,note3 ,images of the original pages are available through ,internet ,archive_/,canadian ,libraries4 ,see http3_/_/www4archive4org_/details_/kantk nowledge#jjpricuoft ,transcriber's note3 #a4 ,text in italics is enclosed by underscores 7italics74 #b4 ,the original text includes ,greek characters4 ,for this text version these letters have been replaced with transliterations represented within square brackets ,greek3 4 ,also greek letters alpha and beta are represented as alpha and beta in this text4 #c4 ,a subscript is indicated by an underscore followed by the subscript in curly braces4 ,for example1 a#b indicates a with subscript #b4 #d4 ,footnotes have been moved to the end of the paragraph wherein they have been referred to4 #e4 ,other than the corrections listed above1 printer's inconsistencies in spelling1 punctuation and hyphenation have been retained4 ,,kant',s ,,theory ,,of ,,knowledge by ,h4 ,a4 ,,prichard ,fellow of ,trinity ,college1 ,oxford ,oxford ,at the ,clarendon ,press #aiji ,henry ,frowde1 ,m4,a4 ,publisher to the ,university of ,oxford ,london1 ,edinburgh1 ,new ,york ,toronto and ,melbourne ,,preface ,this book is an attempt to think out the nature and tenability of ,kant's ,transcendental ,idealism1 an attempt animated by the conviction that even the elucidation of ,kant's meaning1 apart from any criticism1 is impossible without a discussion on their own merits of the main issues which he raises4 ,my obligations are many and great3 to ,caird's ,critical ,philosophy of ,kant and to the translations of ,meiklejohn1 ,max ,mller1 and ,professor ,mahaffy2 to ,mr4 ,j4 ,a4 ,smith1 ,fellow of ,balliol ,college1 and to ,mr4 ,h4 ,w4 ,b4 ,joseph1 ,fellow of ,new ,college1 for what ,i have learned from them in discussion2 to ,mr4 ,a4 ,j4 ,jenkinson1 ,fellow of ,brasenose ,college1 for reading and commenting on the first half of the ,,ms42 to ,mr4 ,h4 ,h4 ,joachim1 ,fellow of ,merton ,college1 for making many important suggestions1 especially with regard to matters of translation2 to ,mr4 ,joseph1 for reading the whole of the proofs and for making many valuable corrections2 and1 above all1 to my wife for constant and unfailing help throughout1 and to ,professor ,cook ,wilson1 to have been whose pupil ,i count the greatest of philosophical good fortunes4 ,some years ago it was my privilege to be a member of a class with which ,professor ,cook ,wilson read a portion of ,kant's ,critique of ,pure ,reason1 and subsequently ,i have had the advantage of discussing with him several of the more important passages4 ,i am especially indebted to him in my discussion of the following topics3 the distinction between the ,sensibility and the ,understanding 7pp4 #bg-ca1 #adf-i1 #afb-f71 the term 'form of perception' 7pp4 #cg1 #dj1 #acc fin4-#ace71 the ,metaphysical ,exposition of ,space 7pp4 #da-h71 ,inner ,sense 7,ch4 ,v1 and pp4 #ach-i71 the ,metaphysical ,deduction of the ,categories 7pp4 #adi-ec71 ,kant's account of 'the reference of representations to an object' 7pp4 #agh-hf71 an implication of perspective 7p4 #ij71 the impossibility of a 'theory' of knowledge 7p4 #bde71 and the points considered1 pp4 #bjj med4-#bjb med41 #bad med4-#bae med41 and #bah4 ,the views expressed in the pages referred to originated from ,professor ,cook ,wilson1 though it must not be assumed that he would accept them in the form in which they are there stated4 ,,contents ,,chapter ,i ,,page ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,the ,critique #a ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,sensibility ,,and ,,the ,,understanding #bg ,,chapter ,,iii ,,space #cf ,,chapter ,,iv ,,phenomena ,,and ,,things ,,in ,,themselves #ga ,,note ,,the ,,first ,,antinomy #aja ,,chapter ,v ,,time ,,and ,,inner ,,sense #ajc ,,chapter ,,vi ,,knowledge ,,and ,,reality #aae ,,chapter ,,vii ,,the ,,metaphysical ,,deduction ,,of ,,the ,,categories #adj ,,chapter ,,viii ,,the ,,transcendental ,,deduction ,,of ,,the ,,categories #afa ,,chapter ,,ix ,,general ,,criticism ,,of ,,the ,,transcendental ,,deduction ,,of ,,the ,,categories #bad ,,chapter ,x ,,the ,,schematism ,,of ,,the ,,categories #bdf ,,chapter ,,xi ,,the ,,mathematical ,,principles #bfj ,,chapter ,,xii ,,the ,,analogies ,,of ,,experience #bfh ,,chapter ,,xiii ,,the ,,postulates ,,of ,,empirical ,,thought #cjh ,,note ,,the ,,refutation ,,of ,,idealism #cai ,,references ,a ,first edition of the ,critique of ,pure ,reason4 ,b ,second edition of the ,critique of ,pure ,reason4 ,prol4 ,kant's ,prolegomena to any future ,metaphysic4 ,m ,meiklejohn's ,translation of the ,critique of ,pure ,reason4 ,mah4 ,mahaffy4 ,translation of ,kant's ,prolegomena to any future ,metaphysic4 7,the pages referred to are those of the first edition2 these are also to be found in the text of the second edition47 ,caird ,caird's ,critical ,philosophy of ,kant4 ,,chapter ,i ,,the ,,problem ,,of ,,the ,,critique ,the problem of the ,critique may be stated in outline and approximately in ,kant's own words as follows4 ,human reason is called upon to consider certain questions1 which it cannot decline1 as they are presented by its own nature1 but which it cannot answer4 ,these questions relate to ,god1 freedom of the will1 and immortality4 ,and the name for the subject which has to deal with these questions is metaphysics4 ,at one time metaphysics was regarded as the queen of all the sciences1 and the importance of its aim justified the title4 ,at first the subject1 propounding as it did a dogmatic system1 exercised a despotic sway4 ,but its subsequent failure brought it into disrepute4 ,it has constantly been compelled to retrace its steps2 there has been fundamental disagreement among philosophers1 and no philosopher has successfully refuted his critics4 ,consequently the current attitude to the subject is one of weariness and indifference4 ,yet humanity cannot really be indifferent to such problems2 even those who profess indifference inevitably make metaphysical assertions2 and the current attitude is a sign not of levity but of a refusal to put up with the illusory knowledge offered by contemporary philosophy4 ,now the objects of metaphysics1 ,god1 freedom1 and immortality1 are not objects of experience in the sense in which a tree or a stone is an object of experience4 ,hence our views about them cannot be due to experience2 they must somehow be apprehended by pure reason1 i4 e4 by thinking and without appeal to experience4 ,moreover1 it is in fact by thinking that men have always tried to solve the problems concerning ,god1 freedom1 and immortality4 ,what1 then1 is the cause of the unsatisfactory treatment of these problems and men's consequent indifference8 ,it must1 in some way1 lie in a failure to attain the sure scientific method1 and really consists in the neglect of an inquiry which should be a preliminary to all others in metaphysics4 ,men ought to have begun with a critical investigation of pure reason itself4 ,reason should have examined its own nature1 to ascertain in general the extent to which it is capable of attaining knowledge without the aid of experience4 ,this examination will decide whether reason is able to deal with the problems of ,god1 freedom1 and immortality at all2 and without it no discussion of these problems will have a solid foundation4 ,it is this preliminary investigation which the ,critique of ,pure ,reason proposes to undertake4 ,its aim is to answer the question1 ',how far can reason go1 without the material presented and the aid furnished by experience8' and the result furnishes the solution1 or at least the key to the solution1 of all metaphysical problems4 ,kant's problem1 then1 is similar to ,locke's4 ,locke states#a that his purpose is to inquire into the original1 certainty1 and extent of human knowledge2 and he says1 ,if1 by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding ,i can discover the powers thereof2 how far they reach1 to what things they are in any degree proportionate1 and where they fail us2 ,i suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man1 to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension2 to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether2 and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things1 which1 upon examination1 are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities4 ,thus1 to use ,dr4 ,caird's analogy1#b the task which both ,locke and ,kant set themselves resembled that of investigating a telescope1 before turning it upon the stars1 to determine its competence for the work4 #a ,locke's ,essay1 i1 #a1 #b1 #d4 #b ,caird1 i1 #aj4 ,the above outline of ,kant's problem is of course only an outline4 ,its definite formulation is expressed in the well-known question1 ',how are a priori synthetic judgements possible8'#c ,to determine the meaning of this question it is necessary to begin with some consideration of the terms 'a priori' and 'synthetic'4 #c ,b4 #ai1 ,m4 #ab4 ,while there is no difficulty in determining what ,kant would have recognized as an a priori judgement1 there is difficulty in determining what he meant by calling such a judgement a priori4 ,the general account is given in the first two sections of the ,introduction4 ,an a priori judgement is introduced as something opposed to an a posteriori judgement1 or a judgement which has its source in experience4 ,instances of the latter would be ',this body is heavy'1 and ',this body is hot'4 ,the point of the word 'experience' is that there is direct apprehension of some individual1 e4 g4 an individual body4 ,to say that a judgement has its source in experience is of course to imply a distinction between the judgement and experience1 and the word 'source' may be taken to mean that the judgement depends for its validity upon the experience of the individual thing to which the judgement relates4 ,an a priori judgement1 then1 as first described1 is simply a judgement which is not a posteriori4 ,it is independent of all experience2 in other words1 its validity does not depend on the experience of individual things4 ,it might be illustrated by the judgement that all three-sided figures must have three angles4 ,so far1 then1 no positive meaning has been given to a priori4#d #d ,kant is careful to exclude from the class of a priori judgements proper what may be called relatively a priori judgements1 viz4 judgements which1 though not independent of all experience1 are independent of experience of the facts to which they relate4 ,thus one would say of a man who undermined the foundations of his house that he might have known a priori that it would fall down1 i4 e4 that he did not need to wait for the experience of its actual falling down4 ,but still he could not know this wholly a priori1 for he had first to learn through experience that bodies are heavy and consequently fall1 if their supports are taken away4 7,b4 #b1 ,m4 #b47 ,kant then proceeds1 not as we should expect1 to state the positive meaning of a priori2 but to give tests for what is a priori4 ,since a test implies a distinction between itself and what is tested1 it is implied that the meaning of a priori is already known4#e #e ,it may be noted that in this passage 7,introduction1 #a and #b7 ,kant is inconsistent in his use of the term 'pure'4 ,pure knowledge is introduced as a species of a priori knowledge3 ,a priori knowledge1 if nothing empirical is mixed with it1 is called pure4 7,b4 #c1 ,m4 #b1 #ag47 ,and in accordance with this1 the proposition 'every change has a cause' is said to be a priori but impure1 because the conception of change can only be derived from experience4 ,yet immediately afterwards1 pure1 being opposed in general to empirical1 can only mean a priori4 ,again1 in the phrase 'pure a priori' 7,b4 #d fin41 ,m4 #c med471 the context shows that 'pure' adds nothing to 'a priori'1 and the proposition 'every change must have a cause' is expressly given as an instance of pure a priori knowledge4 ,the inconsistency of this treatment of the causal rule is explained by the fact that in the former passage he is thinking of the conception of change as empirical1 while in the latter he is thinking of the judgement as not empirical4 ,at bottom in this passage 'pure' simply means a priori4 ,the tests given are necessity and strict universality4#f ,since judgements which are necessary and strictly universal cannot be based on experience1 their existence is said to indicate another source of knowledge4 ,and ,kant gives as illustrations1 7#a7 any proposition in mathematics1 and 7#b7 the proposition ',every change must have a cause'4 #f ,in reality1 these tests come to the same thing1 for necessity means the necessity of connexion between the subject and predicate of a judgement1 and since empirical universality1 to which strict universality is opposed1 means numerical universality1 as illustrated by the proposition ',all bodies are heavy'1 the only meaning left for strict universality is that of a universality reached not through an enumeration of instances1 but through the apprehension of a necessity of connexion4 ,so far ,kant has said nothing which determines the positive meaning of a priori4 ,a clue is1 however1 to be found in two subsequent phrases4 ,he says that we may content ourselves with having established as a fact the pure use of our faculty of knowledge4#g ,and he adds that not only in judgements1 but even in conceptions1 is an a priori origin manifest4#h ,the second statement seems to make the a priori character of a judgement consist in its origin4 ,as this origin cannot be experience1 it must1 as the first statement implies1 lie in our faculty of knowledge4 ,kant's point is that the existence of universal and necessary judgements shows that we must possess a faculty of knowledge capable of yielding knowledge without appeal to experience4 ,the term a priori1 then1 has some reference to the existence of this faculty2 in other words1 it gives expression to a doctrine of 'innate ideas'4 ,perhaps1 however1 it is hardly fair to press the phrase 'test of a priori judgements'4 ,if so1 it may be said that on the whole1 by a priori judgements ,kant really means judgements which are universal and necessary1 and that he regards them as implying a faculty which gives us knowledge without appeal to experience4 #g ,b4 #e1 ,m4 #d4 #h ,ibid4 ,we may now turn to the term 'synthetic judgement'4 ,kant distinguishes analytic and synthetic judgements thus4 ,in any judgement the predicate ,b either belongs to the subject ,a1 as something contained 7though covertly7 in the conception ,a1 or lies completely outside the conception ,a1 although it stands in relation to it4 ,in the former case the judgement is called analytic1 in the latter synthetic4#i ',all bodies are extended' is an analytic judgement2 ',all bodies are heavy' is synthetic4 ,it immediately follows that only synthetic judgements extend our knowledge2 for in making an analytic judgement we are only clearing up our conception of the subject4 ,this process yields no new knowledge1 for it only gives us a clearer view of what we know already4 ,further1 all judgements based on experience are synthetic1 for it would be absurd to base an analytical judgement on experience1 when to make the judgement we need not go beyond our own conceptions4 ,on the other hand1 a priori judgements are sometimes analytic and sometimes synthetic4 ,for1 besides analytical judgements1 all judgements in mathematics and certain judgements which underlie physics are asserted independently of experience1 and they are synthetic4 #i ,b4 #aj1 ,m4 #g4 ,here ,kant is obviously right in vindicating the synthetic character of mathematical judgements4 ,in the arithmetical judgement #g #e #ab1 the thought of certain units as a group of twelve is no mere repetition of the thought of them as a group of five added to a group of seven4 ,though the same units are referred to1 they are regarded differently4 ,thus the thought of them as twelve means either that we think of them as formed by adding one unit to a group of eleven1 or that we think of them as formed by adding two units to a group of ten1 and so on4 ,and the assertion is that the same units1 which can be grouped in one way1 can also be grouped in another4 ,similarly1 ,kant is right in pointing out that the geometrical judgement1 ',a straight line between two points is the shortest1' is synthetic1 on the ground that the conception of straightness is purely qualitative1#aj while the conception of shortest distance implies the thought of quantity4 #aj ,straightness means identity of direction4 ,it should now be an easy matter to understand the problem expressed by the question1 ',how are a priori synthetic judgements possible8' ,its substance may be stated thus4 ,the existence of a posteriori synthetic judgements presents no difficulty4 ,for experience is equivalent to perception1 and1 as we suppose1 in perception we are confronted with reality1 and apprehend it as it is4 ,if ,i am asked1 ',how do ,i know that my pen is black or my chair hard8' ,i answer that it is because ,i see or feel it to be so4 ,in such cases1 then1 when my assertion is challenged1 ,i appeal to my experience or perception of the reality to which the assertion relates4 ,my appeal raises no difficulty because it conforms to the universal belief that if judgements are to rank as knowledge1 they must be made to conform to the nature of things1 and that the conformity is established by appeal to actual experience of the things4 ,but do a priori synthetic judgements satisfy this condition8 ,apparently not4 ,for when ,i assert that every straight line is the shortest way between its extremities1 ,i have not had1 and never can have1 experience of all possible straight lines4 ,how then can ,i be sure that all cases will conform to my judgement8 ,in fact1 how can ,i anticipate my experience at all8 ,how can ,i make an assertion about any individual until ,i have had actual experience of it8 ,in an a priori synthetic judgement the mind in some way1 in virtue of its own powers and independently of experience1 makes an assertion to which it claims that reality must conform4 ,yet why should reality conform8 ,a priori judgements of the other kind1 viz4 analytic judgements1 offer no difficulty1 since they are at bottom tautologies1 and consequently denial of them is self-contradictory and meaningless4 ,but there is difficulty where a judgement asserts that a term ,b is connected with another term ,a1 ,b being neither identical with nor a part of ,a4 ,in this case there is no contradiction in asserting that ,a is not ,b1 and it would seem that only experience can determine whether all ,a is or is not ,b4 ,otherwise we are presupposing that things must conform to our ideas about them4 ,now metaphysics claims to make a priori synthetic judgements1 for it does not base its results on any appeal to experience4 ,hence1 before we enter upon metaphysics1 we really ought to investigate our right to make a priori synthetic judgements at all4 ,therein1 in fact1 lies the importance to metaphysics of the existence of such judgements in mathematics and physics4 ,for it shows that the difficulty is not peculiar to metaphysics1 but is a general one shared by other subjects2 and the existence of such judgements in mathematics is specially important because there their validity or certainty has never been questioned4#aa ,the success of mathematics shows that at any rate under certain conditions a priori synthetic judgements are valid1 and if we can determine these conditions1 we shall be able to decide whether such judgements are possible in metaphysics4 ,in this way we shall be able to settle a disputed case of their validity by examination of an undisputed case4 ,the general problem1 however1 is simply to show what it is which makes a priori synthetic judgements as such possible2 and there will be three cases1 those of mathematics1 of physics1 and of metaphysics4 #aa ,kant points out that this certainty has usually been attributed to the analytic character of mathematical judgements1 and it is of course vital to his argument that he should be successful in showing that they are really synthetic4 ,the outline of the solution of this problem is contained in the ,preface to the ,second ,edition4 ,there ,kant urges that the key is to be found by consideration of mathematics and physics4 ,if the question be raised as to what it is that has enabled these subjects to advance1 in both cases the answer will be found to lie in a change of method4 ,since the earliest times to which the history of human reason reaches1 mathematics has1 among that wonderful nation the ,greeks1 followed the safe road of a science4 ,still it is not to be supposed that it was as easy for this science to strike into1 or rather to construct for itself1 that royal road1 as it was for logic1 in which reason has only to do with itself4 ,on the contrary1 ,i believe that it must have remained long in the stage of groping 7chiefly among the ,egyptians71 and that this change is to be ascribed to a revolution1 due to the happy thought of one man1 through whose experiment the path to be followed was rendered unmistakable for future generations1 and the certain way of a science was entered upon and sketched out once for all4444 ,a new light shone upon the first man 7,thales1 or whatever may have been his name7 who demonstrated the properties of the isosceles triangle2 for he found that he ought not to investigate that which he saw in the figure or even the mere conception of the same1 and learn its properties from this1 but that he ought to produce the figure by virtue of that which he himself had thought into it a priori in accordance with conceptions and had represented 7by means of a construction71 and that in order to know something with certainty a priori he must not attribute to the figure any property other than that which necessarily follows from that which he has himself introduced into the figure1 in accordance with his conception4#ab #ab ,b4 x-xii1 ,m4 xxvi4 ,here ,kant's point is as follows4 ,geometry remained barren so long as men confined themselves either to the empirical study of individual figures1 of which the properties were to be discovered by observation1 or to the consideration of the mere conception of various kinds of figure1 e4 g4 of an isosceles triangle4 ,in order to advance1 men had in some sense to produce the figure through their own activity1 and in the act of constructing it to recognize that certain features were necessitated by those features which they had given to the figure in constructing it4 ,thus men had to make a triangle by drawing three straight lines so as to enclose a space1 and then to recognize that three angles must have been made by the same process4 ,in this way the mind discovered a general rule1 which must apply to all cases1 because the mind itself had determined the nature of the cases4 ,a property ,b follows from a nature ,a2 all instances of ,a must possess the property ,b1 because they have solely that nature ,a which the mind has given them and whatever is involved in ,a4 ,the mind's own rule holds good in all cases1 because the mind has itself determined the nature of the cases4 ,kant's statements about physics1 though not the same1 are analogous4 ,experiment1 he holds1 is only fruitful when reason does not follow nature in a passive spirit1 but compels nature to answer its own questions4 ,thus1 when ,torricelli made an experiment to ascertain whether a certain column of air would sustain a given weight1 he had previously calculated that the quantity of air was just sufficient to balance the weight1 and the significance of the experiment lay in his expectation that nature would conform to his calculations and in the vindication of this expectation4 ,reason1 ,kant says1 must approach nature not as a pupil but as a judge1 and this attitude forms the condition of progress in physics4 ,the examples of mathematics and physics suggest1 according to ,kant1 that metaphysics may require a similar revolution of standpoint1 the lack of which will account for its past failure4 ,an attempt should therefore be made to introduce such a change into metaphysics4 ,the change is this4 ,hitherto it has been assumed that our knowledge must conform to objects4 ,this assumption is the real cause of the failure to extend our knowledge a priori1 for it limits thought to the analysis of conceptions1 which can only yield tautological judgements4 ,let us therefore try the effect of assuming that objects must conform to our knowledge4 ,herein lies the ,copernican revolution4 ,we find that this reversal of the ordinary view of the relation of objects to the mind enables us for the first time to understand the possibility of a priori synthetic judgements1 and even to demonstrate certain laws which lie at the basis of nature1 e4 g4 the law of causality4 ,it is true that the reversal also involves the surprising consequence that our faculty of knowledge is incapable of dealing with the objects of metaphysics proper1 viz4 ,god1 freedom1 and immortality1 for the assumption limits our knowledge to objects of possible experience4 ,but this very consequence1 viz4 the impossibility of metaphysics1 serves to test and vindicate the assumption4 ,for the view that our knowledge conforms to objects as things in themselves leads us into an insoluble contradiction when we go on1 as we must1 to seek for the unconditioned2 while the assumption that objects must1 as phenomena1 conform to our way of representing them1 removes the contradiction#ac4 ,further1 though the assumption leads to the denial of speculative knowledge in the sphere of metaphysics1 it is still possible that reason in its practical aspect may step in to fill the gap4 ,and the negative result of the assumption may even have a positive value4 ,for if1 as is the case1 the moral reason1 or reason in its practical aspect1 involves certain postulates concerning ,god1 freedom1 and immortality1 which are rejected by the speculative reason1 it is important to be able to show that these objects fall beyond the scope of the speculative reason4 ,and if we call reliance on these postulates1 as being presuppositions of morality1 faith1 we may say that knowledge must be abolished to make room for faith4 #ac ,cf4 pp4 #aja-b4 ,this answer to the main problem1 given in outline in the ,preface1 is undeniably plausible4 ,yet examination of it suggests two criticisms which affect ,kant's general position4 ,in the first place1 the parallel of mathematics which suggests the ',copernican' revolution does not really lead to the results which ,kant supposes4 ,advance in mathematics is due to the adoption not of any conscious assumption but of a certain procedure1 viz4 that by which we draw a figure and thereby see the necessity of certain relations within it4 ,to preserve the parallel1 the revolution in metaphysics should have consisted in the adoption of a similar procedure1 and advance should have been made dependent on the application of an at least quasi-mathematical method to the objects of metaphysics4 ,moreover1 since these objects are ,god1 freedom1 and immortality1 the conclusion should have been that we ought to study ,god1 freedom1 and immortality by somehow constructing them in perception and thereby gaining insight into the necessity of certain relations4 ,success or failure in metaphysics would therefore consist simply in success or failure to see the necessity of the relations involved4 ,kant1 however1 makes the condition of advance in metaphysics consist in the adoption not of a method of procedure but of an assumption1 viz4 that objects conform to the mind4 ,and it is impossible to see how this assumption can assist what1 on ,kant's theory1 it ought to have assisted1 viz4 the study of ,god1 freedom1 and immortality1 or indeed the study of anything4 ,in geometry we presuppose that individual objects conform to the universal rules of relation which we discover4 ,now suppose we describe a geometrical judgement1 e4 g4 that two straight lines cannot enclose a space1 as a mental law1 because we are bound to think it true4 ,then we may state the presupposition by saying that objects1 e4 g4 individual pairs of straight lines1 must conform to such a mental law4 ,but the explicit recognition of this presupposition and the conscious assertion of it in no way assist the solution of particular geometrical problems4 ,the presupposition is really a condition of geometrical thinking at all4 ,without it there is no geometrical thinking1 and the recognition of it places us in no better position for the study of geometrical problems4 ,similarly1 if we wish to think out the nature of ,god1 freedom1 and immortality1 we are not assisted by assuming that these objects must conform to the laws of our thinking4 ,we must presuppose this conformity if we are to think at all1 and consciousness of the presupposition puts us in no better position4 ,what is needed is an insight similar to that which we have in geometry1 i4 e4 an insight into the necessity of the relations under consideration such as would enable us to see1 for example1 that being a man1 as such1 involves living for ever4 ,kant has been led into the mistake by a momentary change in the meaning given to 'metaphysics'4 ,for the moment he is thinking of metaphysics1 not as the inquiry concerned with ,god1 freedom1 and immortality1 but as the inquiry which has to deal with the problem as to how we can know a priori4 ,this problem is assisted1 at any rate prima facie1 by the assumption that things must conform to the mind4 ,and this assumption can be said to be suggested by mathematics1 inasmuch as the mathematician presupposes that particular objects must correspond to the general rules discovered by the mind4 ,from this point of view ,kant's only mistake1 if the parallelism is to be maintained1 is that he takes for an assumption which enables the mathematician to advance a metaphysical presupposition of the advance1 on which the mathematician never reflects1 and awareness of which would in no way assist his mathematics4 ,in the second place the ',copernican' revolution is not strictly the revolution which ,kant supposes it to be4 ,he speaks as though his aim is precisely to reverse the ordinary view of the relation of the mind to objects4 ,instead of the mind being conceived as having to conform to objects1 objects are to be conceived as having to conform to the mind4 ,but if we consider ,kant's real position1 we see that these views are only verbally contrary1 since the word object refers to something different in each case4 ,on the ordinary view objects are something outside the mind1 in the sense of independent of it1 and the ideas1 which must conform to objects1 are something within the mind1 in the sense of dependent upon it4 ,the conformity then is of something within the mind to something outside it4 ,again1 the conformity means that one of the terms1 viz4 the object1 exists first and that then the other term1 the idea1 is fitted to or made to correspond to it4 ,hence the real contrary of this view is that ideas1 within the mind1 exist first and that objects outside the mind1 coming into existence afterwards1 must adapt themselves to the ideas4 ,this of course strikes us as absurd1 because we always think of the existence of the object as the presupposition of the existence of the knowledge of it2 we do not think the existence of the knowledge as the presupposition of the existence of the object4 ,hence ,kant only succeeds in stating the contrary of the ordinary view with any plausibility1 because in doing so he makes the term object refer to something which like 'knowledge' is within the mind4 ,his position is that objects within the mind must conform to our general ways of knowing4 ,for ,kant1 therefore1 the conformity is not between something within and something without the mind1 but between two realities within the mind1 viz4 the individual object1 as object of perception1 i4 e4 a phenomenon1 and our general ways of perceiving and thinking4 ,but this view is only verbally the contrary of the ordinary view1 and consequently ,kant does not succeed in reversing the ordinary view that we know objects independent of or outside the mind1 by bringing our ideas into conformity with them4 ,in fact1 his conclusion is that we do not know this object1 i4 e4 the thing in itself1 at all4 ,hence his real position should be stated by saying not that the ordinary view puts the conformity between mind and things in the wrong way1 but that we ought not to speak of conformity at all4 ,for the thing in itself being unknowable1 our ideas can never be made to conform to it4 ,kant then only reaches a conclusion which is apparently the reverse of the ordinary view by substituting another object for the thing in itself1 viz4 the phenomenon or appearance of the thing in itself to us4 ,further1 this second line of criticism1 if followed out1 will be found to affect his statement of the problem as well as that of its solution4 ,it will be seen that the problem is mis-stated1 and that the solution offered presupposes it to be mis-stated4 ,his statement of the problem takes the form of raising a difficulty which the existence of a priori knowledge presents to the ordinary view1 according to which objects are independent of the mind1 and ideas must be brought into conformity with them4 ,in a synthetic a priori judgement we claim to discover the nature of certain objects by an act of our thinking1 and independently of actual experience of them4 ,hence if a supporter of the ordinary view is asked to justify the conformity of this judgement or idea with the objects to which it relates1 he can give no answer4 ,the judgement having ex hypothesi been made without reference to the objects1 the belief that the objects must conform to it is the merely arbitrary supposition that a reality independent of the mind must conform to the mind's ideas4 ,but ,kant1 in thus confining the difficulty to a priori judgements1 implies that empirical judgements present no difficulty to the ordinary view2 since they rest upon actual experience of the objects concerned1 they are conformed to the objects by the very process through which they arise4 ,he thereby fails to notice that empirical judgements present a precisely parallel difficulty4 ,it can only be supposed that the conformity of empirical judgements to their objects is guaranteed by the experience upon which they rest1 if it be assumed that in experience we apprehend objects as they are4 ,but our experience or perception of individual objects is just as much mental as the thinking which originates a priori judgements4 ,if we can question the truth of our thinking1 we can likewise question the truth of our perception4 ,if we can ask whether our ideas must correspond to their objects1 we can likewise ask whether our perceptions must correspond to them4 ,the problem relates solely to the correspondence between something within the mind and something outside it2 it applies equally to perceiving and thinking1 and concerns all judgements alike1 empirical as well as a priori4 ,kant1 therefore1 has no right to imply that empirical judgements raise no problem1 if he finds difficulty in a priori judgements4 ,he is only able to draw a distinction between them1 because1 without being aware that he is doing so1 he takes account of the relation of the object to the subject in the case of an a priori judgement1 while in the case of an empirical judgement he ignores it4 ,in other words1 in dealing with the general connexion between the qualities of an object1 he takes into account the fact that we are thinking it1 but1 in dealing with the perception of the coexistence of particular qualities of an object1 he ignores the fact that we are perceiving it4 ,further1 that the real problem concerns all synthetic judgements alike is shown by the solution which he eventually reaches4 ,his conclusion turns out to be that while both empirical and a priori judgements are valid of phenomena1 they are not valid of things in themselves2 i4 e4 that of things in themselves we know nothing at all1 not even their particular qualities4 ,since1 then1 his conclusion is that even empirical judgements are not valid of things in themselves1 it shows that the problem cannot be confined to a priori judgements1 and therefore constitutes an implicit criticism of his statement of the problem4 ,must there not1 however1 be some problem peculiar to a priori judgements8 ,otherwise why should ,kant have been led to suppose that his problem concerned them only8 ,further consideration will show that there is such a problem1 and that it was only owing to the mistake indicated that ,kant treated this problem as identical with that of which he actually offered a solution4 ,in the universal judgements of mathematics we apprehend1 as we think1 general rules of connexion which must apply to all possible cases4 ,such judgements1 then1 presuppose a conformity between the connexions which we discover and all possible instances4 ,now ,kant's treatment of this conformity as a conformity between our ideas and things has two implications4 ,in the first place1 it implies1 as has been pointed out1 that relation to the subject1 as thinking1 is taken into account in the case of the universal connexion1 and that relation to the subject1 as perceiving1 is ignored in the case of the individual thing4 ,in the second place1 it implies that what is related to the subject as the object of its thought must be subjective or mental2 that because we have to think the general connexion1 the connexion is only our own idea1 the conformity of things to which may be questioned4 ,but the treatment1 to be consistent1 should take account of relation to the subject in both cases or in neither4 ,if the former alternative be accepted1 then the subjective character attributed by ,kant in virtue of this relation to what is object of thought1 and equally attributable to what is object of perception1 reduces the problem to that of the conformity in general of all ideas1 including perceptions1 within the mind to things outside it2 and this problem does not relate specially to a priori judgements4 ,to discover the problem which relates specially to them1 the other alternative must be accepted1 that of ignoring relation to the subject in both cases4 ,the problem then becomes ',what renders possible or is presupposed by the conformity of individual things to certain laws of connexion8' ,and1 inasmuch as to deny the conformity is really to deny that there are laws of connexion1#ad the problem reduces itself to the question1 ',what is the presupposition of the existence of definite laws of connexion in the world8' ,and the only answer possible is that reality is a system or a whole of connected parts1 in other words1 that nature is uniform4 ,thus it turns out that the problem relates to the uniformity of nature1 and that the question ',how are a priori synthetic judgements possible8' has in reality nothing to do with the problem of the relation of reality to the knowing subject1 but is concerned solely with the nature of reality4 #ad ,to object that the laws in question1 being laws which we have thought1 may not be the true laws1 and that therefore there may still be other laws to which reality conforms1 is of course to reintroduce relation to the thinking subject4 ,further1 it is important to see that the alternative of ignoring relation to the subject is the right one1 not only from the point of view of the problem peculiar to a priori judgements1 but also from the point of view of the nature of knowledge in general4 ,perceiving and thinking alike presuppose that reality is immediately object of the mind1 and that the act of apprehension in no way affects or enters into the nature of what we apprehend about reality4 ,if1 for instance1 ,i assert on the strength of perception that this table is round1 ,i imply that ,i see the table1 and that the shape which ,i judge it to have is not affected by the fact that ,i am perceiving it2 for ,i mean that the table really is round4 ,if some one then convinces me that ,i have made a mistake owing to an effect of foreshortening1 and that the table is really oval1 ,i amend my assertion1 not by saying that the table is round but only to my apprehension1 but by saying that it looks round4 ,thereby ,i cease to predicate roundness of the table altogether2 for ,i mean that while it still looks round1 it is not really so4 ,the case of universal judgements is similar4 ,the statement that a straight line is the shortest distance between its extremities means that it really is so4 ,the fact is presupposed to be in no way altered by our having apprehended it4 ,moreover1 reality is here just as much implied to be directly object of the mind as it is in the case of the singular judgement4 ,making the judgement consists1 as we say1 in seeing the connexion between the direction between two points and the shortest distance between them4 ,the connexion of real characteristics is implied to be directly object of thought4#af ,thus both perceiving and thinking presuppose that the reality to which they relate is directly object of the mind1 and that the character of it which we apprehend in the resulting judgement is not affected or altered by the fact that we have had to perceive or conceive the reality4#ag #ae ,cf4 ,bosanquet1 ,logic1 vol4 ii1 p4 #b4 #af ,in saying that a universal judgement is an immediate apprehension of fact1 it is of course not meant that it can be actualized by itself or1 so to say1 in vacuo4 ,its actualization obviously presupposes the presentation of individuals in perception or imagination4 ,perception or imagination thus forms the necessary occasion of a universal judgement1 and in that sense mediates it4 ,moreover1 the universal judgement implies an act of abstraction by which we specially attend to those universal characters of the individuals perceived or imagined1 which enter into the judgement4 ,but1 though our apprehension of a universal connexion thus implies a process1 and is therefore mediated1 yet the connexion1 when we apprehend it1 is immediately our object4 ,there is nothing between it and us4 #ag ,for a fuller discussion of the subject see ,chh4 ,,iv and ,,vi4 ,kant in the formulation of his problem implicitly admits this presupposition in the case of perception4 ,he implies that empirical judgements involve no difficulty1 because they rest upon the perception or experience of the objects to which they relate4 ,on the other hand1 he does not admit the presupposition in the case of conception1 for he implies that in a priori judgements we are not confronted with reality but are confined to our own ideas4 ,hence we ought to ask why ,kant is led to adopt an attitude in the latter case which he does not adopt in the former4 ,the answer appears to be twofold4 ,in the first place1 there is an inveterate tendency to think of universals1 and therefore of the connexions between them1 as being not objective realities#ah but mere ideas4 ,in other words1 we tend to adopt the conceptualist attitude1 which regards individuals as the only reality1 and universals as mental fictions4 ,in consequence1 we are apt to think that while in perception1 which is of the individual1 we are confronted by reality1 in universal judgements1 in which we apprehend connexions between universals1 we have before us mere ideas4 ,kant may fairly be supposed to have been unconsciously under the influence of this tendency4 ,in the second place1 we apprehend a universal connexion by the operation of thinking4 ,thinking is essentially an activity2 and since activity in the ordinary sense in which we oppose action to knowledge originates something1 we tend to think of the activity of thinking as also originating something1 viz4 that which is our object when we think4 ,hence1 since we think of what is real as independent of us and therefore as something which we may discover but can in no sense make1 we tend to think of the object of thought as only an idea4 ,on the other hand1 what is ordinarily called perception1 though it involves the activity of thinking1 also involves an element in respect of which we are passive4 ,this is the fact pointed to by ,kant's phrase 'objects are given in perception'4 ,in virtue of this passive element we are inclined to think that in perception we simply stand before the reality in a passive attitude4 ,the reality perceived is thought to be1 so to say1 there1 existing independently of us2 relation to the subject is unnoticed because of our apparently wholly passive attitude4 ,at times1 and especially when he is thinking of the understanding as a faculty of spontaneity1 ,kant seems to have been under the influence of this second tendency4 #ah i4 e4 as not having a place in the reality which1 as we think1 exists independently of the mind4 ,the preceding summary of the problem of the ,critique represents the account given in the two ,prefaces and the ,introduction4 ,according to this account1 the problem arises from the unquestioned existence of a priori knowledge in mathematics and physics and the problematic existence of such knowledge in metaphysics1 and ,kant's aim is to determine the range within which a priori knowledge is possible4 ,thus the problem is introduced as relating to a priori knowledge as such1 no distinction being drawn between its character in different cases4 ,nevertheless the actual discussion of the problem in the body of the ,critique implies a fundamental distinction between the nature of a priori knowledge in mathematics and its nature in physics1 and in order that a complete view of the problem may be given1 this distinction must be stated4 ,the ',copernican' revolution was brought about by consideration of the facts of mathematics4 ,kant accepted as an absolute starting-point the existence in mathematics of true universal and necessary judgements4 ,he then asked1 ',what follows as to the nature of the objects known in mathematics from the fact that we really know them8' ,further1 in his answer he accepted a distinction which he never examined or even questioned1 viz4 the distinction between things in themselves and phenomena4#ai ,this distinction assumed1 ,kant inferred from the truth of mathematics that things in space and time are only phenomena4 ,according to him mathematicians are able to make the true judgements that they do make only because they deal with phenomena4 ,thus ,kant in no way sought to prove the truth of mathematics4 ,on the contrary1 he argued from the truth of mathematics to the nature of the world which we thereby know4 ,the phenomenal character of the world being thus established1 he was able to reverse the argument and to regard the phenomenal character of the world as explaining the validity of mathematical judgements4 ,they are valid1 because they relate to phenomena4 ,and the consideration which led ,kant to take mathematics as his starting-point seems to have been the self-evidence of mathematical judgements4 ,as we directly apprehend their necessity1 they admit of no reasonable doubt4 #ai ,cf4 ,ch4 ,,iv4 ,this distinction should of course have been examined by one whose aim it was to determine how far our knowledge can reach4 #bj ,for the self-evidence of mathematics to ,kant compare ,b4 #abj1 ,m4 #gc and ,b4 #bjj1 ,m4 #aba4 ,on the other hand1 the general principles underlying physics1 e4 g4 that every change must have a cause1 or that in all change the quantum of matter is constant1 appeared to ,kant in a different light4 ,though certainly not based on experience1 they did not seem to him self-evident4#ba ,hence1#bb in the case of these principles1 he sought to give what he did not seek to give in the case of mathematical judgements1 viz4 a proof of their truth4#bc ,the nerve of the proof lies in the contention that these principles are involved not merely in any general judgement in physics1 e4 g4 ',all bodies are heavy1' but even in any singular judgement1 e4 g4 ',this body is heavy1' and that the validity of singular judgements is universally conceded4 ,thus here the fact upon which he takes his stand is not the admitted truth of the universal judgements under consideration1 but the admitted truth of any singular judgement in physics4 ,his treatment1 then1 of the universal judgements of mathematics and that of the principles underlying physics are distinguished by the fact that1 while he accepts the former as needing no proof1 he seeks to prove the latter from the admitted validity of singular judgements in physics4 ,at the same time the acceptance of mathematical judgements and the proof of the a priori principles of physics have for ,kant a common presupposition which distinguishes mathematics and physics from metaphysics4 ,like universal judgements in mathematics1 singular judgements in physics1 and therefore the principles which they presuppose1 are true only if the objects to which they relate are phenomena4 ,both in mathematics and physics1 therefore1 it is a condition of a priori knowledge that it relates to phenomena and not to things in themselves4 ,but1 just for this reason1 metaphysics is in a different position2 since ,god1 freedom1 and immortality can never be objects of experience1 a priori knowledge in metaphysics1 and therefore metaphysics itself1 is impossible4 ,thus for ,kant the very condition1 the realization of which justifies the acceptance of mathematical judgements and enables us to prove the principles of physics1 involves the impossibility of metaphysics4 #ba ,this is stated ,b4 #bjj1 ,m4 #aba4 ,it is also implied ,b4 #abb1 ,m4 #ge1 ,b4 #bfc-d1 ,m4 #afj1 and by the argument of the ,analytic generally4 #bb ,this appears to be the real cause of the difference of treatment1 though it is not the reason assigned by ,kant himself1 cf4 ,b4 #abj1 ,m4 #gc-d4 #bc ,his remarks about pure natural science in ,b4 #bj1 ,m4 #ac and ,prol4 #d sub fin41 do not represent the normal attitude of the ,critique4 ,further1 the distinction drawn between a priori judgements in mathematics and in physics is largely responsible for the difficulty of understanding what ,kant means by a priori4 ,his unfortunate tendency to explain the term negatively could be remedied if it could be held either that the term refers solely to mathematical judgements or that he considers the truth of the law of causality to be apprehended in the same way that we see that two and two are four4 ,for an a priori judgement could then be defined as one in which the mind1 on the presentation of an individual in perception or imagination1 and in virtue of its capacity of thinking1 apprehends the necessity of a specific relation4 ,but this definition is precluded by ,kant's view that the law of causality and similar principles1 though a priori1 are not self-evident4 ,,chapter ,,ii ,,the ,,sensibility ,,and ,,the ,,understanding ,the distinction between the sensibility and the understanding#a is to ,kant fundamental both in itself and in relation to the conclusions which he reaches4 ,an outline1 therefore1 of this distinction must precede any statement or examination of the details of his position4 ,unfortunately1 in spite of its fundamental character1 ,kant never thinks of questioning or criticizing the distinction in the form in which he draws it1 and the presence of certain confusions often renders it difficult to be sure of his meaning4 #a ,cf4 ,b4 #a1 #bi1 #cc1 #gd-e1 #ge1 #ib-d2 ,m4 #a1 #ah1 #ba1 #de-df1 #eg4 ,the distinction may be stated in his own words thus3 ,there are two stems of human knowledge1 which perhaps spring from a common but to us unknown root1 namely sensibility and understanding4#b ,our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind2 the first receives representations#c 7receptivity for impressions72 the second is the power of knowing an object by means of these representations 7spontaneity of conceptions74 ,through the first an object is given to us2 through the second the object is thought in relation to the representation 7which is a mere determination of the mind74 ,perception and conceptions constitute1 therefore1 the elements of all our knowledge1 so that neither conceptions without a perception in some way corresponding to them1 nor perception without conceptions can yield any knowledge4444 ,neither of these qualities has a preference over the other4 ,without sensibility no object would be given to us1 and without understanding no object would be thought4 ,thoughts without content are empty1 perceptions without conceptions are blind4 ,hence it is as necessary for the mind to make its conceptions sensuous 7i4 e4 to add to them the object in perception7 as to make its perceptions intelligible 7i4 e4 to bring them under conceptions74 ,neither of these powers or faculties can exchange its function4 ,the understanding cannot perceive1 and the senses cannot think4 ,only by their union can knowledge arise4#d #b ,b4 #bi1 ,m4 #ah #c ,for the sake of uniformity ,vorstellung has throughout been translated by 'representation'1 though sometimes1 as in the present passage1 it would be better rendered by 'presentation'4 #d ,b4 #gd-e1 ,m4 #de-f4 ,the distinction so stated appears straightforward and1 on the whole1#e sound4 ,and it is fairly referred to by ,kant as the distinction between the faculties of perceiving and conceiving or thinking1 provided that the terms perceiving and conceiving or thinking be taken to indicate a distinction within perception in the ordinary sense of the word4 ,his meaning can be stated thus3 ',all knowledge requires the realization of two conditions2 an individual must be presented to us in perception1 and we as thinking beings must bring this individual under or recognize it as an instance of some universal4 ,thus1 in order to judge ',this is a house' or ',that is red' we need the presence of the house or of the red colour in perception1 and we must 'recognize' the house or the colour1 i4 e4 apprehend the individual as a member of a certain kind4 ,suppose either condition unrealized4 ,then if we suppose a failure to conceive1 i4 e4 to apprehend the individual as a member of some kind1 we see that our perception--if it could be allowed to be anything at all--would be blind i4 e4 indeterminate1 or a mere 'blur'4 ,what we perceived would be for us as good as nothing4 ,in fact1 we could not even say that we were perceiving4 ,again1 if we suppose that we had merely the conception of a house1 and neither perceived nor had perceived an individual to which it applied1 we see that the conception1 being without application1 would be neither knowledge nor an element in knowledge4 ,moreover1 the content of a conception is derived from perception2 it is only through its relation to perceived individuals that we become aware of a universal4 ,to know the meaning of 'redness' we must have experienced individual red things2 to know the meaning of 'house' we must at least have had experience of individual men and of their physical needs4 ,hence 'conceptions' without 'perceptions' are void or empty4 ,the existence of conceptions presupposes experience of corresponding individuals1 even though it also implies the activity of thinking in relation to these individuals4'#f #e ,cf4 p4 #bi1 note #a4 #f ,kant's account implies that he has in view only empirical knowledge2 in any case it only applies to empirical conceptions4 ,further1 it is true to say that as perceiving we are passive2 we do not do anything4 ,this1 as has been pointed out1 is the element of truth contained in the statement that objects are given to us4 ,on the other hand1 it may be truly said that as conceiving1 in the sense of bringing an individual under a universal1 we are essentially active4 ,this is presupposed by the notice or attention involved in perception ordinarily so called1 i4 e4 perception in the full sense in which it includes conceiving as well as perceiving4#g ,kant1 therefore1 is justified in referring to the sensibility as a 'receptivity' and to the understanding as a 'spontaneity'4 #g ,this distinction within perception is of course compatible with the view that the elements so distinguished are inseparable4 ,the distinction1 so stated1 appears1 as has been already said1 intelligible and1 in the main#h1 valid4 ,kant1 however1 renders the elucidation of his meaning difficult by combining with this view of the distinction an incompatible and unwarranted theory of perception4 ,he supposes1#i without ever questioning the supposition1 that perception is due to the operation of things outside the mind1 which act upon our sensibility and thereby produce sensations4 ,on this supposition1 what we perceive is not1 as the distinction just stated implies1 the thing itself1 but a sensation produced by it4 ,consequently a problem arises as to the meaning on this supposition of the statements 'by the sensibility objects are given to us' and 'by the understanding they are thought'4 ,the former statement must mean that when a thing affects us there is a sensation4 ,it cannot mean that by the sensibility we know that there exists a thing which causes the sensation1 for this knowledge would imply the activity of thinking2 nor can it mean that in virtue of the sensibility the thing itself is presented to us4 ,the latter statement must mean that when sensation arises1 the understanding judges that there is something causing it2 and this assertion must really be a priori1 because not dependent upon experience4 ,unfortunately the two statements so interpreted are wholly inconsistent with the account of the functions of the sensibility and the understanding which has just been quoted4 #h ,see p4 #bi1 note #a4 #i ,cf4 ,b4 #a1 ,m4 #a4 ,further1 this theory of perception has two forms4 ,in its first form the theory is physical rather than metaphysical1 and is based upon our possession of physical organs4 ,it assumes that the reality to be apprehended is the world of space and time1 and it asserts that by the action of bodies upon our physical organs our sensibility is affected1 and that thereby sensations are originated in us4 ,thereupon a problem arises4 ,for if the contribution of the sensibility to our knowledge of the physical world is limited to a succession of sensations1 explanation must be given of the fact that we have succeeded with an experience confined to these sensations in acquiring knowledge of a world which does not consist of sensations4#aj ,kant1 in fact1 in the ,aesthetic has this problem continually before him1 and tries to solve it4 ,he holds that the mind1 by means of its forms of perception and its conceptions of the understanding1 superinduces upon sensations1 as data1 spatial and other relations1 in such a way that it acquires knowledge of the spatial world4 #aj ,cf4 ,b4 #a init41 ,m4 #a init42 ,b4 #cd1 ,m4 #ba sub fin4 ,an inherent difficulty1 however1 of this 'physical' theory of perception leads to a transformation of it4 ,if1 as the theory supposes1 the cause of sensation is outside or beyond the mind1 it cannot be known4 ,hence the initial assumption that this cause is the physical world has to be withdrawn1 and the cause of sensation comes to be thought of as the thing in itself of which we can know nothing4 ,this is undoubtedly the normal form of the theory in ,kant's mind4 ,it may be objected that to attribute to ,kant at any time the physical form of the theory is to accuse him of an impossibly crude confusion between things in themselves and the spatial world1 and that he can never have thought that the cause of sensation1 being as it is outside the mind1 is spatial4 ,but the answer is to be found in the fact that the problem just referred to as occupying ,kant's attention in the ,aesthetic is only a problem at all so long as the cause of sensation is thought of as a physical body4 ,for the problem ',how do we1 beginning with mere sensation1 come to know a spatial and temporal world8' is only a problem so long as it is supposed that the cause of sensation is a spatial and temporal world or a part of it1 and that this world is what we come to know4 ,if the cause of sensation1 as being beyond the mind1 is held to be unknowable and so not known to be spatial or temporal1 the problem has disappeared4 ,corroboration is given by certain passages#aa in the ,critique which definitely mention 'the senses'1 a term which refers to bodily organs1 and by others#ab to which meaning can be given only if they are taken to imply that the objects which affect our sensibility are not unknown things in themselves1 but things known to be spatial4 ,even the use of the plural in the term 'things in themselves' implies a tendency to identify the unknowable reality beyond the mind with bodies in space4 ,for the implication that different sensations are due to different things in themselves originates in the view that different sensations are due to the operation of different spatial bodies4 #aa ,e4 g4 ,b4 #a init41 ,m4 #a init41 and ,b4 #ge fin41 ,m4 #df1 lines #ab1 #ac for 'the sensuous faculty' should be substituted 'the senses'4 #ab ,e4 g4 ,b4 #db1 lines #aa1 #ab2 ,m4 #bf1 line #ac2 ,a4 #ajj1 ,mah4 #aie 7'even in the absence of the object'74 ,cf4 ,b4 #ahb-c1 ,m4 #aaj-a 7see pp4 #beg-h1 and note p4 #beg71 and ,b4 #bjg-aj1 ,m4 #abf-h 7see pp4 #bfc-e74 ,it is now necessary to consider how the distinction between the sensibility and the understanding contributes to articulate the problem ',how are a priori synthetic judgements possible8' ,as has been pointed out1 ,kant means by this question1 ',how is it possible that the mind is able1 in virtue of its own powers1 to make universal and necessary judgements which anticipate its experience of objects8' ,to this question his general answer is that it is possible and only possible because1 so far from ideas1 as is generally supposed1 having to conform to things1 the things to which our ideas or judgements relate1 viz4 phenomena1 must conform to the nature of the mind4 ,now1 if the mind's knowing nature can be divided into the sensibility and the understanding1 the problem becomes ',how is it possible for the mind to make such judgements in virtue of its sensibility and its understanding8' ,and the answer will be that it is possible because the things concerned1 i4 e4 phenomena1 must conform to the sensibility and the understanding1 i4 e4 to the mind's perceiving and thinking nature4 ,but both the problem and the answer1 so stated1 give no clue to the particular a priori judgements thus rendered possible nor to the nature of the sensibility and the understanding in virtue of which we make them4 ,it has been seen1 however1 that the judgements in question fall into two classes1 those of mathematics and those which form the presuppositions of physics4 ,and it is ,kant's aim to relate these classes to the sensibility and the understanding respectively4 ,his view is that mathematical judgements1 which1 as such1 deal with spatial and temporal relations1 are essentially bound up with our perceptive nature1 i4 e4 with our sensibility1 and that the principles underlying physics are the expression of our thinking nature1 i4 e4 of our understanding4 ,hence if the vindication of this relation between our knowing faculties and the judgements to which they are held to give rise is approached from the side of our faculties1 it must be shown that our sensitive nature is such as to give rise to mathematical judgements1 and that our understanding or thinking nature is such as to originate the principles underlying physics4 ,again1 if the account of this relation is to be adequate1 it must be shown to be exhaustive1 i4 e4 it must be shown that the sensibility and the understanding give rise to no other judgements4 ,otherwise there may be other a priori judgements bound up with the sensibility and the understanding which the inquiry will have ignored4 ,kant1 therefore1 by his distinction between the sensibility and the understanding1 sets himself another problem1 which does not come into sight in the first formulation of the general question ',how are a priori synthetic judgements possible8' ,he has to determine what a priori judgements are related to the sensibility and to the understanding respectively4 ,at the same time the distinction gives rise to a division within the main problem4 ,his chief aim is to discover how it is that a priori judgements are universally applicable4 ,but1 as ,kant conceives the issue1 the problem requires different treatment according as the judgements in question are related to the sensibility or to the understanding4 ,hence arises the distinction between the ,transcendental ,aesthetic and the ,transcendental ,analytic1 the former dealing with the a priori judgements of mathematics1 which relate to the sensibility1 and the latter dealing with the a priori principles of physics1 which originate in the understanding4 ,again1 within each of these two divisions we have to distinguish two problems1 viz4 ',what a priori judgements are essentially related to the faculty in question8' and ',how is it that they are applicable to objects8' ,it is important1 however1 to notice that the distinction between the sensibility and the understanding1 in the form in which it serves as a basis for distinguishing the ,aesthetic and the ,analytic1 is not identical with or even compatible with the distinction1 as ,kant states it when he is considering the distinction in itself and is not thinking of any theory which is to be based upon it4 ,in the latter case the sensibility and the understanding are represented as inseparable faculties involved in all knowledge4#ac ,only from the union of both can knowledge arise4 ,but1 regarded as a basis for the distinction between the ,aesthetic and the ,analytic1 they are implied to be the source of different kinds of knowledge1 viz4 mathematics and the principles of physics4 ,it is no answer to this to urge that ,kant afterwards points out that space as an object presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to sense4 ,no doubt this admission implies that even the apprehension of spatial relations involves the activity of the understanding4 ,but the implication is really inconsistent with the existence of the ,aesthetic as a distinct part of the subject dealing with a special class of a priori judgements4 #ac ,b4 #gd-e1 ,m4 #de-f2 cf4 pp4 #bg-i4 #ad ,b4 #afj note1 ,m4 #ih note4 ,,chapter ,,iii ,,space ,it is the aim of the ,aesthetic to deal with the a priori knowledge which relates to the sensibility4 ,this knowledge1 according to ,kant1 is concerned with space and time4 ,hence he has to show firstly that our apprehension of space and time is a priori1 i4 e4 that it is not derived from experience but originates in our apprehending nature2 and secondly that within our apprehending nature this apprehension belongs to the sensibility and not to the understanding1 or1 in his language1 that space and time are forms of perception or sensibility4 ,further1 if his treatment is to be exhaustive1 he should also show thirdly that space and time are the only forms of perception4 ,this1 however1 he makes no attempt to do except in one passage1#a where the argument fails4 ,the first two points established1 ,kant is able to develop his main thesis1 viz4 that it is a condition of the validity of the a priori judgements which relate to space and time that these are characteristics of phenomena1 and not of things in themselves4 #a ,b4 #eh1 ,m4 #ce4 ,it will be convenient to consider his treatment of space and time separately1 and to begin with his treatment of space4 ,it is necessary1 however1 first of all to refer to the term 'form of perception'4 ,as ,kant conceives a form of perception1 it involves three antitheses4 7#a7 ,as a form of perception it is opposed1 as a way or mode of perceiving1 to particular perceptions4 7#b7 ,as a form or mode of perception it is opposed to a form or mode of conception4 7#c7 ,as a form of perception it is also opposed1 as a way in which we apprehend things1 to a way in which things are4 ,while we may defer consideration of the second and third antitheses1 we should at once give attention to the nature of the first1 because ,kant confuses it with two other antitheses4 ,there is no doubt that in general a form of perception means for ,kant a general capacity of perceiving which1 as such1 is opposed to the actual perceptions in which it is manifested4 ,for according to him our spatial perceptions are not foreign to us1 but manifestations of our general perceiving nature2 and this view finds expression in the assertion that space is a form of perception or of sensibility4#b #b ,cf4 ,b4 #dc init41 ,m4 #bf med4 ,unfortunately1 however1 ,kant frequently speaks of this form of perception as if it were the same thing as the actual perception of empty space4#c ,in other words1 he implies that such a perception is possible1 and confuses it with a potentiality1 i4 e4 the power of perceiving that which is spatial4 ,the confusion is possible because it can be said with some plausibility that a perception of empty space--if its possibility be allowed--does not inform us about actual things1 but only informs us what must be true of things1 if there prove to be any2 such a perception1 therefore1 can be thought of as a possibility of knowledge rather than as actual knowledge4 #c e4 g4 ,b4 #cd1 #ce1 ,m4 #bb2 ,b4 #da1 ,m4 #be2 ,prol4 #i-aa4 ,the commonest expression of the confusion is to be found in the repeated assertion that space is a pure perception4 ,the second confusion is closely related to the first1 and arises from the fact that ,kant speaks of space not only as a form of perception1 but also as the form of phenomena in opposition to sensation as their matter4 ,that which in the phenomenon corresponds to#d the sensation ,i term its matter2 but that which effects that the manifold of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations ,i call the form of the phenomenon4 ,now that in which alone our sensations can be arranged and placed in a certain form cannot itself be sensation4 ,hence while the matter of all phenomena is only given to us a posteriori1 their form i4 e4 space must lie ready for them all together a priori in the mind4#e ,here ,kant is clearly under the influence of his theory of perception4#f ,he is thinking that1 given the origination of sensations in us by the thing in itself1 it is the business of the mind to arrange these sensations spatially in order to attain knowledge of the spatial world4#g ,space being1 as it were1 a kind of empty vessel in which sensations are arranged1 is said to be the form of phenomena4#h ,moreover1 if we bear in mind that ultimately bodies in space are for ,kant only spatial arrangements of sensations1#i we see that the assertion that space is the form of phenomena is only ,kant's way of saying that all bodies are spatial4#aj ,now ,kant1 in thus asserting that space is the form of phenomena1 is clearly confusing this assertion with the assertion that space is a form of perception1 and he does so in consequence of the first confusion1 viz4 that between a capacity of perceiving and an actual perception of empty space4 ,for in the passage last quoted he continues thus3 ,i call all representations#aa pure 7in the transcendental sense7 in which nothing is found which belongs to sensation4 ,accordingly there will be found a priori in the mind the pure form of sensuous perceptions in general1 wherein all the manifold of phenomena is perceived in certain relations4 ,this pure form of sensibility will also itself be called pure perception4 ,thus1 if ,i abstract from the representation of a body that which the understanding thinks respecting it1 such as substance1 force1 divisibility1 c41 and also that which belongs to sensation1 such as impenetrability1 hardness1 colour1 c41 something is still left over for me from this empirical perception1 viz4 extension and shape4 ,these belong to pure perception1 which exists in the mind a priori1 even without an actual object of the senses or a sensation1 as a mere form of sensibility4 ,here ,kant has passed1 without any consciousness of a transition1 from treating space as that in which the manifold of sensation is arranged to treating it as a capacity of perceiving4 ,moreover1 since ,kant in this passage speaks of space as a perception1 and thereby identifies space with the perception of it1#ab the confusion may be explained thus4 ,the form of phenomena is said to be the space in which all sensations are arranged1 or in which all bodies are2 space1 apart from all sensations or bodies1 i4 e4 empty1 being the object of a pure perception1 is treated as identical with a pure perception1 viz4 the perception of empty space2 and the perception of empty space is treated as identical with a capacity of perceiving that which is spatial4#ac #d ',corresponds to' must mean 'is'4 #e ,b4 #cd1 ,m4 #ba4 #f ,cf4 pp4 #cj-b4 #g ,it is impossible1 of course1 to see how such a process can give us knowledge of the spatial world1 for1 whatever bodies in space are1 they are not arrangements of sensations4 ,nevertheless1 ,kant's theory of perception really precludes him from holding that bodies are anything else than arrangements of sensations1 and he seems at times to accept this view explicitly1 e4 g4 ,b4 #ch1 ,m4 #bc 7quoted p4 #da71 where he speaks of our representing sensations as external to and next to each other1 and1 therefore1 as in different places4 #h ,it may be noted that it would have been more natural to describe the particular shape of the phenomenon 7i4 e4 the particular spatial arrangement of the sensations7 rather than space as the form of the phenomenon2 for the matter to which the form is opposed is said to be sensation1 and that of which it is the matter is said to be the phenomenon1 i4 e4 a body in space4 #i ,cf4 note #d1 p4 #ch4 #aj ,cf4 ,prol4 #aa and p4 #acg4 #aa ,cf4 p4 #da1 note #a4 #ab ,cf4 p4 #ea1 note #a4 #ac ,the same confusion 7and due to the same cause7 is implied ,prol4 #aa1 and ,b4 #db 7b71 ,m4 #bf 7b7 first paragraph4 ,cf4 ,b4 #di 7b71 ,m4 #cj 7b74 ,the existence of the confusion1 however1 is most easily realized by asking1 ',how did ,kant come to think of space and time as the only forms of perception8' ,it would seem obvious that the perception of anything implies a form of perception in the sense of a mode or capacity of perceiving4 ,to perceive colours implies a capacity for seeing2 to hear noises implies a capacity for hearing4 ,and these capacities may fairly be called forms of perception4 ,as soon as this is realized1 the conclusion is inevitable that ,kant was led to think of space and time as the only forms of perception1 because in this connexion he was thinking of each as a form of phenomena1 i4 e4 as something in which all bodies or their states are1 or1 from the point of view of our knowledge1 as that in which sensuous material is to be arranged2 for there is nothing except space and time in which such arrangement could plausibly be said to be carried out4 ,as has been pointed out1 ,kant's argument falls into two main parts1 one of which prepares the way for the other4 ,the aim of the former is to show firstly that our apprehension of space is a priori1 and secondly that it belongs to perception and not to conception4 ,the aim of the latter is to conclude from these characteristics of our apprehension of space that space is a property not of things in themselves but only of phenomena4 ,these arguments may be considered in turn4 ,the really valid argument adduced by ,kant for the a priori character of our apprehension of space is based on the nature of geometrical judgements4 ,the universality of our judgements in geometry is not based upon experience1 i4 e4 upon the observation of individual things in space4 ,the necessity of geometrical relations is apprehended directly in virtue of the mind's own apprehending nature4 ,unfortunately in the present context ,kant ignores this argument and substitutes two others1 both of which are invalid4 #a4 ,space is no empirical conception#ad which has been derived from external#ae experiences4 ,for in order that certain sensations may be related to something external to me 7that is1 to something in a different part of space from that in which ,i am71 in like manner1 in order that ,i may represent them as external to and next to each other1 and consequently as not merely different but as in different places1 the representation of space must already exist as a foundation4 ,consequently1 the representation of space cannot be borrowed from the relations of external phenomena through experience2 but1 on the contrary1 this external experience is itself first possible only through the said representation4#af ,here ,kant is thinking that in order to apprehend1 for example1 that ,a is to the right of ,b we must first apprehend empty space4 ,he concludes that our apprehension of space is a priori1 because we apprehend empty space before we become aware of the spatial relations of individual objects in it4 #ad ,begriff 7conception7 here is to be understood loosely not as something opposed to ,anschauung 7perception71 but as equivalent to the genus of which ,anschauung and ,begriff are species1 i4 e4 ,vorstellung1 which maybe rendered by 'representation' or 'idea'1 in the general sense in which these words are sometimes used to include 'thought' and 'perception'4 #ae ,the next sentence shows that 'external' means1 not 'produced by something external to the mind'1 but simply 'spatial'4 #af ,b4 #ch1 ,m4 #bc-d4 ,to this the following reply may be made4 7a7 ,the term a priori applied to an apprehension should mean1 not that it arises prior to experience1 but that its validity is independent of experience4 7b7 ,that to which the term a priori should be applied is not the apprehension of empty space1 which is individual1 but the apprehension of the nature of space in general1 which is universal4 7c7 ,we do not apprehend empty space before we apprehend individual spatial relations of individual bodies or1 indeed1 at any time4 7d7 ,though we come to apprehend a priori the nature of space in general1 the apprehension is not prior but posterior in time to the apprehension of individual spatial relations4 7e7 ,it does not follow from the temporal priority of our apprehension of individual spatial relations that our apprehension of the nature of space in general is 'borrowed from experience'1 and is therefore not a priori4 #b4 ,we can never represent to ourselves that there is no space1 though we can quite well think that no objects are found in it4 ,it must1 therefore1 be considered as the condition of the possibility of phenomena1 and not as a determination dependent upon them1 and it is an a priori representation1 which necessarily underlies external phenomena4#ag #ag ,b4 #ch1 ,m4 #bd4 ,here the premise is simply false4 ,if 'represent' or 'think' means 'believe'1 we can no more represent or think that there are no objects in space than that there is no space4 ,if1 on the other hand1 'represent' or 'think' means 'make a mental picture of'1 the assertion is equally false4 ,kant is thinking of empty space as a kind of receptacle for objects1 and the a priori character of our apprehension of space lies1 as before1 in the supposed fact that in order to apprehend objects in space we must begin with the apprehension of empty space4 ,the examination of ,kant's arguments for the perceptive character of our apprehension of space is a more complicated matter4 ,by way of preliminary it should be noticed that they presuppose the possibility in general of distinguishing features of objects which belong to the perception of them from others which belong to the conception of them4 ,in particular1 ,kant holds that our apprehension of a body as a substance1 as exercising force and as divisible1 is due to our understanding as conceiving it1 while our apprehension of it as extended and as having a shape is due to our sensibility as perceiving it4#ah ,the distinction1 however1 will be found untenable in principle2 and if this be granted1 ,kant's attempt to distinguish in this way the extension and shape of an object from its other features can be ruled out on general grounds4 ,in any case1 it must be conceded that the arguments fail by which he seeks to show that space in particular belongs to perception4 #ah ,b4 #ce1 ,m4 #bb 7quoted p4 #ci74 ,it is noteworthy 7#a7 that the passage contains no argument to show that extension and shape are not1 equally with divisibility1 thought to belong to an object1 7#b7 that impenetrability1 which is here said to belong to sensation1 obviously cannot do so1 and 7#c7 that 7as has been pointed out1 p4 #ci7 the last sentence of the paragraph in question presupposes that we have a perception of empty space1 and that this is a form of perception4 ,there appears to be no way of distinguishing perception and conception as the apprehension of different realities#ai except as the apprehension of the individual and of the universal respectively4 ,distinguished in this way1 the faculty of perception is that in virtue of which we apprehend the individual1 and the faculty of conception is that power of reflection in virtue of which a universal is made the explicit object of thought4#bj ,if this be granted1 the only test for what is perceived is that it is individual1 and the only test for what is conceived is that it is universal4 ,these are in fact the tests which ,kant uses4 ,but if this be so1 it follows that the various characteristics of objects cannot be divided into those which are perceived and those which are conceived4 ,for the distinction between universal and individual is quite general1 and applies to all characteristics of objects alike4 ,thus1 in the case of colour1 we can distinguish colour in general and the individual colours of individual objects2 or1 to take a less ambiguous instance1 we can distinguish a particular shade of redness and its individual instances4 ,further1 it may be said that perception is of the individual shade of red of the individual object1 and that the faculty by which we become explicitly aware of the particular shade of red in general is that of conception4 ,the same distinction can be drawn with respect to hardness1 or shape1 or any other characteristic of objects4 ,the distinction1 then1 between perception and conception can be drawn with respect to any characteristic of objects1 and does not serve to distinguish one from another4 #ai ,and not as mutually involved in the apprehension of any individual reality4 #bj ,this distinction is of course different to that previously drawn within perception in the full sense between perception in a narrow sense and conception 7pp4 #bh-i74 ,kant's arguments to show that our apprehension of space belongs to perception are two in number1 and both are directed to show not1 as they should1 that space is a form of perception1 but that it is a perception4#ba ,the first runs thus3 ,space is no discursive1 or1 as we say1 general conception of relations of things in general1 but a pure perception4 ,for1 in the first place1 we can represent to ourselves only one space1 and if we speak of many spaces we mean thereby only parts of one and the same unique space4 ,again1 these parts cannot precede the one all-embracing space as the component parts1 as it were1 out of which it can be composed1 but can be thought only in it4 ,space is essentially one2 the manifold in it1 and consequently the general conception of spaces in general1 rests solely upon limitations4#bb #ba ,kant uses the phrase 'pure perception'2 but 'pure' can only mean 'not containing sensation'1 and consequently adds nothing relevant4 #bb ,b4 #ci1 ,m4 #bd4 ,the concluding sentences of the paragraph need not be considered4 ,here ,kant is clearly taking the proper test of perception4 ,its object1 as being an individual1 is unique2 there is only one of it1 whereas any conception has a plurality of instances4 ,but he reaches his conclusion by supposing that we first perceive empty space and then become aware of its parts by dividing it4 ,parts of space are essentially limitations of the one space2 therefore to apprehend them we must first apprehend space4 ,and since space is one1 it must be object of perception2 in other words1 space1 in the sense of the one all-embracing space1 i4 e4 the totality of individual spaces1 is something perceived4 ,the argument appears open to two objections4 ,in the first place1 we do not perceive space as a whole1 and then1 by dividing it1 come to apprehend individual spaces4 ,we perceive individual spaces1 or1 rather1 individual bodies occupying individual spaces4#bc ,we then apprehend that these spaces1 as spaces1 involve an infinity of other spaces4 ,in other words1 it is reflection on the general nature of space1 the apprehension of which is involved in our apprehension of individual spaces or rather of bodies in space1 which gives rise to the apprehension of the totality#bd of spaces1 the apprehension being an act1 not of perception1 but of thought or conception4 ,it is necessary1 then1 to distinguish 7a7 individual spaces1 which we perceive2 7b7 the nature of space in general1 of which we become aware by reflecting upon the character of perceived individual spaces1 and which we conceive2 7c7 the totality of individual spaces1 the thought of which we reach by considering the nature of space in general4 #bc ,this contention is not refuted by the objection that our distinct apprehension of an individual space is always bound up with an indistinct apprehension of the spaces immediately surrounding it4 ,for our indistinct apprehension cannot be supposed to be of the whole of the surrounding space4 #bd ,it is here assumed that a whole or a totality can be infinite4 ,cf4 p4 #ajb4 ,in the second place1 the distinctions just drawn afford no ground for distinguishing space as something perceived from any other characteristic of objects as something conceived2 for any other characteristic admits of corresponding distinctions4 ,thus1 with respect to colour it is possible to distinguish 7a7 individual colours which we perceive2 7b7 colouredness in general1 which we conceive by reflecting on the common character exhibited by individual colours and which involves various kinds or species of colouredness2 7c7 the totality of individual colours1 the thought of which is reached by considering the nature of colouredness in general4#be #be ,for a possible objection and the answer thereto1 see note1 p4 #gj4 ,both in the case of colour and in that of space there is to be found the distinction between universal and individual1 and therefore also that between conception and perception4 ,it may be objected that after all1 as ,kant points out1 there is only one space1 whereas there are many individual colours4 ,but the assertion that there is only one space simply means that all individual bodies in space are related spatially4 ,this will be admitted1 if the attempt be made to think of two bodies as in different spaces and therefore as not related spatially4 ,moreover1 there is a parallel in the case of colour1 since individual coloured bodies are related by way of colour1 e4 g4 as brighter and duller2 and though such a relation is different from a relation of bodies in respect of space1 the difference is due to the special nature of the universals conceived1 and does not imply a difference between space and colour in respect of perception and conception4 ,in any case1 space as a whole is not object of perception1 which it must be if ,kant is to show that space1 as being one1 is perceived2 for space in this context must mean the totality of individual spaces4 ,kant's second argument is stated as follows3 ,space is represented as an infinite given magnitude4 ,now every conception must indeed be considered as a representation which is contained in an infinite number of different possible representations 7as their common mark71 and which therefore contains these under itself1 but no conception can1 as such1 be thought of as though it contained in itself an infinite number of representations4 ,nevertheless1 space is so conceived1 for all parts of space ad infinitum exist simultaneously4 ,consequently the original representation of space is an a priori perception and not a conception4 ,in other words1 while a conception implies an infinity of individuals which come under it1 the elements which constitute the conception itself 7e4 g4 that of triangularity or redness7 are not infinite2 but the elements which go to constitute space are infinite1 and therefore space is not a conception but a perception4 ,though1 however1 space in the sense of the infinity of spaces may be said to contain an infinite number of spaces if it be meant that it is these infinite spaces1 it does not follow1 nor is it true1 that space in this sense is object of perception4 ,the aim of the arguments just considered1 and stated in #b of the ,aesthetic1 is to establish the two characteristics of our apprehension of space1#bf from which it is to follow that space is a property of things only as they appear to us and not as they are in themselves4 ,this conclusion is drawn in #d4 #b and #d therefore complete the argument4 #c1 a passage added in the second edition of the ,critique1 interrupts the thought1 for ignoring #b1 it once more establishes the a priori and perceptive character of our apprehension of space1 and independently draws the conclusion drawn in #d4 ,since1 however1 ,kant draws the final conclusion in the same way in #c and in #d1 and since a passage in the ,prolegomena1#bg of which #c is only a summary1 gives a more detailed account of ,kant's thought1 attention should be concentrated on #c1 together with the passage in the ,prolegomena4 #bf viz4 that it is a priori and a pure perception4 #bg #f-aa4 ,it might seem at the outset that since the arguments upon which ,kant bases the premises for his final argument have turned out invalid1 the final argument itself need not be considered4 ,the argument1 however1 of #c ignores the preceding arguments for the a priori and perceptive character of our apprehension of space4 ,it returns to the a priori synthetic character of geometrical judgements1 upon which stress is laid in the ,introduction1 and appeals to this as the justification of the a priori and perceptive character of our apprehension of space4 ,the argument of #c runs as follows3 ,geometry is a science which determines the properties of space synthetically and yet a priori4 ,what1 then1 must be the representation of space1 in order that such a knowledge of it may be possible8 ,it must be originally perception1 for from a mere conception no propositions can be deduced which go beyond the conception1 and yet this happens in geometry4 ,but this perception must be a priori1 i4 e4 it must occur in us before all sense-perception of an object1 and therefore must be pure1 not empirical perception4 ,for geometrical propositions are always apodeictic1 i4 e4 bound up with the consciousness of their necessity 7e4 g4 space has only three dimensions71 and such propositions cannot be empirical judgements nor conclusions from them4 ,now how can there exist in the mind an external perception#bh which precedes#bi the objects themselves1 and in which the conception of them can be determined a priori8 ,obviously not otherwise than in so far as it has its seat in the subject only1 as the formal nature of the subject to be affected by objects and thereby to obtain immediate representation1 i4 e4 perception of them1 and consequently only as the form of the external sense in general4#cj #bh ',external perception' can only mean perception of what is spatial4 #bi ,vorhergeht4 #cj ',formal nature to be affected by objects' is not relevant to the context4 ,here three steps are taken4 ,from the synthetic character of geometrical judgements it is concluded that space is not something which we conceive1 but something which we perceive4 ,from their a priori character1 i4 e4 from the consciousness of necessity involved1 it is concluded that the perception of space must be a priori in a new sense1 that of taking place before the perception of objects in it4#ca ,from the fact that we perceive space before we perceive objects in it1 and thereby are able to anticipate the spatial relations which condition these objects1 it is concluded that space is only a characteristic of our perceiving nature1 and consequently that space is a property not of things in themselves1 but only of things as perceived by us4#cb #ca ,cf4 ,b4 #db1 ,m4 #bf 7a7 fin41 7b7 second sentence4 #cb ,cf4 ,b4 #dc1 ,m4 #bf-g4 ,two points in this argument are1 even on the face of it1 paradoxical4 ,firstly1 the term a priori1 as applied not to geometrical judgements but to the perception of space1 is given a temporal sense2 it means not something whose validity is independent of experience and which is the manifestation of the nature of the mind1 but something which takes place before experience4 ,secondly1 the conclusion is not that the perception of space is the manifestation of the mind's perceiving nature1 but that it is the mind's perceiving nature4 ,for the conclusion is that space#cc is the formal nature of the subject to be affected by objects1 and therefore the form of the external sense in general4 ,plainly1 then1 ,kant here confuses an actual perception and a form or way of perceiving4 ,these points1 however1 are more explicit in the corresponding passage in the ,prolegomena4#cd #cc ,kant draws no distinction between space and the perception of space1 or1 rather1 habitually speaks of space as a perception4 ,no doubt he considers that his view that space is only a characteristic of phenomena justifies the identification of space and the perception of it4 ,occasionally1 however1 he distinguishes them4 ,thus he sometimes speaks of the representation of space 7e4 g4 ,b4 #ch-dj1 ,m4 #bc-d72 in ,prol41 #aa1 he speaks of a pure perception of space and time2 and in ,b4 #dj1 ,m4 #be1 he says that our representation of space must be perception4 ,but this language is due to the pressure of the facts1 and not to his general theory2 cf4 pp4 #ace-f4 #cd #f-aa4 ,it begins thus3 ,mathematics carries with it thoroughly apodeictic certainty1 that is1 absolute necessity1 and1 therefore1 rests on no empirical grounds1 and consequently is a pure product of reason1 and1 besides1 is thoroughly synthetical4 ,how1 then1 is it possible for human reason to accomplish such knowledge entirely a priori8444 ,but we find that all mathematical knowledge has this peculiarity1 that it must represent its conception previously in perception1 and indeed a priori1 consequently in a perception which is not empirical but pure1 and that otherwise it cannot take a single step4 ,hence its judgements are always intuitive4444 ,this observation on the nature of mathematics at once gives us a clue to the first and highest condition of its possibility1 viz4 that there must underlie it a pure perception in which it can exhibit or1 as we say1 construct all its conceptions in the concrete and yet a priori4 ,if we can discover this pure perception and its possibility1 we may thence easily explain how a priori synthetical propositions in pure mathematics are possible1 and consequently also how the science itself is possible4 ,for just as empirical perception enables us without difficulty to enlarge synthetically in experience the conception which we frame of an object of perception through new predicates which perception itself offers us1 so pure perception also will do the same1 only with the difference that in this case the synthetical judgement will be a priori certain and apodeictic1 while in the former case it will be only a posteriori and empirically certain2 for the latter i4 e4 the empirical perception on which the a posteriori synthetic judgement is based contains only that which is to be found in contingent empirical perception1 while the former i4 e4 the pure perception on which the a priori synthetic judgement is based contains that which is bound to be found in pure perception1 since1 as a priori perception1 it is inseparably connected with the conception before all experience or individual sense-perception4 ,this passage is evidently based upon the account which ,kant gives in the ,doctrine of ,method of the method of geometry4#ce ,according to this account1 in order to apprehend1 for instance1 that a three-sided figure must have three angles1 we must draw in imagination or on paper an individual figure corresponding to the conception of a three-sided figure4 ,we then see that the very nature of the act of construction involves that the figure constructed must possess three angles as well as three sides4 ,hence1 perception being that by which we apprehend the individual1 a perception is involved in the act by which we form a geometrical judgement1 and the perception can be called a priori1 in that it is guided by our a priori apprehension of the necessary nature of the act of construction1 and therefore of the figure constructed4 #ce ,b4 #gdj ff41 ,m4 #dcd ff4 ,compare especially the following3 ,philosophical knowledge is knowledge of reason by means of conceptions2 mathematical knowledge is knowledge by means of the construction of conceptions4 ,but the construction of a conception means the a priori presentation of a perception corresponding to it4 ,the construction of a conception therefore demands a non-empirical perception1 which1 therefore1 as a perception1 is an individual object1 but which none the less1 as the construction of a conception 7a universal representation71 must express in the representation universal validity for all possible perceptions which come under that conception4 ,thus ,i construct a triangle by presenting the object corresponding to the conception1 either by mere imagination in pure perception1 or also1 in accordance with pure perception1 on paper in empirical perception1 but in both cases completely a priori1 without having borrowed the pattern of it from any experience4 ,the individual drawn figure is empirical1 but nevertheless serves to indicate the conception without prejudice to its universality1 because in this empirical perception we always attend only to the act of construction of the conception1 to which many determinations1 e4 g4 the magnitude of the sides and of the angles1 are wholly indifferent1 and accordingly abstract from these differences1 which do not change the conception of the triangle4 ,the account in the ,prolegomena1 however1 differs from that of the ,doctrine of ,method in one important respect4 ,it asserts that the perception involved in a mathematical judgement not only may1 but must1 be pure1 i4 e4 must be a perception in which no spatial object is present1 and it implies that the perception must take place before all experience of actual objects4#cf ,hence a priori1 applied to perception1 has here primarily1 if not exclusively1 the temporal meaning that the perception takes place antecedently to all experience4#cg #cf ,this becomes more explicit in #h and ff4 #cg ,this is also1 and more obviously1 implied in #h-aa4 ,the thought of the passage quoted from the ,prolegomena can be stated thus3 ',a mathematical judgement implies the perception of an individual figure antecedently to all experience4 ,this may be said to be the first condition of the possibility of mathematical judgements which is revealed by reflection4 ,there is1 however1 a prior or higher condition4 ,the perception of an individual figure involves as its basis another pure perception4 ,for we can only construct and therefore perceive an individual figure in empty space4 ,space is that in which it must be constructed and perceived4 ,a perception#ch of empty space is1 therefore1 necessary4 ,if1 then1 we can discover how this perception is possible1 we shall be able to explain the possibility of a priori synthetical judgements of mathematics4' #ch ,pure perception only means that the space perceived is empty4 ,kant continues as follows3 ,but with this step the difficulty seems to increase rather than to lessen4 ,for henceforward the question is ',how is it possible to perceive anything a priori8' ,a perception is such a representation as would immediately depend upon the presence of the object4 ,hence it seems impossible originally to perceive a priori1 because perception would in that case have to take place without an object to which it might refer1 present either formerly or at the moment1 and accordingly could not be perception4444 ,how can perception of the object precede the object itself8#ci ,kant here finds himself face to face with the difficulty created by the preceding section4 ,perception1 as such1 involves the actual presence of an object2 yet the pure perception of space involved by geometry--which1 as pure1 is the perception of empty space1 and which1 as the perception of empty space1 is a priori in the sense of temporally prior to the perception of actual objects--presupposes that an object is not actually present4 #ci ,prol4 #h4 ,the solution is given in the next section4 ,were our perception necessarily of such a kind as to represent things as they are in themselves1 no perception would take place a priori1 but would always be empirical4 ,for ,i can only know what is contained in the object in itself1 if it is present and given to me4 ,no doubt it is even then unintelligible how the perception of a present thing should make me know it as it is in itself1 since its qualities cannot migrate over into my faculty of representation2 but1 even granting this possibility1 such a perception would not occur a priori1 i4 e4 before the object was presented to me2 for without this presentation1 no basis of the relation between my representation and the object can be imagined2 the relation would then have to rest upon inspiration4 ,it is therefore possible only in one way for my perception to precede the actuality of the object and to take place as a priori knowledge1 viz4 if it contains nothing but the form of the sensibility1 which precedes in me1 the subject1 all actual impressions through which ,i am affected by objects4 ,for ,i can know a priori that objects of the senses can only be perceived in accordance with this form of the sensibility4 ,hence it follows that propositions which concern merely this form of sensuous perception will be possible and valid for objects of the senses1 and in the same way1 conversely1 that perceptions which are possible a priori can never concern any things other than objects of our senses4 ,this section clearly constitutes the turning-point in ,kant's argument1 and primarily expresses1 in an expanded form1 the central doctrine of #c of the ,aesthetic1 that an external perception anterior to objects themselves1 and in which our conceptions of objects can be determined a priori1 is possible1 if1 and only if1 it has its seat in the subject as its formal nature of being affected by objects1 and consequently as the form of the external sense in general4 ,it argues that1 since this is true1 and since geometrical judgements involve such a perception anterior to objects1 space must be only the#dj form of sensibility4 #dj ,the and not a1 because1 for the moment1 time is ignored4 ,now why does ,kant think that this conclusion follows8 ,before we can answer this question we must remove an initial difficulty4 ,in this passage ,kant unquestionably identifies a form of perception with an actual perception4 ,it is at once an actual perception and a capacity of perceiving4 ,this is evident from the words1 ,it is possible only in one way for my perception to precede the actuality of the object 444 viz4 if it contains nothing but the form of the sensibility4#da ,the identification becomes more explicit a little later4 ,a pure perception 7of space and time7 can underlie the empirical perception of objects1 because it is nothing but the mere form of the sensibility1 which precedes the actual appearance of the objects1 in that it in fact first makes them possible4 ,yet this faculty of perceiving a priori affects not the matter of the phenomenon1 i4 e4 that in it which is sensation1 for this constitutes that which is empirical1 but only its form1 viz4 space and time4#db ,his argument1 however1 can be successfully stated without this identification4 ,it is only necessary to re-write his cardinal assertion in the form 'the perception of space must be nothing but the manifestation of the form of the sensibility'4 ,given this modification1 the question becomes1 ',why does ,kant think that the perception of empty space1 involved by geometrical judgements1 can be only a manifestation of our perceiving nature1 and not in any way the apprehension of a real quality of objects8' ,the answer must be that it is because he thinks that1 while in empirical perception a real object is present1 in the perception of empty space a real object is not present4 ,he regards this as proving that the latter perception is only of something subjective or mental4 ,space and time1 by being pure a priori perceptions1 prove that they are mere forms of our sensibility which must precede all empirical perception1 i4 e4 sense-perception of actual objects4#dc ,his main conclusion now follows easily enough4 ,if in perceiving empty space we are only apprehending a manifestation of our perceiving nature1 what we apprehend in a geometrical judgement is really a law of our perceiving nature1 and therefore1 while it must apply to our perceptions of objects or to objects as perceived1 it cannot apply to objects apart from our perception1 or1 at least1 there is no ground for holding that it does so4 #da ,prol41 #i4 #db ,prol41 #aa4 #dc ,prol41 #aj4 ,if1 however1 this fairly represents ,kant's thought1 it must be allowed that the conclusion which he should have drawn is different1 and even that the conclusion which he does draw is in reality incompatible with his starting-point4 ,his starting-point is the view that the truth of geometrical judgements presupposes a perception of empty space1 in virtue of which we can discover rules of spatial relation which must apply to all spatial objects subsequently perceived4 ,his problem is to discover the presupposition of this presupposition4 ,the proper answer must be1 not that space is a form of sensibility or a way in which objects appear to us1 but that space is the form of all objects1 i4 e4 that all objects are spatial4#dd ,for in that case they must be subject to the laws of space1 and therefore if we can discover these laws by a study of empty space1 the only condition to be satisfied1 if the objects of subsequent perception are to conform to the laws which we discover1 is that all objects should be spatial4 ,nothing is implied which enables us to decide whether the objects are objects as they are in themselves or objects as perceived2 for in either case the required result follows4 ,if in empirical perception we apprehend things only as they appear to us1 and if space is the form of them as they appear to us1 it will no doubt be true that the laws of spatial relation which we discover must apply to things as they appear to us4 ,but on the other hand1 if in empirical perception we apprehend things as they are1 and if space is their form1 i4 e4 if things are spatial1 it will be equally true that the laws discovered by geometry must apply to things as they are4 #dd ,kant expresses the assertion that space is the form of all objects by saying that space is the form of phenomena4 ,this of course renders easy an unconscious transition from the thesis that space is the form of objects to the quite different thesis that space is the form of sensibility2 cf4 p4 #ci4 ,again1 ,kant's starting-point really commits him to the view that space is a characteristic of things as they are4 ,for--paradoxical though it may be--his problem is to explain the possibility of perceiving a priori1 i4 e4 of perceiving the characteristics of an object anterior to the actual presence of the object in perception4#de ,this implies that empirical perception1 which involves the actual presence of the object1 involves no difficulty2 in other words1 it is implied that empirical perception is of objects as they are4 ,and we find ,kant admitting this to the extent of allowing for the sake of argument that the perception of a present thing can make us know the thing as it is in itself4#df ,but if empirical perception gives us things as they are1 and if1 as is the case1 and as ,kant really presupposes1 the objects of empirical perception are spatial1 then1 since space is their form1 the judgements of geometry must relate to things as they are4 ,it is true that on this view ,kant's first presupposition of geometrical judgements has to be stated by saying that we are able to perceive a real characteristic of things in space1 before we perceive the things2 and1 no doubt1 ,kant thinks this impossible4 ,according to him1 when we perceive empty space no object is present1 and therefore what is before the mind must be merely mental4 ,but no greater difficulty is involved than that involved in the corresponding supposition required by ,kant's own view4 ,it is really just as difficult to hold that we can perceive a characteristic of things as they appear to us before they appear1 as to hold that we can perceive a characteristic of them as they are in themselves before we perceive them4 #de ,cf4 ,prol41 ,section #h4 #df ,prol41 #i 7cf4 p4 #ee74 ,the fact is that the real difficulty with which ,kant is grappling in the ,prolegomena arises1 not from the supposition that spatial bodies are things in themselves1 but from the supposed presupposition of geometry that we must be able to perceive empty space before we perceive bodies in it4 ,it is1 of course1 impossible to defend the perception of empty space1 but if it be maintained1 the space perceived must be conceded to be not1 as ,kant thinks1 something mental or subjective1 but a real characteristic of things4 ,for1 as has been pointed out1 the paradox of pure perception is reached solely through the consideration that1 while in empirical perception we perceive objects1 in pure perception we do not1 and since the objects of empirical perception are spatial1 space must be a real characteristic of them4 ,the general result of the preceding criticism is that ,kant's conclusion does not follow from the premises by which he supports it4 ,it should therefore be asked whether it is not possible to take advantage of this hiatus by presenting the argument for the merely phenomenal character of space without any appeal to the possibility of perceiving empty space4 ,for it is clear that what was primarily before ,kant1 in writing the ,critique1 was the a priori character of geometrical judgements themselves1 and not the existence of a perception of empty space which they were held to presuppose4#dg #dg ,the difficulty with which ,kant is struggling in the ,prolegomena1 #f-aa1 can be stated from a rather different point of view by saying that the thought that geometrical judgements imply a perception of empty space led him to apply the term 'a priori' to perception as well as to judgement4 ,the term1 a priori1 applied to judgements has a valid meaning2 it means1 not that the judgement is made prior to all experience1 but that it is not based upon experience1 being originated by the mind in virtue of its own powers of thinking4 ,applied to perception1 however1 'a priori' must mean prior to all experience1 and1 since the object of perception is essentially individual 7cf4 ,b4 #gda1 ,m4 #dce71 this use of the term gives rise to the impossible task of explaining how a perception can take place prior to the actual experience of an individual in perception 7cf4 ,prol41 #h74 ,if1 then1 the conclusion that space is only the form of sensibility can be connected with the a priori character of geometrical judgements without presupposing the existence of a perception of empty space1 his position will be rendered more plausible4 ,this can be done as follows4 ,the essential characteristic of a geometrical judgement is not that it takes place prior to experience1 but that it is not based upon experience4 ,thus a judgement1 arrived at by an activity of the mind in which it remains within itself and does not appeal to actual experience of the objects to which the judgement relates1 is implied to hold good of those objects4 ,if the objects were things as they are in themselves1 the validity of the judgement could not be justified1 for it would involve the gratuitous assumption that a necessity of thought is binding on things which ex hypothesi are independent of the nature of the mind4 ,if1 however1 the objects in question are things as perceived1 they will be through and through conditioned by the mind's perceiving nature2 and1 consequently1 if a geometrical rule1 e4 g4 that a three-sided figure must have three angles1 is really a law of the mind's perceiving nature1 all individual perceptions1 i4 e4 all objects as perceived by us1 will necessarily conform to the law4 ,therefore1 in the latter case1 and in that only1 will the universal validity of geometrical judgements be justified4 ,since1 then1 geometrical judgements are universally valid1 space1 which is that of which geometrical laws are the laws1 must be merely a form of perception or a characteristic of objects as perceived by us4 ,this appears to be the best form in which the substance of ,kant's argument1 stripped of unessentials1 can be stated4 ,it will be necessary to consider both the argument and its conclusion4 ,the argument1 so stated1 is undeniably plausible4 ,nevertheless1 examination of it reveals two fatal defects4 ,in the first place1 its starting-point is false4 ,to ,kant the paradox of geometrical judgements lies in the fact that they are not based upon an appeal to experience of the things to which they relate4 ,it is implied1 therefore1 that judgements which are based on experience involve no paradox1 and for the reason that in experience we apprehend things as they are4#dh ,in contrast with this1 it is implied that in geometrical judgements the connexion which we apprehend is not real1 i4 e4 does not relate to things as they are4 ,otherwise1 there would be no difficulty2 if in geometry we apprehended rules of connexion relating to things as they are1 we could allow without difficulty that the things must conform to them4 ,no such distinction1 however1 can be drawn between a priori and empirical judgements4 ,for the necessity of connexion1 e4 g4 between being a three-sided figure and being a three-angled figure1 is as much a characteristic of things as the empirically-observed shape of an individual body1 e4 g4 a table4 ,geometrical judgements1 therefore1 cannot be distinguished from empirical judgements on the ground that in the former the mind remains within itself1 and does not immediately apprehend fact or a real characteristic of reality4#di ,moreover1 since in a geometrical judgement we do in fact think that we are apprehending a real connexion1 i4 e4 a connexion which applies to things and to things as they are in themselves1 to question the reality of the connexion is to question the validity of thinking altogether1 and to do this is implicitly to question the validity of our thought about the nature of our own mind1 as well as the validity of our thought about things independent of the mind4 ,yet ,kant's argument1 in the form in which it has just been stated1 presupposes that our thought is valid at any rate when it is concerned with our perceptions of things1 even if it is not valid when concerned with the things as they are in themselves4 #dh ,cf4 p4 #ag4 #di ,for the reasons which led ,kant to draw this distinction between empirical and a priori judgements1 cf4 pp4 #ba-b4 ,this consideration leads to the second criticism4 ,the supposition that space is only a form of perception1 even if it be true1 in no way assists the explanation of the universal validity of geometrical judgements4 ,kant's argument really confuses a necessity of relation with the consciousness of a necessity of relation4 ,no doubt1 if it be a law of our perceiving nature that1 whenever we perceive an object as a three-sided figure1 the object as perceived contains three angles1 it follows that any object as perceived will conform to this law2 just as if it be a law of things as they are in themselves that three-sided figures contain three angles1 all three-sided figures will in themselves have three angles4 ,but what has to be explained is the universal applicability1 not of a law1 but of a judgement about a law4 ,for ,kant's real problem is to explain why our judgement that a three-sided figure must contain three angles must apply to all three-sided figures4 ,of course1 if it be granted that in the judgement we apprehend the true law1 the problem may be regarded as solved4 ,but how are we to know that what we judge is the true law8 ,the answer is in no way facilitated by the supposition that the judgement relates to our perceiving nature4 ,it can just as well be urged that what we think to be a necessity of our perceiving nature is not a necessity of it1 as that what we think to be a necessity of things as they are in themselves is not a necessity of them4 ,the best1 or rather the only possible1 answer is simply that that of which we apprehend the necessity must be true1 or1 in other words1 that we must accept the validity of thought4 ,hence nothing is gained by the supposition that space is a form of sensibility4 ,if what we judge to be necessary is1 as such1 valid1 a judgement relating to things in themselves will be as valid as a judgement relating to our perceiving nature4#ej #ej ,the same criticism can be urged against ,kant's appeal to the necessity of constructing geometrical figures4 ,the conclusion drawn from the necessity of construction is stated thus3 ,if the object 7the triangle7 were something in itself without relation to you the subject1 how could you say that that which lies necessarily in your subjective conditions of constructing a triangle must also necessarily belong to the triangle in itself8 7,b4 #fe1 ,m4 #ci74 ,kant's thought is that the laws of the mind's constructing nature must apply to objects1 if1 and only if1 the objects are the mind's own construction4 ,hence it is open to the above criticism if1 in the criticism1 'construct' be substituted for 'perceive'4 ,this difficulty is concealed from ,kant by his insistence on the perception of space involved in geometrical judgements4 ,this leads him at times to identify the judgement and the perception1 and1 therefore1 to speak of the judgement as a perception4 ,thus we find him saying that mathematical judgements are always perceptive1#ea and that ,it is only possible for my perception to precede the actuality of the object and take place as a priori knowledge1 if c4#eb ,hence1 if1 in addition1 a geometrical judgement1 as being a judgement about a necessity1 be identified with a necessity of judging1 the conformity of things to these universal judgements will become the conformity of things to rules or necessities of our judging1 i4 e4 of our perceiving nature1 and ,kant's conclusion will at once follow4#ec ,unfortunately for ,kant1 a geometrical judgement1 however closely related to a perception1 must itself1 as the apprehension of what is necessary and universal1 be an act of thought rather than of perception1 and therefore the original problem of the conformity of things to our mind can be forced upon him again1 even after he thinks that he has solved it1 in the new form of that of the conformity within the mind of perceiving to thinking4 #ea ,prol41 #g4 #eb ,prol41 #i4 #ec ,cf4 7,introduction1 ,b4 xvii1 ,m4 xxix73 ,but if the object 7as object of the senses7 conforms to the nature of our faculty of perception1 ,i can quite well represent to myself the possibility of a priori knowledge of it i4 e4 mathematical knowledge4 ,the fact is simply that the universal validity of geometrical judgements can in no way be 'explained'4 ,it is not in the least explained or made easier to accept by the supposition that objects are 'phenomena'4 ,these judgements must be accepted as being what we presuppose them to be in making them1 viz4 the direct apprehension of necessities of relation between real characteristics of real things4 ,to explain them by reference to the phenomenal character of what is known is really--though contrary to ,kant's intention--to throw doubt upon their validity2 otherwise1 they would not need explanation4 ,as a matter of fact1 it is impossible to question their validity4 ,in the act of judging1 doubt is impossible4 ,doubt can arise only when we subsequently reflect and temporarily lose our hold upon the consciousness of necessity in judging4#ed ,the doubt1 however1 since it is non-existent in our geometrical consciousness1 is really groundless1#ee and1 therefore1 the problem to which it gives rise is unreal4 ,moreover if1 per impossibile1 doubt could be raised1 it could not be set at rest4 ,no vindication of a judgement in which we are conscious of a necessity could do more than take the problem a stage further back1 by basing it upon some other consciousness of a necessity2 and since this latter judgement could be questioned for precisely the same reason1 we should only be embarking upon an infinite process4 #ed ,cf4 ,descartes1 ,princ4 ,phil4 i4 #ac1 and ,medit4 v sub fin4 #ee ,the view that kinds of space other than that with which we are acquainted are possible1 though usually held and discussed by mathematicians1 belongs to them qua metaphysicians1 and not qua mathematicians4 ,we may now consider ,kant's conclusion in abstraction from the arguments by which he reaches it4 ,it raises three main difficulties4 ,in the first place1 it is not the conclusion to be expected from ,kant's own standpoint4 ,the phenomenal character of space is inferred1 not from the fact that we make judgements at all1 but from the fact that we make judgements of a particular kind1 viz4 a priori judgements4 ,from this point of view empirical judgements present no difficulty4 ,it should1 therefore1 be expected that the qualities which we attribute to things in empirical judgements are not phenomenal1 but belong to things as they are4 ,kant himself implies this in drawing his conclusion concerning the nature of space4 ,space does not represent any quality of things in themselves or things in relation to one another2 that is1 it does not represent any determination of things which would attach to the objects themselves and would remain1 even though we abstracted from all subjective conditions of perception4 ,for neither absolute nor relative#ef determinations of objects can be perceived prior to the existence of the things to which they belong1 and therefore not a priori4#eg ,it is1 of course1 implied that in experience1 where we do not discover determinations of objects prior to the existence of the objects1 we do apprehend determinations of things as they are in themselves1 and not as they are in relation to us4 ,thus we should expect the conclusion to be1 not that all that we know is phenomenal--which is ,kant's real position--but that spatial 7and temporal7 relations alone are phenomenal1 i4 e4 that they alone are the result of a transmutation due to the nature of our perceiving faculties4#eh ,this conclusion would1 of course1 be absurd1 for what ,kant considers to be the empirically known qualities of objects disappear1 if the spatial character of objects is removed4 ,moreover1 ,kant is prevented by his theory of perception from seeing that this is the real solution of his problem1 absurd though it may be4 ,since perception is held to arise through the origination of sensations by things in themselves1 empirical knowledge is naturally thought of as knowledge about sensations1 and since sensations are palpably within the mind1 and are held to be due to things in themselves1 knowledge about sensations can be regarded as phenomenal4 #ef ,the first sentence shows that 'relative determinations' means1 not 'determinations of objects in relation to us'1 but 'determinations of objects in relation to one another4' ,cf4 ,b4 #cg1 ,m4 #bc2 and ,b4 #ff fin41 #fg init41 ,m4 #dj 7where these meanings are confused74 #eg ,b4 #db1 ,m4 #bf4 #eh ,this conclusion is also to be expected because1 inconsistently with his real view1 ,kant is here 7,b4 #da-b1 ,m4 #be-f7 under the influence of the presupposition of our ordinary consciousness that in perception we are confronted by things in themselves1 known to be spatial1 and not by appearances produced by unknown things in themselves4 ,cf4 7,b4 #da1 ,m4 #be7 and thereby of obtaining immediate representation of them i4 e4 objects2 and 7,b4 #db1 ,m4 #bf7 the receptivity of the subject to be affected by objects necessarily precedes all perceptions of these objects4 ,these sentences identify things in themselves and bodies in space1 and thereby imply that in empirical perception we perceive things in themselves and as they are4 ,on the other hand1 if we consider ,kant's conclusion from the point of view1 not of the problem which originates it1 but of the distinction in terms of which he states it1 viz4 that between things as they are in themselves and things as perceived by us1 we are led to expect the contrary result4 ,since perception is the being affected by things1 and since the nature of the affection depends upon the nature of our capacity of being affected1 in all perception the object will become distorted or transformed1 as it were1 by our capacity of being affected4 ,the conclusion1 therefore1 should be that in all judgements1 empirical as well as a priori1 we apprehend things only as perceived4 ,the reason why ,kant does not draw this conclusion is probably that given above1 viz4 that by the time ,kant reaches the solution of his problem empirical knowledge has come to relate to sensation only2 consequently1 it has ceased to occur to him that empirical judgements could possibly give us knowledge of things as they are4 ,nevertheless1 ,kant should not have retained in his formulation of the problem a distinction irreconcilable with his solution of it2 and if he had realized that he was doing so he might have been compelled to modify his whole view4 ,the second difficulty is more serious4 ,if the truth of geometrical judgements presupposes that space is only a property of objects as perceived by us1 it is a paradox that geometricians should be convinced1 as they are1 of the truth of their judgements4 ,they undoubtedly think that their judgements apply to things as they are in themselves1 and not merely as they appear to us4 ,they certainly do not think that the relations which they discover apply to objects only as perceived4 ,not only1 therefore1 do they not think that bodies in space are phenomena1 but they do not even leave it an open question whether bodies are phenomena or not4 ,hence1 if ,kant be right1 they are really in a state of illusion1 for on his view the true geometrical judgement should include in itself the phenomenal character of spatial relations2 it should be illustrated by expressing ,euclid ,i4 #e in the form that the equality of the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle belongs to objects as perceived4 ,kant himself lays this down4 ,the proposition 'all objects are beside one another in space' is valid under#ei the limitation that these things are taken as objects of our sensuous perception4 ,if ,i join the condition to the perception1 and say 'all things1 as external phenomena1 are beside one another in space'1 the rule is valid universally1 and without limitation4#fj ,kant1 then1 is in effect allowing that it is possible for geometricians to make judgements1 of the necessity of which they are convinced1 and yet to be wrong2 and that1 therefore1 the apprehension of the necessity of a judgement is no ground of its truth4 ,it follows that the truth of geometrical judgements can no longer be accepted as a starting-point of discussion1 and1 therefore1 as a ground for inferring the phenomenal character of space4 #ei ,a4 reads 'only under' #fj ,b4 #dc1 ,m4 #bg4 ,there seems1 indeed1 one way of avoiding this consequence1 viz4 to suppose that for ,kant it was an absolute starting-point1 which nothing would have caused him to abandon1 that only those judgements of which we apprehend the necessity are true4 ,it would1 of course1 follow that geometricians would be unable to apprehend the necessity of geometrical judgements1 and therefore to make such judgements1 until they had discovered that things as spatial were only phenomena4 ,it would not be enough that they should think that the phenomenal or non-phenomenal character of things as spatial must be left an open question for the theory of knowledge to decide4 ,in this way the necessity of admitting the illusory character of geometry would be avoided4 ,the remedy1 however1 is at least as bad as the disease4 ,for it would imply that geometry must be preceded by a theory of knowledge1 which is palpably contrary to fact4 ,nor could ,kant accept it2 for he avowedly bases his theory of knowledge1 i4 e4 his view that objects as spatial are phenomena1 upon the truth of geometry2 this procedure would be circular if the making of true geometrical judgements was allowed to require the prior adoption of his theory of knowledge4 ,the third difficulty is the most fundamental4 ,kant's conclusion 7and also1 of course1 his argument7 presupposes the validity of the distinction between phenomena and things in themselves4 ,if1 then1 this distinction should prove untenable in principle1 ,kant's conclusion with regard to space must fail on general grounds1 and it will even have been unnecessary to consider his arguments for it4 ,the importance of the issue1 however1 requires that it should be considered in a separate chapter4 ,,note to page #dg4 ,the argument is not affected by the contention that1 while the totality of spaces is infinite1 the totality of colours or1 at any rate1 the totality of instances of some other characteristic of objects is finite2 for this difference will involve no difference in respect of perception and conception4 ,in both cases the apprehension that there is a totality will be reached in the same way1 i4 e4 through the conception of the characteristic in general1 and the apprehension in the one case that the totality is infinite and in the other that it is finite will depend on the apprehension of the special nature of the characteristic in question4 ,,chapter ,,iv ,,phenomena ,,and ,,things ,,in ,,themselves ,the distinction between phenomena and things in themselves can be best approached by considering ,kant's formulation of the alternative views of the nature of space and time4 ,what are space and time8 ,are they real existences8 ,or are they merely determinations or relations of things1 such1 however1 as would also belong to them in themselves1 even if they were not perceived1 or are they attached to the form of perception only1 and consequently to the subjective nature of our mind1 without which these predicates can never be attributed to any thing8#a #a ,b4 #cg1 ,m4 #bc4 ,of these three alternatives1 the first can be ignored4 ,it is opposed to the second1 and is the view that space and time are things rather than relations between things4 ,this opposition falls within the first member of the wider opposition between things as they are in themselves and things as they are as perceived1 and ,kant1 and indeed any one1 would allow that if space and time belong to things as they are in themselves and not to things only as perceived1 they are relations between things rather than things4 ,the real issue1 therefore1 lies between the second and third alternatives4 ,are space and time relations between things which belong to them both in themselves and also as perceived by us1 or are they relations which belong to things only as perceived8 ,to this question we may at once reply that1 inasmuch as it involves an impossible antithesis1 it is wholly unreal4 ,the thought of a property or a relation which belongs to things as perceived involves a contradiction4 ,to take ,plato's example1 suppose that we are looking at a straight stick1 partially immersed in water4 ,if we have not previously seen the stick1 and are ignorant of the laws of refraction1 we say that the stick is bent4 ,if1 however1 we learn the effect of refraction1 and observe the stick from several positions1 we alter our assertion4 ,we say that the stick is not really bent1 but only looks or appears bent to us4 ,but1 if we reflect at all1 we do not express our meaning by saying that the stick is bent to us as perceiving1 though not in reality4#b ,the word 'is' essentially relates to what really is4 ,if1 therefore1 the phrase 'to us as perceiving' involves an opposition to the phrase 'in reality'1 as it must if it is to be a real qualification of 'is'1 it cannot rightly be added to the word 'is'4 ,to put the matter more explicitly1 the assertion that something is so and so implies that it is so and so in itself1 whether it be perceived or not1 and therefore the assertion that something is so and so to us as perceiving1 though not in itself1 is a contradiction in terms4 ,the phrase 'to us as perceiving'1 as a restriction upon the word 'is'1 merely takes back the precise meaning of the word 'is'4 ,that to which the phrase can be added is not the word 'is'1 but the word 'looks' or 'appears'4 ,we can rightly say that the stick looks or appears bent to us as perceiving4 ,but even then the addition only helps to make explicit the essential meaning of 'appears'1 for 'appears' really means 'appears to us'1 and 'as perceiving' only repeats the meaning of 'appears' from the side of the perceiving subject as opposed to that of the object perceived4 ,the essential point1 however1 is thereby brought out that the phrase 'to us as perceiving' essentially relates not to what a thing is1 but to what it looks or appears to us4 #b ,similarly1 we do not say--if we mean what we say--of a man who is colour blind that an object which others call blue is pink to him or to his perception1 but that it looks pink to him4 ,what1 then1 is the proper statement of ,kant's view that space is a determination of things only as they appear to us1 and not as they are in themselves8 ,it should be said that things are not in reality spatial1 but only look or appear spatial to us4 ,it should not be said that they are spatial for our perception1 though not in themselves4 ,thus the view properly stated implies that space is an illusion1 inasmuch as it is not a real property of things at all4 ,this implication1 however1 is precisely the conclusion which ,kant wishes to avoid4 ,he takes infinite trouble to explain that he does not hold space and time to be illusions4#c ,though transcendentally ideal 7i4 e4 though they do not belong to things in themselves71 they are empirically real4 ,in other words1 space and time are real relations of something1 though not of things in themselves4 #c ,b4 #dd1 #eb1 #ec-d1 #fb-c1 #fi-gj2 ,m4 #bg1 #ca-b1 #cg-h1 #da-b2 ,prol41 #ac1 ,remark iii4 ,how1 then1 does ,kant obtain something of which space and time can be regarded as really relations8 ,he reaches it by a transition which at first sight seems harmless4 ,in stating the fact of perception he substitutes for the assertion that things appear so and so to us the assertion that things produce appearances in us4 ,in this way1 instead of an assertion which relates to the thing and states what it is not but only appears1 he obtains an assertion which introduces a second reality distinct from the thing1 viz4 an appearance or phenomenon1 and thereby he gains something other than the thing to which space can be attached as a real predicate4 ,he thus gains something in respect of which1 with regard to spatial relations we can be said to have knowledge and not illusion4 ,for the position now is that space1 though not a property of things in themselves1 is a property of phenomena or appearances2 in other words1 that while things in themselves are not spatial1 phenomena and appearances are spatial4 ,as evidence of this transition1 it is enough to point out that1 while he states the problem in the form ',are things in themselves spatial or are they only spatial as appearing to us8'#d he usually states the conclusion in the form ',space is the form of phenomena'1 i4 e4 phenomena are spatial4 ,a transition is thereby implied from 'things as appearing' to 'appearances'4 ,at the same time1 it is clear that ,kant is not aware of the transition1 but considers the expressions equivalent1 or1 in other words1 fails to distinguish them4 ,for both modes of stating the conclusion are to be found even in the same sentence4 ,this predicate space is applied to things only in so far as they appear to us1 i4 e4 are objects of sensibility i4 e4 phenomena4#e ,again1 the common phrase 'things as phenomena' implies the same confusion4 ,moreover1 if ,kant had realized that the transition was more than one of phraseology he must have seen that it was necessary to recast his argument4 #d ,this is ,kant's way of putting the question which should be expressed by asking1 ',are things spatial1 or do they only look spatial8' #e ,b4 #dc1 ,m4 #bf4 ,cf4 ,prol41 #i fin4 with #aj init4 ,it may be said1 then1 that ,kant is compelled to end with a different distinction from that with which he begins4 ,he begins with the distinction between things as they are in themselves and things as they appear to us1 the distinction relating to one and the same reality regarded from two different points of view4 ,he ends with the distinction between two different realities1 things-in-themselves1#f external to1 in the sense of independent of1 the mind1 and phenomena or appearances within it4 ,yet if his argument is to be valid1 the two distinctions should be identical1 for it is the first distinction to which the argument appeals4#g ,in fact1 we find him expressing what is to him the same distinction now in the one way and now in the other as the context requires4 #f ,it should be noticed that 'things-in-themselves' and 'things as they are in themselves' have a different meaning4 #g ,cf4 p4 #ee and ff4 ,the final form of ,kant's conclusion1 then1 is that while things in themselves are not1 or1 at least1 cannot be known to be spatial1 'phenomena1' or the appearances produced in us by things in themselves1 are spatial4 ,unfortunately1 the conclusion in this form is no more successful than it is in the former form1 that things are spatial only as perceived4 ,expressed by the formula 'phenomena are spatial'1 it has1 no doubt1 a certain plausibility2 for the word 'phenomena' to some extent conceals the essentially mental character of what is asserted to be spatial4 ,but the plausibility disappears on the substitution of 'appearances'--the true equivalent of ,kant's ,erscheinungen--for 'phenomena'4 ,just as it is absurd to describe the fact that the stick only looks bent by saying that1 while the stick is not bent1 the appearance which it produces is bent1 so it is1 even on the face of it1 nonsense to say that while things are not spatial1 the appearances which they produce in us are spatial4 ,for an 'appearance'1 being necessarily something mental1 cannot possibly be said to be extended4 ,moreover1 it is really an abuse of the term 'appearance' to speak of appearances produced by things1 for this phrase implies a false severance of the appearance from the things which appear4 ,if there are 'appearances' at all1 they are appearances of things and not appearances produced by them4 ,the importance of the distinction lies in the difference of implication4 ,to speak of appearances produced by things is to imply that the object of perception is merely something mental1 viz4 an appearance4 ,consequently1 access to a non-mental reality is excluded2 for a perception of which the object is something belonging to the mind's own being cannot justify an inference to something beyond the mind1 and the result is inevitably solipsism4 ,on the other hand1 the phrase 'appearances of things'1 whatever defects it may have1 at least implies that it is a non-mental reality which appears1 and therefore that in perception we are in direct relation to it2 the phrase1 therefore1 does not imply from the very beginning that the apprehension of a non-mental reality is impossible4 ,the objection will probably be raised that this criticism is much too summary4 ,we do1 it will be said1 distinguish in ordinary consciousness between appearance and reality4 ,consequently there must be some form in which ,kant's distinction between things in themselves and phenomena and the conclusion based upon it are justified4 ,moreover1 ,kant's reiterated assertion that his view does not imply that space is an illusion1 and that the distinction between the real and the illusory is possible within phenomena1 requires us to consider more closely whether ,kant may not after all be entitled to hold that space is not an illusion4#h #h ,cf4 p4 #ic and ff4 ,this objection is1 of course1 reasonable4 ,no one can satisfy himself of the justice of the above criticisms until he has considered the real nature of the distinction between appearance and reality4 ,this distinction must1 therefore1 be analysed4 ,but before this is done it is necessary1 in order to discover the real issue1 to formulate the lines on which ,kant may be defended4 ',the reality1' it may be urged1 'which ideally we wish to know must be admitted to exist in itself1 in the sense of independently of the perception1 and consequently its nature must be admitted to be independent of perception4 ,ideally1 then1 our desire is to know things#i as they are in themselves1 a desire sufficiently expressed by the assertion that we desire to know things1 for to know them is to know them as they are1 i4 e4 as they are independently of perception4 ,again1 since the reality which we desire to know consists of individuals1 and since the apprehension of an individual implies perception1 knowledge of reality requires perception4 ,if in perception we apprehended reality as it is1 no difficulty would arise4 ,but we do not1 for we are compelled to distinguish what things are1 and what they look or appear2 and what they appear essentially relates to perception4 ,we perceive them as they look or appear and1 therefore1 not as they are1 for what they look and what they are are ex hypothesi distinguished4 ,and this fact constitutes a fatal obstacle to knowledge in general4 ,we cannot know anything as it is4 ,at least the negative side of ,kant's position must be justified4 ,we never can know things as they are in themselves4 ,what then do we know8 ,two alternative answers may be given4 ,it may be held that the positive side of ,kant's position1 though indefensible in the form that we know things as they appear to us1 is valid in the form that we know what things look or appear4 ,this1 no doubt1 implies that our ordinary beliefs about reality are illusory1 for what things look is ex hypothesi different from what they are4 ,but the implication does not constitute an important departure from ,kant's view4 ,for in any case only that is knowledge proper which relates to things as they are1 and therefore the supposed knowledge of things as they appear may be discarded without serious loss4 ,on the other hand1 it may be held that the positive side of ,kant's position can be vindicated in the form that1 while we do not know things in themselves1#aj we do know the appearances which they produce in us4 ,it is true that this view involves the difficulty of maintaining that appearances are spatial1 but the difficulty is not insuperable4 ,moreover1 in this form the doctrine has the advantage that1 unlike the former1 it does not imply that the knowledge which we have is only of illusions1 for instead of implying that our knowledge is merely knowledge of what things look but really are not1 it implies that we know the real nature of realities of another kind1 viz4 of appearances4 ,again1 in this form of the view1 it may be possible to vindicate ,kant's doctrine that the distinction between the real and the illusory is tenable within what we know1 for it may be possible to distinguish within appearances between a 'real' appearance#aa and an 'illusory' appearance4#ab' #i ',things' is substituted for 'the reality which we believe to exist independently of perception' in order to conform to ,kant's language4 ,the substitution1 of course1 has the implication--which ,kant took for granted--that the reality consists of a plurality of individuals4 #aj ',things in themselves' has here to be substituted for 'things as they are in themselves' in the statement of the negative side of the position1 in order to express the proper antithesis1 which is now that between two things1 the one known and the other unknown1 and not that between two points of view from which one and the same thing is known and not known respectively4 #aa ,erscheinung4 #ab ,schein4 ,an implication of this defence should be noticed4 ,the issue relates to the nature of space#ac1 and may be stated in terms of it4 ,for1 since space is a presupposition of all other properties which the non-philosophical consciousness attributes to physical things1 it makes no difference whether we say that things only appear heavy1 hard1 in motion1 c41 or whether we say that things only appear spatial4 ,in the same way it is a matter of indifference whether we say that1 though things are not heavy1 hard1 c41 their appearances are so1 or whether we say that1 though things are not spatial1 their appearances are so4 ,the issue1 then1 concerns the possibility of maintaining either that things only appear spatial1 or that the appearances which they produce are spatial1 while the things themselves are not1 or1 at least cannot be known to be1 spatial4 #ac ,we might add time also2 but1 for a reason which will appear later 7p4 #aci71 it can be neglected4 ,the tenability of these alternative positions has to be considered apart from the argument of the ,aesthetic1 for this1 as we have seen1 breaks down4 ,at the outset it is important to realize that these positions are the product of philosophical reflection1 and constitute general theories of knowledge4 ,as has been pointed out1 the distinction between appearance and reality first arises in our ordinary or scientific consciousness4#ad ,in this consciousness we are compelled to distinguish between appearance and reality with respect to the details of a reality which1 as a whole1 or1 in principle1 we suppose ourselves to know4 ,afterwards in our philosophical consciousness we come to reflect upon this distinction and to raise the question whether it is not applicable to reality as a whole4 ,we ask with respect to knowledge in general1 and not merely with respect to certain particular items of knowledge1 whether we know or can know reality1 and not merely appearance4 ,the two positions just stated are alternative ways of answering the question in the negative4 ,they are1 then1 philosophical views based upon a distinction found in our ordinary consciousness4 ,consequently1 in order to decide whether the distinction will bear the superstructure placed upon it by the philosophical consciousness1 it is necessary to examine the distinction as it exists in our ordinary consciousness4 #ad ,i4 e4 the consciousness for which the problems are those of science as opposed to philosophy4 ,the distinction is applied in our ordinary consciousness both to the primary and to the secondary qualities of matter1 i4 e4 to the size1 shape1 position and motion of physical bodies1 and to their colour1 warmth1 c4 ,we say1 for instance1 that the moon looks#ae or appears as large as the sun1 though really it is much smaller4 ,we say that railway lines1 though parallel1 look convergent1 just as we say that the straight stick in water looks bent4 ,we say that at sunset the sun1 though really below the horizon1 looks above it4 ,again1 we say that to a person who is colour blind the colour of an object looks different to what it really is1 and that the water into which we put our hand may be warmer than it appears to our touch4 #ae ',looks' means 'appears to sight'1 and 'looks' is throughout used as synonymous with 'appear'1 where the instance under discussion relates to visual perception4 ,the case of the primary qualities may be considered first4 ,since the instances are identical in principle1 and only differ in complexity1 it will be sufficient to analyse the simplest1 that of the apparent convergence of the railway lines4 ,two points at once force themselves upon our notice4 ,in the first place1 we certainly suppose that we perceive the reality which we wish to know1 i4 e4 the reality which1 as we suppose1 exists independently of our perception1 and not an 'appearance' of it4 ,it is1 as we say1 the real lines which we see4 ,even the term 'convergent'1 in the assertion that the lines look convergent1 conveys this implication4 ,for 'convergent' is essentially a characteristic not of an appearance but of a reality1 in the sense in which something independent of perception may be opposed as a reality to an 'appearance'1 which1 as such1 presupposes perception4 ,we can say neither that an appearance is convergent1 nor that the appearance of the lines is convergent4 ,only a reality similar to the lines1 e4 g4 two roads1 can be said to be convergent4 ,our ordinary thought1 therefore1 furnishes no ground for the view that the object of perception is not the thing1 but merely an appearance of or produced by it4 ,in the second place1 the assertion that the lines look convergent implies considerable knowledge of the real nature of the reality to which the assertion relates4 ,both the terms 'lines' and 'convergent' imply that the reality is spatial4 ,further1 if the context is such that we mean that1 while the lines look convergent1 we do not know their real relation1 we imply that the lines really possess some characteristic which falls within the genus to which convergence belongs1 i4 e4 we imply that they are convergent1 divergent1 or parallel4 ,if1 on the other hand1 the context is such that we mean that the lines only look convergent1 we imply that the lines are parallel1 and therefore presuppose complete knowledge in respect of the very characteristic in regard to which we state what is only appearance4 ,the assertion1 then1 in respect of a primary quality1 that a thing looks so and so implies knowledge of its general character as spatial1 and ignorance only of a detail2 and the assertion that a thing only looks or appears so and so implies knowledge of the detail in question4 ,attention may now be drawn to a general difficulty which may be raised with respect to the use of the terms 'looks' and 'appears'4 ,it may be stated thus3 ',if the lines are not convergent1 how is it possible even to say that they look convergent8 ,must it not be implied that at least under certain circumstances we should perceive the lines as they are8 ,otherwise1 why should we use the words 'look' or 'appear' at all8 ,moreover1 this implication can be pushed further2 for if we maintain that we perceive the real lines1 we may reasonably be asked whether we must not under all circumstances perceive them as they are4 ,it seems as though a reality cannot be perceived except as it is4' ,it is the view to which this difficulty gives rise which is mainly responsible for the doctrine that the object of perception is not the reality1 but an appearance4 ,since we do distinguish between what things look and what they are1 it would seem that the object of perception cannot be the thing1 but only an appearance produced by it4 ,moreover1 the doctrine gains in plausibility from the existence of certain illusions in the case of which the reality to which the illusion relates seems non-existent4 ,for instance1 if we look steadily at the flame of a candle1 and then press one eyeball with a finger1 we see1 as we say1 two candles2#af but since ex hypothesi there is only one candle1 it seems that what we see must be1 not the candle1 but two images or appearances produced by it4 #af ,cf4 ,dr4 ,stout1 on ',things and ,sensations' 7,proceedings of the ,british ,academy1 vol4 ii74 ,this difficulty is raised in order to draw attention to the fact that1 in the case of the railway lines1 where it can be met on its own ground#ag1 this is because1 and only because1 we believe space to be 'real'1 i4 e4 to be a characteristic of reality1 and because we understand its nature4 ,the distinction between the actual and the apparent angle made by two straight lines presupposes a limiting case in which they coincide4 ,if the line of sight along which we observe the point of intersection of two lines is known to be at right angles to both lines1 we expect1 and rightly expect1 to see the angle of intersection as it is4 ,again1 if we look at a short portion of two railway lines from a point known to be directly above them1 and so distant that the effects of perspective are imperceptible1 we can say that the lines look what they are1 viz4 parallel4 ,thus1 from the point of view of the difficulty which has been raised1 there is this justification in general for saying that two lines look parallel or look at right angles1 that we know that in certain cases what they look is identical with what they are4 ,in the same way1 assertions of the type that the moon looks as large as the sun receive justification from our knowledge that two bodies of equal size and equally distant from the observer are what they look1 viz4 of the same size4 ,and in both cases the justification presupposes knowledge of the reality of space and also such insight into its nature as enables us to see that in certain cases there must be an identity between what things look and what they are in respect of certain spatial relations4 ,again1 in such cases we see that so far is it from being necessary to think that a thing must be perceived as it is1 that it is not only possible but necessary to distinguish what a thing looks from what it is1 and precisely in consequence of the nature of space4 ,the visual perception of spatial relations from its very nature presupposes a particular point of view4 ,though the perception itself cannot be spatial1 it presupposes a particular point in space as a standpoint or point of view1#ah and is therefore subject to conditions of perspective4 ,this is best realized by considering the supposition that perfect visual powers would enable us to see the whole of a body at once1 and that this perception would be possible if we had eyes situated all round the body4 ,the supposition obviously breaks down through the impossibility of combining two or more points of view in one perception4 ,but if visual perception is necessarily subject to conditions of perspective1 the spatial relations of bodies can never look what they are except in the limiting case referred to4 ,moreover1 this distinction is perfectly intelligible1 as we should expect from the necessity which we are under of drawing it4 ,we understand perfectly why it is that bodies must1 in respect of their spatial relations1 look different to what they are1 and we do so solely because we understand the nature of space1 and therefore also the conditions of perspective involved in the perception of what is spatial4 ,it is1 therefore1 needless to make the assertion ',two lines appear convergent' intelligible by converting the verb 'appears' into a substantive1 viz4 an 'appearance'1 and then making the assertion relate to an 'appearance'4 ,for--apart from the fact that this would not achieve the desired end1 since no suitable predicate could be found for the appearance--the assertion that the lines look or appear convergent is perfectly intelligible in itself1 though not capable of being stated in terms of anything else4#ai ,if we generalize this result1 we may say that the distinction between appearance and reality1 drawn with regard to the primary qualities of bodies1 throughout presupposes the reality of space1 and is made possible1 and indeed necessary1 by the nature of space itself4 #ag ,cf41 however1 p4 #hg and pp4 #hi-ia4 #ah ,this is1 of course1 not refuted by the reminder that we see with two eyes1 and that these are in different places4 #ai ,it is important to notice that the proper formula to express what is loosely called 'an appearance' is ',a looks or appears ,b'1 and that this cannot be analysed into anything more simple and1 in particular1 into a statement about 'appearances'4 ,even in the case of looking at the candle1 there is no need to speak of two 'appearances' or 'images'4 ,before we discover the truth1 the proper assertion is ',the body which we perceive looks as if it were two candles'1 and1 after we discover the truth1 the proper assertion is ',the candle looks as if it were in two places'4 ,we may now turn to the way in which we draw the distinction with respect to the secondary qualities of physical things4 ,it must1 it seems1 be admitted that in our ordinary consciousness we treat these qualities as real qualities of bodies4 ,we say that a bell is noisy2 that sugar is sweet2 that roses smell2 that a mustard plaster is hot2 that the sky is blue4 ,it must also be admitted that in our ordinary consciousness we draw a distinction between appearance and reality within these qualities1 just as we do within the primary qualities4 ,just as we speak of the right or real shape of a body1 so we speak of its right or real colour1 taste1 c41 and distinguish these from its apparent colours1 taste1 c41 to some individual4 ,we thereby imply that these qualities are real qualities of bodies1 and that the only difficulty is to determine the particular character of the quality in a given case4 ,yet1 as the history of philosophy shows1 it takes but little reflection to throw doubt on the reality of these qualities4 ,the doubt arises not merely from the apparent impossibility of finding a principle by which to determine the right or real quality in a given case1 but also and mainly from misgivings as to the possible reality of heat1 smell1 taste1 noise1 and colour apart from a percipient4 ,it must also be admitted that this misgiving is well founded2 in other words1 that these supposed real qualities do presuppose a percipient1 and therefore cannot be qualities of things1 since the qualities of a thing must exist independently of the perception of the thing4#bj ,this will readily be allowed in the case of all the secondary qualities except colour4 ,no one1 it may reasonably be said1 who is familiar with and really faces the issue1 will maintain that sounds1 smells1 tastes1 and sensations of touch exist apart from a sensitive subject4 ,so much is this the case1 that when once the issue is raised1 it is difficult and1 in the end1 impossible to use the word 'appear' in connexion with these qualities4 ,thus it is difficult and1 in the end1 impossible to say that a bell appears noisy1 or that sugar appears sweet4 ,we say1 rather1 that the bell and the sugar produce certain sensations#ba in us4 #bj ,cf4 pp4 #gb-c1 and #ia4 #ba ,not 'appearances'4 ,the case of colour1 however1 is more difficult4 ,from the closeness of its relation to the shape of bodies1 it seems to be a real quality of bodies1 and not something relative to a sensitive subject like the other secondary qualities4 ,in fact1 so intimate seems the relation of colour to the shape of bodies1 that it would seem--as has1 of course1 often been argued--that if colour be relative to a sensitive subject1 the primary qualities of bodies must also be relative to a sensitive subject1 on the ground that shape is inseparable from colour4#bb ,yet whether this be so or not1 it must1 in the end1 be allowed that colour does presuppose a sensitive subject in virtue of its own nature1 and quite apart from the difficulty--which is in itself insuperable--of determining the right colour of individual bodies4 ,it must1 therefore1 be conceded that colour is not a quality of bodies4 ,but if this be true1 the use of the term 'look' or 'appear' in connexion with colour involves a difficulty which does not arise when it is used in connexion with the primary qualities4 ,bodies undoubtedly look or appear coloured4 ,now1 as has already been suggested1#bc the term 'look' seems to presuppose some identity between what a thing is and what it looks1 and at least the possibility of cases in which they are what they look--a possibility which1 as we have seen1 is realized in the case of the primary qualities4 ,yet1 if colour is not a quality of bodies1 then1 with respect to colour1 things look what they never are1 or1 in other words1 are wholly different from what they look2#bd and since it seems impossible to hold that colour is really a property of bodies1 this conclusion must1 in spite of its difficulty1 be admitted to be true4 #bb ,cf4 p4 #ia note4 #bc ,cf4 p4 #hb4 #bd ,it is assumed that there is not even plausibility in the supposition of continuity or identity between colour proper and its physical conditions in the way of light vibrations4 ,there remain1 however1 to be noticed two respects in which assertions concerning what things look in respect of colour agree with corresponding assertions in respect of the primary qualities4 ,they imply that what we perceive is a reality1 in the sense already explained4#be ,thus the assertion that the grass looks green implies that it is a reality which looks green1 or1 in other words1 that the object of perception is a reality1 and not an 'appearance'4 ,again1 such assertions imply that the reality about which the assertion is made is spatial4 ,the term 'grass' implies extension1 and only what is extended can be said to look coloured4 ,if it be urged that what looks coloured need only look extended1 it may be replied that the two considerations which lead us to think that things only look coloured presuppose that they are spatial4 ,for the two questions1 the consideration of which leads to this conclusion1 are1 ',what is the right or real colour of an individual thing8' and ',has it really any colour at all1 or does it only look coloured8' and neither question is significant unless the thing to which it refers is understood to be spatial4 #be ,i4 e4 in the sense of something which exists independently of perception4 ,we may now return to the main issue4 ,is it possible to maintain either 7#a7 the position that only appearances are spatial and possess all the qualities which imply space1 or 7#b7 the position that things only appear spatial and only appear or look as if they possessed the qualities which imply space8 ,it may be urged that these questions have already been implicitly answered in the negative4 ,for the division of the qualities of things into primary and secondary is exhaustive1 and1 as has been shown1 the distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality'1 when drawn with respect to the primary qualities and to colour--the only secondary quality with respect to which the term 'appears' can properly be used#bf--presupposes the reality of space4 ,consequently1 since we do draw the distinction1 we must accept the reality of that which is the condition of drawing it at all4 ,but even though this be conceded--and the concession is inevitable--the problem cannot be regarded as solved until we have discovered what it is in the nature of space which makes both positions untenable4 ,moreover1 the admission that in the case of colour there is no identity between what things look and what they are removes at a stroke much of the difficulty of one position1 viz4 that we only know what things look or appear1 and not what they are4 ,for the admission makes it impossible to maintain as a general principle that there must be some identity between what they look and what they are4 ,consequently1 it seems possible that things should be wholly different from what they appear1 and1 if so1 the issue cannot be decided on general grounds4 ,what is in substance the same point may be expressed differently by saying that just as things only look coloured1 so things may only look spatial4 ,we are thus again#bg led to see that the issue really turns on the nature of space and of spatial characteristics in particular4 #bf ,cf4 pp4 #hf-g4 #bg ,cf4 p4 #gi4 ,in discussing the distinction between the real and the apparent shape of bodies1 it was argued that while the nature of space makes it necessary to distinguish in general between what a body looks and what it is1 yet the use of the term look receives justification from the existence of limiting cases in which what a thing looks and what it is are identical4 ,the instances considered1 however1 related to qualities involving only two dimensions1 e4 g4 convergence and bentness1 and it will be found that the existence of these limiting cases is due solely to this restriction4 ,if the assertion under consideration involves a term implying three dimensions1 e4 g4 'cubical' or 'cylindrical'1 there are no such limiting cases4 ,since our visual perception is necessarily subject to conditions of perspective1 it follows that although we can and do see a cube1 we can never see it as it is4 ,it is1 so to say1 in the way in which a child draws the side of a house1 i4 e4 with the effect of perspective eliminated2 but it never can be seen in this way4 ,no doubt1 our unreflective knowledge of the nature of perspective enables us to allow for the effect of perspective1 and to ascertain the real shape of a solid object from what it looks when seen from different points4 ,in fact1 the habit of allowing for the effect of perspective is so thoroughly ingrained in human beings that the child is not aware that he is making this allowance1 but thinks that he draws the side of the house as he sees it4 ,nevertheless1 it is true that we never see a cube as it is1 and if we say that a thing looks cubical1 we ought only to mean that it looks precisely what a thing looks which is a cube4 ,it is obvious1 however1 that two dimensions are only an abstraction from three1 and that the spatial relations of bodies1 considered fully1 involve three dimensions2 in other words1 spatial characteristics are1 properly speaking1 three-dimensional4 ,it follows that terms which fully state spatial characteristics can never express what things look1 but only what they are4 ,a body may be cylindrical1 and we may see a cylindrical body2 but such a body can never1 strictly speaking1 look cylindrical4 ,the opposition1 however1 between what a thing is and what it looks implies that what it is is independent of a percipient1 for it is precisely correlation to a percipient which is implied by 'looking' or 'appearing'4 ,in fact1 it is the view that what a thing really is it is1 independently of a percipient1 that forms the real starting-point of ,kant's thought4 ,it follows1 then1 that the spatial characteristics of things1 and therefore space itself1 must belong to what they are in themselves apart from a percipient1 and not to what they look4#bh ,consequently1 it is so far from being true that we only know what things look and not what they are1 that in the case of spatial relations we actually know what things are1 even though they never look what they are4 #bh ,this consideration disposes of the view that1 if colour is relative to perception1 the primary qualities1 as being inseparable from colour1 must also be relative to perception2 for it implies that the primary qualities cannot from their very nature be relative to perception4 ,moreover1 if the possibility of the separation of the primary qualities from colour is still doubted1 it is only necessary to appeal to the blind man's ability to apprehend the primary qualities1 though he may not even know what the word 'colour' means4 ,of course1 it must be admitted that some sensuous elements are involved in the apprehension of the primary qualities1 but the case of the blind man shows that these may relate to sight instead of to touch4 ,moreover1 it1 of course1 does not follow from the fact that sensuous elements are inseparable from our perception of bodies that they belong to1 and are therefore inseparable from1 the bodies perceived4 ,this conclusion1 however1 seems to present a double difficulty4 ,it is admitted that we perceive things as they look1 and not as they are4 ,how1 then1 is it possible for the belief that things are spatial to arise8 ,for how can we advance from knowledge of what they look to knowledge of what they are but do not look8 ,again1 given that the belief has arisen1 may it not after all be illusion8 ,no vindication seems possible4 ,for how can it be possible to base the knowledge of what things are1 independently of perception1 upon the knowledge of what they look8 ,nevertheless1 the answer is simple4 ,in the case of the perception of what is spatial there is no transition in principle from knowledge of what things look to knowledge of what things are1 though there is continually such a transition in respect of details4 ,it is1 of course1 often necessary1 and often difficult1 to determine the precise position1 shape1 c41 of a thing1 and if we are to come to a decision1 we must appeal to what the thing looks or appears under various conditions4 ,but1 from the very beginning1 our consciousness of what a thing appears in respect of spatial characteristics implies the consciousness of it as spatial and therefore also as1 in particular1 three-dimensional4 ,if we suppose the latter consciousness absent1 any assertion as to what a thing appears in respect of spatial characteristics loses significance4 ,thus1 although there is a process by which we come to learn that railway lines are really parallel1 there is no process by which we come to learn that they are really spatial4 ,similarly1 although there is a process by which we become aware that a body is a cube1 there is no process by which we become aware that it has a solid shape of some kind2 the process is only concerned with the determination of the precise shape of the body4 ,the second difficulty is1 therefore1 also removed4 ,for if assertions concerning the apparent shape1 c4 of things presuppose the consciousness that the things are spatial1 to say that this consciousness may be illusory is to say that all statements concerning what things appear1 in respect of spatial relations1 are equally illusory4 ,but1 since it is wholly impossible to deny that we can and do state what things appear in this respect1 the difficulty must fall to the ground4 ,there remains to be answered the question whether ,kant's position is tenable in its other form1 viz4 that while we cannot say that reality is spatial1 we can and must say that the appearances which it produces are spatial4 ,this question1 in view of the foregoing1 can be answered as soon as it is stated4 ,we must allow that reality is spatial1 since1 as has been pointed out1 assertions concerning the apparent shape of things presuppose that they are spatial4 ,we must equally allow that an appearance cannot be spatial4 ,for on the one hand1 as has just been shown1 space and spatial relations can only qualify something the existence of which is not relative to perception1 since it is impossible to perceive what is spatial as it is2 and on the other hand an appearance1 as being ex hypothesi an appearance to some one1 i4 e4 to a percipient1 must be relative to perception4 ,we may say1 then1 generally1 that analysis of the distinction between appearance and reality1 as it is actually drawn in our ordinary consciousness1 shows the falsity of both forms of the philosophical agnosticism which appeals to the distinction4 ,we know things2 not appearances4 ,we know what things are2 and not merely what they appear but are not4 ,we may also say that ,kant cannot possibly be successful in meeting1 at least in respect of space1 what he calls 'the easily foreseen but worthless objection that the ideality of space and of time would turn the whole sensible world into pure illusion'4#bi ,for space1 according to him1 is not a property of things in themselves2 it cannot1 as has been shown1 be a property of appearances2 to say that it is a property of things as they appear to us is self-contradictory2 and there is nothing else of which it can be said to be a property4 #bi ,prol41 #ac1 ,remark iii4 7,cf4 p4 #ajj note47 ,cf4 the confused note ,b4 #gj1 ,m4 #db4 7,see ,dr4 ,vaihinger's ,commentary on the ,critique1 ii1 #dhh ff47 ,in conclusion1 it may be pointed out that the impossibility that space#cj and spatial characteristics should qualify appearances renders untenable ,kant's attempt to draw a distinction between reality and appearance within 'phenomena' or 'appearances'4 ,the passage in which he tries to do so runs as follows3 #cj ,the case of time can be ignored1 since1 as will be seen later 7pp4 #aab-ad71 the contention that space is 'ideal' really involves the admission that time is real4 ,we generally indeed distinguish in appearances that which essentially belongs to the perception of them1 and is valid for every human sense in general1 from that which belongs to the same perception accidentally1 as valid not for the sensibility in general1 but for a particular state or organization of this or that sense4 ,accordingly1 we are accustomed to say that the former is knowledge which represents the object itself1 whilst the latter represents only the appearance of the same4 ,this distinction1 however1 is only empirical4 ,if we stop here 7as is usual7 and do not again regard that empirical perception as itself a mere phenomenon 7as we ought to do71 in which nothing which concerns a thing in itself is to be found1 our transcendental distinction is lost2 and in that case we are after all believing that we know things in themselves1 although in the world of sense1 investigate its objects as profoundly as we may1 we have to do with nothing but appearances4 ,thus we call the rainbow a mere appearance during a sunny shower1 but the rain the thing in itself2 and this is right1 if we understand the latter conception only physically as that which in universal experience and under all different positions with regard to the senses is in perception so and so determined and not otherwise4 ,but if we consider this empirical element#ca in general1 and inquire1 without considering its agreement with every human sense1 whether it represents an object in itself 7not the raindrops1 for their being phenomena by itself makes them empirical objects71 the question of the relation of the representation to the object is transcendental2 and not only are the raindrops mere appearances1 but even their circular form1 nay1 even the space in which they fall1 are nothing in themselves but mere modifications or fundamental dispositions of our sensuous perception2 the transcendental object1 however1 remains unknown to us4#cb #ca ,dieses ,empirische4 #cb ,b4 #fb-c1 ,m4 #cg-h4 ,erscheinung is here translated 'appearance'4 ,kant's meaning is plain4 ,he is anxious to justify the physical distinction made in our ordinary or non-philosophical consciousness between a thing in itself and a mere appearance1#cc but at the same time to show that it falls within appearances1 in respect of the philosophical distinction between things in themselves and appearances or phenomena4 ,the physical distinction is the first of which we become aware1 and it arises through problems connected with our senses4 ,owing1 presumably1 to the contradictions which would otherwise ensue1 the mind is forced to distinguish between things and the 'appearances' which they produce1 and to recognize that they do not correspond4 ,the discrepancy is due to the fact that our perceptions are conditioned by the special positions of our physical organs with regard to the object of perception1 and we discover its real nature by making allowance for these special positions4 ,we thereby advance in knowledge to the extent of overcoming an obstacle due to the nature of our senses4 ,but1 this obstacle overcome1 philosophical reflection forces upon us another4 ,the thing which we distinguish in our ordinary consciousness from its appearances is1 after all1 only another appearance2 and although the physical problem is solved concerning its accordance with our special senses1 there remains the philosophical problem as to whether this appearance need correspond to what in the end is the real thing1 viz4 that which exists in itself and apart from all perception4 ,the only possible answer is that it need not4 ,we therefore can only know appearances and not reality2 in other words1 we cannot have knowledge proper4 ,at the same time1 our knowledge of appearances is objective to the extent that the appearances in question are the same for every one1 and for us on various occasions2 for the effects due to special positions of our senses have been removed4 ,if1 therefore1 we return to the physical distinction1 we see that the 'things' to which it refers are only a special kind of appearance1 viz4 that which is the same for every one1 and for us at all times4 ,the physical distinction1 then1 being a distinction between one kind of appearance and another1 falls within 'phenomena' or 'appearances'4 #cc ,it should be noticed that the passage is1 in the main1 expressed in terms of the distinction between 'things' and 'appearances'1 and not1 as it should be1 in terms of the distinction between what things are and what things appear or look4 ,now the obvious objection to this line of thought is that the result of the second or metaphysical application of the distinction between reality and appearance is to destroy or annul the first or physical application of it4 ,to oppose the rain1 i4 e4 the raindrops as the thing in itself to the rainbow as a mere appearance is to imply that the rain is not an appearance4 ,for though what is opposed to a mere appearance may still be an appearance1 it cannot be called an appearance at all if it be described as the thing in itself4 ,if it be only another appearance1 it is the same in principle as that to which it is opposed1 and consequently cannot be opposed to it4 ,thus1 if ,kant means by the rain1 in distinction from the rainbow1 the appearance when1 as we say1 we see the circular raindrops1 the title of this appearance to the term thing in itself is no better than that of the rainbow2 it is1 in fact1 if anything1 worse1 for the appearance is actual only under exceptional circumstances4 ,we may never see the raindrops thus1 or in ,kant's language1 have this 'appearance'2 and therefore1 in general1 an appearance of this kind is not actual but only possible4 ,the truth is that we can only distinguish something as the thing in itself from an appearance1 so long as we mean by the thing in itself what ,kant normally means by it1 viz4 something which exists independently of perception and is not an appearance at all4#cd ,that of which ,kant is really thinking1 and which he calls the appearance which is the thing1 in distinction from a mere appearance1 is not an appearance2 on the contrary1 it is the raindrops themselves1 which he describes as circular and as falling through space1 and which1 as circular and falling1 must exist and have these characteristics in themselves apart from a percipient4 ,kant's formula for an empirical thing1 i4 e4 a thing which is an appearance1 viz4 'that which in universal experience and under all different positions with regard to the senses is in perception so and so determined'1 is merely an attempt to achieve the impossible1 viz4 to combine in one the characteristics of a thing and an appearance4 ,while the reference to perception and to position with regard to the senses implies that what is being defined is an appearance1 the reference to universal experience1 to all positions with regard to the senses1 and to that which is so and so determined implies that it is a thing4 ,but1 plainly1 mention of position with regard to the senses1 if introduced at all1 should refer to the differences in perception due to the different position of the object in particular cases4 ,there is nothing of which it can be said that we perceive it in the same way or that it looks the same from all positions4 ,when ,kant speaks of that which under all different positions with regard to the senses is so and so determined1 he is really referring to something in the consideration of which all reference to the senses has been discarded2 it is what should be described as that which in reality and apart from all positions with regard to the senses is so and so determined2 and this1 as such1 cannot be an appearance4 ,again1 the qualification of 'is so and so determined' by 'in perception' is merely an attempt to treat as relative to perception1 and so as an appearance1 what is essentially independent of perception4#ce ,kant1 no doubt1 is thinking of a real presupposition of the process by which we distinguish between the real and the apparent qualities of bodies1 i4 e4 between what they are and what they appear4 ,we presuppose that that quality is really1 and not only apparently1 a quality of a body1 which we and every one1 judging from what it looks under various conditions 7i4 e4 'in universal experience'71 must believe it to possess in itself and independently of all perception4 ,his mistake is that in formulating this presupposition he treats as an appearance1 and so as relative to perception1 just that which is being distinguished from what1 as an appearance1 is relative to perception4 #cd ,hence ,kant's protest 7,b4 #de1 ,m4 #bg71 against illustrating the ideality of space by the 'inadequate' examples of colour1 taste1 c41 must be unavailing4 ,for his contention is that1 while the assertion that space is not a property of things means that it is not a property of things in themselves1 the assertion that colour1 for example1 is not a property of a rose only means that it is not a property of a thing in itself in an empirical sense1 i4 e4 of an appearance of a special kind4 #ce ,cf4 pp4 #gb-c4 ,underlying the mistake is the identification of perception with judgement4 ,our apprehension of what things are is essentially a matter of thought or judgement1 and not of perception4 ,we do not perceive#cf but think a thing as it is4 ,it is true that we can follow ,kant's language so far as to say that our judgement that the portion of the great circle joining two points on the surface of a sphere is the shortest way between them via the surface belongs essentially to the thinking faculty of every intelligent being1 and also that it is valid for all intelligences1 in the sense that they must all hold it to be true2 and we can contrast this judgement with a perception of the portion of the great circle as something which1 though it cannot be said to be invalid1 still differs for different beings according to the position from which they perceive it4 ,kant1 however1 treats the judgement as a perception2 for if we apply his general assertion to this instance1 we find him saying that what we judge the portion of the great circle to be essentially belongs to the perception of it1 and is valid for the sensuous faculty of every human being1 and that thereby it can be distinguished from what belongs to the same perception of a great circle accidentally1 e4 g4 its apparent colour1 which is valid only for a particular organization of this or that sense4#cg ,in this way he correlates what the great circle really is1 as well as what it looks1 with perception1 and so is able to speak of what it is for perception4 ,but1 in fact1 what the great circle is1 is correlated with thought1 and not with perception2 and if we raise ,kant's transcendental problem in reference not to perception but to thought1 it cannot be solved in ,kant's agnostic manner4 ,for it is a presupposition of thinking that things are in themselves what we think them to be2 and from the nature of the case a presupposition of thinking not only cannot be rightly questioned1 but cannot be questioned at all4 #cf ,cf4 pp4 #gb-c4 #cg ,in the ,prol41 #ac1 ,remark iii1 ,kant carefully distinguishes judgement from perception1 but destroys the effect of the distinction by regarding judgement as referring to what is relative to perception1 viz4 appearances4 ,,note ,,on ,,the ,,first ,,antinomy ,kant holds that the antinomy or contradiction which arises when we consider the character of the world as spatial and temporal1 viz4 that we are equally bound to hold that the world is infinite in space and time1 and that it is finite in space and time1 is due to regarding the world as a thing in itself4 ,he holds that the contradiction disappears1 as soon as it is recognized that the world is only a phenomenon1 for then we find that we need only say that the world is capable of being extended infinitely in respect of time and space4#a ,objects in space and time are only phenomena1 and1 as such1 are actual only in perception4 ,when we say that a past event1 or that a body which we do not perceive1 is real1 we merely assert the possibility of a 'perception'4 ,all events from time immemorial prior to my existence mean nothing else than the possibility of prolonging the chain of experience from the present perception upwards to the conditions which determine this perception according to time4#b ,that there may be inhabitants of the moon1 although no one has ever seen them1 must certainly be admitted1 but this assertion only means that we could come upon them in the possible progress of experience4#c ,the contradictions1 therefore1 can be avoided by substituting for the actual infinity of space and time1 as relating to things in themselves1 the possible infinity of a series of 'perceptions'4 #a ,b4 #ecb-c1 ,m4 #cae4 #b ,b4 #ebc1 ,m4 #cji4 #c ,b4 #eba1 ,m4 #cjh4 ,this contention1 if successful1 is clearly important4 ,if it could be shown that the treatment of the world as a thing in itself is the source of a contradiction1 we should have what at least would seem a strong1 if not conclusive1 ground for holding that the world is a phenomenon1 and1 consequently1 that the distinction between phenomena and things in themselves is valid4 ,professor ,cook ,wilson has1 however1 pointed out that ,kant's own doctrine does not avoid the difficulty4 ,for1 though1 according to ,kant1 the infinity of actual representations of spaces and times is only possible1 yet the possibilities of these representations will be themselves infinite1 and1 as such1 will give rise to contradictions similar to those involved in the infinity of space and time4 ,moreover1 as ,professor ,cook ,wilson has also pointed out1 there is no contradiction involved in the thought of the world as spatial and temporal2 for1 as we see when we reflect1 we always presuppose that space and time are infinite1 and we are only tempted to think that they must be finite1 because1 when maintaining that the world must be a whole1 we are apt to make the false assumption1 without in any way questioning it1 that any whole must be finite4 ,,chapter ,v ,,time ,,and ,,inner ,,sense ,the arguments by which ,kant seeks to show that time is not a determination of things in themselves but only a form of perception are1 mutatis mutandis1 identical with those used in his treatment of space4#a ,they are1 therefore1 open to the same criticisms1 and need no separate consideration4 #a ,cf4 ,b4 #df-i1 #d1 #e and #f 7a71 ,m4 #bh-cj1 #e1 #f and #g 7a7 with ,b4 #ch-db1 #b 7#a-d71 and 7#c7 to 7a7 inclusive1 ,m4 #bc-f1 #b1 #c1 and #d 7a74 ,the only qualification needed is that1 since the parts of time cannot1 like those of space1 be said to exist simultaneously1 ,b4 #d 7#e71 ,m4 #e1 #e is compelled to appeal to a different consideration from that adduced in the parallel passage on space 7,b4 #b 7#d71 ,m4 #b1 #d74 ,since1 however1 ,b4 #d 7#e71 ,m4 #e1 #e introduces no new matter1 but only appeals to the consideration already urged 7,b4 #d1 #d1 ,m4 #e1 #d71 this difference can be neglected4 ,b4 #e1 ,m4 #f adds a remark about change which does not affect the main argument4 ,time1 however1 according to ,kant1 differs from space in one important respect4 ,it is the form not of outer but of inner sense2 in other words1 while space is the form under which we perceive things1 time is the form under which we perceive ourselves4 ,it is upon this difference that attention must be concentrated4 ,the existence of the difference at all is upon general grounds surprising4 ,for since the arguments by which ,kant establishes the character of time as a form of perception run pari passu with those used in the case of space1 we should expect time1 like space1 to be a form under which we perceive things2 and1 as a matter of fact1 it will be found that the only argument used to show that time is the form of inner1 as opposed to outer1 sense is not only independent of ,kant's general theory of forms of sense1 but is actually inconsistent with it4#b ,before1 however1 we attempt to decide ,kant's right to distinguish between inner and outer sense1 we must consider the facts which were before ,kant's mind in making the distinction4 #b ,b4 #di 7b71 ,m4 #cj 7b74 ,see pp4 #aji-ab4 ,these facts and1 to a large extent1 the frame of mind in which ,kant approached them1 find expression in the passage in ,locke's ,essay1 which explains the distinction between 'ideas of sensation' and 'ideas of reflection'4 ,whence has it i4 e4 the mind all the materials of reason and knowledge8 ,to this ,i answer1 in one word1 from experience4444 ,our observation1 employed either about external1 sensible objects1 or about the internal operations of our minds1 perceived and reflected on1 by ourselves1 is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking4 ,these two are the fountains of knowledge4444 ,first1 ,our senses1 conversant about particular sensible objects1 do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things1 according to those various ways1 wherein those objects do affect them3 and thus we come by those ideas we have of ,yellow1 ,white1 ,heat1 ,cold1 ,soft1 ,hard1 ,bitter1 ,sweet1 and all those1 which we call sensible qualities2 which1 when ,i say the senses convey into the mind1 ,i mean1 they1 from external objects1 convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions4 ,this great source of most of the ideas we have1 depending wholly upon our senses1 and derived by them to the understanding1 ,i call sensation4 ,secondly1 ,the other fountain1 from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas1 is the perception of the operations of our own mind within us1 as it is employed about the ideas it has got2 which operations1 when the soul comes to reflect on1 and consider1 do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas1 which could not be had from things without2 and such are ,perception1 ,thinking1 ,doubting1 ,believing1 ,reasoning1 ,knowing1 ,willing1 and all the different actings of our own minds2 which we being conscious of1 and observing in ourselves1 do1 from these1 receive into our understandings as distinct ideas1 as we do from bodies affecting our senses4 ,this source of ideas every man has wholly in himself2 and though it be not sense as having nothing to do with external objects1 yet it is very like it1 and might properly enough be called internal sense4 ,but1 as ,i call the other sensation1 so ,i call this reflection2 the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets1 by reflecting on its own operations within itself4#c #c ,locke1 ,essay1 ii1 #a1 #b-d4 ,here ,locke is thinking of the distinction between two attitudes of mind1 which1 however difficult it may be to state satisfactorily1 must in some sense be recognized4 ,the mind1 undoubtedly1 in virtue of its powers of perceiving and thinking--or whatever they may be--becomes through a temporal process aware of a spatial world in its varied detail4 ,in the first instance1 its attention is absorbed in the world of which it thus becomes aware2 subsequently1 however1 it is in some way able to direct its attention away from this world to the activities in virtue of which it has become aware of this world1 and in some sense to make itself its own object4 ,from being conscious it becomes self-conscious4 ,this process by which the mind turns its attention back upon itself is said to be a process of 'reflection'4 ,while we should say that it is by perception that we become aware of things in the physical world1 we should say that it is by reflection that we become aware of our activities of perceiving1 thinking1 willing1 c4 ,whatever difficulties the thought of self-consciousness may involve1 and however inseparable1 and perhaps even temporally inseparable1 the attitudes of consciousness and self-consciousness may turn out to be1 the distinction between these attitudes must be recognized4 ,the object of the former is the world1 and the object of the latter is in some sense the mind itself2 and the attitudes may be described as that of our ordinary1 scientific1 or unreflecting consciousness and that of reflection4 ,the significance of ,locke's account of this distinction lies for our purposes in its anticipation of ,kant4 ,he states the second attitude1 as well as the first1 in terms of sense4 ,just as in our apprehension of the world things external to1 in the sense of existing independently of1 the mind are said to act on our physical organs or 'senses'1 and thereby to produce 'perceptions' in the mind1 so the mind is said to become conscious of its own operations by 'sense'4 ,we should notice1 however1 that ,locke hesitates to use the word 'sense' in the latter case1 on the ground that it involves no operation of external things 7presumably upon our physical organs71 though he thinks that the difficulty is removed by calling the sense in question 'internal'4 ,kant is thinking of the same facts1 and also states them in terms of sense1 though allowance must be made for the difference of standpoint1 since for him 'sense'1 in the case of the external sense1 refers not to the affection of our physical organs by physical bodies1 but to the affection of the mind by things in themselves4 ,things in themselves act on our minds and produce in them appearances1 or rather sensations1 and outer sense is the mind's capacity for being so affected by outer things1 i4 e4 things independent of the mind4 ,this is1 in essentials1 ,kant's statement of the attitude of consciousness1 i4 e4 of our apprehension of the world which exists independently of the mind1 and which1 for him1 is the world of things in themselves4 ,he also follows ,locke in giving a parallel account of the attitude of self-consciousness4 ,he asks1 ',how can the subject perceive itself8' ,perception in man is essentially passive2 the mind must be affected by that which it perceives4 ,consequently1 if the mind is to perceive itself1 it must be affected by its own activity2 in other words1 there must be an inner sense1 i4 e4 a capacity in virtue of which the mind is affected by itself4#d ,hence ,kant is compelled to extend his agnosticism to the knowledge of ourselves4 ,just as we do not know things1 but only the appearances which they produce in us1#e so we do not know ourselves1 but only the appearances which we produce in ourselves2 and since time is a mode of relation of these appearances1 it is a determination not of ourselves1 but only of the appearances due to ourselves4 #d ,cf4 ,b4 #fg fin41 ,m4 #da init4 #e ,it is here assumed that this is ,kant's normal view of the phenomenal character of our knowledge4 ,cf4 p4 #ge4 ,the above may be said to represent the train of thought by which ,kant arrived at his doctrine of time and the inner sense4 ,it was reached by combining recognition of the fact that we come to be aware not only of the details of the physical world1 but also of the successive process on our part by which we have attained this knowledge1 with the view that our apprehension of this successive process is based on 'sense'1 just as is our apprehension of the world4 ,but the question remains whether ,kant is1 on his own principles1 entitled to speak of an inner sense at all4 ,according to him1 knowledge begins with the production in us of sensations1 or1 as we ought to say in the present context1 appearances by the action of things in themselves4 ,these sensations or appearances can reasonably be ascribed to external sense4 ,they may be ascribed to sense1 because they arise through our being affected by things in themselves4 ,the sense may be called external1 because the object affecting it is external to the mind1 i4 e4 independent of it4 ,in conformity with this account1 internal sense must be the power of being affected by something internal to the mind1 i4 e4 dependent upon the mind itself1 and since being affected implies the activity of affecting1 it will be the power of being affected by the mind's own activity4#f ,the activity will presumably be that of arranging spatially the sensations or appearances due to things in themselves4#g ,this activity must be said to produce an affection in us1 the affection being an appearance due to ourselves4 ,lastly1 the mind must be said to arrange these appearances temporally4 ,hence it will be said to follow that we know only the appearances due to ourselves and not ourselves1 and that time is only a determination of these appearances4#h #f ,b4 #fh init41 ,m4 #da init4 #g ,the precise nature of the activity makes no difference to the argument4 #h ,in ,b4 #aeb fin41 ,m4 #ic fin4 ,kant expresses his conclusion in the form that we know ourselves only as we appear to ourselves1 and not as we are in ourselves 7cf4 p4 #ge74 ,the above account1 and the criticism which immediately follows1 can be adapted1 mutatis mutandis1 to this form of the view4 ,the weakness of the position just stated lies on the surface4 ,it provides no means of determining whether any affection produced in us is produced by ourselves rather than by the thing in itself2 consequently we could never say that a given affection was an appearance due to ourselves1 and therefore to inner sense4 ,on the contrary1 we should ascribe all affections to things in themselves1 and should1 therefore1 be unable to recognize an inner sense at all4 ,in order to recognize an inner sense we must know that certain affections are due to our activity1 and1 to do this1 we must know what the activity consists in--for we can only be aware that we are active by being aware of an activity of ours of a particular kind--and1 therefore1 we must know ourselves4 ,unless1 then1 we know ourselves1 we cannot call any affections internal4 ,if1 however1 the doctrine of an internal sense is obviously untenable from ,kant's own point of view1 why does he hold it8 ,the answer is that1 inconsistently with his general view1 he continues to think of the facts as they really are1 and that he is deceived by an ambiguity into thinking that the facts justify a distinction between internal and external sense4 ,he brings forward only one argument to show that time is the form of the internal sense4 ,time is nothing else than the form of the internal sense1 i4 e4 of the perception of ourselves and our inner state4 ,for time cannot be any determination of external phenomena2 it has to do neither with a shape nor a position2 on the contrary1 it determines the relation of representations in our internal state4#i #i ,b4 #di 7b71 ,m4 #cj 7b74 ,to follow this argument it is first necessary to realize a certain looseness and confusion in the expression of it4 ,the term 'external'1 applied to phenomena1 has a double meaning4 ,it must mean 7#a7 that of which the parts are external to one another1 i4 e4 spatial2 for the ground on which time is denied to be a determination of external phenomena is that it has nothing to do with a shape or a position4 ,it must also mean 7#b7 external to1 in the sense of independent of1 the mind2 for it is contrasted with our internal state1 and if 'internal'1 applied to 'our state'1 is not to be wholly otiose1 it can only serve to emphasize the contrast between our state and something external to in the sense of independent of us4 ,again1 'phenomena1' in the phrase 'external phenomena'1 can only be an unfortunate expression for things independent of the mind1 these things being here called phenomena owing to ,kant's view that bodies in space are phenomena4 ,otherwise1 'phenomena' offers no contrast to 'our state' and to 'representations'4 ,the passage1 therefore1 presupposes a distinction between states of ourselves and things in space1 the former being internal to1 or dependent upon1 and the latter external to1 or independent of1 the mind4 ,it should now be easy to see that the argument involves a complete non sequitur4 ,the conclusion which is justified is that time is a form not of things but of our own states4 ,for the fact to which he appeals is that while things1 as being spatial1 are not related temporally1 our states are temporally related2 and if 'a form' be understood as a mode of relation1 this fact can be expressed by the formula ',time is a form not of things but of our own states'1 the corresponding formula in the case of space being ',space is a form not of our states but of things'4 ,but the conclusion which ,kant desires to draw--and which he1 in fact1 actually draws--is the quite different conclusion that time is a form of perception of our states1 the corresponding conclusion in the case of space being that space is a form of perception of things4 ,for time is to be shown to be the form of inner sense1 i4 e4 the form of the perception of what is internal to ourselves1 i4 e4 of our own states4#aj ,the fact is that the same unconscious transition takes place in ,kant's account of time which1 as we saw1#aa takes place in his account of space4 ,in the case of space1 ,kant passes from the assertion that space is a form of things1 in the sense that all things are spatially related--an assertion which he expresses by saying that space is the form of phenomena--to the quite different assertion that space is a form of perception1 in the sense of a way in which we perceive things as opposed to a way in which things are4 ,similarly1 in the case of time1 ,kant passes from the assertion that time is the form of our internal states1 in the sense that all our states are temporally related1 to the assertion that time is a way in which we perceive our states as opposed to a way in which our states really are4 ,further1 the two positions1 which he thus fails to distinguish1 are not only different1 but incompatible4 ,for if space is a form of things1 and time is a form of our states1 space and time cannot belong only to our mode of perceiving things and ourselves respectively1 and not to the things and ourselves2 for ex hypothesi things are spatially related1 and our states are temporally related4 #aj ,cf4 ,b4 #di 7b7 line #b1 ,m4 #cj 7b7 line #b #aa ,cf4 pp4 #ch-dj4 ,kant's procedure1 therefore1 may be summed up by saying that he formulates a view which is true but at the same time inconsistent with his general position1 the view1 viz4 that while things in space are not temporally related1 the acts by which we come to apprehend them are so related2 and further1 that he is deceived by the verbally easy transition from a legitimate way of expressing this view1 viz4 that time is the form of our states1 to the desired conclusion that time is the form of inner sense4 ,the untenable character of ,kant's position with regard to time and the knowledge of ourselves can be seen in another way4 ,it is not difficult to show that1 in order to prove that we do not know things1 but only the appearances which they produce1 we must allow that we do know ourselves1 and not appearances produced by ourselves1 and1 consequently1 that time is real and not phenomenal4 ,to show this1 it is only necessary to consider the objection which ,kant himself quotes against his view of time4 ,the objection is important in itself1 and ,kant himself remarks that he has heard it so unanimously urged by intelligent men that he concludes that it must naturally present itself to every reader to whom his views are novel4 ,according to ,kant1 it runs thus3 ,changes are real 7this is proved by the change of our own representations1 even though all external phenomena1 together with their changes1 be denied74 ,now changes are only possible in time2 therefore time is something real4#ab ,and he goes on to explain why this objection is so unanimously brought1 even by those who can bring no intelligible argument against the ideality of space4 ,the reason is that men have no hope of proving apodeictically the absolute reality of space1 because they are confronted by idealism1 according to which the reality of external objects is incapable of strict proof1 whereas the reality of the object of our internal senses 7of myself and my state7 is immediately clear through consciousness4 ,external objects might be mere illusion1 but the object of our internal senses is to their mind undeniably something real4#ac #ab ,b4 #ec1 ,m4 #cb4 #ac ,b4 #ee1 ,m4 #cc4 ,here1 though ,kant does not see it1 he is faced with a difficulty from which there is no escape4 ,on the one hand1 according to him1 we do not know things in themselves1 i4 e4 things independent of the mind4 ,in particular1 we cannot know that they are spatial2 and the objection quoted concedes this4 ,on the other hand1 we do know phenomena or the appearances produced by things in themselves4 ,phenomena or appearances1 however1 as he always insists1 are essentially states or determinations of the mind4 ,to the question1 therefore1 ',why are we justified in saying that we do know phenomena1 whereas we do not know the things which produce them8' ,kant could only answer that it is because phenomena are dependent upon the mind1 as being its own states4#ad ,as the objector is made to say1 'the reality of the object of our internal senses 7of myself and my state7 is immediately clear through consciousness4' ,if we do not know things in themselves1 because they are independent of the mind1 we only know phenomena because they are dependent upon the mind4 ,hence ,kant is only justified in denying that we know things in themselves if he concedes that we really know our own states1 and not merely appearances which they produce4 #ad ,cf4 p4 #abc4 ,again1 ,kant must allow--as indeed he normally does--that these states of ours are related by way of succession4 ,hence1 since these states are really our states and not appearances produced by our states1 these being themselves unknown1 time1 as a relation of these states1 must itself be real1 and not a way in which we apprehend what is real4 ,it must1 so to say1 be really in what we apprehend about ourselves1 and not put into it by us as perceiving ourselves4 ,the objection1 then1 comes to this4 ,kant must at least concede that we undergo a succession of changing states1 even if he holds that things1 being independent of the mind1 cannot be shown to undergo such a succession2 consequently1 he ought to allow that time is not a way in which we apprehend ourselves1 but a real feature of our real states4 ,kant's answer#ae does not meet the point1 and1 in any case1 proceeds on the untenable assumption that it is possible for the characteristic of a thing to belong to it as perceived1 though not in itself4#af #ae ,b4 #ee1 ,m4 #cc med4 #af ,cf4 pp4 #ga-c4 ,,chapter ,,vi ,,knowledge ,,and ,,reality ,kant's theory of space1 and1 still more1 his theory of time1 are bewildering subjects4 ,it is not merely that the facts with which he deals are complex2 his treatment of them is also complicated by his special theories of 'sense' and of 'forms of perception'4 ,light1 however1 may be thrown upon the problems raised by the ,aesthetic1 and upon ,kant's solution of them1 in two ways4 ,in the first place1 we may attempt to vindicate the implication of the preceding criticism1 that the very nature of knowledge presupposes the independent existence of the reality known1 and to show that1 in consequence1 all idealism is of the variety known as subjective4 ,in the second place1 we may point out the way in which ,kant is misled by failing to realize 7#a7 the directness of the relation between the knower and the reality known1 and 7#b7 the impossibility of transferring what belongs to one side of the relation to the other4 ,the question whether any reality exists independently of the knowledge of it may be approached thus4 ,the standpoint of the preceding criticism of ,kant may be described as that of the plain man4 ,it is the view that the mind comes by a temporal process to apprehend or to know a spatial world which exists independently of it or of any other mind1 and that the mind knows it as it exists in the independence4 ',now this view1' it may be replied1 'is exposed to at least one fatal objection4 ,it presupposes the possibility of knowing the thing in itself1 i4 e4 something which exists independently of the mind which comes to know it4 ,whatever is true1 this is not4 ,whatever be the criticism to which ,kant's doctrine is exposed in detail1 it contains one inexpugnable thesis1 viz4 that the thing in itself cannot be known4 ,unless the physical world stands in essential relation to the mind1 it is impossible to understand how it can be known4 ,this position being unassailable1 any criticism of an idealistic theory must be compatible with it1 and therefore confined to details4 ,moreover1 ,kant's view can be transformed into one which will defy criticism4 ,its unsatisfactory character lies in the fact that in regarding the physical world as dependent on the mind1 it really alters the character of the world by reducing the world to a succession of 'appearances' which1 as such1 can only be mental1 i4 e4 can only belong to the mind's own being4 ,bodies1 as being really appearances in the mind1 are regarded as on the level of transitory mental occurrences1 and as thereby at least resembling feelings and sensations4 ,this consequence1 however1 can be avoided by maintaining that the real truth after which ,kant was groping was that knower and known form an inseparable unity1 and that1 therefore1 any reality which is not itself a knower1 or the knowing of a knower1 presupposes a mind which knows it4 ,in that case nothing is suggested as to the special nature of the reality known1 and1 in particular1 it is not implied to be a transitory element of the mind's own being4 ,the contention merely attributes to any reality1 conceived to have the special nature ordinarily attributed to it1 the additional characteristic that it is known4 ,consequently1 on this view1 the physical world can retain the permanence ordinarily attributed to it4 ,to the objection that1 at any rate1 our knowledge is transitory1 and that if the world is relative to it the world also must be transitory1 it may be replied--though with some sense of uneasiness--that the world must be considered relative not to us as knowers1 but to a knower who knows always and completely1 and whose knowing is in some way identical with ours4 ,further1 the view so transformed has two other advantages4 ,in the first place1 it renders it possible to dispense with what has been called the ,mrs4 ,harris of philosophy1 the thing in itself4 ,as ,kant states his position1 the thing in itself must be retained1 for it is impossible to believe that there is no reality other than what is mental4 ,but if the physical world need not be considered to be a succession of mental occurrences1 it can be considered to be the reality which is not mental4 ,in the second place1 knowledge proper is vindicated1 for on this view we do not know 'only' phenomena2 we know the reality which is not mental1 and we know it as it is1 for it is as object of knowledge4' ',moreover1 the contention must be true1 and must form the true basis of idealism4 ,for the driving force of idealism is furnished by the question1 ',how can the mind and reality come into the relation which we call knowledge8' ,this question is unanswerable so long as reality is thought to stand in no essential relation to the knowing mind4 ,consequently1 in the end1 knowledge and reality must be considered inseparable4 ,again1 even if it be conceded that the mind in some way gains access to an independent reality1 it is impossible to hold that the mind can really know it4 ,for the reality cannot in the relation of knowledge be what it is apart from this relation4 ,it must become in some way modified or altered in the process4 ,hence the mind cannot on this view know the reality as it is4 ,on the other hand1 if the reality is essentially relative to a knower1 the knower knows it as it is1 for what it is is what it is in this relation4' ,the fundamental objection1 however1 to this line of thought is that it contradicts the very nature of knowledge4 ,knowledge unconditionally presupposes that the reality known exists independently of the knowledge of it1 and that we know it as it exists in this independence4 ,it is simply impossible to think that any reality depends upon our knowledge of it1 or upon any knowledge of it4 ,if there is to be knowledge1 there must first be something to be known4 ,in other words1 knowledge is essentially discovery1 or the finding of what already is4 ,if a reality could only be or come to be in virtue of some activity or process on the part of the mind1 that activity or process would not be 'knowing'1 but 'making' or 'creating'1 and to make and to know must in the end be admitted to be mutually exclusive4#a #a ,cf4 pp4 #bce-f4 ,this presupposition that what is known exists independently of being known is quite general1 and applies to feeling and sensation just as much as to parts of the physical world4 ,it must in the end be conceded of a toothache as much as of a stone that it exists independently of the knowledge of it4 ,there must be a pain to be attended to or noticed1 which exists independently of our attention or notice4 ,the true reason for asserting feeling and sensation to be dependent on the mind is that they presuppose not a knowing1 but a feeling and a sentient subject respectively4 ,again1 it is equally presupposed that knowing in no way alters or modifies the thing known4 ,we can no more think that in apprehending a reality we do not apprehend it as it is apart from our knowledge of it1 than we can think that its existence depends upon our knowledge of it4 ,hence1 if 'things in themselves' means 'things existing independently of the knowledge of them'1 knowledge is essentially of 'things in themselves'4 ,it is1 therefore1 unnecessary to consider whether idealism is assisted by the supposition of a non-finite knowing mind1 correlated with reality as a whole4 ,for reality must equally be independent of it4 ,consequently1 if the issue between idealism and realism is whether the physical world is or is not dependent on the mind1 it cannot turn upon a dependence in respect of knowledge4 ,that the issue does not turn upon knowledge is confirmed by our instinctive procedure when we are asked whether the various realities which we suppose ourselves to know depend upon the mind4 ,our natural procedure is not to treat them simply as realities and to ask whether1 as realities1 they involve a mind to know them1 but to treat them as realities of the particular kind to which they belong1 and to consider relation to the mind of some kind other than that of knowledge4 ,we should say1 for instance1 that a toothache or an emotion1 as being a feeling1 presupposes a mind capable of feeling1 whose feeling it is2 for if the mind be thought of as withdrawn1 the pain or the feeling must also be thought of as withdrawn4 ,we should say that an act of thinking presupposes a mind which thinks4 ,we should1 however1 naturally deny that an act of thinking or knowing1 in order to be1 presupposes that it is known either by the thinker whose act it is1 or by any other mind4 ,in other words1 we should say that knowing presupposes a mind1 not as something which knows the knowing1 but as something which does the knowing4 ,again1 we should naturally say that the shape or the weight of a stone is not dependent on the mind which perceives the stone4 ,the shape1 we should say1 would disappear with the disappearance of the stone1 but would not disappear with the disappearance of the mind which perceives the stone4 ,again1 we should assert that the stone itself1 so far from depending on the mind which perceives it1 has an independent being of its own4 ,we might1 of course1 find difficulty in deciding whether a reality of some particular kind1 e4 g4 a colour1 is dependent on a mind4 ,but1 in any case1 we should think that the ground for decision lay in the special character of the reality in question1 and should not treat it merely as a reality related to the mind as something known4 ,we should ask1 for instance1 whether a colour1 as a colour1 involves a mind which sees1 and not whether a colour1 as a reality1 involves its being known4 ,our natural procedure1 then1 is to divide realities into two classes1 those which depend on a mind1 and may therefore be called mental1 and those which do not1 and to conclude that some realities depend upon the mind1 while others do not4 ,we thereby ignore a possible dependence of realities on their being known2 for not only is the dependence which we recognize of some other kind1 e4 g4 in respect of feeling or sentience1 but if the dependence were in respect of knowledge1 we could not distinguish in respect of dependence between one reality and another4 ,further1 if reality be allowed to exist independently of knowledge1 it is easy to see that1 from the idealist's point of view1 ,kant's procedure was essentially right1 and that all idealism1 when pressed1 must prove subjective2 in other words1 that the idealist must hold that the mind can only know what is mental and belongs to its own being1 and that the so-called physical world is merely a succession of appearances4 ,moreover1 our instinctive procedure#b is justified4 ,for1 in the first place1 since it is impossible to think that a reality depends for its existence upon being known1 it is impossible to reach an idealistic conclusion by taking into account relation by way of knowledge2 and if this be the relation considered1 the only conclusion can be that all reality is independent of the mind4 ,again1 since knowledge is essentially of reality as it is apart from its being known1 the assertion that a reality is dependent upon the mind is an assertion of the kind of thing which it is in itself1 apart from its being known4#c ,and when we come to consider what we mean by saying of a reality that it depends upon the mind1 we find we mean that it is in its own nature of such a kind as to disappear with the disappearance of the mind1 or1 more simply1 that it is of the kind called mental4 ,hence1 we can only decide that a particular reality depends upon the mind by appeal to its special character4 ,we cannot treat it simply as a reality the relation of which to the mind is solely that of knowledge4 ,and we can only decide that all reality is dependent upon the mind by appeal to the special character of all the kinds of reality of which we are aware4 ,hence1 ,kant in the ,aesthetic1 and ,berkeley before him1 were essentially right in their procedure4 ,they both ignored consideration of the world simply as a reality1 and appealed exclusively to its special character1 the one arguing that in its special character as spatial and temporal it presupposed a percipient1 and the other endeavouring to show that the primary qualities are as relative to perception as the secondary4 ,unfortunately for their view1 in order to think of bodies in space as dependent on the mind1 it is necessary to think of them as being in the end only certain sensations or certain combinations of sensations which may be called appearances4 ,for only sensations or combinations of them can be thought of as at once dependent on the mind1 and capable with any plausibility of being identified with bodies in space4 ,in other words1 in order to think of the world as dependent on the mind1 we have to think of it as consisting only of a succession of appearances1 and in fact ,berkeley1 and1 at certain times1 ,kant1 did think of it in this way4 #b ,cf4 p4 #aai4 #c ,though not apart from relation to the mind of some other kind4 ,that this is the inevitable result of idealism is not noticed1 so long as it is supposed that the essential relation of realities to the mind consists in their being known2 for1 as we have seen1 nothing is thereby implied as to their special nature4 ,to say of a reality that it is essentially an object of knowledge is merely to add to the particular nature ordinarily attributed to the existent in question the further characteristic that it must be known4#d ,moreover1 since in fact1 though contrary to the theory1 any reality exists independently of the knowledge of it1 when the relation thought of between a reality and the mind is solely that of knowledge1 the realities can be thought of as independent of the mind4 ,consequently1 the physical world can be thought to have that independence of the mind which the ordinary man attributes to it1 and1 therefore1 need not be conceived as only a succession of appearances4 ,but the advantage of this form of idealism is really derived from the very fact which it is the aim of idealism in general to deny4 ,for the conclusion that the physical world consists of a succession of appearances is only avoided by taking into account the relation of realities to the mind by way of knowledge1 and1 then1 without being aware of the inconsistency1 making use of the independent existence of the reality known4 #d ,cf4 p4 #aaf4 ,again1 that the real contrary to realism is subjective idealism is confirmed by the history of the theory of knowledge from ,descartes onwards4 ,for the initial supposition which has originated and sustained the problem is that in knowledge the mind is1 at any rate in the first instance1 confined within itself4 ,this supposition granted1 it has always seemed that1 while there is no difficulty in understanding the mind's acquisition of knowledge of what belongs to its own being1 it is difficult1 if not impossible1 to understand how it can acquire knowledge of what does not belong to its own being4 ,further1 since the physical world is ordinarily thought of as something which does not belong to the mind's own being1 the problem has always been not ',how is it possible to know anything8' but ',how is it possible to know a particular kind of reality1 viz4 the physical world8' ,moreover1 in consequence of the initial supposition1 any answer to this question has always presupposed that our apprehension of the physical world is indirect4 ,since ex hypothesi the mind is confined within itself1 it can only apprehend a reality independent of it through something within the mind which 'represents' or 'copies' the reality2 and it is perhaps ,hume's chief merit that he showed that no such solution is possible1 or1 in other words1 that1 on the given supposition1 knowledge of the physical world is impossible4 ,now the essential weakness of this line of thought lies in the initial supposition that the mind can only apprehend what belongs to its own being4 ,it is as much a fact of our experience that we directly apprehend bodies in space1 as that we directly apprehend our feelings and sensations4 ,and1 as has already been shown1#e what is spatial cannot be thought to belong to the mind's own being on the ground that it is relative to perception4 ,further1 if it is legitimate to ask1 ',how can we apprehend what does not belong to our being8' it is equally legitimate to ask1 ',how can we apprehend what does belong to our own being8' ,it is wholly arbitrary to limit the question to the one kind of reality4 ,if a question is to be put at all1 it should take the form1 ',how is it possible to apprehend anything8' ,but this question has only to be put to be discarded4 ,for it amounts to a demand to explain knowledge2 and any answer to it would involve the derivation of knowledge from what was not knowledge1 a task which must be as impossible as the derivation of space from time or of colour from sound4 ,knowledge is sui generis1 and1 as such1 cannot be explained4#f #e ,cf4 pp4 #hi-ia4 #f ,this assertion1 being self-evident1 admits of no direct proof4 ,a 'proof' can only take the form of showing that any supposed 'derivation' or 'explanation' of knowledge presupposes knowledge in that from which it derives it4 ,professor ,cook ,wilson has pointed out that we must understand what knowing is in order to explain anything at all1 so that any proposed explanation of knowing would necessarily presuppose that we understood what knowing is4 ,for the general doctrine1 cf4 p4 #bde4 ,moreover1 it may be noted that the support which this form of idealism sometimes receives from an argument which uses the terms 'inside' and 'outside' the mind is unmerited4 ,at first sight it seems a refutation of the plain man's view to argue thus3 ',the plain man believes the spatial world to exist whether any one knows it or not4 ,consequently1 he allows that the world is outside the mind4 ,but1 to be known1 a reality must be inside the mind4 ,therefore1 the plain man's view renders knowledge impossible4' ,but1 as soon as it is realized that 'inside the mind' and 'outside the mind' are metaphors1 and1 therefore1 must take their meaning from their context1 it is easy to see that the argument either rests on an equivocation or assumes the point at issue4 ,the assertion that the world is outside the mind1 being only a metaphorical expression of the plain man's view1 should only mean that the world is something independent of the mind1 as opposed to something inside the mind1 in the sense of dependent upon it1 or mental4 ,but the assertion that1 to be known1 a reality must be inside the mind1 if it is to be incontestably true1 should only mean that a reality1 to be apprehended1 must really be object of apprehension4 ,and in this case 'being inside the mind'1 since it only means 'being object of apprehension'1 is not the opposite of 'being outside the mind' in the previous assertion4 ,hence1 on this interpretation1 the second assertion is connected with the first only apparently and by an equivocation2 there is really no argument at all4 ,if1 however1 the equivocation is to be avoided1 'inside the mind' in the second assertion must be the opposite of 'outside the mind' in the first1 and consequently the second must mean that a reality1 to be known1 must be dependent on the mind1 or mental4 ,but in that case the objection to the plain man's view is a petitio principii1 and not an argument4 ,nevertheless1 the tendency to think that the only object or1 at least1 the only direct object of the mind is something mental still requires explanation4 ,it seems due to a tendency to treat self-consciousness as similar to consciousness of the world4 ,when in reflection we turn our attention away from the world to the activity by which we come to know it1 we tend to think of our knowledge of the world as a reality to be apprehended similar to the world which we apprehended prior to reflection4 ,we thereby implicitly treat this knowledge as something which1 like the world1 merely is and is not the knowledge of anything2 in other words1 we imply that1 so far from being knowledge1 i4 e4 the knowing of a reality1 it is precisely that which we distinguish from knowledge1 viz4 a reality to be known1 although--since knowledge must be mental--we imply that it is a reality of the special kind called mental4 ,but if the knowledge upon which we reflect is thus treated as consisting in a mental reality which merely is1 it is implied that in this knowledge the world is not1 at any rate directly1 object of the mind1 for ex hypothesi a reality which merely is and is not the knowledge of anything has no object4 ,hence it comes to be thought that the only object or1 at least1 the only direct object of the mind is this mental reality itself1 which is the object of reflection2 in other words1 that the only immediate object of the mind comes to be thought of as its own idea4 ,the root of the mistake lies in the initial supposition--which1 it may be noted1 seems to underlie the whole treatment of knowledge by empirical psychology--that knowledge can be treated as a reality to be apprehended1 in the way in which any reality which is not knowledge is a reality to be apprehended4 ,we may now revert to that form of idealism which maintains that the essential relation of reality to the mind is that of being known1 in order to consider two lines of argument by which it may be defended4 ,according to the first of these1 the view of the plain man either is1 or at least involves1 materialism2 and materialism is demonstrably absurd4 ,the plain man's view involves the existence of the physical world prior to the existence of the knowledge of it1 and therefore also prior to the existence of minds which know it1 since it is impossible to separate the existence of a knowing mind from its actual knowledge4 ,from this it follows that mere matter1 having only the qualities considered by the physicist1 must somehow have originated or produced knowing and knowing minds4 ,but this production is plainly impossible4 ,for matter1 possessing solely1 as it does1 characteristics bound up with extension and motion1 cannot possibly have originated activities of a wholly different kind1 or beings capable of exercising them4 ,it may1 however1 be replied that the supposed consequence1 though absurd1 does not really follow from the plain man's realism4 ,doubtless1 it would be impossible for a universe consisting solely of the physical world to originate thought or beings capable of thinking4 ,but the real presupposition of the coming into existence of human knowledge at a certain stage in the process of the universe is to be found in the pre-existence1 not of a mind or minds which always actually knew1 but simply of a mind or minds in which1 under certain conditions1 knowledge is necessarily actualized4 ,a mind cannot be the product of anything or1 at any rate1 of anything but a mind4 ,it cannot be a new reality introduced at some time or other into a universe of realities of a wholly different order4 ,therefore1 the presupposition of the present existence of knowledge is the pre-existence of a mind or minds2 it is not implied that its or their knowledge must always have been actual4 ,in other words1 knowing implies the ultimate or unoriginated existence of beings possessed of the capacity to know4 ,otherwise1 knowledge would be a merely derivative product1 capable of being stated in terms of something else1 and in the end in terms of matter and motion4 ,this implication is1 however1 in no wise traversed by the plain man's realism4 ,for that implies1 not that the existence of the physical world is prior to the existence of a mind1 but only that it is prior to a mind's actual knowledge of the world4 ,the second line of thought appeals to the logic of relation4 ,it may be stated thus4 ,if a term is relative1 i4 e4 is essentially 'of' or relative to another1 that other is essentially relative to it4 ,just as a doctor1 for instance1 is essentially a doctor of a patient1 so a patient is essentially the patient of a doctor4 ,as a ruler implies subjects1 so subjects imply a ruler4 ,as a line essentially has points at its ends1 so points are essentially ends of a line4 ,now knowledge is essentially 'of' or relative to reality4 ,reality1 therefore1 is essentially relative to or implies the knowledge of it4 ,and this correlativity of knowledge and reality finds linguistic confirmation in the terms 'subject' and 'object'4 ,for1 linguistically1 just as a subject is always the subject of an object1 so an object is always the object of a subject4 ,nevertheless1 further analysis of the nature of relative terms1 and in particular of knowledge1 does not bear out this conclusion4 ,to take the case of a doctor4 ,it is true that if some one is healing1 some one else is receiving treatment1 i4 e4 is being healed2 and 'patient' being the name for the recipient of treatment1 we can express this fact by saying that a doctor is essentially the doctor of a patient4 ,further1 it is true that a recipient of treatment implies a giver of it1 as much as a giver of it implies a recipient4 ,hence we can truly say that since a doctor is the doctor of a patient1 a patient is the patient of a doctor1 meaning thereby that since that to which a doctor is relative is a patient1 a patient must be similarly relative to a doctor4 ,there is1 however1 another statement which can be made concerning a doctor4 ,we can say that a doctor is a doctor of a human being who is ill1 i4 e4 a sick man4 ,but in this case we cannot go on to say that since a doctor is a doctor of a sick man1 a sick man implies or is relative to a doctor4 ,for we mean that the kind of reality capable of being related to a doctor as his patient is a sick man2 and from this it does not follow that a reality of this kind does stand in this relation4 ,doctoring implies a sick man2 a sick man does not imply that some one is treating him4 ,we can only say that since a doctor is the doctor of a sick man1 a sick man implies the possibility of doctoring4 ,in the former case the terms1 viz4 'doctor' and 'patient'1 are inseparable because they signify the relation in question in different aspects4 ,the relation is one fact which has two inseparable 'sides'1 and1 consequently1 the terms must be inseparable which signify the relation respectively from the point of view of the one side and from the point of view of the other4 ,neither term signifies the nature of the elements which can stand in the relation4 ,in the latter case1 however1 the terms1 viz4 'doctor' and 'sick man'1 signify respectively the relation in question 7in one aspect71 and the nature of one of the elements capable of entering into it2 consequently they are separable4 ,now when it is said that knowledge is essentially knowledge of reality1 the statement is parallel to the assertion that a doctor is essentially the doctor of a sick man1 and not to the assertion that a doctor is essentially the doctor of a patient4 ,it should mean that that which is capable of being related to a knower as his object is something which is or exists2 consequently it cannot be said that since knowledge is of reality1 reality must essentially be known4 ,the parallel to the assertion that a doctor is the doctor of a patient is the assertion that knowledge is the knowledge of an object2 for just as 'patient' means that which receives treatment from a doctor1 so 'object' means that which is known4 ,and here we can go on to make the further parallel assertion that since knowledge is essentially the knowledge of an object1 an object is essentially an object of knowledge4 ,just as 'patient' means a recipient of treatment1 or1 more accurately1 a sick man under treatment1 so 'object' means something known1 or1 more accurately1 a reality known4 ,and 'knowledge' and 'object of knowledge'1 like 'doctor' and 'patient'1 indicate the same relation1 though from different points of view1 and1 consequently1 when we can use the one term1 we can use the other4 ,but to say that an object 7i4 e4 a reality known7 implies the knowledge of it is not to say that reality implies the knowledge of it1 any more than to say that a patient implies a doctor is to say that a sick man implies a doctor4 ,but a doctor1 it might be objected1 is not a fair parallel to knowledge or a knower4 ,a doctor1 though an instance of a relative term1 is only an instance of one kind of relative term1 that in which the elements related are capable of existing apart from the relation1 the relation being one in which they can come to stand and cease to stand4 ,but there is another kind of relative term1 in which the elements related presuppose the relation1 and any thought of these elements involves the thought of the relation4 ,a universal1 e4 g4 whiteness1 is always the universal of certain individuals1 viz4 individual whites2 an individual1 e4 g4 this white1 is always an individual of a universal1 viz4 whiteness4 ,a genus is the genus of a species1 and vice versa4 ,a surface is the surface of a volume1 and a volume implies a surface4 ,a point is the end of a line1 and a line is bounded by points4 ,in such cases the very being of the elements related involves the relation1 and1 apart from the relation1 disappears4 ,the difference between the two kinds of relative terms can be seen from the fact that only in the case of the former kind can two elements be found of which we can say significantly that their relation is of the kind in question4 ,we can say of two men that they are related as doctor and patient1 or as father and son1 for we can apprehend two beings as men without being aware of them as so related4 ,but of no two elements is it possible to say that their relation is that of universal and individual1 or of genus and species1 or of surface and volume2 for to apprehend elements which are so related we must apprehend them so related4#g ,to apprehend a surface is to apprehend a surface of a volume4 ,to apprehend a volume is to apprehend a volume bounded by a surface4 ,to apprehend a universal is to apprehend it as the universal of an individual1 and vice versa4#h ,in the case of relations of this kind1 the being of either element which stands in the relation is relative to that of the other2 neither can be real without the other1 as we see if we try to think of one without the other4 ,and it is at least possible that knowledge and reality or1 speaking more strictly1 a knower and reality1 are related in this way4 #g ,it is1 of course1 possible to say significantly that two elements1 ,a and ,b1 are related as universal and individual1 or as surface and volume1 if we are trying to explain what we mean by 'universal and individual' or 'surface and volume'2 but in that case we are elucidating the relationship through the already known relation of ,a and ,b1 and are not giving information about the hitherto unknown relation of ,a and ,b4 #h ,professor ,cook ,wilson has pointed out that the distinction between these two kinds of relation is marked in language in that1 for instance1 while we speak of the 'relation of universal and individual'1 we speak of 'the relation between one man and another'1 or of 'the relation of one man to another'1 using1 however1 the phrase 'the relation of doctor and patient'1 when we consider two men only as in that relation4 ,i owe to him recognition of the fact that the use of the word 'relation' in connexion with such terms as 'universal and individual' is really justified4 ,what is1 however1 at least a strong presumption against this view is to be found in the fact that while relations of the second kind are essentially non-temporal1 the relation of knowing is essentially temporal4 ,the relation of a universal and its individuals1 or of a surface and the volume which it bounds1 does not either come to be1 or persist1 or cease4 ,on the other hand1 it is impossible to think of a knowing which is susceptible of no temporal predicates and is not bound up with a process2 and the thought of knowing as something which comes to be involves the thought that the elements which become thus related exist independently of the relation4 ,moreover1 the real refutation of the view lies in the fact that1 when we consider what we really think1 we find that we think that the relation between a knower and reality is not of the second kind4 ,if we consider what we mean by 'a reality'1 we find that we mean by it something which is not correlative to a mind knowing it4 ,it does not mean something the thought of which disappears with the thought of a mind actually knowing it1 but something which1 though it can be known by a mind1 need not be actually known by a mind4 ,again1 just as we think of a reality as something which can stand as object in the relation of knowledge1 without necessarily being in this relation1 so1 as we see when we reflect1 we think of a knowing mind as something which can stand as subject in this relation without necessarily being in the relation4 ,for though we think of the capacities which constitute the nature of a knowing mind as only recognized through their actualizations1 i4 e4 through actual knowing1 we think of the mind which is possessed of these capacities as something apart from their actualization4 ,it is now possible to direct attention to two characteristics of perception and knowledge with which ,kant's treatment of space and time conflicts1 and the recognition of which reveals his procedure in its true light4 ,it has been already urged that both knowledge and perception--which1 though not identical with knowledge1 is presupposed by it--are essentially of reality4 ,now1 in the first place1 it is thereby implied that the relation between the mind and reality in knowledge or in perception is essentially direct1 i4 e4 that there is no tertium quid in the form of an 'idea' or a 'representation' between us as perceiving or knowing and what we perceive or know4 ,in other words1 it is implied that ,locke's view is wrong in principle1 and1 in fact1 the contrary of the truth4 ,in the second place1 it is implied that while the whole fact of perception includes the reality perceived and the whole fact of knowledge includes the reality known1 since both perception and knowledge are 'of'1 and therefore inseparable from a reality1 yet the reality perceived or known is essentially distinct from1 and cannot be stated in terms of1 the perception or the knowledge4 ,just as neither perception nor knowledge can be stated in terms of the reality perceived or known from which they are distinguished1 so the reality perceived or known cannot be stated in terms of the perception or the knowledge4 ,in other words1 the terms 'perception' and 'knowledge' ought to stand for the activities of perceiving and knowing respectively1 and not for the reality perceived or known4 ,similarly1 the terms 'idea' and 'representation'--the latter of which has been used as a synonym for ,kant's ,vorstellung--ought to stand not for something thought of or represented1 but for the act of thinking or representing4 ,further1 this second implication throws light on the proper meaning of the terms 'form of perception' and 'form of knowledge or of thought'4 ,for1 in accordance with this implication1 a 'form of perception' and a 'form of knowledge' ought to refer to the nature of our acts of perceiving and knowing or thinking respectively1 and not to the nature of the realities perceived or known4 ,consequently1 ,kant was right in making the primary antithesis involved in the term 'form of perception' that between a way in which we perceive and a way in which things are1 or1 in other words1 between a characteristic of our perceiving nature and a characteristic of the reality perceived4 ,moreover1 ,kant was also right in making this distinction a real antithesis and not a mere distinction within one and the same thing regarded from two points of view4 ,that which is a form of perception cannot also be a form of the reality and vice versa4 ,thus we may illustrate a perceived form of perception by pointing out that our apprehension of the physical world 7#a7 is a temporal process1 and 7#b7 is conditioned by perspective4 ,both the succession and the conditions of perspective belong to the act of perception1 and do not form part of the nature of the world perceived4 ,and it is significant that in our ordinary consciousness it never occurs to us to attribute either the perspective or the time to the reality perceived4 ,even if it be difficult in certain cases1 as in that of colour1 to decide whether something belongs to our act of perception or not1 we never suppose that it can be both a form of perception and a characteristic of the reality perceived4 ,we think that if it be the one1 it cannot be the other4 ,moreover1 if we pass from perception to knowledge or thought--which in this context may be treated as identical--and seek to illustrate a form of knowledge or of thought1 we may cite the distinction of logical subject and logical predicate of a judgement4 ,the distinction as it should be understood--for it does not necessitate a difference of grammatical form--may be illustrated by the difference between the judgements ',chess is the most trying of games' and ',chess is the most trying of games'4 ,in the former case 'chess' is the logical subject1 in the latter case it is the logical predicate4 ,now this distinction clearly does not reside in or belong to the reality about which we judge2 it relates solely to the order of our approach in thought to various parts of its nature4 ,for1 to take the case of the former judgement1 in calling 'chess' its subject1 and 'most trying of games' its predicate1 we are asserting that in this judgement we begin by apprehending the reality of which we are thinking as chess1 and come to apprehend it as the most trying of games4 ,in other words1 the distinction relates solely to the order of our apprehension1 and not to anything in the thing apprehended4 ,in view of the preceding1 it is possible to make clear the nature of certain mistakes on ,kant's part4 ,in the first place1 space1 and time also1 so far as we are thinking of the world1 and not of our apprehension of it1 as undergoing a temporal process1 are essentially characteristics not of perception but of the reality perceived1 and ,kant1 in treating space1 and time1 so regarded1 as forms of perception1 is really transferring to the perceiving subject that which in the whole fact 'perception of an object' or 'object perceived' belongs to the object4 ,again1 if we go on to ask how ,kant manages to avoid drawing the conclusion proper to this transference1 viz4 that space and time are not characteristics of any realities at all1 but belong solely to the process by which we come to apprehend them1 we see that he does so because1 in effect1 he contravenes both the characteristics of perception referred to4 ,for1 in the first place1 although in conformity with his theory he almost always speaks of space and time in terms of perception1#i he consistently treats them as features of the reality perceived1 i4 e4 of phenomena4 ,thus in arguing that space and time belong not to the understanding but to the sensibility1 although he uniformly speaks of them as perceptions1 his argument implies that they are objects of perception2 for its aim1 properly stated1 is to show that space and time are not objects of thought but objects of perception4 ,consequently1 in his treatment of space and time1 he refers to what are both to him and in fact objects of perception in terms of perception1 and thereby contravenes the second implication of perception to which attention has been drawn4 ,again1 in the second place1 if we go on to ask how ,kant is misled into doing this1 we see that it is because he contravenes the first implication of perception4 ,in virtue of his theory of perception#aj he interposes a tertium quid between the reality perceived and the percipient1 in the shape of an 'appearance'4 ,this tertium quid gives him something which can plausibly be regarded as at once a perception and something perceived4 ,for1 though from the point of view of the thing in itself an appearance is an appearance or a perception of it1 yet1 regarded from the point of view of what it is in itself1 an appearance is a reality perceived of the kind called mental4 ,hence space and time1 being characteristics of an appearance1 can be regarded as at once characteristics of our perception of a reality1 viz4 of a thing in itself1 and characteristics of a reality perceived1 viz4 an appearance4 ,moreover1 there is another point of view from which the treatment of bodies in space as appearances or phenomena gives plausibility to the view that space1 though a form of perception1 is a characteristic of a reality4 ,when ,kant speaks of space as the form of phenomena the fact to which he refers is that all bodies are spatial4#aa ,he means1 not that space is a way in which we perceive something1 but that it is a characteristic of things perceived1 which he calls phenomena1 and which are bodies4 ,but1 since in his statement of this fact he substitutes for bodies phenomena1 which to him are perceptions1 his statement can be put in the form 'space is the form of perceptions'2 and the statement in this form is verbally almost identical with the statement that space is a form of perception4 ,consequently1 the latter statement1 which should mean that space is a way in which we perceive things1 is easily identified with a statement of which the meaning is that space is a characteristic of something perceived4#ab #i ,cf4 p4 #ea1 note #a4 #aj ,cf4 p4 #cj and ff4 #aa ,cf4 p4 #ci4 #ab ,it can be shown in the same way1 mutatis mutandis 7cp4 p4 #aaa71 that the view that time1 though the form of inner perception1 is a characteristic of a reality gains plausibility from ,kant's implicit treatment of our states as appearances due to ourselves4 ,again1 ,kant's account of time will be found to treat something represented or perceived as also a perception4 ,we find two consecutive paragraphs#ac of which the aim is apparently to establish the contrary conclusions3 7#a7 that time is only the form of our internal state and not of external phenomena1 and 7#b7 that time is the formal condition of all phenomena1 external and internal4 #ac ,b4 #di-ej 7b7 and 7c71 ,m4 #cj 7b7 and 7c74 ,to establish the first conclusion1 ,kant argues that time has nothing to do with shape or position1 but1 on the contrary1 determines the relation of representations in our internal state4 ,his meaning is that we have a succession of perceptions or representations of bodies in space1#ad and that while the bodies perceived are not related temporally1 our perceptions or representations of them are so related4 ,here 'representations' refers to our apprehension1 and is distinguished from what is represented1 viz4 bodies in space4 #ad ,kant here refers to bodies by the term 'phenomena'1 but their character as phenomena is not relevant to his argument4 ,how1 then1 does ,kant reach the second result8 ,he remembers that bodies in space are 'phenomena'1 i4 e4 representations4 ,he is1 therefore1 able to point out that all representations belong1 as determinations of the mind1 to our internal state1 whether they have external things1 i4 e4 bodies in space1 for their objects or not1 and that1 consequently1 they are subject to time4 ,hence time is concluded to be the form of all phenomena4 ,in this second argument1 however1 it is clear that ,kant has passed from his previous treatment of bodies in space as something represented or perceived to the treatment of them as themselves representations or perceptions4#ae #ae ,it may be noted that ,kant's assertion 7,b4 #ej1 ,m4 #ca7 that time is the immediate condition of internal phenomena1 and thereby also mediately the condition of external phenomena1 does not help to reconcile the two positions4 ,in conclusion1 we may point out an insoluble difficulty in ,kant's account of time4 ,his treatment of space and time as the forms of outer and inner sense respectively implies that1 while spatial relations apply to the realities which we perceive1 temporal relations apply solely to our perceptions of them4 ,unfortunately1 however1 as ,kant in certain contexts is clearly aware1 time also belongs to the realities perceived4 ,the moon1 for instance1 moves round the earth4 ,thus there are what may be called real successions as well as successions in our perception4 ,further1 not only are we aware of this distinction in general1 but in particular cases we succeed in distinguishing a succession of the one kind from a succession of the other4 ,yet from ,kant's standpoint it would be impossible to distinguish them in particular cases1 and even to be aware of the distinction in general4 ,for the distinction is possible only so long as a distinction is allowed between our perceptions and the realities perceived4 ,but for ,kant this distinction has disappeared1 for in the end the realities perceived are merely our perceptions2 and time1 if it be a characteristic of anything1 must be a characteristic only of our perceptions4 ,,chapter ,,vii ,,the ,,metaphysical ,,deduction ,,of ,,the ,,categories ,the aim of the ,aesthetic is to answer the first question of the ,critique propounded in the ,introduction1 viz4 ',how is pure mathematics possible8'#a ,the aim of the ,analytic is to answer the second question1 viz4 ',how is pure natural science possible8' ,it has previously#b been implied that the two questions are only verbally of the same kind4 ,since ,kant thinks of the judgements of mathematics as self-evident1 and therefore as admitting of no reasonable doubt#c1 he takes their truth for granted4 ,hence the question1 ',how is pure mathematics possible8' means ',granted the truth of mathematical judgements1 what inference can we draw concerning the nature of the reality to which they relate8'2 and the inference is to proceed from the truth of the judgements to the nature of the reality to which they relate4 ,kant1 however1 considers that the principles underlying natural science1 of which the law of causality is the most prominent1 are not self-evident1 and consequently need proof4#d ,hence1 the question1 ',how is pure natural science possible8' means ',what justifies the assertion that the presuppositions of natural science are true8' and the inference is to proceed from the nature of the objects of natural science to the truth of the a priori judgements which relate to them4 #a ,b4 #bj1 ,m4 #ac4 #b pp4 #bc-e4 #c ,cf4 p4 #bd1 note #a4 #d ,cf4 p4 #bd1 notes #b and #c4 ,again1 as ,kant rightly sees1 the vindication of the presuppositions of natural science1 to be complete1 requires the discovery upon a definite principle of all these presuppositions4 ,the clue to this discovery he finds in the view that1 just as the perceptions of space and time originate in the sensibility1 so the a priori conceptions and laws which underlie natural science originate in the understanding2 for1 on this view1 the discovery of all the conceptions and laws which originate in the understanding will be at the same time the discovery of all the presuppositions of natural science4 ,kant therefore in the ,analytic has a twofold problem to solve4 ,he has firstly to discover the conceptions and laws which belong to the understanding as such1 and secondly to vindicate their application to individual things4 ,moreover1 although it is obvious that the conceptions and the laws of the understanding must be closely related1#e he reserves them for separate treatment4 #e ,e4 g4 the conception of 'cause and effect'1 and the law that 'all changes take place according to the law of the connexion between cause and effect'4 ,the ,analytic is accordingly subdivided into the ,analytic of ,conceptions and the ,analytic of ,principles4 ,the ,analytic of ,conceptions1 again1 is divided into the ,metaphysical ,deduction of the ,categories1 the aim of which is to discover the conceptions of the understanding1 and the ,transcendental ,deduction of the ,categories1 the aim of which is to vindicate their validity1 i4 e4 their applicability to individual things4 ,it should further be noticed that1 according to ,kant1 it is the connexion of the a priori conceptions and laws underlying natural science with the understanding which constitutes the main difficulty of the vindication of their validity1 and renders necessary an answer of a different kind to that which would have been possible1 if the validity of mathematical judgements had been in question4 ,we have been able above1 with little trouble1 to make comprehensible how the conceptions of space and time1 although a priori knowledge1 must necessarily relate to objects and render possible a synthetic knowledge of them independently of all experience4 ,for since an object can appear to us1 i4 e4 be an object of empirical perception1 only by means of such pure forms of sensibility1 space and time are pure perceptions1 which contain a priori the condition of the possibility of objects as phenomena1 and the synthesis in space and time has objective validity4 ,on the other hand1 the categories of the understanding do not represent the conditions under which objects are given in perception2 consequently1 objects can certainly appear to us without their necessarily being related to functions of the understanding1 and therefore without the understanding containing a priori the conditions of these objects4 ,hence a difficulty appears here1 which we did not meet in the field of sensibility1 viz4 how subjective conditions of thought can have objective validity1 i4 e4 can furnish conditions of the possibility of all knowledge of objects2 for phenomena can certainly be given us in perception without the functions of the understanding4 ,let us take1 for example1 the conception of cause1 which indicates a peculiar kind of synthesis in which on ,a something entirely different ,b is placed#f according to a law4 ,it is not a priori clear why phenomena should contain something of this kind 444 and it is consequently doubtful a priori1 whether such a conception is not wholly empty1 and without any corresponding object among phenomena4 ,for that objects of sensuous perception must conform to the formal conditions of the sensibility which lie a priori in the mind is clear1 since otherwise they would not be objects for us2 but that they must also conform to the conditions which the understanding requires for the synthetical unity of thought is a conclusion the cogency of which it is not so easy to see4 ,for phenomena might quite well be so constituted that the understanding did not find them in conformity with the conditions of its unity1 and everything might lie in such confusion that1 e4 g4 in the succession of phenomena1 nothing might present itself which would offer a rule of synthesis1 and so correspond to the conception of cause and effect1 so that this conception would be quite empty1 null1 and meaningless4 ,phenomena would none the less present objects to our perception1 for perception does not in any way require the functions of thinking4#g #f ,gesetzt4 #g ,b4 #aba-c1 ,m4 #ge-f4 ,this passage1 if read in connexion with that immediately preceding it1#h may be paraphrased as follows3 ',the argument of the ,aesthetic assumes the validity of mathematical judgements1 which as such relate to space and time1 and thence it deduces the phenomenal character of space and time1 and of what is contained therein4 ,at the same time the possibility of questioning the validity of the law of causality1 and of similar principles1 may lead us to question even the validity of mathematical judgements4 ,in the case of mathematical judgements1 however1 in consequence of their relation to perception1 an answer is readily forthcoming4 ,we need only reverse the original argument and appeal directly to the phenomenal character of space and time and of what is contained in them4 ,objects in space and time1 being appearances1 must conform to the laws according to which we have appearances2 and since space and time are only ways in which we perceive1 or have appearances1 mathematical laws1 which constitute the general nature of space and time1 are the laws according to which we have appearances4 ,mathematical laws1 then1 constitute the general structure of appearances1 and1 as such1 enter into the very being of objects in space and time4 ,but the case is otherwise with the conceptions and principles underlying natural science4 ,for the law of causality1 for instance1 is a law not of our perceiving but of our thinking nature1 and consequently it is not presupposed in the presentation to us of objects in space and time4 ,objects in space and time1 being appearances1 need conform only to the laws of our perceiving nature4 ,we have therefore to explain the possibility of saying that a law of our thinking nature must be valid for objects which1 as conditioned merely by our perceiving nature1 are independent of the laws of our thinking2 for phenomena might be so constituted as not to correspond to the necessities of our thought4' #h ,b4 #abj-a1 ,m4 #gc-d4 ,no doubt ,kant's solution of this problem in the ,analytic involves an emphatic denial of the central feature of this statement of it1 viz4 that phenomena may be given in perception without any help from the activity of the understanding4#i ,hence it may be urged that this passage merely expresses a temporary aberration on ,kant's part1 and should therefore be ignored4 ,nevertheless1 in spite of this inconsistency1 the view that phenomena may be given in perception without help from the activity of the understanding forms the basis of the difference of treatment which ,kant thinks necessary for the vindication of the judgements underlying natural science and for that of the judgements of mathematics4 #i ,cf4 ,b4 #acg-h1 ,m4 #he1 and ,b4 #afj note1 ,m4 #ih note4 ,we may now consider how ,kant 'discovers' the categories or conceptions which belong to the understanding as such4#aj ,his method is sound in principle4 ,he begins with an account of the understanding in general4 ,he then determines its essential differentiations4 ,finally1 he argues that each of these differentiations involves a special conception1 and that therefore these conceptions taken together constitute an exhaustive list of the conceptions which belong to the understanding4 #aj ,b4 #ia-aje1 ,m4 #ef-fc4 ,his account of the understanding is expressed thus3 ,the understanding was explained above only negatively1 as a non-sensuous faculty of knowledge4 ,now1 independently of sensibility1 we cannot have any perception2 consequently1 the understanding is no faculty of perception4 ,but besides perception there is no other kind of knowledge1 except through conceptions4 ,consequently1 the knowledge of every understanding1 or at least of every human understanding1 is a knowledge through conceptions1--not perceptive1 but discursive4 ,all perceptions1 as sensuous1 depend on affections2 conceptions1 therefore1 upon functions4 ,by the word function1 ,i understand the unity of the act of arranging different representations under one common representation4 ,conceptions1 then1 are based on the spontaneity of thinking1 as sensuous perceptions are on the receptivity of impressions4 ,now the understanding cannot make any other use of these conceptions than to judge by means of them4 ,since no representation1 except only the perception1 refers immediately to the object1 a conception is never referred immediately to an object1 but to some other representation thereof1 be that a perception or itself a conception4 ,a judgement1 therefore1 is the mediate knowledge of an object1 consequently the representation of a representation of it4 ,in every judgement there is a conception which is valid for many representations1 and among these also comprehends a given representation1 this last being then immediately referred to the object4 ,for example1 in the judgement ',all bodies are divisible'1 our conception of the divisible refers to various other conceptions2 among these1 however1 it is herein particularly referred to the conception of body1 and this conception of body is referred to certain phenomena which present themselves to us4 ,these objects1 therefore1 are mediately represented by the conception of divisibility4 ,accordingly1 all judgements are functions of unity in our representations1 since1 instead of an immediate1 a higher representation1 which comprehends this and several others1 is used for the knowledge of the object1 and thereby many possible items of knowledge are collected into one4 ,but we can reduce all acts of the understanding to judgements1 so that the understanding in general can be represented as a faculty of judging4#aa #aa ,b4 #ib-d1 ,m4 #ef-g4 ,it is not worth while to go into all the difficulties of this confused and artificial passage4 ,three points are clear upon the surface4 ,in the first place1 the account of the understanding now given differs from that given earlier in the ,critique#ab in that1 instead of merely distinguishing1 it separates the sensibility and the understanding1 and treats them as contributing1 not two inseparable factors involved in all knowledge1 but two kinds of knowledge4 ,in the second place1 the guise of argument is very thin1 and while ,kant ostensibly proves1 he really only asserts that the understanding is the faculty of judgement4 ,in the third place1 in describing judgement ,kant is hampered by trying to oppose it as the mediate knowledge of an object to perception as the immediate knowledge of an object4 ,a perception is said to relate immediately to an object2 in contrast with this1 a conception is said to relate immediately only to another conception or to a perception1 and mediately to an object through relation to a perception1 either directly or through another conception4 ,hence a judgement1 as being the use of a conception1 viz4 the predicate of the judgement1 is said to be the mediate knowledge of an object4 ,but if this distinction be examined1 it will be found that two kinds of immediate relation are involved1 and that the account of perception is not really compatible with that of judgement4 ,when a perception is said to relate immediately to an object1 the relation in question is that between a sensation or appearance produced by an object acting upon or affecting the sensibility and the object which produces it4 ,but when a conception is said to relate immediately to another conception or to a perception1 the relation in question is that of universal and particular1 i4 e4 that of genus and species or of universal and individual4 ,for the conception is said to be 'valid for' 7i4 e4 to 'apply to'7 and to 'comprehend' the conception or perception to which it is immediately related2 and again1 when a conception is said to relate mediately to an object1 the relation meant is its 'application' to the object1 even though in this case the application is indirect4 ,now if a perception to which a conception is related--either directly or indirectly through another conception--were an appearance produced by an object1 the conception could never be related to the object in the sense required1 viz4 that it applies to it2 for an appearance does not apply to but is produced by the object4 ,consequently1 when ,kant is considering a conception1 and therefore also when he is considering a judgement1 which is the use of a conception1 he is really thinking of the perception to which it is related as an object of perception1 i4 e4 as a perceived individual1 and he has ceased to think of a perception as an appearance produced by an object4#ac ,hence in considering ,kant's account of a conception and of judgement1 we should ignore his account of perception1 and therefore also his statement that judgement is the mediate knowledge of an object4 #ab ,b4 #gd-f1 ,m4 #de-f4 #ac ,kant1 in illustrating the nature of a judgement1 evades the difficulty occasioned by his account of perception1 by illustrating a 'perception' by the 'conception of body'1 and 'objects' by 'certain phenomena'4 ,he thereby covertly substitutes the relation of universal and individual for the relation of an appearance and the object which causes it4 ,if we do so1 we see that ,kant's account of judgement simply amounts to this3 ',judgement is the use of a conception or 'universal'2 the use of a conception or universal consists in bringing under it corresponding individuals or species4 ,consequently1 judgement is a function producing unity4 ,if1 for instance1 we judge ',all bodies are divisible'1 we thereby unify 'bodies' with other kinds of divisible things by bringing them under the conception of divisibility2 and if we judge ',this body is divisible' we thereby unify this divisible body with others by bringing it and them under the conception of divisibility4'#ad ,again1 since 'the understanding in general can be represented as a faculty of judging'1 it follows that the activity of the understanding consists in introducing unity into our representations1 by bringing individuals or species--both these being representations--under the corresponding universal or conception4#ae #ad ,it is not ,kant's general account of judgement given in this passage1 but the account of perception incompatible with it1 which leads him to confine his illustrations to universal judgements4 #ae ,we may note three minor points4 7#a7 ,kant's definition of function as 'the unity of the act of arranging i4 e4 the act which produces unity by arranging different representations under a common representation' has no justification in its immediate context1 and is occasioned solely by the forthcoming description of judgement4 7#b7 ,kant has no right to distinguish the activity which originates conceptions1 or upon which they depend1 from the activity which uses conceptions1 viz4 judgement4 ,for the act of arranging diverse representations under a common representation which originates conceptions is the act of judgement as ,kant describes it4 7#c7 ,it is wholly artificial to speak of judgement as 'the representation of a representation of an object'4 ,having explained the nature of the understanding1 ,kant proceeds to take the next step4 ,his aim being to connect the understanding with the categories1 and the categories being a plurality1 he has to show that the activity of judgement can be differentiated into several kinds1 each of which must subsequently be shown to involve a special category4 ,hence1 solely in view of the desired conclusion1 and in spite of the fact that he has described the activity of judgement as if it were always of the same kind1 he passes in effect from the singular to the plural and asserts that 'all the functions of the understanding can be discovered1 when we can completely exhibit the functions of unity in judgements'4 ,after this preliminary transition1 he proceeds to assert that1 if we abstract in general from all content of a judgement and fix our attention upon the mere form of the understanding1 we find that the function of thinking in a judgement can be brought under four heads1 each of which contains three subdivisions4 ,these1 which are borrowed with slight modifications from ,formal ,logic1 are expressed as follows4#af ,i4 ,quantity4 ,universal ,particular ,singular4 ,,ii4 ,quality4 ,affirmative ,negative ,infinite4 ,,iii4 ,relation4 ,categorical ,hypothetical ,disjunctive4 ,,iv4 ,modality4 ,problematic ,assertoric ,apodeictic4 ,these distinctions1 since they concern only the form of judgements1 belong1 according to ,kant1 to the activity of judgement as such1 and in fact constitute its essential differentiations4 #af ,b4 #ie1 ,m4 #eh4 ,now1 before we consider whether this is really the case1 we should ask what answer ,kant's account of judgement would lead us to expect to the question ',what are all the functions of unity in judgement8' ,the question must mean ',what are the kinds of unity produced by judgement8' ,to this question three alternative answers are prima facie possible4 7#a7 ,there is only one kind of unity1 that of a group of particulars unified through relation to the corresponding universal4 ,the special unity produced will differ for different judgements1 since it will depend upon the special universal involved4 ,the kind or form of unity1 however1 will always be the same1 viz4 that of particulars related through the corresponding universal4 ,for instance1 'plants' and 'trees' are unified respectively by the judgements ',this body is a plant' and ',this body is a tree'2 for 'this body' is in the one case related to other 'plants' and in the other case to other 'trees'4 ,and though the unity produced is different in each case1 the kind of unity is the same2 for plants and trees are1 as members of a kind1 unities of a special kind distinct from unities of another kind1 such as the parts of a spatial or numerical whole4 7#b7 ,there are as many kinds of unity as there are universals4 ,every group of particulars forms a unity of a special kind through relation to the corresponding universal4 7#c7 ,there are as many kinds of unity as there are highest universals or summa genera4 ,these summa genera are the most general sources of unity through which individuals are related in groups1 directly or indirectly4 ,the kinds of unity are therefore in principle the ,aristotelian categories1 i4 e4 the highest forms of being under which all individuals fall4 ,nevertheless1 it is easy to see that the second and third answers should be rejected in favour of the first4 ,for though1 according to ,kant1 a judgement unifies particulars by bringing them under a universal1 the special universal involved in a given judgement belongs not to the judgement as such1 but to the particulars unified4 ,what belongs to the judgement as such is simply the fact that the particulars are brought under a universal4 ,in other words1 the judgement as such determines the kind of unity but not the particular unity4 ,the judgements ',gold is a metal' and ',trees are green'1 considered merely as judgements and not as the particular judgements which they are1 involve the same kind of unity1 viz4 that of particulars as particulars of a universal2 for the distinction between 'metal' and 'green' is a distinction not of kinds of unity but of unities4 ,moreover1 to anticipate the discussion of ,kant's final conclusion1 the moral is that ,kant's account of judgement should have led him to recognize that judgement involves the reality1 not of any special universals or--in ,kant's language--conceptions1 but of universality or conception as such4 ,in other words1 on his view of judgement the activity of the understanding implies simply that there are universals or conceptions2 it does not imply the existence of special conceptions which essentially belong to the understanding1 e4 g4 that of 'cause' or 'plurality'4#ag #ag ,to this failure in ,kant's argument is due the difficulty in following his transition from 'function' to 'functions' of judgements4 ,the judgement1 as ,kant describes it1 always does one and the same thing2 it unifies particulars by bringing them under a universal4 ,this activity does not admit of differentiation4 ,if we now turn to the list of the activities of thought in judgement1 borrowed from ,formal ,logic1 we shall see that it is not in any way connected with ,kant's account of judgement4#ah ,for if the kinds of judgement distinguished by ,formal ,logic are to be regarded as different ways of unifying1 the plurality unified must be allowed to be not a special kind of group of particulars1 but the two conceptions which constitute the terms of the judgement#ai2 and the unity produced must be allowed to be in no case a special form of the unity of particulars related through the corresponding universal4 ,thus the particular judgement ',some coroners are doctors' must be said to unify the conceptions of 'coroner' and of 'doctor'1 and presumably by means of the conception of 'plurality'4 ,again1 the hypothetical judgement ',if it rains1 the ground will be wet' must be said to unify the judgements ',it rains' and ',the ground will be wet'1 and presumably by means of the conception of 'reason and consequence'4 ,in neither case can the act of unification be considered a special form of the act of recognizing particulars as particulars of the corresponding universal4 ,the fact is that the distinctions drawn by ,formal ,logic are based on a view of judgement which is different from1 and even incompatible with1 ,kant's1 and they arise from the attempt to solve a different problem4 ,the problem before ,kant in describing judgement is to distinguish the understanding from the sensibility1 i4 e4 thought from perception4 ,hence he regards judgement as the act of unifying a manifold given in perception1 directly1 or indirectly by means of a conception4 ,but this is not the problem with which ,formal ,logic is occupied4 ,formal ,logic assumes judgement to be an act which relates material given to it in the shape of 'conceptions' or 'judgements' by analysis of this material1 and seeks to discover the various modes of relation thereby effected4 ,the work of judgement1 however1 cannot consist both in relating particulars through a conception and in relating two conceptions or judgements4 #ah ,moreover1 the forms of judgement clearly lack the systematic character which ,kant claims for them4 ,even if it be allowed that the subdivisions within the four main heads of quantity1 quality1 relation1 and modality are based upon single principles of division1 it cannot be said that the four heads themselves originate from a common principle4 #ai ,in the case of the third division1 the plurality unified will be two prior judgements4 ,it may be urged that this criticism only affects ,kant's argument1 but not his conclusion4 ,possibly1 it may be said1 the list of types of judgement borrowed from ,formal ,logic really expresses the essential differentiations of judgement1 and1 in that case1 ,kant's only mistake is that he bases them upon a false or at least inappropriate account of judgement4#bj ,moreover1 since this list furnishes ,kant with the 'clue' to the categories1 provided that it expresses the essential differentiations of judgement1 the particular account of judgement upon which it is based is a matter of indifference4 #bj ,it may be noted that the account cannot be merely inappropriate to the general problem1 if it be incompatible with that assumed by ,formal ,logic4 ,this contention leads us to consider the last stage of ,kant's argument1 in which he deduces the categories in detail from his list of the forms of judgement4 ,for it is clear that unless the forms of judgement severally involve the categories1 it will not matter whether these forms are or are not the essential differentiations of judgement4 ,kant's mode of connecting the categories in detail with the forms of judgement discovered by ,formal ,logic is at least as surprising as his mode of connecting the latter with the nature of judgement in general4 ,since the twelve distinctions within the form of judgement are to serve as a clue to the conceptions which belong to the understanding1 we naturally expect that each distinction will be found directly to involve a special conception or category1 and that therefore1 to discover the categories1 we need only look for the special conception involved in each form of judgement4#ba ,again1 since the plurality unified in a judgement of each form is the two conceptions or judgements which form the matter of the judgement1 we should expect the conception involved in each form of judgement to be merely the type of relationship established between these conceptions or judgements4 ,this expectation is confirmed by a cursory glance at the table of categories4#bb ,i4 ,of ,quantity4 ,unity ,plurality ,totality4 ,,ii4 ,of ,quality4 ,reality ,negation ,limitation4 ,,iii4 ,of ,relation4 ,inherence and ,subsistence 7,substantia et ,accidens7 ,causality and ,dependence 7,cause and ,effect7 ,community 7,reciprocity between the agent and patient47 ,,iv4 ,of ,modality4 ,possibility--,impossibility ,existence--,non-existence ,necessity--,contingence4 ,if we compare the first division of these categories with the first division of judgements we naturally think that ,kant conceived singular1 particular1 and universal judgements to unify their terms by means of the conceptions of 'one'1 of 'some'1 and of 'all' respectively2 and we form corresponding1 though less confident1 expectations in the case of the other divisions4 #ba ,this expectation is confirmed by ,kant's view that judgement introduces unity into a plurality by means of a conception4 ,this view leads us to expect that different forms of judgement--if there be any--will be distinguished by the different conceptions through which they unify the plurality2 for it will naturally be the different conceptions involved which are responsible for the different kinds of unity effected4 #bb ,b4 #ajf1 ,m4 #fd4 ,kant1 however1 makes no attempt to show that each form of judgement distinguished by ,formal ,logic involves a special conception4 ,in fact1 his view is that the activities of thought studied by ,formal ,logic do not originate or use any special conceptions at all4 ,for his actual deduction of the categories#bc is occupied in showing that although thought1 when exercised under the conditions under which it is studied by ,formal ,logic1 does not originate and use conceptions of its own1 it is able under certain other conditions to originate and use such conceptions1 i4 e4 categories4#bd ,hence if we attend only to the professed procedure of the deduction1 we are compelled to admit that the deduction not only excludes any use of the 'clue' to the categories1 supposed to be furnished by ,formal ,logic1 but even fails to deduce them at all4 ,for it does not even nominally attempt to discover the categories in detail1 but reverts to the prior task of showing merely that there are categories4 ,doubtless ,kant thinks that the forms of judgement formulated by ,formal ,logic in some way suggest the conceptions which become operative in thought under these other conditions4 ,nevertheless1 it is impossible to see how these forms of judgement can suggest these conceptions1 unless they actually presuppose them4 ,it is clear1 however1 that the professed link#be between the forms of judgement and the categories does not represent the actual process by which ,kant reached his list of categories2 for he could never have reached any list of categories by an argument which was merely directed to show that there are categories4 ,moreover1 an inspection of the list shows that he actually reached it partly by noticing the conceptions which the forms of judgement seemed to presuppose1 and partly by bearing in mind the general conceptions underlying physics which it was his ultimate aim to vindicate4 ,since this is the case1 and since the categories can only be connected with the forms of judgement by showing that they are presupposed in them1 the proper question to be considered from the point of view of the metaphysical deduction is simply whether the forms of judgement really presuppose the categories4#bf #bc ,b4 #ajb-e1 ,m4 #fb-c4 #bd ,cf4 p4 #aff4 #be ,b4 #ajb-e1 ,m4 #fb-c4 #bf ,as we shall see later1 the real importance of the passage in which ,kant professes to effect the transition from the forms of judgement to the categories 7,b4 #ajb-e1 ,m4 #fb-c7 lies in its introduction of a new and important line of thought1 on which the transcendental deduction turns4 ,consideration of it is therefore deferred to the next chapter4 ,if1 however1 we examine the forms of judgement distinguished by ,formal ,logic1 we find that they do not presuppose the categories4 ,to see this1 it is only necessary to examine the four main divisions of judgement seriatim4 ,the first division of judgements is said to be a division in respect of quantity into singular1 particular1 and universal4 ,so stated1 the division is numerical4 ,it is a division of judgements according as they make an assertion about one1 more than one1 or all the members of a kind4 ,each species may be said to presuppose 7#a7 the conception of quantity1 and 7#b7 a conception peculiar to itself3 the first presupposing the conception of one member of a kind1 the second that of more than one but less than all members of a kind1 the third that of all members of a kind4 ,moreover1 a judgement of each kind may perhaps be said to relate the predicate conception to the subject conception by means of one of these three conceptions4 ,the fundamental division1 however1 into which universal and singular judgements enter is not numerical at all1 and ignores particular judgements altogether4 ,it is that between such judgements as ',three-sided figures1 as such1 are three-angled' and ',this man is tall'4 ,the essential distinction is that in the universal judgement the predicate term is apprehended to belong to the subject through our insight that it is necessitated by the nature of the subject term1 while in the singular judgement our apprehension that the predicate term belongs to the subject is based upon the perception or experience of the coexistence of predicate and subject terms in a common subject4 ,in other words1 it is the distinction between an a priori judgement and a judgement of perception4#bg ,the merely numerically universal judgement1 and the merely numerically particular judgement#bh are simply aggregates of singular judgements1 and therefore are indistinguishable in principle from the singular judgement4 ,if then we ask what conceptions are really presupposed by the kinds of judgement which ,kant seeks to distinguish in the first division1 we can only reply that the universal judgement presupposes the conception of a connected or systematic whole of attributes1 and that the singular judgement presupposes the conception of the coexistence of two attributes in a common subject4 ,neither kind of judgement presupposes the conception of quantity or the conceptions of unity1 plurality1 and totality4 #bg ,i owe this view of the distinction to ,professor ,cook ,wilson's lectures on logic4 #bh ',some coroners are doctors' of course in some contexts means1 'it is possible for a coroner to be a doctor1' and is therefore not numerical2 but understood in this sense it is merely a weakened form of the universal judgement in which the connexion apprehended between subject and predicate terms is incomplete4 ,the second division of judgements is said to be a division in respect of quality into affirmative1 negative1 and infinite1 i4 e4 into species which may be illustrated by the judgements1 ',a college is a place of education1' ',a college is not a hotel1' and ',a college is a not-hotel'4 ,the conceptions involved are said to be those of reality1 of negation1 and of limitation respectively4 ,the conception of limitation may be ignored1 since the infinite judgement said to presuppose it is a fiction4 ,on the other hand1 the conceptions of reality and negation1 even if their existence be conceded1 cannot be allowed to be the conceptions presupposed4 ,for when we affirm or deny1 we affirm or deny of something not mere being1 but being of a particular kind4 ,the conceptions presupposed are rather those of identity and difference4 ,it is only because differences fall within an identity that we can affirm1 and it is only because within an identity there are differences that we can deny4 ,the third division of judgements is said to be in respect of relation into categorical1 hypothetical1 and disjunctive judgements4 ,here1 again1 the conclusion which ,kant desires is clearly impossible4 ,the categorical judgement may be said to presuppose the conception of subject and attribute1 but not that of substance and accident4 ,the hypothetical judgement may be conceded to presuppose the conception of reason and consequence1 but it certainly does not presuppose the conception of cause and effect4#bi ,lastly1 while the disjunctive judgement may be said to presuppose the conception of mutually exclusive species of a genus1 it certainly does not presuppose the conception of reciprocal action between physical things4 #bi ,no doubt1 as the schematism of the categories shows1 ,kant does not think that the hypothetical judgement directly involves the conception of cause and effect1 i4 e4 of the relation of necessary succession between the various states of physical things4 ,the point is1 however1 that the hypothetical judgement does not involve it at all4 ,the fourth division of judgement is said to be in respect of modality into assertoric1 problematic1 and apodeictic1 the conceptions involved being respectively those of possibility and impossibility1 of actuality and non-actuality1 and of necessity and contingence4 ,now1 from the point of view of ,kant's argument1 these conceptions1 like those which he holds to be involved in the other divisions of judgement1 must be considered to relate to reality and not to our attitude towards it4 ,considered in this way1 they resolve themselves into the conceptions of-- 7#a7 the impossible 7impossibility72 7#b7 the possible but not actual 7possibility1 nonexistence72 7#c7 the actual but not necessary 7existence1 contingence72 7#d7 the necessary 7necessity74 ,but since it must1 in the end1 be conceded that all fact is necessary1 it is impossible to admit the reality of the conception of the possible but not actual1 and of the actual but not necessary4 ,there remain1 therefore1 only the conceptions of the necessary and of the impossible4 ,in fact1 however1 the distinctions between the assertoric1 the problematic1 and the apodeictical judgement relate to our attitude to reality and not to reality1 and therefore involve no different conceptions relating to reality4 ,it must1 therefore1 be admitted that the 'metaphysical' deduction of the categories breaks down doubly4 ,judgement1 as ,kant describes it1 does not involve the forms of judgement borrowed from ,formal ,logic as its essential differentiations2 and these forms of judgement do not involve the categories4 ,,chapter ,,viii ,,the ,,transcendental ,,deduction ,,of ,,the ,,categories ,the aim of the ,transcendental ,deduction is to show that the categories1 though a priori as originating in the understanding1 are valid1 i4 e4 applicable to individual things4 ,it is the part of the ,critique which has attracted most attention and which is the most difficult to follow4 ,the difficulty of interpretation is increased rather than diminished by the complete rewriting of this portion in the second edition4 ,for the second version1 though it does not imply a change of view1 is undoubtedly even more obscure than the first4 ,it indeed makes one new contribution to the subject by adding an important link in the argument1#a but the importance of the link is nullified by the fact that it is not really the link which it professes to be4 ,the method of treatment adopted here will be to consider only the minimum of passages necessary to elucidate ,kant's meaning and to make use primarily of the first edition4 #a ,cf4 p4 #bjf-aj4 ,it is necessary1 however1 first to consider the passage in the ,metaphysical ,deduction which nominally connects the list of categories with the list of forms of judgement4#b ,for its real function is to introduce a new and third account of knowledge1 which forms the keynote of the ,transcendental ,deduction4#c #b ,b4 #ajb-e1 ,m4 #fb-c4 ,cf4 pp4 #aee-f4 #c ,the first two accounts are 7#a7 that of judgement given ,b4 #ib-d1 ,m4 #ef-h1 and 7#b7 that of judgement implicit in the view that the forms of judgement distinguished by ,formal ,logic are functions of unity4 ,in ,a4 #abf1 ,mah4 #bae1 ,kant seems to imply--though untruly--that this new account coincides with the other two1 which he does not distinguish4 ,in this passage1 the meaning of which it is difficult to state satisfactorily1 ,kant's thought appears to be as follows3 ',the activity of thought studied by ,formal ,logic relates by way of judgement conceptions previously obtained by an analysis of perceptions4 ,for instance1 it relates the conceptions of body and of divisibility1 obtained by analysis of perceptions of bodies1 in the judgement ',bodies are divisible'4 ,it effects this1 however1 merely by analysis of the conception 'body'4 ,consequently1 the resulting knowledge or judgement1 though a priori1 is only analytic1 and the conceptions involved originate not from thought but from the manifold previously analysed4 ,but besides the conceptions obtained by analysis of a given manifold1 there are others which belong to thought or the understanding as such1 and in virtue of which thought originates synthetic a priori knowledge1 this activity of thought being that studied by ,transcendental ,logic4 ,two questions therefore arise4 ,firstly1 how do these conceptions obtain a matter to which they can apply and without which they would be without content or empty8 ,and1 secondly1 how does thought in virtue of these conceptions originate synthetic a priori knowledge8 ,the first question is easily answered1 for the manifolds of space and time1 i4 e4 individual spaces and individual times1 afford matter of the kind needed to give these conceptions content4 ,as perceptions 7i4 e4 as objects of perception71 they are that to which a conception can apply1 and as pure or a priori perceptions1 they are that to which those conceptions can apply which are pure or a priori1 as belonging to the understanding4 ,the second question can be answered by considering the process by which this pure manifold of space and time enters into knowledge4 ,all synthetic knowledge1 whether empirical or a priori1 requires the realization of three conditions4 ,in the first place1 there must be a manifold given in perception4 ,in the second place1 this manifold must be 'gone through1 taken up1 and combined'4 ,in other words1 if synthesis be defined as 'the act of joining different representations to one another and of including their multiplicity in one knowledge'1 the manifold must be subjected to an act of synthesis4 ,this is effected by the imagination4 ,in the third place1 this synthesis produced by the imagination must be brought to a conception1 i4 e4 brought under a conception which will constitute the synthesis a unity4 ,this is the work of the understanding4 ,the realization of a priori knowledge1 therefore1 will require the realization of the three conditions in a manner appropriate to its a priori character4 ,there must be a pure or a priori manifold2 this is to be found in individual spaces and individual times4 ,there must be an act of pure synthesis of this manifold2 this is effected by the pure imagination4 ,finally1 this pure synthesis must be brought under a conception4 ,this is effected by the pure understanding by means of its pure or a priori conceptions1 i4 e4 the categories4 ,this1 then1 is the process by which a priori knowledge is originated4 ,the activity of thought or understanding1 however1 which unites two conceptions in a judgement by analysis of them--this being the act studied by ,formal ,logic--is the same as that which gives unity to the synthesis of the pure manifold of perception--this being the act studied by ,transcendental ,logic4 ,consequently1 'the same understanding1 and indeed by the same activities whereby in dealing with conceptions it unifies them in a judgement by an act of analysis1 introduces by means of the synthetical unity which it produces in the pure manifold of perception a content into its own conceptions1 in consequence of which these conceptions are called pure conceptions of the understanding1'#d and we are entitled to say a priori that these conceptions apply to objects because they are involved in the process by which we acquire a priori knowledge of objects4' #d ,an interpretation of ,b4 #aje init41 ,m4 #fc fin4 ,a discussion of the various difficulties raised by the general drift of this passage1 as well as by its details1#e is unnecessary1 and would anticipate discussion of the ,transcendental ,deduction4 ,but it is necessary to draw attention to three points4 #e ,e4 g4 ,kant's arbitrary assertion that the operation of counting presupposes the conception of that number which forms the scale of notation adopted as the source of the unity of the synthesis4 ,this is of course refuted among other ways by the fact that a number of units less than the scale of notation can be counted4 ,in the first place1 as has been said1 ,kant here introduces--and introduces without warning--a totally new account of knowledge4 ,it has its origin in his theory of perception1 according to which knowledge begins with the production of sensations in us by things in themselves4 ,since the spatial world which we come to know consists in a multiplicity of related elements1 it is clear that the isolated data of sensation have somehow to be combined and unified1 if we are to have this world before us or1 in other words1 to know it4 ,moreover1 since these empirical data are subject to space and time as the forms of perception1 individual spaces and individual times1 to which the empirical data will be related1 have also to be combined and unified4 ,on this view1 the process of knowledge consists in combining certain data into an individual whole and in unifying them through a principle of combination4#f ,if the data are empirical1 the resulting knowledge will be empirical2 if the data are a priori1 i4 e4 individual spaces and individual times1 the resulting knowledge will be a priori4#g ,this account of knowledge is new1 because1 although it treats knowledge as a process or act of unifying a manifold1 it describes a different act of unification4 ,as ,kant first described the faculty of judgement1#h it unifies a group of particulars through relation to the corresponding universal4 ,as ,formal ,logic1 according to ,kant1 treats the faculty of judgement1 it unifies two conceptions or two prior judgements into a judgement4 ,as ,kant now describes the faculty of judgement or thought1 it unifies an empirical or an a priori manifold of perception combined into an individual whole1 through a conception which constitutes a principle of unity4 ,the difference between this last account and the others is also shown by the fact that while the first two kinds of unification are held to be due to mere analysis of the material given to thought1 the third kind of unification is held to be superinduced by thought1 and to be in no way capable of being extracted from the material by analysis4 ,further1 this new account of knowledge does not replace the others1 but is placed side by side with them4 ,for1 according to ,kant1 there exist both the activity of thought which relates two conceptions in a judgement1#i and the activity by which it introduces a unity of its own into a manifold of perception4 ,nevertheless1 this new account of knowledge1 or rather this account of a new kind of knowledge1 must be the important one2 for it is only the process now described for the first time which produces synthetic as opposed to analytic knowledge4 #f ,cf4 ,a4 #ig1 ,mah4 #aic1 ',knowledge is a totality of compared and connected representations4' #g ,no doubt ,kant would allow that at least some categories1 e4 g4 the conception of cause and effect1 are principles of synthesis of a manifold which at any rate contains an empirical element1 but it includes just one of the difficulties of the passage that it implies that a priori knowledge either is1 or involves1 a synthesis of pure or a priori elements4 #h ,b4 #ib-d1 ,m4 #ef-h4 #i ,kant1 of course1 thinks of this activity of thought1 as identical with that which brings particulars under a conception4 ,in the second place1 the passage incidentally explains why1 according to ,kant1 the forms of judgement distinguished by ,formal ,logic do not involve the categories4#aj ,for its doctrine is that while thought1 if exercised under the conditions under which it is studied by ,formal ,logic1 can only analyse the manifold given to it1 and so has1 as it were1 to borrow from the manifold the unity through which it relates the manifold1#aa yet if an a priori manifold be given to it1 it can by means of a conception introduce into the manifold a unity of its own which could not be discovered by analysis of the manifold4 ,thus thought as studied by ,formal ,logic merely analyses and consequently does not and cannot make use of conceptions of its own2 it can use conceptions of its own only when an a priori manifold is given to it to deal with4 #aj ,cf4 pp4 #aee-f4 #aa ,in bringing perceptions under a conception1 thought1 according to ,kant1 finds the conception in the perceptions by analysis of them1 and in relating two conceptions in judgement1 it determines the particular form of judgement by analysis of the conceptions4 ,in the third place1 there is great difficulty in following the part in knowledge assigned to the understanding4 ,the synthesis of the manifold of perception is assigned to the imagination1 a faculty which1 like the new kind of knowledge1 is introduced without notice4 ,the business of the understanding is to 'bring this synthesis to conceptions' and thereby to 'give unity to the synthesis'4 ,now the question arises whether 'the activity of giving unity to the synthesis' really means what it says1 i4 e4 an activity which unifies or introduces a unity into the synthesis1 or whether it only means an activity which recognizes a unity already given to the synthesis by the imagination4 ,prima facie ,kant is maintaining that the understanding really unifies1 or introduces the principle of unity4 ,for the twice-repeated phrase 'give unity to the synthesis' seems unmistakable in meaning1 and the important rle in knowledge is plainly meant to be assigned to the understanding4 ,kant's language1 however1 is not decisive2 for he speaks of the synthesis of the manifold as that which 'first produces a knowledge which indeed at first may be crude and confused and therefore needs analysis#ab'1 and he says of the conceptions which give unity to the synthesis that 'they consist solely in the representation#ac of this necessary synthetical unity'4#ad ,again1 'to bring the synthesis to a conception' may well be understood to mean 'to recognize the synthesis as an instance of the conception'2 and1 since ,kant is speaking of knowledge1 'to give unity to the synthesis' may only mean 'to give unity to the synthesis for us'1 i4 e4 'to make us aware of its unity'4 ,moreover1 consideration of what thought can possibly achieve with respect to a synthesis presented to it by the imagination renders it necessary to hold that the understanding only recognizes the unity of the synthesis4 ,for if a synthesis has been effected1 it must have been effected in accordance with a principle of construction or synthesis1 and therefore it would seem that the only work left for the understanding is to discover the principle latent in the procedure of the imagination4 ,at any rate1 if the synthesis does not involve a principle of synthesis1 it is impossible to see how thought can subsequently introduce a principle4 ,the imagination1 then1 must be considered to have already introduced the principle of unity into the manifold by combining it in accordance with a conception or principle of combination1 and the work of the understanding must be considered to consist in recognizing that the manifold has been thereby combined and unified through the conception4 ,we are therefore obliged to accept one of two alternatives4 ,either the understanding merely renders the mind conscious of the procedure of a faculty different from itself1 viz4 the imagination1 in which case the important rle in knowledge1 viz4 the effecting of the synthesis according to a principle1 is played by a faculty different from the understanding2 or the imagination is the understanding working unreflectively1 and the subsequent process of bringing the synthesis to a conception is merely a process by which the understanding becomes conscious of its own procedure4 ,moreover1 it is the latter alternative which we must accept as more in accordance with the general tenor of ,kant's thought4 ,for the synthesis of the imagination is essentially the outcome of activity or spontaneity1 and1 as such1 it belongs to the understanding rather than to the sensibility2 in fact we find ,kant in one place actually saying that 'it is one and the same spontaneity which at one time under the name of imagination1 at another time under that of understanding1 introduces connexion into the manifold of perception'4#ae ,further1 it should be noted that since the imagination must be the understanding working unreflectively1 and since it must be that which introduces unity into the manifold1 there is some justification for his use of language which implies that the understanding is the source of the unity1 though it will not be so in the sense in which the passage under discussion might at first sight lead us to suppose4 #ab ,the italics are mine4 #ac ,the italics are mine4 #ad ,cf4 the description of the imagination as 'blind'4 #ae ,b4 #afb note1 ,m4 #ii note4 ,cf4 ,b4 #aeb1 ,m4 #ic4 ,similarly at one point in the passage under discussion 7,b4 #ajb fin41 ,m4 #fb med47 the synthesis is expressly attributed to the spontaneity of thought4 ,we can now turn to the argument of the ,transcendental ,deduction itself4 ,kant introduces it in effect by raising the question1 ',how is it that1 beginning with the isolated data of sense1 we come to acquire knowledge8' ,his aim is to show 7#a7 that knowledge requires the performance of certain operations by the mind upon the manifold of sense2 7#b7 that this process is a condition not merely of knowledge1 but also of self-consciousness2 and 7#c7 that1 since the manifold is capable of entering into knowledge1 and since we are capable of being self-conscious1 the categories1 whose validity is implied by this process1 are valid4 ,kant begins by pointing out#af that all knowledge1 a priori as well as empirical1 requires the manifold1 produced successively in the mind1 to be subjected to three operations4 #af ,a4 #ie-ajd1 ,mah4 #aid-h4 #a4 ,since the elements of the manifold are as given mere isolated units1 and since knowledge is the apprehension of a unity of connected elements1 the mind must first run through the multiplicity of sense and then grasp it together into a whole1 i4 e4 into an image4#ag ,this act is an act of synthesis2 it is called 'the synthesis of apprehension' and is ascribed to the imagination4 ,it must be carried out as much in respect of the pure or a priori elements of space and time as in respect of the manifold of sensation1 for individual spaces and times contain a multiplicity which1 to be apprehended1 must be combined4#ah ,the necessity of this act of synthesis is emphasized in the second edition4 ,we cannot represent anything as combined in the object without having previously combined it ourselves4 ,of all representations1 combination is the only one which cannot be given through objects1#ai but can be originated only by the subject itself because it is an act of its own activity4#bj #ag ,cf4 ,a4 #abj1 ,mah4 #baa4 #ah ',combine' is used as the verb corresponding to 'synthesis'4 #ai ,i4 e4 given to us through the operation of things in themselves upon our sensibility4 #bj ,b4 #acj1 ,m4 #hj4 #b4 ,since the data of perception are momentary1 and pass away with perception1 the act of grasping them together requires that the mind shall reproduce the past data in order to combine them with the present datum4 ,it is plain that if ,i draw a line in thought1 or wish to think of the time from one midday to another1 or even to represent to myself a certain number1 ,i must first necessarily grasp in thought these manifold representations one after another4 ,but if ,i were continually to lose from my thoughts the preceding representations 7the first parts of the line1 the preceding parts of time or the units successively represented71 and were not to reproduce them1 while ,i proceeded to the succeeding parts1 there could never arise a complete representation1 nor any of the thoughts just named1 not even the first and purest fundamental representations of space and time4#ba ,this act of reproduction is called 'the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination'4#bb #ba ,a4 #ajb1 ,mah4 #aig4 #bb ,the term 'synthesis' is undeserved1 and is due to a desire to find a verbal parallel to the 'synthesis of apprehension in perception'4 ,for the inappropriateness of 'reproduction' and of 'imagination' see pp4 #bci-da4 ,further1 the necessity of reproduction brings to light a characteristic of the synthesis of apprehension4 ,it is indeed only an empirical law1 according to which representations which have often followed or accompanied one another in the end become associated1 and so form a connexion1 according to which1 even in the absence of the object1 one of these representations produces a transition of the mind to another by a fixed rule4 ,but this law of reproduction presupposes that phenomena themselves are actually subject to such a rule1 and that in the manifold of their representations there is a concomitance or sequence1 according to a fixed rule2 for1 without this1 our empirical imagination would never find anything to do suited to its capacity1 and would consequently remain hidden within the depths of the mind as a dead faculty1 unknown to ourselves4 ,if cinnabar were now red1 now black1 now light1 now heavy1 if a man were changed now into this1 now into that animal shape1 if our fields were covered on the longest day1 now with fruit1 now with ice and snow1 then my empirical faculty of imagination could not even get an opportunity of thinking of the heavy cinnabar when there occurred the representation of red colour2 or if a certain name were given now to one thing1 now to another1 or if the same thing were called now by one and now by another name1 without the control of some rule1 to which the phenomena themselves are already subject1 no empirical synthesis of reproduction could take place4 ,there must then be something which makes this very reproduction of phenomena possible1 by being the a priori foundation of a necessary synthetical unity of them4 ,but we soon discover it1 if we reflect that phenomena are not things in themselves1 but the mere play of our representations1 which in the end resolve themselves into determinations of our internal sense4 ,for if we can prove that even our purest a priori perceptions afford us no knowledge1 except so far as they contain such a combination of the manifold as renders possible a thoroughgoing synthesis of reproduction1 then this synthesis of imagination is based1 even before all experience1 on a priori principles1 and we must assume a pure transcendental synthesis of the imagination which lies at the foundation of the very possibility of all experience 7as that which necessarily presupposes the reproducibility of phenomena74#bc #bc ,a4 #ajj-b1 ,mah4 #aie-g4 ,in other words1 the faculty of reproduction1 if it is to get to work1 presupposes that the elements of the manifold are parts of a necessarily related whole2 or1 as ,kant expresses it later1 it presupposes the affinity of phenomena2 and this affinity in turn presupposes that the synthesis of apprehension by combining the elements of the manifold on certain principles makes them parts of a necessarily related whole4#bd #bd ,cf4 ,a4 #aac1 ,mah4 #bje2 ,a4 #aba-b1 ,mah4 #baa-ab2 and ,caird1 i4 #cfb-c4 ,for a fuller account of these presuppositions1 and for a criticism of them1 cf4 ,ch4 ,,ix1 p4 #bai and ff4 #c4 ,kant introduces the third operation1 which he calls 'the synthesis of recognition in the conception'1#be as follows3 #be ,this title also is a misnomer due to the desire to give parallel titles to the three operations involved in knowledge4 ,there is really only one synthesis referred to1 and the title here should be 'the recognition of the synthesis in the conception'4 ,without consciousness that what we are thinking is identical with what we thought a moment ago1 all reproduction in the series of representations would be in vain4 ,for what we are thinking would be a new representation at the present moment1 which did not at all belong to the act by which it was bound to have been gradually produced1 and the manifold of the same would never constitute a whole1 as lacking the unity which only consciousness can give it4 ,if in counting ,i forget that the units which now hover before my mind have been gradually added by me to one another1 ,i should not know the generation of the group through this successive addition of one to one1 and consequently ,i should not know the number1 for this conception consists solely in the consciousness of this unity of the synthesis4 ,the word 'conception'#bf might itself lead us to this remark4 ,for it is this one consciousness which unites the manifold gradually perceived and then also reproduced into one representation4 ,this consciousness may often be only weak1 so that we connect it with the production of the representation only in the result but not in the act itself1 i4 e4 immediately2 but nevertheless there must always be one consciousness1 although it lacks striking clearness1 and without it conceptions1 and with them knowledge of objects1 are wholly impossible4#bg #bf ,begriff4 #bg ,a4 #ajc-d1 ,mah4 #aig-h4 ,though the passage is obscure and confused1 its general drift is clear4 ,kant1 having spoken hitherto only of the operation of the imagination in apprehension and reproduction1 now wishes to introduce the understanding4 ,he naturally returns to the thought of it as that which recognizes a manifold as unified by a conception1 the manifold1 however1 being not a group of particulars unified through the corresponding universal or conception1 but the parts of an individual image1 e4 g4 the parts of a line or the constituent units of a number1 and the conception which unifies it being the principle on which these parts are combined4#bh ,his main point is that it is not enough for knowledge that we should combine the manifold of sense into a whole in accordance with a specific principle1#bi but we must also be in some degree conscious of our continuously identical act of combination1#cj this consciousness being at the same time a consciousness of the special unity of the manifold4 ,for the conception which forms the principle of the combination has necessarily two sides2 while from our point of view it is the principle according to which we combine and which makes our combining activity one1 from the point of view of the manifold it is the special principle#ca by which the manifold is made one4 ,if ,i am to count a group of five units1 ,i must not only add them1 but also be conscious of my continuously identical act of addition1 this consciousness consisting in the consciousness that ,i am successively taking units up to1 and only up to1 five1 and being at the same time a consciousness that the units are acquiring the unity of being a group of five4 ,it immediately follows1 though ,kant does not explicitly say so1 that all knowledge implies self-consciousness4 ,for the consciousness that we have been combining the manifold on a certain definite principle is the consciousness of our identity throughout the process1 and1 from the side of the manifold1 it is just that consciousness of the manifold as unified by being brought under a conception which constitutes knowledge4 ,even though it is ,kant's view that the self-consciousness need only be weak and need only arise after the act of combination1 when we are aware of its result1 still1 without it1 there will be no consciousness of the manifold as unified through a conception and therefore no knowledge4 ,moreover1 if the self-consciousness be weak1 the knowledge will be weak also1 so that if it be urged that knowledge in the strictest sense requires the full consciousness that the manifold is unified through a conception1 it must be allowed that knowledge in this sense requires a full or clear self-consciousness4 #bh ,cf4 pp4 #afb-i4 #bi ,that the combination proceeds on a specific principle only emerges in this account of the third operation4 #cj ,kant's example shows that this consciousness is not the mere consciousness of the act of combination as throughout identical1 but the consciousness of it as an identical act of a particular kind4 #ca ,when ,kant says 'this conception i4 e4 the conception of the number counted consists in the consciousness of this unity of the synthesis'1 he is momentarily and contrary to his usual practice speaking of a conception in the sense of the activity of conceiving a universal1 and not in the sense of the universal conceived4 ,similarly in appealing to the meaning of ,begriff 7conception7 he is thinking of 'conceiving' as the activity of combining a manifold through a conception4 ,as is to be expected1 however1 the passage involves a difficulty concerning the respective functions of the imagination and the understanding4 ,is the understanding represented as only recognizing a principle of unity introduced into the manifold by the imagination1 or as also for the first time introducing a principle of unity8 ,at first sight the latter alternative may seem the right interpretation4 ,for he says that unless we were conscious that what we are thinking is identical with what we thought a moment ago1 'what we are thinking would be a new representation which did not at all belong to the act by which it was bound to have been gradually produced1 and the manifold of the same would never constitute a whole1 as lacking the unity which only consciousness can give it4'#cb ,again1 in speaking of a conception--which of course implies the understanding--he says that 'it is this one consciousness which unites the manifold gradually perceived and then reproduced into one representation'4#cc ,but these statements are not decisive1 for he uses the term 'recognition' in his formula for the work of the understanding1 and he illustrates its work by pointing out that in counting we must remember that we have added the units4 ,moreover1 there is a consideration which by itself makes it necessary to accept the former interpretation4 ,the passage certainly represents the understanding as recognizing the identical action of the mind in combining the manifold on a principle1 whether or not it also represents the understanding as the source of this activity4 ,but if it were the understanding which combined the manifold1 there would be no synthesis which the imagination could be supposed to have performed1#cd and therefore it could play no part in knowledge at all1 a consequence which must be contrary to ,kant's meaning4 ,further if1 as the general tenor of the deduction shows1 the imagination is really only the understanding working unreflectively1#ce we are able to understand why ,kant should for the moment cease to distinguish between the imagination and the understanding1 and consequently should use language which implies that the understanding both combines the manifold on a principle and makes us conscious of our activity in so doing4 ,hence we may say that the real meaning of the passage should be stated thus3 ',knowledge requires one consciousness which1 as imagination1 combines the manifold on a definite principle constituted by a conception1#cf and1 as understanding1 is to some extent conscious of its identical activity in so doing1 this self-consciousness being1 from the side of the whole produced by the synthesis1 the consciousness of the conception by which the manifold is unified4' #cb ,the italics are mine4 ,he does not say 'we should not be conscious of what we are thinking as the same representation and as belonging ,greek3 ktl41 and we should not be conscious of the manifold as constituting a whole4 #cc ,the italics are mine4 #cd ,there could not1 of course1 be two syntheses1 the one being and the other not being upon a principle4 #ce ,cf4 pp4 #afh-i4 #cf ,in view of ,kant's subsequent account of the function of the categories it should be noticed that1 according to the present passage1 the conception involved in an act of knowledge is the conception not of an 'object in general'1 but of 'an object of the particular kind which constitutes the individual whole produced by the combination a whole of the particular kind that it is of'1 and that1 in accordance with this1 the self-consciousness involved is not the mere consciousness that our combining activity is identical throughout1 but the consciousness that it is an identical activity of a particular kind1 e4 g4 that of counting five units4 ,cf4 pp4 #ahd fin4-#ahf1 #aij-b1 and #bjf-g4 ,hitherto there has been no mention of an object of knowledge1 and since knowledge is essentially knowledge of an object1 ,kant's next task is to give such an account of an object of knowledge as will show that the processes already described are precisely those which give our representations1 i4 e4 the manifold of sense1 relation to an object1 and consequently yield knowledge4 ,he begins by raising the question1 ',what do we mean by the phrase 'an object of representations'8'#cg ,he points out that a phenomenon1 since it is a mere sensuous representation1 and not a thing in itself existing independently of the faculty of representations1 is just not an object4 ,to the question1 therefore1 ',what is meant by an object corresponding to knowledge and therefore distinct from it8' we are bound to answer from the point of view of the distinction between phenomena and things in themselves1 that the object is something in general x1 i4 e4 the thing in itself of which we know only that it is and not what it is4 ,there is1 however1 another point of view from which we can say something more about an object of representations and the correspondence of our representations to it1 viz4 that from which we consider what is involved in the thought of the relation of knowledge or of a representation to its object4 ,we find that our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it something of necessity1 since its object is regarded as that which prevents our cognitions#ch being determined at random or capriciously1 and causes them to be determined a priori in a certain way1 because in that they are to relate to an object1 they must necessarily also1 in relation to it1 agree with one another1 that is to say1 they must have that unity which constitutes the conception of an object4#ci #cg ,vorstellung in the present passage is perhaps better rendered 'idea'1 but representation has been retained for the sake of uniformity4 #ch ,erkenntnisse4 #ci ,a4 #ajd1 ,mah4 #aii4 ,kant's meaning seems to be this3 ',if we think of certain representations1 e4 g4 certain lines#dj or the representations of extension1 impenetrability1 and shape1#da as related to an object1 e4 g4 to an individual triangle or an individual body1 we think that they must be mutually consistent or1 in other words1 that they must have the unity of being parts of a necessarily related whole or system1 this unity in fact constituting the conception of an object in general1 in distinction from the conception of an object of a particular kind4 ,the latter thought in turn involves the thought of the object of representations as that which prevents them being anything whatever and in fact makes them parts of a system4 ,the thought therefore of representations as related to an object carries with it the thought of a certain necessity1 viz4 the necessary or systematic unity introduced into the representations by the object4 ,hence by an object of representations we mean something which introduces into the representations a systematic unity which constitutes the nature of an object in general1 and the relatedness of representations to1 or their correspondence with1 an object involves their systematic unity4'#db #dj ,cf4 ,a4 #aje1 ,mah4 #aii4 #da ,cf4 ,a4 #ajf1 ,mah4 #bjj4 #db ,it may be noticed that possession of the unity of a system does not really distinguish 'an object' from any other whole of parts1 nor in particular from 'a representation'4 ,any whole of parts must be a systematic unity4 ,certain points1 however1 should be noticed4 ,in the first place1 ,kant is for the moment tacitly ignoring his own theory of knowledge1 in accordance with which the object proper1 i4 e4 the thing in itself1 is unknowable1 and is reverting to the ordinary conception of knowledge as really knowledge of its object4 ,for the elements which are said1 in virtue of being related to an object1 to agree and to have the unity which constitutes the conception of an object must be elements of an object which we know2 for if the assertion that they agree is to be significant1 they must be determinate parts or qualities of the object1 e4 g4 the sides of an individual triangle or the impenetrability or shape of an individual body1 and therefore it is implied that we know that the object has these parts or qualities4 ,in the second place1 both the problem which ,kant raises and the clue which he offers for its solution involve an impossible separation of knowledge or a representation from its object4 ,kant begins with the thought of a phenomenon as a mere representation which1 as mental1 and as the representation of an object1 is just not an object1 and asks1 ',what is meant by the object of it8' ,he finds the clue to the answer in the thought that though a representation or idea when considered in itself is a mere mental modification1 yet1 when considered as related to an object1 it is subject to a certain necessity4 ,in fact1 however1 an idea or knowledge is essentially an idea or knowledge of an object1 and we are bound to think of it as such4 ,there is no meaning whatever in saying that the thought of an idea as related to an object carries with it something of necessity1 for to say so implies that it is possible to think of it as unrelated to an object4 ,similarly there is really no meaning in the question1 ',what is meant by an object corresponding to knowledge or to an idea8' for this in the same way implies that we can first think of an idea as unrelated to an object and then ask1 ',what can be meant by an object corresponding to it8'#dc ,in the third place1 ,kant only escapes the absurdity involved in the thought of a mere idea or a mere representation by treating representations either as parts or as qualities of an object4 ,for although he speaks of our cognitions1#dd i4 e4 of our representations1 as being determined by the object1 he says that they must agree1 i4 e4 they must have that unity which constitutes the conception of an object1 and he illustrates representations by the sides of an individual triangle and the impenetrability and shape of an individual body1 which are just as 'objective' as the objects to which they relate4 ,the fact is that he really treats a representation not as his problem requires that it should be treated1 i4 e4 as a representation of something1 but as something represented1#de i4 e4 as something of which we are aware1 viz4 a part or a quality of an object4 ,in the fourth place1 not only is that which ,kant speaks of as related to an object really not a representation1 but also--as we see if we consider the fact which ,kant has in mind--that to which he speaks of it as related is really not an object but one and the same object to which another so-called representation is related4 ,for what ,kant says is that representations as related to an object must agree among themselves4 ,but this statement1 to be significant1 implies that the object to which various representations are related is one and the same4 ,otherwise why should the representations agree8 ,in view1 therefore1 of these last two considerations we must admit that the real thought underlying ,kant's statement should be expressed thus3 ',we find that the thought that two or more parts or qualities of an object relate to one and the same object carries with it a certain necessity1 since this object is considered to be that which prevents these parts or qualities which we know it to possess from being determined at random1 because by being related to one and the same object1 they must agree among themselves4' ,the importance of the correction lies in the fact that what ,kant is stating is not what he thinks he is stating4 ,he is really stating the implication of the thought that two or more qualities or parts of some object or other1 which1 as such1 already relate to an object1 relate to one and the same object4 ,he thinks he is stating the implication of the thought that a representation which in itself has no relation to an object1 has relation to an object4 ,and since his problem is simply to determine what constitutes the relatedness to an object of that which in itself is a mere representation1 the distinction is important2 for it shows that he really elucidates it by an implication respecting something which already has relation to an object and is not a mental modification at all1 but a quality or a part of an object4 #dc ,cf4 pp4 #bcj-c4 #dd ,erkenntnisse4 #de ,vorgestellt4 ,kant continues thus3 ,but it is clear that1 since we have to do only with the manifold of our representations1 and the x1 which corresponds to them 7the object71 since it is to be something distinct from all our representations1 is for us nothing1 the unity which the object necessitates can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations4 ,i4 e4 since the object which produces systematic unity in our representations is after all only the unknown thing in itself1 viz4 x1#df any of the parts or qualities of which it is impossible to know1 that to which it gives unity can be only our representations and not its own parts or qualities4 ,for1 since we do not know any of its parts or qualities1 these representations cannot be its parts or qualities4 ,consequently1 the unity produced by this x can only be the formal unity of the combination of the manifold in consciousness4#dg ,then and then only do we say that we know the object1 i4 e4 we know that the manifold relates to an object#dh if we have produced synthetical unity in the manifold of perception4 ,but this unity would be impossible1 if the perception could not be produced by means of such a function of synthesis according to a rule as renders the reproduction of the manifold a priori necessary1 and a conception in which the manifold unifies itself possible4 ,thus we think a triangle as an object1 in that we are conscious of the combination of three straight lines in accordance with a rule by which such a perception can at any time be presented4 ,this unity of the rule determines all the manifold and limits it to conditions which make the unity of apperception possible1 and the conception of this unity is the representation of the objectx1 which ,i think through the aforesaid predicates of a triangle4 ,i4 e41 apparently1 'to conceive this unity of the rule is to represent to myself the object x1 i4 e4 the thing in itself1#di of which ,i come to think by means of the rule of combination4' #df ,cf4 p4 #ahc1 note #b4 #dg ',the formal unity' means not the unity peculiar to any particular synthesis1 but the character shared by all syntheses of being a systematic whole4 #dh ,the final sense is the same whether 'object' be here understood to refer to the thing in itself or to a phenomenon4 #di ,a comparison of this passage 7,a4 #ajd-e1 ,mah4 #aih-i7 with ,a4 #ajh-i1 ,mah4 #bja-b 7which seems to reproduce ,a4 #ajd-e1 ,mah4 #aih-i71 ,b4 #ebb-c1 ,m4 #cji and ,a4 #bej1 ,mah4 #bbd1 seems to render it absolutely necessary to understand by x1 and by the transcendental object1 the thing in itself4 ,cf4 also ,b4 #bcf1 ,m4 #adc 7'so soon as ,i raise my conception of an object to the transcendental meaning thereof1 the house is not a thing in itself but only a phenomenon1 i4 e4 a representation of which the transcendental object is unknown'71 ,a4 #cgb1 ,mah4 #bdg and ,a4 #cgi1 ,mah4 #bec4 ,in this passage several points claim attention4 ,in the first place1 it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that in the second sentence the argument is exactly reversed4 ,up to this point1 it is the thing in itself which produces unity in our representations4 ,henceforward it is we who produce the unity by our activity of combining the manifold4 ,the discrepancy cannot be explained away1 and its existence can only be accounted for by the exigencies of ,kant's position4 ,when he is asking ',what is meant by the object 7beyond the mind7 corresponding to our representations8' he has to think of the unity of the representations as due to the object4 ,but when he is asking ',how does the manifold of sense become unified8' his view that all synthesis is due to the mind compels him to hold that the unity is produced by us4 ,in the second place1 the passage introduces a second object in addition to the thing in itself1 viz4 the phenomenal object1 e4 g4 a triangle considered as a whole of parts unified on a definite principle4#ej ,it is this object which1 as the object that we know1 is henceforward prominent in the first edition1 and has exclusive attention in the second4 ,the connexion between this object and the thing in itself appears to lie in the consideration that we are only justified in holding that the manifold of sense is related to a thing in itself when we have unified it and therefore know it to be a unity1 and that to know it to be a unity is ipso facto to be aware of it as related to a phenomenal object2 in other words1 the knowledge that the manifold is related to an object beyond consciousness is acquired through our knowledge of its relatedness to an object within consciousness4 ,in the third place1 in view of ,kant's forthcoming vindication of the categories1 it is important to notice that the process by which the manifold is said to acquire relation to an object is illustrated by a synthesis on a particular principle which constitutes the phenomenal object an object of a particular kind4 ,the synthesis which enables us to recognize three lines as an object is not a synthesis based on general principles constituted by the categories1 but a synthesis based on the particular principle that the three lines must be so put together as to form an enclosed space4 ,moreover1 it should be noticed that the need of a particular principle is really inconsistent with his view that relation to an object gives the manifold the systematic unity which constitutes the conception of an object1 or that at least a ,greek3 hysteron proteron is involved4 ,for if the knowledge that certain representations form a systematic unity justifies our holding that they relate to an object1 it would seem that in order to know that they relate to an object we need not know the special character of their unity4 ,yet1 as ,kant states the facts1 we really have to know the special character of their unity in order to know that they possess systematic unity in general4#ea ,lastly1 it is easy to see the connexion of this account of an object of representations with the preceding account of the synthesis involved in knowledge4 ,kant had said that knowledge requires a synthesis of the imagination in accordance with a definite principle1 and the recognition of the principle of the synthesis by the understanding4 ,from this point of view it is clear that the aim of the present passage is to show that this process yields knowledge of an object2 for it shows that this process yields knowledge of a phenomenal object of a particular kind1 e4 g4 of a triangle or of a body1 and that this object as such refers to what after all is the object1 viz4 the thing in itself4 #ej ,compare ',the object of our perceptions is merely that something of which the conception expresses such a necessity of synthesis' 7,a4 #ajf1 ,mah4 #bjj71 and ',an object is that in the conception of which the manifold of a given perception is united' 7,b4 #acg1 ,m4 #hd74 ,cf4 also ,a4 #ajh1 ,mah4 #bja4 #ea ,kant's position is no doubt explained by the fact that since the object corresponding to our representations is the thing in itself1 and since we only know that this is of the same kind in the case of every representation1 it can only be thought of as producing systematic unity1 and not a unity of a particular kind4 ,the position is also in part due to the fact that the principles of synthesis involved by the phenomenal object are usually thought of by ,kant as the categories2 these of course can only contribute a general kind of unity1 and not the special kind of unity belonging to an individual object4 ,the position reached by ,kant so far is this4 ,knowledge1 as being knowledge of an object1 consists in a process by which the manifold of perception acquires relation to an object4 ,this process again is a process of combination of the manifold into a systematic whole upon a definite principle1 accompanied by the consciousness in some degree of the act of combination1 and therefore also of the acquisition by the manifold of the definite unity which forms the principle of combination4 ,in virtue of this process there is said to be 'unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold'1 a phrase which the context justifies us in understanding as a condensed expression for a situation in which 7#a7 the manifold of sense is a unity of necessarily related parts1 7#b7 there is consciousness of this unity1 and 7#c7 the consciousness which combines and is conscious of combining the manifold1 as being necessarily one and the same throughout this process1 is itself a unity4 ,kant then proceeds to introduce what he evidently considers the keystone of his system1 viz4 'transcendental apperception4' ,there is always a transcendental condition at the basis of any necessity4 ,hence we must be able to find a transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our perceptions1 and therefore also of the conceptions of objects in general1 consequently also of all objects of experience1 a ground without which it would be impossible to think any object for our perceptions2 for this object is no more than that something1 the conception of which expresses such a necessity of synthesis4 ,now this original and transcendental condition is no other than transcendental apperception4 ,the consciousness of self according to the determinations of our state in internal sense-perception is merely empirical1 always changeable2 there can be no fixed or permanent self in this stream of internal phenomena1 and this consciousness is usually called internal sense or empirical apperception4 ,that which is necessarily to be represented as numerically identical cannot be thought as such by means of empirical data4 ,the condition which is to make such a transcendental presupposition valid must be one which precedes all experience1 and makes experience itself possible4 ,now no cognitions#eb can occur in us1 no combination and unity of them with one another1 without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of perception1 and by relation to which alone all representation of objects is possible4 ,this pure original unchangeable consciousness ,i shall call transcendental apperception4 ,that it deserves this name is clear from the fact that even the purest objective unity1 viz4 that of a priori conceptions 7space and time7 is only possible by relation of perceptions to it4 ,the numerical unity of this apperception therefore forms the a priori foundation of all conceptions1 just as the multiplicity of space and time is the foundation of the perceptions of the sensibility4#ec #eb ,erkenntnisse4 #ec ,a4 #ajf-g1 ,mah4 #bjj-a4 ,the argument is clearly meant to be 'transcendental' in character2 in other words1 ,kant continues to argue from the existence of knowledge to the existence of its presuppositions4 ,we should therefore expect the passage to do two things3 firstly1 to show what it is which is presupposed by the 'unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold'#ed2 and secondly1 to show that this presupposition deserves the title 'transcendental apperception'4 ,unfortunately ,kant introduces 'transcendental apperception' after the manner in which he introduced the 'sensibility'1 the 'imagination' and the 'understanding'1 as if it were a term with which every one is familiar1 and which therefore needs little explanation4 ,to interpret the passage1 it seems necessary to take it in close connexion with the preceding account of the three 'syntheses' involved in knowledge1 and to bear in mind that1 as a comparison of passages will show1 the term 'apperception'1 which ,kant borrows from ,leibniz1 always has for ,kant a reference to consciousness of self or self-consciousness4 ,if this be done1 the meaning of the passage seems to be as follows3 #ed ,we should have expected this to have been already accomplished4 ,for according to the account already considered1 it is we who by our imagination introduce necessity into the synthesis of the manifold and by our understanding become conscious of it4 ,we shall therefore not be surprised to find that 'transcendental apperception' is really only ourselves as exercising imagination and understanding in a new guise4 ',to vindicate the existence of a self which is necessarily one and the same throughout its representations1 and which is capable of being aware of its own identity throughout1 it is useless to appeal to that consciousness of ourselves which we have when we reflect upon our successive states4 ,for1 although in being conscious of our states we are conscious of ourselves we are not conscious of ourselves as unchanging4 ,the self as going through successive states is changing1 and even if in fact its states did not change1 its identity would be only contingent2 it need not continue unchanged4 ,consequently1 the only course possible is to show that the self-consciousness in question is presupposed in any experience or knowledge4 ,now it is so presupposed4 ,for1 as we have already shown1 the relation of representations to an object presupposes one consciousness which combines and unifies them1 and is at the same time conscious of the identity of its own action in unifying them4 ,this consciousness is the ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold4 ,it may fairly be called transcendental1 because even a conception which relates to space or time1 and therefore is the most remote from sensation1 presupposes one consciousness which combines and unifies the manifold of space and time through the conception1 and is conscious of the identity of its own action in so doing4 ,it may1 therefore1 be regarded as the presupposition of all conceiving or bringing a manifold under a conception1 and therefore of all knowledge4 ,consequently1 since knowledge is possible1 i4 e4 since the manifold of representations can be related to an object1 there must be one self capable of being aware of its own identity throughout its representations4' ,at this point of ,kant's argument1 however1 there seems to occur an inversion of the thought4 ,hitherto1 ,kant has been arguing from the possibility of knowledge to the possibility of the consciousness of our own identity4 ,but in the next paragraph he appears to reverse this procedure and to argue from the possibility of self-consciousness to the possibility of knowledge4 ,but it is just this transcendental unity of apperception#ee which forms1 from all possible phenomena which can be together in one experience1 a connexion of them according to laws4 ,for this unity of consciousness would be impossible1 if the mind in the knowledge of the manifold could not become conscious of the identity of the function whereby it unites the manifold synthetically in one knowledge4 ,consequently1 the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all phenomena according to conceptions1 i4 e4 according to rules which not only make them necessarily reproducible1 but thereby determine an object for their perception1 i4 e4 determine the conception of something in which they are necessarily connected4 ,for the mind could not possibly think the identity of itself in the manifold of its representations1 and this indeed a priori1 if it had not before its eyes the identity of its action which subjects all synthesis of apprehension 7which is empirical7 to a transcendental unity1 and first makes possible its connexion according to rules4 #ee ,kant seems here and elsewhere to use the phrase 'transcendental unity of apperception' as synonymous with 'transcendental apperception'1 the reason1 presumably1 being that transcendental apperception is a unity4 ,the argument seems indisputably to be as follows3 ',the mind is necessarily able to be aware of its own identity throughout its manifold representations4 ,to be aware of this1 it must be aware of the identity of the activity by which it combines the manifold of representations into a systematic whole4 ,therefore it must be capable of combining1 and of being conscious of its activity in combining1 all phenomena which can be its representations into such a whole4 ,but this process1 from the point of view of the representations combined1 is the process by which they become related to an object and so enter into knowledge4 ,therefore1 since we are capable of being conscious of our identity with respect to all phenomena which can be our representations1 the process of combination and consciousness of combination which constitutes knowledge must be possible with respect to them4' ,thus the thought of this and the preceding paragraph seems to involve a circle4 ,first the possibility of self-consciousness is deduced from the possibility of knowledge1 and then the possibility of knowledge is deduced from the possibility of self-consciousness4 ,an issue therefore arises1 the importance of which can be seen by reference to the final aim of the 'deduction'1 viz4 the vindication of the categories4 ,the categories are 'fundamental conceptions which enable us to think objects in general#ef for phenomena'#eg2 in other words1 they are the principles of the synthesis by which the manifold of sense becomes related to an object4 ,hence1 if this be granted1 the proof that the categories are applicable to objects consists in showing that the manifold can be subjected to this synthesis4 ,the question therefore arises whether ,kant's real starting-point for establishing the possibility of this synthesis and therefore the applicability of the categories1 is to be found in the possibility of knowledge1 or in the possibility of self-consciousness1 or in both4 ,in other words1 does ,kant start from the position that all representations must be capable of being related to an object1 or from the position that we must be capable of being conscious of our identity with respect to all of them1 or from both8 #ef ,objecte berhaupt1 i4 e4 objects of any kind in distinction not from objects of a particular kind but from no objects at all4 #eg ,a4 #aaa1 ,mah4 #bjd ,prima facie the second position is the more plausible basis for the desired conclusion4 ,on the one hand1 it does not seem obvious that the manifold must be capable of being related to an object2 for even if it be urged that otherwise we should have only 'a random play of representations1 less than a dream'#eh1 it may be replied1 that this might be or might come to be the case4 ,on the other hand1 the fact that our representations are ours necessarily seems to presuppose that we are identical subjects of these representations1 and recognition of this fact is the consciousness of our identity4 #eh ,a4 #aab1 ,mah4 #bjd4 ,if we turn to the text for an answer to this question1 we find that ,kant seems not only to use both starting-points1 but even to regard them as equivalents4 ,thus in introducing the categories#ei ,kant begins by appealing to the necessity for knowledge that representations should relate to an object4 #ei ,a4 #aaj-ab1 ,mah4 #bjc-d4 ,unity of synthesis according to empirical conceptions would be purely contingent1 and were these not based on a transcendental ground of unity1 it would be possible for a confused crowd of phenomena to fill our soul1 without the possibility of experience ever arising therefrom4 ,but then also all relation of knowledge to objects would fall away1 because knowledge would lack connexion according to universal and necessary laws2 it would be thoughtless perception but never knowledge1 and therefore for us as good as nothing4 ,the a priori conditions of any possible experience whatever are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience4 ,now ,i assert that the above mentioned categories are nothing but the conditions of thinking in any possible experience1 just as space and time are the conditions of perception requisite for the same4 ,the former therefore are also fundamental conceptions by which we think objects in general for phenomena1 and are therefore objectively valid a priori--which is exactly what we wished to know4 ,the next sentence1 however1 bases the necessity of the categories on the possibility of self-consciousness1 without giving any indication that a change of standpoint is involved4 ,but the possibility1 nay1 even the necessity1 of these categories rests on the relation which the whole sensibility1 and with it also all possible phenomena1 have to original apperception1 a relation which forces everything to conform to the conditions of the thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness1 i4 e4 to stand under universal functions of synthesis1 i4 e4 of synthesis according to conceptions1 as that wherein alone apperception can prove a priori its thorough-going and necessary identity4 ,finally1 the conclusion of the paragraph seems definitely to treat both starting-points as really the same4#fj ,thus the conception of a cause is nothing but a synthesis 7of the consequent in the time series with other phenomena7 according to conceptions2 and without such a unity1 which has its a priori rule and subjects phenomena to itself1 thorough-going and universal and therefore necessary unity of consciousness in the manifold of sense-perceptions would not be met with4 ,but then also these perceptions would belong to no experience1 consequently they would have no object1 and would be nothing but a blind play of representations1 less than a dream4 #fj ,cf4 ,a4 #aac1 ,mah4 #bje-f and ,a4 #ajh-aj1 ,mah4 #bjb-c4 ,the fact is that since for ,kant the synthesis of representations in accordance with the categories1 accompanied by the consciousness of it1 is at once the necessary and sufficient condition of the relatedness of representations to an object and of the consciousness of our identity with respect to them1 it seems to him to be one and the same thing whether1 in vindicating the synthesis1 we appeal to the possibility of knowledge or to the possibility of self-consciousness1 and it even seems possible to argue1 via the synthesis1 from knowledge to self-consciousness and vice versa4 ,nevertheless1 it remains true that the vindication of the categories is different1 according as it is based upon the possibility of relating representations to an object or upon the possibility of becoming self-conscious with respect to them4 ,it also remains true that ,kant vindicates the categories in both ways4 ,for while1 in expounding the three so-called syntheses involved in knowledge1 he is vindicating the categories from the point of view of knowledge1 when he comes to speak of transcendental apperception1 of which the central characteristic is the consciousness of self involved1 there is a shifting of the centre of gravity4 ,instead of treating representations as something which can become related to an object1 he now treats them as something of which1 as belonging to a self1 the self must be capable of being conscious as its own1 and argues that a synthesis in accordance with the categories is required for this self-consciousness4 ,it must be admitted then--and the admission is only to be made with reluctance--that when ,kant reaches transcendental apperception1 he really adopts a new starting-point1#fa and that the passage which introduces transcendental apperception by showing it to be implied in knowledge#fb only serves to conceal from ,kant the fact that1 from the point of view of the deduction of the categories1 he is really assuming without proof the possibility of self-consciousness with respect to all our representations1 as a new basis for argument4 #fa ,the existence of this new starting-point is more explicit1 ,a4 #aaf-g 7and note71 ,mah4 #bjh 7and note71 and ,a4 #abb1 ,mah4 #bab4 #fb ,a4 #ajg1 ,mah4 #bjj4 ,the approach to the categories from the side of self-consciousness is1 however1 more prominent in the second edition1 and consequently we naturally turn to it for more light on this side of ,kant's position4 ,there ,kant vindicates the necessity of the synthesis from the side of self-consciousness as follows3#fc #fc ,the main clauses have been numbered for convenience of reference4 #a4 ,it must be possible that the ',i think' should accompany all my representations2 for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought2 in other words1 the representation would be either impossible or at least for me nothing4 #b4 ,that representation which can be given before all thought is called perception4 ,all the manifold of perception has therefore a necessary relation to the ',i think' in the same subject in which this manifold is found4 #c4 ,but this representation#fd i4 e4 the ',i think' is an act of spontaneity1 i4 e4 it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility4 ,i call it pure apperception1 to distinguish it from empirical apperception1 or original apperception also1 because it is that self-consciousness which1 while it gives birth to the representation ',i think'1 which must be capable of accompanying all others and is one and the same in all consciousness1 cannot itself be accompanied by any other4#fe #d4 ,i also call the unity of it the transcendental unity of self-consciousness1 in order to indicate the possibility of a priori knowledge arising from it4 ,for the manifold representations which are given in a perception would not all of them be my representations1 if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness1 that is1 as my representations 7even though ,i am not conscious of them as such71 they must necessarily conform to the condition under which alone they can stand together in a universal self-consciousness1 because otherwise they would not all belong to me4 ,from this original connexion much can be concluded4 #fd ,this is an indisputable case of the use of representation in the sense of something represented or presented4 #fe ,i4 e4 consciousness of our identity is final2 we cannot1 for instance1 go further back to a consciousness of the consciousness of our identity4 #e4 ,that is to say1 this thorough-going identity of the apperception of a manifold given in perception contains a synthesis of representations1#ff and is possible only through the consciousness of this synthesis4#fg #f4 ,for the empirical consciousness which accompanies different representations is in itself fragmentary1 and without relation to the identity of the subject4 #g4 ,this relation1 therefore1 takes place not by my merely accompanying every representation with consciousness1 but by my adding one representation to another1 and being conscious of the synthesis of them4 #h4 ,consequently1 only because ,i can connect a manifold of given representations in one consciousness1 is it possible for me to represent to myself the identity of consciousness in these representations2 i4 e4 the analytical unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of a synthetical unity4 #i4 ,the thought1 ',these representations given in perception belong all of them to me' is accordingly just the same as1 ',i unite them in one self-consciousness1 or at least can so unite them2' #aj4 and although this thought is not itself as yet the consciousness of the synthesis of representations1 it nevertheless presupposes the possibility of this synthesis2 that is to say1 it is only because ,i can comprehend the manifold of representations in one consciousness1 that ,i call them all my representations2 for otherwise ,i should have as many-coloured and varied a self as ,i have representations of which ,i am conscious4 #aa4 ,synthetical unity of the manifold of perceptions1 as given a priori1 is therefore the ground of the identity of apperception itself1 which precedes a priori all my determinate thinking4 #ab4 ,but connexion does not lie in the objects1 nor can it be borrowed from them through perception and thereby first taken up into the understanding1 but it is always an operation of the understanding which itself is nothing more than the faculty of connecting a priori1 and of bringing the manifold of given representations under the unity of apperception1 which principle is the highest in all human knowledge4 #ff ,i understand this to mean ',this through and through identical consciousness of myself as the identical subject of a manifold given in perception involves a synthesis of representations'4 #fg ,the drift of the passage as a whole 7cf4 especially #af7 seems to show that here 'the synthesis of representations' means 'their connectedness' and not 'the act of connecting them'4 #ac4 ,now this principle of the necessary unity of apperception is indeed an identical1 and therefore an analytical1 proposition1 but nevertheless it declares a synthesis of the manifold given in a perception to be necessary1 without which the thorough-going identity of self-consciousness cannot be thought4 #ad4 ,for through the ,ego1 as a simple representation1 is given no manifold content2 in perception1 which is different from it1 a manifold can only be given1 and through connexion in one consciousness it can be thought4 ,an understanding1 through whose self-consciousness all the manifold would eo ipso be given1 would perceive2 our understanding can only think and must seek its perception in the senses4 #ae4 ,i am1 therefore1 conscious of the identical self1 in relation to the manifold of representations given to me in a perception1 because ,i call all those representations mine1 which constitute one4 #af4 ,but this is the same as to say that ,i am conscious a priori of a necessary synthesis of them1 which is called the original synthetic unity of apperception1 under which all representations given to me stand1 but also under which they must be brought through a synthesis4#fh #fh ,b4 #aca-e1 ,m4 #ha-d4 ,though this passage involves many difficulties1 the main drift of it is clear4 ,kant is anxious to establish the fact that the manifold of sense must be capable of being combined on principles1 which afterwards turn out to be the categories1 by showing this to be involved in the fact that we must be capable of being conscious of ourselves as the identical subject of all our representations4 ,to do this1 he seeks to prove in the first paragraph that self-consciousness in this sense must be possible1 and in the second that this self-consciousness presupposes the synthesis of the manifold4 ,examination of the argument1 however1 shows that the view that self-consciousness must be possible is1 so far as ,kant is concerned1#fi an assumption for which ,kant succeeds in giving no reason at all1 and that even if it be true1 it cannot form a basis from which to deduce the possibility of the synthesis4 #fi ,cf4 p4 #bjd1 note #c4 ,before1 however1 we attempt to prove this1 it is necessary to draw attention to three features of the argument4 ,in the first place1 it implies a somewhat different account of self-consciousness to that implied in the passages of the first edition which we have already considered4 ,self-consciousness1 instead of being the consciousness of the identity of our activity in combining the manifold1 is now primarily the consciousness of ourselves as identical subjects of all our representations1 i4 e4 it is what ,kant calls the analytical unity of apperception2 and consequently it is somewhat differently related to the activity of synthesis involved in knowledge4 ,instead of being regarded as the consciousness of this activity1 it is regarded as presupposing the consciousness of the product of this activity1 i4 e4 of the connectedness#gj of the manifold produced by the activity1 this consciousness being what ,kant calls the synthetical unity of apperception4#ga ,in the second place1 it is plain that ,kant's view is not that self-consciousness involves the consciousness of our representations as a connected whole1 but that it involves the consciousness of them as capable of being connected by a synthesis4 ,yet1 if it is only because ,i can connect 7and therefore apprehend as connected7 a manifold of representations in one consciousness1 that ,i can represent to myself the identity of consciousness in these representations1 self-consciousness really requires the consciousness of our representations as already connected2 the mere consciousness of our representations as capable of being connected would not be enough4 ,the explanation of the inconsistency seems to lie in the fact that the synthetic unity of which ,kant is thinking is the unity of nature4 ,for1 as ,kant of course was aware1 in our ordinary consciousness we do not apprehend the interconnexion of the parts of nature in detail1 but only believe that there is such an interconnexion2 consequently he naturally weakened the conclusion which he ought to have drawn1 viz4 that self-consciousness presupposes consciousness of the synthesis1 in order to make it conform to the facts of our ordinary consciousness4 ,yet1 if his argument is to be defended1 its conclusion must be taken in the form that self-consciousness presupposes consciousness of the actual synthesis or connexion and not merely of the possibility of it4 ,in the third place1 ,kant twice in this passage#gb definitely makes the act of synthesis1 which his argument maintains to be the condition of consciousness of the identity of ourselves1 the condition of the identity of ourselves4 ,the fact is that1 on ,kant's view1 the act of synthesis of the representations is really a condition of their belonging to one self1 the self being presupposed to be a self capable of self-consciousness4#gc #gj ,more accurately1 'of the possibility of the connectedness'4 #ga ,the same view seems implied ,a4 #aag-h1 ,mah4 #bjh4 ,kant apparently thinks of this consciousness as also a self-consciousness 7cf4 #i71 though it seems that he should have considered it rather as a condition of self-consciousness1 cf4 p4 #bjd1 note #b4 #gb ,sections #f and #aj4 #gc ,cf4 pp4 #bjb-c4 ,we may now turn to the first of the two main points to be considered1 viz4 the reason given by ,kant for holding that self-consciousness must be possible4 ,in the first paragraph 7 #a-d7 ,kant appears twice to state a reason1 viz4 in #a and #d4 ,what is meant by the first sentence1 ,it must be possible that the ',i think' should accompany all my representations2 for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought2 in other words1 the representation would either be impossible or at least for me nothing8 ,it is difficult to hold that 'my representations' here means objects of which ,i am aware1 and that the thesis to be established is that ,i must be capable of being conscious of my own identity throughout all awareness or thought of objects4 ,for the next sentence refers to perceptions as representations which can be given previously to all thought1 and therefore1 presumably1 as something of which ,i am not necessarily aware4 ,again1 the ground adduced for the thesis would be in part a mere restatement of it1 and in part nonsense4 ,it would be 'otherwise something would be apprehended with respect to which ,i could not be aware that ,i was apprehending it2 in other words1 ,i could not apprehend it since otherwise ,i could be aware that ,i was apprehending it'1 the last words being incapable of any interpretation4 ,it is much more probable that though ,kant is leading up to self-consciousness1 the phrase ',i think' here refers not to 'consciousness that ,i am thinking'1 but to 'thinking'4 ,he seems to mean ',it must be possible to apprehend all my 'affections' 7i4 e4 sensations or appearances in me71 for otherwise ,i should have an affection of which ,i could not be aware2 in other words1 there could be no such affection1 or at least it would be of no possible importance to me4'#gd ,and on this interpretation self-consciousness is not introduced till #c1 and then only surreptitiously4 ,on neither interpretation1 however1 does ,kant give the vestige of a reason for the possibility of self-consciousness4 ,again1 it seems clear that in #d 'my representations'1 and 'representations which belong to me' mean objects of which ,i am aware 7i4 e4 something presented72 for he says of my representations1 not that ,i may not be conscious of them--which he should have said if 'my representations' meant my mental affections of which ,i could become conscious--but that ,i may not be conscious of them as my representations4 ,consequently in #d he is merely asserting that ,i must be able to be conscious of my identity throughout my awareness of objects4 ,so far1 then1 we find merely the assertion that self-consciousness must be possible4#ge #gd ,a third alternative is to understand ,kant to be thinking of all thought as self-conscious1 i4 e4 as thinking accompanied by the consciousness of thinking4 ,but since in that case ,kant would be arguing from thinking as thinking1 i4 e4 as apprehending objects1 the possibility of self-consciousness would only be glaringly assumed4 #ge ,the same is true of ,a4 #aaf and ,a4 #aag note1 ,mah4 #bjh1 where ,kant also appears to be offering what he considers to be an argument4 ,in the next paragraph#gf--which is clearly meant to be the important one--,kant1 though he can hardly be said to be aware of it1 seems to assume that it is the very nature of a knowing self1 not only to be identical throughout its thoughts or apprehendings1 but to be capable of being conscious of its own identity4 #f runs3 ,the empirical consciousness which accompanies different representations is in itself fragmentary1 and without relation to the identity of the subject4 ,kant is saying that if there existed merely a consciousness of ,a which was not at the same time a consciousness of ,b and a consciousness of ,b which was not at the same time a consciousness of ,a1 these consciousnesses would not be the consciousnesses belonging to one self4 ,but this is only true1 if the one self to which the consciousness of ,a and the consciousness of ,b are to belong must be capable of being aware of its own identity4 ,otherwise it might be one self which apprehended ,a and then1 forgetting ,a1 apprehended ,b4 ,no doubt in that case the self could not be aware of its own identity in apprehending ,a and in apprehending ,b1 but none the less it would be identical in so doing4 ,we reach the same conclusion if we consider the concluding sentence of #aj4 ,it is only because ,i can comprehend the manifold of representations in one consciousness1 that ,i call them all my representations2 for otherwise ,i should have as many-coloured and varied a self as ,i have representations of which ,i am conscious4 ,doubtless if ,i am to be aware of myself as the same in apprehending ,a and ,b1 then1 in coming to apprehend ,b1 ,i must continue to apprehend ,a1 and therefore must apprehend ,a and ,b as related2 and such a consciousness on ,kant's view involves a synthesis4 ,but if ,i am merely to be the same subject which apprehends ,a and ,b1 or rather if the apprehension of ,a and that of ,b are merely to be apprehensions on the part of one and the same subject1 no such consciousness of ,a and ,b as related and1 therefore1 no synthesis is involved4 #gf #e-aa4 ,again1 the third paragraph assumes the possibility of self-consciousness as the starting-point for argument4 ,the thought#gg seems to be this3 ',for a self to be aware of its own identity1 there must be a manifold in relation to which it can apprehend itself as one and the same throughout4 ,an understanding which was perceptive1 i4 e4 which originated objects by its own act of thinking1 would necessarily by its own thinking originate a manifold in relation to which it could be aware of its own identity in thinking1 and therefore its self-consciousness would need no synthesis4 ,but our understanding1 which is not perceptive1 requires a manifold to be given to it1 in relation to which it can be aware of its own identity by means of a synthesis of the manifold4' ,if this be the thought1 it is clearly presupposed that any understanding must be capable of being conscious of its own identity4#gh #gg ,cf4 ,b4 #ach fin4-#aci init41 ,m4 #he fin4 #gh ,b4 #aci init41 ,m4 #he fin4 also assumes that it is impossible for a mind to be a unity without being able to be conscious of its unity4 ,further1 it is easy to see how ,kant came to take for granted the possibility of self-consciousness1 in the sense of the consciousness of ourselves as the identical subject of all our representations4 ,he approaches self-consciousness with the presupposition derived from his analysis of knowledge that our apprehension of a manifold does not consist in separate apprehensions of its elements1 but is one apprehension or consciousness of the elements as related4#gi ,he thinks of this as a general presupposition of all apprehension of a manifold1 and1 of course1 to discover this presupposition is to be self-conscious4 ,to recognize the oneness of our apprehension is to be conscious of our own identity4#hj #gi ,it is in consequence of this that the statement that 'a manifold of representations belongs to me' means1 with the probable exception of #a1 not1 ',i am aware of ,a1 ,i am aware of ,b1 ,i am aware of ,c1' but1 ',i am aware1 in one act of awareness1 of ,a ,b ,c as related' 7 ,,abc are 'connected in' or 'belong to' one consciousness74 ,cf4 #d1 #h 7'in one consciousness'71 #i1 #aj 7'in one consciousness'71 and ,a4 #aaf1 ,mah4 #bjh 7',these representations only represent anything in me by belonging with all the rest to one consciousness accepting ,erdmann's emendation mit allen anderen1 in which at any rate they can be connected'74 #hj ,the above criticism of ,kant's thought has not implied that it may not be true that a knowing mind is1 as such1 capable of being aware of its own unity2 the argument has only been that ,kant's proof is unsuccessful4 ,again1 to pass to the second main point to be considered1#ha ,kant has no justification for arguing from the possibility of self-consciousness to that of the synthesis4 ,this can be seen from the mere form of his argument4 ,kant1 as has been said1 seems first to establish the possibility of self-consciousness1 and thence to conclude that a synthesis must be possible4 ,but if1 as it is his point to urge1 consciousness of our identity only takes place through consciousness of the synthesis1 this method of argument must be invalid4 ,it would clearly be necessary to know that the synthesis is possible1 before and in order that we could know that self-consciousness is possible4 ,an objector has only to urge that the manifold might be such that it could not be combined into a systematic whole1 in order to secure the admission that in that case self-consciousness would not be possible4 #ha ,cf4 p4 #aih4 ,nevertheless1 the passage under consideration may be said to lay bare an important presupposition of self-consciousness4 ,it is true that self-consciousness would be impossible1 if we merely apprehended the parts of the world in isolation4 ,to be conscious that ,i who am perceiving ,c perceived ,b and ,a1 ,i must be conscious at once of ,a1 ,b1 and ,c1 in one act of consciousness or apprehension4 ,to be conscious separately of ,a and ,b and ,c is not to be conscious of ,a and ,b and ,c4 ,and1 to be conscious of ,a and ,b and ,c in one act of consciousness1 ,i must apprehend ,a1 ,b1 and ,c as related1 i4 e4 as forming parts of a whole or system4 ,hence it is only because our consciousness of ,a1 ,b1 and ,c is never the consciousness of a mere ,a1 a mere ,b1 and a mere ,c1 but is always the consciousness of ,a ,b ,c as elements in one world that we can be conscious of our identity in apprehending ,a1 ,b1 and ,c4 ,if per impossibile our apprehension be supposed to cease to be an apprehension of a plurality of objects in relation1 self-consciousness must be supposed to cease also4 ,at the same time1 it is impossible to argue from the consciousness of our identity in apprehending to the consciousness of what is apprehended as a unity1 and thence to the existence of that unity4 ,for1 apart from the consideration that in fact all thinking presupposes the relatedness or--what is the same thing--the necessary relatedness of objects to one another1 and that therefore any assertion to the contrary is meaningless1 the consciousness of objects as a unity is a condition of the consciousness of our identity1 and therefore any doubt that can be raised in regard to the former can be raised equally with regard to the latter4 ,we may now pass to the concluding portion of the deduction4 ,for the purpose of considering it1 we may sum up the results of the preceding discussion by saying that ,kant establishes the synthesis of the manifold on certain principles by what are really two independent lines of thought4 ,the manifold may be regarded either as something which1 in order to enter into knowledge1 must be given relation to an object1 or as something with respect to which self-consciousness must be possible4 ,regarded in either way1 the manifold1 according to ,kant1 involves a process of synthesis on certain principles1 which makes it a systematic unity4 ,now ,kant introduces the categories by maintaining that they are the principles of synthesis in question4 ,i assert that the above mentioned categories are nothing but the conditions of thinking in a possible experience4444 ,they are fundamental conceptions by which we think objects in general for phenomena4#hb ,a synthesis according to the categories is 'that wherein alone apperception can prove a priori its thorough-going and necessary identity'4#hc ,in the first edition this identification is simply asserted1 but in the second ,kant offers a proof4#hd #hb ,a4 #aaa1 ,mah4 #bjd4 ,cf4 ,a4 #aai1 ,mah4 #baj4 #hc ,a4 #aab1 ,mah4 #bjd4 #hd ,cf4 p4 #afa4 ,before1 however1 we consider the proof1 it is necessary to refer to a difficulty which seems to have escaped ,kant altogether4 ,the preceding account of the synthesis involved in knowledge and in self-consciousness implies1 as his illustrations conclusively show1 that the synthesis requires a particular principle which constitutes the individual manifold a whole of a particular kind4#he ,but1 if this be the case1 it is clear that the categories1 which are merely conceptions of an object in general1 and are consequently quite general1 cannot possibly be sufficient for the purpose4 ,and since the manifold in itself includes no synthesis and therefore no principle of synthesis1 ,kant fails to give any account of the source of the particular principles of synthesis required for particular acts of knowledge4#hf ,this difficulty--which admits of no solution--is concealed from ,kant in two ways4 ,in the first place1 when he describes what really must be stated as the process by which parts or qualities of an object become related to an object of a particular kind1 he thinks that he is describing a process by which representations become related to an object in general4#hg ,secondly1 he thinks of the understanding as the source of general principles of synthesis1 individual syntheses and the particular principles involved being attributed to the imagination2 and so1 when he comes to consider the part played in knowledge by the understanding1 he is apt to ignore the need of particular principles4#hh ,hence1 ,kant's proof that the categories are the principles of synthesis can at best be taken only as a proof that the categories1 though not sufficient for the synthesis1 are involved in it4 #he ,cf4 p4 #agg1 note #b1 and p4 #ahe4 #hf ,cf4 pp4 #bae-ag4 #hg ,cf4 pp4 #aha-b4 #hh ,cf4 p4 #bag4 ,the proof runs thus3 ,i could never satisfy myself with the definition which logicians give of a judgement in general4 ,it is1 according to them1 the representation of a relation between two conceptions4444 ,but if ,i examine more closely the relation of given representations#hi in every judgement1 and distinguish it1 as belonging to the understanding1 from their relation according to the laws of the reproductive imagination 7which has only subjective validity71 ,i find that a judgement is nothing but the mode of bringing given representations under the objective unity of apperception4 ,this is what is intended by the term of relation 'is' in judgements1 which is meant to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective4 ,for this term indicates the relation of these representations to the original apperception1 and also their necessary unity1 even though the judgement itself is empirical1 and therefore contingent1 e4 g4 ',bodies are heavy4' ,by this ,i do not mean that these representations necessarily belong to each other in empirical perception1 but that they belong to each other by means of the necessary unity of apperception in the synthesis of perceptions1 that is1 according to principles of the objective determination of all our representations1 in so far as knowledge can arise from them1 these principles being all derived from the principle of the transcendental unity of apperception4 ,in this way alone can there arise from this relation a judgement1 that is1 a relation which is objectively valid1 and is adequately distinguished from the relation of the very same representations which would be only subjectively valid1 e4 g4 according to laws of association4 ,according to these laws1 ,i could only say1 ',if ,i carry a body1 ,i feel an impression of weight'1 but not ',it1 the body1 is heavy'2 for this is tantamount to saying1 ',these two representations are connected in the object1 that is1 without distinction as to the condition of the subject1 and are not merely connected together in the perception1 however often it may be repeated4'#ij #hi ,erkenntnisse here is clearly used as a synonym for representations4 ,cf4 ,a4 #ajd1 ,mah4 #aii4 #ij ,b4 #adj-b1 ,m4 #hf-h2 cf4 ,prol41 #ah-bj4 ,this ground for the identification of the categories with the principles of synthesis involved in knowledge may be ignored1 as on the face of it unsuccessful4 ,for the argument is that since the activity by which the synthesis is affected is that of judgement1 the conceptions shown by the ,metaphysical ,deduction to be involved in judgement must constitute the principles of synthesis4 ,but it is essential to this argument that the present account of judgement and that which forms the basis of the ,metaphysical ,deduction should be the same2 and this is plainly not the case4#ia ,judgement is now represented as an act by which we relate the manifold of sense in certain necessary ways as parts of the physical world1#ib whereas in the ,metaphysical ,deduction it was treated as an act by which we relate conceptions2 and ,kant now actually says that this latter account is faulty4 ,hence even if the metaphysical deduction had successfully derived the categories from the account of judgement which it presupposed1 the present argument would not justify the identification of the categories so deduced with the principles of synthesis4 ,the fact is that ,kant's vindication of the categories is in substance independent of the ,metaphysical ,deduction4 ,kant's real thought1 as opposed to his formal presentation of it1 is simply that when we come to consider what are the principles of synthesis involved in the reference of the manifold to an object1 we find that they are the categories4#ic ,the success1 then1 of this step in ,kant's vindication of the categories is independent of that of the metaphysical deduction1 and depends solely upon the question whether the principles of synthesis involved in knowledge are in fact the categories4 #ia ,cf4 ,caird1 i4 #cdh-i note4 #ib ,we may notice in passing that this passage renders explicit the extreme difficulty of ,kant's view that 'the objective unity of apperception' is the unity of the parts of nature or of the physical world4 ,how can the 'very same representations' stand at once in the subjective relation of association and in the objective relation which consists in their being related as parts of nature8 ,there is plainly involved a transition from representation1 in the sense of the apprehension of something1 to representation1 in the sense of something apprehended4 ,it is objects apprehended which are objectively related2 it is our apprehensions of objects which are associated1 cf4 pp4 #bcc and #bha-b4 ,current psychology seems to share ,kant's mistake in its doctrine of association of ideas1 by treating the elements associated1 which are really apprehensions of objects1 as if they were objects apprehended4 #ic ,cf4 ,a4 #aab1 ,mah4 #bjd2 ,b4 #afb1 ,m4 #ii4 ,the substance of ,kant's vindication of the categories may therefore be epitomized thus3 ',we may take either of two starting-points4 ,on the one hand1 we may start from the fact that our experience is no mere dream1 but an intelligent experience in which we are aware of a world of individual objects4 ,this fact is conceded even by those who1 like ,hume1 deny that we are aware of any necessity of relation between these objects4 ,we may then go on to ask how it comes about that1 beginning as we do with a manifold of sense given in succession1 we come to apprehend this world of individual objects4 ,if we do so1 we find that there is presupposed a synthesis on our part of the manifold upon principles constituted by the categories4 ,to deny1 therefore1 that the manifold is so connected is implicitly to deny that we have an apprehension of objects at all4 ,but the existence of this apprehension is plainly a fact which even ,hume did not dispute4 ,on the other hand1 we may start with the equally obvious fact that we must be capable of apprehending our own identity throughout our apprehension of the manifold of sense1 and look for the presupposition of this fact4 ,if we do this1 we again find that there is involved a combination of the manifold according to the categories4' ,in conclusion1 attention may be drawn to two points4 ,in the first place1 ,kant completes his account by at once emphasizing and explaining the paradoxical character of his conclusion4 ,accordingly1 the order and conformity to law in the phenomena which we call nature we ourselves introduce1 and we could never find it there1 if we1 or the nature of our mind1 had not originally placed it there4#id ,however exaggerated or absurd then it may sound to say that the understanding itself is the source of the laws of nature and consequently of the formal unity of nature1 such an assertion is nevertheless correct and in accordance with the object1 i4 e4 with experience4#ie ,the explanation of the paradox is found in the fact that objects of nature are phenomena4 ,but if we reflect that this nature is in itself nothing else than a totality#if of phenomena and consequently no thing in itself but merely a number of representations of the mind1 we shall not be surprised that only in the radical faculty of all our knowledge1 viz4 transcendental apperception1 do we see it in that unity through which alone it can be called object of all possible experience1 i4 e4 nature4#ig ,it is no more surprising that the laws of the phenomena in nature must agree with the understanding and with its a priori form1 that is1 its faculty of connecting the manifold in general1 than that the phenomena themselves must agree with the a priori form of our sensuous perception4 ,for laws exist in the phenomena as little as phenomena exist in themselves2 on the contrary1 laws exist only relatively to the subject in which the phenomena inhere1 so far as it has understanding1 just as phenomena exist only relatively to the subject1 so far as it has senses4 ,to things in themselves their conformity to law would necessarily also belong independently of an understanding which knows them4 ,but phenomena are only representations of things which exist unknown in respect of what they may be in themselves4 ,but1 as mere representations1 they stand under no law of connexion except that which the connecting faculty prescribes4#ih #id ,a4 #abe1 ,mah4 #bad4 #ie ,a4 #abg1 ,mah4 #baf4 #if ,inbegriff4 #ig ,a4 #aad1 ,mah4 #bjf4 #ih ,b4 #afd1 ,m4 #ajj4 ,in the second place1 this last paragraph contains the real reason from the point of view of the deduction#ii of the categories for what may be called the negative side of his doctrine1 viz4 that the categories only apply to objects of experience and not to things in themselves4 ,according to ,kant1 we can only say that certain principles of connexion apply to a reality into which we introduce the connexion4 ,things in themselves1 if connected1 are connected in themselves and apart from us4 ,hence there can be no guarantee that any principles of connexion which we might assert them to possess are those which they do possess4 #ii ,the main passage 7,b4 #adf-i1 ,m4 #ij-b71 in which he argues that the categories do not apply to things in themselves1 ignores the account of a conception as a principle of synthesis1 upon which the deduction turns1 and returns to the earlier account of a conception as something opposed to a perception1 i4 e4 as that by which an object is thought as opposed to a perception by which an object is given4 ,consequently1 it argues merely that the categories1 as conceptions1 are empty or without an object1 unless an object is given in perception1 and that1 since things in themselves are not objects of perception1 the categories are no more applicable to things in themselves than are any other conceptions4 ,,chapter ,,ix ,,general ,,criticism ,,of ,,the ,,transcendental ,,deduction ,,of ,,the ,,categories ,the preceding account of ,kant's vindication of the categories has included much criticism4 ,but the criticism has been as far as possible restricted to details1 and has dealt with matters of principle only so far as has been necessary in order to follow ,kant's thought4 ,we must now consider the position as a whole1 even though this may involve some repetition4#a ,the general difficulties of the position may be divided into two kinds1 7#a7 difficulties involved in the working out of the theory1 even if its main principles are not questioned1 and 7#b7 difficulties involved in accepting its main principles at all4 #a ,difficulties connected with ,kant's view of self-consciousness will be ignored1 as having been sufficiently considered4 ,the initial difficulty of the first kind1 which naturally strikes the reader1 concerns the possibility of performing the synthesis4 ,the mind has certain general ways of combining the manifold1 viz4 the categories4 ,but on general grounds we should expect the mind to possess only one mode of combining the manifold4 ,for the character of the manifold to be combined cannot affect the mind's power of combination1 and1 if the power of the mind consists in combining1 the combining should always be of the same kind4 ,thus1 suppose the manifold given to the mind to be combined consisted of musical notes1 we could think of the mind's power of combination as exercised in combining the notes by way of succession1 provided that this be regarded as the only mode of combination4 ,but if the mind were thought also capable of combining notes by way of simultaneity1 we should at once be confronted with the insoluble problem of determining why the one mode of combination was exercised in any given case rather than the other4 ,if1 several kinds of synthesis being allowed1 this difficulty be avoided by the supposition that1 not being incompatible1 they are all exercised together1 we have the alternative task of explaining how the same manifold can be combined in each of these ways4 ,as a matter of fact1 ,kant thinks of manifolds of different kinds as combined or related in different ways2 thus events are related causally and quantities quantitatively4 ,but since1 on ,kant's view1 the manifold as given is unrelated and all combination comes from the mind1 the mind should not be held capable of combining manifolds of different kinds differently4 ,otherwise the manifold would in its own nature imply the need of a particular kind of synthesis1 and would therefore not be unrelated4 ,suppose1 however1 we waive the difficulty involved in the plurality of the categories4 ,there remains the equally fundamental difficulty that any single principle of synthesis contains in itself no ground for the different ways of its application4#b ,suppose it to be conceded that in the apprehension of definite shapes we combine the manifold in accordance with the conception of figure1 and1 for the purpose of the argument1 that the conception of figure can be treated as equivalent to the category of quantity4 ,it is plain that we apprehend different shapes1 e4 g4 lines#c and triangles#d1 of which1 if we take into account differences of relative length of sides1 there is an infinite variety1 and houses1#e which may also have an infinite variety of shape4 ,but there is nothing in the mind's capacity of relating the manifold by way of figure to determine it to combine a given manifold into a figure of one kind rather than into a figure of any other kind2 for to combine the manifold into a particular shape1 there is needed not merely the thought of a figure in general1 but the thought of a definite figure4 ,no 'cue' can be furnished by the manifold itself1 for any such cue would involve the conception of a particular figure1 and would therefore imply that the particular synthesis was implicit in the manifold itself1 in which case it would not be true that all synthesis comes from the mind4 #b ,cf4 p4 #bjg4 #c ,b4 #acg1 ,m4 #he4 #d ,a4 #aje1 ,mah4 #aii4 #e ,b4 #afb1 ,m4 #ii4 ,this difficulty takes a somewhat different form in the case of the categories of relation4 ,to take the case of cause and effect1 the conception of which1 according to ,kant1 is involved in our apprehension of a succession1 ,kant's view seems to be that we become aware of two elements of the manifold ,a ,b as a succession of events in the world of nature by combining them as necessarily successive in a causal order1 in which the state of affairs which precedes ,b and which contains ,a contains something upon which ,b must follow 7i4 e4 a cause of ,b71 which therefore makes it necessary that ,b must follow ,a4#f ,but if we are to do this1 we must in some way succeed in selecting or picking out from among the elements of the manifold that element ,a which is to be thus combined with ,b4 ,we therefore need something more than the category4 ,it is not enough that we should think that ,b has a cause2 we must think of something in particular as the cause of ,b1 and we must think of it either as coexistent with1 or as identical with1 ,a4 #f ,cf4 pp4 #bia-c4 ,kant fails to notice this second difficulty1#g and up to a certain point avoids it owing to his distinction between the imagination and the understanding4 ,for he thinks of the understanding as the source of general principles of synthesis1 viz4 the categories1 and attributes individual syntheses to the imagination4 ,hence the individual syntheses1 which involve particular principles1 are already effected before the understanding comes into play4 ,but to throw the work of effecting individual syntheses upon the imagination is only to evade the difficulty4 ,for in the end1 as has been pointed out1#h the imagination must be the understanding working unreflectively1 and1 whether this is so or not1 some account must be given of the way in which the imagination furnishes the particular principles of synthesis required4 #g ,we should have expected ,kant to have noticed this difficulty in ,a4 #aje1 ,mah4 #aii1 where he describes what is involved in the relation of representations to an object1 for his instance of representations becoming so related is the process of combining elements into a triangle1 which plainly requires a synthesis of a very definite kind4 ,for the reasons of his failure to notice the difficulty cf4 p4 #bjg4 #h ,pp4 #afh-i4 ,the third and last main difficulty of the first kind concerns the relation of the elements of the manifold and the kinds of synthesis by which they are combined4 ,this involves the distinction between relating in general and terms to be related4 ,for to perform a synthesis is in general to relate1 and the elements to be combined are the terms to be related4#i ,now it is only necessary to take instances to realize that the possibility of relating terms in certain ways involves two presuppositions1 which concern respectively the general and the special nature of the terms to be related4 #i ',to relate' is used rather than 'to recognize as related'1 in order to conform to ,kant's view of knowledge4 ,but if it be desired to take the argument which follows in connexion with knowledge proper 7cf4 p4 #bdb71 it is only necessary to substitute throughout 'to recognize as related' for 'to relate' and to make the other changes consequent thereon4 ,in the first place1 it is clear that the general nature of the terms must correspond with or be adapted to the general nature of the relationship to be effected4 ,thus if two terms are to be related as more or less loud1 they must be sounds1 since the relation in question is one in respect of sound and not1 e4 g41 of time or colour or space4 ,similarly1 terms to be related as right and left must be bodies in space1 right and left being a spatial relation4 ,again1 only human beings can be related as parent and child4 ,kant's doctrine1 however1 does not conform to this presupposition4 ,for the manifold to be related consists solely of sensations1 and of individual spaces1 and perhaps individual times1 as elements of pure perception2 and such a manifold is not of the kind required4 ,possibly individual spaces may be regarded as adequate terms to be related or combined into geometrical figures1 e4 g4 into lines or triangles4 ,but a house as a synthesis of a manifold cannot be a synthesis of spaces1 or of times1 or of sensations4 ,its parts are bodies1 which1 whatever they may be1 are neither sensations nor spaces nor times1 nor combinations of them4 ,in reality they are substances of a special kind4 ,again1 the relation of cause and effect is not a relation of sensations or spaces or times1 but of successive states of physical things or substances1 the relation consisting in the necessity of their succession4 ,in the second place1 it is clear that the special nature of the relation to be effected presupposes a special nature on the part of the terms to be related4 ,if one sound is to be related to another by way of the octave1 that other must be its octave4 ,if one quantity is to be related to another as the double of it1 that quantity must be twice as large as the other4 ,in the same way1 proceeding to ,kant's instances1 we see that if we are to combine or relate a manifold into a triangle1 and therefore into a triangle of a particular size and shape1 the elements of the manifold must be lines1 and lines of a particular size4 ,if we are to combine a manifold into a house1 and therefore into a house of a certain shape and size1 the manifold must consist of bodies of a suitable shape and size4 ,if we are to relate a manifold by way of necessary succession1 the manifold must be such that it can be so related2 in other words1 if we are to relate an element ,x of the manifold with some other ,y as the necessary antecedent of ,x1 there must be some definite element ,y which is connected with1 and always occurs along with1 ,x4 ,to put the matter generally1 we may say that the manifold must be adapted to or 'fit' the categories not only1 as has been pointed out1 in the sense that it must be of the right kind1 but also in the sense that its individual elements must have that orderly character which enables them to be related according to the categories4 ,now it is plain from ,kant's vindication of what he calls the affinity of phenomena1#aj that he recognizes the existence of this presupposition4 ,but the question arises whether this vindication can be successful4 ,for since the manifold is originated by the thing in itself1 it seems prima facie impossible to prove that the elements of the manifold must have affinity1 and so be capable of being related according to the categories4 ,before1 however1 we consider the chief passage in which ,kant tries to make good his position1 we may notice a defence which might naturally be offered on his behalf4 ,it might be said that he establishes the conformity of the manifold to the categories at least hypothetically1 i4 e4 upon the supposition that the manifold is capable of entering into knowledge1 and also upon the supposition that we are capable of being conscious of our identity with respect to it2 for upon either supposition any element of the manifold must be capable of being combined with all the rest into one world of nature4 ,moreover1 it might be added that these suppositions are justified1 for our experience is not a mere dream1 but is throughout the consciousness of a world1 and we are self-conscious throughout our experience2 and therefore it is clear that the manifold does in fact 'fit' the categories4 ,but the retort is obvious4 ,any actual conformity of the manifold to the categories would upon this view be at best but an empirical fact1 and1 although1 if the conformity ceased1 we should cease to be aware of a world and of ourselves1 no reason has been or can be given why the conformity should not cease4 #aj ,cf4 ,a4 #ajj-b1 ,mah4 #aie-g 7quoted pp4 #aga-b72 ,a4 #aac1 ,mah4 #bje2 ,a4 #aba-b1 ,mah4 #baa-b4 ,the passage in which ,kant vindicates the affinity of phenomena in the greatest detail is the following3 ,we will now try to exhibit the necessary connexion of the understanding with phenomena by means of the categories1 by beginning from below1 i4 e4 from the empirical end4 ,the first that is given us is a phenomenon1 which if connected with consciousness is called perception#aa4444 ,but because every phenomenon contains a manifold1 and consequently different perceptions are found in the mind scattered and single1 a connexion of them is necessary1 which they cannot have in mere sense4 ,there is1 therefore1 in us an active power of synthesis of this manifold1 which we call imagination1 and the action of which1 when exercised immediately upon perceptions1 ,i call apprehension4 ,the business of the imagination1 that is to say1 is to bring the manifold of intuition#ab into an image2 it must1 therefore1 first receive the impressions into its activity1 i4 e4 apprehend them4 #aa ,wahrnehmung4 #ab ,anschauung4 ,but it is clear that even this apprehension of the manifold would not by itself produce an image and a connexion of the impressions1 unless there were a subjective ground in virtue of which one perception1 from which the mind has passed to another1 is summoned to join that which follows1 and thus whole series of perceptions are presented1 i4 e4 a reproductive power of imagination1 which power1 however1 is also only empirical4 ,but if representations reproduced one another at haphazard just as they happened to meet together1 once more no determinate connexion would arise1 but merely chaotic heaps of them1 and consequently no knowledge would arise2 therefore the reproduction of them must have a rule1 according to which a representation enters into connexion with this rather than with another in the imagination4 ,this subjective and empirical ground of reproduction according to rules is called the association of representations4 ,but now1 if this unity of association had not also an objective ground1 so that it was impossible that phenomena should be apprehended by the imagination otherwise than under the condition of a possible synthetic unity of this apprehension1 it would also be a pure accident that phenomena were adapted to a connected system of human knowledge4 ,for although we should have the power of associating perceptions1 it would still remain wholly undetermined and accidental whether they were associable2 and in the event of their not being so1 a multitude of perceptions and even perhaps a whole sensibility would be possible1 in which much empirical consciousness would be met with in my mind1 but divided and without belonging to one consciousness of myself1 which however is impossible4 ,for only in that ,i ascribe all perceptions to one consciousness 7the original apperception7 can ,i say of all of them that ,i am conscious of them4 ,there must therefore be an objective ground1 i4 e4 a ground to be recognized a priori before all empirical laws of the imagination1 on which rests the possibility1 nay even the necessity1 of a law which extends throughout all phenomena1 according to which we regard them without exception as such data of the senses1 as are in themselves associable and subjected to universal rules of a thorough-going connexion in reproduction4 ,this objective ground of all association of phenomena ,i call the affinity of phenomena4 ,but we can meet this nowhere else than in the principle of the unity of apperception as regards all cognitions which are to belong to me4 ,according to it1 all phenomena without exception must so enter into the mind or be apprehended as to agree with the unity of apperception1 which agreement would be impossible without synthetical unity in their connexion1 which therefore is also objectively necessary4 ,the objective unity of all 7empirical7 consciousness in one consciousness 7the original apperception7 is therefore the necessary condition even of all possible perception1 and the affinity of all phenomena 7near or remote7 is a necessary consequence of a synthesis in the imagination1 which is a priori founded upon rules4 ,the imagination is therefore also a power of a priori synthesis1 for which reason we give it the name of the productive imagination2 and so far as it1 in relation to all the manifold of the phenomenon1 has no further aim than the necessary unity in the synthesis of the phenomenon1 it can be called the transcendental function of the imagination4 ,it is therefore strange indeed1 but nevertheless clear from the preceding1 that only by means of this transcendental function of the imagination does even the affinity of phenomena1 and with it their association and1 through this1 lastly their reproduction according to laws1 and consequently experience itself become possible1 because without it no conceptions of objects would ever come together into one experience4#ac #ac ,a4 #aai-bc1 ,mah4 #baj-c4 ,if it were not for the last two paragraphs#ad1 we should understand this difficult passage to be substantially identical in meaning with the defence of the affinity of phenomena just given4#ae ,we should understand ,kant to be saying 7#a7 that the synthesis which knowledge requires presupposes not merely a faculty of association on our part by which we reproduce elements of the manifold according to rules1 but also an affinity on the part of the manifold to be apprehended1 which enables our faculty of association to get to work1 and 7#b7 that this affinity can be vindicated as a presupposition at once of knowledge and of self-consciousness4 #ad ,and also the first and last sentence of the fourth paragraph1 where ,kant speaks not of 'phenomena which are to be apprehended'1 but of the 'apprehension of phenomena' as necessarily agreeing with the unity of apperception4 #ae p4 #bbj4 ,in view1 however1 of the fact that1 according to the last two paragraphs1 the affinity is due to the imagination1#af it seems necessary to interpret the passage thus3 #af ,it should be noted that in the last paragraph but one ,kant does not say 'our knowledge that phenomena must have affinity is a consequence of our knowledge that there must be a synthesis of the imagination'1 but 'the affinity of all phenomena is a consequence of a synthesis in the imagination'4 ,and the last paragraph precludes the view that in making the latter statement he meant the former4 ,cf4 also ,a4 #aja1 ,mah4 #aif4 ',since the given manifold of sense consists of isolated elements1 this manifold1 in order to enter into knowledge1 must be combined into an image4 ,this combination is effected by the imagination1 which however must first apprehend the elements one by one4' ',but this apprehension of the manifold by the imagination could produce no image1 unless the imagination also possessed the power of reproducing past elements of the manifold1 and1 if knowledge is to arise1 of reproducing them according to rules4 ,this faculty of reproduction by which1 on perceiving the element ,a1 we are led to think of or reproduce a past element ,b--,b being reproduced according to some rule--rather than ,c or ,d is called the faculty of association2 and since the rules according to which it works depend on empirical conditions1 and therefore cannot be anticipated a priori1 it may be called the subjective ground of reproduction4' ',but if the image produced by association is to play a part in knowledge1 the empirical faculty of reproduction is not a sufficient condition or ground of it4 ,a further condition is implied1 which may be called objective in the sense that it is a priori and prior to all empirical laws of imagination4 ,this condition is that the act by which the data of sense enter the mind or are apprehended1 i4 e4 the act by which the imagination apprehends and combines the data of sense into a sensuous image1 must make the elements such that they have affinity1 and therefore such that they can subsequently be recognized as parts of a necessarily related whole4#ag ,unless this condition is satisfied1 even if we possessed the faculty of association1 our experience would be a chaos of disconnected elements1 and we could not be self-conscious1 which is impossible4 ,starting1 therefore1 with the principle that we must be capable of being self-conscious with respect to all the elements of the manifold1 we can lay down a priori that this condition is a fact4' #ag ,on this interpretation 'entering the mind' or 'being apprehended' in the fourth paragraph does not refer merely to the apprehension of elements one by one1 which is preliminary to the act of combining them1 but includes the act by which they are combined4 ,if so1 ,kant's argument formally involves a circle4 ,for in the second and third paragraphs he argues that the synthesis of perceptions involves reproduction according to rules1 and then1 in the fourth paragraph1 he argues that this reproduction presupposes a synthesis of perceptions4 ,we may1 however1 perhaps regard his argument as being in substance that knowledge involves reproduction by the imagination of elements capable of connexion1 and that this reproduction involves production by the imagination of the data of sense1 which are to be reproduced1 into an image4 ',it follows1 then1 that the affinity or connectedness of the data of sense presupposed by the reproduction which is presupposed in knowledge1 is actually produced by the productive faculty of imagination1 which1 in combining the data into a sensuous image1 gives them the unity required4' ,if1 as it seems necessary to believe1 this be the correct interpretation of the passage1#ah ,kant is here trying to carry out to the full his doctrine that all unity or connectedness comes from the mind's activity4 ,he is maintaining that the imagination1 acting productively on the data of sense and thereby combining them into an image1 gives the data a connectedness which the understanding can subsequently recognize4 ,but to maintain this is1 of course1 only to throw the problem one stage further back4 ,if reproduction1 in order to enter into knowledge1 implies a manifold which has such connexion that it is capable of being reproduced according to rules1 so the production of sense-elements into a coherent image in turn implies sense-elements capable of being so combined4 ,the act of combination cannot confer upon them or introduce into them a unity which they do not already possess4 #ah ,if the preceding interpretation 7pp4 #bbc-d7 be thought the correct one1 it must be admitted that ,kant's vindication of the affinity breaks down for the reason given1 p4 #bbj4 ,the fact is that this step in ,kant's argument exhibits the final breakdown of his view that all unity or connectedness or relatedness is conferred upon the data of sense by the activity of the mind4 ,consequently1 this forms a convenient point at which to consider what seems to be the fundamental mistake of this view4 ,the mistake stated in its most general form appears to be that1 misled by his theory of perception1 he regards 'terms' as given by things in themselves acting on the sensibility1 and 'relations' as introduced by the understanding1#ai whereas the fact is that in the sense in which terms can be said to be given1 relations can and must also be said to be given4 #ai ,the understanding being taken to include the imagination1 as being the faculty of spontaneity in distinction from the passive sensibility4 ,to realize that this is the case1 we need only consider ,kant's favourite instance of knowledge1 the apprehension of a straight line4 ,according to him1 this presupposes that there is given to us a manifold1 which--whether he admits it or not--must really be parts of the line1 and that we combine this manifold on a principle involved in the nature of straightness4 ,now suppose that the manifold given is the parts ,,ab1 ,,bc1 ,,cd1 ,,de of the line ,,ae4 ,it is clearly only possible to recognize ,,ab and ,,bc as contiguous parts of a straight line1 if we immediately apprehend that ,,ab and ,,bc form one line of which these parts are identical in direction4 ,otherwise1 we might just as well join ,,ab and ,,bc at a right angle1 and in fact at any angle2 we need not even make ,,ab and ,,bc contiguous4#bj ,similarly1 the relation of ,,bc to ,,cd and of ,,cd to ,,de must be just as immediately apprehended as the parts themselves4 ,is there1 however1 any relation of which it could be said that it is not given1 and to which therefore ,kant's doctrine might seem to apply8 ,there is4 ,suppose ,,ab1 ,,bc1 ,,cd to be of such a size that1 though we can see ,,ab and ,,bc1 or ,,bc and ,,cd1 together1 we cannot see ,,ab and ,,cd together4 ,it is clear that in this case we can only learn that ,,ab and ,,cd are parts of the same straight line through an inference4 ,we have to infer that1 because each is in the same straight line with ,,bc1 the one is in the same straight line with the other4 ,here the fact that ,,ab and ,,cd are in the same straight line is not immediately apprehended4 ,this relation1 therefore1 may be said not to be given2 and1 from ,kant's point of view1 we could say that we introduce this relation into the manifold through our activity of thinking1 which combines ,,ab and ,,cd together in accordance with the principle that two straight lines which are in the same line with a third are in line with one another4 ,nevertheless1 this case is no exception to the general principle that relations must be given equally with terms2 for we only become aware of the relation between ,,ab and ,,cd1 which is not given1 because we are already aware of other relations1 viz4 those between ,,ab and ,,bc1 and ,,bc and ,,cd1 which are given4 ,relations then1 or1 in ,kant's language1 particular syntheses must be said to be given1 in the sense in which the elements to be combined can be said to be given4 #bj ,in order to meet a possible objection1 it may be pointed out that if ,,ab and ,,bc be given in isolation1 the contiguity implied in referring to them as ,a,b and ,b,c will not be known4 ,further1 we can better see the nature of ,kant's mistake in this respect1 if we bear in mind that ,kant originally and rightly introduced the distinction between the sensibility and the understanding as that between the passive faculty by which an individual is given or presented to us and the active faculty by which we bring an individual under1 or recognize it as an instance of a universal4#ba ,for we then see that ,kant in the ,transcendental ,deduction1 by treating what is given by the sensibility as terms and what is contributed by the understanding as relations1 is really confusing the distinction between a relation and its terms with that between universal and individual2 in other words1 he says of terms what ought to be said of individuals1 and of relations what ought to be said of universals4 ,that the confusion is a confusion1 and not a legitimate identification1 it is easy to see4 ,for1 on the one hand1 a relation between terms is as much an individual as either of the terms4 ,that a body ,a is to the right of a body ,b is as much an individual fact as either ,a or ,b4#bb ,and if terms1 as being individuals1 belong to perception and are given1 in the sense that they are in an immediate relation to us1 relations1 as being individuals1 equally belong to perception and are given4 ,on the other hand1 individual terms just as much as individual relations imply corresponding universals4 ,an individual body implies 'bodiness'1 just as much as the fact that a body ,a is to the right of a body ,b implies the relationship of 'being to the right of something'4 ,and if1 as is the case1 thinking or conceiving in distinction from perceiving1 is that activity by which we recognize an individual1 given in perception1 as one of a kind1 conceiving is involved as much in the apprehension of a term as in the apprehension of a relation4 ,the apprehension of 'this red body' as much involves the recognition of an individual as an instance of a kind1 i4 e4 as much involves an act of the understanding1 as does the apprehension of the fact that it is brighter than some other body4 #ba ,cf4 pp4 #bg-i4 #bb ,i can attach no meaning to ,mr4 ,bertrand ,russell's assertion that relations have no instances4 ,see ,the ,principles of ,mathematics1 #ee4 ,kant has failed to notice this confusion for two reasons4 ,in the first place1 beginning in the ,analytic with the thought that the thing in itself1 by acting on our sensibility1 produces isolated sense data1 he is led to adopt a different view of the understanding from that which he originally gave1 and to conceive its business as consisting in relating these data4 ,in the second place1 by distinguishing the imagination from the understanding1 he is able to confine the understanding to being the source of universals or principles of relation in distinction from individual relations4#bc ,since1 however1 as has been pointed out1 and as ,kant himself sees at times1 the imagination is the understanding working unreflectively1 this limitation cannot be successful4 #bc ,cf4 p4 #bag4 ,there remain for consideration the difficulties of the second kind1 i4 e4 the difficulties involved in accepting its main principles at all4 ,these are of course the most important4 ,throughout the deduction ,kant is attempting to formulate the nature of knowledge4 ,according to him1 it consists in an activity of the mind by which it combines the manifold of sense on certain principles and is to some extent aware that it does so1 and by which it thereby gives the manifold relation to an object4 ,now the fundamental and final objection to this account is that what it describes is not knowledge at all4 ,the justice of this objection may be seen by considering the two leading thoughts underlying the view1 which1 though closely connected1 may be treated separately4 ,these are the thought of knowledge as a process by which representations acquire relation to an object1 and the thought of knowledge as a process of synthesis4 ,it is in reality meaningless to speak of 'a process by which representations or ideas acquire relation to an object'4#bd ,the phrase must mean a process by which a mere apprehension1 which1 as such1 is not the apprehension of an object1 becomes the apprehension of an object4 ,apprehension1 however1 is essentially and from the very beginning the apprehension of an object1 i4 e4 of a reality apprehended4 ,if there is no object which the apprehension is 'of'1 there is no apprehension4 ,it is therefore wholly meaningless to speak of a process by which an apprehension becomes the apprehension of an object4 ,if when we reflected we were not aware of an object1 i4 e4 a reality apprehended1 we could not be aware of our apprehension2 for our apprehension is the apprehension of it1 and is itself only apprehended in relation to1 though in distinction from1 it4 ,it is therefore impossible to suppose a condition of mind in which1 knowing what 'apprehension' means1 we proceed to ask1 ',what is meant by an object of it8' and ',how does an apprehension become related to an object8'2 for both questions involve the thought of a mere representation1 i4 e4 of an apprehension which as yet is not the apprehension of anything4 #bd ,cf4 p4 #ahj1 and pp4 #bhj-c4 ,these questions1 when their real nature is exhibited1 are plainly absurd4 ,kant's special theory1 however1 enables him to evade the real absurdity involved4 ,for1 according to his view1 a representation is the representation or apprehension of something only from the point of view of the thing in itself4 ,as an appearance or perhaps more strictly speaking as a sensation1 it has also a being of its own which is not relative#be2 and from this point of view it is possible to speak of 'mere' representations and to raise questions which presuppose their reality4#bf #be ,cf4 p4 #acg init4 #bf ,the absurdity of the problem really propounded is also concealed from ,kant in the way indicated1 pp4 #ahj fin4-#aha init4 ,but this remedy1 if remedy it can be called1 is at least as bad as the disease4 ,for1 in the first place1 the change of standpoint is necessarily illegitimate4 ,an appearance or sensation is not from any point of view a representation in the proper sense1 i4 e4 a representation or apprehension of something4 ,it is simply a reality to be apprehended1 of the special kind called mental4 ,if it be called a representation1 the word must have a new meaning2 it must mean something represented1 or presented1#bg i4 e4 object of apprehension1 with the implication that what is presented1 or is object of apprehension1 is mental or a modification of the mind4 ,kant therefore only avoids the original absurdity by an illegitimate change of standpoint1 the change being concealed by a tacit transition in the meaning of representation4 ,in the second place1 the change of standpoint only saves the main problem from being absurd by rendering it insoluble4 ,for if a representation be taken to be an appearance or a sensation1 the main problem becomes that of explaining how it is that1 beginning with the apprehension of mere appearances or sensations1 we come to apprehend an object1 in the sense of an object in nature1 which1 as such1 is not an appearance or sensation but a part of the physical world4 ,but if the immediate object of apprehension were in this way confined to appearances1 which are1 to use ,kant's phrase1 determinations of our mind1 our apprehension would be limited to these appearances1 and any apprehension of an object in nature would be impossible4#bh ,in fact1 it is just the view that the immediate object of apprehension consists in a determination of the mind which forms the basis of the solipsist position4 ,kant's own solution involves an absurdity at least as great as that involved in the thought of a mere representation1 in the proper sense of representation4 ,for the solution is that appearances or sensations become related to an object1 in the sense of an object in nature1 by being combined on certain principles4 ,yet it is plainly impossible to combine appearances or sensations into an object in nature4 ,if a triangle1 or a house1 or 'a freezing of water'#bi is the result of any process of combination1 the elements combined must be respectively lines1 and bricks1 and physical events2 these are objects in the sense in which the whole produced by the combination is an object1 and are certainly not appearances or sensations4 ,kant conceals the difficulty from himself by the use of language to which he is not entitled4 ,for while his instances of objects are always of the kind indicated1 he persists in calling the manifold combined 'representations'1 i4 e4 presented mental modifications4 ,this procedure is of course facilitated for him by his view that nature is a phenomenon or appearance1 but the difficulty which it presents to the reader culminates when he speaks of the very same representations as having both a subjective and an objective relation1 i4 e4 as being both modifications of the mind and parts of nature4#cj #bg ,vorgestellt4 #bh ,cf4 p4 #abc4 #bi ,b4 #afb1 ,m4 #ii4 #cj ,b4 #aci-db1 ,m4 #hg-h4 ,cf4 #bji1 note #c1 and pp4 #bha-b4 ,we may now turn to ,kant's thought of knowledge as a process of synthesis4 ,when ,kant speaks of synthesis1 the kind of synthesis of which he usually is thinking is that of spatial elements into a spatial whole2 and although he refers to other kinds1 e4 g4 of units into numbers1 and of events into a temporal series1 nevertheless it is the thought of spatial synthesis which guides his view4 ,now we must in the end admit that the spatial synthesis of which he is thinking is really the construction or making of spatial objects in the literal sense4 ,it would be rightly illustrated by making figures out of matches or spelicans1 or by drawing a circle with compasses1 or by building a house out of bricks4 ,further1 if we extend this view of the process of which ,kant is thinking1 we have to allow that the process of synthesis in which1 according to ,kant1 knowledge consists is that of making or constructing parts of the physical world1 and in fact the physical world itself1 out of elements given in perception4#ca ,the deduction throughout presupposes that the synthesis is really manufacture1 and ,kant is at pains to emphasize the fact4 ,the order and conformity to law in the phenomena which we call nature we ourselves introduce1 and we could not find it there1 if we or the nature of our mind had not originally placed it there4#cb ,he naturally rejoices in the manufacture1 because it is just this which makes the categories valid4 ,if knowing is really making1 the principles of synthesis must apply to the reality known1 because it is by these very principles that the reality is made4 ,moreover1 recognition of this fact enables us to understand certain features of his view which would otherwise be inexplicable4 ,for if the synthesis consists in literal construction1 we are able to understand why ,kant should think 7#a7 that in the process of knowledge the mind introduces order into the manifold1 7#b7 that the mind is limited in its activity of synthesis by having to conform to certain principles of construction which constitute the nature of the understanding1 and 7#c7 that the manifold of phenomena must possess affinity4 ,if1 for example1 we build a house1 it can be said 7#a7 that we introduce into the materials a plan or principle of arrangement which they do not possess in themselves1 7#b7 that the particular plan is limited by1 and must conform to1 the laws of spatial relation and to the general presuppositions of physics1 such as the uniformity of nature1 and 7#c7 that only such materials are capable of the particular combination as possess a nature suitable to it4 ,moreover1 if1 for ,kant1 knowing is really making1 we are able to understand two other prominent features of his view4 ,we can understand why ,kant should lay so much stress upon the 'recognition' of the synthesis1 and upon the self-consciousness involved in knowledge4 ,for if the synthesis of the manifold is really the making of an object1 it results merely in the existence of the object2 knowledge of it is still to be effected4 ,consequently1 knowledge of the object only finds a place in ,kant's view by the recognition 7on the necessity of which he insists7 of the manifold as combined on a principle4 ,this recognition1 which ,kant considers only an element in knowledge1 is really the knowledge itself4 ,again1 since the reality to be known is a whole of parts which we construct on a principle1 we know that it is such a whole1 and therefore that 'the manifold is related to one object'1 because1 and only because1 we know that we have combined the elements on a principle4 ,self-consciousness therefore must be inseparable from consciousness of an object4 #ca ,it is for this reason that the mathematical illustrations of the synthesis are the most plausible for his theory4 ,while we can be said to construct geometrical figures1 and while the construction of geometrical figures can easily be mistaken for the apprehension of them1 we cannot with any plausibility be said to construct the physical world4 #cb ,a4 #abe1 ,mah4 #bad4 ,cf4 the other passages quoted pp4 #baa-ab4 ,the fundamental objection to this account of knowledge seems so obvious as to be hardly worth stating2 it is of course that knowing and making are not the same4 ,the very nature of knowing presupposes that the thing known is already made1 or1 to speak more accurately1 already exists4#cc ,in other words1 knowing is essentially the discovery of what already is4 ,even if the reality known happens to be something which we make1 e4 g4 a house1 the knowing it is distinct from the making it1 and1 so far from being identical with the making1 presupposes that the reality in question is already made4 ,music and poetry are1 no doubt1 realities which in some sense are 'made' or 'composed'1 but the apprehension of them is distinct from and presupposes the process by which they are composed4 #cc ,cf4 ,ch4 ,,vi4 ,how difficult it is to resolve knowing into making may be seen by consideration of a difficulty in the interpretation of ,kant's phrase 'relation of the manifold to an object'1 to which no allusion has yet been made4 ,when it is said that a certain manifold is related to1 or stands#cd in relation to1 an object1 does the relatedness referred to consist in the fact that the manifold is combined into a whole1 or in the fact that we are conscious of the combination1 or in both8 ,if we accept the first alternative we must allow that1 while relatedness to an object implies a process of synthesis1 yet the relatedness1 and therefore the synthesis1 have nothing to do with knowledge4 ,for the relatedness of the manifold to an object will be the combination of the elements of the manifold as parts of an object constructed1 and the process of synthesis involved will be that by which the object is constructed4 ,this process of synthesis will have nothing to do with knowledge2 for since it is merely the process by which the object is constructed1 knowledge so far is not effected at all1 and no clue is given to the way in which it comes about4 ,if1 however1 we accept the second alternative1 we have to allow that while relatedness to an object has to do with knowledge1 yet it in no way implies a process of synthesis4 ,for since in that case it consists in the fact that we are conscious of the manifold as together forming an object1 it in no way implies that the object has been produced by a process of synthesis4 ,kant1 of course1 would accept the third alternative4 ,for1 firstly1 since it is knowledge which he is describing1 the phrase 'relatedness to an object' cannot refer simply to the existence of a combination of the manifold1 and of a process by which it has been produced2 its meaning must include consciousness of the combination4 ,in the second place1 it is definitely his view that we cannot represent anything as combined in the object without having previously combined it ourselves4#ce ,moreover1 it is just with respect to this connexion between the synthesis and the consciousness of the synthesis that his reduction of knowing to making helps him2 for to make an object1 e4 g4 a house1 is to make it consciously1 i4 e4 to combine materials on a principle of which we are aware4 ,since1 then1 the combining of which he speaks is really making1 it seems to him impossible to combine a manifold without being aware of the nature of the act of combination1 and therefore of the nature of the whole thereby produced4#cf ,but though this is clearly ,kant's view1 it is not justified4 ,in the first place1 'relatedness of the manifold to an object' ought not to refer both to its combination in a whole and to our consciousness of the combination2 and in strictness it should refer to the former only4 ,for as referring to the former it indicates a relation of the manifold to the object1 as being the parts of the object1 and as referring to the latter it indicates a relation of the manifold to us1 as being apprehended by us as the parts of the object4 ,but two relations which1 though they are of one and the same thing1 are nevertheless relations of it to two different things1 should not be referred to by the same phrase4 ,moreover1 since the relatedness is referred to as relatedness to an object1 the phrase properly indicates the relation of the manifold to an object1 and not to us as apprehending it4 ,again1 in the second place1 ,kant cannot successfully maintain that the phrase is primarily a loose expression for our consciousness of the manifold as related to an object1 and that since this implies a process of synthesis1 the phrase may fairly include in its meaning the thought of the combination of the manifold by us into a whole4 ,for although ,kant asserts--and with some plausibility--that we can only apprehend as combined what we have ourselves combined1 yet when we consider this assertion seriously we see it to be in no sense true4 #cd ,a4 #aji1 ,mah4 #bjb4 #ce ,b4 #acj1 ,m4 #hj4 #cf ,to say that 'combining'1 in the sense of making1 really presupposes consciousness of the nature of the whole produced1 would be inconsistent with the previous assertion that even where the reality known is something made1 the knowledge of it presupposes that the reality is already made4 ,strictly speaking1 the activity of combining presupposes consciousness not of the whole which we succeed in producing1 but of the whole which we want to produce4 ,it may be noted that1 from the point of view of the above argument1 the activity of combining presupposes actual consciousness of the act of combination and of its principle1 and does not imply merely the possibility of it4 ,kant1 of course1 does not hold this4 ,the general conclusion1 therefore1 to be drawn is that the process of synthesis by which the manifold is said to become related to an object is a process not of knowledge but of construction in the literal sense1 and that it leaves knowledge of the thing constructed still to be effected4 ,but if knowing is obviously different from making1 why should ,kant have apparently felt no difficulty in resolving knowing into making8 ,three reasons may be given4 ,in the first place1 the very question1 ',what does the process of knowing consist in8' at least suggests that knowing can be resolved into and stated in terms of something else4 ,in this respect it resembles the modern phrase 'theory of knowledge'4 ,moreover1 since it is plain that in knowing we are active1 the question is apt to assume the form1 ',what do we do when we know or think8' and since one of the commonest forms of doing something is to perform a physical operation on physical things1 whereby we effect a recombination of them on some plan1 it is natural to try to resolve knowing into this kind of doing1 i4 e4 into making in a wide sense of the word4 ,in the second place1 ,kant never relaxed his hold upon the thing in itself4 ,consequently1 there always remained for him a reality which existed in itself and was not made by us4 ,this was to him the fundamental reality1 and the proper object of knowledge1 although unfortunately inaccessible to our faculties of knowing4 ,hence to ,kant it did not seriously matter that an inferior reality1 viz4 the phenomenal world1 was made by us in the process of knowing4 ,in the third place1 it is difficult1 if not impossible1 to read the ,deduction without realizing that ,kant failed to distinguish knowing from that formation of mental imagery which accompanies knowing4 ,the process of synthesis1 if it is even to seem to constitute knowledge and to involve the validity of the categories1 must really be a process by which we construct1 and recognize our construction of1 an individual reality in nature out of certain physical data4 ,nevertheless1 it is plain that what ,kant normally describes as the process of synthesis is really the process by which we construct an imaginary picture of a reality in nature not present to perception1 i4 e4 by which we imagine to ourselves what it would look like if we were present to perceive it4 ,this is implied by his continued use of the terms 'reproduction' and 'imagination' in describing the synthesis4 ,to be aware of an object of past perception1 it is necessary1 according to him1 that the object should be reproduced4 ,it is thereby implied that the object of our present awareness is not the object of past perception1 but a mental image which copies or reproduces it4 ,the same implication is conveyed by his use of the term 'imagination' to describe the faculty by which the synthesis is effected2 for 'imagination' normally means the power of making a mental image of something not present to perception1 and this interpretation is confirmed by ,kant's own description of the imagination as 'the faculty of representing an object even without its presence in perception'4#cg ,further1 that ,kant really fails to distinguish the construction of mental imagery from literal construction is shown by the fact that1 although he insists that the formation of an image and reproduction are both necessary for knowledge1 he does not consistently adhere to this4 ,for his general view is that the elements combined and recognized as combined are the original data of sense1 and not reproductions of them which together form an image1 and his instances imply that the elements retained in thought1 i4 e4 the elements of which we are aware subsequently to perception1 are the elements originally perceived1 e4 g4 the parts of a line or the units counted4#ch ,moreover1 in one passage ,kant definitely describes certain objects of perception taken together as an image of that 'kind' of which1 when taken together1 they are an instance4 ,if ,i place five points one after another1 4 4 4 4 4 this is an image of the number five4#ci ,now1 if it be granted that ,kant has in mind normally the process of imagining1 we can see why he found no difficulty in the thought of knowledge as construction4 ,for while we cannot reasonably speak of making an object of knowledge1 we can reasonably speak of making a mental image through our own activity1 and also of making it in accordance with the categories and the empirical laws which presuppose them4 ,moreover1 the ease with which it is possible to take the imagining which accompanies knowing for knowing#dj--the image formed being taken to be the object known and the forming it being taken to be the knowing it--renders it easy to transfer the thought of construction to the knowledge itself4 ,the only defect1 however1 under which the view labours is the important one that1 whatever be the extent to which imagination must accompany knowledge1 it is distinct from knowledge4 ,to realize the difference we have only to notice that the process by which we present to ourselves in imagination realities not present to perception presupposes1 and is throughout guided by1 the knowledge of them4 ,it should be noted1 however1 that1 although the process of which ,kant is normally thinking is doubtless that of constructing mental imagery1 his real view must be that knowledge consists in constructing a world out of the data of sense1 or1 more accurately1 as his instances show1 out of the objects of isolated perceptions1 e4 g4 parts of a line or units to be counted4 ,otherwise the final act of recognition would be an apprehension not of the world of nature1 but of an image of it4 #cg ,b4 #aeb1 ,m4 #ic2 cf4 also ,mah4 #baa1 ,a4 #abj4 #ch ,cf4 ,a4 #ajb-c1 ,mah4 #aig-h4 ,the fact is that the appeal to reproduction is a useless device intended by ,kant--and by 'empirical psychologists'--to get round the difficulty of allowing that in the apprehension 7in memory or otherwise7 of a reality not present to perception1 we are really aware of the reality4 ,the difficulty is in reality due to a sensationalistic standpoint1 avowed or unavowed1 and the device is useless1 because the assumption has in the end to be made1 covertly or otherwise1 that we are really aware of the reality in question4 #ci ,b4 #agi1 ,m4 #aji4 ,cf4 the whole passage ,b4 #agf-ha1 ,m4 #ajg-aj 7part quoted pp4 #bdi-ea71 and p4 #bea4 #dj ,cf4 ,locke and ,hume4 ',this criticism1' it may be said1 'is too sweeping4 ,it may be true that the process which ,kant describes is really making in the literal sense and not knowing1 but ,kant's mistake may have been merely that of thinking of the wrong kind of synthesis4 ,for both ordinary language and that of philosophical discussion imply that synthesis plays some part in knowledge4 ,thus we find in ordinary language the phrases 'putting #b and #b together' and '#b and #b make #d'4 ,even in philosophical discussions we find it said that a complex conception1 e4 g4 gold1 is a synthesis of simple conceptions1 e4 g4 yellowness1 weight1 c42 that in judgement we relate or refer the predicate to the subject2 and that in inference we construct reality1 though only mentally or ideally4 ,further1 in any case it is by thinking or knowing that the world comes to be for us2 the more we think1 the more of reality there is for us4 ,hence at least the world for us or our world is due to our activity of knowing1 and so is in some sense made by us1 i4 e4 by our relating activity4' ,this position1 however1 seems in reality to be based on a simple but illegitimate transition1 viz4 the transition to the assertion that in knowing we relate1 or combine1 or construct from the assertion that in knowing we recognize as related1 or combined1 or constructed--the last two terms being retained to preserve the parallelism4#da ,while the latter assertion may be said to be true1 although the terms 'combined' and 'constructed' should be rejected as misleading1 the former assertion must be admitted to be wholly false1 i4 e4 true in no sense whatever4 ,moreover1 the considerations adduced in favour of the position should1 it seems1 be met by a flat denial of their truth or1 if not1 of their relevance4 ,for when it is said that our world1 or the world for us1 is due to our activity of thinking1 and so is in some sense made by us1 all that should be meant is that our apprehending the world as whatever we apprehend it to be presupposes activity on our part4 ,but since the activity is after all only the activity itself of apprehending or knowing1 this assertion is only a way of saying that apprehending or knowing is not a condition of mind which can be produced in us ab extra1 but is something which we have to do for ourselves4 ,nothing is implied to be made4 ,if anything is to be said to be made1 it must be not our world but our activity of apprehending the world2 but even we and our activity of apprehending the world are not related as maker and thing made4 ,again1 to speak of a complex conception1 e4 g4 gold1 and to say that it involves a synthesis of simple conceptions by the mind is mere 'conceptualism'4 ,if1 as we ought to do1 we replace the term 'conception' by 'universal'1 and speak of gold as a synthesis of universals1 any suggestion that the mind performs the synthesis will vanish1 for a 'synthesis of universals' will mean simply a connexion of universals4 ,all that is mental is our apprehension of their connexion4 ,again1 in judgement we cannot be said to relate predicate to subject4 ,such an assertion would mean either that we relate a conception to a conception1 or a conception to a reality#db1 or a reality to a reality2 and1 on any of these interpretations1 it is plainly false4 ,to retain the language of 'relation' or of 'combination' at all1 we must say that in judgement we recognize real elements as related or combined4 ,again1 when we infer1 we do not construct1 ideally or otherwise4 ',ideal construction'#dc is a contradiction in terms1 unless it refers solely to mental imagining1 in which case it is not inference4 ,construction which is not 'ideal'1 i4 e4 literal construction1 plainly cannot constitute the nature of inference2 for inference would cease to be inference1 if by it we made1 and did not apprehend1 a necessity of connexion4 ,again1 the phrase '#b and #b make #d' does not justify the view that in some sense we 'make' reality4 ,it of course suggests that #b and #b are not #d until they are added1 i4 e4 that the addition makes them #d4dd ,but the language is only appropriate when we are literally making a group of #d by physically placing #b pairs of bodies in one group4 ,where we are counting1 we should say merely that #b and #b are #d4 ,lastly1 it must be allowed that the use of the phrase 'putting two and two together'1 to describe an inference from facts not quite obviously connected1 is loose and inexact4 ,if we meet a dog with a blood-stained mouth and shortly afterwards see a dead fowl1 we may be said to put two and two together and to conclude thereby that the dog killed the fowl4 ,but1 strictly speaking1 in drawing the inference we do not put anything together4 ,we certainly do not put together the facts that the mouth of the dog is blood-stained and that the fowl has just been killed4 ,we do not even put the premises together1 i4 e4 our apprehensions of these facts4 ,what takes place should be described by saying simply that seeing that the fowl is killed1 we also remember that the dog's mouth was stained1 and then apprehend a connexion between these facts4 #da ,cf4 ,caird1 i4 #cid1 where ,dr4 ,caird speaks of 'the distinction of the activity of thought from the matter which it combines or recognizes as combined in the idea of an object'4 7,the italics are mine47 ,the context seems to indicate that the phrase is meant to express the truth1 and not merely ,kant's view4 #db ,cf4 the account of judgement in ,mr4 ,bradley's ,logic4 #dc ,cf4 the account of inference in ,mr4 ,bradley's ,logic4 #dd ,cf4 ,bradley1 ,logic1 pp4 #cgj and #ejf4 ,the fact seems to be that the thought of synthesis in no way helps to elucidate the nature of knowing1 and that the mistake in principle which underlies ,kant's view lies in the implicit supposition that it is possible to elucidate the nature of knowledge by means of something other than itself4 ,knowledge is sui generis and therefore a 'theory' of it is impossible4 ,knowledge is simply knowledge1 and any attempt to state it in terms of something else must end in describing something which is not knowledge4#de #de ,cf4 p4 #abd4 ,,chapter ,x ,,the ,,schematism ,,of ,,the ,,categories ,as has already been pointed out1#a the ,analytic is divided into two parts1 the ,analytic of ,conceptions1 of which the aim is to discover and vindicate the validity of the categories1 and the ,analytic of ,principles1 of which the aim is to determine the use of the categories in judgement4 ,the latter part1 which has now to be considered1 is subdivided into two4 ,it has1 according to ,kant1 firstly to determine the sensuous conditions under which the categories are used1 and secondly to discover the a priori principles involved in the categories1 as exercised under these sensuous conditions1 such1 for instance1 as the law that all changes take place according to the law of cause and effect4 ,the first problem is dealt with in the chapter on the 'schematism of the pure conceptions of the understanding'1 the second in the chapter on the 'system of all principles of the pure understanding'4 #a p4 #ada4 ,we naturally feel a preliminary difficulty with respect to the existence of this second part of the ,analytic at all4 ,it seems clear that if the first part is successful1 the second must be unnecessary4 ,for if ,kant is in a position to lay down that the categories must apply to objects1 no special conditions of their application need be subsequently determined4 ,if1 for instance1 it can be laid down that the category of quantity must apply to objects1 it is implied either that there are no special conditions of its application1 or that they have already been discovered and shown to exist4 ,again1 to assert the applicability of the categories is really to assert the existence of principles1 and in fact of just those principles which it is the aim of the ,system of ,principles to prove4 ,thus to assert the applicability of the categories of quantity and of cause and effect is to assert respectively the principles that all objects of perception are extensive quantities1 and that all changes take place according to the law of cause and effect4 ,the ,deduction of the ,categories therefore1 if successful1 must have already proved the principles now to be vindicated2 and it is a matter for legitimate surprise that we find ,kant in the ,system of ,principles giving proofs of these principles which make no appeal to the ,deduction of the ,categories4#b ,on the other hand1 for the existence of the account of the schematism of the categories ,kant has a better show of reason4 ,for the conceptions derived in the ,metaphysical ,deduction from the nature of formal judgement are in themselves too abstract to be the conceptions which are to be shown applicable to the sensible world1 since all the latter involve the thought of time4 ,thus1 the conception of cause and effect derived from the nature of the hypothetical judgement includes no thought of time1 while the conception of which he wishes to show the validity is that of necessary succession in time4 ,hence the conceptions discovered by analysis of formal judgement have in some way to be rendered more concrete in respect of time4 ,the account of the schematism1 therefore1 is an attempt to get out of the false position reached by appealing to ,formal ,logic for the list of categories4 ,nevertheless1 the mention of a sensuous condition under which alone the categories can be employed#c should have suggested to ,kant that the transcendental deduction was defective1 and1 in fact1 in the second version of the transcendental deduction two paragraphs#d are inserted which take account of this sensuous condition4 #b ,the cause of ,kant's procedure is1 of course1 to be found in the unreal way in which he isolates conception from judgement4 #c ,b4 #age1 ,m4 #ajf4 #d ,b4 #bd and #bf1 ,m4 #bj and #bb4 ,the beginning of ,kant's account of schematism may be summarized thus3 ',whenever we subsume an individual object of a certain kind1 e4 g4 a plate1 under a conception1 e4 g4 a circle1 the object and the conception must be homogeneous1 that is to say1 the individual must possess the characteristic which constitutes the conception1 or1 in other words1 must be an instance of it4 ,pure conceptions1 however1 and empirical perceptions1 i4 e4 objects of empirical perception1 are quite heterogeneous4 ,we do not1 for instance1 perceive cases of cause and effect4 ,hence the problem arises1 ',how is it possible to subsume objects of empirical perception under pure conceptions8' ,the possibility of this subsumption presupposes a tertium quid1 which is homogeneous both with the object of empirical perception and with the conception1 and so makes the subsumption mediately possible4 ,this tertium quid must be1 on the one side1 intellectual and1 on the other side1 sensuous4 ,it is to be found in a 'transcendental determination of time'1 i4 e4 a conception involving time and involved in experience4 ,for in the first place this is on the one side intellectual and on the other sensuous1 and in the second place it is so far homogeneous with the category which constitutes its unity that it is universal and rests on an a priori rule1 and so far homogeneous with the phenomenon that all phenomena are in time#e4 ,such transcendental determinations of time are the schemata of the pure conceptions of the understanding4' ,kant continues as follows3 #e ,it may be noted that the argument here really fails4 ,for though phenomena as involving temporal relations1 might possibly be said to be instances of a transcendental determination of time1 the fact that the latter agrees with the corresponding category by being universal and a priori does not constitute it homogeneous with the category1 in the sense required for subsumption1 viz4 that it is an instance of or a species of the category4 ,the schema is in itself always a mere product of the imagination4 ,but since the synthesis of the imagination has for its aim no single perception1 but merely unity in the determination of the sensibility1 the schema should be distinguished from the image4 ,thus1 if ,i place five points one after another1 4 4 4 4 4 this is an image of the number five4 ,on the other hand1 if ,i only just think a number in general--no matter what it may be1 five or a hundred--this thinking is rather the representation of a method of representing in an image a group 7e4 g4 a thousand71 in conformity with a certain conception1 than the image itself1 an image which1 in the instance given1 ,i should find difficulty in surveying and comparing with the conception4 ,now this representation of a general procedure of the imagination to supply its image to a conception1 ,i call the schema of this conception4 ,the fact is that it is not images of objects1 but schemata1 which lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions4 ,no image could ever be adequate to our conception of a triangle in general4 ,for it would not attain the generality of the conception which makes it valid for all triangles1 whether right-angled1 acute-angled1 c41 but would always be limited to one part only of this sphere4 ,the schema of the triangle can exist nowhere else than in thought1 and signifies a rule of the synthesis of the imagination in regard to pure figures in space4 ,an object of experience or an image of it always falls short of the empirical conception to a far greater degree than does the schema2 the empirical conception always relates immediately to the schema of the imagination as a rule for the determination of our perception in conformity with a certain general conception4 ,the conception of 'dog' signifies a rule according to which my imagination can draw the general outline of the figure of a four-footed animal1 without being limited to any particular single form which experience presents to me1 or indeed to any possible image that ,i can represent to myself in concreto4 ,this schematism of our understanding in regard to phenomena and their mere form is an art hidden in the depths of the human soul1 whose true modes of action we are not likely ever to discover from ,nature and unveil4 ,thus much only can we say3 the image is a product of the empirical faculty of the productive imagination1 while the schema of sensuous conceptions 7such as of figures in space7 is a product and1 as it were1 a monogram of the pure a priori imagination1 through which1 and according to which1 images first become possible1 though the images must be connected with the conception only by means of the schema which they express1 and are in themselves not fully adequate to it4 ,on the other hand1 the schema of a pure conception of the understanding is something which cannot be brought to an image2 on the contrary1 it is only the pure synthesis in accordance with a rule of unity according to conceptions in general1 a rule of unity which the category expresses1 and it is a transcendental product of the imagination which concerns the determination of the inner sense in general according to conditions of its form 7time7 with reference to all representations1 so far as these are to be connected a priori in one conception according to the unity of apperception4#f #f ,b4 #agi-ha1 ,m4 #aji-aj4 ,now1 in order to determine whether schemata can constitute the desired link between the pure conceptions or categories and the manifold of sense1 it is necessary to follow closely this account of a schema4 ,kant unquestionably in this passage treats as a mental image related to a conception what really is1 and what on his own theory ought to have been1 an individual object related to a conception1 i4 e4 an instance of it4 ,in other words1 he takes a mental image of an individual for the individual itself4#g ,on the one hand1 he treats a schema of a conception throughout as the thought of a procedure of the imagination to present to the conception its image1 and he opposes schemata not to objects but to images2 on the other hand1 his problem concerns subsumption under a conception1 and what is subsumed must be an instance of the conception1 i4 e4 an individual object of the kind in question4#h ,again1 in asserting that if ,i place five points one after another1 4 4 4 4 4 this is an image of the number five1 he is actually saying that an individual group of five points is an image of a group of five in general4#i ,further1 if the process of schematizing is to enter--as it must--into knowledge of the phenomenal world1 what ,kant here speaks of as the images related to a conception must be taken to be individual instances of the conception1 whatever his language may be4 ,for1 in order to enter into knowledge1 the process referred to must be that by which objects of experience are constructed4 ,hence the passage should be interpreted as if throughout there had been written for 'image' 'individual instance' or more simply 'instance'4 ,again1 the process of schematizing1 although introduced simply as a process by which an individual is to be subsumed indirectly under a conception1 is assumed in the passage quoted to be a process of synthesis4 ,hence we may say that the process of schematizing is a process by which we combine the manifold of perception into an individual whole in accordance with a conception1 and that the schema of a conception is the thought of the rule of procedure on our part by which we combine the manifold in accordance with the conception1 and so bring the manifold under the conception4 ,thus the schema of the conception of #ajj is the thought of a process of synthesis by which we combine say #aj groups of #aj units into #ajj1 and the schematizing of the conception of #ajj is the process by which we do so4 ,here it is essential to notice three points4 ,in the first place1 the schema is a conception which relates not to the reality apprehended but to us4 ,it is the thought of a rule of procedure on our part by which an instance of a conception is constructed1 and not the thought of a characteristic of the reality constructed4 ,for instance1 the thought of a rule by which we can combine points to make #ajj is a thought which concerns us and not the points2 it is only the conception corresponding to this schema1 viz4 the thought of #ajj1 which concerns the points4 ,in the second place1 although the thought of time is involved in the schema1 the succession in question lies not in the object1 but in our act of construction or apprehension4 ,in the third place1 the schema presupposes the corresponding conception and the process of schematizing directly brings the manifold of perception under the conception4 ,thus the thought of combining #aj groups of #aj units to make #ajj presupposes the thought of #ajj1 and the process of combination brings the units under the conception of #ajj4 #g ,cf4 pp4 #bdj-a4 ,the mistake is1 of course1 facilitated by the fact that 'objects in nature'1 being for ,kant only 'appearances'1 resemble mental images more closely than they do as usually conceived4 #h ,cf4 ,b4 #agf1 ,m4 #ajg4 ,that individuals are really referred to is also implied in the assertion that 'the synthesis of imagination has for its aim no single perception1 but merely unity in the determination of sensibility'4 7,the italics are mine47 #i ,two sentences treat individual objects and images as if they might be mentioned indifferently4 ,an object of experience or an image of it always falls short of the empirical conception to a far greater degree than does the schema4 ,the conception of a 'dog' signifies a rule according to which my imagination can draw the general outline of the figure of a four-footed animal without being limited to any single particular form which experience presents to me1 or indeed to any possible image that ,i can represent to myself in concreto4 ,if1 however1 we go on to ask what is required of schemata and of the process of schematizing1 if they are to enable the manifold to be subsumed under the categories1 we see that each of these three characteristics makes it impossible for them to fulfil this purpose4 ,for firstly1 an individual manifold ,a has to be brought under a category ,b4 ,since ex hypothesi this cannot be effected directly1 there is needed a mediating conception ,c4 ,c1 therefore1 it would seem1 must be at once a species of ,b and a conception of which ,a is an instance4 ,in any case ,c must be a conception relating to the reality to be known1 and not to any process of knowing on our part1 and1 again1 it must be more concrete than ,b4 ,this is borne out by the list of the schemata of the categories4 ,but1 although a schema may be said to be more concrete than the corresponding conception1 in that it presupposes the conception1 it neither is nor involves a more concrete conception of an object and in fact1 as has been pointed out1 relates not to the reality to be known but to the process on our part by which we construct or apprehend it4#aj ,in the second place1 the time in respect of which the category ,b has to be made more concrete must relate to the object1 and not to the successive process by which we apprehend it1 whereas the time involved in a schema concerns the latter and not the former4 ,in the third place1 from the point of view of the categories1 the process of schematizing should be a process whereby we combine the manifold into a whole ,a in accordance with the conception ,c1 and thereby render possible the subsumption of ,a under the category ,b4 ,if it be a process which actually subsumes the manifold under ,b1 it will actually perform that1 the very impossibility of which has made it necessary to postulate such a process at all4 ,for1 according to ,kant1 it is just the fact that the manifold cannot be subsumed directly under the categories that renders schematism necessary4 ,yet1 on ,kant's general account of a schema1 the schematizing must actually bring a manifold under the corresponding conception4 ,if we present to ourselves an individual triangle by successively joining three lines according to the conception of a triangle1 i4 e4 so that they enclose a space1 we are directly bringing the manifold1 i4 e4 the lines1 under the conception of a triangle4 ,again1 if we present to ourselves an instance of a group of #ajj by combining #aj groups of #aj units of any kind1 we are directly bringing the units under the conception of #ajj4 ,if this consideration be applied to the schematism of a category1 we see that the process said to be necessary because a certain other process is impossible is the very process said to be impossible4 #aj ,it may be objected that1 from ,kant's point of view1 the thought of a rule of construction1 and the thought of the principle of the whole to be constructed1 are the same thing from different points of view4 ,but if this be insisted on1 the schema and its corresponding conception become the same thing regarded from different points of view2 consequently the schema will not be a more concrete conception of an object than the corresponding conception1 but it will be the conception itself4 ,if1 therefore1 ,kant succeeds in finding schemata of the categories in detail in the sense in which they are required for the solution of his problem1 i4 e4 in the sense of more concrete conceptions involving the thought of time and relating to objects1 we should expect either that he ignores his general account of a schema1 or that if he appeals to it1 the appeal is irrelevant4 ,this we find to be the case4 ,his account of the first two transcendental schemata makes a wholly irrelevant appeal to the temporal process of synthesis on our part1 while his account of the remaining schemata makes no attempt to appeal to it at all4 ,the pure schema of quantity1 as a conception of the understanding1 is number1 a representation which comprises the successive addition of one to one 7homogeneous elements74 ,accordingly1 number is nothing else than the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a homogeneous perception in general1 in that ,i generate time itself in the apprehension of the perception4#aa #aa ,b4 #ahb1 ,m4 #aaj4 ,it is clear that this passage1 whatever its precise interpretation may be1#ab involves a confusion between the thought of counting and that of number4 ,the thought of number relates to objects of apprehension and does not involve the thought of time4 ,the thought of counting1 which presupposes the thought of number1 relates to our apprehension of objects and involves the thought of time2 it is the thought of a successive process on our part by which we count the number of units contained in what we already know to consist of units4#ac ,now we must assume that the schema of quantity is really what ,kant says it is1 viz4 number1 or to express it more accurately1 the thought of number1 and not the thought of counting1 with which he wrongly identifies it4 ,for his main problem is to find conceptions which at once are more concrete than the categories and1 at the same time1 like the categories1 relate to objects1 and the thought of counting1 though more concrete than that of number1 does not relate to objects4 ,three consequences follow4 ,in the first place1 although the schema of quantity1 i4 e4 the thought of number1 is more concrete than the thought of quantity1#ad it is not1 as it should be1 more concrete in respect of time2 for the thought of number does not include the thought of time4 ,secondly1 the thought of time is only introduced into the schema of quantity irrelevantly by reference to the temporal process of counting1 by which we come to apprehend the number of a given group of units4 ,thirdly1 the schema of quantity is only in appearance connected with the nature of a schema in general1 as ,kant describes it1 by a false identification of the thought of number with the thought of the process on our part by which we count groups of units1 i4 e4 numbers4 #ab ,the drift of the passage would seem to be this3 ',if we are to present to ourselves an instance of a quantity1 we must successively combine similar units until they form a quantity4 ,this process involves the thought of a successive process by which we add units according to the conception of a quantity4 ,this thought is the thought of number1 and since by it we present to ourselves an instance of a quantity1 it is the schema of quantity4' ,but if this be its drift1 considerations of sense demand that it should be rewritten1 at least to the following extent3 ',if we are to present to ourselves an instance of a particular quantity which will really be a particular number1 for it must be regarded as discrete1 7cf4 ,b4 #bab1 ,m4 #abh fin41 #abi init47 e4 g4 three1 we must successively combine units until they form that quantity4 ,this process involves the thought of a successive process1 by which we add units according to the conception of that quantity4 ,this thought is the thought of a particular number1 and since by it we present to ourselves an instance of that quantity1 this thought is the schema of that quantity4' ,if this rewriting be admitted to be necessary1 it must be allowed that ,kant has confused 7a7 the thoughts of particular quantities and of particular numbers with those of quantity and of number in general respectively1 7b7 the thought of a particular quantity with that of a particular number 7for the process referred to presupposes that the particular quantity taken is known to consist of a number of equal units7 and 7c7 the thought of counting with that of number4 #ac ,this statement is1 of course1 not meant as a definition of counting1 but as a means of bringing out the distinction between a process of counting and a number4 #ad ,for the thought of a number is the thought of a quantity of a special kind1 viz4 of a quantity made up of a number of similar units without remainder4 ,the account of the schema of reality1 the second category1 runs as follows3 ,reality is in the pure conception of the understanding that which corresponds to a sensation in general1 that therefore of which the conception in itself indicates a being 7in time71 while negation is that of which the conception indicates a not being 7in time74 ,their opposition1 therefore1 arises in the distinction between one and the same time as filled or empty4 ,since time is only the form of perception1 consequently of objects as phenomena1 that which in objects corresponds to sensation is the transcendental matter of all objects as things in themselves 7thinghood1 reality74#ae ,now every sensation has a degree or magnitude by which it can fill the same time1 i4 e4 the internal sense1 in respect of the same representation of an object1 more or less1 until it vanishes into nothing 7 #j negatio74 ,there is1 therefore1 a relation and connexion between reality and negation1 or rather a transition from the former to the latter1 which makes every reality representable as a quantum2 and the schema of a reality1 as the quantity of something so far as it fills time1 is just this continuous and uniform generation of the reality in time1 as we descend in time from the sensation which has a certain degree1 down to the vanishing thereof1 or gradually ascend from negation to the magnitude thereof4#af #ae ,it is difficult to see how ,kant could meet the criticism that here1 contrary to his intention1 he is treating physical objects as things in themselves4 ,cf4 p4 #bfe4 #af ,b4 #ahb-c1 ,m4 #aaj-aa4 ,this passage1 if it be taken in connexion with the account of the anticipations of perception1#ag seems to have the following meaning3 ',in thinking of something as a reality1 we think of it as that which corresponds to1 i4 e4 produces1 a sensation1 and therefore as something which1 like the sensation1 is in time2 and just as every sensation1 which1 as such1 occupies time1 has a certain degree of intensity1 so has the reality which produces it4 ,now to produce for ourselves an instance of a reality in this sense1 we must add units of reality till a reality of the required degree is produced1 and the thought of this method on our part of constructing an individual reality is the schema of reality4' ,but if this represents ,kant's meaning1 the schema of reality relates only to our process of apprehension1 and therefore is not a conception which relates to objects and is more concrete than the corresponding category in respect of time4 ,moreover1 it is matter for surprise that in the case of this category ,kant should have thought schematism necessary1 for time is actually included in his own statement of the category4 #ag ,b4 #bjg-ah1 ,m4 #abe-cb4 ,the account of the schemata of the remaining categories need not be considered4 ,it merely asserts that certain conceptions relating to objects and involving the thought of time are the schemata corresponding to the remaining categories1 without any attempt to connect them with the nature of a schema4 ,thus1 the schema of substance is asserted to be the permanence of the real in time1 that of cause the succession of the manifold1 in so far as that succession is subjected to a rule1 that of interaction the coexistence of the determinations or accidents of one substance with those of another according to a universal rule4#ah ,again1 the schemata of possibility1 of actuality and of necessity are said to be respectively the accordance of the synthesis of representations with the conditions of time in general1 existence in a determined time1 and existence of an object in all time4 #ah ,the italics are mine4 ,the main confusion pervading the chapter is of course that between temporal relations which concern the process of apprehension and temporal relations which concern the realities apprehended4 ,kant is continually referring to the former as if they were the latter4 ,the cause of this confusion lies in ,kant's reduction of physical realities to representations4 ,since1 according to him1 these realities are only our representations1 all temporal relations are really relations of our representations1 and these relations have to be treated at one time as relations of our apprehensions1 and at another as relations of the realities apprehended1 as the context requires4 ,,chapter ,,xi ,,the ,,mathematical ,,principles ,as has been pointed out1#a the aim of the second part of the ,analytic of ,principles is to determine the a priori principles involved in the use of the categories under the necessary sensuous conditions4 ,these principles ,kant divides into four classes1 corresponding to the four groups of categories1 and he calls them respectively 'axioms of perception'1 'anticipations of sense-perception'1 'analogies of experience'1 and 'postulates of empirical thought'4 ,the first two and the last two classes are grouped together as 'mathematical' and 'dynamical' respectively1 on the ground that the former group concerns the perception of objects1 i4 e4 their nature apprehended in perception1 while the latter group concerns their existence1 and that consequently1 since assertions concerning the existence of objects presuppose the realization of empirical conditions which assertions concerning their nature do not1 only the former possesses an absolute necessity and an immediate evidence such as is found in mathematics4#b #a p4 #bdf4 #b ,the assertion that all perceptions 7i4 e4 all objects of perception7 are extensive quantities relates1 according to ,kant1 to the nature of objects1 while the assertion that an event must have a necessary antecedent affirms that such an antecedent must exist1 but gives no clue to its specific nature4 ,compare ,but the existence of phenomena cannot be known a priori1 and although we could be led in this way to infer the fact of some existence1 we should not know this existence determinately1 i4 e4 we could not anticipate the respect in which the empirical perception of it differed from that of other existences4 7,b4 #bba1 ,m4 #acd74 ,kant seems to think that the fact that the dynamical principles relate to the existence of objects is a sufficient justification of their name4 ,it needs but little reflection to see that the distinctions which ,kant draws between the mathematical and the dynamical principles must break down4 ,these two groups of principles are not1 as their names might suggest1 principles within mathematics and physics1 but presuppositions of mathematics and physics respectively4 ,kant also claims appropriateness for the special terms used of each minor group to indicate the kind of principles in question1 viz4 'axioms'1 'anticipations'1 'analogies'1 'postulates'4 ,but it may be noted as an indication of the artificiality of the scheme that each of the first two groups contains only one principle1 although ,kant refers to them in the plural as axioms and anticipations respectively1 and although the existence of three categories corresponding to each group would suggest the existence of three principles4 ,the axiom of perception is that ',all perceptions are extensive quantities'4 ,the proof of it runs thus3 ,an extensive quantity ,i call that in which the representation of the parts renders possible the representation of the whole 7and therefore necessarily precedes it74 ,i cannot represent to myself any line1 however small it may be1 without drawing it in thought1 that is1 without generating from a point all its parts one after another1 and thereby first drawing this perception4 ,precisely the same is the case with every1 even the smallest1 time4444 ,since the pure perception in all phenomena is either time or space1 every phenomenon as a perception is an extensive quantity1 because it can be known in apprehension only by a successive synthesis 7of part with part74 ,all phenomena1 therefore1 are already perceived as aggregates 7groups of previously given parts71 which is not the case with quantities of every kind1 but only with those which are represented and apprehended by us as extensive4#c #c ,b4 #bjc-d1 ,m4 #abc4 ,kant opposes an extensive quantity to an intensive quantity or a quantity which has a degree4 ,that quantity which is apprehended only as unity and in which plurality can be represented only by approximation to negation #j1 ,i call intensive quantity4#d ,the aspect of this ultimate distinction which underlies ,kant's mode of stating it is that only an extensive quantity is a whole1 i4 e4 something made up of parts4 ,thus a mile can be said to be made up of two half-miles1 but a velocity of one foot per second1 though comparable with a velocity of half a foot per second1 cannot be said to be made up of two such velocities2 it is essentially one and indivisible4 ,hence1 from ,kant's point of view1 it follows that it is only an extensive magnitude which can1 and indeed must1 be apprehended through a successive synthesis of the parts4 ,the proof of the axiom seems to be simply this3 ',all phenomena as objects of perception are subject to the forms of perception1 space and time4 ,space and time are homogeneous manifolds1 and therefore extensive quantities1 only to be apprehended by a successive synthesis of the parts4 ,hence phenomena1 or objects of experience1 must also be extensive quantities1 to be similarly apprehended4' ,and ,kant goes on to add that it is for this reason that geometry and pure mathematics generally apply to objects of experience4 #d ,b4 #baj1 ,m4 #abg4 ,we need only draw attention to three points4 ,firstly1 no justification is given of the term 'axiom'4 ,secondly1 the argument does not really appeal to the doctrine of the categories1 but only to the character of space and time as forms of perception4 ,thirdly1 it need not appeal to space and time as forms of perception in the proper sense of ways in which we apprehend objects1 but only in the sense of ways in which objects are related#e2 in other words1 it need not appeal to ,kant's theory of knowledge4 ,the conclusion follows simply from the nature of objects as spatially and temporally related1 whether they are phenomena or not4 ,it may be objected that ,kant's thesis is that all objects of perception are extensive quantities1 and that unless space and time are allowed to be ways in which we must perceive objects1 we cannot say that all objects will be spatially and temporally related1 and so extensive quantities4 ,but to this it may be replied that it is only true that all objects of perception are extensive quantities if the term 'object of perception' be restricted to parts of the physical world1 i4 e4 to just those realities which ,kant is thinking of as spatially and temporally related1#f and that this restriction is not justified1 since a sensation or a pain which has only intensive quantity is just as much entitled to be called an object of perception4 #e ,cf4 pp4 #cg-i4 #f ,the context shows that ,kant is thinking only of such temporal relations as belong to the physical world1 and not of those which belong to us as apprehending it4 ,cf4 p4 #aci4 ,the anticipation of sense-perception consists in the principle that ',in all phenomena1 the real1 which is an object of sensation1 has intensive magnitude1 i4 e4 a degree'4 ,the proof is stated thus3 ,apprehension merely by means of sensation fills only one moment 7that is1 if ,i do not take into consideration the succession of many sensations74 ,sensation1 therefore1 as that in the phenomenon the apprehension of which is not a successive synthesis advancing from parts to a complete representation1 has no extensive quantity2 the lack of sensation in one and the same moment would represent it as empty1 consequently #j4 ,now that which in the empirical perception corresponds to sensation is reality 7realitas phaenomenon72 that which corresponds to the lack of it is negation #j4 ,but every sensation is capable of a diminution1 so that it can decrease and thus gradually vanish4 ,therefore1 between reality in the phenomenon and negation there exists a continuous connexion of many possible intermediate sensations1 the difference of which from each other is always smaller than that between the given sensation and zero1 or complete negation4 ,that is to say1 the real in the phenomenon has always a quantity1 which1 however1 is not found in apprehension1 since apprehension takes place by means of mere sensation in one moment and not by a successive synthesis of many sensations1 and therefore does not proceed from parts to the whole4 ,consequently1 it has a quantity1 but not an extensive quantity4 ,now that quantity which is apprehended only as unity1 and in which plurality can be represented only by approximation to negation #j1 ,i call an intensive quantity4 ,every reality1 therefore1 in a phenomenon has intensive quantity1 that is1 a degree4#g #g ,b4 #bji-aj1 ,m4 #abg4 ,in other words1 ',we can lay down a priori that all sensations have a certain degree of intensity1 and that between a sensation of a given intensity and the total absence of sensation there is possible an infinite number of sensations varying in intensity from nothing to that degree of intensity4 ,therefore the real1 which corresponds to sensation1 can also be said a priori to admit of an infinite variety of degree4' ,though the principle established is of little intrinsic importance1 the account of it is noticeable for two reasons4 ,in the first place1 although ,kant clearly means by the 'real corresponding to sensation' a body in space1 and regards it as a phenomenon1 it is impossible to see how he can avoid the charge that he in fact treats it as a thing in itself4#h ,for the correspondence must consist in the fact that the real causes or excites sensation in us1 and therefore the real1 i4 e4 a body in space1 is implied to be a thing in itself4 ,in fact1 ,kant himself speaks of considering the real in the phenomenon as the cause of sensation1#i and1 in a passage added in the second edition1 after proving that sensation must have an intensive quantity1 he says that1 corresponding to the intensive quantity of sensation1 an intensive quantity1 i4 e4 a degree of influence on sense1 must be attributed to all objects of sense-perception4#aj ,the difficulty of consistently maintaining that the real1 which corresponds to sensation1 is a phenomenon is1 of course1 due to the impossibility of distinguishing between reality and appearance within phenomena4#aa #h ,cf4 p4 #beg note4 #i ,b4 #baj1 ,m4 #abh4 #aj ,b4 #bjh1 ,m4 #abf4 ,the italics are mine4 ,cf4 from the same passage1 ,phenomena contain1 over and above perception1 the materials for some object 7through which is represented something existing in space and time71 i4 e4 they contain the real of sensation as a merely subjective representation of which we can only become conscious that the subject is affected1 and which we relate to an object in general4 7,the italics are mine47 #aa ,cf4 pp4 #id-ajj4 ,in the second place1 ,kant expressly allows that in this anticipation we succeed in discovering a priori a characteristic of sensation1 although sensation constitutes that empirical element in phenomena1 which on ,kant's general view cannot be apprehended a priori4 ,nevertheless1 this anticipation of sense-perception must always be somewhat surprising to an inquirer who is used to transcendental reflection1 and is thereby rendered cautious4 ,it leads us to feel some misgiving as to whether the understanding can anticipate such a synthetic proposition as that respecting the degree of all that is real in phenomena1 and consequently respecting the possibility of the internal distinction of sensation itself1 if we abstract from its empirical quality4 ,there remains1 therefore1 a problem not unworthy of solution1 viz4 ',how can the understanding pronounce synthetically and a priori upon phenomena in this respect1 and thus anticipate phenomena even in that which is specially and merely empirical1 viz4 that which concerns sensations8'#ab ,but although ,kant recognizes that the anticipation is surprising1 he is not led to revise his general theory1 as being inconsistent with the existence of the anticipation4 ,he indeed makes an attempt#ac to deal with the difficulty2 but his solution consists not in showing that the anticipation is consistent with his general theory--as he should have done1 if the theory was to be retained--but in showing that1 in the case of the degree of sensation1 we do apprehend the nature of sensation a priori4 #ab ,b4 #bag1 ,m4 #aca2 cf4 ,b4 #bji1 ,m4 #abg4 #ac ,b4 #bag-ah1 ,m4 #acb4 ,strangely enough1 ,hume finds himself face to face with what is in principle the same difficulty1 and treats it in a not dissimilar way4 ,there is1 however1 one contradictory phenomenon1 which may prove1 that 'tis not absolutely impossible for ideas to go before their correspondent impressions4 ,i believe it will readily be allow'd1 that the several distinct ideas of colours1 which enter by the eyes1 or those of sounds1 which are convey'd by the hearing1 are really different from each other1 tho' at the same time resembling4 ,now if this be true of different colours1 it must be no less so of the different shades of the same colour1 that each of them produces a distinct idea1 independent of the rest4 ,for if this shou'd be deny'd1 'tis possible1 by the continual gradation of shades1 to run a colour insensibly into what is most remote from it2 and if you will not allow any of the means to be different1 you cannot without absurdity deny the extremes to be the same4 ,suppose therefore a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years1 and to have become perfectly well acquainted with colours of all kinds1 excepting one particular shade of blue1 for instance1 which it never has been his fortune to meet with4 ,let all the different shades of that colour1 except that single one1 be plac'd before him1 descending gradually from the deepest to the lightest2 'tis plain that he will perceive a blank1 where that shade is wanting1 and will be sensible1 that there is a greater distance in that place betwixt the contiguous colours1 than in any other4 ,now ,i ask1 whether 'tis possible for him1 from his own imagination1 to supply this deficiency1 and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade1 tho' it had never been conveyed to him by his senses8 ,i believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can2 and this may serve as a proof1 that the simple ideas are not always derived from the correspondent impressions2 tho' the instance is so particular and singular1 that 'tis scarce worth our observing1 and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim4#ad #ad ,hume1 ,treatise1 ,bk4 ,i1 ,part #a1 #a4 ,,chapter ,,xii ,,the ,,analogies ,,of ,,experience ,each of the three categories of relation1 i4 e4 those of substance and accident1 of cause and effect1 and of interaction between agent and patient involves1 according to ,kant1 a special principle1 and these special principles he calls 'analogies of experience'4 ,they are stated thus3#a 7#a7 ,in all changes of phenomena the substance is permanent1 and its quantity in nature is neither increased nor diminished4 7#b7 ,all changes take place according to the law of the connexion of cause and effect4 7#c7 ,all substances1 so far as they can be perceived in space as coexistent1 are in complete interaction4 ,the justification of the term analogy of experience is as follows4 ,in mathematics an analogy is a formula which asserts the equality of two quantitative relations1 and is such that1 if three of the terms are given1 we can discover the fourth1 e4 g4 if we know that a 3 b c 3 d1 and that a #b1 b #d1 c #f we can discover that d #ab4 ,but in philosophy an analogy is the assertion of the equality of two qualitative relations and is such that1 if three of the terms are given1 we can discover1 not the fourth1 but only the relation of the third to the fourth1 though at the same time we are furnished with a clue whereby to search for the fourth in experience4 ,in this philosophical sense1 the principles involved in the categories of relation are analogies4 ,for instance1 the principles of causality can be stated in the form ',any known event ,x is to some other event ,y1 whatever it be1 as effect to cause'2 so stated1 it clearly informs us not of the character of ,y but only of the fact that there must be a ,y1 i4 e4 a necessary antecedent1 though at the same time this knowledge enables us to search in experience for the special character of ,y4 #a ,the formulation of them in the first edition is slightly different4 ,the principles to be established relate to the two kinds of temporal relation apprehended in the world of nature1 viz4 coexistence and succession4 ,the method of proof1 which is to be gathered from the proofs themselves rather than from ,kant's general remarks#b on the subject1 is the same in each case4 ,kant expressly rejects any proof which is 'dogmatical' or 'from conceptions'1 e4 g4 any attempt to show that the very conception of change presupposes the thought of an identical subject of change4#c ,the proof is transcendental in character1 i4 e4 it argues that the principle to be established is a condition of the possibility of apprehending the temporal relation in question1 e4 g4 that the existence of a permanent subject of change is presupposed in any apprehension of change4 ,it assumes that we become aware of sequences and coexistences in the world of nature by a process which begins with a succession of mere perceptions1 i4 e4 perceptions which are so far not the perceptions of a sequence or of a coexistence or indeed of anything2#d and it seeks to show that this process involves an appeal to one of the principles in question--the particular principle involved depending on the temporal relation apprehended--and consequently1 that since we do apprehend this temporal relation1 which1 as belonging to the world of nature1 must be distinct from any temporal relation of our perceptions1 the principle appealed to is valid4 #b ,b4 #bah-bd1 ,m4 #acb-f2 and ,b4 #bfb-e1 ,m4 #aei-fa4 #c ,b4 #bfc-d1 ,m4 #afj-a2 ,b4 #bhi1 ,m4 #agd-e4 #d ,this assumption is of course analogous to the assumption which underlies the ,transcendental ,deduction of the ,categories1 that knowledge begins with the successive origination in us of isolated data of sense4 ,the proof of the first analogy is given somewhat differently in the first edition1 and in a passage added in the second4 ,the earlier version1 which is a better expression of the attitude underlying ,kant's general remarks on the analogy1 is as follows3 ,our apprehension of the manifold of a phenomenon is always successive1 and is therefore always changing4 ,by it alone1 therefore1 we can never determine whether this manifold1 as an object of experience1 is coexistent or successive1 unless there lies at the base of it something that exists always1 that is1 something enduring and permanent1 of which all succession and coexistence are nothing but so many ways 7modi of time7 in which the permanent exists4 ,only in the permanent1 then1 are time relations possible 7for simultaneity and succession are the only relations in time72 i4 e4 the permanent is the substratum of the empirical representation of time itself1 in which alone all time-determination is possible4 ,permanence expresses in general time1 as the persisting correlate of all existence of phenomena1 of all change1 and of all concomitance4444 ,only through the permanent does existence in different parts of the successive series of time gain a quantity which we call duration4 ,for1 in mere succession1 existence is always vanishing and beginning1 and never has the least quantity4 ,without this permanent1 then1 no time relation is possible4 ,now1 time in itself cannot be perceived#e2 consequently this permanent in phenomena is the substratum of all time-determination1 and therefore also the condition of the possibility of all synthetic unity of sense-perceptions1 that is1 of experience1 and in this permanent all existence and all change in time can only be regarded as a mode of the existence of that which endures and is permanent4 ,therefore in all phenomena the permanent is the object itself1 i4 e4 the substance 7phenomenon72 but all that changes or can change belongs only to the way in which this substance or substances exist1 consequently to their determinations4#f ,accordingly since substance cannot change in existence1 its quantity in nature can neither be increased nor diminished4#g ,the argument becomes plainer if it be realized that in the interval between the two editions1 ,kant came to think that the permanent in question was matter or bodies in space4#h ,we find that in order to give something permanent in perception corresponding to the conception of substance 7and thereby to exhibit the objective reality of this conception71 we need a perception in space 7of matter71 because space alone has permanent determinations1 while time1 and consequently everything which is in the internal sense1 is continually flowing4#i #e ,wahrgenommen4 #f ,a4 #ahb-d and ,b4 #bbe-g1 ,m4 #acg-h4 ,this formulation of the conclusion is adapted only to the form in which the first analogy is stated in the first edition1 viz4 ,all phenomena contain the permanent 7substance7 as the object itself and the changeable as its mere determination1 i4 e4 as a way in which the object exists4 ,hence a sentence from the conclusion of the proof added in the second edition is quoted to elucidate ,kant's meaning2 its doctrine is as legitimate a conclusion of the argument given in the first edition as of that peculiar to the second4 #g ,b4 #bbe1 ,m4 #acg4 #h ,cf4 ,caird1 i4 #eda-b4 #i ,b4 #bia1 ,m4 #agf 7in #bnd ed4 only74 ,cf4 ,b4 #bgg fin4-#bgh init41 ,m4 #afh 7in #bnd ed4 only74 ,kant's thought appears to be as follows3 ',our apprehension of the manifold consists of a series of successive acts in which we apprehend its elements one by one and in isolation4 ,this apprehension1 therefore1 does not enable us to determine that its elements are temporally related either as successive or as coexistent4#aj ,in order to determine this1 we must apprehend the elements of the manifold as related to something permanent4 ,for a succession proper1 i4 e4 a change1 is a succession of states or determinations of something permanent or unchanging4 ,a mere succession which is not a succession of states of something which remains identical is an unconnected series of endings and beginnings1 and with respect to it1 'duration'1 which has meaning with regard to changes1 i4 e4 successions proper1 has no meaning at all4 ,similarly1 coexistence is a coexistence of states of two permanents4 ,hence1 to apprehend elements of the manifold as successive or coexistent1 we must apprehend them in relation to a permanent or permanents4 ,therefore1 to apprehend a coexistence or a succession1 we must perceive something permanent4 ,but this permanent something cannot be time1 for time cannot be perceived4 ,it must therefore be a permanent in phenomena2 and this must be the object itself or the substance of a phenomenon1 i4 e4 the substratum of the changes which it undergoes1 or that of which the elements of the manifold are states or modifications4#aa ,consequently1 there must be a permanent substance of a phenomenon1 and the quantity of substances taken together must be constant4' #aj ,the account of the first analogy as a whole makes it necessary to think that ,kant in the first two sentences of the proof quoted does not mean exactly what he says1 what he says being due to a desire to secure conformity with his treatment of the second and third analogies4 ,what he says suggests 7#a7 that he is about to discuss the implications1 not of the process by which we come to apprehend the manifold as temporally related in one of the two ways possible1 i4 e4 either as successive or as coexistent1 but of the process by which we decide whether the relation of the manifold which we already know to be temporal is that of succession or that of coexistence1 and 7#b7 that the necessity for this process is due to the fact that our apprehension of the manifold is always successive4 ,the context1 however1 refutes both suggestions1 and in any case it is the special function of the processes which involve the second and third analogies to determine the relations of the manifold as that of succession and that of coexistence respectively4 #aa ,cf4 ,b4 #bbe1 ,m4 #acg 7first half74 ,now1 if ,kant's thought has been here represented fairly1 it is open to the following comments4 ,in the first place1 even if his position be right in the main1 ,kant should not introduce the thought of the quantity of substance1 and speak of the quantity as constant4 ,for he thereby implies that in a plurality of substances--if such a plurality can in the end be admitted--there may be total extinction of1 or partial loss in1 some1 if only there be a corresponding compensation in others2 whereas such extinction and creation would be inconsistent with the nature of a substance4#ab ,even ,kant himself speaks of having established the impossibility of the origin and extinction of substance4#ac #ab ,i owe this comment to ,professor ,cook ,wilson4 #ac ,b4 #bcb-c1 ,m4 #ada fin4 ,in the second place1 it is impossible to see how it can be legitimate for ,kant to speak of a permanent substratum of change at all4#ad ,for phenomena or appearances neither are nor imply the substratum of which ,kant is thinking4 ,they might be held to imply ourselves as the identical substratum of which they are successive states1 but this view would be irrelevant to1 if not inconsistent with1 ,kant's doctrine4 ,it is all very well to say that the substratum is to be found in matter1 i4 e4 in bodies in space1#ae but the assertion is incompatible with the phenomenal character of the world2 for the sensations or appearances produced in us by the thing in itself cannot be successive states of bodies in space4 ,in the third place1 in spite of ,kant's protests against any proof which is 'dogmatical' or 'from conceptions'1 such a proof really forms the basis of his thought4 ,for if the argument is to proceed not from the nature of change as such but from the possibility of perceiving change1 it must not take into account any implications of the possibility of perceiving change which rest upon implications of the nature of change as such4 ,yet this is what the argument does4 ,for the reason really given for the view that the apprehension of change involves the apprehension of the manifold as related to a permanent substratum is that a change1 as such1 implies a permanent substratum4 ,it is only because change is held to imply a substratum that we are said to be able to apprehend a change only in relation to a substratum4 ,moreover1 shortly afterwards1 ,kant1 apparently without realizing what he is doing1 actually uses what is1 on the very face of it1 the dogmatic method1 and in accordance with it develops the implications of the perception of change4 ,upon this permanence is based the justification of the conception of change4 ,coming into being and perishing are not changes of that which comes to be or perishes4 ,change is but a mode of existence1 which follows on another mode of existence of the same object4 ,hence everything which changes endures and only its condition changes4444 ,change1 therefore1 can be perceived only in substances1 and absolute coming to be or perishing1 which does not concern merely a determination of the permanent1 cannot be a possible perception4#af ,surely the fact that ,kant is constrained in spite of himself to use the dogmatic method is some indication that it is the right method4 ,it is in reality impossible to make any discoveries about change1 or indeed about anything1 except by consideration of the nature of the thing itself2 no study of the conditions under which it can be apprehended can throw any light upon its nature4#ag ,lastly1 although the supposition is not so explicit as the corresponding supposition made in the case of the other analogies1 ,kant's argument really assumes1 and assumes wrongly1 the existence of a process by which1 starting with the successive apprehension of elements of the manifold in isolation1 we come to apprehend them as temporally related4 #ad ,the term 'permanent' is retained to conform to ,kant's language4 ,strictly speaking1 only a state of that which changes can be said to persist or to be permanent2 for the substratum of change is not susceptible of any temporal predicates4 ,cf4 p4 #cjf4 #ae ,b4 #bia1 ,m4 #agf4 #af ,b4 #bcj-a1 ,m4 #agf4 #ag ,cf4 pp4 #cjj-a4 ,the deduction of the second and third analogies argues that the principles of causality and reciprocal action are involved respectively in the processes by which we become aware of successions and of coexistences in the world of nature4 ,from this point of view it would seem that the first analogy is a presupposition of the others1 and that the process which involves the first is presupposed by the process which involves the others4 ,it would seem that it is only upon the conclusion of a process by which1 beginning with the successive apprehension of elements of the manifold in isolation1 we come to apprehend them as either successive or coexistent elements in the world of nature1 that there can arise a process by which we come to decide whether the specific relation is that of succession or of coexistence4 ,for if the latter process can take place independently of the former1 i4 e4 if it can start from the successive apprehension of the manifold1 the former process will be unnecessary1 and in that case the vindication of the first analogy will be invalid4 ,it is necessary1 however1 to distinguish between ,kant's nominal and his actual procedure4 ,though he nominally regards the first analogy as the presupposition of the others1#ah he really does not4 ,for he does not in fact treat the process which involves the validity of the first analogy as an antecedent condition of the processes which involve the validity of the others4 ,on the contrary1 the latter processes begin ab initio with the mere successive apprehension of the manifold1 i4 e4 they begin at a stage where we are not aware of any relation in the physical world at all2 and ,kant1 in his account of them1 nowhere urges that they involve the first analogy4#ai #ah ,cf4 ,b4 #bbi1 ,m4 #adj2 ,b4 #bcb-c1 ,m4 #ada-b2 and ,caird1 i4 #ede and ff4 #ai ,this is not disproved by ,b4 #bdg-ea1 ,m4 #aej-b1 which involves a different conception of cause and effect4 ,moreover1 just because ,kant does not face the difficulties involved in the thought of a process which begins in this way until he comes to vindicate causality1 it is only when we come to this vindication that we realize the real nature of his deduction of the analogies1 and1 in particular1 of that of the first4 ,kant1 prompted no doubt by his desire to answer ,hume1 treats the principle of causality very fully4 ,the length of the discussion1 however1 is due not so much to the complication of the argument as to ,kant's desire to make his meaning unmistakable2 his account consists mainly in a repetition of what is substantially the same argument no less than five times4 ,hence it will suffice to consider those passages which best express ,kant's meaning4 ,at the same time1 the prominence of the principle of causality in ,kant's theory1 and in the history of philosophy generally1 and also the way in which ,kant's treatment of it reveals the true nature of his general position1 makes it necessary to consider these passages in some detail4 ,hume had denied that we are justified in asserting any causal connexion1 i4 e4 any necessity of succession in the various events which we perceive1 but even this denial presupposed that we do apprehend particular sequences in the world of nature1 and therefore that we succeed in distinguishing between a sequence of events in nature and a mere sequence of perceptions1 such as is also to be found when we apprehend a coexistence of bodies in space4 ,kant urges1 in effect1 that this denial renders it impossible to explain1 as we should be able to do1 the possibility of making the distinction in question1 which even the denial itself presupposes that we make4 ,holding1 with ,hume1 that in all cases of perception what we are directly aware of is a succession of perceptions1 he contends that it is necessary to explain how in certain cases we succeed in passing from the knowledge of our successive perceptions to the knowledge of a succession in what we perceive4 ,how is it that we know1 when1 as we say1 we see a boat going down stream1 that there is a succession in what we perceive1 and not merely a succession in our perception of it1 as is the case when1 as we say1 we see the parts of a house8 ,hume1 according to ,kant1 cannot answer this question2 he has only the right to say that in all cases we have a succession of perceptions2 for in reality an answer to the question will show that the acquisition of this knowledge involves an appeal to the principle of causality4 ,since1 then1 we do in fact1 as even ,hume implicitly allowed1 succeed in distinguishing between a succession in objects in nature and a succession in our apprehension of them1 the law of causality must be true4 ,it is only under this presupposition 7i4 e4 of causality7 that even the experience of an event is possible4#bj #bj ,b4 #bdj1 ,m4 #adf4 ,for the general view1 cf4 ,caird1 i4 #eef-fa4 ,kant begins#ba his proof as follows3 ,our apprehension of the manifold of a phenomenon is always successive4 ,the representations of the parts succeed one another4 ,whether they succeed one another in the object also is a second point for reflection which is not contained in the first4#bb ,but1 before he can continue1 the very nature of these opening sentences compels him to consider a general problem which they raise4 ,the distinction referred to between a succession in our apprehensions or representations and a succession in the object implies an object distinct from the apprehensions or representations4 ,what1 then1 can be meant by such an object8 ,for prima facie1 if we ignore the thing in itself as unknowable1 there is no object2 there are only representations4 ,but1 in that case1 what can be meant by a succession in the object8 ,kant is therefore once more#bc forced to consider the question ',what is meant by object of representations8' although on this occasion with special reference to the meaning of a succession in the object2 and the vindication of causality is bound up with the answer4 ,the answer is stated thus3 #ba ,the preceding paragraph is an addition of the second edition4 #bb ,b4 #bcd1 ,m4 #adb4 #bc ,cf4 ,a4 #ajd-e1 ,mah4 #aih-i1 and pp4 #agh-hf and #bcj-c4 ,now we may certainly give the name of object to everything1 and even to every representation1 so far as we are conscious thereof2 but what this word may mean in the case of phenomena1 not in so far as they 7as representations7 are objects1 but in so far as they only indicate an object1 is a question requiring deeper consideration4 ,so far as they1 as representations only1 are at the same time objects of consciousness1 they are not to be distinguished from apprehension1 i4 e4 reception into the synthesis of imagination1 and we must therefore say1 ',the manifold of phenomena is always produced successively in the mind'4 ,if phenomena were things in themselves1 no man would be able to infer from the succession of the representations of their manifold how this manifold is connected in the object4 ,for after all we have to do only with our representations2 how things may be in themselves1 without regard to the representations through which they affect us1 is wholly outside the sphere of our knowledge4 ,now1 although phenomena are not things in themselves1 and are nevertheless the only thing which can be given to us as data for knowledge1 it is my business to show what kind of connexion in time belongs to the manifold in phenomena themselves1 while the representation of this manifold in apprehension is always successive4 ,thus1 for example1 the apprehension of the manifold in the phenomenon of a house which stands before me is successive4 ,now arises the question1 whether the manifold of this house itself is in itself also successive1 which of course no one will grant4 ,but1 so soon as ,i raise my conceptions of an object to the transcendental meaning thereof1 the house is not a thing in itself1 but only a phenomenon1 i4 e4 a representation1 the transcendental object of which is unknown4 ,what1 then1 am ,i to understand by the question1 ',how may the manifold be connected in the phenomenon itself 7which is nevertheless nothing in itself78' ,here that which lies in the successive apprehension is regarded as representation1 while the phenomenon which is given me1 although it is nothing more than a complex of these representations1 is regarded as the object thereof1 with which my conception1 drawn from the representations of apprehension1 is to agree4 ,it is soon seen that1 since agreement of knowledge with the object is truth1 we can ask here only for the formal conditions of empirical truth1 and that the phenomenon1 in opposition to the representations of apprehension1 can only be represented as the object of the same1 distinct therefrom1 if it stands under a rule1 which distinguishes it from every other apprehension1 and which renders necessary a mode of conjunction of the manifold4 ,that in the phenomenon which contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension is the object4#bd #bd ,b4 #bcd-f1 ,m4 #adc-d4 ,cf4 ,b4 #bdb1 ,m4 #adg4 ,this passage is only intelligible if we realize the impasse into which ,kant has been led by his doctrine that objects1 i4 e4 realities in the physical world1 are only representations or ideas4 ,as has already been pointed out1#be an apprehension is essentially inseparable from a reality of which it is the apprehension4 ,in other words1 an apprehension is always the apprehension of a reality1 and a reality apprehended1 i4 e4 an object of apprehension1 cannot be stated in terms of the apprehension of it4 ,we never confuse an apprehension and its object2 nor do we take the temporal relations which belong to the one for the temporal relations which belong to the other1 for these relations involve different terms which are never confused1 viz4 apprehensions and the objects apprehended4 ,now ,kant1 by his doctrine of the unknowability of the thing in itself1 has really deprived himself of an object of apprehension or1 in his language1 of an object of representations4 ,for it is the thing in itself which is1 properly speaking1 the object of the representations of which he is thinking1 i4 e4 representations of a reality in nature2 and yet the thing in itself1 being on his view inapprehensible1 can never be for him an object in the proper sense1 i4 e4 a reality apprehended4 ,hence he is only able to state the fact of knowledge in terms of mere apprehensions1 or ideas1 or representations--the particular name is a matter of indifference--and consequently his efforts to recover an object of apprehension are fruitless4 ,as a matter of fact1 these efforts only result in the assertion that the object of representations consists in the representations themselves related in a certain necessary way4 ,but this view is open to two fatal objections4 ,in the first place1 a complex of representations is just not an object in the proper sense1 i4 e4 a reality apprehended4 ,it essentially falls on the subject side of the distinction between an apprehension and the reality apprehended4 ,the complexity of a complex of representations in no way divests it of the character which it has as a complex of representations4 ,in the second place1 on this view the same terms have to enter at once into two incompatible relations4 ,representations have to be related successively as our representations or apprehensions--as in fact they are related--and1 at the same time1 successively or otherwise1 as the case may be1 as parts of the object apprehended1 viz4 a reality in nature4 ,in other words1 the same terms have to enter into both a subjective and an objective relation1 i4 e4 both a relation concerning us1 the knowing subjects1 and a relation concerning the object which we know4#bf ,a phenomenon in opposition to the representations of apprehension can only be represented as the object of the same1 distinct therefrom1 if it stands under a rule which distinguishes it from every other apprehension1 and renders necessary a mode of conjunction of the manifold4#bg ,a representation1 however1 cannot be so related by a rule to another representation1 for the rule meant relates to realities in nature1 and1 however much ,kant may try to maintain the contrary1 two representations1 not being realities in nature1 cannot be so related4 ,kant is in fact only driven to treat rules of nature as relating to representations1 because there is nothing else to which he can regard them as relating4 ,the result is that he is unable to justify the very distinction1 the implications of which it is his aim to discover1 and he is unable to do so for the very reason which would have rendered ,hume unable to justify it4 ,like ,hume1 he is committed to a philosophical vocabulary which makes it meaningless to speak of relations of objects at all in distinction from relations of apprehensions4 ,it has been said that for ,kant the road to objectivity lay through necessity4#bh ,but whatever ,kant may have thought1 in point of fact there is no road to objectivity1 and1 in particular1 no road through necessity4 ,no necessity in the relation between two representations can render the relation objective1 i4 e4 a relation between objects4 ,no doubt the successive acts in which we come to apprehend the world are necessarily related2 we certainly do not suppose their order to be fortuitous4 ,nevertheless1 their relations are not in consequence a relation of realities apprehended4 #be pp4 #acc-d2 cf4 pp4 #ahj and #bcj-a4 #bf ,cf4 p4 #bji1 note #c1 and p4 #bcc4 #bg ,the italics are mine4 #bh ,caird1 i4 #eeg4 ,kant only renders his own view plausible by treating an apprehension or representation as if it consisted in a sensation or an appearance4 ,a sensation or an appearance1 so far from being the apprehension of anything1 is in fact a reality which can be apprehended1 of the kind called mental4 ,hence it can be treated as an object1 i4 e4 something apprehended or presented1 though not really as an object in nature4 ,on the other hand1 from the point of view of the thing in itself it can be treated as only an apprehension1 even though it is an unsuccessful apprehension4 ,thus1 for ,kant1 there is something which can with some plausibility be treated as an object as well as an apprehension1 and therefore as capable of standing in both a subjective and an objective relation to other realities of the same kind4#bi #bi ,cf4 pp4 #acg and #bca4 ,if we now turn to the passage under discussion1 we find it easy to vindicate the justice of the criticism that ,kant1 inconsistently with the distinction which he desires to elucidate1 treats the same thing as at once the representation of an object and the object represented4 ,he is trying to give such an account of 'object of representations' as will explain what is meant by a succession in an object in nature1 i4 e4 a phenomenon1 in distinction from the succession in our apprehension of it4 ,in order to state this distinction at all1 he has to speak of what enters into the two successions as different4 ,it is my business to show what sort of connexion in time belongs to the manifold in phenomena themselves1 while the representation of this manifold in apprehension is always successive4#cj ,here an element of the manifold is distinguished from the representation of it4 ,yet ,kant1 though he thus distinguishes them1 repeatedly identifies them2 in other words1 he identifies a representation with that of which it is a representation1 viz4 an element in or part of the object itself4 ,our apprehension of the manifold of the phenomenon is always successive4 ,the representations of the parts succeed one another4 ,whether they i4 e4 the representations#ca succeed one another in the object also1 is a second point for reflection4444 ,so far as they i4 e4 phenomena1 as representations only1 are at the same time objects of consciousness1 they are not to be distinguished from apprehension1 i4 e4 reception into the synthesis of imagination1 and we must therefore say1 ',the manifold of phenomena is always produced successively in the mind'4 ,if phenomena were things in themselves1 no man would be able to infer from the succession of the representations how this manifold is connected in the object4444 ,the phenomenon1 in opposition to the representations of apprehension1 can only be represented as the object of the same1 distinct therefrom1 if it stands under a rule1 which distinguishes it from every other representation and which renders necessary a mode of conjunction of the manifold4#cb #cj ,the italics are mine4 #ca ,this is implied both by the use of 'also' and by the context4 #cb ,the italics are mine4 ,since ,kant in introducing his vindication of causality thus identifies elements in the object apprehended 7i4 e4 the manifold of phenomena7 with the apprehensions of them1 we approach the vindication itself with the expectation that he will identify a causal rule1 which consists in a necessity in the succession of objects1 viz4 of events in nature1 with the necessity in the succession of our apprehensions of them4 ,this expectation turns out justified4 ,the following passage adequately expresses the vindication3 ,let us now proceed to our task4 ,that something happens1 i4 e4 that something or some state comes to be which before was not1 cannot be empirically perceived1 unless a phenomenon precedes1 which does not contain in itself this state2 for a reality which follows upon an empty time1 and therefore a coming into existence preceded by no state of things1 can just as little be apprehended as empty time itself4 ,every apprehension of an event is therefore a perception which follows upon another perception4 ,but because this is the case with all synthesis of apprehension1 as ,i have shown above#cc in the phenomenon of a house1 the apprehension of an event is thereby not yet distinguished from other apprehensions4 ,but ,i notice also1 that if in a phenomenon which contains an event1 ,i call the preceding state of my perception ,a1 and the following state ,b1 ,b can only follow ,a in apprehension1 while the perception ,a cannot follow ,b but can only precede it4 ,for example1 ,i see a ship float down a stream4 ,my perception of its place lower down follows upon my perception of its place higher up the course of the river1 and it is impossible that in the apprehension of this phenomenon the vessel should be perceived first below and afterwards higher up the stream4 ,here1 therefore1 the order in the sequence of perceptions in apprehension is determined1 and apprehension is bound to this order4 ,in the former example of a house1 my perceptions in apprehension could begin at the roof and end at the foundation1 or begin below and end above2 in the same way they could apprehend the manifold of the empirical perception from left to right1 or from right to left4 ,accordingly1 in the series of these perceptions1 there was no determined order1 which necessitated my beginning at a certain point1 in order to combine the manifold empirically4 ,but this rule is always to be found in the perception of that which happens1 and it makes the order of the successive perceptions 7in the apprehension of this phenomenon7 necessary4 #cc ,b4 #bce-f1 ,m4 #adc 7quoted p4 #bgi74 ,in the present case1 therefore1 ,i shall have to derive the subjective sequence of apprehension from the objective sequence of phenomena1 for otherwise the former is wholly undetermined1 and does not distinguish one phenomenon from another4 ,the former alone proves nothing as to the connexion of the manifold in the object1 for it is wholly arbitrary4 ,the latter1 therefore i4 e4 the objective sequence of phenomena#cd1 will consist in that order of the manifold of the phenomenon1 according to which the apprehension of the one 7that which happens7 follows that of the other 7that which precedes7 according to a rule4 ,in this way alone can ,i be justified in saying of the phenomenon itself1 and not merely of my apprehension1 that a sequence is to be found therein1 which is the same as to say that ,i cannot arrange my apprehension otherwise than in just this sequence4 #cd ,the sense is not affected if 'the latter' be understood to refer to the connexion of the manifold in the object4 ,in conformity with such a rule1 therefore1 there must exist in that which in general precedes an event the condition of a rule1 according to which this event follows always and necessarily1 but ,i cannot conversely go back from the event1 and determine 7by apprehension7 that which precedes it4 ,for no phenomenon goes back from the succeeding point of time to the preceding point1 although it does certainly relate to some preceding point of time2 on the other hand1 the advance from a given time to the determinate succeeding time is necessary4 ,therefore1 because there certainly is something which follows1 ,i must relate it necessarily to something else in general1 which precedes1 and upon which it follows in conformity with a rule1 that is necessarily1 so that the event1 as the conditioned1 affords certain indication of some condition1 while this condition determines the event4 ,if we suppose that nothing precedes an event1 upon which this event must follow in conformity with a rule1 all sequence of perception would exist only in apprehension1 i4 e4 would be merely subjective1 but it would not thereby be objectively determined which of the perceptions must in fact be the preceding and which the succeeding one4 ,we should in this manner have only a play of representations1 which would not be related to any object1 i4 e4 no phenomenon would be distinguished through our perception in respect of time relations from any other1 because the succession in apprehension is always of the same kind1 and so there is nothing in the phenomenon to determine the succession1 so as to render a certain sequence objectively necessary4 ,i could therefore not say that in the phenomenon two states follow each other1 but only that one apprehension follows on another1 a fact which is merely subjective and does not determine any object1 and cannot therefore be considered as knowledge of an object 7not even in the phenomenon74 ,if therefore we experience that something happens1 we always thereby presuppose that something precedes1 on which it follows according to a rule4 ,for otherwise1 ,i should not say of the object1 that it follows1 because the mere sequence in my apprehension1 if it is not determined by a rule in relation to something preceding1 does not justify the assumption of a sequence in the object4 ,it is therefore always in reference to a rule1 according to which phenomena are determined in their sequence 7i4 e4 as they happen7 by the preceding state1 that ,i make my subjective synthesis 7of apprehension7 objective1 and it is solely upon this presupposition that even the experience of something which happens is possible4#ce #ce ,b4 #bcf-da1 ,m4 #add-f4 ,the meaning of the first paragraph is plain4 ,kant is saying that when we reflect upon the process by which we come to apprehend the world of nature1 we can lay down two propositions4 ,the first is that the process is equally successive whether the object apprehended be a succession in nature or a coexistence of bodies in space1 so that the knowledge that we have a succession of apprehensions would not by itself enable us to decide whether the object of the apprehensions is a sequence or not4 ,the second proposition is that1 nevertheless1 there is this difference between the succession of our apprehensions where we apprehend a succession and where we apprehend a coexistence1 that in the former case1 and in that only1 the succession of our apprehensions is irreversible or1 in other words1 is the expression of a rule of order which makes it a necessary succession4 ,so far we find no mention of causality1 i4 e4 of a necessity of succession in objects1 but only a necessity of succession in our apprehension of them4 ,so far1 again1 we find no contribution to the problem of explaining how we distinguish between successive perceptions which are the perceptions of an event and those which are not4 ,for it is reasonable to object that it is only possible to say that the order of our perceptions is irreversible1 if and because we already know that what we have been perceiving is an event1 and that therefore any attempt to argue from the irreversibility of our perceptions to the existence of a sequence in the object must involve a ,greek3 hysteron proteron4 ,and it is clear that1 if irreversibility in our perceptions were the only irreversibility to which appeal could be made1 even ,kant would not have supposed that the apprehension of a succession was reached through belief in an irreversibility4 ,the next paragraph1 of which the interpretation is difficult1 appears to introduce a causal rule1 i4 e4 an irreversibility in objects1 by identifying it with the irreversibility in our perceptions of which ,kant has been speaking4 ,the first step to this identification is taken by the assertion3 ,in the present case1 therefore1 ,i shall have to derive the subjective sequence of perceptions from the objective sequence of phenomena4444 ,the latter will consist in the order of the manifold of the phenomenon1 according to which the apprehension of the one 7that which happens7 follows that of the other 7that which precedes7 according to a rule4#cf ,here ,kant definitely implies that an objective sequence1 i4 e4 an order or sequence of the manifold of a phenomenon1 consists in a sequence of perceptions or apprehensions of which the order is necessary or according to a rule2 in other words1 that a succession of perceptions in the special case where the succession is necessary is a succession of events perceived4#cg ,this implication enables us to understand the meaning of the assertion that 'we must therefore derive the subjective sequence of perceptions from the objective sequence of phenomena'1 and to see its connexion with the preceding paragraph4 ,it means1 'in view of the fact that in all apprehensions of a succession1 and in them alone1 the sequence of perceptions is irreversible1 we are justified in saying that a given sequence of perceptions is the apprehension of a succession1 if we know that the sequence is irreversible2 in that case we must be apprehending a real succession1 for an irreversible sequence of perceptions is a sequence of events perceived4' ,having thus implied that irreversibility of perceptions constitutes them events perceived1 he is naturally enough able to go on to speak of the irreversibility of perceptions as if it were the same thing as an irreversibility of events perceived1 and thus to bring in a causal rule4 ,in this way alone i4 e4 only by deriving the subjective from the objective sequence can ,i be justified in saying of the phenomenon itself1 and not merely of my apprehension1 that a sequence is to be found therein1 which is the same as to say that ,i cannot arrange my apprehension otherwise than in just this sequence4 ,in conformity with such a rule1 therefore1 there must exist in that which in general precedes an event the condition of a rule1 according to which this event follows always and necessarily4#ch ,here the use of the word 'arrange'#ci and the statement about the rule in the next sentence imply that ,kant has now come to think of the rule of succession as a causal rule relating to the objective succession4 ,moreover1 if any doubt remains as to whether ,kant really confuses the two irreversibilities or necessities of succession1 it is removed by the last paragraph of the passage quoted4 ,if therefore we experience that something happens1 we always thereby presuppose that something precedes on which it follows according to a rule4 ,for otherwise ,i should not say of the object that it follows2 because the mere succession of my apprehension1 if it is not determined by a rule in relation to something preceding1 does not justify the assumption of a succession in the object4 ,it is therefore always in reference to a rule1 according to which phenomena are determined in their sequence 7i4 e4 as they happen7 by the preceding state1 that ,i make my subjective sequence 7of apprehension7 objective4#dj ,the fact is simply that ,kant must identify the two irreversibilities1 because1 as has been pointed out1 he has only one set of terms to be related as irreversible1 viz4 the elements of the manifold1 which have to be1 from one point of view1 elements of an object and1 from another1 representations or apprehensions of it4 #cf ,the italics are mine4 ',according to which' does not appear to indicate that the two orders referred to are different4 #cg ,cf4 ,b4 #bdb fin41 ,m4 #adg fin4 #ch ,the italics are mine #ci ,anstellen4 #dj ,the italics are mine4 ,as soon1 therefore1 as the real nature of ,kant's vindication of causality has been laid bare1 it is difficult to describe it as an argument at all4 ,he is anxious to show that in apprehending ,a ,b as a real or objective succession we presuppose that they are elements in a causal order of succession4 ,yet in support of his contention he points only to the quite different fact that where we apprehend a succession ,a ,b1 we think of the perception of ,a and the perception of ,b as elements in a necessary but subjective succession4 ,before we attempt to consider the facts with which ,kant is dealing1 we must refer to a feature in ,kant's account to which no allusion has been made4 ,we should on the whole expect from the passage quoted that1 in the case where we regard two perceptions ,a ,b as necessarily successive and therefore as constituting an objective succession1 the necessity of succession consists in the fact that ,a is the cause of ,b4 ,this1 however1 is apparently not ,kant's view2 on the contrary1 he seems to hold that1 in thinking of ,a ,b as an objective succession1 we presuppose not that ,a causes ,b1 but only that the state of affairs which precedes ,b1 and which therefore includes ,a1 contains a cause of ,b1 the coexistence or identity of this cause with ,a rendering the particular succession ,a ,b necessary4 ,thus if ,i perceive that something happens it arises that there comes to be an order among our representations in which the present 7so far as it has taken place7 points to some preceding state as a correlate1 though a still undetermined correlate1#da of this event which is given1 and this correlate relates to the event by determining the event as its consequence1 and connects the event with itself necessarily in the series of time4#db #da ,the italics are mine4 #db ,b4 #bdd1 ,m4 #adh4 ,cf4 ,b4 #bdc1 ,m4 #adh 7first half7 and ,b4 #bci1 ,m4 #ade 7second paragraph74 ,the same implication is to be found in his formulation of the rule involved in the perception of an event1 e4 g4 ,in conformity with such a rule1 there must exist in that which in general precedes an event1 the condition of a rule1 according to which this event follows always and necessarily4 ,here the condition of a rule is the necessary antecedent of the event1 whatever it may be4 ,the fact is that ,kant is in a difficulty which he feels obscurely himself4 ,he seems driven to this view for two reasons4 ,if he were to maintain that ,a was necessarily the cause of ,b1 he would be maintaining that all observed sequences are causal1 i4 e4 that in them the antecedent and consequent are always cause and effect1 which is palpably contrary to fact4 ,again1 his aim is to show that we become aware of a succession by presupposing the law of causality4 ,this law1 however1 is quite general1 and only asserts that something must precede an event upon which it follows always and necessarily4 ,hence by itself it palpably gives no means of determining whether this something is ,a rather than anything else4#dc ,therefore if he were to maintain that the antecedent member of an apprehended objective succession must be thought of as its cause1 the analogy would obviously provide no means of determining the antecedent member1 and therefore the succession itself1 for the succession must be the sequence of ,b upon some definite antecedent4 ,on the other hand1 the view that the cause of ,b need not be ,a only incurs the same difficulty in a rather less obvious form4 ,for1 even on this view1 the argument implies that in order to apprehend two individual perceptions ,a ,b as an objective succession1 we must know that ,a must precede ,b1 and the presupposition that ,b implies a cause in the state of affairs preceding ,b in no way enables us to say either that ,a coexists with the cause1 or that it is identical with it1 and therefore that it must precede ,b4 #dc ,cf4 ,b4 #afe1 ,m4 #aja1 where ,kant points out that the determination of particular laws of nature requires experience4 ,nevertheless1 it cannot be regarded as certain that ,kant did not think of ,a1 the apprehended antecedent of ,b1 as necessarily the cause of ,b1 for his language is both ambiguous and inconsistent4 ,when he considers the apprehension of a succession from the side of the successive perceptions1 he at least tends to think of ,a ,b as cause and effect2#dd and it may well be that in discussing the problem from the side of the law of causality1 he means the cause of ,b to be ,a1 although the generality of the law compels him to refer to it as something upon which ,b follows according to a rule4 #dd ,he definitely implies this1 ,b4 #bcd1 ,m4 #adb4 ,further1 it should be noticed that to allow as ,kant1 in effect1 does elsewhere#de1 that experience is needed to determine the cause of ,b is really to concede that the apprehension of objective successions is prior to1 and presupposed by1 any process which appeals to the principle of causality2 for if the principle of causality does not by itself enable us to determine the cause of ,b1 it cannot do more than enable us to pick out the cause of ,b among events known to precede ,b independently of the principle4 ,hence1 from this point of view1 there can be no process such as ,kant is trying to describe1 and therefore its precise nature is a matter of indifference4 #de ,cf4 ,b4 #afe1 ,m4 #aja1 where ,kant points out that the determination of particular laws of nature requires experience4 ,we may now turn to the facts4 ,there is1 it seems1 no such thing as a process by which1 beginning with the knowledge of successive apprehensions or representations1 of the object of which we are unaware1 we come to be aware of their object4 ,still less is there a process--and it is really this which ,kant is trying to describe--by which1 so beginning1 we come to apprehend these successive representations as objects1 i4 e4 as parts of the physical world1 through the thought of them as necessarily related4 ,we may take ,kant's instance of our apprehension of a boat going down stream4 ,we do not first apprehend two perceptions of which the object is undetermined and then decide that their object is a succession rather than a coexistence4 ,still less do we first apprehend two perceptions or representations and then decide that they are related as successive events in the physical world4 ,from the beginning we apprehend a real sequence1 viz4 the fact that the boat having left one place is arriving at another2 there is no process to this apprehension4 ,in other words1 from the beginning we are aware of real elements1 viz4 of events in nature1 and we are aware of them as really related1 viz4 as successive in nature4 ,this must be so4 ,for if we begin with the awareness of two mere perceptions1 we could never thence reach the knowledge that their object was a succession1 or even the knowledge that they had an object2 nor1 so beginning1 could we become aware of the perceptions themselves as successive events in the physical world4 ,for suppose1 per impossibile1 the existence of a process by which we come to be aware of two elements ,a and ,b as standing in a relation of sequence in the physical world4 ,in the first place1 ,a and ,b1 with the awareness of which we begin1 must be1 and be known to be1 real or objective1 and not perceptions or apprehensions2 otherwise we could never come to apprehend them as related in the physical world4 ,in the second place1 ,a and ,b must be1 and be known to be1 real with the reality of a physical event1 otherwise we could never come to apprehend them as related by way of succession in the physical world4 ,if ,a and ,b were bodies1 as they are when we apprehend the parts of a house1 they could never be apprehended as successive4 ,in other words1 the process by which1 on ,kant's view1 ,a and ,b become1 and become known to be1 events presupposes that they already are1 and are known to be1 events4 ,again1 even if it be granted that ,a and ,b are real events1 it is clear that there can be no process by which we come to apprehend them as successive4 ,for if we apprehended events ,a and ,b separately1 we could never thence advance to the apprehension of their relation1 or1 in other words1 we could never discover which came first4 ,kant himself saw clearly that the perception of ,a followed by the perception of ,b does not by itself yield the perception that ,b follows ,a4 ,in fact it was this insight which formed the starting-point of his discussion4#df ,unfortunately1 instead of concluding that the apprehension of a succession is ultimate and underivable from a more primitive apprehension1 he tried to formulate the nature of the process by which1 starting from such a succession of perceptions1 we reach the apprehension of a succession4 ,the truth is simply that there is and can be no process to the apprehension of a succession2 in other words1 that we do and must apprehend a real succession immediately or not at all4 ,the same considerations can of course be supplied mutatis mutandis to the apprehension of the coexistence of bodies in space1 e4 g4 of the parts of a house4 #df ,cf4 ,b4 #bcg1 ,m4 #add4 ,it may be objected that this denial of the existence of the process which ,kant is trying to describe must at least be an overstatement4 ,for the assertion that the apprehension of a succession or of a coexistence is immediate may seem to imply that the apprehension of the course of a boat or of the shape of a house involves no process at all2 yet either apprehension clearly takes time and so must involve a process4 ,but though a process is obviously involved1 it is not a process from the apprehension of what is not a succession to the apprehension of a succession1 but a process from the apprehension of one succession to that of another4 ,it is the process by which we pass from the apprehension of one part of a succession which may have1 and which it is known may have1 other parts to the apprehension of what is1 and what is known to be1 another part of the same succession4 ,moreover1 the assertion that the apprehension of a succession must be immediate does not imply that it may not be reached by a process4 ,it is not inconsistent with the obvious fact that to apprehend that the boat is now turning a corner is really to apprehend that what before was going straight is now changing its course1 and therefore presupposes a previous apprehension of the boat's course as straight4 ,it only implies that the apprehension of a succession1 if reached by a process at all1 is not reached by a process of which the starting-point is not itself the apprehension of a succession4 ,nevertheless1 a plausible defence of ,kant's treatment of causality can be found1 which may be formulated thus3 ',time1 just as much as space1 is a sphere within which we have to distinguish between appearance and reality4 ,for instance1 when moving in a lift1 we see1 as we say1 the walls moving1 while the lift remains stationary4 ,when sitting in a train which is beginning to move out of a station1 we see1 as we say1 another train beginning to move1 although it is in fact standing still4 ,when looking at distant trees from a fast train1 we see1 as we say1 the buildings in the intermediate space moving backwards4 ,in these cases the events seen are not real1 and we only succeed in determining what is really happening1 by a process which presupposes the law of causality4 ,thus1 in the last case we only believe that the intermediate buildings do not move1 by realizing that1 given the uniformity of nature1 belief in their motion is incompatible with what we believe on the strength of experience of these buildings on other occasions and of the rest of the world4 ,these cases prove the existence of a process which enables us1 and is required to enable us1 to decide whether a given change is objective or subjective1 i4 e4 whether it lies in the reality apprehended or in our apprehension of it2 and this process involves an appeal to causality4 ,kant's mistake lay in his choice of illustrations4 ,his illustrations implied that the process which involves causality is one by which we distinguish a succession in the object apprehended from another relation in the object1 viz4 a coexistence of bodies4 ,but he ought to have taken illustrations which implied that the process is one by which we distinguish a succession in the object from a succession in our perception of it4 ,in other words1 the illustrations should1 like those just given1 have illustrated the process by which we distinguish an objective from a subjective change1 and not a process by which we distinguish an objective change from something else also objective4 ,consequently1 ,kant's conclusion and his general method of treatment are right1 even if1 misled by his instances1 he supports his position by arguments which are wrong4' ,this defence is1 however1 open to the following reply3 ',at first sight the cases taken undoubtedly seem to illustrate a process in which we seek to discover whether a certain change belongs to objects or only to our apprehension of them1 and in which we appeal to causality in arriving at a decision4 ,but this is only because we ignore the relativity of motion4 ,to take the third case3 our first statement of the facts is that we saw the intermediate buildings moving1 but that subsequent reflection on the results of other experience forced us to conclude that the change perceived was after all only in our apprehension and not in the things apprehended4 ,the statement1 however1 that we saw the buildings moving really assumes that we1 the observers1 were stationary2 and it states too much4 ,what we really perceived was a relative changing of position between us1 the near buildings1 and the distant trees4 ,this is a fact1 and the apprehension of it1 therefore1 does not afterwards prove mistaken4 ,it is equally compatible with motion on the part of the trees1 or of the buildings1 or of the observers1 or of a combination of them2 and that for which an appeal to causality is needed is the problem of deciding which of these alternatives is correct4 ,moreover1 the perceived relative change of position is objective2 it concerns the things apprehended4 ,hence1 in this case too1 it can be said that we perceive an objective succession from the beginning1 and that the appeal to causality is only needed to determine something further about it4 ,it is useless to urge that to be aware of an event is to be aware of it in all its definiteness1 and that this awareness admittedly involves an appeal to causality2 for it is easy to see that unless our awareness of the relative motion formed the starting-point of any subsequent process in which we appealed to the law of causality1 we could never use the law to determine which body really moved4' ,two remarks may be made in conclusion4 ,in the first place1 the basis of ,kant's account1 viz4 the view that in our apprehension of the world we advance from the apprehension of a succession of perceptions to the apprehension of objects perceived1 involves a ,greek3 hysteron proteron4 ,as ,kant himself in effect urges in the ,refutation of ,idealism1#dg self-consciousness1 in the sense of the consciousness of the successive process in which we apprehend the world1 is plainly only attained by reflecting upon our apprehension of the world4 ,we first apprehend the world and only by subsequent reflection become aware of our activity in apprehending it4 ,even if consciousness of the world must lead to1 and so is in a sense inseparable from1 self-consciousness1 it is none the less its presupposition4 #dg ,cf4 p4 #cbj4 ,in the second place1 it seems that the true vindication of causality1 like that of the first analogy1 lies in the dogmatic method which ,kant rejects4 ,it consists in insight into the fact that it is of the very nature of a physical event to be an element in a process of change undergone by a system of substances in space1 this process being through and through necessary in the sense that any event 7i4 e4 the attainment of any state by a substance7 is the outcome of certain preceding events 7i4 e4 the previous attainment of certain states by it and other substances71 and is similarly the condition of certain subsequent events4#dh ,to attain this insight1 we have only to reflect upon what we really mean by a 'physical event'4 ,the vindication can also be expressed in the form that the very thought of a physical event presupposes the thought of it as an element in a necessary process of change--provided1 however1 that no distinction is implied between the nature of a thing and what we think its nature to be4 ,but to vindicate causality in this way is to pursue the dogmatic method2 it is to argue from the nature1 or1 to use ,kant's phrase1 from the conception1 of a physical event4 ,on the other hand1 it seems that the method of arguing transcendentally1 or from the possibility of perceiving events1 must be doomed to failure in principle4 ,for if1 as has been argued to be the case1#di apprehension is essentially the apprehension of a reality as it exists independently of the apprehension of it1 only those characteristics can be attributed to it1 as characteristics which it must have if it is to be apprehended1 which belong to it in its own nature or in virtue of its being what it is4 ,it can only be because we think that a thing has some characteristic in virtue of its own nature1 and so think 'dogmatically'1 that we can think that in apprehending it we must apprehend it as having that characteristic4#ej #dh ,this statement of course includes the third analogy4 #di ,cf4 ,chh4 ,,iv and ,,vi4 #ej ,cf4 p4 #bge4 ,there remains to be considered ,kant's proof of the third analogy1 i4 e4 the principle that all substances1 so far as they can be perceived in space as coexistent1 are in thorough-going interaction4 ,the account is extremely confused1 and it is difficult to extract from it a consistent view4 ,we shall consider here the version added in the second edition1 as being the fuller and the less unintelligible4 ,things are coexistent1 when in empirical intuition#ea the perception#eb of the one can follow upon the perception of the other1 and vice versa 7which cannot occur in the temporal succession of phenomena1 as we have shown in the second principle74 ,thus ,i can direct my perception first to the moon and afterwards to the earth1 or conversely1 first to the earth and then to the moon1 and because the perceptions of these objects can reciprocally follow each other1 ,i say that they coexist4 ,now coexistence is the existence of the manifold in the same time4 ,but we cannot perceive time itself1 so as to conclude from the fact that things are placed in the same time that the perceptions of them can follow each other reciprocally4 ,the synthesis of the imagination in apprehension1 therefore1 would only give us each of these perceptions as existing in the subject when the other is absent and vice versa2 but it would not give us that the objects are coexistent1 i4 e4 that1 if the one exists1 the other also exists in the same time1 and that this is necessary in order that the perceptions can follow each other reciprocally4 ,hence there is needed a conception-of-the-understanding#ec of the reciprocal sequence of the determinations of these things coexisting externally to one another1 in order to say that the reciprocal succession of perceptions is grounded in the object1 and thereby to represent the coexistence as objective4 ,but the relation of substances in which the one contains determinations the ground of which is contained in the other is the relation of influence1 and if1 reciprocally1 the former contains the ground of the determinations in the latter1 it is the relation of community or interaction4 ,consequently1 the coexistence of substances in space cannot be known in experience otherwise than under the presupposition of their interaction2 this is therefore also the condition of the possibility of things themselves as objects of experience4#ed #ea ,anschauung4 #eb ,wahrnehmung4 #ec ,verstandesbegriff4 #ed ,b4 #beg-h1 ,m4 #aef-g4 ,the proof begins1 as we should expect1 in a way parallel to that of causality4 ,just as ,kant had apparently argued that we learn that a succession of perceptions is the perception of a sequence when we find the order of the perceptions to be irreversible1 so he now definitely asserts that we learn that certain perceptions are the perceptions of a coexistence of bodies in space when we find that the order of the perceptions is reversible1 or1 to use ,kant's language1 that there can be a reciprocal sequence of the perceptions4 ,this beginning1 if read by itself1 seems as though it should also be the end4 ,there seems nothing more which need be said4 ,just as we should have expected ,kant to have completed his account of the apprehension of a succession when he pointed out that it is distinguished by the irreversibility of the perceptions1 so here we should expect him to have said enough when he points out that the earth and the moon are said to be coexistent because our perceptions of them can follow one another reciprocally4 ,the analogy1 however1 has in some way to be brought in1 and to this the rest of the proof is devoted4 ,in order to consider how this is done1 we must first consider the nature of the analogy itself4 ,kant speaks of 'a conception-of-the-understanding of the reciprocal sequence of the determinations of things which coexist externally to one another'2 and he says that 'that relation of substances in which the one contains determinations1 the ground of which is contained in the other substance1 is the relation of influence'4 ,his meaning can be illustrated thus4 ,suppose two bodies1 ,a1 a lump of ice1 and ,b1 a fire1 close together1 yet at such a distance that they can be observed in succession4 ,suppose that ,a passes through changes of temperature a#a a#b a#c 444 in certain times1 the changes ending in states alpha#a alpha#b alpha#c 4441 and that ,b passes through changes of temperature b#a b#b b#c 444 in the same times1 the changes ending in states beta#a beta#b beta#c4 ,suppose also1 as we must1 that ,a and ,b interact1 i4 e4 that ,a in passing through its changes conditions the changes through which ,b passes1 and therefore also the states in which ,b ends1 and vice versa1 so that a#b and alpha#b will be the outcome not of a#a and alpha#a alone1 but of a#a and alpha#a1 and b#a and beta#a jointly4 ,then we can say 7#a7 that ,a and ,b are in the relation of influence1 and also of interaction or reciprocal influence1 in the sense that they mutually 7not alternately7 determine one another's states4 ,again1 if we first perceive ,a in the state alpha#a by a perception ,a#a1 then ,b in the state beta#b by a perception ,b#b1 then ,a in the state alpha#c by a perception ,a#c and so on1 we can speak 7#b7 of a reciprocal sequence of perceptions1 in the sense of a sequence of perceptions in which alternately a perception of ,b follows a perception of ,a and a perception of ,a follows a perception of ,b2 for first a perception of ,b1 viz4 ,b#b1 follows a perception of ,a1 viz4 ,a#a1 and then a perception of ,a1 viz4 ,a#c1 follows a perception of ,b1 viz4 ,b#b4 ,we can also speak 7#c7 of a reciprocal sequence of the determinations of two things in the sense of a necessary succession of states which alternately are states of ,a and of ,b2 for alpha#a1 which is perceived first1 can be said to contribute to determine beta#b1 which is perceived next1 and beta#b can be said to contribute to determine alpha#c1 which is perceived next1 and so on2 and this reciprocal sequence can be said to be involved in the very nature of interaction4 ,further1 it can be said 7#d7 that if we perceive ,a and ,b alternately1 and so only in the states alpha#a alpha#c 444 beta#b beta#d 444 respectively1 we can only fill in the blanks1 i4 e4 discover the states alpha#b alpha#d 444 beta#a beta#c 444 coexistent with beta#b beta#d 444 and alpha#a alpha#c 444 respectively1 if we presuppose the thought of interaction4 ,for it is only possible to use the observed states as a clue to the unobserved states1 if we presuppose that the observed states are members of a necessary succession of which the unobserved states are also members and therefore have partially determined and been determined by the observed states4 ,hence it may be said that the determination of the unobserved states coexistent with the observed states presupposes the thought of interaction4 ,how then does ,kant advance from the assertion that the apprehension of a coexistence requires the knowledge that our perceptions can be reciprocally sequent to the assertion that it presupposes the thought that the determinations of phenomena are reciprocally sequent8 ,the passage in which the transition is effected is obscure and confused1 but it is capable of interpretation as soon as we see that it is intended to run parallel to the proof of the second analogy which is added in the second edition4#ee ,kant apparently puts to himself the question1 ',how are we to know when we have a reciprocal sequence of perceptions from which we can infer a coexistence in what we perceived8' and apparently answers it thus3 ',since we cannot perceive time1 and therefore cannot perceive objects as dated in time with respect to one another1 we cannot begin with the apprehension of the coexistence of two objects1 and thence infer the possibility of reciprocal sequence in our perceptions4 ,this being so1 the synthesis of imagination in apprehension can indeed combine these perceptions these now being really considered as determinations or states of an object perceived in a reciprocal sequence1 but there is so far no guarantee that the sequence produced by the synthesis is not an arbitrary product of the imagination1 and therefore we cannot think of it as a reciprocal sequence in objects4 ,in order to think of such a reciprocal sequence as not arbitrary but as constituting a real sequence in objects 'as grounded in the object'1 we must think of the states reciprocally sequent as necessarily related and therefore as successive states of two coexisting substances which interact or mutually determine one another's successive states4 ,only then shall we be able to think of the coexistence of objects involved in the reciprocal sequence as an objective fact1 and not merely as an arbitrary product of the imagination4' ,but1 if this fairly expresses ,kant's meaning1 his argument is clearly vitiated by two confusions4 ,in the first place1 it confuses a subjective sequence of perceptions which are alternately perceptions of ,a and of ,b1 two bodies in space1 with an objective sequence of perceived states of bodies1 alpha#a beta#b alpha#c beta#d1 which are alternately states of two bodies ,a and ,b1 the same thing being regarded at once as a perception and as a state of a physical object4 ,in the second place1 mainly in consequence of the first confusion1 it confuses the necessity that the perceptions of ,a and of ,b can follow one another alternately with the necessity of succession in the alternately perceived states of ,a and ,b as interacting4 ,moreover1 there is really a change in the cases under consideration4 ,the case with which he begins1 i4 e4 when he is considering merely the reciprocal sequence of perceptions1 is the successive perceptions of two bodies in space alternately1 e4 g4 of the moon and the earth1 the nature of their states at the time of perception not being in question4 ,but the case with which he ends is the successive perception of the states of two bodies alternately1 e4 g4 of the states of the fire and of the lump of ice4 ,moreover1 it is only in the latter case that the objective relation apprehended is that of coexistence in the proper sense1 and in the sense which ,kant intends throughout1 viz4 that of being contemporaneous in distinction from being successive4 ,for when we say that two bodies1 e4 g4 the moon and the earth1 coexist1 we should only mean that both exist1 and not1 as ,kant means1 that they are contemporaneous4 ,for to a substance1 being as it is the substratum of changes1 we can ascribe no temporal predicates4 ,that which changes cannot be said either to begin1 or to end1 or to exist at a certain moment of time1 or1 therefore1 to exist contemporaneously with1 or after1 or before anything else2 it cannot even be said to persist through a portion of time or1 to use the phrase of the first analogy1 to be permanent4 ,it will be objected that1 though the cases are different1 yet the transition from the one to the other is justified1 for it is precisely ,kant's point that the existence together of two substances in space can only be discovered by consideration of their successive states under the presupposition that they mutually determine one another's states4 ,besides the mere fact of existence there must be something by which ,a determines the place in time for ,b1 and conversely ,b the place for ,a1 because only under this condition can these substances be empirically represented as coexistent4#ef ,the objection1 however1 should be met by two considerations1 each of which is of some intrinsic importance4 ,in the first place1 the apprehension of a body in space in itself involves the apprehension that it exists together with all other bodies in space1 for the apprehension of something as spatial involves the apprehension of it as spatially related to1 and therefore as existing together with1 everything else which is spatial4 ,no process1 therefore1 such as ,kant describes is required in order that we may learn that it exists along with some other body4 ,in the second place1 that for which the principle of interaction is really required is not1 as ,kant supposes1 the determination of the coexistence of an unperceived body with a perceived body1 but the determination of that unperceived state of a body already known to exist which is coexistent with a perceived state of a perceived body4 ,as has been pointed out1 if we perceive ,a and ,b alternately in the states alpha#a beta#b alpha#c beta#d 444 we need the thought of interaction to determine the nature of beta#a alpha#b beta#c alpha#d 444 ,thus it appears that ,kant in his vindication of the third analogy omits altogether to notice the one process which really presupposes it4 #ee ,b4 #bcc-d1 ,m4 #adb4 #ef ,b4 #bei1 ,m4 #aeg4 ,,chapter ,,xiii ,,the ,,postulates ,,of ,,empirical ,,thought ,the postulates of empirical thought1 which correspond to the categories of modality1 are stated as follows3 #a4 ,that which agrees with the formal conditions of experience 7according to perception and conceptions7 is possible4 #b4 ,that which is connected with the material conditions of experience 7sensation7 is actual4 #c4 ,that of which the connexion with the actual is determined according to universal conditions of experience is necessary 7exists necessarily74#a #a ,b4 #bfe-f1 ,m4 #afa4 ,these principles1 described as only 'explanations of the conceptions of possibility1 actuality1 and necessity as employed in experience'1 are really treated as principles by which we decide what is possible1 what is actual1 and what is necessary4 ,the three conceptions involved do not1 according to ,kant1 enlarge our knowledge of the nature of objects1 but only 'express their relation to the faculty of knowledge'#b2 i4 e4 they only concern our ability to apprehend an object whose nature is already determined for us otherwise as at least possible1 or as real1 or as even necessary4 ,moreover1 it is because these principles do not enlarge our knowledge of the nature of objects that they are called postulates2 for a postulate in geometry1 from which science the term is borrowed 7e4 g4 that it is possible with a given line to describe a circle from a given point71 does not augment the conception of the figure to which it relates1 but only asserts the possibility of the conception itself4#c ,the discussion of these principles is described1 contrary to the terminology adopted in the case of the preceding principles1 as 'explanation' and not as 'proof'4 ,the discussion1 however1 certainly includes a proof of them1 for it is ,kant's main object to prove that these principles constitute the general character of what can be asserted to be possible1 actual1 or necessary respectively4 ,again1 as before1 the basis of proof lies in a theory of knowledge1 and in particular in ,kant's theory of knowledge2 for it consists in the principle that everything knowable must conform to the conditions involved in its being an object of possible experience4 #b ,b4 #bff1 ,m4 #afa4 ,cf4 ,b4 #bhf-g1 ,m4 #agc-d4 #c ,b4 #bhf-g1 ,m4 #agc-d4 ,to understand these principles and the proof of them1 we must notice certain preliminary considerations4 ,in the first place1 the very problem of distinguishing the possible1 the actual1 and the necessary presupposes the existence of distinctions which may prove open to question4 ,it presupposes that something may be possible without being actual1 and again that something may be actual without being necessary4 ,in the second place1 ,kant's mode of approaching the problem assumes that we can begin with a conception of an object1 e4 g4 of a man with six toes1 and then ask whether the object of it is possible1 whether1 if possible1 it is also actual1 and whether1 if actual1 it is also necessary4 ,in other words1 it assumes the possibility of separating what is conceived from what is possible1 and therefore a fortiori from what is actual1#d and from what is necessary4 ,thirdly1 in this context1 as in most others1 ,kant in speaking of a conception is thinking1 to use ,locke's phraseology1 not of a 'simple' conception1 such as that of equality or of redness1 but of a 'complex' conception1 such as that of a centaur1 or of a triangle in the sense of a three-sided three-angled figure4 ,it is the apprehension of a 'complex' of elements4#e ,fourthly1 what is said to be possible1 real1 or necessary is not the conception but the corresponding object4 ,the question is not1 for instance1 whether the conception of a triangle or of a centaur is possible1 actual1 or necessary1 but whether a triangle or a centaur is possible1 actual1 or necessary4 ,kant sometimes speaks loosely of conceptions as possible1#f but the terms which he normally and1 from the point of view of his theory1 rightly applies to conceptions are 'objectively real' and 'fictitious'4#g ,lastly1 ,kant distinguishes 'objectively real' and 'fictitious' conceptions in two ways4 ,he speaks of establishing the objective reality of a conception as consisting in establishing the possibility of a corresponding object1#h implying therefore that a fictitious conception is a conception of which the corresponding object is not known to be possible4 ,again1 he describes as fictitious new conceptions of substances1 powers1 and interactions1 which we might form from the material offered to us by perception without borrowing from experience itself the example of their connexions1 e4 g4 the conception of a power of the mind to perceive the future2 and he says that the possibility of these conceptions 7i4 e4 the possibility of corresponding objects7 cannot1 like that of the categories1 be acquired a priori through their being conditions on which all experience depends1 but must be discovered empirically or not at all4 ,of such conceptions he says that1 without being based upon experience and its known laws1 they are arbitrary syntheses which1 although they contain no contradiction1 have no claim to objective reality1 and therefore to the possibility of corresponding objects4#i ,he implies1 therefore1 that the object of a conception can be said to be possible only when the conception is the apprehension of a complex of elements together with the apprehension--which1 if not a priori1 must be based upon experience--that they are connected4 ,hence a conception may be regarded as 'objectively real'1 or as 'fictitious' according as it is the apprehension of a complex of elements accompanied by the apprehension that they are connected1 or the apprehension of a complex of elements not so accompanied4 #d ,the view that 'in the mere conception of a thing no sign of its existence is to be found' 7,b4 #bgb1 ,m4 #afe7 forms1 of course1 the basis of ,kant's criticism of the ontological argument for the existence of ,god4 ,cf4 ,dialectic1 ,bk4 ,,ii1 ,ch4 ,,iii1 #d4 #e ,cf4 'a conception which includes in itself a synthesis' 7,b4 #bfg med41 ,m4 #afb med474 #f ,e4 g4 ,b4 #bfi fin41 ,m4 #afc fin42 ,b4 #bgj med41 ,m4 #afd init4 ,the formulation which really expresses ,kant's thought is to be found ,b4 #bff med41 ,m4 #afa fin42 ,b4 #bfh init41 ,m4 #afb fin42 ,b4 #bfh med41 ,m4 #afc init42 and ,b4 #bgj med41 ,m4 #afd init4 #g ,gedichtete4 #h ,b4 #bfh init41 ,m4 #afb fin4 #i ,b4 #bfi-gj1 ,m4 #afc-d4 ,it is now possible to state ,kant's problem more precisely4 ,with regard to a given complex conception he wishes to determine the way in which we can answer the questions 7#a7 ',has the conception a possible object to correspond to it'1 or1 in other words1 ',is the conception 'objectively real' or 'fictitious'8' 7#b7 ',given that a corresponding object is possible1 is it also real8' 7#c7 ',given that it is real1 is it also necessary8' ,the substance of ,kant's answer to this problem may be stated thus3 ',the most obvious guarantee of the objective reality of a conception1 i4 e4 of the possibility of a corresponding object1 is the experience of such an object4 ,for instance1 our experience of water guarantees the objective reality of the conception of a liquid which expands as it solidifies4 ,this appeal to experience1 however1 takes us beyond the possibility of the object to its reality1 for the experience vindicates the possibility of the object only through its reality4 ,moreover1 here the basis of our assertion of possibility is only empirical1 whereas our aim is to discover the conceptions of which the objects can be determined a priori to be possible4 ,what then is the answer to this1 the real problem8 ,to take the case of cause and effect1 we cannot reach any conclusion by the mere study of the conception of cause and effect4 ,for although the conception of a necessary succession contains no contradiction1 the necessary succession of events is a mere arbitrary synthesis as far as our thought of it is concerned2 we have no direct insight into the necessity4 ,therefore we cannot argue from this conception to the possibility of a corresponding object1 viz4 a necessarily successive series of events in nature4 ,we can1 however1 say that that synthesis is not arbitrary but necessary to which any object must conform1 if it is to be an object of experience4 ,from this point of view we can say that there must be a possible object corresponding to the conception of cause and effect1 because only as subjected to this synthesis are there objects of experience at all4 ,hence1 if we take this point of view1 we can say generally that all spatial and temporal conceptions1 as constituting the conditions of perceiving in experience1 and all the categories1 as constituting the conditions of conceiving in experience1 must have possible objects4 ,in other words1 'that which agrees with the formal conditions of experience 7according to perception and conceptions7 is possible'4 ,again1 if we know that the object of a conception is possible1 how are we to determine whether it is also actual8 ,it is clear that1 since we cannot advance from the mere conception1 objectively real though it may be1 to the reality of the corresponding object1 we need perception4 ,the case1 however1 where the corresponding object is directly perceived may be ignored1 for it involves no inference or process of thought2 the appeal is to experience alone4 ,therefore the question to be considered is1 ',how do we determine the actuality of the object of a conception comparatively a priori1 i4 e4 without direct experience of it#aj8' ,the answer must be that we do so by finding it to be 'connected with an actual perception in accordance with the analogies of experience'#aa4 ,for instance1 we must establish the actuality of an object corresponding to the conception of a volcanic eruption by showing it to be involved1 in accordance with the analogies 7and with particular empirical laws71 in the state of a place which we are now perceiving4 ,in other words1 we can say that 'that which is connected with the material conditions of existence 7sensation7 is actual'4 ,finally1 since we cannot learn the existence of any object of experience wholly a priori1 but only relatively to another existence already given1 the necessity of the existence of an object can never be known from conceptions1 but only from its connexion with what is perceived2 this necessity1 however1 is not the necessity of the existence of a substance1 but only the necessity of connexion of an unobserved state of a substance with some observed state of a substance4 ,therefore we can 7and indeed must7 say of an unobserved object corresponding to a conception1 not only that it is real1 but also that it is necessary1 when we know it to be connected with a perceived reality 'according to universal conditions of experience'2 but the necessity can be attributed only to states of substances and not to substances themselves4' #aj ,cf4 ,b4 #bgi1 ,m4 #afi and p4 #d1 note #a4 #aa ,b4 #bgc1 ,m4 #afe4 ,throughout this account there runs one fatal mistake1 that of supposing that we can separate our knowledge of things as possible1 as actual1 and as necessary4 ,even if this supposition be tenable in certain cases1#ab it is not tenable in respect of the objects of a complex conception1 with which ,kant is dealing4 ,if we know the object of a complex conception to be possible1 we already know it to be actual1 and if we know it to be actual1 we already know it to be necessary4 ,a complex conception in the proper sense is the apprehension of a complex of elements together with the apprehension of1 or insight into1 their connexion4#ac ,thus1 in the case of the conception of a triangle we see that the possession of three sides necessitates the possession of three angles4 ,from such a conception must be distinguished ,kant's 'fictitious' conception1 i4 e4 the apprehension of a complex of elements without the apprehension of connexion between them4 ,thus1 in the case of the conception of a man with six toes1 there is no apprehension of connexion between the possession of the characteristics indicated by the term 'man' and the possession of six toes4 ,in such a case1 since we do not apprehend any connexion between the elements1 we do not really 'conceive' or 'think' the object in question1 e4 g4 a man with six toes4 ,now in the case of a complex conception proper1 it is impossible to think of a corresponding individual as only possible4 ,the question ',is a triangle1 in the sense of a figure with three sides and three angles1 possible8' really means ',is it possible for a three-sided figure to have three angles8' ,to this question we can only answer that we see that a three-sided figure can have three angles1 because we see that it must have1 and therefore has1 and can have1 three angles2 in other words1 that we see a triangle in the sense in question to be possible1 because we see it to be necessary1 and1 therefore1 actual1 and possible4 ,it cannot be argued that our insight is limited to the fact that if there are three-sided figures they must be three-angled1 and that therefore we only know a triangle in the sense in question to be possible4 ,our apprehension of the fact that the possession of three sides necessitates the possession of three angles presupposes knowledge of the existence of three-sided figures1 for it is only in an actual three-sided figure that we can apprehend the necessity4 ,it may1 however1 be objected that the question ought to mean simply ',is a three-sided figure possible8' and that1 understood in this sense1 it cannot be answered in a similar way4 ,nevertheless1 a similar answer is the right answer4 ,for the question ',is a three-sided figure possible8' really means ',is it possible for three straight lines to form a figure1 i4 e4 to enclose a space8' and we can only answer it for ourselves by seeing that a group of three straight lines or directions1 no two of which are parallel1 must1 as such1 enclose a space1 this insight presupposing the apprehension of an actual group of three straight lines4 ,it may be said1 therefore1 that we can only determine the possibility of the object of a complex conception in the proper sense1 through an act in which we apprehend its necessity and its actuality at once4 ,it is only where conceptions are 'fictitious'1 and so not properly conceptions1 that appeal to experience is necessary4 ,the question ',is an object corresponding to the conception of a man with six toes possible8' presupposes the reality of man and asks whether any man can have six toes4 ,if we understood the nature of man and could thereby apprehend either that the possession of six toes was1 or that it was not1 involved in one of the possible differentiations of man1 we could decide the question of possibility a priori1 i4 e4 through our conceiving alone without an appeal to experience2 but we could do so only because we apprehended either that a certain kind of man with six toes was necessary and actual1 or that such a man was impossible and not actual4 ,if1 however1 as is the case1 we do not understand the nature of man1 we can only decide the question of possibility by an appeal to experience1 i4 e4 to the experience of a corresponding object1 or of an object from which the existence of such an object could be inferred4 ,here1 therefore--assuming the required experience to be forthcoming--we can appeal to ,kant's formula and say that we know that such a man1 i4 e4 an object corresponding to the conception1 is actual1 as being connected with the material conditions of experience4 ,but the perception which constitutes the material conditions of experience in the case in question is only of use because it carries us beyond possibility to actuality1 and appeal to it is only necessary because the object is not really conceived or1 in other words1 because the so-called conception is not really a conception4 #ab ,for instance1 it might at least be argued that we know space to be actual without knowing it to be necessary4 #ac ,not 'together with the apprehension that the elements are connected'4 ,cf4 p4 #caa4 ,kant really treats his 'objectively real' conceptions as if they were 'fictitious'1 even though he speaks of them as complete4 ,consequently1 his conceptions not being conceptions proper1 he is necessarily led to hold that an appeal to experience is needed in order to establish the reality of a corresponding object4 ,yet1 this being so1 he should have asked himself whether1 without an appeal to perception1 we could even say that a corresponding object was possible4 ,that he did not ask this question is partly due to the fact that he attributes the form and the matter of knowledge to different sources1 viz4 to the mind and to things in themselves4 ,while the conceptions involved in the forms of perception1 space1 and time1 and also the categories are the manifestations of the mind's own nature1 sensations1 which form the matter of knowledge1 are due to the action of things in themselves on our sensibility1 and of this activity we can say nothing4 ,hence1 from the point of view of our mind--and since we do not know things in themselves1 this is the only point of view we can take--the existence of sensations1 and therefore of objects1 which must be given in perception1 is wholly contingent and only to be discovered through experience4 ,on the other hand1 since the forms of perception and conception necessarily determine in certain ways the nature of objects1 if there prove to be any objects1 the conceptions involved may be thought to determine what objects are possible1 even though the very existence of the objects is uncertain4 ,nevertheless1 on his own principles1 ,kant should have allowed that1 apart from perception1 we could discover a priori at least the reality1 even if not the necessity1 of the objects of these conceptions4 ,for his general view is that the forms of perception and the categories are only actualized on the occasion of the stimulus afforded by the action of things in themselves on the sensibility4 ,hence the fact that the categories and forms of perception are actualized--a fact implied in the very existence of the ,critique--involves the existence of objects corresponding to the categories and to the conceptions involved in the forms of perception4 ,on ,kant's own principles1 therefore1 we could say a priori that there must be objects corresponding to these conceptions1 even though their nature in detail could only be filled in by experience4#ad #ad ,cf4 ,caird1 i4 #fjd-e4 ,,note ,,on ,,the ,,refutation ,,of ,,idealism ,this well-known passage#a practically replaces a long section1#b contained only in the first edition1 on the fourth paralogism of pure reason4 ,its aim is to vindicate against 'idealism' the reality of objects in space1 and it is for this reason inserted after the discussion of the second postulate4 ,the interest which it has excited is due to ,kant's use of language which at least seems to imply that bodies in space are things in themselves1 and therefore that here he really abandons his main thesis4 #a ,b4 #bgd-i1 ,m4 #afg-i4 ,cf4 ,b4 xxxix 7note71 ,m4 xl 7note74 #b ,a4 #cfg-hj1 ,mah4 #bda-ec4 ,idealism is the general name which ,kant gives to any view which questions or denies the reality of the physical world2 and1 as has been pointed out before1#c he repeatedly tries to defend himself against the charge of being an idealist in this general sense4 ,this passage is the expression of his final attempt4 ,kant begins by distinguishing two forms which idealism can take according as it regards the existence of objects in space as false and impossible1 or as doubtful and indemonstrable4 ,his own view1 which regards their existence as certain and demonstrable1 and which he elsewhere#d calls transcendental idealism1 constitutes a third form4 ,the first form is the dogmatic idealism of ,berkeley4 ,this view1 ,kant says1 is unavoidable1 if space be regarded as a property of things in themselves1 and the basis of it has been destroyed in the ,aesthetic4 ,the second form is the problematic idealism of ,descartes1 according to which we are immediately aware only of our own existence1 and belief in the existence of bodies in space can be only an inference1 and an uncertain inference1 from the immediate apprehension of our own existence4 ,this view1 according to ,kant1 is the outcome of a philosophical attitude of mind1 in that it demands that a belief should be proved1 and apparently--to judge from what ,kant says of ,berkeley--it does not commit ,descartes to the view that bodies in space1 if their reality can be vindicated1 are things in themselves4 #c ,cf4 p4 #gf4 #d ,a4 #cfi1 ,mah4 #bdc2 cf4 ,b4 #dd1 ,m4 #bg4 ,the assertion that the ,aesthetic has destroyed the basis of ,berkeley's view1 taken together with the drift of the ,refutation as a whole1 and especially of ,remark ,i1 renders it clear that the ,refutation is directed against ,descartes and not ,berkeley4 ,kant regards himself as having already refuted ,berkeley's view1 as he here states it1 viz4 that the existence of objects in space is impossible1 on the ground that it arose from the mistake of supposing that space1 if real at all1 must be a property of things in themselves1 whereas the ,aesthetic has as he thinks1 shown that space can be1 and in point of fact is1 a property of phenomena4 ,he now wants to prove--compatibly with their character as phenomena--that the existence of bodies in space is not even1 as ,descartes contends1 doubtful4 ,to prove this he seeks to show that ,descartes is wrong in supposing that we have no immediate experience of these objects4 ,his method is to argue that reflection shows that internal experience presupposes external experience1 i4 e4 that unless we were directly aware of spatial objects1 we could not be aware of the succession of our own states1 and consequently that it is an inversion to hold that we must reach the knowledge of objects in space1 if at all1 by an inference from the immediate apprehension of our own states4 ,an examination of the proof itself1 however1 forces us to allow that ,kant1 without realizing what he is doing1 really abandons the view that objects in space are phenomena1 and uses an argument the very nature of which implies that these objects are things in themselves4 ,the proof runs thus3 ,theorem4 ,the mere but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space external to me4 ,proof4 ,i am conscious of my own existence as determined in time4 ,all time-determination presupposes something permanent in perception4#e ,this permanent1 however1 cannot be an intuition#f in me4 ,for all grounds of determination of my own existence1 which can be found in me1 are representations1 and as such themselves need a permanent different from them1 in relation to which their change and consequently my existence in the time in which they change can be determined4#g ,the perception of this permanent1 therefore1 is possible only through a thing external to me1 and not through the mere representation of a thing external to me4 ,consequently1 the determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of actual things1 which ,i perceive external to me4 ,now consciousness in time is necessarily connected with the consciousness of the possibility of this time-determination2 hence it is necessarily connected also with the existence of things external to me1 as the condition of time-determination1 i4 e4 the consciousness of my own existence1 is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things external to me4#h #e ,wahrnehmung4 #f ,anschauung4 #g ,the text has been corrected in accordance with ,kant's note in the preface to the second edition1 ,b4 xxxix1 ,m4 xl4 #h ,b4 #bge-f1 ,m4 #afg4 ,the nature of the argument is clear4 ',in order to be conscious1 as ,i am1 of a determinate succession of my states1 ,i must perceive something permanent as that in relation to which alone ,i can perceive my states as having a definite order4#i ,but this permanent cannot be a perception in me1 for in that case it would only be a representation of mine1 which1 as such1 could only be apprehended in relation to another permanent4 ,consequently1 this permanent must be a thing external to me and not a representation of a thing external to me4 ,consequently1 the consciousness of my own existence1 which is necessarily a consciousness of my successive states1 involves the immediate consciousness of things external to me4' #i ,cf4 ,kant's proof of the first analogy4 ,here there is no way of avoiding the conclusion that ,kant is deceived by the ambiguity of the phrase 'a thing external to me' into thinking that he has given a proof of the existence of bodies in space which is compatible with the view that they are only phenomena1 although in reality the proof presupposes that they are things in themselves4 ,in the 'proof'1 the phrase 'a thing external to me' must have a double meaning4 ,it must mean a thing external to my body1 i4 e4 any body which is not my body2 in other words1 it must be a loose expression for a body in space4 ,for1 though the 'proof' makes us appeal to the spatial character of things external to me1 the ,refutation as a whole1 and especially ,remark ,,ii1 shows that it is of bodies in space that he is thinking throughout4 ,the phrase must also1 and primarily1 mean a thing external to1 in the sense of independent of1 my mind1 i4 e4 a thing in itself4 ,for the nerve of the argument consists in the contention that the permanent the perception of which is required for the consciousness of my successive states must be a thing external to me in opposition to the representation of a thing external to me1 and a thing external to me in opposition to a thing external to me can only be a thing in itself4 ,on the other hand1 in ,kant's conclusion1 'a thing external to me' can only mean a body in space1 this being supposed to be a phenomenon2 for his aim is to establish the reality of bodies in space compatibly with his general view that they are only phenomena4 ,the proof therefore requires that things external to me1 in order that they may render possible the consciousness of my successive states1 should have the very character which is withheld from them in the conclusion1 viz4 that of existing independently of me2 in other words1 if ,kant establishes the existence of bodies in space at all1 he does so only at the cost of allowing that they are things in themselves4#aj #aj ,the ambiguity of the phrase 'external to me' is pointed out in the suppressed account of the fourth paralogism1 where it is expressly declared that objects in space are only representations4 7,a4 #cgb-c1 ,mah4 #bdg74 ,possibly the introduction of an argument which turns on the view that they are not representations may have had something to do with the suppression4 ,nevertheless1 the ,refutation may be considered to suggest the proper refutation of ,descartes4 ,it is possible to ignore ,kant's demand for a permanent as a condition of the apprehension of our successive states1 and to confine attention to his remark that he has shown that external experience is really immediate1 and that only by means of it is the consciousness of our existence as determined in time possible4#aa ,if we do so1 we may consider the ,refutation as suggesting the view that ,descartes' position is precisely an inversion of the truth2 in other words1 that our consciousness of the world1 so far from being an uncertain inference from the consciousness of our successive states1 is in reality a presupposition of the latter consciousness1 in that this latter consciousness only arises through reflection upon the former1 and that therefore ,descartes' admission of the validity of self-consciousness implicitly involves the admission a fortiori of the validity of our consciousness of the world4#ab #aa ,b4 #bgg1 ,m4 #afg fin4 #ab ,cf4 ,caird1 i4 #fcb and ff4 ,oxford3 ,printed at the ,clarendon ,press by ,,horace ,,hart1 ,m4,a4