,an ,essay ,in ,aid ,of ,a ,grammar ,of ,assent4 by ,john ,henry ,newman1 ,of the ,oratory4 ,non in dialectic complacuit ,deo salvum facere populum suum4 ,,st4 ,,ambrose4 ,london3 ,burns1 ,oates1 ,co4 #ag #ah1 ,portman ,street1 and #fc1 ,paternoster ,row4 #ahgd ,,contents ,dedication4 ,part ,i4 ,assent ,and ,apprehension4 ,chapter ,i4 ,modes ,of ,holding ,and ,apprehending ,propositions4 #a4 ,modes of ,holding ,propositions4 #b4 ,modes of apprehending ,propositions4 ,chapter ,,ii4 ,assent ,considered ,as ,apprehensive4 ,chapter ,,iii4 ,the ,apprehension ,of ,propositions4 ,chapter ,,iv4 ,notional ,and ,real ,assent4 #a4 ,notional ,assents4 #b4 ,real ,assents4 #c4 ,notional and ,real ,assents ,contrasted4 ,chapter ,v4 ,apprehension ,and ,assent ,in ,the ,matter ,of ,religion4 #a4 ,belief in ,one ,god4 #b4 ,belief in the ,holy ,trinity4 #c4 ,belief in ,dogmatic ,theology4 ,part ,,ii4 ,assent ,and ,inference4 ,chapter ,,vi4 ,assent ,considered ,as ,unconditional4 #a4 ,simple ,assent4 #b4 ,complex ,assent4 ,chapter ,,vii4 ,certitude4 #a4 ,assent and ,certitude ,contrasted4 #b4 ,indefectibility of ,certitude4 ,chapter ,,viii4 ,inference4 #a4 ,formal ,inference4 #b4 ,informal ,inference4 #c4 ,natural ,inference4 ,chapter ,,ix4 ,the ,illative ,sense4 #a4 ,the ,sanction of the ,illative ,sense4 #b4 ,the ,nature of the ,illative ,sense4 #c4 ,the ,range of the ,illative ,sense4 ,chapter ,x4 ,inference ,and ,assent ,in ,the ,matter ,of ,religion4 #a4 ,natural ,religion4 #b4 ,revealed ,religion4 ,note4 ,footnotes ,,dedication4 ,to ,edward ,bellasis1 ,serjeant ,at ,law1 ,in ,remembrance ,of ,a ,long1 ,equable1 ,sunny ,friendship2 ,in ,gratitude ,for ,continual ,kindnesses ,shown ,to ,me1 ,for ,an ,unwearied ,zeal ,in ,my ,behalf1 ,for ,a ,trust ,in ,me ,which ,has ,never ,wavered1 ,and ,a ,prompt1 ,effectual ,succour ,and ,support ,in ,times ,of ,special ,trial1 ,from ,his ,affectionate ,j4 ,h4 ,n4 ,february #ba1 #ahgj4 ,,part ,i4 ,,assent ,,and ,,apprehension4 ,chapter ,i4 ,modes ,of ,holding ,and ,apprehending ,propositions4 #a4 ,modes of ,holding ,propositions4 #a4 ,propositions 7consisting of a subject and predicate united by the copula7 may take a categorical1 conditional1 or interrogative form4 7#a7 ,an interrogative1 when they ask a ,question1 7e4 g4 ,does ,free-trade benefit the poorer classes87 and imply the possibility of an affirmative or negative resolution of it4 7#b7 ,a conditional1 when they express a ,conclusion 7e4 g4 ,free-trade therefore benefits the poorer classes71 and both imply1 and imply their dependence on1 other propositions4 7#c7 ,a categorical1 when they simply make an ,assertion 7e4 g4 ,free-trade does benefit71 and imply the absence of any condition or reservation of any kind1 looking neither before nor behind1 as resting in themselves and being intrinsically complete4 ,these three modes of shaping a proposition1 distinct as they are from each other1 follow each other in natural sequence4 ,a proposition1 which starts with being a ,question1 may become a ,conclusion1 and then be changed into an ,assertion2 but it has of course ceased to be a question1 so far forth as it has become a conclusion1 and has rid itself of its argumentative form--that is1 has ceased to be a conclusion1--so far forth as it has become an assertion4 ,a question has not yet got so far as to be a conclusion1 though it is the necessary preliminary of a conclusion2 and an assertion has got beyond being a mere conclusion1 though it is the natural issue of a conclusion4 ,their correlation is the measure of their distinction one from another4 ,no one is likely to deny that a question is distinct both from a conclusion and from an assertion2 and an assertion will be found to be equally distinct from a conclusion4 ,for1 if we rest our affirmation on arguments1 this shows that we are not asserting2 and1 when we assert1 we do not argue4 ,an assertion is as distinct from a conclusion1 as a word of command is from a persuasion or recommendation4 ,command and assertion1 as such1 both of them1 in their different ways1 dispense with1 discard1 ignore1 antecedents of any kind1 though antecedents may have been a sine qu non condition of their being elicited4 ,they both carry with them the pretension of being personal acts4 ,in insisting on the intrinsic distinctness of these three modes of putting a proposition1 ,i am not maintaining that they may not co-exist as regards one and the same subject4 ,for what we have already concluded1 we may1 if we will1 make a question of2 and what we are asserting1 we may of course conclude over again4 ,we may assert1 to one man1 and conclude to another1 and ask of a third2 still1 when we assert1 we do not conclude1 and1 when we assert or conclude1 we do not question4 #b4 ,the internal act of holding propositions is for the most part analogous to the external act of enunciating them2 as there are three ways of enunciating1 so are there three ways of holding them1 each corresponding to each4 ,these three mental acts are ,doubt1 ,inference1 and ,assent4 ,a question is the expression of a doubt2 a conclusion is the expression of an act of inference2 and an assertion is the expression of an act of assent4 ,to doubt1 for instance1 is not to see one's way to hold that ,free-trade is or that it is not a benefit2 to infer1 is to hold on sufficient grounds that ,free-trade may1 must1 or should be a benefit2 to assent to the proposition1 is to hold that ,free-trade is a benefit4 ,moreover1 propositions1 while they are the material of these three enunciations1 are the objects of the three corresponding mental acts2 and as without a proposition1 there cannot be a question1 conclusion1 or assertion1 so without a proposition there is nothing to doubt about1 nothing to infer1 nothing to assent to4 ,mental acts of whatever kind presuppose their objects4 ,and1 since the three enunciations are distinct from each other1 therefore the three mental acts also1 ,doubt1 ,inference1 and ,assent1 are1 with reference to one and the same proposition1 distinct from each other2 else1 why should their several enunciations be distinct8 ,and indeed it is very evident1 that1 so far forth as we infer1 we do not doubt1 and that1 when we assent1 we are not inferring1 and1 when we doubt1 we cannot assent4 ,and in fact1 these three modes of entertaining propositions1--doubting them1 inferring them1 assenting to them1 are so distinct in their action1 that1 when they are severally carried out into the intellectual habits of an individual1 they become the principles and notes of three distinct states or characters of mind4 ,for instance1 in the case of ,revealed ,religion1 according as one or other of these is paramount within him1 a man is a sceptic as regards it2 or a philosopher1 thinking it more or less probable considered as a conclusion of reason2 or he has an unhesitating faith in it1 and is recognized as a believer4 ,if he simply disbelieves1 or dissents1 he is assenting to the contradictory of the thesis1 viz4 that there is no ,revelation4 ,many minds of course there are1 which are not under the predominant influence of any one of the three4 ,thus men are to be found of irreflective1 impulsive1 unsettled1 or again of acute minds1 who do not know what they believe and what they do not1 and who may be by turns sceptics1 inquirers1 or believers2 who doubt1 assent1 infer1 and doubt again1 according to the circumstances of the season4 ,nay further1 in all minds there is a certain coexistence of these distinct acts2 that is1 of two of them1 for we can at once infer and assent1 though we cannot at once either assent or infer and also doubt4 ,indeed1 in a multitude of cases we infer truths1 or apparent truths1 before1 and while1 and after we assent to them4 ,lastly1 it cannot be denied that these three acts are all natural to the mind2 ,i mean1 that1 in exercising them1 we are not violating the laws of our nature1 as if they were in themselves an extravagance or weakness1 but are acting according to it1 according to its legitimate constitution4 ,undoubtedly1 it is possible1 it is common1 in the particular case1 to err in the exercise of ,doubt1 of ,inference1 and of ,assent2 that is1 we may be withholding a judgment about propositions on which we have the means of coming to some definitive conclusion2 or we may be assenting to propositions which we ought to receive only on the credit of their premisses1 or again to keep ourselves in suspense about2 but such errors of the individual belong to the individual1 not to his nature1 and cannot avail to forfeit for him his natural right1 under proper circumstances1 to doubt1 or to infer1 or to assent4 ,we do but fulfil our nature in doubting1 inferring1 and assenting2 and our duty is1 not to abstain from the exercise of any function of our nature1 but to do what is in itself right rightly4 #c4 ,so far in general3--in this ,essay ,i treat of propositions only in their bearing upon concrete matter1 and ,i am mainly concerned with ,assent2 with ,inference1 in its relation to ,assent1 and only such inference as is not demonstration2 with ,doubt hardly at all4 ,i dismiss ,doubt with one observation4 ,i have here spoken of it simply as a suspense of mind1 in which sense of the word1 to have 8no doubt0 about a thesis is equivalent to one or other of the two remaining acts1 either to inferring it or else assenting to it4 ,however1 the word is often taken to mean the deliberate recognition of a thesis as being uncertain2 in this sense ,doubt is nothing else than an assent1 viz4 an assent to a proposition at variance with the thesis1 as ,i have already noticed in the case of ,disbelief4 ,confining myself to the subject of ,assent and ,inference1 ,i observe two points of contrast between them4 ,the first ,i have already noted4 ,assent is unconditional2 else1 it is not really represented by assertion4 ,inference is conditional1 because a conclusion at least implies the assumption of premisses1 and still more1 because in concrete matter1 on which ,i am engaged1 demonstration is impossible4 ,the second has regard to the apprehension necessary for holding a proposition4 ,we cannot assent to a proposition1 without some intelligent apprehension of it2 whereas we need not understand it at all in order to infer it4 ,we cannot give our assent to the proposition that 8x is z10 till we are told something about one or other of the terms2 but we can infer1 if 8x is y1 and y is z1 that x is z10 whether we know the meaning of x and z or no4 ,these points of contrast and their results will come before us in due course3 here1 for a time leaving the consideration of the modes of holding propositions1 ,i proceed to inquire into what is to be understood by apprehending them4 #b4 ,modes of apprehending ,propositions4 ,by our apprehension of propositions ,i mean our imposition of a sense on the terms of which they are composed4 ,now what do the terms of a proposition1 the subject and predicate1 stand for8 ,sometimes they stand for certain ideas existing in our own minds1 and for nothing outside of them2 sometimes for things simply external to us1 brought home to us through the experiences and informations we have of them4 ,all things in the exterior world are unit and individual1 and are nothing else2 but the mind not only contemplates those unit realities1 as they exist1 but has the gift1 by an act of creation1 of bringing before it abstractions and generalizations1 which have no existence1 no counterpart1 out of it4 ,now there are propositions1 in which one or both of the terms are common nouns1 as standing for what is abstract1 general1 and non-existing1 such as 8,man is an animal1 some men are learned1 an ,apostle is a creation of ,christianity1 a line is length without breadth1 to err is human1 to forgive divine40 ,these ,i shall call notional propositions1 and the apprehension with which we infer or assent to them1 notional4 ,and there are other propositions1 which are composed of singular nouns1 and of which the terms stand for things external to us1 unit and individual1 as 8,philip was the father of ,alexander10 8the earth goes round the sun10 8the ,apostles first preached to the ,jews20 and these ,i shall call real propositions1 and their apprehension real4 ,there are then two apprehensions or interpretations to which propositions may be subjected1 notional and real4 ,next ,i observe1 that the same proposition may admit of both of these interpretations at once1 having a notional sense as used by one man1 and a real as used by another4 ,thus a schoolboy may perfectly apprehend1 and construe with spirit1 the poet's words1 8,dum ,capitolium scandet cum tacit ,virgine ,pontifex20 he has seen steep hills1 flights of steps1 and processions2 he knows what enforced silence is2 also he knows all about the ,pontifex ,maximus1 and the ,vestal ,virgins2 he has an abstract hold upon every word of the description1 yet without the words therefore bringing before him at all the living image which they would light up in the mind of a contemporary of the poet1 who had seen the fact described1 or of a modern historian who had duly informed himself in the religious phenomena1 and by meditation had realized the ,roman ceremonial1 of the age of ,augustus4 ,again1 8,dulce et decorum est pro patri mori10 is a mere common-place1 a terse expression of abstractions in the mind of the poet himself1 if ,philippi is to be the index of his patriotism1 whereas it would be the record of experiences1 a sovereign dogma1 a grand aspiration1 inflaming the imagination1 piercing the heart1 of a ,wallace or a ,tell4 ,as the multitude of common nouns have originally been singular1 it is not surprising that many of them should so remain still in the apprehension of particular individuals4 ,in the proposition 8,sugar is sweet10 the predicate is a common noun as used by those who have compared sugar in their thoughts with honey or glycerine2 but it may be the only distinctively sweet thing in the experience of a child1 and may be used by him as a noun singular4 ,the first time that he tastes sugar1 if his nurse says1 8,sugar is sweet0 in a notional sense1 meaning by sugar1 lump-sugar1 powdered1 brown1 and candied1 and by sweet1 a specific flavour or scent which is found in many articles of food and many flowers1 he may answer in a real sense1 and in an individual proposition 8,sugar is sweet10 meaning 8this sugar is this sweet thing40 ,thirdly1 in the same mind and at the same time1 the same proposition may express both what is notional and what is real4 ,when a lecturer in mechanics or chemistry shows to his class by experiment some physical fact1 he and his hearers at once enunciate it as an individual thing before their eyes1 and also as generalized by their minds into a law of nature4 ,when ,virgil says1 8,varium et mutabile semper fmina10 he both sets before his readers what he means to be a general truth1 and at the same time applies it individually to the instance of ,dido4 ,he expresses at once a notion and a fact4 ,of these two modes of apprehending propositions1 notional and real1 real is the stronger2 ,i mean by stronger the more vivid and forcible4 ,it is so to be accounted for the very reason that it is concerned with what is either real or taken for real2 for intellectual ideas cannot compete in effectiveness with the experience of concrete facts4 ,various proverbs and maxims sanction me in so speaking1 such as1 8,facts are stubborn things10 8,experientia docet10 8,seeing is believing20 and the popular contrast between theory and practice1 reason and sight1 philosophy and faith4 ,not that real apprehension1 as such1 impels to action1 any more than notional2 but it excites and stimulates the affections and passions1 by bringing facts home to them as motive causes4 ,thus it indirectly brings about what the apprehension of large principles1 of general laws1 or of moral obligations1 never could effect4 ,reverting to the two modes of holding propositions1 conditional and unconditional1 which was the subject of the former ,section1 that is1 inferences and assents1 ,i observe that inferences1 which are conditional acts1 are especially cognate to notional apprehension1 and assents1 which are unconditional1 to real4 ,this distinction1 too1 will come before us in the course of the following chapters4 ,and now ,i have stated the main subjects of which ,i propose to treat2 viz41 the distinctions in the use of propositions1 which ,i have been drawing1 and the questions which those distinctions involve4 ,chapter ,,ii4 ,assent ,considered ,as ,apprehensive4 ,i have already said of an act of ,assent1 first1 that it is in itself the absolute acceptance of a proposition without any condition2 and next that1 in order to its being made1 it presupposes the condition1 not only of some previous inference in favour of the proposition1 but especially of some concomitant apprehension of its terms4 ,i proceed to the latter of these two subjects2 that is1 of ,assent considered as apprehensive1 leaving the discussion of ,assent as unconditional for a later place in this ,essay4 ,by apprehension of a proposition1 ,i mean1 as ,i have already said1 the interpretation given to the terms of which it is composed4 ,when we infer1 we consider a proposition in relation to other propositions2 when we assent to it1 we consider it for its own sake and in its intrinsic sense4 ,that sense must be in some degree known to us2 else1 we do but assert the proposition1 we in no wise assent to it4 ,assent ,i have described to be a mental assertion2 in its very nature then it is of the mind1 and not of the lips4 ,we can assert without assenting2 assent is more than assertion just by this much1 that it is accompanied by some apprehension of the matter asserted4 ,this is plain2 and the only question is1 what measure of apprehension is sufficient4 ,and the answer to this question is equally plain3--it is the predicate of the proposition which must be apprehended4 ,in a proposition one term is predicated of another2 the subject is referred to the predicate1 and the predicate gives us information about the subject2--therefore to apprehend the proposition is to have that information1 and to assent to it is to acquiesce in it as true4 ,therefore ,i apprehend a proposition1 when ,i apprehend its predicate4 ,the subject itself need not be apprehended per se in order to a genuine assent3 for it is the very thing which the predicate has to elucidate1 and therefore by its formal place in the proposition1 so far as it is the subject1 it is something unknown1 something which the predicate makes known2 but the predicate cannot make it known1 unless it is known itself4 ,let the question be1 8,what is ,trade80 here is a distinct profession of ignorance about 8,trade20 and let the answer be1 8,trade is the interchange of goods20--trade then need not be known1 as a condition of assent to the proposition1 except so far as the account of it which is given in answer1 8the interchange of goods10 makes it known2 and that must be apprehended in order to make it known4 ,the very drift of the proposition is to tell us something about the subject2 but there is no reason why our knowledge of the subject1 whatever it is1 should go beyond what the predicate tells us about it4 ,further than this the subject need not be apprehended3 as far as this it must2 it will not be apprehended thus far1 unless we apprehend the predicate4 ,if a child asks1 8,what is ,lucern80 and is answered1 8,lucern is medicago sativa1 of the class ,diadelphia and order ,decandria20 and henceforth says obediently1 8,lucern is medicago sativa1 c410 he makes no act of assent to the proposition which he enunciates1 but speaks like a parrot4 ,but1 if he is told1 8,lucern is food for cattle10 and is shown cows grazing in a meadow1 then though he never saw lucern1 and knows nothing at all about it1 besides what he has learned from the predicate1 he is in a position to make as genuine an assent to the proposition 8,lucern is food for cattle10 on the word of his informant1 as if he knew ever so much more about lucern4 ,and as soon as he has got as far as this1 he may go further4 ,he now knows enough about lucern1 to enable him to apprehend propositions which have lucern for their predicate1 should they come before him for assent1 as1 8,that field is sown with lucern10 or 8,clover is not lucern40 ,yet there is a way1 in which the child can give an indirect assent even to a proposition1 in which he understood neither subject nor predicate4 ,he cannot indeed in that case assent to the proposition itself1 but he can assent to its truth4 ,he cannot do more than assert that 8,lucern is medicago sativa10 but he can assent to the proposition1 8,that lucern is medicago sativa is true40 ,for here is a predicate which he sufficiently apprehends1 what is inapprehensible in the proposition being confined to the subject4 ,thus the child's mother might teach him to repeat a passage of ,shakespeare1 and when he asked the meaning of a particular line1 such as 8,the quality of mercy is not strained10 or 8,virtue itself turns vice1 being misapplied10 she might answer him1 that he was too young to understand it yet1 but that it had a beautiful meaning1 as he would one day know3 and he1 in faith on her word1 might give his assent to such a proposition1--not1 that is1 to the line itself which he had got by heart1 and which would be beyond him1 but to its being true1 beautiful1 and good4 ,of course ,i am speaking of assent itself1 and its intrinsic conditions1 not of the ground or motive of it4 ,whether there is an obligation upon the child to trust his mother1 or whether there are cases where such trust is impossible1 are irrelevant questions1 and ,i notice them in order to put them aside4 ,i am examining the act of assent itself1 not its preliminaries1 and ,i have specified three directions1 which among others the assent may take1 viz4 assent immediately to a proposition1 assent to its truth1 and assent both to its truth and to the ground of its being true together1--8,lucern is food for cattle10--8,that lucern is medicago sativa is true10--and 8,my mother's word1 that lucern is medicago sativa1 and is food for cattle1 is the truth40 ,now in each of these there is one and the same absolute adhesion of the mind to the proposition1 on the part of the child2 he assents to the apprehensible proposition1 and to the truth of the inapprehensible1 and to the veracity of his mother in her assertion of the inapprehensible4 ,i say the same absolute adhesion1 because1 unless he did assent without any reserve to the proposition that lucern was food for cattle1 or to the accuracy of the botanical name and description of it1 he would not be giving an unreserved assent to his mother's word3 yet1 though these assents are all unreserved1 still they certainly differ in strength1 and this is the next point to which ,i wish to draw attention4 ,it is indeed plain1 that1 though the child assents to his mother's veracity1 without perhaps being conscious of his own act1 nevertheless that particular assent of his has a force and life in it which the other assents have not1 insomuch as he apprehends the proposition1 which is the subject of it1 with greater keenness and energy than belongs to his apprehension of the others4 ,her veracity and authority is to him no abstract truth or item of general knowledge1 but is bound up with that image and love of her person which is part of himself1 and makes a direct claim on him for his summary assent to her general teachings4 ,accordingly1 by reason of this circumstance of his apprehension he would not hesitate to say1 did his years admit of it1 that he would lay down his life in defence of his mother's veracity4 ,on the other hand1 he would not make such a profession in the case of the propositions1 8,lucern is food for cattle10 or 8,that lucern is medicago sativa is true20 and yet it is clear too1 that1 if he did in truth assent to these propositions1 he would have to die for them also1 rather than deny them1 when it came to the point1 unless he made up his mind to tell a falsehood4 ,that he would have to die for all three propositions severally rather than deny them1 shows the completeness and absoluteness of assent in its very nature2 that he would not spontaneously challenge so severe a trial in the case of two out of the three particular acts of assent1 illustrates in what sense one assent may be stronger than another4 ,it appears then1 that1 in assenting to propositions1 an apprehension in some sense of their terms is not only necessary to assent1 as such1 but also gives a distinct character to its acts4 ,if therefore we would know more about ,assent1 we must know more about the apprehension which accompanies it4 ,accordingly to the subject of ,apprehension ,i proceed4 ,chapter ,,iii4 ,the ,apprehension ,of ,propositions4 ,i said in my ,introductory ,chapter that there can be no assent to a proposition1 without some sort of apprehension of its terms2 next that there are two modes of apprehension1 notional and real2 thirdly1 that1 while assent may be given to a proposition on either apprehension of it1 still its acts are elicited more heartily and forcibly1 when they are made upon real apprehension which has things for its objects1 than when they are made in favour of notions and with a notional apprehension4 ,the first of these three points ,i have just been discussing2 now ,i will proceed to the second1 viz4 the two modes of apprehending propositions1 leaving the third for the ,chapters which follow4 ,i have used the word apprehension1 and not understanding1 because the latter word is of uncertain meaning1 standing sometimes for the faculty or act of conceiving a proposition1 sometimes for that of comprehending it1 neither of which come into the sense of apprehension4 ,it is possible to apprehend without understanding4 ,i apprehend what is meant by saying that ,john is ,richard's wife's father's aunt's husband1 but1 if ,i am unable so to take in these successive relationships as to understand the upshot of the whole1 viz4 that ,john is great-uncle-in-law to ,richard1 ,i cannot be said to understand the proposition4 ,in like manner1 ,i may take a just view of a man's conduct1 and therefore apprehend it1 and yet may profess that ,i cannot understand it2 that is1 ,i have not the key to it1 and do not see its consistency in detail3 ,i have no just conception of it4 ,apprehension then is simply an intelligent acceptance of the idea or of the fact which a proposition enunciates4 8,pride will have a fall20 8,napoleon died at ,st4 ,helena20 ,i have no difficulty in entering into the sentiment contained in the former of these1 or into the fact declared in the latter2 that is1 ,i apprehend them both4 ,now apprehension1 as ,i have said1 has two subject-matters3--according as language expresses things external to us1 or our own thoughts1 so is apprehension real or notional4 ,it is notional in the grammarian1 it is real in the experimentalist4 ,the grammarian has to determine the force of words and phrases2 he has to master the structure of sentences and the composition of paragraphs2 he has to compare language with language1 to ascertain the common ideas expressed under different idiomatic forms1 and to achieve the difficult work of recasting the mind of an original author in the mould of a translation4 ,on the other hand1 the philosopher or experimentalist aims at investigating1 questioning1 ascertaining facts1 causes1 effects1 actions1 qualities3 these are things1 and he makes his words distinctly subordinate to these1 as means to an end4 ,the primary duty of a literary man is to have clear conceptions1 and to be exact and intelligible in expressing them2 but in a philosopher it is even a merit to be not altogether vague1 inchoate and obscure in his teaching1 and if he fails even of this low standard of language1 we remind ourselves that his obscurity perhaps is owing to his depth4 ,no power of words in a lecturer would be sufficient to make psychology easy to his hearers2 if they are to profit by him1 they must throw their minds into the matters in discussion1 must accompany his treatment of them with an active1 personal concurrence1 and interpret for themselves1 as he proceeds1 the dim suggestions and adumbrations of objects1 which he has a right to presuppose1 while he uses them1 as images existing in their apprehension as well as in his own4 ,in something of a parallel way it is the least pardonable fault in an ,orator to fail in clearness of style1 and the most pardonable fault of a ,poet4 ,so again1 an ,economist is dealing with facts2 whatever there is of theory in his work professes to be founded on facts1 by facts alone must his sense be interpreted1 and to those only who are well furnished with the necessary facts does he address himself2 yet a clever schoolboy1 from a thorough grammatical knowledge of both languages1 might turn into ,english a ,french treatise on national wealth1 produce1 consumption1 labour1 profits1 measures of value1 public debt1 and the circulating medium1 with an apprehension of what it was that his author was stating sufficient for making it clear to an ,english reader1 while he had not the faintest conception himself what the treatise1 which he was translating really determined4 ,the man uses language as the vehicle of things1 and the boy of abstractions4 ,hence in literary examinations1 it is a test of good scholarship to be able to construe aright1 without the aid of understanding the sentiment1 action1 or historical occurrence conveyed in the passage thus accurately rendered1 let it be a battle in ,livy1 or some subtle train of thought in ,virgil or ,pindar4 ,and those who have acquitted themselves best in the trial1 will often be disposed to think they have most notably failed1 for the very reason that they have been too busy with the grammar of each sentence1 as it came1 to have been able1 as they construed on1 to enter into the facts or the feelings1 which1 unknown to themselves1 they were bringing out of it4 ,to take a very different instance of this contrast between notions and facts2--pathology and medicine1 in the interests of science1 and as a protection to the practitioner1 veil the shocking realities of disease and physical suffering under a notional phraseology1 under the abstract terms of debility1 distress1 irritability1 paroxysm1 and a host of ,greek and ,latin words4 ,the arts of medicine and surgery are necessarily experimental2 but for writing and conversing on these subjects they require to be stripped of the association of the facts from which they are derived4 ,such are the two modes of apprehension4 ,the terms of a proposition do or do not stand for things4 ,if they do1 then they are singular terms1 for all things that are1 are units4 ,but if they do not stand for things they must stand for notions1 and are common terms4 ,singular nouns come from experience1 common from abstraction4 ,the apprehension of the former ,i call real1 and of the latter notional4 ,now let us look at this difference between them more narrowly4 #a4 ,real ,apprehension1 is1 as ,i have said1 in the first instance an experience or information about the concrete4 ,now1 when these informations are in fact presented to us1 7that is1 when they are directly subjected to our bodily senses or our mental sensations1 as when we say1 8,the sun shines10 or 8,the prospect is charming10 or indirectly by means of a picture or even a narrative17 then there is no difficulty in determining what is meant by saying that our enunciation of a proposition concerning them implies an apprehension of things2 because we can actually point out the objects which they indicate4 ,but supposing those things are no longer before us1 supposing they have passed beyond our field of view1 or the book is closed in which the description of them occurs1 how can an apprehension of things be said to remain to us8 ,it remains on our minds by means of the faculty of memory4 ,memory consists in a present imagination of things that are past2 memory retains the impressions and likenesses of what they were when before us2 and when we make use of the proposition which refers to them1 it supplies us with objects by which to interpret it4 ,they are things still1 as being the reflections of things in a mental mirror4 ,hence the poet calls memory 8the mind's eye40 ,i am in a foreign country among unfamiliar sights2 at will ,i am able to conjure up before me the vision of my home1 and all that belongs to it1 its rooms and their furniture1 its books1 its inmates1 their countenances1 looks and movements4 ,i see those who once were there and are no more2 past scenes1 and the very expression of the features1 and the tones of the voices1 of those who took part in them1 in a time of trial or difficulty4 ,i create nothing2 ,i see the facsimiles of facts2 and of these facsimiles the words and propositions which ,i use concerning them are from habitual association the proper or the sole expression4 ,and so again1 ,i may have seen a celebrated painting1 or some great pageant1 or some public man2 and ,i have on my memory stored up and ready at hand1 but latent1 an impress more or less distinct of that experience4 ,the words 8the ,madonna di ,s4 ,sisto10 or 8the last ,coronation10 or 8the ,duke of ,wellington10 have power to revive that impress of it4 ,memory has to do with individual things and nothing that is not individual4 ,and my apprehension of its notices is conveyed in a collection of singular and real propositions4 ,i have hitherto been adducing instances from 7for the most part7 objects of sight2 but the memory preserves the impress1 though not so vivid1 of the experiences which come to us through our other senses also4 ,the memory of a beautiful air1 or the scent of a particular flower1 as far as any remembrance remains of it1 is the continued presence in our minds of a likeness of it1 which its actual presence has left there4 ,i can bring before me the music of the ,adeste ,fideles1 as if ,i were actually hearing it2 and the scent of a clematis as if ,i were in my garden2 and the flavour of a peach as if it were in season2 and the thought ,i have of all these is as of something individual and from without1--as much as the things themselves1 the tune1 the scent1 and the flavour1 are from without1--though1 compared with the things themselves1 these images 7as they may be called7 are faint and intermitting4 ,nor need such an image be in any sense an abstraction1 though ,i may have eaten a hundred peaches in times past1 the impression1 which remains on my memory of the flavour1 may be of any of them1 of the ten1 twenty1 thirty units1 as the case may be1 not a general notion1 distinct from every one of them1 and formed from all of them by a fabrication of my mind4 ,and so again the apprehension which we have of our past mental acts of any kind1 of hope1 inquiry1 effort1 triumph1 disappointment1 suspicion1 hatred1 and a hundred others1 is an apprehension of the memory of those definite acts1 and therefore an apprehension of things2 not to say that many of them do not need memory1 but are such as admit of being actually summoned and repeated at our will4 ,such an apprehension again is elicited by propositions embodying the notices of our history1 of our pursuits and their results1 of our friends1 of our bereavements1 of our illnesses1 of our fortunes1 which remain imprinted upon our memory as sharply and deeply as is any recollection of sight4 ,nay1 and such recollections may have in them an individuality and completeness which outlives the impressions made by sensible objects4 ,the memory of countenances and of places in times past may fade away from the mind2 but the vivid image of certain anxieties or deliverances never4 ,and by means of these particular and personal experiences1 thus impressed upon us1 we attain an apprehension of what such things are at other times when we have not experience of them2 an apprehension of sights and sounds1 of colours and forms1 of places and persons1 of mental acts and states1 parallel to our actual experiences1 such1 that1 when we meet with definite propositions expressive of them1 our apprehension cannot be called abstract and notional4 ,if ,i am told 8there is a raging fire in ,london10 or 8,london is on fire10 8fire0 need not be a common noun in my apprehension more than 8,london40 ,the word may recall to my memory the experience of a fire which ,i have known elsewhere1 or of some vivid description which ,i have read4 ,it is of course difficult to draw the line and to say where the office of memory ends1 and where abstraction takes its place2 and again1 as ,i said in my first pages1 the same proposition is to one man an image1 to another a notion2 but still there is a host of predicates1 of the most various kinds1 8lovely10 8vulgar10 8a conceited man10 8a manufacturing town10 8a catastrophe10 and any number of others1 which1 though as predicates they would be accounted common nouns1 are in fact in the mouths of particular persons singular1 as conveying images of things individual1 as the rustic in ,virgil says1-- 8,urbem1 quam dicunt ,romam1 ,melibe1 putavi1 ,stultus ego1 huic nostr similem40 ,and so the child's idea of a king1 as derived from his picture-book1 will be that of a fierce or stern or venerable man1 seated above a flight of steps1 with a crown on his head and a sceptre in his hand4 ,in these two instances indeed the experience does but mislead1 when applied to the unknown2 but it often happens on the contrary1 that it is a serviceable help1 especially when a man has large experiences and has learned to distinguish between them and apply them duly1 as in the instance of the hero 8who knew many cities of men and many minds40 ,further1 we are able by an inventive faculty1 or1 as ,i may call it1 the faculty of composition1 to follow the descriptions of things which have never come before us1 and to form1 out of such passive impressions as experience has heretofore left on our minds1 new images1 which1 though mental creations1 are in no sense abstractions1 and though ideal1 are not notional4 ,they are concrete units in the minds both of the party describing and the party informed of them4 ,thus ,i may never have seen a palm or a banana1 but ,i have conversed with those who have1 or ,i have read graphic accounts of it1 and1 from my own previous knowledge of other trees1 have been able with so ready an intelligence to interpret their language1 and to light up such an image of it in my thoughts1 that1 were it not that ,i never was in the countries where the tree is found1 ,i should fancy that ,i had actually seen it4 ,hence again it is the very praise we give to the characters of some great poet or historian that he is so individual4 ,i am able as it were to gaze on ,tiberius1 as ,tacitus draws him1 and to figure to myself our ,james the ,first1 as he is painted in ,scott's ,romance4 ,the assassination of ,csar1 his 8,et tu1 ,brute80 his collecting his robes about him1 and his fall under ,pompey's statue1 all this becomes a fact to me and an object of real apprehension4 ,thus it is that we live in the past and in the distant2 by means of our capacity of interpreting the statements of others about former ages or foreign climes by the lights of our own experience4 ,the picture1 which historians are able to bring before us1 of ,csar's death1 derives its vividness and effect from its virtual appeal to the various images of our memory4 ,this faculty of composition is of course a step beyond experience1 but we have now reached its furthest point2 it is mainly limited as regards its materials1 by the sense of sight4 ,as regards the other senses1 new images cannot well be elicited and shaped out of old experiences4 ,no description1 however complete1 could convey to my mind an exact likeness of a tune or an harmony1 which ,i have never heard2 and still less of a scent1 which ,i have never smelt4 ,generic resemblances and metaphorical substitutes are indeed producible2 but ,i should not acquire any real knowledge of the ,scotch air 8,there's nae luck0 by being told it was like 8,auld lang syne10 or 8,robin ,gray20 and if ,i said that ,mozart's melodies were as a summer sky or as the breath of ,zephyr1 ,i should be better understood by those who knew ,mozart than by those who did not4 ,such vague illustrations suggest intellectual notions1 not images4 ,and quite as difficult is it to create or to apprehend by description images of mental facts1 of which we have no direct experience4 ,i may indeed1 as ,i have already said1 bring home to my mind so complex a fact as an historical character1 by composition out of my experiences about character generally2 ,tiberius1 ,james the ,first1 ,louis the ,eleventh1 or ,napoleon2 but who is able to infuse into me1 or how shall ,i imbibe1 a sense of the peculiarities of the style of ,cicero or ,virgil1 if ,i have not read their writings8 or how shall ,i gain a shadow of a perception of the wit or the grace ascribed to the conversation of the ,french salons1 being myself an untravelled ,john ,bull8 ,and so again1 as regards the affections and passions of our nature1 they are sui generis respectively1 and incommensurable1 and must be severally experienced in order to be apprehended really4 ,i can understand the rabbia of a native of ,southern ,europe1 if ,i am of a passionate temper myself2 and the taste for speculation or betting found in great traders or on the turf1 if ,i am fond of enterprise or games of chance2 but on the other hand1 not all the possible descriptions of headlong love will make me comprehend the delirium1 if ,i have never had a fit of it2 nor will ever so many sermons about the inward satisfaction of strict conscientiousness create in my mind the image of a virtuous action and its attendant sentiments1 if ,i have been brought up to lie1 thieve and indulge my appetites4 ,thus we meet with men of the world who cannot enter into the very idea of devotion1 and think1 for instance1 that1 from the nature of the case1 a life of religious seclusion must be either one of unutterable dreariness or abandoned sensuality1 because they know of no exercise of the affections but what is merely human2 and with others again1 who1 living in the home of their own selfishness1 ridicule as something fanatical and pitiable the self-sacrifices of generous high-mindedness and chivalrous honour4 ,they cannot create images of these things1 any more than children can on the contrary of vice1 when they ask whereabouts and who the bad men are2 for they have no personal memories1 and have to content themselves with notions drawn from books or from what others tell them4 ,so much on the apprehension of things and on the real sense in our use of language2 now let us pass on to the notional sense4 #b4 ,experience tells us only of individual things1 and these things are innumerable4 ,our minds might have been so constructed as to be able to receive and retain an exact image of each of these various objects1 one by one1 as it came before us1 but only in and for itself1 without the power of comparing it with any of the others4 ,but this is not our case3 on the contrary1 to compare and to contrast are among the most prominent and busy of our intellectual functions4 ,instinctively1 even though unconsciously1 we are ever instituting comparisons between the manifold phenomena of the external world1 as we meet with them1 criticizing1 referring to a standard1 collecting1 analyzing them4 ,nay1 as if by one and the same action1 as soon as we perceive them1 we also perceive that they are like each other or unlike1 or rather both like and unlike at once4 ,we apprehend spontaneously1 even before we set about apprehending1 that man is like man1 yet unlike2 and unlike a horse1 a tree1 a mountain1 or a monument1 yet in some1 though not the same respects1 like each of them4 ,and in consequence1 as ,i have said1 we are ever grouping and discriminating1 measuring and sounding1 framing cross classes and cross divisions1 and thereby rising from particulars to generals1 that is from images to notions4 ,in processes of this kind we regard things1 not as they are in themselves1 but mainly as they stand in relation to each other4 ,we look at nothing simply for its own sake2 we cannot look at any one thing without keeping our eyes on a multitude of other things besides4 8,man0 is no longer what he really is1 an individual presented to us by our senses1 but as we read him in the light of those comparisons and contrasts which we have made him suggest to us4 ,he is attenuated into an aspect1 or relegated to his place in a classification4 ,thus his appellation is made to suggest1 not the real being which he is in this or that specimen of himself1 but a definition4 ,if ,i might use a harsh metaphor1 ,i should say he is made the logarithm of his true self1 and in that shape is worked with the ease and satisfaction of logarithms4 ,it is plain what a different sense language will bear in this system of intellectual notions from what it has when it is the representative of things3 and such a use of it is not only the very foundation of all science1 but may be1 and is1 carried out in literature and in the ordinary intercourse of man with man4 ,and then it comes to pass that individual propositions about the concrete almost cease to be1 and are diluted or starved into abstract notions4 ,the events of history and the characters who figure in it lose their individuality4 ,states and governments1 society and its component parts1 cities1 nations1 even the physical face of the country1 things past1 and things contemporary1 all that fulness of meaning which ,i have described as accruing to language from experience1 now that experience is absent1 necessarily becomes to the multitude of men nothing but a heap of notions1 little more intelligible than the beauties of a prospect to the short-sighted1 or the music of a great master to a listener who has no ear4 ,i suppose most men will recollect in their past years how many mistakes they have made about persons1 parties1 local occurrences1 nations and the like1 of which at the time they had no actual knowledge of their own3 how ashamed or how amused they have since been at their own gratuitous idealism when they came into possession of the real facts concerning them4 ,they were accustomed to treat the definite ,titus or ,sempronius as the quidam homo1 the individuum vagum of the logician4 ,they spoke of his opinions1 his motives1 his practices1 as their traditional rule for the species ,titus or ,sempronius enjoined4 ,in order to find out what individual men in flesh and blood were1 they fancied that they had nothing to do but to refer to commonplaces1 alphabetically arranged4 ,thus they were well up with the character of a ,whig statesman or ,tory magnate1 a ,wesleyan1 a ,congregationalist1 a parson1 a priest1 a philanthropist1 a writer of controversy1 a sceptic2 and found themselves prepared1 without the trouble of direct inquiry1 to draw the individual after the peculiarities of his type4 ,and so with national character2 the late ,duke of ,wellington must have been impulsive1 quarrelsome1 witty1 clever at repartee1 for he was an ,irishman2 in like manner1 we must have cold and selfish ,scots1 crafty ,italians1 vulgar ,americans1 and ,frenchmen1 half tiger1 half monkey4 ,as to the ,french1 those who are old enough to recollect the wars with ,napoleon1 know what eccentric notions were popularly entertained about them in ,england2 how it was even a surprise to find some military man1 who was a prisoner of war1 to be tall and stout1 because it was a received idea that all ,frenchmen were undersized and lived on frogs4 ,such again are the ideal personages who figure in romances and dramas of the old school2 tyrants1 monks1 crusaders1 princes in disguise1 and captive damsels2 or benevolent or angry fathers1 and spendthrift heirs2 like the symbolical characters in some of ,shakespeare's plays1 8a ,tapster10 or 8a ,lord ,mayor10 or in the stage directions 8,enter two murderers40 ,what ,i have been illustrating in the case of persons1 might be instanced in regard to places1 transactions1 physical calamities1 events in history4 ,words which are used by an eye-witness to express things1 unless he be especially eloquent or graphic1 may only convey general notions4 ,such is1 and ever must be1 the popular and ordinary mode of apprehending language4 ,on few subjects only have any of us the opportunity of realizing in our minds what we speak and hear about2 and we fancy that we are doing justice to individual men and things by making them a mere synthesis of qualities1 as if any number whatever of abstractions would1 by being fused together1 be equivalent to one concrete4 ,here then we have two modes of thought1 both using the same words1 both having one origin1 yet with nothing in common in their results4 ,the informations of sense and sensation are the initial basis of both of them2 but in the one we take hold of objects from within them1 and in the other we view them from without them2 we perpetuate them as images in the one case1 we transform them into notions in the other4 ,and natural to us as are both processes in their first elements and in their growth1 however divergent and independent in their direction1 they cannot really be inconsistent with each other2 yet no one from the sight of a horse or a dog would be able to anticipate its zoological definition1 nor from a knowledge of its definition to draw such a picture as would direct another to the living specimen4 ,each use of propositions has its own excellence and serviceableness1 and each has its own imperfection4 ,to apprehend notionally is to have breadth of mind1 but to be shallow2 to apprehend really is to be deep1 but to be narrow-minded4 ,the latter is the conservative principle of knowledge1 and the former the principle of its advancement4 ,without the apprehension of notions1 we should for ever pace round one small circle of knowledge2 without a firm hold upon things1 we shall waste ourselves in vague speculations4 ,however1 real apprehension has the precedence1 as being the scope and end and the test of notional2 and the fuller is the mind's hold upon things or what it considers such1 the more fertile is it in its aspects of them1 and the more practical in its definitions4 ,of course1 as these two are not inconsistent with each other1 they may co-exist in the same mind4 ,indeed there is no one who does not to a certain extent exercise both the one and the other4 ,viewed in relation to ,assent1 which has led to my speaking of them1 they do not in any way affect the nature of the mental act1 which is in all cases absolute and unconditional2 but they give it an external character corresponding respectively to their own3 so much so1 that at first sight it might seem as if ,assent admitted of degrees1 on account of the variation of vividness in these different apprehensions4 ,as notions come of abstractions1 so images come of experiences2 the more fully the mind is occupied by an experience1 the keener will be its assent to it1 if it assents1 and on the other hand1 the duller will be its assent and the less operative1 the more it is engaged with an abstraction2 and thus a scale of assents is conceivable1 either in the instance of one mind upon different subjects1 or of many minds upon one subject1 varying from an assent which looks like mere inference up to a belief both intense and practical1--from the acceptance which we accord to some accidental news of the day to the supernatural dogmatic faith of the ,christian4 ,it follows to treat of ,assent under this double aspect of its subject-matter1--assent to notions1 and assent to things4 ,chapter ,,iv4 ,notional ,and ,real ,assent4 #a4 ,i have said that our apprehension of a proposition varies in strength1 and that it is stronger when it is concerned with a proposition expressive to us of things than when concerned with a proposition expressive of notions2 and ,i have given this reason for it1 viz4 that what is concrete exerts a force and makes an impression on the mind which nothing abstract can rival4 ,that is1 ,i have argued that1 because the object is more powerful1 therefore so is the apprehension of it4 ,i do not think it unfair reasoning thus to take the apprehension for its object4 ,the mind is ever stimulated in proportion to the cause stimulating it4 ,sights1 for instance1 sway us1 as scents do not2 whether this be owing to a greater power in the thing seen1 or to a greater receptivity and expansiveness in the sense of seeing1 is a superfluous question4 ,the strong object would make the apprehension strong4 ,our sense of seeing is able to open to its object1 as our sense of smell cannot open to its own4 ,its objects are able to awaken the mind1 take possession of it1 inspire it1 act through it1 with an energy and variousness which is not found in the case of scents and their apprehension4 ,since we cannot draw the line between the object and the act1 ,i am at liberty to say1 as ,i have said1 that1 as is the thing apprehended1 so is the apprehension4 ,and so in like manner as regards apprehension of mental objects4 ,if an image derived from experience or information is stronger than an abstraction1 conception1 or conclusion--if ,i am more arrested by our ,lord's bearing before ,pilate and ,herod than by the 8,justum et tenacem0 c4 of the poet1 more arrested by ,his ,voice saying to us1 8,give to him that asketh thee10 than by the best arguments of the ,economist against indiscriminate almsgiving1 it does not matter for my present purpose whether the objects give strength to the apprehension or the apprehension gives large admittance into the mind to the object4 ,it is in human nature to be more affected by the concrete than by the abstract2 it may be the reverse with other beings4 ,the apprehension1 then1 may be as fairly said to possess the force which acts upon us1 as the object apprehended4 #b4 ,real apprehension1 then1 may be pronounced stronger than notional1 because things1 which are its objects1 are confessedly more impressive and affective than notions1 which are the objects of notional4 ,experiences and their images strike and occupy the mind1 as abstractions and their combinations do not4 ,next1 passing on to ,assent1 ,i observe that it is this variation in the mind's apprehension of an object to which it assents1 and not any incompleteness in the assent itself1 which leads us to speak of strong and weak assents1 as if ,assent itself admitted of degrees4 ,in either mode of apprehension1 be it real or be it notional1 the assent preserves its essential characteristic of being unconditional4 ,the assent of a ,stoic to the 8,justum et tenacem0 c4 may be as genuine an assent1 as absolute and entire1 as little admitting of degree or variation1 as distinct from an act of inference1 as the assent of a ,christian to the history of our ,lord's ,passion in the ,gospel4 #c4 ,however1 characteristic as it is of ,assent1 to be thus in its nature simply one and indivisible1 and thereby essentially different from ,inference1 which is ever varying in strength1 never quite at the same pitch in any two of its acts1 still it is at the same time true that it may be difficult in fact1 by external tokens1 to distinguish certain acts of assent from certain acts of inference4 ,thus1 whereas no one could possibly confuse the real assent of a ,christian to the fact of our ,lord's crucifixion1 with the notional acceptance of it1 as a point of history1 on the part of a philosophical heathen 7so removed from each other1 toto clo1 are the respective modes of apprehending it in the two cases1 though in both the assent is in its nature one and the same71 nevertheless it would be easy to mistake the ,stoic's notional assent1 genuine though it might be1 to the moral nobleness of the just man 8struggling in the storms of fate10 for a mere act of inference resulting from the principles of his ,stoical profession1 or again for an assent merely to the inferential necessity of the nobleness of that struggle4 ,nothing1 indeed1 is more common than to praise men for their consistency to their principles1 whatever those principles are1 that is1 to praise them on an inference1 without thereby implying any assent to the principles themselves4 ,the cause of this resemblance between acts so distinct is obvious4 ,it exists only in cases of notional assents2 when the assent is given to notions1 then it is possible to hesitate in deciding whether it is assent or inference1 whether the mind is merely without doubt or whether it is actually certain4 ,and the reason is this3 notional ,assent seems like ,inference1 because the apprehension which accompanies acts of inference is notional also1--because ,inference is engaged for the most part on notional propositions1 both premiss and conclusion4 ,this point1 which ,i have implied throughout1 ,i here distinctly record1 and shall enlarge upon hereafter4 ,only propositions about individuals are not notional1 and they are seldom the matter of inference4 ,thus1 did the ,stoic infer the fact of our ,lord's death instead of assenting to it1 the proposition would have been as much an abstraction to him as the 8,justum et tenacem10 c2 nay further1 the 8,justus et tenax0 was at least a notion in his mind1 but 8,jesus ,christ0 would1 in the schools of ,athens or of ,rome1 have stood for less1 for an unknown being1 the x or y of a formula4 ,except then in some of the cases of singular conclusions1 inferences are employed on notions1 that is1 unless they are employed on mere symbols2 and1 indeed1 when they are symbolical1 then are they clearest and most cogent1 as ,i shall hereafter show4 ,the next clearest are such as carry out the necessary results of previous classifications1 and therefore may be called definitions or conclusions1 as we please4 ,for instance1 having divided beings into their classes1 the definition of man is inevitable4 #d4 ,we may call it then the normal state of ,inference to apprehend propositions as notions3--and we may call it the normal state of ,assent to apprehend propositions as things4 ,if notional apprehension is most congenial to ,inference1 real apprehension will be the most natural concomitant on ,assent4 ,an act of ,inference includes in its object the dependence of its thesis upon its premisses1 that is1 upon a relation1 which is abstract2 but an act of ,assent rests wholly on the thesis as its object1 and the reality of the thesis is almost a condition of its unconditionality4 #e4 ,i am led on to make one remark more1 and it shall be my last4 ,an act of assent1 it seems1 is the most perfect and highest of its kind1 when it is exercised on propositions1 which are apprehended as experiences and images1 that is1 which stand for things2 and1 on the other hand1 an act of inference is the most perfect and highest of its kind1 when it is exercised on propositions which are apprehended as notions1 that is1 which are creations of the mind4 ,an act of inference indeed may be made with either of these modes of apprehension2 so may an act of assent2 but1 when inferences are exercised on things1 they tend to be conjectures or presentiments1 without logical force2 and when assents are exercised on notions1 they tend to be mere assertions without any personal hold on them on the part of those who make them4 ,if this be so1 the paradox is true1 that1 when ,inference is clearest1 ,assent may be least forcible1 and1 when ,assent is most intense1 ,inference may be least distinct2--for1 though acts of assent require previous acts of inference1 they require them1 not as adequate causes1 but as sine qu non conditions3 and1 while the apprehension strengthens ,assent1 ,inference often weakens the apprehension4 #a4 ,notional ,assents4 ,i shall consider ,assent made to propositions which express abstractions or notions under five heads2 which ,i shall call ,profession1 ,credence1 ,opinion1 ,presumption1 and ,speculation4 #a4 ,profession4 ,there are assents so feeble and superficial1 as to be little more than assertions4 ,i class them all together under the head of ,profession4 ,such are the assents made upon habit and without reflection2 as when a man calls himself a ,tory or a ,liberal1 as having been brought up as such2 or again1 when he adopts as a matter of course the literary or other fashions of the day1 admiring the poems1 or the novels1 or the music1 or the personages1 or the costume1 or the wines1 or the manners1 which happen to be popular1 or are patronized in the higher circles4 ,such again are the assents of men of wavering restless minds1 who take up and then abandon beliefs so readily1 so suddenly1 as to make it appear that they had no view 7as it is called7 on the matter they professed1 and did not know to what they assented or why4 ,then1 again1 when men say they have no doubt of a thing1 this is a case1 in which it is difficult to determine whether they assent to it1 infer it1 or consider it highly probable4 ,there are many cases1 indeed1 in which it is impossible to discriminate between assent1 inference1 and assertion1 on account of the otiose1 passive1 inchoate character of the act in question4 ,if ,i say that to-morrow will be fine1 what does this enunciation mean8 ,perhaps it means that it ought to be fine1 if the glass tells truly2 then it is the inference of a probability4 ,perhaps it means no more than a surmise1 because it is fine to-day1 or has been so for the week past4 ,and perhaps it is a compliance with the word of another1 in which case it is sometimes a real assent1 sometimes a polite assertion or a wish4 ,many a disciple of a philosophical school1 who talks fluently1 does but assert1 when he seems to assent to the dicta of his master1 little as he may be aware of it4 ,nor is he secured against this self-deception by knowing the arguments on which those dicta rest1 for he may learn the arguments by heart1 as a careless schoolboy gets up his ,euclid4 ,this practice of asserting simply on authority1 with the pretence and without the reality of assent1 is what is meant by formalism4 ,to say 8,i do not understand a proposition1 but ,i accept it on authority10 is not formalism1 but faith2 it is not a direct assent to the proposition1 still it is an assent to the authority which enunciates it2 but what ,i here speak of is professing to understand without understanding4 ,it is thus that political and religious watchwords are created2 first one man of name and then another adopts them1 till their use becomes popular1 and then every one professes them1 because every one else does4 ,such words are 8liberality10 8progress10 8light10 8civilization20 such are 8justification by faith only10 8vital religion10 8private judgment10 8the ,bible and nothing but the ,bible40 ,such again are 8,rationalism10 8,gallicanism10 8,jesuitism10 8,ultramontanism0--all of which1 in the mouths of conscientious thinkers1 have a definite meaning1 but are used by the multitude as war-cries1 nicknames1 and shibboleths1 with scarcely enough of the scantiest grammatical apprehension of them to allow of their being considered really more than assertions4 ,thus1 instances occur now and then1 when1 in consequence of the urgency of some fashionable superstition or popular delusion1 some eminent scientific authority is provoked to come forward1 and to set the world right by his 8ipse dixit40 ,he1 indeed1 himself knows very well what he is about2 he has a right to speak1 and his reasonings and conclusions are sufficient1 not only for his own1 but for general assent1 and1 it may be1 are as simply true and impregnable1 as they are authoritative2 but an intelligent hold on the matter in dispute1 such as he has himself1 cannot be expected in the case of men in general4 ,they1 nevertheless1 one and all1 repeat and retail his arguments1 as suddenly as if they had not to study them1 as heartily as if they understood them1 changing round and becoming as strong antagonists of the error which their master has exposed1 as if they had never been its advocates4 ,if their word is to be taken1 it is not simply his authority that moves them1 which would be sensible enough and suitable in them1 both apprehension and assent being in that case grounded on the maxim 8,cuique in arte su credendum10 but so far forth as they disown this motive1 and claim to judge in a scientific question of the worth of arguments which require some real knowledge1 they are little better1 not of course in a very serious matter1 than pretenders and formalists4 ,not only ,authority1 but ,inference also may impose on us assents which in themselves are little better than assertions1 and which1 so far as they are assents1 can only be notional assents1 as being assents1 not to the propositions inferred1 but to the truth of those propositions4 ,for instance1 it can be proved by irrefragable calculations1 that the stars are not less than billions of miles distant from the earth2 and the process of calculation1 upon which such statements are made1 is not so difficult as to require authority to secure our acceptance of both it and of them2 yet who can say that he has any real1 nay1 any notional apprehension of a billion or a trillion8 ,we can1 indeed1 have some notion of it1 if we analyze it into its factors1 if we compare it with other numbers1 or if we illustrate it by analogies or by its implications2 but ,i am speaking of the vast number in itself4 ,we cannot assent to a proposition of which it is the predicate2 we can but assent to the truth of it4 ,this leads me to the question1 whether belief in a mystery can be more than an assertion4 ,i consider it can be an assent1 and my reasons for saying so are as follows3--,a mystery is a proposition conveying incompatible notions1 or is a statement of the inconceivable4 ,now we can assent to propositions 7and a mystery is a proposition71 provided we can apprehend them2 therefore we can assent to a mystery1 for1 unless we in some sense apprehended it1 we should not recognize it to be a mystery1 that is1 a statement uniting incompatible notions4 ,the same act1 then1 which enables us to discern that the words of the proposition express a mystery1 capacitates us for assenting to it4 ,words which make nonsense1 do not make a mystery4 ,no one would call ,warton's line--8,revolving swans proclaim the welkin near0--an inconceivable assertion4 ,it is equally plain1 that the assent which we give to mysteries1 as such1 is notional assent2 for1 by the supposition1 it is assent to propositions which we cannot conceive1 whereas1 if we had had experience of them1 we should be able to conceive them1 and without experience assent is not real4 ,but the question follows1 ,can processes of inference end in a mystery8 that is1 not only in what is incomprehensible1 that the stars are billions of miles from each other1 but in what is inconceivable1 in the co-existence of 7seeming7 incompatibilities8 ,for how1 it may be asked1 can reason carry out notions into their contradictories8 since all the developments of a truth must from the nature of the case be consistent both with it and with each other4 ,i answer1 certainly processes of inference1 however accurate1 can end in mystery2 and ,i solve the objection to such a doctrine thus3--our notion of a thing may be only partially faithful to the original2 it may be in excess of the thing1 or it may represent it incompletely1 and1 in consequence1 it may serve for it1 it may stand for it1 only to a certain point1 in certain cases1 but no further4 ,after that point is reached1 the notion and the thing part company2 and then the notion1 if still used as the representative of the thing1 will work out conclusions1 not inconsistent with itself1 but with the thing to which it no longer corresponds4 ,this is seen most familiarly in the use of metaphors4 ,thus1 in an ,oxford satire1 which deservedly made a sensation in its day1 it is said that ,vice 8from its hardness takes a polish too407#a7 ,whence we might argue1 that1 whereas ,caliban was vicious1 he was therefore polished2 but politeness and ,caliban are incompatible notions4 ,or again1 when some one said1 perhaps to ,dr4 ,johnson1 that a certain writer 7say ,hume7 was a clear thinker1 he made answer1 8,all shallows are clear40 ,but supposing ,hume to be in fact both a clear and a deep thinker1 yet supposing clearness and depth are incompatible in their literal sense1 which the objection seems to imply1 and still in their full literal sense were to be ascribed to ,hume1 then our reasoning about his intellect has ended in the mystery1 8,deep ,hume is shallow20 whereas the contradiction lies1 not in the reasoning1 but in the fancying that inadequate notions can be taken as the exact representations of things4 ,hence in science we sometimes use a definition or a formula1 not as exact1 but as being sufficient for our purpose1 for working out certain conclusions1 for a practical approximation1 the error being small1 till a certain point is reached4 ,this is what in theological investigations ,i should call an economy4 ,a like contrast between notions and the things which they represent is the principle of suspense and curiosity in those enigmatical sayings which were frequent in the early stage of human society4 ,in them the problem proposed to the acuteness of the hearers1 is to find some real thing which may unite in itself certain conflicting notions which in the question are attributed to it3 8,out of the eater came forth meat1 and out of the strong came forth sweetness20 or1 8,what creature is that1 which in the morning goes on four legs1 at noon on two1 and on three in the evening80 ,the answer1 which names the thing1 interprets and thereby limits the notions under which it has been represented4 ,let us take an example in algebra4 ,its calculus is commonly used to investigate1 not only the relations of quantity generally1 but geometrical facts in particular4 ,now it is at once too wide and too narrow for such a purpose1 fitting on to the doctrine of lines and angles with a bad fit1 as the coat of a short and stout man might serve the needs of one who was tall and slim4 ,certainly it works well for geometrical purposes up to a certain point1 as when it enables us to dispense with the cumbrous method of proof in questions of ratio and proportion1 which is adopted in the fifth book of ,euclid2 but what are we to make of the fourth power of a1 when it is to be translated into geometrical language8 ,if from this algebraical expression we determined that space admitted of four dimensions1 we should be enunciating a mystery1 because we should be applying to space a notion which belongs to quantity4 ,in this case algebra is in excess of geometrical truth4 ,now let us take an instance in which it falls short of geometry1--,what is the meaning of the square root of minus a8 ,here the mystery is on the side of algebra2 and1 in accordance with the principle which ,i am illustrating1 it has sometimes been considered as an abortive effort to express1 what is really beyond the capacity of algebraical notation1 the direction and position of lines in the third dimension of space1 as well as their length upon a plane4 ,when the calculus is urged on by the inevitable course of the working to do what it cannot do1 it stops short as if in resistance1 and protests by an absurdity4 ,our notions of things are never simply commensurate with the things themselves2 they are aspects of them1 more or less exact1 and sometimes a mistake ab initio4 ,take an instance from arithmetic3--,we are accustomed to subject all that exists to numeration2 but1 to be correct1 we are bound first to reduce to some level of possible comparison the things which we wish to number4 ,we must be able to say1 not only that they are ten1 twenty1 or a hundred1 but so many definite somethings4 ,for instance1 we could not without extravagance throw together ,napoleon's brain1 ambition1 hand1 soul1 smile1 height1 and age at ,marengo1 and say that there were seven of them1 though there are seven words2 nor will it even be enough to content ourselves with what may be called a negative level1 viz4 that these seven were an un-,english or are a departed seven4 ,unless numeration is to issue in nonsense1 it must be conducted on conditions4 ,this being the case1 there are1 for what we know1 collections of beings1 to whom the notion of number cannot be attached1 except catachrestically1 because1 taken individually1 no positive point of real agreement can be found between them1 by which to call them4 ,if indeed we can denote them by a plural noun1 then we can measure that plurality2 but if they agree in nothing1 they cannot agree in bearing a common name1 and to say that they amount to a thousand these or those1 is not to number them1 but to count up a certain number of names or words which we have written down4 ,thus1 the ,angels have been considered by divines to have each of them a species to himself2 and we may fancy each of them so absolutely sui similis as to be like nothing else1 so that it would be as untrue to speak of a thousand ,angels as of a thousand ,hannibals or ,ciceros4 ,it will be said1 indeed1 that all beings but ,one at least will come under the notion of creatures1 and are dependent upon that ,one2 but that is true of the brain1 smile1 and height of ,napoleon1 which no one would call three creatures4 ,but1 if all this be so1 much more does it apply to our speculations concerning the ,supreme ,being1 whom it may be unmeaning1 not only to number with other beings1 but to subject to number in regard to ,his own intrinsic characteristics4 ,that is1 to apply arithmetical notions to ,him may be as unphilosophical as it is profane4 ,though ,he is at once ,father1 ,son1 and ,holy ,ghost1 the word 8,trinity0 belongs to those notions of ,him which are forced on us by the necessity of our finite conceptions1 the real and immutable distinction which exists between ,person and ,person implying in itself no infringement of ,his real and numerical ,unity4 ,and if it be asked how1 if we cannot properly speak of ,him as ,three1 we can speak of ,him as ,one1 ,i reply that ,he is not ,one in the way in which created things are severally units2 for one1 as applied to ourselves1 is used in contrast to two or three and a whole series of numbers2 but of the ,supreme ,being it is safer to use the word 8monad0 than unit1 for ,he has not even such relation to ,his creatures as to allow1 philosophically speaking1 of our contrasting ,him with them4 ,coming back to the main subject1 which ,i have illustrated at the risk of digression1 ,i observe1 that an alleged fact is not therefore impossible because it is inconceivable2 for the incompatible notions1 in which consists its inconceivableness1 need not each of them really belong to it in that fulness which involves their being incompatible with each other4 ,it is true indeed that ,i deny the possibility of two straight lines enclosing a space1 on the ground of its being inconceivable2 but ,i do so because a straight line is a notion and nothing more1 and not a thing1 to which ,i may have attached a notion more or less unfaithful4 ,i have defined a straight line in my own way at my own pleasure2 the question is not one of facts at all1 but of the consistency with each other of definitions and of their logical consequences4 8,space is not infinite1 for nothing but the ,creator is such30--starting from this thesis as a theological information1 to be assumed as a fact1 though not one of experience1 we arrive at once at an insoluble mystery2 for1 if space be not infinite1 it is finite1 and finite space is a contradiction in notions1 space1 as such1 implying the absence of boundaries4 ,here again it is our notion that carries us beyond the fact1 and in opposition to it1 showing that from the first what we apprehend of space does not in all respects correspond to the thing1 of which indeed we have no image4 ,this1 then1 is another instance in which the juxtaposition of notions by the logical faculty lands us in what are commonly called mysteries4 ,notions are but aspects of things2 the free deductions from one of these necessarily contradicts the free deductions from another4 ,after proceeding in our investigations a certain way1 suddenly a blank or a maze presents itself before the mental vision1 as when the eye is confused by the varying slides of a telescope4 ,thus1 we believe in the infinitude of the ,divine ,attributes1 but we can have no experience of infinitude as a fact2 the word stands for a definition or a notion4 ,hence1 when we try how to reconcile in the moral world the fulness of mercy with exactitude in sanctity and justice1 or to explain that the physical tokens of creative skill need not suggest any want of creative power1 we feel we are not masters of our subject4 ,we apprehend sufficiently to be able to assent to these theological truths as mysteries2 did we not apprehend them at all1 we should be merely asserting2 though even then we might convert that assertion into an assent1 if we wished to do so1 as ,i have already shown1 by making it the subject of a proposition1 and predicating of it that it is true4 #b4 ,credence4 ,what ,i mean by giving credence to propositions is pretty much the same as having 8no doubt0 about them4 ,it is the sort of assent which we give to those opinions and professed facts which are ever presenting themselves to us without any effort of ours1 and which we commonly take for granted1 thereby obtaining a broad foundation of thought for ourselves1 and a medium of intercourse between ourselves and others4 ,this form of notional assent comprises a great variety of subject-matters2 and is1 as ,i have implied1 of an otiose and passive character1 accepting whatever comes to hand1 from whatever quarter1 warranted or not1 so that it convey nothing on the face of it to its own disadvantage4 ,from the time that we begin to observe1 think1 and reason1 to the final failure of our powers1 we are ever acquiring fresh and fresh informations by means of our senses1 and still more from others and from books4 ,the friends or strangers whom we fall in with in the course of the day1 the conversations or discussions to which we are parties1 the newspapers1 the light reading of the season1 our recreations1 our rambles in the country1 our foreign tours1 all pour their contributions of intellectual matter into the storehouses of our memory2 and1 though much may be lost1 much is retained4 ,these informations1 thus received with a spontaneous assent1 constitute the furniture of the mind1 and make the difference between its civilized condition and a state of nature4 ,they are its education1 as far as general knowledge can so be called2 and1 though education is discipline as well as learning1 still1 unless the mind implicitly welcomes the truths1 real or ostensible1 which these informations supply1 it will gain neither formation nor a stimulus for its activity and progress4 ,besides1 to believe frankly what it is told1 is in the young an exercise of teachableness and humility4 ,credence is the means by which1 in high and low1 in the man of the world and in the recluse1 our bare and barren nature is overrun and diversified from without with a rich and living clothing4 ,it is by such ungrudging1 prompt assents to what is offered to us so lavishly1 that we become possessed of the principles1 doctrines1 sentiments1 facts1 which constitute useful1 and especially liberal knowledge4 ,these various teachings1 shallow though they be1 are of a breadth which secures us against those lacun of knowledge which are apt to befall the professed student1 and keep us up to the mark in literature1 in the arts1 in history1 and in public matters4 ,they give us in great measure our morality1 our politics1 our social code1 our art of life4 ,they supply the elements of public opinion1 the watchwords of patriotism1 the standards of thought and action2 they are our mutual understandings1 our channels of sympathy1 our means of co-operation1 and the bond of our civil union4 ,they become our moral language2 we learn them as we learn our mother tongue2 they distinguish us from foreigners2 they are1 in each of us1 not indeed personal1 but national characteristics4 ,this account of them implies that they are received with a notional1 not a real assent2 they are too manifold to be received in any other way4 ,even the most practised and earnest minds must needs be superficial in the greater part of their attainments4 ,they know just enough on all subjects1 in literature1 history1 politics1 philosophy1 and art1 to be able to converse sensibly on them1 and to understand those who are really deep in one or other of them4 ,this is what is called1 with a special appositeness1 a gentleman's knowledge1 as contrasted with that of a professional man1 and is neither worthless nor despicable1 if used for its proper ends2 but it is never more than the furniture of the mind1 as ,i have called it2 it never is thoroughly assimilated with it4 ,yet of course there is nothing to hinder those who have even the largest stock of such notions from devoting themselves to one or other of the subjects to which those notions belong1 and mastering it with a real apprehension2 and then their general knowledge of all subjects may be made variously useful in the direction of that particular study or pursuit which they have selected4 ,i have been speaking of secular knowledge2 but religion may be made a subject of notional assent also1 and is especially so made in our own country4 ,theology1 as such1 always is notional1 as being scientific3 religion1 as being personal1 should be real2 but1 except within a small range of subjects1 it commonly is not real in ,england4 ,as to ,catholic populations1 such as those of medieval ,europe1 or the ,spain of this day1 or quasi-,catholic as those of ,russia1 among them assent to religious objects is real1 not notional4 ,to them the ,supreme ,being1 our ,lord1 the ,blessed ,virgin1 ,angels and ,saints1 heaven and hell1 are as present as if they were objects of sight2 but such a faith does not suit the genius of modern ,england4 ,there is in the literary world just now an affectation of calling religion a 8sentiment20 and it must be confessed that usually it is nothing more with our own people1 educated or rude4 ,objects are barely necessary to it4 ,i do not say so of old ,calvinism or ,evangelical ,religion2 ,i do not call the religion of ,leighton1 ,beveridge1 ,wesley1 ,thomas ,scott1 or ,cecil a mere sentiment2 nor do ,i so term the high ,anglicanism of the present generation4 ,but these are only denominations1 parties1 schools1 compared with the national religion of ,england in its length and breadth4 8,bible ,religion0 is both the recognized title and the best description of ,english religion4 ,it consists1 not in rites or creeds1 but mainly in having the ,bible read in ,church1 in the family1 and in private4 ,now ,i am far indeed from undervaluing that mere knowledge of ,scripture which is imparted to the population thus promiscuously4 ,at least in ,england1 it has to a certain point made up for great and grievous losses in its ,christianity4 ,the reiteration1 again and again1 in fixed course in the public service1 of the words of inspired teachers under both ,covenants1 and that in grave majestic ,english1 has in matter of fact been to our people a vast benefit4 ,it has attuned their minds to religious thoughts2 it has given them a high moral standard2 it has served them in associating religion with compositions which1 even humanly considered1 are among the most sublime and beautiful ever written2 especially1 it has impressed upon them the series of ,divine ,providences in behalf of man from his creation to his end1 and1 above all1 the words1 deeds1 and sacred sufferings of ,him in whom all the ,providences of ,god centre4 ,so far the indiscriminate reading of ,scripture has been of service2 still1 much more is necessary than the benefits which ,i have enumerated1 to answer to the idea of a ,religion2 whereas our national form professes to be little more than thus reading the ,bible and living a correct life4 ,it is not a religion of persons and things1 of acts of faith and of direct devotion2 but of sacred scenes and pious sentiments4 ,it has been comparatively careless of creed and catechism2 and has in consequence shown little sense of the need of consistency in the matter of its teaching4 ,its doctrines are not so much facts1 as stereotyped aspects of facts2 and it is afraid1 so to say1 of walking round them4 ,it induces its followers to be content with this meagre view of revealed truth2 or1 rather1 it is suspicious and protests1 or is frightened1 as if it saw a figure in a picture move out of its frame1 when our ,lord1 the ,blessed ,virgin1 or the ,holy ,apostles1 are spoken of as real beings1 and really such as ,scripture implies them to be4 ,i am not denying that the assent which it inculcates and elicits is genuine as regards its contracted range of doctrine1 but it is at best notional4 ,what ,scripture especially illustrates from its first page to its last1 is ,god's ,providence2 and that is nearly the only doctrine held with a real assent by the mass of religious ,englishmen4 ,hence the ,bible is so great a solace and refuge to them in trouble4 ,i repeat1 ,i am not speaking of particular schools and parties in ,england1 whether of the ,high ,church or the ,low1 but of the mass of piously-minded and well-living people in all ranks of the community4 #c4 ,opinion4 ,that class of assents which ,i have called ,credence1 being a spontaneous acceptance of the various informations1 which are by whatever means conveyed to our minds1 sometimes goes by the name of ,opinion4 ,when we speak of a man's opinions1 what do we mean1 but the collection of notions which he happens to have1 and does not easily part with1 though he has neither sufficient proof nor firm grasp of them8 ,this is true2 however1 ,opinion is a word of various significations1 and ,i prefer to use it in my own4 ,besides standing for ,credence1 it is sometimes taken to mean ,conviction1 as when we speak of the 8variety of religious opinions10 or of being 8persecuted for religious opinions10 or of our having 8no opinion on a particular point10 or of another having 8no religious opinions40 ,and sometimes it is used in contrast with ,conviction1 as synonymous with a light and casual1 though genuine assent2 thus1 if a man was every day changing his mind1 that is1 his assents1 we might say1 that he was very changeable in his opinions4 ,i shall here use the word to denote an assent1 but an assent to a proposition1 not as true1 but as probably true1 that is1 to the probability of that which the proposition enunciates2 and1 as that probability may vary in strength without limit1 so may the cogency and moment of the opinion4 ,this account of ,opinion may seem to confuse it with ,inference2 for the strength of an inference varies with its premisses1 and is a probability2 but the two acts of mind are really distinct4 ,opinion1 as being an assent1 is independent of premisses4 ,we have opinions which we never think of defending by argument1 though1 of course1 we think they can be so defended4 ,we are even obstinate in them1 or what is called 8opinionated10 and may say that we have a right to think just as we please1 reason or no reason2 whereas ,inference is in its nature and by its profession conditional and uncertain4 ,to say that 8we shall have a fine hay-harvest if the present weather lasts10 does not come of the same state of mind as1 8,i am of opinion that we shall have a fine hay-harvest this year40 ,opinion1 thus explained1 has more connexion with ,credence than with ,inference4 ,it differs from ,credence in these two points1 viz4 that1 while ,opinion explicitly assents to the probability of a given proposition1 ,credence is an implicit assent to its truth4 ,it differs from ,credence in a third respect1 viz4 in being a reflex act2--when we take a thing for granted1 we have credence in it2 when we begin to reflect upon our credence1 and to measure1 estimate1 and modify it1 then we are forming an opinion4 ,it is in this sense that ,catholics speak of theological opinion1 in contrast with faith in dogma4 ,it is much more than an inferential act1 but it is distinct from an act of certitude4 ,and this is really the sense which ,protestants give to the word1 when they interpret it by ,conviction2 for their highest opinion in religion is1 generally speaking1 an assent to a probability--as even ,butler has been understood or misunderstood to teach1--and therefore consistent with toleration of its contradictory4 ,opinion1 being such as ,i have described1 is a notional assent1 for the predicate of the proposition1 on which it is exercised1 is the abstract word 8probable40 #d4 ,presumption4 ,by ,presumption ,i mean an assent to first principles2 and by first principles ,i mean the propositions with which we start in reasoning on any given subject-matter4 ,they are in consequence very numerous1 and vary in great measure with the persons who reason1 according to their judgment and power of assent1 being received by some minds1 not by others1 and only a few of them received universally4 ,they are all of them notions1 not images1 because they express what is abstract1 not what is individual and from direct experience4 #a4 ,sometimes our trust in our powers of reasoning and memory1 that is1 our implicit assent to their telling truly1 is treated as a first principle2 but we cannot properly be said to have any trust in them as faculties4 ,at most we trust in particular acts of memory and reasoning4 ,we are sure there was a yesterday1 and that we did this or that in it2 we are sure that three times six is eighteen1 and that the diagonal of a square is longer than the side4 ,so far as this we may be said to trust the mental act1 by which the object of our assent is verified2 but1 in doing so1 we imply no recognition of a general power or faculty1 or of any capability or affection of our minds1 over and above the particular act4 ,we know indeed that we have a faculty by which we remember1 as we know we have a faculty by which we breathe2 but we gain this knowledge by abstraction or inference from its particular acts1 not by direct experience4 ,nor do we trust in the faculty of memory or reasoning as such1 even after that we have inferred its existence2 for its acts are often inaccurate1 nor do we invariably assent to them4 ,however1 if ,i must speak my mind1 ,i have another ground for reluctance to speak of our trusting memory or reasoning1 except indeed by a figure of speech4 ,it seems to me unphilosophical to speak of trusting ourselves4 ,we are what we are1 and we use1 not trust our faculties4 ,to debate about trusting in a case like this1 is parallel to the confusion implied in wishing ,i had had a choice if ,i would be created or no1 or speculating what ,i should be like1 if ,i were born of other parents4 8,proximus sum egomet mihi40 ,our consciousness of self is prior to all questions of trust or assent4 ,we act according to our nature1 by means of ourselves1 when we remember or reason4 ,we are as little able to accept or reject our mental constitution1 as our being4 ,we have not the option2 we can but misuse or mar its functions4 ,we do not confront or bargain with ourselves2 and therefore ,i cannot call the trustworthiness of the faculties of memory and reasoning one of our first principles4 #b4 ,next1 as to the proposition1 that things exist external to ourselves1 this ,i do consider a first principle1 and one of universal reception4 ,it is founded on an instinct2 ,i so call it1 because the brute creation possesses it4 ,this instinct is directed towards individual phenomena1 one by one1 and has nothing of the character of a generalization2 and1 since it exists in brutes1 the gift of reason is not a condition of its existence1 and it may justly be considered an instinct in man4 ,what the human mind does is what brutes cannot do1 viz4 to draw from our ever-recurring experiences of its testimony in particulars a general proposition1 and1 because this instinct or intuition acts whenever the phenomena of sense present themselves1 to lay down in broad terms1 by an inductive process1 the great aphorism1 that there is an external world1 and that all the phenomena of sense proceed from it4 ,this general proposition1 to which we go on to assent1 goes 7extensiv1 though not intensiv7 far beyond our experience1 illimitable as that experience may be1 and represents a notion4 #c4 ,i have spoken1 and ,i think rightly spoken1 of instinct as a force which spontaneously impels us1 not only to bodily movements1 but to mental acts4 ,it is instinct which leads the quasi-intelligent principle 7whatever it is7 in brutes to perceive in the phenomena of sense a something distinct from and beyond those phenomena4 ,it is instinct which impels the child to recognize in the smiles or the frowns of a countenance which meets his eyes1 not only a being external to himself1 but one whose looks elicit in him confidence or fear4 ,and1 as he instinctively interprets these physical phenomena1 as tokens of things beyond themselves1 so from the sensations attendant upon certain classes of his thoughts and actions he gains a perception of an external being1 who reads his mind1 to whom he is responsible1 who praises and blames1 who promises and threatens4 ,as ,i am only illustrating a general view by examples1 ,i shall take this analogy for granted here4 ,as then we have our initial knowledge of the universe through sense1 so do we in the first instance begin to learn about its ,lord and ,god from conscience2 and1 as from particular acts of that instinct1 which makes experiences1 mere images 7as they ultimately are7 upon the retina1 the means of our perceiving something real beyond them1 we go on to draw the general conclusion that there is a vast external world1 so from the recurring instances in which conscience acts1 forcing upon us importunately the mandate of a ,superior1 we have fresh and fresh evidence of the existence of a ,sovereign ,ruler1 from whom those particular dictates which we experience proceed2 so that1 with limitations which cannot here be made without digressing from my main subject1 we may1 by means of that induction from particular experiences of conscience1 have as good a warrant for concluding the ,ubiquitous ,presence of ,one ,supreme ,master1 as we have1 from parallel experience of sense1 for assenting to the fact of a multiform and vast world1 material and mental4 ,however1 this assent is notional1 because we generalize a consistent1 methodical form of ,divine ,unity and ,personality with ,its attributes1 from particular experiences of the religious instinct1 which are themselves1 only intensiv1 not extensiv1 and in the imagination1 not intellectually1 notices of ,its ,presence2 though at the same time that assent may become real of course1 as may the assent to the external world1 viz4 when we apply our general knowledge to a particular instance of that knowledge1 as1 according to a former remark1 the general 8varium et mutabile0 was realized in ,dido4 ,and in thus treating the origin of these great notions1 ,i am not forgetting the aid which from our earliest years we receive from teachers1 nor am ,i denying the influence of certain original forms of thinking or formative ideas1 connatural with our minds1 without which we could not reason at all4 ,i am only contemplating the mind as it moves in fact1 by whatever hidden mechanism2 as a locomotive engine could not move without steam1 but still1 under whatever number of forces1 it certainly does start from ,birmingham and does arrive in ,london4 #d4 ,and so again1 as regards the first principles expressed in such propositions as 8,there is a right and a wrong10 8a true and a false10 8a just and an unjust10 8a beautiful and a deformed20 they are abstractions to which we give a notional assent in consequence of our particular experiences of qualities in the concrete1 to which we give a real assent4 ,as we form our notion of whiteness from the actual sight of snow1 milk1 a lily1 or a cloud1 so1 after experiencing the sentiment of approbation which arises in us on the sight of certain acts one by one1 we go on to assign to that sentiment a cause1 and to those acts a quality1 and we give to this notional cause or quality the name of virtue1 which is an abstraction1 not a thing4 ,and in like manner1 when we have been affected by a certain specific admiring pleasure at the sight of this or that concrete object1 we proceed by an arbitrary act of the mind to give a name to the hypothetical cause or quality in the abstract1 which excites it4 ,we speak of it as beautifulness1 and henceforth1 when we call a thing beautiful1 we mean by the word nothing else than a certain quality of things which creates in us this special sensation4 ,these so-called first principles1 ,i say1 are really conclusions or abstractions from particular experiences2 and an assent to their existence is not an assent to things or their images1 but to notions1 real assent being confined to the propositions directly embodying those experiences4 ,such notions indeed are an evidence of the reality of the special sentiments in particular instances1 without which they would not have been formed2 but in themselves they are abstractions from facts1 not elementary truths prior to reasoning4 ,i am not of course dreaming of denying the objective existence of the ,moral ,law1 nor our instinctive recognition of the immutable difference in the moral quality of acts1 as elicited in us by one instance of them4 ,even one act of cruelty1 ingratitude1 generosity1 or justice reveals to us at once intensiv the immutable distinction between those qualities and their contraries2 that is1 in that particular instance and pro hac vice4 ,from such experience--an experience which is ever recurring--we proceed to abstract and generalize2 and thus the abstract proposition 8,there is a right and a wrong10 as representing an act of inference1 is received by the mind with a notional1 not a real assent4 ,however1 in proportion as we obey the particular dictates which are its tokens1 so are we led on more and more to view it in the association of those particulars1 which are real1 and virtually to change our notion of it into the image of that objective fact1 which in each particular case it undeniably is4 #e4 ,another of these presumptions is the belief in causation4 ,it is to me a perplexity that grave authors seem to enunciate as an intuitive truth1 that every thing must have a cause4 ,if this were so1 the voice of nature would tell false2 for why in that case stop short at ,one1 who is ,himself without cause8 ,the assent which we give to the proposition1 as a first principle1 that nothing happens without a cause1 is derived1 in the first instance1 from what we know of ourselves2 and we argue analogically from what is within us to what is external to us4 ,one of the first experiences of an infant is that of his willing and doing2 and1 as time goes on1 one of the first temptations of the boy is to bring home to himself the fact of his sovereign arbitrary power1 though it be at the price of waywardness1 mischievousness1 and disobedience4 ,and when his parents1 as antagonists of this wilfulness1 begin to restrain him1 and to bring his mind and conduct into shape1 then he has a second series of experiences of cause and effect1 and that upon a principle or rule4 ,thus the notion of causation is one of the first lessons which he learns from experience1 that experience limiting it to agents possessed of intelligence and will4 ,it is the notion of power combined with a purpose and an end4 ,physical phenomena1 as such1 are without sense2 and experience teaches us nothing about physical phenomena as causes4 ,accordingly1 wherever the world is young1 the movements and changes of physical nature have been and are spontaneously ascribed by its people to the presence and will of hidden agents1 who haunt every part of it1 the woods1 the mountains and the streams1 the air and the stars1 for good or for evil2--just as children again1 by beating the ground after falling1 imply that what has bruised them has intelligence2--nor is there anything illogical in such a belief4 ,it rests on the argument from analogy4 ,as time goes on1 and society is formed1 and the idea of science is mastered1 a different aspect of the physical universe presents itself to the mind4 ,since causation implies a sequence of acts in our own case1 and our doing is always posterior1 never contemporaneous or prior1 to our willing1 therefore1 when we witness invariable antecedents and consequents1 we call the former the cause of the latter1 though intelligence is absent1 from the analogy of external appearances4 ,at length we go on to confuse causation with order2 and1 because we happen to have made a successful analysis of some complicated assemblage of phenomena1 which experience has brought before us in the visible scene of things1 and have reduced them to a tolerable dependence on each other1 we call the ultimate points of this analysis1 and the hypothetical facts in which the whole mass of phenomena is gathered up1 by the name of causes1 whereas they are really only the formula under which those phenomena are conveniently represented4 ,thus the constitutional formula1 8,the king can do no wrong10 is not a fact1 or a cause of the ,constitution1 but a happy mode of bringing out its genius1 of determining the correlations of its elements1 and of grouping or regulating political rules and proceedings in a particular direction and in a particular form4 ,and in like manner1 that all the particles of matter throughout the universe are attracted to each other with a force varying inversely with the square of their respective distances1 is a profound idea1 harmonizing the physical works of the ,creator2 but even could it be proved to be a universal fact1 and also to be the actual cause of the movements of all bodies in the universe1 still it would not be an experience1 any more than is the mythological doctrine of the presence of innumerable spirits in physical phenomena4 ,of these two senses of the word 8cause10 viz4 that which brings a thing to be1 and that on which a thing under given circumstances follows1 the former is that of which our experience is the earlier and more intimate1 being suggested to us by our consciousness of willing and doing4 ,the latter of the two requires a discrimination and exactness of thought for its apprehension1 which implies special mental training2 else1 how do we learn to call food the cause of refreshment1 but day never the cause of night1 though night follows day more surely than refreshment follows food8 ,starting1 then1 from experience1 ,i consider a cause to be an effective will2 and1 by the doctrine of causation1 ,i mean the notion1 or first principle1 that all things come of effective will2 and the reception or presumption of this notion is a notional assent4 #f4 ,as to causation in the second sense 7viz4 an ordinary succession of antecedents and consequents1 or what is called the ,order of ,nature71 when so explained1 it falls under the doctrine of general laws2 and of this ,i proceed to make mention1 as another first principle or notion1 derived by us from experience1 and accepted with what ,i have called a presumption4 ,by natural law ,i mean the fact that things happen uniformly according to certain circumstances1 and not without them and at random3 that is1 that they happen in an order2 and1 as all things in the universe are unit and individual1 order implies a certain repetition1 whether of things or like things1 or of their affections and relations4 ,thus we have experience1 for instance1 of the regularity of our physical functions1 such as the beating of the pulse and the heaving of the breath2 of the recurring sensations of hunger and thirst2 of the alternation of waking and sleeping1 and the succession of youth and age4 ,in like manner we have experience of the great recurring phenomena of the heavens and earth1 of day and night1 summer and winter4 ,also1 we have experience of a like uniform succession in the instance of fire burning1 water choking1 stones falling down and not up1 iron moving towards a magnet1 friction followed by sparks and crackling1 an oar looking bent in the stream1 and compressed steam bursting its vessel4 ,also1 by scientific analysis1 we are led to the conclusion that phenomena1 which seem very different from each other1 admit of being grouped together as modes of the operation of one hypothetical law1 acting under varied circumstances4 ,for instance1 the motion of a stone falling freely1 of a projectile1 and of a planet1 may be generalized as one and the same property1 in each of them1 of the particles of matter2 and this generalization loses its character of hypothesis1 and becomes a probability1 in proportion as we have reason for thinking on other grounds that the particles of all matter really move and act towards each other in one certain way in relation to space and time1 and not in half a dozen ways2 that is1 that nature acts by uniform laws4 ,and thus we advance to the general notion or first principle of the sovereignty of law throughout the universe4 ,there are philosophers who go farther1 and teach1 not only a general1 but an invariable1 and inviolable1 and necessary uniformity in the action of the laws of nature1 holding that every thing is the result of some law or laws1 and that exceptions are impossible2 but ,i do not see on what ground of experience or reason they take up this position4 ,our experience rather is adverse to such a doctrine1 for what concrete fact or phenomenon exactly repeats itself8 ,some abstract conception of it1 more perfect than the recurrent phenomenon itself1 is necessary1 before we are able to say that it has happened even twice1 and the variations which accompany the repetition are of the nature of exceptions4 ,the earth1 for instance1 never moves exactly in the same orbit year by year1 but is in perpetual vacillation4 ,it will1 indeed1 be replied that this arises from the interaction of one law with another1 of which the actual orbit is only the accidental issue1 that the earth is under the influence of a variety of attractions from cosmical bodies1 and that1 if it is subject to continual aberrations in its course1 these are accounted for accurately or sufficiently by the presence of those extraordinary and variable attractions3--science1 then1 by its analytical processes sets right the prim facie confusion4 ,of course2 still let us not by our words imply that we are appealing to experience1 when really we are only accounting1 and that by hypothesis1 for the absence of experience4 ,the confusion is a fact1 the reasoning processes are not facts4 ,the extraordinary attractions assigned to account for our experience of that confusion are not themselves experienced phenomenal facts1 but more or less probable hypotheses1 argued out by means of an assumed analogy between the cosmical bodies to which those attractions are referred and falling bodies on the earth4 ,i say 8assumed10 because that analogy 7in other words1 the unfailing uniformity of nature7 is the very point which has to be proved4 ,it is true1 that we can make experiment of the law of attraction in the case of bodies on the earth2 but1 ,i repeat1 to assume from analogy that1 as stones do fall to the earth1 so ,jupiter1 if let alone1 would fall upon the earth and the earth upon ,jupiter1 and with certain peculiarities of velocity on either side1 is to have recourse to an explanation which is not necessarily valid1 unless nature is necessarily uniform4 ,nor1 indeed1 has it yet been proved1 nor ought it to be assumed1 even that the law of velocity of falling bodies on the earth is invariable in its operation2 for that again is only an instance of the general proposition1 which is the very thesis in debate4 ,it seems safer then to hold that the order of nature is not necessary1 but general in its manifestations4 ,but1 it may be urged1 if a thing happens once1 it must happen always2 for what is to hinder it8 ,nay1 on the contrary1 why1 because one particle of matter has a certain property1 should all particles have the same8 ,why1 because particles have instanced the property a thousand times1 should the thousand and first instance it also8 ,it is prim facie unaccountable that an accident should happen twice1 not to speak of its happening always4 ,if we expect a thing to happen twice1 it is because we think it is not an accident1 but has a cause4 ,what has brought about a thing once1 may bring it about twice4 ,what is to hinder its happening8 rather1 ,what is to make it happen8 ,here we are thrown back from the question of ,order to that of ,causation4 ,a law is not a cause1 but a fact2 but when we come to the question of cause1 then1 as ,i have said1 we have no experience of any cause but ,will4 ,if1 then1 ,i must answer the question1 ,what is to alter the order of nature8 ,i reply1 ,that which willed it2--,that which willed it1 can unwill it2 and the invariableness of law depends on the unchangeableness of that ,will4 ,and here ,i am led to observe that1 as a cause implies a will1 so order implies a purpose4 ,did we see flint celts1 in their various receptacles all over ,europe1 scored always with certain special and characteristic marks1 even though those marks had no assignable meaning or final cause whatever1 we should take that very repetition1 which indeed is the principle of order1 to be a proof of intelligence4 ,the agency then which has kept up and keeps up the general laws of nature1 energizing at once in ,sirius and on the earth1 and on the earth in its primary period as well as in the nineteenth century1 must be ,mind1 and nothing else1 and ,mind at least as wide and as enduring in its living action1 as the immeasurable ages and spaces of the universe on which that agency has left its traces4 ,in these remarks ,i have digressed from my immediate subject1 but they have some bearing on points which will subsequently come into discussion4 #e4 ,speculation4 ,speculation is one of those words which1 in the vernacular1 have so different a sense from what they bear in philosophy4 ,it is commonly taken to mean a conjecture1 or a venture on chances2 but its proper meaning is mental sight1 or the contemplation of mental operations and their results as opposed to experience1 experiment1 or sense1 analogous to its meaning in ,shakspeare's line1 8,thou hast no speculation in those eyes40 ,in this sense ,i use it here4 ,and ,i use it in this sense to denote those notional assents which are the most direct1 explicit1 and perfect of their kind1 viz4 those which are the firm1 conscious acceptance of propositions as true4 ,this kind of assent includes the assent to all reasoning and its conclusions1 to all general propositions1 to all rules of conduct1 to all proverbs1 aphorisms1 sayings1 and reflections on men and society4 ,of course mathematical investigations and truths are the subjects of this speculative assent4 ,so are legal judgments1 and constitutional maxims1 as far as they appeal to us for assent4 ,so are the determinations of science2 so are the principles1 disputations1 and doctrines of theology4 ,that there is a ,god1 that ,he has certain attributes1 and in what sense ,he can be said to have attributes1 that ,he has done certain works1 that ,he has made certain revelations of ,himself and of ,his will1 and what they are1 and the multiplied bearings of the parts of the teaching1 thus developed and formed1 upon each other1 all this is the subject of notional assent1 and of that particular department of it which ,i have called ,speculation4 ,as far as these particular subjects can be viewed in the concrete and represent experiences1 they can be received by real assent also2 but as expressed in general propositions they belong to notional apprehension and assent4 #b4 ,real ,assents4 ,i have in a measure anticipated the subject of ,real ,assent by what ,i have been saying about ,notional4 ,in comparison of the directness and force of the apprehension1 which we have of an object1 when our assent is to be called real1 ,notional ,assent and ,inference seem to be thrown back into one and the same class of intellectual acts1 though the former of the two is always an unconditional acceptance of a proposition1 and the latter is an acceptance on the condition of an acceptance of its premisses4 ,in its notional assents as well as in its inferences1 the mind contemplates its own creations instead of things2 in real1 it is directed towards things1 represented by the impressions which they have left on the imagination4 ,these images1 when assented-to1 have an influence both on the individual and on society1 which mere notions cannot exert4 ,i have already given various illustrations of ,real ,assent2 ,i will follow them up here by some instances of the change of ,notional ,assent into ,real4 #a4 ,for instance3 boys at school look like each other1 and pursue the same studies1 some of them with greater success than others2 but it will sometimes happen1 that those who acquitted themselves but poorly in class1 when they come into the action of life1 and engage in some particular work1 which they have already been learning in its theory and with little promise of proficiency1 are suddenly found to have what is called an eye for that work--an eye for trade matters1 or for engineering1 or a special taste for literature--which no one expected from them at school1 while they were engaged on notions4 ,minds of this stamp not only know the received rules of their profession1 but enter into them1 and even anticipate them1 or dispense with them1 or substitute other rules instead4 ,and when new questions are opened1 and arguments are drawn up on one side and the other in long array1 they with a natural ease and promptness form their views and give their decision1 as if they had no need to reason1 from their clear apprehension of the lie and issue of the whole matter in dispute1 as if it were drawn out in a map before them4 ,these are the reformers1 systematizers1 inventors1 in various departments of thought1 speculative and practical2 in education1 in administration1 in social and political matters1 in science4 ,such men indeed are far from infallible2 however great their powers1 they sometimes fall into great errors1 in their own special department1 while second-rate men who go by rule come to sound and safe conclusions4 ,images need not be true2 but ,i am illustrating what vividness of apprehension is1 and what is the strength of belief consequent upon it4 #b4 ,again3--twenty years ago1 the ,duke of ,wellington wrote his celebrated letter on the subject of the national defences4 ,his authority gave it an immediate circulation among all classes of the community2 none questioned what he said1 nor as if taking his words on faith merely1 but as intellectually recognizing their truth2 yet few could be said to see or feel that truth4 ,his letter lay1 so to say1 upon the pure intellect of the national mind1 and nothing for a time came of it4 ,but eleven years afterwards1 after his death1 the anger of the ,french colonels with us1 after the attempt upon ,louis ,napoleon's life1 transferred its facts to the charge of the imagination4 ,then forthwith the national assent became in various ways an operative principle1 especially in its promotion of the volunteer movement4 ,the ,duke1 having a special eye for military matters1 had realized the state of things from the first2 but it took a course of years to impress upon the public mind an assent to his warning deeper and more energetic than the reception it is accustomed to give to a clever article in a newspaper or a review4 #c4 ,and so generally3 great truths1 practical or ethical1 float on the surface of society1 admitted by all1 valued by few1 exemplifying the poet's adage1 8,probitas laudatur et alget10 until changed circumstances1 accident1 or the continual pressure of their advocates1 force them upon its attention4 ,the iniquity1 for instance1 of the slave-trade ought to have been acknowledged by all men from the first2 it was acknowledged by many1 but it needed an organized agitation1 with tracts and speeches innumerable1 so to affect the imagination of men as to make their acknowledgment of that iniquitousness operative4 ,in like manner1 when ,mr4 ,wilberforce1 after succeeding in the slave question1 urged the ,duke of ,wellington to use his great influence in discountenancing duelling1 he could only get from him in answer1 8,a relic of barbarism1 ,mr4 ,wilberforce20 as if he accepted a notion without realizing a fact3 at length1 the growing intelligence of the community1 and the shock inflicted upon it by the tragical circumstances of a particular duel1 were fatal to that barbarism4 ,the governing classes were roused from their dreamy acquiescence in an abstract truth1 and recognized the duty of giving it practical expression4 #d4 ,let us consider1 too1 how differently young and old are affected by the words of some classic author1 such as ,homer or ,horace4 ,passages1 which to a boy are but rhetorical commonplaces1 neither better nor worse than a hundred others which any clever writer might supply1 which he gets by heart and thinks very fine1 and imitates1 as he thinks1 successfully1 in his own flowing versification1 at length come home to him1 when long years have passed1 and he has had experience of life1 and pierce him1 as if he had never before known them1 with their sad earnestness and vivid exactness4 ,then he comes to understand how it is that lines1 the birth of some chance morning or evening at an ,ionian festival1 or among the ,sabine hills1 have lasted generation after generation1 for thousands of years1 with a power over the mind1 and a charm1 which the current literature of his own day1 with all its obvious advantages1 is utterly unable to rival4 ,perhaps this is the reason of the medieval opinion about ,virgil1 as if a prophet or magician2 his single words and phrases1 his pathetic half lines1 giving utterance1 as the voice of ,nature herself1 to that pain and weariness1 yet hope of better things1 which is the experience of her children in every time4 #e4 ,and what the experience of the world effects for the illustration of classical authors1 that office the religious sense1 carefully cultivated1 fulfils towards ,holy ,scripture4 ,to the devout and spiritual1 the ,divine ,word speaks of things1 not merely of notions4 ,and1 again1 to the disconsolate1 the tempted1 the perplexed1 the suffering1 there comes1 by means of their very trials1 an enlargement of thought1 which enables them to see in it what they never saw before4 ,henceforth there is to them a reality in its teachings1 which they recognize as an argument1 and the best of arguments1 for its divine origin4 ,hence the practice of meditation on the ,sacred ,text1 so highly thought of by ,catholics4 ,reading1 as we do1 the ,gospels from our youth up1 we are in danger of becoming so familiar with them as to be dead to their force1 and to view them as a mere history4 ,the purpose1 then1 of meditation is to realize them2 to make the facts which they relate stand out before our minds as objects1 such as may be appropriated by a faith as living as the imagination which apprehends them4 ,it is obvious to refer to the unworthy use made of the more solemn parts of the sacred volume by the mere popular preacher4 ,his very mode of reading1 whether warnings or prayers1 is as if he thought them to be little more than fine writing1 poetical in sense1 musical in sound1 and worthy of inspiration4 ,the most awful truths are to him but sublime or beautiful conceptions1 and are adduced and used by him1 in season and out of season1 for his own purposes1 for embellishing his style or rounding his periods4 ,but let his heart at length be ploughed by some keen grief or deep anxiety1 and ,scripture is a new book to him4 ,this is the change which so often takes place in what is called religious conversion1 and it is a change so far simply for the better1 by whatever infirmity or error it is in the particular case accompanied4 ,and it is strikingly suggested to us1 to take a saintly example1 in the confession of the patriarch ,job1 when he contrasts his apprehension of the ,almighty before and after his afflictions4 ,he says he had indeed a true apprehension of the ,divine ,attributes before as well as after2 but with the trial came a great change in the character of that apprehension3--8,with the hearing of the ear10 he says1 8,i have heard ,thee1 but now mine eye seeth ,thee2 therefore ,i reprehend myself1 and do penance in dust and ashes40 ,let these instances suffice of ,real ,assent in its relation to ,notional2 they lead me to make three remarks in further illustration of its character4 #a4 ,the fact of the distinctness of the images1 which are required for real assent1 is no warrant for the existence of the objects which those images represent4 ,a proposition1 be it ever so keenly apprehended1 may be true or may be false4 ,if we simply put aside all inferential information1 such as is derived from testimony1 from general belief1 from the concurrence of the senses1 from common sense1 or otherwise1 we have no right to consider that we have apprehended a truth1 merely because of the strength of our mental impression of it4 ,hence the proverb1 8,fronti nulla fides40 ,an image1 with the characters of perfect veracity and faithfulness1 may be ever so distinct and eloquent an object presented before the mind 7or1 as it is sometimes called1 an 8objectum internum10 or a 8subject-object072 but1 nevertheless1 there may be no external reality in the case1 corresponding to it1 in spite of its impressiveness4 ,one of the most remarkable instances of this fallacious impressiveness is the illusion which possesses the minds of able men1 those especially who are exercised in physical investigations1 in favour of the inviolability of the laws of nature4 ,philosophers of the school of ,hume discard the very supposition of miracles1 and scornfully refuse to hear evidence in their behalf in given instances1 from their intimate experience of physical order and of the ever-recurring connexion of antecedent and consequent4 ,their imagination usurps the functions of reason2 and they cannot bring themselves even to entertain as a hypothesis 7and this is all that they are asked to do7 a thought contrary to that vivid impression of which they are the victims1 that the uniformity of nature1 which they witness hour by hour1 is equivalent to a necessary1 inviolable law4 ,yet it is plain1 and ,i shall take it for granted here1 that when ,i assent to a proposition1 ,i ought to have some more legitimate reason for doing so1 than the brilliancy of the image of which that proposition is the expression4 ,that ,i have no experience of a thing happening except in one way1 is a cause of the intensity of my assent1 if ,i assent1 but not the reason of my assenting4 ,in saying this1 ,i am not disposed to deny the presence in some men of an idiosyncratic sagacity1 which really and rightly sees reasons in impressions which common men cannot see1 and is secured from the peril of confusing truth with make-belief2 but this is genius1 and beyond rule4 ,i grant too1 of course1 that accidentally impressiveness does in matter of fact1 as in the instance which ,i have been giving1 constitute the motive principle of belief2 for the mind is ever exposed to the danger of being carried away by the liveliness of its conceptions1 to the sacrifice of good sense and conscientious caution1 and the greater and the more rare are its gifts1 the greater is the risk of swerving from the line of reason and duty2 but here ,i am not speaking of transgressions of rule any more than of exceptions to it1 but of the normal constitution of our minds1 and of the natural and rightful effect of acts of the imagination upon us1 and this is1 not to create assent1 but to intensify it4 #b4 ,next1 ,assent1 however strong1 and accorded to images however vivid1 is not therefore necessarily practical4 ,strictly speaking1 it is not imagination that causes action2 but hope and fear1 likes and dislikes1 appetite1 passion1 affection1 the stirrings of selfishness and self-love4 ,what imagination does for us is to find a means of stimulating those motive powers2 and it does so by providing a supply of objects strong enough to stimulate them4 ,the thought of honour1 glory1 duty1 self-aggrandisement1 gain1 or on the other hand of ,divine ,goodness1 future reward1 eternal life1 perseveringly dwelt upon1 leads us along a course of action corresponding to itself1 but only in case there be that in our minds which is congenial to it4 ,however1 when there is that preparation of mind1 the thought does lead to the act4 ,hence it is that the fact of a proposition being accepted with a real assent is accidentally an earnest of that proposition being carried out in conduct1 and the imagination may be said in some sense to be of a practical nature1 inasmuch as it leads to practice indirectly by the action of its object upon the affections4 #c4 ,there is a third remark suggested by the view which ,i have been taking of real assents1 viz4 that they are of a personal character1 each individual having his own1 and being known by them4 ,it is otherwise with notions2 notional apprehension is in itself an ordinary act of our common nature4 ,all of us have the power of abstraction1 and can be taught either to make or to enter into the same abstractions2 and thus to co-operate in the establishment of a common measure between mind and mind4 ,and1 though for one and all of us to assent to the notions which we thus apprehend in common1 is a further step1 as requiring the adoption of a common stand-point of principle and judgment1 yet this too depends in good measure on certain logical processes of thought1 with which we are all familiar1 and on facts which we all take for granted4 ,but we cannot make sure1 for ourselves or others1 of real apprehension and assent1 because we have to secure first the images which are their objects1 and these are often peculiar and special4 ,they depend on personal experience2 and the experience of one man is not the experience of another4 ,real assent1 then1 as the experience which it presupposes1 is proper to the individual1 and1 as such1 thwarts rather than promotes the intercourse of man with man4 ,it shuts itself up1 as it were1 in its own home1 or at least it is its own witness and its own standard2 and1 as in the instances above given1 it cannot be reckoned on1 anticipated1 accounted for1 inasmuch as it is the accident of this man or that4 ,i call the characteristics of an individual accidents1 in spite of the universal reign of law1 because they are severally the co-incidents of many laws1 and there are no laws as yet discovered of such coincidence4 ,a man who is run over in the street and killed1 in one sense suffers according to rule or law2 he was crossing1 he was short-sighted or preoccupied in mind1 or he was looking another way2 he was deaf1 lame1 or flurried2 and the cab came up at a great pace4 ,if all this was so1 it was by a necessity that he was run over2 it would have been a miracle if he had escaped4 ,so far is clear2 but what is not clear is how all these various conditions met together in the particular case1 how it was that a man1 short-sighted1 hard of hearing1 deficient in presence of mind1 happened to get in the way of a cab hurrying along to catch a train4 ,this concrete fact does not come under any law of sudden deaths1 but1 like the earth's yearly path which ,i spoke of above1 is the accident of the individual4 ,it does not meet the case to refer to the law of averages1 for such laws deal with percentages1 not with individuals1 and it is about individuals that ,i am speaking4 ,that this particular man out of the three millions congregated in the metropolis1 was to have the experience of this catastrophe1 and to be the select victim to appease that law of averages1 no statistical tables could foretell1 even though they could determine that it was in the fates that in that week or day some four persons in the length and breadth of ,london should be run over4 ,and in like manner that this or that person should have the particular experiences necessary for real assent on any point1 that the ,deist should become a ,theist1 the ,erastian a ,catholic1 the ,protectionist a ,free-trader1 the ,conservative a ,legitimist1 the high ,tory an out-and-out ,democrat1 are facts1 each of which may be the result of a multitude of coincidences in one and the same individual1 coincidences which we have no means of determining1 and which1 therefore1 we may call accidents4 ,for-- 8,there's a ,divinity that shapes our ends1 ,rough hew them how we will40 ,such accidents are the characteristics of persons1 as differenti and properties are the characteristics of species or natures4 ,that a man dies when deprived of air1 is not an accident of his person1 but a law of his nature2 that he cannot live without quinine or opium1 or out of the climate of ,madeira1 is his own peculiarity4 ,if all men every where usually had the yellow fever once in their lives1 we should call it 7speaking according to our knowledge7 a law of the human constitution2 if the inhabitants of a particular country commonly had it1 we should call it a law of the climate2 if a healthy man has a fever in a healthy place1 in a healthy season1 we call it an accident1 though it be reducible to the coincidence of laws1 because there is no known law of their coincidence4 ,to be rational1 to have speech1 to pass through successive changes of mind and body from infancy to death1 belong to man's nature2 to have a particular history1 to be married or single1 to have children or to be childless1 to live a given number of years1 to have a certain constitution1 moral temperament1 intellectual outfit1 mental formation1 these and the like1 taken all together1 are the accidents which make up our notion of a man's person1 and are the ground-work or condition of his particular experiences4 ,moreover1 various of the experiences which befall this man may be the same as those which befall that1 although those experiences result each from the combination of its own accidents1 and are ultimately traceable each to its own special condition or history4 ,that is1 images which are possessed in common1 with their apprehensions and assents1 may nevertheless be personal characteristics4 ,if two or three hundred men are to be found1 who cannot live out of ,madeira1 that inability would still be an accident and a peculiarity of each of them4 ,even if in each case it implied delicacy of lungs1 still that delicacy is a vague notion1 comprehending under it a great variety of cases in detail4 ,if 8five hundred brethren at once0 saw our risen ,lord1 that common experience would not be a law1 but a personal accident which was the prerogative of each4 ,and so again in this day the belief of so many thousands in ,his ,divinity1 is not therefore notional1 because it is common1 but may be a real and personal belief1 being produced in different individual minds by various experiences and disposing causes1 variously combined2 such as a warm or strong imagination1 great sensibility1 compunction and horror at sin1 frequenting the ,mass and other rites of the ,church1 meditating on the contents of the ,gospels1 familiarity with hymns and religious poems1 dwelling on the ,evidences1 parental example and instruction1 religious friends1 strange providences1 powerful preaching4 ,in each case the image in the mind1 with the experiences out of which it is formed1 would be a personal result2 and1 though the same in all1 would in each case be so idiosyncratic in its circumstances1 that it would stand by itself1 a special formation1 unconnected with any law2 though at the same time it would necessarily be a principle of sympathy and a bond of intercourse between those whose minds had been thus variously wrought into a common assent1 far stronger than could follow upon any multitude of mere notions which they unanimously held4 ,and even when that assent is not the result of concurrent causes1 if such a case is possible1 but has one single origin1 as the study of ,scripture1 careful teaching1 or a religious temper1 still its presence argues a special history1 and a personal formation1 which an abstraction does not4 ,for an abstraction can be made at will1 and may be the work of a moment2 but the moral experiences which perpetuate themselves in images1 must be sought after in order to be found1 and encouraged and cultivated in order to be appropriated4 ,i have now said all that occurs to me on the subject of ,real ,assents1 perhaps not without some risk of subtlety and minuteness4 ,they are sometimes called beliefs1 convictions1 certitudes2 and1 as given to moral objects1 they are perhaps as rare as they are powerful4 ,till we have them1 in spite of a full apprehension and assent in the field of notions1 we have no intellectual moorings1 and are at the mercy of impulses1 fancies1 and wandering lights1 whether as regards personal conduct1 social and political action1 or religion4 ,these beliefs1 be they true or false in the particular case1 form the mind out of which they grow1 and impart to it a seriousness and manliness which inspires in other minds a confidence in its views1 and is one secret of persuasiveness and influence in the public stage of the world4 ,they create1 as the case may be1 heroes and saints1 great leaders1 statesmen1 preachers1 and reformers1 the pioneers of discovery in science1 visionaries1 fanatics1 knight-errants1 demagogues1 and adventurers4 ,they have given to the world men of one idea1 of immense energy1 of adamantine will1 of revolutionary power4 ,they kindle sympathies between man and man1 and knit together the innumerable units which constitute a race and a nation4 ,they become the principle of its political existence2 they impart to it homogeneity of thought and fellowship of purpose4 ,they have given form to the medieval theocracy and to the ,mahometan superstition2 they are now the life both of 8,holy ,russia10 and of that freedom of speech and action which is the special boast of ,englishmen4 #c4 ,notional and ,real ,assents ,contrasted4 ,it appears from what has been said1 that1 though ,real ,assent is not intrinsically operative1 it accidentally and indirectly affects practice4 ,it is in itself an intellectual act1 of which the object is presented to it by the imagination2 and though the pure intellect does not lead to action1 nor the imagination either1 yet the imagination has the means1 which pure intellect has not1 of stimulating those powers of the mind from which action proceeds4 ,real ,assent then1 or ,belief1 as it may be called1 viewed in itself1 that is1 simply as ,assent1 does not lead to action2 but the images in which it lives1 representing as they do the concrete1 have the power of the concrete upon the affections and passions1 and by means of these indirectly become operative4 ,still this practical influence is not invariable1 nor to be relied on2 for given images may have no tendency to affect given minds1 or to excite them to action4 ,thus1 a philosopher or a poet may vividly realize the brilliant rewards of military genius or of eloquence1 without wishing either to be a commander or an orator4 ,however1 on the whole1 broadly contrasting ,belief with ,notional ,assent and with ,inference1 we shall not1 with this explanation1 be very wrong in pronouncing that acts of ,notional ,assent and of ,inference do not affect our conduct1 and acts of ,belief1 that is1 of ,real ,assent1 do 7not necessarily1 but do7 affect it4 ,i have scarcely spoken of ,inference since my ,introductory ,chapter1 though ,i intend1 before ,i conclude1 to consider it fully2 but ,i have said enough to admit of my introducing it here in contrast with ,real ,assent or ,belief1 and that contrast is necessary in order to complete what ,i have been saying about the latter4 ,let me then1 for the sake of the latter1 be allowed here to say1 that1 while ,assent1 or ,belief1 presupposes some apprehension of the things believed1 ,inference requires no apprehension of the things inferred2 that in consequence1 ,inference is necessarily concerned with surfaces and aspects2 that it begins with itself1 and ends with itself2 that it does not reach as far as facts2 that it is employed upon formulas2 that1 as far as it takes real objects of whatever kind into account1 such as motives and actions1 character and conduct1 art1 science1 taste1 morals1 religion1 it deals with them1 not as they are1 but simply in its own line1 as materials of argument or inquiry1 that they are to it nothing more than major and minor premisses and conclusions4 ,belief1 on the other hand1 being concerned with things concrete1 not abstract1 which variously excite the mind from their moral and imaginative properties1 has for its object1 not only directly what is true1 but inclusively what is beautiful1 useful1 admirable1 heroic2 objects which kindle devotion1 rouse the passions1 and attach the affections2 and thus it leads the way to actions of every kind1 to the establishment of principles1 and the formation of character1 and is thus again intimately connected with what is individual and personal4 ,i insisted on this marked distinction between ,beliefs on the one hand1 and ,notional ,assents and ,inferences on the other1 many years ago in words which it will be to my purpose to use now47#b7 ,i quote them1 because1 over and above their appositeness in this place1 they present the doctrine on which ,i have been insisting1 from a second point of view1 and with a freshness and force which ,i cannot now command1 and1 moreover1 7though they are my own1 nevertheless1 from the length of time which has elapsed since their publication17 almost with the cogency of an independent testimony4 ,they occur in a protest which ,i had occasion to write in ,february1 #ahda1 against a dangerous doctrine maintained1 as ,i considered1 by two very eminent men of that day1 now no more--,lord ,brougham and ,sir ,robert ,peel4 ,that doctrine was to the effect that the claims of religion could be secured and sustained in the mass of men1 and in particular in the lower classes of society1 by acquaintance with literature and physical science1 and through the instrumentality of ,mechanics' ,institutes and ,reading ,rooms1 to the serious disparagement1 as it seemed to me1 of direct ,christian instruction4 ,in the course of my remarks is found the passage which ,i shall here quote1 and which1 with whatever differences in terminology1 and hardihood of assertion1 befitting the circumstances of its publication1 nay1 as far as words go1 inaccuracy of theological statement1 suitably illustrates the subject here under discussion4 ,it runs thus3-- 8,people say to me1 that it is but a dream to suppose that ,christianity should regain the organic power in human society which once it possessed4 ,i cannot help that2 ,i never said it could4 ,i am not a politician2 ,i am proposing no measures1 but exposing a fallacy and resisting a pretence4 ,let ,benthamism reign1 if men have no aspirations2 but do not tell them to be romantic and then solace them with #8glory3' do not attempt by philosophy what once was done by religion4 ,the ascendency of faith may be impracticable1 but the reign of knowledge is incomprehensible4 ,the problem for statesmen of this age is how to educate the masses1 and literature and science cannot give the solution4 8,science gives us the grounds or premisses from which religious truths are to be enforced2 but it does not set about inferring them1 much less does it reach the inference--that is not its province4 ,it brings before us phenomena1 and it leaves us1 if we will1 to call them works of design1 wisdom1 or benevolence2 and further still1 if we will1 to proceed to confess an ,intelligent ,creator4 ,we have to take its facts1 and to give them a meaning1 and to draw our own conclusions from them4 ,first comes knowledge1 then a view1 then reasoning1 and then belief4 ,this is why science has so little of a religious tendency2 deductions have no power of persuasion4 ,the heart is commonly reached1 not through the reason1 but through the imagination1 by means of direct impressions1 by the testimony of facts and events1 by history1 by description4 ,persons influence us1 voices melt us1 looks subdue us1 deeds inflame us4 ,many a man will live and die upon a dogma3 no man will be a martyr for a conclusion4 ,a conclusion is but an opinion2 it is not a thing which is1 but which we are #8quite sure about2' and it has often been observed1 that we never say we are sure and certain without implying that we doubt4 ,to say that a thing must be1 is to admit that it may not be4 ,no one1 ,i say1 will die for his own calculations3 he dies for realities4 ,this is why a literary religion is so little to be depended upon2 it looks well in fair weather2 but its doctrines are opinions1 and1 when called to suffer for them1 it slips them between its folios1 or burns them at its hearth4 ,and this again is the secret of the distrust and raillery with which moralists have been so commonly visited4 ,they say and do not4 ,why8 ,because they are contemplating the fitness of things1 and they live by the square1 when they should be realizing their high maxims in the concrete4 ,now ,sir ,robert ,peel thinks better of natural history1 chemistry1 and astronomy than of such ethics2 but these too1 what are they more than divinity in posse8 ,he protests against #8controversial divinity3' is inferential much better8 8,i have no confidence1 then1 in philosophers who cannot help being religious1 and are ,christians by implication4 ,they sit at home1 and reach forward to distances which astonish us2 but they hit without grasping1 and are sometimes as confident about shadows as about realities4 ,they have worked out by a calculation the lie of a country which they never saw1 and mapped it by means of a gazetteer2 and1 like blind men1 though they can put a stranger on his way1 they cannot walk straight themselves1 and do not feel it quite their business to walk at all4 8,logic makes but a sorry rhetoric with the multitude2 first shoot round corners1 and you may not despair of converting by a syllogism4 ,tell men to gain notions of a ,creator from ,his works1 and1 if they were to set about it 7which nobody does7 they would be jaded and wearied by the labyrinth they were tracing4 ,their minds would be gorged and surfeited by the logical operation4 ,logicians are more set upon concluding rightly1 than on right conclusions4 ,they cannot see the end for the process4 ,few men have that power of mind which may hold fast and firmly a variety of thoughts4 ,we ridicule 'men of one idea2' but a great many of us are born to be such1 and we should be happier if we knew it4 ,to most men argument makes the point in hand only more doubtful1 and considerably less impressive4 ,after all1 man is not a reasoning animal2 he is a seeing1 feeling1 contemplating1 acting animal4 ,he is influenced by what is direct and precise4 ,it is very well to freshen our impressions and convictions from physics1 but to create them we must go elsewhere4 ,sir ,robert ,peel #8never can think it possible that a mind can be so constituted1 that1 after being familiarized with the wonderful discoveries which have been made in every part of experimental science1 it can retire from such contemplation without more enlarged conceptions of ,god's providence1 and a higher reverence for ,his ,name6' ,if he speaks of religious minds1 he perpetrates a truism2 if of irreligious1 he insinuates a paradox4 8,life is not long enough for a religion of inferences2 we shall never have done beginning1 if we determine to begin with proof4 ,we shall ever be laying our foundations2 we shall turn theology into evidences1 and divines into textuaries4 ,we shall never get at our first principles4 ,resolve to believe nothing1 and you must prove your proof and analyze your elements1 sinking farther and farther1 and finding #8in the lowest depth a lower deep1' till you come to the broad bosom of scepticism4 ,i would rather be bound to defend the reasonableness of assuming that ,christianity is true1 than to demonstrate a moral governance from the physical world4 ,life is for action4 ,if we insist on proofs for every thing1 we shall never come to action3 to act you must assume1 and that assumption is faith4 8,let no one suppose1 that in saying this ,i am maintaining that all proofs are equally difficult1 and all propositions equally debatable4 ,some assumptions are greater than others1 and some doctrines involve postulates larger than others1 and more numerous4 ,i only say1 that impressions lead to action1 and that reasonings lead from it4 ,knowledge of premisses1 and inferences upon them1--this is not to live4 ,it is very well as a matter of liberal curiosity and of philosophy to analyze our modes of thought3 but let this come second1 and when there is leisure for it1 and then our examinations will in many ways even be subservient to action4 ,but if we commence with scientific knowledge and argumentative proof1 or lay any great stress upon it as the basis of personal ,christianity1 or attempt to make man moral and religious by libraries and museums1 let us in consistency take chemists for our cooks1 and mineralogists for our masons4 8,now ,i wish to state all this as matter of fact1 to be judged by the candid testimony of any persons whatever4 ,why we are so constituted that faith1 not knowledge or argument1 is our principle of action1 is a question with which ,i have nothing to do2 but ,i think it is a fact1 and1 if it be such1 we must resign ourselves to it as best we may1 unless we take refuge in the intolerable paradox1 that the mass of men are created for nothing1 and are meant to leave life as they entered it4 8,so well has this practically been understood in all ages of the world1 that no religion yet has been a religion of physics or of philosophy4 ,it has ever been synonymous with revelation4 ,it never has been a deduction from what we know2 it has ever been an assertion of what we are to believe4 ,it has never lived in a conclusion2 it has ever been a message1 a history1 or a vision4 ,no legislator or priest ever dreamed of educating our moral nature by science or by argument4 ,there is no difference here between true religions and pretended4 ,moses was instructed not to reason from the creation1 but to work miracles4 ,christianity is a history supernatural1 and almost scenic3 it tells us what its ,author is1 by telling us what ,he has done4 8,lord ,brougham himself has recognized the force of this principle4 ,he has not left his philosophical religion to argument2 he has committed it to the keeping of the imagination4 ,why should he depict a great republic of letters1 and an intellectual pantheon1 but that he feels that instances and patterns1 not logical reasonings1 are the living conclusions which alone have a hold over the affections or can form the character80 ,chapter ,v4 ,apprehension ,and ,assent ,in ,the ,matter ,of ,religion4 ,we are now able to determine what a dogma of faith is1 and what it is to believe it4 ,a dogma is a proposition2 it stands for a notion or for a thing2 and to believe it is to give the assent of the mind to it1 as it stands for the one or for the other4 ,to give a real assent to it is an act of religion2 to give a notional1 is a theological act4 ,it is discerned1 rested in1 and appropriated as a reality1 by the religious imagination2 it is held as a truth1 by the theological intellect4 ,not as if there were in fact1 or could be1 any line of demarcation or party-wall between these two modes of assent1 the religious and the theological4 ,as intellect is common to all men as well as imagination1 every religious man is to a certain extent a theologian1 and no theology can start or thrive without the initiative and abiding presence of religion4 ,as in matters of this world1 sense1 sensation1 instinct1 intuition1 supply us with facts1 and the intellect uses them2 so1 as regards our relations with the ,supreme ,being1 we get our facts from the witness1 first of nature1 then of revelation1 and our doctrines1 in which they issue1 through the exercise of abstraction and inference4 ,this is obvious2 but it does not interfere with holding that there is a theological habit of mind1 and a religious1 each distinct from each1 religion using theology1 and theology using religion4 ,this being understood1 ,i propose to consider the dogmas of the ,being of a ,god1 and of the ,divine ,trinity in ,unity1 in their relation to assent1 both notional and real1 and principally to real assent2--however1 ,i have not yet finished all ,i have to say by way of introduction4 ,now first1 my subject is assent1 and not inference4 ,i am not proposing to set forth the arguments which issue in the belief of these doctrines1 but to investigate what it is to believe in them1 what the mind does1 what it contemplates1 when it makes an act of faith4 ,it is true that the same elementary facts which create an object for an assent1 also furnish matter for an inference3 and in showing what we believe1 ,i shall unavoidably be in a measure showing why we believe2 but this is the very reason that makes it necessary for me at the outset to insist on the real distinction between these two concurring and coincident courses of thought1 and to premise by way of caution1 lest ,i should be misunderstood1 that ,i am not considering the question that there is a ,god1 but rather what ,god is4 ,and secondly1 ,i mean by belief1 not precisely faith1 because faith1 in its theological sense1 includes a belief1 not only in the thing believed1 but also in the ground of believing2 that is1 not only belief in certain doctrines1 but belief in them expressly because ,god has revealed them2 but here ,i am engaged only with what is called the material object of faith1 not with the formal1--with the thing believed4 ,the ,almighty witnesses to ,himself in ,revelation2 we believe that ,he is ,one and that ,he is ,three1 because ,he says so4 ,we believe also what ,he tells us about ,his ,attributes1 ,his providences and dispensations1 ,his determinations and acts1 what ,he has done and what ,he will do4 ,and if all this is too much for us1 whether to bring before our minds at one time from its variety1 or even to apprehend at all or enunciate from our narrowness of intellect or want of learning1 then at least we believe in globo all that ,he has revealed to us about ,himself1 and that1 because ,he has revealed it4 ,however1 this 8because ,he says it0 does not enter into the scope of the present inquiry1 but only the truths themselves1 and these particular truths1 8,he is ,one10 8,he is ,three20 and of these two1 both of which are in ,revelation1 ,i shall consider 8,he is ,one10 not as a revealed truth1 but as1 what it is also1 a natural truth1 the foundation of all religion4 ,and with it ,i begin4 #a4 ,belief in ,one ,god4 ,there is one ,,god1 such and such in ,nature and ,attributes4 ,i say 8such and such10 for1 unless ,i explain what ,i mean by 8one ,god10 ,i use words which may mean any thing or nothing4 ,i may mean a mere anima mundi2 or an initial principle which once was in action and now is not2 or collective humanity4 ,i speak then of the ,god of the ,theist and of the ,christian3 a ,god who is numerically ,one1 who is ,personal2 the ,author1 ,sustainer1 and ,finisher of all things1 the life of ,law and ,order1 the ,moral ,governor2 ,one who is ,supreme and ,sole2 like ,himself1 unlike all things besides ,himself1 which all are but ,his creatures2 distinct from1 independent of them all2 ,one who is self-existing1 absolutely infinite1 who has ever been and ever will be1 to whom nothing is past or future2 who is all perfection1 and the fulness and archetype of every possible excellence1 the ,truth ,itself1 ,wisdom1 ,love1 ,justice1 ,holiness2 ,one who is ,all-powerful1 ,all-knowing1 ,omnipresent1 ,incomprehensible4 ,these are some of the distinctive prerogatives which ,i ascribe unconditionally and unreservedly to the great ,being whom ,i call ,god4 ,this being what ,theists mean when they speak of ,god1 their assent to this truth admits without difficulty of being what ,i have called a notional assent4 ,it is an assent following upon acts of inference1 and other purely intellectual exercises2 and it is an assent to a large development of predicates1 correlative to each other1 or at least intimately connected together1 drawn out as if on paper1 as we might map a country which we had never seen1 or construct mathematical tables1 or master the methods of discovery of ,newton or ,davy1 without being geographers1 mathematicians1 or chemists ourselves4 ,so far is clear2 but the question follows1 ,can ,i attain to any more vivid assent to the ,being of a ,god1 than that which is given merely to notions of the intellect8 ,can ,i enter with a personal knowledge into the circle of truths which make up that great thought8 ,can ,i rise to what ,i have called an imaginative apprehension of it8 ,can ,i believe as if ,i saw8 ,since such a high assent requires a present experience or memory of the fact1 at first sight it would seem as if the answer must be in the negative2 for how can ,i assent as if ,i saw1 unless ,i have seen8 but no one in this life can see ,god4 ,yet ,i conceive a real assent is possible1 and ,i proceed to show how4 ,when it is said that we cannot see ,god1 this is undeniable2 but in what sense have we a discernment of ,his creatures1 of the individual beings which surround us8 ,the evidence which we have of their presence lies in the phenomena which address our senses1 and our warrant for taking these for evidence is our instinctive certitude that they are evidence4 ,by the law of our nature we associate those sensible phenomena or impressions with certain units1 individuals1 substances1 whatever they are to be called1 which are outside and out of the reach of sense1 and we picture them to ourselves in those phenomena4 ,the phenomena are as if pictures2 but at the same time they give us no exact measure or character of the unknown things beyond them2--for who will say there is any uniformity between the impressions which two of us would respectively have of some third thing1 supposing one of us had only the sense of touch1 and the other only the sense of hearing8 ,therefore1 when we speak of our having a picture of the things which are perceived through the senses1 we mean a certain representation1 true as far as it goes1 but not adequate4 ,and so of those intellectual and moral objects which are brought home to us through our senses3--that they exist1 we know by instinct2 that they are such and such1 we apprehend from the impressions which they leave upon our minds4 ,thus the life and writings of ,cicero or ,dr4 ,johnson1 of ,st4 ,jerome or ,st4 ,chrysostom1 leave upon us certain impressions of the intellectual and moral character of each of them1 sui generis1 and unmistakable4 ,we take up a passage of ,chrysostom or a passage of ,jerome2 there is no possibility of confusing the one with the other2 in each case we see the man in his language4 ,and so of any great man whom we may have known3 that he is not a mere impression on our senses1 but a real being1 we know by instinct2 that he is such and such1 we know by the matter or quality of that impression4 ,now certainly the thought of ,god1 as ,theists entertain it1 is not gained by an instinctive association of ,his presence with any sensible phenomena2 but the office which the senses directly fulfil as regards creation that devolves indirectly on certain of our mental phenomena as regards the ,creator4 ,those phenomena are found in the sense of moral obligation4 ,as from a multitude of instinctive perceptions1 acting in particular instances1 of something beyond the senses1 we generalize the notion of an external world1 and then picture that world in and according to those particular phenomena from which we started1 so from the perceptive power which identifies the intimations of conscience with the reverberations or echoes 7so to say7 of an external admonition1 we proceed on to the notion of a ,supreme ,ruler and ,judge1 and then again we image ,him and ,his attributes in those recurring intimations1 out of which1 as mental phenomena1 our recognition of ,his existence was originally gained4 ,and1 if the impressions which ,his creatures make on us through our senses oblige us to regard those creatures as sui generis respectively1 it is not wonderful that the notices1 which ,he indirectly gives us through our conscience1 of ,his own nature are such as to make us understand that ,he is like ,himself and like nothing else4 ,i have already said ,i am not proposing here to prove the ,being of a ,god2 yet ,i have found it impossible to avoid saying where ,i look for the proof of it4 ,for ,i am looking for that proof in the same quarter as that from which ,i would commence a proof of ,his attributes and character1--by the same means as those by which ,i show how we apprehend ,him1 not merely as a notion1 but as a reality4 ,the last indeed of these three investigations alone concerns me here1 but ,i cannot altogether exclude the two former from my consideration4 ,however1 ,i repeat1 what ,i am directly aiming at1 is to explain how we gain an image of ,god and give a real assent to the proposition that ,he exists4 ,and next1 in order to do this1 of course ,i must start from some first principle2--and that first principle1 which ,i assume and shall not attempt to prove1 is that which ,i should also use as a foundation in those other two inquiries1 viz4 that we have by nature a conscience4 ,i assume1 then1 that ,conscience has a legitimate place among our mental acts2 as really so1 as the action of memory1 of reasoning1 of imagination1 or as the sense of the beautiful2 that1 as there are objects which1 when presented to the mind1 cause it to feel grief1 regret1 joy1 or desire1 so there are things which excite in us approbation or blame1 and which we in consequence call right or wrong2 and which1 experienced in ourselves1 kindle in us that specific sense of pleasure or pain1 which goes by the name of a good or bad conscience4 ,this being taken for granted1 ,i shall attempt to show that in this special feeling1 which follows on the commission of what we call right or wrong1 lie the materials for the real apprehension of a ,divine ,sovereign and ,judge4 ,the feeling of conscience 7being1 ,i repeat1 a certain keen sensibility1 pleasant or painful1--self-approval and hope1 or compunction and fear1--attendant on certain of our actions1 which in consequence we call right or wrong7 is twofold3--it is a moral sense1 and a sense of duty2 a judgment of the reason and a magisterial dictate4 ,of course its act is indivisible2 still it has these two aspects1 distinct from each other1 and admitting of a separate consideration4 ,though ,i lost my sense of the obligation which ,i lie under to abstain from acts of dishonesty1 ,i should not in consequence lose my sense that such actions were an outrage offered to my moral nature4 ,again2 though ,i lost my sense of their moral deformity1 ,i should not therefore lose my sense that they were forbidden to me4 ,thus conscience has both a critical and a judicial office1 and though its promptings1 in the breasts of the millions of human beings to whom it is given1 are not in all cases correct1 that does not necessarily interfere with the force of its testimony and of its sanction3 its testimony that there is a right and a wrong1 and its sanction to that testimony conveyed in the feelings which attend on right or wrong conduct4 ,here ,i have to speak of conscience in the latter point of view1 not as supplying us1 by means of its various acts1 with the elements of morals1 such as may be developed by the intellect into an ethical code1 but simply as the dictate of an authoritative monitor bearing upon the details of conduct as they come before us1 and complete in its several acts1 one by one4 ,let us then thus consider conscience1 not as a rule of right conduct1 but as a sanction of right conduct4 ,this is its primary and most authoritative aspect2 it is the ordinary sense of the word4 ,half the world would be puzzled to know what was meant by the moral sense2 but every one knows what is meant by a good or bad conscience4 ,conscience is ever forcing on us by threats and by promises that we must follow the right and avoid the wrong2 so far it is one and the same in the mind of every one1 whatever be its particular errors in particular minds as to the acts which it orders to be done or to be avoided2 and in this respect it corresponds to our perception of the beautiful and deformed4 ,as we have naturally a sense of the beautiful and graceful in nature and art1 though tastes proverbially differ1 so we have a sense of duty and obligation1 whether we all associate it with the same certain actions in particular or not4 ,here1 however1 ,taste and ,conscience part company3 for the sense of beautifulness1 as indeed the ,moral ,sense1 has no special relations to persons1 but contemplates objects in themselves2 conscience1 on the other hand1 is concerned with persons primarily1 and with actions mainly as viewed in their doers1 or rather with self alone and one's own actions1 and with others only indirectly and as if in association with self4 ,and further1 taste is its own evidence1 appealing to nothing beyond its own sense of the beautiful or the ugly1 and enjoying the specimens of the beautiful simply for their own sake2 but conscience does not repose on itself1 but vaguely reaches forward to something beyond self1 and dimly discerns a sanction higher than self for its decisions1 as is evidenced in that keen sense of obligation and responsibility which informs them4 ,and hence it is that we are accustomed to speak of conscience as a voice1--a term which we should never think of applying to the sense of the beautiful2 and moreover a voice1 or the echo of a voice1 imperative and constraining1 like no other dictate in the whole of our experience4 ,and again1 in consequence of this prerogative of dictating and commanding1 which is of its essence1 ,conscience has an intimate bearing on our affections and emotions1 leading us to reverence and awe1 hope and fear1 especially fear1 a feeling which is foreign for the most part1 not only to ,taste1 but even to the ,moral ,sense1 except in consequence of accidental associations4 ,no fear is felt by any one who recognizes that his conduct has not been beautiful1 though he may be mortified at himself1 if perhaps he has thereby forfeited some advantage2 but1 if he has been betrayed into any kind of immorality1 he has a lively sense of responsibility and guilt1 though the act be no offence against society1--of distress and apprehension1 even though it may be of present service to him1--of compunction and regret1 though in itself it be most pleasurable1--of confusion of face1 though it may have no witnesses4 ,these various perturbations of mind1 which are characteristic of a bad conscience1 and may be very considerable1--self-reproach1 poignant shame1 haunting remorse1 chill dismay at the prospect of the future1--and their contraries1 when the conscience is good1 as real though less forcible1 self-approval1 inward peace1 lightness of heart1 and the like1--these emotions constitute a specific difference between conscience and our other intellectual senses1--common sense1 good sense1 sense of expedience1 taste1 sense of honour1 and the like1--as indeed they would also constitute between conscience and the moral sense1 supposing these two were not aspects of one and the same feeling1 exercised upon one and the same subject-matter4 ,so much for the characteristic phenomena1 which conscience presents1 nor is it difficult to determine what they imply4 ,i refer once more to our sense of the beautiful4 ,this sense is attended by an intellectual enjoyment1 and is free from whatever is of the nature of emotion1 except in one case1 viz4 when it is excited by personal objects2 then it is that the tranquil feeling of admiration is exchanged for the excitement of affection and passion4 ,conscience too1 considered as a moral sense1 an intellectual sentiment1 is a sense of admiration and disgust1 of approbation and blame3 but it is something more than a moral sense2 it is always1 what the sense of the beautiful is only in certain cases2 it is always emotional4 ,no wonder then that it always implies what that sense only sometimes implies2 that it always involves the recognition of a living object1 towards which it is directed4 ,inanimate things cannot stir our affections2 these are correlative with persons4 ,if1 as is the case1 we feel responsibility1 are ashamed1 are frightened1 at transgressing the voice of conscience1 this implies that there is ,one to whom we are responsible1 before whom we are ashamed1 whose claims upon us we fear4 ,if1 on doing wrong1 we feel the same tearful1 broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us on hurting a mother2 if1 on doing right1 we enjoy the same sunny serenity of mind1 the same soothing1 satisfactory delight which follows on our receiving praise from a father1 we certainly have within us the image of some person1 to whom our love and veneration look1 in whose smile we find our happiness1 for whom we yearn1 towards whom we direct our pleadings1 in whose anger we are troubled and waste away4 ,these feelings in us are such as require for their exciting cause an intelligent being3 we are not affectionate towards a stone1 nor do we feel shame before a horse or a dog2 we have no remorse or compunction on breaking mere human law3 yet1 so it is1 conscience excites all these painful emotions1 confusion1 foreboding1 self-condemnation2 and on the other hand it sheds upon us a deep peace1 a sense of security1 a resignation1 and a hope1 which there is no sensible1 no earthly object to elicit4 8,the wicked flees1 when no one pursueth20 then why does he flee8 whence his terror8 ,who is it that he sees in solitude1 in darkness1 in the hidden chambers of his heart8 ,if the cause of these emotions does not belong to this visible world1 the ,object to which his perception is directed must be ,supernatural and ,divine2 and thus the phenomena of ,conscience1 as a dictate1 avail to impress the imagination with the picture7#c7 of a ,supreme ,governor1 a ,judge1 holy1 just1 powerful1 all-seeing1 retributive1 and is the creative principle of religion1 as the ,moral ,sense is the principle of ethics4 ,and let me here refer again to the fact1 to which ,i have already drawn attention1 that this instinct of the mind recognizing an external ,master in the dictate of conscience1 and imaging the thought of ,him in the definite impressions which conscience creates1 is parallel to that other law of1 not only human1 but of brute nature1 by which the presence of unseen individual beings is discerned under the shifting shapes and colours of the visible world4 ,is it by sense1 or by reason1 that brutes understand the real unities1 material and spiritual1 which are signified by the lights and shadows1 the brilliant ever-changing calidoscope1 as it may be called1 which plays upon their retina8 ,not by reason1 for they have not reason2 not by sense1 because they are transcending sense2 therefore it is an instinct4 ,this faculty on the part of brutes1 unless we were used to it1 would strike us as a great mystery4 ,it is one peculiarity of animal natures to be susceptible of phenomena through the channels of sense2 it is another to have in those sensible phenomena a perception of the individuals to which this or that group of them belongs4 ,this perception of individual things1 amid the maze of shapes and colours which meets their sight1 is given to brutes in large measures1 and that1 apparently from the moment of their birth4 ,it is by no mere physical instinct1 such as that which leads him to his mother for milk1 that the new-dropped lamb recognizes each of his fellow lambkins as a whole1 consisting of many parts bound up in one1 and1 before he is an hour old1 makes experience of his and their rival individualities4 ,and much more distinctly do the horse and dog recognize even the personality of their masters4 ,how are we to explain this apprehension of things1 which are one and individual1 in the midst of a world of pluralities and transmutations1 whether in the instance of brutes or again of children8 ,but until we account for the knowledge which an infant has of his mother or his nurse1 what reason have we to take exception at the doctrine1 as strange and difficult1 that in the dictate of conscience1 without previous experiences or analogical reasoning1 he is able gradually to perceive the voice1 or the echoes of the voice1 of a ,master1 living1 personal1 and sovereign8 ,i grant1 of course1 that we cannot assign a date1 ever so early1 before which he had learned nothing at all1 and formed no mental associations1 from the words and conduct of those who have the care of him4 ,but still1 if a child of five or six years old1 when reason is at length fully awake1 has already mastered and appropriated thoughts and beliefs1 in consequence of their teaching1 in such sort as to be able to handle and apply them familiarly1 according to the occasion1 as principles of intellectual action1 those beliefs at the very least must be singularly congenial to his mind1 if not connatural with its initial action4 ,and that such a spontaneous reception of religious truths is common with children1 ,i shall take for granted1 till ,i am convinced that ,i am wrong in so doing4 ,the child keenly understands that there is a difference between right and wrong2 and when he has done what he believes to be wrong1 he is conscious that he is offending ,one to whom he is amenable1 whom he does not see1 who sees him4 ,his mind reaches forward with a strong presentiment to the thought of a ,moral ,governor1 sovereign over him1 mindful1 and just4 ,it comes to him like an impulse of nature to entertain it4 ,it is my wish to take an ordinary child1 but still one who is safe from influences destructive of his religious instincts4 ,supposing he has offended his parents1 he will all alone and without effort1 as if it were the most natural of acts1 place himself in the presence of ,god1 and beg of ,him to set him right with them4 ,let us consider how much is contained in this simple act4 ,first1 it involves the impression on his mind of an unseen ,being with whom he is in immediate relation1 and that relation so familiar that he can address ,him whenever he himself chooses2 next1 of ,one whose goodwill towards him he is assured of1 and can take for granted--nay1 who loves him better1 and is nearer to him1 than his parents2 further1 of ,one who can hear him1 wherever he happens to be1 and who can read his thoughts1 for his prayer need not be vocal2 lastly1 of ,one who can effect a critical change in the state of feeling of others towards him4 ,that is1 we shall not be wrong in holding that this child has in his mind the image of an ,invisible ,being1 who exercises a particular providence among us1 who is present every where1 who is heart-reading1 heart-changing1 ever-accessible1 open to impetration4 ,what a strong and intimate vision of ,god must he have already attained1 if1 as ,i have supposed1 an ordinary trouble of mind has the spontaneous effect of leading him for consolation and aid to an ,invisible ,personal ,power6 ,moreover1 this image brought before his mental vision is the image of ,one who by implicit threat and promise commands certain things which he1 the same child1 coincidently1 by the same act of his mind1 approves2 which receive the adhesion of his moral sense and judgment1 as right and good4 ,it is the image of ,one who is good1 inasmuch as enjoining and enforcing what is right and good1 and who1 in consequence1 not only excites in the child hope and fear1--nay 7it may be added71 gratitude towards ,him1 as giving a law and maintaining it by reward and punishment1--but kindles in him love towards ,him1 as giving him a good law1 and therefore as being good ,himself1 for it is the property of goodness to kindle love1 or rather the very object of love is goodness2 and all those distinct elements of the moral law1 which the typical child1 whom ,i am supposing1 more or less consciously loves and approves1--truth1 purity1 justice1 kindness1 and the like1--are but shapes and aspects of goodness4 ,and having in his degree a sensibility towards them all1 for the sake of them all he is moved to love the ,lawgiver1 who enjoins them upon him4 ,and1 as he can contemplate these qualities and their manifestations under the common name of goodness1 he is prepared to think of them as indivisible1 correlative1 supplementary of each other in one and the same ,personality1 so that there is no aspect of goodness which ,god is not2 and that the more1 because the notion of a perfection embracing all possible excellences1 both moral and intellectual1 is especially congenial to the mind1 and there are in fact intellectual attributes1 as well as moral1 included in the child's image of ,god1 as above represented4 ,such is the apprehension which even a child may have of his ,sovereign ,lawgiver and ,judge2 which is possible in the case of children1 because1 at least1 some children possess it1 whether others possess it or no2 and which1 when it is found in children1 is found to act promptly and keenly1 by reason of the paucity of their ideas4 ,it is an image of the good ,god1 good in ,himself1 good relatively to the child1 with whatever incompleteness2 an image before it has been reflected on1 and before it is recognized by him as a notion4 ,though he cannot explain or define the word 8,god10 when told to use it1 his acts show that to him it is far more than a word4 ,he listens1 indeed1 with wonder and interest to fables or tales2 he has a dim1 shadowy sense of what he hears about persons and matters of this world2 but he has that within him which actually vibrates1 responds1 and gives a deep meaning to the lessons of his first teachers about the will and the providence of ,god4 ,how far this initial religious knowledge comes from without1 and how far from within1 how much is natural1 how much implies a special divine aid which is above nature1 we have no means of determining1 nor is it necessary for my present purpose to determine4 ,i am not engaged in tracing the image of ,god in the mind of a child or a man to its first origins1 but showing that he can become possessed of such an image1 over and above all mere notions of ,god1 and in what that image consists4 ,whether its elements1 latent in the mind1 would ever be elicited without extrinsic help is very doubtful2 but whatever be the actual history of the first formation of the divine image within us1 so far at least is certain1 that1 by informations external to ourselves1 as time goes on1 it admits of being strengthened and improved4 ,it is certain too1 that1 whether it grows brighter and stronger1 or1 on the other hand1 is dimmed1 distorted1 or obliterated1 depends on each of us individually1 and on his circumstances4 ,it is more than probable that1 in the event1 from neglect1 from the temptations of life1 from bad companions1 or from the urgency of secular occupations1 the light of the soul will fade away and die out4 ,men transgress their sense of duty1 and gradually lose those sentiments of shame and fear1 the natural supplements of transgression1 which1 as ,i have said1 are the witnesses of the ,unseen ,judge4 ,and1 even were it deemed impossible that those who had in their first youth a genuine apprehension of ,him1 could ever utterly lose it1 yet that apprehension may become almost undistinguishable from an inferential acceptance of the great truth1 or may dwindle into a mere notion of their intellect4 ,on the contrary1 the image of ,god1 if duly cherished1 may expand1 deepen1 and be completed1 with the growth of their powers and in the course of life1 under the varied lessons1 within and without them1 which are brought home to them concerning that same ,god1 ,one and ,personal1 by means of education1 social intercourse1 experience1 and literature4 ,to a mind thus carefully formed upon the basis of its natural conscience1 the world1 both of nature and of man1 does but give back a reflection of those truths about the ,one ,living ,god1 which have been familiar to it from childhood4 ,good and evil meet us daily as we pass through life1 and there are those who think it philosophical to act towards the manifestations of each with some sort of impartiality1 as if evil had as much right to be there as good1 or even a better1 as having more striking triumphs and a broader jurisdiction4 ,and because the course of things is determined by fixed laws1 they consider that those laws preclude the present agency of the ,creator in the carrying out of particular issues4 ,it is otherwise with the theology of a religious imagination4 ,it has a living hold on truths which are really to be found in the world1 though they are not upon the surface4 ,it is able to pronounce by anticipation1 what it takes a long argument to prove--that good is the rule1 and evil the exception4 ,it is able to assume that1 uniform as are the laws of nature1 they are consistent with a particular ,providence4 ,it interprets what it sees around it by this previous inward teaching1 as the true key of that maze of vast complicated disorder2 and thus it gains a more and more consistent and luminous vision of ,god from the most unpromising materials4 ,thus conscience is a connecting principle between the creature and his ,creator2 and the firmest hold of theological truths is gained by habits of personal religion4 ,when men begin all their works with the thought of ,god1 acting for ,his sake and to fulfil ,his will1 when they ask ,his blessing on themselves and their life1 pray to ,him for the objects they desire1 and see ,him in the event1 whether it be according to their prayers or not1 they will find every thing that happens tend to confirm them in the truth about ,him which live in their imagination1 varied and unearthly as those truths may be4 ,then they are brought into ,his presence as that of a ,living ,person1 and are able to hold converse with ,him1 and that with a directness and simplicity1 with a confidence and intimacy1 mutatis mutandis1 which we use towards an earthly superior2 so that it is doubtful whether we realize the company of our fellow-men with greater keenness than these favoured minds are able to contemplate and adore the ,unseen1 ,incomprehensible ,creator4 ,this vivid apprehension of religious objects1 on which ,i have been enlarging1 is independent of the written records of ,revelation2 it does not require any knowledge of ,scripture1 nor of the history or the teaching of the ,catholic ,church4 ,it is independent of books4 ,but if so much may be traced out in the twilight of ,natural ,religion1 it is obvious how great an addition in fulness and exactness is made to our mental image of the ,divine ,personality and ,attributes1 by the light of ,christianity4 ,and1 indeed1 to give us a clear and sufficient object for our faith1 is one main purpose of the supernatural ,dispensations of ,religion4 ,this purpose is carried out in the written ,word1 with an effectiveness which inspiration alone could secure1 first1 by the histories which form so large a portion of the ,old ,testament2 and scarcely less impressively in the prophetical system1 as it is gradually unfolded and perfected in the writings of those who were its ministers and spokesmen4 ,and as the exercise of the affections strengthens our apprehension of the object of them1 it is impossible to exaggerate the influence exerted on the religious imagination by a book of devotions so sublime1 so penetrating1 so full of deep instruction as the ,psalter1 to say nothing of other portions of the ,hagiographa4 ,and then as regards the ,new ,testament1 the ,gospels1 from their subject1 contain a manifestation of the ,divine ,nature1 so special1 as to make it appear from the contrast as if nothing were known of ,god1 when they are unknown4 ,lastly1 the ,apostolic ,epistles1 the long history of the ,church1 with its fresh exhibitions of ,divine ,agency1 the ,lives of the ,saints1 and the reasonings1 internal collisions1 and decisions of the ,theological ,school1 form an extended comment on the words and works of our ,lord4 ,i think ,i need not say more in illustration of the subject which ,i proposed for consideration in this ,section4 ,i have wished to trace the process by which the mind arrives1 not only at a notional1 but at an imaginative or real assent to the doctrine that there is ,one ,god1 that is1 an assent made with an apprehension1 not only of what the words of the proposition mean1 but of the object denoted by them4 ,without a proposition or thesis there can be no assent1 no belief1 at all2 any more than there can be an inference without a conclusion4 ,the proposition that there is ,one ,personal and ,present ,god may be held in either way2 either as a theological truth1 or as a religious fact or reality4 ,the notion and the reality assented-to are represented by one and the same proposition1 but serve as distinct interpretations of it4 ,when the proposition is apprehended for the purposes of proof1 analysis1 comparison1 and the like intellectual exercises1 it is used as the expression of a notion2 when for the purposes of devotion1 it is the image of a reality4 ,theology1 properly and directly1 deals with notional apprehension2 religion with imaginative4 ,here we have the solution of the common mistake of supposing that there is a contrariety and antagonism between a dogmatic creed and vital religion4 ,people urge that salvation consists1 not in believing the propositions that there is a ,god1 that there is a ,saviour1 that our ,lord is ,god1 that there is a ,trinity1 but in believing in ,god1 in a ,saviour1 in a ,sanctifier2 and they object that such propositions are but a formal and human medium destroying all true reception of the ,gospel1 and making religion a matter of words or of logic1 instead of its having its seat in the heart4 ,they are right so far as this1 that men can and sometimes do rest in the propositions themselves as expressing intellectual notions2 they are wrong1 when they maintain that men need do so or always do so4 ,the propositions may and must be used1 and can easily be used1 as the expression of facts1 not notions1 and they are necessary to the mind in the same way that language is ever necessary for denoting facts1 both for ourselves as individuals1 and for our intercourse with others4 ,again1 they are useful in their dogmatic aspect as ascertaining and making clear for us the truths on which the religious imagination has to rest4 ,knowledge must ever precede the exercise of the affections4 ,we feel gratitude and love1 we feel indignation and dislike1 when we have the informations actually put before us which are to kindle those several emotions4 ,we love our parents1 as our parents1 when we know them to be our parents2 we must know concerning ,god1 before we can feel love1 fear1 hope1 or trust towards ,him4 ,devotion must have its objects2 those objects1 as being supernatural1 when not represented to our senses by material symbols1 must be set before the mind in propositions4 ,the formula1 which embodies a dogma for the theologian1 readily suggests an object for the worshipper4 ,it seems a truism to say1 yet it is all that ,i have been saying1 that in religion the imagination and affections should always be under the control of reason4 ,theology may stand as a substantive science1 though it be without the life of religion2 but religion cannot maintain its ground at all without theology4 ,sentiment1 whether imaginative or emotional1 falls back upon the intellect for its stay1 when sense cannot be called into exercise2 and it is in this way that devotion falls back upon dogma4 #b4 ,belief in the ,holy ,trinity4 ,of course ,i cannot hope to carry all inquiring minds with me in what ,i have been laying down in the foregoing ,section4 ,i have appealed to the testimony given implicitly by our conscience to the ,divine ,being and ,his ,attributes1 and there are those1 ,i know1 whose experience will not respond to the appeal3--doubtless2 but are there any truths which have reality1 whether of experience or of reason1 which are not disputed by some schools of philosophy or some bodies of men8 ,if we assume nothing but what has universal reception1 the field of our possible discussions will suffer much contraction2 so that it must be considered sufficient in any inquiry1 if the principles or facts assumed have a large following4 ,this condition is abundantly fulfilled as regards the authority and religious meaning of conscience2--that conscience is the voice of ,god has almost grown into a proverb4 ,this solemn dogma is recognized as such by the great mass both of the young and of the uneducated1 by the religious few and the irreligious many4 ,it is proclaimed in the history and literature of nations2 it has had supporters in all ages1 places1 creeds1 forms of social life1 professions1 and classes4 ,it has held its ground under great intellectual and moral disadvantages2 it has recovered its supremacy1 and ultimately triumphed in the minds of those who had rebelled against it4 ,even philosophers1 who have been antagonists on other points1 agree in recognizing the inward voice of that solemn ,monitor1 personal1 peremptory1 unargumentative1 irresponsible1 minatory1 definitive4 ,this ,i consider relieves me of the necessity of arguing with those who would resolve our sense of right and wrong into a sense of the ,expedient or the ,beautiful1 or would refer its authoritative suggestions to the effect of teaching or of association4 ,there are those who can see and hear for all the common purposes of life1 yet have no eye for colours or their shades1 or no ear for music2 moreover1 there are degrees of sensibility to colours and to sounds1 in the comparison of man with man1 while some men are stone-blind or stone-deaf4 ,again1 all men1 as time goes on1 have the prospect of losing that keenness of sight and hearing which they possessed in their youth2 and so1 in like manner1 we may lose in manhood and in age that sense of a ,supreme ,teacher and ,judge which was the gift of our first years2 and that the more1 because in most men the imagination suffers from the lapse of time and the experience of life1 long before the bodily senses fail4 ,and this accords with the advice of the sacred writer to 8remember our ,creator in the days of our youth10 while our moral sensibilities are fresh1 8before the sun and the light and the moon and the stars be darkened1 and the clouds return after the rain40 ,accordingly1 if there be those who deny that the dictate of conscience is ever more than a taste1 or an association1 it is a less difficulty to me to believe that they are deficient either in the religious sense or in their memory of early years1 than that they never had at all what those around them without hesitation profess to have received from nature4 ,so much on the doctrine of the ,being and ,attributes of ,god1 and of the real apprehension with which we can contemplate and assent to it3--now ,i turn to the doctrine of the ,holy ,trinity1 with the purpose of investigating in like manner how far it belongs to theology1 how far to the faith and devotion of the individual2 how far the propositions enunciating it are confined to the expression of intellectual notions1 and how far they stand for things also1 and admit of that assent which we give to objects presented to us by the imagination4 ,and first ,i have to state what our doctrine is4 ,no one is to be called a ,theist1 who does not believe in a ,personal ,god1 whatever difficulty there may be in defining the word 8,personal40 ,now it is the belief of ,catholics about the ,supreme ,being1 that this essential characteristic of ,his ,nature is reiterated in three distinct ways or modes2 so that the ,almighty ,god1 instead of being ,one ,person only1 which is the teaching of ,natural ,religion1 has ,three ,personalities1 and is at once1 according as we view ,him in the one or the other of them1 the ,father1 the ,son1 and the ,spirit--a ,divine ,three1 who bear towards ,each ,other the several relations which those names indicate1 and are in that respect distinct from ,each ,other1 and in that alone4 ,this is the teaching of the ,athanasian ,creed2 viz4 that the ,one ,personal ,god1 who is not a logical or physical unity1 but a ,living ,monas1 more really one even than an individual man is one--,he 78unus10 not 8unum10 because of the inseparability of ,his ,nature and ,personality71--,he at once is ,father1 is ,son1 is ,holy ,ghost1 ,each of whom is that ,one ,personal ,god in the fulness of ,his ,being and ,attributes2 so that the ,father is all that is meant by the word 8,god10 as if we knew nothing of ,son1 or of ,spirit2 and in like manner the ,son and the ,spirit are ,each by ,himself all that is meant by the word1 as if the ,other ,two were unknown2 moreover1 that by the word 8,god0 is meant nothing over and above what is meant by the 8,father10 or by 8the ,son10 or by 8the ,holy ,ghost20 and that the ,father is in no sense the ,son1 nor the ,son the ,holy ,ghost1 nor the ,holy ,ghost the ,father4 ,such is the prerogative of the ,divine ,infinitude1 that that ,one and ,single ,personal ,being1 the ,almighty ,god1 is really ,three1 while ,he is absolutely ,one4 ,indeed1 the ,catholic dogma may be said to be summed up in this very formula on which ,st4 ,augustine lays so much stress1 8,tres et ,unus10 not merely 8,unum20 hence that formula is the key-note1 as it may be called1 of the ,athanasian ,creed4 ,in that ,creed we testify to the ,unus ,increatus1 to the ,unus ,immensus1 ,omnipotens1 ,deus1 and ,dominus2 yet ,each of the ,three also is by ,himself ,increatus1 ,immensus1 ,omnipotens1 for ,each is that ,one ,god1 though ,each is not the ,other2 ,each1 as is intimated by ,unus ,increatus1 is the ,one ,personal ,god of ,natural ,religion4 ,that this doctrine1 thus drawn out1 is of a notional character1 is plain2 the question before me is whether in any sense it can become the object of real apprehension1 that is1 whether any portion of it may be considered as addressed to the imagination1 and is able to exert that living mastery over the mind1 which is instanced as ,i have shown above1 as regards the proposition1 8,there is a ,god40 8,there is a ,god10 when really apprehended1 is the object of a strong energetic adhesion1 which works a revolution in the mind2 but when held merely as a notion1 it requires but a cold and ineffective acceptance1 though it be held ever so unconditionally4 ,such in its character is the assent of thousands1 whose imaginations are not at all kindled1 nor their hearts inflamed1 nor their conduct affected1 by the most august of all conceivable truths4 ,i ask1 then1 as concerns the doctrine of the ,holy ,trinity1 such as ,i have drawn it out to be1 is it capable of being apprehended otherwise than notionally8 ,is it a theory1 undeniable indeed1 but addressed to the student1 and to no one else8 ,is it the elaborate1 subtle1 triumphant exhibition of a truth1 completely developed1 and happily adjusted1 and accurately balanced on its centre1 and impregnable on every side1 as a scientific view1 8totus1 teres1 atque rotundus10 challenging all assailants1 or1 on the other hand1 does it come to the unlearned1 the young1 the busy1 and the afflicted1 as a fact which is to arrest them1 penetrate them1 and to support and animate them in their passage through life8 ,that is1 does it admit of being held in the imagination1 and being embraced with a real assent8 ,i maintain it does1 and that it is the normal faith which every ,christian has1 on which he is stayed1 which is his spiritual life1 there being nothing in the exposition of the dogma1 as ,i have given it above1 which does not address the imagination1 as well as the intellect4 ,now let us observe what is not in that exposition2--there are no scientific terms in it4 ,i will not allow that 8,personal0 is such1 because it is a word in common use1 and though it cannot mean precisely the same when used of ,god as when it is used of man1 yet it is sufficiently explained by that common use1 to allow of its being intelligibly applied to the ,divine ,nature4 ,the other words1 which occur in the above account of the doctrine1--,three1 ,one1 ,he1 ,god1 ,father1 ,son1 ,spirit1--are none of them words peculiar to theology1 have all a popular meaning1 and are used according to that obvious and popular meaning1 when introduced into the ,catholic dogma4 ,no human words indeed are worthy of the ,supreme ,being1 none are adequate2 but we have no other words to use but human1 and those in question are among the simplest and most intelligible that are to be found in language4 ,there are then no terms in the foregoing exposition which do not admit of a plain sense1 and they are there used in that sense2 and1 moreover1 that sense is what ,i have called real1 for the words in their ordinary use stand for things4 ,the words1 ,father1 ,son1 ,spirit1 ,he1 ,one1 and the rest1 are not abstract terms1 but concrete1 and adapted to excite images4 ,and these words thus simple and clear1 are embodied in simple1 clear1 brief1 categorical propositions4 ,there is nothing abstruse either in the terms themselves1 or in their setting4 ,it is otherwise of course with formal theological treatises on the subject of the dogma4 ,there we find such words as substance1 essence1 existence1 form1 subsistence1 notion1 circumincession2 and1 though these are far easier to understand than might at first sight be thought1 still they are doubtless addressed to the intellect1 and can only command a notional assent4 ,it will be observed also that not even the words 8mysteriousness0 and 8mystery0 occur in the exposition which ,i have above given of the doctrine2 ,i omitted them1 because they are not parts of the ,divine ,verity as such1 but in relation to creatures and to the human intellect2 and because they are of a notional character4 ,it is plain of course even at first sight that the doctrine is an inscrutable mystery1 or has an inscrutable mysteriousness2 few minds indeed but have theology enough to see this2 and if an educated man1 to whom it is presented1 does not perceive that mysteriousness at once1 that is a sure token that he does not rightly apprehend the propositions which contain the doctrine4 ,hence it follows that the thesis 8the doctrine of the ,holy ,trinity in ,unity is mysterious0 is indirectly an article of faith4 ,but such an article1 being a reflection made upon a revealed truth in an inference1 expresses a notion1 not a thing4 ,it does not relate to the direct apprehension of the object1 but to a judgment of our reason upon the object4 ,accordingly the mysteriousness of the doctrine is not1 strictly speaking1 intrinsical to it1 as it is proposed to the religious apprehension1 though in matter of fact a devotional mind1 on perceiving that mysteriousness1 will lovingly appropriate it1 as involved in the divine revelation2 and1 as such a mind turns all thoughts which come before it to a sacred use1 so will it dwell upon the ,mystery of the ,trinity with awe and veneration1 as a truth befitting1 so to say1 the ,immensity and ,incomprehensibility of the ,supreme ,being4 ,however1 ,i do not put forward the mystery as the direct object of real or religious apprehension2 nor again1 the complex doctrine 7when it is viewed1 per modum unius1 as one whole71 in which the mystery lies4 ,let it be observed1 it is possible for the mind to hold a number of propositions either in their combination as one whole1 or one by one2 one by one1 with an intelligent perception indeed of each1 and of the general direction of each towards the rest1 yet of each separately from the rest1 for its own sake only1 and not in connexion and one with the rest4 ,thus ,i may know ,london quite well1 and find my way from street to street in any part of it without difficulty1 yet be quite unable to draw a map of it4 ,comparison1 calculation1 cataloguing1 arranging1 classifying1 are intellectual acts subsequent upon1 and not necessary for1 a real apprehension of the things on which they are exercised4 ,strictly speaking then1 the dogma of the ,holy ,trinity1 as a complex whole1 or as a mystery1 is not the formal object of religious apprehension and assent2 but as a number of propositions1 taken one by one4 ,that mystery also is of course the object of assent1 but it is the notional object2 and when presented to religious minds1 it is received by them notionally2 and again implicitly1 viz4 in the real assent which they give to the word of ,god as conveyed to them through the instrumentality of ,his ,church4 ,on these points it may be right to enlarge4 ,of course1 as ,i have been saying1 a man of ordinary intelligence will be at once struck with the apparent contrariety between the propositions one with another which constitute the ,heavenly ,dogma1 and1 by reason of his spontaneous activity of mind and by an habitual association1 he will be compelled to view the ,dogma in the light of that contrariety1--so much so1 that to hold one and all of these separate propositions will be to such a man all one with holding the mystery1 as a mystery2 and in consequence he will so hold it2--but still1 ,i say1 so far he will hold it only with a notional apprehension4 ,he will accurately take in the meaning of each of the dogmatic propositions in its relation to the rest of them1 combining them into one whole and embracing what he cannot realize1 with an assent1 notional indeed1 but as genuine and thorough as any real assent can be4 ,but the question is whether a real assent to the mystery1 as such1 is possible2 and ,i say it is not possible1 because1 while we can image the separate propositions1 we cannot image them all together4 ,we cannot1 because the mystery transcends all our experience2 we have no experiences in our memory which we can put together1 compare1 contrast1 unite1 and thereby transmute into an image of the ,ineffable ,verity2--certainly2 but what is in some degree a matter of experience1 what is presented for the imagination1 the affections1 the devotion1 the spiritual life of the ,christian to repose upon with a real assent1 what stands for things1 not for notions only1 is each of those propositions taken one by one1 and that1 not in the case of intellectual and thoughtful minds only1 but of all religious minds whatever1 in the case of a child or a peasant1 as well as of a philosopher4 ,this is only one instance of a general principle which holds good in all such real apprehension as is possible to us1 of ,god and ,his ,attributes4 ,not only do we see ,him at best only in shadows1 but we cannot bring even those shadows together1 for they flit to and fro1 and are never present to us at once4 ,we can indeed combine the various matters which we know of ,him by an act of the intellect1 and treat them theologically1 but such theological combinations are no objects for the imagination to gaze upon4 ,our image of ,him never is one1 but broken into numberless partial aspects1 independent each of each4 ,as we cannot see the whole starry firmament at once1 but have to turn ourselves from east to west1 and then round to east again1 sighting first one constellation and then another1 and losing these in order to gain those1 so it is1 and much more1 with such real apprehensions as we can secure of the ,divine ,nature4 ,we know one truth about ,him and another truth1--but we cannot image both of them together2 we cannot bring them before us by one act of the mind2 we drop the one while we turn to take up the other4 ,none of them are fully dwelt on and enjoyed1 when they are viewed in combination4 ,moreover1 our devotion is tried and confused by the long list of propositions which theology is obliged to draw up1 by the limitations1 explanations1 definitions1 adjustments1 balancings1 cautions1 arbitrary prohibitions1 which are imperatively required by the weakness of human thought and the imperfections of human language4 ,such exercises of reasoning indeed do but increase and harmonize our notional apprehension of the dogma1 but they add little to the luminousness and vital force with which its separate propositions come home to our imagination1 and if they are necessary1 as they certainly are1 they are necessary not so much for faith1 as against unbelief4 ,break a ray of light into its constituent colours1 each is beautiful1 each may be enjoyed2 attempt to unite them1 and perhaps you produce only a dirty white4 ,the pure and indivisible ,light is seen only by the blessed inhabitants of heaven2 here we have but such faint reflections of it as its diffraction supplies2 but they are sufficient for faith and devotion4 ,attempt to combine them into one1 and you gain nothing but a mystery1 which you can describe as a notion1 but cannot depict as an imagination4 ,and this1 which holds of the ,divine ,attributes1 holds also of the ,holy ,trinity in ,unity4 ,and hence1 perhaps1 it is that the latter doctrine is never spoken of as a ,mystery in the ,new ,testament1 which is addressed far more to the imagination and affections than to the intellect4 ,hence1 too1 what is more remarkable1 the dogma is not called a mystery in the ,creeds2 not in the ,apostles' nor the ,nicene1 nor even in the ,athanasian4 ,the reason seems to be1 that the ,creeds have a place in the ,ritual2 they are devotional acts1 and of the nature of prayers1 addressed to ,god2 and1 in such addresses1 to speak of intellectual difficulties would be out of place4 ,it must be recollected especially that the ,athanasian ,creed has sometimes been called the 8,psalmus ,quicunque40 ,it is not a mere collection of notions1 however momentous4 ,it is a psalm or hymn of praise1 of confession1 and of profound1 self-prostrating homage1 parallel to the canticles of the elect in the ,apocalypse4 ,it appeals to the imagination quite as much as to the intellect4 ,it is the war-song of faith1 with which we warn first ourselves1 then each other1 and then all those who are within its hearing1 and the hearing of the ,truth1 who our ,god is1 and how we must worship ,him1 and how vast our responsibility will be1 if we know what to believe1 and yet believe not4 ,it is 8,the ,psalm that gathers in one glorious lay ,all chants that e'er from heaven to earth found way2 ,creed of the ,saints1 and ,anthem of the ,blest1 ,and calm-breathed warning of the kindliest love ,that ever heaved a wakeful mother's breast40 ,for myself1 ,i have ever felt it as the most simple and sublime1 the most devotional formulary to which ,christianity has given birth1 more so even than the ,veni ,creator and the ,te ,deum4 ,even the antithetical form of its sentences1 which is a stumbling-block to so many1 as seeming to force1 and to exult in forcing a mystery upon recalcitrating minds1 has to my apprehension1 even notionally considered1 a very different drift4 ,it is intended as a check upon our reasonings1 lest they rush on in one direction beyond the limits of the truth1 and it turns them back into the opposite direction4 ,certainly it implies a glorying in the ,mystery2 but it is not simply a statement of the ,mystery for the sake of its mysteriousness4 ,what is more remarkable still1 a like silence as to the mysteriousness of the doctrine is observed in the successive definitions of the ,church concerning it4 ,confession after confession1 canon after canon is drawn up in the course of centuries2 ,popes and ,councils have found it their duty to insist afresh upon the dogma2 they have enunciated it in new or additional propositions2 but not even in their most elaborate formularies do they use the word 8mystery10 as far as ,i know4 ,the great ,council of ,toledo pursues the scientific ramifications of the doctrine1 with the exact diligence of theology1 at a length four times that of the ,athanasian ,creed2 the fourth ,lateran completes1 by a final enunciation1 the development of the sacred doctrine after the mind of ,st4 ,augustine2 the ,creed of ,pope ,pius ,,iv4 prescribes the general rule of faith against the heresies of these latter times2 but in none of them do we find either the word 8mystery10 or any suggestion of mysteriousness4 ,such is the usage of the ,church in its dogmatic statements concerning the ,holy ,trinity1 as if fulfilling the maxim1 8,lex orandi1 lex credendi40 ,i suppose it is founded on a tradition1 because the custom is otherwise as regards catechisms and theological treatises4 ,these belong to particular ages and places1 and are addressed to the intellect4 ,in them1 certainly1 the mysteriousness of the doctrine is almost uniformly insisted on4 ,but1 however this contrast of usage is to be explained1 the ,creeds are enough to show that the dogma may be taught in its fulness for the purposes of popular faith and devotion without directly insisting on that mysteriousness1 which is necessarily involved in the combined view of its separate propositions4 ,that systematized whole is the object of notional assent1 and its propositions1 one by one1 are the objects of real4 ,to show this in fact1 ,i will enumerate the separate propositions of which the dogma consists4 ,they are nine1 and stand as follows3-- #a4 ,there are ,three who give testimony in heaven1 the ,father1 the ,word or ,son1 and the ,holy ,spirit4 #b4 ,from the ,father is1 and ever has been1 the ,son4 #c4 ,from the ,father and ,son is1 and ever has been1 the ,spirit4 #d4 ,the ,father is the ,one ,eternal ,personal ,god4 #e4 ,the ,son is the ,one ,eternal ,personal ,god4 #f4 ,the ,spirit is the ,one ,eternal ,personal ,god4 #g4 ,the ,father is not the ,son4 #h4 ,the ,son is not the ,holy ,ghost4 #i4 ,the ,holy ,ghost is not the ,father4 ,now ,i think it is a fact1 that1 whereas these nine propositions contain the ,mystery1 yet1 taken1 not as a whole1 but separately1 each by itself1 they are not only apprehensible1 but admit of a real apprehension4 ,thus1 for instance1 if the proposition 8,there is ,one who bears witness of ,himself10 or 8reveals ,himself10 would admit of a real assent1 why does not also the proposition 8,there are ,three who bear witness08 ,again1 if the word 8,god0 may create an image in our minds1 why may not the proposition 8,the ,father is ,god08 or again1 8,the ,son10 or 8,the ,holy ,ghost is ,god08 ,again1 to say that 8the ,son is other than the ,holy ,ghost10 or 8neither ,son nor ,holy ,ghost is the ,father10 is not a simple negative1 but also a declaration that ,each of the ,divine ,three by ,himself is complete in ,himself1 and simply and absolutely ,god as though the ,other ,two were not revealed to us4 ,again1 from our experience of the works of man1 we accept with a real apprehension the proposition 8,the ,angels are made by ,god10 correcting the word 8made10 as is required in the case of a creating ,power1 and a spiritual work3--why may we not in like matter refine and elevate the human analogy1 yet keep the image1 when a ,divine ,birth is set before us in terms which properly belong to what is human and earthly8 ,if our experience enables us to apprehend the essential fact of sonship1 as being a communication of being and of nature from one to another1 why should we not thereby in a certain measure realize the proposition 8,the ,word is the ,son of ,god08 ,again1 we have abundant instances in nature of the general law of one thing coming from another or from others3--as the child issues in the man as his successor1 and the child and the man issue in the old man1 like them both1 but not the same1 so different as almost to have a fresh personality distinct from each1 so we may form some image1 however vague1 of the procession of the ,holy ,spirit from ,father and ,son4 ,this is what ,i should say of the propositions which ,i have numbered two and three1 which are the least susceptible of a real assent out of the nine4 ,so much at first sight2 but the force of what ,i have been saying will be best understood1 by considering what ,scripture and the ,ritual of the ,church witness in accordance with it4 ,in referring to these two great store-houses of faith and devotion1 ,i must premise1 as when ,i spoke of the ,being of a ,god1 that ,i am not proving by means of them the dogma of the ,holy ,trinity1 but using the one and the other in illustration of the action of the separate articles of that dogma upon the imagination1 though the complex truth1 in which1 when combined1 they issue1 is not in sympathy or correspondence with it1 but altogether beyond it2 and next of the action and influence of those separate articles1 by means of the imagination1 upon the affections and obedience of ,christians1 high and low4 ,this being understood1 ,i ask what chapter of ,st4 ,john or ,st4 ,paul is not full of the ,three ,divine ,names1 introduced in one or other of the above nine propositions1 expressed or implied1 or in their parallels1 or in parts or equivalents of them8 ,what lesson is there given us by these two chief writers of the ,new ,testament1 which does not grow out of ,their ,persons and ,their ,offices8 ,at one time we read of the grace of the ,second ,person1 the love of the ,first1 and the communication of the ,third2 at another we are told by the ,son1 8,i will pray the ,father1 and ,he will send you another ,paraclete20 and then1 8,all that the ,father hath are ,mine2 the ,paraclete shall receive of ,mine40 ,then again we read of 8the foreknowledge of the ,father1 the sanctification of the ,spirit1 the ,blood of ,jesus ,christ20 and again we are to 8pray in the ,holy ,ghost1 abide in the love of ,god1 and look for the mercy of ,jesus40 ,and so1 in like manner1 to ,each1 in one passage or another1 are ascribed the same titles and works3 ,each is acknowledged as ,lord2 ,each is eternal2 ,each is ,truth2 ,each is ,holiness2 ,each is all in all2 ,each is ,creator2 ,each wills with a ,supreme ,will2 ,each is the ,author of the new birth2 ,each speaks in ,his ministers2 ,each is the ,revealer2 ,each is the ,lawgiver2 ,each is the ,teacher of the elect2 in ,each the elect have fellowship2 ,each leads them on2 ,each raises them from the dead4 ,what is all this1 but 8the ,father ,eternal1 the ,son ,eternal1 and the ,holy ,ghost ,eternal2 the ,father1 ,son1 and ,holy ,ghost ,omnipotent2 the ,father1 ,son1 and ,holy ,ghost ,god10 of the ,athanasian ,creed8 ,and if the ,new ,testament be1 as it confessedly is1 so real in its teaching1 so luminous1 so impressive1 so constraining1 so full of images1 so sparing in mere notions1 whence is this but because1 in its references to the ,object of our supreme worship1 it is ever ringing the changes 7so to say7 on the nine propositions which ,i have set down1 and on the particular statements into which they may be severally resolved8 ,take one of them1 as an instance1 viz4 the dogmatic sentence 8,the ,son is ,god40 ,what an illustration of the real assent which can be given to this proposition1 and its power over our affections and emotions1 is the first half of the first chapter of ,st4 ,john's gospel6 or again the vision of our ,lord in the first chapter of the ,apocalypse6 or the first chapter of ,st4 ,john's first ,epistle6 ,again1 how burning are ,st4 ,paul's words when he speaks of our ,lord's crucifixion and death6 what is the secret of that flame1 but this same dogmatic sentence1 8,the ,son is ,god08 why should the death of the ,son be more awful than any other death1 except that ,he1 though man1 was ,god8 ,and so1 again1 all through the ,old ,testament1 what is it which gives an interpretation and a persuasive power to so many passages and portions1 especially of the ,psalms and the ,prophets1 but this same theological formula1 8,the ,messias is ,god10 a proposition which never could thus vivify in the religious mind the letter of the sacred text1 unless it appealed to the imagination1 and could be held with a much stronger assent than any that is merely notional4 ,this same power of the dogma may be illustrated from the ,ritual4 ,consider the services for ,christmas or ,epiphany2 for ,easter1 ,ascension1 and 7,i may say7 pre-eminently ,corpus ,christi2 what are these great ,festivals but comments on the words1 8,the ,son is ,god08 ,yet who will say that they have the subtlety1 the aridity1 the coldness of mere scholastic science8 ,are they addressed to the pure intellect1 or to the imagination8 do they interest our logical faculty1 or excite our devotion8 ,why is it that personally we often find ourselves so ill-fitted to take part in them1 except that we are not good enough1 that in our case the dogma is far too much a theological notion1 far too little an image living within us8 ,and so again1 as to the ,divinity of the ,holy ,ghost3 consider the breviary offices for ,pentecost and its ,octave1 the grandest perhaps in the whole year2 are they created out of mere abstractions and inferences1 or has not the categorical proposition of ,st4 ,athanasius1 8,the ,holy ,ghost is ,god10 such a place in the imagination and the heart1 as suffices to give birth to the noble ,hymns1 ,veni ,creator1 and ,veni ,sancte ,spiritus8 ,i sum up then to the same effect as in the preceding ,section4 ,religion has to do with the real1 and the real is the particular2 theology has to do with what is notional1 and the notional is the general and systematic4 ,hence theology has to do with the dogma of the ,holy ,trinity as a whole made up of many propositions2 but ,religion has to do with each of those separate propositions which compose it1 and lives and thrives in the contemplation of them4 ,in them it finds the motives for devotion and faithful obedience2 while theology on the other hand forms and protects them by virtue of its function of regarding them1 not merely one by one1 but as a system of truth4 ,one other remark is in place here4 ,if the separate articles of the ,athanasian ,creed are so closely connected with vital and personal religion as ,i have shown them to be1 if they supply motives on which a man may act1 if they determine the state of mind1 the special thoughts1 affections1 and habits1 which he carries with him from this world to the next1 is there cause to wonder1 that the ,creed should proclaim aloud1 that those who are not internally such as ,christ1 by means of it1 came to make them1 are not capable of the heaven to which ,he died to bring them8 ,is not the importance of accepting the dogma the very explanation of that careful minuteness with which the few simple truths which compose it are inculcated1 are reiterated1 in the ,creed8 ,and shall the ,church of ,god1 to whom 8the dispensation0 of the ,gospel is committed1 forget the concomitant obligation1 8,woe is unto me if ,i preach not the ,gospel08 ,are her ministers by their silence to bring upon themselves the ,prophet's anathema1 8,cursed is he that doth the work of the ,lord deceitfully08 ,can they ever forget the lesson conveyed to them in the ,apostle's protestation1 8,god is faithful1 as our preaching which was among you was not ,yea and ,nay4444 ,for we are a good odour of ,christ unto ,god in them that are in the way of salvation1 and in them that are perishing4 ,for we are not as the many1 who adulterate the word of ,god2 but with sincerity1 but as from ,god1 in the presence of ,god1 so speak we in ,christ08 #c4 ,belief in ,dogmatic ,theology4 ,it is a familiar charge against the ,catholic ,church in the mouths of her opponents1 that she imposes on her children as matters of faith1 not only such dogmas as have an intimate bearing on moral conduct and character1 but a great number of doctrines which none but professed theologians can understand1 and which in consequence do but oppress the mind1 and are the perpetual fuel of controversy4 ,the first who made this complaint was no less a man than the great ,constantine1 and on no less an occasion than the rise of the ,arian heresy1 which he1 as yet a catechumen1 was pleased to consider a trifling and tolerable error4 ,so1 deciding the matter1 he wrote at once a letter to ,alexander1 ,bishop of ,alexandria1 and to ,arius1 who was a presbyter in the same city1 exhorting them to drop the matter in dispute1 and to live in peace with one another4 ,he was answered by the meeting of the ,council of ,nica1 and by the insertion of the word 8,consubstantial0 into the ,creed of the ,church4 ,what the ,emperor thought of the controversy itself1 that ,bishop ,jeremy ,taylor thought of the insertion of the 8,consubstantial10 viz4 that it was a mischievous affair1 and ought never to have taken place4 ,he thus quotes and comments on the ,emperor's letter3 8,the ,epistle of ,constantine to ,alexander and ,arius tells the truth1 and chides them both for commencing the question1 ,alexander for broaching it1 ,arius for taking it up4 ,and although this be true1 that it had been better for the ,church it had never begun1 yet1 being begun1 what is to be done with it8 ,of this also1 in that admirable epistle1 we have the ,emperor's judgment 7,i suppose not without the advice and privity of ,hosius71 444 for first he calls it a certain vain piece of a question1 ill begun1 and more unadvisedly published1--a question which no law or ecclesiastical canon defineth2 a fruitless contention2 the product of idle brains2 a matter so nice1 so obscure1 so intricate1 that it was neither to be explicated by the clergy nor understood by the people2 a dispute of words1 a doctrine inexplicable1 but most dangerous when taught1 lest it introduce discord or blasphemy2 and1 therefore1 the objector was rash1 and the answer unadvised1 for it concerned not the substance of faith or the worship of ,god1 nor the chief commandment of ,scripture2 and1 therefore1 why should it be the matter of discord8 for though the matter be grave1 yet1 because neither necessary nor explicable1 the contention is trifling and toyish4444 ,so that the matter being of no great importance1 but vain and a toy in respect of the excellent blessings of peace and charity1 it were good that ,alexander and ,arius should leave contending1 keep their opinions to themselves1 ask each other forgiveness1 and give mutual toleration47#d70 ,moreover1 ,taylor is of opinion that 8they both did believe ,one ,god1 and the ,holy ,trinity20 an opinion in the teeth of historical fact4 ,also he is of opinion1 that 8that faith is best which hath greatest simplicity1 and that it is better in all cases humbly to submit1 than curiously to inquire and pry into the mystery under the cloud1 and to hazard our faith by improving knowledge40 ,he is1 further1 of opinion1 that 8if the ,nicene ,fathers had done so too1 possibly the ,church would never have repented it40 ,he also thinks that their insertion of the 8,consubstantial0 into the ,creed was a bad precedent4 ,whether it was likely to act as a precedent or not1 it has not been so in fact1 for fifteen hundred years have passed since the ,nicene ,council1 and it is the one instance of a scientific word having been introduced into the ,creed from that day to this4 ,and after all1 the word in question has a plain meaning1 as the ,council used it1 easily stated and intelligible to all2 for 8consubstantial with the ,father10 means nothing more than 8really one with the ,father10 being adopted to meet the evasion of the ,arians4 ,the ,creed then remains now what it was in the beginning1 a popular form of faith1 suited to every age1 class1 and condition4 ,its declarations are categorical1 brief1 clear1 elementary1 of the first importance1 expressive of the concrete1 the objects of real apprehension1 and the basis and rule of devotion4 ,as to the proper ,nicene formula itself1 excepting the one term 8,consubstantial10 it has not a word which does not relate to the rudimental facts of ,christianity4 ,the ,niceno-,constantinopolitan and the various ante-,nicene ,symbols1 of which the ,apostles' is one1 add summarily one or two notional articles1 such as 8the communion of ,saints10 and 8the forgiveness of sins10 which1 however1 may be readily converted into real propositions4 ,on the other hand1 one chief dogma1 which is easy to popular apprehension1 is necessarily absent from all of them1 the ,real ,presence2 but the omission is owing to the ancient 8,disciplina ,arcani10 which withheld the ,sacred ,mystery from catechumens and heathen1 to whom the ,creed was known4 ,so far the charge which ,taylor brings forward has no great plausibility2 but it is not the whole of his case4 ,i cannot deny that a large and ever-increasing collection of propositions1 abstract notions1 not concrete truths1 become1 by the successive definitions of ,councils1 a portion of the credenda1 and have an imperative claim upon the faith of every ,catholic2 and this being the case1 it will be asked me how ,i am borne out by facts in enlarging1 as ,i have done1 on the simplicity and directness1 on the tangible reality1 of the ,church's dogmatic teaching4 ,i will suppose the objection urged thus3--why has not the ,catholic ,church limited her credenda to propositions such as those in her ,creed1 concrete and practical1 easy of apprehension1 and of a character to win assent8 such as 8,christ is ,god20 8,this is ,my ,body20 8,baptism gives life to the soul20 8,the ,saints intercede for us20 8,death1 judgment1 heaven1 hell1 the four last things20 8,there are seven gifts of the ,holy ,ghost10 8three theological virtues10 8seven capital sins10 and the like1 as they are found in her catechisms4 ,on the contrary1 she makes it imperative on every one1 priest and layman1 to profess as revealed truth all the canons of the ,councils1 and innumerable decisions of ,popes1 propositions so various1 so notional1 that but few can know them1 and fewer can understand them4 ,what sense1 for instance1 can a child or a peasant1 nay1 or any ordinary ,catholic1 put upon the ,tridentine ,canons1 even in translation8 such as1 8,siquis dixerit homines sine ,christi justiti1 per quam nobis meruit1 justificari1 aut per eam ipsam formaliter justos esse1 anathema sit20 or 8,siquis dixerit justificatum peccare1 dum intuitu tern mercedis bene operatur1 anathema sit40 ,or again1 consider the very anathema annexed by the ,nicene ,council to its ,creed1 the language of which is so obscure1 that even theologians differ about its meaning4 ,it runs as follows3--8,those who say that once the ,son was not1 and before ,he was begotten ,he was not1 and that ,he was made out of that which was not1 or who pretend that ,he was of other hypostasis or substance1 or that the ,son of ,god is created1 mutable1 or alterable1 the ,holy ,catholic and ,apostolic ,church anathematizes40 ,these doctrinal enunciations are de fide2 peasants are bound to believe them as well as controversialists1 and to believe them as truly as they believe that our ,lord is ,god4 ,how then are the ,catholic credenda easy and within reach of all men8 ,i begin my answer to this objection by recurring to what has already been said concerning the relation of theology with its notional propositions to religious and devotional assent4 ,devotion is excited doubtless by the plain1 categorical truths of revelation1 such as the articles of the ,creed2 on these it depends2 with these it is satisfied4 ,it accepts them one by one2 it is careless about intellectual consistency2 it draws from each of them the spiritual nourishment which it was intended to supply4 ,far different1 certainly1 is the nature and duty of the intellect4 ,it is ever active1 inquisitive1 penetrating2 it examines doctrine and doctrine2 it compares1 contrasts1 and forms them into a science2 that science is theology4 ,now theological science1 being thus the exercise of the intellect upon the credenda of revelation1 is1 though not directly devotional1 at once natural1 excellent1 and necessary4 ,it is natural1 because the intellect is one of our highest faculties2 excellent1 because it is our duty to use our faculties to the full2 necessary1 because1 unless we apply our intellect to revealed truth rightly1 others will exercise their minds upon it wrongly4 ,accordingly1 the ,catholic intellect makes a survey and a catalogue of the doctrines contained in the depositum of revelation1 as committed to the ,church's keeping2 it locates1 adjusts1 defines them each1 and brings them together into a whole4 ,moreover1 it takes particular aspects or portions of them2 it analyzes them1 whether into first principles really such1 or into hypotheses of an illustrative character4 ,it forms generalizations1 and gives names to them4 ,all these deductions are true1 if rightly deduced1 because they are deduced from what is true2 and therefore in one sense they are a portion of the depositum of faith or credenda1 while in another sense they are additions to it3 however1 additions or not1 they have1 ,i readily grant1 the characteristic disadvantage of being abstract and notional statements4 ,nor is this all3 error gives opportunity to many more additions than truth4 ,there is another set of deductions1 inevitable also1 and also part or not part of the revealed credenda1 according as we please to view them4 ,if a proposition is true1 its contradictory is false4 ,if then a man believes that ,christ is ,god1 he believes also1 and that necessarily1 that to say ,he is not ,god is false1 and that those who so say are in error4 ,here then again the prospect opens upon us of a countless multitude of propositions1 which in their first elements are close upon devotional truth1--of groups of propositions1 and those groups divergent1 independent1 ever springing into life with an inexhaustible fecundity1 according to the ever-germinating forms of heresy1 of which they are the antagonists4 ,these too have their place in theological science4 ,such is theology in contrast to religion2 and as follows from the circumstances of its formation1 though some of its statements easily find equivalents in the language of devotion1 the greater number of them are more or less unintelligible to the ordinary ,catholic1 as law-books to the private citizen4 ,and especially those portions of theology which are the indirect creation1 not of orthodox1 but of heretical thought1 such as the repudiations of error contained in the ,canons of ,councils1 of which specimens have been given above1 will ever be foreign1 strange1 and hard to the pious but uncontroversial mind2 for what have good ,christians to do1 in the ordinary course of things1 with the subtle hallucinations of the intellect8 ,this is manifest from the nature of the case2 but then the question recurs1 why should the refutations of heresy be our objects of faith8 if no mind1 theological or not1 can believe what it cannot understand1 in what sense can the ,canons of ,councils and other ecclesiastical determinations be included in those credenda which the ,church presents to every ,catholic as if apprehensible1 and to which every ,catholic gives his firm interior assent8 ,in solving this difficulty ,i wish it first observed1 that1 if it is the duty of the ,church to act as 8the pillar and ground of the ,truth10 she is manifestly obliged from time to time1 and to the end of time1 to denounce opinions incompatible with that truth1 whenever able and subtle minds in her communion venture to publish such opinions4 ,suppose certain ,bishops and priests at this day began to teach that ,islamism or ,buddhism was a direct and immediate revelation from ,god1 she would be bound to use the authority which ,god has given her to declare that such a proposition will not stand with ,christianity1 and that those who hold it are none of hers2 and she would be bound to impose such a declaration on that very knot of persons who had committed themselves to the novel proposition1 in order that1 if they would not recant1 they might be separated from her communion1 as they were separate from her faith4 ,in such a case1 her masses of population would either not hear of the controversy1 or they would at once take part with her1 and without effort take any test1 which secured the exclusion of the innovators2 and she on the other hand would feel that what is a rule for some ,catholics must be a rule for all4 ,who is to draw the line between who are to acknowledge it1 and who are not8 ,it is plain1 there cannot be two rules of faith in the same communion1 or rather1 as the case really would be1 an endless variety of rules1 coming into force according to the multiplication of heretical theories1 and to the degrees of knowledge and varieties of sentiment in individual ,catholics4 ,there is but one rule of faith for all2 and it would be a greater difficulty to allow of an uncertain rule of faith1 than 7if that was the alternative1 as it is not71 to impose upon uneducated minds a profession which they cannot understand4 ,but it is not the necessary result of unity of profession1 nor is it the fact1 that the ,church imposes dogmatic statements on the interior assent of those who cannot apprehend them4 ,the difficulty is removed by the dogma of the ,church's infallibility1 and of the consequent duty of 8implicit faith0 in her word4 ,the 8,one ,holy ,catholic and ,apostolic ,church0 is an article of the ,creed1 and an article1 which1 inclusive of her infallibility1 all men1 high and low1 can easily master and accept with a real and operative assent4 ,it stands in the place of all abstruse propositions in a ,catholic's mind1 for to believe in her word is virtually to believe in them all4 ,even what he cannot understand1 at least he can believe to be true2 and he believes it to be true because he believes in the ,church4 ,the rationale of this provision for unlearned devotion is as follows3--,it stands to reason that all of us1 learned and unlearned1 are bound to believe the whole revealed doctrine in all its parts and in all that it implies1 according as portion after portion is brought home to our consciousness as belonging to it2 and it also stands to reason1 that a doctrine1 so deep and so various1 as the revealed depositum of faith1 cannot be brought home to us and made our own all at once4 ,no mind1 however large1 however penetrating1 can directly and fully by one act understand any one truth1 however simple4 ,what can be more intelligible than that 8,alexander conquered ,asia10 or that 8,veracity is a duty08 but what a multitude of propositions is included under either of these theses6 still1 if we profess either1 we profess all that it includes4 ,thus1 as regards the ,catholic ,creed1 if we really believe that our ,lord is ,god1 we believe all that is meant by such a belief2 or1 else1 we are not in earnest1 when we profess to believe the proposition4 ,in the act of believing it at all1 we forthwith commit ourselves by anticipation to believe truths which at present we do not believe1 because they have never come before us2--we limit henceforth the range of our private judgment in prospect by the conditions1 whatever they are1 of that dogma4 ,thus the ,arians said that they believed in our ,lord's divinity1 but when they were pressed to confess ,his eternity1 they denied it3 thereby showing in fact that they never had believed in ,his divinity at all4 ,in other words1 a man who really believes in our ,lord's proper divinity1 believes implicit in ,his eternity4 ,and so1 in like manner1 of the whole depositum of faith1 or the revealed word3--if we believe in the revelation1 we believe in what is revealed1 in all that is revealed1 however it may be brought home to us1 by reasoning or in any other way4 ,he who believes that ,christ is the ,truth1 and that the ,evangelists are truthful1 believes all that ,he has said through them1 though he has only read ,st4 ,matthew and has not read ,st4 ,john4 ,he who believes in the depositum of ,revelation1 believes in all the doctrines of the depositum2 and since he cannot know them all at once1 he knows some doctrines1 and does not know others2 he may know only the ,creed1 nay1 perhaps only the chief portions of the ,creed2 but1 whether he knows little or much1 he has the intention of believing all that there is to believe1 whenever and as soon as it is brought home to him1 if he believes in ,revelation at all4 ,all that he knows now as revealed1 and all that he shall know1 and all that there is to know1 he embraces it all in his intention by one act of faith2 otherwise1 it is but an accident that he believes this or that1 not because it is a revelation4 ,this virtual1 interpretative1 or prospective belief is called a believing implicit2 and it follows from this1 that1 granting that the ,canons of ,councils and the other ecclesiastical documents and confessions1 to which ,i have referred1 are really involved in the depositum or revealed word1 every ,catholic1 in accepting the depositum1 does implicit accept those dogmatic decisions4 ,i say1 8granting these various propositions are virtually contained in the revealed word10 for this is the only question left2 and that it is to be answered in the affirmative1 is clear at once to the ,catholic1 from the fact that the ,church declares that they really belong to it4 ,to her is committed the care and the interpretation of the revelation4 ,the word of the ,church is the word of the revelation4 ,that the ,church is the infallible oracle of truth is the fundamental dogma of the ,catholic religion2 and 8,i believe what the ,church proposes to be believed0 is an act of real assent1 including all particular assents1 notional and real2 and1 while it is possible for unlearned as well as learned1 it is imperative on learned as well as unlearned4 ,and thus it is1 that by believing the word of the ,church implicit1 that is1 by believing all that that word does or shall declare itself to contain1 every ,catholic1 according to his intellectual capacity1 supplements the shortcomings of his knowledge without blunting his real assent to what is elementary1 and takes upon himself from the first the whole truth of revelation1 progressing from one apprehension of it to another according to his opportunities of doing so4 ,,part ,,ii4 ,,assent ,,and ,,inference4 ,chapter ,,vi4 ,assent ,considered ,as ,unconditional4 ,i have now said as much as need be said about the relation of ,assent to ,apprehension1 and shall turn to the consideration of the relation existing between ,assent and ,inference4 ,as apprehension is a concomitant1 so inference is ordinarily the antecedent of assent2--on this surely ,i need not enlarge2--but neither apprehension nor inference interferes with the unconditional character of the assent1 viewed in itself4 ,the circumstances of an act1 however necessary to it1 do not enter into the act2 assent is in its nature absolute and unconditional1 though it cannot be given except under certain conditions4 ,this is obvious2 but what presents some difficulty is this1 how it is that a conditional acceptance of a proposition1--such as is an act of inference1--is able to lead1 as it does1 to an unconditional acceptance of it1--such as is assent2 how it is that a proposition which is not1 and cannot be1 demonstrated1 which at the highest can only be proved to be truth-like1 not true1 such as 8,i shall die10 nevertheless claims and receives our unqualified adhesion4 ,to the consideration of this paradox1 as it may be called1 ,i shall now proceed2 that is1 to the consideration1 first1 of the act of assent to a proposition1 which act is unconditional2 next1 of the act of inference1 which goes before the assent and is conditional2 and1 thirdly1 of the solution of the apparent inconsistency which is involved in holding that an unconditional acceptance of a proposition can be the result of its conditional verification4 #a4 ,simple ,assent4 ,the doctrine which ,i have been enunciating requires such careful explanation1 that it is not wonderful that writers of great ability and name are to be found who have put it aside for a doctrine of their own2 but no doctrine on the subject is without its difficulties1 and certainly not theirs1 though it carries with it a show of common sense4 ,the authors to whom ,i refer wish to maintain that there are degrees of assent1 and that1 as the reasons for a proposition are strong or weak1 so is the assent4 ,it follows from this that absolute assent has no legitimate exercise1 except as ratifying acts of intuition or demonstration4 ,what is thus brought home to us is indeed to be accepted unconditionally2 but1 as to reasonings in concrete matters1 they are never more than probabilities1 and the probability in each conclusion which we draw is the measure of our assent to that conclusion4 ,thus assent becomes a sort of necessary shadow1 following upon inference1 which is the substance2 and is never without some alloy of doubt1 because inference in the concrete never reaches more than probability4 ,such is what may be called the priori method of regarding assent in its relation to inference4 ,it condemns an unconditional assent in concrete matters on what may be called the nature of the case4 ,assent cannot rise higher than its source2 inference in such matters is at best conditional1 therefore assent is conditional also4 ,abstract argument is always dangerous1 and this instance is no exception to the rule2 ,i prefer to go by facts4 ,the theory to which ,i have referred cannot be carried out in practice4 ,it may be rightly said to prove too much2 for it debars us from unconditional assent in cases in which the common voice of mankind1 the advocates of this theory included1 would protest against the prohibition4 ,there are many truths in concrete matter1 which no one can demonstrate1 yet every one unconditionally accepts2 and though of course there are innumerable propositions to which it would be absurd to give an absolute assent1 still the absurdity lies in the circumstances of each particular case1 as it is taken by itself1 not in their common violation of the pretentious axiom that probable reasoning can never lead to certitude4 ,locke's remarks on the subject are an illustration of what ,i have been saying4 ,this celebrated writer1 after the manner of his school1 speaks freely of degrees of assent1 and considers that the strength of assent given to each proposition varies with the strength of the inference on which the assent follows2 yet he is obliged to make exceptions to his general principle1--exceptions1 unintelligible on his abstract doctrine1 but demanded by the logic of facts4 ,the practice of mankind is too strong for the antecedent theorem1 to which he is desirous to subject it4 ,first he says1 in his chapter 8,on ,probability10 8,most of the propositions we think1 reason1 discourse1 nay1 act upon1 are such as we cannot have undoubted knowledge of their truth2 yet some of them border so near upon certainty1 that we make no doubt at all about them1 but assent to them as firmly1 and act according to that assent as resolutely1 as if they were infallibly demonstrated1 and that our knowledge of them was perfect and certain40 ,here he allows that inferences1 which are only 8near upon certainty10 are so near1 that we legitimately accept them with 8no doubt at all10 and 8assent to them as firmly as if they were infallibly demonstrated40 ,that is1 he affirms and sanctions the very paradox to which ,i am committed myself4 ,again2 he says1 in his chapter on 8,the ,degrees of ,assent10 that 8when any particular thing1 consonant to the constant observation of ourselves and others in the like case1 comes attested by the concurrent reports of all that mention it1 we receive it as easily1 and build as firmly upon it1 as if it were certain knowledge1 and we reason and act thereupon1 with as little doubt as if it were perfect demonstration40 ,and he repeats1 8,these probabilities rise so near to certainty1 that they govern our thoughts as absolutely1 and influence all our actions as fully1 as the most evident demonstration2 and in what concerns us1 we make little or no difference between them and certain knowledge4 ,our belief thus grounded1 rises to assurance40 ,here again1 8probabilities0 may be so strong as to 8govern our thoughts as absolutely0 as sheer demonstration1 so strong that belief1 grounded on them1 8rises to assurance10 that is1 certitude4 ,i have so high a respect both for the character and the ability of ,locke1 for his manly simplicity of mind and his outspoken candour1 and there is so much in his remarks upon reasoning and proof in which ,i fully concur1 that ,i feel no pleasure in considering him in the light of an opponent to views1 which ,i myself have ever cherished as true with an obstinate devotion2 and ,i would willingly think that in the passage which follows in his chapter on 8,enthusiasm10 he is aiming at superstitious extravagances which ,i should repudiate myself as much as he can do2 but1 if so1 his words go beyond the occasion1 and contradict what ,i have quoted from him above4 8,he that would seriously set upon the search of truth1 ought1 in the first place1 to prepare his mind with a love of it4 ,for he that loves it not will not take much pains to get it1 nor be much concerned when he misses it4 ,there is nobody1 in the commonwealth of learning1 who does not profess himself a lover of truth1--and there is not a rational creature1 that would not take it amiss1 to be thought otherwise of4 ,and yet1 for all this1 one may truly say1 there are very few lovers of truth1 for truth-sake1 even amongst those who persuade themselves that they are so4 ,how a man may know1 whether he be so1 in earnest1 is worth inquiry2 and ,i think1 there is this one unerring mark of it1 viz4 the not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance than the proofs it is built on will warrant4 ,whoever goes beyond this measure of assent1 it is plain1 receives not truth in the love of it1 loves not truth for truth-sake1 but for some other by-end4 ,for the evidence that any proposition is true 7except such as are self-evident7 lying only in the proofs a man has of it1 whatsoever degrees of assent he affords it beyond the degrees of that evidence1 it is plain all that surplusage of assurance is owing to some other affection1 and not to the love of truth2 it being as impossible that the love of truth should carry my assent above the evidence there is to me that it is true1 as that the love of truth should make me assent to any proposition for the sake of that evidence which it has not that it is true2 which is in effect to love it as a truth1 because it is possible or probable that it may not be true47#e70 ,here he says that it is not only illogical1 but immoral to 8carry our assent above the evidence that a proposition is true10 to have 8a surplusage of assurance beyond the degrees of that evidence40 ,and he excepts from this rule only self-evident propositions4 ,how then is it not inconsistent with right reason1 with the love of truth for its own sake1 to allow1 in his words quoted above1 certain strong 8probabilities0 to 8govern our thoughts as absolutely as the most evident demonstration08 how is there no 8surplusage of assurance beyond the degrees of evidence0 when in the case of those strong probabilities1 we permit 8our belief1 thus grounded1 to rise to assurance10 as he pronounces we are rational in doing8 ,of course he had in view one set of instances1 when he implied that demonstration was the condition of absolute assent1 and another set when he said that it was no such condition2 but he surely cannot be acquitted of slovenly thinking in thus treating a cardinal subject4 ,a philosopher should so anticipate the application1 and guard the enunciation of his principles1 as to secure them against the risk of their being made to change places with each other1 to defend what he is eager to denounce1 and to condemn what he finds it necessary to sanction4 ,however1 whatever is to be thought of his priori method and his logical consistency1 his animus1 ,i fear1 must be understood as hostile to the doctrine which ,i am going to maintain4 ,he takes a view of the human mind1 in relation to inference and assent1 which to me seems theoretical and unreal4 ,reasonings and convictions which ,i deem natural and legitimate1 he apparently would call irrational1 enthusiastic1 perverse1 and immoral2 and that1 as ,i think1 because he consults his own ideal of how the mind ought to act1 instead of interrogating human nature1 as an existing thing1 as it is found in the world4 ,instead of going by the testimony of psychological facts1 and thereby determining our constitutive faculties and our proper condition1 and being content with the mind as ,god has made it1 he would form men as he thinks they ought to be formed1 into something better and higher1 and calls them irrational and immoral1 if 7so to speak7 they take to the water1 instead of remaining under the narrow wings of his own arbitrary theory4 #a4 ,now the first question which this theory leads me to consider is1 whether there is such an act of the mind as assent at all4 ,if there is1 it is plain it ought to show itself unequivocally as such1 as distinct from other acts4 ,for if a professed act can only be viewed as the recessary and immediate repetition of another act1 if assent is a sort of reproduction and double of an act of inference1 if when inference determines that a proposition is somewhat1 or not a little1 or a good deal1 or very like truth1 assent as its natural and normal counterpart says that it is somewhat1 or not a little1 or a good deal1 or very like truth1 then ,i do not see what we mean by saying1 or why we say at all1 that there is any such act4 ,it is simply superfluous1 in a psychological point of view1 and a curiosity of subtle minds1 and the sooner it is got out of the way the better4 ,when ,i assent1 ,i am supposed1 it seems1 to do precisely what ,i do when ,i infer1 or rather not quite so much1 but something which is included in inferring2 for1 while the disposition of my mind towards a given proposition is identical in assent and in inference1 ,i merely drop the thought of the premisses when ,i assent1 though not of their influence on the proposition inferred4 ,this1 then1 and no more after all1 is what nature prescribes2 and this1 and no more than this1 is the conscientious use of our faculties1 so to assent forsooth as to do nothing else than infer4 ,then1 ,i say1 if this be really the state of the case1 if assent in no real way differs from inference1 it is one and the same thing with it4 ,it is another name for inference1 and to speak of it at all does but mislead4 ,nor can it fairly be urged as a parallel case that an act of conscious recognition1 though distinct from an act of knowledge1 is after all only its repetition4 ,on the contrary1 such a recognition is a reflex act with its own object1 viz4 the act of knowledge itself4 ,as well might it be said that the hearing of the notes of my voice is a repetition of the act of singing3--it gives no plausibility then to the anomaly ,i am combating4 ,i lay it down1 then1 as a principle that either assent is intrinsically distinct from inference1 or the sooner we get rid of the word in philosophy the better4 ,if it be only the echo of an inference1 do not treat it as a substantive act2 but on the other hand1 supposing it be not such an idle repetition1 as ,i am sure it is not1 supposing the word 8assent0 does hold a necessary place in language and in thought1 if it does not admit of being confused with concluding and inferring1 if the two words are used for two operations of the intellect which cannot change their character1 if in matter of fact they are not always found together1 if they do not vary with each other1 if one is sometimes found without the other1 if one is strong when the other is weak1 if sometimes they seem even in conflict with each other1 then1 since we know perfectly well what an inference is1 it comes upon us to consider what1 as distinct from inference1 an assent is1 and we are1 by the very fact of its being distinct1 advanced one step towards that account of it which ,i think is the true one4 ,the first step then towards deciding the point1 will be to inquire what the experience of human life1 as it is daily brought before us1 teaches us of the relation to each other of inference and assent4 7#a47 ,first1 we know from experience that assents may endure without the presence of the inferential acts upon which they were originally elicited4 ,it is plain1 that1 as life goes on1 we are not only inwardly formed and changed by the accession of habits1 but we are also enriched by a great multitude of beliefs and opinions1 and that on a variety of subjects4 ,these beliefs and opinions1 held1 as some of them are1 almost as first principles1 are assents1 and they constitute1 as it were1 the clothing and furniture of the mind4 ,i have already spoken of them under the head of 8,credence0 and 8,opinion40 ,sometimes we are fully conscious of them2 sometimes they are implicit1 or only now and then come directly before our reflective faculty4 ,still they are assents2 and1 when we first admitted them1 we had some kind of reason1 slight or strong1 recognized or not1 for doing so4 ,however1 whatever those reasons were1 even if we ever realized them1 we have long forgotten them4 ,whether it was the authority of others1 or our own observation1 or our reading1 or our reflections1 which became the warrant of our assent1 any how we received the matters in question into our minds as true1 and gave them a place there4 ,we assented to them1 and we still assent1 though we have forgotten what the warrant was4 ,at present they are self-sustained in our minds1 and have been so for long years2 they are in no sense conclusions2 they imply no process of thought4 ,here then is a case in which assent stands out as distinct from inference4 7#b47 ,again2 sometimes assent fails1 while the reasons for it and the inferential act which is the recognition of those reasons1 are still present1 and in force4 ,our reasons may seem to us as strong as ever1 yet they do not secure our assent4 ,our beliefs1 founded on them1 were and are not2 we cannot perhaps tell when they went2 we may have thought that we still held them1 till something happened to call our attention to the state of our minds1 and then we found that our assent had become an assertion4 ,sometimes1 of course1 a cause may be found why they went2 there may have been some vague feeling that a fault lay at the ultimate basis1 or in the underlying conditions1 of our reasonings2 or some misgiving that the subject-matter of them was beyond the reach of the human mind2 or a consciousness that we had gained a broader view of things in general than when we first gave our assent2 or that there were strong objections to our first convictions1 which we had never taken into account4 ,but this is not always so2 sometimes our mind changes so quickly1 so unaccountably1 so disproportionately to any tangible arguments to which the change can be referred1 and with such abiding recognition of the force of the old arguments1 as to suggest the suspicion that moral causes1 arising out of our condition1 age1 company1 occupations1 fortunes1 are at the bottom4 ,however1 what once was assent is gone2 yet the perception of the old arguments remains1 showing that inference is one thing1 and assent another4 7#c47 ,and as assent sometimes dies out without tangible reasons1 sufficient to account for its failure1 so sometimes1 in spite of strong and convincing arguments1 it is never given4 ,we sometimes find men loud in their admiration of truths which they never profess4 ,as1 by the law of our mental constitution1 obedience is quite distinct from faith1 and men may believe without practising1 so is assent also independent of our acts of inference4 ,again1 prejudice hinders assent to the most incontrovertible proofs4 ,again1 it not unfrequently happens1 that while the keenness of the ratiocinative faculty enables a man to see the ultimate result of a complicated problem in a moment1 it takes years for him to embrace it as a truth1 and to recognize it as an item in the circle of his knowledge4 ,yet he does at last so accept it1 and then we say that he assents4 7#d47 ,again2 very numerous are the cases1 in which good arguments1 and really good as far as they go1 and confessed by us to be good1 nevertheless are not strong enough to incline our minds ever so little to the conclusion at which they point4 ,but why is it that we do not assent a little1 in proportion to those arguments8 ,on the contrary1 we throw the full onus probandi on the side of the conclusion1 and we refuse to assent to it at all1 until we can assent to it altogether4 ,the proof is capable of growth2 but the assent either exists or does not exist4 7#e47 ,i have already alluded to the influence of moral motives in hindering assent to conclusions which are logically unimpeachable4 ,according to the couplet1-- 8,a man convinced against his will ,is of the same opinion still20-- assent then is not the same as inference4 7#f47 ,strange as it may seem1 this contrast between inference and assent is exemplified even in the province of mathematics4 ,argument is not always able to command our assent1 even though it be demonstrative4 ,sometimes of course it forces its way1 that is1 when the steps of the reasoning are few1 and admit of being viewed by the mind altogether4 ,certainly1 one cannot conceive a man having before him the series of conditions and truths on which it depends that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles1 and yet not assenting to that proposition4 ,were all propositions as plain1 though assent would not in consequence be the same act as inference1 yet it would certainly follow immediately upon it4 ,i allow then as much as this1 that1 when an argument is in itself and by itself conclusive of a truth1 it has by a law of our nature the same command over our assent1 or rather the truth which it has reached has the same command1 as our senses have4 ,certainly our intellectual nature is under laws1 and the correlative of ascertained truth is unreserved assent4 ,but ,i am not speaking of short and lucid demonstrations2 but of long and intricate mathematical investigations2 and in that case1 though every step may be indisputable1 it still requires a specially sustained attention and an effort of memory to have in the mind all at once all the steps of the proof1 with their bearings on each other1 and the antecedents which they severally involve2 and these conditions of the inference may interfere with the promptness of our assent4 ,hence it is that party spirit or national feeling or religious prepossessions have before now had power to retard the reception of truths of a mathematical character2 which never could have been1 if demonstrations were ipso facto assents4 ,nor indeed would any mathematician1 even in questions of pure science1 assent to his own conclusions1 on new and difficult ground1 and in the case of abstruse calculations1 however often he went over his work1 till he had the corroboration of other judgments besides his own4 ,he would have carefully revised his inference1 and would assent to the probability of his accuracy in inferring1 but still he would abstain from an immediate assent to the truth of his conclusion4 ,yet the corroboration of others cannot add to his perception of the proof2 he would still perceive the proof1 even though he failed in gaining their corroboration4 ,and yet again he might arbitrarily make it his rule1 never to assent to his conclusions without such corroboration1 or at least before the lapse of a sufficient interval4 ,here again inference is distinct from assent4 ,i have been showing that inference and assent are distinct acts of the mind1 and that they may be made apart from each other4 ,of course ,i cannot be taken to mean that there is no legitimate or actual connexion between them1 as if arguments adverse to a conclusion did not naturally hinder assent2 or as if the inclination to give assent were not greater or less according as the particular act of inference expressed a stronger or weaker probability2 or as if assent did not always imply grounds in reason1 implicit1 if not explicit1 or could be rightly given without sufficient grounds4 ,so much is it commonly felt that assent must be preceded by inferential acts1 that obstinate men give their own will as their very reason for assenting1 if they can think of nothing better2 8stat pro ratione voluntas40 ,indeed1 ,i doubt whether assent is ever given without some preliminary1 which stands for a reason2 but it does not follow from this1 that it may not be withheld in cases when there are good reasons for giving it to a proposition1 or may not be withdrawn after it has been given1 the reasons remaining1 or may not remain when the reasons are forgotten2 or must always vary in strength1 as the reasons vary2 and this substantiveness1 as ,i may call it1 of the act of assent is the very point which ,i have wished to establish4 #b4 ,and in showing that assent is distinct from an act of inference1 ,i have gone a good way towards showing in what it differs from it4 ,if assent and inference are each of them the acceptance of a proposition1 but the special characteristic of inference is that it is conditional1 it is natural to suppose that assent is unconditional4 ,again1 if assent is the acceptance of truth1 and truth is the proper object of the intellect1 and no one can hold conditionally what by the same act he holds to be true1 here too is a reason for saying that assent is an adhesion without reserve or doubt to the proposition to which it is given4 ,and again1 it is to be presumed that the word has not two meanings3 what it has at one time1 it has at another4 ,inference is always inference2 even if demonstrative1 it is still conditional2 it establishes an incontrovertible conclusion on the condition of incontrovertible premisses4 ,to the conclusion thus drawn1 assent gives its absolute recognition4 ,in the case of all demonstrations1 assent1 when given1 is unconditionally given4 ,in one class of subjects1 then1 assent certainly is always unconditional2 but if the word stands for an undoubting and unhesitating act of the mind once1 why does it not denote the same always8 what evidence is there that it ever means any thing else than that which the whole world will unite in witnessing that it means in certain cases8 why are we not to interpret what is controverted by what is known8 ,this is what is suggested on the first view of the question2 but to continue3-- ,in demonstrative matters assent excludes the presence of doubt3 now are instances producible1 on the other hand1 of its ever co-existing with doubt in cases of the concrete8 ,as the above instances have shown1 on very many questions we do not give an assent at all4 ,what commonly happens is this1 that1 after hearing and entering into what may be said for a proposition1 we pronounce neither for nor against it4 ,we may accept the conclusion as a conclusion1 dependent on premisses1 abstract1 and tending to the concrete2 but we do not follow up our inference of a proposition by giving an assent to it4 ,that there are concrete propositions to which we give unconditional assents1 ,i shall presently show2 but ,i am now asking for instances of conditional1 for instances in which we assent a little and not much4 ,usually1 we do not assent at all4 ,every day1 as it comes1 brings with it opportunities for us to enlarge our circle of assents4 ,we read the newspapers2 we look through debates in ,parliament1 pleadings in the law courts1 leading articles1 letters of correspondents1 reviews of books1 criticisms in the fine arts1 and we either form no opinion at all upon the subjects discussed1 as lying out of our line1 or at most we have only an opinion about them4 ,at the utmost we say that we are inclined to believe this proposition or that1 that we are not sure it is not true1 that much may be said for it1 that we have been much struck by it2 but we never say that we give it a degree of assent4 ,we might as well talk of degrees of truth as of degrees of assent4 ,yet ,locke heads one of his chapters with the title 8,degrees of ,assent20 and a writer1 of this century1 who claims our respect from the tone and drift of his work1 thus expresses himself after ,locke's manner3 8,moral evidence10 he says1 8may produce a variety of degrees of assents1 from suspicion to moral certainty4 ,for1 here1 the degree of assent depends upon the degree in which the evidence on one side preponderates1 or exceeds that on the other4 ,and as this preponderancy may vary almost infinitely1 so likewise may the degrees of assent4 ,for a few of these degrees1 though but for a few1 names have been invented4 ,thus1 when the evidence on one side preponderates a very little1 there is ground for suspicion1 or conjecture4 ,presumption1 persuasion1 belief1 conclusion1 conviction1 moral certainty1--doubt1 wavering1 distrust1 disbelief1--are words which imply an increase or decrease of this preponderancy4 ,some of these words also admit of epithets which denote a further increase or diminution of the assent47#f70 ,can there be a better illustration than this passage supplies of what ,i have been insisting on above1 viz4 that1 in teaching various degrees of assent1 we tend to destroy assent1 as an act of the mind1 altogether8 ,this author makes the degrees of assent 8infinite10 as the degrees of probability are infinite4 ,his assents are really only inferences1 and assent is a name without a meaning1 the needless repetition of an inference4 ,but in truth 8suspicion1 conjecture1 presumption1 persuasion1 belief1 conclusion1 conviction1 moral certainty10 are not 8assents0 at all2 they are simply more or less strong inferences of a proposition2 and 8doubt1 wavering1 distrust1 disbelief10 are recognitions1 more or less strong1 of the probability of its contradictory4 ,there is only one sense in which we are allowed to call such acts or states of mind assents4 ,they are opinions2 and1 as being such1 they are1 as ,i have already observed1 when speaking of ,opinion1 assents to the plausibility1 probability1 doubtfulness1 or untrustworthiness1 of a proposition2 that is1 not variations of assent to an inference1 but assents to a variation in inferences4 ,when ,i assent to a doubtfulness1 or to a probability1 my assent1 as such1 is as complete as if ,i assented to a truth2 it is not a certain degree of assent4 ,and1 in like manner1 ,i may be certain of an uncertainty2 that does not destroy the specific notion convened in the word 8certain40 ,i do not know then when it is that we ever deliberately profess assent to a proposition without meaning to convey to others the impression that we accept it unreservedly1 and that because it is true4 ,certainly1 we familiarly use such phrases as a half-assent1 as we also speak of half-truths2 but a half-assent is not a kind of assent any more than a half-truth is a kind of truth4 ,as the object is indivisible1 so is the act4 ,a half-truth is a proposition which in one aspect is a truth1 and in another is not2 to give a half-assent is to feel drawn towards assent1 or to assent one moment and not the next1 or to be in the way to assent to it4 ,it means that the proposition in question deserves a hearing1 that it is probable1 or attractive1 that it opens important views1 that it is a key to perplexing difficulties1 or the like4 #c4 ,treating the subject then1 not according to priori fitness1 but according to the facts of human nature1 as they are found in the concrete action of life1 ,i find numberless cases in which we do not assent at all1 none in which assent is evidently conditional2--and many1 as ,i shall now proceed to show1 in which it is unconditional1 and these in subject-matters which admit of nothing higher than probable reasoning4 ,if human nature is to be its own witness1 there is no medium between assenting and not assenting4 ,locke's theory of the duty of assenting more or less according to degrees of evidence1 is invalidated by the testimony of high and low1 young and old1 ancient and modern1 as continually given in their ordinary sayings and doings4 ,indeed1 as ,i have shown1 he does not strictly maintain it himself2 yet1 though he feels the claims of nature and fact to be too strong for him in certain cases1 he gives no reason why he should violate his theory in these1 and yet not in many more4 ,now let us review some of those assents1 which men give on evidence short of intuition and demonstration1 yet which are as unconditional as if they had that highest evidence4 ,first of all1 starting from intuition1 of course we all believe1 without any doubt1 that we exist2 that we have an individuality and identity all our own2 that we think1 feel1 and act1 in the home of our own minds2 that we have a present sense of good and evil1 of a right and a wrong1 of a true and a false1 of a beautiful and a hideous1 however we analyze our ideas of them4 ,we have an absolute vision before us of what happened yesterday or last year1 so as to be able without any chance of mistake to give evidence upon it in a court of justice1 let the consequences be ever so serious4 ,we are sure that of many things we are ignorant1 that of many things we are in doubt1 and that of many things we are not in doubt4 ,nor is the assent which we give to facts limited to the range of self-consciousness4 ,we are sure beyond all hazard of a mistake1 that our own self is not the only being existing2 that there is an external world2 that it is a system with parts and a whole1 a universe carried on by laws2 and that the future is affected by the past4 ,we accept and hold with an unqualified assent1 that the earth1 considered as a phenomenon1 is a globe2 that all its regions see the sun by turns2 that there are vast tracts on it of land and water2 that there are really existing cities on definite sites1 which go by the names of ,london1 ,paris1 ,florence1 and ,madrid4 ,we are sure that ,paris or ,london1 unless swallowed up by an earthquake or burned to the ground1 is to-day just what it was yesterday1 when we left it4 ,we laugh to scorn the idea that we had no parents1 though we have no memory of our birth2 that we shall never depart this life1 though we can have no experience of the future2 that we are able to live without food1 though we have never tried2 that a world of men did not live before our time1 or that that world has had no history2 that there has been no rise and fall of states1 no great men1 no wars1 no revolutions1 no art1 no science1 no literature1 no religion4 ,we should be either indignant or amused at the report of our intimate friend being false to us2 and we are able sometimes1 without any hesitation1 to accuse certain parties of hostility and injustice to us4 ,we may have a deep consciousness1 which we never can lose1 that we on our part have been cruel to others1 and that they have felt us to be so1 or that we have been1 and have been felt to be1 ungenerous to those who love us4 ,we may have an overpowering sense of our moral weakness1 of the precariousness of our life1 health1 wealth1 position1 and good fortune4 ,we may have a clear view of the weak points of our physical constitution1 of what food or medicine is good for us1 and what does us harm4 ,we may be able to master1 at least in part1 the course of our past history2 its turning-points1 our hits1 and our great mistakes4 ,we may have a sense of the presence of a ,supreme ,being1 which never has been dimmed by even a passing shadow1 which has inhabited us ever since we can recollect any thing1 and which we cannot imagine our losing4 ,we may be able1 for others have been able1 so to realize the precepts and truths of ,christianity1 as deliberately to surrender our life1 rather than transgress the one or to deny the other4 ,on all these truths we have an immediate and an unhesitating hold1 nor do we think ourselves guilty of not loving truth for truth's sake1 because we cannot reach them through a series of intuitive propositions4 ,assent on reasonings not demonstrative is too widely recognized an act to be irrational1 unless man's nature is irrational1 too familiar to the prudent and clear-minded to be an infirmity or an extravagance4 ,none of us can think or act without the acceptance of truths1 not intuitive1 not demonstrated1 yet sovereign4 ,if our nature has any constitution1 any laws1 one of them is this absolute reception of propositions as true1 which lie outside the narrow range of conclusions to which logic1 formal or virtual1 is tethered2 nor has any philosophical theory the power to force on us a rule which will not work for a day4 ,when1 then1 philosophers lay down principles1 on which it follows that our assent1 except when given to objects of intuition or demonstration1 is conditional1 that the assent given to propositions by well-ordered minds necessarily varies with the proof producible for them1 and that it does not and cannot remain one and the same while the proof is strengthened or weakened1--are they not to be considered as confusing together two things very distinct from each other1 a mental act or state and a scientific rule1 an interior assent and a set of logical formulas8 ,when they speak of degrees of assent1 surely they have no intention at all of defining the position of the mind itself relative to the adoption of a given conclusion1 but they mean to determine the relation of that conclusion towards its premisses4 ,they are contemplating how representative symbols work1 not how the intellect is affected towards the thing which those symbols represent4 ,in real truth they as little mean to assert the principle of measuring our assents by our logic1 as they would fancy they could record the refreshment which we receive from the open air by the readings of the graduated scale of a thermometer4 ,there is a connexion doubtless between a logical conclusion and an assent1 as there is between the variation of the mercury and our sensations2 but the mercury is not the cause of life and health1 nor is verbal argumentation the principle of inward belief4 ,if we feel hot or chilly1 no one will convince us to the contrary by insisting that the glass is at #fj4 ,it is the mind that reasons and assents1 not a diagram on paper4 ,i may have difficulty in the management of a proof1 while ,i remain unshaken in my adherence to the conclusion4 ,supposing a boy cannot make his answer to some arithmetical or algebraical question tally with the book1 need he at once distrust the book8 ,does his trust in it fall down a certain number of degrees1 according to the force of his difficulty8 ,on the contrary1 he keeps to the principle1 implicit but present to his mind1 with which he took up the book1 that the book is more likely to be right than he is2 and this mere preponderance of probability is sufficient to make him faithful to his belief in its correctness1 till its incorrectness is actually proved4 ,my own opinion is1 that the class of writers of whom ,i have been speaking1 have themselves as little misgiving about the truths which they pretend to weigh out and measure1 as their unsophisticated neighbours2 but they think it a duty to remind us1 that since the full etiquette of logical requirements has not been satisfied1 we must believe those truths at our peril4 ,they warn us1 that an issue which can never come to pass in matter of fact1 is nevertheless in theory a possible supposition4 ,they do not1 for instance1 intend for a moment to imply that there is even the shadow of a doubt that ,great ,britain is an island1 but they think we ought to know1 if we do not know1 that there is no proof of the fact1 in mode and figure1 equal to the proof of a proposition of ,euclid2 and that in consequence they and we are all bound to suspend our judgment about such a fact1 though it be in an infinitesimal degree1 lest we should seem not to love truth for truth's sake4 ,having made their protest1 they subside without scruple into that same absolute assurance of only partially-proved truths1 which is natural to the illogical imagination of the multitude4 #d4 ,it remains to explain some conversational expressions1 at first sight favourable to that doctrine of degrees in assent1 which ,i have been combating4 7#a47 ,we often speak of giving a modified and qualified1 or a presumptive and prim facie assent1 or 7as ,i have already said7 a half-assent to opinions or facts2 but these expressions admit of an easy explanation4 ,assent1 upon the authority of others is often1 as ,i have noticed1 when speaking of notional assents1 little more than a profession or acquiescence or inference1 not a real acceptance of a proposition4 ,i report1 for instance1 that there was a serious fire in the town in the past night2 and then perhaps ,i add1 that at least the morning papers say so2--that is1 ,i have perhaps no positive doubt of the fact2 still1 by referring to the newspapers ,i imply that ,i do not take on myself the responsibility of the statement4 ,in thus qualifying my apparent assent1 ,i show that it was not a genuine assent at all4 ,in like manner a prim facie assent is an assent to an antecedent probability of a fact1 not to the fact itself2 as ,i might give a prim facie assent to the ,plurality of worlds or to the personality of ,homer1 without pledging myself to either absolutely4 8,half-assent10 of which ,i spoke above1 is an inclination to assent1 or again1 an intention of assenting1 when certain difficulties are surmounted4 ,when we speak without thought1 assent has as vague a meaning as half-assent2 but when we deliberately say1 8,i assent10 we signify an act of the mind so definite1 as to admit of no change but that of its ceasing to be4 7#b47 ,and so1 too1 though we sometimes use the phrase 8conditional assent10 yet we only mean thereby to say that we will assent under certain contingencies4 ,of course we may1 if we please1 include a condition in the proposition to which our assent is given2 and then1 that condition enters into the matter of the assent1 but not into the assent itself4 ,to assent to--8,if this man is in a consumption1 his days are numbered10--is as little a conditional assent1 as to assent to--8,of this consumptive patient the days are numbered10--which1 7though without the conditional form17 is an equivalent proposition4 ,in such cases1 strictly speaking1 the assent is given neither to antecedent nor consequent of the conditional proposition1 but to their connexion1 that is1 to the enthymematic inferentia4 ,if we place the condition external to the proposition1 then the assent will be given to 8,that #8his days are numbered' is conditionally true20 and of course we can assent to the conditionality of a proposition as well as to its probability4 ,or again1 if so be1 we may give our assent not only to the inferentia in a complex conditional proposition1 but to each of the simple propositions1 of which it is made up1 besides4 8,there will be a storm soon1 for the mercury falls20--here1 besides assenting to the connexion of the propositions1 we may assent also to 8,the mercury falls10 and to 8,there will be a storm40 ,this is assenting to the premiss1 inferentia1 and thing inferred1 all at once2--we assent to the whole syllogism1 and to its component parts4 7#c47 ,in like manner are to be explained the phrases1 8deliberate assent10 a 8rational assent20 a 8sudden10 8impulsive10 or 8hesitating0 assent4 ,these expressions denote1 not kinds or qualities1 but the circumstances of assenting4 ,a deliberate assent is an assent following upon deliberation4 ,it is sometimes called a conviction1 a word which commonly includes in its meaning two acts1 both the act of inference1 and the act of assent consequent upon the inference4 ,this subject will be considered in the next ,section4 ,on the other hand1 a hesitating assent is an assent to which we have been slow and intermittent in coming2 or an assent which1 when given1 is thwarted and obscured by external and flitting misgivings1 though not such as to enter into the act itself1 or essentially to damage it4 ,there is another sense in which we speak of a hesitating or uncertain assent2 viz4 when we assent in act1 but not in the habit of our minds4 ,till assent to a doctrine or fact is my habit1 ,i am at the mercy of inferences contrary to it2 ,i assent to-day1 and give up my belief1 or incline to disbelief1 to-morrow4 ,i may find it my duty1 for instance1 after the opportunity of careful inquiry and inference1 to assent to another's innocence1 whom ,i have for years considered guilty2 but from long prejudice ,i may be unable to carry my new assent well about me1 and may every now and then relapse into momentary thoughts injurious to him4 7#d47 ,a more plausible objection to the absolute absence of all doubt or misgiving in an act of assent is found in the use of the terms firm and weak assent1 or in the growth of belief and trust4 ,thus1 we assent to the events of history1 but not with that fulness and force of adherence to the received account of them with which we realize a record of occurrences which are within our own memory4 ,and again1 we assent to the praise bestowed on a friend's good qualities with an energy which we do not feel1 when we are speaking of virtue in the abstract3 and if we are political partisans1 our assent is very cold1 when we cannot refuse it1 to representations made in favour of the wisdom or patriotism of statesmen whom we dislike4 ,and then as to religious subjects we speak of 8strong0 faith and 8feeble0 faith2 of the faith which would move mountains1 and of the ordinary faith 8without which it is impossible to please ,god40 ,and as we can grow in graces1 so surely can we inclusively in faith4 ,again we rise from one work of ,christian ,evidences with our faith enlivened and invigorated2 from another perhaps with the distracted father's words in our mouth1 8,i believe1 help my unbelief40 ,now it is evident1 first of all1 that habits of mind may grow1 as being a something permanent and continuous2 and by assent growing1 it is often only meant that the habit grows and has greater hold upon the mind4 ,but again1 when we carefully consider the matter1 it will be found that this increase or decrease of strength does not lie in the assent itself1 but in its circumstances and concomitants2 for instance1 in the emotions1 in the ratiocinative faculty1 or in the imagination4 ,for instance1 as to the emotions1 this strength of assent may be nothing more than the strength of love1 hatred1 interest1 desire1 or fear1 which the object of the assent elicits1 and this is especially the case when that object is of a religious nature4 ,such strength is adventitious and accidental2 it may come1 it may go2 it is found in one man1 not in another2 it does not interfere with the genuineness and perfection of the act of assent4 ,balaam assented to the fact of his own intercourse with the supernatural1 as well as ,moses2 but1 to use religious language1 he had light without love2 his intellect was clear1 his heart was cold4 ,hence his faith would popularly be considered wanting in strength4 ,on the other hand1 prejudice implies strong assents to the disadvantage of its object2 that is1 it encourages such assents1 and guards them from the chance of being lost4 ,again1 when a conclusion is recommended to us by the number and force of the arguments in proof of it1 our recognition of them invests it with a luminousness1 which in one sense adds strength to our assent to it1 as it certainly does protect and embolden that assent4 ,thus we assent to a review of recent events1 which we have studied from original documents1 with a triumphant peremptoriness which it neither occurs to us1 nor is possible for us1 to exercise1 when we make an act of assent to the assassination of ,julius ,caesar1 or to the existence of the ,abipones1 though we are as securely certain of these latter facts as of the doings and occurrences of yesterday4 ,and further1 all that ,i have said about the apprehension of propositions is in point here4 ,we may speak of assent to our ,lord's divinity as strong or feeble1 according as it is given to the reality as impressed upon the imagination1 or to the notion of it as entertained by the intellect4 7#e47 ,nor1 lastly1 does this doctrine of the intrinsic integrity and indivisibility 7if ,i may so speak7 of assent interfere with the teaching of ,catholic theology as to the pre-eminence of strength in divine faith1 which has a supernatural origin1 when compared with all belief which is merely human and natural4 ,for first1 that pre-eminence consists1 not in its differing from human faith1 merely in degree of assent1 but in its being superior in nature and kind17#g7 so that the one does not admit of a comparison with the other2 and next1 its intrinsic superiority is not a matter of experience1 but is above experience47#h7 ,assent is ever assent27#i7 but in the assent which follows on a divine announcement1 and is vivified by a divine grace1 there is1 from the nature of the case1 a transcendant adhesion of mind1 intellectual and moral1 and a special self-protection17#aj7 beyond the operation of those ordinary laws of thought1 which alone have a place in my discussion4 #b4 ,complex ,assent4 ,i have been considering assent as the mental assertion of an intelligible proposition1 as an act of the intellect direct1 absolute1 complete in itself1 unconditional1 arbitrary1 yet not incompatible with an appeal to argument1 and at least in many cases exercised unconsciously4 ,on this last characteristic of assent ,i have not dwelt1 as it has not come in my way2 nor is it more than an accident of acts of assent1 though an ordinary accident4 ,that it is of ordinary occurrence cannot be doubted4 ,a great many of our assents are merely expressions of our personal likings1 tastes1 principles1 motives1 and opinions1 as dictated by nature1 or resulting from habit2 in other words1 they are acts and manifestations of self3 now what is more rare than self-knowledge8 ,in proportion then to our ignorance of self1 is our unconsciousness of those innumerable acts of assent1 which we are incessantly making4 ,and so again in what may be almost called the mechanical operation of our minds1 in our continual acts of apprehension and inference1 speculation1 and resolve1 propositions pass before us and receive our assent without our consciousness4 ,hence it is that we are so apt to confuse together acts of assent and acts of inference4 ,indeed1 ,i may fairly say1 that those assents which we give with a direct knowledge of what we are doing1 are few compared with the multitude of like acts which pass through our minds in long succession without our observing them4 ,that mode of assent which is exercised thus unconsciously1 ,i may call simple assent1 and of it ,i have treated in the foregoing ,section2 but now ,i am going to speak of such assents as must be made consciously and deliberately1 and which ,i shall call complex or reflex assents4 ,and ,i begin by recalling what ,i have already stated about the relation in which ,assent and ,inference stand to each other1--,inference1 which holds propositions conditionally1 and ,assent1 which unconditionally accepts them2 the relation is this3-- ,acts of inference are both the antecedents of assent before assenting1 and its usual concomitants after assenting4 ,for instance1 ,i hold absolutely that the country which we call ,india exists1 upon trustworthy testimony2 and next1 ,i may continue to believe it on the same testimony4 ,in like manner1 ,i have ever believed that ,great ,britain is an island1 for certain sufficient reasons2 and on the same reasons ,i may persist in the belief4 ,but it may happen that ,i forget my reasons for what ,i believe to be so absolutely true2 or ,i may never have asked myself about them1 or formally marshalled them in order1 and have been accustomed to assent without a recognition of my assent or of its grounds1 and then perhaps something occurs which leads to my reviewing and completing those grounds1 analyzing and arranging them1 yet without on that account implying of necessity any suspense1 ever so slight1 of assent1 to the proposition that ,india is in a certain part of the earth1 and that ,great ,britain is an island4 ,with no suspense of assent at all2 any more than the boy in my former illustration had any doubt about the answer set down in his arithmetic-book1 when he began working out the question2 any more than he would be doubting his eyes and his common sense1 that the two sides of a triangle are together greater than the third1 because he drew out the geometrical proof of it4 ,he does but repeat1 after his formal demonstration1 that assent which he made before it1 and assents to his previous assenting4 ,this is what ,i call a reflex or complex assent4 ,i say1 there is no necessary incompatibility between thus assenting and yet proving1--for the conclusiveness of a proposition is not synonymous with its truth4 ,a proposition may be true1 yet not admit of being concluded2--it may be a conclusion and yet not a truth4 ,to contemplate it under one aspect1 is not to contemplate it under another2 and the two aspects may be consistent1 from the very fact that they are two aspects4 ,therefore to set about concluding a proposition is not ipso facto to doubt its truth2 we may aim at inferring a proposition1 while all the time we assent to it4 ,we have to do this as a common occurrence1 when we take on ourselves to convince another on any point in which he differs from us4 ,we do not deny our faith1 because we become controversialists2 and in like manner we may employ ourselves in proving what we believe to be true1 simply in order to ascertain the producible evidence in its favour1 and in order to fulfil what is due to ourselves and to the claims and responsibilities of our education and social position4 ,i have been speaking of investigation1 not of inquiry2 it is quite true that inquiry is inconsistent with assent1 but inquiry is something more than the mere exercise of inference4 ,he who inquires has not found2 he is in doubt where the truth lies1 and wishes his present profession either proved or disproved4 ,we cannot without absurdity call ourselves at once believers and inquirers also4 ,thus it is sometimes spoken of as a hardship that a ,catholic is not allowed to inquire into the truth of his ,creed2--of course he cannot1 if he would retain the name of believer4 ,he cannot be both inside and outside of the ,church at once4 ,it is merely common sense to tell him that1 if he is seeking1 he has not found4 ,if seeking includes doubting1 and doubting excludes believing1 then the ,catholic who sets about inquiring1 thereby declares that he is not a ,catholic4 ,he has already lost faith4 ,and this is his best defence to himself for inquiring1 viz4 that he is no longer a ,catholic1 and wishes to become one4 ,they who would forbid him to inquire1 would in that case be shutting the stable-door after the steed is stolen4 ,what can he do better than inquire1 if he is in doubt8 how else can he become a ,catholic again8 ,not to inquire is in his case to be satisfied with disbelief4 ,however1 in thus speaking1 ,i am viewing the matter in the abstract1 and without allowing for the manifold inconsistencies of individuals1 as they are found in the world1 who attempt to unite incompatibilities2 who do not doubt1 but who act as if they did2 who1 though they believe1 are weak in faith1 and put themselves in the way of losing it by unnecessarily listening to objections4 ,moreover1 there are minds1 undoubtedly1 with whom at all times to question a truth is to make it questionable1 and to investigate is equivalent to inquiring2 and again1 there may be beliefs so sacred or so delicate1 that1 if ,i may use the metaphor1 they will not wash without shrinking and losing colour4 ,i grant all this2 but here ,i am discussing broad principles1 not individual cases2 and these principles are1 that inquiry implies doubt1 and that investigation does not imply it1 and that those who assent to a doctrine or fact may without inconsistency investigate its credibility1 though they cannot literally inquire about its truth4 ,next1 ,i consider that1 in the case of educated minds1 investigations into the argumentative proof of the things to which they have given their assent1 is an obligation1 or rather a necessity4 ,such a trial of their intellects is a law of their nature1 like the growth of childhood into manhood1 and analogous to the moral ordeal which is the instrument of their spiritual life4 ,the lessons of right and wrong1 which are taught them at school1 are to be carried out into action amid the good and evil of the world2 and so again the intellectual assents1 in which they have in like manner been instructed from the first1 have to be tested1 realized1 and developed by the exercise of their mature judgment4 ,certainly1 such processes of investigation1 whether in religious subjects or secular1 often issue in the reversal of the assents which they were originally intended to confirm2 as the boy who works out an arithmetical problem from his book may end in detecting1 or thinking he detects1 a false print in the answer4 ,but the question before us is whether acts of assent and of inference are compatible2 and my vague consciousness of the possibility of a reversal of my belief in the course of my researches1 as little interferes with the honesty and firmness of that belief while those researches proceed1 as the recognition of the possibility of my train's oversetting is an evidence of an intention on my part of undergoing so great a calamity4 ,my mind is not moved by a scientific computation of chances1 nor can any law of averages affect my particular case4 ,to incur a risk is not to expect reverse2 and if my opinions are true1 ,i have a right to think that they will bear examining4 ,nor1 on the other hand1 does belief1 viewed in its idea1 imply a positive resolution in the party believing never to abandon that belief4 ,what belief1 as such1 does imply is1 not an intention never to change1 but the utter absence of all thought1 or expectation1 or fear of changing4 ,a spontaneous resolution never to change is inconsistent with the idea of belief2 for the very force and absoluteness of the act of assent precludes any such resolution4 ,we do not commonly determine not to do what we cannot fancy ourselves ever doing4 ,we should readily indeed make such a formal promise if we were called upon to do so2 for1 since we have the truth1 and truth cannot change1 how can we possibly change in our belief1 except indeed through our own weakness or fickleness8 ,we have no intention whatever of being weak or fickle2 so our promise is but the natural guarantee of our sincerity4 ,it is possible then1 without disloyalty to our convictions1 to examine their grounds1 even though in the event they are to fail under the examination1 for we have no suspicion of this failure4 ,and such examination1 as ,i have said1 does but fulfil a law of our nature4 ,our first assents1 right or wrong1 are often little more than prejudices4 ,the reasonings1 which precede and accompany them1 though sufficient for their purpose1 do not rise up to the importance and energy of the assents themselves4 ,as time goes on1 by degrees and without set purpose1 by reflection and experience1 we begin to confirm or to correct the notions and the images to which those assents are given4 ,at times it is a necessity formally to undertake a survey and revision of this or that class of them1 of those which relate to religion1 or to social duty1 or to politics1 or to the conduct of life4 ,sometimes this review begins in doubt as to the matters which we propose to consider1 that is1 in a suspension of the assents hitherto familiar to us2 sometimes those assents are too strong to allow of being lost on the first stirring of the inquisitive intellect1 and if1 as time goes on1 they give way1 our change of mind1 be it for good or for evil1 is owing to the accumulating force of the arguments1 sound or unsound1 which bear down upon the propositions which we have hitherto received4 ,objections1 indeed1 as such1 have no direct force to weaken assent2 but1 when they multiply1 they tell against the implicit reasonings or the formal inferences which are its warrant1 and suspend its acts and gradually undermine its habit4 ,then the assent goes2 but whether slowly or suddenly1 noticeably or imperceptibly1 is a matter of circumstance or accident4 ,however1 whether the original assent is continued on or not1 the new assent differs from the old in this1 that it has the strength of explicitness and deliberation1 that it is not a mere prejudice1 and its strength the strength of prejudice4 ,it is an assent1 not only to a given proposition1 but to the claim of that proposition on our assent as true2 it is an assent to an assent1 or what is commonly called a conviction4 ,of course these reflex acts may be repeated in a series4 ,as ,i pronounce that 8,great ,britain is an island10 and then pronounce 8,that #8,great ,britain is an island' has a claim on my assent10 or is to 8be assented-to10 or to be 8accepted as true10 or to be 8believed10 or simply 8is true0 7these predicates being equivalent71 so ,i may proceed1 8,the proposition #8that ,great-,britain-is-an-island is to be believed1' is to be believed10 c41 c41 and so on to ad infinitum4 ,but this would be trifling4 ,the mind is like a double mirror1 in which reflexions of self within self multiply themselves till they are undistinguishable1 and the first reflexion contains all the rest4 ,at the same time1 it is worth while to notice two other reflex propositions3--8,that #8,great ,britain is an island' is probable0 is true2--and 8,that #8,great ,britain is an island' is uncertain0 is true3--for the former of these is the expression of ,opinion1 and the latter of formal or theological ,doubt1 as ,i have already determined4 ,i have one step farther to make3--let the proposition to which the assent is given be as absolutely true as the reflex act pronounces it to be1 that is1 objectively true as well as subjectively3--then the assent may be called a perception1 the conviction a certitude1 the proposition or truth a certainty1 or thing known1 or a matter of knowledge1 and to assent to it is to know4 ,of course1 in thus speaking1 ,i open the all-important question1 what is truth1 and what apparent truth8 what is genuine knowledge1 and what is its counterfeit8 what are the tests for discriminating certitude from mere persuasion or delusion8 ,whatever a man holds to be true1 he will say he holds for certain2 and for the present ,i must allow him in his assumption1 hoping in one way or another1 as ,i proceed1 to lessen the difficulties which lie in the way of calling him to account for so doing4 ,and ,i have the less scruple in taking this course1 as believing that1 among fairly prudent and circumspect men1 there are far fewer instances of false certitude than at first sight might be supposed4 ,men are often doubtful about propositions which are really true2 they are not commonly certain of such as are simply false4 ,what they judge to be a certainty is in matter of fact for the most part a truth4 ,not that there is not a great deal of rash talking even among the educated portion of the community1 and many a man makes professions of certitude1 for which he has no warrant2 but that such off-hand1 confident language is no token how these persons will express themselves when brought to book4 ,no one will with justice consider himself certain of any matter1 unless he has sufficient reasons for so considering2 and it is rare that what is not true should be so free from every circumstance and token of falsity as to create no suspicion in his mind to its disadvantage1 no reason for suspense of judgment4 ,however1 ,i shall have to remark on this difficulty by and by2 here ,i will mention two conditions of certitude1 in close connexion with that necessary preliminary of investigation and proof of which ,i have been speaking1 which will throw some light upon it4 ,the one1 which is priori1 or from the nature of the case1 will tell us what is not certitude2 the other1 which is posteriori1 or from experience1 will tell us in a measure what certitude is4 #a4 ,certitude1 as ,i have said1 is the perception of a truth with the perception that it is a truth1 or the consciousness of knowing1 as expressed in the phrase1 8,i know that ,i know10 or 8,i know that ,i know that ,i know10--or simply 8,i know20 for one reflex assertion of the mind about self sums up the series of self-consciousnesses without the need of any actual evolution of them4 ,certitude is the knowledge of a truth3--but what is once true is always true1 and cannot fail1 whereas what is once known need not always be known1 and is capable of failing4 ,it follows1 that if ,i am certain of a thing1 ,i believe it will remain what ,i now hold it to be1 even though my mind should have the bad fortune to let it drop4 ,since mere argument is not the measure of assent1 no one can be called certain of a proposition1 whose mind does not spontaneously and promptly reject1 on their first suggestion1 as idle1 as impertinent1 as sophistical1 any objections which are directed against its truth4 ,no man is certain of a truth1 who can endure the thought of the fact of its contradictory existing or occurring2 and that not from any set purpose or effort to reject that thought1 but1 as ,i have said1 by the spontaneous action of the intellect4 ,what is contradictory to the truth1 with its apparatus of argument1 fades out of the mind as fast as it enters it2 and though it be brought back to the mind ever so often by the pertinacity of an opponent1 or by a voluntary or involuntary act of imagination1 still that contradictory proposition and its arguments are mere phantoms and dreams1 in the light of our certitude1 and their very entering into the mind is the first step of their going out of it4 ,such is the position of our minds towards the heathen fancy that ,enceladus lies under ,etna2 or1 not to take so extreme a case1 that ,joanna ,southcote was a messenger from heaven1 or the ,emperor ,napoleon really had a star4 ,equal to this peremptory assertion of negative propositions is the revolt of the mind from suppositions incompatible with positive statements of which we are certain1 whether abstract truths or facts2 as that a straight line is the longest possible distance between its two extreme points1 that ,great ,britain is in shape an exact square or circle1 that ,i shall escape dying1 or that my intimate friend is false to me4 ,we may indeed say1 if we please1 that a man ought not to have so supreme a conviction in a given case1 or in any case whatever2 and that he is therefore wrong in treating opinions which he does not himself hold1 with this even involuntary contempt2--certainly1 we have a right to say so1 if we will2 but if1 in matter of fact1 a man has such a conviction1 if he is sure that ,ireland is to the ,west of ,england1 or that the ,pope is the ,vicar of ,christ1 nothing is left to him1 if he would be consistent1 but to carry his conviction out into this magisterial intolerance of any contrary assertion2 and if he were in his own mind tolerant1 ,i do not say patient 7for patience and gentleness are moral duties1 but ,i mean intellectually tolerant71 of objections as objections1 he would virtually be giving countenance to the views which those objections represented4 ,i say ,i certainly should be very intolerant of such a notion as that ,i shall one day be ,emperor of the ,french2 ,i should think it too absurd even to be ridiculous1 and that ,i must be mad before ,i could entertain it4 ,and did a man try to persuade me that treachery1 cruelty1 or ingratitude were as praiseworthy as honesty and temperance1 and that a man who lived the life of a knave and died the death of a brute had nothing to fear from future retribution1 ,i should think there was no call on me to listen to his arguments1 except with the hope of converting him1 though he called me a bigot and a coward for refusing to inquire into his speculations4 ,and if1 in a matter in which my temporal interests were concerned1 he attempted to reconcile me to fraudulent acts by what he called philosophical views1 ,i should say to him1 8,retro ,satana10 and that1 not from any suspicion of his ability to reverse immutable principles1 but from a consciousness of my own moral changeableness1 and a fear1 on that account1 that ,i might not be intellectually true to the truth4 ,this1 then1 from the nature of the case1 is a main characteristic of certitude in any matter1 to be confident indeed that that certitude will last1 but to be confident of this also1 that1 if it did fail1 nevertheless1 the thing itself1 whatever it is1 of which we are certain1 will remain just as it is1 true and irreversible4 ,if this be so1 it is easy to instance cases of an adherence to propositions1 which does not fulfil the conditions of certitude2 for instance3-- 7#a47 ,how positive and circumstantial disputants may be on both sides of a question of fact1 on which they give their evidence1 till they are called to swear to it1 and then how guarded and conditional their testimony becomes6 ,again1 how confident are they in their rival accounts of a transaction at which they were present1 till a third person makes his appearance1 whose word will be decisive about it6 ,then they suddenly drop their tone1 and trim their statements1 and by provisos and explanations leave themselves loopholes for escape1 in case his testimony should turn out to their disadvantage4 ,at first no language could be too bold or absolute to express the distinctness of their knowledge on this side or that2 but second thoughts are best1 and their giving way shows that their belief does not come up to the mark of certitude4 7#b47 ,again1 can we doubt that many a confident expounder of ,scripture1 who is so sure that ,st4 ,paul meant this1 and that ,st4 ,john and ,st4 ,james did not mean that1 would be seriously disconcerted at the presence of those ,apostles1 if their presence were possible1 and that they have now an especial 8boldness of speech0 in treating their subject1 because there is no one authoritatively to set them right1 if they are wrong8 7#c47 ,take another instance1 in which the absence of certitude is professed from the first4 ,though it is a matter of faith with ,catholics that miracles never cease in the ,church1 still that this or that professed miracle really took place1 is for the most part only a matter of opinion1 and when it is believed1 whether on testimony or tradition1 it is not believed to the exclusion of all doubt1 whether about the fact or its miraculousness4 ,thus ,i may believe in the liquefaction of ,st4 ,pantaleon's blood1 and believe it to the best of my judgment to be a miracle1 yet1 supposing a chemist offered to produce exactly the same phenomena under exactly similar circumstances by the materials put at his command by his science1 so as to reduce what seemed beyond nature within natural laws1 ,i should watch with some suspense of mind and misgiving the course of his experiment1 as having no ,divine ,word to fall back upon as a ground of certainty that the liquefaction was miraculous4 7#d47 ,take another virtual exhibition of fear2 ,i mean irritation and impatience of contradiction1 vehemence of assertion1 determination to silence others1--these are the tokens of a mind which has not yet attained the tranquil enjoyment of certitude4 ,no one1 ,i suppose1 would say that he was certain of the ,plurality of worlds3 that uncertitude on the subject is just the explanation1 and the only explanation satisfactory to my mind1 of the strange violence of language which has before now dishonoured the philosophical controversy upon it4 ,those who are certain of a fact are indolent disputants2 it is enough for them that they have the truth2 and they have little disposition1 except at the call of duty1 to criticize the hallucinations of others1 and much less are they angry at their positiveness or ingenuity in argument2 but to call names1 to impute motives1 to accuse of sophistry1 to be impetuous and overbearing1 is the part of men who are alarmed for their own position1 and fear to have it approached too nearly4 ,and in like manner the intemperance of language and of thought1 which is sometimes found in converts to a religious creed1 is often attributed1 not without plausibility 7even though erroneously in the particular case71 to some flaw in the completeness of their certitude1 which interferes with the harmony and repose of their convictions4 7#e47 ,again1 this intellectual anxiety1 which is incompatible with certitude1 shows itself in our running back in our minds to the arguments on which we came to believe1 in not letting our conclusions alone1 in going over and strengthening the evidence1 and1 as it were1 getting it by heart1 as if our highest assent were only an inference4 ,and such too is our unnecessarily declaring that we are certain1 as if to reassure ourselves1 and our appealing to others for their suffrage in behalf of the truths of which we are so sure2 which is like our asking another whether we are weary and hungry1 or have eaten and drunk to our satisfaction4 ,all laws are general2 none are invariable2 ,i am not writing as a moralist or casuist4 ,it must ever be recollected that these various phenomena of mind1 though signs1 are not infallible signs of uncertitude2 they may proceed1 in the particular case1 from other circumstances4 ,such anxieties and alarms may be merely emotional and from the imagination1 not intellectual2 parallel to the beating of the heart1 nay1 as ,i have been told1 the trembling of the limbs1 of even the bravest men1 before a battle1 when standing still to receive the first attack of the enemy4 ,such too is that palpitating self-interrogation1 that trouble of the mind lest it should not believe strongly enough1 which1 and not doubt1 underlies the sensitiveness described in the well-known lines1-- 8,with eyes too tremblingly awake1 ,to bear with dimness for ,his sake40 ,and so again1 a man's over-earnestness in argument may arise from zeal or charity2 his impatience from loyalty to the truth2 his extravagance from want of taste1 from enthusiasm1 or from youthful ardour2 and his restless recurrence to argument1 not from personal disquiet1 but from a vivid appreciation of the controversial talent of an opponent1 or of his own1 or of the mere philosophical difficulties of the subject in dispute4 ,these are points for the consideration of those who are concerned in registering and explaining what may be called the meteorological phenomena of the human mind1 and do not interfere with the broad principle which ,i would lay down1 that to fear argument is to doubt the conclusion1 and to be certain of a truth is to be careless of objections to it2--nor with the practical rule1 that mere assent is not certitude1 and must not be confused with it4 #b4 ,now to consider what ,certitude positively is1 as a matter of experience4 ,it is accompanied1 as a state of mind1 by a specific feeling1 proper to it1 and discriminating it from other states1 intellectual and moral1 ,i do not say1 as its practical test or as its differentia1 but as its token1 and in a certain sense its form4 ,when a man says he is certain1 he means he is conscious to himself of having this specific feeling4 ,it is a feeling of satisfaction and self-gratulation1 of intellectual security1 arising out of a sense of success1 attainment1 possession1 finality1 as regards the matter which has been in question4 ,as a conscientious deed is attended by a self-approval which nothing but itself can create1 so certitude is united to a sentiment sui generis in which it lives and is manifested4 ,these two parallel sentiments indeed have no relationship with each other1 the enjoyable self-repose of certitude being as foreign to a good deed1 as the self-approving glow of conscience is to the perception of a truth2 yet knowledge1 as well as virtue1 is an end1 and both knowledge and virtue1 when reflected on1 carry with them respectively their own reward in the characteristic sentiment1 which1 as ,i have said1 is proper to each4 ,and1 as the performance of what is right is distinguished by this religious peace1 so the attainment of what is true is attested by this intellectual security4 ,and1 as the feeling of self-approbation1 which is proper to good conduct1 does not belong to the sense or to the possession of the beautiful or of the becoming1 of the pleasant or of the useful1 so neither is the special relaxation and repose of mind1 which is the token of ,certitude1 ever found to attend upon simple ,assent1 on processes of ,inference1 or on ,doubt2 nor on investigation1 conjecture1 opinion1 as such1 or on any other state or action of mind1 besides ,certitude4 ,on the contrary1 those acts and states of mind have gratifications proper to themselves1 and unlike that of ,certitude1 as will sufficiently appear on considering them separately4 7#a47 ,philosophers are fond of enlarging on the pleasures of ,knowledge1 7that is1 ,knowledge as such17 nor need ,i here prove that such pleasures exist2 but the repose in self and in its object1 as connected with self1 which ,i attribute to ,certitude1 does not attach to mere knowing1 that is1 to the perception of things1 but to the consciousness of having that knowledge4 ,the simple and direct perception of things has its own great satisfaction2 but it must recognize them as realities1 and recognize them as known1 before it becomes the perception and has the satisfaction of certitude4 ,indeed1 as far as ,i see1 the pleasure of perceiving truth without reflecting on it as truth1 is not very different1 except in intensity and in dignity1 from the pleasure1 as such1 of assent or belief given to what is not true1 nay1 from the pleasure of the mere passive reception of recitals or narratives1 which neither profess to be true nor claim to be believed4 ,representations of any kind are in their own nature pleasurable1 whether they be true or not1 whether they come to us1 or do not come1 as true4 ,we read a history1 or a biographical notice1 with pleasure2 and we read a romance with pleasure2 and a pleasure which is quite apart from the question of fact or fiction4 ,indeed1 when we would persuade young people to read history1 we tell them that it is as interesting as a romance or a novel4 ,the mere acquisition of new images1 and those images striking1 great1 various1 unexpected1 beautiful1 with mutual relations and bearings1 as being parts of a whole1 with continuity1 succession1 evolution1 with recurring complications and corresponding solutions1 with a crisis and a catastrophe1 is highly pleasurable1 quite independently of the question whether there is any truth in them4 ,i am not denying that we should be baulked and disappointed to be told they were all untrue1 but this seems to arise from the reflection that we have been taken in2 not as if the fact of their truth were a distinct element of pleasure1 though it would increase the pleasure1 as investing them with a character of marvellousness1 and as associating them with known or ascertained places4 ,but even if the pleasure of knowledge is not thus founded on the imagination1 at least it does not consist in that triumphant repose of the mind after a struggle1 which is the characteristic of ,certitude4 ,and so too as to such statements as gain from us a half-assent1 as superstitious tales1 stories of magic1 of romantic crime1 of ghosts1 or such as we follow for the moment with a faint and languid assent1--contemporary history1 political occurrences1 the news of the day1--the pleasure resulting from these is that of novelty or curiosity1 and is like the pleasure arising from the excitement of chance and from variety2 it has in it no sense of possession3 it is simply external to us1 and has nothing akin to the thought of a battle and a victory4 7#b47 ,again1 the ,pursuit of knowledge has its own pleasure1--as distinct from the pleasures of knowledge1 as it is distinct from that of consciously possessing it4 ,this will be evident at once1 if we consider what a vacuity and depression of mind sometimes comes upon us on the termination of an inquiry1 however successfully terminated1 compared with the interest and spirit with which we carried it on4 ,the pleasure of a search1 like that of a hunt1 lies in the searching1 and ends at the point at which the pleasure of ,certitude begins4 ,its elements are altogether foreign to those which go to compose the serene satisfaction of ,certitude4 ,first1 the successive steps of discovery1 which attend on an investigation1 are continual and ever-extending informations1 and pleasurable1 not only as such1 but also as the evidence of past efforts1 and the earnest of success at the last4 ,next1 there is the interest which attaches to a mystery1 not yet removed1 but tending to removal1--the complex pleasure of wonder1 expectation1 sudden surprises1 suspense1 and hope1 of advances fitful1 yet sure1 to the unknown4 ,and there is the pleasure which attaches to the toil and conflict of the strong1 the consciousness and successive evidences of power1 moral and intellectual1 the pride of ingenuity and skill1 of industry1 patience1 vigilance1 and perseverance4 ,such are the pleasures of investigation and discovery2 and to these we must add1 what ,i have suggested in the last sentence1 the logical satisfaction1 as it may be called1 which accompanies these efforts of mind4 ,there is great pleasure1 as is plain1 at least to certain minds1 in proceeding from particular facts to principles1 in generalizing1 discriminating1 reducing into order and meaning the maze of phenomena which nature presents to us4 ,this is the kind of pleasure attendant on the treatment of probabilities which point at conclusions without reaching them1 or of objections which must be weighed and measured1 and adjusted for what they are worth1 over and against propositions which are antecedently evident4 ,it is the special pleasure belonging to ,inference as contrasted with ,assent1 a pleasure almost poetical1 as twilight has more poetry in it than noon-day4 ,such is the joy of the pleader1 with a good case in hand1 and expecting the separate attacks of half a dozen acute intellects1 each advancing from a point of his own4 ,i suppose this was the pleasure which the ,academics had in mind1 when they propounded that happiness lay1 not in finding the truth1 but in seeking it4 ,to seek1 indeed1 with the certainty of not finding what we seek1 cannot in any serious matter1 be pleasurable1 any more than the labour of ,sisyphus or the ,danaides2 but when the result does not concern us very much1 clever arguments and rival ones have the attraction of a game of chance or skill1 whether or not they lead to any definite conclusion4 7#c47 ,are there pleasures of ,doubt1 as well as of ,inference and of ,assent8 ,in one sense1 there are4 ,not indeed1 if doubt simply means ignorance1 uncertainty1 or hopeless suspense2 but there is a certain grave acquiescence in ignorance1 a recognition of our impotence to solve momentous and urgent questions1 which has a satisfaction of its own4 ,after high aspirations1 after renewed endeavours1 after bootless toil1 after long wanderings1 after hope1 effort1 weariness1 failure1 painfully alternating and recurring1 it is an immense relief to the exhausted mind to be able to say1 8,at length ,i know that ,i can know nothing about any thing10--that is1 while it can maintain itself in a posture of thought which has no promise of permanence1 because it is unnatural4 ,but here the satisfaction does not lie in not knowing1 but in knowing there is nothing to know4 ,it is a positive act of assent or conviction1 given to what in the particular case is an untruth4 ,it is the assent and the false certitude which are the cause of the tranquillity of mind4 ,ignorance remains the evil which it ever was1 but something of the peace of ,certitude is gained in knowing the worst1 and in having reconciled the mind to the endurance of it4 ,i may seem to have been needlessly diffuse in thus dwelling on the pleasurable affections severally attending on these various conditions of the intellect1 but ,i have had a purpose in doing so4 ,that ,certitude is a natural and normal state of mind1 and not 7as is sometimes objected7 one of its extravagances or infirmities1 is proved indeed by the remarks which ,i have made above on the same objection1 as directed against ,assent2 for ,certitude is only one of its forms4 ,but ,i have thought it well in addition to suggest1 even at the expense of a digression1 that as no one would refuse to ,inquiry1 ,doubt1 and ,knowledge a legitimate place among our mental constituents1 so no one can reasonably ignore a state of mind which not only is shown to be substantive by possessing a sentiment sui generis and characteristic1 but is analogical to ,inquiry1 ,doubt1 and ,knowledge1 in the fact of its thus having a sentiment of its own4 ,chapter ,,vii4 ,certitude4 #a4 ,assent and ,certitude ,contrasted4 ,in proceeding to compare together simple assent and complex1 that is1 ,assent and ,certitude1 ,i begin by observing1 that popularly no distinction is made between the two2 or rather1 that in religious teaching that is called ,certitude to which ,i have given the name of ,assent4 ,i have no difficulty in adopting such a use of the words1 though the course of my investigation has led me to another4 ,perhaps religious assent may be fitly called1 to use a theological term1 8material certitude20 and the first point of comparison which ,i shall make between the two states of mind1 will serve to set me right with the common way of speaking4 #a4 ,it certainly follows then1 from the distinctions which ,i have made1 that great numbers of men must be considered to pass through life with neither doubt nor1 on the other hand1 certitude 7as ,i have used the words7 on the most important propositions which can occupy their minds1 but with only a simple assent1 that is1 an assent which they barely recognize1 or bring home to their consciousness or reflect upon1 as being assent4 ,such an assent is all that religious ,protestants commonly have to show1 who believe nevertheless with their whole hearts the contents of ,holy ,scripture4 ,such too is the state of mind of multitudes of good ,catholics1 perhaps the majority1 who live and die in a simple1 full1 firm belief in all that the ,church teaches1 because she teaches it1--in the belief of the irreversible truth of whatever she defines and declares1--but who1 as being far removed from ,protestant and other dissentients1 and having but little intellectual training1 have never had the temptation to doubt1 and never the opportunity to be certain4 ,there were whole nations in the middle ages thus steeped in the ,catholic ,faith1 who never used its doctrines as matter for argument or research1 or changed the original belief of their childhood into the more scientific convictions of philosophy4 ,as there is a condition of mind which is characterized by invincible ignorance1 so there is another which may be said to be possessed of invincible knowledge2 and it would be paradoxical in me to deny to such a mental state the highest quality of religious faith1--,i mean certitude4 ,i allow this1 and therefore ,i will call simple assent material certitude2 or1 to use a still more apposite term for it1 interpretative certitude4 ,i call it interpretative1 signifying thereby that1 though the assent in the individuals contemplated is not a reflex act1 still the question only has to be started about the truth of the objects of their assent1 in order to elicit from them an act of faith in response which will fulfil the conditions of certitude1 as ,i have drawn them out4 ,as to the argumentative process necessary for such an act1 it is valid and sufficient1 if it be carried out seriously1 and proportionate to their several capacities3--8,the ,catholic ,religion is true1 because its objects1 as present to my mind1 control and influence my conduct as nothing else does20 or 8because it has about it an odour of truth and sanctity sui generis1 as perceptible to my moral nature as flowers to my sense1 such as can only come from heaven20 or 8because it has never been to me any thing but peace1 joy1 consolation1 and strength1 all through my troubled life40 ,and if the particular argument used in some instances needs strengthening1 then let it be observed1 that the keenness of the real apprehension with which the assent is made1 though it cannot be the legitimate basis of the assent1 may still legitimately act1 and strongly act1 in confirmation4 ,such1 ,i say1 would be the promptitude and effectiveness of the reasoning1 and the facility of the change from assent to certitude proper1 in the case of the multitudes in question1 did the occasion for reflection occur2 but it does not occur2 and accordingly1 most genuine and thorough as is the assent1 it can only be called virtual1 material1 or interpretative certitude1 if ,i have above explained certitude rightly4 ,of course these remarks hold good in secular subjects as well as religious3--,i believe1 for instance1 that ,i am living in an island1 that ,julius ,csar once invaded it1 that it has been conquered by successive races1 that it has had great political and social changes1 and that at this time it has colonies1 establishments1 and imperial dominion all over the earth4 ,all this ,i am accustomed to take for granted without a thought2 but1 were the need to arise1 ,i should not find much difficulty in drawing out from my own mental resources reasons sufficient to justify me in these beliefs4 ,it is true indeed that1 among the multitudes who are thus implicitly certain1 there may be those who would change their assents1 did they seek to place them upon an argumentative footing2 for instance1 some believers in ,christianity1 did they examine into its claims1 might end in renouncing it4 ,but this is only saying that there are genuine assents1 and assents that ultimately prove to be not genuine2 and again1 that there is an assent which is not a virtual certitude1 and is lost in the attempt to make it certitude4 ,and of course we are not gifted with that insight into the minds of individuals1 which enables us to determine before the event1 when it is that an assent is really such1 and when not1 or not a deeply rooted assent4 ,men may assent lightly1 or from mere prejudice1 or without understanding what it is to which they assent4 ,they may be genuine believers in ,revelation up to the time when they begin formally to examine1--nay1 and really have implicit reasons for their belief1--and then1 being overcome by the number of views which they have to confront1 and swayed by the urgency of special objections1 or biassed by their imaginations1 or frightened by a deeper insight into the claims of religion upon the soul1 may1 in spite of their habitual and latent grounds for believing1 shrink back and withdraw their assent4 ,or again1 they may once have believed1 but their assent has gradually become a mere profession1 without their knowing it2 then1 when by accident they interrogate themselves1 they find no assent within them at all1 to turn into certitude4 ,the event1 ,i say1 alone determines whether what is outwardly an assent is really such an act of the mind as admits of being developed into certitude1 or is a mere self-delusion or a cloak for unbelief4 #b4 ,next1 ,i observe1 that1 of the two modes of apprehending propositions1 notional and real1 assent1 as ,i have already said1 has closer relations with real than with notional4 ,now a simple assent need not be notional2 but the reflex or confirmatory assent of certitude always is given to a notional proposition1 viz4 to the truth1 necessity1 duty1 c41 of our assent to the simple assent and to its proposition4 ,its predicate is a general term1 and cannot stand for a fact1 whereas the original proposition1 included in it1 may1 and often does1 express a fact4 ,thus1 8,the cholera is in the midst of us0 is a real proposition2 but 8,that #8the cholera is in the midst of us' is beyond all doubt0 is a notional4 ,now assent to a real proposition is assent to an imagination1 and an imagination1 as supplying objects to our emotional and moral nature1 is adapted to be a principle of action3 accordingly1 the simple assent to 8,the cholera is among us10 is more emphatic and operative1 than the confirmatory assent1 8,it is beyond reasonable doubt that #8the cholera is among us4'0 ,the confirmation gives momentum to the complex act of the mind1 but the simple assent gives it its edge4 ,the simple assent would still be operative in its measure1 though the reflex assent was1 not 8,it is undeniable10 but 8,it is probable0 that 8the cholera is among us20 whereas there would be no operative force in the mental act at all1 though the reflex assent was to the truth1 not to the probability of the fact1 if the fact which was the object of the simple assent was nothing more than 8,the cholera is in ,china40 ,the reflex assent then1 which is the characteristic of certitude1 does not immediately touch us2 it is purely intellectual1 and1 taken by itself1 has scarcely more force than the recording of a conclusion4 ,i have taken an instance1 in which the matter which is submitted for examination and for assent1 can hardly fail of being interesting to the minds employed upon it2 but in many cases1 even though the fact assented-to has a bearing upon action1 it is not directly of a nature to influence the feelings or conduct1 except of particular persons4 ,and in such instances of certitude1 the previous labour of coming to a conclusion1 and that repose of mind which ,i have above described as attendant on an assent to its truth1 often counteracts whatever of lively sensation the fact thus concluded is in itself adapted to excite2 so that what is gained in depth and exactness of belief is lost as regards freshness and vigour4 ,hence it is that literary or scientific men1 who may have investigated some difficult point of history1 philosophy1 or physics1 and have come to their own settled conclusion about it1 having had a perfect right to form one1 are far more disposed to be silent as to their convictions1 and to let others alone1 than partisans on either side of the question1 who take it up with less thought and seriousness4 ,and so again1 in the religious world1 no one seems to look for any great devotion or fervour in controversialists1 writers on ,christian ,evidences1 theologians1 and the like1 it being taken for granted1 rightly or wrongly1 that such men are too intellectual to be spiritual1 and are more occupied with the truth of doctrine than with its reality4 ,if1 on the other hand1 we would see what the force of simple assent can be1 viewed apart from its reflex confirmation1 we have but to look at the generous and uncalculating energy of faith as exemplified in the primitive ,martyrs1 in the youths who defied the pagan tyrant1 or the maidens who were silent under his tortures4 ,it is assent1 pure and simple1 which is the motive cause of great achievements2 it is a confidence1 growing out of instincts rather than arguments1 stayed upon a vivid apprehension1 and animated by a transcendent logic1 more concentrated in will and in deed for the very reason that it has not been subjected to any intellectual development4 ,it must be borne in mind1 that1 in thus speaking1 ,i am contrasting with each other the simple and the reflex assent1 which together make up the complex act of certitude4 ,in its complete exhibition keenness in believing is united with repose and persistence4 #c4 ,we must take the constitution of the human mind as we find it1 and not as we may judge it ought to be2--thus ,i am led on to another remark1 which is at first sight disadvantageous to ,certitude4 ,introspection of our intellectual operations is not the best of means for preserving us from intellectual hesitations4 ,to meddle with the springs of thought and action is really to weaken them2 and1 as to that argumentation which is the preliminary to ,certitude1 it may indeed be unavoidable1 but1 as in the case of other serviceable allies1 it is not so easy to discard it1 after it has done its work1 as it was in the first instance to obtain its assistance4 ,questioning1 when encouraged on any subject-matter1 readily becomes a habit1 and leads the mind to substitute exercises of inference for assent1 whether simple or complex4 ,reasons for assenting suggest reasons for not assenting1 and what were realities to our imagination1 while our assent was simple1 may become little more than notions1 when we have attained to certitude4 ,objections and difficulties tell upon the mind2 it may lose its elasticity1 and be unable to throw them off4 ,and thus1 even as regards things which it may be absurd to doubt1 we may1 in consequence of some past suggestion of the possibility of error1 or of some chance association to their disadvantage1 be teazed from time to time and hampered by involuntary questionings1 as if we were not certain1 when we are4 ,nay1 there are those1 who are visited with these even permanently1 as a sort of musc volitantes of their mental vision1 ever flitting to and fro1 and dimming its clearness and completeness--visitants1 for which they are not responsible1 and which they know to be unreal1 still so seriously interfering with their comfort and even with their energy1 that they may be tempted to complain that even blind prejudice has more of quiet and of durability than certitude4 ,as even ,saints may suffer from imaginations in which they have no part1 so the shreds and tatters of former controversies1 and the litter of an argumentative habit1 may beset and obstruct the intellect1--questions which have been solved without their solutions1 chains of reasoning with missing links1 difficulties which have their roots in the nature of things1 and which are necessarily left behind in a philosophical inquiry because they cannot be removed1 and which call for the exercise of good sense and for strength of will to put them down with a high hand1 as irrational or preposterous4 ,whence comes evil8 why are we created without our consent8 how can the ,supreme ,being have no beginning8 how can ,he need skill1 if ,he is omnipotent8 if ,he is omnipotent1 why does ,he permit suffering8 ,if ,he permits suffering1 how is ,he all-loving8 if ,he is all-loving1 how can ,he be just8 if ,he is infinite1 what has ,he to do with the finite8 how can the temporary be decisive of the eternal8--these1 and a host of like questions1 must arise in every thoughtful mind1 and1 after the best use of reason1 must be deliberately put aside1 as beyond reason1 as 7so to speak7 no-thoroughfares1 which1 having no outlet themselves1 have no legitimate power to divert us from the ,king's highway1 and to hinder the direct course of religious inquiry from reaching its destination4 ,a serious obstruction1 however1 they will be now and then to particular minds1 enfeebling the faith which they cannot destroy1--being parallel to the uncomfortable1 associations with which sometimes we regard one whom we have fallen-in with1 acquaintance or stranger1 arising from some chance word1 look1 or action of his which we have witnessed1 and which prejudices him in our imagination1 though we are angry with ourselves that it should do so4 ,again1 when1 in confidence of our own certitude1 and with a view to philosophical fairness1 we have attempted successfully to throw ourselves out of our habits of belief into a simply dispassionate frame of mind1 then vague antecedent improbabilities1 or what seem to us as such1--merely what is strange or marvellous in certain truths1 merely the fact that things happen in one way and not in another1 when they must happen in some way1--may disturb us1 as suggesting to us1 8,is it possible8 who would have thought it6 what a coincidence60 without really touching the deep assent of our whole intellectual being to the object1 whatever it be1 thus irrationally assailed4 ,thus we may wonder at the ,divine ,mercy of the ,incarnation1 till we grow startled at it1 and ask why the earth has so special a theological history1 or why we are ,christians and others not1 or how ,god can really exert a particular governance1 since ,he does not punish such sinners as we are1 thus seeming to doubt ,his power or ,his equity1 though in truth we are not doubting at all4 ,the occasion of this intellectual waywardness may be slighter still4 ,i gaze on the ,palatine ,hill1 or on the ,parthenon1 or on the ,pyramids1 which ,i have read of from a boy1 or upon the matter-of-fact reality of the sacred places in the ,holy ,land1 and ,i have to force my imagination to follow the guidance of sight and of reason4 ,it is to me so strange that a lifelong belief should be changed into sight1 and things should be so near me1 which hitherto had been visions4 ,and so in times1 first of suspense1 then of joy2 8,when the ,lord turned the captivity of ,sion1 then0 7according to the ,hebrew text7 8we were like unto them that dream40 ,yet it was a dream which they were certain was a truth1 while they seemed to doubt it4 ,so1 too1 was it in some sense with the ,apostles after our ,lord's resurrection4 ,such vague thoughts1 haunting or evanescent1 are in no sense akin to that struggle between faith and unbelief1 which made the poor father cry out1 8,i believe1 help ,thou mine unbelief60 ,nay1 even what in some minds seems like an undercurrent of scepticism1 or a faith founded on a perilous substratum of doubt1 need not be more than a temptation1 though robbing ,certitude of its normal peacefulness4 ,in such a case1 faith may still express the steady conviction of the intellect2 it may still be the grave1 deep1 calm1 prudent assurance of mature experience1 though it is not the ready and impetuous assent of the young1 the generous1 or the unreflecting4 #d4 ,there is another characteristic of ,certitude1 in contrast with ,assent1 which it is important to insist upon1 and that is1 its persistence4 ,assents may and do change2 certitudes endure4 ,this is why religion demands more than an assent to its truth2 it requires a certitude1 or at least an assent which is convertible into certitude on demand4 ,without certitude in religious faith there may be much decency of profession and of observance1 but there can be no habit of prayer1 no directness of devotion1 no intercourse with the unseen1 no generosity of self-sacrifice4 ,certitude then is essential to the ,christian2 and if he is to persevere to the end1 his certitude must include in it a principle of persistence4 ,this it has2 as ,i shall explain in the next ,section4 #b4 ,indefectibility of ,certitude4 ,it is the characteristic of certitude that its object is a truth1 a truth as such1 a proposition as true4 ,there are right and wrong convictions1 and certitude is a right conviction2 if it is not right with a consciousness of being right1 it is not certitude4 ,now truth cannot change2 what is once truth is always truth2 and the human mind is made for truth1 and so rests in truth1 as it cannot rest in falsehood4 ,when then it once becomes possessed of a truth1 what is to dispossess it8 but this is to be certain2 therefore once certitude1 always certitude4 ,if certitude in any matter be the termination of all doubt or fear about its truth1 and an unconditional conscious adherence to it1 it carries with it an inward assurance1 strong though implicit1 that it shall never fail4 ,indefectibility almost enters into its very idea1 enters into it at least so far as this1 that its failure1 if of frequent occurrence1 would prove that certitude was after all and in fact an impossible act1 and that what looked like it was a mere extravagance of the intellect4 ,truth would still be truth1 but the knowledge of it would be beyond us and unattainable4 ,it is of great importance then to show1 that1 as a general rule1 certitude does not fail2 that failures of what was taken for certitude are the exception2 that the intellect1 which is made for truth1 can attain truth1 and1 having attained it1 can keep it1 can recognize it1 and preserve the recognition4 ,this is on the whole reasonable2 yet are the stipulations1 thus obviously necessary for an act or state of certitude1 ever fulfilled8 ,we know what conjecture is1 and what opinion1 and what assent is1 can we point out any specific state or habit of thought1 of which the distinguishing mark is unchangeableness8 ,on the contrary1 any conviction1 false as well as true1 may last2 and any conviction1 true as well as false1 may be lost4 ,a conviction in favour of a proposition may be exchanged for a conviction of its contradictory2 and each of them may be attended1 while they last1 by that sense of security and repose1 which a true object alone can legitimately impart4 ,no line can be drawn between such real certitudes as have truth for their object1 and apparent certitudes4 ,no distinct test can be named1 sufficient to discriminate between what may be called the false prophet and the true4 ,what looks like certitude always is exposed to the chance of turning out to be a mistake4 ,if our intimate1 deliberate conviction may be counterfeit in the case of one proposition1 why not in the case of another8 if in the case of one man1 why not in the case of a hundred8 ,is certitude then ever possible without the attendant gift of infallibility8 can we know what is right in one case1 unless we are secured against error in any8 ,further1 if one man is infallible1 why is he different from his brethren8 unless indeed he is distinctly marked out for the prerogative4 ,must not all men be infallible by consequence1 if any man is to be considered as certain8 ,the difficulty1 thus stated argumentatively1 has only too accurate a response in what actually goes on in the world4 ,it is a fact of daily occurrence that men change their certitudes1 that is1 what they consider to be such1 and are as confident and well-established in their new opinions as they were once in their old4 ,they take up forms of religion only to leave them for their contradictories4 ,they risk their fortunes and their lives on impossible adventures4 ,they commit themselves by word and deed1 in reputation and position1 to schemes which in the event they bitterly repent of and renounce2 they set out in youth with intemperate confidence in prospects which fail them1 and in friends who betray them1 ere they come to middle age2 and they end their days in cynical disbelief of truth and virtue any where2--and often1 the more absurd are their means and their ends1 so much the longer do they cling to them1 and then again so much the more passionate is their eventual disgust and contempt of them4 ,how then can certitude be theirs1 how is certitude possible at all1 considering it is so often misplaced1 so often fickle and inconsistent1 so deficient in available criteria8 ,and1 as to the feeling of finality and security1 ought it ever to be indulged8 ,is it not a mere weakness or extravagance1 a deceit1 to be eschewed by every clear and prudent mind8 ,with the countless instances1 on all sides of us1 of human fallibility1 with the constant exhibitions of antagonist certitudes1 who can so sin against modesty and sobriety of mind1 as not to be content with probability1 as the true guide of life1 renouncing ambitious thoughts1 which are sure either to delude him1 or to disappoint8 ,this is what may be objected3 now let us see what can be said in answer1 particularly as regards religious certitude4 #a4 ,first1 as to fallibility and infallibility4 ,it is very common1 doubtless1 especially in religious controversy1 to confuse infallibility with certitude1 and to argue that1 since we have not the one1 we have not the other1 for that no one can claim to be certain on any point1 who is not infallible about all2 but the two words stand for things quite distinct from each other4 ,for example1 ,i remember for certain what ,i did yesterday1 but still my memory is not infallible2 ,i am quite clear that two and two makes four1 but ,i often make mistakes in long addition sums4 ,i have no doubt whatever that ,john or ,richard is my true friend1 but ,i have before now trusted those who failed me1 and ,i may do so again before ,i die4 ,a certitude is directed to this or that particular proposition2 it is not a faculty or gift1 but a disposition of mind relatively to a definite case which is before me4 ,infallibility1 on the contrary1 is just that which certitude is not2 it is a faculty or gift1 and relates1 not to some one truth in particular1 but to all possible propositions in a given subject-matter4 ,we ought in strict propriety1 to speak1 not of infallible acts1 but of acts of infallibility4 ,a belief or opinion as little admits of being called infallible1 as a deed can correctly be called immortal4 ,a deed is done and over2 it may be great1 momentous1 effective1 anything but immortal2 it is its fame1 it is the work which it brings to pass1 which is immortal1 not the deed itself4 ,and as a deed is good or bad1 but never immortal1 so a belief1 opinion1 or certitude is true or false1 but never infallible4 ,we cannot speak of things which exist or things which once were1 as if they were something in posse4 ,it is persons and rules that are infallible1 not what is brought out into act1 or committed to paper4 ,a man is infallible1 whose words are always true2 a rule is infallible1 if it is unerring in all its possible applications4 ,an infallible authority is certain in every particular case that may arise2 but a man who is certain in some one definite case1 is not on that account infallible4 ,i am quite certain that ,victoria is our ,sovereign1 and not her father1 the late ,duke of ,kent1 without laying any claim to the gift of infallibility2 as ,i may do a virtuous action1 without being impeccable4 ,i may be certain that the ,church is infallible1 while ,i am myself a fallible mortal2 otherwise1 ,i cannot be certain that the ,supreme ,being is infallible1 until ,i am infallible myself4 ,it is a strange objection1 then1 which is sometimes urged against ,catholics1 that they cannot prove and assent to the ,church's infallibility1 unless they first believe in their own4 ,certitude1 as ,i have said1 is directed to one or other definite concrete proposition4 ,i am certain of proposition one1 two1 three1 four1 or five1 one by one1 each by itself4 ,i may be certain of one of them1 without being certain of the rest2 that ,i am certain of the first makes it neither likely nor unlikely that ,i am certain of the second2 but were ,i infallible1 then ,i should be certain1 not only of one of them1 but of all1 and of many more besides1 which have never come before me as yet4 ,therefore we may be certain of the infallibility of the ,church1 while we admit that in many things we are not1 and cannot be1 certain at all4 ,it is wonderful that a clear-headed man1 like ,chillingworth1 sees this as little as the run of every-day objectors to the ,catholic religion2 for in his celebrated 8,religion of ,protestants0 he writes as follows3--8,you tell me they cannot be saved1 unless they believe in your proposals with an infallible faith4 ,to which end they must believe also your propounder1 the ,church1 to be simply infallible4 ,now how is it possible for them to give a rational assent to the ,church's infallibility1 unless they have some infallible means to know that she is infallible8 ,neither can they infallibly know the infallibility of this means1 but by some other2 and so on for ever1 unless they can dig so deep1 as to come at length to the ,rock1 that is1 to settle all upon something evident of itself1 which is not so much as pretended47#aa70 ,now what is an 8infallible means08 ,it is a means of coming at a fact without the chance of mistake4 ,it is a proof which is sufficient for certitude in the particular case1 or a proof that is certain4 ,when then ,chillingworth says that there can be no 8rational assent to the ,church's infallibility0 without 8some infallible means of knowing that she is infallible10 he means nothing else than some means which is certain2 he says that for a rational assent to infallibility there must be an absolutely valid or certain proof4 ,this is intelligible2 but observe how his argument will run1 if worded according to this interpretation3 8,the doctrine of the ,church's infallibility requires a proof that is certain2 and that certain proof requires another previous certain proof1 and that again another1 and so on ad infinitum1 unless indeed we dig so deep as to settle all upon something evident of itself40 ,what is this but to say that nothing in this world is certain but what is self-evident8 that nothing can be absolutely proved8 ,can he really mean this8 ,what then becomes of physical truth8 of the discoveries in optics1 chemistry1 and electricity1 or of the science of motion8 ,intuition by itself will carry us but a little way into that circle of knowledge which is the boast of the present age4 ,i can believe then in the infallible ,church without my own personal infallibility4 ,certitude is at most nothing more than infallibility pro hac vice1 and promises nothing as to the truth of any proposition beside its own4 ,that ,i am certain of this proposition to-day1 is no ground for thinking that ,i shall have a right to be certain of that proposition to-morrow2 and that ,i am wrong in my convictions about to-day's proposition1 does not hinder my having a true conviction1 a genuine certitude1 about to-morrow's proposition4 ,if indeed ,i claimed to be infallible1 one failure would shiver my claim to pieces2 but ,i may claim to be certain of the truth to which ,i have already attained1 though ,i should arrive at no new truths in addition as long as ,i live4 #b4 ,let us put aside the word 8infallibility20 let us understand by certitude1 as ,i have explained it1 nothing more than a relation of the mind towards given propositions3--still1 it may be urged1 it involves a sense of security and of repose1 at least as regards these in particular4 ,now how can this security be mine1--without which certitude is not1--if ,i know1 as ,i know too well1 that before now ,i have thought myself certain1 when ,i was certain after all of an untruth8 ,is not the very possibility of certitude lost to me for ever by that one mistake8 ,what happened once1 may happen again4 ,all my certitudes before and after are henceforth destroyed by the introduction of a reasonable doubt1 underlying them all4 ,ipso facto they cease to be certitudes1--they come short of unconditional assents by the measure of that counterfeit assurance4 ,they are nothing more to me than opinions or anticipations1 judgments on the verisimilitude of intellectual views1 not the possession and enjoyment of truths4 ,and who has not thus been balked by false certitudes a hundred times in the course of his experience8 and how can certitude have a legitimate place in our mental constitution1 when it thus manifestly ministers to error and to scepticism8 ,this is what may be objected1 and it is not1 as ,i think1 difficult to answer4 ,certainly1 the experience of mistakes in the assents which we have made are to the prejudice of subsequent ones4 ,there is an antecedent difficulty in our allowing ourselves to be certain of something to-day1 if yesterday we had to give up our belief of something else1 of which we had up to that time professed ourselves to be certain4 ,this is true2 but antecedent objections to an act are not sufficient of themselves to prohibit its exercise2 they may demand of us an increased circumspection before committing ourselves to it1 but may be met with reasons more than sufficient to overcome them4 ,it must be recollected that certitude is a deliberate assent given expressly after reasoning4 ,if then my certitude is unfounded1 it is the reasoning that is in fault1 not my assent to it4 ,it is the law of my mind to seal up the conclusions to which ratiocination has brought me1 by that formal assent which ,i have called a certitude4 ,i could indeed have withheld my assent1 but ,i should have acted against my nature1 had ,i done so when there was what ,i considered a proof2 and ,i did only what was fitting1 what was incumbent on me1 upon those existing conditions1 in giving it4 ,this is the process by which knowledge accumulates and is stored up both in the individual and in the world4 ,it has sometimes been remarked1 when men have boasted of the knowledge of modern times1 that no wonder we see more than the ancients1 because we are mounted upon their shoulders4 ,the conclusions of one generation are the truths of the next4 ,we are able1 it is our duty1 deliberately to take things for granted which our forefathers had a duty to doubt about2 and unless we summarily put down disputation on points which have been already proved and ruled1 we shall waste our time1 and make no advances4 ,circumstances indeed may arise1 when a question may legitimately be revived1 which has already been definitely determined2 but a re-consideration of such a question need not abruptly unsettle the existing certitude of those who engage in it1 or throw them into a scepticism about things in general1 even though eventually they find they have been wrong in a particular matter4 ,it would have been absurd to prohibit the controversy which has lately been held concerning the obligations of ,newton to ,pascal2 and supposing it had issued in their being established1 the partisans of ,newton would not have thought it necessary to renounce their certitude of the law of gravitation itself1 on the ground that they had been mistaken in their certitude that ,newton discovered it4 ,if we are never to be certain1 after having been once certain wrongly1 then we ought never to attempt a proof because we have once made a bad one4 ,errors in reasoning are lessons and warnings1 not to give up reasoning1 but to reason with greater caution4 ,it is absurd to break up the whole structure of our knowledge1 which is the glory of the human intellect1 because the intellect is not infallible in its conclusions4 ,if in any particular case we have been mistaken in our inferences and the certitudes which followed upon them1 we are bound of course to take the fact of this mistake into account1 in making up our minds on any new question1 before we proceed to decide upon it4 ,but if1 while weighing the arguments on one side and the other and drawing our conclusion1 that old mistake has already been allowed for1 or has been1 to use a familiar mode of speaking1 discounted1 then it has no outstanding claim against our acceptance of that conclusion1 after it has actually been drawn4 ,whatever be the legitimate weight of the fact of that mistake in our inquiry1 justice has been done to it1 before we have allowed ourselves to be certain again4 ,suppose ,i am walking out in the moonlight1 and see dimly the outlines of some figure among the trees2--it is a man4 ,i draw nearer1--it is still a man2 nearer still1 and all hesitation is at an end1--,i am certain it is a man4 ,but he neither moves1 nor speaks when ,i address him2 and then ,i ask myself what can be his purpose in hiding among the trees at such an hour4 ,i come quite close to him1 and put out my arm4 ,then ,i find for certain that what ,i took for a man is but a singular shadow1 formed by the falling of the moonlight on the interstices of some branches or their foliage4 ,am ,i not to indulge my second certitude1 because ,i was wrong in my first8 does not any objection1 which lies against my second from the failure of my first1 fade away before the evidence on which my second is founded8 ,or again3 ,i depose on my oath in a court of justice1 to the best of my knowledge and belief1 that ,i was robbed by the prisoner at the bar4 ,then1 when the real offender is brought before me1 ,i am obliged1 to my great confusion1 to retract4 ,because ,i have been mistaken in my certitude1 may ,i not at least be certain that ,i have been mistaken8 ,and further1 in spite of the shock which that mistake gives me1 is it impossible that the sight of the real culprit may give me so luminous a conviction that at length ,i have got the right man1 that1 were it decent towards the court1 or consistent with self-respect1 ,i may find myself prepared to swear to the identity of the second1 as ,i have already solemnly committed myself to the identity of the first8 ,it is manifest that the two certitudes stand each on its own basis1 and the antecedent objection to the admission of a truth which was brought home to me second1 drawn from a hallucination which came first1 is a mere abstract argument1 impotent when directed against good evidence lying in the concrete4 #c4 ,if in the criminal case which ,i have been supposing1 the second certitude1 felt by a witness1 was a legitimate state of mind1 so was the first4 ,an act1 viewed in itself1 is not wrong1 because it is done wrongly4 ,false certitudes are faults because they are false1 not because they are 7so-called7 certitudes4 ,they are1 or may be1 the attempts and the failures of an intellect insufficiently trained1 or off its guard4 ,assent is an act of the mind1 congenial to its nature2 and it1 as other acts1 may be made both when it ought to be made1 and when it ought not4 ,it is a free act1 a personal act for which the doer is responsible1 and the actual mistakes in making it1 be they ever so numerous or serious1 have no force whatever to prohibit the act itself4 ,we are accustomed in such cases1 to appeal to the maxim1 8,usum non tollit abusus20 and it is plain that1 if what may be called functional disarrangements of the intellect are to be considered fatal to the recognition of the functions themselves1 then the mind has no laws whatever and no normal constitution4 ,i just now spoke of the growth of knowledge2 there is also a growth in the use of those faculties by which knowledge is acquired4 ,the intellect admits of an education2 man is a being of progress2 he has to learn how to fulfil his end1 and to be what facts show that he is intended to be4 ,his mind is in the first instance in disorder1 and runs wild2 his faculties have their rudimental and inchoate state1 and are gradually carried on by practice and experience to their perfection4 ,no instances then whatever of mistaken certitude are sufficient to constitute a proof1 that certitude itself is a perversion or extravagance of his nature4 ,we do not dispense with clocks1 because from time to time they go wrong1 and tell untruly4 ,a clock1 organically considered1 may be perfect1 yet it may require regulating4 ,till that needful work is done1 the moment-hand may mark the half-minute1 when the minute-hand is at the quarter-past1 and the hour hand is just at noon1 and the quarter-bell strikes the three-quarters1 and the hour-bell strikes four1 while the sun-dial precisely tells two o'clock4 ,the sense of certitude may be called the bell of the intellect2 and that it strikes when it should not is a proof that the clock is out of order1 no proof that the bell will be untrustworthy and useless1 when it comes to us adjusted and regulated from the hands of the clock-maker4 ,our conscience too may be said to strike the hours1 and will strike them wrongly1 unless it be duly regulated for the performance of its proper function4 ,it is the loud announcement of the principle of right in the details of conduct1 as the sense of certitude is the clear witness to what is true4 ,both certitude and conscience have a place in the normal condition of the mind4 ,as a human being1 ,i am unable1 if ,i were to try1 to live without some kind of conscience2 and ,i am as little able to live without those landmarks of thought which certitude secures for me2 still1 as the hammer of a clock may tell untruly1 so may my conscience and my sense of certitude be attached to mental acts1 whether of consent or of assent1 which have no claim to be thus sanctioned4 ,both the moral and the intellectual sanction are liable to be biassed by personal inclinations and motives2 both require and admit of discipline2 and1 as it is no disproof of the authority of conscience that false consciences abound1 neither does it destroy the importance and the uses of certitude1 because even educated minds1 who are earnest in their inquiries after the truth1 in many cases remain under the power of prejudice or delusion4 ,to this deficiency in mental training a wider error is to be attributed1--the mistaking for conviction and certitude states and frames of mind which make no pretence to the fundamental condition on which conviction rests as distinct from assent4 ,the multitude of men confuse together the probable1 the possible1 and the certain1 and apply these terms to doctrines and statements almost at random4 ,they have no clear view what it is they know1 what they presume1 what they suppose1 and what they only assert4 ,they make little distinction between credence1 opinion1 and profession2 at various times they give them all perhaps the name of certitude1 and accordingly1 when they change their minds1 they fancy they have given up points of which they had a true conviction4 ,or at least bystanders thus speak of them1 and the very idea of certitude falls into disrepute4 ,in this day the subject-matter of thought and belief has so increased upon us1 that a far higher mental formation is required than was necessary in times past1 and higher than we have actually reached4 ,the whole world is brought to our doors every morning1 and our judgment is required upon social concerns1 books1 persons1 parties1 creeds1 national acts1 political principles and measures4 ,we have to form our opinion1 make our profession1 take our side on a hundred matters on which we have but little right to speak at all4 ,but we do speak1 and must speak1 upon them1 though neither we nor those who hear us are well able to determine what is the real position of our intellect relatively to those many questions1 one by one1 on which we commit ourselves2 and then1 since many of these questions change their complexion with the passing hour1 and many require elaborate consideration1 and many are simply beyond us1 it is not wonderful1 if1 at the end of a few years1 we have to revise or to repudiate our conclusions2 and then we shall be unfairly said to have changed our certitudes1 and shall confirm the doctrine1 that1 except in abstract truth1 no judgment rises higher than probability4 ,such are the mistakes about certitude among educated men2 and after referring to them1 it is scarcely worth while to dwell upon the absurdities and excesses of the rude intellect1 as seen in the world at large2 as if any one could dream of treating as deliberate assents1 as assents upon assents1 as convictions or certitudes1 the prejudices1 credulities1 infatuations1 superstitions1 fanaticisms1 the whims and fancies1 the sudden irrevocable plunges into the unknown1 the obstinate determinations1--the offspring1 as they are1 of ignorance1 wilfulness1 cupidity1 and pride1--which go so far to make up the history of mankind2 yet these are often set down as instances of certitude and of its failure4 #d4 ,i have spoken of certitude as being assigned a definite and fixed place among our mental acts2--it follows upon examination and proof1 as the bell sounds the hour1 when the hands reach it1--so that no act or state of the intellect is certitude1 however it may resemble it1 which does not observe this appointed law4 ,this proviso greatly diminishes the catalogue of genuine certitudes4 ,another restriction is this3--the occasions or subject-matters of certitude are under law also4 ,putting aside the daily exercise of the senses1 the principal subjects in secular knowledge1 about which we can be certain1 are the truths or facts which are its basis4 ,as to this world1 we are certain of the elements of knowledge1 whether general1 scientific1 historical1 or such as bear on our daily needs and habits1 and relate to ourselves1 our homes and families1 our friends1 neighbourhood1 country1 and civil state4 ,beyond these elementary points of knowledge1 lies a vast subject-matter of opinion1 credence1 and belief1 viz4 the field of public affairs1 of social and professional life1 of business1 of duty1 of literature1 of taste1 nay1 of the experimental sciences4 ,on subjects such as these the reasonings and conclusions of mankind vary1--8mundum tradidit disputationi eorum20--and prudent men in consequence seldom speak confidently1 unless they are warranted to do so by genius1 great experience1 or some special qualification4 ,they determine their judgments by what is probable1 what is safe1 what promises best1 what has verisimilitude1 what impresses and sways them4 ,they neither can possess1 nor need certitude1 nor do they look out for it4 ,hence it is that--the province of certitude being so contracted1 and that of opinion so large--it is common to call probability the guide of life4 ,this saying1 when properly explained1 is true2 however1 we must not suffer ourselves to carry a true maxim to an extreme2 it is far from true1 if we so hold it as to forget that without first principles there can be no conclusions at all1 and that thus probability does in some sense presuppose and require the existence of truths which are certain4 ,especially is the maxim untrue1 in respect to the other great department of knowledge1 if taken to support the doctrine1 that the first principles and elements of religion1 which are universally received1 are mere matter of opinion2 though in this day1 it is too often taken for granted that religion is one of those subjects on which truth cannot be discovered1 and on which one conclusion is pretty much on a level with another4 ,but on the contrary1 the initial truths of divine knowledge ought to be viewed as parallel to the initial truths of secular3 as the latter are certain1 so too are the former4 ,i cannot indeed deny that a decent reverence for the ,supreme ,being1 an acquiescence in the claims of ,revelation1 a general profession of ,christian doctrine1 and some sort of attendance on sacred ordinances1 is in fact all the religion that is usual with even the better sort of men1 and that for all this a sufficient basis may certainly be found in probabilities2 but if religion is to be devotion1 and not a mere matter of sentiment1 if it is to be made the ruling principle of our lives1 if our actions1 one by one1 and our daily conduct1 are to be consistently directed towards an ,invisible ,being1 we need something higher than a mere balance of arguments to fix and to control our minds4 ,sacrifice of wealth1 name1 or position1 faith and hope1 self-conquest1 communion with the spiritual world1 presuppose a real hold and habitual intuition of the objects of ,revelation1 which is certitude under another name4 ,to this issue indeed we may bring the main difference1 viewed philosophically1 between nominal ,christianity on the one hand1 and vital ,christianity on the other4 ,rational1 sensible men1 as they consider themselves1 men who do not comprehend the very notion of loving ,god above all things1 are content with such a measure of probability for the truths of religion1 as serves them in their secular transactions2 but those who are deliberately staking their all upon the hopes of the next world1 think it reasonable1 and find it necessary1 before starting on their new course1 to have some points1 clear and immutable1 to start from2 otherwise1 they will not start at all4 ,they ask1 as a preliminary condition1 to have the ground sure under their feet2 they look for more than human reasonings and inferences1 for nothing less than the 8strong consolation10 as the ,apostle speaks1 of those 8immutable things in which it is impossible for ,god to lie10 ,his counsel and ,his oath4 ,christian earnestness may be ruled by the world to be a perverseness or a delusion2 but1 as long as it exists1 it will presuppose certitude as the very life which is to animate it4 ,this is the true parallel between human and divine knowledge2 each of them opens into a large field of mere opinion1 but in both the one and the other the primary principles1 the general1 fundamental1 cardinal truths are immutable4 ,in human matters we are guided by probabilities1 but1 ,i repeat1 they are probabilities founded on certainties4 ,it is on no probability that we are constantly receiving the informations and dictates of sense and memory1 of our intellectual instincts1 of the moral sense1 and of the logical faculty4 ,it is on no probability that we receive the generalizations of science1 and the great outlines of history4 ,these are certain truths2 and from them each of us forms his own judgments and directs his own course1 according to the probabilities which they suggest to him1 as the navigator applies his observations and his charts for the determination of his course4 ,such is the main view to be taken of the separate provinces of probability and certainty in matters of this world2 and so1 as regards the world invisible and future1 we have a direct and conscious knowledge of our ,maker1 ,his attributes1 ,his providences1 acts1 works1 and will2 and1 beyond this knowledge lies the large domain of theology1 metaphysics1 and ethics1 on which it is not allowed to us to advance beyond probabilities1 or to attain to more than an opinion4 ,such on the whole is the analogy between our knowledge of matters of this world and matters of the world unseen2--indefectible certitude in primary truths1 manifold variations of opinion in their application and disposition4 #e4 ,i have said that ,certitude1 whether in human or divine knowledge1 is attainable as regards general and cardinal truths2 and that in neither department of knowledge1 on the whole1 is certitude discredited1 lost1 or reversed2 for1 in matter of fact1 whether in human or divine1 those primary truths have ever kept their place from the time when they first took possession of it4 ,however1 there is one obvious objection which may be made to this representation1 and ,i proceed to take notice of it4 ,it may be urged then1 that time was when the primary truths of science were unknown1 and when in consequence various theories were held1 contrary to each other4 ,the first element of all things was said to be water1 to be air1 to be fire2 the framework of the universe was eternal2 or it was the ever-new combination of innumerable atoms3 the planets were fixed in solid crystal revolving spheres2 or they moved round the earth in epicycles mounted upon circular orbits2 or they were carried whirling round about the sun1 while the sun was whirling round the earth4 ,about such doctrines there was no certitude1 no more than there is now certitude about the origin of languages1 the age of man1 or the evolution of species1 considered as philosophical questions4 ,now theology is at present in the very same state in which natural science was five hundred years ago2 and this is the proof of it1--that1 instead of there being one received theological science in the world1 there are a multitude of hypotheses4 ,we have a professed science of ,atheism1 another of ,deism1 a ,pantheistic1 ever so many ,christian theologies1 to say nothing of ,judaism1 ,islamism1 and the ,oriental religions4 ,each of these creeds has its own upholders1 and these upholders all certain that it is the very and the only truth1 and these same upholders1 it may happen1 presently giving it up1 and then taking up some other creed1 and being certain again1 as they profess1 that it and it only is the truth1 these various so-called truths being incompatible with each other4 ,are not ,jews certain about their interpretation of their law8 yet they become ,christians3 are not ,catholics certain about the new law8 yet they become ,protestants4 ,at present then1 and as yet1 there is no clear certainty anywhere about religious truth at all2 it has still to be discovered2 and therefore for ,catholics to claim the right to lay down the first principles of theological science in their own way1 is to assume the very matter in dispute4 ,first let their doctrines be universally received1 and then they will have a right to place them on a level with the certainty which belongs to the laws of motion or of refraction4 ,this is the objection which ,i propose to consider4 ,now first as to the want of universal reception which is urged against the ,catholic dogmas1 this part of the objection will not require many words4 ,surely a truth or a fact may be certain1 though it is not generally received2--we are each of us ever gaining through our senses various certainties1 which no one shares with us2 again1 the certainties of the sciences are in the possession of a few countries only1 and for the most part only of the educated classes in those countries2 yet the philosophers of ,europe and ,america would feel certain that the earth rolled round the sun1 in spite of the ,indian belief of its being supported by an elephant with a tortoise under it4 ,the ,catholic ,church then1 though not universally acknowledged1 may without inconsistency claim to teach the primary truths of religion1 just as modern science1 though but partially received1 claims to teach the great principles and laws which are the foundation of secular knowledge1 and that with a significance to which no other religious system can pretend1 because it is its very profession to speak to all mankind1 and its very badge to be ever making converts all over the earth1 whereas other religions are more or less variable in their teaching1 tolerant of each other1 and local1 and professedly local1 in their habitat and character4 ,this1 however1 is not the main point of the objection2 the real difficulty lies not in the variety of religions1 but in the contradiction1 conflict1 and change of religious certitudes4 ,truth need not be universal1 but it must of necessity be certain2 and certainty1 in order to be certainty1 must endure2 yet how is this reasonable expectation fulfilled in the case of religion8 ,on the contrary1 those who have been the most certain in their beliefs are sometimes found to lose them1 ,catholics as well as others2 and then to take up new beliefs1 perhaps contrary ones1 of which they become as certain as if they had never been certain of the old4 ,in answering this representation1 ,i begin with recurring to the remark which ,i have already made1 that assent and certitude have reference to propositions1 one by one4 ,we may of course assent to a number of propositions all together1 that is1 we may make a number of assents all at once2 but in doing so we run the risk of putting upon one level1 and treating as if of the same value1 acts of the mind which are very different from each other in character and circumstance4 ,an assent1 indeed1 is ever an assent2 but given assents may be strong or weak1 deliberate or impulsive1 lasting or ephemeral4 ,now a religion is not a proposition1 but a system2 it is a rite1 a creed1 a philosophy1 a rule of duty1 all at once2 and to accept a religion is neither a simple assent to it nor a complex1 neither a conviction nor a prejudice1 neither a notional assent nor a real1 not a mere act of profession1 nor of credence1 nor of opinion1 nor of speculation1 but it is a collection of all these various kinds of assents1 some of one description1 some of another2 but1 out of all these different assents1 how many are of that kind which ,i have called certitude8 ,certitudes indeed do not change1 but who shall pretend that assents are indefectible8 ,for instance3 the fundamental dogma of ,protestantism is the exclusive authority of ,holy ,scripture2 but in holding this a ,protestant holds a host of propositions1 explicitly or implicitly1 and holds them with assents of various character4 ,among these propositions1 he holds that ,scripture is the ,divine ,revelation itself1 that it is inspired1 that nothing is known in doctrine but what is there1 that the ,church has no authority in matters of doctrine1 that1 as claiming it1 it condemned long ago in the ,apocalypse1 that ,st4 ,john wrote the ,apocalypse1 that justification is by faith only1 that our ,lord is ,god1 that there are seventy-two generations between ,adam and our ,lord4 ,now of which1 out of all these propositions1 is he certain8 and to how many of them is his assent of one and the same description8 ,his belief1 that ,scripture is commensurate with the ,divine ,revelation1 is perhaps implicit1 not conscious2 as to inspiration1 he does not well know what the word means1 and his assent is scarcely more than a profession2 that no doctrine is true but what can be proved from ,scripture he understands1 and his assent to it is what ,i have called speculative2 that the ,church has no authority he holds with a real assent or belief2 that the ,church is condemned in the ,apocalypse is a standing prejudice2 that ,st4 ,john wrote the ,apocalypse is his opinion2 that justification is by faith only1 he accepts1 but scarcely can be said to apprehend2 that our ,lord is ,god perhaps he is certain2 that there are seventy-two generations between ,adam and ,christ he accepts on credence4 ,yet1 if he were asked the question1 he would most probably answer that he was certain of the truth of 8,protestantism10 though 8,protestantism0 means these things and a hundred more all at once1 and though he believes with actual certitude only one of them all1--that indeed a dogma of most sacred importance1 but not the discovery of ,luther or ,calvin4 ,he would think it enough to say that he was a foe to 8,romanism0 and 8,socinianism10 and to avow that he gloried in the ,reformation4 ,he looks upon each of these religious professions1 ,protestantism1 ,romanism1 ,socinianism and ,theism1 merely as units1 as if they were not each made up of many elements1 as if they had nothing in common1 as if a transition from the one to the other involved a simple obliteration of all that had been as yet written on his mind1 and would be the reception of a new faith4 ,when1 then1 we are told that a man has changed from one religion to another1 the first question which we have to ask1 is1 have the first and the second religions nothing in common8 ,if they have common doctrines1 he has changed only a portion of his creed1 not the whole3 and the next question is1 has he ever made much of those doctrines which are common to his new creed and his old8 and then again1 what doctrines was he certain of among the old1 and what among the new8 ,thus1 of three ,protestants1 one becomes a ,catholic1 a second a ,unitarian1 and a third an unbeliever3 how is this8 ,the first becomes a ,catholic1 because he assented1 as a ,protestant1 to the doctrine of our ,lord's divinity1 with a real assent and a genuine conviction1 and because this certitude1 taking possession of his mind1 led him on to welcome the ,catholic doctrines of the ,real ,presence and of the ,theotocos1 till his ,protestantism fell off from him1 and he submitted himself to the ,church4 ,the second became a ,unitarian1 because1 proceeding on the principle that ,scripture was the rule of faith and that a man's private judgment was its rule of interpretation1 and finding that the doctrine of the ,nicene and ,athanasian ,creeds did not follow by logical necessity from the text of ,scripture1 he said to himself1 8,the word of ,god has been made of none effect by the traditions of men10 and therefore nothing was left for him but to profess what he considered primitive ,christianity1 and to become a ,humanitarian4 ,the third gradually subsided into infidelity1 because he started with the ,protestant dogma1 cherished in the depths of his nature1 that a priesthood was a corruption of the simplicity of the ,gospel4 ,first1 then1 he would protest against the sacrifice of the ,mass2 next he gave up baptismal regeneration1 and the sacramental principle2 then he asked himself whether dogmas were not a restraint on ,christian liberty as well as sacraments2 then came the question1 what after all was the use of teachers of religion8 why should any one stand between him and his ,maker8 ,after a time it struck him1 that this obvious question had to be answered by the ,apostles1 as well as by the ,anglican clergy2 so he came to the conclusion that the true and only revelation of ,god to man is that which is written on the heart4 ,this did for a time1 and he remained a ,deist4 ,but then it occurred to him1 that this inward moral law was there within the breast1 whether there was a ,god or not1 and that it was a roundabout way of enforcing that law1 to say that it came from ,god1 and simply unnecessary1 considering it carried with it its own sacred and sovereign authority1 as our feelings instinctively testified2 and when he turned to look at the physical world around him1 he really did not see what scientific proof there was there of the ,being of ,god at all1 and it seemed to him as if all things would go on quite as well as at present1 without that hypothesis as with it2 so he dropped it1 and became a purus1 putus ,atheist4 ,now the world will say1 that in these three cases old certitudes were lost1 and new were gained2 but it is not so3 each of the three men started with just one certitude1 as he would have himself professed1 had he examined himself narrowly2 and he carried it out and carried it with him into a new system of belief4 ,he was true to that one conviction from first to last2 and on looking back on the past1 would perhaps insist upon this1 and say he had really been consistent all through1 when others made much of his great changes in religious opinion4 ,he has indeed made serious additions to his initial ruling principle1 but he has lost no conviction of which he was originally possessed4 ,i will take one more instance4 ,a man is converted to the ,catholic ,church from his admiration of its religious system1 and his disgust with ,protestantism4 ,that admiration remains2 but1 after a time1 he leaves his new faith1 perhaps returns to his old4 ,the reason1 if we may conjecture1 may sometimes be this3 he has never believed in the ,church's infallibility2 in her doctrinal truth he has believed1 but in her infallibility1 no4 ,he was asked1 before he was received1 whether he held all that the ,church taught1 he replied he did2 but he understood the question to mean1 whether he held those particular doctrines 8which at that time the ,church in matter of fact formally taught10 whereas it really meant 8whatever the ,church then or at any future time should teach40 ,thus1 he never had the indispensable and elementary faith of a ,catholic1 and was simply no subject for reception into the fold of the ,church4 ,this being the case1 when the ,immaculate ,conception is defined1 he feels that it is something more than he bargained for when he became a ,catholic1 and accordingly he gives up his religious profession4 ,the world will say that he has lost his certitude of the divinity of the ,catholic ,faith1 but he never had it4 ,the first point to be ascertained1 then1 when we hear of a change of religious certitude in another1 is1 what the doctrines are on which his so-called certitude before now and at present has respectively fallen4 ,all doctrines besides these were the accidents of his profession1 and the indefectibility of certitude would not be disproved1 though he changed them every year4 ,there are few religions which have no points in common2 and these1 whether true or false1 when embraced with an absolute conviction1 are the pivots on which changes take place in that collection of credences1 opinions1 prejudices1 and other assents1 which make up what is called a man's selection and adoption of a form of religion1 a denomination1 or a ,church4 ,there have been ,protestants whose idea of enlightened ,christianity has been a strenuous antagonism to what they consider the unmanliness and unreasonableness of ,catholic morality1 an antipathy to the precepts of patience1 meekness1 forgiveness of injuries1 and chastity4 ,all this they have considered a woman's religion1 the ornament of monks1 of the sick1 the feeble1 and the old4 ,lust1 revenge1 ambition1 courage1 pride1 these1 they have fancied1 made the man1 and want of them the slave4 ,no one could fairly accuse such men of any great change of their convictions1 or refer to them in proof of the defectibility of certitude1 if they were one day found to have taken up the profession of ,islam4 ,and if this intercommunion of religions holds good1 even when the common points between them are but errors held in common1 much more natural will be the transition from one religion to another1 without injury to existing certitudes1 when the common points1 the objects of those certitudes1 are truths2 and still stronger in that case and more constraining will be the sympathy1 with which minds that love truth1 even when they have surrounded it with error1 will yearn towards the ,catholic faith1 which contains within itself1 and claims as its own1 all truth that is elsewhere to be found1 and more than all1 and nothing but truth4 ,this is the secret of the influence1 by which the ,church draws to herself converts from such various and conflicting religions4 ,they come1 not to lose what they have1 but to gain what they have not2 and in order that1 by means of what they have1 more may be given to them4 ,st4 ,augustine tells us that there is no false teaching without an intermixture of truth2 and it is by the light of those particular truths1 contained respectively in the various religions of men1 and by our certitudes about them1 which are possible wherever those truths are found1 that we pick our way1 slowly perhaps1 but surely1 into the ,one ,religion which ,god has given1 taking our certitudes with us1 not to lose1 but to keep them more securely1 and to understand and love their objects more perfectly4 ,not even are idolaters and heathen out of the range of some of these religious truths and their correlative certitudes4 ,the old ,greek and ,roman polytheists had1 as they show in their literature1 clear and strong notions1 nay1 vivid mental images1 of a ,particular ,providence1 of the power of prayer1 of the rule of ,divine ,governance1 of the law of conscience1 of sin and guilt1 of expiation by means of sacrifices1 and of future retribution3 ,i will even add1 of the ,unity and ,personality of the ,supreme ,being4 ,this it is that throws such a magnificent light over the ,homeric poems1 the tragic choruses1 and the ,odes of ,pindar2 and it has its counterpart in the philosophy of ,socrates and of the ,stoics1 and in such historians as ,herodotus4 ,it would be out of place to speak confidently of a state of society which has passed away1 but at first sight it does not appear why the truths which ,i have enumerated should not have received as genuine and deliberate an assent on the part of ,socrates or ,cleanthes1 7of course with divine aids1 but they do not enter into this discussion17 as was given to them by ,st4 ,john or ,st4 ,paul1 nay1 an assent which rose to certitude4 ,much more safely may it be pronounced of a ,mahometan1 that he may have a certitude of the ,divine ,unity1 as well as a ,christian2 and of a ,jew1 that he may believe as truly as a ,christian in the resurrection of the body2 and of a ,unitarian that he can give a deliberate and real assent to the fact of a supernatural revelation1 to the ,christian miracles1 to the eternal moral law1 and to the immortality of the soul4 ,and so1 again1 a ,protestant may1 not only in words1 but in mind and heart1 hold1 as if he were a ,catholic1 with simple certitude1 the doctrines of the ,holy ,trinity1 of the fall of man1 of the need of regeneration1 of the efficacy of ,divine ,grace1 and of the possibility and danger of falling away4 ,and thus it is conceivable that a man might travel in his religious profession all the way from heathenism to ,catholicity1 through ,mahometanism1 ,judaism1 ,unitarianism1 ,protestantism1 and ,anglicanism1 without any one certitude lost1 but with a continual accumulation of truths1 which claimed from him and elicited in his intellect fresh and fresh certitudes4 ,in saying all this1 ,i do not forget that the same doctrines1 as held in different religions1 may be and often are held very differently1 as belonging to distinct wholes or forms1 as they are called1 and exposed to the influence and the bias of the teaching1 perhaps false1 with which they are associated4 ,thus1 for instance1 whatever be the resemblance between ,st4 ,augustine's doctrine of ,predestination and the tenet of ,calvin upon it1 the two really differ from each other toto clo in significance and effect1 in consequence of the place they hold in the systems in which they are respectively incorporated1 just as shades and tints show so differently in a painting according to the masses of colour to which they are attached4 ,but1 in spite of this1 a man may so hold the doctrine of personal election as a ,calvinist1 as to be able still to hold it as a ,catholic4 ,however1 ,i have been speaking of certitudes which remain unimpaired1 or rather confirmed1 by a change of religion2 on the contrary there are others1 whether we call them certitudes or convictions1 which perish in the change1 as ,st4 ,paul's conviction of the sufficiency of the ,jewish ,law came to an end on his becoming a ,christian4 ,now how is such a series of facts to be reconciled with the doctrine which ,i have been enforcing8 ,what conviction could be stronger than the faith of the ,jews in the perpetuity of the ,mosaic system8 ,those1 then1 it may be said1 who abandoned ,judaism for the ,gospel1 surely1 in so doing1 bore the most emphatic of testimonies to the defectibility of certitude4 ,and1 in like manner1 a ,mahometan may be so deeply convinced that ,mahomet is the prophet of ,god1 that it would be only by a quibble about the meaning of the word 8certitude0 that we could maintain1 that1 on his becoming a ,catholic1 he did not unequivocally prove that certitude is defectible4 ,and it may be argued1 perhaps1 in the case of some members of the ,church of ,england1 that their faith in the validity of ,anglican orders1 and the invisibility of the ,church's unity1 is so absolute1 so deliberate1 that their abandonment of it1 did they become ,catholics or sceptics1 would be tantamount to the abandonment of a certitude4 ,now1 in meeting this difficulty1 ,i will not urge 7lest ,i should be accused of quibbling71 that certitude is a conviction of what is true1 and that these so-called certitudes have come to nought1 because1 their objects being errors1 not truths1 they really were not certitudes at all2 nor will ,i insist1 as ,i might1 that they ought to be proved first to be something more than mere prejudices1 assents without reason and judgment1 before they can fairly be taken as instances of the defectibility of certitude2 but ,i simply ask1 as regards the zeal of the ,jews for the sufficiency of their law1 7even though it implied genuine certitude1 not a prejudice1 not a mere conviction17 still was such zeal1 such professed certitude1 found in those who were eventually converted1 or in those who were not2 for1 if those who had not that certitude became ,christians and those who had it remained ,jews1 then loss of certitude in the latter is not instanced in the fact of the conversion of the former4 ,st4 ,paul certainly is an exception1 but his conversion1 as also his after-life1 was miraculous2 ordinarily speaking1 it was not the zealots who supplied members to the ,catholic ,church1 but those 8men of good will10 who1 instead of considering the law as perfect and eternal1 8looked for the redemption of ,israel10 and for 8the knowledge of salvation in the remission of sins40 ,and1 in like manner1 as to those learned and devout men among the ,anglicans at the present day1 who come so near the ,church without acknowledging her claims1 ,i ask whether there are not two classes among them also1--those who are looking out beyond their own body for the perfect way1 and those on the other hand who teach that the ,anglican communion is the golden mean between men who believe too much and men who believe too little1 the centre of unity to which ,east and ,west are destined to gravitate1 the instrument and the mould1 as the ,jews might think of their own moribund institutions1 through which the kingdom of ,christ is to be established all over the earth4 ,and next ,i would ask1 which of these two classes supplies converts to the ,church2 for if they come from among those who never professed to be quite certain of the special strength of the ,anglican position1 such men cannot be quoted as instances of the defectibility of certitude4 ,there is indeed another class of beliefs1 of which ,i must take notice1 the failure of which may be taken at first sight as a proof that certitude may be lost4 ,yet they clearly deserve no other name than prejudices1 as being founded upon reports of facts1 or on arguments1 which will not bear careful examination4 ,such was the disgust felt towards our predecessors in primitive times1 the ,christians of the first centuries1 as a secret society1 as a conspiracy against the civil power1 as a set of mean1 sordid1 despicable fanatics1 as monsters revelling in blood and impurity4 ,such also is the deep prejudice now existing against the ,church among ,protestants1 who dress her up in the most hideous and loathsome images1 which rightly attach1 in the prophetic descriptions1 to the evil spirit1 his agents and instruments4 ,and so of the numberless calumnies directed against individual ,catholics1 against our religious bodies1 and men in authority1 which serve to feed and sustain the suspicion and dislike with which everything ,catholic is regarded in this country4 ,but as a persistence in such prejudices is no evidence of their truth1 so an abandonment of them is no evidence that certitude can fail4 ,there is yet another class of prejudices against the ,catholic ,religion1 which is far more tolerable and intelligible than those on which ,i have been dwelling1 but still in no sense certitudes4 ,indeed1 ,i doubt whether they would be considered more than presumptive opinions by the persons who entertain them4 ,such is the idea which has possessed certain philosophers1 ancient and modern1 that miracles are an infringement and disfigurement of the beautiful order of nature4 ,such1 too1 is the persuasion1 common among political and literary men1 that the ,catholic ,church is inconsistent with the true interests of the human race1 with social progress1 with rational freedom1 with good government4 ,a renunciation of these imaginations is not a change in certitudes4 ,so much on this subject4 ,all concrete laws are general1 and persons1 as such1 do not fall under laws4 ,still1 ,i have gone a good way1 as ,i think1 to remove the objections to the doctrine of the indefectibility of certitude in matters of religion4 #f4 ,one further remark may be made4 ,certitude does not admit of an interior1 immediate test1 sufficient to discriminate it from false certitude4 ,such a test is rendered impossible from the circumstance that1 when we make the mental act expressed by 8,i know10 we sum up the whole series of reflex judgments which might1 each in turn1 successively exercise a critical function towards those of the series which precede it4 ,but still1 if it is the general rule that certitude is indefectible1 will not that indefectibility itself become at least in the event a criterion of the genuineness of the certitude8 or is there any rival state or habit of the intellect1 which claims to be indefectible also8 ,a few words will suffice to answer these questions4 ,premising that all rules are but general1 especially those which relate to the mind1 ,i observe that indefectibility may at least serve as a negative test of certitude1 or sine qu non condition1 so that whoever loses his conviction on a given point is thereby proved not to have been certain of it4 ,certitude ought to stand all trials1 or it is not certitude4 ,its very office is to cherish and maintain its object1 and its very lot and duty is to sustain rude shocks in maintenance of it without being damaged by them4 ,i will take an example4 ,let us suppose we are told on an unimpeachable authority1 that a man whom we saw die is now alive again and at his work1 as it was his wont to be2 let us suppose we actually see him and converse with him2 what will become of our certitude of his death8 ,i do not think we should give it up2 how could we1 when we actually saw him die8 ,at first1 indeed1 we should be thrown into an astonishment and confusion so great1 that the world would seem to reel round us1 and we should be ready to give up the use of our senses and of our memory1 of our reflective powers1 and of our reason1 and even to deny our power of thinking1 and our existence itself4 ,such confidence have we in the doctrine that when life goes it never returns4 ,nor would our bewilderment be less1 when the first blow was over2 but our reason would rally1 and with our reason our certitude would come back to us4 ,whatever came of it1 we should never cease to know and to confess to ourselves both of the contrary facts1 that we saw him die1 and that after dying we saw him alive again4 ,the overpowering strangeness of our experience would have no power to shake our certitude in the facts which created it4 ,again1 let us suppose1 for argument's sake1 that ethnologists1 philologists1 anatomists1 and antiquarians agreed together in separate demonstrations that there were half a dozen races of men1 and that they were all descended from gorillas1 or chimpanzees1 or ourang-outangs1 or baboons2 moreover1 that ,adam was an historical personage1 with a well-ascertained dwelling-place1 surroundings and date1 in a comparatively modern world4 ,on the other hand1 let me believe that the ,word of ,god ,himself distinctly declares that there were no men before ,adam1 that he was immediately made out of the slime of the earth1 and that he is the first father of all men that are or ever have been4 ,here is a contradiction of statements more direct than in the former instance2 the two cannot stand together2 one or other of them is untrue4 ,but whatever means ,i might be led to take1 for making1 if possible1 the antagonism tolerable1 ,i conceive ,i should never give up my certitude in that truth which on sufficient grounds ,i determined to come from heaven4 ,if ,i so believed1 ,i should not pretend to argue1 or to defend myself to others2 ,i should be patient2 ,i should look for better days2 but ,i should still believe4 ,if1 indeed1 ,i had hitherto only half believed1 if ,i believed with an assent short of certitude1 or with an acquiescence short of assent1 or hastily or on light grounds1 then the case would be altered2 but if1 after full consideration1 and availing myself of my best lights1 ,i did think that beyond all question ,god spoke as ,i thought ,he did1 philosophers and experimentalists might take their course for me1--,i should consider that they and ,i thought and reasoned in different mediums1 and that my certitude was as little in collision with them or damaged by them1 as if they attempted to counteract in some great matter chemical action by the force of gravity1 or to weigh magnetic influence against capillary attraction4 ,of course1 ,i am putting an impossible case1 for philosophical discoveries cannot really contradict divine revelation4 ,so much on the indefectibility of certitude2 as to the question whether any other assent is indefectible besides it1 ,i think prejudice may be such2 but it cannot be confused with certitude1 for the one is an assent previous to rational grounds1 and the other an assent given expressly after careful examination4 ,it seems then that on the whole there are three conditions of certitude3 that it follows on investigation and proof1 that it is accompanied by a specific sense of intellectual satisfaction and repose1 and that it is irreversible4 ,if the assent is made without rational grounds1 it is a rash judgment1 a fancy1 or a prejudice2 if without the sense of finality1 it is scarcely more than an inference2 if without permanence1 it is a mere conviction4 ,chapter ,,viii4 ,inference4 #a4 ,formal ,inference4 ,inference is the conditional acceptance of a proposition1 ,assent is the unconditional2 the object of ,assent is a truth1 the object of ,inference is the truth-like or a verisimilitude4 ,the problem which ,i have undertaken is that of ascertaining how it comes to pass that a conditional act leads to an unconditional2 and1 having now shown that assent really is unconditional1 ,i proceed to show how inferential exercises1 as such1 always must be conditional4 ,we reason1 when we hold this by virtue of that2 whether we hold it as evident or as approximating or tending to be evident1 in either case we so hold it because of holding something else to be evident or tending to be evident4 ,in the next place1 our reasoning ordinarily presents itself to our mind as a simple act1 not a process or series of acts4 ,we apprehend the antecedent and then apprehend the consequent1 without explicit recognition of the medium connecting the two1 as if by a sort of direct association of the first thought with the second4 ,we proceed by a sort of instinctive perception1 from premiss to conclusion4 ,i call it instinctive1 not as if the faculty were one and the same to all men in strength and quality 7as we generally conceive of instinct71 but because ordinarily1 or at least often1 it acts by a spontaneous impulse1 as prompt and inevitable as the exercise of sense and memory4 ,we perceive external objects1 and we remember past events1 without knowing how we do so2 and in like manner we reason without effort and intention1 or any necessary consciousness of the path which the mind takes in passing from antecedent to conclusion4 ,such is ratiocination1 in what may be called a state of nature1 as it is found in the uneducated1--nay1 in all men1 in its ordinary exercise2 nor is there any antecedent ground for determining that it will not be as correct in its informations as it is instinctive1 as trustworthy as are sensible perception and memory1 though its informations are not so immediate and have a wider range4 ,by means of sense we gain knowledge directly2 by means of reasoning we gain it indirectly1 that is1 by virtue of a previous knowledge4 ,and if we may justly regard the universe1 according to the meaning of the word1 as one whole1 we may also believe justly that to know one part of it is necessarily to know much more than that one part4 ,this thought leads us to a further view of ratiocination4 ,the proverb says1 8,ex pede ,herculem20 and we have actual experience how the practised zoologist can build up some intricate organization from the sight of its smallest bone1 evoking the whole as if it were a remembrance2 how1 again1 a philosophical antiquarian1 by means of an inscription1 interprets the mythical traditions of former ages1 and makes the past live2 and how a ,columbus is led1 from considerations which are common property1 and fortuitous phenomena which are successively brought to his notice1 to have such faith in a western world1 as willingly to commit himself to the terrors of a mysterious ocean in order to arrive at it4 ,that which the mind is able thus variously to bring together into unity1 must have some real intrinsic connexion of part with part4 ,but if this summa rerum is thus one whole1 it must be constructed on definite principles and laws1 the knowledge of which will enlarge our capacity of reasoning about it in particulars2--thus we are led on to aim at determining on a large scale and on system1 what even gifted or practised intellects are only able by their own personal vigour to reach piece-meal and fitfully1 that is1 at substituting scientific methods1 such as all may use1 for the action of individual genius4 ,there is another reason for attempting to discover an instrument of reasoning 7that is1 of gaining new truths by means of old71 which may be less vague and arbitrary than the talent and experience of the few or the common-sense of the many4 ,as memory is not always accurate1 and has on that account led to the adoption of writing1 as being a memoria technica1 unaffected by the failure of mental impressions1--as our senses at times deceive us1 and have to be corrected by each other2 so is it also with our reasoning faculty4 ,the conclusions of one man are not the conclusions of another2 those of the same man do not always agree together2 those of ever so many who agree together may differ from the facts themselves1 which those conclusions are intended to ascertain4 ,in consequence it becomes a necessity1 if it be possible1 to analyze the process of reasoning1 and to invent a method which may act as a common measure between mind and mind1 as a means of joint investigation1 and as a recognized intellectual standard1--a standard such as to secure us against hopeless mistakes1 and to emancipate us from the capricious ipse dixit of authority4 ,as the index on the dial notes down the sun's course in the heavens1 as a key1 revolving through the intricate wards of the lock1 opens for us a treasure-house1 so let us1 if we can1 provide ourselves with some ready expedient to serve as a true record of the system of objective truth1 and an available rule for interpreting its phenomena2 or at least let us go as far as we can in providing it4 ,one such experimental key is the science of geometry1 which1 in a certain department of nature1 substitutes a collection of true principles1 fruitful and interminable in consequences1 for the guesses1 pro re nat1 of our intellect1 and saves it both the labour and the risk of guessing4 ,another far more subtle and effective instrument is algebraical science1 which acts as a spell in unlocking for us1 without merit or effort of our own individually1 the arcana of the concrete physical universe4 ,a more ambitious1 because a more comprehensive contrivance still1 for interpreting the concrete world is the method of logical inference4 ,what we desiderate is something which may supersede the need of personal gifts by a far-reaching and infallible rule4 ,now1 without external symbols to mark out and to steady its course1 the intellect runs wild2 but with the aid of symbols1 as in algebra1 it advances with precision and effect4 ,let then our symbols be words3 let all thought be arrested and embodied in words4 ,let language have a monopoly of thought2 and thought go for only so much as it can show itself to be worth in language4 ,let every prompting of the intellect be ignored1 every momentum of argument be disowned1 which is unprovided with an equivalent wording1 as its ticket for sharing in the common search after truth4 ,let the authority of nature1 common-sense1 experience1 genius1 go for nothing4 ,ratiocination1 thus restricted and put into grooves1 is what ,i have called ,inference1 and the science1 which is its regulating principle1 is ,logic4 ,the first step in the inferential method is to throw the question to be decided into the form of a proposition2 then to throw the proof itself into propositions1 the force of the proof lying in the comparison of these propositions with each other4 ,when the analysis is carried out fully and put into form1 it becomes the ,aristotelic syllogism4 ,however1 an inference need not be expressed thus technically2 an enthymeme fulfils the requirements of what ,i have called ,inference4 ,so does any other form of words with the mere grammatical expressions1 8for10 8therefore10 8supposing10 8so that10 8similarly10 and the like4 ,verbal reasoning1 of whatever kind1 as opposed to mental1 is what ,i mean by inference1 which differs from logic only inasmuch as logic is its scientific form4 ,and it will be more convenient here to use the two words indiscriminately1 for ,i shall say nothing about logic which does not in its substance also apply to inference4 ,logical inference1 then1 being such1 and its office such as ,i have described1 the question follows1 how far it answers the purpose for which it is used4 ,it proposes to provide both a test and a common measure of reasoning2 and ,i think it will be found partly to succeed and partly to fail2 succeeding so far as words can in fact be found for representing the countless varieties and subtleties of human thought1 failing on account of the fallacy of the original assumption1 that whatever can be thought can be adequately expressed in words4 ,in the first place1 ,inference1 being conditional1 is hampered with other propositions besides that which is especially its own1 that is1 with the premisses as well as the conclusion1 and with the rules connecting the latter with the former4 ,it views its own proper proposition in the medium of prior propositions1 and measures it by them4 ,it does not hold a proposition for its own sake1 but as dependent upon others1 and those others it entertains for the sake of the conclusion4 ,thus it is practically far more concerned with the comparison of propositions1 than with the propositions themselves4 ,it is obliged to regard all the propositions1 with which it has to do1 not so much for their own sake1 as for the sake of each other1 as regards the identity or likeness1 independence or dissimilarity1 which has to be mutually predicated of them4 ,it follows from this1 that the more simple and definite are the words of a proposition1 and the narrower their meaning1 and the more that meaning in each proposition is restricted to the relation which it has to the words of the other propositions compared with it1--in other words1 the nearer the propositions concerned in the inference approach to being mental abstractions1 and the less they have to do with the concrete reality1 and the more closely they are made to express exact1 intelligible1 comprehensible1 communicable notions1 and the less they stand for objective things1 that is1 the more they are the subjects1 not of real1 but of notional apprehension1--so much the more suitable do they become for the purposes of ,inference4 ,hence it is that no process of argument is so perfect1 as that which is conducted by means of symbols4 ,in ,arithmetic #a is #a1 and just #a1 and never anything else but #a2 it never is #b1 it has no tendency to change its meaning1 and to become #b2 it has no portion1 quality1 admixture of #b in its meaning4 ,and #f under all circumstances is #c times #b1 and the sum of #b and #d2 nor can the whole world supply anything to throw doubt upon these elementary positions4 ,it is not so with language4 ,take1 by contrast1 the word 8inference10 which ,i have been using3 it may stand for the act of inferring1 as ,i have used it2 or for the connecting principle1 or inferentia1 between premisses and conclusions2 or for the conclusion itself4 ,and sometimes it will be difficult1 in a particular sentence1 to say which it bears of these three senses4 ,and so again in ,algebra1 a is never x1 or anything but a1 wherever it is found2 and a and b are always standard quantities1 to which x and y are always to be referred1 and by which they are always to be measured4 ,in ,geometry again1 the subjects of argument1 points1 lines1 and surfaces1 are precise creations of the mind1 suggested indeed by external objects1 but meaning nothing but what they are defined to mean3 they have no colour1 no motion1 no heat1 no qualities which address themselves to the ear or to the palate2 so that1 in whatever combinations or relations the words denoting them occur1 and to whomsoever they come1 those words never vary in their meaning1 but are just of the same measure and weight at one time and at another4 ,what is true of ,arithmetic1 ,algebra1 and ,geometry1 is true also of ,aristotelic argumentation in its typical modes and figures4 ,it compares two given words separately with a third1 and then determines how they stand towards each other1 in a bona fide identity of sense4 ,in consequence1 its formal process is best conducted by means of symbols1 ,a1 ,b1 and ,c4 ,while it keeps to these1 it is safe2 it has the cogency of mathematical reasoning1 and draws its conclusions by a rule as unerring as it is blind4 ,symbolical notation1 then1 being the perfection of the syllogistic method1 it follows that1 when words are substituted for symbols1 it will be its aim to circumscribe and stint their import as much as possible1 lest perchance ,a should not always exactly mean ,a1 and ,b mean ,b2 and to make them1 as much as possible1 the calculi of notions1 which are in our absolute power1 as meaning just what we choose them to mean1 and as little as possible the tokens of real things1 which are outside of us1 and which mean we do not know how much1 but so much certainly as may run away with us1 in proportion as we enter into them1 beyond the range of scientific management4 ,the concrete matter of propositions is a constant source of trouble to syllogistic reasoning1 as marring the simplicity and perfection of its process4 ,words1 which denote things1 have innumerable implications2 but in inferential exercises it is the very triumph of that clearness and hardness of head1 which is the characteristic talent for the art1 to have stripped them of all these connatural senses1 to have drained them of that depth and breadth of associations which constitute their poetry1 their rhetoric1 and their historical life1 to have starved each term down till it has become the ghost of itself1 and everywhere one and the same ghost1 8omnibus umbra locis10 so that it may stand for just one unreal aspect of the concrete thing to which it properly belongs1 for a relation1 a generalization1 or other abstraction1 for a notion neatly turned out of the laboratory of the mind1 and sufficiently tame and subdued1 because existing only in a definition4 ,thus it is that the logician for his own purposes1 and most usefully as far as those purposes are concerned1 turns rivers1 full1 winding1 and beautiful1 into navigable canals4 ,to him dog or horse is not a thing which he sees1 but a mere name suggesting ideas2 and by dog or horse universal he means1 not the aggregate of all individual dogs or horses brought together1 but a common aspect1 meagre but precise1 of all existing or possible dogs or horses1 which all the while does not really correspond to any one single dog or horse out of the whole aggregate4 ,such minute fidelity in the representation of individuals is neither necessary nor possible to his art2 his business is not to ascertain facts in the concrete1 but to find and dress up middle terms2 and1 provided they and the extremes which they go between are not equivocal1 either in themselves or in their use1 and he can enable his pupils to show well in a viv voce disputation1 or in a popular harangue1 or in a written dissertation1 he has achieved the main purpose of his profession4 ,such are the characteristics of reasoning1 viewed as a science or scientific art1 or inferential process1 and we might anticipate that1 narrow as by necessity is its field of view1 for that reason its pretensions to be demonstrative were incontrovertible4 ,in a certain sense they really are so2 while we talk logic1 we are unanswerable2 but then1 on the other hand1 this universal living scene of things is after all as little a logical world as it is a poetical2 and1 as it cannot without violence be exalted into poetical perfection1 neither can it be attenuated into a logical formula4 ,abstract can only conduct to abstract2 but we have need to attain by our reasonings to what is concrete2 and the margin between the abstract conclusions of the science1 and the concrete facts which we wish to ascertain1 will be found to reduce the force of the inferential method from demonstration to the mere determination of the probable4 ,thus1 whereas 7as ,i have already said7 ,inference starts with conditions1 as starting with premisses1 here are two reasons why1 when employed upon matters of fact1 it can only conclude probabilities3 first1 because its premisses are assumed1 not proved2 and secondly1 because its conclusions are abstract1 and not concrete4 ,i will now consider these two points separately4 #a4 ,inference comes short of proof in concrete matters1 because it has not a full command over the objects to which it relates1 but merely assumes its premisses4 ,in order to complete the proof1 we are thrown upon some previous syllogism or syllogisms1 in which the assumptions may be proved2 and then1 still farther back1 we are thrown upon others again1 to prove the new assumptions of that second order of syllogisms4 ,where is this process to stop8 especially since it must run upon separated1 divergent1 and multiplied lines of argument1 the farther the investigation is carried back4 ,at length a score of propositions present themselves1 all to be proved by propositions more evident than themselves1 in order to enable them respectively to become premisses to that series of inferences which terminates in the conclusion which we originally drew4 ,but even now the difficulty is not at an end2 it would be something to arrive at length at premisses which are undeniable1 however long we might be in arriving at them2 but in this case the long retrospection lodges us at length at what are called first principles1 the recondite sources of all knowledge1 as to which logic provides no common measure of minds1--which are accepted by some1 rejected by others1--in which1 and not in the syllogistic exhibitions1 lies the whole problem of attaining to truth1--and which are called self-evident by their respective advocates because they are evident in no other way4 ,one of the two uses contemplated in reasoning by rule1 or in verbal argumentation1 was1 as ,i have said1 to establish a standard of truth and to supersede the ipse dixit of authority3 how does it fulfil this end1 if it only leads us back to first principles1 about which there is interminable controversy8 ,we are not able to prove by syllogism that there are any self-evident propositions at all2 but supposing there are 7as of course ,i hold there are71 still who can determine these by logic8 ,syllogism1 then1 though of course it has its use1 still does only the minutest and easiest part of the work1 in the investigation of truth1 for when there is any difficulty1 that difficulty commonly lies in determining first principles1 not in the arrangement of proofs4 ,even when argument is the most direct and severe of its kind1 there must be those assumptions in the process which resolve themselves into the conditions of human nature2 but how many more assumptions does that process in ordinary concrete matters involve1 subtle assumptions not directly arising out of these primary conditions1 but accompanying the course of reasoning1 step by step1 and traceable to the sentiments of the age1 country1 religion1 social habits and ideas1 of the particular inquirers or disputants1 and passing current without detection1 because admitted equally on all hands6 ,and to these must be added the assumptions which are made from the necessity of the case1 in consequence of the prolixity and elaborateness of any argument which should faithfully note down all the propositions which go to make it up4 ,we recognize this tediousness even in the case of the theorems of ,euclid1 though mathematical proof is comparatively simple4 ,logic then does not really prove2 it enables us to join issue with others2 it suggests ideas2 it opens views2 it maps out for us the lines of thought2 it verifies negatively2 it determines when differences of opinion are hopeless2 and when and how far conclusions are probable2 but for genuine proof in concrete matter we require an organon more delicate1 versatile1 and elastic than verbal argumentation4 ,i ought to give an illustration of what ,i have been stating in general terms2 but it is difficult to do so without a digression4 ,however1 if it must be1 ,i look round the room in which ,i happen to be writing1 and take down the first book which catches my eye4 ,it is an old volume of a ,magazine of great name2 ,i open it at random and fall upon a discussion about the then lately discovered emendations of the text of ,shakespeare4 ,it will do for my purpose4 ,in the account of ,falstaff's death in 8,henry ,v40 7act ii4 scene #c7 we read1 according to the received text1 the well-known words1 8,his nose was as sharp as a pen1 and 'a babbled of green fields40 ,in the first authentic edition1 published in #afbc1 some years after ,shakespeare's death1 the words1 ,i believe1 ran1 8and a table of green fields10 which has no sense4 ,accordingly1 an anonymous critic1 reported by ,theobald in the last century1 corrected them to 8and 'a talked of green fields10 ,theobald himself improved the reading into 8and 'a babbled of green fields10 which since his time has been the received text4 ,but just twenty years ago an annotated copy of the edition of #afcb was found1 annotated perhaps by a contemporary1 which1 among as many as #bj1jjj corrections of the text1 substituted for the corrupt reading of #afbc1 the words 8on a table of green frieze10 which has a sufficient sense1 though far less acceptable to an admirer of ,shakespeare1 than ,theobald's4 ,the genuineness of this copy with its annotations1 as it is presented to us1 ,i shall here take for granted4 ,now ,i understand1 or at least will suppose1 the argument1 maintained in the article of the ,magazine in question1 to run thus3--8,theobald's reading1 as at present received1 is to be retained1 to the exclusion of the text of #afbc and of the emendation made on the copy of the edition of #afcb2--to the exclusion of the text of #afbc because that text is corrupt2 to the exclusion of the annotation of #afcb because it is anonymous40 ,i wish it then observed how many large questions are opened in the discussion which ensues1 how many recondite and untractable principles have to be settled1 and how impotent is logic1 or any reasonings which can be thrown into language1 to deal with these indispensable first principles4 ,the first position is1 8,the authoritative reading of #afbc is not to be restored to the received text1 because it is corrupt40 ,now are we to take it for granted1 as a first principle1 which needs no proof1 that a text may be tampered with1 because it is corrupt8 ,however the corrupt reading arose1 it is authoritative4 ,it is found in an edition1 published by known persons1 only six years after ,shakespeare's death1 from his own manuscript1 as it appears1 and with his corrections of earlier faulty impressions4 ,authority cannot sanction nonsense1 but it can forbid critics from experimentalizing upon it4 ,if the text of ,shakespeare is corrupt1 it should be published as corrupt4 ,i believe the best editors of the ,greek tragedians have given up the impertinence of introducing their conjectures into the text2 and a classic like ,shakespeare has a right to be treated with the same respect as schylus4 ,to this it will be replied1 that ,shakespeare is for the general public and schylus for students of a dead language2 that the run of men read for amusement or as a recreation1 and that1 if the editions of ,shakespeare were made on critical principles1 they would remain unsold4 ,here1 then1 we are brought to the question whether it is any advantage to read ,shakespeare except with the care and pains which a classic demands1 and whether he is in fact read at all by those whom such critical exactness would offend2 and thus we are led on to further questions about cultivation of mind and the education of the masses4 ,further1 the question presents itself1 whether the general admiration of ,shakespeare is genuine1 whether it is not a mere fashion1 whether the multitude of men understand him at all1 whether it is not true that every one makes much of him1 because every one else makes much of him4 ,can we possibly make ,shakespeare light reading1 especially in this day of cheap novels1 by ever so much correction of his text8 ,now supposing this point settled1 and the text of #afbc put out of court1 then comes the claim of the ,annotator to introduce into ,shakespeare's text the emendation made upon his copy of the edition of #afcb2 why is he not of greater authority than ,theobald1 the inventor of the received reading1 and his emendation of more authority than ,theobald's8 ,if the corrupt reading must any how be got out of the way1 why should not the ,annotator1 rather than ,theobald1 determine its substitute8 ,for what we know1 the authority of the anonymous ,annotator may be very great4 ,there is nothing to show that he was not a contemporary of the poet2 and if so1 the question arises1 what is the character of his emendations8 are they his own private and arbitrary conjectures1 or are they informations from those who knew ,shakespeare1 traditions of the theatre1 of the actors or spectators of his plays8 ,here1 then1 we are involved in intricate questions which can only be decided by a minute examination of the #bj1jjj emendations so industriously brought together by this anonymous critic4 ,but it is obvious that a verbal argumentation upon #bj1jjj corrections is impossible3 there must be first careful processes of perusal1 classification1 discrimination1 selection1 which mainly are acts of the mind without the intervention of language4 ,there must be a cumulation of arguments on one side and on the other1 of which only the heads or the results can be put upon paper4 ,next come in questions of criticism and taste1 with their recondite and disputable premisses1 and the usual deductions from them1 so subtle and difficult to follow4 ,all this being considered1 am ,i wrong in saying that1 though controversy is both possible and useful at all times1 yet it is not adequate to this occasion2 rather that that sum-total of argument 7whether for or against the ,annotator7 which is furnished by his numerous emendations1--or what may be called the multiform1 evidential fact1 in which the examination of these emendations results1--requires rather to be photographed on the individual mind as by one impression1 than admits of delineation for the satisfaction of the many in any known or possible language1 however rich in vocabulary and flexible in structure8 ,and now as to the third point which presents itself for consideration1 the claim of ,theobald's emendation to retain its place in the textus receptus4 ,it strikes me with wonder that an argument in its defence could have been put forward to the following effect1 viz4 that true though it be1 that the ,editors of #afbc are of much more authority than ,theobald1 and that the ,annotator's reading in the passage in question is more likely to be correct than ,theobald's1 nevertheless ,theobald's has by this time acquired a prescriptive right to its place there1 the prescription of more than a hundred years2--that usurpation has become legitimacy2 that ,theobald's words have sunk into the hearts of thousands2 that in fact they have become ,shakespeare's2 that it would be a dangerous innovation and an evil precedent to touch them4 ,if we begin an unsettlement of the popular mind1 where is it to stop8 ,thus it appears1 in order to do justice to the question before us1 we have to betake ourselves to the consideration of myths1 pious frauds1 and other grave matters1 which introduce us into a sylva1 dense and intricate1 of first principles and elementary phenomena1 belonging to the domains of archeology and theology4 ,nor is this all2 when such views of the duty of garbling a classic are propounded1 they open upon us a long vista of sceptical interrogations which go far to disparage the claims upon us1 the genius1 the very existence of the great poet to whose honour these views are intended to minister4 ,for perhaps1 after all1 ,shakespeare is really but a collection of many ,theobalds1 who have each of them a right to his own share of him4 ,there was a great dramatic school in his day2 he was one of a number of first-rate artists1--perhaps they wrote in common4 ,how are we to know what is his1 or how much8 ,are the best parts his1 or the worst8 ,it is said that the players put in what is vulgar and offensive in his writings2 perhaps they inserted the beauties4 ,i have heard it urged years ago1 as an objection to ,sheridan's claim of authorship to the plays which bear his name1 that they were so unlike each other2 is not this the very peculiarity of those imputed to ,shakespeare8 ,were ever the writings of one man so various1 so impersonal8 can we form any one true idea of what he was in history or character1 by means of them8 is he not in short 8vox et prterea nihil08 ,then again1 in corroboration1 is there any author's life so deficient in biographical notices as his8 ,we know about ,hooker1 ,spenser1 ,spelman1 ,raleigh1 ,harvey1 his contemporaries3 what do we know of ,shakespeare8 ,is he much more than a name8 ,is not the traditional object of an ,englishman's idolatry after all a nebula of genius1 destined1 like ,homer1 to be resolved into its separate and independent luminaries1 as soon as we have a criticism powerful enough for the purpose8 ,i must not be supposed for a moment to countenance such scepticism myself1--though it is a subject worthy the attention of a sceptical age3 here ,i have introduced it simply to suggest how many words go to make up a thoroughly valid argument2 how short and easy a way to a true conclusion is the logic of good sense2 how little syllogisms have to do with the formation of opinion2 how little depends upon the inferential proofs1 and how much upon those pre-existing beliefs and views1 in which men either already agree with each other or hopelessly differ1 before they begin to dispute1 and which are hidden deep in our nature1 or1 it may be1 in our personal peculiarities4 #b4 ,so much on the multiplicity of assumptions1 which in spite of formal exactness1 logical reasoning in concrete matters is forced to admit1 and on the consequent uncertainty which attends its conclusions4 ,now ,i come to the second reason why its conclusions are thus wanting in precision4 ,in this world of sense we have to do with things1 far more than with notions4 ,we are not solitary1 left to the contemplation of our own thoughts and their legitimate developments4 ,we are surrounded by external beings1 and our enunciations are directed to the concrete4 ,we reason in order to enlarge our knowledge of matters1 which do not depend on us for being what they are4 ,but how is an exercise of mind1 which is for the most part occupied with notions1 not things1 competent to deal with things1 except partially and indirectly8 ,this is the main reason why an inference1 however fully worded1 7except perhaps in some peculiar cases1 which are out of place here17 never can reach so far as to ascertain a fact4 ,as ,i have already said1 arguments about the abstract cannot handle and determine the concrete4 ,they may approximate to a proof1 but they only reach the probable1 because they cannot reach the particular4 ,even in mathematical physics a margin is left for possible imperfection in the investigation4 ,when the planet ,neptune was discovered1 it was deservedly considered a triumph of science1 that abstract reasonings had done so much towards determining the planet and its orbit4 ,there would have been no triumph in success1 had there been no hazard of failure2 it is no triumph to ,euclid1 in pure mathematics1 that the geometrical conclusions of his second book can be worked out and verified by algebra4 ,the motions of the heavenly bodies are almost mathematical in their precision2 but there is a multitude of matters1 to which mathematical science is applied1 which are in their nature intricate and obscure1 and require that reasoning by rule should be completed by the living mind4 ,who would be satisfied with a navigator or engineer1 who had no practice or experience whereby to carry on his scientific conclusions out of their native abstract into the concrete and the real8 ,what is the meaning of the distrust1 which is ordinarily felt1 of speculators and theorists but this1 that they are dead to the necessity of personal prudence and judgment to qualify and complete their logic8 ,science1 working by itself1 reaches truth in the abstract1 and probability in the concrete2 but what we aim at is truth in the concrete4 ,this is true of other inferences besides mathematical4 ,they come to no definite conclusions about matters of fact1 except as they are made effectual for their purpose by the living intelligence which uses them4 8,all men have their price2 ,fabricius is a man2 he has his price20 but he had not his price2 how is this8 ,because he is more than a universal2 because he falls under other universals2 because universals are ever at war with each other2 because what is called a universal is only a general2 because what is only general does not lead to a necessary conclusion4 ,let us judge him by another universal4 8,men have a conscience2 ,fabricius is a man2 he has a conscience40 ,until we have actual experience of ,fabricius1 we can only say1 that1 since he is a man1 perhaps he will take a bribe1 and perhaps he will not4 8,latet dolus in generalibus20 they are arbitrary and fallacious1 if we take them for more than broad views and aspects of things1 serving as our notes and indications for judging of the particular1 but not absolutely touching and determining facts4 ,let units come first1 and 7so-called7 universals second2 let universals minister to units1 not units be sacrificed to universals4 ,john1 ,richard1 and ,robert are individual things1 independent1 incommunicable4 ,we may find some kind of common measure between them1 and we may give it the name of man1 man as such1 the typical man1 the auto-anthropos4 ,we are justified in so doing1 and in investing it with general attributes1 and bestowing on it what we consider a definition4 ,but we think we may go on to impose our definition on the whole race1 and to every member of it1 to the thousand ,johns1 ,richards1 and ,roberts who are found in it4 ,no2 each of them is what he is1 in spite of it4 ,not any one of them is man1 as such1 or coincides with the auto-anthropos4 ,another ,john is not necessarily rational1 because 8all men are rational10 for he may be an idiot2--nor because 8man is a being of progress10 does the second ,richard progress1 for he may be a dunce2--nor1 because 8man is made for society10 must we therefore go on to deny that the second ,robert is a gipsy or a bandit1 as he is found to be4 ,there is no such thing as stereotyped humanity2 it must ever be a vague1 bodiless idea1 because the concrete units from which it is formed are independent realities4 ,general laws are not inviolable truths2 much less are they necessary causes4 ,since1 as a rule1 men are rational1 progressive1 and social1 there is a high probability of this rule being true in the case of a particular person2 but we must know him to be sure of it4 ,each thing has its own nature and its own history4 ,when the nature and the history of many things are similar1 we say that they have the same nature2 but there is no such thing as one and the same nature2 they are each of them itself1 not identical1 but like4 ,a law is not a fact1 but a notion4 8,all men die2 therefore ,elias has died20 but he has not died1 and did not die4 ,he was an exception to the general law of humanity2 so far1 he did not come under that law1 but under the law 7so to say7 of ,elias4 ,it was the peculiarity of his individuality1 that he left the world without dying3 what right have we to subject the person of ,elias to the scientific notion of an abstract humanity1 which we have formed without asking his leave8 ,why must the tyrant majority find a rule for his history8 8,but all men are mortal20 not so2 what is really meant is1 that 8man1 as such1 is mortal10 or the abstract1 typical auto-anthropos2 therefore the minor premiss ought to be1 8,elias was the auto-anthropos or abstract man20 but he was not1 and could not be the abstract man1 nor could any one else1 any more than the average man of an ,insurance ,company is every individual man who insures his life with it4 ,such a syllogism proves nothing about the veritable ,elias1 except in the way of antecedent probability4 ,if it be said that ,elias was exempted from death1 not by nature1 but by miracle1 what is this to the purpose1 undeniable as it is8 ,still1 to have this miraculous exemption was the personal prerogative of ,elias4 ,we call it miracle1 because ,god ordinarily acts otherwise4 ,he who causes men in general to die1 gave to ,elias not to die4 ,this miraculous gift comes into the individuality of ,elias4 ,on this individuality we must fix our thoughts1 and not begin our notion of him by ignoring it4 ,he was a man1 and something more than 8man02 and if we do not take this into account1 we fall into an initial error in our thoughts of him4 ,what is true of ,elias is true of every one in his own place and degree4 ,we call rationality the distinction of man1 when compared with other animals4 ,this is true in logic2 but in fact a man differs from a brute1 not in rationality only1 but in all that he is1 even in those respects in which he is most like a brute2 so that his whole self1 his bones1 limbs1 make1 life1 reason1 moral feeling1 immortality1 and all that he is besides1 is his real differentia1 in contrast to a horse or a dog4 ,and in like manner as regards ,john and ,richard1 when compared with one another2 each is himself1 and nothing else1 and1 though1 regarded abstractedly1 the two may fairly be said to have something in common1 7viz4 that abstract sameness which does not exist at all17 yet1 strictly speaking1 they have nothing in common1 for each of them has a vested interest in all that he himself is2 and1 moreover1 what seems to be common in the two1 becomes in fact so uncommon1 so sui simile1 in their respective individualities--the bodily frame of each is so singled out from all other bodies by its special constitution1 sound or weak1 by its vitality1 activity1 pathological history and changes1 and1 again1 the mind of each is so distinct from all other minds1 in disposition1 powers1 and habits1--that1 instead of saying1 as logicians say1 that the two men differ only in number1 we ought1 ,i repeat1 rather to say that they differ from each other in all that they are1 in identity1 in incommunicability1 in personality4 ,nor does any real thing admit1 by any calculus of logic1 of being dissected into all the possible general notions which it admits1 nor1 in consequence1 of being recomposed out of them2 though the attempt thus to treat it is more unpromising in proportion to the intricacy and completeness of its make4 ,we cannot see through any one of the myriad beings which make up the universe1 or give the full catalogue of its belongings4 ,we are accustomed1 indeed1 and rightly1 to speak of the ,creator ,himself as incomprehensible2 and1 indeed1 ,he is so by an incommunicable attribute2 but in a certain sense each of ,his creatures is incomprehensible to us also1 in the sense that no one has a perfect understanding of it but ,he4 ,we recognize and appropriate aspects of them1 and logic is useful to us in registering these aspects and what they imply2 but it does not give us to know even one individual being4 ,so much on logical argumentation2 and in speaking of the syllogism1 ,i have spoken of all inferential processes whatever1 as expressed in language1 7if they are such as to be reducible to science17 for they all require general notions1 as conditions of their coming to a conclusion4 ,thus1 in the deductive argument1 8,europe has no security for peace1 till its large standing armies in its separate states are reduced2 for a large standing army is in its very idea provocative of war10 the conclusion is only probable1 for it may so be that in no country is that pure idea realized1 but in every country in concrete fact there may be circumstances1 political or social1 which destroy the abstract dangerousness4 ,so1 too1 as regards ,induction and ,analogy1 as modes of ,inference2 for1 whether ,i argue1 8,this place will have the cholera1 unless it is drained2 for there are a number of well-ascertained cases which point to this conclusion20 or1 8,the sun will rise to-morrow1 for it rose to-day20 in either method of reasoning ,i appeal1 in order to prove a particular case1 to a general principle or law1 which has not force enough to warrant more than a probable conclusion4 ,as to the cholera1 the place in question may have certain antagonist advantages1 which anticipate or neutralize the miasma which is the principle of the poison2 and as to the sun's rising to-morrow1 there was a first day of the sun's rising1 and therefore there may be a last4 ,this is what ,i have to say on formal ,inference1 when taken to represent ,ratiocination4 ,science in all its departments has too much simplicity and exactness1 from the nature of the case1 to be the measure of fact4 ,in its very perfection lies its incompetency to settle particulars and details4 ,as to ,logic1 its chain of conclusions hangs loose at both ends2 both the point from which the proof should start1 and the points at which it should arrive1 are beyond its reach2 it comes short both of first principles and of concrete issues4 ,even its most elaborate exhibitions fail to represent adequately the sum total of considerations by which an individual mind is determined in its judgment of things2 even its most careful combinations made to bear on a conclusion want that steadiness of aim which is necessary for hitting it4 ,as ,i said when ,i began1 thought is too keen and manifold1 its sources are too remote and hidden1 its path too personal1 delicate1 and circuitous1 its subject-matter too various and intricate1 to admit of the trammels of any language1 of whatever subtlety and of whatever compass4 ,nor is it any disparagement of the proper value of formal reasonings thus to speak of them4 ,that they cannot proceed beyond probabilities is most readily allowed by those who use them most4 ,philosophers1 experimentalists1 lawyers1 in their several ways1 have commonly the reputation of being1 at least on moral and religious subjects1 hard of belief2 because1 proceeding in the necessary investigation by the analytical method of verbal inference1 they find within its limits no sufficient resources for attaining a conclusion4 ,nay1 they do not always find it possible in their own special province severally2 for1 even when in their hearts they have no doubt about a conclusion1 still often1 from the habit of their minds1 they are reluctant to own it1 and dwell upon the deficiencies of the evidence1 or the possibility of error1 because they speak by rule and by book1 though they judge and determine by common-sense4 ,every exercise of nature or of art is good in its place2 and the uses of this logical inference are manifold4 ,it is the great principle of order in our thinking2 it reduces a chaos into harmony2 it catalogues the accumulations of knowledge2 it maps out for us the relations of its separate departments2 it puts us in the way to correct its own mistakes4 ,it enables the independent intellects of many1 acting and re-acting on each other1 to bring their collective force to bear upon one and the same subject-matter1 or the same question4 ,if language is an inestimable gift to man1 the logical faculty prepares it for our use4 ,though it does not go so far as to ascertain truth1 still it teaches us the direction in which truth lies1 and how propositions lie towards each other4 ,nor is it a slight benefit to know what is probable1 and what is not so1 what is needed for the proof of a point1 what is wanting in a theory1 how a theory hangs together1 and what will follow1 if it be admitted4 ,though it does not itself discover the unknown1 it is one principal way by which discoveries are made4 ,moreover1 a course of argument1 which is simply conditional1 will point out when and where experiment and observation should be applied1 or testimony sought for1 as often happens both in physical and legal questions4 ,a logical hypothesis is the means of holding facts together1 explaining difficulties1 and reconciling the imagination to what is strange4 ,and1 again1 processes of logic are useful as enabling us to get over particular stages of an investigation speedily and surely1 as on a journey we now and then gain time by travelling by night1 make short cuts when the high-road winds1 or adopt water-carriage to avoid fatigue4 ,but reasoning by rule and in words is too natural to us1 to admit of being regarded merely in the light of utility4 ,our inquiries spontaneously fall into scientific sequence1 and we think in logic1 as we talk in prose1 without aiming at doing so4 ,however sure we are of the accuracy of our instinctive conclusions1 we as instinctively put them into words1 as far as we can2 as preferring1 if possible1 to have them in an objective shape which we can fall back upon1--first for our own satisfaction1 then for our justification with others4 ,such a tangible defence of what we hold1 inadequate as it necessarily is1 considered as an analysis of our ratiocination in its length and breadth1 nevertheless is in such sense associated with our holdings1 and so fortifies and illustrates them1 that it acts as a vivid apprehension acts1 giving them luminousness and force4 ,thus inference becomes a sort of symbol of assent1 and even bears upon action4 ,i have enlarged on these obvious considerations1 lest ,i should seem paradoxical2 but they do not impair the main position of this ,section1 that ,inference1 considered in the shape of verbal argumentation1 determines neither our principles1 nor our ultimate judgments1--that it is neither the test of truth1 nor the adequate basis of assent47#ab7 #b4 ,informal ,inference4 ,it is plain that formal logical sequence is not in fact the method by which we are enabled to become certain of what is concrete2 and it is equally plain1 from what has been already suggested1 what the real and necessary method is4 ,it is the cumulation of probabilities1 independent of each other1 arising out of the nature and circumstances of the particular case which is under review2 probabilities too fine to avail separately1 too subtle and circuitous to be convertible into syllogisms1 too numerous and various for such conversion1 even were they convertible4 ,as a man's portrait differs from a sketch of him1 in having1 not merely a continuous outline1 but all its details filled in1 and shades and colours laid on and harmonized together1 such is the multiform and intricate process of ratiocination1 necessary for our reaching him as a concrete fact1 compared with the rude operation of syllogistic treatment4 ,let us suppose ,i wish to convert an educated1 thoughtful ,protestant1 and accordingly present for his acceptance a syllogism of the following kind3--8,all ,protestants are bound to join the ,church2 you are a ,protestant3 ergo40 ,he answers1 we will say1 by denying both premisses2 and he does so by means of arguments1 which branch out into other arguments1 and those into others1 and all of them severally requiring to be considered by him on their own merits1 before the syllogism reaches him1 and in consequence mounting up1 taken all together1 into an array of inferential exercises large and various beyond calculation4 ,moreover1 he is bound to submit himself to this complicated process from the nature of the case2 he would act rashly1 if he did not2 for he is a concrete individual unit1 and being so1 is under so many laws1 and is the subject of so many predications all at once1 that he cannot determine1 offhand1 his position and his duty by the law and the predication of one syllogism in particular4 ,i mean he may fairly say1 8,distinguo10 to each of its premisses3 he says1 8,protestants are bound to join the ,church1--under circumstances10 and 8,i am a ,protestant--in a certain sense20 and therefore the syllogism1 at first sight1 does not touch him at all4 ,before1 then1 he grants the major1 he asks whether all ,protestants really are bound to join the ,church--are they bound in case they do not feel themselves bound2 if they are satisfied that their present religion is a safe one2 if they are sure it is true2 if1 on the other hand1 they have grave doubts as to the doctrinal fidelity and purity of the ,church2 if they are convinced that the ,church is corrupt2 if their conscience instinctively rejects certain of its doctrines2 if history convinces them that the ,pope's power is not jure divino1 but merely in the order of ,providence8 if1 again1 they are in a heathen country where priests are not8 or where the only priest who is to be found exacts of them1 as a condition of their reception1 a profession1 which the ,creed of ,pope ,pius ,,iv4 says nothing about2 for instance1 that the ,holy ,see is fallible even when it teaches1 or that the ,temporal ,power is an anti-,christian corruption8 ,on one or other of such grounds he thinks he need not change his religion2 but presently he asks himself1 ,can a ,protestant be in such a state as to be really satisfied with his religion1 as he has just now been professing8 ,can he possibly believe ,protestantism came from above1 as a whole8 how much of it can he believe came from above8 and1 as to that portion which he feels did come from above1 has it not all been derived to him from the ,church1 when traced to its source8 ,is not ,protestantism in itself a negation8 ,did not the ,church exist before it8 and can he be sure1 on the other hand1 that any one of the ,church's doctrines is not from above8 ,further1 he finds he has to make up his mind what is a corruption1 and what are the tests of it2 what he means by a religion2 whether it is obligatory to profess any religion in particular2 what are the standards of truth and falsehood in religion2 and what are the special claims of the ,church4 ,and so1 again1 as to the minor premiss1 perhaps he will answer1 that he is not a ,protestant2 that he is a ,catholic of the early undivided ,church2 that he is a ,catholic1 but not a ,papist4 ,then he has to determine questions about division1 schism1 visible unity1 what is essential1 what is desirable2 about provisional states2 as to the adjustment of the ,church's claims with those of personal judgment and responsibility2 as to the soul of the ,church contrasted with the body2 as to degrees of proof1 and the degree necessary for his conversion2 as to what is called his providential position1 and the responsibility of change2 as to the sincerity of his purpose to follow the ,divine ,will1 whithersoever it may lead him2 as to his intellectual capacity of investigating such questions at all4 ,none of these questions1 as they come before him1 admit of simple demonstration2 but each carries with it a number of independent probable arguments1 sufficient1 when united1 for a reasonable conclusion about itself4 ,and first he determines that the questions are such as he personally1 with such talents or attainments as he has1 may fairly entertain2 and then he goes on1 after deliberation1 to form a definite judgment upon them2 and determines them1 one way or another1 in their bearing on the bald syllogism which was originally offered to his acceptance4 ,and1 we will say1 he comes to the conclusion1 that he ought to accept it as true in his case2 that he is a ,protestant in such a sense1 of such a complexion1 of such knowledge1 under such circumstances1 as to be called upon by duty to join the ,church2 that this is a conclusion of which he can be certain1 and ought to be certain1 and that he will be incurring grave responsibility1 if he does not accept it as certain1 and act upon the certainty of it4 ,and to this conclusion he comes1 as is plain1 not by any possible verbal enumeration of all the considerations1 minute but abundant1 delicate but effective1 which unite to bring him to it2 but by a mental comprehension of the whole case1 and a discernment of its upshot1 sometimes after much deliberation1 but1 it may be1 by a clear and rapid act of the intellect1 always1 however1 by an unwritten summing-up1 something like the summation of the terms1 plus and minus of an algebraical series4 ,this ,i conceive to be the real method of reasoning in concrete matters2 and it has these characteristics3--,first1 it does not supersede the logical form of inference1 but is one and the same with it2 only it is no longer an abstraction1 but carried out into the realities of life1 its premisses being instinct with the substance and the momentum of that mass of probabilities1 which1 acting upon each other in correction and confirmation1 carry it home definitely to the individual case1 which is its original scope4 ,next1 from what has been said it is plain1 that such a process of reasoning is more or less implicit1 and without the direct and full advertence of the mind exercising it4 ,as by the use of our eyesight we recognize two brothers1 yet without being able to express what it is by which we distinguish them2 as at first sight we perhaps confuse them together1 but1 on better knowledge1 we see no likeness between them at all2 as it requires an artist's eye to determine what lines and shades make a countenance look young or old1 amiable1 thoughtful1 angry or conceited1 the principle of discrimination being in each case real1 but implicit2--so is the mind unequal to a complete analysis of the motives which carry it on to a particular conclusion1 and is swayed and determined by a body of proof1 which it recognizes only as a body1 and not in its constituent parts4 ,and thirdly1 it is plain1 that1 in this investigation of the method of concrete inference1 we have not advanced one step towards depriving inference of its conditional character2 for it is still as dependent on premisses1 as it is in its elementary idea4 ,on the contrary1 we have rather added to the obscurity of the problem2 for a syllogism is at least a demonstration1 when the premisses are granted1 but a cumulation of probabilities1 over and above their implicit character1 will vary both in their number and their separate estimated value1 according to the particular intellect which is employed upon it4 ,it follows that what to one intellect is a proof is not so to another1 and that the certainty of a proposition does properly consist in the certitude of the mind which contemplates it4 ,and this of course may be said without prejudice to the objective truth or falsehood of propositions1 since it does not follow that these propositions on the one hand are not true1 and based on right reason1 and those on the other not false1 and based on false reason1 because not all men discriminate them in the same way4 ,having thus explained the view which ,i would take of reasoning in the concrete1 viz4 that1 from the nature of the case1 and from the constitution of the human mind1 certitude is the result of arguments which1 taken in the letter1 and not in their full implicit sense1 are but probabilities1 ,i proceed to dwell on some instances and circumstances of a phenomenon which seems to me as undeniable as to many it may be perplexing4 #a4 ,let us take three instances belonging respectively to the present1 the past1 and the future4 #a4 ,we are all absolutely certain1 beyond the possibility of doubt1 that ,great ,britain is an island4 ,we give to that proposition our deliberate and unconditional adhesion4 ,there is no security on which we should be better content to stake our interests1 our property1 our welfare1 than on the fact that we are living in an island4 ,we have no fear of any geographical discovery which may reverse our belief4 ,we should be amused or angry at the assertion1 as a bad jest1 did any one say that we were at this time joined to the main-land in ,norway or in ,france1 though a canal was cut across the isthmus4 ,we are as little exposed to the misgiving1 8,perhaps we are not on an island after all10 as to the question1 8,is it quite certain that the angle in a semi-circle is a right-angle80 ,it is a simple and primary truth with us1 if any truth is such2 to believe it is as legitimate an exercise of assent1 as there are legitimate exercises of doubt or of opinion4 ,this is the position of our minds towards our insularity2 yet are the arguments producible for it 7to use the common expression7 in black and white commensurate with this overpowering certitude about it8 ,our reasons for believing that we are circumnavigable are such as these3--first1 we have been so taught in our childhood1 and it is so in all the maps2 next1 we have never heard it contradicted or questioned2 on the contrary1 every one whom we have heard speak on the subject of ,great ,britain1 every book we have read1 invariably took it for granted2 our whole national history1 the routine transactions and current events of the country1 our social and commercial system1 our political relations with foreigners1 imply it in one way or another4 ,numberless facts1 or what we consider facts1 rest on the truth of it2 no received fact rests on its being otherwise4 ,if there is anywhere a junction between us and the continent1 where is it8 and how do we know it8 is it in the north or in the south8 ,there is a manifest reductio ad absurdum attached to the notion that we can be deceived on such a point as this4 ,however1 negative arguments and circumstantial evidence are not all1 in such a matter1 which we have a right to require4 ,they are not the highest kind of proof possible4 ,those who have circumnavigated the island have a right to be certain3 have we ever ourselves even fallen in with any one who has8 ,and as to the common belief1 what is the proof that we are not all of us believing it on the credit of each other8 ,and then1 when it is said that every one believes it1 and everything implies it1 how much comes home to me personally of this 8every one0 and 8everything08 ,the question is1 ,why do ,i believe it myself8 ,a living statesman is said to have fancied ,demerara an island2 his belief was an impression2 have we personally more than an impression1 if we view the matter argumentatively1 a lifelong impression about ,great ,britain1 like the belief1 so long and so widely entertained1 that the earth was immovable1 and the sun careered round it8 ,i am not at all insinuating that we are not rational in our certitude2 ,i only mean that we cannot analyze a proof satisfactorily1 the result of which good sense actually guarantees to us4 #b4 ,father ,hardouin maintained that ,terence's ,plays1 ,virgil's 8neid10 ,horace's ,odes1 and the ,histories of ,livy and ,tacitus1 were the forgeries of the monks of the thirteenth century4 ,that he should be able to argue in behalf of such a position1 shows of course that the proof in behalf of the received opinion is not overwhelming4 ,that is1 we have no means of inferring absolutely1 that ,virgil's episode of ,dido1 or of the ,sibyl1 and ,horace's 8,te quoque mensorem0 and 8,quem tu ,melpomene10 belong to that ,augustan age1 which owes its celebrity mainly to those poets4 ,our common-sense1 however1 believes in their genuineness without any hesitation or reserve1 as if it had been demonstrated1 and not in proportion to the available evidence in its favour1 or the balance of arguments4 ,so much at first sight2--but what are our grounds for dismissing thus summarily1 as we are likely to do1 a theory such as ,hardouin's8 ,for let it be observed first1 that all knowledge of the ,latin classics comes to us from the medieval transcriptions of them1 and they who transcribed them had the opportunity of forging or garbling them4 ,we are simply at their mercy2 for neither by oral transmission1 nor by monumental inscriptions1 nor by contemporaneous manuscripts are the works of ,virgil1 ,horace1 and ,terence1 of ,livy and ,tacitus1 brought to our knowledge4 ,the existing copies1 whenever made1 are to us the autographic originals4 ,next1 it must be considered1 that the numerous religious bodies1 then existing over the face of ,europe1 had leisure enough1 in the course of a century1 to compose1 not only all the classics1 but all the ,fathers too4 ,the question is1 whether they had the ability4 ,this is the main point on which the inquiry turns1 or at least the most obvious2 and it forms one of those arguments1 which1 from the nature of the case1 are felt rather than are convertible into syllogisms4 ,hardouin allows that the ,georgics1 ,horace's ,satires and ,epistles1 and the whole of ,cicero1 are genuine3 we have a standard then in these undisputed compositions of the ,augustan age4 ,we have a standard also1 in the extant medieval works1 of what the thirteenth century could do2 and we see at once how widely the disputed works differ from the medieval4 ,now could the thirteenth century simulate ,augustan writers better than the ,augustan could simulate such writers as those of the thirteenth8 ,no4 ,perhaps1 when the subject is critically examined1 the question may be brought to a more simple issue2 but as to our personal reasons for receiving as genuine the whole of ,virgil1 ,horace1 ,livy1 ,tacitus1 and ,terence1 they are summed up in our conviction that the monks had not the ability to write them4 ,that is1 we take for granted that we are sufficiently informed about the capabilities of the human mind1 and the conditions of genius1 to be quite sure that an age which was fertile in great ideas and in momentous elements of the future1 robust in thought1 hopeful in its anticipations1 of singular intellectual curiosity and acumen1 and of high genius in at least one of the fine arts1 could not1 for the very reason of its pre-eminence in its own line1 have an equal pre-eminence in a contrary one4 ,we do not pretend to be able to draw the line between what the medieval intellect could or could not do2 but we feel sure that at least it could not write the classics4 ,an instinctive sense of this1 and a faith in testimony1 are the sufficient1 but the undeveloped argument on which to ground our certitude4 ,i will add1 that1 if we deal with arguments in the mere letter1 the question of the authorship of works in any case has much difficulty4 ,i have noticed it in the instance of ,shakespeare1 and of ,newton4 ,we are all certain that ,johnson wrote the prose of ,johnson1 and ,pope the poetry of ,pope2 but what is there but prescription1 at least after contemporaries are dead1 to connect together the author of the work and the owner of the name8 ,our lawyers prefer the examination of present witnesses to affidavits on paper2 but the tradition of 8testimonia10 such as are prefixed to the classics and the ,fathers1 together with the absence of dissentient voices1 is the adequate groundwork of our belief in the history of literature4 #c4 ,once more3 what are my grounds for thinking that ,i1 in my own particular case1 shall die8 ,i am as certain of it in my own innermost mind1 as ,i am that ,i now live2 but what is the distinct evidence on which ,i allow myself to be certain8 how would it tell in a court of justice8 how should ,i fare under a cross-examination upon the grounds of my certitude8 ,demonstration of course ,i cannot have of a future event1 unless by means of a ,divine ,voice2 but what logical defence can ,i make for that undoubting1 obstinate anticipation of it1 of which ,i could not rid myself1 if ,i tried8 ,first1 the future cannot be proved posteriori2 therefore we are compelled by the nature of the case to put up with priori arguments1 that is1 with antecedent probability1 which is by itself no logical proof4 ,men tell me that there is a law of death1 meaning by law a necessity2 and ,i answer that they are throwing dust into my eyes1 giving me words instead of things4 ,what is a law but a generalized fact8 and what power has the past over the future8 and what power has the case of others over my own case8 and how many deaths have ,i seen8 how many ocular witnesses have imparted to me their experience of deaths1 sufficient to establish what is called a law8 ,but let there be a law of death2 so there is a law1 we are told1 that the planets1 if let alone1 would severally fall into the sun--it is the centrifugal law which hinders it1 and so the centripetal law is never carried out4 ,in like manner ,i am not under the law of death alone1 ,i am under a thousand laws1 if ,i am under one2 and they thwart and counteract each other1 and jointly determine the irregular line1 along which my actual history runs1 divergent from the special direction of any one of them4 ,no law is carried out1 except in cases where it acts freely3 how do ,i know that the law of death will be allowed its free action in my particular case8 ,we often are able to avert death by medical treatment3 why should death have its effect1 sooner or later1 in every case conceivable8 ,it is true that the human frame1 in all instances which come before me1 first grows1 and then declines1 wastes1 and decays1 in visible preparation for dissolution4 ,we see death seldom1 but of this decline we are witnesses daily2 still1 it is a plain fact1 that most men who die1 die1 not by any law of death1 but by the law of disease2 and some writers have questioned whether death is ever1 strictly speaking1 natural4 ,now1 are diseases necessary8 is there any law that every one1 sooner or later1 must fall under the power of disease8 and what would happen on a large scale1 were there no diseases8 ,is what we call the law of death anything more than the chance of disease8 ,is the prospect of my death1 in its logical evidence1--as that evidence is brought home to me--much more than a high probability8 ,the strongest proof ,i have for my inevitable mortality is the reductio ad absurdum4 ,can ,i point to the man1 in historic times1 who has lived his two hundred years8 ,what has become of past generations of men1 unless it is true that they suffered dissolution8 ,but this is a circuitous argument to warrant a conclusion to which in matter of fact ,i adhere so relentlessly4 ,anyhow1 there is a considerable 8surplusage10 as ,locke calls it1 of belief over proof1 when ,i determine that ,i individually must die4 ,but what logic cannot do1 my own living personal reasoning1 my good sense1 which is the healthy condition of such personal reasoning1 but which cannot adequately express itself in words1 does for me1 and ,i am possessed with the most precise1 absolute1 masterful certitude of my dying some day or other4 ,i am led on by these reflections to make another remark4 ,if it is difficult to explain how a man knows that he shall die1 is it not more difficult for him to satisfy himself how he knows that he was born8 ,his knowledge about himself does not rest on memory1 nor on distinct testimony1 nor on circumstantial evidence4 ,can he bring into one focus of proof the reasons which make him so sure8 ,i am not speaking of scientific men1 who have diverse channels of knowledge1 but of an ordinary individual1 as one of ourselves4 ,answers doubtless may be given to some of these questions2 but1 on the whole1 ,i think it is the fact that many of our most obstinate and most reasonable certitudes depend on proofs which are informal and personal1 which baffle our powers of analysis1 and cannot be brought under logical rule1 because they cannot be submitted to logical statistics4 ,if we must speak of ,law1 this recognition of a correlation between certitude and implicit proof seems to me a law of our minds4 #b4 ,i said just now that an object of sense presents itself to our view as one whole1 and not in its separate details3 we take it in1 recognize it1 and discriminate it from other objects1 all at once4 ,such too is the intellectual view we take of the momenta of proof for a concrete truth2 we grasp the full tale of premisses and the conclusion1 per modum unius1--by a sort of instinctive perception of the legitimate conclusion in and through the premisses1 not by a formal juxta-position of propositions2 though of course such a juxta-position is useful and natural1 both to direct and to verify1 just as in objects of sight our notice of bodily peculiarities1 or the remarks of others may aid us in establishing a case of disputed identity4 ,and1 as this man or that will receive his own impression of one and the same person1 and judge differently from others about his countenance1 its expression1 its moral significance1 its physical contour and complexion1 so an intellectual question may strike two minds very differently1 may awaken in them distinct associations1 may be invested by them in contrary characteristics1 and lead them to opposite conclusions2--and so1 again1 a body of proof1 or a line of argument1 may produce a distinct1 nay1 a dissimilar effect1 as addressed to one or to the other4 ,thus in concrete reasonings we are in great measure thrown back into that condition1 from which logic proposed to rescue us4 ,we judge for ourselves1 by our own lights1 and on our own principles2 and our criterion of truth is not so much the manipulation of propositions1 as the intellectual and moral character of the person maintaining them1 and the ultimate silent effect of his arguments or conclusions upon our minds4 ,it is this distinction between ratiocination as the exercise of a living faculty in the individual intellect1 and mere skill in argumentative science1 which is the true interpretation of the prejudice which exists against logic in the popular mind1 and of the animadversions which are levelled against it1 as that its formulas make a pedant and a doctrinaire1 that it never makes converts1 that it leads to rationalism1 that ,englishmen are too practical to be logical1 that an ounce of common-sense goes farther than many cartloads of logic1 that ,laputa is the land of logicians1 and the like4 ,such maxims mean1 when analyzed1 that the processes of reasoning which legitimately lead to assent1 to action1 to certitude1 are in fact too multiform1 subtle1 omnigenous1 too implicit1 to allow of being measured by rule1 that they are after all personal1--verbal argumentation being useful only in subordination to a higher logic4 ,it is this which was meant by the ,judge who1 when asked for his advice by a friend1 on his being called to important duties which were new to him1 bade him always lay down the law boldly1 but never give his reasons1 for his decision was likely to be right1 but his reasons sure to be unsatisfactory4 ,this is the point which ,i proceed to illustrate4 #a4 ,i will take a question of the present moment4 8,we shall have a ,european war1 for ,greece is audaciously defying ,turkey40 ,how are we to test the validity of the reason1 implied1 not expressed1 in the word 8for08 ,only the judgment of diplomatists1 statesmen1 capitalists1 and the like1 founded on experience1 strengthened by practical and historical knowledge1 controlled by self-interest1 can decide the worth of that 8for0 in relation to accepting or not accepting the conclusion which depends on it4 ,the argument is from concrete fact to concrete fact4 ,how will mere logical inferences1 which cannot proceed without general and abstract propositions1 help us on to the determination of this particular case8 ,it is not the case of ,switzerland attacking ,austria1 or of ,portugal attacking ,spain1 or of ,belgium attacking ,prussia1 but a case without parallels4 ,to draw a scientific conclusion1 the argument must run somewhat in this way3--8,all audacious defiances of ,turkey on the part of ,greece must end in a ,european war2 these present acts of ,greece are such3 ergo20--where the major premiss is more difficult to accept than the conclusion1 and the proof becomes an 8obscurum per obscurius40 ,but1 in truth1 ,i should not betake myself to some one universal proposition to defend my view of the matter2 ,i should determine the particular case by its particular circumstances1 by the combination of many uncatalogued experiences floating in my memory1 of many reflections1 variously produced1 felt rather than capable of statement2 and if ,i had them not1 ,i should go to those who had4 ,i assent in consequence of some such complex act of judgment1 or from faith in those who are capable of making it1 and practically syllogism has no part1 even verificatory1 in the action of my mind4 ,i take this instance at random in illustration2 now let me follow it up by more serious cases4 #b4 ,leighton says1 8,what a full confession do we make of our dissatisfaction with the objects of our bodily senses1 that in our attempts to express what we conceive of the best of beings and the greatest of felicities to be1 we describe by the exact contraries of all that we experience here1--the one as infinite1 incomprehensible1 immutable1 c42 the other as incorruptible1 undefiled1 and that passeth not away4 ,at all events1 this coincidence1 say rather identity of attributes1 is sufficient to apprise us that1 to be inheritors of bliss1 we must become the children of ,god40 ,coleridge quotes this passage1 and adds1 8,another and more fruitful1 perhaps more solid1 inference from the facts would be1 that there is something in the human mind which makes it know that in all finite quantity1 there is an infinite1 in all measures of time an eternal2 that the latter are the basis1 the substance1 of the former2 and that1 as we truly are only as far as ,god is with us1 so neither can we truly possess1 that is1 enjoy our being or any other real good1 but by living in the sense of ,his holy presence47#ac70 ,what is this an argument for8 how few readers will enter into either premiss or conclusion6 and of those who understand what it means1 will not at least some confess that they understand it by fits and starts1 not at all times8 ,can we ascertain its force by mood and figure8 ,is there any royal road by which we may indolently be carried along into the acceptance of it8 ,does not the author rightly number it among his 8aids0 for our 8reflection10 not instruments for our compulsion8 ,it is plain that1 if the passage is worth anything1 we must secure that worth for our own use by the personal action of our own minds1 or else we shall be only professing and asserting its doctrine1 without having any ground or right to assert it4 ,and our preparation for understanding and making use of it will be the general state of our mental discipline and cultivation1 our own experiences1 our appreciation of religious ideas1 the perspicacity and steadiness of our intellectual vision4 #c4 ,it is argued by ,hume against the actual occurrence of the ,jewish and ,christian miracles1 that1 whereas 8it is experience only which gives authority to human testimony1 and it is the same experience which assures us of the laws of nature10 therefore1 8when these two kinds of experience are contrary0 to each other1 8we are bound to subtract the one from the other20 and1 in consequence1 since we have no experience of a violation of natural laws1 and much experience of the violation of truth1 8we may establish it as a maxim that no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle1 and make it a just foundation for any such system of religion40 ,i will accept the general proposition1 but ,i resist its application4 ,doubtless it is abstractedly more likely that men should lie than that the order of nature should be infringed2 but what is abstract reasoning to a question of concrete fact8 ,to arrive at the fact of any matter1 we must eschew generalities1 and take things as they stand1 with all their circumstances4 priori1 of course the acts of men are not so trustworthy as the order of nature1 and the pretence of miracles is in fact more common than the occurrence4 ,but the question is not about miracles in general1 or men in general1 but definitely1 whether these particular miracles1 ascribed to the particular ,peter1 ,james1 and ,john1 are more likely to have been or not2 whether they are unlikely1 supposing that there is a ,power1 external to the world1 who can bring them about2 supposing they are the only means by which ,he can reveal ,himself to those who need a revelation2 supposing ,he is likely to reveal ,himself2 that ,he has a great end in doing so2 that the professed miracles in question are like ,his natural works1 and such as ,he is likely to work1 in case ,he wrought miracles2 that great effects1 otherwise unaccountable1 in the event followed upon the acts said to be miraculous2 that they were from the first accepted as true by large numbers of men against their natural interests2 that the reception of them as true has left its mark upon the world1 as no other event ever did2 that1 viewed in their effects1 they have--that is1 the belief of them has--served to raise human nature to a high moral standard1 otherwise unattainable3 these and the like considerations are parts of a great complex argument1 which so far can be put into propositions1 but which1 even between1 and around1 and behind these1 still is implicit and secret1 and cannot by any ingenuity be imprisoned in a formula1 and packed into a nut-shell4 ,these various conditions may be decided in the affirmative or in the negative4 ,that is a further point2 here ,i only insist upon the nature of the argument1 if it is to be philosophical4 ,it must be no smart antithesis which may look well on paper1 but the living action of the mind on a great problem of fact2 and we must summon to our aid all our powers and resources1 if we would encounter it worthily1 and not as if it were a literary essay4 #d4 8,consider the establishment of the ,christian religion10 says ,pascal in his 8,thoughts40 8,here is a religion contrary to our nature1 which establishes itself in men's minds with so much mildness1 as to use no external force2 with so much energy1 that no tortures could silence its martyrs and confessors2 and consider the holiness1 devotion1 humility of its true disciples2 its sacred books1 their superhuman grandeur1 their admirable simplicity4 ,consider the character of its ,founder2 ,his associates and disciples1 unlettered men1 yet possessed of wisdom sufficient to confound the ablest philosopher2 the astonishing succession of prophets who heralded ,him2 the state at this day of the ,jewish people who rejected ,him and ,his religion2 its perpetuity and its holiness2 the light which its doctrines shed upon the contrarieties of our nature2--after considering these things1 let any man judge if it be possible to doubt about its being the only true one47#ad70 ,this is an argument parallel in its character to that by which we ascribe the classics to the ,augustan age4 ,we urge1 that1 though we cannot draw the line definitely between what the monks could do in literature1 and what they could not1 anyhow ,virgil's 8neid0 and the ,odes of ,horace are far beyond the highest capacity of the medieval mind1 which1 however great1 was different in the character of its endowments4 ,and in like manner we maintain1 that1 granting that we cannot decide how far the human mind can advance by its own unaided powers in religious ideas and sentiments1 and in religious practice1 still the facts of ,christianity1 as they stand1 are beyond what is possible to man1 and betoken the presence of a higher intelligence1 purpose1 and might4 ,many have been converted and sustained in their faith by this argument1 which admits of being powerfully stated2 but still such statement is after all only intended to be a vehicle of thought1 and to open the mind to the apprehension of the facts of the case1 and to trace them and their implications in outline1 not to convince by the logic of its mere wording4 ,do we not think and muse as we read it1 try to master it as we proceed1 put down the book in which we find it1 fill out its details from our own resources1 and then resume the study of it8 ,and1 when we have to give an account of it to others1 should we make use of its language1 or even of its thoughts1 and not rather of its drift and spirit8 ,has it never struck us what different lights different minds throw upon the same theory and argument1 nay1 how they seem to be differing in detail when they are professing1 and in reality showing1 a concurrence in it8 ,have we never found1 that1 when a friend takes up the defence of what we have written or said1 that at first we are unable to recognize in his statement of it what we meant it to convey8 ,it will be our wisdom to avail ourselves of language1 as far as it will go1 but to aim mainly by means of it to stimulate1 in those to whom we address ourselves1 a mode of thinking and trains of thought similar to our own1 leading them on by their own independent action1 not by any syllogistic compulsion4 ,hence it is that an intellectual school will always have something of an esoteric character2 for it is an assemblage of minds that think2 their bond is unity of thought1 and their words become a sort of tessera1 not expressing thought1 but symbolizing it4 ,recurring to ,pascal's argument1 ,i observe that1 its force depending upon the assumption that the facts of ,christianity are beyond human nature1 therefore1 according as the powers of nature are placed at a high or low standard1 that force will be greater or less2 and that standard will vary according to the respective dispositions1 opinions1 and experiences1 of those to whom the argument is addressed4 ,thus its value is a personal question2 not as if there were not an objective truth and ,christianity as a whole not supernatural1 but that1 when we come to consider where it is that the supernatural presence is found1 there may be fair differences of opinion1 both as to the fact and the proof of what is supernatural4 ,there is a multitude of facts1 which1 taken separately1 may perhaps be natural1 but1 found together1 must come from a source above nature2 and what these are1 and how many are necessary1 will be variously determined4 ,and while every inquirer has a right to determine the question according to the best exercise of his judgment1 still whether he so determine it for himself1 or trust in part or altogether to the judgment of those who have the best claim to judge1 in either case he is guided by the implicit processes of the reasoning faculty1 not by any manufacture of arguments forcing their way to an irrefragable conclusion4 #e4 ,pascal writes in another place1 8,he who doubts1 but seeks not to have his doubts removed1 is at once the most criminal and the most unhappy of mortals4 ,if1 together with this1 he is tranquil and self-satisfied1 if he be vain of his tranquillity1 or makes his state a topic of mirth and self-gratulation1 ,i have not words to describe so insane a creature4 ,truly it is to the honour of religion to have for its adversaries men so bereft of reason2 their opposition1 far from being formidable1 bears testimony to its most distinguishing truths2 for the great object of the ,christian religion is to establish the corruption of our nature1 and the redemption by ,jesus ,christ47#ae70 ,elsewhere he says of ,montaigne1 8,he involves everything in such universal1 unmingled scepticism1 as to doubt of his very doubts4 ,he was a pure ,pyrrhonist4 ,he ridicules all attempts at certainty in anything4 ,delighted with exhibiting in his own person the contradictions that exist in the mind of a free-thinker1 it is all one to him whether he is successful or not in his argument4 ,the virtue he loved was simple1 sociable1 gay1 sprightly1 and playful2 to use one of his own expressions1 #8,ignorance and incuriousness are two charming pillows for a sound head4'7#af70 ,here are two celebrated writers in direct opposition to each other in their fundamental view of truth and duty4 ,shall we say that there is no such thing as truth and error1 but that anything is truth to a man which he troweth8 and not rather1 as the solution of a great mystery1 that truth there is1 and attainable it is1 but that its rays stream in upon us through the medium of our moral as well as our intellectual being2 and that in consequence that perception of its first principles which is natural to us is enfeebled1 obstructed1 perverted1 by allurements of sense and the supremacy of self1 and1 on the other hand1 quickened by aspirations after the supernatural2 so that at length two characters of mind are brought out into shape1 and two standards and systems of thought1--each logical1 when analyzed1 yet contradictory of each other1 and only not antagonistic because they have no common ground on which they can conflict8 #f4 ,montaigne was endowed with a good estate1 health1 leisure1 and an easy temper1 literary tastes1 and a sufficiency of books3 he could afford thus to play with life1 and the abysses into which it leads us4 ,let us take a case in contrast4 8,i think10 says the poor dying factory-girl in the tale1 8if this should be the end of all1 and if all ,i have been born for is just to work my heart and life away1 and to sicken in this dree place1 with those mill-stones in my ears for ever1 until ,i could scream out for them to stop and let me have a little piece of quiet1 and with the fluff filling my lungs1 until ,i thirst to death for one long deep breath of the clear air1 and my mother gone1 and ,i never able to tell her again how ,i loved her1 and of all my troubles1--,i think1 if this life is the end1 and that there is no ,god to wipe away all tears from all eyes1 ,i could go mad67#ag70 ,here is an argument for the immortality of the soul4 ,as to its force1 be it great or small1 will it make a figure in a logical disputation1 carried on secundum artem8 ,can any scientific common measure compel the intellects of ,dives and ,lazarus to take the same estimate of it8 ,is there any test of the validity of it better than the ipse dixit of private judgment1 that is1 the judgment of those who have a right to judge1 and next1 the agreement of many private judgments in one and the same view of it8 #g4 8,in order to prove plainly and intelligibly10 says ,dr4 ,samuel ,clarke1 8that ,god is a ,being1 which must of necessity be endued with perfect knowledge1 'tis to be observed that knowledge is a perfection1 without which the foregoing attributes are no perfections at all1 and without which those which follow can have no foundation4 ,where there is no ,knowledge1 ,eternity and ,immensity are as nothing1 and ,justice1 ,goodness1 ,mercy1 and ,wisdom can have no place4 ,the idea of eternity and omnipresence1 devoid of knowledge1 is as the notion of darkness compared with that of light4 ',tis as a notion of the world without the sun to illuminate it2 'tis as the notion of inanimate matter 7which is the atheist's supreme cause7 compared with that of light and spirit4 ,and as for the following attributes of ,justice1 ,goodness1 ,mercy1 and ,wisdom1 'tis evident that without knowledge there could not possibly be any such things as these at all47#ah70 ,the argument here used in behalf of the ,divine ,attribute of ,knowledge comes under the general proposition that the attributes imply each other1 for the denial of one is the denial of the rest4 ,to some minds this thesis is self-evident2 others are utterly insensible to its force4 ,will it bear bringing out into words throughout the whole series of its argumentative links8 for if it does1 then either those who maintain it or those who reject it1 the one or the other1 will be compelled by logical necessity to confess that they are in error4 8,god is wise1 if ,he is eternal2 ,he is good1 if ,he is wise2 ,he is just1 if ,he is good40 ,what skill can so arrange these propositions1 so add to them1 so combine them1 that they may be able1 by the force of their juxta-position1 to follow one from the other1 and become one and the same by an inevitable correlation4 ,that is not the method by which the argument becomes a demonstration4 ,such a method1 used by a ,theist in controversy against men who are unprepared personally for the question1 will but issue in his retreat along a series of major propositions1 farther and farther back1 till he and they find themselves in a land of shadows1 8where the light is as darkness40 ,to feel the true force of an argument like this1 we must not confine ourselves to abstractions1 and merely compare notion with notion1 but we must contemplate the ,god of our conscience as a ,living ,being1 as one ,object and ,reality1 under the aspect of this or that attribute4 ,we must patiently rest in the thought of the ,eternal1 ,omnipresent1 and ,all-knowing1 rather than of ,eternity1 ,omnipresence1 and ,omniscience2 and we must not hurry on and force a series of deductions1 which1 if they are to be realized1 must distil like dew into our minds1 and form themselves spontaneously there1 by a calm contemplation and gradual understanding of their premisses4 ,ordinarily speaking1 such deductions do not flow forth1 except according as the ,image17#ai7 presented to us through conscience1 on which they depend1 is cherished within us with the sentiments which1 supposing it be1 as we know it is1 the truth1 it necessarily claims of us1 and is seen reflected1 by the habit of our intellect1 in the appointments and the events of the external world4 ,and1 in their manifestation to our inward sense1 they are analogous to the knowledge which we at length attain of the details of a landscape1 after we have selected the right stand-point1 and have learned to accommodate the pupil of our eye to the varying focus necessary for seeing them2 have accustomed it to the glare of light1 have mentally grouped or discriminated lines and shadows and given them their due meaning1 and have mastered the perspective of the whole4 ,or they may be compared to a landscape as drawn by the pencil 7unless the illustration seem forced71 in which by the skill of the artist1 amid the bold outlines of trees and rocks1 when the eye has learned to take in their reverse aspects1 the forms or faces of historical personages are discernible1 which we catch and lose again1 and then recover1 and which some who look on with us are never able to catch at all4 ,analogous to such an exercise of sight1 must be our mode of dealing with the verbal expositions of an argument such as ,clarke's4 ,his words speak to those who understand the speech4 ,to the mere barren intellect they are but the pale ghosts of notions2 but the trained imagination sees in them the representations of things4 ,he who has once detected in his conscience the outline of a ,lawgiver and ,judge1 needs no definition of ,him1 whom he dimly but surely contemplates there1 and he rejects the mechanism of logic1 which cannot contain in its grasp matters so real and so recondite4 ,such a one1 according to the strength and perspicacity of his mind1 the force of his presentiments1 and his power of sustained attention1 is able to pronounce about the great ,sight which encompasses him1 as about some visible object2 and1 in his investigation of the ,divine ,attributes1 is not inferring abstraction from abstraction1 but noting down the aspects and phases of that one thing on which he ever is gazing4 ,nor is it possible to limit the depth of meaning1 which at length he will attach to words1 which to the many are but definitions and ideas4 ,here then again1 as in the other instances1 it seems clear1 that methodical processes of inference1 useful as they are1 as far as they go1 are only instruments of the mind1 and need1 in order to their due exercise1 that real ratiocination and present imagination which gives them a sense beyond their letter1 and which1 while acting through them1 reaches to conclusions beyond and above them4 ,such a living organon is a personal gift1 and not a mere method or calculus4 #c4 ,that there are cases1 in which evidence1 not sufficient for a scientific proof1 is nevertheless sufficient for assent and certitude1 is the doctrine of ,locke1 as of most men4 ,he tells us that belief1 grounded on sufficient probabilities1 8rises to assurance20 and as to the question of sufficiency1 that where propositions 8border near on certainty10 then 8we assent to them as firmly as if they were infallibly demonstrated40 ,the only question is1 what these propositions are3 this he does not tell us1 but he seems to think that they are few in number1 and will be without any trouble recognized at once by common-sense2 whereas1 unless ,i am mistaken1 they are to be found throughout the range of concrete matter1 and that supra-logical judgment1 which is the warrant for our certitude about them1 is not mere common-sense1 but the true healthy action of our ratiocinative powers1 an action more subtle and more comprehensive than the mere appreciation of a syllogistic argument4 ,it is often called the 8judicium prudentis viri10 a standard of certitude which holds good in all concrete matter1 not only in those cases of practice and duty1 in which we are more familiar with it1 but in questions of truth and falsehood generally1 or in what are called 8speculative0 questions1 and that1 not indeed to the exclusion1 but as the supplement of logic4 ,thus a proof1 except in abstract demonstration1 has always in it1 more or less1 an element of the personal1 because 8prudence0 is not a constituent part of our nature1 but a personal endowment4 ,and the language in common use1 when concrete conclusions are in question1 implies the presence of this personal element in the proof of them4 ,we are considered to feel1 rather than to see1 its cogency2 and we decide1 not that the conclusion must be1 but that it cannot be otherwise4 ,we say1 that we do not see our way to doubt it1 that it is impossible to doubt1 that we are bound to believe it1 that we should be idiots1 if we did not believe4 ,we never should say1 in abstract science1 that we could not escape the conclusion that #be was a mean proportional between #e and #abe2 or that a man had no right to say that a tangent to a circle at the extremity of the radius makes an acute angle with it4 ,yet1 though our certitude of the fact is quite as clear1 we should not think it unnatural to say that the insularity of ,great ,britain is as good as demonstrated1 or that none but a fool expects never to die4 ,phrases indeed such as these are sometimes used to express a shade of doubt1 but it is enough for my purpose if they are also used when doubt is altogether absent4 ,what1 then1 they signify1 is1 what ,i have so much insisted on1 that we have arrived at these conclusions--not ex opere operato1 by a scientific necessity independent of ourselves1--but by the action of our own minds1 by our own individual perception of the truth in question1 under a sense of duty to those conclusions and with an intellectual conscientiousness4 ,this certitude and this evidence are often called moral2 a word which ,i avoid1 as having a very vague meaning2 but using it here for once1 ,i observe that moral evidence and moral certitude are all that we can attain1 not only in the case of ethical and spiritual subjects1 such as religion1 but of terrestrial and cosmical questions also4 ,so far1 physical ,astronomy and ,revelation stand on the same footing4 ,vince1 in his treatise on ,astronomy1 does but use the language of philosophical sobriety1 when1 after speaking of the proofs of the earth's rotatory motion1 he says1 8,when these reasons1 all upon different principles1 are considered1 they amount to a proof of the earth's rotation about its axis1 which is as satisfactory to the mind as the most direct demonstration could be20 or1 as he had said just before1 8the mind rests equally satisfied1 as if the matter was strictly proved47#bj70 ,that is1 first there is no demonstration that the earth rotates2 next there is a cluster of 8reasons on different principles10 that is1 independent probabilities in cumulation2 thirdly1 these 8amount to a proof10 and 8the mind0 feels 8as if the matter was strictly proved10 that is1 there is the equivalent of proof2 lastly1 8the mind rests satisfied10 that is1 it is certain on the point4 ,and though evidence of the fact is now obtained which was not known fifty years ago1 that evidence on the whole has not changed its character4 ,compare with this avowal the language of ,butler1 when discussing the proof of ,revelation4 8,probable proofs10 he says1 8by being added1 not only increase the evidence1 but multiply it4 ,the truth of our religion1 like the truth of common matters1 is to be judged by the whole evidence taken together 444 in like manner as1 if in any common case numerous events acknowledged were to be alleged in proof of any other event disputed1 the truth of the disputed event would be proved1 not only if any one of the acknowledged ones did of itself clearly imply it1 but though no one of them singly did so1 if the whole of the acknowledged events taken together could not in reason be supposed to have happened1 unless the disputed one were true47#ba70 ,here1 as in ,astronomy1 is the same absence of demonstration of the thesis1 the same cumulating and converging indications of it1 the same indirectness in the proof1 as being per impossibile1 the same recognition nevertheless that the conclusion is not only probable1 but true4 ,one other characteristic of the argumentative process is given1 which is unnecessary in a subject-matter so clear and simple as astronomical science1 viz4 the moral state of the parties inquiring or disputing4 ,they must be 8as much in earnest about religion1 as about their temporal affairs1 capable of being convinced1 on real evidence1 that there is a ,god who governs the world1 and feel themselves to be of a moral nature and accountable creatures47#bb70 ,this being the state of the case1 the question arises1 whether1 granting that the personality 7so to speak7 of the parties reasoning is an important element in proving propositions in concrete matter1 any account can be given of the ratiocinative method in such proofs1 over and above that analysis into syllogism which is possible in each of its steps in detail4 ,i think there can2 though ,i fear1 lest to some minds it may appear far-fetched or fanciful2 however1 ,i will hazard this imputation4 ,i consider1 then1 that the principle of concrete reasoning is parallel to the method of proof which is the foundation of modern mathematical science1 as contained in the celebrated lemma with which ,newton opens his 8,principia40 ,we know that a regular polygon1 inscribed in a circle1 its sides being continually diminished1 tends to become that circle1 as its limit2 but it vanishes before it has coincided with the circle1 so that its tendency to be the circle1 though ever nearer fulfilment1 never in fact gets beyond a tendency4 ,in like manner1 the conclusion in a real or concrete question is foreseen and predicted rather than actually attained2 foreseen in the number and direction of accumulated premisses1 which all converge to it1 and approach it1 as the result of their combination1 more nearly than any assignable difference1 yet do not touch it logically1 7though only not touching it17 on account of the nature of its subject-matter1 and the delicate and implicit character of at least part of the reasonings on which it depends4 ,it is by the strength1 variety1 or multiplicity of premisses1 which are only probable1 not by invincible syllogisms1--by objections overcome1 by adverse theories neutralized1 by difficulties gradually clearing up1 by exceptions proving the rule1 by unlooked-for correlations found with received truths1 by suspense and delay in the process issuing in triumphant reactions1--by all these ways1 and many others1 the practised and experienced mind is able to make a sure divination that a conclusion is inevitable1 of which his lines of reasoning do not actually put him in possession4 ,this is what is meant by a proposition being 8as good as proved10 a conclusion as undeniable 8as if it were proved10 and by the reasons for it 8amounting to a proof10 for a proof is the limit of converging probabilities4 ,it may be added1 that1 whereas the logical form of this argument1 is1 as ,i have already observed1 indirect1 viz4 that 8the conclusion cannot be otherwise10 and ,butler says that an event is proved1 if its antecedents 8could not in reason be supposed to have happened unless it were true10 and law-books tell us that the principle of circumstantial evidence is the reductio ad absurdum1 so ,newton is forced to the same mode of proof for the establishment of his lemma1 about prime and ultimate ratios4 8,if you deny that they become ultimately equal10 he says1 8let them be ultimately unequal20 and the consequence follows1 8which is against the supposition40 ,such being the character of the mental process in concrete reasoning1 ,i should wish to adduce some good instances of it in illustration1 instances in which the person reasoning confesses that he is reasoning on this very process1 as ,i have been stating it2 but these are difficult to find1 from the very circumstance that the process from first to last is carried on as much without words as with them4 ,however1 ,i will set down three such4 #a4 ,first1 an instance in physics4 ,wood1 treating of the laws of motion1 thus describes the line of reasoning by which the mind is certified of them4 8,they are not indeed self-evident1 nor do they admit of accurate proof by experiment1 on account of the effects of friction and the air's resistance1 which cannot entirely be removed4 ,they are1 however1 constantly and invariably suggested to our senses1 and they agree with experiment1 as far as experiment can go2 and the more accurately the experiments are made1 and the greater care we take to remove all those impediments which tend to render the conclusions erroneous1 the more nearly do the experiments coincide with these laws4 8,their truth is also established upon a different ground3 from these general principles innumerable particular conclusions have been deducted2 sometimes the deductions are simple and immediate1 sometimes they are made by tedious and intricate operations2 yet they are all1 without exception1 consistent with each other and with experiment4 ,it follows thereby1 that the principles upon which the calculations are founded are true47#bc70 ,the reasoning of this passage 7in which the uniformity of the laws of nature is assumed7 seems to me a good illustration of what must be considered the principle or form of an induction4 ,the conclusion1 which is its scope1 is1 by its own confession1 not proved2 but it ought to be proved1 or is as good as proved1 and a man would be irrational who did not take it to be virtually proved2 first1 because the imperfections in the proof arise out of its subject-matter and the nature of the case1 so that it is proved interpretativ2 and next1 because in the same degree in which these faults in the subject-matter are overcome here or there1 are the involved imperfections here or there of the proof remedied2 and further1 because1 when the conclusion is assumed as an hypothesis1 it throws light upon a multitude of collateral facts1 accounting for them1 and uniting them together in one whole4 ,consistency is not always the guarantee of truth2 but there may be a consistency in a theory so variously tried and exemplified as to lead to belief in it1 as reasonably as a witness in a court of law may1 after a severe cross-examination1 satisfy and assure judge1 jury1 and the whole court1 of his simple veracity4 #b4 ,and from the courts of law shall my second illustration be taken4 ,a learned writer says1 8,in criminal prosecutions1 the circumstantial evidence should be such1 as to produce nearly the same degree of certainty as that which arises from direct testimony1 and to exclude a rational probability of innocence47#bd70 ,by degrees of certainty he seems to mean1 together with many other writers1 degrees of proof1 or approximations towards proof1 and not certitude1 as a state of mind2 and he says that no one should be pronounced guilty on evidence which is not equivalent in weight to direct testimony4 ,so far is clear2 but what is meant by the expression 8rational probability08 for there can be no probability but what is rational4 ,i consider that the 8exclusion of a rational probability0 means 8the exclusion of any argument in the man's favour which has a rational claim to be called probable10 or rather1 8the rational exclusion of any supposition that he is innocent20 and 8rational0 is used in contradistinction to argumentative1 and means 8resting on implicit reasons10 such as we feel1 indeed1 but which for some cause or other1 because they are too subtle or too circuitous1 we cannot put into words so as to satisfy logic4 ,if this is a correct account of his meaning1 he says that the evidence against a criminal1 in order to be decisive of his guilt1 to the satisfaction of our conscience1 must bear with it1 along with the palpable arguments for that guilt1 such a reasonableness1 or body of implicit reasons for it in addition1 as may exclude any probability1 really such1 that he is not guilty1--that is1 it must be an evidence free from anything obscure1 suspicious1 unnatural1 or defective1 such as 7in the judgment of a prudent man7 to hinder that summation or coalescence of the evidence into a proof1 which ,i have compared to the running into a limit1 in the case of mathematical ratios4 ,just as an algebraical series may be of a nature never to terminate or admit of valuation1 as being the equivalent of an irrational quantity or surd1 so there may be some grave imperfections in a body of reasons1 explicit or implicit1 which is directed to a proof1 sufficient to interfere with its successful issue or resolution1 and to balk us with an irrational1 that is1 an indeterminate1 conclusion4 ,so much as to the principle of conclusions made upon evidence in criminal cases2 now let us turn to an instance of its application in a particular instance4 ,some years ago there was a murder committed1 which unusually agitated the popular mind1 and the evidence against the culprit was necessarily circumstantial4 ,at the trial the ,judge1 in addressing the ,jury1 instructed them on the kind of evidence necessary for a verdict of guilty4 ,of course he could not mean to say that they must convict a man1 of whose guilt they were not certain1 especially in a case in which two foreign countries1 ,germany and the ,american ,states1 were attentively looking on4 ,if the ,jury had any doubt1 that is1 reasonable doubt1 about the man's guilt1 of course they would give him the benefit of that doubt4 ,nor could the certitude1 which would be necessary for an adverse verdict1 be merely that which is sometimes called a 8practical certitude10 that is1 a certitude indeed1 but a certitude that it was a 8duty10 8expedient10 8safe10 to bring in a verdict of guilty4 ,of course the ,judge spoke of what is called a 8speculative certitude10 that is1 a certitude of the fact that the man was guilty2 the only question being1 what evidence was sufficient for the proof1 for the certitude of that fact4 ,this is what the ,judge meant2 and these are among the remarks which1 with this drift1 he made upon the occasion3-- ,after observing that by circumstantial evidence he meant a case in which 8the facts do not directly prove the actual crime1 but lead to the conclusion that the prisoner committed that crime10 he went on to disclaim the suggestion1 made by counsel in the case1 that the ,jury could not pronounce a verdict of guilty1 unless they were as much satisfied that the prisoner did the deed as if they had seen him commit it4 8,that is not the certainty10 he said1 8which is required of you to discharge your duty to the prisoner1 whose safety is in your hands40 ,then he stated what was the 8degree of certainty10 that is1 of certainty or perfection of proof1 which was necessary to the question1 8involving as it did the life of the prisoner at the bar10--it was such as that 8with which10 he said1 8you decide upon and conclude your own most important transactions in life4 ,take the facts which are proved before you1 separate those you believe from those which you do not believe1 and all the conclusions that naturally and almost necessarily result from those facts1 you may confide in as much as in the facts themselves4 ,the case on the part of the prosecution is the story of the murder1 told by the different witnesses1 who unfold the circumstances one after another1 according to their occurrence1 together with the gradual discovery of some apparent connexion between the property that was lost1 and the possession of it by the prisoner40 ,now here ,i observe1 that whereas the conclusion which is contemplated by the ,judge1 is what may be pronounced 7on the whole1 and considering all things1 and judging reasonably7 a proved or certain conclusion1 that is1 a conclusion of the truth of the allegation against the prisoner1 or of the fact of his guilt1 on the other hand1 the motiva constituting this reasonable1 rational proof1 and this satisfactory certitude1 needed not1 according to him1 to be stronger than those on which we prudently act on matters of important interest to ourselves1 that is1 probable reasons viewed in their convergence and combination4 ,and whereas the certitude is viewed by the ,judge as following on converging probabilities1 which constitute a real1 though only a reasonable1 not an argumentative1 proof1 so it will be observed in this particular instance1 that1 in illustration of the general doctrine which ,i have laid down1 the process is one of 8line upon line1 and letter upon letter10 of various details accumulating and of deductions fitting in to each other2 for1 in the ,judge's words1 there was a story--and that not told right out and by one witness1 but taken up and handed on from witness to witness--gradually unfolded1 and tending to a proof1 which of course might have been ten times stronger than it was1 but was still a proof for all that1 and sufficient for its conclusion1--just as we see that two straight lines are meeting1 and are certain they will meet at a given distance1 though we do not actually see the junction4 #c4 ,the third instance ,i will take is one of a literary character1 the divination of the authorship of a certain anonymous publication1 as suggested mainly by internal evidence1 as ,i find it in a critique written some twenty years ago4 ,in the extract which ,i make from it1 we may observe the same steady march of a proof towards a conclusion1 which is 7as it were7 out of sight2--a reckoning1 or a reasonable judgment1 that the conclusion really is proved1 and a personal certitude upon that judgment1 joined with a confession that a logical argument could not well be made out for it1 and that the various details in which the proof consisted were in no small measure implicit and impalpable4 8,rumour speaks uniformly and clearly enough in attributing it to the pen of a particular individual4 ,nor1 although a cursory reader might well skim the book without finding in it anything to suggest1 c41 444 will it appear improbable to the more attentive student of its internal evidence2 and the improbability will decrease more and more1 in proportion as the reader is capable of judging and appreciating the delicate1 and at first invisible touches1 which limit1 to those who understand them1 the individuals who can have written it to a very small number indeed4 ,the utmost scepticism as to its authorship 7which we do not feel ourselves7 cannot remove it farther from him than to that of some one among his most intimate friends2 so that1 leaving others to discuss antecedent probabilities10 c4 ,here is a writer who professes to have no doubt at all about the authorship of a book1--which at the same time he cannot prove by mere argumentation set down in words4 ,the reasons of his conviction are too delicate1 too intricate2 nay1 they are in part invisible2 invisible1 except to those who from circumstances have an intellectual perception of what does not appear to the many4 ,they are personal to the individual4 ,this again is an instance1 distinctly set before us1 of the particular mode in which the mind progresses in concrete matter1 viz4 from merely probable antecedents to the sufficient proof of a fact or a truth1 and1 after the proof1 to an act of certitude about it4 ,i trust the foregoing remarks may not deserve the blame of a needless refinement4 ,i have thought it incumbent on me to illustrate the intellectual process by which we pass from conditional inference to unconditional assent2 and ,i have had only the alternative of lying under the imputation of a paradox or of a subtlety4 #c4 ,natural ,inference4 ,i commenced my remarks upon ,inference by saying that reasoning ordinarily shows as a simple act1 not as a process1 as if there were no medium interposed between antecedent and consequent1 and the transition from one to the other were of the nature of an instinct1--that is1 the process is altogether unconscious and implicit4 ,it is necessary1 then1 to take some notice of this natural or material ,inference1 as an existing phenomenon of mind2 and that the more1 because ,i shall thereby be illustrating and supporting what ,i have been saying of the characteristics of inferential processes as carried on in concrete matter1 and especially of their being the action of the mind itself1 that is1 by its ratiocinative or illative faculty1 not a mere operation as in the rules of arithmetic4 ,i say1 then1 that our most natural mode of reasoning is1 not from propositions to propositions1 but from things to things1 from concrete to concrete1 from wholes to wholes4 ,whether the consequents1 at which we arrive from the antecedents with which we start1 lead us to assent or only towards assent1 those antecedents commonly are not recognized by us as subjects for analysis2 nay1 often are only indirectly recognized as antecedents at all4 ,not only is the inference with its process ignored1 but the antecedent also4 ,to the mind itself the reasoning is a simple divination or prediction2 as it literally is in the instance of enthusiasts1 who mistake their own thoughts for inspirations4 ,this is the mode in which we ordinarily reason1 dealing with things directly1 and as they stand1 one by one1 in the concrete1 with an intrinsic and personal power1 not a conscious adoption of an artificial instrument or expedient2 and it is especially exemplified both in uneducated men1 and in men of genius1--in those who know nothing of intellectual aids and rules1 and in those who care nothing for them1--in those who are either without or above mental discipline4 ,as true poetry is a spontaneous outpouring of thought1 and therefore belongs to rude as well as to gifted minds1 whereas no one becomes a poet merely by the canons of criticism1 so this unscientific reasoning1 being sometimes a natural1 uncultivated faculty1 sometimes approaching to a gift1 sometimes an acquired habit and second nature1 has a higher source than logical rule1--8nascitur1 non fit40 ,when it is characterized by precision1 subtlety1 promptitude1 and truth1 it is of course a gift and a rarity3 in ordinary minds it is biassed and degraded by prejudice1 passion1 and self-interest2 but still1 after all1 this divination comes by nature1 and belongs to all of us in a measure1 to women more than to men1 hitting or missing1 as the case may be1 but with a success on the whole sufficient to show that there is a method in it1 though it be implicit4 ,a peasant who is weather-wise may be simply unable to assign intelligible reasons why he thinks it will be fine to-morrow2 and if he attempts to do so1 he may give reasons wide of the mark2 but that will not weaken his own confidence in his prediction4 ,his mind does not proceed step by step1 but he feels all at once the force of various combined phenomena1 though he is not conscious of them4 ,again1 there are physicians who excel in the diagnosis of complaints2 though it does not follow from this1 that they could defend their decision in a particular case against a brother physician who disputed it4 ,they are guided by natural acuteness and varied experience2 they have their own idiosyncratic modes of observing1 generalizing1 and concluding2 when questioned1 they can but rest on their own authority1 or appeal to the future event4 ,in a popular novel17#be7 a lawyer is introduced1 who 8would know1 almost by instinct1 whether an accused person was or was not guilty2 and he had already perceived by instinct0 that the heroine was guilty4 8,i've no doubt she's a clever woman10 he said1 and at once named an attorney practising at the ,old ,bailey4 ,so1 again1 experts and detectives1 when employed to investigate mysteries1 in cases whether of the civil or criminal law1 discern and follow out indications which promise solution with a sagacity incomprehensible to ordinary men4 ,a parallel gift is the intuitive perception of character possessed by certain men1 while others are as destitute of it1 as others again are of an ear for music4 ,what common measure is there between the judgments of those who have this intuition1 and those who have not8 ,what but the event can settle any difference of opinion which occurs in their estimation of a third person8 ,these are instances of a natural capacity1 or of nature improved by practice and habit1 enabling the mind to pass promptly from one set of facts to another1 not only1 ,i say1 without conscious media1 but without conscious antecedents4 ,sometimes1 ,i say1 this illative faculty is nothing short of genius4 ,such seems to have been ,newton's perception of truths mathematical and physical1 though proof was absent4 ,at least that is the impression left on my own mind by various stories which are told of him1 one of which was stated in the public papers a few years ago4 8,professor ,sylvester10 it was said1 8has just discovered the proof of ,sir ,isaac ,newton's rule for ascertaining the imaginary roots of equations4444 ,this rule has been a ,gordian-knot among algebraists for the last century and a half4 ,the proof being wanting1 authors became ashamed at length of advancing a proposition1 the evidence for which rested on no other foundation than belief in ,newton's sagacity47#bf70 ,such is the gift of the calculating boys who now and then make their appearance1 who seem to have certain short-cuts to conclusions1 which they cannot explain to themselves4 ,some are said to have been able to determine off-hand what numbers are prime1--numbers1 ,i think1 up to seven places4 ,in a very different subject-matter1 ,napoleon supplies us with an instance of a parallel genius in reasoning1 by which he was enabled to look at things in his own province1 and to interpret them truly1 apparently without any ratiocinative media4 8,by long experience10 says ,alison1 8joined to great natural quickness and precision of eye1 he had acquired the power of judging1 with extraordinary accuracy1 both of the amount of the enemy's force opposed to him in the field1 and of the probable result of the movements1 even the most complicated1 going forward in the opposite armies4444 ,he looked around him for a little while with his telescope1 and immediately formed a clear conception of the position1 forces1 and intention of the whole hostile array4 ,in this way he could1 with surprising accuracy1 calculate in a few minutes1 according to what he could see of their formation and the extent of the ground which they occupied1 the numerical force of armies of #fj1jjj or #hj1jjj men2 and if their troops were at all scattered1 he knew at once how long it would require for them to concentrate1 and how many hours must elapse before they could make their attack47#bg70 ,it is difficult to avoid calling such clear presentiments by the name of instinct2 and ,i think they may so be called1 if by instinct be understood1 not a natural sense1 one and the same in all1 and incapable of cultivation1 but a perception of facts without assignable media of perceiving4 ,there are those who can tell at once what is conducive or injurious to their welfare1 who are their friends1 who their enemies1 what is to happen to them1 and how they are to meet it4 ,presence of mind1 fathoming of motives1 talent for repartee1 are instances of this gift4 ,as to that divination of personal danger which is found in the young and innocent1 we find a description of it in one of ,scott's romances1 in which the heroine1 8without being able to discover what was wrong either in the scenes of unusual luxury with which she was surrounded1 or in the manner of her hostess10 is said nevertheless to have felt 8an instinctive apprehension that all was not right1--a feeling in the human mind10 the author proceeds to say1 8allied perhaps to that sense of danger1 which animals exhibit1 when placed in the vicinity of the natural enemies of their race1 and which makes birds cower when the hawk is in the air1 and beasts tremble when the tiger is abroad in the desert47#bh70 ,a religious biography1 lately published1 affords us an instance of this spontaneous perception of truth in the province of revealed doctrine4 8,her firm faith10 says the ,author of the ,preface1 8was so vivid in its character1 that it was almost like an intuition of the entire prospect of revealed truth4 ,let an error against faith be concealed under expressions however abstruse1 and her sure instinct found it out4 ,i have tried this experiment repeatedly4 ,she might not be able to separate the heresy by analysis1 but she saw1 and felt1 and suffered from its presence47#bi70 ,and so of the great fundamental truths of religion1 natural and revealed1 and as regards the mass of religious men3 these truths1 doubtless1 may be proved and defended by an array of invincible logical arguments1 but such is not commonly the method in which those same logical arguments make their way into our minds4 ,the grounds1 on which we hold the divine origin of the ,church1 and the previous truths which are taught us by nature--the being of a ,god1 and the immortality of the soul--are felt by most men to be recondite and impalpable1 in proportion to their depth and reality4 ,as we cannot see ourselves1 so we cannot well see intellectual motives which are so intimately ours1 and which spring up from the very constitution of our minds2 and while we refuse to admit the notion that religion has not irrefragable arguments in its behalf1 still the attempts to argue1 on the part of an individual hic et nunc1 will sometimes only confuse his apprehension of sacred objects1 and subtracts from his devotion quite as much as it adds to his knowledge4 ,this is found in the case of other perceptions besides that of faith4 ,it is the case of nature against art3 of course1 if possible1 nature and art should be combined1 but sometimes they are incompatible4 ,thus1 in the case of calculating boys1 it is said1 ,i know not with what truth1 that to teach them the ordinary rules of arithmetic is to endanger or to destroy the extraordinary endowment4 ,and men who have the gift of playing on an instrument by ear1 are sometimes afraid to learn by rule1 lest they should lose it4 ,there is an analogy1 in this respect1 between ,ratiocination and ,memory1 though the latter may be exercised without antecedents or media1 whereas the former requires them in its very idea4 ,at the same time association has so much to do with memory1 that we may not unfairly consider that memory1 as well as reasoning1 depends on certain previous conditions4 ,writing1 as ,i have already observed1 is a memoria technica1 or logic of memory4 ,now it will be found1 ,i think1 that indispensable as is the use of letters1 still1 in fact1 we weaken our memory in proportion as we habituate ourselves to commit all that we wish to remember to memorandums4 ,of course in proportion as our memory is weak or over-burdened1 and thereby treacherous1 we cannot help ourselves2 but in the case of men of strong memory in any particular subject-matter1 as in that of dates1 all artificial expedients1 from the 8,thirty days has ,september10 c41 to the more formidable formulas which are offered for their use1 are as difficult and repulsive as the natural exercise of memory is healthy and easy to them2 just as the clear-headed and practical reasoner1 who sees conclusions at a glance1 is uncomfortable under the drill of a logician1 being oppressed and hampered1 as ,david in ,saul's armour1 by what is intended to be a benefit4 ,i need not say more on this part of the subject4 ,what is called reasoning is often only a peculiar and personal mode of abstraction1 and so far1 like memory1 may be said to exist without antecedents4 ,it is a power of looking at things in some particular aspect1 and of determining their internal and external relations thereby4 ,and according to the subtlety and versatility of their gift1 are men able to read what comes before them justly1 variously1 and fruitfully4 ,hence1 too1 it is1 that in our intercourse with others1 in business and family matters1 in social and political transactions1 a word or an act on the part of another is sometimes a sudden revelation2 light breaks in upon us1 and our whole judgment of a course of events1 or of an undertaking1 is changed4 ,we determine correctly or otherwise1 as it may be2 but in either case1 by a sense proper to ourselves1 for another may see the objects which we are thus using1 and give them quite a different interpretation1 inasmuch as he abstracts another set of general notions from those same phenomena which present themselves to us4 ,what ,i have been saying of ,ratiocination1 may be said of ,taste1 and is confirmed by the obvious analogy between the two4 ,taste1 skill1 invention in the fine arts--and so1 again1 discretion or judgment in conduct--are exerted spontaneously1 when once acquired1 and could not give a clear account of themselves1 or of their mode of proceeding4 ,they do not go by rule1 though to a certain point their exercise may be analyzed1 and may take the shape of an art or method4 ,but these parallels will come before us presently4 ,and now ,i come to a further peculiarity of this natural and spontaneous ratiocination4 ,this faculty1 as it is actually found in us1 proceeding from concrete to concrete1 belongs to a definite subject-matter1 according to the individual4 ,in spite of ,aristotle1 ,i will not allow that genuine reasoning is an instrumental art2 and in spite of ,dr4 ,johnson1 ,i will assert that genius1 as far as it is manifested in ratiocination1 is not equal to all undertakings1 but has its own peculiar subject-matter1 and is circumscribed in its range4 ,no one would for a moment expect that because ,newton and ,napoleon both had a genius for ratiocination1 that1 in consequence1 ,napoleon could have generalized the principle of gravitation1 or ,newton have seen how to concentrate a hundred thousand men at ,austerlitz4 ,the ratiocinative faculty1 then1 as found in individuals1 is not a general instrument of knowledge1 but has its province1 or is what may be called departmental4 ,it is not so much one faculty1 as a collection of similar or analogous faculties under one name1 there being really as many faculties as there are distinct subject-matters1 though in the same person some of them may1 if it so happen1 be united1--nay1 though some men have a sort of literary power in arguing in all subject-matters1 de omni scibili1 a power extensive1 but not deep or real4 ,this surely is the conclusion1 to which we are brought by our ordinary experience of men4 ,it is almost proverbial that a hard-headed mathematician may have no head at all for what is called historical evidence4 ,successful experimentalists need not have talent for legal research or pleading4 ,a shrewd man of business may be a bad arguer in philosophical questions4 ,able statesmen and politicians have been before now eccentric or superstitious in their religious views4 ,it is notorious how ridiculous a clever man may make himself1 who ventures to argue with professed theologians1 critics1 or geologists1 though without positive defects in knowledge of his subject4 ,priestley1 great in electricity and chemistry1 was but a poor ecclesiastical historian4 ,the ,author of the ,minute ,philosopher is also the ,author of the ,analyst4 ,newton wrote not only his 8,principia10 but his comments on the ,apocalypse2 ,cromwell1 whose actions savoured of the boldest logic1 was a confused speaker4 ,in these1 and various similar instances1 the defect lay1 not so much in an ignorance of facts1 as in an inability to handle those facts suitably2 in feeble or perverse modes of abstraction1 observation1 comparison1 analysis1 inference1 which nothing could have obviated1 but that which was wanting1--a specific talent1 and a ready exercise of it4 ,i have already referred to the faculty of memory in illustration2 it will serve me also here4 ,we can form an abstract idea of memory1 and call it one faculty1 which has for its subject-matter all past facts of our personal experience2 but this is really only an illusion2 for there is no such gift of universal memory4 ,of course we all remember1 in a way1 as we reason1 in all subject-matters2 but ,i am speaking of remembering rightly1 as ,i spoke of reasoning rightly4 ,in real fact memory1 as a talent1 is not one indivisible faculty1 but a power of retaining and recalling the past in this or that department of our experience1 not in any whatever4 ,two memories1 which are both specially retentive1 may also be incommensurate4 ,some men can recite the canto of a poem1 or good part of a speech1 after once reading it1 but have no head for dates4 ,others have great capacity for the vocabulary of languages1 but recollect nothing of the small occurrences of the day or year4 ,others never forget any statement which they have read1 and can give volume and page1 but have no memory for faces4 ,i have known those who could1 without effort1 run through the succession of days on which ,easter fell for years back2 or could say where they were1 or what they were doing1 on a given day1 in a given year2 or could recollect accurately the ,christian names of friends and strangers2 or could enumerate in exact order the names on all the shops from ,hyde ,park ,corner to the ,bank2 or had so mastered the ,university ,calendar as to be able to bear an examination in the academical history of any ,m4 ,a4 taken at random4 ,and ,i believe in most of these cases the talent1 in its exceptional character1 did not extend beyond several classes of subjects4 ,there are a hundred memories1 as there are a hundred virtues4 ,virtue is one indeed in the abstract2 but1 in fact1 gentle and kind natures are not therefore heroic1 and prudent and self-controlled minds need not be open-handed4 ,at the utmost such virtue is one only in posse2 as developed in the concrete1 it takes the shape of species which in no sense imply each other4 ,so is it with ,ratiocination2 and as we should betake ourselves to ,newton for physical1 not for theological conclusions1 and to ,wellington for his military experience1 not for statesmanship1 so the maxim holds good generally1 8,cuique in arte su credendum est30 or1 to use the grand words of ,aristotle1 8,we are bound to give heed to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of the experienced and aged1 not less than to demonstrations2 because1 from their having the eye of experience1 they behold the principles of things47#cj70 ,instead of trusting logical science1 we must trust persons1 namely1 those who by long acquaintance with their subject have a right to judge4 ,and if we wish ourselves to share in their convictions and the grounds of them1 we must follow their history1 and learn as they have learned4 ,we must take up their particular subject as they took it up1 beginning at the beginning1 give ourselves to it1 depend on practice and experience more than on reasoning1 and thus gain that mental insight into truth1 whatever its subject-matter may be1 which our masters have gained before us4 ,by following this course1 we may make ourselves of their number1 and then we rightly lean upon ourselves2 we follow our own moral or intellectual judgment1 but not our skill in argumentation4 ,this doctrine1 stated in substance as above by the great philosopher of antiquity1 is more fully expounded in a passage which he elsewhere quotes from ,hesiod4 8,best of all is he10 says that poet1 8who is wise by his own wit2 next best he who is wise by the wit of others2 but whoso is neither able to see1 nor willing to hear1 he is a good-for-nothing fellow40 ,judgment then in all concrete matter is the architectonic faculty2 and what may be called the ,illative ,sense1 or right judgment in ratiocination1 is one branch of it4 ,chapter ,,ix4 ,the ,illative ,sense4 ,my object in the foregoing pages has been1 not to form a theory which may account for those phenomena of the intellect of which they treat1 viz4 those which characterize inference and assent1 but to ascertain what is the matter of fact as regards them1 that is1 when it is that assent is given to propositions which are inferred1 and under what circumstances4 ,i have never had the thought of an attempt which would be ambitious in me1 and which has failed in the hands of others1 if that attempt may not unfairly be called unsuccessful1 which1 though made by the acutest minds1 has not succeeded in convincing opponents4 ,especially have ,i found myself unequal to antecedent reasonings in the instance of a matter of fact4 ,there are those1 who1 arguing priori1 maintain1 that1 since experience leads by syllogism only to probabilities1 certitude is ever a mistake4 ,there are others1 who1 while they deny this conclusion1 grant the priori principle assumed in the argument1 and in consequence are obliged1 in order to vindicate the certainty of our knowledge1 to have recourse to the hypothesis of intuitions1 intellectual forms1 and the like1 which belong to us by nature1 and may be considered to elevate our experience into something more than it is in itself4 ,earnestly maintaining1 as ,i would1 with this latter school of philosophers1 the certainty of knowledge1 ,i think it enough to appeal to the common voice of mankind in proof of it4 ,that is to be accounted a normal operation of our nature1 which men in general do actually instance4 ,that is a law of our minds1 which is exemplified in action on a large scale1 whether priori it ought to be a law or no4 ,our hoping is a proof that hope1 as such1 is not an extravagance2 and our possession of certitude is a proof that it is not a weakness or an absurdity to be certain4 ,how it comes about that we can be certain is not my business to determine2 for me it is sufficient that certitude is felt4 ,this is what the schoolmen1 ,i believe1 call treating a subject in facto esse1 in contrast with in fieri4 ,had ,i attempted the latter1 ,i should have been falling into metaphysics2 but my aim is of a practical character1 such as that of ,butler in his ,analogy1 with this difference1 that he treats of probability1 doubt1 expedience1 and duty1 whereas in these pages1 without excluding1 far from it1 the question of duty1 ,i would confine myself to the truth of things1 and to the mind's certitude of that truth4 ,certitude is a mental state3 certainty is a quality of propositions4 ,those propositions ,i call certain1 which are such that ,i am certain of them4 ,certitude is not a passive impression made upon the mind from without1 by argumentative compulsion1 but in all concrete questions 7nay1 even in abstract1 for though the reasoning is abstract1 the mind which judges of it is concrete7 it is an active recognition of propositions as true1 such as it is the duty of each individual himself to exercise at the bidding of reason1 and1 when reason forbids1 to withhold4 ,and reason never bids us be certain except on an absolute proof2 and such a proof can never be furnished to us by the logic of words1 for as certitude is of the mind1 so is the act of inference which leads to it4 ,every one who reasons1 is his own centre2 and no expedient for attaining a common measure of minds can reverse this truth2--but then the question follows1 is there any criterion of the accuracy of an inference1 such as may be our warrant that certitude is rightly elicited in favour of the proposition inferred1 since our warrant cannot1 as ,i have said1 be scientific8 ,i have already said that the sole and final judgment on the validity of an inference in concrete matter is committed to the personal action of the ratiocinative faculty1 the perfection or virtue of which ,i have called the ,illative ,sense1 a use of the word 8sense0 parallel to our use of it in 8good sense10 8common sense10 a 8sense of beauty10 c42--and ,i own ,i do not see any way to go farther than this in answer to the question4 ,however1 ,i can at least explain my meaning more fully2 and therefore ,i will now speak1 first of the sanction of the ,illative ,sense1 next of its nature1 and then of its range4 #a4 ,the ,sanction of the ,illative ,sense4 ,we are in a world of facts1 and we use them2 for there is nothing else to use4 ,we do not quarrel with them1 but we take them as they are1 and avail ourselves of what they can do for us4 ,it would be out of place to demand of fire1 water1 earth1 and air their credentials1 so to say1 for acting upon us1 or ministering to us4 ,we call them elements1 and turn them to account1 and make the most of them4 ,we speculate on them at our leisure4 ,but what we are still less able to doubt about or annul1 at our leisure or not1 is that which is at once their counterpart and their witness1 ,i mean1 ourselves4 ,we are conscious of the objects of external nature1 and we reflect and act upon them1 and this consciousness1 reflection1 and action we call our rationality4 ,and as we use the 7so called7 elements without first criticizing what we have no command over1 so is it much more unmeaning in us to criticize or find fault with our own nature1 which is nothing else than we ourselves1 instead of using it according to the use of which it ordinarily admits4 ,our being1 with its faculties1 mind and body1 is a fact not admitting of question1 all things being of necessity referred to it1 not it to other things4 ,if ,i may not assume that ,i exist1 and in a particular way1 that is1 with a particular mental constitution1 ,i have nothing to speculate about1 and had better let speculation alone4 ,such as ,i am1 it is my all2 this is my essential stand-point1 and must be taken for granted2 otherwise1 thought is but an idle amusement1 not worth the trouble4 ,there is no medium between using my faculties1 as ,i have them1 and flinging myself upon the external world according to the random impulse of the moment1 as spray upon the surface of the waves1 and simply forgetting that ,i am4 ,i am what ,i am1 or ,i am nothing4 ,i cannot think1 reflect1 or judge about my being1 without starting from the very point which ,i aim at concluding4 ,my ideas are all assumptions1 and ,i am ever moving in a circle4 ,i cannot avoid being sufficient for myself1 for ,i cannot make myself anything else1 and to change me is to destroy me4 ,if ,i do not use myself1 ,i have no other self to use4 ,my only business is to ascertain what ,i am1 in order to put it to use4 ,it is enough for the proof of the value and authority of any function which ,i possess1 to be able to pronounce that it is natural4 ,what ,i have to ascertain is the laws under which ,i live4 ,my first elementary lesson of duty is that of resignation to the laws of my nature1 whatever they are2 my first disobedience is to be impatient at what ,i am1 and to indulge an ambitious aspiration after what ,i cannot be1 to cherish a distrust of my powers1 and to desire to change laws which are identical with myself4 ,truths such as these1 which are too obvious to be called irresistible1 are illustrated by what we see in universal nature4 ,every being is in a true sense sufficient for itself1 so as to be able to fulfil its particular needs4 ,it is a general law that1 whatever is found as a function or an attribute of any class of beings1 or is natural to it1 is in its substance suitable to it1 and subserves its existence1 and cannot be rightly regarded as a fault or enormity4 ,no being could endure1 of which the constituent parts were at war with each other4 ,and more than this2 there is that principle of vitality in every being1 which is of a sanative and restorative character1 and which brings all its parts and functions together into one whole1 and is ever repelling and correcting the mischiefs which befall it1 whether from within or without1 while showing no tendency to cast off its belongings as if foreign to its nature4 ,the brute animals are found severally with limbs and organs1 habits1 instincts1 appetites1 surroundings1 which play together for the safety and welfare of the whole2 and1 after all exceptions1 may be said each of them to have1 after its own kind1 a perfection of nature4 ,man is the highest of the animals1 and more indeed than an animal1 as having a mind2 that is1 he has a complex nature different from theirs1 with a higher aim and a specific perfection2 but still the fact that other beings find their good in the use of their particular nature1 is a reason for anticipating that to use duly our own is our interest as well as our necessity4 ,what is the peculiarity of our nature1 in contrast with the inferior animals around us8 ,it is that1 though man cannot change what he is born with1 he is a being of progress with relation to his perfection and characteristic good4 ,other beings are complete from their first existence1 in that line of excellence which is allotted to them2 but man begins with nothing realized 7to use the word71 and he has to make capital for himself by the exercise of those faculties which are his natural inheritance4 ,thus he gradually advances to the fulness of his original destiny4 ,nor is this progress mechanical1 nor is it of necessity2 it is committed to the personal efforts of each individual of the species2 each of us has the prerogative of completing his inchoate and rudimental nature1 and of developing his own perfection out of the living elements with which his mind began to be4 ,it is his gift to be the creator of his own sufficiency2 and to be emphatically self-made4 ,this is the law of his being1 which he cannot escape2 and whatever is involved in that law he is bound1 or rather he is carried on1 to fulfil4 ,and here ,i am brought to the bearing of these remarks upon my subject4 ,for this law of progress is carried out by means of the acquisition of knowledge1 of which inference and assent are the immediate instruments4 ,supposing1 then1 the advancement of our nature1 both in ourselves individually and as regards the human family1 is1 to every one of us in his place1 a sacred duty1 it follows that that duty is intimately bound up with the right use of these two main instruments of fulfilling it4 ,and as we do not gain the knowledge of the law of progress by any priori view of man1 but by looking at it as the interpretation which is provided by himself on a large scale in the ordinary action of his intellectual nature1 so too we must appeal to himself1 as a fact1 and not to any antecedent theory1 in order to find what is the law of his mind as regards the two faculties in question4 ,if then such an appeal does bear me out in deciding1 as ,i have done1 that the course of inference is ever more or less obscure1 while assent is ever distinct and definite1 and yet that what is in its nature thus absolute does1 in fact follow upon what in outward manifestation is thus complex1 indirect1 and recondite1 what is left to us but to take things as they are1 and to resign ourselves to what we find8 that is1 instead of devising1 what cannot be1 some sufficient science of reasoning which may compel certitude in concrete conclusions1 to confess that there is no ultimate test of truth besides the testimony born to truth by the mind itself1 and that this phenomenon1 perplexing as we may find it1 is a normal and inevitable characteristic of the mental constitution of a being like man on a stage such as the world4 ,his progress is a living growth1 not a mechanism2 and its instruments are mental acts1 not the formulas and contrivances of language4 ,we are accustomed in this day to lay great stress upon the harmony of the universe2 and we have well learned the maxim so powerfully inculcated by our own ,english philosopher1 that in our inquiries into its laws1 we must sternly destroy all idols of the intellect1 and subdue nature by co-operating with her4 ,knowledge is power1 for it enables us to use eternal principles which we cannot alter4 ,so also is it in that microcosm1 the human mind4 ,let us follow ,bacon more closely than to distort its faculties according to the demands of an ideal optimism1 instead of looking out for modes of thought proper to our nature1 and faithfully observing them in our intellectual exercises4 ,of course ,i do not stop here4 ,as the structure of the universe speaks to us of ,him who made it1 so the laws of the mind are the expression1 not of mere constituted order1 but of ,his will4 ,i should be bound by them even were they not ,his laws2 but since one of their very functions is to tell me of ,him1 they throw a reflex light upon themselves1 and1 for resignation to my destiny1 ,i substitute a cheerful concurrence in an overruling ,providence4 ,we may gladly welcome such difficulties as there are in our mental constitution1 and in the interaction of our faculties1 if we are able to feel that ,he gave them to us1 and ,he can overrule them for us4 ,we may securely take them as they are1 and use them as we find them4 ,it is ,he who teaches us all knowledge2 and the way by which we acquire it is ,his way4 ,he varies that way according to the subject-matter2 but whether ,he has set before us in our particular pursuit the way of observation or of experiment1 of speculation or of research1 of demonstration or of probability1 whether we are inquiring into the system of the universe1 or into the elements of matter and of life1 or into the history of human society and past times1 if we take the way proper to our subject-matter1 we have ,his blessing upon us1 and shall find1 besides abundant matter for mere opinion1 the materials in due measure of proof and assent4 ,and especially1 by this disposition of things1 shall we learn1 as regards religious and ethical inquiries1 how little we can effect1 however much we exert ourselves1 without that ,blessing2 for1 as if on set purpose1 ,he has made this path of thought rugged and circuitous above other investigations1 that the very discipline inflicted on our minds in finding ,him1 may mould them into due devotion to ,him when ,he is found4 8,verily ,thou art a hidden ,god1 the ,god of ,israel1 the ,saviour10 is the very law of ,his dealings with us4 ,certainly we need a clue into the labyrinth which is to lead us to ,him2 and who among us can hope to seize upon the true starting-points of thought for that enterprise1 and upon all of them1 who is to understand their right direction1 to follow them out to their just limits1 and duly to estimate1 adjust1 and combine the various reasonings in which they issue1 so as safely to arrive at what it is worth any labour to secure1 without a special illumination from ,himself8 ,such are the dealings of ,wisdom with the elect soul4 8,she will bring upon him fear1 and dread1 and trial2 and ,she will torture him with the tribulation of ,her discipline1 till ,she try him by ,her laws1 and trust his soul4 ,then ,she will strengthen him1 and make ,her way straight to him1 and give him joy40 #b4 ,the ,nature of the ,illative ,sense4 ,it is the mind that reasons1 and that controls its own reasonings1 not any technical apparatus of words and propositions4 ,this power of judging and concluding1 when in its perfection1 ,i call the ,illative ,sense1 and ,i shall best illustrate it by referring to parallel faculties1 which we commonly recognize without difficulty4 ,for instance1 how does the mind fulfil its function of supreme direction and control1 in matters of duty1 social intercourse1 and taste8 ,in all of these separate actions of the intellect1 the individual is supreme1 and responsible to himself1 nay1 under circumstances1 may be justified in opposing himself to the judgment of the whole world2 though he uses rules to his great advantage1 as far as they go1 and is in consequence bound to use them4 ,as regards moral duty1 the subject is fully considered in the well-known ethical treatises of ,aristotle47#ca7 ,he calls the faculty which guides the mind in matters of conduct1 by the name of phronesis1 or judgment4 ,this is the directing1 controlling1 and determining principle in such matters1 personal and social4 ,what it is to be virtuous1 how we are to gain the just idea and standard of virtue1 how we are to approximate in practice to our own standard1 what is right and wrong in a particular case1 for the answers in fulness and accuracy to these and similar questions1 the philosopher refers us to no code of laws1 to no moral treatise1 because no science of life1 applicable to the case of an individual1 has been or can be written4 ,such is ,aristotle's doctrine1 and it is undoubtedly true4 ,an ethical system may supply laws1 general rules1 guiding principles1 a number of examples1 suggestions1 landmarks1 limitations1 cautions1 distinctions1 solutions of critical or anxious difficulties2 but who is to apply them to a particular case8 whither can we go1 except to the living intellect1 our own1 or another's8 ,what is written is too vague1 too negative for our need4 ,it bids us avoid extremes2 but it cannot ascertain for us1 according to our personal need1 the golden mean4 ,the authoritative oracle1 which is to decide our path1 is something more searching and manifold than such jejune generalizations as treatises can give1 which are most distinct and clear when we least need them4 ,it is seated in the mind of the individual1 who is thus his own law1 his own teacher1 and his own judge in those special cases of duty which are personal to him4 ,it comes of an acquired habit1 though it has its first origin in nature itself1 and it is formed and matured by practice and experience2 and it manifests itself1 not in any breadth of view1 any philosophical comprehension of the mutual relations of duty towards duty1 or any consistency in its teachings1 but it is a capacity sufficient for the occasion1 deciding what ought to be done here and now1 by this given person1 under these given circumstances4 ,it decides nothing hypothetical1 it does not determine what a man should do ten years hence1 or what another should do at this time4 ,it may indeed happen to decide ten years hence as it does now1 and to decide a second case now as it now decides a first2 still its present act is for the present1 not for the distant or the future4 ,state or public law is inflexible1 but this mental rule is not only minute and particular1 but has an elasticity1 which1 in its application to individual cases1 is1 as ,i have said1 not studious to maintain the appearance of consistency4 ,in old times the mason's rule which was in use at ,lesbos was1 according to ,aristotle1 not of wood or iron1 but of lead1 so as to allow of its adjustment to the uneven surface of the stones brought together for the work4 ,by such the philosopher illustrates the nature of equity in contrast with law1 and such is that phronesis1 from which the science of morals forms its rules1 and receives its complement4 ,in this respect of course the law of truth differs from the law of duty1 that duties change1 but truths never2 but1 though truth is ever one and the same1 and the assent of certitude is immutable1 still the reasonings which carry us on to truth and certitude are many and distinct1 and vary with the inquirer2 and it is not with assent1 but with the controlling principle in inferences that ,i am comparing phronesis4 ,it is with this drift that ,i observe that the rule of conduct for one man is not always the rule for another1 though the rule is always one and the same in the abstract1 and in its principle and scope4 ,to learn his own duty in his own case1 each individual must have recourse to his own rule2 and if his rule is not sufficiently developed in his intellect for his need1 then he goes to some other living1 present authority1 to supply it for him1 not to the dead letter of a treatise or a code4 ,a living1 present authority1 himself or another1 is his immediate guide in matters of a personal1 social1 or political character4 ,in buying and selling1 in contracts1 in his treatment of others1 in giving and receiving1 in thinking1 speaking1 doing1 and working1 in toil1 in danger1 in his recreations and pleasures1 every one of his acts1 to be praiseworthy1 must be in accordance with this practical sense4 ,thus it is1 and not by science1 that he perfects the virtues of justice1 self-command1 magnanimity1 generosity1 gentleness1 and all others4 ,phronesis is the regulating principle of every one of them4 ,these last words lead me to a further remark4 ,i doubt whether it is correct1 strictly speaking1 to consider this phronesis as a general faculty1 directing and perfecting all the virtues at once4 ,so understood1 it is little better than an abstract term1 including under it a circle of analogous faculties1 severally proper to the separate virtues4 ,properly speaking1 there are as many kinds of phronesis as there are virtues2 for the judgment1 good sense1 or tact which is conspicuous in a man's conduct in one subject-matter1 is not necessarily traceable in another4 ,as in the parallel cases of memory and reasoning1 he may be great in one aspect of his character1 and little-minded in another4 ,he may be exemplary in his family1 yet commit a fraud on the revenue2 he may be just and cruel1 brave and sensual1 imprudent and patient4 ,and if this be true of the moral virtues1 it holds good still more fully when we compare what is called his private character with his public4 ,a good man may make a bad king2 profligates have been great statesmen1 or magnanimous political leaders4 ,so1 too1 ,i may go on to speak of the various callings and professions which give scope to the exercise of great talents1 for these talents also are matured1 not by mere rule1 but by personal skill and sagacity4 ,they are as diverse as pleading and cross-examining1 conducting a debate in ,parliament1 swaying a public meeting1 and commanding an army2 and here1 too1 ,i observe that1 though the directing principle in each case is called by the same name1--sagacity1 skill1 tact1 or prudence1--still there is no one ruling faculty leading to eminence in all these various lines of action in common1 but men will excel in one of them1 without any talent for the rest4 ,the parallel may be continued in the case of the ,fine ,arts1 in which1 though true and scientific rules may be given1 no one would therefore deny that ,phidias or ,rafael had a far more subtle standard of taste and a more versatile power of embodying it in his works1 than any which he could communicate to others in even a series of treatises4 ,and here again genius is indissolubly united to one definite subject-matter2 a poet is not therefore a painter1 or an architect a musical composer4 ,and so1 again1 as regards the useful arts and personal accomplishments1 we use the same word 8skill10 but proficiency in engineering or in ship-building1 or again in engraving1 or again in singing1 in playing instruments1 in acting1 or in gymnastic exercises1 is as simply one with its particular subject-matter1 as the human soul with its particular body1 and is1 in its own department1 a sort of instinct or inspiration1 not an obedience to external rules of criticism or of science4 ,it is natural1 then1 to ask the question1 why ratiocination should be an exception to a general law which attaches to the intellectual exercises of the mind2 why it is held to be commensurate with logical science2 and why logic is made an instrumental art sufficient for determining every sort of truth1 while no one would dream of making any one formula1 however generalized1 a working rule at once for poetry1 the art of medicine1 and political warfare8 ,this is what ,i have to remark concerning the ,illative ,sense1 and in explanation of its nature and claims2 and on the whole1 ,i have spoken of it in four respects1--as viewed in itself1 in its subject-matter1 in the process it uses1 and in its function and scope4 ,first1 viewed in its exercise1 it is one and the same in all concrete matters1 though employed in them in different measures4 ,we do not reason in one way in chemistry or law1 in another in morals or religion2 but in reasoning on any subject whatever1 which is concrete1 we proceed1 as far indeed as we can1 by the logic of language1 but we are obliged to supplement it by the more subtle and elastic logic of thought2 for forms by themselves prove nothing4 ,secondly1 it is in fact attached to definite subject-matters1 so that a given individual may possess it in one department of thought1 for instance1 history1 and not in another1 for instance1 philosophy4 ,thirdly1 in coming to its conclusion1 it proceeds always in the same way1 by a method of reasoning1 which is the elementary principle of that mathematical calculus of modern times1 which has so wonderfully extended the limits of abstract science4 ,fourthly1 in no class of concrete reasonings1 whether in experimental science1 historical research1 or theology1 is there any ultimate test of truth and error in our inferences besides the trustworthiness of the ,illative ,sense that gives them its sanction2 just as there is no sufficient test of poetical excellence1 heroic action1 or gentleman-like conduct1 other than the particular mental sense1 be it genius1 taste1 sense of propriety1 or the moral sense1 to which those subject-matters are severally committed4 ,our duty in each of these is to strengthen and perfect the special faculty which is its living rule1 and in every case as it comes to do our best4 ,and such also is our duty and our necessity1 as regards the ,illative ,sense4 #c4 ,the ,range of the ,illative ,sense4 ,great as are the services of language in enabling us to extend the compass of our inferences1 to test their validity1 and to communicate them to others1 still the mind itself is more versatile and vigorous than any of its works1 of which language is one1 and it is only under its penetrating and subtle action that the margin disappears1 which ,i have described as intervening between verbal argumentation and conclusions in the concrete4 ,it determines what science cannot determine1 the limit of converging probabilities and the reasons sufficient for a proof4 ,it is the ratiocinative mind itself1 and no trick of art1 however simple in its form and sure in operation1 by which we are able to determine that a moving body left to itself will never stop1 and that no man can live without eating4 ,nor1 again1 is it by any diagram that we are able to scrutinize1 sort1 and combine the many premisses which must be first run together before we answer duly a given question4 ,it is to the living mind that we must look for the means of using correctly principles of whatever kind1 facts or doctrines1 experiences or testimonies1 true or probable1 and of discerning what conclusion from these is necessary1 suitable1 or expedient1 when they are taken for granted2 and this1 either by means of a natural gift1 or from mental formation and practice and a long familiarity with those various starting-points4 ,thus1 when ,laud said that he did not see his way to come to terms with the ,holy ,see1 8till ,rome was other than she was10 no ,catholic would admit the sentiment3 but any ,catholic may understand that this is just the judgment consistent with ,laud's actual condition of thought and cast of opinions1 his ecclesiastical position1 and the existing state of ,england4 ,nor1 lastly1 is an action of the mind itself less necessary in relation to those first elements of thought which in all reasoning are assumptions1 the principles1 tastes1 and opinions1 very often of a personal character1 which are half the battle in the inference with which the reasoning is to terminate4 ,it is the mind itself that detects them in their obscure recesses1 illustrates them1 establishes them1 eliminates them1 resolves them into simpler ideas1 as the case may be4 ,the mind contemplates them without the use of words1 by a process which cannot be analyzed4 ,thus it was that ,bacon separated the physical system of the world from the theological2 thus that ,butler connected together the moral system with the religious4 ,logical formulas could never have sustained the reasonings involved in such investigations4 ,thus the ,illative ,sense1 that is1 the reasoning faculty1 as exercised by gifted1 or by educated or otherwise well-prepared minds1 has its function in the beginning1 middle1 and end of all discussion and inquiry1 and in every step of the process4 ,it is a rule to itself1 and appeals to no judgment beyond its own2 and attends upon the whole course of thought from antecedents to consequents1 with a minute diligence and unwearied presence1 which is impossible to a cumbrous apparatus of verbal reasoning1 though1 in communicating with others1 words are the only instrument we possess1 and a serviceable1 though imperfect instrument4 ,one function indeed there is of ,logic1 to which ,i have referred in the preceding sentence1 which the ,illative ,sense does not and cannot perform4 ,it supplies no common measure between mind and mind1 as being nothing else than a personal gift or acquisition4 ,few there are1 as ,i said above1 who are good reasoners on all subject-matters4 ,two men1 who reason well each in his own province of thought1 may1 one or both of them1 fail and pronounce opposite judgments on a question belonging to some third province4 ,moreover1 all reasoning being from premisses1 and those premisses arising 7if it so happen7 in their first elements from personal characteristics1 in which men are in fact in essential and irremediable variance one with another1 the ratiocinative talent can do no more than point out where the difference between them lies1 how far it is immaterial1 when it is worth while continuing an argument between them1 and when not4 ,now of the three main occasions of the exercise of the ,illative ,sense1 which ,i have been insisting on1 and which are the measure of its range1 the start1 the course1 and the issue of an inquiry1 ,i have already1 in treating of ,informal ,inference1 shown the place it holds in the final resolution of concrete questions4 ,here then it is left to me to illustrate its presence and action in relation to the elementary premisses1 and1 again1 to the conduct of an argument4 ,and first of the latter4 #a4 ,there has been a great deal written of late years on the subject of the state of ,greece and ,rome during the pre-historic period2 let us say before the ,olympiads in ,greece1 and the war with ,pyrrhus in the annals of ,rome4 ,now1 in a question like this1 it is plain that the inquirer has first of all to decide on the point from which he is to start in the presence of the received accounts2 on what side1 from what quarter he is to approach them2 on what principles his discussion is to be conducted2 what he is to assume1 what opinions or objections he is summarily to put aside as nugatory1 what arguments1 and when1 he is to consider as apposite1 what false issues are to be avoided1 when the state of his arguments is ripe for a conclusion4 ,is he to commence with absolutely discarding all that has hitherto been received2 or to retain it in outline2 or to make selections from it2 or to consider and interpret it as mythical1 or as allegorical2 or to hold so much to be trustworthy1 or at least of prim facie authority1 as he cannot actually disprove2 or never to destroy except in proportion as he can construct8 ,then1 as to the kind of arguments suitable or admissible1 how far are tradition1 analogy1 isolated monuments and records1 ruins1 vague reports1 legends1 the facts or sayings of later times1 language1 popular proverbs1 to tell in the inquiry8 what are marks of truth1 what of falsehood1 what is probable1 what suspicious1 what promises well for discriminating facts from fictions8 ,then1 arguments have to be balanced against each other1 and then lastly the decision is to be made1 whether any conclusion at all can be drawn1 or whether any before certain issues are tried and settled1 or whether a probable conclusion or a certain4 ,it is plain how incessant will be the call here or there for the exercise of a definitive judgment1 how little that judgment will be helped on by logic1 and how intimately it will be dependent upon the intellectual complexion of the writer4 ,this might be illustrated at great length1 were it necessary1 from the writings of any of those able men1 whose names are so well known in connexion with the subject ,i have instanced2 such as ,niebuhr1 ,mr4 ,clinton1 ,sir ,george ,lewis1 ,mr4 ,grote1 and ,colonel ,mure4 ,these authors have severally views of their own on the period of history which they have selected for investigation1 and they are too learned and logical not to know and to use to the utmost the testimonies by which the facts which they investigate are to be ascertained4 ,why then do they differ so much from each other1 whether in their estimate of those testimonies or of those facts8 ,because that estimate is simply their own1 coming of their own judgment2 and that judgment coming of assumptions of their own1 explicit or implicit2 and those assumptions spontaneously issuing out of the state of thought respectively belonging to each of them2 and all these successive processes of minute reasoning superintended and directed by an intellectual instrument far too subtle and spiritual to be scientific4 ,what was ,niebuhr's idea of the office he had undertaken8 ,i suppose it was to accept what he found in the historians of ,rome1 to interrogate it1 to take it to pieces1 to put it together again1 to re-arrange and interpret it4 ,prescription together with internal consistency was to him the evidence of fact1 and if he pulled down he felt he was bound to build up4 ,very different is the spirit of another school of writers1 with whom prescription is nothing1 and who will admit no evidence which has not first proved its right to be admitted4 8,we are able10 says ,niebuhr1 8to trace the history of the ,roman constitution back to the beginning of the ,commonwealth1 as accurately as we wish1 and even more perfectly than the history of many portions of the middle ages40 ,but1 8we may rejoice10 says ,sir ,george ,lewis1 8that the ingenuity or learning of ,niebuhr should have enabled him to advance many noble hypotheses and conjectures respecting the form of the early constitution of ,rome1 but1 unless he can support those hypotheses by sufficient evidence1 they are not entitled to our belief40 8,niebuhr10 says a writer nearly related to myself1 8often expresses much contempt for mere incredulous criticism and negative conclusions2 444 yet wisely to disbelieve is our first grand requisite in dealing with materials of mixed worth40 ,and ,sir ,george ,lewis again1 8,it may be said that there is scarcely any of the leading conclusions of ,niebuhr's work which has not been impugned by some subsequent writer40 ,again1 8,it is true10 says ,niebuhr1 8that the ,trojan war belongs to the region of fable1 yet undeniably it has an historical foundation40 ,but ,mr4 ,grote writes1 8,if we are asked whether the ,trojan war is not a legend 444 raised upon a basis of truth1 444 our answer must be1 that1 as the possibility of it cannot be denied1 so neither can the reality of it be affirmed40 ,on the other hand1 ,mr4 ,clinton lays down the general rule1 8,we may acknowledge as real persons1 all those whom there is no reason for rejecting4 ,the presumption is in favour of the early tradition1 if no argument can be brought to overthrow it40 ,thus he lodges the onus probandi with those who impugn the received accounts2 but ,mr4 ,grote and ,sir ,george ,lewis throw it upon those who defend them4 8,historical evidence10 says the latter1 8is founded on the testimony of credible witnesses40 ,and again1 8,it is perpetually assumed in practice1 that historical evidence is different in its nature from other sorts of evidence4 ,this laxity seems to be justified by the doctrine of taking the best evidence which can be obtained4 ,the object of my inquiry will be to apply to the early ,roman history the same rules of evidence which are applied by common consent to modern history40 ,far less severe is the judgment of ,colonel ,mure3 8,where no positive historical proof is affirmable1 the balance of historical probability must reduce itself very much to a reasonable indulgence to the weight of national conviction1 and a deference to the testimony of the earliest native authorities40 8,reasonable indulgence0 to popular belief1 8deference0 to ancient tradition1 are principles of writing history abhorrent to the judicial temper of ,sir ,george ,lewis4 ,he considers the words 8reasonable indulgence0 to be 8ambiguous10 and observes that 8the very point which cannot be taken for granted1 and in which writers differ1 is1 as to the extent to which contemporary attestation may be presumed without direct and positive proof1 444 the extent to which the existence of a popular belief concerning a supposed matter of fact authorizes the inference that it grew out of authentic testimony40 ,and ,mr4 ,grote observes to the same effect3 8,the word tradition is an equivocal word1 and begs the whole question4 ,it is tacitly understood to imply a tale descriptive of some real matter of fact1 taking rise at the time when the fact happened1 originally accurate1 but corrupted by oral transmission40 ,and ,lewis1 who quotes the passage1 adds1 8,this tacit understanding is the key-stone of the whole argument40 ,i am not contrasting these various opinions of able men1 who have given themselves to historical research1 as if it were any reflection on them that they differ from each other4 ,it is the cause of their differing on which ,i wish to insist4 ,taking the facts by themselves1 probably these authors would come to no conclusion at all2 it is the 8tacit understandings0 which ,mr4 ,grote speaks of1 the vague and impalpable notions of 8reasonableness0 on his own side as well as on that of others1 which both make conclusions possible1 and are the pledge of their being contradictory4 ,the conclusions vary with the particular writer1 for each writes from his own point of view and with his own principles1 and these admit of no common measure4 ,this in fact is their own account of the matter3 8,the results of speculative historical inquiry10 says ,colonel ,mure1 8can rarely amount to more than fair presumption of the reality of the events in question1 as limited to their general substance1 not as extending to their details4 ,nor can there consequently be expected in the minds of different inquirers any such unity regarding the precise degree of reality1 as may frequently exist in respect to events attested by documentary evidence40 ,mr4 ,grote corroborates this decision by the striking instance of the diversity of existing opinions concerning the ,homeric ,poems4 8,our means of knowledge10 he says1 8are so limited1 that no one can produce arguments sufficiently cogent to contend against opposing preconceptions1 and it creates a painful sensation of diffidence1 when we read the expressions of equal and absolute persuasion with which the two opposite conclusions have both been advanced40 ,and again1 8,there is a difference of opinion among the best critics1 which is probably not destined to be adjusted1 since so much depends partly upon critical feeling1 partly upon the general reasonings in respect to ancient epical unity1 with which a man sits down to the study40 ,exactly so2 every one has his own 8critical feeling10 his antecedent 8reasonings10 and in consequence his own 8absolute persuasion10 coming in fresh and fresh at every turn of the discussion2 and who1 whether stranger or friend1 is to reach and affect what is so intimately bound up with the mental constitution of each8 ,hence the categorical contradictions between one writer and another1 which abound4 ,colonel ,mure appeals in defence of an historical thesis to the 8fact of the ,hellenic confederacy combining for the adoption of a common national system of chronology in #ggf ,b4,c40 ,mr4 ,grote replies3 8,nothing is more at variance with my conception10--he just now spoke of the preconceptions of others1--8of the state of the ,hellenic world in #ggf ,b4,c41 than the idea of a combination among all the members of the race for any purpose1 much more for the purpose of adopting a common national system of chronology40 ,colonel ,mure speaks of the 8bigoted ,athenian public20 ,mr4 ,grote replies that 8no public ever less deserved the epithet of #8bigoted' than the ,athenian10 ,colonel ,mure also speaks of ,mr4 ,grote's 8arbitrary hypothesis20 and again 7in ,mr4 ,grote's words71 of his 8unreasonable scepticism40 ,he cannot disprove by mere argument the conclusions of ,mr4 ,grote2 he can but have recourse to a personal criticism4 ,he virtually says1 8,we differ in our personal view of things40 ,men become personal when logic fails2 it is their mode of appealing to their own primary elements of thought1 and their own illative sense1 against the principles and the judgment of another4 ,i have already touched upon ,niebuhr's method of investigation1 and ,sir ,george ,lewis's dislike of it3 it supplies us with as apposite an instance of a difference in first principles as is afforded by ,mr4 ,grote and ,colonel ,mure4 8,the main characteristic of his history10 says ,lewis1 8is the extent to which he relies upon internal evidence1 and upon the indications afforded by the narrative itself1 independently of the testimony of its truth40 ,and1 8,ingenuity and labour can produce nothing but hypotheses and conjectures1 which may be supported by analogies1 but can never rest upon the solid foundation of proof40 ,and it is undeniable1 that1 rightly or wrongly1 disdaining the scepticism of the mere critic1 ,niebuhr does consciously proceed by the high path of divination4 8,for my own part10 he says1 8,i divine that1 since the censorship of ,fabius and ,decius falls in the same year1 that ,cn4 ,flavius became mediator between his own class and the higher orders40 ,lewis considers this to be a process of guessing2 and says1 8,instead of employing those tests of credibility which are consistently applied to modern history10 ,niebuhr1 and his followers1 and most of his opponents1 8attempt to guide their judgment by the indication of internal evidence1 and assume that the truth is discovered by an occult faculty of historical divination40 ,niebuhr defends himself thus3 8,the real geographer has a tact which determines his judgment and choice among different statements4 ,he is able from isolated statements to draw inferences respecting things that are unknown1 which are closely approximate to results obtained from observation of facts1 and may supply their place4 ,he is able with limited data to form an image of things which no eyewitness has described40 ,he applies this to himself4 ,the principle set forth in this passage is obviously the same as ,i should put forward myself2 but ,sir ,george ,lewis1 though not simply denying it as a principle1 makes little account of it1 when applied to historical research4 8,it is not enough10 he says1 8for an historian to claim the possession of a retrospective second-sight1 which is denied to the rest of the world--of a mysterious doctrine1 revealed only to the initiated40 ,and he pronounces1 that 8the history of ,niebuhr has opened more questions than it has closed1 and it has set in motion a large body of combatants1 whose mutual variances are not at present likely to be settled by deference to a common principle47#cb70 ,we see from the above extracts how a controversy1 such as that to which they belong1 is carried on from starting-points1 and with collateral aids1 not formally proved1 but more or less assumed1 the process of assumption lying in the action of the ,illative ,sense1 as applied to primary elements of thought respectively congenial to the disputants4 ,not that explicit argumentation on these minute or minor1 though important1 points is not sometimes possible to a certain extent2 but1 as ,i had said1 it is too unwieldy an expedient for a constantly recurring need1 even when it is tolerably exact4 #b4 ,and now secondly1 as to the first principles themselves4 ,in illustration1 ,i will mention under separate heads some of those elementary contrarieties of opinion1 on which the ,illative ,sense has to act1 discovering them1 following them out1 defending or resisting them1 as the case may be4 #a4 ,as to the statement of the case4 ,this depends on the particular aspect under which we view a subject1 that is1 on the abstraction which forms our representative notion of what it is4 ,sciences are only so many distinct aspects of nature2 sometimes suggested by nature itself1 sometimes created by the mind4 7#a7 ,one of the simplest and broadest aspects under which to view the physical world1 is that of a system of final causes1 or1 on the other hand1 of initial or effective causes4 ,bacon1 having it in view to extend our power over nature1 adopted the latter4 ,he took firm hold of the idea of causation 7in the common sense of the word7 as contrasted with that of design1 refusing to mix up the two ideas in one inquiry1 and denouncing such traditional interpretations of facts1 as did but obscure the simplicity of the aspect necessary for his purpose4 ,he saw what others before him might have seen in what they saw1 but who did not see as he saw it4 ,in this achievement of intellect1 which has been so fruitful in results1 lie his genius and his fame4 7#b7 ,so again1 to refer to a very different subject-matter1 we often hear of the exploits of some great lawyer1 judge or advocate1 who is able in perplexed cases1 when common minds see nothing but a hopeless heap of facts1 foreign or contrary to each other1 to detect the principle which rightly interprets the riddle1 and1 to the admiration of all hearers1 converts a chaos into an orderly and luminous whole4 ,this is what is meant by originality1 in thinking3 it is the discovery of an aspect of a subject-matter1 simpler1 perhaps1 and more intelligible than any hitherto taken4 7#c7 ,on the other hand1 such aspects are often unreal1 as being mere exhibitions of ingenuity1 not of true originality of mind4 ,this is especially the case in what are called philosophical views of history4 ,such seems to me the theory advocated in a work of great learning1 vigour1 and acuteness1 ,warburton's 8,divine ,legation of ,moses40 ,i do not call ,gibbon merely ingenious2 still his account of the rise of ,christianity is the mere subjective view of one who could not enter into its depth and power4 7#d7 ,the aspect under which we view things is often intensely personal2 nay1 even awfully so1 considering that1 from the nature of the case1 it does not bring home its idiosyncrasy either to ourselves or to others4 ,each of us looks at the world in his own way1 and does not know that perhaps it is characteristically his own4 ,this is the case even as regards the senses4 ,some men have little perception of colours2 some recognize one or two2 to some men two contrary colours1 as red and green1 are one and the same4 ,how poorly can we appreciate the beauties of nature1 if our eyes discern1 on the face of things1 only an ,indian-ink or a drab creation6 7#e7 ,so again1 as regards form3 each of us abstracts the relation of line to line in his own personal way1--as one man might apprehend a curve as convex1 another as concave4 ,of course1 as in the case of a curve1 there may be a limit to possible aspects2 but still1 even when we agree together1 it is not perhaps that we learn one from another1 or fall under any law of agreement1 but that our separate idiosyncrasies happen to concur4 ,i fear ,i may seem trifling1 if ,i allude to an illustration which has ever had a great force with me1 and that for the very reason it is so trivial and minute4 ,children1 learning to read1 are sometimes presented with the letters of the alphabet turned into the figures of men in various attitudes4 ,it is curious to observe from such representations1 how differently the shape of the letters strikes different minds4 ,in consequence ,i have continually asked the question in a chance company1 which way certain of the great letters look1 to the right or to the left2 and whereas nearly every one present had his own clear view1 so clear that he could not endure the opposite view1 still ,i have generally found that one half of the party considered the letters in question to look to the left1 while the other half thought they looked to the right4 7#f7 ,this variety of interpretation in the very elements of outlines seems to throw light upon other cognate differences between one man and another4 ,if they look at the mere letters of the alphabet so differently1 we may understand how it is they form such distinct judgments upon handwriting2 nay1 how some men may have a talent for decyphering from it the intellectual and moral character of the writer1 which others have not4 ,another thought that occurs is1 that perhaps here lies the explanation why it is that family likenesses are so variously recognized1 and how mistakes in identity may be dangerously frequent4 7#g7 ,if we so variously apprehend the familiar objects of sense1 still more various1 we may suppose1 are the aspects and associations attached by us1 one with another1 to intellectual objects4 ,i do not say we differ in the objects themselves1 but that we may have interminable differences as to their relations and circumstances4 ,i have heard say 7again to take a trifling matter7 that at the beginning of this century1 it was a subject of serious1 nay1 of angry controversy1 whether it began with ,january #ahjj1 or ,january #ahja4 ,argument1 which ought1 if in any case1 to have easily brought the question to a decision1 was but sprinkling water upon a flame4 ,i am not clear that1 if it could be fairly started now1 it would not lead to similar results2 certainly ,i know those who studiously withdraw from giving an opinion on the subject1 when it is accidentally mooted1 from their experience of the eager feeling which it is sure to excite in some one or other who is present4 ,this eagerness can only arise from an overpowering sense that the truth of the matter lies in the one alternative1 and not in the other4 ,these instances1 because they are so casual1 suggest how it comes to pass1 that men differ so widely from each other in religious and moral perceptions4 ,here1 ,i say again1 it does not prove that there is no objective truth1 because not all men are in possession of it2 or that we are not responsible for the associations which we attach1 and the relations which we assign1 to the objects of the intellect4 ,but this it does suggest to us1 that there is something deeper in our differences than the accident of external circumstances2 and that we need the interposition of a ,power greater than human teaching and human argument to make our beliefs true and our minds one4 #b4 ,next ,i come to the implicit assumption of definite propositions in the first start of a course of reasoning1 and the arbitrary exclusion of others1 of whatever kind4 ,unless we had the right1 when we pleased1 of ruling that propositions were irrelevant or absurd1 ,i do not see how we could conduct an argument at all2 our way would be simply blocked up by extravagant principles and theories1 gratuitous hypotheses1 false issues1 unsupported statements1 and incredible facts4 ,there are those who have treated the history of ,abraham as an astronomical record1 and have spoken of our ,adorable ,saviour as the sun in ,aries4 ,arabian ,mythology has changed ,solomon into a mighty wizard4 ,noah has been considered the patriarch of the ,chinese people4 ,the ten tribes have been pronounced still to live in their descendants1 the ,red ,indians2 or to be the ancestors of the ,goths and ,vandals1 and thereby of the present ,european races4 ,some have conjectured that the ,apollos of the ,acts of the ,apostles was ,apollonius ,tyaneus4 ,able men have reasoned out1 almost against their will1 that ,adam was a negro4 ,these propositions1 and many others of various kinds1 we should think ourselves justified in passing over1 if we were engaged in a work on sacred history2 and there are others1 on the contrary1 which we should assume as true by our own right and without notice1 and without which we could not set about or carry on our work4 7#a7 ,however1 the right of making assumptions has been disputed2 but1 when the objections are examined1 ,i think they only go to show that we have no right in argument to make any assumption we please4 ,thus1 in the historical researches which just now came before us1 it seems fair to say that no testimony should be received1 except such as comes from competent witnesses1 while it is not unfair to urge1 on the other side1 that tradition1 though unauthenticated1 being 7what is called7 in possession1 has a prescription in its favour1 and may1 prim facie1 or provisionally1 be received4 ,here are the materials of a fair dispute2 but there are writers who seem to have gone far beyond this reasonable scepticism1 laying down as a general proposition that we have no right in philosophy to make any assumption whatever1 and that we ought to begin with a universal doubt4 ,this1 however1 is of all assumptions the greatest1 and to forbid assumptions universally is to forbid this one in particular4 ,doubt itself is a positive state1 and implies a definite habit of mind1 and thereby necessarily involves a system of principles and doctrines all its own4 ,again1 if nothing is to be assumed1 what is our very method of reasoning but an assumption8 and what our nature itself8 ,the very sense of pleasure and pain1 which is one of the most intimate portions of ourselves1 inevitably translates itself into intellectual assumptions4 ,of the two1 ,i would rather have to maintain that we ought to begin with believing everything that is offered to our acceptance1 than that it is our duty to doubt of everything4 ,the former1 indeed1 seems the true way of learning4 ,in that case1 we soon discover and discard what is contradictory to itself2 and error having always some portion of truth in it1 and the truth having a reality which error has not1 we may expect1 that when there is an honest purpose and fair talents1 we shall somehow make our way forward1 the error falling off from the mind1 and the truth developing and occupying it4 ,thus it is that the ,catholic religion is reached1 as we see1 by inquirers from all points of the compass1 as if it mattered not where a man began1 so that he had an eye and a heart for the truth4 7#b7 ,an argument has been often put forward by unbelievers1 ,i think by ,paine1 to this effect1 that 8a revelation1 which is to be received as true1 ought to be written on the sun40 ,this appeals to the common-sense of the many with great force1 and implies the assumption of a principle which ,butler1 indeed1 would not grant1 and would consider unphilosophical1 and yet ,i think something may be said in its favour4 ,whether abstractedly defensible or not1 ,catholic populations would not be averse1 mutatis mutandis1 to admitting it4 ,till these last centuries1 the ,visible ,church was1 at least to her children1 the light of the world1 as conspicuous as the sun in the heavens2 and the ,creed was written on her forehead1 and proclaimed through her voice1 by a teaching as precise as it was emphatical2 in accordance with the text1 8,who is she that looketh forth at the dawn1 fair as the moon1 bright as the sun1 terrible as an army set in array80 ,it was not1 strictly speaking1 a miracle1 doubtless2 but in its effect1 nay1 in its circumstances1 it was little less4 ,of course ,i would not allow that the ,church fails in this manifestation of the truth now1 any more than in former times1 though the clouds have come over the sun2 for what she has lost in her appeal to the imagination1 she has gained in philosophical cogency1 by the evidence of her persistent vitality4 ,so far is clear1 that if ,paine's aphorism has a prim facie force against ,christianity1 it owes this advantage to the miserable deeds of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries4 7#c7 ,another conflict of first principles or assumptions1 which have often been implicit on either side1 has been carried through in our day1 and relates to the end and scope of civil society1 that is1 whether government and legislation ought to be of a religious character1 or not2 whether the state has a conscience2 whether ,christianity is the law of the land2 whether the magistrate1 in punishing offenders1 exercises a retributive office or a corrective2 or whether the whole structure of society is raised upon the basis of secular expediency4 ,the relation of philosophy and the sciences to theology comes into the question4 ,the old time-honoured theory has1 during the last forty years1 been vigorously contending with the new2 and the new is in the ascendant4 7#d7 ,there is another great conflict of first principles1 and that among ,christians1 which has occupied a large space in our domestic history1 during the last thirty or forty years1 and that is the controversy about the ,rule of ,faith4 ,i notice it as affording an instance of an assumption so deeply sunk into the popular mind1 that it is a work of great difficulty to obtain from its maintainers an acknowledgment that it is an assumption4 ,that ,scripture is the ,rule of ,faith is in fact an assumption so congenial to the state of mind and course of thought usual among ,protestants1 that it seems to them rather a truism than a truth4 ,if they are in controversy with ,catholics on any point of faith1 they at once ask1 8,where do you find it in ,scripture80 and if ,catholics reply1 as they must do1 that it is not necessarily in ,scripture in order to be true1 nothing can persuade them that such an answer is not an evasion1 and a triumph to themselves4 ,yet it is by no means self-evident that all religious truth is to be found in a number of works1 however sacred1 which were written at different times1 and did not always form one book2 and in fact it is a doctrine very hard to prove4 ,so much so1 that years ago1 when ,i was considering it from a ,protestant point of view1 and wished to defend it to the best of my power1 ,i was unable to give any better account of it than the following1 which ,i here quote from its appositeness to my present subject4 8,it matters not10 ,i said1 speaking of the first ,protestants1 8whether or not they only happened to come right on what1 in a logical point of view1 are faulty premisses4 ,they had no time for theories of any kind2 and to require theories at their hand argues an ignorance of human nature1 and of the ways in which truth is struck out in the course of life4 ,common sense1 chance1 moral perception1 genius1 the great discoverers of principles do not reason4 ,they have no arguments1 no grounds1 they see the truth1 but they do not know how they see it2 and if at any time they attempt to prove it1 it is as much a matter of experiment with them1 as if they had to find a road to a distant mountain1 which they see with the eye2 and they get entangled1 embarrassed1 and perchance overthrown in the superfluous endeavour4 ,it is the second-rate men1 though most useful in their place1 who prove1 reconcile1 finish1 and explain4 ,probably1 the popular feeling of the sixteenth century saw the ,bible to be the ,word of ,god1 so as nothing else is ,his ,word1 by the power of a strong sense1 by a sort of moral instinct1 or by a happy augury47#cc70 ,that is1 ,i considered the assumption an act of the ,illative ,sense2--,i should now add1 the ,illative ,sense1 acting on mistaken elements of thought4 #c4 ,after the aspects in which a question is to be viewed1 and the principles on which it is to be considered1 come the arguments by which it is decided2 among these are antecedent reasons1 which are especially in point here1 because they are in great measure made by ourselves and belong to our personal character1 and to them ,i shall confine myself4 ,antecedent reasoning1 when negative1 is safe4 ,thus no one would say that1 because ,alexander's rash heroism is one of the leading characteristics of his history1 therefore we are justified1 except in writing a romance1 in asserting that at a particular time and place1 he distinguished himself by a certain exploit about which history is altogether silent2 but1 on the other hand1 his notorious bravery would be almost decisive against any charge against him of having on a particular occasion acted as a coward4 ,in like manner1 good character goes far in destroying the force of even plausible charges4 ,there is indeed a degree of evidence in support of an allegation1 against which reputation is no defence2 but it must be singularly strong to overcome an established antecedent probability which stands opposed to it4 ,thus historical personages or great authors1 men of high and pure character1 have had imputations cast upon them1 easy to make1 difficult or impossible to meet1 which are indignantly trodden under foot by all just and sensible men1 as being as anti-social as they are inhuman4 ,i need not add what a cruel and despicable part a husband or a son would play1 who readily listened to a charge against his wife or his father4 ,yet all this being admitted1 a great number of cases remain which are perplexing1 and on which we cannot adjust the claims of conflicting and heterogeneous arguments except by the keen and subtle operation of the ,illative ,sense4 ,butler's argument in his ,analogy is such a presumption used negatively4 ,objection being brought against certain characteristics of ,christianity1 he meets it by the presumption in their favour derived from their parallels as discoverable in the order of nature1 arguing that they do not tell against the ,divine origin of ,christianity1 unless they tell against the ,divine origin of the natural system also4 ,but he could not adduce it as a positive and direct proof of the ,divine origin of the ,christian doctrines that they had their parallels in nature1 or at the utmost as more than a recommendation of them to the religious inquirer4 ,unbelievers use the antecedent argument from the order of nature against our belief in miracles4 ,here1 if they only mean that the fact of that system of laws1 by which physical nature is governed1 makes it antecedently improbable that an exception should occur in it1 there is no objection to the argument2 but if1 as is not uncommon1 they mean that the fact of an established order is absolutely fatal to the very notion of an exception1 they are using a presumption as if it were a proof4 ,they are saying1--,what has happened #iii times one way cannot possibly happen on the #ajjjth time another way1 because what has happened #iii times one way is likely to happen in the same way on the #ajjjth4 ,if1 however1 they mean that the order of nature constitutes a physical necessity1 and that a law is an unalterable fate1 this is to assume the very point in debate1 and is much more than its antecedent probability4 ,facts cannot be proved by presumptions1 yet it is remarkable that in cases where nothing stronger than presumption was even professed1 scientific men have sometimes acted as if they thought this kind of argument1 taken by itself1 decisive of a fact which was in debate4 ,in the controversy about the ,plurality of worlds1 it has been considered1 on purely antecedent grounds1 as far as ,i see1 to be so necessary that the ,creator should have filled with living beings the luminaries which we see in the sky1 and the other cosmical bodies which we imagine there1 that it almost amounts to a blasphemy to doubt it4 ,theological conclusions1 it is true1 have often been made on antecedent reasoning2 but then it must be recollected that theological reasoning professes to be sustained by a more than human power1 and to be guaranteed by a more than human authority4 ,it may be true1 also1 that conversions to ,christianity have often been made on antecedent reasons2 yet1 even admitting the fact1 which is not quite clear1 a number of antecedent probabilities1 confirming each other1 may make it a duty in the judgment of a prudent man1 not only to act as if a statement were true1 but actually to accept and believe it4 ,this is not unfrequently instanced in our dealings with others1 when we feel it right1 in spite of our misgivings1 to oblige ourselves to believe their honesty4 ,and in all these delicate questions there is constant call for the exercise of the ,illative ,sense4 ,chapter ,x4 ,inference ,and ,assent ,in ,the ,matter ,of ,religion4 ,and now ,i have completed my review of the second subject to which ,i have given my attention in this ,essay1 the connexion existing between the intellectual acts of ,assent and ,inference1 my first being the connexion of ,assent with ,apprehension2 and as ,i closed my remarks upon ,assent and ,apprehension by applying the conclusions at which ,i had arrived to our belief in the ,truths of ,religion1 so now ,i ought to speak of its ,evidences1 before quitting the consideration of the dependence of ,assent upon ,inference4 ,i shall attempt to do so in this ,chapter1 not without much anxiety1 lest ,i should injure so large1 momentous1 and sacred a subject by a necessarily cursory treatment4 ,i begin with expressing a sentiment1 which is habitually in my thoughts1 whenever they are turned to the subject of mental or moral science1 and which ,i am as willing to apply here to the ,evidences of ,religion as it properly applies to ,metaphysics or ,ethics1 viz4 that in these provinces of inquiry egotism is true modesty4 ,in religious inquiry each of us can speak only for himself1 and for himself he has a right to speak4 ,his own experiences are enough for himself1 but he cannot speak for others3 he cannot lay down the law2 he can only bring his own experiences to the common stock of psychological facts4 ,he knows what has satisfied and satisfies himself2 if it satisfies him1 it is likely to satisfy others2 if1 as he believes and is sure1 it is true1 it will approve itself to others also1 for there is but one truth4 ,and doubtless he does find in fact1 that1 allowing for the difference of minds and of modes of speech1 what convinces him1 does convince others also4 ,there will be very many exceptions1 but these will admit of explanation4 ,great numbers of men refuse to inquire at all2 they put the subject of religion aside altogether2 others are not serious enough to care about questions of truth and duty and to entertain them2 and to numbers1 from their temper of mind1 or the absence of doubt1 or a dormant intellect1 it does not occur to inquire why or what they believe2 many1 though they tried1 could not do so in any satisfactory way4 ,this being the case1 it causes no uneasiness to any one who honestly attempts to set down his own view of the ,evidences of ,religion1 that at first sight he seems to be but one among many who are all in opposition to each other4 ,but1 however that may be1 he brings together his reasons1 and relies on them1 because they are his own1 and this is his primary evidence2 and he has a second ground of evidence1 in the testimony of those who agree with him4 ,but his best evidence is the former1 which is derived from his own thoughts2 and it is that which the world has a right to demand of him2 and therefore his true sobriety and modesty consists1 not in claiming for his conclusions an acceptance or a scientific approval which is not to be found anywhere1 but in stating what are personally his own grounds for his belief in ,natural and ,revealed ,religion1--grounds which he holds to be so sufficient1 that he thinks that others do hold them implicitly or in substance1 or would hold them1 if they inquired fairly1 or will hold if they listen to him1 or do not hold from impediments1 invincible or not as it may be1 into which he has no call to inquire4 ,however1 his own business is to speak for himself4 ,he uses the words of the ,samaritans to their countrywoman1 when our ,lord had remained with them for two days1 8,now we believe1 not for thy saying1 for we have heard ,him ourselves1 and know that this is indeed the ,saviour of the world40 ,in these words it is declared both that the ,gospel ,revelation is divine1 and that it carries with it the evidence of its divinity2 and this is of course the matter of fact4 ,however1 these two attributes need not have been united2 a revelation might have been really given1 yet given without credentials4 ,our ,supreme ,master might have imparted to us truths which nature cannot teach us1 without telling us that ,he had imparted them1 as is actually the case now1 as regards heathen countries1 into which portions of revealed truth overflow and penetrate1 without their populations knowing whence those truths came4 ,but the very idea of ,christianity in its profession and history1 is something more than this2 it is a 8,revelatio revelata20 it is a definite message from ,god to man distinctly conveyed by ,his chosen instruments1 and to be received as such a message2 and therefore to be positively acknowledged1 embraced1 and maintained as true1 on the ground of its being divine1 not as true on intrinsic grounds1 not as probably true1 or partially true1 but as absolutely certain knowledge1 certain in a sense in which nothing else can be certain1 because it comes from ,him who neither can deceive nor be deceived4 ,and the whole tenor of ,scripture from beginning to end is to this effect3 the matter of revelation is not a mere collection of truths1 not a philosophical view1 not a religious sentiment or spirit1 not a special morality1--poured out upon mankind as a stream might pour itself into the sea1 mixing with the world's thought1 modifying1 purifying1 invigorating it2--but an authoritative teaching1 which bears witness to itself and keeps itself together as one1 in contrast to the assemblage of opinions on all sides of it1 and speaks to all men1 as being ever and everywhere one and the same1 and claiming to be received intelligently1 by all whom it addresses1 as one doctrine1 discipline1 and devotion directly given from above4 ,in consequence1 the exhibition of credentials1 that is1 of evidence1 that it is what it professes to be1 is essential to ,christianity1 as it comes to us2 for we are not left at liberty to pick and choose out of its contents according to our judgment1 but must receive it all1 as we find it1 if we accept it at all4 ,it is a religion in addition to the religion of nature2 and as nature has an intrinsic claim upon us to be obeyed and used1 so what is over and above nature1 or supernatural1 must also bring with it valid testimonials of its right to demand our homage4 ,next1 as to its relation to nature4 ,as ,i have said1 ,christianity is simply an addition to it2 it does not supersede or contradict it2 it recognizes and depends on it1 and that of necessity3 for how possibly can it prove its claims except by an appeal to what men have already8 be it ever so miraculous1 it cannot dispense with nature2 this would be to cut the ground from under it2 for what would be the worth of evidences in favour of a revelation which denied the authority of that system of thought1 and those courses of reasoning1 out of which those evidences necessarily grew8 ,and in agreement with this obvious conclusion we find in ,scripture our ,lord and ,his ,apostles always treating ,christianity as the completion and supplement of ,natural ,religion1 and of previous revelations2 as when ,he says that the ,father testified of ,him2 that not to know ,him was not to know the ,father2 and as ,st4 ,paul at ,athens appeals to the 8,unknown ,god10 and says that 8,he that made the world0 8now declareth to all men to do penance1 because ,he hath appointed a day to judge the world by the man whom ,he hath appointed40 ,as then our ,lord and ,his ,apostles appeal to the ,god of nature1 we must follow them in that appeal2 and1 to do this with the better effect1 we must first inquire into the chief doctrines and the grounds of ,natural ,religion4 #a4 ,natural ,religion4 ,by ,religion ,i mean the knowledge of ,god1 of ,his ,will1 and of our duties towards ,him2 and there are three main channels which ,nature furnishes for our acquiring this knowledge1 viz4 our own minds1 the voice of mankind1 and the course of the world1 that is1 of human life and human affairs4 ,the informations which these three convey to us teach us the ,being and ,attributes of ,god1 our responsibility to ,him1 our dependence on ,him1 our prospect of reward or punishment1 to be somehow brought about1 according as we obey or disobey ,him4 ,and the most authoritative of these three means of knowledge1 as being specially our own1 is our own mind1 whose informations give us the rule by which we test1 interpret1 and correct what is presented to us for belief1 whether by the universal testimony of mankind1 or by the history of society and of the world4 ,our great internal teacher of religion is1 as ,i have said in an earlier part of this ,essay1 our ,conscience47#cd7 ,conscience is a personal guide1 and ,i use it because ,i must use myself2 ,i am as little able to think by any mind but my own as to breathe with another's lungs4 ,conscience is nearer to me than any other means of knowledge4 ,and as it is given to me1 so also is it given to others2 and being carried about by every individual in his own breast1 and requiring nothing besides itself1 it is thus adapted for the communication to each separately of that knowledge which is most momentous to him individually1--adapted for the use of all classes and conditions of men1 for high and low1 young and old1 men and women1 independently of books1 of educated reasoning1 of physical knowledge1 or of philosophy4 ,conscience1 too1 teaches us1 not only that ,god is1 but what ,he is2 it provides for the mind a real image of ,him1 as a medium of worship2 it gives us a rule of right and wrong1 as being ,his rule1 and a code of moral duties4 ,moreover1 it is so constituted that1 if obeyed1 it becomes clearer in its injunctions1 and wider in their range1 and corrects and completes the accidental feebleness of its initial teachings4 ,conscience1 then1 considered as our guide1 is fully furnished for its office4 ,i say all this without entering into the question how far external assistances are in all cases necessary to the action of the mind1 because in fact man does not live in isolation1 but is everywhere found as a member of society4 ,i am not concerned here with abstract questions4 ,now ,conscience suggests to us many things about that ,master1 whom by means of it we perceive1 but its most prominent teaching1 and its cardinal and distinguishing truth1 is that ,he is our ,judge4 ,in consequence1 the special ,attribute under which it brings ,him before us1 to which it subordinates all other ,attributes1 is that of justice--retributive justice4 ,we learn from its informations to conceive of the ,almighty1 primarily1 not as a ,god of ,wisdom1 of ,knowledge1 of ,power1 of ,benevolence1 but as a ,god of ,judgment and ,justice2 as ,one1 who not simply for the good of the offender1 but as an end good in itself1 and as a principle of government1 ordains that the offender should suffer for his offence4 ,if it tells us anything at all of the characteristics of the ,divine ,mind1 it certainly tells us this2 and1 considering that our shortcomings are far more frequent and important than our fulfilment of the duties enjoined upon us1 and that of this point we are fully aware ourselves1 it follows that the aspect under which ,almighty ,god is presented to us by ,nature1 is 7to use a figure7 of ,one who is angry with us1 and threatens evil4 ,hence its effect is to burden and sadden the religious mind1 and is in contrast with the enjoyment derivable from the exercise of the affections1 and from the perception of beauty1 whether in the material universe or in the creations of the intellect4 ,this is that fearful antagonism brought out with such soul-piercing reality by ,lucretius1 when he speaks so dishonourably of what he considers the heavy yoke of religion1 and the 8ternas pnas in morte timendum20 and1 on the other hand1 rejoices in his 8,alma ,venus10 8qu rerum naturam sola gubernas40 ,and we may appeal to him for the fact1 while we repudiate his view of it4 ,such being the prim facie aspect of religion which the teachings of ,conscience bring before us individually1 in the next place let us consider what are the doctrines1 and what the influences of religion1 as we find it embodied in those various rites and devotions which have taken root in the many races of mankind1 since the beginning of history1 and before history1 all over the earth4 ,of these also ,lucretius gives us a specimen2 and they accord in form and complexion with that doctrine about duty and responsibility1 which he so bitterly hates and loathes4 ,it is scarcely necessary to insist1 that wherever ,religion exists in a popular shape1 it has almost invariably worn its dark side outwards4 ,it is founded in one way or other on the sense of sin2 and without that vivid sense it would hardly have any precepts or any observances4 ,its many varieties all proclaim or imply that man is in a degraded1 servile condition1 and requires expiation1 reconciliation1 and some great change of nature4 ,this is suggested to us in the many ways in which we are told of a realm of light and a realm of darkness1 of an elect fold and a regenerate state4 ,it is suggested in the almost ubiquitous and ever-recurring institution of a ,priesthood2 for wherever there is a priest1 there is the notion of sin1 pollution1 and retribution1 as1 on the other hand1 of intercession and mediation4 ,also1 still more directly1 is the notion of our guilt impressed upon us by the doctrine of future punishment1 and that eternal1 which is found in mythologies and creeds of such various parentage4 ,of these distinct rites and doctrines embodying the severe side of ,natural ,religion1 the most remarkable is that of atonement1 that is1 8a substitution of something offered1 or some personal suffering1 for a penalty which would otherwise be exacted20 most remarkable1 ,i say1 both from its close connexion with the notion of vicarious satisfaction1 and1 on the other hand1 from its universality4 8,the practice of atonement10 says the author1 whose definition of the word ,i have just given1 8is remarkable for its antiquity and universality1 proved by the earliest records that have come down to us of all nations1 and by the testimony of ancient and modern travellers4 ,in the oldest books of the ,hebrew ,scriptures1 we have numerous instances of expiatory rites1 where atonement is the prominent feature4 ,at the earliest date1 to which we can carry our inquiries by means of the heathen records1 we meet with the same notion of atonement4 ,if we pursue our inquiries through the accounts left us by the ,greek and ,roman writers of the barbarous nations with which they were acquainted1 from ,india to ,britain1 we shall find the same notions and similar practices of atonement4 ,from the most popular portion of our own literature1 our narratives of voyages and travels1 every one1 probably1 who reads at all will be able to find for himself abundant proof that the notion has been as permanent as it is universal4 ,it shows itself among the various tribes of ,africa1 the islanders of the ,south ,seas1 and even that most peculiar race1 the natives of ,australia1 either in the shape of some offering1 or some mutilation of the person47#ce70 ,these ceremonial acknowledgments1 in so many distinct forms of worship1 of the existing degradation of the human race1 of course imply a brighter1 as well as a threatening aspect of ,natural ,religion2 for why should men adopt any rites of deprecation or of purification at all1 unless they had some hope of attaining to a better condition than their present8 ,of this happier side of religion ,i will speak presently2 here1 however1 a question of another kind occurs1 viz4 whether the notion of atonement can be admitted among the doctrines of ,natural ,religion1--,i mean1 on the ground that it is inconsistent with those teachings of ,conscience1 which ,i have recognized above1 as the rule and corrective of every other information on the subject4 ,if there is any truth brought home to us by conscience1 it is this1 that we are personally responsible for what we do1 that we have no means of shifting our responsibility1 and that dereliction of duty involves punishment2 how1 it may be asked1 can acts of ours of any kind--how can even amendment of life--undo the past8 ,and if even our own subsequent acts of obedience bring with them no promise of reversing what has once been committed1 how can external rites1 or the actions of another 7as of a priest71 be substitutes for that punishment which is the connatural fruit and intrinsic development of violation of the sense of duty8 ,i think this objection avails as far as this1 that amendment is no reparation1 and that no ceremonies or penances can in themselves exercise any vicarious virtue in our behalf2 and that1 if they avail1 they only avail in the intermediate season of probation2 that in some way we must make them our own2 and that1 when the time comes1 which conscience forebodes1 of our being called to judgment1 then1 at least1 we shall have to stand in and by ourselves1 whatever we shall have by that time become1 and must bear our own burden4 ,but it is plain that in this final account1 as it lies between us and our ,master1 ,he alone can decide how the past and the present will stand together who is our ,creator and our ,judge4 ,in thus making it a necessary point to adjust the religions of the world with the intimations of our conscience1 ,i am suggesting the reason why ,i confine myself to such religions as have had their rise in barbarous times1 and do not recognize the religion of what is called civilization1 as having legitimately a part in the delineation of ,natural ,religion4 ,it may at first sight seem strange1 that1 considering ,i have laid such stress upon the progressive nature of man1 ,i should take my ideas of his religion from his initial1 and not his final testimony about its doctrines2 and it may be urged that the religion of civilized times is quite opposite in character to the rites and traditions of barbarians1 and has nothing of that gloom and sternness1 on which ,i have insisted as their characteristic4 ,thus the ,greek ,mythology was for the most part cheerful and graceful1 and the new gods certainly more genial and indulgent than the old ones4 ,and1 in like manner1 the religion of philosophy is more noble and more humane than those primitive conceptions which were sufficient for early kings and warriors4 ,but my answer to this objection is obvious3 the progress of which man's nature is capable is a development1 not a destruction of its original state2 it must subserve the elements from which it proceeds1 in order to be a true development and not a perversion47#cf7 ,and it does in fact subserve and complete that nature with which man is born4 ,it is otherwise with the religion of so-called civilization2 such religion does but contradict the religion of barbarism2 and since this civilization itself is not a development of man's whole nature1 but mainly of the intellect1 recognizing indeed the moral sense1 but ignoring the conscience1 no wonder that the religion in which it issues has no sympathy either with the hopes and fears of the awakened soul1 or with those frightful presentiments which are expressed in the worship and traditions of the heathen4 ,this artificial religion1 then1 has no place in the inquiry2 first1 because it comes of a one-sided progress of mind1 and next1 for the very reason that it contradicts informants which speak with greater authority than itself4 ,now we come to the third natural informant on the subject of ,religion2 ,i mean the system and the course of the world4 ,this established order of things1 in which we find ourselves1 if it has a ,creator1 must surely speak of ,his will in its broad outlines and its main issues4 ,this principle being laid down as certain1 when we come to apply it to things as they are1 our first feeling is one of surprise and 7,i may say7 of dismay1 that ,his control of the world is so indirect1 and ,his action so obscure4 ,this is the first lesson that we gain from the course of human affairs4 ,what strikes the mind so forcibly and so painfully is1 ,his absence 7if ,i may so speak7 from ,his own world47#cg7 ,it is a silence that speaks4 ,it is as if others had got possession of ,his work4 ,why does not ,he1 our ,maker and ,ruler1 give us some immediate knowledge of ,himself8 ,why does ,he not write ,his ,moral ,nature in large letters upon the face of history1 and bring the blind1 tumultuous rush of its events into a celestial1 hierarchical order8 ,why does ,he not grant us in the structure of society at least so much of a revelation of ,himself as the religions of the heathen attempt to supply8 ,why from the beginning of time has no one uniform steady light guided all families of the earth1 and all individual men1 how to please ,him8 ,why is it possible without absurdity to deny ,his will1 ,his attributes1 ,his existence8 ,why does ,he not walk with us one by one1 as ,he is said to have walked with ,his chosen men of old time8 ,we both see and know each other2 why1 if we cannot have the sight of ,him1 have we not at least the knowledge8 ,on the contrary1 ,he is specially 8a ,hidden ,god20 and with our best efforts we can only glean from the surface of the world some faint and fragmentary views of ,him4 ,i see only a choice of alternatives in explanation of so critical a fact3--either there is no ,creator1 or ,he has disowned ,his creatures4 ,are then the dim shadows of ,his ,presence in the affairs of men but a fancy of our own1 or1 on the other hand1 has ,he hid ,his face and the light of ,his countenance1 because we have in some special way dishonoured ,him8 ,my true informant1 my burdened conscience1 gives me at once the true answer to each of these antagonist questions3--it pronounces without any misgiving that ,god exists3--and it pronounces quite as surely that ,i am alienated from ,him2 that 8,his ,hand is not shortened1 but that our iniquities have divided between us and our ,god40 ,thus it solves the world's mystery1 and sees in that mystery only a confirmation of its own original teaching4 ,let us pass on to another great fact of experience1 bearing on ,religion1 which confirms this testimony both of conscience and of the forms of worship which prevail among mankind2--,i mean1 the amount of suffering1 bodily and mental1 which is our portion in this life4 ,not only is the ,creator far off1 but some being of malignant nature seems1 as ,i have said1 to have got hold of us1 and to be making us his sport4 ,let us say there are a thousand millions of men on the earth at this time2 who can weigh and measure the aggregate of pain which this one generation has endured and will endure from birth to death8 ,then add to this all the pain which has fallen and will fall upon our race through centuries past and to come4 ,is there not then some great gulf fixed between us and the good ,god8 ,here again the testimony of the system of nature is more than corroborated by those popular traditions about the unseen state1 which are found in mythologies and superstitions1 ancient and modern2 for those traditions speak1 not only of present misery1 but of pain and evil hereafter1 and even without end4 ,but this dreadful addition is not necessary for the conclusion which ,i am here wishing to draw4 ,the real mystery is1 not that evil should never have an end1 but that it should ever have had a beginning4 ,even a universal restitution could not undo what had been1 or account for evil being the necessary condition of good4 ,how are we to explain it1 the existence of ,god being taken for granted1 except by saying that another will1 besides ,his1 has had a part in the disposition of ,his work1 that there is an intractable quarrel1 a chronic alienation1 between ,god and man8 ,i have implied that the laws on which this world is governed do not go so far as to prove that evil will never die out of the creation2 nevertheless1 they look in that direction4 ,no experience indeed of life can assure us about the future1 but it can and does give us means of conjecturing what is likely to be2 and those conjectures coincide with our natural forebodings4 ,experience enables us to ascertain the moral constitution of man1 and thereby to presage his future from his present4 ,it teaches us1 first1 that he is not sufficient for his own happiness1 but is dependent upon the sensible objects which surround him1 and that these he cannot take with him when he leaves the world2 secondly1 that disobedience to his sense of right is even by itself misery1 and that he carries that misery about him1 wherever he is1 though no divine retribution followed upon it2 and thirdly1 that he cannot change his nature and his habits by wishing1 but is simply himself1 and will ever be himself and what he now is1 wherever he is1 as long as he continues to be1--or at least that pain has no natural tendency to make him other than he is1 and that the longer he lives1 the more difficult he is to change4 ,how can we meet these not irrational anticipations1 except by shutting our eyes1 turning away from them1 and saying that we have no call1 no right1 to think of them at present1 or to make ourselves miserable about what is not certain1 and may be not true87#ch7 ,such is the severe aspect of ,natural ,religion3 also it is the most prominent aspect1 because the multitude of men follow their own likings and wills1 and not the decisions of their sense of right and wrong4 ,to them ,religion is a mere yoke1 as ,lucretius describes it2 not a satisfaction or refuge1 but a terror and a superstition4 ,however1 ,i must not for an instant be supposed to mean1 that this is its only1 its chief1 or its legitimate aspect4 ,all ,religion1 so far as it is genuine1 is a blessing1 ,natural as well as ,revealed4 ,i have insisted on its severe aspect in the first place1 because1 from the circumstances of human nature1 though not by the fault of ,religion1 such is the shape in which we first encounter it4 ,its large and deep foundation is the sense of sin and guilt1 and without this sense there is for man1 as he is1 no genuine religion4 ,otherwise1 it is but counterfeit and hollow2 and that is the reason why this so-called religion of civilization and philosophy is so great a mockery4 ,however1 true as this judgment is which ,i pass on philosophical religion1 and troubled as are the existing relations between ,god and man1 as both the voice of mankind and the facts of ,divine ,government testify1 equally true are other general laws which govern those relations1 and they speak another language1 and compensate for what is stern in the teaching of nature1 without tending to deny that sternness4 ,the first of these laws1 relieving the aspect of ,natural ,religion1 is the very fact that religious beliefs and institutions1 of some kind or other1 are of such general acceptance in all times and places4 ,why should men subject themselves to the tyranny which ,lucretius denounces1 unless they had either experience or hope of benefits to themselves by so doing8 ,though it be mere hope of benefits1 that alone is a great alleviation of the gloom and misery which their religious rites presuppose or occasion2 for thereby they have a prospect1 more or less clear1 of some happier state in reserve for them1 or at least the chances of it4 ,if they simply despaired of their fortunes1 they would not care about religion4 ,and hope of future good1 as we know1 sweetens all suffering4 ,moreover1 they have an earnest of that future in the real and recurring blessings of life1 the enjoyment of the gifts of the earth1 and of domestic affection and social intercourse1 which is sufficient to touch and to subdue even the most guilty of men in his better moments1 reminding him that he is not utterly cast off by ,him whom nevertheless he is not given to know4 ,or1 in the ,apostle's words1 though the ,creator once 8suffered all nations to walk in their own ways10 still1 8,he left not ,himself without testimony1 doing good from heaven1 giving rains and fruitful seasons1 filling our hearts with food and gladness40 ,nor are these blessings of physical nature the only tokens in the ,divine ,system1 which in that heathen time1 and indeed in every age1 bring home to our experience the fact of a ,good ,god1 in spite of the tumult and confusion of the world4 ,it is possible to give an interpretation to the course of things1 by which every event or occurrence in its order becomes providential3 and though that interpretation does not hold good unless the world is contemplated from a particular point of view1 in one given aspect1 and with certain inward experiences1 and personal first principles and judgments1 yet these may be fairly pronounced to be common conditions of human thought1 that is1 till they are wilfully or accidentally lost2 and they issue in fact1 in leading the great majority of men to recognize the ,hand of unseen power1 directing in mercy or in judgment the physical and moral system4 ,in the prominent events of the world1 past and contemporary1 the fate1 evil or happy1 of great men1 the rise and fall of states1 popular revolutions1 decisive battles1 the migration of races1 the replenishing of the earth1 earthquakes and pestilences1 critical discoveries and inventions1 the history of philosophy1 the advancement of knowledge1 in these the spontaneous piety of the human mind discerns a ,divine ,supervision4 ,nay1 there is a general feeling1 originating directly in the workings of conscience1 that a similar governance is extended over the persons of individuals1 who thereby both fulfil the purposes and receive the just recompenses of an ,omnipotent ,providence4 ,good to the good1 and evil to the evil1 is instinctively felt to be1 even from what we see1 amid whatever obscurity and confusion1 the universal rule of ,god's dealings with us4 ,hence come the great proverbs1 indigenous in both ,christian and heathen nations1 that punishment is sure1 though slow1 that murder will out1 that treason never prospers1 that pride will have a fall1 that honesty is the best policy1 and that curses fall on the heads of those who utter them4 ,to the unsophisticated apprehension of the many1 the successive passages of life1 social or political1 are so many miracles1 if that is to be accounted miraculous which brings before them the immediate ,divine ,presence2 and should it be objected that this is an illogical exercise of reason1 ,i answer1 that since it actually brings them to a right conclusion1 and was intended to bring them to it1 if logic finds fault with it1 so much the worse for logic4 ,again1 prayer is essential to religion1 and1 where prayer is1 there is a natural relief and solace in all trouble1 great or ordinary3 now prayer is not less general in mankind at large than is faith in ,providence4 ,it has ever been in use1 both as a personal and as a social practice4 ,here again1 if1 in order to determine what the ,religion of ,nature is1 we may justly have recourse to the spontaneous acts and proceedings of our race1 as viewed on a large field1 we may safely say that prayer1 as well as hope1 is a constituent of man's religion4 ,nor is it a fair objection to this argument1 to say that such prayers and rites as have obtained in various places and times1 are in their character1 object1 and scope inconsistent with each other2 because their contrarieties do not come into the idea of religion1 as such1 at all1 and the very fact of their discordance destroys their right to be taken into account1 so far as they are discordant2 for what is not universal has no claim to be considered natural1 right1 or of divine origin4 ,thus we may determine prayer to be part of ,natural ,religion1 from such instances of the usage as are supplied by the priests of ,baal and by dancing ,dervishes1 without therefore including in our notions of prayer the frantic excesses of the one1 or the artistic spinning of the other1 or sanctioning their respective objects of belief1 ,baal or ,mahomet4 ,as prayer is the voice of man to ,god1 so ,revelation is the voice of ,god to man4 ,accordingly1 it is another alleviation of the darkness and distress which weigh upon the religions of the world1 that in one way or other such religions are founded on some idea of express revelation1 coming from the unseen agents whose anger they deprecate2 nay1 that the very rites and observances1 by which they hope to gain the favour of these beings1 are by these beings themselves communicated and appointed4 ,the ,religion of ,nature is not a deduction of reason1 or the joint1 voluntary manifesto of a multitude meeting together and pledging themselves to each other1 as men move resolutions now for some political or social purpose1 but it is a tradition or an interposition vouchsafed to a people from above4 ,to such an interposition men even ascribed their civil polity or citizenship1 which did not originate in any plebiscite1 but in dii minores or heroes1 was inaugurated with portents or palladia1 and protected and prospered by oracles and auguries4 ,here is an evidence1 too1 how congenial the notion of a revelation is to the human mind1 so that the expectation of it may truly be considered an integral part of ,natural ,religion4 ,among the observances imposed by these professed revelations1 none is more remarkable1 or more general1 than the rite of sacrifice1 in which guilt was removed or blessing gained by an offering1 which availed instead of the merits of the offerer4 ,this1 too1 as well as the notion of divine interpositions1 may be considered almost an integral part of the ,religion of ,nature1 and an alleviation of its gloom4 ,but it does not stand by itself2 ,i have already spoken of the doctrine of atonement1 under which it falls1 and which1 if what is universal is natural1 enters into the idea of religious service4 ,and what the nature of man suggests1 the providential system of the world sanctions by enforcing4 ,it is the law1 or the permission1 given to our whole race1 to use the ,apostle's words1 to 8bear one another's burdens20 and this1 as ,i said when on the subject of ,atonement1 is quite consistent with his antithesis that 8every one must bear his own burden40 ,the final burden of responsibility when we are called to judgment is our own2 but among the media by which we are prepared for that judgment are the exertions and pains taken in our behalf by others4 ,on this vicarious principle1 by which we appropriate to ourselves what others do for us1 the whole structure of society is raised4 ,parents work and endure pain1 that their children may prosper2 children suffer for the sin of their parents1 who have died before it bore fruit4 8,delirant reges1 plectuntur ,achivi40 ,sometimes it is a compulsory1 sometimes a willing mediation4 ,the punishment which is earned by the husband falls upon the wife2 the benefits in which all classes partake are wrought out by the unhealthy or dangerous toil of the few4 ,soldiers endure wounds and death for those who sit at home2 and ministers of state fall victims to their zeal for their countrymen1 who do little else than criticize their actions4 ,and so in some measure or way this law embraces all of us4 ,we all suffer for each other1 and gain by each other's sufferings2 for man never stands alone here1 though he will stand by himself one day hereafter2 but here he is a social being1 and goes forward to his long home as one of a large company4 ,butler1 it need scarcely be said1 is the great master of this doctrine1 as it is brought out in the system of nature4 ,in answer to the objection to the ,christian doctrine of satisfaction1 that it 8represents ,god as indifferent whether ,he punishes the innocent or the guilty10 he observes that 8the world is a constitution or system1 whose parts have a mutual reference to each other2 and that there is a scheme of things gradually carrying on1 called the course of nature1 to the carrying on of which ,god has appointed us1 in various ways1 to contribute4 ,and in the daily course of natural providence1 it is appointed that innocent people should suffer for the faults of the guilty4 ,finally1 indeed and upon the whole1 every one shall receive according to his personal deserts2 but during the progress1 and1 for aught we know1 even in order to the completion of this moral scheme1 vicarious punishments may be fit1 and absolutely necessary4 ,we see in what variety of ways one person's sufferings contribute to the relief of another2 and being familiarized to it1 men are not shocked with it4 ,so the reason of their insisting on objections against the doctrine of satisfaction is1 either that they do not consider ,god's settled and uniform appointments as ,his appointments at all2 or else they forget that vicarious punishment is a providential appointment of every day's experience47#ci70 ,i will but add1 that1 since all human suffering is in its last resolution the punishment of sin1 and punishment implies a ,judge and a rule of justice1 he who undergoes the punishment of another in his stead may be said in a certain sense to satisfy the claims of justice towards that other in his own person4 ,one concluding remark has to be made here4 ,in all sacrifices it was specially required that the thing offered should be something rare1 and unblemished2 and in like manner in all atonements and all satisfactions1 not only was the innocent taken for the guilty1 but it was a point of special importance that the victim should be spotless1 and the more manifest that spotlessness1 the more efficacious was the sacrifice4 ,this leads me to a last principle which ,i shall notice as proper to ,natural ,religion1 and as lightening the prophecies of evil in which it is founded2 ,i mean the doctrine of meritorious intercession4 ,the man in the ,gospel did but speak for the human race everywhere1 when he said1 8,god heareth not sinners2 but if a man be a worshipper of ,god1 and doth ,his will1 him ,he heareth40 ,hence every religion has had its eminent devotees1 exalted above the body of the people1 mortified men1 brought nearer to the ,source of good by austerities1 self-inflictions1 and prayer1 who have influence with ,him1 and extend a shelter and gain blessings for those who become their clients4 ,a belief like this has been1 of course1 attended by numberless superstitions2 but those superstitions vary with times and places1 and the belief itself in the mediatorial power of the good and holy has been one and the same everywhere4 ,nor is this belief an idea of past times only or of heathen countries4 ,it is one of the most natural visions of the young and innocent4 ,and all of us1 the more keenly we feel our own distance from holy persons1 the more are we drawn near to them1 as if forgetting that distance1 and proud of them because they are so unlike ourselves1 as being specimens of what our nature may be1 and with some vague hope that we1 their relations by blood1 may profit in our own persons by their holiness4 ,such1 then1 in outline is that system of natural beliefs and sentiments1 which1 though true and divine1 is still possible to us independently of ,revelation1 and is the preparation for it2 though in ,christians themselves it cannot really be separated from their ,christianity1 and never is possessed in its higher forms in any people without some portion of those inward aids which ,christianity imparts to us1 and those endemic traditions which have their first origin in a paradisiacal illumination4 #b4 ,revealed ,religion4 ,in determining1 as above1 the main features of ,natural ,religion1 and distinguishing it from the religion of philosophy or civilization1 ,i may be accused of having taken a course of my own1 for which ,i have no sufficient warrant4 ,such an accusation does not give me much concern4 ,every one who thinks on these subjects takes a course of his own1 though it will also happen to be the course which others take besides himself4 ,the minds of many separately bear them forward in the same direction1 and they are confirmed in it by each other4 ,this ,i consider to be my own case2 if ,i have mis-stated or omitted notorious facts in my account of ,natural ,religion1 if ,i have contradicted or disregarded anything which ,he who speaks through my conscience has told us all directly from ,heaven1 then indeed ,i have acted unjustifiably and have something to unsay2 but1 if ,i have done no more than view the notorious facts of the case in the medium of my primary mental experiences1 under the aspects which they spontaneously present to me1 and with the aid of my best illative sense1 ,i only do on one side of the question what those who think differently do on the other4 ,as they start with one set of first principles1 ,i start with another4 ,i gave notice just now that ,i should offer my own witness in the matter in question2 though of course it would not be worth while my offering it1 unless what ,i felt myself agreed with what is felt by hundreds and thousands besides me1 as ,i am sure it does1 whatever be the measure1 more or less1 of their explicit recognition of it4 ,in thus speaking of ,natural ,religion as in one sense a matter of private judgment1 and that with a view of proceeding from it to the proof of ,christianity1 ,i seem to give up the intention of demonstrating either4 ,certainly ,i do2 not that ,i deny that demonstration is possible4 ,truth certainly1 as such1 rests upon grounds intrinsically and objectively and abstractedly demonstrative1 but it does not follow from this that the arguments producible in its favour are unanswerable and irresistible4 ,these latter epithets are relative1 and bear upon matters of fact2 arguments in themselves ought to do1 what perhaps in the particular case they cannot do4 ,the fact of revelation is in itself demonstrably true1 but it is not therefore true irresistibly2 else1 how comes it to be resisted8 ,there is a vast distance between what it is in itself1 and what it is to us4 ,light is a quality of matter1 as truth is of ,christianity2 but light is not recognized by the blind1 and there are those who do not recognize truth1 from the fault1 not of truth1 but of themselves4 ,i cannot convert men1 when ,i ask for assumptions which they refuse to grant to me2 and without assumptions no one can prove anything about anything4 ,i am suspicious then of scientific demonstrations in a question of concrete fact1 in a discussion between fallible men4 ,however1 let those demonstrate who have the gift2 8unusquisque in suo sensu abundet40 ,for me1 it is more congenial to my own judgment to attempt to prove ,christianity in the same informal way in which ,i can prove for certain that ,i have been born into this world1 and that ,i shall die out of it4 ,it is pleasant to my own feelings to follow a theological writer1 such as ,amort1 who has dedicated to the great ,pope1 ,benedict ,,xiv41 what he calls 8a new1 modest1 and easy way of demonstrating the ,catholic ,religion40 ,in this work he adopts the argument merely of the greater probability27#dj7 ,i prefer to rely on that of an accumulation of various probabilities2 but we both hold 7that is1 ,i hold with him71 that from probabilities we may construct legitimate proof1 sufficient for certitude4 ,i follow him in holding1 that1 since a ,good ,providence watches over us1 ,he blesses such means of argument as it has pleased ,him to give us1 in the nature of man and of the world1 if we use them duly for those ends for which ,he has given them2 and that1 as in mathematics we are justified by the dictate of nature in withholding our assent from a conclusion of which we have not yet a strict logical demonstration1 so by a like dictate we are not justified1 in the case of concrete reasoning and especially of religious inquiry1 in waiting till such logical demonstration is ours1 but on the contrary are bound in conscience to seek truth and to look for certainty by modes of proof1 which1 when reduced to the shape of formal propositions1 fail to satisfy the severe requisitions of science47#da7 ,here then at once is one momentous doctrine or principle1 which enters into my own reasoning1 and which another ignores1 viz4 the providence and intention of ,god2 and of course there are other principles1 explicit or implicit1 which are in like circumstances4 ,it is not wonderful then1 that1 while ,i can prove ,christianity divine to my own satisfaction1 ,i shall not be able to force it upon any one else4 ,multitudes indeed ,i ought to succeed in persuading of its truth without any force at all1 because they and ,i start from the same principles1 and what is a proof to me is a proof to them2 but if any one starts from any other principles but ours1 ,i have not the power to change his principles or the conclusion which he draws from them1 any more than ,i can make a crooked man straight4 ,whether his mind will ever grow straight1 whether ,i can do anything towards its becoming straight1 whether he is not responsible1 responsible to his ,maker1 for being mentally crooked1 is another matter2 still the fact remains1 that1 in any inquiry about things in the concrete1 men differ from each other1 not so much in the soundness of their reasoning as in the principles which govern its exercise1 that those principles are of a personal character1 that where there is no common measure of minds1 there is no common measure of arguments1 and that the validity of proof is determined1 not by any scientific test1 but by the illative sense4 ,accordingly1 instead of saying that the truths of ,revelation depend on those of ,natural ,religion1 it is more pertinent to say that belief in revealed truths depends on belief in natural4 ,belief is a state of mind2 belief generates belief2 states of mind correspond to each other2 the habits of thought and the reasonings which lead us on to a higher state of belief than our present1 are the very same which we already possess in connexion with the lower state4 ,those ,jews became ,christians in ,apostolic times who were already what may be called crypto-,christians2 and those ,christians in this day remain ,christian only in name1 and 7if it so happen7 at length fall away1 who are nothing deeper or better than men of the world1 savants1 literary men1 or politicians4 ,that a special preparation of mind is required for each separate department of inquiry and discussion 7excepting1 of course1 that of abstract science7 is strongly insisted upon in well-known passages of the ,nicomachean ,ethics4 ,speaking of the variations which are found in the logical perfection of proof in various subject-matters1 ,aristotle says1 8,a well-educated man will expect exactness in every class of subjects1 according as the nature of the thing admits2 for it is much the same mistake to put up with a mathematician using probabilities1 and to require demonstration of an orator4 ,each man judges skilfully in those things about which he is well-informed2 it is of these1 that he is a good judge2 viz4 he1 in each subject-matter1 is a judge1 who is well-educated in that subject-matter1 and he is in an absolute sense a judge1 who is in all of them well-educated40 ,again3 8,young men come to be mathematicians and the like1 but they cannot possess practical judgment2 for this talent is employed upon individual facts1 and these are learned only by experience2 and a youth has not experience1 for experience is only gained by a course of years4 ,and so1 again1 it would appear that a boy may be a mathematician1 but not a philosopher1 or learned in physics1 and for this reason1--because the one study deals with abstractions1 while the other studies gain their principles from experience1 and in the latter subjects youths do not give assent1 but make assertions1 but in the former they know what it is that they are handling40 ,these words of a heathen philosopher1 laying down broad principles about all knowledge1 express a general rule1 which in ,scripture is applied authoritatively to the case of revealed knowledge in particular2--and that not once or twice only1 but continually1 as is notorious4 ,for instance3--8,i have understood10 says the ,psalmist1 8more than all my teachers1 because ,thy testimonies are my meditation40 ,and so our ,lord3 8,he that hath ears1 let him hear40 8,if any man will do ,his will1 he shall know of the doctrine40 ,and 8,he that is of ,god1 heareth the words of ,god40 ,thus too the ,angels at the ,nativity announce 8,peace to men of good will40 ,and we read in the ,acts of the ,apostles of 8,lydia1 whose heart the ,lord opened to attend to those things which were said by ,paul40 ,and we are told on another occasion1 that 8as many as were ordained10 or disposed by ,god1 8to life everlasting1 believed40 ,and ,st4 ,john tells us1 8,he that knoweth ,god1 heareth us2 he that is not of ,god1 heareth us not2 by this we know the spirit of truth1 and the spirit of error40 #a4 ,relying then on these authorities1 human and ,divine1 ,i have no scruple in beginning the review ,i shall take of ,christianity by professing to consult for those only whose minds are properly prepared for it2 and by being prepared1 ,i mean to denote those who are imbued with the religious opinions and sentiments which ,i have identified with ,natural ,religion4 ,i do not address myself to those1 who in moral evil and physical see nothing more than imperfections of a parallel nature2 who consider that the difference in gravity between the two is one of degree only1 not of kind2 that moral evil is merely the offspring of physical1 and that as we remove the latter so we inevitably remove the former2 that there is a progress of the human race which tends to the annihilation of moral evil2 that knowledge is virtue1 and vice is ignorance2 that sin is a bugbear1 not a reality2 that the ,creator does not punish except in the sense of correcting2 that vengeance in ,him would of necessity be vindictiveness2 that all that we know of ,him1 be it much or little1 is through the laws of nature2 that miracles are impossible2 that prayer to ,him is a superstition2 that the fear of ,him is unmanly2 that sorrow for sin is slavish and abject2 that the only intelligible worship of ,him is to act well our part in the world1 and the only sensible repentance to do better in future2 that if we do our duties in this life1 we may take our chance for the next2 and that it is of no use perplexing our minds about the future state1 for it is all a matter of guess4 ,these opinions characterize a civilized age2 and if ,i say that ,i will not argue about ,christianity with men who hold them1 ,i do so1 not as claiming any right to be impatient or peremptory with any one1 but because it is plainly absurd to attempt to prove a second proposition to those who do not admit the first4 ,i assume then that the above system of opinion is simply false1 inasmuch as it contradicts the primary teachings of nature in the human race1 wherever a religion is found and its workings can be ascertained4 ,i assume the ,presence of ,god in our conscience1 and the universal experience1 as keen as our experience of bodily pain1 of what we call a sense of sin or guilt4 ,this sense of sin1 as of something not only evil in itself1 but an affront to the good ,god1 is chiefly felt as regards one or other of three violations of ,his ,law4 ,he ,himself is ,sanctity1 ,truth1 and ,love2 and the three offences against ,his ,majesty are impurity1 inveracity1 and cruelty4 ,all men are not distressed at these offences alike2 but the piercing pain and sharp remorse which one or other inflicts upon the mind1 till habituated to them1 brings home to it the notion of what sin is1 and is the vivid type and representative of its intrinsic hatefulness4 ,starting from these elements1 we may determine without difficulty the class of sentiments1 intellectual and moral1 which constitute the formal preparation for entering upon what are called the ,evidences of ,christianity4 ,these ,evidences1 then1 presuppose a belief and perception of the ,divine ,presence1 a recognition of ,his attributes and an admiration of ,his ,person viewed under them1 a conviction of the worth of the soul and of the reality and momentousness of the unseen world1 an understanding that1 in proportion as we partake in our own persons of the attributes which we admire in ,him1 we are dear to ,him1 a consciousness on the contrary that we are far from partaking them1 a consequent insight into our guilt and misery1 an eager hope of reconciliation to ,him1 a desire to know and to love ,him1 and a sensitive looking-out in all that happens1 whether in the course of nature or of human life1 for tokens1 if such there be1 of ,his bestowing on us what we so greatly need4 ,these are specimens of the state of mind for which ,i stipulate in those who would inquire into the truth of ,christianity2 and my warrant for so definite a stipulation lies in the teaching1 as ,i have described it1 of conscience and the moral sense1 in the testimony of those religious rites which have ever prevailed in all parts of the world1 and in the character and conduct of those who have commonly been selected by the popular instinct as the special favourites of ,heaven4 #b4 ,i have appealed to the popular ideas on the subject of religion1 and to the objects of popular admiration and praise1 as illustrating my account of the preparation of mind which is necessary for the inquirer into ,christianity4 ,here an obvious objection occurs1 in noticing which ,i shall be advanced one step farther in the work which ,i have undertaken4 ,it may be urged1 then1 that no appeal will avail me1 which is made to religions so notoriously immoral as those of paganism2 nor indeed can it be made without an explanation4 ,certainly1 as regards ethical teaching1 various religions1 which have been popular in the world1 have not supplied any2 and in the corrupt state in which they appear in history1 they are little better than schools of imposture1 cruelty1 and impurity4 ,their objects of worship were immoral as well as false1 and their founders and heroes have been in keeping with their gods4 ,this is undeniable1 but it does not destroy the use that may be made of their testimony4 ,there is a better side of their teaching2 purity has often been held in reverence1 if not practised2 ascetics have been in honour2 hospitality has been a sacred duty2 and dishonesty and injustice have been under a ban4 ,here then1 as before1 ,i take our natural perception of right and wrong as the standard for determining the characteristics of ,natural ,religion1 and ,i use the religious rites and traditions which are actually found in the world1 only so far as they agree with our moral sense4 ,this leads me to lay down the general principle1 which ,i have all along implied3--that no religion is from ,god which contradicts our sense of right and wrong4 ,doubtless2 but at the same time we ought to be quite sure that1 in a particular case which is before us1 we have satisfactorily ascertained what the dictates of our moral nature are1 and that we apply them rightly1 and whether the applying them or not comes into question at all4 ,the precepts of a religion certainly may be absolutely immoral2 a religion which simply commanded us to lie1 or to have a community of wives1 would ipso facto forfeit all claim to a divine origin4 ,jupiter and ,neptune1 as represented in the classical mythology1 are evil spirits1 and nothing can make them otherwise4 ,and ,i should in like manner repudiate a theology which taught that men were created in order to be wicked and wretched4 ,i alluded just now to those who consider the doctrine of retributive punishment1 or of divine vengeance1 to be incompatible with the true religion2 but ,i do not see how they can maintain their ground4 ,in order to do so1 they have first to prove that an act of vengeance must1 as such1 be a sin in our own instance2 but even this is far from clear4 ,anger and indignation against cruelty and injustice1 resentment of injuries1 desire that the false1 the ungrateful1 and the depraved should meet with punishment1 these1 if not in themselves virtuous feelings1 are at least not vicious2 but1 first from the certainty that1 if habitual1 it will run into excess and become sin1 and next because the office of punishment has not been committed to us1 and further because it is a feeling unsuitable to those who are themselves so laden with imperfection and guilt1 therefore vengeance1 in itself allowable1 is forbidden to us4 ,these exceptions do not hold in the case of a perfect being1 and certainly not in the instance of the ,supreme ,judge4 ,moreover1 we see that even men on earth have different duties1 according to their personal qualifications and their positions in the community4 ,the rule of morals is the same for all2 and yet1 notwithstanding1 what is right in one is not necessarily right in another4 ,what would be a crime in a private man to do1 is a crime in a magistrate not to have done2 still wider is the difference between man and his ,maker4 ,nor must it be forgotten1 that1 as ,i have observed above1 retributive justice is the very attribute under which ,god is primarily brought before us in the teachings of our natural conscience4 ,and further1 we cannot determine the character of particular actions1 till we have the whole case before us out of which they arise2 unless1 indeed1 they are in themselves distinctively vicious4 ,we all feel the force of the maxim1 8,audi alteram partem40 ,it is difficult to trace the path and to determine the scope of ,divine ,providence4 ,we read of a day when the ,almighty will condescend to place ,his actions in their completeness before ,his creatures1 and 8will overcome when ,he is judged40 ,if1 till then1 we feel it to be a duty to suspend our judgment concerning certain of ,his actions or precepts1 we do no more than what we do every day in the case of an earthly friend or enemy1 whose conduct in some point requires explanation4 ,it surely is not too much to expect of us that we should act with parallel caution1 and be 8memores conditionis nostr0 as regards the acts of our ,creator4 ,there is a poem of ,parnell's which strikingly brings home to us how differently the divine appointments will look in the light of day1 from what they appear to be in our present twilight4 ,an ,angel1 in disguise of a man1 steals a golden cup1 strangles an infant1 and throws a guide into the stream1 and then explains to his horrified companion1 that acts which would be enormities in man1 are in him1 as ,god's minister1 deeds of merciful correction or of retribution4 ,moreover1 when we are about to pass judgment on the dealings of ,providence with other men1 we shall do well to consider first ,his dealings with ourselves4 ,we cannot know about others1 about ourselves we do know something2 and we know that ,he has ever been good to us1 and not severe4 ,is it not wise to argue from what we actually know to what we do not know8 ,it may turn out in the day of account1 that unforgiven souls1 while charging ,his laws with injustice in the case of others1 may be unable to find fault with ,his dealings severally towards themselves4 ,as to those various religions which1 together with ,christianity1 teach the doctrine of eternal punishment1 here again we ought1 before we judge1 to understand1 not only the whole state of the case1 but what is meant by the doctrine itself4 ,eternity1 or endlessness1 is in itself only a negative idea1 though punishment is positive4 ,its fearful force1 as added to punishment1 lies in what it is not2 it means no change of state1 no annihilation1 no restoration4 ,but it cannot become a quality of punishment1 any more than a man's living seventy years is a quality of his mind1 or enters into the idea of his virtues or talents4 ,if punishment be attended by continuity1 by a sense of duration and succession1 by the mental presence of its past and its future1 by a sustained power of realizing it17#db7 this must be because it is endless and something more2 such inflictions are an addition to its endlessness1 and do not necessarily belong to it because it is endless4 ,as ,i have already said1 the great mystery is1 not that evil has no end1 but that it had a beginning4 ,but ,i submit the whole subject to the ,theological ,school4 #c4 ,one of the most important effects of ,natural ,religion on the mind1 in preparation for ,revealed1 is the anticipation which it creates1 that a ,revelation will be given4 ,that earnest desire of it1 which religious minds cherish1 leads the way to the expectation of it4 ,those who know nothing of the wounds of the soul1 are not led to deal with the question1 or to consider its circumstances2 but when our attention is roused1 then the more steadily we dwell upon it1 the more probable does it seem that a revelation has been or will be given to us4 ,this presentiment is founded on our sense1 on the one hand1 of the infinite goodness of ,god1 and1 on the other1 of our own extreme misery and need--two doctrines which are the primary constituents of ,natural ,religion4 ,it is difficult to put a limit to the legitimate force of this antecedent probability4 ,some minds will feel it so powerfully1 as to recognize in it almost a proof1 without direct evidence1 of the divinity of a religion claiming to be the true1 supposing its history and doctrine are free from positive objection1 and there be no rival religion with plausible claims of its own4 ,nor ought this trust in a presumption to seem preposterous to those who are so confident1 on priori grounds1 that the moon is inhabited by rational beings1 and that the course of nature is never crossed by miraculous agency4 ,any how1 very little positive evidence seems to be necessary1 when the mind is penetrated by the strong anticipation which ,i am supposing4 ,it was this instinctive apprehension1 as we may conjecture1 which carried on ,dionysius and ,damaris at ,athens to a belief in ,christianity1 though ,st4 ,paul did no miracle there1 and only asserted the doctrines of the ,divine ,unity1 the ,resurrection1 and the universal judgment1 while1 on the other hand1 it had had no tendency to attach them to any of the mythological rites in which the place abounded4 ,here my method of argument differs from that adopted by ,paley in his ,evidences of ,christianity4 ,this clear-headed and almost mathematical reasoner postulates1 for his proof of its miracles1 only thus much1 that1 under the circumstances of the case1 a revelation is not improbable4 ,he says1 8,we do not assume the attributes of the ,deity1 or the existence of a future state40 8,it is not necessary for our purpose that these propositions 7viz4 that a future existence should be destined by ,god for ,his human creation1 and that1 being so destined1 ,he should have acquainted them with it17 be capable of proof1 or even that1 by arguments drawn from the light of nature1 they can be made out as probable2 it is enough that we are able to say of them1 that they are not so violently improbable1 so contradictory to what we already believe of the divine power and character1 that they ought to be rejected at first sight1 and to be rejected by whatever strength or complication of evidence they be attested40 ,he has such confidence in the strength of the testimony which he can produce in favour of the ,christian miracles1 that he only asks to be allowed to bring it into court4 ,i confess to much suspicion of legal proceedings and legal arguments1 when used in questions whether of history or of philosophy4 ,rules of court are dictated by what is expedient on the whole and in the long run2 but they incur the risk of being unjust to the claims of particular cases4 ,why am ,i to begin with taking up a position not my own1 and unclothing my mind of that large outfit of existing thoughts1 principles1 likings1 desires1 and hopes1 which make me what ,i am8 ,if ,i am asked to use ,paley's argument for my own conversion1 ,i say plainly ,i do not want to be converted by a smart syllogism27#dc7 if ,i am asked to convert others by it1 ,i say plainly ,i do not care to overcome their reason without touching their hearts4 ,i wish to deal1 not with controversialists1 but with inquirers4 ,i think ,paley's argument clear1 clever1 and powerful2 and there is something which looks like charity in going out into the highways and hedges1 and compelling men to come in2 but in this matter some exertion on the part of the persons whom ,i am to convert is a condition of a true conversion4 ,they who have no religious earnestness are at the mercy1 day by day1 of some new argument or fact1 which may overtake them1 in favour of one conclusion or the other4 ,and how1 after all1 is a man better for ,christianity1 who has never felt the need of it or the desire8 ,on the other hand1 if he has longed for a revelation to enlighten him and to cleanse his heart1 why may he not use1 in his inquiries after it1 that just and reasonable anticipation of its probability1 which such longing has opened the way to his entertaining8 ,men are too well inclined to sit at home1 instead of stirring themselves to inquire whether a revelation has been given2 they expect its evidences to come to them without their trouble2 they act1 not as suppliants1 but as judges47#dd7 ,modes of argument such as ,paley's1 encourage this state of mind2 they allow men to forget that revelation is a boon1 not a debt on the part of the ,giver2 they treat it as a mere historical phenomenon4 ,if ,i was told that some great man1 a foreigner1 whom ,i did not know1 had come into town1 and was on his way to call on me1 and to go over my house1 ,i should send to ascertain the fact1 and meanwhile should do my best to put my house into a condition to receive him4 ,he would not be pleased if ,i left the matter to take its chance1 and went on the maxim that seeing was believing4 ,like this is the conduct of those who resolve to treat the ,almighty with dispassionateness1 a judicial temper1 clearheadedness1 and candour4 ,it is the way with some men1 7surely not a good way17 to say1 that without these lawyerlike qualifications conversion is immoral4 ,it is their way1 a miserable way1 to pronounce that there is no religious love of truth where there is fear of error4 ,on the contrary1 ,i would maintain that the fear of error is simply necessary to the genuine love of truth4 ,no inquiry comes to good which is not conducted under a deep sense of responsibility1 and of the issues depending upon its determination4 ,even the ordinary matters of life are an exercise of conscientiousness2 and where conscience is1 fear must be4 ,so much is this acknowledged just now1 that there is almost an affectation1 in popular literature1 in the case of criticisms on the fine arts1 on poetry1 and music1 of speaking about conscientiousness in writing1 painting1 or singing2 and that earnestness and simplicity of mind1 which makes men fear to go wrong in these minor matters1 has surely a place in the most serious of all undertakings4 ,it is on these grounds that1 in considering ,christianity1 ,i start with conditions different from ,paley's2 not1 however1 as undervaluing the force and the serviceableness of his argument1 but as preferring inquiry to disputation in a question about truth4 #d4 ,there is another point on which my basis of argument differs from ,paley's4 ,he argues on the principle that the credentials1 which ascertain for us a message from above1 are necessarily in their nature miraculous2 nor have ,i any thought of venturing to say otherwise4 ,in fact1 all professed revelations have been attended1 in one shape or another1 with the profession of miracles2 and we know how direct and unequivocal are the miracles of both the ,jewish ,covenant and of our own4 ,however1 my object here is to assume as little as possible as regards facts1 and to dwell only on what is patent and notorious2 and therefore ,i will only insist on those coincidences and their cumulations1 which1 though not in themselves miraculous1 do irresistibly force upon us1 almost by the law of our nature1 the presence of the extraordinary agency of ,him whose being we already acknowledge4 ,though coincidences rise out of a combination of general laws1 there is no law of those coincidences27#de7 they have a character of their own1 and seem left by ,providence in ,his own hands1 as the channel by which1 inscrutable to us1 ,he may make known to us ,his will4 ,for instance1 if ,i am a believer in a ,god of ,truth and ,avenger of dishonesty1 and know for certain that a market-woman1 after calling on ,him to strike her dead if she had in her possession a piece of money not hers1 did fall down dead on the spot1 and that the money was found in her hand1 how can ,i call this a blind coincidence1 and not discern in it an act of ,providence over and above its general laws8 ,so1 certainly1 thought the inhabitants of an ,english town1 when they erected a pillar as a record of such an event at the place where it occurred4 ,and if a ,pope excommunicates a great conqueror2 and he1 on hearing the threat1 says to one of his friends1 8,does he think the world has gone back a thousand years8 does he suppose the arms will fall from the hands of my soldiers80 and within two years1 on the retreat over the snows of ,russia1 as two contemporary historians relate1 8famine and cold tore their arms from the grasp of the soldiers10 8they fell from the hands of the bravest and most robust10 and 8destitute of the power of raising them from the ground1 the soldiers left them in the snow20 is not this too1 though no miracle1 a coincidence so special1 as rightly to be called a ,divine judgment8 ,so thinks ,alison1 who avows with religious honesty1 that 8there is something in these marvellous coincidences beyond the operation of chance1 and which even a ,protestant historian feels himself bound to mark for the observation of future years47#df70 ,and so1 too1 of a cumulation of coincidences1 separately less striking2 when ,spelman sets about establishing the fact of the ill-fortune which in a multitude of instances has followed upon acts of sacrilege1 then1 even though in many instances it has not followed1 and in many instances he exaggerates1 still there may be a large residuum of cases which cannot be properly resolved into the mere accident of concurrent causes1 but must in reason be considered the warning voice of ,god4 ,so1 at least1 thought ,gibson1 ,bishop of ,london1 when he wrote1 8,many of the instances1 and those too well-attested1 are so terrible in the event1 and in the circumstances so surprising1 that no considering person can well pass them over40 ,i think1 then1 that the circumstances under which a professed revelation comes to us1 may be such as to impress both our reason and our imagination with a sense of its truth1 even though no appeal be made to strictly miraculous intervention--in saying which ,i do not mean of course to imply that those circumstances1 when traced back to their first origins1 are not the outcome of such intervention1 but that the miraculous intervention addresses us at this day in the guise of those circumstances2 that is1 of coincidences1 which are indications1 to the illative sense of those who believe in a ,moral ,governor1 of ,his immediate ,presence1 especially to those who in addition hold with me the strong antecedent probability that1 in ,his mercy1 ,he will thus supernaturally present ,himself to our apprehension4 #e4 ,now as to the fact2 has what is so probable in anticipation actually been granted to us1 or have we still to look out for it8 ,it is very plain1 supposing it has been granted1 which among all the religions of the world comes from ,god3 and if it is not that1 a revelation is not yet given1 and we must look forward to the future4 ,there is only one ,religion in the world which tends to fulfil the aspirations1 needs1 and foreshadowings of natural faith and devotion4 ,it may be said1 perhaps1 that1 educated in ,christianity1 ,i merely judge of it by its own principles2 but this is not the fact4 ,for1 in the first place1 ,i have taken my idea of what a revelation must be1 in good measure1 from the actual religions of the world2 and as to its ethics1 the ideas with which ,i come to it are derived not simply from the ,gospel1 but prior to it from heathen moralists1 whom ,fathers of the ,church and ,ecclesiastical writers have imitated or sanctioned2 and as to the intellectual position from which ,i have contemplated the subject1 ,aristotle has been my master4 ,besides1 ,i do not here single out ,christianity with reference simply to its particular doctrines or precepts1 but for a reason which is on the surface of its history4 ,it alone has a definite message addressed to all mankind4 ,as far as ,i know1 the religion of ,mahomet has brought into the world no new doctrine whatever1 except1 indeed1 that of its own divine origin2 and the character of its teaching is too exact a reflection of the race1 time1 place1 and climate in which it arose1 to admit of its becoming universal4 ,the same dependence on external circumstances is characteristic1 so far as ,i know1 of the religions of the far ,east2 nor am ,i sure of any definite message from ,god to man which they convey and protect1 though they may have sacred books4 ,christianity1 on the other hand1 is in its idea an announcement1 a preaching2 it is the depositary of truths beyond human discovery1 momentous1 practical1 maintained one and the same in substance in every age from its first1 and addressed to all mankind4 ,and it has actually been embraced and is found in all parts of the world1 in all climates1 among all races1 in all ranks of society1 under every degree of civilization1 from barbarism to the highest cultivation of mind4 ,coming to set right and to govern the world1 it has ever been1 as it ought to be1 in conflict with large masses of men1 with the civil power1 with physical force1 with adverse philosophies2 it has had successes1 it has had reverses2 but it has had a grand history1 and has effected great things1 and is as vigorous in its age as in its youth4 ,in all these respects it has a distinction in the world and a pre-eminence of its own2 it has upon it prim facie signs of divinity2 ,i do not know what can be advanced by rival religions to match prerogatives so special2 so that ,i feel myself justified in saying either ,christianity is from ,god1 or a revelation has not yet been given to us4 ,it will not surely be objected1 as a point in favour of some of the ,oriental religions1 that they are older than ,christianity by some centuries2 yet1 should it be so said1 it must be recollected that ,christianity is only the continuation and conclusion of what professes to be an earlier revelation1 which may be traced back into prehistoric times1 till it is lost in the darkness that hangs over them4 ,as far as we know1 there never was a time when that revelation was not1--a revelation continuous and systematic1 with distinct representatives and an orderly succession4 ,and this1 ,i suppose1 is far more than can be said for the religions of the ,east4 #f4 ,here1 then1 ,i am brought to the consideration of the ,hebrew nation and the ,mosaic religion1 as the first step in the direct evidence for ,christianity4 ,the ,jews are one of the few ,oriental nations who are known in history as a people of progress1 and their line of progress is the development of religious truth4 ,in that their own line they stand by themselves among all the populations1 not only of the ,east1 but of the ,west4 ,their country may be called the classical home of the religious principle1 as ,greece is the home of intellectual power1 and ,rome that of political and practical wisdom4 ,theism is their life2 it is emphatically their national religion1 for they never were without it1 and were made a people by means of it4 ,this is a phenomenon singular and solitary in history1 and must have a meaning4 ,if there be a ,god and ,providence1 it must come from ,him1 whether immediately or indirectly2 and the people themselves have ever maintained that it has been ,his direct work1 and has been recognized by ,him as such4 ,we are apt to treat pretences to a divine mission or to supernatural powers as of frequent occurrence1 and on that score to dismiss them from our thoughts2 but we cannot so deal with ,judaism4 ,when mankind had universally denied the first lesson of their conscience by lapsing into polytheism1 is it a thing of slight moment that there was just one exception to the rule1 that there was just one people who1 first by their rulers and priests1 and afterwards by their own unanimous zeal1 professed1 as their distinguishing doctrine1 the ,divine ,unity and ,government of the world1 and that1 moreover1 not only as a natural truth1 but as revealed to them by that ,god ,himself of whom they spoke1--who so embodied it in their national polity1 that a ,theocracy was the only name by which it could be called8 ,it was a people founded and set up in ,theism1 kept together by ,theism1 and maintaining ,theism for a period from first to last of #bjjj years1 till the dissolution of their body politic2 and they have maintained it since in their state of exile and wandering for #bjjj years more4 ,they begin with the beginning of history1 and the preaching of this august dogma begins with them4 ,they are its witnesses and confessors1 even to torture and death2 on it and its revelation are moulded their laws and government2 on this their politics1 philosophy1 and literature are founded2 of this truth their poetry is the voice1 pouring itself out in devotional compositions which ,christianity1 through all its many countries and ages1 has been unable to rival2 on this aboriginal truth1 as time goes on1 prophet after prophet bases his further revelations1 with a sustained reference to a time when1 according to the secret counsels of its ,divine ,object and ,author1 it is to receive completion and perfection1--till at length that time comes4 ,the last age of their history is as strange as their first4 ,when that time of destined blessing came1 which they had so accurately marked out1 and were so carefully waiting for--a time which found them1 in fact1 more zealous for their ,law1 and for the dogma it enshrined1 than they ever had been before--then1 instead of any final favour coming on them from above1 they fell under the power of their enemies1 and were overthrown1 their holy city razed to the ground1 their polity destroyed1 and the remnant of their people cast off to wander far and away through every land except their own1 as we find them at this day2 lasting on1 century after century1 not absorbed in other populations1 not annihilated1 as likely to last on1 as unlikely to be restored1 as far as outward appearances go1 now as a thousand years ago4 ,what nation has so grand1 so romantic1 so terrible a history8 ,does it not fulfil the idea of1 what the nation calls itself1 a chosen people1 chosen for good and evil8 ,is it not an exhibition in a course of history of that primary declaration of conscience1 as ,i have been determining it1 8,with the upright ,thou shalt be upright1 and with the froward ,thou shalt be froward08 ,it must have a meaning1 if there is a ,god4 ,we know what was their witness of old time2 what is their witness now8 ,why1 ,i say1 was it that1 after so memorable a career1 when their sins and sufferings were now to come to an end1 when they were looking out for a deliverance and a ,deliverer1 suddenly all was reversed for once and for all8 ,they were the favoured servants of ,god1 and yet a peculiar reproach and note of infamy is affixed to their name4 ,it was their belief that ,his protection was unchangeable1 and that their ,law would last for ever2--it was their consolation to be taught by an uninterrupted tradition1 that it could not die1 except by changing into a new self1 more wonderful than it was before2--it was their faithful expectation that a promised ,king was coming1 the ,messiah1 who would extend the sway of ,israel over all people2--it was a condition of their covenant1 that1 as a reward to ,abraham1 their first father1 the day at length should dawn when the gates of their narrow land should open1 and they should pour out for the conquest and occupation of the whole earth2--and1 ,i repeat1 when the day came1 they did go forth1 and they did spread into all lands1 but as hopeless exiles1 as eternal wanderers4 ,are we to say that this failure is a proof that1 after all1 there was nothing providential in their history8 ,for myself1 ,i do not see how a second portent obliterates a first2 and1 in truth1 their own testimony and their own sacred books carry us on towards a better solution of the difficulty4 ,i have said they were in ,god's favour under a covenant1--perhaps they did not fulfil the conditions of it4 ,this indeed seems to be their own account of the matter1 though it is not clear what their breach of engagement was4 ,and that in some way they did sin1 whatever their sin was1 is corroborated by the well-known chapter in the ,book of ,deuteronomy1 which so strikingly anticipates the nature of their punishment4 ,that passage1 translated into ,greek as many as #cej years before the siege of ,jerusalem by ,titus1 has on it the marks of a wonderful prophecy2 but ,i am not now referring to it as such1 but merely as an indication that the disappointment1 which actually overtook them at the ,christian era1 was not necessarily out of keeping with the original divine purpose1 or again with the old promise made to them1 and their confident expectation of its fulfilment4 ,their national ruin1 which came instead of aggrandizement1 is described in that book1 in spite of all promises1 with an emphasis and minuteness which prove that it was contemplated long before1 at least as a possible issue of the fortunes of ,israel4 ,among other inflictions which should befall the guilty people1 it was told them that they should fall down before their enemies1 and should be scattered throughout all the kingdoms of the earth2 that they never should have quiet in those nations1 or have rest for the sole of their foot2 that they were to have a fearful heart and languishing eyes1 and a soul consumed with heaviness2 that they were to suffer wrong1 and to be crushed at all times1 and to be astonished at the terror of their lot2 that their sons and daughters were to be given to another people1 and they were to look and to sicken all the day1 and their life was ever to hang in doubt before them1 and fear to haunt them day and night2 that they should be a proverb and a by-word of all people among whom they were brought2 and that curses were to come on them1 and to be signs and wonders on them and their seed for ever4 ,such are some portions1 and not the most terrible1 of this extended anathema2 and its partial accomplishment at an earlier date of their history was a warning to them1 when the destined time drew near1 that1 however great the promises made to them might be1 those promises were dependent on the terms of the covenant which stood between them and their ,maker1 and that1 as they had turned to curses at that former time1 so they might turn to curses again4 ,this grand drama1 so impressed with the characters of supernatural agency1 concerns us here only in its bearing upon the evidence for the divine origin of ,christianity2 and it is at this point that ,christianity comes upon the historical scene4 ,it is a notorious fact that it issued from the ,jewish land and people2 and1 had it no other than this historical connexion with ,judaism1 it would have some share in the prestige of its original home4 ,but it claims to be far more than this2 it professes to be the actual completion of the ,mosaic ,law1 the promised means of deliverance and triumph to the nation1 which that nation itself1 as ,i have said1 has since considered to be1 on account of some sin or other1 withheld or forfeited4 ,it professes to be1 not the casual1 but the legitimate offspring1 heir1 and successor of the ,mosaic covenant1 or rather to be ,judaism itself1 developed and transformed4 ,of course it has to prove its claim1 as well as to prefer it2 but if it succeeds in doing so1 then all those tokens of the ,divine ,presence1 which distinguish the ,jewish history1 at once belong to it1 and are a portion of its credentials4 ,and at least the prim facie view of its relations towards ,judaism is in favour of these pretensions4 ,it is an historical fact1 that1 at the very time that the ,jews committed their unpardonable sin1 whatever it was1 and were driven out from their home to wander over the earth1 their ,christian brethren1 born of the same stock1 and equally citizens of ,jerusalem1 did also issue forth from the same home1 but in order to subdue that same earth and make it their own2 that is1 they undertook the very work which1 according to the promise1 their nation actually was ordained to execute2 and1 with a method of their own indeed1 and with a new end1 and only slowly and painfully1 but still really and thoroughly1 they did it4 ,and since that time the two children of the promise have ever been found together--of the promise forfeited and the promise fulfilled2 and whereas the ,christian has been in high place1 so the ,jew has been degraded and despised--the one has been 8the head10 and the other 8the tail20 so that1 to go no farther1 the fact that ,christianity actually has done what ,judaism was to have done1 decides the controversy1 by the logic of facts1 in favour of ,christianity4 ,the prophecies announced that the ,messiah was to come at a definite time and place2 ,christians point to ,him as coming then and there1 as announced2 they are not met by any counter claim or rival claimant on the part of the ,jews1 only by their assertion that ,he did not come at all1 though up to the event they had said ,he was then and there coming4 ,further1 ,christianity clears up the mystery which hangs over ,judaism1 accounting fully for the punishment of the people1 by specifying their sin1 their heinous sin4 ,if1 instead of hailing their own ,messiah1 they crucified ,him1 then the strange scourge which has pursued them after the deed1 and the energetic wording of the curse before it1 are explained by the very strangeness of their guilt2--or rather1 their sin is their punishment2 for in rejecting their ,divine ,king1 they ipso facto lost the living principle and tie of their nationality4 ,moreover1 we see what led them into error2 they thought a triumph and an empire were to be given to them at once1 which were given indeed eventually1 but by the slow and gradual growth of many centuries and a long warfare4 ,on the whole1 then1 ,i observe1 on the one hand1 that1 ,judaism having been the channel of religious traditions which are lost in the depth of their antiquity1 of course it is a great point for ,christianity to succeed in proving that it is the legitimate heir to that former religion4 ,nor is it1 on the other1 of less importance to the significance of those early traditions to be able to determine that they were not lost together with their original store-house1 but were transferred1 on the failure of ,judaism1 to the custody of the ,christian ,church4 ,and this apparent correspondence between the two is in itself a presumption for such correspondence being real4 ,next1 ,i observe1 that if the history of ,judaism is so wonderful as to suggest the presence of some special divine agency in its appointments and fortunes1 still more wonderful and divine is the history of ,christianity2 and again it is more wonderful still1 that two such wonderful creations should span almost the whole course of ages1 during which nations and states have been in existence1 and should constitute a professed system of continued intercourse between earth and heaven from first to last amid all the vicissitudes of human affairs4 ,this phenomenon again carries on its face1 to those who believe in a ,god1 the probability that it has that divine origin which it professes to have2 and1 7when viewed in the light of the strong presumption which ,i have insisted on1 that in ,god's mercy a revelation from ,him will be granted to us1 and of the contrast presented by other religions1 no one of which professes to be a revelation direct1 definite1 and integral as this is17--this phenomenon1 ,i say1 of cumulative marvels raises that probability1 both for ,judaism and ,christianity1 in religious minds1 almost to a certainty4 #g4 ,if ,christianity is connected with ,judaism as closely as ,i have been supposing1 then there have been1 by means of the two1 direct communications between man and his ,maker from time immemorial down to this day--a great prerogative such1 that it is nowhere else even claimed4 ,no other religion but these two professes to be the organ of a formal revelation1 certainly not of a revelation which is directed to the benefit of the whole human race4 ,here it is that ,mahometanism fails1 though it claims to carry on the line of revelation after ,christianity2 for it is the mere creed and rite of certain races1 bringing with it1 as such1 no gifts to our nature1 and is rather a reformation of local corruptions1 and a return to the ceremonial worship of earlier times1 than a new and larger revelation4 ,and while ,christianity was the heir to a dead religion1 ,mahometanism was little more than a rebellion against a living one4 ,moreover1 though ,mahomet professed to be the ,paraclete1 no one pretends that he occupies a place in the ,christian ,scriptures as prominent as that which the ,messiah fills in the ,jewish4 ,to this especial prominence of the ,messianic idea ,i shall now advert2 that is1 to the prophecies of the ,old ,scriptures1 and to the argument which they furnish in favour of ,christianity2 and though ,i know that argument might be clearer and more exact than it is1 and ,i do not pretend here to do much more than refer to the fact of its existence1 still so far forth as we enter into it1 will it strengthen our conviction of the claim to divinity both of the ,religion which is the organ of those prophecies1 and of the ,religion which is their object4 ,now that the ,jewish ,scriptures were in existence long before the ,christian era1 and were in the sole custody of the ,jews1 is undeniable2 whatever then their ,scriptures distinctly say of ,christianity1 if not attributable to chance or to happy conjecture1 is prophetic4 ,it is undeniable too1 that the ,jews gathered from those books that a great ,personage was to be born of their stock1 and to conquer the whole world and to become the instrument of extraordinary blessings to it2 moreover1 that he would make his appearance at a fixed date1 and that1 the very date when1 as it turned out1 our ,lord did actually come4 ,this is the great outline of the prediction1 and if nothing more could be said about them than this1 to prove as much as this is far from unimportant4 ,and it is undeniable1 ,i say1 both that the ,jewish ,scriptures contain thus much1 and that the ,jews actually understood them as containing it4 ,first1 then1 as to what ,scripture declares4 ,from the book of ,genesis we learn that the chosen people was set up in this one idea1 viz4 to be a blessing to the whole earth1 and that1 by means of one of their own race1 a greater than their father ,abraham4 ,this was the meaning and drift of their being chosen4 ,there is no room for mistake here2 the divine purpose is stated from the first with the utmost precision4 ,at the very time of ,abraham's call1 he is told of it3--8,i will make of thee a great nation1 and in thee shall all tribes of the earth be blessed40 ,thrice is this promise and purpose announced in ,abraham's history2 and after ,abraham's time it is repeated to ,isaac1 8,in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed20 and after ,isaac to ,jacob1 when a wanderer from his home1 8,in thee and in thy seed shall all the tribes of the earth be blessed40 ,and from ,jacob the promise passes on to his son ,judah1 and that with an addition1 viz4 with a reference to the great ,person who was to be the world-wide blessing1 and to the date when ,he should come4 ,judah was the chosen son of ,jacob1 and his staff or sceptre1 that is1 his patriarchal authority1 was to endure till a greater than ,judah came1 so that the loss of the sceptre1 when it took place1 was the sign of ,his near approach4 8,the sceptre10 says ,jacob on his death-bed1 8shall not be taken away from ,judah1 until ,he come for whom it is reserved10 or 8who is to be sent10 8and ,he shall be the expectation of the nations47#dg70 ,such was the categorical prophecy1 literal and unequivocal in its wording1 direct and simple in its scope4 ,one man1 born of the chosen tribe1 was the destined minister of blessing to the whole world2 and the race1 as represented by that tribe1 was to lose its old self in gaining a new self in ,him4 ,its destiny was sealed upon it in its beginning4 ,an expectation was the measure of its life4 ,it was created for a great end1 and in that end it had its ending4 ,such were the initial communications made to the chosen people1 and there they stopped2--as if the outline of promise1 so sharply cut1 had to be effectually imprinted on their minds1 before more knowledge was given to them2 as if1 by the long interval of years which passed before the more varied prophecies in type and figure1 after the manner of the ,east1 were added1 the original notices might stand out in the sight of all in their severe explicitness1 as archetypal truths1 and guides in interpreting whatever else was obscure in its wording or complex in its direction4 ,and in the second place it is quite clear that the ,jews did thus understand their prophecies1 and did expect their great ,ruler1 in the very age in which our ,lord came1 and in which they1 on the other hand1 were destroyed1 losing their old self without gaining their new4 ,heathen historians shall speak for the fact4 8,a persuasion had possession of most of them10 says ,tacitus1 speaking of their resistance to the ,romans1 8that it was contained in the ancient books of the priests that at that very time the ,east should prevail1 and that men who issued from ,judea should obtain the empire4 ,the common people1 as is the way with human cupidity1 having once interpreted in their own favour this grand destiny1 were not even by their reverses brought round to the truth of facts40 ,and ,suetonius extends the belief3--8,the whole ,east was rife with an old and persistent belief1 that at that time persons who issued from ,judea1 should possess the empire40 ,after the event of course the ,jews drew back1 and denied the correctness of their expectation1 still they could not deny that the expectation had existed4 ,thus the ,jew ,josephus1 who was of the ,roman party1 says that what encouraged them in the stand they made against the ,romans was 8an ambiguous oracle1 found in their sacred writings1 that at that date some one of them from that country should rule the world40 ,he can but pronounce that the oracle was ambiguous2 he cannot state that they thought it so4 ,now1 considering that at that very time our ,lord did appear as a teacher1 and founded not merely a religion1 but 7what was then quite a new idea in the world7 a system of religious warfare1 an aggressive and militant body1 a dominant ,catholic ,church1 which aimed at the benefit of all nations by the spiritual conquest of all2 and that this warfare1 then begun by it1 has gone on without cessation down to this day1 and now is as living and real as ever it was2 that that militant body has from the first filled the world1 that it has had wonderful successes1 that its successes have on the whole been of extreme benefit to the human race1 that it has imparted an intelligent notion about the ,supreme ,god to millions who would have lived and died in irreligion1 that it has raised the tone of morality wherever it has come1 has abolished great social anomalies and miseries1 has elevated the female sex to its proper dignity1 has protected the poorer classes1 has destroyed slavery1 encouraged literature and philosophy1 and had a principal part in that civilization of human kind1 which1 with some evils still1 has on the whole been productive of far greater good1--considering1 ,i say1 that all this began at the destined1 expected1 recognized season when the old prophecy said that in one ,man1 born of the tribe of ,judah1 all the tribes of the earth were to be blessed1 ,i feel ,i have a right to say 7and my line of argument does not lead me to say more71 that it is at the very least a remarkable coincidence1--that is1 one of those coincidences which1 when they are accumulated1 come close upon the idea of miracle1 as being impossible without the ,hand of ,god directly and immediately in them4 ,when we have got as far as this1 we may go on a great deal farther4 ,announcements1 which could not be put forward in the front of the argument1 as being figurative1 vague1 or ambiguous1 may be used validly and with great effect1 when they have been interpreted for us1 first by the prophetic outline1 and still more by the historical object4 ,it is a principle which applies to all matters on which we reason1 that what is only a maze of facts1 without order or drift prior to the explanation1 may1 when we once have that explanation1 be located and adjusted with great facility in all its separate parts1 as we know is the case as regards the motions of the heavenly bodies since the hypothesis of ,newton4 ,in like manner the event is the true key to prophecy1 and reconciles conflicting and divergent descriptions by embodying them in one common representative4 ,thus it is that we learn how1 as the prophecies said1 the ,messiah could both suffer1 yet be victorious2 ,his kingdom be ,judaic in structure1 yet evangelic in spirit2 and ,his people the children of ,abraham1 yet 8sinners of the ,gentiles40 ,these seeming paradoxes1 are only parallel and akin to those others which form so prominent a feature in the teaching of our ,lord and ,his ,apostles4 ,as to the ,jews1 since they lived before the event1 it is not wonderful1 that1 though they were right in their general interpretation of ,scripture as far as it went1 they stopped short of the whole truth2 nay1 that even when their ,messiah came1 they could not recognize ,him as the promised ,king as we recognize ,him now2--for we have the experience of ,his history for nearly two thousand years1 by which to interpret their ,scriptures4 ,we may partly understand their position towards those prophecies1 by our own at present towards the ,apocalypse4 ,who can deny the superhuman grandeur and impressiveness of that sacred book6 yet1 as a prophecy1 though some outlines of the future are discernible1 how differently it affects us from the predictions of ,isaiah6 either because it relates to undreamed-of events still to come1 or because it has been fulfilled long ago in events which in their detail and circumstance have never become history4 ,and the same remark applies doubtless to portions of the ,messianic prophecies still2 but1 if their fulfilment has been thus gradual in time past1 we must not be surprised though portions of them still await their slow but true accomplishment in the future4 #h4 ,when ,i implied that in some points of view ,christianity has not answered the expectations of the old prophecies1 of which it claims to be the fulfilment1 ,i had in mind principally the contrast which is presented to us between the picture which they draw of the universality of the kingdom of the ,messiah1 and that partial development of it through the world1 which is all the ,christian ,church can show2 and again the contrast between the rest and peace which they said ,he was to introduce1 and the ,church's actual history1--the conflicts of opinion which have raged within its pale1 the violent acts and unworthy lives of many of its rulers1 and the moral degradation of great masses of its people4 ,i do not profess to meet these difficulties here1 except by saying that the failure of ,christianity in one respect in corresponding to those prophecies cannot destroy the force of its correspondence to them in others2 just as we may allow that the portrait of a friend is a faulty likeness to him1 and yet be quite sure that it is his portrait4 ,what ,i shall actually attempt to show here is this1--that ,christianity was quite aware from the first of its own prospective future1 so unlike the expectations which the prophets would excite concerning it1 and that it meets the difficulty thence arising by anticipation1 by giving us its own predictions of what it was to be in historical fact1 predictions which are at once explanatory comments upon the ,jewish ,scriptures1 and direct evidences of its own prescience4 ,i think it observable then1 that1 though our ,lord claims to be the ,messiah1 ,he shows so little of conscious dependence on the old ,scriptures1 or of anxiety to fulfil them2 as if it became ,him1 who was the ,lord of the ,prophets1 to take ,his own course1 and to leave their utterances to adjust themselves to ,him as they could1 and not to be careful to accommodate ,himself to them4 ,the evangelists do indeed show some such natural zeal in ,his behalf1 and thereby illustrate what ,i notice in ,him by the contrast4 ,they betray an earnestness to trace in ,his ,person and history the accomplishment of prophecy1 as when they discern it in ,his return from ,egypt1 in ,his life at ,nazareth1 in the gentleness and tenderness of ,his mode of teaching1 and in the various minute occurrences of ,his passion2 but ,he ,himself goes straight forward on ,his way1 of course claiming to be the ,messiah of the ,prophets17#dh7 still not so much recurring to past prophecies1 as uttering new ones1 with an antithesis not unlike that which is so impressive in the ,sermon on the ,mount1 when ,he first says1 8,it has been said by them of old time10 and then adds1 8,but ,i say unto you40 ,another striking instance of this is seen in the ,names under which ,he spoke of ,himself1 which have little or no foundation in any thing which was said of ,him beforehand in the ,jewish ,scriptures4 ,they speak of ,him as ,ruler1 ,prophet1 ,king1 ,hope of ,israel1 ,offspring of ,judah1 and ,messiah2 and ,his ,evangelists and ,disciples call ,him ,master1 ,lord1 ,prophet1 ,son of ,david1 ,king of ,israel1 ,king of the ,jews1 and ,messiah or ,christ2 but ,he ,himself1 though1 ,i repeat1 ,he acknowledges these titles as ,his own1 especially that of the ,christ1 chooses as ,his special designations these two1 ,son of ,god and ,son of ,man1 the latter of which is only once given ,him in the ,old ,scriptures1 and by which ,he corrects any narrow ,judaic interpretation of them2 while the former was never distinctly used of ,him before ,he came1 and seems first to have been announced to the world by the ,angel ,gabriel and ,st4 ,john the ,baptist4 ,in those two ,names1 ,son of ,god and ,son of ,man1 declaratory of the two natures of ,emmanuel1 ,he separates ,himself from the ,jewish ,dispensation1 in which ,he was born1 and inaugurates the ,new ,covenant4 ,this is not an accident1 and ,i shall now give some instances of it1 that is1 of what ,i may call the independent autocratic view which ,he takes of ,his own religion1 into which the old ,judaism was melting1 and of the prophetic insight into its spirit and its future which that view involves4 ,in quoting ,his own sayings from the ,evangelists for this purpose1 ,i assume 7of which there is no reasonable doubt7 that they wrote before any historical events had happened of a nature to cause them unconsciously to modify or to colour the language which their ,master used4 #a4 ,first1 then1 the fact has been often insisted on as a bold conception1 unheard of before1 and worthy of divine origin1 that ,he should even project a universal religion1 and that to be effected by what may be called a propagandist movement from one centre4 ,hitherto it had been the received notion in the world1 that each nation had its own gods4 ,the ,romans legislated upon that basis1 and the ,jews had held it from the first1 holding of course also1 that all gods but their own ,god were idols and demons4 ,it is true that the ,jews ought to have been taught by their prophecies what was in store for the world and for them1 and that their first dispersion through the ,empire centuries before ,christ came1 and the proselytes which they collected around them in every place1 were a kind of comment on the prophecies larger than their own2 but we see what was1 in fact1 when our ,lord came1 their expectation from those prophecies1 in the passages which ,i have quoted above from the ,roman historians of ,his day4 ,but ,he from the first resisted those plausible1 but mistaken interpretations of ,scripture4 ,in ,his cradle indeed ,he had been recognized by the ,eastern sages as their king2 the ,angel announced that ,he was to reign over the house of ,jacob2 ,nathanael1 too1 owned ,him as the ,messiah with a regal title2 but ,he1 on entering upon ,his work1 interpreted these anticipations in ,his own way1 and that not the way of ,theudas and ,judas of ,galilee1 who took the sword1 and collected soldiers about them1--nor the way of the ,tempter1 who offered ,him 8all the kingdoms of the world40 ,in the words of the ,evangelists1 ,he began1 not to fight1 but 8to preach20 and further1 to 8preach the kingdom of heaven10 saying1 8,the time is accomplished1 and the kingdom of ,god is at hand2 repent1 and believe the ,gospel40 ,this is the significant title1 8the kingdom of heaven10--the more significant1 when explained by the attendant precept of repentance and faith1--on which ,he founds the polity which ,he was establishing from first to last4 ,one of ,his last sayings before ,he suffered was1 8,my kingdom is not of this world40 ,and ,his last words1 before ,he left the earth1 when ,his disciples asked ,him about ,his kingdom1 were that they1 preachers as they were1 and not soldiers1 should 8be ,his witnesses to the end of the earth10 should 8preach to all nations1 beginning with ,jerusalem10 should 8go into the world and preach the ,gospel to every creature10 should 8go and make disciples of all nations till the consummation of all things40 ,the last ,evangelist of the four is equally precise in recording the initial purpose with which our ,lord began ,his ministry1 viz4 to create an empire1 not by force1 but by persuasion4 8,light is come into the world2 every one that doth evil1 hateth the light1 but he that doth truth1 cometh to the light40 8,lift up your eyes1 and see the countries1 for they are white already to harvest40 8,no man can come to ,me1 except the ,father1 who hath sent ,me1 draw him40 8,and ,i1 if ,i be lifted up from the earth1 will draw all things to ,myself40 ,thus1 while the ,jews1 relying on their ,scriptures with great appearance of reason1 looked for a deliverer who should conquer with the sword1 we find that ,christianity1 from the first1 not by an after-thought upon trial and experience1 but as a fundamental truth1 magisterially set right that mistake1 transfiguring the old prophecies1 and bringing to light1 as ,st4 ,paul might say1 8the mystery which had been hidden from ages and generations1 but now was made manifest in ,his saints1 the glory of this mystery among the ,gentiles1 which is ,christ in you10 not simply over you1 but in you1 by faith and love1 8the hope of glory40 #b4 ,i have partly anticipated my next remark1 which relates to the means by which the ,christian enterprise was to be carried into effect4 ,that preaching was to have a share in the victories of the ,messiah was plain from ,prophet and ,psalmist2 but then ,charlemagne preached1 and ,mahomet preached1 with an army to back them4 ,the same ,psalm which speaks of those 8who preach good tidings10 speaks also of their ,king's 8foot being dipped in the blood of ,his enemies20 but what is so grandly original in ,christianity is1 that on its broad field of conflict its preachers were to be simply unarmed1 and to suffer1 but to prevail4 ,if we were not so familiar with our ,lord's words1 ,i think they would astonish us4 8,behold1 ,i send you as sheep in the midst of wolves40 ,this was to be their normal state1 and so it was2 and all the promises and directions given to them imply it4 8,blessed are they that suffer persecution20 8blessed are ye when they revile you20 8the meek shall inherit the earth20 8resist not evil20 8you shall be hated of all men for ,my ,name's sake20 8a man's enemies shall be they of his own household20 8he that shall persevere to the end1 he shall be saved40 ,what sort of encouragement was this for men who were to go about an immense work8 ,do men in this way send out their soldiers to battle1 or their sons to ,india or ,australia8 ,the ,king of ,israel hated ,micaiah1 because he always 8prophesied of him evil40 8,so persecuted they the ,prophets that were before you10 says our ,lord4 ,yes1 and the ,prophets failed2 they were persecuted and they lost the battle4 8,take1 my brethren10 says ,st4 ,james1 8for an example of suffering evil1 of labour and patience1 the ,prophets1 who spake in the ,name of the ,lord40 ,they were 8racked1 mocked1 stoned1 cut asunder1 they wandered about1--of whom the world was not worthy10 says ,st4 ,paul4 ,what an argument to encourage them to aim at success by suffering1 to put before them the precedent of those who suffered and who failed6 ,yet the first preachers1 our ,lord's immediate disciples1 saw no difficulty in a prospect to human eyes so appalling1 so hopeless4 ,how connatural this strange1 unreasoning1 reckless courage was with their regenerate state is shown most signally in ,st4 ,paul1 as having been a convert of later vocation4 ,he was no personal associate of our ,lord's1 yet how faithfully he echoes back our ,lord's language6 ,his instrument of conversion is 8the foolishness of preaching20 8the weak things of the earth confound the strong20 8we hunger and thirst1 and are naked1 and are buffeted1 and have no home20 8we are reviled and bless1 we are persecuted1 and blasphemed1 and are made the refuse of this world1 and the offscouring of all things40 ,such is the intimate comprehension1 on the part of one who had never seen our ,lord on earth1 and knew little from ,his original disciples of the genius of ,his teaching2--and considering that the prophecies1 upon which he had lived from his birth1 for the most part bear on their surface a contrary doctrine1 and that the ,jews of that day did commonly understand them in that contrary sense1 we cannot deny that ,christianity1 in tracing out the method by which it was to prevail in the future1 took its own1 independent line1 and1 in assigning from the first a rule and a history to its propagation1 a rule and a history which have been carried out to this day1 rescues itself from the charge of but partially fulfilling those ,jewish prophecies1 by the assumption of a prophetical character of its own4 #c4 ,now we come to a third point1 in which the ,divine ,master explains1 and in a certain sense corrects1 the prophecies of the ,old ,covenant1 by a more exact interpretation of them from ,himself4 ,i have granted that they seemed to say that ,his coming would issue in a period of peace and religiousness4 8,behold10 says the ,prophet1 8a king shall reign in justice1 and princes shall rule in judgment4 ,the fool shall no more be called prince1 neither shall the deceitful be called great4 ,the wolf shall dwell with the lamb1 and the leopard lie down with the kid4 ,they shall not hurt nor kill in all ,my holy mountain1 for the earth is filled with the knowledge of the ,lord1 as the covering waters of the sea40 ,these words seem to predict a reversal of the consequences of the fall1 and that reversal has not been granted to us1 it is true2 but let us consider how distinctly ,christianity warns us against any such anticipation4 ,while it is so forcibly laid down in the ,gospels that the history of the kingdom of heaven begins in suffering and sanctity1 it is as plainly said that it results in unfaithfulness and sin2 that is to say1 that1 though there are at all times many holy1 many religious men in it1 and though sanctity1 as at the beginning1 is ever the life and the substance and the germinal seed of the ,divine ,kingdom1 yet there will be many too1 there will be more1 who by their lives are a scandal and injury to it1 not a defence4 ,this again1 is an astonishing announcement1 and the more so when viewed in contrast with the precepts delivered by our ,lord in ,his ,sermon on the ,mount1 and ,his description to the ,apostles of their weapons and their warfare4 ,so perplexing to ,christians was the fact when fulfilled1 as it was in no long time on a large scale1 that three of the early heresies more or less originated in obstinate1 unchristian refusal to readmit to the privileges of the ,gospel those who had fallen into sin4 ,yet our ,lord's words are express3 ,he tells us that 8,many are called1 few are chosen20 in the parable of the ,marriage ,feast1 the servants who are sent out gather together 8all that they found1 both bad and good20 the foolish virgins 8had no oil in their vessels20 amid the good seed an enemy sows seed that is noxious or worthless2 and 8the kingdom is like to a net which gathered together all kind of fishes20 and 8at the end of the world the ,angels shall go forth1 and shall separate the wicked from among the just40 ,moreover1 ,he not only speaks of ,his religion as destined to possess a wide temporal power1 such1 that1 as in the case of the ,babylonian1 8the birds of the air should dwell in its branches10 but ,he opens on us the prospect of ambition and rivalry in its leading members1 when ,he warns ,his disciples against desiring the first places in ,his kingdom2 nay1 of grosser sins1 in ,his description of the ,ruler1 who 8began to strike his fellow-servants1 and to eat and drink and be drunken10--passages which have an awful significance1 considering what kind of men have before now been ,his chosen representatives1 and have sat in the chair of ,his ,apostles4 ,if then it be objected that ,christianity does not1 as the old prophets seem to promise1 abolish sin and irreligion within its pale1 we may answer1 not only that it did not engage to do so1 but that actually in a prophetical spirit it warned its followers against the expectation of its so doing4 #i4 ,according to our ,lord's announcements before the event1 ,christianity was to prevail and to become a great empire1 and to fill the earth2 but it was to accomplish this destiny1 not as other victorious powers had done1 and as the ,jews expected1 by force of arms or by other means of this world1 but by the novel expedient of sanctity and suffering4 ,if some aspiring party of this day1 the great ,orleans family1 or a branch of the ,hohenzollern1 wishing to found a kingdom1 were to profess1 as their only weapon1 the practice of virtue1 they would not startle us more than it startled a ,jew eighteen hundred years ago1 to be told that his glorious ,messiah was not to fight1 like ,joshua or ,david1 but simply to preach4 ,it is indeed a thought so strange1 both in its prediction and in its fulfilment1 as urgently to suggest to us that some ,divine ,power went with him who conceived and proclaimed it4 ,this is what ,i have been saying2--now ,i wish to consider the fact1 which was predicted1 in itself1 without reference to its being the subject whether of a prediction or of a fulfilment2 that is1 the history of the rise and establishment of ,christianity2 and to inquire whether it is a history that admits of being resolved1 by any philosophical ingenuity1 into the ordinary operation of moral1 social1 or political causes4 ,as is well known1 various writers have attempted to assign human causes in explanation of the phenomenon3 ,gibbon especially has mentioned five1 viz4 the zeal of ,christians1 inherited from the ,jews1 their doctrine of a future state1 their claim to miraculous power1 their virtues1 and their ecclesiastical organization4 ,let us briefly consider them4 ,he thinks these five causes1 when combined1 will fairly account for the event2 but he has not thought of accounting for their combination4 ,if they are ever so available for his purpose1 still that availableness arises out of their coincidence1 and out of what does that coincidence arise8 ,until this is explained1 nothing is explained1 and the question had better have been let alone4 ,these presumed causes are quite distinct from each other1 and1 ,i say1 the wonder is1 what made them come together4 ,how came a multitude of ,gentiles to be influenced with ,jewish zeal8 ,how came zealots to submit to a strict1 ecclesiastical rgime8 ,what connexion has a secular rgime with the immortality of the soul8 ,why should immortality1 a philosophical doctrine1 lead to belief in miracles1 which is a superstition of the vulgar8 ,what tendency had miracles and magic to make men austerely virtuous8 ,lastly1 what power was there in a code of virtue1 as calm and enlightened as that of ,antoninus1 to generate a zeal as fierce as that of ,maccabus8 ,wonderful events before now have apparently been nothing but coincidences1 certainly2 but they do not become less wonderful by cataloguing their constituent causes1 unless we also show how these came to be constituent4 ,however1 this by the way2 the real question is this1--are these historical characteristics of ,christianity1 also in matter of fact1 historical causes of ,christianity8 ,has ,gibbon given proof that they are8 ,has he brought evidence of their operation1 or does he simply conjecture in his private judgment that they operated8 ,whether they were adapted to accomplish a certain work1 is a matter of opinion2 whether they did accomplish it is a question of fact4 ,he ought to adduce instances of their efficiency before he has a right to say that they are efficient4 ,and the second question is1 what is this effect1 of which they are to be considered as causes8 ,it is no other than this1 the conversion of bodies of men to the ,christian faith4 ,let us keep this in view4 ,we have to determine whether these five characteristics of ,christianity were efficient causes of bodies of men becoming ,christians8 ,i think they neither did effect such conversions1 nor were adapted to do so1 and for these reasons3-- #a4 ,for first1 as to zeal1 by which ,gibbon means party spirit1 or esprit de corps2 this doubtless is a motive principle when men are already members of a body1 but does it operate in bringing them into it8 ,the ,jews were born in ,judaism1 they had a long and glorious history1 and would naturally feel and show esprit de corps2 but how did party spirit tend to transplant ,jew or ,gentile out of his own place into a new society1 and that a society which as yet scarcely was formed in a society8 ,zeal1 certainly1 may be felt for a cause1 or for a person2 on this point ,i shall speak presently2 but ,gibbon's idea of ,christian zeal is nothing better than the old wine of ,judaism decanted into new ,christian bottles1 and would be too flat a stimulant1 even if it admitted of such a transference1 to be taken as a cause of conversion to ,christianity without definite evidence in proof of the fact4 ,christians had zeal for ,christianity after they were converted1 not before4 #b4 ,next1 as to the doctrine of a future state4 ,gibbon seems to mean by this doctrine the fear of hell2 now certainly in this day there are persons converted from sin to a religious life1 by vivid descriptions of the future punishment of the wicked2 but then it must be recollected that such persons already believe in the doctrine thus urged upon them4 ,on the contrary1 give some ,tract upon hell-fire to one of the wild boys in a large town1 who has had no education1 who has no faith2 and1 instead of being startled by it1 he will laugh at it as something frightfully ridiculous4 ,the belief in ,styx and ,tartarus was dying out of the world at the time that ,christianity came in1 as the parallel belief now seems to be dying out in all classes of our own society4 ,the doctrine of eternal punishment does only anger the multitude of men in our large towns now1 and make them blaspheme2 why should it have had any other effect on the heathen populations in the age when our ,lord came8 ,yet it was among those populations1 that ,he and ,his made their way from the first4 ,as to the hope of eternal life1 that doubtless1 as well as the fear of hell1 was a most operative doctrine in the case of men who had been actually converted1 of ,christians brought before the magistrate1 or writhing under torture1 but the thought of eternal glory does not keep bad men from a bad life now1 and why should it convert them then from their pleasant sins1 to a heavy1 mortified1 joyless existence1 to a life of ill-usage1 fright1 contempt1 and desolation8 #c4 ,that the claim to miracles should have any wide influence in favour of ,christianity among heathen populations1 who had plenty of portents of their own1 is an opinion in curious contrast with the objection against ,christianity which has provoked an answer from ,paley1 viz4 that 8,christian miracles are not recited or appealed to1 by early ,christian writers themselves1 so fully or so frequently as might have been expected40 ,paley solves the difficulty as far as it is a fact1 by observing1 as ,i have suggested1 that 8it was their lot to contend with magical agency1 against which the mere production of these facts was not sufficient for the convincing of their adversaries30 8,i do not know10 he continues1 8whether they themselves thought it quite decisive of the controversy40 ,a claim to miraculous power on the part of ,christians1 which was so unfrequent as to become now an objection to the fact of their possessing it1 can hardly have been a principal cause of their success4 #d4 ,and how is it possible to imagine with ,gibbon that what he calls the 8sober and domestic virtues0 of ,christians1 their 8aversion to the luxury of the age10 their 8chastity1 temperance1 and economy10 that these dull qualities were persuasives of a nature to win and melt the hard heathen heart1 in spite too of the dreary prospect of the barathrum1 the amphitheatre1 and the stake8 ,did the ,christian morality by its severe beauty make a convert of ,gibbon himself8 ,on the contrary1 he bitterly says1 8,it was not in this world that the primitive ,christians were desirous of making themselves either agreeable or useful40 8,the virtue of the primitive ,christians1 like that of the first ,romans1 was very frequently guarded by poverty and ignorance40 8,their gloomy and austere aspect1 their abhorrence of the common business and pleasures of life1 and their frequent predictions of impending calamities1 inspired the ,pagans with the apprehension of some danger which would arise from the new sect40 ,here we have not only ,gibbon hating their moral and social bearing1 but his heathen also4 ,how then were those heathen overcome by the amiableness of that which they viewed with such disgust8 ,we have here plain proof that the ,christian character repelled the heathen2 where is the evidence that it converted them8 #e4 ,lastly1 as to the ecclesiastical organization1 this1 doubtless1 as time went on1 was a special characteristic of the new religion2 but how could it directly contribute to its extension8 ,of course it gave it strength1 but it did not give it life4 ,we are not born of bones and muscles4 ,it is one thing to make conquests1 another to consolidate an empire4 ,it was before ,constantine that ,christians made their great conquests4 ,rules are for settled times1 not for time of war4 ,so much is this contrast felt in the ,catholic ,church now1 that1 as is well known1 in heathen countries and in countries which have thrown off her yoke1 she suspends her diocesan administration and her ,canon ,law1 and puts her children under the extraordinary1 extra-legal jurisdiction of ,propaganda4 ,this is what ,i am led to say on ,gibbon's ,five ,causes4 ,i do not deny that they might have operated now and then2 ,simon ,magus came to ,christianity in order to learn the craft of miracles1 and ,peregrinus from love of influence and power2 but ,christianity made its way1 not by individual1 but by broad1 wholesale conversions1 and the question is1 how they originated8 ,it is very remarkable that it should not have occurred to a man of ,gibbon's sagacity to inquire1 what account the ,christians themselves gave of the matter4 ,would it not have been worth while for him to have let conjecture alone1 and to have looked for facts instead8 ,why did he not try the hypothesis of faith1 hope1 and charity8 ,did he never hear of repentance towards ,god1 and faith in ,christ8 ,did he not recollect the many words of ,apostles1 ,bishops1 ,apologists1 ,martyrs1 all forming one testimony8 ,no2 such thoughts are close upon him1 and close upon the truth2 but he cannot sympathize with them1 he cannot believe in them1 he cannot even enter into them1 because he needs the due formation of mind47#di7 ,let us see whether the facts of the case do not come out clear and unequivocal1 if we will but have the patience to endure them4 ,a ,deliverer of the human race through the ,jewish nation had been promised from time immemorial4 ,the day came when ,he was to appear1 and ,he was eagerly expected2 moreover1 ,one actually did make ,his appearance at that date in ,palestine1 and claimed to be ,he4 ,he left the earth without apparently doing much for the object of ,his coming4 ,but when ,he was gone1 ,his disciples took upon themselves to go forth to preach to all parts of the earth with the object of preaching ,him1 and collecting converts in ,his ,name4 ,after a little while they are found wonderfully to have succeeded4 ,large bodies of men in various places are to be seen1 professing to be ,his disciples1 owning ,him as their ,king1 and continually swelling in number and penetrating into the populations of the ,roman ,empire2 at length they convert the ,empire itself4 ,all this is historical fact4 ,now1 we want to know the farther historical fact1 viz4 the cause of their conversion2 in other words1 what were the topics of that preaching which was so effective8 ,if we believe what is told us by the preachers and their converts1 the answer is plain4 ,they 8preached ,christ20 they called on men to believe1 hope1 and place their affections1 in that ,deliverer who had come and gone2 and the moral instrument by which they persuaded them to do so1 was a description of the life1 character1 mission1 and power of that ,deliverer1 a promise of ,his invisible ,presence and ,protection here1 and of the ,vision and ,fruition of ,him hereafter4 ,from first to last to ,christians1 as to ,abraham1 ,he ,himself is the centre and fulness of the dispensation4 ,they1 as ,abraham1 8see ,his day1 and are glad40 ,a temporal sovereign makes himself felt by means of his subordinate administrators1 who bring his power and will to bear upon every individual of his subjects who personally know him not2 the universal ,deliverer1 long expected1 when ,he came1 ,he too1 instead of making and securing subjects by a visible graciousness or majesty1 departs2--but is found1 through ,his preachers1 to have imprinted the ,image7#ej7 or ,idea of ,himself in the minds of ,his subjects individually2 and that ,image1 apprehended and worshipped in individual minds1 becomes a principle of association1 and a real bond of those subjects one with another1 who are thus united to the body by being united to that ,image2 and moreover that ,image1 which is their moral life1 when they have been already converted1 is also the original instrument of their conversion4 ,it is the ,image of ,him who fulfils the one great need of human nature1 the ,healer of its wounds1 the ,physician of the soul1 this ,image it is which both creates faith1 and then rewards it4 ,when we recognize this central ,image as the vivifying idea both of the ,christian body and of individuals in it1 then1 certainly1 we are able to take into account at least two of ,gibbon's causes1 as having1 in connexion with that idea1 some influence both in making converts and in strengthening them to persevere4 ,it was the ,thought of ,christ1 not a corporate body or a doctrine1 which inspired that zeal which the historian so poorly comprehends2 and it was the ,thought of ,christ which gave a life to the promise of that eternity1 which without ,him would be1 in any soul1 nothing short of an intolerable burden4 ,now a mental vision such as this1 perhaps will be called cloudy1 fanciful1 unintelligible2 that is1 in other words1 miraculous4 ,i think it is so4 ,how1 without the ,hand of ,god1 could a new idea1 one and the same1 enter at once into myriads of men1 women1 and children of all ranks1 especially the lower1 and have power to wean them from their indulgences and sins1 and to nerve them against the most cruel tortures1 and to last in vigour as a sustaining influence for seven or eight generations1 till it founded an extended polity1 broke the obstinacy of the strongest and wisest government which the world has ever seen1 and forced its way from its first caves and catacombs to the fulness of imperial power8 ,in considering this subject1 ,i shall confine myself to the proof1 as far as my limits allow1 of two points1--first1 that this ,thought or ,image of ,christ was the principle of conversion and of fellowship2 and next1 that among the lower classes1 who had no power1 influence1 reputation1 or education1 lay its principal success47#ea7 ,as to the vivifying idea1 this is ,st4 ,paul's account of it3 8,i make known to you the gospel which ,i preached to you1 which also you have received1 and wherein you stand2 by which also you are saved4 ,for ,i delivered to you first of all that which ,i also received1 how that ,christ died for our sins according to the ,scriptures10 c41 c4 8,i am the least of the ,apostles2 but1 whether ,i or they1 so we preached1 and so you believed40 8,it has pleased ,god by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe40 8,we preach ,christ crucified40 8,i determined to know nothing among you1 but ,jesus ,christ1 and ,him crucified40 8,your life is hid with ,christ in ,god4 ,when ,christ1 who is your life1 shall appear1 then you also shall appear with ,him in glory40 8,i live1 but now not ,i1 but ,christ liveth in me40 ,st4 ,peter1 who has been accounted the master of a separate school1 says the same3 8,jesus ,christ1 whom you have not seen1 yet love2 in whom you now believe1 and shall rejoice40 ,and ,st4 ,john1 who is sometimes accounted a third master in ,christianity3 8,it hath not yet appeared what we shall be2 but we know that1 when ,he shall appear1 we shall be like to ,him1 because we shall see ,him as ,he is40 ,that their disciples followed them in this sovereign devotion to an ,invisible ,lord1 will appear as ,i proceed4 ,and next1 as to the worldly position and character of ,his disciples1 our ,lord1 in the well-known passage1 returns thanks to ,his ,heavenly ,father 8because10 ,he says1 8,thou hast hid these things0--the mysteries of ,his kingdom--8from the wise and prudent1 and hast revealed them to little ones40 ,and1 in accordance with this announcement1 ,st4 ,paul says that 8not many wise men according to the flesh1 not many mighty1 not many noble10 became ,christians4 ,he1 indeed1 is one of those few2 so were others his contemporaries1 and1 as time went on1 the number of these exceptions increased1 so that converts were found1 not a few1 in the high places of the ,empire1 and in the schools of philosophy and learning2 but still the rule held1 that the great mass of ,christians were to be found in those classes which were of no account in the world1 whether on the score of rank or of education4 ,we all know this was the case with our ,lord and ,his ,apostles4 ,it seems almost irreverent to speak of their temporal employments1 when we are so simply accustomed to consider them in their spiritual associations2 but it is profitable to remind ourselves that our ,lord ,himself was a sort of smith1 and made ploughs and cattle-yokes4 ,four ,apostles were fishermen1 one a petty tax collector1 two husbandmen1 and another is said to have been a market gardener47#eb7 ,when ,peter and ,john were brought before the ,council1 they are spoken of as being1 in a secular point of view1 8illiterate men1 and of the lower sort10 and thus they are spoken of in a later age by the ,fathers4 ,that their converts were of the same rank as themselves1 is reported1 in their favour or to their discredit1 by friends and enemies1 for four centuries4 8,if a man be educated10 says ,celsus in mockery1 8let him keep clear of us ,christians2 we want no men of wisdom1 no men of sense4 ,we account all such as evil4 ,no2 but1 if there be one who is inexperienced1 or stupid1 or untaught1 or a fool1 let him come with good heart40 8,they are weavers10 he says elsewhere1 8shoemakers1 fullers1 illiterate1 clowns40 8,fools1 low-born fellows10 says ,trypho4 8,the greater part of you10 says ,ccilius1 8are worn with want1 cold1 toil1 and famine2 men collected from the lowest dregs of the people2 ignorant1 credulous women20 8unpolished1 boors1 illiterate1 ignorant even of the sordid arts of life2 they do not understand even civil matters1 how can they understand divine80 8,they have left their tongs1 mallets1 and anvils1 to preach about the things of heaven10 says ,libanius4 8,they deceive women1 servants1 and slaves10 says ,julian4 ,the author of ,philopatris speaks of them as 8poor creatures1 blocks1 withered old fellows1 men of downcast and pale visages40 ,as to their religion1 it had the reputation popularly1 according to various ,fathers1 of being an anile superstition1 the discovery of old women1 a joke1 a madness1 an infatuation1 an absurdity1 a fanaticism4 ,the ,fathers themselves confirm these statements1 so far as they relate to the insignificance and ignorance of their brethren4 ,athenagoras speaks of the virtue of their 8ignorant men1 mechanics1 and old women40 8,they are gathered10 says ,st4 ,jerome1 8not from the ,academy or ,lyceum1 but from the low populace40 8,they are whitesmiths1 servants1 farm-labourers1 woodmen1 men of sordid trades1 beggars10 says ,theodoret4 8,we are engaged in the farm1 in the market1 at the baths1 wine-shops1 stables1 and fairs2 as seamen1 as soldiers1 as peasants1 as dealers10 says ,tertullian4 ,how came such men to be converted8 and1 being converted1 how came such men to overturn the world8 ,yet they went forth from the first1 8conquering and to conquer40 ,the first manifestation of their formidable numbers is made just about the time when ,st4 ,peter and ,st4 ,paul suffered martyrdom1 and was the cause of a terrible persecution4 ,we have the account of it in ,tacitus4 8,nero10 he says1 8to put an end to the common talk that ,rome had been set on fire by his order1 imputed it to others1 visiting with a refinement of punishment those detestable criminals who went by the name of ,christians4 ,the author of that denomination was ,christus1 who had been executed in ,tiberius's time by the procurator1 ,pontius ,pilate4 ,the pestilent superstition1 checked for a while1 burst out again1 not only throughout ,judea1 the first seat of the evil1 but even throughout ,rome1 the centre both of confluence and outbreak of all that is atrocious and disgraceful from every quarter4 ,first were arrested those who made no secret of their sect2 and by this clue a vast multitude of others1 convicted1 not so much of firing the city1 as of hatred to the human race4 ,mockery was added to death2 clad in skins of beasts1 they were torn to pieces by dogs2 they were nailed up to crosses2 they were made inflammable1 so that1 when day failed1 they might serve as lights4 ,hence1 guilty as they were1 and deserving of exemplary punishment1 they excited compassion1 as being destroyed1 not for the public welfare1 but from the cruelty of one man40 ,the two ,apostles suffered1 and a silence follows of a whole generation4 ,at the end of thirty or forty years1 ,pliny1 the friend of ,trajan1 as well as of ,tacitus1 is sent as that ,emperor's ,proprtor into ,bithynia1 and is startled and perplexed by the number1 influence1 and pertinacity of the ,christians whom he finds there1 and in the neighbouring province of ,pontus4 ,he has the opportunity of being far more fair to them than his friend the historian4 ,he writes to ,trajan to know how he ought to deal with them1 and ,i will quote some portions of his letter4 ,he says he does not know how to proceed with them1 as their religion has not received toleration from the state4 ,he never was present at any trial of them2 he doubted whether the children among them1 as well as grown people1 ought to be accounted as culprits1 whether recantation would set matters right1 or whether they incurred punishment all the same2 whether they were to be punished1 merely because ,christians1 even though no definite crime was proved against them4 ,his way had been to examine them1 and put questions to them2 if they confessed the charge1 he gave them one or two chances1 threatening them with punishment2 then1 if they persisted1 he gave orders for their execution4 8,for10 he argues1 8,i felt no doubt that1 whatever might be the character of their opinions1 stubborn and inflexible obstinacy deserved punishment4 ,others there were of a like infatuation1 whom1 being citizens1 ,i sent to ,rome40 ,some satisfied him2 they repeated after him an invocation to the gods1 and offered wine and incense to the ,emperor's image1 and in addition1 cursed the name of ,christ4 8,accordingly10 he says1 8,i let them go2 for ,i am told nothing can compel a real ,christian to do any of these things40 ,there were others1 too1 who sacrificed2 who had been ,christians1 some of them for as many as twenty years4 ,then he is curious to know something more definite about them4 8,this1 the informers told me1 was the whole of their crime or mistake1 that they were accustomed to assemble on a stated day before dawn1 and to say together a hymn to ,christ as a god1 and to bind themselves by an oath sacramento 7not to any crime1 but on the contrary7 to keep from theft1 robbery1 adultery1 breach of promise1 and making free with deposits4 ,after this they used to separate1 and then to meet again for a meal1 which was social and harmless4 ,however1 they left even that off1 after my ,edict against their meeting40 ,this information led him to put to the torture two maid-servants1 8who were called ministers10 in order to find out what was true1 what was false in it2 but he says he could make out nothing1 except a depraved and excessive superstition4 ,this is what led him to consult the ,emperor1 8especially because of the number who were implicated in it2 for these are1 or are likely to be1 many1 of all ages1 nay1 of both sexes4 ,for the contagion of this superstition has spread1 not only in the cities1 but about the villages and the open country40 ,he adds that already there was some improvement4 8,the almost forsaken temples begin to be filled again1 and the sacred solemnities after a long intermission are revived4 ,victims1 too1 are again on sale1 purchasers having been most rare to find40 ,the salient points in this account are these1 that1 at the end of one generation from the ,apostles1 nay1 almost in the lifetime of ,st4 ,john1 ,christians had so widely spread in a large district of ,asia1 as nearly to suppress the ,pagan religions there2 that they were people of exemplary lives2 that they had a name for invincible fidelity to their religion2 that no threats or sufferings could make them deny it2 and that their only tangible characteristic was the worship of our ,lord4 ,this was at the beginning of the second century2 not a great many years after1 we have another account of the ,christian body1 from an anonymous ,greek ,christian1 in a letter to a friend whom he was anxious to convert4 ,it is far too long to quote1 and difficult to compress2 but a few sentences will show how strikingly it agrees with the account of the heathen ,pliny1 especially in two points1--first1 in the numbers of the ,christians1 secondly1 on devotion to our ,lord as the vivifying principle of their association4 8,christians10 says the writer1 8differ not from other men in country1 or speech1 or customs4 ,they do not live in cities of their own1 or speak in any peculiar dialect1 or adopt any strange modes of living4 ,they inhabit their native countries1 but as sojourners2 they take their part in all burdens1 as if citizens1 and in all sufferings1 as if they were strangers4 ,in foreign countries they recognize a home1 and in every home they see a foreign country4 ,they marry like other men1 but do not disown their children4 ,they obey the established laws1 but they go beyond them in the tenor of their lives4 ,they love all men1 and are persecuted by all2 they are not known1 and they are condemned2 they are poor1 and make many rich2 they are dishonoured1 yet in dishonour they are glorified2 they are slandered1 and they are cleared2 they are called names1 and they bless4 ,by the ,jews they are assailed as aliens1 by the ,greeks they are persecuted1 nor can they who hate them say why4 8,christians are in the world1 as the soul in the body4 ,the soul pervades the limbs of the body1 and ,christians the cities of the world4 ,the flesh hates the soul1 and wars against it1 though suffering no wrong from it2 and the world hates ,christians4 ,the soul loves the flesh that hates it1 and ,christians love their enemies4 ,their tradition is not an earthly invention1 nor is it a mortal thought which they so carefully guard1 nor a dispensation of human mysteries which is committed to their charge2 but ,god ,himself1 the ,omnipotent and ,invisible ,creator1 has from heaven established among men ,his ,truth and ,his ,word1 the ,holy and ,incomprehensible1 and has deeply fixed the same in their hearts2 not1 as might be expected1 sending any servant1 angel1 or prince1 or administrator of things earthly or heavenly1 but the very ,artificer and ,demiurge of the ,universe4 ,him ,god hath sent to man1 not to inflict terror1 but in clemency and gentleness1 as a ,king sending a ,king who was ,his ,son2 ,he sent ,him as ,god to men1 to save them4 ,he hated not1 nor rejected us1 nor remembered our guilt1 but showed ,himself long-suffering1 and1 in ,his own words1 bore our sins4 ,he gave ,his own ,son as a ransom for us1 the just for the unjust4 ,for what other thing1 except ,his ,righteousness1 could cover our guilt8 ,in whom was it possible for us1 lawless sinners1 to find justification1 save in the ,son of ,god alone8 ,o sweet interchange6 ,o heavenly workmanship past finding out6 ,o benefits exceeding expectation6 ,sending1 then1 a ,saviour1 who is able to save those who of themselves are incapable of salvation1 ,he has willed that we should regard ,him as our ,guardian1 ,father1 ,teacher1 ,counsellor1 ,physician2 our ,mind1 ,light1 ,honour1 ,glory1 ,strength1 and ,life47#ec70 ,the writing from which ,i have been quoting is of the early part of the second century4 ,twenty or thirty years after it ,st4 ,justin ,martyr speaks as strongly of the spread of the new ,religion3 8,there is not any one race of men10 he says1 8barbarian or ,greek1 nay1 of those who live in waggons1 or who are ,nomads1 or ,shepherds in tents1 among whom prayers and eucharists are not offered to the ,father and ,maker of the ,universe1 through the name of the crucified ,jesus40 ,towards the end of the century1 ,clement3--8,the word of our ,master did not remain in ,judea1 as philosophy remained in ,greece1 but has been poured out over the whole world1 persuading ,greeks and ,barbarians alike1 race by race1 village by village1 every city1 whole houses1 and hearers one by one1 nay1 not a few of the philosophers themselves40 ,and ,tertullian1 at the very close of it1 could in his ,apologia even proceed to threaten the ,roman ,government3--8,we are a people of yesterday10 he says2 8and yet we have filled every place belonging to you1 cities1 islands1 castles1 towns1 assemblies1 your very camp1 your tribes1 companies1 palaces1 senate1 forum4 ,we leave you your temples only4 ,we can count your armies1 and our numbers in a single province will be greater4 ,in what war with you should we not be sufficient and ready1 even though unequal in numbers1 who so willingly are put to death1 if it were not in this ,religion of ours more lawful to be slain than to slay80 ,once more1 let us hear the great ,origen1 in the early part of the next century3--8,in all ,greece and in all barbarous races within our world1 there are tens of thousands who have left their national laws and customary gods for the law of ,moses and the word of ,jesus ,christ2 though to adhere to that law is to incur the hatred of idolaters1 and the risk of death besides to have embraced that word4 ,and considering how1 in so few years1 in spite of the attacks made on us1 to the loss of life or property1 and with no great store of teachers1 the preaching of that word has found its way into every part of the world1 so that ,greek and barbarians1 wise and unwise1 adhere to the religion of ,jesus1 doubtless it is a work greater than any work of man40 ,we need no proof to assure us that this steady and rapid growth of ,christianity was a phenomenon which startled its contemporaries1 as much as it excites the curiosity of philosophic historians now2 and they too then had their own ways of accounting for it1 different indeed from ,gibbon's1 but quite as pertinent1 though less elaborate4 ,these were principally two1 both leading them to persecute it1--the obstinacy of the ,christians and their magical powers1 of which the former was the explanation adopted by educated minds1 and the latter chiefly by the populace4 ,as to the former1 from first to last1 men in power magisterially reprobate the senseless obstinacy of the members of the new sect1 as their characteristic offence4 ,pliny1 as we have seen1 found it to be their only fault1 but one sufficient to merit capital punishment4 ,the ,emperor ,marcus seems to consider obstinacy the ultimate motive-cause to which their unnatural conduct was traceable4 ,after speaking of the soul1 as 8ready1 if it must now be separated from the body1 to be extinguished1 or dissolved1 or to remain with it20 he adds1 8but the readiness must come of its own judgment1 not from simple perverseness1 as in the case of ,christians1 but with considerateness1 with gravity1 and without theatrical effect1 so as to be persuasive40 ,and ,diocletian1 in his ,edict of persecution1 professes it to be his 8earnest aim to punish the depraved persistence of those most wicked men40 ,as to the latter charge1 their founder1 it was said1 had gained a knowledge of magic in ,egypt1 and had left behind him in his sacred books the secrets of the art4 ,suetonius himself speaks of them as 8men of a magical superstition20 and ,celsus accuses them of 8incantations in the name of demons40 ,the officer who had custody of ,st4 ,perpetua1 feared her escape from prison 8by magical incantations40 ,when ,st4 ,tiburtius had walked barefoot on hot coals1 his judge cried out that ,christ had taught him magic4 ,st4 ,anastasia was thrown into prison as dealing in poisons2 the populace called out against ,st4 ,agnes1 8,away with the witch6 away with the sorceress60 ,when ,st4 ,bonosus and ,st4 ,maximilian bore the burning pitch without shrinking1 ,jews and heathen cried out1 8,those wizards and sorcerers60 8,what new delusion10 says the magistrate concerning ,st4 ,romanus1 in the ,hymn of ,prudentius1 8has brought in these sophists who deny the worship of the ,gods8 how doth this chief sorcerer mock us1 stilled by his ,thessalian charm to laugh at punishment87#ed70 ,it is indeed difficult to enter into the feelings of irritation and fear1 of contempt and amazement1 which were excited1 whether in the town populace or in the magistrates in the presence of conduct so novel1 so unvarying1 so absolutely beyond their comprehension4 ,the very young and the very old1 the child1 the youth in the heyday of his passions1 the sober man of middle age1 maidens and mothers of families1 boors and slaves as well as philosophers and nobles1 solitary confessors and companies of men and women1--all these were seen equally to defy the powers of darkness to do their worst4 ,in this strange encounter it became a point of honour with the ,roman to break the determination of his victim1 and it was the triumph of faith when his most savage expedients for that purpose were found to be in vain4 ,the martyrs shrank from suffering like other men1 but such natural shrinking was incommensurable with apostasy4 ,no intensity of torture had any means of affecting what was a mental conviction2 and the sovereign ,thought in which they had lived was their adequate support and consolation in their death4 ,to them the prospect of wounds and loss of limbs was not more terrible than it is to the combatant of this world4 ,they faced the implements of torture as the soldier takes his post before the enemy's battery4 ,they cheered and ran forward to meet his attack1 and as it were dared him1 if he would1 to destroy the numbers who kept closing up the foremost rank1 as their comrades who had filled it fell4 ,and when ,rome at last found she had to deal with a host of ,scvolas1 then the proudest of earthly sovereignties1 arrayed in the completeness of her material resources1 humbled herself before a power which was founded on a mere sense of the unseen4 ,in the colloquy of the aged ,ignatius1 the disciple of the ,apostles1 with the ,emperor ,trajan1 we have a sort of type of what went on for three1 or rather four centuries4 ,he was sent all the way from ,antioch to ,rome to be devoured by the beasts in the amphitheatre4 ,as he travelled1 he wrote letters to various ,christian ,churches1 and among others to his ,roman brethren1 among whom he was to suffer4 ,let us see whether1 as ,i have said1 the ,image of that ,divine ,king1 who had been promised from the beginning1 was not the living principle of his obstinate resolve4 ,the old man is almost fierce in his determination to be martyred4 8,may those beasts10 he says to his brethren1 8be my gain1 which are in readiness for me6 ,i will provoke and coax them to devour me quickly1 and not to be afraid of me1 as they are of some whom they will not touch4 ,should they be unwilling1 ,i will compel them4 ,bear with me2 ,i know what is my gain4 ,now ,i begin to be a disciple4 ,of nothing of things visible or invisible am ,i ambitious1 save to gain ,christ4 ,whether it is fire or the cross1 the assault of wild beasts1 the wrenching of my bones1 the crunching of my limbs1 the crushing of my whole body1 let the tortures of the devil all assail me1 if ,i do but gain ,christ ,jesus40 ,elsewhere in the same ,epistle he says1 8,i write to you1 still alive1 but longing to die4 ,my ,love is crucified6 ,i have no taste for perishable food4 ,i long for ,god's ,bread1 heavenly ,bread1 ,bread of life1 which is ,flesh of ,jesus ,christ1 the ,son of ,god4 ,i long for ,god's draught1 ,his ,blood1 which is ,love without corruption1 and ,life for evermore40 ,it is said that1 when he came into the presence of ,trajan1 the latter cried out1 8,who are you1 poor devil1 who are so eager to transgress our rules80 8,that is no name10 he answered1 8for ,theophorus40 8,who is ,theophorus80 asked the ,emperor4 8,he who bears ,christ in his breast40 ,in the ,apostle's words1 already cited1 he had 8,christ in him1 the hope of glory40 ,all this may be called enthusiasm2 but enthusiasm affords a much more adequate explanation of the confessorship of an old man1 than do ,gibbon's five reasons4 ,instances of the same ardent spirit1 and of the living faith on which it was founded1 are to be found wherever we open the ,acta ,martyrum4 ,in the outbreak at ,smyrna1 in the middle of the second century1 amid tortures which even moved the heathen bystanders to compassion1 the sufferers were conspicuous for their serene calmness4 8,they made it evident to us all10 says the ,epistle of the ,church1 8that in the midst of those sufferings they were absent from the body1 or rather1 that the ,lord stood by them1 and walked in the midst of them40 ,at that time ,polycarp1 the familiar friend of ,st4 ,john1 and a contemporary of ,ignatius1 suffered in his extreme old age4 ,when1 before his sentence1 the ,proconsul bade him 8swear by the fortunes of ,csar1 and have done with ,christ10 his answer betrayed that intimate devotion to the self-same ,idea1 which had been the inward life of ,ignatius4 8,eighty and six years10 he answered1 8have ,i been ,his servant1 and ,he has never wronged me1 but ever has preserved me2 and how can ,i blaspheme my ,king and my ,saviour80 ,when they would have fastened him to the stake1 he said1 8,let alone2 ,he who gives me to bear the fire1 will give me also to stand firm upon the pyre without your nails40 ,christians felt it as an acceptable service to ,him who loved them1 to confess with courage and to suffer with dignity4 ,in this chivalrous spirit1 as it may be called1 they met the words and deeds of their persecutors1 as the children of men return bitterness for bitterness1 and blow for blow4 8,what soldier10 says ,minucius1 with a reference to the invisible ,presence of our ,lord1 8does not challenge danger more daringly under the eye of his commander80 ,in that same outbreak at ,smyrna1 when the ,proconsul urged the young ,germanicus to have mercy on himself and on his youth1 to the astonishment of the populace he provoked a wild beast to fall upon him4 ,in like manner1 ,st4 ,justin tells us of ,lucius1 who1 when he saw a ,christian sent off to suffer1 at once remonstrated sharply with the judge1 and was sent off to execution with him2 and then another presented himself1 and was sent off also4 ,when the ,christians were thrown into prison1 in the fierce persecution at ,lyons1 ,vettius ,epagathus1 a youth of distinction who had given himself to an ascetic life1 could not bear the sight of the sufferings of his brethren1 and asked leave to plead their cause4 ,the only answer he got was to be sent off the first to die4 ,what the contemporary account sees in his conduct is1 not that he was zealous for his brethren1 though zealous he was1 nor that he believed in miracles1 though he doubtless did believe2 but that he 8was a gracious disciple of ,christ1 following the ,lamb whithersoever ,he went40 ,in that memorable persecution1 when ,blandina1 a slave1 was seized for confessorship1 her mistress and her fellow-,christians dreaded lest1 from her delicate make1 she should give way under the torments2 but she even tired out her tormentors4 ,it was a refreshment and relief to her to cry out amid her pains1 8,i am a ,christian40 ,they remanded her to prison1 and then brought her out for fresh suffering a second day and a third4 ,on the last day she saw a boy of fifteen brought into the amphitheatre for death2 she feared for him1 as others had feared for her2 but he too went through his trial generously1 and went to ,god before her4 ,her last sufferings were to be placed in the notorious red-hot chair1 and then to be exposed in a net to a wild bull2 they finished by cutting her throat4 ,sanctus1 too1 when the burning plates of brass were placed on his limbs1 all through his torments did but say1 8,i am a ,christian10 and stood erect and firm1 8bathed and strengthened10 say his brethren who write the account1 8in the heavenly well of living water which flows from the breast of ,christ10 or1 as they say elsewhere of all the martyrs1 8refreshed with the joy of martyrdom1 the hope of blessedness1 love towards ,christ1 and the spirit of ,god the ,father40 ,how clearly do we see all through this narrative what it was which nerved them for the combat6 ,if they love their brethren1 it is in the fellowship of their ,lord2 if they look for heaven1 it is because ,he is the ,light of it4 ,epipodius1 a youth of gentle nurture1 when struck by the ,prefect on the mouth1 while blood flowed from it1 cried out1 8,i confess that ,jesus ,christ is ,god1 together with the ,father and the ,holy ,ghost40 ,symphorian1 of ,autun1 also a youth1 and of noble birth1 when told to adore an idol1 answered1 8,give me leave1 and ,i will hammer it to pieces40 ,when ,leonidas1 the father of the young ,origen1 was in prison for his faith1 the boy1 then seventeen1 burned to share his martyrdom1 and his mother had to hide his clothes to prevent him from executing his purpose4 ,afterwards he attended the confessors in prison1 stood by them at the tribunal1 and gave them the kiss of peace when they were led out to suffer1 and this1 in spite of being several times apprehended and put upon the rack4 ,also in ,alexandria1 the beautiful slave1 ,potamina1 when about to be stripped in order to be thrown into the cauldron of hot pitch1 said to the ,prefect1 8,i pray you rather let me be dipped down slowly into it with my clothes on1 and you shall see with what patience ,i am gifted by ,him of whom you are ignorant1 ,jesus ,christ40 ,when the populace in the same city had beaten out the aged ,apollonia's teeth1 and lit a fire to burn her1 unless she would blaspheme1 she leaped into the fire herself1 and so gained her crown4 ,when ,sixtus1 ,bishop of ,rome1 was led to martyrdom1 his deacon1 ,laurence1 followed him weeping and complaining1 8,o my father1 whither goest thou without thy son80 ,and when his own turn came1 three days afterwards1 and he was put upon the gridiron1 after a while he said to the ,prefect1 8,turn me2 this side is done40 ,whence came this tremendous spirit1 scaring1 nay1 offending1 the fastidious criticism of our delicate days8 ,does ,gibbon think to sound the depths of the eternal ocean with the tape and measuring-rod of his merely literary philosophy8 ,when ,barulas1 a child of seven years old1 was scourged to blood for repeating his catechism before the heathen judge--viz4 8,there is but one ,god1 and ,jesus ,christ is true ,god0--his mother encouraged him to persevere1 chiding him for asking for some drink4 ,at ,merida1 a girl of noble family1 of the age of twelve1 presented herself before the tribunal1 and overturned the idols4 ,she was scourged and burned with torches2 she neither shed a tear1 nor showed other signs of suffering4 ,when the fire reached her face1 she opened her mouth to receive it1 and was suffocated4 ,at ,csarea1 a girl1 under eighteen1 went boldly to ask the prayers of some ,christians who were in chains before the ,prtorium4 ,she was seized at once1 and her sides torn open with the iron rakes1 preserving the while a bright and joyous countenance4 ,peter1 ,dorotheus1 ,gorgonius1 were boys of the imperial bedchamber2 they were highly in favour with their masters1 and were ,christians4 ,they too suffered dreadful torments1 dying under them1 without a shadow of wavering4 ,call such conduct madness1 if you will1 or magic3 but do not mock us by ascribing it in such mere children to simple desire of immortality1 or to any ecclesiastical organization4 ,when the persecution raged in ,asia1 a vast multitude of ,christians presented themselves before the ,proconsul1 challenging him to proceed against them4 8,poor wretches60 half in contempt and half in affright1 he answered1 8if you must die1 cannot you find ropes or precipices for the purpose80 ,at ,utica1 a hundred and fifty ,christians of both sexes and all ages were martyrs in one company4 ,they are said to have been told to burn incense to an idol1 or they should be thrown into a pit of burning lime2 they without hesitation leapt into it4 ,in ,egypt a hundred and twenty confessors1 after having sustained the loss of eyes or of feet1 endured to linger out their lives in the mines of ,palestine and ,cilicia4 ,in the last persecution1 according to the testimony of the grave ,eusebius1 a contemporary1 the slaughter of men1 women1 and children1 went on by twenties1 sixties1 hundreds1 till the instruments of execution were worn out1 and the executioners could kill no more4 ,yet he tells us1 as an eye-witness1 that1 as soon as any ,christians were condemned1 others ran from all parts1 and surrounded the tribunals1 confessing the faith1 and joyfully receiving their condemnation1 and singing songs of thanksgiving and triumph to the last4 ,thus was the ,roman power overcome4 ,thus did the ,seed of ,abraham1 and the ,expectation of the ,gentiles1 the meek ,son of man1 8take to ,himself ,his great power and reign0 in the hearts of ,his people1 in the public theatre of the world4 ,the mode in which the primeval prophecy was fulfilled is as marvellous1 as the prophecy itself is clear and bold4 8,so may all ,thy enemies perish1 ,o ,lord2 but let them that love ,thee shine1 as the sun shineth in his rising60 ,i will add the memorable words of the two great ,apologists of the period3-- 8,your cruelty10 says ,tertullian1 8though each act be more refined than the last1 doth profit you nothing4 ,to our sect it is rather an inducement4 ,we grow up in greater numbers1 as often as you cut us down4 ,the blood of the martyrs is their seed for the harvest40 ,origen even uses the language of prophecy4 ,to the objection of ,celsus that ,christianity from its principles would1 if let alone1 open the whole empire to the irruption of the barbarians1 and the utter ruin of civilization1 he replies1 8,if all ,romans are such as we1 then too the barbarians will draw near to the ,word of ,god1 and will become the most observant of the ,law4 ,and every worship shall come to nought1 and that of the ,christians alone obtain the mastery1 for the ,word is continually gaining possession of more and more souls40 ,one additional remark3--,it was fitting that those mixed unlettered multitudes1 who for three centuries had suffered and triumphed by virtue of the inward ,vision of their ,divine ,lord1 should be selected1 as we know they were1 in the fourth1 to be the special champions of ,his ,divinity and the victorious foes of its impugners1 at a time when the civil power1 which had found them too strong for its arms1 attempted1 by means of a portentous heresy in the high places of the ,church1 to rob them of that ,truth which had all along been the principle of their strength4 #aj4 ,i have been forestalling all along the thought with which ,i shall close these considerations on the subject of ,christianity2 and necessarily forestalling it1 because it properly comes first1 though the course which my argument has taken has not allowed me to introduce it in its natural place4 ,revelation begins where ,natural ,religion fails4 ,the ,religion of ,nature is a mere inchoation1 and needs a complement1--it can have but one complement1 and that very complement is ,christianity4 ,natural ,religion is based upon the sense of sin2 it recognizes the disease1 but it cannot find1 it does but look out for the remedy4 ,that remedy1 both for guilt and for moral impotence1 is found in the central doctrine of ,revelation1 the ,mediation of ,christ4 ,i need not go into a subject so familiar to all men in a ,christian country4 ,thus it is that ,christianity is the fulfilment of the promise made to ,abraham1 and of the ,mosaic revelations2 this is how it has been able from the first to occupy the world and gain a hold on every class of human society to which its preachers reached2 this is why the ,roman power and the multitude of religions which it embraced could not stand against it2 this is the secret of its sustained energy1 and its never-flagging martyrdoms2 this is how at present it is so mysteriously potent1 in spite of the new and fearful adversaries which beset its path4 ,it has with it that gift of staunching and healing the one deep wound of human nature1 which avails more for its success than a full encyclopedia of scientific knowledge and a whole library of controversy1 and therefore it must last while human nature lasts4 ,it is a living truth which never can grow old4 ,some persons speak of it as if it were a thing of history1 with only indirect bearings upon modern times2 ,i cannot allow that it is a mere historical religion4 ,certainly it has its foundations in past and glorious memories1 but its power is in the present4 ,it is no dreary matter of antiquarianism2 we do not contemplate it in conclusions drawn from dumb documents and dead events1 but by faith exercised in ever-living objects1 and by the appropriation and use of ever-recurring gifts4 ,our communion with it is in the unseen1 not in the obsolete4 ,at this very day its rites and ordinances are continually eliciting the active interposition of that ,omnipotence in which the ,religion long ago began4 ,first and above all is the ,holy ,mass1 in which ,he who once died for us upon the ,cross1 brings back and perpetuates1 by ,his literal presence in it1 that one and the same sacrifice which cannot be repeated4 ,next1 there is the actual entrance of ,himself1 soul and body1 and divinity1 into the soul and body of every worshipper who comes to ,him for the gift1 a privilege more intimate than if we lived with ,him during ,his long-past sojourn upon earth4 ,and then1 moreover1 there is ,his personal abidance in our churches1 raising earthly service into a foretaste of heaven4 ,such is the profession of ,christianity1 and1 ,i repeat1 its very divination of our needs is in itself a proof that it is really the supply of them4 ,upon the doctrines which ,i have mentioned as central truths1 others1 as we all know1 follow1 which rule our personal conduct and course of life1 and our social and civil relations4 ,the promised ,deliverer1 the ,expectation of the nations1 has not done ,his work by halves4 ,he has given us ,saints and ,angels for our protection4 ,he has taught us how by our prayers and services to benefit our departed friends1 and to keep up a memorial of ourselves when we are gone4 ,he has created a visible hierarchy and a succession of sacraments1 to be the channels of ,his mercies1 and the ,crucifix secures the thought of ,him in every house and chamber4 ,in all these ways ,he brings ,himself before us4 ,i am not here speaking of ,his gifts as gifts1 but as memorials2 not as what ,christians know they convey1 but in their visible character2 and ,i say1 that1 as human nature itself is still in life and action as much as ever it was1 so ,he too lives1 to our imaginations1 by ,his visible symbols1 as if ,he were on earth1 with a practical efficacy which even unbelievers cannot deny1 to be the corrective of that nature1 and its strength day by day1 and that this power of perpetuating ,his ,image1 being altogether singular and special1 and the prerogative of ,him and ,him alone1 is a grand evidence how well ,he fulfils to this day that ,sovereign ,mission which1 from the first beginning of the world's history1 has been in prophecy assigned to ,him4 ,i cannot better illustrate this argument than by recurring to a deep thought on the subject of ,christianity1 which has before now attracted the notice of philosophers and preachers17#ee7 as coming from the wonderful man who swayed the destinies of ,europe in the first years of this century4 ,it was an argument not unnatural in one who had that special passion for human glory1 which has been the incentive of so many heroic careers and of so many mighty revolutions in the history of the world4 ,in the solitude of his imprisonment1 and in the view of death1 he is said to have expressed himself to the following effect3-- 8,i have been accustomed to put before me the examples of ,alexander and ,csar1 with the hope of rivalling their exploits1 and living in the minds of men for ever4 ,yet1 after all1 in what sense does ,csar1 in what sense does ,alexander live8 ,who knows or cares anything about them8 ,at best1 nothing but their names is known2 for who among the multitude of men1 who hear or who utter their names1 really knows anything about their lives or their deeds1 or attaches to those names any definite idea8 ,nay1 even their names do but flit up and down the world like ghosts1 mentioned only on particular occasions1 or from accidental associations4 ,their chief home is the schoolroom2 they have a foremost place in boys' grammars and exercise-books2 they are splendid examples for themes2 they form writing-copies4 ,so low is heroic ,alexander fallen1 so low is imperial ,csar1 #8ut pueris placeant et declamatio fiant4' 8,but1 on the contrary0 7he is reported to have continued71 8there is just ,one ,name in the whole world that lives2 it is the ,name of ,one who passed ,his years in obscurity1 and who died a malefactor's death4 ,eighteen hundred years have gone since that time1 but still it has its hold upon the human mind4 ,it has possessed the world1 and it maintains possession4 ,amid the most varied nations1 under the most diversified circumstances1 in the most cultivated1 in the rudest races and intellects1 in all classes of society1 the ,owner of that great ,name reigns4 ,high and low1 rich and poor1 acknowledge ,him4 ,millions of souls are conversing with ,him1 are venturing on ,his word1 are looking for ,his presence4 ,palaces1 sumptuous1 innumerable1 are raised to ,his honour2 ,his image1 as in the hour of his deepest humiliation1 is triumphantly displayed in the proud city1 in the open country1 in the corners of streets1 on the tops of mountains4 ,it sanctifies the ancestral hall1 the closet1 and the bedchamber2 it is the subject for the exercise of the highest genius in the imitative arts4 ,it is worn next the heart in life2 it is held before the failing eyes in death4 ,here1 then1 is ,one who is not a mere name1 who is not a mere fiction1 who is a reality4 ,he is dead and gone1 but still ,he lives1--lives as the living1 energetic thought of successive generations1 as the awful motive-power of a thousand great events4 ,he has done without effort what others with life-long struggles have not done4 ,can ,he be less than ,divine8 ,who is ,he but the ,creator ,himself2 who is sovereign over ,his own works1 towards whom our eyes and hearts turn instinctively1 because ,he is our ,father and our ,god87#ef70 ,here ,i end my specimens1 among the many which might be given1 of the arguments adducible for ,christianity4 ,i have dwelt upon them1 in order to show how ,i would apply the principles of this ,essay to the proof of its divine origin4 ,christianity is addressed1 both as regards its evidences and its contents1 to minds which are in the normal condition of human nature1 as believing in ,god and in a future judgment4 ,such minds it addresses both through the intellect and through the imagination2 creating a certitude of its truth by arguments too various for enumeration1 too personal and deep for words1 too powerful and concurrent for refutation4 ,nor need reason come first and faith second 7though this is the logical order71 but one and the same teaching is in different aspects both object and proof1 and elicits one complex act both of inference and of assent4 ,it speaks to us one by one1 and it is received by us one by one1 as the counterpart1 so to say1 of ourselves1 and is real as we are real4 ,in the sacred words of its ,divine ,author and ,object concerning ,himself1 8,i am the ,good ,shepherd1 and ,i know mine1 and ,mine know ,me4 ,my sheep hear ,my voice1 and ,i know them1 and they follow ,me4 ,and ,i give them everlasting life1 and they shall never perish2 and no man shall pluck them out of ,my hand40 ,,note4 #a4 ,on the first publication of this volume1 a ,correspondent did me the favour of marking for me a list of passages in ,chillingworth's celebrated work1 besides that which ,i had myself quoted1 in which the argument was more or less brought forward1 on which ,i have animadverted in ch4 vii4 #b1 p4 #bbf4 ,he did this with the purpose of showing1 that ,chillingworth's meaning1 when carefully inquired into1 would be found to be in substantial agreement with the distinction ,i had myself made between infallibility and certitude2 those inaccuracies of language into which he fell1 being necessarily involved in the argumentum ad hominem1 which he was urging upon his opponent1 or being the accidental result of the peculiar character of his intellect1 which1 while full of ideas1 was wanting in the calmness and caution which are conspicuous in ,bishop ,butler4 ,others more familiar with ,chillingworth than ,i am must decide on this point2 but ,i can have no indisposition to accept an explanation1 which deprives controversialists of this day of the authority of a vigorous and acute mind in their use of an argument1 which is certainly founded on a great confusion of thought4 ,i subjoin the references with which my ,correspondent has supplied me3-- 7#a47 ,passages tending to show an agreement of ,chillingworth's opinion on the distinction between certitude and infallibility with that laid down in the foregoing essay3-- #a4 8,religion of ,protestants10 ch4 ii4 #aba 7vol4 i4 p4 #bdc1 ,oxf4 ed4 #ahch71 8,for may not a private man10 c4 #b4 ,ibid4 #aeb 7p4 #bfe74 ,the last sentence1 however1 after 8when they thought they dreamt10 is a fall into the error which he had been exposing4 #c4 ,ibid4 #afj 7p4 #bge74 #d4 ,ch4 iii4 #bf 7p4 #ccb71 8,neither is your argument10 c4 #e4 ,ibid4 #cf 7p4 #cdf74 #f4 ,ibid4 #ej 7p4 #cfc71 8,that ,abraham10 c4 #g4 ,ch4 v4 #fc 7vol ii4 p4 #bae74 #h4 ,ibid4 #ajg 7p4 #bfe74 #i4 ,ch vii4 #ac 7p4 #deb74 ,vide also vol4 i4 pp4 #aae1 #aba1 #aif1 #bcf1 #bdb1 #daa4 7#b47 ,passages inconsistent with the above3-- #a4 ,ch4 ii4 #be 7vol4 i4 p4 #agg74 ,an argumentum ad hominem4 #b4 ,ibid4 #bh 7p4 #ahj74 #c4 ,ibid4 #de 7p4 #ahi74 ,an argumentum ad hominem4 #d4 ,ibid4 #adi 7p4 #bfc74 ,an argumentum ad hominem4 #e4 ,ibid4 #aed 7p4 #bfg74 ,quoted in the text1 p4 #bbf4 #f4 ,ch4 v4 #de 7vol4 ii4 p4 #cia74 ,he is arguing on his opponent's principles4 #b4 ,also1 ,i have to express my obligation to another ,correspondent1 who called my attention to a passage of ,hooker 78,eccles4 ,pol40 ii4 #g7 beginning 8,an earnest desire10 c41 which seemed to anticipate the doctrine of ,locke about certitude4 ,it is so difficult to be sure of the meaning of a writer whose style is so foreign to that of our own times1 that ,i am shy of attempting to turn this passage into categorical statements4 ,else1 ,i should ask1 does not ,hooker here assume the absolute certainty of the inspiration and divine authority of ,scripture1 and believe its teaching as the very truth unconditionally and without any admixture of doubt8 ,yet what had he but probable evidence as a warrant for such a view of it8 ,again1 did he receive the ,athanasian ,creed on any logical demonstration that its articles were in ,scripture8 ,yet he felt himself able without any misgiving to say aloud in the congregation1 8,which faith except every one do keep whole and undefiled1 without doubt he shall perish everlastingly40 ,in truth it is the happy inconsistency of his school to be more orthodox in their conclusions than in their premisses2 to be sceptics in their paper theories1 and believers in their own persons4 #c4 ,also1 a friend sends me word1 as regards the controversy on the various readings of ,shakespeare to which ,i have referred 7supra1 ch4 viii4 #a1 p4 #bga7 in illustration of the shortcomings of ,formal ,inference1 that1 since the date of the article in the magazine1 of which ,i have there availed myself1 the verdict of critics has been unfavourable to the authority and value of the ,annotated ,copy1 discovered twenty years ago4 ,i may add1 that1 since my first edition1 ,i have had the pleasure of reading ,dr4 ,ingleby's interesting dissertation on the 8,traces of the ,authorship of the ,works attributed to ,shakespeare40 ,,footnotes #a 8,the ,oxford ,spy10 #ahah2 by ,j4 ,s4 ,boone1 p4 #ajg4 #b ,vide 8,discussions and ,arguments on ,various ,subjects10 art4 #d4 #c ,on the ,formation of ,images1 vide supr4 ch4 iii4 #a1 pp4 #bg1 #bh4 #d ,liberty of ,prophesying1 #b4 #e ,this passage is already quoted in my 8,essay on ,development of ,doctrine10 vi4 #a1 #b4 #f ,gambier on ,moral ,evidence1 p4 #f4 #g 8,supernaturalis mentis assensus1 rebus fidei exhibitus1 cm prcipu dependeat grati ,dei intrinsecus mentem illuminante et commovente1 potest esse1 et est1 major quocunque assensu certitudini naturali prstito1 seu ex motivis naturalibus orto10 c4--,dmouski1 ,instit4 t4 i4 p4 #bh4 #h 8,hoc viz4 multo certior est homo de eo quod audit ,deo qui falli non potest1 qum de eo quod videt propri ratione qu falli potest intelligendum est de certitudine fidei secundum appretiationem1 non secundum intentionem2 nam spe contingit1 ut scientia claris percipiatur ab intellectu1 atque ut connexio scienti cum veritate magis appareat1 qum connexio fidei cum edem2 cognitiones enim naturales1 utpote captui nostro accommodat1 magis animum quietant1 delectant1 et veluti4 satiant40--,scavini1 ,theol4 ,moral4 t4 ii4 p4 #dbh4 #i 8,suppono enim1 veritatem fidei non esse certiorem veritate metaphysic aut geometric quoad modum assensionis1 sed tantum quoad modum adhsionis2 quia utrinque intellectus absolut sine modo limitante assentitur4 ,sola autem adhsio voluntatis diversa est2 quia in actu fidei gratia seu habitus infusus roborat intellectum et voluntatem1 ne tam facil mutentur aut perturbentur40--,amort1 ,theol4 t4 i4 p4 #cab4 8,hc distinctio certitudinis ex diversitate motivorum extrinsecam tantum differentiam importat1 cm omnis naturalis certitudo1 formaliter spectata1 sit qualis2 debet enim essentialiter erroris periculum amovere1 exclusio autem periculi erroris in indivisibili consistit2 aut enim babetur aut non habetur40--,dmouski1 ibid4 p4 #bg4 #aj 8,fides est certior omni veritate naturali1 etiam geometric aut metaphysic cert2 idque non solum certitudine adhsionis sed etiam assentionis4444 ,intellectus sentit se in multis veritatibus etiam metaphysic certis posse per objectiones perturbari1 e4 g4 si legat scepticos4444 ,e contr circa ea1 qu constat esse revelata ,deo1 nullus potest perturbari40--,amort1 ibid4 p4 #cfg4 #aa ii4 n4 #aed4 ,vide ,note at the end of the volume4 #ab ,i have assumed throughout this ,section that all verbal argumentation is ultimately syllogistic2 and in consequence that it ever requires universal propositions and comes short of concrete fact4 ,a friend refers me to the dispute between ,des ,cartes and ,gassendi1 the latter maintaining against the former that 8,cogito ergo sum0 implies the universal 8,all who think exist40 ,i should deny this with ,des ,cartes2 but ,i should say 7as indeed he said71 that his dictum was not an argument1 but was the expression of a ratiocinative instinct1 as ,i explain below under the head of 8,natural ,logic40 ,as to the instance 8,brutes are not men2 therefore men are not brutes10 there seems to me no consequence here1 neither a prter nor a propter1 but a tautology4 ,and as to 8,it was either ,tom or ,dick that did it2 it was not ,dick1 ergo10 this may be referred to the one great principle on which all logical reasoning is founded1 but really it ought not to be accounted an inference any more than if ,i broke a biscuit1 flung half away1 and then said of the other half1 8,this is what remains40 ,it does but state a fact4 ,so1 when the #ast1 #bnd1 or #crd proposition of ,euclid ,,ii4 is put before the eyes in a diagram1 a boy1 before he yet has learned to reason1 sees with his eyes the fact of the thesis1 and this seeing it even makes it difficult for him to master the mathematical proof4 ,here1 then1 a fact is stated in the form of an argument4 ,however1 ,i have inserted parentheses at pp4 #bgg and #bhc1 in order to say 8transeat0 to the question4 #ac 8,aids to ,reflection10 p4 #ei1 ed4 #ahci4 #ad ,taylor's ,translation1 p4 #aca4 #ae ,ibid4 pp4 #ajh-aaj4 #af ,ibid4 pp4 #dbi-dcf4 #ag 8,north and ,south40 #ah ,serm4 xi4 init4 #ai ,vide supr4 ch4 v4 #a1 pp4 #aji1 #aac4 #bj ,pp4 #hd1 #he4 #ba 8,analogy10 pp4 #cbi1 #ccj1 ed4 #ahcf4 #bb ,ibid4 p4 #bgh4 #bc 8,mechanics10 p4 #ca4 #bd ,phillipps' 8,law of ,evidence10 vol4 i4 p4 #def4 #be 8,orley ,farm40 #bf ,guardian1 ,june #bh1 #ahfe4 #bg ,history1 vol4 x4 pp4 #bhf1 #bhg4 #bh 8,peveril of the ,peak40 #bi 8,life of ,mother ,margaret ,m4 ,hallahan10 p4 vii4 #cj ,eth4 ,nicom4 vi4 #aa1 fin4 #ca ,though ,aristotle1 in his ,nicomachean ,ethics1 speaks of as the virtue of the generally1 and as being concerned generally with contingent matter 7vi4 #d71 or what ,i have called the concrete1 and of its function being1 as regards that matter1 7ibid4 #c71 he does not treat of it in that work in its general relation to truth and the affirmation of truth1 but only as it bears upon 4 #cb ,niebuhr1 8,roman ,history10 vol4 i4 p4 #agg2 vol4 iii4 pp4 #bfb4 #cah4 #cbb4 8,lectures10 vol4 iii4 ,app4 p4 xxii4 ,lewis1 8,roman ,history10 vol4 i4 pp4 #aa-ag2 vol4 ii4 pp4 #dhi-dib4 ,f4 ,w4 ,newman1 8,regal ,rome10 p4 v4 ,grote1 8,greece10 vol4 ii4 pp4 #fg1 #fh4 #bah4 #fcj-fci4 ,mure1 8,greece10 vol4 iii4 p4 #ejc2 vol4 iv4 p4 #cah4 ,clinton1 ap4 ,grote1 supr4 #cc 8,prophetical ,office of the ,church10 pp4 #cdg1 #cdh1 ed4 #ahcg4 #cd ,supra1 p4 #aje1 c4 ,vide also ,univ4 ,serm4 ii4 #g-ac4 #ce ,penny ,cyclopdia1 art4 8,atonement0 7abridged74 #cf ,on these various subjects ,i have written in 8,university ,sermons0 7,oxford71 ,no4 vi4 8,idea of the ,university10 ,disc4 viii4 8,history of ,turks10 ch4 iv4 8,development of ,doctrine10 ch4 i4 sect4 #c4 #cg ,vide 8,apologia10 p4 #bda4 #ch ,vide 8,callista10 ch4 xix4 #ci 8,analogy10 ,pt4 ii4 ch4 #e 7abridged74 #dj 8,scopus operis est1 planiorem ,protestantibus aperire viam ad veram ,ecclesiam4 ,cm enim hactenus ,polemici nostri insudarint toti in demonstrandis singulis ,religionis ,catholic articulis1 in id ego unum incumbo1 ut hc tria evincam4 ,primo3 ,articulos fundamentales ,religionis ,catholic esse evidenter credibiliores oppositis1 c4 c4444 ,demonstratio autem hujus nov1 modest1 ac facilis vi1 qu ex articulis fundamentalibus solm probabilioribus adstruitur summa ,religionis certitudo1 hc est3 ,deus1 cm sit sapiens ac providus1 tenetur1 ,religionem se revelatam reddere evidenter credibiliorem religionibus falsis4 ,imprudenter enim vellet1 suam ,religionem ab hominibus recipi1 nisi eam redderet evidenter credibiliorem religionibus cteris4 ,ergo illa religio1 qu est evidenter credibilior cteris1 est ipsissima religio a ,deo revelata1 adeoque certissim vera1 seu demonstrata4 ,atqui1 c4444 ,motivum aggrediendi novam hanc1 modestam1 ac facilem viam illud prcipuum est1 qud observem1 ,protestantium plurimos post innumeros concertationum fluctus1 in iis tandem consedisse syrtibus1 ut credant1 nullam dari religionem undequaque demonstratam1 c4444 ,ratiociniis denique opponunt ratiocinia2 prjudiciis prjudicia ex majoribus sua10 c4 #da 8,docet naturalis ratio1 ,deum1 ex ips natur bonitatis ac providenti su1 si velit in mundo habere religionem puram1 eamque instituere ac conservare usque in finem mundi1 teneri ad eam religionem reddendam evidenter credibiliorem ac verisimiliorem cteris1 c4 c4444 ,ex hoc sequitur ulterius2 certitudinem moralem de ver ,ecclesi elevari posse ad certitudinem metaphysicam1 si homo advertat1 certitudinem moralem absolut fallibilem substare in materi religionis circa ejus constitutiva fundamentalia speciali providenti divin1 prservatrici ab omni errore4444 ,itaque homo semel ex serie historic actorum perductus ad moralem certitudinem de auctore1 fundatione1 propagatione1 et continuatione ,ecclesi ,christian1 per reflexionem ad existentiam certissimam providenti divin in materi religionis1 priori lumine natur certitudine metaphysic notam1 eo ipso eadem infallibili certitudine intelliget1 argumenta de auctore10 c4--,amort4 ,ethica ,christiana1 p4 #beb4 #db 8,de hac damnatorum saltem hominum respiratione1 nihil adhuc certi decretum est ab ,ecclesi ,catholic3 ut propterea non temer1 tanquam absurda1 sit explodenda sanctissimorum ,patrum hc opinio3 quamvis communi sensu ,catholicorum hoc tempore sit aliena40--,petavius de ,angelis1 fin4 #dc ,vide supra1 p4 #cjb4 #dd ,vide the author's ,occasional ,sermons1 ,no4 #e4 #de ,vide supra1 p4 #hd4 #df ,history1 vol4 viii4 #dg ,before and apart from ,christianity1 the ,samaritan ,version reads1 8donec veniat ,pacificus1 et ad ipsum congregabuntur populi40 ,the ,targum1 8donec veniat ,messias1 cujus est regnum1 et obedient populi40 ,the ,septuagint1 8donec veniant qu reservata sunt illi0 7or 8donec veniat cui reservatum est071 8et ipse expectatio gentium40 ,and so again the ,vulgate1 8donec veniat qui mittendus est1 et ipse erit expectatio gentium40 ,the ingenious translation of some learned men 78donec venerit ,juda ,siluntem10 i4 e4 8the tribe-sceptre shall not depart from ,judah till ,judah comes to ,shiloh071 with the explanation that the tribe of ,judah had the leadership in the war against the ,canaanites1 vide ,judges i4 #a1 #b2 xx4 #ah 7i4 e4 after ,joshua's death71 and that possibly1 and for what we know1 the tribe gave up that war-command at ,shiloh1 vide ,joshua xviii4 #a 7i4 e4 in ,joshua's life-time71 labours under three grave difficulties3 #a4 ,that the patriarchal sceptre is a temporary war-command4 #b4 ,that this command belonged to ,judah at the very time that it belonged to ,joshua4 ,and #c4 ,that it was finally lost to ,judah 7,joshua living7 before it had been committed to ,judah 7,joshua dead74 #dh ,he appeals to the prophecies in evidence of ,his ,divine mission1 in addressing the ,nazarites 7,luke iv4 #ah71 ,st4 ,john's disciples 7,matt4 xi4 #e71 and the ,pharisees 7,matt4 xxi4 #db1 and ,john v4 #ci71 but not in details4 ,the appeal to details ,he reserves for ,his disciples4 ,vide ,matt4 xi4 #aj2 xxvi4 #bd1 #ca1 #ed3 ,luke xxii4 #cg2 xxiv4 #bg1 #df4 #di ,vide supra1 pp4 #cda1 #cge1 #dac-daf4 #ej ,vide supra4 #ea ,had my limits allowed it1 ,i ought1 as a third subject1 to have described the existing system of impure idolatry1 and the wonderful phenomenon of such multitudes1 who had been slaves to it1 escaping from it by the power of ,christianity1--under the guidance of the great work 78,on the ,gentile and the ,jew07 of ,dr4 ,dllinger4 #eb ,on the subjects which follow1 vide ,lami1 ,de ,eruditione ,apostolorum2 ,mamachius1 ,origines ,christ42 ,ruinart1 ,act4 ,mart42 ,lardner1 ,credibility1 c42 ,fleury1 ,eccles4 ,hist42 ,kortholt1 ,calumn4 ,pagan42 and ,de ,morib4 ,christ41 c4 #ec ,ep4 ad ,diognet4 #ed ,essay on ,development of ,doctrine1 ch4 iv4 #a4 #ee ,fr4 ,lacordaire and ,m4 ,nicolas4 #ef ,occas4 ,serm41 pp4 #di-ea4