,transcriber's ,notes   ,this text is   
derived from a copy in the ,ave ,maria  
,university   library1 catalog number ,b
 #aga 4,s#h   ,end ,transcriber's ,notes
  ,a ,,critical ,,history ,,of ,,greek  
,,philosophy  ,,macmillan ,,and ,,co41  
,,limited ,,london - ,,bombay -         
,,calcutta - ,,madras ,,melbourne       
,,the ,,macmillan ,,company ,,new ,,york
 - ,,boston - ,,chicago ,,dallas - ,,san
 ,,francisco  ,,the ,,macmillan ,,co4   
,,of ,,canada1 ,ltd ,,toronto    ,a     
,,critical ,,history ,,of ,,greek       
,,philosophy  ,,by  ,w4 ,t4 ,,stace     
,,macmillan ,,and ,,co41 ,,limited ,,st4
 ,,martin',s ,,street1 ,,london #aibj   
,,copyright   ,,glasgow3 ,,printed ,,at 
,,the ,,university ,,press ,,by ,,robert
 ,,maclehose ,,and ,,co4 ,,ltd4   v     
,,preface  ,this book contains the      
substance1 and for the most part the    
words1 of a course of public lectures   
delivered during the first three months 
of #aiai4 ,the original division into   
lectures has been dropped1 the matter   

being more conveniently redivided into  
chapters4  ,the audience to whom the    
lectures were delivered was composed of 
members of the general public1 and not  
only of students4 ,for the most part    
they possessed no previous knowledge of 
philosophy4 ,hence this book1 like the  
original lectures1 assumes no previous  
special knowledge1 though it assumes1 of
 course1 a state of general education in
 the reader4 ,technical philosophical   
terms are carefully explained when first
 introduced2 and a special effort has   
been made to put philosophical ideas in 
the clearest way possible4 ,but it must 
be remembered that many of the          
profoundest as well as the most         
difficult of human conceptions are to be
 found in ,greek philosophy4 ,such ideas
 are difficult in themselves1 however   
clearly expressed4 ,no amount of        
explanation can ever render them        
anything but difficult to the           
unsophisticated mind1 and anything in   
the nature of philosophy made easy is   

only to be expected from quacks and     
charlatans4  ,greek philosophy is not1  
even now1 antiquated4 ,it is not from   
the point of view of an antiquary or    
historian vi that its treasures are     
valuable4 ,we are dealing here with     
living things1 and not with mere dead   
things--not with the dry bones and      
debris of a bygone age4 ,and ,i have    
tried to lecture and write for living   
people1 and not for mere                
fossil-grubbers4 ,if ,i did not believe 
that there is to be found here1 in      
,greek philosophy1 at least a measure of
 the truth1 the truth that does not grow
 old1 ,i would not waste five minutes of
 my life upon it4  ,we do not1 says a   
popular modern writer1 ,footnote #a     
bring the young mind up against the few 
broad elemental questions that are the  
questions of metaphysics 4444 ,we do not
 make it discuss1 correct it1 elucidate 
it4 ,that was the way of the ,greeks1   
and we worship that divine people far   
too much to adopt their way4 ,no1 we    

lecture to our young people about not   
philosophy but philosophers1 we put them
 through book after book1 telling how   
other people have discussed these       
questions4 ,we avoid the questions of   
metaphysics1 but we deliver             
semi-digested half views of the         
discussions of1 and answers to these    
questions made by men of all sorts and  
qualities1 in various remote languages  
and under conditions quite different    
from our own4 4 4 4 ,it is as if we     
began teaching arithmetic by long       
lectures upon the origin of the ,roman  
numerals1 and then went on to the lives 
and motives of the ,arab mathematicians 
in ,spain1 or started with ,roger ,bacon
 in chemistry1 or ,sir ,richard ,owen in
 comparative anatomy 4444 ,it is time   
the educational powers began to realise 
that the questions of metaphysics1 the  
elements of philosophy1 are1 here and   
now to be done afresh in each mind 4444 
,what is wanted is philosophy1 and not a
 shallow smattering of the history of   

philosophy 444 vii ,the proper way to   
discuss metaphysics1 like the proper way
 to discuss mathematics or chemistry1 is
 to discuss the accumulated and digested
 product of human thought in such       
matters4  ,footnote #a3 ,h4 ,g4 ,wells  
in ,first and ,last ,things4  ,plausible
 words these1 certain to seem conclusive
 to the mob1 notwithstanding that for   
one element of truth they contain nine  
of untruth6 ,the elements of truth are  
that our educational system             
unwarrantably leaves unused the powerful
 weapon of oral discussion--so forcibly 
wielded by the ,greeks--and develops    
book knowledge at the expense of        
original thought4 ,though even here it  
must be remembered1 as regards the      
,greeks1 7#a7 that if they studied the  
history of philosophy but little1 it was
 because there was then but little      
history of philosophy to study1 and 7#b7
 that if anyone imagines that the great 
,greek thinkers did not fully master the
 thought of their predecessors before   

constructing their own systems1 he is   
grievously mistaken1 and 7#c7 that in   
some cases the over-reliance on oral    
discussion--the opposite fault to       
ours--led to intellectual dishonesty1   
quibbling1 ostentation1 disregard of    
truth1 shallowness1 and absence of all  
principle2 this was the case with the   
,sophists4  ,as to the comparisons      
between arithmetic and philosophy1      
chemistry and philosophy1 etc41 they    
rest wholly upon a false parallel1 and  
involve a total failure to comprehend   
the nature of philosophic truth1 and its
 fundamental difference from            
arithmetical1 chemical1 or physical     
truth4 ,if ,eratosthenes thought the    
circumference of the earth to be so     
much1 whereas it has now been discovered
 to be so much1 then the later correct  
view simply cancels and renders nugatory
 the older view4 viii ,the one is       
correct1 the other incorrect4 ,we can   
ignore and forget the incorrect view    
altogether4 ,but the development of     

philosophy proceeds on quite other      
principles4 ,philosophical truth is no  
sum in arithmetic to be totted up so    
that the answer is thus formally and    
finally correct or incorrect4 ,rather1  
the philosophical truth unfolds itself1 
factor by factor1 in time1 in the       
successive systems of philosophy1 and it
 is only in the complete series that the
 complete truth is to be found4 ,the    
system of ,aristotle does not simply    
cancel and refute that of ,plato4       
,spinoza does not simply abolish        
,descartes4 ,aristotle completes ,plato1
 as his necessary complement4 ,spinoza  
does the same for ,descartes4 ,and so it
 is always4 ,the calculation of         
,eratosthenes is simply wrong1 and so we
 can afford to forget it4 ,but the      
systems of ,plato1 ,aristotle1 ,spinoza1
 ,leibniz1 etc41 are all alike factors  
of the truth4 ,they are as true now as  
they were in their own times1 though    
they are not1 and never were1 the whole 
truth4 ,and therefore it is that they   

are not simply wrong1 done with1        
finished1 ended1 and that we cannot     
afford to forget them4 ,whether it is   
not possible to bring the many lights to
 a single focus1 to weld the various    
factors of the truth into a single      
organic whole or system1 which should   
thus be the total result to date1 is    
another question4 ,only one such attempt
 has ever been made1 but no one will    
pretend that it is possible to          
understand it without a thorough        
knowledge of all previous systems1 a    
knowledge1 in fact1 of the separate     
factors of the truth before they are    
thus combined into a total result4      
,besides1 that attempt1 too1 is now part
 of the history of philosophy6  ,hence  
any philosophical thinking which is not 
founded ix upon a thorough study of the 
systems of the past will necessarily be 
shallow and worthless4 ,and the notions 
that we can dispense with this study1   
and do everything out of our own heads1 
that everyone is to be his own          

philosopher1 and is competent to        
construct his own system in his own     
way--such ideas are utterly empty and   
hollow4 ,of these truths1 indeed1 we see
 a notable example in what the writer   
just quoted styles his metaphysic4 ,this
 so-called metaphysic is wholly based   
upon the assumption that knowledge and  
its object exist1 each on its own       
account1 external to one another1 the   
one here1 the other there over against  
it1 and that knowledge is an instrument 
which in this external manner takes hold
 of its object and makes it its own4    
,the very moment the word instrument is 
used here1 all the rest1 including the  
invalidity of knowledge1 follows as a   
matter of course4 ,such assumption      
then--that knowledge is an              
instrument--our writer makes1 wholly    
uncritically1 and without a shadow of   
right4 ,he gives no sign that it has    
ever even occurred to him that this is  
an assumption1 that it needs any        
enquiry1 or that it is possible for     

anyone to think otherwise4 ,yet anyone  
who will take the trouble1 not merely   
superficially to dip into the history of
 philosophy1 but thoroughly to submit   
himself to its discipline1 will at least
 learn that this is an assumption1 a    
very doubtful assumption1 too1 which no 
one now has the right to foist upon the 
public without discussion as if it were 
an axiomatic truth4 ,he might even learn
 that it is a false assumption4 ,and he 
will note1 as an ominous sign1 that the 
subjectivism which permeates and directs
 the whole course of ,mr4 ,wells's      
thinking is identical in character with 
that x subjectivism which was the       
essential feature of the decay and      
downfall of the ,greek philosophic      
spirit1 and was the cause of its final  
ruin and dissolution4  ,i would counsel 
the young1 therefore1 to pay no         
attention to plausible and shallow words
 such as those quoted1 but1 before      
forming their own philosophic opinions1 
most thoroughly and earnestly to study  

and master the history of past          
philosophies1 first the ,greek and then 
the modern4 ,that this cannot be done   
merely by reading a modern resume of    
that history1 but only by studying the  
great thinkers in their own works1 is   
true4 ,but philosophical education must 
begin1 and the function of such books as
 this1 is1 not to complete it1 but to   
begin it2 and to obtain first of all a  
general view of what must afterwards be 
studied in detail is no bad way of      
beginning4 ,moreover1 the study of the  
development and historical connexions of
 the various philosophies1 which is not 
found in the original writings          
themselves1 will always provide a work  
for histories of philosophy to do4  ,two
 omissions in this book require1        
perhaps1 a word of explanation4         
,firstly1 in dealing with ,plato's      
politics ,i have relied on the          
,republic1 and said nothing of the      
,laws4 ,this would not be permissible in
 a history of political theories1 nor   

even in a history of philosophy which   
laid any special emphasis on politics4  
,but1 from my point of view1 politics   
lie on the extreme outer margin of      
philosophy1 so that a more slender      
treatment of the subject is permissible4
 ,moreover1 the ,republic1 whether      
written early or late1 expresses1 in my 
opinion1 the views of ,plato1 and not   
those of ,socrates1 and it still remains
 the outstanding1 typical1 and          
characteristic xi expression of the     
,platonic political ideal1 however much 
that ideal had afterwards to be modified
 by practical considerations4           
,secondly1 ,i have not even mentioned   
the view1 now held by some1 that the    
theory of ,ideas is really the work of  
,socrates1 and not of ,plato1 and that  
,plato's own philosophy consisted in    
some sort of esoteric number-theory1    
combined with theistic and other        
doctrines4 ,i can only say that this    
theory1 as expounded for example by     
,professor ,burnet1 does not commend    

itself to me1 that1 in fact1 ,i do not  
believe it1 but that1 it being          
impossible to discuss it adequately in a
 book of this kind1 ,i have thought     
that1 rather than discuss it            
inadequately1 it were better to leave it
 alone altogether4 ,moreover1 it stands 
on a totally different footing from1    
say1 ,professor ,burnet's interpretation
 of ,parmenides1 which ,i have          
discussed4 ,that concerned the          
interpretation of the true meaning of a 
philosophy4 ,this merely concerns the   
question who was the author of a        
philosophy4 ,that was a question of     
principle1 this merely of personalities4
 ,that was of importance to the         
philosopher1 this merely to the         
historian and antiquary4 ,it is like the
 ,bacon-,shakespeare question1 which no 
lover of drama1 as such1 need concern   
himself with at all4 ,no doubt the      
,plato-,socrates question is of interest
 to antiquarians1 but after all1        
fundamentally1 it does not matter who is

 to have the credit of the theory of    
,ideas1 the only essential thing for us 
being to understand that theory1 and    
rightly to apprehend its value as a     
factor of the truth4 ,this book is      
primarily concerned with philosophical  
ideas1 their truth1 meaning1 and        
significance1 and not with the rights   
and wrongs of antiquarian disputes4 ,it 
does indeed purport to xii be a history1
 as well as a discussion of philosophic 
conceptions4 ,but this only means that  
it takes up philosophical ideas in their
 historical sequence and connexions1 and
 it does this only because the          
conceptions of evolution in philosophy1 
of the onward march of thought to a     
determined goal2 of its gradual and     
steady rise to the supreme heights of   
idealism1 its subsequent decline1 and   
ultimate collapse1 are not only         
profoundly impressive as historical     
phenomena1 but are of vital importance  
to a true conception of philosophy      
itself4 ,were it not for this1 ,mr4     

,wells would1 ,i think1 be right1 and ,i
 for one should abandon treatment in    
historical order altogether4 ,lastly1 ,i
 may remark that the description of this
 book as a critical history means that  
it is1 or attempts to be critical1 not  
of dates1 texts1 readings1 and the like1
 but of philosophical conceptions4  ,i  
owe a debt of thanks to ,mr4 ,f4 ,l4    
,woodward1 ,m4,a41 late principal of    
,mahinda ,college1 ,galle1 ,ceylon1 for 
assisting me in the compilation of the  
index of names1 and in sundry other     
matters4  ,w4,t4,s4  ,january1 #aibj4   
xiii  ,,contents  ,,chapter             
,,page  ,i4    ,,the ,,idea ,,of        
,,philosophy ,,in ,,general4 ,,the      
,,origin ,,and ,,development ,,of       
,,greek ,,philosophy           #a  ,,ii4
   ,,the ,,ionics4 ,,thales4            
,,anaximander4       ,,anaximenes4      
,,other ,,ionic ,,thinkers              
#bj  ,,iii4  ,,the ,,pythagoreans       
#ca  ,,iv4   ,,the ,,eleatics4          
,,xenophanes4 ,,parmenides4             

,,zeno4 ,,critical ,,remarks ,,on       
,,eleaticism                #dj  ,v4    
,,heracleitus                           
#gb  ,,vi4   ,,empedocles               
#ha  ,,vii4  ,,the ,,atomists           
#hf  ,,viii4 ,,anaxagoras               
#id  ,,ix4   ,,the ,,sophists           
#ajf  ,x4    ,,socrates                 
#abg  ,,xi4   ,,the ,,semi-,,socratics4 
,,the ,,cynics4 ,,the       ,,cyrenaics4
 ,,the ,,megarics                       
#aee  ,,xii4  ,,plato                   
#afd        7i47 ,life and writings     
#afe        7ii47 ,the theory of        
knowledge                      #agg     
7iii47 ,dialectic1 or the theory of     
,ideas           #ahc        7iv47      
,physics1 or the theory of existence    
#bjg              7a7 ,the doctrine of  
the world                #bjg           
7b7 ,the doctrine of the human soul     
#baa  xiv        7v47 ,ethics           
#bag             7a7 ,of the individual 
#bag             7b7 ,the ,state        
#bbe        7vi47 ,views upon art       

#bbi        7vii47 ,critical estimate of
 ,plato's philosophy     #bcd  ,,xiii4  
,,aristotle3        7i47 ,life1         
,writings1 and general character of     
his work                                
#bdi        7ii47 ,logic                
#bfj        7iii47 ,metaphysics         
#bfa        7iv47 ,physics1 or the      
philosophy of nature         #bhh       
7v47 ,ethics3             7a7 ,the      
individual                              
#cad             7b7 ,the ,state        
#cbj        7vi47 ,aesthetics1 or the   
theory of art             #cbe          
7vii47 ,critical estimate of            
,aristotle's philosophy                 
#cca  ,,xiv4   ,,the ,,general          
,,character ,,of ,,post-,,aristotelian  
,,philosophy                            
#cci  ,,xv4    ,,the ,,stoics4 ,,logic4 
,,physics4 ,,ethics                #cdd 
,,xvi4   ,,the ,,epicureans4 ,,physics4 
,,ethics                   #ced  ,,xvii4
  ,,the ,,sceptics4 ,,pyrrho4 ,,the     
,,new ,,academy4        ,,later         

,,scepticism                            
#cfa  ,,xviii4 ,,transition ,,to        
,,neo-,,platonism                       
#cfh  ,,xix4   ,,the ,,neo-,,platonists 
#cgb         ,,index ,,of ,,subjects    
#cgh         ,,index ,,of ,,names       
#chb   #a ,a ,,critical ,,history ,,of  
,,greek ,,philosophy   ,,chapter ,i     
,,the ,,idea ,,of ,,philosophy ,,in     
,,general4  ,,the ,,origins ,,and       
,,development ,,of ,,greek ,,philosophy 
,it is natural that1 at the commencement
 of any study1 one should be expected to
 say what the subject-matter of that    
study is4 ,botany is the knowledge of   
plants1 astronomy of the heavenly       
bodies1 geology of the rocks of the     
earth's crust4 ,what1 then1 is the      
special sphere of philosophy8 ,what is  
philosophy about8 ,now it is not as easy
 to give a concise definition of        
philosophy1 as it is of the other       
sciences4 ,in the first place1 the      
content of philosophy has differed      
considerably in different periods of    

history4 ,in general the tendency has   
been to narrow down the scope of the    
subject as knowledge advanced1 to       
exclude from philosophy what was        
formerly included in it4 ,thus in the   
time of ,plato1 physics and astronomy   
were included as parts of philosophy1   
whereas now they constitute separate    
sciences4 ,this1 however1 is not an     
insurmountable difficulty4 ,what chiefly
 militates against the effort to frame a
 definition is that the precise content 
of philosophy is differently viewed by  
different schools of thought4 ,thus a   
definition of #b philosophy which a     
follower of ,herbert ,spencer might     
frame would be unacceptable to an       
,hegelian1 and the ,hegelian definition 
would be rejected by the ,spencerian4   
,if we were to include in our definition
 some such phrase as the knowledge of   
the ,absolute1 while this might suit    
some philosophers1 others would deny    
that there is any ,absolute at all4     
,another school would say that there may

 be an ,absolute1 but that it is        
unknowable1 so that philosophy cannot be
 the knowledge of it4 ,yet another      
school would tell us that1 whether there
 is or is not an ,absolute1 whether it  
is or is not knowable1 the knowledge of 
it is in any case useless1 and ought not
 to be sought4 ,hence no definition of  
philosophy can be appreciated without   
some knowledge of the special tenets of 
the various schools4 ,in a word1 the    
proper place to give a definition is not
 at the beginning of the study of       
philosophy1 but at the end of it4 ,then1
 with all views before us1 we might be  
able to decide the question4  ,i shall  
make no attempt1 therefore1 to place    
before you a precise definition4 ,but   
perhaps the same purpose will be served1
 if ,i pick out some of the leading     
traits of philosophy1 which serve to    
distinguish it from other branches of   
knowledge1 and illustrate them by       
enumerating--but without any attempt at 
completeness--some of the chief problems

 which philosophers have usually        
attempted to solve4 ,and firstly1       
philosophy is distinguished from other  
branches of knowledge by the fact that1 
whereas these each take some particular 
portion of the universe for their study1
 philosophy does not specialize in this 
way1 but deals with the universe as a   
whole4 ,the universe is one1 and ideal  
knowledge of it would be one2 but the   
principles of specialization and        
division of #c labour apply here as     
elsewhere1 and so astronomy takes for   
its subject that portion of the universe
 which we call the heavenly bodies1     
botany specializes in plant life1       
psychology in the facts of the mind1 and
 so on4 ,but philosophy does not deal   
with this or that particular sphere of  
being1 but with being as such4 ,it seeks
 to see the universe as a single        
co-ordinated system of things4 ,it might
 be described as the science of things  
in general4 ,the world in its most      
universal aspects is its subject4 ,all  

sciences tend to generalize1 to reduce  
multitudes of particular facts to single
 general laws4 ,philosophy carries this 
process to its highest limit4 ,it       
generalizes to the utmost4 ,it seeks to 
view the entire universe in the light of
 the fewest possible general principles1
 in the light1 if possible1 of a single 
ultimate principle4  ,it is a           
consequence of this that the special    
sciences take their subject matter1 and 
much of their contents1 for granted1    
whereas philosophy seeks to trace       
everything back to its ultimate grounds4
 ,it may be thought that this           
description of the sciences is          
incorrect4 ,is not the essential maxim  
of modern science to assume nothing1 to 
take nothing for granted1 to assert     
nothing without demonstration1 to prove 
all8 ,this is no doubt true within      
certain limits1 but beyond those limits 
it does not hold good4 ,all the sciences
 take quite for granted certain         
principles and facts which are1 for     

them1 ultimate4 ,to investigate these is
 the portion of the philosopher1 and    
philosophy thus takes up the thread of  
knowledge where the sciences drop it4   
,it begins where they end4 ,it          
investigates what they take as a matter 
of course4  ,let us consider some       
examples of this4 ,the science of       
geometry deals with the laws of space4  
,but it takes #d space just as it finds 
it in common experience4 ,it takes space
 for granted4 ,no geometrician asks what
 space is4 ,this1 then1 will be a       
problem for philosophy4 ,moreover1      
geometry is founded upon certain        
fundamental propositions which1 it      
asserts1 being self-evident1 require no 
investigation4 ,these are called axioms4
 ,that two straight lines cannot enclose
 a space1 and that equals being added to
 equals the results are equal1 are      
common examples4 ,into the ground of    
these axioms the geometrician does not  
enquire4 ,that is the business of       
philosophy4 ,not that philosophers      

affect to doubt the truth of these      
axioms4 ,but surely it is a very strange
 thing1 and a fact quite worthy of      
study1 that there are some statements of
 which we feel that we must give the    
most laborious proofs1 and others in the
 case of which we feel no such          
necessity4 ,how is it that some         
propositions can be self-evident and    
others must be proved8 ,what is the     
ground of this distinction8 ,and when   
one comes to think of it1 it is a very  
extraordinary property of mind that it  
should be able to make the most         
universal and unconditional statements  
about things1 without a jot of evidence 
or proof4 ,when we say that two straight
 lines cannot enclose a space1 we do not
 mean merely that this has been found   
true in regard to all the particular    
pairs of straight lines with which we   
have tried the experiment4 ,we mean that
 it never can be and never has been     
otherwise4 ,we mean that a million      
million years ago two straight lines did

 not enclose a space1 and that it will  
be the same a million million years     
hence1 and that it is just as true on   
those stars1 if there are any1 which are
 invisible even to the greatest         
telescopes4 ,but we have no experience  
of what will #e happen a million million
 years hence1 or of what can take place 
among those remote stars4 ,and yet we   
assert1 with absolute confidence1 that  
our axiom is and must be equally true   
everywhere and at all times4 ,moreover1 
we do not found this on probabilities   
gathered from experience4 ,nobody would 
make experiments or use telescopes to   
prove such axioms4 ,how is it that they 
are thus self-evident1 that the mind can
 make these definite and far-reaching   
assertions without any evidence at all8 
,geometricians do not consider these    
questions4 ,they take the facts for     
granted4 ,to solve these problems is for
 philosophy4   ,again1 the physical     
sciences take the existence of matter   
for granted4 ,but philosophy asks what  

matter is4 ,at first sight it might     
appear that this question is one for the
 physicist and not the philosopher4 ,for
 the problem of the constitution of     
matter is a well-known physical problem4
 ,but a little consideration will show  
that this is quite a different question 
from the one the philosopher propounds4 
,for even if it be shown that all matter
 is ether1 or electricity1 or           
vortex-atoms1 or other such1 this does  
not help us in our special problem4 ,for
 these theories1 even if proved1 only   
teach us that the different kinds of    
matter are forms of some one physical   
existence4 ,but what we want to know is 
what physical existence itself is4 ,to  
prove that one kind of matter is really 
another kind of matter does not tell us 
what is the essential nature of matter4 
,that1 therefore1 is a problem1 not of  
science1 but of philosophy4  ,in the    
same way1 all the sciences take the     
existence of the universe for granted4  
,but philosophy seeks to know why it is 

that there is a universe at all4 ,is it 
#f true1 for example1 that there is some
 single ultimate reality which produces 
all things8 ,and if so1 what sort of a  
reality is it8 ,is it matter1 or mind1  
or something different from both8 ,is it
 good or evil8 ,and if it is good1 how  
is it that there is evil in the world8  
,moreover every science1 except the     
purely mathematical sciences1 assumes   
the truth of the law of causation4      
,every student of logic knows that this 
is the ultimate canon of the sciences1  
the foundation of them all4 ,if we did  
not believe in the truth of the law of  
causation1 namely1 that everything which
 has a beginning has a cause1 and that  
in the same circumstances the same      
things invariably happen1 all the       
sciences would at once crumble to dust4 
,in every scientific investigation1 this
 truth is assumed4 ,if we ask the       
zoologist how he knows that all camels  
are herbivorous1 he will no doubt point 
in the first instance to experience4    

,the habits of many thousands of camels 
have been observed4 ,but this only      
proves that those particular camels are 
herbivorous4 ,how about the millions    
that have never been observed at all8   
,he can only appeal to the law of       
causation4 ,the camel's structure is    
such that it cannot digest meat4 ,it is 
a case of cause and effect4 ,how do we  
know that water always freezes at #j    
deg4 centigrade 7neglecting questions of
 pressure1 etc478 ,how do we know that  
this is true at those regions of the    
earth where no one has ever been to see8
 ,only because we believe that in the   
same circumstances the same thing always
 happens1 that like causes always       
produce like effects4 ,but how do we    
know the truth of this law of causation 
itself8 ,science does not consider the  
question4 ,it traces its assertions back
 to this law1 but goes no #g further4   
,its fundamental canon it takes for     
granted4 ,the grounds of causation1 why 
it is true1 and how we know it is true1 

are1 therefore1 philosophical questions4
  ,one may be tempted to enquire whether
 many of these questions1 especially    
those connected with the ultimate       
reality1 do not transcend human         
faculties altogether1 and whether we had
 not better confine our enquiries to    
matters that are not too high for us4   
,one may question whether it is possible
 for finite minds to comprehend the     
infinite4 ,now it is very right that    
such questions should be asked1 and it  
is essential that a correct answer      
should be found4 ,but1 for the present1 
there is nothing to say about the       
matter1 except that these questions     
themselves constitute one of the most   
important problems of philosophy1 though
 it is one which1 as a matter of fact1  
has scarcely been considered in full    
until modern times4 ,the ,greeks did not
 raise the question4 ,footnote #b ,and  
as this is itself one of the problems of
 philosophy1 it will be well to start   
with an open mind4 ,the question cannot 

be decided offhand1 but must be         
thoroughly investigated4 ,that the      
finite mind of man cannot understand the
 infinite is one of those popular       
dogmatic assertions1 which are bruited  
about from mouth to mouth1 as if they   
were self-evident1 and so come to       
tyrannize over men's minds4 ,but for the
 most part those who make this statement
 have never thoroughly sifted the       
grounds of it1 but simply take it as    
something universally admitted1 and     
trouble no further about it4 ,but at the
 very least we should first know exactly
 what #h we mean by such terms as mind1 
finite1 and infinite4 ,and we shall not 
find that our difficulties end even     
there4  ,footnote #b3 ,the reasoning of 
the ,sceptics and others no doubt       
involved this question4 ,but they did   
not consider it in its peculiar modern  
form4   ,philosophy1 then1 deals with   
the universe as a whole2 and it seeks to
 take nothing for granted4 ,a third     
characteristic may be noted as          

especially important1 though here no    
doubt we are trenching upon matters upon
 which there is no such universal       
agreement4 ,philosophy is essentially an
 attempt to rise from sensuous to pure1 
that is1 non-senuous1 thought4 ,this    
requires some explanation4  ,we are     
conscious1 so to speak1 of two different
 worlds1 the external physical world and
 the internal mental world4 ,if we look 
outwards we are aware of the former1 if 
we turn our gaze inwards upon our own   
minds we become aware of the latter4 ,it
 may appear incorrect to say that the   
external world is purely physical1 for  
it includes other minds4 ,i am aware of 
your mind1 and this is1 to me1 part of  
the world which is external to me4 ,but 
,i am not now speaking of what we know  
by inference1 but only of what we       
directly perceive4 ,i cannot directly   
perceive your mind1 but only your       
physical body4 ,in the last resort it   
will be found that ,i am aware of the   
existence of your mind only by inference

 from perceived physical facts1 such as 
the movements of your body and the      
sounds that issue from your lips4 ,the  
only mind which ,i can immediately      
perceive is my own4 ,there is then a    
physical world external to us1 and an   
internal mental world4  ,which of these 
will naturally be regarded as the most  
real8 ,men will regard as the most real 
that which is the most familiar1 that   
which they came first into #i contact   
with1 and have most experience of4 ,and 
this is unquestionably the external     
material world4 ,when a child is born1  
it turns its eyes to the light1 which is
 an external physical thing4 ,gradually 
it gets to know different objects in the
 room4 ,it comes to know its mother1 but
 its mother is1 in the first instance1 a
 physical object1 a body4 ,it is only   
long afterwards that its mother becomes 
for the child a mind or a soul4 ,in     
general1 all our earliest experiences   
are of the material world4 ,we come to  
know of the mental world only by        

introspection1 and the habit of         
introspection comes in youth or manhood 
only1 and to many people it hardly comes
 at all4 ,in all those early            
impressionable years1 therefore1 when   
our most durable ideas of the universe  
are formed1 we are concerned almost     
exclusively with the material world4    
,the mental world with which we are much
 less familiar consequently tends to    
appear to all of us something           
comparatively unreal1 a world of        
shadows4 ,the bent of our minds becomes 
materialistic4  ,what ,i have said of   
the individual is equally true of the   
race4 ,primitive man does not brood over
 the facts of his own mind4 ,necessity  
compels him to devote most of his life  
to the acquisition of food1 and to      
warding off the dangers which           
continually threaten him from other     
physical objects4 ,and even among       
ourselves1 the majority of men have to  
spend most of their time upon           
considering various aspects of things   

external to them4 ,by the individual    
training of each man1 and by long       
hereditary habit1 then1 it comes about  
that men tend to regard the physical    
world as more real than the mental4  #aj
  ,abundant evidences of this are to be 
found in the structure of human         
language4 ,we seek to explain what is   
strange by means of what is well-known4 
,we try to express the unfamiliar in    
terms of the familiar4 ,we shall find   
that language always seeks to express   
the mental by the analogy of the        
physical4 ,we speak of a man as a clear 
thinker4 ,clear is an attribute of      
physical objects4 ,water is clear if it 
has no extraneous matter in it4 ,we say 
that a man's ideas are luminous1 thus   
taking a metaphor from physical light4  
,we talk of having an idea at the back  
of the mind4 ,at the back of8 ,has the  
mind got a front and a back8 ,we are    
thinking of it as if it were a physical 
thing in space4 ,we speak of mental     
habits of attention4 ,attention means   

stretching or turning the mind in a     
special direction4 ,we reflect4         
,reflection means bending our thoughts  
back upon themselves4 ,but1 literally   
speaking1 only physical objects can be  
stretched1 turned1 and bent4 ,whenever  
we wish to express something mental we  
do it by a physical analogy4 ,we talk of
 it in terms of physical things4 ,this  
shows how deep-rooted our materialism   
is4 ,if the mental world were more      
familiar and real to us than the        
material1 language would have been      
constructed on the opposite principle4  
,the earliest words of language would   
have expressed mental facts1 and we     
should afterwards have tried to express 
physical things by means of mental      
analogies4  ,in the ,east one commonly  
hears ,oriental idealism contrasted with
 ,western materialism4 ,such phrases may
 possess a certain relative truth4 ,but 
if they mean that there is in the ,east1
 or anywhere else in the world1 #aa a   
race of men who are naturally idealists1

 they are nonsense4 ,materialism is     
ingrained in all men4 ,we1 ,easterns or 
,westerns1 are born materialists4 ,hence
 when we try to think of objects which  
are commonly regarded as non-material1  
such as ,god or the soul1 it requires   
continual effort1 a tremendous struggle1
 to avoid picturing them as material    
things4 ,it goes utterly against the    
grain4 ,perhaps hundreds of thousands of
 years of hereditary materialism are    
against us4 ,the popular idea of ghosts 
will illustrate this4 ,those who believe
 in ghosts1 ,i suppose1 regard them as  
some sort of disembodied souls4 ,the    
pictures of ghosts in magazines show    
them as if composed of matter1 but      
matter of some thin kind1 such as       
vapour4 ,certain ,indian systems of     
thought1 which are by way of regarding  
themselves as idealistic1 nevertheless  
teach that thought or mind is an        
extremely subtle kind of matter1 far    
subtler than any ever dealt with by the 
physicist and chemist4 ,this is very    

interesting1 because it shows that the  
authors of such ideas feel vaguely that 
it is wrong to think of thought as if it
 were matter1 but being unable to think 
of it in any other way1 owing to man's  
ingrained materialism1 they seek to     
palliate their sin by making it thin    
matter4 ,of course this is just as      
absurd as the excuse made by the mother 
of an illegitimate child1 that it was a 
very small one4 ,this thin matter is    
just as material as lead or brass4 ,and 
such systems are purely materialistic4  
,but they illustrate the extraordinary  
difficulty that the ordinary mind       
experiences in attempting to rise from  
sensuous to non-sensuous thinking4 ,they
 illustrate the ingrained materialism of
 man4  ,this natural human materialism  
is also the cause #ab of mysticism and  
symbolism4 ,a symbolic thought          
necessarily contains two terms1 the     
symbol and the reality which it         
symbolizes4 ,the symbol is always a     
sensuous or material object1 or the     

mental image of such an object1 and the 
reality is always something             
non-sensuous4 ,because the human mind   
finds it such an incredible struggle to 
think non-sensuously1 it seeks to help  
itself by symbols4 ,it takes a material 
thing and makes it stand for the        
non-material thing which it is too weak 
to grasp4 ,thus we talk of ,god as the  
light of lights4 ,no doubt this is a    
very natural expression of the religious
 consciousness1 and it has its meaning4 
,but it is not the naked truth4 ,light  
is a physical existence1 and ,god is no 
more light than he is heat or           
electricity4 ,people talk of symbolism  
as if it were a very high and exalted   
thing4 ,they say1 ,what a wonderful     
piece of symbolism6 ,but1 in truth      
symbolism is the mark of an infirm mind4
 ,it is the measure of our weakness and 
not of our strength4 ,its root is in    
materialism1 and it is produced and     
propagated by those who are unable to   
rise above a materialistic level4  ,now 

philosophy is essentially the attempt to
 get beyond this sort of symbolic and   
mystical thinking1 to get at the naked  
truth1 to grasp what lies behind the    
symbol as it is in itself4 ,these       
inferior modes of thought are a help to 
those who are themselves below their    
level1 but are a hindrance to those who 
seek to reach the highest level of      
truth4  ,it is often said that          
philosophy is a very difficult and      
abstruse subject4 ,its difficulty lies  
almost wholly in the struggle to think  
non-sensuously4 ,whenever we #ac come to
 anything in philosophy that seems      
beyond us1 we shall generally find that 
the root of the trouble is that we are  
trying to think non-sensuous objects in 
a sensuous way1 that is1 we are trying  
to form mental pictures and images of   
them1 for all mental pictures are       
composed of sensuous materials1 and     
hence no such picture is adequate for a 
pure thought4 ,it is impossible to      
exaggerate this difficulty4 ,even the   

greatest philosophers have succumbed to 
it4 ,we shall constantly have to point  
out that when a great thinker1 such as  
,parmenides or ,plato1 fails1 and begins
 to flounder in difficulties1 the reason
 usually is that1 though for a time he  
has attained to pure thought1 he has    
sunk back exhausted into sensuous       
thinking1 and has attempted to form     
mental pictures of what is beyond the   
power of any such picture to represent1 
and so has fallen into contradictions4  
,we must keep this constantly in mind in
 the study of philosophy4  ,in modern   
times philosophy is variously divided1  
as into metaphysics1 which is the theory
 of reality1 ethics1 the theory of the  
good1 and aesthetics1 the theory of the 
beautiful4 ,modern divisions do not1    
however1 altogether fit in with ,greek  
philosophy1 and it is better to let the 
natural divisions develop themselves as 
we go on1 than to attempt to force our  
material into these moulds4  ,if1 now1  
we look round the world and ask2 in what

 countries and what ages the kind of    
thought we have described has attained a
 high degree of development1 we shall   
find such a development only in ancient 
,greece and in modern ,europe4 ,there   
were great civilizations in ,egypt1     
,china1 ,assyria1 and so on4 ,they      
produced art and religion1 but no       
philosophy to speak of4 ,even #ad       
ancient ,rome added nothing to the      
world's philosophical knowledge4 ,its   
so-called philosophers1 ,marcus         
,aurelius1 ,seneca1 ,epictetus1         
,lucretius1 produced no essentially new 
principle4 ,they were merely disciples  
of ,greek ,schools1 whose writings may  
be full of interest and of noble        
feeling1 but whose essential thoughts   
contained nothing not already developed 
by the ,greeks4  ,the case of ,india is 
more doubtful4 ,opinions may differ as  
to whether ,india ever had any          
philosophy4 ,the ,upanishads contain    
religio-philosophical thinking of a     
kind4 ,and later we have the six        

so-called schools of philosophy4 ,the   
reasons why this ,indian thought is not 
usually included in histories of        
philosophy are as follows4 ,firstly1    
philosophy in ,india has never separated
 itself from religious and practical    
needs4 ,the ideal of knowledge for its  
own sake is rarely to be found4         
,knowledge is desired merely as a means 
towards salvation4 ,philosophy and      
science1 said ,aristotle1 have their    
roots in wonder1--the desire to know and
 understand for the sole sake of knowing
 and understanding4 ,but the roots of   
,indian thought lie in the anxiety of   
the individual to escape from the ills  
and calamities of existence4 ,this is   
not the scientific1 but the practical   
spirit4 ,it gives birth to religions1   
but not to philosophies4 ,of course it  
is a mistake to imagine that philosophy 
and religion are totally separate and   
have no community4 ,they are in fact    
fundamentally akin4 ,but they are also  
distinct4 ,perhaps the truest view is   

that they are identical in substance1   
but different in form4 ,the substance of
 both is the absolute reality and the   
relation of all things1 including men1  
to that reality4 ,but whereas philosophy
 presents this subject-matter           
scientifically1 in #ae the form of pure 
thought1 religion gives it in the form  
of sensuous pictures1 myths1 images1 and
 symbols4  ,and this gives us the second
 reason why ,indian thought is more     
properly classed as religious than      
philosophical4 ,it seldom or never rises
 from sensuous to pure thought4 ,it is  
poetical rather than scientific4 ,it is 
content with symbols and metaphors in   
place of rational explanations1 and all 
this is a mark of the religious1 rather 
than the philosophical1 presentation of 
the truth4 ,for example1 the main       
thought of the ,upanishads is that the  
entire universe is derived from a       
single1 changeless1 eternal1 infinite1  
being1 called ,brahman or ,paramatman4  
,when we come to the crucial question   

how the universe arises out of this     
being1 we find such passages as         
this3--,as the colours in the flame or  
the red-hot iron proceed therefrom a    
thousand-fold1 so do all beings proceed 
from the ,unchangeable1 and return again
 to it4 ,or again1 ,as the web issues   
from the spider1 as little sparks       
proceed from fire1 so from the one soul 
proceed all living animals1 all worlds1 
all the gods and all beings4 ,there are 
thousands of such passages in the       
,upanishads4 ,but obviously these       
neither explain nor attempt to explain  
anything4 ,they are nothing but hollow  
metaphors4 ,they are poetic rather than 
scientific4 ,they may satisfy the       
imagination and the religious feelings1 
but not the rational understanding4 ,or 
when again ,krishna1 in the             
,bhagavat-,gita1 describes himself as   
the moon among the lunar mansions1 the  
sun among the stars1 ,meru among the    
high-peaked mountains1 it is clear that 
we are merely piling sensuous image upon

 sensuous image without any further     
understanding of what the nature of the 
absolute being in its own self is4 #af  
,the moon1 the sun1 ,meru1 are physical 
sense-objects4 ,and this is totally     
sensuous thinking1 whereas the aim of   
philosophy is to rise to pure thought4  
,in such passages we are still on the   
level of symbolism1 and philosophy only 
begins when symbolism has been          
surpassed4 ,no doubt it is possible to  
take the line that man's thought is not 
capable of grasping the infinite as it  
is in itself1 and can only fall back    
upon symbols4 ,but that is another      
question1 and at any rate1 whether it is
 or is not possible to rise from        
sensuous to pure thought1 philosophy is 
essentially the attempt to do so4       
,lastly1 ,indian thought is usually     
excluded from the history of philosophy 
because1 whatever its character1 it lies
 outside the main stream of human       
development4 ,it has been cut off by    
geographical and other barriers4        

,consequently1 whatever its value in    
itself1 it has exerted little influence 
upon philosophy in general4  ,the claim 
is sometimes put forward by ,orientals  
themselves that ,greek philosophy came  
from ,india1 and if this were true1 it  
would greatly affect the statement made 
in the last paragraph4 ,but it is not   
true4 ,it used to be believed that      
,greek philosophy came from the ,east1  
but this meant ,egypt4 ,and even this   
theory is now abandoned4 ,greek culture1
 especially mathematics and astronomy1  
owed much to ,egypt4 ,but ,greece did   
not owe its philosophy to that source4  
,the view that it did was propagated by 
,alexandrian priests and others1 whose  
sole motive was1 that to represent the  
triumphs of ,greek philosophy as        
borrowed from ,egypt1 flattered their   
national vanity4 ,it was a great thing1 
wherever they found anything good1 to   
say1 this must have come from us4 ,a    
precisely similar motive lies behind the
 #ag ,oriental claim that ,greek        

philosophy came from ,india4 ,there is  
not a scrap of evidence for it1 and it  
rests entirely upon the supposed        
resemblance between the two4 ,but this  
resemblance is in fact mythical4 ,the   
whole character of ,greek philosophy is 
,european and unoriental to the         
back-bone4 ,the doctrine of             
re-incarnation is usually appealed to4  
,this characteristically ,indian        
doctrine was held by the ,pythagoreans1 
from whom it passed to ,empedocles and  
,plato4 ,the ,pythagoreans got it from  
the ,orphic sect1 to whom quite possibly
 it came indirectly from ,india1        
although even this is by no means       
certain1 and is in fact highly doubtful4
 ,but even if this be true1 it proves   
nothing4 ,re-incarnation is of little   
importance in ,greek philosophy4 ,even  
in ,plato1 who makes much of it1 it is  
quite unessential to the fundamental    
ideas of his philosophy1 and is only    
artificially connected with them4 ,and  
the influence of this doctrine upon     

,plato's philosophy was thoroughly bad4 
,it was largely responsible for leading 
him into the main error of his          
philosophy1 which it required an        
,aristotle to correct4 ,all this will be
 evident when we come to consider the   
systems of ,plato and ,aristotle4  ,the 
origin of ,greek philosophy is not to be
 found in ,india1 or ,egypt1 or in any  
country outside ,greece4 ,the ,greeks   
themselves were solely responsible for  
it4 ,it is not as if history traces back
 their thought only to a point at which 
it was already highly developed1 and    
cannot explain its beginnings4 ,we know 
its history from the time1 so to speak1 
when it was in the cradle4 ,in the next 
two chapters we shall see that the first
 ,greek attempts at philosophising were 
so much the beginnings of a beginner1   
were so very crude and unformed1 that it
 is #ah mere perversity to suppose that 
they could not make these simple efforts
 for themselves4 ,from those crude      
beginnings we can trace the whole       

development in detail up to its         
culmination in ,aristotle1 and beyond4  
,so there is no need to assume foreign  
influence at any point4  ,greek         
philosophy begins in the sixth century  
before ,christ4 ,it begins when men for 
the first time attempted to give a      
scientific reply to the question1 what  
is the explanation of the world8 ,before
 this era we have1 of course1 the       
mythologies1 cosmogonies1 and theologies
 of the poets4 ,but they contain no     
attempt at a naturalistic explanation of
 things4 ,they belong to the spheres of 
poetry and religion1 not to philosophy4 
,it must not be supposed1 when we speak 
of the philosophy of ,greece1 that we   
refer only to the mainland of what is   
now called ,greece4 ,very early in      
history1 ,greeks of the mainland        
migrated to the islands of the ,aegean1 
to ,sicily1 to the ,south of ,italy1 to 
the coast of ,asia ,minor1 and          
elsewhere1 and founded flourishing      
colonies4 ,the ,greece of philosophy    

includes all these places4 ,it is to be 
thought of rather racially than         
territorially4 ,it is the philosophy of 
the men of ,greek race1 wherever they   
happened to be situated4 ,and in fact   
the first period of ,greek philosophy   
deals exclusively with the thoughts of  
these colonial ,greeks4 ,it was not till
 just before the time of ,socrates that 
philosophy was transplanted to the      
mainland4  ,greek philosophy falls      
naturally into three periods4 ,the first
 may be roughly described as            
pre-,socratic philosophy1 though it does
 not include the ,sophists who were both
 the contemporaries and the predecessors
 of ,socrates4 ,this period is the rise 
of ,greek philosophy4 #ai ,secondly1 the
 period from the ,sophists to           
,aristotle1 which includes ,socrates and
 ,plato1 is the maturity of ,greek      
philosophy1 the actual zenith and       
culmination of which is undoubtedly the 
system of ,aristotle4 ,lastly1 the      
period of post-,aristotelian philosophy 

constitutes the decline and fall of the 
national thought4 ,these are not merely 
arbitrary divisions4 ,each period has   
its own special characters1 which will  
be described in the sequel4  ,a few     
words must be said of the sources of our
 knowledge of pre-,socratic philosophy4 
,if we want to know what ,plato and     
,aristotle thought about any matter1 we 
have only to consult their works4 ,but  
the works of the earlier philosophers   
have not come down to us1 except in     
fragments1 and several of them never    
committed their opinions to writing4    
,our knowledge of their doctrines is the
 result of the laborious sifting by     
scholars of such materials as are       
available4 ,luckily the material has    
been plentiful4 ,it may be divided into 
three classes4 ,first come the fragments
 of the original writings of the        
philosophers themselves4 ,these are in  
many cases long and important1 in other 
cases scanty4 ,secondly1 there are the  
references in ,plato and ,aristotle4 ,of

 these by far the most important are to 
be found in the first book of           
,aristotle's ,metaphysics1 which is a   
history of philosophy up to his own     
time1 and is the first attempt on record
 to write a history of philosophy4      
,thirdly1 there is an enormous mass of  
references1 some valuable1 some         
worthless1 contained in the works of    
later1 but still ancient1 writers4  #bj 
,,chapter ,,ii  ,,the ,,ionics4    ,the 
earliest ,greek philosophers belong to  
what in after times came to be called   
the ,ionic school4 ,the name was derived
 from the fact that the three chief     
representatives of this school1 ,thales1
 ,anaximander1 and ,anaximenes1 were all
 men of ,ionia1 that is to say1 the     
coast of ,asia ,minor4    ,thales  ,as  
the founder of the earliest school in   
history1 ,thales of ,miletus is         
generally accounted the founder and     
father of all philosophy4 ,he was born  
about #fbd ,b4,c4 and died about #eej   
,b4,c4 ,these dates are approximate1 and

 it should be understood that the same  
thing is true of nearly all the dates of
 the early philosophers4 ,different     
scholars vary1 sometimes as much as ten 
years1 in the dates they give4 ,we shall
 not enter into these questions at all1 
because they are of no importance4 ,and 
throughout these lectures it should be  
understood that the dates given are     
approximate4  ,thales1 at any rate1 was 
a contemporary of ,solon and ,croesus4  
,he was famous in antiquity for his     
mathematical and astronomical learning1 
and also for his practical sagacity and 
wisdom4 ,he is included in #ba all the  
accounts of the ,seven ,sages4 ,the     
story of the ,seven ,sages is           
unhistorical1 but the fact that the     
lists of their names differ considerably
 as given by different writers1 whereas 
the name of ,thales appears in all1     
shows with what veneration he was       
anciently regarded4 ,an eclipse of the  
sun occurred in #ehe ,b4,c41 and ,thales
 is alleged to have predicted it1 which 

was a feat for the astronomy of those   
times4 ,and he must have been a great   
engineer1 for he caused a diversion of  
the river ,halys1 when ,croesus and his 
army were unable to cross it4 ,nothing  
else is known of his life1 though there 
were many apocryphal stories4  ,no      
writings by ,thales were extant even in 
the time of ,aristotle1 and it is       
believed that he wrote nothing4 ,his    
philosophy1 if we can call it by that   
name1 consisted1 so far as we know1 of  
two propositions4 ,firstly1 that the    
principle of all things is water1 that  
all comes from water1 and to water all  
returns4 ,and secondly1 that the earth  
is a flat disc which floats upon water4 
,the first1 which is the chief          
proposition1 means that water is the one
 primal kind of existence and that      
everything else in the universe is      
merely a modification of water4 ,two    
questions will naturally occur to us4   
,why did ,thales choose water as the    
first principle8 ,and by what process   

does water1 in his opinion1 come to be  
changed into other things2 how was the  
universe formed out of water8 ,we cannot
 answer either of these questions with  
certainty4 ,aristotle says that ,thales 
probably derived his opinion from       
observing that the nutriment of all     
things is moist1 and that even actual   
heat is generated therefrom1 and that   
animal life is sustained by water1 444  
and from the fact that the seeds of all 
things possess #bb a moist nature1 and  
that water is a first principle of all  
things that are humid4 ,this is very    
likely the true explanation4 ,but it    
will be noted that even ,aristotle uses 
the word probably1 and so gives his     
statement merely as a conjecture4 ,how1 
in the opinion of ,thales1 the universe 
arose out of water1 is even more        
uncertain4 ,most likely he never asked  
himself the question1 and gave no       
explanation4 ,at any rate nothing is    
known on the point4  ,this being the sum
 and substance of the teaching of       

,thales1 we may naturally ask why1 on   
account of such a crude and undeveloped 
idea1 he should be given the title of   
the father of philosophy4 ,why should   
philosophy be said to begin here in     
particular8 ,now1 the significance of   
,thales is not that his water-philosophy
 has any value in itself1 but that this 
was the first recorded attempt to       
explain the universe on naturalistic and
 scientific principles1 without the aid 
of myths and anthropomorphic gods4      
,moreover1 ,thales propounded the       
problem1 and determined the direction   
and character1 of all pre-,socratic     
philosophy4 ,the fundamental thought of 
that period was1 that under the         
multiplicity of the world there must be 
a single ultimate principle4 ,the       
problem of all philosophers from ,thales
 to ,anaxagoras was1 what is the nature 
of that first principle from which all  
things have issued8 ,their systems are  
all attempts to answer this question1   
and may be classified according to their

 different replies4 ,thus ,thales       
asserted that the ultimate reality is   
water1 ,anaximander indefinite matter1  
,anaximenes air1 the ,pythagoreans      
number1 the ,eleatics ,being1           
,heracleitus fire1 ,empedocles the four 
elements1 ,democritus atoms1 and so on4 
,the first period is thus #bc           
essentially cosmological in character1  
and it was ,thales who determined the   
character4 ,his importance is that he   
was the first to propound the question1 
not that he gave any rational reply to  
it4  ,we saw in the first chapter1 that 
man is naturally a materialist1 and that
 philosophy is the movement from        
sensuous to non-sensuous thought4 ,as we
 should expect1 then1 philosophy begins 
in materialism4 ,the first answer to the
 question1 what the ultimate reality is1
 places the nature of that reality in a 
sensuous object1 water4 ,the other      
members of the ,ionic school1           
,anaximander1 and ,anaximenes1 are also 
materialists4 ,and from their time      

onwards we can trace the gradual rise of
 thought1 with occasional breaks and    
relapses1 from this sensualism of the   
,ionics1 through the semi-sensuous      
idealism of the ,eleatics1 to the       
highest point of pure non-sensuous      
thought1 the idealism of ,plato and     
,aristotle4 ,it is important to keep in 
mind1 then1 that the history of         
philosophy is not a mere chaotic        
hotch-potch of opinions and theories1   
succeeding each other without connection
 or order4 ,it is a logical and         
historical evolution1 each step in which
 is determined by the last1 and advances
 beyond the last towards a definite     
goal4 ,the goal1 of course1 is visible  
to us1 but was not visible to the early 
thinkers themselves4  ,since man begins 
by looking outwards upon the external   
world and not inwards upon his own self1
 this fact too determines the character 
of the first period of ,greek           
philosophy4 ,it concerns itself solely  
with nature1 with the external world1   

and only with man as a part of nature4  
,it demands an explanation of nature4   
,and this is the same as saying that it 
is cosmological4 ,the #bd problems of   
man1 of life1 of human destiny1 of      
ethics1 are treated by it scantily1 or  
not at all4 ,it is not till the time of 
the ,sophists that the ,greek spirit    
turns inwards upon itself and begins to 
consider these problems1 and with the   
emergence of that point of view we have 
passed from the first to the second     
period of ,greek philosophy4  ,because  
the ,ionic philosophers were all        
materialists they are also sometimes    
called ,hylicists1 from the ,greek hule 
which means matter4    ,anaximander     
,the next philosopher of the ,ionic     
school is ,anaximander4 ,he was an      
exceedingly original and audacious      
thinker4 ,he was probably born about    
#faa ,b4,c4 and died about #edg4 ,he was
 an inhabitant of ,miletus1 and is said 
to have been a disciple of ,thales4 ,it 
will be seen1 thus1 that he was a       

younger contemporary of ,thales4 ,he was
 born at the time that ,thales was      
flourishing1 and was about a generation 
younger4 ,he was the first ,greek to    
write a philosophic treatise1 which     
however has been unfortunately lost4 ,he
 was eminent for his astronomical and   
geographical knowledge1 and in this     
connection was the first to construct a 
map4 ,details of his life are not known4
  ,now ,thales had made the ultimate    
principle of the universe1 water4       
,anaximander agrees with ,thales that   
the ultimate principle of things is     
material1 but he does not name it water1
 does not in fact believe that it is any
 particular kind of matter4 ,it is      
rather a formless1 indefinite1 and      
absolutely featureless matter in        
general4 #be ,matter1 as we know it1 is 
always some particular kind of matter4  
,it must be iron1 brass1 water1 air1 or 
other such4 ,the difference between the 
different kinds of matter is            
qualitative1 that is to say1 we know    

that air is air because it has the      
qualities of air and differs from iron  
because iron has the qualities of iron1 
and so on4 ,the primeval matter of      
,anaximander is just matter not yet     
sundered into the different kinds of    
matter4 ,it is therefore formless and   
characterless4 ,and as it is thus       
indeterminate in quality1 so it is      
illimitable in quantity4 ,anaximander   
believed that this matter stretches out 
to infinity through space4 ,the reason  
he gave for this opinion was1 that if   
there were a limited amount of matter it
 would long ago have been used up in the
 creation and destruction of the        
innumerable worlds4 ,hence he called it 
the boundless4 ,in regard to these      
innumerable worlds1 the traditional     
opinion about ,anaximander was that he  
believed these worlds to succeed each   
other in time1 and that first a world   
was created1 developed1 and was         
destroyed1 then another world arose1 was
 developed and destroyed1 and that this 

periodic revolution of worlds went on   
for ever4 ,professor ,burnet1 however1  
is of opinion that the innumerable      
worlds of ,anaximander were not         
necessarily successive but rather       
simultaneously existing worlds4         
,according to this view there may be any
 number of worlds existing at the same  
time4 ,but1 even so1 it is still true   
that these worlds were not everlasting1 
but began1 developed and decayed1 giving
 place in due time to other worlds4     
,how1 now1 have these various worlds    
been formed out of the formless1        
indefinite1 indeterminate matter of #bf 
,anaximander8 ,on this question         
,anaximander is vague and has nothing   
very definite to put forward4           
,indeterminate matter by a vaguely      
conceived process separates itself into 
the hot and the cold4 ,the cold is moist
 or damp4 ,this cold and moist matter   
becomes the earth1 in the centre of the 
universe4 ,the hot matter collects into 
a sphere of fire surrounding the earth4 

,the earth in the centre was originally 
fluid4 ,the heat of the surrounding     
sphere caused the waters of the earth   
progressively to evaporate giving rise  
to the envelope of air which surrounds  
the earth4 ,for the early ,greeks       
regarded the air and vapour as the same 
thing4 ,as this air or vapour expanded  
under the action of heat it burst the   
outside hot sphere of fire into a series
 of enormous wheel-shaped husks1        
resembling cart wheels1 which encircle  
the earth4 ,you may naturally ask how it
 is that if these are composed of fire  
we do not see them continually glowing4 
,anaximander's answer was that these    
wheel-shaped husks are encrusted with   
thick1 opaque vapour1 which conceals the
 inner fire from our view4 ,but there   
are apertures1 or pipe-like holes in the
 vapour-crust1 and through these the    
fire gleams1 causing the appearance of  
the sun1 stars1 and moon4 ,you will note
 that the moon was1 on this theory1     
considered to be fiery1 and not1 as we  

now know it to be1 a cold surface       
reflecting the sun's light4 ,there were 
three of these cart wheels2 the first   
was that of the sun1 furthest away from 
the earth1 nearer to us was that of the 
moon1 and closest of all was that of the
 fixed stars4 ,the wheel-shaped husks   
containing the heavenly bodies are      
revolved round the earth by means of    
currents of air4 ,the earth in the      
centre was believed by #bg ,anaximander 
to be not spherical but cylindrical4    
,men live on the top end of this pillar 
or cylinder4  ,anaximander also         
developed a striking theory about the   
origin and evolution of living beings4  
,in the beginning the earth was fluid   
and in the gradual drying up by         
evaporation of this fluid1 living beings
 were produced from the heat and        
moisture4 ,in the first instance these  
beings were of a low order4 ,they       
gradually evolved into successively     
higher and higher organisms by means of 
adaptation to their environment4 ,man   

was in the first instance a fish living 
in the water4 ,the gradual drying up    
left parts of the earth high and dry1   
and marine animals migrated to the land1
 and their fins by adaptation became    
members fitted for movement on land4    
,the resemblance of this primitive      
theory to modern theories of evolution  
is remarkable4 ,it is easy to exaggerate
 its importance1 but it is at any rate  
clear that ,anaximander had1 by a happy 
guess1 hit upon the central idea of     
adaptation of species to their          
environment4  ,the teaching of          
,anaximander exhibits a marked advance  
beyond the position of ,thales4 ,thales 
had taught that the first principle of  
things is water4 ,the formless matter of
 ,anaximander is1 philosophically1 an   
advance on this1 showing the operation  
of thought and abstraction4 ,secondly1  
,anaximander had definitely attempted to
 apply this idea1 and to derive from it 
the existent world4 ,thales had left the
 question how the primal water developed

 into a world1 entirely unanswered4     
,anaximenes  ,like the two previous     
thinkers ,anaximenes was an inhabitant  
of ,miletus4 ,he was born about #ehh    
,b4,c4 and #bh died about #ebd4 ,he     
wrote a treatise of which a small       
fragment still remains4 ,he agreed with 
,thales and ,anaximander that the first 
principle of the universe is material4  
,with ,thales too1 he looked upon it as 
a particular kind of matter1 not        
indeterminate matter as taught by       
,anaximander4 ,thales had declared it to
 be water4 ,anaximenes named air as     
first principle4 ,this air1 like the    
matter of ,anaximander1 stretches       
illimitably through space4 ,air is      
constantly in motion and has the power  
of motion inherent in it and this motion
 brought about the development of the   
universe from air4 ,as operating process
 of this development ,anaximenes named  
the two opposite processes of 7#a7      
,rarefaction1 7#b7 ,condensation4       
,rarefaction is the same thing as heat  

or growing hot1 and condensation is     
identified with growing cold4 ,the air  
by rarefaction becomes fire1 and fire   
borne aloft upon the air becomes the    
stars4 ,by the opposite process of      
condensation1 air first becomes clouds  
and1 by further degrees of condensation1
 becomes successively water1 earth1 and 
rocks4 ,the world resolves again in the 
course of time into the primal air4     
,anaximenes1 like ,anaximander1 held the
 theory of innumerable worlds1 and these
 worlds are1 according to the           
traditional view1 successive4 ,but here 
again ,professor ,burnet considers that 
the innumerable worlds may have been    
co-existent as well as successive4      
,anaximenes considered the earth to be a
 flat disc floating upon air4  ,the     
origin of the air theory of ,anaximenes 
seems to have been suggested to him by  
the fact that air in the form of breath 
is the principle of life4  ,the teaching
 of ,anaximenes seems at first sight to 
be #bi a falling off from the position  

of ,anaximander1 because he goes back to
 the position of ,thales in favour of a 
determinate matter as first principle4  
,but in one respect at least there is   
here an advance upon ,anaximander4 ,the 
latter had been vague as to how formless
 matter differentiates itself into the  
world of objects4 ,anaximenes names the 
definite processes of rarefaction and   
condensation4 ,if you believe1 as these 
early physicists did1 that every        
different kind of matter is ultimately  
one kind of matter1 the problem of the  
differentiation of the qualities of the 
existent elements arises4 ,for example1 
if this paper is really composed of air1
 how do we account for its colour1 its  
hardness1 texture1 etc4 ,either these   
qualities must be originally in the     
primal air1 or not4 ,if the qualities   
existed in it then it was not really one
 homogeneous matter like air1 but must  
have been simply a mixture of different 
kinds of matter4 ,if not1 how do these  
properties arise8 ,how can this air     

which has not in it the qualities of    
things we see1 develop them8 ,the       
simplest way of getting out of the      
difficulty is to found quality upon     
quantity1 and to explain the former by  
the amount or quantity1 more or less1 of
 matter existent in the same volume4    
,this is precisely what is meant by     
rarefaction and condensation4           
,condensation would result in           
compressing more matter into the same   
volume4 ,rarefaction would give rise to 
the opposite process4 ,great compression
 of air1 a great amount of it in a small
 space1 might account for the qualities1
 say1 of earth and stones1 for example1 
their heaviness1 hardness1 colour1 etc4 
,hence ,anaximenes was to some extent a 
more logical and definite thinker than  
,anaximander1 but cannot #cj compare    
with him in audacity and originality of 
thought4    ,other ,ionic ,thinkers  ,we
 have now considered the three chief    
thinkers of the ,ionic ,school4 ,others 
there were1 but they added nothing new  

to the teaching of these three4 ,they   
followed either ,thales or ,anaximenes  
in stating the first principle of the   
world either as water or as air4 ,hippo1
 for example1 followed ,thales1 and for 
him the world is composed of water1     
,idaeus agreed with ,anaximenes that it 
is derived from air4 ,diogenes of       
,apollonia is chiefly remarkable for the
 fact that he lived at a very much later
 date4 ,he was a contemporary of        
,anaxagoras1 and opposed to the more    
developed teachings of that philosopher 
the crude materialism of the ,ionic     
,school4 ,air was by him considered to  
be the ground of all things4  #ca       
,,chapter ,,iii  ,,the ,,pythagoreans   
,not much is known of the life of       
,pythagoras4 ,three so-called           
biographies have come down to us from   
antiquity1 but they were written        
hundreds of years after the event1 and  
are filled with a tissue of extravagant 
fancies1 and with stories of miracles   
and wonders worked by ,pythagoras4 ,all 

sorts of fantastic legends seem to have 
gathered very early around his life1    
obscuring from us the actual historical 
details4 ,a few definite facts1 however1
 are known4 ,he was born somewhere      
between #ehj and #egj ,b4,c4 at ,samos1 
and about middle age he migrated to     
,crotona in ,south ,italy4 ,according to
 legend1 before he arrived in ,south    
,italy he had travelled extensively in  
,egypt and other countries of the ,east4
 ,there is1 however1 no historical      
evidence of this4 ,there is nothing in  
itself improbable in the belief that    
,pythagoras made these travels1 but it  
cannot be accepted as proved for lack of
 evidence4 ,the legend is really founded
 simply upon the oriental flavour of his
 doctrines4 ,in middle age he arrived in
 ,south ,italy and settled at ,crotona4 
,there he founded the ,pythagorean      
,society and lived for many years at the
 head of it4 ,his later life1 the date  
and manner of his death1 are not        
certainly known4  ,now it is important  

to note that the ,pythagorean #cb       
,society was not primarily a school of  
philosophy at all4 ,it was really a     
religious and moral ,order1 a ,society  
of religious reformers4 ,the            
,pythagoreans were closely associated   
with the ,orphic ,sect1 and took from it
 the belief in the transmigration of    
souls1 including transmigration of human
 souls into animals4 ,they also taught  
the doctrine of the wheel of things1 and
 the necessity of obtaining release from
 it1 by which one could escape from the 
weary round of reincarnate lives4 ,thus 
they shared with the ,orphic religious  
,sect the principle of reincarnation4   
,the ,orphic ,sect believed that release
 from the wheel of life was to be       
obtained by religious ceremonial and    
ritual4 ,the ,pythagoreans had a similar
 ritual1 but they added to this the     
belief that intellectual pursuits1 the  
cultivation of science and philosophy1  
and1 in general1 the intellectual       
contemplation of the ultimate things of 

the universe would be of great help     
towards the release of the soul4 ,from  
this arose the tendency to develop      
science and philosophy4 ,gradually their
 philosophy attained a semi-independence
 from their religious rites which       
justifies us in regarding it definitely 
as philosophy4  ,the ,pythagorean       
ethical views were rigorous and ascetic 
in character4 ,they insisted upon the   
utmost purity of life in the members of 
the ,order4 ,abstinence from flesh was  
insisted upon1 although this was        
apparently a late development4 ,we know 
that ,pythagoras himself was not a total
 abstainer from flesh4 ,they forbade the
 eating of beans4 ,they wore a garb     
peculiar to themselves4 ,the body1 they 
taught1 is the prison or tomb of the    
soul4 ,they thought that one must not   
attempt to obtain release by suicide1   
because man is the #cc property of ,god1
 the chattel of ,god4 ,they were not    
politicians in the modern sense1 but    
their procedure in practice amounted to 

the greatest possible interference in   
politics4 ,it appears that the          
,pythagoreans attempted to impose their 
ordinances upon the ordinary citizens of
 ,crotona4 ,they aimed at the           
supersession of the ,state by their own 
,order and they did actually capture the
 government of ,crotona for a short     
period4 ,this led to attacks on the     
,order1 and the persecution of its      
members4 ,when the plain citizen of     
,crotona was told not to eat beans1 and 
that under no circumstances could he eat
 his own dog1 this was too much4 ,a     
general persecution occurred4 ,the      
meeting place of the ,pythagoreans was  
burnt to the ground1 the ,society was   
scattered1 and its members killed or    
driven away4 ,this occurred between the 
years #ddj and #dcj ,b4,c4 ,some years  
later the ,society revived and continued
 its activities1 but we do not hear much
 of it after the fourth century ,b4,c4  
,it was largely a mystical society4 ,the
 ,pythagoreans developed their own      

ritual1 ceremonial and mysteries4 ,this 
love of mystery1 and their general      
character as miracle-mongers1 largely   
account for the legends which grew up   
around the life of ,pythagoras himself4 
,their scientific activities were also  
considerable4 ,they enforced moral      
self-control4 ,they cultivated the arts 
and crafts1 gymnastics1 music1 medicine1
 and mathematics4 ,the development of   
mathematics in early ,greece was largely
 the work of the ,pythagoreans4         
,pythagoras is said to have discovered  
the #dgth ,proposition of ,euclid1 and  
to have sacrificed an ox in honour      
thereof4 ,and there is good reason to   
believe that practically the whole of   
the substance of the ,first ,book of    
,euclid is the work of ,pythagoras4  #cd
  ,turning now to their philosophical   
teaching1 the first thing that we have  
to understand is that we cannot speak of
 the philosophy of ,pythagoras1 but only
 of the philosophy of the ,pythagoreans4
 ,for it is not known what share        

,pythagoras had in this philosophy or   
what share was contributed by his       
successors4 ,now we recognize objects in
 the universe by means of their         
qualities4 ,but the majority of these   
qualities are not universal in their    
scope2 some things possess some         
qualities2 others possess others4 ,a    
leaf1 for example1 is green1 but not all
 things are green4 ,some things have no 
colour at all4 ,the same is true of     
tastes and smells4 ,some things are     
sweet2 some bitter4 ,but there is one   
quality in things which is absolutely   
universal in its scope1 which applies to
 everything in the universe--corporeal  
or incorporeal4 ,all things are         
numerable1 and can be counted4          
,moreover1 it is impossible to conceive 
a universe in which number is not to be 
found4 ,you could easily imagine a      
universe in which there is no colour1 or
 no sweet taste1 or a universe in which 
nothing possesses weight4 ,but you      
cannot imagine a universe in which there

 is no number4 ,this is an inconceivable
 thought4 ,upon these grounds we should 
be justified in concluding that number  
is an extremely important aspect of     
things1 and forms a fundamental pad of  
the framework of the world4 ,and it is  
upon this aspect of things that the     
,pythagoreans laid emphasis4  ,they drew
 attention to proportion1 order1 and    
harmony as the dominant notes of the    
universe4 ,now when we examine the ideas
 of proportion1 order1 and harmony1 we  
shall see that they are closely         
connected with number4 ,proportion1 for 
example1 must necessarily #ce be        
expressible by the relation of one      
number to another4 ,similarly order is  
measurable by numbers4 ,when we say that
 the ranks of a regiment exhibit order1 
we mean that they are arranged in such a
 way that the soldiers stand at certain 
regular distances from each other1 and  
these distances are measurable by       
numbers of feet or inches4 ,lastly1     
consider the idea of harmony4 ,if1 in   

modern times1 we were to say that the   
universe is a harmonious whole1 we      
should understand that we are merely    
using a metaphor from music4 ,but the   
,pythagoreans lived in an age when men  
were not practised in thought1 and they 
confused cosmical harmony with musical  
harmony4 ,they thought that the two     
things were the same4 ,now musical      
harmony is founded upon numbers1 and the
 ,pythagoreans were the first to        
discover this4 ,the difference of notes 
is due to the different numbers of      
vibrations of the sounding instrument4  
,the musical intervals are likewise     
based upon numerical proportions4 ,so   
that since1 for the ,pythagoreans1 the  
universe is a musical harmony1 it       
follows that the essential character of 
the universe is number4 ,the study of   
mathematics confirmed the ,pythagoreans 
in this idea4 ,arithmetic is the science
 of numbers1 and all other mathematical 
sciences are ultimately reducible to    
numbers4 ,for instance1 in geometry1    

angles are measured by the number of    
degrees4  ,now1 as already pointed out1 
considering all these facts1 we might   
well be justified in concluding that    
number is a very important aspect of the
 universe1 and is fundamental in it4    
,but the ,pythagoreans went much further
 than this4 ,they drew what seems to us 
the extraordinary conclusion that the   
world is made of #cf numbers4 ,at this  
point1 then1 we reach the heart of the  
,pythagorean philosophy4 ,just as       
,thales had said that the ultimate      
reality1 the first principle of which   
things are composed1 is water1 so now   
the ,pythagoreans teach that the first  
principle of things is number4 ,number  
is the world-ground1 the stuff out of   
which the universe is made4  ,in the    
detailed application of this principle  
to the world of things we have a        
conglomeration of extraordinary fancies 
and extravagances4 ,in the first place1 
all numbers arise out of the unit4 ,this
 is the prime number1 every other number

 being simply so many units4 ,the unit  
then is the first in the order of things
 in the universe4 ,again1 numbers are   
divided into odd and even4 ,the         
universe1 said the ,pythagoreans1 is    
composed of pairs of opposites and      
contradictories1 and the fundamental    
character of these opposites is that    
they are composed of the odd and even4  
,the odd and even1 moreover1 they       
identified with the limited and the     
unlimited respectively4 ,how this       
identification was made seems somewhat  
doubtful4 ,but it is clearly connected  
with the theory of bipartition4 ,an even
 number can be divided by two and       
therefore it does not set a limit to    
bipartition4 ,hence it is unlimited4 ,an
 odd number cannot be divided by two1   
and therefore it sets a limit to        
bipartition4 ,the limited and the       
unlimited become therefore the ultimate 
principles of the universe4 ,the ,limit 
is identified with the unit1 and this   
again with the central fire of the      

universe4 ,the ,limit is first formed   
and proceeds to draw more and more of   
the unlimited towards itself1 and to    
limit it4 ,becoming limited1 it becomes 
a definite something1 a thing4 ,so the  
formation of the #cg world of things    
proceeds4 ,the ,pythagoreans drew up a  
list of ten opposites of which the      
universe is composed4 ,they are 7#a7    
,limited and unlimited1 7#b7 odd and    
even1 7#c7 one and many1 7#d7 right and 
left1 7#e7 masculine and feminine1 7#f7 
rest and motion1 7#g7 straight and      
crooked1 7#h7 light and darkness1 7#i7  
good and evil1 7#aj7 square and oblong4 
,with the further development of the    
number-theory ,pythagoreanism becomes   
entirely arbitrary and without          
principle4 ,we hear1 for example1 that  
#a is the point1 #b is the line1 #c is  
the plane1 #d is the solid1 #e physical 
qualities1 #f animation1 #g             
intelligence1 health1 love1 wisdom4     
,there is no principle in all this4     
,identification of the different numbers

 with different things can only be left 
to the whim and fancy of the individual4
 ,the ,pythagoreans disagreed among     
themselves as to what number is to be   
assigned to what thing4 ,for example1   
justice1 they said1 is that which       
returns equal for equal4 ,if ,i do a man
 an injury1 justice ordains that injury 
should be done to me1 thus giving equal 
for equal4 ,justice must1 therefore1 be 
a number which returns equal for equal4 
,now the only numbers which do this are 
square numbers4 ,four equals two into   
two1 and so returns equal for equal4    
,four1 then1 must be justice4 ,but nine 
is equally the square of three4 ,hence  
other ,pythagoreans identified justice  
with nine4  ,according to ,philolaus1   
one of the most prominent ,pythagoreans1
 the quality of matter depends upon the 
number of sides of its smallest         
particles4 ,of the five regular solids1 
three were known to the ,pythagoreans4  
,that matter whose smallest particles   
are regular tetrahedra1 said ,philolaus1

 is fire4 ,similarly earth is composed  
#ch of cubes1 and the universe is       
identified with the dodecahedron4 ,this 
idea was developed further by ,plato in 
the ,timaeus1 where we find all the five
 regular solids brought into the theory4
  ,the central fire1 already mentioned  
as identified with the unit1 is a       
characteristic doctrine of the          
,pythagoreans4 ,up to this time it had  
been believed that the earth is the     
centre of the universe1 and that        
everything revolves round it4 ,but with 
the ,pythagoreans the earth revolves    
round the central fire4 ,one feels      
inclined at once to identify this with  
the sun4 ,but this is not correct4 ,the 
sun1 like the earth1 revolves round the 
central fire4 ,we do not see the central
 fire because that side of the earth on 
which we live is perpetually turned away
 from it4 ,this involves the theory that
 the earth revolves round the central   
fire in the same period that it takes to
 rotate upon its axis4 ,the             

,pythagoreans were the first to see that
 the earth is itself one of the planets1
 and to shake themselves free from the  
geocentric hypothesis4 ,round the       
central fire1 sometimes mystically      
called the ,hearth of the ,universe1    
revolve ten bodies4 ,first is the       
counter-earth1 a non-existent body      
invented by the ,pythagoreans1 next     
comes the earth1 then the sun1 the moon1
 the five planets1 and lastly the heaven
 of the fixed stars4 ,this curious      
system might have borne fruit in        
astronomy4 ,that it did not do so was   
largely due to the influence of         
,aristotle1 who discountenanced the     
theory1 and insisted that the earth is  
the centre of the universe4 ,but in the 
end the ,pythagorean view won the day4  
,we know that ,copernicus derived the   
suggestion of his heliocentric          
hypothesis from the ,pythagoreans4  #ci 
,the ,pythagoreans also taught ,the     
,great ,year1 probably a period of      
#aj1jjj years1 in which the world comes 

into being and passes away1 going in    
each such period through the same       
evolution down to the smallest details4 
,there is little to be said by way of   
criticism of the ,pythagorean system4   
,it is entirely crude philosophy4 ,the  
application of the number theory issues 
in a barren and futile arithmetical     
mysticism4 ,hegel's words in this       
connection are instructive3--  ,we may  
certainly1 he says1 feel ourselves      
prompted to associate the most general  
characteristics of thought with the     
first numbers3 saying one is the simple 
and immediate1 two is difference and    
mediation1 and three the unity of both  
these4 ,such associations however are   
purely external2 there is nothing in the
 mere numbers to make them express these
 definite thoughts4 ,with every step in 
this method1 the more arbitrary grows   
the association of definite numbers with
 definite thoughts 444 ,to attach1 as do
 some secret societies of modern times1 
importance to all sorts of numbers and  

figures is1 to some extent an innocent  
amusement1 but it is also a sign of     
deficiency of intellectual resource4    
,these numbers1 it is said1 conceal a   
profound meaning1 and suggest a deal to 
think about4 ,but the point in          
philosophy is not what you may think but
 what you do think2 and the genuine air 
of thought is to be sought in thought   
itself and not in arbitrarily selected  
symbols4 ,footnote #c  ,footnote #c3    
,hegel's ,smaller ,logic1 translated by 
,wallace1 second edition1 page #aih4    
#dj  ,,chapter ,,iv  ,,the ,,eleatics   
,the ,eleatics are so called because the
 seat of their school was at ,elea1 a   
town in ,south ,italy1 and ,parmenides  
and ,zeno1 the two chief representatives
 of the school1 were both citizens of   
,elea4 ,so far we have been dealing with
 crude systems of thought in which only 
the germs of philosophic thinking can be
 dimly discerned4 ,now1 however1 with   
the ,eleatics we step out definitely for
 the first time upon the platform of    

philosophy4 ,eleaticism is the first    
true philosophy4 ,in it there emerges   
the first factor of the truth1 however  
poor1 meagre1 and inadequate4 ,for      
philosophy is not1 as many persons      
suppose1 simply a collection of freak   
speculations1 which we may study in     
historical order1 but at the end of     
which1 ,god alone knows which we ought  
to believe4 ,on the contrary1 the       
history of philosophy presents a        
definite line of evolution4 ,the truth  
unfolds itself gradually in time4       
,xenophanes  ,the reputed founder of the
 ,eleatic ,school was ,xenophanes4 ,it  
is1 however1 doubtful whether           
,xenophanes ever went to ,elea4         
,moreover1 he belongs more properly #da 
to the history of religion than to the  
history of philosophy4 ,the real creator
 of the ,eleatic ,school was            
,parmenides4 ,but ,parmenides seized    
upon certain germs of thought latent in 
,xenophanes and transmuted them into    
philosophic principles4 ,we have1       

therefore1 in the first instance1 to say
 something of ,xenophanes4 ,he was born 
about the year #egf ,b4,c41 at ,colophon
 in ,ionia4 ,his long life was spent in 
wandering up and down the cities of     
,hellas1 as a poet and minstrel1 singing
 songs at banquets and festivals4       
,whether1 as sometimes stated2 he       
finally settled at ,elea is a matter of 
doubt1 but we know definitely that at   
the advanced age of ninety-two he was   
still wandering about ,greece4 ,his     
philosophy1 such as it is1 is expressed 
in poems4 ,he did not1 however1 write   
philosophical poems1 but rather elegies 
and satires upon various subjects1 only 
incidentally expressing his religious   
views therein4 ,fragments of these poems
 have come down to us4  ,xenophanes is  
the originator of the quarrel between   
philosophy and religion4 ,he attacked   
the popular religious notions of the    
,greeks with a view to founding a purer 
and nobler conception of ,deity4        
,popular ,greek religion consisted of a 

belief in a number of gods who were     
conceived very much as in the form of   
human beings4 ,xenophanes attacks this  
conception of ,god as possessing human  
form4 ,it is absurd1 he says1 to suppose
 that the gods wander about from place  
to place1 as represented in the ,greek  
legends4 ,it is absurd to suppose that  
the gods had a beginning4 ,it is        
disgraceful to impute to them stories of
 fraud1 adultery1 theft and deceit4 ,and
 ,xenophanes inveighs against ,homer and
 ,hesiod for disseminating these        
degrading conceptions #db of the ,deity4
 ,he argues1 too1 against the           
polytheistic notion of a plurality of   
gods4 ,that which is divine can only be 
one4 ,there can only be one best4       
,therefore1 ,god is to be conceived as  
one4 ,and this ,god is comparable to    
mortals neither in bodily form nor      
understanding4 ,he is all eye1 all ear1 
all thought4 ,it is he who1 without     
trouble1 by his thought governs all     
things4 ,but it would be a mistake to   

suppose that ,xenophanes thought of this
 ,god as a being external to the world1 
governing it from the outside1 as a     
general governs his soldiers4 ,on the   
contrary1 ,xenophanes identified ,god   
with the world4 ,the world is ,god1 a   
sentient being1 though without organs of
 sense4 ,looking out into the wide      
heavens1 he said1 ,the ,one is ,god4    
,footnote #d ,the thought of ,xenophanes
 is therefore more properly described as
 pantheism than as monotheism4 ,god is  
unchangeable1 immutable1 undivided1     
unmoved1 passionless1 undisturbed4      
,xenophanes appears1 thus1 rather as a  
religious reformer than as a            
philosopher4 ,nevertheless1 inasmuch as 
he was the first to enunciate the       
proposition ,all is one1 he takes his   
place in philosophy4 ,it was upon this  
thought that ,parmenides built the      
foundations of the ,eleatic philosophy4 
,footnote #d3 ,aristotle1 ,metaphysics1 
,book ,i4 chapter v4  ,certain other    
opinions of ,xenophanes have been       

preserved4 ,he observed fossils1 and    
found shells inland1 and the forms of   
fish and sea-weed embedded in the rocks 
in the quarries of ,syracuse and        
elsewhere4 ,from these he concluded that
 the earth had risen out of the sea and 
would again partially sink into it4     
,then the human race would be destroyed4
 ,but the earth would again rise from   
the sea and the human race would again  
#dc be renewed4 ,he believed that the   
sun and stars were burning masses of    
vapour4 ,the sun1 he thought1 does not  
revolve round the earth4 ,it goes on in 
a straight line1 and disappears in the  
remote distance in the evening4 ,it is  
not the same sun which rises the next   
morning4 ,every day a new sun is formed 
out of the vapours of the sea4 ,this    
idea is connected with his general      
attitude towards the popular religion4  
,his motive was to show that the sun and
 stars are not divine beings1 but like  
other beings1 ephemeral4 ,xenophanes    
also ridiculed the ,pythagoreans1       

especially their doctrine of            
re-incarnation4    ,parmenides          
,parmenides was born about #ead ,b4,c4  
at ,elea4 ,not much is known of his     
life4 ,he was in his early youth a      
,pythagorean1 but recanted that         
philosophy and formulated a philosophy  
of his own4 ,he was greatly revered in  
antiquity both for the depth of his     
intellect1 and the sublimity and        
nobility of his character4 ,plato refers
 to him always with reverence4 ,his     
philosophy is comprised in a philosophic
 didactic poem which is divided into two
 parts4 ,the first part expounds his own
 philosophy and is called the way of    
truth4 ,the second part describes the   
false opinions current in his day and is
 called the way of opinion4  ,the       
reflection of ,parmenides takes its rise
 from observation of the transitoriness 
and changeableness of things4 ,the      
world1 as we know it1 is a world of     
change and mutation4 ,all things arise  
and pass away4 ,nothing is permanent1   

nothing stands4 ,one moment it is1      
another moment it is not4 ,it is as true
 to say of #dd anything1 that it is not1
 as that it is4 ,the truth of things    
cannot lie here1 for no knowledge of    
that which is constantly changing is    
possible4 ,hence the thought of         
,parmenides becomes the effort to find  
the eternal amid the shifting1 the      
abiding and everlasting amid the change 
and mutation of things4 ,and there      
arises in this way the antithesis       
between ,being and not-being4 ,the      
absolutely real is ,being4 ,not-being is
 the unreal4 ,not-being is not at all4  
,and this not-being he identifies with  
becoming1 with the world of shifting and
 changing things1 the world which is    
known to us by the senses4 ,the world of
 sense is unreal1 illusory1 a mere      
appearance4 ,it is not-being4 ,only     
,being truly is4 ,as ,thales designated 
water the one reality1 as the           
,pythagoreans named number1 so now for  
,parmenides the sole reality1 the first 

principle of things1 is ,being1 wholly  
unmixed with not-being1 wholly excludent
 of all becoming4 ,the character of     
,being he describes1 for the most part1 
in a series of negatives4 ,there is in  
it no change1 it is absolutely unbecome 
and imperishable4 ,it has neither       
beginning nor end1 neither arising nor  
passing away4 ,if ,being began1 it must 
have arisen either from ,being or from  
not-being4 ,but for ,being to arise out 
of ,being1 that is not a beginning1 and 
for ,being to arise out of not-being is 
impossible1 since there is then no      
reason why it should arise later rather 
than sooner4 ,being cannot come out of  
not-being1 nor something out of nothing4
 ,ex nihilo nihil fit4 ,this is the     
fundamental thought of ,parmenides4     
,moreover1 we cannot say of ,being that 
it was1 that it is1 that it will be4    
,there is for it no past1 no present1   
and no future4 ,it is rather eternally  
and timelessly present4 ,it is undivided
 and indivisible4 ,for anything to be   

divided #de it must be divided by       
something other than itself4 ,but there 
is nothing other than ,being2 there is  
no not-being4 ,therefore there is       
nothing by which ,being can be divided4 
,hence it is indivisible4 ,it is unmoved
 and undisturbed1 for motion and        
disturbance are forms of becoming1 and  
all becoming is excluded from ,being4   
,it is absolutely self-identical4 ,it   
does not arise from anything other than 
itself4 ,it does not pass into anything 
other than itself4 ,it has its whole    
being in itself4 ,it does not depend    
upon anything else for its being and    
reality4 ,it does not pass over into    
otherness2 it remains1 steadfast1 and   
abiding in itself4 ,of positive         
character ,being has nothing4 ,its sole 
character is simply its being4 ,it      
cannot be said that it is this or that2 
it cannot be said that it has this or   
that quality1 that it is here or there1 
then or now4 ,it simply is4 ,its only   
quality is1 so to speak1 isness4  ,but  

in ,parmenides there emerges for the    
first time a distinction of fundamental 
importance in philosophy1 the           
distinction between ,sense and ,reason4 
,the world of falsity and appearance1 of
 becoming1 of not-being1 this is1 says  
,parmenides1 the world which is         
presented to us by the senses4 ,true and
 veritable ,being is known to us only by
 reason1 by thought4 ,the senses        
therefore1 are1 for ,parmenides1 the    
sources of all illusion and error4      
,truth lies only in reason4 ,this is    
exceedingly important1 because this1    
that truth lies in reason and not in the
 world of sense1 is the fundamental     
position of idealism4  ,the doctrine of 
,being1 just described1 occupies the    
first part of the poem of ,parmenides4  
,the second part is the way of false    
opinion4 ,but whether ,parmenides is    
here simply giving an account of the    
false philosophies #df of his day1 7and 
in doing this there does not seem much  
point17 or whether he was1 with total   

inconsistency1 attempting1 in a         
cosmological theory of his own1 to      
explain the origin of that world of     
appearance and illusion1 whose very     
being he has1 in the first part of the  
poem1 denied--this does not seem to be  
clear4 ,the theory here propounded1 at  
any rate1 is that the sense-world is    
composed of the two opposites1 the hot  
and the cold1 or light and darkness4    
,the more hot there is1 the more life1  
the more reality2 the more cold1 the    
more unreality and death4  ,what        
position1 now1 are we to assign to      
,parmenides in philosophy8 ,how are we  
to characterize his system8 ,such       
writers as ,hegel1 ,erdmann1 and        
,schwegler1 have always interpreted his 
philosophy in an idealistic sense4      
,professor ,burnet1 however1 takes the  
opposite view4 ,to quote his own words3 
,parmenides is not1 as some have said1  
the father of idealism4 ,on the         
contrary1 all materialism depends upon  
his view4 ,footnote #e ,now if we cannot

 say whether ,parmenides was a          
materialist or an idealist1 we cannot be
 said to understand much about his      
philosophy4 ,the question is therefore  
of cardinal importance4 ,let us see1 in 
the first place1 upon what grounds the  
materialistic interpretation of         
,parmenides is based4 ,it is based upon 
a fact which ,i have so far not         
mentioned1 leaving it for explanation at
 this moment4 ,parmenides said that     
,being1 which is for him the ultimate   
reality1 occupies space1 is finite1 and 
is spherical or globe-shaped4 ,now that 
which occupies space1 and has shape1 is 
matter4 ,the ultimate reality of things1
 therefore1 is conceived by ,parmenides 
as material1 and this1 of course1 is the
 #dg cardinal thesis of materialism4    
,this interpretation of ,parmenides is  
further emphasized in the disagreement  
between himself and ,melissus1 as to    
whether ,being is finite or infinite4   
,melissus was a younger adherent of the 
,eleatic ,school1 whose chief interest  

lies in his views on this question4 ,his
 philosophical position in general is   
the same as that of ,parmenides4 ,but on
 this point they differed4 ,parmenides  
asserted that ,being is globe-shaped1   
and therefore finite4 ,now it was an    
essential part of the doctrine of       
,parmenides that empty space is         
non-existent4 ,empty space is an        
existent non-existence4 ,this is        
self-contradictory1 and for ,parmenides1
 therefore1 empty space is simply       
not-being4 ,there are1 for example1 no  
interstices1 or empty spaces between the
 particles of matter4 ,being is the     
full1 that is1 full space with no       
mixture of empty space in it4 ,now      
,melissus agreed with ,parmenides that  
there is no such thing as empty space2  
and he pointed out1 that if ,being is   
globe-shaped1 it must be bounded on the 
outside by empty space4 ,and as this is 
impossible1 it cannot be true that      
,being is globe-shaped1 or finite1 but  
must1 on the contrary1 extend           

illimitably through space4 ,this makes  
it quite clear that ,parmenides1        
,melissus1 and the ,eleatics generally1 
did regard ,being as1 in some sense1    
material4  ,footnote #e3 ,early ,greek  
,philosophy1 chap4 iv4 ,sec4 #hi4  ,now1
 however1 let us turn to the other side 
of the picture4 ,what ground is there   
for regarding ,parmenides as an         
idealist8 ,in the first place1 we may   
say that his ultimate principle1 ,being1
 whatever he may have thought of it1 is 
not in fact material1 but is essentially
 an abstract thought1 a concept4 ,being 
is not here1 it is not there4 ,it is not
 in any place or time4 ,it is not to be 
found by the senses4 ,it is to be found 
only in reason4 #dh ,we form the idea of
 ,being by the process of abstraction4  
,for example1 we see this desk4 ,our    
entire knowledge of the desk consists in
 our knowledge of its qualities4 ,it is 
square1 brown1 hard1 odourless1 etc4    
,now suppose we successively strip off  
these qualities in thought--its colour1 

its size1 its shape4 ,we shall          
ultimately be left with nothing at all  
except its mere being4 ,we can no longer
 say of it that it is hard1 square1 etc4
 ,we can only say it is4 ,as ,parmenides
 said1 ,being is not divisible1 movable2
 it is not here nor there1 then nor now4
 ,it simply is4 ,this is the ,eleatic   
notion of ,being1 and it is a pure      
concept4 ,it may be compared to such an 
idea as whiteness4 ,we cannot see       
whiteness4 ,we see white things1 but not
 whiteness itself4 ,what1 then1 is      
whiteness8 ,it is a concept1 that is to 
say1 not a particular thing1 but a      
general idea1 which we form by          
abstraction1 by considering the quality 
which all white things have in common1  
and neglecting the qualities in which   
they differ4 ,just so1 if we consider   
the common character of all objects in  
the universe1 and neglect their         
differences1 we shall find that what    
they all have in common is simply being4
 ,being then is a general idea1 or      

concept4 ,it is a thought1 and not a    
thing4 ,parmenides1 therefore1 actually 
placed the absolute reality of things in
 an idea1 in a thought1 though he may   
have conceived it in a material and     
sensuous way4 ,now the cardinal thesis  
of idealism is precisely this1 that the 
absolute reality1 of which the world is 
a manifestation1 consists in thought1 in
 concepts4 ,parmenides1 on this view1   
was an idealist4  ,moreover1 ,parmenides
 has clearly made the distinction       
between sense and reason4 ,true ,being  
is not known to #di the senses1 but only
 to reason1 and this distinction is an  
essential feature of all idealism4      
,materialism is precisely the view that 
reality is to be found in the world of  
sense4 ,but the proposition of          
,parmenides is the exact opposite of    
this1 namely1 that reality is to be     
found only in reason4 ,again1 there     
begins to appear for the first time in  
,parmenides the distinction between     
reality and appearance4 ,parmenides1 of 

course1 would not have used these terms1
 which have been adopted in modern      
times4 ,but the thought which they      
express is unmistakably there4 ,this    
outward world1 the world of sense1 he   
proclaims to be illusion and appearance4
 ,reality is something which lies       
behind1 and is invisible to the senses4 
,now the very essence of materialism is 
that this material world1 this world of 
sense1 is the real world4 ,idealism is  
the doctrine that the sense-world is an 
appearance4 ,how then can ,parmenides be
 called a materialist8  ,how are we to  
reconcile these two conflicting views of
 ,parmenides8 ,i think the truth is that
 these two contradictories lie side by  
side in ,parmenides unreconciled1 and   
still mutually contradicting each other4
 ,parmenides himself did not see the    
contradiction4 ,if we emphasize the one 
side1 then ,parmenides was a            
materialist4 ,if we emphasize the other 
side1 then he is to be interpreted as an
 idealist4 ,in point of fact1 in the    

history of ,greek philosophy1 both these
 sides of ,parmenides were successively 
emphasized4 ,he became the father both  
of materialism and of idealism4 ,his    
immediate successors1 ,empedocles and   
,democritus1 seized upon the            
materialistic aspect of his thought1 and
 developed it4 ,the essential thought of
 ,parmenides was that ,being cannot     
arise from not-being1 and that ,being   
neither #ej arises nor passes away4 ,if 
we apply this idea to matter we get what
 in modern times is called the doctrine 
of the indestructibility of matter4     
,matter has no beginning and no end4    
,the apparent arising and passing away  
of things is simply the aggregation and 
separation of particles of matter which1
 in themselves1 are indestructible4     
,this is precisely the position of      
,democritus4 ,and his doctrine1         
therefore1 is a materialistic rendering 
of the main thought of ,parmenides that 
,being cannot arise from not-being or   
pass into not-being4  ,it was not till  

the time of ,plato that the idealistic  
aspect of the ,parmenidean doctrine was 
developed4 ,it was the genius of ,plato 
which seized upon the germs of idealism 
in ,parmenides and developed them4      
,plato was deeply influenced by         
,parmenides4 ,his main doctrine was that
 the reality of the world is to be found
 in thought1 in concepts1 in what is    
called the ,idea4 ,and he identified the
 ,idea with the ,being of ,parmenides4  
,but still1 it may be asked1 which is   
the true view of ,parmenides8 ,which is 
the historical ,parmenides8 ,was not    
,plato in interpreting him              
idealistically reading his own thought  
into ,parmenides8 ,are not we1 if we    
interpret him as an idealist1 reading   
into him later ideas8 ,in one sense this
 is perfectly true4 ,it is clear from   
what ,parmenides himself said that he   
regarded the ultimate reality of things 
as material4 ,it would be a complete    
mistake to attribute to him a fully     
developed and consistent system of      

idealism4 ,if you had told ,parmenides  
that he was an idealist1 he would not   
have understood you4 ,the distinction   
between materialism and idealism was not
 then developed4 ,if you had told him1  
moreover1 that ,being is a concept1 he  
would not have understood #ea you1      
because the theory of concepts was not  
developed until the time of ,socrates   
and ,plato4 ,now it is the function of  
historical criticism to insist upon     
this1 to see that later thought is not  
attributed to ,parmenides4 ,but if this 
is the function of historical           
scholarship1 it is equally the function 
of philosophic insight to seize upon the
 germs of a higher thought amid the     
confused thinking of ,parmenides1 to see
 what he was groping for1 to see clearly
 what he saw only vaguely and dimly1 to 
make explicit what in him was merely    
implicit1 to exhibit the true inwardness
 of his teaching1 to separate what is   
valuable and essential in it from what  
is worthless and accidental4 ,and ,i say

 that in this sense the true and        
essential meaning of ,parmenides is his 
idealism4 ,i said in the first chapter  
that philosophy is the movement from    
sensuous to non-sensuous thought4 ,i    
said that it is only with the utmost    
difficulty that this movement occurs4   
,and ,i said that even the greatest     
philosophers have sometimes failed      
herein4 ,in ,parmenides we have the     
first example of this4 ,he began by     
propounding the truth that ,being is the
 essential reality1 and ,being1 as we   
saw1 is a concept4 ,but ,parmenides was 
a pioneer4 ,he trod upon unbroken       
ground4 ,he had not behind him1 as we   
have1 a long line of idealistic thinkers
 to guide him4 ,so he could not maintain
 this first non-sensuous thought4 ,he   
could not resist the temptation to frame
 for himself a mental image1 a picture1 
of ,being4 ,now all mental images and   
pictures are framed out of materials    
supplied to us by the senses4 ,hence it 
comes about that ,parmenides pictured   

,being as a globe-shaped something      
occupying space4 ,but this is not the   
truth of ,parmenides4 ,this is simply   
his failure to realise #eb and          
understand his own principle1 and to    
think his own thought4 ,it is true that 
his immediate successors1 ,empedocles   
and ,democritus1 seized upon this1 and  
built their philosophies upon it4 ,but  
in doing so they were building upon the 
darkness of ,parmenides1 upon his       
dimness of vision1 upon his inability to
 grapple with his own idea4 ,it was     
,plato who built upon the light of      
,parmenides4    ,zeno  ,the third and   
last important thinker of the ,eleatic  
,school is ,zeno who1 like ,parmenides1 
was a man of ,elea4 ,his birth is placed
 about #dhi ,b4,c4 ,he composed a prose 
treatise in which he developed his      
philosophy4 ,zeno's contribution to     
,eleaticism is1 in a sense1 entirely    
negative4 ,he did not add anything      
positive to the teachings of            
,parmenides4 ,he supports ,parmenides in

 the doctrine of ,being4 ,but it is not 
the conclusions of ,zeno that are novel1
 it is rather the reasons which he gave 
for them4 ,in attempting to support the 
,parmenidean doctrine from a new point  
of view he developed certain ideas about
 the ultimate character of space and    
time which have since been of the utmost
 importance in philosophy4 ,parmenides  
had taught that the world of sense is   
illusory and false4 ,the essentials of  
that world are two-- multiplicity and   
change4 ,true ,being is absolutely one2 
there is in it no plurality or          
multiplicity4 ,being1 moreover1 is      
absolutely static and unchangeable4     
,there is in it no motion4 ,multiplicity
 and motion are the two characteristics 
of the false world of sense4 ,against   
multiplicity and motion1 therefore1     
,zeno directed his #ec arguments1 and   
attempted indirectly to support the     
conclusions of ,parmenides by showing   
that multiplicity and motion are        
impossible4 ,he attempted to force      

multiplicity and motion to refute       
themselves by showing that1 if we assume
 them as real1 contradictory            
propositions follow from that           
assumption4 ,two propositions which     
contradict each other cannot both be    
true4 ,therefore the assumptions from   
which both follow1 namely1 multiplicity 
and motion1 cannot be real things4      
,zeno's arguments against multiplicity4 
7#a7 ,if the many is1 it must be both   
infinitely small and infinitely large4  
,the many must be infinitely small4 ,for
 it is composed of units4 ,this is what 
we mean by saying that it is many4 ,it  
is many parts or units4 ,these units    
must be indivisible4 ,for if they are   
further divisible1 then they are not    
units4 ,since they are indivisible they 
can have no magnitude1 for that which   
has magnitude is divisible4 ,the many1  
therefore1 is composed of units which   
have no magnitude4 ,but if none of the  
parts of the many have magnitude1 the   
many as a whole has none4 ,therefore1   

the many is infinitely small4 ,but the  
many must also be infinitely large4 ,for
 the many has magnitude1 and as such1 is
 divisible into parts4 ,these parts     
still have magnitude1 and are therefore 
further divisible4 ,however far we      
proceed with the division the parts     
still have magnitude and are still      
divisible4 ,hence the many is divisible 
ad infinitum4 ,it must therefore be     
composed of an infinite number of parts1
 each having magnitude4 ,but the        
smallest magnitude1 multiplied by       
infinity1 becomes an infinite magnitude4
 ,therefore the many is infinitely      
large4 7#b7 ,the #ed many must be1 in   
number1 both limited and unlimited4 ,it 
must be limited because it is just as   
many as it is1 no more1 no less4 ,it is1
 therefore1 a definite number4 ,but a   
definite number is a finite or limited  
number4 ,but the many must be also      
unlimited in number4 ,for it is         
infinitely divisible1 or composed of an 
infinite number of parts4    ,zeno's    

arguments against motion4  7#a7 ,in     
order to travel a distance1 a body must 
first travel half the distance4 ,there  
remains half left for it still to       
travel4 ,it must then travel half the   
remaining distance4 ,there is still a   
remainder4 ,this progress proceeds      
infinitely1 but there is always a       
remainder untravelled4 ,therefore1 it is
 impossible for a body to travel from   
one point to another4 ,it can never     
arrive4 7#b7 ,achilles and the tortoise 
run a race4 ,if the tortoise is given a 
start1 ,achilles can never catch it up4 
,for1 in the first place1 he must run to
 the point from which the tortoise      
started4 ,when he gets there1 the       
tortoise will have gone to a point      
further on4 ,achilles must then run to  
that point1 and finds then that the     
tortoise has reached a third point4     
,this will go on for ever1 the distance 
between them continually diminishing1   
but never being wholly wiped out4       
,achilles will never catch up the       

tortoise4 7#c7 ,this is the story of the
 flying arrow4 ,an object cannot be in  
two places at the same time4 ,therefore1
 at any particular moment in its flight 
the arrow is in one place and not in    
two4 ,but to be in one place is to be at
 rest4 ,therefore in each and every     
moment of its flight it is at rest4 ,it 
is thus at rest throughout4 ,motion is  
impossible4  #ee  ,this type of argument
 is1 in modern times1 called antinomy4  
,an antinomy is a proof that1 since two 
contradictory propositions equally      
follow from a given assumption1 that    
assumption must be false4 ,zeno is also 
called by ,aristotle the inventor of    
dialectic4 ,dialectic originally meant  
simply discussion1 but it has come to be
 a technical term in philosophy1 and is 
used for that type of reasoning which   
seeks to develop the truth by making the
 false refute and contradict itself4    
,the conception of dialectic is         
especially important in ,zeno1 ,plato1  
,kant1 and ,hegel4  ,all the arguments  

which ,zeno uses against multiplicity   
and motion are in reality merely        
variations of one argument4 ,that       
argument is as follows4 ,it applies     
equally to space1 to time1 or to        
anything which can be quantitatively    
measured4 ,for simplicity we will       
consider it only in its spatial         
significance4 ,any quantity of space1   
say the space enclosed within a circle1 
must either be composed of ultimate     
indivisible units1 or it must be        
divisible ad infinitum4 ,if it is       
composed of indivisible units1 these    
must have magnitude1 and we are faced   
with the contradiction of a magnitude   
which cannot be divided4 ,if it is      
divisible ad infinitum1 we are faced    
with the contradiction of supposing that
 an infinite number of parts can be     
added up and make a finite sum-total4   
,it is thus a great mistake to suppose  
that ,zeno's stories of ,achilles and   
the tortoise1 and of the flying arrow1  
are merely childish puzzles4 ,on the    

contrary1 ,zeno was the first1 by means 
of these stories1 to bring to light the 
essential contradictions which lie in   
our ideas of space and time1 and thus to
 set an important problem for all       
subsequent philosophy4  #ef  ,all       
,zeno's arguments are based upon the one
 argument described above1 which may be 
called the antinomy of infinite         
divisibility4 ,for example1 the story of
 the flying arrow4 ,at any moment of its
 flight1 says ,zeno1 it must be in one  
place1 because it cannot be in two      
places at the same moment4 ,this depends
 upon the view of time as being         
infinitely divisible4 ,it is only in an 
infinitesimal moment1 an absolute moment
 having no duration1 that the arrow is  
at rest4 ,this1 however1 is not the only
 antinomy which we find in our          
conceptions of space and time4 ,every   
mathematician is acquainted with the    
contradictions immanent in our ideas of 
infinity4 ,for example1 the familiar    
proposition that parallel straight lines

 meet at infinity1 is a contradiction4  
,again1 a decreasing geometrical        
progression can be added up to infinity1
 the infinite number of its terms adding
 up in the sum-total to a finite number4
 ,the idea of infinite space itself is a
 contradiction4 ,you can say of it      
exactly what ,zeno said of the many4    
,there must be in existence as much     
space as there is1 no more4 ,but this   
means that there must be a definite and 
limited amount of space4 ,therefore     
space is finite4 ,on the other hand1 it 
is impossible to conceive a limit to    
space4 ,beyond the limit there must be  
more space4 ,therefore space is         
infinite4 ,zeno himself gave expression 
to this antinomy in the form of an      
argument which ,i have not so far       
mentioned4 ,he said that everything     
which exists is in space4 ,space itself 
exists1 therefore space must be in      
space4 ,that space must be in another   
space and so ad infinitum4 ,this of     
course is merely a quaint way of saying 

that to conceive a limit to space is    
impossible4  ,but to return to the      
antinomy of infinite divisibility1 #eg  
on which most of ,zeno's arguments rest1
 you will perhaps expect me to say      
something of the different solutions    
which have been offered4 ,in the first  
place1 we must not forget ,zeno's own   
solution4 ,he did not propound this     
contradiction for its own sake1 but to  
support the thesis of ,parmenides4 ,his 
solution is that as multiplicity and    
motion contain these contradictions1    
therefore multiplicity and motion cannot
 be real4 ,therefore1 there is1 as      
,parmenides said1 only one ,being1 with 
no multiplicity in it1 and excludent of 
all motion and becoming4 ,the solution  
given by ,kant in modern times is       
essentially similar4 ,according to      
,kant1 these contradictions are immanent
 in our conceptions of space and time1  
and since time and space involve these  
contradictions it follows that they are 
not real beings1 but appearances1 mere  

phenomena4 ,space and time do not belong
 to things as they are in themselves1   
but rather to our way of looking at     
things4 ,they are forms of our          
perception4 ,it is our minds which      
impose space and time upon objects1 and 
not objects which impose space and time 
upon our minds4 ,further1 ,kant drew    
from these contradictions the conclusion
 that to comprehend the infinite is     
beyond the capacity of human reason4 ,he
 attempted to show that1 wherever we try
 to think the infinite1 whether the     
infinitely large or the infinitely      
small1 we fall into irreconcilable      
contradictions4 ,therefore1 he concluded
 that human faculties are incapable of  
apprehending infinity4 ,as might be     
expected1 many thinkers have attempted  
to solve the problem by denying one or  
other side of the contradiction1 by     
saying that one or other side does not  
follow from the premises1 that one is   
true and the other false4 ,david ,hume1 
for example1 #eh denied the infinite    

divisibility of space and time1 and     
declared that they are composed of      
indivisible units having magnitude4 ,but
 the difficulty that it is impossible to
 conceive of units having magnitude     
which are yet indivisible is not        
satisfactorily explained by ,hume4 ,and 
in general1 it seems that any solution  
which is to be satisfactory must somehow
 make room for both sides of the        
contradiction4 ,it will not do to deny  
one side or the other1 to say that one  
is false and the other true4 ,a true    
solution is only possible by rising     
above the level of the two antagonistic 
principles and taking them both up to   
the level of a higher conception1 in    
which both opposites are reconciled4    
,this was the procedure followed by     
,hegel in his solution of the problem4  
,unfortunately his solution cannot be   
fully understood without some knowledge 
of his general philosophical principles1
 on which it wholly depends4 ,i will1   
however1 try to make it as plain as     

possible4 ,in the first place1 ,hegel   
did not go out of his way to solve these
 antinomies4 ,they appear as mere       
incidents in the development of his     
thought4 ,he did not regard them as     
isolated cases of contradiction which   
occur in thought1 as exceptions to a    
general rule1 which therefore need      
special explanation4 ,on the contrary1  
he regarded them1 not as exceptions to1 
but as examples of1 the essential       
character of reason4 ,all thought1 all  
reason1 for ,hegel1 contains immanent   
contradictions which it first posits and
 then reconciles in a higher unity1 and 
this particular contradiction of        
infinite divisibility is reconciled in  
the higher notion of quantity4 ,the     
notion of quantity contains two factors1
 namely the one and the many4 ,quantity 
means precisely a many in #ei one1 or a 
one in many4 ,if1 for example1 we       
consider a quantity of anything1 say a  
heap of wheat1 this is1 in the first    
place1 one2 it is one whole4 ,secondly1 

it is many2 for it is composed of many  
parts4 ,as one it is continuous2 as many
 it is discrete4 ,now the true notion of
 quantity is not one1 apart from many1  
nor many apart from one4 ,it is the     
synthesis of both4 ,it is a many in one4
 ,the antinomy we are considering arises
 from considering one side of the truth 
in a false abstraction from the other4  
,to conceive unity as not being in      
itself multiplicity1 or multiplicity as 
not being unity1 is a false abstraction4
 ,the thought of the one involves the   
thought of the many1 and the thought of 
the many involves the thought of the    
one4 ,you cannot have a many without a  
one1 any more than you can have one end 
of a stick without the other4 ,now1 if  
we consider anything which is           
quantitatively measured1 such as a      
straight line1 we may consider it1 in   
the first place1 as one4 ,in that case  
it is a continuous indivisible unit4    
,next we may regard it as many1 in which
 case it falls into parts4 ,now each of 

these parts may again be regarded as    
one1 and as such is an indivisible unit2
 and again each part may be regarded as 
many1 in which case it falls into       
further parts2 and this alternating     
process may go on for ever4 ,this is the
 view of the matter which gives rise to 
the contradictions we have been         
considering4 ,but it is a false view4   
,it involves the false abstraction of   
first regarding the many as something   
that has reality apart from the one1 and
 then regarding the one as something    
that has reality apart from the many4   
,if you persist in saying that the line 
is simply one and not many1 then there  
arises the theory of indivisible units4 
,if you #fj persist in saying it is     
simply many and not one1 then it is     
divisible ad infinitum4 ,but the truth  
is that it is neither simply many nor   
simply one2 it is a many in one1 that   
is1 it is a quantity4 ,both sides of the
 contradiction are1 therefore1 in one   
sense true1 for each is a factor of the 

truth4 ,but both sides are also false1  
if and in so far as1 each sets itself up
 as the whole truth4    ,critical       
,remarks on ,eleaticism4  ,the          
consideration of the meaning of ,zeno's 
doctrine will give us an insight into   
the essentials of the position of the   
,eleatics4 ,zeno said that motion and   
multiplicity are not real4 ,now what    
does this mean8 ,did ,zeno mean to say  
that when he walked about the streets of
 ,elea1 it was not true that he walked  
about8 ,did he mean that it was not a   
fact that he moved from place to place8 
,when ,i move my arms1 did he mean that 
,i am not moving my arms1 but that they 
really remain at rest all the time8 ,if 
so1 we might justly conclude that this  
philosophy is a mere craze of           
speculation run mad1 or else a joke4    
,but this is not what is meant4 ,the    
,eleatic position is that though the    
world of sense1 of which multiplicity   
and motion are essential features1 may  
exist1 yet that outward world is not the

 true ,being4 ,they do not deny that the
 world exists4 ,they do not deny that   
motion exists or that multiplicity      
exists4 ,these things no sane man can   
deny4 ,the existence of motion and      
multiplicity is1 as ,hegel says1 as     
sensuously certain as the existence of  
elephants4 ,zeno1 then1 does not deny   
the existence of the world4 ,what he    
denies is the truth of existence4 ,what 
he means is3 certainly there is motion  
and multiplicity2 certainly the world is
 here1 is present to our senses1 but it 
is not the true world4 ,it is #fa not   
reality4 ,it is mere appearance1        
illusion1 an outward show and sham1 a   
hollow mask which hides the real being  
of things4 ,you may ask what is meant by
 this distinction between appearance and
 reality4 ,is not even an appearance    
real8 ,it appears4 ,it exists4 ,even a  
delusion exists1 and is therefore a real
 thing4 ,so is not the distinction      
between appearance and reality itself   
meaningless8 ,now all this is perfectly 

true1 but it does not comprehend quite  
what is meant by the distinction4 ,what 
is meant is that the objects around us  
have existence1 but not self-existence1 
not self-substantiality4 ,that is to    
say1 their being is not in themselves1  
their existence is not grounded in      
themselves but is grounded in another1  
and flows from that other4 ,they exist1 
but they are not independent existences4
 ,they are rather beings whose being    
flows into them from another1 which     
itself is self-existent and             
self-substantial4 ,they are1 therefore1 
mere appearances of that other1 which is
 the reality4 ,of course the ,eleatics  
did not speak of appearance and reality 
in these terms4 ,but this is what they  
were groping for1 and dimly saw4  ,if we
 now look back upon the road on which we
 have travelled from the beginning of   
,greek philosophy1 we shall be able to  
characterize the direction in which we  
have been moving4 ,the earliest ,greek  
philosophers1 the ,ionics1 propounded   

the question1 what is the ultimate      
principle of things8 and answered it by 
declaring that the first principle of   
things is matter4 ,the second ,greek    
,school1 the ,pythagoreans1 answered the
 same question by declaring numbers to  
be the first principle4 ,the third      
school1 the ,eleatics1 answered the     
question by asserting that the first    
principle of things is ,being4 #fb ,now 
the universe1 as we know it1 is both    
quantitative and qualitative4 ,quantity 
and quality are characteristics of every
 sense-object4 ,these are not1 indeed1  
the only characteristics of the world1  
but they are the only characteristics   
which have so far come to light4 ,now   
the position of the ,ionics was that the
 ultimate reality is both quantitative  
and qualitative1 that is to say1 it is  
matter1 for matter is just what has both
 quantity and quality4 ,the             
,pythagoreans abstracted from the       
quality of things4 ,they stripped off   
the qualitative aspect from things1 and 

were accordingly left with only quantity
 as ultimate reality4 ,quantity is the  
same as number4 ,hence the ,pythagorean 
position that the world is made of      
numbers4 ,the ,eleatic philosophy1      
proceeding one step further in the same 
direction1 abstracted from quantity as  
well as quality4 ,whereas the           
,pythagoreans had denied the qualitative
 aspect of things1 leaving themselves   
only with the quantitative1 the         
,eleatics denied both quantity and      
quality1 for in denying multiplicity    
they denied quantity4 ,therefore they   
are left with the total abstraction of  
mere ,being which has in it neither     
dividedness 7quantity71 nor positive    
character 7quality74 ,the rise from the 
,ionic to the ,eleatic philosophy is    
therefore essentially a rise from       
sensuous to pure thinking4 ,the ,eleatic
 ,being is a pure abstract thought4 ,the
 position of the ,pythagoreans on the   
other hand is that of semi-sensuous     
thought4 ,they form the stepping-stone  

from the ,ionics to the ,eleatics4  ,now
 let us consider what of worth there is 
in this ,eleatic principle1 and what its
 defects are4 ,in the first place1 it is
 necessary for us to understand that the
 ,eleatic philosophy is the first       
monism4 ,a monistic philosophy #fc is a 
philosophy which attempts to explain the
 entire universe from one single        
principle4 ,the opposite of monism is   
therefore pluralism1 which is that kind 
of philosophy which seeks to explain the
 universe from many ultimate and equally
 underived principles4 ,but more        
particularly and more frequently we     
speak of the opposite of monism as being
 dualism1 that is to say1 the position  
that there are two ultimate principles  
of explanation4 ,if1 for example1 we say
 that all the good in the universe      
arises from one source which is good1   
and that all the evil arises from       
another source which is evil1 and that  
these sources of good and evil cannot be
 subordinated one to the other1 and that

 one does not arise out of the other1   
but both are co-ordinate and equally    
primeval and independent1 that position 
would be a dualism4 ,all philosophy1    
which is worthy of the name1 seeks1 in  
some sense1 a monistic explanation of   
the universe1 and when we find that a   
system of philosophy breaks down and    
fails1 then we may nearly always be sure
 its defect will reveal itself as an    
unreconciled dualism4 ,such a philosophy
 will begin with a monistic principle1  
and will attempt to derive or deduce the
 entire universe from it1 but somewhere 
or other it comes across something in   
the world which it cannot bring under   
that principle4 ,then it is left with   
two equally ultimate existences1 neither
 of which can be derived from the other4
 ,thus it breaks out into dualism4  ,now
 the search for a monistic explanation  
of things is a universal tendency of    
human thought4 ,wherever we look in the 
world of thought1 we find that this     
monistic tendency appears4 ,i have      

already said that it appears throughout 
the history of philosophy4 ,it reveals  
itself1 #fd too1 very clearly in the    
history of religion4 ,religion begins in
 polytheism1 the belief in many gods4   
,from that it passes on to monotheism1  
the belief in one ,god1 who is the sole 
author and creator of the universe4 ,in 
,hindu thought we find the same thing4  
,hindu thought is based upon the        
principle that ,all is one4 ,everything 
in the world is derived from one        
ultimate being1 ,brahman4 ,but not only 
is this monistic tendency traceable in  
religion and philosophy2 it is also     
traceable in science4 ,the progress of  
scientific explanation is essentially a 
progress towards monism4 ,in the first  
place1 the explanation of isolated facts
 consists always in assigning causes for
 them4 ,suppose there is a strange noise
 in your room at night4 ,you say it is  
explained when you find that it is due  
to the falling of a book or the         
scuttling of a rat across the floor4    

,the noise is thus explained by         
assigning a cause for it4 ,but this     
simply means that you have robbed it of 
its isolated and exceptional position1  
and reduced it to the position of an    
example of a general law4 ,when the     
water freezes in your jug1 you say that 
the cause of this is the cold4 ,it is an
 example of the law that whenever the   
cold reaches a certain degree1 then1    
other things being equal1 water         
solidifies4 ,but to assign causes in    
this way is not really to explain       
anything4 ,it does not give any reason  
for an event happening4 ,you cannot see 
any reason why water should solidify in 
the cold4 ,it merely tells us that the  
event is not exceptional1 but is an     
example of what always happens4 ,it     
reduces the isolated event to a case of 
a general law1 which explains1 not      
merely this one event1 but possibly     
millions of events4 ,it is not merely   
that cold solidifies the water in your  
jug4 #fe ,it equally solidifies the     

water in everybody's jug4 ,the same law 
explains all these1 and likewise        
explains icebergs and the polar caps on 
the earth and the planet ,mars4 ,in fact
 scientific explanation means the       
reduction of millions of facts to one   
principle4 ,but science does not stop   
here4 ,it seeks further to explain the  
laws themselves1 and its method is to   
reduce the many laws to one higher and  
more general law4 ,a familiar example of
 this is the explanation of ,kepler's   
laws of the planetary motions4 ,kepler  
laid down three such laws4 ,the first   
was that planets move in elliptical     
orbits with the sun in one focus4 ,the  
second was that planets describe equal  
areas in equal times4 ,the third was a  
rather more complicated law4 ,kepler    
knew these laws from observation1 but he
 could not explain them4 ,they were     
explained by ,newton's discovery of the 
law of gravitation4 ,newton proved that 
,kepler's three laws could be           
mathematically deduced from the law of  

gravitation4 ,in that way ,kepler's laws
 were explained1 and not only ,kepler's 
laws1 but many other astronomical laws  
and facts4 ,thus the explanation of the 
many isolated facts consists in their   
reduction to the one law1 and the       
explanation of the many laws consists in
 their reduction to the one more general
 law4 ,as knowledge advances1 the       
phenomena of the universe come to be    
explained by fewer and fewer1 and wider 
and wider1 general principles4          
,obviously the ultimate goal would be   
the explanation of all things by one    
principle4 ,i do not mean to say that   
scientific men have this end consciously
 in view4 ,but the point is that the    
monistic tendency is there4 ,what is    
meant by the explanation is the         
reduction of all things to one          
principle4  #ff  ,in philosophy1 in     
religion1 and in science1 then1 we find 
this monistic tendency of thought4 ,but 
it might be asked how we know that this 
universal tendency is right8 ,how do we 

know that it is not merely a universal  
error8 ,is there no logical or          
philosophical basis for the belief that 
the ultimate explanation of things must 
be one8 ,now this is a subject which    
takes us far afield from ,greek         
philosophy4 ,the philosophical basis of 
monism was never thought out till the   
time of ,spinoza4 ,so we cannot go into 
it at length here4 ,but1 quite shortly1 
the question is--,is there any reason   
for believing that the ultimate         
explanation of things must be one8 ,now 
if we are to explain the universe1 two  
conditions must be fulfilled4 ,in the   
first place1 the ultimate reality by    
which we attempt to explain everything  
must explain all the other things in the
 world4 ,it must be possible to deduce  
the whole world from it4 ,secondly1 the 
first principle must explain itself4 ,it
 cannot be a principle which itself     
still requires explanation by something 
else4 ,if it is itself not              
self-explanatory1 but is an ultimate    

mystery1 then even if we succeed in     
deducing the universe from it1 nothing  
is thereby explained4 ,this1 for        
example1 is precisely the defect of     
materialism4 ,even if we suppose it     
proved that all things1 including mind1 
arise from matter1 yet the objection    
remains that this explains nothing at   
all1 for matter is not a                
self-explanatory existence4 ,it is an   
unintelligible mystery4 ,and to reduce  
the universe to an ultimate mystery is  
not to explain it4 ,again2 some people  
think that the world is to be explained 
by what they call a first cause4 ,but   
why should any cause be the first8 ,why 
should we stop anywhere in the chain of 
causes8 ,every cause is #fg necessarily 
the effect of a prior cause4 ,the child1
 who is told that ,god made the world1  
and who inquires who1 in that case1 made
 ,god1 is asking a highly sensible      
question4 ,or suppose1 in tracing back  
the chain of causes1 we come upon one   
which we have reason to say is really   

the first1 is anything explained        
thereby8 ,still we are left with an     
ultimate mystery4 ,whatever the         
principle of explanation is1 it cannot  
be a principle of this kind4 ,it must be
 a principle which explains itself1 and 
does not lead to something further1 such
 as another cause4 ,in other words1 it  
must be a principle which has its whole 
being in itself1 which does not for its 
completeness refer us to anything beyond
 itself4 ,it must be something fully    
comprehended in itself1 without         
reference to anything outside it4 ,that 
is to say1 it must be what we call      
self-determined or absolute4 ,now any   
absolute principle must necessarily be  
one4 ,suppose that it were two4 ,suppose
 you attempt to explain the world by two
 principles1 ,x and ,y1 each of which is
 ultimate1 neither being derived from   
the other4 ,then what relation does ,x  
bear to ,y8 ,we cannot fully comprehend 
,x without knowing its relation to ,y4  
,part of the character and being of ,x  

is constituted by its relation to ,y4   
,part of ,x's character has to be       
explained by ,y4 ,but that is not to be 
self-explained4 ,it is to be explained  
by something not itself4 ,therefore1 the
 ultimate explanation of things must be 
one4  ,the ,eleatics1 then1 were        
perfectly correct in saying that all is 
one1 and that the ultimate principle of 
the universe1 ,being1 is one4 ,but if we
 examine the way in which they carried  
out their monism1 we shall see that it  
broke down in a hopeless dualism4 ,how  
did they #fh explain the existence of   
the world8 ,they propounded the         
principle of ,being1 as the ultimate    
reality4 ,how then did they derive the  
actual world from that principle8 ,the  
answer is that they neither derived it  
nor made any attempt to derive it4      
,instead of deducing the world from     
their first principle1 they simply      
denied the reality of the world         
altogether4 ,they attempted to solve the
 problem by denying the existence of the

 problem4 ,the world1 they said1 is     
simply not-being4 ,it is an illusion4   
,now certainly it is a great thing to   
know which is the true world1 and which 
the false1 but after all this is not an 
explanation4 ,to call the world an      
illusion is not to explain it4 ,if the  
world is reality1 then the problem of   
philosophy is1 how does that reality    
arise8 ,if the world is illusion1 then  
the problem is1 how does that illusion  
arise8 ,call it illusion1 if you like4  
,but this is not explaining it4 ,it is  
simply calling it names4 ,this is the   
defect1 too1 of ,indian philosophy in   
which the world is said to be           
,maya--delusion4 ,hence in the ,eleatic 
philosophy there are two worlds brought 
face to face1 lying side by side of each
 other1 unreconciled--the world of      
,being1 which is the true world1 and the
 world of facts1 which is illusion4     
,although the ,eleatics deny the        
sense-world1 and call it illusion1 yet  
of this illusion they cannot rid        

themselves4 ,in some sense or other1    
this world is here1 is present4 ,it     
comes back upon our senses1 and demands 
explanation4 ,call it illusion1 but it  
still stands beside the true world1 and 
demands that it be deduced from that4   
,so that the ,eleatics have two         
principles1 the false world and the true
 world1 simply lying side by side1      
without any connecting link between     
them1 without anything to #fi show how  
the one arises from the other4 ,it is an
 utterly irreconcilable dualism4  ,it is
 easy to see why the ,eleatic philosophy
 broke down in this dualism4 ,it is due 
to the barrenness of their first        
principle itself4 ,being1 they say1 has 
in it no becoming4 ,all principle of    
motion is expressly excluded from it4   
,likewise they deny to it any           
multiplicity4 ,it is simply one1 without
 any many in it4 ,if you expressly      
exclude multiplicity and becoming from  
your first principle1 then you can never
 get multiplicity and becoming out of   

it4 ,you cannot get out of it anything  
that is not in it4 ,if you say          
absolutely there is no multiplicity in  
the ,absolute1 then it is impossible to 
explain how multiplicity comes into this
 world4 ,it is exactly the same in      
regard to the question of quality4 ,pure
 ,being is without quality4 ,it is mere 
isness4 ,it is an utterly featureless1  
characterless ,being1 perfectly empty   
and abstract4 ,how then can the quality 
of things issue from it8 ,how can all   
the riches and variety of the world come
 out of this emptiness8 ,the ,eleatics  
are like jugglers who try to make you   
believe that they get rabbits1          
guinea-pigs1 pieces of string1 paper1   
and ribbon1 out of an entirely empty    
top-hat4 ,one can see how utterly barren
 and empty this principle is1 if one    
translates it into figurative language1 
that is to say1 into the language of    
religion4 ,the ,eleatic principle would 
correspond to a religion in which we    
said that ,god is1 but beyond the fact  

that ,he is1 ,he has absolutely no      
character4 ,but surely this is a wholly 
barren and meagre conception of the     
,deity4 ,in the ,christian religion we  
are accustomed to hear such expressions 
as1 not only that ,god is1 but that ,god
 is ,love1 ,god is ,power1 #gj ,god is  
,goodness1 ,god is ,wisdom4 ,now        
objection may certainly be taken to     
these predicates and epithets on the    
ground that they are merely figurative  
and anthropomorphic4 ,in fact1 they     
exhibit the tendency to think           
non-sensuous objects sensuously4 ,these 
predicates are merely picked up from the
 finite world and applied haphazard to  
,god1 for whom they are entirely        
inadequate4 ,but at least these         
expressions teach us1 that out of mere  
emptiness nothing can come2 that the    
world cannot arise out of something     
which is lower and poorer than itself4  
,here in the world we find in a certain 
measure1 love1 wisdom1 excellence1      
power4 ,these things cannot spring from 

a source which is so poor that it       
contains nothing but isness4 ,the less  
can arise out of the greater1 but not   
the greater out of the less4 ,we may    
contrast ,eleaticism not only with      
,christianity1 but even with popular    
modern agnosticism4 ,according to this1 
the ,absolute is unknowable4 ,but what  
the agnostic means is that human reason 
is inadequate to grasp the greatness of 
the ultimate being4 ,but the ,eleatic   
principle is1 not that in saying ,god is
 ,love1 ,power1 ,wisdom1 we are saying  
too little about ,god1 and that our     
ideas are inadequate to express the     
fullness of ,his being1 but on the      
contrary1 that they express too high an 
idea for ,god1 of whom nothing can be   
said except ,he is1 because there is    
absolutely nothing more to say4 ,this   
conception of ,god is the conception of 
an absolutely empty being4  ,monism1 ,i 
said1 is a necessary idea in philosophy4
 ,the ,absolute must be one4 ,but an    
utterly abstract monism is impossible4  

,if the ,absolute is simply one1 wholly 
excludent of all process and            
multiplicity1 out of such an abstraction
 the process and multiplicity of the #ga
 world cannot issue4 ,the ,absolute is  
not simply one1 or simply many4 ,it must
 be a many in one1 as correctly set     
forth in the ,christian doctrine of the 
,trinity4 ,religion moves from an       
abstract polytheism 7,god is many7 to an
 abstract monotheism 7,god is one2      
,judaism1 ,hinduism and ,islam74 ,but it
 does not stop there4 ,it rightly passes
 on to a concrete monotheism 7,god is   
many in one2 ,christianity74 ,there are 
two popular misconceptions regarding the
 doctrine of the ,trinity4 ,the first   
mistake is that of popular rationalism1 
the second is that of popular theology4 
,popular rationalism asserts that the   
doctrine of the ,trinity is contrary to 
reason4 ,popular theology asserts that  
it is a mystery which transcends reason4
 ,but the truth is that it neither      
contradicts nor transcends reason4 ,on  

the contrary1 it is in itself the       
highest manifestation of reason4 ,what  
is really a mystery1 what really        
contradicts reason1 is to suppose that  
,god1 the ,absolute1 is simply one      
without any multiplicity4 ,this         
contradiction results in the fatal      
dualism which broke out in ,eleaticism1 
and has broken out in every other system
 of thought1 such as that of the ,hindus
 or that of ,spinoza1 which begins with 
the conception of the ,absolute as a    
pure one1 totally exclusive of the many4
  #gb  ,,chapter ,v  ,,heracleitus      
,heracleitus was born about #ece ,b4,c41
 and is believed to have lived to the   
age of sixty4 ,this places his death at 
#dge ,b4,c4 ,he was thus subsequent to  
,xenophanes1 contemporary with          
,parmenides1 and older than ,zeno4 ,in  
historical order of time1 therefore1 he 
runs parallel to the ,eleatics4         
,heracleitus was a man of ,ephesus in   
,asia ,minor4 ,he was an aristocrat1    
descendant of a noble ,ephesian family1 

and occupied in ,ephesus the nominal    
position of basileus1 or ,king4 ,this1  
however1 merely meant that he was the   
,chief ,priest of the local branch of   
the ,eleusinian mysteries1 and this     
position he resigned in favour of his   
brother4 ,he appears to have been a man 
of a somewhat aloof1 solitary1 and      
scornful nature4 ,he looked down1 not   
only upon the common herd1 but even upon
 the great men of his own race4 ,he     
mentions ,xenophanes and ,pythagoras in 
terms of obloquy4 ,homer1 he thinks1    
should be taken out and whipped4 ,hesiod
 he considers to be the teacher of the  
common herd1 one with them1 a man1 he   
says1 who does not even know day and    
night4 ,upon the common herd of mortals 
he looks down with infinite scorn4 ,some
 of his sayings remind us not a little  
of ,schopenhauer in their pungency and  
sharpness4 ,asses prefer straw to #gc   
gold4 ,dogs bark at everyone they do not
 know4 ,many of his sayings1 however1   
are memorable and trenchant epitomes of 

practical wisdom4 ,man's character is   
his fate4 ,physicians who cut1 burn1    
stab and rack the sick1 demand a fee for
 doing it1 which they do not deserve to 
get4 ,from his aloof and aristocratic   
standpoint he launched forth            
denunciations against the democracy of  
,ephesus4  ,heracleitus embodied his    
philosophical thoughts in a prose       
treatise1 which was well-known at the   
time of ,socrates1 but of which only    
fragments have come down to us4 ,his    
style soon became proverbial for its    
difficulty and obscurity1 and he gained 
the nickname of ,heracleitus the ,dark1 
or the ,obscure4 ,socrates said of his  
work that what he understood of it was  
excellent1 what not1 he believed was    
equally so1 but that the book required a
 tough swimmer4 ,he has even been       
accused of intentional obscurity4 ,but  
there does not seem to be any foundation
 for this charge4 ,the fact is that if  
he takes no great trouble to explain his
 thoughts1 neither does he take any     

trouble to conceal them4 ,he does not   
write for fools4 ,his attitude appears  
to be that if his readers understand    
him1 well2 if not1 so much the worse for
 his readers4 ,he wastes no time in     
elaborating and explaining his thought1 
but embodies it in short1 terse1 pithy1 
and pregnant sayings4   ,his            
philosophical principle is the direct   
antithesis of ,eleaticism4 ,the         
,eleatics had taught that only ,being   
is1 and ,becoming is not at all4 ,all   
change1 all ,becoming is mere illusion4 
,for ,heracleitus1 on the contrary1 only
 ,becoming is1 and ,being1 permanence1  
identity1 these are nothing but         
illusion4 ,all things sublunary are #gd 
perpetually changing1 passing over into 
new forms and new shapes4 ,nothing      
stands1 nothing holds fast1 nothing     
remains what it is4 ,into the same      
river1 he says1 we go down1 and we do   
not go down2 for into the same river no 
man can enter twice2 ever it flows in   
and flows out4 ,not only does he deny   

all absolute permanence1 but even a     
relative permanence of things is        
declared to be illusory4 ,we all know   
that everything has its term1 that all  
things arise and pass away1 from the    
insects who live an hour to the eternal 
hills4 ,yet we commonly attribute to    
these things at least a relative        
permanence1 a shorter or longer         
continuance in the same state4 ,but even
 this ,heracleitus will not allow4      
,nothing is ever the same1 nothing      
remains identical from one consecutive  
moment to another4 ,the appearance of   
relative permanence is an illusion1 like
 that which makes us think that a wave  
passing over the surface of the water   
remains all the time the same identical 
wave4 ,here1 as we know1 the water of   
which the wave is composed changes from 
moment to moment1 only the form         
remaining the same4 ,precisely so1 for  
,heracleitus1 the permanent appearance  
of things results from the inflow and   
outflow in them of equivalent quantities

 of substance4 ,all is flux4 ,it is not1
 for example1 the same sun which sets   
to-day and rises to-morrow4 ,it is a new
 sun4 ,for the fire of the sun burns    
itself out and is replenished from the  
vapours of the sea4  ,not only do things
 change from moment to moment4 ,even in 
one and the same moment they are and are
 not the same4 ,it is not merely that a 
thing first is1 and then a moment       
afterwards1 is not4 ,it both is and is  
not at the same time4 ,the at-onceness  
of is and is not #ge is the meaning of  
,becoming4 ,we shall understand this    
better if we contrast it with the       
,eleatic principle4 ,the ,eleatics      
described all things under two concepts1
 ,being and not-being4 ,being has1 for  
them1 all truth1 all reality4 ,not-being
 is wholly false and illusory4 ,for     
,heracleitus both ,being and not-being  
are equally real4 ,the one is as true as
 the other4 ,both are true1 for both are
 identical4 ,becoming is the identity of
 ,being and not-being4 ,for ,becoming   

has only two forms1 namely1 the arising 
of things and their passing away1 their 
beginning and their end1 their          
origination and their decease4 ,perhaps 
you may think that this is not correct1 
that there are other forms of change    
besides origination and decease4 ,a man 
is born4 ,that is his origination4 ,he  
dies4 ,that is his decease4 ,between his
 birth and his death there are          
intermediate changes4 ,he grows larger1 
grows older1 grows wiser or more        
foolish1 his hair turns grey4 ,so also  
the leaf of a tree does not merely come 
into being and pass out of being4 ,it   
changes in shape1 form1 colour4 ,from   
light green it becomes dark green1 and  
from dark green1 yellow4 ,but there is  
after all nothing in all this except    
origination and decease1 not of the     
thing itself1 but of its qualities4 ,the
 change from green to yellow is the     
decease of green colour1 the origination
 of yellow colour4 ,origination is the  
passage of not-being into ,being4       

,decease is the passage of ,being into  
not-being4 ,becoming1 then1 has in it   
only the two factors of ,being and      
not-being1 and it means the passing of  
one into the other4 ,but this passage   
does not mean1 for ,heracleitus1 that at
 one moment there is ,being1 and at the 
next moment not-being4 ,it means that   
,being and not-being are in everything  
at one and the same time4 ,being is #gf 
not-being4 ,being has not-being in it4  
,take as an example the problem of life 
and death4 ,ordinarily we think that    
death is due to external causes1 such as
 accident or disease4 ,we consider that 
while life lasts1 it is what it is1 and 
remains what it is1 namely life1 unmixed
 with death1 and that it goes on being  
life until something comes from outside1
 as it were1 in the shape of external   
causes1 and puts an end to it4 ,you may 
have read ,metchnikoff's book ,the      
,nature of ,man4 ,in the course of that 
book he develops this idea4 ,death1 he  
says1 is always due to external causes4 

,therefore1 if we could remove the      
causes1 we could conquer death4 ,the    
causes of death are mostly disease and  
accident1 for even old age is disease4  
,there is no reason why science should  
not advance so far as to eliminate      
disease and accident from life4 ,in that
 case life might be made immortal1 or at
 any rate1 indefinitely prolonged4 ,now 
this is founded upon a confusion of     
ideas4 ,no doubt death is always due to 
external causes4 ,every event in the    
world is determined1 and wholly         
determined1 by causes4 ,the law of      
causation admits of no exception        
whatever4 ,therefore it is perfectly    
true that in every case of death causes 
precede it4 ,but1 as ,i explained in the
 last chapter1 ,footnote #f to give the 
cause is not to give any reason for an  
event4 ,causation is never a principle  
of explanation of anything4 ,it tells us
 that the phenomenon ,a is invariably   
and unconditionally followed by the     
phenomenon ,b1 and we call ,a the cause 

of ,b4 ,but this only means that        
whenever ,b happens1 it happens in a    
certain regular order and succession of 
events4 ,but it does not tell us why ,b 
happens at all4 ,the reason of a thing  
is to be #gg distinguished from its     
cause4 ,the reason why a man dies is not
 to be found in the causes which bring  
about his death4 ,the reason rather is  
that life has the germ of death already 
in it1 that life is already death       
potentially1 that ,being has not-being  
in it4 ,the causation of death is merely
 the mechanism1 by the instrumentality  
of which1 through one set of causes or  
another1 the inevitable end is brought  
about4  ,footnote #f3 ,page #fd4  ,not  
only is ,being1 for ,heracleitus1       
identical with not-being1 but everything
 in the universe has in it its own      
opposite4 ,every existent thing is a    
harmony of opposite tensions4 ,a harmony
 contains necessarily two opposite      
principles which1 in spite of their     
opposition1 reveal an underlying unity4 

,that it is by virtue of this principle 
that everything in the universe exists1 
is the teaching of ,heracleitus4 ,all   
things contain their own opposites      
within them4 ,in the struggle and       
antagonism between hostile principles   
consists their life1 their being1 their 
very existence4 ,at the heart of things 
is conflict4 ,if there were no conflict 
in a thing1 it would cease to exist4    
,this idea is expressed by ,heracleitus 
in a variety of ways4 ,strife1 he says1 
is the father of all things4 ,the one1  
sundering from itself1 coalesces with   
itself1 like the harmony of the bow and 
the lyre4 ,god is day and night1 summer 
and winter1 war and peace1 satiety and  
hunger4 ,join together whole and        
unwhole1 congruous and incongruous1     
accordant and discordant1 then comes    
from one all and from all one4 ,in this 
sense1 too1 he censures ,homer for      
having prayed that strife might cease   
from among gods and men4 ,if such a     
prayer were granted1 the universe itself

 would pass away4  #gh  ,side by side   
with this metaphysic1 ,heracleitus lays 
down a theory of physics4 ,all things   
are composed of fire4 ,this world1 he   
says1 neither one of the gods nor of the
 human race has made2 but it is1 it was1
 and ever shall be1 an eternally living 
fire4 ,all comes from fire1 and to fire 
all returns4 ,all things are exchanged  
for fire and fire for all1 as wares for 
gold and gold for wares4 ,thus there is 
only one ultimate kind of matter1 fire1 
and all other forms of matter are merely
 modifications and variations of fire4  
,it is clear for what reason            
,heracleitus enunciated this principle4 
,it is an exact physical parallel to the
 metaphysical principle of ,becoming4   
,fire is the most mutable of the        
elements4 ,it does not remain the same  
from one moment to another4 ,it is      
continually taking up matter in the form
 of fuel1 and giving off equivalent     
matter in the form of smoke and vapour4 
,the primal fire1 according to          

,heracleitus1 transmutes itself into    
air1 air into water1 and water into     
earth4 ,this he calls the downward path4
 ,to it corresponds the upward path1 the
 transmutation of earth into water1     
water to air1 and air to fire4 ,all     
transformation takes place in this      
regular order1 and therefore1 says      
,heracleitus1 the upward and the        
downward path are one4  ,fire is further
 specially identified with life and     
reason4 ,it is the rational element in  
things4 ,the more fire there is1 the    
more life1 the more movement4 ,the more 
dark and heavy materials there are1 the 
more death1 cold1 and not-being4 ,the   
soul1 accordingly1 is fire1 and like all
 other fires it continually burns itself
 out and needs replenishment4 ,this it  
obtains1 through the senses and the     
breath1 from the common life and reason 
of the #gi world1 that is1 from the     
surrounding and all-pervading fire4 ,in 
this we live and move and have our      
being4 ,no man has a separate soul of   

his own4 ,it is merely part of the one  
universal soul-fire4 ,hence if          
communication with this is cut off1 man 
becomes irrational and finally dies4    
,sleep is the half-way house to death4  
,in sleep the passages of the senses are
 stopped up1 and the outer fire reaches 
us only through breath4 ,hence in sleep 
we become irrational and senseless1     
turning aside from the common life of   
the world1 each to a private world of   
his own4 ,heracleitus taught also the   
doctrine of periodic world-cycles4 ,the 
world forms itself out of fire1 and by  
conflagration passes back to the        
primitive fire4  ,in his religious      
opinions ,heracleitus was sceptical4    
,but he does not1 like ,xenophanes1     
direct his attacks against the central  
ideas of religion1 and the doctrine of  
the gods4 ,he attacks mostly the outward
 observances and forms in which the     
religious spirit manifests itself4 ,he  
inveighs against the worship of images1 
and urges the uselessness of blood      

sacrifice4  ,with the ,eleatics he      
distinguishes between sense and reason1 
and places truth in rational cognition4 
,the illusion of permanence he ascribes 
to the senses4 ,it is by reason that we 
rise to the knowledge of the law of     
,becoming4 ,in the comprehension of this
 law lies the duty of man1 and the only 
road to happiness4 ,understanding this1 
man becomes resigned and contented4 ,he 
sees that evil is the necessary         
counterpart of good1 and pain the       
necessary counterpart of pleasure1 and  
that both together are necessary to form
 the harmony of the world4 ,good and    
evil are principles on the struggle #hj 
between which the very existence of     
things depends4 ,evil1 too1 is          
necessary1 has its place in the world4  
,to see this is to put oneself above    
pitiful and futile struggles against the
 supreme law of the universe4           
,,chapter ,,vi  ,,empedocles            
,empedocles was a man of ,agrigentum in 
,sicily4 ,the dates of his birth and    

death are placed about #die and #dce    
,b4,c4 respectively4 ,like ,pythagoras1 
he possessed a powerful and magnetic    
personality4 ,hence all kinds of legends
 quickly grew up and wove themselves    
round his life and death4 ,he was       
credited with the performance of        
miracles1 and romantic stories were     
circulated about his death4 ,a man of   
much persuasive eloquence he raised     
himself to the leadership of the        
,agrigentine democracy1 until he was    
driven out into exile4  ,the philosophy 
of ,empedocles is eclectic in character4
 ,greek philosophy had now developed a  
variety of conflicting principles1 and  
the task of ,empedocles is to reconcile 
these1 and to weld them together in a   
new system1 containing however no new   
thought of its own4 ,in speaking of     
,parmenides1 ,i pointed out that his    
teaching may be interpreted either in an
 idealistic or a materialistic sense1   
and that these two aspects of thought   
lie side by side in ,parmenides1 and    

that it is possible to emphasize either 
the one or the other4 ,empedocles seizes
 upon the materialistic side4 ,the      
essential thought of ,parmenides was    
that ,being cannot pass into not-being1 
nor not-being into ,being4 ,whatever is1
 remains for ever what it is4 #hb ,if we
 take that in a purely material context1
 what it means is that matter has       
neither beginning nor end1 is uncreated 
and indestructible4 ,and this is the    
first basic principle of ,empedocles4   
,on the other hand1 ,heracleitus had    
shown that becoming and change cannot be
 denied4 ,this is the second basic      
principle of ,empedocles4 ,that there is
 no absolute becoming1 no creation1 and 
utter destruction of things1 and yet    
that things do somehow arise and pass   
away1 this must be explained1 these     
contradictory ideas must be reconciled4 
,now if we assert that matter is        
uncreated and indestructible1 and yet   
that things arise and pass away1 there  
is only one way of explaining this4 ,we 

must suppose that objects1 as wholes    
begin and cease to be1 but that the     
material particles of which they are    
composed are uncreated and              
indestructible4 ,this thought now forms 
the first principle of ,empedocles1 and 
of his successors1 ,anaxagoras1 and the 
,atomists4  ,now the ,ionic philosophers
 had taught that all things are composed
 of some one ultimate matter4 ,thales   
believed it to be water1 ,anaximenes    
air4 ,this necessarily involved that the
 ultimate kind of matter must be capable
 of transformation into other kinds of  
matter4 ,if it is water1 then water must
 be capable of turning into brass1 wood1
 iron1 air1 or whatever other kind of   
matter exists4 ,and the same thing      
applies to the air of ,anaximenes4      
,parmenides1 however1 had taught that   
whatever is1 remains always the same1 no
 change or transformation being         
possible4 ,empedocles here too follows  
,parmenides1 and interprets his doctrine
 in his own way4 ,one kind of matter1 he

 thinks1 can never change into another  
kind of matter2 fire never becomes #hc  
water1 nor does earth ever become air4  
,this leads ,empedocles at once to a    
doctrine of elements4 ,the word         
elements1 indeed1 is of later invention1
 and ,empedocles speaks of the elements 
as the roots of all4 ,there are four    
elements1 earth1 air1 fire1 and water4  
,empedocles was therefore the originator
 of the familiar classification of the  
four elements4 ,all other kinds of      
matter are to be explained as mixtures1 
in various proportions1 of these four4  
,thus all origination and decease1 as   
well as the differential qualities of   
certain kinds of matter1 are now        
explained by the mixing and unmixing of 
the four elements4 ,all becoming is     
simply composition and decomposition4   
,but the coming together and separation 
of the elements involves the movement of
 particles1 and to explain this there   
must exist some moving force4 ,the      
,ionic philosophers had assumed that    

matter has the power or force required  
for movement immanent in itself4 ,the   
air of ,anaximenes1 of its own inherent 
power1 transforms itself into other     
kinds of matter4 ,this doctrine         
,empedocles rejects4 ,matter is for him 
absolutely dead and lifeless1 without   
any principle of motion in itself4      
,there is1 therefore1 only one remaining
 possibility4 ,forces acting upon matter
 from the outside must be assumed4 ,and 
as the two essential processes of the   
world1 mixing and unmixing1 are opposite
 in character1 so there must be two     
opposite forces4 ,these he calls by the 
names ,love and ,hate1 or ,harmony and  
,discord4 ,though these terms may have  
an idealistic sound1 ,empedocles        
conceives them as entirely physical and 
material forces4 ,but he identifies the 
attractions and repulsions of human     
beings1 which we call love and hate1    
with the universally operating forces of
 the material world4 ,human love and #hd
 hate are but the manifestations in us  

of the mechanical forces of attraction  
and repulsion at work in the world at   
large4  ,empedocles taught the doctrine 
of periodic world-cycles4 ,the          
world-process is1 therefore1 properly   
speaking1 circular1 and has neither     
beginning nor end4 ,but in describing   
this process one must begin somewhere4  
,we will begin1 then1 with the sphairos 
7sphere74 ,in the primeval sphere the   
four elements are completely mixed1 and 
interpenetrate each other completely4   
,water is not separated off from air1   
nor air from earth4 ,all are chaotically
 mixed together4 ,in any portion of the 
sphere there must be an equal quantity  
of earth1 air1 fire and water4 ,the     
elements are thus in union1 and the sole
 force operative within the sphere is   
,love or ,harmony4 ,hence the sphere is 
called a blessed god4 ,hate1 however1   
exists all round the outside of the     
sphere4 ,hate gradually penetrates from 
the circumference towards the centre and
 introduces the process of separation   

and disunion of the elements4 ,this     
process continues till1 like coming     
together with like1 the elements are    
wholly separated4 ,all the water is     
together2 all the fire is together1 and 
so on4 ,when this process of            
disintegration is complete1 ,hate is    
supreme and ,love is entirely driven    
out4 ,but ,love again begins to         
penetrate matter1 to cause union and    
mixture of the elements1 and finally    
brings the world back to the state of   
the original sphere4 ,then the same     
process begins again4 ,at what position 
in this circular movement is our present
 world to be placed8 ,the answer is that
 it is neither in the complete union of 
the sphere1 nor is it completely        
disintegrated4 ,it is half-way between  
the sphere and the stage of total #he   
disintegration4 ,it is proceeding from  
the former towards the later1 and ,hate 
is gradually gaining the upper hand4 ,in
 the formation of the present world from
 the sphere the first element to be     

separated off was air1 next fire1 then  
the earth4 ,water is squeezed out of the
 earth by the rapidity of its rotation4 
,the sky is composed of two halves4 ,one
 is of fire1 and this is the day4 ,the  
other is dark matter with masses of fire
 scattered about in it1 and this is the 
night4  ,empedocles believed in the     
transmigration of souls4 ,he also put   
forward a theory of sense-perception1   
the essential of which is that like     
perceives like4 ,the fire in us         
perceives external fire1 and so with the
 other elements4 ,sight is caused by    
effluences of the fire and water of the 
eyes meeting similar effluences from    
external objects4  #hf  ,,chapter ,,vii 
,,the ,,atomists  ,the founder of the   
,atomist philosophy was ,leucippus4     
,practically nothing is known of his    
life4 ,the date of his birth1 the date  
of his death1 and his place of          
residence1 are alike unknown1 but it is 
believed that he was a contemporary of  
,empedocles and ,anaxagoras4 ,democritus

 was a citizen of ,abdera in ,thrace4   
,he was a man of the widest learning1 as
 learning was understood in his day4 ,a 
passion for knowledge and the possession
 of adequate means for the purpose1     
determined him to undertake extensive   
travels in order to acquire the wisdom  
and knowledge of other nations4 ,he     
travelled largely in ,egypt1 also       
probably in ,babylonia4 ,the date of his
 death is unknown1 but he certainly     
lived to a great age1 estimated at from 
ninety to one hundred years4 ,exactly   
what were the respective contributions  
of ,leucippus and ,democritus to the    
,atomist philosophy1 is also a matter of
 doubt4 ,but it is believed that all the
 essentials of this philosophy were the 
work of ,leucippus1 and that ,democritus
 applied and extended them1 worked out  
details1 and made the theory famous4    
,now we saw that the philosophy of      
,empedocles was based upon an attempt to
 reconcile the doctrine of ,parmenides  
with the doctrine of ,heracleitus4 ,the 

#hg fundamental thought of ,empedocles  
was that there is no absolute becoming  
in the strict sense1 no passage of      
,being into not-being or not-being into 
,being4 ,yet the objects of the senses  
do1 in some way1 arise and pass away1   
and the only method by which this is    
capable of explanation is to suppose    
that objects1 as whole objects1 come to 
be and cease to be1 but that the        
material particles of which they are    
composed are eternally existent4 ,but   
the detailed development which          
,empedocles gave to this principle was  
by no means satisfactory4 ,in the first 
place1 if we hold that all objects are  
composed of parts1 and that all becoming
 is due to the mixing and unmixing of   
pre-existent matter1 we must have a     
theory of particles4 ,and we do hear    
vaguely of physical particles in the    
doctrine of ,empedocles1 but no         
definition is given of their nature1 and
 no clear conception is formed of their 
character4 ,secondly1 the moving forces 

of ,empedocles1 ,love and ,hate1 are    
fanciful and mythological4 ,lastly1     
though there are in ,empedocles traces  
of the doctrine that the qualities of   
things depend on the position and       
arrangement of their particles1 this    
idea is not consistently developed4 ,for
 ,empedocles there are only four        
ultimate kinds of matter1 qualitatively 
distinguished4 ,the differential        
qualities of all other kinds of matter  
must1 therefore1 be due to the mixing of
 these four elements4 ,thus the         
qualities of the four elements are      
ultimate and underived1 but all other   
qualities must be founded upon the      
position and arrangement of particles of
 the four elements4 ,this is the        
beginning of the mechanical explanation 
of quality4 ,but to develop this theory 
fully and consistently1 it should be    
shown1 not merely that some qualities   
are ultimate and some #hh derived from  
position and arrangement of particles1  
but that all quality whatever is founded

 upon position and arrangement4 ,all    
becoming is explained by ,empedocles as 
the result of motion of material        
particles4 ,to bring this mechanical    
philosophy to its logical conclusion1   
all qualitativeness of things must be   
explained in the same way4 ,hence it was
 impossible that the philosophy of      
mechanism and materialism should stand  
still in the position in which          
,empedocles left it4 ,it had to advance 
to the position of ,atomism4 ,the       
,atomists1 therefore1 maintain the      
essential position of ,empedocles1 after
 eliminating the inconsistencies which  
we have just noted4 ,the philosophy of  
,empedocles is therefore to be          
considered as merely transitional in    
character4  ,first1 the ,atomists       
developed the theory of particles4      
,according to ,leucippus and            
,democritus1 if matter were divided far 
enough1 we should ultimately come to    
indivisible units4 ,these indivisible   
units are called atoms1 and atoms are   

therefore the ultimate constituents of  
matter4 ,they are infinite in number1   
and are too small to be perceptible to  
the senses4 ,empedocles had assumed four
 different kinds of matter4 ,but1 for   
the ,atomists1 there is only one kind4  
,all the atoms are composed of exactly  
the same kind of matter4 ,with certain  
exceptions1 which ,i will mention in a  
moment1 they possess no quality4 ,they  
are entirely non-qualitative1 the only  
differences between them being          
differences of quantity4 ,they differ in
 size1 some being larger1 some smaller4 
,and they likewise differ in shape4     
,since the ultimate particles of things 
thus possess no quality1 all the actual 
qualities of objects must be due to the 
#hi arrangement and position of the     
atoms4 ,this is the logical development 
of the tentative mechanism of           
,empedocles4  ,i said that the atoms    
possess no qualities4 ,they must1       
however1 be admitted to possess the     
quality of solidity1 or impenetrability1

 since they are defined as being        
indivisible4 ,moreover it is a question 
whether the atoms of ,democritus and    
,leucippus were thought to possess      
weight1 or whether the weight of objects
 is to be explained1 like other         
qualities1 by the position and movement 
of the atoms4 ,there is no doubt that   
the ,epicureans of a later date         
considered the atoms to have weight4    
,the ,epicureans took over the atomism  
of ,democritus and ,leucippus1 with few 
modifications1 and made it the basis of 
their own teaching4 ,they ascribed      
weight to the atoms1 and the only       
question is whether this was a          
modification introduced by them1 or     
whether it was part of the original     
doctrine of ,democritus and ,leucippus4 
,the atoms are bounded1 and separated   
off from each other4 ,therefore1 they   
must be separated by something1 and this
 something can only be empty space4     
,moreover1 since all becoming and all   
qualitativeness of things are to be     

explained by the mixing and unmixing of 
atoms1 and since this involves movement 
of the atoms1 for this reason also empty
 space must be assumed to exist1 for    
nothing can move unless it has empty    
space to move in4 ,hence there are two  
ultimate realities1 atoms and empty     
space4 ,these correspond respectively to
 the ,being and not-being of the        
,eleatics4 ,but whereas the latter      
denied any reality to not-being1 the    
,atomists affirm that not-being1 that   
is1 empty space1 is just as real as     
being4 ,not-being also exists4 ,being1  
said #ij ,democritus1 is by nothing more
 real than nothing4 ,the atoms being    
non-qualitative1 they differ in no      
respect from empty space1 except that   
they are full4 ,hence atoms and the void
 are also called the plenum and the     
vacuum4  ,how1 now1 is the movement of  
the atoms brought about8 ,since all     
becoming is due to the separation and   
aggregation of atoms1 a moving force is 
required4 ,what is this moving force8   

,this depends upon the question whether 
atoms have weight4 ,if we assume that   
they have weight1 then the origin of the
 world1 and the motion of atoms1 becomes
 clear4 ,in the system of the           
,epicureans the original movement of the
 atoms is due to their weight1 which    
causes them to fall perpetually         
downwards through infinite space4 ,of   
course the ,atomists had no true ideas  
of gravitation1 nor did they understand 
that there is no absolute up and down4  
,the large atoms are heavier than the   
smaller4 ,the matter of which they are  
composed is always the same4 ,therefore1
 volume for volume1 they weigh the same4
 ,their weight is thus proportional to  
their size1 and if one atom is twice as 
large as another1 it will also be twice 
as heavy4 ,here the ,atomists made      
another mistake1 in supposing that      
heavier things fall in a vacuum more    
quickly than light things4 ,they fall1  
as a matter of fact1 with the same      
speed4 ,but according to the ,atomists1 

the heavier atoms1 falling faster1      
strike against the lighter1 and push    
them to one side and upwards4 ,through  
this general concussion of atoms a      
vortex is formed1 in which like atoms   
come together with like4 ,from the      
aggregation of atoms worlds are created4
 ,as space is infinite and the atoms go 
on falling eternally1 there must have   
been innumerable worlds of which our    
world is only one4 #ia ,when the        
aggregated atoms fall apart again1 this 
particular world will cease to exist4   
,but all this depends upon the theory   
that the atoms have weight4 ,according  
to ,professor ,burnet1 however1 the     
weight of atoms is a later addition of  
the ,epicureans4 ,if that is so1 it is  
very difficult to say how the early     
,atomists1 ,leucippus and ,democritus1  
explained the original motion4 ,what was
 their moving force1 if it was not      
weight8 ,if the atoms have no weight1   
their original movement cannot have been
 a fall4 ,it is safest to say1 says     

,professor ,burnet1 that it is simply a 
confused motion this way and that4      
,footnote #g ,probably this is a very   
safe thing to say1 because it means     
nothing in particular4 ,motion itself   
cannot be confused4 ,it is only our     
ideas of motion which can be confused4  
,if this theory is correct1 then1 we can
 only say that the ,atomists had no     
definite solution of the problem of the 
origin of motion and the character of   
the moving force4 ,they apparently saw  
no necessity for explanation1 which     
seems unlikely in view of the fact that 
,empedocles had already seen the        
necessity of solving the problem1 and   
given a definite1 if unsatisfactory1    
solution1 in his theory of ,love and    
,hate4 ,this remark would apply to      
,democritus1 if not to ,leucippus4      
,footnote #g3 ,early ,greek ,philosophy1
 chap4 ix4 ,sec4 #agi4  ,the ,atomists  
also spoke of all movement being under  
the force of necessity4 ,anaxagoras was 
at this time teaching that all motion of

 things is produced by a                
world-intelligence1 or reason4          
,democritus expressly opposes to this   
the doctrine of necessity4 ,there is no 
reason or intelligence in the world4 ,on
 the contrary1 all phenomena and all    
becoming are completely determined by   
blind mechanical causes4 ,in this       
connection there arises #ib among the   
,atomists a polemic against the popular 
gods and the popular religion4 ,belief  
in gods ,democritus explains as being   
due to fear of great terrestrial and    
astronomical phenomena1 such as         
volcanoes1 earthquakes1 comets1 and     
meteors4 ,but somewhat inconsistently   
with this1 ,democritus believed that the
 air is inhabited by beings resembling  
men1 but larger and of longer life1 and 
explained belief in the gods as being   
due to projection from these of images  
of themselves composed of atoms which   
impinge upon human senses1 and produce  
the ideas of gods4  ,different kinds of 
matter must be explained1 in any atomic 

theory1 by the shape1 size1 and position
 of the atoms of which they are         
composed4 ,thus the ,atomists taught    
that fire is composed of smooth round   
atoms4 ,the soul is also composed of    
smooth round atoms1 and is an           
exceptionally pure and refined fire4 ,at
 death the soul atoms are scattered1 and
 hence there is1 of course1 no question 
of a future life4 ,democritus also put  
forward a theory of perception1         
according to which objects project into 
space images of themselves composed of  
atoms4 ,these images strike against the 
senses4 ,like atoms are perceived by    
like4 ,thought is true when the soul is 
equable in temperature4 ,the sensible   
qualities of things1 such as smell1     
taste1 colour1 do not exist in the      
things themselves1 but merely express   
the manner in which they affect our     
senses1 and are therefore relative to   
us4 ,a number of the ethical maxims of  
,democritus have come down to us4 ,but  
they are not based in any way upon the  

,atomic theory1 and cannot be deduced   
from it4 ,hence they have no scientific 
foundation but are merely detached      
sayings1 epitomizing the experience #ic 
and worldly wisdom of ,democritus4 ,that
 one should enjoy oneself as much and   
vex oneself as little as possible seems 
to have been his principal idea4 ,this1 
however1 is not to be interpreted in any
 low1 degraded1 or sensual way4 ,on the 
contrary1 ,democritus says that the     
happiness of man does not depend on     
material possessions1 but upon the state
 of the soul4 ,he praises equanimity and
 cheerfulness1 and these are best       
attained1 he thinks1 by moderation and  
simplicity4    #id  ,,chapter ,,viii    
,,anaxagoras  ,anaxagoras was born at   
,clazomenae in ,asia ,minor about #ejj  
,b4,c4 ,he was a man of noble family1   
and possessed considerable property4 ,he
 neglected his property in the search   
for knowledge and in the pursuit of     
science and philosophy4 ,leaving his    
home at ,clazomenae1 he settled down in 

,athens4 ,we have not heard so far      
anything of ,athens in the history of   
,greek ,philosophy4 ,it was ,anaxagoras 
who transplanted philosophy to ,athens1 
which from his time forward became the  
chief centre of ,greek thought4 ,at     
,athens1 ,anaxagoras came into contact  
with all the famous men of the time4 ,he
 was an intimate friend of ,pericles1   
the statesman1 and of ,euripides1 the   
poet4 ,but his friendship with ,pericles
 cost him dear4 ,there was a strong     
political faction opposed to ,pericles4 
,so far as we know ,anaxagoras never    
meddled in politics1 but he was a friend
 of the statesman ,pericles1 and that   
was quite enough4 ,the enemies of       
,pericles determined to teach           
,anaxagoras a lesson1 and a charge of   
atheism and blasphemy was accordingly   
brought against him4 ,the particulars of
 the charge were that ,anaxagoras said  
that the sun was a red-hot stone1 and   
that the moon was made of earth4 ,this  
was quite true1 as that is exactly what 

,anaxagoras did say of the sun and the  
moon4 ,but the ,greeks #ie regarded the 
heavenly bodies as gods2 even ,plato and
 ,aristotle thought that the stars were 
divine beings4 ,to call the sun a       
red-hot stone1 and to say that the moon 
was made of earth1 was therefore        
blasphemy according to ,greek ideas4    
,anaxagoras was charged1 tried1 and     
condemned4 ,the details of the trial1   
and of what followed1 are not known with
 accuracy4 ,but it appears that         
,anaxagoras escaped1 probably with the  
help of ,pericles1 and from ,athens went
 back to his native country in ,asia    
,minor4 ,he settled at ,lampsacus1 and  
died there at the age of #gb4 ,he was   
the author of a treatise in which he    
wrote down his philosophical ideas4     
,this treatise was well-known at the    
time of ,socrates1 but only fragments   
now remain4  ,the foundation of the     
philosophy of ,anaxagoras is the same as
 that of ,empedocles and the ,atomists4 
,he denied any absolute becoming in the 

strict sense of the passing of being    
into not-being and not-being into being4
 ,matter is uncreated and               
indestructible1 and all becoming must be
 accounted for by the mixing and        
unmixing of its component parts4 ,this  
principle ,anaxagoras himself expressed 
with great clearness1 in a fragment of  
his treatise which has come down to us4 
,the ,greeks1 he says1 erroneously      
assume origination and destruction1 for 
nothing originates and nothing is       
destroyed4 ,all is only mixed and       
unmixed out of pre-existent things1 and 
it were more correct to call the one    
process composition and the other       
process decomposition4  ,the ,atomists  
had assumed the ultimate constituents of
 things to be atoms composed of the same
 kind of matter4 ,empedocles had        
believed in four ultimate and underived 
kinds of matter4 ,with neither of these 
does ,anaxagoras agree4 ,for him1 all   
the different kinds of #if matter are   
equally ultimate and underived1 that is 

to say1 such things as gold1 bone1 hair1
 earth1 water1 wood1 etc41 are ultimate 
kinds of matter1 which do not arise from
 anything else1 and do not pass over    
into one another4 ,he also disagrees    
with the conception of the ,atomists    
that if matter is divided far enough1   
ultimate and indivisible particles will 
be reached4 ,according to ,anaxagoras   
matter is infinitely divisible4 ,in the 
beginning all these kinds of matter were
 mixed together in a chaotic mass4 ,the 
mass stretches infinitely throughout    
space4 ,the different kinds of matter   
wholly intermingle and interpenetrate   
each other4 ,the process of             
world-formation is brought about by the 
unmixing of the conglomeration of all   
kinds of matter1 and the bringing       
together of like matter with like4 ,thus
 the gold particles separating out of   
the mass come together1 and form gold2  
the wood particles come together and    
form wood1 and so on4 ,but as matter is 
infinitely divisible and the original   

mixing of the elements was complete1    
they were1 so to speak1 mixed to an     
infinite extent4 ,therefore the process 
of unmixing would take infinite time1 is
 now going on1 and will always go on4   
,even in the purest element there is    
still a certain admixture of particles  
of other kinds of matter4 ,there is no  
such thing as pure gold4 ,gold is merely
 matter in which the gold particles     
predominate4  ,as with ,empedocles and  
the ,atomists1 a moving force is        
required to explain the world-process of
 unmixing4 ,what1 in the philosophy of  
,anaxagoras1 is this force8 ,now up to  
the present point the philosophy of     
,anaxagoras does not rise above the     
previous philosophies of ,empedocles and
 the ,atomists4 ,on the contrary1 in    
clearness #ig and logical consistency1  
it falls considerably below the teaching
 of the latter4 ,but it is just here1 on
 the question of the moving force1 that 
,anaxagoras becomes for the first time  
wholly original1 and introduces a       

principle peculiar to himself1 a        
principle1 moreover1 which is entirely  
new in philosophy4 ,empedocles had taken
 as his moving forces1 ,love and ,hate1 
mythical and fanciful on the one hand1  
and yet purely physical on the other4   
,the forces of the ,atomists were also  
completely material4 ,but ,anaxagoras   
conceives the moving force as wholly    
non-physical and incorporeal4 ,it is    
called ,nous1 that is1 mind or          
intelligence4 ,it is intelligence which 
produces the movement in things which   
brings about the formation of the world4
 ,what was it1 now1 which led           
,anaxagoras to the doctrine of a        
world-governing intelligence8 ,it seems 
that he was struck with the apparent    
design1 order1 beauty and harmony of the
 universe4 ,these things1 he thought1   
could not be accounted for by blind     
forces4 ,the world is apparently a      
rationally governed world4 ,it moves    
towards definite ends4 ,nature shows    
plentiful examples of the adaptation of 

means to ends4 ,there appears to be plan
 and purpose in the world4 ,the         
,atomists had assumed nothing but matter
 and physical force4 ,how can design1   
order1 harmony and beauty be brought    
about by blind forces acting upon       
chaotic matter8 ,blind forces acting    
upon a chaos would produce motion and   
change4 ,but the change would be        
meaningless and purposeless4 ,they could
 not produce a rationally ordered       
cosmos4 ,one chaos would succeed another
 chaos ad infinitum4 ,that alone which  
can produce law and order is            
intelligence4 ,there must therefore be a
 world-controlling ,nous4  #ih  ,what is
 the character of the ,nous1 according  
to ,anaxagoras8 ,is it1 in the first    
place1 really conceived as purely       
non-material and incorporeal8           
,aristotle1 who was in a position to    
know more of the matter than any modern 
scholar1 clearly implies in his         
criticism that the ,nous of ,anaxagoras 
is an incorporeal principle1 and he has 

been followed in this by the majority of
 the best modern writers1 such as       
,zeller and ,erdmann4 ,but the opposite 
view has been maintained1 by ,grote1 for
 example1 and more recently by          
,professor ,burnet1 who thinks that     
,anaxagoras conceived the ,nous as a    
material and physical force4 ,footnote  
#h ,as the matter is of fundamental     
importance1 ,i will mention the chief   
arguments upon which ,professor ,burnet 
rests his case4 ,in the first place     
,anaxagoras described the ,nous as the  
thinnest and purest of all things4 ,he  
also said that it was unmixed1 that it  
had in it no mixture of anything besides
 itself4 ,professor ,burnet argues that 
such words as thin and unmixed would be 
meaningless in connection with an       
incorporeal principle4 ,only material   
things can properly be described as     
thin1 pure1 and unmixed4 ,secondly1     
,professor ,burnet thinks that it is    
quite certain that the ,nous occupies   
space1 for ,anaxagoras speaks of greater

 and smaller portions of it4 ,greater   
and smaller are spatial relations4      
,hence the ,nous occupies space1 and    
that which occupies space is material4  
,but surely these are very inconclusive 
arguments4 ,in the first place as       
regards the use of the words thin and   
unmixed4 ,it is true that these terms   
express primarily physical qualities4   
,but1 as ,i pointed out in #ii the first
 chapter1 almost all words by which we  
seek to express incorporeal ideas have  
originally a physical signification4    
,and if ,anaxagoras is to be called a   
materialist because he described the    
,nous as thin1 then we must also plead  
guilty to materialism if we say that the
 thought of ,plato is luminous1 or that 
the mind of ,aristotle is clear4 ,the   
fact is that all philosophy labours     
under the difficulty of having to       
express non-sensuous thought in language
 which has been evolved for the purpose 
of expressing sensuous ideas4 ,there is 
no philosophy in the world1 even up to  

the present day1 in which expressions   
could not be found in plenty which are  
based upon the use of physical analogies
 to express entirely non-physical ideas4
 ,then as regards the ,nous occupying   
space1 it is not true that greater and  
smaller are necessarily spatial         
relations4 ,they are also qualitative   
relations of degree4 ,i say that the    
mind of ,plato is greater than the mind 
of ,callias4 ,am ,i to be called a      
materialist8 ,am ,i to be supposed to   
mean that ,plato's mind occupies more   
space than that of ,callias8 ,and it is 
certainly in this way that ,anaxagoras  
uses the terms4 ,all ,nous1 he says1 is 
alike1 both the greater and the smaller4
 ,he means thereby that the             
world-forming mind 7the greater7 is     
identical in character with the mind of 
man 7the smaller74 ,for ,anaxagoras it  
is the one ,nous which animates all     
living beings1 men1 animals1 and even   
plants4 ,these different orders of      
beings are animated by the same ,nous   

but in different degrees1 that of man   
being the greatest4 ,but this does not  
mean that the ,nous in man occupies more
 space than the ,nous in a plant4 ,but  
even if ,anaxagoras did conceive the    
,nous as spatial1 it does not follow    
that he #ajj regarded it as material4   
,the doctrine of the non-spatiality of  
mind is a modern doctrine1 never fully  
developed till the time of ,descartes4  
,and to say that ,anaxagoras did not    
realize that mind is non-spatial is     
merely to say that he lived before the  
time of ,descartes4 ,no doubt it would  
follow from this that the incorporeality
 of mind is vaguely and indistinctly    
conceived by ,anaxagoras1 that the      
antithesis between matter and mind is   
not so sharply drawn by him as it is by 
us4 ,but still the antithesis is        
conceived1 and therefore it is correct  
to say that the ,nous of ,anaxagoras is 
an incorporeal principle4 ,the whole    
point of this introduction of the ,nous 
into the philosophy of ,anaxagoras is   

because he could not explain the design 
and order of the universe on a purely   
physical basis4  ,footnote #h3 ,early   
,greek ,philosophy1 chap4 vi4 ,sec4     
#acb4  ,the next characteristic of ,nous
 is that it is to be thought of as      
essentially the ground of motion4 ,it is
 because he cannot in any other way     
explain purposive motion that           
,anaxagoras introduces mind into his    
otherwise materialistic system4 ,mind   
plays the part of the moving force which
 explains the world-process of unmixing4
 ,as the ground of motion1 the ,nous is 
itself unmoved2 for if there were any   
motion in it we should have to seek for 
the ground of this motion in something  
else outside it4 ,that which is the     
cause of all motion1 cannot itself be   
moved4 ,next1 the ,nous is absolutely   
pure and unmixed with anything else4 ,it
 exists apart1 by itself1 wholly in     
itself1 and for itself4 ,in contrast to 
matter1 it is uncompounded and simple4  
,it is this which gives it omnipotence1 

complete power over everything1 because 
there is no mixture of matter in it to  
limit it1 to clog and hinder its        
activities4 ,we moderns are #aja        
inclined to ask the question whether the
 ,nous is personal4 ,is it1 for example1
 a personal being like the ,god of the  
,christians8 ,this is a question which  
it is almost impossible to answer4      
,anaxagoras certainly never considered  
it4 ,according to ,zeller1 the ,greeks  
had an imperfect and undeveloped        
conception of personality4 ,even in     
,plato we find the same difficulty4 ,the
 antithesis between ,god as a personal  
and as an impersonal being1 is a wholly 
modern idea4 ,no ,greek ever discussed  
it4  ,to come now to the question of the
 activity of the ,nous and its function 
in the philosophy of ,anaxagoras1 we    
must note that it is essentially a      
world-forming1 and not a world-creating1
 intelligence4 ,the ,nous and matter    
exist side by side from eternity4 ,it   
does not create matter1 but only        

arranges it4 ,all things were together1 
says ,anaxagoras1 infinitely numerous1  
infinitely little2 then came the ,nous  
and set them in order4 ,in this         
,anaxagoras showed a sound logical      
sense4 ,he based his idea of the        
existence of ,nous upon the design which
 exhibits itself in the world4 ,in      
modern times the existence of design in 
the world has been made the foundation  
of an argument for the existence of     
,god1 which is known as the teleological
 argument4 ,the word teleology means the
 view of things as adapting means       
towards purposive ends4 ,to see         
intelligent design in the universe is to
 view the universe teleologically4 ,and 
the teleological argument for the       
existence of ,god asserts that1 as there
 is evidence of purpose in nature1 this 
must be due to an intelligent cause4    
,but1 as a matter of fact1 taken by     
itself1 teleology cannot possibly be    
made the basis of an argument for the   
existence of a world-creating           

intelligence1 but only for the existence
 of a world-designing #ajb intelligence4
 ,if you find in the desert the ruins of
 ancient cities and temples1 you are    
entitled to conclude therefrom1 that    
there existed a mind which designed     
these cities and buildings1 and which   
arranged matter in that purposive way1  
but you are not entitled to conclude    
that the mind which designed the cities 
also created the matter out of which    
they were made4 ,anaxagoras was1        
therefore1 in that sense quite right4   
,teleology is not evidence of a         
world-creating mind1 and if we are to   
prove that1 we must have recourse to    
other lines of reasoning4  ,in the      
beginning1 then1 there was a chaotic    
mixture of different kinds of matter4   
,the ,nous produced a vortex at one     
point in the middle of this mass4 ,this 
vortex spread itself outwards in the    
mass of matter1 like rings caused by the
 fall of a stone in water4 ,it goes on  
for ever and continually draws more and 

more matter out of the infinite mass    
into itself4 ,the movement1 therefore1  
is never-ending4 ,it causes like kinds  
of matter to come together with like1   
gold to gold1 wood to wood1 water to    
water1 and so on4 ,it is to be noted1   
therefore1 that the action of the ,nous 
is apparently confined to the first     
movement4 ,it acts only at the one      
central point1 and every subsequent     
movement is caused by the vortex itself1
 which draws in more and more of the    
surrounding matter into itself4 ,first  
are separated out the warm1 dry1 and    
light particles1 and these form the     
aether or upper air4 ,next come the     
cold1 moist1 dark1 and dense particles  
which form the lower air4 ,rotation     
takes the latter towards the centre1 and
 out of this the earth is formed4 ,the  
earth1 as with ,anaximenes1 is a flat   
disc1 borne upon the air4 ,the heavenly 
bodies consist of #ajc masses of stone  
which have been torn from the earth by  
the force of its rotation1 and being    

projected outwards become incandescent  
through the rapidity of their movement4 
,the moon is made of earth and reflects 
the light of the sun4 ,anaxagoras was   
thus the first to give the true cause of
 the moon's light4 ,he was also the     
first to discover the true theory of    
eclipses1 since he taught that the solar
 eclipse is due to the intervention of  
the moon between the sun and the earth1 
and that lunar eclipses arise from the  
shadow of the earth falling upon the    
moon4 ,he believed that there are other 
worlds besides our own with their own   
suns and moons4 ,these worlds are       
inhabited4 ,the sun1 according to       
,anaxagoras1 is many times as large as  
the ,peloponnese4 ,the origin of life   
upon the earth is accounted for by germs
 which existed in the atmosphere1 and   
which were brought down into the        
terrestrial slime by rain water1 and    
there fructified4 ,anaxagoras's theory  
of perception is the opposite of the    
theories of ,empedocles and the         

,atomists4 ,perception takes place by   
unlike matter meeting unlike4           
,anaxagoras owes his importance in the  
history of philosophy to the theory of  
the ,nous4 ,this was the first time that
 a definite distinction had been made   
between the corporeal and incorporeal4  
,anaxagoras is the last philosopher of  
the first period of ,greek philosophy4  
,in the second chapter1 ,footnote #i ,i 
observed that this first period is      
characterized by the fact that in it the
 ,greek mind looks only outward upon the
 external world4 ,it attempts to explain
 the operations of nature4 ,it had not  
yet learned to look inward upon itself4 
,but the transition to the introspective
 study of mind is found in the ,nous of 
#ajd ,anaxagoras4 ,mind is now brought  
to the fore as a problem for philosophy4
 ,to find reason1 intelligence1 mind1 in
 all things1 in the ,state1 in the      
individual1 in external nature1 this is 
the characteristic of the second period 
of ,greek philosophy4 ,to have          

formulated the antithesis between mind  
and matter is the most important work of
 ,anaxagoras4  ,footnote #i3 ,pages     
#bc-d4  ,secondly1 it is to the credit  
of ,anaxagoras that he was the first to 
introduce the idea of teleology into    
philosophy4 ,the system of the ,atomists
 formed the logical completion of the   
mechanical theory of the world4 ,the    
theory of mechanism seeks to explain all
 things by causes4 ,but1 as we saw1     
causation can explain nothing4 ,the     
mechanism of the world shows us by what 
means events are brought about1 but it  
does not explain why they are brought   
about at all4 ,that can only be         
explained by showing the reason for     
things1 by exhibiting all process as a  
means towards rational ends4 ,to look to
 the beginning 7cause7 of things for    
their explanation is the theory of      
mechanism4 ,to look to their ends for   
explanation of them is teleology4       
,anaxagoras was the first to have dimly 
seen this4 ,and for this reason         

,aristotle praises him1 and1 contrasting
 him with the mechanists1 ,leucippus and
 ,democritus1 says that he appears like 
a sober man among vain babblers4 ,the   
new principle which he thus introduced  
into philosophy was developed1 and      
formed the central idea of ,plato and   
,aristotle4 ,to have realized the twin  
antitheses of matter and mind1 of       
mechanism and teleology1 is the glory of
 ,anaxagoras4  ,but it is just here1 in 
the development of these two ideas1 that
 the defects of his system make their   
appearance4 ,firstly1 he so separated   
matter and mind that #aje his philosophy
 ends in sheer dualism4 ,he assumes the 
,nous and matter as existing from the   
beginning1 side by side1 as equally     
ultimate and underived principles4 ,a   
monistic materialism would have derived 
the ,nous from matter1 and a monistic   
idealism would have derived matter from 
the ,nous4 ,but ,anaxagoras does        
neither4 ,each is left1 in his theory1  
an inexplicable ultimate mystery4 ,his  

philosophy is1 therefore1 an            
irreconcilable dualism4  ,secondly1 his 
teleology turns out in the end to be    
only a new theory of mechanism4 ,the    
only reason which induces him to        
introduce the ,nous into the world1 is  
because he cannot otherwise explain the 
origin of movement4 ,it is only the     
first movement of things1 the formation 
of the vortex1 which he explains by     
mind4 ,all subsequent process is        
explained by the action of the vortex   
itself1 which draws the surrounding     
matter into itself4 ,the ,nous is thus  
nothing but another piece of mechanism  
to account for the first impulse to     
motion4 ,he regards the ,nous simply as 
a first cause1 and thus the             
characteristic of all mechanism1 to look
 back to first causes1 to the beginning1
 rather than to the end of things for   
their explanation1 appears here4        
,aristotle1 as usual1 puts the matter in
 a nutshell4 ,anaxagoras1 he says1 uses 
mind as a deus ex machina to account for

 the formation of the world1 and        
whenever he is at a loss to explain why 
anything necessarily is1 he drags it in 
by force4 ,but in other cases he assigns
 as a cause for things anything else in 
preference to mind4 ,footnote #aj       
,footnote #aj2 ,aristotle1 ,metaphysics1
 book i1 chap4 iv4    #ajf  ,,chapter   
,,ix  ,,the ,,sophists  ,the first      
period of ,greek philosophy closes with 
,anaxagoras4 ,his doctrine of the       
world-forming intelligence introduced a 
new principle into philosophy1 the      
principle of the antithesis between     
corporeal matter and incorporeal mind1  
and therefore1 by implication1 the      
antithesis between nature and man4 ,and 
if the first period of philosophy has   
for its problem the origin of the world1
 and the explanation of the being and   
becoming of nature1 the second period of
 philosophy opens1 in the ,sophists1    
with the problem of the position of man 
in the universe4 ,the teaching of the   
earlier philosophers was exclusively    

cosmological1 that of the ,sophists     
exclusively humanistic4 ,later in this  
second period1 these two modes of       
thought come together and fructify one  
another4 ,the problem of the mind and   
the problem of nature are subordinated  
as factors of the great1 universal1     
all-embracing1 world-systems of ,plato  
and ,aristotle4  ,it is not possible to 
understand the activities and teaching  
of the ,sophists without some knowledge 
of the religious1 political1 and social 
conditions of the time4 ,after long     
struggles between the people and the    
nobles1 democracy had almost everywhere 
triumphed4 ,but in ,greece democracy did
 not mean what we now mean by #ajg that 
word4 ,it did not mean representative   
institutions1 government by the people  
through their elected deputies4 ,ancient
 ,greece was never a single nation under
 a single government4 ,every city1      
almost every hamlet1 was an independent 
,state1 governed only by its own laws4  
,some of these ,states were so small    

that they comprised merely a handful of 
citizens4 ,all were so small that all   
the citizens could meet together in one 
place1 and themselves in person enact   
the laws and transact public business4  
,there was no necessity for             
representation4 ,consequently in ,greece
 every citizen was himself a politician 
and a legislator4 ,in these             
circumstances1 partisan feeling ran to  
extravagant lengths4 ,men forgot the    
interests of the ,state in the interests
 of party1 and this ended in men        
forgetting the interests of their party 
in their own interests4 ,greed1         
ambition1 grabbing1 selfishness1        
unrestricted egotism1 unbridled avarice1
 became the dominant notes of the       
political life of the time4  ,hand in   
hand with the rise of democracy went the
 decay of religion4 ,belief in the gods 
was almost everywhere discredited4 ,this
 was partly due to the moral            
worthlessness of the ,greek religion    
itself4 ,any action1 however scandalous 

or disgraceful1 could be justified by   
the examples of the gods themselves as  
related by the poets and mythologers of 
,greece4 ,but1 in greater measure1 the  
collapse of religion was due to that    
advance of science and philosophy which 
we have been considering in these       
lectures4 ,the universal tendency of    
that philosophy was to find natural     
causes for what had hitherto been       
ascribed to the action of the divine    
powers1 and this could not but have an  
undermining effect upon popular #ajh    
belief4 ,nearly all the philosophers had
 been secretly1 and many of them openly1
 antagonistic to the people's religion4 
,the attack was begun by ,xenophanes2   
,heracleitus carried it on2 and lastly  
,democritus had attempted to explain    
belief in the gods as being caused by   
fear of gigantic terrestrial and        
astronomical phenomena4 ,no educated man
 any longer believed in divination1     
auguries1 and miracles4 ,a wave of      
rationalism and scepticism passed over  

the ,greek people4 ,the age became one  
of negative1 critical1 and destructive  
thought4 ,democracy had undermined the  
old aristocratic institutions of the    
,state1 and science had undermined      
religious orthodoxy4 ,with the downfall 
of these two pillars of things          
established1 all else went too4 ,all    
morality1 all custom1 all authority1 all
 tradition1 were criticised and         
rejected4 ,what was regarded with awe   
and pious veneration by their           
fore-fathers the modern ,greeks now     
looked upon as fit subjects for jest and
 mockery4 ,every restraint of custom1   
law1 or morality1 was resented as an    
unwarrantable restriction upon the      
natural impulses of man4 ,what alone    
remained when these were thrust aside   
were the lust1 avarice1 and self-will of
 the individual4  ,the teaching of the  
,sophists was merely a translation into 
theoretical propositions of these       
practical tendencies of the period4 ,the
 ,sophists were the children of their   

time1 and the interpreters of their age4
 ,their philosophical teachings were    
simply the crystallization of the       
impulses which governed the life of the 
people into abstract principles and     
maxims4  ,who and what were the         
,sophists8 ,in the first place1 they    
were not a school of philosophers4 ,they
 are not to be compared1 for example1   
with the ,pythagoreans or #aji          
,eleatics4 ,they had not1 as a school   
has1 any system of philosophy held in   
common by them all4 ,none of them       
constructed systems of thought4 ,they   
had in common only certain loose        
tendencies of thought4 ,nor were they1  
as we understand the members of a school
 to be1 in any close personal           
association with one another4 ,they were
 a professional class rather than a     
school1 and as such they were scattered 
over ,greece1 and nourished among       
themselves the usual professional       
rivalries4 ,they were professional      
teachers and educators4 ,the rise of the

 ,sophists was due to the growing demand
 for popular education1 which was partly
 a genuine demand for light and         
knowledge1 but was mostly a desire for  
such spurious learning as would lead to 
worldly1 and especially political1      
success4 ,the triumph of democracy had  
brought it about that political careers 
were now open to the masses who had     
hitherto been wholly shut out from them4
 ,any man could rise to the highest     
positions in the ,state1 if he were     
endowed with cleverness1 ready speech1  
whereby to sway the passions of the mob1
 and a sufficient equipment in the way  
of education4 ,hence the demand arose   
for such an education as would enable   
the ordinary man to carve out a         
political career for himself4 ,it was   
this demand which the ,sophists         
undertook to satisfy4 ,they wandered    
about ,greece from place to place1 they 
gave lectures1 they took pupils1 they   
entered into disputations4 ,for these   
services they exacted large fees4 ,they 

were the first in ,greece to take fees  
for the teaching of wisdom4 ,there was  
nothing disgraceful in this in itself1  
but it had never been customary4 ,the   
wise men of ,greece had never accepted  
any payment for their wisdom4 ,socrates1
 who never accepted any payment1 #aaj   
but gave his wisdom freely to all who   
sought it1 somewhat proudly contrasted  
himself with the ,sophists in this      
respect4  ,the ,sophists were not1      
technically speaking1 philosophers4     
,they did not specialise in the problems
 of philosophy4 ,their tendencies were  
purely practical4 ,they taught any      
subject whatever for the teaching of    
which there was a popular demand4 ,for  
example1 ,protagoras undertook to impart
 to his pupils the principles of success
 as a politician or as a private        
citizen4 ,gorgias taught rhetoric and   
politics1 ,prodicus grammar and         
etymology1 ,hippias history1 mathematics
 and physics4 ,in consequence of this   
practical tendency of the ,sophists we  

hear of no attempts among them to solve 
the problem of the origin of nature1 or 
the character of the ultimate reality4  
,the ,sophists have been described as   
teachers of virtue1 and the description 
is correct1 provided that the word      
virtue is understood in its ,greek      
sense1 which did not restrict it to     
morality alone4 ,for the ,greeks1 it    
meant the capacity of a person          
successfully to perform his functions in
 the ,state4 ,thus the virtue of a      
mechanic is to understand machinery1 the
 virtue of a physician to cure the sick1
 the virtue of a horse trainer the      
ability to train horses4 ,the ,sophists 
undertook to train men to virtue in this
 sense1 to make them successful citizens
 and members of the ,state4  ,but the   
most popular career for a ,greek of     
ability at the time was the political1  
which offered the attraction of high    
positions in the ,state4 ,and for this  
career what was above all necessary was 
eloquence1 or if that were unattainable1

 at least ready speech1 the ability to  
argue1 to meet every point as it arose1 
if not with sound #aaa reasoning1 then  
with quick repartee4 ,hence the         
,sophists very largely concentrated     
their energies upon the teaching of     
rhetoric4 ,in itself this was good4     
,they were the first to direct attention
 to the science of rhetoric1 of which   
they may be considered the founders4    
,but their rhetoric also had its bad    
side1 which indeed1 soon became its only
 side4 ,the aims of the young           
politicians whom they trained were1 not 
to seek out the truth for its own sake1 
but merely to persuade the multitude of 
whatever they wished them to believe4   
,consequently the ,sophists1 like       
lawyers1 not caring for the truth of the
 matter1 undertook to provide a stock of
 arguments on any subject1 or to prove  
any proposition4 ,they boasted of their 
ability to make the worse appear the    
better reason1 to prove that black is   
white4 ,some of them1 like ,gorgias1    

asserted that it was not necessary to   
have any knowledge of a subject to give 
satisfactory replies as regards it4 ,and
 ,gorgias ostentatiously undertook to   
answer any question on any subject      
instantly and without consideration4 ,to
 attain these ends mere quibbling1 and  
the scoring of verbal points1 were      
employed4 ,hence our word sophistry4    
,the ,sophists1 in this way1 endeavoured
 to entangle1 entrap1 and confuse their 
opponents1 and even1 if this were not   
possible1 to beat them down by mere     
violence and noise4 ,they sought also to
 dazzle by means of strange or flowery  
metaphors1 by unusual figures of speech1
 by epigrams and paradoxes1 and in      
general by being clever and smart1      
rather than earnest and truthful4 ,when 
a man is young he is often dazzled by   
brilliance and cleverness1 by paradox   
and epigram1 but as he grows older he   
learns to discount these things and to  
care chiefly for the substance and #aab 
truth of what is said4 ,and the ,greeks 

were a young people4 ,they loved clever 
sayings4 ,and this it is which accounts 
for the toleration which they extended  
even to the most patent absurdities of  
the ,sophists4 ,the modern question     
whether a man has ceased beating his    
wife is not more childish than many of  
the rhetorical devices of the ,sophists1
 and is indeed characteristic of the    
methods of the more extravagant among   
them4  ,the earliest known ,sophist is  
,protagoras4 ,he was born at ,abdera1   
about #dhj ,b4,c4 ,he wandered up and   
down ,greece1 and settled for some time 
at ,athens4 ,at ,athens1 however1 he was
 charged with impiety and atheism4 ,this
 was on account of a book written by him
 on the subject of the gods1 which began
 with the words1 ,as for the gods1 ,i am
 unable to say whether they exist or    
whether they do not exist4 ,the book was
 publicly burnt1 and ,protagoras had to 
fly from ,athens4 ,he fled to ,sicily1  
but was drowned on the way about the    
year #daj ,b4,c4  ,protagoras was the   

author of the famous saying1 ,man is the
 measure of all things2 of what is1 that
 it is2 of what is not1 that it is not4 
,now this saying puts in a nutshell1 so 
to speak1 the whole teaching of         
,protagoras4 ,and1 indeed1 it contains  
in germ the entire thought of the       
,sophists4 ,it is well1 therefore1 that 
we should fully understand exactly what 
it means4 ,the earlier ,greek           
philosophers had made a clear           
distinction between sense and thought1  
between perception and reason1 and had  
believed that the truth is to be found1 
not by the senses1 but by reason4 ,the  
,eleatics had been the first to         
emphasize this distinction4 ,the        
ultimate reality of #aac things1 they   
said1 is pure ,being1 which is known    
only through reason2 it is the senses   
which delude us with a show of becoming4
 ,heracleitus had likewise affirmed that
 the truth1 which was1 for him1 the law 
of becoming1 is known by thought1 and   
that it is the senses which delude us   

with a show of permanence4 ,even        
,democritus believed that true being1   
that is1 material atoms1 are so small   
that the senses cannot perceive them1   
and only reason is aware of their       
existence4 ,now the teaching of         
,protagoras really rests fundamentally  
upon the denying and confusing of this  
distinction4 ,if we are to see this1 we 
must first of all understand that reason
 is the universal1 sensation the        
particular1 element in man4 ,in the     
first place1 reason is communicable1    
sensation incommunicable4 ,my sensations
 and feelings are personal to myself1   
and cannot be imparted to other people4 
,for example1 no one can communicate the
 sensation of redness to a colour-blind 
man1 who has not already experienced it4
 ,but a thought1 or rational idea1 can  
be communicated to any rational being4  
,now suppose the question is whether the
 angles at the base of an isosceles     
triangle are equal4 ,we may approach the
 problem in two ways4 ,we may appeal    

either to the senses or to reason4 ,if  
we appeal to the senses1 one man will   
come forward and say that to him the    
angles look equal4 ,another man will say
 that one angle looks bigger than the   
other1 and so on4 ,but if1 like ,euclid1
 we appeal to reason1 then it can be    
proved that the two angles are equal1   
and there is no room left for mere      
personal impressions1 because reason is 
a law universally valid and binding upon
 all men4 ,my sensations are private and
 peculiar to myself4 ,they bind no one  
but myself4 ,my #aad impressions about  
the triangle are not a law to anyone    
except myself4 ,but my reason ,i share  
with all other rational beings4 ,it is  
not a law for me merely1 but for all4   
,it is one and the same reason in me and
 in other men4 ,reason1 therefore1 is   
the universal1 sensation the particular1
 element in man4 ,now it is practically 
this distinction that ,protagoras       
denied4 ,man1 he said1 is the measure of
 all things4 ,by man he did not mean    

mankind at large4 ,he meant the         
individual man4 ,and by measure of all  
things he meant the standard of the     
truth of all things4 ,each individual   
man is the standard of what is true to  
himself4 ,there is no truth except the  
sensations and impressions of each man4 
,what seems true to me is true for me4  
,what seems true to you is true for you4
  ,we commonly distinguish between      
subjective impressions and objective    
truth4 ,the words subjective and        
objective are constantly recurring      
throughout the history of philosophy1   
and as this is the first time ,i use    
them1 ,i will explain them here4 ,in    
every act of thought there must         
necessarily be two terms4 ,i am now     
looking at this desk and thinking of    
this desk4 ,there is the ,i which       
thinks1 and there is the desk which is  
thought4 ,i am the subject of the       
thought1 the desk is the object of the  
thought4 ,in general1 the subject is    
that which thinks1 and the object is    

that which is thought4 ,subjective is   
that which appertains to the subject1   
and objective is that which appertains  
to the object4 ,so the meaning of the   
distinction between subjective          
impressions and the objective truth is  
clear4 ,my personal impression may be   
that the earth is flat1 but the         
objective truth is that the #aae earth  
is round4 ,travelling through a desert1 
,i may be subject to a mirage1 and think
 that there is water in front of me4    
,that is my subjective impression4 ,the 
objective truth is that there is nothing
 but sand4 ,the objective truth is      
something which has an existence of its 
own1 independent of me4 ,it does not    
matter what ,i think1 or what you think1
 what ,i want1 or what you want2 the    
truth is what it is4 ,we must conform   
ourselves to the truth4 ,truth will not 
conform itself to our personal          
inclinations1 wishes1 or impressions4   
,the teaching of ,protagoras practically
 amounted to a denial of this4 ,what it 

meant was that there is no objective    
truth1 no truth independent of the      
individual subject4 ,whatever seems to  
the individual true is true for that    
individual4 ,thus truth is identified   
with subjective sensations and          
impressions4  ,to deny the distinction  
between objective truth and subjective  
impression is the same as to deny the   
distinction between reason and sense4   
,to my senses the earth seems flat4 ,it 
looks flat to the eye4 ,it is only      
through reason that ,i know the         
objective truth that the world is round4
 ,reason1 therefore1 is the only        
possible standard of objective truth4   
,if you deny the rational element its   
proper part1 it follows that you will be
 left a helpless prey to diverse        
personal impressions4 ,the impressions  
yielded by the senses differ in         
different people4 ,one man sees a thing 
in one way1 another sees it in another4 
,if1 therefore1 what seems to me true is
 true for me1 and what seems to you true

 is true for you1 and if our impressions
 differ1 it will follow that two        
contradictory propositions must both be 
true4 ,protagoras clearly understood    
this1 #aaf and did not flinch from the  
conclusion4 ,he taught that all opinions
 are true1 that error is impossible1 and
 that1 whatever proposition is put      
forward1 it is always possible to oppose
 to it a contradictory proposition with 
equally good arguments and with equal   
truth4 ,in reality1 the result of this  
procedure is to rob the distinction     
between truth and falsehood of all      
meaning4 ,it makes no difference whether
 we say that all opinions are true1 or  
whether we say that all are false4 ,the 
words truth and falsehood1 in such      
context1 have no meaning4 ,to say that  
whatever ,i feel is the truth for me    
means only that what ,i feel ,i feel4   
,to call this truth for me1 adds nothing
 to the meaning4  ,protagoras seems to  
have been led to these doctrines partly 
by observing the different accounts of  

the same object which the sense-organs  
yield to different people1 and even to  
the same person at different times4 ,if 
knowledge depends upon these            
impressions1 the truth about the object 
cannot be ascertained4 ,he was also     
influenced by the teaching of           
,heracleitus4 ,heracleitus had taught   
that all permanence is illusion4        
,everything is a perpetual becoming2 all
 things flow4 ,what is at this moment1  
at the next moment is not4 ,even at one 
and the same moment1 ,heracleitus       
believed1 a thing is and is not4 ,if it 
is true to say that it is1 it is equally
 true that it is not4 ,and this is1 in  
effect1 the teaching of ,protagoras4    
,the ,protagorean philosophy thus       
amounts to a declaration that knowledge 
is impossible4 ,if there is no objective
 truth1 there cannot be any knowledge of
 it4 ,the impossibility of knowledge is 
also the standpoint of ,gorgias4 ,the   
title of his book is characteristic of  
#aag the ,sophistical love of paradox4  

,it was called ,on ,nature1 or the      
non-existent4 ,in this book he attempted
 to prove three propositions1 7#a7 that 
nothing exists3 7#b7 that if anything   
exists1 it cannot be known3 7#c7 that if
 it can be known1 the knowledge of it   
cannot be communicated4  ,for proof of  
the first proposition1 nothing exists1  
,gorgias attached himself to the school 
of the ,eleatics1 especially to ,zeno4  
,zeno had taught that in all            
multiplicity and motion1 that is to say1
 in all existence1 there are            
irreconcilable contradictions4 ,zeno was
 in no sense a sceptic4 ,he did not seek
 for contradictions in things for the   
sake of the contradictions1 but in order
 to support the positive thesis of      
,parmenides1 that only being is1 and    
that becoming is not at all4 ,zeno1     
therefore1 is to be regarded as a       
constructive1 and not merely as a       
destructive1 thinker4 ,but it is obvious
 that by emphasizing only the negative  
element in his philosophy1 it is        

possible to use his antinomies as       
powerful weapons in the cause of        
scepticism and nihilism4 ,and it was in 
this way that ,gorgias made use of the  
dialectic of ,zeno4 ,since all existence
 is self-contradictory1 it follows that 
nothing exists4 ,he also made use of the
 famous argument of ,parmenides         
regarding the origin of being4 ,if      
anything is1 said ,gorgias1 it must have
 had a beginning4 ,its being must have  
arisen either from being1 or from       
not-being4 ,if it arose from being1     
there is no beginning4 ,if it arose from
 not-being1 this is impossible1 since   
something cannot arise out of nothing4  
,therefore nothing exists4  ,the second 
proposition of ,gorgias1 that if        
anything exists it cannot be known1 is  
part and parcel of the whole ,sophistic 
tendency of thought1 which identifies   
knowledge #aah with sense-perception1   
and ignores the rational element4 ,since
 sense-impressions differ in different  
people1 and even in the same person1 the

 object as it is in itself cannot be    
known4 ,the third proposition follows   
from the same identification of         
knowledge with sensation1 since         
sensation is what cannot be             
communicated4  ,the later ,sophists went
 much further than ,protagoras and      
,gorgias4 ,it was their work to apply   
the teaching of ,protagoras to the      
spheres of politics and morals4 ,if     
there is no objective truth1 and if what
 seems true to each individual is for   
him the truth1 so also1 there can be no 
objective moral code1 and what seems    
right to each man is right for him4 ,if 
we are to have anything worth calling   
morality1 it is clear that it must be a 
law for all1 and not merely a law for   
some4 ,it must be valid for1 and binding
 upon1 all men4 ,it must1 therefore1 be 
founded upon that which is universal in 
man1 that is to say1 his reason4 ,to    
found it upon sense-impressions and     
feelings is to found it upon shifting   
quicksands4 ,my feelings and sensations 

are binding upon no man but myself1 and 
therefore a universally valid law cannot
 be founded upon them4 ,yet the         
,sophists identified morality with the  
feelings of the individual4 ,whatever ,i
 think right is right for me4 ,whatever 
you think right is right for you4       
,whatever each man1 in his irrational   
self-will1 chooses to do1 that is1 for  
him1 legitimate4 ,these conclusions were
 drawn by ,polus1 ,thrasymachus1 and    
,critias4  ,now if there is1 in this    
way1 no such thing as objective right1  
it follows that the laws of the ,state  
can be founded upon nothing except      
force1 custom1 and convention4 ,we often
 speak of just laws1 and good laws4 ,but
 to speak in that way involves the      
existence of an objective #aai standard 
of goodness and justice1 with which we  
can compare the law1 and see whether it 
agrees with that standard or not4 ,to   
the ,sophists1 who denied any such      
standard1 it was mere nonsense to speak 
of just and good laws4 ,no law is in    

itself good or just1 because there is no
 such thing as goodness or justice4 ,or 
if they used such a word as justice1    
they defined it as meaning the right of 
the stronger2 or the right of the       
majority4 ,polus and ,thrasymachus1     
consequently1 drew the conclusion that  
the laws of the ,state were inventions  
of the weak1 who were cunning enough1 by
 means of this stratagem1 to control the
 strong1 and rob them of the natural    
fruits of their strength4 ,the law of   
force is the only law which nature      
recognizes4 ,if a man1 therefore1 is    
powerful enough to defy the law with    
impunity1 he has a perfect right to do  
so4 ,the ,sophists were thus the first1 
but not the last1 to preach the doctrine
 that might is right4 ,and1 in similar  
vein1 ,critias explained popular belief 
in the gods as the invention of some    
crafty statesman for controlling the mob
 through fear4  ,now it is obvious that 
the whole tendency of this sophistical  
teaching is destructive and anti-social4

 ,it is destructive of religion1 of     
morality1 of the foundations of the     
,state1 and of all established          
institutions4 ,and we can now see that  
the doctrines of the ,sophists were1 in 
fact1 simply the crystallization into   
abstract thought of the practical       
tendencies of the age4 ,the people in   
practice1 the ,sophists in theory1      
decried and trod under foot the         
restrictions of law1 authority1 and     
custom1 leaving nothing but the         
deification of the individual in his    
crude self-will and egotism4 ,it was in 
fact an age of aufklaerung1 which means 
enlightenment or #abj illumination4     
,such periods of illumination1 it seems1
 recur periodically in the history of   
thought1 and in the history of          
civilization4 ,this is the first1 but   
not the last1 such period with which the
 history of philosophy deals4 ,this is  
the ,greek illumination4 ,such periods  
present certain characteristic features4
 ,they follow1 as a rule1 upon an era of

 constructive thought4 ,in the present  
instance the ,greek illumination        
followed closely upon the heels of the  
great development of science and        
philosophy from ,thales to ,anaxagoras4 
,in such a constructive period the great
 thinkers bring to birth new principles1
 which1 in the course of time1 filter   
down to the masses of the people and    
cause popular1 if shallow1 science1 and 
a wide-spread culture4 ,popular         
education becomes a feature of the time4
 ,the new ideas1 fermenting among the   
people1 break up old prejudices and     
established ideas1 and thus thought1 at 
first constructive1 becomes1 among the  
masses1 destructive in character4 ,hence
 the popular thought1 in a period of    
enlightenment1 issues in denial1        
scepticism1 and disbelief4 ,it is merely
 negative in its activities and results4
 ,authority1 tradition1 and custom are  
wholly or partially destroyed4 ,and     
since authority1 tradition1 and custom  
are the cement of the social structure1 

there results a general dissolution of  
that structure into its component       
individuals4 ,all emphasis is now laid  
on the individual4 ,thought becomes     
egocentric4 ,individualism is the       
dominant note4 ,extreme subjectivity is 
the principle of the age4 ,all these    
features make their appearance in the   
,greek aufklaerung4 ,the ,sophistical   
doctrine that the truth is what ,i      
think1 the good what ,i choose to do1 is
 the extreme application of the         
subjective and egocentric principles4   
#aba  ,the early eighteenth century in  
,england and ,france was likewise a     
period of enlightenment1 and the era    
from which we are now1 perhaps1 just    
emerging1 bears many of the             
characteristics of aufklaerung4 ,it is  
sceptical and destructive4 ,all         
established institutions1 marriage1 the 
family1 the state1 the law1 come in for 
much destructive criticism4 ,it followed
 immediately upon the close of a great  
period of constructive thought1 the     

scientific development of the nineteenth
 century4 ,and lastly1 the age has      
produced its own ,protagorean           
philosophy1 which it calls pragmatism4  
,if pragmatism is not egocentric1 it is 
at least anthropocentric4 ,truth is no  
longer thought of as an objective       
reality1 to which mankind must conform4 
,on the contrary1 the truth must conform
 itself to mankind4 ,whatever it is     
useful to believe1 whatever belief works
 in practice1 is declared to be true4   
,but since what works in one age and    
country does not work in another1 since 
what it is useful to believe to-day will
 be useless to-morrow1 it follows that  
there is no objective truth independent 
of mankind at all4 ,truth is not now    
defined as dependent on the sensations  
of man1 as it was with ,protagoras1 but 
as dependent on the volition of man4 ,in
 either case it is not the universal in 
man1 his reason1 which is made the basis
 of truth and morals1 but the           
subjective1 individual1 particular      

element in him4  ,we must not forget the
 many merits of the ,sophists4          
,individually1 they were often estimable
 men4 ,nothing is known against the     
character of ,protagoras1 and ,prodicus 
was proverbial for his wisdom and the   
genuine probity and uprightness of his  
principles4 ,moreover the ,sophists     
contributed much to the advance of      
learning4 #abb ,they were the first to  
direct attention to the study of words1 
sentences1 style1 prosody1 and rhythm4  
,they were the founders of the science  
of rhetoric4 ,they spread education and 
culture far and wide in ,greece1 they   
gave a great impulse to the study of    
ethical ideas1 which made possible the  
teaching of ,socrates1 and they stirred 
up a ferment of ideas without which the 
great period of ,plato and ,aristotle   
could never have seen the light4 ,but1  
from the philosophical point of view1   
their merit is for the first time to    
have brought into general recognition   
the right of the subject4 ,for there is1

 after all1 much reason in these attacks
 made by the ,sophists upon authority1  
upon established things1 upon tradition1
 custom and dogma4 ,man1 as a rational  
being1 ought not to be tyrannized over  
by authority1 dogma1 and tradition4 ,he 
cannot be subjected1 thus violently1 to 
the imposition of beliefs from an       
external source4 ,no man has the right  
to say to me1 you shall think this1 or  
you shall think that4 ,i1 as a rational 
being1 have the right to use my reason1 
and judge for myself4 ,if a man would   
convince me1 he must not appeal to      
force1 but to reason4 ,in doing so1 he  
is not imposing his opinions externally 
upon me2 he is educing his opinions from
 the internal sources of my own thought2
 he is showing me that his opinions are 
in reality my own opinions1 if ,i only  
knew it4 ,but the mistake of the        
,sophists was that1 in thus recognizing 
the right of the subject1 they wholly   
ignored and forgot the right of the     
object4 ,for the truth has objective    

existence1 and is what it is1 whether ,i
 think it or not4 ,their mistake was    
that though they rightly saw that for   
truth and morality to be valid for me1  
they must be assented to by1 and        
developed out of1 #abc me myself1 not   
imposed from the outside1 yet they laid 
the emphasis on my merely accidental and
 particular characteristics1 my         
impulses1 feelings1 and sensations1 and 
made these the source of truth and      
morality1 instead of emphasizing as the 
source of truth and right the universal 
part of me1 my reason4 ,man is the      
measure of all things2 certainly1 but   
man as a rational being1 not man as a   
bundle of particular sensations1        
subjective impressions1 impulses1       
irrational prejudices1 self-will1 mere  
eccentricities1 oddities1 foibles1 and  
fancies4  ,good examples of the right   
and wrong principles of the ,sophists   
are to be found in modern ,protestantism
 and modern democracy4 ,protestantism1  
it is often said1 is founded upon the   

right of private judgment1 and this is  
simply the right of the subject1 the    
right of the individual to exercise his 
own reason4 ,but if this is interpreted 
to mean that each individual is entitled
 to set up his mere whims and fancies as
 the law in religious matters1 then we  
have the bad sort of ,protestantism4    
,again1 democracy is simply political   
protestantism1 and democratic ideas are 
the direct offspring of the protestant  
,reformation4 ,the democratic principle 
is that no rational being can be asked  
to obey a law to which his own reason   
has not assented4 ,but the law must be  
founded upon reason1 upon the universal 
in man4 ,i1 as an individual1 as a mere 
ego1 have no rights whatever4 ,it is    
only as a rational being1 as a          
potentially universal being1 as a member
 of the commonwealth of reason1 that ,i 
have any rights1 that ,i can claim to   
legislate for myself and others4 ,but if
 each individual's capricious self-will1
 his mere whims and fancies1 are erected

 into a law1 then democracy turns into  
anarchism and bolshevism4  #abd  ,it is 
a great mistake to suppose that the     
doctrines of the ,sophists are merely   
antiquated ideas1 dead and fossilized   
thoughts1 of interest only to           
historians1 but of no importance to us4 
,on the contrary1 modern popular thought
 positively reeks with the ideas and    
tendencies of the ,sophists4 ,it is     
often said that a man ought to have     
strong convictions1 and some people even
 go so far as to say that it does not   
much matter what a man believes1 so long
 as what he believes he believes        
strongly and firmly4 ,now certainly it  
is quite true that a man with strong    
convictions is more interesting than a  
man without any opinions4 ,the former is
 at least a force in the world1 while   
the latter is colourless and            
ineffectual4 ,but to put exclusive      
emphasis on the mere fact of having     
convictions is wrong4 ,after all1 the   
final test of worth must be whether the 

man's convictions are true or false4    
,there must be an objective standard of 
truth1 and to forget this1 to talk of   
the mere fact of having strong opinions 
as in itself a merit1 is to fall into   
the error of the ,sophists4  ,another   
common saying is that everyone has a    
right to his own opinions4 ,this is     
quite true1 and it merely expresses the 
right of the subject to use his own     
reason4 ,but it is sometimes interpreted
 in a different way4 ,if a man holds a  
totally irrational opinion1 and if every
 weapon is beaten out of his hands1 if  
he is driven from every position he     
takes up--so that there is nothing left 
for him to do1 except to admit that he  
is wrong1 such a man will sometimes take
 refuge in the saying1 that1 after all1 
argue as you may1 he has a right to his 
own opinion4 ,but we cannot allow the   
claim4 ,no man has a right to wrong     
opinions4 ,there cannot be any right    
#abe in wrong opinions4 ,you have no    
right to an opinion unless it is founded

 upon that which is universal in man1   
his reason4 ,you cannot claim this right
 on behalf of your subjective           
impressions1 and irrational whims4 ,to  
do so is to make the mistake of the     
,sophists4  ,the tendencies of the more 
shallow type of modern rationalism      
exhibit a similar ,sophistical thought4 
,it is pointed out that moral ideas vary
 very much in different countries and   
ages1 that in ,japan1 for example1      
prostitution is condoned1 and that in   
ancient ,egypt incest was not condemned4
 ,now it is important to know these     
facts4 ,they should serve as a warning  
to us against dogmatic narrow-mindedness
 in moral matters4 ,but some people draw
 from these facts the conclusion that   
there is no universally valid and       
objectively real moral law4 ,the        
conclusion does not follow from the     
premises1 and the conclusion is false4  
,people's opinions differ1 not only on  
moral questions1 but upon every subject 
under the sun4 ,because men1 a few      

hundred years ago1 believed that the    
earth was flat1 whereas now we believe  
it is round1 it does not follow that it 
has in reality no shape at all1 that    
there is no objective truth in the      
matter4 ,and because men's opinions     
differ1 in different ages and countries1
 as to what the true moral law is1 it   
does not follow that there is no        
objective moral law4  ,we will take as  
our last example the current talk about 
the importance of developing one's      
personality4 ,a man1 it is said1 should 
be himself1 and the expression of his   
own individuality must be his leading   
idea4 ,now certainly it is good to be   
oneself in the sense that it is         
hypocritical to pretend to be what one  
is not4 ,moreover1 it is no doubt true  
that each man has certain special #abf  
gifts1 which he ought to develop1 so    
that all1 in their diverse ways1 may    
contribute as much as possible to the   
spiritual and material wealth of the    
world4 ,but this ideal of individuality 

often leads to false developments1 as we
 see in the spheres of art and of       
education4 ,such a man as ,oscar ,wilde1
 whose personality is essentially evil1 
defends his artistic principles on the  
ground that he must needs express his   
personality1 that art is nothing but    
such personal expression1 and that it is
 subject to no standard save the        
individuality of the artist4 ,some      
writers on education1 among them ,mr4   
,bernard ,shaw1 who has many points in  
common with the ,sophists1 tell us that 
to attempt to mould the character of a  
child by discipline1 is to sin against  
its personality1 and that the child     
should be allowed to develop its        
individuality unchecked in its own way4 
,but against this we have to protest    
that to make the cultivation of         
individuality an end in itself1 and to  
put exclusive emphasis on this1 is      
wrong4 ,the cultivation of an           
individuality is not in itself a good   
thing2 it is not a good thing if the    

individuality be a worthless one4 ,if a 
child exhibits savage or selfish        
tendencies1 it must be subjected to     
discipline1 and it is ridiculous to make
 a fetish of its personality to such an 
extent as to allow it to develop as it  
likes4 ,in a similar way1 the ideal of  
individuality is often interpreted to   
mean that the cultivation of the mere   
eccentricities and oddities of the      
individual is something good4 ,but the  
personal peculiarities of a man are just
 what is worthless about him4 ,that     
alone which entitles him to the sacred  
rights of a person is his rational and  
universal nature4    #abg  ,,chapter ,x 
,,socrates  ,amid the destruction of all
 ideals of truth and morality1 which was
 brought about by the ,sophists1 there  
appeared in ,athens the figure of       
,socrates1 who was destined to restore  
order out of chaos1 and to introduce    
sanity into the disordered intellectual 
life of the time4 ,socrates was born    
about #dgj ,b4,c4 in ,athens4 ,his      

father was a sculptor1 his mother a     
midwife4 ,very little is known of his   
early years and education1 except that  
he took up his father's occupation as a 
sculptor4 ,in later years some statues  
used to be shown at the ,acropolis in   
,athens1 which were said to be the work 
of ,socrates4 ,but comparatively early  
in life he deserted his profession in   
order to devote himself to what he      
considered his mission in life1         
philosophy4 ,he spent his entire life in
 ,athens1 never departing from it1 save 
for short periods on three occasions1   
when he served in military expeditions  
in the ,athenian army4 ,for from twenty 
to thirty years he laboured at his      
philosophical mission in ,athens1 until1
 in his seventieth year1 he was charged 
with denying the national gods1         
introducing new gods of his own1 and    
corrupting the ,athenian youth4 ,on     
these charges he was condemned to death 
and executed4  #abh  ,the personal      
appearance of ,socrates was grotesque4  

,he was short1 thick-set1 and ugly4 ,as 
he grew older he became bald2 his nose  
was broad1 flat1 and turned up2 he      
walked with a peculiar gait1 and had a  
trick of rolling his eyes4 ,his clothes 
were old and poor4 ,he cared little or  
nothing for external appearances4       
,socrates believed that he was guided in
 all his actions by a supernatural      
voice1 which he called his daemon4 ,this
 voice1 he thought1 gave him            
premonitions of the good or evil        
consequences of his proposed actions1   
and nothing would induce him to disobey 
its injunctions4 ,socrates constructed  
no philosophy1 that is to say1 no system
 of philosophy4 ,he was the author of   
philosophical tendencies1 and of a      
philosophic method4 ,he never committed 
his opinions to writing4 ,his method of 
philosophizing was purely               
conversational4 ,it was his habit to go 
down every day to the market place in   
,athens1 or to any other spot where     
people gathered1 and there to engage in 

conversation with anyone who was ready  
to talk to him about the deep problems  
of life and death4 ,rich or poor1 young 
or old1 friend or stranger1 whoever     
came1 and would attend1 could listen    
freely to the talk of ,socrates4 ,he    
took no fees1 as the ,sophists did1 and 
remained always a poor man4 ,he did not1
 like the ,sophists1 deliver long       
speeches1 tirades1 and monologues4 ,he  
never monopolised the conversation1 and 
frequently it was the other party who   
did most of the talking1 ,socrates only 
interposing questions and comments1 and 
yet remaining always master of the      
conversation1 and directing it into     
fruitful channels4 ,the conversation    
proceeded chiefly by the method of      
question and answer1 ,socrates by acute 
questions educing1 bringing to birth1   
#abi the thoughts of his partner1       
correcting1 refuting1 or developing     
them4  ,in carrying on this daily work1 
,socrates undoubtedly regarded himself  
as engaged upon a mission in some way   

supernaturally imposed upon him by ,god4
 ,of the origin of this mission we have 
an account in the ,apology of ,plato1   
who puts into the mouth of ,socrates the
 following words3--,chairephon 4444 made
 a pilgrimage to ,delphi and had the    
audacity to ask this question from the  
oracle 4444 ,he actually asked if there 
was any man wiser than ,i4 ,and the     
priestess answered1 ,no 4444 ,when ,i   
heard the answer1 ,i asked myself3 ,what
 can the god mean8 what can he be       
hinting8 ,for certainly ,i have never   
thought myself wise in anything1 great  
or small4 ,what can he mean then1 when  
he asserts that ,i am the wisest of men8
 ,he cannot lie1 of course3 that would  
be impossible for him4 ,and for a long  
while ,i was at a loss to think what he 
could mean4 ,at last1 after much        
thought1 ,i started on some such course 
as this4 ,i betook myself to one of the 
men who seemed wise1 thinking that      
there1 if anywhere1 ,i should refute the
 utterance1 and could say to the oracle3

 ',this man is wiser than ,i1 and you   
said ,i was the wisest4' ,now when ,i   
looked into the man--there is no need to
 give his name--it was one of our       
citizens1 men of ,athens1 with whom ,i  
had an experience of this kind--when we 
talked together ,i thought1 ',this man  
seems wise to many men1 and above all to
 himself1 but he is not so'2 and then ,i
 tried to show that he thought he was   
wise1 but he was not4 ,then he got angry
 with me and so did many who heard us1  
but ,i went away and thought to myself1 
',well1 at any rate ,i am wiser than    
this man3 probably neither of #acj us   
knows anything of beauty or of good1 but
 he thinks he knows something when he   
knows nothing1 and ,i1 if ,i know       
nothing1 at least never suppose that ,i 
do4 ,so it looks as though ,i really    
were a little wiser than he1 just in so 
far as ,i do not imagine myself to know 
things about which ,i know nothing at   
all4' ,after that ,i went to another man
 who seemed to be wiser still1 and ,i   

had exactly the same experience1 and    
then he got angry with me too1 and so   
did many more4 ,thus ,i went round them 
all1 one after the other1 aware of what 
was happening and sorry for it1 and     
afraid that they were getting to hate   
me4  ,in this passage we can see1 too1  
the supposed origin of another peculiar 
,socratic feature1 the ,socratic irony4 
,in any discussion1 ,socrates would1 as 
a rule1 profess himself to be totally   
ignorant of the matter in hand1 and only
 anxious to learn the wisdom possessed  
by his interlocutor4 ,this professed    
ignorance was not affectation4 ,he was  
genuinely impressed with the notion that
 not only he1 but all other men1 live   
for the most part in ignorance of the   
things that are the most important to be
 known1 the nature of goodness1 beauty1 
and truth4 ,he believed that the        
self-styled knowledge of the wise was1  
for the most part1 nothing but          
pretentious ignorance4 ,nevertheless1 he
 used this profession of ignorance as a 

weapon of offence1 and it became in his 
hands a powerful rhetorical instrument1 
which he used with specially telling    
effect against those who1 puffed up with
 their own importance and wisdom1       
pretended to knowledge which they did   
not possess4 ,such hollow pretence of   
knowledge met with uncompromising       
exposure at the hands of ,socrates4     
,with such persons he would open the    
#aca conversation with a confession of  
his own ignorance and an expression of  
his desire to learn the wisdom1 which1  
he knew1 they possessed4 ,in their      
eagerness to show off their knowledge1  
they would1 perhaps1 rush into the      
breach with some very positive          
assertion4 ,socrates would express      
himself as delighted with this1 but     
would add that there were one or two    
things about it which he did not fully  
understand1 and he would proceed1 with a
 few dexterous questions1 to expose the 
hollowness1 the shallowness1 or the     
ignorance of the answers4  ,it was      

chiefly the young men of ,athens who    
gathered round ,socrates1 who was for   
them a centre of intellectual activity  
and a fountain of inspiration4 ,it was  
this fact which afterwards formed the   
basis of the charge that he corrupted   
the youth4 ,he was a man of the noblest 
character and of the simplest life4     
,accepting no fees1 he acquired no      
wealth4 ,poor1 caring nothing for       
worldly goods1 wholly independent of the
 ordinary needs and desires of men1 he  
devoted himself exclusively to the      
acquisition of that which1 in his eyes1 
alone had value1 wisdom and virtue4 ,he 
was endowed with the utmost powers of   
physical endurance and moral strength4  
,when he served with the army in the    
,peloponnesian war1 he astonished his   
fellow-soldiers by his bravery1 and his 
cheerful endurance of every hardship4   
,on two occasions1 at considerable risk 
to himself1 he saved the lives of his   
companions4 ,at the battle of ,delium it
 is said that ,socrates was the only man

 who kept his head in the rout of the   
,athenians4 ,he was an excellent        
companion1 and though simple in his     
habits1 and independent of all material 
pleasures1 never made a fetish of this  
independence1 nor allowed it to         
degenerate into a harsh asceticism1 #acb
 ,thus1 he needed no wine1 but yet1 if  
occasion called for it1 he not only     
drank1 but could drink more than any    
other man without turning a hair4 ,in   
the ,banquet of ,plato1 ,socrates is    
depicted sitting all night long drinking
 and talking philosophy with his        
friends4 ,one by one the guests         
succumbed1 leaving only ,socrates and   
two others1 and at last1 as the dawn    
broke1 these two also fell asleep4 ,but 
,socrates got up1 washed himself1 and   
went down to the market place to begin  
his daily work4  ,in his seventieth year
 he was tried on three charges3 7#a7 for
 denying the national gods1 7#b7 for    
setting up new gods of his own1 7#c7 for
 corrupting the youth4 ,all these       

charges were entirely baseless4 ,the    
first might well have been brought      
against almost any of the earlier ,greek
 thinkers with some justice4 ,most of   
them disbelieved in the national        
religion2 many of them openly denied the
 existence of the gods4 ,socrates1      
almost alone1 had refrained from any    
such attitude4 ,on the contrary1 he     
always enjoined veneration towards the  
gods1 and urged his hearers1 in whatever
 city they might be1 to honour the gods 
according to the custom of that city4   
,according to ,xenophon1 however1 he    
distinguished between the many gods and 
the one creator of the universe1 who    
controls1 guides1 and guards over the   
lives of men4 ,the second charge appears
 to have been based upon the claim of   
,socrates to be guided by a supernatural
 inner voice1 but whatever we may think 
of this claim1 it can hardly constitute 
good ground for a charge of introducing 
new gods4 ,the third charge1 that of    
corrupting the youth1 was equally       

baseless1 though the fact that          
,alcibiades1 who had been a favourite   
pupil of ,socrates1 afterwards turned   
traitor to ,athens1 and #acc led1       
moreover1 a dissolute and unprincipled  
life1 no doubt prejudiced the           
philosopher in the eyes of the          
,athenians4 ,but ,socrates was not      
responsible for the misdeeds of         
,alcibiades1 and his general influence  
upon the ,athenian youth was the very   
opposite of corrupting4   ,what then    
were the real reasons for these         
accusations8 ,in the first place1 there 
is no doubt that ,socrates had made many
 personal enemies4 ,in his daily        
disputations he had not spared even the 
most powerful men in ,athens1 but had   
ruthlessly laid bare the ignorance of   
those who pretended to be wise4 ,there  
is1 however1 no reason to believe that  
the three men who actually laid the     
charges1 ,melitus1 ,lycon1 and ,anytus1 
did so out of any personal animosity4   
,but they were men of straw1 put forward

 by more powerful persons who remained  
behind the scenes4 ,in the second place1
 ,socrates had rendered himself         
obnoxious to the ,athenian democracy4   
,he was no aristocrat in feeling1 nor   
was he a supporter of the vested        
interests and privileges of the few4    
,but he could not accommodate himself to
 the mob-rule which then went by the    
name of democracy4 ,the government of   
the ,state1 he believed1 should be in   
the hands of the wise1 the just1 and the
 good1 those competent and trained to   
govern1 and these are necessarily the   
few4 ,he himself had taken no part in   
the political life of the time1         
preferring to guide by his influence and
 advice the young men on whom some day  
the duties of the ,state would devolve4 
,on two occasions only did he take an   
active part in politics1 and on both    
occasions his conduct gave great        
offence4 ,both these incidents are      
recounted in a passage in ,plato's      
,apology1 which ,i will quote4 ,the #acd

 first incident refers to the aftermath 
of the battle of ,arginusae4 ,the       
,athenian fleet had gained a victory    
here1 but lost twenty-five ships of war1
 and the whole of the crews of these    
ships were drowned4 ,this was attributed
 to the carelessness of the generals1   
and there was great indignation in      
,athens1 upon their return whither the  
generals were put upon their trial4     
,according to the law of ,athens each   
accused had to be given a separate      
trial1 but in their eagerness to have   
the generals condemned1 the judges in   
this instance decided to try them all in
 a body4 ,you know1 men of ,athens1 says
 ,socrates in the ,apology1 that ,i have
 never held any other office in the     
,state1 but ,i did serve on the         
,council4 ,and it happened that my      
tribe1 ,antiochis1 had the ,presidency  
at the time you decided to try the ten  
generals who had not taken up the dead  
after the fight at sea4 ,you decided to 
try them in one body1 contrary to law1  

as you all felt afterwards4 ,on that    
occasion ,i was the only one of the     
,presidents who opposed you1 and told   
you not to break the law2 and ,i gave my
 vote against you2 and when the orators 
were ready to impeach and arrest me1 and
 you encouraged them and hooted me1 ,i  
thought then that ,i ought to take all  
the risks on the side of law and        
justice1 rather than side with you1 when
 your decisions were unjust1 through    
fear of imprisonment or death4 ,that was
 while the city was still under the     
democracy4 ,when the oligarchy came into
 power1 the ,thirty1 in their turn1     
summoned me with four others to the     
,rotunda1 and commanded us to fetch     
,leon of ,salamis from that island1 in  
order to put him to death3 the sort of  
commands they often gave to many others1
 anxious as they were to incriminate all
 they could4 ,and on that occasion #ace 
,i showed not by words only1 that for   
death1 to put it bluntly1 ,i did not    
care one straw--but ,i did care1 and to 

the full1 about doing what was wicked   
and unjust4 ,i was not terrified then   
into doing wrong by that government in  
all its power2 when we left the         
,rotunda1 the other four went off to    
,salamis and brought ,leon back1 but ,i 
went home4 ,and probably ,i should have 
been put to death for it1 if the        
government had not been overthrown soon 
afterwards4  ,but there was a third1 and
 greater reason1 for the condemnation of
 ,socrates4 ,these charges were brought 
against him because the popular mind    
confused him with the ,sophists4 ,this  
was entirely absurd1 because ,socrates  
in no respect resembled the ,sophists1  
either in the manner of his life or in  
the tendency of his thought1 which was  
wholly anti-sophistical4 ,but that such 
a confusion did exist in the popular    
mind is clearly proved by ,the ,clouds  
of ,aristophanes4 ,aristophanes was a   
reactionary in thought and politics1    
and1 hating the ,sophists as the        
representatives of modernism1 he        

lampooned them in his comedy1 ,the      
,clouds4 ,socrates appears in the play  
as the central character1 and the chief 
of the ,sophists4 ,this was entirely    
unjust1 but it affords evidence of the  
fact that ,socrates was commonly        
mistaken for a ,sophist by the          
,athenians4 ,aristophanes would not have
 ventured to introduce such a delusion  
into his play1 had his audience not     
shared in it4 ,now at this time a wave  
of reaction was passing over ,athens1   
and there was great indignation against 
the ,sophists1 who were rightly supposed
 to be overturning all ideals of truth  
and goodness4 ,socrates fell a victim to
 the anger of the populace against the  
,sophists4  #acf  ,at the trial         
,socrates conducted himself with dignity
 and confidence4 ,it was usual in those 
days for an accused person to weep and  
lament1 to flatter the judges1 to seek  
indulgence by grovelling and fawning1 to
 appeal for pity by parading his wife   
and children in the court4 ,socrates    

refused to do any of these things1      
considering them unmanly4 ,his defence  
was1 indeed1 not so much a defence of   
himself as an arraignment of his judges1
 the people of ,athens1 for their       
corruption and vice4 ,this attitude of  
,socrates certainly brought about his   
condemnation4 ,there is every reason to 
believe that if he had adopted a        
grovelling1 even a conciliatory tone1 he
 would have been acquitted4 ,as it was1 
he was found guilty by a bare majority4 
,the law enacted that1 when the charge  
was proved1 those who had brought the   
accusation should first propose the     
penalty which they thought fitting2 then
 the accused himself should propose an  
alternative penalty4 ,it was for the    
judges to decide which of the two should
 be inflicted4 ,the accusers of         
,socrates proposed the death-penalty4   
,here again ,socrates might have escaped
 by proposing at once some petty        
punishment4 ,this would have satisfied  
the people1 who were only anxious to    

score off the troublesome philosopher   
and pedant4 ,but ,socrates proudly      
affirmed that1 as he was guilty of no   
crime1 he deserved no punishment4 ,to   
propose a penalty would be to admit his 
guilt4 ,far from being a guilty person1 
he considered himself in the light of a 
public benefactor1 and as such1 if he   
were to get his deserts1 he proposed    
that he should be publicly honoured by  
being given a seat at the ,president's  
table4 ,nevertheless1 as the law forced 
him to propose a penalty1 he would1     
without prejudice to his #acg plea of   
innocence1 suggest a fine of thirty     
minas4 ,this conduct so exasperated the 
judges that he was now condemned to     
death by a large majority1 about eighty 
of those who had previously voted for   
his acquittal now voting for his        
execution4  ,thirty days elapsed before 
he was executed1 and these days were    
spent in prison4 ,his friends1 who had  
free access to him1 urged him to escape4
 ,these things were possible in ,athens4

 ,anaxagoras had apparently escaped with
 the help of ,pericles4 ,a little silver
 in the hands of the jailguards would   
probably have settled the matter4       
,socrates could fly to ,thessaly1 where 
the law could not reach him1 as         
,anaxagoras had fled to ,ionia4 ,but    
,socrates steadily refused1 saying that 
to flee from death was cowardly1 and    
that one ought to obey the laws4 ,the   
law had decreed his death1 and he must  
obey4 ,after thirty days1 therefore1 the
 poison cup was brought to him1 and he  
drank it without flinching4 ,here is    
,plato's account of the death of        
,socrates1 which ,i quote from the      
,phaedo4 ,in detail it cannot be        
considered historical1 but we may well  
believe that the main incidents as well 
as the picture it gives us of the       
bearing and demeanour of the philosopher
 in his last moments1 are accurate      
representations of the facts4  ,he rose 
and went into a chamber to bathe1 and   
,crito followed him1 but he directed us 

to wait for him4 ,we waited1 therefore1 
conversing among ourselves about what   
had been said1 and considering it again1
 and sometimes speaking about our       
calamity1 how severe it would be to us1 
sincerely thinking that1 like those who 
are deprived of a father1 we should pass
 the rest of our lives as orphans4 ,when
 he had bathed and his #ach children    
were brought to him1 for he had two     
little sons and one grown up1 and the   
women belonging to his family were come1
 having conversed with them in the      
presence of ,crito1 and given them such 
injunctions as he wished1 he directed   
the women and children to go away1 and  
then returned to us4 ,and it was now    
near sunset2 for he spent a considerable
 time within4 ,but when he came from    
bathing he sat down and did not speak   
much afterwards3 then the officer of the
 ,eleven came in and standing near him  
said1 ',socrates1 ,i shall not have to  
find that fault with you that ,i do with
 the others1 that they are angry with   

me1 and curse me1 when1 by order of the 
archons1 ,i bid them drink the poison4  
,but you1 on all other occasions during 
the time you have been here1 ,i have    
found to be the most noble1 meek and    
excellent man of all that ever came into
 this place2 and1 therefore1 ,i am now  
well convinced that you will not be     
angry with me4 ,now1 then1 for you know 
what ,i came to announce to you1        
farewell1 and endeavour to bear what is 
inevitable as easily as possible4' ,and 
at the same time1 bursting into tears1  
he turned away and withdrew4 ,and       
,socrates1 looking after him1 said1     
',and thou too1 farewell1 we will do as 
you direct4' ,at the same time1 turning 
to us he said ',how courteous the man   
is2 during the whole time ,i have been  
here he has visited me1 and conversed   
with me sometimes1 and proved the       
worthiest of men2 and how generously he 
weeps for me4 ,but come1 ,crito1 let us 
obey him and let some one bring the     
poison1 if it is ready pounded1 but if  

not let the man pound it4'  ,then ,crito
 said1 ',but ,i think1 ,socrates1 that  
the sun is still on the mountains1 and  
has not yet set4 ,besides1 #aci ,i know 
that others have drunk the poison very  
late1 after it had been announced to    
them1 and have supped and drunk freely1 
and some even have enjoyed the objects  
of their love4 ,do not hasten them1 for 
there is yet time4'  ,upon this         
,socrates replied1 ',these men whom you 
mention1 ,crito1 do these things with   
good reason1 for they think they shall  
gain by so doing1 and ,i too with good  
reason1 shall not do so2 for ,i think ,i
 shall gain nothing by drinking a little
 later1 except to become ridiculous to  
myself1 in being so fond of life1 and   
sparing of it when none any longer      
remains4 ,go then1' he said1 'obey1 and 
do not resist4'  ,crito having heard    
this1 nodded to the boy that stood near4
 ,and the boy having gone out1 and      
stayed for some time1 came1 bringing    
with him the man that was to administer 

the poison1 who brought it ready pounded
 in a cup4 ,and ,socrates1 on seeing the
 man1 said1 ',well1 my good friend1 as  
you are skilled in these matters1 what  
must ,i do8' ',nothing else1' he        
replied1 'than when you have drunk it   
walk about1 until there is a heaviness  
in your legs1 then lie down2 thus it    
will do its purpose4' ,and at the same  
time he held out the cup to ,socrates4  
,and he having received it very         
cheerfully1 ,echecrates1 neither        
trembling1 nor changing at all in colour
 or countenance1 but1 as he was wont1   
looking steadfastly at the man1 said1   
'what say you of this potion1 with      
respect to making a libation to anyone1 
is it lawful or not8' ',we only pound so
 much1 ,socrates1' he said1 'as we think
 sufficient to drink4' ',i understand   
you1' he said1 'but it is certainly both
 lawful and right to pray to the gods   
that my departure hence thither may be  
happy2 which therefore ,i pray1 and so  
#adj may it be4' ,and as he said this he

 drank it off readily and calmly4 ,thus 
far1 most of us were with difficulty    
able to restrain ourselves from weeping1
 but when we saw him drinking1 and      
having finished the draught1 we could do
 so no longer2 but in spite of myself   
the tears came in full torrent1 so that1
 covering my face1 ,i wept for myself1  
for ,i did not weep for him1 but for my 
own fortune1 in being deprived of such a
 friend4 ,but ,crito1 even before me1   
when he could not restrain his tears1   
had risen up4 ,but ,apollodorus even    
before this had not ceased weeping1 and 
then1 bursting into an agony of grief1  
weeping and lamenting1 he pierced the   
heart of everyone present1 except       
,socrates himself4 ,but he said4 ',what 
are you doing1 my admirable friends8 ,i 
indeed1 for this reason chiefly1 sent   
away the women1 that they might not     
commit any folly of this kind4 ,for ,i  
have heard that it is right to die with 
good omens4 ,be quiet1 therefore1 and   
bear up4'  ,when we heard this we were  

ashamed1 and restrained our tears4 ,but 
he1 having walked about1 when he said   
that his legs were growing heavy1 lay   
down on his back2 for the man so        
directed him4 ,and at the same time he  
who gave him the poison1 taking hold of 
him1 after a short interval examined his
 feet and legs2 and then having pressed 
his foot hard1 he asked if he felt it2  
he said that he did not4 ,and after this
 he pressed his thighs2 and thus going  
higher he showed us that he was growing 
cold and stiff4 ,then ,socrates touched 
himself1 and said that when the poison  
reached his heart he should then depart4
 ,but now the parts around the lower    
belly were almost cold2 when uncovering 
himself1 for he had been covered over1  
he said2 and they were his #ada last    
words4 ',crito1 we owe a cock to        
,a,esculapius2 pay it1 therefore1 and do
 not neglect it4' ',it shall be done1'  
said ,crito1 'but consider whether you  
have anything else to say4'  ,to this   
question he gave no reply2 but shortly  

after he gave a convulsive movement1 and
 the man covered him1 and his eyes were 
fixed1 and ,crito1 perceiving it1 closed
 his mouth and eyes4  ,this1            
,echecrates1 was the end of our friend1 
a man1 as we may say1 the best of all of
 his time that we have known1 and       
moreover1 the most wise and just4  ,our 
knowledge of the teaching of ,socrates  
is derived chiefly from two sources1    
,plato and ,xenophon1 for the           
peculiarities of each of whom allowances
 must be made4 ,plato in his dialogues  
makes ,socrates the mouthpiece of his   
own teaching1 consequently the majority 
of the tenets to which ,socrates is made
 to give expression are purely ,platonic
 doctrines of which the historical      
,socrates could never even have dreamed4
 ,it might1 therefore1 seem at first    
sight that there is no possibility of   
ascertaining from ,plato's dialogues any
 trustworthy account of the ideas of    
,socrates4 ,but on closer inspection    
this does not turn out to be correct1   

because the earlier dialogues of ,plato 
were written before he had developed his
 own philosophy1 and when he was1 to all
 intents and purposes1 simply a disciple
 of ,socrates1 bent only upon giving the
 best expression to the ,socratic       
doctrine4 ,even in these ,socratic      
dialogues1 however1 we have what is no  
doubt an idealized portrait of          
,socrates4 ,plato makes no pretence of  
being merely a biographer or historian4 
,the incidents and conversation1        
although they are no doubt frequently   
founded upon facts1 are1 in the #adb    
main1 imaginary4 ,all we can say is that
 they contain the gist and substance of 
the philosophy of ,socrates4 ,the other 
source1 ,xenophon1 also has his         
peculiarities4 ,if ,plato was an        
idealizing philosopher1 ,xenophon was a 
prosaic and matter of fact man of       
affairs4 ,he was a plain1 honest        
soldier4 ,he had no great insight into  
any philosophy1 ,socratic or otherwise4 
,he was not attached to ,socrates       

primarily as a philosopher1 but as an   
admirer of his character and            
personality4 ,if ,plato puts the        
teaching of ,socrates too high1         
,xenophon puts it too low4 ,but1 in     
spite of this1 ,xenophon's ,memorabilia 
contains a mass of valuable information 
both about the life and the             
philosophical ideas of ,socrates4  ,the 
,socratic teaching is essentially       
ethical in character4 ,in this alone did
 ,socrates bear any resemblance to the  
,sophists4 ,it was the ,sophists who had
 introduced into ,greek philosophy the  
problem of man1 and of the duties of    
man4 ,and to these problems ,socrates   
also turns his exclusive attention4 ,he 
brushes aside all questions as to the   
origin of the world1 or the nature of   
the ultimate reality1 of which we have  
heard so much in the philosophies of the
 earlier thinkers4 ,socrates openly     
deprecated such speculations and        
considered all such knowledge           
comparatively worthless as against      

ethical knowledge1 the knowledge of man4
 ,mathematics1 physics1 and astronomy1  
he thought1 were not valuable forms of  
knowledge4 ,he said that he never went  
for walks outside the city1 because     
there is nothing to be learnt from      
fields and trees4  ,nevertheless the    
ethical teaching of ,socrates was       
founded upon a theory of knowledge1     
which is quite simple1 but extremely    
important4 ,the ,sophists had founded   
knowledge upon perception1 with the     
result #adc that all objective standards
 of truth had been destroyed4 ,it was   
the work of ,socrates to found knowledge
 upon reason1 and thereby to restore to 
truth its objectivity4 ,briefly1 the    
theory of ,socrates may be summarized by
 saying that he taught that all         
knowledge is knowledge through concepts4
 ,what is a concept8 ,when we are       
directly conscious of the presence of   
any particular thing1 a man1 a tree1 a  
house1 or a star1 such consciousness is 
called perception4 ,when1 shutting our  

eyes1 we frame a mental picture of such 
an object1 such consciousness is called 
an image or representation4 ,such mental
 images are1 like perceptions1 always   
ideas of particular individual objects4 
,but besides these ideas of individual  
objects1 whether through                
sense-perception or imagination1 we have
 also general ideas1 that is to say1 not
 ideas of any particular thing1 but     
ideas of whole classes of things4 ,if ,i
 say ,socrates is mortal1 ,i am thinking
 of the individual1 ,socrates4 ,but if  
,i say ,man is mortal1 ,i am thinking1  
not of any particular man1 but of the   
class of men in general4 ,such an idea  
is called a general idea1 or a concept4 
,all class-names1 such as man1 tree1    
house1 river1 animal1 horse1 being1     
which stand1 not for one thing1 but for 
a multitude of things1 represent        
concepts4 ,we form these general ideas  
by including in them all the qualities  
which the whole class of objects has in 
common1 and excluding from them all the 

qualities in which they differ1 that is 
to say1 the qualities which some of the 
objects possess1 but others do not4 ,for
 example1 ,i cannot include the quality 
whiteness in my general idea of horses1 
because1 though some horses are white1  
others are not4 ,but ,i can include the 
quality vertebrate because all horses   
agree in being vertebrate4 ,thus a #add 
concept is formed by bringing together  
the ideas in which all the members of a 
class of objects agree with one another1
 and neglecting the ideas in which they 
differ4  ,now reason is the faculty of  
concepts4 ,this may not1 at first sight1
 be obvious4 ,reason1 it might be       
objected1 is the faculty of arguing1 of 
drawing conclusions from premises4 ,but 
a little consideration will show us     
that1 though this is so1 yet all        
reasoning is employed upon concepts4    
,all reasoning is either deductive or   
inductive4 ,induction consists in the   
formulation of general principles from  
particular cases4 ,a general principle  

is always a statement made1 not about a 
particular thing1 but about a whole     
class of things1 that is1 about a       
concept4 ,concepts are formed           
inductively by comparing numerous       
examples of a class4 ,deductive         
reasoning is always the opposite process
 of applying general principles to      
particular cases4 ,if we argue that     
,socrates must be mortal because all men
 are so1 the question is whether        
,socrates is a man1 that is to say1     
whether the concept1 man1 is properly   
applied to the particular object called 
,socrates4 ,thus inductive reasoning is 
concerned with the formation of         
concepts1 deductive reasoning with the  
application of them4  ,socrates1 in     
placing all knowledge in concepts1 was  
thus making reason the organ of         
knowledge4 ,this was in direct          
opposition to the principle of the      
,sophists1 who placed all knowledge in  
sense-perception4 ,now since reason is  
the universal element in man1 it follows

 that ,socrates1 in identifying         
knowledge with concepts1 was restoring  
the belief in an objective truth1 valid 
for all men1 and binding upon all men1  
and was destroying the ,sophistic       
teaching that the truth is whatever each
 #ade individual chooses to think it is4
 ,we shall see this more clearly if we  
reflect that a concept is the same thing
 as a definition4 ,if we wish to define 
any word1 for example1 the word man1 we 
must include in our definition only the 
qualities which all men have in common4 
,we cannot1 for example1 define man as a
 white-skinned animal1 because all men  
are not white-skinned4 ,similarly we    
cannot include ,english-speaking in our 
definition1 because1 though some men    
speak ,english1 others do not4 ,but we  
might include such a quality as         
two-legged1 because two-legged is a     
quality common to all human beings1     
except mere aberrations and distortions 
of the normal type4 ,thus a definition  
is formed in the same way as a concept1 

namely1 by including the common         
qualities of a class of objects1 and    
excluding the qualities in which the    
members of the class differ4 ,a         
definition1 in fact1 is merely the      
expression of a concept in words4 ,now  
by the process of fixing definitions we 
obtain objective standards of truth4    
,if1 for example1 we fix the definition 
of a triangle1 then we can compare any  
geometrical figure with it1 and say     
whether it is a triangle or not4 ,it is 
no longer open to anyone to declare that
 whatever he chooses to call a triangle 
is a triangle4 ,similarly1 if we fix    
upon a definition of the word man1 we   
can then compare any object with that   
definition1 and say whether it is a man 
or not4 ,again1 if we can decide what   
the proper concept of virtue is1 then   
the question whether any particular act 
is virtuous can only be decided by      
comparing that act with the concept1 and
 seeing if they agree4 ,the ,sophist can
 no longer say1 whatever seems to me    

right1 is right for me4 ,whatever ,i    
choose to do is virtuous for me4 ,his   
act must be judged1 not by #adf his     
subjective impressions1 but by the      
concept or definition1 which is thus an 
objective standard of truth1 independent
 of the individual4 ,this1 then1 was the
 theory of knowledge propounded by      
,socrates4 ,knowledge1 he said1 is not  
the same thing as the sensations of the 
individual1 which would mean that each  
individual can name as the truth        
whatever he pleases4 ,knowledge means   
knowledge of things as they objectively 
are1 independently of the individual1   
and such knowledge is knowledge of the  
concepts of things4 ,therefore the      
philosophizing of ,socrates consisted   
almost exclusively in trying to frame   
proper concepts4 ,he went about         
enquiring1 ,what is virtue8 ,what is    
prudence8 ,what is temperance8--meaning 
thereby what are the true concepts or   
definitions of these things8 ,in this   
way he attempted to find a basis for    

believing in an objectively real truth  
and an objectively real moral law4  ,his
 method of forming concepts was by      
induction4 ,he would take common        
examples of actions which are           
universally admitted to be prudent1 and 
would attempt to find the quality which 
they all have in common1 and by virtue  
of which they are all classed together1 
and so form the concept of prudence4    
,then he would bring up fresh examples1 
and see whether they agreed with the    
concept so formed4 ,if not1 the concept 
might have to be corrected in the light 
of the new examples4  ,but the ,socratic
 theory of knowledge was not a theory   
put forward for its own sake1 but for   
practical ends4 ,socrates always made   
theory subservient to practice4 ,he     
wanted to know what the concept of      
virtue is1 only in order to practise    
virtue in life4 ,and this brings us to  
the central point of the ethical        
teaching of ,socrates1 #adg which was   
the identification of virtue with       

knowledge4 ,socrates believed that a man
 cannot act rightly1 unless he first    
knows what is right1 unless1 in fact1 he
 knows the concept of right4 ,moral     
action is thus founded upon knowledge1  
and must spring from it4 ,but not only  
did ,socrates think that if a man has   
not knowledge1 he cannot do right4 ,he  
also put forward the much more doubtful 
assertion that if a man possesses       
knowledge1 he cannot do wrong4 ,all     
wrong-doing arises from ignorance4 ,if a
 man only knows what is right1 he must  
and will infallibly do what is right4   
,all men seek the good1 but men differ  
as to what the good is4 ,no man1 said   
,socrates1 intentionally does wrong4 ,he
 does wrong1 because he does not know   
the true concept of right1 and being    
ignorant1 thinks that what he is doing  
is good4 ,if a man intentionally does   
wrong1 said ,socrates again1 he is      
better than a man who does so           
unintentionally4 ,for the former has in 
him the essential condition of goodness1

 knowledge of what goodness is1 but the 
latter1 lacking that knowledge1 is      
hopeless4  ,aristotle1 in commenting    
upon this whole doctrine1 observed that 
,socrates had ignored or forgotten the  
irrational parts of the soul4 ,socrates 
imagined that everybody's actions are   
governed solely by reason1 and that     
therefore if only they reasoned aright1 
they must do right4 ,he forgot that the 
majority of men's actions are governed  
by passions and emotions1 the irrational
 parts of the soul4 ,aristotle's        
criticism of ,socrates is unanswerable4 
,all experience shows that men do       
deliberately do wrong1 that1 knowing    
well what is right1 they nevertheless do
 wrong4 ,but it is easy to see why      
,socrates made this mistake2 he was     
arguing only from #adh his own case4    
,socrates really does appear to have    
been above human weakness4 ,he was not  
guided by passions1 but by reason1 and  
it followed as the night follows the    
day1 that if ,socrates knew what was    

right1 he did it4 ,he was unable to     
understand how men1 knowing the right1  
could yet do the wrong4 ,if they are    
vicious1 he thought1 it must be because 
they do not know what is right4 ,the    
criticism of ,aristotle is thus         
justified4 ,yet for all that1 the theory
 of ,socrates is not to be too quickly  
brushed aside4 ,there is more truth in  
it than appears at first sight4 ,we say 
that a man believes one thing and does  
another4 ,yet it is a matter of question
 what a man really believes1 and what is
 the test of his belief4 ,men go to     
church every ,sunday1 and there repeat  
formulas and prayers1 of which the main 
idea is that all earthly riches are     
worthless in comparison with spiritual  
treasures4 ,such men1 if asked1 might   
tell us that they believe this to be    
true4 ,they believe that they believe   
it4 ,and yet in actual life1 perhaps1   
they seek only for earthly riches1 and  
behave as if they thought these the     
supreme good4 ,what do such men really  

believe8 ,do they believe as they speak1
 or as they act8 ,is it not at least    
arguable that they are really pursuing  
what they believe to be good1 and that1 
if they were genuinely convinced of the 
superiority of spiritual treasures1 they
 would seek them1 and not material      
riches8 ,this at least is what ,socrates
 thought4 ,all men seek the good1 but   
the many do not know what the good is4  
,there is certainly truth in this in    
many cases1 though in others there can  
be no doubt that men do deliberately    
what they know to be evil4  ,there are  
two other characteristic ,socratic      
propositions #adi which flow from the   
same general idea1 that virtue is       
identical with knowledge4 ,the first is1
 that virtue can be taught4 ,we do not  
ordinarily think that virtue can be     
taught like arithmetic4 ,we think that  
virtue depends upon a number of factors1
 prominent among which are the inborn   
disposition of a man1 heredity1         
environment1 modified to some extent by 

education1 practice1 and habit4 ,the    
consequence is that a man's character   
does not change very much as he grows   
older4 ,by constant practice1 by        
continual self-control1 a man may1 to   
some extent1 make himself better1 but on
 the whole1 what he is he remains4 ,the 
leopard1 we say1 does not change his    
spots4 ,but as1 for ,socrates1 the sole 
condition of virtue is knowledge1 and as
 knowledge is just what can be imparted 
by teaching1 it followed that virtue    
must be teachable4 ,the only difficulty 
is to find the teacher1 to find some one
 who knows the concept of virtue4 ,what 
the concept of virtue is--that is1      
thought ,socrates1 the precious piece of
 knowledge1 which no philosopher has    
ever discovered1 and which1 if it were  
only discovered1 could at once be       
imparted by teaching1 whereupon men     
would at once become virtuous4  ,the    
other ,socraticism is that virtue is    
one4 ,we talk of many virtues1          
temperance1 prudence1 foresight1        

benevolence1 kindness1 etc4 ,socrates   
believed that all these particular      
virtues flowed from the one source1     
knowledge4 ,therefore knowledge itself1 
that is to say1 wisdom1 is the sole     
virtue1 and this includes all the       
others4  ,this completes the exposition 
of the positive teaching of ,socrates4  
,it only remains for us to consider what
 position ,socrates holds in the history
 of thought4 ,there are two sides of the
 ,socratic teaching4 ,in the first #aej 
place1 there is the doctrine of         
knowledge1 that all knowledge is through
 concepts4 ,this is the scientific side 
of the philosophy of ,socrates4         
,secondly1 there is his ethical         
teaching4 ,now the essential and        
important side of ,socrates is          
undoubtedly the scientific theory of    
concepts4 ,it is this which gives him   
his position in the history of          
philosophy4 ,his ethical ideas1         
suggestive as they were1 were yet all   
tainted with the fallacy that men are   

governed only by reason4 ,hence they    
have exercised no great influence on the
 history of thought4 ,but the theory of 
concepts worked a revolution in         
philosophy4 ,upon a development of it is
 founded the whole of ,plato's          
philosophy1 and1 through ,plato1 the    
philosophy of ,aristotle1 and1 indeed1  
all subsequent idealism4 ,the immediate 
effect of this theory1 however1 was the 
destruction of the teaching of the      
,sophists4 ,the ,sophists taught the    
doctrine that truth is sense-perception1
 and as the perceptions of different    
individuals differ in regard to the same
 object1 it followed that truth became a
 matter of taste with the individual4   
,this undermined all belief in truth as 
an objective reality1 and1 by similar   
reasoning1 faith in the objectivity of  
the moral law was also destroyed4 ,the  
essential position of ,socrates is that 
of a restorer of faith4 ,his greatness  
lay in the fact that he saw that the    
only way to combat the disastrous       

results of the ,sophistic teaching was  
to refute the fundamental assumption    
from which all that teaching flowed1 the
 assumption1 namely1 that knowledge is  
perception4 ,against this1 therefore1   
,socrates opposed the doctrine that     
knowledge is through concepts4 ,to base 
knowledge upon concepts is to base it   
upon the universality of reason1 and    
therefore to restore it from the #aea   
position of a subjective seeming to that
 of an objective reality4  ,but though  
,socrates is thus a restorer of faith1  
we must not imagine that his thought is 
therefore a mere retrogression to the   
intellectual condition of pre-,sophistic
 times4 ,it was1 on the contrary1 an    
advance beyond the ,sophists4 ,we have  
here1 in fact1 an example of what is the
 normal development of all thought1     
whether in the individual or the race4  
,the movement of thought exhibits three 
stages4 ,the first stage is positive    
belief1 not founded upon reason2 it is  
merely conventional belief4 ,at the     

second stage thought becomes destructive
 and sceptical4 ,it denies what was     
affirmed in the previous stage4 ,the    
third stage is the restoration of       
positive belief now founded upon the    
concept1 upon reason1 and not merely    
upon custom4 ,before the time of the    
,sophists1 men took it for granted that 
truth and goodness are objective        
realities2 nobody specially affirmed it1
 because nobody denied it4 ,it seemed   
obvious4 ,it was1 thus1 not believed on 
rational grounds1 but through custom and
 habit4 ,this1 the first stage of       
thought1 we may call the era of simple  
faith4 ,when the ,sophists came upon the
 scene1 they brought reason and thought 
to bear upon what had hitherto been     
accepted as a matter of course1 namely  
law1 custom1 and authority4 ,the first  
encroachment of reason upon simple faith
 is always destructive1 and hence the   
,sophists undermined all ideals of      
goodness and truth4 ,socrates is the    
restorer of these ideals1 but with him  

they are no longer the ideals of simple 
faith2 they are the ideals of reason4   
,they are based upon reason4 ,socrates  
substituted comprehending belief for    
unintelligent assent4 ,we may contrast  
him1 in this #aeb respect1 with         
,aristophanes4 ,aristophanes1 the       
conservative1 the believer in the good  
old times1 saw1 as clearly as ,socrates1
 the disastrous effects worked by the   
,sophists upon public morals4 ,but the  
remedy he proposed was a violent return 
to the good old times4 ,since it was    
thought which worked these ill effects1 
thought must be suppressed4 ,we must go 
back to simple faith4 ,but simple faith1
 once destroyed by thought1 never       
returns either to the individual1 or to 
the race4 ,this can no more happen than 
a man can again become a child4 ,there  
is only one remedy for the ills of      
thought1 and that is1 more thought4 ,if 
thought1 in its first inroads1 leads1 as
 it always does1 to scepticism and      
denial1 the only course is1 not to      

suppress thought1 but to found faith    
upon it4 ,this was the method of        
,socrates1 and it is the method1 too1 of
 all great spirits4 ,they are not       
frightened of shadows4 ,they have faith 
in reason4 ,if reason leads them into   
the darkness1 they do not scuttle back  
in fright4 ,they advance till the light 
comes again4 ,they are false teachers   
who counsel us to give no heed to the   
promptings of reason1 if reason brings  
doubt into our beliefs4 ,thought cannot 
be thus suppressed4 ,reason has rights  
upon us as rational beings4 ,we cannot  
go back4 ,we must go on1 and make our   
beliefs rational4 ,we must found them   
upon the concept1 as ,socrates did4     
,socrates did not deny the principle of 
the ,sophists that all institutions1 all
 ideals1 all existing and established   
things must justify themselves before   
the tribunal of reason4 ,he accepted    
this without question4 ,he took up the  
challenge of thought1 and won the battle
 of reason in his day4  ,the ,sophists  

brought to light the principle of       
subjectivity1 the principle that the    
truth must be my truth1 #aec and the    
right my right4 ,they must be the       
products of my own thinking1 not        
standards forcibly imposed upon me from 
without4 ,but the mistake of the        
,sophists was to imagine that the truth 
must be mine1 merely in my capacity as a
 percipient creature of sense1 which    
means that ,i have a private truth of my
 own4 ,socrates corrected this by       
admitting that the truth must be my     
truth1 but mine in my capacity as a     
rational being1 which means1 since      
reason is the universal1 that it is not 
my private truth1 but universal truth   
which is shared by and valid for all    
rational beings4 ,truth is thus         
established as being not mere subjective
 appearance1 but objective reality1     
independent of the sensations1 whims1   
and self-will of the individual4 ,the   
whole period of ,socrates and the       
,sophists is full of instruction4 ,its  

essential lesson is that to deny the    
supremacy of reason1 to set up any other
 process of consciousness above reason1 
must inevitably end in scepticism and   
the denial of the objectivity of truth  
and morality4 ,many theosophists and    
others1 at the present day1 teach the   
doctrine of what they call intuition4   
,the supreme kind of religious          
knowledge1 they think1 is to be reached 
by intuition1 which is conceived as     
something higher than reason4 ,but this 
is simply to make the mistake of        
,protagoras over again4 ,it is true that
 this so-called intuition is not merely 
sense-perception1 as was the case with  
,protagoras4 ,it is1 however1 a form of 
immediate spiritual perception4 ,it is  
immediate apprehension of the object as 
being present to me1 as having          
thereness4 ,it is therefore of the      
nature of perception4 ,it is spiritual  
and super-sensuous1 as opposed to       
material and sensuous1 perception4 ,but 
it makes no difference at all whether   

perception is sensuous #aed or          
super-sensuous4 ,to place the truth in  
any sort of perception is1 in principle1
 to do as ,protagoras did1 to yield     
oneself up a helpless prey to the       
subjective impressions of the           
individual4 ,i intuit one thing2 another
 man intuits the opposite4 ,what ,i     
intuit must be true for me1 what he     
intuits true for him4 ,for we have      
denied reason1 we have placed it below  
intuition1 and have thereby discarded   
that which alone can subject the varying
 impressions of each individual to the  
rule of a universal and objective       
standard4 ,the logical conclusion is    
that1 since each man's intuition is true
 for him1 there is no such thing as an  
objective truth4 ,nor can there be such 
a thing1 in these circumstances1 as an  
objective goodness4 ,thus the theory    
must end in total scepticism and        
darkness4 ,the fact that theosophists do
 not1 as a matter of fact1 draw these   
sceptical conclusions1 simply means that

 they are not as clear-headed and       
logical as ,protagoras was4  #aee       
,,chapter ,,xi  ,,the ,,semi-,,socratics
  ,upon the death of ,socrates there    
ensued a phenomenon which is not        
infrequent in the history of thought4 ,a
 great and many-sided personality       
combines in himself many conflicting    
tendencies and ideas4 ,let us take an   
example1 not1 however1 from the sphere  
of intellect1 but from the sphere of    
practical life4 ,we often say that it is
 difficult to reconcile mercy and       
justice4 ,among the many small          
personalities1 one man follows only the 
ideal of mercy1 and as his mercy has not
 in it the stern stuff of justice1 it   
degenerates into mawkishness and        
sentimental humanitarianism4 ,another   
man follows only the ideal of justice1  
forgetting mercy1 and he becomes harsh  
and unsympathetic4 ,it takes a greater  
man1 a larger personality1 harmoniously 
to combine the two4 ,and as it is in the
 sphere of practical life1 so it is in  

the arena of thought and philosophy4 ,a 
great thinker is not he who seizes upon 
a single aspect of the truth1 and pushes
 that to its extreme limit1 but the man 
who combines1 in one many-sided system1 
all the varying and conflicting sides of
 truth4 ,by emphasizing one thought1 by 
being obsessed by a single idea and     
pushing it to its logical conclusion1   
regardless of the other aspects of the  
truth1 one may indeed achieve a         
considerable local and #aef temporary   
reputation2 because such a procedure    
often leads to striking paradoxes1 to   
strange and seemingly uncommon          
conclusions4 ,the reputations of such   
men as ,nietzsche1 ,bernard ,shaw1      
,oscar ,wilde1 are made chiefly in this 
way4 ,but upon the death of a great     
all-embracing personality1 just because 
his thought is a combination of so many 
divergent truths1 we often find that it 
splits up into its component parts1 each
 of which gives rise to a one-sided     
school of thought4 ,the disciples1 being

 smaller men1 are not able to grasp the 
great man's thought in its wholeness and
 many-sidedness4 ,each disciple seizes  
upon that portion of his master's       
teaching which has most in common with  
his own temperament1 and proceeds to    
erect this one incomplete idea into a   
philosophy1 treating the part as if it  
were the whole4 ,this is exactly what   
happened after the death of ,socrates4  
,only one man among his disciples was   
able to grasp the whole of his teaching1
 and understand the whole of his        
personality1 and that was ,plato4 ,among
 the lesser men who were the followers  
and personal friends of ,socrates1 there
 were three who founded schools of      
philosophy1 each partial and one-sided1 
but each claiming to be the exponent of 
the true ,socraticism4 ,antisthenes     
founded the ,cynic school1 ,aristippus  
the ,cyrenaic1 and ,euclid the ,megaric4
  ,now1 of the two aspects of the       
,socratic philosophy1 the theory of     
concepts1 and the ethical theory1 it is 

easy for us1 looking back upon history1 
to see which it was that influenced the 
history of thought most1 and which1     
therefore1 was the most important4 ,but 
the men of his own time could not see   
this4 ,what they fastened upon was the  
obvious aspect of ,socrates1 his ethics1
 and above all the ethical teaching     
which was expressed1 not so #aeg much in
 abstract ideas1 as in the life and     
personality of the master4 ,both this   
life and this teaching might be summed  
up in the thought that virtue is the    
sole end of life1 that1 as against      
virtue1 all else in the world1 comfort1 
riches1 learning1 is comparatively      
worthless4 ,it is this1 then1 that      
virtue is the sole end of life1 which   
forms the point of agreement between all
 the three semi-,socratic schools4 ,we  
have now to see upon what points they   
diverge from one another4  ,if virtue is
 the sole end of life1 what precisely is
 virtue8 ,socrates had given no clear   
answer to this question4 ,the only      

definition he had given was that virtue 
is knowledge1 but upon examination it   
turns out that this is not a definition 
at all4 ,virtue is knowledge1 but       
knowledge of what8 ,it is not knowledge 
of astronomy1 of mathematics1 or of     
physics4 ,it is ethical knowledge1 that 
is to say1 knowledge of virtue4 ,to     
define virtue as the knowledge of virtue
 is to think in a circle1 and gets us no
 further in the enquiry what virtue is4 
,but ,socrates1 as a matter of fact1 did
 not think in a circle4 ,he did not mean
 that virtue is knowledge1 although his 
doctrine is often1 somewhat             
misleadingly1 stated in that form4 ,what
 he meant was--quite a different        
thing--that virtue depends upon         
knowledge4 ,it is the first condition of
 virtue4 ,the principle1 accurately     
stated1 is1 not that virtue is the      
knowledge of virtue1 which is thinking  
in a circle1 but that virtue depends    
upon the knowledge of virtue1 which is  
quite straight thinking4 ,only if you   

know what virtue is can you be virtuous4
 ,hence we have not here any definition 
of virtue1 or any attempt to define it4 
,we are still left with the question1   
what is virtue8 unanswered4  #aeh  ,no  
doubt this was due in part to the       
unmethodical and unsystematic manner in 
which ,socrates developed his thought1  
and this1 in its turn1 was due to his   
conversational style of philosophizing4 
,for it is not possible to develop      
systematic thinking in the course of    
casual conversations4 ,but in part1 too1
 it was due to the very universality of 
the man's genius4 ,he was broad enough  
to realize that it is not possible to   
tie down virtue in any single narrow    
formula1 which shall serve as a         
practical receipt for action in all the 
infinitely various circumstances of     
life4 ,so that1 in spite of the fact    
that his whole principle lay in the     
method of definitions1 ,socrates1 in    
fact1 left his followers without any    
definition of the supreme concept of his

 philosophy1 virtue4 ,it was upon this  
point1 therefore1 that the followers of 
,socrates disagreed4 ,they all agreed   
that virtue is the sole end of life1 but
 they developed different ideas as to   
what sort of life is in fact virtuous4  
,the ,cynics4  ,antisthenes1 the founder
 of the ,cynic ,school1 repeated the    
familiar propositions that virtue is    
founded upon knowledge1 is teachable1   
and is one4 ,but what aroused the       
admiration of ,antisthenes was not      
,socrates1 the man of intellect1 the man
 of science1 the philosopher1 but       
,socrates1 the man of independent       
character1 who followed his own notions 
of right with complete indifference to  
the opinions of others4 ,this           
independence was in fact merely a       
by-product of the ,socratic life4       
,socrates had been independent of all   
earthly goods and possessions1 caring   
neither for riches nor for applause1    
only because his heart was set upon a   
greater treasure1 the acquisition of    

wisdom4 ,mere independence and          
indifference to the #aei opinions of    
others were not for him ends in         
themselves4 ,he did not make fetishes of
 them4 ,but the ,cynics interpreted his 
teaching to mean that the independence  
of earthly pleasures and possessions is 
in itself the end and object of life4   
,this1 in fact1 was their definition of 
virtue1 complete renunciation of        
everything that1 for ordinary men1 makes
 life worth living1 absolute asceticism1
 and rigorous self-mortification4       
,socrates1 again1 thinking that the only
 knowledge of supreme value is ethical  
knowledge1 had exhibited a tendency to  
disparage other kinds of knowledge4     
,this trait the ,cynics exaggerated into
 a contempt for all art and learning so 
great as frequently to amount to        
ignorance and boorishness4 ,virtue is   
sufficient for happiness1 said          
,antisthenes1 and for virtue nothing is 
requisite but the strength of a         
,socrates2 it is a matter of action1 and

 does not require many words1 or much   
learning4 ,the ,cynic ideal of virtue is
 thus purely negative2 it is the absence
 of all desire1 freedom from all wants1 
complete independence of all            
possessions4 ,many of them refused to   
own houses or any dwelling place1 and   
wandered about as vagrants and beggars4 
,diogenes1 for the same reason1 lived in
 a tub4 ,socrates1 following            
single-heartedly what he knew to be     
good1 cared nothing what the vulgar     
said4 ,but this indifference to the     
opinion of others was1 like his         
independence of possessions1 not an end 
in itself4 ,he did not interpret it to  
mean that he was wantonly to offend     
public opinion4 ,but the ,cynics1 to    
show their indifference1 flouted public 
opinion1 and gave frequent and          
disgusting exhibitions of indecency4    
,virtue1 for the ,cynics1 is alone good4
 ,vice is the only evil4 ,nothing else  
in the world is either good or bad4 #afj
 ,everything else is indifferent4       

,property1 pleasure1 wealth1 freedom1   
comfort1 even life itself1 are not to be
 regarded as goods4 ,poverty1 misery1   
illness1 slavery1 and death itself1 are 
not to be regarded as evils4 ,it is no  
better to be a freeman than a slave1 for
 if the slave have virtue1 he is in     
himself free1 and a born ruler4 ,suicide
 is not a crime1 and a man may destroy  
his life1 not however to escape from    
misery and pain 7for these are not      
ills71 but to show that for him life is 
indifferent4 ,and as the line between   
virtue and vice is absolutely definite1 
so is the distinction between the wise  
man and the fool4 ,all men are divided  
into these two classes4 ,there is no    
middle term between them4 ,virtue being 
one and indivisible1 either a man       
possesses it whole or does not possess  
it at all4 ,in the former case he is a  
wise man1 in the latter case a fool4    
,the wise man possesses all virtue1 all 
knowledge1 all wisdom1 all happiness1   
all perfection4 ,the fool possesses all 

evil1 all misery1 all imperfection4     
,the ,cyrenaics4  ,for the ,cyrenaics1  
too1 virtue is1 at least formally1 the  
sole object of life4 ,it is only        
formally1 however1 because they give to 
virtue a definition which robbed it of  
all meaning4 ,socrates had not          
infrequently recommended virtue on      
account of the advantages which it      
brings4 ,virtue1 he said1 is the sole   
path to happiness1 and he had not       
refrained from holding out happiness as 
a motive for virtue4 ,this did not mean1
 however1 that he did not recognize a   
man's duty to do the right for its own  
sake1 and not for the sake of the       
advantage it brings4 ,honesty1 we say1  
is the best policy1 #afa but we do not  
mean thereby to deny that it is the duty
 of men to be honest even if it is not1 
in some particular case1 the best       
policy4 ,socrates1 however1 had not been
 very clear upon these points1 and had  
been unable to find any definite basis  
for morality1 other than that of        

happiness4 ,it was this side of his     
teaching which ,aristippus now pressed  
to its logical conclusions1 regardless  
of all other claims4 ,doubtless virtue  
is the sole end of life1 but the sole   
end of virtue is one's own advantage1   
that is to say1 pleasure4 ,one may as   
well say at once that the sole end of   
life is pleasure4  ,the influence of    
,protagoras and the ,sophists also      
played its part in moulding the thought 
of ,aristippus4 ,protagoras had denied  
the objectivity of truth1 and the later 
,sophists had applied the same theory to
 morals4 ,each man is a law unto        
himself4 ,there is no moral code binding
 upon the individual against his own    
wishes4 ,aristippus combined this with  
his doctrine of pleasure4 ,pleasure     
being the sole end of life1 no moral law
 externally imposed can invalidate its  
absolute claims4 ,nothing is wicked1    
nothing evil1 provided only it satisfies
 the individual's thirst for pleasure4  
,whether such a philosophy will lead1 in

 practice1 to the complete degradation  
of its devotees1 depends chiefly upon   
what sort of pleasure they have in mind4
 ,if refined and intellectual pleasures 
are meant1 there is no reason why a     
comparatively good life should not      
result4 ,if bodily pleasures are        
intended1 the results are not likely to 
be noble4 ,the ,cyrenaics by no means   
wholly ignored the pleasures of the     
mind1 but they pointed out that feelings
 of bodily pleasure are more potent and 
intense1 and it was upon these1         
therefore1 that they chiefly #afb       
concentrated their attention4           
,nevertheless they were saved from the  
lowest abysses of sensuality and        
bestiality by their doctrine that1 in   
the pursuit of pleasure1 the wise man   
must exercise prudence4 ,completely     
unrestrained pursuit of pleasure leads  
in fact to pain and disaster4 ,pain is  
that which has to be avoided4 ,therefore
 the wise man will remain always master 
of himself1 will control his desires1   

and postpone a more urgent to a less    
urgent desire1 if thereby in the end    
more pleasure and less pain will accrue 
to him4 ,the ,cyrenaic ideal of the wise
 man is the man of the world1 bent      
indeed solely upon pleasure1 restrained 
by no superstitious scruples1 yet       
pursuing his end with prudence1         
foresight1 and intelligence4 ,such      
principles would1 of course1 admit of   
various interpretations1 according to   
the temperament of the individual4 ,we  
may notice two examples4 ,anniceris1 the
 ,cyrenaic1 believed indeed that        
pleasure is the sole end1 but set such  
store upon the pleasures that arise from
 friendship and family affection1 that  
he admitted that the wise man should be 
ready to sacrifice himself for his      
friends or family--a gleam of light in  
the moral darkness4 ,hegesias1 a        
pessimist1 considered that positive     
enjoyment is impossible of attainment4  
,in practice the sole end of life which 
can be realized is the avoidance of     

pain4    ,the ,megarics4  ,euclid of    
,megara was the founder of this school4 
,his principle was a combination of     
,socraticism with ,eleaticism4 ,virtue  
is knowledge1 but knowledge of what8 ,it
 is here that the ,eleatic influence    
became visible4 ,with ,parmenides1 the  
,megarics believed in the ,one ,absolute
 ,being4 ,all multiplicity1 all motion1 
are illusory4 #afc the world of sense   
has in it no true reality4 ,only ,being 
is4 ,if virtue is knowledge1 therefore1 
it can only be the knowledge of this    
,being4 ,if the essential concept of    
,socrates was the ,good and the         
essential concept of ,parmenides ,being1
 ,euclid now combined the two4 ,the     
,good is identified with ,being4 ,being1
 the ,one1 ,god1 the ,good1 divinity1   
are merely different names for one and  
the same thing4 ,becoming1 the many1    
,evil1 are the names of its opposite1   
not-being1 ,multiplicity is thus        
identified with evil1 and both are      
declared illusory4 ,evil has no real    

existence4 ,the ,good alone truly is4   
,the various virtues1 as benevolence1   
temperance1 prudence1 are merely        
different names for the one virtue1     
knowledge of ,being4  ,zeno1 the        
,eleatic1 had shown that multiplicity   
and motion are not only unreal but even 
impossible1 since they are              
self-contradictory4 ,the ,megarics      
appropriated this idea1 together with   
the dialectic of ,zeno1 and concluded   
that since not-being is impossible1     
,being includes all possibility4        
,whatever is possible is also actual4   
,there is no such thing as a possible   
something1 which yet does not exist4    
,as the ,cynics found virtue in         
renunciation and negative independence1 
the ,cyrenaics in the hedonistic pursuit
 of pleasure1 so the ,megarics find it  
in the life of philosophic              
contemplation1 the knowledge of ,being4 
#afd    ,,chapter ,,xii  ,,plato  ,none 
of the predecessors of ,plato had       
constructed a system of philosophy4     

,what they had produced1 and in great   
abundance1 were isolated philosophical  
ideas1 theories1 hints1 and suggestions4
 ,plato was the first person in the     
history of the world to produce a great 
all-embracing system of philosophy1     
which has its ramifications in all      
departments of thought and reality4 ,in 
doing this1 ,plato laid all previous    
thought under contribution4 ,he gathered
 the entire harvest of ,greek           
philosophy4 ,all that was best in the   
,pythagoreans1 the ,eleatics1           
,heracleitus1 and ,socrates1 reappears1 
transfigured in the system of ,plato4   
,but it is not to be imagined1 on this  
account1 that ,plato was a mere         
eclectic1 or a plagiarist1 who took the 
best thoughts of others1 and worked them
 into some sort of a patch-work         
philosophy of his own4 ,he was1 on the  
contrary1 in the highest degree an      
original thinker4 ,but like all great   
systems of thought1 that of ,plato grows
 out of the thought of previous         

thinkers4 ,he does indeed appropriate   
the ideas of ,heracleitus1 ,parmenides1 
and ,socrates4 ,but he does not leave   
them as he finds them4 ,he takes them as
 the germs of a new development4 ,they  
are the foundations1 below ground1 upon 
which he builds the palace of           
philosophy4 ,in his hands1 all previous 
thought becomes #afe transfigured under 
the light of a new and original         
principle4    #a4 ,life and ,writings4  
,the exact date of the birth of ,plato  
is a matter of doubt4 ,but the date     
usually given1 #dbi-g ,b4,c4 cannot be  
far wrong4 ,he came of an aristocratic  
,athenian family1 and was possessed of  
sufficient wealth to enable him to      
command that leisure which was essential
 for a life devoted to philosophy4 ,his 
youth coincided with the most disastrous
 period of ,athenian history4 ,after a  
bitter struggle1 which lasted over a    
quarter of a century1 the ,peloponnesian
 war ended in the complete downfall of  
,athens as a political power4 ,and the  

internal affairs of the ,state were in  
no less confusion than the external4    
,here1 as elsewhere1 a triumphant       
democracy had developed into mob-rule4  
,then at the close of the ,peloponnesian
 war1 the aristocratic party again came 
into power with the ,thirty ,tyrants1   
among whom were some of ,plato's own    
relatives4 ,but the aristocratic party1 
so far from improving affairs1 plunged  
at once into a reign of bloodshed1      
terror1 and oppression4 ,these facts    
have an important bearing upon the      
history of ,plato's life4 ,if he ever   
possessed any desire to adopt a         
political career1 the actual condition  
of ,athenian affairs must have quenched 
it4 ,an aristocrat1 both in thought and 
by birth1 he could not accommodate      
himself to the rule of the mob4 ,and if 
he ever imagined that the return of the 
aristocracy to power would improve      
matters1 he must have been bitterly     
disillusioned by the proceedings of the 
,thirty ,tyrants4 ,disgusted alike with 

the democracy and the aristocracy he    
seems to have retired into seclusion4   
,he never once1 throughout his long     
life1 appeared as a #aff speaker in the 
popular assembly4 ,he regarded the      
,athenian constitution as past help4    
,not much is known of the philosopher's 
youth4 ,he composed poems4 ,he was given
 the best education that an ,athenian   
citizen of those days could obtain4 ,his
 teacher1 ,cratylus1 was a follower of  
,heracleitus1 and ,plato no doubt       
learned from him the doctrines of that  
philosopher4 ,it is improbable that he  
allowed himself to remain unacquainted  
with the disputations of the ,sophists1 
many of whom were his own               
contemporaries4 ,he probably read the   
book of ,anaxagoras1 which was easily   
obtainable in ,athens at the time4 ,but 
on all these points we have no certain  
information4 ,what we do know is that   
the decisive event in his youth1 and    
indeed in his life1 was his association 
with ,socrates4  ,for the last eight    

years of the life of ,socrates1 ,plato  
was his friend and his faithful         
disciple4 ,the teaching and personality 
of the master constituted the supreme   
intellectual impulse of his life1 and   
the inspiration of his entire thought4  
,and the devotion and esteem which he   
felt for ,socrates1 so far from waning  
as the years went by1 seem1 on the      
contrary1 to have grown continually     
stronger4 ,for it is precisely in the   
latest dialogues of his long life that  
some of the most charming and admiring  
portraits of ,socrates are to be found4 
,socrates became for him the pattern and
 exemplar of the true philosopher4      
,after the death of ,socrates a second  
period opens in the life of ,plato1 the 
period of his travels4 ,he migrated     
first to ,megara1 where his friend and  
fellow-disciple ,euclid was then        
founding the ,megaric school4 ,the      
,megaric philosophy was a combination of
 the thought of ,socrates with that of  
the ,eleatics4 ,and it was no doubt     

here1 at #afg ,megara1 under the        
influence of ,euclid1 that ,plato formed
 his deeper acquaintance with the       
teaching of ,parmenides1 which exercised
 an all-important influence upon his own
 philosophy4 ,from ,megara he travelled 
to ,cyrene1 ,egypt1 ,italy1 and ,sicily4
 ,in ,italy he came in contact with the 
,pythagoreans4 ,and to the effects of   
this journey may be attributed the      
strong ,pythagorean elements which      
permeate his thought4  ,in ,sicily he   
attended the court of ,dionysius the    
,elder1 tyrant of ,syracuse4 ,but here  
his conduct seems to have given grave   
offence4 ,dionysius was so angered by   
his moralizings and philosophical       
diatribes that he put ,plato up to      
auction in the slave market4 ,plato     
narrowly escaped the fate of slavery1   
but was ransomed by ,anniceris1 the     
,cyrenaic4 ,he then returned to ,athens1
 his travels having occupied a period of
 about ten years4  ,with the return of  
,plato to ,athens we enter upon the     

third and last period of his life4 ,with
 the exception of two journeys to be    
mentioned shortly1 he never again left  
,athens4 ,he now appeared for the first 
time as a professional teacher and      
philosopher4 ,he chose for the scene of 
his activities a gymnasium1 called the  
,academy4 ,here he gradually collected  
round him a circle of pupils and        
disciples4 ,for the rest of his life1 a 
period of about forty years1 he occupied
 himself in literary activity1 and in   
the management of the school which he   
had founded4 ,his manner of life was in 
strong contrast to that of ,socrates4   
,only in one respect did he resemble his
 master4 ,he took no fees for his       
teaching4 ,otherwise the lives of the   
two great men bear no resemblance to    
each other4 ,socrates had gone out into 
the highways and byways in search of    
wisdom4 ,he had wrangled in #afh the    
market-place with all comers4 ,plato    
withdrew himself into the seclusion of a
 school1 protected from the hubbub of   

the world by a ring of faithful         
disciples4 ,it was not to be expected   
that a man of ,plato's refinement1      
culture1 and aristocratic feelings1     
should appreciate1 as ,socrates1 the man
 of the people1 had done1 the           
rough-and-tumble life of the ,athenian  
market-place4 ,nor was it desirable for 
the advancement of philosophy that it   
should be so4 ,the ,socratic philosophy 
had suffered from the ,socratic manner  
of life4 ,it was unmethodical and       
inchoate4 ,systematic thought is not    
born of disputes at the street corner4  
,for the development of a great         
world-system1 such as that of ,plato1   
laborious study and quiet seclusion were
 essential4  ,this period of ,plato's   
mastership was broken only by two       
journeys to ,sicily1 both undertaken    
with political objects4 ,plato knew well
 that the perfect ,state1 as depicted in
 his ,republic1 was not capable of      
realization in the ,greece of his own   
time4 ,nevertheless1 he took his        

political philosophy very seriously4    
,though the perfect republic was an     
unattainable ideal1 yet1 he thought1 any
 real reform of the ,state must at least
 proceed in the direction of that ideal4
 ,one of the essential principles of the
 ,republic was that the rulers must also
 be philosophers4 ,not till philosopher 
and ruler were combined in one and the  
same person could the ,state be governed
 upon true principles4 ,now1 in the year
 #cfh ,b4,c41 ,dionysius the ,elder     
died1 and ,dionysius the younger became 
tyrant of ,syracuse4 ,dionysius         
despatched an invitation to ,plato to   
attend his court and give him the       
benefit of his advice4 ,here was an     
opportunity to experiment4 ,plato could 
train and educate a #afi                
philosopher-king4 ,he accepted the      
invitation4 ,but the expedition ended   
disastrously4 ,dionysius received him   
with enthusiasm1 and interested himself 
in the philosophical discourses of his  
teacher4 ,but he was young1 impetuous1  

hot-headed1 and without genuine         
philosophic bent4 ,his first interest   
gave place to weariness and irritation4 
,plato left ,syracuse a disappointed    
man2 and returned to ,athens4           
,nevertheless1 after the lapse of a few 
years1 ,dionysius again invited him to  
,syracuse1 and again he accepted the    
invitation4 ,but the second journey     
ended in disaster like the first1 and   
,plato was even in danger of his life1  
but was rescued by the intervention of  
the ,pythagoreans4 ,he returned to      
,athens in his seventieth year1 and     
lived till his death in the seclusion of
 his school1 never again attempting to  
intervene in practical politics4  ,for  
more than another decade he dwelt and   
taught in ,athens4 ,his life was serene1
 quiet1 and happy4 ,he died peacefully  
at the age of eighty-two4  ,plato's     
writings take the form of dialogues4 ,in
 the majority of these1 the chief part  
is taken by ,socrates1 into whose mouth 
,plato puts the exposition of his own   

philosophy4 ,in a few1 as for example   
the ,parmenides1 other speakers         
enunciate the ,platonic teaching1 but   
even in these ,socrates always plays an 
important role4 ,plato was not only a   
philosopher1 but a consummate literary  
artist4 ,the dialogues are genuinely    
dramatic1 enlivened by incident1 humour1
 and life-like characterization4 ,not   
only is the portrait of ,socrates drawn 
with loving affection1 but even the     
minor characters are flesh and blood4   
,a most important element of ,plato's   
style is his use of myths4 ,he does not 
always explain his meaning in #agj the  
form of direct scientific exposition4   
,he frequently teaches by allegories1   
fables1 and stories1 all of which may be
 included under the one general         
appellation of ,platonic myths4 ,these  
are often of great literary beauty1 but 
in spite of this they involve grave     
disadvantages4 ,plato slips so easily   
from scientific exposition into myth1   
that it is often no easy matter to      

decide whether his statements are meant 
literally or allegorically4 ,moreover1  
the myths usually signify a defect in   
his thought itself4 ,the fact is that   
the combination of poet and philosopher 
in one man is an exceedingly dangerous  
combination4 ,i have explained before   
that the object of philosophy is1 not   
merely to feel the truth1 as the poet   
and mystic feel it1 but intellectually  
to comprehend it1 not merely to give us 
a series of pictures and metaphors1 but 
a reasoned explanation of things upon   
scientific principles4 ,when a man1 who 
is at once a poet and a philosopher1    
cannot rationally explain a thing1 it is
 a terrible temptation to him to        
substitute poetic metaphors for the     
explanation which is lacking4 ,we saw1  
for example1 that the writers of the    
,upanishads1 who believed that the whole
 world issues forth from the one1       
absolute1 imperishable1 being1 which    
they called ,brahman1 being unable to   
explain why the ,one thus differentiates

 itself into the many1 took refuge in   
metaphors4 ,as the sparks from the      
substantial fire1 so1 they say1 do all  
finite beings issue forth from the ,one4
 ,but this explains nothing1 and the aim
 of the philosopher is not thus vaguely 
to feel1 but rationally to understand4  
,now this is not merely my view of the  
functions of philosophy4 ,it is         
emphatically ,plato's own view4 ,in fact
 ,plato was the originator of it4 ,he is
 perpetually insisting that #aga nothing
 save full rational comprehension       
deserves the names of knowledge and     
philosophy4 ,no writer has ever used    
such contemptuous language as ,plato    
used of the mere mystic and poet1 who   
says wise and beautiful things1 without 
in the least understanding why they are 
wise and beautiful4 ,no man has formed  
such a low estimate of the functions of 
the poet and mystic4 ,plato is1 in      
theory at least1 the prince of          
rationalists and intellectualists4 ,in  
practice1 however1 he must be convicted 

of the very fault he so severely        
censured in others4 ,this1 in fact1 is  
the explanation of most of the ,platonic
 myths4 ,wherever ,plato is unable to   
explain anything1 he covers up the gap  
in his system with a myth4 ,this is     
particularly noticeable1 for example1 in
 the ,timaeus4 ,plato having1 in other  
dialogues1 developed his theory of the  
nature of the ultimate reality1 arrives1
 in the ,timaeus1 at the problem how the
 actual world is to be explained from   
that ultimate reality4 ,at this point1  
as we shall see1 ,plato's system breaks 
down4 ,his account of the absolute      
reality is defective1 and in            
consequence1 it affords no principle    
whereby the actual universe can be      
explained4 ,in the ,timaeus1 therefore1 
instead of a reasoned explanation1 he   
gives us a series of wholly fanciful    
myths about the origin of the world4    
,wherever we find myths in ,plato's     
dialogues1 we may suspect that we have  
arrived at one of the weak points of the

 system4  ,if we are to study ,plato    
intelligently1 it is essential that we  
should cease to regard the dialogues as 
if they were all produced en bloc from a
 single phase of their author's mind4   
,his literary activity extended over a  
period of not less than fifty years4    
,during that time1 he did not stand     
still4 ,his thought1 and his mode of    
#agb expression1 were constantly        
developing4 ,if we are to understand    
,plato1 we must obtain some clue to     
enable us to trace this development4    
,and this means that we must know       
something of the order in which the     
dialogues were written4 ,unfortunately1 
however1 they have not come down to us  
dated and numbered4 ,it is a matter of  
scholarship and criticism to deduce the 
period at which any dialogue was written
 from internal evidences4 ,many minor   
points are still undecided1 as well as a
 few questions of importance1 such as   
the date of the ,phaedrus1 ,footnote #aa
 which some critics place quite early   

and some very late in ,plato's life4    
,neglecting these points1 however1 we   
may say in general that unanimity has   
been reached1 and that we now know      
enough to be able to trace the main     
lines of development4  ,footnote #aa3   
,the same remark applies to the         
,symposium1 the ,republic1 and the      
,theaetetus4  ,the dialogues fall into  
three main groups1 which correspond     
roughly to the three periods of ,plato's
 life4 ,those of the earliest group were
 written about the time of the death of 
,socrates1 and before the author's      
journey to ,megara4 ,some of them may   
have been written before the death of   
,socrates4 ,this group includes the     
,hippias ,minor1 the ,lysis1 the        
,charmides1 the ,laches1 the ,euthyphro1
 the ,apology1 the ,crito1 and the      
,protagoras4 ,the ,protagoras is the    
longest1 the most complex in thought1   
and the most developed4 ,it is probably 
the latest1 and forms the bridge to the 
second group4  ,all these early         

dialogues are short and simple1 and are 
still1 as regards their thought1        
entirely under the influence of         
,socrates4 ,plato has not as yet        
developed #agc any philosophy of his    
own4 ,he propounds the philosophy of    
,socrates almost unaltered4 ,even so1   
however1 he is no mere plagiarist4      
,there are throughout these dialogues   
evidences of freshness and originality1 
but these qualities exhibit themselves  
rather in the literary form than in the 
philosophical substance4 ,we find here  
all the familiar ,socratic propositions1
 that virtue is knowledge1 is one1 is   
teachable2 that all men seek the good1  
but that men differ as to what the good 
is2 that a man who does wrong           
deliberately is better than a man who   
does it unintentionally2 and so on4     
,moreover1 just as ,socrates had        
occupied himself in attempting to fix   
the concepts of the virtues1 asking what
 is prudence81 what is temperance81 and 
the like1 so in many of these dialogues 

,plato pursues similar inquiries4 ,the  
,lysis discusses the concept of         
friendship1 the ,charmides of           
temperance1 the ,laches of bravery4 ,on 
the whole1 the philosophical substance  
of these early writings is thin and     
meagre4 ,there is a preponderance of    
incident and much biographical detail   
regarding ,socrates4 ,there is more art 
than matter4 ,consequently1 from a      
purely literary point of view1 these are
 among the most charming of ,plato's    
dialogues1 and many of them1 such as the
 ,apology and the ,crito1 are especially
 popular with those who care for ,plato 
rather as an artist than as a           
philosopher4  ,the second group of      
dialogues is generally connected with   
the period of ,plato's travels4 ,in     
addition to the influence of ,socrates1 
we have now the influence of the        
,eleatics1 which naturally connects     
these dialogues with the period of the  
philosopher's sojourn at ,megara4 ,but  
it is in these dialogues1 too1 that     

,plato for the first time #agd develops 
his own special philosophical thesis4   
,this is in fact his great constructive 
period4 ,the central and governing      
principle of his philosophy is the      
theory of ,ideas4 ,all else hinges on   
this1 and is dominated by this4 ,in a   
sense1 his whole philosophy is nothing  
but the theory of ,ideas and what       
depends upon it4 ,it is in this second  
period that the theory of ,ideas is     
founded and developed1 and its          
relationship to the ,eleatic philosophy 
of ,being discussed4 ,we have here the  
spectacle of ,plato's most original     
thoughts in the pangs of childbirth4 ,he
 is now at grips with the central       
problems of philosophy4 ,he is intent   
upon the thought itself1 and cares      
little for the ornaments of style4 ,he  
is struggling to find expression for    
ideas newly-formed in his mind1 of which
 he is not yet completely master1 and   
which he cannot manipulate with ease4   
,consequently1 the literary graces of   

the first period recede into the        
background4 ,there is little incident1  
and no humour4 ,there is nothing but    
close reasoning1 hard and laborious     
discussion4  ,the twin dialogues1       
,gorgias and ,theaetetus are probably   
the earliest of this group4 ,they result
 in nothing very definite1 and are      
chiefly negative in character4 ,plato is
 here engaged merely in a preparatory   
clearing of the ground4 ,the ,gorgias   
discusses and refutes the ,sophistic    
identification of virtue and pleasure1  
and attempts to show1 as against it1    
that the good must be something         
objectively existent1 and independent of
 the pleasure of the individual4 ,the   
,theaetetus1 similarly1 shows that truth
 is not1 as the ,sophists thought1      
merely the subjective impression of the 
individual1 but is something objectively
 true in itself4 ,the other #age        
dialogues of the group are the ,sophist1
 the ,statesman1 and the ,parmenides4   
,the ,sophist discusses ,being and      

not-being1 and their relationship to the
 theory of ,ideas4 ,the ,parmenides     
inquires whether the absolute reality is
 to be regarded1 in the manner of the   
,eleatics1 as an abstract ,one4 ,it     
gives us1 therefore1 ,plato's conception
 of the relation of his own philosophy  
to ,eleaticism4  ,the dialogues of the  
third group are the work of ,plato's    
maturity4 ,he has now completely        
mastered his thought1 and turns it with 
ease in all directions4 ,hence the style
 returns to the lucidity and purity of  
the first period4 ,if the first period  
was marked chiefly by literary grace1   
the second by depth of thought1 the     
third period combines both4 ,the perfect
 substance is now moulded in the perfect
 form4 ,but a peculiarity of all the    
dialogues of this period is that they   
take it for granted that the theory of  
,ideas is already established and       
familiar to the reader4 ,they proceed to
 apply it to all departments of thought4
 ,the second period was concerned with  

the formulation and proof of the theory 
of ,ideas1 the third period undertakes  
its systematic application4 ,thus the   
,symposium1 which has for its subject   
the metaphysic of love1 attempts to     
connect man's feeling for beauty with   
the intellectual knowledge of the       
,ideas4 ,the ,philebus applies the      
theory of ,ideas to the sphere of       
ethics1 the ,timaeus to the sphere of   
physics1 and the ,republic to the sphere
 of politics4 ,the ,phaedo founds the   
doctrine of the immortality of the soul 
upon the theory of ,ideas4 ,the         
,phaedrus is probably to be grouped with
 the ,symposium4 ,the beauty1 grace1 and
 lucidity of the style1 and the fact    
that it assumes throughout that #agf the
 theory of ,ideas is a thing            
established1 lead us to the belief that 
it belongs to the period of ,plato's    
maturity4 ,zeller's theory that it was  
written at the beginning of the second  
period1 and is then offered to the      
reader as a sort of sweetmeat to induce 

him to enter upon the laborious task of 
reading the ,sophist1 the ,statesman1   
and the ,parmenides1 seems to be        
far-fetched and unnecessary4 ,footnote  
#ab  ,footnote #ab3 ,zeller's ,plato and
 the ,older ,academy1 chap4 iii4  ,if   
the second is the great constructive    
period of ,plato's life1 the third may  
be described as his systematic and      
synthetic period4 ,every part of his    
philosophy is here linked up with every 
other part4 ,all the details of the     
system are seen to flow from the one    
central principle of his thought1 the   
theory of ,ideas4 ,every sphere of      
knowledge and being is in turn exhibited
 in the light of that principle1 is     
permeated and penetrated by it4  ,the   
plan for expounding ,plato which first  
suggests itself is to go through the    
dialogues1 one by one1 and extract the  
doctrine of each successively4 ,but this
 suggestion has to be given up as soon  
as it is mentioned4 ,for although the   
philosophy of ,plato is in itself a     

systematic and coherent body of thought1
 he did not express it in a systematic  
way4 ,on the contrary1 he scatters his  
ideas in all directions4 ,he throws them
 out at random in any order4 ,what      
logically comes first often appears     
last4 ,it may be found at the end of a  
dialogue1 and the next step in reasoning
 may make its appearance at the         
beginning1 or even in a totally         
different dialogue4 ,if1 therefore1 we  
are to get any connected view of the    
system1 we must abandon ,plato's own    
order of exposition1 and piece the      
thought together for ourselves4 ,we must
 begin #agg with what logically comes   
first1 wherever we may find it1 and     
proceed with the exposition in the same 
manner4  ,a similar difficulty attends  
the question of the division of ,plato's
 philosophy4 ,he himself has given us no
 single and certain principle of        
division4 ,but the principle usually    
adopted divides his philosophy into     
,dialectic1 ,physics1 and ,ethics4      

,dialectic1 or the theory of ,ideas1 is 
,plato's doctrine of the nature of the  
absolute reality4 ,physics is the theory
 of phenomenal existence in space and   
time1 and includes therefore the        
doctrine of the soul and its migrations1
 since these are happenings in time4    
,ethics includes politics1 the theory of
 the duty of man as a citizen1 as well  
as the ethics of the individual4        
,certain portions of the system1 the    
doctrine of ,eros1 for example1 do not  
fall very naturally into any of these   
divisions4 ,but1 on the other hand1     
though some dialogues are mixed as to   
their subject matter1 others1 and those 
the most important1 fall almost         
exclusively into one or other division4 
,for example1 the ,timaeus1 the ,phaedo1
 and the ,phaedrus1 are physical4 ,the  
,philebus1 the ,gorgias1 and the        
,republic1 are ethical4 ,the            
,theaetetus1 the ,sophist1 and the      
,parmenides1 are dialectical4    #b4    
,the ,theory of ,knowledge4  ,the theory

 of ,ideas is itself based upon the     
theory of knowledge4 ,what is knowledge8
 ,what is truth8 ,plato opens the       
discussion by telling us first what     
knowledge and truth are not4 ,his object
 here is the refutation of false        
theories4 ,these must be disposed of to 
clear the ground preparatory to positive
 exposition4 ,the first such false      
theory which he attacks is that         
knowledge #agh is perception4 ,to refute
 this is the main object of the         
,theaetetus4 ,his arguments may be      
summarized as follows3--  7#a7 ,that    
knowledge is perception is the theory of
 ,protagoras and the ,sophists1 and we  
have seen to what results it leads4     
,what it amounts to is that what appears
 to each individual true is true for    
that individual4 ,but this is at any    
rate false in its application to our    
judgment of future events4 ,the frequent
 mistakes which men make about the      
future show this4 ,it may appear to me  
that ,i shall be ,chief ,justice next   

year4 ,but instead of that1 ,i find     
myself1 perhaps1 in prison4 ,in general1
 what appears to each individual to be  
the truth about the future frequently   
does not turn out so in the event4  7#b7
 ,perception yields contradictory       
impressions4 ,the same object appears   
large when near1 small when removed to a
 distance4 ,compared with some things it
 is light1 with others heavy4 ,in one   
light it is white1 in another green1 and
 in the dark it has no colour at all4   
,looked at from one angle this piece of 
paper seems square1 from another it     
appears to be a rhombus4 ,which of all  
these impressions is true8 ,to know     
which is true1 we must be able to       
exercise a choice among these varying   
impressions1 to prefer one to another1  
to discriminate1 to accept this and     
reject that4 ,but if knowledge is       
perception1 then we have no right to    
give one perception preference over     
another4 ,for all perceptions are       
knowledge4 ,all are true4  7#c7 ,this   

doctrine renders all teaching1 all      
discussion1 proof1 or disproof1         
impossible4 ,since all perceptions are  
equally true1 the child's perceptions   
must be just as much the truth as those 
of his teachers4 ,his teachers1 #agi    
therefore1 can teach him nothing4 ,as to
 discussion and proof1 the very fact    
that two people dispute about anything  
implies that they believe in the        
existence of an objective truth4 ,their 
impressions1 if they contradict each    
other1 cannot both be true4 ,for if so1 
there is nothing to dispute about4 ,thus
 all proof and refutation are rendered  
futile by the theory of ,protagoras4    
7#d7 ,if perception is truth1 man is the
 measure of all things1 in his character
 as a percipient being4 ,but since      
animals are also percipient beings1 the 
lowest brute must be1 equally with man1 
the measure of all things4  7#e7 ,the   
theory of ,protagoras contradicts       
itself4 ,for ,protagoras admits that    
what appears to me true is true4 ,if1   

therefore1 it appears to me true that   
the doctrine of ,protagoras is false1   
,protagoras himself must admit that it  
is false4  7#f7 ,it destroys the        
objectivity of truth1 and renders the   
distinction between truth and falsehood 
wholly meaningless4 ,the same thing is  
true and false at the same time1 true   
for you and false for me4 ,hence it     
makes no difference at all whether we   
say that a proposition is true1 or      
whether we say that it is false4 ,both  
statements mean the same thing1 that is 
to say1 neither of them means anything4 
,to say that whatever ,i perceive is    
true for me merely gives a new name to  
my perception1 but does not add any     
value to it4  7#g7 ,in all perception   
there are elements which are not        
contributed by the senses4 ,suppose ,i  
say1 ,this piece of paper is white4     
,this1 we might think1 is a pure        
judgment of perception4 ,nothing is     
stated except what ,i perceive by means 
of my senses4 ,but on consideration it  

turns out that this is not correct4     
,first of all ,i must #ahj think this   
piece of paper4 ,why do ,i call it      
paper8 ,my doing so means that ,i have  
classified it4 ,i have mentally compared
 it with other pieces of paper1 and     
decided that it is of a class with them4
 ,my thought1 then1 involves comparison 
and classification4 ,the object is a    
compound sensation of whiteness1        
squareness1 etc4 ,i can only recognise  
it as a piece of paper by identifying   
these sensations1 which ,i have now1    
with sensations received from other     
similar objects in the past4 ,and not   
only must ,i recognize the sameness of  
the sensations1 but ,i must recognize   
their difference from other sensations4 
,i must not confound the sensations ,i  
receive from paper with those which ,i  
receive from a piece of wood4 ,both     
identities and differences of sensations
 must be known before ,i can say this   
piece of paper4 ,the same is true when  
,i go on to say that it is white4 ,this 

is only possible by classifying it with 
other white objects1 and differentiating
 it from objects of other colours4 ,but 
the senses themselves cannot perform    
these acts of comparison and contrast4  
,each sensation is1 so to speak1 an     
isolated dot4 ,it cannot go beyond      
itself to compare itself with others4   
,this operation must be performed by my 
mind1 which acts as a co-ordinating     
central authority1 receiving the        
isolated sensations1 combining1         
comparing1 and contrasting them4 ,this  
is particularly noticeable in cases     
where we compare sensations of one sense
 with those of another4 ,feeling a ball 
with my fingers1 ,i say it feels round4 
,looking at it with my eyes1 ,i say it  
looks round4 ,but the feel is quite a   
different sensation from the look4 ,yet 
,i use the same word1 round1 to describe
 both4 ,and this shows that ,i have     
identified the two sensations4 ,this    
#aha cannot be done by the senses       
themselves4 ,for my eyes cannot feel1   

and my fingers cannot see4 ,it must be  
the mind itself1 standing above the     
senses1 which performs the              
identification4 ,thus the ideas of      
identity and difference are not yielded 
to me by my senses4 ,the intellect      
itself introduces them into things4 ,yet
 they are involved in all knowledge1 for
 they are involved even in the simplest 
acts of knowledge1 such as the          
proposition1 ,this is white4 ,knowledge1
 therefore1 cannot consist simply of    
sense-impressions1 as ,protagoras       
thought1 for even the simplest          
propositions contain more than          
sensation4  ,if knowledge is not the    
same as perception1 neither is it1 on   
the other hand1 the same as opinion4    
,that knowledge is opinion is the second
 false theory that ,plato seeks to      
refute4 ,wrong opinion is clearly not   
knowledge4 ,but even right opinion      
cannot be called knowledge4 ,if ,i say1 
without any grounds for the statement1  
that there will be a thunderstorm next  

,easter ,sunday1 it may chance that my  
statement turns out to be correct4 ,but 
it cannot be said that1 in making this  
blind guess1 ,i had any knowledge1      
although1 as it turned out1 ,i had right
 opinion4 ,right opinion may also be    
grounded1 not on mere guess-work1 but on
 something which1 though better1 is     
still not true understanding4 ,we often 
feel intuitively1 or instinctively1 that
 something is true1 though we cannot    
give any definite grounds for our       
belief4 ,the belief may be quite        
correct1 but it is not1 according to    
,plato1 knowledge4 ,it is only right    
opinion4 ,to possess knowledge1 one must
 not only know that a thing is so1 but  
why it is so4 ,one must know the        
reasons4 ,knowledge must be full and    
complete understanding1 rational        
comprehension1 and not mere instinctive 
belief4 #ahb ,it must be grounded on    
reason1 and not on faith4 ,right opinion
 may be produced by persuasion and      
sophistry1 by the arts of the orator and

 rhetorician4 ,knowledge can only be    
produced by reason4 ,right opinion may  
equally be removed by the false arts of 
rhetoric1 and is therefore unstable and 
uncertain4 ,but true knowledge cannot be
 thus shaken4 ,he who truly knows and   
understands cannot be robbed of his     
knowledge by the glamour of words4      
,opinion1 lastly1 may be true or false4 
,knowledge can only be true4  ,these    
false theories being refuted1 we can now
 pass to the positive side of the theory
 of knowledge4 ,if knowledge is neither 
perception nor opinion1 what is it8     
,plato adopts1 without alteration1 the  
,socratic doctrine that all knowledge is
 knowledge through concepts4 ,this1 as  
,i explained in the lecture on          
,socrates1 gets rid of the objectionable
 results of the ,sophistic              
identification of knowledge with        
perception4 ,a concept1 being the same  
thing as a definition1 is something     
fixed and permanent1 not liable to      
mutation according to the subjective    

impressions of the individual4 ,it gives
 us objective truth4 ,this also agrees  
with ,plato's view of opinion4          
,knowledge is not opinion1 founded on   
instinct or intuition4 ,knowledge is    
founded on reason4 ,this is the same as 
saying that it is founded upon concepts1
 since reason is the faculty of         
concepts4  ,but if ,plato1 in answering 
the question1 ,what is knowledge8       
follows implicitly the teaching of      
,socrates1 he yet builds upon this      
teaching a new and wholly un-,socratic  
metaphysic of his own4 ,the ,socratic   
theory of knowledge he now converts into
 a theory of the nature of reality4     
,this is the subject-matter of          
,dialectic4  #ahc    #c4 ,dialectic1 or 
the ,theory of ,ideas4  ,the concept had
 been for ,socrates merely a rule of    
thought4 ,definitions1 like guide-rails1
 keep thought upon the straight path2 we
 compare any act with the definition of 
virtue in order to ascertain whether it 
is virtuous4 ,but what was for ,socrates

 merely regulative of thought1 ,plato   
now transforms into a metaphysical      
substance4 ,his theory of ,ideas is the 
theory of the objectivity of concepts4  
,that the concept is not merely an idea 
in the mind1 but something which has a  
reality of its own1 outside and         
independent of the mind--this is the    
essence of the philosophy of ,plato4    
,how did ,plato arrive at this doctrine8
 ,it is founded upon the view that truth
 means the correspondence of one's ideas
 with the facts of existence4 ,if ,i see
 a lake of water1 and if there really is
 such a lake1 then my idea is true4 ,but
 if there is no lake1 then my idea is   
false4 ,it is an hallucination4 ,truth1 
according to this view1 means that the  
thought in my mind is a copy of         
something outside my mind4 ,falsehood   
consists in having an idea which is not 
a copy of anything which really exists4 
,knowledge1 of course1 means knowledge  
of the truth4 ,and when ,i say that a   
thought in my mind is knowledge1 ,i must

 therefore mean that this thought is a  
copy of something that exists4 ,but we  
have already seen that knowledge is the 
knowledge of concepts4 ,and if a concept
 is true knowledge1 it can only be true 
in virtue of the fact that it           
corresponds to an objective reality4    
,there must1 therefore1 be general ideas
 or concepts1 outside my mind4 ,it were 
a contradiction to suppose1 on the one  
hand1 that the concept is true          
knowledge1 and on the other1 that it    
corresponds to nothing external #ahd to 
us4 ,this would be like saying that my  
idea of the lake of water is a true     
idea1 but that no such lake really      
exists4 ,the concept in my mind must be 
a copy of the concept outside it4  ,now 
if knowledge by concepts is true1 our   
experiences through sensation must be   
false4 ,our senses make us aware of many
 individual horses4 ,our intellect gives
 us the concept of the horse in general4
 ,if the latter is the sole truth1 the  
former must be false4 ,and this can only

 mean that the objects of sensation have
 no true reality4 ,what has reality is  
the concept2 what has no reality is the 
individual thing which is perceived by  
the senses4 ,this and that particular   
horse have no true being4 ,reality      
belongs only to the idea of the horse in
 general4  ,let us approach this theory 
from a somewhat different direction4    
,suppose ,i ask you the question1 ,what 
is beauty8 ,you point to a rose1 and    
say1 ,here is beauty4 ,and you say the  
same of a woman's face1 a piece of      
woodland scenery1 and a clear moonlight 
night4 ,but ,i answer that this is not  
what ,i want to know4 ,i did not ask    
what things are beautiful1 but what is  
beauty4 ,i did not ask for many things1 
but for one thing1 namely1 beauty4 ,if  
beauty is a rose1 it cannot be          
moonlight1 because a rose and moonlight 
are quite different things4 ,by beauty  
we mean1 not many things1 but one4 ,this
 is proved by the fact that we use only 
one word for it4 ,and what ,i want to   

know is what this one beauty is1 which  
is distinct from all beautiful objects4 
,perhaps you will say that there is no  
such thing as beauty apart from         
beautiful objects1 and that1 though we  
use one word1 yet this is only a manner 
of #ahe speech1 and that there are in   
reality many beauties1 each residing in 
a beautiful object4 ,in that case1 ,i   
observe that1 though the many beauties  
are all different1 yet1 since you use   
the one word to describe them all1 you  
evidently think that they are similar to
 each other4 ,how do you know that they 
are similar8 ,your eyes cannot inform   
you of this similarity1 because it      
involves comparison1 and we have already
 seen that comparison is an act of the  
mind1 and not of the senses4 ,you must  
therefore have an idea of beauty in your
 mind1 with which you compare the       
various beautiful objects and so        
recognise them as all resembling your   
idea of beauty1 and therefore as        
resembling each other4 ,so that there is

 at any rate an idea of one beauty in   
your mind4 ,either this idea corresponds
 to something outside you1 or it does   
not4 ,in the latter case1 your idea of  
beauty is a mere invention1 a figment of
 your own brain4 ,if so1 then1 in       
judging external objects by your        
subjective idea1 and in making it the   
standard of whether they are beautiful  
or not1 you are back again at the       
position of the ,sophists4 ,you are     
making yourself and the fancies of your 
individual brain the standard of        
external truth4 ,therefore1 the only    
alternative is to believe that there is 
not only an idea of beauty in your mind1
 but that there is such a thing as the  
one beauty itself1 of which your idea is
 a copy4 ,this beauty exists outside the
 mind1 and it is something distinct from
 all beautiful objects4  ,what has been 
said of beauty may equally be said of   
justice1 or of goodness1 or of          
whiteness1 or of heaviness4 ,there are  
many just acts1 but only one justice1   

since we use one word for it4 ,this     
justice must be a real thing1 distinct  
from all particular just acts4 ,our     
ideas of justice #ahf are copies of it4 
,so also there are many white objects1  
but also the one whiteness4  ,of the    
above examples1 several are very exalted
 moral ideas1 such as beauty1 justice1  
and goodness4 ,but the case of whiteness
 will serve to show that the theory     
attributes reality not only to exalted  
ideas1 but to others also4 ,in fact1 we 
might quite well substitute evil for    
goodness1 and all the same arguments    
would apply4 ,or we might take a        
corporeal object such as the horse1 and 
ask what horse means4 ,it does not mean 
the many individual horses1 for since   
one word is used it must mean one thing1
 which is related to individual horses1 
just as whiteness is related to         
individual white things4 ,it means the  
universal horse1 the idea of the horse  
in general1 and this1 just as much as   
goodness or beauty1 must be something   

objectively real4  ,now beauty1 justice1
 goodness1 whiteness1 the horse in      
general1 are all concepts4 ,the idea of 
beauty is formed by including what is   
common to all beautiful objects1 and    
excluding those points in which they    
differ4 ,and this1 as we have seen1 is  
just what is meant by a concept4        
,plato's theory1 therefore1 is that     
concepts are objective realities4 ,and  
he gives to these objective concepts the
 technical name ,ideas4 ,this is his    
answer to the chief question of         
philosophy1 namely1 what1 amid all the  
appearances and unrealities of things1  
is that absolute and ultimate reality1  
from which all else is to be explained8 
,it consists1 for ,plato1 in ,ideas4    
,let us see next what the               
characteristics of the ,ideas are4 ,in  
the first place1 they are substances4   
,substance is a technical term in       
philosophy1 but its philosophical       
meaning is merely a more consistent     
development of its #ahg popular meaning4

 ,in common talk1 we generally apply the
 word substance to material things such 
as iron1 brass1 wood1 or water4 ,and we 
say that these substances possess       
qualities4 ,for example1 hardness and   
shininess are qualities of the substance
 iron4 ,the qualities cannot exist apart
 from the substances4 ,they do not exist
 on their own account1 but are dependent
 on the substance4 ,the shininess cannot
 exist by itself4 ,there must be a shiny
 something4 ,but1 according to popular  
ideas1 though the qualities are not     
independent of the substance1 the       
substance is independent of the         
qualities4 ,the qualities derive their  
reality from the substance4 ,but the    
substance has reality in itself4 ,the   
philosophical use of the term substance 
is simply a more consistent application 
of this idea4 ,substance means1 for the 
philosopher1 that which has its whole   
being in itself1 whose reality does not 
flow into it from anything else1 but    
which is the source of its own reality4 

,it is self-caused1 and self-determined4
 ,it is the ground of other things1 but 
itself has no ground except itself4 ,for
 example1 if we believe the popular     
,christian idea that ,god created the   
world1 but is ,himself an ultimate and  
uncreated being1 then1 since the world  
depends for its existence upon ,god1 but
 ,god's existence depends only upon     
,himself1 ,god is a substance and the   
world is not4 ,in this sense the word is
 correctly used in the ,creed where it  
speaks of ,god as three persons1 but one
 substance4 ,again1 if1 with the        
,idealists1 we think that mind is a     
self-existent reality1 and that matter  
owes its existence to mind1 then in that
 case matter is not substance1 but mind 
is4 ,in this technical sense the ,ideas 
are substances4 ,they are absolute and  
ultimate realities4 #ahh ,their whole   
being is in themselves4 ,they depend on 
nothing1 but all things depend on them4 
,they are the first principles of the   
universe4  ,secondly1 the ,ideas are    

universal4 ,an ,idea is not any         
particular thing4 ,the ,idea of the     
horse is not this or that horse4 ,it is 
the general concept of all horses4 ,it  
is the universal horse4 ,for this reason
 the ,ideas are1 in modern times1 often 
called universals4  ,thirdly1 the ,ideas
 are not things1 but thoughts4 ,there is
 no such thing as the horse-in-general4 
,if there were1 we should be able to    
find it somewhere1 and it would then be 
a particular thing instead of a         
universal4 ,but in saying that the      
,ideas are thoughts1 there are two      
mistakes to be carefully avoided4 ,the  
first is to suppose that they are the   
thoughts of a person1 that they are your
 thoughts or my thoughts4 ,the second is
 to suppose that they are thoughts in   
the mind of ,god4 ,both these views are 
wrong4 ,it would be absurd to suppose   
that our thoughts can be the cause of   
the universe4 ,our concepts are indeed  
copies of the ,ideas1 but to confuse    
them with the ,ideas themselves is1 for 

,plato1 as absurd as to confuse our idea
 of a mountain with the mountain itself4
 ,nor are they the thoughts of ,god4    
,they are indeed sometimes spoken of as 
the ,ideas in the divine mind4 ,but this
 is only a figurative expression4 ,we   
can1 if we like1 talk of the sum of all 
the ,ideas as constituting the divine   
mind4 ,but this means nothing in        
particular1 and is only a poetical      
phrase4 ,both these mistakes are due to 
the fact that we find it difficult to   
conceive of thoughts without a thinker4 
,this1 however1 is just what ,plato     
meant4 ,they are not subjective ideas1  
that is1 the ideas in a particular and  
existent #ahi mind4 ,they are objective 
,ideas1 thoughts which have reality on  
their own account1 independently of any 
mind4  ,fourthly1 each ,idea is a unity4
 ,it is the one amid the many4 ,the     
,idea of man is one1 although individual
 men are many4 ,there cannot be more    
than one ,idea for each class of        
objects4 ,if there were several ,ideas  

of justice1 we should have to seek for  
the common element among them1 and this 
common element would itself constitute  
the one ,idea of justice4  ,fifthly1 the
 ,ideas are immutable and imperishable4 
,a concept is the same as a definition4 
,and the whole point in a definition is 
that it should always be the same4 ,the 
object of a definition is to compare    
individual things with it1 and to see   
whether they agree with it or not4 ,but 
if the definition of a triangle differed
 from day to day1 it would be useless1  
since we could never say whether any    
particular figure were a triangle or    
not1 just as the standard yard in the   
,tower of ,london would be useless if it
 changed in length1 and were twice as   
long to-day as it was yesterday4 ,a     
definition is thus something absolutely 
permanent1 and a definition is only the 
expression in words of the nature of an 
,idea4 ,consequently the ,ideas cannot  
change4 ,the many beautiful objects     
arise and pass away1 but the one ,beauty

 neither begins nor ends4 ,it is        
eternal1 unchangeable1 and imperishable4
 ,the many beautiful things are but the 
fleeting expressions of the one eternal 
beauty4 ,the definition of man would    
remain the same1 even if all men were   
destroyed4 ,the ,idea of man is eternal1
 and remains untouched by the birth1 old
 age1 decay1 and death1 of individual   
men4  ,sixthly1 the ,ideas are the      
,essences of all things4 ,the definition
 gives us what is essential to a thing4 
,if we #aij define man as a rational    
animal1 this means that reason is of the
 essence of man4 ,the fact that this man
 has a turned-up nose1 and that man red 
hair1 are accidental facts1 not         
essential to their humanity4 ,we do not 
include them in the definition of man4  
,seventhly1 each ,idea is1 in its own   
kind1 an absolute perfection1 and its   
perfection is the same as its reality4  
,the perfect man is the one universal   
type-man1 that is1 the ,idea of man1 and
 all individual men deviate more or less

 from this perfect type4 ,in so far as  
they fall short of it1 they are         
imperfect and unreal4  ,eighthly1 the   
,ideas are outside space and time4 ,that
 they are outside space is obvious4 ,if 
they were in space1 they would have to  
be in some particular place4 ,we ought  
to be able to find them somewhere4 ,a   
telescope or microscope might reveal    
them4 ,and this would mean that they are
 individual and particular things1 and  
not universals at all4 ,they are also   
outside time4 ,for they are unchangeable
 and eternal2 and this does not mean    
that they are the same at all times4 ,if
 that were so1 their immutability would 
be a matter of experience1 and not of   
reason4 ,we should1 so to speak1 have to
 look at them from time to time to see  
that they had not really changed4 ,but  
their immutability is not a matter of   
experience1 but is known to thought4 ,it
 is not merely that they are always the 
same in time1 but that time is          
irrelevant to them4 ,they are timeless4 

,in the ,timaeus eternity is            
distinguished from infinite time4 ,the  
latter is described as a mere copy of   
eternity4  ,ninthly1 the ,ideas are     
rational1 that is to say1 they are      
apprehended through reason4 ,the finding
 of the common element in the manifold  
is the work of inductive #aia reason1   
and through this alone is knowledge of  
the ,ideas possible4 ,this should be    
noted by those persons who imagine that 
,plato was some sort of benevolent      
mystic4 ,the imperishable ,one1 the     
absolute reality1 is apprehended1 not by
 intuition1 or in any kind of mystic    
ecstasy1 but only by rational cognition 
and laborious thought4  ,lastly1 towards
 the end of his life1 ,plato identified 
the ,ideas with the ,pythagorean        
numbers4 ,we know this from ,aristotle1 
but it is not mentioned in the dialogues
 of ,plato himself4 ,it appears to have 
been a theory adopted in old age1 and   
set forth in the lectures which         
,aristotle attended4 ,it is a retrograde

 step1 and tends to degrade the great   
and lucid idealism of ,plato into a     
mathematical mysticism4 ,in this1 as in 
other respects1 the influence of the    
,pythagoreans upon ,plato was harmful4  
,it results from this whole theory of   
,ideas that there are two sources of    
human experience1 sense-perception and  
reason4 ,sense-perception has for its   
object the world of sense2 reason has   
for its object the ,ideas4 ,the world of
 sense has all the opposite             
characteristics to the ,ideas4 ,the     
,ideas are absolute reality1 absolute   
,being4 ,objects of sense are absolute  
unreality1 not-being1 except in so far  
as the ,ideas are in them4 ,whatever    
reality they have they owe to the       
,ideas4 ,there is in ,plato's system a  
principle of absolute not-being which we
 shall consider when we come to deal    
with his ,physics4 ,objects of sense    
participate both in the ,ideas and in   
this not-being4 ,they are1 therefore1   
half way between ,being and not-being4  

,they are half real4 ,ideas1 again1 are 
universal2 things of sense are always   
particular and individual4 ,the ,idea is
 one1 the sense-object is always #aib a 
multiplicity4 ,ideas are outside space  
and time1 things of sense are both      
temporal and spatial4 ,the ,idea is     
eternal and immutable2 sense-objects are
 changeable and in perpetual flux4  ,as 
regards the last point1 ,plato adopts   
the view of ,heracleitus that there is  
an absolute ,becoming1 and he identifies
 it with the world of sense1 which      
contains nothing stable and permanent1  
but is a constant flow4 ,the ,idea      
always is1 and never becomes2 the thing 
of sense always becomes1 and never is4  
,it is for this reason that1 in the     
opinion of ,plato1 no knowledge of the  
world of sense is possible1 for one can 
have no knowledge of that which changes 
from moment to moment4 ,knowledge is    
only possible if its subject stands     
fixed before the mind1 is permanent and 
changeless4 ,the only knowledge1 then1  

is knowledge of the ,ideas4  ,this may  
seem1 at first sight1 a very singular   
doctrine4 ,that there can be no         
knowledge of sense-objects would1 it    
might seem to us moderns1 involve the   
denial that modern physical science1    
with all its exactitude and accumulated 
knowledge1 is knowledge at all4 ,and    
surely1 though all earthly things arise 
and pass away1 many of them last long   
enough to admit of knowledge4 ,surely   
the mountains are sufficiently permanent
 to allow us to know something of them4 
,they have relative1 though not         
absolute1 permanence4 ,this criticism is
 partly justified4 ,plato did           
underestimate the value of physical     
knowledge4 ,but for the most part1 the  
criticism is a misunderstanding4 ,by the
 world of sense ,plato means bare       
sensation with no rational element in   
it4 ,now physical science has not such  
crude sensation for its object4 ,its    
objects are rationalized sensations4    
#aic ,if1 in ,plato's manner1 we think  

only of pure sensation1 then it is true 
that it is nothing but a constant flux  
without stability2 and knowledge of it  
is impossible4 ,the mountains are       
comparatively permanent4 ,but our       
sensation of the mountains is           
perpetually changing4 ,every change of  
light1 every cloud that passes over the 
sun1 changes the colours and the shades4
 ,every time we move from one situation 
to another1 the mountain appears a      
different shape4 ,the permanence of the 
mountain itself is due to the fact that 
all these varying sensations are        
identified as sensations of one and the 
same object4 ,the idea of identity is   
involved here1 and it is1 as it were1 a 
thread upon which these fleeting        
sensations are strung4 ,but the idea of 
identity cannot be obtained from the    
senses4 ,it is introduced into things by
 reason4 ,hence knowledge of this       
permanent mountain is only possible     
through the exercise of reason4 ,in     
,plato's language1 all we can know of   

the mountain is the ,ideas in which it  
participates4 ,to revert to a previous  
example1 even the knowledge this paper  
is white involves the activity of       
intellect1 and is impossible through    
sensation alone4 ,bare sensation is a   
flow1 of which no knowledge is possible4
  ,aristotle observes that ,plato's     
theory of ,ideas has three sources1 the 
teachings of the ,eleatics1 of          
,heracleitus1 and of ,socrates4 ,from   
,heracleitus1 ,plato took the notion of 
a sphere of ,becoming1 and it appears in
 his system as the world of sense4 ,from
 the ,eleatics he took the idea of a    
sphere of absolute ,being4 ,from        
,socrates he took the doctrine of       
concepts1 and proceeded to identify the 
,eleatic ,being with the ,socratic      
concepts4 ,this gives him his theory of 
,ideas4  #aid  ,sense objects1 so far as
 they are knowable1 that is so far as   
they are more than bare sensations1 are 
so only because the ,idea resides in    
them4 ,and this yields the clue to      

,plato's teaching regarding the relation
 of sense objects to the ,ideas4 ,the   
,ideas are1 in the first place the      
cause1 that is to say1 the ground 7not  
the mechanical cause7 of sense-objects4 
,the ,ideas are the absolute reality by 
which individual things must be         
explained4 ,the being of things flows   
into them from the ,ideas4 ,they are    
copies1 imitations1 of the ,ideas4 ,in  
so far as they resemble the ,idea1 they 
are real2 in so far as they differ from 
it1 they are unreal4 ,in general1 sense 
objects are1 in ,plato's opinion1 only  
very dim1 poor and imperfect copies of  
the ,ideas4 ,they are mere shadows1 and 
half-realities4 ,another expression     
frequently used by ,plato to express    
this relationship is that of            
participation4 ,things participate in   
the ,ideas4 ,white objects participate  
in the one whiteness1 beautiful objects1
 in the one beauty4 ,in this way beauty 
itself is the cause or explanation of   
beautiful objects1 and so of all other  

,ideas4 ,the ,ideas are thus both       
transcendent and immanent2 immanent in  
so far as they reside in the things of  
sense1 transcendent inasmuch as they    
have a reality of their own apart from  
the objects of sense which participate  
in them4 ,the ,idea of man would still  
be real even if all men were destroyed1 
and it was real before any man existed1 
if there ever was such a time4 ,for the 
,ideas1 being timeless1 cannot be real  
now and not then4  ,of what kinds of    
things are there ,ideas8 ,that there are
 moral ,ideas1 such as ,justice1        
,goodness1 and ,beauty1 ,ideas of       
corporeal things1 such as horse1 man1   
tree1 star1 river1 and ,ideas of        
qualities1 such as whiteness1 heaviness1
 #aie sweetness1 we have already seen4  
,but there are ,ideas not only of       
natural corporeal objects1 but likewise 
of manufactured articles2 there are     
,ideas of beds1 tables1 clothes4 ,and   
there are ,ideas not only of exalted    
moral entities1 such as ,beauty and     

,justice4 ,there are also the ,ideal    
,ugliness1 and the ,ideal ,injustice4   
,there are even ,ideas of the positively
 nauseating1 such as hair1 filth1 and   
dirt4 ,this is asserted in the          
,parmenides4 ,in that dialogue ,plato's 
teaching is put into the mouth of       
,parmenides4 ,he questions the young    
,socrates whether there are ,ideas of   
hair1 filth1 and dirt4 ,socrates denies 
that there can be ,ideas of such base   
things4 ,but ,parmenides corrects him1  
and tells him that1 when he has attained
 the highest philosophy1 he will no     
longer despise such things4 ,moreover1  
these ,ideas of base things are just as 
much perfection in their kind as ,beauty
 and ,goodness are in theirs4 ,in       
general1 the principle is that there    
must be an ,idea wherever a concept can 
be formed2 that is1 wherever there is a 
class of many things called by one name4
  ,we saw1 in treating of the ,eleatics1
 that for them the absolute ,being      
contained no not-being1 and the absolute

 ,one no multiplicity4 ,and it was just 
because they denied all not-being and   
multiplicity of the absolute reality    
that they were unable to explain the    
world of existence1 and were forced to  
deny it altogether4 ,the same problem   
arises for ,plato4 ,is ,being absolutely
 excludent of not-being8 ,is the        
,absolute an abstract ,one1 utterly     
exclusive of the many8 ,is his          
philosophy a pure monism8 ,is it a      
pluralism8 ,or is it a combination of   
the two8 ,these questions are discussed 
in the ,sophist and the ,parmenides4    
#aif  ,plato investigates the relations 
of the ,one and the many1 ,being and    
not-being1 quite in the abstract4 ,he   
decides the principles involved1 and    
leaves it to the reader to apply them to
 the theory of ,ideas4 ,whether the     
,absolute is one or many1 ,being or     
not-being1 can be decided independently 
of any particular theory of the nature  
of the ,absolute1 and therefore         
independently of ,plato's own theory1   

which was that the ,absolute consists of
 ,ideas4 ,plato does not accept the     
,eleatic abstraction4 ,the ,one cannot  
be simply one1 for every unity must     
necessarily be a multiplicity4 ,the many
 and the ,one are correlative ideas     
which involve each other4 ,neither is   
thinkable without the other4 ,a ,one    
which is not many is as absurd an       
abstraction as a whole which has no     
parts4 ,for the ,one can only be defined
 as that which is not many1 and the many
 can only be defined as the not-one4    
,the ,one is unthinkable except as      
standing out against a background of the
 many4 ,the idea of the ,one therefore  
involves the idea of the many1 and      
cannot be thought without it4 ,moreover1
 an abstract ,one is unthinkable and    
unknowable1 because all thought and     
knowledge consist in applying predicates
 to subjects1 and all predication       
involves the duality of its subject4    
,consider the simplest affirmation that 
can be made about the ,one1 namely1 ,the

 ,one is4 ,here we have two things1 the 
,one1 and is1 that is to say1 being4    
,the proposition means that the ,one is 
,being4 ,hence the ,one is two4         
,firstly1 it is itself1 ,one4 ,secondly1
 it is ,being1 and the proposition      
affirms that these two things are one4  
,similarly with any other predicate we  
apply to the ,one4 ,whatever we say of  
it involves its duality4 ,thus we find  
that all systems of thought which #aig  
postulate an abstract unity as ultimate 
reality1 such as ,eleaticism1 ,hinduism1
 and the system of ,spinoza1 attempt to 
avoid the difficulty by saying nothing  
positive about the ,one4 ,they apply to 
it only negative predicates1 which tell 
us not what it is1 but what it is not4  
,thus the ,hindus speak of ,brahman as  
formless1 immutable1 imperishable1      
unmoved1 uncreated4 ,but this1 of       
course1 is a futile expedient4 ,in the  
first place1 even a negative predicate  
involves the duality of the subject4    
,and1 in the second place1 a negative   

predicate is always1 by implication1 a  
positive one4 ,you cannot have a        
negative without a positive4 ,to deny   
one thing is to affirm its opposite4 ,to
 deny motion of the ,one1 by calling it 
the unmoved1 is to affirm rest of it4   
,thus a ,one which is not also a many is
 unthinkable4 ,similarly1 the idea of   
the many is inconceivable without the   
idea of the ,one4 ,for the many is many 
ones4 ,hence the ,one and the many      
cannot be separated in the ,eleatic     
manner4 ,every unity must be a unity of 
the many4 ,and every many is ipso facto 
a unity1 since we think the many in one 
idea1 and1 if we did not1 we should not 
even know that it is a many4 ,the       
,absolute must therefore be neither an  
abstract ,one1 nor an abstract many4 ,it
 must be a many in one4  ,similarly1    
,being cannot totally exclude not-being4
 ,they are1 just as much as the ,one and
 the many1 correlatives1 which mutually 
involve each other4 ,the being of       
anything is the not-being of its        

opposite4 ,the being of light is the    
not-being of darkness4 ,all being1      
therefore1 has not-being in it4  ,let us
 apply these principles to the theory of
 ,ideas4 ,the absolute reality1 the     
world of ,ideas1 is many1 since #aih    
there are many ,ideas1 but it is one1   
because the ,ideas are not isolated     
units1 but members of a single organized
 system4 ,there is1 in fact1 a hierarchy
 of ,ideas4 ,just as the one ,idea      
presides over many individual things of 
which it is the common element1 so one  
higher ,idea presides over many lower   
,ideas1 and is the common element in    
them4 ,and over this higher ,idea1      
together with many others1 a still      
higher ,idea will rule4 ,for example1   
the ,ideas of whiteness1 redness1       
blueness1 are all subsumed under the one
 ,idea of colour4 ,the ,ideas of        
sweetness and bitterness come under the 
one ,idea of taste4 ,but the ,ideas of  
colour and taste themselves stand under 
the still higher ,idea of quality4 ,in  

this way1 the ,ideas form1 as it were1 a
 pyramid1 and to this pyramid there must
 be an apex4 ,there must be one highest 
,idea1 which is supreme over all the    
others4 ,this ,idea will be the one     
final and absolutely real ,being which  
is the ultimate ground1 of itself1 of   
the other ,ideas1 and of the entire     
universe4 ,this ,idea is1 ,plato tells  
us1 the ,idea of the ,good4 ,we have    
seen that the world of ,ideas is many1  
and we now see that it is one4 ,for it  
is one single system culminating in one 
supreme ,idea1 which is the highest     
expression of its unity4 ,moreover1 each
 separate ,idea is1 in the same way1 a  
many in one4 ,it is one in regard to    
itself4 ,that is to say1 if we ignore   
its relations to other ,ideas1 it is1 in
 itself1 single4 ,but as it has also    
many relations to other ,ideas1 it is1  
in this way1 a multiplicity4  ,every    
,idea is likewise a ,being which        
contains not-being4 ,for each ,idea     
combines with some ,ideas and not with  

others4 ,thus the ,idea of corporeal    
body combines both with the ,idea of    
rest and that of motion4 #aii ,but the  
,ideas of rest and motion will not      
combine with each other4 ,the ,idea of  
rest1 therefore1 is ,being in regard to 
itself1 not-being in regard to the ,idea
 of motion1 for the being of rest is the
 not-being of motion4 ,all ,ideas are   
,being in regard to themselves1 and     
not-being in regard to all those other  
,ideas with which they do not combine4  
,in this way there arises a science of  
,ideas which is called dialectic4 ,this 
word is sometimes used as identical with
 the phrase1 theory of ,ideas4 ,but it  
is also used1 in a narrower sense1 to   
mean the science which has to do with   
the knowledge of which ,ideas will      
combine and which not4 ,dialectic is the
 correct joining and disjoining of      
,ideas4 ,it is the knowledge of the     
relations of all the ,ideas to each     
other4  ,the attainment of this         
knowledge is1 in ,plato's opinion1 the  

chief problem of philosophy4 ,to know   
all the ,ideas1 each in itself and in   
its relations to other ,ideas1 is the   
supreme task4 ,this involves two steps4 
,the first is the formation of concepts4
 ,its object is to know each ,idea      
separately1 and its procedure is by     
inductive reason to find the common     
element in which the many individual    
objects participate4 ,the second step   
consists in the knowledge of the        
inter-relation of ,ideas1 and involves  
the two processes of classification and 
division4 ,classification and division  
both have for their object to arrange   
the lower ,ideas under the proper higher
 ,ideas1 but they do this in opposite   
ways4 ,one may begin with the lower     
,ideas1 such as redness1 whiteness1     
etc41 and range them under their higher 
,idea1 that of colour4 ,this is         
classification4 ,or one may begin with  
the higher ,idea1 colour1 and divide it 
into the lower ,ideas1 red1 white1 #bjj 
etc4 ,classification proceeds from below

 upwards4 ,division proceeds from above 
downwards4 ,most of the examples of     
division which ,plato gives are         
divisions by dichotomy4 ,we may either  
divide colour straight away into red1   
blue1 white1 etc42 or we may divide each
 class into two sub-classes4 ,thus      
colour will be divided into red and     
not-red1 not-red into white and         
not-white1 not-white into blue and      
not-blue1 and so on4 ,this latter       
process is division by dichotomy1 and   
,plato prefers it because1 though it is 
tedious1 it is very exhaustive and      
systematic4  ,plato's actual performance
 of the supreme task of dialectic1 the  
classification and arrangement of all   
,ideas1 is not great4 ,he has made no   
attempt to complete it4 ,all he has done
 is to give us numerous examples4 ,and  
this is1 in reality1 all that can be    
expected1 for the number of ,ideas is   
obviously infinite1 and therefore the   
task of arranging them cannot be        
completed4 ,there is1 however1 one      

important defect in the dialectic1 which
 ,plato ought certainly to have         
remedied4 ,the supreme ,idea1 he tells  
us1 is the ,good4 ,this1 as being the   
ultimate reality1 is the ground of all  
other ,ideas4 ,plato ought therefore to 
have derived all other ,ideas from it1  
but this he has not done4 ,he merely    
asserts1 in a more or less dogmatic way1
 that the ,idea of the ,good is the     
highest1 but does nothing to connect it 
with the other ,ideas4 ,it is easy to   
see1 however1 why he made this          
assertion4 ,it is1 in fact1 a necessary 
logical outcome of his system4 ,for     
every ,idea is perfection in its kind4  
,all the ,ideas have perfection in      
common4 ,and just as the one beauty is  
the ,idea which presides over all       
beautiful things1 so the one perfection 
must be the supreme ,idea which presides
 #bja over all the perfect ,ideas4 ,the 
supreme ,idea1 therefore1 must be       
perfection itself1 that is to say1 the  
,idea of the ,good4 ,on the other hand  

it might1 with equal force1 be argued   
that since all the ,ideas are           
substances1 therefore the highest ,idea 
is the ,idea of substance4 ,all that can
 be said is that ,plato has left these  
matters in obscurity1 and has merely    
asserted that the highest ,idea is the  
,good4  ,consideration of the ,idea of  
the ,good leads us naturally to enquire 
how far ,plato's system is teleological 
in character4 ,a little consideration   
will show that it is out and out        
teleological4 ,we can see this both by  
studying the many lower ,ideas1 and the 
one supreme ,idea4 ,each ,idea is       
perfection of its kind4 ,and each ,idea 
is the ground of the existence of the   
individual objects which come under it4 
,thus the explanation of white objects  
is the perfect whiteness1 of beautiful  
objects the perfect beauty4 ,or we may  
take as our example the ,idea of the    
,state which ,plato describes in the    
,republic4 ,the ordinary view is that   
,plato was describing a ,state which was

 the invention of his own fancy1 and is 
therefore to be regarded as entirely    
unreal4 ,this is completely to          
misunderstand ,plato4 ,so far was he    
from thinking the ideal ,state unreal1  
that he regarded it1 on the contrary1 as
 the only real ,state4 ,all existent    
,states1 such as the ,athenian or the   
,spartan1 are unreal in so far as they  
differ from the ideal ,state4 ,and      
moreover1 this one reality1 the ideal   
,state1 is the ground of the existence  
of all actual ,states4 ,they owe their  
existence to its reality4 ,their        
existence can only be explained by it4  
,now since the ideal ,state is not yet  
reached in fact1 but is the perfect     
,state towards which all actual ,states 
tend1 it is clear that we have here #bjb
 a teleological principle4 ,the real    
explanation of the ,state is not to be  
found in its beginnings in history1 in  
an original contract1 or in biological  
necessities1 but in its end1 the final  
or perfect ,state4 ,or1 if we prefer to 

put it so2 the true beginning is the    
end4 ,the end must be in the beginning1 
potentially and ideally1 otherwise it   
could never begin3 ,it is the same with 
all other things4 ,man is explained by  
the ideal man1 the perfect man2 white   
things by the perfect whiteness1 and so 
on4 ,everything is explained by its end1
 and not by its beginning4 ,things are  
not explained by mechanical causes1 but 
by reasons4  ,and the teleology of      
,plato culminates in the ,idea of the   
,good4 ,that ,idea is the final         
explanation of all other ,ideas1 and of 
the entire universe4 ,and to place the  
final ground of all things in perfection
 itself means that the universe arises  
out of that perfect end towards which   
all things move4  ,another matter which 
requires elucidation here is the place  
which the conception of ,god holds in   
,plato's system4 ,he frequently uses the
 word ,god both in the singular and the 
plural1 and seems to slip with          
remarkable ease from the monotheistic to

 the polytheistic manner of speaking4   
,in addition to the many gods1 we have  
frequent reference to the one supreme   
,creator1 controller1 and ruler of the  
world1 who is further conceived as a    
,being providentially watching over the 
lives of men4 ,but in what relation does
 this supreme ,god stand to the ,ideas1 
and especially to the ,idea of the      
,good8 ,if ,god is separate from the    
highest ,idea1 then1 as ,zeller points  
out1 ,footnote #ac only three relations 
are possible1 all of which are #bjc     
equally objectionable4 ,firstly1 ,god   
may be the cause or ground of the ,idea 
of the ,good4 ,but this destroys the    
substantiality of the ,idea1 and indeed1
 destroys ,plato's whole system4 ,the   
very essence of his philosophy is that  
the ,idea is the ultimate reality1 which
 is self-existent1 and owes its being to
 nothing else4 ,but this theory makes it
 a mere creature of ,god1 dependent on  
,him for its existence4 ,secondly1 ,god 
may owe ,his being to the ,idea4 ,the   

,idea may be the ground of ,god's       
existence as it is the ground of all    
else in the universe4 ,but this theory  
does violence to the idea of ,god1      
turning ,him into a mere derivative     
existence1 and1 in fact1 into an        
appearance4 ,thirdly1 ,god and the ,idea
 may be co-ordinate in the system as    
equally primordial independent ultimate 
realities4 ,but this means that ,plato  
has given two mutually inconsistent     
accounts of the ultimate reality1 or1 if
 not1 that his system is a hopeless     
dualism4 ,as none of these theories can 
be maintained1 it must be supposed that 
,god is identical with the ,idea of the 
,good1 and we find certain expressions  
in the ,philebus which seem clearly to  
assert this4 ,but in that case ,god is  
not a personal ,god at all1 since the   
,idea is not a person4 ,the word ,god1  
if used in this way1 is merely a        
figurative term for the ,idea4 ,and this
 is the most probable theory1 if we     
reflect that there is in fact no room   

for a personal ,god in a system which   
places all reality in the ,idea1 and    
that to introduce such a conception     
threatens to break up the whole system4 
,plato probably found it useful to take 
the popular conceptions about the       
personality of ,god or the gods and use 
them1 in mythical fashion1 to express   
his ,ideas4 ,those parts of ,plato which
 speak of ,god1 and the governance of   
,god1 #bjd are to be interpreted on the 
same principles as the other ,platonic  
myths4  ,footnote #ac3 ,plato and the   
,older ,academy1 chap4 vi4  ,before     
closing our discussion of dialectic1 it 
may be well to consider what place it   
occupies in the life of man1 and what   
importance is attached to it4 ,here     
,plato's answer is emphatic4 ,dialectic 
is the crown of knowledge1 and knowledge
 is the crown of life4 ,all other       
spiritual activities have value only in 
so far as they lead up to the knowledge 
of the ,idea4 ,all other subjects of    
intellectual study are merely           

preparatory to the study of philosophy4 
,the special sciences have no value in  
themselves1 but they have value inasmuch
 as their definitions and               
classifications form a preparation for  
the knowledge of ,ideas4 ,mathematics is
 important because it is a              
stepping-stone from the world of sense  
to the ,ideas4 ,its objects1 namely1    
numbers and geometrical figures1        
resemble the ,ideas in so far as they   
are immutable1 and they resemble        
sense-objects in so far as they are in  
space or time4 ,in the educational      
curriculum of ,plato1 philosophy comes  
last4 ,not everyone may study it4 ,and  
none may study it till he has been      
through all the preparatory stages of   
education1 which form a rigorous        
discipline of the mind before it finally
 enters upon dialectic4 ,thus all       
knowledge ends in dialectic1 and that   
life has not attained its end which     
falls short of philosophy4  ,perhaps the
 most striking illustration of the      

subordination of all spiritual          
activities to philosophy is to be found 
in the doctrine of ,eros1 or ,love4 ,the
 phrase platonic love is on the lips of 
many1 but1 as a rule1 something very    
different from ,plato's own doctrine is 
meant4 ,according to him1 love is always
 concerned with beauty1 and his teaching
 on the subject is expounded #bje       
chiefly in the ,symposium1 ,he believed 
that before birth the soul dwelt        
disembodied in the pure contemplation of
 the world of ,ideas4 ,sinking down into
 a body1 becoming immersed in the world 
of sense1 it forgets the ,ideas4 ,the   
sight of a beautiful object reminds it  
of that one ,idea of beauty of which the
 object is a copy4 ,this accounts for   
the mystic rapture1 the emotion1 the    
joy1 with which we greet the sight of   
the beautiful4 ,since ,plato had        
expressly declared that there are ,ideas
 of the ugly as well as of the          
beautiful1 that there are ,ideas1 for   
example1 of hair1 filth1 and dirt1 and  

since these ,ideas are just as divine   
and perfect as the ,idea of the         
beautiful1 we ought1 on this theory1 to 
greet the ugly1 the filthy1 and the     
nauseating1 with a ravishment of joy    
similar to that which we experience in  
the presence of beauty4 ,why this is not
 the case ,plato omitted to explain4    
,however1 having learned to love the one
 beautiful object1 the soul passes on to
 the love of others4 ,then it perceives 
that it is the same beauty which reveals
 itself in all these4 ,it passes from   
the love of beautiful forms to the love 
of beautiful souls1 and from that to the
 love of beautiful sciences4 ,it ceases 
to be attached to the many objects1 as  
such1 that is to say1 to the sensuous   
envelopes of the ,idea of beauty4 ,love 
passes into the knowledge of the ,idea  
of beauty itself1 and from this to the  
knowledge of the world of ,ideas in     
general4 ,it passes in fact into        
philosophy4  ,in this development there 
are two points which we cannot fail to  

note4 ,in the first place1 emotional    
love is explained as being simply the   
blind groping of reason towards the     
,idea4 ,it is reason which has not yet  
recognized itself as such4 ,it appears1 
therefore1 in the #bjf guise of feeling4
 ,secondly1 the later progress of the   
soul's love is simply the gradual       
recognition of itself by reason4 ,when  
the soul perceives that the beauty in   
all objects is the same1 that it is the 
common element amid the many1 this is   
nothing but the process of inductive    
reasoning4 ,and this development ends at
 last in the complete rational cognition
 of the world of ,ideas1 in a word1     
philosophy4 ,love is but an instinctive 
reason4 ,the animal has no feeling of   
the beautiful1 just because it has no   
reason4 ,love of the beautiful is       
founded upon the nature of man1 not as a
 percipient or feeling being1 but as a  
rational being4 ,and it must end in the 
complete recognition of reason by       
itself1 not in the feeling and          

intuition1 but in the rational          
comprehension1 of the ,idea4  ,one can  
imagine what ,plato's answer would be to
 the sort of vulgarians and philistines 
who want to know what the use of        
philosophy is1 and in what way it is    
practical4 ,to answer such a question is
 for ,plato impossible1 because the     
question itself is illegitimate4 ,for a 
thing to have a use involves that it is 
a means towards an end4 ,fire has use1  
because it may be made a means towards  
the cooking of food4 ,money is useful1  
because it is a means to the acquisition
 of goods4 ,that which is an end in     
itself1 and not a means towards any     
further end1 cannot possibly have any   
use4 ,to suggest that philosophy ought  
to have use is1 therefore1 to put the   
cart before the horse1 to invert the    
whole scale of values4 ,it suggests that
 philosophy is a means towards some     
further end1 instead of being the       
absolute end to which all other things  
are means4 ,philosophy is not for       

anything4 ,everything else is for it4   
,and1 if this seems an exaggerated or   
unpractical view1 we may at least #bjg  
remember that this is the view taken by 
the religious consciousness of man4     
,religion makes the supreme end of life 
the knowledge of1 and communion with1   
,god4 ,god is for religion what the     
,idea is for philosophy4 ,god is a      
figurative name for the ,idea4 ,to place
 the end of life in the knowledge of the
 ,absolute1 or the ,idea1 is therefore  
the teaching both of philosophy and     
religion4    #d4 ,physics1 or the       
,theory of ,existence4  ,dialectic is   
the theory of reality1 physics the      
theory of existence1 dialectic of that  
which lies behind things as their       
ground1 physics of the things which are 
thus grounded4 ,that is to say1 physics 
is concerned with phenomena and         
appearances1 things which exist in space
 and time1 as opposed to the timeless   
and non-spatial ,ideas4 ,things of this 
kind are both corporeal and incorporeal4

 ,physics falls therefore into two      
parts1 the doctrine of the outward      
corporeality1 the world1 with its       
incorporeal essence1 the ,world-,soul1  
and the doctrine of the incorporeal soul
 of man4    7a7 ,the ,doctrine of the   
,world4  ,if1 in the dialectic1 ,plato  
has given an account of the nature of   
the first principle and ground of all   
things1 the problem now arises of       
explaining how the actual universe of   
things arises out of that ground1 how it
 is derived from the first principle4   
,in other words1 the ,ideas being the   
absolute reality1 how does the world of 
sense1 and1 in general1 the existent    
universe1 arise out of the ,ideas8      
,faced with this problem1 the system of 
,plato broke down4 ,the things of sense 
are1 we are told1 copies or imitations  
of the ,ideas4 #bjh ,they participate in
 the ,ideas4 ,so far1 so good4 ,but why 
should there be any copies of the       
,ideas8 ,why should the ,ideas give rise
 to copies of themselves1 and how is the

 production of these copies effected8   
,to these questions ,plato has no       
answer1 and he therefore has recourse to
 the use of myths4 ,poetic description  
here takes the place of scientific      
explanation4  ,this poetic description  
of the origin of the world is to be     
found in the ,timaeus4 ,we have seen    
that the ,ideas are absolute ,being1 and
 that things of sense are half real and 
half unreal4 ,they are partly real      
because they participate in ,being4     
,they are partly unreal because they    
participate in not-being4 ,there must   
be1 therefore1 a principle of absolute  
not-being4 ,this1 in ,plato's opinion1  
is matter4 ,things of sense are copies  
of the ,ideas fashioned out of1 or      
stamped upon1 matter4 ,but ,plato does  
not understand by matter what we1 in    
modern times1 understand by it4 ,matter1
 in our sense1 is always some particular
 kind of matter4 ,it is brass1 or wood1 
or iron1 or stone4 ,it is matter which  
has determinate character and quality4  

,but the possession of specific         
character means that it is matter with  
the copy of ,ideas already stamped upon 
it4 ,since iron exists in great         
quantities in the world1 and there is a 
common element in all the various pieces
 of iron1 by virtue of which all are    
classed together1 there must be a       
concept of iron4 ,there is1 therefore1  
an ,idea of iron in the world of ,ideas4
 ,and the iron which we find in the     
earth must be matter which is already   
formed into a copy of this ,idea4 ,it   
participates in the ,idea of iron4 ,the 
same remarks apply to any other         
particular kind of matter4 ,in fact1 all
 form1 all the specific characters and  
#bji features of matter1 as we know it1 
are due to the operation of the ,ideas4 
,hence matter as it is in itself1 before
 the image of the ,ideas is stamped upon
 it1 must be absolutely without quality1
 featureless1 formless4 ,but to be      
absolutely without any quality is to be 
simply nothing at all4 ,this matter is1 

therefore1 as ,plato says1 absolute     
not-being4 ,zeller conjectures1 probably
 rightly1 that what ,plato meant was    
simply empty space4 ,footnote #ad ,empty
 space is an existent not-being1 and it 
is totally indeterminate and formless4  
,it accords with this view that ,plato  
adopted the ,pythagorean tenet that the 
differential qualities of material      
substances are due to their smallest    
particles being regular geometrical     
figures limited out of the unlimited1   
that is1 out of space4 ,thus earth is   
composed of cubes4 ,that is to say1     
empty space when bound into cubes 7the  
limiting of the unlimited7 becomes      
earth4 ,the smallest particles of fire  
are tetrahedra1 of air octahedra1 of    
water icosahedra4  ,footnote #ad3 ,plato
 and the ,older ,academy1 chap4 vii4    
,we have1 then1 on the one hand1 the    
world of ,ideas1 on the other1 matter1  
an absolutely formless1 chaotic1 mass4  
,by impressing the images of the ,ideas 
upon this mass1 things arise1 that is to

 say1 the specific objects of sense4    
,they thus participate both in ,being   
and in not-being4 ,but how is this      
mixing of ,being and not-being brought  
about8 ,how do the ,ideas come to have  
their images stamped upon matter8 ,it is
 at this point that we enter upon the   
region of myth4 ,up to this point ,plato
 is certainly to be taken literally4 ,he
 of course believed in the reality of   
the world of ,ideas1 and he no doubt    
also believed in his principle of       
matter4 ,and he thought that the objects
 of sense are to be #baj explained as   
copies of the ,ideas impressed upon     
matter4 ,but now1 with the problem how  
this copying is brought about1 ,plato   
leaves the method of scientific         
explanation behind4 ,if the ,ideas are  
the absolute ground of all things1 then 
the copying process must be done by the 
,ideas themselves4 ,they must themselves
 be made the principles for the         
production of things4 ,but this is1 for 
,plato1 impossible4 ,for production     

involves change4 ,if the ,ideas produce 
things out of themselves1 the ,ideas    
must in the process undergo change4 ,but
 ,plato has declared them to be         
absolutely unchangeable1 and to be thus 
immutable is to be sterile4 ,hence the  
,ideas have within themselves no        
principle for the production of things1 
and the scientific explanation of things
 by this means becomes impossible4      
,hence there is nothing for it but to   
have recourse to myth4 ,plato can only  
imagine that things are produced by a   
world-former1 or designer1 who1 like a  
human artist1 fashions the plastic      
matter into images of the ,ideas4  ,god1
 the ,creator1 the world-designer1 finds
 beside him1 on the one hand1 the       
,ideas1 on the other1 formless matter4  
,first1 he creates the ,world-,soul4    
,this is incorporeal1 but occupies      
space4 ,he spreads it out like a huge   
net in empty space4 ,he bisects it1 and 
bends the two halves into an inner and  
an outer circle1 these circles being    

destined to become the spheres of the   
planets and the stars respectively4 ,he 
takes matter and binds it into the four 
elements1 and these elements he builds  
into the empty framework of the         
,world-,soul4 ,when this is done1 the   
creation of the universe is complete4   
,the rest of the ,timaeus is occupied   
with the details of ,plato's ideas of   
astronomy and physical #baa science4    
,these are mostly worthless and tedious1
 and we need not pursue them here4 ,but 
we may mention that ,plato1 of course1  
regarded the earth as the centre of the 
world4 ,the stars1 which are divine     
beings1 revolve around it4 ,they        
necessarily move in circles1 because the
 circle is the perfect figure4 ,the     
stars1 being divine1 are governed solely
 by reason1 and their movement must     
therefore be circular1 because a        
circular motion is the motion of reason4
  ,the above account of the origin of   
the world is merely myth1 and ,plato    
knows that it is myth4 ,what he         

apparently did believe in1 however1 was 
the existence of the ,world-,soul1 and a
 few words upon this subject are        
necessary4 ,the soul1 in ,plato's       
system1 is the mediator between the     
world of ,ideas and the world of sense4 
,like the former1 it is incorporeal and 
immortal4 ,like the latter1 it occupies 
space4 ,plato thought that there must be
 a soul in the world to account for the 
rational behaviour of things1 and to    
explain motion4 ,the reason which       
governs and directs the world dwells in 
the ,world-,soul4 ,and the ,world-,soul 
is the cause of motion in the outer     
universe1 just as the human soul is the 
cause of the motions of the human body4 
,the cosmos is a living being4    7b7   
,the ,doctrine of the ,human ,soul4     
,the human soul is similar in kind to   
the ,world-,soul4 ,it is the cause of   
the body's movements1 and in it the     
human reason dwells4 ,it has affinities 
both with the world of ,ideas and the   
world of sense4 ,it is divided into two 

parts1 of which one part is again       
subdivided into two4 ,the highest part  
is reason1 which is #bab that part of   
the soul which apprehends the ,ideas4   
,it is simple and indivisible4 ,now all 
destruction of things means the         
sundering of their parts4 ,but the      
rational part of the soul1 being simple1
 has no parts4 ,therefore it is         
indestructible and immortal4 ,the       
irrational part of the soul is mortal1  
and is subdivided into a noble and an   
ignoble half4 ,to the noble half belong 
courage1 love of honour1 and in general 
the nobler emotions4 ,to the ignoble    
portion belong the sensuous appetites4  
,the noble half has a certain affinity  
with reason1 in that it has an instinct 
for what is noble and great4            
,nevertheless1 this is mere instinct1   
and is not rational4 ,the seat of reason
 is the head1 of the noble half of the  
lower soul1 the breast1 of the ignoble  
half1 the lower part of the body4 ,man  
alone possesses the three parts of the  

soul4 ,animals possess the two lower    
parts1 plants only the appetitive soul4 
,what distinguishes man from the lower  
orders of creation is thus that he alone
 possesses reason4  ,plato connects the 
doctrine of the immortality of the      
rational soul with the theory of ,ideas 
by means of the doctrines of            
recollection and transmigration4        
,according to the former doctrine1 all  
knowledge is recollection of what was   
experienced by the soul in its          
disembodied state before birth4 ,it must
 carefully be noted1 however1 that the  
word knowledge is here used in the      
special and restricted sense of ,plato4 
,not everything that we should call     
knowledge is recollection4 ,the sensuous
 element in my perception that this     
paper is white is not recollection1     
since1 as being merely sensuous1 it is  
not1 in ,plato's opinion1 to be called  
knowledge4 ,here1 as elsewhere1 he      
confines the term #bac to rational      
knowledge1 that is to say1 knowledge of 

the ,ideas1 though it is doubtful       
whether he is wholly consistent with    
himself in the matter1 especially in    
regard to mathematical knowledge4 ,it   
must also be noted that this doctrine   
has nothing in common with the ,oriental
 doctrine of the memory of our past     
lives upon the earth4 ,an example of    
this is found in the ,buddhist ,jatakas1
 where the ,buddha relates from memory  
many things that happened to him in the 
body in his previous births4 ,plato's   
doctrine is quite different4 ,it refers 
only to recollection of the experiences 
of the soul in its disembodied state in 
the world of ,ideas4  ,the reasons      
assigned by ,plato for believing in this
 doctrine may be reduced to two4        
,firstly1 knowledge of the ,ideas cannot
 be derived from the senses1 because the
 ,idea is never pure in its sensuous    
manifestation1 but always mixed4 ,the   
one beauty1 for example1 is only found  
in experience mixed with the ugly4 ,the 
second reason is more striking4 ,and1 if

 the doctrine of recollection is itself 
fantastic1 this1 the chief reason upon  
which ,plato bases it1 is interesting   
and important4 ,he pointed out that     
mathematical knowledge seems to be      
innate in the mind4 ,it is neither      
imparted to us by instruction1 nor is it
 gained from experience4 ,plato1 in     
fact1 came within an ace of discovering 
what1 in modern times1 is called the    
distinction between necessary and       
contingent knowledge1 a distinction     
which was made by ,kant the basis of    
most far-reaching developments in       
philosophy4 ,the character of necessity 
attaches to rational knowledge1 but not 
to sensuous4 ,to explain this           
distinction1 we may take as our example 
of rational knowledge such a proposition
 as that two #bad and two make four4    
,this does not mean merely that1 as a   
matter of fact1 every two objects and   
every other two objects1 with which we  
have tried the experiment1 make four4   
,it is not merely a fact1 it is a       

necessity4 ,it is not merely that two   
and two do make four1 but that they must
 make four4 ,it is inconceivable that   
they should not4 ,we have not got to go 
and see whether1 in each new case1 they 
do so4 ,we know beforehand that they    
will1 because they must4 ,it is quite   
otherwise with such a proposition as1   
gold is yellow4 ,there is no necessity  
about it4 ,it is merely a fact4 ,for all
 anybody can see to the contrary it     
might just as well be blue4 ,there is   
nothing inconceivable about its being   
blue1 as there is about two and two     
making five4 ,of course1 that gold is   
yellow is no doubt a mechanical         
necessity1 that is1 it is determined by 
causes1 and in that sense could not be  
otherwise4 ,but it is not a logical     
necessity4 ,it is not a logical         
contradiction to imagine blue gold1 as  
it would be to imagine two and two      
making five4 ,any other proposition in  
mathematics possesses the same          
necessity4 ,that the angles at the base 

of an isosceles triangle are equal is a 
necessary proposition4 ,it could not be 
otherwise without contradiction4 ,its   
opposite is unthinkable4 ,but that      
,socrates is standing is not a necessary
 truth4 ,he might just as well be       
sitting4  ,since a mathematical         
proposition is necessarily true1 its    
truth is known without verification by  
experience4 ,having proved the          
proposition about the isosceles         
triangle1 we do not go about measuring  
the angles of triangular objects to make
 sure there is no exception4 ,we know it
 without any experience at all4 ,and if 
we #bae were sufficiently clever1 we    
might even evolve mathematical knowledge
 out of the resources of our own minds1 
without its being told us by any        
teacher4 ,that ,caesar was stabbed by   
,brutus is a fact which no amount of    
cleverness could ever reveal to me4     
,this information ,i can only get by    
being told it4 ,but that the base angles
 of an isosceles triangle are equal ,i  

could discover by merely thinking about 
it4 ,the proposition about ,brutus is   
not a necessary proposition4 ,it might  
be otherwise4 ,and therefore ,i must be 
told whether it is true or not4 ,but the
 proposition about the isosceles        
triangle is necessary1 and therefore ,i 
can see that it must be true without    
being told4  ,now ,plato did not clearly
 make this distinction between necessary
 and non-necessary knowledge4 ,but what 
he did perceive was that mathematical   
knowledge can be known without either   
experience or instruction4 ,kant        
afterwards gave a less fantastic        
explanation of these facts4 ,but ,plato 
concluded that such knowledge must be   
already present in the mind at birth4   
,it must be recollected from a previous 
existence4 ,it might be answered that1  
though this kind of knowledge is not    
gained from the experience of the       
senses1 it may be gained from teaching4 
,it may be imparted by another mind4 ,we
 have to teach children mathematics1    

which we should not have to do if it    
were already in their minds4 ,but       
,plato's answer is that when the teacher
 explains a geometrical theorem to the  
child1 directly the child understands   
what is meant1 he assents4 ,he sees it  
for himself4 ,but if the teacher        
explains that ,lisbon is on the ,tagus1 
the child cannot see that this is true  
for himself4 ,he must either believe the
 word #baf of the teacher1 or he must go
 and see4 ,in this case1 therefore1 the 
knowledge is really imparted from one   
mind to another4 ,the teacher transfers 
to the child knowledge which the child  
does not possess4 ,but the mathematical 
theorem is already present in the       
child's mind1 and the process of        
teaching merely consists in making him  
see what he already potentially knows4  
,he has only to look into his own mind  
to find it4 ,this is what we mean by    
saying that the child sees it for       
himself4  ,in the ,meno ,plato attempts 
to give an experimental proof of the    

doctrine of recollection4 ,socrates is  
represented as talking to a slave-boy1  
who admittedly has no education in      
mathematics1 and barely knows what a    
square is4 ,by dint of skilful          
questioning ,socrates elicits from the  
boy's mind a theorem about the          
properties of the square4 ,the point of 
the argument is that ,socrates tells him
 nothing at all4 ,he imparts no         
information4 ,he only asks questions4   
,the boy's knowledge of the theorem1    
therefore1 is not due to the teaching of
 ,socrates1 nor is it due to experience4
 ,it can only be recollection4 ,but if  
knowledge is recollection1 it may be    
asked1 why is it that we do not remember
 at once8 ,why is the tedious process of
 education in mathematics necessary8    
,because the soul1 descending from the  
world of ,ideas into the body1 has its  
knowledge dulled and almost blotted out 
by its immersion in the sensuous4 ,it   
has forgotten1 or it has only the       
dimmest and faintest recollection4 ,it  

has to be reminded1 and it takes a great
 effort to bring the half-lost ideas    
back to the mind4 ,this process of being
 reminded is education4  ,with this1 of 
course1 is connected the doctrine of    
#bag transmigration1 which ,plato took1 
no doubt1 from the ,pythagoreans4 ,most 
of the details of ,plato's doctrine of  
transmigration are mere myth4 ,plato    
does not mean them seriously1 as is     
shown by the fact that he gives quite   
different and inconsistent accounts of  
these details in different dialogues4   
,what1 in all probability1 he did       
believe1 however1 may be summarized as  
follows4 ,the soul is pre-existent as   
well as immortal4 ,its natural home is  
the world of ,ideas1 where at first it  
existed1 without a body1 in the pure and
 blissful contemplation of ,ideas4 ,but 
because it has affinities with the world
 of sense1 it sinks down into a body4   
,after death1 if a man has lived a good 
life1 and especially if he has          
cultivated the knowledge of ,ideas1     

philosophy1 the soul returns to its     
blissful abode in the world of ,ideas1  
till1 after a long period it again      
returns to earth in a body4 ,those who  
do evil suffer after death severe       
penalties1 and are then reincarnated in 
the body of some being lower than       
themselves4 ,a man may become a woman4  
,men may even1 if their lives have been 
utterly sensual1 pass into the bodies of
 animals4    #e4 ,ethics  7a7 ,the      
,ethics of the ,individual  ,just as    
,plato's theory of knowledge begins with
 a negative portion1 designed to refute 
false theories of what truth is1 so does
 his theory of morals begin with a      
negative portion1 intended to refute    
false theories of what virtue is4 ,these
 two negative departments of ,plato's   
philosophy correspond in every way4 ,as 
he was then engaged in showing that     
knowledge is not perception1 as         
,protagoras thought1 so he now urges    
that #bah virtue is not the same as     
pleasure4 ,and as knowledge is not mere 

right opinion1 neither is virtue mere   
right action4 ,the propositions that    
knowledge is perception1 and that virtue
 is pleasure1 are indeed only the same  
principle applied to different spheres  
of thought4 ,for the ,sophists whatever 
appeared true to the individual was true
 for that individual4 ,this is the same 
as saying that knowledge is perception4 
,for the ,sophists1 again1 whatever     
appeared right to the individual was    
right for that individual4 ,this is the 
same as saying that it is right for each
 man to do whatever he pleases4 ,virtue 
is defined as the pleasure of the       
individual4 ,this consequence of the    
,sophistic principles was drawn both by 
many of the ,sophists themselves1 and   
later by the ,cyrenaics4  ,as these two 
propositions are thus in fact only one  
principle1 what ,plato has said in      
refutation of the former provides also  
his refutation of the latter4 ,the      
theory that virtue is pleasure has the  
same destructive influence upon morals  

as the theory that knowledge is         
perception had upon truth4 ,we may thus 
shortly summarize ,plato's arguments4   
7#a7 ,as the ,sophistic theory of truth 
destroys the objectivity of truth1 so   
the doctrine that virtue is the pleasure
 of the individual destroys the         
objectivity of the good4 ,nothing is    
good in itself4 ,things are only good   
for me or for you4 ,there results an    
absolute moral relativity1 in which the 
idea of an objective standard of        
goodness totally disappears4  7#b7 ,this
 theory destroys the distinction between
 good and evil4 ,since the good is      
whatever the individual pleases1 and    
since the pleasure of one individual is 
the #bai displeasure of another1 the    
same thing is both good and evil at the 
same time1 good for one person and evil 
for another4 ,good and evil are         
therefore not distinct4 ,they are the   
same4  7#c7 ,pleasure is the            
satisfaction of our desires4 ,desires   
are merely feelings4 ,this theory1      

therefore1 founds morality upon feeling4
 ,but an objective morality cannot be   
founded upon what is peculiar to        
individuals4 ,if the moral code is to be
 a law binding upon all men1 it can only
 be founded upon that which is common to
 all men1 the universal reason4  7#d7   
,the end of moral activity must fall    
within1 and not outside1 the moral act  
itself4 ,morality must have an          
intrinsic1 not a merely extrinsic1      
value4 ,we must not do right for the    
sake of something else4 ,we must do     
right because it is right1 and thus make
 virtue an end in itself4 ,but the      
,sophistic theory places the end of     
morality outside morality4 ,we are to do
 right1 not for its own sake1 but for   
the sake of pleasure4 ,morality is thus 
not an end in itself1 but merely a means
 towards a further end4  ,virtue1       
therefore1 is not pleasure1 any more    
than knowledge is perception4 ,likewise1
 just as knowledge is not right opinion1
 so virtue is not right action4 ,right  

opinion may be held upon wrong grounds1 
and right action may be performed on    
wrong grounds4 ,for true virtue we must 
not only know what is right1 but why it 
is right4 ,true virtue is thus right    
action proceeding from a rational       
comprehension of true values4 ,hence    
there arises in ,plato's philosophy a   
distinction between philosophic virtue  
and customary virtue4 ,philosophic      
virtue is founded upon reason1 and      
understands the #bbj principle on which 
it acts4 ,it is1 in fact1 action        
governed by principles4 ,customary      
virtue is right action proceeding from  
any other grounds1 such as custom1      
habit1 tradition1 good impulses1        
benevolent feelings1 instinctive        
goodness4 ,men do right merely because  
other people do it1 because it is       
customary1 and they do it without       
understanding the reasons for it4 ,this 
is the virtue of the ordinary honest    
citizen1 the respectable person4 ,it is 
the virtue of bees and ants1 who act as 

if rationally1 but without any          
understanding of what they are doing4   
,and ,plato observes--no doubt with an  
intentional spice of humour--that such  
people may in the next life find        
themselves born as bees and ants4 ,plato
 denies philosophic virtue not only to  
the masses of men1 but even to the best 
statesmen and politicians of ,greece4   
,as true virtue is virtue which knows at
 what it is aiming1 the knowledge of the
 nature of the highest aim becomes the  
chief question of ethics4 ,what is the  
end of moral activity8 ,now we have just
 seen that that end must fall within1   
and not outside1 the moral act4 ,the end
 of goodness is the good4 ,what1 then1  
is the good8 ,what is the supreme good1 
the summum bonum8  ,a note of warning is
 necessary before we enter upon the     
details of this problem4 ,plato         
frequently speaks of all moral activity 
aiming at1 and ending in1 happiness4    
,with modern phrases ringing in our     
ears1 we might easily suppose this to   

mean that ,plato is a utilitarian4 ,the 
utilitarianism of ,bentham and ,mill is 
distinguished by the fact that it places
 the end of morality in happiness4 ,yet 
,plato was not a utilitarian1 and would 
unhesitatingly have condemned the theory
 of ,mill4 ,he #bba would have found it 
identical in principle with the         
,sophistic doctrine that pleasure is the
 end of virtue4 ,the only difference is 
that1 whereas the ,sophists identified  
virtue with the pleasure of the         
individual1 ,mill makes it the pleasure 
of the community4 ,that act is right    
which leads to the greatest happiness of
 the greatest number4 ,in practice1 of  
course1 this makes a tremendous         
difference4 ,but the principle is       
equally objectionable because1 like the 
,sophistic theory1 it founds morality   
upon mere feeling1 instead of upon      
reason1 and because it places the end of
 morality outside morality itself4 ,yet 
the formula of ,mill1 that the end of   
morals is happiness1 seems the same as  

,plato's formula4 ,what is the          
difference8  ,the fact is that what     
,mill calls happiness ,plato would have 
called pleasure4 ,pleasure is the       
satisfaction of one's desires1 whether  
they are noble or ignoble4 ,then what is
 happiness8 ,it can only be defined as  
the general harmonious well-being of    
life4 ,only that man is happy whose soul
 is in the state it ought to be in1 only
 in fact the just1 the good1 and the    
moral man4 ,happiness has nothing to do 
with pleasure4 ,if you could conceive an
 absolutely just and upright man1 who   
was yet weighed down with every possible
 misery and disaster1 in whose life     
pleasure had no part1 such a man would  
still be absolutely happy4 ,happiness   
is1 therefore1 in ,plato1 merely another
 name for the summum bonum4 ,in saying  
that the summum bonum is happiness1     
,plato is not telling us anything about 
it4 ,he is merely giving it a new name4 
,and we are still left to enquire3 what 
is the summum bonum8 what is happiness8 

,plato's answer1 as indeed his whole    
ethics1 is but #bbb an application of   
the theory of ,ideas4 ,but here we can  
distinguish two different and1 to some  
extent1 inconsistent strains of thought1
 which exist side by side in ,plato1 and
 perpetually struggle for the mastery4  
,both views depend upon the theory of   
,ideas4 ,in the first place1 the ,idea1 
in ,plato's philosophy1 is the sole     
reality4 ,the object of sense is unreal1
 and merely clogs and dims the soul's   
vision of the ,ideas4 ,matter is that   
which obstructs the free activity of the
 ,idea4 ,sense-objects hide the ,idea   
from our view4 ,therefore the world of  
sense is wholly evil4 ,true virtue must 
consist in flying from the world of     
sense1 in retiring from the affairs of  
the world1 and even from the beauty of  
the senses1 into the calm of philosophic
 contemplation4 ,and if this were all1  
philosophy1 the knowledge of the ,ideas1
 would be the sole constituent of the   
summum bonum4 ,but it is possible to    

regard sense-objects in another light4  
,they are1 after all1 copies of the     
,ideas4 ,they are therefore a           
manifestation and revelation of the     
ideal world4 ,hence ,plato is compelled 
by this thought to allow a certain value
 to the world of sense1 its affairs1 and
 its beauty4  ,the result of this       
inconsistency is1 at any rate1 that     
,plato remains broad and human4 ,he does
 not1 on the one hand1 preach a purely  
selfish retirement into philosophy1 or a
 narrow ascetic ideal4 ,he does not1 on 
the other hand1 adopt a low utilitarian 
view of life1 allowing value only to    
that which is practical4 ,he remains    
true to the ,greek ideal of life as a   
harmonious play of all the faculties1 in
 which no one part of man is            
over-developed at the expense of the    
others4  ,the result is that ,plato's   
summum bonum is not a single #bbc end4  
,it is a compound consisting of four    
parts4 ,first1 and chief of all1 is the 
knowledge of the ,ideas as they are in  

themselves1 philosophy4 ,secondly1 the  
contemplation of the ,ideas as they     
reveal themselves in the world of sense1
 the love and appreciation of all that  
is beautiful1 ordered1 and harmonious4  
,thirdly1 the cultivation of the special
 sciences and arts4 ,and fourthly1      
indulgence in pure1 refined1 and        
innocent pleasures of the senses1       
excluding1 of course1 whatever is base  
and evil4  ,plato had also a specific   
doctrine of virtue4 ,as already stated1 
he distinguished between philosophic and
 customary virtue1 and attached absolute
 value only to the former4 ,he does not1
 however1 deny a relative value to      
customary virtue1 inasmuch as it is a   
means towards true virtue4 ,plato saw   
that man cannot rise at one bound to the
 pinnacles of rational virtue4 ,he must 
needs pass through the preparatory stage
 of customary virtue4 ,in the man in    
whom reason is not yet awakened1 good   
habits and customs must be implanted1 in
 order that1 when reason comes1 it may  

find the ground ready prepared4         
,socrates had taught that virtue is one4
 ,and ,plato in his earlier writings    
adopted this view4 ,but later on he came
 to see that every faculty of man has   
its place and its function1 and the due 
performance of its function is a virtue4
 ,he did not1 however1 surrender the    
unity of virtue altogether1 but believed
 that its unity is compatible with its  
plurality4 ,there are four cardinal     
virtues4 ,three of these correspond to  
the three parts of the soul1 and the    
fourth is the unity of the others4 ,the 
virtue of reason is wisdom1 of the noble
 half of #bbd the mortal soul courage1  
of the ignoble appetites1 temperance or 
self-control1 in which the passions     
allow themselves to be governed by      
reason4 ,the fourth virtue1 justice1    
arises from the others4 ,justice means  
proportion and harmony1 and accrues to  
the soul when all three parts perform   
their functions and co-operate with each
 other4  ,following ,zeller1 we may add 

to this account of the virtues some of  
,plato's views upon the details of life4
 ,and first1 his opinion of women and   
marriage4 ,here ,plato does not rise    
above the level of ordinary ,greek      
morals4 ,he has nothing specially       
original to say1 but reflects the       
opinions of his age4 ,women he regards  
as essentially inferior to men4         
,moreover1 the modern view of woman as  
the complement of man1 as possessing    
those special virtues of womanliness1   
which a man lacks1 is quite alien to    
,plato4 ,the difference between men and 
women is1 in his view1 not one of kind  
but only of degree4 ,the only specific  
difference between the sexes is the     
physical difference4 ,spiritually they  
are quite the same1 except that woman is
 inferior4 ,hence ,plato would not      
exclude women from the same education   
which man receives4 ,he would educate   
them in exactly the same way1 but this  
involves the imposition upon them of the
 same burdens4 ,even military duties are

 not outside the sphere of women4  ,his 
views of marriage flow from the same    
principle4 ,since woman is not the      
complement of man1 she is in no special 
sense fitted to be his companion4 ,hence
 the ideal of spiritual companionship is
 absent from ,plato's view of marriage1 
the sole object of which1 in his        
opinion1 is the propagation of children4
 ,the natural companion #bbe of a man is
 not a woman1 but another man4 ,the     
ideal of friendship1 therefore1 takes   
the place of the spiritual ideal of     
marriage in ,plato and1 indeed1 among   
the ancients generally4  ,slavery is not
 denounced by ,plato4 ,he takes no      
trouble to justify it1 because he thinks
 it so obviously right that it needs no 
justification4 ,all that can be said to 
his credit is that he demands humane and
 just1 though firm and unsentimental1   
treatment of slaves4  ,if in these      
respects ,plato never transcends the    
,greek view of life1 in one matter at   
least he does so4 ,the common view of   

his time was that one ought to do good  
to one's friends and evil to one's      
enemies4 ,this ,plato expressly         
repudiates4 ,it can never be good1 he   
thinks1 to do evil4 ,one should rather  
do good to one's enemies1 and so convert
 them into friends4 ,to return good for 
evil is no less a ,platonic than a      
,christian maxim4    7b7 ,the ,state4   
,we pass from the ethics of individual  
life to the ethics of the community4    
,plato's ,republic is not an attempt to 
paint an imaginary and unreal           
perfection4 ,its object is to found     
politics on the theory of ,ideas by     
depicting the ,idea of the ,state4 ,this
 ,state is1 therefore1 not unreal1 but  
the only real ,state1 and its reality is
 the ground of the existence of all     
actually existent ,states4  ,we can     
trace here1 too1 the same two strains of
 thought as we found in considering the 
ethics of the individual4 ,on the one   
hand1 since the ,idea alone is real1 the
 existent world a mere illusion1 the    

service of the #bbf ,state cannot be the
 ideal life for a rational being4       
,complete retirement from the world into
 the sphere of ,ideas is a far nobler   
end1 and the aims of the ordinary       
politician are1 in comparison1 worthless
 baubles4 ,though only the philosopher  
is competent to rule1 yet he will not   
undertake the business of the ,state1   
except under compulsion4 ,in the        
political ,states1 as they exist in the 
world1 the philosopher dwells with his  
body1 but his soul is a stranger1       
ignorant of their standards1 unmoved by 
their ambitions4 ,but the opposite      
strain of thought is uppermost when we  
are told that it is1 after all1 only in 
the ,state1 only in his capacity as a   
citizen and a social being that the     
individual can attain perfection4 ,it is
 only possible to reconcile these views 
in one way4 ,if the ideals of the ,state
 and of philosophy seem inconsistent1   
they must be brought together by        
adapting the ,state to philosophy4 ,we  

must have a ,state founded upon         
philosophy and reason4 ,then only can   
the philosopher dwell in it with his    
soul as well as with his body4 ,then    
only can either the individual or the   
,state reach perfection4 ,to found the  
,state upon reason is the keynote of    
,plato's politics4  ,and this gives us1 
too1 the clue to the problem1 what is   
the end of the ,state8 ,why should there
 be a ,state at all8 ,this does not     
mean1 how has the ,state arisen in      
history8 ,we are not in search of the   
cause1 but of the reason1 or end1 of the
 ,state4 ,the end of all life is wisdom1
 virtue1 and knowledge4 ,the unassisted 
individual cannot reach these ends4 ,it 
is only by the ,state that they can be  
brought down from heaven to earth4 ,the 
end of the ,state is thus the virtue and
 happiness 7not pleasure7 of the        
citizens4 ,and since this is only       
possible #bbg through education1 the    
,state's primary function is            
educational4  ,since the ,state is to be

 founded upon reason1 its laws must be  
rational1 and rational laws can only be 
made by rational men1 philosophers4 ,the
 rulers must be philosophers4 ,and since
 the philosophers are few1 we must have 
an aristocracy1 not of birth1 or of     
wealth1 but of intellect4 ,the first    
operative principle of the ,state is    
reason1 the second is force4 ,for it is 
not to be expected that the irrational  
masses will willingly submit to rational
 laws4 ,they must be compelled4 ,and    
since the work of the world must go on1 
the third operative principle will be   
labour4 ,plato believed in the principle
 of division of labour4 ,only he can    
excel at any occupation whose life is   
devoted to it4 ,hence to the three      
operative principles correspond three   
classes1 castes1 or professions4 ,reason
 is embodied in the philosopher-rulers1 
force in the warriors1 labour in the    
masses4 ,this division of the functions 
of the ,state is based upon the         
threefold division of the soul4 ,to the 

rational soul correspond the            
philosopher-rulers1 to the nobler half  
of the mortal soul the warriors1 to the 
appetitive soul the masses4             
,consequently the four cardinal virtues 
belong to the ,state through the        
functioning of the three classes4 ,the  
virtue of the philosopher-rulers is     
wisdom1 of the warriors courage1 of the 
masses1 temperance4 ,the harmonious     
co-operation of all three produces      
justice4  ,the rulers must not cease to 
be philosophers4 ,most of their time    
must be spent in the study of the       
,ideas1 philosophy1 and only a portion  
in the affairs of government4 ,this is  
rendered possible by the system of      
taking turns4 ,those who are not at any 
particular time #bbh engaged upon       
government retire into thought4 ,the    
duty of the warriors is the protection  
of the ,state1 both against its external
 enemies1 and against the irrational    
impulses of the masses of its own       
citizens4 ,normally1 the latter will be 

their chief duty1 the enforcement of the
 decrees of the philosopher-rulers upon 
the masses4 ,the masses will engage     
themselves in trade1 commerce1 and      
agriculture4 ,both the other ranks are  
prohibited from soiling their fingers   
with trade or agriculture1 upon which   
,plato1 as a ,greek aristocrat1 looked  
down with unbounded contempt4 ,to what  
rank a citizen belongs is not determined
 by birth1 nor by individual choice4 ,no
 individual can choose his own          
profession4 ,this will be determined by 
the officers of the ,state1 who will    
base their decision1 however1 upon the  
disposition and capabilities of the     
individual4 ,as they have also to decide
 the numbers required for each rank1 the
 magistrates also control the birth of  
children4 ,parents cannot have children 
when they wish4 ,the sanction of the    
,state is required4  ,since the end of  
the ,state is the virtue of the         
citizens1 this involves the destruction 
of whatever is evil and the             

encouragement of whatever is good4 ,to  
compass the destruction of evil1 the    
children of bad parents1 or offspring   
not sanctioned by the ,state1 will be   
destroyed4 ,weak and sickly children    
will also not be allowed to live4 ,the  
positive encouragement of good involves 
the education of the citizens by the    
,state4 ,children from their earliest   
years do not belong to their parents1   
but to the ,state4 ,they are1 therefore1
 at once removed from the custody of    
their parents1 and transferred to ,state
 nurseries4 ,since the parents are to   
have no #bbi property nor interest in   
them1 stringent means are adopted to see
 that1 after removal to the public      
nurseries1 parents shall never again be 
able to recognize their own children4   
,all the details of the educational     
curriculum are decreed by the ,state4   
,poetry1 for example1 is only allowed in
 an emasculated form4 ,of the three     
kinds1 epic1 dramatic1 and lyric1 the   
two former are banished from the ,state 

altogether1 because1 in the base example
 of the immorality of the gods1 which   
they depict1 they are powerful          
instruments in the propagation of evil4 
,only lyric poetry is allowed1 and that 
under strict supervision4 ,the subject1 
the form1 even the metre1 will be       
prescribed by the proper authorities4   
,poetry is not recognized as valuable in
 itself1 but only as an educative moral 
influence4 ,all poems1 therefore1 must  
strictly inculcate virtue4  ,it is1 in  
,plato's opinion1 intolerable that the  
individual should have any interest     
apart from the interests of the ,state4 
,private interests clash with those of  
the community1 and must therefore be    
abolished4 ,the individual can possess  
no property either in material things1  
or in the members of his family4 ,this  
involves the community of goods1        
community of wives1 and the ,state      
ownership of children from their birth4 
#f4 ,views upon ,art4  ,in modern times 
aesthetics is recognized as a separate  

division of philosophy4 ,this was not   
the case in ,plato's time1 and yet his  
opinions upon art cannot be fitted into 
either dialectic1 physics1 or ethics4   
,on the other hand1 they cannot be      
ignored1 and there is nothing for it1   
therefore1 but to treat them as a sort  
of appendix #bcj to his philosophy4     
,plato has no systematic theory of art1 
but only scattered opinions1 the most   
important of which will now be          
mentioned4  ,most modern theories of art
 are based upon the view that art is an 
end in itself1 that the beautiful has1  
as such1 absolute value1 and not value  
merely as a means to some further end4  
,upon such a view1 art is recognized as 
autonomous within its own sphere1       
governed only by its own laws1 judged   
only by its own standards4 ,it cannot be
 judged1 as ,tolstoi would have us      
believe1 by the standard of morals4 ,the
 beautiful is not a means to the good4  
,they may be indeed1 ultimately         
identical1 but their identity cannot be 

recognized till their difference has    
been admitted4 ,nor can one be          
subordinated to the other4  ,now this   
view of art finds no place at all in    
,plato's thought4 ,art is1 for him1     
absolutely subservient both to morals   
and to philosophy4 ,that it subserves   
morality we see from the ,republic1     
where only that poetry is allowed which 
inculcates virtue1 and only because it  
inculcates virtue4 ,it is no sufficient 
justification of a poem to plead that it
 is beautiful4 ,beautiful or not1 if it 
does not subserve the ends of morality1 
it is forbidden4 ,hence too the         
preposterous notion that its exercise is
 to be controlled1 even in details1 by  
the ,state4 ,that this would mean the   
utter destruction of art either did not 
occur to ,plato1 or if it did1 did not  
deter him4 ,if poetry cannot exist under
 the yoke of morality1 it must not be   
allowed to exist at all4 ,that art is   
merely a means to philosophy is even    
more evident4 ,the end of all education 

is the knowledge of the ,ideas1 and     
every other subject1 science1           
mathematics1 art1 is introduced into the
 #bca educational curriculum solely as a
 preparation for that end4 ,they have no
 value in themselves4 ,this is obvious  
from the teaching of the ,republic1 and 
it is even more evident in the          
,symposium1 where the love of beautiful 
objects is made to end1 not in itself1  
but in philosophy4  ,plato's low        
estimate of art appears also in his     
theory of art as imitation1 and his     
contemptuous references to the nature of
 artistic genius4 ,as to the first1 art 
is1 to him1 only imitation4 ,it is the  
copy of an object of the senses1 and    
this again is only a copy of an ,idea4  
,hence a work of art is only a copy of a
 copy4 ,plato did not recognise the     
creativeness of art4 ,this view is      
certainly false4 ,if the aims of art    
were merely to imitate1 a photograph    
would be the best picture1 since it is  
the most accurate copy of its object4   

,what ,plato failed to see was that the 
artist does not copy his object1 but    
idealizes it4 ,and this means that he   
does not see the object simply as an    
object1 but as the revelation of an     
,idea4 ,he does not see the phenomenon  
with the eyes of other men1 but         
penetrates the sensuous envelope and    
exhibits the ,idea shining through the  
veils of sense4  ,the second point is   
,plato's estimate of artistic genius4   
,the artist does not work by reason1 but
 by inspiration4 ,he does not1 or he    
should not1 create the beautiful by     
means of rules1 or by the application of
 principles4 ,it is only after the work 
of art is created that the critic       
discovers rules in it4 ,this does not   
mean that the discovery of rules is     
false1 but that the artist follows them 
unconsciously and instinctively4 ,if1   
for example1 we believe ,aristotle's    
dictum that the object of tragedy #bcb  
is to purge the heart by terror and     
pity1 we do not mean that the tragedian 

deliberately sets out to accomplish that
 end4 ,he does so without knowing or    
intending it4 ,and this kind of         
instinctive impulse we call the         
inspiration of the artist4 ,now ,plato  
fully recognizes these facts4 ,but far  
from considering inspiration something  
exalted1 he thinks it1 on the contrary1 
comparatively low and contemptible1 just
 because it is not rational4 ,he calls  
it divine madness1 divine indeed1       
because the artist produces beautiful   
things1 but madness because he himself  
does not know how or why he has done it4
 ,the poet says very wise and beautiful 
things1 but he does not know why they   
are wise and beautiful4 ,he merely      
feels1 and does not understand anything4
 ,his inspiration1 therefore1 is not on 
the level of knowledge1 but only of     
right opinion1 which knows what is true1
 but does not know why4  ,plato's views 
of art are thus not satisfactory4 ,he is
 doubtless right in placing inspiration 
below reason1 and art below philosophy4 

,they do stand to each other in the     
relation of higher and lower4 ,not that 
such a question can be decided by mere  
personal preferences4 ,the usual        
discussions whether art or philosophy is
 better1 whether emotion or reason is   
higher1 are pointless and insipid1      
because the disputants merely exalt     
their personal peculiarities4 ,the man  
of artistic temperament naturally       
prefers art1 and says it is the highest4
 ,the philosopher exalts philosophy     
above art1 merely because it is his pet 
hobby4 ,this kind of discussion is      
futile4 ,the matter must be decided upon
 some principle4 ,and the principle is  
quite clear4 ,both art and philosophy   
have the same object1 the #bcc          
apprehension of the ,absolute1 or the   
,idea4 ,philosophy apprehends it as it  
is in itself1 that is to say1 as        
thought4 ,art apprehends it in a merely 
sensuous form4 ,philosophy apprehends it
 in its truth1 art in a comparatively   
untrue way4 ,philosophy1 therefore1 is  

the higher4 ,but while any true         
philosophy of art must recognize this1  
it must not interpret it to mean that   
art is to be made merely a means towards
 philosophy4 ,it must somehow find room 
for the recognition of the truth that   
art is an end in itself1 and it is in   
this that ,plato fails4  ,aristotle1 who
 had no spark of artistic capacity in   
his composition1 whose own writings are 
the severest of scientific treatises1   
did far greater justice to art than     
,plato1 and propounded a far more       
satisfactory theory4 ,plato1 himself a  
great artist1 is utterly unjust to art4 
,paradoxical as it may appear1 the very 
reason why ,aristotle could be just to  
art was that he was no artist4 ,being   
solely a philosopher1 his own writings  
are scientific and inartistic4 ,this    
enables him to recognize art as a       
separate sphere1 and therefore as having
 its own rights4 ,plato could not keep  
the two separate4 ,his dialogues are    
both works of art and of philosophy4 ,we

 have seen already that this fact       
exercised an evil influence on his      
philosophy1 since it made him substitute
 poetic myths for scientific            
explanation4 ,now we see that it        
exercised an equally evil influence on  
his views of art4 ,as a                 
philosopher-artist his own practice is  
to use literary art solely as a means   
towards the expression of philosophical 
ideas4 ,and this colours his whole view 
of art4 ,it is1 to him1 nothing but a   
means towards philosophy4 ,and this is  
the tap-root of his entire view of the  
subject4    #bcd  #g4 ,critical         
,estimate of ,plato's ,philosophy1  ,if 
we are to form a just estimate of the   
value of ,plato's philosophy1 we must   
not fritter away our criticism on the   
minor points1 the external details1 the 
mere outworks of the system4 ,we must   
get at the heart and governing centre of
 it all4 ,amid the mass of thought which
 ,plato has developed1 in all           
departments of speculation1 that which  

stands out as the central thesis of the 
whole system is the theory of ,ideas4   
,all else is but deduction from this4   
,his physics1 his ethics1 his politics1 
his views upon art1 all flow from this  
one governing theory4 ,it is here then  
that we must look1 alike for the merits 
and the defects of ,plato's system4     
,the theory of ,ideas is not a something
 sprung suddenly upon the world out of  
,plato's brain4 ,it has its roots in the
 past4 ,it is1 as ,aristotle showed1 the
 outcome of ,eleatic1 ,heracleitean1 and
 ,socratic determinations4              
,fundamentally1 however1 it grows out of
 the distinction between sense and      
reason1 which had been the common       
property of ,greek thinkers since the   
time of ,parmenides4 ,parmenides was the
 first to emphasize this distinction1   
and to teach that the truth is to be    
found by reason1 the world of sense     
being illusory4 ,heracleitus1 and even  
,democritus1 were pronounced adherents  
of reason1 as against sense4 ,the crisis

 came with the ,sophists1 who attempted 
to obliterate the distinction           
altogether1 and to find all knowledge in
 sensation1 thus calling forth the      
opposition of ,socrates and ,plato4 ,as 
against them ,socrates pointed out that 
all knowledge is through concepts1      
reason3 and ,plato added to this that   
the concept is not a mere rule of       
thought but a metaphysical reality4     
,this was the substance of the theory of
 ,ideas4 #bce ,every philosophy which   
makes a systematic attempt to solve the 
riddle of the universe necessarily      
begins with a theory of the nature of   
that absolute and ultimate reality from 
which the universe is derived4 ,this    
absolute reality we will call simply the
 ,absolute4 ,plato's theory is that the 
,absolute consists of concepts4 ,to say 
that the ,absolute is reason1 is        
thought1 is concepts1 is the            
universal--these are merely four        
different expressions of the same       
theory4 ,now this proposition1 that the 

,absolute is reason1 is the fundamental 
thesis of all idealism4 ,since ,plato's 
time there have been several great      
idealistic systems of philosophy4 ,that 
the ,absolute is reason is the central  
teaching of them all4 ,plato1 therefore1
 is the founder and initiator of all    
idealism4 ,it is this that gives him his
 great place in the history of          
philosophy4 ,that the ,absolute is      
universal thought1 this is what ,plato  
has contributed to the philosophical    
speculation of the world4 ,this is his  
crowning merit4  ,but we must go        
somewhat more into details4 ,we must see
 how far he applied this principle      
successfully to the unravelment of the  
great problems of philosophy4 ,in       
lecturing upon the ,eleatics1 ,i said   
that any successful philosophy must     
satisfy at least two conditions4 ,it    
must give such an account of the        
,absolute1 that the ,absolute is shown  
as capable of explaining the world4 ,it 
must be possible to deduce the actual   

world of facts from the first principle4
 ,secondly1 not only must this first    
principle explain the world2 it must    
also explain itself4 ,it must be really 
ultimate1 that is1 we must not1 in order
 to understand it1 have to refer to     
anything beyond and outside it4 ,if we  
have to do so then our ultimate is not  
an ultimate at all2 our first principle 
#bcf is not first4 ,that thing by means 
of which we explain it must itself be   
the ultimate reality4 ,and besides being
 ultimate1 our principle must be wholly 
intelligible4 ,it must not be a mere    
ultimate mystery2 for to reduce the     
whole world to an ultimate mystery is   
clearly not to explain it4 ,our first   
principle must1 in a word1 be           
self-explanatory4 ,let us apply this    
two-fold test to ,plato's system4 ,let  
us see1 firstly1 whether the principle  
of ,ideas explains the world1 and       
secondly1 whether it explains itself4   
,does it explain the world8 ,is the     
actual existence of things1 horses1     

trees1 stars1 men1 explained by it8     
,what1 in the first place1 is the       
relation between things and the ,ideas8 
,things1 says ,plato1 are copies1 or    
imitations of the ,ideas4 ,they         
participate in the ,ideas4 ,the ,ideas  
are archetypal of things4 ,now all these
 phrases are mere poetic metaphors4     
,they do not really tell us how things  
are related to ,ideas4 ,but suppose we  
ignore this1 and assume1 for the sake of
 argument1 that we understand what is   
meant by participation and that things  
are1 in the literal sense1 copies of    
,ideas4 ,the question still remains1 why
 do such copies exist1 how do they      
arise8 ,now1 if this problem is to be   
solved1 it is not enough to show1 merely
 as a fact1 that1 by some mysterious    
act1 copies of ,ideas come into         
existence4 ,there must be a reason for  
it1 and this reason it is the business  
of philosophy to explain4 ,this reason1 
too1 must exist in the nature of the    
,ideas themselves1 and not outside them4

 ,there must be1 in the very nature of  
the ,ideas1 some inner necessity which  
forces them to reproduce themselves in  
things4 ,this is what we #bcg mean by   
saying that the ,ideas are a sufficient 
explanation of the existence of things4 
,but there is in ,plato's ,ideas no such
 necessity4 ,the ,ideas are defined as  
being the sole reality4 ,they have      
already all reality in themselves4 ,they
 are self-sufficient4 ,they lack        
nothing4 ,it is not necessary for them  
further to realize their being in the   
concrete manifestation of things1       
because they1 as wholly real1 need no   
realization4 ,why1 then1 should they not
 remain for ever simply as they are8    
,why should they go out of themselves   
into things8 ,why should they not remain
 in themselves and by themselves8 ,why  
should they need to reproduce themselves
 in objects8 ,there are1 we know1 white 
objects in the universe4 ,their         
existence1 we are told1 is explained by 
the ,idea of whiteness8 ,but why should 

the ,idea of whiteness produce white    
things8 ,it is itself the perfect       
whiteness4 ,why should it stir itself8  
,why should it not remain by itself1    
apart1 sterile1 in the world of ,ideas1 
for all eternity8 ,we cannot see4 ,there
 is in the ,ideas no necessity urging   
them towards reproduction of themselves1
 and this means that they possess no    
principle for the explanation of things4
  ,nevertheless ,plato has to make some 
attempt to meet the difficulty4 ,and as 
the ,ideas are themselves impotent to   
produce things1 ,plato1 unable to solve 
the problem by reason1 attempts to solve
 it by violence4 ,he drags in the notion
 of ,god from nowhere in particular1 and
 uses him as a deus ex machina4 ,god    
fashions matter into the images of      
,ideas4 ,the very fact that ,plato is   
forced to introduce a creator shows     
that1 in the ,ideas themselves1 there is
 no ground of explanation4 ,things ought
 to be explained by the ,ideas          
themselves1 #bch but as they are        

incapable of explaining anything1 ,god  
is called upon to do their work for     
them4 ,thus ,plato1 faced with the      
problem of existence1 practically       
deserts his theory of ,ideas1 and falls 
back upon a crude theism4 ,or if we say 
that the term ,god is not to be taken   
literally1 and that ,plato uses it      
merely as a figurative term for the     
,idea of ,good1 then this saves ,plato  
from the charge of introducing a theism 
altogether inconsistent with his        
philosophy1 but it brings us back to the
 old difficulty4 ,for in this case1 the 
existence of things must be explained by
 means of the ,idea of the ,good4 ,but  
this ,idea is just as impotent as the   
other ,ideas4  ,in this connection1 too1
 the dualism of ,plato's system becomes 
evident4 ,if everything is grounded in  
the one ultimate reality1 the ,ideas1   
then the entire universe must be clasped
 together in a system1 all parts of     
which flow out of the ,ideas4 ,if there 
exists in the universe anything which   

stands aloof from this system1 remains  
isolated1 and cannot be reduced to a    
manifestation of the ,ideas1 then the   
philosophy has failed to explain the    
world1 and we have before us a confessed
 dualism4 ,now not only has ,plato to   
drag in ,god for the explanation of     
things1 he has also to drag in matter4  
,god takes matter and forms it into     
copies of the ,ideas4 ,but what is this 
matter1 and where does it spring from8  
,clearly1 if the sole reality is the    
,ideas1 matter1 like all else1 must be  
grounded in the ,ideas4 ,but this is not
 the case in ,plato's system4 ,matter   
appears as a principle quite independent
 of the ,ideas4 ,as its being is        
self-derived and original1 it must be   
itself a substance4 ,but this is just   
what ,plato denies1 calling it absolute 
#bci not-being4 ,yet since it has not   
its source in the ,ideas or in anything 
outside itself1 we must say that though 
,plato calls it absolute not-being1 it  
is in fact an absolute being4 ,the      

,ideas and matter stand face to face in 
,plato's system neither derived from the
 other1 equally ultimate co-ordinate1   
absolute realities4 ,this is sheer      
dualism4  ,the source of this dualism is
 to be found in the absolute separation 
which ,plato makes between sense and    
reason4 ,he places the world of sense on
 one side1 the world of reason on the   
other1 as things radically different and
 opposed4 ,hence it is impossible for   
him ever to bridge the gulf that he has 
himself created between them4 ,we may   
expect the dualism of a philosophy which
 builds upon such premises to break out 
at numerous points in the system4 ,and  
so indeed it does4 ,it exhibits itself  
as the dualism of ,ideas and matter1 of 
the sense-world and the thought-world1  
of body and soul4 ,not1 of course1 that 
it is not quite right to recognize the  
distinction between sense and reason4   
,any genuine philosophy must recognize  
that4 ,and no doubt too it is right to  
place truth and reality on the side of  

reason rather than sense4 ,but although 
sense and reason are distinct1 they must
 also be identical4 ,they must be       
divergent streams flowing from one      
source4 ,and this means that a          
philosophy which considers the absolute 
reality to be reason must exhibit sense 
as a lower form of reason4 ,because     
,plato fails to see the identity of     
sense and reason1 as well as their      
difference1 his philosophy becomes a    
continual fruitless effort to overreach 
the dualism thus generated4  ,thus the  
answer to our first question1 whether   
the theory of ,ideas explains the world 
of things1 must be #bdj answered in the 
negative4 ,let us pass on to the second 
test4 ,is the principle of ,ideas a     
self-explanatory principle8 ,such a     
principle must be understood purely out 
of itself4 ,it must not be a principle1 
like that of the materialist1 which     
merely reduces the whole universe to an 
ultimate mysterious fact4 ,for even if  
it be shown that the reason of          

everything is matter1 it is still open  
to us to ask what the reason of matter  
is4 ,we cannot see any reason why matter
 should exist4 ,it is a mere fact1 which
 dogmatically forces itself upon our    
consciousness without giving any reason 
for itself4 ,our principle must be such 
that we cannot ask a further reason of  
it4 ,it must be its own reason1 and so  
in itself satisfy the demand for a final
 explanation4 ,now there is only one    
such principle in the world1 namely1    
reason itself4 ,you can ask the reason  
of everything else in the world4 ,you   
can ask the reason of the sun1 the moon1
 stars1 the soul1 ,god1 or the devil4   
,but you cannot ask the reason of       
reason1 because reason is its own       
reason4 ,let us put the same thought in 
another way4 ,when we demand the        
explanation of anything1 what do we mean
 by explanation8 ,what is it we want8   
,do we not mean that the thing appears  
to us irrational1 and we want it shown  
that it is rational8 ,when this is done1

 we say it is explained4 ,think1 for    
example1 of what is called the problem  
of evil4 ,people often talk of it as the
 problem of the origin of evil1 as if   
what we want to know is1 how evil began4
 ,but even if we knew this1 it would not
 explain anything4 ,suppose that evil   
began because someone ate an apple4     
,does this make the matter any clearer8 
,do we feel that all our difficulties   
about the existence of evil are solved8 
,no4 ,this is #bda not what we want to  
know4 ,the difficulty is that evil      
appears to us something irrational4 ,the
 problem can only be solved by showing  
us that somehow1 in spite of            
appearances1 it is rational that evil   
should exist4 ,show us this1 and evil is
 explained4 ,explanation of a thing1    
then1 means showing that the thing is   
rational4 ,now we can ask that          
everything else in the world should be  
shown to be rational4 ,but we cannot    
demand that the philosopher shall show  
that reason is rational4 ,this is       

absurd4 ,reason is what is already      
absolutely rational4 ,it is what        
explains itself4 ,it is its own reason4 
,it is a self-explanatory principle4    
,this1 then1 must be the principle of   
which we are in search4 ,the ,absolute1 
we said1 must be a self-explanatory     
principle1 and there is only one such1  
namely1 reason4 ,the ,absolute1         
therefore1 is reason4  ,it was the      
greatness and glory of ,plato to have   
seen this1 and thereby to have become   
the founder of all true philosophy4 ,for
 to say that the ,absolute is concepts  
is the same as saying it is reason4 ,it 
might seem1 then1 that ,plato has       
satisfied the second canon of criticism4
 ,he takes as first principle a         
self-explanatory reality4 ,but we cannot
 quite so quickly jump to this          
conclusion4 ,after all1 the mere word   
reason is not a key which will unlock to
 us the doors of the universe4          
,something more is necessary than the   
mere word4 ,we must1 in fact1 be told   

what reason is4 ,now there are two      
senses in which we might ask the        
question1 what reason is1 one of which  
is legitimate1 the other illegitimate4  
,it is illegitimate to ask what reason  
is1 in the sense of asking that it shall
 be explained to us in terms of         
something else1 which is not reason4    
,this would be #bdb to give up our      
belief that reason is its own reason4   
,it would be to seek the reason of      
reason in something which is not reason4
 ,it would be to admit that reason1 in  
itself1 is not rational4 ,and this is   
absurd4 ,but it is legitimate to ask1   
what reason is1 meaning thereby1 what is
 the content of reason4 ,the content of 
reason1 we have seen1 is concepts4 ,but 
what concepts8 ,how are we to know      
whether any particular concept is part  
of the system of reason or not8 ,only1  
it is evident1 by ascertaining whether  
it is a rational concept4 ,if a concept 
is wholly rational1 then it is a part of
 reason4 ,if not1 not4 ,what we need1   

then1 is a detailed account of all the  
concepts which reason contains1 and a   
proof that each of these concepts is    
really rational4 ,it is obvious that    
only in this way can we make a          
satisfactory beginning in philosophy4   
,before we can show that reason         
explains1 that is1 rationalizes the     
world1 we must surely first show that   
reason itself is rational1 or rather1 to
 be more accurate1 that our conception  
of reason is rational4 ,there must not  
be any mere inexplicable facts1 any     
mysteries1 any dark places1 in our      
notion of reason4 ,it must be penetrated
 through and through by the light of    
reason4 ,it must be absolutely          
transparent1 crystalline4 ,how can we   
hope to explain the world1 if our very  
first principle itself contains         
irrationalities8  ,each concept then    
must prove itself rational4 ,and this   
means that it must be a necessary       
concept4 ,a necessary proposition1 we   
saw1 is one1 such as that two and two   

equal four1 the opposite of which is    
unthinkable4 ,so for ,plato's ,ideas to 
be really necessary it ought to be      
logically impossible for us to deny     
their #bdc reality4 ,it ought to be     
impossible to think the world at all    
without these concepts4 ,to attempt to  
deny them ought to be shown to be       
self-contradictory4 ,they ought to be so
 necessarily involved in reason that    
thought without them becomes impossible4
 ,clearly this is the same as saying    
that the ,ideas must not be mere        
ultimate inexplicable facts4 ,of such a 
fact we assert merely that it is so1 but
 we cannot see any reason for it4 ,to   
see a reason for it is the same as      
seeing its necessity1 seeing not merely 
that it is so1 but that it must be so4  
,now ,plato's ,ideas are not of this    
necessary kind4 ,there is1 we are told1 
an ,idea of whiteness4 ,but why should  
there be such an ,idea8 ,it is a mere   
fact4 ,it is not a necessity4 ,we can   
think the world quite well without the  

,idea of whiteness4 ,the world1 so far  
as we can see1 could get on perfectly   
well without either white objects or the
 ,idea of whiteness4 ,to deny its       
reality leads to no self-contradictions4
 ,put it in another way4 ,there are     
certainly white objects in the world4   
,we demand that these1 among other      
things1 be explained4 ,plato tells us1  
by way of explanation1 that there are   
white objects because there is an ,idea 
of whiteness4 ,but in that case why is  
there an ,idea of whiteness8 ,we cannot 
see4 ,there is no reason4 ,there is no  
necessity in this4 ,the same thing      
applies to all the other ,ideas4 ,they  
are not rational concepts4 ,they are not
 a part of the system of reason4  ,but  
at this point1 perhaps1 a glimmer of    
hope dawns upon us4 ,we ask the reason  
for these ,ideas4 ,has not ,plato       
asserted that the ultimate reason and   
ground of all the lower ,ideas will be  
found in the supreme ,idea of #bdd the  
,good8 ,now if this is so1 it means that

 the lower ,ideas must find their       
necessity in the highest ,idea4 ,if we  
could see that the ,idea of the ,good   
necessarily involves the other ,ideas1  
then these other ,ideas would be really 
explained4 ,in other words1 we ought to 
be able to deduce all the other ,ideas  
from this one ,idea4 ,it ought to be    
possible to show that1 granted the ,idea
 of the ,good1 all the other ,ideas     
necessarily follow1 that to assume the  
,good and deny the other ,ideas would be
 self-contradictory and unthinkable4    
,there are examples in ,plato of the    
kind of deduction we require4 ,for      
example1 in the ,parmenides he showed   
that the ,idea of the one necessarily   
involves the ,idea of the many1 and vice
 versa4 ,you cannot think the one       
without also thinking the many4 ,this   
means that the many is deduced from the 
one1 and the one from the many4 ,just in
 the same way1 we ought to be able to   
deduce the ,idea of whiteness from the  
,idea of the ,good4 ,but this is clearly

 not possible4 ,you may analyse the     
,good as long as you like1 you may turn 
it in every conceivable direction1 but  
you cannot get whiteness out of it4 ,the
 two ,ideas do not involve each other4  
,they are thinkable apart4 ,it is quite 
possible to think the ,good without     
thinking whiteness4 ,and it is the same 
with all the other ,ideas4 ,none of them
 can be deduced from the ,good4  ,and   
the reason of this is very obvious4     
,just as the lower ,ideas contain only  
what is common among the things of a    
class1 and exclude their differences1 so
 the higher ,ideas include what is      
common to the ,ideas that come under    
them1 but exclude what is not common4   
,for example1 the ,idea of colour       
contains what white1 blue1 red1 and     
green1 have in common4 ,but all colours 
#bde have not whiteness in common4      
,green1 for example1 is not white4      
,hence the ,idea of colour excludes the 
,idea of whiteness1 and it likewise     
excludes all the ,ideas of the other    

particular colours4 ,so too the highest 
,idea of all contains only what all the 
,ideas agree in1 but all the rest falls 
outside it4 ,thus the ,idea of whiteness
 is perfect in its kind4 ,and as all    
,ideas are likewise perfect1 the highest
 ,idea is that in which they all agree1 
namely1 perfection itself4 ,but this    
means that the perfection of the ,idea  
of whiteness is contained in the supreme
 ,idea1 but its specific character in   
which it differs from other ,ideas is   
excluded4 ,its specific character is    
just its whiteness4 ,thus the perfection
 of whiteness is contained in the ,good1
 but its whiteness is not4 ,consequently
 it is impossible to deduce whiteness   
from the ,good1 because the ,good does  
not contain whiteness4 ,you cannot get  
out of it what is not in it4 ,when      
,plato deduced the many from the one1 he
 did so only by showing that the ,one   
contains the many4 ,he cannot deduce    
whiteness from goodness1 because        
goodness does not contain whiteness4    

,the lower ,ideas thus have not the     
character of necessity4 ,they are mere  
facts4 ,and the hope that we shall find 
their necessity in the supreme ,idea    
fails4 ,but suppose we waive this4      
,suppose we grant that there must be an 
,idea of whiteness1 because there is an 
,idea of the ,good4 ,then why is there  
an ,idea of the ,good8 ,what is the     
necessity of that8 ,we cannot see any   
necessity in it4 ,what we said of the   
other ,ideas applies with equal force to
 the highest ,idea4 ,the ,good may be a 
necessary ,idea1 but ,plato has not     
shown it4  ,thus1 though ,plato named   
reason as the ,absolute1 #bdf and though
 reason is a self-explanatory principle1
 his account of the detailed content of 
reason is so unsatisfactory that none of
 the concepts which he includes in it   
are really shown to be rational4 ,his   
philosophy breaks down upon the second  
test as it did upon the first4 ,he has  
neither explained the world from the    
,ideas1 nor has he made the ,ideas      

explain themselves4  ,there is one other
 defect in ,plato's system which is of  
capital importance4 ,there runs         
throughout it a confusion between the   
notions of reality and existence4 ,to   
distinguish between existence and       
reality is an essential feature of all  
idealism4 ,even if we go back to the dim
 idealism of the ,eleatics1 we shall see
 this4 ,zeno1 we saw1 denied motion1    
multiplicity1 and the world of sense4   
,but he did not deny the existence of   
the world4 ,that is an impossibility4   
,even if the world is delusion1 the     
delusion exists4 ,what he denied was the
 reality of existence4 ,but if reality  
is not existence1 what is it8 ,it is    
,being1 replied the ,eleatics4 ,but     
,being does not exist4 ,whatever exists 
is this or that particular sort of      
being4 ,being itself is not anywhere to 
be found4 ,thus the ,eleatics first     
denied that existence is reality1 and   
then that reality exists4 ,they did not 
themselves draw this conclusion1 but it 

is involved in their whole position4    
,with a fully developed idealism1 like  
,plato's1 this ought to be still        
clearer4 ,and1 in a sense1 it is4 ,the  
individual horse is not real4 ,but it   
certainly exists4 ,the universal horse  
is real4 ,but it does not exist4 ,but1  
upon this last point1 ,plato wavered and
 fell4 ,he cannot resist the temptation 
to think of the absolute reality as     
existing4 ,and consequently the ,ideas  
are #bdg not merely thought as the real 
universal in the world1 but as having a 
separate existence in a world of their  
own4 ,plato must have realised what is1 
in truth1 involved in his whole         
position1 that the absolute reality has 
no existence4 ,for he tells us that it  
is the universal1 and not any particular
 individual thing4 ,but everything that 
exists is an individual thing4 ,again1  
he tells us that the ,idea is outside   
time4 ,but whatever exists must exist at
 some time4 ,here then this central     
idealistic thought seems well fixed in  

,plato's mind4 ,but when he goes on to  
speak of recollection and reincarnation1
 when he tells us that the soul before  
birth dwelt apart in the world of       
,ideas1 to which after death it may hope
 to return1 it is clear that ,plato has 
forgotten his own philosophy1 that he is
 now thinking of the ,ideas as          
individual existences in a world of     
their own4 ,this is a world of ,ideas   
having a separate existence and place of
 its own4 ,it is not this world4 ,it is 
a world beyond4 ,thus the ,platonic     
philosophy which began on a high level  
of idealistic thinking1 proclaiming the 
sole reality of the universal1 ends by  
turning the universal itself into       
nothing but an existent particular4 ,it 
is the old old story of trying to form  
mental pictures of that which no picture
 is adequate to comprehend4 ,since all  
pictures are formed out of sensuous     
materials1 and since we can form no     
picture of anything that is not an      
individual thing1 to form a picture of  

the universal necessarily means thinking
 of it as just what it is not1 an       
individual4 ,so ,plato commits the      
greatest sin that can be ascribed to a  
philosopher4 ,he treats thought as a    
thing4  ,to sum up4 ,plato is the great 
founder of idealism1 the initiator of   
all subsequent truths in philosophy4    
#bdh ,but1 as always with pioneers1 his 
idealism is crude4 ,it cannot explain   
the world2 it cannot explain itself4 ,it
 cannot even keep true to its own       
principles1 because1 having for the     
first time in history definitely        
enunciated the truth that reality is the
 universal1 it straightway forgets its  
own creed and plunges back into a       
particularism which regards the ,ideas  
as existent individuals4 ,it was these  
defects which ,aristotle set himself to 
rectify in a purer idealism1 shorn of   
,plato's impurities4    #bdi  ,,chapter 
,,xiii  ,,aristotle  #a4 ,life1         
,writings1 and general character of his 
,work4  ,aristotle was born in #chd     

,b4,c4 at ,stagirus1 a ,grecian colony  
and seaport on the coast of ,thrace4    
,his father ,nichomachus was court      
physician to ,king ,amyntas of          
,macedonia1 and from this began         
,aristotle's long association with the  
,macedonian ,court1 which considerably  
influenced his life and destinies4      
,while he was still a boy his father    
died1 and he was sent by his guardian1  
,proxenus1 to ,athens1 the intellectual 
centre of the world1 to complete his    
education4 ,he was then aged seventeen4 
,he joined the ,academy and studied     
under ,plato1 attending the latter's    
lectures for a period of twenty years4  
,in subsequent times1 ,aristotle's      
detractors1 anxious to vilify his       
character1 accused him of ingratitude to
 his master1 ,plato4 ,it was said that  
,plato's old age had been embittered by 
dissensions in the school caused by the 
factious spirit of ,aristotle4 ,that    
there is no ground for attaching any    
blame to ,aristotle for the troubles of 

,plato1 which either did not exist or   
have been grossly exaggerated1 is       
evident both from the facts within our  
knowledge and from the reference to     
,plato in ,aristotle's works4 ,it is not
 likely that1 had ,aristotle rendered   
himself genuinely objectionable1 he     
could have remained for twenty years in 
#bej the ,academy1 and only left it upon
 the death of ,plato4 ,moreover1        
although ,aristotle in his works attacks
 the teaching of ,plato with unsparing  
vigour1 there is nowhere to be found in 
these attacks any suggestion of acrimony
 or personal rancour4 ,on the contrary1 
he refers to himself as the friend of   
,plato1 but a greater friend of the     
truth4 ,the fact1 in all probability1 is
 that a man of such independent and     
original mind as ,aristotle did not     
accord to ,plato the kind of blind      
adoration and hero-worship which he may 
have received from the inferior         
intellects in the school4 ,as is so     
often the case with young men of marked 

ability1 the brilliant student may have 
suffered from the impatience and        
self-assertion of youth4 ,there was     
certainly nothing worse4  ,while at the 
,academy ,aristotle exhibited an        
unflagging spirit and unwearied zeal in 
the pursuit of knowledge in all its     
forms1 a spirit which gave rise to      
nick-names and anecdotes1 which probably
 contained as much truth1 or as little1 
as most of the anecdotes which gather   
round remarkable characters4 ,one of    
these stories was that he used a        
mechanical contrivance to wake him up   
whenever sleep threatened to put an end 
to his hours of study4  ,in #cdg ,b4,c4 
,plato died1 and his nephew ,speusippus 
was chosen as head of the ,academy4     
,aristotle left ,athens with his        
fellow-student ,xenocrates1 and together
 they repaired to the court of          
,hermeias1 ,king of ,atarneus1 in ,asia 
,minor4 ,hermeias1 a man of low origin1 
but of high instincts and advanced      
education1 had himself attended the     

lectures of ,plato1 and received the two
 young philosophers as welcome guests4  
,aristotle stayed three years at        
,atarneus1 and1 while there1 married    
#bea ,pythias1 the niece of the ,king4  
,in later life he was married a second  
time to one ,herpyllis1 who bore him a  
son1 ,nichomachus4 ,at the end of three 
years ,hermeias fell a victim to the    
treachery of the ,persians1 and         
,aristotle went to ,mytilene4 ,here he  
remained for several years till he      
received an invitation from ,philip of  
,macedonia to become the tutor of the   
young ,alexander1 afterwards conqueror  
of the world1 then aged thirteen4       
,aristotle obeyed the summons1 and for  
about five years superintended the      
education of ,alexander4 ,both ,philip  
and ,alexander appear to have paid      
,aristotle high honour1 and there were  
stories that he was supplied by the     
,macedonian court1 not only with funds  
for the prosecution of learning1 but    
even with thousands of slaves for the   

collection of specimens4 ,these stories 
are probably false and certainly        
exaggerated4 ,but there is no doubt     
that1 in his scientific and             
philosophical enquiries1 he was backed  
by the influence of the court1 and could
 even perhaps have looked to that       
quarter for supplies1 had it ever been  
necessary4  ,upon the death of ,philip1 
,alexander succeeded to the kingship4   
,the period of his studies was now over1
 and he began to make preparations for  
his subsequent conquests4 ,aristotle's  
work being finished1 he returned to     
,athens1 which he had not visited since 
the death of ,plato4 ,he found the      
,platonic school flourishing under      
,xenocrates1 and ,platonism the dominant
 philosophy of ,athens4 ,he thereupon   
set up his own school at a place called 
the ,lyceum4 ,it was in connection with 
this that his followers became known1 in
 after years1 as the peripatetics1 a    
name which arose from ,aristotle's habit
 of walking about as he discoursed4 ,the

 period of #beb his residence in ,athens
 lasted thirteen years1 during which    
time he was occupied in the leadership  
of his school and in literary labours4  
,this appears to have been the most     
fruitful period of his life4 ,there is  
no doubt that all his most important    
writings were composed at this time4    
,but at the end of this period his      
fortunes changed4  ,in ,b4,c4 #cbc      
,alexander the ,great died suddenly at  
,babylon in the midst of his triumphs4  
,the ,athenian ,government was in the   
hands of a pro-,macedonian party4 ,upon 
the death of ,alexander this party was  
overthrown1 and a general reaction      
occurred against everything ,macedonian4
 ,alexander had been regarded in ,greece
 much as ,napoleon was regarded in      
,europe a century ago4 ,he had insulted 
the free ,greek cities4 ,he had even    
sacked the city of ,thebes4 ,the whole  
of ,greece lived in perpetual terror of 
invasion4 ,now that this fear was       
removed by his death1 there was a       

general outburst of feeling against     
,macedonia4 ,an anti-,macedonian party  
came into power4 ,now ,aristotle had    
always been regarded as a representative
 and protege of the ,macedonian court1  
although1 as a matter of fact1 he had   
recently fallen out of favour with the  
autocratic ,alexander4 ,a charge of     
impiety was trumped up against him4 ,to 
escape prosecution he fled to ,chalcis  
in ,euboea1 in order that1 as he said1  
the ,athenians might not have another   
opportunity of sinning against          
philosophy as they had already done in  
the person of ,socrates4 ,he perhaps    
intended to return to ,athens as soon as
 the storm had blown over4 ,but in the  
first year of his residence at ,chalcis 
he was overtaken by a sudden illness1   
and died at the age of sixty-three1 in  
,b4,c4 #cbb4  #bec  ,aristotle is said  
to have composed some four hundred      
books4 ,our astonishment at this        
productivity diminishes somewhat when we
 remember that what is here called a    

book is much the same as what we should 
call a chapter in a modern treatise4    
,more than three-quarters of these      
writings have been lost4 ,but1 by good  
fortune1 what remains to us is          
undoubtedly by far the most important   
part1 and we have preserved in it a     
fairly complete account of the whole    
,aristotelian system in all its         
departments4 ,nearly all the writings1  
however1 have come down to us in a      
mutilated state4 ,this is especially the
 case with the ,metaphysics4 ,this      
treatise is unfinished1 and it was      
probably left unfinished by its author  
at his death4 ,but apart from this1     
several of the books of the ,metaphysics
 are undoubtedly spurious4 ,others      
apparently come in the wrong order4 ,we 
end one book in the middle of a         
discussion1 and when we begin the next  
we find ourselves in the middle of an   
entirely different subject4 ,there are  
frequent repetitions1 and parts of it   
read as if they were mere lecture notes4

 ,there are many interpolations4 ,the   
same characteristics are to be observed 
in ,aristotle's other writings1 though  
in a less degree4 ,it seems probable    
that they were not intended1 in their   
present state1 for publication4 ,final  
revision and finishing touches are      
lacking4 ,in spite of these defects1 the
 writings are voluminous and clear      
enough to enable us to trace out the    
whole of the main positions of          
,aristotle's thought4  ,we saw1 in the  
case of ,plato1 that1 as his literary   
activity lasted over a period of half a 
century1 during which his philosophy was
 in constant development1 it became     
important to trace this development in  
the #bed order of his ,dialogues4 ,the  
same thing is not true in the case of   
,aristotle4 ,the whole of his writings1 
or rather those that have come down to  
us1 seem to have been written during his
 last thirteen years1 while he was at   
,athens1 that is to say1 after he had   
passed his fiftieth year4 ,his system   

was then complete1 mature1 and fully    
developed4 ,the question of the order in
 which they were written has no great   
importance4 ,the result of critical     
investigations1 however1 is to show that
 he probably began with the various     
works upon logic1 composed next the     
treatises upon physical science1 next   
the ethical and political books1 and    
lastly the ,metaphysics1 which he left  
unfinished4  ,it must not be forgotten  
that ,aristotle was not only a          
philosopher in the modern restricted    
sense of that term4 ,he was a man of    
universal learning4 ,there is no branch 
of knowledge which did not receive his  
attention1 and upon which he was not the
 greatest expert of his time1 except    
perhaps mathematics4 ,so far was he from
 being only an abstract philosopher1    
that his natural tastes seem to have    
lain rather in the field of physical    
science than of abstract thought4 ,but  
his design seems to have been to work   
over the entire field of knowledge1     

thoroughly to overhaul the sciences     
already in existence1 rejecting what    
seemed false in the work of his         
predecessors1 and invariably adding to  
the residue valuable developments and   
suggestions of his own4 ,where there was
 no science already in existence1 his   
plan involved the foundation of new     
sciences wherever necessary1 and he thus
 became the founder of at least two     
sciences1 ,logic and ,zoology4 ,he thus 
attained to a pre-eminence in all       
branches #bee of knowledge which would  
be impossible for a single man in modern
 times4 ,his works include treatises    
upon ,logic and ,metaphysics1 upon      
,ethics1 ,politics1 and ,art4 ,he wrote 
a treatise upon the principles of       
,rhetoric1 another upon ,astronomy1     
under the title ,on the ,heavens1       
another upon ,meteorology4 ,several of  
his treatises deal with the biology of  
animal life1 in which he was intensely  
interested4 ,they include books entitled
 ,on the ,parts of ,animals1 ,on the    

,movements of ,animals1 ,on the ,origin 
of ,animals1 as well as his great       
treatise1 ,researches on ,animals1 which
 contains an enormous mass of facts     
collected from every possible source4   
,it is true that a large proportion of  
these facts have turned out to be       
fictions1 but this was inevitable in the
 infancy of science4 ,it has been       
calculated that ,aristotle shows himself
 acquainted with about five hundred     
different species of living beings1     
though they are not1 of course1         
classified by him in the modern way4    
,with these books upon animals he       
founded the science of ,zoology1 for no 
one before his day had made any special 
study of the subject4  ,it has been said
 that everyone has either an            
,aristotelian or a ,platonic type of    
mind4 ,as this implies that ,aristotle  
and ,plato are opposites1 it is         
considerably less than a half truth4 ,no
 genuine understanding of ,aristotle can
 endorse the opinion that his           

philosophical system was the opposite of
 ,plato's4 ,it would be truer to say    
that ,aristotle was the greatest of all 
,platonists1 since his system is still  
founded upon the ,idea1 and is an       
attempt to found an idealism free from  
the defects of ,plato's system4 ,it is  
in fact a development of ,platonism4    
,what is the cause then of the popular  
notion that #bef ,aristotle was the     
opposite of ,plato8 ,now the fact is    
that they were opposites in many        
important respects4 ,but there was a    
fundamental agreement between them which
 lies deeper than the differences4 ,the 
differences are largely superficial1 the
 agreement is deep-seated4 ,hence it is 
the differences that are most obvious1  
and it was the differences1 too1 which  
were most obvious to ,aristotle himself4
 ,the popular opinion arises largely    
from the fact that ,aristotle never     
loses an opportunity of attacking the   
,platonic theory of ,ideas4 ,he is      
continually at pains to emphasize the   

difference between himself and ,plato1  
but says nothing of the agreement4 ,but 
no man is a judge of his own deeper     
relations to his predecessors and       
contemporaries4 ,it is only in after    
years1 when the hubbub of controversy   
has settled down into the silence of the
 past1 that the historian can see the   
true perspective1 and can penetrate the 
relations of each great man to the time 
in which he lived4 ,plato was the       
founder of idealism1 and his idealism   
was in many respects crude and          
untenable4 ,it was the special mission  
of ,aristotle to clear away these       
crudities1 and so develop ,platonism    
into a tenable philosophy4 ,and it was  
natural that he should emphasize the    
crudities1 which he had to fight so hard
 to overcome1 rather than that          
substratum of truth which ,plato had    
already developed1 and which therefore  
required no special treatment at his    
hands4 ,it was the differences between  
himself and his predecessor which were  

most obvious to him1 and it was         
inevitable that he should adopt a       
thoroughly polemical attitude towards   
his master4  ,but if the agreement was  
more deep-seated than the differences1  
and lay in the recognition of the ,idea 
as the #beg absolute foundation of the  
world1 the differences were none the    
less very striking4 ,in the first place1
 ,aristotle loved facts4 ,what he wanted
 was always definite scientific         
knowledge4 ,plato1 on the other hand1   
had no love of facts and no gift for    
physical enquiries4 ,and what disgusted 
,aristotle about the system of ,plato   
was the contempt which it poured upon   
the world of sense4 ,to depreciate      
objects of sense1 and to proclaim the   
knowledge of them valueless1 was a      
fundamental characteristic of all       
,plato's thinking4 ,but the world of    
sense is the world of facts1 and        
,aristotle was deeply interested in     
facts4 ,no matter in what branch of     
knowledge1 any fact was received by     

,aristotle with enthusiasm4 ,to ,plato  
it appeared of no interest what the     
habits of some obscure animal might be4 
,that alone which should be pursued is  
the knowledge of the ,idea4 ,and he went
 so far as to deny that knowledge of the
 sense-world could properly be described
 as knowledge at all4 ,but the habits of
 animals appeared to ,aristotle a matter
 worthy of investigation for its own    
sake4 ,francis ,bacon in his ,novum     
,organum has many contemptuous          
references to ,aristotle4 ,and the gist 
of them all is that ,aristotle had no   
regard for facts1 but theorized a priori
 out of his head1 and that instead of   
patiently investigating the facts of    
nature1 he decided1 upon so-called      
rational grounds1 what nature ought to  
do1 and squared the facts with his      
theories4  ,it was natural for ,bacon to
 be unjust to him4 ,he1 with the other  
thinkers of his time1 was engaged upon  
an uphill fight against scholasticism1  
then dominant1 which claimed to         

represent the true teaching of          
,aristotle4 ,and it was true that the   
schoolmen theorized a priori1 #beh and  
ignored facts1 or1 what was worse1      
appealed to the writings of ,aristotle  
to decide questions of fact which should
 have been decided by an appeal to      
nature4 ,and ,bacon not unnaturally     
confounded ,aristotle with these modern 
,aristotelians1 and attributed to him   
the faults that were really theirs4 ,but
 no man was ever keener on facts than   
,aristotle as is proved by his treatises
 upon animals1 which contain evidences  
of astonishing patience and laborious   
work in the collection of facts4 ,it is 
true1 however1 that even in the domain  
of facts1 ,aristotle1 like all the      
ancients1 was guilty of introducing a   
priori reasonings when they were quite  
out of place4 ,thus he does not scruple 
to argue that the stars must move in    
circles because the circle is the       
perfect figure4 ,and numerous similar   
instances could be quoted4 ,but it was  

inevitable that1 with science in its    
swaddling clothes1 without the aid of   
any instruments1 or of any body of      
previously ascertained truths1          
,aristotle should fall into these       
snares4 ,he well understood the         
fundamental necessity of all natural    
sciences for a laborious investigation  
of facts1 but1 when this was impossible1
 he used the only means in his power1   
his reason4  ,secondly1 in spite of     
,plato's rationalism1 he had allowed to 
myths and poetry a large share in the   
development of his thoughts1 and had    
even exhibited a distinct tendency      
towards mysticism4 ,here again what     
,aristotle wanted was definite          
knowledge4 ,it pained him to see poetic 
metaphors substituted for rational      
explanation4 ,and this accounts for the 
third main difference between ,plato and
 ,aristotle1 the marked contrast in     
their prose styles4 ,plato was a        
master-artist in words4 ,aristotle cared
 nothing for the ornaments and beauties 

of style4 #bei ,he harshly excludes them
 from his work4 ,what alone he is intent
 upon is the meaning1 the truth that the
 words express4 ,he is too much in      
earnest with philosophy to lose himself 
in a haze of beautiful words1 or to be  
put off with metaphors instead of       
reasons4 ,his style is even harsh1      
abrupt1 and ugly4 ,but what it loses in 
beauty it gains in clearness of         
conception4 ,for every thought or shade 
of thought which it is desired to       
express there is an accurate term4 ,if  
no term in common use will express the  
thought1 ,aristotle coins one4 ,hence he
 is one of the greatest terminologists  
that ever lived4 ,he adapted or invented
 an enormous number of terms4 ,he may be
 not unjustly regarded as the founder of
 philosophical language1 as the inventor
 of a vocabulary of technical terms4    
,many of the terms used to this day to  
express man's most abstract thoughts1   
were invented or introduced by          
,aristotle4 ,it must not be supposed    

that ,aristotle wrote in a rigidly      
scientific style because he had no      
aesthetic sense4 ,the very contrary is  
the case4 ,his treatise on art shows him
 by far the best critic of the ancient  
world1 and in his appreciation and      
estimation of the beautiful he far      
excels ,plato4 ,but he saw that art and 
science have each their own sphere1 and 
that it is fatal to confuse the two4    
,nothing is so damaging to art as to be 
made the mere vehicle of reasoning4     
,nothing is so damaging to philosophy as
 to allow itself to be governed by      
poetry4 ,if we want beauty1 we must     
follow the path of art4 ,but if we      
desire truth1 we must stick close to    
reason4  ,aristotle's system falls most 
easily into the fivefold division of    
logic1 metaphysics1 physics1 ethics1 and
 aesthetics4  #bfj  #b4 ,logic4  ,not   
much need be said under this head1      
because whoever knows the common logic  
of the text-books knows the logic of    
,aristotle4 ,of the two branches of     

reasoning1 deductive and inductive1     
,aristotle clearly recognizes the       
latter4 ,and many of his observations   
upon induction are acute and            
penetrating4 ,but he has not reduced    
induction to a science4 ,he has not laid
 bare the fundamental canons of         
inductive thought4 ,this was a work not 
performed until comparatively modern    
times4 ,his name therefore is more      
especially associated with deductive    
logic1 of which he was the founder4 ,he 
not only founded the science1 but       
practically completed it4 ,what we now  
know as formal logic1 what is to this   
day contained in all text-books1 taught 
in all schools and universities1 is1 in 
all its essentials1 nothing more than   
the logic of ,aristotle4 ,his writings  
upon the subject include the treatment  
of the well-known laws of thought1 the  
doctrine of the ten categories1 the five
 predicables1 the doctrines of terms1 of
 propositions1 of syllogisms1 and of the
 reduction of the other figures to the  

first figure of the syllogism4 ,and     
these heads might well form the list of 
contents of a modern work on formal     
logic4 ,in only two respects has any    
advance been made upon ,aristotle by    
subsequent logicians4 ,the fourth figure
 of the syllogism is not recognized by  
,aristotle2 and he dealt only with      
categorical syllogisms1 and does not    
treat conditional syllogisms4 ,but      
whether or not the fourth figure of the 
syllogism has any value is still a      
matter open to dispute4 ,and though the 
doctrine of conditional syllogisms is   
important1 it is not essential1 because 
all conditional syllogisms can be       
reduced to categorical #bfa syllogisms4 
,the categorical syllogism is the       
fundamental type of reasoning1 to which 
every other form of deduction can be    
reduced4 ,as for the rest of the huge   
treatises on formal logic which some    
moderns have produced1 the supposed     
additions are nothing but wearisome1    
endless1 useless1 nauseating1 academic  

distinctions and refinements1 which are 
much better forgotten than remembered4  
,aristotle's logic contains therefore   
all that is essential to the subject4   
,the only ground on which it can be     
attacked is its wholly empirical        
procedure4 ,but that is another story4  
,as a collection1 arrangement1 and      
analysis of the facts of reason1 it is  
to all intents and purposes finality    
achieved at one stroke4    #c4          
,metaphysics4  ,the treatise now known  
as the ,metaphysics of ,aristotle did   
not originally bear that name4          
,aristotle's name for this subject is   
first philosophy1 by which he means the 
knowledge of the first1 highest1 or most
 general principles of the universe4    
,all other branches of knowledge are    
subordinate to this science1 not because
 they are inferior in value1 but because
 they are lower in logical sequence as  
dealing with principles less universal  
in their scope4 ,thus all the special   
sciences deal with one or another       

particular sphere of being1 but the     
first philosophy has for its subject    
being as such1 being so far forth as it 
is being4 ,it studies1 not the          
characteristics of this or that kind of 
being1 but the principles which are     
equally true of all being4 ,the laws of 
,zoology apply only to animals1 but the 
principles of the first philosophy apply
 to everything4 ,the name metaphysics   
came into use only half a century       
,b4,c41 when #bfb ,andronicus published 
a complete edition of ,aristotle's known
 works4 ,in this edition the treatise on
 first philosophy was placed after the  
physics1 and metaphysics signifies      
simply after physics4 ,the derivation of
 the word thus appears to be merely     
accidental and adventitious4 ,whether it
 was also in any way intended to signify
 that the subject is beyond physics1    
that is1 deals with what transcends     
physical existence1 seems doubtful4     
,aristotle's metaphysical theory grows  
naturally out of his polemic against    

,plato's theory of ,ideas1 because his  
own system was in effect simply an      
attempt to overcome the defects which he
 found in ,plato4 ,the main heads of    
this polemic are the following3--  7#a7 
,plato's ,ideas do not explain the      
existence of things4 ,to explain why the
 world is here is after all the main    
problem of philosophy1 and ,plato's     
theory fails to do this4 ,even admitting
 that1 say1 the ,idea of whiteness      
exists1 we cannot see how it produces   
white objects4  7#b7 ,plato has not     
explained the relation of ,ideas to     
things4 ,things1 we are told1 are copies
 of ,ideas1 and participate in them4    
,but how are we to understand this      
participation8 ,in using such phrases1  
says ,aristotle1 ,plato is giving no    
real account of the relationship1 but is
 merely uttering poetic metaphors4  7#c7
 ,even if the existence of things is    
explained by the ,ideas1 their motion is
 not4 ,suppose that the ,idea of        
whiteness produces white things1 the    

,idea of beauty beautiful things1 and so
 on1 yet1 since the ,ideas themselves   
are immutable and motionless1 so will be
 the world which is their copy4 ,thus   
the universe would be #bfc absolutely   
static1 like ,coleridge's painted ship  
upon a painted ocean4 ,but the world1 on
 the contrary1 is a world of change1    
motion1 life1 becoming4 ,plato makes no 
attempt to explain the unceasing        
becoming of things4 ,even if the ,idea  
of whiteness explains white objects1 yet
 why do these objects arise1 develop1   
decay1 and cease to exist8 ,to explain  
this there must be some principle of    
motion in the ,ideas themselves4 ,but   
there is not4 ,they are immovable and   
lifeless4  7#d7 ,the world consists of a
 multitude of things1 and it is the     
business of philosophy to explain why   
they exist4 ,by way of explanation      
,plato merely assumes the existence of  
another multitude of things1 the ,ideas4
 ,but the only effect of this is to     
double the number of things to be       

explained4 ,how does it help thus to    
duplicate everything8 ,and ,aristotle   
likens ,plato to a man who1 being unable
 to count with a small number1 fancies  
that1 if he doubles the number1 he will 
find it easier to count4  7#e7 ,the     
,ideas are supposed to be non-sensuous1 
but they are1 in fact1 sensuous4 ,plato 
thought that a non-sensuous principle   
must be sought in order to explain the  
world of sense4 ,but not being able to  
find any such principle1 he merely took 
the objects of sense over again and     
called them non-sensuous4 ,but there is1
 in fact1 no difference between the     
horse and the ,idea of the horse1       
between the man and the ,idea of the    
man1 except a useless and meaningless   
in-itself or in-general attached to each
 object of sense to make it appear      
something different4 ,the ,ideas are    
nothing but hypostatized things of      
sense1 and ,aristotle likens them to the
 anthropomorphic gods of the popular    
religion4 ,as #bfd these1 he says1 are  

nothing but deified men1 so the ,ideas  
are nothing but eternalized things of   
nature4 ,things are said to be copies of
 ,ideas1 but in fact the ,ideas are only
 copies of things4  7#f7 ,next comes the
 argument of the third man1 so called by
 ,aristotle from the illustration by    
which he explained it4 ,ideas are       
assumed in order to explain what is     
common to many objects4 ,wherever there 
is a common element there must be an    
,idea4 ,thus there is a common element  
in all men1 and therefore there is an   
,idea of man4 ,but there is also an     
element common to the individual man and
 to the ,idea of man4 ,there must1      
therefore1 be a further ,idea1 the third
 man1 to explain this4 ,and between this
 further ,idea and the individual man   
there must be yet another ,idea to      
explain what they have in common1 and so
 on ad infinitum4  7#g7 ,but by far the 
most important of all ,aristotle's      
objections to the ideal theory1 and that
 which1 to all intents and purposes1    

sums up all the others1 is that it      
assumes that ,ideas are the essences of 
things1 and yet places those essences   
outside the things themselves4 ,the     
essence of a thing must be in it1 and   
not outside it4 ,but ,plato separated   
,ideas from things1 and placed the      
,ideas away somewhere in a mysterious   
world of their own4 ,the ,idea1 as the  
universal1 can only exist in the        
particular4 ,possibly the reality in all
 horses is the universal horse1 but the 
universal horse is not something that   
exists by itself and independently of   
individual horses4 ,hence ,plato was led
 into the absurdity of talking as if1   
besides the individual horses we know1  
there is somewhere another individual   
called the horse-in-general1 or as if   
besides white objects there is a thing  
called #bfe whiteness4 ,and this is in  
fact the supreme self-contradiction of  
the theory of ,ideas1 that it begins by 
saying that the universal is real1 and  
the particular unreal1 but ends by      

degrading the universal again into a    
particular4 ,this is the same thing as  
saying that ,plato's mistake lay in     
first 7rightly7 seeing that existence is
 not reality1 but then 7wrongly7 going  
on to imagine that the reality is an    
existence4  ,out of this last objection 
grows ,aristotle's own philosophy1 the  
fundamental principle of which is that  
the universal is indeed the absolute    
reality1 but that it is a universal     
which exists only in the particular4    
,what is reality8 ,what is substance8   
,this is the first question for the     
metaphysician4 ,now substance is what   
has an independent existence of its own2
 it is that whose being does not flow   
into it from any source outside itself4 
,consequently1 substance is what is     
never a predicate2 it is that to which  
all predicates are applied4 ,thus in the
 proposition1 ,gold is heavy1 gold is   
the subject1 or substance1 and heavy is 
its predicate4 ,the heaviness is        
dependent for its existence on the gold1

 and it is therefore the latter1 and not
 the former1 that is the substance4     
,now1 keeping this in mind1 are         
universals1 as ,plato asserts1          
substances8 ,no2 because the universal  
is merely a common predicate which      
attaches to many objects of a class4    
,thus the concept of man is merely what 
is common to all men4 ,it is the same   
thing as the predicate humanness4 ,but  
humanness cannot exist apart from human 
beings1 any more than heaviness apart   
from the heavy object4 ,universals1     
then1 are not substances4 ,but neither  
are particulars substances4 ,for there  
is no such thing as that which is       
absolutely #bff particular and isolated4
 ,if humanness does not exist apart from
 men1 neither do men exist apart from   
humanness4 ,take away from a man what he
 has in common with other men1 and what 
he has in common with other objects1 and
 you will find that1 having stripped him
 of all his qualities1 there is         
absolutely nothing left4 ,we say gold is

 heavy1 yellow1 malleable1 etc4 ,now the
 heaviness1 the yellowness1 and the     
other qualities1 cannot exist apart from
 the gold4 ,but it is equally true that 
the gold cannot exist apart from its    
qualities4 ,strip off all its qualities 
in thought1 and then ask yourself what  
the gold itself is apart from its       
qualities4 ,you will find that your mind
 is a total blank4 ,in taking away the  
qualities you have taken away the gold  
itself4 ,the gold can only be thought   
through its qualities4 ,it only exists  
through its qualities4 ,the gold1       
therefore1 just as much depends on the  
qualities for its existence as the      
qualities depend upon the gold4 ,hence  
neither of them1 considered apart from  
the other1 is substance4 ,but the       
qualities are the universal element in  
the gold1 the gold without the qualities
 is the absolutely particular and       
isolated4 ,for1 first1 the yellowness is
 a quality which this gold has in common
 with that gold1 and is therefore a     

universal1 and so with all the          
qualities4 ,even if a particular piece  
of gold has a quality possessed by no   
other gold1 it is yet possessed by some 
other object in the universe1 or it     
would be unknowable4 ,every quality is  
consequently a universal4 ,secondly1 the
 gold without its qualities is the      
absolutely particular4 ,for1 being      
stripped of all qualities1 it is        
stripped of whatever it has in common   
with other things2 it is stripped of    
whatever universality it has1 and it    
remains an absolute particular4 ,hence  
the #bfg universal is not substance1 nor
 is the particular4 ,for neither of them
 can exist without the other4 ,substance
 must be a compound of the two2 it must 
be the universal in the particular4 ,and
 this means that that alone which is    
substance is the individual object1 for 
example1 the gold with all its qualities
 attached to it4  ,it is usually        
believed that ,aristotle contradicted   
himself in as much as he first states1  

as above1 that the individual object1   
the compound of universal and           
particular1 is substance1 but later on  
allows a superior reality to the        
universal1 or form as he calls it1 and  
in effect teaches1 like ,plato1 that the
 universal is what alone is absolutely  
real1 that is1 that the universal is    
substance4 ,i do not agree that there is
 any real inconsistency in ,aristotle4  
,or rather1 the inconsistency is one of 
words and not of thought4 ,it must be   
remembered that1 whenever ,aristotle    
says that the individual1 and not the   
universal1 is substance1 he is thinking 
of ,plato4 ,what he means to deny is    
that the universal can exist on its own 
account1 as ,plato thought4             
,nevertheless he agrees with ,plato that
 the universal is the real4 ,when he    
says that the universal is not substance
 he means1 as against ,plato1 that it is
 not existent4 ,what alone exists is the
 individual thing1 the compound of      
universal and particular4 ,when he says1

 or implies1 that the universal is      
substance1 he means that1 though it is  
not existent1 it is real4 ,his words are
 contradictory1 but his meaning is not4 
,he has not expressed himself as clearly
 as he should2 that is all4  ,the       
further development of ,aristotle's     
metaphysics depends upon his doctrine of
 causation4 ,by causation here1 however1
 is meant a very much wider conception  
#bfh than what is understood by that    
term in modern times4 ,i have in        
previous lectures attempted to make     
clear the distinction between causes and
 reasons4 ,the cause of a thing does not
 give any reason for it1 and therefore  
does not explain it4 ,the cause is      
merely the mechanism by which a reason  
produces its consequence4 ,death is     
caused by accident or disease1 but these
 causes explain nothing as to why death 
should be in the world at all4 ,now if  
we accept this distinction1 we may say  
that ,aristotle's conception of         
causation includes both what we have    

called causes and reasons4 ,whatever is 
necessary1 whether facts or principles1 
whether causes or reasons1 fully to     
understand the existence of a thing1 or 
the happening of an event1 is included  
in the ,aristotelian notion of          
causation4  ,taking causation in this   
wide sense1 ,aristotle finds that there 
are four kinds of causes1 the material1 
the efficient1 the formal1 and the final
 cause4 ,these are not alternative      
causes2 it is not meant that1 to explain
 anything1 one or other of the four must
 be present4 ,in every case of the      
existence or production of a thing all  
four causes operate simultaneously4     
,moreover the same four causes are to be
 found both in human and in cosmic      
production1 in the making of            
manufactured articles by man and in the 
production of things by nature4 ,they   
are more clearly and easily seen1       
however1 in human production1 from which
 sphere1 therefore1 we select our       
example4 ,the material cause of a thing 

is the matter of which it is composed4  
,it is the raw material which becomes   
the thing4 ,for example1 in the making  
of a bronze statue of ,hermes1 the      
bronze is the material cause of the     
statue4 ,this example might lead one to 
suppose #bfi that ,aristotle means by   
material cause what we call matter1     
physical substance1 such as brass1 iron1
 or wood4 ,as we shall see later1 this  
is not necessarily the case1 though it  
is so in the present instance4 ,the     
efficient cause is always defined by    
,aristotle as the cause of motion4 ,it  
is the energy or moving force required  
to bring about change4 ,it must be      
remembered that by motion ,aristotle    
means not merely change of place but    
change of any sort4 ,the alteration of a
 leaf from green to yellow is just as   
much motion1 in his sense1 as the       
falling of a stone4 ,the efficient      
cause1 then1 is the cause of all change4
 ,in the example taken1 what causes the 
bronze to become a statue1 what produces

 this change1 is the sculptor4 ,he is1  
therefore1 the efficient cause of the   
statue4 ,the formal cause ,aristotle    
defines as the substance and essence of 
the thing4 ,now the essence of a thing  
is given in its definition4 ,but the    
definition is the explication of the    
concept4 ,therefore the formal cause is 
the concept1 or1 as ,plato would call   
it1 the ,idea of the thing4 ,plato's    
,ideas thus reappear in ,aristotle as   
formal causes4 ,the final cause is the  
end1 purpose1 or aim1 towards which the 
movement is directed4 ,when a statue is 
being produced1 the end of this         
activity1 what the sculptor aims at1 is 
the completed statue itself4 ,and the   
final cause of a thing in general is the
 thing itself1 the completed being of   
the object4  ,we can see at once how    
much wider this conception of causation 
is than the modern conception4 ,if we   
take ,mill's definition of a cause as   
the best expression of modern scientific
 ideas1 we find that he defines a cause 

as the invariable and unconditional     
antecedent of a phenomenon4 ,this cuts  
out final causes at once4 ,for #bgj the 
final cause is the end1 and is not an   
antecedent in time4 ,it also does not   
include formal causes4 ,for we do not   
now think of the concept of a thing as  
being part of its cause4 ,this leaves us
 with only material and efficient       
causes1 and these correspond roughly to 
the modern notions of matter and energy4
 ,even the efficient causes of          
,aristotle1 however1 appear on further  
consideration1 to be excluded from the  
modern idea of causation4 ,for1 though  
the efficient cause is the energy which 
produces motion1 modern science regards 
it as purely mechanical energy1 whereas 
,aristotle thinks of it1 as we shall    
see1 as an ideal force1 operating not   
from the beginning but from the end4    
,but it must not be supposed that1 in   
saying that the modern idea of causation
 excludes formal and final causes1 we   
mean that ,aristotle is wrong in adding 

them1 or that the modern idea is better 
than ,aristotle's4 ,it is not a question
 of better and worse at all4 ,modern    
science does not in any way deny the    
reality of formal and final causes4 ,it 
merely considers them to be outside its 
sphere4 ,it is no business of science   
whether they exist or not4 ,as knowledge
 advances1 differentiation and division 
of labour occur4 ,science takes as its  
province mechanical causes1 and leaves  
formal and final causes to the          
philosopher to explicate4 ,thus1 for    
example1 formal causes are not          
considered by science because they are  
not1 in the modern sense1 causes at all4
 ,they are what we have called reasons4 
,if we are to explain the existence of  
an object in the universe it may be     
necessary to introduce formal causes1   
concepts1 to show why the thing exists1 
to show in fact its reasons4 ,but       
science makes no attempt to explain the 
existence of objects4 ,it takes their   
#bga existence for granted1 and seeks to

 trace their history and their relations
 to each other4 ,therefore it does not  
require formal causes4 ,it seeks to work
 out the mechanical view of the         
universe1 and therefore considers only  
mechanical causes4 ,but ,aristotle's    
theory1 as being philosophy rather than 
science1 includes both the principles of
 mechanism and teleology4   ,it was not 
,aristotle's habit to propound his      
theories as if they were something      
absolutely new1 sprung for the first    
time out of his own brain4 ,in attacking
 any problem1 his custom was to begin by
 enumerating current and past opinions1 
to criticise them1 to reject what was   
valueless in them1 to retain the residue
 of truth1 and to add to it his own     
suggestions and original ideas4 ,the    
resultant of this process was his own   
theory1 which he thus represented1 not  
as absolutely new1 but as a development 
of the views of his predecessors4 ,this 
course he follows also in the present   
instance4 ,the first book of the        

,metaphysics is a history of all        
previous philosophy1 from ,thales to    
,plato1 undertaken with the object of   
investigating how far the four causes   
had been recognized by his predecessors4
 ,the material cause1 he says1 had been 
recognized from the first4 ,the ,ionics 
believed in this and no other cause4    
,they sought to explain everything by   
matter1 though they differed among      
themselves as to the nature of the      
material cause1 ,thales describing it as
 water1 ,anaximenes as air4 ,later      
philosophers also gave different        
accounts of it1 ,heracleitus thinking it
 was fire1 ,empedocles the four         
elements1 ,anaxagoras an indefinite     
number of kinds of matter4 ,but the     
point is that they all recognized the   
necessity for a material cause of some  
sort to explain the universe4  #bgb     
,the earliest thinkers1 then1 the       
,ionics1 assumed only this one cause4   
,but as thought advanced1 says          
,aristotle1 and other philosophers came 

upon the scene1 the thing itself guided 
them4 ,it was seen that a second cause  
was necessary to explain the motion and 
becoming of things4 ,for matter itself  
does not produce its motion4 ,wood is   
not the cause of its becoming a bed1 nor
 is brass the cause of its becoming a   
statue4 ,hence arose the idea of the    
efficient cause4 ,the ,eleatics did not 
recognize it1 for they denied motion1   
and for them1 therefore1 no cause of    
motion could be assumed4 ,but           
,parmenides1 ,aristotle thinks1 wavered 
on this point1 somehow allowing vaguely 
the existence of a second cause1 which  
he denominated the hot and the cold4    
,the reference is1 of course1 to the    
second part of the poem of ,parmenides4 
,other philosophers clearly assumed an  
efficient cause1 for they thought that  
one element1 for example1 fire1 is more 
active1 that is1 more productive of     
motion1 than others4 ,empedocles        
certainly attained to the idea of an    
efficient cause1 for he named as moving 

forces1 harmony and discord1 love and   
hate4 ,anaxagoras also1 used ,nous as a 
moving force4  ,formal causes had1      
perhaps1 been recognized by the         
,pythagoreans1 for numbers are forms4   
,but they straightway degraded the      
formal cause to the level of a material 
cause by declaring that number is the   
stuff or matter of which things are     
made4 ,plato alone clearly saw the      
necessity for the formal cause1 for     
formal causes are1 as we have seen1 the 
same as ,plato's ,ideas4 ,but ,plato's  
philosophy contains only two of the four
 causes1 namely the material and the    
formal1 for ,plato made all things out  
of matter and the ,ideas4 ,since the    
,ideas have in them #bgc no principle of
 motion1 ,plato's system contains no    
efficient cause4 ,as for final causes1  
,plato had indeed the vague idea that   
everything is for the sake of the ,good1
 but he makes no use of this conception 
and does not develop it4 ,final causes  
were introduced into philosophy by      

,anaxagoras1 whose doctrine of the world
 forming mind was assumed to explain the
 design and purpose which the universe  
exhibits4 ,but as his system developed  
he forgot about this1 and used the ,nous
 merely as a piece of mechanism to      
explain motion1 thus letting it sink    
into nothing more than an efficient     
cause4  ,in the result1 ,aristotle finds
 that all four causes have been         
recognized in greater or lesser degrees 
by his predecessors1 and this1 in his   
opinion1 greatly reinforces his own     
doctrine4 ,but whereas material and     
efficient causes have been clearly      
understood1 his predecessors had only   
vaguely foreshadowed and dimly perceived
 the value of formal and final causes4  
,the next step in ,aristotle's          
metaphysics is to reduce these four     
principles to two1 which he calls matter
 and form4 ,this reduction takes place  
by showing that formal cause1 efficient 
cause1 and final cause1 all melt into   
the single conception of form4 ,in the  

first place1 the formal cause and the   
final cause are the same4 ,for the      
formal cause is the essence1 the        
concept1 the ,idea1 of the thing4 ,now  
the final cause1 or the end1 is simply  
the realisation of the ,idea of the     
thing in actuality4 ,what the thing aims
 at is the definite expression of its   
form4 ,it thus aims at its form4 ,its   
end1 final cause1 is thus the same as   
its formal cause4 ,secondly1 the        
efficient cause is the same as the final
 cause4 ,for the efficient cause is the 
cause of becoming4 ,the final cause is  
the end of #bgd the becoming1 it is what
 it becomes4 ,and1 in ,aristotle's      
opinion1 what causes the becoming is    
just that it aims at the end4 ,the      
striving of all things is towards the   
end1 and exists because of the end4 ,the
 end is thus itself the cause of        
becoming or motion4 ,that is to say1 the
 final cause is the real efficient      
cause4 ,we may see this better by an    
example4 ,the end or final cause of the 

acorn is the oak4 ,and it is the oak    
which is the cause of the acorn's       
growth1 which consists essentially in a 
movement by which the acorn is drawn    
towards its end1 the oak4 ,we may see   
this even more definitely in the case of
 human productions1 because here the    
striving towards an end is conscious1   
whereas in nature it is unconscious or  
instinctive4 ,the efficient cause of the
 statue is the sculptor4 ,it is he that 
moves the brass4 ,but what moves the    
sculptor1 and causes him to act upon the
 brass1 is the idea of the completed    
statue in his mind4 ,the idea of the    
end1 the final cause1 is thus the real  
ultimate cause of the movement4 ,only1  
in the case of human production1 the    
idea of the end is actually present in  
the sculptor's mind as a motive4 ,in    
nature there is no mind in which the end
 is conscious of itself1 but            
nevertheless nature moves towards the   
end1 and the end is the cause of the    
movement4 ,thus the three causes named  

all melt into a single notion1 which    
,aristotle calls the form of the thing4 
,and this leaves only the material cause
 unreduced to any other4 ,so we are left
 with the single antithesis of matter   
and form4  ,now as matter and form are  
the fundamental categories of           
,aristotle's philosophy1 by means of    
which he seeks to explain the entire    
universe1 it is essential that we should
 thoroughly understand their            
characteristics4 #bge ,first of all1    
matter and form are inseparable4 ,we    
think of them as separate in order to   
understand them clearly4 ,and this is   
quite right1 because they are opposite  
principles1 and therefore they are      
separable in thought4 ,but they are     
never separable in fact4 ,there is no   
such thing as form without matter1 or   
matter without form4 ,every existent    
thing1 that is1 every individual object1
 is a compound of matter and form4 ,we  
may compare them in this respect to the 
material and the shape of a thing1      

though we must be careful not to think  
that form is merely shape4 ,geometry    
considers shapes as if they existed by  
themselves4 ,but1 in fact1 we know that 
there are no such things as squares1    
circles1 and triangles4 ,there are only 
square objects1 circular objects1 etc4  
,and as there are no shapes without     
objects1 so there are no objects without
 shapes4 ,we talk of things being       
shapeless1 but this only means that     
their shape is irregular or unusual4    
,some shape an object must have4 ,yet1  
though shape and matter are inseparable 
in fact1 they are opposite principles1  
and are separable in thought4 ,geometry 
is quite right to treat shapes as if    
they existed by themselves1 but it is   
nevertheless dealing with mere          
abstractions4 ,just in the same way1    
matter and form are never apart1 and to 
think of form by itself or matter by    
itself is a mere abstraction4 ,no such  
thing exists4 ,in fact1 to imagine that 
forms can exist by themselves was just  

the mistake of which1 as we have seen1  
,aristotle accuses ,plato4 ,for the form
 is the ,idea1 and ,plato imagined that 
,ideas exist in a world of their own4   
,from this1 too1 we can see that the    
form is the universal1 the matter the   
particular4 ,for the form is the ,idea1 
and the ,idea is the universal4 ,to say 
that form and #bgf matter cannot exist  
apart is thus the same as saying that   
the universal only exists in the        
particular1 which1 as we have seen1 is  
the fundamental note of ,aristotle's    
philosophy4 ,but if we thus identify    
matter with the particular element in   
things1 we must be careful that we do   
not confuse the particular with the     
individual4 ,we often use these two     
words as practically synonymous1 and    
there is no harm in this1 but here we   
must be careful to separate them4 ,for  
every individual is1 according to       
,aristotle1 a compound of matter and    
form1 of the particular and the         
universal4 ,and when we say that matter 

is the particular1 we mean1 not that it 
is such a compound1 but that it is the  
absolutely particular which has no      
universal in it4 ,but the absolutely    
particular and isolated does not exist4 
,a piece of gold1 for instance1 only    
exists by virtue of its properties1     
yellowness1 heaviness1 etc41 and these  
qualities are just what it has in common
 with other things4 ,so that the        
particular1 as such1 has no existence1  
but this is only the same as saying1    
what we have already said1 that matter  
has no existence apart from form4  ,a   
very natural mistake would be to suppose
 that by matter ,aristotle meant the    
same as we do1 namely1 physical         
substance1 such as wood or iron1 and    
that by form he meant simply shape4 ,now
 although there is a kinship in the     
ideas1 these two pairs of ideas are far 
from identical4 ,let us begin with      
matter4 ,our ordinary idea of matter as 
physical substance is an absolute       
conception4 ,that is to say1 a thing    

which we call material is absolutely1   
once and for all1 matter4 ,it is not    
material from one point of view1 and    
immaterial from another4 ,in every      
possible relation it is1 and #bgg       
remains1 matter4 ,nor does it in process
 of time cease to be matter4 ,brass     
never becomes anything but matter4 ,no  
doubt there are in nature changes of one
 sort of matter into another1 for       
example1 radium into helium4 ,and for   
all we know1 brass may become lead4 ,but
 even so1 it does not cease to be       
matter4 ,but ,aristotle's conception of 
matter is a relative conception4 ,matter
 and form are fluid4 ,they flow into one
 another4 ,the same thing1 from one     
point of view1 is matter1 from another1 
form4 ,in all change1 matter is that    
which becomes1 that upon which the      
change is wrought4 ,that is form towards
 which the change operates4 ,what       
becomes is matter4 ,what it becomes is  
form4 ,thus wood is matter if considered
 in relation to the bed4 ,for it is what

 becomes the bed4 ,but wood is form if  
considered in relation to the growing   
plant4 ,for it is what the plant        
becomes4 ,the oak is the form of the    
acorn1 but it is the matter of the oak  
furniture4  ,that matter and form are   
relative terms shows1 too1 that the form
 cannot be merely the shape4 ,for what  
is form in one aspect is matter in      
another4 ,but shape is never anything   
but shape4 ,no doubt the shape is part  
of the form1 for the form in fact       
includes all the qualities of the thing4
 ,but the shape is quite an unimportant 
part of the form4 ,for form includes    
organization1 the relation of part to   
part1 and the subordination of all parts
 to the whole4 ,the form is the sum of  
the internal and external relations1 the
 ideal framework1 so to speak1 into     
which the thing is moulded4 ,form also  
includes function4 ,for it includes the 
final cause4 ,now the function of a     
thing is just what the thing is for4    
,and what it is for is the same as its  

end1 or final cause4 #bgh ,therefore    
function is included in form4 ,for      
example1 the function of a hand1 its    
power of gripping1 is part of its form4 
,and therefore1 if it loses its function
 by being cut off from the arm1 it      
likewise loses its form4 ,even the dead 
hand1 of course1 has some form1 for     
every individual object is a compound of
 matter and form4 ,but it has lost the  
highest part of its form1 and relatively
 to the living hand it is mere matter1  
although1 relatively to the flesh and   
bones of which it is composed1 it is    
still form4 ,clearly1 then1 form is not 
merely shape4 ,for the hand cut off does
 not lose its shape4  ,the form includes
 all the qualities of the thing4 ,the   
matter is what has the qualities4 ,for  
the qualities are all universals4 ,a    
piece of gold is yellow1 and this means 
simply that it has this in common with  
other pieces of gold1 and other yellow  
objects4 ,to say that anything has a    
quality is immediately to place it in a 

class4 ,and what the class has in common
 is a universal4 ,a thing without       
qualities cannot exist1 nor qualities   
without a thing4 ,and this is the same  
as saying that form and matter cannot   
exist separately4  ,the matter1 then1 is
 the absolutely formless4 ,it is the    
substratum which underlies everything4  
,it has1 in itself1 no character4 ,it is
 absolutely featureless1 indefinite1    
without any quality4 ,whatever gives a  
thing definiteness1 character1 quality1 
whatever makes it a this or that1 is its
 form4 ,consequently1 there are no      
differences within matter4 ,one thing   
can only differ from another by having  
different qualities4 ,and as matter has 
no qualities1 it has no difference4 ,and
 this in itself shows that the          
,aristotelian notion of matter is not   
the same as our notion of physical      
substance4 ,for1 according #bgi to our  
modern usage1 one kind of matter differs
 from another1 as brass from iron4 ,but 
this is a difference of quality1 and for

 ,aristotle all quality is part of the  
form4 ,so in his view the difference of 
brass from iron is not a difference of  
matter1 but a difference of form4       
,consequently1 matter may become        
anything1 according to the form         
impressed upon it4 ,it is thus the      
possibility of everything1 though it is 
actually nothing4 ,it only becomes      
something by the acquisition of form4   
,and this leads directly to a most      
important ,aristotelian antithesis1 that
 between potentiality and actuality4    
,potentiality is the same as matter1    
actuality as form4 ,for matter is       
potentially everything4 ,it may become  
everything4 ,it is not actually         
anything4 ,it is a mere potentiality1 or
 capacity of becoming something4 ,but   
whatever gives it definiteness as a this
 or that1 whatever makes it an actual   
thing1 is its form4 ,thus the actuality 
of a thing is simply its form4          
,aristotle claims1 by means of the      
antithesis of potentiality and          

actuality1 to have solved the ancient   
problem of becoming1 a riddle1          
propounded by the ,eleatics1 which had  
never ceased to trouble ,greek thinkers4
 ,how is becoming possible8 ,for being  
to pass into being is not becoming1 for 
it involves no change1 and for not-being
 to pass into being is impossible1 since
 something cannot come out of nothing4  
,for ,aristotle1 the sharp line drawn   
between not-being and being does not    
exist4 ,for these absolute terms he     
substitutes the relative terms          
potentiality and actuality1 which shade 
off into each other4 ,potentiality in   
his philosophy takes the place of       
not-being in previous systems4 ,it      
solves the riddle because it is not an  
absolute not-being4 ,it is #bhj         
not-being inasmuch as it is actually    
nothing1 but it is being because it is  
potential being4 ,becoming1 therefore1  
does not involve the impossible leap    
from nothing to something4 ,it involves 
the transition from potential to actual 

being4 ,all change1 all motion1 is thus 
the passage of potentiality into        
actuality1 of matter into form4  ,since 
matter is in itself nothing1 a bare     
unrealised capacity1 while form is      
actuality1 the completed and perfected  
being1 it follows that form is something
 higher than matter4 ,but matter is what
 becomes form4 ,in order of time1       
therefore1 matter is earlier1 form      
later4 ,but in order of thought1 and in 
reality1 it is otherwise4 ,for when we  
say that matter is the potentiality of  
what it is to become1 this implies that 
what it is to become is already present 
in it ideally and potentially1 though   
not actually4 ,the end1 therefore1 is   
already present in the beginning4 ,the  
oak is in the acorn1 ideally1 otherwise 
the oak could never come out of it4 ,and
 since all becoming is towards the end1 
and would not take place but for the    
end1 the end is the operative principle 
and true cause of becoming4 ,motion is  
produced not by a mechanical propulsive 

force1 pushing from behind1 so to speak1
 but by an ideal attractive force1      
drawing the thing towards its end1 as a 
piece of iron is drawn to the magnet4   
,it is the end itself which exerts this 
force4 ,and1 therefore1 the end must be 
present at the beginning1 for if it were
 not present it could exert no force4   
,nay1 more4 ,it is not only present in  
the beginning1 it is anterior to it4    
,for the end is the cause of the motion1
 and the cause is logically prior to its
 consequence4 ,the end1 or the principle
 of form1 is thus the absolute first in 
thought and reality1 though it may be   
the last in time4 ,if1 then1 #bha we ask
 what1 for ,aristotle1 is that ultimate 
reality1 that first principle1 from     
which the entire universe flows1 the    
answer is1 the end1 the principle of    
form4 ,and as form is the universal1 the
 ,idea1 we see that his fundamental     
thesis is the same as ,plato's4 ,it is  
the one thesis of all idealism1 namely1 
that thought1 the universal1 reason1 is 

the absolute being1 the foundation of   
the world4 ,where he differs from ,plato
 is in denying that form has any        
existence apart from the matter in which
 it exhibits itself4  ,now all this may 
strike the unsophisticated as very      
strange4 ,that the absolute being whence
 the universe flows should be described 
as that which lies at the end of the    
development of the universe1 and that   
philosophy should proceed to justify    
this by asserting that the end is really
 prior to the beginning1 this is so far 
removed from the common man's mode of   
thought1 that it may appear mere        
paradox4 ,it is1 however1 neither       
strange nor paradoxical4 ,it is         
essentially sound and true1 and it seems
 strange to the ordinary man only       
because it penetrates so much deeper    
into things than he can4 ,this thought  
is1 in fact1 essential to a developed   
idealism1 and till it is grasped no     
advance can be made in philosophy4      
,whether it is understood is1 indeed1 a 

good test of whether a man has any      
talent for philosophy or not4 ,the fact 
is that all philosophies of this sort   
regard time as unreal1 as an appearance4
 ,this being so1 the relation of the    
absolute being1 or ,god1 to the world   
cannot be a relation of time at all4    
,the common man's idea is that1 if there
 is a first principle or ,god at all1   
,he must have existed before the world  
began1 and then1 somehow1 perhaps       
billions of years ago1 something        
happened as a #bhb result of which the  
world came into being4 ,the ,absolute is
 thus conceived as the cause1 the world 
as the effect1 and the cause always     
precedes its effect in time4 ,or if1 on 
the other hand1 we think that the world 
never had a beginning1 the ordinary     
man's thought would lead him to believe 
that1 in that case1 it is no longer     
necessary to assume a first principle at
 all4 ,but if time is a mere appearance1
 this whole way of looking at things    
must be wrong4 ,god is not related to   

the world as cause to effect4 ,it is not
 a relation of time at all4 ,it is a    
logical relation4 ,god is rather the    
logical premise1 of which the world is  
the conclusion1 so that1 ,god granted1  
the world follows necessarily1 just as1 
the premises granted1 the conclusion    
follows4 ,this is the reason why1 in    
discussing ,plato1 we said that it must 
be possible to deduce the world from his
 first principle4 ,if the ,absolute were
 merely the cause of the world in time1 
it would not explain the world1 for1 as 
,i have so often pointed out1 causes    
explain nothing4 ,but if the world be   
deducible from the ,absolute1 the world 
is explained1 a reason1 not a cause1 is 
given for it1 just as the premises      
constitute the reason for the           
conclusion4 ,now the conclusion of a    
syllogism follows from the premises1    
that is1 the premises come first1 the   
conclusion second4 ,but the premise only
 comes first in thought1 not in time4   
,it is a logical succession1 not a      

time-succession4 ,just in the same way1 
the ,absolute1 or in ,aristotle's       
language1 the form1 is logically first1 
but is not first in order of time4 ,and 
though it is the end1 it is in thought  
the absolute beginning1 and is thus the 
foundation of the world1 the first      
principle from which the world flows4   
,the objection may be1 taken that if the
 relation of the #bhc ,absolute to the  
world is not a time-relation1 then it   
can no more be the end than the         
beginning4 ,this objection is1 as we    
shall see1 a misunderstanding of        
,aristotle's philosophy4 ,although      
things in time strive towards the end1  
yet the absolute end is not in time at  
all1 or1 in other words1 the end is     
never reached4 ,its relation to the     
world as end is just as much a logical1 
and not a time-relation1 as its relation
 to the world as beginning or absolute  
prius4 ,as far as time is concerned1 the
 universe is without beginning or end4  
,as the world-process is a continual    

elevation of matter into higher and     
higher forms1 there results the         
conception that the universe exhibits a 
continuous scale of being4 ,that is     
higher in the scale in which form       
predominates1 that lower in which matter
 outweighs form4 ,at the bottom of the  
scale will be absolutely formless       
matter1 at the top1 absolutely          
matterless form4 ,both these extremes1  
however1 are abstractions4 ,neither of  
them exists1 because matter and form    
cannot be separated4 ,whatever exists   
comes somewhere between the two1 and the
 universe thus exhibits a process of    
continuous gradations4 ,motion and      
change are produced by the effort to    
pass from the lower to the higher under 
the attractive force of the end4  ,that 
which comes at the top of the scale1    
absolute form1 is called by ,aristotle1 
,god4 ,and the definitions of ,god's    
character follow from this as a matter  
of course4 ,first1 since form is        
actuality1 ,god alone is absolutely     

actual4 ,he alone is real4 ,all existent
 things are more or less unreal4 ,the   
higher in the scale are the more real1  
as possessing more form4 ,the scale of  
being is thus also a scale of reality1  
shading off through infinite gradations 
#bhd from the absolutely real1 ,god1 to 
the absolutely unreal1 formless matter4 
,secondly1 since the principle of form  
contains the formal1 the final1 and the 
efficient causes1 ,god is all these4 ,as
 formal cause1 ,he is the ,idea4 ,he is 
essentially thought1 reason4 ,as final  
cause1 ,he is the absolute end4 ,he is  
that to which all beings strive4 ,each  
being has no doubt its own end in       
itself4 ,but as absolute end1 ,god      
includes all lower ends4 ,and as the end
 of each thing is the completed         
perfection of the thing1 so1 as absolute
 end1 ,god is absolute perfection4      
,lastly1 as efficient cause1 ,god is the
 ultimate cause of all motion and       
becoming4 ,he is the first mover4 ,as   
such1 ,he is ,himself unmoved4 ,that the

 first mover should be itself unmoved is
 a necessary consequence of ,aristotle's
 conception of it as end and form4 ,for 
motion is the transition of a thing     
towards its end4 ,the absolute end can  
have no end beyond it1 and therefore    
cannot be moved4 ,likewise motion is the
 passage of matter into form4 ,absolute 
form cannot pass into any higher form1  
and is therefore unmoved4 ,but the      
argument which ,aristotle himself more  
frequently uses to establish the        
immovability of the first mover is that1
 unless we so conceive it1 no cause of  
motion appears4 ,the moving object is   
moved perhaps by another moving object4 
,the motion of the latter demands a     
further cause4 ,if this further cause is
 itself moving1 we must again ask for   
the cause of its motion4 ,if this       
process goes on for ever1 then motion is
 unexplained1 and no real cause of it   
has been shown4 ,the real and ultimate  
cause must therefore be unmoved4  ,this 
last argument sounds as if ,aristotle is

 now thinking in terms of mechanism4 ,it
 sounds as if he meant that #bhe the    
first mover is something at the         
beginning of time1 which1 so to speak1  
gave things a push to start them off4   
,this is not what ,aristotle means4 ,for
 the true efficient cause is the final  
cause4 ,and ,god is the first mover only
 in ,his character as absolute end4 ,as 
far as time is concerned1 neither the   
universe1 nor the motion in it1 ever had
 any beginning4 ,every mechanical cause 
has its cause in turn1 and so ad        
infinitum4 ,god is not a first cause1 in
 our sense1 that is1 a first mechanical 
cause which existed before the world1   
and created it4 ,he is a teleological   
cause working from the end4 ,but as     
such1 ,he is logically prior to all     
beginning1 and so is the first mover4   
,and just as the universe has no        
beginning in time1 so it has no end in  
time4 ,it will go on for ever4 ,its end 
is absolute form1 but this can never be 
reached1 because if it were1 this would 

mean that absolute form would exist1    
whereas we have seen that form cannot   
exist apart from matter4  ,god is       
thought4 ,but the thought of what8 ,as  
absolute form1 he is not the form of    
matter1 but the form of form4 ,his      
matter1 so to speak1 is form4 ,form1 as 
the universal1 is thought4 ,and this    
gives us ,aristotle's famous definition 
of ,god as the thought of thought4 ,he  
thinks only his own self4 ,he is at once
 the subject and the object of his      
thought4 ,as mortal men think material  
things1 as ,i now think the paper on    
which ,i write1 so ,god thinks thought4 
,in more modern terms1 he is            
self-consciousness1 the absolute        
subject-object4 ,that ,god should think 
anything other than thought is          
inconceivable1 because the end of all   
other thought is outside the thought    
itself4 ,if ,i think this paper1 the end
 of my thought1 the paper1 is outside   
me4 ,but the thought of #bhf ,god1 as   
the absolute end1 cannot have any end   

outside itself4 ,were ,god to think     
anything else than thought1 he would be 
determined by that which is not himself4
 ,by way of further expression of the   
same idea1 ,aristotle passes into       
figurative language4 ,god1 he says1     
lives in eternal blessedness1 and his   
blessedness consists in the everlasting 
contemplation of his own perfection4  ,a
 modern will naturally ask whether      
,aristotle's ,god is personal4 ,it does 
not do to be very dogmatic upon the     
point4 ,aristotle1 like ,plato1 never   
discusses the question4 ,no ,greek ever 
did4 ,it is a modern question4 ,what we 
have to do1 then1 is to take the        
evidence on both sides4 ,the case for   
personality is that the language        
,aristotle uses implies it4 ,the very   
word ,god1 used instead of the          
,absolute1 or form1 conveys the idea of 
personality4 ,and when he goes on to    
speak of ,god living in eternal         
blessedness1 these words1 if taken      
literally1 can mean nothing except that 

,god is a conscious person4 ,if we say  
that this language is merely figurative1
 it may be replied that ,aristotle on   
principle objects to figurative         
language1 that he frequently censures   
,plato for using it1 that what he       
demands and sets out to supply is exact1
 literal1 scientific terminology1 and   
that he is not likely to have broken his
 own canons of philosophic expression by
 using merely poetical phrases4  ,to see
 the other side of the case1 we must    
first ask what personality means4 ,now  
without entering into an intricate      
discussion of this most elusive idea1 we
 may answer that personality at any rate
 implies an individual and existent     
consciousness4 ,but1 in the first place1
 ,god is absolute form1 and form is the 
universal4 ,what is universal1 with no  
particular in it1 cannot be an          
individual4 #bhg ,god1 therefore1 cannot
 be individual4 ,secondly1 form without 
matter cannot exist4 ,and as ,god is    
form without matter1 he cannot be called

 existent1 though he is absolutely real4
 ,god1 therefore1 is neither existent   
nor individual4 ,and this means that he 
is not a person4 ,to degrade the real to
 the level of the existent1 to convert  
the universal into the individual1 is   
exactly the fault for which ,aristotle  
blames ,plato4 ,it is exactly the fault 
which it was the whole object of his    
philosophy to remedy4 ,if he thought    
that ,god is a person1 he committed the 
same fault himself in an aggravated     
form4  ,we have1 then1 two hypotheses1  
both of which involve that ,aristotle   
was guilty of some inconsistency4 ,if   
,god is not a person1 then ,aristotle's 
language is figurative1 and his use of  
such language is inconsistent with his  
rooted objection to its use4 ,this1     
however1 is1 after all1 merely an       
inconsistency of language1 and not of   
thought4 ,it does not mean that         
,aristotle really contradicted himself4 
,it merely means that1 though he set    
himself to express his philosophy in    

technical scientific terms1 and to      
exclude figurative language1 yet he     
found himself compelled in a few        
passages to make use of it4 ,there are  
some metaphysical ideas so abstract1 so 
abstruse1 that it is almost impossible  
to express them at all without the use  
of figures of speech4 ,language was made
 by common men for common purposes1 and 
this fact often forces the philosopher  
to use terms which he knows only figure 
forth his meaning without accurately    
expressing it4 ,perhaps every philosophy
 in the world finds itself sometimes    
under this necessity1 and1 if ,aristotle
 did so1 and was thereby technically    
inconsistent with himself1 it is no     
wonder1 and involves no serious blame   
upon him4  #bhh  ,but the other         
hypothesis1 that ,god is a person1 means
 that ,aristotle committed a            
contradiction1 not merely in words1 but 
in thought1 and not merely as regards   
some unimportant detail1 but as regards 
the central thesis of his system4 ,it   

means that he stultified himself by     
making his conception of ,god absolutely
 contradict the essentials of his       
system4 ,for what is the whole of       
,aristotle's philosophy1 put in a       
nutshell8 ,it is that the ,absolute is  
the universal1 but that the universal   
does not exist apart from the           
particular4 ,plato supplied the thought 
of the first clause of the sentence4    
,aristotle added the last clause1 and it
 is the essential of his philosophy4 ,to
 assert that ,god1 the absolute form1   
exists as an individual1 is flatly to   
contradict this4 ,it is not likely that 
,aristotle should have contradicted     
himself in so vital a matter1 and in a  
manner which simply means that his      
system falls to the ground like a house 
of cards4  ,my conclusion1 then1 is that
 it was not ,aristotle's intention that 
what he calls ,god should be regarded as
 a person4 ,god is thought1 but not     
subjective thought4 ,he is not thought  
existent in a mind1 but objective       

thought1 real on its own account1 apart 
from any mind which thinks it1 like     
,plato's ,ideas4 ,but ,plato's mistake  
was to suppose that because thought is  
real and objective1 it must exist4      
,aristotle avoids this error4 ,the      
absolute thought is the absolutely real4
 ,but it does not exist4 ,with the      
concept of ,god the metaphysics of      
,aristotle closes4    #d4 ,physics1 or  
the ,philosophy of ,nature4  ,the       
existent universe is a scale of being   
lying between the two extremes of       
formless matter and matterless form4    
,but this must not be merely asserted1  
as a general #bhi principle4 ,it must be
 carried out in detail4 ,the passage of 
matter into form must be shown in its   
various stages in the world of nature4  
,to do this is the object of            
,aristotle's ,physics1 or philosophy of 
nature4  ,if nature is to be understood1
 we must keep in mind certain general   
points of view4 ,in the first place1    
since form includes end1 the entire     

world-process1 as passage of matter into
 form1 is essentially movement towards  
ends4 ,everything in nature has its end 
and function4 ,nothing is purposeless4  
,nature seeks everywhere to attain the  
best possible4 ,everywhere we find      
evidences of design and of rational     
plan4 ,aristotle's philosophy of nature 
is essentially teleological4 ,this does 
not1 however1 exclude the principle of  
mechanism1 and to investigate mechanical
 causes is part of the duty of science4 
,but mechanical causes turn out in the  
end to be teleological1 because the true
 efficient cause is the final cause4    
,but if nothing in nature is aimless or 
useless1 this is not to be interpreted  
in a narrow anthropocentric spirit4 ,it 
does not mean that everything exists for
 the use of man1 that the sun was       
created to give him light by day1 the   
moon by night1 and that plants and      
animals exist only for his food4 ,it is 
true that1 in a certain sense1          
everything else sublunary is for man4   

,for man is the highest in the scale of 
beings in this terrestrial sphere1 and  
therefore as the higher end1 he includes
 all lower ends4 ,but this does not     
exclude the fact that lower beings have 
each its own end4 ,they exist for       
themselves and not for us4  ,another    
mistake which we must avoid is to       
suppose that the design in nature means 
that nature is conscious of her designs1
 or1 on the other hand1 that there is   
any #bij existent consciousness outside 
the world which governs and controls it4
 ,the latter supposition is excluded by 
the fact that ,god is not an existent   
conscious person1 the former by its own 
inherent absurdity4 ,the only being upon
 this earth who is conscious of his ends
 is man4 ,such animals as bees and ants 
appear to work rationally1 and their    
activities are clearly governed by      
design4 ,but it is not to be supposed   
that they are reasoning beings4 ,they   
attain their ends instinctively4 ,and   
when we come to inorganic matter1 we    

find that even here its movements are   
purposive1 but no one could suppose them
 deliberate and conscious4 ,these       
manifold activities of lower nature are 
indeed the work of reason1 but not of an
 existent or self-conscious reason4 ,and
 this means that instinct1 and even     
mechanical forces such as gravitation   
are1 in their essence1 reason4 ,it is   
not that they are created by reason1 but
 that they are reason1 exhibiting itself
 in lower forms4 ,in commenting upon    
,plato's dualism of sense and reason1 ,i
 remarked that any true philosophy1     
though recognizing the distinction      
between sense and reason1 must yet find 
room for their identity1 and must show  
that sense is but a lower form of       
reason4 ,this idea ,aristotle thoroughly
 understood1 and sought to show1 not    
merely that sense is reason1 but even   
that the activities of inorganic matter1
 such as gravitation1 are so4 ,in the   
result1 nature1 though working through  
reason1 is not conscious of the fact1   

does so blindly and instinctively1 and  
is compared to a creative artist1 who   
forms beautiful objects by instinct1 or1
 as we should say1 by inspiration1      
without setting before his mind the end 
to be attained or the rules to be       
observed in order to attain it4  #bia   
,in the process of nature1 it is always 
form which impels1 matter which retards 
and obstructs4 ,the entire              
world-movement is the effort of form to 
mould matter1 but1 just because matter  
has in itself a power of resistance1    
this effort does not always succeed4    
,this is the reason why form cannot     
exist without matter1 because it can    
never wholly overcome the clogging      
activity of matter1 and therefore matter
 can never be wholly moulded into form4 
,and this explains1 too1 the occasional 
occurrence in nature of freaks1         
monstrosities1 abortions1 and unnatural 
births4 ,in these the form has failed to
 mould the matter4 ,nature has failed to
 attain her ends4 ,science1 therefore1  

should study the normal and natural     
rather than the abnormal and monstrous4 
,for it is in the normal that the ends  
of nature are to be seen1 and through   
them alone nature can be understood4    
,aristotle is fond of using the words   
natural and unnatural1 but he uses them 
always with this special meaning4 ,that 
is natural which attains its end1 that  
in which the form successfully masters  
the matter4  ,no doctrine of physics can
 ignore the fundamental notions of      
motion1 space1 and time4 ,aristotle1    
therefore1 finds it necessary to        
consider these4 ,motion is the passage  
of matter into form1 and it is of four  
kinds4 ,the first is motion which       
affects the substance of a thing1       
origination and decease4 ,secondly1     
change of quality4 ,thirdly1 change of  
quantity1 increase and decrease4        
,fourthly1 locomotion1 change of place4 
,of these1 the last is the most         
fundamental and important4  ,aristotle  
rejects the definition of space as the  

void4 ,empty space is an impossibility4 
,hence1 too1 he disagrees with the view 
of ,plato and the ,pythagoreans that    
#bib the elements are composed of       
geometrical figures4 ,and connected with
 this is his repudiation of the         
mechanical hypothesis that all quality  
is founded upon quantity1 or upon       
composition and decomposition4 ,quality 
has a real existence of its own4 ,he    
rejects1 also1 the view that space is a 
physical thing4 ,if this were true1     
there would be two bodies occupying the 
same place at the same time1 namely the 
object and the space it fills4 ,hence   
there is nothing for it but to conceive 
space as limit4 ,space is1 therefore1   
defined as the limit of the surrounding 
body towards what is surrounded4 ,as we 
shall see later1 in another connexion1  
,aristotle did not regard space as      
infinite4  ,time is defined as the      
measure of motion in regard to what is  
earlier and later4 ,it thus depends for 
its existence upon motion4 ,if there    

were no change in the universe1 there   
would be no time4 ,and since it is the  
measuring or counting of motion1 it also
 depends for its existence upon a       
counting mind4 ,if there were no mind to
 count1 there could be no time4 ,this   
presents difficulties to us1 if we      
conceive that there was a time when     
conscious beings did not exist4 ,but    
this difficulty is non-existent for     
,aristotle1 who believed that men and   
animals have existed from all eternity4 
,the essentials of time1 therefore1 are 
two3 change and consciousness4 ,time is 
the succession of thoughts4 ,if we      
object that the definition is bad       
because succession already involves     
time1 there is doubtless no answer      
possible4  ,as to the infinite          
divisibility of space and time1 and the 
riddles proposed thereupon by ,zeno1    
,aristotle is of opinion that space and 
time are potentially divisible #bic ad  
infinitum1 but are not actually so      
divided4 ,there is nothing to prevent us

 from going on for ever with the process
 of division1 but space and time are not
 given in experience as infinitely      
divided4  ,after these preliminaries1 we
 can pass on to consider the main       
subject of physics1 the scale of being4 
,we should notice1 in the first place1  
that it is also a scale of values4 ,what
 is higher in the scale of being is of  
more worth1 because the principle of    
form is more advanced in it4 ,it        
constitutes also a theory of            
development1 a philosophy of evolution4 
,the lower develops into the higher4 ,it
 does not1 however1 so develop in time4 
,that the lower form passes in due time 
into a higher form is a discovery of    
modern times4 ,such a conception was    
impossible for ,aristotle4 ,for him1    
genus and species are eternal4 ,they    
have neither beginning nor end4         
,individual men are born and die1 but   
the species man never dies1 and has     
always existed upon the earth4 ,the same
 is true of plants and animals4 ,and    

since man has always existed1 he cannot 
have evolved in time from a lower being4
 ,there is no room here for ,darwinism4 
,in what sense1 then1 is this a theory  
of development or evolution8 ,the       
process involved is not a time-process1 
it is a logical process1 and the        
development is a logical development4   
,the lower always contains the higher   
potentially4 ,the man is in the ape     
ideally4 ,the higher1 again1 contains   
the lower actually4 ,the man is all that
 the ape is1 and more also4 ,what is    
merely implicit in the lower form is    
explicit in the higher4 ,the form which 
is dimly seen struggling to light in the
 lower1 has realized itself in the      
higher4 ,the higher is the same thing as
 the lower1 but it is the same thing in 
a more #bid evolved state4 ,the higher  
presupposes the lower and rests upon it 
as foundation4 ,the higher is the form  
of which the lower is the matter4 ,it   
actually is what the lower is struggling
 to become4 ,hence the entire universe  

is one continuous chain4 ,it is a       
process2 not a time-process1 but an     
eternal process4 ,the one ultimate      
reality1 ,god1 reason1 absolute form1   
eternally exhibits itself in every stage
 of its development4 ,all the stages1   
therefore1 must exist for ever side by  
side4  ,now the form of a thing is its  
organization4 ,hence to be higher in the
 scale means to be more organized4 ,the 
first distinction1 therefore1 with which
 nature presents us is between the      
organic and the inorganic4 ,aristotle   
was the discoverer of the idea of       
organism1 as he was also the inventor of
 the word4 ,at the bottom of the scale  
of being1 therefore1 is inorganic       
matter4 ,inorganic matter is the nearest
 existent thing to absolutely formless  
matter1 which1 of course1 does not      
exist4 ,in the inorganic world matter   
preponderates to such an extent as      
almost to overwhelm form1 and we can    
only expect to see the universal        
exhibiting itself in it in a vague and  

dim way4 ,what1 then1 is its form8 ,and 
this is the same as asking what its     
function1 end1 or essential activity is4
 ,the end of inorganic matter is merely 
external to it4 ,form has not truly     
entered into it at all1 and remains     
outside it4 ,hence the activity of      
inorganic matter can only be to move in 
space towards its external end4 ,this is
 the explanation of what we1 in modern  
times1 call gravitation4 ,but1 according
 to ,aristotle1 every element has its   
peculiar and natural motion2 its end is 
conceived merely spatially1 and its     
activity is to move towards its proper  
place1 and1 having thus reached its end1
 it rests4 ,the natural #bie movement of
 fire is up4 ,we may call this a        
principle of levitation1 as opposed to  
gravitation4 ,aristotle has been the    
subject of cheap criticism on account of
 his frequent use of the words natural  
and unnatural4 ,footnote #ae ,it is said
 that he was satisfied to explain the   
operations of nature by simply labelling

 them natural4 ,if you ask a quite      
uneducated person why heavy bodies fall1
 he may quite possibly reply1 ,oh6      
naturally they fall4 ,this simply means 
that the man has never thought about the
 matter at all1 and thinks whatever is  
absolutely familiar to him is natural   
and needs no explanation4 ,it is like   
the feminine argument that a thing is   
so1 because it is4 ,it is assumed that  
,aristotle was guilty of a like         
futility4 ,this is not the case4 ,his   
use of the word natural does not        
indicate lack of thought4 ,there is a   
thought1 an idea1 here4 ,no doubt he was
 quite wrong in many of his facts4 ,thus
 there is no such principle as          
levitation in the universe4 ,but there  
is a principle of gravitation1 and when 
he explains this by saying it is natural
 for earth to move downwards1 he means1 
not that the fact is familiar1 but that 
the principle of form1 or the           
world-reason1 can only exhibit itself   
here so dimly as to give rise to a      

comparatively aimless and purposeless   
movement in a straight line4 ,not       
absolutely purposeless1 however1 because
 nothing in the world is such1 and the  
purpose here is simply the movement of  
matter towards its end4 ,this may or may
 not be a true explanation of gravity4  
,but has anybody since ever explained it
 better8  ,footnote #ae3 ,see1 e4g4 ,sir
 ,alexander ,grant's ,aristotle in the  
,ancient ,classics for ,english ,readers
 ,series 7,blackwood71 pages #aai-aba4  
,this gives us1 too1 the clue to the    
distinction between #bif the inorganic  
and the organic4 ,if inorganic matter is
 what has its end outside itself1       
organic matter will be what has its end 
within itself4 ,this is the essential   
character of an organism1 that its end  
is internal to it4 ,it is an inward     
self-developing principle4 ,its         
function1 therefore1 can only be the    
actualisation1 the self-realization of  
this inward end4 ,whereas1 therefore1   
inorganic matter has no activity except 

spatial movement1 organic matter has for
 its activity growth1 and this growth is
 not the mere mechanical addition of    
extraneous matter1 as we add a pound of 
tea to a pound of tea4 ,it is true      
growth from within4 ,it is the making   
outward of what is inward4 ,it is the   
making explicit of what is implicit4 ,it
 is the making actual of what is        
potential in the embryo organism4  ,the 
lowest in the scale of being is thus    
inorganic matter1 and above it comes    
organic matter1 in which the principle  
of form becomes real and definite as the
 inward organization of the thing4 ,this
 inward organization is the life1 or    
what we call the soul1 of the organism4 
,even the human soul is nothing but the 
organization of the body4 ,it stands to 
the body in the relation of form to     
matter4 ,with organism1 then1 we reach  
the idea of living soul4 ,but this      
living soul will itself have lower and  
higher grades of being1 the higher being
 a higher realization of the principle  

of form4 ,as the essential of organism  
is self-realization1 this will express  
itself first as self-preservation4      
,self-preservation means first the      
preservation of the individual1 and this
 gives the function of nutrition4       
,secondly1 it means preservation of the 
species1 and this gives the function of 
propagation4 ,the lowest grade in the   
organic kingdom will1 therefore1 be #big
 those organisms whose sole functions   
are to nourish themselves1 grow1 and    
propagate their kind4 ,these are plants4
 ,and we may sum up this by saying that 
plants possess the nutritive soul4      
,aristotle intended to write a treatise 
upon plants1 which intention1 however1  
he never carried out4 ,all that we have 
from him on plants is scattered         
references in his other books4 ,had the 
promised treatise been forthcoming1 we  
cannot doubt what its plan would have   
been4 ,aristotle would have shown1 as he
 did in the case of animals1 that there 
are higher and lower grades of organism 

within the plant kingdom1 and he would  
have attempted to trace the development 
in detail through all the then known    
species of plants4  ,next above plants  
in the scale of being come animals4     
,since the higher always contains the   
lower1 but exhibits a further           
realization of form peculiar to itself1 
animals share with plants the functions 
of nutrition and propagation4 ,what is  
peculiar to them1 the point in which    
they rise above plants1 is the          
possession of sensation4                
,sense-perception is therefore the      
special function of animals1 and they   
possess1 therefore1 the nutritive and   
the sensitive souls4 ,with sensation    
come pleasure and pain1 for pleasure is 
a pleasant sensation1 and pain the      
opposite4 ,hence arises the impulse to  
seek the pleasant and avoid the painful4
 ,this can only be achieved by the power
 of movement4 ,most animals1            
accordingly1 have the power of          
locomotion1 which is not possessed by   

plants1 because they do not require it1 
since they are not sensitive to pleasure
 and pain4 ,in his books upon animals   
,aristotle attempts to carry out the    
principle of development in detail1     
showing what are the higher1 and what   
the lower1 animal organisms4 ,this he   
connects with the #bih methods of       
propagation employed by different       
animals4 ,sex-generation is the mark of 
a higher organism than parthenogenesis4 
,the scale of being proceeds from       
animals to man4 ,the human organism1 of 
course1 contains the principles of all  
lower organisms4 ,man nourishes himself1
 grows1 propagates his kind1 moves      
about1 and is endowed with              
sense-perception4 ,but he must have in  
addition his own special function1 which
 constitutes his advance beyond the     
animals4 ,this is reason4 ,reason is the
 essential1 the proper end and activity 
of man4 ,his soul is nutritive1         
sensitive1 and rational4 ,in man1       
therefore1 the world-reason which could 

only appear in inorganic matter as      
gravitation and levitation1 in plants as
 nutrition1 in animals as sensation1    
appears at last in its own proper form1 
as what it essentially is1 reason4 ,the 
world-reason1 so long struggling towards
 the light1 has reached it1 has become  
actual1 has become existent1 in man4    
,the world-process has attained its     
proximate end4  ,within human           
consciousness there are lower and higher
 grades1 and ,aristotle has taken great 
pains to trace these from the bottom to 
the top4 ,these stages of consciousness 
are what are ordinarily called          
faculties4 ,but ,aristotle notes that it
 is nonsense to talk1 as ,plato did1 of 
the parts of the soul4 ,the soul1 being 
a single indivisible being1 has no      
parts4 ,they are different aspects of   
the activity of one and the same being2 
different stages of its development4    
,they can no more be separated than the 
convex and concave aspects of a curve4  
,the lowest faculty1 if we must use that

 word1 is sense-perception4 ,now what we
 perceive in a thing is its qualities4  
,perception tells us that a piece of    
gold is #bii heavy1 yellow1 etc4 ,the   
underlying substratum which supports the
 qualities cannot be perceived4 ,this   
means that the matter is unknowable1 the
 form knowable1 for the qualities are   
part of the form4 ,sense-perception1    
therefore1 takes place when the object  
stamps its form upon the soul4 ,this is 
important for what it implies rather    
than what it states4 ,it shows the      
thoroughly idealistic trend of          
,aristotle's thought4 ,for if the form  
is what is knowable in a thing1 the more
 form there is1 the more knowable it    
will be4 ,absolute form1 ,god1 will be  
the absolutely knowable4 ,that the      
,absolute is what alone is completely   
knowable1 intelligible1 and             
comprehensible1 and the finite and      
material comparatively unknowable1 is a 
point of view essential to idealism1 and
 stands in marked contrast to the       

popular idea of rationalism that the    
,absolute is unknowable1 and matter     
knowable4 ,for idealism1 the ,absolute  
is reason1 thought4 ,what can be more   
thoroughly intelligible than reason8    
,what can thought understand1 if not    
thought8 ,this1 of course1 is not stated
 by ,aristotle4 ,but it is implied in   
his theory of sense-perception4  ,next  
in the scale above the senses comes the 
common sense4 ,this has nothing to do   
with what we understand by that phrase  
in every-day language4 ,it means the    
central sensation-ganglion in which     
isolated sensations meet1 are combined1 
and form a unity of experience4 ,we saw1
 in considering ,plato1 that the        
simplest kind of knowledge1 such as1    
this paper is white1 involves1 not only 
isolated sensations1 but their          
comparison and contrast4 ,bare          
sensations would not even make objects4 
,for every object is a combined bundle  
of sensations4 ,what thus combines the  
various sensations1 and in #cjj         

particular those received from different
 sense-organs1 what compares and        
contrasts them1 and turns them from a   
blind medley of phantasms into a        
definite experience1 a single cosmos1 is
 the common sense4 ,its organ is the    
heart4  ,above the common sense is the  
faculty of imagination4 ,by this        
,aristotle means1 not the creative      
imagination of the artist1 but the      
power1 which everyone possesses1 of     
forming mental images and pictures4     
,this is due to the excitation in the   
sense-organ continuing after the object 
has ceased to affect it4  ,the next     
faculty is memory4 ,this is the same as 
imagination1 except that there is       
combined with the image a recognition of
 it as a copy of a past                 
sense-impression4  ,recollection1 again1
 is higher than memory4 ,memory images  
drift purposelessly through the mind4   
,recollection is the deliberate evoking 
of memory-images4  ,from recollection we
 pass to the specifically human faculty 

of reason4 ,but reason itself has two   
grades4 ,the lower is called passive    
reason1 the higher active reason4 ,the  
mind has the power of thought before it 
actually thinks4 ,this latent capacity  
is passive reason4 ,the mind is here    
like a smooth piece of wax which has the
 power to receive writing1 but has not  
received it4 ,the positive activity of  
thought itself is active reason4 ,the   
comparison with wax must not mislead us 
into supposing that the soul only       
receives its impressions from sensation4
 ,it is pure thought which writes upon  
the wax4  ,now the sum of the faculties 
in general we call the soul4 ,and the   
soul1 we saw1 is simply the organization
 #cja or form1 of the body4 ,as form is 
inseparable from matter1 the soul cannot
 exist without the body4 ,it is the     
function of the body4 ,it is to the body
 what sight is to the eye4 ,and in the  
same sense ,aristotle denies the        
doctrine of ,pythagoras and ,plato that 
the soul reincarnates itself in new     

bodies1 particularly in the bodies of   
animals4 ,what is the function of one   
thing cannot become the function of     
another4 ,exactly what the soul is to   
the body the music of the flute is to   
the flute itself4 ,it is the form of    
which the flute is the matter4 ,it is1  
to speak metaphorically1 the soul of the
 flute4 ,and you might as well talk1    
says ,aristotle1 of the art of          
flute-playing becoming reincarnate in   
the blacksmith's anvil1 as of the soul  
passing into another body4 ,this would  
seem also to preclude any doctrine of   
immortality4 ,for the function perishes 
with the thing4 ,we shall return to that
 point in a moment4 ,but we may note1   
meanwhile1 that ,aristotle's theory of  
the soul is not only a great advance    
upon ,plato's1 but is a great advance   
upon popular thinking of the present    
day4 ,the ordinary view of the soul1    
which was ,plato's view1 is that the    
soul is a sort of thing4 ,no doubt it is
 non-material and supersensuous4 ,but   

still it is a thing2 it can be put into 
a body and taken out of it1 as wine can 
be put into or taken out of a bottle4   
,the connection between body and soul is
 thus purely mechanical4 ,they are      
attached to each other by no necessary  
bond1 but rather by force4 ,they have1  
in their own natures1 no connexion with 
each other1 and it is difficult to see  
why the soul ever entered a body1 if it 
is in its nature something quite        
separate4 ,but ,aristotle's view is that
 the soul1 as form of the body1 is not  
separable from it4 ,you cannot have #cjb
 a soul without a body4 ,the connection 
between them is not mechanical1 but     
organic4 ,the soul is not a thing which 
comes into the body and goes out of it4 
,it is not a thing at all4 ,it is a     
function4  ,but to this doctrine        
,aristotle makes an exception in favour 
of the active reason4 ,all the lower    
faculties perish with the body1         
including the passive reason4 ,active   
reason is imperishable and eternal4 ,it 

has neither beginning nor end4 ,it comes
 into the body from without1 and departs
 from it at death4 ,god being absolute  
reason1 man's reason comes from ,god1   
and returns to him1 after the body      
ceases to function4 ,but before we hail 
this as a doctrine of personal          
immortality1 we had best reflect4 ,all  
the lower faculties perish at death1 and
 this includes memory4 ,now memory is an
 essential of personality4 ,without     
memory our experiences would be a       
succession of isolated sensations1 with 
no connecting link4 ,what connects my   
last with my present experience is that 
my last experience was mine4 ,to be mine
 it must be remembered4 ,memory is the  
string upon which isolated experiences  
are strung together1 and which makes    
them into that unity ,i call myself1 my 
personality4 ,if memory perishes1 there 
can be no personal life4 ,and it must be
 remembered that ,aristotle does not    
mean merely that1 in that future        
life--if we persist in calling it       

such--the memory of this life is        
obliterated4 ,he means that in the      
future life itself reason has no memory 
of itself from moment to moment4 ,we    
cannot be dogmatic about what ,aristotle
 himself thought4 ,he seems to avoid the
 question4 ,he probably shrank from     
disturbing popular beliefs on the       
subject4 ,we have1 at any rate1 no      
definite pronouncement from #cjc him4   
,all we can say is that his doctrine    
does not provide the material for belief
 in personal immortality4 ,it expressly 
removes the material in that it denies  
the persistence of memory4 ,moreover1 if
 ,aristotle really thought that reason  
is a thing1 which goes in and out of the
 body1 an exception1 in the literal     
sense1 to his general doctrine of soul1 
all we can say is that he undergoes a   
sudden drop in the philosophic scale4   
,having propounded so advanced a theory1
 he sinks back to the crude view of     
,plato4 ,and as this is not likely1 the 
most probable explanation is that he is 

here speaking figuratively1 perhaps with
 the intention of propitiating the      
religious and avoiding any rude         
disturbance of popular belief4 ,if so1  
the statements that active reason is    
immortal1 comes from ,god1 and returns  
to ,god1 mean simply that the           
world-reason is eternal1 and that man's 
reason is the actualization of this     
eternal reason1 and in that sense comes 
from ,god and returns to ,him4 ,we may  
add1 too1 that since ,god1 though real1 
is not to be regarded as an existent    
individual1 our return to ,him cannot be
 thought as a continuation of individual
 existence4 ,personal immortality is    
inconsistent with the fundamentals of   
,aristotle's system4 ,we ought not to   
suppose that he contradicted himself in 
this way4 ,yet if ,aristotle used       
language which seems to imply personal  
immortality1 this is neither meaningless
 nor dishonest4 ,it is as true for him  
as for others that the soul is eternal4 
,but eternal does not mean everlasting  

in time4 ,it means timeless4 ,and       
reason1 even our reason1 is timeless4   
,the soul has eternity in it4 ,it is    
eternity in an hour4 ,and it is this    
which puts the difference between man   
and the brutes4  #cjd  ,we have traced  
the scale of being from inorganic       
matter1 through plants and animals1 to  
man4 ,what then8 ,what is the next step8
 ,or does the scale stop there8 ,now    
there is a sort of break in ,aristotle's
 system at this point1 which has led    
many to say that man is the top of the  
scale4 ,the rest of ,aristotle's physics
 deal with what is outside our earth1   
such as the stars and planets4 ,and they
 deal with them quite as if they were a 
different subject1 having little or     
nothing to do with the terrestrial scale
 of being which we have been            
considering4 ,but here we must not      
forget two facts4 ,the first is that    
,aristotle's writings have come down to 
us mutilated1 and in many cases         
unfinished4 ,the second is that         

,aristotle had a curious habit of       
writing separate monographs on different
 parts of his system1 and omitting to   
point out any connexion between them1   
although such a connexion undoubtedly   
exists4  ,now although ,aristotle       
himself does not say it1 there are      
several good reasons for thinking that  
the true interpretation of his meaning  
is that the scale of being does not stop
 at man1 that there is no gap in the    
chain here1 but that it proceeds from   
man through planets and stars--which    
,aristotle1 like ,plato1 regarded as    
divine beings--right up to ,god himself4
 ,in the first place1 this is required  
by the logic of his system4 ,the scale  
has formless matter at the bottom and   
matterless form at the top4 ,it should  
proceed direct from one to the other4   
,it is essential to his philosophy that 
the universe is a single continuous     
chain4 ,there is no place for such a    
hiatus between man and the higher       
beings4 ,secondly1 it is not as if      

terrestrial life formed a scale1 and    
celestial beings were all on a par1     
having among themselves no #cje scale of
 higher and lower4 ,this is not the     
case4 ,the heavenly bodies have grades  
among themselves4 ,the higher are       
related to the lower as form to matter4 
,thus stars are higher than planets4 ,so
 that if we suppose that evolution stops
 at man1 what we have is a gap in the   
middle1 a scale below it1 and a scale   
above it4 ,it is like a bridge over a   
sheet of water1 the two ends of which   
are intact1 but which is broken down in 
the middle4 ,the natural completion of  
this scheme involves the filling up of  
the gap4 ,thirdly1 we have another very 
important piece of evidence4 ,with his  
valuable idea of evolution ,aristotle   
combined another very curious1 and no   
doubt1 absurd1 theory4 ,this was that in
 the scale of the universe the lowest   
existence is to be found in the middle1 
the highest at the periphery1 and that  
in general the higher is always outside 

the lower1 so that the spatial universe 
is a system of concentric spheres1 the  
outer sphere being related to the inner 
sphere as higher to lower1 as form to   
matter4 ,at the centre of the spherical 
universe is our earth4 ,earth1 as the   
lowest element1 is in the middle4 ,then 
comes a layer of water1 then of air1    
then of fire4 ,among the heavenly bodies
 there are fifty-six spheres4 ,the stars
 are outside the planets and are        
therefore higher beings4 ,and in        
conformity with this scheme1 the supreme
 being1 ,god1 is outside the outermost  
sphere4 ,now it is obvious that1 in this
 scheme1 the passage from the centre of 
the earth to the stars forms a spatial  
continuity1 and it is impossible to     
resist the conclusion that it also forms
 a logical continuity1 that is1 that    
there is no break in the chain of       
evolution4  ,noting that this is not    
what ,aristotle in so many words says1  
but that it is our interpretation of his
 #cjf intention1 which is almost        

certainly correct1 we conclude that man 
is not the top of the scale4 ,next to   
him come the heavenly bodies4 ,the      
planets include the sun and the moon1   
which1 revolve round the earth in a     
direction opposite to that of the stars4
 ,next in the scale come the stars4 ,we 
need not go into details of the         
fifty-six spheres4 ,the stars and       
planets are divine beings4 ,but this is 
only a comparative term4 ,man1 as the   
possessor of reason1 is also divine1 but
 the heavenly bodies infinitely more so4
 ,and this means that they are more     
rational than man1 and so higher in the 
scale4 ,they live an absolutely blessed 
and perfect life4 ,they are immortal and
 eternal1 because they are the supreme  
self-realization of the eternal reason4 
,it is only upon this earth that death  
and corruption occur1 a circumstance    
which has no doubt emphasized that view 
of ,aristotle's philosophy which holds  
the gap between man and the stars to be 
a real one4 ,the heavenly bodies are not

 composed of the four elements1 but of a
 fifth1 a quintessence1 which is called 
ether4 ,like all elements it must have  
its natural motion4 ,and as it is the   
finest and most perfect1 its motion must
 be perfect4 ,and it must be an eternal 
motion1 because the stars are eternal   
beings4 ,it cannot be motion in a       
straight line1 because that never comes 
to an end1 and so is never perfect4     
,circular motion alone is perfect4 ,and 
it is eternal because its end and its   
beginning are one4 ,hence the natural   
motion of ether is circular1 and the    
stars move in perfect circles4  ,leaving
 the stars behind1 we reach the summit  
of the long ladder from matter to form4 
,this is the absolute form1 ,god4 ,as   
formless matter is not an existent      
thing1 nor is matterless form4 ,god1    
therefore1 is not in the #cjg world of  
space and time at all4 ,but it is one of
 the curiosities of thought that        
,aristotle nevertheless gives him a     
place outside the outermost sphere4     

,what is outside the sphere is1         
therefore1 not space4 ,all space and    
time are inside this globular universe4 
,space is therefore finite4 ,and ,god   
must be outside the outermost sphere    
because he is the highest being1 and the
 higher always comes outside the lower4 
,we have now described the entire scale 
of evolution4 ,looking back upon it1 we 
can see its inner significance4 ,the    
,absolute is reason1 matterless form4   
,everything in the world1 therefore1 is1
 in its essence1 reason4 ,if we wish to 
know the essential nature even of this  
clod of earth1 the answer is that it is 
reason1 although this view is not       
consistently developed by ,aristotle1   
since he allows that matter is a        
separate principle which cannot be      
reduced to form4 ,the whole universal   
process of things is nothing but the    
struggle of reason to express itself1 to
 actualize itself1 to become existent in
 the world4 ,this it definitely does1   
for the first time proximately in man1  

and completely in the stars4 ,it can    
only express itself in lower beings as  
sensation 7animals71 as nutrition       
7plants71 or as gravitation and its     
opposite 7inorganic matter74  ,the value
 of ,aristotle's theory of evolution is 
immense4 ,it is not the details that    
signify4 ,the application of the        
principle in the world of matter and    
life could not be carried out           
satisfactorily in the then state of     
physical science4 ,it could not be      
carried out with perfection even now4   
,omniscience alone could give finality  
to such a scheme4 ,but it is the        
principle itself which matters4 ,and    
that it is one of the most valuable     
conceptions in #cjh philosophy will     
perhaps be more evident if we compare   
it1 firstly1 with modern scientific     
theories of evolution and secondly1 with
 certain aspects of ,hindu pantheism4   
,what has ,aristotle in common with such
 a writer a ,herbert ,spencer8          
,according to ,spencer1 evolution is a  

movement from the indefinite1           
incoherent1 and homogeneous1 to the     
definite1 coherent1 and heterogeneous4  
,aristotle has all this1 though his     
words are different4 ,he calls it a     
movement from matter to form4 ,form he  
describes as whatever gives definiteness
 to a thing4 ,matter is the indefinite  
substrate1 form gives it definiteness4  
,hence for him too the higher being is  
more definite because it has more form4 
,that matter is the homogeneous1 form   
the heterogeneous1 follows from this4   
,we saw that there are in matter itself 
no differences1 because there are no    
qualities4 ,and this is the same as     
saying it is homogeneous4               
,heterogeneity1 that is1                
differentiation1 is introduced by form4 
,coherence is the same thing as         
organization4 ,aristotle has himself    
defined the form of a thing as its      
organization4 ,for him1 as for ,spencer1
 the higher being is simply that which  
is more organized4 ,every theory of     

evolution depends fundamentally upon the
 idea of organism4 ,aristotle invented  
the idea and the word4 ,spencer carried 
it no further1 though the more advanced 
physical knowledge of his day enabled   
him to illustrate it more copiously4    
,but of course the great difference     
between ,aristotle and the moderns1 is  
that the former did not guess1 what the 
latter have discovered1 namely that     
evolution is not only a logical         
development1 but is a fact in time4     
,aristotle knew what was meant by the   
higher and lower organism as well as    
,darwin1 but he did not know1 that the  
latter #cji actually turns into the     
former in the course of years4 ,but     
this1 though the most obvious1 is not   
really the most important difference    
between ,spencer and ,aristotle4 ,the   
real difference is that ,aristotle      
penetrated far more deeply into the     
philosophy of evolution than modern     
science does2 that1 in fact1 modern     
science has no philosophy of evolution  

at all4 ,for the fundamental problem    
here is1 if we speak of higher and lower
 beings1 what rational ground have we   
for calling them higher and lower8 ,that
 the lower passes in time into the      
higher is no doubt a very interesting   
fact to discover1 but it dwindles into  
insignificance beside the problem just  
indicated1 because1 on the solution of  
that problem it depends whether the     
universe is to be regarded as futile1   
meaningless1 and irrational1 or whether 
we are to see in it order1 plan1 and    
purpose4 ,is ,spencer's doctrine a      
theory of development at all8 ,or is it 
not rather simply a theory of change8   
,something resembling an ape becomes a  
man4 ,is there development here1 that   
is1 is it a movement from something     
really lower to something really higher8
 ,or is it merely change from one       
indifferent thing to another8 ,is there 
improvement1 or only difference8 ,in the
 latter case1 it makes not the slightest
 difference whether the ape becomes man1

 or man becomes an ape4 ,the one is as  
good as the other4 ,in either case1 it  
is merely a change from ,tweedledum to  
,tweedledee4 ,the change is meaningless1
 and has no significance4  ,the modern  
doctrine of evolution can only render   
the world more intelligible1 can only   
develop into a philosophy of evolution1 
by showing that there is evolution and  
not merely change1 and this it can only 
do by #caj giving a rational basis for  
the belief that some forms of existence 
are higher than others4 ,to put the     
matter bluntly1 why is a man higher than
 a horse1 or a horse than a sponge8     
,answer that1 and you have a philosophy 
of evolution4 ,fail to answer it1 and   
you have none4 ,now the man in the      
street will say that man is higher than 
the horse1 because he not merely eats   
grass1 but thinks1 deliberates1         
possesses art1 science1 religion1       
morality4 ,ask him why these things are 
higher than eating grass1 and he has no 
answer4 ,from him1 then1 we turn to     

,spencer1 and there we find a sort of   
answer4 ,man is higher because he is    
more organized4 ,but why is it better to
 be more organized8 ,science1 as such1  
has no answer4 ,if pressed in this way1 
science may of course turn round and    
say3 there is in the reality of things  
no higher and no lower2 what ,i mean by 
higher and lower is simply more and less
 organized2 higher and lower are mere   
metaphors2 they are the human way of    
looking at things2 we naturally call    
higher what is nearest ourselves2 but   
from the absolute point of view there is
 no higher and lower4 ,but this is to   
reduce the universe to a madhouse4 ,it  
means that there is no purpose1 no      
reason1 in anything that happens4 ,the  
universe1 in this case1 is irrational4  
,no explanation of it is possible4      
,philosophy is futile1 and not only     
philosophy1 but morality and everything 
else4 ,if there is really no higher and 
lower1 there is no better and no worse4 
,it is just as good to be a murderer as 

to be a saint4 ,evil is the same as     
good4 ,instead of striving to be saints1
 statesmen1 philosophers1 we may as well
 go and play marbles1 because all these 
values of higher and lower are mere     
delusions1 the human way of looking at  
things4  #caa  ,spencer then has no     
answer to the question why it is better 
to be more organized4 ,so we turn at    
last to ,aristotle4 ,he has an answer4  
,he sees that it is meaningless to talk 
of development1 advance1 higher and     
lower1 except in relation to an end4    
,there is no such thing as advance      
unless it is an advance towards         
something4 ,a body moving purposelessly 
in a straight line through infinite     
space does not advance4 ,it might as    
well be here as a mile hence4 ,in either
 case it is no nearer to anything4 ,but 
if it is moving towards a definite      
point1 we can call this advance4 ,every 
mile it moves it gets nearer to its end4
 ,so1 if we are to have a philosophy of 
evolution1 it must be teleological4 ,if 

nature is not advancing towards an end1 
there is no nearer and further1 no      
higher and lower1 no development4 ,what 
then is the end8 ,it is the             
actualization of reason1 says           
,aristotle4 ,the primal being is eternal
 reason1 but this is not existent4 ,it  
must come to exist4 ,it first enunciates
 itself vaguely as gravitation4 ,but    
this is far off from its end1 which is  
the existence of reason1 as such1 in the
 world4 ,it comes nearer in plants and  
animals4 ,it is proximately reached in  
man1 for man is the existent reason4    
,but there is no question of the        
universe coming to a stop1 when it      
reaches its end--7the usual objection to
 teleology74 ,for the absolute end1     
absolute form1 can never be reached4    
,the higher is thus the more rational1  
the lower the less rational4 ,now if we 
try to go on asking1 why is it better to
 be more rational8 we find we cannot ask
 such a question4 ,the word why means   
that we want a reason4 ,and our question

 is absurd because we are asking a      
reason for reason4 ,why is it better to 
be rational means simply1 how is reason 
rational4 ,to #cab doubt it is a        
self-contradiction4 ,or1 to put the same
 thing in another way1 reason is the    
,absolute4 ,and to ask why it is better 
to be rational is to demand that the    
ultimate should be expressed in terms of
 something beyond it4 ,hence modern     
science has no philosophy of evolution1 
whereas ,aristotle has4 ,footnote #af   
,footnote #af3 ,see ,h4 ,s4 ,macran's   
,hegel's ,doctrine of ,formal ,logic    
7,clarendon ,press71 ,introduction1     
section on the ,conception of           
,evolution1 to which ,i am much indebted
 in the above paragraphs4  ,the main    
idea of pantheism is that everything is 
,god4 ,the clod of earth is divine      
because it is a manifestation of ,deity4
 ,now this idea is all very well1 and is
 in fact essential to philosophy4 ,we   
find it in ,aristotle himself1 since the
 entire world is1 for him1 the          

actualization of reason1 and reason is  
,god4 ,but this is also a very dangerous
 idea1 if not supplemented by a         
rationally grounded scale of values4 ,no
 doubt everything is1 in a sense1 ,god4 
,but if we leave it at this1 it would   
follow that1 since everything is equally
 divine1 there is no higher and lower4  
,if the clod of earth1 like the         
saintliest man1 is ,god1 and there is no
 more to say of the matter1 then how is 
the saint higher than the clod of earth8
 ,why should one ever struggle towards  
higher things1 when in reality all are  
equally high8 ,why avoid evil1 when evil
 is as much a manifestation of ,god as  
good8 ,mere pantheism must necessarily  
end in this calamitous view4 ,and these 
deplorable effects explain the fact that
 ,hinduism1 with all its high thinking1 
finds room for the worship of cows and  
snakes1 and1 with all its undoubted     
moral elevation1 yet allows into its    
fold the grossest abominations4 ,both   
these features are due to the           

pantheistic placing of all things on a  
par as equally #cac divine4 ,not of     
course that ,hinduism has not a sort of 
doctrine of evolution1 a belief in a    
higher and lower4 ,as everyone knows1 it
 admits the belief that in successive   
incarnations the soul may mount higher  
and higher till it perhaps rejoins the  
common source of all things4 ,there is  
probably no race of man so savage that  
it does not instinctively feel that     
there is a higher and lower1 a better   
and worse1 in things4 ,but the point is 
that1 although ,hinduism has its scale  
of values1 and its doctrine of          
development1 it has no rational         
foundation for these1 and though it has 
the idea of higher and lower1 yet1      
because this is without foundation1 it  
lets it slip1 it never grips the idea1  
and so easily slides into the view that 
all is equally divine4 ,the thought that
 all is ,god1 and the thought that there
 are higher and lower beings1 are1 on   
the surface1 opposed and inconsistent   

theories4 ,yet both are necessary1 and  
it is the business of philosophy to find
 a reconciliation4 ,this ,aristotle     
does1 but ,hinduism fails to do4 ,it    
asserts both1 but fails to bring them to
 unity4 ,now it asserts one view1 and   
again at another time it asserts the    
other4 ,and this1 of course1 is         
connected with the general defect of    
oriental thinking1 its vagueness4       
,everything is seen1 but seen in a haze1
 in which all things appear one1 in     
which shapes flow into another1 in which
 nothing has an outline1 in which even  
vital distinctions are obliterated4     
,hence it is that1 though oriental      
thought contains1 in one way or another1
 practically all philosophical ideas1 it
 grips none1 and can hold nothing fast4 
,it seizes its object1 but its flabby   
grasp relaxes and slips off4 ,hinduism1 
like modern science1 has its doctrine of
 evolution4 ,but it has no philosophy of
 evolution4    #cad  #e4 ,ethics4  7a7  
,the ,individual4  ,a strong note of    

practical moderation pervades the ethics
 of ,aristotle4 ,while ,plato's ethical 
teaching transcended the ordinary limits
 of human life1 and so lost itself in   
ideal ,utopias1 ,aristotle1 on the other
 hand1 sits down to make practical      
suggestions3 ,he wishes to enquire what 
the good is1 but by this he means1 not  
some ideal good impossible of attainment
 upon this earth1 but rather that good  
which1 in all the circumstances in which
 men find themselves1 ought to be       
realizable4 ,the ethical theories of    
,plato and ,aristotle are thus          
characteristic of the two men4 ,plato   
despised the world of sense1 and sought 
to soar altogether beyond the common    
life of the senses4 ,aristotle1 with his
 love of facts and of the concrete1     
keeps close within the bounds of actual 
human experience4  ,the first question  
for ethics is the nature of the summum  
bonum4 ,we desire one thing for the sake
 of a second1 we desire that for the    
sake of a third4 ,but if this series of 

means and ends goes on ad infinitum1    
then all desire and all action are      
futile and purposeless4 ,there must be  
some one thing which we desire1 not for 
the sake of anything else1 but on its   
own account4 ,what is this end in       
itself1 this summum bonum1 at which all 
human activity ultimately aims4         
,everybody1 says ,aristotle1 is agreed  
about the name of this end4 ,it is      
happiness4 ,what all men seek1 what is  
the motive of all their actions1 that   
which they desire for the sake of itself
 and nothing beyond1 is happiness4 ,but 
though all agree as to the name1 beyond 
that there is no agreement4             
,philosophers1 #cae no less than the    
vulgar1 differ as to what this word     
happiness means4 ,some say it is a life 
of pleasure4 ,others say it consists in 
the renunciation of pleasures4 ,some    
recommend one life1 some another4  ,we  
must repeat here the warning which was  
found necessary in the case of ,plato1  
who also called the summum bonum        

happiness4 ,aristotle's doctrine is no  
more to be confused with modern         
utilitarianism than is ,plato's4 ,moral 
activity is usually accompanied by a    
subjective feeling of enjoyment4 ,in    
modern times the word happiness connotes
 the feeling of enjoyment4 ,but for the 
,greeks it was the moral activity which 
the word signified4 ,for ,aristotle an  
action is not good because it yields    
enjoyment4 ,on the contrary1 it yields  
enjoyment because it is good4 ,the      
utilitarian doctrine is that the        
enjoyment is the ground of the moral    
value4 ,but1 for ,aristotle1 the        
enjoyment is the consequence of the     
moral value4 ,hence when he tells us    
that the highest good is happiness1 he  
is giving us no information regarding   
its nature1 but merely applying a new   
name to it4 ,we have still to enquire   
what the nature of the good is4 ,as he  
himself says1 everyone agrees upon the  
name1 but the real question is what this
 name connotes4  ,aristotle's solution  

of this problem follows from the general
 principles of his philosophy4 ,we have 
seen that1 throughout nature1 every     
being has its proper end1 and the       
attainment of this end is its special   
function4 ,hence the good for each being
 must be the adequate performance of its
 special function4 ,the good for man    
will not consist in the pleasure of the 
senses4 ,sensation is the special       
function of animals1 but not of man4    
,man's special function is reason4      
,hence the proper #caf activity of      
reason is the summum bonum1 the good for
 man4 ,morality consists in the life of 
reason4 ,but what precisely that means  
we have still to see4  ,man is not only 
a reasoning animal4 ,as the higher      
being1 he contains within himself the   
faculties of the lower beings also4     
,like plants he is appetitive1 like     
animals1 sensitive4 ,the passions and   
appetites are an organic part of his    
nature4 ,hence virtue will be of two    
kinds4 ,the highest virtues will be     

found in the life of reason1 and the    
life of thought1 philosophy4 ,these     
intellectual virtues are called by      
,aristotle dianoetic4 ,secondly1 the    
ethical virtues proper will consist in  
the submission of the passions and      
appetites to the control of reason4 ,the
 dianoetic virtues are the higher1      
because in them man's special function  
alone is in operation1 and also because 
the thinking man most resembles ,god1   
whose life is a life of pure thought4   
,happiness1 therefore1 consists in the  
combination of dianoetic and ethical    
virtues4 ,they alone are of absolute    
value to man4 ,yet1 though he places    
happiness in virtue1 ,aristotle1 in his 
broad and practical way1 does not       
overlook the fact that external goods   
and circumstances have a profound       
influence upon happiness1 and cannot be 
ignored1 as the ,cynics attempted to    
ignore them4 ,not that ,aristotle       
regards externals as having any value in
 themselves4 ,what alone is good in     

itself1 is an end in itself1 is virtue4 
,but external goods help a man in his   
quest of virtue4 ,poverty1 sickness1 and
 misfortune1 on the other hand1 hinder  
his efforts4 ,therefore1 though         
externals are not goods in themselves1  
they may be a means towards the good4   
,hence they are not to be despised and  
rejected4 ,riches1 friends1 health1 #cag
 good fortune1 are not happiness4 ,but  
they are negative conditions of it4     
,with them happiness is within our      
grasp4 ,without them its attainment is  
difficult4 ,they will be valued         
accordingly4  ,aristotle says little in 
detail of the dianoetic virtues4 ,and we
 may turn at once to the main subject of
 his moral system1 the ethical virtues4 
,these consist in the governance of the 
passions by reason4 ,socrates was wrong 
in supposing that virtue is purely      
intellectual1 that nothing save         
knowledge is needed for it1 and that if 
a man thinks right he must needs do     
right4 ,he forgot the existence of the  

passions1 which are not easily          
controlled4 ,a man may reason perfectly1
 his reason may point him to the right  
path1 but his passions may get the upper
 hand and lead him out of it4 ,how then 
is reason to gain control over the      
appetites8 ,only by practice4 ,it is    
only by continual effort1 by the        
constant exercise of self-control1 that 
the unruly passions can be tamed4 ,once 
brought under the yoke1 their control   
becomes habit4 ,aristotle lays the      
utmost emphasis on the importance of    
habit in morality4 ,it is only by       
cultivating good habits that a man      
becomes good4  ,now if virtue consists  
in the control of the appetites by      
reason1 it thus contains two            
constituents1 reason and appetite4 ,both
 must be present4 ,there must be        
passions1 if they are to be controlled4 
,hence the ascetic ideal of rooting out 
the passions altogether is fundamentally
 wrong4 ,it overlooks the fact that the 
higher form does not exclude the        

lower--that were contrary to the        
conception of evolution--it includes and
 transcends it4 ,it forgets that the    
passions are an organic part of man1 and
 that to destroy them is to do injury to
 his #cah nature by destroying one of   
its essential members4 ,the passions and
 appetites are1 in fact1 the matter of  
virtue1 reason its form1 and the mistake
 of asceticism is that it destroys the  
matter of virtue1 and supposes that the 
form can subsist by itself4 ,virtue     
means that the appetites must be brought
 under control1 not that they must be   
eradicated4 ,hence there are two        
extremes to be avoided4 ,it is extreme1 
on the one hand1 to attempt to uproot   
the passions2 and it is extreme1 on the 
other1 to allow them to run riot4       
,virtue means moderation4 ,it consists  
in hitting the happy mean as regards the
 passions1 in not allowing them to get  
the upper hand of reason1 and yet in not
 being quite passionless and apathetic4 
,from this follows the famous           

,aristotelian doctrine of virtue as the 
mean between two extremes4 ,every virtue
 lies between two vices1 which are the  
excess and defect of appetite           
respectively4  ,what is the criterion   
here8 ,who is to judge8 ,how are we to  
know what is the proper mean in any     
matter8 ,mathematical analogies will not
 help us4 ,it is not a case of drawing a
 straight line from one extreme to the  
other1 and finding the middle point by  
bisection4 ,and ,aristotle refuses to   
lay down any rule of thumb in the       
matter4 ,there is no golden rule by     
virtue of which we can tell where the   
proper mean is4 ,it all depends on      
circumstances1 and on the person        
involved4 ,what is the proper mean in   
one case is not the proper mean in      
another4 ,what is moderate for one man  
is immoderate for his neighbour4 ,hence 
the matter must be left to the good     
judgment of the individual4 ,a sort of  
fine tact1 good sense1 is required to   
know the mean1 which ,aristotle calls   

insight4 ,this insight is both the cause
 and the #cai effect of virtue4 ,it is  
the cause1 because he who has it knows  
what he ought to do4 ,it is the effect1 
because it is only developed by         
practice4 ,virtue renders virtue easy4  
,each time a man1 by use of his insight1
 rightly decides upon the mean1 it      
becomes easier for him to discriminate  
next time4  ,aristotle attempts no      
systematic classification of the        
virtues1 as ,plato had done4 ,this sort 
of schematism is contrary to the        
practical character of his thought4 ,he 
sees that life is far too complex to be 
treated in this way4 ,the proper mean is
 different in every different case1 and 
therefore there are as many virtues as  
there are circumstances in life4 ,his   
list of virtues1 therefore1 is not      
intended to be exhaustive4 ,it is merely
 illustrative4 ,though the number of    
virtues is infinite1 there are certain  
well-recognized kinds of good action1   
which are of such constant importance in

 life that they have received names4 ,by
 the example of some of these virtues   
,aristotle illustrates his doctrine of  
the mean4 ,for instance1 courage is the 
mean between cowardice and rashness4    
,that is to say1 cowardice is the defect
 of boldness1 rashness the excess1      
courage the reasonable medium4          
,munificence is the mean between        
pettiness and vulgar profusion1 good    
temper between spiritlessness and       
irascibility1 politeness between        
rudeness and obsequiousness1 modesty    
between shamelessness and bashfulness1  
temperance between insensibility and    
intemperance4  ,justice hardly comes    
into the scheme2 it is rather a virtue  
of the ,state than of the individual1   
and it has been thought by some that the
 book devoted to it in the ,ethics has  
been misplaced4 ,justice is of two      
kinds1 distributive and corrective4 ,its
 fundamental idea #cbj is the assignment
 of advantages and disadvantages        
according to merit4 ,distributive       

justice assigns honours and rewards     
according to the worth of the           
individuals involved4 ,corrective       
justice has to do with punishment4 ,if a
 man improperly obtains an advantage1   
things must be equalized by the         
imposition on him of a corresponding    
disadvantage4 ,justice1 however1 is a   
general principle1 and no general       
principle is equal to the complexity of 
life4 ,special cases cannot be foreseen1
 ,the necessary adjustment of human     
relations arising from this cause is    
equity4  ,aristotle is a pronounced     
supporter of the freedom of the will4   
,he censures ,socrates because the      
latter's theory of virtue practically   
amounts to a denial of freedom4         
,according to ,socrates1 whoever thinks 
right must necessarily do right4 ,but   
this is equivalent to denying a man's   
power to choose evil4 ,and if he cannot 
choose evil1 he cannot choose good4 ,for
 the right-thinking man does not do     
right voluntarily1 but necessarily4     

,aristotle believed1 on the contrary1   
that man has the choice of good and     
evil4 ,the doctrine of ,socrates makes  
all actions involuntary4 ,but in        
,aristotle's opinion only actions       
performed under forcible compulsion are 
involuntary4 ,aristotle did not1        
however1 consider the special           
difficulties in the theory of free will 
which in modern times have made it one  
of the most thorny of all philosophical 
problems4 ,hence his treatment of the   
subject is not of great value to us4    
7b7 ,the ,state4  ,politics is not a    
separate subject from ,ethics4 ,it is   
merely another division of the same     
subject4 ,and #cba this1 not merely     
because politics is the ethics of the   
,state as against the individual1 but   
because the morality of the individual  
really finds its end in the ,state1 and 
is impossible without it4 ,aristotle    
agrees with ,plato that the object of   
the ,state is the virtue and happiness  
of the citizens1 which are impossible   

except in the ,state4 ,for man is a     
political animal by nature1 as is proved
 by his possession of speech1 which     
would be useless to any save a social   
being4 ,and the phrase by nature means  
the same here as elsewhere in           
,aristotle4 ,it means that the ,state is
 the end of the individual1 and that    
activity in the ,state is part of man's 
essential function4 ,the ,state1 in     
fact1 is the form1 the individual1 the  
matter4 ,the ,state provides both an    
education in virtue and the necessary   
opportunities for its exercise4 ,without
 it man would not be man at all4 ,he    
would be a savage animal4  ,the         
historical origin of the ,state         
,aristotle finds in the family4 ,at     
first there is the individual4 ,the     
individual gets himself a mate1 and the 
family arises4 ,the family1 in          
,aristotle's opinion1 includes the      
slaves3 for1 like ,plato1 he sees no    
wrong in the institution of slavery4 ,a 
number of families1 joining together1   

develop into a village community1 and a 
number of village communities into a    
polis 7city71 or ,state4 ,beyond the    
city1 of course1 the ,greek idea of the 
,state did not extend4  ,such then is   
the historical origin of the ,state4    
,but it is of capital importance to     
understand that1 in ,aristotle's        
opinion1 this question of historical    
origin has nothing on earth to do with  
the far more important question what the
 ,state essentially is4 ,it is no mere  
mechanical aggregate of families and    
village communities1 #cbb ,the nature of
 the ,state is not explained in this    
way4 ,for though the family is prior to 
the ,state in order of time1 the ,state 
is prior to the family and to the       
individual in order of thought1 and in  
reality4 ,for the ,state is the end1 and
 the end is always prior to that of     
which it is the end4 ,the state as form 
is prior to the family as matter1 and in
 the same way the family is prior to the
 individual4 ,and as the explanation of 

things is only possible by teleology1 it
 is the end which explains the          
beginning1 it is the ,state which       
explains the family1 and not vice versa4
  ,the true nature of the ,state1       
therefore1 is not that it is a          
mechanical sum of individuals1 as a heap
 of sand is the sum of its grains4 ,the 
,state is a real organism1 and the      
connexion of part to part is not        
mechanical1 but organic4 ,the ,state has
 a life of its own4 ,and its members    
also have their own lives1 which are    
included in the higher life of the      
,state4 ,all the parts of an organism   
are themselves organisms4 ,and as the   
distinction between organic and         
inorganic is that the former has its end
 in itself1 while the latter has its end
 external to it1 this means that the    
,state is an end in itself1 that the    
individual is an end in himself1 and    
that the former end includes the latter4
 ,or we may express the same thought    
otherwise by saying that1 in the ,state1

 both the whole and the parts are to be 
regarded as real1 both having their own 
lives and1 in their character as ends1  
their own rights4 ,consequently1 there  
are two kinds of views of the nature of 
the ,state1 which are1 according to     
,aristotle1 fundamentally erroneous4    
,the first is the kind of view which    
depends upon asserting the reality of   
the parts1 but denying the reality of   
the whole1 or1 what is the same #cbc    
thing1 allowing that the individual is  
an end in himself1 but denying that the 
,state as a whole is such an end or has 
a separate life of its own4 ,the second 
kind of false view is of the opposite   
kind1 and consists in allowing reality  
only to the whole ,state1 and denying   
the reality of its parts1 the           
individuals4 ,the opinions that the     
,state is merely a mechanical aggregate 
of individuals1 that it is formed by the
 combination of individuals or families 
for the sake of mutual protection and   
benefit1 and that it exists only for    

these purposes1 are examples of the     
first kind4 ,such views subordinate the 
,state to the individual4 ,the ,state is
 treated as an external contrivance for 
securing the life1 the property1 or the 
convenience of the individual4 ,the     
,state exists solely for the sake of the
 individual1 and is not in itself an    
end4 ,the individual alone is real1 the 
,state unreal1 because it is only a     
collection of individuals4 ,these views 
forget that the ,state is an organism1  
and they forget all that this implies4  
,aristotle would have condemned1 on     
these grounds1 the social contract      
theory so popular in the eighteenth     
century1 and likewise the view of modern
 individualism that the ,state exists   
solely to ensure that the liberty of the
 individual is curtailed only by the    
right of other individuals to the same  
liberty4 ,the opposite kind of false    
view is illustrated by the ideal ,state 
of ,plato4 ,as the views we have just   
discussed deny the reality of the whole1

 ,plato's view1 on the contrary1 denies 
the reality of the parts4 ,for him the  
individual is nothing1 the ,state       
everything4 ,the individual is          
absolutely sacrificed to the ,state4 ,he
 exists only for the ,state1 and thus   
,plato makes the mistake of setting up  
the ,state as sole end and denying that 
the #cbd individual is an end in        
himself4 ,plato imagined that the ,state
 is a homogeneous unity1 in which its   
parts totally disappear4 ,but the true  
view is that the ,state1 as an organism1
 is a unity which contains              
heterogeneity4 ,it is coherent1 yet     
heterogeneous4 ,and ,plato makes the    
same mistake in his view of the family  
as in his view of the individual4 ,the  
family1 ,aristotle thinks1 is1 like the 
individual1 a real part of the social   
whole4 ,it is an organism within an     
organism4 ,as such1 it is an end in     
itself1 has absolute rights1 and cannot 
be obliterated4 ,but ,plato expressly   
proposed to abolish the family in favour

 of the ,state1 and by suggesting       
community of wives and the education of 
children in ,state nurseries from the   
year of their birth1 struck a deadly    
blow at an essential part of the ,state 
organization4 ,aristotle thus supports  
the institution of family1 not on       
sentimental1 but upon philosophic       
grounds4  ,aristotle gives no exhaustive
 classification of different kinds of   
,state1 because forms of government may 
be as various as the circumstances which
 give rise to them4 ,his classification 
is intended to include only outstanding 
types4 ,he finds that there are six such
 types1 of which three are good4 ,the   
other three are bad1 because they are   
corruptions of the good types4 ,these   
are 7#a7 ,monarchy1 the rule of one man 
by virtue of his being so superior in   
wisdom to all his fellows that he       
naturally rules them4 ,the corruption of
 ,monarchy is 7#b7 ,tyranny1 the rule of
 one man founded not on wisdom and      
capacity1 but upon force4 ,the second   

good form is 7#c7 ,aristocracy1 the rule
 of the wiser and better few1 of which  
the corrupt form is 7#d7 ,oligarchy1 the
 rule of the rich and powerful few4 7#e7
 ,constitutional ,republic or ,timocracy
 arises #cbe where all the citizens are 
of fairly equal capacity1 i4e41 where no
 stand-out individual or class exists1  
so that all or most take a share in the 
government4 ,the corresponding corrupt  
form is 7#f7 ,democracy1 which1 though  
it is the rule of the many1 is more     
especially characterized as being the   
rule of the poor4  ,unlike ,plato1      
,aristotle depicts no ideal ,state4 ,no 
single ,state1 he thinks1 is in itself  
the best4 ,everything must depend upon  
the circumstances4 ,what is the best    
,state in one age and county will not be
 the best in another4 ,moreover1 it is  
useless to discuss ,utopian             
constitutions4 ,what alone interests the
 sane and balanced mind of ,aristotle is
 the kind of constitution which we may  
hope actually to realize4 ,of the three 

good forms of government he considers   
that monarchy is theoretically the best4
 ,the rule of a single perfectly wise   
and just man would be better than any   
other4 ,but it has to be given up as    
impracticable1 because such perfect     
individuals do not exist4 ,and it is    
only among primitive peoples that we    
find the hero1 the man whose moral      
stature so completely exalts him above  
his fellows that he rules as a matter of
 course4 ,the next best ,state is       
aristocracy4 ,and last1 in ,aristotle's 
opinion1 comes constitutional republic1 
which is1 however1 perhaps the ,state   
best suited to the special needs and    
level of development of the ,greek      
city-states4    #f4 ,aesthetics1 or the 
,theory of ,art4  ,plato had no         
systematic philosophy of ,art1 and his  
views had to be collected from scattered
 references4 ,aristotle likewise has    
scarcely a system1 though his opinions  
are more connected1 and though he       
devoted a special tretise1 the ,poetics1

 to the subject4 ,and this #cbf book1   
which has come down to us in a          
fragmentary condition1 deals exclusively
 with poetry1 and even in poetry only   
the drama is considered in detail4 ,what
 we have from ,aristotle on the subject 
of aesthetics may be divided roughly    
into two classes1 firstly1 reflections  
on the nature and significance of art in
 general1 and1 secondly1 a more detailed
 application of these principles to the 
art of poetry4 ,we shall deal with these
 two classes of opinions in that order4 
,in order to know what art is1 we must  
first know what it is not4 ,it must be  
distinguished from kindred activities4  
,and firstly1 it is distinguished from  
morality in that morality is concerned  
with action1 art with production4       
,morality consists in the activity      
itself1 art in that which the activity  
produces4 ,hence the state of mind of   
the actor1 his motives1 feelings1 etc41 
are important in morality1 for they are 
part of the act itself4 ,but they are   

not important in art1 the only essential
 being that the work of art should turn 
out well1 however it has been produced4 
,secondly1 art is distinguished from the
 activity of nature1 which it in many   
respects resembles4 ,organic beings     
reproduce their own kind1 and1 in the   
fact that it is concerned with          
production1 generation resembles art4   
,but in generation1 the living being    
produces only itself4 ,the plant        
produces a plant1 man begets man4 ,but  
the artist produces something quite     
other than himself1 a poem1 a picture1 a
 statue4  ,art is of two kinds1         
according as it aims at completing the  
work of nature1 or at creating something
 new1 an imaginary world of its own     
which is a copy of the real world4 ,in  
the former case1 we get such arts as    
that of #cbg medicine4 ,where nature has
 failed to produce a healthy body1 the  
physician helps nature out1 and         
completes the work that she has begun4  
,in the latter case1 we get what are1 in

 modern times1 called the fine arts4    
,these ,aristotle calls the imitative   
arts4 ,we saw that ,plato regarded all  
art as imitative1 and that such a view  
is essentially unsatisfactory4 ,now     
,aristotle uses the same word1 which he 
perhaps borrowed from ,plato1 but his   
meaning is not the same as ,plato's1 nor
 does he fall into the same mistakes4   
,that in calling art imitative he has   
not in mind the thought that it has for 
its aim merely the faithful copying of  
natural objects is proved by the fact   
that he mentions music as the most      
imitative of the arts1 whereas music is1
 in fact1 in this sense1 the least      
imitative of all4 ,the painter may      
conceivably be regarded as imitating    
trees1 rivers1 or men1 but the musician 
for the most part produces what is      
unlike anything in nature4 ,what        
,aristotle means is that the artist     
copies1 not the sensuous object1 but    
what ,plato would call the ,idea4 ,art  
is thus not1 in ,plato's contemptuous   

phrase1 a copy of a copy4 ,it is a copy 
of the original4 ,its object is not this
 or that particular thing1 but the      
universal which manifests itself in the 
particular4 ,art idealizes nature1 that 
is1 sees the ,idea in it4 ,it regards   
the individual thing1 not as an         
individual1 but in its universal        
aspects1 as the fleeting embodiment of  
an eternal thought4 ,hence it is that   
the sculptor depicts not the individual 
man1 but rather the type-man1 the       
perfection of his kind4 ,hence too1 in  
modern times1 the portrait painter is   
not concerned to paint a faithful image 
of his model1 but takes the model merely
 as a suggestion1 and seizes upon that  
essential and eternal #cbh essence1 that
 ideal thought1 or universal1 which he  
sees shining through the sensuous       
materials in which it is imprisoned4    
,his task is to free it from this       
imprisonment4 ,the common man sees only 
the particular object4 ,the artist sees 
the universal in the particular4 ,every 

individual thing is a compound of matter
 and form1 of particular and universal4 
,the function of art is to exhibit the  
universal in it4  ,hence poetry is      
truer1 more philosophical1 than history4
 ,for history deals only with the       
particular as the particular4 ,it tells 
us only of the fact1 of what has        
happened4 ,its truth is mere            
correctness1 accuracy4 ,it has not in   
it1 as art has1 the living and eternal  
truth4 ,it does not deal with the ,idea4
 ,it yields us only the knowledge of    
something that1 having happened1 having 
gone by1 is finished4 ,its object is    
transient and perishable4 ,it concerns  
only the endless iteration of           
meaningless events4 ,but the object of  
art is that inner essence of objects and
 events1 which perishes not1 and of     
which the objects and events are the    
mere external drapery4 ,if therefore we 
would arrange philosophy1 art1 and      
history1 in order of their essential    
nobility and truth1 we should place     

philosophy first1 because its object is 
the universal as it is in itself1 the   
pure universal4 ,we should place art    
second1 because its object is the       
universal in the particular1 and history
 last1 because it deals only with the   
particular as such4 ,yet because each   
thing in the world has its own proper   
function1 and errs if it seeks to       
perform the functions of something else1
 hence1 in ,aristotle's opinion1 art    
must not attempt to emulate philosophy4 
,it must not deal with the abstract     
universal4 ,the poet must not use his   
verses as a vehicle of abstract thought4
 ,his proper #cbi sphere is the         
universal as it manifests itself in the 
particular1 not the universal as it is  
in itself4 ,aristotle1 for this reason1 
censures didactic poetry4 ,such a poem  
as that of ,empedocles1 who unfolded his
 philosophical system in metre1 is not1 
in fact1 poetry at all4 ,it is versified
 philosophy4 ,art is thus lower than    
philosophy4 ,the absolute reality1 the  

inner essence of the world1 is thought1 
reason1 the universal4 ,to contemplate  
this reality is the object alike of     
philosophy and of art4 ,but art sees the
 ,absolute not in its final truth1 but  
wrapped up in a sensuous drapery4       
,philosophy sees the ,absolute as it is 
in itself1 in its own nature1 in its    
full truth2 it sees it as what it       
essentially is1 thought4 ,philosophy1   
therefore1 is the perfect truth4 ,but   
this does not mean that art is to be    
superseded and done away with4 ,because 
philosophy is higher than art1 it does  
not follow that a man should suppress   
the artist in himself in order to rise  
to philosophy4 ,for an essential thought
 of the ,aristotelian philosophy is     
that1 in the scale of beings1 even the  
lower form is an end in itself1 and has 
absolute rights4 ,the higher activities 
presuppose the lower1 and rest upon     
them4 ,the higher includes the lower1   
and the lower1 as an organic part of its
 being1 cannot be eradicated without    

injury to the whole4 ,to suppress art in
 favour of philosophy would be a mistake
 precisely parallel to the moral error  
of asceticism4 ,in treating of          
,aristotle's ethics we saw that1        
although the activity of reason is held 
in highest esteem1 the attempt to uproot
 the passions was censured as erroneous4
 ,so here1 though philosophy is the     
crown of man's spiritual activity1 art  
has its rights1 and is an absolute end  
in itself1 a point which ,plato failed  
to see4 ,in the human organism1 the head
 is the #ccj chief of the members4 ,but 
one does not cut off the hand because it
 is not the head4  ,coming now to       
,aristotle's special treatment of the   
art of poetry1 we may note that he      
concentrates his attention almost       
exclusively upon the drama4 ,it does not
 matter whether the plot of a drama is  
historical or fictitious4 ,for the      
object of art1 the exhibition of the    
universal1 is just as well attained in  
an imaginary as in a real series of     

events4 ,its aim is not correctness1 but
 truth1 not facts1 but the ,idea4 ,drama
 is of two kinds1 tragedy and comedy4   
,tragedy exhibits the nobler specimens  
of humanity1 comedy the worse4 ,this    
remark should be carefully understood4  
,it does not mean that the hero of a    
tragedy is necessarily a good man in the
 ordinary sense4 ,he may even be a      
wicked man4 ,but the point is that1 in  
some sense1 he must be a great          
personality4 ,he cannot be an           
insignificant person4 ,he cannot be a   
nonentity4 ,be he good or bad1 he must  
be conceived in the grand manner4       
,milton's ,satan is not good1 but he is 
great1 and would be a fit subject for a 
tragedy4 ,the soundness of ,aristotle's 
thought here is very noteworthy4 ,what  
is mean and sordid can never form the   
basis of tragedy4 ,modern newspapers    
have done their best to debauch this    
word tragedy4 ,some wretched noteless   
human being is crushed to death by a    
train1 and the newspapers head their    

paragraph ,fearful ,tragedy at ,peckham 
,rye4 ,now such an incident may be sad1 
it may be dreadful1 it may be horrible1 
but it is not tragic4 ,tragedy no doubt 
deals with suffering4 ,but there is     
nothing great and ennobling about this  
suffering1 and tragedy is concerned with
 the sufferings of greatness4 ,in the   
same way1 ,aristotle does not mean that 
the comic #cca hero is necessarily a    
wicked man1 but that he is1 on the      
whole1 a poor creature1 an insignificant
 being4 ,he may be very worthy1 but     
there is something low and ignoble about
 him which makes us laugh4  ,tragedy    
brings about a purification of the soul 
through pity and terror4 ,mean1 sordid1 
or dreadful things do not ennoble us4   
,but the representation of truly great  
and tragic sufferings arouses in the    
beholder pity and terror which purge his
 spirit1 and render it serene and pure4 
,this is the thought of a great and     
penetrating critic4 ,the theory of      
certain scholars1 based upon            

etymological grounds1 that it means that
 the soul is purged1 not through1 but of
 pity and terror1 that by means of a    
diarrhoea of these unpleasant emotions  
we get rid of them and are left happy1  
is the thought of men whose scholarship 
may be great1 but whose understanding of
 art is limited4 ,such a theory would   
reduce ,aristotle's great and           
illuminating criticism to the           
meaningless babble of a philistine4     
#g4 ,critical ,estimate of ,aristotle's 
,philosophy4  ,it is not necessary to   
spend so much time upon criticising     
,aristotle as we spent upon doing the   
same for ,plato1 and that for two       
reasons4 ,in the first place1 ,plato    
with his obvious greatness abounded in  
defects which had to be pointed out1    
whereas we have but little adverse      
criticism for ,aristotle4 ,secondly1    
,aristotle's main defect is a dualism   
almost identical with that of ,plato1   
and what has been said of the one need  
only be shortly applied to the other4   

,at bottom ,aristotle's philosophy is   
the same as ,plato's1 with some of the  
main defects and crudities removed4     
,plato was the founder of the philosophy
 of the ,idea4 #ccb ,but in his hands1  
idealism was clogged with unessentials1 
and overgrown with excrescences4 ,his   
crude theory of the soul as a thing     
mechanically forced in and out of the   
body1 his doctrines of reincarnation and
 recollection1 the belief that this     
thing the soul can travel to some place 
far away where it will see those things 
the ,ideas1 and above all1 what is the  
root of all these1 the confusion between
 reality and existence1 with its        
consequent degradation of the universal 
to a mere particular--these were the    
unessentials with which ,plato connected
 his essential idealism4 ,to take the   
pure theory of ,ideas--albeit not under 
that name--to purge it of these         
encumbrances and to cast them upon the  
rubbish heap1 to cleanse ,plato's gold  
of its dross1 this was the task of      

,aristotle4 ,thought1 the universal1 the
 ,idea1 form--call it what you          
will--this is the ultimate reality1 the 
foundation of the world1 the absolute   
prius of all things4 ,so thought both   
,plato and ,aristotle4 ,but whereas     
,plato began to draw mental pictures of 
the universal1 to imagine that it       
existed apart in a world of its own1 and
 so might be experienced by the vision  
of the wandering soul1 ,aristotle saw   
that this was to treat thought as if it 
were a thing1 to turn it into a mere    
particular again4 ,he saw that the      
universal1 though it is the real1 has no
 existence in a world of its own1 but   
only in this world1 only as a formative 
principle of particular things4 ,this is
 the key-note of his philosophy4        
,aristotle registers1 therefore1 an     
enormous advance upon ,plato4 ,his      
system is the perfected and completed   
,greek idealism4 ,it is the highest     
point reached in the philosophy of      
,greece4 ,the flower of all previous    

thought1 the essence and pure           
distillation of the ,greek philosophic  
spirit1 the gathering #ccc up of all    
that is good in his predecessors and the
 rejection of all that is faulty and    
worthless--such is the philosophy of    
,aristotle4 ,it was not possible for the
 ,greek spirit to advance further4      
,further development could be only      
decay4 ,and so1 in fact1 it turned out  
to be4   ,aristotle deserves1 too1 the  
credit of having produced the only      
philosophy of evolution which the world 
has ever seen1 with the exception of    
that of ,hegel2 and ,hegel was enabled  
to found a newer theory of evolution    
only by following largely in the        
footsteps of ,aristotle4 ,this was      
perhaps ,aristotle's most original      
contribution to thought4 ,yet the       
factors of the problem1 though not its  
solution1 he took from his predecessors4
 ,the problem of becoming had tortured  
,greek thought from the earliest ages4  
,the philosophy of ,heracleitus1 in     

which it was most prominent1 had failed 
to solve it4 ,heracleitus and his       
successors racked their brains to       
discover how becoming could be possible4
 ,but even if they had solved this minor
 problem1 the greater question still    
remained in the background1 what does   
this becoming mean8 ,becoming for them  
was only meaningless change4 ,it was not
 development4 ,the world-process was an 
endless stream of futile and purposeless
 events1 a tale1 told by an idiot1 full 
of sound and fury1 signifying nothing4  
,aristotle not merely asked himself how 
becoming is possible4 ,he showed that   
becoming has a meaning1 that it         
signifies something1 that the           
world-process is a rationally ordered   
development towards a rational end4     
,but1 though ,aristotle's philosophy is 
the highest presentation of the truth in
 ancient times1 it cannot be accepted as
 anything final and faultless4          
,doubtless no philosophy can ever attain
 to finality4 ,let us apply our #ccd    

two-fold test4 ,does his principle      
explain the world1 and does it explain  
itself8 ,first1 does it explain the     
world8 ,the cause of ,plato's failure   
here was the dualism in his system      
between sense and thought1 between      
matter and the ,ideas4 ,it was          
impossible to derive the world from the 
,ideas1 because they were absolutely    
separated from the world4 ,the gulf was 
so great that it could never be bridged4
 ,matter and ,idea lay apart1 and could 
never be brought together4 ,now         
,aristotle saw this dualism in ,plato1  
and attempted to surmount it4 ,the      
universal and the particular1 he said1  
do not thus lie apart1 in different     
worlds4 ,the ,idea is not a thing here1 
and matter a thing there1 so that these 
two incommensurables have to be somehow 
mechanically and violently forced       
together to form a world4 ,universal and
 particular1 matter and form1 are       
inseparable4 ,the connexion between them
 is not mechanical1 but organic4 ,the   

dualism of ,plato is thus admitted and  
refuted4 ,but is it really surmounted8  
,the answer must be in the negative4 ,it
 is not enough by a tour de force to    
bring matter and form together1 to      
assert that they are inseparable1 while 
they remain all the time1 in principle1 
separate entities4 ,if the ,absolute is 
form1 matter ought to be deduced from   
form1 shown to be merely a projection   
and manifestation of it4 ,it must be    
shown that form not only moulds matter  
but produces it4 ,if we assert that the 
one primal reality is form1 then clearly
 we must prove that all else in the     
world1 including matter1 arises out of  
that prime being4 ,either matter arises 
out of form or it does not4 ,if it does1
 this arising must be exhibited4 ,if it 
does not1 then form is not the sole     
ultimate reality1 for matter is equally 
an ultimate1 underivative1 #cce         
primordial substance4 ,in that case1 we 
thus have two equally real ultimate     
beings1 each underived from the other1  

existing side by side from all eternity4
 ,this is dualism1 and this is the      
defect of ,aristotle4 ,not only does he 
not derive matter from form1 but he     
obviously sees no necessity for doing   
so4 ,he would probably have protested   
against any attempt to do so1 for1 when 
he identifies the formal1 final1 and    
efficient causes with each other1       
leaving out the material cause1 this is 
equivalent to an assertion that matter  
cannot be reduced to form4 ,thus his    
dualism is deliberate and persistent4   
,the world1 says ,aristotle1 is composed
 of matter and form4 ,where does this   
matter come from8 ,as it does not1 in   
his system1 arise out of form1 we can   
only conclude that its being is wholly  
in itself1 i4e41 that it is a substance1
 an absolute reality4 ,and this is      
utterly inconsistent with ,aristotle's  
assertion that it is in itself nothing  
but a mere potentiality4 ,thus1 in the  
last resort1 this dualism of sense and  
thought1 of matter and ,idea1 of        

unlimited and limiting1 which runs1 the 
little rift within the lute1 through all
 ,greek philosophy1 is not resolved4    
,the world is not explained1 because it 
is not derived from a single principle4 
,if form be the ,absolute1 the whole    
world must flow out of it4 ,in          
,aristotle's system1 it does not4       
,secondly1 is the principle of form     
self-explanatory8 ,here1 again1 we must 
answer negatively4 ,most of what was    
said of ,plato under this head applies  
equally to ,aristotle4 ,plato asserted  
that the ,absolute is reason1 and it was
 therefore incumbent on him to show that
 his account of reason was truly        
rational4 ,he failed to do so4          
,aristotle asserts the same thing1 for  
form is only #ccf another word for      
reason4 ,hence he must show us that this
 form is a rational principle1 and this 
means that he must show us that it is   
necessary4 ,but he fails to do so4 ,how 
is form a necessary and self-determining
 principle8 ,why should there be such a 

principle as form8 ,we cannot see any   
necessity4 ,it is a mere fact4 ,it is   
nothing but an ultimate mystery4 ,it is 
so1 and that is an end of it4 ,but why  
it should be so1 we cannot see4 ,nor can
 we see why there should be any of the  
particular kinds of form that there are4
 ,to explain this1 ,aristotle ought to  
have shown that the forms constitute a  
systematic unity1 that they can be      
deduced one from another1 just as we saw
 that ,plato ought to have deduced all  
the ,ideas from one another4 ,thus      
,aristotle asserts that the form of     
plants is nutrition1 of animals         
sensation1 and that the one passes into 
the other4 ,but even if this assertion  
be true1 it is a mere fact4 ,he ought   
not merely to have asserted this1 but to
 have deduced sensation from nutrition4 
,instead of being content to allege     
that1 as a fact1 nutrition passes into  
sensation1 he ought to have shown that  
it must pass into sensation1 that the   
passage from one to the other is a      

logical necessity4 ,otherwise1 we cannot
 see the reason why this change occurs4 
,that is to say1 the change is not      
explained4  ,consider the effects of    
this omission upon the theory of        
evolution4 ,we are told that the        
world-process moves towards an end1 and 
that this end is the self-realization of
 reason1 and that it is proximately     
attained in man1 because man is a       
reasoning being4 ,so far this is quite  
intelligible4 ,but this implies that    
each step in evolution is higher than   
the last because it approaches nearer to
 #ccg the end of the world-process4 ,and
 as that end is the realization of      
reason1 this is equivalent to saying    
that each step is higher than the last  
because it is more rational4 ,but how is
 sensation more rational than nutrition8
 ,why should it not be the other way    
about8 ,nutrition passes through        
sensation into human reason4 ,but why   
should not sensation pass through       
nutrition into human reason8 ,why should

 not the order be reversed8 ,we cannot  
explain4 ,and such an admission is      
absolutely fatal to any philosophy of   
evolution4 ,the whole object of such a  
philosophy is to make it clear to us why
 the higher form is higher1 and why the 
lower is lower3 why1 for example1       
nutrition must1 as lower1 come first1   
and sensation second1 and not vice      
versa4 ,if we can see no reason why the 
order should not be reversed1 this      
simply means that our philosophy of     
evolution has failed in its main point4 
,it means that we cannot see any real   
difference between lower and higher1 and
 that therefore we have merely change   
without development1 since it is        
indifferent whether ,a passes into ,b1  
or ,b into ,a4 ,the only way in which   
,aristotle could have surmounted these  
difficulties would have been to prove   
that sensation is a development of      
reason which goes beyond nutrition4 ,and
 he could only do this by showing that  
sensation logically arises out of       

nutrition4 ,for a logical development is
 the same as a rational development4 ,he
 ought to have logically deduced        
sensation from nutrition1 and so with   
all the other forms4 ,as it is1 all that
 can be said is that ,aristotle was the 
founder of a philosophy of evolution    
because he saw that evolution implies   
movement towards an end1 and because he 
attempted to point out the different    
stages in the attainment of that end1   
#cch but that he failed rationally to   
develop the doctrine stage by stage4    
,as neither the principle of form in    
general was shown to be necessary1 nor  
were the particular forms deduced from  
each other1 we have to conclude that    
,aristotle like ,plato1 named a         
self-explanatory principle1 reason or   
form1 as ultimate principle of things1  
but failed to show in detail that it is 
self-explanatory4 ,yet1 in spite these  
defects1 the philosophy of ,aristotle is
 one of the greatest philosophies that  
the world has ever seen1 or is ever     

likely to see4 ,if it does not solve all
 problems1 it does render the world more
 intelligible to us than it was before4 
#cci  ,,chapter ,,xiv  ,,the ,,general  
,,character ,,of ,,post-,,aristotelian  
,,philosophy  ,the rest of the story of 
,greek philosophy is soon told1 for it  
is the story of decay4 ,the             
post-,aristotelian is the least         
instructive of the three periods of     
,greek thought1 and ,i shall delineate  
only its main outlines4  ,the general   
characteristics of the decay of thought 
which set in after ,aristotle are       
intimately connected with the political1
 social1 and moral events of the time4  
,although the huge empire of ,alexander 
had broken up at the conqueror's death1 
this fact had in no way helped the      
,greek ,states to throw off the yoke of 
their oppressors4 ,with the single      
exception of ,sparta1 which stubbornly  
held out1 they had become1 for all      
intents and purposes1 subject to the    
dominion of ,macedonia4 ,and the death  

of ,alexander did not alter this fact4  
,it was not merely that rude might had  
overwhelmed a beautiful and delicate    
civilization4 ,that civilization itself 
was decaying4 ,the ,greeks had ceased to
 be a great and free people4 ,their     
vitality was ebbing4 ,had it not been   
one conqueror it would have been        
another4 ,they were growing old4 ,they  
had to give way before younger and      
sturdier races4 ,it was not so many     
years now before ,greece1 passing from  
one alien yoke to another1 was to become
 no more than a ,roman province4  #cdj  
,philosophy is not something that       
subsists independently of the growth and
 decay of the spirit of man4 ,it goes   
hand in hand with political1 social1    
religious1 and artistic development4    
,political organization1 art1 religion1 
science1 and philosophy1 are but        
different forms in which the life of a  
people expresses itself4 ,the innermost 
substance of the national life is found 
in the national philosophy1 and the     

history of philosophy is the kernel of  
the history of nations4 ,it was but     
natural1 then1 that from the time of    
,alexander onwards ,greek philosophy    
should exhibit symptoms of decay4  ,the 
essential mark of the decay of ,greek   
thought was the intense subjectivism    
which is a feature of all the           
post-,aristotelian schools4 ,not one of 
them is interested in the solution of   
the world-problem for its own sake4 ,the
 pure scientific spirit1 the desire for 
knowledge for its own sake1 is gone4    
,that curiosity1 that wonder1 of which  
,aristotle speaks as the inspiring      
spirit of philosophy1 is dead4 ,the     
motive power of philosophy is no longer 
the disinterested pursuit of truth1 but 
only the desire of the individual to    
escape from the ills of life4           
,philosophy only interests men in so far
 as it affects their lives4 ,it becomes 
anthropocentric and egocentric4         
,everything pivots on the individual    
subject1 his destiny1 his fate1 the     

welfare of his soul4 ,religion has long 
since become corrupted and worthless1   
and philosophy is now expected to do the
 work of religion1 and to be a haven of 
refuge from the storms of life4 ,hence  
it becomes essentially practical4       
,before everything else it is ethical4  
,all other departments of thought are   
now subordinated to ethics4 ,it is not  
as in the days of the strength and youth
 of the ,greek spirit1 when ,xenophanes 
or #cda ,anaxagoras looked out into the 
heavens1 and naively wondered what the  
sun and the stars were1 and how the     
world arose4 ,men's thought no longer   
turns outward toward the stars1 but only
 inward upon themselves4 ,it is not the 
riddle of the universe1 but the riddle  
of human life1 which makes them ponder4 
,this subjectivism has as its necessary 
consequences1 one-sidedness1 absence of 
originality1 and finally complete       
scepticism4 ,since men are no longer    
interested in the wider problems of the 
universe1 but only in the comparatively 

petty problems of human life1 their     
outlook becomes exclusively ethical1    
narrow1 and one-sided4 ,he who cannot   
forget his own self1 cannot merge and   
lose himself in the universe1 but looks 
at all things only as they affect       
himself1 does not give birth to great   
and universal thoughts4 ,he becomes     
self-centred1 and makes the universe    
revolve round him4 ,hence we no longer  
have now great1 universal1 all-embracing
 systems1 like those of ,plato and      
,aristotle4 ,metaphysics1 physics1      
logic1 are not studied for their own    
sakes1 but only as preparations for     
ethics4 ,narrowness1 however1 is always 
compensated by intensity1 which in the  
end becomes fanaticism4 ,hence the      
intense earnestness and almost          
miraculous heights of fanatical         
asceticism1 to which the ,stoics        
attained4 ,and an unbalanced and        
one-sided philosophy leads to extremes4 
,such a philosophy1 obsessed by a single
 idea1 unrestrained by any consideration

 for other and equally important factors
 of truth1 regardless of all other      
claims1 pushes its idea pig-headedly to 
its logical extreme4 ,such a procedure  
results in paradoxes and extravagances4 
,hence the ,stoics1 if they made duty   
their watchword1 must needs conceive it 
in #cdb the most extreme opposition to  
all natural impulses1 with a sternness  
unheard of in any previous ethical      
doctrine save that of the ,cynics4      
,hence the ,sceptics1 if they lighted on
 the thought that knowledge is difficult
 of attainment1 must needs rush to the  
extreme conclusion that any knowledge is
 utterly impossible4 ,hence the         
,neo-,platonists must needs cap all     
these tendencies by making out a drunken
 frenzy of the soul to be the true organ
 of philosophy1 and by introducing into 
speculation all the fantastic           
paraphernalia of sorcery1 demons1 and   
demi-gods4 ,absence of sanity and       
balance1 then1 are characteristics of   
the last period of ,greek philosophy4   

,the serenity and calm of ,plato and    
,aristotle are gone1 and in their place 
we have turgidity and extravagance4     
,lack of originality is a second        
consequence of the subjectivism of the  
age4 ,since metaphysics1 physics1 and   
logic are not cultivated1 except in a   
purely practical interest1 they do not  
flourish4 ,instead of advancing in these
 arenas of thought1 the philosophies of 
the age go backwards4 ,older systems1   
long discredited1 are revived1 and their
 dead bones triumphantly paraded abroad4
 ,the ,stoics return to ,heracleitus for
 their physics1 ,epicurus resurrects the
 atomism of ,democritus4 ,even in       
ethics1 on which they concentrate all   
their thought1 these post-,aristotelian 
systems have nothing essentially new to 
say4 ,stoicism borrows its principal    
ideas from the ,cynics1 ,epicureanism   
from the ,cyrenaics4 ,the               
post-,aristotelians rearrange old       
thoughts in a new order4 ,they take up  
the ideas of the past and exaggerate    

this or that aspect of them4 ,they twist
 and turn them in all directions1 and   
squeeze them dry for a drop of new life4
 #cdc ,but in the end nothing new       
eventuates4 ,greek thought is finished1 
and there is nothing new to be got out  
of it1 torture it how they will4 ,from  
the first ,stoic to the last            
,neo-,platonist1 there is no essentially
 new principle added to philosophy1     
unless we count as such the sad and     
jaded ideas which the ,neo-,platonists  
introduced from the ,east4  ,lastly1    
subjectivism ends naturally in          
scepticism1 the denial of all knowledge1
 the rejection of all philosophy4 ,we   
have already seen1 in the ,sophists1 the
 phenomenon of subjectivism leading to  
scepticism4 ,the ,sophists made the     
individual subject the measure of truth 
and morals1 and in the end this meant   
the denial of truth and morality        
altogether4 ,so it is now4 ,the         
subjectivism of the ,stoics and         
,epicureans is followed by the          

scepticism of ,pyrrho and his           
successors4 ,with them1 as with the     
,sophists1 nothing is true or good in   
itself1 but only opinion makes it so4   
#cdd  ,,chapter ,,xv  ,,the ,,stoics    
,zeno of ,cyprus1 the founder of the    
,stoic ,school1 a ,greek of ,phoenician 
descent1 was born about #cdb ,b4,c41 and
 died in #bgj4 ,he is said to have      
followed philosophy2 because he lost all
 his property in a ship-wreck--a motive 
characteristic of the age4 ,he came to  
,athens1 and learned philosophy under   
,crates the ,cynic1 ,stilpo the         
,megaric1 and ,polemo the ,academic4    
,about #cjj ,b4,c4 he founded his school
 at the ,stoa ,poecile 7many-coloured   
portico7 whence the name ,stoic4 ,he    
died by his own hand4 ,he was followed  
by ,cleanthes1 and then by ,chrysippus1 
as leaders of the school4 ,chrysippus   
was a man of immense productivity and   
laborious scholarship4 ,he composed over
 seven hundred books1 but all are lost4 
,though not the founder1 he was the     

chief pillar of ,stoicism4 ,the school  
attracted many adherents1 and flourished
 for many centuries1 not only in        
,greece1 but later in ,rome1 where the  
most thoughtful writers1 such as ,marcus
 ,aurelius1 ,seneca1 and ,epictetus1    
counted themselves among its followers4 
,we know little for certain as to what  
share particular ,stoics1 ,zeno1        
,cleanthes1 or ,chrysippus1 had in the  
formation of the doctrines of the       
school4 ,but after ,chrysippus the main 
lines of the doctrine were complete4    
#cde ,we shall deal1 therefore1 with    
,stoicism as a whole1 and not with the  
special teaching of particular ,stoics4 
,the system is divided into three parts1
 ,logic1 ,physics1 and ,ethics1 of which
 the first two are entirely subservient 
to the last4 ,stoicism is essentially a 
system of ethics which1 however1 is     
guided by a logic as theory of method1  
and rests upon physics as foundation4   
,logic4  ,we may pass over the formal   
logic of the ,stoics1 which is1 in all  

essentials1 the logic of ,aristotle4 ,to
 this1 however1 they added a theory1    
peculiar to themselves1 of the origin of
 knowledge and the criterion of truth4  
,all knowledge1 they said1 enters the   
mind through the senses4 ,the mind is a 
tabula rasa1 upon which                 
sense-impressions are inscribed4 ,it may
 have a certain activity of its own1 but
 this activity is confined exclusively  
to materials supplied by the physical   
organs of sense4 ,this theory stands1 of
 course1 in sheer opposition to the     
idealism of ,plato1 for whom the mind   
alone was the source of knowledge1 the  
senses being the sources of all illusion
 and error4 ,the ,stoics denied the     
metaphysical reality of concepts4       
,concepts are merely ideas in the mind1 
abstracted from particulars1 and have no
 reality outside consciousness4  ,since 
all knowledge is a knowledge of         
sense-objects1 truth is simply the      
correspondence of our impressions to    
things4 ,how are we to know whether our 

ideas are correct copies of things8 ,how
 distinguish between reality and        
imagination1 dreams1 or illusions8 ,what
 is the criterion of truth8 ,it cannot  
lie in concepts1 since these are of our 
own making4 ,nothing is true save #cdf  
sense-impressions1 and therefore the    
criterion of truth must lie in sensation
 itself4 ,it cannot be in thought1 but  
must be in feeling4 ,real objects1 said 
the ,stoics1 produce in us an intense   
feeling1 or conviction1 of their        
reality4 ,the strength and vividness of 
the image distinguish these real        
perceptions from a dream or fancy4      
,hence the sole criterion of truth is   
this striking conviction1 whereby the   
real forces itself upon our             
consciousness1 and will not be denied4  
,the relapse into complete subjectivity 
will here be noted4 ,there is no        
universally grounded criterion of truth4
 ,it is based1 not on reason1 but on    
feeling4 ,all depends on the subjective 
convictions of the individual4          

,physics4  ,the fundamental proposition 
of the ,stoic physics is that nothing   
incorporeal exists4 ,this materialism   
coheres with the sensationalism of their
 doctrine of knowledge4 ,plato placed   
knowledge in thought1 and reality1      
therefore1 in the ,idea4 ,the ,stoics1  
however1 place knowledge in physical    
sensation1 and reality1 therefore1 in   
what is known by the senses1 matter4    
,all things1 they said1 even the soul1  
even ,god himself1 are material and     
nothing more than material4 ,this belief
 they based upon two main               
considerations4 ,firstly1 the unity of  
the world demands it4 ,the world is one1
 and must issue from one principle4 ,we 
must have a monism4 ,the idealism of    
,plato and ,aristotle had resolved      
itself into a futile struggle against   
the dualism of matter and thought4      
,since the gulf cannot be bridged from  
the side of the ,idea1 we must take our 
stand on matter1 and reduce mind to it4 
,secondly1 body and soul1 ,god and #cdg 

the world1 are pairs which act and react
 upon one another4 ,the body1 for       
example1 produces thoughts              
7sense-impressions7 in the soul1 the    
soul produces movements in the body4    
,this would be impossible if both were  
not of the same substance4 ,the         
corporeal cannot act on the incorporeal1
 nor the incorporeal on the corporeal4  
,there is no point of contact4 ,hence   
all must be equally corporeal4  ,all    
things being material1 what is the      
original kind of matter1 or stuff1 out  
of which the world is made8 ,the ,stoics
 turned to ,heracleitus for an answer4  
,fire is the primordial kind of being1  
and all things are composed of fire4    
,with this materialism the ,stoics      
combined pantheism4 ,the primal fire is 
,god4 ,god is related to the world      
exactly as the soul to the body4 ,the   
human soul is likewise fire1 and comes  
from the divine fire4 ,it permeates and 
penetrates the entire body1 and1 in     
order that its interpenetration might be

 regarded as complete1 the ,stoics      
denied the impenetrability of matter4   
,just as the soul-fire permeates the    
whole body1 so ,god1 the primal fire1   
pervades the entire world4 ,he is the   
soul of the world4 ,the world is ,his   
body4  ,but in spite of this            
materialism1 the ,stoics averred that   
,god is absolute reason4 ,this is not a 
return to idealism4 ,it does not imply  
the incorporeality of ,god4 ,for reason1
 like all else1 is material4 ,it means  
simply that the divine fire is a        
rational element4 ,since ,god is reason1
 it follows that the world is governed  
by reason1 and this means two things4   
,it means1 firstly1 that there is       
purpose in the world1 and therefore1    
order1 harmony1 beauty1 and design4     
,secondly1 since reason is law as       
opposed to the lawless1 it means that   
the universe is #cdh subject to the     
absolute sway of law1 is governed by the
 rigorous necessity of cause and effect4
  ,hence the individual is not free4    

,there can be no true freedom of the    
will in a world governed by necessity4  
,we may1 without harm1 say that we      
choose to do this or that1 that our acts
 are voluntary4 ,but such phrases merely
 mean that we assent to what we do4     
,what we do is none the less governed by
 causes1 and therefore by necessity4    
,the world-process is circular4 ,god    
changes the fiery substance of himself  
first into air1 then water1 then earth4 
,so the world arises4 ,but it will be   
ended by a conflagration in which all   
things will return into the primal fire4
 ,thereafter1 at a pre-ordained time1   
,god will again transmute himself into a
 world4 ,it follows from the law of     
necessity that the course taken by this 
second1 and every subsequent1 world1    
will be identical in every way with the 
course taken by the first world4 ,the   
process goes on for ever1 and nothing   
new ever happens4 ,the history of each  
successive world is the same as that of 
all the others down to the minutest     

details4  ,the human soul is part of the
 divine fire1 and proceeds into man from
 ,god4 ,hence it is a rational soul1 and
 this is a point of cardinal importance 
in connexion with the ,stoic ethics4    
,but the soul of each individual does   
not come direct from ,god4 ,the divine  
fire was breathed into the first man1   
and thereafter passes from parent to    
child in the act of procreation4 ,after 
death1 all souls1 according to some1 but
 only the souls of the good1 according  
to others1 continue in individual       
existence until the general             
conflagration in which they1 and all    
else1 return to ,god4    #cdi  ,ethics4 
,the ,stoic ethical teaching is based   
upon two principles already developed in
 their physics2 first1 that the universe
 is governed by absolute law1 which     
admits of no exceptions2 and second1    
that the essential nature of man is     
reason4 ,both are summed up in the      
famous ,stoic maxim1 ,live according to 
nature4 ,for this maxim has two aspects4

 ,it means1 in the first place1 that men
 should conform themselves to nature in 
the wider sense1 that is1 to the laws of
 the universe1 and secondly1 that they  
should conform their actions to nature  
in the narrower sense1 to their own     
essential nature1 reason4 ,these two    
expressions mean1 for the ,stoics1 the  
same thing4 ,for the universe is        
governed not only by law1 but by the law
 of reason1 and man in following his own
 rational nature is ipso facto          
conforming himself to the laws of the   
larger world4 ,in a sense1 of course1   
there is no possibility of man's        
disobeying the laws of nature1 for he1  
like all else in the world1 acts of     
necessity4 ,and it might be asked1 what 
is the use of exhorting a man to obey   
the laws of the universe1 when1 as part 
of the great mechanism of the world1 he 
cannot by any possibility do anything   
else8 ,it is not to be supposed that a  
genuine solution of this difficulty is  
to be found in ,stoic philosophy4 ,they 

urged1 however1 that1 though man will in
 any case do as the necessity of the    
world compels him1 it is given to him   
alone1 not merely to obey the law1 but  
to assent to his own obedience1 to      
follow the law consciously and          
deliberately1 as only a rational being  
can4  ,virtue1 then1 is the life        
according to reason4 ,morality is simply
 rational action4 ,it is the universal  
reason which is to govern our lives1 not
 the caprice and self-will #cej of the  
individual4 ,the wise man consciously   
subordinates his life to the life of the
 whole universe1 and recognises himself 
as merely a cog in the great machine4   
,now the definition of morality as the  
life according to reason is not a       
principle peculiar to the ,stoics4 ,both
 ,plato and ,aristotle taught the same4 
,in fact1 as we have already seen1 to   
found morality upon reason1 and not upon
 the particular foibles1 feelings1 or   
intuitions1 of the individual self1 is  
the basis of every genuine ethic4 ,but  

what was peculiar to the ,stoics was the
 narrow and one-sided interpretation    
which they gave to this principle4      
,aristotle had taught that the essential
 nature of man is reason1 and that      
morality consists in following this1 his
 essential nature4 ,but he recognized   
that the passions and appetites have    
their place in the human organism4 ,he  
did not demand their suppression1 but   
merely their control by reason4 ,but the
 ,stoics looked upon the passions as    
essentially irrational1 and demanded    
their complete extirpation4 ,they       
envisaged life as a battle against the  
passions1 in which the latter had to be 
completely annihilated4 ,hence their    
ethical views end in a rigorous and     
unbalanced asceticism4  ,aristotle1 in  
his broad and moderate way1 though he   
believed virtue alone to possess        
intrinsic value1 yet allowed to external
 goods and circumstances a place in the 
scheme of life4 ,the ,stoics asserted   
that virtue alone is good1 vice alone   

evil1 and that all else is absolutely   
indifferent4 ,poverty1 sickness1 pain1  
and death1 are not evils4 ,riches1      
health1 pleasure1 and life1 are not     
goods4 ,a man may commit suicide1 for in
 destroying his life he destroys nothing
 of value4 ,above all1 pleasure is not a
 good4 ,one ought not to seek pleasure4 
,virtue is #cea the only happiness4 ,and
 man must be virtuous1 not for the sake 
of pleasure1 but for the sake of duty4  
,and since virtue alone is good1 vice   
alone evil1 there followed the further  
paradox that all virtues are equally    
good1 and all vices equally evil4 ,there
 are no degrees4  ,virtue is founded    
upon reason1 and so upon knowledge4     
,hence the importance of science1       
physics1 logic1 which are valued not for
 themselves1 but because they are the   
foundations of morality4 ,the prime     
virtue1 and the root of all other       
virtues1 is therefore wisdom4 ,the wise 
man is synonymous with the good man4    
,from the root-virtue1 wisdom1 spring   

the four cardinal virtues1 insight1     
bravery1 self-control1 justice4 ,but    
since all virtues have one root1 he who 
possesses wisdom possesses all virtue1  
he who lacks it lacks all4 ,a man is    
either wholly virtuous1 or wholly       
vicious4 ,the world is divided into wise
 men and fools1 the former perfectly    
good1 the latter absolutely evil4 ,there
 is nothing between the two4 ,there is  
no such thing as a gradual transition   
from one to the other4 ,conversion must 
be instantaneous4 ,the wise man is      
perfect1 has all happiness1 freedom1    
riches1 beauty4 ,he alone is the perfect
 king1 statesman1 poet1 prophet1 orator1
 critic1 physician4 ,the fool has all   
vice1 all misery1 all ugliness1 all     
poverty4 ,and every man is one or the   
other4 ,asked where such a wise man was 
to be found1 the ,stoics pointed        
doubtfully at ,socrates and ,diogenes   
the ,cynic4 ,the number of the wise1    
they thought1 is small1 and is          
continually growing smaller4 ,the world1

 which they painted in the blackest     
colours as a sea of vice and misery1    
grows steadily worse4  ,in all this we  
easily recognize the features of a      
resuscitated ,cynicism4 ,but the ,stoics
 modified and softened #ceb the harsh   
outlines of ,cynicism1 and rounded off  
its angles4 ,to do this meant           
inconsistency4 ,it meant that they first
 laid down harsh principles1 and then   
proceeded to tone them down1 to explain 
them away1 to admit exceptions4 ,such   
inconsistency the ,stoics accepted with 
their habitual cheerfulness4 ,this      
process of toning down their first harsh
 utterances took place mainly in three  
ways4 ,in the first place1 they modified
 their principle of the complete        
extirpation of the passions4 ,since this
 is impossible1 and1 if possible1 could 
only lead to immovable inactivity1 they 
admitted that the wise man might exhibit
 certain mild and rational emotions1 and
 that the roots of the passions might be
 found in him1 though he never allowed  

them to grow4 ,in the second place1 they
 modified their principle that all else1
 save virtue and vice1 is indifferent4  
,such a view is unreal1 and out of      
accord with life4 ,hence the ,stoics1   
with a masterly disregard of            
consistency1 stuck to the principle1 and
 yet declared that among things         
indifferent some are preferable to      
others4 ,if the wise man has the choice 
between health and sickness1 he will    
choose the former4 ,indifferent things  
were divided into three classes1 those  
to be preferred1 those to be avoided1   
and those which are absolutely          
indifferent4 ,in the third place1 the   
,stoics toned down the principle that   
men are either wholly good1 or wholly   
evil4 ,the famous heroes and statesmen  
of history1 though fools1 are yet       
polluted with the common vices of       
mankind less than others4 ,moreover1    
what were the ,stoics to say about      
themselves8 ,were they wise men or      
fools8 ,they hesitated to claim         

perfection1 to put themselves on a level
 with ,socrates and ,diogenes4 ,yet they
 could not bring themselves to admit    
that there was #cec no difference       
between themselves and the common herd4 
,they were proficients1 and1 if not     
absolutely wise1 approximated to wisdom4
  ,if the ,stoics were thus merely less 
consistent ,cynics1 and originated      
nothing in the doctrines of physics and 
ethics so far considered1 yet of one    
idea at least they can claim to be the  
inventors4 ,this was the idea of        
cosmopolitanism4 ,this they deduced from
 two grounds4 ,firstly1 the universe is 
one1 proceeds from one ,god1 is ordered 
by one law1 and forms one system4       
,secondly1 however much men may differ  
in unessentials1 they share their       
essential nature1 their reason1 in      
common4 ,hence all men are of one stock1
 as rational beings1 and should form one
 ,state4 ,the division of mankind into  
warring ,states is irrational and       
absurd4 ,the wise man is not a citizen  

of this or that ,state4 ,he is a citizen
 of the world4  ,this is1 however1 only 
an application of principles already    
asserted4 ,the ,stoics produced no      
essentially new thought1 in physics1 or 
in ethics4 ,their entire stock of ideas 
is but a new combination of ideas       
already developed by their predecessors4
 ,they were narrow1 extreme1            
over-rigorous1 and one-sided4 ,their    
truths are all half-truths4 ,and they   
regarded philosophy too subjectively4   
,what alone interested them was the     
question1 how am ,i to live8 ,yet in    
spite of these defects1 there is        
undoubtedly something grand and noble   
about their zeal for duty1 their        
exaltation above all that is petty and  
paltry1 their uncompromising contempt   
for all lower ends4 ,their merit1 says  
,schwegler1 was that in an age of ruin  
they held fast by the moral idea4       
#ced  ,,chapter ,,xvi  ,,the            
,,epicureans  ,epicurus was born at     
,samos in #cdb ,b4,c4 ,he founded his   

school a year or two before ,zeno       
founded the ,stoa1 so that the two      
schools from the first ran parallel in  
time4 ,the school of ,epicurus lasted   
over six centuries4 ,epicurus early     
became acquainted with the atomism of   
,democritus1 but his learning in earlier
 systems of philosophy does not appear  
to have been extensive4 ,he was a man of
 estimable life and character4 ,he      
founded his school in #cjf ,b4,c4 ,the  
,epicurean philosophy was both founded  
and completed by him4 ,no subsequent    
,epicurean to any appreciable extent    
added to or altered the doctrines laid  
down by the founder4  ,the ,epicurean   
system is even more purely practical in 
tendency than the ,stoic4 ,in spite of  
the fact that ,stoicism subordinates    
logic and physics to ethics1 yet the    
diligence and care which the ,stoics    
bestowed upon such doctrines as those of
 the criterion of truth1 the nature of  
the world1 the soul1 and so on1 afford  
evidence of a genuine1 if subordinate1  

interest in these subjects4 ,epicurus   
likewise divided his system into logic  
7which he called canonic71 physics1 and 
ethics1 yet the two former branches of  
thought are pursued with an obvious     
carelessness and absence of interest4   
,it is evident that learned #cee        
discussions bored ,epicurus4 ,his system
 is amiable and shallow4 ,knowledge for 
its own sake is not desired4            
,mathematics1 he said1 are useless1     
because they have no connexion with     
life4 ,the logic1 or canonic1 we may    
pass over completely1 as possessing no  
elements of interest1 and come at once  
to the physics4    ,physics4  ,physics  
interests ,epicurus only from one point 
of view--its power to banish            
superstitious fear from the minds of    
men4 ,all supernatural religion1 he     
thought1 operates for the most part upon
 mankind by means of fear4 ,men are     
afraid of the gods1 afraid of           
retribution1 afraid of death because of 
the stories of what comes after death4  

,this incessant fear and anxiety is one 
of the chief causes of the unhappiness  
of men4 ,destroy it1 and we have at     
least got rid of the prime hindrance to 
human happiness4 ,we can only do this by
 means of a suitable doctrine of        
physics4 ,what is necessary is to be    
able to regard the world as a piece of  
mechanism1 governed solely by natural   
causes1 without any interference by     
supernatural beings1 in which man is    
free to find his happiness how and when 
he will1 without being frightened by the
 bogeys of popular religion4 ,for though
 the world is ruled mechanically1 man1  
thought ,epicurus in opposition to the  
,stoics1 possesses free will1 and the   
problem of philosophy is to ascertain   
how he can best use this gift in a world
 otherwise mechanically governed4 ,what 
he required1 therefore1 was a purely    
mechanical philosophy4 ,to invent such a
 philosophy for himself was a task not  
suited to his indolence1 and for which  
he could not pretend to possess the     

necessary #cef qualifications4          
,therefore he searched the past1 and    
soon found what he wanted in the atomism
 of ,democritus4 ,this1 as an entirely  
mechanical philosophy1 perfectly suited 
his ends1 and the pragmatic spirit in   
which he chose his beliefs1 not on any  
abstract grounds of their objective     
truth1 but on the basis of his          
subjective needs and personal wishes1   
will be noted4 ,it is a sign of the     
times4 ,when truth comes to be regarded 
as something that men may construct in  
accordance with their real or imagined  
needs1 and not in accordance with any   
objective standard1 we are well advanced
 upon the downward path of decay4       
,epicurus1 therefore1 adopted the       
atomism of ,democritus en bloc1 or with 
trifling modifications4 ,all things are 
composed of atoms and the void4 ,atoms  
differ only in shape and weight1 not in 
quality4 ,they fall eternally through   
the void4 ,by virtue of free will1 they 
deviate infinitesimally from the        

perpendicular in their fall1 and so     
clash against one another4 ,this1 of    
course1 is an invention of ,epicurus1   
and formed no part of the doctrine of   
,democritus4 ,it might be expected of   
,epicurus that his modifications would  
not be improvements4 ,in the present    
case1 the attribution of free will to   
the atoms adversely affects the logical 
consistency of the mechanical theory4   
,from the collision of atoms arises a   
whirling movement out of which the world
 emerges4 ,not only the world1 but all  
individual phenomena1 are to be         
explained mechanically4 ,teleology is   
rigorously excluded4 ,in any particular 
case1 however1 ,epicurus is not         
interested to know what particular      
causes determine a phenomenon4 ,it is   
enough for him to be sure that it is    
wholly determined by mechanical causes1 
and that supernatural agencies are      
excluded4  #ceg  ,the soul being        
composed of atoms which are scattered at
 death1 a future life is not to be      

thought of4 ,but this is to be regarded 
as the greatest blessing4 ,it frees us  
from the fear of death1 and the fear of 
a hereafter4 ,death is not an evil4 ,for
 if death is1 we are not2 if we are1    
death is not4 ,when death comes we shall
 not feel it1 for is it not the end of  
all feeling and consciousness8 ,and     
there is no reason to fear now what we  
know that we shall not feel when it     
comes4  ,having thus disposed of the    
fear of retribution in a future life1   
,epicurus proceeds to dispose of the    
fear of the interference of the gods in 
this life4 ,one might have expected that
 ,epicurus would for this purpose have  
embraced atheism4 ,but he does not deny 
the existence of the gods4 ,on the      
contrary1 he believed that there are    
innumerable gods4 ,they have the form of
 men1 because that is the most beautiful
 of all forms4 ,they have distinctions  
in sex4 ,they eat1 drink1 and talk      
,greek4 ,their bodies are composed of a 
substance like light4 ,but though       

,epicurus allows them to exist1 he is   
careful to disarm them1 and to rob them 
of their fears4 ,they live in the       
interstellar spaces1 an immortal1 calm1 
and blessed existence4 ,they do not     
intervene in the affairs of the world1  
because they are perfectly happy4 ,why  
should they burden themselves with the  
control of that which nowise concerns   
them8 ,theirs is the beatitude of a     
wholly untroubled joy4    ,immortal are 
they1 clothed with powers1      ,not to 
be comforted at all1   ,lords over all  
the fruitless hours1      ,too great to 
appease1 too high to appal1         ,too
 far to call4 ,footnote #ag  ,footnote  
#ag3 ,a4 ,c4 ,swinburne's ,felise4  #ceh
  ,man1 therefore1 freed from the fear  
of death and the fear of the gods1 has  
no duty save to live as happily as he   
can during his brief space upon earth4  
,we can quit the realm of physics with a
 light heart1 and turn to what alone    
truly matters1 ethics1 the consideration
 of how man ought to conduct his life4  

,ethics4  ,if the ,stoics were the      
intellectual successors of the ,cynics1 
the ,epicureans bear the same relation  
to the ,cyrenaics4 ,like ,aristippus1   
they founded morality upon pleasure1 but
 they differ because they developed a   
purer and nobler conception of pleasure 
than the ,cyrenaics had known4 ,pleasure
 alone is an end in itself4 ,it is the  
only good4 ,pain is the only evil4      
,morality1 therefore1 is an activity    
which yields pleasure4 ,virtue has no   
value on its own account1 but derives   
its value from the pleasure which       
accompanies it4  ,this is the only      
foundation which ,epicurus could find1  
or desired to find1 for moral activity4 
,this is his only ethical principle4    
,the rest of the ,epicurean ethics      
consists in the interpretation of the   
idea of pleasure4 ,and1 firstly1 by     
pleasure ,epicurus did not mean1 as the 
,cyrenaics did1 merely the pleasure of  
the moment1 whether physical or mental4 
,he meant the pleasure that endures     

throughout a lifetime1 a happy life4    
,hence we are not to allow ourselves to 
be enslaved by any particular pleasure  
or desire4 ,we must master our          
appetites4 ,we must often forego a      
pleasure if it leads in the end to      
greater pain4 ,we must be ready to      
undergo pain for the sake of a greater  
pleasure to come4  ,and it was just for 
this reason1 secondly1 that the #cei    
,epicureans regarded spiritual and      
mental pleasures as far more important  
than those of the body4 ,for the body   
feels pleasure and pain only while they 
last4 ,the body has in itself neither   
memory nor fore-knowledge4 ,it is the   
mind which remembers and foresees4 ,and 
by far the most potent pleasures and    
pains are those of remembrance and      
anticipation4 ,a physical pleasure is a 
pleasure to the body only now4 ,but the 
anticipation of a future pain is mental 
anxiety1 the remembrance of a past joy  
is a present delight4 ,hence what is to 
be aimed at above all is a calm         

untroubled mind1 for the pleasures of   
the body are ephemeral1 those of the    
spirit enduring4 ,the ,epicureans1 like 
the ,stoics1 preached the necessity of  
superiority to bodily pains and external
 circumstances4 ,so a man must not      
depend for his happiness upon externals2
 he must have his blessedness in his own
 self4 ,the wise man can be happy even  
in bodily torment1 for in the inner     
tranquillity of his soul he possesses a 
happiness which far outweighs any bodily
 pain4 ,yet innocent pleasures of sense 
are neither forbidden1 nor to be        
despised4 ,the wise man will enjoy      
whatever he can without harm4 ,of all   
mental pleasures the ,epicureans laid1  
perhaps1 most stress upon friendship4   
,the school was not merely a collection 
of fellow-philosophers1 but above all a 
society of friends4  ,thirdly1 the      
,epicurean ideal of pleasure tended     
rather towards a negative than a        
positive conception of it4 ,it was not  
the state of enjoyment that they aimed  

at1 much less the excitement of the     
feelings4 ,not the feverish pleasures of
 the world constituted their ideal4     
,they aimed rather at a negative absence
 of pain1 at tranquillity1 quiet calm1  
repose of spirit1 undisturbed by fears  
and #cfj anxieties4 ,as so often with   
men whose ideal is pleasure1 their view 
of the world was tinged with a gentle   
and even luxurious pessimism4 ,positive 
happiness is beyond the reach of        
mortals4 ,all that man can hope for is  
to avoid pain1 and to live in quiet     
contentment4  ,fourthly1 pleasure does  
not consist in the multiplication of    
needs and their subsequent satisfaction4
 ,the multiplication of wants only      
renders it more difficult to satisfy    
them4 ,it complicates life without      
adding to happiness4 ,we should have as 
few needs as possible4 ,epicurus himself
 lived a simple life1 and advised his   
followers to do the same4 ,the wise man1
 he said1 living on bread and water1    
could vie with ,zeus himself in         

happiness4 ,simplicity1 cheerfulness1   
moderation1 temperance1 are the best    
means to happiness4 ,the majority of    
human wants1 and the example of the     
thirst for fame is quoted1 are entirely 
unnecessary and useless4  ,lastly1 the  
,epicurean ideal1 though containing no  
possibility of an exalted nobility1 was 
yet by no means entirely selfish4 ,a    
kindly1 benevolent temper appeared in   
these men4 ,it is pleasanter1 they said1
 to do a kindness than to receive one4  
,there is little of the stern stuff of  
heroes1 but there is much that is gentle
 and lovable1 in the amiable moralizings
 of these butterfly-philosophers4       
#cfa  ,,chapter ,,xvii  ,,the ,,sceptics
  ,scepticism is a semi-technical term  
in philosophy1 and means the doctrine   
which doubts or denies the possibility  
of knowledge4 ,it is thus destructive of
 philosophy1 since philosophy purports  
to be a form of knowledge4 ,scepticism  
appears and reappears at intervals in   
the history of thought4 ,we have already

 met with it among the ,sophists4 ,when 
,gorgias said that1 if anything exists1 
it cannot be known1 this was a direct   
expression of the sceptical spirit4 ,and
 the ,protagorean ,man is the measure of
 all things amounts to the same thing1  
for it implies that man can only know   
things as they appear to him1 and not as
 they are in themselves4 ,in modern     
times the most noted sceptic was ,david 
,hume1 who attempted to show that the   
most fundamental categories of thought1 
such as substance and causality1 are    
illusory1 and thereby to undermine the  
fabric of knowledge4 ,subjectivism      
usually ends in scepticism4 ,for        
knowledge is the relation of subject and
 object1 and to lay exclusive emphasis  
upon one of its terms1 the subject1     
ignoring the object1 leads to the denial
 of the reality of everything except    
that which appears to the subject4 ,this
 was so with the ,sophists4 ,and now we 
have the reappearance of a similar #cfb 
phenomenon4 ,the ,sceptics1 of whom we  

are about to treat1 made their          
appearance at about the same time as the
 ,stoics and ,epicureans4 ,the          
subjective tendencies of these latter   
schools find their logical conclusion in
 the ,sceptics4 ,scepticism makes its   
appearance usually1 but not always1 when
 the spiritual forces of a race are in  
decay4 ,when its spiritual and          
intellectual impulses are spent1 the    
spirit flags1 grows weary1 loses        
confidence1 begins to doubt its power of
 finding truth2 and the despair of truth
 is scepticism4  ,pyrrho4  ,the first to
 introduce a thorough-going scepticism  
among the ,greeks was ,pyrrho4 ,he was  
born about #cfj ,b4,c41 and was         
originally a painter4 ,he took part in  
the ,indian expedition of ,alexander the
 ,great4 ,he left no writings1 and we   
owe our knowledge of his thoughts       
chiefly to his disciple ,timon of       
,phlius4 ,his philosophy1 in common with
 all post-,aristotelian systems1 is     
purely practical in its outlook4        

,scepticism1 the denial of knowledge1 is
 not posited on account of its          
speculative interest1 but only because  
,pyrrho sees in it the road to          
happiness1 and the escape from the      
calamities of life4  ,the proper course 
of the sage1 said ,pyrrho1 is to ask    
himself three questions4 ,firstly1 he   
must ask what things are and how they   
are constituted2 secondly1 how we are   
related to these things2 thirdly1 what  
ought to be our attitude towards them4  
,as to what things are1 we can only     
answer that we know nothing4 ,we only   
know how things appear to us1 but of    
their inner substance we are ignorant4  
,the same thing appears differently to  
different people1 and therefore it is   
#cfc impossible to know which opinion is
 right4 ,the diversity of opinion among 
the wise1 as well as among the vulgar1  
proves this4 ,to every assertion the    
contradictory assertion can be opposed  
with equally good grounds1 and whatever 
my opinion1 the contrary opinion is     

believed by somebody else who is quite  
as clever and competent to judge as ,i  
am4 ,opinion we may have1 but certainty 
and knowledge are impossible4 ,hence our
 attitude to things 7the third          
question71 ought to be complete suspense
 of judgment4 ,we can be certain of     
nothing1 not even of the most trivial   
assertions4 ,therefore we ought never to
 make any positive statements on any    
subject4 ,and the ,pyrrhonists were     
careful to import an element of doubt   
even into the most trifling assertions  
which they might make in the course of  
their daily life4 ,they did not say1 it 
is so1 but it seems so1 or it appears so
 to me4 ,every observation would be     
prefixed with a perhaps1 or it may be4  
,this absence of certainty applies as   
much to practical as to theoretical     
matters4 ,nothing is in itself true or  
false4 ,it only appears so4 ,in the same
 way1 nothing is in itself good or evil4
 ,it is only opinion1 custom1 law1 which
 makes it so4 ,when the sage realizes   

this1 he will cease to prefer one course
 of action to another1 and the result   
will be apathy1 ataraxia4 ,all action is
 the result of preference1 and          
preference is the belief that one thing 
is better than another4 ,if ,i go to the
 north1 it is because1 for one reason or
 another1 ,i believe that it is better  
than going to the south4 ,suppress this 
belief1 learn that the one is not in    
reality better than the other1 but only 
appears so1 and one would go in no      
direction at all4 ,complete suppression 
of opinion would mean complete #cfd     
suppression of action1 and it was at    
this that ,pyrrho aimed4 ,to have no    
opinions was the sceptical maxim1       
because in practice it meant apathy1    
total quietism4 ,all action is founded  
on belief1 and all belief is delusion1  
hence the absence of all activity is the
 ideal of the sage4 ,in this apathy he  
will renounce all desires1 for desire is
 the opinion that one thing is better   
than another4 ,he will live in complete 

repose1 in undisturbed tranquillity of  
soul1 free from all delusions4          
,unhappiness is the result of not       
attaining what one desires1 or of losing
 it when attained4 ,the wise man1 being 
free from desires1 is free from         
unhappiness4 ,he knows that1 though men 
struggle and fight for what they desire1
 vainly supposing some things better    
than others1 such activity is but a     
futile struggle about nothing1 for all  
things are equally indifferent1 and     
nothing matters4 ,between health and    
sickness1 life and death1 difference    
there is none4 ,yet in so far as the    
sage is compelled to act1 he will follow
 probability1 opinion1 custom1 and law1 
but without any belief in the essential 
validity or truth of these criteria4    
,the ,new ,academy4  ,the scepticism    
founded by ,pyrrho soon became extinct1 
but an essentially similar doctrine     
began to be taught in the school of     
,plato4 ,after the death of ,plato1 the 
,academy continued1 under various       

leaders1 to follow in the path marked   
out by the founder4 ,but1 under the     
leadership of ,arcesilaus1 scepticism   
was introduced into the school1 and from
 that time1 therefore1 it is usually    
known as the ,new ,academy1 for though  
its historical continuity as a school   
was not broken1 its essential character 
underwent change4 ,what especially #cfe 
characterized the ,new ,academy was its 
fierce opposition to the ,stoics1 whom  
its members attacked as the chief       
dogmatists of the time4 ,dogmatism1 for 
us1 usually means making assertions     
without proper grounds4 ,but since      
scepticism regards all assertions as    
equally ill-grounded1 the holding of any
 positive opinion whatever is by it     
regarded as dogmatism4 ,the ,stoics were
 the most powerful1 influential1 and    
forceful of all those who at that time  
held any positive philosophical         
opinions4 ,hence they were singled out  
for attack by the ,new ,academy as the  
greatest of dogmatists4 ,arcesilaus     

attacked especially their doctrine of   
the criterion of truth4 ,the striking   
conviction which1 according to the      
,stoics1 accompanies truth1 equally     
accompanies error4 ,there is no         
criterion of truth1 either in sense or  
in reason4 ,i am certain of nothing1    
said ,arcesilaus2 ,i am not even certain
 that ,i am certain of nothing4  ,but   
the ,academics did not draw from their  
scepticism1 as ,pyrrho had done1 the    
full logical conclusion as regards      
action4 ,men1 they thought1 must act4   
,and1 although certainty and knowledge  
are impossible1 probability is a        
sufficient guide for action4  ,carneades
 is usually considered the greatest of  
the ,academic ,sceptics4 ,yet he added  
nothing essentially new to their        
conclusions4 ,he appears1 however1 to   
have been a man of singularly acute and 
powerful mind1 whose destructive        
criticism acted like a battering-ram not
 only upon ,stoicism1 but upon all      
established philosophies4 ,as examples  

of his thoughts may be mentioned the two
 following4 ,firstly1 nothing can ever  
be proved4 ,for the conclusion must be  
proved by premises1 which in turn       
require proof1 and so ad infinitum4     
,secondly1 #cff it is impossible to know
 whether our ideas of an object are     
true1 i4e41 whether they resemble the   
object1 because we cannot compare our   
idea with the object itself4 ,to do so  
would involve getting outside our own   
minds4 ,we know nothing of the object   
except our idea of it1 and therefore we 
cannot compare the original and the     
copy1 since we can see only the copy4   
,later ,scepticism4  ,after a period of 
obliteration1 ,scepticism again revived 
in the ,academy4 ,of this last phase of 
,greek scepticism1 ,aenesidemus1 a      
contemporary of ,cicero1 is the earliest
 example1 and later we have the         
well-known names of ,simplicius and     
,sextus ,empiricus4 ,the distinctive    
character of later scepticism is its    
return to the position of ,pyrrho4 ,the 

,new ,academy1 in its eagerness to      
overthrow the ,stoic dogmatism1 had     
fallen into a dogmatism of its own4 ,if 
the ,stoics dogmatically asserted1 the  
,academics equally dogmatically denied4 
,but wisdom lies neither in assertion   
nor denial1 but in doubt4 ,hence the    
later ,sceptics returned to the attitude
 of complete suspense of judgment4      
,moreover1 the ,academics had allowed   
the possibility of probable knowledge4  
,and even this is now regarded as       
dogmatism4 ,aenesidemus was the author  
of the ten well-known arguments to show 
the impossibility of knowledge4 ,they   
contain in reality1 not ten1 but only   
two or three distinct ideas1 several    
being merely different expressions of   
the same line of reasoning4 ,they are as
 follows4 7#a7 ,the feelings and        
perceptions of all living beings differ4
 7#b7 ,men have physical and mental     
differences1 which make things appear   
different to them4 7#c7 ,the different  
senses give different #cfg impressions  

of things4 7#d7 ,our perceptions depend 
on our physical and intellectual        
conditions at the time of perception4   
7#e7 ,things appear different in        
different positions1 and at different   
distances4 7#f7 ,perception is never    
direct1 but always through a medium4    
,for example1 we see things through the 
air4 7#g7 ,things appear different      
according to variations in their        
quantity1 colour1 motion1 and           
temperature4 7#h7 ,a thing impresses us 
differently when it is familiar and when
 it is unfamiliar4 7#i7 ,all supposed   
knowledge is predication4 ,all          
predicates give us only the relation of 
things to other things or to ourselves2 
they never tell us what the thing in    
itself is4 7#aj7 ,the opinions and      
customs of men are different in         
different countries4    #cfh  ,,chapter 
,,xviii  ,,transition ,,to              
,,neo-,,platonism  ,it has been doubted 
whether ,neo-,platonism ought to be     
included in ,greek philosophy at all1   

and ,erdmann1 in his ,history of        
,philosophy1 places it in the medieval  
division4 ,for1 firstly1 an interval of 
no less than five centuries separates   
the foundation of ,neo-,platonism from  
the foundation of the preceding ,greek  
schools1 the ,stoic1 the ,epicurean1 and
 the ,sceptic4 ,how long a period this  
is will be seen if we remember that the 
entire development of ,greek thought    
from ,thales to the ,sceptics occupied  
only about three centuries4 ,plotinus1  
the real founder of ,neo-,platonism1 was
 born in #bje ,a4,d41 so that it is1 as 
far as historical time is concerned1 a  
product of the ,christian era4          
,secondly1 its character is largely     
un-,greek and un-,european4 ,the ,greek 
elements are largely swamped by oriental
 mysticism4 ,its seat was not in        
,greece1 but at ,alexandria1 which was  
not a ,greek1 but a cosmopolitan1 city4 
,men of all races met here1 and1 in     
particular1 it was here that ,east and  
,west joined hands1 and the fusion of   

thought which resulted was              
,neo-,platonism4 ,but1 on the other     
hand1 it seems wrong to include the     
thought of ,plotinus and his successors 
in medieval philosophy4 ,the whole      
character of what is usually called     
medieval philosophy was determined by   
its growth upon a distinctively         
,christian soil4 ,it was #cfi ,christian
 philosophy4 ,it was the product of the 
new era which ,christianity had         
substituted for paganism4               
,neo-,platonism1 on the other hand1 is  
not only unchristian1 but even          
anti-christian4 ,the only ,christian    
influence to be detected in it is that  
of opposition4 ,it is a survival of the 
pagan spirit in ,christian times4 ,in it
 the old pagan spirit struggles         
desperately against its younger         
antagonist1 and finally succumbs4 ,in it
 we see the last gasp and final expiry  
of the ancient culture of the ,greeks4  
,so far as it is not ,asiatic in its    
elements1 it draws its inspiration      

wholly from the philosophies of the     
past1 from the thought and culture of   
,greece4 ,on the whole1 therefore1 it is
 properly classified as the last school 
of ,greek philosophy4  ,the long        
interval of time which elapsed between  
the rise of the preceding ,greek        
schools1 whose history we have traced1  
and the foundation of ,neo-,platonism1  
was filled up by the continued          
existence1 in more or less fossilized   
form1 of the main ,greek schools1 the   
,academic1 the ,peripatetic1 the ,stoic1
 and the ,epicurean1 scattered and      
harried at times by the inroads of      
scepticism4 ,it would be wearisome to   
follow in detail the development in     
these schools1 and the more or less     
trifling disputes of which it consists4 
,no new thought1 no original principle1 
supervened4 ,it is sufficient to say    
that1 as time went on1 the differences  
between the schools became softened1 and
 their agreements became more prominent4
 ,as intellectual vigour wanes1 there is

 always the tendency to forget          
differences1 to rest1 as the orientals  
do1 in the good-natured and comfortable 
delusion that all religions and all     
philosophies really mean much the same  
thing4 ,hence eclecticism became        
characteristic of the schools4 #cgj     
,they did not keep themselves distinct4 
,we find ,stoic doctrines taught by     
,academics1 ,academic doctrines by      
,stoics4 ,only the ,epicureans kept     
their race pure1 and stood aloof from   
the general eclecticism of the time4    
,certain other tendencies also made     
their appearance4 ,there was a          
recrudescence of ,pythagoreanism1 with  
its attendant symbolism and mysticism4  
,there grew up a tendency to exalt the  
conception of ,god so high above the    
world1 to widen so greatly the gulf     
which divides them1 that it was felt    
that there could be no community between
 the two1 that ,god could not act upon  
matter1 nor matter upon ,god4 ,such     
interaction would contaminate the purity

 of the ,absolute4 ,hence all kinds of  
beings were invented1 demons1 spirits1  
and angels1 intended to fill up the gap1
 and to act as intermediaries between   
,god and the world4  ,as an example of  
these latter tendencies1 and as         
precursor of ,neo-,platonism proper1    
,philo the ,jew deserves a brief        
mention4 ,he lived at ,alexandria       
between #cj ,b4,c4 and #ej ,a4,d4 ,a    
staunch upholder of the religion and    
scriptures of the ,hebrew race1 he      
believed in the verbal inspiration of   
the ,old ,testament4 ,but he was learned
 in ,greek studies1 and thought that    
,greek philosophy was a dimmer          
revelation of those truths which were   
more perfectly manifested in the sacred 
books of his own race4 ,and just as     
,egyptian priests1 out of national      
vanity1 made out that ,greek philosophy 
came from ,egypt1 just as orientals now 
pretend that it came from ,india1 so    
,philo declared that the origin of all  
that was great in ,greek philosophy was 

to be found in ,judea4 ,plato and       
,aristotle1 he was certain1 were        
followers of ,moses1 used the ,old      
,testament1 and gained their wisdom     
therefrom6 #cga ,philo's own ideas were 
governed by the attempt to fuse ,jewish 
theology and ,greek philosophy into a   
homogeneous system4 ,it was ,philo1     
therefore1 who was largely responsible  
for contaminating the pure clear air of 
,greek thought with the enervating fogs 
of oriental mysticism4  ,philo taught   
that ,god1 as the absolutely infinite1  
must be elevated completely above all   
that is finite4 ,no name1 no thought1   
can correspond to the infinity of ,god4 
,he is the unthinkable and the          
ineffable1 and ,his nature is beyond the
 reach of reason4 ,the human soul       
reaches up to ,god1 not through thought1
 but by means of a mystical inner       
illumination and revelation that        
transcends thought4 ,god cannot act     
directly upon the world1 for this would 
involve ,his defilement by matter and   

the limitation of ,his infinity4 ,there 
are therefore intermediate spiritual    
beings1 who1 as the ministers of ,god1  
created and control the world4 ,all     
these intermediaries are included in the
 ,logos1 which is the rational thought  
which governs the world4 ,the relation  
of ,god to the ,logos1 and of the ,logos
 to the world1 is one of progressive    
emanation4 ,clearly the idea of         
emanation is a mere metaphor which      
explains nothing1 and this becomes more 
evident when ,philo compares the        
emanations to rays of light issuing from
 an effulgent centre and growing less   
and less bright as they radiate         
outwards4 ,when we hear this1 we know in
 what direction we are moving4 ,this has
 the characteristic ring of ,asiatic    
pseudo-philosophy4 ,it reminds us       
forcibly of the ,upanishads4 ,we are    
passing out of the realm of thought1    
reason1 and philosophy1 into the        
dream-and-shadow-land of oriental       
mysticism1 where the heavy scents of    

beautiful poison flowers drug the       
intellect and obliterate thought in a   
blissful and languorous repose4    #cgb 
,,chapter ,,xix  ,,the                  
,,neo-,,platonists  ,the word           
,neo-,platonism is a misnomer4 ,it does 
not stand for a genuine revival of      
,platonism4 ,the ,neo-,platonists were  
no doubt the offspring of ,plato1 but   
they were the illegitimate offspring4   
,the true greatness of ,plato lay in his
 rationalistic idealism2 his defects    
were mostly connected with his tendency 
to myth and mysticism4 ,the             
,neo-,platonists hailed his defects as  
the true and inner secret of his        
doctrine1 developed them out of all     
recognition1 and combined them with the 
hazy dream-philosophies of the ,east4   
,the reputed founder was ,ammonius      
,saccas1 but we may pass him over and   
come at once to his disciple ,plotinus1 
who was the first to develop            
,neo-,platonism into a system1 was the  
greatest of all its exponents1 and may  

be regarded as its real founder4 ,he was
 born in #bje ,a4,d4 at ,lycopolis in   
,egypt1 went to ,rome in #bde1 founded  
his ,school there1 and remained at the  
head of it till his death in #bgj4 ,he  
left extensive writings which have been 
preserved4  ,plato had shown that the   
idea of the ,one1 exclusive of all      
multiplicity1 was an impossible         
abstraction4 ,even to say the ,one is1  
involves the duality of the ,one4 ,the  
,absolute ,being can be no abstract     
unity1 but only a unity in multiplicity4
 ,plotinus begins by ignoring this #cgc 
supremely important philosophical       
principle4 ,he falls back upon the lower
 level of oriental monism4 ,god1 he     
thinks1 is absolutely ,one4 ,he is the  
unity which lies beyond all             
multiplicity4 ,there is in him no       
plurality1 no movement1 no distinction4 
,thought involves the distinction       
between object and subject2 therefore   
the ,one is above and beyond thought4   
,nor is the ,one describable in terms of

 volition or activity4 ,for volition    
involves the distinction between the    
willer and the willed1 activity between 
the actor and that upon which he acts4  
,god1 therefore1 is neither thought1 nor
 volition1 nor activity4 ,he is beyond  
all thought and all being4 ,as          
absolutely infinite1 ,he is also        
absolutely indeterminate4 ,all          
predicates limit their subject1 and     
hence nothing can be predicated of the  
,one4 ,he is unthinkable1 for all       
thought limits and confines that which  
is thought4 ,he is the ineffable and    
inconceivable4 ,the sole predicates     
which ,plotinus applies to ,him are the 
,one and the ,good4 ,he sees1 however1  
that these predicates1 as much as any   
others1 limit the infinite4 ,he regards 
them1 therefore1 not as literally       
expressing the nature of the infinite1  
but as figuratively shadowing it forth4 
,they are applied by analogy only4 ,we  
can1 in truth1 know nothing of the ,one1
 except that it is4  ,now it is         

impossible to derive the world from a   
first principle of this kind4 ,as being 
utterly exalted above the world1 ,god   
cannot enter into the world4 ,as        
absolutely infinite1 ,he can never limit
 ,himself to become finite1 and so give 
rise to the world of objects4 ,as       
absolutely ,one1 the many can never     
issue out of ,him4 ,the ,one cannot     
create the world1 for creation is an    
activity1 and the ,one is immutable and 
excludes all #cgd activity4 ,as the     
infinite first principle of all things1 
the ,one must be regarded as in some    
sense the source of all being4 ,and yet 
how it can give rise to being is        
inconceivable1 since any such act       
destroys its unity and infinity4 ,we saw
 once for all1 in the case of the       
,eleatics1 that it is fatal to define   
the ,absolute as unity exclusive of all 
multiplicity1 as immutable essence      
exclusive of all process1 and that if we
 do so we cut off all hope of showing   
how the world has issued from the       

,absolute4 ,it is just the same with    
,plotinus4 ,there is in his system the  
absolute contradiction that the ,one is 
regarded1 on the one hand1 as source of 
the world1 and on the other as so       
exalted above the world that all        
relationship to the world is impossible4
 ,we come1 therefore1 to a complete     
deadlock at this point4 ,we can get no  
further4 ,we can find no way to pass    
from ,god to the world4 ,we are involved
 in a hopeless1 logical contradiction4  
,but ,plotinus was a mystic1 and logical
 absurdities do not trouble mystics4    
,being unable to explain how the world  
can possibly arise out of the vacuum of 
the ,one1 he has recourse1 in the       
oriental style1 to poetry and metaphors4
 ,god1 by reason of ,his                
super-perfection1 overflows ,himself1   
and this overflow becomes the world4 ,he
 sends forth a beam from ,himself4 ,as  
flame emits light1 as snow cold1 so do  
all lower beings issue from the ,one4   
,thus1 without solving the difficulty1  

,plotinus deftly smothers it in flowery 
phrases1 and quietly passes on his way4 
,the first emanation from the ,one is   
called the ,nous4 ,this ,nous is        
thought1 mind1 reason4 ,we have seen    
that ,plato regarded the ,absolute      
itself as thought4 ,for ,plotinus1      
however1 thought is derivative4 ,the    
,one is beyond thought1 and thought     
issues forth from the ,one #cge as first
 emanation4 ,the ,nous is not discursive
 thought1 however4 ,it is not in time4  
,it is immediate apprehension1 or       
intuition4 ,its object is twofold4      
,firstly1 it thinks the ,one1 though its
 thought thereof is necessarily         
inadequate4 ,secondly1 it thinks itself4
 ,it is the thought of thought1 like    
,aristotle's ,god4 ,it corresponds to   
,plato's world of ,ideas4 ,the ,ideas of
 all things exist in the ,nous1 and not 
only the ,ideas of classes1 but of every
 individual thing4  ,from the ,nous1 as 
second emanation1 proceeds the          
world-soul4 ,this is1 in ,erdmann's     

phrase1 a sort of faded-out copy of the 
,nous1 and it is outside time1          
incorporeal1 and indivisible4 ,it works 
rationally1 but yet is not conscious4   
,it has a two-fold aspect1 inclining    
upwards to the ,nous on the one hand1   
and downwards to the world of nature on 
the other4 ,it produces out of itself   
the individual souls which inhabit the  
world4  ,the idea of emanation is       
essentially a poetical metaphor1 and not
 a rational concept4 ,it is conceived   
poetically by ,plotinus as resembling   
light which radiates from a bright      
centre1 and grows dimmer as it passes   
outwards1 till it shades off at last    
into total darkness4 ,this total        
darkness is matter4 ,matter1 as negation
 of light1 as the limit of being1 is in 
itself not-being4 ,thus the crucial     
difficulty of all ,greek philosophy1 the
 problem of the whence of matter1 the   
dualism of matter and thought1 which we 
have seen ,plato and ,aristotle         
struggling in vain to subjugate1 is     

loosely and lightly slurred over by     
,plotinus with poetic metaphors and     
roseate phrases4  ,matter ,plotinus     
considers to be the ground of plurality 
and the cause of all evil4 ,hence the   
object of life can #cgf only be1 as with
 ,plato1 to escape from the material    
world of the senses4 ,the first step in 
this process of liberation is katharsis1
 purification1 the freeing of oneself   
from the dominion of the body and the   
senses4 ,this includes all the ordinary 
ethical virtues4 ,the second step is    
thought1 reason1 and philosophy4 ,in the
 third stage the soul rises above       
thought to an intuition of the ,nous4   
,but all these are merely preparatory   
for the supreme and final stage of      
exaltation into the ,absolute ,one1 by  
means of trance1 rapture1 ecstasy4 ,here
 all thought is transcended1 and the    
soul passes into a state of unconscious 
swoon1 during which it is mystically    
united with ,god4 ,it is not a thought  
of ,god1 it is not even that the soul   

sees ,god1 for all such conscious       
activities involve the separation of the
 subject from its object4 ,in the       
ecstasy all such disunion and separation
 are annihilated4 ,the soul does not    
look upon ,god from the outside4 ,it    
becomes one with ,god4 ,it is ,god4     
,such mystical raptures can1 in the     
nature of the case1 only be momentary1  
and the soul sinks back exhausted to the
 levels of ordinary consciousness4      
,plotinus claimed to have been exalted  
in this divine ecstasy several times    
during his life4  ,after ,plotinus      
,neo-,platonism continues with          
modifications in his successors1        
,porphyry1 ,iamblicus1 ,syrianus1       
,proclus1 and others4  ,the essential   
character of ,neo-,platonism comes out  
in its theory of the mystical exaltation
 of the subject to ,god4 ,it is the     
extremity of subjectivism1 the forcing  
of the individual subject to the centre 
of the universe1 to the position of the 
,absolute ,being4 ,and it follows       

naturally upon the heels of ,scepticism4
 ,in the ,sceptics all faith in the     
power of thought and reason had finally 
died out4 ,they #cgg took as their      
watchword the utter impotence of reason 
to reach the truth4 ,from this it was   
but a step to the position that1 if we  
cannot attain truth by the natural means
 of thought1 we will do so by a miracle4
 ,if ordinary consciousness will not    
suffice1 we will pass beyond ordinary   
consciousness altogether4               
,neo-,platonism is founded upon despair1
 the despair of reason4 ,it is the last 
frantic struggle of the ,greek spirit to
 reach1 by desperate means1 by force1   
the point which it felt it had failed to
 reach by reason4 ,it seeks to take the 
,absolute by storm4 ,it feels that where
 sobriety has failed1 the violence of   
spiritual intoxication may succeed4  ,it
 was natural that philosophy should end 
here4 ,for philosophy is founded upon   
reason4 ,it is the effort to comprehend1
 to understand1 to grasp the reality of 

things intellectually4 ,therefore it    
cannot admit anything higher than       
reason4 ,to exalt intuition1 ecstasy1 or
 rapture1 above thought--this is death  
to philosophy4 ,philosophy in making    
such an admission1 lets out its own     
life-blood1 which is thought4 ,in       
,neo-,platonism1 therefore1 ancient     
philosophy commits suicide4 ,this is the
 end4 ,the place of philosophy is taken 
henceforth by religion4 ,christianity   
triumphs1 and sweeps away all           
independent thought from its path4      
,there is no more philosophy now till a 
new spirit of enquiry and wonder is     
breathed into man at the ,renaissance   
and the ,reformation4 ,then the new era 
begins1 and gives birth to a new        
philosophic impulse1 under the influence
 of which we are still living4 ,but to  
reach that new era of philosophy1 the   
human spirit had first to pass through  
the arid wastes of ,scholasticism4      
,,subject ,,index  ,a  ,abortions1 #bia4
  ,absolute1 ,the2   as many in one1    

#gj-ga1 #aig2   as reason1 #bdj-a1 #cjg2
   as knowable1 #bii2   as form1 #cjg4  
,actuality1 #bgi4 ,air1 as first        
principle1 #bh4 ,antinomy1 #ed4         
,appearance1 #fa4 ,aristocracy1 #cbd4   
,asceticism1 defect of1 #cag4 ,ataraxia1
 #cfc4 ,atoms1 #hh et seq1 #cef4        
,aufklaerung1 #aai-abj4   ,b  ,becoming2
   ,parmenides on1 #dd2   ,heracleitus  
on1 #gc2   ,empedocles on1 #hb2   ,plato
 on1 #aib2   ,aristotle on1 #bgi-bhj    
,being2   ,parmenides on1 #dd et seq2   
,plato on1 #aia1 #aig4   ,c  ,causation1
 #f-g2   as explanation1 #fd2           
,aristotle's doctrine of1 #bfg-gc4      
,classification1 #aii4 ,comedy1 #ccj-a4 
,concepts2   defined1 #adc2   identified
 with definitions1 #ade2   ,socrates's  
doctrine of1 #adc-f2   objectivity of1  
#ahc2   ,stoics on1 #cde4 ,condensation1
 #bh4 ,contract1 the social1 #cbc4      
,cosmopolitanism1 #cec4 ,counter-earth1 
#ch4 ,criterion1 ,the ,stoic1 #cde-f4   
,d  ,darwinism1 #bic4 ,death1 problem   
of1 #gf-g4 ,democracy1 #abc1 #cbe4      

,dialectic1 #ee1 #ahc1 #aii1 #bjd4      
,dichotomy1 #bjj4 ,division1 #aii4      
,dualism2   defined1 #fc2   of          
,eleatics1 #fh-gj2   of ,anaxagoras1    
#aje2   of ,plato1 #bch2   of           
,aristotle1 #ccd-e4   ,e  ,eclipses1    
#ajc4 ,ecstasy1 #cgf-g4 ,efficient      
cause1 #bfi2   identified with final    
cause1 #bgc-d4 ,elements1 ,the ,four1   
#hc4 ,emanation1 #cga1 #cgd-e4 ,empty   
,space1 #dg1 #hi1 #bia-b ,eros1 #bjd4   
,evolution2   ,anaximander and1 #bg2    
,aristotle's doctrine of1 #bic-i1       
#cjg-ab1 #ccc1 #ccf-g2   ,spencer's     
doctrine of1 #cjh et seq4  #cgi  ,evil1 
problem of1 #bdj-a4 ,explanation1       
scientific1 #fd-e4 ,external goods1     
value of1 #aei1 #ca-f1 #cej1 #cei4   ,f 
,faith1 age of1 #aea4 ,family1 ,the2    
,aristotle on1 #cbd4 ,final cause1 #bfi2
   identified with formal cause1 #bgc4  
,fire1 as first principle1 #gh1 #cdg4   
,first ,cause1 #ff4 ,first ,mover1      
#bhd-e4 ,form1 ,aristotle's doctrine of1
 #bfg1 #bgd-h4 ,formal cause1 #bfi2     

identified with final cause1 #bgc4 ,free
 ,will1 #cbj1 #cdh1 #cee4 ,friendship1  
#bbe1 #cei4   ,g  ,genius1 artistic1    
#bca4 ,geocentric hypothesis1 #ch1 #baa1
 #cje4 ,geometry1 #c-e1 #bge4 ,god2     
,xenophanes on1 #da-b2   ,socrates on1  
#acb2   ,plato on1 #bjb-d2   ,aristotle 
on1 #bhc-h2   as first mover1 #bhd-e2   
as thought of thought1 #bhe-f2          
relation of1 to the world1 #bhb2        
,plotinus on1 #cgc4 ,gods1 ,the2        
,democritus on1 #ib2   ,protagoras on1  
#aab2   ,socrates on1 #acb2   ,epicurus 
on1 #ceg4 ,good1   ,the ,idea of1 #aih1 
#bjj-a1 #bdd2   as ,god1 #bjc4          
,gravitation1 #bid-e4  ,h  ,habit1 #g4  
,happiness2   ,antisthenes on1 #aei2    
,plato on1 #bbj-a2   ,aristotle on1     
#cad-ae2   ,stoics on1 #cea2   ,epicurus
 on1 #ceh1 #cfa2   distinguished from   
pleasure1 #bba4 ,heavenly bodies1 ,the2 
,anaximander on1 #bf2   ,pythagoreans   
on1 #ch2   ,xenophanes on1 #dc2         
,anaxagoras on1 #ajc2   ,plato on1 #baa2
   ,aristotle on1 #cje-f4 ,heliocentric 

hypothesis1 #ch4 ,hinduism1 #ga1 #aig1  
#cjh1 #cab-ac4   ,i  ,idealism2   of    
,parmenides1 #dg et seq2   essentials   
of1 #dh1 #di1 #bce2   ,plato as founder 
of1 #bce4 ,ideas1   ,theory of1 #agd1   
#ahc-bjg2   ,aristotle on1 #bfb-e4      
,imagination1 #cjj4 ,immortality2       
,atomists on1 #ib2   ,plato on1 #age1   
#bab2   ,aristotle on1 #cjb-c2          
,epicurus on1 #ceg4 ,indian ,thought1   
#ad-af2 see also ,hinduism4             
,individualism1 #cbc4 ,induction1 #add1 
#adf1 #aij1 #bjf1 #bfj4 ,infinite       
divisibility2   ,zeno on1 #ef2          
,anaxagoras on1 #if2   ,aristotle on1   
#bib-c2   ,hume on1 #eg-h2   ,kant on1  
#eg2   ,hegel on1 #eh-fj4 ,inorganic    
matter1 #bid-f4 ,insight1 moral1 #cah4  
,intuition1 #aec1 #cge1 #cgg4 ,irony1 of
 ,socrates1 #acj4  ,j  ,judaism1 #ga4   
,justice2   ,pythagoreans on1 #cg2      
,plato on1 #bbd2   ,aristotle on1       
#cai-bj4  #chj  ,k  ,knowledge2   of the
 ,infinite1 #g-h2   of the ,absolute1   
#bii2   through concepts1 #adf1 #ahb2   

,plato on1 #agg-hb2   as recollection1  
#bab-ag2   necessary knowledge1 #bac-ae4
   ,l  ,life2 ,aristotle's doctrine of1 
#bif4 ,limit1 ,the1 #cf4 ,love1         
,platonic1 #bjd-f4   ,m  ,marriage1     
#bbd4 ,material cause1 #bfh4            
,materialism2   origin of1 #i-aa2   of  
,ionics1 #bc2   defect of1 #ff4 ,matter2
   indestructibility of1 #ej2           
,platonic1 #bjh2   ,aristotle's doctrine
 of1 #bge-i2   ,plotinus on1 #cge4      
,mechanical theories1 #hh4 ,memory1     
#cjj4 ,monarchy1 #cbd4 ,monism1 #fb-g4  
,monstrosities1#bil4 ,morality2         
founded on reason1 #aah4 ,motion2       
,zeno on1 #ed2   ,aristotle on1 #bil4   
,multiplicity2   ,zeno on1 #ec4         
,mysticism1 #ab1 #aga1 #cga1 #cgb1 #cgd1
 #cgf4 ,myths1 of ,plato1 #agj-ga1 #bjh1
 #bji1 #baj1 #baa4  ,n  ,necessary      
,knowledge1 #bac-ae2   necessary        
concepts1 #bdb4 ,non-sensuous thought1  
#h-ac4 ,not-being1 #dd1 #ge1 #gf1 #gg1  
#hi1 #aia1 #bjh1 #bgi1 #bhj4 ,nous2   of
 ,anaxagoras1 #ig-aje2   of ,plotinus1  

#cge4 ,numbers1 as first principle1 #cf4
  ,o  ,object1 the right of the1 #abb4  
,objectivity2   defined1 #aac2   of     
concepts1 #ahc4 ,oligarchy1 #cbd4       
,opinion1 #aha-b4 ,organic matter1      
organism1 #bid-f4  ,p  ,pantheism1 #cab4
 ,participation1 #aid1 #bcf4            
,personality1 #bhf4 ,pleasure1 #afa-b1  
#bah-ai1 #cej1 #ceh2   distinguished    
from happiness1 #bba4 ,potentiality1    
#bgi4 ,pragmatism1 #aba4 ,protestantism1
 #abc4  ,q  ,quality1 mechanical        
explanation of1 #hg-h4  ,r              
,rarefaction1 #bh4 ,reality2            
distinguished from appearance1 #fa2     
distinguished from existence1 #fj-a1    
#bdf-g4 ,reason2   distinguished from   
sense1 #de1 #gi1 #aab1 #aac1 #aae1 #bci1
 #bij2   distinguished from cause1 #fd1 
#gf2   as universal1 #aac2   as         
concepts1 #add2   supremacy of1 #aec-d2 
as basis of love1 #bje-f2   as          
,absolute1 #bdj-a2   passive and active1
 #cjj2   as basis of morals1 #aah1 #cag1
 #cdi-ej4  #cha  ,recollection2         

knowledge as1 #bab-ag2   ,aristotle on1 
#cjj4 ,reincarnation2 see               
,transmigration4 ,religion2   relation  
to philosophy1 #ad-ae1 #bjg2            
,xenophanes on1 #da-b2   ,heracleitus   
on1 #gi2   ,democritus on1 #ib2   decay 
of ,greek1 #ajg-h4  ,rhetoric1 #aaa1    
#abb4  ,s  ,scepticism1 #cdc1 #cfa4     
,sensation2   particularism of1 #aac2   
distinguished from reason1 #de1 #gi1    
#aab1 #aac1 #aae1 #bci1 #bij4 ,slavery1 
#bbe1 #cba4 ,soul2   ,heracleitus on1   
#gh-i2   ,atomists on1 #ib2   ,plato on1
 #baa-ag2   ,aristotle on1 #bif et seq2 
,stoics on1 #cdh2   ,epicureans on1     
#ceg4 ,space1 #c-d1 #ef2 see also ,empty
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,state1 ,the2   ,sophists on1 #aai2     
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on1 #cbj-e4 ,subject1 the right of the1 
#abb1 #aeb4 ,subjectivism1 ,preface1    
#cdj-c1 #cfa1 #cgf4 ,subjectivity1      
defined1 #aac4 ,substance2   defined1   
#ahf-g2   ,ideas as1 #ahf-h2            
,aristotle's doctrine of #bfe-g4        

,suicide1 #afj1 #cej4 ,summum ,bonum1   
#bbb1 #cad4 ,symbolism1 #ab4   ,t       
,teleology2   defined1#aja2   of        
,anaxagoras1 #ajd1 #aje2   of ,plato1   
#bja-b2   of ,aristotle1 #bhi4          
,theosophists1 #aec-d4 ,time1 #bhb1     
#bib4 ,timocracy1 #cbd4 ,tragedy1       
#ccj-a4 ,transmigration1 #ag1 #cb1 #he1 
#bab1 #bag1 #cja4 ,tyranny1 #cbd4   ,u  
,universals1 #ahh4 ,utilitarianism1     
#bbj-ba1 #cae4  ,v  ,virtue2   as       
knowledge1 #adg1 #aeg2   teachable1     
#adi2   unity of1 #adi1 #bbc1 #cea2   as
 sole good1 #aei-fj1 #cej2   relation to
 pleasure1 #afa1 #bah-ai2   customary   
and philosophic1 #bbj2   dianoetic1     
#caf1 #cag2   as the mean1 #cag4 ,void1 
,the1 #ij4 ,vortex1 #ij1 #ajb4   ,w     
,water1 as first principle1 #ba4 ,wise  
,man1 ,the2   of the ,cynics1 #afj2   of
 the ,cyrenaics1 #afb2   of the ,stoics1
 #cea4 ,women1 status of1 #bbd4         
,world-,soul1 ,the1 #baj1 #baa1 #cge4   
#chb  ,,index ,,of ,,names  ,a  ,abdera1
 #hf1 #aab4 ,academy1 ,the1 #afg1 #bdi1 

#bej2   ,the ,new1 #cfd-f4 ,aegean1     
,the1 #ah4 ,aenesidemus1 #cff-g4        
,a,esculapius1 #ada4 ,agrigentum1 #ha4  
,alcibiades1 #acb1 #acc4 ,alexander the 
,great1 #bea1 #beb1 #cci1 #cdj1 #cfb4   
,alexandria1 #cfh1 #cgj4 ,ammonius      
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,anaxagoras1 #bb1 #cj1 #hb1 #hf1 #ia1   
#id-aje1 #ajf1 #abj1 #acg1 #aff1        
#bga1 #bgb1 #bgc1 #cdj ,anaximander1    
#bj1 #bb1 #bc1 #bd-g1 #bh1 #bi4         
,anaximenes1 #bj1 #bb1 #bc1 #bg-cj1 #hb1
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,anniceris1 #afb1 #afg4 ,antiochis1     
#acd4 ,antisthenes1 #aef1 #aeh1 #aei4   
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#abi1 #acc1 #acd1 #agb1 #agc4           
,arcesilaus1 #cfd1 #cfe4 ,arginusae1    
#acd4 ,aristippus1 #aef1 #afa1 #ceh4    
,aristophanes1 #ace1 #aeb4 ,aristotle1  
#ad1 #ag1 #ah1 #ai1bc1 #ch1 #db         
7footnote71 #ee1 #ie1 #ih1 #ii1         
#ajf1 #abb1 #adh1 #aej1 #aia1 #aic1     
#bca1 #bcc1 #bdh1 #bdi-cch1             

#cci1 #cdj1 #cda1 #cdb1 #cde1 #cdf1     
#cej1 #cgj2   on ,thales1 #ba-b2   on   
,anaxagoras1 #ajd1 #aje2   on ,socrates1
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#bfb-e1 #cbc-d4  ,asia ,minor1 #ah1 #bj1
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,atarneus1 #bej4 ,athens1 #id1 #ie1     
#aab1 #abg1 #abh1 #abi1 #aca1 #acc1     
#acd1 #ace1 #acf1         #acg1 #afe1   
#aff1 #afg1 #afi1 #bdi1 #bej1 #bea1     
#beb1 #bed1 #cdd4 ,atomists1 ,the1 #hb1 
#hf-ic1 #ie1 #if1 #ig1 #ajc1 #ajd4      
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,babylon1 #beb4 ,babylonia1 #hf4 ,bacon1
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#bbj4 ,bhagavat ,gita1 ,the1 #ae4       
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#be1 #bh1 #df1 #ia1 #ih4  #chc   ,c     
,carneades1 #cfe4 ,chairephon1 #abi4    
,chalcis1 #beb4 ,charmides1 ,the1 #agb1 
#agc4 ,china1 #ac4 ,christianity1 #fi1  
#gj1 #ga1 #aja1 #cfi1 #cgg4 ,chrysippus1
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,cleanthes1 #cdd4 ,clouds1 ,the1 of     
,aristophanes1 #ace4 ,coleridge1 ,s4    
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#ch4 ,crates1 #cdd4 ,cratylus1 #aff4    
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#agc4 ,croesus1 #bj1 #ba4 ,crotona1 #ca1
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#afc1 #caf1 #cdb1 #cea1 #cec1 #ceh4     
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#afj-b1 #afc1 #bah1 #cdb1 #ceh4 ,cyrene1
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#aca4 ,delphi1 #abi4 ,democritus1 #bb1  
#di1 #ej1 #eb1 #hf1 #ic1 #ajd1 #ajh1    
#aab1 #bcd1 #cdb1             #ced1     
#cef4 ,diogenes of ,apollonia1 #cj4     
,diogenes the ,cynic1 #aei1 #cea1 #ceb4 
,dionysius the ,elder1 #afg1 #afh4      
,dionysius the ,younger1 #afh1 #afi4    
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#ac1 #af1 #ag1 #ca1 #hf1 #abe1 #afg1    
#cgb4 ,elea1 #dj1 #da1 #dc1 #eb1 #fj4   
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#gc1 #ge1 #gi1 #hi1 #aji1 #aab1 #aag1   
#afb1 #afd1 #aff1 #agc1 #agd1 #age1     

#aic1 #aie1 #aif1 #aig1                 
#bcd1 #bce1 #bdf1 #bgb1 #bgi1 #cgd4     
,eleusinian mysteries1 #gb4 ,empedocles1
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#hi1 #ie1 #if1             #ig1 #ajc1   
#bga1 #bgb1 #cbi4 ,empiricus1 ,sextus1  
#cff4 ,england1 #aba4 ,ephesus1 #gb1    
#gc4 ,epictetus1 #ad1 #cdd4 ,epicureans1
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#ced-fj1 #cfb1 #cfh1 #cfi4 ,epicurus1   
#cdb1 #cde-fj4 ,erdmann1 #df1 #ih1 #cfh1
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#cai4 ,euboea1 #beb4 ,euclid1 the       
geometrician1 #cc1 #aac4 ,euclid of     
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,euripides1 #id4 ,euthyphro1 ,the1 #agb4
   ,f  ,france1 #aba4   ,g  ,gorgias1   
#aaj1 #aaa1 #aaf-ah1 #cfa4 ,gorgias1    
,the1 #agd1 #agg4 ,grant1 ,sir ,a41 #bie
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#ah1 #cc1 #da1 #ajg1 #aji1 #aab1 #abb1  
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#cfh4 ,grote1 #ih4   #chd  ,h  ,halys1  
#ba4 ,hegel1 #ch1 #df1 #ee1 #eh-fj1 #cab
 7footnote71 #ccc4 ,hegesias1 #afb4     

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 #hb1 #hf1 #ajh1 #aab1 #aaf1 #afd1 #aff1
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#gg4 ,hippias1 #aaj4 ,hippias ,minor1   
,the1 #agb4 ,hippo1 #cj4 ,homer1 #da1   
#gb4 ,hume1 ,david1 #eg1 #eh1 #cfa4     
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#bgb4 ,islam1 #ga4 ,italy1 #ah1 #ca1    
#dj1 #afg4   ,j  ,japan1 #abe4 ,jatakas1
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#agb1 #agc4 ,lampsacus1 #ie4 ,leon1     
#acd-e4 ,leucippus1 #hf1 #hh1 #hi1 #ia1 
#ajd4 ,london1 #ahi4 ,lucretius1 #ad4   
,lyceum1 ,the1 #bea4 ,lycon1 #acc4      
,lycopolis1 #cgb4 ,lysis1 ,the1 #agb1   
#agc4   ,m  ,macedonia1 #bdi1 #beb1     
#cci4 ,macran1 ,h4 ,s41 #cab 7footnote74
 ,megara1 #aff1 #afg1 #agb1 #agc4       

,megarics1 ,the1 #aef1 #afb-c4          
,melissus1 #df4 ,melitus1 #acc4         
,memorabilia1 ,the1 #adb4 ,meno1 ,the1  
#baf4 ,meru1 #ae1 #af4 ,metaphysics1    
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#bec1 #bed1 #bfa1 #bga4 ,metchnikoff1   
#gf4 ,miletus1 #bj1 #bd1 #bg4 ,mill1 ,j4
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,newton1 #fe4 ,nichomachus1 #bdi1 #bea  
,nietzsche1 #aef4   ,o  ,orphics1 ,the1 
#ag1 #cb4   ,p  ,paramatman1 #ae4       
,parmenides1 #ac1dj1da1 #db1 #dc1 #eb1  
#ec1 #eg1 #gb1 #ha1 #hb1 #hf1 #aag1     
#afb1 #afc1 #afd1 #afg1 #bcd4           
,parmenides1 ,the1 #afi1 #age1 #agf1    
#agg1 #aie1 #bdd4 ,peloponnese1 ,the1   
#ajc4  #che  ,peloponnesian ,war1 ,the1 
#aca1 #afe4 ,pericles1 #id1 #ie1 #acg4  
,peripatetics1 ,the1 #bea1 #cfi4        
,persians1 ,the1 #bea4 ,phaedo1 ,the1   
#acg1 #age1 #agg4 ,phaedrus1 ,the1 #agb1
 #age1 #agg4 ,philebus1 ,the1 #age1     

#bjc4 ,philip of ,macedonia1 #bea4      
,philo the ,jew1 #cgj-a4 ,philolaus1    
#cg4 ,phlius1 #bfb4 ,plato1 #a1 #ac1    
#ag1 #ai1 #bc1 #ch1 #ej1 #ea1 #eb1 #ee1 
#ie1 #ii1 #aja1 #ajd1        #ajf1 #abb1
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#aej1 #aef1 #afd-bdh1        #bdi1 #bej1
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#bfb-e1 #bfg1 #bfi1        #bga1 #bgb1  
#bgc1 #bge1 #bha1 #bhb1 #bhf1 #bhg1     
#bhh1 #bij1 #bia1 #bih1        #bii1    
#cja1 #cjc1 #cjd1 #cad1 #cai1 #cba1     
#cbc1 #cbd1 #cbe1 #cbg1 #cbi1           
#cca1 #ccb1 #ccd1 #cce1 #ccf1 #cch1     
#cda1 #cdb1 #cde1 #cdf1 #cej1 #cfd1     
#cgj1 #cgb1 #cgd1 #cge4 ,plotinus1 #cfh1
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#cgf4 ,poetics1 ,the1 of ,aristotle1    
#cbf4 ,polus1 #aah-i4 ,polemo1 #cdd4    
,prodicus1 #aaj1 #aba4 ,protagoras1     
#aaj1 #aab-f1 #aah1 #aba1 #aec1 #aed1   
#afa1 #agh1 #agi1             #aha1     
#bag1 #cfa4 ,protagoras1 ,the1 #agb4    
,proxenus1 #bdi4 ,pyrrho1 #cdc1 #cfb-d1 
#cfe1 #cff4 ,pythagoras1 #ca1 #cb1 #cc1 

#cd1 #gb1 #ha1 #cja4 ,pythagoreans1     
,the1 #ag1 #bb1 #ca-i1 #dc1 #dd1 #fa1   
#fb1 #aji1 #afd1                        
#afg1 #afi1 #aia1 #bji1 #bag1 #bgb1     
#bia1 #cgj4 ,pythias1 #bea4   ,r        
,republic1 ,the1 ,preface1 #afh1 #age1  
#agg1 #bja-b1 #bbe-i1 #bcj1 #bca4 ,rome1
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#ace4   ,s  ,salamis1 #acd1 #ace4       
,satan1 ,milton's1 #ccj4 ,sceptics1     
,the1 #g 7footnote71 #cdb1 #cfa-g1 #cfh1
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#df1 #cec4 ,seneca1 #ad1 #cdd4 ,seven   
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#abf1 #aef4 ,sicily1 #ah1 #ha1 #aab1    
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#aaj1 #abb1 #abg-ed1 #aee1 #aef1 #aeg1  
#aeh1 #aei1 #afj1 #afa1 #afc1 #afd1     
#aff1 #afg1 #afh1 #afi1 #agb1           
#agc1 #ahb1 #ahc1 #aic1 #bbc1 #bcd1     
#beb1 #cag1 #cbj1 #cea1 #ceb4 ,solon1   
#bj4 ,sophist1 ,the1 #age1 #agf1 #agg1  
#aie4 ,sophists1 ,the1 #ah1 #ai1 #bd1   
#ajf-bf1 #abg1 #abh1 #ace1 #adb1 #add1  

#ade1 #aej1 #aea1 #aeb1 #aec1 #afa1     
#aff1 #agd1 #agh1                #ahb1  
#ahe1 #bah1 #bai1 #bba1 #bcd1 #cdc1     
#cfa4 ,sparta1 #cci4 ,spencer1 ,herbert1
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#bdi4 ,statesman1 ,the1 #age1 #agf4     
,stilpo1 #cdd4 ,stoa1 ,the1 #cdd4       
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#cdd-ec1 #ceh1 #cei1 #cfb1 #cfe1 #cff1  
#cfh1 #cfi1 #cgj4 ,swinburne1 ,a4 ,c41  
#ceg4  #chf  ,symposium1 ,the1 #age1    
#bje-f1 #bca4 ,see also ,banquet1 ,the4 
,syracuse1 #db1 #afg1 #afh1 #afi4       
,syrianus1 #cgf4   ,t  ,thales #bj-d1   
#bg1 #bh1 #bi1 #cj1 #cf1 #dd1 #hb1 #abj1
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#acg4 ,thirty ,tyrants1 ,the1 #acd1     
#afe4 ,thrace1 #hf1 #bdi4 ,thrasymachus1
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#age1 #agg1 #aij1 #bjh1 #baj4 ,timon of 
,phlius1 #cfb4 ,tolstoi1 #bcj4   ,u     
,upanishads1 ,the1 #ad1 #ae1 #agj1 #cga4
   ,w  ,wallace1 #ch 7footnote74 ,wells1
 ,h4 ,g41 ,preface4 ,wilde1 ,oscar1     

#abf1 #aef4   ,x  ,xenocrates1 #bej1    
#bea4 ,xenophanes1 #dj-c1 #gb1 #gi1     
#ajh1 #cdj4 ,xenophon1 #acb1 #ada1 #adb4
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#bji1 #bbd4 ,zeno the ,eleatic1 #dj1    
#eb-fj1 #gb1 #aag1 #afc1 #bdf1 #bib4    
,zeno the ,stoic1 #cdd1 #ced4 ,zeus1    
#cfj4    ,,glasgow3 ,,printed ,,at ,,the
 ,,university ,,press ,,by ,,robert     
,,maclehose ,,and ,,co4 ,,ltd4   #chg   
,,new ,,works ,,on ,,philosophy   ,,the 
,,idea ,,of ,,progress3 ,an ,inquiry    
into its ,origin and ,growth4 ,by       
,professor ,j4 ,b4 ,,bury1 ,d4 ,litt4   
#hvo4   ,,mind-,,energy4 ,by ,professor 
,,henri ,,bergson4 ,translated by       
,professor ,h4 ,,wildon ,,carr1 in      
collaboration with the ,author4 #hvo4   
,,implication ,,and ,,linear            
,,inference4 ,by ,,bernard ,,bosanquet1 
,,ll4,d41 ,f4,b4,a4 ,crown #hvo4 #gs4   
#f;d4 net4   ,,space1 ,,time1 ,,and     
,,deity4 ,gifford ,lectures at ,glasgow1
 #aiaf-aiah4 ,by ,professor ,s4         
,,alexander1 ,m4,a41 ,,ll4,d41 ,f4,,ra4 

#b vols4 #hvo4   ,,the ,,reign ,,of     
,,religion ,,in ,,contemporary          
,,philosophy4 ,by ,professor ,s4        
,,radhakrishnan1 ,m4,a4 ,extra ,crown   
#hvo4   ,,essays ,,in ,,critical        
,,realism3 ,a ,co-operative ,study of   
the ,problem of ,knowledge4 ,by         
,professors ,,durant ,,drake1 ,,arthur  
,o4 ,,lovejoy1 ,,james ,,bissett        
,,pratt1 ,,arthur ,k4 ,,rogers1 ,,george
 ,,santayana1 ,,roy ,,wood ,,sellars1   
,c4 ,a4 ,,strong4 #hvo4  ,,london3      
,,macmillan  ,,co41 ,,ltd4  #chh        
,,works ,,on ,,philosophy ----- ,by     
,prof4 ,,henri ,,bergson  ,,creative    
,,evolution4 ,translated by ,,arthur    
,,mitchell1 ,ph4,d4 #hvo4 #abs4 #f;d4   
net4  ,,laughter3 ,an ,essay on the     
,meaning of the ,comic4 ,authorised     
,translation from the ,sixth ,edition by
 ,,cloudesley ,,brereton1 ,l4 es ,l4    
7,paris71 ,m4,a4 7,cantab472 and ,,fred 
,,rothwell1 ,b4,a4 7,london74 ,extra    
,crown #hvo4 #ds4 #f;d4 net4  ,,an      
,,introduction ,,to ,,metaphysics4      

,translated by ,t4 ,e4 ,,hulme4 ,crown  
#hvo4 #b;d4 #f;d4 net4  -----  ,a       
,,critical ,,exposition ,,of            
,,bergson',s ,,philosophy4 ,by ,j4      
,m',,kellar ,,stewart1 ,b4,a41 ,d4,phil4
 ,extra ,crown #hvo4 #fs4 #f;d4 net4    
,,henri ,,bergson4 ,an ,account of his  
,life and ,philosophy4 ,by ,,algot      
,,ruhe and ,,nancy ,,margaret ,,paul4   
,with ,portrait4 ,extra ,crown #hvo4    
#fs4 #f;d4 net4   ,,the ,,philosophy    
,,of ,,change4 ,a ,study of the         
,fundamental ,principle of the          
,philosophy of ,bergson4 ,by ,h4        
,,wildon ,,carr4 #hvo4 #gs4 #f;d4 net4  
,by ,,benedetto ,,croce  ,,philosophy   
,,of ,,the ,,practical4 ,economic and   
,ethic ,translated by ,,douglas         
,,ainslie1 ,b4,a4 #hvo4 #ads4 net4      
,,aesthetic ,,as ,,science ,,of         
,,expression ,,and ,,general            
,,linguistic4 ,translated by ,,douglas  
,,ainslie1 ,b4,a #hvo4 #abs4 #f;d4 net4 
,,logic ,,as ,,the ,,science ,,of ,,the 
,,pure ,,concept ,translated by         

,,douglas ,,ainslie1 ,b4,a4 #hvo4 #ads4 
net4   ,,what ,,is ,,living ,,and ,,what
 ,,is ,,dead ,,of ,,the ,,philosophy    
,,of ,,hegel4 ,translated by ,,douglas  
,,ainslie ,b4,a4 #hvo4 #ajs4 net4       
,,the ,,philosophy ,,of ,,benedetto     
,,croce3 ,the ,problem of ,art and      
,history4 ,by ,h4 ,,wildon ,,carr1 ,hon4
 ,d4,litt4 #hvo4 #gs4 #f;d4 net4        
,,london3 ,,macmillan  ,,co41 ,,ltd4