,,creative ,,intelligence ,,essays ,,in ,,the ,,pragmatic ,,attitude ,,by ,,john ,,dewey ,,addison ,w4 ,,moore ,,harold ,,chapman ,,brown ,,george ,h4 ,,mead ,,boyd ,h4 ,,bode ,,henry ,,waldgrave ,,stuart ,,james ,,hayden ,,tufts ,,horace ,m4 ,,kallen ,illustration ,,new ,,york ,,henry ,,holt ,,and ,,company ,,copyright1 #aiag1 ,,by ,,henry ,,holt ,,and ,,company ,published ,january1 #aiag ,,the ,,quinn ,,boden ,,co4 ,,press ,,rahway1 ,n4 ,j4 ,,prefatory ,,note ,the ,essays which follow represent an attempt at intellectual cooeperation4 ,no effort has been made1 however1 to attain unanimity of belief nor to proffer a platform of planks on which there is agreement4 ,the consensus represented lies primarily in outlook1 in conviction of what is most likely to be fruitful in method of approach4 ,as the title page suggests1 the volume presents a unity in attitude rather than a uniformity in results4 ,consequently each writer is definitively responsible only for his own essay4 ,the reader will note that the ,essays endeavor to embody the common attitude in application to specific fields of inquiry which have been historically associated with philosophy rather than as a thing by itself4 ,beginning with philosophy itself1 subsequent contributions discuss its application to logic1 to mathematics1 to physical science1 to psychology1 to ethics1 to economics1 and then again to philosophy itself in conjunction with esthetics and religion4 ,the reader will probably find that the significant points of agreement have to do with the ideas of the genuineness of the future1 of intelligence as the organ for determining the quality of that future so far as it can come within human control1 and of a courageously inventive individual as the bearer of a creatively employed mind4 ,while all the essays are new in the form in which they are now published1 various contributors make their acknowledgments to the editors of the ,philosophical ,review1 the ,psychological ,review1 and the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology and ,scientific ,methods for use of material which first made its appearance in the pages of these journals4 ,,contents ,,page ,,the ,,need ,,for ,a ,,recovery ,,of ,,philosophy #c ,john ,dewey1 ,columbia ,university4 ,,reformation ,,of ,,logic #gj ,addison ,w4 ,moore1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,intelligence ,,and ,,mathematics #aah ,harold ,chapman ,brown1 ,leland ,stanford1 ,jr41 ,university4 ,,scientific ,,method ,,and ,,individual ,,thinker #agf ,george ,h4 ,mead1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,consciousness ,,and ,,psychology #bbh ,boyd ,h4 ,bode1 ,university of ,illinois4 ,,the ,,phases ,,of ,,the ,,economic ,,interest #bhb ,henry ,waldgrave ,stuart1 ,leland ,stanford1 ,jr41 ,university4 ,,the ,,moral ,,life ,,and ,,the ,,construction ,,of ,,values ,,and ,,standards #ced ,james ,hayden ,tufts1 ,university of ,chicago4 ,,value ,,and ,,existence ,,in ,,philosophy1 ,,art1 ,,and ,,religion #dji ,horace ,m4 ,kallen1 ,university of ,wisconsin4 ,,creative ,,intelligence ,,the ,,need ,,for ,a ,,recovery ,,of ,,philosophy ,,john ,,dewey ,intellectual advance occurs in two ways4 ,at times increase of knowledge is organized about old conceptions1 while these are expanded1 elaborated and refined1 but not seriously revised1 much less abandoned4 ,at other times1 the increase of knowledge demands qualitative rather than quantitative change2 alteration1 not addition4 ,men's minds grow cold to their former intellectual concerns2 ideas that were burning fade2 interests that were urgent seem remote4 ,men face in another direction2 their older perplexities are unreal2 considerations passed over as negligible loom up4 ,former problems may not have been solved1 but they no longer press for solutions4 ,philosophy is no exception to the rule4 ,but it is unusually conservative--not1 necessarily1 in proffering solutions1 but in clinging to problems4 ,it has been so allied with theology and theological morals as representatives of men's chief interests1 that radical alteration has been shocking4 ,men's activities took a decidedly new turn1 for example1 in the seventeenth century1 and it seems as if philosophy1 under the lead of thinkers like ,bacon and ,descartes1 was to execute an about-face4 ,but1 in spite of the ferment1 it turned out that many of the older problems were but translated from ,latin into the vernacular or into the new terminology furnished by science4 ,the association of philosophy with academic teaching has reinforced this intrinsic conservatism4 ,scholastic philosophy persisted in universities after men's thoughts outside of the walls of colleges had moved in other directions4 ,in the last hundred years intellectual advances of science and politics have in like fashion been crystallized into material of instruction and now resist further change4 ,i would not say that the spirit of teaching is hostile to that of liberal inquiry1 but a philosophy which exists largely as something to be taught rather than wholly as something to be reflected upon is conducive to discussion of views held by others rather than to immediate response4 ,philosophy when taught inevitably magnifies the history of past thought1 and leads professional philosophers to approach their subject-matter through its formulation in received systems4 ,it tends1 also1 to emphasize points upon which men have divided into schools1 for these lend themselves to retrospective definition and elaboration4 ,consequently1 philosophical discussion is likely to be a dressing out of antithetical traditions1 where criticism of one view is thought to afford proof of the truth of its opposite 7as if formulation of views guaranteed logical exclusives74 ,direct preoccupation with contemporary difficulties is left to literature and politics4 ,if changing conduct and expanding knowledge ever required a willingness to surrender not merely old solutions but old problems it is now4 ,i do not mean that we can turn abruptly away from all traditional issues4 ,this is impossible2 it would be the undoing of the one who attempted it4 ,irrespective of the professionalizing of philosophy1 the ideas philosophers discuss are still those in which ,western civilization has been bred4 ,they are in the backs of the heads of educated people4 ,but what serious-minded men not engaged in the professional business of philosophy most want to know is what modifications and abandonments of intellectual inheritance are required by the newer industrial1 political1 and scientific movements4 ,they want to know what these newer movements mean when translated into general ideas4 ,unless professional philosophy can mobilize itself sufficiently to assist in this clarification and redirection of men's thoughts1 it is likely to get more and more sidetracked from the main currents of contemporary life4 ,this essay may1 then1 be looked upon as an attempt to forward the emancipation of philosophy from too intimate and exclusive attachment to traditional problems4 ,it is not in intent a criticism of various solutions that have been offered1 but raises a question as to the genuineness1 under the present conditions of science and social life1 of the problems4 ,the limited object of my discussion will1 doubtless1 give an exaggerated impression of my conviction as to the artificiality of much recent philosophizing4 ,not that ,i have wilfully exaggerated in what ,i have said1 but that the limitations of my purpose have led me not to say many things pertinent to a broader purpose4 ,a discussion less restricted would strive to enforce the genuineness1 in their own context1 of questions now discussed mainly because they have been discussed rather than because contemporary conditions of life suggest them4 ,it would also be a grateful task to dwell upon the precious contributions made by philosophic systems which as a whole are impossible4 ,in the course of the development of unreal premises and the discussion of artificial problems1 points of view have emerged which are indispensable possessions of culture4 ,the horizon has been widened2 ideas of great fecundity struck out2 imagination quickened2 a sense of the meaning of things created4 ,it may even be asked whether these accompaniments of classic systems have not often been treated as a kind of guarantee of the systems themselves4 ,but while it is a sign of an illiberal mind to throw away the fertile and ample ideas of a ,spinoza1 a ,kant1 or a ,hegel1 because their setting is not logically adequate1 is surely a sign of an undisciplined one to treat their contributions to culture as confirmations of premises with which they have no necessary connection4 ,i ,a criticism of current philosophizing from the standpoint of the traditional quality of its problems must begin somewhere1 and the choice of a beginning is arbitrary4 ,it has appeared to me that the notion of experience implied in the questions most actively discussed gives a natural point of departure4 ,for1 if ,i mistake not1 it is just the inherited view of experience common to the empirical school and its opponents which keeps alive many discussions even of matters that on their face are quite remote from it1 while it is also this view which is most untenable in the light of existing science and social practice4 ,accordingly ,i set out with a brief statement of some of the chief contrasts between the orthodox description of experience and that congenial to present conditions4 7i7 ,in the orthodox view1 experience is regarded primarily as a knowledge-affair4 ,but to eyes not looking through ancient spectacles1 it assuredly appears as an affair of the intercourse of a living being with its physical and social environment4 7ii7 ,according to tradition experience is 7at least primarily7 a psychical thing1 infected throughout by subjectivity4 ,what experience suggests about itself is a genuinely objective world which enters into the actions and sufferings of men and undergoes modifications through their responses4 7iii7 ,so far as anything beyond a bare present is recognized by the established doctrine1 the past exclusively counts4 ,registration of what has taken place1 reference to precedent1 is believed to be the essence of experience4 ,empiricism is conceived of as tied up to what has been1 or is1 given4 ,but experience in its vital form is experimental1 an effort to change the given2 it is characterized by projection1 by reaching forward into the unknown2 connexion with a future is its salient trait4 7iv7 ,the empirical tradition is committed to particularism4 ,connexions and continuities are supposed to be foreign to experience1 to be by-products of dubious validity4 ,an experience that is an undergoing of an environment and a striving for its control in new directions is pregnant with connexions4 7v7 ,in the traditional notion experience and thought are antithetical terms4 ,inference1 so far as it is other than a revival of what has been given in the past1 goes beyond experience2 hence it is either invalid1 or else a measure of desperation by which1 using experience as a springboard1 we jump out to a world of stable things and other selves4 ,but experience1 taken free of the restrictions imposed by the older concept1 is full of inference4 ,there is1 apparently1 no conscious experience without inference2 reflection is native and constant4 ,these contrasts1 with a consideration of the effect of substituting the account of experience relevant to modern life for the inherited account1 afford the subject-matter of the following discussion4 ,suppose we take seriously the contribution made to our idea of experience by biology1--not that recent biological science discovered the facts1 but that it has so emphasized them that there is no longer an excuse for ignoring them or treating them as negligible4 ,any account of experience must now fit into the consideration that experiencing means living2 and that living goes on in and because of an environing medium1 not in a vacuum4 ,where there is experience1 there is a living being4 ,where there is life1 there is a double connexion maintained with the environment4 ,in part1 environmental energies constitute organic functions2 they enter into them4 ,life is not possible without such direct support by the environment4 ,but while all organic changes depend upon the natural energies of the environment for their origination and occurrence1 the natural energies sometimes carry the organic functions prosperously forward1 and sometimes act counter to their continuance4 ,growth and decay1 health and disease1 are alike continuous with activities of the natural surroundings4 ,the difference lies in the bearing of what happens upon future life-activity4 ,from the standpoint of this future reference environmental incidents fall into groups3 those favorable to life-activities1 and those hostile4 ,the successful activities of the organism1 those within which environmental assistance is incorporated1 react upon the environment to bring about modifications favorable to their own future4 ,the human being has upon his hands the problem of responding to what is going on around him so that these changes will take one turn rather than another1 namely1 that required by its own further functioning4 ,while backed in part by the environment1 its life is anything but a peaceful exhalation of environment4 ,it is obliged to struggle--that is to say1 to employ the direct support given by the environment in order indirectly to effect changes that would not otherwise occur4 ,in this sense1 life goes on by means of controlling the environment4 ,its activities must change the changes going on around it2 they must neutralize hostile occurrences2 they must transform neutral events into cooeperative factors or into an efflorescence of new features4 ,dialectic developments of the notion of self-preservation1 of the conatus essendi1 often ignore all the important facts of the actual process4 ,they argue as if self-control1 self-development1 went on directly as a sort of unrolling push from within4 ,but life endures only in virtue of the support of the environment4 ,and since the environment is only incompletely enlisted in our behalf1 self-preservation--or self-realization or whatever--is always indirect--always an affair of the way in which our present activities affect the direction taken by independent changes in the surroundings4 ,hindrances must be turned into means4 ,we are also given to playing loose with the conception of adjustment1 as if that meant something fixed--a kind of accommodation once for all 7ideally at least7 of the organism to an environment4 ,but as life requires the fitness of the environment to the organic functions1 adjustment to the environment means not passive acceptance of the latter1 but acting so that the environing changes take a certain turn4 ,the higher the type of life1 the more adjustment takes the form of an adjusting of the factors of the environment to one another in the interest of life2 the less the significance of living1 the more it becomes an adjustment to a given environment till at the lower end of the scale the differences between living and the non-living disappear4 ,these statements are of an external kind4 ,they are about the conditions of experience1 rather than about experiencing itself4 ,but assuredly experience as it concretely takes place bears out the statements4 ,experience is primarily a process of undergoing3 a process of standing something2 of suffering and passion1 of affection1 in the literal sense of these words4 ,the organism has to endure1 to undergo1 the consequences of its own actions4 ,experience is no slipping along in a path fixed by inner consciousness4 ,private consciousness is an incidental outcome of experience of a vital objective sort2 it is not its source4 ,undergoing1 however1 is never mere passivity4 ,the most patient patient is more than a receptor4 ,he is also an agent--a reactor1 one trying experiments1 one concerned with undergoing in a way which may influence what is still to happen4 ,sheer endurance1 side-stepping evasions1 are1 after all1 ways of treating the environment with a view to what such treatment will accomplish4 ,even if we shut ourselves up in the most clam-like fashion1 we are doing something2 our passivity is an active attitude1 not an extinction of response4 ,just as there is no assertive action1 no aggressive attack upon things as they are1 which is all action1 so there is no undergoing which is not on our part also a going on and a going through4 ,experience1 in other words1 is a matter of simultaneous doings and sufferings4 ,our undergoings are experiments in varying the course of events2 our active tryings are trials and tests of ourselves4 ,this duplicity of experience shows itself in our happiness and misery1 our successes and failures4 ,triumphs are dangerous when dwelt upon or lived off from2 successes use themselves up4 ,any achieved equilibrium of adjustment with the environment is precarious because we cannot evenly keep pace with changes in the environment4 ,these are so opposed in direction that we must choose4 ,we must take the risk of casting in our lot with one movement or the other4 ,nothing can eliminate all risk1 all adventure2 the one thing doomed to failure is to try to keep even with the whole environment at once--that is to say1 to maintain the happy moment when all things go our way4 ,the obstacles which confront us are stimuli to variation1 to novel response1 and hence are occasions of progress4 ,if a favor done us by the environment conceals a threat1 so its disfavor is a potential means of hitherto unexperienced modes of success4 ,to treat misery as anything but misery1 as for example a blessing in disguise or a necessary factor in good1 is disingenuous apologetics4 ,but to say that the progress of the race has been stimulated by ills undergone1 and that men have been moved by what they suffer to search out new and better courses of action is to speak veraciously4 ,the preoccupation of experience with things which are coming 7are now coming1 not just to come7 is obvious to any one whose interest in experience is empirical4 ,since we live forward2 since we live in a world where changes are going on whose issue means our weal or woe2 since every act of ours modifies these changes and hence is fraught with promise1 or charged with hostile energies--what should experience be but a future implicated in a present6 ,adjustment is no timeless state2 it is a continuing process4 ,to say that a change takes time may be to say something about the event which is external and uninstructive4 ,but adjustment of organism to environment takes time in the pregnant sense2 every step in the process is conditioned by reference to further changes which it effects4 ,what is going on in the environment is the concern of the organism2 not what is already there in accomplished and finished form4 ,in so far as the issue of what is going on may be affected by intervention of the organism1 the moving event is a challenge which stretches the agent-patient to meet what is coming4 ,experiencing exhibits things in their unterminated aspect moving toward determinate conclusions4 ,the finished and done with is of import as affecting the future1 not on its own account3 in short1 because it is not1 really1 done with4 ,anticipation is therefore more primary than recollection2 projection than summoning of the past2 the prospective than the retrospective4 ,given a world like that in which we live1 a world in which environing changes are partly favorable and partly callously indifferent1 and experience is bound to be prospective in import2 for any control attainable by the living creature depends upon what is done to alter the state of things4 ,success and failure are the primary categories of life2 achieving of good and averting of ill are its supreme interests2 hope and anxiety 7which are not self-enclosed states of feeling1 but active attitudes of welcome and wariness7 are dominant qualities of experience4 ,imaginative forecast of the future is this forerunning quality of behavior rendered available for guidance in the present4 ,day-dreaming and castle-building and esthetic realization of what is not practically achieved are offshoots of this practical trait1 or else practical intelligence is a chastened fantasy4 ,it makes little difference4 ,imaginative recovery of the bygone is indispensable to successful invasion of the future1 but its status is that of an instrument4 ,to ignore its import is the sign of an undisciplined agent2 but to isolate the past1 dwelling upon it for its own sake and giving it the eulogistic name of knowledge1 is to substitute the reminiscence of old-age for effective intelligence4 ,the movement of the agent-patient to meet the future is partial and passionate2 yet detached and impartial study of the past is the only alternative to luck in assuring success to passion4 ,,ii ,this description of experience would be but a rhapsodic celebration of the commonplace were it not in marked contrast to orthodox philosophical accounts4 ,the contrast indicates that traditional accounts have not been empirical1 but have been deductions1 from unnamed premises1 of what experience must be4 ,historic empiricism has been empirical in a technical and controversial sense4 ,it has said1 ,lord1 ,lord1 ,experience1 ,experience2 but in practice it has served ideas forced into experience1 not gathered from it4 ,the confusion and artificiality thereby introduced into philosophical thought is nowhere more evident than in the empirical treatment of relations or dynamic continuities4 ,the experience of a living being struggling to hold its own and make its way in an environment1 physical and social1 partly facilitating and partly obstructing its actions1 is of necessity a matter of ties and connexions1 of bearings and uses4 ,the very point of experience1 so to say1 is that it doesn't occur in a vacuum2 its agent-patient instead of being insulated and disconnected is bound up with the movement of things by most intimate and pervasive bonds4 ,only because the organism is in and of the world1 and its activities correlated with those of other things in multiple ways1 is it susceptible to undergoing things and capable of trying to reduce objects to means of securing its good fortune4 ,that these connexions are of diverse kinds is irresistibly proved by the fluctuations which occur in its career4 ,help and hindrance1 stimulation and inhibition1 success and failure mean specifically different modes of correlation4 ,although the actions of things in the world are taking place in one continuous stretch of existence1 there are all kinds of specific affinities1 repulsions1 and relative indifferencies4 ,dynamic connexions are qualitatively diverse1 just as are the centers of action4 ,in this sense1 pluralism1 not monism1 is an established empirical fact4 ,the attempt to establish monism from consideration of the very nature of a relation is a mere piece of dialectics4 ,equally dialectical is the effort to establish by a consideration of the nature of relations an ontological ,pluralism of ,ultimates3 simple and independent beings4 ,to attempt to get results from a consideration of the external nature of relations is of a piece with the attempt to deduce results from their internal character4 ,some things are relatively insulated from the influence of other things2 some things are easily invaded by others2 some things are fiercely attracted to conjoin their activities with those of others4 ,experience exhibits every kind of connexion#a from the most intimate to mere external juxtaposition4 ,empirically1 then1 active bonds or continuities of all kinds1 together with static discontinuities1 characterize existence4 ,to deny this qualitative heterogeneity is to reduce the struggles and difficulties of life1 its comedies and tragedies to illusion3 to the non-being of the ,greeks or to its modern counterpart1 the subjective4 ,experience is an affair of facilitations and checks1 of being sustained and disrupted1 being let alone1 being helped and troubled1 of good fortune and defeat in all the countless qualitative modes which these words pallidly suggest4 ,the existence of genuine connexions of all manner of heterogeneity cannot be doubted4 ,such words as conjoining1 disjoining1 resisting1 modifying1 saltatory1 and ambulatory 7to use ,james' picturesque term7 only hint at their actual heterogeneity4 ,among the revisions and surrenders of historic problems demanded by this feature of empirical situations1 those centering in the rationalistic-empirical controversy may be selected for attention4 ,the implications of this controversy are twofold3 ,first1 that connexions are as homogeneous in fact as in name2 and1 secondly1 if genuine1 are all due to thought1 or1 if empirical1 are arbitrary by-products of past particulars4 ,the stubborn particularism of orthodox empiricism is its outstanding trait2 consequently the opposed rationalism found no justification of bearings1 continuities1 and ties save to refer them in gross to the work of a hyper-empirical ,reason4 ,of course1 not all empiricism prior to ,hume and ,kant was sensationalistic1 pulverizing experience into isolated sensory qualities or simple ideas4 ,it did not all follow ,locke's lead in regarding the entire content of generalization as the workmanship of the understanding4 ,on the ,continent1 prior to ,kant1 philosophers were content to draw a line between empirical generalizations regarding matters of fact and necessary universals applying to truths of reason4 ,but logical atomism was implicit even in this theory4 ,statements referring to empirical fact were mere quantitative summaries of particular instances4 ,in the sensationalism which sprang from ,hume 7and which was left unquestioned by ,kant as far as any strictly empirical element was concerned7 the implicit particularism was made explicit4 ,but the doctrine that sensations and ideas are so many separate existences was not derived from observation nor from experiment4 ,it was a logical deduction from a prior unexamined concept of the nature of experience4 ,from the same concept it followed that the appearance of stable objects and of general principles of connexion was but an appearance4#b ,kantianism1 then1 naturally invoked universal bonds to restore objectivity4 ,but1 in so doing1 it accepted the particularism of experience and proceeded to supplement it from non-empirical sources4 ,a sensory manifold being all which is really empirical in experience1 a reason which transcends experience must provide synthesis4 ,the net outcome might have suggested a correct account of experience4 ,for we have only to forget the apparatus by which the net outcome is arrived at1 to have before us the experience of the plain man--a diversity of ceaseless changes connected in all kinds of ways1 static and dynamic4 ,this conclusion would deal a deathblow to both empiricism and rationalism4 ,for1 making clear the non-empirical character of the alleged manifold of unconnected particulars1 it would render unnecessary the appeal to functions of the understanding in order to connect them4 ,with the downfall of the traditional notion of experience1 the appeal to reason to supplement its defects becomes superfluous4 ,the tradition was1 however1 too strongly entrenched2 especially as it furnished the subject-matter of an alleged science of states of mind which were directly known in their very presence4 ,the historic outcome was a new crop of artificial puzzles about relations2 it fastened upon philosophy for a long time the quarrel about the a priori and the a posteriori as its chief issue4 ,the controversy is to-day quiescent4 ,yet it is not at all uncommon to find thinkers modern in tone and intent who regard any philosophy of experience as necessarily committed to denial of the existence of genuinely general propositions1 and who take empiricism to be inherently averse to the recognition of the importance of an organizing and constructive intelligence4 ,the quiescence alluded to is in part due1 ,i think1 to sheer weariness4 ,but it is also due to a change of standpoint introduced by biological conceptions2 and particularly the discovery of biological continuity from the lower organisms to man4 ,for a short period1 ,spencerians might connect the doctrine of evolution with the old problem1 and use the long temporal accumulation of experiences to generate something which1 for human experience1 is a priori4 ,but the tendency of the biological way of thinking is neither to confirm or negate the ,spencerian doctrine1 but to shift the issue4 ,in the orthodox position a posteriori and a priori were affairs of knowledge4 ,but it soon becomes obvious that while there is assuredly something a priori--that is to say1 native1 unlearned1 original--in human experience1 that something is not knowledge1 but is activities made possible by means of established connexions of neurones4 ,this empirical fact does not solve the orthodox problem2 it dissolves it4 ,it shows that the problem was misconceived1 and solution sought by both parties in the wrong direction4 ,organic instincts and organic retention1 or habit-forming1 are undeniable factors in actual experience4 ,they are factors which effect organization and secure continuity4 ,they are among the specific facts which a description of experience cognizant of the correlation of organic action with the action of other natural objects will include4 ,but while fortunately the contribution of biological science to a truly empirical description of experiencing has outlawed the discussion of the a priori and a posteriori1 the transforming effect of the same contributions upon other issues has gone unnoticed1 save as pragmatism has made an effort to bring them to recognition4 ,,iii ,the point seriously at issue in the notion of experience common to both sides in the older controversy thus turns out to be the place of thought or intelligence in experience4 ,does reason have a distinctive office8 ,is there a characteristic order of relations contributed by it8 ,experience1 to return to our positive conception1 is primarily what is undergone in connexion with activities whose import lies in their objective consequences--their bearing upon future experiences4 ,organic functions deal with things as things in course1 in operation1 in a state of affairs not yet given or completed4 ,what is done with1 what is just there1 is of concern only in the potentialities which it may indicate4 ,as ended1 as wholly given1 it is of no account4 ,but as a sign of what may come1 it becomes an indispensable factor in behavior dealing with changes1 the outcome of which is not yet determined4 ,the only power the organism possesses to control its own future depends upon the way its present responses modify changes which are taking place in its medium4 ,a living being may be comparatively impotent1 or comparatively free4 ,it is all a matter of the way in which its present reactions to things influence the future reactions of things upon it4 ,without regard to its wish or intent every act it performs makes some difference in the environment4 ,the change may be trivial as respects its own career and fortune4 ,but it may also be of incalculable importance2 it may import harm1 destruction1 or it may procure well-being4 ,is it possible for a living being to increase its control of welfare and success8 ,can it manage1 in any degree1 to assure its future8 ,or does the amount of security depend wholly upon the accidents of the situation8 ,can it learn8 ,can it gain ability to assure its future in the present8 ,these questions center attention upon the significance of reflective intelligence in the process of experience4 ,the extent of an agent's capacity for inference1 its power to use a given fact as a sign of something not yet given1 measures the extent of its ability systematically to enlarge its control of the future4 ,a being which can use given and finished facts as signs of things to come2 which can take given things as evidences of absent things1 can1 in that degree1 forecast the future2 it can form reasonable expectations4 ,it is capable of achieving ideas2 it is possessed of intelligence4 ,for use of the given or finished to anticipate the consequence of processes going on is precisely what is meant by ideas1 by intelligence4 ,as we have already noted1 the environment is rarely all of a kind in its bearing upon organic welfare2 its most whole-hearted support of life-activities is precarious and temporary4 ,some environmental changes are auspicious2 others are menacing4 ,the secret of success--that is1 of the greatest attainable success--is for the organic response to cast in its lot with present auspicious changes to strengthen them and thus to avert the consequences flowing from occurrences of ill-omen4 ,any reaction is a venture2 it involves risk4 ,we always build better or worse than we can foretell4 ,but the organism's fateful intervention in the course of events is blind1 its choice is random1 except as it can employ what happens to it as a basis of inferring what is likely to happen later4 ,in the degree in which it can read future results in present on-goings1 its responsive choice1 its partiality to this condition or that1 become intelligent4 ,its bias grows reasonable4 ,it can deliberately1 intentionally1 participate in the direction of the course of affairs4 ,its foresight of different futures which result according as this or that present factor predominates in the shaping of affairs permits it to partake intelligently instead of blindly and fatally in the consequences its reactions give rise to4 ,participate it must1 and to its own weal or woe4 ,inference1 the use of what happens1 to anticipate what will--or at least may--happen1 makes the difference between directed and undirected participation4 ,and this capacity for inferring is precisely the same as that use of natural occurrences for the discovery and determination of consequences--the formation of new dynamic connexions--which constitutes knowledge4 ,the fact that thought is an intrinsic feature of experience is fatal to the traditional empiricism which makes it an artificial by-product4 ,but for that same reason it is fatal to the historic rationalisms whose justification was the secondary and retrospective position assigned to thought by empirical philosophy4 ,according to the particularism of the latter1 thought was inevitably only a bunching together of hard-and-fast separate items2 thinking was but the gathering together and tying of items already completely given1 or else an equally artificial untying--a mechanical adding and subtracting of the given4 ,it was but a cumulative registration1 a consolidated merger2 generality was a matter of bulk1 not of quality4 ,thinking was therefore treated as lacking constructive power2 even its organizing capacity was but simulated1 being in truth but arbitrary pigeon-holing4 ,genuine projection of the novel1 deliberate variation and invention1 are idle fictions in such a version of experience4 ,if there ever was creation1 it all took place at a remote period4 ,since then the world has only recited lessons4 ,the value of inventive construction is too precious to be disposed of in this cavalier way4 ,its unceremonious denial afforded an opportunity to assert that in addition to experience the subject has a ready-made faculty of thought or reason which transcends experience4 ,rationalism thus accepted the account of experience given by traditional empiricism1 and introduced reason as extra-empirical4 ,there are still thinkers who regard any empiricism as necessarily committed to a belief in a cut-and-dried reliance upon disconnected precedents1 and who hold that all systematic organization of past experiences for new and constructive purposes is alien to strict empiricism4 ,rationalism never explained1 however1 how a reason extraneous to experience could enter into helpful relation with concrete experiences4 ,by definition1 reason and experience were antithetical1 so that the concern of reason was not the fruitful expansion and guidance of the course of experience1 but a realm of considerations too sublime to touch1 or be touched by1 experience4 ,discreet rationalists confined themselves to theology and allied branches of abtruse science1 and to mathematics4 ,rationalism would have been a doctrine reserved for academic specialists and abstract formalists had it not assumed the task of providing an apologetics for traditional morals and theology1 thereby getting into touch with actual human beliefs and concerns4 ,it is notorious that historic empiricism was strong in criticism and in demolition of outworn beliefs1 but weak for purposes of constructive social direction4 ,but we frequently overlook the fact that whenever rationalism cut free from conservative apologetics1 it was also simply an instrumentality for pointing out inconsistencies and absurdities in existing beliefs--a sphere in which it was immensely useful1 as the ,enlightenment shows4 ,leibniz and ,voltaire were contemporary rationalists in more senses than one4#c ,the recognition that reflection is a genuine factor within experience and an indispensable factor in that control of the world which secures a prosperous and significant expansion of experience undermines historic rationalism as assuredly as it abolishes the foundations of historic empiricism4 ,the bearing of a correct idea of the place and office of reflection upon modern idealisms is less obvious1 but no less certain4 ,one of the curiosities of orthodox empiricism is that its outstanding speculative problem is the existence of an external world4 ,for in accordance with the notion that experience is attached to a private subject as its exclusive possession1 a world like the one in which we appear to live must be external to experience instead of being its subject-matter4 ,i call it a curiosity1 for if anything seems adequately grounded empirically it is the existence of a world which resists the characteristic functions of the subject of experience2 which goes its way1 in some respects1 independently of these functions1 and which frustrates our hopes and intentions4 ,ignorance which is fatal2 disappointment2 the need of adjusting means and ends to the course of nature1 would seem to be facts sufficiently characterizing empirical situations as to render the existence of an external world indubitable4 ,that the description of experience was arrived at by forcing actual empirical facts into conformity with dialectic developments from a concept of a knower outside of the real world of nature is testified to by the historic alliance of empiricism and idealism4#d ,according to the most logically consistent editions of orthodox empiricism1 all that can be experienced is the fleeting1 the momentary1 mental state4 ,that alone is absolutely and indubitably present2 therefore1 it alone is cognitively certain4 ,it alone is knowledge4 ,the existence of the past 7and of the future71 of a decently stable world and of other selves--indeed1 of one's own self--falls outside this datum of experience4 ,these can be arrived at only by inference which is ejective--a name given to an alleged type of inference that jumps from experience1 as from a springboard1 to something beyond experience4 ,i should not anticipate difficulty in showing that this doctrine is1 dialectically1 a mass of inconsistencies4 ,avowedly it is a doctrine of desperation1 and as such it is cited here to show the desperate straits to which ignoring empirical facts has reduced a doctrine of experience4 ,more positively instructive are the objective idealisms which have been the offspring of the marriage between the reason of historic rationalism and the alleged immediate psychical stuff of historic empiricism4 ,these idealisms have recognized the genuineness of connexions and the impotency of feeling4 ,they have then identified connexions with logical or rational connexions1 and thus treated the real ,world as a synthesis of sentient consciousness by means of a rational self-consciousness introducing objectivity3 stability and universality of reference4 ,here again1 for present purposes1 criticism is unnecessary4 ,it suffices to point out that the value of this theory is bound up with the genuineness of the problem of which it purports to be a solution4 ,if the basic concept is a fiction1 there is no call for the solution4 ,the more important point is to perceive how far the thought which figures in objective idealism comes from meeting the empirical demands made upon actual thought4 ,idealism is much less formal than historic rationalism4 ,it treats thought1 or reason1 as constitutive of experience by means of uniting and constructive functions1 not as just concerned with a realm of eternal truths apart from experience4 ,on such a view thought certainly loses its abstractness and remoteness4 ,but1 unfortunately1 in thus gaining the whole world it loses its own self4 ,a world already1 in its intrinsic structure1 dominated by thought is not a world in which1 save by contradiction of premises1 thinking has anything to do4 ,that the doctrine logically results in making change unreal and error unaccountable are consequences of importance in the technique of professional philosophy2 in the denial of empirical fact which they imply they seem to many a reductio ad absurdum of the premises from which they proceed4 ,but1 after all1 such consequences are of only professional import4 ,what is serious1 even sinister1 is the implied sophistication regarding the place and office of reflection in the scheme of things4 ,a doctrine which exalts thought in name while ignoring its efficacy in fact 7that is1 its use in bettering life7 is a doctrine which cannot be entertained and taught without serious peril4 ,those who are not concerned with professional philosophy but who are solicitous for intelligence as a factor in the amelioration of actual conditions can but look askance at any doctrine which holds that the entire scheme of things is already1 if we but acquire the knack of looking at it aright1 fixedly and completely rational4 ,it is a striking manifestation of the extent in which philosophies have been compensatory in quality4#e ,but the matter cannot be passed over as if it were simply a question of not grudging a certain amount of consolation to one amid the irretrievable evils of life4 ,for as to these evils no one knows how many are retrievable2 and a philosophy which proclaims the ability of a dialectic theory of knowledge to reveal the world as already and eternally a self-luminous rational whole1 contaminates the scope and use of thought at its very spring4 ,to substitute the otiose insight gained by manipulation of a formula for the slow cooeperative work of a humanity guided by reflective intelligence is more than a technical blunder of speculative philosophers4 ,a practical crisis may throw the relationship of ideas to life into an exaggerated ,brocken-like spectral relief1 where exaggeration renders perceptible features not ordinarily noted4 ,the use of force to secure narrow because exclusive aims is no novelty in human affairs4 ,the deploying of all the intelligence at command in order to increase the effectiveness of the force used is not so common1 yet presents nothing intrinsically remarkable4 ,the identification of force--military1 economic1 and administrative--with moral necessity and moral culture is1 however1 a phenomenon not likely to exhibit itself on a wide scale except where intelligence has already been suborned by an idealism which identifies the actual with the rational1 and thus finds the measure of reason in the brute event determined by superior force4 ,if we are to have a philosophy which will intervene between attachment to rule of thumb muddling and devotion to a systematized subordination of intelligence to preexistent ends1 it can be found only in a philosophy which finds the ultimate measure of intelligence in consideration of a desirable future and in search for the means of bringing it progressively into existence4 ,when professed idealism turns out to be a narrow pragmatism--narrow because taking for granted the finality of ends determined by historic conditions--the time has arrived for a pragmatism which shall be empirically idealistic1 proclaiming the essential connexion of intelligence with the unachieved future--with possibilities involving a transfiguration4 ,,iv ,why has the description of experience been so remote from the facts of empirical situations8 ,to answer this question throws light upon the submergence of recent philosophizing in epistemology--that is1 in discussions of the nature1 possibility1 and limits of knowledge in general1 and in the attempt to reach conclusions regarding the ultimate nature of reality from the answers given to such questions4 ,the reply to the query regarding the currency of a non-empirical doctrine of experience 7even among professed empiricists7 is that the traditional account is derived from a conception once universally entertained regarding the subject or bearer or center of experience4 ,the description of experience has been forced into conformity with this prior conception2 it has been primarily a deduction from it1 actual empirical facts being poured into the moulds of the deductions4 ,the characteristic feature of this prior notion is the assumption that experience centers in1 or gathers about1 or proceeds from a center or subject which is outside the course of natural existence1 and set over against it3--it being of no importance1 for present purposes1 whether this antithetical subject is termed soul1 or spirit1 or mind1 or ego1 or consciousness1 or just knower or knowing subject4 ,there are plausible grounds for thinking that the currency of the idea in question lies in the form which men's religious preoccupations took for many centuries4 ,these were deliberately and systematically other-worldly4 ,they centered about a ,fall which was not an event in nature1 but an aboriginal catastrophe that corrupted ,nature2 about a redemption made possible by supernatural means2 about a life in another world--essentially1 not merely spatially1 ,other4 ,the supreme drama of destiny took place in a soul or spirit which1 under the circumstances1 could not be conceived other than as non-natural--extra-natural1 if not1 strictly speaking1 supernatural4 ,when ,descartes and others broke away from medieval interests1 they retained as commonplaces its intellectual apparatus3 ,such as1 knowledge is exercised by a power that is extra-natural and set over against the world to be known4 ,even if they had wished to make a complete break1 they had nothing to put as knower in the place of the soul4 ,it may be doubted whether there was any available empirical substitute until science worked out the fact that physical changes are functional correlations of energies1 and that man is continuous with other forms of life1 and until social life had developed an intellectually free and responsible individual as its agent4 ,but my main point is not dependent upon any particular theory as to the historic origin of the notion about the bearer of experience4 ,the point is there on its own account4 ,the essential thing is that the bearer was conceived as outside of the world2 so that experience consisted in the bearer's being affected through a type of operations not found anywhere in the world1 while knowledge consists in surveying the world1 looking at it1 getting the view of a spectator4 ,the theological problem of attaining knowledge of ,god as ultimate reality was transformed in effect into the philosophical problem of the possibility of attaining knowledge of reality4 ,for how is one to get beyond the limits of the subject and subjective occurrences8 ,familiarity breeds credulity oftener than contempt4 ,how can a problem be artificial when men have been busy discussing it almost for three hundred years8 ,but if the assumption that experience is something set over against the world is contrary to fact1 then the problem of how self or mind or subjective experience or consciousness can reach knowledge of an external world is assuredly a meaningless problem4 ,whatever questions there may be about knowledge1 they will not be the kind of problems which have formed epistemology4 ,the problem of knowledge as conceived in the industry of epistemology is the problem of knowledge in general--of the possibility1 extent1 and validity of knowledge in general4 ,what does this in general mean8 ,in ordinary life there are problems a-plenty of knowledge in particular2 every conclusion we try to reach1 theoretical or practical1 affords such a problem4 ,but there is no problem of knowledge in general4 ,i do not mean1 of course1 that general statements cannot be made about knowledge1 or that the problem of attaining these general statements is not a genuine one4 ,on the contrary1 specific instances of success and failure in inquiry exist1 and are of such a character that one can discover the conditions conducing to success and failure4 ,statement of these conditions constitutes logic1 and is capable of being an important aid in proper guidance of further attempts at knowing4 ,but this logical problem of knowledge is at the opposite pole from the epistemological4 ,specific problems are about right conclusions to be reached--which means1 in effect1 right ways of going about the business of inquiry4 ,they imply a difference between knowledge and error consequent upon right and wrong methods of inquiry and testing2 not a difference between experience and the world4 ,the problem of knowledge ueberhaupt exists because it is assumed that there is a knower in general1 who is outside of the world to be known1 and who is defined in terms antithetical to the traits of the world4 ,with analogous assumptions1 we could invent and discuss a problem of digestion in general4 ,all that would be required would be to conceive the stomach and food-material as inhabiting different worlds4 ,such an assumption would leave on our hands the question of the possibility1 extent1 nature1 and genuineness of any transaction between stomach and food4 ,but because the stomach and food inhabit a continuous stretch of existence1 because digestion is but a correlation of diverse activities in one world1 the problems of digestion are specific and plural3 ,what are the particular correlations which constitute it8 ,how does it proceed in different situations8 ,what is favorable and what unfavorable to its best performance8--and so on4 ,can one deny that if we were to take our clue from the present empirical situation1 including the scientific notion of evolution 7biological continuity7 and the existing arts of control of nature1 subject and object would be treated as occupying the same natural world as unhesitatingly as we assume the natural conjunction of an animal and its food8 ,would it not follow that knowledge is one way in which natural energies cooeperate8 ,would there be any problem save discovery of the peculiar structure of this cooeperation1 the conditions under which it occurs to best effect1 and the consequences which issue from its occurrence8 ,it is a commonplace that the chief divisions of modern philosophy1 idealism in its different kinds1 realisms of various brands1 so-called common-sense dualism1 agnosticism1 relativism1 phenomenalism1 have grown up around the epistemological problem of the general relation of subject and object4 ,problems not openly epistemological1 such as whether the relation of changes in consciousness to physical changes is one of interaction1 parallelism1 or automatism have the same origin4 ,what becomes of philosophy1 consisting largely as it does of different answers to these questions1 in case the assumptions which generate the questions have no empirical standing8 ,is it not time that philosophers turned from the attempt to determine the comparative merits of various replies to the questions to a consideration of the claims of the questions8 ,when dominating religious ideas were built up about the idea that the self is a stranger and pilgrim in this world2 when morals1 falling in line1 found true good only in inner states of a self inaccessible to anything but its own private introspection2 when political theory assumed the finality of disconnected and mutually exclusive personalities1 the notion that the bearer of experience is antithetical to the world instead of being in and of it was congenial4 ,it at least had the warrant of other beliefs and aspirations4 ,but the doctrine of biological continuity or organic evolution has destroyed the scientific basis of the conception4 ,morally1 men are now concerned with the amelioration of the conditions of the common lot in this world4 ,social sciences recognize that associated life is not a matter of physical juxtaposition1 but of genuine intercourse--of community of experience in a non-metaphorical sense of community4 ,why should we longer try to patch up and refine and stretch the old solutions till they seem to cover the change of thought and practice8 ,why not recognize that the trouble is with the problem8 ,a belief in organic evolution which does not extend unreservedly to the way in which the subject of experience is thought of1 and which does not strive to bring the entire theory of experience and knowing into line with biological and social facts1 is hardly more than ,pickwickian4 ,there are many1 for example1 who hold that dreams1 hallucinations1 and errors cannot be accounted for at all except on the theory that a self 7or consciousness7 exercises a modifying influence upon the real object4 ,the logical assumption is that consciousness is outside of the real object2 that it is something different in kind1 and therefore has the power of changing reality into appearance1 of introducing relativities into things as they are in themselves--in short1 of infecting real things with subjectivity4 ,such writers seem unaware of the fact that this assumption makes consciousness supernatural in the literal sense of the word2 and that1 to say the least1 the conception can be accepted by one who accepts the doctrine of biological continuity only after every other way of dealing with the facts has been exhausted4 ,realists1 of course 7at least some of the ,neo-realists71 deny any such miraculous intervention of consciousness4 ,but they#f admit the reality of the problem2 denying only this particular solution1 they try to find some other way out1 which will still preserve intact the notion of knowledge as a relationship of a general sort between subject and object4 ,now dreams and hallucinations1 errors1 pleasures1 and pains1 possibly secondary qualities1 do not occur save where there are organic centers of experience4 ,they cluster about a subject4 ,but to treat them as things which inhere exclusively in the subject2 or as posing the problem of a distortion of the real object by a knower set over against the world1 or as presenting facts to be explained primarily as cases of contemplative knowledge1 is to testify that one has still to learn the lesson of evolution in its application to the affairs in hand4 ,if biological development be accepted1 the subject of experience is at least an animal1 continuous with other organic forms in a process of more complex organization4 ,an animal in turn is at least continuous with chemico-physical processes which1 in living things1 are so organized as really to constitute the activities of life with all their defining traits4 ,and experience is not identical with brain action2 it is the entire organic agent-patient in all its interaction with the environment1 natural and social4 ,the brain is primarily an organ of a certain kind of behavior1 not of knowing the world4 ,and to repeat what has already been said1 experiencing is just certain modes of interaction1 of correlation1 of natural objects among which the organism happens1 so to say1 to be one4 ,it follows with equal force that experience means primarily not knowledge1 but ways of doing and suffering4 ,knowing must be described by discovering what particular mode--qualitatively unique--of doing and suffering it is4 ,as it is1 we find experience assimilated to a non-empirical concept of knowledge1 derived from an antecedent notion of a spectator outside of the world4#g ,in short1 the epistemological fashion of conceiving dreams1 errors1 relativities1 etc41 depends upon the isolation of mind from intimate participation with other changes in the same continuous nexus4 ,thus it is like contending that when a bottle bursts1 the bottle is1 in some self-contained miraculous way1 exclusively responsible4 ,since it is the nature of a bottle to be whole so as to retain fluids1 bursting is an abnormal event--comparable to an hallucination4 ,hence it cannot belong to the real bottle2 the subjectivity of glass is the cause4 ,it is obvious that since the breaking of glass is a case of specific correlation of natural energies1 its accidental and abnormal character has to do with consequences1 not with causation4 ,accident is interference with the consequences for which the bottle is intended4 ,the bursting considered apart from its bearing on these consequences is on a plane with any other occurrence in the wide world4 ,but from the standpoint of a desired future1 bursting is an anomaly1 an interruption of the course of events4 ,the analogy with the occurrence of dreams1 hallucinations1 etc41 seems to me exact4 ,dreams are not something outside of the regular course of events2 they are in and of it4 ,they are not cognitive distortions of real things2 they are more real things4 ,there is nothing abnormal in their existence1 any more than there is in the bursting of a bottle4#h ,but they may be abnormal1 from the standpoint of their influence1 of their operation as stimuli in calling out responses to modify the future4 ,dreams have often been taken as prognostics of what is to happen2 they have modified conduct4 ,a hallucination may lead a man to consult a doctor2 such a consequence is right and proper4 ,but the consultation indicates that the subject regarded it as an indication of consequences which he feared3 as a symptom of a disturbed life4 ,or the hallucination may lead him to anticipate consequences which in fact flow only from the possession of great wealth4 ,then the hallucination is a disturbance of the normal course of events2 the occurrence is wrongly used with reference to eventualities4 ,to regard reference to use and to desired and intended consequences as involving a subjective factor is to miss the point1 for this has regard to the future4 ,the uses to which a bottle are put are not mental2 they do not consist of physical states2 they are further correlations of natural existences4 ,consequences in use are genuine natural events2 but they do not occur without the intervention of behavior involving anticipation of a future4 ,the case is not otherwise with an hallucination4 ,the differences it makes are in any case differences in the course of the one continuous world4 ,the important point is whether they are good or bad differences4 ,to use the hallucination as a sign of organic lesions that menace health means the beneficial result of seeing a physician2 to respond to it as a sign of consequences such as actually follow only from being persecuted is to fall into error--to be abnormal4 ,the persecutors are unreal2 that is1 there are no things which act as persecutors act2 but the hallucination exists4 ,given its conditions it is as natural as any other event1 and poses only the same kind of problem as is put by the occurrence of1 say1 a thunderstorm4 ,the unreality of persecution is not1 however1 a subjective matter2 it means that conditions do not exist for producing the future consequences which are now anticipated and reacted to4 ,ability to anticipate future consequences and to respond to them as stimuli to present behavior may well define what is meant by a mind or by consciousness4#i ,but this is only a way of saying just what kind of a real or natural existence the subject is2 it is not to fall back on a preconception about an unnatural subject in order to characterize the occurrence of error4 ,although the discussion may be already labored1 let us take another example--the occurrence of disease4 ,by definition it is pathological1 abnormal4 ,at one time in human history this abnormality was taken to be something dwelling in the intrinsic nature of the event--in its existence irrespective of future consequences4 ,disease was literally extra-natural and to be referred to demons1 or to magic4 ,no one to-day questions its naturalness--its place in the order of natural events4 ,yet it is abnormal--for it operates to effect results different from those which follow from health4 ,the difference is a genuine empirical difference1 not a mere mental distinction4 ,from the standpoint of bearing on a subsequent course of events disease is unnatural1 in spite of the naturalness of its occurrence and origin4 ,the habit of ignoring reference to the future is responsible for the assumption that to admit human participation in any form is to admit the subjective in a sense which alters the objective into the phenomenal4 ,there have been those who1 like ,spinoza1 regarded health and disease1 good and ill1 as equally real and equally unreal4 ,however1 only a few consistent materialists have included truth along with error as merely phenomenal and subjective4 ,but if one does not regard movement toward possible consequences as genuine1 wholesale denial of existential validity to all these distinctions is the only logical course4 ,to select truth as objective and error as subjective is1 on this basis1 an unjustifiably partial procedure4 ,take everything as fixedly given1 and both truth and error are arbitrary insertions into fact4 ,admit the genuineness of changes going on1 and capacity for its direction through organic action based on foresight1 and both truth and falsity are alike existential4 ,it is human to regard the course of events which is in line with our own efforts as the regular course of events1 and interruptions as abnormal1 but this partiality of human desire is itself a part of what actually takes place4 ,it is now proposed to take a particular case of the alleged epistemological predicament for discussion1 since the entire ground cannot be covered4 ,i think1 however1 the instance chosen is typical1 so that the conclusion reached may be generalized4 ,the instance is that of so-called relativity in perception4 ,there are almost endless instances2 the stick bent in water2 the whistle changing pitch with change of distance from the ear2 objects doubled when the eye is pushed2 the destroyed star still visible1 etc41 etc4 ,for our consideration we may take the case of a spherical object that presents itself to one observer as a flat circle1 to another as a somewhat distorted elliptical surface4 ,this situation gives empirical proof1 so it is argued1 of the difference between a real object and mere appearance4 ,since there is but one object1 the existence of two subjects is the sole differentiating factor4 ,hence the two appearances of the one real object is proof of the intervening distorting action of the subject4 ,and many of the ,neo-realists who deny the difference in question1 admit the case to be one of knowledge and accordingly to constitute an epistemological problem4 ,they have in consequence developed wonderfully elaborate schemes of sundry kinds to maintain epistemological monism intact4 ,let us try to keep close to empirical facts4 ,in the first place the two unlike appearances of the one sphere are physically necessary because of the laws of reaction of light4 ,if the one sphere did not assume these two appearances under given conditions1 we should be confronted with a hopelessly irreconcilable discrepancy in the behavior of natural energy4 ,that the result is natural is evidenced by the fact that two cameras--or other arrangements of apparatus for reflecting light--yield precisely the same results4 ,photographs are as genuinely physical existences as the original sphere2 and they exhibit the two geometrical forms4 ,the statement of these facts makes no impression upon the confirmed epistemologist2 he merely retorts that as long as it is admitted that the organism is the cause of a sphere being seen1 from different points1 as a circular and as an elliptical surface1 the essence of his contention--the modification of the real object by the subject--is admitted4 ,to the question why the same logic does not apply to photographic records he makes1 as far as ,i know1 no reply at all4 ,the source of the difficulty is not hard to see4 ,the objection assumes that the alleged modifications of the real object are cases of knowing and hence attributable to the influence of a knower4 ,statements which set forth the doctrine will always be found to refer to the organic factor1 to the eye1 as an observer or a percipient4 ,even when reference is made to a lens or a mirror1 language is sometimes used which suggests that the writer's naivete is sufficiently gross to treat these physical factors as if they were engaged in perceiving the sphere4 ,but as it is evident that the lens operates as a physical factor in correlation with other physical factors--notably light--so it ought to be evident that the intervention of the optical apparatus of the eye is a purely non-cognitive matter4 ,the relation in question is not one between a sphere and a would-be knower of it1 unfortunately condemned by the nature of the knowing apparatus to alter the thing he would know2 it is an affair of the dynamic interaction of two physical agents in producing a third thing1 an effect2--an affair of precisely the same kind as in any physical conjoint action1 say the operation of hydrogen and oxygen in producing water4 ,to regard the eye as primarily a knower1 an observer1 of things1 is as crass as to assign that function to a camera4 ,but unless the eye 7or optical apparatus1 or brain1 or organism7 be so regarded1 there is absolutely no problem of observation or of knowledge in the case of the occurrence of elliptical and circular surfaces4 ,knowledge does not enter into the affair at all till after these forms of refracted light have been produced4 ,about them there is nothing unreal4 ,light is really1 physically1 existentially1 refracted into these forms4 ,if the same spherical form upon refracting light to physical objects in two quite different positions produced the same geometric forms1 there would1 indeed1 be something to marvel at--as there would be if wax produced the same results in contact simultaneously with a cold body and with a warm one4 ,why talk about the real object in relation to a knower when what is given is one real thing in dynamic connection with another real thing8 ,the way of dealing with the case will probably meet with a retort2 at least1 it has done so before4 ,it has been said that the account given above and the account of traditional subjectivism differ only verbally4 ,the essential thing in both1 so it is said1 is the admission that an activity of a self or subject or organism makes a difference in the real object4 ,whether the subject makes this difference in the very process of knowing or makes it prior to the act of knowing is a minor matter2 what is important is that the known thing has1 by the time it is known1 been subjectified4 ,the objection gives a convenient occasion for summarizing the main points of the argument4 ,on the one hand1 the retort of the objector depends upon talking about the real object4 ,employ the term a real object1 and the change produced by the activity characteristic of the optical apparatus is of just the same kind as that of the camera lens or that of any other physical agency4 ,every event in the world marks a difference made to one existence in active conjunction with some other existence4 ,and1 as for the alleged subjectivity1 if subjective is used merely as an adjective to designate the specific activity of a particular existence1 comparable1 say1 to the term feral1 applied to tiger1 or metallic1 applied to iron1 then of course reference to subjective is legitimate4 ,but it is also tautological4 ,it is like saying that flesh eaters are carnivorous4 ,but the term subjective is so consecrated to other uses1 usually implying invidious contrast with objectivity 7while subjective in the sense just suggested means specific mode of objectivity71 that it is difficult to maintain this innocent sense4 ,its use in any disparaging way in the situation before us--any sense implicating contrast with a real object--assumes that the organism ought not to make any difference when it operates in conjunction with other things4 ,thus we run to earth that assumption that the subject is heterogeneous from every other natural existence2 it is to be the one otiose1 inoperative thing in a moving world--our old assumption of the self as outside of things4#aj ,what and where is knowledge in the case we have been considering8 ,not1 as we have already seen1 in the production of forms of light having a circular and elliptical surface4 ,these forms are natural happenings4 ,they may enter into knowledge or they may not1 according to circumstances4 ,countless such refractive changes take place without being noted4#aa ,when they become subject-matter for knowledge1 the inquiry they set on foot may take on an indefinite variety of forms4 ,one may be interested in ascertaining more about the structural peculiarities of the forms themselves2 one may be interested in the mechanism of their production2 one may find problems in projective geometry1 or in drawing and painting--all depending upon the specific matter-of-fact context4 ,the forms may be objectives of knowledge--of reflective examination--or they may be means of knowing something else4 ,it may happen--under some circumstances it does happen--that the objective of inquiry is the nature of the geometric form which1 when refracting light1 gives rise to these other forms4 ,in this case the sphere is the thing known1 and in this case1 the forms of light are signs or evidence of the conclusion to be drawn4 ,there is no more reason for supposing that they are 7mis7knowledges of the sphere--that the sphere is necessarily and from the start what one is trying to know--than for supposing that the position of the mercury in the thermometer tube is a cognitive distortion of atmospheric pressure4 ,in each case 7that of the mercury and that of1 say1 a circular surface7 the primary datum is a physical happening4 ,in each case it may be used1 upon occasion1 as a sign or evidence of the nature of the causes which brought it about4 ,given the position in question1 the circular form would be an intrinsically unreliable evidence of the nature and position of the spherical body only in case it1 as the direct datum of perception1 were not what it is--a circular form4 ,i confess that all this seems so obvious that the reader is entitled to inquire into the motive for reciting such plain facts4 ,were it not for the persistence of the epistemological problem it would be an affront to the reader's intelligence to dwell upon them4 ,but as long as such facts as we have been discussing furnish the subject-matter with which philosophizing is peculiarly concerned1 these commonplaces must be urged and reiterated4 ,they bear out two contentions which are important at the juncture1 although they will lose special significance as soon as these are habitually recognized3 ,negatively1 a prior and non-empirical notion of the self is the source of the prevailing belief that experience as such is primarily cognitional--a knowledge affair2 positively1 knowledge is always a matter of the use that is made of experienced natural events1 a use in which given things are treated as indications of what will be experienced under different conditions4 ,let us make one effort more to clear up these points4 ,suppose it is a question of knowledge of water4 ,the thing to be known does not present itself primarily as a matter of knowledge-and-ignorance at all4 ,it occurs as a stimulus to action and as the source of certain undergoings4 ,it is something to react to3--to drink1 to wash with1 to put out fire with1 and also something that reacts unexpectedly to our reactions1 that makes us undergo disease1 suffocation1 drowning4 ,in this twofold way1 water or anything else enters into experience4 ,such presence in experience has of itself nothing to do with knowledge or consciousness2 nothing that is in the sense of depending upon them1 though it has everything to do with knowledge and consciousness in the sense that the latter depends upon prior experience of this non-cognitive sort4 ,man's experience is what it is because his response to things 7even successful response7 and the reactions of things to his life1 are so radically different from knowledge4 ,the difficulties and tragedies of life1 the stimuli to acquiring knowledge1 lie in the radical disparity of presence-in-experience and presence-in-knowing4 ,yet the immense importance of knowledge experience1 the fact that turning presence-in-experience over into presence-in-a-knowledge-experience is the sole mode of control of nature1 has systematically hypnotized ,european philosophy since the time of ,socrates into thinking that all experiencing is a mode of knowing1 if not good knowledge1 then a low-grade or confused or implicit knowledge4 ,when water is an adequate stimulus to action or when its reactions oppress and overwhelm us1 it remains outside the scope of knowledge4 ,when1 however1 the bare presence of the thing 7say1 as optical stimulus7 ceases to operate directly as stimulus to response and begins to operate in connection with a forecast of the consequences it will effect when responded to1 it begins to acquire meaning--to be known1 to be an object4 ,it is noted as something which is wet1 fluid1 satisfies thirst1 allays uneasiness1 etc4 ,the conception that we begin with a known visual quality which is thereafter enlarged by adding on qualities apprehended by the other senses does not rest upon experience2 it rests upon making experience conform to the notion that every experience must be a cognitive noting4 ,as long as the visual stimulus operates as a stimulus on its own account1 there is no apprehension1 no noting1 of color or light at all4 ,to much the greater portion of sensory stimuli we react in precisely this wholly non-cognitive way4 ,in the attitude of suspended response in which consequences are anticipated1 the direct stimulus becomes a sign or index of something else--and thus matter of noting or apprehension or acquaintance1 or whatever term may be employed4 ,this difference 7together1 of course1 with the consequences which go with it7 is the difference which the natural event of knowing makes to the natural event of direct organic stimulation4 ,it is no change of a reality into an unreality1 of an object into something subjective2 it is no secret1 illicit1 or epistemological transformation2 it is a genuine acquisition of new and distinctive features through entering into relations with things with which it was not formerly connected--namely1 possible and future things4 ,but1 replies some one so obsessed with the epistemological point of view that he assumes that the prior account is a rival epistemology in disguise1 all this involves no change in ,reality1 no difference made to ,reality4 ,water was all the time all the things it is ever found out to be4 ,its real nature has not been altered by knowing it2 any such alteration means a mis-knowing4 ,in reply let it be said1--once more and finally1--there is no assertion or implication about the real object or the real world or the reality4 ,such an assumption goes with that epistemological universe of discourse which has to be abandoned in an empirical universe of discourse4 ,the change is of a real object4 ,an incident of the world operating as a physiologically direct stimulus is assuredly a reality4 ,responded to1 it produces specific consequences in virtue of the response4 ,water is not drunk unless somebody drinks it2 it does not quench thirst unless a thirsty person drinks it--and so on4 ,consequences occur whether one is aware of them or not2 they are integral facts in experience4 ,but let one of these consequences be anticipated and let it1 as anticipated1 become an indispensable element in the stimulus1 and then there is a known object4 ,it is not that knowing produces a change1 but that it is a change of the specific kind described4 ,a serial process1 the successive portions of which are as such incapable of simultaneous occurrence1 is telescoped and condensed into an object1 a unified inter-reference of contemporaneous properties1 most of which express potentialities rather than completed data4 ,because of this change1 an object possesses truth or error 7which the physical occurrence as such never has72 it is classifiable as fact or fantasy2 it is of a sort or kind1 expresses an essence or nature1 possesses implications1 etc41 etc4 ,that is to say1 it is marked by specifiable logical traits not found in physical occurrences as such4 ,because objective idealisms have seized upon these traits as constituting the very essence of ,reality is no reason for proclaiming that they are ready-made features of physical happenings1 and hence for maintaining that knowing is nothing but an appearance of things on a stage for which consciousness supplies the footlights4 ,for only the epistemological predicament leads to presentations being regarded as cognitions of things which were previously unpresented4 ,in any empirical situation of everyday life or of science1 knowledge signifies something stated or inferred of another thing4 ,visible water is not a more less erroneous presentation of ,h#b,o1 but ,h#b,o is a knowledge about the thing we see1 drink1 wash with1 sail on1 and use for power4 ,a further point and the present phase of discussion terminates4 ,treating knowledge as a presentative relation between the knower and object makes it necessary to regard the mechanism of presentation as constituting the act of knowing4 ,since things may be presented in sense-perception1 in recollection1 in imagination and in conception1 and since the mechanism in every one of these four styles of presentation is sensory-cerebral the problem of knowing becomes a mind-body problem4#ab ,the psychological1 or physiological1 mechanism of presentation involved in seeing a chair1 remembering what ,i ate yesterday for luncheon1 imagining the moon the size of a cart wheel1 conceiving a mathematical continuum is identified with the operation of knowing4 ,the evil consequences are twofold4 ,the problem of the relation of mind and body has become a part of the problem of the possibility of knowledge in general1 to the further complication of a matter already hopelessly constrained4 ,meantime the actual process of knowing1 namely1 operations of controlled observation1 inference1 reasoning1 and testing1 the only process with intellectual import1 is dismissed as irrelevant to the theory of knowing4 ,the methods of knowing practised in daily life and science are excluded from consideration in the philosophical theory of knowing4 ,hence the constructions of the latter become more and more elaborately artificial because there is no definite check upon them4 ,it would be easy to quote from epistemological writers statements to the effect that these processes 7which supply the only empirically verifiable facts of knowing7 are merely inductive in character1 or even that they are of purely psychological significance4 ,it would be difficult to find a more complete inversion of the facts than in the latter statement1 since presentation constitutes in fact the psychological affair4 ,a confusion of logic with physiological physiology has bred hybrid epistemology1 with the amazing result that the technique of effective inquiry is rendered irrelevant to the theory of knowing1 and those physical events involved in the occurrence of data for knowing are treated as if they constituted the act of knowing4 ,v ,what are the bearings of our discussion upon the conception of the present scope and office of philosophy8 ,what do our conclusions indicate and demand with reference to philosophy itself8 ,for the philosophy which reaches such conclusions regarding knowledge and mind must apply them1 sincerely and whole-heartedly1 to its idea of its own nature4 ,for philosophy claims to be one form or mode of knowing4 ,if1 then1 the conclusion is reached that knowing is a way of employing empirical occurrences with respect to increasing power to direct the consequences which flow from things1 the application of the conclusion must be made to philosophy itself4 ,it1 too1 becomes not a contemplative survey of existence nor an analysis of what is past and done with1 but an outlook upon future possibilities with reference to attaining the better and averting the worse4 ,philosophy must take1 with good grace1 its own medicine4 ,it is easier to state the negative results of the changed idea of philosophy than the positive ones4 ,the point that occurs to mind most readily is that philosophy will have to surrender all pretension to be peculiarly concerned with ultimate reality1 or with reality as a complete 7i4e41 completed7 whole3 with the real object4 ,the surrender is not easy of achievement4 ,the philosophic tradition that comes to us from classic ,greek thought and that was reinforced by ,christian philosophy in the ,middle ,ages discriminates philosophical knowing from other modes of knowing by means of an alleged peculiarly intimate concern with supreme1 ultimate1 true reality4 ,to deny this trait to philosophy seems to many to be the suicide of philosophy2 to be a systematic adoption of skepticism or agnostic positivism4 ,the pervasiveness of the tradition is shown in the fact that so vitally a contemporary thinker as ,bergson1 who finds a philosophic revolution involved in abandonment of the traditional identification of the truly real with the fixed 7an identification inherited from ,greek thought71 does not find it in his heart to abandon the counterpart identification of philosophy with search for the truly ,real2 and hence finds it necessary to substitute an ultimate and absolute flux for an ultimate and absolute permanence4 ,thus his great empirical services in calling attention to the fundamental importance of considerations of time for problems of life and mind get compromised with a mystic1 non-empirical ,intuition2 and we find him preoccupied with solving1 by means of his new idea of ultimate reality1 the traditional problems of realities-in-themselves and phenomena1 matter and mind1 free-will and determinism1 ,god and the world4 ,is not that another evidence of the influence of the classic idea about philosophy8 ,even the new realists are not content to take their realism as a plea for approaching subject-matter directly instead of through the intervention of epistemological apparatus2 they find it necessary first to determine the status of the real object4 ,thus they too become entangled in the problem of the possibility of error1 dreams1 hallucinations1 etc41 in short1 the problem of evil4 ,for ,i take it that an uncorrupted realism would accept such things as real events1 and find in them no other problems than those attending the consideration of any real occurrence--namely1 problems of structure1 origin1 and operation4 ,it is often said that pragmatism1 unless it is content to be a contribution to mere methodology1 must develop a theory of ,reality4 ,but the chief characteristic trait of the pragmatic notion of reality is precisely that no theory of ,reality in general1 ueberhaupt1 is possible or needed4 ,it occupies the position of an emancipated empiricism or a thoroughgoing naive realism4 ,it finds that reality is a denotative term1 a word used to designate indifferently everything that happens4 ,lies1 dreams1 insanities1 deceptions1 myths1 theories are all of them just the events which they specifically are4 ,pragmatism is content to take its stand with science2 for science finds all such events to be subject-matter of description and inquiry--just like stars and fossils1 mosquitoes and malaria1 circulation and vision4 ,it also takes its stand with daily life1 which finds that such things really have to be reckoned with as they occur interwoven in the texture of events4 ,the only way in which the term reality can ever become more than a blanket denotative term is through recourse to specific events in all their diversity and thatness4 ,speaking summarily1 ,i find that the retention by philosophy of the notion of a ,reality feudally superior to the events of everyday occurrence is the chief source of the increasing isolation of philosophy from common sense and science4 ,for the latter do not operate in any such region4 ,as with them of old1 philosophy in dealing with real difficulties finds itself still hampered by reference to realities more real1 more ultimate1 than those which directly happen4 ,i have said that identifying the cause of philosophy with the notion of superior reality is the cause of an increasing isolation from science and practical life4 ,the phrase reminds us that there was a time when the enterprise of science and the moral interests of men both moved in a universe invidiously distinguished from that of ordinary occurrence4 ,while all that happens is equally real--since it really happens--happenings are not of equal worth4 ,their respective consequences1 their import1 varies tremendously4 ,counterfeit money1 although real 7or rather because real71 is really different from valid circulatory medium1 just as disease is really different from health2 different in specific structure and so different in consequences4 ,in occidental thought1 the ,greeks were the first to draw the distinction between the genuine and the spurious in a generalized fashion and to formulate and enforce its tremendous significance for the conduct of life4 ,but since they had at command no technique of experimental analysis and no adequate technique of mathematical analysis1 they were compelled to treat the difference of the true and the false1 the dependable and the deceptive1 as signifying two kinds of existence1 the truly real and the apparently real4 ,two points can hardly be asserted with too much emphasis4 ,the ,greeks were wholly right in the feeling that questions of good and ill1 as far as they fall within human control1 are bound up with discrimination of the genuine from the spurious1 of being from what only pretends to be4 ,but because they lacked adequate instrumentalities for coping with this difference in specific situations1 they were forced to treat the difference as a wholesale and rigid one4 ,science was concerned with vision of ultimate and true reality2 opinion was concerned with getting along with apparent realities4 ,each had its appropriate region permanently marked off4 ,matters of opinion could never become matters of science2 their intrinsic nature forbade4 ,when the practice of science went on under such conditions1 science and philosophy were one and the same thing4 ,both had to do with ultimate reality in its rigid and insuperable difference from ordinary occurrences4 ,we have only to refer to the way in which medieval life wrought the philosophy of an ultimate and supreme reality into the context of practical life to realize that for centuries political and moral interests were bound up with the distinction between the absolutely real and the relatively real4 ,the difference was no matter of a remote technical philosophy1 but one which controlled life from the cradle to the grave1 from the grave to the endless life after death4 ,by means of a vast institution1 which in effect was state as well as church1 the claims of ultimate reality were enforced2 means of access to it were provided4 ,acknowledgment of ,the ,reality brought security in this world and salvation in the next4 ,it is not necessary to report the story of the change which has since taken place4 ,it is enough for our purposes to note that none of the modern philosophies of a superior reality1 or the real object1 idealistic or realistic1 holds that its insight makes a difference like that between sin and holiness1 eternal condemnation and eternal bliss4 ,while in its own context the philosophy of ultimate reality entered into the vital concerns of men1 it now tends to be an ingenious dialectic exercised in professorial corners by a few who have retained ancient premises while rejecting their application to the conduct of life4 ,the increased isolation from science of any philosophy identified with the problem of the real is equally marked4 ,for the growth of science has consisted precisely in the invention of an equipment1 a technique of appliances and procedures1 which1 accepting all occurrences as homogeneously real1 proceeds to distinguish the authenticated from the spurious1 the true from the false1 by specific modes of treatment in specific situations4 ,the procedures of the trained engineer1 of the competent physician1 of the laboratory expert1 have turned out to be the only ways of discriminating the counterfeit from the valid4 ,and they have revealed that the difference is not one of antecedent fixity of existence1 but one of mode of treatment and of the consequences thereon attendant4 ,after mankind has learned to put its trust in specific procedures in order to make its discriminations between the false and the true1 philosophy arrogates to itself the enforcement of the distinction at its own cost4 ,more than once1 this essay has intimated that the counterpart of the idea of invidiously real reality is the spectator notion of knowledge4 ,if the knower1 however defined1 is set over against the world to be known1 knowing consists in possessing a transcript1 more or less accurate but otiose1 of real things4 ,whether this transcript is presentative in character 7as realists say7 or whether it is by means of states of consciousness which represent things 7as subjectivists say71 is a matter of great importance in its own context4 ,but1 in another regard1 this difference is negligible in comparison with the point in which both agree4 ,knowing is viewing from outside4 ,but if it be true that the self or subject of experience is part and parcel of the course of events1 it follows that the self becomes a knower4 ,it becomes a mind in virtue of a distinctive way of partaking in the course of events4 ,the significant distinction is no longer between the knower and the world2 it is between different ways of being in and of the movement of things2 between a brute physical way and a purposive1 intelligent way4 ,there is no call to repeat in detail the statements which have been advanced4 ,their net purport is that the directive presence of future possibilities in dealing with existent conditions is what is meant by knowing2 that the self becomes a knower or mind when anticipation of future consequences operates as its stimulus4 ,what we are now concerned with is the effect of this conception upon the nature of philosophic knowing4 ,as far as ,i can judge1 popular response to pragmatic philosophy was moved by two quite different considerations4 ,by some it was thought to provide a new species of sanctions1 a new mode of apologetics1 for certain religious ideas whose standing had been threatened4 ,by others1 it was welcomed because it was taken as a sign that philosophy was about to surrender its otiose and speculative remoteness2 that philosophers were beginning to recognize that philosophy is of account only if1 like everyday knowing and like science1 it affords guidance to action and thereby makes a difference in the event4 ,it was welcomed as a sign that philosophers were willing to have the worth of their philosophizing measured by responsible tests4 ,i have not seen this point of view emphasized1 or hardly recognized1 by professional critics4 ,the difference of attitude can probably be easily explained4 ,the epistemological universe of discourse is so highly technical that only those who have been trained in the history of thought think in terms of it4 ,it did not occur1 accordingly1 to non-technical readers to interpret the doctrine that the meaning and validity of thought are fixed by differences made in consequences and in satisfactoriness1 to mean consequences in personal feelings4 ,those who were professionally trained1 however1 took the statement to mean that consciousness or mind in the mere act of looking at things modifies them4 ,it understood the doctrine of test of validity by consequences to mean that apprehensions and conceptions are true if the modifications affected by them were of an emotionally desirable tone4 ,prior discussion should have made it reasonably clear that the source of this misunderstanding lies in the neglect of temporal considerations4 ,the change made in things by the self in knowing is not immediate and1 so to say1 cross-sectional4 ,it is longitudinal--in the redirection given to changes already going on4 ,its analogue is found in the changes which take place in the development of1 say1 iron ore into a watch-spring1 not in those of the miracle of transubstantiation4 ,for the static1 cross-sectional1 non-temporal relation of subject and object1 the pragmatic hypothesis substitutes apprehension of a thing in terms of the results in other things which it is tending to effect4 ,for the unique epistemological relation1 it substitutes a practical relation of a familiar type3--responsive behavior which changes in time the subject-matter to which it applies4 ,the unique thing about the responsive behavior which constitutes knowing is the specific difference which marks it off from other modes of response1 namely1 the part played in it by anticipation and prediction4 ,knowing is the act1 stimulated by this foresight1 of securing and averting consequences4 ,the success of the achievement measures the standing of the foresight by which response is directed4 ,the popular impression that pragmatic philosophy means that philosophy shall develop ideas relevant to the actual crises of life1 ideas influential in dealing with them and tested by the assistance they afford1 is correct4 ,reference to practical response suggests1 however1 another misapprehension4 ,many critics have jumped at the obvious association of the word pragmatic with practical4 ,they have assumed that the intent is to limit all knowledge1 philosophic included1 to promoting action1 understanding by action either just any bodily movement1 or those bodily movements which conduce to the preservation and grosser well-being of the body4 ,james' statement1 that general conceptions must cash in has been taken 7especially by ,european critics7 to mean that the end and measure of intelligence lies in the narrow and coarse utilities which it produces4 ,even an acute ,american thinker1 after first criticizing pragmatism as a kind of idealistic epistemology1 goes on to treat it as a doctrine which regards intelligence as a lubricating oil facilitating the workings of the body4 ,one source of the misunderstanding is suggested by the fact that cashing in to ,james meant that a general idea must always be capable of verification in specific existential cases4 ,the notion of cashing in says nothing about the breadth or depth of the specific consequences4 ,as an empirical doctrine1 it could not say anything about them in general2 the specific cases must speak for themselves4 ,if one conception is verified in terms of eating beefsteak1 and another in terms of a favorable credit balance in the bank1 that is not because of anything in the theory1 but because of the specific nature of the conceptions in question1 and because there exist particular events like hunger and trade4 ,if there are also existences in which the most liberal esthetic ideas and the most generous moral conceptions can be verified by specific embodiment1 assuredly so much the better4 ,the fact that a strictly empirical philosophy was taken by so many critics to imply an a priori dogma about the kind of consequences capable of existence is evidence1 ,i think1 of the inability of many philosophers to think in concretely empirical terms4 ,since the critics were themselves accustomed to get results by manipulating the concepts of consequences and of practice1 they assumed that even a would-be empiricist must be doing the same sort of thing4 ,it will1 ,i suppose1 remain for a long time incredible to some that a philosopher should really intend to go to specific experiences to determine of what scope and depth practice admits1 and what sort of consequences the world permits to come into being4 ,concepts are so clear2 it takes so little time to develop their implications2 experiences are so confused1 and it requires so much time and energy to lay hold of them4 ,and yet these same critics charge pragmatism with adopting subjective and emotional standards6 ,as a matter of fact1 the pragmatic theory of intelligence means that the function of mind is to project new and more complex ends--to free experience from routine and from caprice4 ,not the use of thought to accomplish purposes already given either in the mechanism of the body or in that of the existent state of society1 but the use of intelligence to liberate and liberalize action1 is the pragmatic lesson4 ,action restricted to given and fixed ends may attain great technical efficiency2 but efficiency is the only quality to which it can lay claim4 ,such action is mechanical 7or becomes so71 no matter what the scope of the preformed end1 be it the ,will of ,god or ,kultur4 ,but the doctrine that intelligence develops within the sphere of action for the sake of possibilities not yet given is the opposite of a doctrine of mechanical efficiency4 ,intelligence as intelligence is inherently forward-looking2 only by ignoring its primary function does it become a mere means for an end already given4 ,the latter is servile1 even when the end is labeled moral1 religious1 or esthetic4 ,but action directed to ends to which the agent has not previously been attached inevitably carries with it a quickened and enlarged spirit4 ,a pragmatic intelligence is a creative intelligence1 not a routine mechanic4 ,all this may read like a defense of pragmatism by one concerned to make out for it the best case possible4 ,such is not1 however1 the intention4 ,the purpose is to indicate the extent to which intelligence frees action from a mechanically instrumental character4 ,intelligence is1 indeed1 instrumental through action to the determination of the qualities of future experience4 ,but the very fact that the concern of intelligence is with the future1 with the as-yet-unrealized 7and with the given and the established only as conditions of the realization of possibilities71 makes the action in which it takes effect generous and liberal2 free of spirit4 ,just that action which extends and approves intelligence has an intrinsic value of its own in being instrumental3--the intrinsic value of being informed with intelligence in behalf of the enrichment of life4 ,by the same stroke1 intelligence becomes truly liberal3 knowing is a human undertaking1 not an esthetic appreciation carried on by a refined class or a capitalistic possession of a few learned specialists1 whether men of science or of philosophy4 ,more emphasis has been put upon what philosophy is not than upon what it may become4 ,but it is not necessary1 it is not even desirable1 to set forth philosophy as a scheduled program4 ,there are human difficulties of an urgent1 deep-seated kind which may be clarified by trained reflection1 and whose solution may be forwarded by the careful development of hypotheses4 ,when it is understood that philosophic thinking is caught up in the actual course of events1 having the office of guiding them towards a prosperous issue1 problems will abundantly present themselves4 ,philosophy will not solve these problems2 philosophy is vision1 imagination1 reflection--and these functions1 apart from action1 modify nothing and hence resolve nothing4 ,but in a complicated and perverse world1 action which is not informed with vision1 imagination1 and reflection1 is more likely to increase confusion and conflict than to straighten things out4 ,it is not easy for generous and sustained reflection to become a guiding and illuminating method in action4 ,until it frees itself from identification with problems which are supposed to depend upon ,reality as such1 or its distinction from a world of ,appearance1 or its relation to a ,knower as such1 the hands of philosophy are tied4 ,having no chance to link its fortunes with a responsible career by suggesting things to be tried1 it cannot identify itself with questions which actually arise in the vicissitudes of life4 ,philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method1 cultivated by philosophers1 for dealing with the problems of men4 ,emphasis must vary with the stress and special impact of the troubles which perplex men4 ,each age knows its own ills1 and seeks its own remedies4 ,one does not have to forecast a particular program to note that the central need of any program at the present day is an adequate conception of the nature of intelligence and its place in action4 ,philosophy cannot disavow responsibility for many misconceptions of the nature of intelligence which now hamper its efficacious operation4 ,it has at least a negative task imposed upon it4 ,it must take away the burdens which it has laid upon the intelligence of the common man in struggling with his difficulties4 ,it must deny and eject that intelligence which is naught but a distant eye1 registering in a remote and alien medium the spectacle of nature and life4 ,to enforce the fact that the emergence of imagination and thought is relative to the connexion of the sufferings of men with their doings is of itself to illuminate those sufferings and to instruct those doings4 ,to catch mind in its connexion with the entrance of the novel into the course of the world is to be on the road to see that intelligence is itself the most promising of all novelties1 the revelation of the meaning of that transformation of past into future which is the reality of every present4 ,to reveal intelligence as the organ for the guidance of this transformation1 the sole director of its quality1 is to make a declaration of present untold significance for action4 ,to elaborate these convictions of the connexion of intelligence with what men undergo because of their doings and with the emergence and direction of the creative1 the novel1 in the world is of itself a program which will keep philosophers busy until something more worth while is forced upon them4 ,for the elaboration has to be made through application to all the disciplines which have an intimate connexion with human conduct3--to logic1 ethics1 esthetics1 economics1 and the procedure of the sciences formal and natural4 ,i also believe that there is a genuine sense in which the enforcement of the pivotal position of intelligence in the world and thereby in control of human fortunes 7so far as they are manageable7 is the peculiar problem in the problems of life which come home most closely to ourselves--to ourselves living not merely in the early twentieth century but in the ,united ,states4 ,it is easy to be foolish about the connexion of thought with national life4 ,but ,i do not see how any one can question the distinctively national color of ,english1 or ,french1 or ,german philosophies4 ,and if of late the history of thought has come under the domination of the ,german dogma of an inner evolution of ideas1 it requires but a little inquiry to convince oneself that that dogma itself testifies to a particularly nationalistic need and origin4 ,i believe that philosophy in ,america will be lost between chewing a historic cud long since reduced to woody fiber1 or an apologetics for lost causes 7lost to natural science71 or a scholastic1 schematic formalism1 unless it can somehow bring to consciousness ,america's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action4 ,this need and principle1 ,i am convinced1 is the necessity of a deliberate control of policies by the method of intelligence1 an intelligence which is not the faculty of intellect honored in text-books and neglected elsewhere1 but which is the sum-total of impulses1 habits1 emotions1 records1 and discoveries which forecast what is desirable and undesirable in future possibilities1 and which contrive ingeniously in behalf of imagined good4 ,our life has no background of sanctified categories upon which we may fall back2 we rely upon precedent as authority only to our own undoing--for with us there is such a continuously novel situation that final reliance upon precedent entails some class interest guiding us by the nose whither it will4 ,british empiricism1 with its appeal to what has been in the past1 is1 after all1 only a kind of a priorism4 ,for it lays down a fixed rule for future intelligence to follow2 and only the immersion of philosophy in technical learning prevents our seeing that this is the essence of a priorism4 ,we pride ourselves upon being realistic1 desiring a hardheaded cognizance of facts1 and devoted to mastering the means of life4 ,we pride ourselves upon a practical idealism1 a lively and easily moved faith in possibilities as yet unrealized1 in willingness to make sacrifice for their realization4 ,idealism easily becomes a sanction of waste and carefulness1 and realism a sanction of legal formalism in behalf of things as they are--the rights of the possessor4 ,we thus tend to combine a loose and ineffective optimism with assent to the doctrine of take who take can3 a deification of power4 ,all peoples at all times have been narrowly realistic in practice and have then employed idealization to cover up in sentiment and theory their brutalities4 ,but never1 perhaps1 has the tendency been so dangerous and so tempting as with ourselves4 ,faith in the power of intelligence to imagine a future which is the projection of the desirable in the present1 and to invent the instrumentalities of its realization1 is our salvation4 ,and it is a faith which must be nurtured and made articulate3 surely a sufficiently large task for our philosophy4 ,,reformation ,,of ,,logic ,,addison ,w4 ,,moore ,i ,in a general survey of the development of logical theory one is struck by the similarity1 not to say identity1 of the indictments which reformers1 since the days of ,aristotle1 have brought against it4 ,the most fundamental of these charges are3 first1 that the theory of logic has left it formal and with little significance for the advancement of science and the conduct of society2 second1 that it has great difficulty in avoiding the predicament of logical operations that are merely labored reproductions of non-logical activities and therefore tautologous and trifling1 or of logical operations that are so far removed from immediate1 non-logical experience that they are irrelevant2 third1 that logical theory has had trouble in finding room in its own household for both truth and error2 each crowds out the other4 ,the identity of these indictments regardless of the general philosophical faith1 empiricism1 or rationalism1 realism1 or idealism to which the reformer or the logic to be reformed has belonged1 suggests that whatever the differences in the doctrines of these various philosophic traditions1 they possess a common ground from which these common difficulties spring4 ,it is the conviction of a number who are at present attempting to rid logic of these ancient disabilities that their common source is to be found in a lack of continuity between the acts of intelligence 7or to avoid the dangers of hypostasis1 intelligent acts7 and other acts2 between logical conduct and other conduct4 ,so wide1 indeed1 is this breach1 that often little remains of the act of knowing but the name4 ,it may still be called an act1 but it has no describable instruments nor technique of operation4 ,it is an indefinable and often mystical performance of which only the results can be stated4 ,in recent logical discussion this techniqueless act of knowing has been properly enough transformed into an indefinable external relation in which an entity called a knower stands to another entity called the known4 ,for many centuries this breach between the operations of intelligence and other operations has been closed by various metaphysical devices with the result that logic has been a hybrid science1--half logic1 half metaphysics and epistemology4 ,so great has been the momentum of the metaphysical tradition that long after we have begun to discover the connection between logical and non-logical operations its methods remain to plague us4 ,efforts to heal the breach without a direct appeal to metaphysical agencies have been made by attempting a complete logicizing of all operations4 ,but besides requiring additional metaphysics to effect it1 the procedure is as fatal to continuity as is an impassable disjunction4 ,continuity demands distinction as well as connection4 ,it requires the development1 the growth of old material and functions into new forms4 ,driven by the difficulties of this complete logicization1 which are as serious as those of isolation1 logical theory was obliged to reinstate some sort of distinction4 ,this it did by resorting to the categories of explicit and implicit4 ,all so-called non-logical operations were regarded as implicitly logical4 ,and1 paradoxically1 logical operations had for their task the transformation of the implicit into the explicit4 ,an adequate account of the origin and continuance of this isolation of the conduct of intelligence from other conduct is too long a story to be told here4 ,suffice it to recall that in the society in which the distinction between immediate and reflective experience1 between opinion and science1 between percepts and universals was first made1 intelligence was largely the possession of a special and privileged class removed in great measure from hand-to-hand contact with nature and with much of society4 ,because it did not fully participate in the operations of nature and society intelligence could not become fully domesticated1 i4e41 fully naturalized and socialized in its world4 ,it was a charmed spectator of the cosmic and social drama4 ,doubtless when ,greek intelligence discovered the distinction between immediate and reflective experience--possibly the most momentous discovery in history--the world1 as ,kant says of the speculations of ,thales1 must suddenly have appeared in a new light4 ,but not recognizing the full significance of this discovery1 ideas1 universals1 became but a wondrous spectacle for the eye of reason4 ,they brought1 to be sure1 blessed relief from the bewildering and baffling flux of perception4 ,but it was the relief of sanctuary1 not of victory4 ,that the brilliant speculations of ,greek intelligence were barren because there was no technique for testing and applying them in detail is an old story4 ,but it is merely a restatement1 not a solution1 of the pertinent question4 ,this is3 why did not ,greek intelligence develop such a technique8 ,the answer lies in the fact that the technique of intelligence is to be found precisely in the details of the operations of nature and of human conduct from which an aristocratic intelligence is always in large measure shut off4 ,intelligence cannot operate fruitfully in a vacuum4 ,it must be incarnate4 ,it must1 as ,hegel said1 have hands and feet4 ,when we turn to the history of modern science the one thing that stands out is that it was not until the point was reached where intelligence was ready 7continuing the ,hegelian figure7 to thrust its hands into the vitals of nature and society that it began to acquire a real control over its operations4 ,in default of such controlling technique there was nothing to be done with this newly found instrument of intelligence--the universal--but to retain it as an object of contemplation and of worshipful adoration4 ,this involved1 of course1 its hypostasis as the metaphysical reality of supreme importance4 ,with this1 the only difference between opinion and science became one of the kind of objects known4 ,that universals were known by reason and particulars by sense was of little more logical significance than that sounds are known by the ear and smells by the nose4 ,particulars and universals were equally given4 ,if the latter required some abstraction this was regarded as merely auxiliary to the immediate vision1 as sniffing is to the perception of odor4 ,that universals should or could be conceived as experimental1 as hypotheses1 was1 when translated into later theology1 the sin against the ,holy ,ghost4 ,however1 the fact that the particulars in the world of opinion were the stimuli to the recollection of universals and that the latter in turn were the patterns1 the forms1 for the particulars1 opened the way in actual practice for the exercise of a great deal of the controlling function of the universals4 ,but the failure to recognize this control value of the universal as fundamental1 made it necessary for the universal to exercise its function surreptitiously1 in the disguise of a pattern and in the clumsy garb of imitation and participation4 ,with perceptions1 desires1 and impulses relegated to the world of opinion and shadows1 and with the newly discovered instrument of knowledge turned into an object1 the knower was stripped of all his knowing apparatus and was left an empty1 scuttled entity definable and describable only as a knower4 ,the knower must know1 even if he had nothing to know with4 ,hence the mystical almost indefinable character of the knowing act or relation4 ,i say almost indefinable2 for as an act it had1 of course1 to have some sort of conceptualized form4 ,and this form vision naturally furnished4 ,naturally1 because intelligence was so largely contemplative1 and vision so largely immediate1 unanalyzed1 and diaphanous4 ,there was1 to be sure1 the concept of effluxes4 ,but this was a statement of the fact of vision in terms of its results1 not of the process itself4 ,thus it was that the whole terminology of knowing which we still use was moulded and fixed upon a very crude conception of one of the constituents of its process4 ,there can be no doubt that this terminology has added much to the inertia against which the advance of logical theory has worked4 ,it would be interesting to see what would be the effect upon logical theory of the substitution of an auditory or olfactory terminology for visual2 or of a visual terminology revised to agree with modern scientific analysis of the act of vision as determined by its connections with other functions4 ,with the act of knowing stripped of its technique and left a bare1 unique1 indescribable act or relation1 the foundations for epistemological and metaphysical logic were laid4 ,that ,greek logic escaped the ravages of epistemology was due to the saving materialism in its metaphysical conception of mind and to the steadfastness of the aristocratic regime4 ,but when medieval theology and ,cartesian metaphysics had destroyed the last remnant of metaphysical connection between the knowing mind and nature1 and when revolutions had torn the individual from his social moorings1 the stage for epistemological logic was fully set4 ,i do not mean to identify the epistemological situation with the ,cartesian disjunction4 ,that disjunction was but the metaphysical expression of the one which constitutes the real foundation of epistemology--the disjunction1 namely1 between the act of knowing and other acts4 ,from this point logic has followed one of two general courses4 ,it has sought continuity by attempting to reduce non-logical things and operations to terms of logical operations1 i4e41 to sensations or universals or both2 or it has attempted to exclude entirely the act of knowing from logic and to transfer logical distinctions and operations1 and even the attributes of truth and error to objects which1 significantly enough1 are still composed of these same hypostatized logical processes4 ,the first course results in an epistemological logic of some form of the idealistic tradition1 rationalism1 sensationalism1 or transcendentalism1 depending upon whether universals1 or sensations1 or a combination of both1 is made fundamental in the constitution of the object4 ,the second course yields an epistemological logic of the realistic type1--again1 sensational or rationalistic 7mathematical71 or a combination of the two--a sort of realistic transcendentalism4 ,each type has essentially the same difficulties with the processes of inference1 with the problem of change1 with truth and error1 and1 on the ethical side1 with good and evil4 ,with the processes of knowing converted into objects1 and with the act of knowing reduced to a unique and external relation between the despoiled knower and the objects made from its own hypostatized processes1 all knowing becomes in the end immediate4 ,all attempts at an inference that is anything more than an elaborated and often confused restatement of non-logical operations break down4 ,the associational inference of empiricism1 the subsumptive inference of rationalism1 the transcendental inference of objective idealism1 the analytical inference of neo-realism--all alike face the dilemma of an inference that is trifling or miraculous1 tautologous or false4 ,where the knower and its object are so constituted that the only relation in which the latter can stand to the former is that of presence or absence1 and if to be present is to be known1 how1 as ,plato asked1 can there be any false knowing8 ,for those who accept the foregoing general diagnosis the prescription is obvious4 ,the present task of logical theory is the restoration of the continuity of the act and agent of knowing with other acts and agents4 ,but this is not to be done by merely furnishing the act of knowing with a body and a nervous system4 ,if the nervous system be regarded as only an onlooking1 beholding nervous system1 if no connection be made between the logical operations of a nervous system and its other operations a nervous system has no logical advantage over a purely psychical mind4 ,it was to be expected that this movement toward restoration of continuity made in the name of instrumental or experimental logic would be regarded1 alike1 by the logics of rationalism and empiricism1 of idealism and of realism1 as an attempt to rob intelligence of its own unique and proper character2 to reduce it to a merely psychological and existential affair2 to leave no place for genuine intellectual interest and activity2 and to make science a series of more or less respectable adventures4 ,the counter thesis is1 that this restoration is truly a restoration--not a despoliation of the character and rights of intelligence2 that only such a restoration can preserve the unique function of intelligence1 can prevent it from becoming merely existential1 and can provide a distinct place for intellectual and scientific interest and activity4 ,it does not1 however1 promise to remove the stigma of adventure from science4 ,every experiment is an adventure2 and it is precisely the experimental character of scientific logic that distinguishes it from scholasticism1 medieval or modern4 ,,ii ,first it is clear that a reform of logic based upon the restoration of knowing to its connections with other acts will begin with a chapter containing an account of these other operations and the general character of this connection4#ac ,logical theory has been truncated4 ,it has tried to begin and end in the middle1 with the result that it has ended in the air4 ,logic presents the curious anachronism of a science which attempts to deal with its subject-matter apart from what it comes from and what comes from it4 ,the objection that such a chapter on the conditions and genesis of the operations of knowing belongs to psychology1 only shows how firmly fixed is the discontinuity we are trying to escape4 ,as we have seen1 the original motive for leaving this account of genesis to psychology was that the act of knowing was supposed to originate in a purely psychical mind4 ,such an origin was of course embarrassing to logic1 which aimed to be scientific4 ,the old opposition between origin and validity was due to the kind of origin assumed and the kind of validity necessitated by the origin4 ,one may well be excused for evading the question of how ideas1 originated in a purely psychical mind1 can1 in ,kant's phrase1 have objective validity1 by throwing out the question of origin altogether4 ,whatever difficulties remain for validity after this expulsion could not be greater than those of the task of combining the objective validity of ideas with their subjective origin4 ,the whole of this chapter on the connection between logical and non-logical operations cannot be written here4 ,but its central point would be that these other acts with which the act of knowing must have continuity are just the operations of our unreflective conduct4 ,note that it is unreflective1 not unconscious1 nor yet merely instinctive conduct4 ,it is our perceptive1 remembering1 imagining1 desiring1 loving1 hating conduct4 ,note also that we do not say psychical or physical1 nor psycho-physical conduct4 ,these terms stand for certain distinctions in logical conduct1#ad and we are here concerned with the character of non-logical conduct which is to be distinguished from1 and yet kept in closest continuity with1 logical conduct4 ,if1 here1 the metaphysical logician should ask3 ,are you not in this assumption of a world of reflective and unreflective conduct and affection1 and of a world of beings in interaction1 begging a whole system of metaphysics8 the reply is that if it is a metaphysics bad for logic1 it will keep turning up in the course of logical theory as a constant source of trouble4 ,on the other hand1 if logic encounters grave difficulties when it attempts to get on without it1 its assumption1 for the purposes of logic1 has all the justification possible4 ,again it will be urged that this alleged non-logical conduct1 in so far as it involves perception1 memory1 and anticipation1 is already cognitive and logical2 or if the act of knowing is to be entirely excluded from logic1 then1 in so far as what is left involves objective terms and relations1 it1 also1 is already logical4 ,and it may be thought strange that a logic based upon the restoration of continuity between the act of knowing and other acts should here be insisting on distinction and separation4 ,the point is fundamental2 and must be disposed of before we go on4 ,first1 we must observe that the unity secured by making all conscious conduct logical turns out1 on examination1 to be more nominal than real4 ,as we have already seen1 this attempt at a complete logicizing of all conduct is forced at once to introduce the distinction of explicit and implicit1 of conscious and unconscious or subconscious logic4 ,some cynics have found that this suggests dividing triangles into explicit and implicit triangles1 or into triangles and sub-triangles4 ,doubtless the attempt to make all perceptions1 memories1 and anticipations1 and even instincts and habits1 into implicit or subconscious inference is an awkward effort to restore the continuity of logical and non-logical conduct4 ,its awkwardness consists in attempting to secure this continuity by the method of subsumptive identity1 instead of finding it in a transitive continuity of function2--instead of seeing that perception1 memory1 and anticipation become logical processes when they are employed in a process of inquiry1 whose purpose is to relieve the difficulties into which these operations in their function as direct stimuli have fallen4 ,logical conduct is constituted by the cooeperation of these processes for the improvement of their further operation4 ,to regard perception1 memory1 and imagination as implicit forms or as sub-species of logical operation is much like conceiving the movements of our fingers and arms as implicit or imperfect species of painting1 or swimming4 ,moreover1 this doctrine of universal logicism teaches that when that which is perfect is come1 imperfection shall be done away4 ,this should mean that when painting becomes completely explicit and perfect1 fingers and hands shall disappear4 ,perfect painting will be the pure essence of painting4 ,and this interpretation is not strained2 for this logic expressly teaches that in the perfected real system all temporal elements are unessential to logical operations4 ,they are1 of course1 psychologically necessary for finite beings1 who can never have perfectly logical experiences4 ,but1 from the standpoint of a completely logicized experience1 all finite1 temporal processes are accidents1 not essentials1 of logical operations4 ,the fact that the processes of perception1 memory1 and anticipation are transformed in their logical operation into sensations and universals1 terms1 and relations1 and1 as such1 become the subject-matter of logical theory1 does not mean that they have lost their mediating character1 and have become merely objects of logical contemplation at large4 ,sensations or sense-data1 and ideas1 terms and relations1 are the subject-matter of logical theory for the reason that they sometimes succeed and sometimes fail in their logical operations4 ,and it is the business of logical theory to diagnose the conditions of this success and failure4 ,if1 in writing1 my pen becomes defective and is made an object of inquiry1 it does not therefore lose all its character as a pen and become merely an object at large4 ,it is as an instrument of writing that it is investigated4 ,so1 sense-data1 universals1 terms1 and relations as subject-matter of logic are investigated in their character as mediators of the ambiguities and conflicts1 of non-logical experience4 ,if the operations of habit1 instinct1 perceptions1 memory1 and anticipation become logical1 when1 instead of operating as direct stimuli1 they are employed in a process of inquiry1 we must next ask3 7#a7 under what conditions do they pass over into this process of inquiry8 7#b7 what modifications of operation do they undergo1 what new forms do they take1 and what new results do they produce in their logical operations8 ,if the act of inquiry be not superimposed1 it must arise out of some specific condition in the course of non-logical conduct4 ,once more1 if the alarm be sounded at this proposal to find the origin of logical in non-logical operations it must be summarily answered by asking if the one who raises the cry finds it impossible to imagine that one who is not hungry1 or angry1 or patriotic1 or wise may become so4 ,non-logical conduct is not the abstract formal contradictory of logical conduct any more than present satiety or foolishness is the contradictory of later hunger or wisdom1 or than anger at one person contradicts cordiality to another1 or to the same person1 later4 ,the old bogie of the logical irrelevance of origin was due to the inability to conceive continuity except in the form of identity in which there was no place for the notion of growth4 ,the conditions under which non-logical conduct becomes logical are familiar to those who have followed the doctrines of experimental logic as expounded in the discussions of the past few years4 ,the transformation begins at the point where non-logical processes instead of operating as direct unambiguous stimuli and response become ambiguous with consequent inhibition of conduct4 ,but again this does not mean that at this juncture the non-logical processes quit the field and give place to a totally new faculty and process called reason4 ,they stay on the job4 ,but there is a change in the job1 which now is to get rid of this ambiguity4 ,this modification of the task requires1 of course1 corresponding modification and adaptation of these operations4 ,they take on the form of sensations and universals1 terms and relations1 data and hypotheses4 ,this modification of function and form constitutes reason or1 better1 reasoning4 ,here some one will ask1 ,whence comes this ambiguity8 ,how can a mere perception or memory as such be ambiguous8 ,must it not be ambiguous to1 or for1 something1 or some one8 ,the point is well taken4 ,but it should not be taken to imply that the ambiguity is for a merely onlooking1 beholding psychical mind--especially when the perception is itself regarded as an act of beholding4 ,nor are we any better off if we suppose the beholding mind to be equipped with a faculty of reason in the form of the principle of contradiction4 ,for this throws no light on the origin and meaning of ambiguity4 ,and if we seek to make all perceptions as such ambiguous and contradictory1 in order to make room for1 and justify1 the operations of reason1 other difficulties at once beset us4 ,when we attempt to remove this specific ambiguity of perceptive conduct we shall be forced1 before we are through1 to appeal back to perception1 which we have condemned as inherently contradictory1 both for data and for verification4 ,however1 the insistence that perception must be ambiguous to1 or for1 something beyond itself is well grounded4 ,and this was recognized in the statement that it is equivocal as a stimulus in conduct4 ,there need be no mystery as to how such equivocation arises4 ,that there is such a thing as a conduct at all means that there are certain beings who have acquired definite ways of responding to one another4 ,it is important to observe that these forms of interaction--instinct and habit1 perception1 memory1 etc4--are not to be located in either of the interacting beings but are functions of both4 ,the conception of these operations as the private functions of an organism is the forerunner of the epistemological predicament4 ,it results in a conception of knowing as wholly the act of a knower apart from the known4 ,this is the beginning of epistemology4 ,but to whatever extent interacting beings have acquired definite and specific ways of behavior toward one another it is equally plain--the theory of external relations notwithstanding--that in this process of interaction these ways of behavior1 of stimulus and response1 undergo modification4 ,if the world consisted of two interacting beings1 it is conceivable that the modifications of behavior might occur in such close continuity of relation to each of the interacting beings that the adjustment would be very continuous1 and there might be little or no ambiguity and conflict4 ,but in a world where any two interacting beings have innumerable interactions with innumerable other beings and in all these interactions modifications are effected1 it is to be expected that changes in the behavior of each or both will occur1 so marked that they are bound to result in breaks in the continuity of stimulus and response--even to the point of tragedy4 ,however1 the tragedy is seldom so great that the ambiguity extends to the whole field of conduct4 ,except in extreme pathological cases 7and in epistemology71 complete skepticism and aboulia do not occur4 ,ambiguity always falls within a field or direction of conduct1 and though it may extend much further1 and must extend some further than the point at which equivocation occurs1 yet it is never ubiquitous4 ,an ambiguity concerning the action of gravitation is no less specific than one regarding color or sound2 indeed1 the one may be found to involve the other4 ,logical conduct is1 then1 conduct which aims to remove ambiguity and inhibition in unreflective conduct4 ,the instruments of its operation are forged from the processes of unreflective conduct by such modification and adaptation as is required to enable them to accomplish this end4 ,since these logical operations sometimes fail and sometimes succeed they become the subject-matter of logical theory4 ,but the technique of this second involution of reflection is not supplied by some new and unique entity4 ,it also is derived from modifications of previous operations of both reflective and non-reflective conduct4 ,while emphasizing the continuity between non-logical and logical operations1 we must keep in mind that their distinction is of equal importance4 ,confusion at this point is fatal4 ,a case in point is the confusion between non-logical and logical observation4 ,the results of non-logical observation1 e4g41 looking and listening1 are direct stimuli to further conduct4 ,but the purpose and result of logical observation are to secure data1 not as direct stimuli to immediate conduct but as stimuli to the construction or verification of hypotheses which are the responses of the logical operation of imagination to the data4 ,hypotheses are anticipatory4 ,but they differ from non-logical anticipation in that they are tentatively1 experimentally1 i4e41 logically anticipatory4 ,the non-logical operations of memory and anticipation lack just this tentative1 experimental character4 ,when we confuse the logical and non-logical operations of these processes the result is either that logical processes will merely repeat non-logical operations in which case we have inference that is tautologous and trifling2 or the non-logical will attempt to perform logical operations1 and our inference is miraculous4 ,if we seek to escape by an appeal to habit1 as in empiricism1 or to an objective universal1 as in idealism and neo-realism1 we are merely disguising1 not removing the miracle4 ,it may be thought that this confusion would be most likely to occur in a theory which teaches that non-logical processes are carried over into logical operations4 ,but this overlooks the fact that the theory recognizes at the same time that these non-logical operations undergo modification and adaptation to the demands of the logical enterprise4 ,on the other hand1 those who make all perceptions1 memory1 and anticipation1 not to speak of habit and instinct1 logical1 have no basis for the distinction between logical and non-logical results2 while those who refuse to give the operations of perception1 memory1 etc41 any place in logic can make no connections between logical and non-logical conduct4 ,nor are they able to distinguish in a specific case truth from error4 ,in all logics that fail to make this connection and distinction between logical and non-logical operations there is no criterion for data4 ,if ultimate simplicity is demanded of the data1 there is no standard for simplicity except the minimum sensibile or the minimum intelligibile which have recently been resurrected4 ,on the other hand1 where simplicity is waived1 as in the logic of objective idealism1 there is still no criterion of logical adequacy4 ,but if we understand by logical data not anything that happens to be given1 but something sought as material for an hypothesis1 i4e41 a proposed solution 7proposition7 of an ambiguous object of conduct and affection1 then whatever results of observation meet this requirement are logical data4 ,and whenever data are found from which an hypothesis is constructed that succeeds in abolishing the ambiguity1 they are simple1 adequate1 and true data4 ,no scientist1 not even the mathematician1 in the specific investigations of his field1 seeks for ultimate and irreducible data at large4 ,and if he found them he could not use them4 ,it is only in his metaphysical personality that he longs for such data4 ,the data which the scientist in any specific inquiry seeks are the data which suggest a solution of the question in which the investigation starts4 ,when these data are found they are the irreducibles of that problem4 ,but they are relative to the question and answer of the investigation4 ,their simplicity consists in the fact that they are the data from which a conclusion can be made4 ,the term simple data is tautologous4 ,that one is in need of data more simple means that one is in need of new data from which an hypothesis can be formed4 ,it is true that the actual working elements with which the scientist operates are always complex in the sense that they are always something more than elements in any specific investigation4 ,they have other connections and alliances4 ,and this complexity is at once the despair and the hope of the scientist2 his despair1 because he cannot be sure when these other connections will interfere with the allegiance of his elements to his particular undertaking2 his hope1 because when these alliances are revealed they often make the elements more efficient or exhibit capacities which will make them elements in some other undertaking for which elements have not been found4 ,a general resolves his army into so many marching1 eating1 shooting units2 but these elements are something more than marching1 shooting units4 ,they are husbands and fathers1 brothers and lovers1 protestants and catholics1 artists and artisans1 etc4 ,and the militarist can never be sure at what point these other activities--,i do not say merely external relationships--may upset his calculations4 ,if he could find units whose whole and sole nature is to march and shoot1 his problem would be1 in some respects1 simpler1 though in others more complex4 ,as it is1 he is constantly required to ask how far these other functions will support and at what point they will rebel at the marching and shooting4 ,such1 in principle1 is the situation in every scientific inquiry4 ,when the failure of the old elements occurs it is common to say that simpler elements are needed4 ,and doubtless in his perplexity the scientist may long for elements which have no entangling alliances1 whose sole nature and character is to be elements4 ,but what in fact he actually seeks in every specific investigation are elements whose nature and functions will not interfere with their serving as units in the enterprise in hand4 ,but from some other standpoint these new elements may be vastly more complex than the old1 as is the case with the modern as compared with the ancient atom4 ,when the elements are secured which operate successfully1 the non-interfering connections can be ignored and the elements can be treated as if they did not have them1--as if they were metaphysically simple4 ,but there is no criterion for metaphysical simplicity except operative simplicity4 ,to be simple is to serve as an element1 and to serve as an element is to be simple4 ,it is scarcely necessary in view of the foregoing to add that the data of science are not sense-data1 if by sense-data be meant data which are the result of the operations of sense organs alone4 ,data are as much or more the result of operations1 first1 of the motor system of the scientist's own organism1 and second1 of all of the machinery of his laboratory which he calls to his aid4 ,whether named after the way they are obtained1 or after the way they are used1 data are quite as much motor as sense4 ,nor1 on the other hand1 are there any purely intellectual data--not even for the mathematician4 ,some mathematicians may insist that their symbols and diagrams are merely stimuli to the platonic operation of pure and given universals4 ,but until mathematics can get on without these symbols or any substitutes the intuitionist in mathematics will continue to have his say4 ,wherever the discontinuity between logical operations and their acts persists1 all the difficulties with data have their correlative difficulties with hypotheses4 ,in ,mill's logic the account of the origin of hypotheses oscillates between the view that they are happy guesses of a mind composed of states of consciousness1 and the view that they are found in the facts or are impressed on the mind by the facts4 ,the miracle of relevancy required in the first position drives the theory to the second4 ,and the tautologous1 useless nature of the hypothesis in the second forces the theory back to the first view4 ,in this predicament1 little wonder ,mill finds that the easiest way out is to make hypotheses auxiliary and not indigenous to inference4 ,but this exclusion of hypotheses as essential leaves his account of inference to oscillate between the association of particulars of nominalism and scholastic formalism1 from both of which ,mill1 with the dignified zeal of a prophet1 set out to rescue logic4 ,mill's rejection of hypotheses formed by a mind whose operations have no discoverable continuity with the operations of things1 or by things whose actions are independent of the operations of ideas1 is forever sound4 ,but his acceptance of the discontinuity between the acts of knowing and the operation of things1 and the conclusion that these two conceptions of the origin and nature of hypotheses are the only alternatives1 were the source of most of his difficulties4 ,,iii ,the efforts of classic empiricism at the reform of logic have long been an easy mark for idealistic reformers4 ,but it is interesting to observe that the idealistic logic from the beginning finds itself in precisely the same predicament regarding hypotheses2--they are trifling or false4 ,and in the end they are made1 as in ,mill1 accidents of inference4 ,the part played by ,kant's sense-material and the categories is almost the reverse of those of data and hypothesis in science4 ,sense material and the categories are the given elements from which objects are somehow made2 in scientific procedure data and hypothesis are derived through logical observation and imagination from the content and operations of immediate experience4 ,in ,kant's account of the process by which objects are constructed we are nowhere in sight of any experimental procedure4 ,indeed1 the real act of knowing1 the selection and application of the category to the sense matter1 is1 as ,kant in the end had to confess1 hidden away in the depths of the soul4 ,made in the presence of the elaborate machinery of knowing which ,kant had constructed1 this confession is almost tragic2 and the tragic aspect grows when we find that the result of the hidden operation is merely a phenomenal object4 ,that this should be the case1 however1 is not strange4 ,a phenomenal object is the inevitable correlate of the hidden act of knowing whether in a transcendental or in an empirical logic4 ,in vain do we call the act of knowing constructive and synthetic if its method of synthesis is hidden4 ,a transcendental unity whose method is indefinable has no advantage over empirical association4 ,it was the dream of ,kant as of ,mill to replace the logics of sensationalism and rationalism with a logic of things and of truth4 ,but as ,mill's things turned to states of consciousness1 so ,kant's are phenomenal4 ,their common fate proclaims their common failure--the failure to reestablish continuity between the conduct of intelligence and other conduct4 ,one of the chief counts in ,hegel's indictment of ,kant's logic is that it had no influence on the methods of science4#ae ,hegel's explanation is that ,kant's categories have no genesis2 they are not constructed in and as part of logical operations4 ,as given1 ready-made1 their relevance is a miracle4 ,but if categories be generated in the process of knowing1 says ,hegel1 they are indigenous1 and their fitness is inevitable4 ,in such statements ,hegel raises expectations that we are at last to have a logic which squares with the procedure of science4 ,but when we discover that instead of being generated out of all the material involved in the scientific problem ,hegel's categories are derived from each other1 misgivings arise4 ,and when we further learn that this genesis is timeless1 which means that1 after all1 the categories stand related to each other in a closed1 eternal system of implication1 we abandon hope of a scientific--i4e41 experimental--logic4 ,hegel also says it is the business of philosophy to substitute categories or in more precise language adequate notions for the several modes of feeling1 perception1 desire1 and will4 ,the word substitute reveals the point at issue4 ,if to substitute means that philosophy is a complete exchange of the modes of feeling1 perception1 desire1 and will for a world of categories or notions1 then1 saying nothing of the range of values in such a world1 the problem of the meaning of adequate is on our hands4 ,what is the notion to be adequate to8 ,but if to substitute means that the modes of feeling1 perception1 desire1 and will1 when in a specific situation of ambiguity and inhibition1 go over into1 take on1 the modes of data and hypothesis in the effort to get rid of inhibiting conflict that is quite another matter4 ,here the notion1 as the scientific hypothesis1 has a criterion for its adequacy4 ,but if the notion usurps the place of feeling1 perception1 desire1 and will1 as many find1 in the end1 it does in ,hegel's logic1 it thereby loses all tests for the adequacy of its function and character as a notion4 ,in the development of the logical doctrines of ,kant and ,hegel by ,lotze1 ,green1 ,sigwart1 ,bradley1 ,bosanquet1 ,royce1 and others1 there are indeed differences4 ,but these differences only throw their common ground into bolder relief4 ,this common ground is that1 procedure by hypotheses1 by induction1 is1 in the language of ,professor ,bosanquet1 a transient and external characteristic of inference4#af ,and the ground of this verdict is essentially the same as ,mill's1 when he rejects hypotheses made by the mind1 namely1 that such hypotheses are too subjective in their origin and nature to have objective validity4 ,objective idealism is trying1 like ,mill1 to escape the subjectivism of the purely individual and psychical knower4 ,but1 being unable to reconstruct the finite knower1 and being too sophisticated to make what it regards as ,mill's naive appeal to hypotheses found in things1 it transfers the real process of inference to the objective universal1 and the process of all thought1 including inference1 is now defined as the reproduction1 by a universal presented in a content1 of contents distinguished from the presented content which also are differences of the same universal4#ag ,it need scarcely be said that in inference thus defined there is scant room for hypotheses4 ,there is nothing hypothetical1 experimental1 or tentative in this process of reproduction by the objective universal as such4 ,as little is there any possibility of error4 ,if there is anything hypothetical1 or any possibility of error1 in inference1 it is due to the temporal1 finite human being in which1 paradoxically enough1 this process of reproduction goes on and to whom1 at times1 is given an infinitesimal part in the operation1 while at other times he is said merely to witness it4 ,but the real inference does not proceed by hypotheses2 it is only the finite mind in witnessing the real logical spectacle or in its infinitesimal contribution to it that lamely proceeds in this manner4 ,here1 again1 we have the same break in continuity between the finite1 human act of knowing and the operations that constitute the real world4 ,when the logic of the objective universal rejects imputations of harboring a despoiled psychical knower it has in mind1 of course1 the objective universal as knower1 not the finite1 human act4 ,but1 if the participations of the latter are all accidents of inference1 as they are said to be1 its advantage over a purely psychical knower1 or states of consciousness1 is difficult to see4 ,the rejection of metaphysical dualism is of no consequence if the logical operations of the finite1 human being are only accidents of the real logical process4 ,as already remarked1 the metaphysical disjunction is merely a schematism of the more fundamental1 logical disjunction4 ,as for tautology and miracle1 the follower of ,mill might well ask3 how an association of particulars1 whether mental states or things1 could be more tautologous than a universal reproducing its own differences8 ,and if the transition from particular to particular is a miracle in which the grace of ,god is disguised as habit1 why is not habit as good a disguise for ,providence as universals8 ,moreover1 by what miracle does the one all-inclusive universal become a universal8 ,and since perception always presents a number of universals1 what determines which one shall perform the reproduction8 ,finally1 since there are infinite differences of the universal that might be reproduced1 what determines just which differences shall be reproduced8 ,in this wise the controversy has gone on ever since the challenge of the old rationalistic logic by the nominalists launched the issue of empiricism and rationalism4 ,all the charges which each makes against the other are easily retorted upon itself4 ,each side is resistless in attack1 but helpless in defense4 ,in a conception of inference in which both data and hypothesis are regarded as the tentative1 experimental results of the processes of perception1 memory1 and constructive imagination engaged in the special task of removing conflict1 ambiguity1 and inhibition1 and in which these processes are not conceived as the functions of a private mind nor of an equally private brain and nervous system1 but as functions of interacting beings1--in such a conception there is no ground for anxiety concerning the simplicity of data1 nor the objectivity of hypotheses4 ,simplicity and objectivity do not have to be secured through elaborate and labored metaphysical construction4 ,the data are simple and the hypothesis objective in so far as they accomplish the work where unto they are called--the removal of conflict1 ambiguity1 and inhibition in conduct and affection4 ,in the experimental conception of inference it is clear that the principles of formal logic must play their role wholly inside the course of logical operations4 ,they do not apply to relations between these operations and reality2 nor to reality itself4 ,formal identity and non-contradiction signify1 in experimental logic1 the complete correlativity of data and hypothesis4 ,they mean that in the logical procedure data must not be shifted without a corresponding change in the hypothesis and conversely4 ,the doctrine that theoretically there may be any number of hypotheses for the same facts is1 when these multiple hypotheses are anything more than different names or symbols1 nothing less than the very essence of formal contradiction4 ,it doubtless makes little difference whether a disease be attributed to big or little1 black or red1 demons or whether the cause be represented by a1 b1 or c1 etc4 ,but where data and hypotheses are such as are capable of verification1 i4e41 of mutually checking up each other1 a change in one without a corresponding modification of the other is the principle of all formal fallacies4#ah ,with this conception of the origin1 nature1 and functions of logical operations little remains to be said of their truth and falsity4 ,if the whole enterprise of logical operation1 of the construction and verification of hypothesis1 is in the interest of the removal of ambiguity1 and inhibition in conduct1 the only relevant truth or falsity they can possess must be determined by their success or failure in that undertaking4 ,the acceptance of this view of truth and error1 be it said again1 depends on holding steadfastly to the conception of the operations of knowing as real acts1 which1 though having a distinct character and function1 are yet in closest continuity with other acts of which indeed they are but modifications and adaptations in order to meet the logical demand4 ,here1 perhaps1 is the place for a word on truth and satisfaction4 ,the satisfaction which marks the truth of logical operations--intellectual satisfaction--is the satisfaction which attends the accomplishment of their task1 viz41 the removal of ambiguity in conduct1 i4e41 in our interaction with other beings4 ,it does not mean that this satisfaction is bound to be followed by wholly blissful consequences4 ,all our troubles are not over when the distress of ambiguity is removed4 ,it may be indeed that the verdict of the logical operation is that we must face certain death4 ,very well1 we must have felt it to be good to know the worst1 or no inquiry would have been started4 ,we should have deemed ignorance bliss and sat with closed eyes waiting for fate to overtake us instead of going forward to meet it and in some measure determine it4 ,death anticipated and accepted is realiter very different from death that falls upon us unawares1 however we may estimate that difference4 ,if this distinction in the foci of satisfaction is kept clear it must do away with a large amount of the hedonistic interpretations of satisfaction in which many critics have indulged4 ,but hereupon some one may exclaim1 as did a colleague recently3 ,welcome to the ranks of the intellectualists6 ,if so1 the experimentalist is bound to reply that he is as willing1 and as unwilling1 to be welcomed to the ranks of intellectualism as to those of anti-intellectualism4 ,he wonders1 however1 how long the welcome would last in either4 ,among the intellectualists the welcome would begin to cool as soon as it should be discovered that the ambiguity to which logical operations are the response is not regarded by the experimentalist as a purely intellectual affair4 ,it is an ambiguity in conduct with all the attendant affectional values that may be at stake4#ai ,it is1 to be sure1 the fact of ambiguity1 and the effort to resolve it1 that adds the intellectual1 logical character to conduct and to affectional values4 ,but if the logical interest attempts entirely to detach itself it will soon be without either subject-matter or criterion4 ,and if it sets itself up as supreme1 we shall be forced to say that our quandaries of affection1 our problems of life and death are merely to furnish occasions and material for logical operations4 ,on the other hand1 the welcome of the anti-intellectualists is equally sure to wane when the experimentalist asserts that the doctrine that logical operations mutilate the wholeness of immediate experience overlooks the palpable fact that it is precisely these immediate experiences--the experiences of intuition and instinct--that get into conflict and inhibit and mutilate one another1 and as a consequence are obliged to go into logical session to patch up the mutilation and provide new and better methods of cooeperation4 ,at this point the weakness in ,bergson's view of logical operations appears4 ,bergson1 too1 is impressed by the break in continuity between logical operations and the rest of experience4 ,but with ,mr4 ,bradley he believes this breach to be essentially incurable1 because the mutilations and disjunctions are due to and introduced by logical operations4 ,just why the latter are introduced remains in the end a mystery4 ,both1 to be sure1 believe that logical operations are valuable for practical purposes1--for action4 ,but1 aside from the question of how operations essentially mutilative can be valuable for action1 immediate intuitional experience being already in unity with ,reality1 why should there be any practical need for logical operations--least of all such as introduce disjunction and mutilation8 ,the admission of a demand for logical operations1 whether charged to matter1 the devil1 or any other metaphysical adversary1 is1 of course1 a confession that conflict and ambiguity are as fundamental in experience as unity and immediacy and that logical operations are therefore no less indigenous4 ,the failure to see this implication is responsible for the paradox that in the logic of ,creative ,evolution the operations of intelligence are neither creative nor evolutional4 ,they not only have no constructive part but are positively destructive and devolutional4 ,since1 moreover1 these logical operations1 like those of the objective universal1 and like ,mill's association of particulars1 can only reproduce in fragmentary form what has already been done1 it is difficult to see how they can meet the demands of action4 ,for here no more than in ,mill1 or in the logic of idealism1 is there any place for constructive hypotheses or any technique by which they can become effective4 ,whatever ,creative ,evolution may be1 there is no place in its logic for ,creative ,intelligence4 ,,iv ,the prominence in current discussion of the logical reforms proposed by the analytic logic of the neo-realistic movement and the enthusiastic optimism of its representatives over the prospective results of these reforms for logic1 science1 and practical life are the warrant for devoting a special section to their discussion4 ,there are indeed some marked differences of opinion among the expounders of the new logic concerning the results which it is expected to achieve4 ,some find that it clears away incredible accumulations of metaphysical lumber2 others rejoice that it is to restore metaphysics1 once the queen of the sciences1 to her ancient throne4 ,but whatever the difference among the representatives of analytical logic all seem agreed at the outset on two fundamental reforms which the new logic makes4 ,these are3 first1 that analytic logic gets rid entirely of the act of knowing1 the retention of which has been the bane of all other logics2 second1 in its discovery of terms and relations1 sense-data and universals as the simple elements not only of logic but of the world1 it furnishes science at last with the simple neutral elements at large which it is supposed science so long has sought1 and mourned because it found them not4 ,taking these in order1 we are told that realism frees logic as a study of objective fact from all accounts of the states and operations of mind4 444 ,logic and mathematics are sciences which can be pursued quite independently of the study of knowing4#bj ,the new logic believes that it deals with no such entities as thoughts1 ideas1 or minds1 but with entities that merely are4#bj ,the motive for the banishment of the act of knowing from logic is that as an act knowing is mental1 psychological1 and subjective4#ba ,all other logics have indeed realized this subjective character of the act of knowing1 but have neither dared completely to discard it nor been able sufficiently to counteract its effects even with such agencies as the objective universal to prevent it from infecting logic with its subjectivity4 ,because logic has tolerated and attempted to compromise with this subjective act of knowing1 say these reformers1 it has been forced constantly into epistemology and has become a hybrid science4 ,had logic possessed the courage long ago to throw overboard this subjective ,jonah it would have been spared the storms of epistemology and the reefs of metaphysics4 ,analytic logic is the first attempt in the history of modern logical theory at a deliberate1 sophisticated exclusion of the act of knowing from logic4 ,other logics1 to be sure1 have tried to neutralize the effects of its presence1 but none has had the temerity to cast it bodily overboard4 ,the experiment1 therefore1 is highly interesting4 ,we should note at the outset that in regarding the act of knowing as incurably psychical and subjective analytic logic accepts a fundamental premise of the logics of rationalism1 empiricism1 and idealism which it seeks to reform4 ,it is true that it is the bold proposal of analytic logic to keep logic out of the pit of epistemology by excluding the act of knowing from logic4 ,nevertheless analytic logic still accepts the subjective character of this act2 and if it excludes it from its logic it welcomes it in its psychology4 ,this is a dangerous situation4 ,can the analytic logician prevent all osmosis between his logic and his psychology8#bb ,if not1 and if the psychological act is subjective1 woe then to his logic4 ,had the new logic begun with a bold challenge of the psychical character of the act of knowing1 the prospect of a logic free from epistemology would have been much brighter4 ,with the desire to rid logic of the epistemological taint the experimental logic of the pragmatic movement has the strongest sympathy4 ,but the proposal to effect this by the excision of the act of knowing appears to experimental logic to be a case of heroic but fatal surgery4 ,prima facie a logic with no act of knowing presents an uncanny appearance4 ,what sort of logical operations are possible in such a logic and of what kind of truth and falsity are they capable8 ,before taking up these questions in detail it is worth while to note the character of the entities that merely are with which analytic logic proposes exclusively to deal4 ,in their general form they are terms and propositions1 sense-data and universals4 ,we are struck at once by the fact that these entities bear the names of logical operations4 ,they are1 to be sure1 disguised as entities and have been baptised in a highly dilute solution of objectivity called subsistence4 ,but this does not conceal their origin1 nor does it obscure the fact that if it is possible for any entities that merely are to have logical character those made from hypostatized processes of logical operations should be the most promising4 ,they might be expected to retain some vestiges of logical character even after they have been torn from the process of inquiry and converted into entities that merely are4 ,also it is not surprising that having stripped the act of knowing of its constituent operations analytic logic should feel that it can well dispense with the empty shell called mind and1 as ,professor ,dewey says1 wish it on psychology4 ,but if the analytic logician be also a philosopher and perchance a lover of his fellow-man1 it is hard to see how he can have a good conscience over this disposition of the case4 ,turning now to the character of inference and of truth and falsity which are possible in a logic which excludes the operation of knowing and deals only with entities that are1 all the expounders seem to agree that in such a logic inference must be purely deductive4 ,all alleged induction is either disguised deduction or a lucky guess4 ,this raises apprehension at the start concerning the value of analytic logic for other sciences4 ,but let us observe what deduction in analytic logic is4 ,we begin at once with a distinction which involves the whole issue4#bc ,we are asked to carefully distinguish logical deduction from psychological deduction4 ,the latter is the vulgar meaning of the term1 and is the thinker's name for his own act of conforming his thought to the objective and independent processes that constitute the real logical process4 ,this act of conforming the mind is a purely psychological affair4 ,it has no logical function whatever4 ,in what the conforming consists is not clear4 ,it seems to be merely the act of turning the psychological eye on the objective logical process4 ,one beholds it 7the logical process7 as one beholds a star1 a river1 a character in a play4444 ,the novelist and the dramatist1 like the mathematician and logician1 are onlookers at the logical spectacle4#bd ,on the other hand1 the term conforming suggests a task1 with the possibilities of success and failure4 ,have we1 then1 two wholly independent possibilities of error--one merely psychological1 the other logical8 ,the same point may be made even more obviously with reference to the term beholding4 ,the term is used as if beholding were a perfectly simple act1 having no problems and no possibilities of mistakes--as if there could be no mis-beholding4#be ,but fixing our psychological eye on the logical spectacle1 what does it behold8 ,a universal generating an infinite series of identical instances of itself--i4e41 instances which differ only in logical position4 ,if in a world of entities that merely are the term generation causes perplexity1 the tension is soon relieved2 for this turns out to be a merely subsistential non-temporal generation which1 like ,hegel's generation of the categories1 in no way compromises a world of entities that merely are4 ,steering clear of the thicket of metaphysical problems that we here encounter1 let us keep to the logical trail4 ,first it is clear that logical operations are of the same reproductive repetitive type that we have found in the associational logic of empiricism1 and in the logic of the objective universal4 ,indeed1 after objective idealism has conceded that the finite mind merely witnesses or at most contributes only in an infinitesimal degree to the logical activity of the objective universal1 what remains of the supposed gulf between absolute idealism and analytic realism8 ,it follows1 of course1 that there can be no place in analytic logic for procedure by hypotheses4 ,however1 it is to the credit of some analytic logicians that they see this and frankly accept the situation instead of attempting to retain hypotheses by making them accidents or mere auxiliaries of inference4 ,on the other hand1 others find that the chief glory of analytic logic is precisely that it gives thought wings#bf for the free construction of hypotheses4 ,in his lectures on ,scientific ,methods in ,philosophy ,mr4 ,russell calls some of the most elemental and sacred entities of analytic logic convenient fictions4 ,this retention of hypotheses at the cost of cogency is of course in order to avoid a break with science4 ,those who see that there is no place in analytic logic for hypotheses are equally anxious to preserve their connections with science4 ,hence they boldly challenge the superstition that science has anything to do with hypotheses4 ,newton's ,hypotheses non fingo should be the motto of every conscientious scientist who dares trust his own perceptions and disregard the ukase of idealism4 ,the theory of mental construction is the child of idealism1 now put out to service for the support of its parents4 ,theory is no longer regarded in science as an hypothesis added to the observed facts1 but a law which is found in the facts4#bg ,the identity of this with ,mill's doctrine of hypotheses as found in things is obvious4 ,as against the conception of hypotheses as free1 winged1 constructions of a psychical1 beholding1 gossiping mind we may well take our stand with those who would exclude such hypotheses from science4 ,and this doubtless was the sort of mind and sort of hypotheses ,newton meant when he said ,hypotheses non fingo4#bh ,but had ,newton's mind really been of the character which he1 as a physicist1 had learned from philosophers to suppose it to be1 and had he really waited to find his hypotheses ready-made in the facts1 there never would have been any dispute about who discovered the calculus1 and we should never have been interested in what ,newton said about hypotheses or anything else4 ,what ,newton did is a much better source of information on the part hypotheses play in scientific method than what he said about them4 ,the former speaks for itself2 the latter is the pious repetition of a metaphysical creed made necessary by the very separation of mind from things expressed in the statement quoted4 ,logically there is little to choose between hypotheses found ready-made in the facts and those which are the winged constructions of a purely psychical mind4 ,both are equally useless in logic and in science4 ,one makes logic and science trifling1 the other makes them miraculous4 ,but if hypotheses be conceived not as the output of a cloistered psychical entity but as the joint product of all the beings and operations involved in the specific situation in which logical inquiry originates1 and more particularly in all those involved in the operations of the inquiry itself 7including all the experimental material and apparatus which the inquiry may require71 we shall have sufficient continuity between hypotheses and things to do away with miracle1 and sufficient reconstruction to avoid inference that is trifling4 ,it is1 however1 the second contribution of analytic logic that is the basis of the enthusiasm over its prospective value for other sciences4 ,this is the discovery that terms and propositions1 sense-data1 and universals1 are not only elements of logical operation but are the simple1 neutral elements at large which science is supposed to have been seeking4 ,as the botanist analyzes the structures of the vegetable organism and finds chemical compounds of which they are built so the ordinary chemist analyzes these compounds into their elements1 but does not analyze these4 ,the physical chemist analyzes these elemental atoms1 as now appears1 into minuter components which he in turn must leave to the mathematicians and logicians further to analyze4#bi ,again it is worth noting that this mutation of logical into ontological elements seems to differ only in position from the universal logicism of absolute idealism4 ,what are these simple elements into which the mathematician and logician are to analyze the crude elements of the laboratory8 ,and how are these elements to be put into operation in the laboratory8 ,let us picture an analytic logician meeting a physical scientist at a moment when the latter is distressed over the unmanageable complexity of his elements4 ,will the logician say to the scientist3 ,your difficulty is that you are trusting too much to your mundane apparatus4 ,the kingdom of truth cometh not with such things4 ,forsake your microscopes1 test tubes1 refractors and resonators1 and follow me1 and you shall behold the truly simple elements of which you have dreamed48 ,and when the moment of revelation arrives and the expectant scientist is solemnly told that the simple elements which he has sought so long are terms and propositions1 sense-data and universals1 is it surprising that he does not seem impressed8 ,will he not ask3 ,what am ,i to do with these in the specific difficulties of my laboratory8 ,shall ,i say to the crude and complex elements of my laboratory operations3 ',be ye resolved into terms and propositions1 sense-data and universals'2 and will they forthwith obey this incantation and fall apart so that ,i may locate and remove the hidden source of my difficulty8 ,are you not mocking me and deceiving yourself with the old ontological argument8 ,your 'simple' elements--are they anything but the hypostatized process by which elements may be found8#cj ,the expounders as well as the critics of analytic logic have agreed that it reaches its most critical junction when it faces the problem of truth and error4 ,there is no doubt that the logic of objective idealism1 in other respects so similar to analytic logic1 has at this point an advantage2 for it retains just enough of the finite operation of knowing--an infinitesimal part will answer--to furnish the culture germs of error4 ,but analytic logic having completely sterilized itself against this source of infection is in serious difficulty4 ,here again it is ,professor ,holt who has the courage to follow--or shall we say behold8--his theory as it generates the doctrine that error is a given objective opposition of forces entirely independent of any such thing as a process of inquiry and all that such a process presupposes4 ,all collisions between bodies1 all inference between energies1 all process of warming and cooling1 of starting and stopping1 of combining and separating1 all counterbalancings1 as in cantilevers and gothic vaultings1 are contradictory forces which can be stated only in propositions that manifestly contradict each other4#ca ,but the argument proves too much4 ,for in the world of forces to which we have here appealed there is no force which is not opposed by others and no particle which is not the center of opposing forces4 ,hence error is ubiquitous4 ,in making error objective we have made all objectivity erroneous4 ,we find ourselves obliged to say that the choir of ,westminster ,abbey1 the ,brooklyn bridge1 the heads on our shoulders are all supported by logical errors6 ,following these illustrations of ontological contradictions there is indeed this interesting statement3 ,nature is so full of these mutually negative processes that we are moved to admiration when a few forces cooeperate long enough to form what we call an organism4#cb ,the implication is1 apparently1 that as an opposition of forces is error1 cooeperation of forces is truth4 ,but what is to distinguish opposition from cooeperation8 ,in the illustration it is clear that opposing forces--error--do not interfere with cooeperative forces--truth4 ,where should we find more counterbalancing1 more starting and stopping1 warming and cooling1 combining and separating than in an organism8 ,and if these processes can be stated only in propositions that are manifestly contradictory1 are we to understand that truth has errors for its constituent elements8 ,such paradoxes have always delighted the soul of absolute idealism4 ,but1 as we have seen1 only the veil of an infinitesimal finitude intervenes between the logic of the objective universal of absolute idealism and the objective logic of analytic realism4 ,it is1 of course1 this predicament regarding objective truth and error that has driven most analytic logicians to recall the exiled psychological1 mental act of knowing4 ,it had to be recalled to provide some basis of distinction between truth and error1 but1 this act having already been conceived as incurably subjective1 the result is only an exchange of dilemmas4 ,for the reinstatement of this act ipso facto reinstates the epistemological predicament to get rid of which it was first banished from logic4 ,earnest efforts to escape this outcome have been made by attaching the act of knowing to the nervous system1 and this is a move in the right direction4 ,but so far the effort has been fruitless because no connection has been made between the knowing function of the nervous system and its other functions4 ,the result is that the cognitive operation of the nervous system1 as of the psychical mind1 is that of a mere spectator2 and the epistemological problem abides4 ,an onlooking nervous system has no advantage over an onlooking mind4 ,onlooking1 beholding may indeed be a part of a genuine act of knowing4 ,but in that act it is always a stimulus or response to other acts4 ,it is one of them2--never a mere spectator of them4 ,it is when the act of knowing is cut off from its connection with other acts and finds itself adrift that it seeks metaphysical lodgings4 ,and this it may find either in an empty psychical mind or in an equally empty body4#cc ,if1 in reinstating the act of knowing as a function of the nervous system1 neo-realism had recognized the logical significance of the fact that the nervous system of which knowing is a function is the same nervous system of which loving and hating1 desiring and striving are functions and that the transition from these to the operations of inquiry and knowing is not a capricious jump but a transition motived by the loving and hating1 desiring and striving--if this had been recognized the logic of neo-realism would have been spared its embarrassments over the distinction of truth and error4 ,it would have seen that the passage from loving and hating1 desiring and striving to inquiry and knowing is made in order to renew and reform specific desires and strivings which1 through conflict and consequent equivocation1 have become fruitless and vain2 and it must have seen that the results of the inquiry are true or false as they succeed or fail in this reformation and renewal4 ,but once more1 it must steadily be kept in view that while the loving and hating1 desiring and striving1 which the logical operations are reforming and renewing1 are functions of the nervous system1 they are not functions of the nervous system alone1 else the door of subjectivism again closes upon us4 ,loving and hating1 desiring and striving have their objects4 ,hence any reformation of these functions involves no less a reformation of their objects4 ,when therefore we say that truth and error are relevant to desires and strivings1 this means relevant to them as including their objects1 not as entitized processes 7such are the pitfalls of language7 inclosed in a nervous system or mind4 ,with this before us the relevance of truth and error to desires and strivings can never be made the basis for the charge of subjectivism4 ,the conception of desires as peculiarly individual and subjective is a survival of the very isolation which is the source of the difficulty with truth and error4 ,hence the appeal to this isolation1 made alike by idealism and realism1 in charging instrumental logic with subjectivism is an elementary petitio4 ,doubtless it will be urged again that the act of knowing is motived by an independent desire and striving of its own4 ,this is of course consonant with the neo-realistic atomism1 however inconsonant it may be with the conception of implication which it employs4 ,if we take a small enough1 isolated segment of experience we can find meaning for this notion1 as we may for the idea that the earth is flat and that the sun moves around the earth4 ,but as consequences accrue we find as great difficulties with the one as with the other4 ,if the course of events did not bring us to book1 if we could get off with a mere definition of truth and error we might go on piling up subsistential definitional logics world without end4 ,but sublime adventurers1 logically unregenerate and uninitiated1 will go on sailing westward to the confusion and confounding of all definitional systems that leave them out of account4 ,the conclusion is plain4 ,if logic is to have room in its household for both truth and error1 if it is to avoid the old predicament of knowledge that is trifling or miraculous1 tautologous or false1 if it is to have no fear of the challenge of other sciences or of practical life1 it must be content to take for its subject-matter the operations of intelligence conceived as real acts on the same metaphysical plane and in strictest continuity with other acts4 ,such a logic will not fear the challenge of science1 for it is precisely this continuity that makes possible experimentation1 which is the fundamental characteristic of scientific procedure4 ,science without experiment is indeed a strange apparition4 ,it is a ,greek3 logos with no ,greek3 legein1 a science with no scire2 and this spells dogmatism4 ,how necessary such continuity is to experimentation is apparent when we recall that there is no limit to the range of operations of every sort which scientific experiment calls into play2 and that unless there be thoroughgoing continuity between the logical demand of the experiment and all the materials and devices employed in the process of the experiment1 the operations of the latter in the experiment will be either miraculous or ruinous4 ,finally1 if this continuity of the operations of intelligence with other operations be essential to science1 its relation to practical life is ipso facto established4 ,for science is practical life aware of its problems and aware of the part that experimental--i4e41 creative--intelligence plays in the solution of those problems4 ,,intelligence ,,and ,,mathematics ,,harold ,,chapman ,,brown ,herbart is said to have given the deathblow to faculty psychology4 ,man no longer appears endowed with volition1 passion1 desire1 and reason2 and logic1 deprived of its hereditary right to elucidate the operations of inherent intelligence1 has the new problem of investigating forms of intelligence in the making4 ,this is no inconsequential task4 ,if man originally possesses only capacities which after a given amount of education will produce ideas and judgments 7,thorndike1 ,educational ,psychology1 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #aih71 and if these ideas and judgments are to be substituted for a mythical intelligence it follows that tracing their development and observing their functioning renders clearer our conception of their nature and value and brings us nearer that exact knowledge of what we are talking about in which the philosopher at least aspires to equal the scientist1 however much he may fall below his ideal4 ,for contemporary thought concerning the mathematical sciences this altered point of view generates peculiarly pressing problems4 ,mathematicians have weighed the old logic and found it wanting4 ,they have builded themselves a new logic more adequate to their ends4 ,but they have not whole-heartedly recognized the change that has come about in psychology2 hence they have retained the faculty of intelligence knit into certain indefinables such as implication1 relation1 class1 term1 and the like1 and have transported the faculty from the human soul to a mysterious realm of subsistence whence it radiates its ghostly light upon the realm of existence below4 ,but while they reproach the old logic1 often bitterly1 their new logic merely furnishes a more adequate show-case in which already attained knowledge may be arranged to set off its charms for the observer in the same way that specimens in a museum are displayed before an admiring world4 ,this statement is not a sweeping condemnation1 however1 for such a setting forth is not useless4 ,it resembles the classificatory stage of science which1 although not itself in the highest sense creative1 often leads to higher stages by bringing under observation relations and facts that might otherwise have escaped notice4 ,and in the realm of pure mathematics1 the new logic has undoubtedly contributed in this manner to such discoveries4 ,danger appears when the logician attains ,cartesian intoxication with the beauty of logico-mathematical form and tries to infer from the form itself the real nature of the formed material4 ,the realm of subsistence too often has armed ,indefinables with metaphysical myths whose attack is valiant when the doors of reflection are opened4 ,it may be possible1 however1 to arrive at an understanding of mathematics without entering the kingdom of these warriors4 ,it is the essence of science to make prediction possible4 ,the value of prediction lies in the fact that through this function man can control his environment1 or1 at worst1 fortify himself to meet its vagaries4 ,to attain such predictions1 however1 the world need not be grasped in its full concreteness4 ,hence arise processes of abstraction4 ,while all other symptoms remain unnoticed1 the temperature and pulse may mark a disease1 or a barometer-reading the weather4 ,the physicist may work only in terms of quantity in a world which is equally truly qualitative4 ,all that is necessary is to select the elements which are most effective for prediction and control4 ,such selection gives the principle that dominates all abstractions4 ,progress is movement from the less abstract to the more abstract1 but it is progress only because the more abstract is as genuinely an aspect of the concrete starting-point as anything is4 ,moreover1 the outcome of progress of this sort cannot be definitely foreseen at the beginnings4 ,the simple activities of primitive men have to be spontaneously performed before their value becomes evident4 ,only afterwards can they be cultivated for the sake of their value1 and then only can the self-conscious cultivation of a science begin4 ,the process remains full not only of perplexities1 but of surprises2 men's activities lead to goals far other than those which appear at the start4 ,these goals1 however1 never deny the method by which the start is made4 ,developed intelligence is nothing but skill in using a set of concepts generated in this manner4 ,in this sense the histories of all human endeavors run parallel4 ,where the empirical bases of a science are continually in the foreground1 as in physics or chemistry1 the foregoing formulation of procedure is intelligible and acceptable to most men4 ,mathematics seem1 however1 to stand peculiarly apart4 ,many1 with ,descartes1 have delighted in them on account of the certitude and evidence of their reasonings and recognized their contribution to the advancement of mechanical arts4 ,but since the days of ,kant even this value has become a problem1 and many a young philosophic student has the question laid before him as to why it is that mathematics1 a purely conceptual science1 can tell us anything about the character of a world which is1 apparently at least1 free from the idiosyncrasies of individual mind4 ,it may be that mathematics began in empirical practice1 such philosophers admit1 but they add that1 somehow1 in its later career1 it has escaped its lowly origin4 ,now it moves in the higher circles of postulated relations and arbitrarily defined entities to which its humble progenitors and relatives are denied the entree4 ,parvenus1 however1 usually bear with them the mark of history1 and in the case of this one1 at least1 we may hope that the history will be sufficient to drag it from the affectations of its newly acquired set and reinstate it in its proper place in the workaday world4 ,for the sake of this hope1 we shall take the risk of being tedious by citing certain striking moments of mathematical progress2 and then we shall try to interpret its genuine status in the world of working truths4 ,i ,,beginnings ,,of ,,arithmetic ,,and ,,geometry ,the most primitive mathematical activity of man is counting1 but here his first efforts are lost in the obscurity of the past4 ,the lower races1 however1 yield us evidence that is not without value4 ,although the savage mind is not identical with the mind of primitive man1 there is much in the activities of undeveloped races that can throw light upon the behavior of peoples more advanced4 ,we must be careful in our inferences1 however4 ,among the ,australians and ,south ,americans there are peoples whose numerical systems go little1 or not at all1 beyond the first two or three numbers4 ,it has been inferred from this1 writes ,professor ,boas 7,mind of ,primitive ,man1 pp4 #aeb-ec71 that the people speaking these languages are not capable of forming the concept of higher numbers4444 ,people like the ,south ,american ,indians1 444 or like the ,esquimo 444 are presumably not in need of higher numerical expressions1 because there are not many objects that they have to count4 ,on the other hand1 just as soon as these same people find themselves in contact with civilization1 and when they acquire standards of value that have to be counted1 they adopt with perfect ease higher numerals from other languages1 and develop a more or less perfect system of counting4444 ,it must be borne in mind that counting does not become necessary until objects are considered in such generalized form that their individualities are entirely lost sight of4 ,for this reason it is possible that even a person who owns a herd of domesticated animals may know them by name and by their characteristics1 without even desiring to count them4 ,and there is one other false interpretation to be avoided4 ,man does not feel the need of counting and then develop a system of numerals to meet the need4 ,such an assumption is as ridiculous as to assume prehistoric man thinking to himself3 ,i must speak1 and then inventing voice culture and grammar to make speaking pleasant and possible4 ,rather1 when powers of communication are once attained1 presumably in their beginnings also without forethought1 man being still more animal than man1 there were gradually dissociated communications of a kind approaching what numbers mean to us4 ,but the number is not yet a symbol apart from that of the things numbered4 ,picture writing1 re-representing the things meant1 preceded developmentally any kind of symbolization representing the number by mere one-one correspondence with non-particularized symbols4 ,it is plausible1 although ,i have no anthropological authority for the statement1 that the prevalence of finger words as number symbols 7cf4 infra7 is originally a consequence of the fact that our organization makes the hand the natural instrument of pointing4 ,the difficulty of passing from concrete representations to abstract symbols has been keenly stated by ,conant 7,the ,number ,concept1 pp4 #gb-gc71 although his terminology is that of an old psychology and the limitations implied for the primitive mind are limitations of practice rather than of capacity as ,mr4 ,conant seems to believe4 ,an abstract conception is something quite foreign to the essentially primitive mind1 as missionaries and explorers have found to their chagrin4 ,the savage can form no mental concept of what civilized man means by such a word as soul2 nor would his idea of the abstract number #e be much clearer4 ,when he says five1 he uses1 in many cases at least1 the same word that serves him when he wishes to say hand2 and his mental concept when he says five is a hand4 ,the concrete idea of a closed fist1 of an open hand with outstretched fingers1 is what is uppermost in his mind4 ,he knows no more and cares no more about the pure number #e than he does about the law of conservation of energy4 ,he sees in his mental picture only the real1 material image1 and his only comprehension of the number is1 these objects are as many as the fingers on my hand4 ,then1 in the lapse of the long interval of centuries which intervene between lowest barbarism and highest civilization1 the abstract and concrete become slowly dissociated1 the one from the other4 ,first the actual hand picture fades away1 and the number is recognized without the original assistance furnished by the derivation of the word4 ,but the number is still for a long time a certain number of objects1 and not an independent concept4 ,an excellent fur trader's story1 reported to me by ,mr4 ,dewey1 suggests a further impulse to count besides that given by the need of keeping a tally1 namely1 the need of making one thing correspond to another in a business transaction4 ,the ,indian laid down one skin and the trader two dollars2 if he proposed to count several skins at once and pay for all together1 the former replied too much cheatem4 ,the result1 however1 demanded a tally either by the fingers1 a pebble1 or a mark made in the sand1 and as the magnitude of such transactions grows the need of a specific number symbol becomes ever more acute4 ,the first obstacle1 then1 to overcome--and it has already been successfully passed by many primitive peoples--is the need of fortuitous attainment of a numerical symbol1 which is not the mere repeated symbol of the things numbered4 ,significantly1 this symbol is usually derived from the hand1 suggesting gestures of tallying1 and not from the words of already developed language4 ,consequently1 number words relate themselves for the most part to the hand1 and written number symbols1 which are among the earliest writings of most peoples1 tend to depict it as soon as they have passed beyond the stage mentioned above of merely repeating the symbol of the things numbered4 ,w4 ,c4 ,eells1 in writing of the ,number ,systems of the ,north ,american ,indians 7,am4 ,math4 ,mo41 ,nov41 #aiac2 pp4 #bfc-gb71 finds clear linguistic evidence for a digital origin in about #dj of the languages examined4 ,of the non-digital instances1 #a was sometimes connected with the first personal pronoun1 #b with roots meaning separation1 #c1 rarely1 meaning more1 or plural as distinguished from the dual1 just as the ,greek uses a plural as well as a dual in nouns and verbs1 #d is often the perfect1 complete right4 ,it is often a sacred number and the base of a quarternary system4 ,conant 7loc4 cit4 p4 #ih7 also gives a classification of the meanings of simple number words for more advanced languages2 and even in them the hand is constantly in evidence1 as in #e1 the hand2 #aj1 two hands1 half a man1 when fingers and toes are both considered1 or a man1 when the hands alone are considered2 #bj1 one man1 two feet4 ,the other meanings hang upon the ideas of existence1 piece1 group1 beginning1 for #a2 and repetition1 division1 and collection for higher numerals4 ,a peculiar difficulty lies in the fact that when once numbering has become a self-conscious effort1 the collection of things to be numbered frequently tends to exceed the number of names that have become available4 ,sometimes the difficulty is met by using a second man when the fingers and toes of the first are used up1 sometimes by a method of repetition with the record of the number of the repetition itself added to the numerical significance of the whole process4 ,hence arise the various systems of bases that occur in developed mathematics4 ,but the inertia to be overcome in the recognition of the base idea is nowhere more obvious than in the retention by the comparatively developed ,babylonian system of a second base of #fj to supplement the decimal one for smaller numbers4 ,among the ,american ,indians 7,eells1 loc4 cit47 the system of bases used varies from the cumbersome binary scale1 that exercised such a fascination over ,leibniz 7,opera1 ,,iii1 p4 #cdf71 through the rare ternary1 and the more common quarternary to the natural quinary1 decimal1 and vigesimal systems derived from the use of the fingers and toes in counting4 ,the achievement of a number base and number words1 however1 does not always open the way to further mathematical development4 ,only too often a complexity of expression is involved that almost immediately cuts off further progress4 ,thus the ,youcos of the ,amazon cannot get beyond the number three1 for the simplest expression for the idea in their language is pzettarrarorincoaroac 7,conant1 loc4 cit41 pp4 #ade1 #hc1 #ec74 ,such names as #ii1 tongo solo manani nun solo manani 7i4e41 #aj1 understood1 #e plus #d times1 and #e plus #d7 of the ,soussous of ,sierra ,leone2 #cii1 caxtolli onnauh poalli ipan caxtolli onnaui 7#ae plus #d times #bj plus #ae plus #d7 of the ,aztec2 #bi1 wick a chimen ne nompah sam pah nep e chu wink a 7,sioux71 make it easy to understand the proverb of the ,yorubas of ,abeokuta1 ,you may be very clever1 but you can't tell #i times #i4 ,almost contemporaneously with the beginnings of counting various auxiliary devices were introduced to help out the difficult task4 ,in place of many men1 notched sticks1 knotted strings1 pebbles1 or finger pantomime were used4 ,in the best form1 these devices resulted in the abacus2 indeed1 it was not until after the introduction of arabic numerals and well into the ,renaissance period that instrumental arithmetic gave way to graphical in ,europe 7,d4 ,e4 ,smith1 ,rara ,arithmetica1 under ,counters74 ,in eastern ,europe1 say ,smith and ,mikami 7,japanese ,mathematics1 pp4 #ah-ai71 it--the abacus--has never been replaced1 for the tschotue is used everywhere in ,russia to-day1 and when one passes over into ,persia the same type of abacus is common in all the bazaars4 ,in ,china the swan-pan is universally used for the purposes of computation1 and in ,japan the soroban is as strongly entrenched as it was before the invasion of western ideas4 ,given1 then1 the idea of counting1 and a mechanical device to aid computation1 it still remains necessary to obtain some notation in which to record results4 ,at the early dawn of history the ,egyptians seem to have been already possessed of number signs 7cf4 ,cantor1 ,gesch4 de4 ,math41 p4 #dd7 and the ,phoenicians either wrote out their number words or used a few simple signs1 vertical1 horizontal1 and oblique lines1 a process which the ,arabians perpetuated up to the beginning of the eleventh century 7,fink1 p4 #ae72 the ,greeks1 as early as #fjj ,b4 ,c41 used the initial letters of words for numbers4 ,but speaking generally1 historical beginnings of ,european number signs are too obscure to furnish us good material4 ,our ,indians have few number symbols other than words1 but when they occur 7cf4 ,eells1 loc4 cit47 they usually take the form of pictorial presentation of some counting device such as strokes1 lines dotted to suggest a knotted cord1 etc4 ,indeed1 the smaller ,roman numerals were probably but a pictorial representation of finger symbols4 ,however1 a beautiful concrete instance is furnished us in the ,japanese mathematics 7cf4 ,smith and ,mikami1 ,ch4 ,,iii74 ,the earliest instrument of reckoning in ,japan seems to have been the rod1 ,ch'eou1 adapted from the ,chinese under the name of ,chikusaku 7bamboo rods7 about #fjj ,a4 ,d4 ,at first relatively large 7measuring rods871 they became reduced to about #ab cm41 but from their tendency to roll were quickly replaced by the sangi 7square prisms1 about #g mm4 thick and #e cm4 long7 and the number symbols were evidently derived from the use of these rods3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 ,for the sake of clearness1 tens1 hundreds1 etc41 were expressed in the even place by horizontal instead of vertical lines and vice versa2 thus #abfg would be formed - 4 - ,the rods were arranged on a sort of chessboard called the swan-pan4 ,much later the lines were transferred to paper1 and a circle used to denote the vacant square4 ,the use of squares1 however1 rendered it unnecessary to arrange the even places differently from the odd1 so numbers like #chjeg came to be written ---------------------------------- ---------------------------------- instead of ---------------------------------- - - - - - - - - ---------------------------------- as in the earlier notation4 ,somewhere in the course of these early mathematical activities the process has changed from the more or less spontaneous operating that led primitive man to the first enunciation of arithmetical ideas1 and has become a self-conscious striving for the solution of problems4 ,this change had already taken place before the historical origins of arithmetic are met4 ,thus1 the treatise of ,ahmes 7#bjjj ,b4 ,c47 contains the curious problem3 #g persons each have #g cats2 each cat eats #g mice2 each mouse eats #g ears of barley2 from each ear #g measures of corn may grow2 how much grain has been saved8 ,such problems are1 however1 half play1 as appears in a ,leonardo of ,pisa version some #cjjj years later3 #g old women go to ,rome2 each woman has #g mules2 each mule1 #g sacks2 each sack contains #g loaves2 with each loaf are #g knives2 each knife is in #g sheaths4 ,similarly in ,diophantus' epitaph 7#ccj ,a4 ,d473 ,diophantus passed #a_/f of his life in childhood1 #a_/ab in youth1 and #a_/g more as a bachelor2 #e years after his marriage1 was born a son who died #d years before his father at #a_/b his age4 ,often among peoples such puzzles were a favorite social amusement4 ,thus ,braymagupta 7#fbh ,a4 ,d47 reads1 ,these problems are proposed simply for pleasure2 the wise man can invent a thousand others1 or he can solve the problems of others by the rules given here4 ,as the sun eclipses the stars by its brilliancy1 so the man of knowledge will eclipse the fame of others in assemblies of the people if he proposes algebraic problems1 and still more if he solves them 7,cajori1 ,hist4 of ,math41 p4 #ib74 ,the limitation of these early methods is that the notation merely records and does not aid computation4 ,and this is true even of such a highly developed system as was in use among the ,romans4 ,if the reader is unconvinced1 let him attempt some such problem as the multiplication of ,,cccxvi by ,,cccclxviii1 expressing it and carrying it through in ,roman numerals1 and he will long for the abacus to assist his labors4 ,it was the positional arithmetic of the ,arabians1 of which the origins are obscure1 that made possible the development of modern technique4 ,of this discovery1 or rediscovery from the ,hindoos1 together with the zero symbol1 ,cajori 7,hist4 of ,math41 p4 #aa7 has said of all mathematical discoveries1 no one has contributed more to the general progress of intelligence than this4 ,the notation no longer merely records results1 but now assists in performing operations4 ,the origins of geometry are even more obscure than those of arithmetic4 ,not only is geometry as highly developed as arithmetic when it first appears in occidental civilization1 but1 in addition1 the problems of primitive peoples seem to have been such that they have developed no geometrical formulae striking enough to be recorded by investigators1 so far as ,i have been able to discover4 ,but just as the commercial life of the ,phoenicians early forced them self-consciously to develop arithmetical calculation1 so environmental conditions seem to have forced upon the ,egyptians a need for geometrical considerations4 ,it is almost platitudinous to quote ,herodotus' remark that the invention of geometry was necessary because of the floods of the ,nile1 which washed away the boundaries and changed the contours of the fields4 ,and as ,proclus ,diadochus adds 7,procli ,diadochi1 in primum ,euclidis elementorum librum commentarii--quoted ,cantor1 ,i1 p4 #abe73 ,it is not surprising that the discovery of this as well as other sciences has sprung from need1 because everything in the process of beginning proceeds from the incomplete to the complete4 ,there takes place a suitable transition from sensible perception to thoughtful consideration and rational knowledge4 ,just as with the ,phoenicians1 for the sake of business and commerce1 an exact knowledge of numbers had its beginning1 so with the ,egyptians1 for the above-mentioned reasons1 was geometry contrived4 ,the earliest ,egyptian mathematical writing that we know is that of ,ahmes 7#bjjj ,b4 ,c471 but long before this the mural decorations of the temple wall involved many figures1 the construction of which involved a certain amount of working knowledge of such operations as may be performed with the aid of a ruler and compass4 ,the fact that these operations did not earlier lead to geometry1 as ruler and compass work seems to have done in ,japan in the nineteenth century 7,smith and ,mikami1 index1 ,geometry71 is probably due to the stage at which the development of ,egyptian intelligence had arrived1 feebly advanced on the road to higher abstract thinking4 ,it is everywhere characteristic of ,egyptian genius that little purely intellectual curiosity is shown4 ,even astronomical knowledge was limited to those determinations which had religious or magically practical significance1 and its arithmetic and geometry never escaped these bounds as with the more imaginative ,pythagoreans1 where mystical interpretation seems to have been a consequence of rather than a stimulus to investigation4 ,an old ,egyptian treatise reads 7,cantor1 p4 #fc73 ,i hold the wooden pin 7,nebi7 and the handle of the mallet 7semes71 ,i hold the line in concurrence with the ,goddess ,sa4fech4 ,my glance follows the course of the stars4 ,when my eye comes to the constellation of the great bear and the time of the number of the hour determined by me is fulfilled1 ,i place the corner of the temple4 ,this incantation method could hardly advance intelligence2 but the methods of practical measuring were more effective4 ,here the rather happy device of using knotted cords1 carried about by the ,harpedonapts1 or cord stretchers1 was of some moment4 ,especially1 the fact that the lengths #c1 #d1 and #e1 brought into triangular form1 served for an interesting connection between arithmetic and the right triangle1 was not a little gain1 later making possible the discovery of the ,pythagorean theorem1 although in ,egypt the theoretical properties of the triangle were never developed4 ,the triangle obviously must have been practically considered by the decorators of the temple and its builders1 but the cord stretchers rendered clear its arithmetical significance4 ,however1 ,ahmes' ,rules for attaining the knowledge of all dark things 444 all secrets that are contained in objects 7,cantor1 loc4 cit41 p4 #bb7 contains merely a mixture of all sorts of mathematical information of a practical nature1--rules for making a round fruit house1 rules for measuring fields1 rules for making an ornament1 etc41 but hardly a word of arithmetical and geometrical processes in themselves1 unless it be certain devices for writing fractions and the like4 ,,ii ,,the ,,progress ,,of ,,self-,,conscious ,,theory ,a characteristic of ,greek social life is responsible both for the next phase of the development of mathematical thought and for the misapprehension of its nature by so many moderns4 ,when ,archytas and ,menaechmus employed mechanical instruments for solving certain geometrical problems1 ',plato1' says ,plutarch1 'inveighed against them with great indignation and persistence as destroying and perverting all the good that there is in geometry2 for the method absconds from incorporeal and intellectual or sensible things1 and besides employs again such bodies as require much vulgar handicraft3 in this way mechanics was dissimilated and expelled from geometry1 and being for a long time looked down upon by philosophy1 became one of the arts of war4' ,in fact1 manual labor was looked down upon by the ,greeks1 and a sharp distinction was drawn between the slaves who performed bodily work and really observed nature1 and the leisured upper classes who speculated1 and often only knew nature by hearsay4 ,this explains much of the naive dreamy and hazy character of ancient natural science4 ,only seldom did the impulse to make experiments for oneself break through2 but when it did1 a great progress resulted1 as was the case of ,archytas and ,archimedes4 ,archimedes1 like ,plato1 held that it was undesirable for a philosopher to seek to apply the results of science to any practical use2 but1 whatever might have been his view of what ought to be in the case1 he did actually introduce a large number of new inventions 7,jourdain1 ,the ,nature of ,mathematics1 pp4 #ah-ai74 ,following the ,greek lead1 certain empirically minded modern thinkers construe geometry wholly from an intellectual point of view4 ,history is read by them as establishing indubitably the proposition that mathematics is a matter of purely intellectual operations4 ,but by so construing it1 they have1 in geometry1 remembered solely the measuring and forgotten the land1 and1 in arithmetic1 remembered the counting and forgotten the things counted4 ,arithmetic experienced little immediate gain from its new association with geometry1 which was destined to be of momentous import in its latter history1 beyond the discovery of irrationals 7which1 however1 were for centuries not accepted as numbers71 and the establishment of the problem of root-taking by its association with the square1 and interest in negative numbers4 ,the ,greeks had only subtracted smaller numbers from larger1 but the ,arabs began to generalize the process and had some acquaintance with negative results1 but it was difficult for them to see that these results might really have significance4 ,n4 ,chuquet1 in the fifteenth century1 seems to have been the first to interpret the negative numbers1 but he remained a long time without imitators4 ,michael ,stifel1 in the sixteenth century1 still calls them ,numeri absurdi as over against the ,numeri veri4 ,however1 their geometrical interpretation was not difficult1 and they soon won their way into good standing4 ,but the case of the imaginary is more striking4 ,the need for it was first felt when it was seen that negative numbers have no square roots4 ,chuquet had dealt with second-degree equations involving the roots of negative numbers in #adhd1 but says these numbers are impossible1 and ,descartes 7,geom41 #afcg7 first uses the word imaginary to denote them4 ,their introduction is due to the ,italian algebrists of the sixteenth century4 ,they knew that the real roots of certain algebraic equations of the third degree are represented as results of operations effected upon impossible numbers of the form a b sqrt-#a 7where a and b are real numbers7 without it being possible in general to find an algebraic expression for the roots containing only real numbers4 ,cardan calculated with these impossibles1 using them to get real results 7#e sqrt-#ae7 7#e - sqrt-#ae7 #be - 7-#ae7 #dj1 but adds that it is a quantitas quae vere est sophistica and that the calculus itself adeo est subtilis ut est inutilis4 ,in #afbi1 ,girard announced the theorem that every complete algebraic equation admits of as many roots1 real or imaginary1 as there are units in its degree1 but ,gauss first proved this in #agii1 and finally1 in his ,theory of ,complex ,quantity1 in #ahca4 ,geometry1 however1 among the ,greeks passed into a stage of abstraction in which lines1 planes1 etc41 in the sense in which they are understood in our elementary texts1 took the place of actually measured surfaces1 and also took on the deductive form of presentation that has served as a model for all mathematical presentation since ,euclid4 ,mensuration smacked too much of the exchange1 and before the time of ,archimedes is practically wholly absent4 ,even such theorems as that the area of a triangle equals half the product of its base and its altitude is foreign to ,euclid 7cf4 ,cajori1 p4 #ci74 ,lines were merely directions1 and points limitations from which one worked4 ,but there was still dependence upon the things that one measures4 ,euclid's elements1 when examined in the light of strict mathematical logic1 444 has been pronounced by ,c4 ,s4 ,peirce to be ',riddled with fallacies' 7,cajori1 p4 #cg74 ,not logic1 but observation of the figures drawn1 that is1 concrete symbolization of the processes indicated1 saves ,euclid from error4 ,roman practical geometry seems to have come from the ,etruscans1 but the ,roman here is as little inventive as in his arithmetical ventures1 although the latter were stimulated somewhat by problems of inheritance and interest reckoning4 ,indeed1 before the entrance of ,arabic learning into ,europe and the translation of ,euclid from the ,arabic in #aabj1 there is little or no advance over the ,egyptian geometry of #fjj ,b4 ,c4 ,even the universities neglected mathematics4 ,at ,paris in #accf a rule was introduced that no student should take a degree without attending lectures on mathematics1 and from a commentary on the first six books of ,euclid1 dated #aecf1 it appears that candidates for the degree of ,a4 ,m4 had to give an oath that they had attended lectures on these books4 ,examinations1 when held at all1 probably did not extend beyond the first book1 as is shown by the nickname 'magister matheseos' applied to the ,theorem of ,pythagoras1 the last in the first book4444 ,at ,oxford1 in the middle of the fifteenth century1 the first two books of ,euclid were read 7,cajori1 loc4 cit41 p4 #acf74 ,but later geometry dropped out and not till #afai was a professorship of geometry instituted at ,oxford4 ,roger ,bacon speaks of ,euclid's fifth proposition as elefuga1 and it also gets the name of pons asinorum from its point of transition to higher learning4 ,as late as the fourteenth century an ,english manuscript begins ,nowe sues here a ,tretis of ,geometri whereby you may knowe the hegte1 depnes1 and the brede of most what erthely thynges4 ,the first significant turning-point lies in the geometry of ,descartes4 ,viete 7#aedj-afjc7 and others had already applied algebra to geometry1 but ,descartes1 by means of cooerdinate representation1 established the idea of motion in geometry in a fashion destined to react most fruitfully on algebra1 and through this1 on arithmetic1 as well as enormously to increase the scope of geometry4 ,these discoveries are not1 however1 of first moment for our problem1 for the ideas of mathematical entities remain throughout them the generalized processes that had appeared in ,greece4 ,it is worth noting1 however1 that in ,england mechanics has always been taught as an experimental science1 while on the ,continent it has been expanded deductively1 as a development of a priori principles4 ,,iii ,,contemporary ,,thought ,,in ,,arithmetic ,,and ,,geometry ,to develop the complete history of arithmetic and geometry would be a task quite beyond the limits of this paper1 and of the writer's knowledge4 ,in arithmetic we were able to observe a stage in which spontaneous behavior led to the invention of number names and methods of counting4 ,then1 by certain speculative and play impulses1 there arose elementary arithmetical problems which began to be of interest in themselves4 ,geometry here also comes into consideration1 and1 in connection with positional number symbols1 begin those interactions between arithmetic and geometry that result in the forms of our contemporary mathematics4 ,the complex quantities represented by number symbols are no longer merely the necessary results of analyzing commercial relations or practical measurements1 and geometry is no longer directly based upon the intuitively given line1 point1 and plane4 ,if number relations are to be expressed in terms of empirical spatial positions1 it is necessary to construct many imaginary surfaces1 as is done by ,riemann in his theory of functions1 a construction representing the type of imagination which ,poincare has called the intuitional in contradistinction to the logical 7,value of ,science1 ,ch4 ,i74 ,and geometry has not only been led to the construction of many non-,euclidian spaces1 but has even1 with ,peano and his school1 been freed from the bonds of any necessary spatial interpretation whatsoever4 ,to trace in concrete detail the attainment of modern refinements of number theory would likewise exhibit nothing new in the building up of mathematical intelligence4 ,we should find1 here1 a process carried out without thought of the consequences1 there1 an analogy suggesting an operation that might lead us beyond a difficulty that had blocked progress2 here1 a play interest leading to a combination of symbols out of which a new idea has sprung2 there1 a painstaking and methodical effort to overcome a difficulty recognized from the start4 ,it is rather for us now to ask what it is that has been attained by these means1 to inquire finally what are those things called number and line in the broad sense in which the terms are now used4 ,in so far as the cardinal number at least is concerned1 the answer generally accepted by ,dedekind1 ,peano1 ,russell1 and such writers is this3 the number is a class of similar classes 7,whitehead and ,russell1 ,prin4 ,math41 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #d74 ,to the interpretation of this answer1 ,mr4 ,russell1 the most self-consciously philosophical of these mathematicians1 has devoted his full dialectic skill4 ,the definition has at least the merit of being free from certain arbitrary psychologizing that has vitiated many earlier attempts at the problem4 ,mr4 ,russell claims for it 7#a7 that the formal properties which we expect cardinal numbers to have result from it2 7#b7 that unless we adopt this definition or some more complicated and practically equivalent definition1 it is necessary to regard the cardinal number of a class as indefinable 7loc4 cit41 p4 #d74 ,that the definition's terms1 however1 are not without obscurity appears in ,mr4 ,russell's struggles with the zigzag theory1 the no-class theory1 etc41 and finally in his taking refuge in the theory of logical types 7loc4 cit41 ,vol4 ,,iii1 ,part ,v4 ,e471 whereby the contradiction that subverted ,frege and drove ,mr4 ,russell from the standpoint of the ,principles of ,mathematics is finally overcome4 ,the second of ,mr4 ,russell's claims for his definition adds nothing to the first1 for it merely asserts that unless we adopt some definition of the cardinal number from which its formal properties result1 number is undefined4 ,any such definition would be1 ipso facto1 a practical equivalent of the first4 ,we need only consider whether or not the formal properties of numbers clearly follow from this definition4 ,mr4 ,russell's own experience makes us hesitate4 ,when he first adopted this definition from ,frege1 he was led to make the inference that the class of all possible classes might furnish a type for a greatest cardinal number4 ,but this led to nothing but paradox and contradiction4 ,the obvious conclusion was that something was wrong with the concept of class1 and the obvious way out was to deny the possibility of any such all-inclusive class4 ,just why there should be such limitation1 except that it enables one to escape the contradiction1 is not clear from ,mr4 ,russell's analysis 7cf4 ,brown1 ,the ,logic of ,mr4 ,russell1 ,journ4 of ,phil41 ,psych41 and ,sci4 ,meth41 ,vol4 ,,viii1 ,no4 #d1 pp4 #he-hi74 ,furthermore1 to pass to the theory of types on this ground is to give up the value of the first claim for the definition 7quoted above71 since the formal properties of numbers now merely follow from the definition because the terms of the definition are reinterpreted from the properties of number1 so that these properties will follow from it4 ,the definition has become circular4 ,the real difficulty lies in the concept of the class4 ,dogmatic realism is prone to find here an entity for which1 as it is obviously not a physical thing1 a home must be provided in some region of being4 ,hence arises the realm of subsistence1 as for ,plato the world of facts duplicated itself in a world of ideas4 ,but the subsistent realm of the mathematician is even more astounding than the ideal realm of ,plato1 for the latter world is a prototype of the world of things1 while the world of the mathematician is peopled by all sorts of entities that never were on land or sea4 ,the transfinite numbers of ,cantor have1 without doubt1 a definite mathematical meaning1 but they have no known representatives in the world of things1 nor in the imagination of man1 and in spite of the efforts of philosophers it may even be doubted whether an entity correlative to the mathematical infinite has ever been or can ever be specified4 ,mr4 ,russell now teaches that classes are merely symbolic 7,sci4 ,meth4 in ,phil41 p4 #bjh71 but this expression still needs elucidation4 ,it does1 to be sure1 avoid the earlier difficulty of admitting new and mysterious metaphysical entities 7loc4 cit41 p4 #bjd71 but the feeling of oddity that accompanies it seems not without significance4 ,what can be meant by a merely symbolic class of similar classes themselves merely symbolical8 ,i do not know1 unless it is that we are to throw overboard the effort aimed at arbitrary and creative definition and proceed in simple inductive and interpretative fashion4 ,with classes as entities abandoned1 we are left1 until we have passed to a new point of view as to arithmetical entities1 in the position of the intelligent ignoramus who defined a stock market operation as buying what you can't get with money you never had1 and selling what you never owned for more than it was ever worth4 ,the situation seems to be that we are now face to face with new generalizations4 ,just as number symbols arose to denote operations gone through in counting things when attention is diverted from the particular characteristics of the things counted1 and remained a symbol for those operations with things1 so now we are becoming self-conscious of the character of the operations we have been performing and are developing new symbols to express possible operations with operations4 ,the infinity of the number series expresses the fact that it is possible to continue the enumerating process indefinitely1 and when we are asked by certain mathematicians to practise ourselves in such thoughts as that for infinite series a proper part can be the equal of the whole1 where equality is defined through the establishment of one-one correspondence1 we are really merely informed that among the group of symbols used to denote the concrete steps of an ever open counting process are groups of symbols that can be used to indicate operations that are of the same type as the given one in so far as the characteristic of being an open series is concerned4 ,if there were anywhere an infinity of things to count1 an unintelligible supposition1 it would by no means be true that any selection of things from that series would be the equivalent of all things in the series1 except in so far as equivalence meant that they could be arranged in the same type of series as that from which they were drawn4 ,similarly the mathematical conception of the continuum is nothing but a formulation of the manner in which the cuts of a line or the numbers of a continuous series must be chosen so that there shall remain no possible cut or number of which the choice is not indicated4 ,correspondence is reached between elements of such series when the corresponding elements can be reached by an identical process4 ,it seems to me1 however1 a mistake to identify the number continuum with the linear continuum1 for the latter must include the irrational numbers1 whereas the irrational number can never represent a spatial position in a series4 ,for example1 the sqrt#b is by nature a decimal involving an infinite1 i4e41 an ever increasing1 number of digits to express it and1 by virtue of the infinity of these digits1 they can never be looked upon as all given4 ,it is then truly a number1 for it expresses a genuine numerical operation1 but it is not a position1 for it cannot be a determinate magnitude but merely a quantity approaching a determinate magnitude as closely as one may please4 ,that is1 without its complete expression1 which would be analogous to the self-contradictory task of finding a greatest cardinal number1 there can be no cut in the line which is symbolized by it4 ,but the operations of translating algebraic expressions into geometrical ones and vice versa 7operations which are so important in physical investigations7 are facilitated by the notion of a one to one correspondence between number and space4 ,when we pass to the transfinite numbers1 we have nothing in the ,alephs but the symbols of certain groupings of operations expressible in ordinary number series4 ,and the many forms of numbers are all simply the result of recognizing value in naming definite groups of operations of a lower level1 which may itself be a complication of processes indicated by the simple numerical signs4 ,to create such symbols is by no means illegitimate and no paradox results in any forms as long as we remember that our numbers are not things but are signs of operations that may be performed directly upon things or upon other operations4 ,for example1 let us consider such a symbol as sqrt-#e4 -#e signifies the totality of a counting process carried on in an opposite sense from that denoted by #e4 ,to take the square root is to symbolize a number1 the totality of an operation1 such that when the operation denoted by multiplying it by itself is performed the result is #e4 ,consequently the sqrt-#e is merely the symbol of these processes combined in such a way that the whole operation is to be considered as opposite in some sense to that denoted by sqrt#e4 ,hence1 an easy method for the representation of such imaginaries is based on the principle of analytic geometry and a system of co-ordinates4 ,the nature of this last generalization of mathematics is well shown by ,mr4 ,whitehead in his monumental ,universal ,algebra4 ,the work begins with the definition of a calculus as ,the art of manipulating substitutive signs according to fixed rules1 and the deduction therefrom of true propositions 7loc4 cit41 p4 #d74 ,the deduction itself is really a manipulation according to rules1 and the truth consists essentially in the results being actually derived from the premises according to rule4 ,following ,stout1 substitutive signs are characterized thus3 a word is an instrument for thinking about the meaning which it expresses2 a substitutive sign is a means of not thinking about the meaning which it symbolizes4 ,mathematical symbols have1 then1 become substitutive signs4 ,but this is only possible because they were at an early stage of their history expressive signs1 and the laws which connected them were derived from the relations of the things for which they stood4 ,first it became possible to forget the things in their concreteness1 and now they have become mere terms for the relations that had been generalized between them4 ,consequently1 the things forgotten and the terms treated as mere elements of a relational complex1 it is possible to state such relational complexes with the utmost freedom4 ,but this does not mean that mathematics can be created in a purely arbitrary fashion4 ,the mark of its origin is upon it in the need of exhibiting some existing situation through which the non-contradictory character of its postulates can be verified4 ,the real advantage of the generalization is that of all generalizations in science1 namely1 that by looking away from practical applications 7as appears in a historical survey7 results are frequently obtained that would never have been attained if our labor had been consciously limited merely to those problems where the advantages of a solution were obvious4 ,so the most fantastic forms of mathematics1 which themselves seem to bear no relation to actual phenomena1 just because the relations involved in them are the relations that have been derived from dealing with an actual world1 may contribute to the solutions of problems in other forms of calculus1 or even to the creation of new forms of mathematics4 ,and these new forms may stand in a more intimate connection with aspects of the real world than the original mathematics4 ,in #ahcf-ci there appeared in the ,gelehrte ,schriften der ,universitaet ,kasan1 ,lobatchewsky's epoch-making ,new ,elements of ,geometry1 with a ,complete ,theory of ,parallels4 ,after proving that if a straight line falling on two other straight lines make the alternate angles equal to one another1 the two straight lines shall be parallel to one another1 ,euclid1 finding himself unable to prove that in every other case they were not parallel1 assumed it in an axiom4 ,but it had never seemed obvious4 ,lobatchewsky's system amounted merely to developing a geometry on the basis of the contradictory axiom1 that through a point outside a line an indefinite number of lines can be drawn1 no one of which shall cut a given line in that plane4 ,in #ahcb-cc1 similar results were attained by ,johann ,bolyai in an appendix to his father's ,tentamen juventutem studiosam in elementa matheseosos purae 444 introducendi entitled ,the ,science of ,absolute ,space4 ,in #ahbd the dissertation of ,riemann1 under ,gauss1 introduced the idea of an n-ply extended magnitude1 or a study of n-dimensional manifolds and a new road was opened for mathematical intelligence4 ,at first this new knowledge suggested all sorts of metaphysical hypotheses4 ,if it is possible to build geometries of n-dimensions or geometries in which the axiom of parallels is no longer true1 why may it not be that the space in which we make our measurements and on which we base our mechanics is some one of these non-,euclidian spaces8 ,and indeed many experiments were conducted in search of some clue that this might be the case4 ,such experiments in relation to curved spaces seemed particularly alluring1 but all have turned out to be fruitless in results4 ,failure leads to investigation of the causes of failure4 ,if our space had been some one of these spaces how would it have been possible for us to know this fact8 ,the traditional definition of a straight line has never been satisfactory from a physical point of view4 ,to define it as the shortest distance between two points is to introduce the idea of distance1 and the idea of distance itself has no meaning without the idea of straight line1 and so the definition moves in a vicious circle4 ,on the metaphysical side1 ,lotze 7,metaphysik1 p4 #bdi7 and others 7,merz1 ,history of ,european ,thought in the ,nineteenth ,century1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 p4 #gaf7 criticized these attempts1 on the whole justly1 but the best interpretation of the situation has been given by ,poincare4 ,two lines of thought now lead to a recasting of our conceptions of the fundamental notions of geometry4 ,on the one hand1 that very investigation of postulates that had led to the discovery of the apparently strange non-,euclidian geometries was easily continued to an investigation of the simplest basis on which a geometry could be founded4 ,then by reaction it was continued with similar methods in dealing with algebra1 and other forms of analysis1 with the result that conceptions of mathematical entities have gradually emerged that represent a new stage of abstraction in the evolution of mathematics1 soon to be discussed as the dominating conceptions in contemporary thought4 ,on the other hand1 there also developed the problem of the relations of these geometrical worlds to one another1 which has been primarily significant in helping to clear up the relations of mathematics in its pure and applied forms4 ,geometry passed through a stage of abstraction like that examined in connection with arithmetic4 ,beginning with the discovery of non-,euclidian geometry1 it has been becoming more and more evident that a line need not be a name for an aspect of a physical object such as the ridge-pole line of a house and the like1 nor even for the more abstract mechanical characteristic of direction of movement2--although the persistency with which intuitionally minded geometers have sought to adapt such illustrations to their needs has somewhat obscured this fact4 ,however1 even a cursory examination of a modern treatise on geometry makes clear what has taken place4 ,for example1 ,professor ,hilbert begins his ,grundlagen der ,geometrie1 not with definition of points1 lines1 and planes1 but with the assumption of three different systems of things 7,dinge7 of which the first1 called points1 are denoted ,a1 ,b1 ,c1 etc41 second1 called straight lines 7,gerade71 are denoted a1 b1 c1 etc41 and the third1 called planes1 are denoted by ,greek3 alpha1 ,greek3 beta1 ,greek3 gamma1 etc4 ,the relations between these things then receive genaue und vollstaendige ,beschreibung through the axioms of the geometry4 ,and the fact that these things are called points1 lines1 and planes is not to give to them any of the connotations ordinarily associated with these words further than are determined by the axiom groups that follow4 ,indeed1 other geometers are even more explicit on this point4 ,thus for ,peano 7,i ,principii di ,geometria1 #ahhi7 the line is a mere class of entities1 the relations amongst which are no longer concrete relations but types of relations4 ,the plane is a class of classes of entities1 etc4 ,and an almost unlimited number of examples1 about which the theorems of the geometry will express truths1 can be exhibited1 not one of which has any close resemblance to spatial facts in the ordinary sense4 ,philosophers1 it seems to me1 have been slow to recognize the significance of the step involved in this last phase of mathematical thought4 ,we have been so schooled in an arbitrary distinction between relations and concepts1 that while long familiar with general ideas of concepts1 we are not familiar with generalized ideas of relations4 ,yet this is exactly what mathematics is everywhere presenting4 ,a transition has been made from relations to types of relations1 so that instead of speaking in terms of quantitative1 spatial and temporal relations1 mathematicians can now talk in terms of symmetrical1 asymmetrical1 transitive1 intransitive relational types and the like4 ,these present1 however1 nothing but the empirical character that is common to such relations as that of father and son2 debtor and creditor2 master and servant2 a is to the left of b1 b of c2 c of d2 a is older than b1 b than c1 c than d1 etc4 ,hence this is not abandonment of experience but a generalization of it1 which results in a calculus potentially applicable not only to it but also to other subject-matter of thought4 ,indeed1 if it were not for the possibility of this generalization1 the almost unlimited applicability of diagrams1 so useful in the classroom1 to illustrate everything from the nature of reality to the categorical imperative1 as well as to the more technical usages of the psychological and social sciences1 would not be understandable4 ,it would be a paradox1 however1 if starting out from processes of counting and measuring1 generalizations had been attained that no longer had significance for counting or measuring1 and the non-,euclidian hyper-dimensional geometries seem at first to present this paradox4 ,but1 as the outcome of our second line of thought proves1 this is not the case4 ,the investigation of the relations of different geometrical systems to each other has shown 7cf4 ,brown1 ,the ,work of ,h4 ,poincare1 ,journ4 of ,phil41 ,psy41 and ,sci4 ,meth41 ,vol4 ,,xi1 ,no4 #i1 p4 #bbi7 that these different systems have a correspondence with one another so that for any theorem stated in one of them there is a corresponding theorem that can be stated in another4 ,in other words1 given any factual situation that can be stated in ,euclidian geometry1 the aspect treated as a straight line in the ,euclidian exposition will be treated as a curve in the non-,euclidian1 and a situation treated as three-dimensional by ,euclid's methods can be treated as of any number of dimensions when the proper fundamental element is chosen1 and vice versa1 although of course the element will not be the line or plane in our empirical usage of the term4 ,this is what ,poincare means by saying that our geometry is a free choice1 but not arbitrary 7,the ,value of ,science1 ,pt4 ,,iii1 ,ch4 ,x1 ,sec4 #c71 for there are many limitations imposed by fact upon the choice1 and usually there is some clear indication of convenience as to the system chosen1 based on the fundamental ideal of simplicity4 ,it is evident1 then1 that geometry and arithmetic have been drawing closer together1 and that to-day the distinction between them is somewhat hard to maintain4 ,the older arithmetic had limited itself largely to the study of the relations involved in serial orders as suggested by counting1 whereas geometry had concerned itself primarily with the relations of groups of such series to each other when the series1 or groups of series1 are represented as lines or planes4 ,but partly by interaction in analytic geometry1 and partly in the generalization of their own methods1 both have come to recognize the fundamental character of the relations involved in their thought1 and arithmetic1 through the complex number and the algebraic unknown quantities1 has come to consider more complex serial types1 while geometry has approached the analysis of its series through interaction with number theory4 ,for both1 the content of their entities and the relations involved have been brought to a minimum4 ,and this is true even of such apparently essentially intuitional fields as projective geometry1 where entities can be substituted for directional lines and the axioms be turned into relational postulates governing their configurations4 ,nevertheless1 geometry like arithmetic1 has remained true to the need that gave it initial impulse4 ,as in the beginning it was only a method of dealing with a concrete situation1 so in the end it is nothing but such a method1 although1 as in the case of arithmetic1 from ever closer contact with the situation in question1 it has been led1 by refinements that thoughtful and continual contact bring1 to dissect that situation and give heed to aspects of it which were undreamed of at the initial moment4 ,in a sense1 then1 there are no such things as mathematical entities1 as scholastic realism would conceive them4 ,and yet1 mathematics is not dealing with unrealities1 for it is everywhere concerned with real rational types and systems where such types may be exemplified4 ,or we can say in a purely practical way that mathematical entities are constituted by their relations1 but this phrase cannot here be interpreted in the ,hegelian ontological sense in which it has played so great and so pernicious a part in contemporary philosophy4 ,such metaphysical interpretation and its consequences are the basis of paradoxical absolutisms1 such as that arrived at by ,professor ,royce 7,world and the ,individual1 ,vol4 ,,ii1 ,supplementary ,essay74 ,the peculiar character of abstract or pure mathematics seems to be that its own operations on a lower level constitute material which serves for the subject-matter with which its later investigations deal4 ,but mathematics is1 after all1 not fundamentally different from the other sciences4 ,the concepts of all sciences alike constitute a special language peculiarly adapted for dealing with certain experience adjustments1 and the differences in the development of the different sciences merely express different degrees of success with which such languages have been formulated with respect to making it possible to predict concerning not yet realized situations4 ,some sciences are still seeking their terms and fundamental concepts1 others are formulating their first grammar1 and mathematics1 still inadequate1 yearly gains both in vocabulary and flexibility4 ,but if we are to conceive mathematical entities as mere terminal points in a relational system1 it is necessary that we should become clear as to just what is meant by relation1 and what is the connection between relations and quantities4 ,modern thought has shown a strong tendency to insist1 somewhat arbitrarily1 on the internal or external character of relations4 ,the former emphasis has been primarily associated with idealistic ontology1 and has often brought with it complex dialectic questions as to the identity of an individual thing in passing from one relational situation to another4 ,the latter insistence has meant primarily that things do not change with changing relations to other things4 ,it has1 however1 often implied the independent existence1 in some curiously metaphysical state1 of relations that are not relating anything1 and is hardly less paradoxical than the older view4 ,in the field of physical phenomena1 it seems to triumph1 while the facts of social life1 on the other hand1 lend some countenance to the view of the internalists4 ,like many such discussions1 the best way around them is to forget their arguments1 and turn to a fresh and independent investigation of the facts in question4 ,,iv ,,things1 ,,relations1 ,,and ,,quantities ,as ,i write1 the way is paved for me by ,professor ,cohen 7,journ4 of ,phil41 ,psy41 and ,sci4 ,meth41 ,vol4 ,,xi1 ,no4 #bc1 ,nov4 #e1 #aiad1 pp4 #fbc-bd71 who outlines a theory of relations closely allied to that which ,i have in mind4 ,professor ,cohen writes3 ,like the distinction between primary and secondary qualities1 the distinction between qualities and relations seems to me a shifting one because the 'nature' of a thing changes as the thing shifts from one context to another4444 ,to ,professors ,montague and ,lovejoy the 'thing' is like an old-fashioned landowner and the qualities are its immemorial private possessions4 ,a thing may enter into commercial relations with others1 but these relations are extrinsic4 ,it never parts with its patrimony4 ,to me1 the 'nature' of a thing seems not to be so private or fixed4 ,it may consist entirely of bonds1 stocks1 franchises1 and other ways in which public credit or the right to certain transactions is represented4444 ,at any rate1 relations or transactions may be regarded as wider or more primary than qualities or possessions4 ,the latter may be defined as internal relations1 that is1 relations within the system that constitutes the 'thing4' ,the nature of a thing contains an essence1 i4e41 a group of characteristics which1 in any given system or context1 remain invariant1 so that if these are changed the things drop out of our system 444 but the same thing may present different essences in different contexts4 ,as a thing shifts from one context to another1 it acquires new relations and drops old ones1 and in all transformations there is a change or readjustment of the line between the internal relations which constitute the essence and the external relations which are outside the inner circle4444 ,before continuing1 however1 ,i wish to make certain interpretations of these statements for which1 of course1 ,professor ,cohen is not responsible1 and with which he would not be wholly in agreement4 ,my general attitude will be shown by the first comment4 ,concepts are only means of denoting fragments of experience directly or indirectly given4 ,if we then try to speak of a nature of a thing two interpretations of this expression are possible4 ,the thing as such is only a bit of reality which some motive1 that without undue extension of the term can be called practical1 has led us to treat as more or less isolable from the rest of reality4 ,its nature1 then1 may consist of either its relations to other practically isolated realities or things1 its actual effective value in its environment 7and hence shift with the environment as ,professor ,cohen points out71 or may consist of its essence1 the relations within the system1 considered from the point of view of the potentialities implied by these for various environments4 ,in the first sense the nature may easily change with change in environment1 but if it changes in the second sense1 as ,professor ,cohen remarks1 it drops out of our system4 ,this ,i should interpret as meaning that we no longer have that thing1 but some other thing selected from reality by a different purpose and point of view4 ,i should not say with ,professor ,cohen that the same thing may present different essences in different contexts4 ,every reality is more than one thing--man is an aggregate of atoms1 a living being1 an animal1 and a thinker1 and all of these are different things in essence1 although having certain common characteristics4 ,all attribution of thingship is abstraction1 and all particular things may be said to participate in higher1 i4e41 more abstract1 levels of thingship4 ,hence the effort to retain a thingship through a changing of essence seems to me but the echo of the motive that has so long deduced ontological monism from the logical fact that to conceive any two things is at least to throw them into a common universe of discourse4 ,consequently ,i should part company from ,professor ,cohen on this one point 7which is perhaps largely a matter of definition1 though here not unimportant7 and distinguish merely the nature of a thing as actual and as potential4 ,of these the former alone changes with the environment1 while the latter changes only as the thing ceases to be by passing into some other thing4 ,in other words1 if the example does not do violence to ,professor ,cohen's thought1 ,i can quite understand this paper as a stimulator of criticism1 or as a means of kindling a fire4 ,professor ,cohen would1 ,i suspect1 take this to mean that the same thing--this paper--must be looked upon as having two different essences in two different contexts1 for the same thing may possess two different essences in different contexts1 whereas ,i should prefer to interpret the situation as meaning that there are before me three 7and as many more as may be7 different things having three different essences3 first1 the paper as a physical object having a considerable number of definite properties2 second1 written words1 which are undoubtedly in one sense mere structural modifications of the physical object paper 7i4e41 coloring on it by ink1 etc471 but whose reality for my purpose lies in the power of evoking ideas acquired by things as symbols 7things1 indeed1 but things whose essence lies in the effects they produce upon a reader rather than in their physical character72 and third1 the chemical and combustion producing properties of the paper4 ,now it is simpler for me to consider the situation as one in which three things have a common point in thingship1 i4e41 an abstract element in common1 than to think of a thing shifting contexts and thereby changing its essence4 ,but now my divergence from ,professor ,cohen becomes more marked4 ,he continues with the following example 7p4 #fbb73 ,our neighbor ,m4 is tall1 modest1 cheerful1 and we understand a banker4 ,his tallness1 modesty1 cheerfulness1 and the fact that he is a banker we usually regard as his qualities2 the fact that he is our neighbor is a relation which he seems to bear to us4 ,he may move his residence1 cease to be our neighbor1 and yet remain the same person with the same qualities4 ,if1 however1 ,i become his tailor1 his tallness becomes translated into certain relations of measurement2 if ,i become his social companion1 his modesty means that he will stand in certain social relations with me1 etc4 ,in other words1 we are illustrating the doctrine that qualities are reducible to relations 7cf4 p4 #fbc74 ,this doctrine ,i cannot quite accept without modification1 for ,i cannot tell what it means4 ,without any presuppositions as to subjectivity or consciousness 7cf4 p4 #fbc1 7a747 there are in the world as ,i know it certain colored objects--let the expression be taken naively to avoid idealistico-realistic discussion which is here irrelevant4 ,now it is as unintelligible to me that the red flowers and green leaves of the geraniums before my windows should be reducible to mere relations in any existential sense1 as it would be to ask for the square root of their odor1 though of course it is quite intelligible that the physical theory and predictions concerning green and red surfaces 7or odors7 should be stated in terms of atomic distances and ether vibrations of specific lengths4 ,the scientific conception is1 after all1 nothing more than an indication of how to take hold of things and manipulate them to get foreseen results1 and its entities are real things only in the sense that they are the practically effective keynotes of the complex reality4 ,accordingly1 instead of reducing qualities to relations1 it seems to me a much more intelligible view to consider relations as abstract ways of taking qualities in general1 as qualities thought of in their function of bridging a gap or making a transition between two bits of reality that have previously been taken as separate things4 ,indeed1 it is just because things are not ontologically independent beings 7but rather selections from genuinely concatenated existence7 that relations become important as indications of the practical significance of qualitative continuities which have been neglected in the prior isolation of the thing4 ,thus1 instead of an existential world that is a network of relations whose intersections are called terms 7p4 #fbb71 ,i find more intelligible a qualitatively heterogeneous reality that can be variously partitioned into things1 and that can he abstractly replaced by systems of terms and relations that are adequate to symbolize their effective nature in particular respects4 ,there is a tendency for certain attributes to maintain their concreteness 7qualitativeness7 in things1 and for others to suggest the connection of things with other things1 and so to emphasize a more abstract aspect of experience4 ,thus then arises a temporary and practical distinction that tends to be taken as opposition between qualities and relations4 ,as spatial and temporal characteristics possess their chief practical value in the connection of things1 so they1 like ,professor ,cohen's neighbor-character1 are ordinarily assumed abstractly as mere relations1 while shapes1 colors1 etc41 and ,professor ,cohen's modesty1 tallness1 cheerfulness1 may be thought of more easily without emphasis on other things and so tend to be accepted in their concreteness as qualities1 but how slender is the dividing-line ,professor ,cohen's easy translation of these things into relations makes clear4 ,taken purely intellectualistically1 there would be first a fiction of separation in what is really already continuous and then another fiction to bridge the gap thus made4 ,this would1 of course1 be the falsification against which ,bergson inveighs4 ,but this interpretation is to misunderstand the nature of abstraction4 ,abstraction does not substitute an unreal for a real1 but selects from reality a genuine characteristic of it which is adequate for a particular purpose4 ,thus to conceive time as a succession of moments is not to falsify time1 but to select from processes going on in time a characteristic of them through which predictions can be made1 which may be verified and turned into an instrument for the control of life or environment4 ,a similar misunderstanding of abstraction1 coupled with a fuller appreciation than ,bergson evinces of the value of its results1 has led to the neo-realistic insistence on turning abstractions into existent entities of which the real world is taken to be an organized composite aggregate4 ,the practice of turning qualities into merely conscious entities has done much to obscure the status of scientific knowing1 for it has left mere quantity as the only real character of the actual world4 ,but once take a realistic standpoint1 and quantity is no more real than quality4 ,for primitive man1 the qualitative aspect of reality is probably the first to which he gives heed1 and it is only through efforts to get along with the world in its qualitative character that its quantitative side is forced upon the attention4 ,then so-called exact science is born1 but it does not follow that qualities henceforth become insignificant4 ,they are still the basis of all relations1 even of those that are most directly construed as quantitative4 ,quality and quantity are only different aspects of the world which the status of our practical life leads us to take separately or abstractly4 ,thing is no less an abstraction1 in which we disregard certain continuities with the rest of the world because we are so constituted that the demands of living make it expedient to do so4 ,things once given1 further abstractions become possible1 among which are those leading to mathematical thinking1 in which higher abstractions are made1 guided always by the generating problem 7cf4 ,karl ,schmidt1 ,jour4 of ,phil41 ,psy41 and ,sci4 ,meth41 ,vol4 ,x1 ,no4 #c1 #aiac1 pp4 #fd-ge74 ,v ,,the ,,function ,,of ,,theory ,,in ,,science ,the controlling factors for the progress of scientific thought are inventions that lead the scientist into closer contact with his data1 and direct attention to complexities which would otherwise have escaped observation4 ,this end is best fulfilled by conceiving entities that under some point of view are practically isolable from the context in which they occur4 ,only too often philosophic thought has confused this practical segregation with ontological separation1 and so been obliged to introduce metaphysical and external relations to bring these entities together again in a real world1 when in reality they have never been separated from one another and hence not from the real world4 ,furthermore1 the conceptual model1 built on the lines of a calculus of mathematics1 is often considered the truth par excellence after the analogy of a camera's portrait4 ,progress in science1 however1 shows that these models have to be continually rebuilt4 ,each seems to lead to further knowledge that necessitates its reconstruction1 so that truth takes on an ideal value as an ultimate but unattained1 if not unattainable1 goal1 while existing science becomes reduced to working hypotheses4 ,from a positivistic point of view1 however1 the goal is not only practically unattainable1 but it is irrational1 for there seems to be every evidence that it expresses something contrary to the nature of the real4 ,yet scientific theory is not wholly arbitrary4 ,we cannot construe nature as constituted of any sorts of entities that may suit our whim4 ,and this is because science itself recognizes that its entities are not really isolated1 but are endowed with all sorts of properties that serve to connect them with other entities4 ,they are only symbols of critical points of reality which1 conceived in a certain way1 make the behavior of the whole intelligible4 ,indeed1 the only significant sense in which they are true for the scientist is that they indicate real connections that might otherwise have been overlooked1 and this is only possible from the fact that reality has the characteristics that they present and that1 with their relations1 they give an approximate presentation of what is actually presented just as a successful portrait painter considers the individuality of the eyes1 nose1 mouth1 etc41 although he does not imply that a face is compounded of these separate features as a house is built of boards4 ,the atomic theory1 for example1 has undoubtedly been of the greatest service to chemistry1 and atoms undoubtedly denote a significant resting-place in the analysis of the physical world4 ,yet in the light of electron theories1 it is becoming more and more evident that atoms are not ultimate particles1 and are not even all alike 7,becker1 ,isostasy and ,radioactivity1 ,sci41 ,jan4 #bi1 #aiae7 when they represent a single substance4 ,again1 while there is as yet no evidence to suggest that the electron must itself be considered as divisible 7unless it be the distinction between the positive and negative electron71 there are suggestions that electrons may themselves arise and pass away 7cf4 ,moore1 ,origin1 and ,nature of ,life1 p4 #ci74 ,a wisely positivistic mind1 writes ,enriques 7,problems of ,science1 p4 #cd71 can see in the atomic hypothesis only a subjective representation1#cd and1 we might add1 in any other hypothesis4 ,he continues 7pp4 #cd-cf73 robbing the atom of the concrete attributes inherent in its image1 we find ourselves regarding it as a mere symbol4 ,the logical value of the atomic theory depends1 then1 upon the establishment of a proper correspondence between the symbols which it contains and the reality which we are trying to represent4 ,now1 if we go back to the time when the atomic theory was accepted by modern chemistry1 we see that the plain atomic formulae contain only the representation of the invariable relations in the combination of simple bodies1 in weight and volume2 these last being taken in relation to a well-defined gaseous state4 ,but1 once introduced into science1 the atomic phraseology suggested the extension of the meaning of the symbols1 and the search in reality for facts in correspondence with its more extended conception4 ,the theory advances1 urged on1 as it were1 by its metaphysical nature1 or1 if you wish1 by the association of ideas which the concrete image of the atom carries with it4 ,thus for the plain formulae we have substituted1 in the chemistry of carbon compounds1 structural formulae1 which come to represent1 thanks to the disposition or grouping of atoms in a molecule1 structural relations of the second degree1 that is to say1 relations inherent in certain chemical transformations with respect to which some groups of elements have in some way an invariant character4 ,and here1 because the image of a simple molecule upon a plane does not suffice to explain1 for example1 the facts of isomerism1 we must resort to the stereo-chemical representation of ,van't ,hoff4 ,must we further recall the kinetic theory of gases1 the facts explained by the breaking up of molecules into ions1 the hypothesis suggested1 for example1 by ,van der ,waals by the view that an atom has an actual bulk8 ,must we point to a physical phenomenon of quite a different class1 for example1 to the coloring of the thin film forming the soap-bubbles which ,w4 ,thomson has taken as the measure of the size of a molecule8 ,such a resume of results shows plainly that we cannot help the progress of science by blocking the path of theory and looking only at its positive aspects1 that is to say1 at the collection of facts that it explains4 ,the value of a theory lies rather in the hypothesis which it can suggest1 by means of the psychological representation of the symbols4 ,we shall not draw from all this the conclusion that the atomic hypothesis ought to correspond to the extremely subtle sensations of a being resembling a perfected man4 ,we shall not even reason about the possibility of those imaginary sensations1 in so far as they are conceived simply as an extension of our own4 ,but we shall repeat1 in regard to the atomic theory1 what an illustrious master is said to have remarked as to the unity of matter3 if on first examination a fact seems possible which contradicts the atomic view of things1 there is a strong probability that such a fact will be disproved by experience4 ,does not such a capacity for adaptation to facts1 thus furnishing a model for them1 perhaps denote the positive reality of a theory8 ,and the above principles are as true of mathematical concepts as of chemical4 ,everywhere it is capacity of adaptation to facts that is the criterion of a branch of mathematics1 except1 of course1 that in mathematics the facts are not always physical facts4 ,mathematics has successfully accomplished a generalization whereby its own methods furnish the material for higher generalizations4 ,the imaginary number and the hyper-dimensional or non-,euclidian geometries may be absurd if measured by the standard of physical reality1 but they nevertheless have something real about them in relation to certain mathematical processes on a lower level4 ,there is no philosophic paradox about modern arithmetic or geometry1 once it is recognized that they are merely abstractions of genuine features of simpler and more obviously practical manipulations that are clearly derived from the dealing of a human being with genuine realities4 ,in the light of these considerations1 ,i cannot help feeling that the frequent attempts of mathematicians with a philosophical turn of mind1 and philosophers who are dipping into mathematics1 to derive geometrical entities from psychological considerations are quite mistaken1 and are but another example of those traditional presuppositions of psychology which1 ,professor ,dewey has pointed out 7,jour4 of ,phil41 ,psy41 and ,sci4 ,meth41 ,,xi1 ,no4 #ai1 p4 #ejh71 were bequeathed by seventeenth-century philosophy to psychology1 instead of originating within psychology 444 that were wished upon it by philosophy when it was as yet too immature to defend itself4 ,henri ,poincare 7,science and ,hypothesis1 ,ch4 ,,iv1 ,the ,value of ,science1 ,ch4 ,,iv7 and ,enriques 7,problems of ,science1 ,ch4 ,,iv1 esp4 ,b--,the ,psychological ,acquisition of ,geometrical ,concepts7 furnish two of the most familiar examples of this sort of philosophizing4 ,each isolates special senses1 sight1 touch1 or motion1 and tries to show how a being merely equipped with one or the other of these senses might arrive at geometrical conceptions which differ1 of course1 from space as represented by our familiar ,euclidian geometry4 ,then comes the question of fusing these different sorts of experience into a single experience of which geometry may be an intelligible transcription4 ,enriques finds a parallel between the historical development and the psycho-genetic development of the postulates of geometry 7loc4 cit41 p4 #bad seq474 ,the three groups of ideas that are connected with the concepts that serve as the basis for the theory of continuum 7,analysis situs71 of metrical1 and of projective geometry1 may be connected1 as to their psychological origin1 with three groups of sensations3 with the general tactile-muscular sensations1 with those of special touch1 and of sight1 respectively4 ,poincare even evokes ancestral experience to make good his case 7,sci4 and ,hyp41 ,ch4 ,v1 end74 ,it has often been said that if individual experience could not create geometry1 the same is not true of ancestral experience4 ,but what does that mean8 ,is it meant that we could not experimentally demonstrate ,euclid's postulate1 but that our ancestors have been able to do it8 ,not in the least4 ,it is meant that by natural selection our mind has adapted itself to the conditions of the external world1 that it has adopted the geometry most advantageous to the species3 or in other words1 the most convenient4 ,now undoubtedly there may be a certain modicum of truth in these statements4 ,as implied by the last quotation from ,poincare1 the modern scientist can hardly doubt that the fact of the adaptation of our thinking to the world we live in is due to the fact that it is in that world that we evolved4 ,as is implied by both writers1 if one could limit human contact with the world to a particular form of sense response1 thought about that world would take place in different terms from what it now does and would presumably be less efficient4 ,but these admissions do not imply that any light is thrown upon the nature of mathematical entities by such abstractions4 ,russell 7,scientific ,method in ,philosophy7 is in the curious position of raising arithmetic to a purely logical status1 but playing with geometry and sensation after the manner of ,poincare1 to whom he gives somewhat grudging praise on this account4 ,the psychological methods upon which all such investigations are based are open to all sorts of criticisms4 ,chiefly1 the conceptions on which they are based1 even if correct1 are only abstractions4 ,there is not the least evidence for the existence of organisms with a single differentiated sense organ1 nor the least evidence that there ever was such an organism4 ,indeed1 according to modern accounts of the evolution of the nervous system 7cf4 ,g4 ,h4 ,parker1 ,pop4 ,sci4 ,month41 ,feb41 #aiad7 different senses have arisen through a gradual differentiation of a more general form of stimulus receptor1 and consequently1 the possibility of the detachment of special senses is the latter end of the series and not the first4 ,but1 however this may be1 the mathematical concepts that we are studying have only been grasped by a highly developed organism1 man1 but they had already begun to be grasped by him in an early stage of his career before he had analyzed his experience and connected it with specific sense organs4 ,it may of course be a pleasant exercise1 if one likes that sort of thing1 to assume with most psychologists certain elementary sensations1 and then examine the amount of information each can give in the light of possible mathematical interpretations1 but to do so is not to show that a being so scantily endowed would ever have acquired a geometry of the type in question1 or any geometry at all4 ,inferences of the sort are in the same category with those from hypothetical children1 that used to justify all theories of the pedagogue and psychologist1 or from the economic man1 that still1 ,i fear1 play too great a part in the world of social science4 ,,vi ,,mathematical ,,intelligence ,the real nature of intelligence as it appears in the development of mathematics is something quite other than that of sensory analysis4 ,intelligence is fundamentally skill1 and although skill may be acquired in connection with some sort of sensory contact of an organism and environment1 it is only determined by that contact in the sense that if the sensory conditions were different the needs of the organism might be different1 and the kind and degree of skill it could attain would be other than under the conditions at first assumed4 ,whenever the beginnings of mathematics appear with primitive people1 we find a stage of development that calls for the exercise of skill in dealing with certain practical situations4 ,hence we found early in our investigations that it was impossible to affirm a weak intelligence from limited achievements in counting1 just as it would be absurd to assume the feeble intelligence of a philosopher from his inability to manipulate a boomerang4 ,the instance merely suggests a kind of skill that he has never been led to acquire4 ,yet it is possible to distinguish intellectual skill1 or better skills1 from physical or athletic prowess4 ,primarily1 it is directed at the formation and use of concepts1 and the concept is only a symbol that can be substituted for experiences4 ,a well-built concept is a part of a system of concepts where relations have taken the place of real connections in such a fashion that1 forgetting the actuality1 it is possible to present situations that have never occurred or at least are not immediately given at the time and place of the presentation1 and to substitute them for actual situations in such a fashion that these may be expediently met1 if or when such situations present themselves4 ,an isolated concept1 that is1 one not a part of any system1 is as mythical an entity as any savage ever dreamed4 ,indeed1 it would add much to the clearness of our thinking if we could limit the use of intelligence to skill in constructing and using different systems of concepts1 and speak concretely of mathematical intelligence1 philosophical intelligence1 economic intelligence1 historic intelligence1 and the like4 ,the problem of creative intelligence is1 after all1 the problem of the acquisition of certain forms of skill1 and while the general lines are the same for all knowledge 7because the instruments are everywhere symbolic presentations1 or concepts71 in each field the situation studied makes different types of difficulties to be overcome and suggest different methods of attaining the object4 ,in mathematics1 the formal impulse to reduce the content of fundamental concepts to a minimum1 and to stress merely relations has been most successful4 ,we saw its results in such geometries as ,hilbert's and ,peano's1 where the empty name entity supplants the more concrete point1 and the #a of arithmetic has the same character4 ,in the social sciences1 however1 such examples as the political and the economic man are signal failures1 while1 perhaps1 the atom and the electron approach the ideal in physics and chemistry4 ,in mathematics1 all further concepts can be defined by collections of these fundamental entities constituted in certain specified ways4 ,and it is worth noting that both factually and logically a collection of entities so defined is not a mere aggregate1 but possesses a differentiated character of its own which1 although the resultant of its constitution1 is not a property of any of its elements4 ,a whole number is thus a collection of #as1 but the properties of the whole number are something quite different from that of the elements through which it is constituted1 just as an atom may be composed of electrons and yet1 in valency1 possess a property that is not the direct analogue of any property possessed by electrons not so organized4 ,natural science1 however1 considers such building up of its fundamental entities into new entities as a process taking place in time rather than as consequent upon change of form of the whole rendering new analytic forms expedient4 ,hence it points to the occurrence of genuine novelties in the realm of objective reality4 ,mathematics1 on the other hand1 has generalized its concepts beyond the facts implied in spatial and temporal observations1 so that while significant in both fields by virtue of the nature of its abstractions1 its novelties are the novelties of new conceptual formations1 a distinguishing of previously unnoted generalizations of relations existent in the realm of facts4 ,but the fact that time has thus passed beyond its empirical meaning in the mathematical realm is no ground for giving mathematics an elevated position as a science of eternal realities1 of subsistent beings1 or the like4 ,the generalization of concepts to cover both spatial and temporal facts does not create new entities for which a home must be provided in the partition of realities4 ,metaphysicians should not be the needy knife grinders of ,m4 ,anatole ,france 7cf4 ,garden of ,epicurus1 ,ch4 ,the ,language of the ,metaphysicians74 ,nevertheless1 the success of abstraction for mathematical intelligence has been immense4 ,no significant thinking is wholly the work of an individual man4 ,ideas are a product of social cooeperation in which some have wrested crude concepts from nature1 others have refined them through usage1 and still others have built them into an effective system4 ,the first steps were undoubtedly taken in an effort to communicate1 and progress has been in part the progress of language4 ,the original nature of man may have as a part those reactions which we call curiosity1 but1 as ,auguste ,comte long ago pointed out 7,levy-,bruhl1 ,a4 ,comte1 p4 #fg71 these reactions are among the feeblest of our nature and without the pressure of practical affairs could hardly have advanced the race beyond barbarism4 ,science was the plaything of the ,greek1 the consolation of the ,middle ,ages1 and only for the modern has it become an instrument in such fashion as to mark an epoch in the still dawning discovery of mind4 ,man is1 after all1 rational only because through his nervous system he can hold his immediate responses in check and finally react as a being that has had experiences and profited by them4 ,concepts are the medium through which these experiences are in effect preserved2 they express not merely a fact recorded but also the significance of a fact1 not merely a contact with the world but also an attitude toward the future4 ,it may be that the mere judgment of fact1 a citation of resemblances and differences1 is the basis of scientific knowledge1 but before knowledge is worthy of the name1 these facts have undergone an ideal transformation controlled by the needs of successful prediction and motivated by that self-conscious realization of the value of control which has raised man above the beasts of the field4 ,the realm of mathematics1 which we have been examining1 is but one aspect of the growth of intelligence4 ,but in theory1 at least1 it is among the most interesting1 since in it are reached the highest abstractions of science1 while its empirical beginnings are not lost4 ,but its processes and their significance are in no way different in essence from those of the other sciences4 ,it marks one road of specialization in the discovery of mind4 ,and in these terms we may read all history4 ,to quote ,professor ,woodbridge 7,columbia ,university ,quarterly1 ,dec41 #aiab1 p4 #aj73 ,we may see man rising from the ground1 startled by the first dim intimation that the things and forces about him are convertible and controllable4 ,curiosity excites him1 but he is subdued by an untrained imagination4 ,the things that frighten him1 he tries to frighten in return4 ,the things that bless him1 he blesses4 ,he would scare the earth's shadow from the moon and sacrifice his dearest to a propitious sky4 ,it avails not4 ,but the little things teach him and discipline his imagination4 ,he has kicked the stone that bruised him only to be bruised again4 ,so he converts the stone into a weapon and begins the subjugation of the world1 singing a song of triumph by the way4 ,such is his history in epitome--a blunder1 a conversion1 a conquest1 and a song4 ,that sequence he will repeat in greater things4 ,he will repeat it yet and rejoice where he now despairs1 converting the chaos of his social1 political1 industrial1 and emotional life into wholesome force4 ,he will sing again4 ,but the discovery of mind comes first1 and then1 the song4 ,,scientific ,,method ,,and ,,individual ,,thinker ,,george ,h4 ,,mead ,the scientist in the ancient world found his test of reality in the evidence of the presence of the essence of the object4 ,this evidence came by way of observation1 even to the ,platonist4 ,plato could treat this evidence as the awaking of memories of the ideal essence of the object seen in a world beyond the heavens during a former stage of the existence of the soul4 ,in the language of ,theatetus it was the agreement of fluctuating sensual content with the thought-content imprinted in or viewed by the soul4 ,in ,aristotle it is again the agreement of the organized sensuous experience with the vision which the mind gets of the essence of the object through the perceptual experience of a number of instances4 ,that which gives the stamp of reality is the coincidence of the percept with a rational content which must in some sense be in the mind to insure knowledge1 as it must be in the cosmos to insure existence1 of the object4 ,the relation of this test of reality to an analytical method is evident4 ,our perceptual world is always more crowded and confused than the ideal contents by which the reality of its meaning is to be tested4 ,the aim of the analysis varies with the character of the science4 ,in the case of ,aristotle's theoretical sciences1 such as mathematics and metaphysics1 where one proceeds by demonstration from the given existences1 analysis isolates such elements as numbers1 points1 lines1 surfaces1 and solids1 essences and essential accidents4 ,aristotle approaches nature1 however1 as he approaches the works of human art4 ,indeed1 he speaks of nature as the artificer par excellence4 ,in the study of nature1 then1 as in the study of the practical and productive arts1 it is of the first importance that the observer should have the idea--the final cause--as the means of deciphering the nature of living forms4 ,here analysis proceeds to isolate characters which are already present in forms whose functions are assumed to be known4 ,by analogy such identities as that of fish fins with limbs of other vertebrates are assumed1 and some very striking anticipations of modern biological conceptions and discoveries are reached4 ,aristotle recognizes that the theory of the nature of the form or essence must be supported by observation of the actual individual4 ,what is lacking is any body of observation which has value apart from some theory4 ,he tests his theory by the observed individual which is already an embodied theory1 rather than by what we are wont to call the facts4 ,he refers to other observers to disagree with them4 ,he does not present their observations apart from their theories as material which has existential value1 independent for the time being of any hypothesis4 ,and it is consistent with this attitude that he never presents the observations of others in support of his own doctrine4 ,his analysis within this field of biological observation does not bring him back to what1 in modern science1 are the data1 but to general characters which make up the definition of the form4 ,his induction involves a gathering of individuals rather than of data4 ,thus analysis in the theoretical1 the natural1 the practical1 and the productive sciences1 leads back to universals4 ,this is quite consistent with ,aristotle's metaphysical position that since the matter of natural objects has reality through its realization in the form1 whatever appears without such meaning can be accounted for only as the expression of the resistance which matter offers to this realization4 ,this is the field of a blind necessity1 not that of a constructive science4 ,continuous advance in science has been possible only when analysis of the object of knowledge has supplied not elements of meanings as the objects have been conceived but elements abstracted from those meanings4 ,that is1 scientific advance implies a willingness to remain on terms of tolerant acceptance of the reality of what cannot be stated in the accepted doctrine of the time1 but what must be stated in the form of contradiction with these accepted doctrines4 ,the domain of what is usually connoted by the term facts or data belongs to the field lying between the old doctrine and the new4 ,this field is not inhabited by the ,aristotelian individual1 for the individual is but the realization of the form or universal essence4 ,when the new theory has displaced the old1 the new individual appears in the place of its predecessor1 but during the period within which the old theory is being dislodged and the new is arising1 a consciously growing science finds itself occupied with what is on the one hand the debris of the old and on the other the building material of the new4 ,obviously1 this must find its immediate raison d'etre in something other than the meaning that is gone or the meaning that is not yet here4 ,it is true that the barest facts do not lack meaning1 though a meaning which has been theirs in the past is lost4 ,the meaning1 however1 that is still theirs is confessedly inadequate1 otherwise there would be no scientific problem to be solved4 ,thus1 when older theories of the spread of infectious diseases lost their validity because of instances where these explanations could not be applied1 the diagnoses and accounts which could still be given of the cases of the sickness themselves were no explanation of the spread of the infection4 ,the facts of the spread of the infection could be brought neither under a doctrine of contagion which was shattered by actual events nor under a doctrine of the germ theory of disease1 which was as yet unborn4 ,the logical import of the dependence of these facts upon observation1 and hence upon the individual experience of the scientist1 ,i shall have occasion to discuss later2 what ,i am referring to here is that the conscious growth of science is accompanied by the appearance of this sort of material4 ,there were two fields of ancient science1 those of mathematics and of astronomy1 within which very considerable advance was achieved1 a fact which would seem therefore to offer exception to the statement just made4 ,the theory of the growth of mathematics is a disputed territory1 but whether mathematical discovery and invention take place by steps which can be identified with those which mark the advance in the experimental sciences or not1 the individual processes in which the discoveries and inventions have arisen are almost uniformly lost to view in the demonstration which presents the results4 ,it would be improper to state that no new data have arisen in the development of mathematics1 in the face of such innovations as the minus quantity1 the irrational1 the imaginary1 the infinitesimal1 or the transfinite number1 and yet the innovations appear as the recasting of the mathematical theories rather than as new facts4 ,it is of course true that these advances have depended upon problems such as those which in the researches of ,kepler and ,galileo led to the early concepts of the infinitesimal procedure1 and upon such undertakings as bringing the combined theories of geometry and algebra to bear upon the experiences of continuous change4 ,for a century after the formulation of the infinitesimal method men were occupied in carrying the new tool of analysis into every field where its use promised advance4 ,the conceptions of the method were uncritical4 ,its applications were the center of attention4 ,the next century undertook to bring order into the concepts1 consistency into the doctrine1 and rigor into the reasoning4 ,the dominating trend of this movement was logical rather than methodological4 ,the development was in the interest of the foundations of mathematics rather than in the use of mathematics as a method for solving scientific problems4 ,of course this has in no way interfered with the freedom of application of mathematical technique to the problems of physical science4 ,on the contrary1 it was on account of the richness and variety of the contents which the use of mathematical methods in the physical sciences imported into the doctrine that this logical housecleaning became necessary in mathematics4 ,the movement has been not only logical as distinguished from methodological but logical as distinguished from metaphysical as well4 ,it has abandoned a ,euclidean space with its axioms as a metaphysical presupposition1 and it has abandoned an ,aristotelian subsumptive logic for which definition is a necessary presupposition4 ,it recognizes that everything cannot be proved1 but it does not undertake to state what the axiomata shall be2 and it also recognizes that not everything can be defined1 and does not undertake to determine what shall be defined implicitly and what explicitly4 ,its constants are logical constants1 as the proposition1 the class and the relation4 ,with these and their like and with relatively few primitive ideas1 which are represented by symbols1 and used according to certain given postulates1 it becomes possible to bring the whole body of mathematics within a single treatment4 ,the development of this pure mathematics1 which comes to be a logic of the mathematical sciences1 has been made possible by such a generalization of number theory and theories of the elements of space and time that the rigor of mathematical reasoning is secured1 while the physical scientist is left the widest freedom in the choice and construction of concepts and imagery for his hypotheses4 ,the only compulsion is a logical compulsion4 ,the metaphysical compulsion has disappeared from mathematics and the sciences whose techniques it provides4 ,it was just this compulsion which confined ancient science4 ,euclidian geometry defined the limits of mathematics4 ,even mechanics was cultivated largely as a geometrical field4 ,the metaphysical doctrine according to which physical objects had their own places and their own motions determined the limits within which astronomical speculations could be carried on4 ,within these limits ,greek mathematical genius achieved marvelous results4 ,the achievements of any period will be limited by two variables3 the type of problem against which science formulates its methods1 and the materials which analysis puts at the scientist's disposal in attacking the problems4 ,the technical problems of the trisection of an angle and the duplication of a cube are illustrations of the problems which characterize a geometrical doctrine that was finding its technique4 ,there appears also the method of analysis of the problem into simpler problems1 the assumption of the truth of the conclusion to be proved and the process of arguing from this to a known truth4 ,the more fundamental problem which appears first as the squaring of the circle1 which becomes that of the determination of the relation of the circle to its diameter and development of the method of exhaustion1 leads up to the sphere1 the regular polyhedra1 to conic sections and the beginnings of trigonometry4 ,number was not freed from the relations of geometrical magnitudes1 though ,archimedes could conceive of a number greater or smaller than any assignable magnitude4 ,with the method of exhaustion1 with the conceptions of number found in writings of ,archimedes and others1 with the beginnings of spherical geometry and trigonometry1 and with the slow growth of algebra finding its highest expression in that last flaring up of ,greek mathematical creation1 the work of ,diophantes2 there were present all the conceptions which were necessary for attack upon the problems of velocities and changing velocities1 and the development of the method of analysis which has been the revolutionary tool of ,europe since the ,renaissance4 ,but the problems of a relation between the time and space of a motion that should change just as a motion1 without reference to the essence of the object in motion1 were problems which did not1 perhaps could not1 arise to confront the ,greek mind4 ,in any case its mathematics was firmly embedded in a ,euclidian space4 ,though there are indications of some distrust1 even in ,greek times1 of the parallel axiom1 the suggestion that mathematical reasoning could be made rigorous and comprehensive independently of the specific content of axiom and definition was an impossible one for the ,greek1 because such a suggestion could be made only on the presupposition of a number theory and an algebra capable of stating a continuum in terms which are independent of the sensuous intuition of space and time and of the motion that takes place within space and time4 ,in the same fashion mechanics came back to fundamental generalizations of experience with reference to motions which served as axioms of mechanics1 both celestial and terrestrial3 the assumptions of the natural motion of earthly substances to their own places in straight lines1 and of celestial bodies in circles and uniform velocities1 of an equilibrium where equal weights operate at equal distances from the fulcrum4 ,the incommensurable of ,pythagoras and the paradoxes of ,zeno present the no thoroughfares of ancient mathematical thought4 ,neither the continuum of space nor of motion could be broken up into ultimate units1 when incommensurable ratios existed which could not be expressed1 and when motion refused to be divided into positions of space or time since these are functions of motion4 ,it was not until an algebraic theory of number led mathematicians to the use of expressions for the irrational1 the minus1 and the imaginary numbers through the logical development of generalized expressions1 that problems could be formulated in which these irrational ratios and quantities were involved1 though it is also true that the effort to deal with problems of this character was in no small degree responsible for the development of the algebra4 ,fixed metaphysical assumptions in regard to number1 space1 time1 motion1 and the nature of physical objects determined the limits within which scientific investigation could take place4 ,thus though the hypothesis of ,copernicus and in all probability of ,tycho ,brahe were formulated by ,greek astronomers1 their physical doctrine was unable to use them because they were in flagrant contradiction with the definitions the ancient world gave to earthly and celestial bodies and their natural motions4 ,the atomic doctrine with ,democritus' thoroughgoing undertaking to substitute a quantitative for a qualitative conception of matter with the location of the qualitative aspects of the world in the experience of the soul appealed only to the ,epicurean who used the theory as an exorcism to drive out of the universe the spirits which disturbed the calm of the philosopher4 ,there was only one field in which ancient science seemed to break away from the fixed assumptions of its metaphysics and from the definitions of natural objects which were the bases for their scientific inferences1 this was the field of astronomy in the period after ,eudoxus4 ,up to and including the theories of ,eudoxus1 physical and mathematical astronomy went hand in hand4 ,eudoxus' nests of spheres within spheres hung on different axes revolving in different uniform periods was the last attempt of the mathematician philosopher to state the anomalies of the heavens1 and to account for the stations1 the retrogressions1 and varying velocities of planetary bodies by a theory resolving all phenomena of these bodies into motions of uniform velocities in perfect circles1 and also placing these phenomena within a physical theory consistent with the prevailing conceptions of the science and philosophy of the time4 ,as a physicist ,aristotle felt the necessity of introducing further spheres between the nests of spheres assigned by ,eudoxus to the planetary bodies1 spheres whose peculiar motions should correct the tendency of the different groups of spheres to pass their motions on to each other4 ,since the form of the orbits of heavenly bodies and their velocities could not be considered to be the results of their masses and of their relative positions with reference to one another2 since it was not possible to calculate the velocities and orbits from the physical characters of the bodies1 since in a word these physical characters did not enter into the problem of calculating the positions of the bodies nor offer explanations for the anomalies which the mathematical astronomer had to explain1 it was not strange that he disinterested himself from the metaphysical celestial mechanics of his time and concentrated his attention upon the geometrical hypotheses by means of which he could hope to resolve into uniform revolutions in circular orbits the anomalous motions of the planetary bodies4 ,the introduction of the epicycle with the deferent and the eccentric as working hypotheses to solve the anomalies of the heavens is to be comprehended largely in view of the isolation of the mathematical as distinguished from the physical problem of astronomy4 ,in no sense were these conceptions working hypotheses of a celestial mechanics4 ,they were the only means of an age whose mathematics was almost entirely geometrical for accomplishing what a later generation could accomplish by an algebraic theory of functions4 ,as has been pointed out1 the undertaking of the ancient mathematical astronomer to resolve the motions of planetary bodies into circular1 uniform1 continuous1 symmetrical movements is comparable to the theorem of ,fourier which allows the mathematician to replace any one periodic function by a sum of circular functions4 ,in other words1 the astronomy of the ,alexandrian period is a somewhat cumbrous development of the mathematical technique of the time to enable the astronomer to bring the anomalies of the planetary bodies1 as they increased under observation1 within the axioms of a metaphysical physics4 ,the genius exhibited in the development of the mathematical technique places the names of ,apollonius of ,perga1 ,hipparchus of ,nicaea1 and ,ptolemy among the great mathematicians of the world1 but they never felt themselves free to attack by their hypotheses the fundamental assumptions of the ancient metaphysical doctrine of the universe4 ,thus it was said of ,hipparchus by ,adrastus1 a philosopher of the first century ,a4 ,d41 in explaining his preference for the epicycle to the eccentric as a means of analyzing the motions of the planetary bodies3 ,he preferred and adopted the principle of the epicycle as more probable to his mind1 because it ordered the system of the heavens with more symmetry and with a more intimate dependence with reference to the center of the universe4 ,although he guarded himself from assuming the role of the physicist in devoting himself to the investigations of the real movements of the stars1 and in undertaking to distinguish between the motions which nature has adopted from those which the appearances present to our eyes1 he assumed that every planet revolved along an epicycle1 the center of which describes a circumference concentric with the earth4 ,even mathematical astronomy does not offer an exception to the scientific method of the ancient world1 that of bringing to consciousness the concepts involved in their world of experience1 organizing these concepts with reference to each1 analyzing and restating them within the limits of their essential accidents1 and assimilating the concrete objects of experience to these typical forms as more or less complete realizations4 ,at the beginning of the process of ,greek self-conscious reflection and analysis1 the mind ran riot among the concepts and their characters until the contradictions which arose from these unsystematized speculations brought the ,greek mind up to the problems of criticism and scientific method4 ,criticism led to the separation of the many from the one1 the imperfect copy from the perfect type1 the sensuous and passionate from the rational and the intrinsically good1 the impermanent particular from the incorruptible universal4 ,the line of demarcation ran between the lasting reality that answered to critical objective thought and the realm of perishing imperfect instances1 of partially realized forms full of unmeaning differences due to distortion and imperfection1 the realm answering to a sensuous passionate unreflective experience4 ,it would be a quite inexcusable mistake to put all that falls on the wrong side of the line into a subjective experience1 for these characters belonged not alone to the experience1 but also to the passing show1 to the world of imperfectly developed matter which belonged to the perceptual passionate experience4 ,while it may not then be classed as subjective1 the ,greeks of the ,sophistic period felt that this phase of existence was an experience which belongs to the man in his individual life1 that life in which he revolts from the conventions of society1 in which he questions accepted doctrine1 in which he differentiates himself from his fellows4 ,protagoras seems even to have undertaken to make this experience of the individual1 the stuff of the known world4 ,it is difficult adequately to assess ,protagoras' undertaking4 ,he seems to be insisting both that the man's experience as his own must be the measure of reality as known and on the other hand that these experiences present norms which offer a choice in conduct4 ,if this is true ,protagoras conceived of the individual's experience in its atypical and revolutionary form as not only real but the possible source of fuller realities than the world of convention4 ,the undertaking failed both in philosophic doctrine and in practical politics4 ,it failed in both fields because the subjectivist1 both in theory and practice1 did not succeed in finding a place for the universal character of the object1 its meaning1 in the mind of the individual and thus in finding in this experience the hypothesis for the reconstruction of the real world4 ,in the ancient world the atypical individual1 the revolutionist1 the non-conformist was a self-seeking adventurer or an anarchist1 not an innovator or reformer1 and subjectivism in ancient philosophy remained a skeptical attitude which could destroy but could not build up4 ,hippocrates and his school came nearer consciously using the experience of the individual as the actual material of the object of knowledge4 ,in the skeptical period in which they flourished they rejected on the one hand the magic of traditional medicine and on the other the empty theorizing that had been called out among the physicians by the philosophers4 ,their practical tasks held them to immediate experience4 ,their functions in the gymnasia gave their medicine an interest in health as well as in disease1 and directed their attention largely toward diet1 exercise1 and climate in the treatment even of disease4 ,in its study they have left the most admirable sets of observations1 including even accounts of acknowledged errors and the results of different treatments of cases1 which ancient science can present4 ,it was the misfortune of their science that it dealt with a complicated subject-matter dependent for its successful treatment upon the whole body of physical1 chemical1 and biological disciplines as well as the discovery and invention of complicated techniques4 ,they were forced after all to adopt a hopelessly inadequate physiological theory--that of the four humors--with the corresponding doctrine of health and disease as the proper and improper mixture of these fluids4 ,their marvelously fine observation of symptoms led only to the definition of types and a medical practice which was capable of no consistent progress outside of certain fields of surgery4 ,thus even ,greek medicine was unable to develop a different type of scientific method except in so far as it kept alive an empiricism which played a not unimportant part in post-,aristotelian philosophy4 ,within the field of astronomy in explaining the anomalies of the heavens involved in their metaphysical assumptions1 they built up a marvelously perfect ,euclidian geometry1 for here refined and exhaustive definition of all the elements was possible4 ,the problems involved in propositions to be proved appeared in the individual experience of the geometrician1 but this experience in space was uniform with that of every one else and took on a universal not an individual form4 ,the test of the solution was given in a demonstration which holds for every one living in the same ,euclidian space4 ,when the mathematician found himself carried by his mathematical technique beyond the assumptions of a metaphysical physics he abandoned the field of physical astronomy and confined himself to the development of his mathematical expressions4 ,in other fields ,greek science analyzed with varying success and critical skill only the conceptions found in the experience of their time and world4 ,nor did ,greek thought succeed in formulating any adequate method by which the ultimate concepts in any field of science were to be determined4 ,it is in ,aristotle's statement of induction and the process of definition that we appreciate most clearly the inadequacy of their method4 ,this inadequacy lies fundamentally in ,aristotle's conception of observation which1 as ,i have already noted1 implies the recognition of an individual1 that is1 an object which is an embodied form or idea4 ,the function of knowledge is to bring out this essence4 ,the mind sees through the individuals the universal nature4 ,the value of the observation lies1 then1 not in the controlled perception of certain data as observed facts1 but in the insight with which he recognizes the nature of the object4 ,when this nature has been seen it is to be analyzed into essential characters and thus formulated into the definition4 ,in ,aristotle's methodology there is no procedure by which the mind can deliberately question the experience of the community and by a controlled method reconstruct its received world4 ,thus the natural sciences were as really fixed by the conceptions of the community as were the exact sciences by the conceptions of a ,euclidian geometry and the mathematics which the ,greeks formulated within it4 ,the individual within whose peculiar experience arises a contradiction to the prevailing conceptions of the community and in whose creative intelligence appears the new hypothesis which makes possible a new heaven and a new earth could utilize his individual experience only in destructive skepticism4 ,subjectivism served in ancient thought to invalidate knowledge not to enlarge it4 ,zeller has sketched a parallelism between the ideal state of ,plato and the social structure of the medieval world4 ,the philosopher-king is represented by the ,pope1 below him answering to the warrior class in the ,platonic state stands the warrior class of the ,holy ,roman ,empire1 who in theory enforce the dictates of the ,roman curia1 while at the bottom in both communities stand the mass of the people bound to obedience to the powers above4 ,there is1 however1 one profound difference between the two1 and that is to be found in the relative positions of the ideal worlds that dominate each4 ,plato's ideal world beyond the heavens gives what reality it has to this through the participation by the world of becoming in the ideas4 ,opinion dimly sensed the ideas in the evanescent objects about it1 and though ,plato's memory theory of knowledge assumed that the ideas had been seen in former existence and men could thus recognize the copies here1 the ideal world was not within the mind but without4 ,in a real sense the ,kingdom of ,heaven was within men in the medieval world1 as was the ,holy ,roman ,empire4 ,they were ideal communities that ought to exist on earth1 and it was due to the depravity of men that they did not exist4 ,from time to time men undertook in various upheavals to realize in some part these spiritual and political ideals which they carried within them4 ,and men not only carried within them the ideas of a ,new ,jerusalem in which the interest of one was the interest of all and of an earthly state ordered by a divine decree to fulfil this ,christian ideal1 but the determining causes of the present condition and the future realization depended also upon the inner attitudes and experiences of the individuals themselves4 ,without carrying the analogy here too far1 this relation between the experience of the individual and the world which may arise through the realization of his ideas is the basis of the most profound distinction between the ancient world and the modern4 ,before the logic of this attitude could appear in science a long period of intellectual and social growth was necessary4 ,the most essential part of this growth was the slow but steady development of psychological doctrine which placed the objective world in the experience of the individual4 ,it is not of interest here to bring out the modern epistemological problem that grew out of this1 or to present this in the world of ,leibnitzian monads that had no windows or in the ,berkeleyan subjective idealism4 ,what is of interest is to point out that this attitude established a functional relationship between even the subjective experience of the individual and the object of knowledge4 ,a skepticism based upon subjectivism might thereafter question the justification of the reference of experience beyond itself2 it could not question knowledge and its immediate object4 ,kant formalizes the relation of what was subjective and what was objective by identifying the former with the sensuous content of experience and the latter with the application of the forms of sensibility and understanding to this content4 ,the relationship was formal and dead4 ,kant recognized no functional relationship between the nature of the ,mannigfaltigkeit of sensuous experience and the forms into which it was poured4 ,the forms remained external to the content1 but the relationship was one which existed within experience1 not without it1 and within this experience could be found the necessity and universality which had been located in the world independent of experience4 ,the melting of these fixed ,kantian categories came with the spring floods of the romantic idealism that followed ,kant4 ,the starting-point of this idealism was ,kantian4 ,within experience lay the object of knowledge4 ,the ,idealist's principal undertaking was to overcome the skepticism that attached to the object of knowledge because of its reference to what lies outside itself4 ,if1 as ,kant had undertaken to prove1 the reality which knowledge implies must reach beyond experience1 then1 on the ,kantian doctrine that knowledge lies within experience1 knowledge itself is infected with skepticism4 ,kant's practical bridge from the world of experience to the world of things-in-themselves1 which he walked by faith and not by sight1 was found in the postulates of the conduct of the self as a moral being1 as a personality4 ,the romantic idealists advance by the same road1 though as romanticists not critical philosophers1 they fashioned the world of reality1 that transcends experience1 out of experience itself1 by centering the self in the absolute self and conceiving the whole infinite universe as the experience of the absolute self4 ,the interesting phase of this development is that the form which experience takes in becoming objective is found in the nature and thought of the individual1 and that this process of epistemological experience becomes thus a process of nature1 if the objective is the natural4 ,in ,kant's terms our minds give laws to nature4 ,but this nature constantly exhibits its dependence upon underlying noumena that must therefore transcend the laws given by the understanding4 ,the ,romanticist insists that this other reality must be the same stuff as that of experience1 that in experience arise forms which transcend those which bound the experience in its earlier phase4 ,if in experience the forms of the objective world are themselves involved1 the process of knowledge sets no limits to itself1 which it may not1 does not1 by implication transcend4 ,as further indication of the shift by which thought had passed into possession of the world of things in themselves stands the antinomy which in ,kantian experience marks the limit of our knowledge while in post-,kantian idealism it becomes the antithesis that leads to the synthesis upon the higher plane4 ,contradiction marks the phase at which the spirit becomes creative1 not simply giving an empty formal law to nature1 but creating the concrete universe in which content and form merge in true actuality4 ,the relation of the sensuous content to the conceptual form is not dead1 as in ,kant's doctrine4 ,it is fused as perception into concept and carries its immediacy and concreteness of detail into the concrete universal as the complete organization of stimulation and response pass into the flexible habit4 ,and yet in the ,hegelian logic1 the movement is always away from the perceptual experience toward the higher realm of the ,idee4 ,thought is creative in the movement1 but in its ultimate reality it transcends spatial and temporal experience1 the experience with which the natural and mathematical sciences deal4 ,thought is not a means of solving the problems of this world as they arise1 but a great process of realization in which this world is forever transcended4 ,its abstract particularities of sensuous detail belong only to the finite experience of the partial self4 ,this world is1 therefore1 always incomplete in its reality and1 in so far1 always untrue4 ,truth and full reality belong not to the field of scientific investigation4 ,in its metaphysics ,romantic ,idealism1 though it finds a place for scientific discovery and reconstruction1 leaves these disdainfully behind1 as incomplete phases of the ultimate process of reality1 as infected with untruth and deceptive unwarranted claims4 ,the world is still too much with us4 ,we recognize here three striking results of the development of reflective consciousness in the modern world3--first1 it is assumed that the objective world of knowledge can be placed within the experience of the individual without losing thereby its nature as an object1 that all characters of that object can be presented as belonging to that experience1 whether adequately or not is another question2 and second1 it is assumed that the contradictions in its nature which are associated with its inclusion in individual experience1 its references beyond itself when so included1 may themselves be the starting-point of a reconstruction which at least carries that object beyond the experience within which these contradictions arose2 and third1 it is assumed that this growth takes place in a world of reality within which the incomplete experience of the individual is an essential part of the process1 in which it is not a mere fiction1 destroying reality by its representation1 but is a growing-point in that reality itself4 ,these characters of philosophic interpretation1 the inclusion of the object of knowledge in the individual experience and the turning of the conflicts in that experience into the occasion for the creation of new objects transcending these contradictions1 are the characters in the conscious method1 of modern science1 which most profoundly distinguish it from the method of ancient science4 ,this1 of course1 is tantamount to saying that they are those which mark the experimental method in science4 ,that phase of the method upon which ,i have touched already has been its occupation with the so-called data or facts as distinguished from ,aristotelian individuals4 ,whenever we reduce the objects of scientific investigation to facts and undertake to record them as such1 they become events1 happenings1 whose hard factual character lies in the circumstance that they have taken place1 and this quite independently of any explanation of their taking place4 ,when they are explained they have ceased to be facts and have become instances of a law1 that is1 ,aristotelian individuals1 embodied theories1 and their actuality as events is lost in the necessity of their occurrence as expressions of the law2 with this change their particularity as events or happenings disappears4 ,they are but the specific values of the equation when constants are substituted for variables4 ,before the equation is known or the law discovered they have no such ground of existence4 ,up to this point they find their ground for existence in their mere occurrence1 to which the law which is to explain them must accommodate itself4 ,there are here suggested two points of view from which these facts may be regarded4 ,considered with reference to a uniformity or law by which they will be ordered and explained they are the phenomena with which the positivist deals2 as existencies to be identified and localized before they are placed within such a uniformity they fall within the domain of the psychological philosopher who can at least place them in their relation to the other events in the experience of the individual who observes them4 ,considered as having a residual meaning apart from the law to which they have become exceptions1 they can become the subject-matter of the rationalist4 ,it is important that we recognize that neither the positivist nor the rationalist is able to identify the nature of the fact or datum to which they refer4 ,i refer to such stubborn facts as those of the sporadic appearance of infectious diseases before the germ theory of the disease was discovered4 ,here was a fact which contradicted the doctrine of the spread of the infection by contact4 ,it appeared not as an instance of a law1 but as an exception to a law4 ,as such1 its nature is found in its having happened at a given place and time4 ,if the case had appeared in the midst of an epidemic1 its nature as a case of the infectious disease would have been cared for in the accepted doctrine1 and for its acceptance as an object of knowledge its location in space and time as an event would not have been required4 ,its geographical and historical traits would have followed from the theory of the infection1 as we identify by our calculations the happy fulfilment of ,thales' prophecy4 ,the happening of an instance of a law is accounted for by the law4 ,its happening may and in most instances does escape observation1 while as an exception to an accepted law it captures attention4 ,its nature as an event is1 then1 found in its appearance in the experience of some individual1 whose observation is controlled and recorded as his experience4 ,without its reference to this individual's experience it could not appear as a fact for further scientific consideration4 ,now the attitude of the positivist toward this fact is that induced by its relation to the law which is subsequently discovered4 ,it has then fallen into place in a series1 and his doctrine is that all laws are but uniformities of such events4 ,he treats the fact when it is an exception to law as an instance of the new law and assumes that the exception to the old law and the instance of the new are identical4 ,and this is a great mistake1--the mistake made also by the neo-realist when he assumes that the object of knowledge is the same within and without the mind1 that nothing happens to what is to be known when it by chance strays into the realm of conscious cognition4 ,any as yet unexplained exception to an old theory can happen only in the experience of an individual1 and that which has its existence as an event in some one's biography is a different thing from the future instance which is not beholden to any one for its existence4 ,yet there are1 as ,i indicated earlier1 meanings in this exceptional event which1 at least for the time1 are unaffected by the exceptional character of the occurrence4 ,for example1 certain clinical symptoms by which an infectious disease is identified have remained unchanged in diagnosis since the days of ,hippocrates4 ,these characters remain as characters of the instance of the law of germ-origin when this law has been discovered4 ,this may lead us to say that the exception which appears for the time being as a unique incident in a biography is identical with the instance of a germ-induced disease4 ,indeed1 we are likely to go further and1 in the assurance of the new doctrine1 state that former exceptions can 7or with adequate acquaintance with the facts could7 be proved to be necessarily an instance of a disease carried by a germ4 ,the positivist is therefore confident that the field of scientific knowledge is made up of events which are instances of uniform series1 although under conditions of inadequate information some of them appear as exceptions to the statements of uniformities1 in truth the latter being no uniformities at all4 ,that this is not a true statement of the nature of the exception and of the instance1 it is not difficult to show if we are willing to accept the accounts which the scientists themselves give of their own observation1 the changing forms which the hypothesis assumes during the effort to reach a solution and the ultimate reconstruction which attends the final tested solution4 ,wherever we are fortunate enough1 as in the biographies of men such as ,darwin and ,pasteur1 to follow a number of the steps by which they recognized problems and worked out tenable hypotheses for their solution1 we find that the direction which is given to attention in the early stage of scientific investigation is toward conflicts between current theories and observed phenomena1 and that since the form which these observations take is determined by the opposition1 it is determined by a statement which itself is later abandoned4 ,we find that the scope and character of the observations change at once when the investigator sets about gathering as much of the material as he can secure1 and changes constantly as he formulates tentative hypotheses for the solution of the problem1 which1 moreover1 generally changes its form during the investigation4 ,i am aware that this change in the form of the data will be brushed aside by many as belonging only to the attitude of mind of the investigator1 while it is assumed that the facts themselves1 however selected and organized in his observation and thought1 remain identical in their nature throughout4 ,indeed1 the scientist himself carries with him in the whole procedure the confidence that the fact-structure of reality is unchanged1 however varied are the forms of the observations which refer to the same entities4#ce ,the analysis of the fact-structure of reality shows in the first place that the scientist undertakes to form such an hypothesis that all the data of observation will find their place in the objective world1 and in the second place to bring them into such a structure that future experience will lead to anticipated results4 ,he does not undertake to preserve facts in the form in which they existed in experience before the problem arose nor to construct a world independent of experience or that will not be subject itself to future reconstructions in experience4 ,he merely insists that future reconstructions will take into account the old in re-adjusting it to the new4 ,in such a process it is evident that the change of the form in the data is not due to a subjective attitude of the investigator which can be abstracted from the facts4 ,when ,darwin1 for instance1 found that the marl dressings which farmers spread over their soil did not sink through the soil by the force of gravity as was supposed1 but that the earthworm castings were thrown up above these dressings at nearly the same rate at which they disappeared1 he did not correct a subjective attitude of mind4 ,he created in experience a humus which took the place of a former soil1 and justified itself by fitting it into the whole process of disintegration of the earth's surface4 ,it would be impossible to separate in the earlier experiences certain facts and certain attitudes of mind entertained by men with reference to these facts4 ,certain objects have replaced other objects4 ,it is only after the process of analysis1 which arose out of the conflicting observations1 has broken up the old object that what was a part of the object1 heavier-things-pushing-their way-through-soil-of-lighter-texture1 can become a mere idea4 ,earlier it was an object4 ,until it could be tested the earthworm as the cause of the disappearance of the dressings was also ,darwin's idea4 ,it became fact4 ,for science at least it is quite impossible to distinguish between what in an object must be fact and what may be idea4 ,the distinction when it is made is dependent upon the form of the problem and is functional to its solution1 not metaphysical4 ,so little can a consistent line of cleavage between facts and ideas be indicated1 that we can never tell where in our world of observation the problem of science will arise1 or what will be regarded as structure of reality or what erroneous idea4 ,there is a strong temptation to lodge these supposititious fact-structures in a world of conceptual objects1 molecules1 atoms1 electrons1 and the like4 ,for these at least lie beyond the range of perception by their very definition4 ,they seem to be in a realm of things-in-themselves4 ,yet they also are found now in the field of fact and now in that of ideas4 ,furthermore1 a study of their structure as they exist in the world of constructive science shows that their infra-sensible character is due simply to the nature of our sense-processes1 not to a different metaphysical nature4 ,they occupy space1 have measurable dimensions1 mass1 and are subject to the same laws of motion as are sensible objects4 ,we even bring them indirectly into the field of vision and photograph their paths of motion4 ,the ultimate elements referred to above provide a consistent symbolism for the finding and formulating of applied mathematical sciences1 within which lies the whole field of physics1 including ,euclidian geometry as well4 ,however1 they have succeeded in providing nothing more than a language and logic pruned of the obstinate contradictions1 inaccuracies1 and unanalyzed sensuous stuff of earlier mathematical science4 ,such a rationalistic doctrine can never present in an unchanged form the objects with which natural science deals in any of the stages of its investigation4 ,it can deal only with ultimate elements and forms of propositions4 ,it is compelled to fall back on a theory of analysis which reaches ultimate elements and an assumption of inference as an indefinable4 ,such an analysis is actually impossible either in the field of the conceptual objects into which physical science reduces physical objects1 or in the field of sensuous experience4 ,atoms can be reduced into positive and negative electrical elements and these may1 perhaps do1 imply a structure of ether that again invites further analysis and so on ad infinitum4 ,none of the hypothetical constructs carry with themselves the character of being ultimate elements unless they are purely metaphysical4 ,if they are fashioned to meet the actual problems of scientific research they will admit of possible further analysis1 because they must be located and defined in the continuity of space and time4 ,they cannot be the points and instants of modern mathematical theory4 ,nor can we reach ultimate elements in sensuous experience1 for this lies also within a continuum4 ,furthermore1 our scientific analyses are dependent upon the form that our objects assume4 ,there is no general analysis which research in science has ever used4 ,the assumption that psychology provides us with an analysis of experience which can be carried to ultimate elements or facts1 and which thereby provides the elements out of which the objects of our physical world must be constructed1 denies to psychology its rights as a natural science of which it is so jealous1 turning it into a ,berkeleyan metaphysics4 ,this most modern form of rationalism being unable to find ultimate elements in the field of actual science is compelled to take what it can find there4 ,now the results of the analysis of the classical ,english psychological school give the impression of being what ,mr4 ,russell calls hard facts1 i4e41 facts which cannot be broken up into others4 ,they seem to be the data of experience4 ,moreover1 the term hard is not so uncompromising as is the term element4 ,a fact can be more or less hard1 while an ultimate element cannot be more or less ultimate4 ,furthermore1 the entirely formal character of the logic enables it to deal with equal facility with any content4 ,one can operate with the more or less hard sense-data1 putting them in to satisfy the seeming variables of the propositions1 and reach conclusions which are formally correct4 ,there is no necessity for scrutinizing the data under these circumstances1 if one can only assume that the data are those which science is actually using4 ,the difficulty is that no scientist ever analyzed his objects into such sense-data4 ,they exist only in philosophical text-books4 ,even the psychologists recognize that these sensations are abstractions which are not the elements out of which objects of sense are constructed4 ,they are abstractions made from those objects whose ground for isolation is found in the peculiar problems of experimental psychology1 such as those of color or tone perception4 ,it would be impossible to make anything in terms of ,berkeleyan sense-data and of symbolic logic out of any scientific discovery4 ,research defines its problem by isolating certain facts which appear for the time being not as the sense-data of a solipsistic mind1 but as experiences of an individual in a highly organized society1 facts which1 because they are in conflict with accepted doctrines1 must be described so that they can be experienced by others under like conditions4 ,the ground for the analysis which leads to such facts is found in the conflict between the accepted theory and the experience of the individual scientist4 ,the analysis is strictly ad hoc4 ,as far as possible the exception is stated in terms of accepted meanings4 ,only where the meaning is in contradiction with the experience does the fact appear as the happening to an individual and become a paragraph out of his biography4 ,but as such an event1 whose existence for science depends upon the acceptance of the description of him to whom it has happened1 it must have all the setting of circumstantial evidence4 ,part of this circumstantial evidence is found in so-called scientific control1 that is1 the evidence that conditions were such that similar experiences could happen to others and could be described as they are described in the account given4 ,other parts of this evidence which we call corroborative are found in the statements of others which bear out details of this peculiar event1 though it is important to note that these details have to be wrenched from their settings to give this corroborative value4 ,to be most conclusive they must have no intentional connection with the experience of the scientist4 ,in other words1 those individuals who corroborate the facts are made1 in spite of themselves1 experiencers of the same facts4 ,the perfection of this evidence is attained when the fact can happen to others and the observer simply details the conditions under which he made the observation1 which can be then so perfectly reproduced that others may repeat the exceptional experience4 ,this process is not an analysis of a known world into ultimate elements and their relations4 ,such an analysis never isolates this particular exception which constitutes the scientific problems as an individual experience4 ,the extent to which the analysis is carried depends upon the exigencies of the problem4 ,it is the indefinite variety of the problems which accounts for the indefinite variety of the facts4 ,what constitutes them facts in the sense in which we are using the term is their exceptional nature2 formally they appear as particular judgments1 being denials of universal judgments1 whether positive or negative4 ,this exceptional nature robs the events of a reality which would have belonged to them as instances of a universal law4 ,it leaves them1 however1 with the rest of their meaning4 ,but the value which they have lost is just that which was essential to give them their place in the world as it has existed for thought4 ,banished from that universally valid structure1 their ground for existence is found in the experience of the puzzled observer4 ,such an observation was that of the moons of ,jupiter made possible by the primitive telescope of ,galileo4 ,for those who lived in a ,ptolemaic cosmos1 these could have existence only as observations of individuals4 ,as moons they had distinct meaning1 circling ,jupiter as our moon circles the earth1 but being in contradiction with the ,ptolemaic order they could depend for their existence only on the evidence of the senses1 until a ,copernican order could give them a local habitation and a name4 ,then they were observed not as the experiences of individuals but as instances of planetary order in a heliocentric system4 ,it would be palpably absurd to refer to them as mere sense-data1 mere sensations4 ,they are for the time being inexplicable experiences of certain individuals4 ,they are inexplicable because they have a meaning which is at variance with the structure of the whole world to which they belong4 ,they are the phenomena termed accidental by ,aristotle and rejected as full realities by him1 but which have become1 in the habitat of individual experience1 the headstone of the structure of modern research of science4 ,a rationalism which relegates implication to the indefinables cannot present the process of modern science4 ,implication is exactly that process by which these events pass from their individual existence into that of universal reality1 and the scientist is at pains to define it as the experimental method4 ,it is true that a proposition implies implication4 ,but the proposition is the statement of the result of the process by which an object has arisen for knowledge and merely indicates the structure of the object4 ,in discovery1 invention1 and research the escape from the exceptional1 from the data of early stages of observation1 is by way of an hypothesis2 and every hypothesis so far as it is tenable and workable in its form is universal4 ,no one would waste his time with a hypothesis which confessedly was not applicable to all instances of the problem4 ,an hypothesis may be again and again abandoned1 it may prove to be faulty and contradictory1 but in so far as it is an instrument of research it is assumed to be universal and to perfect a system which has broken down at the point indicated by the problem4 ,implication and more elaborated instances flow from the structure of this hypothesis4 ,the classical illustration which stands at the door of modern experimental science is the hypothesis which ,galileo formed of the rate of the velocity of a falling body4 ,he conceived that this was in proportion to the time elapsed during the fall and then elaborated the consequences of this hypothesis by working it into the accepted mathematical doctrines of the physical world1 until it led to an anticipated result which would be actually secured and which would be so characteristic an instance of a falling body that it would answer to every other instance as he had defined them4 ,in this fashion he defined his inference as the anticipation of a result because this result was a part of the world as he presented it amended by his hypothesis4 ,it is true that back of the specific implication of this result lay a mass of other implications1 many not even presented specifically in thought and many others presented by symbols which generalized innumerable instances4 ,these implications are for the scientist more or less implicit meanings1 but they are meanings each of which may be brought into question and tested in the same fashion if it should become an actual problem4 ,many of them which would not have occurred to ,galileo as possible problems have been questioned since his day4 ,what has remained after this period of determined questioning of the foundations of mathematics and the structure of the world of physical science is a method of agreement with oneself and others1 in 7a7 the identification of the object of thought1 in 7b7 the accepted values of assent and denial called truth and falsehood1 and in 7c7 referring to meaning1 in its relation to what is meant4 ,in any case the achievement of symbolic logic1 with its indefinables and axioms has been to reduce this logic to a statement of the most generalized form of possible consistent thought intercourse1 with entire abstraction from the content of the object to which it refers4 ,if1 however1 we abstract from its value in giving a consistent theory of number1 continuity1 and infinity1 this complete abstraction from the content has carried the conditions of thinking in agreement with self and others so far away from the actual problem of science that symbolic logic has never been used as a research method4 ,it has indeed emphasized the fact that thinking deals with problems which have reference to uses to which it can be put1 not to a metaphysical world lying beyond experience4 ,symbolic logic has to do with the world of discourse1 not with the world of things4 ,what ,russell pushes to one side as a happy guess is the actual process of implication by which1 for example1 the minute form in the diseased human system is identified with unicellular life and the history of the disease with the life history of this form4 ,this identification implies reclassification of these forms and a treatment of the disease that answers to their life history4 ,having made this identification we anticipate the result of this treatment1 calling it an inference4 ,implication belongs to the reconstruction of the object4 ,as long as no question has arisen1 the object is what it means or means what it is4 ,it does not imply any feature of itself4 ,when through conflict with the experience of the individual some feature of the object is divorced from some meaning the relationship between these becomes a false implication4 ,when a hypothetically reconstructed object finds us anticipating a result which accords with the nature of such objects we assert an implication of this meaning4 ,to carry this relation of implication back into objects which are subject to no criticism or question would of course resolve the world into elements connected by external relations1 with the added consequence that these elements can have no content1 since every content in the face of such an analysis must be subject to further analysis4 ,we reach inevitably symbols such as ,x1 ,y1 and ,z1 which can symbolize nothing4 ,theoretically we can assume an implication between any elements of an object1 but in this abstract assumption the symbolic logician overlooks the fact that he is also assuming some content which is not analyzed and which is the ground of the implication4 ,in other words this logician confuses the scientific attitude of being ready to question anything with an attitude of being willing to question everything at once4 ,it is only in an unquestioned objective world that the exceptional instance appears and it is only in such a world that an experimental science tests the implications of the hypothetically reconstructed object4 ,the guess is happy because it carries with it the consequences which follow from its fitting into the world1 and the guess1 in other words the hypothesis1 takes on this happy form solely because of the material reconstruction which by its nature removes the unhappy contradiction and promises the successful carrying out of the conflicting attitudes in the new objective world4 ,there is no such thing as formal implication4 ,where no reconstruction of the world is involved in our identification of objects that belong to it and where1 therefore1 no readjustment of conduct is demanded1 such a logic symbolizes what takes place in our direct recognition of objects and our response to them4 ,then ,x is a man implies ,x is mortal for all values of ,x exactly symbolizes the attitude toward a man subject to a disease supposedly mortal4 ,but it fails to symbolize the biological research which starting with inexplicable sporadic cases of an infectious disease carries over from the study of the life history of infusoria a hypothetical reconstruction of the history of disease and then acts upon the result of this assumption4 ,research-science presents a world whose form is always universal1 but this universal form is neither a metaphysical assumption nor a fixed form of the understanding4 ,while the scientist may as a metaphysician assume the existence of realities which lie beyond a possible experience1 or be a ,kantian or ,neo-,kantian1 neither of these attitudes is necessary for his research4 ,he may be a positivist--a disciple of ,hume or of ,john ,stuart ,mill4 ,he may be a pluralist who conceives1 with ,william ,james1 that the order which we detect in parts of the universe is possibly one that is rising out of the chaos and which may never be as universal as our hypothesis demands4 ,none of these attitudes has any bearing upon his scientific method4 ,this simplifies his thinking1 enables him to identify the object in which he is interested wherever he finds it1 and to abstract in the world as he conceives it those features which carry with them the occurrence he is endeavoring to place4 ,especially it enables him to make his thought a part of the socially accepted and socially organized science to which his thought belongs4 ,he is far too modest to demand that the world be as his inference demands4 ,he asks that his view of the world be cogent and convincing to all those whose thinking has made his own possible1 and be an acceptable premise for the conduct of that society to which he belongs4 ,the hypothesis has no universal and necessary characters except those that belong to the thought which preserves the same meanings to the same objects1 the same relations between the same relata1 the same attributes of assent and dissent under the same conditions1 the same results of the same combinations of the same things4 ,for scientific research the meanings1 the relations with the relata1 the assent and dissent1 the combinations and the things combined are all in the world of experience4 ,thinking in its abstractions and identifications and reconstructions undertakes to preserve the values that it finds1 and the necessity of its thinking lies in its ability to so identify1 preserve1 and combine what it has isolated that the thought structure will have an identical import under like conditions for the thinker with all other thinkers to whom these instruments of research conduct are addressed4 ,whatever conclusions the scientist draws as necessary and universal results from his hypothesis for a world independent of his thought are due1 not to the cogency of his logic1 but to other considerations4 ,for he knows if he reflects that another problem may arise which will in its solution change the face of the world built upon the present hypothesis4 ,he will defend the inexorableness of his reasoning1 but the premises may change4 ,even the contents of tridimensional space and sensuous time are not essential to the cogency of that reasoning nor can the unbroken web of the argument assure the content of the world as invariable4 ,his universals1 when applied to nature1 are all hypothetical universals2 hence the import of experiment as the test of an hypothesis4 ,experience does not rule out the possible cropping up of a new problem which may shift the values attained4 ,experience simply reveals that the new hypothesis fits into the meanings of the world which are not shaken2 it shows that1 with the reconstruction which the hypothesis offers1 it is possible for scientific conduct to proceed4 ,but if the universal character of the hypothesis and the tested theory belong to the instrumental character of thought in so reconstructing a world that has proved to be imperfect1 and inadequate to conduct1 the stuff of the world and of the new hypothesis are the same4 ,at least this is true for the scientist who has no interest in an epistemological problem that does not affect his scientific undertakings in one way nor another4 ,i have already pointed out that from the standpoint of logical and psychological analysis the things with which science deals can be neither ultimate elements nor sense-data2 but that they must be phases and characters and parts of things in some whole1 parts which can only be isolated because of the conflict between an accepted meaning and some experience4 ,i have pointed out that an analysis is guided by the practical demands of a solution of this conflict2 that even that which is individual in its most unique sense in the conflict and in attempts at its solution does not enter into the field of psychology--which has its own problems peculiar to its science4 ,certain psychological problems belong to the problems of other sciences1 as1 for example1 that of the personal equation belongs to astronomy or that of color vision to the theory of light4 ,but they bulk small in these sciences4 ,it cannot be successfully maintained that a scientific observation of the most unique sort1 one which is accepted for the time being simply as a happening in this or that scientist's experience1 is as such a psychological datum1 for the data in psychological text-books have reference to psychological problems4 ,psychology deals with the consciousness of the individual in its dependence upon the physiological organism and upon those contents which detach themselves from the objects outside the individual and which are identified with his inner experience4 ,it deals with the laws and processes and structures of this consciousness in all its experiences1 not with exceptional experiences4 ,it is necessary to emphasize again that for science these particular experiences arise within a world which is in its logical structure organized and universal4 ,they arise only through the conflict of the individual's experience with such an accepted structure4 ,for science individual experience presupposes the organized structure2 hence it cannot provide the material out of which the structure is built up4 ,this is the error of both the positivist and of the psychological philosopher1 if scientific procedure gives us in any sense a picture of the situation4 ,a sharp contrast appears between the accepted hypothesis with its universal form and the experiences which invalidate the earlier theory4 ,the reality of these experiences lies in their happening4 ,they were unpredictable4 ,they are not instances of a law4 ,the later theory1 the one which explains these occurrences1 changes their character and status1 making them necessary results of the world as that is conceived under this new doctrine4 ,this new standpoint carries with it a backward view1 which explains the erroneous doctrine1 and accounts for the observations which invalidated it4 ,every new theory must take up into itself earlier doctrines and rationalize the earlier exceptions4 ,a generalization of this attitude places the scientist in the position of anticipating later reconstructions4 ,he then must conceive of his world as subject to continuous reconstructions4 ,a familiar interpretation of his attitude is that the hypothesis is thus approaching nearer and nearer toward a reality which would never change if it could be attained1 or1 from the standpoint of the ,hegelian toward a goal at infinity4 ,the ,hegelian also undertakes to make this continuous process of reconstruction an organic phase in reality and to identify with nature the process of finding exceptions and of correcting them4 ,the fundamental difference between this position and that of the scientist who looks before and after is that the ,hegelian undertakes to make the exception in its exceptional character a part of the reality which transcends it1 while the scientist usually relegates the exception to the experience of individuals who were simply caught in an error which later investigation removes4 ,the error remains as an historical incident explicable perhaps as a result of the conditions under which it occurred1 but in so far as it was an error1 not a part of reality4 ,it is customary to speak of it as subjective1 though this implies that we are putting the man who was unwittingly in error into the position of the one who has corrected it4 ,to entertain that error in the face of its correction would be subjective4 ,a result of this interpretation is that the theories are abstracted from the world and regarded as something outside it4 ,it is assumed that the theories are mental or subjective and change while the facts remain unchanged4 ,even when it is assumed that theories and facts agree1 men speak of a correspondence or parallelism between idea and the reality to which it refers4 ,while this attitude seems to be that of science toward the disproved theories which lie behind it1 it is not its attitude to the theories which it accepts4 ,these are not regarded as merely parallel to realities1 as abstracted from the structure of things4 ,these meanings go into the makeup of the world4 ,it is true that the scientist who looks before and after realizes that any specific meaning which is now accepted may be questioned and discarded4 ,if he carries his refection far enough he sees that a complete elimination of all the meanings which might conceivably be so discredited would leave nothing but logical constants1 a world with no facts in any sense4 ,in this position he may of course take an agnostic attitude and be satisfied with the attitude of ,hume or ,mill or ,russell4 ,but if he does so1 he will pass into the camp of the psychological philosophers and will have left the position of the scientist4 ,the scientist always deals with an actual problem1 and even when he looks before and after he does so in so far as he is facing in inquiry some actual problem4 ,no actual problem could conceivably take on the form of a conflict involving the whole world of meaning4 ,the conflict always arises between an individual experience and certain laws1 certain meanings while others are unaffected4 ,these others form the necessary field without which no conflict can arise4 ,they give the man of research his 7,greek3 pou sto7 upon which he can formulate his problem and undertake its solution4 ,the possible calling in question of any content1 whatever it may be1 means always that there is left a field of unquestioned reality4 ,the attitude of the scientist never contemplates or could contemplate the possibility of a world in which there would be no reality by which to test his hypothetical solution of the problem that arises4 ,nor does this attitude when applied to past discarded theories necessarily carry with it the implication that these older theories were subjective ideas in men's minds1 while the reality lay beside and beyond them unmingled with ideas4 ,it always finds a standpoint from which these ideas in the earlier situation are still recognized as reliable1 for there are no scientific data without meanings4 ,there could be no history of science on any other basis4 ,no history of science goes back to ultimate elements or sense-data1 or to any combination of bare data on one hand and logical elements on the other4 ,the world of the scientist is always there as one in which reconstruction is taking place with continual shifting of problems1 but as a real world within which the problems arise4 ,the errors of the past and present appear as untenable hypotheses which could not bear the test of experiment if the experience were sufficiently enlarged and interpreted4 ,but they are not mere errors to be thrown into the scrap heap4 ,they become a part of a different phase of reality which a fuller history of the past records or a fuller account of the present interprets1 giving them thereby their proper place in a real world4#cf ,the completion of this program1 however1 awaits the solution of the scientific problem of the relation of the psychical and the physical with the attendant problem of the meaning of the so-called origin of consciousness in the history of the world4 ,my own feeling is that these problems must be attacked from the standpoint of the social nature of so-called consciousness4 ,the clear indications of this ,i find in the reference of our logical constants to the structure of thought as a means of communication1 in the explanation of errors in the history of science by their social determination1 and in the interpretation of the inner field of experience as the importation of social intercourse into the conscious conduct of the individual4 ,but whatever may be the solution of these problems1 it must carry with it such a treatment of the experience of the individual that the latter will never be regarded merely as a subjective state1 however inadequate it may have proved itself as a scientific hypothesis4 ,this seems to me to be involved in the conception of psychology as a natural science and in any legitimate carrying out of the ,hegelian program of giving reality and creative import to individual experience4 ,the experience of the individual in its exceptional character is the growing-point of science1 first of all in the recognition of data upon which the older theories break1 and second in the hypothesis which arises in the individual and is tested by the experiment which reconstructs the world4 ,a scientific history and a scientific psychology from which epistemology has been banished must place these observations and hypotheses together with erroneous conceptions and mistaken observations within the real world in such a fashion that their reference to the experience of the individual and to the world to which he belongs will be comprehensible4 ,as ,i have indicated1 the scientific theory of the physical and conscious individual in the world implied in this problem has still to be adequately developed4 ,but there is implied in the conception of such a theory such a location of the process of thought in the process of reality as will give it an import both in the meaning of things and in the individual's thinking4 ,we have the beginning of such a doctrine in the conception of a functional value of consciousness in the conduct of living forms1 and the development of reflective thought out of such a consciousness which puts it within the act and gives it the function of preparation where adjustment is necessary4 ,such a process creates the situation with reference to which the form acts4 ,in all adjustment or adaptation the result is that the form which is adjusted finds that by its adjustment it has created an environment4 ,the ancients by their formulation of the ,ptolemaic theory committed themselves to the world in which the fixed values of the heavenly over against the earthly obtained4 ,such a world was the interpretation of the experience involved in their physical and social attitudes4 ,they could not accept the hypothesis of ,aristarchus because it conflicted with the world which they had created1 with the values which were determining values for them4 ,the same was true of the hypothesis of ,democritus4 ,they could not1 as they conceived the physical world1 accept its purely quantitative character4 ,the conception of a disinterested truth which we have cherished since the ,middle ,ages is itself a value that has a social basis as really as had the dogma of the church4 ,the earliest statement of it was perhaps that of ,francis ,bacon4 ,freeing investigation from the church dogma and its attendant logic meant to him the freedom to find in nature what men needed and could use for the amelioration of their social and physical condition4 ,the full implication of the doctrine has been recognized as that of freedom1 freedom to effect not only values already recognized1 but freedom to attain as well such complete acquaintance with nature that new and unrecognized uses would be at our disposal2 that is1 that progress should be one toward any possible use to which increased knowledge might lead4 ,the cult of increasing knowledge1 of continually reconstructing the world1 took the place both of the ancient conception of adequately organizing the world as presented in thought1 and of the medieval conception of a systematic formulation on the basis of the statement in church dogma of social values4 ,this modern conception proceeds from the standpoint not of formulating values1 but giving society at the moment the largest possible number of alternatives of conduct1 i4e41 undertaking to fix from moment to moment the widest possible field of conduct4 ,the purposes of conduct are to be determined in the presence of a field of alternative possibilities of action4 ,the ends of conduct are not to be determined in advance1 but in view of the interests that fuller knowledge of conditions awaken4 ,so there appears a conception of determining the field that shall be quite independent of given values4 ,a real world which consists not of an unchanged universe1 but of a universe which may be continually readjusted according to the problems arising in the consciousness of the individuals within society4 ,the seemingly fixed character of such a world is found in the generally fixed conditions which underlie the type of problems which we find4 ,we determine the important conditions incident to the working out of the great problems which face us4 ,our conception of a given universe is formed in the effort to mobilize all the material about us in relation to these problems--the structure of the self1 the structure of matter1 the physical process of life1 the laws of change and the interrelation of changes4 ,with reference to these problems certain conditions appear fixed and become the statement of the world by which we must determine by experimental test the viability of our hypotheses4 ,there arises then the conception of a world which is unquestioned over against any particular problem4 ,while our science continually changes that world1 at least it must be always realized as there4 ,on the other hand1 these conceptions are after all relative to the ends of social conduct which may be formulated in the presence of any freedom of action4 ,we postulate freedom of action as the condition of formulating the ends toward which our conduct shall be directed4 ,ancient thought assured itself of its ends of conduct and allowed these to determine the world which tested its hypothesis4 ,we insist such ends may not be formulated until we know the field of possible action4 ,the formulation of the ends is essentially a social undertaking and seems to follow the statement of the field of possible conduct1 while in fact the statement of the possible field of conduct is actually dependent on the push toward action4 ,a moving end which is continually reconstructing itself follows upon the continually enlarging field of opportunities of conduct4 ,the conception of a world of existence1 then1 is the result of the determination at the moment of the conditions of the solution of the given problems4 ,these problems constitute the conditions of conduct1 and the ends of conduct can only be determined as we realize the possibilities which changing conditions carry with them4 ,our world of reality thus becomes independent of any special ends or purposes and we reach an entirely disinterested knowledge4 ,and yet the value and import of this knowledge is found in our conduct and in our continually changing conditions4 ,knowledge for its own sake is the slogan of freedom1 for it alone makes possible the continual reconstruction and enlargement of the ends of conduct4 ,the individual in his experiences is continually creating a world which becomes real through his discovery4 ,in so far as new conduct arises under the conditions made possible by his experience and his hypothesis the world1 which may be made the test of reality1 has been modified and enlarged4 ,i have endeavored to present the world which is an implication of the scientific method of discovery with entire abstraction from any epistemological or metaphysical presuppositions or complications4 ,scientific method is indifferent to a world of things-in-themselves1 or to the previous condition of philosophic servitude of those to whom its teachings are addressed4 ,it is a method not of knowing the unchangeable but of determining the form of the world within which we live as it changes from moment to moment4 ,it undertakes to tell us what we may expect to happen when we act in such or such a fashion4 ,it has become a matter of serious consideration for a philosophy which is interested in a world of things-in-themselves1 and the epistemological problem4 ,for the cherished structures of the metaphysical world1 having ceased to house the values of mankind1 provide good working materials in the hypothetical structures of science1 on condition of surrendering their metaphysical reality2 and the epistemological problem1 having seemingly died of inanition1 has been found to be at bottom a problem of method or logic4 ,my attempt has been to present what seems to me to be two capital instances of these transformations4 ,science always has a world of reality by which to test its hypotheses1 but this world is not a world independent of scientific experience1 but the immediate world surrounding us within which we must act4 ,our next action may find these conditions seriously changed1 and then science will formulate this world so that in view of this problem we may logically construct our next plan of action4 ,the plan of action should be made self-consistent and universal in its form1 not that we may thus approach nearer to a self-consistent and universal reality which is independent of our conduct1 but because our plan of action needs to be intelligent and generally applicable4 ,again science advances by the experiences of individuals1 experiences which are different from the world in which they have arisen and which refer to a world which is not yet in existence1 so far as scientific experience is concerned4 ,but this relation to the old and new is not that of a subjective world to an objective universe1 but is a process of logical reconstruction by which out of exceptions the new law arises to replace a structure that has become inadequate4 ,in both of these processes1 that of determining the structure of experience which will test by experiment the legitimacy of the new hypothesis1 and that of formulating the problem and the hypothesis for its solution1 the individual functions in his full particularity1 and yet in organic relationship with the society that is responsible for him4 ,it is the import for scientific method of this relationship that promises most for the interpretation of the philosophic problems involved4 ,,consciousness ,,and ,,psychology ,,boyd ,h4 ,,bode ,if it is true that misery loves company1 those persons who feel despondent over the present situation in philosophy may console themselves with the reflection that things are not so bad as they might be4 ,our friends1 the psychologists1 are afflicted even as we are4 ,the disagreements of experts as to both the subject-matter and the method of psychology are as fundamental as anything that philosophy can show4 ,a spirit of revolt is abroad in the land1 and psychology is once more on trial4 ,the compact which provided that psychology should be admitted to the rank of a natural science1 on condition that it surrender its pretension to be the science of the soul and confine itself to the study of consciousness1 is no longer considered binding4 ,the suspicion is growing that consciousness is nothing more nor less than an attenuated form of the soul that it pretends to displace4 ,consequently the psychology without a soul to which we have just become accustomed is now attacked on behalf of a psychology without a consciousness1 on the ground that this latter standpoint alone can give assurance against entangling alliances between psychology and metaphysics4 ,from the side of philosophy this situation is interesting1 not only to such as may crave the comfort that springs from the spectacle of distress1 but also to those who take a more hopeful view of present-day tendencies4 ,the question that is at issue is fundamentally the question of the nature of consciousness1 which is quite as important to philosophy as to psychology4 ,on the one hand it is maintained that psychology has to do with consciousness and that its distinctive method is the method of introspection4 ,on the other hand it is urged that psychology is nothing more nor less than a study of behavior1 that it is not a science at all1 unless the existence of consciousness is denied or at least ignored1 and that the method of introspection is a delusion and a snare4 ,the two standpoints are not always clearly formulated1 nor can we say that every system of psychology is true to type4 ,it is1 in fact1 the lack of clearness in the fundamental concepts that makes the status of psychology a matter of so much uncertainty4 ,the situation presents an apparent anomaly4 ,both parties profess to deal with facts of observation1 yet the claim of the introspectionist that he observes facts of consciousness is met by the assertion of his rival that there is no consciousness to be observed4 ,how can this be1 unless we assume that introspection presupposes an esoteric principle1 like the principle of grace in religion8 ,it seems evident that we have to do here with some deep-seated misconception regarding the facts that are supposed to constitute the subject-matter for observation and description4 ,a common procedure on the part of introspectionism is to assert the existence of consciousness as something which is indeed indefinable1 but which admits of observation and description4 ,but this procedure is no longer justified4 ,in the first place1 the assertion that consciousness exists is not the statement of a fact but the designation of a problem4 ,what is the nature of the fact that we call consciousness8 ,if the common-sense individual1 who assents so readily to the proposition that we all know consciousness1 be asked to differentiate between consciousness and the objects of consciousness1 he is dazed and helpless4 ,and1 secondly1 the assertion of indefinability involves us in a difficulty4 ,the indefinability of consciousness has sometimes been likened to that of space1 but in this latter case we find no such confusion between space and the objects in space4 ,it is clear1 however1 that if consciousness is not something distinguishable from objects1 there is no need to discuss consciousness1 and if it is distinguishable1 it must be distinguished before we are entitled to proceed with observation and description4 ,definition is indispensable1 at least to the extent of circumscribing the facts that are to be investigated4 ,moreover1 if consciousness cannot be defined1 neither can it be described4 ,what is definition1 after all1 but a form of description8 ,to assert1 in effect1 that consciousness is indefinable because it is indescribable1 and that for this reason we must be content with description1 is both a flagrant disregard of consistency and an unwarranted abuse of our good nature4 ,this difficulty leads on to another1 for doubts1 like lies1 have a singular propensity to breed more of their kind4 ,if consciousness is something that everybody knows1 why should it be necessary to look to the psychologist for a description of it8 if the study of consciousness brings to light any new fact1 that fact by definition is not a conscious fact at all1 and consequently is not the kind of thing that we set out to describe4 ,consciousness1 in short1 cannot be analyzed2 it cannot be resolved into elements or constituents4 ,it is precisely what it is and not some product of our after-thought that we are pleased to substitute for it4 ,these familiar considerations do not1 indeed1 decide the issue between the rival theories of psychology1 but they serve to suggest that our introspective psychology has been too easily satisfied in the conception of its specific problem or subject-matter4 ,as a matter of fact1 the work that has been done in the name of psychology has been peculiarly barren of results1 so far as a consciousness an sich is concerned1 although it has led to a wealth of material pertaining to adaptive behavior4 ,its solid achievements lie in the domain1 not of consciousness1 but of instinctive1 habitual1 and intelligent adaptation4 ,it teaches us little that has to do unequivocally with consciousness as distinct from things1 but it teaches us much concerning stimulus and response1 attention and habit1 conflict and adjustment4 ,the doctrine that psychology is a science of behavior is justified at least to the extent that it emphasizes a factor1 the importance of which introspectionism has consistently refused to recognize4 ,whatever conclusion we may ultimately reach regarding the nature of consciousness1 the whole drift of psychological and biological investigation seems to indicate that an adequate conception of consciousness and of the distinctive problem of psychology can be attained only on the basis of a painstaking reflection on the facts of behavior4 ,i ,it is evident that the attempt to ascertain the nature of consciousness and of psychology from the standpoint of behavior is committed to the assumption that the behavior in question is of a distinctive kind4 ,the justification of this assumption will enable us to formulate the definitions which we seek4 ,discussions of conscious behavior ordinarily emphasize the similarity between conscious and reflex behavior rather than the difference4 ,an attitude of expectancy1 for example1 is usually conceived as a sort of temporary reflex4 ,certain nervous connections are organized for the occasion1 so that1 when a given stimulus arrives1 it will induce its appropriate response4 ,this situation is best exemplified1 perhaps1 in simple reaction-experiments1 in which the subject makes a certain predetermined response upon presentation of the stimulus4 ,the process is supposed to be of the reflex type throughout1 the only difference being that ordinary reflexes are relatively permanent and unvarying1 whereas a prearranged response to a stimulus has to do with a reflex that is made to order so as to meet the exigencies of the moment4 ,for certain purposes such a description of conscious behavior is no doubt sufficiently accurate4 ,our present concern1 however1 is with the differences between these temporary organizations and ordinary reflexes4 ,in order to bring out these differences1 let us introduce a slight complication into our reaction-experiment and suppose that the subject is to make one of two alternative responses1 according to the nature of the stimulus4 ,his state of expectancy is accompanied by a certain bodily set or preparedness for the coming event1 although the precise nature of the event is a matter of uncertainty4 ,his nervous system is in readiness to respond this way or that1 or rather1 it has already started to act in both of the alternative ways4 ,if the subject is to respond with the right hand to one stimulus and with the left hand to the other1 both hands are in a state of activity before the stimulus appears4 ,the organization of the temporary reflex through the agency of the cerebral cortex could not be achieved were it not for the fact that all the movements entering into the organization are nascently aroused before the spring is touched which permits the act to unroll itself in orderly sequence4 ,the various successive movements1 then1 which make up our temporary reflex achieve their relationship to one another from the fact that they are started simultaneously1 and this peculiarity constitutes a distinctive feature4 ,apparently this feature is absent from true reflexes4 ,an act of swallowing1 performed unconsciously1 may start the complicated processes of digestion1 but it is merely the first act of a series4 ,there is no evidence that the movements of the stomach and of the other organs concerned in digestion must be presupposed before the act of swallowing can take place4 ,the swallowing may start the other processes1 but we cannot say that these other processes react back upon the first act and make it one of swallowing rather than something else4 ,yet this back stroke is precisely what is necessary in our reaction-experiment1 for it is by virtue of this fact that the organization of the temporary reflex becomes a possibility4 ,the first response cannot take place until the last is provided for4 ,thus the immediate act of looking has embodied in it the activity that is to follow later4 ,the looking is not simply with the eye1 but with the hands that are to complete the response4 ,the optical response is a response which1 in the language of ,bergson1 prefigures or sketches out the act of a later moment4 ,the nervous system is enabled to act as a unit1 because the movements that are to occur at a later time are represented in the first stage of the complete act4 ,the first stage1 accordingly1 does not occur independently1 but as a preliminary to the second4 ,with an imperfect organization of the entire response1 it may happen that the subsequent movements are not suppressed until their proper moment arrives1 but appear in advance of their scheduled time4 ,in writing1 for example1 we frequently omit words or add to a word the final letter of some word that belongs to a subsequent part of the sentence4 ,an error of this sort could hardly occur so readily in the course of an act that belongs to the type of the true reflex4 ,lest the reader suspect that this is a priori physiology1 ,i may quote the following from a prominent neurologist3 ,no simple sensory impulse can1 under ordinary circumstances1 reach the cerebral cortex without first being influenced by subcortical association centers1 within which complex reflex combinations may be effected and various automatisms set off in accordance with their preformed structure4 ,these subcortical systems are to some extent modifiable by racial and individual experience1 but their reactions are chiefly of the determinate or stereotyped character1 with a relatively limited range of possible reaction types for any given stimulus complex4 ,it is shown by the lower vertebrates1 which lack the cerebral cortex1 that these subcortical mechanisms are adequate for all of the ordinary simple processes of life1 including some degree of associative memory4 ,but here1 when emergencies arise which involve situations too complex to be resolved by these mechanisms1 the animal will pay the inevitable penalty of failure--perhaps the loss of his dinner1 or even of his life4 ,in the higher mammals with well-developed cortex the automatisms and simple associations are likewise performed mainly by the subcortical apparatus1 but the inadequacy of this apparatus in any particular situation presents not the certainty of failure1 but rather a dilemma4 ,the rapid preformed automatisms fail to give relief1 or perhaps the situation presents so many complex sensory excitations as to cause mutual interference and inhibition of all reaction4 ,there is a stasis in the subcortical centers4 ,meanwhile the higher neural resistance of the cortical pathways has been overcome by summation of stimuli and the cortex is excited to function4 ,here is a mechanism adapted1 not for a limited number of predetermined and immediate responses1 but for a much greater range of combination of the afferent impressions with each other and with memory vestiges of previous reactions and a much larger range of possible modes of response to any given set of afferent impressions4 ,by a process of trial and error1 perhaps1 the elements necessary to effect the adaptive response may be assembled and the problem solved4 ,it is evident here that the physiological factors in the dilemma or problem as this is presented to the cortex are by no means simple sensory impressions1 but definitely organized systems of neural discharge1 each of which is a physiological resultant of the reflexes1 automatisms1 impulses1 and inhibitions characteristic of its appropriate subcortical centers4 ,the precise form which these subcortical combinations will assume in response to any particular excitation is in large measure determined by the structural connections inter se4444 ,from the standpoint of the cerebral cortex considered as an essential part of the mechanism of higher conscious acts1 every afferent stimulus1 as we have seen1 is to some extent affected by its passage through various subcortical association centers 7i4e41 it carries a quale of central origin74 ,but this same afferent impulse in its passage through the spinal cord and brain stem may1 before reaching the cortex1 discharge collateral impulses into the lower centers of reflex cooerdination1 from which incipient 7or even actually consummated7 motor responses are discharged previous to the cortical reaction4 ,these motor discharges may1 through the 'back stroke' action1 in turn exert an influence upon the slower cortical reaction4 ,thus the lower reflex response may in a literal physiological sense act into the cortical stimulus complex and become an integral part of it4#cg ,it seems clear1 then1 that conscious behavior involves a certain process of organization which constitutes a differential4 ,the units entering into this process are definitely organized systems of neural discharge1 the antecedent organization of these several systems being due either to the inherited or to the acquired structure of the nervous system4 ,given a certain amount of plasticity1 the nervous system builds up specific forms of response for certain objects or situations1 and these forms of response subsequently become the material from which new organizations or new modes of response are constructed4 ,the achievements of the past1 accordingly1 become stepping-stones to new achievement4 ,the new organization1 moreover1 is not determined by a mechanism antecedently provided1 but has a peculiar flexibility1 so as to meet the demands of a new situation4 ,that is1 a new mode of procedure is adopted4 ,instead of being a purely mechanical reaction1 the response that results from the situation is tentative or experimental in character1 and by a process of trial and error1 perhaps1 the elements necessary to effect the adaptive response may be assembled and the problem solved4 ,we may add at once that the reorganization which is required to constitute conscious behavior varies a great deal in extent4 ,in an act that is more or less habitual1 a comparatively slight modification of the corresponding organized system of neural discharge will suffice to harmonize the conflicting elements1 whereas on other occasions a more extensive modification is required4 ,but in any case it appears that there is a certain impropriety in describing conscious behavior in terms of a temporary reflex1 since the study of this behavior is concerned with the organization of the discordant elements1 not as a result1 but primarily as a process4 ,in a reflex act we may suppose that the stimulus which evokes the first stage in the response is like the first in a row of upstanding bricks1 which in falling knocks down another4 ,that is1 the reflex arc is built up by agencies that are quite independent of the subsequent act4 ,the arc is all set up and ready for use by the time the reflex act appears upon the scene4 ,in the case of conscious activity1 on the other hand1 we find a very different state of affairs4 ,the arc is not first constructed and then used1 but is constructed as the act proceeds2 and this progressive organization is1 in the end1 what is meant by conscious behavior4 ,if the course of a reflex act may be compared with traveling in a railroad train1 the progress of a conscious act is more like that of a band of explorers1 who hew their path and build their bridges as they go along4 ,the direction of the act is not determined from without but from within2 the end is internal to the process4 ,this process of organization and purposive direction is exemplified in every act of attention4 ,is that noise1 for example1 a horse in the street1 or is it the rain on the roof8 ,what we find in such a situation is not a paralysis of activity1 but a redirection4 ,the incompatibility of responses is purely relative4 ,there is indeed a mutual inhibition of the responses for hoof-beats and rain respectively1 in the sense that neither has undisputed possession of the field2 but this very inhibition sets free the process of attention1 in which the various responses participate and cooeperate4 ,there is no static balancing of forces1 but rather a process in which the conflict is simply a condition for an activity of a different kind4 ,if ,i am near a window facing the street1 my eye turns thither for a clue2 if the appeal to vision be eliminated1 the eye becomes unseeing and cooeperates with the ear by excluding all that is irrelevant to the matter in hand4 ,in this process the nervous system functions as a unit1 with reference to the task of determining the source and character of the sound4 ,this task or problem dominates the situation4 ,a voice in an adjoining room may break in1 but only as something to be ignored and shut out2 whereas a voice in the street may become all-absorbing as possibly indicating the driver of the hypothetical horse4 ,that is1 the reason why the conflict of responses does not end in a deadlock1 but in a redirection1 is that a certain selectiveness of response comes into play4 ,out of the mass of more or less inchoate activities a certain response is selected as a rallying-point for the rest1 and this selection is of a purposive character4 ,the selection is determined by reference to the task in hand1 which is to restore a certain harmony of response4 ,accordingly1 that response is selected which gives promise of forwarding the business of the moment4 ,by virtue of this selective character1 one of the constituents of the total activity becomes exalted among its fellows and is entrusted with the function of determining further behavior4 ,the purpose of the discussion1 up to this point1 is to put forward this selective or teleological character as the fundamental and differentiating trait of conscious behavior2 and our task1 accordingly1 is to give an account of the nature and modus operandi of this purposive control4 ,this control1 it is evident1 consists in giving direction to behavior with reference to results that are still in the future4 ,the basis for this anticipation of the future is furnished by the nascent responses which foreshadow further activity1 even while they are still under the thraldom of the inhibitions which hold them back4 ,these suppressed activities furnish a sort of diagram or sketch of further possible behavior1 and the problem of consciousness is the problem of making the result or outcome of these incipient responses effective in the control of behavior4 ,future results or consequences must be converted into present stimuli2 and the accomplishment of this conversion is the miracle of consciousness4 ,to be conscious is to have a future possible result of present behavior embodied as a present existence functioning as a stimulus to further behavior4 ,thus the qualities of a perceptual experience may be interpreted1 without exception1 as anticipations of the results of activities which are as yet in an embryonic stage4 ,the results of the activity that is as yet partly suppressed are already expressed or anticipated in the perception4 ,the present experience may1 as ,james says1 shoot its perspective far before it1 irradiating in advance the regions in which lie the thoughts as yet unborn4#ch ,a baseball player1 for example1 who is all set to field a ball as a preliminary to a further play1 sees the ball1 not simply as an approaching object1 but as ball-to-be-caught-and-then-thrown-to-fir st-base4 ,moreover1 the ball1 while still on the way1 is a ball-that-may-bound-to-the-right-or- to-the-left4 ,the corresponding movements of the player to the right or left1 and the act of throwing1 although present only as inhibited or incipient acts1 are nevertheless embodied in the visual experience4 ,similarly my couch looks soft and inviting1 because the optical stimulation suggests or prompts1 not only the act of lying down1 but also the kind of relaxation that is made possible by a comfortable bed4 ,so likewise the tiger's jaws and claws look cruel and horrible1 because in that perception are reflected the incipient movements of defense and recoil which are going on in the body of the observer4 ,perception1 like our air-castles1 or like dreams in the ,freudian theory1 presents what is at best but a suggestion or program in the guise of accomplished fact4 ,this projection1 however1 of our submerged activities into our perceptions requires a more precise statement4 ,according to the foregoing contention1 the appearance1 for example1 of a razor's edge as sharp is the sensory correlate of an incipient response which1 if it were to attain full-blown perfection1 would be the reaction to a cut4 ,by hypothesis1 however1 the response is inhibited1 and it is this inhibition which calls forth the perception of the object4 ,if the response encountered no obstruction1 adaptation would be complete and perception would not occur4 ,since there is a blocking of the response1 nature resorts to a special device in order to overcome the difficulty1 and this device consists in furnishing the organism with a new type of stimulus4 ,the razor as perceived does not actually cut just now1 but it bodies forth the quality 'will cut1' i4e41 the perceived attribute derives its character from what the object will1 or may1 do at a future time4 ,that is1 a perceived object is a stimulus which controls or directs the organism by results which have not yet occurred1 but which will1 or may1 occur in the future4 ,the uniqueness of such a stimulus lies in the fact that a contingent result somehow becomes operative as a present fact2 the future is transferred into the present so as to become effective in the guidance of behavior4 ,this control by a future that is made present is what constitutes consciousness4 ,a living body may respond to an actual cut by a knife on purely mechanical or reflex principles2 but to respond to a cut by anticipation1 i4e41 to behave with reference to a merely possible or future injury1 is manifestly an exhibition of intelligence4 ,not that there need be any conscious reference to the future as future in the act4 ,merely to see the object as sharp is sufficient to give direction to conduct4 ,but sharp is equivalent to will cut2 the quality of sharpness is a translation of future possibility into terms of present fact1 and as thus translated the future possibility becomes a factor in the control of behavior4 ,perception1 therefore1 is a point where present and future coincide4 ,what the object will do is1 in itself1 just a contingency1 an abstract possibility1 but in perception this possibility clothes itself in the garments of present1 concrete fact and thus provides the organism with a different environment4 ,the environment provides a new stimulus by undergoing a certain kind of change1 i4e41 by exercising a peculiar function of control4 ,this control is seeing1 and the whole mystery of consciousness is just this rendering of future stimulations or results into terms of present existence4 ,consciousness1 accordingly1 is a name for a certain change that takes place in the stimulus2 or1 more specifically1 it is a name for the control of conduct by future results or consequences4 ,to acquire such a stimulus and to become conscious are one and the same thing4 ,as was indicated previously1 the conscious stimulus is correlated with the various inherited and acquired motor tendencies which have been set off and which are struggling for expression1 and the uniqueness of the stimulus lies in the fact that the adaptive value of these nascent motor tendencies becomes operative as the determining principle in the organization of the response4 ,the response1 for example1 to sharp or will cut is reminiscent of an earlier reaction in which the organism engaged in certain defensive movements as the result of an actual injury4 ,that is1 the response to sharp is a nascent or incipient form of a response which at the time of its first occurrence was the expression of a maladaptation4 ,the response that is induced when an object is seen as sharp would be biologically bad1 if it were completed1 and the fact that the object is seen as sharp means that this result is foreshadowed and operates as a stimulus to prevent such maladaptation4 ,similarly the couch which meets my weary eye becomes a stimulus to repose because the nascent activity which is aroused would be biologically good if completed4 ,in any case the character of the stimulus is determined by the adaptive value which the incipient activity would have if it were carried out4 ,consciousness1 accordingly1 is just a future adaptation that has been set to work so as to bring about its own realization4 ,the future thus becomes operative in the present1 in much the same way as the prospects for next year's crop may be converted by the farmer into ready money with which to secure the tools for its production4 ,to justify this conclusion by a detailed and extensive application of this interpretation to every form of quality and relation would carry us beyond the limits of the present undertaking4 ,it is a view1 however1 which offers possibilities that have not as yet been properly recognized4 ,certain considerations1 besides those already discussed1 may be mentioned as giving it an antecedent plausibility4 ,as regards simple sense-qualities1 there is abundant reason for believing that ,locke's doctrine of simple ideas is a violent perversion of the facts4 ,to assume that the last results of analysis are the first things in experience is to give a fatal twist to psychology and to commit us to the fruitless agonies of epistemology4 ,the original blooming1 buzzing confusion with which experience starts becomes differentiated into specific qualities only to the extent that certain typical and organized forms of response are built up within the body4 ,sense-qualities1 in other words1 are functionally not simple but extremely complex2 they owe their distinctiveness or individuality to the fact that each of them embodies a specific set of cues or anticipations1 with reference to further experiences4 ,the difference between a quality like sharpness and a quality like red lies in the fact that the former is a translation of a relatively simple possibility1 viz41 will cut1 whereas the latter embodies a greater variety of anticipations4 ,the perception of red1 being the outcome of many comparisons and associations1 presupposes a complex physical response which contains multitudinous tendencies to reinstate former responses2 and the combined effect of these suppressed tendencies is the perception of a color which offers possibilities of control over behavior in such directions as reminiscences1 idle associations1 or perhaps scrutiny and investigation4 ,a similar explanation evidently applies to abstract ideas1 which neither admit of reduction to revived sensations nor compel the adoption of a peculiarly spiritual or psychic existence in the form of unanalyzable meanings4 ,here again a complex mode of response must be assumed1 having as its correlate an experience describable only in terms of its functioning1 which is such as to enable the organism to act intelligently1 i4e41 with reference to future results1 which are sufficiently embodied in the experience to secure appropriate behavior4 ,again1 this point of view offers a satisfactory solution for the time-worn puzzle of relativity4 ,if perception is just the translation of future possible stimulations into present fact1 there is assuredly no justification for the notion that perception distorts the facts or that discrepancies among different perceptions prove their subjectivity4 ,there remains but one test by which the correctness or validity of perception may be judged1 viz41 whether the perceived object proves to be the kind of stimulus which is reported or anticipated in the present experience4 ,so far our discussion has emphasized the anticipatory character of the conscious stimulus4 ,future consequences come into the present as conditions for further behavior4 ,these anticipations are based1 indeed1 upon previous happenings1 but they enter into the present situation as conditions that must be taken into account4 ,but to take them into account means that the conscious situation is essentially incomplete and in process of transformation or reconstruction4 ,this peculiar incompleteness or contingency stands out prominently when the situation rises to the level of uncertainty and perplexity4 ,to borrow the classical illustration of the child and the candle1 the child is in a state of uncertainty because the neural activity of the moment comprises two incompatible systems of discharge1 the one being a grasping and holding1 the other a withdrawal and such further movements as may be induced by contact with fire4 ,hence the candle has the seductiveness of a prize1 but at the same time carries the suggestion of burning the fingers4 ,that is1 the perceived object has a unique character of uncertainty1 which inheres in it as a present positive quality4 ,we are here confronted with genuine contingency1 such as is encountered nowhere else4 ,other modes of behavior may be uncertain in the sense that the incoming stimulation finds no fixed line of discharge laid down for itself within the organism4 ,in seeking to convert itself into response it may either sweep away the obstructions in its path or work itself out along lines of less resistance1 in ways that no man can foretell4 ,there may be moments of equilibrium1 moments when it remains to be seen where the dam will break and the current rush through4 ,such uncertainty1 however1 is the uncertainty of the bystander who attempts to forecast what will happen next4 ,it is not the uncertainty that figures as an integral part of conscious behavior4 ,this inherent uncertainty means that conscious behavior1 as contrasted with the mechanical character of the reflexes1 is essentially experimental4 ,the uncertainty exists precisely because an effort is under way to clear up the uncertainty4 ,the resort to eye or ear or to reflective thinking is suggested by the corresponding nascent responses and is an endeavor to secure something which is still to seek1 but which1 when found1 will meet the requirements of the situation4 ,translating this process into terms of stimulus and response1 we may say that the conscious stimulus of the moment induces the investigation or scrutiny which presently results in the arrival of a stimulus that is adequate to the situation4 ,the stimulus1 in other words1 provides for its own successor2 or we may say that the process as a whole is a self-directing1 self-determining activity4 ,stimulus and response are not successive stages or moments1 but rather simultaneous functions or phases of the total process4 ,within this process the given situation is the stimulus because it is that aspect or function which guides the subsequent course of the activity1 while the bodily movements are the response because they already embody the activity that is to follow4 ,the significant circumstance here is that stimulus and response resist the temporal separation that we find in a purely reflex act2 stimulus and response are bound together as correlated functions in a unitary1 self-directing process1 so that these twain are one flesh4 ,situations of uncertainty and expectancy1 as exemplified by the familiar child-candle incident1 are of interest1 because they emphasize both the anticipatory character of experience and the peculiar reconstruction of the stimulus4 ,these situations1 however1 differ merely in degree1 not in kind1 from other experiences2 their merit is that in them the distinctive character of conscious life is writ large4 ,to say that they are conscious situations is to say that they are so constituted that the possibilities of a subsequent moment are embodied in them as a positive quality4 ,in them the present moment embodies a future that is contingent4 ,and similarly the response has neither the predetermined organization of the reflex nor the aimless character of a response that issues in a set of random movements4 ,it is1 so to speak1 of a generalized character1 like the paleontological specimens that foreshadow in their structure the advent of both fish and reptile4 ,this form of organization1 however1 while exemplified most strikingly in situations of uncertainty1 pertains to all conscious behavior4 ,in uttering a sentence1 for example1 we know in advance what we are going to say1 yet the sentence shapes itself into definite form only as we proceed2 or perhaps we get stuck1 and by hemming and hawing bear witness that a struggle for a certain kind of organization is going on4 ,the same word in different contexts is a different word in each instance1 by virtue of the coloring that it takes on from what is to follow after4 ,and this is equally true of our most casual experiences4 ,the auditory or visual object that we happen to notice and immediately afterwards ignore is apprehended with reference to the possibility of warranting further attention1 or else it presents itself as an intruder that is to be excluded in order that we may go on with the concern of the moment4 ,all experience is a kind of intelligence1 a control of present behavior with reference to future adjustment4 ,to be in experience at all is to have the future operate in the present4 ,this reference to the future may be in the nature of an end or goal that controls a series of activities or it may be of a momentary and casual kind4 ,in any case the character of the stimulus changes with the progress of the act4 ,the book on the table must become successively book-to-be-reached-for1 book-to-be-picked-up1 and book-to-be-opened1 unless the process is to drop back to the type of reflex4 ,this development of the stimulus gives genuine continuity1 since every moment in the process comes as a fulfilment of its predecessor and as a transition-point to its successor4 ,in a purely mechanical act response follows stimulus like the successive strokes of a clock4 ,it is a touch-and-go affair2 the stimulus presses the button and then subsides1 while the neural organization does the rest4 ,in conscious behavior1 on the other hand1 stimulus and response keep step with each other4 ,a mere succession of stimuli would reduce conscious behavior to a series of explosive jerks1 on the principle of the gasoline engine4 ,to be conscious at all is to duplicate in principle the agility of the tight-rope performer1 who continuously establishes new co-ordinations according to the exigencies of the moment and with constant reference to the controlling consideration of keeping right side up4 ,the sensory stimulus provides continuously for its own rehabilitation or appropriate transformation1 and in a similar way the neural organization is never a finished thing1 but is in constant process of readjustment to meet the demands of an adaptation that still lies in the future4 ,it is this relationship of present response to the response of the next moment that constitutes the distinctive trait of conscious behavior4 ,the relatively unorganized responses of the present moment1 in becoming reflected in the experienced object1 reveal their outcome or meaning before they have become overt1 and thus provide the conditions of intelligent action4 ,in other words1 future consequences become transformed into a stimulus for further behavior4 ,we are confronted here with a distinctive mode of operation1 which must be properly recognized1 if we are to give a consistent and intelligent account of conscious behavior4 ,on the other hand1 if we refuse to recognize the advent here of a new category1 intelligence becomes an anomaly and mystery deepens into contradiction4 ,since intelligence or consciousness must be provided for somehow1 we are forced back upon either interactionism or else epiphenomenalism1 more or less disguised under a euphonious name1 such as psycho-physical parallelism or the double-aspect theory4 ,that is1 the relation of stimulus and response is either reduced to plain cause and effect or else is rejected altogether and supplanted by a bare concomitance of the physical and mental series4 ,in either case conscious behavior is reduced to the type of reflex action1 the only issue between the two doctrines being the question whether or not it is necessary or permissible to interpolate mental links in the causal chain4 ,according to the doctrine of parallelism1 conscious behavior is nothing more than a complicated form of reflex1 which goes on without any interference on the part of mind or intelligence4 ,intelligence adds nothing to the situation except itself2 it carries no implications or new significance with regard to conduct4 ,the psychic correlate is permitted to tag along1 but the explanations of response remain the same in kind as they were before they reached the level of consciousness4 ,mere complexity should not becloud the issue4 ,every brain process1 like every reflex activity1 is presumably the result of physico-chemical processes4 ,the assumption of a mysterious intuition or 'psychic force' adds nothing to the mechanistic explanation1 even when the latter is most fragmentary4 ,the interactionists go out of their way unnecessarily in assuming a special activity of consciousness to account for the dislocation of reactions from sensations4 ,the nervous organization suffices to explain it4 ,distant-stimuli and central stimuli co-operate to bring about anticipatory reactions2 foresight is but the conscious side of this process4 ,the phenomenon is both physical and mental4#ci ,the passage just quoted is fairly typical4 ,since the mental is an aspect or concomitant of the physical it is clearly entitled to an occasional honorable mention1 but the fact remains that the explanation of behavior is to be given wholly in terms of neural organization4 ,the mental is quite literally an also ran4 ,to say that a physico-chemical process is also mental is of no particular significance as long as it is implied that the end or goal of the process plays no part in shaping the course of events4 ,the mental simply gives dignity to the occasion1 like the sedan chair with no bottom1 in which the ,irishman's admirers1 according to ,james's story1 ran him along to the place of banquet and which prompted the hero to remark3 ,faith1 if it wasn't for the honor of the thing1 ,i might as well have come on foot4 ,it is this empty show of respect which the interactionists seek to avoid when they make the mental a distinct link in the causal sequence4 ,the physical first causes the mental1 and the mental in turn brings about a change in the physical4 ,in this way a certain importance is indeed secured to mental facts1 but it appears that1 so far as purposive action is concerned1 we are no better off than we were before4 ,the mental is simply another kind of cause2 it has as little option regarding its physical effect as the physical cause has with regard to its mental effect4 ,non-mechanical behavior is again ruled out1 or else a vain attempt is made to secure a place for it through the introduction of an independent psychic agency4 ,it is true1 indeed1 that we are under no antecedent obligation to maintain the existence of an activity that is not entirely reducible to the type of everyday cause and effect4 ,but neither does scientific zeal and incorruptibility require us to do violence to the facts in order to secure this uniformity of type4 ,not to speak at all of the difficulties inherent in this dualism1 it seems undeniable that some facts persistently refuse to conform to the type of mechanism1 unless they are previously clubbed into submission4 ,foresight and the sense of obligation1 for example1 must learn to regard themselves as nothing more than an interesting indication of the way in which the neural machinery is operating before they will fit into the scheme4 ,and similarly the progress of an argument is no way controlled or directed by the end in view1 or by considerations of logical coherence1 but by the impact of causation4 ,ideas lose their power to guide conduct by prevision of the future1 and truth and error consequently lose their significance1 save perhaps as manifestations of cerebral operations4 ,since reasoning involves association1 it must be reducible to bare association2 the sequence of the process is just sequence and nothing more4 ,a description of this kind is on a par with the celebrated opinion that violin music is just a case of scraping horse-hair on catgut4 ,everything that is distinctive in the facts is left out of account1 and we are forced to the conclusion that no conclusion has any logical significance or value4 ,in the end these difficulties1 and in fact most of our philosophic ills1 may be traced back to the prejudice that experience or knowing is a process in which the objects concerned do not participate and have no share4 ,this assumption commits us at once to various corollaries and thus breeds a set of abstractions that pass themselves off as entities and add themselves to the world of our experience as demonstrable facts4 ,in philosophy1 as in the financial world1 there is a constant temptation to do business on a basis of fictitious capitalization4 ,our abstract physico-chemical processes1 with their correlates1 such as passive1 independent objects1 souls1 minds1 or absolutes1 do not represent actual working capital1 but watered stock1 and their inevitable tendency is to convert the legitimate business of philosophy into a campaign of exploitation1 which is none the less exploitation because it is frequently done in the interests of what are supposed to be the spiritual values of man4 ,a careful inventory of our assets brings to light no such entities as those which have been placed to our credit4 ,we do not find body and object and consciousness1 but only body and object4 ,we do not find objects that remain indifferent to the experiential process1 but rather objects that exhibit a flexibility and mobility which defy all description4 ,we do not find a self-sufficient environment or absolute to which intelligence must needs adjust itself1 but an environment that is at odds with itself and struggling in the throes of a reconstruction4 ,the process of intelligence is something that goes on1 not in our minds1 but in things2 it is not photographic1 but creative4 ,from the simplest perception to the most ideal aspiration or the wildest hallucination1 our human experience is reality engaged in the guidance or control of behavior4 ,things undergo a change in becoming experienced1 but the change consists in a doing1 in the assumption of a certain task or duty4 ,the experiential object hence varies with the response2 the situation and the motor activity fit together like the sections of a broken bowl4 ,the bearing of this standpoint on the interpretation of psychology is readily apparent4 ,if it be granted that consciousness is just a name for behavior that is guided by the results of acts not yet performed but reflected beforehand in the objects of experience1 it follows that this behavior is the peculiar subject-matter of psychology4 ,it is only by reference to behavior that a distinctive field can be marked off for psychological enterprise4 ,when we say that the flame is hot1 the stone hard1 and the ice cold and slippery1 we are describing objects and nothing more4 ,these qualities are1 indeed1 anticipations of future possibilities1 but this means simply that the objects are described in terms of their properties or capacities as stimuli of the organism4 ,such an account leaves out of consideration certain changes which things undergo when they exercise the function of controlling or directing changes in the adjustment of the body4 ,a quality1 such as sharp or hot1 is not mental or constituted by consciousness1 but the function of the quality in giving direction to behavior through certain changes which it undergoes is consciousness4 ,the changes that take place in things as a result of association1 attention1 or memory1 are changes that have no significance1 save with regard to their function as stimuli to new adjustments4 ,psychology1 therefore1 is properly a study of the conditions which determine the change or development of stimuli2 more specifically it is a study of the conditions which govern such processes as those by which problems are solved1 lessons are memorized1 habits and attitudes are built up1 and decisions are reached4 ,to call such study applied psychology is to misunderstand the proper scope and purpose of the subject4 ,psychology frequently has occasion to draw extensively upon physics and physiology1 but it has its own problem and its own method of procedure4 ,that this view of conscious behavior should involve an extensive reinterpretation of familiar facts is altogether natural and inevitable4 ,if consciousness is a form of control1 the question1 for example1 what is in consciousness and what is not must be interpreted with reference to this function of control4 ,in a sense we perceive many things to which we are not paying attention1 such as the light in the room or the familiar chairs and bookcases4 ,these are perceived marginally1 as we say1 in the sense that the presence of these objects affects the total adjustment of the moment in such a way that the experience would become a clue to these objects if they were withdrawn4 ,and similarly we may speak of marginal sensations of strain or movement1 to indicate possible clues to certain bodily activities which are factors in the process4 ,these marginal perceptions or images are not actual existences1 but are symbols and nothing more4 ,the significance of these symbols is that they point to certain conditions by which the experiences in question are determined4 ,thus the question whether a given experience involves certain sensations is just a question whether certain bodily or extra-bodily conditions are involved in the experience4 ,if this reference to conditions is ignored and experience is explained in terms of sensory material that blends and fuses and otherwise disposes itself1 the explanation is no longer science but sleight-of-hand4 ,psychology has no proper concern with such mythical constituents of consciousness2 its business is with things as related to conduct1 which is to say that psychology is a science of behavior4 ,,ii ,according to the standpoint set forth in the preceding discussion1 the key to a consistent and fruitful interpretation of consciousness and psychology lies in behavior4 ,if we turn now to the psychology of introspection1 which has been dominant so many years1 we find a standpoint and mode of procedure which1 on the surface at least1 is of a radically different kind4 ,it behooves us1 therefore1 to consider this standpoint in some detail in order to justify the attempt to reinterpret and evaluate it in the light of our own doctrine4 ,the point of departure for introspective psychology is to be found1 so it seems1 not in the facts of behavior1 but in the distinction between focal and marginal experience4 ,it is on this distinction that the introspective psychologist bases the attempt to give a psychological analysis and description of the contents of experience4 ,to analyze and describe the facts of consciousness is to bring the marginal constituents of experience into the white light of attention4 ,analysis and description are possible just because experience is so largely a welter of elements that disguise their identity and character4 ,in some way these unrecognized and unidentified elements are constituents of the total experience4 ,to borrow the language of a writer quoted by ,james1 ,however deeply we may suppose the attention to be engaged by any thought1 any considerable alteration of the surrounding phenomena would still be perceived2 the most abstruse demonstration in this room would not prevent a listener1 however absorbed1 from noticing the sudden extinction of the lights4#dj ,or1 as ,james remarks3 ,it is just like the overtones in music4 ,different instruments give the 'same note1' namely1 various upper harmonics of it which differ from one instrument to another4 ,they are not separately heard by the ear2 they blend with the fundamental note and suffuse it1 and alter it4#da ,let the attention be directed to these overtones1 however1 and they at once detach themselves from their surroundings and step forth into the light of day4 ,even so the ticking of the clock may pass unnoticed in the sense that it is an undiscriminated element in the background of our consciousness2 but if the ticking comes to a sudden stop1 the feeling of a void in our consciousness proclaims the fact that something has gone out from it4 ,the observation and description of the facts of consciousness1 then1 is based directly on the fact that experience1 as the psychologist deals with it1 possesses a focus and margin4 ,nature as conceived by the physical sciences presents no such distinction4 ,the facts are what they are1 and their character as focal or marginal1 as clear or obscure1 depends altogether upon their relation to an intelligence4 ,or we may say that if the facts of experience were always focal and never marginal1 it would never occur to us to speak of consciousness as we do at present4 ,as long as we confine ourselves to a given color1 shape or temperature1 as experienced focally1 we are not dealing with consciousness1 but with objects4 ,an analysis of such facts that does not bring in the marginal is not an analysis of consciousness1 but an analysis of physical reality4 ,even if we consider non-physical objects1 such as mathematical or economic concepts1 we find that our analysis is not psychological as long as the marginal is left out4 ,the consideration of the margin1 however1 brings us into the presence of facts which are of a distinctive kind and which warrant a new science4 ,let the margin be eliminated and psychology disappears at the same time4 ,the psychological doctrine of focus and margin1 then1 is a matter of fundamental importance4 ,on the interpretation of this doctrine depend our systems of psychology and of philosophy4 ,what1 then1 is meant by focus and margin8 ,if we turn to our psychologies1 we seem to be confronted once more with something that everybody knows and nobody can define4 ,but since we have to do with a distinction1 the obligation to differentiate cannot be wholly ignored4 ,consciousness is sometimes likened to a visual field and sometimes to the waves of the sea4 ,like the visual field it has a foreground and a background1 a near and a remote1 a center and a margin or periphery4 ,the contents of consciousness are vivid or clear in the center of this field and fade away into vagueness or obscureness in proportion to their approach to the periphery4 ,or1 to take the other comparison1 the focus may be represented by the crest of a wave and the margin by what we may call its base4 ,this illustration has the advantage that it indicates the difference between higher and lower degrees of concentration4 ,as concentration increases1 the crest of the wave rises higher and its width decreases1 while the reverse is true where the concentration of attention is less intense4 ,all consciousness possesses the distinction of focus and margin in some degree2 however much we may be absorbed in an object or topic1 there is always an indirect mental vision that informs us of other facts1 which for the time being are in the background of our consciousness4 ,for purposes of description a metaphor is at best a clumsy device4 ,it has a tendency to substitute itself for the thing to be described and thus to conceal its limitations and inaccuracies4 ,the present case is no exception4 ,i am forced to think that the visual field in particular is a thoroughly vicious metaphor when employed to body forth the distinction of focus and margin4 ,whatever this distinction may in the end turn out to be1 it is not such as this comparison would lead one to suppose4 ,objects seen in indirect vision appear obscure and blurred precisely because they are in the focus of consciousness4 ,we get pretty much the same sort of obscureness or blur on a printed page when we look at it in indirect vision as we do when we look at it from a distance that is just too great to make out the words or characters4 ,what the illustration shows is that things look different according as the circumstances under which we see them are different1 but what bearing this has on marginal consciousness is not at all obvious to an unsophisticated intelligence4 ,when we speak of a focus and margin in consciousness1 we are presumably dealing with conscious fact4 ,now this illustration of the visual field does not represent conscious fact4 ,ordinary perception carries with it no sense of obscureness at all1 and when it does we have exactly the same kind of situation as when an object is too distant or in some other way inaccessible to satisfactory perception4 ,that is1 the object perceived is in the 'focus' and not in the margin4 ,the obscureness of objects when seen with the margin of the retina has no more to do with the margin of consciousness than the obscureness caused by an attack of dizziness or by a morning fog4 ,it will be said1 perhaps1 that consciousness may be unclear even though there be no sense of unclearness1 that there is such a thing as intrinsic clearness1 quite apart from obstacles and problems4 ,in other words1 the same sensation is capable of realizing various degrees of clearness4 ,it is not at all obvious1 however1 why the different experiences that are concerned in such a comparison should be called the same sensation4 ,as long as we abstract from objective reference1 each sensation is just what it is and there is no opportunity to make comparisons on the basis of clearness4 ,a sensation as such--if we are bound to speak of sensations--can by no possibility be an obscure sensation1 for the trait that we call obscureness or vagueness constitutes the intrinsic being of that sensation4 ,if we permit ourselves to speak of clearness at all1 we should rather say that it possesses a maximum of clearness1 since it has managed to express or present its whole nature with not one trait or feature lacking4 ,what more could be demanded1 in the way of clearness1 of any conscious fact than that it should body forth every detail that it possesses8 ,if sensations or states of consciousness possess degrees of clearness1 it seems to follow that we may scrutinize them for the purpose of discovering characteristics that were present though scarcely perceived1 in much the same way that the polishing of old furniture brings out the grain in the wood4 ,but such a parallel1 ,i submit1 is plain nonsense4 ,the supposition that consciousness is something that in due time and with good fortune may attain consciousness is too absurd for discussion1 even though it is a supposition that plays a considerable role in present-day psychology4 ,the purpose of the discussion1 up to this point1 has not been to deny the validity of the distinction between focus and margin1 but to insist upon the necessity of reconsidering the meaning of this distinction1 if we are to attain to a workable definition of consciousness and a fruitful or even intelligible conception of the problem of psychology4 ,i have endeavored to show1 in the first place1 that the doctrine of focus and margin involves the raison d'etre of psychology4 ,apart from this doctrine we have no task or problem that psychology can claim as its distinctive possession4 ,the analysis of what is in the focus of consciousness is adequately provided for in the other sciences2 it is only with the introduction of what is called the margin that an enterprise of a different kind becomes necessary4 ,but1 secondly1 this distinction of focus and margin cannot be drawn on the basis of the experienced contrast between clearness and obscureness4 ,the very fact that anything is experienced as obscure means that it is an object of attention1 or1 in other words1 that it is in the focus of consciousness and not in the margin4 ,the comparison of focus and margin with direct and indirect vision is misleading1 because it suggests that experiences are marginal in proportion as they are felt as obscure4 ,and1 thirdly1 if we undertake to distinguish between focus and margin on the basis of a difference in clearness or vividness of which no note is taken at the time1 we encounter the difficulty that experience or consciousness1 taken abstractly1 does not admit of such variations in degree1 and so this criterion likewise goes by the board4 ,the situation is indeed peculiar4 ,that there is a realm of psychological fact is universally conceded4 ,as a consequence of this conviction a great body of fact and of doctrine has been built up4 ,it would be folly to deny either the distinctiveness or the significance of this achievement4 ,and yet ,james's description of psychology as a string of raw facts2 a little gossip and wrangle about opinions2 a little classification and generalization on the mere descriptive level2 a strong prejudice that we have states of mind and that our brain conditions them1#db is not wholly untrue even today4 ,it is even possible for a present-day critic to outdo ,james and maintain that the legitimacy of psychology as a separate inquiry is a matter of faith rather than of sight4 ,the 'raw facts' of which ,james speaks resolve themselves into physical and physiological material on the one hand and metaphysical dogmas on the other2 the gossip and wrangle are largely over fictitious problems2 the classifications and generalizations as a rule involve trespassing on other fields2 the prejudice that we have states of mind has less standing-ground today than it had twenty years ago4 ,in other words1 there is still plausible ground for ,james's pessimistic comment3 ,this is no science1 it is only the hope of a science4 ,a situation such as this carries with it the insistent suggestion that the trouble lies1 not primarily in the nature of the subject-matter1 but in our conception of the problem4 ,the matter of a science1 as ,james says1 is with us4 ,and if the distinction of focus and margin constitutes the starting-point and justification for a science of psychology1 a better understanding of this distinction will mean a more adequate appreciation of the problem with which psychology has to deal4 ,as a starting-point for a reconsideration of focus and margin1 we may take those experiences in which the distinction of clearness and obscureness is presented as an experienced fact4 ,let us then turn once more to the familiar illustration of the visual field4 ,when we look at a printed page1 there is always some one portion of it1 perhaps a word1 which we see more clearly than we do the rest2 and out beyond the margin of the page we are still conscious of objects which we see only in a very imperfect way4#dc ,that is1 we appreciate the distinction between what lies in the center of our visual field and what is more remote1 just because in this experiment we are trying to see what lies beyond the center without turning our eyes in that direction4 ,we set ourselves the task of seeing what is on the page1 and at the same time we interpose an artificial obstacle4 ,hence the sense of effort1 and the contrast between what is clear and what is obscure4 ,the present experience is obscure1 not inherently1 but only with reference to a certain problem or question4 ,it is inadequate as an anticipation of further experience4 ,the contrast between clear and obscure is created by our attempt to overcome the difficulty1 and is therefore absent from ordinary1 unobstructed visual perception4 ,the situation described in the following familiar quotation from ,james is an illustration of the same thing3 ,suppose we try to recall a forgotten name4 ,the state of our consciousness is peculiar4 ,there is a gap therein2 but no mere gap4 ,it is a gap that is intensely active4 ,a sort of wraith of the name is in it1 beckoning us in a given direction1 making us at moments tingle with the sense of our closeness1 and then letting us sink back without the longed-for term4#dd ',i met this man on the train1 and later at the reception2 but what is his name8' ,the struggle rends our consciousness in twain4 ,the occasions of our meeting1 his appearance1 his conversation1 are solid fact1 yet all suffused with the pervasive1 evanscent wraith that tantalizes us with glimpses which half reveal and half conceal the name we seek to grasp4 ,to account for such experiences simply in terms of half-submerged sensations and images is to do violence to all the requirements for clear thinking4 ,if we rule out explanations of this kind1 we are evidently forced to the conclusion that these experiences are obscure1 not in themselves or in the abstract1 but with reference to the function of putting us in possession of the name to which they are inadequate clues4 ,it is the subsequent1 satisfactory experience of the name which furnishes our standard for clearness2 in other words1 the implications of obscureness are of a functional1 and not of a static or structural1 kind4 ,the marginal character of an experience is simply a reference to its function as a clue or cue to some further experience1 i4e41 a reference to its character as a changing stimulus4 ,or we may say that the distinction between focus and margin is just another aspect of the distinction between the conditions for further activity and the incompleteness which leads to further adjustment4 ,the transfer of the future into the present gives us a fact1 here and now1 and in this respect the experience is entirely focal in character1 and as such it is subject-matter for the various sciences4 ,whatever the nature of the experience1 it is just what it is1 and not something else4 ,with respect to the further experience1 however1 which it conditions or for which it prepares the way1 the present experience is entirely marginal1 i4e41 in its character as a changing stimulus it is subject-matter for psychology4 ,the distinction of focus and margin1 then1 is based ultimately upon the function of experience in the control of behavior4 ,the given situation is a present fact and is in functional change2 or1 in terms of our present discussion1 it has both a focus and a margin4 ,as present fact it is a reality which requires recognition in the form of adjustment2 as in functional change it provides opportunity for bringing the adjustment to fruition4 ,that is1 the experience both sets a task or makes a demand and it points the way4 ,the distinction is a distinction of function1 not of static existence1 and it is this distinction which is represented by the contrast of focus and margin4 ,if we compare this interpretation of focus and margin with that of traditional psychology1 we find that the latter construes the relation of the present to the future experience wholly in static terms1 the functional relation being left out of account4 ,the later experience is read back into its predecessor in the form of dim or marginal images1 which need but show themselves more completely to make the two identical4 ,if these sensations were intended only as symbols of a functional relationship1 it would perhaps be scarcely worth while to enter a protest against them4 ,but when the functional relationship is quite overlooked1 the explanation that is given becomes exceedingly dubious4 ,the ticking of the clock1 for example1 that is present1 though unnoticed1 the overtones of the note that suffuse the whole without diverting attention to their individual qualities1--in what precise way are facts of this kind concerned in the description of the experience which they modify8 ,a study of the clock or of the overtones can hardly pass as an analysis of consciousness2 it is too obviously an affair of physics4 ,such a study becomes merely an excuse for repeating the analyses of physics and reading them off in terms of sensations and images4 ,moreover1 the transfer of all this material to consciousness looks suspiciously like a transaction in mental chemistry4 ,where1 then1 is psychology to gain a foothold8 ,what is the meaning of these uncanny sensations and images1 which nobody experiences1 unless it be their character as symbols of adjustment8 ,they have no legitimate status1 and psychology1 by consequence1 has no legitimate problem1 except in so far as they represent those possible acts of adaptation which are the sole and proper concern of psychology4 ,it remains to point out briefly the bearing of these results on what is called the method of introspection4 ,we are sometimes assured that introspection has discarded the belief in a separate mental stuff or subject-matter1 but there is ground for the suspicion that such protestations are made in the same spirit that we affirm our belief in the ,ten ,commandments or the ,golden ,rule1 with no thought of being taken seriously4 ,at all events1 without a literal looking within it seems to become exceedingly difficult to differentiate introspection from ordinary observation as practised in the other sciences4 ,the reason for this difficulty is that there is nothing left in introspection by which it can be differentiated4 ,the term introspection properly designates1 not a method but a problem2 the problem1 namely1 of interpreting given facts with reference to their function in the control of behavior4 ,if psychology is to justify its claim to the status of a science1 it is in duty bound to secure for itself both an objective criterion for the adjudication of disputes which otherwise are of necessity interminable1 and a subject-matter that is not simply a heritage of metaphysical prejudice1 but a realm of fact that is attested by everyday observation and experience4 ,,iii ,within recent years the doctrine that psychology is a science of behavior has acquired a certain prominence4 ,it is presupposed1 of course1 that the behavior with which psychology is concerned is of a distinctive sort2 but the differentia is unfortunately the very thing that the behaviorist has hitherto left out of account4 ,in his revolt against introspectionism1 which has been accustomed to give to its subject-matter a subjectivistic and psychic interpretation1 he goes to the other extreme and relies on behavior pure and simple4 ,being without a serviceable differentia1 he is unable to mark off the field of psychology from contiguous territory4 ,the selection of certain problems within the general range of behavior1 with no recognition of any distinctive trait to guide and justify the selection1 is hardly enough to warrant a new science4 ,even an arbitrary principle of selection is better than none1 and it would1 therefore1 be quite as reasonable to subdivide the field of botany in the interests of a new science1 and group together for separate botanical study those flowers which have enabled poets to give symbolic expression to the beauty of women4 ,that the principle of selection is1 in the end1 the ability to modify behavior through the anticipation of possible consequences1 appears from the fact that the category of stimulus and response is otherwise found to be unworkable4 ,it is true that in the simpler forms of behavior stimulus and response may be correlated without practical difficulty4 ,but when we deal with what has been called delayed overt response1 the matter becomes more complicated and the theoretical difficulty becomes more prominent4 ,the behaviorist would not seriously undertake to record everything that happens between stimulus and response4 ,he proceeds selectively1 taking the relation of stimulus and response as his clue4 ,he is properly interested in the movements which result from the application of the stimulus only in so far as they constitute response4 ,otherwise his study is not a study of behavior1 but a study of movements4 ,but when does a movement constitute a response8 ,do we label as stimulus the spoken word which results in overt action a week later1 or the visual perception which sets a complicated and long-drawn-out problem1 for no other reason than that it appears somewhere as an antecedent in the causal chain of events8 ,if so1 there is no obvious reason why the event which occurred just before or immediately after the soi-disant stimulus should not be regarded as the true stimulus4 ,unless a satisfactory reason is forthcoming1 it would seem better to substitute cause and effect for stimulus and response and to drop the term behavior from our vocabulary4 ,psychology then becomes a study of certain causal relationships1 but is still without a principle for the selection of those causal events which are supposed to constitute its peculiar subject-matter4 ,even if we manage to become reconciled to this situation1 however1 our troubles are not yet at an end4 ,there still remains the difficulty in certain cases of showing that the event which is selected as stimulus or cause bears any significant relationship to the event which figures in our scheme as the response4 ,the stimulus is supposed to have a causal connection with the response1 but how are we to know that this is the fact8 ,how are we to know that the engineer who solves a problem for me at my request might not have done so anyway8 ,no behaviorist can possibly show that the air waves set in motion by my vocalization were an indispensable stimulus4 ,we doubtless believe that the spoken word was in fact the spark which lit the fuse and finally exploded the mine1 but this belief involves a complication of causes which it is wholly beyond our power to control or to verify4 ,it is true1 of course1 that we are able1 as a matter of fact1 to correlate stimulus and response4 ,i know that it was the spoken word which caused the commission to be executed1 for the expert reminds me of the fact and presents a bill4 ,but neither of us makes any pretense that his belief is derived from a scrutiny of the causal sequence4 ,memory furnishes us with a shortcut to the result4 ,while our present acts are doubtless connected with the past through causation1 we do not regard them as simply the effects of antecedent causes4 ,they are rather responses to present stimuli4 ,the expert presents his bill1 being moved thereto by a stimulus which may be indicated by saying that it is the spoken-word-constituting-a-commission-no w-completed-and-entitling-me- to-compensation4 ,that is1 the stimulus cannot be pushed back and anchored at a fixed point in the past1 but is a present factor at the moment of response and is operative by virtue of its anticipation of future events4 ,if1 then1 psychology is to be regarded as a study of behavior1 it is plainly necessary to reinterpret the category of behavior4 ,for example1 a purely mechanical response to a light-stimulus may properly be viewed as response to the ether-vibration or wave-length upon which it follows in temporal sequence4 ,but if this stimulation results in what is commonly called consciousness1 a different kind of response ensues4 ,the light-stimulus becomes a cause or occasion for the act of looking4 ,but why look1 unless it be to secure a new stimulus for further response8 ,we stop to look1 precisely because the first stimulus does not run smoothly off the reel4 ,the response will not go forward1 but is halted and expends itself in the effort to secure a further stimulus4 ,this is the moment of attention1 in which the stimulus undergoes a process of transformation1 concomitantly with the process of reorganization in the motor responses1 and in the direction of ends or results that are foreshadowed in it4 ,this change in the stimulus takes place under certain specifiable conditions1 and the study of these conditions is a study of such processes as perceiving1 attending1 remembering1 and deliberating1 which are distinctively psychological in their nature4 ,processes of this kind1 if taken as changes in stimuli1 find an objective criterion in the adaptive behavior for the sake of which they occur1 and they provide psychology with a distinctive task and subject-matter4 ,as against the introspectionist1 then1 the behaviorist is justified in his contention that psychological procedure must be objective and experimental in character4 ,the danger to which he has exposed himself is the failure to differentiate his problem from that of physiology and physics4 ,it is only by a proper recognition of both the objective and the distinctive character of conscious behavior that psychology can free itself of the reproach which is heaped upon it by members of its own household and take the place that rightfully belongs to it in the community of the sciences4 ,,iv ,according to the preceding exposition1 the current psychological doctrine of focus and margin is an attempt to reduce the changes in the stimulus to terms of static entities denominated sensations and images4 ,by abstracting from change we convert the new stimulus that is already on the way into inert sensory material1 which lends itself to purely analytic treatment4 ,in this way the suggested hardness of the rock becomes a centrally aroused sensation of a stubbed toe1 the heat of the candle becomes an image of a burn1 etc4 ,as was said before1 the sensations are not existences1 but representatives or symbols of our nascent activities2 they are the static equivalents of this foreshadowing or reference to the future4 ,the explanation of experience that we find in ,james and ,bergson approximates this view so closely in one respect and departs from it so widely in another as to warrant a brief discussion4 ,a prominent characteristic of the doctrine advocated by ,james and ,bergson is the emphasis given to the foreshadowings or anticipations of the future4 ,experiences of conflict1 such as the struggle to recall a name1 take on their peculiar coloring1 so these writers contend1 from their relationship to a beyond1 to something which is yet to be4 ,if we are to understand experience as it really is1 we must guard against the besetting temptation to translate everything into spatial equivalents4 ,this forward reference is usually read off as a distinction and contrast between simultaneously existing components4 ,some constituent is first set apart as the nucleus or focus and is then enveloped with an elusive1 intangible wraith of meaning1 which is called the margin4 ,we have been taught to think of the focus as made up of sensory material of some sort and silhouetted against a background lit up by the fitful1 inconsequential heat-lightning of meaning4 ,but this is a perversion of the facts4 ,when we are engaged in a problem it is precisely these unformed meanings that are of interest and importance4 ,they are in the focus of consciousness1 in so far as we can speak of a focus at all4 ,they absorb our attention and direct our energies4 ,they inform us of a margin1 not by refusing to compete for our attention with more important or more interesting facts1 but by bodying forth the unfinished character of the situation4 ,hence this beckoning1 this tingling with the sense of closeness1 this sinking back when our efforts meet with defeat4 ,focus and margin1 in short1 have to do with movement1 with transition1 and not with a static field4 ,these situations are felt as inherently unstable and in process of reconstruction4 ,there is a peculiar sense of activity1 of something doing1 of a future knocking on the door of the present4 ,what is thus on its way to the present we can designate only in terms of the object as it is after it has arrived4 ,to call it marginal is to immerse the object in this temporal flux1 which embodies perfectly the characteristics of ,bergsonian duration4 ,but this is only a first step4 ,if we turn now to those experiences from which this inner diremption of fact and meaning is absent1 we find a process that is essentially the same in kind4 ,they likewise constitute a temporal flow1 even though there be no sense of duration or of change as such4 ,the different moments of these experiences are not mechanically juxtaposed1 but blend together in much the same way as when the process is experienced as a process4 ,in principle we have the same transition1 the same becoming1 the same growth from less to more1 the same activity of continuous reconstruction4 ,conscious life1 we find1 is a continuous adjustment2 each of its moments is a transitive state4 ,the more evenly flowing experiences are likewise endowed with a focus and margin1 not in the form of static elements1 but as a dynamic relationship of what is with what is to be4 ,such an interpretation of experience1 moreover1 opens the way for a proper valuation of the psychologist's procedure4 ,the concept of sensation is methodology pure and simple4 ,granted that focus and margin are such as was indicated a moment ago1 how are they to be described1 unless we resort to some ,hilfsbegriff such as sensations8 ,james's description of the effort to recall a forgotten name is not description at all in a scientific sense1 since the wraith of the name that we are trying to recover is of too unearthly a fabric to be weighed and measured by accepted scientific standards4 ,it makes us tingle1 it lets us sink back1 but such portrayal is literature rather than science4 ,our first step must be to resolve our material into components4 ,these components we identify with genuine elements if we can1 with pious fictions if we must2 but until this is done there can be no exact description4 ,there can be no precision in our statement of the facts and no formulation of the laws that govern their changes4 ,this view undeniably has a certain plausibility4 ,as long as the results are attained which the psychologist sets out to reach1 we need not be hypersensitive on the score of methods4 ,in the field of natural science1 at all events1 this ,jesuitical principle is not incompatible with respectability4 ,if it be true1 however1 that sensation is but a tool or artifact1 a means to an end1 what is the end that is to be attained by this device8 ,it is at this point that we come to the parting of the ways4 ,according to the view previously elaborated1 the anticipations of the future have to do with the results of our possible acts1 and sensations are simply symbols for the various elements in our complex motor responses4 ,in the case of ,bergson and ,james1 however1 the clue that is furnished by response is discarded4 ,the reference to the future1 being dissociated from behavior1 is taken as evidence of an abstract or metaphysical duration1 so that experience is somehow other than it seems2 and sensation is regarded as the translation of duration into the language of space4 ,associationism is justified in its belief that reality is different from its appearance in our experience1 but is criticized for attempting to interpret the real in terms of space rather than time4 ,in both cases the lead of the subject-matter is abandoned in favor of an explanation that is derived from a fourth-dimensional plane of existence4 ,the suspicion that these two positions have a deep-seated affinity is strengthened if we call to mind that the concept of sensation was originated1 not in the interests of methodology1 but as the expression of a historic preconception that mistook fiction for fact4 ,the fundamental error back of it was the preposterous notion that consciousness consists of subconscious or unconscious constituents1 which by their mechanical or chemical combinations make our experience what it is4 ,the question which it raises and which has afflicted us even to the present day is not primarily the question of fact1 but the question of intelligibility1 as the controversy over mindstuff abundantly attests4 ,whether we regard experience as made up of sensory material1 however1 or as constituted in a ,bergsonian fashion1 is a matter of detail2 the primary question is whether a distinction between consciousness as it appears and as it really is has any meaning4 ,in so far as this distinction is maintained1 we are beating the thin air of mythology1 despite our reinterpretations and justifications4 ,true conversion does not consist in a renaming of old gods1 but demands a humble and a contrite heart4 ,to call sensation an artifact1 a methodological device1 without a surrender of the metaphysical assumption that lies back of ,associationism is not to correct the evil1 but is more likely to be treated as an indulgence for sins that are yet to be committed4 ,this fundamental identity is presumably the reason for certain other similarities1 which would perhaps not be readily anticipated4 ,both doctrines undertake to tell us what is going on behind the scenes1 what consciousness or experience really is4 ,the descriptions present an astonishing difference of vocabulary1 but if we take care not to be misled by superficial differences1 we find an equally astonishing agreement as to content4 ,from the one side consciousness is explained as a juxtaposition of elements2 from the other as an interpenetration of elements so complete that the parts can be neither isolated nor distinguished from the whole4 ,on the one hand we find a multiplicity without unity1 on the other a unity without multiplicity4 ,in the one account the temporal unit is a sensation devoid of internal temporal diversity2 in the other duration as such is a unity in which past1 present1 and future blend into an undifferentiated whole4 ,the one position gathers its facts by a mystifying process called introspection2 the other obtains its results from a mystical faculty of intuition4 ,the difference in language remains1 but both accounts lead us away into a twilight region where words substitute themselves for facts4 ,as was suggested a moment ago1 the contrast between ordinary experience and something else of which it is the appearance is the result of the failure to give proper recognition to the facts of behavior4 ,if we connect the forward reference of experience with the operations of our nascent activities1 we have no need of a pure duration or of bridging the gulf between reality and its appearances4 ,in the same way1 if we construe sensations as just symbols of our responses1 we rid ourselves of problems that are insoluble because they are unintelligible4 ,such problems constitute metaphysics in the bad sense of the word1 whether they show themselves in the domain of science or of philosophy4 ,to describe experience by reference to such a real is to explain what we know in terms of what we do not know4 ,the question what is real is absolutely sterile4 ,our descriptions and explanations must remain on the same plane as the experiences with which they deal1 and not seek after a real of a different order4 ,if we are to have an explanation of consciousness at all1 the explanation must not take us back to hypothetical sensations that are almost but not quite experienced1 nor to a duration in which all distinctions are swallowed up1 but must be rendered in terms of other facts that dwell in the light of common day4 ,by way of conclusion ,i venture to urge once more that a proper consideration of the facts of behavior will furnish us with a key that will unlock many a door4 ,the conception of stimulus and response gives us a differentia for experience and also enables us to distinguish within experience between consciousness and object4 ,if1 however1 we disregard behavior1 we are bound to lose our way4 ,the distinction between the experienced and the unexperienced is either wiped out or else is permitted to convert itself into a distinction between appearance and reality that leads nowhere and explains nothing4 ,the significance of truth as the successful guidance of behavior1 in accordance with the program laid down in the organization of stimulus and response1 is lost to sight and recourse is had to a fourth-dimensional truth or reality for the miracle of breathing life into the dead bones of our philosophic abstractions4 ,the study of behavior constitutes a mode of approach that holds out the hope of deliverance from questions that should never have been asked4 ,we are on a different and1 let us hope1 a higher level when we cease to ask how consciousness can lay hold of passive objects1 or how knowledge ueberhaupt is possible1 and concern ourselves rather with the wondrous activity whereby this plastic dance of circumstance that we call the universe transcends the domain of mechanism and embodies itself in the values of conscious life4 ,,the ,,phases ,,of ,,the ,,economic ,,interest ,,henry ,,waldgrave ,,stuart ,sec4 #a4 ,in the logic of ,instrumentalism1 truth has been identified with usefulness and the good with the satisfactory4 ,classifying critics have seen in this the damaging mark of ,utilitarianism1 certain of them deeming ,amerikanismus an even shrewder and more specific diagnosis4 ,the association of these terms together and the aptness of either to express what the critics have in mind are matters of small interest4 ,it is of more importance to discover1 behind the reproach implied1 the assumptions which may have made the reproach seem pertinent4 ,one cannot1 of course1 suppose it to express a sheer general aversion to the useful or an ascetic abhorrence of all satisfaction on principle4 ,puritanism1 aestheticism1 and pedantry should be last resorts in any search for an interpretative clue4 ,the distrust of ,utilitarianism need be ascribed to none of these4 ,it comes instead from a conception of the true ,utilitarian as a dull and dogmatic being with no interests beyond the range of his own uninquiring vision1 no aspiration beyond the complacent survey of his own perfections and no standards beyond the inventory of his own bourgeois tastes and prejudices4 ,the type is indeed not yet extinct in our day3 but is it plausible to charge a new philosophy with conspiring to perpetuate it8 ,is ,instrumentalism only philistinism called by a more descriptive name8 ,it professes at least to be a logic of hypothesis and experiment1 whereas for the perfect philistine there are no ultimate problems and hence no logic but the logic of self-evidence4 ,when ,instrumentalism speaks of needs and interests in its analysis of truth and goodness does it then mean the needs and interests that define the individual in what is sometimes invidiously termed a biological sense--interests that control him before his conduct becomes in any way a problem for himself8 ,quite as a matter of course1 just this has been the assumption4 ,the satisfactoriness of prompt and cogent classification has had a hand in the vindication of truth's supremacy over satisfaction4 ,in the view of instrumentalism this ready interpretation of its meaning is nothing less than the thinking of the unthinkable and the bodying-forth of what is not4 ,the man who has solved a problem simply is not the man he was before--if his problem was a genuine one and it was he who solved it4 ,he cannot measure and judge the outcome by his earlier demands for the very good reason that the outcome of real deliberation empties these earlier demands of their interest and authority for him4 ,can the conception thus suggested of personal growth through exercise of creative or constructive intelligence be in any measure verified by a general survey of the economic side of life8 ,has it any important bearings upon any parts of economic theory8 ,these are the questions to which this essay is addressed4 ,i ,sec4 #b4 ,how have the real or fancied needs of the average person of today come to be what they are8 ,for all sorts and conditions of men1 the ways and means of living have1 during the past century or two--even during the past decade or two--undergone revolutionary changes4 ,it is true that many of these changes have been relatively superficial1 touching only certain externalities and entering in no important way into life's underlying and dominant motives4 ,others1 no doubt1 may fairly be held to confuse and disperse the energies of men1 instead of making for wholeness1 sanity and development of human interest and power4 ,and critics of industrial and social progress who have felt the need for reservations of this sort fall easily into a certain mood of historic homesickness for the supposed simplicity of an earlier age4 ,but our interest1 in this discussion1 is in the genesis1 the actual process of becoming1 of our present standards of living1 not their value as rated by any critical 7or uncritical7 standard4 ,and accordingly we shall take it for a fact that on the whole the average person of today is reasonably1 perhaps unreasonably1 well satisfied with his telephone1 his typewriter1 and his motor-car2 with his swift and easy journeyings over land and sea2 with his increasingly scientific medical attendance and public sanitation2 with his virtually free supplies of literature and information1 new and old1 and with his electric light or his midnight oil 7triple distilled7 to aid in the perusal4 ,more than this1 he is so well satisfied with all these modern inventions that1 historical or aesthetical or other holidays apart1 he would never for a moment dispense with any one of them as a matter of free choice4 ,grossly material and humbly instrumental though they are1 these things and their like constitute the framework sustaining the whole system of spiritual functions that make up the life we live today1 as a society and as individuals4 ,and our present problem simply is the way in which they were first received by those who were to use them1 and passed into their present common acceptance4 ,to put the matter in general terms1 how is it that novel means of action or enjoyment1 despite their novelty1 are able to command fair scrutiny and hearing and can contrive to make their way1 often very speedily1 into a position of importance for industry and life8 ,there is an easy and not unnatural way of thinking of this process as we see it going on about us that may keep us long unmindful of even the possibility of such a question4 ,in every field of action1 we habitually look back upon accomplished changes from some present well-secured vantage-point1 and as we trace the steps by which they have come to pass it is almost inevitable that we should first see the sequence as an approach1 direct or devious but always sure1 to the stage on which we happen to have taken our stand4 ,it seems clear to us that what we have attained is better than aught that has gone before--if it were not distinctly satisfactory on its own merits we should not now be taking it as the standpoint for a survey4 ,but once it is so taken1 our recognition of its appreciable and satisfying superiority passes over insensibly into metaphysics4 ,what we now find good we find ourselves perceiving to have been all the while predestined in the eternal scheme of things6 ,we pause in retrospect like the wayfarer who has reached the turning of a mountain road or the man of middle age who for the first time feels that his professional position is assured4 ,this1 we say1 justifies the effort it has cost1 this at last is really living6 ,and the next step in retrospective reconstruction follows easily2 this was my true goal from the first1 the dim and inexpressible hope of which would not let me pause and kept me until now dissatisfied4 ,the end was present in the beginning1 provoking the first groping efforts and affording progressively the test and measure by which their results were found ever wanting4 ,this retrospective logic may explain the presence and perennial charm of those panoramic pages in our encyclopaedias purporting to show forth the gradual perfecting of great instrumentalities upon which our modern life depends4 ,we survey the evolution of printing1 for example1 from the wooden blocks of the ,chinese or of ,laurens ,coster down to the ,hoe press1 the stereotype plate1 and the linotype machine4 ,or we see the forms of written record from pictured papyrus1 cuneiform brick1 and manuscript scroll down to the printed book and the typewritten page2 the means of carriage by land from the ox-cart of the patriarchs to the stage-coach1 the ,cannonball ,limited1 the motor-truck1 and the twelve-cylinder touring-car4 ,and as one contemplates these cheerfully colored exhibits there is in each case an almost irresistible suggestion of a constant and compelling need of universal man seeking in more and more marvellously ingenious ways an adequate expression and satisfaction4 ,this need seems never to have lapsed or changed its nature4 ,all along both driving power and direction1 it has been the one fixed factor in a long process in which all else has been fluctuating1 contingent1 and imperfect--all else except the nature of the materials and the principles of mechanics1 which1 too1 are seen in the end to have been mutely conspiring toward the result4 ,essential human nature1 it seems clear1 does not and happily cannot change4 ,spiritual progress1 in this ultimate optimism1 means simply clearer vision1 completer knowledge1 and a less petulant and self-assertive habit of insistence upon the details of particular purposes as individual impulse and idiosyncrasy define them4 ,we fortunate beings of today have available1 in the various departments of our life1 certain instrumentalities1 and to these our interests attach4 ,these interests of ours in their proportional strength 7so the argument runs7 express our native and generic constitution in so far as this constitution has been able as yet to achieve outward expression and embodiment4 ,and accordingly1 in interpreting the long history of technological evolution1 we take what we conceive ourselves now to be as normative and essential4 ,we project back into the lives of primitive man1 of our own racial ancestors1 or of our grandfathers1 the habits and requirements which we acknowledge in ourselves today and we conceive the men of the past to have been driven forward on the ways of progress by the identical discontent that would presumably beset ourselves if we were to be suddenly carried back to their scale and manner of existence4 ,sec4 #c4 ,whatever else may be thought of it1 there is at least this to be said for the cult of historic homesickness to which reference has just been made3 it happens to be at one with modern ethnology and history in suggesting that earlier cultures were on the whole not less content and self-satisfied in their condition than our own4 ,it is primitive man1 not the modern1 who is slow to move and is satisfied1 as a matter of course1 with the manner of life in which he fancies his people to have lived from time immemorial4 ,change in early social groups is tragic when it is not insensible4 ,it comes through conquest and enslavement by outsiders or through stress of the dread of these1 or by gradual adaptation of custom to failing environmental resources or to increasing wealth4 ,assent to change is in general grudging or tacit at best and is commonly veiled by some more or less transparent fiction4 ,and our suspicion of fallacy lurking somewhere in the type of retrospective ,idealism we have been considering is strengthened when we come to look a little closely to details4 ,to take a commonplace example--can it be held that the difference between using a typewriter and writing by hand is purely and simply a matter of degree--that the machine serves the same purpose and accomplishes the same kind of result as the pen1 but simply does the work more easily1 rapidly1 and neatly8 ,undoubtedly some such impression may easily be gathered from an external survey of the ways that men have used at different times for putting their ideas on record4 ,but it ignores important aspects of the case4 ,for one thing1 the modern invention effects a saving of the writer's time which can be used in further investigation or in more careful revision or in some way wholly unrelated to literary work1 and if the machine makes any part of the writer's task less irksome1 or the task as a whole less engrossing1 the whole matter of literary effort becomes less forbidding and its place and influence as a social or a personal function may for better or for worse be altered4 ,the difference brought to pass transcends mere technical facility--it ramifies into a manifold of differences affecting the entire qualitative character and meaning of the literary function4 ,and only by an arbitrary sophistication of the facts can this complexity of new outcome be thought of as implicit and dynamic in the earlier stage4 ,in the same way precisely1 the motor-car1 as every one knows1 has vanquished distance and has revolutionized suburban life4 ,in ,england it is said to have made acute the issue of plural voting4 ,in ,america it is hailed by the optimistic as the solution of the vexed problem of urban concentration and the decline of agriculture4 ,even as a means of recreation it is said by the initiated to transform the whole meaning of one's physical environment1 exploiting new values in sky and air and the green earth1 which pass the utmost possibilities of family carry-all or coach and four4 ,or consider the ocean steamship and its influence3 today we travel freely over the world1 for all manner of reasons1 sufficient or otherwise4 ,a hundred years ago distant journeyings by sea or land were arduous and full of peril1 undertaken only by the most adventurous or the most curious or for urgent need4 ,now commodities of every sort can be transported to virtually every quarter of the globe--rails and locomotives1 cement and structural steel1 machinery of all kinds from the motor and the dynamo to the printing press and the cinematograph1 in a word whatever is necessary to recreate the waste places of the earth and to make life in these regions humanly liveable4 ,the sheer scale and magnitude of such operations lifts them above the level of the international trade of five hundred or even a hundred years ago4 ,and their far-reaching results of every sort in the lives of nations and of individuals the world over can in no intelligible sense be understood as mere homogeneous multiples of what trade meant before our age of steam1 iron1 and electricity4 ,finally1 we may think of modern developments in printing as compared1 for example1 with the state of the craft in the days when the ,new ,england ,primer served to induct juvenile ,america into the pleasant paths of art and literature4 ,and it is clear that the mechanical art that makes books and reading both widely inviting and easily possible of enjoyment today is not merely a more perfect substitute for the quill and ink-horn of the mediaeval scribe or even for the printing press of ,caxton or of ,benjamin ,franklin4 ,the enormously and variously heightened efficiency of the mechanical instrumentalities nowadays available has for good and for evil carried forward the whole function of printing and publication into relations and effects which are qualitatively new and beyond the possible conception of the earlier inventors and readers4 ,sec4 #d4 ,the real evolution in such cases of the coming of a new commodity or a new instrument into common and established use is an evolution of a more radical1 more distinctly epigenetic type than the pictured stories of the encyclopaedia-maker serve to suggest4 ,at each forward step the novelty makes possible not merely satisfactions more adequate as measured by existing requirements or more economical in terms of cost1 but new satisfactions also for which no demand or desire before existed or could possibly exist--satisfactions which1 once become habitual1 make the contentment of former times in the lack of them hard to understand or credit4 ,and indeed the story is perhaps never quite one-sided2 the gain we reckon is perhaps never absolutely unmixed4 ,there may be1 perhaps must in principle be1 not only gain but loss4 ,the books we read have lost something of the charm of the illuminated manuscript2 our compositors and linotypers1 it may be1 have forgotten something of the piety and devotion of the mediaeval scribe and copyist4 ,so everywhere in industry the machine depreciates and pushes out the skilled artisan and craftsman1 summoning into his place the hired operative whose business is to feed and serve instead of to conceive and execute4 ,for cheapness and abundance1 for convenience of repair and replacement we everywhere sacrifice something of artistic quality in the instrumentalities of life and action and something of freedom and self-expression in the processes of manufacture4 ,thus again1 to change the venue1 there are those who miss in democratic government or in an ethical type of religion the poignant and exalting spiritual quality of devotion to a personal sovereign or a personal ,god4 ,whatever one's judgment may be in particular cases1 there can be no reason for disputing that in epigenetic or creative evolution there is1 in a sense1 loss as well as gain4 ,there is no more reason for supposing that all that was wholesome or ennobling or beautiful in an earlier function must somehow have its specific compensation in kind infallibly present in the new than for supposing that all that is desirable in the new must surely have been present discernibly or indiscernibly in the old4 ,if we are on the whole satisfied with the new on its intrinsic merits as a present complex fact1 we have therein sufficient ground for saying that it marks a stage in progress4 ,this1 in fact1 is what such a proposition means4 ,and the old then appears more or less widely discontinuous with the new--not merely that it shows1 in units of measure1 less of the acceptable quality or qualities which the new fact or situation is found to possess1 but that it belongs for us to a qualitatively different level and order of existence4 ,how1 we wonder1 could our ancestors have found life tolerable in their undrained and imperfectly heated dwellings1 without the telephone1 the morning's news of the world by cable1 and the phonograph8 ,how1 again1 could feudal homage and fealty have ever been the foundation of social order in countries where today every elector is wont to think and to act in his public relations no longer as a subject but as a citizen4 ,and how1 in still a different sphere1 could the father or the mother of a happy family of children ever have found the freedom and irresponsibility of bachelorhood endurable8 ,shall we say that in changes like these we have to do simply with the quantitative increase of some quality1 present in small measure in the earlier stages and in larger measure in the later8 ,or shall we evade the issue with the general admission that of course1 as every schoolboy knows1 there are in this world many differences of degree that somehow amount to differences of kind8 ,as a matter of fact what has happened in every case like these is an actual change of standard1 a new construction in the growing system of one's norms of value and behavior4 ,provisionally1 though hopefully1 a step has been taken--a real event in personal and in social history has been given place and date4 ,from some source beyond the scope and nature of the earlier function a suggestion or an impulsion has come by which the agent has endeavored to move forward4 ,the change wrought is a transcendence of the earlier level of experience and valuation1 not a widening and clarification of vision on that level4 ,and the standards which govern on the new level serve not so much to condemn the old as to seal its consignment to disuse and oblivion4 ,least of all can a judgment or appraisal of the old from the standpoint of the new be taken for a transcript of the motives which led to the transition4 ,we must confine ourselves more closely1 however1 to the sphere of material goods and their uses4 ,and in this sphere objection to the view proposed will run in some such terms as the following3 ,take our ancestors1 for example1 and their household arrangements to which invidious reference has been made3 why should we suppose that their seeming contentment was anything more 7or less7 than a dignified composure in which we might well imitate them--an attitude in no way precluding a definite sense of specific discomforts and embarrassments and a distinct determination to be rid of them as soon as might be8 ,and1 in fact1 if they were satisfied with what they had why did they receive the new when it was offered8 ,if1 on the other hand1 they were not satisfied1 how is the fact intelligible except upon the assumption that they had distinct and definite wants not yet supplied1 and were wishing 7but patiently7 for conveniences and comforts of a sort not yet existent4 ,and this latter hypothesis1 it will be urged1 is precisely what the foregoing argument has sought to discredit as an account of the moving springs in the evolution of consumption4 ,sec4 #e4 ,any adequate discussion of the central issue thus presented would fall into two parts4 ,in the first place1 before a consumption good can come into general acceptance and currency it must have been in some way discovered1 suggested or invented1 and the psychology of invention is undoubtedly a matter of very great complexity and difficulty4 ,but for the purposes of the present inquiry all this may be passed over4 ,the other branch of a full discussion of our problem has to do with the reception of the newly invented commodity or process into wider and wider use--and this again is a social phenomenon not less complex than the other4 ,it is this phenomenon of increasing extension and vogue1 of widening propagation from person to person1 that is directly of present concern for us--and in particular the individual person's attitude toward the new thing and the nature of the interest he takes in it4 ,it has recently been argued by a learned and acute investigator of economic origins that invention is the mother of necessity1 and not the child4#de ,such a complete reversal of all our ordinary thought about the matter seems at first sheer paradox4 ,what1 one may ask1 can ever suggest an invention and what can give it welcome and currency but an existing need--which1 if it happens to be for the time being latent and unconscious1 needs only the presentation of its appropriate means of satisfaction to arouse and awaken it fully into action8 ,but this paradox as to invention is at all events not more paradoxical than the view as to the reception of new commodities and the rise of new desires that has been above suggested4 ,what it appears to imply is in principle identical with what has seemed1 from our consideration of the other aspect of the general situation1 to be the simple empirical fact2 neither the existence of the new commodity nor our interest in it when it is presented admits of explanation as an effect on each particular occasion of a preexisting unsatisfied desire for it4 ,what both sides of the problem bring to view is a certain original bent or constitutive character of human nature--a predisposition1 an elan vital perhaps1 which we must recognize as nothing less than perfectly general and comprehensive--finding expression in inventive effort and likewise in the readiness with which the individual meets a new commodity halfway and gives it opportunity to become for him1 if it can1 a new necessity and the source of a new type of satisfaction4 ,from the point of view of logic1 as ,william ,james might have said1 such a version of psychological fact may seem essentially self-contradictory4 ,unless1 it may be argued1 a novelty when presented excites some manner of desire for itself in the beholder1 the beholder will make no effort towards it and thus take no step away from his existing system of life to a new system in which a new desire and a new commodity shall have a place4 ,so much would seem clear enough but the question immediately follows3 ,how can a thing that is new arouse desire8 ,in so far as it is new it must ex vi termini be unknown and wanting definition in terms of remembered past experiences2 and how can a thing unknown make that connection with the present character of the individual which must be deemed necessary to the arousal of desire in him8 ,a new thing would seem1 then1 from this point of view1 to be able to arouse desire only in so far as it is able to conceal or subordinate its aspects of novelty and appear as known and well-accredited--either this or there must be in the individual some definite instinctive mechanism ready to be set in action by the thing's presentment4 ,and on neither of these suppositions can having to do with the new thing effect any fundamental or radical difference in the individual--it can serve at most only to bring out what was already there in him in a latent or implicit status4 ,whatever new developments of power or desire may be attained and organized into the individual's character through his commerce with the novelty must be new in only a superficial sense--they will be new only as occurrences1 only as the striking of the hour by the clock and the resulting abrasion of the bell and hammer are new events4 ,but the clock was made to strike2 it is the nature of metal to wear away and likewise these changes in the individual are in deeper truth not new at all but only a disclosure of the agent's character1 a further fulfilment along preestablished and unalterable lines which all along was making headway in the agent's earlier quests and efforts and attainments4 ,there is a sense1 no doubt1 in which some such version of the facts as this is unanswerable1 but controversial advantage is paid for1 here as elsewhere in the logic of absolute idealism1 at the cost of tangible meaning and practical importance4 ,just what does the contention come to8 ,let us say1 for example1 that one has learned to use a typewriter4 ,what has happened is like an illiterate person's learning to read and write4 ,correspondence with one's friends begins to take on new meaning and to acquire new value2 one begins to find a new pleasure and stimulation taking the place of the ineffectual drivings of an uneasy conscience4 ,all this1 let us say1 has come from the moderate outlay for a superior mechanical instrument4 ,and now let it be granted that it would not have come if the fortunate individual had not been what he was4 ,if it has come it is because the individual and the rest of the world were of such a sort that the revival and new growth of interest could take its rise with the provision of the new instrumentality4 ,but what1 precisely1 does such a statement mean8 ,what sort of verification does it admit of8 ,what fruitful insight into the concrete facts of the case does it convey8 ,of what sort1 prior to the event1 does it show the individual to have been8 ,the truth is1 of course1 that he was of no sort1 then and there and with reference to the purchase--he was of no sort decisively4 ,he was neither purchaser nor rejector4 ,he was neither a convinced typist nor piously confirmed in his predilection for writing by hand4 ,he was neither wholly weary of his correspondence nor fully cognizant of the importance of intercourse with his friends for his soul's good4 ,he may have been dissatisfied and rebellious or he may have been comfortably persuaded that letter-writing1 though an irksome labor1 was even at that sufficiently worth while4 ,the most that can be said is simply that he must have been willing and desirous to try the experiment for the sake of any good1 imaginable or beyond present imagination1 that might come of it4 ,but being of such a sort as this could not prejudge the issue--although1 undoubtedly1 in willingness to raise an issue there lies always the possibility of change4 ,all the plausibility of the dogma we are here considering comes from its hasty inclusion of this general attitude of constructively experimental inquiry and effort1 this essential character of creative intelligence1 as one among the concrete interests which constitute and define our particular problems in their inception4 ,to say ex post facto that the individual must have been of such a sort as to do what he has in fact done is a purely verbal comment which1 whatever may be its uses1 can assuredly be of no use whatever in suggesting either solution or method for the next situation to arise4 ,it may be comfortably reassuring afterwards1 but it is an empty oracle beforehand4 ,sec4 #f4 ,if then logic is unable to express the nature of our forward looking interest in the unexperienced and unpredictable1 perhaps the empirical fact will speak for itself4 ,we call things new2 we recognize their novelty and their novelty excites our interest4 ,but just as we are sometimes told that we can only know the new in terms of its resemblances to what we have known before1 so it may be held that in the end we can desire it only on the like condition4 ,are we1 then1 to conclude that the seeming novelty of things new is an illusion1 or shall we hold1 on the contrary1 that novelty need not be explained away and that a spontaneous constructive interest stands more or less constantly ready in us to go out to meet it and possess it8 ,unquestionably1 let us say the latter4 ,any new commodity will1 of course1 resemble in part or in a general way some old one4 ,it is said that bath-tubs are sometimes used in model tenements as coal-bins4 ,old uses persist unchanged in the presence of new possibilities4 ,but in general new possibilities invite interest and effort because our experimental and constructive bent contrives on the whole to make head against habituation and routine4 ,we recognize the new as new4 ,and if it be contended that novelty in its own right cannot be a ground of interest1 that novelty must first get restatement as the old with certain accidents externally adhering1 the answer is that the accidents interest us nevertheless4 ,they may prove their right to stand as the very essence of some new kind that one may wish to let take form and character for him4 ,instead of the chips and shavings1 they are in fact the raw material of the logical process4 ,for if we can know the new as new1 if we can know the accident as accidental in a commodity before us1 the fact betrays an incipient interest in the quality or aspect that its novelty or contingency at least does not thwart4 ,and is this quite all8 ,will it be disputed that a relation of a quality or feature to ourselves which we can know1 name1 and recognize--like novelty--must be known1 as anything else is known1 through an interest of which it is the appropriate terminus8#df ,and there is no difficulty in pointing to instances in which the character of novelty seems fundamental4 ,consider1 for example1 the interest one feels in spending a day with a friend or in making a new acquaintance or1 say1 in entering on the cares of parenthood4 ,or again1 take the impulse toward research1 artistic creation1 or artistic study and appreciation4 ,or again1 take the interest in topography and exploration4 ,that there is in such phenomena as these a certain essentially and irreducibly forward look1 a certain residual freedom of our interest and effort from dependence on the detail of prior experience down to date1 probably few persons without ulterior philosophical prepossessions will dispute4 ,if we call these phenomena instinctive we are using the term in a far more loose and general sense than it seems to have in the best usage of animal psychology4 ,if we call them attitudes or dispositions1 such a term has at least the negative merit of setting them apart from the class of instinctive acts1 but it may carry with it a connotation of fixity and unconsciousness that after all surrenders the essential distinction4 ,it will suffice to look at a single one of these instances4 ,in friendship1 for example1 there is undoubtedly strongly operative a desire for the mere recurrence1 in our further friendly intercourse1 of certain values that have become habitual and familiar4 ,we may have long known and become attached to a friend's tones of voice1 peculiarities of manner and external appearance1 turns of speech and thought and the like1 which we miss in absence and which give us pleasure when we meet the friend again4 ,but if the friendship is not one of pleasure or utility simply1 but of virtue#dg as well1 there is also present on both sides a constructive or progressive or creative interest4 ,and this interest1 stated on its self-regarding and introspective side1 is more than a desire for the mere grateful recurrence of the old looks and words recoined at the old mint4 ,it is an interest looking into the undone vast1 an interest in an indefinite prolongation1 an infinite series1 of joint experiences the end of which cannot and need not be foreseen and the nature of which neither can nor need be forecasted4 ,and there is the same characteristic in all the other instances mentioned in this connection4 ,it is not a desire for recurrent satisfactions of a determinate type1 but an interest in the active development of unexperienced and indeterminate possibilities4 ,if finally the question be pressed1 how there can be an interest of this seemingly self-contradictory type in human nature1 the answer can only be that we must take the facts as we find them4 ,is such a conception inherently more difficult than the view that all ramifications and developments of human interest are concretely predetermined and implicit a priori8 ,to ignore or deny palpable fact because it eludes the reach of a current type of conceptual analysis is to part company with both science and philosophy4 ,we are in fact here dealing with the essential mark and trait of what is called self-conscious process4 ,if there are ultimates and indefinables in this world of ours1 self-consciousness may as fairly claim the dignity or avow the discredit as any other of the list4 ,sec4 #g4 ,does our interest in economic goods on occasion exhibit the trait of which we are here speaking8 ,precisely this is our present contention4 ,and yet it seems not too much to say that virtually all economic theory1 whether the classical or the present dominant type that has drawn its terminology and working concepts from the ostensible psychology of the ,austrian ,school1 is founded upon the contradictory assumption4 ,the economic interest1 our desire and esteem for solid and matter-of-fact things like market commodities and standardized market services1 has been conceived as nothing visionary and speculative1 as no peering into the infinite or outreaching of an inexpressible discontent1 but an intelligent1 clear-eyed grasping and holding of known satisfactions for measured and acknowledged desires4 ,art and religion1 friendship and love1 sport and adventure1 morality and legislation1 these all may be fields for the free play and constructive experimentation of human faculty1 but in our economic efforts and relations we are supposed to tread the solid ground of fact4 ,business is business4 ,waste not1 want not4 ,first a living1 then 7perhaps7 a good life4#dh ,and we are assured one need not recoil from the hard logic of such maxims1 for they do not dispute the existence of spacious 7and well-shaded7 suburban regions fringing the busy areas of industry and commerce4 ,such is the assumption4 ,we have said that it precludes the admission of speculation as an economic factor4 ,speculation for economic theory is a purely commercial phenomenon1 a hazarding of capital on the supposition that desires will be found ready and waiting for the commodity produced--with a sufficient offering of purchasing power to afford a profit4 ,and the creation of demand1 where this is part of the program of speculative enterprise1 means the arousal of a dormant or implicit desire1 in the sense above discussed--there is nothing1 at all events1 in other parts of current theory to indicate a different conception4 ,the economist will probably contend that what the process of the creation of demand may be is not his but the psychologist's affair2 that his professional concern is only whether or not the economic demand1 as an objective market fact1 be actually forthcoming4 ,but what we here contend for as a fact of economic experience is a speculation that is in the nature of personal adventure and not simply an adventuring of stock4 ,sec4 #h4 ,for what is the nature of the economic experience or situation1 considered as a certain type of juncture in the life of an individual8 ,it may be shortly described as the process of determining how much of one's time1 strength1 or external resources of any sort shall be expended for whatever one is thinking of doing or acquiring4 ,two general motives enter here to govern the estimate and each may show the routine or the innovative phase4 ,in any work there is possible1 first1 more or less of the workman's interest--an interest not merely in a conventional standard of excellence in the finished result but also in betterment of the standard and in a corresponding heightened excellence of technique and spirit in the execution4#di ,these interests1 without reference to the useful result and for their own sake 7i4e41 for the workman's sake1 in ways not specifiable in advance71 may command a share of one's available time1 strength1 and resources4 ,in the second place1 any work or effort or offer to give in exchange has a nameable result of some kind in view--a crop of wheat1 a coat1 a musical rendition1 or the education of a child4 ,why are such things produced or sought for8 ,verbally and platitudinously one may answer3 ,for the sake of the satisfactions they are expected to afford4 ,but such an answer ignores the contrast of attitudes that both workmanship and productive or acquisitive effort in the ordinary sense display4 ,as the workman may conform to his standard or may be ambitious to surpass it1 so the intending consumer may be counting on known satisfactions or hoping for satisfactions of a kind that he has never known before4 ,both sorts of effort may be of either the routine or the innovative type4 ,in neither workmanship nor acquisition can one fix upon routine as the normal type1 hoping to derive or to explain away the inevitable residue of outstanding cases4 ,for as a matter of fact the outstanding cases prove to be our only clue to a knowledge of how routine is made4#ej ,the above formula will apply1 with the appropriate changes of emphasis1 to buyers and sellers in an organized market1 as well as to the parties to a simple transaction of barter4 ,two main empirical characteristics of the economic situation are suggested in putting the statement in just these terms4 ,in the first place1 the primary problem in such a situation is that of exchange valuation1 the fixation of a subjective 7or better1 a personal7 price ratio between what the agent wishes to acquire and whatever it is that he offers in exchange4 ,the agent thus is engaged in determining what shall be the relative importance for himself of two commodities or exchangeable goods4 ,and in the second place these goods get their values determined together and in relation to each other1 never singly and with a view to subsequent comparison4 ,these values when they have been determined will be measured in terms of marginal utility in accordance with familiar principles1 but the marginal utilities that are to express the attained and accepted ratio at which exchange eventually takes place are not known quantities at all in the inception of the process of comparison4 ,if these dogmatic statements seem to issue in hopeless paradox or worse1 then let us not fear to face the paradox and fix its lines with all possible distinctness4 ,can a man decide to offer so much of one commodity for so much of another unless he first has settled what each is worth to him in some intelligible terms or other8 ,and is not this latter in point of fact the real decision--at all events clearly more than half the battle8 ,does not the exchange ratio to which one can agree leap to the eyes1 in fact1 as soon as the absolute values in the case have been once isolated and given numerical expression8 ,in a single word we here join issue4 ,for the comparison in such a case is constructive comparison1 not a mechanical measuring of fixed magnitudes1 as the above objection tacitly assumes4 ,and constructive comparison is essentially a transitive or inductive operation whereby the agent moves from one level to another1 altering his standard of living in some more or less important way1 embarking upon a new interest1 entering upon the formation of a new habit or upon a new accession of power or effectiveness--making or seeking to make1 in short1 some transformation in his environment and in himself that shall give his life as an entire system a changed tenor and perspective4 ,the term constructive comparison is thus intended1 among other things1 to suggest that the process is in the nature of adventure1 not calculation1 and1 on the other hand1 that though adventurous it is not sheer hazard uncontrolled4 ,and the motive dominant throughout the process--the economic motive in its constructive phase--is neither more nor less than a supposition1 on the agent's part1 that there may be forthcoming for him in the given case in hand just such an epigenetic development of new significance and value as we have found actual history to disclose as a normal result of economic innovation4 ,it is the gist of hedonism1 in economic theory as in its other expressions1 that inevitably the agent's interests and motives are restricted in every case to the precise range and scope of his existing tendencies and desires2 he can be provoked to act only by the hope of just those particular future pleasures or means of pleasure which the present constitution of his nature enables him to enjoy4 ,idealism assumes that the emergent new interest of the present was wrapped up or implied1 in some sense1 in the interests of the remote and immediate past--interests of which the agent at the time could of course be but imperfectly aware4 ,such differences as one can discern between the two interpretations seem small indeed--like many others to which idealism has been wont to point in disparagement of the hedonistic world view4 ,for in both philosophies the agent is without initiative and effect2 he is in principle but the convergence of impersonal motive powers which it is1 in the one view1 absurdly futile1 in the other misguidedly presumptuous1 to try to alter or control4 ,sec4 #i4 ,a commodity sought or encountered may then be of interest to us for reasons of the following three general sorts4 ,in the first place it may simply be the normal and appropriate object of some established desire of ours4 ,we may be seeking the commodity because this desire has first become active1 or encountering the commodity in the market may have suddenly awakened the desire4 ,illustration seems superfluous2 tobacco for the habitual smoker1 clothing of most sorts for the ordinary person1 regular supplies of the household staples--these will suffice4 ,this is the province within which a hedonistic account of the economic motive holds good with a cogency that anti-hedonistic criticism has not been able to dissolve4 ,our outlays for such things as these may as a rule be held in their due and proper relation to each other--at all events in their established or normal relation--simply by recalling at critical times our relative marginal likes and dislikes for them4 ,that these likes and dislikes are not self-explanatory1 that they are concrete expectations and not abstract affective elements1 does not seem greatly to matter where the issue lies between maintaining or renouncing an existing schedule of consumption4 ,and in this same classification belong also industrial and commercial expenditures of a similarly routine sort4 ,even where the scale of operations is being enlarged1 expenditures for machines1 fuel1 raw materials1 and labor may have been so carefully planned in advance with reference to the desired increase of output or pecuniary profit that no special problem of motivation attaches directly to them4 ,and these outlays are so important in industry and commerce that the impression comes easily to prevail that all business undertaking1 and then all consumption of finished goods1 fall under the simple hedonistic type4 ,but if we keep to the plane of final consumption1 there appears a second sort of situation4 ,our interest in the commodity before us may be due to a suggestion of some sort that prompts us to take a step beyond the limits that our present formed desires mark out4 ,the suggestion may be given by adroit advertising1 by fashion1 by the habits of another class to which one may aspire or by a person to whom one may look as guide1 philosopher1 and friend4 ,an authority of one sort or another invites or constrains us to take the merits of the article on trust4 ,actual trial and use may show1 not so much that it can minister to a latent desire as that we have been able through its use to form a habit that constitutes a settled need4 ,and1 finally1 in the third place1 there is a more spontaneous and intrinsically personal type of interest which is very largely independent of suggestion or authority4 ,a thing of beauty1 a new author1 a new acquaintance1 a new sport or game1 a new convenience or mechanical device may challenge one's curiosity and powers of appreciation1 may seem to offer a new facility in action or some unimagined release from labor or restriction4 ,the adventure of marriage and parenthood1 the intimate attraction of great music1 the mystery of an unknown language or a forbidden country1 the disdainful aloofness of a mountain peak dominating a landscape are conspicuous instances inviting a more spontaneous type of constructive interest that finds abundant expression also in the more commonplace situations and emergencies of everyday life4 ,it is sheer play upon words to speak in such cases of a pleasure of adventurousness1 a pleasure of discovery1 a pleasure of conquest and mastery1 assigning this as the motive in order to bring these interests to the type that fits addiction to one's particular old coat or easy-chair4 ,the specific pleasure alleged could not exist were the tendency not active beforehand4 ,while the same is true in a sense for habitual concrete pleasures in relation to their corresponding habits1 the irreducible difference in constructive interest as a type lies in the transition which this type of interest purposes and effects from one level of concrete or substantive desire and pleasure to another4 ,here one consciously looks to a result that he cannot foresee or foretell2 in the other type his interest as interest goes straight to its mark1 sustained by a confident forecast4#ea ,sec4 #aj4 ,but constructive interests1 whether provoked by suggestion or of the more freely imaginative type1 may1 as has been said1 be held to lie outside the scope of economic theory4 ,how a desire for a certain thing has come to get expression may seem quite immaterial--economically speaking4 ,economics has no concern with human folly as such or human imitativeness1 or human aspiration high or low or any other of the multitude of motives that have to do with secular changes in the standard of living and in the ideals of life at large4 ,it has no concern with anything that lies behind the fact that ,i am in the market with my mind made up to buy or sell a thing at a certain price4 ,and the answer to this contention must be that it first reverses and then distorts the true perspective of our economic experience4 ,let it be admitted freely--indeed1 let it be insisted on--that the definition of a science must be determined by the pragmatic test4 ,if an economist elects to concern himself with the problems of what has been called the loose mechanics of trade there can be no question of his right to do so or of the importance of the services he may render thereby1 both to theory and to practice4 ,but on the other hand economic theory cannot be therefore1 once and for all1 made a matter of accounting--to the effacement of all problems and aspects of problems of which the accountant has no professional cognizance4 ,just this1 apparently1 is what it means to level down all types of interest to the hedonistic1 leaving aside as extra-economic those that too palpably resist the operation4 ,it is acknowledged that freshly suggested modes of consumption and ends of effort require expenditure and sacrifice no less than the habitual1 that the exploration of ,tibet or of the ,polar ,seas affects the market for supplies not less certainly than the scheduled voyages of oceanic liners4 ,moreover1 behind these scheduled voyages there are all the varied motives that induce people to travel and the desires that lead to the shipment of goods4 ,shall it be said that all of these motives and desires must be traceable back to settled habits of behavior and consumption8 ,and if this cannot be maintained is it not hazardous to assume that such general problems of economic theory as the determination of market values or of the shares in distribution require no recognition of the other empirical types of interest8 ,these types1 if they are genuine1 are surely important2 they may well prove to be1 in many ways1 fundamentally important4 ,for a commodity that has become habitual must once have been new and untried4 ,sec4 #aa4 ,the economic demands which make up the budget of a particular person at a particular time are clearly interdependent4 ,a man's income or the greater part of it is usually distributed among various channels of expenditure in a certain fairly constant way4 ,in proportion to the definiteness of this distribution and the resoluteness with which it is maintained does the impression gain strength that the man is carrying out a consistent plan of some sort4 ,such a regular plan of expenditure may be drawn out into a schedule1 setting forth the amounts required at a certain price for the unit of each kind4 ,and such a schedule is an expression in detail1 in terms of ways and means1 of the type of life one has elected to lead4 ,for virtually any income above the level of bare physical subsistence1 there will be an indefinite number of alternative budgets possible4 ,a little less may be spent for household conveniences and adornments and a little more for food4 ,some recreations may be sacrificed for an occasional book or magazine4 ,one may build a house or purchase a motor-car instead of going abroad4 ,and whichever choice is made1 related expenditures must be made in consequence for which1 on the assumption of a definite amount of income1 compensation must be made by curtailment of outlay at other points4 ,what seems clear in general is that one's total budget is relative to the general plan and manner of life one deems for him the best possible and that this plan1 more or less definitely formulated1 more or less steadily operative1 is what really determines how far expenditure shall go in this direction and in that4 ,the budget as a whole will define for the individual an equilibrium among his various recognized wants2 if the work of calculating it has been carefully done there will be for the time being no tendency to change in any item4 ,if1 then1 we choose to say in such a case that the individual carries his expenditure along each line to the precise point at which the last or marginal utility enjoyed is precisely equal to the marginal utility on every other line1 it seems not difficult to grasp what such a statement means4 ,quite harmlessly1 all that it can mean is that the individual has planned precisely what he has planned and is not sorry for it1 and for the time being does not think he can improve upon it4 ,as there is one earth drawing toward its center each billiard ball of the dozen in equilibrium in a bowl1 so there is behind the budget of the individual one complex personal conception of a way of life that fixes more or less certainly and clearly the kinds and intensities of his wants and assigns to each its share of purchasing power4 ,that the units or elements in equilibrium hold their positions with reference to each other for reasons capable of separate statement for each unit seems a supposition no less impossible in the one case than in the other4 ,to think of each kind of want in the individual's nature as holding separately in fee simple and clamoring for full and separate satisfaction in its separate kind1 is the characteristic illusion of a purely formal type of analysis4 ,the permanence of a budget and its carrying out no doubt require the due and precise realization of each plotted marginal utility--to go further than this along any one line would inevitably mean getting not so far along certain others1 and thus a distorted and disappointing total attainment in the end4 ,but to say that one actually plans and controls his expenditures along various lines by the ultimate aim of attaining equivalent terminal utilities on each is quite another story4 ,it is much like saying that the square inches of canvas assigned in a picture to sky and sea and crannied wall are arranged upon the principle of identical and equal effects for artist or beholder from the last inches painted of each kind4 ,the formula of the equality of marginal effects is no constructive principle2 it is only a concise if indeed somewhat grotesque way of phrasing the essential fact that no change of the qualitative whole is going to be made1 because no imperfection in it as a whole is felt4#eb ,sec4 #ab4 ,we come1 then1 to the problem of the individual's encounter with a new commodity4 ,in general1 a purchase in such a case must amount to more or less of a departure from the scheme of life in force and a transition over to a different one4 ,and a new commodity 7in the sense in which the term has been used above7 is apt to be initially more tempting than an addition along some line of expenditure already represented in the budget4 ,the latter1 supposing there has been no change of price and no increase of income1 is usually a mere irregularity1 an insurgent departure from some one specification of a total plan without preliminary compensating adjustment or appropriate change at other points4 ,the erratic outlay1 if considerable1 will result in sheer disorder and extravagance--indefensible and self-condemned on the principles of the individual's own economy4 ,but with a new commodity the case stands differently4 ,it is more interesting to consider a really new proposal than to reopen a case once closed when no evidence distinctly new is offered4 ,a sheer temptation or an isolated impulse toward new outlay along a line already measured in one's scheme has the force of habit and a presumption of un-wisdom to overcome4 ,if the case is one not of temptation but of being urged one is apt to answer1 ,no1 ,i can make no use of any more of that4 ,but a new commodity has the charm of its novelty1 a charm consisting in the promise1 in positive fashion1 of new qualitative values about which a new entire schedule will have to be organized4 ,partly its strength of appeal lies in its radicalism2 it gains ready attention not only by its promise but by its boldness4 ,preparedness gains a more ready acclaim than better schools or the extirpation of disease4 ,the automobile and the moving picture probably have a vogue today far surpassing any use of earlier equivalents that a mere general augmentation of incomes could have brought about4 ,indeed1 the economic danger of the middle classes in present-day society lies not in mere occasional excess at certain points but in heedless commitment to a showy and thinned-out scheme of life in which the elements are ill-chosen and ill-proportioned and from which1 as a whole1 abiding satisfaction cannot be drawn4 ,it is where real and thoroughgoing change in the manner of life is hopeless that irregular intemperance of various sorts appears to bulk relatively largest as an economic evil4 ,shall we not say1 however1 that the superior attraction of the new in competition with established lines of expenditure only indicates the greater satiation of the wants the latter represent and the comparative freshness of the wants the novelty will satisfy8 ,on the contrary the latter wants are in the full sense not yet existent1 the new satisfactions are untried and unmeasured2 the older wants have the advantage of position1 and if satiated today1 will reassert themselves with a predictable strength tomorrow4 ,the new wants1 it is true1 if they are acquired1 will be part of a new system1 but the present fact remains that their full meaning cannot be known in advance of trial and the further outlines of the new scheme of uses and values cannot be drawn up until this meaning has been learned4 ,if1 then1 the new commodity is taken1 it is not because the promised satisfaction and the sum of known utilities to be sacrificed are found equal1 nor again because the new commodity will fit neatly into a place in the existing schedule that can be vacated for it4 ,this latter is the case of substitution4 ,such an interpretation of the facts is retrospective only2 it is a formal declaration that the exchange has been deemed on the whole worth while1 but the reasons for this outcome such a formula is powerless to suggest4 ,in general the new commodity and the habits it engenders could not remain without effect upon a system into which they might be mechanically introduced4 ,certain items in the schedule1 associated in use with those dispensed with for the new1 must be rendered obsolete by the change4 ,the new interests called into play will draw to themselves and to their further development attention which may be in large measure diverted from the interests of older standing4 ,and in the new system all interests remaining over from the old will accordingly stand in a new light and their objects will be valued1 will be held important1 for reasons that will need fresh statement4#ec ,in similar fashion it might be argued that the commodities or uses which one sacrifices for the sake of a new venture are inevitably more than a simple deduction that curtails one's schedule in a certain kind and amount4 ,such a deduction or excision must leave the remaining lines of the original complex hanging at loose ends4 ,the catching-up of these and their cooerdination with the new interest must in any event amount1 as has been contended1 to a thoroughgoing reorganization4 ,what must really happen then1 in the event of action1 is in principle nothing less than the disappearance of the whole from which the sacrificed uses are dissevered4 ,these latter1 therefore1 stand in the process of decision as a symbol for the existing personal economy as a whole4 ,the old order and the new confront each other as an accepted view of fact and a plausible hypothesis everywhere confront each other and the issue for the individual is the practical issue of making the transition to a new working level4 ,to declare that the salient elements of the confronting complexes are quantitatively equivalent is only to announce in symbolic terms that the transition has been effected1 the die cast4#ed ,sec4 #ac4 ,the statement thus given has been purposely made1 for many transactions of the sort referred to1 something of an over-statement4 ,if ,i contemplate purchasing a typewriter or a book on an unfamiliar but inviting subject it may well seem somewhat extravagant to describe the situation as an opposition between two schemes of life4 ,is the issue so momentous2 is the act so revolutionary8 ,but the purpose of our over-statement was simply to make clear the type of situation without regard to the magnitudes involved4 ,no novelty that carries one in any respect beyond the range of existing habits can be wholly without its collateral effects nor can its proximate and proper significance be measured in advance4 ,this is in principle as true of a relatively slight innovation as of a considerable one4 ,and our present conscious exaggeration departs less widely from the truth than the alternative usual preoccupation of economic theory with the logic of routine desire and demand4 ,for the phenomena of routine and habit are thereby made a standard by which all others1 if indeed recognized as real at all1 must be judged exceptional4 ,and1 as we shall see1 to do this introduces difficulty into certain parts of substantive economic theory4 ,again1 objection may attach to the view that equivalence of the salient members of the opposing systems is only another name for the comprehensive fact of the novelty's acceptance4 ,for if we hesitate in such a case1 is this not because we judge the price too high8 ,what can this signify but that the service or satisfaction we expect from the novelty falls short of sufficing to convince us8 ,and unless we are dealing with measured quantities1 how can we come to this conclusion8 ,moreover1 if the novel commodity is divided into units we may take a smaller quantity when the price demanded is high than if the price were lower4 ,and does this not suggest predetermined value-magnitudes as data8 ,but if one takes thus a smaller amount1 as the argument contends1 it is because there is a presumption of being able to make some important total use of it and there is no general reason apparent for supposing that this will be merely a fractional part of a larger but like significance that might be hoped for from a larger quantity4 ,and on the other hand1 the prospect simply may not tempt at all2 the smaller quantity may be deemed an improbable support for a really promising total program and the present program will hold its ground1 not seriously shaken4 ,the total demand of a market for a given commodity is no doubt in some sort a mathematical function of the price4 ,the lower the price the greater in some ratio will be the number of persons who will buy and in general the greater the number of units taken by those who are already buyers4 ,but that such a proposition admits of statistical proof from the observation of a series of price changes in a market affords no presumption concerning the nature of the reasons that move any individual person to his action4 ,the theoretical temptation is strong1 here as elsewhere1 in passing from the study of markets to the personal economy of the individual forthwith to find this also a trafficking in unit-quantities and marginal satisfactions to which the concepts and notation of market analysis will readily apply4 ,it remains to consider certain implications of this view of economic desire and demand4 ,,ii ,sec4 #ad4 ,it is evident that the issue finally at stake in any economic problem of constructive comparison1 is an ethical issue4 ,two immediate alternatives are before one--to expend a sum of money in some new and interesting way1 or to keep it devoted to the uses of one's established plan4 ,upon the choice1 one recognizes1 hinge consequences of larger and more comprehensive importance than the mere present enjoyment or non-enjoyment of the new commodity4#ee ,and these more important consequences are important because there appears to lie in them the possibility of a type of personal character divergent from the present type and from any present point of view incommensurable with it4#ef ,the ethical urgency of such a problem will impress one in the measure in which one can see that such an issue really does depend upon his present action and irretrievably depends4 ,and we are able now to see what that economic quality is that attaches to ethical problems at a certain stage of their development and calls for a supplementary type of treatment4 ,let us first consider certain types of juncture in conduct that will be recognized at once as ethical and in which any economic aspect is relatively inconspicuous4 ,temperance or intemperance1 truth or falsehood1 idleness or industry1 honesty or fraud1 social justice or class-interest--these will serve4 ,what makes such problems as these ethical is their demand for creative intelligence4 ,in each1 alternative types of character or manners of life stand initially opposed4 ,if the concrete issue is really problematical1 if there is no rule that one can follow in the case with full assurance1 constructive comparison1 whether covertly or openly1 must come into play4 ,how long1 then1 will a problem of temperance or intemperance1 idleness or industry1 preserve its obviously ethical character without admixture8 ,just so long1 apparently1 as the modes of conduct that come into view as possible solutions are considered and valued with regard to their directly physiological and psychological consequences alone4 ,any given sort of conduct1 that is to say1 makes inevitably for the formation of certain habits of mind or muscle1 weakening1 or precluding the formation of1 certain others4 ,attention is engrossed that is thereby not available elsewhere1 time and strength are expended1 discriminations are dulled and sharpened1 sympathies and sensitivities are narrowed and broadened1 every trait and bent of character is directly or indirectly affected in some way by every resolve concluded and every action embarked upon4 ,if one moves a certain way along a certain line he can never return to the starting-point and set out unchanged along any other4 ,if one does one thing one cannot do another4 ,and when the sufficient reasons for this mutual exclusion lie in the structure and organization of the human mind and body our deliberation as between the two alternatives1 our constructive comparison of them remains upon the ethical plane4 ,if one does one thing one cannot do another4 ,if we substitute the well-worn saying one cannot eat his cake and have it we indicate the economic plane of constructive comparison with all needful clearness4 ,this is in fact the situation that has been already under discussion at such length above and the economic quality of which we are just now in quest arises from neither more nor less than the fact of our dependence in the working out of our personal problems upon limited external resources4 ,the eventual solution sought under these circumstances remains ethical as before4 ,but to reach it1 it is necessary to bring into consideration not only such other interests and ends as the psycho-physical structure of human nature and the laws of character-development show to be involved1 but a still wider range of interests less intimately or internally related to the focal interest of the occasion but imperatively requiring to be heard4 ,if my acquisition of a phonograph turns upon the direct psychological bearing of the new interest upon my other interests1 its probable effects whether good or bad upon my musical tastes and the diplomatic complications with my neighbors in which the possession of the instrument may involve me1 the problem of its purchase remains clearly in the ethical phase4 ,but when ,i count the cost in terms of sacrifices which the purchase price makes necessary1 from literature down to food and fuel1 and must draw this whole range of fact also into the adjustment if ,i can1 the economic phase is reached4 ,in principle two entire and very concrete schemes of life now stand opposed4 ,just what concrete sacrifices ,i shall make ,i do not know--this1 in fact1 is one way of stating my problem4 ,nor1 conversely1 do ,i know just what ,i shall be able to make the phonograph worth to me4 ,it is my task to come to a conclusion in the case that shall be explicit and clear enough to enable me to judge in the event whether my expectation has been realized and ,i have acted wisely or unwisely4 ,thus a problem is economic when the fact of the limitation of my external resources must be eventually and frankly faced4 ,the characteristic quality of a problem grown economic is a certain vexatiousness and seeming irrationality in the ill-assorted array of nevertheless indisputable interests1 prosaic and ideal1 that have to be reduced to order4 ,it is perhaps this characteristic emotional quality of economic problems that has insensibly inclined economists to favor a simpler and more clear-cut analysis4 ,as for ethical problems--they have been left to conscience or to the jurisdiction of a greatest happiness principle in which the ordinary individual or legislator has somehow come to take an interest4 ,that they arise and become urgent in us of course does human nature unimpeachable credit and economics must by all means wait respectfully upon their settlement4 ,so much is conceded4 ,but economics is economics1 when all is said and done4 ,what we mean by the economic interest is an interest in the direct and several satisfactions that a man can get from the several things he shrewdly finds it worth his while to pay for4 ,and shrewdness means nicety of calculation1 accuracy of measurement in the determination of tangible loss and gain4 ,here1 then1 is no field for ethics but a field of fact4 ,thus ethics on her side must also wait until the case is fully ready for her praise or blame4 ,such is the modus vivendi4 ,but its simplicity is oversimple and unreal4 ,it pictures the economic man as bound in the chains of a perfunctory deference that he would throw off if he could4 ,for the theory of constructive comparison or creative intelligence1 on the other hand1 instead of a seeker and recipient of psychic income and a calculator of gain and loss1 he is a personal agent maintaining continuity of action in a life of discontinuously changing levels of interest and experience4 ,his measure of attainment lies not in an accelerating rate of psychic income1 but in an increasing sense of personal effectiveness and an increasing readiness and confidence before new junctures4 ,the possession and use of commodities are1 then1 not in themselves and directly economic facts at all4 ,as material things commodities serve certain purposes and effect certain results4 ,they are means to ends and their serving so is a matter of technology4 ,but do ,i seriously want their services8 ,this is a matter of my ethical point of view4 ,do ,i want them at the price demanded or at what price and how many8 ,this is the economic question and it obviously is a question wholly ethical in import--more broadly and inclusively ethical1 in fact1 than the ethical question in its earlier and more humanly inviting form4 ,and what we have now to see is the fact that no consideration that has a bearing upon the problem in its ethical phase can lose its importance and relevance in the subsequent phase4 ,there can be no restriction of the economic interest1 for example1 to egoism4 ,if on general principles ,i would really rather use goods produced in safe and cleanly factories or produced by union labor1 there is no possible reason why this should not incline me to pay the higher prices that such goods may cost and make the needful readjustment in my budget4 ,is there reason why my valuation of these goods should not thus be the decisive act that takes me out of one relation to industrial workers and sets me in another--can anything else1 indeed1 quite so distinctly do this8 ,for economic valuation is only the fixation of a purchase price1 or an exchange relation in terms of price and quantity1 upon which two schemes of life1 two differing perspectives of social contact and relationship converge--the scheme of life from which ,i am departing and the one upon which ,i have resolved to make my hazard4 ,it is this election1 this transition1 that the purchase price expresses--drawing all the strands of interest and action into a knot so that a single grasp may seize them4 ,the only essential egoism in the case lies in the subjectivism of the fact that inevitably the emergency and the act are mine and not another's4 ,this is the egocentric predicament in its ethical aspect4 ,and the egocentric predicament proves ,hobbes and ,la ,rochefoucauld as little as it proves ,berkeley or ,karl ,pearson4 ,no social interest1 no objective interest of any sort1 is shown ungenuine by my remembering in season that if ,i cannot fill my coal-bin ,i shall freeze4#eg ,sec4 #ae4 ,this logical and psychological continuity of the ethical and economic problems suggests certain general considerations of some practical interest4 ,in the first place as to egoism4 ,i am1 let us say1 an employer4 ,if ,i am interested in procuring just labor1 in the sense of foot-pounds of energy1 then undoubtedly labor performed under safe and healthful conditions is worth no more to me than other labor 7provided it does not prove more efficient74 ,but is this attitude of interest in just foot-pounds of energy the attitude par excellence or solely entitled to be called economic8 ,and just this may be asserted for the reason that an exclusive interest in just labor is the only interest in the case that men of business1 or at least many of them1 can entertain without going speedily to the wall4 ,if1 then1 ,i do in fact pay more than ,i must in wages or if ,i expend more than a bare minimum for conveniences and safety-guards this is not because of the valuation ,i put upon labor1 but only because ,i take pleasure in the contentment and well-being of others4 ,and this is not business but uplift--or else a subtle form of emotional self-indulgence4 ,suppose1 however1 that by legislation similar working conditions have been made mandatory for the entire industry and suppose that the community approves the law1 even to the extent of cheerfully paying so much of the additional cost thereby imposed as may be shifted upon them4 ,shall we say that this is an ethical intrusion into the sphere of economics or shall we say that the former economic demand for labor as such has given place to an economic demand for labor better circumstanced or better paid8 ,the community at all events is paying the increase of price or a part of the increase4 ,it seems arbitrary to insist that the old price is still the economic price of the commodity and the increase only the price of a quiet conscience4 ,the notion of a strictly economic demand for labor pure and simple seems in fact a concept of accounting4 ,to meet the community's demand for the commodity a number of producers were required4 ,the least capable of these could make both ends meet at the prevailing price only by ignoring all but the severely impersonal aspects of the process4 ,taking these costs as a base1 other more capable or more fortunate producers may have been able to make additional expenditures of the sort in question1 charging these perhaps to welfare account4 ,the law then intervenes1 making labor in effect more expensive for all by requiring the superior conveniences or by compelling employers' insurance against accidents to workmen or by enforcing outright a higher minimum wage4 ,the old basic labor cost becomes thus obsolete4 ,and without prejudging as to the expediency of such legislation in particular industrial or business situations may we not protest against a priori and wholesale condemnation of such legislation as merely irresponsibly ethical and unscientific8 ,is it not1 rather1 economically experimental and constructive1 amounting in substance to a simple insistence that henceforth the hiring and paying of labor shall express a wider range of social interests--shall signalize a more clearly self-validating level of comprehension1 on the part of employers and consumers1 of the social significance of industry than the old8 ,and may we not protest also1 as a matter of sheer logic1 against carrying over a producer's distinction of accounting between labor cost and welfare cost into the consumer's valuation of the article8 ,how and to what end shall a distinction be drawn between his esteem for the trimmed and isolated article and his esteem for the men who made it--which1 taken together1 dispose him to pay a certain undivided price for it8 ,for the egoism of men is no fixed and unalterable fact4 ,taking it as a postulate1 a mathematical theory of market phenomena may be erected upon it1 but such a postulate is purely formal1 taking no note of the reasons which at any given time lie behind the individuals' demand or supply schedules4 ,it amounts simply to an assumption that these schedules will not change during the lapse of time contemplated in the problem in hand4 ,and it therefore cannot serve as the basis for a social science4 ,as an actual social phenomenon egoism is merely a disclosure of a certain present narrowness and inertness in the nature of the individual which may or may not be definitive for him4 ,it is precisely on a par with anemia1 dyspepsia or fatigue1 or any other like unhappy fact of personal biography4 ,sec4 #af4 ,there is another suggestion of ethical and economic continuity that may be briefly indicated4 ,if our view of this relation is correct1 a problem1 by becoming economic1 may lose something in dramatic interest and grandiosity but gains in precision and complexity4 ,in the economic phase an issue becomes sensibly crucial4 ,it is in this phase that are chiefly developed those qualities of clear-headedness1 temperateness of thought and action1 and well-founded self-reliance that are the foundation of all genuine personal morality and social effectiveness4 ,and one may question therefore the ethical consequences of such measures as old age1 sickness1 and industrial accident insurance or insurance against unemployment4 ,in proportion as these measures are effective they amount to a constant virtual addition to the individual's income from year to year without corresponding effort and forethought on his part4 ,they may accordingly be condemned as systematic pauperization--the endowment of the unfit4 ,there is evidently a fundamental problem here at issue1 apart from all administrative difficulties4 ,clearly this type of criticism assumes a permanent incapacity in human nature or in most actual beings therewith endowed1 to recognize as seriously important other interests than those upon which hinge physical life and death4 ,the ordinary man1 it is believed1 is held back from moral ,quixotism as from material extravagance by the fear of starvation alone2 and it is assumed that there are no other interests in the normal man that can or ever will be so wholesomely effective to these ends4 ,and two remarks in answer appear not without a measure of pertinence4 ,first1 if what is alleged be true 7and there is evidence in ,malthus' ,essay and elsewhere to support it7 it seems less a proof of original sin and inperfectibility than a reproach to a social order whose collective tenor and institutions leave the mass untouched and unawakened above the level of animal reproduction and whose inequalities of opportunity prevent awakened life from growing strong4 ,and second1 the democratic society of the future1 if it exempts the individual in part or wholly from the dread of premature physical extinction must leave him on higher levels of interest similarly dependent for success or failure upon his ultimate personal discretion4 ,and is it inconceivable that on higher levels there should ever genuinely be such a persisting type of issue for the multitude of men8#eh ,sec4 #ag4 ,we have held constructive comparison in its economic phase to be a reciprocal evaluating of the salient members of two budgets4 ,the respective budgets in such a case express in the outcome 7#a7 the plane of life to which one is to move and 7#b7 the plane one is forsaking4 ,it was the salient member of the former that presented the problem at the outset4 ,in the course of the process its associates were gathered about it in their due proportions and perspective4 ,the salient member of the latter 7i4e41 whatever the purchase is to oblige one to do without71 it was the business of constructive comparison to single out from among its associates and designate for sacrifice4 ,in any case at all departing from the type of substitution pure and simple1 the commodities sacrificed will come to have a certain value in exchange that clearly is a new fact1 a new judgment1 in experience4 ,this value in exchange1 this subjective or personal exchange value1 may fittingly be termed a value for transition4 ,the transition once made1 the exchange once concluded1 ,i shall deem the motor-car1 for example1 that ,i have not bought to replace one used-up1 to be worth less than the piano ,i have bought instead4 ,this indeed 7in no disparaging sense7 is a tautology4 ,but does this lesser relative value equal or exceed or fall short of the value the car would have had if no question of a piano had been raised at all and ,i had bought it in replacement of the old one as a matter of course8 ,how can one say8 ,the question seems unmeaning1 for the levels of value referred to are different and discontinuous and the magnitudes belong to different orders4 ,in a word1 because a value for transition marks a resolve and succinctly describes an act1 it cannot be broken in two and expressed as an equating of two magnitudes independently definable apart from the relation4 ,the motor-car had its value as a member of the old system--the piano has its value as a member of the new4 ,the piano is worth more than the car2 the car is worth less than the piano--these are the prospective and retrospective views across a gulf that separates two specious presents1 not judgments of static inequality in terms of a common measure4 ,is value1 then1 absolute or relative8 ,is value or price the prior notion8 ,was the classical ,english economics superficial in its predilection for the relative conception of value8 ,or is the reigning ,austrian economics profound in its reliance upon marginal utility8 ,by way of answer let us ask--,what in our world can be more absolute a fact than a man's transition from one level of experience and action to another8 ,can the flight of time be stayed or turned backward8 ,and if not can the acts by whose intrinsic uniqueness and successiveness time becomes filled for me and by which ,i feel time's sensible passage as swift or slow1 lose their individuality8 ,but it is not by a mere empiric temporalism alone that the sufficient absoluteness of the present act is attested4 ,my transition from phase to phase of finitude is a thing so absolute that ,idealism itself has deemed an ,absolute indispensable to assure its safe and sane achievement4 ,and with all ,idealism's distrust of immediate experience for every evidential use1 the ,idealist does not scruple to cite the higher obviousness of personal effort1 attainment1 and fruition as the best of evidence for his most momentous truth of all4#ei ,and accordingly 7in sharp descent7 we need not hesitate to regard value in exchange as a primary fact in its own right1 standing in no need of resolution into marginal pseudo-absolutes4 ,a price agreed to and paid marks a real transition to another level4 ,there are both marginal valuation and ,werthaltung on this level1 but they are subordinate incidents to this level's mapping and the conservation of its resources4 ,on this level every marginal utility is relative1 as we have seen1 to every other through their common relation to the complex plan of organization as a whole4#fj ,sec4 #ah4 ,in conclusion one more question closely related to the foregoing may be briefly touched upon4 ,we have held that the individual's attitude toward a commodity is in the first instance one of putting a price-estimate upon it and only secondarily that of holding it in a provisionally settled marginal esteem4 ,if this principle of the priority of price-estimation or exchange value is true1 it seems evident that there can be no line of demarcation drawn 7except for doubtfully expedient pedagogical purposes7 between 7#a7 ,subjective valuations with which individuals are conceived to come to a market and 7#b7 a mechanical equilibration of demand and supply which it is the distinctive and sole function of market concourse to effect4 ,in such a view the market process in strict logic must be timeless as it is spaceless2 a superposition of the two curves is effected and they are seen to cross in a common point which their shapes geometrically predetermine4 ,discussion1 in any proper sense1 can be no inherent part of a market process thus conceived4 ,once in the market1 buyers and sellers can only declare their subjective exchange valuations of the commodity and await the outcome with a dispassionate certainty that whoever may gain by exchanging at the price to be determined1 those who cannot exchange will at all events not lose4 ,but considered as a typical likeness of men who have seen a thing they want and are seeking to possess it1 this picture of mingled hope and resignation is not convincing4 ,most actual offering of goods for sale that one observes suggests less the dispassionate manner of the physiologist or psychologist taking the measure of his subject's reactions1 sensibilities1 and preferences than the more masterful procedure of the physician or the hypnotist who seeks to uproot or modify or reconstruct them4 ,this is the process known in economic writing since ,adam ,smith as the higgling and bargaining of the market4 ,in fact1 the individual's ante-market valuation1 when there temporarily is one1 is an exchange valuation of the constructive or experimental and therefore 7in any significant sense of the word7 perfectly objective type1 and the market process into which this enters is only a perfectly homogeneous temporal continuation of it that carries the individual forward to decisive action4 ,there is no more reason for a separation here than for sundering the ante-experimental sketching out of an hypothesis in any branch of research from the work of putting the hypothesis to experimental test4 ,the results of experiment may serve in a marked way in both sorts of process to elucidate or reconstruct the hypothesis4 ,the higgling and bargaining of the market has been accorded but scant attention by economists4 ,it has apparently been regarded as a kind of irrelevance--a comedy part1 at best1 in the serious drama of industry and trade1 never for a moment hindering the significant movement and outcome of the major action4 ,as if to excuse the incompetence of this treatment 7or as another phase of it7 theory has tended to lay stress upon1 and mildly to deplore1 certain of the less amiable and engaging aspects of the process4 ,the very term indeed as used by ,adam ,smith1 imported a certain aesthetic disesteem1 albeit tempered with indulgent approbation on other grounds4 ,in ,boehm-,bawerk's more modern account this approbation has given place to a neutral tolerance4 ,a certain buyer1 he says 7in his discussion of simple isolated exchange71 will give as much as thirty pounds for a horse2 the horse's owner will take as little as ten pounds--these are predetermined and fixed valuations brought to the exchange negotiations and nothing that happens in the game of wits is conceived to modify them4 ,the price will then be fixed somewhere between these limits4 ,but how8 ,here 444 we read1 is room for any amount of 'higgling4' ,according as in the conduct of the transaction the buyer or the seller shows the greater dexterity1 cunning1 obstinacy1 power-of-persuasion1 or such like1 will the price be forced either to its lower or to its upper limit4#fa ,but the higgling cannot touch the underlying attitudes4 ,even power of persuasion is only one part of skill in bargaining1 with all the rest and like all the rest2 if it were more than this there would be for ,boehm-,bawerk no theoretically grounded price limits to define the range of accidental settlement and the whole explanation1 as a theory of price1 would reduce to nullity4#fb ,with this1 then1 appears to fall away all ground for a one-sided1 or even a sharply two-sided1 conception of the process of fixation of market-values4 ,a marginal utility theory and a cost of production theory of market price alike assume that the factor chosen as the ultimate determinant is a fixed fact defined by conditions which the actual spatial and temporal meeting-together of buyers and sellers in the market cannot affect4 ,in this logical sense1 the chosen determinant is in each case an ante-market or extra-market fact and the same is true of the blades of ,marshall's famous pair of scissors4 ,the price of a certain article let us say is #e4 ,according to the current type of analysis this is the price because1 intending buyers' and sellers' valuations of the article being just what they are1 it is at this figure that the largest number of exchanges can occur4 ,were the price higher there would be more persons willing to sell than to buy2 were it lower there would be more persons willing to buy than to sell4 ,at #e no buyer or seller who means what he says about his valuation when he enters the market goes away disappointed or dissatisfied4 ,with this price established all sellers whose costs of production prevent their conforming to it must drop out of the market2 so must all buyers whose desire for the article does not warrant their paying so much4 ,more fundamentally then1 ,why is #e the price8 ,is it because intending buyers and the marginal buyer in particular do not desire the article more strongly8 ,or is it because conditions of production1 all things considered1 do not permit a lower marginal unit cost8 ,the argument might seem hopeless4 ,but the advantage is claimed for the principle of demand4 ,without demand arising out of desires expressive of wants there would simply be no value1 no production1 and no price4 ,demand evokes production and sanctions cost4 ,but cost expended can give no value to a product that no one wants4 ,does it follow1 however1 that the cost of a commodity in which on its general merits ,i have come to take a hypothetical interest can in no wise affect my actual price-offer for it8 ,can it contribute nothing to the preciser definition of my interest which is eventually to be expressed in a price offer8 ,if the answer is ,no1 for how can this external fact affect the strength of your desire for the object8--then the reason given begs the question at issue4 ,is my interest in the object an interest in the object alone8 ,and is the cost of the object a fact for me external and indifferent8 ,it is1 at all events1 not uncommon to be assured that an article cannot be produced for less1 that one or another of its elements of cost is higher than would be natural to suppose4 ,not always scientifically accurate1 such assurances express an evident confidence that they will not be without effect upon a hesitant but fair-minded purchaser4 ,and in other ways as well1 the position of sellers in the market is not so defenseless as a strict utility theory of price conceives--apart from the standpoint of an abstract normality that can never contrive to get itself realized in empirical fact4#fc ,it is true that1 in general1 one tends to purchase an article of a given familiar kind where its price1 all things considered1 is lowest4 ,in consequence the less capable producers or sellers must go to the wall4 ,but the fact seems mainly regulative and of subordinate importance4 ,is it equally certain that as between branches of expenditure1 such as clothing1 food1 and shelter1 children1 books1 and social intercourse1 the shares of income we expend upon them or the marginal prices we are content to pay express the original strength of separate and unmodified extra-market interests8 ,on the contrary we have paid in the past what we have had to pay1 what we have deemed just and reasonable1 what we have been willing experimentally to hazard upon the possibility of the outlay's proving to have been worth while4 ,in these twilight-zones of indetermination1 cost as well as other factors of supply have had their opportunity4 ,shall we nevertheless insist that our demands are ideally fixed1 even though in fallible human fact they are more or less indistinct1 yielding and modifiable8 ,on the contrary they are in principle and for the most part indeterminate and expectant of suggested experimental shaping from the supply side of the market4 ,it is less in theory than in fact that they have a salutary tendency 7none too dependable7 toward rigidity4 ,,conclusion ,sec4 #ai4 ,the argument may now be summarily reviewed4 ,i4 ,how are we to understand the acquisition1 by an individual1 of what are called new economic needs and interests8 ,except by a fairly obvious fallacy of retrospection we cannot regard this phenomenon as a mere arousal of so-called latent or implicit desires4 ,new products and new means of production afford satisfactions and bring about objective results which are unimaginable and therefore unpredictable1 in any descriptive fashion1 in advance4 ,in a realistic or empirical view of the matter1 these constitute genuinely new developments of personality and of social function1 not mere unfoldings of a preformed logical or vital system4 ,human nature is modifiable and economic choice and action are factors in this indivisible process 7,sec4,sec4 #b-d74 ,now logically it would seem clear that unless a new commodity is an object of desire it will not be made or paid for4 ,on the other hand1 with equal logic1 a new commodity1 it would seem1 cannot be an object of desire because all desire must be for what we already know4 ,we seem confronted with a complete impasse 7,sec4 #e74 ,but the impasse is conceptual only4 ,we have simply to acknowledge the patent fact of our recognition of the new as novel and our interest in the new in its outstanding character of novelty4 ,we need only express and interpret this fact1 instead of fancying ourselves bound to explain it away4 ,it is an interest not less genuine and significant in economic experience than elsewhere 7,sec4,sec4 #f1 #g74 ,its importance lies in the fact that it obliges us to regard what is called economic choice not as a balancing of utilities1 marginal or otherwise1 but as a process of constructive comparison4 ,the new commodity and its purchase price are in reality symbols for alternatively possible systems of life and action4 ,can the old be relinquished for the new8 ,before this question is answered each system may be criticized and interpreted from the standpoint of the other1 each may be supplemented by suggestion1 by dictate of tradition and by impulsive prompting1 by inference1 and by conjecture4 ,finally in experimental fashion an election must be made4 ,the system as accepted may or may not be1 in terms1 identical with one of the initial alternatives2 it can never be identical in full meaning and perspective with either one4 ,and in the end we have not chosen the new because its value1 as seen beforehand1 measured more than the value of the old1 but we now declare the old1 seen in retrospect1 to have been worth less 7,sec4,sec4 #h-ab74 ,there are apparently no valid objections to this view to be drawn from the current logical type of marginal-utility analysis 7,sec4 #ac74 ,,ii4 ,because so-called economic choice is in reality constructive comparison it must be regarded as essentially ethical in import4 ,ethics and economic theory1 instead of dealing with separate problems of conduct1 deal with distinguishable but inseparable stages belonging to the complete analysis of most1 if not all1 problems 7,sec4 #ad74 ,this view suggests1 7a7 that no reasons in experience or in logic exist for identifying the economic interest with an attitude of exclusive or particularistic egoism 7,sec4 #ae71 and 7b7 that social reformers are justified in their assumption of a certain perfectibility in human nature--a constructive responsiveness instead of an insensate and stubborn inertia 7,sec4 #af74 ,again1 in the process of constructive comparison in its economic phase1 ,price or ,exchange ,value is1 in apparent accord with the ,english classical tradition1 the fundamental working conception4 ,value as absolute is essentially a subordinate and conservative conception1 belonging to a status of system and routine1 and is absolute in a purely functional sense 7,sec4 #ag74 ,and finally constructive comparison1 with price or exchange value as its dominant conception1 is clearly nothing if not a market process4 ,in the nature of the case1 then1 there can be no such ante-market definiteness and rigidity of demand schedules as a strictly marginal-utility theory of market prices logically must require 7,sec4 #ah74 ,sec4 #bj4 ,in at least two respects the argument falls short of what might be desired4 ,no account is given of the actual procedure of constructive comparison and nothing like a complete survey of the leading ideas and problems of economic theory is undertaken by way of verification4 ,but to have supplied the former in any satisfactory way would have required an unduly extended discussion of the more general1 or ethical1 phases of constructive comparison4 ,the other deficiency is less regrettable1 since the task in question is one that could only be hopefully undertaken and convincingly carried through by a professional economist4 ,for the present purpose1 it is perhaps enough to have found in our economic experience and behavior the same interest in novelty that is so manifest in other departments of life1 and the same attainment of new self-validating levels of power and interest1 through the acquisition and exploitation of the novel4 ,in our economic experience1 no more than elsewhere1 is satisfaction an ultimate and self-explanatory term4 ,satisfaction carries with it always a reference to the level of power and interest that makes it possible and on which it must be measured4 ,to seek satisfaction for its own sake or to hinge one's interest in science or art upon their ability to serve the palpable needs of the present moment--these1 together1 make up the meaning of what is called ,utilitarianism4 ,and ,utilitarianism in this sense 7which is far less what ,mill meant by the term than a tradition he could never1 with all his striving1 quite get free of71 this type of ,utilitarianism spells routine4 ,it is the surrender of initiative and control1 in the quest for ends in life1 for a philistine pleased acceptance of the ends that ,nature1 assisted by the advertisement-writers1 sets before us4 ,but this type of ,utilitarianism is less frequent in actual occurrence than its vogue in popular literature and elsewhere may appear to indicate4 ,as a matter of fact1 we more often look to satisfaction1 not as an end of effort or a condition to be preserved1 but as the evidence that an experimental venture has been justified in its event4 ,and this is a widely different matter1 for in this there is no inherent implication of a habit-bound or egoistic narrowness of interest in the conceiving or the launching of the venture4 ,the economic interest1 as a function of intelligence1 finds its proper expression in a valuation set upon one thing in terms of another--a valuation that is either a step in a settled plan of spending and consumption or marks the passing of an old plan and our embarkation on a new4 ,from such a view it must follow that the economic betterment of an individual or a society can consist neither in the accumulation of material wealth alone nor in a more diversified technical knowledge and skill4 ,for the individual or for a collectivist state there must be added to these things alertness and imagination in the personal quest and discovery of values and a broad and critical intelligence in making the actual trial of them4 ,without a commensurate gain in these qualities it will avail little to make technical training and industrial opportunity more free or even to make the rewards of effort more equitable and secure4 ,but it has been one of the purposes of this discussion to suggest that just this growth in outlook and intelligence may in the long run be counted on--not indeed as a direct and simple consequence of increasing material abundance but as an expression of an inherent creativeness in man that responds to discipline and education and will not fail to recognize the opportunity it seeks4 ,real economic progress is ethical in aim and outcome4 ,we cannot think of the economic interest as restricted in its exercise to a certain sphere or level of effort--such as the ordinary business of life or the gaining of a livelihood or the satisfaction of our so-called material wants1 or the pursuit of an enlightened1 or an unenlightened1 self-regard4 ,economics has no special relation to material or even to commonplace ends4 ,its materialism lies not in its aim and tendency but in its problem and method4 ,it has no bias toward a lower order of mundane values4 ,it only takes note of the ways and degrees of dependence upon mundane resources and conditions that values of every order must acknowledge4 ,it reminds us that morality and culture1 if they are genuine1 must know not only what they intend but what they cost4 ,they must understand not only the direct but the indirect and accidental bearing of their purposes upon all of our interests1 private and social1 that they are likely to affect4 ,the detachment of the economic interest from any particular level or class of values is only the obverse aspect of the special kind of concern it has with values of every sort4 ,the very generality of the economic interest1 and the abstractness of the ideas by which it maintains routine or safeguards change in our experience1 are what make it unmistakably ethical4 ,without specific ends of its own1 it affords no ground for dogmatism or apologetics4 ,and this indicates as the appropriate task of economic theory not the arrest and thwarting but the steadying and shaping of social change4 ,,the ,,moral ,,life ,,and ,,the ,,construction ,,of ,,values ,,and ,,standards#fd ,,james ,,hayden ,,tufts ,writing about ethics has tended to take one of two directions4 ,on the one hand we have description of conduct in terms of psychology1 or anthropology4 ,on the other a study of the concepts right and wrong1 good and bad1 duty and freedom4 ,if we follow the first line we may attempt to explain conduct psychologically by showing the simple ideas or feelings and the causal connections or laws of habit and association out of which actions arise4 ,or anthropologically we may show the successive stages of custom and taboo1 or the family1 religious1 political1 legal1 and social institutions from which morality has emerged4 ,but we meet at once a difficulty if we ask what is the bearing of this description and analysis4 ,will it aid me in the practical judgment ,what shall ,i do8 ,in physics there is no corresponding difficulty4 ,to analyze gravity enables us to compute an orbit1 or aim a gun2 to analyze electric action is to have the basis for lighting streets and carrying messages4 ,it assumes the uniformity of nature and takes no responsibility as to whether we shall aim guns or whether our messages shall be of war or of peace4 ,whereas in ethics it is claimed that the elements are so changed by their combination--that the process is so essential a factor--that no prediction is certain4 ,and it is also claimed that the ends themselves are perhaps to be changed as well as the means4 ,stated otherwise1 suppose that mankind has passed through various stages1 can mere observation of these tell me what next8 ,perhaps ,i don't care to repeat the past2 how can ,i plan for a better future8 ,or grant that ,i may discover instinct and emotion1 habit and association in my thinking and willing1 how will this guide me to direct my thinking and willing to right ends8 ,the second method has tended to examine concepts4 ,good is an eternal1 changeless pattern2 it is to be discovered by a vision2 or right and good are but other terms for nature's or reason's universal laws which are timeless and wholly unaffected by human desires or passions2 moral nature is soul1 and soul is created not built up of elements1--such were some of the older absolutisms4 ,right and good are unique concepts not to be resolved or explained in terms of anything else1--this is a more modern thesis which on the face of it may appear to discourage analysis4 ,the ethical world is a world of eternal values4 ,philosophy by taking part in empirical questions sinks both itself and them4 ,these doctrines bring high claims1 but are they more valuable for human guidance than the empirical method8#fe ,the knowledge that is superhuman only is ridiculous in man4 ,no man can ever find his way home with the pure circle unless he has also the art of the impure4 ,it is the conviction of this paper that in ethics1 as in knowledge1 thoughts without contents are empty2 percepts without concepts are blind4 ,description of what has been--empiricism--is futile in itself to project and criticize4 ,intuitions and deductions a priori are empty4 ,the thoughts of ethics are of course the terms right1 good1 ought1 worth1 and their kin4 ,the percepts are the instincts and emotions1 the desires and aspirations1 the conditions of time and place1 of nature1 and institutions4 ,yet it is misleading to say that in studying the history of morals we are merely empiricists1 and can hope to find no criterion4 ,this would be the case if we were studying non-moral beings4 ,but moral beings have to some degree guided life by judgments and not merely followed impulse or habit4 ,early judgments as to taboos1 customs1 and conduct may be crude and in need of correction2 they are none the less judgments4 ,over and over we find them reshaped to meet change from hunting to agriculture1 from want to plenty1 from war to peace1 from small to large groupings4 ,much more clearly when we consider civilized peoples1 the interaction between reflection and impulse becomes patent4 ,to study this interaction can be regarded as futile for the future only if we discredit all past moral achievement4 ,those writers who have based their ethics upon concepts have frequently expressed the conviction that the security of morality depends upon the question whether good and right are absolute and eternal essences independent of human opinion or volition4 ,a different source of standards which to some offers more promise for the future is the fact of the moral life as a constant process of forming and reshaping ideals and of bringing these to bear upon conditions of existence4 ,to construct a right and good is at least a process tending to responsibility1 if this construction is to be for the real world in which we must live and not merely for a world of fancy or caprice4 ,it is not the aim of this paper to give a comprehensive outline of ethical method4 ,four factors in the moral life will be pointed out and this analysis will be used to emphasize especially certain social and constructive aspects of our concepts of right and good4 ,i ,the four factors which it is proposed to emphasize are these3 7#a7 ,life as a biological process involving relation to nature1 with all that this signifies in the equipment of instincts1 emotions1 and selective activity by which life maintains itself4 7#b7 ,interrelation with other human beings1 including on the one hand associating1 grouping1 mating1 communicating1 cooeperating1 commanding1 obeying1 worshiping1 adjudicating1 and on the psychological side the various instincts1 emotions1 susceptibilities to personal stimulation and appropriate responses in language and behavior which underlie or are evoked by the life in common4 7#c7 ,intelligence and reason1 through which experience is interrelated1 viewed as a whole1 enlarged in imagination4 7#d7 ,the process of judgment and choice1 in which different elements are brought together1 considered in one conscious universe1 evaluated or measured1 thereby giving rise reciprocally to a self on the one hand and to approved or chosen objects on the other4 7#a7 ,life4 ,life is at least the raw material of all values1 even if it is not in itself entitled to be called good without qualification4 ,for in the process of nourishing and protecting itself1 the plant or animal selects and in the case of higher animals1 manipulates2 it adapts itself to nature and adapts nature to itself2 it shows reciprocal relation of means to end1 of whole to part4 ,it foreshadows the conscious processes in so many ways that men have always been trying to read back some degree of consciousness4 ,and life in the animal1 at least1 is regarded as having experiences of pleasure and pain1 and emotions of fear1 anger1 shame1 and sex1 which are an inseparable aspect of values4 ,if it is not the supreme or only good1 if men freely sacrifice it for other ends1 it is none the less an inevitable factor4 ,pessimistic theories indeed have contended that life is evil and have sought to place good in a will-less ,nirvana4 ,yet such theories make limited appeal4 ,their protest is ultimately not against life as life but against life as painful4 ,and their refutation is rather to be intrusted to the constructive possibilities of freer life than to an analysis of concepts4 ,another class of theories which omit life from the good is that which holds to abstractly ontological concepts of good as an eternal essence or form4 ,it must be remembered1 however1 that the idea of good was not merely a fixed essence4 ,it was also for ,plato the self-moving and the cause of all motion4 ,and further1 ,plato evidently believed that life1 the very nature of the soul1 was itself in the class of supreme values along with ,god and the good4 ,the prize of immortality was ,greek3 kalon and the hope great4 ,and with ,aristotle and his followers the good of contemplation no less truly than the good of action had elements of value derived from the vital process4 ,such a mystic as ,spinoza1 who finds good in the understanding values this because in it man is active1 and would unite himself with the ,all because in ,god is ,power and ,freedom4 ,the ,hebrew prophet found a word capable of evoking great ethical values when he urged his countrymen to choose life1 and ,christian teaching found in the conception of eternal life an ideal of profound appeal4 ,it is not surprising that with his biological interests ,spencer should have set up life of greatest length and breadth as a goal4 ,the struggle of the present war emphasizes tremendously two aspects of this factor of life4 ,national life is an ideal which gets its emotional backing largely from the imagery of our physical life4 ,for any one of the small nations involved to give up its national life--whatever the possibilities of better organized industry or more comfortable material conditions--seems to it a desperate alternative4 ,self-defense is regarded by the various powers at war as a complete justification not merely for armed resistance or attack but for ruthless acts4 ,and if we are tempted to say that the war involves a prodigal waste of individual life on a scale never known before1 we are at the same time compelled to recognize that never before has the bare destruction of life aroused such horror4 ,for never before has peace set its forces so determinedly to protect life4 ,the span of human life has been lengthened3 the wastefulness of accident and disease has been magnified4 ,the dumb acquiescence with which former generations accepted the death of infants and children and those in the prime of life has given way to active and increasingly successful efforts to preserve4 ,the enormous increase in scientific study of biology1 including eugenics1 reflects not only an advance of science but a trend in morality4 ,it is scarcely conceivable that it should grow less in absolute importance1 whatever crises may temporarily cause its depreciation relatively to other values4 ,one exception to the growing appreciation calls for notice--the interest in immortality appears to be less rather than greater4 ,the strong belief in life beyond the grave which since the days of ancient ,egypt has prevailed in the main stream of ,western culture seems not only to be affected by the scientific temper of the day1 but also to be subject to a shift in interest4 ,this may be in part a reaction from other-worldliness4 ,in part it may be due to loss of fervor for a theological picture of a future heaven of a rather monotonous sort and may signify not so much loss of interest in life as desire for a more vital kind of continuance4 ,it is not true that all that a man hath will he give for his life1 yet it is true that no valuing process is intelligible that leaves out life with its impulses1 emotions1 and desires as the first factor to be reckoned with4 7#b7 ,the second factor is the life in common1 with its system of relations1 and its corresponding instincts1 emotions1 and desires4 ,so much has been written in recent years on the social nature of man that it seems unnecessary to elaborate the obvious4 ,protest has even been raised against the exaggeration of the social4 ,but ,i believe that in certain points at least we have not yet penetrated to the heart of the social factor1 and its significance for morals4 ,so far as the moral aspect is concerned ,i know nothing more significant than the attitude of the ,common ,law as set forth by ,professor ,pound4#ff ,this has sought to base its system of duties on relations4 ,the relation which was prominent in the ,middle ,ages was that of landlord and tenant2 other relations are those of principal and agent1 of trustee1 etc4 ,an older relation was that of kinship4 ,the kin was held for the wergeld2 the goel must avenge his next of kin2 the father must provide for prospective parents-in-law2 the child must serve the parents4 ,duty was the legal term for the relation4 ,in all this there is no romanticism1 no exaggeration of the social2 there is a fair statement of the facts which men have recognized and acted upon the world over and in all times4 ,individualistic times or peoples have modified certain phases4 ,the ,roman law sought to ground many of its duties in the contract1 the will of the parties4 ,but covenants by no means exhaust duties4 ,and according to ,professor ,pound the whole course of ,english and ,american law today is belying the generalization of ,sir ,henry ,maine1 that the evolution of law is a progress from status to contract4 ,we are shaping law of insurance1 of public service companies1 not by contract but by the relation of insurer and insured1 of public utility and patron4 ,psychologically1 the correlate of the system of relations is the set of instincts and emotions1 of capacity for stimulation and response1 which presuppose society for their exercise and in turn make society possible4 ,there can be no question as to the reality and strength of these in both animals and men4 ,the bear will fight for her young more savagely than for her life4 ,the human mother's thoughts center far more intensely upon her offspring than upon her own person4 ,the man who is cut dead by all his acquaintance suffers more than he would from hunger or physical fear4 ,the passion of sex frequently overmasters every instinct of individual prudence4 ,the majority of men face poverty and live in want2 relatively few prefer physical comfort to family ties4 ,aristotle's ,greek3 philia is the oftenest quoted recognition of the emotional basis of common life1 but a statement of ,kant's earlier years is particularly happy4 ,the point to which the lines of direction of our impulses converge is thus not only in ourselves1 but there are besides powers moving us in the will of others outside of ourselves4 ,hence arise the moral impulses which often carry us away to the discomfiture of selfishness1 the strong law of duty1 and the weaker of benevolence4 ,both of these wring from us many a sacrifice1 and although selfish inclinations now and then preponderate over both1 these still never fail to assert their reality in human nature4 ,thus we recognize that in our most secret motives1 we are dependent upon the rule of the general will4#fg ,the law of duty1 and ,i believe we may add1 the conception of right1 do arise objectively in the social relations as the common law assumes and subjectively in the social instincts1 emotions1 and the more intimate social consciousness which had not been worked out in the time of ,kant as it has been by recent authors4 ,this point will receive further treatment later1 but ,i desire to point out in anticipation that if right and duty have their origin in this social factor there is at least a presumption against their being subordinate ethically to the conception of good as we find them in certain writers4 ,if they have independent origin and are the outgrowth of a special aspect of life it is at least probable that they are not to be subordinated to the good unless the very notion of good is itself reciprocally modified by right in a way that is not usually recognized in teleological systems4 7#c7 ,intelligence and reason imply 7a7 considering the proposed act or the actually performed act as a whole and in its relations4 ,especially they mean considering consequences4 ,in order to foresee consequences there is required not only empirical observation of past experience1 not only deduction from already formulated concepts--as when we say that injustice will cause hard feelings and revolt--but that rarer quality which in the presence of a situation discerns a meaning not obvious1 suggests an idea1 injustice1 to interpret the situation4 ,situations are neither already labeled unjust1 nor are they obviously unjust to the ordinary mind4 ,analysis into elements and rearrangement of the elements into a new synthesis are required4 ,this is eminently a synthetic or creative activity4 ,further it is evident that the activity of intelligence in considering consequences implies not only what we call reasoning in the narrower sense but imagination and feeling4 ,for the consequences of an act which are of importance ethically are consequences which are not merely to be described but are to be imagined so vividly as to be felt1 whether they are consequences that affect ourselves or affect others4 7b7 ,but it would be a very narrow intelligence that should attempt to consider only consequences of a single proposed act without considering also other possible acts and their consequences4 ,the second important characteristic of intelligence is that it considers either other means of reaching a given end1 or other ends1 and by working out the consequences of these also has the basis for deliberation and choice4 ,the method of multiple working hypotheses1 urged as highly important in scientific investigation1 is no less essential in the moral field4 ,to bring several ends into the field of consideration is the characteristic of the intelligent1 or as we often say1 the open-minded man4 ,such consideration as this widens the capacity of the agent and marks him off from the creature of habit1 of prejudice1 or of instinct4 7c7 ,intelligence implies considering in two senses all persons involved1 that is1 it means taking into account not only how an act will affect others but also how others look at it4 ,it is scarcely necessary to say that this activity of intelligence cannot be cut off from its roots in social intercourse4 ,it is by the processes of give and take1 of stimulus and response1 in a social medium that this possibility of looking at things from a different angle is secured4 ,and once more this different angle is not gained by what in the strict sense could be called a purely intellectual operation1 although it has come to be so well recognized as the necessary equipment for dealing successfully with conditions that we commonly characterize the person as stupid who does not take account of what others think and feel and how they will react to a projected line of conduct4 ,this social element in intelligence is to a considerable degree implied in the term reasonable1 which signifies not merely that a man is logical in his processes but also that he is ready to listen to what others say and to look at things from their point of view whether he finally accepts it or not4 ,the broad grounds on which it is better to use the word intelligence than the word reason in the analysis with which we are concerned are two4 7#a7 ,it is not a question-begging term which tends to commit us at the outset to a specific doctrine as to the source of our judgments4 7#b7 ,the activity of intelligence which is now most significant for ethical progress is not suggested by the term reason1 for unless we arbitrarily smuggle in under the term practical reason the whole activity of the moral consciousness without inquiry as to the propriety of the name we shall be likely to omit the constructive and creative efforts to promote morality by positive supplying of enlarged education1 new sources of interest1 and more open fields for development1 by replacing haunting fears of misery with positive hopes1 and by suggesting new imagery1 new ambitions in the place of sodden indifference or sensuality4 ,the term reason as used by the ,stoics and by ,kant meant control of the passions by some law--some authority cosmic or logical4 ,it prepared for the inevitable2 it forbade the private point of view4 ,but as thus presenting a negative aspect the law was long ago characterized by a profound moral genius as weak4 ,it has its value as a schoolmaster1 but it is not in itself capable of supplying the new life which dissolves the old sentiment1 breaks up the settled evil habit1 and supplies both larger ends and effective motives4 ,if we state human progress in objective fashion we may say that although men today are still as in earlier times engaged in getting a living1 in mating1 in rearing of offspring1 in fighting and adventure1 in play1 and in art1 they are also engaged in science and invention1 interested in the news of other human activities all over the world2 they are adjusting differences by judicial processes1 cooeperating to promote general welfare1 enjoying refined and more permanent friendships and affections1 and viewing life in its tragedy and comedy with enhanced emotion and broader sympathy4 ,leaving out of consideration the work of the religious or artistic genius as not in question here1 the great objective agencies in bringing about these changes have been on the one hand the growth of invention1 scientific method1 and education1 and on the other the increase in human intercourse and communication4 ,reason plays its part in both of these in freeing the mind from wasteful superstitious methods and in analyzing situations and testing hypotheses1 but the term is inadequate to do justice to that creative element in the formation of hypotheses which finds the new1 and it tends to leave out of account the social point of view involved in the widening of the area of human intercourse4 ,more will be said upon this point in connection with the discussion of rationalism4 7#d7 ,the process of judgment and choice4 ,the elements are not the sum4 ,the moral consciousness is not just the urge of life1 plus the social relations1 plus intelligence4 ,the process of moral deliberation1 evaluation1 judgment1 and choice is itself essential4 ,in this process are born the concepts and standards good and right1 and likewise the moral self which utters the judgment4 ,it is in this twofold respect synthetic1 creative4 ,it is as an interpretation of this process that the concept of freedom arises4 ,four aspects of the process may be noted4 7a7 ,the process involves holding possibilities of action1 or objects for valuation1 or ends for choice1 in consciousness and measuring them one against another in a simultaneous field--or in a field of alternating objects1 any of which can be continually recalled4 ,one possibility after another may be tried out in anticipation and its relations successively considered1 but the comparison is essential to the complete moral consciousness4 7b7 ,the process yields a universe of valued objects as distinguished from a subjective consciousness of desires and feelings4 ,we say1 ,this is right1 ,that is good4 ,every is in such judgments may be denied by an is not and we hold one alternative to be true1 the other false4 ,as the market or the stock exchange or board of trade fixes values by a meeting of buyers and sellers and settles the price of wheat accurately enough to enable farmers to decide how much land to seed for the next season1 so the world of men and women who must live together and cooeperate1 or fight and perish1 forces upon consciousness the necessity of adjustment4 ,the preliminary approaches are usually hesitant and subjective--like the offers or bids in the market--e4g41 ,i should like to go to college2 ,i believe that is a good thing2 ,my parents need my help2 it does not seem right to leave them4 ,the judgments finally emerge4 ,a college education is good2 ,it is wrong to leave my parents--both seemingly objective yet conflicting1 and unless ,i can secure both ,i must seemingly forego actual objective good1 or commit actual wrong4 7c7 ,the process may be described also as one of universalizing the judging consciousness4 ,for it is a counterpart of the objective implication of a judgment that it is not an affirmation as to any individual's opinion4 ,this negative characterization of the judgment is commonly converted into the positive doctrine that any one who is unprejudiced and equally well informed would make the same judgment4 ,strictly speaking the judgment itself represents in its completed form the elimination of the private attitude rather than the express inclusion of other judges4 ,but in the making of the judgment it is probable that this elimination of the private is reached by a mental reference to other persons and their attitudes1 if not by an actual conversation with another4 ,it is dubious whether an individual that had never communicated with another would get the distinction between a private subjective attitude and the general or objective4 ,moreover1 one form of the moral judgment3 ,this is right1 speaks the language of law--of the collective judgment1 or of the judge who hears both sides but is neither4 ,this generalizing or universalizing is frequently supposed to be the characteristic activity of reason4 ,i believe that a comparison with the kindred value judgments in economics supports the doctrine that in judgments as to the good as well as in those as to right1 there is no product of any simple faculty1 but rather a synthetic process in which the social factor is prominent4 ,a compelling motive toward an objective and universal judgment is found in the practical conditions of moral judgments4 ,unless men agree on such fundamental things as killing1 stealing1 and sex relations they cannot get on together4 ,not that when ,i say1 ,killing is wrong1 ,i mean to affirm ,i agree with you in objecting to it2 but that the necessity 7a7 of acting as if ,i either do or do not approve it1 and 7b7 of either making my attitude agree with yours1 or yours agree with mine1 or of fighting it out with you or with the whole force of organized society1 compels me to put my attitude into objective terms1 to meet you and society on a common platform4 ,this is a synthesis1 an achievement4 ,to attribute the synthesis to any faculty of practical reason1 adds nothing to our information1 but tends rather to obscure the facts4 7d7 ,the process is thus a reciprocal process of valuing objects and of constructing and reconstructing a self4 ,the object as first imaged or anticipated undergoes enlargement and change as it is put into relations to other objects and as the consequences of adoption or rejection are tried in anticipation4 ,the self by reflecting and by enlarging its scope is similarly enlarged4 ,it is the resulting self which is the final valuer4 ,the values of most objects are at first fixed for us by instinct or they are suggested by the ethos and mores of our groups--family1 society1 national religions1 and reign under the appearance of habitual self-suggested tendencies4 ,the self is constituted accordingly4 ,collisions with other selves1 conflicts between group valuations and standards and individual impulses or desires1 failure of old standards as applied to new situations1 bring about a more conscious definition of purposes4 ,the agent identifies himself with these purposes1 and values objects with reference to them4 ,in this process of revaluing and defining1 of comparing and anticipation1 freedom is found if anywhere4 ,for if the process is a real one the elements do not remain unaffected by their relation to each other and to the whole4 ,the act is not determined by any single antecedent or by the sum of antecedents4 ,it is determined by the process4 ,the self is not made wholly by heredity1 or environment4 ,it is itself creating for each of its elements a new environment1 viz41 the process of reflection and choice4 ,and if man can change the heredity of pigeons and race horses by suitable selection1 if every scientific experiment is a varying of conditions1 it is at least plausible that man can guide his own acts by intelligence1 and revise his values by criticism4 ,the self is itself creating for each of its elements a new environment--this is a fact which if kept in mind will enable us to see the abstractness and fallacies not merely of libertarianism and determinism1 but of subjectivism and objectivism4 ,subjective or inward theories have sought standards in the self2 but in regarding the self as an entity independent of such a process as we have described they have exposed themselves to the criticism of providing only private1 variable1 accidental1 unauthoritative sources of standards--instincts1 or emotions1 or intuitions4 ,the self of the full moral consciousness1 however1--the only one which can claim acceptance or authority--is born only in the process of considering real conditions1 of weighing and choosing between alternatives of action in a real world of nature and persons4 ,its judgments are more than subjective4 ,objectivism in its absolutist and abstract forms assumes a standard--nature1 essence1 law--independent of process4 ,such a standard is easily shown to be free from anything individual1 private1 or changing4 ,it is universal1 consistent1 and eternal1 in fact it has many good mathematical characteristics1 but unfortunately it is not moral4 ,as mathematical1 logical1 biological1 or what not1 it offers no standard that appeals to the moral nature as authoritative or that can help us to find our way home4 ,,ii ,if we are dissatisfied with custom and habit and seek to take philosophy for the guide of life we have two possibilities3 7#a7 we may look for the good1 and treat right and duty as subordinate concepts which indicate the way to the good1 that is1 consider them as good as a means1 or 7#b7 we may seek first to do right irrespective of consequences1 in the belief that in willing to do right we are already in possession of the highest good4 ,in either case we may consider our standards and values either as in some sense fixed or as in the making4#fh ,we may suppose that good is objective and absolute1 that right is discovered by a rational faculty1 or we may consider that in regarding good as objective we have not made it independent of the valuing process and that in treating right as a standard we have not thereby made it a fixed concept to be discovered by the pure intellect4 ,the position of this paper will be 7#a7 that good while objective is yet objective as a value and not as an essence or physical fact2 7#b7 that a social factor in value throws light upon the relation between moral and other values2 7#c7 that right is not merely a means to the good but has an independent place in the moral consciousness2 7#d7 that right while signifying order does not necessarily involve a timeless1 eternal order since it refers to an order of personal relations2 7#e7 that the conception of right instead of being a matter for pure reason or even the cognitive faculty shows an intimate blending of the emotional and intellectual and that this appears particularly in the conception of the reasonable4 7#a7 ,we begin with the question of the synthetic and objective character of the good4 ,with ,g4 ,e4 ,moore as with the utilitarians the good is the ultimate concept4 ,right and duty are means to the good4 ,moore and ,rashdall also follow ,sidgwick in regarding good as unique1 that is1 as synthetic4 ,sidgwick emphasized in this especially the point that moral value cannot be decided by physical existence or the course of evolution1 nor can the good be regarded as meaning the pleasant4 ,moore and ,russell reinforce this4 ,however true it may be that pleasure is one among other good things or that life is one among other good things1 good does not mean either pleasure or survival4 ,good means just good4 ,a similar thought underlies ,croce's division of the ,practical into the two spheres of the ,economic and the ,ethical4 ,the economic activity is that which wills and effects only what corresponds to the conditions of fact in which a man finds himself2 the ethical activity is that which1 although it correspond to these conditions1 also refers to something that transcends them4 ,to the first correspond what are called individual ends1 to the second universal ends2 the one gives rise to the judgment concerning the greater or less coherence of the action taken in itself1 the other to that concerning its greater or less coherence in respect to the universal end1 which transcends the individual4#fi ,utilitarianism is according to ,croce an attempt to reduce the ,ethical to the ,economic form1 although the utilitarians as men attempt in various ways to make a place for that distinction which as philosophers they would suppress4 ,man is not a consumer of pleasures4 ,he is a creator of life4 ,with this claim of the distinctive1 synthetic1 character of the moral consciousness and of the impossibility of testing the worth of ideals by cosmic laws1 or by gratification of particular wants as measured by pleasure1 ,i have no issue4 ,the analysis of the moral judgment made above points out just how it is that good is synthetic4 ,it is synthetic in that it represents a measuring and valuing of ends--instinctive and imagined1 individual and social--against each other and as part of a whole to which a growing self corresponds4 ,it is synthetic in that it represents not merely a process of evaluating ends which match actually defined desires1 but also a process in which the growing self1 dissatisfied with any ends already in view1 gropes for some new definition of ends that shall better respond to its living1 creative capacity1 its active synthetic character4 ,good is the concept for just this valuing process as carried on by a conscious being that is not content to take its desire as ready made by its present construction1 but is reaching out for ends that shall respond to a growing1 expanding1 inclusive1 social1 self4 ,it expresses value as value4 ,value as value6 not as being2 nor as independent essence2 nor as anything static and fixed4 ,for a synthetic self1 a living personality1 could find no supreme value in the complete absence of valuing1 in the cessation of life1 in the negation of that very activity of projection1 adventure1 construction1 and synthesis in which it has struck out the concept good4 ,a theory of ethics which upholds the synthetic character of the good may be criticized as being not synthetic enough if it fails to see that on the basis of the mutual determination of percepts and concepts1 of self and objects1 the synthetic character of the process must be reflected in the ultimate meaning of the category which symbolizes and incorporates the process4 7#b7 ,we may find some light upon the question how moral value gets its distinctive and unique character1 and how it comes to be more objective than economic value if we consider some of the social factors in the moral judgment4 ,for although the concept good is rooted in the life process with its selective activity and attending emotions it involves a subtle social element1 as well as the more commonly recognized factors of intelligence4 ,within the fundamental selective process two types of behavior tend to differentiate in response to two general sorts of stimulation4 ,one sort is simpler1 more monotonous1 more easily analyzable4 ,response to such stimulation1 or treatment of objects which may be described under these terms of simple1 analyzable1 etc41 is easily organized into a habit4 ,it calls for no great shifts in attention1 no sudden readjustments4 ,there is nothing mysterious about it4 ,as satisfying various wants it has a certain kind of value4 ,it1 however1 evokes no consciousness of self4 ,toward the more variable1 complex sort of stimuli1 greater attention1 constant adjustment and readjustment1 are necessary4 ,objects of the first sort are treated as things1 in the sense that they do not call out any respect from us or have any intrinsic value4 ,we understand them through and through1 manipulate them1 consume them1 throw them away4 ,we regard them as valuable only with reference to our wants4 ,on the other hand1 objects of the second sort take their place in a bi-focal situation4 ,our attention shifts alternately to their behavior and to our response1 or1 conversely1 from our act to their response4 ,this back and forth movement of attention in the case of certain of these objects is reinforced by the fact that certain stimuli from them or from the organism1 find peculiar responses already prepared in social instincts2 gesture and language play their part4 ,such a bi-focal situation as this1 when completely developed1 involves persons4 ,in its earlier stages it is the quasi-personal attitude which is found in certain savage religious attitudes1 in certain aesthetic attitudes1 and in the emotional attitudes which we all have toward many of the objects of daily life4 ,economic values arise in connection with attitudes toward things4 ,we buy things1 we sell them4 ,they have value just in that they gratify our wants1 but they do not compel any revision or change in wants or in the self which wants4 ,they represent a partial interest--or if they become the total interest we regard them as now in the moral sphere4 ,values of personal affection arise as we find a constant rapport in thought1 feeling1 purpose1 between the two members of our social consciousness4 ,the attitude is that of going along with another and thereby extending and enriching our experiences4 ,we enter into his ideas1 range with his imagination1 kindle at his enthusiasms1 sympathize with his joys or sorrows4 ,we may disagree with our friend's opinions1 but we do not maintain a critical attitude toward him1 that is1 toward his fundamental convictions and attitudes4 ,if home is the place where1 when you have to go there1 they have to take you in1 as ,frost puts it1 a friend is one who1 when you go to him1 has to accept you4 ,moral values also arise in a social or personal relation--not in relation to things4 ,this is on the surface in the form of judgment2 ,he is a good man1 ,that is a good act4 ,if it is less obvious in the practical judgment1 ,this is the better course of action1 i4e41 the course which leads to the greater good1 or to the good1 this is because we fail to discern that the good in these cases is a something with which ,i can identify myself1 not a something which ,i merely possess and keep separate from my personality4 ,it is something ,i shall be rather than have4 ,or if ,i speak of a share or participation it is a sharing in the sense of entering into a kindred life4 ,it is an ideal1 and an ideal for a conscious personal being can hardly be other than conscious4 ,it may be objected that however personal the ideal it is not on this account necessarily social4 ,it embodies what ,i would be1 but does not necessarily imply response to any other personality4 ,this1 however1 would be to overlook the analyses which recent psychology has made of the personal4 ,the ideal does not develop in a vacuum4 ,it implies for one thing individuality which is conceivable only as other individuals are distinguished4 ,it implies the definition of purposes1 and such definition is scarcely if ever attempted except as a possible world of purposes is envisaged4 ,a,esthetic valuation is in certain respects intermediate between the valuation of things on the one hand and the moral evaluation of acts of persons or conscious states on the other4 ,a,esthetic objects are in many cases seemingly things and yet even as things they are quasi-personal2 they are viewed with a certain sympathy quite different from that which we feel for a purely economic object4 ,if it is a work of art the artist has embodied his thought and feeling and the observer finds it there4 ,the experience is that of ,einfuehlung4 ,yet we do not expect the kind of response which we look for in friendship1 nor do we take the object as merely a factor for the guidance or control of our own action as in the practical judgment of morality4 ,the aesthetic becomes the object of contemplation1 not of response2 of embodied meaning1 not of individuality4 ,it is so far personal that no one of aesthetic sensibility likes to see a thing of beauty destroyed or mistreated4 ,the situation in which we recognize in an object meaning and embodied feeling1 or at least find sources of stimulation which appeal to our emotions1 develops an aesthetic enhancement of conscious experience4 ,the aesthetic value predicate is the outcome of this peculiar enhancement4 ,it seems that the social nature of the judgment plays a part also in the varying objectivity of values4 ,it is undoubtedly true that some values are treated as belonging to objects4 ,if we cannot explain this fully we may get some light upon the situation by noticing the degree to which this is true in the cases of the kinds of values already described4 ,economic values are dubiously objective4 ,we use both forms of expression4 ,we say on the one hand1 ,i want wheat1 ,there is a demand for wheat1 or1 on the other1 ,wheat is worth one dollar a bushel4 ,conversely1 ,there is no demand for the old-fashioned high-framed bicycle or ,it is worthless4 ,the ,middle ,ages regarded economic value as completely objective4 ,a thing had a real value4 ,the retailer could not add to it4 ,the mediaeval economist believed in the externality of relations2 he prosecuted for the offenses of forestalling and regrating the man who would make a profit by merely changing things in place4 ,he condemned usury4 ,we have definitely abandoned this theory4 ,we recognize that it is the want which makes the value4 ,to make exchange possible and socialize to some degree the scale of prices we depend upon a public market or a stock exchange4 ,in values of personal affection we may begin with a purely individual attitude1 ,i love or esteem my friend4 ,if ,i put it more objectively ,i may say1 ,he is an honored and valued friend4 ,perhaps still more objectively1 we--especially if we are feminine--may say ,is not ,x dear8 ,we may then go on to seek a social standard4 ,we perhaps look for reinforcement in a small group of like-minded4 ,we are a little perplexed and1 it may be1 aggrieved if other members of the circle do not love the one whom we love4 ,in such a group judgment of a common friend there is doubtless greater objectivity than in the economic judgment4 ,the value of a friend does not depend upon his adjustment to our wants4 ,as ,aristotle pointed out1 true friendship is for its own sake4 ,its value is disinterested4 ,if a man does not care for an economic good it does not reflect upon him4 ,he may be careless of futures1 neglectful of corn1 indifferent to steel4 ,it lessens the demand1 lowers the values of these goods1 an infinitesimal1 but does not write him down an inferior person4 ,to fail to prize a possible friend is a reflection upon us4 ,however the fact that in the very nature of the case one can scarcely be a personal friend to a large1 not to say a universal group1 operates to limit the objectivity4 ,in the aesthetic and moral attitudes we incorporate value in the object decisively4 ,we do not like to think that beauty can be changed with shifting fashions or to affirm that the firmament was ever anything but sublime4 ,it seems to belong to the very essence of right that it is something to which the self can commit itself in absolute loyalty and finality4 ,and1 as for good1 we may say with ,moore in judgments of intrinsic value1 at least1 we judge concerning a particular state of things that it would be worth while--would be a good thing--that that state of things should exist1 even if nothing else were to exist besides4 ,with regard to this problem of objectivity it is significant in the first place that the kind of situation out of which this object value is affirmed in aesthetic and moral judgments is a social situation4 ,it contrasts in this respect with the economic situation4 ,the economic is indeed social in so far as it sets exchange values1 but the object valued is not a social object4 ,the aesthetic and moral object is such an object4 ,not only is there no contradiction in giving to the symbolic form or the moral act intrinsic value3 there is entire plausibility in doing so4 ,for in so far as the situation is really personal1 either member is fundamentally equal to the other and may be treated as embodying all the value of the situation4 ,the value which rises to consciousness in the situation is made more complete by eliminating from consideration the originating factors1 the plural agents of admiration or approval1 and incorporating the whole product abstractly in the object4 ,in thus calling attention to the social or personal character of the aesthetic or moral object it is not intended to minimize that factor in the judgment which we properly speak of as the universalizing activity of thought1 much less to overlook the importance of the judgmental process itself4 ,the intention is to point out some of the reasons why in one case the thinking process does universalize while in the other it does not1 why in one case the judgment is completely objective while in the other it is not4 ,in both aesthetic and moral judgments social art1 social action1 social judgments1 through collective decisions prepare the way for the general non-personal1 objective form4 ,it is probable that man would not say1 ,this is right1 using the word as an adjective1 if he had not first said1 as member of a judicially acting group1 ,this is right1 using the word as a noun4 ,and finally whatever we may claim as to the cognitive nature of the aesthetic and moral judgment1 the only test for the beauty of an object is that persons of taste discover it4 ,the only test for the rightness of an act is that persons of good character approve it4 ,the only test for goodness is that good persons on reflection approve and choose it--just as the test for good persons is that they choose and do the good4 7#c7 ,right is not merely a means to good but has a place of its own in the moral consciousness4 ,many of our moral choices or judgments do not take the form of choice between right and wrong1 or between duty and its opposite2 they appear to be choices between goods4 ,that is1 we do not always consider our value as crystallized into a present standard or feel a tension between a resisting and an authoritative self4 ,but when they do emerge they signify a distinct factor4 ,what ,moore says of good may be said also of right4 ,right means just right1 nothing else4 ,that is1 we mean that acts so characterized correspond exactly to a self in a peculiar attitude1 viz41 one of adequate standardizing and adjustment1 of equilibrium1 in view of all relations4 ,the concept signifies that in finding our way into a moral world into which we are born in the process of valuing and judging1 we take along the imagery of social judgment in which through language and behavior the individual is constantly adjusting himself1 not only to the social institutions1 and group organization but far more subtly and unconsciously to the social consciousness and attitudes4 ,this conception of an order to which the act must refer has usually been regarded as peculiarly a rational factor4 ,it is1 however1 rather an order of social elements1 of a nature of persons1 than of a nature of things4 ,in savage life the position of father1 wife1 child1 guest1 or other members of the household1 is one of the most prominent facts of the situation4 ,the relationship of various totem groups and inter-marrying groups is the very focus of moral consciousness4 ,even in the case of such a cosmic conception of order as ,dike and ,themis1 ,rita and ,tao1 the ,way is not impersonal cosmos4 ,it is at least quasi-personal4 ,and if we say such primitive myth has no bearing on what the nature of right or the true meaning of right is1 it is pertinent to repeat that concepts without percepts are empty2 that the term means nothing except the conceptual interpretation of a unique synthetic process in which an act placed in relation to a standard is thereby given new meaning4 ,so long as custom or law forms the only or the dominant factor in the process1 we have little development of the ideal concept right as distinct from a factual standard4 ,but when reason and intelligence enter1 particularly when that creative activity of intelligence enters which attempts a new construction of ends1 a new ordering of possible experience1 then the standardizing process is set free2 a new self with new possibilities of relation seeks expression4 ,the concept right reflects the standardizing1 valuing process of a synthetic order and a synthetic self4 ,duty born similarly in the world of social relations and reflecting especially the tension between the individual and the larger whole is likewise given full moral significance when it becomes a tension within the synthetic self4 ,and as thus reflecting the immediate attitudes of the self to an ideal social order both right and duty are not to be treated merely as means to any value which does not include as integrant factors just what these signify4 ,this view is contrary to that of ,moore1 for whom right does and can mean nothing but 'cause of a good result1' and is thus identical with useful4#gj ,the right act is that which has the best consequences4#ga ,similarly duty is that action which will cause more good to exist in the ,universe than any possible alternative4 ,it is evident that this makes it impossible for any finite mind to assert confidently that any act is right or a duty4 ,accordingly it follows that we never have any reason to suppose that an action is our duty3 we can never be sure that any action will produce the greatest value possible4#gb ,whatever the convenience of such a definition of right and duty for a simplified ethics it can hardly be claimed to accord with the moral consciousness1 for men have notoriously supposed certain acts to be duty4 ,to say that a parent has no reason to suppose that it is his duty to care for his child is more than paradox4 ,and a still greater contradiction to the morality of common sense inheres in the doctrine that the right act is that which has the best consequences4 ,considering all the good to literature and free inquiry which has resulted from the condemnation of ,socrates it is highly probable--or at least it is arguable--that the condemnation had better results than an acquittal would have yielded4 ,but it would be contrary to our ordinary use of language to maintain that this made the act right4 ,or to take a more recent case3 the present war may conceivably lead to a more permanent peace4 ,the severities1 practised by one party1 may stir the other to greater indignation and lead ultimately to triumph of the latter4 ,will the acts in question be termed right by the second party if they actually have this effect8 ,on this hypothesis the more outrageous an act and the greater the reaction against it1 the better the consequences are likely to be and hence the more reason to call the act right and a duty4 ,the paradox results from omitting from right the elements of the immediate situation and considering only consequences4 ,the very meaning of the concept right1 implies focussing attention upon the present rather than upon the future4 ,it suggests a cross-section of life in its relations4 ,if the time process were to be arrested immediately after our act ,i think we might still speak of it as right or wrong4 ,in trying to judge a proposed act we doubtless try to discover what it will mean1 that is1 we look at consequences4 ,but these consequences are looked upon as giving us the meaning of the present act and we do not on this account subordinate the present act to these consequences4 ,especially we do not mean to eliminate the significance of this very process of judgment4 ,it is significant that in considering what are the intrinsic goods ,moore enumerates personal affection and the appreciation of beauty1 and with less positiveness1 true belief1 but does not include any mention of the valuing or choosing or creative consciousness4 7#d7 ,if we regard right as the concept which reflects the judgment of standardizing our acts by some ideal order1 questions arise as to the objectivity of this order and the fixed or moving character of the implied standard4 ,rashdall lays great stress upon the importance of objectivity3 ,assuredly there is no scientific problem upon which so much depends as upon the answer we give to the question whether the distinction which we are accustomed to draw between right and wrong belongs to the region of objective truth like the laws of mathematics and of physical science1 or whether it is based upon an actual emotional constitution of individual human beings4#gc ,the appraisement of the various desires and impulses by myself and other men is a piece of insight into the true nature of things4#gd ,while these statements are primarily intended to oppose the moral sense view of the judgment1 they also bear upon the question whether right is something fixed4 ,the phrase insight into the true nature of things suggests at once the view that the nature of things is quite independent of any attitude of human beings toward it4 ,it is something which the seeker for moral truth may discover but nothing which he can in any way modify4 ,it is urged that if we are to have any science of ethics at all what was once right must be conceived as always right in the same circumstances4#ge ,i hold no brief for the position--if any one holds the position--that in saying this is right ,i am making an assertion about my own feelings or those of any one else4 ,as already stated the function of the judging process is to determine objects1 with reference to which we say is or is not4 ,the emotional theory of the moral consciousness does not give adequate recognition to this4 ,but just as little as the process of the moral consciousness is satisfied by an emotional theory of the judgment does it sanction any conception of objectivity which requires that values are here or there once for all2 that they are fixed entities or a nature of things upon which the moral consciousness may look for its information but upon which it exercises no influence4 ,the process of attempting to give--or discover--moral values is a process of mutual determination of object and agent4 ,we have to do in morals not with a nature of things but with natures of persons4 ,the very characteristic of a person as we have understood it is that he is synthetic1 is actually creating something new by organizing experiences and purposes1 by judging and choosing4 ,objectivity does not necessarily imply changelessness4 ,whether right is a term of fixed and changeless character depends upon whether the agents are fixed units1 either in fact or in ideal4 ,if1 as we maintain1 right is the correlate of a self confronting a world of other persons conceived as all related in an order1 the vital question is whether this order is a fixed or a moving order4 ,straight is a term of fixed content just because we conceive space in timeless terms2 it is by its very meaning a cross-section of a static order4 ,but a world of living intelligent agents in social relations is in its very presuppositions a world of activity1 of mutual understanding and adjustment4 ,rationalistic theory1 led astray by geometrical conceptions1 conceived that a universal criterion must be like a straight line1 a fixed and timeless--or eternal--entity4 ,but in such an order of fixed units there could be no selection1 no adjustment to other changing agents1 no adventure upon the new untested possibility which marks the advance of every great moral idea1 in a word1 no morality of the positive and constructive sort4 ,and if it be objected that the predicate of a judgment must be timeless whatever the subject1 that the word is as ,plato insists cannot be used if all flows1 we reply that if rightthe correlate of a moving order1 of living social intelligent beings1 it is quite possible to affirm ,this is according to that law4 ,if our logic provides no form of judgment for the analysis of such a situation it is inadequate for the facts which it would interpret4 ,but in truth mankind's moral judgments have never committed themselves to any such implication4 ,we recognize the futility of attempting to answer simply any such questions as whether the ,israelites did right to conquer ,canaan or ,hamlet to avenge his father4 7#e7 ,the category of right has usually been closely connected1 if not identified1 with reason or cognitive activity as contrasted with emotion4 ,professor ,dewey on the contrary has pointed out clearly#gf the impossibility of separating emotion and thought4 ,to put ourselves in the place of another 444 is the surest way to attain universality and objectivity of moral knowledge4 ,the only truly general1 the reasonable as distinct from the merely shrewd or clever thought1 is the generous thought4 ,but in the case of certain judgments such as those approving fairness and the general good ,sidgwick finds a rational intuition4 ,the principle of impartiality is obtained by considering the similarity of the individuals that make up a ,logical ,whole or ,genus4#gg ,rashdall challenges any but a rationalistic ethics to explain fairness as contrasted with partiality of affection4 ,there is without question a properly rational or intellectual element in the judgment of impartiality1 namely1 analysis of the situation and comparison of the units4 ,but what we shall set up as our units--whether we shall treat the gentile or the barbarian or negro as a person1 as end and not merely means1 or not1 depends on something quite other than reason4 ,and this other factor is not covered by the term practical reason4 ,in fact no ethical principle shows better the subtle blending of the emotional and social factors with the rational4 ,for the student of the history of justice is aware that only an extraordinarily ingenious exegesis could regard justice as having ever been governed by a mathematical logic4 ,the logic of justice has been the logic of a we-group gradually expanding its area4 ,or it has been the logic of a ,magna ,charta--a document of special privileges wrested from a superior by a strong group1 and gradually widening its benefits with the admission of others into the favored class4 ,or it has been the logic of class1 in which those of the same level are treated alike but those of different levels of birth or wealth are treated proportionately4 ,yet it would seem far-fetched to maintain that the countrymen of ,euclid and ,aristotle were deficient in the ability to perform so simple a reasoning process as the judgment one equals one1 or that men who developed the ,roman ,law1 or built the cathedrals of the ,middle ,ages1 were similarly lacking in elementary analysis4 ,inequality rather than equality has been the rule in the world's justice4 ,it has not only been the practice but the approved principle4 ,it still is in regard to great areas of life4 ,in the ,united ,states there is no general disapproval of the great inequalities in opportunity for children1 to say nothing of inequalities in distribution of wealth4 ,in ,england higher education is for the classes rather than for the masses4 ,in ,prussia the inequality in voting strength of different groups and the practical immunity of the military class from the constraints of civil law seem to an ,american unfair4 ,the western states of the ,union think it unfair to restrict the suffrage to males and give women no voice in the determination of matters of such vital interest to them as the law of divorce1 the guardianship of children1 the regulation of women's labor1 the sale of alcoholic liquors1 the protection of milk and food supply4 ,are all these differences of practice and conviction due to the fact that some people use reason while others do not8 ,of course in every case excellent reasons can be given for the inequality4 ,the gentile should not be treated as a ,jew because he is not a ,jew4 ,the slave should not be treated as a free citizen because he is not a free citizen4 ,the churl should not have the same wergeld as the thane because he is lowborn4 ,the more able should possess more goods4 ,the woman should not vote because she is not a man4 ,the reasoning is clear and unimpeachable if you accept the premises1 but what gives the premises8 ,in every case cited the premise is determined largely if not exclusively by social or emotional factors4 ,if reason can then prescribe equally well that the slave should be given rights because he is a man of similar traits or denied rights because he has different traits from his master1 if the ,jew may either be given his place of equality because he hath eyes1 hands1 organs1 dimensions1 senses1 affections1 passions1 or denied equality because he differs in descent1 if a woman is equal as regards taxpaying but unequal as regards voting1 it is at least evident that reason is no unambiguous source of morality4 ,the devil can quote ,scripture and it is a very poor reasoner who cannot find a reason for anything that he wishes to do4 ,a partiality that is more or less consistently partial to certain sets or classes is perhaps as near impartiality as man has yet come1 whether by a rational faculty or any other4 ,is it1 then1 the intent of this argument merely to reiterate that reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions8 ,on the contrary1 the intent is to substitute for such blanket words as reason and passions a more adequate analysis4 ,and what difference will this make8 ,as regards the particular point in controversy it will make this difference3 the rationalist having smuggled in under the cover of reason the whole moral consciousness then proceeds to assume that because two and two are always four1 or the relations of a straight line are timeless1 therefore ethics is similarly a matter of fixed standards and timeless goods4 ,a legal friend told me that he once spent a year trying to decide whether a corporation was or was not a person and then concluded that the question was immaterial4 ,but when the supreme court decided that a corporation was a person in the meaning of the ,fourteenth ,amendment it thereby made the corporation heir to the rights established primarily for the negro4 ,can the moral consciousness by taking the name reason become heir to all the privileges of the absolute idea and to the timelessness of space and number8 ,suppose ,i am to divide an apple between my two children--two children1 two pieces--this is an analysis of the situation which is obvious and may well be called the analytic activity of reason4 ,but shall ,i give to each an equal share on the ground that both are equally my children or shall ,i reason that as ,john is older or larger or hungrier or mentally keener or more generous or is a male1 he shall have a larger piece than ,jane8 ,to settle this it may be said that we ought to see whether there is any connection between the size of the piece and the particular quality of ,john which is considered1 or that by a somewhat different use of reason we should look at the whole situation and see how we shall best promote family harmony and mutual affection4 ,to settle the first of these problems1 that of the connection between the size of the piece and the size of the hunger or the sex of the child1 is seemingly again a question of analysis1 of finding identical units1 but a moment's thought shows that the case is not so simple2 that the larger child should have the larger piece is by no means self-evident4 ,this is in principle doubtless the logic1 to him that hath shall be given4 ,it is the logic of the survival of the strong1 but over against that the moral consciousness has always set another logic which says that the smaller child should have the larger piece if thereby intelligent sympathy can contribute toward evening up the lot of the smaller4 ,now it is precisely this attitude of the moral consciousness which is not suggested by the term reason1 for it is quite different from the analytic and identifying activity4 ,this analytical and identifying activity may very well rule out of court the hypothesis that ,i should give ,john the larger piece because he has already eaten too much or because he has just found a penny or because he has red hair2 it has undoubtedly helped in abolishing such practices as that of testing innocence by the ordeal4 ,but before the crucial question of justice which divides modern society1 namely1 whether we shall lay emphasis upon adjustment of rewards to previous abilities1 habits1 possessions1 character1 or shall lay stress upon needs1 and the possibility of bringing about a greater measure of equality1 the doctrine which would find its standard in an a priori reason is helpless4 ,if we look at the second test suggested1 namely1 that of considering the situation as a whole with a view to the harmony of the children and the mutual affection within the family1 there can be even less question that this is no mere logical problem of the individuals in a logical genus4 ,it is the social problem of individuals who have feelings and emotions as well as thought and will4 ,the problem of distributing the apple fairly is then a complex in which at least the following processes enter4 7#a7 ,analysis of the situation to show all the relevant factors with the full bearing of each2 7#b7 putting yourself in the place of each one to be considered and experiencing to the full the claims1 the difficulties and the purposes of each person involved2 7#c7 considering all of these as members of the situation so that no individual is given rights or allowed claims except in so far as he represents a point of view which is comprehensive and sympathetic4 ,this ,i take it is the force of ,president ,wilson's utterance which has commanded such wide acceptance3 ,america asks nothing for herself except what she has a right to ask in the name of humanity4 ,kant aimed to express a high and democratic ideal of justice in his doctrine that we should treat every rational being as end4 ,the defect in his statement is that the rational process as such has never treated and so far as can be foreseen never will treat human beings as ends4 ,to treat a human being as an end it is necessary to put oneself into his place in his whole nature and not simply in his universalizing1 and legislative aspects3 ,kant's principle is profound and noble1 but his label for it is misleading and leaves a door open for appalling disregard of other people's feelings1 sympathies1 and moral sentiments1 as ,professor ,dewey has indicated in his recent lectures on ,german ,philosophy and ,politics4 ,the term reasonable1 which is frequently used in law and common life as a criterion of right1 seems to imply that reason is a standard4 ,as already stated1 common life understands by the reasonable man one who not only uses his own thinking powers but is willing to listen to reason as presented by some one else4 ,he makes allowance for frailties in human nature4 ,to be reasonable means1 very nearly1 taking into account all factors of the case not only as ,i see them but as men of varying capacities and interests regard them4 ,the type of the unreasonable employer is the man who refuses to talk over things with the laborers2 to put himself in their place2 or to look at matters from the point of view of society as a whole4 ,just as little does the term reasonable as used in law permit a purely intellectualistic view of the process or an a priori standard4 ,the question as to what is reasonable care or a reasonable price is often declared to be a matter not for the court but for the jury to decide1 i4e41 it is not to be deduced from any settled principle but is a question of what the average thoughtful man1 who considers other people as well as himself1 would do under the circumstances4 ,a glance at some of the judicial definitions of such phrases as reasonable care1 reasonable doubt1 reasonable law1 as brought together in ,words and ,phrases ,judicially ,defined1 illustrates this view4 ,we get a picture not of any definite standard but of such a process as we have described in our analysis1 namely1 a process into which the existing social tradition1 the mutual adjustments of a changing society and the intelligent consideration of all facts1 enter4 ,the courts have variously defined the reasonable 7#a7 as the customary1 or ordinary1 or legal1 or 7#b7 as according with the existing state of knowledge in some special field1 or 7#c7 as proceeding on due consideration of all the facts1 or 7#d7 as offering sufficient basis for action4 ,for example1 7#a7 reasonable care means according to the usages1 habits1 and ordinary risks of the business1 7#b7 surgeons should keep up with the latest advances in medical science1 7#c7 a reasonable price is such a price as the jury would under all the circumstances decide to be reasonable4 ,if1 after an impartial comparison and consideration the jury can say candidly they are not satisfied with the defendant's guilt they have a reasonable doubt4 ,under 7#d7 falls one of various definitions of beyond reasonable doubt4 ,the evidence must be such as to produce in the minds of prudent men such certainty that they would act without hesitation in their own most important affairs4 ,there is evidently ground for the statement of one judge that reasonable 7he was speaking the phrase reasonable care1 but his words would seem to apply to other cases7 cannot be measured by any fixed or inflexible standard4 ,professor ,freund characterizes reasonable as the negation of precision4 ,in the development of judicial interpretation as applied to the ,sherman ,law the tendency is to hold that the rule of reason will regard as forbidden by the statute 7a7 such combinations as have historically been prohibited and 7b7 such as seem to work some definite injury4 ,,iii ,the above view of the function of intelligence1 and of the synthetic character of the conscious process may be further defined in certain aspects by comparison with the view of ,professor ,fite1 who likewise develops the significance of consciousness and particularly of intelligence for our ethical concepts and social program4 ,professor ,fite insists that in contrast with the functional psychology which would make consciousness merely a means to the preservation of the organic individual in mechanical working order1 the whole value of life from the standpoint of the conscious agent consists in its being conscious4 ,creative moments in which there is complete conscious control of materials and technique represent high and unique individuality4 ,extension of range of consciousness makes the agent a larger and more inclusive being1 for he is living in the future and past as well as in the present4 ,consciousness means that a new and original force is inserted into the economy of the social and the physical world4#gh ,on the basis of the importance of consciousness ,professor ,fite would ground his justification of rights1 his conception of justice1 and his social program4 ,the individual derives his rights simply from the fact that he knows what he is doing1 hence as individuals differ in intelligence they differ in rights4 ,the problem of justice is that of according to each a degree of recognition proportioned to his intelligence1 that is1 treat others as ends so far as they are intelligent2 so far as they are ignorant treat them as means4#gi ,the conscious individual when dealing with other conscious individuals will take account of their aims1 as of other factors in his situation4 ,this will involve 'adjustment1' but not abandonment of ends1 i4e41 self-sacrifice4 ,obligation to consider these ends of others is based on 'the same logic that binds me to get out of the way of an approaching train4'#hj ,the point in which the conception of rights and justice and the implied social program advocated in this paper differs as ,i view it from that of ,professor ,fite is briefly this4 ,i regard both the individual and his rights as essentially synthetic and in constant process of reconstruction4 ,therefore what is due to any individual at a moment is not measured by his present stage of consciousness4 ,it is measured rather by his possibilities than his actualities4 ,this does not mean that the actual is to be ignored1 but it does mean that if we take our stand upon the actual we are committed to a program with little place for imagination1 with an emphasis all on the side of giving people what they deserve rather than of making them capable of deserving more4 ,professor ,fite's position ,i regard as conceiving consciousness itself too largely in the category of the identical and the static rather than in the more conscious categories of constant reconstruction4 ,when by virtue of consciousness you conceive new ends in addition to your former particular ideas of present good the problem is1 he says1 to secure perfect fulfilment of each of them4 ,the usefulness or advantage or profitableness of entering into social relations is the central category for measuring their value and their obligation4 ,now the conception of securing perfect fulfilment of all one's aims by means of society rather than of putting one's own aims into the process for reciprocal modification and adjustment with the aims of others and of the new social whole involves a view of these ends as fixed1 an essentially mechanical view4 ,the same is the implication in considering society from the point of view of use and profit4 ,as previously suggested these economic terms apply appropriately to things rather than to intrinsic values4 ,to consider the uses of a fellow-being is to measure him in terms of some other end than his own intrinsic personal worth4 ,to consider family life or society as profitable implies in ordinary language that such life is a means for securing ends already established rather than that it proves a good to the man who invests in it and thereby becomes himself a new individual with a new standard of values4 ,any object to be chosen must of course have value to the chooser4 ,but it is one thing to be valued because it appeals to the actual chooser as already constituted2 it is another thing to be valued because it appeals to a moving self which adventures upon this new unproved objective4 ,this second is the distinction of taking an interest instead of being interested4 ,the second point of divergence is that ,professor ,fite lays greater stress upon the intellectual side of intelligence1 whereas ,i should deny that the intellectual activity in itself is adequate to give either a basis for obligation or a method of dealing with the social problem4 ,the primary fact1 as ,professor ,fite well states it1 is that men are conscious beings and therefore know themselves and one another4 ,it involves a mutual recognition of personal ends4 ,that very knowledge which shows the individual himself shows him also that he is living in a world with other persons and other things whose mode of behavior and whose interests determine for him the conditions through which his own interests are to be realized4 ,what kind of knowledge is it which shows the individual himself8 ,professor ,fite has two quite different ways of referring to this4 ,he uses one set of terms when he would contrast his view with the sentimental1 or the ,oriental1 or justify exploitation by those who know better what they are about than the exploited4 ,he uses another set of terms to characterize it when he wishes to commend his view as human1 and fraternal1 and as affording the only firm basis for social reform4 ,in the first case he speaks of mere knowing2 of intelligence as clear1 and far-sighted1 of higher degrees of consciousness as simply more in one4 ,our test of intelligence would be breadth of vision 7in a coherent view71 fineness and keenness of insight4#ha ,in the second case it is generous1 it will show an intelligent sympathy2 it seeks fellowship1 and would not elect to live in a social environment in which the distinction of 'inferiors' were an essential part of the idea4#hb ,the type of intelligence is found not in the man seeking wealth or power1 nor in the legal acumen which forecasts all discoverable consequences and devises means to carry out purposes1 but in literature and art4#hc ,the terms which cover both these meanings are the words consider and considerate4 ,breadth of consideration gives the basis for rights4 ,the selfish man is the inconsiderate4#hd ,this term plays the part of the amor intellectualis in the system of ,spinoza1 which enables him at once to discard all emotion and yet to keep it4 ,for consideration is used in common life1 and defined in the dictionaries1 as meaning both examination1 careful thought1 and appreciative or sympathetic regard4 ,the ambiguity in the term may well have served to disguise from the author himself the double role which intelligence is made to play4 ,the broader use is the only one that does justice to the moral consciousness1 but we cannot include sympathy and still maintain that mere knowing covers the whole4 ,the insistence at times upon the mere knowing is a mechanical element which needs to be removed before the ethical implications can be accepted4 ,once more1 how does one know himself and others8 ,is it the same process precisely as knowing a mechanical object8 ,thoughts without percepts are empty1 and what are the percepts in the two cases8 ,in the first case1 that of knowing things1 the percepts are colors1 sounds1 resistances2 in the case of persons the percepts are impulses1 feelings1 desires1 passions1 as well as images1 purposes1 and the reflective process itself4 ,in the former case we construct objects dehumanized2 in the latter we keep them more or less concrete4 ,but now1 just as primitive man did not so thoroughly de-personalize nature1 but left in it an element of personal aim1 so science may view human beings as objects whose purposes and even feelings may be predicted1 and hence may1 as ,professor ,fite well puts it1 view them mechanically4 ,what he fails to note is that just this mechanical point of view is the view of mere knowing--if mere has any significance at all1 it is meant to shut out sentiment4 ,and this mechanical view is entirely equal to the adjectives of clear1 far-sighted1 and even broad so far as this means more in one4 ,for it is not essential to a mechanical point of view that we consider men in masses or study them by statistics4 ,i may calculate the purposes and actions1 yes1 and the emotions and values of one1 or of a thousand1 and be increasingly clear1 and far-sighted1 and broad1 but if it is mere knowing--scientific information--it is still mechanical1 i4e41 external4 ,on the other hand1 if it is to be a knowledge that has the qualities of humaneness1 or intelligent sympathy1 it must have some of the stuff of feeling1 even as in the realm of things an artist's forest will differ from that of the most far-sighted1 clear1 and broad statistician1 by being rich with color and moving line4 ,and this leads to a statement of the way in which my fellow-beings will find place in my self4 ,i grant that if they are there ,i shall take some account of them4 ,but they may be there in all sorts of ways4 ,they may be there as population if ,i am a statistician1 or as consumers1 or as rivals1 or as enemies1 or as fellows1 or as friends4 ,they will have a value in each case1 but it will sometimes be a positive value1 and sometimes a negative value4 ,which it will be1 and how great it will be1 depends not on the mere fact of these objects being in consciousness but on the capacity in which they are there4 ,and this capacity depends on the dominant interest and not on mere knowing4 ,the trouble with the selfish man1 says ,professor ,fite1 is that he fails to consider1 he fails to take account of me4#he ,well1 then1 why does he fail8 ,why does he not take account of me8 ,he probably does consider me in several of the ways that are possible and in the ways that it suits him to consider me4 ,i call him selfish because he does not consider me in the one particular way in which ,i wish to be considered4 ,and what will get me into his consideration from this point of view8 ,in some cases it may be that ,i can speak3 ,sir1 you are standing on my toe1 and as the message encounters no obstacle in any fixed purpose or temperamental bent the idea has no difficulty in penetrating his mind4 ,in other cases it may interfere with his desire to raise himself as high as possible1 but ,i may convince him by the same logic as that of an approaching railway train--that he must regard me4 ,in still other cases--and it is these that always test ,individualism--,i am not myself aware of the injury1 or ,i am too faint to protest4 ,how shall those who have no voice to speak get consideration8 ,only by intelligent sympathy1 and by just those emotions rooted in instinctive social tendencies which an intellectualistic ,individualism excludes or distrusts4 ,,iv ,what practical conclusion1 if any1 follows from this interpretation of the moral consciousness and its categories8 ,moral progress involves both the formation of better ideals and the adoption of such ideals as actual standards and guides of life4 ,if our view is correct we can construct better ideals neither by logical deduction nor solely by insight into the nature of things--if by this we mean things as they are4 ,we must rather take as our starting-point the conviction that moral life is a process involving physical life1 social intercourse1 measuring and constructive intelligence4 ,we shall endeavor to further each of these factors with the conviction that thus we are most likely to reconstruct our standards and find a fuller good4#hf ,physical life1 which has often been depreciated from the moral point of view1 is not indeed by itself supreme1 but it is certain that much evil charged to a bad will is due to morbid or defective conditions of the physical organism4 ,one would be ashamed to write such a truism were it not that our juvenile courts and our prison investigations show how far we are from having sensed it in the past4 ,and our present labor conditions show how far our organization of industry is from any decent provision for a healthy1 sound1 vigorous life of all the people4 ,this war is shocking in its destruction1 but it is doubtful if it can do the harm to ,great ,britain that her factory system has done4 ,and if life is in one respect less than ideals1 in another respect it is greater2 for it provides the possibility not only of carrying out existing ideals but of the birth of new and higher ideals4 ,social interaction likewise has been much discussed but is still very inadequately realized4 ,the great possibilities of cooeperation have long been utilized in war4 ,with the factory and commercial organization of the past century we have hints of their economic power4 ,our schools1 books1 newspapers1 are removing some of the barriers4 ,but how far different social classes are from any knowledge1 not to say appreciation1 of each other6 ,how far different races are apart6 ,how easy to inculcate national hatred and distrust6 ,the fourth great problem which baffles ,wells's hero in the ,research ,magnificent is yet far from solution4 ,the great danger to morality in ,america lies not in any theory as to the subjectivity of the moral judgment1 but in the conflict of classes and races4 ,intelligence and reason are in certain respects advancing4 ,the social sciences are finding tools and methods4 ,we are learning to think of much of our moral inertia1 our waste of life1 our narrowness1 our muddling and blundering in social arrangements1 as stupid--we do not like to be called stupid even if we scorn the imputation of claiming to be good4 ,but we do not organize peace as effectively as war4 ,we shrink before the thought of expending for scientific investigation sums comparable with those used for military purposes4 ,and is scholarship entitled to shift the blame entirely upon other interests8 ,perhaps if it conceived its tasks in greater terms and addressed itself to them more energetically it would find greater support4 ,and finally the process of judgment and appraisal1 of examination and revaluation4 ,to judge for the sake of judging1 to analyze and evaluate for the sake of the process hardly seems worth while4 ,but if we supply the process with the new factors of increased life1 physical1 social1 intelligent1 we shall be compelled to new valuations4 ,such has been the course of moral development2 we may expect this to be repeated4 ,the great war and the changes that emerge ought to set new tasks for ethical students4 ,as medievalism1 the century of enlightenment1 and the century of industrial revolution1 each had its ethics1 so the century that follows ought to have its ethics1 roused by the problem of dealing fundamentally with economic1 social1 racial1 and national relations1 and using the resources of better scientific method than belonged to the ethical systems which served well their time4 ,only wilful misinterpretation will suppose that the method here set forth is that of taking every want or desire as itself a final justification1 or of making morality a matter of arbitrary caprice4 ,but some may in all sincerity raise the question3 ,is morality then after all simply the shifting mores of groups stumbling forward--or backward1 or sidewise--with no fixed standards of right and good8 ,if this is so how can we have any confidence in our present judgments1 to say nothing of calling others to an account or of reasoning with them8 ,what we have aimed to present as a moral method is essentially this3 to take into our reckoning all the factors in the situation1 to take into account the other persons involved1 to put ourselves into their places by sympathy as well as conceptually1 to face collisions and difficulties not merely in terms of fixed concepts of what is good or fair1 and what the right of each party concerned may be1 but with the conviction that we need new definitions of the ideal life1 and of the social order1 and thus reciprocally of personality4 ,thus harmonized1 free1 and responsible1 life may well find new meaning also in the older intrinsic goods of friendship1 aesthetic appreciation and true belief4 ,and it is not likely to omit the satisfaction in actively constructing new ideals and working for their fulfilment4 ,frankly1 if we do not accept this method what remains8 ,can any one by pure reason discover a single forward step in the treatment of the social situation or a single new value in the moral ideal8 ,can any analysis of the pure concept of right and good teach us anything8 ,in the last analysis the moral judgment is not analytic but synthetic4 ,the moral life is not natural but spiritual4 ,and spirit is creative4 ,,value ,,and ,,existence ,,in ,,philosophy1 ,,art1 ,,and ,,religion ,,horace ,m4 ,,kallen ,he who assiduously compares the profound and the commonplace will find their difference to turn merely on the manner of their expression2 a profundity is a commonplace formulated in strange or otherwise obscure and unintelligible terms4 ,this must be my excuse for beginning with the trite remark that the world we live in is not one which was made for us1 but one in which we happened and grew4 ,i am much aware that there exists a large and influential class of persons who do not think so2 and ,i offer this remark with all deference to devotees of idealism1 and to other such pietists who persist in arguing that the trouble which we do encounter in this vale of tears springs from the inwardness of our own natures and not from that of the world4 ,i wish1 indeed1 that ,i could agree with them1 but unhappily their very arguments prevent me1 since1 if the world were actually as they think it1 they could not think it as they do4 ,in fact1 they could not think4 ,thinking--worse luck6--came into being as response to discomfort1 to pain1 to uncertainty1 to problems1 such as could not exist in a world truly made for us2 while from time immemorial pure as distinct from human consciousness has been identified with absolute certainty1 with self-absorption and self-sufficiency2 as a god1 a goal to attain1 not a fact to rest in4 ,it is notable that those who believe the world actually to have been made for us devote most of their thinking to explaining away the experiences which have made all men feel that the world was actually not made for us4 ,their chief business1 after proving the world to be all good1 is solving the problem of evil4 ,yet1 had there really been no evil1 this evil consequence could not have ensued3 existence would have emerged as beatitude and not as adjustment2 thinking might in truth have been self-absorbed contemplation1 blissful intuition1 not painful learning by the method of trial and error4 ,alas that what might have been cannot come into being by force of discursive demonstration6 ,if it could1 goodness alone would have existed and been real1 and evil would have been non-existence1 unreality1 and appearance--all by the force of the ,word4 ,as it is1 the appearance of evil is in so far forth no less an evil than its reality2 in truth1 it is reality and its best witnesses are the historic attempts to explain it away4 ,for even as appearance it has a definite and inexpugnable character of its own which cannot be destroyed by subsumption under the standpoint of the whole1 the absolute good1 the over-individual values4 ,nor1 since only sticks and stones break bones and names never hurt1 can it be abolished by the epithet appearance4 ,to deny reality to evil is to multiply the evil4 ,it is to make two problems grow where only one grew before1 to add to the problem of evil the problem of appearance without serving any end toward the solution of the real problem how evil can be effectively abolished4 ,i may then1 in view of these reflections1 hold myself safe in assuming that the world we live in was not made for us2 that1 humanly speaking1 it is open to improvement in a great many directions4 ,it will be comparatively innocuous to assume also1 as a corollary1 that in so far as the world was made for mind1 it has been made so by man1 that civilization is the adaptation of nature to human nature4 ,and as a second corollary it may be safely assumed that the world does not stay made2 civilization has brought its own problems and peculiar evils4 ,i realize that1 in the light of my title1 much of what ,i have written above must seem irrelevant1 since the problem of evil has not1 within the philosophic tradition1 been considered part of a problem of values as such4 ,if ,i dwell on it1 ,i do so to indicate that the problem of evil can perhaps be best understood in the light of another problem3 the problem1 namely1 of why men have created the problem of evil4 ,for obviously1 evil can be problematic only in an absolutely good world1 and the idea that the world is absolutely good is not a generalization upon experience1 but a contradiction of experience4 ,if there exists a metaphysical problem of evil1 hence1 it arises out of this generalization2 it is secondary1 not primary2 and the primary problem requires solution before the secondary one can be understood4 ,and what else1 under the circumstances1 can the primary one be than this3 ,why do men contradict their own experience8 ,,ii ,so put1 the problem suggests its own solution4 ,it indicates1 first of all1 that nature and human nature are not completely compatible1 that consequently1 conclusions are being forced by nature on human nature which human nature resents and rejects1 and that traits are being assigned to nature by human nature which nature does not possess1 but which1 if possessed1 would make her congenial to human needs4 ,all this is so platitudinous that ,i feel ashamed to write it2 but then1 how can one avoid platitudes without avoiding truth8 ,and truth here is the obvious fact that since human nature is the point of existence to which good and evil refer1 what is called value has its seat necessarily in human nature1 and what is called existence has its seat necessarily in the nature of which human nature is a part and apart4 ,value1 in so far forth1 is a content of nature1 having its roots in her conditions and its life in her force1 while the converse is not true4 ,all nature and all existence is not spontaneously and intrinsically a content of value4 ,only that portion of it which is human is such4 ,humanly speaking1 non-human existences become valuable by their efficacious bearing on humanity1 by their propitious or their disastrous relations to human consciousness4 ,it is these relations which delimit the substance of our goods and evils1 and these1 at bottom1 are indistinguishable from consciousness4 ,they do not1 need not1 and cannot connect all existence with human life4 ,they are inevitably implicated only with those which make human life possible at all4 ,of the environment1 they pertain only to that portion which is fit by the implicated conditions of life itself4 ,it may therefore be said that natural existence produces and sustains some values1--at least the minimal value which is identical with the bare existence of mankind--on its own account1 but no more4 ,the residual environment remains--irrelevant and menacing1 wider than consciousness and independent of it4 ,value1 hence1 is a specific kind of natural existence among other existences4 ,to say that it is non-existent in nature1 is to say that value is not coincident and coexistent with other existences1 just as when it is said that a thing is not red1 the meaning is that red is not copresent with other qualities4 ,conversely1 to say that value exists in nature is to say that nature and human nature1 things and thoughts1 are in some respect harmonious or identical4 ,hence1 what human nature tries to force upon nature must be1 by implication1 non-existent in nature but actual in mind1 so that the nature of value must be held inseparable from the nature of mind4#hg ,it follows that value is1 in origin and character1 completely irrational4 ,at the foundations of our existence it is relation of their conditions and objects to our major instincts1 our appetites1 our feelings1 our desires1 our ambitions--most clearly1 to the self-regarding instinct and the instincts of nutrition1 reproduction1 and gregariousness4 ,concerning those1 as ,william ,james writes1 ,science may come and consider their ways and find that most of them are useful4 ,but it is not for the sake of their utility that they are followed1 but because at the moment of following them we feel that it is the only appropriate and natural thing to do4 ,not a man in a billion when taking his dinner1 ever thinks of utility4 ,he eats because the food tastes good and makes him want more4 ,if you ask him why he should want to eat more of what tastes like that1 instead of revering you as a philosopher1 he will probably laugh at you for a fool4 ,the connection between the savory sensation and the act it awakens is for him absolute and selbstverstaendlich1 an a priori synthesis of the most perfect sort1 needing no proof but its own evidence4444 ,to the metaphysician alone can such questions occur as ',why do we smile when pleased1 and not scowl8 ,why are we unable to talk to a crowd as we talk to a single friend8 ,why does a particular maiden turn our wits upside down8' ,the common man can only say 'of course we smile1 of course our heart palpitates at the sight of a crowd1 of course we love the maiden1 that beautiful soul clad in that perfect form1 so palpably and flagrantly made from all eternity to be loved4' ,and so1 probably1 does each animal feel about the particular things it tends to do in the presence of particular objects4444 ,to the broody hen the notion would probably seem monstrous that there should be a creature in the world to whom a nestful of eggs was not the utterly fascinating and precious and never-to-be-too-much-set-upon object it is to her4 ,in sum1 fundamental values are relations1 responses1 attitudes1 immediate1 simple1 subjectively obvious1 and irrational4 ,but everything else becomes valuable or rational only by reference to them4 ,study them or others empirically1#hh and they appear as types of specific behavior1 simple or complicated1 consisting of a given motor set of the organism1 strong emotional tone1 and aggregates of connected ideas1 more or less systematized4 ,in the slang of the new medical psychology which has done so much to uncover their method and mechanism1 they are called complexes2 ethics has called them interests1 and that designation will do well enough4 ,they are the primary and morally ultimate efficacious units of which human nature is compounded1 and it is in terms of the world's bearing upon their destiny that we evaluate nature and judge her significance and worth4 ,now in interest1 the important delimiting quality is emotional tone4 ,whatever else is sharable1 that is not4 ,it is the very stuff of our attitudes1 of our acceptances and rejections of the world and its contents1 the very essence of the relations we bear to these4 ,that these relations shall be identical for any two human beings requires that the two shall be identical3 two persons cannot hold the same relation to the same or different objects any more than two objects can occupy absolutely the same space at the same time4 ,hence1 all our differences and disagreements4 ,however socially-minded we may be1 mere numerical diversity compels us to act as separate centers1 to value things with reference to separate interests1 to orient our worlds severally1 and with ourselves as centers4 ,this orienting is the relating of the environment to our interests1 the establishment of our worlds of appreciation1 the creation of our orders of value4 ,however much these cross and interpenetrate1 coincide they never can4 ,our interests1 furthermore1 are possibly as numerous as our reflex arcs4 ,each may1 and most do1 constitute distinct and independent valuations of their objects1 to which they respond1 and each1 with these objects1 remains an irreducible system4 ,but reflex arcs and interests do not act alone4 ,they act like armies2 they compound and are integrated1 and when so integrated their valuations fuse and constitute the more complex and massive feelings1 pleasures and pains1 the emotions of anger1 of fear1 of love2 the sentiments of respect1 of admiration1 of sympathy4 ,they remain1 through all degrees of complexity1 appraisements of the environment1 reactions upon it1 behavior toward it1 as subject to empirical examination by the psychologist as the environment itself by the physicist4 ,with a difference1 however1 a fundamental difference4 ,when you have an emotion you cannot yourself examine it4 ,effectively as the mind may work in sections1 it cannot with sanity be divided against itself nor long remain so4 ,a feeling cannot be had and examined in the same time4 ,and though the investigator who studies the nature of red does not become red1 the investigator who studies the actual emotion of anger does tend to become angry4 ,emotion is infectious2 anger begets anger2 fear1 fear2 love1 love2 hate1 hate2 actions1 relations1 attitudes1 when actual1 integrate and fuse2 as feelings1 they constitute the sense of behavior1 varying according to a changing and unstable equilibrium of factors within the organism2 they are actually underneath the skin1 and consequently1 to know them alive is to have them4 ,on the other hand1 to know things is simply to have a relation to them4 ,the same thing may be both loved and hated1 desired or spurned1 by different minds at the same time or by the same mind at different times4 ,one1 for example1 values whiskey positively1 approaches1 absorbs it1 aims to increase its quantity and sale2 another apprehends it negatively1 turns from it1 strives to oust it from the world4 ,then1 according to these direct and immediate valuations of whiskey1 its place in the common world of the two minds will be determined4 ,to save or destroy it1 they may seek to destroy each other4 ,even similar positive valuations of the object might imply this mutual repugnance and destruction4 ,thus1 rivals in love3 they enhance and glorify the same woman1 but as she is not otherwise sharable1 they strive to eliminate each other4 ,throughout the world of values the numerical distinctness of the seats or centers of value1 whatever their identity otherwise1 keeps them ultimately inimical4 ,they may terminate in the common object1 but they originate in different souls and they are related to the object like two magnets of like polarity to the same piece of iron that lies between them4 ,most of what is orderly in society and in science is the outcome of the adjustment of just such oppositions3 our civilization is an unstable equilibrium of objects1 through the cooeperation1 antipathy1 and fusion of value-relations4 ,individuals are no better off2 personality is constructed in the same way4 ,if1 indeed1 the world had been made for us1 we might have been spared this warfare to man upon earth4 ,life might have been the obvious irrational flow of bliss so vividly described by ,william ,james2 nature and human nature would have been one2 bridging the gulf between them would never have been the task of the tender-minded among philosophers4 ,unfortunately our mere numerical difference1 the mere numerical difference of the interests which compose our egos1 makes the trouble1 so that we are compelled to devote most of our lives to converting the different into the same4 ,the major part of our instincts serve this function recognizably1 e4g41 nutrition1 and the higher powers do so no less1 if not so obviously4 ,generalization is nothing more1 thinking nothing else4 ,it is the assimilation of many instances into one form1 law1 or purpose2 the preservation of established contents of value1 just as nutrition is the preservation of life by means of the conversion of foreign matter into the form and substance of the body4 ,by bowels and by brain1 what is necessary1 what will feed the irrationally given interest1 is preserved and consumed3 the rest is cast off as waste1 as irrelevance1 as contradiction4 ,the relation may1 of course1 also reverse itself4 ,face to face with the immovable and inexorable1 the mind may accept it with due resignation1 or it may challenge its tyranny and exclude it from its world4 ,it may seek or create or discover a substitute that it is content to accept1 though this will in turn alter the course and character of the interest which in such an instance defines the mind's action4 ,thus1 a way out for one of the lovers of the same girl might be to become a depressed and yearning bachelor1 realizing his potential sexuality in the vicarious reproduction of reverie and sentiment2 another might be to divert the stream of his affections to another girl1 reorganizing his life about a different center and acquiring a new system of practical values determined by this center2 a third might be a complete redirection of his sexual energies upon objects the interest in which we would call1 abnormal and anti-social in one case1 and in another lofty and spiritual4 ,in the latter case sexuality would have been depersonalized2 it would have changed into poetic and humanitarian passion2 it would have become love as ,plato means us to take the word4 ,but each of these processes would have been a conversion1 through the need defined by an identical instinct1 of the same into the different2 the human nature which existed at the beginning of the change would be deeply other than the human nature in which the change culminated4 ,in each case a condition thrust upon the spirit by its environment would have occasioned the creation and maintenance of an environment demanded by the spirit4 ,yet in so far as it was not truly the same as that envisaged in the primitive demand1 it would still imply the tragedy of the world not made for us and the problem of evil1 in which the life of the spirit is persistently a salvage of one of two always incompatible goods1 a saving by surrender4 ,and this is all that a mind is--an affair of saving and rejecting1 of valuing with a system of objects of which a living body and its desires and operations1 its interests1 are focal and the objects marginal1 for its standard4 ,mind1 thus1 is neither simple1 nor immutable1 nor stable2 it is a thing to be changed1 confused1 cleared1 made-up1 trained4 ,one body1 ,i have written elsewhere1#hi in the course of its lifetime1 has many minds1 only partially united4 ,men are all too often of two minds4 ,the unity of a mind depends on its consistent pursuit of one interest1 although we then call it narrow2 or on the cooeperation and harmony of its many interests4 ,frequently1 two or more minds may struggle for the possession of the same body2 that is1 the body may be divided by two elaborately systematized tendencies to act4 ,the beginning of such division occurs wherever there is a difficulty in deciding between alternative modes of behavior2 the end is to be observed in those cases of dual or multiple personality in which the body has ordered a great collection of objects and systematized so large a collection of interests in such typically distinct ways as to have set up for itself different and opposed minds4 ,on the other hand1 two or fifty or a million bodies may be of the same mind4 ,unhappily1 difference of mind1 diversity and conflict of interests is quite as fundamental1 if not more so1 as sameness of mind1 cooeperation and unity of interests4 ,this the philosophical tradition sufficiently attests4 ,to ,plato man is at once a protean beast1 a lion1 and an intellect2 the last having for its proper task to rule the first and to regulate the second1 which is always rebellious and irruptive4#ij ,according to the ,christian tradition man is at once flesh and spirit1 eternally in conflict with one another1 and the former is to be mortified that the latter may have eternal life4 ,common sense divides us into head and heart1 never quite at peace with one another4 ,there is no need of piling up citations4 ,add to the inward disharmonies of mind its incompatibilities with the environment1 and you perceive at once how completely it is1 from moment to moment1 a theater and its life a drama of which the interests that compose it are at once protagonists and directors4 ,the catastrophe of this unceasing drama is always that one or more of the players is driven from the stage of conscious existence4 ,it may be that the environment--social conditions1 commercial necessity1 intellectual urgency1 allies of other interests--will drive it off2 it may be that its own intrinsic unpleasantness will banish it1 will put it out of mind2 whatever the cause1 it is put out4 ,putting it out does not1 however1 end the drama2 putting it out serves to complicate the drama4 ,for the new psychology#ia shows that whenever an interest or a desire or impulsion is put out of the mind1 it is really1 if not extirpated1 put into the mind2 it is driven from the conscious level of existence to the unconscious4 ,it retains its force and direction1 only its work now lies underground4 ,its life henceforward consists partly in a direct oppugnance to the inhibitions that keep it down1 partly in burrowing beneath and around them and seeking out unwonted channels of escape4 ,since life is long1 repressions accumulate1 the mass of existence of feeling and desire tends to become composed entirely of these repressions1 layer upon layer1 with every interest in the aggregate striving to attain place in the daylight of consciousness4 ,now1 empirically and metaphysically1 no one interest is more excellent than any other4 ,repressed or patent1 each is1 whether in a completely favorable environment or in a completely indifferent universe1 or before the bar of an absolute justice1 or under the domination of an absolute and universal good1 entitled to its free fulfilment and perfect maintenance4 ,each is a form of the good2 the essential content of each is good4 ,that any are not fulfilled1 but repressed1 is a fact to be recorded1 not an appearance to be explained away4 ,and it may turn out that the existence of the fact may explain the effort to explain it away4 ,for where interests are in conflict with each other or with reality1 and where the loser is not extirpated1 its revenge may be just this self-fulfilment in unreality1 in idea1 which philosophies of absolute values offer it4 ,dreams1 some of the arts1 religion1 and philosophy may indeed be considered as such fulfilments1 worlds of luxuriant self-realization of all that part of our nature which the harsh conjunctions with the environment overthrow and suppress4 ,sometimes abortive self-expressions of frustrated desires1 sometimes ideal compensations for the shortcomings of existence1 they are always equally ideal reconstructions of the surrounding evil of the world into forms of the good4 ,and because they are compensations in idea1 they are substituted for existence1 appraised as true1 and good1 and beautiful1 and real1 while the experiences which have suppressed the desires they realize are condemned as illusory and unreal4 ,in them humanity has its freest play and amplest expression4 ,,iii ,this has been1 and still to a very great extent remains1 most specifically true of philosophy4 ,the environment with which philosophy concerns itself is nothing less than the whole universe2 its content is1 within the history of its dominant tradition1 absolutely general and abstract2 it is1 of all great human enterprises1 even religion1 least constrained by the direction and march of events or the mandate of circumstance4 ,like music1 it expresses most truly the immediate and intrinsic interests of the mind1 its native bias and its inward goal4 ,it has been constituted1 for this reason1 of the so-called normative sciences1 envisaging the non-existent as real1 forcing upon nature pure values1 forms of the spirit incident to the total life of this world1 unmixed with baser matter4 ,to formulate ultimate standards1 to be completely and utterly lyrical has been the prerogative of philosophy alone4 ,since these standards reappear in all other reconstructions of the environment and most clearly in art and in religion1 it is pertinent to enumerate them1 and to indicate briefly their bearing on existence4 ,the foremost outstanding is perhaps the unity of the world4 ,confronted by the perplexing menace of the variation of experience1 the dichotomies and oppositions of thoughts and things1 the fusion and diversifications of many things into one and one into many1 mankind has1 from the moment it became reflective1 felt in the relation of the ,one and the ,many the presence of a riddle that engendered and sustained uneasiness1 a mystery that concealed a threat4 ,the mind's own preference1 given the physiological processes that condition its existence1 constitution1 and operation1 could hardly come to rest in a more fundamental normation than ,unity4 ,a world which is one is easier to live in and with2 initial adjustment therein is final adjustment2 in its substance there exists nothing sudden and in its character nothing uncontrollable4 ,it guarantees whatever vital equilibrium the organism has achieved in it1 ill or good4 ,it secures life in attainment and possession1 insuring it repose1 simplicity1 and spaciousness4 ,a world which is many complicates existence3 it demands watchful consideration of irreducible discrete individualities3 it necessitates the integration and humanization in a common system of adjustment of entities which in the last analysis refuse all ordering and reject all subordination1 consequently keeping the mind on an everlasting jump1 compelling it to pay with eternal vigilance the price of being4 ,the preference for unity1 then1 is almost inevitable1 and the history of philosophy1 from the ,vedas to the ,brahma ,somaj and from ,thales to ,bergson1 is significantly unanimous in its attempts to prove that the world is1 somehow1 through and through one4 ,that the oneness requires proof is prima facie evidence that it is a value1 a desiderate1 not an existence4 ,and how valuable it is may be seen merely in the fact that it derealizes the inner conflict of interests1 the incompatibilities between nature and man1 the uncertainties of knowledge1 and the certainties of evil1 and substitutes therefore the ultimate happy unison which the identity of the different compels4 ,unity is the common desiderate of philosophic systems of all metaphysical types--neutral1 materialistic1 idealistic4 ,but the dominant tradition has tended to think this unity in terms of interest1 of spirit1 of mentality4 ,it has tended1 in a word1 to assimilate nature to human nature1 to identify things with the values of things1 to envisage the world in the image of man4 ,to it1 the world is all spirit1 ego1 or idea2 and if not such through and through1 then entirely subservient1 in its unhumanized parts1 to the purposes and interests of ego1 idea1 or spirit4 ,why1 is obvious4 ,a world of which the ,one substance is such constitutes a totality of interest and purpose which faces no conflict and has no enemy4 ,it is fulfilment even before it is need1 and need1 indeed1 is only illusion4 ,even when its number is many1 the world is a better world if the stuff of these many is the same stuff as the spirit of man4 ,for mind is more at home with mind than with things2 the pathetic fallacy is the most inevitable and most general4 ,although the totality of spirit is conceived as good1 that is1 as actualizing all our desiderates and ideals1 it would still be felt that1 even if the totality were evil1 and not ,god1 but the ,devil ruled the roost1 the world so constituted must be better than one utterly non-spiritual4 ,we can understand and be at home with malevolence3 it offers at least the benefits of similarity1 of companionship1 of intimateness1 of consubstantiality with will2 its behavior may be foreseen and its intentions influenced2 but no horror can be greater than that of utter aliency4 ,how much of religion turns with a persistent tropism to the consideration of the devil and his works1 and how much it has fought his elimination from the cosmic scheme6 ,yet never because it loved the devil4 ,the deep-lying reason is the fact that the humanization of ,evil into ,devil mitigates ,evil and improves the world4 ,philosophy has been least free from this corrective and spiritizing bias4 ,though it has cared less for the devil1 it has predominantly repudiated aliency1 has sought to prove spirit the cause and substance of the world1 and in that degree1 to transmute the aliency of nature into sameness with human nature4 ,with unity and spirituality1 eternity makes a third4 ,this norm is a fundamental attribute of the ,one ,god himself1 and interchangeable with his ineffable name3 the ,lord is ,eternal1 and the ,eternal1 even more than the ,one1 receives the eulogium of exclusive realness4 ,to the philosophical tradition it is the most real4 ,once more the reason should be obvious4 ,the underlying urge which pushes the mind to think the world as a unity pushes it even more inexorably to think the world as timeless4 ,for unity is asserted only against the perplexities of a manyness which may be static and unchanging1 and hence comparatively simple4 ,but eternity is asserted and set against mutability3 it is the negation of change1 of time1 of novelty1 of the suddenness and slaughter of the flux of life itself1 which consumes what it generates1 undermines what it builds and sweeps to destruction what it founds to endure4 ,change is the arch-enemy of a life which struggles for self-preservation1 of an intellect which operates spontaneously by the logic of identity1 of a will which seeks to convert others into sames4 ,it substitutes a different self for the old1 it falsifies systems of thought and deteriorates systems of life4 ,it makes unity impossible and manyness inevitable4 ,it upsets every actual equilibrium that life attains4 ,it opens the doors and windows of every closed and comfortable cosmos to all transcosmic winds that blow1 with whatever they carry of possible danger and possible ill4 ,it is the very soul of chaos in which the pleasant1 ordered world is such a little helpless thing4 ,of this change eternity is by primary intention the negation1 as its philological form shows4 ,it is not-time1 without positive intrinsic content1 and in its secondary significances1 i4e41 in those significances which appear in metaphysical dialectic1 without meaning2 since it is there a pure negation1 intrinsically affirming nothing1 of the same character as not-man or not-donkey1 standing for a nature altogether unspecific and indeterminable in the residual universe4 ,by a sort of obverse implication it does1 however1 possess1 in the philosophic tradition1 a positive content which accrues to it by virtue of what it denies4 ,this content makes it a designation for the persistence and perdurability of desiderated quality--from metaphysical unity and spirituality to the happy hunting-grounds or a woman's affection4 ,at bottom it means the assurance that the contents of value cannot and will not be altered or destroyed1 that their natures and their relations to man do not undergo change4 ,there is no recorded attempt to prove that evil is eternal3 eternity is eternity of the good alone4 ,unity1 spirituality1 and eternity1 then1 are the forms which contents of value receive under the shaping hands of the philosophic tradition1 to which they owe their metaphysical designation and of which the business has so largely and uniquely been to prove them the foundations and ontological roots of universal nature4 ,but the problem of evil does not come to complete solution with these4 ,even in a single1 metaphysically spiritual and unchanging world1 man himself may still be less than a metaphysical absolute and his proper individuality doomed to absorption1 his wishes to obstruction and frustration4 ,of man1 therefore1 the tradition posits immortality and freedom1 and even the materialistic systems have sought to keep somehow room for some form of these goods4 ,to turn first to immortality4 ,its source and matrix is less the love of life than the fear of death--that fear which ,lucretius1 dour poet of disillusion1 so nobly deplored4 ,that he had ever himself been possessed of it is not clear1 but it is perfectly clear that his altogether sound arguments against it have not abolished its operation1 nor its effect upon human character1 society1 and imagination4 ,fear which made the gods1 made also the immortality of man1 the denial of death4 ,what the fear's unmistakable traits may be has never been articulately said1 perhaps never can be said4 ,most of us never may undergo the fear of death2 we undergo comfort and discomfort1 joy and sorrow1 intoxication and reaction1 love and disgust2 we aim to preserve the one and to abolish the other1 but we do not knowingly undergo the fear of death4 ,indeed1 it is logically impossible that we should1 since to do so would be to acquire an experience of death such that we should be conscious of being unconscious1 sensible of being insensible1 aware of being unaware4 ,we should be required to be and not to be at the same instant1 in view of which ,lucretius both logically and wisely advises us to remember that when death is1 we are not2 and when we are1 death is not4 ,experience and feeling are1 however1 neither logical nor wise1 and to these death is far from the mere non-being which the poet would have us think it4 ,to these it has a positive reality which makes the fear of it a genuine cause of conduct in individuals and in groups1 with a basis in knowledge such as is realized in the diminishing of consciousness under anaesthetic1 in dreams of certain types1 and most generally in the nascent imitation of the rigor mortis which makes looking upon the dead such a horror to most of us4 ,even then1 however1 something is lacking toward the complete realization of death1 and children and primitive peoples never realize it at all4 ,its full meaning comes out as an unsatisfied hunger in the living rather than as a condition of the dead1 who1 alive1 would have satisfied this hunger4 ,and the realization of this meaning requires sophistication1 requires a lengthy corporate memory and the disillusions which civilization engenders4 ,primitive peoples ask for no proof of immortality because they have no notion of mortality2 civilized thinking has largely concerned itself about the proof of immortality because its assurance of life has been shaken by the realization of death through the gnawing of desire which only the dead could still4 ,the proof which in the history of thought is offered again and again1 be it noted1 is not of the reality of life1 but of the unreality and inefficacy of death4 ,immortality is like eternity1 a negative term2 it is immortality4 ,the experienced fact is mortality2 and the fear of it is only an inversion of the desire which it frustrates1 just as frustrated love becomes hatred4 ,the doctrine of immortality1 hence1 springs from the fear of death1 not from the love of life1 and immortality is a value-form1 not an existence4 ,now1 although fear of death and love of life are in constant play in character and conduct1 neither constitutes the original1 innocent urge of life within us4 ,will to live1 will to power1 struggle for existence1 and other ,germanic hypostases of experienced events which the great civil war in ,europe is just now giving such an airing1 hardly deserve1 as natural data1 the high metaphysical status that ,schopenhauer1 ,nietzsche1 and company have given them4 ,they follow in fact upon a more primary type of living1 acting form1 a type to which the pathetic fallacy or any other manner of psychologizing may not apply4 ,the most that can be said about this type is that its earlier stages are related to its later ones as potential is to kinetic energy4 ,if1 since we are discussing a metaphysical issue1 we must mythologize1 we might call it the will to self-expression4 ,had this will chanced to happen in a world which was made for it1 or had it itself been the substance of the world1 struggle for existence1 will to live1 and will to power1 never could have supervened4 ,all three of these expressions designate data which require an opposite1 a counter-will1 to give them meaning4 ,there can be a struggle for existence only when there are obstacles thereto1 a will to live only when there are obstructions to life1 a will to power only when there is a resistance against which power may be exercised4 ,expression alone is self-implying and self-sufficient1 and in an altogether favorable environment we might have realized our instincts1 impulses1 interests1 appetites and desires1 expressed and actualized our potentialities1 and when our day is done1 have ceased1 as unconcerned about going on as about starting4 ,metchnikoff speaks somewhere of an instinct toward death and the euphoria which accompanies its realization4 ,he cites1 ,i think1 no more than two or three cases4 ,to most of us the mere notion of the existence and operation of such an instinct seems fanciful and uncanny4 ,yet from the standpoint of biology nothing should be more natural4 ,each living thing has its span1 which consists of a cycle from birth through maturation and senescence to dissolution1 and the latter half of the process is as fateful and inevitable as the former6 ,dying is itself the inexpugnable conclusion of that setting free of organic potentialities which we call life1 and if dying seems horrid and unnatural1 it seems so because for most of us death is violent1 because its occasion is a shock from without1 not the realization of a tendency from within4 ,in a completely favorable environment we should not struggle to exist1 we should simply exist2 we should not will to live1 we should simply live1 i4e41 we should actualize our potentialities and die4 ,but1 once more alas1 our environment is not completely favorable1 and there's the rub4 ,that disorderly constellation of instincts and appetites and interests which constitutes the personality of the best of us does not work itself out evenly4 ,at the most favorable1 our self-realizations are lopsided and distorted4 ,for every capacity of ours in full play1 there are a score at least mutilated1 sometimes extirpated1 always repressed4 ,they never attain the free fullness of expression which is consciousness1 or when they do1 they find themselves confronted with an opponent which neutralizes their maturation at every point4 ,hence1 as ,i have already indicated1 they remain in1 or revert to1 the subterranean regions of our lives1 and govern the making of our biographies from their seats below4 ,what they fail to attain in fact they succeed in generating in imagination to compensate for the failure2 they realize themselves vicariously4 ,the doctrine of immortality is the generic form of such vicarious self-realization1 as frequently by means of dead friends and relatives to whose absolute non-being the mind will not assent1 as by means of the everlasting heaven in which the mind may forever disport itself amid those delights it had to forego on earth4 ,much of the underlying motive of the doctrine is a sehnsucht and nostalgia after the absent dead2 little a concern for the continuity of the visible living4 ,and often this passion is so intense that system after system in the philosophic tradition is constructed to satisfy it1 and even the most disillusioned of systems--for example1 ,spinoza's--will preserve its form if not its substance4 ,that the freedom of the will shall be a particularized compensatory desiderate like the immortality of the soul1 the unity1 the spirituality1 and the eternity of the world is a perversion worked upon this ideal by the historic accident we call ,christianity4 ,the assumptions of that theory concerning the nature of the universe and the destiny of man1 being through and through compensatory1 changed freedom from the possible fact and actual hope of ,hellenic systems into the problem of the ,christian ones4 ,the consequent controversy over free-will1 the casuistic entanglement of this ideal with the notion of responsibility1 its theological development in the problem of the relation of an omnipotent ,god to a recalcitrant creature1 have completely obscured its primal significance4 ,for the ancients1 the free man and the wise man were identical1 and the wise man was one who all in all had so mastered the secrets of the universe that there was no desire of his that was not actually realized1 no wish the satisfaction of which was obstructed4 ,his way in the world was a way without let or hindrance4 ,now freedom and wisdom in this sense is never a fact and ever a value4 ,its attainment ensues upon created distinctions between appearance and reality1 upon the postulation of the metaphysical existence of the value-forms of the unity1 spirituality1 and the eternity of the world1 in the realization of which the wise man founded his wisdom and gained his freedom4 ,freedom1 then1 is an ideal that could have arisen only in the face of obstruction to action directed toward the fulfilling and satisfying of interests4 ,it is the assurance of the smooth and uninterrupted flow of behavior2 the flow of desire into fulfilment1 of thought into deed1 of act into fact4 ,it is perhaps the most pervasive and fundamental of all desiderates1 and in a definite way the others may be said to derive from it and to realize it4 ,for the soul's immortality1 the world's unity and spirituality and eternity1 are but conditions which facilitate and assure the flow of life without obstruction4 ,they define a world in which danger1 evil1 and frustration are non-existent2 they so reconstitute our actual environment that the obstructions it offers to the course of life are abolished4 ,they make the world rational1 and in the great philosophic tradition the freedom of man is held to be a function of the rationality of the world4 ,thus1 even deterministic solutions of the problem of freedom are at bottom no more than the rationalization of natural existence by the dialectical removal of obstructions to human existence4 ,once more1 ,spinoza's solution is typical1 and its form is that of all idealisms as well4 ,it ensues by way of identification of the obstruction's interest with those of the obstructee3 the world becomes ego or the ego the world1 with nothing outside to hinder or to interfere4 ,in the absolute1 existence is declared to be value de facto2 in fact1 de jure4 ,and by virtue of this compensating reciprocity the course of life runs free4 ,is any proof necessary that these value-forms are not the contents of the daily life8 ,if there be1 why this unvarying succession of attempts to prove that they are the contents of daily life that goes by the name of history of philosophy8 ,in fact1 experience as it comes from moment to moment is not one1 harmonious and orderly1 but multifold1 discordant1 and chaotic4 ,its stuff is not spirit1 but stones and railway wrecks and volcanoes and ,mexico and submarines1 and trenches1 and frightfulness1 and ,germany1 and disease1 and waters1 and trees1 and stars1 and mud4 ,it is not eternal1 but changes from instant to instant and from season to season4 ,actually1 men do not live forever2 death is a fact1 and immortality is literally as well as in philosophic discourse not so much an aspiration for the continuity of life as an aspiration for the elimination of death1 purely immortality4 ,actually the will is not free1 each interest encounters obstruction1 no interest is completely satisfied1 all are ultimately cut off by death4 ,such are the general features of all human experience1 by age unwithered1 and with infinite variety forever unstaled4 ,the traditional philosophic treatment of them is to deny their reality1 and to call them appearance1 and to satisfy the generic human interest which they oppose and repress by means of the historical reconstruction in imaginative dialectic of a world constituted by these most generalized value-forms and then to eulogize the reconstruction with the epithet reality4 ,when1 in the course of human events1 such reconstruction becomes limited to the biography of particular individuals1 is an expression of their concrete and unique interest1 is lived and acted on1 it is called paranoia4 ,the difference is not one of kind1 but of concreteness1 application1 and individuality4 ,such a philosophy applied universally in the daily life is a madness1 like ,christian ,science3 kept in its proper sphere1 it is a fine art1 the finest and most human of the arts1 a reconstruction in discourse of the whole universe1 in the image of the free human spirit4 ,philosophy has been reasonable because it is so unpersonal1 abstract1 and general1 like music2 because1 in spite of its labels1 its reconstructions remain pure desiderates and value-forms1 never to be confused with and substituted for existence4 ,but philosophers even to this day often have the delusion that the substitutions are actually made4#ib ,,iv ,it is the purity of the value-forms imagined in philosophy that makes philosophy normative4 ,the arts1 which it judges1 have an identical origin and an indistinguishable intent1 but they are properly its subordinates because they have not its purity4 ,they1 too1 aim at remodeling discordant nature into harmony with human nature4 ,they1 too1 are dominated by value-forms which shall satisfy as nearly as possible all interests1 shall liberate and fulfil all repressions1 and shall supply to our lives that unity1 eternity1 spirituality1 and freedom which are the exfoliations of our central desire--the desire to live4 ,but where philosophy has merely negated the concrete stuff of experience and defined its reality in terms of desire alone1 the arts acknowledge the reality of immediate experience1 accept it as it comes1 eliminating1 adding1 molding1 until the values desiderated become existent in the concrete immediacies of experience as such4 ,art does not substitute values for existence by changing their roles and calling one appearance and the other reality3 art converts values into existences1 it realizes values1 injecting them into nature as far as may be4 ,it creates truth and beauty and goodness4 ,but it does not claim for its results greater reality than nature's4 ,it claims for its results greater immediate harmony with human interests than nature4 ,the propitious reality of the philosopher is the unseen3 the harmonious reality of the artist must be sensible4 ,philosophy says that apparent actual evil is merely apparent3 art compels potential apparent good actually to appear4 ,philosophy realizes fundamental values transcendentally beyond experience3 art realizes them within experience4 ,thus1 men cherish no illusions concerning the contents of a novel1 a picture1 a play1 a musical composition4 ,they are taken for what they are1 and are enjoyed for what they are4 ,the shopgirl1 organizing her life on the basis of eight dollars a week1 wears flimsy for broadcloth and the tail feather of a rooster for an ostrich plume4 ,she is as capable of wearing and enjoying broadcloth and ostrich plume as ,my ,lady1 whose income is eight dollars a minute4 ,but she has not them1 and in all likelihood1 without a social revolution she never will have them4 ,in the novels of ,mr4 ,robert ,chambers1 however1 or of ,miss ,jean ,libbey1 which she religiously reads in the street-car on her way to the shop2 in the motion picture theater which she visits for ten cents after her supper of corned beef1 cabbage1 and cream puffs1 she comes into possession of them forthwith1 vicariously1 and of all ,my ,lady's proper perquisites--the ,prince ,charming1 the motor-car1 the ,chinese pug1 the flowers1 and the costly bonbons4 ,for the time being her life is liberated1 new avenues of experience are actually opened to her1 all sorts of unsatisfied desires are satisfied1 all sorts of potentialities realized4 ,all that she might have been and is not1 she becomes through art1 here and now1 and continuously with the drab workaday life which is her lot1 and she becomes this without any compensatory derealization of that life1 without any transcendentalism1 without any loss of grip on the necessities of her experience3 strengthened1 on the contrary1 and emboldened1 to meet them as they are4 ,i might multiply examples3 for every object of fine art has the same intention1 and if adequate1 accomplishes the same end--from the sculptures of ,phidias and the dramas of ,euripides1 to the sky-scrapers of ,sullivan and the dances of ,pavlowa4 ,but there is need only to consider the multitude of abstract descriptions of the aesthetic encounter4 ,the artist's business is to create the other object in the encounter1 and this object1 in ,miss ,puffer's words1 which are completely representative and typical1 is such that the organism is in a condition of repose and of the highest possible tone1 functional efficiency1 enhanced life4 ,the personality is brought into a state of unity and self-completeness4 ,the object1 when apprehended1 awakens the active functioning of the whole organism directly and harmoniously with itself1 cuts it off from the surrounding world1 shuts that world out for the time being1 and forms a complete1 harmonious1 and self-sufficient system1 peculiar and unique in the fact that there is no passing from this deed into further adaptation with the object4 ,struggle and aliency are at end1 and whatever activity now goes on feels self-conserving1 spontaneous1 free4 ,the need of readjustment has disappeared1 and with it the feeling of strain1 obstruction1 and resistance1 which is its sign4 ,there is nothing but the object1 and that is possessed completely1 satisfying1 and as if forever4 ,art1 in a word1 supplies an environment from which strife1 foreignness1 obstruction1 and death are eliminated4 ,it actualizes unity1 spirituality1 and eternity in the environment2 it frees and enhances the life of the self4 ,to the environment which art successfully creates1 the mind finds itself completely and harmoniously adapted by the initial act of perception4 ,in the world of art1 value and existence are one4 ,v ,if art may be said to create values1 religion has been said to conserve them4 ,but the values conserved are not those created3 they are the values postulated by philosophy as metaphysical reality4 ,whereas1 however1 philosophy substitutes these values for the world of experience1 religion makes them continuous with the world of experience4 ,for religion value and existence are on the same level1 but value is more potent and environs existence1 directing it for its own ends4 ,the unique content of religion1 hence1 is a specific imaginative extension of the environment with value-forms3 the visible world is extended at either end by heaven and hell2 the world of minds1 by ,god1 ,satan1 angels1 demons1 saints1 and so on4 ,but where philosophy imaginatively abolishes existence in behalf of value1 where art realizes value in existence1 religion tends to control and to escape the environment which exists by means of the environment which is postulated4 ,the aim of religion is salvation from sin4 ,salvation is the escape from experience to heaven and the bosom of ,god2 while hell is the compensatory readjustment of inner quality to outer condition for the alien and the enemy1 without the knowledge of whose existence life in heaven could not be complete4 ,in religion1 hence1 the conversion of the repressed array of interests into ideal value-forms is less radical and abstract than in philosophy1 and less checked by fusion with existence than in art4 ,religion is1 therefore1 at one and the same time more carnal and less reasonable than philosophy and art4 ,its history and protagonists exhibit a closer kinship to what is called insanity#ic--that being1 in essence1 the substitution in actual life of the creatures of the imagination which satisfy repressed needs for those of reality which repress them4 ,it is a somnambulism which intensifies rather than abolishes the contrast between what is desired and what must be accepted4 ,it offers itself ultimately rather as a refuge from reality than a control of it1 and its development as an institution has turned on the creation and use of devices to make this escape feasible4 ,for religion1 therefore1 the perception that the actual world1 whatever its history1 is now not adapted to human nature1 is the true point of departure4 ,thus religion takes more account of experience than compensatory philosophy2 it does not de-realize existent evil4 ,the outer conflict between human nature and nature1 primitively articulated in consciousness and conduct by the distress engendered through the fact that the food supply depends upon the march of the seasons1#id becomes later assimilated to the inner conflict between opposing interests1 wishes1 and desires4 ,finally1 the whole so constituted gets expressed in the idea of sin4 ,that idea makes outward prosperity dependent upon inward purity1 although it often transfers the locus of the prosperity to another world4 ,through its operation fortune becomes a function of conscience and the one desire of religious thinking and religious practice becomes to bring the two to a happy outcome1 to abolish the conflicts4 ,this desiderated abolition is salvation4 ,it is expressed in the ideas of a fall1 or a separation from heaven and reunion therewith4 ,the machinery of this reunion of the divided1 the reconversion of the differentiated into the same1 consists of the furniture of religious symbols and ceremonials--myths1 baptisms1 sacraments1 prayers1 and sacrifices3 and all these are at the same time instruments and expressions of desires4 ,god is literally the conservation of values4#ie ,god's life in eternity1 writes ,aristotle1 who here dominates the earlier tradition1 is that which we enjoy in our best moments1 but are unable to possess permanently3 its very being is delight4 ,and as actual being is delight1 so the various functions of waking1 perceiving1 thinking1 are to us the pleasantest parts of our life4 ,perfect and absolute thought is just this absolute vision of perfection4#if ,even the least somnambulistic of the transcendental philosophies has repeated1 not improved upon ,aristotle4 ,the highest conceptions that ,i get from experience of what goodness and beauty are1 ,royce declares1 the noblest life that ,i can imagine1 the completest blessedness that ,i can think1 all these are but faint suggestions of a truth that is infinitely realized in the ,divine1 that knows all truth4 ,whatever perfection there is suggested in these things1 that he must fully know and experience4 ,but this aesthetic excellence1 this maximum of ideality is in and by itself inadequate4 ,god1 to be ,god1 must work4 ,he is first of all the invisible socius1 the ever-living witness1 in whose eyes the disharmonies and injustices of this life are enregistered1 and who in the life everlasting redresses the balances and adjusts the account4 ,even his grace is not unconditional2 it requires a return1 in deed or faith2 a payment by which the fact of his salvation is made visible4 ,but this payment is made identical by the great religions of disillusion with nothing other than the concrete condition from which the faithful are to be saved4 ,if the self is not impoverished1 unkempt1 and hungry1 in fact1 it is made so4 ,cleanliness may be next to godliness1 but self-defilement is godliness2 sainthood1 if we are to trust the lives of saints1 whether in ,asia or in ,europe1 is coincident with insanitation2 saintly virtues are depressed virtues1--humility1 hope1 meekness1 pity2 and such conditions of life which define the holy ones are unwholesome--poverty1 asceticism1 squalor1 filth4 ,hence1 by an ironic inversion1 religions of disillusion1 being other-worldly1 identify escape from an actual unpropitious environment with submergence in it2 that being the visible and indispensable sign of an operative grace4 ,so the beatitudes3 the blessed are the poor1 the mourners1 the meek4 ,beginning as a correction of the evils of existence1 religion ends by offering an infallible avenue of escape from them through postulating a desiderated type of existence which operates to gather the spirit to itself4 ,for this reason the value-forms of the spirituality or spiritual control of the universe and of the immortality of the soul have been very largely the practical concern of religion alone1 since these are the instruments indispensable to the attainment of salvation4 ,in so far forth religion has been an art and its institutional association with the arts has been made one of its conspicuous justifications4 ,so far1 however1 as it has declared values to be operative without making them actually existent it has been only a black art1 a magic4 ,it has ignored the actual causes in the nature and history of things1 and has substituted for them non-existent desirable causes1 ultimately reducible to a single1 eternal1 beneficent spirit1 omnipotent and free4 ,to convert these into existence1 an operation which is the obvious intent of much contemporary thinking in religion1#ig it must1 however1 give up the assumption that they already exist qua spirit4 ,but when religion gives up this assumption1 religion gives up the ghost4 ,what it demands of the ghost1 and of all hypostatized or anthropomorphized ultimate value-forms1 is that they shall work1 and its life as an institution depends upon making them work4 ,christian ,science becomes a refuge from the failure of science1 magic from mechanism1 and by means of them and their kind1 blissful immortality1 complete self-fulfilment is to be attained--after death4 ,there is a beautiful land of somewhere1 a happy life beyond1 but it is beyond life4 ,in fact1 although religion confuses value and existence1 it localizes the great value-forms outside of existence4 ,its history has been an epic of the retreat and decimation of the gods from the world1 a movement from animism and pluralism to transcendentalism and monism2 and concomitantly1 of an elaboration and extension of institutional devices by which the saving value-forms are to be made and kept operative in the world4 ,,vi ,let us consider this history a little4 ,consciousness of feeling1 psychologists are agreed1 is prior to consciousness of the objects of feeling4 ,the will's inward strain1 intense throbs of sensation1 pangs and pulses of pleasure and pain make up the bulk of the undifferentiated primal sum of sentience4 ,the soul is aware of herself before she is aware of her world4 ,a childish or primeval mind1 face to face with an environment actual1 dreamt1 or remembered1 does not distinguish from its privacy the objective or the common4 ,all is shot through with the pathos and triumph which come unaccountably as desired good or evaded evil2 all has the same tensions and effects ends in the same manner as the laboring1 straining1 volitional life within4 ,these feelings1 residuary qualities1 the last floating1 unattached sediment of a world organized by association and classified by activity1 these subtlest of all its beings1 finally termed mind and self1 at first suffuse and dominate the whole4 ,even when objects are distinguished and their places determined these are not absent2 and the so-called pre-animistic faiths are not the less suffused with spirit because the spiritual has not yet received a local habitation and name4 ,they differ from animism in this only1 not in that their objects are characterized by lack of animation and vital tonality4 ,and this is necessary4 ,for religion must be anthropopathic before it becomes anthropomorphic2 since feeling1 eloquent of good and evil1 is the first and deepest essence of consciousness1 and only by its wandering from home are forms distinguished and man's nature separated from that of things and beasts4 ,when practice has cooerdinated activity1 and reflection distinguished places1 animism proper arises4 ,first the environment is felt as the soul's kindred2 then its operations are fancied in terms dramatic and personal4 ,the world becomes almost instinctively defined as a hegemony of spirits similar to man1 with powers and passions like his1 and directed for his destruction or conservation1 but chiefly for their own glory and self-maintenance4 ,the vast pathetic fallacy makes religion of the whole of life4 ,it is at this point indistinguishable from science or ethics4 ,it is1 in fact1 the pregnant matrix of all subsequent discourse about the universe4 ,its character is such that it becomes the determinating factor of human adaptations to the conditions imposed by the environment1 by envisaging the enduring and efficacious elements among these conditions as persons4 ,the satisfaction of felt needs is rendered thereby inevitably social2 and in a like manner fear of their frustration cannot be unsocial4 ,life is conceived and acted out as a miraculous traffic with the universe2 and the universe as a band of spirits who monopolize the good and make free gifts of evil1 who can be feared1 threatened1 worshiped1 scolded1 wheedled1 coaxed1 bribed1 deceived1 enslaved1 held in awe1 and above all1 used for the prosecution of desiderated ends and the fulfilment of instinctive desires4 ,the first recorded cognized order is a moral order in which fragmentary feelings1 instinctive impulsions1 and spontaneous imaginings are hypostatized1 ideas are identified with their causes1 all the contents of the immature1 sudden1 primitive1 blundering consciousness receive a vital figure and a proper name4 ,so man makes himself more at home in the world without1--that world which enslaves the spirit so fearfully and with such strangeness1 and which just as miraculously yields such ecstasy1 such power1 such unaccountable good6 ,in this immediate sense the soul controls the world by becoming symbolic of it2 it is the world's first language4 ,it is1 however1 an inarticulate1 blundering1 incoherent thing and the cues which it furnishes to the nature of the environment are as often as not dangerous and misleading4 ,when bows and arrows1 crystals and caves1 clouds and waters1 dung and dew1 mountains and trees1 beasts and visions1 are treated as chiefs and men must be treated1 then the moral regimen initiated1 taking little account of the barest real qualities manifested by these things1 and attributing the maximum importance to the characters postulated and foreign1 is successful neither in allaying evil nor in extending good4 ,its benefits are adventitious and its malfeasance constant4 ,food buried with the dead was food lost2 blood smeared upon the bow to make it shoot better served only to make the hands unskilful by impeding their activity4 ,initiation1 ceremony1 sacrificial ritual1 fasting1 and isolation involved privations for which no adequate return was recovered1 even by the medicine-man whose absolute and ephemeral power needed only the betrayal of circumstances for its own destruction1 taking him along with it1 oftener than not1 to disgrace or death4 ,as the cumulus of experience on experience grew greater1 chance violations of tradition1 or custom1 or ritual1 or formula achieving for the violator a mastery or stability which performance and obedience failed to achieve1 the new heresy became the later orthodoxy1 for in religion1 as in all other matters human1 nothing succeeds like success4 ,an impotent god has no divinity2 a disused potency means a dying life among the immortals as on the earth4 ,and as the gods themselves seemed often to give their worshipers the lie1 the futility of the personal and dramatic definitions of the immediate environment became slowly recognized1 the recognition varying in extent1 and clearer in practice than in discourse4 ,accordingly the most primitive of the animisms underwent a necessary modification4 ,the plasticity of objects under destructive treatment1 the impotence of taboo before elementary needs1 the adequate satisfactions which violations of the divine law brought1--these killed many gods and drove others from their homes in the hearts of things4 ,the objects so purged became matters of accurate knowledge4 ,where animation is denied the whole environment1 wisdom begins to distinguish between spirit-haunted matter and the purely material2 knowledge of person and knowledge of things differentiate1 and science1 the impersonal and more potent knowledge of the environment1 properly begins4 ,familiarity leads to control1 control to contempt1 and for the unreflective mind1 personality is not1 as for the sophisticated1 an attribute of the contemptible4 ,the incalculable appearance of thunder1 the magic greed of fire1 the malice1 the spontaneity1 the thresh and pulse as of life which seems to characterize whatever is capricious or impenetrable or uncontrollable are too much like the felt throbs of consciousness to become dehumanized4 ,to the variable alone1 therefore1 is transcendent animation attributed4 ,not the seasonal variation of the sun's heat1 but the joy and the sorrow of which his heat is the occasion made him divine4 ,when the gods appear1 to take the place of the immanent spirits immediately present in things1 they appear1 therefore1 as already transcendent1 with habitations just beyond the well-known3 on high mountains1 in the skies1 in dark forests1 in caves1 in all regions feared or unexplored4 ,but chiefly the gods inhabit those spaces whence issue the power of darkness and destruction1 particularly the heaven1 a word whose meaning is now1 as it was primitively1 identical with divinity4 ,the savage becomes a pagan by giving concrete personality to the dreadful unknown4 ,thence it is that the ancient poet assigns the gods a lineage of fear2 and fear may truly be said to have made the gods1 in so far as the gods personify the fear which made them4 ,the moral level of these figments alters with the level of their habitation2 their power varies with their remoteness2 ,zeus lives in the highest heaven and is arbiter of the destiny of both gods and man4 ,to him and to his like there cannot be the relation of equality which is sustained between men and spirits of the lower order4 ,his very love is blasting2 interchange of commodities1 good for good and evil for evil is not possible where he is concerned4 ,gods of the higher order he exemplifies1 even all the gods of ,olympus1 of the ,himalayas1 of ,valhalla1 are literally beings invoked and implored1 as well as dwellers in heaven4 ,to them man pays a toll on all excellence he gains or finds2 libations and burnt-offerings1 the fat and the first fruits3 he exists by their sufferance and serves their caprice4 ,he is their toy1 born for their pleasure1 and living by their need4 ,but just because men conceive themselves to be play-things of the gods1 they define in the gods the ideals of mankind4 ,for the divine power is power to live forever1 and the sum of human desire is just the desire to maintain its humanity in freedom and happiness endlessly4 ,and exactly those capacities and instruments of self-maintenance1--all that is beauty1 or truth1 or goodness1 the very essence of value in any of its forms1--the gods are conceived to possess and to control3 these they may grant1 withhold1 destroy4 ,they are as eternal as their habitations1 the mountains2 as ruthless as their element1 the sea2 as omnipresent as the heavens1 their home4 ,to become like the gods1 therefore1 the masters and fathers of men1 is to remain eternally and absolutely human3 so that who is most like them on earth takes his place beside them in heaven4 ,hercules and ,elias and ,krishna1 ,caka-,muni and ,ishvara1 ,jesus and ,baha ,ullah4 ,nay1 they are the very gods themselves1 manifest as men6 ,the history of the gods thus presents a double aspect3 it is first a characterization of the important objects and processes of nature and their survival-values1--the sun1 thunder1 rain1 and earthquakes2 dissolution1 rebirth1 and love2 and again it is the narration of activities native and delightful to mankind4 ,zeus is a promiscuous lover as well as a wielder of thunderbolts2 ,apollo not only drives the chariot of the sun2 he plays and dances1 discourses melody and herds sheep4 ,but while the portrait of the heart's desire in fictitious adventures of divinity endears the gods to the spirit1 the exploration of the elements in the environment whose natures they dramatically express1 destroys their force1 reduces their number1 and drives them still further into the unknown4 ,olympus is surrendered for the planets and the fixed stars4 ,with remoteness of location comes transmutation of character4 ,the forces of the environment which were the divinity are now conceived as instrumental to its uses4 ,its power is more subtly described2 its nature becomes a more purely ideal expression of human aspiration4 ,physical remoteness and metaphysical ultimacy are akin4 ,god among the stars is better than ,god on ,olympus4 ,if1 as with the ,parsees1 the unfavorable character of the environment is expressed in another and equal being1--the devil1 then the god of good must1 in the symbolic struggle1 become the ultimate victor and remain the more potent director of man's destiny4 ,in religion1 therefore1 when the mind grows at all by experience1 monism develops spontaneously4 ,for the character of the god becomes increasingly more relevant to hope than to the conditions of hope's satisfaction4 ,and what man first of all and beyond all aspires to1 is that single1 undivided good1--the free flow of his unitary life1 stable1 complete1 eternal4 ,there is hence always to be found a chief and father among the gods who1 as mankind gain in wisdom and in material power1 consumes his mates and his children like ,kronos or ,jahweh1 inherits their attributes and performs their functions4 ,the chief divinity becomes the only divinity2 a god becomes ,god4 ,but divinity1 in becoming one and unique1 becomes also transcendent4 ,monotheism pushes ,god altogether beyond the sensible environment4 ,personality1 instead of being the nature of the world1 has become its ground and cause1 and all that mankind loves is conserved1 in order that man1 whom ,god loves1 may have his desire and live forever4 ,life is eternal and happiness necessary1 beyond nature1--in heaven4 ,finally1 in transcendental idealism1 the poles meet2 what has been put eternally apart is eternally united2 the immaterial1 impalpable1 transcendent heaven is made one and continuous with the gross and unhappy natural world4 ,one is the other2 the other the one4 ,god is the world and transcends it2 is the evil and the good which conquers and consumes that evil4 ,the environment becomes thus described as a single1 eternal1 conscious unity1 in which all the actual but transitory values of the actual but transitory life are conserved and eternalized4 ,in a description of ,god such as ,royce's or ,aristotle's the environment is the eternity of all its constituents that are dearest to man4 ,religion1 which began as a definition of the environment as it moved and controlled mankind1 ends by describing it as mankind desires it to be4 ,the environment is now the aforementioned ideal socius or self which satisfies perfectly all human requirements4 ,pluralistic and quarrelsome animism has become monistic and harmonious spiritism4 ,forces have turned to excellences and needs to satisfactions4 ,necessity has been transmuted to ,providence1 sin has been identified with salvation1 value with existence1 and existence with impotence and illusion before ,providence1 salvation1 and value4 ,,vii ,with this is completed the reply to the question3 ,why do men contradict their own experience8 ,experience is1 as ,spinoza says1 passion and action1 both inextricably mingled and coincident1 with the good and evil of them as interwoven as they4 ,that piecemeal conquest of the evil which we call civilization has not even the promise of finality4 ,it is a ,penelope's web1 always needing to be woven anew4 ,now1 in experience desire anticipates and outleaps action and fact rebuffs desire4 ,desire realizes itself1 consequently1 in ideas objectified by the power of speech into independent and autonomous subjects of discourse1 whereby experience is ,one1 ,eternal1 a ,spirit or ,spiritually ,controlled1 wherein man has ,freedom and ,immortality4 ,these1 the constantly desiderated traits of a perfect universe1 are in fact the limits of what adequacy environmental satisfactions can attain1 ideas hypostatized1 normative of existence1 but not constituting it4 ,with them1 in philosophy and religion1 the mind confronts the experiences of death and obstruction1 of manifoldness1 change and materiality1 and denies them1 as ,peter denied ,jesus4 ,the visible world1 being not as we want it1 we imagine an unseen one that satisfies our want1 declaring the visible one an illusion by its side4 ,so we work a radical substitution of desiderates for actualities1 of ideals for facts1 of values for existences4 ,art alone acknowledges the actual relations between these contrasting pairs4 ,art alone so operates as in fact to convert their oppugnance into identity4 ,intrinsically1 its whole purpose and technique consists of transmutation of values into existences1 in the incarnation the realization of values4 ,the philosophy and religion of tradition1 on the contrary1 consists intrinsically in the flat denial of reality1 or at least1 co-reality1 to existence1 and the transfer of that eulogium to value-forms as such4 ,metaphysics1 theology1 ethics1 logic1 aesthetics1 dialectic developments as they are of norms or realities which themselves can have no meaning without the apparent1 changing world they measure and belie1 assume consequently a detachment and self-sufficiency they do not actually possess4 ,their historians have treated them as if they had no context1 as if the elaboration of the ideal tendencies of the successive systems explained their origin1 character1 and significance4 ,but in fact they are unendowed with this pure intrinsicality1 and their development is not to be accounted for as exteriorization of innate motive or an unfoldment of inward implications4 ,they have a context2 they are crossed and interpenetrated by outer interests and extraneous considerations4 ,their meaning1 in so far as it is not merely aesthetic1 is nil apart from these interests and considerations of which they are sometimes expressions1 sometimes reconstructions1 and from which they are persistently refuges4 ,philosophy and religion are1 in a word1 no less than art1 social facts4 ,they are responses to group situations without which they cannot be understood4 ,although analysis has shown them to be rooted in certain persistent motives and conditions of human nature by whose virtue they issue in definite contours and significances1 they acquire individuality and specific importance only through interaction with the constantly varying social situations in which they arise1 on which they operate1 and by which they are in turn operated on4 ,philosophy has perhaps suffered most of all from nescience of those and from devoting itself1 at a minimum1 to the satisfaction of that passion for oneness1 for logical consistency without which philosophic systems would never arise1 nor the metaphysical distinction between appearance and reality2 and with which the same systems have made up a historic aggregate of strikingly repugnant and quarrelsome units4 ,it is this pursuit of consistency as against correctness which has resulted in the irrelevance of philosophy that the philosopher1 unconscious of his motives and roots1 or naively identifying1 through the instrumentality of an elaborate dialectic1 his instinctive and responsive valuations of existence with its categoric essences1 confuses with inward autonomy and the vision of the real4 ,consequently1 the systems of tradition begin as attempts to transvalue social situations whose existence is troublesome and end as utterances of which the specific bearing1 save to the system of an opponent1 is undiscoverable4 ,the attempt to correct the environment in fact concludes as an abolition of it in words4 ,the philosophic system becomes a solipsism1 a pure lyric expression of the appetites of human nature4 ,for this perversity of the philosophic tradition ,plato is perhaps1 more than any one else1 answerable4 ,he is the first explicitly to have reduplicated the world1 to have set existences over against values1 to have made them dependent upon values1 to have assigned absolute reality to the compensatory ideals1 and to have identified philosophy with preoccupation with these ideals4 ,behind his theory of life lay far from agreeable personal experience of the attitude of political power toward philosophic ideas4 ,its ripening was coincident with the most distressing period of the history of his country4 ,the ,peloponnesian ,war was the confrontation of two social systems1 radically opposed in form1 method1 and outlook4 ,democracy1 in ,athens1 had become synonymous with demagoguery1 corruption1 inefficiency1 injustice and unscrupulousness in every aspect of public affairs4 ,the government had no consistent policy and no centralized responsibility2 divided counsel led to continual disaster without1 and party politics rotted the strength within4 ,beside ,athens1 ,sparta1 a communistic oligarchy1 was a tower of strength and effectiveness4 ,the ,spartans made mistakes2 they were slow1 inept1 rude1 and tyrannical1 but they were a unit on the war1 their policy was consistent1 responsibilities were adequately centered1 good order and loyalty designated the aims and habits of life4#ih ,the ,republic is the response to the confrontation of ,spartan and ,athenian2 the attempt to find an adequate solution of the great social problem this confrontation expressed4 ,the successful state becomes in it the model for the metaphysical one1 and the difference between fact and ideal is amended by dialectically forcing the implications of existence in the direction of desire4 ,neither ,athens nor ,sparta presented a completely satisfactory social organization4 ,there must therefore exist a type of social organization which is so satisfying4 ,it must have existed from eternity1 and must be in essence identical with eternal good1 identical with that oneness and spirituality1 lacking which1 nothing is important4 ,this archetypal social organization whose essence is excellence1 it is the congenital vocation of the philosopher to contemplate and to realize4 ,philosophers are hence the paragons among animals1 lovers of truth1 haters of falsehood and of multiplicity1 spectators of all time and all existence4 ,in them the power to govern should be vested4 ,their nature is of the same stuff as the ,highest ,good with which it concerns itself1 but being such1 it appears1 merely appears alas6 irrelevant to the actual situations of the daily life4 ,the philosopher is hence opposed and expelled by that arch-sophist1 ,public ,opinion3 the man on the street1 failing to understand him1 dubs him prater1 star-gazer1 good-for-nothing4#ii ,he becomes an ineffectual stranger1 an outlaw1 in a world in which he should be master4 ,plato's description of the philosopher and philosophy is1 it will be seen1 at once an apology and a program4 ,but it is a program which has been petrified into a compensatory ideal4 ,the confession of impotence1 the abandonment of the programmatic intent is due to identification of the ideal with metaphysical fact1 to the hypostasis of the ideal4 ,with ,christianism1 that being a philosophy operating as a religion1 world-weariness made the apology unnecessary and converted the hypostasis into the basis of that program of complete surrender of the attempt to master the problems of existence upon which ensued the arrest of science and civilization for a thousand years4 ,the ,greeks were not world-weary1 and consequently1 their joy in life and existence contributed a minimum of relevance to their other-worldly dreams4 ,need it be reasserted that the whole ,platonic system1 at its richest and best in the ,republic1 is both an expression of and a compensation for a concrete social situation8 ,once it was formulated it became a part of that situation1 altered it1 served as another among the actual causes which determined the subsequent history of philosophy4 ,its historic and efficacious significance is defined by that situation1 but philosophers ignore the situation and accept the system as painters accept a landscape--as the thing in itself4 ,now1 the aesthetic aspect of the philosophic system1 its autonomy1 and consequent irrelevancy1 are undeniable4 ,once it comes to be1 its intrinsic excellence may constitute its infallible justification for existence1 with no more to be said2 and if its defenders or proponents claimed nothing more for it than this immediate satisfactoriness1 there would be no quarrel with them4 ,there is1 however1 present in their minds a sense of the other bearings of their systems4 ,they claim them1 in any event1 to be true1 that is1 to be relevant to a situation regarded as more important because more lastingly determinative of conduct1 more real than the situation of which they are born4 ,their systems are offered1 hence1 as maps of life1 as guides to the everlasting4 ,that they intend to define some method for the conservation of life eternally1 is clear enough from their initial motivation and formal issue3 all the ,socratics1 with their minds fixed on happiness or salvation according to the prevalence of disillusionment among them2 the ,christian systems1 still ,socratic1 but as resolutely other-worldly as disillusioned ,buddhists2 the systems of ,spinoza1 of ,kant1 the whole subsequent horde of idealisms1 up to the contemporary ,germanoid and ,german idealistic soliloquies1--they all declare that the vanity and multiplicity of life as it is leads them to seek for the permanent and the meaningful1 and they each find it according to the idiosyncrasies of the particular impulses and terms they start with4 ,that their ,snark turns out in every case to be a ,boojum is another story4 ,yet this story is what gives philosophy1 like religion1 its social significance4 ,if its roots1 as its actual biography shows1 did not reach deep in the soil of events1 if its issues had no fruitage in events made over by its being1 it would never have been so closely identified with intelligence and its systematic hypostasis would never have ensued4 ,the fact is that philosophy1 like all forms of creative intelligence1 is a tool before it is a perfection4 ,its autonomy supervenes on its efficaciousness2 it does not precede its efficaciousness4 ,men philosophize in order to live before they live in order to philosophize4 ,aristotle's description of the self-sufficiency of theory is possible only for a life wherein theory had already earned this self-sufficiency as practice1 in a life1 that is1 which is itself an art1 organized by the application of value-forms to its existent psycho-physical processes in such a way that its existence incarnates the values it desiderates and the values perfect the existence that embodies them4 ,the biography of philosophy1 hence1 reveals it to have the same possibilities and the same fate that all other ideas have4 ,today ideas are the patent of our humanity1 the stuff and form of intelligence1 the differentiae between us and the beasts4 ,in so far forth1 they express the surplusage of vitality over need1 the creative freedom of life at play4 ,this is the thing we see in the imaginings and fantasies of childhood1 whose environment is by social intent formed to favor and sustain its being4 ,the capacity for spontaneity of idea appears to decrease with maturity1 and the few favored healthy mortals with whom it remains are called men of genius4 ,william ,james was such a man1 and there are a few still among the philosophers4 ,but in the mass and in the long run1 ideas are not a primary confirmation of our humanity2 in the mass and long they are warnings of menace to it1 a sign of its disintegration4 ,even so radical an intellectualist as ,mr4 ,santayana cherishes this observation to the degree of almost suggesting it as the dogma that all ideas have their origin in inner or outer maladjustment4#ajj ,however this may be1 that the dominant philosophic ideas arise out of radical disharmonies between nature and human nature need not be here reiterated1 while the provocative character of minor maladjustments is to be inferred from the fertility of ideas in unstable minds1 of whatever type1 from the neurasthenic to the mad4 ,ideas represent in these cases the limits of vital elasticity1 the attempt of the organism to maintain its organic balance2 it is as if a balloon1 compressed on one side1 bulged on the other4 ,ideas1 then1 bear three types of relations to organic life1 relations socially incarnated in traditional art1 religion1 and philosophy4 ,first of all they may be an expression of innate capacities1 the very essence of the freedom of life4 ,in certain arts1 such as music1 they are just this4 ,in the opposite case they may be the effect of the compression of innate capacities1 an outcome of obstruction to the free low of life4 ,they are then compensatory4 ,where expressive ideas are confluent with existence1 compensatory ideas diverge from existence2 they become pure value-forms whose paramount realization is traditional philosophy4 ,their rise and motivation in both these forms is unconscious4 ,they are ideas1 but not yet intelligence4 ,the third instance falls between these original two4 ,the idea is neither merely a free expression of innate capacities1 nor a compensation for their obstruction or compression4 ,arising as the effect of a disharmony1 it develops as an enchannelment of organic powers directed to the conversion of the disharmony into an adjustment4 ,it does not use up vital energies like the expressive idea1 it is not an abortion of them1 like the compensatory idea4 ,it uses them1 and is aware that it uses them--that is1 it is a program of action upon the environment1 of conversion of values into existences4 ,such an idea has the differentia of intelligence4 ,it is creative2 it actually converts nature into forms appropriate to human nature4 ,it abolishes the ,otherworld of the compensatory tradition in philosophy by incarnating it in this world2 it abolishes the ,otherworld of the religionist1 rendered important by belittling the actual one1 by restoring the working relationships between thoughts and things4 ,this restoration develops as reconstruction of the world in fact4 ,it consists specifically of the art and science which compose the efficacious enterprises of history and of which the actual web of our civilization is spun4 ,manifest in its purity in art1 it attends unconsciously both religion and philosophy1 for the strands of life keep interweaving1 and whatever is1 in our collective being1 changes and is changed by whatever else may be1 that is in reach4 ,the life of reason is initially unconscious because it can learn only by living to seek a reason for life4 ,once it discovers that it can become self-maintaining alone through relevance to its ground and conditions1 the control which this relevance yields makes it so infectious that it tends to permeate every human institution1 even religion and philosophy4 ,philosophy1 it is true1 has lagged behind even religion in relevancy1 but the lagging has been due not to the intention of the philosopher but to the inherent character of the task he assumed4 ,both art and religion1 we have seen1 possess an immediacy and concreteness which philosophy lacks4 ,art reconstructs correlative portions of the environment for the eye1 the ear1 the hopes and fears of the daily life4 ,religion extends this reconstruction beyond the actual environment1 but applies its saving technique at the critical points in the career of the group or the individual2 to control the food-supply1 to protect in birth1 pubescence1 marriage1 and death4 ,all its motives are grounded in specific instincts and needs1 all its reconstructions and compensations culminate with reference to these4 ,philosophy1 on the other hand1 deals with the whole nature of man and his whole environment4 ,it seeks primaries and ultimates4 ,its traditional task is so to define the universe as to articulate thereby a theory of life and eternal salvation4 ,it establishes contact with reality at no individual1 specific point3 its reals are real in general4 ,it aims1 in a word1 to be relevant to all nature1 and to express the whole soul of man4 ,the consequence is inevitable3 it forfeits relevance to everything natural2 touching nothing actual1 it reconstructs nothing actual4 ,its concretest incarnation is a dialectic design woven of words4 ,the systems of tradition1 hence1 are works of art1 to be contemplated1 enjoyed1 and believed in1 but not to be acted on4 ,for1 since action is always concrete and specific1 always determined to time1 place1 and occasion1 we cannot in fact adapt ourselves to the aggregate infinitude of the environment1 or that to ourselves4 ,something always stands out1 recalcitrant1 invincible1 defiant4 ,but it is just such an adaptation that philosophy intends1 and the futility of the intention is evinced by the fact that the systems of tradition continue side by side with the realities they deny1 and live unmixed in one and the same mind1 as a picture of the ocean on the wall of a dining room in an inland town4 ,our operative relations to them tend always to be essentially aesthetic4 ,we may and do believe in them in spite of life and experience1 because belief in them1 involving no action1 involves no practical risk4 ,where action is a consequence of a philosophic system1 the system seems to dichotomize into art and religion4 ,it becomes particularized into a technique of living or the dogma of a sect1 and so particularized it becomes radically self-conscious and an aspect of creative intelligence4 ,so particularized1 it is1 however1 no longer philosophy1 and philosophy has 7,i hope ,i may say this without professional bias7 an inalienable place in the life of reason4 ,this place is rationally defined for it by the discovery of its ground and function in the making of civilization2 and by the perfection of its possibilities through the definition of its natural relationships4 ,thus1 it is1 in its essential historic character at least1 as fine an art as music1 the most inward and human of all arts4 ,it may be1 and human nature being what it is1 undoubtedly will continue to be1 an added item to the creations wherewith man makes his world a better place to live in1 precious in that it envisages and projects the excellences and perfections his heart desires and his imagination therefore defines4 ,so taken1 it is not a substitution for the world1 but an addition to it1 a refraction of it through the medium of human nature1 as a landscape painting by ,whistler or ,turner is not a substitution for the actual landscape1 but an interpretation and imaginative perfection of it1 more suitable to the eye of man4 ,a system like ,bergson's is such a work1 and its aesthetic adequacy1 its beauty1 may be measured by the acknowledgment it receives and the influence it exercises4 ,choosing one of the items of experience as its medium1 and this item the most precious in the mind's eye which the history of philosophy reveals1 it proceeds to fabricate a dialectical image of experience in which all the compensatory desiderates are expressed and realized4 ,it entices minds of all orders1 and they are happy to dwell in it1 for the nonce realizing in the perception of the system the values it utters4 ,by abandoning all pretense to be true1 philosophic systems of the traditional sort may attain the simple but supreme excellence of beauty1 and rest content therewith4 ,the philosophic ideal1 however1 is traditionally not beauty but truth3 the function of a philosophic system is not presentative1 but representative and causal1 and that the systems of tradition have had and still have consequences as well as character1 is obvious enough4 ,it is1 however1 to be noted that these consequences have issued out of the fact that the systems have been specific items of existence among other equally and even more specific items1 thought by particular men1 at particular times and in particular places4 ,as such they have been programs for meeting events and incarnating values2 operative ideals aiming to recreate the world according to determined standards4 ,they have looked forward rather than backward1 have tacitly acknowledged the reality of change1 the irreducible pluralism of nature1 and the genuineness of the activities1 oppugnant or harmonizing1 between the items of the ,cosmic4 ,many they ostensibly negate4 ,the truth1 in a word1 has been experimental and prospective2 the desiderates they uttered operated actually as such and not as already existing4 ,historians of philosophy1 treating it as if it had no context1 have denied or ignored this role of philosophy in human events1 but historians of the events themselves could not avoid observing and enregistering it4 ,only within very recent years1 as an effect of the concept of evolution in the field of the sciences1 have philosophers as such envisaged this non-aesthetic aspect of philosophy's ground and function in the making of civilization and have made it the basis for a sober vision which may or may not have beauty1 but which cannot have finality4 ,such a vision is again nothing more than traditional philosophy become conscious of its character and limitations and shorn of its pretense4 ,it is a program to execute rather than a metaphysic to rest in4 ,its procedure is the procedure of all the arts and sciences4 ,it frankly acknowledges the realities of immediate experience1 the turbulence and complexity of the flux1 the interpenetrative confusion of orders1 the inward self-diversification of even the simplest thing1 which change means1 and the continual emergence of novel entities1 unforeseen and unprevisible1 from the reciprocal action of the older aggregate4 ,this perceptual reality it aims to remould according to the heart's desire4 ,accordingly it drops the pretense of envisaging the universe and devotes itself to its more modest task of applying its standards to a particular item that needs to be remade4 ,it is believed in1 but no longer without risk1 for1 without becoming a dogma1 it still subjects itself to the tests of action4 ,so it acknowledges that it must and will itself undergo constant modification through the process of action1 in which it uses events1 in their meanings rather than in their natures1 to map out the future and to make it amenable to human nature4 ,philosophy so used is1 as ,john ,dewey somewhere says1 a mode and organ of experience among many others4 ,in a world the very core of which is change1 it is directed upon that which is not yet1 to previse and to form its character and to map out the way of life within it4 ,its aim is the liberation and enlargement of human capacities1 the enfranchisement of man by the actual realization of values4 ,in its integrate character therefore1 it envisages the life of reason and realizes it as the art of life4 ,where it is successful1 beauty and use are confluent and identical in it4 ,it converts sight into insight4 ,it infuses existence with value1 making them one4 ,it is the concrete incarnation of ,creative ,intelligence4 ,,footnotes3 #a ,the word relation suffers from ambiguity4 ,i am speaking here of connexion1 dynamic and functional interaction4 ,relation is a term used also to express logical reference4 ,i suspect that much of the controversy about internal and external relations is due to this ambiguity4 ,one passes at will from existential connexions of things to logical relationship of terms4 ,such an identification of existences with terms is congenial to idealism1 but is paradoxical in a professed realism4 #b ,there is some gain in substituting a doctrine of flux and interpenetration of psychical states1 a la ,bergson1 for that of rigid discontinuity4 ,but the substitution leaves untouched the fundamental misstatement of experience1 the conception of experience as directly and primarily inner and psychical4 #c ,mathematical science in its formal aspects1 or as a branch of formal logic1 has been the empirical stronghold of rationalism4 ,but an empirical empiricism1 in contrast with orthodox deductive empiricism1 has no difficulty in establishing its jurisdiction as to deductive functions4 #d ,it is a shame to devote the word idealism1 with its latent moral1 practical connotations1 to a doctrine whose tenets are the denial of the existence of a physical world1 and the psychical character of all objects--at least as far as they are knowable4 ,but ,i am following usage1 not attempting to make it4 #e ,see ,dr4 ,kallen's essay1 below4 #f ,the they means the some of the prior sentence--those whose realism is epistemological1 instead of being a plea for taking the facts of experience as we find them without refraction through epistemological apparatus4 #g ,it is interesting to note that some of the realists who have assimilated the cognitive relation to other existential relations in the world 7instead of treating it as an unique or epistemological relation7 have been forced in support of their conception of knowledge as a presentative or spectatorial affair to extend the defining features of the latter to all relations among things1 and hence to make all the real things in the world pure simples1 wholly independent of one another4 ,so conceived the doctrine of external relations appears to be rather the doctrine of complete externality of things4 ,aside from this point1 the doctrine is interesting for its dialectical ingenuity and for the elegant development of assumed premises1 rather than convincing on account of empirical evidence supporting it4 #h ,in other words1 there is a general problem of error only because there is a general problem of evil1 concerning which see ,dr4 ,kallen's essay1 below4 #i ,compare the paper by ,professor ,bode4 #aj ,as the attempt to retain the epistemological problem and yet to reject idealistic and relativistic solutions has forced some ,neo-realists into the doctrine of isolated and independent simples1 so it has also led to a doctrine of ,eleatic pluralism4 ,in order to maintain the doctrine the subject makes no difference to anything else1 it is held that no ultimate real makes any difference to anything else--all this rather than surrender once for all the genuineness of the problem and to follow the lead of empirical subject-matter4 #aa ,there is almost no end to the various dialectic developments of the epistemological situation4 ,when it is held that all the relations of the type in question are cognitive1 and yet it is recognized 7as it must be7 that many such transformations go unremarked1 the theory is supplemented by introducing unconscious psychical modifications4 #ab ,conception-presentation has1 of course1 been made by many in the history of speculation an exception to this statement2 pure memory is also made an exception by ,bergson4 ,to take cognizance of this matter would1 of course1 accentuate1 not relieve1 the difficulty remarked upon in the text4 #ac ,cf4 ,studies in ,logical ,theory1 ,chs4 ,i and ,,ii1 by ,dewey2 also ,epistemology and ,mental ,states1 ,tufts1 ,phil4 ,rev41 ,vol4 ,,vi1 which deserves to rank as one of the early documents of the experimental movement4 #ad ,cf4 ,the ,definition of the ,psychical1 ,g4 ,h4 ,mead1 ,decennial ,publications of the ,university of ,chicago4 #ae ,cf4 ,the ,logic of ,hegel-,wallace1 p4 #aag4 #af ,bosanquet's ,logic1 #bnd ,ed41 p4 #aga4 ,the identification of induction and procedure by hypothesis occurs on p4 #aef4 #ag ,ibid41 p4 #ad 7italics mine74 #ah ,perhaps the most complete exhibition of the breakdown of formal logic considered as an account of the operation of thought apart from its subject-matter is to be found in ,schiller's ,formal ,logic4 #ai ,cf4 ,stuart on ,valuation as a ,logical ,process in ,studies in ,logical ,theory4 #bj ,the ,new ,realism1 pp4 #dj-da4 #ba ,cf4 ,montague1 pp4 #bef-eg2 also ,russell1 ,the ,problems of ,philosophy1 pp4 #bg-fe-ff1 et passim2 and ,holt's ,concept of ,consciousness1 pp4 #ad;ff41 discussed below4 #bb ,cf4 ,angell1 ,relations of ,psychology to ,philosophy1 ,decennial ,publications of ,university of ,chicago1 ,vol4 ,,iii2 also ,castro1 ,the ,respective ,standpoints of ,psychology and ,logic1 ,philosophic ,studies1 ,university of ,chicago1 ,no4 #d4 #bc ,i am here following1 in the main1 ,professor ,holt because he alone appears to have had the courage to develop the full consequences of the premises of analytic logic4 #bd ,the ,concept of ,consciousness1 pp4 #ad-ae4 #be ,it is interesting to compare this onlooking act with the account of consciousness further on4 ,as psychological this act of onlooking must be an act of consciousness4 ,but consciousness is a cross-section or a projection of things made by their interaction with a nervous system4 ,here consciousness is a function of all the interacting factors4 ,it is in the play4 ,it is the play4 ,it is not in a spectator's box4 ,how can consciousness be a function of all the things put into the cross-section and yet be a mere beholder of the process8 ,moreover1 what is it that makes any particular1 spectacle1 or cross-section logical8 ,if it be said all are logical what significance has the term8 #bf ,cf4 ,russell's ,scientific ,methods in ,philosophy1 p4 #ei4 #bg ,holt1 op4 cit41 pp4 #abh-cj4 #bh ,in fact1 ,newton1 in all probability1 had the ,cartesian pure notions in mind4 #bi ,holt1 op4 cit41 p4 #aah 7italics mine74 ,cf4 also ,perry's ,present ,philosophical ,tendencies1 pp4 #ajh and #caa4 #cj ,the character of elements and the nature of simplicity have been discussed in the preceding section4 #ca ,ibid41 p4 #bge4 #cb ,ibid41 p4 #bge4 #cc ,this lack of continuity between the cognitive function of the nervous system and its other functions accounts for the strange paradox in the logic of neo-realism of an act of knowing which is subjective and yet is the act of so palpably an objective affair as a nervous system4 ,the explanation is that the essence of all deprecated subjectivity is1 as before pointed out1 functional isolation4 ,that this sort of subjectivity should be identified with the psychical is not strange1 since a living organism is very difficult to isolate1 while the term psychical1 in its metaphysical sense1 seems to stand for little else than just this complete isolation4 ,having once appealed to the nervous system it seems incredible that the physiological continuity of its functions with each other and with its environment should not have suggested the logical corollary4 ,only the force of the prepossession of mathematical atomism in analytic logic can account for its failure to do so4 #cd ,but it would be better to use the term logically-practical instead of subjective with the psychical implications of that term4 #ce ,an analysis which has been many times carried out has made it clear that scientific data never do more than approximate the laws and entities upon which our science rests4 ,it is equally evident that the forms of these laws and entities themselves shift in the reconstructions of incessant research1 or where they seem most secure could consistently be changed1 or at least could be fundamentally different were our psychological structure or even our conventions of thought different4 ,i need only refer to the ,science et ,hypothese of ,poincare and the ,problems of ,science of ,enriques4 ,the positivist who undertakes to carry the structure of the world back to the data of observation1 and the uniformities appearing in the accepted hypotheses of growing sciences cannot maintain that we ever succeed in isolating data which must remain the same in the kaleidoscope of our research science2 nor are we better served if we retreat to the ultimate elements of points and instants which our pure mathematics assumes and implicitly defines1 and in connection with which it has worked out the modern theory of the number and continuous series1 its statements of continuity and infinity4 #cf ,in other words1 science assumes that every error is ex post facto explicable as a function of the real conditions under which it really arose4 ,hence1 consciousness1 set over against ,reality1 was not its condition4 #cg ,c4 ,judson ,herrick1 ,some ,reflections on the ,origin and ,significance of the ,cerebral ,cortex1 ,journal of ,animal ,behavior1 ,vol4 ,,iii1 pp4 #bbh-bcc4 #ch ,psychology1 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #bef4 #ci ,h4 ,c4 ,warren1 ,psychological ,review1 ,vol4 ,,xxi1 ,page #ic4 #dj ,principles of ,psychology1 ,i1 p4 #bda1 note4 #da ,ibid41 p4 #beh4 #db ,psychology4 ,briefer ,course4 ,p4 #dfh4 #dc ,angell1 ,psychology1 p4 #fe4 #dd ,psychology1 ,vol4 ,i1 p4 #bea4 #de ,thorstein ,veblen3 ,the ,instinct of ,workmanship1 p4 #caf4 #df ,it may still be argued that we must depend upon analogy in our acceptance or rejection of a new commodity4 ,for any element of novelty must surely suggest something to us1 must mean something to us1 if it is to attract or repel4 ,thus1 the motor-car will whirl us rapidly over the country1 the motor-boat will dart over the water without effort on our part4 ,and in such measure as we have had them hitherto1 we have always enjoyed experiences of rapid motion4 ,these new instruments simply promise a perfectly well-known sort of experience in fuller measure4 ,so the argument may run4 ,and our mental process in such a case may accordingly be held to be nothing more mysterious than a passing by analogy from the old ways in which we got rapid motion in the past to the new way which now promises more of the same4 ,and more of the same is what we want4 ,more of the same means here intensive magnitude and in this connection at all events it begs the question4 ,bergson's polemic seems perfectly valid against such a use of the notion4 ,but kept in logical terms the case seems clearer4 ,it is said that we reason in such a case by analogy4 ,we do1 indeed2 but what is analogy8 ,the term explains nothing until the real process behind the term is clearly and realistically conceived4 ,what ,i shall here suggest holds true1 ,i think1 as an account of analogical inference generally and not simply for the economic type of case we have here to do with4 ,reasoning is too often thought of as proceeding from given independent premises--as here 7#a7 the fact that hitherto the driving we have most enjoyed and the sailing we have most enjoyed have been fast and 7#b7 the fact that the motor-car is fast4 ,but do we accept the conclusion because the premises suggest it in a way we cannot resist8 ,on the contrary1 stated thus1 the premises clearly do not warrant the conclusion that the motor-car will be enjoyable4 ,such a statement of the premises is wholly formal and ex post facto4 ,what1 then1 is our actual mental process in the case8 ,the truth is1 ,i think1 that we simply--yes1 psychologically--wish to try that promised unheard-of rate of speed6 ,that comes first and foremost4 ,but we mean to be reasonably prudent on the whole1 although we are avowedly adventurous just now in this particular direction6 ,we1 therefore1 ransack our memory for other fast things we have known1 to see whether they have encouragement to give us4 ,we try to supply ourselves with a major premise because the new proposal in its own right interests us--instead of having the major premise already there to coerce us by a purely logical compulsion as soon as we invade its sphere of influence4 ,and confessedly1 in point of logic1 there is no such compulsion in the second figure3 there is only a timid and vexatious neutrality1 a mere not proven4 ,why1 then1 do we in fact take the much admired inductive leap1 in seeming defiance of strict logic8 ,why do we close our eyes to logic1 turn our back upon logic1 behave as if logic were not and had never been8 ,in point of fact1 we do nothing of the sort4 ,the inductive leap is no leap away from logic1 but the impulsion of logic's mainspring seen only in its legitimate event4 ,because we have not taken care to see the impulse coming1 it surprises us and we are frightened4 ,and we look about for an illusive assurance in some law of thought1 or some question-begging universal premise of ,nature's uniformity4 ,we do not see that we were already conditionally committed to the leap by our initial interest4 ,getting our premises together is no hurried forging of a chain to save us from our own madness in the nick of time4 ,we are only hoping to rid ourselves of an excess of conservative ballast4 ,to reason by analogy is not to repress or to dispense with the interest in the radically novel1 but to give methodical and intelligent expression to that interest4 #dg ,aristotle's ,nicomachaean ,ethics 7,welldon's transl471 ,book ,,viii4 #dh ,cf4 ,aristotle's ,politics 7,jowett's trans47 ,,iii4 #i4 ,sec4#f ff4 and elsewhere2 ,nicom4 ,ethics1 ,i1 ,chap4 ,,iii 7end74 #di ,cf4 ,veblen3 op4 cit4 #ej ,w4 ,mc,dougall in his ,social ,psychology 7,ed4 #aiab1 pp4 #ceh ff47 recognizes incomplete anticipation of the end of action as a genuine type of preliminary situation in human behavior1 but appears to regard this as in so far a levelling-down of man to the blindness of the brutes4 ,but incompleteness is a highly ambiguous term and seems here to beg the question4 ,incompleteness may be given an emphasis in which it imports conjecture and hypothesis--almost anything1 in fact1 but blindness4 ,rather do the brutes get levelled up to man by such facts as those ,mc,dougall cites4 #ea take routine to be the essence and meaning of hedonism4 ,there are two fundamental types of conduct--routine and constructiveness4 ,reference may be made here to ,boehm-,bawerk's pronouncement on hedonism in ,kapital und ,kapitalzins1 #aiab 7,,ii-#b1 pp4 #caj ff473 ,what people love and hate1 strive towards or fight off--whether only pleasure and pain or other 'lovable' and 'hatable' things as well1--is a matter of entire indifference to the economist4 ,the only thing important is that they do love and hate certain things4444 ,the deductions of marginal utility theory lose no whit of their cogency even if certain ends 7dependent for their realization upon a supply of goods inadequate to the fulfillment of all ends without limit7 are held to have the character not of pleasure but of something else4 ,the marginal utility may be a least pleasure or a competing least utility of some other sort4444 7p4 #cag74 ,this is a not uncommon view4 ,as ,w4 ,c4 ,mitchell has suggested1 it is too obvious to be wholly convincing4 7,journ4 ,pol4 ,ec41 ,vol4 ,,xviii4 ,the ,rationality of ,economic ,activity47 ,veblen has made it perfectly clear that particular matters of theory are affected by the presupposition of hedonism4 7,journ4 ,pol4 ,ec41 ,vol4 ,,xvii1 ,quart4 ,journ4 ,econ41 ,vol4 ,,xxii1 p4 #adg ff47 ,the matter is too complex for a footnote1 but ,i think it of little consequence whether pleasure be in any case regarded as substantively the end of desire or not4 ,this is largely a matter of words4 ,what is important is the practical question whether a thing is so habitual with me that when the issue arises ,i cannot or will not give it up and take an interest in something new the utility of which ,i cannot as yet be cognizant of because it partly rests with me to create it4 ,if this is the fact it will surely look as if pleasure or the avoidance of pain were my end in the case4 ,hedonism and egoism are in the end convertible terms4 ,there is conduct wearing the outward aspect of altruism that is egotistic in fact--not because it was from the first insincere or self-delusive1 but because it has become habitual and may in a crisis be held to for the sake of the satisfaction it affords4 ,genuine altruism1 on the other hand1 is a form of constructiveness4 #eb ,until after this essay was finished ,i had not seen ,john ,a4 ,hobson's book entitled ,work and ,wealth1 ,a ,human ,valuation 7,london1 #aiad74 ,my attention was first definitely called to this work by a friend among the economists who read my finished ,,ms4 late in #aiae1 and referred me in particular to the concluding chapter on ,social ,science and ,social ,art4 ,on now tardily reading this chapter ,i find that1 as any reader will readily perceive1 it distinctly anticipates1 almost verbatim in parts1 what ,i have tried1 with far less success1 to say in the foregoing two paragraphs above4 ,hobson argues1 with characteristic clearness and effect1 for the qualitative uniqueness and the integral character of personal budgets1 holding that the logic of marginality is an entirely illusory account of the psychical process by which a man lays out his money1 or his time1 or his energy 7p4 #cca74 ,so far as it is true that the last sovereign of my expenditure in bread equals in utility the last sovereign of my expenditure in books1 that fact proceeds not from a comparison1 conscious1 or unconscious1 of these separate items at this margin1 but from the parts assigned respectively to bread and books in the organic plan of my life4 ,quantitative analysis1 inherently incapable of comprehending qualitative unity or qualitative differences1 can only pretend to reduce the latter to quantitative differences4 ,what it actually does is to ignore alike the unity of the whole and the qualitativeness of the parts 7p4 #ccd74 ,hobson not only uses the analogy of the artist and the picture 7p4 #ccj7 precisely as ,i have done1 but offers still other illustrations of the principle that seem to me even more apt and telling4 ,though not indebted to him for what ,i have put into the above paragraphs1 ,i am glad to be able to cite the authority of so distinguished an economist and sociologist for conclusions to which ,i found my own way4 ,other parts as well of ,work and ,wealth 7e4g41 ,chapter ,,iv1 on ,the ,creative ,factor in ,production7 seem to have a close relation to the main theme of the present discussion4 #ec ,it may be worth while to glance here for the sake of illustration at an ethical view of preference parallel with the economic logic above contested4 ,the act which is right in that it promotes one interest1 is1 by the same principle1 writes ,r4 ,b4 ,perry1 wrong in that it injures another interest4 ,there is no contradiction in this fact 444 simply because it is possible for the same thing to possess several relations1 the question of their compatibility or incompatibility being in each case a question of empirical fact4 ,now 444 an act 444 may be doubly right in that it conduces to the fulfillment of two interests4 ,hence arises the conception of comparative goodness4 ,if the fulfillment of one interest is good1 the fulfillment of two is better2 and the fulfillment of all interests is best4444 ,morality1 then1 is such performance as under the circumstances1 and in view of all the interests affected1 conduces to most goodness4 ,in other words1 that act is morally right which is most right4 7,present ,philosophical ,tendencies1 p4 #ccd4 ,cf4 also ,the ,moral ,economy74 ,it is evident that constructive change in the underlying system 7or aggregate87 of the agent's interests gets no recognition here as a matter of moral concern or as a fact of the agent's moral experience4 ,thus ,perry understands the meaning of freedom to lie in the fact that interests operate1 i4e41 that interests exist as a certain class of operative factors in the universe along with factors of other sorts4 ,i can and do1 within limits1 act as ,i will4 ,action1 in other words1 is governed by desires and intentions4 7pp4 #cdb ff474 ,the cosmical heroics of ,bertrand ,russell are thus not quite the last word in ,ethics 7p4 #cdf74 ,nevertheless1 the free man1 in ,perry's view1 apparently must get on with the interests that once for all initially defined him as a moral constant 7p4 #cdc74 #ed ,in a recent interesting discussion of ,self-interest 7,t4 ,n4 ,carver1 ,essays in ,social ,justice1 #aiae1 ,chap4 ,,iii7 occurs the following3 ,we may conclude 444 that even after we eliminate from our consideration all other beings than self1 there is yet a possible distinction between one's present and one's future self4 ,it is always1 of course1 the present self which esteems or appreciates all interests whether they be present or future4 ,and the present self estimates or appreciates present interests somewhat more highly than it does future interests4 ,in this respect the present self appreciates the interests of the future self according to a law quite analogous to1 if indeed it be not the same law as that according to which it appreciates the interests of others 7p4 #ga74 ,this bit of subjective analysis 7p4 #fj71 a procedure rather scornfully condemned as subjective quibbling on the following page1 must be counted a fortunate lapse4 ,it could be bettered1 ,i think1 in only one point4 ,must the future self of course and always get license to live by meeting the standards of the present self8 ,has the present self no modesty1 no curiosity1 no sense of humor8 ,if it is so stupidly hard and fast1 how can a self new and qualitatively different ever get upon its feet in a man8 ,in some men no such thing can happen--but must it be in all men impossible and impossible of course8 ,and what of the other self8 ,carver has not applied the methods of subjective analysis to change from self to self or from interest in self to interest in others4 ,the present tense of formal logic governs fundamentally throughout the whole account4 ,if this essay were a volume ,i should try to consider1 from the point of view of constructive intelligence1 the explanation of interest as due to the undervaluation of future goods4 #ee ,fite1 ,introductory ,study of ,ethics1 pp4 #c-h4 #ef ,dewey and ,tufts1 ,ethics1 pp4 #bje-aa4 #eg ,the term egocentric predicament 7cf4 ,r4 ,b4 ,perry3 ,present ,philosophical ,tendencies1 p4 #abi ff47 has had1 for a philosophic term1 a remarkable literary success4 ,but at best it conveys a partial view of the situation it purports to describe4 ,the egocentricity of our experience1 viewed in its relation to action1 seems1 rightly considered1 less a predicament than an opportunity1 a responsibility and an immunity4 ,for in relation to action1 it means 7#a7 that an objective complex situation has become1 in various of its aspects1 a matter of my cognizance in terms significant to me4 ,that so many of its aspects have come into relations of conflict or reenforcement significant for me is my opportunity for reconstructive effort if ,i choose to avail myself of it4 ,because1 again1 ,i am thus on hand myself 7op4 cit41 p4 #abi7 and am thus able to report upon the situation1 ,i am 7#b7 responsible1 in the measure of my advantages1 for the adequacy of my performance4 ,and finally 7#c7 ,i cannot be held to account for failure to reckon with such aspects of the situation as ,i cannot get hold of in the guise of ideas1 objects of knowledge or experiences 7,ibid474 ,our egocentricity is1 then1 a predicament only so long as one stubbornly insists1 to no obvious positive purpose1 on thinking of knowledge as a self-sufficing entitative complex1 like a vision suddenly appearing full-blown out of the blue1 and as inviting judgment in that isolated character on the representative adequacy which it is supposed to claim 7cf4 ,a4 ,w4 ,moore1 ,isolated ,knowledge1 ,journ4 of ,philos41 etc41 ,vol4 ,,xi74 ,the way out of the predicament for ,perry and his colleagues is to attack the traditional subjective and representative aspects of knowledge4 ,but1 this carried out1 what remains of knowledge is a cross-section of neutral entities which still retains all the original unaccountability1 genetically speaking1 and the original intrinsic and isolated self-sufficiency traditionally supposed to belong to knowledge4 ,the ostensible gain achieved for knowledge is an alleged proof of its ultimate self-validation or the meaninglessness of any suspicion of its validity 7because there is no uncontrolled and distorting intermediation of consciousness in the case74 ,but to wage strenuous war on subjectivism and representationism and still to have on hand a problem calling for the invention ad hoc of an entire new theory of mind and knowledge seems a waste of good ammunition on rather unimportant outworks4 ,they might have been circumvented4 ,but what concerns us here is the ethical parallel4 ,the egocentric predicament in this aspect purports to compel the admission by the altruist that since whatever he chooses to do must be his act and is obviously done because he wishes1 for good and sufficient reasons of his own1 to do it1 therefore he is an egoist after all--perhaps in spite of himself and then again perhaps not4 ,the ethical realism of ,g4 ,e4 ,moore 7,principia ,ethica1 #aijc7 breaks out of the predicament by declaring ,good independent of all desire1 wish or human interest and indefinable1 and by supplying a partial list of things thus independently good4 ,what ,i do1 ,i do because it seems likely to put me in possession of objective ,good1 not because it accords with some habit or whim of mine 7although my own pleasure is undoubtedly one of the good things74 ,it is noteworthy that ,perry declines to follow ,moore in this 7op4 cit41 p4 #cca ff474 ,now such an ethical objectivism can give no account of the motivation1 or the process1 of the individual's efforts to attain1 for guidance in any case1 a more adequate apprehension of what things are good than he may already possess1 just as the objectivist theory of consciousness 7 knowledge7 can supply no clue as to how or whether a more or a less comprehensive or a qualitatively different cross-section of entities can or should be got into one's mind as warrant or guidance 7stimulus7 for a contemplated response that is to meet a present emergency 7cf4 ,john ,dewey1 ,the ,reflex ,arc ,concept in ,psychology1 ,psychol4 ,rev41 ,vol4 ,,iv74 ,thus neither sort of deliverance out of the alleged predicament of egocentricity abates in the least the only serious inconvenience or danger threatened by subjectivism4 #eh ,cf4 ,w4 ,jethro ,brown1 ,the ,underlying ,principles of ,modern ,legislation 7#c;d ed41 ,london1 #aiad71 pp4 #afe-fh4 #ei ,bosanquet3 ,principle of ,individuality and ,value1 pp4 #ac1 #ae1 #bj1 #bd1 #bg1 #cj4 #fj ,the case against the ,austrian explanation of market-price in terms of marginal utility has been well summed up and re-enforced by ,b4 ,m4 ,anderson in his monograph1 ,social ,value 7,boston1 #aiaa74 ,anderson finds the fatal flaw in the ,austrian account to consist in the psychological particularism of the marginal utility theory4 ,the only way1 he holds1 to provide an adequate foundation for a non-circular theory of price is to understand the marginal estimates people put upon goods as resultants of the entire moral1 legal1 institutional1 scientific1 aesthetical1 and religious state of society at the time4 ,this total and therefore absolute state of affairs1 if ,i understand the argument1 is to be regarded as focussed to a unique point in the estimate each man puts upon a commodity4 ,thus1 presumably1 the values which come together1 summed up in the total demand and supply schedules for a commodity in the market1 are social values and the resultant market-price is a social price4 ,this cross-sectional social totality of conditions is strongly suggestive of an idealistic ,absolute4 ,the individual is a mere focussing of impersonal strains and stresses in the ,absolute4 ,but the real society is a radically temporal process4 ,the real centers of initiation in it are creatively intelligent individuals whose economic character as such expresses itself not in absolute marginal registrations but in price estimates4 ,on the priority of price to value ,i venture to claim the support of ,a4 ,a4 ,young1 ,some ,limitations of the ,value ,concept1 ,quart4 ,journ4 ,econ41 ,vol4 ,,xxv1 p4 #dji 7esp4 pp4 #dag-ai74 ,incidentally1 ,i suspect the attempt to reconstruct ethical theory as a branch of what is called ,werttheorie to be a mistake and likely to result only in useless and misleading terminology4 #fa ,positive ,theory of ,capital 7,eng4 trans474 ,bk4 ,,iv1 ,ch4 ,,ii4 ,the passage is unchanged in the author's latest edition 7#aiab74 #fb ,it is pointed out 7e4g41 by ,davenport in his ,economics of ,enterprise1 pp4 #ec-ed7 that1 mathematically1 in a market where large numbers of buyers and sellers confront each other with their respective maximum and minimum valuations on the commodity this interval within which price must fall becomes indefinitely small to the point of vanishing4 ,this is doubtless in accord with the law of probability1 but it would be an obvious fallacy to see in this any manner of proof or presumption that therefore the assumptions as to the nature of the individual valuations upon which such analysis proceeds are true4 ,in a large market where this interval is supposed to be a vanishing quantity is there more or less higgling and bargaining than in a small market where the interval is admittedly perceptible8 ,and if there is higgling and bargaining 7op4 cit41 pp4 #if-ig71 what is it doing that is of price-fixing importance unless there be supposed to be a critical interval for it to work in8 ,such a use of probability-theory is a good example of the way in which mathematics may be used to cover the false assumptions which have to be made in order to make a mathematical treatment of certain sorts of subject-matter initially plausible as description of concrete fact4 #fc ,as ,i have elsewhere argued 7,subjective and ,exchange ,value1 ,journ4 ,pol4 ,econ41 ,vol4 ,,iv1 pp4 #bbg-cj74 ,by the same token1 ,i confess skepticism of the classical ,english doctrine that cost can affect price only through its effect upon quantity produced4 ,if all the commodities used by man1 wrote ,senior 7quoted by ,davenport1 op4 cit41 p4 #eh71 were supplied by nature without any interference whatever of human labor1 but were supplied in precisely the same amounts that they now are1 there is no reason to suppose either that they would cease to be valuable or would exchange at any other than the present proportions4 ,but is this inductive evidence or illustrative rhetoric8 ,one wonders1 indeed1 whether private property would ever have developed or how long modern society would tolerate it if all wealth were the gift of nature instead of only some of it 7that part1 of course1 which requires no use of produced capital goods for its appropriation74 #fd ,certain points in this discussion have been raised in two papers1 entitled1 ,the ,present ,task of ,ethical ,theory1 ,int4 ,jour4 of ,ethics1 ,,xx1 and ,ethical ,value1 ,jour4 of ,phil41 ,psy41 and ,scientific ,methods1 ,v1 p4 #eag4 #fe ,cf4 also ,john ,dewey1 ,influence of ,darwin upon ,philosophy1 and ,dewey and ,tufts1 ,ethics1 ,ch4 ,,xvi4 #ff ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 ,,xxv1 #aiad1 pp4 #a-bd4 #fg ,dreams of a ,spirit ,seer4 #fh ,cf4 ,a4 ,w4 ,moore1 ,pragmatism and ,its ,critics1 #beg-gh4 #fi ,croce1 ,philosophy of the ,practical1 pp4 #cab f4 #gj ,g4 ,e4 ,moore1 ,principia ,ethica1 p4 #adg4 #ga ,ethics1 ch4 ,v4 #gb ,g4 ,e4 ,moore1 ,principia ,ethica1 p4 #adi4 #gc ,rashdall1 ,is ,conscience an ,emotion8 pp4 #aii f4 #gd ,ibid41 #agg4 #ge ,g4,e4 ,moore1 ,ethics1 ,ch4 ,,iii4 #gf ,dewey and ,tufts1 ,ethics1 pp4 #ccd f4 #gg ,methods of ,ethics1 p4 #chj4 #gh ,individualism1 #ee1 #fa1 #fb4 #gi ,lectures ,,iii and ,,iv1 especially #age1 #agf1 #bce-ci4 #hj ,pp4 #aaa ff41 #agb-ge1 #cbi ff4 #ha ,pp4 #gc1 #ahf1 #bcf1 #bfa f41 #bfg1 #bfi4 #hb #abd1 #ahb1 #cja4 #hc #bfc ff41 #abc4 #hd ,pp4 #ahj1 #bda4 #he ,p4 #ahj4 #hf ,art and religion have doubtless their important parts in embodying values1 or in adding the consciousness of membership in a larger union of spirits1 or of relation to a cosmic order conceived as ethical1 but the limits of our discussion do not permit treatment of these factors4 #hg ,cf4 my paper1 ,goodness1 ,cognition1 and ,beauty1 ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology1 and ,scientific ,methods1 ,vol4 ,,ix1 p4 #bec4 #hh ,cf4 ,thorndike1 ,the ,original ,nature of ,man2 ,s4 ,freud1 ,die ,traumdeutung1 ,psychopathologie des ,alltagsleben1 etc42 ,mc,dougall1 ,social ,psychology4 #hi ,the ,journal of ,philosophy1 ,psychology1 and ,scientific ,methods1 ,vol4 ,,ix1 p4 #bef4 #ij ,cf4 ,plato1 ,republic1 ,,ix1 #ega1 #egb1 for an explicit anticipation of ,freud4 #ia ,this new psychology is not so very new4 #ib ,cf4 ,hocking1 ,the ,meaning of ,god in ,human ,experience1 for the most recent of these somnambulisms4 ,but any idealistic system will do1 from ,plato to ,bradley4 #ic ,cf4 ,james1 ,the ,varieties of ,religious ,experience4 #id ,cf4 ,jane ,harrison1 ,ancient ,art and ,ritual4 #ie ,cf4 my paper1 ,is ,belief ,essential in ,religion81 ,international ,journal of ,ethics1 ,october1 #aiaj4 #if ,metaphysics1 ,book ,lambda4 #ig ,this is accomplished usually by ignoring the differentia of the term of religion1 and using it simply as an adjective of eulogy1 as in the common practice the term ,christian is made coextensive with the denotation of good1 or social4 ,for example1 a ,christian gentleman can differ in no discernible way from a gentleman not so qualified save by believing in certain theological propositions4 ,but in usage1 the adjective is simply tautologous4 ,compare ,r4 ,b4 ,perry1 ,the ,moral ,economy2 ,e4 ,s4 ,ames1 ,the ,psychology of ,religious ,experience2 ,j4 ,h4 ,leuba1 ,a ,psychological ,study of ,religion2 ,h4 ,m4 ,kallen1 ,is ,belief ,essential in ,religion8 #ih ,the condition of ,england and ,germany in the present civil war in ,europe echoes this situation4 #ii ,cf4 ,republic1 ,books ,v and ,,vi4 #ajj ,cf4 ,winds of ,doctrine and ,reason in ,common ,sense4 ,,transcriber',s ,,notes #a4 ,passages in italics are surrounded by underscores4 #b4 ,punctuation has been normalized4 ,as well as obvious misprints have been corrected4 #c4 ,the original text includes ,greek characters4 ,for this text version these letters have been replaced with transliterations4 #d4 ,the word ,phoenicians uses an oe ligature in the original4