocabulary4--,part ,,ii4 ,grammar4--,part ,,iii4 ,their ,origin1 ,location1 ,numbers1 ,creed1 ,customs1 ,character1 and ,condition1 with a ,general ,description of the ,climate they dwell in--,appendix4 ,,section ,,ii4--,on ,himalayan ,ethnology4--,i4 ,comparative ,vocabulary of the ,languages of the ,broken ,tribes of ,npl4--,,ii4 ,vocabulary of the ,dialects of the ,kiranti ,language4--,,iii4 ,grammatical ,analysis of the ,vyu ,language4 ,the ,vyu ,grammar4--,,iv4 ,analysis of the ,bhing ,dialect of the ,kiranti language4 ,the ,bhing ,grammar4--,v4 ,on the ,vyu or ,hyu ,tribe of the ,central ,himalya4--,,vi4 ,on the ,kiranti ,tribe of the ,central ,himalya4 ,,contents ,,of ,,vol4 ,,ii4 ,,section ,,iii4--,on the ,aborigines of ,north-,eastern ,india4 ,comparative ,vocabulary of the ,tibetan1 ,bd1 and ,gr ,tongues4 ,,section ,,iv4--,aborigines of the ,north-,eastern ,frontier4 ,,section ,v4--,aborigines of the ,eastern ,frontier4 ,,section ,,vi4--,the ,indo-,chinese ,borderers1 and their connection with the ,himalayans and ,tibetans4 ,comparative ,vocabulary of ,indo-,chinese ,borderers in ,arakan4 ,comparative ,vocabulary of ,indo-,chinese ,borderers in ,tenasserim4 ,,section ,,vii4--,the ,mongolian ,affinities of the ,caucasians4--,comparison and ,analysis of ,caucasian and ,mongolian ,words4 ,,section ,,viii4--,physical ,type of ,tibetans4 ,,section ,,ix4--,the ,aborigines of ,central ,india4--,comparative ,vocabulary of the ,aboriginal ,languages of ,central ,india4--,aborigines of the ,eastern ,ghats4--,vocabulary of some of the ,dialects of the ,hill and ,wandering ,tribes in the ,northern ,sircars4--,aborigines of the ,nilgiris1 with ,remarks on their ,affinities4--,supplement to the ,nilgirian ,vocabularies4--,the ,aborigines of ,southern ,india and ,ceylon4 ,,section ,x4--,route of ,nepalese ,mission to ,pekin1 with ,remarks on the ,water-,shed and ,plateau of ,tibet4 ,,section ,,xi4--,route from ,kthmnd1 the ,capital of ,nepl1 to ,darjeeling in ,sikim4--,memorandum relative to the ,seven ,cosis of ,nepl4 ,,section ,,xii4--,some ,accounts of the ,systems of ,law and ,police as recognised in the ,state of ,nepl4 ,,section ,,xiii4--,the ,native ,method of making the ,paper denominated ,hindustan1 ,nplese4 ,,section ,,xiv4--,pre-eminence of the ,vernaculars2 or1 the ,anglicists ,answered2 ,being ,letters on the ,education of the ,people of ,india4 ,for the study of the less-known races of ,india ,mr4 ,brian ,hodgson's ',miscellaneous ,essays' will be found very valuable both to the philologist and the ethnologist4 99 99 99 99 99 ,third ,edition1 ,two ,vols41 post #hvo1 pp4 viii4-#bfh and viii4-#cbf1 cloth1 price #bas4 ,,the ,,life ,,or ,,legend ,,of ,,gaudama1 ,,the ,,buddha ,,of ,,the ,,burmese4 ,with ,annotations4 ,the ,ways to ,neibban1 and ,notice on the ,phongyies or ,burmese ,monks4 ,,by ,,the ,,right ,,rev4 ,p4 ,,bigandet1 ,bishop of ,ramatha1 ,vicar-,apostolic of ,ava and ,pegu4 ,the work is furnished with copious notes1 which not only illustrate the subject-matter1 but form a perfect encyclopdia of ,buddhist lore4--,times4 ,a work which will furnish ,european students of ,buddhism with a most valuable help in the prosecution of their investigations4--,edinburgh ,daily ,review4 ,bishop ,bigandet's invaluable work4--,indian ,antiquary4 ,viewed in this light1 its importance is sufficient to place students of the subject under a deep obligation to its author4--,calcutta ,review4 ,this work is one of the greatest authorities upon ,buddhism4--,dublin ,review4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 xxiv4-#dbj1 cloth1 price #ahs4 ,,chinese ,,buddhism4 ,a ,,volume ,,of ,,sketches1 ,,historical ,,and ,,critical4 ,,by ,j4 ,,edkins1 ,d4,d4 ,author of ,china's ,place in ,philology1 ,religion in ,china1 c41 c4 ,it contains a vast deal of important information on the subject1 such as is only to be gained by long-continued study on the spot4--,athenum4 ,upon the whole1 we know of no work comparable to it for the extent of its original research1 and the simplicity with which this complicated system of philosophy1 religion1 literature1 and ritual is set forth4--,british ,quarterly ,review4 ,the whole volume is replete with learning4444 ,it deserves most careful study from all interested in the history of the religions of the world1 and expressly of those who are concerned in the propagation of ,christianity4 ,dr4 ,edkins notices in terms of just condemnation the exaggerated praise bestowed upon ,buddhism by recent ,english writers4--,record4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 #dif1 cloth1 price #ajs4 #f;d4 ,,linguistic ,,and ,,oriental ,,essays4 ,,written ,,from ,,the ,,year #ahdf ,,to #ahgh4 ,,by ,,robert ,,needham ,,cust1 ,late ,member of ,her ,majesty's ,indian ,civil ,service2 ,hon4 ,secretary to the ,royal ,asiatic ,society2 and ,author of ,the ,modern ,languages of the ,east ,indies4 ,we know none who has described ,indian life1 especially the life of the natives1 with so much learning1 sympathy1 and literary talent4--,academy4 ,they seem to us to be full of suggestive and original remarks4--,st4 ,james's ,gazette4 ,his book contains a vast amount of information4 ,the result of thirty-five years of inquiry1 reflection1 and speculation1 and that on subjects as full of fascination as of food for thought4--,tablet4 ,exhibit such a thorough acquaintance with the history and antiquities of ,india as to entitle him to speak as one having authority4--,edinburgh ,daily ,review4 ,the author speaks with the authority of personal experience4444 ,it is this constant association with the country and the people which gives such a vividness to many of the pages4--,athenum4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 civ4-#cdh1 cloth1 price #ahs4 ,,buddhist ,,birth ,,stories2 or1 ,jataka ,tales4 ,the ,oldest ,collection of ,folk-lore ,extant3 ,,being ,,the ,,jatakatthavannana1 ,for the first time ,edited in the original ,pali4 ,,by ,v4 ,,fausboll2 ,and ,translated by ,t4 ,w4 ,,rhys ,,davids4 ,translation4 ,volume ,i4 ,these are tales supposed to have been told by the ,buddha of what he had seen and heard in his previous births4 ,they are probably the nearest representatives of the original ,aryan stories from which sprang the folk-lore of ,europe as well as ,india4 ,the introduction contains a most interesting disquisition on the migrations of these fables1 tracing their reappearance in the various groups of folk-lore legends4 ,among other old friends1 we meet with a version of the ,judgment of ,solomon4--,times4 ,it is now some years since ,mr4 ,rhys ,davids asserted his right to be heard on this subject by his able article on ,buddhism in the new edition of the ',encyclopdia ,britannica4'--,leeds ,mercury4 ,all who are interested in ,buddhist literature ought to feel deeply indebted to ,mr4 ,rhys ,davids4 ,his well-established reputation as a ,pali scholar is a sufficient guarantee for the fidelity of his version1 and the style of his translations is deserving of high praise4--,academy4 ,no more competent expositor of ,buddhism could be found than ,mr4 ,rhys ,davids4 ,in the ,jataka book we have1 then1 a priceless record of the earliest imaginative literature of our race2 and 444 it presents to us a nearly complete picture of the social life and customs and popular beliefs of the common people of ,aryan tribes1 closely related to ourselves1 just as they were passing through the first stages of civilisation4--,st4 ,james's ,gazette4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 xxviii4-#cfb1 cloth1 price #ads4 ,a ,,talmudic ,,miscellany2 ,,or1 ,a ,,thousand ,,and ,,one ,,extracts ,,from ,,the ,,talmud1 ,,the ,,midrashim1 ,,and ,,the ,,kabbalah4 ,compiled and ,translated by ,,paul ,,isaac ,,hershon1 ,author of ,genesis ,according to the ,talmud1 c4 ,with ,notes and ,copious ,indexes4 ,to obtain in so concise and handy a form as this volume a general idea of the ,talmud is a boon to ,christians at least4--,times4 ,its peculiar and popular character will make it attractive to general readers4 ,mr4 ,hershon is a very competent scholar4444 ,contains samples of the good1 bad1 and indifferent1 and especially extracts that throw light upon the ,scriptures4--,british ,quarterly ,review4 ,will convey to ,english readers a more complete and truthful notion of the ,talmud than any other work that has yet appeared4--,daily ,news4 ,without overlooking in the slightest the several attractions of the previous volumes of the ',oriental ,series4' we have no hesitation in saying that this surpasses them all in interest4--,edinburgh ,daily ,review4 ,mr4 ,hershon has 444 thus given ,english readers what is1 we believe1 a fair set of specimens which they can test for themselves4--,the ,record4 ,this book is by far the best fitted in the present state of knowledge to enable the general reader to gain a fair and unbiased conception of the multifarious contents of the wonderful miscellany which can only be truly understood--so ,jewish pride asserts--by the life-long devotion of scholars of the ,chosen ,people4--,inquirer4 ,the value and importance of this volume consist in the fact that scarcely a single extract is given in its pages but throws some light1 direct or refracted1 upon those ,scriptures which are the common heritage of ,jew and ,christian alike4--,john ,bull4 ,it is a capital specimen of ,hebrew scholarship2 a monument of learned1 loving1 light-giving labour4--,jewish ,herald4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 xii4-#bbh1 cloth1 price #gs4 #f;d4 ,,the ,,classical ,,poetry ,,of ,,the ,,japanese4 ,,by ,,basil ,,hall ,,chamberlain1 ,author of ,yeigo ,hekaku ,shira4 ,a very curious volume4 ,the author has manifestly devoted much labour to the task of studying the poetical literature of the ,japanese1 and rendering characteristic specimens into ,english verse4--,daily ,news4 ,mr4 ,chamberlain's volume is1 so far as we are aware1 the first attempt which has been made to interpret the literature of the ,japanese to the ,western world4 ,it is to the classical poetry of ,old ,japan that we must turn for indigenous ,japanese thought1 and in the volume before us we have a selection from that poetry rendered into graceful ,english verse4--,tablet4 ,it is undoubtedly one of the best translations of lyric literature which has appeared during the close of the last year4--,celestial ,empire4 ,mr4 ,chamberlain set himself a difficult task when he undertook to reproduce ,japanese poetry in an ,english form4 ,but he has evidently laboured con amore1 and his efforts are successful to a degree4--,london and ,china ,express4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 xii4-#afd1 cloth1 price #ajs4 #f;d4 ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,esarhaddon 7,son of ,sennacherib71 ,,king ,,of ,,assyria1 ,b4,c4 #fha-ffh4 ,translated from the ,cuneiform ,inscriptions upon ,cylinders and ,tablets in the ,british ,museum ,collection2 together with a ,grammatical ,analysis of each ,word1 ,explanations of the ,ideographs by ,extracts from the ,bi-,lingual ,syllabaries1 and ,list of ,eponyms1 c4 ,,by ,,ernest ,a4 ,,budge1 ,b4,a41 ,m4,r4,a4,s41 ,assyrian ,exhibitioner1 ,christ's ,college1 ,cambridge4 ,students of scriptural archology will also appreciate the ',history of ,esarhaddon4'--,times4 ,there is much to attract the scholar in this volume4 ,it does not pretend to popularise studies which are yet in their infancy4 ,its primary object is to translate1 but it does not assume to be more than tentative1 and it offers both to the professed ,assyriologist and to the ordinary non-,assyriological ,semitic scholar the means of controlling its results4--,academy4 ,mr4 ,budge's book is1 of course1 mainly addressed to ,assyrian scholars and students4 ,they are not1 it is to be feared1 a very numerous class4 ,but the more thanks are due to him on that account for the way in which he has acquitted himself in his laborious task4--,tablet4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 #ddh1 cloth1 price #bas4 ,,the ,,mesnevi 7,usually known as ,,the ,,mesneviyi ,,sherif1 or ,,holy ,,mesnevi7 ,,of ,,mevlana 7,,our ,,lord7 ,,jelalu ',d-,,din ,,muhammed ,,er-,,rumi4 ,book the ,first4 ,together with some ,account of the ,life and ,acts of the ,author1 of his ,ancestors1 and of his ,descendants4 ,illustrated by a ,selection of ,characteristic ,anecdotes1 as ,collected by their ,historian1 ,,mevlana ,,shemsu-',d-,,din ,,ahmed1 ,,el ,,eflaki1 ,,el ',,arifi4 ,translated1 and the ,poetry ,versified1 in ,english1 ,,by ,,james ,w4 ,,redhouse1 ,m4,r4,a4,s41 c4 ,a complete treasury of occult ,oriental lore4--,saturday ,review4 ,this book will be a very valuable help to the reader ignorant of ,persia1 who is desirous of obtaining an insight into a very important department of the literature extant in that language4--,tablet4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 xvi4-#bhj1 cloth1 price #fs4 ,,eastern ,,proverbs ,,and ,,emblems ,,illustrating ,,old ,,truths4 ,,by ,,rev4 ,j4 ,,long1 ,member of the ,bengal ,asiatic ,society1 ,f4,r4,g4,s4 ,we regard the book as valuable1 and wish for it a wide circulation and attentive reading4--,record4 ,altogether1 it is quite a feast of good things4--,globe4 ,it is full of interesting matter4--,antiquary4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 viii4-#bgj1 cloth1 price #gs4 #f;d4 ,,indian ,,poetry2 ,containing a ,new ,edition of the ,indian ,song of ,songs1 from the ,sanscrit of the ,gita ,govinda of ,jayadeva2 ,two ,books from ,the ,iliad of ,india 7,mahabharata71 ,proverbial ,wisdom from the ,shlokas of the ,hitopadesa1 and other ,oriental ,poems4 ,,by ,,edwin ,,arnold1 ,c4,s4,i41 ,author of ,the ,light of ,asia4 ,in this new volume of ,messrs4 ,trbner's ,oriental ,series1 ,mr4 ,edwin ,arnold does good service by illustrating1 through the medium of his musical ,english melodies1 the power of ,indian poetry to stir ,european emotions4 ,the ',indian ,song of ,songs' is not unknown to scholars4 ,mr4 ,arnold will have introduced it among popular ,english poems4 ,nothing could be more graceful and delicate than the shades by which ,krishna is portrayed in the gradual process of being weaned by the love of ',beautiful ,radha1 jasmine-bosomed ,radha1' from the allurements of the forest nymphs1 in whom the five senses are typified4--,times4 ,no other ,english poet has ever thrown his genius and his art so thoroughly into the work of translating ,eastern ideas as ,mr4 ,arnold has done in his splendid paraphrases of language contained in these mighty epics4--,daily ,telegraph4 ,the poem abounds with imagery of ,eastern luxuriousness and sensuousness2 the air seems laden with the spicy odours of the tropics1 and the verse has a richness and a melody sufficient to captivate the senses of the dullest4--,standard4 ,the translator1 while producing a very enjoyable poem1 has adhered with tolerable fidelity to the original text4--,overland ,mail4 ,we certainly wish ,mr4 ,arnold success in his attempt 'to popularise ,indian classics1' that being1 as his preface tells us1 the goal towards which he bends his efforts4--,allen's ,indian ,mail4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 xvi4-#bif1 cloth1 price #ajs4 #f;d4 ,,the ,,mind ,,of ,,mencius2 ,,or1 ,,political ,,economy ,,founded ,,upon ,,moral ,,philosophy4 ,a ,,systematic ,,digest ,,of ,,the ,,doctrines ,,of ,,the ,,chinese ,,philosopher ,,mencius4 ,translated from the ,original ,text and ,classified1 with ,comments and ,explanations1 ,by the ,,rev4 ,,ernst ,,faber1 ,rhenish ,mission ,society4 ,translated from the ,german1 with ,additional ,notes1 ,by the ,,rev4 ,a4 ,b4 ,,hutchinson1 ,c4,m4,s41 ,church ,mission1 ,hong ,kong4 ,mr4 ,faber is already well known in the field of ,chinese studies by his digest of the doctrines of ,confucius4 ,the value of this work will be perceived when it is remembered that at no time since relations commenced between ,china and the ,west has the former been so powerful--we had almost said aggressive--as now4 ,for those who will give it careful study1 ,mr4 ,faber's work is one of the most valuable of the excellent series to which it belongs4--,nature4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 #ccf1 cloth1 price #afs4 ,,the ,,religions ,,of ,,india4 ,,by ,a4 ,,barth4 ,translated from the ,french with the authority and assistance of the ,author4 ,the author has1 at the request of the publishers1 considerably enlarged the work for the translator1 and has added the literature of the subject to date2 the translation may1 therefore1 be looked upon as an equivalent of a new and improved edition of the original4 ,is not only a valuable manual of the religions of ,india1 which marks a distinct step in the treatment of the subject1 but also a useful work of reference4--,academy4 ,this volume is a reproduction1 with corrections and additions1 of an article contributed by the learned author two years ago to the ',encyclopdie des ,sciences ,religieuses4' ,it attracted much notice when it first appeared1 and is generally admitted to present the best summary extant of the vast subject with which it deals4--,tablet4 ,this is not only on the whole the best but the only manual of the religions of ,india1 apart from ,buddhism1 which we have in ,english4 ,the present work 444 shows not only great knowledge of the facts and power of clear exposition1 but also great insight into the inner history and the deeper meaning of the great religion1 for it is in reality only one1 which it proposes to describe4--,modern ,review4 ,the merit of the work has been emphatically recognised by the most authoritative ,orientalists1 both in this country and on the continent of ,europe4 ,but probably there are few ,indianists 7if we may use the word7 who would not derive a good deal of information from it1 and especially from the extensive bibliography provided in the notes4--,dublin ,review4 ,such a sketch ,m4 ,barth has drawn with a master-hand4--,critic 7,new ,york74 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 viii4-#aeb1 cloth1 price #fs4 ,,hindu ,,philosophy4 ,,the ,,sankhya ,,karika ,,of ,,is',,wara ,,krishna4 ,an ,exposition of the ,system of ,kapila1 with an ,appendix on the ,nyaya and ,vais'eshika ,systems4 ,,by ,,john ,,davies1 ,m4,a4 7,cantab471 ,m4,r4,a4,s4 ,the system of ,kapila contains nearly all that ,india has produced in the department of pure philosophy4 ,the non-,orientalist 444 finds in ,mr4 ,davies a patient and learned guide who leads him into the intricacies of the philosophy of ,india1 and supplies him with a clue1 that he may not be lost in them4 ,in the preface he states that the system of ,kapila is the 'earliest attempt on record to give an answer1 from reason alone1 to the mysterious questions which arise in every thoughtful mind about the origin of the world1 the nature and relations of man and his future destiny1' and in his learned and able notes he exhibits 'the connection of the ,sankhya system with the philosophy of ,spinoza1' and 'the connection of the system of ,kapila with that of ,schopenhauer and ,von ,hartmann4'--,foreign ,church ,chronicle4 ,mr4 ,davies's volume on ,hindu ,philosophy is an undoubted gain to all students of the development of thought4 ,the system of ,kapila1 which is here given in a translation from the ,sankhya ,karika1 is the only contribution of ,india to pure philosophy4444 ,presents many points of deep interest to the student of comparative philosophy1 and without ,mr4 ,davies's lucid interpretation it would be difficult to appreciate these points in any adequate manner4--,saturday ,review4 ,we welcome ,mr4 ,davies's book as a valuable addition to our philosophical library4--,notes and ,queries4 99 99 99 99 99 ,second ,edition4 ,post #hvo1 pp4 x4-#acj1 cloth1 price #fs4 ,a ,,manual ,,of ,,hindu ,,pantheism4 ,,ved,,ntas,,ra4 ,translated1 with copious ,annotations1 ,,by ,,major ,g4 ,a4 ,,jacob1 ,bombay ,staff ,corps2 ,inspector of ,army ,schools4 ,the design of this little work is to provide for missionaries1 and for others who1 like them1 have little leisure for original research1 an accurate summary of the doctrines of the ,vednta4 ,the modest title of ,major ,jacob's work conveys but an inadequate idea of the vast amount of research embodied in his notes to the text of the ,vedantasara4 ,so copious1 indeed1 are these1 and so much collateral matter do they bring to bear on the subject1 that the diligent student will rise from their perusal with a fairly adequate view of ,hind philosophy generally4 ,his work 444 is one of the best of its kind that we have seen4--,calcutta ,review4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 xii4-#aed1 cloth1 price #gs4 #f;d4 ,,tsuni--,,goam3 ,,the ,,supreme ,,being ,,of ,,the ,,khoi-,,khoi4 ,,by ,,theophilus ,,hahn1 ,ph4,d41 ,custodian of the ,grey ,collection1 ,cape ,town2 ,corresponding ,member of the ,geogr4 ,society1 ,dresden2 ,corresponding ,member of the ,anthropological ,society1 ,vienna1 c41 c4 ,the first instalment of ,dr4 ,hahn's labours will be of interest1 not at the ,cape only1 but in every ,university of ,europe4 ,it is1 in fact1 a most valuable contribution to the comparative study of religion and mythology4 ,accounts of their religion and mythology were scattered about in various books2 these have been carefully collected by ,dr4 ,hahn and printed in his second chapter1 enriched and improved by what he has been able to collect himself4--,prof4 ,max ,mller in the ,nineteenth ,century4 ,it is full of good things4--,st4 ,james's ,gazette4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in ,four ,volumes4 ,post #hvo1 ,vol4 ,i41 pp4 xii4-#cib1 cloth1 price #abs4 #f;d41 ,vol4 ,,ii41 pp4 vi4-#djh1 cloth1 price #abs4 #f;d41 ,vol4 ,,iii41 pp4 viii4-#dad1 cloth1 price #abs4 #f;d41 ,vol4 ,,iv41 pp4 viii4-#cdj1 cloth1 price #ajs4 #f;d4 ,a ,,comprehensive ,,commentary ,,to ,,the ,,quran4 ,,to ,,which ,,is ,,prefixed ,,sale',s ,,preliminary ,,discourse1 ,,with ,,additional ,,notes ,,and ,,emendations4 ,together with a ,complete ,index to the ,text1 ,preliminary ,discourse1 and ,notes4 ,by ,rev4 ,e4 ,m4 ,,wherry1 ,m4,a41 ,lodiana4 ,as ,mr4 ,wherry's book is intended for missionaries in ,india1 it is no doubt well that they should be prepared to meet1 if they can1 the ordinary arguments and interpretations1 and for this purpose ,mr4 ,wherry's additions will prove useful4--,saturday ,review4 99 99 99 99 99 ,second ,edition4 ,post #hvo1 pp4 vi4-#bjh1 cloth1 price #hs4 #f;d4 ,,the ,,bhagavad-,g,t4 ,translated1 with ,introduction and ,notes4 ,,by ,,john ,,davies1 ,m4,a4 7,cantab47 ,let us add that his translation of the ,bhagavad ,gt is1 as we judge1 the best that has as yet appeared in ,english1 and that his ,philological ,notes are of quite peculiar value4--,dublin ,review4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 #if1 cloth1 price #es4 ,,the ,,quatrains ,,of ,,omar ,,khayyam4 ,translated by ,e4 ,h4 ,,whinfield1 ,m4,a41 ,barrister-at-,law1 late ,h4,m4 ,bengal ,civil ,service4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 xxxii4-#ccf1 cloth1 price #ajs4 #f;d4 ,,the ,,quatrains ,,of ,,omar ,,khayyam4 ,the ,persian ,text1 with an ,english ,verse ,translation4 ,by ,e4 ,h4 ,,whinfield1 late of the ,bengal ,civil ,service4 ,mr4 ,whinfield has executed a difficult task with considerable success1 and his version contains much that will be new to those who only know ,mr4 ,fitzgerald's delightful selection4--,academy4 ,the most prominent features in the ,quatrains are their profound agnosticism1 combined with a fatalism based more on philosophic than religious grounds1 their ,epicureanism and the spirit of universal tolerance and charity which animates them4--,calcutta ,review4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 xxiv4-#bfh1 cloth1 price #is4 ,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,the ,,upanishads ,,and ,,ancient ,,indian ,,metaphysics4 ,as exhibited in a series of ,articles contributed to the ,calcutta ,review4 ,by ,,archibald ,,edward ,,gough1 ,m4,a41 ,lincoln ,college1 ,oxford2 ,principal of the ,calcutta ,madrasa4 ,for practical purposes this is perhaps the most important of the works that have thus far appeared in ',trbner's ,oriental ,series4'444 ,we cannot doubt that for all who may take it up the work must be one of profound interest4--,saturday ,review4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in ,two ,volumes4 ,vol4 ,i41 post #hvo1 pp4 xxiv4-#bcj1 cloth1 price #gs4 #f;d4 ,a ,,comparative ,,history ,,of ,,the ,,egyptian ,,and ,,mesopotamian ,,religions4 ,by ,,dr4 ,c4 ,p4 ,,tiele4 ,vol4 ,i4--,,history ,,of ,,the ,,egyptian ,,religion4 ,translated from the ,dutch with the ,assistance of the ,author4 ,by ,,james ,,ballingal4 ,it places in the hands of the ,english readers a history of ,egyptian ,religion which is very complete1 which is based on the best materials1 and which has been illustrated by the latest results of research4 ,in this volume there is a great deal of information1 as well as independent investigation1 for the trustworthiness of which ,dr4 ,tiele's name is in itself a guarantee2 and the description of the successive religions under the ,old ,kingdom1 the ,middle ,kingdom1 and the ,new ,kingdom1 is given in a manner which is scholarly and minute4--,scotsman4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 xii4-#cjb1 cloth1 price #hs4 #f;d4 ,,yusuf ,,and ,,zulaikha4 ,a ,,poem ,,by ,,jami4 ,translated from the ,persian into ,english ,verse4 ,,by ,,ralph ,t4 ,h4 ,,griffith4 ,mr4 ,griffith1 who has done already good service as translator into verse from the ,sanskrit1 has done further good work in this translation from the ,persian1 and he has evidently shown not a little skill in his rendering the quaint and very oriental style of his author into our more prosaic1 less figurative1 language4444 ,the work1 besides its intrinsic merits1 is of importance as being one of the most popular and famous poems of ,persia1 and that which is read in all the independent native schools of ,india where ,persian is taught4--,scotsman4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 viii4-#bff1 cloth1 price #is4 ,,linguistic ,,essays4 ,,by ,,carl ,,abel4 ,an entirely novel method of dealing with philosophical questions and impart a real human interest to the otherwise dry technicalities of the science4--,standard4 ,dr4 ,abel is an opponent from whom it is pleasant to differ1 for he writes with enthusiasm and temper1 and his mastery over the ,english language fits him to be a champion of unpopular doctrines4--,athenum4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 ix4-#bha1 cloth1 price #ajs4 #f;d4 ,,the ,,sarva-,,darsana-,,samgraha2 ,,or1 ,,review ,,of ,,the ,,different ,,systems ,,of ,,hindu ,,philosophy4 ,,by ,,madhava ,,acharya4 ,translated by ,e4 ,b4 ,,cowell1 ,m4 ,a41 ,professor of ,sanskrit in the ,university of ,cambridge1 and ,a4 ,e4 ,,gough1 ,m4,a41 ,professor of ,philosophy in the ,presidency ,college1 ,calcutta4 ,this work is an interesting specimen of ,hindu critical ability4 ,the author successively passes in review the sixteen philosophical systems current in the fourteenth century in the ,south of ,india2 and he gives what appears to him to be their most important tenets4 ,the translation is trustworthy throughout4 ,a protracted sojourn in ,india1 where there is a living tradition1 has familiarised the translators with ,indian thought4--,athenum4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 lxv4-#cfh1 cloth1 price #ads4 ,,tibetan ,,tales ,,derived ,,from ,,indian ,,sources4 ,translated from the ,tibetan of the ,,kah-,,gyur4 ,,by ,f4 ,,anton ,,von ,,schiefner4 ,done into ,english from the ,german1 with an ,introduction1 ,,by ,w4 ,r4 ,s4 ,,ralston1 ,m4,a4 ,mr4 ,ralston1 whose name is so familiar to all lovers of ,russian folk-lore1 has supplied some interesting ,western analogies and parallels1 drawn1 for the most part1 from ,slavonic sources1 to the ,eastern folk-tales1 culled from the ,kahgyur1 one of the divisions of the ,tibetan sacred books4--,academy4 ,the translation 444 could scarcely have fallen into better hands4 ,an ,introduction 444 gives the leading facts in the lives of those scholars who have given their attention to gaining a knowledge of the ,tibetan literature and language4--,calcutta ,review4 ,ought to interest all who care for the ,east1 for amusing stories1 or for comparative folk-lore4--,pall ,mall ,gazette4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 xvi4-#bbd1 cloth1 price #is4 ,,ud,,navarga4 ,a ,,collection ,,of ,,verses ,,from ,,the ,,buddhist ,,canon4 ,compiled by ,,dharmatr,,ta4 ,,being ,,the ,,northern ,,buddhist ,,version ,,of ,,dhammapada4 ,translated from the ,tibetan of ,bkah-hgyur1 with ,notes1 and ,extracts from the ,commentary of ,pradjnavarman1 ,,by ,w4 ,,woodville ,,rockhill4 ,mr4 ,rockhill's present work is the first from which assistance will be gained for a more accurate understanding of the ,pali text2 it is1 in fact1 as yet the only term of comparison available to us4 ,the ',udanavarga1' the ,thibetan version1 was originally discovered by the late ,m4 ,schiefner1 who published the ,tibetan text1 and had intended adding a translation1 an intention frustrated by his death1 but which has been carried out by ,mr4 ,rockhill4444 ,mr4 ,rockhill may be congratulated for having well accomplished a difficult task4--,saturday ,review4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in ,two ,volumes1 post #hvo1 pp4 xxiv4-#eff1 cloth1 accompanied by a ,language ,map1 price #ahs4 ,a ,,sketch ,,of ,,the ,,modern ,,languages ,,of ,,africa4 ,,by ,,robert ,,needham ,,cust1 ,barrister-at-,law1 and late of ,her ,majesty's ,indian ,civil ,service4 ,any one at all interested in ,african languages cannot do better than get ,mr4 ,cust's book4 ,it is encyclopdic in its scope1 and the reader gets a start clear away in any particular language1 and is left free to add to the initial sum of knowledge there collected4--,natal ,mercury4 ,mr4 ,cust has contrived to produce a work of value to linguistic students4--,nature4 99 99 99 99 99 ,third ,edition4 ,post #hvo1 pp4 xv4-#bej1 cloth1 price #gs4 #f;d4 ,,outlines ,,of ,,the ,,history ,,of ,,religion ,,to ,,the ,,spread ,,of ,,the ,,universal ,,religions4 ,,by ,c4 ,p4 ,,tiele1 ,doctor of ,theology1 ,professor of the ,history of ,religions in the ,university of ,leyden4 ,translated from the ,dutch by ,j4 ,,estlin ,,carpenter1 ,m4,a4 ,few books of its size contain the result of so much wide thinking1 able and laborious study1 or enable the reader to gain a better bird's-eye view of the latest results of investigations into the religious history of nations4 ,as ,professor ,tiele modestly says1 ',in this little book are outlines--pencil sketches1 ,i might say--nothing more4' ,but there are some men whose sketches from a thumb-nail are of far more worth than an enormous canvas covered with the crude painting of others1 and it is easy to see that these pages1 full of information1 these sentences1 cut and perhaps also dry1 short and clear1 condense the fruits of long and thorough research4--,scotsman4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 xii4-#cab1 with ,maps and ,plan1 cloth1 price #ads4 ,a ,,history ,,of ,,burma4 ,including ,burma ,proper1 ,pegu1 ,taungu1 ,tenasserim1 and ,arakan4 ,from the ,earliest ,time to the ,end of the ,first ,war with ,british ,india4 ,,by ,,lieut4-,,gen4 ,,sir ,,arthur ,p4 ,,phayre1 ,g4,c4,m4,g41 ,k4,c4,s4,i41 and ,c4,b41 ,membre ,correspondant de la ,socit ,acadmique ,indo-,chinoise de ,france4 ,sir ,arthur ,phayre's contribution to ,trbner's ,oriental ,series supplies a recognised want1 and its appearance has been looked forward to for many years4444 ,general ,phayre deserves great credit for the patience and industry which has resulted in this ,history of ,burma4--,saturday ,review4 99 99 99 99 99 ,third ,edition4 ,post #hvo1 pp4 #bgf1 cloth1 price #gs4 #f;d4 ,,religion ,,in ,,china4 ,by ,,joseph ,,edkins1 ,d4,d41 ,,peking4 ,containing a ,brief ,account of the ,three ,religions of the ,chinese1 with ,observations on the ,prospects of ,christian ,conversion amongst that ,people4 ,dr4 ,edkins has been most careful in noting the varied and often complex phases of opinion1 so as to give an account of considerable value of the subject4--,scotsman4 ,as a missionary1 it has been part of ,dr4 ,edkins' duty to study the existing religions in ,china1 and his long residence in the country has enabled him to acquire an intimate knowledge of them as they at present exist4--,saturday ,review4 ,dr4 ,edkins' valuable work1 of which this is a second and revised edition1 has1 from the time that it was published1 been the standard authority upon the subject of which it treats4--,nonconformist4 ,dr4 ,edkins 444 may now be fairly regarded as among the first authorities on ,chinese religion and language4--,british ,quarterly ,review4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 x4-#bgd1 cloth1 price #is4 ,,the ,,life ,,of ,,the ,,buddha ,,and ,,the ,,early ,,history ,,of ,,his ,,order4 ,derived from ,tibetan ,works in the ,bkah-hgyur and ,bstan-hgyur4 ,followed by notices on the ,early ,history of ,tibet and ,khoten4 ,translated by ,w4 ,w4 ,,rockhill1 ,second ,secretary ,u4,s4 ,legation in ,china4 ,the volume bears testimony to the diligence and fulness with which the author has consulted and tested the ancient documents bearing upon his remarkable subject4--,times4 ,will be appreciated by those who devote themselves to those ,buddhist studies which have of late years taken in these ,western regions so remarkable a development4 ,its matter possesses a special interest as being derived from ancient ,tibetan works1 some portions of which1 here analysed and translated1 have not yet attracted the attention of scholars4 ,the volume is rich in ancient stories bearing upon the world's renovation and the origin of castes1 as recorded in these venerable authorities4--,daily ,news4 99 99 99 99 99 ,third ,edition4 ,post #hvo1 pp4 viii4-#dfd1 cloth1 price #afs4 ,,the ,,sankhya ,,aphorisms ,,of ,,kapila4 ,with ,illustrative ,extracts from the ,commentaries4 ,translated by ,j4 ,r4 ,,ballantyne1 ,,ll4,d41 late ,principal of the ,benares ,college4 ,edited by ,,fitzedward ,,hall4 ,the work displays a vast expenditure of labour and scholarship1 for which students of ,hindoo philosophy have every reason to be grateful to ,dr4 ,hall and the publishers4--,calcutta ,review4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in ,two ,volumes1 post #hvo1 pp4 cviii4-#bdb1 and viii4-#cgj1 cloth1 price #bds4 ,dedicated by permission to ,h4,r4,h4 the ,prince of ,wales4 ,,buddhist ,,records ,,of ,,the ,,western ,,world1 ,translated from the ,chinese of ,hiuen ,tsiang 7,a4,d4 #fbi74 ,,by ,,samuel ,,beal1 ,b4,a41 7,trin4 ,coll41 ,camb472 ,r4,n4 7,retired ,chaplain and ,n4,i472 ,professor of ,chinese1 ,university ,college1 ,london2 ,rector of ,wark1 ,northumberland1 c4 ,an eminent ,indian authority writes respecting this work3--,nothing more can be done in elucidating the ,history of ,india until ,mr4 ,beal's translation of the ',si-yu-ki' appears4 ,it is a strange freak of historical preservation that the best account of the condition of ,india at that ancient period has come down to us in the books of travel written by the ,chinese pilgrims1 of whom ,hwen ,thsang is the best known4--,times4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 xlviii4-#cih1 cloth1 price #abs4 ,,the ,,ordinances ,,of ,,manu4 ,translated from the ,sanskrit1 with an ,introduction4 ,by the late ,a4,c4 ,,burnell1 ,ph4,d41 ,c4,i4,e4 ,completed and ,edited by ,e4,w4 ,,hopkins1 ,ph4,d41 of ,columbia ,college1 ,n4,y4 ,this work is full of interest2 while for the student of sociology and the science of religion it is full of importance4 ,it is a great boon to get so notable a work in so accessible a form1 admirably edited1 and competently translated4--,scotsman4 ,few men were more competent than ,burnell to give us a really good translation of this well-known law book1 first rendered into ,english by ,sir ,william ,jones4 ,burnell was not only an independent ,sanskrit scholar1 but an experienced lawyer1 and he joined to these two important qualifications the rare faculty of being able to express his thoughts in clear and trenchant ,english4444 ,we ought to feel very grateful to ,dr4 ,hopkins for having given us all that could be published of the translation left by ,burnell4--,f4 ,,max ,m,,ller in the ,academy4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 xii4-#bcd1 cloth1 price #is4 ,,the ,,life ,,and ,,works ,,of ,,alexander ,,csoma ,,de ,,koros1 ,between #ahai and #ahdb4 ,with a ,short ,notice of all his ,published and ,unpublished ,works and ,essays4 ,from ,original and for most part ,unpublished ,documents4 ,by ,,theodore ,,duka1 ,m4,d41 ,f4,r4,c4,s4 7,eng471 ,surgeon-,major ,h4,m4's ,bengal ,medical ,service1 ,retired1 c4 ,not too soon have ,messrs4 ,trbner added to their valuable ,oriental ,series a history of the life and works of one of the most gifted and devoted of ,oriental students1 ,alexander ,csoma de ,koros4 ,it is forty-three years since his death1 and though an account of his career was demanded soon after his decease1 it has only now appeared in the important memoir of his compatriot1 ,dr4 ,duka4--,bookseller4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in ,two ,volumes1 post #hvo1 pp4 xii4-#cah and vi4-#cab1 cloth1 price #bas4 ,,miscellaneous ,,papers ,,relating ,,to ,,indo-,,china4 ,reprinted from ,dalrymple's ,oriental ,repertory1 ,asiatic ,researches1 and the ,journal of the ,asiatic ,society of ,bengal4 ,,contents ,,of ,,vol4 ,i4 ,i4--,some ,accounts of ,quedah4 ,by ,michael ,topping4 ,,ii4--,report made to the ,chief and ,council of ,balambangan1 by ,lieut4 ,james ,barton1 of his several ,surveys4 ,,iii4--,substance of a ,letter to the ,court of ,directors from ,mr4 ,john ,jesse1 dated ,july #bj1 #agge1 at ,borneo ,proper4 ,,iv4--,formation of the ,establishment of ,poolo ,peenang4 ,v4--,the ,gold of ,limong4 ,by ,john ,macdonald4 ,,vi4--,on ,three ,natural ,productions of ,sumatra4 ,by ,john ,macdonald4 ,,vii4--,on the ,traces of the ,hindu ,language and ,literature extant amongst the ,malays4 ,by ,william ,marsden4 ,,viii4--,some ,account of the ,elastic ,gum ,vine of ,prince-,wales ,island4 ,by ,james ,howison4 ,,ix4--,a ,botanical ,description of ,urceola ,elastica1 or ,caoutchouc ,vine of ,sumatra and ,pulo-,pinang4 ,by ,william ,roxburgh1 ,m4,d4 ,x4--,an ,account of the ,inhabitants of the ,poggy1 or ,nassau ,islands1 lying off ,sumatra4 ,by ,john ,crisp4 ,,xi4--,remarks on the ,species of ,pepper which are found on ,prince-,wales ,island4 ,by ,william ,hunter1 ,m4,d4 ,,xii4--,on the ,languages and ,literature of the ,indo-,chinese ,nations4 ,by ,j4 ,leyden1 ,m4,d4 ,,xiii4--,some ,account of an ,orang-,outang of remarkable height found on the ,island of ,sumatra4 ,by ,clarke ,abel1 ,m4,d4 ,,xiv4--,observations on the ,geological ,appearances and ,general ,features of ,portions of the ,malayan ,peninsula4 ,by ,captain ,james ,low4 ,,xv4--,short ,sketch of the ,geology of ,pulo-,pinang and the ,neighbouring ,islands4 ,by ,t4 ,ware4 ,,xvi4--,climate of ,singapore4 ,,xvii4--,inscription on the ,jetty at ,singapore4 ,,xviii4--,extract of a ,letter from ,colonel ,j4 ,low4 ,,xix4--,inscription at ,singapore4 ,,xx--,an ,account of ,several ,inscriptions found in ,province ,wellesley4 ,by ,lieut4-,col4 ,james ,low4 ,,xxi4--,note on the ,inscriptions from ,singapore and ,province ,wellesley4 ,by ,j4 ,w4 ,laidlay4 ,,xxii4--,on an ,inscription from ,keddah4 ,by ,lieut4-,col4 ,low4 ,,xxiii4--,a ,notice of the ,alphabets of the ,philippine ,islands4 ,,xxiv4--,succinct ,review of the ,observations of the ,tides in the ,indian ,archipelago4 ,,xxv4--,report on the ,tin of the ,province of ,mergui4 ,by ,capt4 ,g4 ,b ,tremenheere4 ,,xxvi4--,report on the ,manganese of ,mergui ,province4 ,by ,capt4 ,g4 ,b4 ,tremenheere4 ,,xxvii4--,paragraphs to be added to ,capt4 ,g4 ,b4 ,tremenheere's ,report4 ,,xxviii4--,second ,report on the ,tin of ,mergui4 ,by ,capt4 ,g4 ,b4 ,tremenheere4 ,,xxix4--,analysis of ,iron ,ores from ,tavoy and ,mergui1 and of ,limestone from ,mergui4 ,by ,dr4 ,a4 ,ure4 ,,xxx4--,report of a ,visit to the ,pakchan ,river1 and of some ,tin ,localities in the ,southern ,portion of the ,tenasserim ,provinces4 ,by ,capt4 ,g4 ,b4 ,tremenheere4 ,,xxxi4--,report on a ,route from the ,mouth of the ,pakchan to ,krau1 and thence across the ,isthmus of ,krau to the ,gulf of ,siam4 ,by ,capt4 ,al4 ,fraser and ,capt4 ,j4 ,g4 ,forlong4 ,,xxxii4--,report1 c41 from ,capt4 ,g4 ,b4 ,tremenheere on the ,price of ,mergui ,tin ,ore4 ,,xxxiii4--,remarks on the ,different ,species of ,orang-utan4 ,by ,e4 ,blyth4 ,,xxxiv4--,further ,remarks4 ,by ,e4 ,blyth4 ,,contents ,,of ,,vol4 ,,ii4 ,,xxxv4--,catalogue of ,mammalia inhabiting the ,malayan ,peninsula and ,islands4 ,by ,theodore ,cantor1 ,m4,d4 ,,xxxvi4--,on the ,local and ,relative ,geology of ,singapore4 ,by ,j4 ,r4 ,logan4 ,,xxxvii4--,catalogue of ,reptiles inhabiting the ,malayan ,peninsula and ,islands4 ,by ,theodore ,cantor1 ,m4,d4 ,,xxxviii4--,some ,account of the ,botanical ,collection brought from the ,eastward1 in #ahda1 by ,dr4 ,cantor4 ,by the late ,w4 ,griffith4 ,,xxxix4--,on the ,flat-,horned ,taurine ,cattle of ,s4,e4 ,asia4 ,by ,e4 ,blyth4 ,,xl4--,note1 by ,major-,general ,g4 ,b4 ,tremenheere4 ,general ,index4 ,index of ,vernacular ,terms4 ,index of ,zoological ,genera and ,sub-,genera occurring in ,vol4 ,,ii4 ,the papers treat of almost every aspect of ,indo-,china--its philology1 economy1 geography1 geology--and constitute a very material and important contribution to our accessible information regarding that country and its people4--,contemporary ,review4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 xii4-#gb1 cloth1 price #es4 ,,the ,,satakas ,,of ,,bhartrihari4 ,translated from the ,sanskrit ,by the ,,rev4 ,b4 ,,hale ,,wortham1 ,m4,r4,a4,s41 ,rector of ,eggesford1 ,north ,devon4 ,a very interesting addition to ,trbner's ,oriental ,series4--,saturday ,review4 ,many of the ,maxims in the book have a ,biblical ring and beauty of expression4--,st4 ,james' ,gazette4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 xii4-#ahj1 cloth1 price #fs4 ,,ancient ,,proverbs ,,and ,,maxims ,,from ,,burmese ,,sources2 ,or1 ,,the ,,niti ,,literature ,,of ,,burma4 ,,by ,,james ,,gray1 ,author of ,elements of ,pali ,grammar1 ,translation of the ,dhammapada1 c4 ,the ,sanscrit-,pli word ,nti is equivalent to conduct in its abstract1 and guide in its concrete signification4 ,as applied to books1 it is a general term for a treatise which includes maxims1 pithy sayings1 and didactic stories1 intended as a guide to such matters of everyday life as form the character of an individual and influence him in his relations to his fellow-men4 ,treatises of this kind have been popular in all ages1 and have served as a most effective medium of instruction4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 xxxii4 and #ccj1 cloth1 price #gs4 #f;d4 ,,masnavi ,i ,,ma' ,,navi3 ,,the ,,spiritual ,,couplets ,,of ,,maulana ,,jalalu-',d-,,din ,,muhammad ,i ,,rumi4 ,translated and ,abridged by ,e4 ,h4 ,,whinfield1 ,m4,a41 ,late of ,h4,m4 ,bengal ,civil ,service4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 viii4 and #cdf1 cloth1 price #ajs4 #f;d4 ,,manava-,,dharma-,,castra3 ,,the ,,code ,,of ,,manu4 ,,original ,,sanskrit ,,text1 ,,with ,,critical ,,notes4 ,,by ,j4 ,,jolly1 ,ph4,d41 ,professor of ,sanskrit in the ,university of ,wurzburg2 late ,tagore ,professor of ,law in the ,university of ,calcutta4 ,the date assigned by ,sir ,william ,jones to this ,code--the well-known ,great ,law ,book of the ,hindus--is #abej-ejj ,b4,c41 although the rules and precepts contained in it had probably existed as tradition for countless ages before4 ,there has been no reliable edition of the ,text for ,students for many years past1 and it is believed1 therefore1 that ,prof4 ,jolly's work will supply a want long felt4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 #bae1 cloth1 price #gs4 #f;d4 ,,leaves ,,from ,,my ,,chinese ,,scrap-,,book4 ,,by ,,frederic ,,henry ,,balfour4 ,author of ,waifs and ,strays from the ,far ,east1 ,taoist ,texts1 ,idiomatic ,phrases in the ,peking ,colloquial1 c4 c4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 xvi4-#edh1 with ,six ,maps1 cloth1 price #bas4 ,,linguistic ,,and ,,oriental ,,essays4 ,,written ,,from ,,the ,,year #ahdg ,,to #ahhg4 ,second ,series4 ,,by ,,robert ,,needham ,,cust1 ,,ll4,d41 ,barrister-at-,law2 ,honorary ,secretary of the ,royal ,asiatic ,society2 ,late ,member of ,her ,majesty's ,indian ,civil ,service4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in ,two ,volumes1 post #hvo1 pp4 x4-#cjh and vi4-#cad1 cloth1 price #bes4 ,,miscellaneous ,,papers ,,relating ,,to ,,indo-,,china4 ,edited by ,r4 ,,rost1 ,ph4,d41 c4 c41 ,librarian to the ,india ,office4 ,,second ,,series4 ,reprinted for the ,straits ,branch of the ,royal ,asiatic ,society from the ,malayan ,miscellanies1 the ,transactions and ,journal of the ,batavian ,society1 and the ,journals of the ,asiatic ,society of ,bengal1 and the ,royal ,geographical and ,royal ,asiatic ,societies4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 xii4-#eab1 price #afs4 ,,folk-,,tales ,,of ,,kashmir4 ,by the ,,rev4 ,j4 ,,hinton ,,knowles1 ,f4,r4,g4,s41 ,m4,r4,a4,s41 c4 7,c4,m4,s47 ,missionary to the ,kashmiris4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in ,two ,volumes1 post #hvo1 pp4 xii4-#ccf and ,x4-#ceb1 cloth1 price #bas4 ,,medi,,val ,,researches ,,from ,,eastern ,,asiatic ,,sources4 ,,fragments ,,towards ,,the ,,knowledge ,,of ,,the ,,geography ,,and ,,history ,,of ,,central ,,and ,,western ,,asia ,,from ,,the ,,thirteenth ,,to ,,the ,,seventeenth ,,century4 ,,by ,e4 ,,bretschneider1 ,m4,d41 ,formerly ,physician of the ,russian ,legation at ,pekin4 99 99 99 99 99 ,in ,two ,volumes1 post #hvo1 pp4 l4-#djh and #dca1 cloth1 price #cfs4 ,,alberuni',s ,,india3 ,,an ,,account ,,of ,,its ,,religion1 ,,philosophy1 ,,literature1 ,,geography1 ,,chronology1 ,,astronomy1 ,,customs1 ,,law1 ,,and ,,astrology 7,,about ,a4,d4 #ajca74 ,,translated ,,into ,,english4 ,with ,notes and ,indices by ,prof4 ,,edward ,,sachau1 ,university of ,berlin4 #c asterisks in triangle ,the ,arabic ,original1 with an ,index of the ,sanskrit ,words1 ,edited by ,professor ,,sachau1 is in the press4 99 99 99 99 99 ,post #hvo1 pp4 xxxvii4-#bah1 cloth1 price #ajs4 ,,the ,,life ,,of ,,hiuen ,,tsiang4 ,,by ,,the ,,shamans ,,hwui ,,li ,,and ,,yen-,,tsung4 ,with a ,preface containing an account of the ,works of ,i-,,tsing4 ,,by ,,samuel ,,beal1 ,b4,a4 7,trin4 ,coll41 ,camb472 ,professor of ,chinese1 ,university ,college1 ,london2 ,rector of ,wark1 ,northumberland1 c4 ,author of ,buddhist ,records of the ,western ,world1 ,the ,romantic ,legend of ,sakya ,buddha1 c4 ,when the ,pilgrim ,hiuen ,tsiang returned from his travels in ,india1 he took up his abode in the ,temple of ,great ,benevolence2 this convent had been constructed by the ,emperor in honour of the ,empress1 ,wen-te-hau4 ,after ,hiuen ,tsiang's death1 his disciple1 ,hwui ,li1 composed a work which gave an account of his illustrious ,master's travels2 this work when he completed he buried1 and refused to discover its place of concealment4 ,but previous to his death he revealed its whereabouts to ,yen-tsung1 by whom it was finally revised and published4 ,this is ,the ,life of ,hiuen ,tsiang4 ,it is a valuable sequel to the ,si-yu-ki1 correcting and illustrating it in many particulars4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,in ,,preparation3-- ,post #hvo4 ,a ,,sketch ,,of ,,the ,,modern ,,languages ,,of ,,oceania4 ,,by ,r4 ,n4 ,,cust1 ,,ll4 ,d4 ,author of ,modern ,languages of the ,east1 ,modern ,languages of ,africa1 c4 99 99 99 99 99 ,,london3 ,,tr,,bner ,,co41 #eg ,,and #ei ,,ludgate ,,hill4 99 99 99 99 99